HEIDEGGER ON PLATO'S CAVE ALETHOLOGY

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But deep inside me, in my most intimate thought, Truth, which is neither Hebrew nor Greek nor Latin nor any foreign speech, would speak to me, though not in syllables formed by lips and tongue.

- Saint Augustine,
  Confessions
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ABSTRACT

In Plato's Doctrine of the Truth (PLW), Martin Heidegger argues that Plato, in the Republic, yokes truth to a preconceived notion of logical and moral rightness. This yoke is a result, Heidegger argues, of Plato's basic orientation towards beings. For Plato the essential characteristic of beings, so runs the argument in PLW, lies in the ἐός, a being's whatness, its essential nature. Heidegger maintains that Plato is wrong in so characterizing beings, since unhiddenness (ἀλήθεια) and not whatness is the primordial characteristic (Grundzug) of beings. Heidegger further argues that Plato holds a Correspondence Theory of Truth, that for Plato ἀλήθεια is really ὀρθότης (rightness), and that ὀρθότης is the correspondence (ὁμοιόωσις) of the correct ἔσείν to the right ἔσεια.

In PLW we find Heidegger in the midst of a contemporary philosophical debate, more or less on the side of those who expound, in multifarious ways, the existentialist's l'existence précède l'essence, while opposing the so-called Platonic-Scholastic Essentia antecedit Existentiam. My purpose in this thesis is twofold: first I show how Heidegger's thesis in PLW is based on his alethology in Being and Time (SZ), and secondly I show how Heidegger, by neglecting the role that to agathon plays as the originating locus (ἀφανή) of aletheia, misconstrues the notion of truth put forth in the Republic.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS


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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

Just as an intoxicated person reveals more about himself than he does about the alcohol that he has consumed, so Heidegger, in Plato's Doctrine of Truth (PLW), reveals more about his own way of thinking than he does about Plato's. This is not to say that Heidegger doesn't reveal anything about Plato's doctrine of truth put forth in the Republic, for such an opinion concerning the argument in PLW would be indicative of a most reprehensible frivolousness and superficiality. Rather, one ought to see Heidegger at work in PLW in much the same way as Edmund Husserl was fond of seeing Galileo—"at once a discovering and a concealing genius (entdeckender und verdeckender Genius)." For indeed, there is much that Heidegger does reveal about Plato's Republic alethology, even though it remains basically unstated in PLW.

The main purpose of this thesis is to show, in the context of the doctrine of truth put forth in Heidegger's major work, Being and Time (SZ), how Heidegger construes Plato's doctrine of truth. SZ stems from Heidegger's thinking in the beginning of his career, while PLW stems from the middle period of his career; that the position in PLW regarding the nature of truth represents a change from
the position in \textit{SZ} is evinced by the argument in \textit{PLW} and other works that were written at the same time as \textit{PLW}.\textsuperscript{2} Herein it is argued that Heidegger cannot hold at one and the same time his basic position concerning truth in \textit{PLW} and his position in \textit{SZ}: not only Plato's alethology, as construed by Heidegger, is subjected to the razor-bladed argument in \textit{PLW}, but also, whether intentionally or unintentionally, the alethology put forth in \textit{SZ}. Herein it is also argued that Heidegger only deals with one aspect of Plato's \textit{Republic} alethology; neglected in \textit{PLW} is as much as is dissected, which is why it is said that \textit{PLW} reveals more about Heidegger than about Plato.

Heidegger's basic thesis in \textit{PLW} has its parallels in the history of Western philosophy, especially in Aristotle. Aristotle sees Plato's notion of the \textit{\delta\epsilon\alpha \varepsilon \rho \iota \o\omicron \varepsilon \alpha} as an attempted solution to the problem raised by Heraclitean doctrines that "the whole of the perceptual world is always changing, and there can be no certain knowledge about anything that is..."\textsuperscript{3} Influenced by Socrates' search for the non-relative and non-vicissitudinous in the realm of ethical comportment, and influenced by the Pythagorean doctrine that describes empirical beings as "imitations" of numbers, Plato eclectically invents a new approach: now there are "two" orders of beings, one that does not change and is most truly the order of beings, i.e. the order of the \textit{\delta\epsilon\alpha \varepsilon \rho \iota \o\omicron \varepsilon \alpha}, and the other, the order of beings which are always changing, \textit{τὰ γιγνώσκειν}. But Aristotle
criticizes Plato for leaving vague and unclarified the notion of the "participation" (μεταξία) of the ἀρέτα in the γενόμενα: in other words, one finds an ambiguous schism in Plato's approach to beings. Aristotle, like Heidegger, tries to do away with this "schism" in Plato's thought. Aristotle attempts to deal with beings in terms of the beings themselves, "beings as beings". He does not postulate, as Plato apparently does, another realm of beings to account for the beings that are here at hand (τὸ ὄν). Indeed, Aristotle sees his construal of beings as unique in that no-one prior to him locates the essential determination of a being in the being itself. Unlike Heidegger, however, Aristotle does not see his dissatisfaction with Plato's ontology in terms of a "priority argument", but rather in a "locality argument". Aristotle argues, seemingly in contradistinction to Plato, that "what" a being is must be located in the same place as where this "what" is, in the being itself. Heidegger, on the other hand, argues in PLW that the being itself is more prior than "what" it is, that in some sense in which he does not explain the sheer isness or suchness of a being is "more prior to" what that being is.

With his priority argument Heidegger endeavors to return to a pre-Platonic ontology characteristic of a Heraclitean interpretation of beings. But instead of saying that beings are, first and foremost, always changing or flowing (βεβαιότης), Heidegger argues in PLW that they are always unfolding, always rising into unhiddenness (der Aufgang des Verborgen...
in die Unverborgenheit). The continual rise into unhidden-ness is prior to, or more primordial than, any other deter-
mination both being itself and the many beings possess.
The "as what they are", maintains Heidegger, applies to
beings only as a secondary, after the fact, determination
of their essential unhiddenness; comportment towards the "as
what they are" is a secondary and modified form of comportment.
The old saying that "contraries complement" is far from
Heidegger's mind in PLW, for in no way can the sheer such-
ness and whatness of a being be said to be complementary.
Uncompromisingly, Heidegger argues against Plato's apparent
"whatness first" approach; in its place he offers his own
"suchness first" approach.

Prima facie Heidegger's priority argument that "such-
ness precedes whatness" finds its most natural completion
and refinement in the later to be developed formula "existence
precedes essence", a formula whose bankruptcy continually
stares one in the face. For if it be granted that the terms
existence and essence, as nouns, actually refer to something,
then to claim that existence precedes essence is to claim that
the particular "essence of existence" is such that it precedes
essence, in this case the essence of itself. In other words,
to uphold this formula is to uphold a contradiction in terms:
on the one hand, existence is said to precede essence, while
on the other hand, existence is said itself to be an essence
or have an essence. But, as an essence, how can existence
precede essence? The same conclusion, it can be argued, can
be shown to hold for the "suchness precedes whatness" formula as well.

But even on a more basic level, Heidegger's priority argument in PLW appears bankrupt when "being" is understood, as it is commonly understood, as "what is". For truth then becomes the rise of "what is" into unhiddenness. To subsequently argue that unhiddenness is more prior to, or primordial than, what unhiddenness is, is to argue quite contradictorily. In the very claim that truth is the unhiddenness of what is, one makes the "what" and the "unhiddenness" equiprimordial. As long as unhiddenness, i.e. truth, is understood as the unhiddenness of being, of "what is", the claim that unhiddenness is prior to whatness (what gets unhidden) is rather unfounded.

As has been stated, Heidegger does reveal much about Plato in PLW, most of which has to do with Heidegger's insistence on interpreting Plato in terms of a notion of truth; as such, Heidegger has awakened new interest in Plato's notion of truth. At the same time, however, by focusing on Plato's approach to logical truth, Heidegger tends to conceal much about Plato's overall alethology.

Heidegger loses sight of Plato's intention in postulating the ἴδεα or τὸ ἀλήθεια to account for the relation between, on the one hand, the human being's sentient comportment towards and engagement with beings, and on the other hand, the truth of the beings themselves. In his attempt to prove, however, that Plato essentially interprets being, ὁ ἰδεα, in terms
of the ἴδεα, Heidegger conceals the fact that Plato sees idetic-seeing (ἴδειν) in the larger framework of the art or techne of διαλεκτική, dialectics, whose telos is seen by Plato, not Heidegger, as the awareness and knowledge of that which is most basic or fundamental for the human being. The human being qua psyche is not divorced from the teleological processes of growth and development found in nature: the human being qua ψυχή is brought into being, according to the Republic, with a telos. But the human being's telos is unique in that it seeks the arche—the human being's essential goal is to seek that which is most basic or archical. And for Plato, the human being qua ψυχή can reach or accomplish this telos most appropriately by means of dialectics. In the sun and cave eikons, in the divided line epistemology, in the construal of the dialectical method of philosophy, in the notion of the state put forth in the Republic, and finally in the myth of Er, Socrates consistently maintains that idetic-seeing is the means, not end, of archiological understanding and awareness. Heidegger tends to forget about this context in which Plato's notion of idetic-seeing is inextricably bound.

As will be shown, however, the roots of this forgetfulness have their origins in §44 of 52 wherein Heidegger "criticizes" the traditional notion of truth. But this criticism turns out to be, in the final analysis, a diminishment of the tradition. Heidegger reduces the traditional notion of truth to a strictly logical doctrine of truth, a
doctrine of "derived" or "propositional" truth. He neglects the traditional notion of an archical, logos-grounding truth. That is to say, he first assumes that there are two basic kinds of truth, one fundamental and one derived, and then assumes without further ado that the whole of Western thought has upheld only one, the derived. By criticizing the derived notion as it has been traditionally expressed, he bethinks himself to have dealt with the whole approach to truth in the West. It will be shown how this argument is carried through from \( \text{SZ} \) to \( \text{PLW} \).

In order to acquire a general understanding of the philosophical and historical orientation from which Heidegger derives his interpretation of Plato's alethology, Chapter II introduces Heidegger in terms of Husserl and phenomenology in general. In chapter III Heidegger's \( \text{SZ} \) alethology is treated, in an attempt to extrapolate the essential conception of truth and the connection between, on the one hand, the "structure of Sorge" and, on the other, truth itself. Chapter IV is a general exegesis of the main arguments and procedures found in \( \text{PLW} \), with special attention paid to Heidegger's criticisms of the \( \tilde{\delta} \varepsilon \alpha \). Finally, Chapter V, the concluding chapter, brings into focus, on the one hand, the connection between Heidegger's \( \text{SZ} \) and Plato's \text{Republic} alethologies, and on the other, the frailties of Heidegger's interpretation of Plato's notion of \( \delta \lambda \nu \theta \varepsilon \iota \alpha \).

Since a claim to intelligibility is made in this thesis, that is, since the author claims to know something
about what Heidegger is trying to say in _SZ_ and _PLW_, perhaps it may be wise to warn the reader that this author makes no claims to a complete and comprehensive understanding of Heidegger's aims, intentions, and results in _SZ_ and _PLW_. Although the author upholds a thesis about the works, he has not abandoned his concern for what the works themselves have to say, as he is always mindful of Heidegger's own hints about listening:

If we were to be shown right now two pictures by Paul Klee, in the original, which he painted in the year of his death—the watercolour "Saints from a Window," and "Death and Fire," tempera on burlap—we should want to stand before them for a long while—and should abandon any claim that they be immediately intelligible.
CHAPTER II

THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT OF PEATO'S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH

I. Introduction

This chapter introduces the philosophical context of Heidegger's doctrine of truth, i.e. his aletiology. In order to carry this introduction out in a complete fashion, however, one would have to examine, in light of the basic Judeo-Christian teaching on truth, the aletologies of such thinkers as Husserl, Kierkegaard, Hegel, Brentano, Kant, Duns Scotus, St. Augustine, and Aristotle. The scope of this introduction shall therefore be limited to Heidegger's most important influence, his friend and teacher, Edmund Husserl. This chapter first points out Heidegger's inheritance of and reaction to Husserl's aletology; secondly, it outlines the dialectic that may have led to Heidegger's writing of PLW.

2. Husserl's Basic Position Concerning Truth

What do phenomenologists have in common beyond the maxim Zu den Sachen selbst: To the things themselves? Quite justifiably, they can be said to have a recognized locus classicus, Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations. Heidegger started to read the labyrinthian Investigations in the winter of 1909-10, while a student of Christian theology at the University of Freiburg. Heidegger had been led to the
**Investigations** by his search for an answer to the question, "What does being mean?" This question had first been kindled in him by Franz Brentano's *On The Manifold Meaning of Being According to Aristotle* and Carl Craig's *On Being: Outline of Ontology*.  

Heidegger could not finish the complex *Investigations* on his first reading, nor for that matter, so he tells us in his autobiographical *My Way to Phenomenology*, could he come to understand them. "My perplexity decreased slowly, my confusion dissolved laboriously, only after I met Husserl personally in his workshop." Heidegger says that years later, as he worked on the *Investigations* with advanced students, he learned something which was to become the basis of his own outlook for the rest of his life:

What occurs for the phenomenology of the acts of consciousness as the self-manifestation of phenomena is thought more originally by Aristotle and in all Greek thinking and existence as aletheia, as the unconcealedness of what-is-present, its being revealed, its showing itself. That which phenomenological investigations rediscovered as the supporting attitude of thought proves to be the fundamental trait of Greek thinking, if not indeed of philosophy as such.

In very general terms, it can be said that Husserl's *Investigations* attempts to outline and describe a radically new approach to "logic", or synonymously for Husserl, a "theory of science" (*Wissenschaftslehre*). Husserl defines science as "unified truth"; logic as thus understood is the theory of unified truth, at least understood from an objective point of view. The *Investigations*, as Heidegger himself slowly came to understand, ultimately turns out to be investigations
into the nature of truth.

Husserl sets up a fundamental distinction between, on the one hand, the a priori, formal conditions of logical truth, and on the other, logical truth itself. The former he calls the noetical conditions of truth, and the latter the logical conditions. The noetic conditions are grounded, a priori, in the very notion of knowledge itself, and cannot be reduced to the psychological conditions of an empirical human being; these a priori, pre-logical conditions are to the logical conditions as genes are to organisms. The logical conditions themselves are grounded in the content of knowledge, as the (logical) law of non-contradiction.

In the context of this distinction between noetical and logical conditions, phenomenology acts as the propaedeutic to logical truth, since Husserl sees phenomenology as the discipline which endeavors to lay bare the sources from which logical truth "flows" and to which it must "return". According to the Investigations, this ultimate "source" turns out to be the intentional structure of consciousness.

Husserl describes his phenomenological approach to truth not so much in terms of a fundamental axiom, such as esse is percipi or cogito ergo sum, as in terms of a fundamental experience, an "immediate inner awareness of truth itself (als unmittelbares Innewerden der Wahrheit selbst). This experience "is, in fact, only immediately felt in the case of a relatively quite limited group of primitive facts."
One can describe this experience as the plain and simple self-evidence (Evidenz) immediately experienced in an unbiased and straightforward openness—a foundational openness which is more like an intuition than an ideation, more like an experience than an axiom, and more like an awareness than a cognition. The Evidenz given in this "immediate inner awareness of truth itself" serves as the matrix through which all knowledge takes its rise:

Ultimately, therefore, all genuine, and specifically all scientific knowledge, rests on {inner} evidence, and so far as such evidence extends, the concept of knowledge extends also.

Heidegger was particularly entranced by the sixth investigation, entitled "Elements of a Phenomenological Elucidation of Knowledge." In §§36 to 39 of this investigation, Husserl formally puts forth his alethology. He claims to found logical truth on a "genuine" aequatio rei et intellectus. Logical truth, he says, is "the complete correspondence (Übereinstimmung) between the Meant and the Given as such." This Übereinstimmung is described as the most perfect and complete "equality" (Deckung) by means of which the correlatives, the Given and the Meant, become one. Husserl bases this phenomenological Correspondence Theory of Logical Truth on a fundamental distinction between perception and imagination.

Only perception (Wahrnehmung), Husserl emphatically argues, can provide the basis for one's claims about truth, since only in perception is one truly given "the thing itself." The imagination only offers images, "it does not give the
object itself, not even in part, it gives only its image, which, as long as it is generally an image, never is the thing itself.\(^{21}\) The truth of a logical proposition, Husserl maintains, is based on its perceptual verification in experience. A proposition that one figures or imagines to be true may very well be true, but as long as it remains in the imagination and is not verified in perception, it is only a likeness of truth, and hence not in the strict sense, a true proposition.\(^{22}\) The truth of a logical judgment, in other words, is not its logical correctness in the imagination, but rather its experiential verification in perception.

According to Husserl the criterion used as evidence for the justification of claims about truth cannot be relative to particular human beings. He discounts the claim that what is evidence for one person, may be absurdity for another:

If someone experiences the evidence of A, then it is evident that no second person can experience the absurdity of this same A; for, that A is evident means: A is not merely meant, but rather, exactly meant as that which it is meant to be, and truly given.\(^{23}\)

Husserl's well known *Kehre*, turning, to a more transcendental attitude in *Ideas Towards a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy*\(^{24}\) departs somewhat from his earlier *Investigations* position concerning the notion of truth.\(^{25}\) The basic state of self-evidence put forth in the *Investigations* as the foundation of all logical, propositional truth, i.e. the "inner awareness of truth itself," becomes the fundamental ground of "rightness" (*Richtigkeit*) in the *Ideas*; it
becomes the ground for the Principle of Principles:

The primary source of all rightness (Rechtsquelle) in respect of all domains of objects and the positing acts relating to them lies in immediate and more narrowly specified primordial self-evidence, or the primordial givenness which motivates it.26

Husserl is not making a complete and radical shift in his whole way of looking at the nature of truth in the Ideas, for self-evidence also grounds rightness, understood as logical truth, in the Investigations. His "shift" is one of emphasis, the emphasis put on the connection between primordially self-evident truth and correct, logical truth. As a result of this emphasis found in the Ideas, the faculty of rightness, reason, tends to overshadow truth.27 In short, a notion of primordial rightness, with its derived forms of rightness and wrongness (memory, empathy, and all reproductive acts in general) eclipses the Investigations notion of a primordial, experiential locus of truth.28

3. Heidegger's Inheritance of Husserl's Alethology

First and foremost Heidegger inherited Husserl's use of the epoche (ἐποχή), the neutral suspension of discursive and presumptive thought.29 The epoche, or transcendental reduction as Husserl also calls it, is a technique used to open up and clarify the realm of primordial self-evidence, a realm in which one can find no clear dichotomy between a separate subject and a separate object, a self-contained human being and a self-contained world of nature. By using the technique of epoche Husserl thinks that one can break away from one's habitually dualistic way of looking at
things, a way which usually distorts and falsifies.

Husserl's notion of the ἐποχή as that which delivers one into the already existing plenum of Givenness is transformed by Heidegger into a notion of ᾱ-λήθεια, understood as the openness which discloses being as it truly is. 30

According to Heidegger in SZ, phenomenology bases itself on a criterion of truth that can only be understood by those who are cognitively aware of "being-in-the-truth," by those who have "broken away from" the habitually mundane and dualistic way of thinking about being and truth. One must be aware of one's transcendence:

The transcendence of the being of Dasein is a unique kind of transcendence, in that in this transcendence lies the possibility and necessity of the most radical individuation. Every disclosure of being as the transcenden-
dens is transcendental knowledge.) Phenomenological truth (disclosure of being) is veritas transcendentalis. (SZ, 38)

Upholding Husserl's approach, Heidegger's attitude in SZ is that phenomenology, as the science of phenomena, is the science of sciences, the ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστημῶν. (SZ,28) Heidegger defines a phenomenon according to its essential Greek sense, as "that which shows itself in itself, the mani-
ifest." (SZ,28) A phenomenon self manifests itself; it is the Sichzeigen. In the context of being, a phenomenon is "what shows itself as being and as a Struktur of being." (SZ, 130) When Heidegger treats beings, and especially human beings, as "phenomena", he treats them twofoldly as nexuses of a Sich and a Zeigend element, of a "self" and an "appearing" element. To treat Dasein, for example, simply as a being,
without any Sich or Struktur, i.e. without any form, would be like treating it as if it were an amorphous appearing, a blob of being.\(^3\)

A phenomenon is that which truly is, as opposed to that which merely seems to be or is false. Heidegger deals with the classical being and seeming problem so indigenous to Greek philosophy by maintaining that seeming (Schein) is a mere "privation" of being (Sein):

> Only so far as something generally pretends to show its meaning, that is, to be a phenomenon, can it show itself as something which it is not, can it only appear as if..." (Sz, 29)

For Heidegger there can be no opposite to or negation of a phenomenon being "as it truly is in itself". Every phenomenon presented to Dasein, even Dasein itself, is either "as it truly is in itself" or "privatively as it truly is in itself". Heidegger, as his teacher Husserl before him, vehemently opposes the perfumery of radical doubt. Evil geniuses and the like of Pyrrho are given no hearing in either Husserl's or Heidegger's phenomenology. Although at one point in Sz Heidegger says that Dasein is "equiprimordially" in truth and untruth,\(^3\) the notion of untruth is to be understood, as it is always to be understood in Heidegger's Sz philosophy, as a mere privation of being-in-the-truth.

To take a phenomenon apart, so to speak, to "ex-press" and "dis-cuss" the phenomenon, is the essential function of what Heidegger calls the "logos".\(^3\) He construes his use of the traditional Greek concept of the logos in broader terms than is usually done; the logos for Heidegger is not just...
a term for ratio and rational discourse: "Αὐγός as discourse means rather the same as ὅναῦυ, to make manifest what is 'discoursed about' in the discourse." (SZ, 32) Thus considered, the logos "lets something be seen" (Sehenlassen); it is, in the strictest sense, apophantical.35

The logos lets the phenomenon be seen in a formal and propositional manner; the logos has its own structure and its own manner of structuralizing the way in which the phenomenon is "opened-up" to Dasein. Therefore, the truth of the logos will henceforth be referred to as "logical truth", and refers generally to all forms of statement making; as a result, "logic" as Heidegger sees it not only includes formal and symbolic logic, but also poetry, mathematics, biology and so forth.

Unlike a phenomenon, which cannot in itself be false, logic can be false in a very basic sense. Being a "source" of both truth and falsity, logic cannot, in principle, be a primary source of truth itself. Logic lets something be seen; it does not just "show itself in itself" as does a phenomenon. False logic, nevertheless, is still a phenomenon, the phenomenon of false logic. Qua phenomenon, false logic is, in light of Heidegger's doctrine of privation, truly a falsity--that which "covers-up" the phenomenon. The expression "two-faced" means that a person's "true face" is false when the person pretends to be something that he or she is not. Likewise, false logic, logic that covers-up and does not let be seen that which it is about, i.e. does not let
be seen the truth of the phenomenon, does not radically alter the nature of the phenomenon's truth, its Sichzeugend.

Heidegger is emphatic in stressing that logic, whether monologue or dialogue, either uncovers or does not uncover the truth of that which it is about. He emphatically rejects the notion of logic that goes hand in hand with the Correspondence Theory of Truth; according to this notion of logic all propositional or logical statements either agree or disagree with that which they are about. Heidegger's emphasis is on the revealing aspect of the logos:

The truth of the λόγος as ἄληθευς means to uncover the beings of which the discourse is about: in λέγειν as ἀποφαίνεσθαι beings must be taken out of their concealment and let be seen as unconcealed (ἄληθεύς). (SZ, 33)

The concepts of a phenomenon and a logos go into making up the doctrinal side of Heidegger's phenomenology, whose aim is "to let be seen that which shows itself from itself, in the manner in which it itself shows itself from itself." (SZ, 34) The Greek and German obsession with the philosophical implications of the reflexive pronoun "self"—αὐτός and sich selbst—permeates Heidegger's methodology. The forgotten question in SZ, however, is the role that the notion of a self plays in Heidegger's notion of a phenomenon and a being; but this forgetfulness is perhaps intentional. Upholding Aristotle's notion of the study of τὸ ὄν ἢ ὄν, Heidegger argues that the aim of phenomenology is the logical analysis of beings, not forms, whatness, quiddity or Selbigkeit:
Phenomena, according to a phenomenological understanding, are always only that which constitutes being, and being is always the being of beings; it is therefore necessary, if our aim is the laying bare of being, to first correctly bring forward the beings themselves. (SZ, 37)

For Heidegger the correct way of "laying-bare" the phenomena qua beings is through the medium of the logos, logical analysis: onto-logical analysis. Hence, "in terms of its subject matter, phenomenology is the science of the being of beings, ontology." (SZ, 37) Instead of a dialectical approach such as is found in Plato's dialogues, Heidegger's logic of being and beings is based on a hermeneutical approach (διαλήκτω). Heidegger begins his onto-logical analysis in SZ by laying bare the structure of the "who", the one doing the interpreting, Dasein. The laying-bare of the true constitution (Verfassung) of Dasein as a totality of structures is the means by which Heidegger's philosophy reaches its goal, the logical and structural understanding of das Sinn des Sein.

3. Heidegger's Reaction to Husserl's Alethology

Heidegger not only restates Husserl's alethology in SZ; he reformulates it. Gone in SZ is Husserl's use of the term "eidetic structures"; instead, the "existential structures" are made to bear the burden of unravelling the nature of being and beings. Instead of the matrix of truth being located in the "intentionality of Bewußtsein" (consciousness), Heidegger locates it in the "existentiality of Dasein". The onus is no longer put on the constitution of Bewußtsein as it "intends its object", but rather on the constitution of Dasein
as it "exists in its world". And Husserl's basic notion of truth is also reformulated by this shift in emphasis.

Especially after SZ, Heidegger came to see this shift in his own philosophizing in a much larger context, the context of the historical development of Western existence and philosophy. Heidegger takes the Correspondence Theory of Logical Truth that we find in the Investigations for example, and sets it up as the representative of the approach which has historically distorted the Western understanding of the nature of truth. The linking-up of truth and rightness found in Husserl's Ideas is seen by Heidegger as the manifestation of this distortion, whose historical roots are traced back, in PLW, to Plato's doctrine of truth.

In PLW, Heidegger has been very much influenced by Nietzsche's interpretation of Plato, an interpretation which is a romantic, or perhaps decadent, version of the commonly held "hypostatization theory" of Plato's ontology of whatness, i.e. his doctrine of the forms.

According to Nietzsche, Plato had an obsession--the mummification of being. Plato, says Nietzsche, acquired this obsession during his travels through Egypt. Under the guise of philosophy and with the patience of a temple priest, Plato the Egyptianized Greek slowly and methodically set about embellishing his corpse, being, with the shroud of the eternal preservatives, the ιδέα.

In PLW Heidegger more or less adopts this "mummification interpretation" of Plato, but from the phenomenological
point of view. In a radical and iconoclastic manner, Hei-
degger argues in PLW that any kind of whatness, form, or
quiddity thought to lie in the very truth of being, is a
mummification approach to being.

In his adoption of the mummification interpretation
of Plato, and indirectly of Husserl as well, Heidegger is
breaking with his notion in S2 that the formal aspect or what-
ness of Being (Verfassung, Struktur, Selbigkeit, sich selvst)
lies in the very truth of being. In S2 the whole notion of a
Struktur is never questioned or made explicit, especially the
Struktur that is supposed to be in Sein. The question is
never raised, for example, as to the way in which the con-
cept of "structure" has been dealt with traditionally, espe-
cially by the Greeks. In PLW, however, this question is of
utmost importance for Heidegger, who sees Plato's notion of
the ἐνόεα as that which makes a being what it is structurally.

5. The Dialectic Behind the Writing of PLW

As roots are to leaves, so Greek philosophy is to
modern philosophy. It would only be with the utmost arro-
gance that a modern thinker or mode of thought would deal
with the basic issues of philosophy totally outside of the
context of Greek philosophy. Phenomenology is no exception.

Husserl felt it necessary to defend his Investigations
against the charge that this work merely reformulated Plato's
epistemology in the language of the "logical realism" of the
day. To this Husserl replies:
My so-called "Platonism" does not consist in some sort of metaphysical or epistemological substructures, hypostases (Hypostasen), or theories but rather in the simple reference to a type of "givens" which usually, however, are falsely explained away.38

The ultimate standard of all theorizing and philosophizing, Husserl maintains in this passage, is "that which is given in plain seeing and is, therefore, original."39 Husserl thinks that any substructures in or theories about the Given must come after the experience of the Given as it is. Even if we discover, which we in fact do according to Husserl, that the Given has its own essential structure, this structural aspect has nothing in common with Plato's notions of the eidos and idea.40 Husserl warns that "the average reader is fixated right from the beginning on the view that he who teaches of ideal objects cannot avoid metaphysical hypostatization—that he can only deny it verbally."41

But Husserl somewhat changed his attitude towards the generally conceived Platonic position during his more idealistic period, the time of the Ideas. During this period Husserl borrows many of the ideas indigenous to the epistemology and philosophical anthropology found in the Republic.42 Especially noteworthy in light of this connection between the Ideas and the Republic is an article by one of Husserl's students, Eugene Fink;43 this article was apparently written to counter the influence Heidegger's SZ was having in Germany. The article, "What Does the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl Want to Accomplish?", besides being a heap of abuse directed against Heidegger for not understanding the true nature of
Husserl's phenomenology, \textsuperscript{44} defends Husserl's philosophy in terms of the cave eikon in the Republic. According to Fink, Plato, "from out of the power of mythical intuition, discovered the great, visionary symbol of all philosophizing." \textsuperscript{45} The struggle of paideia, education, to attain aletheia which is dealt with in the cave eikon is also meant to symbolize, says Fink, the struggle of Husserl's phenomenology:

The philosophical "unchaining", the tearing oneself free from the power of one's naive submission to the world, the stepping-forth from out of that familiarity with entities which always provides us with security, in one word, the phenomenological "epoché", is anything but a noncommittal, "merely" theoretical, intellectual act;\textsuperscript{46}

Fink's article may be the reason why Heidegger chose Plato's cave to launch his attack, directly against Plato's yoking of ἀλήθεια to δρόστης, indirectly against Husserl's linking-up of Wahrheit and Richtigkeit in the Ideas, and finally, against his own equiprimordializing of Sein and Struktur in SZ.\textsuperscript{47} Indeed, Heidegger argues in PLW that the notion of truth he finds expressed in Plato's cave eikon is the basic notion of truth operative in the most modern forms of thought; as a result, Heidegger no doubt sees his thesis in PLW as having a cathartic effect, especially for those phenomenologists who emphasize that aspect of Husserl's thought which locates "truth" and "rightness" in the same source, the Rechtsquelle—"reason".

But despite Heidegger's interpretation of Plato and the consequences of this interpretation for Husserlian phenomenology, both Heidegger and Husserl had the same fundamental
opinion of Plato, which Husserl stated in his lectures on Greek philosophy in 1923-24 (First Philosophy): Plato was a social revolutionary whose Zweckidee der Philosophie, pure rationality, has altered the very fabric of a whole culture. Husserl says, "Consciously or unconsciously Plato's ideal determines the essential character and destiny of the development of European culture."48 And it is to this "determining factor" that Heidegger addresses himself in PLW.
CHAPTER III
CARE AS THE CAUSE AND ORIGINATING-LOCUS OF TRUTH IN SZ

1. Introduction

This chapter examines Heidegger's interpretation of truth which is mainly put forth in §44 of SZ, a small section which embodies the essential teaching of this monumental work. Also dealt with is Heidegger's notion of the connection between truth and care (Sorge) which appears throughout SZ, but most notably in §41 and §57.

Shortly after SZ Heidegger published two works which deal specifically with the notion of truth. The first of these, The Essence of Truth (1930), although it indicates a subtle shift in Heidegger's way of thinking about truth, is mainly a clarification of the doctrine of truth set out in SZ—a clarification aimed at a wider audience than perhaps SZ is capable of attracting. The second work, Plato's Doctrine of Truth, Heidegger wrote in 1930-31 as a text for a lecture course given in 1931 as "The Essence of Truth: The Cave Allegory", and in 1933 as "The Fundamental Question of Philosophy: The Cave Allegory". Offering a more critical study of a particular, historical figure's alethology, PLW adds much to the argument put forth in §44 of SZ. Thus, a deeper understanding of PLW necessitates a more comprehensive understanding of Heidegger's own teaching on truth.

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Section 44 of SZ is divided into four topics: the first deals with the traditional, proto-Greek, "Western", philosophical interpretation of truth; the second is an explanation of Heidegger's notion of logical truth; the third is an exposition of the distinction between logical and existential truth; and the fourth deals with the relation between care and truth. Although the sections in SZ preceding and following §44 provide the basis on which Heidegger feels secure in expounding his overall alethology, we shall not treat these sections in detail for two reasons; firstly, they are not imperative for an understanding of what Heidegger means by truth, and secondly the nature and purview of this paper prohibit such an excursion.

2. The Traditional Interpretation of Truth

Heidegger sees his questioning of the meaning (Sinn) of truth as intimately connected to his primary aim in SZ: the questioning of the meaning of being (Sein). Indeed, he even calls being and truth "equiprimordial phenomena" (SZ, 230), which has led, among other things, one Heideggerian scholar to replace Heidegger's term "being" for "being-as-truth".\(^3\) Too often, Heidegger states, ontologies are based on a single axiom or principle and too often philosophers neglect to think in terms of the equiprimordiality of different phenomena, such as the phenomena of "being" and "truth". (SZ, 132) Heidegger does not see this association of being and truth as peculiar, however, to his own thinking; indeed, as he correctly points out, philosophy and common sense have, from time immemorial, "grouped
together truth and being."  (SZ,212) Parmenides, whom Heidegger considers to be one of the first recorded Greek thinkers to make the being of beings thematic, "identified being with the perceiving-understanding of being (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἑστὶν ὑπὲρ καὶ εἶναι)."  (SZ,212) Aristotle calls Parmenides' way of thinking "philosophizing about the truth."  (SZ,213) Aristotle himself defines philosophy, on the one hand, as a science of truth (ἐπιστήμη τῆς ἀληθείας), and on the other, as "a science which examines beings as beings in respect of their being (ἐπιστήμη, ὃ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὑπὲρ ἑπὶ ὑπὸ)."  (SZ,213) One can refer to the Greek language itself, which is imbued with this association, as, for example, in the common synonymous terms "truly" and "beingly" (ἀληθῶς and ἐν ἑπὶ), or the common "in being" (ἐπὶ ἐν ἑπὶ) for our "in fact". Even the titles of early Greek works about nature (φύσις) were called "Concerning the Truth" (Περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας).  

In the first topic of §44 Heidegger does not present a well documented "thinker by thinker" analysis of what he calls the "traditional" concept of truth. He rather extracts the essential historical notion of truth in order "to lay open the ontological foundations of that conception."  (SZ,214) Much like Aristotle's cursory histories of thinkers and ideas, Heidegger's outline of the traditional notion of truth, for what it covers, loses none of its quality due to the lack of quantity. The only criticism one can make of it, and this indeed is a serious criticism, lies in Heidegger's use of the term "traditional". By traditional he means the "orthodox"
tradition of the German universities at the turn of the century. The orthodox tradition, if one can so call it that, tends to either neglect or exclude many of the traditions which lie outside of the Kantian and Aristotelian frameworks. Even such traditions as gnosticism, hermeticism, and Christian mysticism can be said to have a lot in common with Heidegger's "panaletheism", the doctrine which claims that everything is imbued with truth, untruth being merely a privation of truth. Indeed, even in his characterization of the orthodox tradition, one may wish to argue that Heidegger has simply left out too much of the "the tradition". In any case, it must be granted to him, as it is granted to Aristotle, the right to use his own approach to the history of philosophy.

Heidegger begins his analysis by stating that traditionally "truth" has been understood solely as the truth of logic. Logical truth, in turn, has been traditionally characterized by three fundamental theses: first, that the locus of truth is thought to be in the "logos", in the proposition (Aussage) qua judgment (Urteil); secondly, that "the essence of truth lies in the 'correspondence' (Übereinstimmung) of the judgment with its object." (SZ, 214); and thirdly, that Aristotle "set going" the formalized definition of truth as correspondence (διαδοχησις).

From antiquity we have Aristotle's statement that the παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν πραγμάτων διαδοχησις: "the soul's experiences, the νοηματα (representations) are likenings of things." (SZ, 214) This concept of the correspondence is
carried into the mediaeval period where Thomas Aquinas expresses it as the *adaequatio intellectus et rei*. It enters the modern period, where it is upheld, for example, by Immanuel Kant, in his *Critique of Pure Reason*: "Truth or illusion is not in the object insofar as it is intuited, but in the judgment about it, insofar as it is thought." *(SZ, 215)*

If we grant to Heidegger that the traditional notion of truth locates truth in the logos (proposition) qua "judgment", and if we grant that this thesis finds its expression in the formula of the Correspondence Theory, then we should also grant that an analysis of the formula ought to reveal the foundations on which the traditional notion rests. So whether we describe the Correspondence formula of logical truth as a correspondence, agreement, Übereinstimmung, *adaequatio*, or *διαλόγος*, the question must be raised: What do we mean when we equate the two things, the intellectus and the res, the proposition and the fact, the Meant and the Given?

According to Heidegger, the "correspondence" is traditionally intended to have the formal characteristic "of a relation of something to something (Beziehung von etwas zu etwas)." *(SZ, 215)* This means, therefore, that every "correspondence", and hence "truth", is a relation. But it does not mean, however, that every relation is a "correspondence" of the type implied by the Correspondence Theory. A symbol, for example, has a relation to something—to that which is
symbolized. But the symbol and the symbolized do not "correspond" in the same way the intellectus and the res are supposed to correspond. The symbol and the symbolized "correspond" by means of a "symbolic relation". Nor is the "correspondence" meant in the formula like that of a relation between numbers, as "6" corresponds with "16 minus 10"; such a numerical correspondence is based on a "quantitative relation". Without further pursuing the possible kinds of relations that may be said to exist between the intellectus and the res, Heidegger asserts that the relation is traditionally construed as a "just-as" relation: the intellectus is "supposed to 'give' the thing just as it is." (SZ, 216) But Heidegger thinks that by so characterizing the correspondence relation as a "just-as" (So-Wie) relation, nothing significant can be gained: "for the clarification of the structure of truth it is simply not enough to presuppose this relational totality, but it is necessary to go back and question the 'context of being' which supports this totality as such." (SZ, 216)

One can approach the thesis of the Correspondence Theory from the point of view of the "being" of the correlatives, but this, Heidegger maintains, doesn't help either. For the traditional interpretation leaves unclarified the description of the kind of being of the correlatives. The closest it comes to such a description lies in the commonly held presupposition that when the correlatives do correspond, "knowledge" is that mode of being which is true. Yet knowl-
edge is traditionally equated with judging; the judgments are ultimately considered to be true.

In the traditional conception of judgment, however, "one must distinguish between the Judging as a real psychical event and the Judged as an Ideal content." ([SZ, 216]) How is one to understand, Heidegger asks, the kind of relationship that is supposed to exist between something real and something ideal? Should one construe it as a "hybrid" relation between one order of being and another, or indeed "may the ontological meaning of the relation between the real and the ideal (the μεθεύμενο) not be questioned?" ([SZ, 216]) Heidegger maintains that no headway has been made in this problem in over two thousand years, mainly because the question has been wrongly posed with the artificial separation of the "real" from the "ideal". Consequently, in order to avoid this same mistake, one should steer clear of placing the onus of knowledge on "the act of judgment and its content". Instead, one should "try to bring into view the phenomenon that characterizes knowledge, the phenomenon of truth." ([SZ, 217]) The question then will be aimed at making phenomenally explicit the relation between truth and knowledge.

3. Uncovering Logical Truth

"Suppose that someone with his back turned to the wall puts forth the true proposition: The picture on the wall is crooked." ([SZ, 217]) Before turning around and perceiving that the picture really is crooked, the person's proposition cannot be construed, argues Heidegger, as a relation between
a mental picture and a real picture. One does not, he emphatically maintains, have such a relation in mind when one asserts the proposition. On the contrary, in asserting the proposition one feels related to the real picture; one's whole "propositional comportment" is towards the real picture. The act of making the proposition is not an "asserting or stating of a mental representation", but a way of being-towards the thing itself (ein Sein zum seienden Ding selbst).

In asserting the logical proposition, one is not comporting oneself to the crookedness of the picture in one's mind. One is comporting oneself, and only comporting oneself, to the crookedness of the picture on the wall. When one actually turns around, opens one's eyes and perceives that the picture truly is crooked, one does not discover that one's mental picture corresponds with something "out there". In the perception of the crooked picture, says Heidegger, one uncovers the proposition. In uncovering the proposition, one is really uncovering that which the proposition is about:

And what is demonstrated through the perception of the picture? Nothing else than that it is the being itself that was meant in the proposition. What comes forward for verification is that the proposition qua "being towards that which is meant in the proposition" is the showing-up of the being, that it is an uncovering of the being, towards which it is. What gets demonstrated is the uncovering of the proposition." (SZ, 218)

This description of logical truth as an act of uncovering should not be seen as a departure from the traditional framework of the "intellectus and the res", or the "proposition and the fact". Heidegger does not deny that one discovers or "uncovers" a particular kind of relation between the correla-
tives. He rather emphasizes that the relation, although static, is necessarily bound to an active, on-going experience. For on the one hand, the sheer act of "uncovering" takes place, while on the other hand, the correlative, the Given and the Meant, are uncovered in the uncovering-act.

Regarding the correlative, Heidegger argues that the Given is found to be the Meant in the verifying, i.e. uncovering, of the proposition. As such, the Given is that to which the uncovering-compassion is directed; in carrying out the perceptual verification of the picture-meant in the proposition, one's knowing or cognitive compassion is related to the picture-given on the wall, not to one's mental representation. Heidegger emphasizes that this "knowing", this "verifying-uncovering", accepts the given picture as the one which was meant in the proposition. His emphasis, therefore, is on the Given, and the way in which it grounds the meaning(s) ascribed to it.

Heidegger justifies the emphasis he places on the Given in light of the basic axiom of phenomenology: the Given—whether it be a stone, a pig, or the human being—can and does show itself just as it is in itself, i.e. in its Selfsameness (Selbigkeit):

This uncoveredness is proven-true when that which is put forward in the proposition (namely the thing itself) shows itself as the very same thing (als dasselbe). Proving-true (i.e. verification) signifies the being's showing itself in its Selfsameness. (SZ, 218)

Although the relation between the Given and the Meant is described in terms of the Sameness (dasselbe) of the Given
and the Meant, the Given itself is described in terms of its own Selbsameness (Selbigkeit). But both determinations, however, ultimately apply to the Given: the Given, in its Selbsameness, is also the Same as that which is Meant in the logical proposition. Consequently, the uncovering of the Meant in the proposition turns out to be, in the final analysis, the uncovering of the Given "as it is in itself", i.e. in its Selbsameness. The ultimate criterion in this verification process is the "true-proof", so to speak, that one is given in perception (Wahrnehmung), the true-proof of the being's Selbsameness.

Without the Selbsameness of beings, the Givens, the uncovering of propositions would be impossible. If, indeed, there were no Selbsameness, i.e. if everything were in flux, as the Greeks were fond of speculating, there would be no beings, and hence no logic about beings. Proving logical propositions to be true, in other words, depends on some other, ontologically more prior, criterion of truth, which for Heidegger is the Selbsameness of beings. The given "being" must show itself truthfully in order for one to uncover the truthfulness of one's propositions about it. With this stipulation Heidegger removes the locus of logical truth from the realm of Judgment and relocates it in the realm of beings, in the Selbigkeit of beings.¹⁴ The logical proposition merely "lets be seen (φανωσι) beings in their uncoveredness." (SZ, 218) The pillar of Heidegger's conception of logical truth, therefore, is the same pillar that holds up his entire methodology--
the fact that beings, and as will be seen in the next section, being itself, are revealed as they truly are in themselves, that is, in their Selbigeiten.

It ought to be mentioned at this point, however, that Heidegger has solely described the logical truth about a perceptual entity, a picture on a wall. Perhaps the reader might ask about an intuitional entity, something that is not given in perception, such as the Struktur of Dasein's being. Heidegger does not take this issue up in §44 of SZ, even though it is a crucial aspect of his alethology. By restricting his description of logical truth to "perception" he has, quite clearly, side-stepped many of the problems a complete account of logical truth encounters. But at the same time, he somewhat undermines his own account.15

One must turn to his distinction between ontological logic, or the knowledge that flows therefrom, and ontical logic. The former can be described in traditional terms as a "transcendental" logic, one that deals with the a priori "conditions of possibility" of whatever is under investigation, be it consciousness, existence, or nature. Heidegger calls his own ontological approach in SZ "fundamental ontology", meaning thereby that it is the logic or "logos" about being itself, and beings only insofar as they can open up an understanding of being itself. Ontical logic, as he construes it, is best typified by the sciences, which understand "being itself" in terms of particular beings, such as anthropology, chemistry, and biology.
If Heidegger had given an example of an onto-logical truth in §44 of 
SZ, it would have had to take into account
some other criterion of logical truth than perception, namely
intuition. For the Selbigkeit of Dasein, for example, cannot
be given in perception. The Strukturen that the ontological
approach uncovers cannot be found to be the Same (dasselbe)
as anything given in perception. Heidegger prefers to call
the non-perceptual criterion of logical truth in which Dasein's
Selbigkeit (i.e. its Eigentlichkeit) is revealed something
other than "intuition" (Anschauung)—he calls it "Dasein's
sight". (SZ,146) The Selbigkeit of Dasein is revealed
propositionally or logically in an act of "Dasein's sight".

Assuming that logical truths concerning intuitional
as well as perceptual contents are structurally the same,
that is, assuming that both in "perception" and in "Dasein's
sight" a particular relation of Sameness is uncovered between
the Given and the Meant, Heidegger's notion of logical truth
can be brought into a historical perspective when it is
questioned as follows: in exactly what way is 
SZ's notion
of logical truth different from the traditional Correspondence
Theory?

Heidegger describes the traditional Correspondence
Theory in terms of the relation between the correlatives; he
calls this relation a "just-as" (So-wie) relation, meaning
that the Meant is supposed to be given "just as" it is.
He further characterizes this relation according to the way
in which the mediaevals described it, as an adaequatio.
Since the Latin term *adaequatio* quite literally means "equalness", Heidegger's basic interpretation of the traditional Correspondence Theory can be said to emphasize two aspects of this theory—the notions of correlativeness and equalness. 16

But these two notions lie at the bottom of Heidegger's own theory of logical truth. For he does not claim that, in light of the notion of correlativeness, the Meant vanishes once the Given's *Selbigkeit* is revealed; nor, for that matter, does he himself describe what he means by "sameness", the sameness found to exist between the two correlatives. And who would want to haggle over whether the most appropriate description of this correlativeness should be encapsulated in the term "equalness" or "sameness"? 17

What Heidegger has done that is unique, and what may henceforth add a new chapter to the history of the Correspondence Theory, is to emphasize the distinction between, on the one hand, the revealing or "uncovering" of the correspondence relation, and on the other, the relation itself. Heidegger stresses, and stresses emphatically, that the onus of logical truth should not be placed, as it has been done traditionally, on the corresponding solely, but more importantly, on the context in which this corresponding takes place—the context of the propositional uncovering of the correspondence. In a word, Heidegger has broadened the Correspondence Theory; in modern English, it now reads: logical, propositional truth is the uncovering of the correspondence between the proposition
and the fact. In Heidegger's terminology: logical truth is the uncovering of the sameness between the Given and the Meant.

4. **Uncovering of Existential Truth**

In §44 of *SZ*, a fundamental distinction is drawn between "logical" and "existential" truth. Logical truth is defined as the uncovering of propositions (logic), while existential truth is defined as the uncovering of Dasein (existence). Existential truth is based on Dasein's awareness of "being-in-the-world" as "what" it is; "what" Dasein is, is predetermined by the formal structures of its being. The truth of Dasein's own particular "whatness", its structural disclosedness in-the-world, is existential truth.\(^{18}\)

Existential truth is the most basic or "primordial" form of truth; logical truth is derived from existential truth. In order for the Selbigkeit of a being or phenomenon to be uncovered logically as what it truly is, the being that uncovers it "logically" must first be uncovered as what it truly is. Heidegger's description of the truth of a phenomenon as "the showing of itself in itself" applies also to the phenomenon of Dasein; Dasein's existential showing-up of itself precedes its logical showing-up of itself and other beings.

Heidegger calls the uncovering of Dasein "disclosedness" (Erschlossenheit).\(^{19}\) He uses the present tense of the verbal "uncovering" (entdeckend-sein) to denote the pure coming-to-be (entstehend-sein) of Dasein. By virtue of the uncovering...
of Dasein, other beings are uncovered along with Dasein: Dasein's practical, pre-theoretical, everyday absorption in its surrounding environment reveals other beings within Dasein's world. Saying that other beings are uncovered by Dasein does not mean that they are brought into being by Dasein, but rather that they are revealed to be "in being" by Dasein, and hence are said to be "unhidden" or "a-lethea". The truth or unhiddenness of the beings discovered to be within-the-world is described by Heidegger as an "after-the-fact" truth, i.e. after the fact of Dasein. These beings revealed to be "within" Dasein's world have a quality of truth which is best described in terms of the past tense, in terms of "uncoveredness" (Entdecktheit) or "having-been-uncovered" (entdeckt-sein). Terminologically, therefore, disclosedness refers to the being-unhiddenness of Dasein while uncoveredness refers to the unhiddenness of inner-mundane beings.

For the sake of simplicity, one can schematize Heidegger's overall distinction between existential and logical uncovering as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOGIC ---------</th>
<th>EXISTENCE -----</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ontological (uncovers being itself)</td>
<td>uncovering of beings within Dasein's environing world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontical (uncovers particular beings)</td>
<td>uncovering of Dasein</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dasein is primordially "in-the-truth", i.e. in the unhiddenness of being. This does not mean that Dasein is in "the whole truth" as would be an omniscient Mind; it simply
means that, for Dasein, "the disclosedness of its ownmost being belongs to its existential constitution." (SZ, 221)

Any untruth or falsity that Dasein may be in is not a radical alteration or metamorphosis of its ownmost being. Heidegger speaks of Dasein's existential truth being "covered-over" when Dasein is in untruth; but being "covered-over" does not have the same status as "uncovering". The primary function of a mirror, for example, is to reflect or depict imitatively; when the mirror gets covered-over with dust, its primary function (ἐγγυον) has not been negated or obliterated. Likewise, when Dasein is in untruth on an existential level, when Dasein is "inauthentic", its basic state of being "in-the-truth" has been covered-over by the dust, so to speak, of untruth--"hiddenness". Thus, a fundamental clarity (Durchsichtigkeit) goes along with being-in-the-truth, a clarity in which Dasein is transparently aware of its ownmost participation and presence in this essential unhiddenness. Existential untruth is a privation of the fundamental clarity of "being-in-the-truth". Heidegger says:

But only insofar as Dasein has been disclosed, has it also been closed-off; and only insofar as beings within-the-world have been uncovered along with Dasein have such beings, as possibly encounterable within-the-world, been covered-over or disguised. (SZ, 222)

Insofar as Dasein existentially comports itself both truthfully and untruthfully, says Heidegger, is Dasein "a fallen being", a being "thrown into" a world in which a prior culturally and socially defined interpretation of Dasein's ownmost being determines to a large extent the way Dasein is
in-the-world. Dasein is thrown into the demands of this world, i.e. into the claims made on Dasein's ownmost being. For Dasein to authentically--truly--be aware of its fundamental clarity of being-in-the-truth, it must modify the interpretation of itself that is manufactured, so to speak, "by the public", by the das Man consciousness.

Since "truth" for Heidegger always rests on the disclosedness of Dasein, truth is relative to this disclosedness. Truth is, he emphasizes, "only insofar as Dasein is and so long as Dasein is." (SZ,226) Not only truth itself, the disclosedness of Dasein, but all logical truths, scientific or otherwise, "are true only as long as Dasein is". Before Newton's or Einstein's laws of "nature" were discovered, the laws were neither true nor false; through Newton and through Einstein, i.e. through Dasein, the phenomena, and therefore the laws about the phenomena, were uncovered--made true.

Through Dasein the truth came into being:

Before there was any Dasein, there was no truth, and after Dasein is no more there will be no truth, because then truth as disclosedness, uncovering, and uncoveredness can not be. (SZ,226)

Heidegger opposes the kind of scepticism which denies that Dasein can have certainty concerning matters of truth. A sceptic, he argues, can "no more be refuted than the being of truth can be 'proven'." (SZ,229) Heidegger says that any sceptic who denies the truth does not even need to be refuted, since his very existence refutes him. In denying the truth the sceptic denies his own being. Blindly the sceptic "has obliterated Dasein in the desperation of suicide; and in doing
so he has obliterated the truth." (SZ, 229)

5. Care: The Cause and Originating-locus of Disclosedness

In SZ Heidegger does not, as he does in his later writings on truth, simply locate the phenomenon of primordial truth in the sheer opening-up (φαντάζει) of being, with Dasein as a participant in this disclosure. In the SZ the whole phenomenon of truth is related back to the essence of Dasein, care—Sorge. By Sorge (ςπαράκλησις) Heidegger does not mean a particular kind of care, such as willing, wishing, urging, worrying, concerning, or loving; he rather means "care itself", the Struktur of care. The many cares are derived from and founded on the phenomenon of care itself (SZ, 182; 192):

As a primordial Structural-totality, Sorge lies existentially-aprioriilly "before", and this means always in, every factual "attitude" and "situation" of Dasein. (SZ, 193)

Heidegger has two basic notions of Sorge. On the one hand, he sees it as a sort of power or force which the term "cause" (αίτησις) perhaps captures. On the other hand, he sees it in a more formal sense as the source, form, or originating-locus (αρχή) of disclosedness. These two aspects of Sorge and the way that they relate to Heidegger's construal of truth in SZ will be dealt with separately.

(a) Sorge as a Power or Cause: Whenever Dasein becomes lost in the existential untruth of inauthenticity, conscience as the Voice of Sorge calls Dasein back to its primordial and ownmost awareness of being-in-the-truth. (SZ, 274-280)

As conscience, Sorge is that steady force or power which
maintains Dasein's awareness of being-in-the-truth. The
determination and resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) to live
by the Voice of Sorge, i.e. to exist authentically, is the
determination and resoluteness to be aware of being (in the
truth). (SZ, 297-98)

In the way that Heidegger defines it, Sorge as a
power or cause is that which maintains Dasein's own par-
ticular ζρ̄γον as what it is. Unlike a tree or a stone, for
example, Dasein is not maintained "as what it is" just as it
is: unique to Dasein is its fallenness, its original and
continual "falling away from" its essential nature or ownmost
being. Dasein must therefore continually "return to" its
essential ergon, to its essential Eigentlichkeit.

The subjective "I" or "ego", argues Heidegger, is
not the ultimate criterion for what gets determined as "inau-
thentic" or "authentic"; the doctrine of the authenticity of
Dasein is not a relativistic ethical doctrine. Heidegger is
against interpreting his notion of Sorge as the Voice of
conscience in an "ethical" context, a context based on the
concepts of "goodness" and "badness". Heidegger does not see
his aim as a retrieval of classical ethical notions; "being-
authentic" is not just a modern answer from "fundamental
ontology" replying to the age old question: what does "being-
good" mean? Authenticity, argues Heidegger, has to do with
Dasein's truthfulness, not its goodness. Sorge as the Voice
of conscience, Sorge as a power or cause that is, lies
like the centre of a vortex at the root of Dasein's being-in-
the-truth.\textsuperscript{23}

(b) Sorge as the Originating-locus or Source of Form: As has already been noted, Dasein is not an amorphic "blob of being". Heidegger says:

We have found the fundamental constitution of the being we have thematized, that being-in-the-world, whose essential Structures are centred in Disclosedness. The wholeness of this Structural-totality has been uncovered as Sorge. (SZ, 231)

Dasein is a being that has a definite "form"; Dasein is intrinsically morphic. Hence, Heidegger, not only calls Dasein a being (Seiende) (SZ, 7), but also a Structural-totality (Strukturganzheit). (SZ, 191) He calls this Structural-totality "the constitution of Dasein (Daseinsverfassung)." (SZ, 192)

Dasein's epistemological, temporal, historical, and ontological state of being is structurally constituted by Sorge.

Sorge, as the structure of structures (Strukturganz), is the formal source of both being and truth. For as Heidegger says, without Dasein there would be neither truth nor being. "Being--not beings--'is given' only insofar as truth is. And truth is only insofar as and so long as Dasein is." (SZ, 230)

But what is Dasein? Dasein is Sorge.

Sorge as the Strukturganz constitutes Dasein's being as a whole; hence, the disclosedness of Dasein, "primordial truth", is constituted by Sorge. The mediating link between Dasein as Structure and Dasein as being is Sorge. As the basic originating-locus of all truth, Sorge lies at the foundation of Heidegger'sSZ alethology.

If Dasein can be said to have a teIos at all, it lies
in Dasein's disclosedness: Dasein's telos is to be disclosed, to be in the open of being itself. And the origin or arche of this telos is Sorge, the "structure" of Sorge. As a cause or power, Sorge maintains Dasein in this teleological openness; as the originating-locus of the formal dimensions of Dasein's teleological openness, Sorge structuralizes the on-going activity of disclosedness. All truth and being ultimately arise from Sorge.

6. Conclusion

To deal more adequately with this twofold notion of Sorge, one can borrow the terminological distinction between "suchness" and "whatness" already established in Chapter I. On the one hand, the sheer truth of Dasein, the sheer disclosedness or openness of Dasein--"such that Dasein is"--is Dasein's "suchness", the suchness of a-letheia. On the other hand, the "whatness" of truth--the manner in which Dasein is disclosed or opened--has its locus in the formal constitution of Dasein, in Dasein as a structural-totality, in "Sorge".

In SZ the relation between the two aspects of truth is largely left untouched by Heidegger's analytic. In other words, the relation between Sein and the Seinsstructur is never dealt with in the same manner that Sein itself is treated. This lack of concern is also found in the notion of logical truth found in SZ: the dependency on a notion of a formal relation between two correlatives, i.e. the dependency on a notion of "correspondence between correlatives", is not
acknowledged by Heidegger.

This lack of concern in \textit{SZ} over the connection between the suchness and whatness of truth, or the \textit{Sein} and \textit{Struktur} of truth, has something in common with the lack of concern in §44 of \textit{SZ} to treat the historical—"traditional"—notion of "primordial" truth, that which grounds logical truth. For Heidegger basically argues in §44 of \textit{SZ} that traditionally one notion of truth has been held, a notion of logical truth, and a free-floating one at that. Had his history of the Western notion of "truth" been complete, he would have included also a criticism of the traditional notions of a "ground"—reality, being, God, nature, or "man the measure".

In any case, the connection between the whatness and suchness of truth is of prime importance in \textit{PLW} wherein Heidegger argues that "suchness", the sheer unhiddenness of being, is prior to its "whatness", the way in which it is unhidden. In light of \textit{SZ} the thesis in \textit{PLW} appears to mark a development in Heidegger's thinking, since the thesis in \textit{SZ} maintains that the suchness and whatness, the \textit{Sein} and the \textit{Struktur}, are equiprimordial. The overcoming of metaphysics, "Plato's metaphysics" that is, which Heidegger sees as his task in \textit{PLW}, must also include the metaphysic of truth found in \textit{SZ}.\footnote{Moreover, and even more importantly, the attempted "overcoming of morality" in \textit{PLW} must also include the doctrine of \textit{Sorge} as found in \textit{SZ}.}
CHAPTER IV

HEIDEGGER'S PLATO CRITIQUE OF PLATO

1. Introduction

The theme of the Republic is the nature of justice, δικαιοσύνη. The most dominant problem raised in the majority of Plato's dialogues lies at the heart of the Republic: the problem of "being and seeming". Socrates is searching for justice that doesn't just seem just, but really is just; this search is no ordinary matter, but concerns "the whole way in which one has to live." (R,352d,8) Plato leads the reader into the complexities of this search through the very simple question that Socrates asks the aged Cephalus, the one who has experienced "life", and is now about to leave it:

For it seems to me a necessity that we have to learn from the aged as from those who have gone before us on a path which we perhaps will also journey on, What is it like? (R,328e,1)

Out of this search an image of justice emerges in the Republic that is founded on the image of a just psyche: a just political order ought to be founded on the model of a just psyche. The telos of the state ought to reflect the telos of the psyche. Education ought to cultivate the teleological aspirations of the psyche; the state, if it is to act wisely, ought to establish the most appropriate form of education that can carry this out. The Republic ends, appropriately enough, with the myth of Er, a myth in which
human beings are exhorted to really be just, for the just are rewarded. The River of Uncaring and the Plain of Forgetfulness explain why the truly rich nature of the psyche is so hidden. In short, the myth of Er, in line with the eikon of the cave, tells us that the essential battle "here" is with Uncaringness and Forgetfulness.

On the whole, PLW is a three part work. In the first section Heidegger introduces his subject matter, the change in the essence of truth that Plato inaugurates; he also outlines the method he uses in analyzing Plato's doctrine of truth. In section two he includes the Greek text of the cave with his own translation; and in section three he interprets the meaning and ramifications of his interpretation. While dealing briefly with the first two sections, this chapter basically deals with the third section of PLW. The overall aim of this chapter is expository in nature, i.e. to point out Heidegger's essential position regarding Plato's construal of truth in the Republic, especially in Books VI and VII.

2. Heidegger's Hermeneutical Approach

Heidegger introduces the theme of PLW with an explanation of what he means by a Lehre, a doctrine or teaching. He begins by contrasting the knowledge (Erkenntnis) of the sciences with the doctrine of a thinker. The sciences, he says, set their results before humankind as comprehensible results to be put to some practical use. The doctrine of a thinker, on the other hand, is not a set of reflections meant to be put to some practical use; rather, a thinker puts out
his doctrine, a doctrine to which humankind is exposed and upon which it may or may not expend itself. This distinction between a science and a doctrine, or a scientist and a thinker, is relevant on two accounts. First it indicates that Heidegger, insofar as he considers himself a thinker, has stepped away from his position in SZ regarding the construal of phenomenological philosophy as "the science" of the being of beings. Secondly, it puts the onus of thinking on the thinker's doctrine (Lehre), and as such equates Plato the thinker with Plato the teacher, Lehrer.

Heidegger further says that the "doctrine" of a thinker is that which remains unsaid in what he says. Invoking the notion from SZ that unhiddenness must be wrested from hiddenness, Heidegger claims that one must wrest the unsaid from the said in a thinker's doctrine. In Plato's thought the unsaid lies harboured in Plato's doctrine of truth:

What remains unsaid in Plato's thought is a change in the way the essence of truth gets treated. That this change takes place, what it consists in, and what gets established by it, would be made clear through an interpretation of the "cave allegory". (PLW,5;249)

Section two of PLW consists of the Greek text and Heidegger's translation, neither of which differs significantly from the common texts and translations. A common textual variation is absent from the Greek text Heidegger has chosen for PLW, and his translation doesn't differ significantly from the mainstream of translations. Understandably Heidegger translates ἄληθεία as Unverborgenheit, unhiddenness, instead
of the common English translation "reality" or "truth", or
the common German "das Wahre"; he also makes a point of trans-
slating τα πνευμα as beings (Seienden) instead of "things" or
"realities", and διότι as "right" or "correct" (richtig)
instead of "true". Perhaps his concern over the translation
of these words is an expression of the same concern he expresses
in §2, wherein he states that one of the most basic functions
of philosophy is to preserve and protect the power of the
most elemental words through which and in which Dasein ex-
presses itself.

3. The Stages of Truth in the Events of the Cave

In section three of PLW Heidegger interprets the
cave in terms of the stages of truth represented by the
ascent to and descent from the seeing of what "goodness itself"
is. Heidegger lists four such stages. To his four is added
a fifth, that which Heidegger calls "Plato's interpretation".
This is included as a stage, indeed the culminating stage,
since it also deals with "truth", the truth of the cave eikon
itself.

(a) Stage one is characterized by the state of mind
of those who dwell in the Lebenswelt of the cave; these
cave dwellers are "prejudiced by what they immediately encoun-
ter." (PLW, 27; 268) They immediately encounter the shadows,
shadows which they have been chained to experience "since
childhood". This stage ends when Socrates says of the yoked
ones that "they would consider nothing else to be the truth
{το δάληςες} than the shadows of the artificial objects." (R,-
51c,2) Zu den Sachen selbst means, at this stage, Zu den Schatten selbst--To the shadows themselves!

(b) Stage two is characterized by the removal of the chains of one of the cave dwellers. Although liberated, he continues to believe that the shadows are the things themselves, even when shown the real source of the shadows, the artifacts being carried in front of the fire. Perplexed and bewildered, he believes that the objects that he formerly saw with his own eyes are truer, more hidden, than the objects he now is being forced to look at, objects he can barely discern in the dazzle and brightness of the fire-light. Like Oedipus, unable to face the truth with his naked eyes, this newly liberated one blinds himself to the painful truth he now is forced to face. "Consequently, at the end of the portrayal of the second stage the word ἀληθές also occurs again, and now in the comparative ἀληθεστέρα, the 'more hidden'." (PLW, 28; 258)

(c) In the third stage the liberated one is forced into the open region outside of the cave. This open region constitutes the most difficult phase of education, one which is supposed to reveal the true nature of things. A genuine revelation does not, however, take place all at once, but rather by means of a process of dwelling, a dwelling in which the unhidden, truth, is attained as the most unhidden of all, as τὰ ἀληθεστάτα. (PLW, 29; 259)

According to Heidegger the most unhidden truth in the cave eikon is the unhiddenness of primordial quiddity.
Plato stresses that the unhiddenness of whatness, not of beingness, is what is revealed to the one who dwells in the truth. Heidegger says:

The most unhidden shows itself in that which each being always is. Without such a self-showing of the What— that means of the Ideas—this and that and all such things, and therefore everything, remains hidden. (PLW, 29;259)

As Heidegger also points out, the revelation of that which is most true depends on the freedom of the person who is in the open region; the person must first be liberated, "free", from the tyrannical yoke of the habitually unquestioned interpretation of "what is". Education, according to the cave eikon, is the means by which this liberation is effected. Education is construed in the eikon as that steady orienting and dwelling in which the whole psyche turns towards the most unhidden, until a transformation takes place, a περιήγησις τῆς ψυχῆς. Hence education can only find its completion and consummation in that which is most true: "The essence of 'education' is founded in the essence of 'truth'." (PLW,30;260)

(d) Stage four of the cave events deals with the constant overcoming of being uneducated, ἀπαλάχυσθα. The descent into the darkness and hiddenness of the cave is the descent into the privation of both education and truth. The one who has experienced the most unhidden and who must nonetheless continue to dwell in the hiddenness of the cave must summon up with Herculean strength the full powers of the great Hermes: "The unhidden must be torn away from hiddenness, in a certain sense stolen from it." (PLW,32;260)
But theft is always the theft of something that already exists, which in this case is the existence of truth, "unhiddenness". One can say that a Law of Truth emerges: hiddenness is always the hiddenness of unhiddenness. This stage therefore culminates with the privation thesis: apaideia is a mere privation of paideia as hiddenness is of unhiddenness. Dwelling in the cave is not a negation of aletheia and paideia. Ἀλήθεια is dealt with in this stage solely in terms of privation, as privation belongs to the essence of truth.

(e) The cave as Heidegger sees it is primarily concerned with truth, from its acquisition to its preservation. But, as has already been pointed out, Heidegger goes one step further in his exposition, he interprets what he calls "Plato's own interpretation" of the cave--which actually points to a fifth stage, and thus treats the truth of the cave eikon itself.

Heidegger says that Plato's interpretation immediately follows the cave, construing it as "the image (Bild) for τὴν... δὲς ποιεῖται φανόμενη ἕδραν--the dwelling place which shows itself to our (everyday) looking around." (PL, 19; 254) The fire is the Bild for the sun while the whole cave represents our celestial firmament. In this firmament human beings are attached and bound to the earth:

What environs and concerns them there on the earth is to them "the real", i.e. beings. In this cavernous dwelling they feel "in the world" and "at home" and find reliability here. (PL, 19; 254)

The region which lies outside the cave is the Bild for that which constitutes what beings really are: eide and
ideai. According to Plato, says Heidegger, humankind never really suspects that what it considers to be "the real" is known to be what it is by means of something largely considered "unreal", the eide and ideai. The common agreement about the "real" is largely a "manufactured interpretation", an interpretation which, when unexamined, has the same truth value as the cave dwellers' interpretation of the totality of shadows passing on the wall. That which lies outside of the environing interpretation shows itself "as it is", not as it is according to "something else":

Thus the sunlight outside the cave is not in the first place manufactured by man. In its brightness the growing and appearing things immediately show themselves, without needing to be represented through an adumbration. The self-showing things in the "allegory" are the "image" for the "Ideas". The sun in the "allegory" is meant to be the "image" for that which makes all the Ideas visible. The sun is the "image" for the Idea of all Ideas. (PLW, 21; 255)

In this fifth stage, states Heidegger, Plato identifies truth with whatness, not with unhiddenness. Plato is interested in the unhiddenness of "what" lies behind the appearing. Thus, everything is gathered together for Plato in the "allegorical" meaning of the fire, shadows, daylight, and sun; unhiddenness as truth is therefore used in the cave to describe the events that take place, but only in terms of "the way it makes that which appears accessible in its external-appearance (εἴδως) and the way it makes this self-showing (ἴδεα) visible." (PLW, 34; 261)

4. Paideia Based on a Pre-established Notion of Correctness

Socrates introduces the cave eikon with the statement
to Glaucion: "liken our nature to an experience such as this one with respect to paideia and its privation, apaideia." (R, 514a,1) To show that Plato yokes truth to a notion of correctness, Heidegger first shows how paideia is yoked to a notion of correctness. He deals with paideia for two reasons: first because Plato introduces the cave by saying that it concerns paideia, and secondly because truth and paideia have already been shown to be essentially connected.

Although Plato says that paideia should be a "turning of the whole psyche around", the kind of paideia outlined in the cave is not based on this principle, argues Heidegger. Paideia as it is exemplified in the cave is based on a pre-established model (Vor-bild) of the way a part of the psyche—the part that carries out the idetic-seeing—ought to be moulded. The psyche's correct development according to the pre-established "model" of the psyche constitutes the telos of paideia for Plato.²

Heidegger says that, if one wants to think as the Greeks thought, and if one wants to correctly translate the Greek word paideia (παιδεία), then one must not content oneself with a mere literal translation of this word. Paideia, he argues, should be translated in German by the word Bildung, an abstract noun which stems from the noun Bild, a picture or image, and which is related to the verb bilden, to form, mould, shape or educate. Heidegger chooses Bildung, a more uncommon word for education proper, instead of the more common term Erziehung, a drawing-out as the English "education" (educere,
to bring out). His reasons are etymologically motivated: Plato, he argues, bases paideia, Bildung, on a pre-planned model (Vor-bild) of paideia, and therefore makes paideia into a method of moulding (bilden) the psyche according to an overall picture (Bild) of the way the psyche ought to be "in the truth", not necessarily how it is actually already in the truth. Plato's ought is the "idetic ought", the ought that is based on a "picture" of unhiddenness, not as unhiddenness, i.e. truth, is "in itself".

The pre-planned model, the Vorbild, is Plato's notion of the telos of an education for philosophers: the idetic-seeing (τὸ ἰδεῖν) of the true telos of the psyche, the seeing of ἡ ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Thus, a particular kind of seeing, a seeing in which one sees the ideai, becomes the essence of a philosophical education. In a word, paideia as Plato sees it is simply, argues Heidegger, "a correct way of seeing things". And since "correctness" has very little to do with "truth", Plato's conception of paideia has very little to do with truth, with which it is supposed to be essentially connected. Heidegger bases this argument on his interpretation of Plato's notion of the idea and eidos. Since Plato's notion of the idea and eidos is based on a fabrication, and since his notion of paideia is based on a "correct apprehension" of the idea and eidos, his notion of paideia is based on a fabrication also.

5. Heidegger's Interpretation of the Τὸ ἰδεῖν

According to Plato, the real understanding of the
meaning of things is made possible in the lighted openness outside of the cave. In this most hidden region of being, beings present themselves as they are, says Heidegger, in their outer-appearance (Aussehen):

Plato does not take this "outer-appearance" as a mere "aspect". The "outer-appearance" for him has even something of an extrusion (Heraustreten) through which each thing "presents" itself. (PLW,19-20;255)

Commonly in Greek the outer-appearance of a thing is termed the ἔτος or ἔση. For Plato the ἔτος is, strictly speaking in terms of the Republic, a being's outer-appearance, its Aus-sehen. And in Plato's technical vocabulary also, argues Heidegger, the ἔση is a being's inner-appearance, so to speak, its self-showing (Sich-zeigend).

Heidegger is textually justified in drawing this twofold, formal distinction between the ἔτος and ἔση, although nowhere in the Republic does Plato himself explicitly draw such a distinction. Throughout the Republic, however, Plato uses the term ἔτος in a non-technical fashion to denote a type, class, or kind, and the term generally appears when a plurality of things are meant. "Eidos" as it is used in the Republic generally means "the way in which a phenomenon appears outwardly"; examples of this notion of the eidos are numerous in the Republic:

a. "four kinds (eide) of government..." (R,544a,2)
b. "three different kinds (eide) of good..." (R,367c,7)
c. "the different kinds (eide) of soberness, courage..." (R,402c,1)
d. "three parts (eide) of the psyche..." (R,504a,3)
e. eikons (ἐικόνες) liken, whereas eide classify according to outward appearance (R,510c-d)
f. "two types (eide)..." (R,509d,1)
g. "we are in the habit of setting down an eidos in
each instance for each of the many things to which we give the same name." (R,596a,5)

The ἰδέα, on the other hand, is only used in the Republic when a single thing is meant, and refers to a thing's inner nature, i.e. to what makes it what it is. Plato variously describes the ἰδέα in terms of a thing's own inner-selvesameness:

a. "although three different kinds (eide) of good exist, there is only one thing (idea) goodness itself can be." (R,507b,5)
b. "the idea of agathos..." (R,508a,1)
c. "the eidos of couches" is distinguished from "the idea of a couch" (R,596a-c)
d. each type (eidos) of government (oligarchy, democracy, and so on) has its own idea (R,544c-e)
e. "beauty itself" is a synonymous expression for "the idea of beauty" (R,479a-b)

From a less "ontological" point of view, Jowett, for example, takes the same approach to the εἴδος and ἰδέα as Heidegger. On the one hand, Jowett distinguishes the "ordinary meanings" of the two terms as used by Greeks in general from Plato's "philosophical usage", while on the other hand Jowett distinguishes Plato's notion of the eidos from his notion of the idea:

ἡδέα, as a philosophical term, signifies rather form than kind. The meaning of a class, which εἴδος often essentially connotes, attaches only accidentally to ἰδέα. The latter term immediately suggests the unity of a complex notion as present to the mind. It is thus used to describe the work of συναγωγή, where εἴδος denotes the result of διαίρεσις:
Phaedr. 265 D, Ε ἐϊς μίαν τε ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἀγείν τα πολλαχύ διεσπαρμένα, κ.τ.λ....το πάλιν κατ' εἴδος δύνασθαι τέλεσθαι.

To the twofold, formal nature of beings as Plato construes them, Heidegger adds a third element, a being's presence (Anwesung); "presence" is Heidegger's translation of
of the Greek word for "being"—οὐσία. He does not explain why he translates ousia as presence instead of as being, since the rightful word in Greek for presence is parousia, παρουσία. In the way that Heidegger does use the term, however, one can gather that he is trying to capture the connotative sense of the Greek notion of ousia: being is that which is "present" or has "presence". Thus Heidegger says that presence, in the beginning of Western thinking, was thought of as the rise (Aufgang) of truth, a-letheia; as such, presence was experienced as unhiddenness.

But although Plato, argues Heidegger, works with three basic notions concerning beings—ousia, eidos and idea—these three constituents do not have an equal status: for Plato the idea is the most important. Although ousia, maintained Heidegger, is basically the rise of beings into unhiddenness (truth), Plato ends up relegating it to the rise of the idea into unhiddenness. As a result, in one's comportment towards beings one's interest is not supposed to lie in the experience of the "presence" of the being, nor in the experience of its outer appearance (eidos), but rather in the doctrine, in that which makes the presence of the outer appearance "what it is". The psyche thus gets construed in the Republic as a kind of sentient movie camera equipped with a telephoto lens that has been pre-set to zoom-in on the truth of the idea. In such a zooming-in, however, the back-drop and context, the ousia and eidos, get "put out of focus" as being unimportant for the picture
of the idea. Indeed, argues Heidegger, in this approach
the idea is actually mistaken for the ousia:

The idea achieves presence, namely the
presence of what a being continuously is.
The whatness [Was-sein] of a being is con-
tinually present as what that being is.
Presence, however, is generally the essence
of being. Therefore, for Plato, being
has its real essence in the whatness.
Even more recent terminology betrays this
way of looking at beings, that the true
esse is the quidditas, the essentia,
and not the existentia (SZ, 38; 262).

Equating the idea with the ousia has far reaching
implications, for it immediately equates the idea with
aletheia. As we have seen from the cave, truth as unhidden-
ness makes the idea visible. And since one is only concerned
about and directed towards the idea, the unhidden (truth)
becomes a mere means to an end, a means for bringing the
idea into being.

But unhiddenness, argues Heidegger, can never really
be made to play the slave's role, which is why one finds a
certain ambiguity in Plato's thought. On the one hand,
Plato speaks of aletheia, while on the other hand he really
has orthotes in mind, a notion of correctness. The relation
one has to the idea is fundamentally different than the
relation one has to aletheia itself. One's relationship
to the idea, maintains Heidegger, is based on a concept of
"rightness" (Richtigkeit), i.e. orthotes. One must first
make an adjustment (Einrichtung) in one's whole comportment
towards beings in order to idetically see (λογεῖν) the λόγος.
One must consciously direct oneself (Sichrichtung) to the
lēsia. The prior-adjustment and self-direction predetermine the whole way one experiences beings. In other words, truth gets bound to a particular kind of rectified seeing; thus, "ἀλήθεια is treated and mentioned while at the same time ὀρθότης is meant and set as a standard, all in the same train of thought" (PLW, 42-43, 265-266). The stages of "truth" in the cave eikon turn out to be, upon closer scrutiny, stages marking the degree to which one's idetic-looking (lēsia) is correct. The stages mark the way one sees beings idetically—the more idetically, the more truly, i.e. the more correctly. Heidegger cites the passage in which the liberated one is set free within the cave and looks towards those things which are being more (R. 515d, 3-4):

πρὸς μᾶλλον ἄντα τετραμμένος ὀρθότερον βλέποι—"turned towards the beings that are being more (Seinenderen), he can have a more rectified look" (PLW, 41; 265). A correspondence (δυοϊῶς) is thus set up between the rectified idein and the idea, and this correspondence thus becomes mistaken for truth itself.

6. Orthotes Eclipses Aletheia

Heidegger's diagnosis: Plato has an idetic complex. The correspondence set up between the idein and the idea becomes the formula for an anthropocentric and orthological conception of truth, a conception which has crystalized into the mediaeval and modern Correspondence Theory of Logical Truth, first formulated by Aristotle. Heidegger
now turns his attention to Plato's position regarding existential truth—that mode of truth which is supposed to be "primordial". The final tour de force of PLW is delivered with Heidegger's argument that Plato doesn't really have a notion of existential truth: for Plato a rectified-idetic-seeing-in-the-world is the most primordial way of "disclosively-being-in-the-world". In a word, in Plato's view the rectified seeing of the "highest idea", the idea of agathon, is the most primordial way to be "in-the-truth".

Heidegger begins this concluding argument by claiming that the translation of τὸ ἀγαθόν as "the good", especially the morally good, is incorrect. The Greeks, he says, thought of the good as something useful or efficacious—tauglich. Agathon is therefore that "which is useful to something and which makes something useful" (PLW, 38; 263). Unfortunately Heidegger does not describe what he means by usefulness (Tauglichkeit), except to say that, in effect, X is useful because it makes Y possible and useful. But this description is too vague; thus, when he translates the λόγον of agathon as "the λόγος of usefulness", or simply as "the power which renders something useful" (Tauglichmachend), he puts a lot of strain on his argument in PLW. Perhaps he has in mind a passage in Book VI wherein Socrates calls to agathon "the means by which just things and the rest of the benefits become useful and beneficial". But as the reader
knows from other passages in the Republic, ἀγαθὸν is shown to have at least three very basic interpretations, and "usefulness" is only one of them. So "usefulness" cannot be an adequate translation of τὸ ἀγαθὸν; indeed, by translating τὸ ἄγαθον as Tauglichkeit, Heidegger commits the fallacy of ad aspectum.

Heidegger's translation can only make sense if it is put into the context of the sun eikon of Book VI. In this eikon agathon is construed as a power, maker, or creator, and reinforces Heidegger's argument that ἡ τοῦ ἄγαθου ὥσα is "a power which renders (useful)" -- a Tauglich-machend. In the sun eikon agathon itself is construed as a power (Macht) and a cause, in the same way as the sun is a power and cause:

HELIOS------------------------------HEMERA- lights-up the 
Kosmos (horetic dimension)

PHAOS- light

AGATHOS------------------------------ALETHEIA- lights-up the 
Psyche (noetic dimension)

Plato further describes agathon itself as a power and a cause:

This, then, that gives the truth to the object you must call the inner nature [ὀδεα] of the good itself, and of knowledge and the power to know to the knower, you must discern it as being the cause of the understanding of being and truth insofar as they are known (R. 508e,1).

Heidegger further argues that not only should agathon be translated by "usefulness", but the term ὥσα should be thought essentially in terms of usefulness. The Greeks,
he argues, generally thought that the *ideai* were useful, because they "make it useful that something can appear as what it is and so can be present in its constancy" (PLW, 38; 263). And since the idea of agathon is the last *ōθεα* to be seen in the intelligible sphere it is the Highest Idea, the cause of all usefulness. The seeing of the Highest Idea is a rectified seeing, as is all idetic-seeing. As Plato construes the truth of the *ōθεα* as orthotes, he construes the truth of the Highest Idea, the Idea of all Ideai, as embodying the highest form of orthotes.

Thus the cave eikon culminates in the notion that the most primordial kind of truth is that which causes the things considered to be most useful to human beings. That which is valued as useful is considered as the criterion by which all things are judged, especially "truth". Truth is only truth insofar as it is "useful". For Plato the highest kind of usefulness is found in idetic-seeing, in the "right way" of looking at things.

On the ὀφθάλμος, the correctness of looking, rests everything. Through this correctness, seeing and recognizing are made correct so that this correctness ultimately aims straight for the highest Idea, and fixes itself in this "alignment" (PLW, 41-42; 265).

The inner teleology of the original Greek approach gets covered-up in this reversal in thinking: presence (*ousia*) as the emergence (*θεόν*) of the hidden (*λήθα*) into unhiddenness (*ἀλήθεια*) becomes the emergence of the *ōθεα* into unhiddenness. This reversal determines modern thinking
to this day, and is still the accepted and uncontested notion of "reality". Beings are treated according to "ideas" and "values" (of usefulness); which values and which ideas one chooses is really not that important, as long as things can be weighed according to values and ideas.

Paideia in the "post-reversal" Western world thus becomes an institution for teaching the "correct way" of ideating and valuing. The realm of experience which is not directly related to "ideas" and "values" is considered both useless and meaningless. Truth that is neither an idea nor a value is forgotten, indeed considered meaningless. And in the eikon of the cave, so argues Heidegger, this forgetfulness itself is forgotten about--lost in a world of values and ideas.

7. Conclusion

In PLW Heidegger carries out two basic arguments: first, he attempts to show that one can speak meaningfully about "Plato's doctrine", in this case his doctrine of truth. Not only can one speak about this doctrine, but one can speak about an "unsaid teaching" harboured deep within it. Although the sheer fact that "Plato" never says anything in the espousal of this doctrine does not concern Heidegger, nor likewise does the fact that the "doctrine" is found in an eikon. Secondly, and more importantly, Heidegger argues that with Plato οὐσία as α-λήθεια becomes οὐσία as ζήσα. This shift away from the truth of being to the truth of the
"inner nature" or "idea" of being follows from the belief that mankind's essential connection to being can only be experienced through idetic-seeing, the most primordial way of being-in-the-world. Primordial idetic-seeing is consequently construed as "the best way" for human beings "to be", whence Plato's notion of the idea of to agathon.
Chapter V

HEIDEGGER'S NEGLECT: THE ARCHE AND TELOS OF IDEIN

1. Introduction

In this concluding chapter the main argument of PLW is examined, on the one hand, in light of the alethology put forth in SZ, and on the other, in light of the notion of the psyche put forth in the Republic. This task is accomplished in a threefold manner.

First, the basic position put forth in SZ concerning Sorge (qua source of Dasein's "being-true" or "being what it is") is set before the argument put forth in PLW; it is consequently shown that PLW and SZ are at doctrinal variance. Quite simply, it is shown that Sorge, as it is construed in SZ, serves a similar role as the notion of Agathon does in the Republic; since PLW rejects the claim that there can be any formal or structural equiprimordiality with one's sheer being-in-the-truth, PLW must perforce reject the claim made in SZ that "without Dasein, i.e. Sorge, there would be no truth".

Secondly, the main arguments in PLW are examined in light of the Republic itself. Special attention is paid to Heidegger's neglect of the role that dialectics, and not just idetic-seeing, plays in the philosophical method praised by Socrates. Also, special attention is paid to Heidegger's
neglect of the Republic's description of the arche and the telos of the psyche.

Thirdly, and finally, this chapter and thesis close with what can be called no less than a most timely voice. Walter Hirsch's approach to Plato in Platon's Weg zum Mythos is brought forward as an example of the direction which a Heideggerian critique of Plato ought to take, but which Heidegger himself never took. Hirsch successfully retrieves from Plato a position in line with the basic teaching of SZ.

The overall results of this chapter reinforce this paper's thesis that one cannot accept, given the main argument in SZ, the hermeneutical context from which Heidegger argues in PLW, the context of the "unhiddenness first" approach to beings and being itself. Either PLW contradicts the alethology put forth in SZ, or else points beyond it; given the substance of his later writings, which PLW along with The Essence of Truth more or less inaugurate, Heidegger seems to be going beyond the notion of truth found in SZ.

2. The Structure of Sorge: PLW and SZ

In PLW Heidegger envisions "the end of metaphysics" taking place when Plato's approach to beings and being itself is finally overcome, since the beginning of metaphysics, argues Heidegger, first takes its rise with Plato. In a similar manner; he also envisions "the end of morality" taking place when Plato's notion of the good is finally
overcome.

The overcoming of Plato's "metaphysical" as well as his "moralistic" thought is put forth in PLW as lying at the very heart of Heidegger's philosophical task. Given the thesis in SZ however, one must seriously question whether or not it is Plato or Heidegger, or indeed the Plato in Heidegger, that Heidegger is trying to overcome.

Heidegger's SZ notion of the role that Sorge plays in Dasein's truthfulness or authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) is meant to replace, not retrieve, the traditional and so called "Platonic" manner of dealing with the origin or source of ethical comportment. As Heidegger argues, the Platonic approach is embedded in the basic cultural experience of the West, since Christianity as it has developed has expressed itself through a "Platonic" experience of being: "Platonism for the people" as Nietzsche calls it. Thus, Heidegger also sees his task in PLW as the fundamental overcoming of the basic moral teaching of Christianity, in which the notion of the God found in the Republic has been assimilated by the notion of God found in the Bible.

From a Judeo-Christian point of view, God is construed as the primordial source, origin, and ground (ἀρχή) of human goodness and badness, rightness and wrongness; God is seen as the basic arche of authenticity and inauthenticity. The Devil is seen as the arche of human badness, of the most basic badness. But the Devil does not hold an equal position with God; the Devil is a "privation" of God. The Devil
denied and continues to deny God. The Devil has "fallen from" God's essential way of being. The Devil continually tries to overcome and annihilate God, but never is wholly successful. It is God as the arche of human aletheia, ousia, and episteme that is constantly the maintainer and sustainer of what is.

In Sz Heidegger argues that one need not go beyond his notion of Sorge in order to account for Dasein's essential truth and falsity; authenticity and inauthenticity; goodness and badness. In PLW he thinks that the notions of God and the Devil cannot adequately deal with Dasein's basic predicament. Nor does he think that his notion of Sorge is merely a literal interpretation, rather a "reinterpretation", of the traditional, eikonical-mythological, "religious" interpretation of Dasein.

But viewed from a traditional point of view, viewed from the point of view of the tradition that Heidegger is "putting into brackets", Heidegger's doctrine of Sorge can only be called an ethical doctrine, i.e. a teaching which describes how one has been created to live, and therefore how one ought to live. In Heidegger's case the notion of the "ought" is of utmost importance. In Sz one finds that Sorge metaphorically says to Dasein, as the voice of Dasein's conscience: Dasein you ought to act in this way, i.e. you ought to be aware of being-in-the-truth in the way that you are; you ought not cover this basic unhiddenness over; you ought not live in an inauthentic interpretation of
what you are....

According to Heidegger, one finds this "ought" in the very "structure" of Dasein, and the very fact that there is an "ought" at all, and that Dasein encounters and experiences it, is evidence that Dasein finds a "way to be" that is its own, that it finds its own Ἡθός. In this sense, the arguments against Plato's notion of agathon in PLW appear to apply equally to the notion of Sorge in SZ. This is further evinced in the way that Heidegger sees Sorge in SZ and Agathon in PLW.

In SZ Heidegger puts forth two notions of Sorge. On the one hand, Sorge is construed as a power, and, on the other hand, as a structure. As a power, Sorge is the voice of conscience, that which calls, draws and maintains Dasein in its innermost unhiddenness (truth). As a structure, Sorge is the structure of all structures, the Strukturganzheit. Sorge is that which structurally "constitutes" Dasein's being. In this formally structural sense, Sorge is that which is both the reason for and source of Dasein's being-in-the-truth as "what" it is.

In PLW Heidegger puts forth two interpretations of the Agathon. On the one hand, he interprets to agathon as a power, a power which renders all things useful, a Tauglich-machend. On the other hand, he interprets to agathon or "the idea of Agathon" in terms of its formal function. As an idea it serves the same function as all the ideai, but as the idea of Agathon, it is "the highest idea", the idea of...
idea, and that which constitutes the formal constitution of the human being.

If Sorge and Agathon do share this twofold functional sameness, as is herein described, then why doesn't Heidegger, in PLW, offer his own doctrine of Sorge in place of Plato's doctrine of Agathon? After all, he does offer an alternative to Plato's doctrine of the truth of beings. He does argue that the primordial truth of a being is not its whatness, but rather its unhiddenness; he does maintain throughout PLW that "the fundamental trait (Grundzug) of being and beings is unhiddenness" (PLW, 46, 51, 52; 267, 270). But he does not offer an alternative to Plato's notion of the "arche" of truth, to agathon; no mention is made about the Grund of unhiddenness itself, about the "arche" of unhiddenness. From the point of view of SZ this arche is Sorge. But why is it not brought forth in PLW as is the concept of unhiddenness?

Perhaps the answer to this question has to do more with Heidegger's notion of Struktur in SZ than with his notion of Sorge, for Struktur is a much more unclarified notion in SZ than Sorge, although Heidegger appears unaware of the degree to which the whole philosophical enterprise in SZ is dependent on the notion of Struktur, the formal element of beings and being itself.

Like the ideai, one is not given structures, especially the structure of Sorge, in the same way as one is given beings. Structures are not, it must be emphasized, the
immediately given. Dasein must extrapolate the structures from beings by means of logical analysis, or in Heidegger's case, onto-logical analysis. The structures are not, however, to be thought of solely as Begriffe, concepts in the mind. Structures are rooted "in the things themselves". Thus, on the one hand, Dasein always understands itself and the world "by means of" these structures even though for the most part it does so unawares. On the other hand, from a more reflective point of view, Dasein understands itself and its world "in terms of" these structures, i.e. they are the extrapolated framework through which Dasein can look, and look most primordially, at itself and its world. The aim of philosophy as seen from the point of Sz is the understanding of the nature of things "in terms of" these basic, archical structures of Dasein's being, and hence of being itself. Sorge as the most archical structure is the highest form of the "in terms of which" all phenomena must be interpreted. But then, how different is this manner of speaking about structures and the structure of Sorge than the manner used for speaking about the idea and the idea of Agathon in the Republic?

Not everyone can "see" things "in terms of" structures, even though they constantly see by means of the structures. Even in the "sciences", that mode of knowledge which sees things and works with things in terms of ontical structures, the most basic "in terms of which" is not the main concern. Only in fundamental ontology, argues Heidegger, is the most
archical "in terms of which" sought after, and sought after by means of "structural-seeing". Ultimately, fundamental ontology leads to the structural seeing of the arche of all truth and being, the structure of Sorge itself.

It should be stressed, however, that this kind of structural-seeing into the nature of Dasein, truth, and being is not construed as a purely revelational experience of the sheer unhiddenness or presence of what is. The "telos" that Heidegger sets up for philosophy in _SZ_, the structural-seeing of the "arche" of Dasein's being-in-the-truth, is exactly the kind of telos argued against in _PLW_; for, Heidegger does not outrightly reject Plato's notion of the "telos" of philosophy, he rather rejects the means (δόξα) by which this telos is accomplished. The "means" is quite simply idetic-seeing, argues Heidegger, and this consequently reduces the "telos" to a matter of idetic-seeing. However, if one accepts this argument formulated by Heidegger in _PLW_, then one must conclude that the telos of philosophy in Heidegger's own _SZ_ remains fixed within "structural-seeing".

As a result of this conflict between the very foundations on which _SZ_ and _PLW_ rest, one is also forced to conclude that the latter work does not truly reflect, and cannot truly reflect, the position taken in the former. If there is indeed a _Kehre_ in Heidegger's thinking between _SZ_ and his later writings, perhaps it lies within the parameters of this very conflict.
3. To Agathon as the Originating-locus of the Inner-nature of the Human Being qua Psyche

In his analysis of Plato's notion of truth in PLW, Heidegger argues that Plato's thought is ruled by an anthropocentric and moralistic utilitarianism, that Plato's whole philosophy is based on a concept of usefulness, Tauglichkeit. This critique of Plato's alethology rests on two basic arguments, one concerning the ἔσει, and the other τὸ ἁγορόν. Herein both arguments are examined and criticized not so much for the position that they defend, but rather for the material that they choose to neglect. Overall it is herein maintained that Heidegger does not deal with the role that the psyche plays in the doctrine of truth expressed in the Republic.

(a) To Agathon: Before dealing with Heidegger's actual interpretation of the idea of Agathon, a few remarks should be made concerning his translation of τὸ ἁγορόν. He says: "As thought in a Greek manner, τὸ ἁγορόν means that which is useful to something, or makes something useful" (PLW, 38; 263).

Given this notion of usefulness, however, anything and everything can be considered tauglich, fittingly useful. As long as something has some reference to the human being, it can be considered useful; since everything can be considered useful to the human being, and since the main theme of the Republic concerns the human being, all the notions taken up and dealt with by Plato in the Republic
can be interpreted in the framework of Tauglichkeit. Hence, without further knowing what Heidegger actually means by this term, it is difficult to follow the exact meaning of his subsequent argument.

If it is, however, granted that perhaps Heidegger's translation of to agathon as Tauglichkeit instead of as das Gute does capture the sense of to agathon, then the question must be raised concerning his claim that the Greeks thought about the idea and the good in terms of usefulness: granted that the idea and the good were thought about in terms of their usefulness, can one really claim that these two notions were essentially thought in this sense, especially in the Republic?

In several places in the Republic the notion of an ethic or even an ontology established on and rooted in a utilitarianism of the kind that Heidegger ascribes to Plato's thinking is examined. Indeed, the Republic opens with an attack on traditional Greek morality as represented by Simonides' two dictums that justice is "speaking the truth" and "giving back what one has been given" (R, 332c). Socrates, assuming that the former dictum is actually contained in the latter (R, 332a-c), argues that the Simonidean ethic is really based on a notion of befittingness (διφειλόμενον) (R, 332c). In order for one to be just, one must determine what befits one to speak truly and what befits others to be given their due. Justice construed as a doctrine of befittingness looks at the world
in terms of usefulness; it turns the just person into someone who is just only when determining what is befitting. Outside of determining befittingness, i.e. outside of determining the utility (χρήσιμον) of acts and things, justice and the just person are useless (ἄχρηστος) (R, 332e). Although Socrates' arguments against this doctrine of utilitarian justice may appear overtly specious, they are intended, nevertheless, to seriously call into doubt the foundations of the traditional Greek approach to justice.

It is this notion of the χρήσιμον or Tauglichkeit which the Republic tries to uproot and replace. So although Heidegger may be quite correct in maintaining that the Greeks generally thought of τὸ ἀγαθόν in terms of χρήσιμον, he is wrong in arguing that Plato's thought is also ruled by a similar idea.

It would be fruitless, however, to argue that Plato does not think of the idea in terms of its Tauglichkeit; the idetic-seeing of the idea in general, and the idetic-seeing of the idea of agathon in particular, as Plato himself says (489b-c; 505a, 2), serve a useful function. Idetic-seeing of the idea is prima facie useful in the way that all knowledge is useful, and not just in the way that it applies to the utilitarian praxis-world. But idetic-seeing also lies outside of the domain of that which is usually called "useful". When idetic-seeing is employed for the purpose of arriving at the most fundamental understanding of being, one becomes godlike, one participates in the divine:
"Then, by dealing with the cosmos, and that which is divine, the philosopher will become like the cosmos and like the divine" (500c, 1-3). To idetically see the most basic idetic connections at work in the reality of the human being's world is to partake in that which is not in itself "human", which is not in itself "mortal" in the way human beings appear mortal, and which is not in itself rooted in the purely human web of affairs; it is to partake in the non-human, non-mortal, non-utilitarian and non-temporal realm of what is. Passion and desire, not utility, originally compel one to employ idetic-seeing for the purpose of comporting oneself towards that which is most truly being (μυ̂γεις τῷ δώτῳ δύνας) (R, 490, b6). Indeed, Plato draws an analogy between sexual and philosophical intercourse. In the former kind lies the possibility of the birth of human beings, while in the latter, the birth of truth and intelligence (R, 490b-c).

From fear of belabouring the point that "usefulness" is an inadequate translation of the term to agathon and interpretation of the notion of the idea itself, Heidegger's construal of the ἄγαθος τοῦ ἀληθοῦς is now turned to.

As will be pointed out in the next section on the idea, Heidegger tends to neglect the role that the psyche plays in the Republic; along with this neglect of the ψυχή goes the neglect of the arche. The neglect of the arche is illustrated most clearly in Heidegger's construal of the idea of agathon as a cause of usefulness, a Tauglichmachen.
As Plato says, the seeing into the psyche's being in the truth (R, 505a, 1) is one of the most useful and beneficial kinds of knowledge, but this does not mean that as a cause to agathon is solely the cause of usefulness.

Plato says:

This, then, that provides the truth to that which is known, and gives the ability to know to the knower, you must say is the idea of agathon, and you must construe it as being the cause of episteme, and aletheia insofar as it is known (R, 508e 1-3).

The idea of agathon is first and foremost the arche of Eigentlichkeit—human essentialness or truthfulness—and only secondarily an arche of Tauglichkeit, human utility or efficaciousness. The idea of agathon is the source and cause of that which is the particular essence or nature of the human being qua psyche. The idea of agathon is that which is the source and cause of the particular Eigentlichkeit of the psyche. Dialectics, the means by which the human being comes to understand the idea of agathon, attempts to find its way "to that which each thing in itself is. (ἐπ' ὧν ὅ ἐστιν ἐκμακρύνοντο)" (R, 532a, 9) until led to the "telos" of intelligence, to agathon itself. Since the Republic aims at getting to the very essence (ὅ ἐστιν) of the human being, it seeks to get to the Eigentlichkeit of the human being; it finds this in the psyche's participation in truth and in the source and cause of this truth, to agathon. In a word, to agathon, considered as a cause, is construed in the Republic as an Eigentlichmachend, a cause
or maker of the very nature of the human being. The Tauglichkeit follows from the fact of there being an Eigentlichkeit to begin with, just as economics follows from the human beings who carry it out. To agathon is a cause of Tauglichkeit, but not solely and foremostly so.

4. The Beginning (Αρχή) Understood as the End (Τέλος)

Throughout the Republic, but especially in Book VII, Socrates emphatically maintains that the psyche, the nexus and sole locus of awareness, seeks a teleological understanding of itself: the ἔσεα in itself is simply not enough -- the psyche by its own nature seeks the arche of the ἔσεα. The greatest drawback of PLW lies in its neglect of the teleological dimension of Plato's thought as expressed in the Republic. In his attempt to make the ἔσειν of the ἔσεα the most thematic aspect of Plato's alethology, Heidegger fails to see the teleological relation that the psyche has with its arche. 2

Since a great deal of the argument in PLW is based on the sun eikon of Book VI, the divided line shall be borrowed from this same Book in order to cast more light on PLW. What is of concern here is the distinction in the divided line between noetical and dianoetical knowledge.

Dianoetical knowledge is characterized by a certain restriction: in its nature dianoetical knowledge is restricted to the idein of the ideai. On the level of dianoia, one treats the ideai in a strictly eikonical fashion, i.e. as
likenesses of what is. In dianoia the idein is eikonical because it proceeds without questioning, in a thematic fashion, the archical foundations that exist between, on the one hand, one's idetic-interpretation of what is, and on the other, what truly is. Geometry and mathematics are the paradigms of dianoetical knowledge; these two "sciences" are based on certain "hypotheses" about the nature of being, albeit these hypotheses are considered self-evidently axiomatic.

On the level of "nous" or noetical understanding one accepts no hypothetical agreement between an idein and an idea without first dealing with the archological foundations on which this agreement (ὁμοίωσις) rests. The method used in the noetical approach is described by Plato as dialectics (διάλεκτική). Dialectics uses the method of idetic-seeing, but its aim or telos is unique in that it seeks the arche, and not a hypothesis about the arche. Dialectics uses idetic-seeing to get to the origin of idetic-seeing itself. As such, the dialectical approach can be described as archological in order to distinguish it from the dianoetical approach, which is eikonical, i.e. seeking likeness and agreement.

According to Plato, the noetical and dianoetical approaches are interdependent. Without the noetical dimension, dianoetical understanding would be blind—dianoia needs the vision called for by nous. Without the dianoetical, the noetical would be crippled. The noetical depends on the
dianoetical as vision depends on the eyes or hearing on the ears.

The crucial error in PLW is Heidegger's setting-up of dianosynical knowledge in place of that which Plato reserves for noetical knowledge. Heidegger argues in PLW that the truth of dianoia is seen as the primary locus of truth for Plato, since the ἔσεια, Heidegger argues, is all that Plato is after. The term ἀφοξή doesn't appear once in PLW, nor indeed is there any attempt to distinguish ἴδεν from other types of comportment towards beings.

In the Republic Plato establishes dialectics as the essence of philosophy, the love of wisdom. Dialectics is a comportment which seeks the most basic arché itself (ἐπ' ἀυτὴν τὴν ἀφοξήν) (R, 511b, 2; R, 533c, 3). Although it uses idetic-seeing (ἔσεια) to accomplish this goal, dialectics itself cannot be reduced solely to idetic-seeing. Plato rather calls dialectics the grasping, touching or beholding (ἀπτεσθαι) of the ἀφοξή (R, 511b, 2). By means of dialectics one grasps that which is most archical; in seeking the truth of the most archical, dialectics seeks to draw the psyche into a grasping of the archical—employing the idein of nous as its guide and helper (R, 533d, 1-2). Dialectics "compels the psyche to employ nous with a view to αλήθεια itself. (προσαναγκάζειν αύτῇ τῇ νοησεῖ ἀφοξήλα τὴν ψυχῆν ἐπ' αυτὴν τὴν αλήθειαν)" (R, 526b, 1).

Dialectics aims first and foremost at a conversion (περιαγωγή) of the psyche, without which it would be impossible to truly idein the idea of the good. Since the ἔσεια of the ἔσεια
is for the sake of the psyche—the psyche understood as the essence of the human being—Plato's doctrine of truth in the Republic cannot be limited to his doctrine of the idea. Heidegger confuses Plato's method, the idetic-seeing carried out by nous, with Plato's aim, archological understanding. Heidegger neglects the fact that the telos of dialectics according to Plato does not lie in nous' idein of the idea, but rather in the psyche's beholding and grasping of the arche of idein. True, the idein of the idea is basically a relationship based on rectified seeing, but the beholding of the archical is not restricted to a matter of this rectified, idetic-seeing. The method, it is true, depends on orthotes, but the telos, the psyche's awareness and understanding of that in which it is fundamentally rooted, depends on the nature of truth itself.

To neglect, as Heidegger does, the role that the arche of idein plays in the doctrine of truth put forth in the Republic and to set up the idein itself as the whole basis of Plato's doctrine of truth, would be like describing a path without at the same time describing the purpose of that path.

5. Concluding Remarks

Heidegger's interpretation of Plato is having a great impact on many modern thinkers. Little time, however, seems to be spent on thinking about the validity of Heidegger's formula that "with Plato ousia is no longer thought of as
a-letheia, but as idea". In terms of this formula, Plato is seen as the villain behind Western thought, and Heidegger the knight in shining armour who battles and conquers this great Grendel.

Since the approach in this thesis is mainly critical, and since an actual positive contribution towards a fuller description of Plato's doctrine of truth lies outside the purview of the thesis, an author is mentioned whose work reflects the direction which a positive contribution ought to take.

In Platons Weg zum Mythos, Walter Hirsch takes up a phenomenological interpretation of Plato which takes into account both the historical progression and logical development of Plato's thought. Hirsch puts forth a more successful reading of Plato in light of Heidegger's basic position in SZ—but Hirsch goes beyond the narrow confines of PLW.

Hirsch argues consistently and persuasively that, first and foremost, Plato's main concern and point of departure is always the life world, the world in which the human psyche finds itself. For Plato, argues Hirsch, the "logos"—and the "idein" it involves—is not of first importance, but rather "life"; the aim of the dialogues is not the perfection of the logos itself, but rather the perfection of life. And in order to more fully understand what Plato said and thought about the nature of truth, one has to study not only his logical doctrine, but also his mythological one
as well, with a view to both his basic teaching on "life"
and the situation out of which his logos and mythos stem.
In a word, Hirsch argues that the context of the question
about the Λόγος τοῦ ἀγάθου has its source in the larger ques-
tion about human existence (das menschliche Dasein). Heidegger,
on the other hand, situates the question solely in the context
of the Λόγος, therefore neglecting the real intention behind
the question.

Had Heidegger taken into account this larger question
behind Plato's notion of το ἀγαθόν, his thesis in PLW would
have been significantly different. As it stands, however,
the thesis of "the mummification interpretation" itself
betrays the rubber-gloved handiwork of the embalmer. For
there is a higher god than Hermes--the god of Λόγος--being
praised in the Republic; the recognized patron of the Republic
is the sun-god Apollo, the god of archery, the god of truth,
the god of healing, and the god whom the Muses attend. The
best philosophy and the most noble state are what come into
being midway between this god's two hands.
NOTES


2<sup>The evidence from PLW is taken up in Ch. III, wherein also the other works are noted.</sup>


4<sup>Cf. PLW, p. 46.</sup>

Chapter II

NOTES


3Cf. Heidegger's letter to Richardson, Heidegger, pp. IX-XI.

4"My Way to Phenomenology" appears in On Time and Being, pp. 74-82.

5Ibid., p. 78.

6Ibid., p. 79.

7Husserl, LU, I, pp. 11-12 (I, p. 60). "Hierdurch ist das Gebiet einer neuen und, wie sich alsbald zeigen wird, komplexen Disziplin bezeichnet, deren Eigentümliches es ist, Wissenschaft zu sein, und die eben darum am prägnantesten als Wissenschaftslehre zu benennen wäre."

8LU, I, p. 230 (I, 227): "Dahin gehören auch die Wissenschaften, das Wort objektiv genommen, also im Sinne der geeinigten Wahrheit."
nöetische, nämlich sie gründen in der Idee der Erkenntnis
als solcher, und zwar a priori, ohne jede Rücksicht auf
die empirische Besonderheit des menschlichen Erkennens
in seinen psychologischen Bedingtheiten; oder sie sind
rein logische, d.h. sie gründen rein im Inhalt der Erkenntnis."

10 LU, I, p. 246 (I, 239).

11 For Husserl the realm of truth "is no disordered
Chaos, but is ruled and unified by Law." (Die Wissenschaft,
will das Mittel sein, unserem Wissen das Reich der Wahrheit,
und zwar in grösstmöglichem Umfange, zu erobern; aber das
Reich der Wahrheit ist kein ungeordnetes Chaos, es herrscht

12 LU, I, 16 (I, 63).

13 Loc. cit.

14 Findlay translates Husserl's term Evidenz as
"self-evidence", as does David Carr, the translator of
Husserl's The Crisis of European Sciences (Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 1970), who says that, when
Husserl uses the term Evidenz technically, "it means 'self-
givenness'; whereas the English word 'evidence' usually
has a very different meaning, that of something testifying
to the existence of something else (e.g., evidence in a
trial)." (p. 128)

15 LU, I, p. 14 (I, 61): "Im letzten Grunde beruht
also jede echte und speziell jede wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis
auf Evidenz, und so weit die Evidenz reicht, so weit reicht
auch der Begriff des Wissens.

16 Indeed, Heidegger says that, after the publication
of the Ideas, "we--friends and pupils--begged the master
again and again to republish the sixth Investigation which
was then difficult to obtain." On Time and Being, p. 78.
Cf. also the footnote to the sixth Investigation in § 44
of SZ, wherein Heidegger formally acknowledges his indeb-
tness to Husserl's alethology, especially for the crucial
notion of Identifizierung. The act of truth is described
by Husserl as a Deckung, which is returned by Heidegger as
Entdeckung; important also is the distinction Husserl
draws in § 38 of Investigation VI between truth understood
as Evidenz (which only applies to the logic of Bestätigung)
and truth as Sein.


22. **LU**, II, 124 (II, 767): Summarizing the crux of his notion of logical truth, Husserl says: "Denn wir bemerken, dass bei einer Urteilsevidenz (Urteil = prädikative Aussage) das Sein im Sinne der Urteilswahrheit erlebt, aber nicht ausgedruckt ist, also niemals mit dem in dem ist der Aussage gemeinten und erlebten Sein koinzidiert."

Truth, so understood, is more appropriately described by Husserl as a 'being-true' *(Wahrsein).*


26. Husserl, *Ideas*, p. 361. In LU Husserl distinguishes the verification from the justification of truth, the former referring to *Evidenz* and the latter to *Sein*.


28 It should be noted, however, that in his last major work, The Crisis of European Sciences (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), Husserl reaffirms the less rationalistic LU notion of truth; Wahrnehmung and Gegenwartigung are somewhat broadened out to include the Lebenswelt (cf. pp. 127-128). The lifeworld becomes the basic justification of truth claims; the life-world, and not Reason or Consciousness harbours within itself the fundamental Structures: "the life-world does have, in all its relative features, a general structure. This general structure, to which everything that exists relatively is bound, is not itself relative." (p. 130)

29 Like Descartes before him, Husserl has borrowed and modified Pyrrho's and Sextus Empiricus' method of εποχή.

30 Ernst Tugendhat, Der Wahrheitbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967); describes the distinction drawn here between Husserl's notion of epoché and Heidegger's α-letheia in the context of the two thinkers' notions of (self-)givenness. Tugendhat maintains that for Husserl the correlate of Intentionality is, strictly speaking, Gvenness itself, whereas for Heidegger the correlate of Disclosiveness (Erschlossenheit) is Openness or Clearedness (Lichtung) (p. 259).

31Like the English translator of SZ, this author chooses not to translate Heidegger's term Dasein. Richardson, in Heidegger, for example, awkwardly translates Dasein as "being-there", thus trying to capture both the literal sense of the term Da-sein and Heidegger's metaphorical designation of "being-aware-of-being-here-now". Spiegelberg, in The Phenomenological Movement, somewhat stubbornly translates Heidegger's term Dasein as "human existence". Cf. p. 282.
In the German language, the term "Dasein" means much the same as the early Greek notion of the "Psyche (ψυχή)", i.e. existence, being, life, and presence; the idiomatic German phrase "to step into Dasein" means "to come into being or life", and the phrase "Struggle for Dasein" (Daseinskampf) means "the struggle for life or existence". Heidegger etymologically breaks down Dasein into its two morphemes, Da and Sein. Da means "(to be) here", or "(to be) there", or especially, "(to be) present", as in 'Is Joe da?' (i.e. Is Joe around--here/present?). Sein means "to be", and quite literally translates as the English "being". Dasein, for Heidegger, is that being which is in the Open, i.e. is present (da) in being (Sein). Cf. SZ, 134, 143, 220. In SZ Dasein is no longer thought of as an animal rationale, an animal with logos (ἔλογον ἀλογον ἔχον), but rather as a being with logos (ὅν λόγον ἔχον). For Heidegger's own awareness of the connection between his notion of Dasein and the notion of the ψυχή, cf. SZ, p. 14.

32 The SZ notion of Struktur will play an increasingly more important role in this paper, as will the SZ notion of a phenomenon's Sich, self. Nowhere in SZ is the term Struktur defined, although it is one of the most crucial terms in SZ. It appears in SZ mostly as a noun, otherwise usually as part of a compound noun, as in Daseinsstruktur, Existenziestruktur, Seinsstruktur, Wesensstruktur, Vorstruktur and Strukturganzen. The term Struktur, oddly enough, does not appear in the comprehensive index to SZ, cf. Hildegard Feick, Index zu Heideggers Sein und Zeit (2. Auflage; Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1968).

In German the term Struktur has been borrowed from the Latin structura, which means to build, erect (édifico), and form. Perhaps Heidegger has simply taken over Husserl's notion of structure, a notion which cannot be taken out of the context of the eidetic and essential structures. For Husserl the prinzipielle Struktureinsichten are the "insights by which the essential structure is seen" [cf., Dorion Cairns, Guide for Translating Husserl (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 108]. In his post-SZ writings, Heidegger is very aware, indeed painstakingly aware, of the word(s) he uses to describe the formal aspect of Being; for example, the term Grundzug is used in PLW (pp. 46, 51, and 52) as the (unclarified) alternative notion to Plato's ἔνδοκα, and perhaps alternative term for "fundamental Structure" of SZ. Cf. also the description of the term Wesen, essence, in "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit," Wegmarken (3. Auflage, Frankfurt Am Main: Klostermann, 1976); Wesen only partly entails the notion of the formal aspect (ἔνδοκα/ἔνδοκα) that Struktur implies. Heidegger says in Wesen des Wahrheit: "Wesen: 1. Quidditas—das Was—κατον; 2. Ermöglichung—Bedingung
der Möglichkeit; 3. Grund der Ermöglichung" p. 177.

33SZ, pp. 222 and 298.

34Heidegger's notion of λόγος is herein called logic; hence, phenomenology as a logos of phenomena, is a logic about phenomena. Logic for Heidegger encompasses the whole sphere of statements which make a claim about something. Above all, Heidegger's notion of "logic" should not be thought of as a particular kind of syllogistic or symbolic logic; neither does Heidegger construe logic as the study which "questions about what good reasoning is and about the difference between correct and incorrect steps in thinking."

35David F. Krell, "On the Manifold Meaning of Aletheia: Brentano, Aristotle, Heidegger," in Research in Phenomenology V (1975), 77-94, points out the degree to which Heidegger's methodology in §7 of SZ is dependent on the question of truth raised in §4 of SZ. Krell identifies the φαινόμενον in §7 with Heidegger's overall notion of οὐσία in SZ; logos as Heidegger thus construes it, argues Krell, becomes the άποθέτης of the truth (of being) (pp. 90-91).
Tugendhat makes the same point in his article "Heideggers Idee von Wahrheit" in Heidegger, herausgegeben Otto Pöggler (Köln: Kiepenheuer and Witsch, 1969), pp. 286-297 (i.e. Heidegger's "an ihm selbst" and "wie sie an ihm selbst ist" are synonymous with Entdecken understood as truth, or rather "being-true"--cf. p. 289).


37Husserl's notion of the Rechtsquelle and the subsequent identification of Wahrheit with Richtigkeit qualifies him, according to the argument in PLW, as a mummifier of the truth of Being. But it should also be noted that the SZ Heidegger is not without his own belief in an ontological and methodological άποθέτης: "Die Seinsfrage verlangt im Hinblick auf ihr Befragtes die Gewinnung und vorherige Sicherung der rechten Zugangsart zum Seienden." (SZ, 6). Cf. also: "Die rechtverstandene ontologische Forschung..." (SZ, 37); "Diese eigentliche Verbundheit ermöglicht erst die rechte Sachlichkeit..." (SZ, 122); and finally, "Wird die rechtverstandene Wahrheit..." (SZ, 227).

Loc. cit.

A very questionable denial, since for Husserl the Given is almost a synonymous expression for the Meant as such: "I can simply look at that which is meant as such and can grasp it absolutely." Husserl, Introduction, p. 25.

Husserl, Introduction, p. 25.

The reader is referred to the concepts of the eidos, doksa, and natural attitude in the Ideas. In this respect, one should note that in the ancient world the technical use of the Eidos was not antithetical to the Platonic project; indeed, Arisilaus (315-240 B.C.), the first great Academic user of the Eidos, took over the headship of Plato's Academy; cf. T. E. Page, ed., Diogenes Laertius, Vol. I, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, trans. R. D. Hicks (6th ed., London: Heinemann, 1968), pp. 405-423.


Heidegger is never referred to by name; instead Fink directs critical remarks towards his doctrine, calling it "philosophical anthropology" or "ontology which tries to determine the Being of Subjectivity." Cf. pp. 15-17.

Fink, Research in Phenomenology, p. 7.

Ibid., p. 9.

Douglas R. McCaughey, in "Husserl and Heidegger on Plato's Cave Allegory: A Study on Philosophical Influence," International Philosophical Quarterly, 16 (1976), 331-348, tries to point out Heidegger's "contra Husserl via Plato" position in PLW with reference to Fink's article. For the contra SZ via Plato's attitude, one has to turn to Heidegger himself; he says that he didn't finish SZ because he realized that he had failed to adequately express the experience SZ.

43 Edmund Husserl, Erste Philosophie (1923-1924), ed. Rudolf Boehm (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), p. 17. Author's translation. "Bewusst oder unbewusst bestimmen sie den Wesenscharakter und das Schicksal der europäischen Kulturentwicklung." Perhaps Husserl has Plato in mind when he characterizes the origins of the desire to put an Ideenkleid over the immediately given, cf. The Crisis, p. 23 and 51. For Husserl's opinion about Plato at the time of The Crisis, cf. Dorion Cairns, Conversations with Husserl and Fink, trans. Dorion Cairns (1st ed., The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976): "With Parmenides and Plato we find that the world of experience is actually rejected, as a field of mere doxa; and for Plato a supersensible world, a realm of ideas, is held to be the field of episteme" (p. 75).
Chapter III

NOTES

1 There seems to be some disagreement as to when this work was written; W. B. Macomber, in The Anatomy of Disillusion (Martin Heidegger's Notion of Truth), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967), bases the thesis of his book on the mistaken idea that this work represents Heidegger's thinking "in the middle of his career", 1943 (cf. p. 92). "The Essence of Truth," trans. John Sallis, in Martin Heidegger Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), pp. 117-351, will hereafter be referred to as ET. ET was originally given as a lecture in 1930 and subsequently in 1932 and 1933; it was first published in 1943 and appears in Wegmarken (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1967). For the dates, cf. Walter Biemald, Martin Heidegger, trans. J. L. Mehta (1st ed., New York: Harcourt, 1973), pp. 180 and 183; cf. also the "Verzeichnis der Vorlesungen und Übungen von Martin Heidegger" (pp. 663-682) in Richardson, Heidegger, p. 668. Biemald explains the difference between the doctrines of truth put forth in S2 and ET in terms of Heidegger's construal of the locus of truth: in the former work, Dasein (as Entschlossenheit) is the locus, in the latter, truth itself. (p. 90) Richardson takes the same approach as Biemald, cf. p. 220.

2 For these dates, cf. Richardson, Heidegger, p. 667. In a posthumously published interview with Der Spiegel, Heidegger says that the Nazi Party would not allow him, in 1937, to publicly discuss PLW; cf. Der Spiegel, XII (May 26, 1976), p. 274. But they must have had a change of heart, because they allowed him to publish it in 1942 (in Jahrbuch für die geistige Überlieferung, II).

3 Fay, Critique of Logic, pp. 3 and 9.


5 Ibid., 993b20.

6 Ibid., 1003a21.

7 Cf. Shorey, Plato, The Republic, p. 86.
8 Not according to Werner Marx, who goes so far as to speak of Heidegger and the tradition, cf. Heidegger and the Tradition, p. 17.

9 By "logic" is meant any statement or assertion (Aus-sage). In this sense, poetry, song, legend, myth, and syllogistic reasoning are kinds of Logic. Opposed to logic is existence. In the ordo essendi found in SŽ, logic and existence are kinds of truth.

10 Aristotle "set going" the adaequatio thesis, but as Heidegger also points out, Aristotle never "defends" it in its "broadened" form, i.e. the form which includes not only verification (derived truth) but also justification (primordial truth). Cf. p. 226.


12 Heidegger cites Question I, Article I, from Aquinas' Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate; he further claims that the adaequatio formula ultimately stems from Isaac Israeli's tenth century Book of Definitions (SŽ, 214). It should be noted, however, that Aquinas, in Question I, Article I, also expresses a different formula of truth, i.e. "truth is exactly the same as being", as in Augustine's formula: verum est id quod est; cf. Thomas Aquinas, The Disputed Questions on Truth, trans. Robert W. Yulligan, S.J. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952), Col. I, p. 9. The adaequatio-formula that Heidegger attributes to Israeli, moreover, cannot be found in Israeli's book, as has already been pointed by J. T. Muckle, "Isaac Israeli's Definition of Truth," in Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age, 1933, pp. 5-8, and by A. Altmann and S. Stern, Isaac Israeli (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 58-59. Isaac does argue in the Definitions that propositional truth (i.e. derivative truth) merely describes an aspect of truth, and not what truth itself is, "because if someone asks what truth is, the answer will be: that which a thing is." Isaac Israeli, p. 56. For evidence that Aristotle held a theory of truth other than the ὅμωμας, cf. De Anima III,5, 428b18 and 430b26; Posterior Analytics, 11,9 100b5-16; and especially (for the stipulation that 'rightness' in logical thinking and deliberating is dependent on a prior apprehension of truth itself) Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI. Since Heidegger acknowledges that Aristotle never defends the thesis that locates the essence of truth in logic (i.e. in the judgment), one is left wondering why Aristotle, according to Heidegger's argument in SŽ, did not also "set going" a notion of truth more basic than the one founded on ὅμωμας.


15 This problem arises because fundamental ontology stays within the sphere of the logical-apophantical As-structure of interpretation, i.e. the Aussage-logic. But since logic cannot verify, at least in perception (Wahrnehmung), the existential-hermeneutical As-structure's pre-conceptual understanding of Dasein and Being, logic, as it is understood in §Z, somehow fails fundamental ontology; hence, unless perception is broadened to include the "givenness" of the Auslegung (pre-conceptual understanding), Heidegger's notion of logical truth in § 44 of §Z harbours a lacuna.

16 Heidegger recognizes this in ET, §§ 2 and 3. In ET Heidegger grounds the traditional Correspondence Theory on his notion of the Openness of primordial truth. The "So-wie" relation understood as the rightness of the correspondence is a relation grounded in truth itself: "Das Wesen der Wahrheit als Richtigkeit der Aussage verstanden, ist die Freiheit." Wesen der Wahrheit, p. 186.

17 That traditionally the Correspondence Theory has been construed as applying to logical truth understood as a mode of truth dependent on a more basic truth, needs no justification at this point, since Aristotle has already been mentioned. But for evidence that even a modern defender of the Correspondence Theory recognizes that the primary locus of truth does not lie in the judgment itself, cf. D. W. Hamlyn's notion that "the truth of a statement is dependent upon the nature of the world" (p. 204) in "The Correspondence Theory of Truth," in The Philosophical Quarterly, 12 (1962), pp. 193-205.
Eigentlichkeit is Heidegger's term for Dasein's authenticity. Literally Eigentlichkeit means "ownness", as the word is based on eigen, own, of one's own. 'To own' means to possess, have, or be bound to. Dasein "possesses" or "has" a particular mode of being. Heidegger never explicitly defines the term Eigentlichkeit; but one is led to believe that it only applies to Dasein, and that rocks and pigs, for example, are devoid of Eigentlichkeit, rather they have, as categorical beings, a Selbigerkeit, self-sameness. Formally the term Eigentlichkeit expresses a relation that Dasein has to itself.

Primordiality (Ursprunglichkeit) and derivedness (Abkunftigkeit) are the only two terms that Heidegger uses in his "priority argument". Neither term, however, ever appears as a noun; they are only found as adjectives. Regarding truth, Heidegger argues that there are only two basic kinds of truth, primordial and derivative. For him, primordial truth is found in existence, and derivative truth in statements about existence, i.e. in logic. Like the term Struktur, however, Ursprunglichkeit is never discussed, like most of the crucial terms in SZ, from a historical point of view. One can only conclude that by the way Heidegger uses the term "ursprünglich" he has the notion of an ἀρχή in mind.

Durchsichtigkeit is Dasein's fundamental awareness or clarity; as the most primordial mode of Sicht, vision or sight, it precedes all other modes of understanding. Traditionally, says Heidegger, the most primordial way of access to Being and beings was construed in terms of 'seeing' (sehen), which is a derived mode of Sicht. Sicht (as synonymous for Verstehen) is always contextual, as opposed to Sehen, seeing, which is directional, as the following phrases indicate: "to sight a whale" and "to see a whale". Cf. SZ, § 51.

Cf. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale, 1958), pp. 102 and 105, where Heidegger argues that aletheia can only be understood if Being is understood as phusis, the sheer opening-up or unfolding of what is. In PLW Heidegger offers an alternative to Plato's notion of aletheia and ousia, but not, and this should be stressed, to agathon, whereas in SZ Sorge serves the function that agathon serves, for example, in Plato's Republic aletheology. Cf. also ET, in which Sorge is not referred to at all; in its place one finds the term Freiheit, freedom, understood as "the openness of comportment" (als Offenständigkeit des Verhaltens) (pp. 121-125).
Heidegger misses the point in his characterization of the-historical notion of "goodness (SZ, § 59). His only argument against this historical conception is silly and is indicative of an overall whimsical attitude towards historical morality. He argues that the notion of the good leads to Pharisaism, since all that one has to do is say that one is "good" and follow the socially defined notions of "goodness." But the doctrine of "authenticity" (Eigentlichkeit) can no less become a slave to Pharisaism. (The inscription on the marble wall of the main lobby at CIA headquarters, Langley, Virginia reads: And ye shall know the truth, And the truth shall make you free. John VII:32.) In a word, his argument against the traditional notion of what "good" means is based on the fallacy of ad aspectum.

For a different interpretation, cf. Jakob Amstutz, "Origin and Types of Existentialism," The Journal of Religion, XLI, (1961), pp. 248-262. The author says that the essence of Heidegger's ethics lies in Heidegger's belief that "being itself delivers itself to man, in order to be thought and articulated by him" (p. 260). Our duty is to be aware of being.

In PLW Heidegger traces the origin of metaphysics back to Plato's thinking (PLW, 48; 268).
Chapter IV

NOTES


2 It should be noted that the literal translation of παιδεία is childhood, which implies either that only children are the ones who learn and are educated, or else that only children can learn and be educated. If the latter, then the object of education and learning is to become like a child. Heidegger is not consistent in the way he treats the Greek; for on the one hand he says that ἀληθεία, for example, is correctly translated literally in order to capture its true meaning, whereas with παιδεία he says it is incorrect to use the same "literal" principles of translation. Taken literally, however, "unhiddenness" and "childhood" do seem "to crystallize together into an essential unity" as Heidegger thinks. Gilbert Ryle has pointed out the connection between "childhoodness" and "unhiddenness" in Heidegger's SZ, cf. G. Ryle, "Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit" Mind, XXXVIII (1929), 355-370. (Referred to is the "Language of the nursery", pp. 364 and 369.)


5 Jowett, pp. 303-304.

6 Tauglichkeit is translated by John Barlow (PLW) as "usefulness" (p. 263) and by Richardson, Heidegger, as "efficaciousness" (pp. 304 and 707). But besides usefulness and efficaciousness, Tauglichkeit also means fitness, fittedness, adaptedness and appropriateness. Idiomatically, a "tauglich man" is an "able man" and a "tauglich ship" is a "seaworthy ship".
Chapter V
NOTES


2 For Plato, at least in the Republic, the Psyche is a more primordial phenomenon than Nous, for the Psyche is said to possess Nous (Ψυχή ἔχειν νοῦν: R, 508d, 5). Nous is an aspect of the Psyche--Nous is the metaphorical eye of the Psyche (τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐμα: R, 533d, 1). The Psyche is compelled towards truth (R, 527b, 6), whereas the idein of Nous is compelled towards the idea, and when acting in harmony with the Psyche, is compelled towards the arche. Stressed also should be the priority Plato gives to the Psyche in the cave eikon: before the most truthful idetic seeing can place, there must be a change (περιγραφή) in the Psyche first.

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