HEIDEGGER ON PLATO'S CAVE ALETHOLOGY

By

WAYNE ANDREW BORODY

A Thesis

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies

in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements

for the Degree

Master of Arts

McMaster University

December 1980

MASTER OF ARTS (1980)   McMaster University
(PHILOSOPHY)   Hamilton, Ontario

TITLE: Heidegger on Plato's Cave Alethology

AUTHOR: Wayne Andrew Borody, B.A. (University of Guelph)

SUPERVISOR: Dr. G. B. Madison

NUMBER OF PAGES: ix, 106

But deep inside me, in my most intimate
thought, Truth, which is neither Hebrew
nor Greek nor Latin nor any foreign
speech, would speak to me, though not
in syllables formed by lips and tongue.

- Saint Augustine,
    Confessions

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ABSTRACT

In Plato's Doctrine of the Truth (PLW), Martin Heidegger argues that Plato, in the Republic, yokes truth to a preconceived notion of logical and moral rightness. This yoke is a result, Heidegger argues, of Plato's basic orientation towards beings. For Plato the essential characteristic of beings, so runs the argument in PLW, lies in the ἰδέα, a being's whatness, its essential nature. Heidegger maintains that Plato is wrong in so characterizing beings, since unhiddenness (ἀλήθεια) and not whatness is the primordial characteristic (Grundzug) of beings. Heidegger further argues that Plato holds a Correspondence Theory of Truth, that for Plato ἀλήθεια is really ὀρθότης (rightness), and that ὀρθότης is the correspondence (ὁμοίωσις) of the correct ἰδεῖν to the right ἰδέα.

In PLW we find Heidegger in the midst of a contemporary philosophical debate, more or less on the side of those who expound, in multifarious ways, the existentialist's l'existence précède l'essence, while opposing the so-called Platonic-Scholastic Essentia antecedit Existentiam. My purpose in this thesis is twofold: first I show how Heidegger's thesis in PLW is based on his alethology in Being and Time (SZ), and secondly I show how Heidegger, by neglecting the role that to agathon plays as the originating locus (ἀρχή) of aletheia, misconstrues the notion of truth put forth in the Republic.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

L.U.--Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen (5. Aufl.,
      Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1968). Translations are
      the author's. Quotations and references give the
      German pagination, followed by the English pagina-
      tion in Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations,
      trans. J. N. Findlay (1st ed. London: Routledge
      and Kegan Paul, 1970).

PLW--Martin Heidegger, Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit
      (3. Aufl., Bern: Francke Verlag, 1975). Translations
      are the author's. Quotations and references give
      the German pagination, followed by the English
      pagination in "Plato's Doctrine of Truth," trans.
      J. Barlow, in Philosophy in the Twentieth Century,
      ed. W. Barrett, H. Aiken (New York: Random House,
      1962), pp. 251-270.

R--E. H. Warmington, ed., Plato, Vol. VI: The Republic,
     trans. Paul Shorey (7th ed. London: Heinemann,
     1970). Translations are the author's.

SZ--Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (14. Aufl., Tübingen:
     Max Niemeyer, 1977). The translations are the
     author's. The pagination cited from SZ corresponds
     with the citations marked H in the margins of
     Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward
     Robinson (1st ed. New York: Harper and Row, 1962).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

viii

. Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

Just as an intoxicated person reveals more about
himself than he does about the alcohol that he has consumed,
so Heidegger, in Plato's Doctrine of Truth (PLW), reveals
more about his own way of thinking than he does about Plato's.
This is not to say that Heidegger doesn't reveal anything
about Plato's doctrine of truth put forth in the Republic,
for such an opinion concerning the argument in PLW would be
indicative of a most reprehensible frivolousness and super-
ficiality. Rather, one ought to see Heidegger at work in
PLW in much the same way as Edmund Husserl was fond of seeing
Galileo--"at once a discovering and a concealing genius (ent-
deckender und verdeckender Genius)."[1] For indeed, there is
much that Heidegger does reveal about Plato's Republic aleth-
ology, even though it remains basically unstated in PLW.

The main purpose of this thesis is to show, in the
context of the doctrine of truth put forth in Heidegger's
major work, Being and Time (SZ), how Heidegger construes
Plato's doctrine of truth. SZ stems from Heidegger's
thinking in the beginning of his career, while PLW stems
from the middle period of his career; that the position in
PLW regarding the nature of truth represents a change from

1

the position in SZ is evinced by the argument in PLW and
other works that were written at the same time as PLW.[2]
Herein it is argued that Heidegger cannot hold at one and
the same time his basic position concerning truth in PLW and
his position in SZ: not only Plato's alethology, as construed
by Heidegger, is subjected to the razor-bladed argument in
PLW, but also, whether intentionally or unintentionally, the
alethology put forth in SZ. Herein it is also argued that
Heidegger only deals with one aspect of Plato's Republic aleth-
ology; neglected in PLW is as much as is dissected, which is
why it is said that PLW reveals more about Heidegger than
about Plato.

Heidegger's basic thesis in PLW has its parallels in
the history of Western philosophy, especially in Aristotle.
Aristotle sees Plato's notion of the ἰδέα as an attempted
solution to the problem raised by Heraclitean doctrines that
"the whole of the perceptual world is always changing, and there
can be no certain knowledge about anything that is..."[3] In-
fluenced by Socrates' search for the non-relative and non-
vicissitudinous in the realm of ethical comportment, and
influenced by the Pythagorean doctrine that describes empirical
beings as "imitations" of numbers, Plato eclectically invents
a new approach: now there are "two" orders of beings, one that
does not change and is most truly the order of beings, i.e.
the order of the ἰδέαι, and the other, the order of beings
which are always changing, τὰ γιγνόμενα. But Aristotle

criticizes Plato for leaving vague and unclarified the notion of the "participation" (μέθεξις) of the ἰδέαι in the γιγνόμενα: in other words, one finds an ambiguous schism in Plato's approach to beings. Aristotle, like Heidegger, tries to do away with this "schism" in Plato's thought. Aristotle attempts to deal with beings in terms of the beings themselves, "beings as beings". He does not postulate, as Plato apparently does, another realm of beings to account for the beings that are here at hand (τόδε τι). Indeed, Aristotle sees his construal of beings as unique in that no-one prior to him locates the essential determination of a being in the being itself. Unlike Heidegger, however, Aristotle does not see his dissatisfaction with Plato's ontology in terms of a "priority argument", but rather in a "locality argument". Aristotle argues, seemingly in contradistinction to Plato, that "what" a being is must be located in the same place as where this "what" is, in the being itself. Heidegger, on the other hand, argues in PLW that the being itself is more prior than "what" it is, that in some sense in which he does not explain the sheer isness or suchness of a being is "more prior to" what that being is.

With his priority argument Heidegger endeavors to return to a pre-Platonic ontology characteristic of a Hera-clitean interpretation of beings. But instead of saying that beings are, first and foremost, always changing or flowing (ῥέειν), Heidegger argues in PLW that they are always unfold-ing, always rising into unhiddenness (der Aufgang des Verborgen

in die Unverborgenheit).[4]   The continual rise into unhidden-
ness is prior to, or more primordial than, any other deter-
mination both being itself and the many beings possess.
The "as what they are", maintains Heidegger, applies to
beings only as a secondary, after the fact, determination
of their essential unhiddenness; comportment towards the "as
what they are" is a secondary and modified form of comportment.
The old saying that "contraries complement" is far from
Heidegger's mind in PLW, for in no way can the sheer such-
ness and whatness of a being be said to be complementary.
Uncompromisingly, Heidegger argues against Plato's apparent
"whatness first" approach; in its place he offers his own
"suchness first" approach.

Prima facie Heidegger's priority argument that "such-
ness precedes whatness" finds its most natural completion
and refinement in the later to be developed formula "existence
precedes essence", a formula whose bankruptcy continually
stares one in the face. For if it be granted that the terms
existence and essence, as nouns, actually refer to something,
then to claim that existence precedes essence is to claim that
the particular "essence of existence" is such that it precedes
essence, in this case the essence of itself. In other words,
to uphold this formula is to uphold a contradiction in terms:
on the one hand, existence is said to precede essence, while
on the other hand, existence is said itself to be an essence
or have an essence. But, as an essence, how can existence
precede essence ? The same conclusion, it can be argued, can

be shown to hold for the "suchness precedes whatness" formula as well.

But even on a more basic level, Heidegger's priority argument in PLW appears bankrupt when "being" is understood, as it is commonly understood, as "what is". For truth then becomes the rise of "what is" into unhiddenness. To subsequently argue that unhiddenness is more prior to, or primordial than, what unhiddenness is, is to argue quite contradictorily. In the very claim that truth is the unhiddenness of what is, one makes the "what" and the "unhiddenness" equiprimordial. As long as unhiddenness, i.e. truth, is understood as the unhiddenness of being, of "what is", the claim that unhiddenness is prior to whatness (what gets unhidden) is rather unfounded.

As has been stated, Heidegger does reveal much about Plato in PLW, most of which has to do with Heidegger's insistence on interpreting Plato in terms of a notion of truth; as such, Heidegger has awakened new interest in Plato's notion of truth. At the same time, however, by focusing on Plato's approach to logical truth, Heidegger tends to conceal much about Plato's overall alethology.

Heidegger loses sight of Plato's intention in postulating the ἰδέα or τὸ αὐτόν to account for the relation between, on the one hand, the human being's sentient comportment towards and engagement with beings, and on the other hand, the truth of the beings themselves. In his attempt to prove, however, that Plato essentially interprets being, οὐσία, in terms

of the ἰδέα, Heidegger conceals the fact that Plato sees
idetic-seeing (ἰδεῖν) in the larger framework of the art or
techne of διαλεκτική, dialectics, whose telos is seen by
Plato, not Heidegger, as the awareness and knowledge of that
which is most basic or fundamental for the human being. The
human being qua psyche is not divorced from the teleological
processes of growth and development found in nature: the
human being qua ψυχή is brought into being, according to the
Republic, with a telos. But the human being's telos is
unique in that it seeks the arche--the human being's essential
goal is to seek that which is most basic or archical. And
for Plato, the human being qua ψυχή can reach or accomplish
this telos most appropriately by means of dialectics. In the
sun and cave eikons, in the divided line epistemology, in
the construal of the dialectical method of philosophy, in
the notion of the state put forth in the Republic, and finally
in the myth of Er, Socrates consistently maintains that
idetic-seeing is the means, not end, of archological under-
standing and awareness. Heidegger tends to forget about this
context in which Plato's notion of idetic-seeing is inextri-
cably bound.

As will be shown, however, the roots of this forget-
fulness have their origins in §44 of SZ wherein Heidegger
"criticizes" the traditional notion of truth. But this
criticism turns out to be, in the final analysis, a dimin-
ishment of the tradition. Heidegger reduces the traditional
notion of truth to a strictly logical doctrine of truth, a

doctrine of "derived" or "propositional" truth. He neglects
the traditional notion of an archical, logos-grounding truth.
That is to say, he first assumes that there are two basic
kinds of truth, one fundamental and one derived, and then
assumes without further ado that the whole of Western thought
has upheld only one, the derived. By criticizing the derived
notion as it has been traditionally expressed, he bethinks him-
self to have dealt with the whole approach to truth in the
West. It will be shown how this argument is carried through
from SZ to PLW.

In order to acquire a general understanding of the
philosophical and historical orientation from which Heidegger
derives his interpretation of Plato's alethology, Chapter II
introduces Heidegger in terms of Husserl and phenomenology in
general. In chapter III Heidegger's SZ alethology is treated,
in an attempt to extrapolate the essential conception of truth
and the connection between, on the one hand, the "structure
of Sorge" and, on the other, truth itself. Chapter IV is a
general exegesis of the main arguments and procedures found
in PLW, with special attention paid to Heidegger's criticisms
of the ἰδέα. Finally, Chapter V, the concluding chapter,
brings into focus, on the one hand, the connection between
Heidegger's SZ and Plato's Republic alethologies, and on the
other, the frailties of Heidegger's interpretation of Plato's
notion of ἀλήθεια.

Since a claim to intelligibility is made in this
thesis, that is, since the author claims to know something

about what Heidegger is trying to say in SZ and PLW, perhaps

it may be wise to warn the reader that this author makes no

claims to a complete and comprehensive understanding of

Heidegger's aims, intentions, and results in SZ and PLW.

Although the author upholds a thesis about the works, he

has not abandoned his concern for what the works themselves

have to say, as he is always mindful of Heidegger's own

hints about listening:

> If we were to be shown right now two pictures by Paul
> Klee, in the original, which he painted in the year of
> his death--the watercolour "Saints from a Window," and
> "Death and Fire," tempera on burlap--we should want to
> stand before them for a long while--and should abandon
> any claim that they be immediately intelligible.[5]

CHAPTER II

THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT OF PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH

I. Introduction

This chapter introduces the philosophical context
of Heidegger's doctrine of truth, i.e. his alethology. In
order to carry this introduction out in a complete fashion,
however, one would have to examine, in light of the basic
Judeo-Christian teaching on truth, the alethologies of such
thinkers as Husserl, Kierkegaard, Hegel, Brentano, Kant,
Duns Scotus, St. Augustine, and Aristotle.[1] The scope of
this introduction shall therefore be limited to Heidegger's
most important influence, his friend and teacher, Edmund
Husserl. This chapter first points out Heidegger's inher-
itance of and reaction to Husserl's alethology; secondly,
it outlines the dialectic that may have led to Heidegger's
writing of PLW.

2. Husserl's Basic Position Concerning Truth

What do phenomenologists have in common beyond the
maxim Zu den Sachen selbst: To the things themselves? Quite
justifiably, they can be said to have a recognized locus
classicus, Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations.[2] Heidegger
started to read the labyrinthian Investigations in the
winter of 1909-10, while a student of Christian theology at
the University of Freiburg.[3] Heidegger had been led to the

Investigations by his search for an answer to the question,
"What does being mean?" This question had first been kindled
in him by Franz Brentano's On The Manifold Meaning of Being
According to Aristotle and Carl Braig's On Being: Outline of
Ontology.[4]

Heidegger could not finish the complex Investigations
on his first reading, nor for that matter, so he tells us in
his autobiographical My Way to Phenomenology,[5] could he come
to understand them. "My perplexity decreased slowly, my
confusion dissolved laboriously, only after I met Husserl per-
sonally in his workshop."[6] Heidegger says that years later,
as he worked on the Investigations with advanced students,
he learned something which was to become the basis of his
own outlook for the rest of his life:

> What occurs for the phenomenology of the acts of
> consciousness as the self-manifestation of phenomena
> is thought more originally by Aristotle and in all
> Greek thinking and existence as aletheia, as the
> unconcealedness of what-is-present, its being revealed,
> its showing itself. That which phenomenological
> investigations rediscovered as the supporting attitude
> of thought proves to be the fundamental trait of Greek
> thinking, if not indeed of philosophy as such.[6]

In very general terms, it can be said that Husserl's
Investigations attempts to outline and describe a radically
new approach to "logic", or synonymously for Husserl, a
"theory of science" (Wissenschaftslehre).[7] Husserl defines
science as "unified truth";[8] logic as thus understood is the
theory of unified truth, at least understood from an objective
point of view. The Investigations, as Heidegger himself slowly
came to understand, ultimately turns out to be investigations

into the nature of truth.

Husserl sets up a fundamental distinction between, on the one hand, the a priori, formal conditions of logical truth, and on the other, logical truth itself. The former he calls the noetical conditions of truth, and the latter the logical conditions.[9] The noetic conditions are grounded, a priori, in the very notion of knowledge itself, and cannot be reduced to the psychological conditions of an empirical human being; these a priori, pre-logical conditions are to the logical conditions as genes are to organisms. The logical conditions themselves are grounded in the content of knowledge, as the (logical) law of non-contradiction.

In the context of this distinction between noetical and logical conditions, phenomenology acts as the propae-deutic to logical truth, since Husserl sees phenomenology as the discipline which endeavors to lay bare the sources from which logical truth "flows" and to which it must "return".[10] According to the Investigations, this ultimate "source" turns out to be the intentional structure of consciousness.[11]

Husserl describes his phenomenological approach to truth not so much in terms of a fundamental axiom, such as esse is percipi or cogito ergo sum, as in terms of a funda-mental experience, an "immediate inner awareness of truth itself (als unmittlebares Innewerden der Wahrheit selbst)."[12] This experience "is, in fact, only immediately felt in the case of a relatively quite limited group of primitive facts."[13]

One can describe this experience as the plain and simple
self-evidence (Evidenz) immediately experienced in an un-
biased and straightforward openness--a foundational openness
which is more like an intuition than an ideation, more like
an experience than an axiom, and more like an awareness than
a cognition.[14]   The Evidenz given in this "immediate inner
awareness of truth itself" serves as the matrix through which
all knowledge takes its rise:

> Ultimately, therefore, all genuine, and specifically
> all scientific knowledge, rests on (inner) evidence,
> and so far as such evidence extends, the concept of
> knowledge extends also.[15]

Heidegger was particularly entranced by the sixth
investigation, entitled "Elements of a Phenomenological
Elucidation of Knowledge."[16]   In §§36 to 39 of this inves-
tigation, Husserl formally puts forth his alethology. He
claims to found logical truth on a "genuine" adaequatio rei
et intellectus.[17]   Logical truth, he says, is "the complete
correspondence (Übereinstimmung) between the Meant and the
Given as such."[18]   This Übereinstimmung is described as the
most perfect and complete "equality" (Deckung) by means of
which the correlatives, the Given and the Meant, become one.[19]
Husserl bases this phenomenological Correspondence Theory of
Logical Truth on a fundamental distinction between perception
and imagination.

Only perception (Wahr-nehmung), Husserl emphatically
argues, can provide the basis for one's claims about truth,
since only in perception is one truly given "the thing itself."
The imagination only offers images,[20] "it does not give the

object itself, not even in part, it gives only its image, which, as long as it is generally an image, never is the thing itself."[21] The truth of a logical proposition, Husserl maintains, is based on its perceptual verification in experience. A proposition that one figures or imagines to be true may very well be true, but as long as it remains in the imagination and is not verified in perception, it is only a likeness of truth, and hence not in the strict sense, a true proposition.[22] The truth of a logical judgment, in other words, is not its logical correctness in the imagination, but rather its experiential verification in perception.

According to Husserl the criterion used as evidence for the justification of claims about truth cannot be relative to particular human beings. He discounts the claim that what is evidence for one person, may be absurdity for another:

> If someone experiences the evidence of A, then it is
> evident that no second person can experience the
> absurdity of this same A; for, that A is evident means:
> A is not merely meant, but rather, exactly meant as
> that which it is meant to be, and truly given.[23]

Husserl's well known _Kehre_, turning, to a more transscendental attitude in _Ideas Towards a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy_[24] departs somewhat from his earlier _Investigations_ position concerning the notion of truth.[25] The basic state of self-evidence put forth in the _Investigations_ as the foundation of all logical, propositional truth, i.e. the "inner awareness of truth itself," becomes the fundamental ground of "rightness" (_Richtigkeit_) in the _Ideas_; it

becomes the ground for the Principle of Principles:

> The primary source of all rightness {Rechtsquelle}
> in respect of all domains of objects and the positing
> acts relating to them lies in immediate and more
> narrowly specified primordial self-evidence, or the
> primordial givenness which motivates it.26

Husserl is not making a complete and radical shift
in his whole way of looking at the nature of truth in the
Ideas, for self-evidence also grounds rightness, understood
as logical truth, in the Investigations. His "shift" is one
of emphasis, the emphasis put on the connection between pri-
mordially self-evident truth and correct, logical truth. As
a result of this emphasis found in the Ideas, the faculty of
rightness, reason, tends to overshadow truth.[27] In short,
a notion of primordial rightness, with its derived forms of
rightness and wrongness (memory, empathy, and all reproductive
acts in general) eclipses the Investigations notion of a
primordial, experiential locus of truth.[28]

3. Heidegger's Inheritance of Husserl's Alethology

First and foremost Heidegger inherited Husserl's
use of the epoche (ἐποχή), the neutral suspension of dis-
cursive and presumptive thought.[29] The epoche, or trans-
cendental reduction as Husserl also calls it, is a technique
used to open up and clarify the realm of primordial self-
evidence, a realm in which one can find no clear dichotomy
between a separate subject and a separate object, a self-
contained human being and a self-contained world of nature.
By using the technique of epoche Husserl thinks that one can
break away from one's habitually dualistic way of looking at

things, a way which usually distorts and falsifies.

Husserl's notion of the ἐποχή as that which delivers
one into the already existing plenum of Givenness is trans-
formed by Heidegger into a notion of ἀ-λήθεια, understood
as the openness which discloses being as it truly is.[30]
According to Heidegger in SZ, phenomenology bases itself on
a criterion of truth that can only be understood by those who
are cognitively aware of "being-in-the-truth," by those who
have "broken away from" the habitually mundane and dualistic[31]
way of thinking about being and truth. One must be aware of
one's transcendence:

> The transcendence of the being of Dasein is a unique
> kind of transcendence, in that in this transcendence
> lies the possibility and necessity of the most radical
> individuation. Every disclosure of being as the transcen-
> dens is transcendental knowledge. Phenomenological truth
> (disclosure of being) is veritas transcendentalis. (SZ,
> 38)

Upholding Husserl's approach, Heidegger's attitude
in SZ is that phenomenology, as the science of phenomena,
is the science of sciences, the ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστημῶν. (SZ,28)
Heidegger defines a phenomenon according to its essential
Greek sense, as "that which shows itself in itself, the man-
ifest." (SZ,28) A phenomenon self manifests itself; it is
the Sichzeigend. In the context of being, a phenomenon is
"what shows itself as being and as a Struktur of being." (SZ,
130) When Heidegger treats beings, and especially human beings,
as "phenomena", he treats them twofoldly as nexuses of a
Sich and a Zeigend element, of a "self" and an "appearing"
element. To treat Dasein, for example, simply as a being,

without any <u>Sich</u> or <u>Struktur</u>, i.e. without any form, would
be like treating it as if it were an amorphous appearing, a
blob of being.[32]

A phenomenon is that which truly is, as opposed to
that which merely seems to be or is false. Heidegger deals
with the classical being and seeming problem so indigenous to
Greek philosophy by maintaining that seeming (<u>Schein</u>) is a
mere "privation" of being (<u>Sein</u>):

> Only so far as something generally pretends to show
> its meaning, that is, to be a phenomenon, <u>can</u> it show
> itself as something which it is <u>not</u>, <u>can</u> it 'only
> appear as if...' (<u>SZ</u>,29)

For Heidegger there can be no opposite to or negation
of a phenomenon being "as it truly is in itself". Every phe-
nomenon presented to Dasein, even Dasein itself, is either
"as it truly is in itself" or "privatively as it truly is in
itself". Heidegger, as his teacher Husserl before him, vehe-
mently opposes the perfumery of radical doubt. Evil geniuses
and the like of Pyrrho are given no hearing in either Husserl's
or Heidegger's phenomenology. Although at one point in <u>SZ</u>
Heidegger says that Dasein is "equiprimordially" in truth
and untruth,[33] the notion of untruth is to be understood, as
it is always to be understood in Heidegger's <u>SZ</u> philosophy,
as a mere privation of being-in-the-truth.

To take a phenomenon apart, so to speak, to "ex-press"
and "dis-cuss" the phenomenon, is the essential function of
what Heidegger calls the "logos".[34] He construes his use of
the traditional Greek concept of the logos in broader terms
than is usually done; the logos for Heidegger is not just

a term for <u>ratio</u> and rational discourse: "Λόγος as discourse means rather the same as δηλοῦν, to make manifest what is 'discoursed about' in the discourse." (<u>SZ</u>,32) Thus considered, the logos "lets something be seen" (<u>Sehenlassen</u>); it is, in the strictest sense, <u>apophantical</u>.[35]

The logos lets the phenomenon be seen in a formal and propositional manner; the logos has its own structure and its own manner of structuralizing the way in which the phenomenon is "opened-up" to Dasein. Therefore, the truth of the logos will henceforth be referred to as "logical truth", and refers generally to all forms of statement making; as a result, "logic" as Heidegger sees it not only includes formal and symbolic logic, but also poetry, mathematics, biology and so forth.

Unlike a phenomenon, which cannot in itself be false, logic can be false in a very basic sense. Being a "source" of both truth and falsity, logic cannot, in principle, be a primary source of truth itself. Logic <u>lets</u> something be seen; it does not just "show itself in itself" as does a phenomenon. False logic, nevertheless, is still a phenomenon, the phenomenon of false logic. Qua phenomenon, false logic is, in light of Heidegger's doctrine of privation, truly a falsity--that which "covers-up" the phenomenon. The expression "two-faced" means that a person's "true face" is false when the person pretends to be something that he or she is not. Likewise, false logic, logic that covers-up and does not let be seen that which it is about, i.e. does not let

be seen the truth of the phenomenon, does not radically alter

the nature of the phenomenon's truth, its <u>Sichzeigend</u>.

Heidegger is emphatic in stressing that logic, whether

monologue or dialogue, either uncovers or does not uncover

the truth of that which it is about. He emphatically rejects

the notion of logic that goes hand in hand with the Corre-

spondence Theory of Truth; according to this notion of logic

all propositional or logical statements either agree or disagree

with that which they are about. Heidegger's emphasis is on

the revealing aspect of the logos:

> The truth of the λόγος as ἀληθεύειν means to <u>uncover</u>
> the beings <u>of which</u> the discourse is about: in λέγειν
> as ἀποφαίνεσθαι beings must be taken out of their
> concealment and let be seen as unconcealed (ἀληθές). (<u>SZ</u>,
> 33)

The concepts of a phenomenon and a logos go into

making up the doctrinal side of Heidegger's phenomenology,

whose aim is "to let be seen that which shows itself from

itself, in the manner in which it itself shows itself from

itself." (<u>SZ</u>,34) The Greek and German obsession with the

philosophical implications of the reflexive pronoun "self"--

αὐτός and <u>sich selbst</u>--permeates Heidegger's methodology.

The forgotten question in <u>SZ</u>, however, is the role that the

notion of a self plays in Heidegger's notion of a phenomenon

and a being; but this forgetfulness is perhaps intentional.

Upholding Aristotle's notion of the study of τὸ ὂν ἧ ὂν, Hei-

degger argues that the aim of phenomenology is the logical

analysis of <u>beings</u>, not forms, whatness, quiddity or <u>Selbig-</u>

<u>keit</u>:

> Phenomena, according to a phenomenological understanding, are always only that which constitutes being, and being is always the being of beings; it is therefore necessary, if our aim is the laying bare of being, to first correctly bring forward the beings themselves.(SZ, 37)

For Heidegger the correct way of "laying-bare" the phenomena qua beings is through the medium of the logos, logical analysis: onto-logical analysis. Hence, "in terms of its subject matter, phenomenology is the science of the being of beings, ontology." (SZ,37) Instead of a dialectical approach such as is found in Plato's dialogues, Heidegger's logic of being and beings is based on a hermeneutical approach (ἑρμηνεία). Heidegger begins his onto-logical analysis in SZ by laying bare the structure of the "who", the one doing the interpreting, Dasein. The laying-bare of the true constitution (Verfassung) of Dasein as a totality of structures is the means by which Heidegger's philosophy reaches its goal, the logical and structural understanding of das Sinn des Sein.

3. Heidegger's Reaction to Husserl's Alethology

Heidegger not only restates Husserl's alethology in SZ; he reformulates it. Gone in SZ is Husserl's use of the term "eidetic structures"; instead, the "existential structures" are made to bear the burden of unravelling the nature of being and beings. Instead of the matrix of truth being located in the "intentionality of Bewußtsein" (consciousness), Heidegger locates it in the "existentiality of Dasein". The onus is no longer put on the constitution of Bewußtsein as it "intends its object", but rather on the constitution of Dasein

as it "exists in its world". And Husserl's basic notion of truth is also reformulated by this shift in emphasis.

Especially after SZ, Heidegger came to see this shift· in his own philosophizing in a much larger context, the context of the historical development of Western existence and philosophy. Heidegger takes the Correspondence Theory of Logical Truth that we find in the Investigations for example, and sets it up as the representative of the approach which has historically distorted the Western understanding of the nature of truth. The linking-up of truth and rightness found in Husserl's Ideas is seen by Heidegger as the manifestation of this distortion, whose historical roots are.traced back, in PLW, to Plato's doctrine of truth.

In PLW, Heidegger has been very much influenced by Nietzsche's interpretation of Plato, an interpretation which is a romantic, or perhaps decadent, version of the commonly held "hypostatization theory" of Plato's ontology of whatness, i.e. his doctrine of the forms.

According to Nietzsche, Plato had an obsession--the mummification of being.[36] Plato, says Nietzsche, acquired this obsession during his travels through Egypt. Under the guise of philosophy and with the patience of a temple priest, Plato the Egyptianized Greek slowly and methodically set about embellishing his corpse, being, with the shroud of the eternal preservatives, the ἰδέαι.

In PLW Heidegger more or less adopts this "mummification interpretation" of Plato, but from the phenomenological

point of view. In a radical and iconoclastic manner, Hei-
degger argues in PLW that any kind of whatness, form, or
quiddity thought to lie in the very truth of being, is a
mummification approach to being.

In his adoption of the mummification interpretation
of Plato, and indirectly of Husserl as well, Heidegger is
breaking with his notion in SZ that the formal aspect or what-
ness of Being (Verfassung, Struktur, Selbigkeit, sich selbst)
lies in the very truth of being.[37] In SZ the whole notion of a
Struktur is never questioned or made explicit, especially the
Struktur that is supposed to be in Sein. The question is
never raised, for example, as to the way in which the con-
cept of "structure" has been dealt with traditionally, espe-
cially by the Greeks. In PLW, however, this question is of
utmost importance for Heidegger, who sees Plato's notion of
the ἰδέα as that which makes a being what it is structurally.

5. The Dialectic Behind the Writing of PLW

As roots are to leaves, so Greek philosophy is to
modern philosophy. It would only be with the utmost arro-
gance that a modern thinker or mode of thought would deal
with the basic issues of philosophy totally outside of the
context of Greek philosophy. Phenomenology is no exception.

Husserl felt it necessary to defend his Investigations
against the charge that this work merely reformulated Plato's
epistemology in the language of the "logical realism" of the
day. To this Husserl replies:

My so-called "Platonism" does not consist in some
sort of metaphysical or epistemological substructures,
hypostases (Hypostasen), or theories but rather in the
simple reference to a type of "givens" which usually,
however, are falsely explained away.[38]

The ultimate standard of all theorizing and philos-
ophizing, Husserl maintains in this passage, is "that which
is given in plain seeing and is, therefore, original."[39]
Husserl thinks that any substructures in or theories about
the Given must come after the experience of the Given as it
is. Even if we discover, which we in fact do according to
Husserl, that the Given has its own essential structure, this
structural aspect has nothing in common with Plato's notions
of the eidos and idea.[40] Husserl warns that "the average
reader is fixated right from the beginning on the view that
he who teaches of ideal objects cannot avoid metaphysical
hypostatization--that he can only deny it verbally."[41]

But Husserl somewhat changed his attitude towards
the generally conceived Platonic position during his more
idealistic period, the time of the Ideas. During this period
Husserl borrows many of the ideas indigenous to the episte-
mology and philosophical anthropology found in the Republic.[42]
Especially noteworthy in light of this connection between the
Ideas and the Republic is an article by one of Husserl's
students, Eugene Fink;[43] this article was apparently written
to counter the influence Heidegger's SZ was having in Germany.
The article, "What Does the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl
Want to Accomplish?", besides being a heap of abuse directed
against Heidegger for not understanding the true nature of

Husserl's phenomenology,[44] defends Husserl's philosophy

in terms of the cave eikon in the Republic. According to

Fink, Plato, "from out of the power of mythical intuition,

discovered the great, visionary symbol of all philosophizing."[45]

The struggle of paideia, education, to attain aletheia which

is dealt with in the cave eikon is also meant to symbolize,

says Fink, the struggle of Husserl's phenomenology:

> The philosophical "unchaining", the tearing oneself
> free from the power of one's naive submission to the
> world, the stepping-forth from out of that familiarity
> with entities which always provides us with security,
> in one word, the phenomenological "epoche", is anything
> but a noncommital, "merely" theoretical, intellectual
> act;"[46]

Fink's article may be the reason why Heidegger chose

Plato's cave to launch his attack, directly against Plato's

yoking of ἀλήθεια to ὀρθότης, indirectly against Husserl's

linking-up of Wahrheit and Richtigkeit in the Ideas, and

finally, against his own equiprimordializing of Sein and

Struktur in SZ.[47] Indeed, Heidegger argues in PLW that the

notion of truth he finds expressed in Plato's cave eikon

is the basic notion of truth operative in the most modern

forms of thought; as a result, Heidegger no doubt sees his

thesis in PLW as having a cathartic effect, especially for

those phenomenologists who emphasize that aspect of Husserl's

thought which locates "truth" and "rightness" in the same

source, the Rechtsquelle--"reason".

But despite Heidegger's interpretation of Plato and

the consequences of this interpretation for Husserlian pheno-

menology, both Heidegger and Husserl had the same fundamental

opinion of Plato, which Husserl stated in his lectures on

Greek philosophy in 1923-24 (First Philosophy): Plato was

a social revolutionary whose Zweckidee der Philosophie, pure

rationality, has altered the very fabric of a whole culture.

Husserl says, "Consciously or unconsciously Plato's ideal

determines the essential character and destiny of the devel-

opment of European culture."[48] And it is to this "determining

factor" that Heidegger addresses himself in PLW.

CHAPTER III

CARE AS THE CAUSE AND ORIGINATING-LOCUS OF TRUTH IN SZ

1. Introduction

This chapter examines Heidegger's interpretation of truth which is mainly put forth in §44 of SZ, a small section which embodies the essential teaching of this monumental work. Also dealt with is Heidegger's notion of the connection between truth and care (Sorge) which appears throughout SZ, but most notably in §41 and §57.

Shortly after SZ Heidegger published two works which deal specifically with the notion of truth. The first of these, The Essence of Truth (1930),[1] although it indicates a subtle shift in Heidegger's way of thinking about truth, is mainly a clarification of the doctrine of truth set out in SZ--a clarification aimed at a wider audience than perhaps SZ is capable of attracting. The second work, Plato's Doctrine of Truth,[2] Heidegger wrote in 1930-31 as a text for a lecture course given in 1931 as "The Essence of Truth: The Cave Allegory", and in 1933 as "The Fundamental Question of Philosophy: The Cave Allegory". Offering a more critical study of a particular, historical figure's alethology, PLW adds much to the argument put forth in §44 of SZ. Thus, a deeper understanding of PLW necessitates a more comprehensive understanding of Heidegger's own teaching on truth.

Section 44 of SZ is divided into four topics: the first deals with the traditional, proto-Greek, "Western", philosophical interpretation of truth; the second is an explanation of Heidegger's notion of logical truth; the third is an exposition of the distinction between logical and existential truth; and the fourth deals with the relation between care and truth. Although the sections in SZ preceeding and following §44 provide the basis on which Heidegger feels secure in expounding his overall alethology, we shall not treat these sections in detail for two reasons; firstly, they are not imperative for an understanding of what Heidegger means by truth, and secondly the nature and purview of this paper prohibit such an excursion.

2. The Traditional Interpretation of Truth

Heidegger sees his questioning of the meaning (Sinn) of truth as intimately connected to his primary aim in SZ: the questioning of the meaning of being (Sein). Indeed, he even calls being and truth "equiprimordial phenomena"(SZ,230), which has led, among other things, one Heideggerian scholar to replace Heidegger's term "being" for "being-as-truth".[3] Too often, Heidegger states, ontologies are based on a single axiom or principle and too often philosophers neglect to think in terms of the equiprimordiality of different phenomena, such as the phenomena of "being" and "truth". (SZ,132) Heidegger does not see this association of being and truth as peculiar, however, to his own thinking; indeed, as he correctly points out, philosophy and common sense have, from time immemorial, "grouped

together truth and being." (SZ,212)   Parmenides, whom Hei-
degger considers to be one of the first recorded Greek think-
ers to make the being of beings thematic, "identified being
with the perceiving-understanding of being (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν
ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι)." (SZ,212) Aristotle calls Parmenides'
way of thinking "philosophizing about the truth." (SZ,213)[4]
Aristotle himself defines philosophy, on the one hand, as
a science of truth (ἐπιστήμη τις τῆς ἀληθείας),[5] and on the
other, as "a science which examines beings as beings in respect
of their being (ἐπιστήμη, ἣ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὄν)." (SZ,213)[6]
One can refer to the Greek language itself, which is im-
bued with this association, as, for example, in the common
synonymous terms "truly" and "beingly" (ἀληθῶς and ὄντως), or
the common "in being" (τῷ ὄντι) for our "in fact". Even the
titles of early Greek works about nature (φύσις) were called
"Concerning the Truth" (Περὶ Τῆς Ἀληθείας).[7]

In the first topic of §44 Heidegger does not present
a well documented "thinker by thinker" analysis of what he
calls the "traditional" concept of truth. He rather extracts
the essential historical notion of truth in order "to lay
open the ontological foundations of that conception." (SZ,214)
Much like Aristotle's cursory histories of thinkers and ideas,
Heidegger's outline of the traditional notion of truth, for
what it covers, loses none of its quality due to the lack of
quantity. The only criticism one can make of it, and this
indeed is a serious criticism, lies in Heidegger's use of the
term "traditional". By traditional he means the "orthodox"

tradition of the German universities at the turn of the century. The orthodox tradition, if one can so call it that, tends to either neglect or exclude many of the traditions which lie outside of the Kantian and Aristotelian frameworks. Even such traditions as gnosticism, hermeticism, and Christian mysticism can be said to have a lot in common with Heidegger's "panaletheism", the docrine which claims that everything is imbued with truth, untruth being merely a privation of truth. Indeed, even in his characterization of the orthodox tradition, one may wish to argue that Heidegger has simply left out too much of the "the tradition".[8] In any case, it must be granted to him, as it is granted to Aristotle, the right to use his own approach to the history of philosophy.

Heidegger begins his analysis by stating that traditionally "truth" has been understood solely as the truth of logic. Logical truth, in turn, has been traditionally characterized by three fundamental theses: first, that the locus of truth is thought to be in the "logos", in the proposition (Aus-sage) qua judgment (Ur-teil);[9] secondly, that "the essence of truth lies in the 'correspondence' (Überein-stimmung) of the judgment with its object." (SZ,214); and thirdly, that Aristotle "set going"[10] the formalized definition of truth as correspondence (ὁμοίωσις).

From antiquity we have Aristotle's statement that the παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν πραγμάτων ὁμοιμώματα:[11] "the soul's experiences, the νοήματα (representations) are likenings of things." (SZ,214) This concept of the correspondence is

carried into the mediaeval period where Thomas Aquinas expresses it as the _adaequatio intellectus et rei_.[12] It enters the modern period, where it is upheld, for example, by Immanuel Kant, in his _Critique of Pure Reason_: "Truth or illusion is not in the object insofar as it is intuited, but in the judgment about it, insofar as it is thought."(_SZ_, 215)[13]

If we grant to Heidegger that the traditional notion of truth locates truth in the logos (proposition) qua "judgment", and if we graht that this thesis finds its expression in the formula of the Correspondence Theory, then we should also grant that an analysis of the formula ought to reveal the foundations on which the traditional notion rests. So whether we describe the Correspondence formula of logical truth as a correspondence, agreement, _Übereinstimmung_, _adaequatio_, or ὁμοίωσις, the question must be raised: What do we mean when we equate the two things, the _intellectus_ and the _res_, the proposition and the fact, the Meant and the Given ?

According to Heidegger, the "correspondence" is traditionally intended to have the formal characteristic "of a relation of something to something (_Beziehung von etwas zu etwas_)." (_SZ_,215) This means, therefore, that every "correspondence", and hence "truth", is a relation. But it does not mean, however, that every relation is a "correspondence" of the type implied by the Correspondence Theory. A symbol, for example, has a relation to something—to that which is

symbolized. But the symbol and the symbolized do not
"correspond" in the same way the <u>intellectus</u> and the <u>res</u>
are supposed to correspond. The symbol and the symbolized
"correspond" by means of a "symbolic relation". Nor is the
"correspondence" meant in the formula like that of a relation
between numbers, as "6" corresponds with "16 minus 10"; such
a numerical correspondence is based on a "quantitative rela-
tion". Without further pursuing the possible kinds of rela-
tions that may be said to exist between the <u>intellectus</u> and
the <u>res</u>, Heidegger asserts that the relation is traditionally
construed as a "just-as" relation: the <u>intellectus</u> is "sup-
posed to 'give' the thing <u>just as</u> it is." (<u>SZ</u>,216) But Hei-
degger thinks that by so characterizing the correspondence
relation as a "just-as" (<u>So - Wie</u>) relation, nothing signi-
ficant can be gained: "for the clarification of the structure
of truth it is simply not enough to presuppose this relational
totality, but it is necessary to go back and question the
'context of being' which supports this totality as such." (<u>SZ</u>,
216)

One can approach the thesis of the Correspondence
Theory from the point of view of the "being" of the correl-
atives, but this, Heidegger maintains, doesn't help either.
For the traditional interpretation leaves unclarified the
description of the kind of being of the correlatives. The
closest it comes to such a description lies in the commonly
held presuppostion that when the correlatives do correspond,
"knowledge" is that mode of being which is true. Yet knowl-

edge is traditionally equated with judging: the judgments
are ultimately considered to be true.

In the traditional conception of judgment, however,
"one must distinguish between the Judging as a _real_ psychical
event and the Judged as an _Ideal_ content." (SZ,216) How is
one to understand, Heidegger asks, the kind of relationship
that is supposed to exist between something real and something
ideal ? Should one construe it as a "hybrid" relation between
one order of being and another, or indeed "may the ontolog-
ical meaning of the relation between the real and the ideal
(the μέθεξις) not be questioned ?" (SZ,216) Heidegger main-
tains that no headway has been made in this problem in over
two thousand years, mainly because the question has been
wrongly posed with the artificial separation of the "real"
from the "ideal". Consequently, in order to avoid this same
mistake, one should steer clear of placing the onus of knowl-
edge on "the act of judgment and its content". Instead, one
should "try to bring into view the phenomenon that character-
izes knowledge, the phenomenon of truth." (SZ,217) The ques-
tion then will be aimed at making phenomenally explicit the
relation between truth and knowledge.

3.   Uncovering Logical Truth

"Suppose that someone with his back turned to the
wall puts forth the true proposition: The picture on the wall
is crooked." (SZ,217) Before turning around and perceiving
that the picture really is crooked, the person's proposition
cannot be construed, argues Heidegger, as a relation between

a mental picture and a real picture. One does not, he emphatically maintains, have such a relation in mind when one asserts the proposition. On the contrary, in asserting the proposition one feels related to the real picture; one's whole "propositional comportment" is _towards_ the real picture. The act of making the proposition is not an "asserting or stating of a mental representation", but a way of _being-towards_ the thing itself (_ein Sein zum seienden Ding selbst_).

In asserting the logical proposition, one is not comporting oneself to the crookedness of the picture in one's mind. One is comporting oneself, and only comporting oneself, to the crookedness of the picture on the wall. When one actually turns around, opens one's eyes and perceives that the picture truly is crooked, one does not discover that one's mental picture corresponds with something "out there". In the perception of the crooked picture, says Heidegger, one _uncovers_ the proposition. In uncovering the proposition, one is really uncovering that which the proposition is about:

> And what is demonstrated through the perception of the picture ? Nothing else than that it is the being itself that was meant in the proposition. What comes forward for verification is that the proposition qua "being towards that which is meant in the proposition" is the showing-up of the being, _that_ it is an _uncovering_ of the being, towards which it _is_. What gets demonstrated is the uncovering of the proposition." (_SZ_,218)

This description of logical truth as an act of uncovering should not be seen as a departure from the traditional framework of the "_intellectus_ and the _res_", or the "proposition and the fact". Heidegger does not deny that one discovers or "uncovers" a particular kind of _relation_ between the correla-

tives. He rather emphasizes that the relation, although static, is necessarily bound to an active, on-going experience. For on the one hand, the sheer act of "uncovering" takes place, while on the other hand, the correlatives, the Given and the Meant, are uncovered in the uncovering-act.

Regarding the correlatives, Heidegger argues that the Given is found to be the Meant in the verifying, i.e. uncovering, of the proposition. As such, the Given is that to which the uncovering comportment is directed; in carrying out the perceptual verification of the picture-meant in the proposition, one's knowing or cognitive comportment is related to the picture-given on the wall, not to one's mental representation. Heidegger emphasizes that this "knowing", this "verifying-uncovering" , accepts the given picture as the one which was meant in the proposition. His emphasis, therefore, is on the Given, and the way in which it grounds the meaning(s) ascribed to it.

Heidegger justifies the emphasis he places on the Given in light of the basic axiom of phenomenology: the Given--whether it be a stone, a pig, or the human being--can and does show itself just as it is in itself, i.e. in its Selfsameness (Selbigkeit):

> This uncoveredness is proven-true when that which is
> put forward in the proposition (namely the thing itself)
> shows itself as the very same thing (als dasselbe).
> Proving-true (i.e. verification) signifies the being's
> showing itself in its Selfsameness. (SZ,218)

Although the relation between the Given and the Meant is described in terms of the Sameness (dasselbe) of the Given

and the Meant, the Given itself is described in terms of its own Selfsameness (Selbigkeit). But both determinations, however, ultimately apply to the Given: the Given, in its Self-sameness, is also the Same as that which is Meant in the logical proposition. Consequently, the uncovering of the Meant in the proposition turns out to be, in the final analysis, the uncovering of the Given "as it is in itself", i.e. in its Selfsameness. The ultimate criterion in this verification process is the "true-proof", so to speak, that one is given in perception (Wahr-nehmung), the true-proof of the being's Selfsamenss.

Without the Selfsameness of beings, the Givens, the uncovering of propositions would be impossible. If, indeed, there were no Selfsameness, i.e. if everything were in flux, as the Greeks were fond of speculating, there would be no beings, and hence no logic about beings. Proving logical propositions to be true, in other words, depends on some other, ontologically more prior, criterion of truth, which for Heidegger is the Selfsameness of beings. The given "being" must show itself truthfully in order for one to uncover the truthfullness of one's propositions about it. With this stipulation Heidegger removes the locus of logical truth from the realm of Judgment and relocates it in the realm of beings, in the Selbigkeit of beings.[14] The logical proposition merely "lets be seen (ἀπόφανσις) beings in their uncoveredness." (SZ,218) The pillar of Heidegger's conception of logical truth, therefore, is the same pillar that holds up his entire methodology--

the fact that beings, and as will be seen in the next sec-
tion, being itself, are revealed as they truly are in them-
selves, that is, in their Selbigkeiten.

It ought to be mentioned at this point, however, that
Heidegger has solely·described the logical truth about a
perceptual entity, a picture on a wall. Perhaps the reader
might ask about an intuitional entity, something that is not
given in perception, such as the Struktur of Dasein's being.
Heidegger does not take this issue up in §44 of SZ, even though
it is a crucial aspect of his alethology. By restricting his
description of logical truth to "perception" he has, quite
clearly, side-stepped many of the problems a complete account
of logical truth encounters. But at the same time, he somewhat
undermines his own account.[15]

One must turn to his distinction between ontological
logic, or the knowledge that flows therefrom, and ontical
logic. The former can be described in traditional terms as
a "transcendental" logic, one that deals with the a priori·
"conditions of possibility" of whatever is under investigation,
be it consciousness, existence, or nature. Heidegger calls
his own ontological approach in SZ "fundamental ontology",
meaning thereby that it is the logic or "logos" about being
itself, and beings only insofar as they can open up an under-
standing of being itself. Ontical logic, as he construes it,
is best typified by the sciences, which understand "being
itself" in terms of particular beings, such as anthropology,
chemistry, and biology.

If Heidegger had given an example of an onto-logical truth in §44 of SZ, it would have had to take into account some other criterion of logical truth than perception, namely intuition. For the Selbigkeit of Dasein, for example, cannot be given in perception. The Strukturen that the ontological approach uncovers cannot be found to be the Same (dasselbe) as anything given in perception. Heidegger prefers to call the non-perceptual criterion of logical truth in which Dasein's Selbigkeit (i.e. its Eigentlichkeit) is revealed something other than "intuition" (Anschauung)--he calls it "Dasein's sight". (SZ,146) The Selbigkeit of Dasein is revealed propositionally or logically in an act of "Dasein's sight".

Assuming that logical truths concerning intuitional as well as perceptual contents are structurally the same, that is, assuming that both in "perception" and in "Dasein's sight" a particular relation of Sameness is uncovered between the Given and the Meant, Heidegger's notion of logical truth can be brought into a historical perspective when it is questioned as follows: in exactly what way is SZ's notion of logical truth different from the traditional Correspondence Theory ?

Heidegger describes the traditional Correspondence Theory in terms of the relation between the correlatives; he calls this relation a "just-as" (So-wie) relation, meaning that the Meant is supposed to be given "just as" it is. He further characterizes this relation according to the way in which the mediaevals described it, as an adaequatio.

Since the Latin term <u>adaequatio</u> quite literally means "equalness", Heidegger's basic interpretation of the tradi- tional Correspondence Theory can be said to emphasize two aspects of this theory--the notions of correlativeness and equalness.[16]

But these two notions lie at the bottom of Heidegger's own theory of logical truth. For he does not claim that, in light of the notion of correlativeness, the Meant vanishes once the Given's <u>Selbigkeit</u> is revealed; nor, for that matter, does he himself describe what he means by "sameness", the sameness found to exist between the two correlatives. And who would want to haggle over whether the most appropriate description of this correlativeness should be encapsulated in the term "equalness" or "sameness" ?[17]

What Heidegger has done that is unique, and what may henceforth add a new chapter to the history of the Corres- pondence Theory, is to emphasize the distinction between, on the one hand, the revealing or "uncovering" of the correspondence relation, and on the other, the relation itself. Heidegger stresses, and stresses emphatically, that the onus of logical truth should not be placed, as it has been done traditionally, on the corresponding solely, but more importantly, on the context in which this corresponding takes place--the context of the propositional <u>uncovering</u> of the correspondence. In a word, Heidegger has broadened the Correspondence Theory; in modern English, it now reads: logical, propositional truth is the uncovering of the correspondence between the proposition

and the fact. In Heidegger's terminology: logical truth
is the uncovering of the sameness between the Given and the
Meant.

4. Uncovering of Existential Truth

In §44 of SZ, ·a fundamental distinction is drawn
between "logical" and "existential" truth. Logical truth
is defined as the uncovering of propositions (logic), while
existential truth is defined as the uncovering of Dasein
(existence). Existential truth is based on Dasein's aware-
ness of "being-in-the-world" as "what" it is; "what" Dasein
is, is predetermined by the formal structures of its being.
The truth of Dasein's own particular "whatness", its structural
disclosedness in-the-world, is existential truth.[18]

Existential truth is the most basic or "primordial"
form of truth; logical truth is derived from existential truth.
In order for the Selbigkeit of a being or phenomenon to be
uncovered logically as what it truly is, the being that un-
covers it "logically" must first be uncovered as what it
truly is. Heidegger's description of the truth of a phenomenon
as "the showing of itself in itself" applies also to the
phenomenon of Dasein; Dasein's existential showing-up of .
itself precedes its logical showing-up. of itself and other
beings.

Heidegger calls the uncovering of Dasein "disclosed- ·
ness" (Erschlossenheit).[19] He uses the present tense of the
verbal "uncovering" (entdeckend-sein) to denote the pure com-
ing-to-be (φύειν) of Dasein. By virtue of the uncovering

of Dasein, other beings are uncovered along with Dasein:
Dasein's practical, pre-theoretical, everyday absorption
in its surrounding enviroment reveals other beings within
Dasein's world. Saying that other beings are uncovered by
Dasein does not mean that they are brought into being by
Dasein, but rather that they are _revealed_ to be "in being"
by Dasein, and hence are said to be "unhidden" or "a-lethes".
The truth or unhiddenness of the beings discovered to be within-
the-world is described by Heidegger as an "after-the-fact"
truth, i.e. after the fact of Dasein. These beings revealed
to be "within" Dasein's world have a quality of truth which is
best described in terms of the past tense, in terms of "un-
coveredness" (_Entdecktheit_) or "having-been-uncovered" (_ent-
deckt-sein_). Terminologically, therefore, disclosedness refers
to the being-unhiddenness of Dasein while uncoveredness refers
to the unhiddenness of inner-mundane beings.

For the sake of simplicity, one can schematize Hei-
degger's overall distinction between existential and logical
uncovering as follows:

```
                      Ontological (uncovers being itself)
        LOGIC----------
                      Ontical     (uncovers particular beings)
```

```
                      uncovering of beings within Dasein's
        EXISTENCE-----       environing world

                      uncovering of Dasein
```

Dasein is primordially "in-the-truth", i.e. in the
unhiddenness of being. This does not mean that Dasein is in
"the whole truth" as would be an omniscient Mind; it simply

means that, for Dasein, "the disclosedness of its ownmost being belongs to its existential constitution."(SZ,221)

Any untruth or falsity that Dasein may be in is not a radical alteration or metamorphosis of its ownmost being. Heidegger speaks of Dasein's existential truth being "covered-over" when Dasein is in untruth; but being "covered-over" does not have the same status as "uncovering". The primary function of a mirror, for example, is to reflect or depict imitatively; when the mirror gets covered-over with dust, its primary function (ἔργον) has not been negated or obliterated. Likewise, when Dasein is in untruth on an existential level, when Dasein is "inauthentic", its basic state of being "in-the-truth" has been covered-over by the dust, so to speak, of untruth--"hiddenness". Thus, a fundamental clarity (Durchsichtigkeit) goes along with being-in-the-truth, a clarity in which Dasein is transparently aware of its ownmost participation and presence in this essential unhiddenness.[20] Existential untruth is a privation of the fundamental clarity of "being-in-the-truth". Heidegger says:

> But only insofar as Dasein has been disclosed, has it also been closed-off; and only insofar as beings within-the-world have been uncovered along with Dasein have such beings, as possibly encounterable within-the-world, been covered-over or disguised. (SZ,222)

Insofar as Dasein existentially comports itself both truthfully and untruthfully, says Heidegger, is Dasein "a fallen being", a being "thrown into" a world in which a prior culturally and socially defined interpretation of Dasein's ownmost being determines to a large extent the way Dasein is

in-the-world. Dasein is thrown into the demands of this
world, i.e. into the claims made on Dasein's ownmost being.
For Dasein to authentically--truly--be aware of its funda-
mental clarity of being-in-the-truth, it must modify the
interpretation of itself that is manufactured, so to speak,
"by the public", by the das Man consciousness.

Since "truth" for Heidegger always rests on the
disclosedness of Dasein, truth is relative to this disclosed-
ness. Truth is, he emphasizes, "only insofar as Dasein is and
so long as Dasein is." (SZ,226) Not only truth itself, the
disclosedness of Dasein, but all logical truths, scientific
or otherwise, "are true only as long as Dasein is". Before
Newton's or Einstein's laws of "nature" were discovered, the
laws were neither true nor false; through Newton and through
Einstein, i.e. through Dasein, the phenomena, and therefore
the laws about the phenomena, were uncovered--made true.
Through Dasein the truth came into being:

> Before there was any Dasein, there was no truth, and
> after Dasein is no more there will be no truth, because
> then truth as disclosedness, uncovering, and uncovered-
> ness can not be. (SZ,226)

Heidegger opposes the kind of scepticism which denies
that Dasein can have certainty concerning matters of truth.
A sceptic, he argues, can "no more be refuted than the being
of truth can be 'proven'." (SZ,229) Heidegger says that any
sceptic who denies the truth does not even need to be refuted,
since his very existence refutes him. In denying the truth
the sceptic denies his own being. Blindly the sceptic "has
obliterated Dasein in the desperation of suicide; and in doing

so he has obliterated the truth." (SZ,229)

5. Care: The Cause and Originating-locus of Disclosedness

In SZ Heidegger does not, as he does in his later writings on truth, simply locate the phenomenon of primordial truth in the sheer opening-up (φύειν) of being, with Dasein as a participant in this disclosure.[21] In the SZ the whole phenomenon of truth is related back to the essence of Dasein, care--Sorge. By Sorge (ἐπιμέλεια) Heidegger does not mean a particular kind of care, such as willing, wishing, urging, worrying, concerning, or loving; he rather means "care itself", the Struktur of care. The many cares are derived from and founded on the phenomenon of care itself (SZ,182;192):

> As a primordial Structural-totality, Sorge lies existentially-apriorily "before", and this means always in, every factual "attitude" and "situation" of Dasein. (SZ,193)

Heidegger has two basic notions of Sorge. On the one hand, he sees it as a sort of power or force which the term "cause" (αἰτία) perhaps captures. On the other hand, he sees it in a more formal sense as the source, form, or originating-locus (ἀρχή) of disclosedness. These two aspects of Sorge and the way that they relate to Heidegger's construal of truth in SZ will be dealt with separately.

(a) Sorge as a Power or Cause: Whenever Dasein becomes lost in the existential untruth of inauthenticity, conscience as the Voice of Sorge calls Dasein back to its primordial and ownmost awareness of being-in-the-truth. (SZ,274-280) As conscience, Sorge is that steady force or power which

maintains Dasein's awareness of being-in-the-truth. The determination and resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) to live by the Voice of Sorge, i.e. to exist authentically, is the determination and resoluteness to be aware of being (in the truth). (SZ,297-98)

In the way that Heidegger defines it, Sorge as a power or cause is that which maintains Dasein's own particular ἔργον as what it is. Unlike a tree or a stone, for example, Dasein is not maintained "as what it is" just as it is: unique to Dasein is its fallenness, its original and continual "falling away from" its essential nature or ownmost being. Dasein must therefore continually "return to" its essential ergon, to its essential Eigentlichkeit.

The subjective "I" or "ego", argues Heidegger, is not the ultimate criterion for what gets determined as "inauthentic" or "authentic"; the doctrine of the authenticity of Dasein is not a relativistic ethical doctrine. Heidegger is against interpreting his notion of Sorge as the Voice of conscience in an "ethical" context, a context based on the concepts of "goodness" and "badness". Heidegger does not see his aim as a retrieval of classical ethical notions; "being-authentic" is not just a modern answer from "fundamental ontology" replying to the age old question: what does "being-good" mean ? Authenticity, argues Heidegger, has to do with Dasein's truthfulness, not its goodness.[22] Sorge as the Voice of conscience, Sorge as a power or cause that is, lies like the centre of a vortex at the root of Dasein's being-in-

the-truth.[23]

(b) _Sorge_ as the Originating-locus or Source of
Form: As has already been noted, Dasein is not an amorphic
"blob of being". Heidegger says:

> We have _found_ the fundamental constitution of the being
> we have _thematized_, that being-in-the-world, whose
> essential Structures are centred in Disclosedness.
> The wholeness of this Structural-totality has been
> uncovered as _Sorge_. (SZ,231)

Dasein is a being that has a definite "form"; Dasein
is intrinsically morphic. Hence, Heidegger not only calls
Dasein a being (Seiende) (SZ,7), but also a Structural-totality
(Strukturganzheit). (SZ,191) He calls this Structural-totality
"the constitution of Dasein (Daseinsverfassung)." (SZ,192)
Dasein's epistemological, temporal, historical, and onto-
logical state of being is structurally constituted by _Sorge_.

Sorge, as the structure of structures (Strukturganz),
is the formal source of both being and truth. For as Heidegger
says, without Dasein there would be neither truth nor being.
"Being--not beings--'is given' only insofar as truth is. And
truth is only insofar as and so long as Dasein is." (SZ,230)
But what is Dasein ? Dasein is _Sorge_.

Sorge as the Strukturganz constitutes Dasein's being
as a whole; hence, the disclosedness of Dasein, "primordial
truth", is constituted by _Sorge_. The mediating link between
Dasein as Structure and Dasein as being is _Sorge_. As the basic
originating-locus of all truth, _Sorge_ lies at the foundation
of Heidegger's SZ alethology.

If Dasein can be said to have a _telos_ at all, it lies

in Dasein's disclosedness: Dasein's _telos_ is to be disclosed, to be in the open of being itself. And the origin or _arche_ of this telos is _Sorge_, the "structure" of _Sorge_. As a cause or power, _Sorge_ maintains Dasein in this teleological openness; as the originating-locus of the formal dimensions of Dasein's teleolological openness, _Sorge_ structuralizes the on-going activity of disclosedness. All truth and being ultimately arise from _Sorge_.

6. Conclusion

To deal more adequately with this twofold notion of _Sorge_, one can borrow the terminological distinction between "suchness" and "whatness" already established in Chapter I. On the one hand, the sheer truth of Dasein, the sheer disclosedness or openness of Dasein--"such that Dasein is"-- is Dasein's "suchness", the suchness of a-letheia. On the other hand, the "whatness" of truth--the manner in which Dasein is disclosed or opened--has its locus in the _formal constitution_ of Dasein, in Dasein as a structural-totality, in "_Sorge_".

In _SZ_ the relation between the two aspects of truth is largely left untouched by Heidegger's analytic. In other words, the relation between _Sein_ and the _Seinsstructur_ is never dealt with in the same manner that _Sein_ itself is treated. This lack of concern is also found in the notion of logical truth found in _SZ_: the dependency on a notion of a formal relation between two correlatives, i.e. the dependency on a notion of "correspondence between correlatives", is not

acknowledged· by Heidegger.

This lack of concern in SZ over the connection be-
tween the suchness and whatness of truth, or the Sein and
Struktur of truth, has something in common with the lack of
concern in §44 of SZ to treat the historical--"traditional"--
·notion of "primordial" truth, that which grounds logical
truth. .For Heidegger basically argues in §44 of SZ that
traditionally one notion of truth has been held, a notion of
logical truth, and a free-floating one at that. Had his his-
tory of the Western notion of "truth" been complete, he would
have included also a criticism of the traditional notions of
a "ground"--reality, being, God, nature, or "man the measure".

In any case, the connection between the whatness and
suchness of truth is of prime importance in PLW wherein
Heidegger argues that "suchness", the sheer unhiddenness of
being, is·prior to its "whatness", the way in which it is
unhidden. In light of SZ the thesis in PLW appears to mark a
·development in Heidegger's thinking, since the thesis in SZ
maintains that the suchness and whatness, the Sein and the
Struktur, are equiprimordial. The overcoming of metaphysics,
"Plato's metaphysics" that is, which Heidegger sees as his task
in PLW, must also include the metaphysic of truth found in SZ.[24]
·Moreover, and even more importantly, the attempted "overcoming
of morality" in PLW must also include the doctrine of Sorge
·as found in SZ. .

CHAPTER IV

HEIDEGGER'S PLW CRITIQUE OF PLATO

1. Introduction

The theme of the Republic is the nature of justice,
δικαιοσύνη. The most dominant problem raised in the majority
of Plato's dialogues lies at the heart of the Republic: the
problem of "being and seeming". Socrates is searching for
justice that doesn't just seem just, but really is just; this
search is no ordinary matter, but concerns "the whole way in
which one has to live." (R,352d,8) Plato leads the reader
into the complexities of this search through the very simple
question that Socrates asks the aged Cephalus, the one who has
experienced "life", and is now about to leave it:

> For it seems to me a necessity that we have to learn
> from the aged as from those who have gone before us on
> a path which we perhaps will also journey on, What is
> it like ? (R,328e,I)

Out of this search an image of justice emerges in
the Republic that is founded on the image of a just psyche:
a just political order ought to be founded on the model of
a just psyche. The telos of the state ought to reflect the
telos of the psyche. Education ought to cultivate the
teleological aspirations of the psyche; the state, if it is
to act wisely, ought to establish the most appropriate form
of education that can carry this out. The Republic ends,
appropriately enough, with the myth of Er, a myth in which

human beings are exhorted to really be just, for the just are
rewarded. The River of Uncaring and the Plain of Forgetfulness
explain why the truly rich nature of the psyche is so hidden.
In short, the myth of Er, in line with the eikon of the cave,
tells us that the essential battle "here" is with Uncaringness
and Forgetfulness.

On the whole, PLW is a three part work. In the
first section Heidegger introduces his subject matter, the
change in the essence of truth that Plato inaugurates; he also
outlines the method he uses in analyzing Plato's doctrine
of truth. In section two he includes the Greek text of the
cave with his own translation; and in section three he inter-
prets the meaning and ramifications of his interpreation.
While dealing briefly with the first two sections, this chapter
basically deals with the third section of PLW. The overall aim
of this chapter is expository in nature, i.e. to point out
Heidegger's essential position regarding Plato's construal
of truth in the Republic, especially in Books VI and VII.

2. Heidegger's Hermeneutical Approach

Heidegger introduces the theme of PLW with an expla-
nation of what he means by a Lehre, a doctrine or teaching.
He begins by contrasting the knowledge (Erkenntnis) of the
sciences with the doctrine of a thinker. The sciences, he
says, set their results before humankind as comprehensible
results to be put to some practical use. The doctrine of a
thinker, on the other hand, is not a set of reflections meant
to be put to some practical use; rather, a thinker puts out

his doctrine, a doctrine to which humankind is exposed and upon which it may or may not expend itself. This distinction between a science and a doctrine, or a scientist and a thinker, is relevant on two accounts. First it indicates that Heidegger, insofar as he considers himself a thinker, has stepped away from his position in SZ regarding the construal of phenomenological philosophy as "the science" of the being of beings. Secondly, it puts the onus of thinking on the thinker's doctrine (Lehre), and as such equates Plato the thinker with Plato the teacher, Lehrer.

Heidegger further says that the "doctrine" of a thinker is that which remains unsaid in what he says. Invoking the notion from SZ that unhiddenness must be wrested from hiddenness, Heidegger claims that one must wrest the unsaid from the said in a thinker's doctrine. In Plato's thought the unsaid lies harboured in Plato's doctrine of truth:

> What remains unsaid in Plato's thought is a change in the way the essence of truth gets treated. That this change takes place, what it consists in, and what gets established by it, would be made clear through an interpretation of the "cave allegory". (PLW,5;249)

Section two of PLW consists of the Greek text and Heidegger's translation, neither of which differs significantly from the common texts and translations. A common textual variation is absent from the Greek text Heidegger has chosen for PLW, and his translation doesn't differ significantly from the mainstream of translations. Understandably Heidegger translates ἀλήθεια as Unverborgenheit, unhiddenness, instead

of the common English translation "reality" or "truth", or
the common German "das Wahre";[1] he also makes a point of trans-
lating τά ὄντα as beings (Seienden) instead of "things" or
"realities", and ὀρθότης as "right" or "correct" (richtig)
instead of "true". Perhaps his concern over the translation
of these words is an expression of the same concern he expresses
in SZ, wherein he states that one of the most basic functions
of philosophy is to preserve and protect the power of the
most elemental words through which and in which Dasein ex-
presses itself.

3. The Stages of Truth in the Events of the Cave

In section three of PLW Heidegger interprets the
cave in terms of the stages of truth represented by the
ascent to and descent from the seeing of what "goodness itself"
is. Heidegger lists four such stages. To his four is added
a fifth, that which Heidegger calls "Plato's interpretation".
This is included as a stage, indeed the culminating stage,
since it also deals with "truth", the truth of the cave eikon
itself.

(a) Stage one is characterized by the state of mind
of those who dwell in the Lebenswelt of the cave; these
cave dwellers are "prejudiced by what they immediately encoun-
ter." (PLW,27;268) They immediately encounter the shadows,
shadows which they have been chained to experience "since
childhood". This stage ends when Socrates says of the yoked
ones that "they would consider nothing else to be the truth
{τὸ ἀληθὲs} than the shadows of the artificial objects." (R,-

515c,2) <u>Zu den Sachen selbst</u> means, at this stage, <u>Zu den Schatten selbst</u>--To the shadows themselves !

(b) Stage two is characterized by the removal of the chains of one of the cave dwellers. Although liberated, he continues to believe that the shadows are the things themselves, even when shown the real source of the shadows, the artifacts being carried in front of the fire. Perplexed and bewildered, he believes that the objects that he formerly saw with his own eyes are <u>truer</u>, more unhidden, than the objects he now is being forced to look at, objects he can barely discern in the dazzle and brightness of the fire-light. Like Oedipus. unable to face the truth with his naked eyes, this newly liberated one blinds himself to the painful truth he now is forced to face. "Consequently, at the end of the portrayal of the second stage the word ἀληθές also occurs again, and now in the comparative ἀληθεστέρα, the 'more unhidden'." (<u>PLW</u>,28;-258)

(c) In the third stage the liberated one is forced into the open region outside of the cave. This open region constitutes the most difficult phase of education, one which is supposed to reveal the true nature of things. A genuine revelation does not, however, take place all at once, but rather by means of a process of dwelling, a dwelling in which the unhidden, truth, is attained as the most unhidden of all, as τὰ ἀληθέστατα. (<u>PLW</u>,29;259)

According to Heidegger the most unhidden truth in the cave eikon is the unhiddenness of primordial quiddity.

Plato stresses that the unhiddenness of whatness, not of being-
ness, is what is <u>revealed</u> to the one who dwells in the
truth. Heidegger says:

> The most unhidden shows itself in that which each being
> always is. Without such a self-showing of the What--
> that means of the Ideas--this and that and all such
> things, and therefore everything, remains hidden. (<u>PLW</u>,
> 29;259)

As Heidegger also points out, the revelation of that
which is most true depends on the freedom of the person who is
in the open region; the person must first be liberated, "free",
from the tyrannical yoke of the habitually unquestioned inter-
pretation of "what is". Education, according to the cave
eikon, is the means by which this liberation is effected.
Education is construed in the eikon as that steady orienting
and dwelling in which the whole psyche turns towards the
most unhidden, until a transformation takes place, a περιαγωγή
ὅλης τῆς ψυχῆς. Hence education can only find its completion
and consummation in that which is most true: "The essence of
'education' is founded in the essence of 'truth'." (<u>PLW</u>,30;260)

(d) Stage four of the cave events deals with the
constant overcoming of being uneducated, ἀπαιδευσία. The
descent into the darkness and hiddenness of the cave is the
descent into the <u>privation</u> of both education and truth. The
one who has experienced the most unhidden and who must nonetheless
continue to dwell in the hiddenness of the cave must summon
up with Herculean strength the full powers of the great Hermes:
"The unhidden must be torn away from hiddenness, in a certain
sense stolen from it." (<u>PLW</u>,32;260)

But theft is always the theft of something that already exists, which in this case is the existence of truth, "unhiddenness". One can say that a Law of Truth emerges: hiddenness is always the hiddenness of unhiddenness. This stage therefore culminates with the privation thesis: apaideia is a mere privation of paideia as hiddenness is of unhiddenness. Dwelling in the cave is not a negation of aletheia and paideia. Ἀλήθεια is dealt with in this stage solely in terms of privation, as privation belongs to the essence of truth.

(e) The cave as Heidegger sees it is primarily concerned with truth, from its acquisition to its preservation. But, as has already been pointed out, Heidegger goes one step further in his exposition, he interprets what he calls "Plato's own interpretation" of the cave--which actually points to a fifth stage, and thus treats the truth of the cave eikon itself.

Heidegger says that Plato's interpretation immediately follows the cave, construing it as "the image (Bild) for τὴν... δι᾽ ὄψεως φαινομένην ἕδραν-- the dwelling place which shows itself to our (everyday) looking around."—(PLW,19;254) The fire is the Bild for the sun while the whole cave represents our celestial firmament. In this firmament human beings are attached and bound to the earth:

> What environs and concerns them there on the earth is to them "the real", i.e. beings. In this cavernous dwelling they feel "in the world" and "at home" and find reliability here. (PLW,19;254)

The region which lies outside the cave is the Bild for that which constitutes what beings really are: eide and

ideai. According to Plato, says Heidegger, humankind never
really suspects that what it considers to be "the real" is
known to be what it is by means of something largely considered
"unreal", the eide and ideai. The common agreement about the
"real" is largely a "manufactured interpretation", an inter-
pretation which, when unexamined, has the same truth value as
the cave dwellers' interpretation of the totality of shadows
passing on the wall. That which lies outside of the environ-
ing interpretation shows itself "as it is", not as it is
according to "something else":

> Thus the sunlight outside the cave is not in the first
> place manufactured by man. In its brightness the growing
> and appearing things immediately show themselves, without
> needing to be represented through an adumbration. The
> self-showing things in the "allegory" are the "image"
> for the "Ideas". The sun in the "allegory" is meant to
> be the "image" for that which makes all the Ideas visible.
> The sun is the "image" for the Idea of all Ideas. (PLW,21;
> 255)

In this fifth stage, states Heidegger, Plato identi-
fies truth with whatness, not with unhiddenness. Plato is
interested in the unhiddenness of "what" lies behind the
appearing. Thus, everything is gathered together for Plato in
the "allegorical" meaning of the fire, shadows, daylight, and
sun; unhiddenness as truth is therefore used in the cave to
describe the events that take place, but only in terms of "the
way it makes that which appears accessible in its external-
appearance (εἶδος) and the way it makes this self-showing
(ἰδέα) visible." (PLW,34;261)

4. Paideia Based on a Pre-established Notion of Correctness

Socrates introduces the cave eikon with the statement

to Glaucon: "liken our nature to an experience such as this one with respect to paideia and its privation, apaideia." (R, 514a,1) To show that Plato yokes truth to a notion of correctness, Heidegger first shows how paideia is yoked to a notion of correctness. He deals with paideia for two reasons: first because Plato introduces the cave by saying that it concerns paideia, and secondly because truth and paideia have already been shown to be essentially connected.

Although Plato says that paideia should be a "turning of the whole psyche around", the kind of paideia outlined in the cave is not based on this principle, argues Heidegger. Paideia as it is exemplified in the cave is based on a pre-established model (Vor-bild) of the way a part of the psyche-- the part that carries out the idetic-seeing--ought to be moulded. The psyche's correct development according to the pre-estab-lished "model" of the psyche constitutes the telos of paideia for Plato.[2]

Heidegger says that, if one wants to think as the Greeks thought, and if one wants to correctly translate the Greek word paideia (παιδεία), then one must not content oneself with a mere literal translation of this word. Paideia, he argues, should be translated in German by the word Bildung, an abstract noun which stems from the noun Bild, a picture or image, and which is related to the verb bilden, to form, mould, shape or educate. Heidegger chooses Bildung, a more uncommon word for education proper, instead of the more common term Erziehung, a drawing-out as the English "education" (educere,

to bring out)'. His reasons are etymologically motivated:
Plato, he argues, bases paideia, Bildung, on a pre-planned
model (Vor-bild) of paideia, and therefore makes paideia into
a method of moulding (bilden) the psyche according to an
overall picture (Bild) of the way the psyche ought to be
"in the truth", not necessarily how it is actually already
in the truth. Plato's ought is the "idetic ought", the ought
that is based on a "picture" of unhiddenness, not as unhidden-
ness, i.e. truth, is "in itself".

The pre-planned model, the Vorbild, is Plato's notion
of the telos of an education for philosophers: the idetic-
seeing (ἰδεῖν) of the true telos of the psyche, the seeing of
ἡ ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Thus, a particular kind of seeing, a seeing
in which one sees the ideai, becomes the essence of a philosoph-
ical education. In a word, paideia as Plato sees it is simply,
argues Heidegger, "a correct way of seeing things". And since
"correctness" has very little to do with "truth", Plato's
conception of paideia has very little to do with truth, with
which it is supposed to be essentially connected. Heidegger
bases this argument on his interpretation of Plato's notion
of the idea and eidos. Since Plato's notion of the idea and
eidos is based on a fabrication, and since his notion of
paideia is based on a "correct apprehension" of the idea
and eidos, his notion of paideia is based on a fabrication
also.

5. Heidegger's Interpretation of the Ἰδέα

According to Plato, the real understanding of the

meaning of things is made possible in the lighted openness
outside of the cave. In this most unhidden region of being,
beings present themselves as they are, says Heidegger, in
their outer-appearance (Aussehen):

> Plato does not take this "outer-appearance" as a
> mere "aspect". The "outer-appearance" for him has
> even something of an extrusion (Heraustreten) through
> which each thing "presents" itself. (PLW,19-20;255)

Commonly in Greek the outer-appearance of a thing is
termed the εἶδος or ἰδέα. For Plato the εἶδος is, strictly
speaking in terms of the Republic, a being's outer-appearance,
its Aus-sehen. And in Plato's technical vocabulary also,
argues Heidegger, the ἰδέα is a being's inner-appearance
so to speak, its self-showing (Sich-zeigend).[3]

Heidegger is textually justified in drawing this
twofold, formal distinction between the εἶδος and ἰδέα,
although nowhere in the Republic does Plato himself explicitly
draw such a distinction. Throughout the Republic, however,
Plato uses the term εἶδος in a non-technical fashion to
denote a type, class, or kind, and the term generally
appears when a plurality of things are meant. "Eidos" as
it is used in the Republic generally means "the way in which
a phenomenon appears outwardly"; examples of this notion of
the eidos are numerous in the Republic:

a. "four kinds (eide) of government..." (R,544a,2)
b. "three different kinds (eide) of good..." (R,367c,7)
c. "the different kinds (eide) of soberness, courage..."
   (R,402c,1)
d. "three parts (eide) of the psyche..." (R,504a,3)
e. eikons (εἰκών) liken, whereas eide classify
   according to outward appearance (R,510c-d)
f. "two types (eide)..." (R,509d,1)
g. "we are in the habit of setting down an eidos in

each instance for each of the many things to
which we give the same name." (R,596a,6)

The ἰδέα, on the other hand, is only used in the
Republic when a single thing is meant, and refers to a thing's
inner nature, i.e. to what makes it what it is. Plato var-
iously describes the ἰδέα in terms of a thing's own inner-
selfsameness:

    a. "although three different kinds (eide) of good exist,
        there is only one thing (idea) goodness itself can
        be." (R,507b,5)
    b. "the idea of agathos..." (R,508a,1)
    c. "the eidos of couches" is distinguished from "the
        idea of a couch" (R,596a-c)
    d. each type (eidos) of government (oligarchy, democracy,
        and so on) has its own idea (R,544c-e)
    e. "beauty itself" is a synonymous expression for "the
        idea of beauty" (R,479a-b)

From a less "ontological" point of view, Jowett, for
example, takes the same approach to the εἶδος and ἰδέα as
Heidegger. On the one hand, Jowett distinguishes the "ordinary
meanings" of the two terms as used by Greeks in general from
Plato's "philosophical usage", while on the other hand Jowett
distinguishes Plato's notion of the eidos from his notion of
the idea:[4]

    Ἰδέα, as a philosophical term, signifies rather form
    than kind. The meaning of a class, which εἶδος often
    essentially connotes, attaches only accidentally to
    ἰδέα. The latter term immediately suggests the unity
    of a complex notion as present to the mind. It is thus
    used to describe the work of συναγωγή, where εἶδος
    denotes the result of διαίρεσις:-
        Phaedr. 265 D, E εἰς μίαν τε ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν
        τὰ πολλαχῆ διεσπαρμένα, κ.τ.λ.....τὸ πάλιν κατ' εἴδη
        δύνασθαι τέμνειν.5.

To the twofold, formal nature of beings as Plato
construes them, Heidegger adds a third element, a being's
presence (Anwesung); "presence" is Heidegger's translation of

of the Greek word for "being"--οὐσία. He does not explain
why he translates ousia as presence instead of as being,
since the rightful word in Greek for presence is parousia,
παρουσία. In the way that Heidegger does use the term,
however, one can gather that he is trying to capture the
connotative sense of the Greek notion of ousia: being
is that which is "present" or has "presence". Thus Heidegger
says that presence, in the beginning of Western thinking,
was thought of as the rise (Aufgang) of truth, a-letheia;
as such, presence was experienced as unhiddenness.

But although Plato, argues Heidegger, works with
three basic notions concerning beings--ousia, eidos and idea--
these three constituents do not have an equal status:
for Plato the idea is the most important. Although ousia,
maintains Heidegger, is basically the rise of beings into
unhiddenness (truth), Plato ends up relegating it to the
rise of the idea into unhiddenness. As a result, in one's
comportment towards beings one's interest is not supposed
to lie in the experience of the "presence" of the being,
nor in the experience of its outer appearance (eidos),
but rather in the ἰδέα, in that which makes the presence
of the outer appearance "what it is". The psyche thus gets
construed in the Republic as a kind of sentient movie camera
equipped with a telephoto lens that has been pre-set to
zoom-in on the truth of the idea. In such a zooming-in,
however, the back-drop and context, the ousia and eidos,
get "put out of focus" as being unimportant for the picture

of the idea. Indeed, argues Heidegger, in this approach the idea is actually mistaken for the ousia:

> The idea achieves presence, namely the
> presence of what a being continuously is.
> The whatness [Was-sein] of a being is con-
> tinually present as what that being is.
> Presence, however, is generally the essence
> of being. Therefore, for Plato, being
> has its real essence in the whatness.
> Even more recent terminology betrays this
> way of looking at beings, that the true
> esse is the quidditas, the essentia,
> and not the existentia (SZ, 38; 262).

Equating the idea with the ousia has far reaching implications, for it immediately equates the idea with aletheia. As we have seen from the cave, truth as unhidden-ness makes the idea visible. And since one is only concerned about and directed towards the idea, the unhidden (truth) becomes a mere means to an end, a means for bringing the idea into being.

But unhiddenness, argues Heidegger, can never really be made to play the slave's role, which is why one finds a certain ambiguity in Plato's thought. On the one hand, Plato speaks of aletheia, while on the other hand he really has orthotes in mind, a notion of correctness. The relation one has to the idea is fundamentally different than the relation one has to aletheia itself. One's relationship to the idea, maintains Heidegger, is based on a concept of "rightness" (Richtigkeit), i.e. orthotes. One must first make an adjustment (Einrichtung) in one's whole comportment towards beings in order to idetically see (ἰδεῖν) the ἰδέα. One must consciously direct oneself (Sichrichtung) to the

ἰδέα. The prior-adjustment and self-direction predetermine
the whole way one experiences beings. In other words, truth
gets bound to a particular kind of rectified seeing; thus,
"ἀλήθεια is treated and mentioned while at the same time
ὀρθότης is meant and set as a standard, all in the same
train of thought" (PLW, 42-43, 265-266). The stages of
"truth" in the cave eikon turn out to be, upon closer
scrutiny, stages marking the degree to which one's idetic-
seeing (ἰδεῖν) is correct. The stages mark the way one sees
beings idetically--the more idetically, the more truly,
i.e. the more correctly. Heidegger cites the passage in
which the liberated one is set free within the cave and
looks towards those things which are being more (R. 515d, 3-4):
πρὸς μᾶλλον ὄντα τετραμμένος ὀρθότερον βλέποι --"turned
towards the beings that are being more (Seinenderen), he
can have a more rectified look" (PLW, 41; 265). A correspon-
dence (ὁμοίωσις) is thus set up between the rectified
idein and the idea, and this correspondence thus becomes
mistaken for truth itself.

6. Orthotes Eclipses Aletheia

Heidegger's diagnosis: Plato has an idetic complex.
The correspondence set up between the idein and the idea
becomes the formula for an anthropocentric and orthological
conception of truth, a conception which has crystalized
into the mediaeval and modern Correspondence Theory of
Logical Truth, first formulated by Aristotle. Heidegger

now turns his attention to Plato's position regarding existential truth--that mode of truth which is supposed to be "primordial". The final <u>tour de force</u> of <u>PLW</u> is delivered with Heidegger's argument that Plato doesn't really have a notion of existential truth: for Plato a rectified-idetic-seeing-in-the-world is the most primordial way of "disclosively-being-in-the-world". In a word, in Plato's view the rectified seeing of the "highest <u>idea</u>", the <u>idea</u> of agathon, is the most primordial way to be "in-the-truth".

Heidegger begins this concluding argument by claiming that the translation of τὸ ἀγαθόν as "the good", especially the <u>morally</u> good, is incorrect. The Greeks, he says, thought of the good as something useful or efficacious-- <u>tauglich</u>.[6] Agathon is therefore that "which is useful to something and which makes something useful" (<u>PLW</u>, 38; 263). Unfortunately Heidegger does not describe what he means by usefulness (<u>Tauglichkeit</u>), except to say that, in effect, X is useful because it makes Y possible and useful. But this description is too vague; thus, when he translates the ἰδέα of agathon as "the ἰδέα of usefulness", or simply as "the power which renders something useful" (<u>Tauglichmachend</u>), he puts a lot of strain on his argument in <u>PLW</u>. Perhaps he has in mind a passage in Book VI wherein Socrates calls <u>to agathon</u> "the means by which just things and the rest of the benefits become useful and beneficial". But as the reader

knows from other passages in the Republic, agathon is shown
to have at least three very basic interpretations, and
"usefulness" is only one of them. So "usefulness" cannot
be an adequate translation of tò agathon; indeed, by translating τὸ
ἀγαθόν as Tauglichkeit, Heidegger commits the fallacy of
ad aspectum.

    Heidegger's translation can only make sense if it is
put into the context of the sun eikon of Book VI. In this
eikon agathon is construed as a power, maker, or creator,
and reinforces Heidegger's argument that ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα
is "a power which renders (useful)"--a Tauglich-machend.
In the sun eikon agathon itself is construed as a power
(Macht) and a cause, in the same way as the sun is a power
and cause:

HELIOS———————————— HEMERA--lights-up the
                                  Kosmos (horetic dimension)

PHAOS--light

AGATHOS———————————ALETHEIA--lights-up the
                                 Psyche (noetic dimension)

Plato further describes agathon itself as a power and a
cause:

> This, then, that gives the truth to the
> object you must call the inner nature
> [ἰδέα] of the good itself, and of knowledge
> and the power to know to the knower, you
> must discern it as being the cause of the
> understanding of being and truth insofar
> as they are known (R. 508e,1).

Heidegger further argues that not only should agathon
be translated by "usefulness", but the term ἰδέα should
be thought essentially in terms of usefulness. The Greeks,

he argues, generally thought that the ideai were useful, because they "make it useful that something can appear as what it is and so can be present in its constancy" (PLW, 38; 263). And since the idea of agathon is the last ἰδέα to be seen in the intelligible sphere it is the Highest Idea, the cause of all usefulness. The seeing of the Highest Idea is a rectified seeing, as is all idetic-seeing. As Plato construes the truth of the ἰδέα as orthotes, he construes the truth of the Highest Idea, the Idea of all Ideai, as embodying the highest form of orthotes.

Thus the cave eikon culminates in the notion that the most primordial kind of truth is that which causes the things considered to be most useful to human beings. That which is valued as useful is considered as the criterion by which all things are judged, especially "truth". Truth is only truth insofar as it is "useful". For Plato the highest kind of usefulness is found in idetic-seeing, in the "right way" of looking at things.

> On the ὀρθότης, the correctness of looking,
> rests everything. Through this correctness,
> seeing and recognizing are made correct
> so that this correctness ultimately aims
> straight for the highest Idea, and fixes
> itself in this "alignment" (PLW, 41-42; 265).

The inner teleology of the original Greek approach gets covered-up in this reversal in thinking: presence (ousia) as the emergence (θύειν) of the hidden (λήθης) into unhiddenness (ἀληθές) becomes the emergence of the ἰδέα into unhiddenness. This reversal determines modern thinking

to this day, and is still the accepted and uncontested
notion of "reality". Beings are treated according to
"ideas" and "values" (of usefulness); which values and which
ideas one chooses   is really not that important, as long
as things can be weighed according to values and ideas.
Paideia in the "post-reversal" Western world thus becomes
an institution for teaching the "correct way" of ideating
and valuing. The realm of experience which is not directly
related to "ideas" and "values" is considered both useless
and meaningless. Truth that is neither an idea nor a value
is forgotten, indeed considered meaningless. And in the
eikon of the cave, so argues Heidegger, this forgetfulness
itself is forgotten about--lost in a world of values and
ideas.

7. Conclusion

In PLW Heidegger carries out two basic arguments:
first, he attempts to show that one can speak meaningfully
about "Plato's doctrine", in this case his doctrine of truth.
Not only can one speak about this doctrine, but one can
speak about an "unsaid teaching" harboured deep within it.
Although the sheer fact that "Plato" never says anything
in the espousal of this doctrine does not concern Heidegger,
nor likewise does the fact that the "doctrine" is found in
an eikon. Secondly, and more importantly, Heidegger argues
that with Plato οὐσία as ἀ-λήθεια becomes οὐσία as ἰδέα.
This shift away from the truth of being to the truth of the

"inner nature" or "idea" of being follows from the belief that humankind's essential connection to being can only be experienced through idetic-seeing, the most primordial way of being-in-the-world. Primordial idetic-seeing is consequently construed as "the best way" for human beings "to be", whence Plato's notion of the <u>idea</u> of <u>to agathon</u>.

Chapter V

HEIDEGGER'S NEGLECT: THE ARCHE AND TELOS OF IDEIN

1. Introduction

In this concluding chapter the main argument of
PLW is examined, on the one hand, in light of the alethology
put forth in SZ, and on the other, in light of the notion
of the psyche put forth in the Republic. This task is
accomplished in a threefold manner.

First, the basic position put forth in SZ concerning
Sorge (qua source of Dasein's "being-true" or "being what
it is") is set before the argument put forth in PLW;
it is consequently shown that PLW and SZ are at doctrinal
variance. Quite simply, it is shown that Sorge, as it is
construed in SZ, serves a similar role as the notion of
Agathon does in the Republic; since PLW rejects the claim
that there can be any formal or structural equiprimordiality
with one's sheer being-in-the-truth, PLW must perforce
reject the claim made in SZ that "without Dasein, i.e.
Sorge, there would be no truth".

Secondly, the main arguments in PLW are examined
in light of the Republic itself. Special attention is paid
to Heidegger's neglect of the role that dialectics, and not
just idetic-seeing, plays in the philosophical method praised
by Socrates. Also, special attention is paid to Heidegger's

neglect of the _Republic's_ description of the arche and the telos of the psyche.

Thirdly, and finally, this chapter and thesis close with what can be called no less than a most timely voice. Walter Hirsch's approach to Plato in _Platons Weg zum Mythos_ is brought forward as an example of the direction which a Heideggerian critique of Plato ought to take, but which Heidegger himself never took. Hirsch successfully retrieves from Plato a position in line with the basic teaching of _SZ_.

The overall results of this chapter reinforce this paper's thesis that one cannot accept, given the main argument in _SZ_, the hermeneutical context from which Heidegger argues in _PLW_, the context of the "unhiddenness first" approach to beings and being itself. Either _PLW_ contradicts the alethology put forth in _SZ_, or else points beyond it; given the substance of his later writings, which _PLW_ along with _The Essence of Truth_ more or less inaugurate, Heidegger seems to be going beyond the notion of truth found in _SZ_.

2. The Structure of Sorge: PLW and SZ

In _PLW_ Heidegger envisions "the end of metaphysics" taking place when Plato's approach to beings and being itself is finally overcome, since the beginning of metaphysics, argues Heidegger, first takes its rise with Plato. In a similar manner; he also envisions "the end of morality" taking place when Plato's notion of the good is finally

overcome.

The overcoming of Plato's "metaphysical" as well as his "moralistic" thought is put forth in PLW as lying at the very heart of Heidegger's philosophical task. Given the thesis in SZ however, one must seriously question whether or not it is Plato or Heidegger, or indeed the Plato in Heidegger, that Heidegger is trying to overcome.

Heidegger's SZ notion of the role that Sorge plays in Dasein's truthfulness or authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) is meant to replace, not retrieve, the traditional and so called "Platonic" manner of dealing with the origin or source of ethical comportment. As Heidegger argues, the Platonic approach is embedded in the basic cultural experience of the West, since Christianity as it has developed has expressed itself through a "Platonic" experience of being: "Platonism for the people" as Nietzsche calls it. Thus, Heidegger also sees his task in PLW as the fundamental overcoming of the basic moral teaching of Christianity, in which the notion of the God found in the Republic has been assimilated by the notion of God found in the Bible.

From a Judeo-Christian point of view, God is construed as the primordial source, origin, and ground (ἀρχή) of human goodness and badness, rightness and wrongness; God is seen as the basic arche of authenticity and inauthenticity. The Devil is seen as the arche of human badness, of the most basic badness. But the Devil does not hold an equal position with God; the Devil is a "privation" of God. The Devil

denied and continues to deny God. The Devil has "fallen
from" God's essential way of being. The Devil continually
tries to overcome and annihilate God, but never is wholly
successful. It is God as the arche of human aletheia, ousia,
and episteme that is constantly the maintainer and sustainer
of what is.

In SZ Heidegger argues that one need not go beyond
his notion of Sorge in order to account for Dasein's essential
truth and falsity; authenticity and inauthenticity; goodness
and badness. In PLW he thinks that the notions of God
and the Devil cannot adequately deal with Dasein's basic
predicament. Nor does he think that his notion of Sorge
is merely a literal interpretation, rather a "reinterpretation",
of the traditional, eikonical-mythological, "religious"
interpretation of Dasein.

But viewed from a traditional point of view, viewed
from the point of view of the tradition that Heidegger is
"putting into brackets", Heidegger's doctrine of Sorge
can only be called an ethical doctrine, i.e. a teaching
which describes how one has been created to live, and there-
fore how one ought to live. In Heidegger's case the notion
of the "ought" is of utmost importance. In SZ one finds
that Sorge metaphorically says to Dasein, as the voice of
Dasein's conscience: Dasein you ought to act in this way,
i.e. you ought to be aware of being-in-the-truth in the
way that you are; you ought not cover this basic unhiddenness
over; you ought not live in an inauthentic interpretation of

what you are....

According to Heidegger, one finds this "ought"
in the very "structure" of Dasein, and the very fact that
there is an "ought" at all, and that Dasein encounters
and experiences it, is evidence that Dasein finds a "way
to be" that is its own, that it finds its own ἦθος. In
this sense, the arguments against Plato's notion of agathon
in PLW appear to apply equally to the notion of Sorge
in SZ. This is further evinced in the way that Heidegger
sees Sorge in SZ and Agathon in PLW.

In SZ Heidegger puts forth two notions of Sorge.
On the one hand, Sorge is construed as a power, and, on
the other hand, as a structure. As a power, Sorge is the
voice of conscience, that which calls, draws and maintains
Dasein in its innermost unhiddenness (truth). As a structure,
Sorge is the structure of all structures, the Strukturganzheit.
Sorge is that which structurally "constitutes" Dasein's
being. In this formally structural sense, Sorge is that
which is both the reason for and source of Dasein's being-
in-the-truth as "what" it is.

In PLW Heidegger puts forth two interpretations of the
Agathon. On the one hand, he interprets to agathon as a
power, a power which renders all things useful, a Tauglich-
machend. On the other hand, he interprets to agathon or
"the idea of Agathon" in terms of its formal function. As
an idea it serves the same function as all the ideai, but
as the idea of Agathon, it is "the highest idea", the idea of

ideai, and that which constitutes the formal constitution
of the human being.

If Sorge and Agathon do share this twofold functional
sameness, as is herein described, then why doesn't Heidegger,
in PLW, offer his own doctrine of Sorge in place of Plato's
doctrine of Agathon? After all, he does offer an alternative
to Plato's doctrine of the truth of beings. He does argue
that the primordial truth of a being is not its whatness, but
rather its unhiddenness; he does maintain throughout
PLW that "the fundamental trait (Grundzug) of being and
beings is unhiddenness" (PLW, 46, 51, 52; 267, 270).
But he does not offer an alternative to Plato's notion of
the "arche" of truth, to agathon; no mention is made about
the Grund of unhiddenness itself, about the "arche" of
unhiddenness. From the point of view of SZ this arche is
Sorge. But why is it not brought forth in PLW as is the
concept of unhiddenness?

.Perhaps the answer to this question has to do more
with Heidegger's notion of Struktur in SZ than with his
notion of Sorge, for Struktur is a much more unclarified
notion in SZ than Sorge, although Heidegger appears unaware
of the degree to which the whole philosophical enterprise
in SZ is dependent on the notion of Struktur, the formal
element of beings and being itself.

Like the ideai, one is not given structures, especially
the structure of Sorge, in the same way as one is given
beings. Structures are not, it must be emphasized, the

immediately given. Dasein must extrapolate the structures from beings by means of logical analysis, or in Heidegger's case, onto-logical analysis. The structures are not, however, to be thought of solely as _Begriffe_, concepts in the mind. Structures are rooted "in the things themselves". Thus, on the one hand, Dasein always understands itself and the world "by means of" these structures even though for the most part it does so unawares. On the other hand, from a more reflective point of view, Dasein understands itself and its world "in terms of" these structures, i.e. they are the extrapolated framework through which Dasein can look, and look most primordially, at itself and its world. The aim of philosophy as seen from the point of _SZ_ is the understanding of the nature of things "in terms of" these basic, archical structures of Dasein's being, and hence of being itself. _Sorge_ as the most archical structure is the highest form of the "in terms of which" all phenomena must be interpreted. But then, how different is this manner of speaking about structures and the structure of Sorge than the manner used for speaking about the ideai and the idea of Agathon in the _Republic?_

Not everyone can "see" things "in terms of" structures, even though they constantly see by means of the structures. Even in the "sciences", that mode of knowledge which sees things and works with things in terms of ontical structures, the most basic "in terms of which" is not the main concern. Only in fundamental ontology, argues Heidegger, is the most

archical "in terms of which" sought after, and sought after
by means of "structural-seeing". Ultimately, fundamental
ontology leads to the structural seeing of the arche of all
truth and being, the structure of Sorge itself.

It should be stressed, however, that this kind of
structural-seeing into the nature of Dasein, truth, and being
is not construed as a purely revelational experience of the
sheer unhiddenness or presence of what is. The "telos"
that Heidegger sets up for philosophy in SZ, the structural-
seeing of the "arche" of Dasein's being-in-the-truth,
is exactly the kind of telos argued against in PLW; for,
Heidegger does not outrightly reject Plato's notion of the
"telos" of philosophy, he rather rejects the means (ὁδός)
by which this telos is accomplished. The "means" is quite
simply idetic-seeing, argues Heidegger, and this consequently
reduces the "telos" to a matter of idetic-seeing. However,
if one accepts this argument formulated by Heidegger in
PLW, then one must conclude that the telos of philosophy
in Heidegger's own SZ remains fixed within "structural-
seeing".

As a result of this conflict between the very founda-
tions on which SZ and PLW rest, one is also forced to conclude
that the latter work does not truly reflect, and cannot
truly reflect, the position taken in the former. If there
is indeed a Kehre in Heidegger's thinking between SZ
and his later writings, perhaps it lies within the parameters
of this very conflict.

3. To Agathon as the Originating-locus of the
Inner-nature of the Human Being qua Psyche

In his analysis of Plato's notion of truth in PLW,
Heidegger argues that Plato's thought is ruled by an
anthropocentric and moralistic utilitarianism, that Plato's
whole philosophy is based on a concept of usefulness,
Tauglichkeit. This critique of Plato's alethology rests
on two basic arguments, one concerning the ἰδέα, and the
other τὸ ἀγαθόν. Herein both arguments are examined and
criticized not so much for the position that they defend,
but rather for the material that they choose to neglect.
Overall it is herein maintained that Heidegger does not
deal with the role that the psyche plays in the doctrine of
truth expressed in the Republic.

(a) To Agathon: Before dealing with Heidegger's
actual interpretation of the idea of Agathon, a few remarks
should be made concerning his translation of to agathon.
He says: "As thought in a Greek manner, τὸ ἀγαθόν means
that which is useful to something, or makes something
useful" (PLW, 38; 263).

Given this notion of usefulness, however, anything
and everything can be considered tauglich, fittingly useful.
As long as something has some reference to the human being,
it can be considered useful; since everything can be
considered useful to the human being, and since the main
theme of the Republic concerns the human being, all the
notions taken up and dealt with by Plato in the Republic

can be interpreted in the framework of <u>Tauglichkeit</u>.
Hence, without further knowing what Heidegger actually
means by this term, it is difficult to follow the exact
meaning of his subsequent argument.

If it is, however, granted that perhaps Heidegger's
translation of <u>to agathon</u> as <u>Tauglichkeit</u> instead of as
<u>das Gute</u> does capture the sense of <u>to agathon</u>, then the question
must be raised concerning his claim that the Greeks thought
about the idea and the good in terms of usefulness: granted
that the idea and the good were thought about in terms of
their usefulness, can one really claim that these two notions
were essentially thought in this sense, especially in the
<u>Republic</u>?

In several places in the <u>Republic</u> the notion of
an ethic or even an ontology established on and rooted
in a utilitarianism of the kind that Heidegger ascribes
to Plato's thinking is examined. Indeed, the <u>Republic</u>
opens with an attack on traditional Greek morality as repre-
sented by Simonides' two dictums that justice is "speaking
the truth" and "giving back what one has been given"
(<u>R</u>, 332c). Socrates, assuming that the former dictum is
actually contained in the latter (<u>R</u>, 332a-c), argues that
the Simonidean ethic is really based on a notion of befit-
tingness (ὀφειλόμενον) (<u>R</u>, 332c). In order for one to be
just, one must determine what befits one to speak truly
and what befits others to be given their due. Justice
construed as a doctrine of befittingness looks at the world

in terms of usefulness; it turns the just person into someone
who is just only when determining what is befitting. Outside
of determining befittingness, i.e. outside of determining
the utility (χρήσιμον) of acts and things, justice and the
just person are useless (ἄχρηστος) (R, 332e). Although
Socrates' arguments against this doctrine of utilitarian
justice may appear overtly specious, they are intended,
nevertheless, to seriously call into doubt the foundations
of the traditional Greek approach to justice.

It is this notion of the χρήσιμον or Tauglichkeit
which the Republic tries to uproot and replace. So although
Heidegger may be quite correct in maintaining that the Greeks
generally thought of to agathon in terms of χρήσιμον,
he is wrong in arguing that Plato's thought is also ruled
by a similar idea.

It would be fruitless, however, to argue that
Plato does not think of the idea in terms of its Tauglichkeit;
the idetic-seeing of the ideai in general, and the idetic-
seeing of the idea of agathon in particular, as Plato himself
says (489b-c; 505a, 2), serve a useful function. Idetic-
seeing of the ideai is prima facie useful in the way that
all knowledge is useful, and not just in the way that it
applies to the utilitarian praxis-world. But idetic-seeing
also lies outside of the domain of that which is usually
called "useful". When idetic-seeing is employed for the
purpose of arriving at the most fundamental understanding
of being, one becomes godlike, one participates in the divine:

"Then, by dealing with the cosmos, and that which is divine, the philosopher will become like the cosmos and like the divine" (500c, 1-3). To idetically see the most basic idetic connections at work in the reality of the human being's world is to partake in that which is not in itself "human", which is not in itself "mortal" in the way human beings appear mortal, and which is not in itself rooted in the purely human web of affairs; it is to partake in the non-human, non-mortal, non-utilitarian and non-temporal realm of what is. Passion and desire, not utility, originally compel one to employ idetic-seeing for the purpose of comporting oneself towards that which is most truly being (μιγείς τῷ ὄντι ὄντως) (R, 490, b6). Indeed, Plato draws an analogy between sexual and philosophical intercourse. In the former kind lies the possibility of the birth of human beings, while in the latter, the birth of truth and intelligence (R, 490b-c).

From fear of belabouring the point that "usefulness" is an inadequate translation of the term to agathon and interpretation of the notion of the idea itself, Heidegger's construal of the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ is now turned to.

As will be pointed out in the next section on the idea, Heidegger tends to neglect the role that the psyche plays in the Republic; along with this neglect of the ψυχή goes the neglect of the arche. The neglect of the arche is illustrated most clearly in Heidegger's construal of the idea of agathon as a cause of usefulness, a Tauglich-machend.

As Plato says, the seeing into the psyche's being in
the truth (R, 505a, 1) is one of the most useful and bene-
ficial kinds of knowledge, but this does not mean that as
a cause to agathon is solely the cause of usefulness.
Plato says:

> This, then, that provides the truth to that
> which is known, and gives the ability to
> know to the knower, you must say is the
> idea of agathon, and you must construe it
> as being the cause of episteme, and
> aletheia insofar as it is   known (R, 508e
> 1-3).

The idea of agathon is first and foremost the arche
of Eigentlichkeit--human essentialness or truthfulness--
and only secondarily an arche of Tauglichkeit, human utility
or efficaciousness. The idea of agathon is the source and
cause of that which is the particular essence or nature of
the human being qua psyche. The idea of agathon is that
which is the source and cause of the particular Eigentlichkeit
of the psyche. Dialectics, the means by which the human
being comes to understand the idea of agathon, attempts
to find its way "to that which each thing in itself is
(ἐπ' αὐτὸ ὅ ἐστιν ἕκαστον)" (R, 532a, 9) until led to the
"telos" of intelligence, to agathon itself. Since the
Republic aims at getting to the very essence (ὅ ἐστιν)
of the human being, it seeks to get to the Eigentlichkeit
of the human being; it finds this in the psyche's participation
in truth and in the source and cause of this truth, to
agathon. In a word, to agathon, considered as a cause, is
construed in the Republic as an Eigentlichmachend, a cause

or maker of the very nature of the human being. The
Tauglichkeit follows from the fact of there being an Eigent-
lichkeit to begin with, just as economics follows from the
human beings who carry it out. To agathon is a cause of
Tauglichkeit, but not solely and foremostly so.

4. The Beginning (Ἀρχή) Understood as the End (Τέλος)

Throughout the Republic, but especially in Book VII,
Socrates emphatically maintains that the psyche, the nexus
and sole locus of awareness, seeks a teleological under-
standing of itself: the ἰδέα in itself is simply not enough
--the psyche by its own nature seeks the arche of the ἰδέαι.
The greatest drawback of PLW lies in its neglect of the
teleological dimension of Plato's thought as expressed
in the Republic. In his attempt to make the ἰδεῖν of the
ἰδέα the most thematic aspect of Plato's alethology, Heidegger
fails to see the teleological relation that the psyche has
with its arche.[2]

Since a great deal of the argument in PLW is based
on the sun eikon of Book VI, the divided line shall be
borrowed from this same Book in order to cast more light
on PLW. What is of concern here is the distinction in the
divided line between noetical and dianoetical knowledge.

Dianoetical knowledge is characterized by a certain
restriction: in its nature dianoetical knowledge is restricted
to the idein of the ideai. On the level of dianoia, one
treats the ideai in a strictly eikonical fashion, i.e. as

likenesses of what is. In dianoia the idein is eikonical because it proceeds without questioning, in a thematic fashion, the archical foundations that exist between, on the one hand, one's idetic-interpretation of what is, and on the other, what truly is. Geometry and mathematics are the paradigms of dianoetical knowledge; these two "sciences" are based on certain "hypotheses" about the nature of being, albeit these hypotheses are considered self-evidently axiomatic.

On the level of "nous" or noetical understanding one accepts no hypothetical agreement between an _idein_ and an _idea_ without first dealing with the archological foundations on which this agreement (ὁμοίωσις) rests. The method used in the noetical approach is described by Plato as dialectics (διαλεκτική). Dialectics uses the method of idetic-seeing, but its aim or telos is unique in that it seeks the arche, and not a hypothesis about the arche. Dialectics uses idetic-seeing to get to the origin of idetic-seeing itself. As such, the dialectical approach can be described as archological in order to distinguish it from the dianoetical approach, which is eikonical, i.e. seeking likeness and agreement.

According to Plato, the noetical and dianoetical approaches are interdependent. Without the noetical dimension, dianoetical understanding would be blind--dianoia needs the vision called for by nous. Without the dianoetical, the noetical would be crippled. The noetical depends on the

dianoetical as vision depends on the eyes or hearing on the ears.

The crucial error in <u>PLW</u> is Heidegger's setting-up of dianoetical knowledge in place of that which Plato reserves for noetical knowledge. Heidegger argues in <u>PLW</u> that the truth of dianoia is seen as the primary locus of truth for Plato, since the ἰδέα, Heidegger argues, is <u>all</u> that Plato is after. The term ἀρχή doesn't appear once in <u>PLW</u>, nor indeed is there any attempt to distinguish <u>idein</u> from other types of comportment towards beings.

In the <u>Republic</u> Plato establishes dialectis as the essence of philosophy, the love of wisdom. Dialectics is a comportment which seeks the most basic arche itself (ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχὴν) (<u>R</u>, 511b, 2; <u>R</u>, 533c, 3). Although it uses idetic-seeing (ἰδεῖν) to accomplish this goal, dialectics itself cannot be reduced solely to idetic-seeing. Plato rather calls dialectics the grasping, touching or beholding (ἅπτεσθαι) of the ἀρχή (<u>R</u>, 511b, 2). By means of dialectics one grasps that which is most archical; in seeking the truth of the most archical, dialectics seeks to draw the psyche into a grasping of the archical--employing the idein of nous <u>as its guide and helper</u> (<u>R</u>, 533d, 1-2). Dialectics "compels the psyche to employ nous with a view to aletheia itself. (προσαναγκάζον αὐτῇ τῇ νοήσει χρῆσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀλήθειαν)" (<u>R</u>, 526b, 1).

Dialectics aims first and foremost at a conversion (περιαγωγή) of the psyche, without which it would be impossible to truly idein the idea of the good. Since the ἰδεῖν of the ἰδέα

is for the sake of the psyche--the psyche understood as the
essence of the human being--Plato's doctrine of truth in
the Republic cannot be limited to his doctrine of the idea.
Heidegger confuses Plato's method, the idetic-seeing carried
out by nous, with Plato's aim, archological understanding.
Heidegger neglects the fact that the telos of dialectics
according to Plato does not lie in nous' idein of the idea,
but rather in the psyche's beholding and grasping of the
arche of idein. True, the idein of the idea is basically
a relationship based on rectified seeing, but the beholding
of the archical is not restricted to a matter of this
rectified, idetic-seeing. The method, it is true, depends
on orthotes, but the telos, the psyche's awareness and understanding
of that in which it is fundamentally rooted, depends on the nature
of truth itself.

To neglect, as Heidegger does, the role that the arche
of idein plays in the doctrine of truth put forth in the
Republic and to set up the idein itself as the whole basis
of Plato's doctrine of truth, would be like describing a
path without at the same time describing the purpose of that
path.

5. Concluding Remarks

Heidegger's interpretation of Plato is having a great
impact on many modern thinkers. Little time, however, seems
to be spent on thinking about the validity of Heidegger's
formula that "with Plato ousia is no longer thought of as

a-letheia, but as idea". In terms of this formula, Plato
is seen as the villan behind Western thought, and Heidegger
the knight in shining armour who battles and conquers
this great Grendel.

Since the approach in this thesis is mainly critical,
and since an actual positive contribution towards a fuller
description of Plato's doctrine of truth lies outside the
purview of the thesis, an author is mentioned whose work
reflects the direction which a positive contribution
ought to take.

In *Platons Weg zum Mythos*,[3] Walter Hirsch takes up
a phenomenological interpretation of Plato which takes
into account both the historical progression and logical
development of Plato's thought. Hirsch puts forth a
more successful reading of Plato in light of Heidegger's
basic position in SZ--but Hirsch goes beyond the narrow
confines of PLW.

Hirsch argues consistently and persuasively that,
first and foremost, Plato's main concern and point of departure
is always the life world, the world in which the human
psyche finds itself. For Plato, argues Hirsch, the "logos"--
and the "idein" it involves--is not of first importance,
but rather "life"; the aim of the dialogues is not the perfec-
tion of the logos itself, but rather the perfection of life.
And in order to more fully understand what Plato said and
thought about the nature of truth, one has to study not
only his logical doctrine, but also his mythological one

as well, with a view to both his basic teaching on "life"
and the situation out of which his logos and mythos stem.
In a word, Hirsch argues that the context of the question
about the ίδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ has its source in the larger ques-
tion about human existence (das menschliche Dasein). Heidegger,
on the other hand, situates the question solely in the context
of the ίδέα, therefore neglecting the real intention behind
the question.

Had Heidegger taken into account this larger question
behind Plato's notion of to agathon, his thesis in PLW would
have been significantly different. As it stands, however,
the thesis of "the mummification interpretation" itself
betrays the rubber-gloved handiwork of the embalmer. For
there is a higher god than Hermes--the god of ίδεῖν--being
praised in the Republic; the recognized patron of the Republic
is the sun-god Apollo, the god of archery, the god of truth,
the god of healing, and the god whom the Muses attend. The
best philosophy and the most noble state are what come into
being midway between this god's two hands.

Chapter I

NOTES

[1]Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences, trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 52.

[2]The evidence from PLW is taken up in Ch. III, wherein also the other works are noted.

[3]E. P. Gould, ed., "Aristotle", The Metaphysics, trans. Hugh Tredennick (7th ed., London: William Heinemann, 1975), p. 987a, 33-35. Aristotle calls this statement "the Heraclitean doctrines", not the Heraclitean doctrine. One ought not forget, however, that another Heraclitean doctrine was: Μεταβαλλον Ἀναπαύεται; cf. Herman Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, herausgegeben von Walther Kranz (12. Aufl., Zürich: Wiedmann, 1966), Bd. I, p. 170.

[4]Cf. PLW, p. 46.

[5]Martin Heidegger, On Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Toronto: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 1.

Chapter II

NOTES

[1]Heidegger has been interpreted in many contexts. From a purely exegetical context, cf. William Richardson, Heidegger (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967). From the context of Aristotle's and Hegel's projects, cf. Werner Marx, Heidegger and the Tradition, trans. Theodore Kissell and Murray Greene (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971). From the context of the pre-Socratic solely, cf. George Joseph Seidel, Martin Heidegger and the Pre-Socratics (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1964). From the context of Christian mysticism, cf. John Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1978).

[2]For evidence that Husserl's students considered the LU the locus classicus of phenomenological thinking, cf. Heidegger in "My Way to Phenomenology", in On Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 78-79.

[3]Cf. Heidegger's letter to Richardson, Heidegger, pp. IX-XI.

[4]"My Way to Phenomenology" appears in On Time and Being, pp. 74-82.

[5]Ibid., p. 78.

[6]Ibid., p. 79.

[7]Husserl, LU, I, pp. 11-12 (I, p. 60). "Hierdurch ist das Gebiet einer neuen und, wie sich alsbald zeigen wird, komplexen Disziplin bezeichnet, deren Eigentümliches es ist, Wissenschaft zu sein, und die eben darum am prägnantesten als Wissenschaftslehre zu benennen wäre."

[8]LU, I, p. 230 (I, 227): ("Dahin gehören auch die Wissenschaften, das Wort objektiv genommen, also im Sinne der geeinigten Wahrheit."

[9]LU, I, pp. 237-238 (I, 232-233): "Entweder sie sind noetische, nämlich sie gründen in der Idee der Erkenntnis als solcher, und zwar a priori, ohne jede Rücksicht auf die empirische Besonderheit des menschlichen Erkennens in seinen psychologischen Bedingtheiten; oder sie sind rein logische, d.h. sie gründen rein im Inhalt der Erkenntnis."

[10]LU, I, p. 246 (I, 239).

[11]For Husserl the realm of truth "is no disordered Chaos, but is ruled and unified by Law." (Die Wissenschaft, will das Mittel sein, unserem Wissen das Reich der Wahrheit, und zwar in grösstmöglichem Umfange, zu erobern; aber das Reich der Wahrheit ist kein ungeordnetes Chaos, es herrscht in ihm Einheit der Gesetzlichkeit;): LU, I, p. 15 (I, 62).

[12]LU, I, 16 (I, 63).

[13]Loc. cit.

[14]Findlay translates Husserl's term Evidenz as "self-evidence", as does David Carr, the translator of Husserl's The Crisis of European Sciences (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), who says that, when Husserl uses the term Evidenz technically, "it means 'self-givenness'; whereas the English word 'evidence' usually has a very different meaning, that of something testifying to the existence of something else (e.g., evidence in a trial)." (p. 128)

[15]LU, I, p. 14 (I, 61): "Im letzten Grunde beruht also jede echte und speziell jede wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis auf Evidenz, und so weit die Evidenz reicht, so weit reicht auch der Begriff des Wissens."

[16]Indeed, Heidegger says that, after the publication of the Ideas, "we--friends and pupils--begged the master again and again to republish the sixth Investigation which was then difficult to obtain." On Time and Being, p. 78. Cf. also the footnote to the sixth Investigation in § 44 of SZ, wherein Heidegger formally acknowledges his indebtness to Husserl's alethology, especially for the crucial notion of Identifizierung. The act of truth is described by Husserl as a Deckung, which is retermed by Heidegger as Entdeckung; important also is the distinction Husserl draws in § 38 of Investigation VI between truth understood as Evidenz (which only applies to the logic of Bestätigung) and truth as Sein.

[17]$\underline{LU}$, II, 118 (II, 762).

[18]$\underline{LU}$, II, 122 (II, 765).

[19]$\underline{Loc.\ cit.}$.

[20]Cf. also $\underline{LU}$, II, 116-117 (II, 761): "Aber das Präsentieren macht in Allegmeinen nicht ein wahrhaftes Gegenwärtigsein, sondern nur ein als gegenwärtig Erscheinen, im welchem die gegenständliche Gegenwart und mit ihr die Vollkommenheit der Wahr-nehmung Abstufungen zeigt."

[21]$\underline{LU}$, II, 116 (II, 761).

[22]$\underline{LU}$, II, 124 (II, 767): Summarizing the crux of his notion of logical truth, Husserl says: "Denn wir bemerken, dass bei einer Urteilsevidenz (Urteil = prädikative Aussage) das Sein im Sinne der Urteilswahrheit erlebt, aber nicht ausgedrukt ist, also niemals mit dem in dem ist der Aussage gemeinten und erlebten Sein koinzidiert." Truth, so understood, is more appropriately described by Husserl as a 'being-true' ($\underline{Wahrsein}$).

[23]$\underline{LU}$, II, 127 (II, 769).

[24]Edmund Husserl, $\underline{Ideas}$, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (5th ed., New York: Macmillan, 1975).

[25]For a more detailed account of Husserl's $\underline{Kehre}$ from a realist position to one more in common with trans-cendental idealism, cf. Roman Ingarden, $\underline{On\ the\ Motives}$ $\underline{which\ Led\ Husserl\ to\ Transcendental\ Idealism}$, trans. Annor Hannibalsson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975).

[26]Husserl, $\underline{Ideas}$, p. 361. In $\underline{LU}$ Husserl distinguishes the verification from the justification of truth, the former referring to $\underline{Evidenz}$ and the latter to $\underline{Sein}$.

[27]For a discussion of the role that the justification of verification plays in Husserl's overall philosophy, cf. Gary Madison, "Phenomenology and Existentialism: Husserl and the End of Idealism," Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals, ed. Frederick Elliston and Peter McCormick (1st ed., Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 1977), p. 257. For a thematic analysis of the way the notions of truth and evidence are construed by Husserl in the $\underline{LU}$ and $\underline{Ideas}$, cf. Günther Patzig, "Husserl on Truth and

Evidence," Readings on Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), pp. 179-196. For an in-depth study of the notions of truth and evidence in the LU, cf. Henry Pietersma, "Husserl's Views on the Evident and the True," in Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 1977), pp. 38-53. For a more exegetical study of the notion of evidence in Husserl's writings, cf. David Levin, Reason and Evidence in Husserl's Phenomenology (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970); a condensed version of Levin's book appears as "Husserl's Notion of Self-Evidence," in Phenomenology and Philosophical Understanding, ed. Edo Pivcevic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 53-79.

[28] It should be noted, however, that in his last major work, The Crisis of European Sciences (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), Husserl reaffirms the less rationalistic LU notion of truth; Wahrnehmung and Gegenwärtigung are somewhat broadened out to include the Lebenswelt (cf. pp. 127-128). The lifeworld becomes the basic justification of truth claims; the life-world, and not Reason or Consciousness harbours within itself the fundamental Structures: "the life-world does have, in all its relative features, a general structure. This general structure, to which everything that exists relatively is bound, is not itself relative." (p. 130)

[29] Like Descartes before him, Husserl has borrowed and modified Pyrrho's and Sextus Empiricus' method of ἐποχή.

[30] Ernst Tugendhat, Der Wahrheitbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967), describes the distinction drawn here between Husserl's notion of epoche and Heidegger's a-letheia in the context of the two thinkers' notions of (self-)givenness. Tugendhat maintains that for Husserl the correlate of Intentionality is, strictly speaking, Givenness itself, whereas for Heidegger the correlate of Disclosiveness (Erschlossenheit) is Openness or Clearedness (Lichtung) (p. 259).

[31] Like the English translator of SZ, this author chooses not to translate Heidegger's term Dasein. Richardson, in Heidegger, for example, awkwardly translates Dasein as "being-there", thus trying to capture both the literal sense of the term Da-sein and Heidegger's metaphorical designation of "being-aware-of-being-here-now". Spiegelberg, in The Phenomenological Movement, somewhat stubbornly translates Heidegger's term Dasein as "human existence". Cf. p. 282.

In the German language, the term Dasein means much
the same as the early Greek notion of the Psyche (ψυχή),
i.e. existence, being, life, and presence; the idiomatic
German phrase "to step into Dasein" means "to come into
being or life", and the phrase "Struggle for Dasein"
(Daseinskampf) means "the struggle for life or existence".
Heidegger etymologically breaks down Dasein into its two
morphemes, da and Sein. Da means "(to be) here", or "(to
be) there", or especially, "(to be) present", as in 'Is
Joe da?' (i.e. Is Joe around--here/present?). Sein means
"to be", and quite literally translates as the English
"being". Dasein, for Heidegger, is that being which is
in the Open, i.e. is present (da) in being (Sein). Cf.
SZ, 134, 143, 220. In SZ Dasein is no longer thought of
as an animal rationale, an animal with logos (ζῷον λόγον
ἔχον), but rather as a being with logos (ὄν λόγον ἔχον).
For Heidegger's own awareness of the connection between
his notion of Dasein and the notion of the ψυχή, cf. SZ,
p. 14.

[32]The SZ notion of Struktur will play an increasingly
more important role in this paper, as will the SZ notion of
a phenomenon's Sich, self. Nowhere in SZ is the term
Struktur defined, although it is one of the most crucial
terms in SZ. It appears in SZ mostly as a noun, otherwise
usually as part of a compound noun, as in Daseinsstruktur,
Existenzstruktur, Seinsstruktur, Wesensstruktur, Vor-
Struktur and Strukturganzen. The term Struktur, oddly enough,
does not appear in the comprehensive index to SZ, cf.
Hildegard Feick, Index zu Heideggers Sein und Zeit (2.
Auflage; Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1968).

In German the term Struktur has been borrowed from
the Latin structura, which means to build, erect (ὀρθοῦν),
and form. Perhaps Heidegger has simply taken over Husserl's
notion of structure, a notion which cannot be taken out of
the context of the eidetic and essential structures. For
Husserl the prinzipielle Struktureinsichten are the "insights
by which the essential structure is seen" [cf., Dorion
Cairns, Guide for Translating Husserl (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1973), p. 108]. In his post-SZ writings, Heidegger
is very aware, indeed painstakingly aware, of the word(s)
he uses to describe the formal aspect of Being; for example,
the term Grundzug is used in PLW (pp. 46, 51, and 52) as
the (unclarified) alternative notion to Plato's ἰδέα, and
perhaps alternative term for "fundamental Structure" of
SZ. Cf. also the description of the term Wesen, essence,
in "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit," Wegmarken (3. Auflage, Frankfurt
Am Main: Klostermann, 1976); Wesen only partly entails
the notion of the formal aspect (ἰδέα/εἶδος) that Struktur
implies. Heidegger says in Wesen des Wahrheit: "Wesen:
1. Quidditas--das Was--κοινόν; 2. Ermöglichung--Bedingung

der Möglichkeit; 3. Grund der Ermöglichung" p. 177.

[33]SZ, pp. 222 and 298.

[34]Heidegger's notion of λόγος is herein called logic ; hence, phenomenology as a logos of phenomena, is a logic about phenomena. Logic for Heidegger encompasses the whole sphere of statements which make a claim about something. Above all, Heidegger's notion of "logic" should not be thought of as a particular kind of syllogistic or symbolic logic; neither does Heidegger construe logic as the study which "questions about what good reasoning is and about the difference between correct and incorrect steps in thinking." Stephen Barker, The Elements of Logic (2nd ed., New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974), p. 16. For a comprehensive and acute study of Heidegger's notion of logic, cf. Thomas Fay, Heidegger: Critique of Logic (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977).

[35]David F. Krell, "On the Manifold Meaning of Aletheia: Brentano, Aristotle, Heidegger," in Research in Phenomenology V (1975), 77-94, points out the degree to which Heidegger's methodology in § 7 of SZ is dependent on the question of truth raised in §44 of SZ. Krell identifies the φαινόμενον in §7 with Heidegger's overall notion of οὐσία in SZ; logos as Heidegger thus construes it, argues Krell, becomes the ἀποφαίνεσθαι of the truth (of being) (pp. 90-91). Tugendhat makes the same point in his article "Heideggers Idee von Wahrheit" in Heidegger, herausgegeben Otto Pöggler (Köln: Kiepenheuer and Witsch, 1969), pp. 286-297 (i.e. Heidegger's "an ihm selbst" and "wie sie an ihm selbst ist" are synonomous with Entdecken understood as truth, or rather "being-true"--cf. p. 289).

[36]Oscar Levy, ed., Friedrich Nietzsche, Vol. 16, The Twilight of the Idols, trans. Anthony M. Ludovici (New York: Russell & Russell, 1964), p. 114.

[37]Husserl's notion of the Rechtsquelle and the subsequent identification of Wahrheit with Richtigkeit qualifies him, according to the argument in PLW, as a mummifier of the truth of Being. But it should also be noted that the SZ Heidegger is not without his own belief in an ontological and methodological ὀρθότης: "Die Seinsfrage verlangt im Hinblick auf ihr Befragtes die Gewinnung und vorherige Sicherung der rechten Zugangsart zum Seienden." (SZ, 6). Cf. also: "Die rechtverstandene ontologische Forschung..." (SZ, 37); "Diese eigentliche Verbundheit ermöglicht erst die rechte Sachlichkeit..." (SZ, 122); and finally, "Wird die rechtverstandene Wahrheit..." (SZ, 227).

[38]Edmund Husserl, Introduction to the Logical Investigations, trans. Philip J. Bossart and Curtis H. Peters, ed. Eugen Fink (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), p. 25.

[39]Loc. cit.

[40]A very questionable denial, since for Husserl the Given is almost a synonomous expression for the Meant as such: "I can simply look at that which is meant as such and can grasp it absolutely." Husserl, Introduction, p. 27.

[41]Husserl, Introduction, p. 25.

[42]The reader is referred to the concepts of the eidos, doksa, and natural attitude in the Ideas. In this respect, one should note that in the ancient world the technical use of the ἐποχή was not antithetical to the Platonic project; indeed, Arcesilaus (315-240 B.C.), the first great Academic user of the ἐποχή, took over the headship of Plato's Academy; cf. T. E. Page, ed., Diogenes Laertius, Vol. I, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, trans. R. D. Hicks (6th ed., London: Heinemann, 1966), pp. 405-423.

[43]Eugen Fink, "What Does the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl Want to Accomplish? (The Phenomenological Idea of Laying-a-Ground),' trans. in Research in Phenomenology (New York: Humanities Press, 1972), pp. 5-27. Fink was responsible for approved publications on the epoche, phenomenological reduction; cf. Spiegelberg, Phenomenological Movement, p. 136.

[44]Heidegger is never referred to by name; instead Fink directs critical remarks towards his doctrine, calling it "philosophical anthropology" or "ontology which tries to determine the Being of Subjectivity." Cf. pp. 15-17.

[45]Fink, Research in Phenomenology, p. 7.

[46]Ibid., p. 9.

[47]Douglas R. McGaughey, in "Husserl and Heidegger on Plato's Cave Alleogry: A Study on Philosophical Influence," International Philosophical Quarterly, 16 (1976), 331-348, tries to point out Heidegger's "contra Husserl via Plato" position in PLW with reference to Fink's article. For the contra SZ via Plato's attitude, one has to turn to Heidegger himself; he says that he didn't finish SZ because he realized that he had failed to adequately express the experience SZ

originally wanted to communicate. This failure was due
to "the language of metaphysics" SZ adopted, cf. Martin
Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," trans. Frank A. Capuzzi
and J. Glenn Cray in Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings,
ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1977),
p. 208.

[48]Edmund Husserl, Erste Philosophie (1923-1924),
ed. Rudolf Boehm (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956),
p. 17. Author's translation. "Bewusst oder unbewusst
bestimmen sie den Wesenscharakter und das Schicksal der
europaischen Kulturentwicklung." Perhaps Husserl has
Plato in mind when he characterizes the origins of the desire
to put an Ideenkleid over the immediately given, cf.
The Crisis, p. 23 and 51. For Husserl's opinion about
Plato at the time of The Crisis, cf. Dorion Cairns, Conversa-
tions with Husserl and Fink, trans. Dorion Cairns (1st ed.,
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976): "With Parmenides
and Plato we find that the world of experience is actually
rejected, as a field of mere doxa; and for Plato a super-
sensible world, a realm of ideas, is held to be the field
of episteme" (p. 75).

Chapter III

NOTES

[1]There seems to be some disagreement as to when
this work was written; W. B. Macomber, in The Anatomy of
Disillusion (Martin Heidegger's Notion of Truth), Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 1967), bases the thesis of
his book on the mistaken idea that this work represents
Heidegger's thinking "in the middle of his career", 1943
(cf. p. 92). "The Essence of Truth," trans. John Sallis,
in Martin Heidegger Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell
(New York: Harper and Row, 1977), pp. 117-351, will hereafter
be referred to as ET. ET was originally given as a lecture
in 1930 and subsequently in 1932 and 1933; it was first
published in 1943 and appears in Wegmarken (Frankfurt:
Vitorio Klostermann, 1967). For the dates, cf. Walter
Biemal, Martin Heidegger, trans. J. L. Mehta (1st ed.,
New York: Harcourt, 1973), pp. 180 and 183; cf. also the
"Verzeichnis der Vorlesungen und Übungen von Martin Heidegger"
(pp. 663-682) in Richardson, Heidegger, p. 668. Biemal
explains the difference between the doctrines of truth
put forth in SZ and ET in terms of Heidegger's construal
of the locus of truth: in the former work, Dasein (as
Entschlossenheit) is the locus, in the latter, truth itself.
(p. 90) Richardson takes the same approach as Biemal,
cf. p. 220.

[2]For these dates, cf. Richardson, Heidegger, p. 667.
In a posthumously published interview with Der Spiegel,
Heidegger says that the Nazi Party would not allow him,
in 1937, to publicly discuss PLW; cf. Der Spiegel, XII
(May 26, 1976), p. 274. But they must have had a change of
heart, because they allowed him to publish it in 1942
(in Jahrbuch für die geistige Überlieferung, II).

[3]Fay, Critique of Logic, pp. 3 and 9.

[4]Aristotle, Vol. XVII, Metaphysics 983b2.

[5]Ibid., 993b20.

[6]Ibid., 1003a21.

[7]Cf. Shorey, Plato, The Republic, p. 86.

[8]Not according to Werner Marx, who goes so far as to speak of Heidegger and the tradition, cf. Heidegger and the Tradition, p. 17.

[9]By "logic" is meant any statement or assertion (Aus-sage). In this sense, poetry, song, legend, myth, and syllogistic reasoning are kinds of Logic. Opposed to logic is existence. In the ordo essendi found in SZ, logic and existence are kinds of truth.

[10]Aristotle "set going" the adaequatio thesis, but as Heidegger also points out, Aristotle never "defends" it in its "broadened" form, i.e. the form which includes not only verification (derived truth) but also justification (primordial truth). Cf. p. 226.

[11]Aristotle, Vol. I, On Interpretation, 16a6.

[12]Heidegger cites Question I, Article I, from Aquinas' Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate; he further claims that the adaequatio formula ultimately stems from Isaac Israeli's tenth century Book of Definitions (SZ, 214). It should be noted, however, that Aquinas, in Question 1, Article I, also expresses a different formula of truth, i.e. "truth is exactly the same as being", as in Augustine's formula: verum est id quod est; cf. Thomas Aquinas, The Disputed Questions on Truth, trans. Robert W. Mulligan, S.J. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952), Col. I, p. 9. The adaequatio-formula that Heidegger attributes to Israeli, moreover, cannot be found in Israeli's book, as has already been pointed by J. T. Muckle, "Isaac Israeli's Definition of Truth," in Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age, 1933, pp. 5-8, and by A. Altmann and S. Stern, Isaac Israeli (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 58-59. Isaac does argue in the Definitions that propositional truth (i.e. derivative truth) merely describes an aspect of truth, and not what truth itself is, "because if someone asks what truth is, the answer will be: that which a thing is." Isaac Israeli, p. 56. For evidence that Aristotle held a theory of truth other than the ὁμοίωσις, cf. De Anima III,3, 428b18 and 430b26; Posterior Analytics, II,9 100b5-16; and especially (for the stipulation that 'rightness' in logical thinking and deliberating is dependent on a prior apprehension of truth itself) Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI. Since Heidegger acknowledges that Aristotle never defends the thesis that locates the essence of truth in logic (i.e. in the judgment), one is left wondering why Aristotle, according to Heidegger's argument in SZ, did not also "set going" a notion of truth more basic than the one founded on ὁμοίωσις.

[13]Cf. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans.
Norman Kemp Smith (13th ed., London: MacMillan, 1976),
p. 297.

[14]This should not be confused with F. P. Ramsey's
"linguistic muddle" theory of logical truth; although when
Ramsey's terms "proposition" and "fact" are transposed
with Heidegger's Aussage and Seiende, the two theories have
much in common. Cf. F. P. Ramsey, "Facts and Propositions,"
Proceedings of the Aristotle Society, Suppl. 7 (1927),
pp. 153-170. Unlike Ramsey, however, and A. J. Ayer
after him [cf. Ayer's "No-Truth Theory" in Language, Truth,
and Logic (2nd ed., New York: Dover Publishing, 1946),
pp. 88-89], Heidegger thinks that the term "truth" serves
an independent statement-making role and should not be
regarded as assertively redundant.

[15]This problem arises because fundamental ontology
stays within the sphere of the logical-apophantical As-
structure of interpretation, i.e. the Aussage--logic.
But since logic cannot verify, at least in perception
(Wahrnehmung), the existential-hermeneutical As-structure's
pre-conceptual understanding of Dasein and Being, logic,
as it is understood in SZ, somehow fails fundamental ontology;
hence, unless perception is broadened to include the "given-
ness" of the Auslegung (pre-conceptual understanding),
Heidegger's notion of logical truth in § 44 of SZ harbours
a lacuna.

[16]Heidegger recognizes this in ET, §§ 2 and 3. In
ET Heidegger grounds the traditional Correspondence Theory
on his notion of the Openness of primordial truth. The
"So-wie" relation understood as the rightness of the corres-
pondence is a relation grounded in truth itself: "Das
Wesen der Wahrheit als Richtigkeit der Aussage verstanden,
ist die Freiheit." Wesen der Wahrheit, p. 186.

[17]That traditionally the Correspondence Theory has
been construed as applying to logical truth understood
as a mode of truth dependent on a more basic truth, needs
no justification at this point, since Aristotle has already
been mentioned. But for evidence that even a modern defender
of the Correspondence Theory recognizes that the primary
locus of truth does not lie in the judgment itself, cf.
D. W. Hamlyn's notion that "the truth of a statement is
dependent upon the nature of the world" (p. 204) in "The
Correspondence Theory of Truth," in The Philosophical
Quarterly, 12 (1962), pp. 193-205.

[18]Eigentlichkeit is Heidegger's term for Dasein's authenticity. Literally Eigentlichkeit means "ownness", as the word is based on eigen, own, of one's own. 'To own' means to possess, have, or be bound to. Dasein "possesses" or "has" a particular mode of being. Heidegger never explicitly defines the term Eigentlichkeit; but one is led to believe that it only applies to Dasein, and that rocks and pigs, for example, are devoid of Eigentlichkeit, rather they have, as categorial beings, a Selbigkeit, self-sameness. Formally the term Eigentlichkeit expresses a relation that Dasein has to itself.

[19]Primordiality (Ursprünglichkeit) and derivedness (Abkunftigkeit) are the only two terms that Heidegger uses in his "priority argument". Neither term, however, ever appears as a noun; they are only found as adjectives. Regarding truth, Heidegger argues that there are only two basic kinds of truth, primordial and derivative. For him primordial truth is found in existence, and derivative truth in statements about existence, i.e. in logic. Like the term Struktur, however, Ursprünglichkeit is never discussed, like most of the crucial terms in SZ, from a historical point of view. One can only conclude that by the way Heidegger uses the term "ursprünglich" he has the notion of an ἀρχή in mind.

[20]Durchsichtigkeit is Dasein's fundamental awareness or clarity; as the most primordial mode of Sicht, vision or sight, it precedes all other modes of understanding. Traditionally, says Heidegger, the most primordial way of access to Being and beings was construed in terms of 'seeing' (sehen), which is a derived mode of Sicht. Sicht (as synonymous for Verstehen) is always contextual, as opposed to Sehen, seeing, which is directional, as the following phrases indicate: "to sight a whale" and "to see a whale". Cf. SZ, § 31.

[21]Cf. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale, 1958), pp. 102 and 105, where Heidegger argues that aletheia can only be understood if Being is understood as phusis, the sheer opening-up or unfolding of what is. In PLW Heidegger offers an alternative to Plato's notion of aletheia and ousia, but not, and this should be stressed, to agathon, whereas in SZ Sorge serves the function that agathon serves, for example, in Plato's Republic alethology. Cf. also ET, in which Sorge is not referred to at all; in its place one finds the term Freiheit, freedom, understood as "the openness of comportment" (als Offenständigkeit des Verhaltens) (pp. 121-125).

[22]Heidegger misses the point in his characterization
of the-historical notion of "goodness (SZ, § 59). His only
argument against this historical conception is silly and
is indicative of an overall whimsical attitude towards
historical morality. He argues that the notion of the good
leads to Pharisaism, since all that one has to do is say
that one is "good" and follow the socially defined notions
of "goodness". But the doctrine of "authenticity" (Eigent-
lichkeit) can no less become a slave to Pharisaism.
(The inscription on the marble wall of the main lobby at
CIA headquarters, Langley, Virginia reads: And ye shall
know the truth, And the truth shall make you free. John
VIII:32.) In a word, his argument against the traditional
notion of what "good" means is based on the fallacy of
ad aspectum.

[23]For a different interpretation, cf. Jakob Amstutz,
"Origin and Types of Existentialism," The Journal of
Religion, XLI, (1961), pp. 248-262. The author says that
the essence of Heidegger's ethics lies in Heidegger's
belief that "being itself delivers itself to man, in order
to be thought and articulated by him" (p. 260). Our
duty is to be aware of being.

[24]In PLW Heidegger traces the origin of metaphysics
back to Plato's thinking (PLW, 48; 268).

Chapter IV

NOTES

[1] For a German example, cf. Gunter Eigler, ed.,
Platon, Vol. V: _Politeia_, trans. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, 1977).

[2] It should be noted that the literal translation of
παιδεία is childhood, which implies either that only children
are the ones who learn and are educated, or else that only
children can learn and be educated. If the latter,
then the object of education and learning is to become
like a child. Heidegger is not consistent in the way
he treats the Greek; for on the one hand he says that
aletheia, for example, is correctly translated literally
in order to capture its true meaning, whereas with paideia
he says it is incorrect to use the same "literal" principles
of translation. Taken literally, however, "unhiddenness"
and "childhood" do seem "to crystallize together into an
essential unity" as Heidegger thinks. Gilbert Ryle has
pointed out the connection between "childhoodness" and
"unhiddenness" in Heidegger's SZ, cf. G. Ryle, "Martin
Heidegger, Sein und Zeit Mind, XXXVIII (1929), 355-370.
(Referred to is the "language of the nursery", pp. 364
and 369.)

[3] For a short, but very penetrating, criticism of
Heidegger's treatment of Plato's notion of beings, and
especially of the _idea_, cf., John Philippoussis, "Heidegger
and Plato's Notion of Truth," _Dialogue_, 15 (1976), 502-504.

[4] Cf. Jowett's "On Plato's use of Language, Diction--
Philosophical Terms", in Jowett and Campbell, _The Republic
of Plato: Greek Text_ (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1894),
pp. 291-340.

[5] Jowett, pp. 303-304.

[6] _Tauglichkeit_ is translated by John Barlow (PLW)
as "usefulness" (p. 263) and by Richardson, _Heidegger_,
as "efficaciousness" (pp. 304 and 707). But besides
usefulness and efficaciousness, _Tauglichkeit_ also means
fitness, fittedness, adaptedness and appropriateness.
Idiomatically, a "_tauglich_ man" is an "able man" and a
"_tauglich_ ship" is a "seaworthy ship".

Chapter V

NOTES

[1]Although one finds this expressed in PLW, Heidegger
expresses it most lucidly in his "Brief über den Humanismus",
included in the German text of PLW; it appears translated
as "Letter on Humanism," tr. El Lohner, in Philosophy
in the Twentieth Century, ed. W. Barrett, H. Aiken (New York:
Random House, 1962), pp. 270-302.

[2]For Plato, at least in the Republic, the Psyche
is a more primordial phenomenon than Nous, for the Psyche
is said to possess Nous (ψυχή ἔχειν νοῦν: R, 508d, 5).
Nous is an aspect of the Psyche--Nous is the metaphorical
eye of the Psyche (τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα : R, 533d, 1).
The Psyche is compelled towards truth (R, 527b, 6), whereas
the idein of Nous is compelled towards the idea, and when
acting in harmony with the Psyche, is compelled towards
the arche. Stressed also should be the priority Plato
gives to the Psyche in the cave eikon: before the most
truthful idetic seeing can place, there must be a change
(περιαγωγή) in the Psyche first.

[3]Walter Hirsch, Platons Weg zum Mythos (Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter, 1971). Cf. also Walter Hirsch, "Platon
und das Problem der Wahrheit," in Durchblicke (Frankfurt
am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1970), pp. 207-234.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Altmann, A., and S. M Stern. Isaac Israeli. London:
    Oxford University Press, 1958.

Aquinas, St. Thomas. The Disputed Questions on Truth.
    Trans. Robert W. Mulligan, S.J. Vol. I, Chicago:
    Henry Regneny Company, 1952.

Aquinatis, S. Thomae. Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritatae.
    Vol. I. Romae: Marietti Editori Ltd., 1964.

Amstutz, Jakob. "Origins and Types of Existentialism".
    The Journal of Religion Vol. XLI, No. 4, October 1961.

Aristotle. De Anima. Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas.
    Trans. K. Foster and S. Humphries. New Haven:
    Yale University Press, 1951.

_____. The Metaphysics. Ed. E. P. Gould. Trans.
    Hugh Tredennick. 7th ed. London: William Heinemann,
    1975.

Ayer, A. J. Language, Truth and Logic. 2nd ed. New York:
    Dover Publications, 1946.

Barker, Stephen. The Elements of Logic. 2nd ed. New York:
    McGraw Hill, 1974.

Biemal, Walter. Martin Heidegger: An Illustrated Study.
    Trans. J. L. Mehta. 1st ed. New York: Harcourt
    Brace Jovanovich, 1973.

Cairns, Dorion. Conversations with Husserl and Fink.
    Trans. Dorion Cairns. 1st ed. The Hague: Martinus
    Nijhoff, 1976.

_____. Guide for Translating Husserl. The Hague:
    Martinus Nijhoff, 1973.

Caputo, John. The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought.
    Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1978.

Der Spiegel. XIII. May 26, 1976. ff. 274.

Diels, Herman. Die Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker. Ed.
    Walther Kranz. 12th ed. Zürich: Weidmann, 1966.

Dupré, Louis. "The Concept of Truth in Husserl's Logical Investigations". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 24, 1953, pp. 345-354.

Ezorsky, Gertrude. "Truth in Context." The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 60, No. 5, February 28, 1963.

Fay, Thomas. Heidegger: Critique of Logic. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977.

Fink, Eugen. "What Does the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl Want to Accomplish? (The Phenomenological Idea of Laying-a-Ground)." Research in Phenomenology. New York: Humanities. Press, 1972.

Gelvin, Michael. "Eros and Projection: Plato and Heidegger." Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, No. 4, Fall, 1973, pp. 125-136.

Hamlyn, D. W. "The Correspondence Theory of Truth". The Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. 12, No. 8, July 1962, pp. 193-205.

Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Trans. John MacQuarrie and Edward Robinson. 1st ed. New York: Harper and Row, 1962.

_____. Introduction to Metaphysics. Trans. Ralph Mannheim, New Haven: Yale, 1958.

_____. Martin Heidegger's Basic Writings. Ed. David Farrell Krell. Trans. Frank A. Cappuzzi and J. Glenn Grey. New York: Harper and Row, 1977.

_____. On Time and Being. Trans. John Stambaugh. Toronto: Harper and Row, 1972.

_____. Phänomendogische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der Reinen Vernunft. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977.

_____. Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit. 3rd ed. Bern: Francke Verlag, 1975.

_____. "Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit." Jahrbuch für die geistige Überlieferung II (1942), pp. 96-124.

_____. "Plato's Doctrine of Truth". Philosophy in the Twentieth Century. Ed. W. Barrett and H. Aiken. Trans. J. Barlow. New York: Random House, 1962, pp. 251-270.

_____. Sein und Zeit. 14th ed. Tubingen: Max Niemeyer, 1977.

Heidegger, Martin. Wegmarken. Frankfurt: Vittorio
        Klostermann, 1967.

Hein, K. F. "Husserl's Criterion of Truth". Journal of
        Critical Analysis, No. 3, 1971, pp. 125-130.

Hirsch, Walter. "Platon und das Problem der Wahrheit".
        Durchblicke. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann,
        1970.

_____. Platons Weg Zum Mythos. Berlin: Walter deGruyter,
        1971.

Husserl, Edmund. Erste Philosphie 1923-1924. Ed. Rudolf
        Boehm. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956.

_____. Ideas. Trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson. 5th ed.
        New York: Mac Millan, 1975.

_____. Introduction to the Logical Investigations.
        Ed. Eugen Fink. Trans. Philip J. Bossert and
        Curtis H. Peters. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
        1975.

_____. Logical Investigations. Trans. J. N. Findlay.
        1st ed. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970.

_____. Logische Untersuchungen. 5th ed. Tubingen:
        Max Niemeyer, 1968.

_____. The Crisis of European Sciences. Trans. David
        Carr. Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
        1970.

Jowett and Campbell. "On Plato's Use of Language, Diction--
        Philosophical Terms." The Republic of Plato:
        Greek Text. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894.

Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. Norman
        Kemp Smith. 13th ed. London: Mac Millan, 1976.

Krell, David Farrell. "On the Manifold Meaning of Aletheia
        in Brentano, Aristotle, and Heidegger." Research
        in Philosophy. Vol. V, 1975, pp. 77-94.

Laertius, Diogenes. Lives of the Eminent Philosophers.
        Vol. I. Ed. T. E. Page. Trans. R. D. Hicks.
        6th ed. London: Heinemann, 1966.

Levin, D. M. "Husserl's Notion of Self-Evidence". Phenomen-
        ology and Philosophical Understanding. Ed. Edo
        Pivcevic. Cambridge University Press, 1975.

Levin, D. M. Reason and Evidence in Husserl's Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970.

Macomber, W. B. The Anatomy of Disillusion (Martin Heidegger's Notion of Truth). Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967.

MacQuarrie, John. Martin Heidegger. Richmond, Virginia: John Knox Press, 1969.

Madison, Gary B. "Phenomenology and Existentialism: Husserl and the End of Idealism." Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals. Ed. Frederick Elliston and Peter McCormick. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977, pp. 247-268.

Marx, Werner. Heidegger and the Tradition. Trans. Theodore Kissell and Murray Greene. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971.

McGaughey, Douglas R. "Husserl and Heidegger on Plato's Cave Allegory: A Study on Philosophical Influence." International Philosophical Quarterly, No. 16, 1976.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. Friedrich Nietzsche, Vol. 16, The Twilight of the Idols. Ed. O. Levy. Trans. A. M. Ludovici. New York: Russell and Russell, 1964.

Patzig, Günther. "Husserl on Truth and Evidence." Readings on Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977, pp. 179-196.

Philippousis, John. "Heidegger and Plato's Notion of Truth." Dialogue, 15, 1976.

Pietersma, Henry. "Husserl's Views on the Evident and the True." Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals. Ed. Frederick A. Elliston and Peter Mc Cormick. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977, pp. 38-53.

Plato, Plato, Vol. VI: The Republic. Ed. E. H. Warmington. Trans. Paul Shorey. 7th ed. London: Heinemann, 1970.

Pöggler, Otto. Heidegger. Köln: Kiepenheuer and Witsch, 1969.

Ramsey, F. D. "Facts and Propositions". PAS. Supp. Vol. 7, 1927. Reprinted in Truth. Ed. George Pitcher. Contemporary Perspectives in Philosophy Series. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964, p. 16.

Richardson, William. Heidegger. The Hague: Martinus
     Nijhoff, 1967.

Ryle, Gilbert. "Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit". Mind,
     XXXVIII, 1927, pp. 355-370.

Seidel, George Joseph. Martin Heidegger and the Pre-
     Socratics. Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1964.

Spiegelberg, Herbert. The Phenomenological Movement 2 vols.
     The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960.

Tugendhat, E. Der Wahrheitbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger.
     Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967.

Turnball, R. G. "Heidegger on the Nature of Truth."
     Journal of Philosophy, LIV. 1957, pp. 559-585.

Versényi, Laslo. Heidegger, Being and Truth. New Haven:
     Yale University Press, 1965, pp. 201.

Vycinas, Vincent. Earth and Gods. The Hague: Martinus
     Nijhoff, 1969.