

THE TRANSCENDENT QUALITIES OF  
LEISURE AND RELIGION

A COMPARISON OF THE TRANSCENDENT  
QUALITIES OF LEISURE AND RELIGION

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF WORK AND LEISURE	11
1. The Classical Form of Leisure	11
2. Theological Significance of Leisure	16
3. The Activities of Work and Labor	25
III. TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY AND LEISURE	29
1. Secularization	29
2. The Transformation of Necessity	36
3. The Social Freedom of Leisure	39
4. The Ideal Functions of Leisure/Culture	43
5. A Comprehensive Definition of Leisure	46
IV. TIME AND LEISURE	48
1. The Temporal Order of Industry	48
2. The Temporal Flow of Religion, Culture and Leisure	55
3. Leisure and Kairos	59
V. THE TRANSCENDENT CAPACITY OF WORK AND PLAY	61
1. Alienation	61
2. Work in Leisure and Religion	68
3. Play in Leisure and Religion	72
4. Escape	83
5. The Work of Developmental Leisure	89
VI. CONCLUSION	93
BIBLIOGRAPHY	96

## INTRODUCTION

The question that we propose to answer in this thesis is: within technological society, to what extent is the transcendent element of leisure similar to that of religion? Before we present the manner in which the basic concepts will be used and why leisure and religion are assumed to possess a transcendent quality, a brief explanation of our interdisciplinary approach should prove useful.

Leisure is a multi-dimensional social phenomenon which is gaining the attention of an increasing number of sociologists. There are, though, important psychological, philosophical and theological aspects of leisure which are not being adequately dealt with by the members of these disciplines. Religious study, being interdisciplinary, ideally lends itself to the study of leisure. By focusing on the common transcendent component of leisure and religion, it is possible to incorporate the insights of the aforementioned disciplines into a cohesive essay.

Our approach will involve the constant switching between three main perspectives. One frame of reference will be that of society and the social structure as a whole. A psychological frame of reference is also needed, for an activity is often classified as leisure on the basis of its conscious and uncon-

scious effects upon the mind. Finally, and only in combination with the above two perspectives, we will consider the nature and characteristics of a leisure activity itself.

These three perspectives will be adopted within both a functional and normative context. When considering the function of leisure, we are interested in what it does for society and the individual. Normatively, we will be discussing leisure in light of contemporary ideology, norms and values, as well as those ideals emanating from philosophical and theological circles.

Our particularly broad approach, if unrestricted, would result in a multi-volume work. This outcome is avoided by limiting our focus to the transcendent aspect of religion and leisure and our context to technological society.

It was assumed at the outset that leisure and religion were, by definition, transcendent. The validity of such a premise is easily appreciated when one considers the extremely broad meaning of transcendence. In Webster's Third New International Dictionary the verb transcend is defined as rising above or going beyond certain limits. Transcendent is an adjective referring to that which goes beyond or exceeds usual limits. Transcendence is the quality or state of being transcendent.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Philip B. Grove, ed. in chief, p. 2426.

One example of "certain" or "usual" limits is that of experience. Transcendent may refer to whatever proceeds beyond or lies outside of what is immediately perceived or presented in experience. The religious significance of the transcendent is particularly clear when it is used to describe that which is above material existence or apart from the universe; for these are characteristics commonly attributed to God or gods. This leads us to the specifically religious notion of the transcendental - of, or relating to, the supernatural. Aristotle, according to Webster's, used transcendental in reference to that which reached or lay beyond the bounds of any category.<sup>2</sup>

Abraham Maslow, in The Further Reaches of Human Nature, expands on the definitions offered by Webster's and provides thirty-five examples and usages of transcendence. Some of these are transcendence in the sense of loss of self, the transcendence of time through symbols, transcendence of lower order human needs and the transcending of atomism in favour of integration.<sup>3</sup>

Maslow refers to the perception of the cosmos as a unity as an example of ultimate transcendence. As an experience, this particular use of transcendence refers to the

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Abraham Maslow, p. 271.

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mystic fusion with another person or with the whole cosmos. He clarifies this by adding: "I mean here the mystical experience as classically described by the religious mystics in various religious literatures."<sup>4</sup> Maslow also writes:

"Transcendence also means to become divine or godlike, to go beyond the merely human."<sup>5</sup> But in keeping with his Humanism, he warns us not to make anything extra-human or supernatural out of the above quote.

Unlike Maslow, the dictionary recognizes the supernatural basis underlying many of the beliefs of those holding religious convictions. Webster's refers to the ultimate extent of transcendence as being above the boundaries and limits of material existence, apart from the universe and relating to the supernatural. Similarly, our analysis recognizes the supernatural make-up of the religious realm. The activity and experience of this realm is acknowledged to be of an absolutely transcendent nature. We do not mean that those involved in religious activity transcend material existence; but that the ultimate reference point or basis which serves to legitimate the activity or experience is of a supernatural or extra-worldly order. Religion is that realm in which man transcends the boundaries and limitations of his humanness by establishing a relationship with that which he

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 274.



holds to be divine, sacred or ultimate by reason of its supernatural or extra-worldly nature.

The transcendent nature of leisure is not as evident, for we must first outline the limits or boundaries of the realm that leisure transcends. These are the limits established by the sphere of work. For purposes of our analysis the term "work" will be used to designate that realm of human activity in which the primary objective is to meet the basic demands (food, clothing, shelter) of existence. Also included in this realm will be those activities which are carried out in direct response to primary physiological drives such as eating or sleeping. The activities of this sphere all share the common trait of necessity. The realm of work is the realm of necessity.


The activities and experience of leisure are not limited by the demands of necessity. Leisure transcends these boundaries. We will use the term "leisure" to signify that sphere of human activity in which one is free (having met the demands of necessity) to voluntarily engage in activity for the sake of the activity itself. It is in this realm that the opportunity exists to concentrate on the development of those qualities traditionally considered to be unique to man alone - qualities not shared with lower order animals.

To distinguish the nature of transcendence experienced in leisure from that of religion, we will designate the former

as limited and the latter as absolute. Quite often the limited or absolute degree of transcendence depends on the significance or meaning attributed to the experience by those involved. It is a common experience to transcend any conscious awareness of the temporal and spatial limitations of the immediate situation. This often occurs when we become totally absorbed or fascinated in viewing a film. The movie would have no "extra-worldly" significance and be classified as a limited transcendent experience. There is a parallel example for absolute transcendence. It is the experience of being absorbed or fascinated by the holy, divine or sacred.

There are also experiences which have both absolute and limited significance attributed to them. One such example is the L.S.D. trip. From the ever increasing number of descriptions available to us of the L.S.D. experience, it is clear that the everyday limits of time, space, reality and self are transcended. For many the trip is merely a pleasant leisure activity. For others, Timothy Leary being one of the more renowned, it definitely constitutes a religious experience.

If we were to combine the four components of work, leisure, religion and transcendence into an analytical framework, the following diagram would emerge:



It is important that the components of an analytical framework be developed and defined with respect to that which is being analyzed. If this is not done, there is a tendency to distort or ignore various factors in order to have the subject material fit the framework. Our concepts were defined and our analytical structure developed for the express purpose of being applied to technological society. By limiting the comprehensiveness of our analysis to modern society, we avoid distorting the reality of it.

Our particular division of technological society into work, leisure and religion is valid on both a practical and theoretical level.\* On the practical level, the division of weekly activity into work, leisure and religion is a common one. For the majority of individuals there are five days of work, one of leisure and one of religious observances. The pronounced differences in behaviour exhibited in the three

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\*The theoretical validity of such a division will become evident in the course of developing the thesis.

types of activities also tend to confirm their existence as independent and distinct realms. The mass media, especially the radio, also serve to confirm the existence of these three realms - particularly those of work and leisure. For it is the radio announcer who faithfully heralds the transition from work to leisure at the end of each working day or week. All of these practical examples and superficial observations support the existence of three distinct realms.

We were also concerned that a term such as 'realm' might not adequately reflect the complexity of these areas of human activity and experience. In order to convey what is meant by "realm" or "sphere", we offer a few examples from the works of theoretical sociologists who used analogous terms.

It was apparently Alfred Schutz who coined the term "multiple realities". Although he uses a much less economically oriented definition of work than we do, he designates the world of work as the paramount reality. It is this realm of work which stands over against the "...many other sub-universes of reality."<sup>6</sup> Actually Schutz preferred to speak of "finite provinces of meaning" upon each of which might be bestowed the accent of reality.<sup>7</sup> He gives the examples of the inner transformation endured as we enter the world of

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<sup>6</sup> Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers, I, 226.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 226.

stage play, the change in attitude if we limit our field of vision to a picture and pass into the pictorial world; as well as the effects of all varieties of religious experiences.

Berger and Luckmann expand on the topic with particular emphasis on the work realm. An example they give of the working world is that of daily occupation. It is this "zone" in which there is intense interest and "...where one's consciousness is dominated by the pragmatic motive."<sup>8</sup> We may now offer a more comprehensive definition of realm as it is used in this thesis. It is a zone of human activity and experience, supported by a set of values and having a distinct meaning in the life of society and the individual; the latter experiencing a pronounced change in consciousness as one realm is left and another entered.

We spoke of leisure and religion as transcending the limits and boundaries of the realm of work. The above sociologists use such terms as commutation and transition in reference to the same phenomenon. Writing from the perspective of the individual, Berger and Luckmann provide an example of the experience of transcendence encountered when entering the world of play:

As the curtain rises the spectator is 'transported to another world', with its own meanings and an order that may or may not have much to do with the order of everyday life. As the curtain

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<sup>8</sup>Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, p. 22.

falls, the spectator 'returns to reality' that is, to the paramount reality of everyday life...<sup>9</sup>

As distinct and separate as the realms of work, leisure and religion are, we do not suggest that they are entirely mutually exclusive. There are certainly characteristics of work in leisure and leisure in work. Traditional religion, despite increasing secularization, still retains some power of legitimation and justification in the leisure realm. This fact is reflected in the schema by the overlap of the three realms.

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 25.

## II

## PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF WORK AND LEISURE

The preceding chapter was used to develop an analytical framework as well as to introduce the basic concepts of work, leisure and religion. The next two chapters will present the historical, theological and philosophical significance of leisure and also those characteristics of technological society and work that are relevant to our discussion. There will be only brief remarks concerning the common transcendent element of leisure and religion. The original question (of page one) will not be specifically dealt with until chapter four. These first three chapters are necessary to acquaint the reader with the many dimensions of leisure and to also present other common features of religion and leisure besides that of transcendence. With this extensive background, the reader will be better able to appreciate the ideas expressed in chapters four, five and six.

1. The Classical Form of Leisure

Even though we have limited our study, historically, to technological society, it is our desire not to arrive at a definition of leisure based exclusively on its particular form in modern society. By presenting a brief description

of leisure as it existed in classical Greek society, the historical dimension of our definition of leisure is enriched.

The Greeks "discovered" leisure by being the first to develop a society with an economic base that provided freedom from necessity for a substantial segment of the population. Those of the leisured class were free to devote themselves to pursuits other than those related to providing for the necessities of life.

The Greek word scholē meant leisure and ascholē denoted non-leisure. According to de Grazia, "...the etymological root of scholē meant to halt or cease, hence to have quiet or peace."<sup>1</sup> He combines this with modern and Aristotelian terminology and translates scholē as being free from the necessity of labor or any other activity one finds necessary to perform but would gladly be free of it.

This freedom allowed for the turning of one's attention to the higher things of life. These "higher" activities were many, but according to Aristotle the central activity with which one was to occupy his leisure was diagoge - the cultivation of the mind. Diagoge included the hearing of noble music and poetry, intercourse with friends chosen for their own worth and, above all, the exercise, alone or in

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<sup>1</sup>Sebastian de Grazia, Of Time, Work and Leisure, p. 10.



company, of the speculative faculty.<sup>2</sup>

Aristotle considered the activities of leisure to be intrinsically rewarding. They contained intrinsic happiness and felicity and were to be pursued for no other purpose. Aschôle corresponded to our modern idea of work or occupation. It was pursued for purposes outside of itself and always had an end beyond itself. Leisure had within itself its own justification and purpose.

Aristotle originally attempted to retain a purity of purpose in leisure by limiting it to two activities - contemplation and music. He assumed that these two could not be applied to useful or utilitarian ends (purposes outside of, extrinsic to, the activity itself). Reading, writing, gymnastics and drawing were not considered proper leisure subjects in which to be educated due to their potential use for extrinsic purposes. He later admitted these four subjects upon the realization that they could be pursued exclusively for their intrinsic rewards. Apparently the quality of schole lay not only in the activity but also in the subjective attitude of whoever was engaged in the activity.

Between the two extremes of schole and aschôle were paida (play and amusement) and anapausis (recreation). These two activities were considered to belong within the realm

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<sup>2</sup>The Politics of Aristotle, end. and trans. by Ernest Barker, p. 324.

of aschole since they were engaged in for the sake of work and could not therefore be considered as having ends intrinsic to the activity. Paida and anapausis were pursued as "...a curative of the stress and strain implicit in its (aschole) constraint,"<sup>3</sup> The element of pleasure present in play and recreation was not considered to be happiness. It was the pleasant feeling of relief from exertion and tension. Play and games acted as restoratives through providing the pleasure of relaxation.

Just as there were intermediate activities between the extremes of aschole and schole, there was a corresponding class of citizens. This class consisted of craftsmen and artisans. Aristotle attributes to them an independent or intermittent slavery. For he, the artisan, "...is active essentially in the execution of purposes not his own; but in his case the submission is for the job only and not, as in the case of the slave, for life." That the purpose be one's own, freely chosen, was essential. For the exclusion of "...autonomous, self-directing activity..." was "...the exclusion of leisure."<sup>4</sup>

In our framework the realm of leisure and religion are almost entirely separated. This is in keeping with their

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<sup>3</sup> J. L. Stocks, "Schole", The Classical Quarterly, XXX(1936), 178.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 181.

nature within technological society. For the Greeks, however, the two realms would have been more closely integrated. The leisure of Aristotle was legitimated, to a very great degree, by religion. Aristotle held contemplation to be the highest form of leisure and therefore the best way to truth finding. It was also believed that the activity of God, which surpassed all other activities in blessedness, was contemplation. Those who most cultivated the mind were most akin to the gods and dearest to them. This close association between leisure and religion was in sharp contrast to the distinct separateness established by Aristotle between work and leisure.

As we noted earlier, in the work realm one's consciousness is dominated and limited by the pragmatic motive and is primarily rewarding only on the basis of some extrinsic function. For the freeman in classical Greece, the limitations and boundaries dictated by pragmatic motives and extrinsic functions were transcended in leisure. The limitations imposed by external directions and orders were transcended through the autonomous and self-directing manner in which the leisure activity was pursued.

Our realm of leisure is not as exclusive as Aristotle's. We include those activities that indirectly (or have potential to) serve utilitarian functions. We exclude only those that directly and overtly serve the realm of work. Play, recreation and amusement are as much leisure activities as contemplation or music.

The directness with which a particular activity serves a utilitarian function is difficult to determine; for any leisure activity will at some point serve extrinsic utilitarian functions. A case could even be made against the pure leisure activities of Aristotle. For "...the Greeks expected the cultured and educated man to do everything he could to contribute his talents to the improvement of the community."<sup>5</sup>

## 2. Theological Significance of Leisure

Since technology permeates America more than any other society, examples to illustrate various characteristics of technological society will be selected from American society. The "official" religion of America is Christianity and we will limit our discussion of the theological significance of leisure to two Christian theologians - Joseph Pieper and Paul Tillich. Pieper serves to present the essential views of traditional, conservative theology while Tillich puts forward those of liberal theology.

According to Pieper, leisure and religion are related in several ways, the most basic being temporal. The potential for religion to develop is made possible by leisure, since leisure "...allows time for the contemplation of the nature of God."<sup>6</sup> There is also a qualitative relationship between

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<sup>5</sup>Henry Winthrop, Ventures In Social Interpretation, p. 107.

<sup>6</sup>Joseph Pieper, Leisure: The Basis Of Culture, p. 18.

leisure and religion, with celebration as the focal point. Pieper writes: "Leisure can only be made possible and justifiable on the same basis as the celebration of a festival. That basis is divine worship."<sup>7</sup>

Celebration is the affirmation of the universe, with the most intense affirmation being that of God - the creator of the universe. To gaze upon a rose in bud or child in play is to experience celebrative leisure. It is to allow the "inner eye" to dwell for a while upon the reality of creation. If leisure should be cut off or separated from worship of the divine then it becomes laziness and the vacancy left by the absence of worship is filled by the killing of time and boredom.

Pieper also provides a description of the way in which leisure is subjectively experienced. During a festival or celebration "...man experiences the world in an aspect other than the everyday one. To know leisure is to have the spirit soar in festive celebration. It is in leisure that man "...oversteps the boundaries of the workaday world."<sup>8</sup> These last two comments illustrate the transcendent capacity that Pieper feels is present in leisure.

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 56.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p. 43.

Leisure is only leisure if it is legitimated or justified through divine worship. Pieper does not consider leisure, as we do, to be an autonomous self-justifying realm of activity. Our earlier example of L.S.D., where the boundaries of the work realm were clearly transcended, would not be leisure according to Pieper. It would be merely the killing of time or boredom. On our schema, Pieper's leisure activities would be confined to that area where the realms of leisure and religion overlap.

We find ourselves more in agreement with Pieper concerning the term "culture". He defines it as "...the quintessence of all the natural goods of the world and of those gifts and qualities which, while belonging to man, lie beyond the immediate sphere of his needs and wants."<sup>9</sup> This definition stresses culture as a product or manifestation of these particular gifts and qualities. What we desire to examine is culture as a sphere or realm of activity in the life of man. In this respect, "...the sphere of culture is no less than the sphere of leisure in so far as the word means anything that lies beyond the utilitarian world."<sup>10</sup>

If we formulate these comments on leisure and culture in terms of our dual (individual and society) perspective, it

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 17.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 61.

would read: culture is to society what leisure is to the individual. Culture and leisure, will be used interchangeably, depending on whether we are using the societal or individual perspective.

In addition to presenting the ideal relation between leisure and religion, Pieper<sup>o</sup> discusses the nature of modern technological society and the way in which it restricts the realization of leisure. Modern society is one of total work since it consists of a population of functionaries. A functionary is one whose effort is totally justified in terms of technical organization and is thereby "harnessed" to the social system. Each member of society, even the scholar, has a place in the division of labor; each has a function.

Pieper considered Goethe<sup>e</sup> to be a true man of leisure. He uses a quote by him to illustrate the direct inverse relationship between the degree to which an activity is "harnessed" to the technically oriented social system and its (the activity) degree of leisure. The quote reads:

I have never bothered to ask in what way I was useful to society as a whole; I contented myself with expressing what I recognized as good and true. That has certainly been useful in a wide circle; but that was not the aim; it was the necessary result.

In an apparent lament of the loss of the likes of Aristotle and Goethe, Pieper asks but does not answer the following question: "Is there not a sphere of human activity, one might even say of human existence, that does not need to be

justified by inclusion in a five year plan and its technical organization?"<sup>11</sup>

Poverty and coercion are some of the obvious causes of being fettered to the work world. Another cause is that of an inner impoverishment. "Everyone whose life is completely filled by his work...is a proletarian because his life has shrunk inwardly and contracted, with the result that he can no longer act significantly outside of his work."<sup>12</sup> Having one's life completely filled by work is not to spend every waking hour on the job. It is to engage, during free time, in recreation and/or amusement. Pieper retains the Aristotelian notion of these terms and insists that any break from work for the sake of work is not leisure. It is impossible to engage in leisure for the sake of anything other than leisure. Any attempt to do so will result in the failure to discover "the fruit of leisure".

There is a parallel situation in religion. A person may say his prayers and discover that he is able to sleep better. Yet no one would say his prayers with that end in mind; for it would no longer be prayer but a sleep-inducing magical incantation.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 34.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 50.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 50.



It is through the activities of leisure and religion, which are not done for the sake of external ends, that the means-ends dichotomy, prevalent in other activities, is transcended. Leisure also transcends another type of split, one within the human psyche. Pieper explains that the Greek word acedia refers to sloth or idleness. The medieval view of such a man was that he renounced the claim implicit in his human dignity. He did not want to be what God wanted him to be - what he fundamentally was. The opposite of this was the happy and cheerful affirmation of his own being, his acquiescence in the world of God.<sup>14</sup> The slothful man, the unwhole man, was incapable of leisure; for leisure is only possible when man is at one with himself.

Despite Pieper's theological bias and often poetic terminology, he does present some essential characteristics of leisure, culture and technological society. Leisure is subjectively experienced as outside of and transcending the workaday world. Leisure may involve work (effort), but it is self-justifying; whereas the effort of a "functionary" is justified in terms of the technical organization of society. Leisure/culture is the preserve of freedom where "that undiminished humanity" views the world as a whole.

Paul Tillich uses a much broader definition of religion

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<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 38.

than does Pieper. Religion is the dimension of depth in all functions of man's spiritual life. "It means that the religious aspect points to that which is ultimate, infinite, unconditional in man's spiritual life."<sup>15</sup> Religion is experienced as ultimate concern in all creative functions of the human spirit. This definition of religion is similar to Pieper's in that Tillich regards culture as legitimated by, rooted in, "ultimate concern".

Tillich presents two structural relations between culture and religion. The first is the ideal or essential relation. "Religion, as ultimate concern, is the meaning giving substance of culture, and culture is the totality of forms in which the basic concern of religion expresses itself."<sup>16</sup> Since ultimate concern is present and consecrates all preliminary concerns, every work is the fulfillment of a divine task.

We will recall that Pieper did not include man's preliminary concerns (those within the realm of necessity) in the sphere of culture. In actuality, neither does Tillich. For in technological society, the "...secular element tends to make itself independent and to establish a realm of its own."<sup>17</sup> It is in this realm that man tends to his preliminary

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<sup>15</sup>Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture, p. 7.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 42.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 41.

concerns. They are not consecrated due to the absence of the dimension of depth. In its exclusion from the secular, religion tends to establish a realm of its own rather than interpenetrate and act as the meaning giving, legitimating substance of all the forms of culture (including work).

Tillich expresses a similar concern about the nature of technological society as does Pieper. "The spirit of the predominant movement in our present culture is the spirit of industrial society."<sup>18</sup> There is a concentration of activity upon the methodical investigation and technical transformation of society and man; with the result that man has become an object among objects, a cog in the universal machine of production and consumption. The dimension of depth has disappeared from man's encounter with everyday reality. Tillich's metaphorical remark that reality has lost its "inner transcendence", its "transparency of the eternal", parallels Pieper's comment that leisure and culture have, to a significant degree, lost their roots in religion.

Tillich and Pieper are at opposite ends of the theological spectrum, yet both refuse to recognize leisure/culture as an independent (not rooted in religion) realm which transcends the realm of work. Transcendence remains a property of religion and is not recognized apart from it.

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 43.

Tillich believes that ultimate concern is present in all creative functions of the human spirit and that such functions do not exist independently of ultimate concern (religion). This is possibly why he defends modern culture (as a creative function), particularly modern art. He contends that "...culture still transcends and serves as a protest directed against the position of man in a system of production and consumption in our society."<sup>19</sup> Having recognized the transcendent function of culture, it becomes necessary to explain culture as a manifestation of ultimate concern.

The expression of ultimate concern may well be the intent and purpose of many who produce and participate in culture, but certainly not of all. Yet it would certainly be incorrect to classify the production of and participation in culture of this group (those not manifesting ultimate concern) as a mere extension of the realm of technical production and consumption. However, this would seem the only classification possible for those recognizing only a sacred/profane, religions/secular type division of society.

It is not until we discuss the insights provided by the sociologists that it becomes evident that the realm of leisure/culture exists independently of, as well as transcends,

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid., p. 44.

the functional, rational world of work, without necessarily being rooted in religion.

### 3. The Activities of Work and Labor

Aristotle divided the realm of work into three categories, based on the degree to which the individual was free to act in an autonomous and self-directing manner. Hannah Arendt also divides the realm of work, but bases her division on the properties of the activities themselves. In her review of the differences between labor and work, she portrays not the character of a certain type of man (such as Aristotle's slave, artisan and freeman), but the properties of a certain type of human activity.

The Greek word ponēin means to labor. "To labor meant to be enslaved by necessity, and this enslavement was inherent in the conditions of human life."<sup>20</sup> A distinction between animal laborans and homo faber slowly developed. It corresponded to the difference between the activity of a slave and that of the craftsman or artisan.

The activities of animal laborans are directed towards producing those things necessary for the condition of life. Those things really useful to the life of man and necessary for subsistence were usually of short duration due to their

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<sup>20</sup>Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 74.

immediate consumption,<sup>21</sup> They are the least worldly and yet most material to the cycle of nature. The fact that the effort of labor left nothing behind, or goods of only short duration, lent to it a quality of futility. Unfortunately it was a futility from which there was no escape, for it was a futility of necessity.

The paradigm of man as laborer, as animal laborans, was the food gatherer. Labor exists in the realm of necessity and its rhythm corresponds to the rhythm of nature. Labor is caught in the cyclical movement of the life process, having neither beginning nor end. This endlessness through repetition contributes to the futility of labor.

Marx considered labor and consumption to be two stages in the ever-recurring cycle of biological life ruled over by the necessity of subsisting.<sup>22</sup> Wherever there was necessity there was no freedom. His aim was to emancipate man from labor into the realm of freedom. It was only where labor, determined through wants and needs of life, ended that freedom began.

In contrast to the short duration products of labor, produced for consumption, were those of work. Labor products are produced to be used up; work products are produced to be

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 84.

<sup>22</sup> Thomas Green, Work, Leisure and The American Schools, p. 20.

used. Even though the destruction of work products was inevitable through use, it was incidental; whereas destruction was inherent in the consumption of labor products. Work added to life whereas labor merely sustained it.

Termination, in contrast to the endlessness through repetition of labor, is a property of work. The process of work disappears in the product and need not be repeated. Work is an object producing effort and therefore terminable; labor is when human effort is expended without any completion and is therefore non-terminable.<sup>23</sup> The paradigm of man as homo faber is the artisan, particularly the artist.<sup>24</sup>

Arendt, as do Pieper and Tillich, comments on the nature of technological society. Having established the striking differences between the activities of work and labor in that even precious use articles are now consumer products. "The rate of use is so tremendously accelerated that the objective difference between use and consumption... dwindles to insignificance."<sup>25</sup> Through their very abundance, use objects have been transformed into consumer products. "The ideals of homo faber, the fabricator of the world, which are permanence, stability and durability, have been sacrificed

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 22.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. 20.

<sup>25</sup> Arendt, op. cit., p. 109.

to abundance, the ideal of animal laborans."<sup>26</sup>

Whether or not this transformation of work into labor has proceeded to the extent that Arendt contends it has is not of particular interest. It is only important to note that she is essentially in agreement with Pieper, Tillich and many other critics of technological society.

In reviewing the qualities of work, it becomes evident why, in traditional society, work and leisure were closely intertwined. The "intrinsically rewarding" aspects of the activities of homo faber gave them a quality of leisure. The craftsman and artisan worked with and controlled their tools instead of being controlled by a machine. They had control over the rhythm and movement of their work rather than being dominated by the rhythm of the machine. Their activities were self-directed rather than being limited by the dictates of a machine and the management.

Craftsmen and artisans also had the satisfaction of totally creating, from start to finish, a product, rather than being allowed to complete only one small segment of the process. The product was designed to last and take up a position of permanence in the world. It is the intrinsic rewards of craftsmanship that are sought in many of today's leisure activities.

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid., p. 110.



## III

## TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY AND LEISURE

1. Secularization

Our analytical framework allows for an interpenetration of leisure by work and religion but not between work and religion. This reflects the total non-religious nature of work in technological society. However, work has not always been completely separated from the religious realm. In primitive and traditional American societies work was "...adulterated by irrational practices, customs and rites."<sup>1</sup> Work had religious meaning.

Weber, in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, outlines the theological origins of the relationship between work and religion that prevailed in traditional American society. Luther and Calvin, explains Weber, greatly influenced early American Puritanism. The German word beruf translated into English as "calling". It was a life task, a definite field in which to work. For Luther, this meant that routine activity now had positive value. Although interpretations of a "calling" differed, it resulted in the moral and religious sanctioning of organized worldly labour.

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<sup>1</sup>Clement Greenberg, "Work and Leisure under Industrialism", in Eric Larabee and Rolf Meyerson, eds., Mass Leisure, p. 38.

Weber reviews the writings of early American Puritans, particularly those of Richard Baxter, in order to understand the attitude towards work and leisure that such religious beliefs would promote. Of course the degree to which these theological proscriptions were adhered to and the extent to which an individual felt his daily job to be the fulfillment of God's will depended on the strength of religious conviction.

From these writings it was clear that the enjoyment of wealth, in the form of idleness and pursuits of the flesh, was to be guarded against. Only those activities which increased the glory of God, namely work and religious observances, were to be engaged in. Baxter cited the wasting of time as the deadliest sin; for wasted time, through sociability, vain recreation, idle talk, luxury and excess sleep, was time lost from assuring one's election. So important was work as an "approved ascetic technique", that some individuals were morally opposed to early retirement.

Leisure was accepted only if it served a rational purpose, such as improving one's physical efficiency. Such past-times as the enjoyment of novels or theatre were condemned: "...all designations of an irrational attitude without objective purpose, thus not ascetic, and especially not serving the glory of God, but of man,..."<sup>2</sup> were morally

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<sup>2</sup>Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, p. 70.

offensive. This belief in the "sober utility" of leisure was most certainly not conducive to the development of man's "artistic tendencies".

The fact that work in technological society is no longer legitimated or justified by, no longer derives its meaning or significance from, a religious tradition, is often cited as an example of secularization. Peter Berger defined it as "...the process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols."<sup>3</sup>

Harvey Cox interprets the secularization of work positively. It is seen as the emancipation of work from its religious character as a discipline. Even though this liberation is somewhat dangerous, it makes "...it possible for man to increase the range of his freedom and responsibility and thus to deepen his maturation."<sup>4</sup> Bennett Berger, a sociologist, views the secularization of work negatively. For as work "...loses its power to command the moral identification and loyalties of man, as men look away from work to find moral experience, society loses an important source or normative integration."<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy, p. 107.

<sup>4</sup> Harvey Cox, The Secular City, p. 145.

<sup>5</sup> Bennett Berger, "The Sociology of Leisure: Some Suggestions", in R. Smigels, ed., Work and Leisure, p. 35.

Whether it be interpreted as a positive or negative situation, the fact remains that work in technological society is essentially a secular activity. The overwhelming majority of workers in modern society perform their daily eight hour routine, not as a spiritual means but as an economic means; not out of any concern for doing the will of God, but out of a concern for acquiring the necessities of technological society.

There is, however, one respect in which work is not secularized. Cox remarks that "the job" has taken on characteristics of religion and work is not yet completely secularized. He is referring to the fact that for some individuals the job has not been functionally secularized, even though it has been substantively secularized. The religious legitimation of the job is absent yet it (the job) still functions in a manner similar to the way in which traditional religion functions. An individual's existence may derive its meaning from work or activities may be justified on the basis of a job. The job functions as a religion for those who worship at the altar of work.

The realm of work is not the only area that has been affected by secularization. Due to many factors, and to varying degrees, secularization is evident in all of the major social institutions, including education, family and politics. For this reason, Peter Berger considers the Protestant believer

as no longer living in a world ongoingly penetrated by sacred beings and forces. Reality is polarized between a radically transcendent divinity and a radically "fallen" humanity.<sup>6</sup>

We would agree with Berger that at one pole, does exist a "radically" (in our terminology - absolute) transcendent divinity. We would not agree that a radically fallen humanity constitutes the other pole. It is similar to our disagreement with Pieper and Tillich and all others who operate within a two-fold framework. In between these two poles, yet constituting a part of humanity, is leisure. It is a derivative phenomenon of secularization - segmentation - that allows leisure to occupy this position. With the loss of religious legitimation as a common and therefore unifying component within all of the primary institutions, they were not only secularized but also clearly differentiated and segmented. The impact of this process of segmentation in the life of the individual is analyzed by Thomas Luckman. "Institutional segmentation left wide areas in the life of the individual unstructured...", and "...in comparison to traditional social orders, the primary public institutions no longer significantly contribute to the formation of individual consciousness and personality."<sup>7</sup> The result is that a "private sphere" has emerged.

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<sup>6</sup>Peter Berger, op. cit., p. 107.

<sup>7</sup>Thomas Luckmann, The Invisible Religion, p. 97.

Although Luckmann's notion of a "private sphere" is much more extensive than our "leisure sphere", the two have much in common and are products of the same process-segmentation. The leisure realm is "private" in that it is relatively free of the norms and values operating respectively in the realms of work and religion. This unstructuredness holds both a promise and a threat. Leisure may merge into the "radically fallen" pole of humanity, yet it also holds the potential to transcend the fallen sphere of work and to thereby contribute, through its limited transcendent power, to the uplifting of a "radically fallen humanity".

Many would contend that it is naive to believe that the sphere of leisure is one of freedom and transcendence. They contend that this "unstructured" sphere is being filled by the norms and values of the work world, the values of big business and the economy, with the advertisers functioning as the "new high priesthood". In order to determine the extent to which the autonomous, transcendent leisure realm has been permeated by the economically based work sphere, we must examine the characteristics of modern work.

To the views of Pieper, Tillich and Arendt concerning this topic, we will add those of a couple of sociologists and philosophers. Nels Anderson, a sociologist, feels that modern work possesses those properties by which Max Weber characterized bureaucracy - rational, imperative and imper-

sonal.<sup>8</sup> The division of labour and fragmentation of tasks has caused work to become depersonalized; the worker feels no identification with either the performance or the product.<sup>9</sup> Despite the significant increase in efficiency, there are many who agree with Emile Durkheim: "If a worker cannot relate his operations to an end and performs them only out of habit with monotonous regularity - it is a debasement of human nature."<sup>10</sup>

The above characteristics, along with those expressed earlier by Pieper, Tillich and Arendt are those that dominate the world of work. The degree to which they prevail and the extent to which they permeate the sphere of leisure is an open question.

Luckmann contends that despite the massive performance control of the individual by the work environment, there is only a minimal affect on the individual consciousness or personality outside of the work realm. This is a feature that contributes to the autonomy of the "private sphere". Jacques Ellul takes the opposite view. He maintains that the essential and dominant feature of the work realm - technique - permeates not only the realm of leisure but even that of religion. "The individual who lives in the technical milieu

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<sup>8</sup>Nels Anderson, Dimensions of Work, p. viii.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>10</sup>Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society, p. 40.

knows very well that there is nothing spiritual anywhere."<sup>11</sup>

The existence within the leisure realm of a few or many dominant work characteristics would certainly seem to diminish the leisure realm to whatever degree they were present; Ellul has a strong point. There is, however, a more fundamental way in which the work realm diminishes that of leisure - through the expansion of necessity.

## 2. The Transformation of Necessity

We originally defined work as that realm of activity, the purpose of which was to meet the demands of necessity. But in technological society this "necessity" has grown far beyond the demands of our biological makeup. The very forces of industrialism, originally developed for increased efficiency in supplying the rudiments of life, have contributed to this growth.

Thomas Green suggests that "what may have been achieved in the modern world...is not the eradication of necessity and futility, but rather the transformation of the sphere within which they are experienced."<sup>12</sup> Ellul sees us as having entered into another realm of necessity to which our efforts in work are directed. "It is not the realm of essential,

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<sup>11</sup>Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, p. 143.

<sup>12</sup>Thomas Green, op. cit., p. 143.



natural necessity - for natural necessity no longer exists."<sup>13</sup> Herbert Marcuse refers to this necessity as "alien necessity."

Lewis Mumford laments the fact that work, besides providing man with a living (meeting the demands of essential natural necessity) has also enlarged his capacities to consume rather than "...liberated his capacities to create." Rather than resting content with the satisfaction of our elemental, biological needs and using them as the basis for the good life, the life of leisure, we have elaborated and refined them and used their satisfaction as a substitute for the good life.<sup>14</sup> Marx believed that surplus energy and time, in excess of that required for necessary work, should be spent in "higher activities". Unfortunately, "...the more time left to him, the greedier and more craving his appetites... Consumption is no longer restricted to the necessities but, on the contrary, mainly concentrates on the superfluities of life."<sup>15</sup>

Superfluous consumption in response to alien necessity certainly constitutes much of the free time activity of modern man. This directly affects the transcendence of leisure. We earlier quoted Marx's comment that labour and consumption

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<sup>13</sup>Jacques Ellul, op. cit., p. 247.

<sup>14</sup>Lewis Mumford, The Condition of Man, p. 143.

<sup>15</sup>Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 115.

were two stages in the ever-recurring cycle of biological life, ruled over by the necessities of subsisting. Accordingly neither the activities of labor or work nor the activities of consumption or other "biologically necessitated" activities can be considered leisure. This is because necessity and freedom are mutually exclusive and freedom is an essential component of leisure. Without freedom there is no leisure and without leisure there is no transcendence of the realm of work.

It is for this reason that "alien" necessity excludes leisure. Marx's statement can be expressed in terms of technological society. It would read: work and superfluous consumption are two stages in the ever-recurring cycle of pseudo-biological life ruled over by the alien necessity of making a living.

Arendt's concern is real. She sees, as did Marx, the danger that "...the modern age's emancipation of labor will not only fail to usher in the age of freedom...but will result, on the contrary, in forcing all mankind for the first time under the yoke of necessity."<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 113.

### 3. The Social Freedom of Leisure

The freedom that an individual experiences in society depends to a great degree upon the repression of the biological urges freely expressed among animals - aggression and sexuality. The individual is freed from the necessity of having to personally maintain a constant defense against unwarranted attacks.

Along with these two primary urges requiring control there are individual needs that must be met as well as societal norms and values that must be internalized in order to achieve a basic stability within the social order. This process of fundamental socialization places controls and limitations upon the activities and experiences of an individual. Leisure is paradoxical in that it both promotes basic socialization, and thereby supports the inherent controls and limitations; as well as opposes it. It is through opposing basic social norms and values that leisure frees the individual from their inherent restrictiveness.

The supportive role of leisure is presented by Edward Gross. He analyzes leisure with respect to "...the four major function problems of social systems as they have been identified by R. F. Bales, Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils."<sup>17</sup> They are: pattern maintenance and tension management,

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<sup>17</sup> Edward Gross, "A functional Approach To Leisure Analysis", Social Problems, IX (Summer, 1961), 4.

adaption, goal attainment and integration. These are the four problems that are overcome through the process of fundamental socialization.

Pattern maintenance is, according to Gross, reinforced in leisure. He cites the example of sports with its emphasis on those essential social qualities of success and competition. "In the area of tension management, the cathartic and restorative functions of leisure are preeminent, from the parlor-room joke to the ritualized functions of spectatorship."<sup>18</sup> Leisure serves to reinforce the individual's adaption to society by serving as a compensation for boredom or any other deprivation that one experiences in the realm of work. As an example of goal attainment, Gross refers to the leisure classes of old who considered it a public responsibility to protect and celebrate the "primary symbols" and "ultimate values" of the culture. As for integration, there are a variety of examples. A contemporary one is that of integration through identification experienced by the Canadian public as they focus their attention on the concerns and aspirations of Team Canada.

The oppositional function of leisure, serving to free the individual from the control and limitations of fundamental socialization, is presented by Thelma McCormack. She empha-

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 45.

sizes the freedom of leisure and treats leisure as a political concept in that it "...is dependent upon the extent of privacy and freedom for dissent."<sup>19</sup> She uses privacy in essentially the same manner as does Luckmann in his notion of the "private sphere" - being only indirectly, or to a minimal degree, influenced by the predominant social norms or mores.

She distinguishes between recreation and leisure:

"Recreational activities are intimately bound up with the cohesion, productivity and continuity of communal life. Thus, they are public rather than private and existentially unfree."<sup>20</sup> It is "...a system of social control and like all systems it is to some degree manipulative, coercive and indoctrinating."<sup>21</sup> Leisure "grew out of recreation" but has no essential function for the community. If leisure contributes to the basic stability of the social order, it does so only "incidentally".

With such a politically based definition of recreation and leisure, the identification of an activity as one or the other, becomes dependent on one's political ideology. This is evident in McCormack's respective examples of recreation and leisure - the summer band concert and the rock festival. The concert is designated as recreation on the basis that it is sponsored by the municipal government and serves to pacify .

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<sup>19</sup> Thelma McCormack, "Politics and Leisure", International Journal of Comparative Sociology, XII (September, 1971), 169.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 171.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

the viewers and perhaps "defuse" any negative feelings the individual might have toward the government; nor does it promote or encourage any anti-establishment activity.

The rock festival is an example of leisure. With its combination of (anti-establishment) rock music, illegal use of drugs and, most importantly, "...the rejection of conventional notions of modesty and sex roles...", it stands in sharp contrast to the summer band concert in the park.

It would appear though, that leisure does not constantly and completely serve to negate the cohesion and continuity of social life, for even the rock concert, which is dysfunctional in the areas of pattern maintenance, adaption, goal attainment and integration, is functional with respect to tension management. However, as McCormack mentions, leisure is functional only "incidentally". We earlier noted that leisure only "indirectly" served the process of production in the work realm; yet it proved difficult to determine the degree to which an activity served production. It is equally difficult to establish the degree to which an activity contributes to the cohesion and continuity of social life.

Besides being directly free of the limitations and restraints inherent in social cohesiveness, leisure is also unrestricted by the constraints of social roles that are so rife in the work realm. McCormack writes: "Ideologically, true leisure is often pictured as a non-role, an anti-role

which liberates the real self and releases wonderful torrents of pure energy. Although this is dubious as social psychology, one can still appreciate the sense of protest it expresses and the feeling that leisure and the constraint of role are in opposition to each other."<sup>22</sup>

There are many others who are in basic agreement with McCormack. F. Scheuch defines leisure as those activities that do not necessarily follow from functional roles. Robert Lee, in Leisure and Religion in America, states: "...leisure must have a minimum of social role obligation."<sup>23</sup> An example of this type of constraint in free time is that of the man who plays with his child only out of a felt obligation to fulfill his duty in accordance with his social role as father. The man is certainly not enjoying his leisure; for leisure is carried out independently of any functional social roles attached to it.

#### 4. The Ideal Functions of Leisure/Culture

The theologians, Joseph Pieper and Paul Tillich, presented some ideas concerning the ideal function of leisure/culture. We will now look at the ideas of Herbert Marcuse, who serves to offset the theistic bias of Pieper and Tillich

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 174.

<sup>23</sup> Robert Lee, Leisure and Religion In America, p. 79.

and to complete a balanced view of this function.

Marcuse formulates his ideals of culture on the basis of the aristocratic or high culture of the past. High culture was always in contradiction to social reality. It contained oppositional, alien and transcendent elements and constituted another dimension of reality. Culture served to ingress a transcendent order of things into the established order. High culture of the past, in its relation to the reality of daily life, represented the realm of freedom.

Social reality, the established order and the reality of daily life to which Marcuse refers correspond to what we termed the realm of necessity (both real and alien). Serving to oppose or negate this order was the transcendence of culture. Marcuse is of the opinion that the ideal function of culture, which the high culture of the past performed so successfully, is no longer served by today's culture. The gap between culture and the order of the day is closing; the other dimension is being absorbed into the prevailing state of affairs. Modern culture is succumbing to the process of "technological rationality".<sup>24</sup>

The truth value of the artistic and literary images of culture depends to a large degree on an uncomprehended and unconquered dimension of man and nature - the insoluble core

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<sup>24</sup> Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, p. 66.



which resisted integration.<sup>25</sup> These images once portrayed tabooed truths, the truths of an unhappy consciousness of the divided world, the defeated possibilities, the hopes unfulfilled and the promises betrayed. Culture was the realm of the Great Refusal - the protest against that which is.<sup>26</sup>

The unconquered dimension of nature, to which Marcuse referred, served an important function in the religiously rooted leisure of Pieper. In fact, nature was actually a part of the realm of culture, for culture included the "quintessence of all the natural goods of the world." Marcuse holds a similar view of nature, for even though technology has conquered nature to a very great degree, nature still represents an uncomprehended, unconquered dimension - thus serving as a source of transcendence.

Marcuse will not accept any "technologized" versions of nature. It is only possible for the untouched forest to serve this transcendent function - not the state park with its signs, concession stands and crowds. The state park has been physically transformed and consequently the symbols, images and ideas which it represents have lost their power to mentally transform us and to transcend the established order. The forest has been absorbed by the state park and incorporated into the "omnipresent daily reality".

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<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 70.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 61.

Tillich, Pieper, Marcuse and Ellul are mainly in agreement about the ideal function of leisure/culture, which is to transcend the workaday world. They are at variance regarding the basis of leisure, as well as the extent to which the technological rationality of the work realm has permeated the realm of leisure. Marcuse sees no area of transcendence, only a one dimensionality of the forces of production and consumption. Ellul offers us only one route to escape the situation - madness. Pieper and Tillich still have hope for leisure/culture, but only if it is religiously based.

##### 5. A Comprehensive Definition of Leisure

The dominant functions and characteristics of leisure have now been presented. Leisure begins with activity that is engaged in primarily for its own sake - not in response to the demands of the work realm nor in accordance with the requirements of societal role playing. Leisure is intrinsically rewarding and freely engaged in.

There are two types of leisure - recreative and developmental. The first is cathartic and serves to restore the mental equilibrium and reduce the tension produced by our daily occupational activity and the disciplines and constraints demanded by society. Developmental leisure involves a deliberate exertion of physical or mental power (effort) directed towards the expansion of man's intellectual, spiritual,

cultural, physical and community horizons. It serves to unfold the individual's potentialities and to enlarge his appreciation for life. This is the transcendent leisure of Marx's hoped for self-realization of the individual and of society.

Developmental leisure focuses on those characteristics of man which many refer to as god-like. An example of this is creativity. Tillich states that in order for man to fulfill his destiny, he must be in possession of creative powers analogous to those previously attributed to God.<sup>27</sup> An attribute, formerly attributed to God, only becomes truly human when that quality is used to serve the glory of man, not the glory of God.

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<sup>27</sup> Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture, p. 44.

## IV

## THE TEMPORAL ORDER OF LEISURE AND RELIGION

1. The Temporal Order of Industry

It is in the discussion of time that the similarity between the transcendent function of leisure and religion is most evident. The temporal order of leisure serves in a transcendent capacity with respect to the work realm, just as the infinity of religion transcends the temporal finiteness of the secular. In order to appreciate this particular quality of leisure, we must be made aware of the temporal limitations and boundaries that exist within the realm of work and that of the secular sphere.

One of the key factors in the development of technology was efficiency and this could only be achieved through the use of mechanical clock time. Mumford cites the clock as the essential machine in the rise of technological society. Although it was within the realm of industry and business that clock time came to be accepted as the norm, it did not remain confined to that realm alone. Throughout modern society the popular notion of time is synonymous with the endless flow of seconds, minutes and hours.

In pre-technological society the dominant temporal form was natural or diurnal time. Natural time was the basis

of agricultural society. It was the ever-recurring, cyclical time of the seasons, marked by the movement of the earth, sun, stars and moon as it affected the tides. Cyclical time was not "ever-new", and the future was anticipated as being quite similar to the past.

There is an unusual quality about natural time that Arendt referred to as blissful. Thomas Green explains that in a life governed by diurnal time, work, leisure, rest and play tend to be mixed up together and do not have a precisely appointed time. Even though such a life is often quite hard, there is something about it that is "inherently leisurely."<sup>1</sup> Henry Thoreau, who lived in harmony with the temporal flow of nature, felt that man should preserve religiously the coincidence of his life with that of nature. It is this inherent leisurely or blissful quality of natural time that many seek to regain once they are free from the realm of work.

The clock had its beginning in the monastery. Writers have noted the ironic fact that this machine was developed "...by persons of such unworldly religious orientations that they withdrew from the ordinary, mundane life."<sup>2</sup> It was the Christian desire of the monks to "...provide for the welfare

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<sup>1</sup>Thomas Green, Work, Leisure and the American Schools, p. 51.

<sup>2</sup>W. E. Moore, Man, Time and Society, p. 23.

of souls in eternity by regular prayers and devotions that time-keeping and the habits of temporal order took hold of men's minds."<sup>3</sup>

Outside the walls of the monastery the clock was put to the most mundane, secular purposes possible - the development of industry and the making of money. The clock made it possible to co-ordinate the various mechanisms and procedures of industry and business, as well as to synchronize men as workers with the "wheels of industry". Industrial man was placed in a new and more precise relationship with time.

Within the monastery, the clock was used to direct man's attention to the timelessness of the infinite. Outside of the monastery, it was used to completely erase any association with the infinite or nature. "After the rise of the factories time was oriented to industrial work; and industry, as an earthly institution, became the core element in a new way of life. Time lost its transcendental meanings of earlier periods."<sup>4</sup> With increasing industrialization, time became clearly linked with money. The worker exchanged his time for money and time began to assume the characteristics of a tangible commodity that could be saved, wasted, spent and counted.

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<sup>3</sup>Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization, p. 260.

<sup>4</sup>Nels Anderson, Work and Leisure, p. 53.

In order to meet the increasing demands of efficiency it became necessary to neutralize time. It has to be completely stripped of any significance or meaning - religious, social or personal. For the purposes of industry and technology, time had to become an abstract, empty measure - separated from the rhythms of nature as well as cultural and religious traditions.

To separate time from the rhythms of nature proved an easier task than secularizing it. People would not work on days that were designated by religious tradition as periods of ceremonies, festivals or ritual activity. These holy days were often made into holidays. For at least holidays could be spent in activities that would re-create the individual for work, rather than focus his attention on the holy.

Today, within the work realm, the flow of quantitative, neutral, homogeneous minutes and hours is the basis of industrial and bureaucratic organization. The activities of the work realm require synchronization, which can only be provided by a time that is devoid of meaning and value - neutral. This empty time is one of the central features of man's continuing mastery of the environment within the world of work.

This gradual transformation of time, paralleling the rise of technological society, has had an affect on the realm of leisure. Sebastian de Grazia is convinced that the adop-

tion of clock time has made leisure impossible even outside of the work realm. He writes: "During the days of technology's birth, leisure disappeared and when it reappeared, its form had changed and become free time."<sup>5</sup> Leisure, in becoming free time, had gone from a qualitative concept to one of pure quantity. He maintains that since free time (time free from the work realm) is actually a product of increased efficiency, it and the temporal order of work have the same basis - clock time. He concludes that since clock time permeates all of modern society, leisure is impossible. Leisure, says de Grazia, is on a different plane than that of free time; it is outside of time.

Another quality of leisure that de Grazia feels can only be preserved if it remains completely separated from clock time, is that of wholeness. To place leisure within the flow of evenly paced units of clock time, of which some are free and others not, is to expose it to the division and fragmentation that purely quantitative time is subject to. It is not possible to "destroy" work or free time by dividing it up into smaller or larger fragments. However, to do the same to leisure, with its quality of wholeness, would be to destroy it.

Thomas Green, unlike de Grazia, does not wish to trans-

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<sup>5</sup>Sebastian de Grazia, Of Time, Work and Leisure, p. 63.



port the classical form of leisure into modern society; he only wishes to be informed by tradition." Green accepts the slightly paradoxical situation that our "...commitment to clock time (and efficiency) in our social arrangements makes leisure in the modern sense attainable and leisure in the classical sense impossible."<sup>6</sup>

Clock time is the fundamental temporal mode of technological society.. It would be impossible both realistically and conceptually to remove it from society. It is impossible to come to grips with modern leisure without referring to it in terms or categories of thought that are derived from work.<sup>7</sup> In this way Green's approach to leisure remains related to contemporary social conditions and not "heuristically worthless" as is de Grazia's. Merely because leisure, like free time, is conceptually derived from the idea of work does not prevent the transformation of a period of free time into leisure. Free time is quantitative, neutral and homogeneous, and may serve as the basis of leisure. Leisure qualifies the quantitative.

Although the presence of the clock in both work and free time does not render leisure impossible, there is another characteristic of work time that, if allowed to overflow into

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<sup>6</sup>Thomas Green, op. cit., p. 74.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 72.

the realm of leisure, does prevent the realization of leisure. Within the work realm a certain tempo or rhythm is maintained. It is a rapid tempo, in accordance with the goal of efficiency - the maximum number of events in the minimum of time units.

The worker adopts to the "tempo consciousness" of the job. Each minute must be filled with some sort of activity so that no time is wasted. The tempo and obsessive filling of every minute is well suited to the work realm. It is efficient and allows an increasing amount of free time and potential leisure. Many writers believe the time and tempo demands of the work realm are "dehumanizing"; but it appears to be the price modern man must be willing to pay for an ever-decreasing work week.

Unfortunately, the "tempo consciousness" of work has not remained confined to that area. The worker's temporary adoption of the "tempo consciousness" of work has, for many, become permanent. There is a tendency to internalize it and allow it to dominate the leisure realm. Nels Anderson warns that if the "tempo consciousness" of work is allowed to encroach upon the realm of leisure, the result is often boredom.<sup>8</sup>

Outside of work, neutral clock time continues in the

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<sup>8</sup>Nels Anderson, Work and Leisure, p. 58.

form of free time. When this unfilled (by the demands of work) free time is not transcended through leisure (since it exists in a plane outside of free time) it must be endured as boredom or killed in a frantic attempt to escape boredom. Man is often driven to activity by the dread of empty time, and for many the killing of free time passes as their leisure.

Lee refers to modern man as having become encased by the time and tempo of the work realm.<sup>9</sup> The work realm has apparently developed a lust for activity and fast tempo, leaving Western man unbalanced to the values of literature, art and nature.<sup>10</sup> To whatever degree this "tempo consciousness" of work or the killing of free time is present, it is to that same degree that we fail to transcend free time through leisure.

## 2. The Temporal Flow of Religion, Culture and Leisure

Time, within the religious sphere, is in direct opposition to that of either work or leisure. The temporal mode of the divine is that of eternity - timelessness. It is said to transcend the finite time of the secular order.

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<sup>9</sup>Robert Lee, Religion and Leisure in America, p. 207.

<sup>10</sup>Nels Anderson, op. cit., p. 60.

During occasions of religious ceremony, ritual or festivity, the eternal is temporarily co-present with the finite. Regular attempts are made within the religious community to recapture periods of eternity through ritual perpetuation of the past. Such activity is carried out in the belief that by the performance of certain acts of an imitative character, the finite temporal order can be transcended and certain relevant events of the past can either be reproduced or their efficacy made available for present use.<sup>11</sup> During sacred periods the individual is, through the power of faith and belief, removed from the secular, temporal order back to the beginning of time or history, or a time when the eternal was present within the finite.

Temporality is an intrinsic property of consciousness and the transcendent power of religious activities is partially dependent on the temporal consciousness or awareness of the individual. The ability to transcend homogeneous, quantitative clock time is not restricted to sacred rituals. Leisure activities are also vehicles of temporal transcendence. They do not transcend the realm of time absolutely, as does religion, but do certainly transcend the basic temporal mode of work.

If we recall our two types of leisure, recreative and

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<sup>11</sup>S.G.F. Brandon, Time and Mankind, p. 23.

developmental, it is the former which serves to "transport" the individual to any one of a number of "multiple temporalities" that transcend the temporal order of quantitative, neutral clock time. Rationality and pragmatism dominate the work realm while fantasy and imagination reign in the recreative leisure realm. The individual participates in the eternal realm of religion through faith. In recreative leisure the individual participates in alternative temporal modes through fantasy and imagination.

In recreative leisure the temporal flow of the work realm is transcended. The temporal consciousness of recreative leisure ranges from that of "stop the clock" football games or the race against seconds in a track meet, to the temporal flow and historical era of an eighteenth century play or the nature lover reharmonizing himself with natural time.

Besides transcending the temporal flow and presentness of work time, the tempo and rhythm are also transcended. This is best exemplified in the dance. John Cohen notes that in traditional festivities the dance accompanied all significant activities. "As in earlier times, the people of today seek in the fantasies aroused by the music, rhythm, whirl and the colour of dance an experience free of the bleak and dismal reality that often surrounds them."<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> John Cohen, "The Scientific Revolution and Leisure", Nature, CLXLVlll (June, 1963), 1032.

From a sociological perspective, recreative leisure functions to counteract and relieve the time and tempo demands of work. For the individual, it is within the vast array of temporal orders available in recreative leisure that it is possible to restore a sense of wholeness to the personality and to rebalance the psychic equilibrium.

Another function of the absolutely transcendent, the divine, is to "rhythm" the flow of profane time. Sorokin notes that the religious calendar divides the flow of time into links of sacred/profane, time devoted to the performance of rites and "empty", insignificant time.<sup>13</sup>

Leisure performs a similar function. Just as the religious periods were the critical, eventful periods separating the empty links of profane time, leisure is the meaningful, valuable period of time between the relatively insignificant periods of work.

Sorokin points out that the religious representation of time involves something else besides the quantitative consideration of more or less. In religious periods there is the notion of presence or absence of active qualities such as eternity, timelessness or God. It is the presence of these qualities that makes corresponding periods similar or dissimilar.

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<sup>13</sup>P. A. Sorokin, Sociocultural Causality, Space and Time, p. 182.

Within the profane sphere, divided into work and leisure, it is seen that leisure, or the presence of leisure qualities, functions in a parallel manner to that of religion. Work time is measured in terms of more or less, very rarely with regard to the presence or absence of certain qualities.

Both religious and leisure periods are experienced as a whole. They transcend the fragmentation and division existing in the work realm. Quantitative, fragmented hourly time has very little meaning within religion or leisure, but is the fundamental feature of work. To say a church service was of two hours duration tells us very little. For it is the richness of experience and presence of certain qualities within these two hours that is of significance. The situation is the same with regard to leisure. However, to say two hours was spent at the job is significant. Two hours at four dollars per hour means eight dollars was accumulated. The quantity of two hours or eight dollars is the sum total of that period. The meaning of the two hours is eight dollars and rarely anything more.

### 3. Leisure and Kairos

In addition to those pre-arranged periods of sacredness in religious ceremonies, there are moments in the life of society and the individual when the eternal "breaks through" into the finite unexpectedly. Such events are referred to as moments of kairos.

Paul Tillich contrasts the Greek word chronos with kairos. The former refers to the quantitative, measurable clock time whereas the latter is a "...qualitatively different and unique moment in the time process."<sup>14</sup> It is a moment rich in content and significance, one of opportunity and regeneration.

On a personal level the idea of a new birth or regeneration was not originally applied to the individual. However, Tillich recognizes that there are "...outstanding moments in the life of the individual which can be called kairos."<sup>15</sup> It is when something new, unexpected and transforming breaks into a person's life.

Similar moments occur in leisure and if we were to place them on the structural framework of our three realms they would be located in that area where religion and leisure overlap - depending on whether or not religious significance was attached to them. They are those rare moments when we are open to the basis of existence; the silent awe and wonder that is occasionally experienced during intense moments of absorption in nature and creation. Whether they are religious moments of Kairos or peak experiences of leisure, they share the characteristics of renewal and regeneration.

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<sup>14</sup>Tillich, Ultimate Concern, p. 125.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 150.



## V

## THE TRANSCENDENT CAPACITY OF WORK AND PLAY

1. Alienation

Up until this point, transcendence has been mainly used to denote "going beyond" or "rising above" certain limits or boundaries. A second meaning, one which shall be used extensively in this chapter, is the integration of that which is atomized or separated. We shall begin with an examination of alienation as a condition of separateness or unwholeness within the work realm and the secular realm. Following this, we shall discuss the manner in which it is integratively transcended through leisure and religion. Finally, the common internal dynamics of leisure and religion will be presented.

Alienation, as a term used to describe the psychosociological condition of man living in technological society, is a concept familiar to both layman and professional. One author suggests that "...if the term is now so fashionable, it is because the condition is so universal."<sup>1</sup> It is a comprehensive term including the more specific disorders of meaningless, anomie, loss of self, powerlessness, depersonal-

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<sup>1</sup>Ben Seligman, "On Work, Alienation and Leisure", The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, XXIV (October, 1965), 349.

ization, estrangement and a general loss of belief or values." Eric and Mary Josephson refer to alienation as "...an individual feeling or state of disassociation from self, from others and the world at large."<sup>2</sup> Karen Horney, focusing on the elements of powerlessness and atomization within the individual personality, defines alienation as "...the loss of the feeling of being an active determining force in his own life. It is the loss of feeling himself as an organic whole."<sup>3</sup> Central to the idea of alienation is the loss of identity or selfhood.

Within the religious community, alienation is tacit in the concept of sin. It may appear in a variety of forms, but is essentially a result of separation or isolation from God. It is also expressed as a separation of the individual from the human community, the absence of fellowship. To these two traditional forms of sin, many theologians of the twentieth century add the estrangement of man from his own true self. Pieper referred to the split between man and God as a result of man renouncing the claim implicit in his human dignity, not being what he fundamentally was - what God wanted him to be.

The separation of man from God, his fellow man and

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<sup>2</sup>Eric and Mary Josephson, Man Alone, p. 13.

<sup>3</sup>Karen Horney, as quoted in above, p. 13.

himself is essentially the result of the radical separation between the secular or profane realm and that of the sacred, God. This was mentioned by Tillich in his earlier comment that "...the existence of religion as a separate realm is man being estranged from his own true being."<sup>4</sup>

The true being of the Christian lay in union with himself and others through union with God. For the Christian, life within the secular realm is lived according to the moral code of Christianity. In this way, even though the sacred and profane realms are separate, the resulting alienation is significantly overcome.

Alienation within the work realm of technological society manifests itself in a variety of ways. The feeling of powerlessness is often experienced on the job. The modern, worker, rather than freely acting, is generally called upon to only react to the demands of production. The job holder must adhere to the regulations of the organization. He has little to say concerning the formulation of rules or the goals and means of production. This powerlessness is largely due to technology. For "...as the mode of work was increasingly directed and specified by advancing technology, it became less flexible, offering less freedom and maneuverability to the individual."<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture, p. 41.

<sup>5</sup>Seligman, op. cit., p. 339.

Meaninglessness, as alienation, is the absence of intrinsic meaning from the work activity. Green notes that the meaning of the job "...does not inure in the job itself, but is quite often derived from the commodities that are bought."<sup>6</sup> Seligman explains that the activity of work has gone in the direction of becoming a mechanical reaction pursuing the dictates of a single set of values (those of technique); "...meaning disappears as work takes on the character of continuous process."<sup>7</sup>

Since the job is an activity devoid of meaning, the individual does not become involved in the activity as a mode of self-expression or personality development. The job fails to serve as a source of personal and/or social identity. The activity is one of self-estrangement. Robert Blauner explains:

...the self is not absorbed by the activity through utilization of individual unique skills or craft resulting in the absence of personal growth. Self-estranged activity is strictly a means to an end, rather than an end in itself accompanied by an attitude of detachment rather than involvement.<sup>8</sup>

This failure of the self to become involved in the work activity leads to the separation of bodily activity from that of the mind; "...the worker thinks and dreams about matters unrelated to his work while his body carries out

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<sup>6</sup>Thomas Green, Work, Leisure and the American Schools, p. 41.

<sup>7</sup>Seligman, op. cit., p. 340.

<sup>8</sup>Robert Blauner, Alienation and Freedom, p. 87.

certain mechanical activities."<sup>9</sup> It is the psychological dissociation between intelligence and action. This situation will inevitably lead to a weakening of the human personality, for it is "...impossible to fragment man's personality without weakening it."<sup>10</sup>

Thomas Luckmann<sup>11</sup> referred to this situation as "performance control". In the past a person's job contributed to his identity. Today, the institutions of work only control performance without serving as a source of identity.

Another dimension of self-estrangement on the job is the relation between it and function; "...disengagement of self is often encouraged to better perform the function for which he was hired."<sup>11</sup> This distinction between "self" and "function" is one that is frequently made by critics of modern work. It is often based on the assumption of a "genuine" or "real" self that lies within each of us, which is prevented from emerging during the performance of a function at work. It assumes a dualism between the functional being and personal being.

Apparently overlooked by these critics is the fact that the self is not a static entity, but one that is continually developing. Potentialities are continually being

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<sup>9</sup>Harvey Cox, The Secular City, p. 155.

<sup>10</sup>Eric and Mary Josephson, op. cit., p. 43.

<sup>11</sup>B. Seligman, op. cit., p. 346-7.

actualized. A function that is performed on the job is based on a particular rationality; and rationality is certainly one - among many - of the human potentials. In this respect, functional behaviour, based on any one of a number of rationalities which underlie a job, may serve as a means by which we realize this particular human characteristic.

Mumford said that rational behaviour must be given expression but at the same time warned that it must not be allowed to encroach where it didn't belong. Robert Kwant is also wary of rationality, but for a different reason. He notes that "...there are some functions which are absolutely in-human because no human individual can actualize himself in them."<sup>12</sup> This is the situation when the range of activity in a particular function is so severely restricted that the individual is not allowed the opportunity to exercise independent judgement on the basis of whatever rationality lay behind the function which is being performed. At this point, functionally rational behaviour becomes routine and mechanized - automatic. The extent to which the job holder is deprived of exercising independent thought, initiative and judgement is the extent to which the functionary becomes an automaton.

There is quite a difference between functional rationality, which permits free development of the rational compon-

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 351.

ent of human personality and automatic functioning. It is the latter to which the majority of criticism is directed, but few bother to make the distinction.

The failure to distinguish is not always the result of oversight; it is often a recognition of the fact that the majority of functional behaviour in the work realm is not an expression of rationality but of automatic behaviour. The official rationality of technological jobs is technique, which emphasizes efficiency above all else. By removing the need for individual judgement in order to avoid the possibility of error, jobs have been made more efficient. The result is efficient, automatic behaviour.

The separation of man from his fellow man is another characteristic of modern work, for the job is a poor basis for community. Ellul refers to the bonds that bind job holders together as mechanical rather than organic. Harvey Cox's remark that organization is increasingly the integrating principle of our society is particularly evident in the realm of work. "The nature of the work process today is the antithesis of genuine communality...Modern technology "desocializes" the worker, tears him from his comrades and isolates him."<sup>13</sup> The result is that "...the individual becomes a member of a collective rather than a participant in a community."<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>Jacques, Ellul, The Technological Society, p. 399.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 400.

## 2. Work In Leisure and Religion

Work, performed outside of the alienating realm of modern work may serve as a source of integrative transcendence. The human needs of community, self-identity and integrated personality are often met through the activity of work. In this section we will discuss work as a transcendent function and source of meaning in the life of the individual and of society.

Work is basically an expenditure of effort and energy. To the observer, it appears as force in action. It is directed to and seeks to overcome "...the resistance of recalcitrant materials."<sup>15</sup> The effort of work may be applied outwards, against the natural and social environment and it is in this form that work customarily appears. Whether it is the craftsman working upon the materials of his trade or the bureaucrat striving to control and direct somewhat more abstract material, work involves the conscious application of effort.

Effort that is directed inwards, towards the self, is equally as much work as outward directed energy. The results of this work are familiar to us in the form of acquired skills, a finely developed body or a well developed personal-

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<sup>15</sup> Ben-Seligman, op. cit., p. 338.



ity. The "recalcitrant materials", which are the objects of work, may be the external environment or the internal self.

Work is very important in the life of the individual for reasons other than those of meeting the demands of necessity. Seligman writes that there are certain emotional and psychological needs which can only be fulfilled through work; for in any work activity there is a sense of achievement, mastery or creativity. Through the skillful use of perceptual, intellectual and/or motor techniques something new is brought into existence.

As satisfying as the achievement might be in isolation, it serves additional functions when shared with others. As the results of an individual's work are seen by others, recognition is gained. Through work, a person is able to contribute to and exert his influence upon society. Work is the standard by which a man's worth is established. Thomas Green writes: "...work is the way in which man defines for himself who he is and what he shall do with himself."<sup>16</sup> "It is through work activities that exercise judgement, insight, craft or skill that men make clear who they are, reveal their individuality and express themselves as persons."<sup>17</sup> Freud recognized work as indispensable to the preservation and

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<sup>16</sup>Thomas Green, Work, Leisure and the American Schools, p. 38.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 39.

justification of the individual's existence in society. From the above remarks it is evident that work is a primary means by which man establishes his personal and social identity, with the growth of an integrated personality being an inevitable result.

Since work is often performed in a group, it serves as an excellent source of human community. Based on the mutual respect of each others skills and effort, with their collective contribution to society as a focal point, a sense of Gemeinschaft is often the result of communal work activity. Freud also recognized the importance of work as it served to give the individual "...a secure place in a portion of reality, in the human community."<sup>18</sup>

All of the above positive features of work are met, to various degrees, in leisure. Work is the essential feature of developmental leisure which distinguishes it from recreative leisure. The work of developmental leisure activities serves to integratively transcend the manifestations of alienation that occur in the technological work realm. Developmental leisure activities are inherently meaningful, thereby transcending the split between activity and meaning of alienated work. The self is intensely involved, trans-

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<sup>18</sup>Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, p. 17.

ending the gap between self and activity and overcoming estrangement. Community is another product of developmental leisure, as is the development of an integrated and whole personality.

There is also an element of work in the realm of religion: It functions to integratively transcend the separation of man from himself, his fellow man and God. Moral behaviour involves work. It is the effort of the individual to become closer to God, to overcome and transcend his fallen state and to integrate that which he essentially is with that which he is in actuality. Religious work often stresses the development and application of divine-like qualities such as kindness, mercy, sacrifice and love.

The development of such qualities is often considered to be directed to the attainment of salvation. Salvation is the symmetric counterpart of sin. Tillich informs us that: "...salvation is derived from salvus or salus, in Latin meaning "healed" or "whole" as opposed to disruptiveness."<sup>19</sup> Salvation is the goal of the sinful, fallen individual. The many different terms for salvation, (i.e., reconciliation, holiness (wholeness), atonement (at-one-ment)) all point in the direction of unity after separation.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup>Paul Tillich, op. cit., p. 119.

<sup>20</sup>Robert Anderson, An Introduction to Christianity, p. 113.

A moral act, quite often involves the overcoming of resistance, one that may be quite strongly felt. To do what is right is frequently at odds with material inclinations. When the resistance of selfishness, sloth, greed or hate is overcome, there is often a feeling of accomplishment or achievement at having done the right thing.

### 3. Play in Leisure and Religion

Robert Neale, in In Praise of Play, states: "...work and play are two fundamental types of behaviour and equal sources of culture."<sup>21</sup> We might add that they are also two equal and fundamental sources of human personality. We have already examined the work component in leisure and religion and we will now do the same with its complementary counterpart - play. Just as work was an essential component of developmental leisure and religious moral behaviour, play is an essential part of recreative leisure and religious ritual.

Although there are a number of theories concerning the function and meaning of play, most tend to be physiologically or psychologically based. Johan Huizinga considers these theories as only partial explanations of the entire phenomenon of play. In his classic, Homo Ludens, he writes: "...play is more than a mere physiological phenomenon or a

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<sup>21</sup> Robert Neale, In Praise of Play, p. 91.

physiological reflex. It goes beyond the confines of purely physical or purely biological activity. It is a significant function; that is to say, there is some sense to it. In play there is something 'at play' which transcends the immediate needs of life and imparts meaning to the action."<sup>22</sup>

Play is a voluntary activity. It is never a task but is done at leisure, during free time.<sup>23</sup> A quality of play that distinguishes it from work is the fact that play is not "ordinary" or "real" life. Play is "...a stepping out of real life into a temporary sphere of activity."<sup>24</sup> Play is recognized as only pretend, but this factor "...does not by any means prevent it from proceeding with the utmost seriousness, with an absorption, a devotion that passes into rapture and, temporarily at least, completely abolishes that troublesome "only" feeling."<sup>25</sup>

Fantasy and imagination are essential to the transcendent property of play. Through utilizing the powers of these two human faculties, the individual is able to remove himself from the "here and now" and become absorbed in an unreal or

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<sup>22</sup>Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens, p. 19.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 26.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 27.

illusory world. The word illusion is derived from the original Latin for play. In Latin, the terms il and ludere are combined to form illudere - to be in play. Robert Neale writes: "...an illusion is something in play and to be in illusion is to be in play."<sup>26</sup>

The illusion experienced by the player is freely entered into; whereas the illusions suffered by the mentally ill are imposed through some physical or mental defect. Even though the player may be totally absorbed in the illusion, he is not deceived into mistaking appearance for reality. What prevents this deception is that "...a subtle consciousness of free, voluntary acceptance of the illusion stamps even the deepest absorption in it with the seal ipse feci as a safeguard from error."<sup>27</sup>

The illusion of play derives its "unreality" from the fact that work is real. It is the "core" or "paramount" reality. As we noted earlier, work is ideally (as it exists in developmental leisure) that activity in which we achieve, express ourselves as individuals and declare who we are to ourselves and the society. Work allows us to realize ourselves. The reality of work is established on the basis of a particular order, according to certain rules, values and

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<sup>26</sup> Neale, op. cit., p. 52.

<sup>27</sup> Karl Groos, The Play of Man, as cited in Robert Neale, In Praise of Play, p. 55.

orientations, and it is within this order that the individual establishes an identity.

It is this work order which play temporarily negates through the establishment of a different order or the presence of no order at all - chaos. The latter, if freely entered and left at will, is pure play, pure ludic activity.

Many writers stress the potential and value for the future of imagination and fantasy. Harvey Cox points out that man can relive and anticipate, remake and create wholly new futures through utilizing his fantasy; it is the richest source of human creativity. Religion and fantasy have the common capacity of enabling "...man to transcend the empirical world and to appreciate the sublimity and mystery of existence."<sup>28</sup>

John Cohen reminds us that man is not only a worker, but also a player, a man of leisure. He refers to the fact that man "...can enter a world of imagination which is quite different from the intelligence and skill exercised in the course of work."<sup>29</sup> He suggests that the key to leisure may be in our use of imagination:

Even if industry of the future would be purged of its monotony and meaninglessness and infused with some of the spontaneity of play, there will remain

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<sup>28</sup> Harvey Cox, The Feast of Fools, p. 68.

<sup>29</sup> John Cohen, "The Scientific Revolution and Leisure", Nature CLXLVIII (June, 1963) 1030.

I suggest, abundant scope for recreation by immersion in the imaginative life, in art, drama, dance and a hundred other ways of transcending the constraints of daily life.<sup>30</sup>

The player of recreative leisure, through the use of imagination and fantasy, is free to temporarily "try out" different identities or to become involved in situations not normally encountered in real life. The player is benefited, says Neale, "...by the gain of a new order, i.e., that of a game or a new self."<sup>31</sup> This loss of the work order or identity is occasionally interpreted negatively. This occurs in any play activity where the means to immediately bring the temporary order (or lack of) to an end are beyond the control of the player. In reference to our earlier example, this control would not be present in a "bad trip" of L.S.D.

Just as the work of developmental leisure served as a source of community, so does the play of recreative leisure. "Play, any kind of play, generates its own morality and values," "...and the enforcement of the rules of play becomes the concern of every player because without their observance, the play cannot continue."<sup>32</sup> Through a joint effort, a temporary play community is established, bonds are developed between the players and the individual self is transcended

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p. 1032.

<sup>31</sup> Neale, op. cit., p. 74.

<sup>32</sup> Nelson Foote, "Sex as Play", Social Problems, I (1954), 162.



through integration into a larger entity.

The play-based community is inferior to the work-based<sup>6</sup> community since it is only temporary, founded on an unreal order and is very fragile. It takes only one player to destroy it. The "spoil-sport" refuses to acknowledge the rules and order of the play community. "By withdrawing from the game he reveals the relativity and fragility of the play world in which he has temporarily shut himself with others...He robs the play of its illusion...Therefore he must be cast out for he threatens the existence of the play community."<sup>33</sup>

Catharsis is the pleasurable experience of emotional arousal. It is present, to varying degrees, in all play activities. Elias and Dunning cite catharsis as the central element in Aristotle's theory concerning the effects of music and drama. The over excited and tense are calmed by music, while those who are despondent are aroused. Aristotle accepted the hedonic element of pleasurable enthusiasm produced by music and drama as necessary ingredients "...of the curative cathartic effect of certain leisure activities."<sup>34</sup>

The excitement produced by the arousal of different emotions in play activities is referred to by the authors as mimetic. This arousal is socially and personally without

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<sup>33</sup> Huizinga, op. cit., p. 30.

<sup>34</sup> Norbert Elias and Eric Dunning, "The Quest for Excitement in Leisure", Society and Leisure, No. 2 (1969), p. 69.

danger, for these emotions are "...blended with a kind of delight and have a different function and effect than when they arise in 'real life'."<sup>35</sup> Catharsis promotes a "...restoration of normal mental 'tonus' through a temporary and transient upsurge of pleasurable excitement."<sup>36</sup> These cathartic play activities of recreative leisure are the complementary counterparts to the disciplined, achievement oriented work of developmental leisure.

The work component of religion is the effort expended in attempting to lead a religiously moral life. The play component of religion is manifested in ritual and festivity. Huizinga claims that "...play consecrated to the Deity is the highest goal of man's endeavour."<sup>37</sup> Just as the playground and play time are carefully separated off from ordinary space and time, so is the time and place of sacred ritual set off from the profane "here and now". A separate order and community are established in ritual, just as they are in the play of recreative leisure. All of the formal and essential characteristics of play are present in ritual, "particularly in so far as it transports the participants to another world."<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid., p. 70.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p. 82.

<sup>37</sup> Huizinga, op. cit., p. 46.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., p. 26.

It was this last common characteristic of play and ritual that proved a difficult point for Huizinga. It was through fantasy and imagination that the individual was "transported" to the world of play in recreative leisure; but the illusory nature of fantasy involved an element of pretend. One could not discount ritual as "just pretend", and Huizinga concluded that it was "...impossible to fix accurately the lower limits of where holy earnest reduces itself to mere pretend or play."<sup>39</sup> Yet he still insisted that there is always a partial consciousness of things "not being real" in magic and supernatural phenomena.

A number of Huizinga's critics maintain that ritual is something quite different than the highest form of play, yet do not deny that the essential characteristics of play are present in ritual. Roger Caillois is in agreement with most of Huizinga's analysis, but suggests that a number of important differences exist between profane play and sacred play (ritual), differences that establish ritual as unique. One of these was that a play area or time is determined by man, whereas the time and place of a ritual is established through the divine. For this reason and others, Caillois suggests that a sacred-profane-play hierarchy be established

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid., p. 42.

in order to balance Huizinga's analysis.<sup>40</sup>

We also feel that ritual is much more than a play form, but for a different reason than that of Caillois. The statement that profane play "transported" the individual into an illusory, unreal world was based on the fact that work constituted the core reality, the real world, the real order. Work is the basis of reality within the profane realm. Profane play serves to temporarily remove one from profane reality.

The situation is quite different for sacred play. In ritual, not only is there a removal from the reality of profane work, but more importantly, it establishes a link with that which is absolutely real and eternal rather than that which is illusory and temporary.

The fact that God or the sacred is not commonly thought of as the absolutely real is just one more example of secularization. In earlier, less secularized stages of Christian society God was accepted as unquestionably and absolutely real. Profane existence was a temporary but necessary reality. Today, in technological society, the profane is commonly accepted as the real, with work as the core of reality.

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<sup>40</sup> Rober Caillois, Man and the Sacred, p. 160.

The fact that ritual brings one into contact with the absolutely real clearly establishes it as much more than a high form of play. However, this does not mean that ritual does not function in the same manner and have the same meaning in relation to the work of religious moral behaviour as does profane play in relation to the work of developmental leisure. Just as the work and play of leisure form complementary and interdependent halves of a dialectical relation, so does sacred work and sacred play.

The religious man, in striving to become what God desires him to become, what he essentially is, to actualize the divine-like qualities contained within, would soon falter without the regenerative, recreating and renewing properties of ritual. Similarly, those engaged in work require the re-creative activity of play.

Work and play, whether they appear within recreative and developmental leisure or religious moral behaviour and ritual, are two equal and fundamental sources of transcendence. Work does not transcend play nor does play transcend work. They operate in a dialectical manner, one giving way to the other in the process of integrative transcendence. Work is not a means to play nor play a means to work; for neither play nor work is subordinated to its equal and complementary counterpart. For the religious life, moral behaviour and ritual, together, function to integratively transcend the

-disunion between the sacred and the profane. For the secular life, developmental leisure and recreative leisure, together, function to integratively transcend the various manifestations of alienation that occur in the work realm.

There is one particular form of alienation that requires special mention. We have already seen that the loss of identity or lack of self-hood is central to the idea of alienation. Identity, both personal and social, reflects an integrated and whole personality as well as integration within a societal group. Both leisure and religion may serve as primary sources of identity. However, it is necessary to secure identity through work, either the work of developmental leisure or moral behaviour. To attempt to secure identity within the realm of play is futile, for the order of play is temporary and unreal. Play is that area in which new identities may be temporarily adopted but not permanently anchored.

Orin Klapp refers to the realm of leisure as a maze of identity seeking activities. Although he does not make rigid distinctions between the work and play components of leisure, he does distinguish between "banal forms of amusement where one gets his kicks" and "potentially realizing ones such as hobbies."<sup>41</sup> They roughly correspond to play

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<sup>41</sup>Orin Klapp, The Collective Search for Identity, p. 200.

activities and those of work. It is impossible to anchor a permanent and real identity in an activity such as amusement that is essentially temporary and unreal. The cathartic element of amusement is what provides the "kicks" of the activity. It is only those activities that Klapp identifies as "potentially realizing" that may serve as sources of identity. Hobbies may be worked at whereas amusements may be only played at; and it is only work that provides a permanent and real order.

There is a parallel situation for those seeking to establish an identity focused on religion. The Christmas and Easter churchgoer, who is not committed to working at establishing his identity through moral behaviour in his daily secular activities, is only a playing or pretend Christian. The pretend Christian, who participates in only the ritualistic playing half of his supposed religious identity, has recently been criticized by church leaders. A number of newspaper articles tell of these 'ritual only' Christians being denied Communion until they proved willing to exert a minimum effort at fulfilling some basic responsibilities as Christians.

#### 4. Escape

Alienation produces the desire to escape. For the individual devoting himself exclusively to play activities during his free time, play is a means of temporarily escaping.

the alienation of the job. For his counterpart in religion, participation exclusively in ritual serves as a temporary escape from the alienation of the secular realm. These play activities are negative responses to alienation since one is driven into the activity rather than entering into it freely.

Religious activity as escape is a particularly sensitive topic. Much depends upon the nature of the religion, the participants and the motivations of the observer. Marx referred to religion as an opiate of the masses, through which people escaped the harshness of alienated existence, particularly that of alienated labor. Marx, however, was not particularly sensitive to the truth or positive functions of religion.

Max Weber referred to the correlation between social conditions and religious orientations as "elective affinity". This affinity was particularly evident in situations of hardship; for the response was quite often the adoption of a millennial religion. From the observer's perspective, such an obvious affinity could be explained entirely as escape. Unfortunately, such a conclusion does not provide insight into the motivation of the individual.

The growing amount of sectarian religious activity in technological society is often explained in a similar comment; that it is nothing more than escape from conditions of alienation. Much background material has been collected on many



members of such sects regarding their pre-sect lives. It has been found that alienation, in various forms, was present. Conditions of estrangement, meaninglessness, powerlessness and anomie were common afflictions of devotees before they entered the sect. To categorically state, on this basis alone, that all members of religious sects in modern society are only escaping, would be unsound. To say that a great many of these sect members are escaping from a world which they found to be one of alienation is probably much closer to the truth.

The escape of the alienated job worker was to lose himself exclusively in play activity. This, at first glance, does not seem to be the situation with devotees. There is quite a large amount of effort involved in memorizing doctrine, praying, meditating and other devotional activities. Nor are they completely isolated, for they often appear as a group in the midst of secular activity, singing songs and chanting.

What must be remembered is that this work of the devotees is carried out in a predominantly ritualistic environment - one of continual play. This becomes evident when contrasted with the struggling, committed, moral individual. His environment is certainly not one of play and ritual but work. He recognizes the validity of both sacred and secular reality; both realities are very basic concerns in his life.

The dialectic between the work of moral behaviour within the secular realm and the play of ritual in religious activities is pronounced, with neither one being predominant.

For the devotee, however, the dialectic is not as existentially pronounced since the play of ritual clearly dominates their lives. They live, to a very great extent, in a ritualistic environment and their activities are predominantly playful. They do not live or experience the pronounced dialectical movement from religiously based moral behaviour in the secular realm to that of sacred ritual in the realm of religion.

Robert Neale refers to the world of work as that of conflict and to the realm of play as that of harmony. The two are equal and opposite needs. He speaks of the devotees of the cloister, devoting themselves to "so called spiritual matters", as "...equally on the run from the world of work as those taking flight in sensual pleasures."<sup>42</sup> Robert MacIver makes a similar indictment. He refers to such fanatical devotional activities as avenues of escape that are delusive but have the merit of not being recognized as such. "Some become devotees, they have undergone a kind of hypnosis, living in the nebula of their mystical dream. They meet reality no more." They make refuge in a fictitious vision,

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<sup>42</sup>Robert Neale, op. cit., p. 56.

"returning to their own earth no more."<sup>43</sup>

Escapism is not limited to the realms of the sacred and profane. It also exists in the realms of alienated work and leisure, especially through the mass media. To periodically remove oneself from the "here and now" and become lost in a novel, television program or movie is a popular form of recreative leisure - play. Through identification, projection and the use of imagination and fantasy, it is an unlimited world. To be constantly lost in novels, television shows or movies indicates that the activity is more a means of escape than the fulfillment of those social and psychological needs that are met through play.

Many extreme critics of modern society operate on the premise that all forms of work in the work realm are totally alienating. That is, they fulfill none of those social and psychological needs which can only be satisfied through work. We agree that modern work, in the form of a job, is inclined to be more alienating than fulfilling. However, we do recognize that there are degrees of alienation, dependent on the nature of the job and the needs of the individual.

For the extreme critics, the mass media, as a legitimate form of play activity is neglected, and it is considered exclusively to be a means of escape. Seligman writes:

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<sup>43</sup> Robert MacIver, "The Great Emptiness", in Eric Larabee and Rolf Meyerson, eds., Mass Leisure, p. 121.

"...under modern technology free time can be used only as an escape from the oppressiveness of the industrial system."<sup>44</sup>

Ellul, another harsh critic, states: "...the modern passion for motion pictures is completely explained by the will to escape."<sup>45</sup>

Somewhat less severe in their indictment of technological society and the work realm are Georges Friedman and Nels Anderson, but both are still quite critical of the mass media and commercial amusements. The former refers to amusement as a way of forgetting oneself, one's emptiness and boredom, through the mad search for fun. Anderson states: "...for many, unable to meet free time creatively, amusement offers an artificial paradise to which they may escape."<sup>46</sup>

The fact that fanatical religious activity and the mass media are potential avenues of escape from alienation is obvious. However, before any activity is labelled as escapist all of the variables must be taken into consideration. It must be remembered that differing value systems, responsibilities, types of jobs and different interpretations of the ultimate meaning of existence determine the amount of time and energy spent on various religious and leisure activities.

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<sup>44</sup>Ben Sleigman, op. cit., p. 354.

<sup>45</sup>Jacques Ellul, op. cit., p. 378.

<sup>46</sup>Nels Anderson, Work and Leisure, p. 84.

5. The Work of Developmental Leisure

The notion of self-actualization has recently been popularized by humanistic philosophers and psychologists, foremost among them being Abraham Maslow. Self-actualization is defined "...as the ongoing actualization of potentialities, capacities, talents; as a fuller knowledge and acceptance of the person's intrinsic nature; as an increasing trend toward unity, integration and synergy within the person."<sup>47</sup>

Within our framework the notion of self-actualization would be equally applicable in both the realms of work and play, for both the work and play of leisure are human capacities and contribute toward integration within the person. What we wish to investigate more closely is the nature of work as it functions within the process of self-actualization. We wish to deal exclusively with those aspects of self-actualization that are a result of or involve the application of work, using the term work as it has been developed within the concept of leisure. We could say that any element of work within self-actualization corresponds to the work of developmental leisure.

Of course self-actualization takes place within the religious realm as well as in the sphere of alienated work.

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<sup>47</sup> Abraham Maslow, Towards a Psychology of Being, p. 23.

However, the work of moral behaviour concentrated on the development of "divine-like" qualities such as mercy, sacrifice and love. The effort was undertaken primarily in an attempt to fulfill the wishes of God. As for the small degree of self-actualization that does occur in the alienated work realm, it is incidental to the processes of work, whereas it is inherent in developmental leisure.

The motivation to engage in those aspects of self-actualization involving work is partially due to the intrinsically rewarding nature of such activities. Maslow offers another source of motivation in the form of a congenital drive in man toward the self-fulfillment of his potentialities. This desire or yearning is the need for man to become what he can. It is the tendency for man to become in actuality what he is in potential. Maslow argues that the higher the need, the more specifically human it is, with self-actualization ranking as one of the most distinctively human needs.

Certainly this drive towards self-fulfillment, if such a thing exists, and the intrinsic reward of self-actualizing activities, would help to alleviate the work and effort involved, but it would not completely eliminate it. Self-development involves much work in the form of self-discipline. This work, directed towards the self, is quite rewarding.

Nels Anderson writes that self-development is the most satisfying function that leisure serves.

Man is constantly striving to actualize and develop his capacities. As Peter Berger points out, man, unlike the other mammals, is "unfinished" at birth. Not only must he produce a world in which to live, but he must also produce himself. Man is always becoming, not only incidentally (as in the work realm) or obediently (as in morally religious behaviour) but also as a result of consciously directed work. Hugo List, in his thesis on leisure, writes of "...people who were making full use of their talents, capacities, potentialities, who were fulfilling themselves, or, to use Allport's term, were directing themselves toward becoming."<sup>48</sup> The notion of a conscious effort toward becoming is central to the idea of developmental leisure.

The work of self-actualization is not exclusively devoted to the attainment or application of skills and the development of potentialities in isolation. Self-actualization is only complete through interaction with others, a fact that is often overlooked by those who direct the effort of developmental leisure and self-actualization exclusively to themselves. Voluntary service to others in the community

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<sup>48</sup>Hugo List, "Toward A Definition of Culture". (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1966), p. 34.

or to mankind in general is a prime example of self-actualization through interaction with others.

Even the primary communal form of the family has to be worked at. Thomas Luckmann writes: "...a family is also a potential form of stable self-transcendence around which a microcosm may be built."<sup>49</sup> Self-transcendence through integration into a larger group as well as movement towards unity and integration within the person are two aspects of self-actualization that must be kept in balance. The work of developmental leisure must be conducted both in isolation and in company. With today's emphasis on "doing your own thing", independent of any group involvement, there is always the danger of "...man's withdrawal into the 'private sphere' while Rome burns."<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>49</sup>Thomas Luckmann, The Invisible Religion, p. 123.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., p. 117.



## VI

## CONCLUSION

The purpose of the preceding five chapters was to present those features of transcendence that leisure shares with religion. We have seen that the capacity of leisure to transcend the limitations of the modern work realm is similar, in many respects, to the manner in which the boundaries of the secular realm are transcended through religion.

Of all the features of leisure, the most significant was its capacity to serve as a transcendent source of meaning. Leisure activities, like those of religion, are done for their own sake and contrast sharply with the means-ends utilitarian activities of the work realm. Leisure and religious activities are done "for the sake of", whereas those of the work realm are done "in order to". Arendt uses these two phrases to distinguish between meaningfulness and utility.

As we have seen, in the past, religion, as a transcendent source of meaning, has served to legitimate a variety of secular activities. However, within technological society, religion has lost a lot of its legitimating power due to secularization. At the same time, leisure appears to be emerging as a primary source of meaning, independent of the ideologies of work and religion.

One factor that is hindering the emergence of leisure as a transcendent source of meaning is that at present "... we lack the intellectual capital to think about leisure as a conception that is meaningful in its own right."<sup>1</sup> A leisure ethic must be developed, for at present there is no firm ideological basis upon which to formulate judgements about leisure.

The ideologies of work and religion can no longer support leisure. In separating itself from the ideology of production and consumption (the ideological basis of the work realm) leisure must stress the celebration of human dignity, a concept that is not present in the efficient production of goods. Rather than promoting physical fitness as a means to increase work productivity it must be viewed as it was by Aristotle: "...for the Greeks physical exercise was an ethic for developing freely and harmoniously the form and strength of the human body."<sup>2</sup> In divorcing itself from the realm of religion, leisure must serve to glorify man rather than God. For it is only, as Tillich said, "...by being in possession of creative powers analogous to those previously attributed to God that man might fulfill his destiny."<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Thomas Green, Work, Leisure and the American Schools, p. 59.

<sup>2</sup> Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, p. 382.

<sup>3</sup> Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture, p. 44.

For those that are concerned about the separation of leisure from any religious affiliation it should be noted that certain segments of leisure have already been separated; and Arendt reminds us that "...art has survived gloriously its severance from religion, magic and myth."<sup>4</sup>

As leisure evolves into a transcendent and independent meaning system, it is claiming for itself some features that religion has apparently defaulted on. Ellul remarked earlier that religious movements have long since failed to express true revolutionary forces, having been defused and integrated into the technological society. It is possible that this will now become a predominant feature of leisure, as McCormack thinks it should. She pointed out that the essential feature of leisure was its revolutionary and dissentful voice.

As the God of Christianity becomes less of an active force in technological society and loses its "hold" on the expanding realm of leisure, we must be sure that leisure does not forfeit its newly won independence to another god, one that dwells in the sphere of work. As Anderson warns us: "...if the mind is not prepared to fill leisure time with new challenges and new endeavors, new initiatives and new activities, the mind falls asleep and becomes an automaton. The God Automaton devours its own children."<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 147.

<sup>5</sup>Nels Anderson, Work and Leisure, p. 76.

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