

AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE

by

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INTRODUCTION

Among the many ways of confronting the perennial questions of aesthetics is the avenue which concerns itself with aesthetic experience. In some sense this approach represents a re-directing of emphasis from the object of aesthetic appreciation to the subject who appreciates. It may be said that this style of aesthetics is in direct contrast to the types which seek to find some common property or properties which are shared by a class of objects, enabling us to call them aesthetic. Rather, an experiential aesthetics claims that the real questions of aesthetics can best be answered only if we attend to the basic lived circumstance in which beauty is met. It assumes that aesthetic qualities are possible only on the basis of a fundamental type of experience which conditions them.

Basically a kind of recalling or re-situating guides the approach of aesthetic experience. It assumes that all of our talk of beauty and works of art issues from basic experiences of aesthetic qualities. This perhaps naive and obvious fact is given grave importance by an experiential aesthetics. For it considers this basic experiential situation in which aesthetic qualities are encountered to be of a fundamental and specific kind. And this kind of aesthetics looks to the human subject for the basic conditions which ground the possibilities of aesthetic activity.

What is important here is that an experiential aesthetics considers aesthetic experience itself to be a fundamental human capacity. As such, it looks to the subject as the determining ground of this unique capability. And it further assumes that, as this kind of experience is a fundamental and specific kind, it must have its own peculiar structure.

Then, the program of the approach of aesthetic experience will be to isolate and portray this kind of experience in its specificity. Considering aesthetic experience to be a unique human capacity which conditions all singular experience of aesthetic qualities, this approach will attempt to characterize this kind of experience. To this end, it must single out those mechanisms which work to make aesthetic experience a unique kind of experience. Its final aim is to establish the aesthetic as a substantial domain of human activity, exhibiting its own peculiar nature.

An aesthetics which has this as its aim may place its emphasis in a few choice directions. It may, as has often been the case with aesthetics at large, consider the artist in his creative activity. Or it may focus on the role of the performer whose task is to present a work of art. Again, an experiential aesthetics may concern itself with the interested spectator who witnesses a work of art. And it is this latter point of view which is taken in this paper. We want to consider the basic possibility of the simple appreciation of aesthetic qualities. We want to see what is necessarily involved in, and what

conditions the very possibility of our aesthetic appreciation of works of art.

Although we are concerned with aesthetic experience as a basic subjective capacity, we must not lose sight of the object of such experience. By recognizing a fundamental interdependence of subject and object, we see that the essential problem of the approach of aesthetic experience rests with the characterization of the object of such experience. In a word, if aesthetic experience is to be experience of a unique kind, it must have its own peculiar kind of object. Further, if the aesthetic experience is one which is fundamentally concerned with an object we want to know if the object of such experience is the same as the real one given to ordinary experience. Since this paper is further demarcated by being solely conceived with aesthetic experience of works of art, this problem will be an essential one.

In the end, an experiential aesthetics will claim as its own the object of such experience. It will attempt to maintain that an aesthetic object is one which is constituted or established only on the basis of this peculiar kind of experience. Or, what is the same thing, an aesthetic object is the result or intentional object of the peculiar attitude or state of mind which characterizes aesthetic experience.

And here an essential point arises. An experiential aestheti which is concerned solely with a spectator's experience of works of art will maintain a difference between the physically given

art object and the proper object of the aesthetic experience. The aesthetic object which is the intentional correlate of the aesthetic experience will be something other than the physically given object which ordinarily persists outside of an aesthetic attitude. With this it will be maintained that the spectator is the point of intersection or confluence between the physically given work and the aesthetic object. In some sense, then, the real or physically given object will serve as the basis for the constitution of another object given a spectator in the aesthetic attitude.

It is, then, along these general lines that this paper proceeds. Its end, if nothing else, is to portray the general intentions motivating an experiential aesthetics, noting the problems and possible solutions it involves. Throughout a faith in the specificity and fundamentality of aesthetic experience persists.

To this end, Chapter One phenomenologically attempts to discern the nature of an aesthetic experience. After presenting a hopefully accurate account of an experience of a Cezanne painting, this chapter attempts to discern its philosophical importance. It is maintained that an aesthetic experience essentially is one which is concerned with qualities of a particular sort. These qualities manifest themselves to an appropriate spectator and he proceeds to deal with them.

Generally, these qualities are given in an unspecified manner and the aesthetic experience is concerned with determining them. In the end, it is held that an aesthetic experience

is commonly one in which indeterminate qualities, given on a work's basis, are formed into completed gestalts by a competent observer. The nature of the formation of these gestalts is variable according to the work in question as well as the capabilities of the spectator.

This process nature of aesthetic experience is commented upon and the different stages of the experience are characterized. Similarly, initial contrasts between this experience and ordinary experience are prepared by the consideration of the initial quality which initiates aesthetic experience.

Chapter Two is concerned solely with the portrayal of the particular attitude or state of mind which typifies aesthetic experience. The entire chapter rests on a confrontation with the hostile tendency, espoused by George Dickie, that no special aesthetic attitude exists. In the end, it is maintained that a psychological modification along the lines of Edward Bullough's notion of "psychic distance" serves to characterize the aesthetic attitude. Here a special attitude persists which transforms ordinary attention into a capacity for the actualizing of aesthetic qualities.

It is maintained that aesthetic qualities reveal themselves to a special distanced attention which is concerned solely with these qualities. With obvious debt to Kant, it is held that this attention, as no longer concerned with function and existence, is specially suited for apprehension of aesthetic qualities.

Chapter Three supplements its predecessor by elaborating on the peculiar way in which aesthetic qualities are apprehended. Here we consider the subject of aesthetic emotion in the treatment of the peculiarly emotional way in which aesthetic qualities are received. This entire chapter centers around the treatment of catharsis in Aristotle's Poetics. Because of a firm belief in this work's aesthetic importance, a relatively great deal of time is spent in the exposition of this topic.

It is maintained that catharsis itself refers to the peculiar change of ordinary receptivity one undergoes in aesthetic concerns. With aesthetic activity one is concerned with a divorced or imaginative realm which is apprehended in a peculiarly emotional way. It is held that the emotion is one which is felt for an aesthetic object and this feelingful way is the mode of its apprehension.

In Chapter Four the question of aesthetic adequacy is met. There the appropriateness of an experience to the work in question is considered. An ordinary solution to the problem is offered, and, in its deficiencies, a new approach is made. It is found that a work of art is a peculiarly constructed schematic object which will accommodate a number of adequate aesthetic objects.

We contend here, as before, that the aesthetic object is the end of an aesthetic experience. This object, it is found, is the completion or realization of the work which is itself a necessarily incomplete creation. The spectator is asked to fulfill the work according to the suggestions offered by it.

adequacy, based on this understanding of the nature of a work of art, is offered.

The Conclusion confronts the question of the value of aesthetic experience for human life. A few partial answers are offered, all based on the notion of the peculiar feeling of perfection and satisfaction such experience generally imparts.

To all this we add an appendix which briefly recounts the seminal influence of Immanuel Kant and Sigmund Freud for this style of aesthetics. Though necessarily partial, this brief appendage hopes to situate this aesthetic approach against two historical figures who substantially prepared it.

In the end, this paper must tolerate its partiality and simplicity. The subject of aesthetics is a demanding one and its appeal comes in great part from its elusiveness. If this paper has at least indicated possible inroads to its problems, it will have served a purpose.

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Chapter One: THE NATURE OF AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE

It seems feasible when examining the nature of aesthetic experience to begin our project with a description of one such possible experience. Once we have presented such an experience we afford ourselves a wealth of evidence to consult towards the resolution of our dilemma. With a representative of such experience we may be in a fortuitous position to determine the possible nature of aesthetic experience at large.

To this end, we begin our examination of aesthetic experience with a sketchy, albeit naive, investigation of a work by the reknown French impressionist Paul Cezanne. The work in question is his "Italian Girl," completed approximately in 1896.

We proceed somewhat reluctantly, cognizant of the possible errors involved with using an instance of the plastic arts, moreover a patently representative one, as a suitable example for research into aesthetic experience. But as practicality was our most pressing motive, we have opted for this course. With a painting we were offered an ease of presentation not possible with any other art form. We wanted to present an aesthetic experience which was fairly unprepared, capable of being casually enacted. Similarly, the basic physical requirements were best satisfied with the choice of a painting. Perhaps a short poem would have sufficed but this seemed to lead into problems of its own kind.

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of the art form chosen, an undue amount of caution was exercised in the description of the aesthetic experience of Cezanne's "Italian Girl." In the end, all fairness demands a consideration of some other art forms if any discoveries into the nature of aesthetic experience are to be legitimate. This we intend to do.

We allow then for an encounter with this object entitled the "Italian Girl." This occurs either in the New York Museum of Art, where the original is presently housed, or perhaps less conspicuously, as a reproduction on the wall of a friend's apartment.

For one reason or another, we approach the object. We notice its size, balance on the wall, relations to other objects in the room. We then look more closely at what the object itself seems to be. We recognize it to be a representation of a woman, ostensibly in a room, doing what we are not certain of.

Then, almost as if by accident, we are aroused or affected by the painting. The girl's expression, most notably her eyes, impresses us most mysteriously. We do not know exactly why but her curious gaze is enigmatic and demands an accountability. We are inexplicably drawn to the painting.

For the moment we are bound in a fascinated way to the girl's expression. Time, as it were, seems to stop and the whole of our energies are directed to this gaze in an indefinite and admiring fashion. A subtle astonishment pervades our discovery of her expression and we remain transfixed for a brief while.

In time, we regain our composure. Still moved by the

inexplicable quality of the girl's expression, we begin to exert a greater amount of control over our condition. We are still very much under the influence of the pleasant shock which our discovery of the girl's expression provided us. But now we seem better able to differentiate the source of our peculiar emotional state. We become aware that it is the girl's expression which has aroused and charmed us in this most unusual way.

At the same time we notice a further attraction to the painting. We are tempted and drawn towards resolving the character of the girl's expression. Her gaze is fascinating but enigmatic. And we recognize in the earliest satisfaction the painting offered us, the hint of the meaning of the girl's expression. We feel that her gaze, though presently an enigma, has definite character. And it is to the end of determining her visage that we are moved. The motive of this resolve seems to be a guarantee of a greater pleasure of the kind originally experienced. If the earliest impressions of this gaze were so exciting, the completed or specific character of her expression could certainly promise a greater amount of this pleasure.

Thus resolved, we direct our energies to the determination of the girl's expression. To this end, we have working for us the original, if only indefinite, impressions the painting offered us. So we return to her expression in an attempt to characterize it. And initially, perhaps, we do this focusing solely on her gaze, ignoring the other aspects of the painting.

And we find, in this attempt to characterize her expression, little success. Her gaze considered in isolation defies any specific determination. When we see it as melancholy, day dreaming, pensive or what not, some essential mystery about her expression remains. We feel that something deeper, or at least more elusive, has evaded our ready classification. And we come to find that her gaze demands a consideration in the face of the painting's other aspects. It seems that only when the painting as a whole is considered can we find the means necessary to specify the girl's expression.

We then search the rest of the painting for clues which may help us determine the character of the girl's expression. Throughout we have this indeterminate yet promising sense of the meaning of the girl's expression, and this motivates and legislates our findings.

We come to see that the girl is a simple woman, casually dressed, who appears to be located inside a room and seems to be resting her weight against an article of furniture. This all seems substantial yet trivial as it does not supplement the quality we felt upon first noticing her expression. More aspects fall into place. There is a clear dynamism in the painting between the girl's head and her right arm. The arm is slender and gently creases what appears to be a fold of fabric of the back of a lounge chair.

Looking at her elbow, we notice a strong diagonal connection with the bulk of her back. We become aware of a dissymmetry and an unusual tension. The girl's body seems strangely disproportionate and we become aware of a great deal of force exerted on her right arm. Also, her left hand seems to barely touch the arm of the chair, the impetus of the movement flowing backwards. Simple tensions and irregularities like these seem to abound.

Continuing our scrutiny of the canvas we notice a curious distortion of perspective as we focus on the area behind the girl's head. The baseboards and the seam in the wall fail to mesh or at least correspond with the depth of the room as suggested by the chair. Moreover, the chair itself presents a puzzle. It seems oddly balanced as we read what must be the point of confluence between its back and arm. Besides all this the chair seems curiously mobile as the depth of what appears to be its cushion rises exactly where we would expect a shadow. In time we come to doubt whether the form she appears to be resting against is actually a chair for it seems oddly unsettled and generally unhospitable to her claims of support.

To this we add a curious leftward movement in the entire scene. What once seemed full and balanced now seems stressed peculiarly to the left. Besides this we notice the peculiar type of coloring and lack of outline. The colors themselves are of unusual hues, tending towards lower value and high saturation. They seem strange and muted. They blend and more peculiarly, rise, oddly releasing the various contours and shapes. It seems as though

the forms of the work are struggling against a subtle yet relentless immersion into a mass of color. Again perspective is challenged or at least cramped by the lack of distinct outline.

Throughout, our motive has been to characterize the girl's expression. And we found, as we searched the painting for clues to this end, a wealth of other indeterminacies. At this point we seem to have complicated the issue as we are presented with a host of problematic aspects. But we notice a strange feeling of optimism, of having uncovered something significant as we consider what we have unearthed. It seems that all these singularly indeterminate aspects of the painting contain a promise of resolution if we only attend to them properly. And so we gradually sift through the evidence we have found, allowing each finding to play against the others, the entire project flowing under the influence of the initial impression given us by the girl's expression.

And suddenly, things begin to gell. We begin to see the scene as exuding a quiet dignity and naturalness. It seems completely devoid of contrivance and artificiality. The minute tensions, muted color, and lack of outline seem to present an ordinary setting as it actually is, free from the rigid structure and affected colors of much representative painting. Cezanne has captured the warmth and unspecifiability of an ordinary moment, giving it an unfathomable magic. The scene looks mysterious and logically elusive; it refuses to properly fall into place, allowing rather a subtle impenetrability to seep through.

The girl's expression now looks poised and unaffected yet still unspecified though now this lack of specificity is congenial, akin to the expression of a Sphinx. She looks totally uncontrived, full of natural power and warmth. She seems to quietly acknowledge the subtle mystery around her, at once being a significant part of it.

Throughout, the strangeness of the colors, the lack of outline, the conflicting lines all seem to surmount the possible hazards of their unspecific placement. The scene does not fall into chaos and disorder but exudes a quiet control. Everything is proper yet not scientifically so. A different control is master here and it seems to be the mastery present in life itself.

With this finding the painting achieves a greater significance, the fulfillment of that initially promised. We look again watching the various parts as they complement each other, resolving the scene into a total meaning. And we feel a very special kind of gratification as the scene gently fulfills itself. The painting seems to speak in a quiet communication and we feel we have responded to its original invitation. The painting leaves us in this silent, rewarding contemplation. In time, we leave the canvas, content that we have dealt with it properly.

With the hopes that we have presented an accurate instance of an aesthetic experience of a work of art, we have before us a substantial project. We must interrogate this experience in an attempt to determine its essential structure. That is, we must carefully analyze the evidence offered us in the hopes of finding

that which is characteristic of an aesthetic experience. With this investigation we hope to be in a position to solidify our conviction that there is indeed a sui generis aesthetic experience by indicating its nature.

We might begin this philosophical appropriation of what was given us in common experience by establishing the actual beginning of the aesthetic experience. Was it when we entered the museum or apartment or even when we approached the object hung on the wall? Or perhaps when we recognized the object as a painting? Or was it rather when we casually examined the canvas only to be suddenly captivated by the peculiarity of the girl's expression?

It seems that this latter discovery, our unexpected and peculiarly emotional involvement with the girl's expression, properly initiated the aesthetic experience. That this is so can be at first substantiated by the fact that the other activities alone do not guarantee such an experience. One can, no doubt, enter a museum or look at a canvas with, say, an historical motive, concerned merely with discovering something about a particular period of history by examining the style of dress as represented in the art works of the time. So it appears that mere contact with a work is not properly the point of origin of an aesthetic experience. No doubt it is often a physical necessity but it seems that something else, something which uniquely characterizes this

contact, must be found as the beginning of this experience. And in our peculiar involvement with the girl's expression, this point of origin seems to be found. And it remains for us to specify the significance of this beginning.

With the discovery of the girl's expression we were placed in a peculiar state of emotional arousal. For the moment, we were totally captivated by the unmistakable presence of this unusual quality. To say that we perceived this quality is a little misleading, suggesting perhaps a casual scrutiny. Rather, we were grasped and held firm by this quality. We might say that we experienced it.

The particular character of our involvement with this quality seemed to come from two sources, more or less loosely differentiated. On the one hand, we were excited and aroused by the quality itself, by the hints of peculiarity and significance it seemed to contain. Though only partially grasped, the quality of expression seemed charged with immense charm and singularity. Secondly, there was a distinct element of surprise associated with this discovery. Seemingly, as if by apparition, we were presented with a highly unusual quality which moments before was not even vaguely suggested. We can say, "in this excitement there is also included a moment of an usually pleasant astonishment on account of the appearance of the preliminary exciting quality, or rather of astonishment that it is 'such a one,' though we have not yet even had time to attain a distinct, intended and conscious grasp of this quality."¹

We call this quality of the girl's expression an initial quality and the emotion felt in its presence a preliminary one because the experience itself seems founded on this occurrence and proceeds from it. The excitement felt with this vague and intriguing quality seems to motivate the experience and the determination of this quality initially given seems to be the end of the experience. But these facts have yet to be established.

At this point what is assured is the efficacy of this initial quality. Once we apprehended it in this peculiarly emotional way we seemed to fall prey to its captivating powers. After our initial enrapture with this quality we began to notice a firm desire to more fully experience it. The quality as originally experienced was charming and overwhelming and a great deal of its force came from the fact that it was indeterminate. It was suggestive and incomplete. We began to direct our energies towards a more complete apprehension of this quality, resolving, as it were, to follow up on its latent promise. The quality was only temporarily nebulous, it seemed, and offered more of the delight and excitement we originally experienced in its presence if we could further delimit it. We then resolved to appropriately determine and specify this quality in order to ". . . consolidate the possession of it."² To this end, we remained vigilant in front of the painting rather than moving to other parts of the museum or apartment. Similarly, the painting itself was our concern and not some other affair. We were no longer concerned with the payment of bills or the upcoming meal, or if we were, the aesthetic ex-

perience was significantly interrupted.

What is important, and essentially so, is the effect of our initial discovery of this quality. If this is the point of origin of the aesthetic experience, this event must substantially characterize the nature of this experience. What then has transpired with our discovery of this initial quality?

Perhaps the most significant aspect of our initial involvement with the quality of the girl's expression was the peculiar isolation and insularity it seemed to possess. We were solely concerned with this quality, it seemed to fill our consciousness; and all other concerns ceased to matter.

As such, this development is not particularly significant. Certainly our overwhelming concern with this quality to the ignorance of all affairs is not sufficient to grant this experience a peculiar nature. For there are many times when we are pre-eminently concerned with something to the virtual neglect of everything else. One intensely working a complicated mathematical problem or repairing an intricate piece of machinery often experiences an acute insularity from surrounding affairs.

If, then, our involvement with this quality is to have any dramatic significance it must be shown that the disregard of other affairs must be much more substantial than an intense pre-occupation. This clearing of the field of consciousness must be indicated as a symptom of a much more far-reaching alteration of mental activity. It must be shown that our dealings with this quality are of a radically particular nature and that the commensurate bracketing of

other concerns has a greater significance than mere concentrated attention on one thing to the ignorance of all other affairs.

If our dealings with this quality are to be of a radically different kind we might contrast them with what we know of ordinary ways of being concerned with objects. To make the juxtaposition reasonably appropriate we might consider what is involved when we are ordinarily presented with a perceptual indeterminacy.

Consider the case of a professional photographer who has as his assignment the capturing of a particular animal in its natural setting. Well armed with equipment, he stalks the woods in search of this animal. In time, he notices a disturbance in some nearby foliage. All attention is focused on this occurrence. He watches intently in hopes of determining whether there was an actual movement and, if so, whether it was more than the breeze. Soon he sights a shape. It seems furry and lightly brown. He follows the suggested outline of the shape, eventually finding the legs and head of a slender animal. With this and other evidence he is able to eventually specify the shape as that of a deer, the animal he wishes to photograph. Convinced of his find, he adjusts the lens and shoots. What, then, has transpired? Once given a perception as yet unspecified, the photographer went through a series of actions for the purpose of determining it. Given the problematic shape, he first established it as something more than a chimera and then proceeded to characterize it according to what it was the shape of. He approached the shape



with a pre-conceived network of possibilities and rapidly applied them to the shape in hopes of determining it. As more evidence came in, the shape became better specified as being the shape of a particular existing object. Throughout the shape itself was subjugated to identification as belonging to some physical object as its property. As furry and brown, it could not be the shape of a human, nor of a flowering bush. Similarly it was delimited until it was identified as the shape of a particular physical object.

What is important here is that the shape itself was important only in so far as it was the shape of something. This something, this object which possessed the shape as a property, was the true locus of our activity. The multiplicity of our conscious intendings was directed towards securing the nature of the existence of an entity. It was this, the constitution of a real thing, which served as the determining factor as to how our perceptions were to be appropriated. In effect, we wanted to know what this shape was.

To this end, to the determination of what the shape was a shape of, we used a pre-given format. We had a program of possible combinations of evidence against which the shape could be determined according to its existence. In the words of Edmund Husserl, "for consciousness the individual thing is not alone; the perception of a thing is a perception of it within a perceptual field. And just as the individual thing in perception has meaning only through an open horizon of 'possible perceptions,' in so far

as what is perceived points to a systematic multiplicity of all possible perceptual intendings belonging to it harmoniously, so the thing has yet another horizon; besides the internal horizon, it has an external horizon precisely as a thing within a field of things; and this points finally to the whole world as a perceptual world.³"

That is, we already "knew" how to constitute the thing. We went along determining its particular character based on the horizon or background against which it appeared. And this horizon was precisely the world as a universe of possible perceptions. We proceeded to complete and determine the object based on the implicit possibilities as to what it might be.

So it is that we have this network of the world as a universe of possible perceptions working for us when we ordinarily attempt to specify an object. It is functioning implicitly in the background and it is on its basis alone that we are able to determine an object in its existence. As Roman Ingarden noted, "both in sense, or inward, perception which is involved in our practical behavior (settling of daily life affairs, realizing the new state of things) and in the perception which we carry out for purely investigative purposes, we look for what is. In both cases real objects and facts are the matter of our perception. . . Therefore our cognitive activities (purely investigative ones or those undertaken for practical purposes) culminate in a conviction of the existence of a fact or of an object in the real or in the ideal world. Normally all those cognitive and practical activities are

accomplished against the background of a general conviction of the existence of the real world in which we too exist, a conviction which is steadily entertained in our natural attitude. (author's italics)"⁴

In effect, we generally specify what an object is against the background of a working conviction of what it can be. This fundamental conviction of existence supports our normal constitution of real objects. With it we specify what a thing is. Even in the heat and isolation of intense practical concern this fundamental existence belief persists. It is the existence of a thing which we are trying to establish when we normally specify an indeterminacy.

What we want to know is whether our dealings with the peculiar aesthetic qualities, in this case, the girl's expression in Cezanne's painting, proceed along different lines. Has the narrowing of the field of consciousness we experienced when we were "filled" with the preliminary quality amounted to anything significant? Or was the affair similar to the determination of a real thing as enacted by the photographer in the forest?

In order to answer these questions it is necessary to consider what further transpired in our experience of Cezanne's "Italian Girl." We want to consider the way we further determined the initial quality of the girl's expression. In this way we recognize a second logical phase of the experience of the painting. If the experience began with our emotional arousal by the indeterminate quality, it proceeded with our attempts to further specify and possess this quality. These various attempts at determining the

quality compose a second stage of the experience. This phase was much more active and investigative than the first one which saw us in a mere emotional arousal in the fact of the just-revealed quality.

What then followed our initial arousal by the indeterminate quality? Perhaps the most significant aspect of our dealings with this quality was the pre-eminence given the quality itself. After our pleasant discovery of the girl's nebulous expression the quality seemed to be the locus of all of our energies. More importantly it seemed to separate itself from its placement on a simple canvas and announce itself as an autonomous entity. The quality seemed to "stand out," emphatically calling our attention to this fact. From this point on we were totally concerned with the quality as it so stood. We were not prompted to find a real entity which possessed this quality as a property, but rather endeavored to determine the nature or essence of the quality as it displayed itself. It might be said that we were concerned with the unravelling of the contents of this quality.

What is important here is the way we proceeded to determine the quality. It is with this information that we are able to solve the problem offered by the insularity of the aesthetic experience. We are now in a position to determine whether the disappearance of other concerns actually signified a radical change in our ways of dealing with objects. With this we can say whether the isolation from other concerns was actually a bracketing or abstention from ordinary ways of constituting objects.

To put the issue in another light, we want to know whether
". . . when starting from a real object, we remain within its
limits while an aesthetic experience is going on in ourselves." ⁵
That is, given that all ordinary experience culminates in real
or ideal objects as grounded in the conviction of existence
we mentioned earlier, we wish to know if the case is different
in an aesthetic experience. To borrow the phenomenological
notion of intentionality implicit in the formulation that "all
experiences are conscious experiences. . ." ⁶ and "consciousness
is just consciousness of . . ." ⁷ we wish to know what the object
or intentional correlate of an aesthetic experience is. If the
aesthetic experience is to be sui generis, it must have its own
peculiar intentional correlate. Without a specific kind of
intentional object we could not allow the aesthetic experience
any kind of essential uniqueness. Only in this way could we
give the narrowing of the field of consciousness we spoke of any
radical significance.

Then it was the quality of expression that completely dominated
the experience. We wanted to determine the specificity of the
quality itself and not the real object which possessed it as a
property. If we recall, we attempted at the beginning to
imaginatively qualify the quality. Failing that we searched the
rest of the painting for clues as to its completion. Throughout
our motive was to solidify our experience of the quality by most
fully determining it. The quality assumed an existence of its
own, quite apart from its simple placement on a canvas and we

attempted to characterize it in its individuality.

What is important here is that with our concern with the quality came a change in our normal way of dwelling with things. With the advent of the peculiar quality and in our attempts to complete it we had abandoned our ordinary existence thesis. No longer did we try to specify the quality as belonging to a real object. Rather we were concerned with determining the quality as it appeared in itself. As such, the aesthetic experience had as its object not a real object but rather a quality as freely floating in search of completion. The end of the experience rested with the completion of the particular quality as it presented itself. In time we will consider the manner of this completion.

What is important now is that we recognize the overwhelming importance of the initial quality. With its appearance and the emotional way we received it came a radical change of attitude. No longer were we concerned with existing facts and objects as we normally are. Rather we were orientated towards qualities of aesthetic nature. The quality itself became the locus of our attention and we were totally concerned with specifying it. Throughout the normal motive of determining a thing in its existence was relinquished or, in Husserlian terms, neutralized. We simply were not concerned in this way. Rather we were given a quality, freely floating as it were, and were concerned with specifying it completely as it revealed itself. That we were not intent on determining it as a property of a real object will become more manifest as we portray the manner in which this quality was

specified. For the moment we were principally concerned with displaying the importance of the initial quality as it commenced the aesthetic experience. With it our natural attitude towards existing things was replaced by one which was concerned principally with qualities and their specification.

What needs elucidation is the way in which the quality was completed. With this we are focusing on the second stage of the aesthetic experience, the more active and investigative one which followed logically upon our initial and generally passive arousal by the original quality.

The manner of our dealings with this quality seem fairly obvious. We attempted, at first imaginatively, to assemble a unity of qualities which would complement and specify our original one. That is, using our original quality as a basis we attempted to find a number of further qualitative aspects in the work which would enter into fruitful combination with it. When we searched the work for evidence to further determine the girl's expression we found a number of indefinite aspects. The colors, the peculiar lines, the lack of outline were all found in this attempt. We tried to assemble all of this evidence together in a meaningful way to give a sense to the entire painting. And this culminated in a very peculiar achievement.

The end of this was the assembling of an organization of qualities which complemented and completed each other. This congregation or ensemble of qualities was active and vital. That is, the individual qualities mattered to each other as they entered

into complementary relations and the entire whole gleaned a significance from this activity. In this way, the ensemble of found qualities attained a completion by the interaction and mutual modification of the individual indeterminate qualities. Through this harmony of qualities a greater or super-quality emerged as the particular character of the whole. And this greater or harmony quality was the proper end of the aesthetic experience. Its constitution was the final aim towards which the entire experience moved.

When we considered the painting as Cezannes' portrayal of the casual mystery of an ordinary situation this is exactly what occurred. This meaning was generated by the appropriate placement of a number of relevant qualities. Once properly assembled, they began to modify and complete each other by portraying an over-riding higher quality. This harmony quality pervaded the whole in which we could distinguish the various parts. In fact, the last part of the experience when we contemplated and watched the painting in operation was comprised of our scrutiny of the whole scene. We revelled in the completed aesthetic object watching the various aspects moving with each other, actively portraying the greater quality.

We see that our attention to the original indeterminate quality resulted in an assembling of a number of appropriate qualities in proper placement. These several qualities through a mutual interaction result in the creation of a higher or gestalt quality. This harmony quality pervades the entire congregation as its

sense. We are able to identify the specific, formerly indefinite, qualities as they move towards this harmony quality. And it becomes apparent that the original quality served as the foundation around which a new object was constituted. As it separated itself from its placement in a real thing, it similarly allowed us freedom from our ordinary tendency to specify a thing in its existence. Once released as a free quality we were able to constitute a new object, the aesthetic object, as its completion. And it was with this constituted gestalt quality that the aesthetic experience found its proper end. With the assembling of a congregation of relevant, interacting qualities the original indeterminacy was given a sense and resolved.

Before finishing we might comment a little more on this constitution of the gestalt quality. In the service of this aim, we needed a new substrate which contained these qualities. In order for the various qualities to appropriately matter to one another, they had to be placed vis-a-vis one another. To this end we secured an adequate subject which served as a substrate for these properties. This action was a further removal from our ordinary ways of dealing with objects as the qualities no longer "belonged" to the canvas on the wall. Rather, we saw them as pertaining to a particular scene. The qualities were those of a situation in which a girl was leaning against an article of furniture in a dim room. Once we had chosen this new substrate, what Ingarden⁸ calls the assembling of qualities into categorical structures, the qualities were better able to complement each other. That is,

as loosely placed with one another, we were then able to embellish the relations the qualities had to one another. We were then able to determine what kind of girl was in the room and in what kind of way. Ingarden further calls this embellishment of categorially formed qualities their formation into qualitative harmony structures. 9 And it is with this latter formation that the aesthetic object is eventually formed.

With the completion of this harmony quality, the second stage of the aesthetic experience is over. Though not without an attendant emotionality this phase was more investigative and active. Once, however, the aesthetic object was constituted, we entered into the final and generally most rewarding phase of the aesthetic experience. Here we "delivered ourselves over" to the majesty and particularity of the constituted aesthetic object. In a peculiarly emotionally, quasi-intuitive commerce we gazed upon the given aesthetic object, watching its internal movement. It is this phase of the experience which people generally consider to be the peculiarly aesthetic experience in which we undergo an unusually pleasant communion with aesthetic qualities. But such moments are not instantaneous and fleeting as they are prepared by the preceding phases which make them possible. No doubt much of the denegation of the aesthetic experience as superficial emotionality rests on the ignorance of these earlier phases.

So it is on the basis of the investigation that we claim the aesthetic experience to be of a peculiar kind. We claim it to be a unique kind of experience which is solely concerned with

certain qualities. It is an experience which is self-motivating and self-justified. It seems like the experience of such qualities points to an essential human capacity which is possessed of its own dynamics. The mechanisms of this experience will be more fully explained in the following chapter on the aesthetic attitude, but we already have a substantial clue to their workings in our discovery of the abandonment of the existence thesis in aesthetic experience. When one is concerned with aesthetic qualities, it seems that the demand to characterize them as properties of real objects is dropped. In this way, we are able to fully qualify them by forming working assemblages of relevant qualities.

That every aesthetic experience follows this rigid process pattern is no doubt a felicitous statement. Certainly this is a major kind of aesthetic experience, perhaps the most frequent kind, but one would not say that it is the strict rule which all such experience necessarily follows. One must, it seems, consider the works of art experienced as well as the spectators themselves. An accomplished spectator, one who has prior experience of a certain work, may conceivably by-pass much of the constructive phase and enter into an immediate commerce with an aesthetic object given on that work's basis.

This process model does seem to work very well for experience of works which are logically elaborated in time. Works of literature and musical compositions are prime examples of this. For here, we are presented with continuing developments and are asked to assemble and complete initial indeterminacies.

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But it is often the case that an aesthetic experience is concerned with a simple immediate quality in no need of completion. Much partial experience of certain works, for example, when we look merely at the smoothness of a shape or listen simply to the tone of an instrument, is of this kind. Similarly, many modern compositions of abstract painting and sculpture prompt such immediate experience. And we have to recognize such experience as substantial.

Also there are times, most generally with regards to the plastic arts, when we perceive an harmony quality immediately and continue our experience in a kind of unravelling of the qualities which compose it. Certain of Picasso's nude lithographs impress us in this way.

Regardless, the process kind of aesthetic experience stands out essentially when one attempts to consider the nature of aesthetic experience. For with it, we come to see that aesthetic experience is concerned with qualities and has them as its proper object. The qualities may be immediately given or may require an active constitution on the subject's part but they serve as the proper concern of such experience.

This process kind of aesthetic experience also helps us solve many aesthetic dilemmas. Because a subject must be aroused to such experience by a quality given on the work's basis, we can understand certain muteness of works of art. Some works remain silent for decades until someone is capable of recognizing an aesthetic quality in the work and brings it to fruition. Some

works are simply not engaging for certain periods of time because initial qualitative indeterminacies are not offered and no aesthetic experience is aroused. Similarly some works appear trite and pretentious because the indeterminacies offered are over-used and common.

Perhaps more importantly, the consideration of aesthetic experience as a process of constituting harmonies of quality allows us to understand the possibility of a number of interpretations belonging to a single work of art. For it seems, one may bind certain qualities together while another selects a different set. Different combinations offer different gestalts and one work may support a variety of aesthetic objects. The stress placed on certain qualities and the actual order of discovery and arrangement may similarly afford different and at times hostile aesthetic objects. In Chapter Four we consider these possibilities in a more elaborate manner as the topic of the adequacy of an aesthetic experience is confronted.

The psychology of the process of aesthetic experience itself offers great possibilities for research. For it seems as though the gestalts formed differ greatly among and within the various arts. For example, the gestalt formed on the basis of a Haydn quartet must differ greatly from that given by a jazz improvisation by John Coltrane. Similarly aesthetic objects given by impressionist poetry must differ greatly in structure from those offered by the works of Pope or Donne. And this is without considering the differences involved with experiences of the different art forms.

Also the possibilities of expanding or comparing aesthetic objects on the basis of multiple experiences of a work or of works in a similar genre offers room for investigation and seems to further support the process notion of aesthetic experience. Very often, works which quote from predecessors utilize this capacity and offer the possibility of a richer experience. Many aesthetes pride themselves on multiplying gestalts and a sense of an author's style seems to rest on this possibility.

In the end one may make a few simple observations on the nature of a process-like aesthetic experience. Though composed of distinct logical phases, these phases may often blend with one another. Similarly, we cannot assume that an experience unravels orderly, each development proceeding smoothly on the heels of its predecessor. Rather, it seems that an aesthetic experience often proceeds in sharp serial combinations. We often notice that such experience involves something like a series of images representing differing aspects of the work following closely upon one another. A comparison based on a series of differently perspected photographs sharply following one another would not be out of place. These images would gradually expand through a process of elimination and appropriation.

The possibilities for psychological research into the varieties of aesthetic experience are staggering. One can sense a wealth of discovery coming along from the comparisons between cultures and the way they form gestalts.

Chapter Two: THE AESTHETIC ATTITUDE

When we speak of an aesthetic experience or, more appropriately, the aesthetic experiencing of a work of art, we seem to be recognizing a few important distinctions. On the one hand, we seem to acknowledge the existence of a certain object, the work. On the other we seem to note the possibility of a number of ways of being concerned with or experiencing the work, giving pre-eminence to a certain way, the aesthetic, as that which secures the work as an object of the peculiar aesthetic satisfaction.

In this sense, we are shifting emphasis, so to speak, from reliance on a particular object, the work of art, as the bearer of particular aesthetic qualities, to a certain subjective pre-condition, the state of mind or attitude the subject must possess if he is to concern himself with the work in an aesthetic way. Implicit is the assumption that the peculiar aesthetic qualities (e.g., beauty, gracefulness, etc.) are not readily available to the ordinary observer, that he must perform some action, some particularly aesthetic operation, which discovers or actualizes these qualities. In this way, the aesthetic experience is inexorably allied with a certain attitude, the aesthetic attitude, which allows the perceiver find in the work the characteristic aesthetic qualities.

So, if the notion "aesthetic experience" is to have any value as referring to the particular way we have of dealing with works of art, it must be shown that this experience is different, involves something else, from ordinary ways of experiencing. Otherwise we are simply left with experience at large and can speak of different experiences only with regard to that which they are experiences of. Aesthetic experience would then, properly speaking, refer only to experiences of certain objects (i.e., works of art and certain natural objects) and the term itself would be misleading. That is, the adjective "aesthetic" would introduce false and misleading notions, most notably those implying a particular attitude or state of mind characteristic of these experiences.

It would seem then that the concept aesthetic experience is significant only if one could establish that there is indeed something characteristic of this experience which would distinguish it from all other sorts of experience. This characteristic or defining notion of aesthetic experience obviously involves the presence of a certain attitude or state of mind which must be present if such a sort of experience can be said to properly exist. It must be shown that a certain characteristic attitude pervades aesthetic experience and distinguishes it from all other sorts of experience.

We are then left with the project of characterizing the



particular attitude which pervades aesthetic experience and distinguishes it from all other sorts of experience. In this sense, we are unusually fortunate since a number of such characterizations are available. Following Kant's seminal notion of "disinterest" came several contemporary attempts to distinguish and specify the peculiar attitude prevalent in aesthetic concerns. Vincent Thomas' notion of "concern with appearances,"¹ Eliseo Vivas' intransitive attention,² and Jerome Stolnitz's disinterested attention³ are each significant attempts to characterize the attitude operative in aesthetic experience.

But it is the work of Edward Bullough and his notion of "psychical distance" which best seems to arrive at that peculiarity of attitude which we call aesthetic. In the belief that each author was, in his own way, attempting to characterize this attitude, we have selected Bullough's notion as representative and will allow this "attitude-position" to stand or fall on his evidence.

In his "'Psychical Distance' as a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle,"⁴ Bullough presents his position that to experience something aesthetically is to experience it from a peculiarly separated or distanced perspective. Briefly, he maintains that we perform a sort of mental operation whereby the object of our concern is allowed to stand "in itself" in a privileged position apart from our ordinary tendencies to use

or react to it practically. This change of attitude is characterized by the "insertion of distance"⁵ which allows us to regard the phenomenon as it is in itself, ". . . allowing it to stand outside the context of our personal needs and ends" In effect, "distance . . . is obtained by separating the object and its appeal from one's own self, by putting it out of gear with practical needs and ends. Thereby the 'contemplation' of the object becomes alone possible."⁷

The aesthetic attitude is then characterized by this peculiar modification or transformation of our practical attention to things. Aesthetically, we distance or separate the object from our normal, practical interests. Our involvement is different since the object is distant and is, as such, unavailable for the easy immersion in our practical affairs. As distant, the object stands before us available not for practical use but rather for aesthetic contemplation.

Bullough goes on to further specify his notion of distance by mentioning the general tendencies of the dissolution of distance, namely under- and over-distancing. When one is regarding a particularly threatening work, say a Salvador Dali composition, and is agitated and visibly upset by the nightmarish presentation, Bullough would say that an under-distancing had occurred. Here one had not properly separated the work from his "self and its affections"⁸ and had rather responded to his own practical fears. Similarly, one who looks at the same composition with



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an eye to economics (e.g., the monetary value of the work on an open market according to its age and authenticity) would have been said to have over-distanced the work since his concern was patently pragmatic and the work held no attraction for him.

In this way, Bullough arrives at his famous principle of the antimony of distance which is that ". . . the utmost decrease of distance without its disappearance" ⁹ is most desirable for aesthetic appreciation. This is to say that a work must have some attraction or personal appeal for us but that this appeal must be peculiarly filtered or held in abeyance so that aesthetic contemplation may ensue. If we are not prepared for it or the work has no fascination for us, we are suffering, so to speak, from over-distancing. On the other hand, if we fall subject to this appeal and immerse ourselves in a highly personal contact with the work, we have failed to establish a distance and are under-distancing. In both cases of under- and over-distance no aesthetic experience has occurred.

Bullough, then, wants to say that all aesthetic experience has this necessary characteristic of the modification of ordinary attention by distance. Because of this distancing attitude we are able to separate the object from its general immersion in ordinary affairs and we can then contemplate it aesthetically. This peculiar disenfranchisement pervades the experience and allows us the possibility of a remarkable quasi-anonymous

experience. By ridding the object and our reactions to it of the general practical tendency of use and appeal, we are able to see it as it stands in itself as a unique individual. Further, distance is meant to refer to a radically different type of attentional involvement with an object. The disenfranchisement which is its characteristic is a bracketing of normal attention so that a different type may ensue.

We will then allow Bullough's characterization of the aesthetic attitude to stand as representative of all such approaches. Although other such attitude theorists use different terms and, to some extent, techniques, they all seem compliant towards the same goal. And this end is the characterization of a peculiar attitude or state of mind which is operative in an aesthetic experience and which allows us to speak of this experience as one which is unique.

This modification of ordinary experience by our peculiar ability to distance phenomena will then serve as characteristic of the attitude which pervades aesthetic experience and gives it its pre-eminence. With such an attitude so characterized stands the claim that some thing like aesthetic experience exists.

As might be expected, that such an ability as distancing is operative in our encounters with works of art is by no means an undisputed fact. By the same token, that there is a peculiar attitude which pervades our dealings with such works is similarly doubted.

Of all those who deny the existence of a particular aesthetic attitude perhaps the most trenchant opposition comes from George Dickie in his "The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude."¹⁰ Briefly, Dickie doubts whether "to distance" denotes any peculiar action and whether "being distanced" denotes any unusual state of mind. For him, the entire distance language is merely an elaborated and confused way of speaking of the very common fact of paying attention.

For Dickie, to say that someone has succeeded in distancing a work of art is to say simply that he is properly attending to it. In the same sense, to speak of an under- or over-distancing is to merely say that someone has failed to pay attention to the work. For example, to say of an agitated spectator who leaves the gallery upon encountering a Dali canvas that he has under-distanced the work is a dubious and misleading way of saying that he was rather attending to his own psychological fears and not the work at all. Similarly, to say of one who regards the same canvas with a view to its economic features that he has over-distanced the work merely means that he was attending to certain business possibilities and not properly the work itself. In both extremes we have encountered not the special failings of distance but rather the quite common occurrence of inattention to a work. By the same token, to appropriately distance must merely mean that we are paying attention to it and not something else like a mood or a possible investment. In this sense, "to introduce the technical terms 'distance,' 'under-distance,' and 'over-

distance' does nothing but send us chasing after phantom acts
and states of consciousness."¹¹

Dickie, after having voided the distance vocabulary, proclaims that there is simply attention and its motives or intentions and that nothing like a peculiar aesthetic attitude exists. For him, talk of an aesthetic experience of a work of art means simply that we have attended to the work and not something else. The term "aesthetic" then becomes vacuous and misleading since it implies that this experience is qualitatively different from all other sorts. But, properly we have experience of works of art and nothing more. No peculiar mental operation or attitude is here involved since the notion of distance has failed to indicate the presence of any fact other than the quite trivial occurrence of paying attention.

For Dickie, the notion of the aesthetic attitude, and the correlative concepts aesthetic experience and aesthetic object, were useful fictions in so far as they freed aesthetic theory from its preoccupation with "beauty" and its determinations. Aesthetic appreciation has since been broadened and, because of this, these puzzling notions were helpful. But they have since outlived their utility because they press upon us to assume actions and states of mind which simply do not exist.

After Dickie, we are faced with the likelihood of abandoning our distance vocabulary and, with it, the phenomena it suggested.

Without a characteristic attitude we can no longer properly speak of aesthetic experience as if it were an experience quite unique and apart from our ordinary sorts. To then speak of the aesthetic experiencing of a work of art would simply mean that we were experiencing or attending to the work and not something else. The term "aesthetic" would then become a dangerous superfluity, along the lines of a hinderance, as its use would suggest a peculiar sort of experience, quite opposed to all other ways of attending to a work. To these other ways of experiencing a work, Dickie would say that some were outright cases of inattention while others (e.g., an historical concern) were instances of attending to some aspects of the work to the ¹²ignorance of others. In this latter situation all that differs is motive or intention and there is no reason to suppose that the attention is any different from that of one who was properly concerned with certain aesthetic aspects in a work. In effect, a work of art certainly comprises more than its relevant aesthetic aspects and one may attend to these other characteristics (e.g., historical, practical) as well as the aesthetic ones without supposing a change of attention for this latter inspection.

Again, after Dickie, we are left with experience at large and the simple fact of attention. If distance as the characterizing feature of the aesthetic attitude has been properly dismissed as mere attention to a work, then no such attitude exists and with its abregation comes the similar abandonment of aesthetic experience and its object.

But has Dickie actually destroyed the notion of distance and with it the attitude characteristic of aesthetic experience? Or has he, as Virgil Aldrich believes,¹³ performed us a service by indicating the unsuitability of the theory as it now stands? At any rate, the notion of distance must be looked at again since the proponents of the theory obviously mean more by it than the simple fact of attending to a work of art. Whether or not the theory does more than this, whether it surmounts Dickie's criticism, remains here to be seen.

At first it might seem odd that Dickie has made a dismissal of the aesthetic attitude as characterized by distance such an easy task. For Bullough does indeed say that "the working of distance is, accordingly, not simple, but highly complex."¹⁴ And in Dickie's treatment of this theory, distance comes off as anything but complex. But perhaps Bullough has been mistaken and he has simply inflated a quite ordinary phenomenon (that of paying attention) into a spurious psychological capacity.

But Bullough does say that the distancing phenomenon is at least two-sided: "it has a negative inhibitory aspect - the cutting-out of the practical sides of things and of our practical attitude to them - and a positive side - the elaboration of the experience on the new basis created by the inhibitory action of distance."¹⁵

Dickie's treatment of distance is thoroughly confined to its prior task of the clearing away of practical concerns so that an aesthetic experience may continue. In such a way he has dismissed

distance in its inhibitory status while not mentioning the elaboration of the experience so prepared. But perhaps Dickie believes that once the negative aspect of distance is displayed as a myth, its capacity of affording a novel type of experience is similarly negated. There is then properly no mechanism which would radically distinguish this experience from all other sorts. So we are left with the task of determining whether this inhibitory aspect of distance, this so-called capacity to clear away practical involvements, amounts to anything more than the trivial fact of paying attention to the work and not something else.

Does, in fact, Bullough's notion of distance in its negative aspect refer to a peculiar sort of attentiveness which is properly characteristic of an aesthetic interest? Or is attention rather a constant which is directed by particular motives and intentions, as Dickie would have us believe? If the latter case proves true, we are left with experience at large and to speak of an aesthetic experience is merely to speak of a certain motive we have when we approach a work of art in an aesthetic sense. In this case there is nothing which would make an aesthetic experience anything consequential since there is properly no distinctive change of attention which would allow us to speak of a characteristic aesthetic attitude. We would therefore be left simply with experience and its motives and aesthetic experience would itself be a phantom.

Perhaps some of the confusion rests with Bullough's examples. When he speaks of under- and over-distancing as the peculiar failings of distance he does so, supposedly, to characterize exactly what he means by distancing. But, as Dickie has shown, these particular examples do nothing more than show us that certain types of inattentiveness have occurred. And, in this light, distance itself must mean nothing more than attentiveness to a work. What we must do is attempt to display a situation in which attention is being paid to a work in seemingly two different ways, so that the one may be shown to be the peculiar aesthetic attention while the other is the practical attention which Bullough contends is transformed in an aesthetic encounter. Only in this way can we possibly demonstrate that difference in motive does indicate a difference of attention (when one motive is aesthetic), as Dickie denies.

Consider the case of two people attending to the same work of art: one an art historian, the other Dickie's "ordinary spectator." The motives are clearly different. One tests the pigments, analyzes the brush strokes, surveys the signature in hopes of determining the legitimacy of the canvas. The other looks at certain qualities of the work: the exuberance of the colors, the boldness of the forms, the depth of the landscape. They both have seemingly attended to the canvas but have they done so in the same ways? The one speaks of the unquestionable veracity of the fact that the work is one of Camielle Pissarro's.

The other, perhaps unaware of the authorship, speaks of the delight and excitement the work has afforded him.

With this difference in motive, the one eminently practical and the other "aesthetic," has there in fact been a commensurate difference in the sort of attention? Both people were concerned with the same work and for once we are rid of the spectre of inattention. But as the one motive is practical and the other is aesthetic can we say that the attention involved is different between the two, the latter being a transformation of the former as Bullough would have us believe? Or is it rather as Dickie says, that the two are responding to different "sets" of characteristics and that no special type of attention is necessary for us to respond to the aesthetic characteristics?¹⁶

There seems to be a number of ways of attempting to resolve this controversy. Ultimately we may have to re-ask our question whether both the historian and the spectator had in fact viewed the same thing. And with this question comes a likely clue to the resolution of this dilemma. But first we might try to locate this distancing phenomenon of Bullough's.

Consider again our two subjects. What happens when they both seem to attend to the same aspect of the work though apparently differently? This might happen when the historian proclaims that the green in the work is oil based of the kind of Pissarro's time and is appropriately aged, and when the spectator exclaims that the color is fresh and vital and bubbling with spring. Is this a case

of noticing different aspects in a work or rather of ordinary aspects seen differently? Might not Frank Sibley's comment that ". . . it seems not so much what we attend to as how we attend to it that makes attention aesthetic" ¹⁷ make sense here?

Both people were regarding the colors of the work but they seemed to do so quite differently. We might say the latter case involved a significant change of attention which allowed the spectator to see the colors qualitatively. We might say that the spectator had dropped his practical "guard," so to speak, and had released the work from its bondage in ordinary affairs. As so distanced, the work could stand in itself as purveyor of its peculiar aesthetic qualities. We could then say that aesthetic qualities are not to be found in the work ordinarily but need to be discovered or actualized by a particular attitude which distances and so transforms practical attention, allowing common aspects to be seen aesthetically. With distance, a radical new relation with the object is made possible.

But Dickie might not agree that we had indeed given a sense to distancing apart from the normal fact of attending. He might say that with our attention motivated historically we were experiencing certain aspects of the colors and with an aesthetic intention different aspects were attended to. In no way then would attention itself be different as the two people were merely attending to different aspects of the colors.

And here we have the crucial point of difference between Dickie and the attitude theorists. Dickie maintains that relevant aesthetic characteristics can be found in the work by a simple attention directed their way. Bullough and those after him contend that such aesthetic aspects cannot be simply found by an ordinary attention but must rather be energized or actualized by a peculiar transformation of attitude which "gets at" these qualities once the work is seen as an aesthetic object. Since Bullough et. al., have introduced these highly disputed operations and objects it is properly their task to display them. In this attempt the problem should be resolved in one of the two directions.

Consider again our example. After hearing the excitement and enthusiasm of the spectator's response, suppose the historian decides to attend to these aesthetic aspects of the colors. Suppose also that he cannot. All he can report to the spectator is that he sees a canvas with a jumble of colors placed on it, looking like a country scene. The green is predominantly in the lower half of the canvas while the upper part consists of a number of variously saturated yellows.

The spectator recognizing a problem decides to help the historian along. He perhaps says, "Forget this is a painting, forget where you are and look, simply, look at the colors." Or maybe, "Do you see the landscape?, Isn't it fresh?, Wouldn't you like to be there?" Suppose also that the historian now sees

the exhilarating colors though this need not happen. All that is really important is the instruction by the spectator.

In this example we have eliminated, so to speak, the problems caused by attending to the work with different motives. Both parties had aesthetic intentions although the historian was having a difficult time finding the aesthetic aspects of the work. With the suggestions coming from the spectator we have an opportunity to determine whether or not Bullough's distancing is a mythology.

It seems as though the spectator was asking the historian to do something more than merely pay attention to the work. It similarly appears that, when he suggested to the historian that he overlook his location and the fact that the colors were "of" a painting, he was doing more than just focusing the historian's attention on certain aspects of the work.

When the spectator asked the historian to forget that the colors belonged to a painting and to see them as aspects of a landscape, he seemed to be suggesting that an operation be performed, one much different than simply locating ordinary attention. He seemed to ask the historian to locate the colors and separate them from their actual occurrence in a material thing, the painting. In this way, the colors could, so to speak, stand in themselves, in their purely qualitative capacity.

The colors, aesthetically speaking, did not even belong to the painting as materially existing in the historian's office. Once looked at in themselves, they belonged to the landscape or rather the work seen as a landscape. The colors were allowed to separate

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themselves from appearing in a two-dimensional canvas and were further seen in themselves as aspects of a landscape, the work seen as an aesthetic object. '

For Dickie, to have an aesthetic attitude means only that we are attending to the proper aesthetic characteristics of a work. That is, first, that one is not being distracted from the work and, secondly, that one is attending to those characteristics which are properly aesthetic. But, as we have seen, something more than focusing our attention on aesthetic characteristics is here involved.

For it seems, aesthetic aspects do not display themselves to an ordinary attention. One must regard the work differently. One must, for example, forget that the colors belong to the painting as a fact existing in the ordinary world. They must be freed or separated from their contact with a material object so that they can be seen in themselves as they qualitatively are. Aesthetically the colors belong to an exuberent landscape whereas practically they are properties of a material painting capable of being moved and chemically analyzed as ordinary things are.

And with this we see the radical transformation Bullough was speaking about. The spectator, and hopefully the historian, was no longer attending to an object hanging on a wall but rather to the painting seen as a landscape. To see the painting aesthetically one had to forget or distance the fact that one was concerned with a simple canvas. One was rather attending to the canvas seen as

a landscape. Aesthetically, the colors were no longer properties of a painting as an object in a room but were rather aspects of the painting seen differently, as a landscape. The objects of attention were radically different. With our original historian, the colors were the properties of a real existing thing, the painting. For the spectator, the colors belonged to the painting seen as an aesthetic object, the landscape.

As we can speak of two different objects, we can speak of two different experiences. On the one hand, we had the painting as the object of a practical attention. On the other hand, we had the painting seen differently, as an aesthetic object, the result of an aesthetic or distanced attention. In this latter sense, our normal attention was transformed, no longer were we dealing with an ordinary object. The painting was rather seen as a vehicle which presented us with certain aspects which belonged to it, not as a material object but, as an aesthetic one. The object of the spectator's attention was not a practical object in the world but rather something given on its basis. For him, the painting was no longer an object on a wall but was rather a certain landscape which, practically speaking, could not rest on a wall. The colors as exuberent and exciting did not belong to our ordinary painting but rather to the painting seen as a landscape, as an aesthetic object.



And this is the radical transformation of attention which we call aesthetic and Bullough characterizes by the operation of distance. With distance, one not only directs his attention but

properly transforms it. Here we have not the simple action of locating aesthetic aspects in a work from among its other aspects, because, as we have seen, the aesthetic aspects do not even belong to the object seen practically. The aesthetic aspects belong to the work seen differently, belong to the work seen as an aesthetic object. The work seen aesthetically becomes another object.

The aesthetic attitude characterized by the notion of distance can now be seen to be this peculiar psychological capacity we have which allows us to distance or separate certain objects from our practical attention. This distanced attention allows us to discover or actualize certain aesthetic aspects of things which were covered over or buried in practical attention. To one in a distancing attitude certain aspects of a work are freed from their immersion in objects attended to practically and are allowed to stand in themselves, able to display their qualitative sides.

Once displayed, certain aesthetic qualities of a work may be apprehended in themselves as qualitative essences. Or, in the case of a prolonged aesthetic experience when we are presented with a number of qualities by the same work, we may hope to unify or harmonize them. In this latter case, the qualities seem not to be indifferent to one another and, for the experience to be complete and satisfying, we may try to unify them under the influence of a higher harmony quality which fulfills them individually and gives them their sense. Whether our experience

ends with our immersion in a singular quality or in the constitution of a higher quality which unifies a number of them, something central happens. In neither case, are we merely ordinarily attending to aesthetic aspects of a work. Rather we had to distance or stop our ordinary mode of attention and allow certain qualitative aspects of the work to stand out in themselves for our further involvement with them.

In order for Dickie's simple experience of a work of art to occur, one must, it seems, attend to it differently, in the style of Hume's inattentiveness. One must forget that he has before him an ordinary object capable of being dealt with in ordinary ways. Indeed one must be able to forget that he has before him a material object at all. In this way certain aesthetic qualities are allowed to stand separated, so to speak, apart from being properties of a material object, able to be seen and appreciated in themselves. As so standing aloof and unbound, one may be able to appreciate the qualities as they stand in themselves as either being complete or in need of further characterization. But in no way are the aesthetic qualities to be seen to as properties of a material thing, as belonging to the material work of art. Either a quality itself becomes the object of an aesthetic appreciation or it becomes harmonized and united with other qualities and the object of our experience is the harmony quality constituted on the basis of the several indeterminate ones. Regardless, the object of the experience is not the material object

but is rather the aesthetic object which is usually built on the basis of the material object.

What is here important is that the work of art must be apprehended differently. We must fail to regard it ordinarily so that its certain aesthetic qualities may reveal themselves to an aesthetic attention. To a distanced regard, certain aesthetic qualities present themselves, free themselves from bondage in ordinary things, and become the proper objects of the experience.

So Dickie's proposal that a distancing attitude is merely attention to certain aesthetic aspects of a work seems patently misleading. For such aspects are not available to an ordinary attention and are further not even properties of the same thing certain practical characteristics are. Aesthetic characteristics belong to the work seen as an aesthetic object. The work itself can then be seen as the material basis for such qualities but the aesthetic experience itself is no longer concerned with the work as such but merely with the qualities which it affords us. And this peculiar phenomenon of distance allows us this capacity to find the aesthetic aspects in a work and to concern ourselves with them.

With this we are able to understand Bullough's notion of the positive aspect of distance, since the original, inhibitory function of distance allows us to discover the aesthetic aspects and to subsequently concern ourselves with them. Similarly, Roman

Ingarden's position that an aesthetic experience does not proceed from within the limits of a material object,¹⁸ seems legitimized. For once the aesthetic aspects of a work are discovered, we properly work with them as the objects of our experience.

So it seems that our commerce with works of art is much more complex than Dickie would have us believe. In order for such experience to ensue, we must, it seems, be able to separate or distance certain aesthetic characteristics from their material bondage in the work. And with these qualities so separated our experience proceeds. They no longer belong to a work as given materially on a wall or in an auditorium, but rather exist in themselves as qualities freely floating to be wholly appreciated or further characterized.

With Dickie, we must agree that the notions under- and over-distancing are more hindrances than helps. With Casebier, we may concur that distance is more an achievement predicate, either operative or not.¹⁹ Often the achievement of this attitude is assisted by certain preparatory activities. The various social and physical settings of works of art are often designed to assist such an attitude. But, in the end, it seems that it is the presence of certain aesthetic qualities alone which substantiate the presence of an aesthetic attitude. Though under- and over-distance may be spurious notions, the workings of distance itself is not. One cannot, like Dickie, dispute its presence in aesthetic experience. For it seems that one must do something extraordinary to a work of art so that its aesthetic properties may be freed for

aesthetic appreciation. One must distance certain ordinary tendencies of attention so that certain aesthetic qualities may be seen to exist, freely floating in themselves against the background of the given material work of art. And these qualities so freed, either entire in themselves or in need of further characterization under the influence of a higher constituted harmony quality, are then the proper objects of our aesthetic experience.

Further, Dickie seems to disregard a very fundamental aspect of our encounters with works of art when he attempts to deny the uniqueness of such experience. By saying that aesthetic aspects are discerned by the same attention which we use practically, Dickie fails to recognize the peculiar emotional aspect which characterizes our dealings with aesthetic qualities. It seems that aesthetic qualities are apprehended differently, in a way which is peculiarly emotional, and any serious consideration of an aesthetic attitude, either supportive or disparaging, ought to take this into account. Again it seems that Dickie's sole treatment of Bullough's principle of distance in its inhibitory aspect has been displayed as a weakness. Because of such a limited concern, Dickie was not able to confront the crucial question of the way the aesthetic attitude receives its objects. And we must similarly confront this aspect if our treatment of aesthetic experience is to be complete.

Chapter Three: AESTHETIC EMOTION

In the previous chapter we attempted to characterize aesthetic experience by means of the peculiar attitude or state of mind which pervades it. And in some sense, our presentation was modeled in response to its sharpest critic. As George Dickie said that aesthetic attention was a myth, there being only specific motives of ordinary attention, we proceeded to argue against him. We contended that there was, in fact, a distinctive aesthetic attitude which, by removing the work from practical interference, was able to discover or actualize the particular aesthetic qualities. We spoke often of this attitude as the one which "gets at" the aesthetic qualities.

Dickie's denial stressed attention; he spoke of it as a constant, a sort of directed recognition of aspects. In our response, in our brief defense of the aesthetic attitude, we perhaps borrowed too much of Dickie's approach, met him more on his own terms than we ought have. For our characterization of the aesthetic attitude seemed to have very much in common with the normal mode of attention (Dickie's constant) which we contended was transformed. It might have seemed that the aesthetic attitude merely apprehends aesthetic qualities in the same way that normal attention might notice such things as historical fact or economic value. That is, it might have seemed that the aesthetic

attitude attends its objects in the same cool, aloof manner with which an investigative attitude proceeds.

As the previous chapter had it, we might have assumed that an aesthetic attitude merely recognizes its qualities and moves from there. And this seems very strange since aesthetic involvement has always been considered a principally emotional affair and our talk of the attitude proper to such experience has, to this point, entirely neglected this aspect. This fact alone should shed further doubt on Dickie's position as it was his talk of attention as a constant which led us on this way.

What we must do now is consider the mode of apprehension of this peculiar attitude, the way it receives its objects. In this way we will be able to determine whether or not an aesthetic attitude, properly speaking, can exist outside of an aesthetic experience.

Here an example may help. We may consider the quite common phenomenon of the art critic. Perhaps he daily reviews movies for the evening newspaper. To this end, every afternoon he finds himself in at least one cinema ready to watch the recent offerings. Because of deadlines and the possibility of fatigue he watches each film only once. And we must admit that his attitude seems aesthetic, or at least something very much like it. He does focus attention on the aesthetic aspects of the works: the character development, the pace of the plot, the significance of the lighting, and the like. But his attention is an aloof curiously

intellectual one. He isolates the aesthetic aspects but more interrogates than experiences them. His unusual amount of control and composure in the face of a work strikes us as strange even though it is, no doubt, a necessity of his occupation. Though his attitude seems to be principally an aesthetic one, one is reluctant to say that the harried critic has had an aesthetic experience. This is, of course, not to say that all critics base their observations on this truncated type of experience but that something like this must happen to many critics.

Consider again a circumstance in which a friend invites us over to his apartment to hear a new recording which has seemingly overwhelmed him. He plays it and we sit curiously untouched. Confused, he replays it saying, "Now listen this time. Aren't the horns angelic? The piano plays with an urgency of the last sun." And we remain unmoved. We might protest his admonitions, telling him that we had isolated the aesthetic aspects of the music and could see how the music could have those characteristics he spoke of. But, and this we emphasize, the music does not appeal to us, we properly do not experience or feel the pleasure he does in its presence. Are we to say that we, in this instance, did not possess an aesthetic attitude? Or perhaps rather that this attitude was not consummated or fulfilled?

The answers to these questions are not immediately obvious, nor, properly, need they be. At this point something more has to be said about this peculiar aesthetic attitude, for, as it

stands, in each of the above examples something like this attitude exists apart from an aesthetic experience. In the first case, one properly wanted no such experience; in the latter, one tried in vain for one.

What we must add or expand on is the character of this attitude during an actual aesthetic experience. For whether or not such an attitude exists outside of such experience, we are concerned with its presence in such experience. It seems as though we have neglected to say something about the way aesthetic qualities are apprehended by such an attitude in aesthetic experience. That is, one does not merely recognize or locate aesthetic aspects of a work, but, in a sense, feels or experiences them. And this fact is what was momentarily lacking in our previous presentation of the attitude prevalent in such experience. As we had it, as our attack was peculiarly directed to Dickie, we left open the possibility that the aesthetic attitude merely locates or finds its qualities. And it seems rather that the proper aesthetic attitude, one which is operative in an aesthetic experience, does more than merely locating its qualities. It peculiarly apprehends them in something like a feelingful way. An aesthetic attitude has its own peculiar way of receiving aesthetic aspects. And this must be considered here. The momentary omission on our part of this important characteristic of this attitude allows us the opportunity to consider a much more instrumental and significant ingredient of aesthetic experience. And here we confront the issue of the place of



emotion or feeling in aesthetic experience.

This feelingful or emotional aspect of aesthetic experience, heretofore neglected, must now be considered. For in order for an aesthetic experience to occur, it seems that the work itself must not be indifferent to us, nor we to it. The work must appeal to us, it must have a significance for us in this peculiarly emotional way. And it is this emotional involvement with works of art which, in the end, must distinguish an aesthetic experience from a purely intellectual attention to a work which results from an unfulfilled aesthetic attitude, or a cognitive scrutiny of such aspects. In an aesthetic experience, one does not simply find aesthetic qualities but must in some sense become involved with them. This involvement with aesthetic qualities, this peculiar emotional reception of them must now serve as the subject of our inquiry.

No doubt the place of emotion in art is substantially located in philosophical discourse. The subject is as old and as contemporary as the philosophic treatment of art itself. Plato spoke of it often and somewhat chastizingly in his Republic. Socrates found himself chiding a number of people who became too involved in a tragedy in the Ion. More recently, the work of Leo Tolstoy, Clive Bell and Susan Langer has, in diverse and compelling ways, approached the issue.

But perhaps one of the most substantial and insightful treatises on the place of emotion in art is Aristotle's Poetics. In the Poetics, Aristotle confronts the problem of "Tragic Beauty" which

must rest at the core of any significant presentation of the workings of emotion in aesthetic experience. He is intrigued by the fact that one can experience in a tragedy the destructive emotions of pity and fear in an unusually pleasurable way. As the resolution to this problem, the Poetics affords us many insights into the nature of our emotional involvement with art.

In the course of a fairly detailed examination of parts of the Poetics, we hope to establish the means necessary for confronting the question of aesthetic emotion. In the course of this exposition, it is hoped that the central issues involved with aesthetic emotion will reveal themselves. Throughout, the underlying motive is the resolution of an essential dilemma and not simple historical exposition.

For Aristotle, as for Plato, art was imitative. But it is Aristotle's treatment of imitation which is most appropriate for us here since it is inexorably allied with his work on the emotions in aesthetic experiences. Aristotle says that art (he speaks of the poetic arts) has its origins in human nature taken as a fact. This is so because "imitation is natural to man from childhood, one of his advantages over the lower animals being this, that he is the most imitative creature in the world, and learns at first by imitation. And it is also natural for all to delight in works of imitation." ¹ We are imitative beings by nature and take pleasure in our imitations.

Art or the "art of poetic composition" or the "making of

poetry" is seen as the perfection of this natural tendency to imitate. Artists or poets are those among men who are the best or most gifted imitators and the pleasure we get naturally from imitation is exalted when we approach their productions. Aristotle often speaks of art as growing out of certain "improvisational beginnings."

He then proceeds to analyze and catalogue the various poetic arts according to the media, elements and methods of imitation. These differentiae serve to distinguish the various art forms. Similarly, they provide a way of determining the relative excellence of works according to how these aspects are handled.

Following on these preliminary analyses, the Poetics proceeds with a deeper consideration of the art of tragedy. And although only the drama is itself considered in the main in the Poetics, much of what Aristotle says of tragedy seems to have the generality of insight coordinate with a substantial work of aesthetics. And it is here that Aristotle says something significant about the nature of emotion in aesthetic concerns.

It is in Aristotle's famous definition of tragedy that we meet the emotions. Here he says, "tragedy, then, is an imitation of an action that is serious and also, as having magnitude, complete in itself; in language with pleasurable accessories, each kind brought in separately in the parts of a work; in a dramatic, not in narrative form; with incidents arousing pity and fear, where with to accomplish its catharsis of such emotions." ² Later, in much the same vein, he says, "tragedy, however, is an imitation

not only of a complete action, but also of incidents arousing
pity and fear."³

The telos or defining characteristic of tragedy then concerns the arousal of the emotions of pity and fear in order that a catharsis of these emotions may proceed. Something is done to these emotions by a work of tragedy and the nature of this operation is to be sought in the meaning of the term catharsis. How one regards catharsis will undoubtedly determine the function of tragedy for Aristotle and, to this end, an overall sense will have been given to the Poetics.

If anything here is certain, it is that the connotation of the term catharsis is ambiguous. The Poetics itself uses the word but once, in the definition of tragedy stated above, and many have been prompted to search Aristotle's other works for clues as to its meaning. Others, still, contend that this is a spurious practice, insisting instead (that/the Poetics is an autonomous work legislated by its own motives and that the meaning of catharsis is evident from the sense of the work as a whole. At any rate, the motives Aristotle had when writing the Poetics are by no means obvious and the debate over the meaning of catharsis has blossomed into one of the most exuberent battles of philosophic exchange.

No doubt much has been made of the notion of Aristotle's "defense of poetry" as his reply to the challenge made by Plato at the end of his Republic's tenth book. Here Plato invites anyone to come to the rescue of poetry in the wake of his cas-

tigation of such art. Briefly, Plato condemns the poets and their offerings on two counts. Initially, they are imitators of things and are hence twice removed from ideal reality, and secondly, they concern themselves with the emotions which are the baser more irrational aspect of our character. Because of this, poetry is an evil which must be subdued and he challenges anyone to see the matter differently. In the light of this rebuke and subsequent challenge, the Poetics is usually seen as Aristotle's reply. The Poetics then is considered as Aristotle's attempt to determine the positive significance of the poetic arts. And the notion of catharsis is seen as the service which these arts perform. Although the Poetics proceeds through a discussion of tragedy, it is generally assumed that tragedy, as the queen of the arts, is in some sense the culmination of all that the arts could do. Whether or not something like catharsis obtains in the other arts is similarly a contested issue and one which we must now approach.

The service of poetry then rests with the notion of catharsis in the tragedy. What then is the working of catharsis on the emotions of pity and fear? A popular interpretation, based in some sense on Aristotle's clinical background, regards catharsis from the point of view of purgation. It similarly draws credence from a passage in the Politics where Aristotle says, "some persons fall into a religious frenzy, whom we see as a result of the sacred melodies - when they have used the melodies that excite the soul to mystic frenzy - restored as though they had found

healing and purgation." What the tragedy does is to purge or cleanse the spectator from the potentially destructive emotions of pity and fear. Such emotions are natural, destructive inclinations and the tragedy allows one the opportunity of ridding oneself of these negative tendencies. These emotions are here considered intrusions or encumbrances on the soul and one is best rid of them. Once released from the bondage of these emotions, a more healthy and rational life is assured. The tragedy here serves a medicinal or therapeutic function by way of exorcizing these emotions. And when Aristotle resumes his discussion of pity and fear in Chapter Fourteen with the notions of the pleasure "proper to tragedy" and the "tragic pleasure," this pleasure is taken to mean that akin to a relief. Once the emotions have been purged and we have been cured or cleansed of them we feel the pleasure attendant to a remedy. One is pleased in a tragedy because one is now clean and free from the pain of destruction engendered by the emotions.

Another popular rendering of catharsis looks to some of Aristotle's moral positions as presented in part in his Nichomachean Ethics and in fragments of his Politics. Here catharsis is meant not as a purgation from emotion but rather as an elevation or purification of emotion. The arts have here an instructive effect so that, with them one may learn the right way to feel emotions. In the Politics, Aristotle says that music ". . . has

the power of giving a tone to our character by habituating us to feel pleasure in the right sort of way." ⁵ It would seem then that the arts have the capacity to effect moral changes in their spectators. Through the arts one can learn to purify or exhalt one's emotions by experiencing exhalted instances of them. Here the emotions are seen not as hindrances but rather as necessary elements to an integrated personality if properly experienced. Via the arts one can learn to experience the emotions well and can then become a better or more healthy individual. The arts become instruments towards the shaping of better moral character.

Here catharsis refers to the working on the emotions from the standpoint of purifying or bettering. In a tragedy, one feels noble or proper pity and fear and learns to temper these emotions in practical life. The tragic pleasure becomes a pleasure of moral goodness or harmony. One is pleased in a tragedy because one experiences better or noble emotions and feels that pleasure attendant to a good life. As the emotions are properly exhalted and situated, one feels the unity of an integrated life which unhealthy or inferior emotions tend to disrupt.

In either characterization of catharsis Aristotle has seemingly answered Plato's charge. In the first instance, art serves to expel or exorcize the unhealthy emotions while the second regards these emotions as properly purified or

tempered. Poetic art has a significance.

Though the arts are seemingly rescued as having redemptive values, their significance is not self-serving. On their own they have no intrinsic value but are merely instruments for the accomplishment of tasks lying properly in other realms. They are means to other ends and there is properly no aesthetic realm with its own mechanisms and values. In the end, the significance of the arts in these two characterizations of catharsis rests outside the province of the arts.

A third and final characterization of catharsis is possible which radically redefines the character of the Poetics. This presentation tends to regard the Poetics as an autonomous enterprise only slightly suggested in Aristotle's other works. It regards the Poetics as an aesthetic endeavor in which Aristotle considers the nature of art and the experience proper to it alone.

This third rendering regards catharsis from the point of view of the transformation or qualification of emotions experienced in an aesthetic endeavor. Here catharsis is taken as a strictly aesthetic notion which finds its meaning only with reference to the aesthetic experience of works of art. Much emphasis is placed on Chapter Fourteen of the Poetics in which Aristotle continues his characterization of pity and fear. Here he speaks of the "proper pleasure" of tragedy and the "tragic pleasure" as if it were a sui generis type of pleasure. Here as before

the connection between catharsis and pleasure is essential, though this rendering tries to work out a sense of catharsis from the notion of tragic pleasure rather than first qualifying catharsis and then its pleasure as did the first two attempts.

Before continuing with a characterization of the third sense of catharsis, it would be judicious to say something about the attempt to consider the Poetics as a general aesthetics. To do so is to regard the discussion of tragedy as in some sense illustrative of all the poetic arts. In a sense this was implicitly assumed in the other two characterizations but now we must attempt to be somewhat more specific.

In the definition of tragedy itself we must try to distill that which is peculiar to tragedy from that which might be said about art in general. And the definition itself may be said to comprise two parts: of kind and of import. Although such a distinction may be ultimately impossible, we may speak of it for presentations sake.

Initially, then, Aristotle defines tragedy as a kind of imitation. This formal characterization allows us to distinguish tragedy from among the various other forms of artistic imitation. And at this point we would have no trouble using the definition as a model to be applied to the other arts. For Aristotle mentions early in the Poetics a number of poetic arts and says that they are all "modes of imitation" to be distinguished from

one another in terms of the means, objects or manner of imitation. Such a structural definition could be applied to any of the arts as a kind of imitation.

The second or effective part of the definition presents a problem. For here Aristotle talks of the effect of tragedy, that it must arouse pity and fear "wherewith to accomplish its catharsis of such emotions." What needs here to be determined is whether or not catharsis is peculiar to the experience of tragedy in the way pity and fear obviously are.

We might as Eva Schaper does concentrate on the emotions of pity and fear for a moment.⁶ She insightfully notes that pity and fear are not the only emotions aroused and therefore purged (or purified or whatever at this point) but are rather the primary or essential ones necessary for a tragedy. It would seem very difficult on the examples of tragedy cited by Aristotle to deny such a proposal. Obviously many emotions are aroused in such works (e.g., grief, apprehension, surprise) but the essential ones are pity and fear. They are those emotions aroused without which there would be no tragedy. And whatever happens to these principle emotions through the workings of catharsis would seem to happen to the rest.

And as other emotions are in principle capable of being handled in a cathartic way in a tragedy, it would seem that certain emotions could have the status of principality in other

art forms that pity and fear have for tragedy. In this way the definition might seem like a possible model for all art forms, initially specifying the kind of imitation according to means, objects and mode and secondarily, noting the principle or characterizing emotions evoked in order for catharsis to operate on them.

Such a possibility of generalizing the talk on tragedy to an overall statement on all art forms may be even more plausible once the aesthetic notion of catharsis is elaborated. But even before this there is other substantiation for this claim. Aristotle mentions many art forms when he is elaborating the differentiae of imitation and says much about comedy and, obviously, epic poetry in his presentation of tragedy. Statements like ". . . it must imitate actions arousing pity and fear, since that is the function of this kind of imitation,"⁷ add credence to such a claim.

There is even historical evidence that the Poetics is but a fragment of a larger whole. This, among other places, is substantiated by a tenth century medieval text, the Tractatus Coislinianus, which is a precis of a much more elaborate Poetics in which a definition of comedy is given using the notion of catharsis.⁸

But all this talk of the expansion of the discussion on tragedy to apply to all the other poetic arts does not yet give us the Poetics as a significant work of aesthetics. For although all art may be cathartic, we as yet do not have a sense

of catharsis which is strictly aesthetic. Works may purge and purify in the senses of the first two considerations but this is not something art does according to its own essential demands. Works are not yet self-serving and art is not for its own sake in this more serious sense. It therefore remains to give a more acute characterization of this third sense of catharsis.

The clue to the aesthetic understanding of the term catharsis seems to rest in Chapter Fourteen of the Poetics in which Aristotle resumes his discussion of pity and fear. Here he speaks of the "tragic pity and fear" in conjunction with the "artistic" ways of effecting their arousal. And he goes on to say that "the tragic pleasure is that of pity and fear. . ."

Again, recalling Chapter Six, it is obvious that catharsis is an operation which does something to these emotions which produces a pleasurable effect. But here, when considering the workings of catharsis and its pleasure, we give a particular significance to the adjective "tragic." It seems that the two previous renderings considered pity and fear in terms of a broad sense of emotion and similarly so for pleasure. A general sense of these emotions and the feeling of pleasure legislated these considerations and they paid little mind to the qualification "tragic." Here we see the phrases "the tragic pity and fear" and the "tragic pleasure" as significant, as referring to the particular type of emotional activity present in and the kind of involvement we have with tragic works, in particular, and works in general.

To do this we must recall what tragedy, and the arts in general, mean for Aristotle. Basically, they are modes of imitation.

But here imitation is to be seen not as a mere copy or pretense but rather as an elevated activity legislated by certain inviolable rules properly handled in the skill of the poet. The poet or artist possesses a particular skill by which he imitates reality in the sense of fashioning or completing it. Poetic imitation is inexorably tied to the unusual skill or techne of the makers.

If Aristotle's compelling remarks on tragedy are of any general consequence, the arts are more imitations in the sense of presentations of reality. A poet operates on reality, so to speak, according to the formal principles of his skill. The work as the telos of his making prescribes his activity. In this sense a tragedy is not merely an imitation of an action or of the lives of men, but an imitation of certain kinds of action peculiarly handled according to the function of tragedy. It is serious, complete, has magnitude, is dramatic and the like. Reality is imitated in the sense of being formulated or structured according to the skills of the poet. Later, we will have more to say on this idea that imitation is not merely a second-order reality but is rather a realm of its own.

It is in this sense of art as imitation that catharsis must be understood. The emotions of pity and fear had in a tragedy are not aroused by real events but by events formulated by the poet according to the regulations of his skill. And this is the crucial point that the previous considerations of catharsis had failed to notice. The tragic emotions are aroused by a tragedy, that being an imitative composition formed by the poet

out of his particular skill. A tragedy is not a real event but presents real events (in the sense of possibility) according to its art.

As one responds to events in a tragedy one cannot be responding to an actual living situation. And it is in this sense that we can talk of an aesthetic realm removed from a real one. It is this sense of imitation which for Aristotle demarcates the realm of the aesthetic. When Aristotle speaks of the tragic pleasure or the pleasure proper to tragedy it seems to be an elaboration on his earlier statement that man derives pleasure from his natural imitative tendencies. The pleasure we get from tragedy is a peculiar kind of pleasure based on its nature as an exalted imitation.

When one is experiencing a tragedy aesthetically no doubt one reacts with emotions similar to those in like situations in life. But the emotions in a tragedy are peculiarly transformed or qualified because of the source of the emotions. One is not reacting to a living thing but rather to art as something in principle beyond ordinary reality. Aristotle's use of imitation may be seen to indicate this remove or isolation from reality, not in the sense of illusion or pale copy, but rather as some qualitatively different realm. One's reactions to drama are not pale or empty and are often more intense than anything permissible in life. One reacts differently because of different kinds of sources; on the one hand life, on the other art.

It is this remove from ordinary or practical reality which distinguishes art and our reactions to it. One can say that in an aesthetic experience the emotions are, in a sense, freed. As being aroused by an object of this imitative or aesthetic realm, there is no need to practically interfere or appropriate these emotions. For once, the emotions are allowed to be felt in themselves without any need to act upon them. This is one way of explaining the pleasing power of catharsis, a way which is popular as an aesthetic explanation of the term. Briefly, we shall go along with this presentation, for although principally naive, it seems to contain the seeds of what we would like to say about catharsis.

Regardless of this peculiar rendition of catharsis as making emotions aesthetically intelligible, we may in the end locate the transformation of emotions in the transformation of levels: the move from an ordinary or real to an aesthetic experience. This preliminary view of catharsis sees the emotions as qualified pleasurably because practical import is removed from them. One is no longer a practical living agent but is rather an aesthetic experiencer. The emotions involved are qualitatively different because they are a response to an entirely different reality. A new form of experience is here taking place.

And this change of levels, from the real to the aesthetic, is in the end made possible on the basis of artistic activity characterized by the principle of mimesis. Mimesis demarcates

the aesthetic realm. The notion of imitation as the artistic activity specifies the aesthetic domain and is what, in the end, distinguishes the artist from the historian. The artist does not copy or reproduce reality as an historian might but does something to reality and his offering is a creation of an entirely different order.

Catharsis then as a peculiarly aesthetic term refers to the transformation or qualifications the emotions undergo when they are aroused by a work of art seen as an aesthetic object. Something is done to the emotions which make them a peculiarly pleasurable affair. One may say that they are intensified, clarified or specified because of the formal organization of the work in question. But this, in itself is only possible on the basis that we are here dealing with a qualitatively different level of experience, the aesthetic, the peculiarly imitative realm of Aristotle's poets. Because the emotions are in response to a work and not an event in life, they are unusually qualified or transformed pleurably. To say that they are rid of practical import is only the beginning of an accurate characterization.

One must go further in this aesthetic characterization of catharsis for, as it now stands, certain fundamental points have not been stressed and this may result in a confusion. To say that catharsis refers to the transformation of emotions resulting from their arousal in a qualitatively different source, the work of art, is as yet insufficient to account for a full aesthetic

sense of tragic pleasure. What is it that is ultimately pleasurable about feeling pity and fear in a tragedy? Is it merely, as we stated earlier, that as presented in a work of art these emotions are emptied of practical import and one can feel them lucidly without the necessity to act upon them as a practical agent? Or is this latter explanation, though presently popular, a much more complicated way of saying something that to Aristotle seemed obvious?

We must remember that for Aristotle the arts were specified in their own kind of reality as being certain modes of imitation. Similarly, he says that one finds pleasure, naturally, in imitation. In a classic passage, Aristotle says, ". . . though the objects themselves may be painful to see, we delight to view the most realistic representations of them in art, the forms for example of the lowliest animals and of dead bodies. (italics mine)" ¹⁰ And it would seem that pity and fear are pleasurable in a tragedy, in the end, because they belong to or are part of an imitation. They are simply components or aspects of a work and that properly is where the pleasurable element comes in.

What we needed to mention, what was lacking in our earlier account, was the mere fact that aesthetic encounters are peculiarly emotional ones. In a tragedy one is not simply given pity and fear but these are gradually aroused by an involvement in a work. The events (or plot) for Aristotle

should peculiarly portray terrible circumstances through gradual and artful presentation. It is the tragedy itself which is piteous and fearful and one "has" these emotions only through an intense peculiar involvement with the work. That one feels these emotions which are properly characteristics of the work itself is the source of the problem.

And here we confront the issue of aesthetic sensitivity or receptivity. When one says of a work that "it is pitiful" or that "it is fearful," or whatever, one must have in a sense felt these as being characteristics of the work in question. Aesthetic qualities are not simply seen or observed from a distance, they must in a sense engage or involve us in a feelingful apprehension of them. To say of a piece of music that it is "joyous" or "rapid" is in some sense to have experienced the music as having that character. This sense of involvement or being affected by a work is what consummates an aesthetic attitude and is what seemed lacking in the movie critic at the beginning of this chapter.

When Aristotle spoke of the evocation of pity and fear by a tragedy, he no doubt assumed that one would have been aesthetically aroused by the work. That he assumed an aesthetic sensitivity is obvious by his ordering of the six constituents of tragedy according to artistic importance, his comparison of epic poetry to tragedy as to greatness, and in numerous other examples. His audience was then engaged with the work. They followed the artful presentation of the tragedy and felt the piteous and fearful character of the events. But these emotions were responses to

a work, the proper mode of involvement with a tragic aesthetic object. To have properly followed or experienced a tragedy one needed to feel or receive the peculiar aesthetic qualities. In a tragedy the aesthetic object is properly piteous and fearful and an adequate experience of such a work should feel this.

What is therefore needed for a complete characterization of catharsis is a recognition of the proper place of emotion in aesthetic experience. And this is found essentially in the kind of mental activity or the mode of apprehension which is present in an aesthetic experience. The particular aesthetic qualities are peculiarly received. We do not merely passively receive or recognize aesthetic qualities along the lines of cognition in an aesthetic experience. Rather we feel or experience the qualities in a much more full or engaged sense.

Kant himself spoke of the peculiar sort of receptivity which distinguished aesthetic encounters. He said, briefly, that the recognition of beauty proceeds along with its own mechanisms. Here one does not refer a representation (that which is present to consciousness) by the understanding to the object in order that concepts may be applied and cognition achieved. Rather the representation is referred by the imagination to the subject and its feeling of pleasure and pain. Aesthetically, one does not want to know what an object is but rather how it is according to certain feelings we have for its manner of givenness. In this sense, he refers to peculiar sort of aesthetic sensitivity which is regulated by its own dynamics. There is an autonomous type of

activity which is aesthetic.

Once we established the fact of a peculiar sort of receptivity for aesthetic qualities the most proper characterization of catharsis may proceed. We must mention that an aesthetic experience of a work of art is essentially characterized by a peculiar state of mind. We schematically characterized this attitude in the previous chapter as being a distancing attitude which managed to isolate the work from practical involvements, freeing its aesthetic qualities.

We now go a step further by saying the most proper aesthetic state of mind is not merely one which has managed to identify the aesthetic qualities, but is rather one which is filled or involved with them. An aesthetic experience is properly had once we are involved with or are feeling these aesthetic qualities. In this sense one is actually experiencing the character of the aesthetic qualities.

One may indeed adopt an aesthetic attitude in the sense that one isolates and regards the aesthetic aspects of a work but unless these aspects move or engage the spectator, properly no aesthetic experience has taken place. Real aesthetic "knowledge" is properly possible of a work only on the basis of this peculiar emotional experience. One must feel the aesthetic qualities in order to most fully "know" their character.

Indeed, perhaps a most common occurrence which has managed to enfeeble the notion of an aesthetic attitude is that many times the aesthetic qualities of a work immediately absorb us

in this fundamental type of involvement. Often we feel the exuberance of the music immediately without any seeming adoption of a new attitude. But what is important is that aesthetic attention is a peculiar sort of attention no matter how easily assumed and that, in an aesthetic experience, this attention not only identifies aesthetic qualities but is captivated by them in a feelingful way.

In a tragedy then one feels pity and fear because these are proper responses to an aesthetic object. The tragedy is fearful and piteous aesthetically and these feelings refer to the proper mode of aesthetic apprehension. One can say that the tragedy is fearful and piteous only on the basis of an aesthetic experience of it which "knows" it as such. The emotions of pity and fear are not the ordinary ones but are rather "created" or "received" emotions based on the proper aesthetic involvement with a tragic work of art. Certainly works with less "human" content would arouse responses which could less properly be called emotional, although the apprehension of the aesthetic qualities would nevertheless be a feelingful one.

And in the end the tragic pleasure is a pleasure connected with the imitation characterized by pity and fear. The pleasure is one of the aesthetic experience of the tragedy in which one experienced a particular fearful and piteous aesthetic object. The tragic pleasure is not simply a pleasure of the emotions but rather one of the experience of tragedy which we had in a

peculiarly emotional way.

The peculiar pleasure is one felt in the face of aesthetic imitation. As Roman Ingarden has pointed out in his short work on the Poetics,¹² imitation seems to refer to a different realm, one of imagination, which our simple commerce with affords a singular pleasure. Imitation does not, again, refer to a simple copy of reality but composes a domain of activity all its own. Aristotle's statements on compositional excellence in which the presentation of an impossible rather than an improbable event enhances a work, seems to substantiate this fact. The imitative realm is not a derivative one but rather works along its own lines, providing a unique pleasure.

And here catharsis takes on its full aesthetic significance. It rests on the fact that our proper aesthetic involvement with works of art is a peculiarly emotional one, that we, in a sense, feel aesthetic qualities. In a successful aesthetic involvement this emotional receptivity of aesthetic qualities culminates in a feeling of pleasure based on the formal unity of the whole. What one is pleased with is the aesthetic object which has been achieved or constituted by our feelingful activity based on the formal structure of the work.

In a tragedy one is not pleased with his fearful or piteous emotion but rather with the tragedy which, as a whole, has this quality. We are pleased with the way it presented itself as fearful or pitiful and no doubt the intensity of the emotions we experienced was based on the tragedy's artful presentation. The

artist had combined the proper elements, had selected his characters well, had paced the plot and so on to give it its particular character. And our experience is a peculiarly pleasant one of the entire tragic presentation.

Catharsis then refers to this peculiar transformation of emotion, this special type of aesthetic receptivity which, when aroused by a work, culminates in a feeling of pleasure of the work as a whole or in some of its aspects. What is pleasant is the telos of the aesthetic experience, the particular aesthetic object which has its own character, one which we "know" by our emotional involvement with it. Catharsis seen as tragic pleasure is the sui generis pleasure in the face of an aesthetic object. It is a pleasure of the rightness, or appropriateness or clarity or individuality of the object and this is, in a sense, the result of the artful fashioning of the work.

That an aesthetic experience is properly a pleasurable affair of a most peculiar kind should not be a notion foreign to us. A quick regard of the early Cezanne example should suffice here. For there as undoubtedly in a tragedy, the aesthetic object was the result of a process extended in time. Initially one discovered a quality of expression which was exciting and yet disturbing. Its disturbing character was in a sense due to its lack of determinateness and was a momentary prohibition of pleasure one would find once its sense or completion was achieved. This promise of fulfillment and its attendant pleasure moved us on. Ultimately the quality was harmonized and an intense sort of

pleasure in the face of the aesthetic object was had.

In this sense where indeterminate aesthetic qualities are found a promise of pleasure in their completion incites or moves the experience along. And it is this pleasure of completed aesthetic experiences, that delight of fulfilled aesthetic objects which seems to be the tragic pleasure Aristotle speaks of.

It is not merely that one is having an ordinary emotional experience of pity or fear in a tragedy and that these ordinary emotions are either purged or purified by the work. Rather the pity and fear we feel is that of the character of an aesthetic object according to the kind of involvement we have with works of art. We have felt the work to have this character and the catharsis comes in our pleasure of seeing this artful presentation of pity and fear and this comes irrevocably from the way the work was fashioned. Our pleasure is a pleasure of the imitation, of its presentation of a peculiar aesthetic quality.

It is no surprise then that Aristotle spent the major portion of the Poetics talking of the craft of tragedy rather than catharsis and its pleasure. He was concerned with the mechanisms of tragic presentation, what we would presently call the formal side of the art. The subject matter was already available, the tragic lives of men, and he wanted to know how best it might be presented. One could supposedly learn of the tragic fate of Haemon and Creon without reading Antigone, perhaps from a history book or a conversation with an elder. But Aristotle was concerned with the proper artful portrayal of such subjects so that a peculiar sort

of involvement would be induced in order for a cathartic or aesthetic experience to ensue. And this experience would be characterized by the "pleasure proper to tragedy." And the pleasure derived from tragedy is a pleasure gotten from its mode of presentation as a particular type of artistic imitation.

And it does seem that something like aesthetic pleasure is a necessity for aesthetic experience. Indeed it is the proper end of such an experience, the type of involvement we have with an aesthetic object. As we said earlier, aesthetic qualities are not simply perceived but are in some sense felt or experienced. It may be that such qualities are immediately complete and experienced wholly or that they are initially deficient, in need of fulfillment and harmonization. In the former sense when we experienced, for example the slenderness of a shape or the starkness of a color in a Mondrian painting or the tone of a set of notes played on a saxophone, we are given complete aesthetic qualities and our experience is properly a more immediate one. But here the qualities themselves are felt as peculiarly pleasing. They have been given to us and we are thoroughly sated with them.

In the latter case when we have a continuing melody or a character yet to be completed in a novel, or an ambiguity of form in a painting, we have partial aesthetic qualities which engage us in a peculiar way. We in some sense feel their character but only incompletely as they have not yet been sufficiently displayed. And even at this moment a trace of pleasure is present if only in terms of a promise. The fulfillment of these qualities urges

us on in pursuit of the pleasure attendant to it.

It may be then that the catharsis notion refers to the peculiar emotional receptivity we have for aesthetic qualities which all along is a pleasurable affair. Ordinary attention to objects is transformed into one which is pleasing even in its process. Ultimately this pleasure is culminated with the aesthetic object whether immediate or the result of a process or something else. Aesthetic experiences are pleasurable ones of a peculiar kind and this must, in the end, be the sense given to catharsis seen as tragic pleasure. Here a change of attitude has been performed which is characterized by the peculiar pleasantness of its workings.

One last thing must be said about aesthetic experiences here and that is that they are essentially pleasurable affairs. If no pleasure proceeds then properly the experience is incomplete and essentially no aesthetic experience has been had. For as Aristotle noted the end of tragedy is tragic pleasure and without this pleasure there can be no experience of tragedy. The pleasure of which we speak is that in the face of an aesthetic object and without it no aesthetic object exists and properly no aesthetic experience has occurred. An unpleasant aesthetic experience is by definition impossible because pleasantness pertains to aesthetic objects and they are the end of a completed experience. This is not to say that one cannot have aesthetic experience of unpleasant objects, as the talk of tragedy must have shown, and this experience is at root pleasant because of the manner of artistic presentation.

In the end one may say that catharsis does admit of a singularly aesthetic meaning once the Poetics is seen as an autonomous aesthetic treatise. And this meaning comes from Aristotle's statements on imitation, his talk of tragic pleasure and his overall manipulation of his material. No doubt our account will not have the last word; we are not so bold. Rather we have hoped to present a substantial treatment of the issues inherent in the Poetics. In the end, though, our charge is not to answer history but rather to faithfully use the thoughts of a great thinker towards the presentation of problems which were facing us. The Poetics then helped us to clarify the attitude present in an aesthetic experience by means of its peculiar reception of aesthetic qualities. Similarly, it helped to portray peculiarly pleasant aspects of all such experiences. Though the terminology was markedly different it is held that all these issues, at least in germ, were present in the Poetics. And it is through an analysis of this fecund work that these issues were placed on the way to resolution.

Before closing we might want to say a few things about the pleasurable of aesthetic emotion. As this pleasure is finally found in the face of an aesthetic object we might wonder if the kind of object itself affects the sort of pleasure we feel. Indeed, are there varieties or gradients of this aesthetic pleasure?

In a real sense it seems as though there are. And the kind of pleasure we feel with an aesthetic object depends a great deal on the type of work of art it is based on. With works which have a specifically human or natural content, which take as their

subject matter specifically human or natural things, the pleasure seems more visceral or passionate. The delight we take in representative paintings or symphonic pastorals, or realistic drama seems a much more impassioned or warm pleasure. We are "closer" to the works of art and our pleasure though aesthetic seems to have a definite animal or basic character to it.

This might be explained by a sharp contrast. Consider the pleasure attendant in the experience of a late Mondrian or a John Cage serial piece or the Sear's skyscraper in Chicago. All these works are properly called formal pieces because of the lack of specificable content and the pleasure allied with an experience of each is one of a purer or more contemplative nature. Here we are pleased, but coolly, more detachedly, along the lines of a pure contemplation.

With these two (the purely formal and the admittedly representative) types of works serving as extremes, we can imagine the types of pleasure present in an aesthetic experience of each as well as that of works which fall somewhere in between. Often specific types of aesthetic experience, based on the particular works we are dealing with, have served a normative function for all such experience in general in the eyes of certain thinkers. For example, Bullough's principle of the antinomy of distance (greatest decrease of distance without disappearance) can be seen to be a favoritism for the more visceral or passionate types of aesthetic encounters. He wanted people "closer" to the works while still allowing an aesthetic experience. In the same sense, certain

drama of audience participation is an attempt to more physically involve people in aesthetic experiences. The aesthetic pleasure gotten, if one could be found, would no doubt be a most intense and impassioned kind.

On the other hand certain thinkers, among them John Cage, Ortega y Gasset and Lenord Meyer have chastized art which has representative content as being savage and barbaric. Their art would be rid of this and experience based on it would be cooler, more contemplative, the kind akin to a selfless transport or communion with essential ideas. Obviously Schopenhauer had this more aloof pleasurable experience in mind when he spoke of the experience of art.

These distinctions too are merely contingent and are by no means hard and fast. For content alone, or lack of it, does not specify a work of art. It may be argued still if something like content itself may be spoken of irrespective of its formation. Regardless, certain abstract paintings may engage us feverishly as some of Kandinsky's can while certain representative works may affect us coolly and impassionately as do some of Renoir's portraits.

What is important here is that there is presumably no end to the kinds of pleasure one may feel for an aesthetic object. It no doubt depends on the kind of work, in part on the acuity of the spectator and the aspects to which he attends. What is important is that a peculiar kind of pleasure is always felt for an aesthetic object, is always present in an aesthetic experience.

Chapter Four: THE ADEQUACY OF AN AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE

When we speak of the aesthetic experience of a work of art we eventually confront the question of the appropriateness or adequacy of this experience to the work considered. We want to know when our experience is one which is permitted or perhaps demanded by the work in question.

The entire question of aesthetic adequacy has as its basis a fundamental regard and loyalty for the particular work of art. It is presumed that each work permits a number of possible experiences which are faithful to it. That is, the work as a more or less individual creation accomodates certain interpretations or ways of experiencing it. Here we approach a work concerned with unravelling its own mystery and not with using it as a source of imaginative journeys which have little to do with the work itself.

In this way the work itself becomes the source and arbiter of our experience, and we adjust our findings according to what it seems to offer. And an adequate aesthetic experience becomes one which is appropriate to the work itself. As Roman Ingarden metaphorically puts it, the aesthetic object of such adequate experience will ". . . resemble or be congenial to what was present¹ in the mind of the artist when creating the work. . . ."

Generally this question of adequacy finds its resolution in the characterization of an hypothetical "ideal observer" who is

specially outfitted to appropriately experience a work of art. This observer is, of course, one who is quite proficient at aesthetic experience and is very adept at recognizing the various aesthetic aspects of a work. Attending solely to a work's aesthetic side, he is able to experience the work as it offers itself. He is completely faithful to the work itself, careful not to "read" too much into it, fully cognizant of its strengths and weaknesses. Because of his particular ability, this observer is the one we appeal to for the most proper or correct experiences of a work of art. Besides being able to attend only to the work's aesthetic aspects and not those imaginatively supplied, we attribute to this spectator the capacity to most fully "understand" the work as it offers itself. Loosely put, we consider his interpretations of a work to be the best.

From this ideal spectator vantage point, the question of aesthetic adequacy generally proceeds according to how this observer is characterized. Although the possibilities of characterization are numerous they can be loosely categorized according to how the question, "with what things outside the work of art must we be acquainted with in order to appreciate a work of art?",² is met. And here we seem to have two very general tendencies which have sired any number of conciliatory combinations.

On the one hand, there seems to be a very isolationist way of considering aesthetic adequacy. This point of view, generally

held by most formalistic proponents, contends that nothing outside the work is needed for an adequate experience of it. For such an isolationist, an ideal spectator would be one possessed of a matured aesthetic sensitivity and an unerring attention to the work itself. Once in the relevant conditions of mental and physical health, and having optimized the environmental variables, this ideal observer would merely attend to the work with acute sensitivity. He would need no appeal to external evidence such as art journals or critical reviews in order to experience the work appropriately. In effect, such appeals would attenuate the completeness and insularity of the experience and would deprive the work of its own singular language.

Such a characterization of an ideal observer, wants to insure the relative self sufficiency and autonomy of a work of art. Convinced that each work is an utter individual, they claim that no appeal to general sources can aid an experience of it and generally depreciates it. This isolationist point of view wants to preserve the experience of a work as an intimate communication between spectator and creation, unblemished by any external influence. For such a position, we must, as Schoepenhauer says, approach a work as we would a prince, allowing it alone to fill us with wisdom.

In a much less purist fashion, there is another general way of confronting the question of aesthetic adequacy. This point of view, popularized by Stephen Pepper contends that "a work of art is not an isolated thing. It is a creation by a man who himself is largely a creation of his society." ³ That is, a work seems

inexorably culture bound or attached and an adequate experience of it must consider it in context. To this end, a contextualist point of view, stressing that an adequate experience of a work is the most complete one, demands that the spectator is familiar with the history and culture surrounding a work. What this position hastens to point out is that the certain insular and unbroken experiences which the isolationists champion actually utilize this same information but in a less obvious way. For example, one may read Dostoevsky's Crime and Punishment straight through, fully aware of the symbolic significance of water, needing no recourse to biographical or historical supplementation because we are basically familiar with the context from which it sprang. As this work came more or less from the same culture which is now operating, we have no problem understanding the significance of its metaphors and images. In a sense, they spring from basically the same world view, the same deep-seated arena of meanings and significances which we all participate in.

In this way, a contextualist position contends that many works, coming from foreign or historically removed cultures must be illuminated against those cultures. Only by portraying, as far as possible, the same active, living condition in which they were created can we adequately experience them. The important notion here is that all the assembled evidence (historical, biographical, cultural, etc.) is to be subjugated to the aesthetic concern. One is concerned with fully experiencing the work

alone and all information is amassed to aid this project, with any discrepancies between work and fact finding resolution in the work's favor.

Generally, some compromise between these two tendencies is found for the serious resolution of the question of aesthetic adequacy. In the end, the work itself is appealed to and a position on its adequate experience is taken. For example, a purely formal creation would need little appeal to outside evidence while a composition manifestly replete with political comment would seemingly demand it. Again there would be no denial of selective experiences of a work (for example, considering the mere sound of words and their rhythmical combinations in a poem to the ignorance of its content or meaning) but as these would not consider a work in its completeness, adequacy would not be claimed.

With this our consideration of aesthetic adequacy would seem to be complete. By saying that a complete and faithful experience of a work is what we mean by adequacy, and by saying that the work itself determines what actions are necessary for an adequate experience of it, the problem would appear to be sufficiently situated. But something remains, something which this very common resolution to the problem has overlooked. In the contextualist and isolationist outlook, as well as the position of compromise, some very basic considerations about the way we experience works of art have been omitted. And these considerations greatly complicate or at least readjust the ways in which we must

approach the problem of adequacy.

It seems that these several attempts to confront the question of aesthetic adequacy suffer from a basic misconception of the spectator's part in an aesthetic experience. Though the contextualist approach comes teasingly close to the proper standpoint, it too neglects the peculiarly active role the spectator assumes in aesthetic experience. All of these characterizations assume that an aesthetic experience proceeds along the lines of simple discovery, with the spectator merely finding the peculiar aesthetic aspects of a work. And this, though naively close, greatly distorts the circumstance as we have found it.

Further, these considerations of aesthetic adequacy, which we intend to expose as insufficient, seem to rest on an essentially misinformed understanding of the nature of a work of art. They appear to regard a work as an established and complete entity, fully given to a spectator. In this way, an aesthetic experience of a work is concerned solely with the spectator's simple identification of the given aesthetic aspects. All he must do is look and he will find the work displaying itself. The ideal spectator then becomes one who is possessed of the most refined and objective powers of identification.

Though this conception of the nature of a work of art and of our ways of dealing with it is appealingly close to what seems to be the case, it is essentially misguided and prompts dangerous misconceptions concerning the issue of aesthetic adequacy. Aided by our earlier work, it may be a relatively easy task

to indicate where this notion of aesthetic experience goes wrong.

In our early investigation of the nature of aesthetic experience, based on our Cezanne example, and in the following discussion of the aesthetic attitude, some very basic considerations were unearthed. Initially it was found that an aesthetic experience involves the spectator in a curiously active fashion. The work of art attracted him with an indeterminacy which thoroughly involved him towards its resolution. It seemed as though the aesthetic experience involved the spectator in a creative way, not unlike the activity the artist himself originally engaged in. That is, one was asked to participate in the work, recreating it in a way towards its possible fulfillment. One was not merely finding aesthetic aspects in a work but was rather actualizing and completing them. Certain relevant aesthetic aspects seemed to be given but not completely so. The spectator had to do something, had to activate or fulfill certain areas of aesthetic merit.

It seemed that one did not merely discover complete and established aesthetic qualities but had rather to create them, in a way. Of course, this creation was not complete and unlegislated, for certain areas of aesthetic indeterminacy were given the spectator and he was asked to complete and fulfill them. What is here important is that the aesthetic aspects were not completely and dutifully handed over to a simple recognizing inspection. Rather, some activity of participation and fulfillment of these aspects was demanded on the spectator's part.

In the chapter on the aesthetic attitude we found that this state of mind did not simply attend to certain given aspects as an ordinary attention does, but rather activated and completed its own aspects. That is, it seemed to possess a way of giving aesthetic significance to things. It seemed able to uncover an aesthetic side of things, a side not ordinarily given, and proceeded to specify and determine this side according to its own vision.

This all has dramatic significance for our understanding of the nature of a work of art. For it seems that a work of art is not something given whole and entire to a spectator for his simple identification, but rather represents a sort of achievement on his part. That is, a work seems to engage and involve a spectator in a highly creative fashion. One becomes absorbed in a work, intent on unravelling its mystery.

A work of art then seems to be an incomplete and suggestive object. That is, "every work of art of whatever kind has the distinguishing feature that it is not the sort of thing which is completely determined in every respect by the primary level variety of its qualities; in other words it contains within itself characteristic lacunae in definition, areas of indeterminateness: it is a schematic creation." ⁴ Every work of art seems replete with certain variable areas of indeterminacy. These suggestive aspects prompt one in an aesthetic attitude to complete and fulfill them. This is commonly what is implied when one speaks of "understanding"

That this incomplete character of works of art has often gone unnoticed is due greatly to a confusion between the concepts, work of art and aesthetic object. Commonly when one speaks of a work of art, he is usually referring to its aesthetic object which is the completion or realization of the work's aesthetic aspects. That is, a work itself merely offers a number of incomplete and suggestive areas of indeterminacy. These are revealed to one in an aesthetic state of mind and he is compelled or invited to resolve the indeterminacy of these aesthetic aspects. This intense participation in the work, when successful, offers a completed realization of these problematic aesthetic qualities. This completion, or in Ingarden's terms "concretion," of a work is the constituted aesthetic object. As interested spectators we fulfill a work's indeterminate regions by giving them a significance, in this way bringing a work to its proper realization.

We find empirical evidence of this fact wherever we encounter works of art. When two people differ as to the meaning of Ingmar Bergman's latest film we see them each completing areas of aesthetic indeterminacy differently. Similarly, drastically differing in readings of "Hamlet" or two renderings of Chopin's polonaises (one for example, terse and mathematical, the other gushing and emotional) represent two completions or aesthetic objects of the same work. For it seems that one work may permit a number of aesthetic objects. And the difference between such completions of a work depends on which areas of indeterminacy are selected and how

will drastically characterize the resultant aesthetic object. Similarly the selection of certain areas to the, usually unconscious, ignorance of others drastically determines the completion of the work.

The aesthetic object is then the work's fulfillment or completion as assembled in the aesthetic attitude. The way the areas of indeterminacy are completed or, which amounts to the same thing, the way the aesthetic qualities are harmonized becomes the end of an aesthetic experience. It is the work as aesthetic object, as concretized or completed, that is the proper object of an aesthetic experience.

This understanding of a work of art as a schematic creation given to a spectator as a project to fulfill has great bearing on how the question of aesthetic adequacy is resolved. This is so because one work may accommodate a number of fulfillments or aesthetic objects. That is, we see a work as a skeleton or incomplete creation which is replete with gaps or variables which must be filled in or characterized by an interested observer. Although the way these gaps are filled in is more or less authorized and indicated by the work itself, there is never any hard and fast determination. This leaves the possibility of the areas of indeterminacy being completed in diverse ways.

Since we are speaking of aesthetic adequacy and this implies, as far as is possible, a complete experience of a work of art, we will omit the possibility of the many aesthetic objects given

should be obvious that even complete experiences of a work (those which consider a work in all its relevant aesthetic aspects) are possible which differ significantly from one another. One may bind the areas of indeterminacy together in different ways, stressing certain ones as major and influential. Similarly, the basic way the areas are completed may differ from one experience to another. In this way, a single work may offer a number of adequate aesthetic objects.

But this fact that a work of art is a schematic creation given to a spectator in the aesthetic attitude to complete has yet to be considered in its greatest implications for the problems of aesthetic adequacy. Once this is done the seeming objectivity of works of art as portrayed in the earlier treatments of adequacy will be drastically laid to rest.

If a work is replete with areas of indeterminacy, it can be realized in adequate aesthetic objects only in the activities of competent observers. A work must display those suggestive regions to a qualified spectator and he must be able to adequately fulfill them. And here we have the crucial point of this issue. It would be bold to expect the same regions of a work of art to hold the same significance for people across cultures and in different periods of time. Rather it would seem plausible that certain areas of indeterminacy manifest themselves and invite completion for certain cultures in certain historical times. That is, a work may have different significance for different moments of time.

of indeterminacy with expected fulfillments to the members of that particular historical period. For those viewing the work from a different temporal and spiritual perspective it may offer different moments of variability. It would seem that the ways areas of indeterminacy are recognized and plenished depends a great deal on the basic social situation. The problems one has in experiencing the pentatonic Oriental scale or certain European folk musics drives this point emphatically home.

In this way, one is prone to adopt the social relativism offered by the earlier contextualist position. It seems that works of art and our experience of them are intimately bound to our natures as culturally and historically established. That a timeless or eternal empathy with a work irrespective of cultural milieu is possible, seems patently foolish. To expect this one would have to ignore the basic styles of living characterized by different historical periods. A man whose culture is greatly influenced by the spatial relativity and social Darwinism is significantly different from one whose time is contending with an heliocentric universe model. It would be bold to expect these same people to recognize same regions of indeterminacy in a work or upon doing so, to give them the same significance.

Just because a work is intimately social bound, there is no reason to believe that adequate experiences of works from cultures and times removed are not presently possible. One can adequately experience a past work in a present way, though
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indeterminacies and invite frequent aesthetic involvement. Certain works seem to be perennially intriguing and important and serve as vital treasures for all cultures. But there is no reason to believe that this peculiar fecundity of certain works signifies comparable aesthetic experiences across time and cultures. A work may simply afford many combinations of fulfilled indeterminacies and this gives us the means to understand in a new way the supposed eternality of certain works of art. It seems not to be, as is generally supposed, that a "King Lear" or a "Mona Lisa" or a Parthenon offers men of all cultures the same experience. This seems idealized and irrespective of social differences. Rather, such works seem to offer a multitude of indeterminacies and suggestive invitations, making them precious to men of many times.

With these considerations we seem to have a clue to the fairly common occurrence of works undergoing periods of silence and importance. At times, a work will be depreciated as ordinary and comatose, only to be later celebrated. The presence or absence of adequate observers who recognize important aspects of the work seems to be a plausible answer to the occurrence. Similarly, works suffer periods of chastisement for suggesting certain ideas and values which are contrary to the particular social climate. Again, it seems that observers must be able and prepared to recognize and fulfill certain aesthetic aspects of a work and this capacity depends greatly on the constitution of these observers. A work may be promising and suggestive to one culture while banal

or silent to another.

It seems then the question of aesthetic adequacy does not rest on such simple ground as the simple identification of aesthetic aspects. Though it would be helpful to portray an ideal observer capable of bringing a work to its permitted fulfillment, this characterization seems secondary and relatively easy. One must first recognize the schematic character of works of art and the problems inherent in the completion of their areas of indeterminacy. For it seems that, based on this understanding of a work of art, any number of adequate aesthetic experiences may be offered on a given work's basis. These completions would differ from culture to culture and one could not be in a position to specify a hierarchy of most appropriate aesthetic objects. One would not even be permitted to say that an experience of a work in its own climate is more complete than one in a removed social setting. The social indignation cast upon Cezanne or Stravinsky by their contemporaries would suffice to disprove this. One work, it seems, can offer any number of aesthetic objects and, as long as it speaks to a particular time and age, it must be considered a vital entity.

One can, as a lesser project, portray an ideal spectator within a given culture who is peculiarly gifted for the proper experiencing of works of art. But this, in contrast to the evidence offered by the preceding investigation, seems a simple and relatively easy endeavor. What is important for the notion of aesthetic adequacy is that a number of adequate aesthetic objects

may be offered by the same work of art and that these may significantly differ and may even be hostile to one another. And this occurrence is possible because very often a single work offers within its skeletal structure a number of areas of indeterminacy which may be variously completed by competent spectators.

Conclusion: THE VALUE OF AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE FOR HUMAN LIFE

With these investigations we must consider our project completed. In its own very limited way, our aim was to secure the aesthetic as a substantial domain of human experience. And in this sense, this paper probably best served an indicating or outlining function. For it is hoped that the project at large was at least given a feasibility in the portrayal of the certain problems this aesthetic approach is built upon. In the end, the establishment of an experiential aesthetics as a significant philosophical approach is left to more competent and aspiring enterprises. Hopefully, this paper has whetted the interest of such an endeavor.

Once one has, more or less, specified the aesthetic as a significant region of human activity, it remains to speak briefly of its usefulness or function. One can speak briefly here because aesthetic matters are almost generally granted a significance which was deprived them only years before. Perhaps it is the recent popularity and acceptance enjoyed by the "softer" sciences, or the preponderance of Deweyian educational ideals, or recent cultural nadirs which have spawned the current favor given to aesthetic activity. Regardless of reason, aesthetic pursuits are no longer dismissed as frivolous activities best enjoyed at leisure when nothing important demands attention.

There does seem to be a current belief that aesthetic interest

are important, that they do represent a side of human life which needs to be nurtured and cultivated. But along with this underlying and implicit belief seems to rest a general negligence or lack of action. Though most people believe in aesthetic pursuits they tend to do little or nothing to supplement these attitudes. And in the end not much has changed. Though aesthetic matters are regarded with greater promise than in recent times, they are still left for the leisurcly fortunate or for those opportunities when time permits. And these improprieties rest, it seems, on a general lack of understanding of the value of aesthetic experience for human life.

Gradually, if at all, direct action has been taken to increase aesthetic interests for what seem to be tertiary or improper reasons. Psychologists often prompt their patients to impassionately create works of art to route certain destructive tendencies. Similarly, companies often offer evenings at the cinema or music hall in order to foster a feeling of social unity among their employecs and one of loyalty to the firm itself. Also, children are encouraged to study music or architecture for the notoriety and financial rewards these avenues might offer.

While not always wrong or off the mark, such considerations of the value of aesthetic experience are markedly misdirected. For as long as aesthetic matters are seen solely as means to ends which rest outside their province, they will never enjoy the prominence their true value demands.

For, along with these other possibilities, aesthetic experience has a value which is its own. It seems that aesthetic experience offers rewards and enrichments which are self-sustaining and most unlike those available in any other kind of experience. A successful aesthetic experience affords the participant a joy and possession of great wealth. It seems to solidify the spirit and bind the soul with a certain mystery and importance. Perspective is often broadened and a feeling of interacting with some source of great and vital worth is felt. Aesthetic experience often seems to bring with it a complacency and integrity all its own. Against its vitality many trivial perturbations seem to pale and lose efficacy. Part of the value of an aesthetic experience seems to rest in the loosening of controls and resistances ordinarily sustained and in the feeling of participating in mysterious and fascinating forces.

Perhaps some of the reward of aesthetic experience is in the feeling one has of properly engaging his possibilities. One feels that something essential and important has been encountered and that one's small exertions were infinitely rewarded. To this end, many troublesome ordinary activities with their negligible offerings are brushed aside or at least properly dominated.

One could imagine an enlightened government capitalizing on this very aspect of aesthetic experience. Because of the broadening of perspective and feeling of worth and integrity offered by such experience, one could fathom a government encouraging greater and more significant aesthetic accomplishments. Rather than exploiting

aesthetic matters to the despicable end of propaganda, a truly humanistic government would educate its people in authentic aesthetic experience. A populous enamoured of such experiences would no doubt be of strong character and the disharmony and petty aggression attendant to insurgent activities would be unappealing to them.

Without attempting to establish a Socratic kind of equation between beauty and goodness and truth, it would not be frivolous to note that one who is keenly aware of beauty would probably hold real wisdom and value as important pursuits. It would seem that as Aristotle and Plato both noted, the values of grace and harmony in a work of art are similar values in a man. One who could discern the valuable properties of a work could conceivably apprehend similar intensities of value in human affairs.

So it might seem that a great deal of unhappiness and stress in human life itself is caused by improper emphasis and misplaced values. And one who could discern proper emphasis and substantial value in a work could conceivably transfer the continuity and harmony of this situation to circumstances in life. In this way the aesthetic experience would find its proper place in the well integrated life, and could surmount the criticism of aloofness and detachment which is often inveighed against it.

Appendix: SOME HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS FOR AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE

The philosophical approach which considers the questions of aesthetics from the standpoint of aesthetic experience is by no means a purely modern phenomenon. As with any significant contemporary trend in philosophy, this way of dealing with aesthetics has a history against which it must be understood. This heritage need not be explicit, indeed it may exist independent of the motives which move contemporary aesthetics, but it must be acknowledged.

There is little doubt that a fully elaborated doctrine of aesthetic experience has gained much credence for aesthetic research. Such recent work abounds with talk of taking aesthetic interests in things, finding aesthetic aspects, having aesthetic attitudes and the like. Behind such talk rests the assertion that there exists a certain type of experience, called aesthetic, which is a distinct human capacity, complete with its own mechanisms. It is with this point of view that a good deal of present day aesthetics proceeds. Based on the subjective possibility of a particular kind of experience, such a style of aesthetics turns away from the task of discovering the necessary ingredients of beauty in the object. Now, it seems, an appeal is made to the particular condition of mind which the subject possesses in order to make possible the appearance of beauty.

Such a change of approach, no doubt highly encouraged by the phenomenological school of philosophy, strikes us as one eminently with its elaborate elaboration, a

doctrine of aesthetic experience may be called a relatively recent accomplishment. But this must not prevent us from recognizing the sizable contributions made by a few significant thinkers to this brand of aesthetics. The work of a few brilliant minds has dramatically cleared the way for this particular style of aesthetics. And, once we recognize their accomplishments, we may understand their influence on an experiential aesthetics while similarly coming to a greater understanding of what this kind of aesthetics intends to do. In an exposition of a few preparatory thinkers, we may better comprehend the workings of such an aesthetics, its motives and limitations.

One would not be acting foolishly, it seems, if he were to accept Jerome Stolnitz' statement that Aristotle's Poetics is perhaps the most influential offering of Western Aesthetics.¹ Although, only a mere lecture outline, the Poetics seems to contain the seeds of a well developed and insightful theory of aesthetics. A consistent elaboration of the ideas presented in the text, an elaboration the Poetics seems to demand, impels one to construct a thorough aesthetic theory, one which seems to bear a striking resemblance to recent work on aesthetic experience. Aristotle's talk of catharsis and its obvious relation to an interested spectator indicates the subjective stance which characterizes experiential aesthetics. The overwhelming influence of Aristotle's remarks for the subjects of aesthetic emotion and the peculiar reality of aesthetic participation needs hardly to be mentioned.

Because of Aristotle's monumental influence on the problem of aesthetic emotion an in depth treatment of the notion of catharsis was undertaken in the text proper. With this a general understanding of the Poetics was given and it is hoped that this attempt came close to portraying the substantial influence Aristotle exerted on the subject of aesthetic experience. As such, no more mention will be made of this text and we will proceed with a casual estimation of some of the contributions made to this approach by Immanuel Kant and Sigmund Freud.

The influence Kant has exerted on Western aesthetics is undeniable. Though the source of his aesthetic thought, The Critique of Judgment, was principally intended to solidify his critical philosophy, resolving the apparent conflict between nature and freedom as portrayed in the first two critiques, it stands on its own as a substantial aesthetic endeavor. The effects of this work, taken in its aesthetic service, are still active and monumental. And we will attempt to isolate a few of its primary aims with hopes of displaying its importance for contemporary aesthetics.

Already a significant service has been done for aesthetics once we understand Kant's basic motive for the Critique of Judgment. To do this we need consider the impetus of his entire critical philosophy. Briefly, the critical philosophy was founded on the notion of securing the a priori realm of human knowledge. Convinced of the existence of experience, Kant set out to determine the conditions of possibility of such knowledge. He did this in a

peculiar way. At the outset, Kant noticed empirically three different tendencies of mind or attitudes which one might take towards an object. In the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment he called them the mental faculties and distinguished them according to our knowing, desiring or finding pleasure in an object;

Each of these empirical tendencies of mind will follow from the a priori sphere of human knowledge if one can find a particular cognitive faculty which has at its basis an a priori principle which conditions these attitudes. In the first critique, Kant isolated the faculty of the understanding which supplies a priori principles for the knowledge of nature. The understanding produced certain a priori concepts which served as necessary conditions for basic experience of objects. In the second critique, Kant displayed the practical reason as that cognitive faculty which provides certain universal laws of reason which determine the will and condition action.

Kant carries this tendency further in the third critique. There he is intent on determining whether or not the judgment has the status of a cognitive faculty by virtue of its having an a priori principle which conditions our finding a certain pleasure in objects. He finds such evidence in his investigation of aesthetic judgments. By doing so he gives the aesthetic experience (or the aesthetic attitude to things) a status comparable to that of cognition and action. As built upon an a priori principle proceeding from a cognitive faculty, such experience is secured as a fundamental

With this, Kant has done something upon which contemporary work on aesthetic experience unimpeachably relies. He has demonstrated (or intends to) that our judgments proceeding from experiences of natural beauty and art depend upon a fundamental human capacity. (Later in Chapter Five of this work Kant will say that ". . . beauty has purport and significance only for human beings, that is for beings at once animal and rational" ²) Here he seems to refer to experiential aspect of beauty, namely, that as finite creatures we cannot merely think beauty but must be given it in sensible intuition.)

In this way, we are able to make aesthetic judgments because we are able to experience things aesthetically. And this form of experience is necessarily conditioned by a certain structure of our cognitive faculties. It is this possibility of dealing with objects aesthetically that Kant investigates in the third critique. By establishing this certain aesthetic tendency of mind Kant gives the subject of aesthetics new integrity. And it is with this assumption of a basic mental capacity that contemporary work on aesthetic experience rests.

To not empirically that we have aesthetic experience and to say that this experience follows from a certain fundamental condition of mind are, of course, two different things. Kant intends to support the latter contention and, as this seems to rest at the basis of the experiential approach to aesthetics, we might learn much about this contemporary trend in aesthetics if

we briefly follow Kant's line of thought. For, in his development of the principles of the judgment, Kant has done much which has drastically influenced contemporary aesthetics.

Briefly, Kant is guided by the work in the first two critiques. As the principles of the understanding determined the knowing faculties and the principles of the reason in its practical employment conditioned the will, Kant wants to know whether the feeling of pleasure and pain for an object rests on an a priori principle. Obviously, this feeling of pleasure and pain is to be of a certain kind if the knowledge it gives is to be of a fundamental sort. With this in mind, Kant turns to the faculty of judgment in its aesthetic employment.

As aesthetically employed, the faculty of judgment has the earmarks of a priority by virtue of its universal and necessary application. When we judge an object to be beautiful, this judgment appears to have the necessity and universality indicative of judgments of the understanding and practical reason. But the a priority of the principle at work in the judgment's aesthetic employment is radically different from that which grounds its practical and theoretical employment. How this is so, how the principle at work in aesthetic judgments is peculiarly necessary and universal, will have a great effect on the character of Kant's system and that of aesthetic theories to follow.

It must be remembered that the judgment is a mediative faculty which has the function of relating universal rules or principles to particular acts or objects. Kant has mentioned that the judgment

is a faculty which displays our finitude as it indicates a dependence on experience and, hence, particularity.

In its theoretical employment, judgment subsumes a particular case under a universal rule. The understanding provides principles as universal rules under which particular instances may be subsumed. In its practical use, the judgment subsumes a particular action under a universal law of the reason. In each of these two employments, the judgments were universal and necessary because reference was made to certain universal and objective rules or principles. Either a universal rule or concept was objectively present and the judgment merely followed their objective guide. An outline was objectively given to the judgment to use.

In aesthetic matters, those of taste, something different happens. A judgment of beauty is not regulated by a universal objective rule. It does not seem to have the reference to the object and, hence, the objective determining ground that determinate (theoretical and practical) judgments have. The aesthetic or reflective judgment, in its estimation of beauty, relates a particular intuition, synthesized by the imagination, to a universal determining ground of a completely different nature. This determining ground will specify how the object is to be considered and the nature of this source will tell us much of the aspect of mind which is aesthetic. With the specification of the determining ground of judgments of taste comes the means necessary for elucidating the a priori principle which secures the aesthetic experience as a fundamental human capacity. Here is where we find

Kant's seminal contribution to aesthetics.

Early in the third critique, Kant states, "if we wish to discern whether anything is beautiful or not, we do not refer the representation of it to the object by means of understanding with a view to cognition, but by means of the imagination (acting perhaps in conjunction with the understanding we refer the representation to the subject and its feeling of pleasure or displeasure."³ With this, we see that the determining ground of such a judgment must be subjective. As one is here concerned with a subjective response to a representation the judgments of taste are seen to be, not logical and objective but, aesthetical and subjective. By speaking of the importance of the imagination (a purely sensuous faculty) in aesthetic matters. Kant plays down the role of the understanding and enlivens the aspect of subjective response. Already a firm break with other modes of experience is felt as cognition is not involved in matters of taste.

If Kant is to secure the aesthetic as an a priori realm of human knowledge, he must drastically supplement his discovery of the subjective determining ground of matters of taste. For he has to discover the aspects of necessity and universality, thereby establishing an a priori and not a mere empirical possibility. In so doing, Kant gives aesthetics the ability to defend itself against those who claim that matters of taste are purely and individually subjective.

To this end, in service of discovering the necessity and universality of matters of taste, Kant turns to the satisfaction

which accompanies a judgment of taste. He claims it is a purely disinterested one. This is seen in juxtaposition to the satisfaction which accompanies a judgment which determines a thing in its existence. This latter kind of satisfaction involves an interest in the thing as it exists. In judgments of practice and theory one is satisfied because one has succeeded in determining what the object was. But in matters of taste one is entirely disinterested in what the object is. No attempt is made to determine the object as all objective reference is sidestepped and the representation is referred merely to the subject and his feeling of pleasure and pain.

It is this disinterested satisfaction which essentially gives judgments of taste the status of proceeding from an a priori principle. In the end it distinguishes these judgments from those involving pleasure in the face of objects agreeable to the senses. These satisfactions are coupled with interest and are empirical and particular. Similarly, a satisfaction of the good has an interest but, as proceeding from an instance of a universal law, has an objective universality.

All that remains to establish the aesthetic as " . . . a domain of human experience equal in dignity to the theoretical and practical (i.e., the cognitive and the moral) . . .,"⁴ is to secure the evidence Kant has provided us. If aesthetic judgments follow from an a priori principle it must be subjectively grounded. But this principle must have the qualities of universality and

necessity to secure its a priority as issuing from an essential possibility of mind. How this can be so rests with the notion of disinterest.

To this end, Kant holds that when we judge an object to be beautiful we are not interested in its existence. As such, the satisfaction, though subjective is not isolated and individual. The judgment assumes the character of universality. This is so because in calling an object beautiful, one does not base this judgment on any personal interest in the object. In this way the quality of beauty assumes a universality akin to that of the objective properties of an object. It is a universality similar to logical judgment but, as arising from a subjective feeling, it is a subjective and not an objective universality. When we judge an object to be beautiful we do so according to an a priori principle but this principle as subjectively grounded does not have the objective determinacy of judgments of theory and practice.

According to Kant, judgments of taste are possible because of an indeterminate relation of the imagination and the understanding. In practical and theoretical matters the judgment related these two powers in a determinate way according to objective principles given it. But matters of taste display a different capacity. They are possible because the mere contemplation of the form of an object, insured by the freedom from interest, displays an indeterminate harmony of these cognitive powers. The subject has a feeling of this harmony of this indeterminate relationship made possible by the absence of objective rules.

Judgments of beauty are based on a felt relation of imagination to understanding made possible by there being no determinate concept linking them. As free of interest, an aesthetic judgment refers to a purposive harmony of our cognitive powers. We feel that a beautiful object refers to a harmony or balance between imagination and understanding although this relation as subjective has no objective reference and is indeterminate. As referring to a harmony of powers we feel we have gone beyond mere idiosyncratic taste and necessarily attribute this satisfaction to every man.

In this way, we feel the harmony and assume that beauty works according to an a priori principle. But this principle eludes specification as it is felt and not objectively known. Each judgment of beauty awakens in us the feeling of a common sense or agreement of purpose of our cognitive faculties. The principle along which judgments of beauty proceed is an indeterminate one given as the feeling of finality or purposiveness of our cognitive powers based on the contemplation of a representation. As devoid of personal interest it becomes a subjectively necessary principle.

We consider an object to be beautiful when it falls under or is conditioned by the subjective principle of purposiveness. The mere representation of an object makes us feel a certain unspecifiable harmony of our powers of representation. But the determining ground of this judgment is subjective and lacks the specificity that an objective judgment of theory or practice would have. Nevertheless by transcending personal interest aesthetic judgments are said to be universal and necessary, following from a fundamental capacity

of mind.

With this we have a brief idea of the workings of the third critique. By finding an a priori principle upon which judgments of beauty are made, Kant secured the aesthetic as a significant domain of human experience. In his portrayal of this principle Kant elucidated the character of this fundamental region.

Among other things Kant referred to the elusive and unspecifiable nature of beauty. Because our sense of beauty is indeterminate, it eludes any formulaization. We do not know why something is beautiful, we cannot give reasons, but merely feel that it is so. As we disinterestedly apprehend a beautiful object, we feel that we have discovered a subjectively universal rule of harmony of our mental faculties. There seems to be a sense that all beautiful things fall under. The apprehension of a beautiful object seems to awaken the presence of certain capacities which legislate its possibility. But as this is only felt, as this ground is completely subjective, we are not able to specify the a priori lines along which a beautiful thing is conditioned.

The importance of Kant's work for later aesthetics is undeniable. Whenever someone attempts to specify a particular aesthetic consciousness he inevitably uses Kant's work on interest. Whether this consciousness is characterized by an "interest in the object's own sake," or an "intransitive attention," a "distanced attention" a "concern with appearances" or whatever, Kant is implicitly referred to. It is his notion which separated the aesthetic from normal modes of attention or interest which guides these more contemporary

attempts.

Others, following the same impulse to specify the aesthetic as an integral domain of human experience, have used Kant's notions of the indeterminate relation of our cognitive powers during an aesthetic experience. Speaking again of disinterest, Kant noted that our powers of representation enjoy a particular freedom in aesthetic matters. Once rid of the necessity of making determinate relations our representative powers were said to undergo a particular freedom of employment. In this kind of liberated activity our powers of representation are given full sweep. It is no rarity to hear someone portray an aesthetic experience as one in which something was done "for its own sake." Once rid of ulterior motive or purpose a kind of exhilarating play of the senses transpires. One hears for the sake of hearing, sees for the sake of seeing, and so on. This kind of freedom from purpose and practical necessity is what is at the heart of most "play" theories of aesthetic experience.

Similarly, Kant's move to the subjective and his talk of the feelingful side of aesthetic experience has been very influential. One cannot escape the fact that aesthetic qualities are based on a peculiar kind of apprehension, one which is quite akin to feeling though not the momentary feeling of a mere sensuous gratification. Recent aesthetics abounds with talk of beauty as feeling, felt qualities and the like.

Again, Kant's talk of the universality of beauty and

its transcendence of particular interest has, no doubt, had much to do with the theories which claim a particular selflessness as characteristic of an aesthetic experience. Certain theories of transport and the loss of the practical self in aesthetic matters might conceivably have Kant as their source.

No doubt Kant was not the father and sole originator of all of his ideas. He was a man well versed in what were then the writings on art and natural beauty and he repeatedly acknowledged his debt to the writings of Edmund Burke. But the Critique of Judgment marked the first attempt to portray these ideas in a unified theory of mind. Similarly, it was the first attempt to seriously work out the conditions which must be present if the aesthetic was to be a source of a fundamental human capacity. Also the depth and insight Kant brought to the subject secured it an integrity equal in kind to the sort he brought to metaphysics and ethics. Once handled by an intellect of Kant's calibre, the subject of aesthetics considered as a manifestation of an inherent human capacity derived a significance which it still enjoys.

With the work of Sigmund Freud we discover another seminal influence for contemporary aesthetics. Although he never explicitly details an aesthetic theory and often mentions his inadequacy to the task, his numerous comments about art and our experience of it have exerted an undeniable influence on the subject of aesthetics.

No doubt the majority of Freud's aesthetic endeavors
con in his pose. Freud

was pre-eminently occupied with understanding the impetus to creation and the function that it served. He did this explicitly among other places, in his General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, his Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious and in several essays, most notably, "Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning," "Creative Writers (Poets) and Day Dreaming," and "The Theme of the Three Caskets." Perhaps more interestingly he implicitly confronted the mechanisms of artistic creation when he took it upon himself to analyze particular works of art, looking for their meanings in the manifest intentions of the authors. His most famous of these latter enterprises include Leonardo da Vinci: A Memory of His Childhood, "Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's Gradiva," "The Moses of Michaelangelo," and "Doestoievski and Parricide."

But throughout this occupation with the creative aspect of aesthetic matters is a connection with the ordinary spectator's appreciation of these matters. Freud considered the impetus to create along with that to appreciate, the former drive being associated with a person of particular constitution. Apparently the mechanisms which motivate one to create are of the same kind which prompt an appreciation, the effects of a successful creation being much the same of those of a successful appreciation.

By being aware of this connection between creator and spectator, we can search Freud's work for a general understanding of the function of aesthetic matters. Apparently the dynamics

of creation and appreciation will be generally similar and we need merely inquire into the basic mental workings which serve these functions.

No doubt at the root of Freud's thought rests his radical understanding of the status of our conscious mental activity. In perhaps direct contrast to the great idealistic systems of philosophy the previous century, Freud held that thoughtful conscious life is tenuously placed in the midst of great irrational forces which simultaneously nurture and threaten it. For him, conscious life was an outgrowth of a deeper unconscious mental activity which completely adumbrated it and gave it impetus.

In a relatively early essay, "A Note on the Unconscious in Psychoanalysis," he briefly expounds on this theme. Here he uses the common process of memory to elucidate his position. We are all aware, he claims, of the possibility of a present conception passing off into obscurity only to be recalled at a later time. Freud maintains that this thought must have had a mental location in the interval between its inception and its recollection. To this end he claims the existence of a mental region other than consciousness which serves as reservoir for these dormant ideas. Since awareness is characteristic of our conscious life, and we had no awareness of these ideas when they were latent, Freud calls this residual region of mental life the unconscious. This side of mental life must be of greater extent than the conscious one because of the wealth of ideas it can store until they are ready to be made conscious.

But Freud discovered another aspect to the unconscious

besides its service of holding ideas in waiting for consciousness. Through his work on neurotic patients, and especially in their hypnotic therapy, Freud discovered an even more important region of the unconscious. With memory, he discovered a realm of mental activity, though not present to consciousness, which was in principle capable of becoming so. In this other region, Freud discovered an area of mental activity which was in principle incapable of becoming conscious. These ideas though not present to consciousness exerted a great deal of influence on conscious life. Indeed a great deal of their efficacy came from the fact that they were unable to become conscious.

In order to understand this stratification of mental life into the two areas of unconsciousness and the derivative layer of consciousness, we must refer to a later article, "The Unconsciousness." There Freud maintains, as he did in the previous selection, that "every mental act begins as an unconscious one, and it may either remain so or go on developing into consciousness according as it meets resistance or not." 5

According to this later essay, every mental act is formed unconsciously (without our awareness) and must pass a kind of scrutiny or censorship before becoming present to consciousness. If a thought is approved it either becomes immediately conscious or lays dormant, available to consciousness. This arena of approved latent thoughts, though properly unconscious, are much closer in nature to conscious activity, and become the pre-consciousness in Freud's scheme.

The other possibility exists that the unconsciously formed thoughts fail to pass a censorship and remain completely recessed and unavailable to consciousness. These thoughts, repelled by the scrutiny, are the result of the fundamental mental mechanism called repression. Certain thoughts though active and forceful are withheld from conscious recognition by the censoring activity. With this Freud found his absolute dynamic region of the unconscious.

The dynamics of movement from the unconscious mental system to the conscious one constitute the basis of all mental activity, according to Freud. There is this constant tendency of movement and discharge of energy which he sets at the roots of the human psyche. The mechanism of repression constitutes an important kind of psychic movement, one which is essential for the well being of the personality and which, as we shall see, is at the basis of artistic activity.

Freud went on to elaborate this theory of mind in later writings especially in The Ego and the Id and Civilization and its Discontents. There he established a tripartite division of the human psyche into the id, ego, and super-ego.

In this later theory, Freud held that the human psyche is essentially rooted in a network of instinctual drives and forces called the id. The id is composed of these blind and irrational drives which are impelled to a discharge and fulfillment. That is, governed by the economics of the pleasure principle, these forces seek immediate discharge of their vital tendencies. This

self moving realm of activity supplies all of the impetus for the human personality and is its foundation.

This condition of id, roughly equated with the unconscious, does not continue as such. In time, because of the workings of the perceptual consciousness, the external world is confronted and a portion of the id is placed in its service. That is, the id eventually separates off into an ego which associates its demands with the offerings of the external world.

The ego, working under the influence of its reality principle, is a governing or legislating agency which seeks to preserve the organism. It tries to secure appropriate objects of discharge for the forces of the id and adequately stratifies the drives.

Already the mechanism of repression is at work since the ego must postpone these drives in the service of adequate fulfillment. It orders them in the face of external reality's demands in the service of self-preservation. To this end, the immediate discharge tendency of the id forces are thwarted.

A third aspect of the psyche is a differentiation of the ego, based on the organism's earliest object choices, called the super ego. This is a regulation of primal forces in the face of social or cultural reality. The super ego as the source of principles and morals is the truest seat of repression as it radically determines which drives will be satisfied as well as how.



Here the dynamics of repression can be elucidated and the function of artistic activity portrayed. The ego cannot satisfy all drives equally. Some are in direct defiance of its program of self-preservation while others defy the overwhelming demands of the super ego. Hence they must be repressed and contained. Though temporarily postponed, these drives do not diminish and the integrated life of the personality demands that they somehow be appeased.

Generally it is the very structures of reality and social relations which demand that certain drives be withheld and frustrated. Most significant of these for Freud is the sex drive. This drive generally takes on super ego disapproval formations and is generally frustrated by the workings of the world itself. In the interests of wholeness, this drive must be satisfied.

In Civilization and its Discontents, Freud notes a triad of ways of ventilating repressed drives. One of these ways is at the roots of the artistic activity.

Freud claims that as a sense of reality was fashioned in the individual, a place was reserved in the psyche which was isolated from reality's interferences. This was, of course, the imagination. Here was the place ". . . expressly exempted from the demands of reality-testing and was set apart from the purpose of fulfilling wishes which were difficult to carry out." 6

With the imagination we were provided with a realm of illusion in which substitute satisfactions could be carried out. For Freud, certain repressed drives allowed their basic energies

be satisfied by indirect means. This mechanism and potential for sublimation allowed the satisfaction of certain tendencies (most significant among them was the sex drive) and provided the importance of artistic activity.

The artist, as Freud mentioned in the General Introduction, is usually an introverted individual, greatly frustrated by ego inspired inhibitions. But he is possessed of a certain flexibility or looseness of repression and is able to satisfy his frustrated inclinations in the surrogate activity of art. Much of this activity as unconsciously inspired is not overtly manifested and finds its expression in symbolic form. In the same way, spectators are allowed to satisfy repressed needs by commerce with works of art. In the very experience of them certain tendencies are imaginatively and generally unconsciously fulfilled.

No doubt, as the theory stands, artistic activity served for Freud a sort of purgative function. Art and beauty were not fundamental realities but rather derivative methods of satisfying more fundamental needs. In Civilization, he even attempts to reduce beauty to a sexual feeling. For him, art is privileged by working on a purely illusory plane where all is permitted.

The artist had succeeded in doing something quite unusual. Because of the severity of his repressions, he had lapsed into the purely fanciful world of his imagination. But, rather than staying in this realm of unreality as a neurotic does, he emerged

from it with a creation, one which shared the properties of reality and illusion. By working in the privileged mid-way realm of the artistic creation the artist and spectators could fulfill repressed tendencies in a way much more satisfying than disorderly imagination. The creation as particularly structured harnessed and adequately directed these energies. Though only imaginatively satisfied these drives were energetically directed and appropriately discharged.

This attempt to regard aesthetic experience as the condition in which certain vital, dark energies are aroused and satisfied has, no doubt, its shortcomings. Freud, in a careless fashion, neglects the formalistic aspect of works of art, focusing almost completely ~~on~~ the content. Indeed he often seems to regard beauty as a kind of sugar-coating or gratuitous embellishment of meaning. It is significant that his treatment of art essentially concerns literature, sculpture and representational painting. He often confessed his abhorrence of abstract art and his impotence in the face of musical compositions. With this neglect of form obviously comes a conflation of artistic values. The work of a master is as good as that of a first-shot amateur. It must, however, be noted that Freud did give indications of recognizing formal or stylistic importance. He briefly used this fact to distinguish a child's play from an artist's work. And, further, contemporary psychoanalysis, especially that with a Jungian emphasis on archetypes, places great stress on stylistic developments.

But Freud's aesthetic contributions do not pale against his obvious limitations. As is the case with many watershed figures, Freud's significance rests not so much in the answers he gives to particular problems as in his portrayal of the questions involved.

Immediately, contemporary aesthetics, and especially one founded on aesthetic experience, is indebted to Freud's process notion of the aesthetic experience. By associating artist and spectator, Freud already demarcated an aesthetic realm and characterized it by his notion that in it certain repressions are lived out. For him an aesthetic experience involved time and effort and accomplished something. Though the aesthetic was not an original and self-serving aspect of human experience, it was a fundamental realm in which certain necessary activity transpired. While the aesthetic consciousness must have had a specificity, Freud was more concerned with portraying its essential utility.

Also his work on the illusory aspect of the aesthetic experience was influential. This kind of activity was recognized by its particular character of unreality. As aesthetic experiences are concerned with energies which elude conscious reality, we might expect them to have an aspect of illusion and mayhem. Similarly, the experience itself would be of a different kind than ordinary conscious experience because certain normally repressed tendencies are being lived out. Aside from Freud's overbearing talk on sexuality, we can recognize the certain unconscious or

uncontrolled aspect of aesthetic experiences. Often we feel incapable of describing such experience and try to induce another to share the same experience in order for a communication to develop. Although Freud would say this lack of cognitive control comes from the prohibition put on the energies used, we can merely acknowledge his location of an important aspect of such experience. Aesthetic experiences do seem to involve a definite irrational aspect which seems built upon the very nature of the reality concerned.

If Freud's statements that aesthetic encounters are built upon certain irrational forces seems tenable, perhaps it is his attempt at a rational estimation of these forces which contributes to the unacceptability of his theory. When he equates the impulse to create and appreciate works of art with the satisfaction of latent sexual desires, he seems to give an overriding explanation to a process which seems to defy such rationalization. Apart from these attempts at explanation, his suggestion that aesthetic activity derives from certain basic irrational and unconscious tendencies has been very influential. For it does seem that aesthetic experiences often thrive on correlations and connections unfathomable to conscious rational thought. Experiences based on recent surrealist and expressionist art bear this out perhaps to the extreme.

Similarly Freud's comparison of the work of art to the dream work with the emphasis on symbolism has been of seminal importance. The basic function of the symbol and the unusual way one apprehends and deals with one is undoubtedly a major

concern.

Again it is perhaps as an indicator of responsible ideas than as an adequate problem solver that Freud gets his importance as an aesthetic theorist. By indicating the forceful and irrational sources of the aesthetic impulse he opens new and insightful avenues. Of perhaps greater importance is his thought concerning the utility of the aesthetic experience. Here he is seen to maintain that the well rounded life of the individual demands experience of the aesthetic sort. Here the aesthetic experience is incorporated into the daily workings of the psyche as a component necessary for its preservation.

With these central lines of thought Freud provided a wealth of possible insight which contemporary work on aesthetic experience utilizes. He offered the means which helped establish the integrity of this type of experience.

ENDNOTES

Chapter One:

1. Roman Ingarden, "Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object", Journal of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXI, (1961), 296.
2. Ibid., 296.
3. Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Evanston, Illinois, Northwestern University Press, (1970), 162.
4. Ingarden, op. cit., 299.
5. Ingarden, op. cit., 290.
6. Edmund Husserl, Ideas, General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, London, Collier-Macmillan Ltd., (1962), 128.
7. Ibid., 110.
8. See Ingarden, op. cit. He elaborates on this notion in section v. of this article.
9. Ibid., 305.

Print taken from: Cezanne, Editions du Phaidon, Paris, (1948).

Chapter Two:

1. This concept of Thomas' is presented, among other places in his "Ducasse on Art and its Appreciation", Journal of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XIII, (1952). This notion is adequately criticized by Frank Sibley in his "Aesthetics and the Looks of Things", Journal of Philosophy, LVI, (1959).
2. See The Problems of Aesthetics, Eliseo Vivas and Murray Krieger, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, (1960).
3. This seminal notion of Stolnitz' aesthetics can be found in his Aesthetics, New York, Macmillan Co., (1965) as well as in his frequent journal contributions. Best of the latter is his "On the Origins of Aesthetic Disinterestedness", Journal of Art and Aesthetic Criticism, XX, (1961).

4. In his Aesthetics, London, Bowes and Bowes, (1957).
5. Ibid., 94.
6. Ibid., 95.
7. Ibid., 96.
8. Ibid., 100.
9. Ibid., 103.
10. In Introductory Readings in Aesthetics, John Hospers, New York, The Free Press, (1969). Originally published in the American Philosophical Quarterly, I, (1964).
11. Ibid., 30.
12. Ibid., 34.
13. See Aldrich's "Back to Aesthetic Experience", Journal of Art and Aesthetic Criticism, XXIV, (1966).
14. Bullough, op. cit., 101.
15. Bullough, op. cit., 101.
16. Dickie, op. cit., 33.
17. Frank Sibley, "Aesthetics and the Looks of Things", Journal of Philosophy, LVI, (1959), 176.
18. See Roman Ingarden, "Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object", Journal of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXI, (1961), 289-291.
19. See Allan Casebier, "The Concept of Aesthetic Distance", Personalist, LII, (1971), 70-91.

Chapter Three:

1. Aristotle, Poetics, trans. by Bywater, in The Works of Aristotle, ed. by W. D. Ross, Oxford, The Clarendon Press, (1921), 1448b.

2. Ibid., 1449b.
3. Ibid., 1452a.
4. Aristotle, Politics, trans. by Barker, in The Works of Aristotle, ed. by W. D. Ross, Oxford, The Clarendon Press, (1921), 1342a.
5. Ibid., 1339a.
6. See Eva Schaper, "Aristotle's Catharsis and Aesthetic Pleasure", Philosophical Quarterly, XVIII, (1968), 131-43.
7. Aristotle, Poetics, op. cit., 1453a.
8. See Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz, History of Aesthetics, Part One, Ancient Aesthetics, Mouton, (1970), 146.
9. Aristotle, Poetics, op. cit., 1453b.
10. Aristotle, Poetics, op. cit., 1448b.
11. Paraphrased from the opening remarks (section one of the first moment of the first division of the first book) of Immanuel Kant's Critique of Judgment, Oxford, The Clarendon Press, (1952).
12. Roman Ingarden, "A Marginal Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics", Journal of Art and Aesthetic Criticism, XX, (1961), 163-73, (1962), 273-85.

Chapter Four:

1. Roman Ingarden, "Artistic and Aesthetic Values", 41, in Stolnitz' Aesthetics. Originally in British Journal of Aesthetics, IV, (1964).
2. John Hospers, "The Problems of Aesthetics", Encyclopedia of Philosophy, New York, Macmillan Co., (1967), 44.
3. Stephen Pepper, Aesthetic Qualities, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, (1937), 117.
4. Roman Ingarden, "Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object", Journal of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXI, (1961), 294.

5. Here it must be noted that this conception of a work of art as a schematic creation meets its most substantial opposition when works of architecture and certain works of modern sculpture are considered. In these cases it seems that the entire work is given, devoid of gaps, and one is not asked to do any supplementing. If this is indeed the case, it would seem that, in these instances, the physical and aesthetic objects would be the same. Such a circumstance would prompt us to establish a continuum of aesthetic objects of works of art, according to their dependence and association with their material bases. On the one hand, we would have the near identity of works of architecture with their material bases which the other extreme would have works of literature and poetry whose association with a physical base is very minimal. Regardless, the question is open as even works of architecture and certain sculpture may be construed as containing gaps in need of completion. But the problem must be mentioned as these cases tend to test this basic conception of the nature of a work of art.

Appendix:

1. Jerome Stolnitz, Aesthetics, xii.
2. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, 49.
3. Ibid., 41.
4. Albert Hofstadter and Richard Kuhns, Philosophies of Art and Beauty, New York, The Modern Library, (1964), 278.
5. Sigmund Freud, "A Note on the Unconscious in Psychoanalysis", (1912), 51, in A General Selection from the Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. by John Rickman, M. D., Garden City, Doubleday and Co.; (1957).
6. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, New York, W. W. Norton and Co., (1961), 27.

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