MORAL EDUCATION

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ABSTRACT

This thesis initially sets forth a program of moral education which teaches moral reasoning is the only program that could be adopted within the educational aim to "educate" and not to "indoctrinate" the child. This is the case because one does not want to implement a program of moral education that adopts a normative system of predetermined judgements because; 1) there is no agreement as to which normative judgements one would adopt as the correct ones, and, 2) by teaching normative judgements one is limiting the cognitive perspective of the child which means he does not have the knowledge or understanding that enables him to be on the "inside" of his "moral knowledge". The child who is taught normative judgements is not educated.

However, even though moral reasoning appears to be a plausible educational option it is not as neutral as one is led to believe. The teaching of a method whereby one can make moral judgements involves second order beliefs about first order moral discourse that may in some instances determine one's moral judgements. One cannot claim that teaching moral reasoning does not indirectly indoctrinate the child. Second, it is not clear that teaching moral knowledge will result in a morally educated child. Morality, as Aristotle points out, not only

involves knowledge but also a disposition to habitually perform right acts. A child cannot be morally educated if he only has moral knowledge. He must also be taught how to act. It is only after he habitually performs right acts that moral knowledge is relevant.

The aim of education must then be changed so that one can inculcate in the child a disposition to perform right acts. The thesis concludes then, that a program of education for attitudes and emotions may in the end be a more comprehensive method whereby we can morally educate children.

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Though this thesis bears only one name as author on the title page, there are many without whose help and encouragement it would not have been possible.

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Credit must also be given to Nathan who took time out from his own work to supply many useful references and ideas to supplement my initial incomplete formulation of the philosophical arguments that were involved in moral education. In addition, thanks goes to Bruce who spent many hours proof reading and noting corrections on countless pages of rough and typed drafts. Many others helped in more ways that can be mentioned here. However, I must express my thanks even though inadequate in this form to Gert and Charlie Father without whose moral and financial support none of this would have been feasible.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

Whether or not to teach morality or virtue is not a new question for educators. Contemporary educators feel, however, that an answer in accordance with the present aims and content of education is urgently needed. Morality that was once believed to be automatically transmitted from generation to generation is now an object of conscious consideration.[1]

> [T]he moral and intellectual culture acquired by man has become complex and plays too important a part in the whole of the common life to leave its transmission from one generation to the next to the hazards of circumstance.[2]

In the past, parents and teachers have guided the young by teaching them that one act is just, another unjust. After this period of parental guardianship, society takes over and compels the youth to learn laws and to live in accordance with these laws, and not simply according to their own desires.

At present, educators are questioning the foundations of such teaching, and asking if this method deserves to be termed "teaching of virtue". Parents and teachers differ in their admonishments; different societies have different laws; these laws are changed with alterations in

government and habits. As a result, it would appear that the basis of morality fluctuates. But it is not clear that morality is something that should differ with different societies or among individuals in the same society. To allow differing opinions to be transmitted to the young concerning "right" or "wrong" action results in little more than indoctrination. Moral conduct does not occur when a person acts in a particular manner because he was instructed or coerced into doing it even though he may be acting in a socially desirable manner. Morality begins when an individual asks "Why should I act this way and not otherwise?"; "Why is it that this is right and that is wrong?". The basis of morals is to know the reasons for these conduct-guiding instructions. Morality does not emerge in a society where a positive belief as to what actions are right or wrong is imposed on individuals. Morality presupposes freedom of choice of action in specific situations on the part of the individual. The setting of preconceived conclusions to questions that ask for justification of actions viewed by society as right, or the teaching of how to act without giving reasons, is seen by contemporary educators as a contradiction to the nature of morality.

The need for an answer to how morality is to be taught becomes urgent when it is pronounced that, "Education must make a major contribution to the intellectual, social, emotional, physical, moral and cultural development of each individual".[3] Morality no longer is just one of the many concerns of a teacher, it is his responsibility. When

one attempts to fulfill one's obligation as a teacher it becomes clear that morality is not a subject that can be easily taught. It is questionable if teachers should play the role of moral educators.[4] What qualifications would be required? A teacher of science needs to know a considerable amount of science. This knowledge could be easily tested. But what similar minimum requirement could be demanded from teachers who wished to become involved in moral education? Would they be required to know what the "right" actions were? If so, who would decide what actions were right? How would one test for knowledge of why actions are right or wrong? Perhaps a person of "good moral character" would be the ideal moral educator.

Before it is decided who is to be the moral educator and what the qualifications are it must first be determined what morality is and if in fact it can be taught,[5] in accordance with the aim to educate and not indoctrinate. The question then still remains as to whether the nature of decision-making in morality is such that we can distinguish the characteristics of moral reasoning independently of some normative system of moral belief. In light of this I will be concerned primarily with attempting to provide an answer to the question whether or not it is possible to teach the skills of moral reasoning. In other words, does teaching moral reasoning avoid presupposing a normative system of ethics? That is, can moral reasoning be taught independently of moral belief?

This thesis sets forth a program of moral education that appears to be in accordance with the present liberalized aim of education which excludes indoctrination as part of a child's education. It will be argued, however, that a program of moral education cannot be included in an educational system that does not aim at indoctrinating the child. This is not because the teaching of moral reasoning necessarily results in indoctrination, but rather because indoctrination must be included in such a program so that moral knowledge is useful to the learner.

FOOTNOTES -- Preface

1. John S. Braubacher, "The Challenge to Philosophize About Education", in What is Philosophy of Education, edited by Christopher J. Lucas (London: Collier-Macmillan Limited, 1969), p. 62.

2. Emile Durkheim, Moral Education (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961), p. 189.

3. Education in the Primary and Junior Divisions 1975 (Ministry of Education, Ontario), p. 7.

4. James Gribble, Introduction to Philosophy of Education (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1969), p. 129.

5. R. D. Archambault, ed., Philosophical Analysis and Education (New York: The Humanities Press, 1965), p. 9.

Chapter I

THE CONCEPT OF A PROGRAM OF MORAL EDUCATION

> Meno: Can you tell me Socrates--is virtue something that can be taught? Or does it come by practice? Or is it neither teaching nor practice that gives it to a man but natural aptitude or something else.[1]

This question, posed by Meno, is similar to that being asked by educators; is morality something which can be taught? In Plato's Meno Socrates challenges the main character to offer an explanation of virtue. Coming to no satisfactory conclusion, Socrates suggests that if virtue is some type of knowledge it must be teachable.[2] He states that virtue is not taught anywhere, because there are neither teachers nor students.[3] Consequently, virtue must not be knowledge which is teachable.[4] We shall not however understand the truth of the matter until we try to discover what virtue is in and by itself.[5]

If the conclusion in the Meno is valid, that virtue is knowledge and can be taught, then, regardless of the Platonic attitude toward knowledge, we may assert similarly that if morality is knowledge it too can be taught. It then becomes the task of the moral pedagogue to determine what morality is "in and by itself" before he becomes concerned with the problem of how it can be taught. Taking the conclusion in the Meno as an indication of where to start our inquiry into the possibility

of teaching morality, then if morality has some content that can be labelled as knowledge, it can be taught. On the other hand, it may be that one cannot define the knowledge involved in the moral sphere due to lack of conclusive agreement as to what moral knowledge is or because knowledge does not pertain to morality. In the former case, educators should put off the teaching of morality until this knowledge is ascertained. In the latter case, the teaching of morality is impossible in school because it results in indoctrination not education. That is, when one decides to teach a particular subject it must first be ascertained what it is that is to be taught. If there is no difference of opinion as to what the content of an area of study is, as would be the case in English grammar, mathematics or swimming, then one needs only to devise a method in accordance with educational guidelines. However, if the content is questionable because it incorporates opinions or beliefs that are uncertain, in such subjects as politics, religion or morality, one must seriously question whether the result will be indoctrination rather than education.

Indoctrination cannot be part of education in a democratic society, such as ours, because it "hinders or thwarts an intellectual process which any individual has a right to exercise freely or autonomously."[6] To indoctrinate an individual in morality would mean that we are saying that an individual does not have the right to make his own moral decisions. This stands in contradiction to the "concept of individual responsibility

upon which our legal and social systems are based."[7] In order to avoid indoctrination one must first ascertain the content of a program of moral education.

The task of determining if morality has a content that can be conclusively called knowledge is not easy. Broadly speaking there are two opposing views; the relativist and the absolutist. The relativists claim that there is no single and absolute standard of values, and that all value systems are relative to the particular culture, group or individual that holds them. Moral values represent devices adopted by a society to aid in adapting to the environment of that particular society and to ensure that the particular ends of the society are upheld. Moral "knowledge" would similarly be relative and not necessarily applicable to those outside the group. It was against the relativist view that Plato spoke out when he remarked that regardless of the values actually adopted by different poleis, there are some that ought to be accepted and others not. This reflected the absolutist position or the belief in certain absolute values that are universal and are not the product of particular groups or individuals. Moral knowledge would in this instance be possible.

The case for relativism seems strong due to the fact that values in or among various societies appear to differ. Even within societies they change from time to time. It is, however, to be acknowledged that a society usually holds opinions on matters other than morality and these views also differ from those held in other societies. The

truth or falsity of statements of fact can be demonstrated by means of evidence. Anyone who questioned Columbus' voyages as not offering evidence for the "roundness" of the earth, rather than its "flatness", could be shown to have misunderstood the meaning of the terms "round" and "flat" and what counts for evidence of each. In not understanding the implications of each attribute, the resulting false belief in the "flatness" of the world after evidence has been given for its "roundness", is a linguistic one. It follows that no two people could make the same statement and count completely different things as evidence; in the end at least one of them could be convicted of linguistic ignorance.[8] In this way opinions can, by means of empirical evidence, be proven to be true or false. Might it not be a matter of time until some moral beliefs are also demonstrated to be wrong, or are moral claims somehow different? Sailing around the world or taking aerial photographs would count as evidence to support the claim that the earth was round, but what would count as evidence against a moral claim? The relativist can claim that in statements of evaluation, "the evaluation is not connected logically with the factual statements on which it is based".[9] One may claim that something is "good" because of certain evidence; another can hold that that fact counts as evidence for the opposite. This difficulty in ascertaining the truth or falsity of statements of evaluation is the upshot of "good" containing nothing in its meaning that connects it with one piece of evidence rather than another.[10] As a result, there

is no agreement as to what would count as criteria for claiming moral knowledge.

When a society or individual starts to question moral beliefs there is a tendency to adopt relativism.[11] What could be more convenient than to say that moral values are simply those rules which a society adopts to promote the type of consequences it prefers? This attitude would obviously dismiss absolute judgement of value and moral knowledge as utter non-sense.

The questioning of moral values did not, however, lead to widespread relativism. It was the aim of all relative systems to lay down a precise meaning of good.[12] If good could be defined in the same manner as we define the term "bachelor" as an "unmarried man", then we should be able to determine good and bad as easily as one distinguishes between married men and bachelors. In addition to the aforementioned difficulty in coming to an agreement as to what would count as evidence for something being "good" in an attempt to make an analogy between moral terms of evaluation and other predicates and adjectives, the acceptance of a definition of good necessitates that certain things ought to be done. The attempt to answer "Why ought I to do X" leads one to ask for reasons which are as difficult to answer as, "What is good?"

G. E. Moore upon being asked "What is good?", answered "Good cannot be defined. Good is good and that is all I have to say about it."[13] The only way one could know anything moral, according to Moore, was

by intuition. If moral adjectives cannot be understood or ascertained in the same manner as non-moral or "natural" properties, then the moral adjectives could only be a sort of property discerned by "intuition". This "intuition" could be used either to decide the goodness of an act or person. According to this view, in justifying "moral intuitions", one eliminates a clear distinction between "objective and subjective" and the possibility of moral knowledge. That is to say, intuiting the good is a subjective act, but that is not to rule out objective environmental factors that come into play. In addition, claiming to know something on the grounds of intuition can be reduced to little more than belief. If one was asked for justification for an intuition, the evidence amounts to saying "X is good because I believe it is." In this instance there would be great difficulty in deciding what constituted moral knowledge. The intuitionists were, however, not entirely wrong. If one were to decide by intuition in a moral situation, would it not be on the basis of objective factors? No one supposes that decisions can be made in a vacuum. The relativist assertion is that moral values are only a reflection of the attitude of a particular society. In other words, each society sets out its own moral rules which are designed to suit the needs of this particular sociological group. Moral knowledge in this instance amounts to nothing more than taste. An individual who resides in a particular society could justify his actions to another only on the basis of what he has been led to believe is the case.

Another subjective view is emotivism. The emotivists claim that goodness and badness are merely expressions of a particular attitude toward an object, person, action, etc. It is expressions of this nature which determine the goodness or badness of an object or action. There is, therefore, no moral truth or knowledge.

Having become convinced that moral values are attitudinal and not something which can be empirically shown to be true or false, certain moral philosophers took to analysing moral language. It appeared to these scholars that knowledge of ultimate moral principles was impossible and moral language was the only remaining clue to determining what moral knowledge consisted of. In a more sophisticated form of emotivism moral language was declared to serve two functions: 1) it expresses approval; 2) it tries to influence others to express a similar approval. Perscriptivism added that moral language also 3) attempts to guide conduct and 4) is universal. Perscriptivism does not deny relativism but it does indicate that emotivism is unconvincing and lacking in adequate criteria for moral knowledge.[14] Moral knowledge, strictly speaking, is not possible for prescriptivists.

In summary, the absolutist position is dubious as it is difficult to see how someone could know that something is good, but similarly we do not know that relativism is correct. At most the relativist can only examine carefully the opinions that are accepted by his society, or by himself, and reduce them to some sort of system that cannot be judged

right or wrong without an appeal to a higher set of values. It does not, however, make something right because everyone thinks or believes that it is. Everyone may believe that it is right to keep slaves but this does not make it right; it allows the possibility that one might question its rightness. It appears from the above views that it would be difficult to ascertain what would count as adequate criteria for moral knowledge. Each of the systems outlined above is open to severe criticism.

Initially it was proposed that if morality was knowledge then it could be taught. In the light of differing views on the possibility of moral knowledge, it is unclear whether or not morality can be taught.

In response to this problem practical educators tend to conclude that

> ...it is simply not the proper business of the school to concern itself with the substance of moral beliefs or practices. The school should attend to promoting the skill of moral reasoning.[15]

In this way the practical problem of existence of conflicting moral beliefs in society and the lack of agreement on the differing criteria of moral knowledge can be circumvented. The characteristics of moral reasoning which are common to all systems become the basis of a curriculum for moral education. To educate with this as one's prospective goal is to maintain neutrality in respect to particular moral standards and systems.

Moral reasoning is therefore "moral knowledge" that can be taught because it involves a neutral position which claims not to presuppose

normative judgements that cannot be conclusively justified. The teaching of moral reasoning will not result in indoctrinating the learner because it is common to all normative systems. It can be justified as not teaching the child uncertain knowledge.

Even though the content of the intended program of moral reasoning is rationally justifiable, one cannot entirely dismiss the notion of indoctrination. Indoctrination pertains not only to the content of a subject taught but also to the method by which it is taught. The intent on the part of the educator must not be to limit the child's perspective. If one fixes in a child's mind that he ought to make moral judgements in a particular manner and does not give him the option to make them differently, is one not still indoctrinating?

We must then look to education in general to ascertain what its aims are before one can decide if there is a method that can be used to teach the learner moral reasoning without indoctrinating him.

FOOTNOTES--Chapter 1

1. Plato, Meno (70a1) transl. W. K. C. Guthrie, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, eds. E. Hamilton and H. Carins, (Princeton: University Press, 1961). Hereafter cited as Meno followed by the paragraph number.

2. Meno (87b3-87c4).

3. Meno (89d1-89e9).

4. Meno (89e1).

5. Meno (100b3).

6. Robert T. Hall and John U. Davis, Moral Education in Theory and Practice (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1975), p. 28.

7. Hall, Davis, p. 28.

8. Philippa Foot, "Moral Beliefs", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 59(1958059), p. 83.

9. Foot, p. 84.

10. Foot, p. 84.

11. Robin Barrow, Moral Philosophy for Education (London: Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1975), p. 47.

12. Barrow, p. 47.

13. G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: University Press, 1968), p. 6.

14. Barrow, p. 52.

15. Brian Crittenden, Form and Content in Moral Education. An Essay on Aspects of the Mackay Report. (Toronto: The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1972), p. 1.

Chapter II

WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE AN EDUCATED PERSON?

When one speaks of the education of a physician or carpenter one has in mind a very definite concept of what it is to be a physician or carpenter. This concept guides what one would expect someone to master through instruction, training, and study to enable him to acquire the necessary knowledge and skills to function within the chosen vocation or profession. The determination of competency within a given area is based upon what we think a physician or carpenter to be, and similarly one uses the same criteria to determine when the "educational" task has been completed.[1] One would not however refer to a physician as "educated" if he had only mastered the skills involved in his profession. The kind of knowledge that an educated man has must also satisfy further requirements.[2]

First, the knowledge that an educated man has must not be knowledge that is received without being "utilized, tested or thrown into fresh combinations." It must not be inert.[3] That is, the knowledge of an educated man must affect the way he looks at things generally. A person who knows architecture may very well be able to answer any "classroom" questions in his field, but in that case he would only be "informed" unless

what he knows affects the way he views the world around him.[4] If the architect is unable to utilize his "knowledge" in his daily living beyond his profession, it cannot be correct to call him "educated". His would be specialized "knowledge", a skill useful only in specific cases for utilitarian reasons. Even though this knowledge is part of "education", it is not the whole of it. A person who possesses this kind of knowledge is merely "informed" not "educated".

Second, the knowledge of the "educated" man must be shown by the individual to be relevant to other knowledge he has acquired, so that it is consistent with other acquired information and produces a coherent body of knowledge. In this way the knowledge of an educated man will be shown by him to be relevant and useful to other information he has, provided that he has useful information only. The information he has should be used, and what is utilized (so far as practicable) should be shown to be relevant to other knowledge he has.[5] Knowing is involved in both inert and non-inert knowledge, but only in non-inert knowledge does understanding become important. The informed person who only "knows" inert ideas does not "understand" the knowledge he has acquired. Inert knowledge only enables him to perform certain limited tasks. He has only been "taught to" or "taught how" which, as Ryle notes in "Teaching and Training", incorporates only a few items of quotable information.[6]

Education then is "the art of utilization of knowledge".[7] As we

have seen, the information that is utilized must be "understood". "Education with inert ideas is not only useless: it is, above all things harmful."[8]

The type of "knowledge" that results in "education" in the true sense is the knowledge Socrates stressed in the Meno when he stated "virtue is knowledge". The "knowledge" of the "educated" man involves a commitment that comes from being "on the inside of a form of thought and awareness."[9]

> "A man cannot really understand what it is to think scientifically unless he not only knows that evidence must be found for assumptions, but knows also what counts as evidence and cares that it should be found."[10]

A person whose "knowledge" is limited to the skills of his vocation or profession possesses knowledge about things that are external to him. It does not necessarily have any real integral effect on the way he thinks or lives his life. He has only acquired information for the purpose of performing the skills of his job. Competency in a particular vocation or profession would serve little purpose if the resultant carpenter or physician was open to condemnation as a person.[11]

Our concern therefore turns to the "education of men". "Moral education" becomes an important part of educating the whole man rather than limiting education to those things that pertain to a person in respect of his competence in any specialized skill, activity or mode of thought.[12] This plea for "education", rather than vocational training or training for

utilitarian purposes only, is that of "liberalized education".[14] Training here implies that the educational aim is limited to the development of competence within the confines of a particular mode of thought or skill.[15] The "knowledge" acquired through training would in most instances only be information because it does not necessitate that the individual question or evaluate the acquired knowledge in terms of what he already knows. The result is only an "informed" person, not an educated one. The individual is only "trained" rather than "educated" because of the end to which his acquisition of knowledge is directed. "Education" for the sole purpose of getting a job implies that the individual is to be educated to do something, this "doing" being so important that the individual as a person is subordinate to the educational aim and is essentially neglected. "Education", on the other hand, suggests a linkage with a wider system of beliefs.[16] The aim of education in this instance is self-development. It encompasses three distinctions:

i) it implies the transmission of what is worthwhile to those who become committed to it;

ii) it must involve knowledge and understanding and some kind of cognitive perspective, which are not inert;

iii) it at least rules out some procedures of transmission on the grounds that the acquired knowledge lacks willingness and voluntariness on the part of the learner.[17]

It is necessary to explore the implications involved in these educational goals in order to determine their usefulness as a guideline for

"educating the whole person". Education passes on something of value. The value, however, must lie within some objective that is worthwhile. If the teaching of something can only be justified by saying that it will enable someone to achieve something else which is valuable, then the activity is not totally educational. It will most likely result only in training or informing the individual. Again, this is part of education, not the whole of it.

Education must, secondly, have a wide cognitive perspective. Education is to deepen and broaden experience and understanding. The teaching of a subject in a narrowly conceived way would not result in a true educational experience. History taught as only related to the past and not to literature, morals, or social structures would not enable the student to have the "wide cognitive" perspective that education demands. Rather, it would narrow the learner's understanding of history.

To say, however, that education has intrinsic value is hard to justify. For one to admit that something is intrinsically valuable one must concede that this thing is valuable in itself. The question that remains is, how can the pursuit of knowledge be justified as the intrinsic end of education?

Hirst clarifies this:

> To question the pursuit of any kind of rational knowledge is in the end self-defeating, for the question itself depends on accepting the very principles whose use is finally being called to question.[18]

One would not question the pursuit of knowledge unless one was already on the "inside of a form of knowledge", for it is only from being in the position of caring that such questions are asked. Further, by questioning knowledge as intrinsically valuable one is utilizing the same rationale that makes the pursuit of knowledge intrinsically valuable. By denying the value of the pursuit of knowledge one is denying the very foundation upon which the original question was based. To question the pursuit of knowledge already indicates a commitment and understanding on the part of the individual.

> The grasp of what is meant by the intrinsic value of seeking knowledge must be largely dependent on one's grasp of the standards which are built into particular forms of knowledge.[19]

People who engage in an activity or sport generally come to care about what they are doing in the same way that those who engage in the pursuit of knowledge come to care about its pursuit.

The caring involved in the pursuit of knowledge involves a change on the part of the individual. It indicates a commitment by the individual that shows he is on the "inside of a form of thought and awareness". "It is a logical contradiction that a man has been educated but has in no way changed for the better."[20]

Thirdly, education rules out some methods of transmission because the learner is not free to interpret the information that is given to him. The acquired knowledge would not require any participation by

the learner. He would not be required to volunteer his opinion, nor would it demand a willingness on his part to accept the information in light of other things he knows. It is not educational for a student to learn a predetermined set of concepts that must be interpreted in a particular way. This amounts only to indoctrination; it prevents the learner from thinking. He can neither reject an interpretation nor formulate one of his own; he must learn only what is given to him. The knowledge acquired through education cannot be limited to one mode of thought any more than it can be limited to doing one thing. The former results in indoctrination, the latter training.

The above aims of education are those of "liberalized" education. "Liberalized" education eliminates the restrictions on curriculum that limit it to those things deemed directly relevant to doing something. It demands that the mind should not be restricted to one mode of thought.[21] It eliminates the possibility of training someone to see the world in a particular perspective as the whole of education. A scientific or historical perspective would still result in "training" rather than "education" because it would limit the way one looked at the world. "Men could be trained to some extent in other ways of thinking."[22] The demand for "liberalized" education also concerns the tendency to constrain people's beliefs. Education should not limit beliefs to narrowly-conceived or doctrinaire lines because these too would demand no cognitive involvement on the part of the individual

and result in an accumulation of "information" but not education.[23]

"Education" must then involve knowledge, understanding and some kind of cognitive perspective which is not inert. Man's education must affect the way he looks at things. He must "act" on the knowledge he acquires through education and not just passively accept it.

The process of education is restricted so that only what is of value is passed on, the knowledge transmitted has a wide cognitive perspective, and the learner is not required to passively accept the given information. If the learner is only "educated" in those things that enable him to perform a particular job, it is questionable if it is to the ultimate benefit of society. Of what service is a lawyer if he can be condemned as a person? "Liberalized" education on the other hand demands that the physician be also knowledgeable in other things beside those necessary for him to be a doctor. This view of education sees the individual not just as someone educated to perform a particular job, but also as a citizen, parent, friend, etc. Consequently, "liberalized" education demands that the physician must also learn history, politics, law, and the like. In this way, the educated person will not only be trained to do something but he will also be able to perform his responsibilities as a parent, citizen, etc. "Liberalized" education implies that an educated person is expected to perform social functions beyond the scope of his profession. It is because of this that

liberal educators feel that the child should be taught what is right and wrong. One's daily living, both as a citizen and as an employed individual, constantly involves judgements as to the rightness or wrongness of particular decisions. These judgements depend upon an individual's character and how he sees himself in relation to the world around him.

Moral education, then, becomes an important part of "educating for men" because the whole person is being taken into account. It relates both to one's profession and daily living. The mastery of the skills in a particular profession only result in a person being "informed"; the person may still "be condemned as a person". Education must not allow for this possibility. It must consider the whole person which necessitates the inclusion of "moral education" within the concept of "education". The reference here is something different from history, science, English, medicine, law, and religion, yet coordinate with them.

A program of moral education, provided that it is part of "education", must be in accordance with the educational guidelines that have been set up. It seems likely that certain methods of teaching moral education can be eliminated because the knowledge acquired would only be inert and the method by which it was taught denied voluntariness of the learner, because he was not free to interpret the acquired knowledge.

Once a method of teaching moral education has been decided upon it remains to be determined whether or not the knowledge that the learner acquires is presupposing a normative system of ethics. For if this is the case then the knowledge acquired would only be inert and the learner's "education" would result in little more than indoctrination.

FOOTNOTES--Chapter II

1. E. Maynard Adams, "Ethics and the Aims of Education", in Education and Ethics, edited by Blackstone and Newsome (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1969), pp. 33-36.

2. Alfred North Whitehead, The Aims of Education (New York: The Free Press, 1967), Chapter 1, pp. 1-14.

3. Whitehead, p. 1.

4. R.S. Peters, Ethics and Education (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970), p. 31.

5. Whitehead, p. 4.

6. Gilbert Ryle, "Teaching and Training", in The Concept of Education, edited by R.S. Peters (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), p. 109.

7. Whitehead, p. 4.

8. Whitehead, pp. 1-2.

9. Peters, p. 31.

10. Peters, p. 31.

11. Adams, p. 33.

12. Peters, p. 35.

13. Peters, p. 34.

14. "Liberalized education" differs primarily from "Liberal education" in this respect: a liberal education does not direct the learner towards a particular profession or job, but rather he is taught how to learn so he can decide for himself what he wants

to do. In a liberal education the learner is given the basics in all subjects so that if he is later required to learn something to function as an individual, he is able to do so. All aspects of education lead toward personal fulfillment. Liberal education does not take the changing needs of society into account per se, but rather sees the fundamental needs of society as unchanging; that is, the need for educated men and women. The individual is educated to adapt to any and all situations on his own.

Liberalized education, on the other hand, recognizes that education must educate the child to fulfil the jobs that society deems necessary for it to function successfully. Therefore, it is educationally acceptable to train someone for a position in society provided he is also acquainted with other subject matter and his education does not result in indoctrination. Education in this "liberalized" sense directs itself towards the ends of society yet still demands that the individual is an autonomous individual and can function outside of the profession or trade for which he was trained.

15. Peters, p. 35.

16. Peters, p. 32.

17. Peters, p. 45.

18. P.H. Hirst, "Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge", in Philosophical Analysis and Education, edited by R. D. Archambault (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1965), p. 127.

19. James Gribble, Introduction to Philosophy of Education (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971), p. 46.

20. R.S. Peters, p. 25.

21. Peters, p. 44.

22. Paul H. Hirst, "Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge", in Philosophical Analysis and Education, edited by R. D. Archambault (New York: The Humanities Press, 1965), pp. 113-138.

23. Peters, p. 34.

Chapter III

THE PROBLEMS OF TEACHING MORAL REASONING

Moral education at first seems to be a denial of what has been said about the need for "liberalized education". "Moral" can mean "right", which implies that "moral education" will be restricted to predetermined standards. This is the case because "moral" and "ethical" are often interchangeable with "right" and "good". But one also talks of moral or ethical judgements, arguments or points of view. Here "moral" and "ethical" do not mean what is morally right or ethically good, but indicate that such arguments, judgements, reasons, etc., pertain to morality and ethics. For the purposes of this analysis "moral education" will be taken in the latter sense as education pertaining to morality. One is not appealing to the former definition because this would assume that a normative system of ethics was being used as a standard whereby to determine the "right" that is to be taught. This would not be "education" for our purposes because the process of teaching would then necessarily limit the child's thinking. That is, the child would only be taught one way to do things--the "right" way. Further, as discussed in chapter one, the possibility of a normative system, as "the" system which is universally

acceptable, cannot be conclusively established. A normative system of ethics is further unacceptable to "liberal" educators because it would only result in "training". This is because the adoption of one normative system of ethics would result in the child's being "educated" to see the world around him in one way only, thus limiting his "knowledge" to information which does not serve educational purposes.

"Moral education", then, is education pertaining to morality. The question, "What is morality?" naturally follows. For, in order to determine if morality is teachable one must try to discover what morality is "in and by itself". The idea, as Frankena suggests[1], is the idea of an action-guide that is both rational and social. In this sense, morality is part of the social institution of life. "It is a way of looking at the world that parallels other approaches such as logical, religious, historical, scientific and aesthetic."[2] Given that moral knowledge could be ascertained, justification of moral education would be based on the same argument that would be used to justify the inclusion of mathematics or physical education in a school curriculum. Although this knowledge cannot be conclusively ascertained, the "education" of a child would not be complete without it because his cognitive perspective of the world around him would be limited. "Moral education" is only one part of education, which has as its subject matter, "Life in all of its manifestations".[3] Morality is concerned with fair play and harmony between individuals, the harmonising of things inside each

individual, and the general purposes of human life as a whole.[4]

"Moral education" should then complete the educational aim to educate the whole person, providing, of course, moral "knowledge" of some sort can be ascertained. But it must be done in accordance with the aforementioned guidelines; it must result in an "educated" rather than a merely "informed" person. Our primary concern is to avoid indoctrination. Initially it was stated that given that there was no difficulty in determining the content of a subject to be taught, then one need only worry about the intent on the part of the educator to avoid indoctrination. Indoctrination is a mixed notion; it involves both the nature of the knowledge taught and the way in which the knowledge is transmitted.[5] Given that moral knowledge cannot be determined, one cannot dismiss it as part of education or dismiss its teaching as not important. Moral education is an important part of "education". When we speak of educating for the whole person, one cannot just teach part of the subject matter and neglect the rest.

Given that the content of moral knowledge cannot be ascertained, one can evaluate programs of moral education for their educational significance by checking the method by which "moral education" is to be taught. There appear to be three methods by which one can teach morality: historical survey, the teaching of moral beliefs, and the teaching of moral thinking.

A historical survey would consist of teaching the learner how

men viewed morality in the past, what types of things were considered to be moral and immoral, and why given the social environment they were regarded as such. This method of "moral education" does not necessarily presuppose a normative system because all systems are being taught. However, this would not result in "education". Knowledge on the part of the learner is involved. He will know how people in a particular era regarded morality, but there is little if any understanding. The child's moral education has resulted in little more than acquainting him with how others view morality. He still does not have any knowledge that is useful to him. He is still on the outside of morality looking in. "Education" demands that the learner be on the "inside", not a passive bystander. This type of "moral education" need not result in any change in how the child viewed the world nor is it likely to give him anything but "inert" knowledge.

Teaching moral beliefs could be done in a similar manner to a historical survey. Since this has been ruled out as non-educational, one must look elsewhere. Moral beliefs could be taught to the learner by rote. The learner would be required to recite why it is that certain acts are right, and expected to act accordingly. However, this would assume first, that a normative system was already adopted, hence resulting in indoctrination. Second, there would be little understanding on the part of the individual. There is a difference between being taught to believe something and believing something. In the former case, there

is neither understanding nor freedom on the part of the individual. He believes something not by choice but because he has been told to believe. In the latter case, the individual, by choice, and through understanding has come to believe that something is right, wrong, etc. The teaching of moral beliefs does not provide for freedom of the individual to choose for himself and it does not attempt to help the child understand why certain things are believed to be right. The child does not have the choice of accepting or rejecting the belief, its teaching by intent is still indoctrination. The child has not arrived at the belief by his own choice, it has been taught to him.

One is left then with teaching moral thinking. This can be done in two ways: (1) by teaching the child predetermined moral judgements, or (2) by teaching the child how to make moral judgements. The former is non-educational on the same grounds as teaching moral beliefs because it would only result in indoctrinating the learner with useless "information". The latter cannot be so easily dismissed. Teaching the child how to make moral judgements will enable him to "be on the inside" of moral knowledge. His "moral education" will involve understanding. Given also that the learner is being taught how to make judgements rather than which judgements to make, it appears that no normative system of ethics is being presupposed. Rather than teaching the child a predetermined set of beliefs that derive their rightness from a normative system, the child is being taught the means whereby he can

decide that a particular moral judgement is right or wrong. Indoctrination does not seem to be explicitly implied either in content or method.

The teaching of normative ethics, or a predetermined set of judgements of moral obligation and moral value, will not satisfy the educational aim to "educate" the whole person. "Moral education" as the "right" education cannot be educationally justified. Education pertaining to morality, on the other hand, does not imply teaching "what is the case" but rather, how to decide what to do. It involves teaching a logic of justification of judgements of moral obligation and value,[6] it does not justify specific predetermined judgements. This latter position is preferable because it is believed that a "neutral" position is being taken as to what is "right" and what is "wrong".

The lack of agreement on the differing criteria of moral knowledge is eliminated. By teaching moral reasoning, or a method whereby one can make moral judgements, the educational aim of educating the whole person appears to be fulfilled, and no normative system is necessarily presupposed.

Is this method of teaching moral education as normatively neutral as one would like to believe? In order to answer this, the policy of the Ontario Ministry of Education, as found in Religious Information and Moral Development, the report of the Committee on

Religious Education in the Public Schools of the Province of Ontario,[7] will be taken as an example of a possible position that one could adopt to teach moral reasoning. Given that this position does not involve knowledge, understanding and a cognitive perspective which is not "inert", it will indicate that there is no position that will meet the educational aim to educate the whole person. Either, the aim must be changed to accommodate moral education or moral education cannot be taught.

The aim of this program of moral education is to stimulate moral reasoning rather than to inculcate moral absolutes. This position is justified in the following manner:

The aim of education, in general, is seen as character building. This alone is justifiable as the aim of education because it "enjoys a respectability of years". Many curriculum objectives have been used as the ultimate aim of education, but character building alone has survived through time. Few, if any, of the other objectives known from the history of education can claim the same durability.[8]

The desirable qualities of character, among other things, encompass a high degree of moral development and an awareness of those ethical ideals which are generally commended by society.[9] It would then be neglect on the part of education not to have a program of moral education when it is an important part of the aim of education. The character of the individual would not be fully "educated" if moral

education was neglected. The school then is justifiably responsible for this aspect of the child's education, even though this is not exclusively a school responsibility. [10]

Having decided that moral education was the responsibility of the school, it was the remaining task of the Committee to decide by what means character, ethics, social attitudes and moral values, and principles might be taught to the young. [11]

Morality as the Committee views it lies in a person's ability to make moral judgements. [12] Since education is a developmental process, moral education consists of helping the child through practice to make moral decisions. [13] The content of the moral judgements is not, however, the important objective, it is rather the moral point of view or formal character of a particular moral judgement or moral decision that is important. By using a definition of morality that makes the process of making a judgement more important than normative judgements, conduct is separated from morality. This avoids the assumption that morality is only conduct. [14] Conduct will be used as a measure of the level of moral development that the child is at, [15] not as a measure of the "morality" of the child. Socially desirable behaviour and social adjustment should not be and are not, according to this position, the immediate purpose of moral education. However, moral conduct will be a probable consequence of moral education [16] and social adjustment will be evidence of moral development. [17]

These conclusions are a result of the belief that norms of conduct based on moral reasoning are more widely applicable than conduct based upon moral absolutes. [18] A child in the former instance will always be able to decide for himself what to do in a particular situation whereas in the latter instance a child would only be able to do those things he has been taught to do. It may well be that in the second case, given a new situation, the child has no idea how to decide what to do. Social adjustment and acceptable behaviour are a probable consequence of moral reasoning because moral judgements will appeal, through moral reasoning, to an absolute standard that the Committee believes lies solely in the precept of justice. This reflects a position similar to that of Rawls.

> "The primary subject of the principles of social justice is the basic structure of society, the arrangement of major institutions into one scheme of cooperation. These principles govern the assignment of rights and duties and they determine the appropriate benefits and burdens of social life." [19]

Given that a child reasons justly, chances are he will act in the same way. Justice is used because the most fundamental value of a society is termed moral value and the major moral value (at least in our society) is justice. [20] To reason morally is synonymous with thinking justly. The objective of the program of moral education must always be to encourage the individual to weigh the justice of alternative courses of action or of varying conclusions open to him. [21] It is this habit of

basing behavioural decisions on the highest moral reasoning (of which the individual is capable) that permits a universal consistency. If all men reason justly then no man will be condemned as a person, and the educational aim to "educate for men" will be fulfilled.

It is, first, not the responsibility of moral educators to decide what behaviour ought to be allowed or disallowed in society. When people who hold different moral beliefs disagree about a standard of behaviour the problem is social or political, not a moral problem. Second, it is not the Committee's responsibility to determine why people who hold definite moral principles and values fail to put these ideas into practice. This is the task of psychology. It is, however, the task of those involved in moral education, to help those who do not know what values and principles they hold and to teach them how to apply their moral ideas to specific situations.[22] What the moral educator does, however, should not conflict with those things that are currently accepted in society and psychology. The aim and method of a program or moral education must be in accordance with what purpose the school has in that society and what psychological principles have been adopted in other areas of learning.

The teaching of moral reasoning as outlined by the Committee is a refined view of moral education that reflects the conflict between old and new morality. The old is unacceptable because it is little more than indoctrination; the new is abandoned because it rejects the

general nature of morality.

This position helps the individual developmentally to become the autonomous individual that society expects him to be. The individual's character development is based upon those things society deems important and thus surpasses self-centered interests, yet is still individualistic because it demands that the individual choose for himself via the use of reason.

In addition, this view of moral education appears to be in accordance with the liberalized aim of education to educate the whole person, rather than to train him for a specific task or to indoctrinate him.

The task of the moral educator as seen by the old morality was to inculcate the rules or values of society. A disposition to live by these rules was taught, through the use of indoctrination, habituation, punishment and reward. The patterns of behaviour taught to the child were taken as complete and final because the contnent of morality was relatively fixed. Any method, even non-rational ones, were justified in making the child behave morally.[23] This position would be acceptable if morals were God-given, immutable or absolute because morality would be the same for adults and children alike. The mistake today is to believe that what mature morality contains is what we should teach the immature. Since morality is developmental this is an untenable position.

The new morality, on the other hand, sees moral education as not including moral lessons, the use of moral praise or blame or the inculcation of moral rules or ideals. It sees moral education as educating the child in an atmosphere of love and sincerity.[24] From a loving environment the child will emerge as a moral person. This latter approach is, however, contrary to the general nature of morality. True, the fear which underlay the old morality was too excessive in some instances, however, "if we totally remove fear from the life of the child, we end up wanting the child to obey a morality whose fundamental motives we do our best to remove."[25] The child must have a motive or reason to behave in a particular manner. Without a motive the child is led to believe "anything goes". A loving environment brings the child to the belief that there is no "wrong" act or judgement.

Fear as an educational concept has far-reaching inplications. The conscience develops on the basis of fear, and learning is modified more and more by reason. The diligence, concentration and perseverance demanded by education do not come from self-interest alone.[26] Those things come from irrational superego anxiety. The child experiences a conflict between what he wants to do and what others require him to do. This anxiety enables the child to see situations as potentially ego-deflating and make him want to do the right thing so he will be accepted by others. It is only when behaviour

becomes an inseparable part of personality that anxiety is no longer necessary. The child behaves not out of fear but rather because he wants to. Until self-interest takes over as a motive for the child to behave properly, which rarely happens before late adolesence, the child needs some fear to motivate him. By removing fear from the child's world a disservice is being done to him. Education in general, along with moral education, expects the child to postpone immediate pleasures (deny his immediate self-interest) in order to gain more lasting satisfactions in the future. This is what education demands in order for one to reach one's goals most effectively.[27] If the child is not able to postpone his immediate pleasures, he will only "learn" when he is happy, e. g. if the lesson is fun. This learning, however, does not result in "education" because the child is not required to re-organize knowledge on his own or put the concepts he has acquired into new combinations. He only acquires inert knowledge.

Teaching how to make moral judgements is an attempt to avoid the paradoxical position that moral education is no moral education[28] and yet react against the older traditional methods of moral education that resulted in little more than indoctrination. This teaching of how to make moral judgements, or "refined" morality has as its base a rigid belief in what is right and wrong based on fear of perdition,[29] a position that permits no shading, and no relativity. The sometimes-yes-sometimes-no position will only result in the child's feeling he

can do as he pleases. The teaching of moral reasoning will serve the purpose of a rigid base for morality. The child will have a standard by which to decide what to do (e. g. justice) and he will be required to make a moral judgement to the best of his ability.

The new morality does, however, make additional demands upon education. These too the "refined" morality recognizes. One must now somehow educate for an "independent arrival at a conviction of one's own accountability towards one's fellow man in addition to having a rational acceptance of justice as the proper atmosphere in which all individuals can flourish. "[30]

Character building, as an aim of a program to teach moral reasoning, needs further clarification. We speak of people "having character", that is, it is something we possess. From this we tend to speak naturally, in the moral sphere, of "training" character. What is in mind here is "persistence, incorruptibility and integrity in relation to the practice of principles. "[31] Character can also be used in a more non-commital sense referring to character traits. The "training" of character here would be to ensure "reliability of response in accordance with a code of ethics". This would suggest that the "reason why" of things would not be part of the endeavour to teach the child. [32]

Neither of these is considered in teaching moral reasoning. First, because "training" has an extrinsic end, and second, because

"the reason why" is by definition a necessary part of the teaching of moral reasoning. This position sees moral education and the building of character as indirectly teaching moral beliefs. That is, the curriculum involves questions of fact, and questions of justification in relation to moral beliefs that people hold. In teaching the reasoning involved in making the decision "I ought to do x", one also teaches the truth claim that "I believe that x is the right thing to do".[33] The teaching of moral reasoning does then indirectly involve people's beliefs.

"Character building" as an aim of moral education as seen by the Committee is also related to those things that are expected by society.[34] Morality as a social enterprise exists before the individual and is therefore not invented by him. In making society the object of moral conduct, one has surpassed the level of self-centered interests.[35] Without a social system, moral claims would amount to little more than shouting in the wind. Moral claims, in this respect, are like any other claims, legal or otherwise. The similarity lies in the fact that without a system to judge these claims, it would be questionable whether they meant anything at all. "A social system provides criteria for judging moral claims and for determining the goals of education."[36] Thus, for an individual his initial moral education is via an external system that makes demands on him. It is the ultimate aim of moral education to ensure that these external demands become internalized by the individual so he sees them as his own. At this point,

the demands made upon him by himself are not just for his benefit or others, rather they are "a combination of both the social and rational elements involved in morality."[37]

The "new morality" is right in demanding freedom on the part of the individual. "A certain amount of 'freedom from' is a necessary precusor to any positive achievement in moral education."[38] In a moral situation a person at some stage must be "free" to judge, decide, opt for or arbitrarily pick one alternative rather than another.[39] The aim of moral education is to teach the reasons one has for choosing one alternative rather than another, and thereby teach what to do. However, it must be remembered that a restrictive system and the tension that it can create involve an important element in achievement. "The removal of all difficulties and stumbling blocks may not necessarily be releasing, paradoxical though this may seem."[40] Freedom from restraints is a "negative freedom" and does not necessarily free the individual. To make a judgement with no standard by which to appeal for justification would leave the individual in a situation where he cannot decide what he is to do. For this reason, the standard of justice is imposed upon the child as a standard by which, through reason, he can make moral judgements.

Morality is not entirely social. It is social and individualistic. It is individualistic because it calls for the use of reason. As Socrates implied, "morality fosters or even calls for the use of a reason and a

kind of autonomy on the part of the individual, asking him, when mature, to make his own decisions and stimulate him to think out the principles or goals in light of which he is to make his decisions."[41] Education is not possible if the individual seeks authoritative moral prescriptions from some person or institution by which to govern his conduct. This would deny the individual's autonomy--he would not be on the "inside of a form of thought".

Moral education then is a process of development that enables an individual to become autonomous and it is therefore usual to distinguish between stages of moral development. The position in question uses the research of Lawrence Kohlberg as support. Kohlberg[42] suggests six stages for moral development grouped in three pairs:

> "There is the pre-moral level when the child obeys to escape punishment or to gain rewards. Then comes the level of conventional role conformity in which the child obeys to escape the disapproval or shame that might follow criticism. Third is the level of self-accepted moral principles."[43]

Generally speaking, in teaching moral reasoning, one is adopting a position that conforms to the aim to "educate for men" in that this method aims to educate the whole person.

A person's ability to make moral judgements is a sign of moral maturity. This reflects the work of Kohlberg. Kohlberg could, upon questioning a child about a particular moral situation, determine by the child's answer what stage of moral development he was in. This,

in turn, could be used as a guide to determine how a child would most likely answer other similar moral questions. Kohlberg could also predict that, given a certain group of children in a test situation where they were given an opportunity to cheat, those that were capable of a higher level of moral reasoning were less likely to cheat than those at a lower level. The child that reasoned at a particular level was most likely to behave in a certain manner that reflected his stage of development; this being very similar to the Platonic idea that "virtue is knowledge". Given a certain kind of knowledge, a man will be necessarily virtuous.

Kohlberg's stages reinforce the idea of teaching moral reasoning as the main content of moral education. In a given moral situation, a person must judge, decide or pick one alternative rather than another.[44] The aim of moral education is to teach the reasons one has for choosing one alternative rather than another. By teaching the child how to choose through the use of moral reasoning, we give him the necessary skills to pass through the stages of moral development outlined by Kohlberg. It will also enable the individual to attain the ultimate aim of moral education to arrive independently at a conviction of one's own accountability towards one's fellow man.

Teaching moral reasoning or how to make moral judgements, therefore, generally complies with the educational theory of education for man. It aims not to train but to educate. The ability to reason

morally will be reflected in behaviour. Secondly, this position also agrees with moral philosophy in general. "Traditionally moral philosophy has always been regarded as a practical science, a "science" because it is a systematic inquiry, the goal of which is knowledge, and "practical" because the goal is practical knowledge of what to do rather than knowledge of what is the case."[45] The approach of teaching the method whereby one can make moral judgements deems moral reasoning to be the teachable part of morality and uses it to "educate" the children to be able to decide what to do. They do not endeavour to teach the child "what is the case". This is left for the child to decide for himself.

In deciding to teach moral reasoning to the child, some educational problems have been avoided. Moral reasoning was chosen as the "knowledge" to be taught because it was believed to be common to all normative systems of ethics. This avoids the problem of teaching a specific normative system. Teaching one system may not be acceptable to those whose children are being taught. This is the case since no system is without faults and parents may claim their way to be equally valid. By teaching a normative system of predetermined judgements of value, the child is being taught what is the case and indoctrinated to act accordingly. This results in the child not being on the "inside" of what he is doing. The child does not understand "why" he is to act in a particular way.

The teaching of normative ethics does not satisfy the aim of education to build character. The teaching of moral reasoning is preferable primarily because it does not presuppose that certain moral judgements and values are right or wrong. It is neutral with respect to a normative system. It leaves the child free to make his own moral judgement as to what he ought to do.

This position is not, however, as "neutral" as the Committee would like us to believe. It is not clear that this position is "neutral" with regard to a normative system. First, in teaching how to make the moral judgement "I ought to do x", one is involved indirectly with normative ethics. Second, it is questionable if, in fact, a logic of justification of judgements of moral obligation and value based on moral reasoning, is normatively neutral.

In order to teach a child how to make the moral judgement "I ought to do x", the child will be taught moral reasoning which is equivalent to thinking justly.[46] This is not a normatively neutral position. In a moral situation a person must at some stage choose alternatives. "Moral education" will teach the child the reasons one has for choosing one alternative rather than another. In this way, one's moral judgements can be justified by giving the reasons for making the choice. It is not, however, enough to cite just any reasons to justify a moral decision; the reasons must be relevant to the situation. In other words, in justifying one's judgement to do something through the use of reason,

a person is committed to an appeal to a certain set of rules. Even though in making the final judgement "I ought to do x", no explicit appeal to a rule is made, there must be rules in order to make the judgement.[47] Moral judgements are made by appeals to descriptive reasons, which describe the situation at hand and make the reasons relevant to the situation. This appeal presupposes rules.[48] If it was not the case that one could appeal to some rules in order to make one's reasons relevant to the judgement "I ought to do x", then what would count as adequate justification of one's moral judgement? Would it be a judgement if it could not be justified?

One must then determine what is a "good" reason or reasons to justify a moral judgement. As Baier explains, "If in offering something as a reason for a moral judgement, one has reason on one's side, then what one has offered as a reason for the moral judgement must be a "good reason"."[49] One must then appeal to some sort of rule in order to determine if his reason is "reasonable" and thereby a "good reason" for the moral judgement.

For example, if I have been cheated, I have a desire for revenge upon the person who cheated me. In justifying my desire for revenge, I would state that "I have been cheated". It is, however, only because there is a moral regulation about cheating that using "I have been cheated" is relevant to the situation. If there was no moral rule about cheating, then any "descriptive" reason that mentioned

cheating would not be relevant to anybody's judgement to get back at the person who cheated. The reason given to justify the decision would not be "reasonable" and, therefore, not a "good" reason. The situation cannot be left as it stands. Although there is a moral rule about cheating this does not justify my judgement to get revenge. This justification must be made by an appeal to higher rules that some would be inclined to call moral principles.[50]

For the present, putting the "moral principles" aside, what are the "moral rules"? Gert, in The Moral Rules,[51] defines them in this way:

Moral Rules are universal[52] in that they have no reference to any specific person, group, place or time. All rational men are required to obey them at all times. For this reason, they must be understandable by all men and capable of being followed by them.[53] They are unchanging and unchangeable, discovered rather than invented, and not dependent on the will of any men or group of men.[54]

The content of moral rules is restricted not to promoting good, but rather to avoiding causing evil. Moral rules do not require one to act to be moral.[55] If one formulates moral rules in a positive manner, e.g. "Promote happiness", one is implying that to be moral, a person must act. This is not always the case. A person does not have to act to be moral. One only has to keep promises if one makes them. It seems to be a more adequate explanation of what morality is about if

one uses "Don't cause pain", rather than "promote happiness". The latter case implies one is required to be consistently acting in order to be moral, which clearly is not the case. In the former case, one need only act when a non-action will cause someone pain.

These necessary, and what Gert believes to be sufficient conditions of moral rules, separate moral rules from other guides for conduct. Men are rational and because they seem to advocate obedience to moral rules as being very important, Gert takes this as well as other characteristics of moral rules and constructs ten moral rules. The primary consideration for Gert is that all rational men would have a "public" attitude toward the moral rules. This "public" attitude toward rules would not be egocentric because an adoption of an egocentric attitude would be irrational because it is self-defeating. The rules are formulated in a negative sense because of the criterion that one does not have to "do" something to be moral. The ideal of morality is rather to prevent evil.

All rational men advocate a public rational attitude toward the following ten rules, all of which have equal rank.

1. Don't kill;
2. Don't cause pain;
3. Don't disable;
4. Don't deprive of freedom or opportunity;
5. Don't deprive of pleasure;
6. Don't deceive;
7. Keep your promise;
8. Don't cheat;
9. Obey the law;
10. Do your duty.[56]

If Gert is correct, then teaching moral reasoning seems to be a relatively easy task. The child will be taught the ten moral rules which will enable him to determine if his reasons are relevant to a particular judgement and then, act in accordance with his judgement which he knows is "right", keeping in mind that to be moral one does not have to act. If a child decides he cannot keep promises then he only needs not to make promises in order to be moral.

However, are we not back where we began? A child cannot be considered "educated" if he is given "knowledge" that he doesn't actively work out for himself. By teaching ten moral rules (or a similar set of rules), the individual will be able to give reasons to justify, but the justification is only a set of predetermined rules he has been taught. Giving the child moral rules amounts to giving him "inert" knowledge. The child would only be "trained" to reason morally which is not acceptable as an educational aim. One's education would amount to indoctrination, and "to brand any act of teaching as propaganda or indoctrination is to damn it in the eyes of the educational world."[57]

If, however, the child could be taught to reason how these ten rules are to guide his decisions, then perhaps the "educational" value of Gert's ten rules could be saved. In making an appeal to a guide to justify moral statutes, one is making an appeal to moral principles or value judgements; that is, the justification of the moral rule "don't cheat" is based on the moral principle or value "Y". Value judgements

are related to moral rules in a somewhat similar manner as moral rules are to factual reasons. Moral rules tell which reasons are relevant to a moral judgement and value judgements tell which principles (e. g. "Y") are relevant to a moral rule. If rules are used to denote some guide to tell one which reasons are relevant to moral judgements, would not the relationship between value judgements and moral rules require a set of rules to tell one which rules are relevant to a moral principle? How will these moral principles be taught? If reasons are related to moral judgements by moral rules what relates a moral rule to a moral principle or value judgement? Gert needs to add another chapter to give us a second set of rules.

Even if this could be done, which is theoretically possible, what about the "moral education" of the child? One is still obligated to teach him moral reasoning if he is to be "educated". He is not to be given "inert" sets of rules that do little if anything for "education". The teaching of moral reasoning based on moral rules initially seems like a defensible position, but these rules must also be taught in an "educational" manner. The child must independently arrive at these rules so that they become his rules rather than those of another. The child will be able to give reasons for all the rules he has. They will amount to "knowledge" rather than "inert" rules that he cannot account for. The child can perhaps justify these rules if he knows the moral principles, but, how in turn would one teach the child to arrive at

these judgements of value?

If at this point one could accept the moral principles, our argument could end. However, in accepting moral principles to justify our moral rules, we must conclude that a normative system (predetermined principles) must be presupposed in order to make moral reasoning relevant. Some would argue that making value judgements is not really part of moral reasoning.[58] This, however, does not take away from the issue at hand. The issue is not whether value judgements are part of moral reasoning, but rather whether moral reasoning presupposes some normative system.

Without a normative system our independent moral judgements based entirely on moral reasoning seem to have no ultimate justification. Rules to justify reasons for a moral judgement necessitate a higher appeal to justify these rules being relevant to the reasons given. This, in turn, necessitates an appeal to some type of moral principles. The educator demands that these principles must also be independently justified by reasons which demand further rules. This system, without an ultimate base upon which an individual's moral reasoning is based, generates an infinite regress.

Those who choose to teach moral judgements by teaching moral reasons must first accept a normative system to prevent an infinite regress. If this is not acceptable they can devise another method of teaching the child so he does not have to arrive at moral concepts

"independently" or change the concept of "education" so that it does include some principles inculcated in the child, upon which to base moral reasoning. Second, in helping someone to make moral judgements through the use of moral reasoning, it must be ascertained if this can be done without also teaching the learner second-order beliefs which determine the cognitive status of moral statements, implicit in moral discourse, that might sometimes affect the content of his moral life. If it cannot be done, then in teaching moral reasoning one is "indoctrinating" the learner with a belief that the teacher's method of making moral judgements is the only correct one; that is, the teaching of moral reasoning would involve an implicit belief that justifies a person's decision to be rational. This belief is passed on to the learner through teaching him moral reasoning. The learner is not free to choose what method he wishes to adopt to justify his moral judgements because he is not aware of the various options. He is, though not explicitly, indoctrinated. This is because the bridging of the gap between second-order beliefs and first-order moral discourse involves a second-order assumption about moral judgements. That is the justification of a moral judgement presupposes a view as to the cognitive status of the moral statement. For example: a woman who is constantly beaten by her husband purchases a gun. The next day he chases her. She believes that he is going to beat her and perhaps even kill her (he had nearly succeeded on a previous occasion). The woman

pulls the gun, as he attempts to hit her, and kills him. The case is brought to court. Nine jurors decide she is not guilty of murder because she killed him in self-defense. The tenth decides, "She killed him. She is guilty." This individual on some basis decided that "It is wrong to kill". She killed him. She is guilty. He need not count any evidence given to show that the person committed the crime in self-defense as adequate evidence to change his decision. An intuitionist's moral judgements are true because the speaker sees them as true through insight, they are not accepted by a rational process but are intuited to be right or wrong. On the other hand, one may, through the use of moral reasoning, decide that because of the circumstances, the killing was in self-defense and the accused is not guilty of murder. Both individuals, in this case two jurors, have heard the same evidence in court, but have come to different decisions because of the underlying second-order belief about what counts as evidence for or against a moral judgement. The moral judgements differ, and further, the difference cannot seemingly be resolved. In the former case, moral discourse allows for no shading of moral absolutes, the latter allows for circumstantial evidence to influence moral judgements, neither individual accepting as valid the other's evidence for his judgement. In both cases, the second-order belief, implicit in moral discourse, has affected the moral judgement, and as a result has affected the content of moral life.

The teaching of moral reasoning can affect the moral life of the individual. The implicit belief that the individual must independently arrive at a moral judgement through the use of reason rules out the possibility that the individual can act on a judgement arrived at by intuition. (It is acknowledged that in other situations the two individuals would make the same moral judgement.) In the example given, the two sets of second-order beliefs about the cognitive status of moral statements conflict, and as a result the judgements differ.

Second-order beliefs implicit in moral discourse sometimes affect the content of moral life. The teaching of moral reasoning completes the task to educate the whole person. A moral education program that consists of a historical survey, the teaching of moral beliefs, or predetermined moral judgements will not meet this aim. It only results in a learner being "informed" or "indoctrinated". A program of moral reasoning initially seemed to imply that the student would be "educated". He would be on the "inside" of a form of knowledge in that the knowledge acquired is both understood and acted upon. Indoctrination did not seem to be implied either in content or method. Moral reasoning appeared to be neutral because it did not presuppose a predetermined set of moral judgements. Its method was acceptable because the child arrived independently at his moral judgements.

A program of moral reasoning avoids the problem of deciding what normative system to teach, in that moral reasoning is common

to all moral systems and does not presuppose any normative judgements. The teaching of a system of moral justification, is not however, as normatively neutral as one is led to believe. When one teaches moral reasoning, one is also inculcating an implicit belief as to the status of moral statements. The teaching of moral reasoning implies that moral statements are arrived at through a rational process by the individual. This belief rules out some methods of justification of moral statements (e. g. intuitionist) and may, as shown, affect the first-order moral discourse, or the moral life of the learner. Though not explicitly, the child is being indoctrinated. He is not totally free to judge as he pleases. A program of moral reasoning, though educationally preferable to an historical survey or teaching moral beliefs, in many ways, is not entirely normatively neutral. It does not teach specific normative judgements, but it does limit the cognitive perspective of the learner through its implicit second-order beliefs about the cognitive status of moral statements.

One must either change the aims of education to allow indoctrination, or eliminate moral education. The latter does not seem to be an option because moral education is an important part of "education". To neglect this area of a child's development and still claim he is "educated" would be an error. The former choice of changing educational aims to accommodate the teaching of moral reasoning appears to be preferable to not "educating" the child. It will become

clear that education pertaining to morality does involve the inculcating of moral absolutes and a program of moral education that does not do so is not truly "moral education".

FOOTNOTES--Chapter III

1. William K. Frankena, "The Concept of Morality", in Perspectives on Morality: Frankena, edited by K. E. Goodpaster (London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976), p. 131. Hereafter Frankena, "Concept of Morality".

2. Philip R. May, Moral Education in School (London: Methuen Educational Ltd., 1971), p. 30.

3. Whitehead, pp. 6-7.

4. May, p. 138.

5. R. T. Hall and J. U. Davis, Moral Education (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1975), p. 36.

6. W. K. Frankena, "Morality and Moral Philosophy", in Moral Education, edited by B. I. Chazan and J. F. Soltis (New York: Teachers College Press, 1974), p. 29.

7. Usually referred to as the Mackay Report.

8. The Report of the Committee on Religious Education in the Public Schools of the Province of Ontario, "Religious Information and Moral Development" (Toronto: Ontario Department of Education, 1969), p. 53. Hereafter referred to as Mackay Report.

9. Mackay Report, p. 41.

10. Mackay Report, p. 41.

11. Mackay Report, p. 41.

12. Mackay Report, p. 44.

13. Mackay Report, p. 44.

14. Mackay Report, p. 45.

15. Mackay Report, p. 49.

16. Mackay Report, p. 47.

17. Mackay Report, p. 48.

18. Mackay Report, p. 48.

19. J. Rawls, Justice as Fairness (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1971) as quoted by L. Kohlberg "From is to Ought", Cognitive Development and Epistemology, ed. T. Mischel (New York: Academic Press, 1971), p. 193).

20. Mackay Report, p. 48.

21. Mackay Report, p. 49.

22. Robert Hall and John Davis, Moral Education in Theory and Practice (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1975), p. 17.

23. Frankena, "The Concept of Morality", p. 162.

24. Frankena, "The Concept of Morality", p. 161.

25. Bruno Bettelheim, "Moral Education", in Moral Education Five Lectures (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 86.

26. Bettelheim, p. 89.

27. Bettelheim, p. 88.

28. Frankena, "The Concept of Morality", p. 161.

29. This perdition can relate to anything--physical punishment or loss of love--but it must be present.

30. N. F. Sizer and T. R. Sizer, "Introduction", in Moral Education Five Lectures, p. 4.

31. Peters, p. 43.

32. Peters, p. 43.

33. Raziel Abelson, "The Logic of Faith and Belief", in Religious Experience and Truth, ed. Sidney Hook (New York: New York University Press, 1961), p. 121.

34. Mackay Report, p. 41.

35. Emile Durkheim, Moral Education (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961), p. 123.

36. G.H. Bantock, Education and Values (London: Faber and Faber, 1965), p. 34.

37. May, p. 137 and Durkheim, p. 123.

38. Bantock, p. 96.

39. N. Fotion, Moral Situations (Yellow Springs: The Antioch Press, 1968), p. 20.

40. Bantock, p. 96.

41. Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1963) p. 7.

42. L. Kohlberg, "The Development of Children's Orientations Towards a Moral Order", Vita Humana, Vol. 6, 1963, pp. 11-33.

43. May, p. 27.

44. Fotion, p. 20.

45. P.H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics (London: Penguin Books, 1954), p. 11.

46. Mackay Report, p. 49.

47. R.M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 16-17.

48. M. Fotion, Moral Situations, p. 38.

49. Kurt Baier, "Good Reasons", in Readings in Contemporary Ethical Theory, edited by Pahel and Schiller (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 113.

50. Fotion, p. 42.

51. Gert's proof of moral rules is in general agreement with the criteria outlined by Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View (New York: Random House, 1969), Chapter 5.

52. Bernard Gerg, The Moral Rules (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 66.

53. Gert, pp. 66-67.

54. Gert, p. 67.

55. Gert, p. 70.

56. Gert, p: 125.

57. I. A. Snook, Concepts of Indoctrination (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), p. 9.

58. W. K. Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 8-10 and 47-48.

Chapter IV

INDOCTRINATION VS. REASONING

Teaching moral reasoning is a response to the general "liberalization" of education. The aim to "liberalize" education is opposed to the indoctrination and strict discipline that limit the freedom of the learner and result in the individual having a narrow cognitive perspective. In the past, the child was taught what was "right" or "wrong". If the child did not act in the predetermined "moral" manner, he was punished. This position is no longer acceptable. First, it does not allow for the freedom of choice that is necessary for a person to act morally. Second, it does not account for the position that the "intent" on the part of the individual is as important as the act. The moral education of the child, if only act-oriented, would only amount to moral training. "Liberalized" education implies that the method used by children to make moral judgements should be the content of moral education. It is not the intent of moral educators to determine if the judgements the child makes are "right" or "wrong" in terms of an ultimate action. Rather, the judgement is "justified" by the moral reasoning used to come to the decision; all judgements being proven

right in terms of what is the "just" thing to do. Justice is a universal standard that can be consistently applied in all situations. No other standard can be given the same placement in moral discourse because no other criterion is universally acceptable.

By teaching the child a method whereby he can arrive at an independent moral judgement, the teacher imparts a "liberalized" education. His education does not consist of inert ideas, rather, those things that he "knows" he understands and are an important part of him. What he "knows" is reflected in his thoughts and actions and shapes his "character". However, will all these things make him a moral person?

Assuming that the child uses justice as a determining factor in his judgements, what kind of situations will he be able to resolve for himself? The teacher in the classroom must be cautious in his selection of examples that he will present to the class for discussion. The examples should relate to situations that the child has been in. The educator must not word the example in such a way that it predetermines a "right" judgement or a "wrong" one. It is important that the child be able to interpret the situation so that he can give relevant reasons for the judgement he would make, and listen to the reasons given by other students in order to determine the "just" thing to do. The "just" judgement is aided by the child's ability to empathize. The child must be left free to decide for himself what

should be done. This classroom practice in making moral judgements, by taking the role of the other, will enable the learner to understand what justice is, thus making it possible for the learner to make "just" judgements on his own.

> "... 'role taking tendencies' and the 'sense of justice' are interlocked. While role taking in the form of sympathy often extends more broadly than the sense of justice, organized or "principled" forms of role taking are defined by justice structures. In order for roles and rules to represent a socio-moral order, they must be experienced as representing shared expectations or shared values, and the general shareability of rules and role expectations in an institution rests centrally upon a justice structure underlying specific rule and role definitions."[1]

The child could, through the use of moral reason, ascertain why it is not right to steal from another student. He would be able to reason that he may have a similar object which he prizes and would not think it just to have someone steal it from him. Similarly, he can appreciate that equivalent reasons apply in the "adult" world. However, it seems that we are demanding something of a child that we do not demand of an adult. The adult has predetermined standards of justice that are set down by laws that in some situations predetermine what he ought to do. One is legally accountable for one's actions because the laws reflect moral sanctions that are more fundamental than, and reflected in, the law. The child is required to reason morally certain judgements of justice that he arrives at independently of predetermined normative moral sanctions. What if the child does not

develop an "independent" judgement that determines "I ought not to steal"? It is possible to question him and decide if his reasoning is "morally defective". However, what is one to do if the child does not see that what he has decided is not the "just" thing to do? Can the teacher stand back and watch while a child continues to steal from other students? Is the teacher justified in devising a scheme whereby something that the child values is stolen to "teach him a lesson"? The injustice of the child's act of stealing, combined with the injustices that others must seemingly tolerate do not result in justice. The teacher must intervene. In the "adult" world, a person who is caught stealing is punished. It does not matter what reasons the guilty party gives for the violation of the law, be it poverty, greed, ignorance or revenge, punishment is assigned. In situations where the child decides he is justified in stealing, it is in accordance with fundamental moral sanctions that he should be punished also. An adult does not act totally from the kind of moral reasoning that the child is taught. Punishment for the violation of certain predetermined standards of behaviour is a deterrent in many instances for the adult, because legal accountability is based on moral responsibility. However, accountability with respect to the law is legal not moral. Moral responsibility is more fundamental. Both are based upon a "sense of justice" but it is often more difficult to decide what one "ought to do" if there is no legal sanction that clearly defines

one's responsibility. Moral accountability, rather than legal responsibility, would be brought to question in situations where there was a more fundamental human involvement. One has no legal responsibility to help an injured person, however one would want to say there is a moral responsibility. The teaching of moral reasoning demands that all judgements made by the child be made to the best of his ability. This implies that, if "I ought to do x" meets the above criterion, in that it is morally reasoned, then the child is justified in performing the act. A program of teaching moral reasoning does not account for the problem concerning the child who does not act in a "just" manner. The child who steals, or does not help the injured person, does not see that the act of stealing and refusing aid are unjust. He cannot evaluate the situation to see that he is wrong because of a fundamental moral sanction. On the other hand, the child may have morally reasoned his act of stealing or denying aid which is all that is seemingly demanded of him. However, it seems also that we want to demand, regardless of what the child thinks, that he does not steal and helps those in need. This means that there are certain predetermined moral judgements which we expect the child to make.

Educationally, it is preferable to teach the child moral reasoning rather than a predetermined set of moral judgements. Teaching moral reasoning leaves the child free to judge what is the right thing to do and is non-indoctrinatory. But what is gained if the child decides

that cheating and stealing are "just" acts?

One cannot dismiss a child's inability to ascertain that stealing is wrong in the same manner that one would discharge his failure in other school subjects.[2] The inability to perform certain mathematical functions, such as long division, does not affect one's life in the way that a failure to reason morally would. Morality affects the whole of one's life, and a failure in this area of education is more far reaching in implication than any other subject area. The inability to do mathematics is limiting, but only in certain instances, such as calculating bills, filling out income tax returns, or pursuing a career as a chemist or mathematician. However, one can still function in daily life without mathematics; calculators can be used in times of need, and there are many professions that do not require extensive mathematical knowledge. Morality is different. One cannot go on in life without the ability to reason morally or morally to understand that killing, stealing, cheating, refusing to aid those in need etc. are unjust. One cannot function as a professional fulfilling a role in society or as a person in the role of friend, father or lover without upholding certain basic moral principles. There are some basic moral principles that are expected to be heeded by all. A program of moral education that allows for judgements such as "stealing is just", that are contrary to these basic principles, clearly is somehow lacking.

Are we then any further ahead by teaching moral reasoning

rather than indoctrinating predetermined normative patterns of behaviour? In both instances, an individual will have a set of principles by which he makes moral judgements. Indoctrinated principles, even though educationally unacceptable, do not seem to breed immoral adults.[3] But, on the other hand, teaching moral reasoning in accordance with liberal educational guidelines seems to necessitate[4] putting predetermined moral standards of behaviour to one side. As the pendulum of educational ideals swung from traditional to more "liberalized", something has been lost. It has not been proven that indoctrinated principles do not play an important part in developing self-discipline and character in the child. Indoctrination has negative connotations, however teaching something by this method may not be completely detrimental if what is being taught is right and true. It may be that in many cases what appear to be negative aspects of indoctrination, such as a narrow cognitive perspective or predetermined set ways that limit the learner's freedom, are in fact necessary. A child must learn that pleasures in the present must be put off until the future in order for him to be successful in education. Not all lessons can be fun. Many pleasures must be postponed in order for the child to be able to think things out and ensure that the knowledge he has acquired is not inert. The enjoyment of talking and physical activity must be postponed in order to learn necessary skills. It is recognized that the traditional system did not take into account the

fact that the child needed some freedom, but the "liberalized" response seems to grant too much freedom. We are demanding more of the child than of a mature moral adult. A middle position that would include the positive aspects of both traditional and "liberalized" education would allow for freedom of choice, yet would impose some predetermined standards. This appears to be the best course of action.

The aforementioned difficulties are, however, practical matters that could theoretically be handled by a program of moral reasoning. Yet there remains an important question that a program of moral reasoning does not account for. A moral situation is a situation in which an individual must choose between alternatives. His choice is indicated by a judgement, justified by reasons that are relevant to the judgement via rules. These rules in turn appeal to principles. There are, however, two non-moral and more importantly, sometimes non-rational factors which affect an individual's choice: "feelings brought to and caused by the situation, and the particular context of the situation".[5] Moral education as outlined by the Mackay Report does not account for the possibility that an individual in a given moral situation may already have feelings or attitudes toward certain judgements. A person educated in the art of moral reasoning seemingly makes no appeal to attitudes or dispositions. He must judge on the basis of reason, not why he feels he

"ought to do x". Even though feelings and attitudes can be said to be rational in nature, it does not follow that a program of moral reasoning will develop them. Does the moral person actually consider, in certain situations, what he must do? Does he not merely act from a feeling that what he is doing is the right thing to do? Would we not say that in a true "moral sense" the moral man has certain feelings that he uses to guide his actions? The Mackay Report takes no note of this factor. From the development of moral reasoning it is difficult to formulate even theoretically, how one would develop "feelings" toward particular judgements except in the context of "Yes I feel this judgement is right because it can be justified by these reasons which conform to this rule, etc." The morality of the Mackay Report is totally founded upon relations between the individual, justice, and reason; that is, it depends upon how the individual evaluates the relation between himself and the moral situation. A relation is set up by the individual between all the relevant reasons one would give to justify "I ought to do x", and justice as sanctioned by the society in which the individual participates. It does not account for the position that,"morality cannot be founded upon a relation. It has to appeal to feelings."[6] The Mackay Report has made it plausible to teach the child the relations that are an important factor in morality, but, what of the feelings?

The issue at hand is:

> "... whether moral appraisals proceed on the basis of discoveries made by the exercise of our natural faculties or whether they are made possible by and are relative to a decision that is unguided by moral experience and reasoning, and, makes moral experience and reasoning possible."[7]

That is, is reasoning enough for morality or is there, as the latter position suggests, something else upon which morality is based? How does the "feeling for the dignity of man",[8] that Durkheim professes is the aim of education, arise if only moral reasoning is taught? Whitehead alludes to a similar position concerning the necessity of "feeling", when he declares that, "Moral education is impossible without the habitual vision of greatness."[9] It seems very unlikely that a child will develop these attitudes towards dignity and the habitual vision of greatness by becoming familiar with moral reasoning.

A look at the postulations of Hume only reinforces the position that the Mackay Report has neglected an important part of morality. Reason judges either matters of fact or of relations.[10] Reason never accounts for the ultimate ends of human action; they recommend themselves exclusively to our feelings and inclinations. "Morality, therefore, is more properly "felt" than judged."[11] The understanding or judgement in a moral deliberation can make the decision "I ought to do x" so long as it only concerns the means to an end. However, the understanding from which judgements are formulated does not have the ability to make the decision about the merit of the ultimate end.

Reason cannot ultimately determine what is "morally right" and "morally wrong", only feelings or dispositions can.

In addition to the knowledge of how to make moral judgements that a program of moral reasoning will ensure, the child needs "an unchangeable disposition to act in the right way". [12] This disposition that Aristotle speaks of, develops not from moral reasoning but rather from a continuous habitual performance of right actions from which the child acquires the disposition to act in the right way. The teacher, therefore, is required to ensure that the classroom environment is such that the correct example of moral behaviour is experienced by the child. In this way, the child will develop the disposition to act in a similar manner. A child who steals would represent a bad example for others and, therefore, the teacher is justified in correcting his behaviour. The child needs both moral knowledge and habit to be morally educated. The habits that the child develops before he is capable of being a moral agent enable him at a later stage of development to reason why these habitual acts are required of him. For:

> "Virtue is of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth... and its growth to teaching, while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit. "[13]

The set of habits derived from experience in childhood make "all the difference in the world. "[14]

This same view is expressed by Russell,

> "I am convinced that, if a child up to the age of six has been properly handled, it is best that the school authorities lay stress upon purely intellectual progress and should rely upon this to produce the further development of character which is still desirable."[15]

If an important part of a child's moral education takes place before the child reaches the age of six years, then the responsibility lies outside the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education.[16] If the basis of a disposition to act in a moral way is developed through the habitual performance of right actions before the age of six years, then the parents must either assume responsibility or place their child in the care of someone who will ensure that these attitudes are developed in their initial stages. It does not seem possible that the school can adapt to children who arrive at kindergarten without a sense of right and wrong unless "educational" objectives such as reading readiness and basic word skills are put off until a later date. This is confirmed by Bettelheim.[17] It is his belief that the parent plays a very important role in the child's life before he reaches school age. It is the parents' responsibility to discipline the child consistently when he does wrong, in order to develop in the child the beginnings of a disposition to behave in a socially predetermined manner. The decision concerning how to discipline the child is the responsibility of the parent. If the "love relationship" is strong enough between parent and child then the "withholding of

love" is an effective disciplinary action. If the relation between parent and child does not have a strong basis of love then physical punishment may be in order. Both actions result in the child knowing that he has done wrong and enabling him to develop a "good" feeling when he performs a right act. The feeling of, "I have done wrong" must accompany all wrong actions[18] to develop a positive sense of value within the child. The child develops a sense of self-worth and a disposition to behave morally by experiencing the environment around him and learning that he must behave in a similar manner regardless of his desires or inclinations. It is only when there is a disposition to put off present pleasures that learning can take place.[19]

Provided it is true that no education can take place without the child learning to postpone present pleasures to a future time, the parent would be obliged to tend to the education of the youngster before school age in order to ensure that the beginnings of the disposition toward right actions are developed.

Moral education would not be a responsibility of the school if, as Russell believes,[20] parents disciplined their children properly before school age. However, (1) it seems to be the case that not all children arrive at school in a state of mind that Russell would approve; (2) even if moral dispositions are developed, there is still the intellectual part of virtue that develops from teaching. Moral education for these reasons can be defended as a responsibility of the school.

The difficulty remains: How does one go about teaching morality to a child? No normative system definitively contains a set of assumptions that we could all agree to call moral knowledge. Faced with this difficulty the Mackay Report chose "moral reasoning" as the knowledge that was common to all systems and could be taught in a "neutral" manner. Their position initially seemed in complete accordance with liberal aims of education. It did not appear to be a matter of indoctrination in content because moral judgements were to be made independently by the child or in intent because the child was taught a method whereby he could make the judgements rather than taught the judgements themselves. However, it is difficult to formulate how one would teach moral reasoning without teaching moral rules that would make the rules relevant to the situation. These rules need further rules or principles to justify their inclusion as relevant reasons for applying a particular rule to a moral judgement. The acceptance of predetermined moral principles is, however, excluded as a basis for moral reasoning because it would result in indoctrination. The child would only be informed, not educated, because he would not understand the principles that were being presupposed because he did not arrive at them independently. His moral education would only result in moral training which does not place the child on the "inside" of his moral knowledge. It is questionable if any metaethic, or method whereby one can make moral judgements, can be

adopted and claim normative neutrality. It is a mistake to claim that the teaching of moral reasoning is a normatively neutral position and fulfills the "liberalized" aim of education to educate the "whole person". The teaching of moral reasoning or any method of making moral judgements involves second-order beliefs about moral judgements. For example, second-order beliefs can affect an individual's judgements because they determine the cognitive status of the belief which determines what counts as evidence for one's judgement. Different second-order beliefs can affect a moral judgement and as a result a person's moral life.

However, it seems that one does want some basic moral principles to be held by all individuals. The educational aim to let the child make his own independent judgements could result in his deciding he is morally justified to steal. It seems that we want to uphold certain normative judgements regardless of what the child morally reasons.[21] If one changed the "liberalized" aim of education to include some indoctrinated principles, it is still not certain that the child would be moral.

"Morality involves a disposition to act in the right way"[22] because it is more properly "felt than judged".[23] This disposition comes from the habitual repetition of right actions and results in a positive attitude toward behaving in a "right way". One must adopt certain standards of action in the child's environment so that he can

experience what it is to act correctly and develop a habit to act likewise. An environment of "sometimes yes, sometimes no" will not develop any disposition to act in a predetermined way. The child will feel he can act as he is inclined.

It is only when the child develops a disposition through the repetition of right acts that he is ready for moral knowledge. At this time, he is a moral agent and is capable of learning the reasons why one behaves in a certain way. At this point, a program similar to that outlined by the Mackay Report could be implemented. The student could be given situations where there is no predetermined right or wrong act and asked to reason morally what he would do. One must, however, be more concerned, especially in elementary grades, with the development of attitudes and dispositions. Without the child becoming familiar with those things that are expected of him, it is unlikely that he will later develop a disposition whereby he will "feel" what is the right thing to do.

A moral education program in total agreement with "liberalized" aims of education does not result in the child being "educated" because (1) there is no method of making moral judgements that could be adopted that would be normatively neutral; (2) morality demands that the child hold certain predetermined moral principles in order to develop a disposition to perform right actions.

"Liberalized" educators must, in order morally to educate the child, change their aim of education so that certain moral judgements can be habitually inculcated. By habitually inculcating moral judgements one is indoctrinating the learner. However, the inculcated habits are those that are deemed right and true by the standard of justice, and without these habits a child will not be able to develop morally. The negative aspects of indoctrination, that "liberalized" education objects to, are in fact a necessary part of moral education. Morality is more important than any other aspect of education because without it the child cannot go on, not only in school but in his daily living. A program of education for the development of attitudes and dispositions would perhaps serve to develop the child in the ways the Mackay Report neglects to consider. It may ultimately also serve to educate the child morally in a more comprehensive manner than the proposed program of moral reasoning.

FOOTNOTES--Chapter IV

1. Lawrence Kohlberg, "From Is To Ought", in Gognitive Development and Epistemology, edited by Theodore Mischel (New York: Academic Press, 1971), p. 193.

2. It has been documented that intelligence plays an important role in one's ability to morally reason but should not be given undue emphasis. A child's inability to achieve academically does not necessarily mean he can not be held morally responsible for some if not all of his actions. Mackay Report, p. 42.

3. Indoctrinating moral principles would exclude the possibility of someone being "moral" in the sense that he freely chose to behave in a moral way. However, it does not exclude the possibility that he would "appear" to act morally because he would not steal, cheat or kill. He would not act in an immoral way.

4. The liberal educators claim they are not assuming predetermined normative judgements, but this is not philosophically possible. Chapter III, pp. 50-52.

5. Barry I. Chazan, "The Moral Situation: A Prolegomenon to Moral Education", in Moral Education, edited by B. I. Chazan and J. F. Soltis (London: Teachers College Press, 1973), p. 48.

6. Franz Brentano, The Foundation and Construction of Ethics, translated by Elizabeth Huges Schneewind (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 44.

7. E. Maynard Adams, "Ethics and the Aims of Education", in Education and Ethics, edited by Blackstone and Newsome (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1969), p. 39.

8. Emile Durkheim, Moral Education (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961), p. 183.

9. A. Whitehead quoted in May, Moral Education in School (London: Chaucer Press Ltd., 1971), p. 148.

10. David Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 287.

11. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 470.

12. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, translated by Thompson (Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books, 1955), II. 4. 1105a34. Hereafter designated as E. N. followed by the appropriate paragraph and line numbers.

13. E. N. II. 1. 1103a14-17.

14. E. N. II. 1. 1103b25.

15. B. Russell, "On Education" in Bertrand Russell on Education, edited by Joe Park (London: Allen and Unwin, 1964), p. 189.

16. The Ministry only has jurisdiction over education from kindergarten to grade thirteen. Day care is not included even though most day care centers are set up in accordance with government guidelines.

17. Bettelheim, pp. 85-107.

18. A wrong act being a result of breaking a set of rules that are consistently imposed on the child. A sometimes-yes-sometimes-no policy would defeat the purpose of discipline. The child must know what he can or cannot do.

19. This assumes that no education is possible without the child being capable of putting off present pleasures for future happiness. See Bettelheim, pp. 85-107.

20. Russell, p. 189.

21. Gert's moral rules could serve as a starting point.

22. E. N. II. 4. 1105a34.

23. Adams, p. 39.

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