THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE:
A STUDY IN BERNARD LÖNERGAN'S METHOD IN THEOLOGY

By

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ABSTRACT

Can Catholicism's claim to permanent and normative truths be reconciled with the changes in that religion brought to light by modern historical-mindedness? Such a question frames the modern problem of doctrinal development. The argument of this thesis is that the method in theology developed by Bernard Lonergan contributes much to the clarification and solution of this problem.

The thesis is divided into two parts. Part One introduces the problem of doctrinal development and examines the context of Lonergan's approach to the problem. The first chapter analyzes the French Modernist Alfred Loisy's position on doctrinal development. It is shown that the modern problem of doctrinal development turns on the issue of synthesizing the normative and the historical elements of doctrine; and it is argued that such a synthesis must be grounded in theological foundations appropriate to historical-mindedness. In the remaining two chapters Lonergan's contribution to the formulation of such foundations is discussed: his analysis of the transition from classicism to historical-mindedness (Chapter Two) and his development of transcendental method (Chapter Three). This discussion provides the context for our analysis of Lonergan's position on doctrinal development.

Part Two addresses in detail Lonergan's efforts to synthesize the permanent and the historical elements of doctrine. Chapter Four traces changes in Lonergan's reflections on doctrinal development over the past forty years, showing that the basis for his affirmation of the permanence of doctrine has altered significantly with changes in his understanding of the method and foundations of theology. Chapter Five examines Lonergan's Christian Philosophy, showing how transcendental method provides a basis for the synthesis of the permanent and historical in doctrine. And Chapter Six discusses how the method and foundations of theology proper to Lonergan's notion of functional specialization can provide for a viable mediation of the permanent meaning of a doctrine through varying cultural and historical contexts. On the basis of the foregoing analysis there follows a response to several criticisms of Lonergan's affirmation of the permanence of doctrine.

The argument of this thesis is of value in three related areas of scholarship. First, the thesis addresses students of Lonergan's thought by showing the strengths and possible shortcomings of his theological method with respect to the specific problem of doctrinal development. Secondly, the thesis addresses Catholic theologians by illustrating the significance of Lonergan's method in theology for problems arising out of Catholicism's engagement with modern historical-mindedness. Thirdly, the thesis addresses students of modern Western thought by elucidating Lonergan's efforts to work out the foundations for modern historical-mindedness in general and a historically-minded theology in particular.
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INTRODUCTION

Christianity is a religion that has persisted over nearly two thousand years. How is this so? Some would argue that Christianity is a religion of eternal significance. From this they conclude that Christianity has persisted over the years because it, like the eternal, is unchanging and immutable, untouched by the ravages of time. For them the Christianity that was preached by Jesus is identical with the religion that is lived and taught by Christians today. Others would argue to the contrary, that Christianity has undergone continual development and change, bearing the mark of each age and culture in which it has lived. What one era has held as the heart of the religion, another excludes to the periphery, putting in its place yet another element of Christianity.

It is obvious, they would state, that Christianity did not mean the same thing to Augustine as to Luther, to Francis as to Thomas Aquinas, to Leo XIII as to John XXIII. The only thing that the diverse forms of Christianity have in common is the common name to which each has laid claim; there is no permanently abiding element. Still others would argue that these two perspectives can be held together, and that one can discern and isolate a permanent and essential structure amidst the varying expressions of the religion. But in what does this structure consist? in the kerygma of the Gospels? in the Church? in a select number of doctrinal truths? Or is it even a valid way to pose the
question, to suppose that one can isolate the eternally valid essence of Christianity apart from its historically-conditioned and transient forms? Is not the fact that there have been so many different "permanent elements" posited through the ages indicative of the fact that the attempt to find it is doomed to failure?

The cluster of questions posed in the preceding paragraph points to a problem that lies at the heart of modern western religious thought. That problem has been to understand and evaluate Christianity's claim to a normative and authoritative status in a way that does justice to what modern historical-mindedness has revealed to be its undeniably historical and changing nature. In the study to follow we will examine and assess Bernard Lonergan's effort to meet this problem. Lonergan has devoted much of his career to this effort, the result of which has been the formulation of a contemporary method in theology. It is his position that such a method provides a basis on which the historical and the permanent, the changeable and the normative elements of Christianity can be understood and integrated. In the remainder

of the introduction we will outline the approach taken in our study of Lonergan's position.

Focus and Structure of the Thesis

The focus of the thesis is the development of doctrine. The reason for this is twofold. First, ever since the publication of Newman's Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine in 1845 the issue of doctrinal development has been in the foreground of Catholic theology's attempt to reconcile the Christian religion's claim to normative and permanent truths with the dynamic viewpoint of historical-mindedness. Indeed, doctrinal development has proven to be the locus of Catholic reflection on the method of a historically-minded theology up to and including Vatican II. Because of this our study of Lonergan's position

A point with regard to terminology should be made here. Throughout the thesis the terms "doctrine" and "dogma" will be taken as interchangeable, Lonergan himself tends to interchange the two, although as F.E. Crowe has suggested, there may be a good reason for this (see F.E. Crowe, "Doctrines and Historicity in the Context of Lonergan's Method", Theological Studies, vol. 38, n.1 [March, 1977], p.117, n. 3). For the sake of continuity in the text we use "doctrine" as often as possible. However, the exact meaning of the term doctrine for Lonergan will be taken up in great detail below in Ch. VI. Thus, when it is appropriate we will differentiate doctrine from dogma and explain why we have done so.

on doctrinal development will also provide a means by which to understand the significance of his thought for the whole of modern Catholic thought.

The second reason we focus on doctrinal development is that a study of this problem takes one to the center of Lonergan's method in theology. For the problem of development revolves around the tension of asserting that doctrines are both permanent, that they perpetually retain the meaning they had when defined, and historical, that they are conditioned by the historical contexts in which they are defined and understood. And a central concern in Lonergan's formulation of a method in theology has been to provide a foundation on which to understand and synthesize the seemingly contradictory assertions of permanence and historicity, of normativeness and change, of identity and plurality in Christian revelation. In the thesis we will argue that the importance of Lonergan's method for the issue of doctrinal development lies precisely in his concentration on this foundational issue. For the problem of such varied theologians as Newman, Möhler, Chenu, Congar, Rahner and Schillebeeckx. On post-Vatican II theology and the issue of historical-mindedness and doctrinal development see J.C. Murray, "The Matter of Religious Freedom", America, vol. 112 (January 9, 1965), p. 43; B. C. Berkouwer, The Second Vatican Council and the New Catholicism, tr. L. Smedes, (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publ. Co., 1965), pp. 67-88; George Lindbeck, The Future of Roman Catholic Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970), pp. 98-99; Thomas O'Dea The Catholic Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968); and Joseph Gremillion, "The Church in the World Today - Challenge to Theology", in ed. John H. Miller, Vatican II: An Interfaith Appraisal (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), pp. 526-529.
can be resolved neither by an a priori appeal to absolute truths nor by a reliance on the a posteriori techniques of critical history. Rather, the problem of development must be resolved by a turn to the more fundamental level of method and the unveiling of the foundations in human nature for both permanence and historicity.

The aim of the present study is to examine the ways in which Lonergan's method in theology underpins his position on the development of doctrine. Our study is divided into two parts. The first part outlines both the problem of doctrinal development in modern Catholic theology and the basis in Lonergan's work for his approach to the problem. Chapter I studies modern thought on doctrinal development by focusing on the Modernist controversy at the turn of the century; Chapter II covers Lonergan's understanding of the contemporary transition to historical-mindedness; and Chapter III deals with Lonergan's account of transcendental method. The second part of our study uses the results of Part I in an examination and critique of Lonergan's position on the development of doctrine. Chapter IV outlines the developments in Lonergan's reflections on historical-mindedness and doctrine; Chapter V deals with one way in which Lonergan's transcendental method grounds an account of the permanence of doctrine; and Chapter VI raises and responds to the critical question of the extent to which Lonergan's method in theology has provided the critical foundations for a historically-minded approach to doctrinal development.

**Doctrinal Development in Catholic Thought**

The question of why and how doctrines develop has been an issue in Christian theology since the early Church Councils. However, the rise
of historical-mindedness in the nineteenth century marked a new and
decisive shift in the way in which the question was to be understood.
Thus F.E. Crowe writes,

The difficulty of reconciling a permanent element in Christian
doctrine with the historicity that affects all human judge­
ments, those of faith as well as those of the secular sciences,
is the present form of a general problem that has been
troubling theologians in their theology and believers in
their beliefs for a century or more.4

The suggestion is not that the development of doctrine is itself new
but rather that to conceive of it in terms of historical-mindedness
constitutes a new and distinct theological problem. For once the
variety and complexity of Christianity’s historical nature is recog­
nized, the authoritative and unchangeable nature of Christian revelation
ceases to be a secure possession. This point can be illustrated by a
brief historical sketch of the way doctrinal development has been
approached in the Catholic tradition.

In the patristic period the question of doctrinal development was
not given much attention. This is not to say that the Fathers were not
aware that there were changes being made; for their discussion of the

4' Doctrines and Historicity", p. 115. See Bernard Lonergan,
The Way to Nicea: The Dialectical Development of Trinitarian Theology,
a translation by Conn O'Donovan of the first part of De Deo Trino
and Man’s Future" in eds. W. Ryan and B. Tyrrell, A Second Collection:
Papers by Bernard J.F. Lonergan, S.J. (London: Darton, Longman and Todd,
Historical Prolegomena (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 53; Avery Dulles,
The Resilient Church: The Necessity and Limits of Adaptation (Garden
City: Doubleday Inc., 1977), p. 46; and Walgrave, Unfolding Revelation,
pp. 3, 10, 153, 159.
issues of the relation of Scripture to Tradition and the Christological doctrines indicate an awareness of the fact that changes were being made. Rather, it is to suggest that the unchanging and final nature of the revelation in Scripture was taken for granted and that there was no sustained reflection on doctrinal development as a theological problem in and of itself. Much the same can be said for the medieval period. Aquinas, for instance, held that revelation had reached its fullness and completion in the apostolic era. Although he was most certainly aware that conciliar definitions were in a sense new, he regarded them merely as amplifications or extensions of the previously held articles of faith.

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6 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1a,q.36,art.2 ad 2; 2-2e, q.1, arts. 7-10. On Aquinas and development see Appendix 9 of the Blackfriar's edition of the Summa, "Doctrinal Development", pp. 102-123; Avery Dulles, The Resilient Church, p. 46; and J.H. Walgrave, Unfolding Revelation, pp. 91-116. One could argue that although it is inappropriate to describe Aquinas as historically-minded it may be equally unjustified to describe him as a-historical. On this point see A. Mauer, "St. Thomas and Eternal Truths", Medieval Studies, vol. 32 (1970), pp. 91-107 and Charles Journet, The Wisdom of Faith: An Introduction to Theology, tr. R.F. Smith (Westminster: The Newman Press, 1956), chs. VI and VII. For example Journet states that "...nothing is less true than the statement that the notion of history is a stranger to Thomism". (p. 105). Perhaps one could argue this point on the basis of the fact that in their recovery of Aquinas such theologians as Rahner and Lonergan have found Aquinas' philosophy to include a dynamic account of human intellect. (see below, Ch. 11, p. 116, n. 79)
With the advent of the Reformation the issue of doctrinal development was brought into the foreground. However, the concern of Catholic theologians in this period was not so much to explain the development from the Gospels to the Church's teaching as to guarantee the continuity. As a result, the unchangeable character of doctrine was very much emphasized. For example, the Counter Reformation polemicist Bossuet held that "[i]n the course of succession, doctrine is always the same; ...all, false doctrine will betray itself at once, beyond all doubt and discussion, whenever it appears, by its novelty, inasmuch as it will always be something that was not perpetually known."\(^7\) In arguing against the Reformers Bossuet found it unnecessary to explain the Catholic Church as the dynamic evolution of the revelation contained in Scripture; for the revelation contained in Scripture, he held, had been perfectly and invariably preserved in the Catholic teaching from the beginning of the Church.

Newman's theory of doctrinal development in the mid-nineteenth century marked a decisive breakthrough in Catholic thought on the issue. Rather than taking immutability as his starting point, Newman took history and change. The opening words of his Essay are indicative of this shift: "Christianity has been long enough in the world to justify us in dealing with it as a fact in the world's history."\(^8\) Newman was

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\(^8\)Essay, p. 69
well aware of the fact that this methodological shift made problematic
the relation of the Catholic tradition's claim to permanence to the
historical phenomenon of change. And yet he saw this problem as inevit-
able. Indeed, one of his reasons for developing a theory of doctrinal
development in the Essay was to confront what had become a "necessary
and anxious problem":

The state of things is not as it was, when an appeal lay to
the supposed works of the Areopagite, or to the primitive
Decretals, or to St. Dionysius' answer to Paul, or to the
Coena Domini of St. Cyprian. The assailants of dogmatic
truth have got the start of its adherents of whatever creed;
philosophy is completing what criticism has begun; and
apprehensions are not unreasonably excited lest we should
have a new world to conquer before we have weapons for the
warfare.9

Newman's recognition and explanation of this "necessary and anxious prob-
lem" proved to be the starting point for the attempts by later Catholic
theologians to meet the problem of the development of doctrine in a
historically-minded way.10

That Newman's emphasis on the historical was exceptional in nine-
teenth century Catholic theology is illustrated by the fact that in
addressing the issue of doctrine in 1870 Vatican I turned not to Newman
and his theory of development but to the Church Father Vincent of Lerins
for whom the very idea of change and evolution was unacceptable. Doctrine

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9Essay, p. 91

10See Lonergan’s comment that the changes taking place in current
Catholic theology date not from Vatican II but from Newman’s Essay in 1845.
(in "A New Pastoral Theology" [1973] [Unpublished Lecture, available at
the Lonergan Center, Regis College, Toronto], pp. 2, 19); see also J.
Pelikan, Development of Christian Doctrine, p. 3 and Chadwick, From
Bossuet to Newman, p.x.
was declared by the Council to be unchanging, its apparent development being actually a matter of increased understanding of "...one and the same doctrine, one and the same sense, one and the same judgement (Vincent of Lérins, Commonitorium, n. 28)." Vatican I and the neo-Scholastic theology that dominated its declarations, and not Newman, thus set the parameters for Catholic reflection on the development of doctrine well into the twentieth century. As a result, up to Vatican II any attempt to examine and bring to light the historical dimension of doctrine was regarded with suspicion in Catholic circles. As we will see in Chapter I, the need to overcome the conflict between the historical and the a-historical approach to doctrine and theology has been a problem in Catholic theology up to the present day.

As our sketch indicates, doctrinal development had generally not been recognized to be a problem by Catholic theologians. Indeed, with the exception of Newman and those who adopted his historical starting point, Catholicism's claim to a permanent and unchanging essence remained relatively unquestioned up to Vatican II. This is not to

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to suggest that Catholic theologians had not experienced the historical phenomenon of doctrinal change. Rather, it is to suggest that these phenomena had been understood in an ahistorical way, i.e., without reflection on the historicity of Christianity in general and doctrinal development in particular. Once the historical viewpoint is adopted, however, then the issue of development becomes central to theology, and theologians become concerned to relate Christianity's claim to a normative element that abides through time to what modern historical-mindedness has brought to light as the cultural and historical relativity of all thought.

The Place of this Study in Modern Western Religious Thought

Catholics are not alone in the attempt to reconcile historical-mindedness with a claim to normative and authoritative truths. For the problems that Catholics experience in this regard arise not so much from an issue internal to Catholicism as from an issue at the center of modern thought, viz., the meaning and implications of the modern turn to history. It is for this reason that Lonergan says that the issue

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12 See Leslie Dewart's statement that "...the fact of which we have recently become aware is not that Christian doctrine has begun to develop in recent times, but that it has always existed in a process of development. It is only the awareness of this fact that is new." (The Future of Belief: Theism in a World Come of Age [New York: Herder and Herder, 1966], p. 78).

facing contemporary Catholic theology is not a new religion or new faith, but a "belated social and cultural transition."\textsuperscript{14} Thus, one can find similarities, as E. Schillebeeckx suggests, between efforts by Catholics to work out a historically-minded account of doctrinal development and Protestant efforts to formulate a valid theological hermeneutics.\textsuperscript{15} And one can find a related concern for a historical approach to tradition in such varied works as those of M. Eliade and the History of Religions School, Pannenberg, Ricoeur and Gadamer.\textsuperscript{16}

What these various approaches have in common is an awareness that modern historical-mindedness radically calls into question any position that claims to make normative statements about man and his destiny. This point is well expressed by Josef Geiselmann in the following passage:

It was only with the discovery of history during the transition from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century that tradition

\textsuperscript{14} "Belief: Today's Issue" in Second Collection, p. 98; see our Ch. II, pp. 83-93.


completely lost its power. History now liberated itself from tradition and made itself independent; history took the place of tradition and, because free of it, became increasingly revolutionary and devoid of any generally recognized human content. The really existing world dissolved into purely subjective views of the world, so that in the end nothing objective would subsist and nihilism would be the final outcome, if modern man was rigorously logical. 17

There is, then, a sense in which the problem of the development of doctrine takes one into issues that lie at the heart of modern thought.

Lonergan has stated that a task facing modern thought is to "...grasp the strength and the weakness, the power and the limitations, the good points and the shortcomings..." of modern historical-mindedness. 18 He holds that a key to this effort is the formulation of a basis for the claim to the universal and normative that was so central in the pre-modern apprehension of man and his world. He has referred to this effort as the "second Enlightenment". The first enlightenment, Lonergan explains, arose out of the rise of Newtonian science, Kant's Critiques, and the effort to reformulate the Christian tradition that turned out to be "...the project of replacing traditional backwardness by the rule of pure reason." 19 The second enlightenment, he claims, arises out of an

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18 "Belief: Today's Issue", in Second Collection, p. 99

19 Bernard Lonergan, "Natural Right and Historical-Mindedness" (1977) (Unpublished lecture, available at the Lonergan Center, Regis College, Toronto), p. 15; see below, Ch. 11, p. 85, n. 11. See also
entirely new context. Lonergan refers here to profound changes in mathematics, natural and human sciences, and philosophy: Euclidean geometry has been relativized; Maxwell, Einstein and Heisenberg have not only developed a new physics but a new notion of science as well; and modern philosophers like Nietzsche, Blondel and Ricoeur have emphasized practical as well as pure reason, maintaining that man is known not only by what he is but also by what he does, not only abstractly by nature but also concretely by history. What the second enlightenment is lacking, however, are normative foundations for its historically-minded apprehension of man. These foundations, according to him, are found not in hermeneutics, as with Gadamer and Ricoeur, nor in universal history, as with Pannenberg, but in the concrete and invariant structures of the human subject himself. As Lonergan writes in Method,

...we are not relativists, and so we acknowledge something substantial and common to human nature and human activity; but that we place in the quite open structure of the human spirit - in the ever immanent and operative though unexpressed transcendent precepts: Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be


reasonable, Be responsible.\textsuperscript{21}

It is our intention in the following study of Lonergan's approach to doctrinal development to bring to light his understanding of these normative foundations.

Early and Later Lonergan

We have stated that this thesis will study the ways in which Lonergan's method in theology provides for a historically-minded approach to doctrine. This means that in our study we will emphasize Lonergan's work after 1965, for it is only in this later work that a concern for historical-mindedness becomes prominent.

The differences between the earlier and the later Lonergan have been well documented. In his doctoral dissertation and later in The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan David Tracy has explained the development of Lonergan's thought on method by relating it to Lonergan's growing recognition of historical-mindedness as the context for theology.\textsuperscript{22}

Tracy's studies have been complemented by a number of recent Ph.D.


studies that have distinguished the early and later Lonergan in explicating some facet of Lonergan's thought. And F.E. Crowe has on numerous occasions linked Lonergan's shift from earlier to later positions to Lonergan's post-1965 emphasis on the historical and existential subject and the notion of value. Finally, Lonergan himself has adverted several times to these differences between his earlier and later work, and more specifically the difference between Insight (1957) and Method in Theology (1972). Concerning the latter he has stated,

The new challenge came from the Geisteswissenschaften, from the problem of hermeneutics and critical history, from the need of integrating 19th century achievement in this field with the teachings of Catholic religion and Catholic theology. It was a long struggle...[the] eventual outcome [of which]

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has been the book *Method in Theology*.\(^{25}\)

Our study will concentrate on Lonergan's work that deals with this new context for theology. However, as the developments in Lonergan's thought tend to be, as David Tracy puts it, "consciously cumulative", we must refer to Lonergan's earlier work throughout our study.\(^{26}\) We find this especially to be the case in our examination of Lonergan's account of transcendental method, for that account is rooted in *Insight*’s cognitional theory. And again, when we turn to *Method*’s functional specialties, we find that their scope and purpose can best be appreciated against the backdrop of Lonergan's earlier reflections on the problem of history and doctrine. But our purpose in these and other instances is not so much to compare the earlier and later Lonergan as it is to elucidate the later positions by reference to the earlier.

**Our Thesis and the Secondary Literature**

Two students of Lonergan's thought have focused on the issue of his historically-minded approach to doctrinal development: F.E. Crowe and

\(^{25} "Insight Revisited", p. 277; see also, pp. 268, 275, 278 and "An Interview with Fr. Bernard Lonergan", pp. 213-15 in Second Collection. Lonergan has remarked that the purpose of *Insight* "...was not a study of human life but of human understanding." ("Bernard Lonergan Responds" in *Language*, p. 310) His point here is related to the fact that *Insight* stressed only intellectual conversion whereas *Method* adds both moral and religious conversion to his account of the human subject. (On conversion see *Method*, pp. 105, 107, 123, 241-42, 270; 283, 288, 350, 357.) Note that Lonergan has also distinguished his two major works by describing *Insight* as an attempt to assimilate modern scientific method and *Method* as an attempt to assimilate modern historical scholarship. ("The Scope of Renewal" [1973] [Unpublished lecture, available at the Lonergan Center, Regis College, Toronto], p. 17)

\(^{26} "Achievement", p. 206; see the studies by Crowe referred to above in n. 24"
F. Smith. Among the many features of Lonergan's thought addressed by
Crowe is the development of doctrine. Beginning with an article in
1962, "Development of Doctrine and the Ecumenical Problem" and con-
tinuing with his "Doctrines and Historicity in the Context of Lonergan's
Method", Crowe has brought to light various aspects of Lonergan's
position on development. Our indebtedness to these articles on
certain points in the discussion will be evident. Our study goes beyond
Crowe's articles on two counts. First, we pose the problem of develop-
ment in a way different from Crowe's by identifying it within the
history of modern Catholic thought as a whole and the Catholic Modernist
controversy in particular. Secondly, our study develops in a more com-
prehensive manner the rootedness of Lonergan's position on doctrinal
development in his historically-minded method in theology.

The second student of Lonergan's thought to have focused on the
development of doctrine, Fran Smith, presented his study in the form of a

27 See F.E. Crowe, "Development of Doctrine and the Ecumenical
Problem", Theological Studies, vol. 23 (1962), pp. 27-46; "The Develop-
ment of Doctrine", The American Ecclesiastical Review, vol. 159 (1968),
pp. 233-249; "Dogma versus the Self-Correcting Process of Learning",
Theological Studies, vol. 31 (1970), pp. 605-24 (also published in P.
McShane, ed., Foundations of Theology: Papers from the International
Lonergan Conference 1970 [Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 1971], pp. 22-40);
and "Doctrines and Historicity in the Context of Lonergan's Method",
should be noted that in all these studies Crowe has not merely been a
commentator; indeed, he has, so to speak, his own axe to grind, as is
evident in the recent publications of his own Theology of the Christian
Word: A Study in History (New York: Paulist Press, 1979) and a fest-
schrift in his honor, eds. T. Dunne and J.M. LaPorte, Trinification
of the World: A Festschrift in Honour of Fréderick E. Crowe in Cele-
buration of His 60th Birthday (Toronto: Regis College Press, 1978).
dissertation in 1976 at the Gregorian in Rome, "The Permanence and Historicity of Dogma According to Bernard Lonergan, S.J.". As the title suggests, this study parallels ours in many ways. Both studies see the question of doctrinal development for Lonergan in terms of the permanence and historicity of doctrine, both find Lonergan's transcendental method to be central to his position on the permanence of doctrine, and both pose and respond to critiques of Lonergan's position on the nature of doctrine. However, the two studies differ in the context in which they discuss Lonergan's position. First, Smith introduces Lonergan's position on doctrinal development in terms of specific issues in post-Vatican II Catholic theology: a new concept of revelation, ecclesiology, the function of the magisterium, etc. We, however, introduce Lonergan's position first in terms of the Modernist controversy and then in terms of the more general issue of what Lonergan terms the second enlightenment and the problem of normative foundations for historical-mindedness. Secondly, in order to explain the basis of Lonergan's position on development, Smith concentrates on the cognitional theory worked out by Lonergan in the earlier works of Verbum and Insight. We, however, explain the basis of Lonergan's position on development by concentrating on the historically-minded account of the structure of theology, his functional specialties, that Lonergan works out in his later work of Method in Theology. Thirdly, Smith's emphasis on Lonergan's cognitonal theory leads him to make the key to the affirmation of the permanence of doctrine Lonergan's emphasis on the role of judgement

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28 Dissertatio ad Laurem (Roma: Pontifica Universitas Gregoriana, Facultas Theologiae, 1976)
in knowing. We, however, make the key to Lonergan's affirmation of the permanence of doctrine his account of the normative foundations for a historically-minded theology, transcendental method and religious conversion. Finally, when he turns to offer a critical comment on Lonergan's position on doctrinal development, Smith does so by expressing a misgiving concerning the starting point of Lonergan's cognitional theory. We, however, offer a critical comment by expressing a misgiving concerning the extent to which Lonergan's notion of doctrine follows from his account of the method, foundations and structure of a historically-minded theology. These differences in context and approach do not lead, however, to contradictory accounts of the contribution of Lonergan's thought to the question of doctrinal development. Rather, our study complements Smith's by discussing and assessing Lonergan's position from a different perspective and with a different set of questions.

Conclusion

In his response to Lonergan's 1973 St. Michael's Institute lectures, Philosophy of God and Theology, E.L. Mascall posed the following question:

In brief, has Father Lonergan discovered the principle which we need in order to solve the pressing problems of the relation of the unchanging datum of revelation to the changing and developing cultural settings in which it has to be expressed? If he has, this will be a matter for gratitude and rejoicing, but I am not yet convinced that it is so.27

One could describe the aim of our study as the argument for a positive answer to questions such as the one Mascall poses. For our argument is

that Lonergan's position on the development of doctrine meets the issue of reconciling the permanence of revealed truths with the relativity of changing cultures and history. This positive judgement of Lonergan's work is warranted, we feel, because in his formulation of transcendental method he has provided critical foundations for the horizon of historical-mindedness. And these foundations prove to be the key to an account of the method and structure of theology that is capable of integrating both the unchangeable and the changeable, the permanent and the historical in doctrine. To the extent that the following pages demonstrate how this is so we will have provided a basis for a positive assessment of the value of Lonergan's method in theology for modern thought.
PART ONE

BACKGROUND TO LONERGAN'S

POSITION ON DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT
CHAPTER ONE

MODERN CATHOLIC THEOLOGY, MODERNISM,
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE

In this chapter we will examine the way in which the problem of the development of doctrine has emerged in modern Catholic theology. We will show that the emergence of development as a problem can be attributed to the introduction of historical-mindedness into the method of theology. We focus on the modernist controversy in this examination for two reasons. First, the modernist controversy, which took place between 1890 and 1910, provides a good access to modern Catholic theology as a whole.¹ For modernism more or less marks the beginning and therefore a particularly clear instance of the shift that proved to be a central feature of the entire development of modern Catholic theology, the shift from a classical to a historically-minded horizon.² Secondly,

¹See, e.g., Gerald McCool's judgement that "...the contemporary debate over theological method is simply another phase in the dialectical movement of Catholic theology's response to the challenge of post-Enlightenent thought from the beginning of the 19th century through Vatican I, Aeterni Patris, the modernist crisis, between the wars Thomism, the New Theology controversy, and Vatican II up to the present." (Catholic Theology in the Nineteenth Century: The Quest for a Unitary Method (New York: The Seabury Press, 1977) p. 15.

²For example, T. Howard Sanks shows how this transition shaped the controversies in the last one hundred years over the question of authority. See his Authority in the Church: A Study in Changing Paradigms. (Missoula: Scholar's Press, 1974), especially pp. 129, 142-43, 146-61 in reference to modernism.
a historically-minded approach to the development of doctrine was at
the heart of the modernist program. Indeed, their case for the neces-
sity of the Church's reform and adaptation to modern thought rested on
their making the case for the essentially historical and therefore
changeable nature of theology and doctrine.

We focus on the French modernist Loisy in our discussion of
modernism because his theology was more consciously historical than
that of any other modernist. Loisy had been trained in the historical-
critical method of biblical studies and, because of this experience, he
had come to appreciate the many implications of modern historical-
mindedness for theology. At the heart of his work was the attempt to
extend the changes historical-mindedness imposed on biblical studies to
the whole of Catholic theology, and particularly to the question of doc-
trinal development. Loisy's position on the development of doctrine was
that Vatican I's affirmation of the permanence of doctrine was untenable
within a historically-minded theology. Loisy held this position because
he took it to be the necessary consequence of the recognition of the
historical and relative character of all religious truth. We shall
argue, however, that had Loisy succeeded in formulating normative and
critical foundations for his historically-minded theology that the

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3 See Bernard Lonergan, "Christology Today: Methodological Reflec-
tions" (1975) (unpublished lecture available at the Lonergan Center,
Regis College, Toronto) where Lonergan states that the use of histori-
cal studies in biblical studies is "a basic feature of the problem of
method in contemporary theology," (p. 12). Although one cannot be cer-
tain from the context, this may be what Lonergan refers to in his
"Dogma and Exegesis" where he describes Loisy's L'Evangile et L'Eglise
as "a turning point". (See "Dogma and Exégésis", (1963) (unpublished
lecture, available on tape (catalogue #731) at the Lonergan Center,
Regis College, Toronto).
denial of the permanence of doctrine would not have been necessary. We propose to use this argument as the point of departure for our study of Lonergan's position on the development of doctrine. For we will show that Lonergan is able to affirm what Loisy denied, the permanence as well as the historicity of doctrine, precisely because he has provided critical and normative foundations for theology.

This chapter is divided into three sections. We shall i) note briefly the significance of the 19th century and modernism for contemporary theology, ii) examine the background to the modernist crisis, focusing on the Church's stance in relation to modern culture and the historical method, and iii) analyze Loisy's views on both the "biblical question" and the development of doctrine.

1. Modernism and Contemporary Catholic Theology

The correctness, the justification in a particular situation of the Church's history, and the import of the Church's condemnation of a heresy, do not necessarily always depend on whether the judgement passed on the heretical thesis also takes into account, and answers, the question which the fundamental tendency of that heresy raises for the Church. A positive solution of the question, which an age may in fact propound in the form of a heresy, may follow only much later. It need not be inquired whether such delay in finding a solution represents tragic guilt, error, incapacity, or is simply the tribute which the Church itself has to pay to its own historical nature. At any rate it would not be right to assume that a condemnation by the Church always falls solely on opinions and tendencies which contain nothing but an empty, dead negation of a truth long since clearly grasped and plainly proclaimed by the Church. 4

This statement by Karl Rahner, one with which we think Lonergan would

be in substantial agreement, highlights the way in which the aims and questions of modernism should be seen today. For the questions to which Loisy and other modernists addressed themselves concerning the import of the new historical methods and awareness of man's historicity are those that occupy many Catholic theologians today, including Rahner and Lonergan. As Donal Dorr put it, modernism was killed by the harsh disciplines of its condemnation in 1907, but today it is generally recognized that "...the skeleton has remained in the cupboard and the ghost has returned to haunt the Church." It is with these questions, or "skeletons", that we will be concerned in our examination of Loisy's theology.

Many commentators on Vatican II have drawn attention to the connection between the theology of Vatican II and the modernist controversy. Thomas O'Dea suggests that Vatican II dealt with the same problems that were operative in modernism, particularly the issues of rapprochement with modernity and the new historical and positive studies. Schoof argues that the development of the Council itself illustrates

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7 Thomas F. O'Dea, The Catholic Crisis, pp. 4-7
this. For as the Council progressed, it became evident that reforms like those of the historically-minded modernists proved to be the point of departure for Vatican II's approach to such issues as ecclesiology, revelation and the modern world. It is justified, then, to place modernism in the wider context of modern Catholic thought and with Alexander Dru describe modernism as . . .

...the denouement of a crisis which has been endemic for the centuries and had reached its acutest phase in the nineteenth century. This is not to deny the crisis, but to recognize that it was at the same time a rebirth of Catholicism: the source of a movement of reform which has received official expression in the 2nd Vatican Council.

The development of modern Catholicism has shown that although

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9 Alexander Dru, "Modernism and the Present Position of the Church", Downside Review, vxxxii, n. 267 (1964) p. 110. This same point is made by John Heaney in The Modernist Crisis: von Hügel (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1969), pp. 35, 215-217; David D. Wells, "Recent Roman Catholic Theology" in eds. S.N. Grundy and A.F. Johnson, Tensions in Contemporary Theology (Chicago: Moody Press, 1976), pp. 287-291; and Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order, p. 27. See also McCool, Catholic Theology, pp. 7-16. For a survey of recent theological interest in the 19th century. For an argument against the continuity of Vatican II with modernism, see Michele Ranchetti, The Catholic Modernists: A Study of the Religious Reform Movement 1864-1907, tr. Isabel Quigley (London, New York and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1969) for whom comparison between the two is out of the question—where modernism sought to structure the doctrinal order of Catholicism and free it from an outdated Scholasticism, Vatican II "...was inspired by ideas that can best be found in the constitution on the liturgy."

(p. vii; see pp. viii-ix where he associates modernism with gnosis and Vatican II with charism, and pp. 33-34.)
the modernists' answers proved to be invalid, their questions were not. The recognition of this validity led Baron Friederich von Hügel to distinguish the particular achievements and answers of the modernism condemned by Pius X from the aims and questions of the perennial modernism that consists in a . . .

. . . permanent, never quite finished, always sooner or later, more or less, rebeginning set of attempts to express the old Faith and its permanent truths and helps—-to interpret it according to what appears the best and most abiding elements in the philosophy and the scholarship and science of the later and latest times. 10

The ways in which the modernists reinterpreted the truth and the problems that arose in that reinterpretation will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter. After a brief discussion of the pre-history of modernism, we shall turn to an analysis of Loisy's modernist program.

II. The Background to the Modernist Crisis

Modernism both as a movement of thought and as a crisis can best be understood in the context of the nineteenth century Catholic Church's

10. Baron Friederich von Hügel, in ed. B. Holland, Selected Letters of Baron Friederich von Hügel (London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1927), p. 248. Cf. the remark made by George Tyrrell in his Medievalism: A Reply to Cardinal Mercier (London, 1908): "... whereas the Medievalist regards the expression of Catholicism, formed by the Synthesis between faith and the general culture of the 13th century, as primitive and practically final and exhaustive, the Modernist denies the possibility of such finality and holds that the task is unending just because the process of culture is unending." (cited in John D. Root, "English Catholic Modernism and Science: The Case of George Tyrrell", The Heythrop Journal, xviii, n. 3 (1977), p. 287.) As we will see in the next chapter, Lonergan argues that a key to classicism is the belief that there is just one culture, classicist culture, and that a key to historical-mindedness is the belief that cultures are man-made and that there is a new culture with each new time and place.
vision of itself in relation to modernity. For that vision was for the
most part unsympathetic to the intentions of modern culture and science,
and as a result any movement that sought to reconcile Catholic theology
with modernity was regarded with suspicion. Significant here is the
fact that the Church, in holding off from "the chill winds of modern-
ity" (Lonergan), was something of an anomaly in nineteenth century the-
oLOGY. G. Daley has remarked that...

... (t)he nineteenth century is by common consent one of the
most important centuries in the history of theology; but Catho-
lic theology went to ground during it, thus avoiding, and thereby
merely postponing, a necessary phase in the normal historical
evolution of religious thought. 11

In this section of the chapter we will examine the ways in which that
postponement set the stage for the modernist crisis. In particular we
will endeavor to show that the Catholic Church's negative reaction to
the historical-mindedness of nineteenth century culture was a function
of its classicist outlook. 12

1. The Early 19th Century Catholic Church's Attitude to Modernity

The roots of the Church's alienation from modernity lay in its
negative reaction to modern science in the seventeenth century. 13

11. G. Daly, O.S.A., "Contemporary Perspectives on Redemption The-
ology", Milltown Studies, n. 1 (Summer, 1977), pp. 41-42.

12. See McCool, Catholic Theology, pp. 8-10, 221-222, 224-226,
228-231, 244, 249. We will analyze in more detail in the next chapter
what is meant by the classicist approach to theology and by "classicism".
Our discussion here, which focuses on the theme of the church and mod-
ernity, supplies more or less the material content for the analysis of
classicism that we undertake in Chapter Two. See pp.127-29 below.

13. As Lonergan puts it, "...theology in the 17th century
This alienation carried through to the nineteenth century, at which
time the Church's stance had become, as Schoof documents, defensive,
very much like that of a fortress besieged on all fronts by enemies. 14
That there were political factors contributing to this stance is without
question. 15 However, these developments in the political sphere

resisted its age by retiring into a dogmatic corner... " ("The Future
of Christianity", in Second Collection, p. 161. See also O'Dea, Catho-
lic Crisis, pp. 39-40; Bertrand von Bilsen, The Changing Church (Pitts-
burgh: Duquesne University Press, 1966), pp. 23-25; and G. Weigel, "Leo
XIII and Contemporary Theology", in ed. Edward T. Gargan, Leo XIII and

14 Schoof, Survey, pp. 32, 37ff.; see Alexander Dru, The Church
in the Nineteenth Century: Germany 1800-1918, Faith and Facts Books,

15 See McCool, Catholic Theology, pp. 21-27, 32-35. For example,
the final proposition of the Syllabus of Errors, that the Pope should
in no way come to terms with modernity and liberalism, was a reaction
to such political events as the crisis of 1848 and the tensions between
the new French Republic and the Vatican; again, many of Pius IX's and
Leo XIII's actions were determined by the changes in the social and
political structures in Germany at mid-century. McCool notes the sig-
nificance of the events occurring in the political sphere in his study,
but argues against reducing the nineteenth century theological scene to
politics (see n. 3 in Ch. 1 where he cites Pierre Thibault's Savoir et
pouvoir: philosophie thomiste et politique cléricale au xixe siècle
[Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1972] for whom, e.g., the
Thomist revival in the second half of the century is entirely a matter
of ecclesial politics.). For a discussion of this period see Roger
Aubert, Le Pontifical de Pie IX (1846-1878), Histoire de l'Eglise, v. 21
(Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1952), his article "Religious Liberty from Miraro
Vos to the Syllabus" in R. Aubert, ed., Historical Problems of Church
Renewal, Concilium, v. 7 (Glen Rock, New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1965),
pp. 89-105 in which he points to the political background of these
encyclicals; Thomas O'Dea, The Catholic Crisis, p. 45; and Sanks, Au-
thority in the Church, pp. 123-128. For a sympathetic discussion of
Leo XIII that focuses on the political dimension and what the contribu-
tors for the most part see as Leo's sympathetic approach to modernity,
see Gargan, ed., Leo XIII and the Modern World (e.g., G. Weigel points
out that Leo, although not entirely accepting the new order, did have
enough insight into modernity to title his 1891 encyclical on social
justice with the Latin for revolution, Rerum Novarum (p. 213)).
resulted in a withdrawal from modern culture that was not without consequences in the theological sphere. For it engendered a reactionary and rigid preoccupation with doctrinal intransigence and a strong authoritarianism that very much affected the course of nineteenth century theology. As an illustration of this preoccupation with doctrinal intransigence, Alexander Dru cites the German historian of the Papacy and staunch supporter of "ghetto" Catholicism in Germany, Ludwig von Pastor. Von Pastor maintained that the proper and true Catholic position was "...a completed and closed system neither requiring nor tolerating any communion with the outside world." 16 This stance had received official expression in 1846 when in his encyclical Qui Pluribus Pius IX spoke out against "...those enemies of divine revelation..." who... 

...wish to introduce with great audacity human progress into the Catholic religion, as though that religion were not the work of God, but that of men or some philosophical invention which was capable of being perfected by human means. 17

Eighteen years later The Syllabus of Errors, in re-affirming the normative character of Christian revelation, anathematized the following statement: "The Pope shall and must reconcile himself and come to

16 The Church in the Nineteenth Century, p. 119.
terms with the progress, liberalism and modern civilization. It was inevitable, then, that attempts to reconcile Catholic theology with the events going forward in modernity were not to be readily appreciated by the Church.

The Tübingen School in Germany was an exception in nineteenth century Catholic theology's approach to modern historical-mindedness. The Tübingen theologians advocated a rapprochement with modernity and a historical and dynamic view of such fundamental issues as the Church, Tradition and doctrine. Apart from Newman, the Tübingen theologians historical approach to doctrine was unique in nineteenth century Catholic thought. Johann Sebastian Drey (1777-1853), the founder of the School, was very much influenced by Schelling's philosophy of history. He rejected what he took to be the Enlightenment view of doctrine as timeless and independent of history and stressed the importance of historical and positive studies in theology. J. Adam Möhler (1796-1838) followed Drey in this emphasis on history. He formed an intuitive and historical approach to doctrinal development and emphasized the existential element in doctrine. "Since Christianity", he wrote,

18 Cited in Dru, The Church in the Nineteenth Century, p. 45. See Schoof, Survey, p. 30 and A. Dulles, Revelation Theology: A History (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), pp. 75ff. It is not surprising that Blondel in the early 1900's lamented the fate of Catholics who sought to re-think the truths of his faith in light of modern culture: "Nothing has been done since the musical prelude of Chateaubriand: we in France and in the Catholic countries have assisted for centuries at the strange spectacle of the whole duty of man divorced from honest scholarship, genuine art, and living thought." (Cited in Dru, The Church in the Nineteenth Century, p. 104)

19 See Appendix I for a more detailed discussion of the Tübingen Schools's approach to the development of doctrine.
"is a new life given to man and not a dead concept, it is subject to
development and elaboration." Anton Günther (1783-1863), whose works
were placed on the Index of Forbidden Books more than once, stressed
the compatibility of philosophy and revelation. He viewed doctrine as
the result of philosophic reflection on revelation, and argued that doct-
trines must be corrected and reformulated with each advance of scienti-
fic and philosophic knowledge.

The reaction to the Tübingen School by the Vatican was under-
standably negative. The Tübingen theologians' emphasis on historical-
mindedness made their work suspect and eventually led to the condemna-
tion of their programs. What is important for an appreciation of Mod-
ernism is that this condemnation promoted an even more stringent rejec-
tion of modernity on the part of the Catholic Church and gave rise to
the neo-Scholastic revival in the latter half of the nineteenth century.
This anti-modern stance coupled with the a-historical approach of neo-
Scholasticism made it inevitable that modernism would be a crisis.

2. **Neo-Scholasticism in the 19th Century Church**

The reforms of the Tübingen school, as we noted above, were an
exception in early- and mid-nineteenth century Catholic theology. In-
deed, the Tübingen School itself later fostered a strong conservatism,
and in the discussions leading up to Vatican I a very narrow scholas-
ticism prevailed.  


Franzelin was responsible for a significant portion of Vatican I's Dei Filius, was highly critical of the "new" modern theology developed by the Tübingen School and Günther. He worked to re-establish what he took to be the scholastic method and theology's proper scientific unity, certainty and universality. For example, he argued against modern theology's historical approach to doctrine, and limited the development of doctrine to the discernment of the logical bonds between the revealed truths of the Tradition. This was in effect a return to the sixteenth century Catholic discussion of development and the logical deductivist theories of Suarez, Lugo, et al. Given this deductivist orientation, a rejection of the Tübingen School's effort to integrate Catholic theology with nineteenth century historical-mindedness was inevitable. The result of this rejection was that the Church discounted the need for a rapprochement with modernity, a move that marked the beginning of what Schoof describes as "...a period of grim skirmishes and alarmed withdrawals into the old fortress of the Church." We will trace this withdrawal from modern culture by focusing on two central documents from Rome that determined the shape of theology for nearly one hundred years: Vatican I's Dei Filius and Leo XIII's Aeterni Patris.


Dei Filius: The permanence of dogma

As we noted above, Günther's work had been placed on the Index because of his semi-rationalism. The Vatican felt that Günther had misunderstood the proper relationship of theology and philosophy. In a brief to Jöhann Cardinal von Geissel, archbishop of Cologne, Pope Pius IX complained, in language reminiscent of Bossuet, that programs like Günther's threw everything into confusion, especially "... the constantly unchanging character of faith, which is always the same, whereas philosophy... is never consistent with itself and is always subject to a wide variety of errors."24

One feature of Günther's program that Rome found particularly objectionable was his assertion that Scholasticism simply was not adequate to the exigencies of the modern age and the progress of science. Vatican I's Dei Filius represented an attempt to prove views like Günther's wrong by showing that Scholasticism could be the key to a modern approach to the relationship between faith and reason. Dei Filius did affirm that man through reason could acquire a limited but fruitful understanding of revealed mysteries. Man was able to attain such understanding through reflection upon analogies drawn between finite intelligibilities and the mysteries, through reflection on the interconnections between the mysteries themselves, and through reflection on the relation of the whole body of mysteries to man's ultimate end.25 How-


25 McCool, Catholic Theology, p. 224; see Aubert, Le Pontificat pp. 334-338. Lonergan has examined Dei Filius on this point in "Theo-
ever, the Vatican was careful to maintain that such understanding did not entail a transformation of doctrine as the Tübingen School had maintained. In a central passage, in which Vincent of Lerins is quoted, the immutability of dogma is defined as follows:

For the doctrine of faith which God hath revealed has not been proposed, like a philosophic invention, to be perfected by human ingenuity, but has been delivered as a divine deposit to the Spouse of Christ, to be faithfully kept and infallibly declared. Hence, also, that meaning of the Sacred dogmas is perpetually to be retained which our holy mother the Church has once declared; nor is that meaning ever to be departed from, under the pretense or pretext of a deeper comprehension of them. Let, then, that intelligence, science and wisdom of each and all, of individuals and of the whole Church, in all ages and all times, increase and flourish in abundance and vigor; but simply in its own proper kind, that is to say, in one and the same doctrine, one and the same sense, one and the same judgement (in eodem scilicet dogmate, eodem sensu, eademque sententia.)

\[26\]

ology and Understanding" (Collection, pp. 121-142), "Natural Knowledge of God" (Second Collection, pp. 117-135) and in Method, pp. 320-324, 336-339. McCool cites Lonergan's "Theology and Understanding" positively, and states that Lonergan showed in that article that the understanding called for by Vatican I cannot be achieved through a theology structured according to deductivist Aristotelian science. According to McCool, Lonergan maintains that such theology is inadequate to the exigencies of a historical revelation mediated to the man of the historically- and empirically-oriented culture of today. (McCool, Catholic Theology, p. 226; see "Theology in its New Context", Second Collection, pp. 55-67 and "Insight Revisited", Second Collection, pp. 263-278).

A corresponding canon reads:

If anyone shall assert it to be possible that sometimes, according to the progress of science, a sense is to be given to doctrines propounded by the Church different from that which the Church has understood and understands: let him be anathema.\(^\text{27}\)

The above declaration is a clear rejection of the Tübingen School's emphasis on history and the related notion of doctrinal evolution. The neo-Scholastic approach to faith and reason lent itself well to this a-historical immobilism. As such, it was the foundation for the denial of the possibility of any such change in theology and doctrine. This denial of change would later be found untenable by the historically-minded modernists.

\textit{Aeterni Patris: a-historical classicism}

The theology which emerged in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, following the spirit of Vatican I and its negative reaction to modern science and philosophy, continued the defensive attitude and preoccupation with doctrinal intransigence that characterized the Church in the previous quarters of the century.\(^\text{28}\) This stance, coupled with the rise of neo-Scholasticism that it in part engendered, set the tone of the theological discussion to follow. Leo XIII, who had long been.

Interestingly enough, the term dogma is relatively new, Vatican I being the first instance where it was identified with a revealed truth. (See Lash, \textit{Change in Focus: A Study of Doctrinal Change and Continuity} (London: Sheed and Ward, 1973), pp. 46-59)

\(^\text{27}\)In Gladstone, \textit{The Vatican Decrees}, p. 152.

\(^\text{28}\)This has led B. Welte to characterize it as a "...theology despite everything..." and a "...safeguarding of orthodoxy that was not without a certain nervousness." (\textit{Auf der Spur des Ewigen}, (Freiburg, 1965), p. 397; cited in Schoof, \textit{Survey}, p. 34.)
committed to the restoration of Aquinas in Catholic education, in 1879 promulgated *Aeterni Patris* as a practical interpretation of Vatican I's teaching. In Leo's mind the key to the errors of the nineteenth century lay in its confused philosophical foundations. Accordingly, the way to a correction of these errors lay in new philosophical foundations. To this end he sought to establish Scholasticism as the *optimus modus philosophandi*, i.e., as the necessary means, far superior to its modern counterparts, for the Church's successful intellectual and apostolic ventures in the modern world. A particular concern in this return to Aquinas was the need to establish an account of knowledge that was the opposite of the modern account. Thus, the effort to counter the Cartesian solipsism and post-Kantism subjectivism that was taken to be characteristic of modern philosophy led the neo-Scholastics to find in Aquinas a view of knowledge that stressed its objective, certain and abstract character. This account of knowledge, which Lonergan terms "conceptualism", provided a sound foundation for eternal truths that are independent of the vicissitudes of history. The key here is that to stress the objectivity of truth at the expense of its subjective element, as the neo-Scholastics did, is to neglect the act of understanding that is by nature historically conditioned and susceptible to development. The neglect of the subjective element meant that (1) the admission of any real historical development was impossible and (2) that the attempt to relate doctrines to the questions and desires of

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modern man was not necessary. 30

In its insistence on the universal and objective and its heavy emphasis on Aristotelian metaphysics and science the neo-Scholastic philosophy and theology promoted in Aeterni Patris contrasted sharply with much of modern thought. In addition, this neo-Scholasticism illustrated little or no concern for history. For example, positive or historical theology, which occupied such a key place in the program of the Tübingen School, was limited to the collection and ordering of the manifold data of revelation according to pre-specified neo-Scholastic concepts. The recent developments in historical exegesis that had taken place in Germany were ignored. And although speculative theology was directed towards an understanding of the mysteries, such understanding was independent of history, its method being Aristotelian deductivism. 31

The overall effect of Aeterni Patris was, then, a serious lack of concern for the implications of positive historical studies and a furthering of the gap that already existed between the neo-scholastic theolo-

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31 McCool, Catholic Theology, pp. 232-33 and Schoof, Survey, p. 149.
gians of Rome and modern culture. McCool describes this situation as follows:

For the inability of Roman epistemology, metaphysics and speculative theology to deal with the problems created by modern exegesis and modern historical method prevented the Roman theologians and the Roman congregations from solving, or even appreciating, the genuine questions with which modern historical science and modern philosophy confronted the Church at the time of the modernist crisis. 32

The neo-scholastic model or paradigm of theology became the rule of orthodoxy for Catholics and was a key factor in the uncomprehending and hostile reaction to Loisy and his modernist program. The following passage, written by A. Loth in reaction to Loisy's attempt to integrate Catholic theology with modern science and philosophy, illustrates this point well:

En face d'une science perpetuellement changeante, l'Eglise est d'avance justifiee de ne pas chercher une intitile conciliation de ses dogmes avec les donnees provisoires des sciences. Elle n'a qu'a s'occuper de son propre enseignement qui ne-relève, que de la foi et qu'a pourvoir aux besoins des âmes en les prémunissant contre les causes de doute et le danger des opinions téméraires.

Si la science change constamment, la foi, elle est immuable. 33

As this passage indicates, what made modernism a crisis was not the Church's rejection of this or that aspect or theory of the modernist. Rather, what made modernism a crisis was the fact that at the root of modernism was a clash between the two fundamentally opposed paradigms.

32 McCool, Catholic Theology, p. 240 (emphasis added); see p. 13.

33 Arthur Loth, "Loisy et Galilée", La Vérité française, (29 décembre 1903); cited in E. Poulat, Histoire, Dogme et Critique dans La Crise Moderniste, Religion et Sociétés (Paris: Casterman, 1962), p. 205; see Schoof, Survey, pp. 34-40. Sanks, in Authority in the Church, discusses the understanding of tradition and magisterium that grew out of this paradigm (pp. 21-103 and 108-128).
or mentalities of classicism and historical-mindedness.\textsuperscript{34}

We have been sketching the pre-history of modernism in order to draw attention to the tensions that existed in the nineteenth century between a predominantly classicist orthodoxy and a small but vocal historically-minded heterodoxy. Toward the close of that century these tensions were resolved ostensibly via the Church's Magisterium in favor of the a-historical approach of Neo-Scholasticism. We say that the problem was resolved "ostensibly" because one issue at the center of that clash, whether the unchangeability of doctrine defined by Vatican I could be maintained within the new paradigm of historical-mindedness, remained a problem after the modernist controversy, and, indeed, remains so today. Be this as it may, our discussion of nineteenth century neo-Scholasticism has provided us with the proper background against which to appreciate and evaluate both Loisy's program of modernization and the wider modernist controversy which it helped to initiate.

III. \textit{Loisy's Modernist Program}

The heart of the modernist program of renewal was the effort to

\textsuperscript{34} C.F. Ratté, \textit{Three Modernists}, pp. 34-35; O'Dea, \textit{Catholic Crisis}, pp. 63-66, 86; and M.D. Petre, \textit{Modernism: Its Failures and Its Fruits} (London and Edinburgh: T.C. and E.C. Jack, Ltd., 1918), pp. 44-47. See also Reardon, "Science and Religious Modernism", p. 63, where he argues that modernism was one instance of a more basic paradigmatic shift that characterized turn of the century philosophy and science; and his \textit{Religious Thought in the 19th Century} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1966), pp. 26-33. Although Lonergan does not discuss the modernist crisis in detail; the few places where he does refer to it do suggest that he would concur with our assessment, viz., that it was a crisis because it was the clash of two fundamentally opposed horizons (See "Belief: Today's Issue", p. 94, "The Absence of God in Modern Culture", p. 112 and "The Response of the Jesuit", p. 184 in \textit{Second Collection and Method}, pp. 273-317).
reconcile the basic truths of the Catholic faith with the assumptions and methods of modern science, particularly the new science of history. This renewal unfolded through two related moments in Loisy's work: (i) a return to the sources of the Christian faith through the modern historical-critical method of biblical studies, and (ii) an attempt to adapt Catholic theology to modern culture. These two moments were inseparable in Loisy's work. For in the former moment Loisy attempted to recover the essence of the Catholic faith from the outdated form it had assumed in nineteenth century neo-Scholasticism. Once this essence had been recovered, then it could be given a new expression appropriate to the modern world.  

35 See A. Loisy, Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire Religieuse de Notre Temps, 3 volumes (Paris, 1930-31), vol. 1, p. 358, where he speaks of adopting Catholic doctrine to the exigencies of contemporary thought. (See A. Vidler, Twentieth Century Defenders of the Faith (London: SCM Press, 1965), p. 40 on how this was the purpose of Loisy's L'Evangile et L'Eglise. In reference to the historical method in particular see the Italian Modernist Buonartí's statement that "...[c]ritical history had been a superb effort of the contemporary mind. ... It is today the unique and indispensable instrument for a religious renaissance." In Bernard Reardon, ed. and intro. Roman Catholic Modernism, A Library of Modern Religious Thought, [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970], p. 235)

We cannot here discuss in detail the modern historical critical method, nor the ways in which Loisy utilized it in his numerous studies of the New and Old Testament. It will be sufficient for our purposes merely to keep in mind that it included the use of historical studies in order to establish the original text (textual criticism). Both these steps were complemented by the identification of the multiple literary genres evident in a text's compilation (literary criticism) and the related study of the history of the transmission and redaction of the text (form criticism). For a fuller discussion the reader is referred to the article "Bible" by Klaus Berger, et al., in Sacramentum Mundi, pp. 160-188; J. Steinman, Biblical Criticism, tr. J.R. Foster, 20th Century Encyclopaedia of Catholicism, v. 63 (New York: Hawthorn Publishers, 1958) and, in terms of New Testament Studies, James Robinson, The New Quest for the Historical Jesus. Studies in Biblical Theology, n. 25 (Naperville: A.R. Allenson, 1959).
After a brief introductory remark on the scope of his modern-ist program, we will turn to a discussion of these two moments in Loisy's work. We will examine first his vision of the import of the use of modern biblical exegesis for theology, and secondly, his vision of the reform of Catholic theology, in which the development of doctrine played a central role. It should be noted that this twofold approach to Loisy's work is determined by an understanding of the contemporary problem of the development of doctrine. For this problem stems from the adjustments historical-mindedness, and in particular the historical-critical study of the Bible, imposed on theologians in understanding the nature of doctrinal development. It also must be noted that we will similarly structure our discussion of the development of Lonergan's thought on doctrinal development in Part II of the thesis. For we will argue that Lonergan's understanding of doctrinal development changed with his growing appreciation of the import of the new methods of historical or positive studies for the method of theology.

1. The Scope of Loisy's Program

In an imaginary dialogue presented in his Mémoires between the Church and a young scholar, Loisy outlined the radical nature and scope of his reform program. The young scholar was told by the Church that a modification in form and expression of the Church's teaching, in itself "...immutable in its principles and in its end...", was acceptable. To this he replied,

It is not your formulas that you must translate for us into a speech intelligible to the men of our age: It is rather your ideas themselves, your absolute affirmations, your theory of
the universe, the conception you have of your own history, that you must renew, rectify, and reconstruct.

In the same vein Loisy later stated that he had come to recognize in his critical studies that...

...what we have to do is to renew theology from top to bottom, to substitute the religious for the dogmatic spirit, to seek the soul of theological truth and leave reason free under the control of conscience.

Loisy held that only such radical renewal could meet what he saw as the crisis of the modern Church. Adaptation on the part of the Church to the culture within which it found itself was for Loisy a fact of its long history; however, to carry such adaptation through in the modern era was especially difficult and critical given the religious crises precipitated by the "...evolution, political, intellectual, economic of the modern world, as a result of all that may be called the modern spirit...".

The orientation of Loisy's whole program was essentially apologetic in nature. And while such a task was not intended to compromise the true nature of the Catholic Church, its primary aim was to "...show how the essentials of Catholicism can survive the

36 Memoires, i, pp. 118-125; cited in Reardon, Roman Catholic Modernism, "Introduction", p. 18.


crisis of contemporary thought. . . . 39

What was the nature of this crisis of faith according to Loisy? At its core, he argued, was the Church's steadfast rejection of the achievements of the rapidly advancing modern science and scientific method. The nineteenth century Church, according to Loisy, rejected these achievements because it felt that the application of modern scientific method to religious questions led to the rejection of fundamental Catholic doctrines (e.g., the Genesis account of creation and the historicity of the deluge). As a result, the Church found modern science's insistence on autonomy inconceivable. The Church had understood science according to the Aristotelian model developed in the middle ages. On this model theology, as the science of God, was the queen of the sciences. Modern science, however, had proven its autonomy in the critical and empirical study of nature. Moreover, its method was then conquering the entire domain of history, philosophy and the history of religions. The inevitable result of these developments, felt Loisy, would be the decline of the outdated Catholic tradition. 40

Loisy found this crisis to be especially evident in biblical studies. In his Autour d'un Petit Livre Loisy relates the hostility Galileo encountered in the 17th century to that encountered by the biblical scholar Richard Simon in the eighteenth century. Indeed, he


experienced it first hand in the resistance encountered in undertaking what he described as the goal of his life's work, "...pour concilier l'orthodoxie catholique avec l'étude sincèrement critique de la Bible...". 41 The result of the Church's resistance to modern science in general and the historical critical method in biblical studies in particular was a profound alienation of Catholic theology and the modern spirit. Loisy refers to Albert Houtin's La Question biblique chez les catholiques de France au XIXe siècle (1902) in reference to this alienation, and explains its origin as follows:

La crise est née de cette opposition que les jeunes intelligences perçoivent entre l'esprit théologique et l'esprit

41 Autour, p. 218. It can be argued that Loisy is not as unorthodox in this statement as it may seem given the resistance to his work on the part of the Church. For instance, Leo XIII in his 1893 encyclical on biblical studies, Providentissimus Deus, had urged Catholic scholars to utilize the new scientific study of the Bible to come to the defense of the Tradition and to turn these weapons on the positivist and rationalist use of them. Leo encouraged Catholic scriptural scholars beseeching them to "...make haste in any case where our times have discovered something useful in the matter of biblical exegesis to avail themselves of it forthwith and by their writings to put it at the service of all." (Cited in R.H. Schmaardt, "The Life and Work of Leo XIII" in ed. E.T. Gargan, Leo XIII, p. 39) Note in this respect that in his submission to this encyclical Loisy wrote to Leo: "It appeared to me necessary, in response to the needs of the present time, to make a prudent application of the critical method, so far as might be legitimate, to the study of Holy Scripture, and thus to meet the adversaries of the Bible with their own weapons." (Letter to Pope Leo XIII, December 7, 1893, found in Appendix IV, in A. Loisy, My Duel With the Vatican. The Autobiography of a Catholic Modernist, tr. R.W. Boynton [New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, 1924], p. 339; see p. 94 in reference to Renan). Loisy and others interested in Catholic biblical scholarship had mixed reactions to Leo's encyclical, for the encyclical was in part intended as a corrective to the use by Loisy and others of the new biblical science; it was seen by one as "a disaster" (Mgr. Mignot), although it did not seem to condemn outright the possibility of a truly critical and historical exegesis for Loisy (See E. Poulat, Histoire, Dogme et Critique, pp. 131, 139, 141, 336-40; (esp. n. 21) 428, 470 and Raitte, Three Modernists, pp. 60-61.)
scientifique; entre ce qui est présenté comme la vérité catho-
ligue et ce qui est présenté de plus en plus comme la vérité de la
science; elle est née sur le terrain philosophique par l'insuffi-
sance du dogmatisme ancien devant la connaissance actuelle de
l'univers; elle est née sur le terrain de l'histoire religieuse
par l'obstination du dogmatisme présent à méconnaître l'évidence
des faits et la légitimité de la méthode critique. 42

What is significant in this description of the 19th century crisis of
faith is the sharp contrast Loisy drew between the a-historical outlook
of the Church and the achievements of historical-mindedness. As we will
see in our discussion to follow, Loisy attempted in the areas of bibli-
cal studies and the development of doctrine to resolve the crisis by
formulating a method of theology appropriate to these developments of
historical-mindedness.

2. The Biblical Question

The question of how and to what extent the new historical cri-
tical study of the Bible was to be introduced into theology was discussed
with much acerbity in nineteenth century Catholic theology. Known as
the "biblical question", it proved to be a focal point of Catholic
discussion of the relationship between religion and science and between
Christianity and history. 43 It was inevitable, then, that the revisions

42 Autour, pp. 216-217. Loisy summarized Houton's work, relating nine key points (pp. 215-216). On Houtin's work in relation to
Loisy and the modernist agenda, see Poulat, Histoire, Dogme et Critique, p. 182 n. 139 and pp. 327-358.

43 See O'Dea in Catholic Crisis: "...the commencement of
modern Biblical study among Catholics...was to lead Catholic thought
to a profound encounter with modern ideas...." (p. 68) Poulat,
Histoire, Dogme et Critique, pp. 615-619; and Ratte, Three Modernists,
Religious Significance. (Cambridge, 1944) in reference to the place of
Loisy introduced in the area of biblical studies would be understood (by both himself and his critics) to entail revisions in the Church's understanding of the nature and method of theology. And such revision in theology would in turn require alterations of the Church's understanding of such basic issues as the nature of doctrine and its development. What were the revisions in biblical studies that Loisy proposed?

Historical and theological interpretations of the Bible

Loisy recognized that his program, given the state of Catholic theology in the nineteenth century, would not be appreciated because of its use of the new historical critical method. In the Introduction to his Autour d'un petit livre, Loisy addressed this problem. Noting the Church's neglect of the merits of Protestant and Rationalist exegesis of Scripture, Loisy complained that the scriptural scholar was denied his rightful autonomy. The reason for this was that in the neo-Scholastic scheme of theology the task and method of the scriptural scholar was entirely determined by the categories and needs of dogmatic and speculative theology. A. Houtin, whose La question biblique chez les Catholiques de France au XIXe siècle Loisy cited favorably, had lamented the biblical criticism in Loisy's work: "A spiritual Church, with an historical foundation, presents a troublesome proposition." (p. 18)

The phrase 'biblical question' actually is the title of an article written by the rector of the Catholic Institute in Paris, Msgr. Maurice le Sage d'Hauteroche de Hulst in 1893, "La Question Biblique." The article was intended to be a defense of the work of Loisy, then a member of his faculty; however, it precipitated Leo XIII's Providentissimus Deus. See A. Lilley, Modernism: A Record and Review (London: Pitman and Sons, 1908), pp. 45ff; and K.S. Latourette, The Nineteenth Century in Europe: Background and Roman Catholic Phase, Christianity in A Revolutionary Age: A History of Christianity in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, vol. I (New York: Harper and Brothers, Pubs., 1958), pp. 395-396.
consequences of this the year before:

The equipment for oriental and biblical-critical studies comes almost entirely from the principles of the heterodox and the unbeliever in Germany and England; polyglot texts, dictionaries, treatises on archaeology, grammars for the two Testaments, concordances, up-to-date historical commentaries. The Protestants have all of them in profusion, while on our side there is poverty, and often enough penury. Not a single classical edition of the original text of the Old Testament; the same has to be said for the critical text of the Septuagint and New Testament, Scholz being now outmoded. We have not even a critical revision of our own Latin Vulgate, which we have left to the enterprise of the Anglican Bishop Wordsworth.\footnote{Cited in Heaney, The Modernist Crisis, pp. 32-33; see n. 8 and his Chapter III for a discussion of and references to 19th century views on scripture.}

Given this situation, how did Loisy justify his proposal to introduce the modern historical method into Catholic scriptural studies? The answer to this question lies in the way in which Loisy distinguished the historical and the theological interpretation of Scripture. For him it was self-evident that the faithful and the biblical critic approached the Bible in different ways. Loisy noted this difference in his biblical studies. "Faith told me that these writings were divine;
reason showed me that they were wholly human, in no way exempt from contradictions, and bearing clear traces of the individual leanings of the authors.45 This difference led him to distinguish the historical from the theological interpretation of Scripture.

De même que le critique ne peut ni ne doit définir la portée dogmatique d'un texte, le théologien ne peut ni ne doit en définir la signification historique. Le principe du critique ne lui permet pas de formuler des conclusions de foi. Nul principe du théologien ne l'autorise à formuler des conclusions d'histoire.46

Thus, for example, his criticism of Harnack in L'Evangile is directed not towards Harnack's effort to reconcile Christian faith with the modern scientific spirit, nor with his use of the historical-critical method. Rather, Loisy takes issue with the way in which Harnack's history serves the point of view of his theology. The historian, qua historian, contended Loisy, must apply the same methods of study to Christianity as he would to any religion. The historian must be critical; he can have no theological or doctrinal presuppositions.47

45 Cited in Ranchetti, The Modernist Crisis, p. 16, n. 1.


47 Gospel, pp. 2-14. Recent developments in hermeneutics would show Loisy's position to be inadequate. For example, both Bultmann and Gadamer have shown that the ideal of interpretation is not to be free of all presuppositions, but to be aware of the presuppositions that one inevitably has. Lonergan refers to the type of position Loisy espouses as the "Principle of the Empty Head" ("In brief, the less one knows, the better an exegete one will be.") (Method, p. 157) which he rejects for its faulty view of knowledge which he terms a "naive intuitionalism". (Method, pp. 156-158).
Historical and dogmatics theology

The separation of the historical from the theological interpretation of Scripture entailed a revision in the relationship between the branches of positive or historical theology and dogmatic and systematic theology. In asserting the necessary autonomy of the scriptural scholar Loisy claimed in his Origins of the New Testament that no external authority "...has the right to impose conclusions upon the critic in anything that falls within the field of his experience, the field namely of everything susceptible of methodical observation." In the first issue of the review he founded, Enseignement biblique (1892), Loisy had cited the autonomy of the exegete's method and conclusions from dogmatic theology as one of the six principles to be realized under his editorship. What this meant for Catholic theology was that Scripture ceased to be the premises or "proof texts" from which the dogmatic theologians drew conclusions. For in Loisy's scheme Scriptures were moved "...from the theological level, where they are viewed dogmatically, to the historical level, where they are viewed rationally and critically." The dogmatic theology from which Loisy sought to free scriptural studies was the neo-Scholastic model outlined in Aeterni Patris. This

view of Scripture was reflected in J.B. Aubry's statement in 1890. "Le programme de tout professeur d'Écriture Sainte doit être rigoureusement celui de S. Thomas: La recherche du sens dogmatique, pas autre chose!!"\textsuperscript{51}

As an example of the type of results obtained when scriptural studies are undertaken within this framework, E. Poulat cites the following "bibliographical note" made on Jesus and Mary in the 1880's.

Jésus-Christ, 2\textsuperscript{e} personne de la Très Sainte-Trinité, Messie conçu du Saint-Esprit à Nazareth 7/5 avant l'ère vulgaire 25 mars, né de la Vierge Marie à Bethléem 25 décembre, circoncis ler janvier 6/4, baptisé 6 janvier 29, crucifié à Jérusalem 3 avril 33, ressuscité le 5, monté au ciel le 7 mai... Marie, conçue immaculée vers 8 décembre-23 et née vers 8 septembre-22 à Jérusalem (ou Nazareth), Vierge/mère de Jésus-Christ 25 décembre-7, morte à Jérusalem (ou Éphèse) vers 13 août 55, assomption 15.\textsuperscript{52}

The above is typical of what Loisy saw as dogmatic theology's uncritical use of its sources; where the liberal Protestant exegete Strauss could

\textsuperscript{51} J.B. Aubry, Essai sur la méthode de études ecclésiastiques en France (Lille, 1890); cited in Heany, The Modernist Crisis, p. 241, n. 8.

\textsuperscript{52} Répertoire des sources historiques du Moyen Age (Paris, 1877-1888\textsuperscript{1}, 1903-1905\textsuperscript{2}); cited in Poulat, Histoire, Dogme et Histoire, p. 619, n. 13. Cf. Albert Schweitzer's low estimation of nineteenth century Catholic biblical studies: "In the Catholic Church the study of the Life of Jesus has remained down to the present day entirely free from criticism. The reason for that is, that in principle it has remained at a pre-Straussian standpoint, and does not venture upon an unreserved application of historical considerations either to the miracle question or to the Johannine question, and naturally therefore resigns the attempt to take account of and explain the great historical problems." (The Quest of the Historical Jesus, tr. W. Montgomery, intro. James Robinson (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1968), p. 295, n. 2. Schweitzer finds in Loisy an exception, as is indicated by his comment "All honour to Alfred Loisy!" and his citing favorably both Loisy's handling of the Johannine question in his Le Quatrième Evangile and his critique of Harnack in L'Evangile (p. 296, n. 2) (see also Loisy, Duel, pp. 87ff.) It is interesting to compare Schweitzer's evaluation of traditional Catholic exegesis with the Vatican's evaluation of modernist exegesis in Pascendi Domini Gregis. Pascendi takes issue in particular with the separation of the Jesus of history from the Christ of faith (see Pascendi Domini Gregis in Vincent A. Yzermans, All Things in Christ: Selected Documents of St. Pius X (Westminster: The Newman Press, 1954) pp. 110-111).
find no basis in the Gospels for the assertion of Jesus' divinity, this Catholic scholar had managed to establish a substantial portion of Catholic doctrine. The significance of this question for the development of doctrine is that on the neo-Scholastic model of theology there was no need to recognize the historicity of doctrine. However, on Loisy's model of theology and his insistence on the return to the sources, such a recognition was inevitable. The dogmatic theology with which Loisy took issue was what Blondel later would describe as 'extrinsicism': a one sided view of the relationship between dogma and history that set the former as the norm for the interpretation of the latter. The key to the neo-Scholastic position was, as we noted above, a conceptualist model of knowing which emphasized objective and eternal truths and a neglect of the subject which precluded any serious concern for history. As a result, the return to the sources of Christianity and the concern with doctrinal development evidenced in Loisy's historical-mindedness could be regarded as nothing short of apostasy.

From the Word of God to the word of man

Loisy's guiding principle in executing his exegetical program was to apprehend the Bible not as the word of God but as "...a book written for men and by men...". Loisy realized that the recognition

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54 A. Loisy, "The Biblical Question and the Inspiration of the
of the Bible as a literary document meant the end of the old-style dogmatic theology.

Criticism...has succeeded, none the less, in finally discrediting the older type of theology, and in placing the Bible on a level with other ancient sources. It has fully demonstrated its human character and gained for it the standing of an ancient literature.\footnote{Loisy, \textit{Duel}, p. 88.}

For once one admits that the Bible is a historical or literary or human document, argues Loisy, then one has to admit the propriety of the historical-critical method as a means of understanding it. As early as 1884 he drew a threefold principle from this basic shift from the Bible as the word of God to the Bible as the word of men, a principle that was to be fundamental to his subsequent work. The principle is that things \textit{relative} (to a particular place and time) are \textit{imperfect}, and things imperfect are essentially \textit{perfectible}.\footnote{See Ranchetti, \textit{The Modernist Crisis}, p. 18.} Very briefly we can summarize Loisy's use of this triad in the study of biblical texts as follows.

First, on Loisy's understanding of the historical-critical method, the biblical texts were regarded as conditioned by and \textit{relative} Scriptures", published in \textit{Etudes bibliques}\footnote{Loisy, \textit{Duel}, p. 149.} (1903), pp. 138-169; cited by Loisy in \textit{Duel}, p. 149. Compare Loisy's remark in \textit{Autour}, "Le Critique impartial trouvera que l'histoire de la nation israélite se ramène à une suite d'événements vulgaires dans la vie des peuples, et à l'action d'hommes religieux dont le caractère n'a rien de commun, le tout, faits et hommes, concourant à une œuvre plus grande qu'eux, c'est à savoir la religion monothéiste" (p. 43), to Lonergan's hermeneutical principle which he employs in \textit{Nicea}, pp. 7-17 (see our discussion in Ch.V, pp. 243-44, and n. 37.)
to the time and place in which they were written. He argued that the biblical authors could not but express themselves in the language of their time and in light of the knowledge of their time. In looking back on his (unsubmitted) doctoral thesis De divina bibliorum inspiratione, tractatio dogmatica, Loisy stated that... .

... if the revelation was contained in the Bible, and without error, as was declared by the Vatican Council, it must be under a relative form, proportioned to the time and environment in which these books emerged, and to the general knowledge of that time and environment... 57

Secondly, the assertion that biblical statements are relative to a particular place and time led Loisy to assert that they are imperfect representations of their object. What Loisy meant by this is simply that what is valid and true in one particular context may cease to be valid and true in another. (We will explicate this notion in some detail in our discussion of the epistemological basis of Loisy's position on the development of doctrine.) Finally, the perfectibility of biblical statements is the corollary to their imperfect nature. For if "... the insufficiency of Scriptures as a rule of faith proceeded from their very nature..." then it was necessary for the Church to adapt them "... to ever new needs, by disengaging the substance of truth from its superannuated form..." 58

Two points important for our study followed from Loisy's use of this three-fold principle in biblical studies. First, the recognition of the Bible as relative, imperfect and perfectible meant the end of

57 Loisy, Duel, p, 98; see p. 338.
58 Loisy; Duel, p. 149.
the Bible as a fixed, normative and unchanging depositum fidei. The problem, then, became to find a suitable replacement for the norm in Christian faith within the context of Loisy's historically-minded theology. This issue was, we will see, central to the question of the development of doctrine; whether or not Loisy was successful in this respect will be discussed at the end of this chapter. The second point that followed from Loisy's use of this threefold principle in biblical studies had to do with the method by which the development of doctrine was to be studied. Loisy's view of the development of doctrine was a function of his view of the use of the historical-critical method in biblical studies. This led him to apply the threefold principle to doctrines as well as to the Bible, for "...the word of Councils and of Popes [is] not above the word of God, but in point of fact manifest[s] itself under identical conditions." However, the recognition of doctrine's historicity by Loisy did not merely mean that one had to use the historical-critical method to study its past development. For to say that doctrines were essentially historical is to posit a future-oriented dimension to development. Indeed, as the following passage

59 Loisy wrote that his idea of "relativity" was calculated to discredit not only Scholasticism, but as well "...the absolute character of the Jewish and Christian revelation, of all the ecclesiastical dogmas and of Papal infallibility." (Duel, p. 99) See also A. Vidler, The Modernist Movement in the Roman Church (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934) pp. 54-55.

60 Loisy, Duel, p. 99. Cf. the passage cited in our Introduction (pp. 8-9) from Newman's Essay: "Christianity has been long enough in the world to justify us in dealing with it as a fact in the world's history... Its home is in the world; and to know what it is, we must seek it in the world, and hear the world's witness of it." (p. 69)
indicates, this recognition of the future-oriented dimension of doctrine served to justify in principle the radical reforms of the modernist program.

Just as Christianity of old, in adapting its message to the conditions of the Mediterranean world, impressed itself on that age by bringing to it a human ideal far superior to that of the pagan religions and the speculations of Greek wisdom, so it behooves the followers of the gleam in our time, to free Christianity from traditional fetters, to enlarge it to the dimension of the rightful aspirations and needs of civilization, to raise speculation to the height of true science in all its findings, welcoming the light from whatsoever quarter it may come.61

What is evident in this passage is that for Loisy the development of doctrine, when approached within the framework of historical-mindedness, of his biblical studies, became the perfectibility of doctrine. In the discussion to follow we will explain the significance of this aspect of Loisy's thought on the nature of doctrinal development.

3. The Development of Doctrine

The main loci for Loisy's conception of the development of doctrine are his L'Évangile et l'Église published in 1902, and the sixth letter ("Lettre à un jeune savant, sur l'origine et l'autorité des dogmes") of the work published the following year in response to the critics of L'Évangile, Autour d'un petit livre. Shortly before his break with the Church Loisy described L'Évangile...

...firstly, as a historical outline and explanation of the development of Christianity and secondly as a general philosophy of religion and an attempt to interpret the formulations of dogma, the official creeds and the conciliar definitions, with the aim of reconciling them, by sacrificing the letter in favour of the

61Loisy, Origins, pp. 31-32.
Loisy carried out this program through what appeared to be a critique of and response to Harnack's *Das Wesen des Christentums*, published in 1901. Such a response was inconceivable in terms of the neo-Scholastic apologetic, for Loisy sought to prove by means of textual criticism that Harnack's vindication of liberal Protestantism did not have a basis in Scripture. Loisy argued that because Harnack missed the essentially eschatological character of Jesus' teaching Harnack was led to see the Catholic tradition as a historical accretion covering up the primitive essence of Christianity. Loisy held that only an appreciation of this eschatological element would lead one to see the Catholic tradition as the genuine development and fulfillment in history of the essential gospel message. As he explained in *Autour d'un petit Livre*, "L'idée du royaume renfermait le germe de l'Église . . .; l'Évangile et l'Église sont dans un rapport identique avec le royaume . . ."63

We say that Loisy's *L'Évangile et l'Église* appeared to be a critique of Harnack because it was more fundamentally an attack on the neo-Scholastic theology then dominant in the Church. This was the judgement of many of the first critics of *L'Évangile*, a judgement that was proven correct when the subsequent *Autour d'un petit Livre*, far from qualifying the earlier work's position, moved on to discuss

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63 p. 159; see *Gospel*, p. 166. For a discussion of Loisy's argument with Harnack see Poulat, *Histoire, Dogme et Critique*, pp. 89-102
explicitly the inability of neo-Scholasticism to meet the challenge of historical-mindedness. At the center of Loisy's critique of neo-Scholasticism was his argument that neo-Scholastic theology, especially as it had been given expression in Vatican I, denied that there had been or could be any real change in doctrine. As a result the neo-Scholastic theologian saw no need to recognize, much less resolve, the problem of the relationship between critical history and the Church's doctrines. Loisy stated in L'Évangile that the efforts...

... of a healthy theology should be directed to a solution of the difficulty, presented by the unquestionable authority of faith demands for dogma, and the variability, the relativity, the critic cannot fail to perceive in the history of dogmas and dogmatic formulas.  

Loisy's idea of the development of doctrine, like that of Newman, was formulated in order to confront this problem. The key to his idea was the rejection of the view of doctrines as"...truths come down to us from heaven and preserved by religious tradition in the exact form in which they were first presented to us." In the discussion to follow we shall explain Loisy's position on the development of doctrine by analyzing his understanding of five issues we take to be at its base:

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65 Gospel, p. 214. Loisy is here again very close to Newman, who likewise saw the need for a theory of development to account for this discrepancy. See Newman, Essay, pp. 74, 88, 90-92, 148-149, 211.

Christianity's relation to culture, the historicity of man, the historical relativity of religious truth, the metaphysical relativity of truth, and the foundations of doctrines and theology.

**Christianity and Culture**

As we noted above, Loisy's use of the historical-critical method informs his view of the development of doctrine. This is evident in *L'Evangile*, for in that work he went to great pains to establish indisputable historical facts from which he drew what he felt were inevitable theological conclusions or principles. For if it is a fact that the Church has adapted its doctrines to various cultural contexts in its long history, then it must be valid in principle for the Church to adapt its doctrines to the modern cultural context. In Loisy's mind the most significant developments or adaptations in the Church took place in the "hellénization" of the gospels in the early centuries. Loisy traced this movement through Paul, the Fourth Gospel, Justin, Irenaeus and Origen, and argued that it was undeniably to the enrichment of Christianity. In each development there was an adherence to tradition (stemming from Christianity's roots in Judaism) and to the exigencies of Greek science and philosophy. "Each step of dogma marks the introduction of Greek philosophy into Christianity, and a compromise between philosophy and Christian tradition."67 Loisy cites, e.g., Origen's theology as "... the bridge between the new religion and the science of antiquity."68

The impetus for such development stemmed from the need felt by the earliest Christians to understand and interpret their religion. And this effort could not but take place within their own cultural context. "...Christianity could not become a religion of Greeks, Romans, or Germans, unless it received many things from them, unless they themselves, as it were, entered into it, and made it in truth their own religion. ..." 69

Critical history had proven, explained Loisy, that the function of doctrine was to harmonize religious faith with the scientific knowledge of a given culture. As science develops, so must doctrine. Loisy had previously worked out this conclusion in a series of articles for the *Revue du clerge francais* from 1898 through 1900. He argued that the religious conception of man, of the universe and of life "...a besoin de s'accorder avec la connaissance scientifique de ces memes objets." 70 Loisy returned to this theme again in his letter on the origin of doctrine in *Autour d'un petit livre*. An evolutionist view of doctrine, he argued, would have a particular advantage for the modern era in that it would re-open the dialogue between doctrine and science that so typified the early Church. 71 He went on to suggest that such a

69 *Gospel*, p. 238; see p. 85.

70 "l'idée de la révélation"; cited in Poulat, *Histoire, Dogme et Critique*, pp. 81-82; see p. 83 and *Autour*, p. 201.

71 Loisy felt that the neo-Scholastic apologetic had effectively closed off this dialogue. See *Autour*, pp. 211-213, 217. Cf also his statement concerning the origin and aim of his *L'Evangile* in reference to the empirical character of modern science: "Dieu ne se montre pas au bout du télescope de l'astronome. Le géologue ne l'exhumera pas en fouillant l'écorce de la terre. Le chimiste ne pourra l'extraire du fond
dialogue, although not the "official" stance of the nineteenth century Church, was nonetheless taking place.

Après tout, l'accord de la foi et de la science est toujours à réaliser; il ne se fait point par décrets de l'autorité, mais il s'accomplit et se perfectionne peu à peu par la bonne volonté des croyants qui étudient, des savants qui croient. Chacun l'opère pour soi, et du travail commun resulte un état général de l'esprit catholique dont on peut dire qu'il est l'attitude de l'Eglise même à l'égard de la science. Espérons que cette attitude se fera de plus en plus franche et loyale, non hostile ni décourageante. La vraie vérité n'a qu'un intérêt, qui est la vérité même.72

Accordingly, when the Catholic Church realized its true spirit, i.e., the spirit that was so much in evidence in the early Church, then there would result developments in both theology and doctrine. And, as we will see in the discussion to follow, Loisy recognized that such developments will be radically different from previous ones given the historical, critical and empirical character of modern culture.

The historicity of man

The second issue that is important to Loisy's position on the development of doctrine is his affirmation of the historicity of man. As we noted in our discussion of the biblical question, his use of the historical-critical method led Loisy to regard Scripture and doctrine as essentially human phénomena. This meant that the proper object of historical inquiry was not the content of revelation but its anthro-

de son creuset. Bien que Dieu soit partout dans le monde, on peut bien dire qu'il n'est nulle part l'objet propre et direct de la science" (p. 10). (Cf. Lonergan's "The Absence of God in Modern Culture", in Second Collection, pp. 101-116). He therefore felt that neo-Scholasticism had to be jettisoned for the realization of an authentically modern Christianity.

72 Autour, p. 219.
pological basis. This basis was understood by examining the way in which a particular historical and cultural context determined the apprehension of revelation's content. He therefore defined revelation as "...un enseignement divin proportionne à la condition intellectuelle des hommes a qui il a ete destine d'abord." 73 What were the consequences of this emphasis on the anthropological element in all religious truth?

If Christianity is a human phenomenon, and man is essentially historical, then it follows that Christianity too must be essentially historical. Such was Loisy's position. For instance, he held that to postulate an essence of Christianity, separate from Christianity's historical development, is to postulate something non-existent. Indeed, he took issue with Harnack on this very point.

Man is not without epoch, he is of all epochs, and changes with them. The gospel was not addressed to abstract man, without an epoch, unchangeable, who never existed save in the mind of theorists, but to real men who followed one another in time and to them it could not fail to accommodate itself... It is pitiful philosophy that attempts to fix the absolute in any scrap of human activity, intellectual or moral. 74

73 "L'idée de la révélation"; cited in Poulant, Histoire, Dogme et Critique, p. 82. Cf. George Tyrrell, for whom the Church's creeds were "...not divine statements but human statements inspired by divine experience. Inspiration does not mean infallible, absolute, final truth. A true hypothesis does not exclude a truer. A useful symbol leaves room for a moré useful." ("Revelation and Experience", unpublished article cited in Petre, Modernism, p. 60.) Loisy's position is very close to that of Spinoza in his Theologico-Political Treatise; see especially the chapters on "Prophecy" and "Prophets" and "The Interpretation of Scripture". (In ed. and tr. E.H.M. Elwes The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza: A Theologico-Political Treatise and a Political Treatise (New York: Dover Publications, 1951), pp. 13-43, 98-120.

74 Gospel, p. 115.
The Christianity which lives on through men cannot be said to have an unchanging essence—whether this essence be neo-Scholasticism's static depositum fidei or Harnack's Faith in God the Father. For to speak about Christianity's essence is to transform it into "...a metaphysical entity, into a logical quintessence, into something resembling the scholastic notion of species..." and to deny its vital development.\textsuperscript{75} Far from being realized at a single moment for all time, the essence of Christianity "...has been realized more or less perfectly from the beginning, and...will continue to be realized thus more and more, so long as Christianity shall endure."\textsuperscript{76}

Loisy did not, however, simply deduce the historicity of Christianity from the notion of the historicity of man. He went on to support this conclusion by appealing to historical studies of the Church's development. Accordingly, the judgement that there was no unchanging essence of Christianity had both \textit{a posteriori} and \textit{a priori} grounds.\textsuperscript{77} Loisy felt that one could not avoid admitting the historically-conditioned character of all Christian truth if one studied history critically. For example, in the imaginary dialogue between the Church and the young scholar to which we referred

\textsuperscript{75}Gospel, p. 14; see p. 137. N.b. that Troeltsch, although appreciating Loisy's critique of Harnack, took him to task on this same point. Troeltsch argued that Loisy simply replaced Harnack's essence as faith in God the Father with his own essence as the Church, and that this reveals his "...unhistorical, Catholic-dogmatic thinking." (E. Troeltsch, Gesammelte Schriften, v. 2, p. 398; cited in Hans Rollmana, "Troeltsch, von Hugel and Modernism", The Downside Review, v. 96 (January, 1978) n. 322, p. 45.

\textsuperscript{76}Gospel, pp. 18-19.

\textsuperscript{77}See Autour, pp. 104, 105, 201; Gospel, pp. 166ff., 211.
earlier, the latter posed the following challenge:

Are you simple enough to suppose that the Trinity of the Council of Nicea is the Trinity of the Gospel and of the early Fathers, that the grace of Molina is the same as that of the apostle Paul, that your God - I ask you, the Church, to pardon my sincerity - who grew great among the Fathers with the help of Plato, and was defined among the Scholastics with the aid of Aristotle is the same as the God of Moses, David and Josias?... I know what men have produced your symbol. What use is it to tell me again you have received it from heaven?\(^7\)8

The point is that one cannot prescind from the process by which Christianity had come to be; and this meant that the proper way to understand Christianity was to focus not on eternal verities but on historical developments.\(^7\)9 And as the emphasis on history was recognized, one would

\(^7\)8 Mémoires, i pp. 120-21; cited in Rondet, Do Dogmas Change? p. 97. Newman made the same point with a similar example in his Essay, pp. 70-71

\(^7\)9 See Mémoires, i, p. 463 (cited in Ratté, Three-Modernists, p. 341) and Gospel, p. 244

Loisy stresses the importance of history for studying Christianity as did Newman fifty years before him. As we noted above, in his Essay Newman started not from immutability but from history and change. He therefore argued against those for whom "...Christianity does not fall within the province of history..." (p. 69) and concluded that "...history [is] the true mode of determining the character of Christianity." (p. 72) (See above, p. 34 and n.60 and our Introduction, pp. 8-10.)

Loisy was familiar with Newman's Essay by 1902, the year L'Evangile was published. In 1896 he wrote to von Hügel, "It has occurred to me that I might find support and good ideas in some of Newman's writings, which I do not know. I have extracts from a book on doctrinal development containing sound principles. What do you think of him...?... I am sure you have all Newman's books, and could tell me which would be useful to me from the theological-apologetic-polemical-pastoral point of view." (Mémoires, i, p. 410; cited in Ranchetti, The Modernist Crisis, p. 28.) In 1898 Loisy published an article on Newman under the pseudonym A. Firmin titled 'Le développement chrétien d'après le
see that the important part of Christianity was "not that which has never changed, for in a sense, all has changed and has never ceased to change." Loisy therefore stressed, as did the Tübingen theologians, the dynamic character of the Church and tradition. And this stress led him to argue, as we noted above, that...

cardinal Newman", Revue de clergé français, 1er décembre, 1899, pp. 5-20. Newman also is referred to several times in L'Evangile. Loisy held Newman in high esteem (he referred to Newman as "le theologien le plus ouvert qui ait existé dans la sacre Eglise depuis Origène" (cited in Vidler, 20th Century, p. 94). However, Loisy and Newman had different concerns. For in formulating his theory of doctrinal development Newman did not have any real familiarity with the type of critical exegesis employed by Loisy and other critics. Newman therefore was addressing a different set of problems from Loisy's. Poulat argues that Loisy's article on Newman both appreciates the Essay and goes beyond it. According to Loisy the merit of Newman's position was that it included a scientific theory of Christianity along the ideals of the theology of the Church Fathers, viz., to harmonize revealed doctrines with the intellectual progress of humanity. However, Loisy felt compelled to go beyond this theory because of the results of critical historical inquiry into Christian origins. Loisy therefore added to the idea of development a "reassessment of the relation between doctrines, the doctrine's historical context, and the present state of mind—something that Newman had not envisaged. (Poulat, Histoire, Dogme et Critique, pp. 74-77; cf. Ben Meyer, The Church in Three Tenses (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1971), pp. 137-146 and n. 32 for a comment on Newman's "historical-mindedness!.) For discussions of Loisy and Newman see Reardon, Introduction, Roman Catholic Modernism, p. 22; translator's Introduction to Gospel, xxx; Ratte, Three Modernists, pp. 29, 63, 106, 133-134, 138 n. 23; Vidler, Twentieth Century, pp. 51-59; 93ff.; Rollman, "Troeltsch, von Hugel and Modernism", p. 45; N. Lash, Newman on Development (Shepardstown: Patmos Press, 1975), pp. 139, 147, 176 n. 35, 192, n. 7, 198, n. 4, 200-210, n. 106; Schoof, Survey, pp. 42, 59, 180-181; and Poulat, Histoire, Dogme et Critique, pp. 16, 18, 71, 74-76, 107, 144, 166, 282, 303, 345, 375-76, 459, 514-15. Note in particular Schoof's judgement that because Loisy took over from Newman... principally the more external, social and historical elements in Newman's works..." Loisy "undoubtedly underestimated the ultimately intellectual character of Newman's theory of development." (Survey, p. 181)

80 Gospel, p. 115; see pp. 177-178. CE. Newman's statement that "...here below to live is to change, and to be perfect is to have changed often." (Essay, p. 100)
.. .[t]he conceptions that the Church presents as revealed dogmas are not truths fallen from heaven, and preserved by religious tradition in the precise form in which they first appeared. . . Though the dogmas may be Divine in origin and substance, they are human in structure and composition.81

Because dogmas are human in structure and composition, it is impossible to say that they are permanent. For man is essentially historical, and as such is incapable of formulating a truth that is permanent. In the remaining three sections we will draw out the methodological basis for Loisy's denial of doctrine's permanence by examining his relativist view of truth.

**Historical relativity of truth**

Loisy's understanding of the development of doctrine as the perfectibility of doctrine is grounded in his assertion of the historicity of man and of Christianity. This led him to argue that doctrines, like all religious truth, are conditioned by and are relative to the context(s) in which they were formulated. This meant that doctrines were forever inadequate to their divine and ineffable object. Loisy offered two grounds of explanation for this inadequacy of doctrines, what he termed their "relativite metaphysique" and their "relativite historique".

The historical relativity of doctrine, according to Loisy, reflected "...le travail incessant de l'Intelligence croyante pour s'approprier cette representation defectueuse et l'adapter aux conditions nouvelles de la pensee humaine."82 The believer will never cease

81 *Gospel*, pp. 210-211.

to put Christianity and Christian doctrine to the question, for he will always strive for a better understanding and profounder appropriation of his belief. Because of this incessant striving, argued Loisy, there will be development and perfection of doctrine until the end of time.

The substance of doctrinal development was the "...constant work of interpretation wherein 'the letter that killeth' is effectively controlled by 'the spirit that giveth life.'" Loisy warned against falling into the "culte de la formule" in the attempt to salvage some immutability out of this process. In a continuation of the dialogue between the scholar and the Church, Loisy had the former challenge,

Will, then, doctrine be more unchangeable in the future than in the past? This would be an end of the Church's thought, which would mean an end to its life. Theological speculation can never stop at any point in any subject it covers. ... This would be compromised if we bound it to intangible and unchangeable formulas.

Such vitality of speculation had been the case in the entire history of Christianity. It had been obscured, however, by neo-Scholastic theology's preoccupation with objective, fixed and eternal truths. Such a preoccupation, argued Loisy, had been discredited by modern critical history's revelation of the essential historicity of all truth. Loisy maintained that this awareness of historicity, an achievement unique to the modern era, imposed on the Church the responsibility to appropriate religious truth in a consciously historical manner. For Loisy

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83 Gospel, p. 211.
84 Autour, p. 208
85 Mémoires, 1, p. 463; cited in Rondet, Do Dogmas Change?, p. 98; see Gospel, pp. 210-11, 221-23.
this meant to put deliberately all religious truth to the question, and
to transform doctrines of the past into new doctrines that would embody
the "spirit that giveth life" in forms appropriate to the modern era. 86

Metaphysical relativity of truth

As a historian Loisy attributed the development of Christianity
to the fact that a doctrine valid in one context
proved to be invalid in another. He concluded from this fact that there
never could be obtained a final expression of Christian truth that
would be valid in every historical context. Loisy recognized, however,
that this conclusion implied a philosophical position on the nature and
origin of religious truth which led to what he called "the metaphysical
relativity" of doctrine.

In the series of articles on development published in Revue du
clerge français, Loisy argued that doctrines were inadequate to their
object, the reality of the divine that is given in experience but cannot
in itself be communicated to the human mind. "Nos idées les plus
consistantes dans l'ordre religieux ne sont que des métaphores et des
symboles, une sorte de notation algébrique représentant des quantités
ineffables." 87 Stressing this ineffable element of religion, he wrote,
"les vérités fondamentales de la religion n'ont pas été communiquées en
forme d'enseignement spéculatif." 88 Loisy felt that such a view of

86 Autour, pp. 201ff.; Gospel, p. 211.
87 "L'idée de la révélation", cited in Poulal, Histoire, Dogme
et Critique, p. 83.
88 Ibid., p. 81. Cf. the journal entry cited by Vidler: "Do not
doctrine was the only one that could account for the facts of doctrinal
development. He made this point repeatedly in L’*Evangile* in arguing
that the "scholastic conception, abstract and unreal, of revelation
and dogma" was not adequate to the concrete, historical unfolding of
doctrine. 89 In *Autour d’un petit livre* Loisy explained that the
scholastic view of doctrine presupposed their view of truth as the
unconditioned and absolute grasp of the real by the human mind.

This emphasis on the conceptual and non-subjective element of truth,
as we noted above, proved to be the grounds for the notion that doc-
trines, even in the forms they took in history, provided immutable and
eternally true knowledge of the divine. 90 Loisy’s view of doctrine as
symbolic expressions of their ineffable objects, in contrast, pre-
supposed the modern philosophical, historical and scientific view of
truth as relative and as inadequate to its object. He stated that it
was self-evident to the modern mind that "...la vérité est en nous
quelque chose de nécessairement conditionné, relatif, toujours per-
fectible, et susceptible aussi de diminution." 91 Loisy held, follow-
ing Kant, that the real is inaccessible to our perceptions and that our

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embarrass yourself with metaphysical questions. The Eternal told Job
the truth about these discussions: man had not made the world and does
not know what is at the bottom of it." (A. Vidler, *A Variety of Catho-
lic Modernists* [Cambridge: University Press, 1970], p. 51)

89 *Gospel*, p. 212.

90 *Autour*, pp. 188-190; *Gospel*, p. 87.

91 *Autour*, p. 191.
perceptions of it therefore cannot but be impoverished; they represent "... adéquatement au sujet ni l'objet ni le sujet lui-même".\footnote{Autour, p. 191.} Truth, then, is both limited and unlimited. It is limited in the sense that it never adequately reflects its object; and it is unlimited in the sense that it is forever progressing towards full adequation to its object.

Within this epistemological framework the assertion of the per-
effectibility of doctrine at the expense of its permanence was inevitable. For the believers will continually be engaging in the activity of seeking ever better approximations to the reality of the object of their faith. Loisy argued that the ancient doctors of the Church were far more aware of this fundamental inadequacy of doctrinal language than their modern, neo-Scholastic counterparts. To this end he quotes a passage from Bossuet's \textit{Instruction sur les états d'oraison}:

'Comme il faut s'élever au-dessus de tout ce qui semble indigne de sa grandeur', dit Bossuet résumant la théologie de saint Augustin, 'à la fois il faut s'élever au-dessus de tout ce qu'on croit le plus digne, de sorte qu'on n'ose plus, en un certain sens, ni rien dire, ni rien penser de ce premier être, ni le nommer en soi-même, parce qu'on ne peut pas même expliquer combien il est ineffable, ni comprendre combien il est incompréhensible'.\footnote{Autour, p. 203.}

The irony of Loisy citing Bossuet as an example of agnosticism concerning the divine object of doctrines is that he has placed Bossuet's words in a context Bossuet himself would never had accepted. Bossuet did distinguish the doctrine from its divine object, but his purpose was to
safeguard the revealed and normative character of doctrines as authentic expressions of the original depositum fidei. Loisy, writing some 200 years later and conscious of the historicity of Christianity, held that the distinction Bossuet drew was between the changing and historical human element and the divine element in doctrine. And Loisy felt that the relationship between the two was a problem, not a given.

Loisy argued that his account of the metaphysical relativity of doctrines was demanded by modern science. For, as we saw above, if modern theology was to model itself on modern science's method, then it would have to be critical and empirical. And because such a method yielded only hypothetical and probable results, the results of theological inquiry, doctrines, too would have to be hypothetical and probable. Modern science shows, maintained Loisy, that man's possession of the truth, like man himself, is constantly on the move; it evolves "avec lui, en lui, par lui." Accordingly, revealed truths could never be isolated from their vital expression in human intelligence as if they were a pure essence independent of the believer's mind. On the contrary, revealed truths are essentially tied into man's apprehension of them, and because man changes, so do the truths he affirms. In L'Évangile Loisy writes,

Our most certain knowledge in the domain of nature and science is always in movement, always relative, always perfectible. It is not with the elements of human thought that an everlasting edifice can be built. Truth alone is unchangeable, but not its image in our minds. Faith addresses itself to the unchangeable truth, through formulae, necessarily inadequate, capable of improvement, consequently of change.95

94 Autour, p. 197
Foundations of doctrines and theology

The final issue we must examine in explicating Loisy's position on the development of doctrine concerns the foundations of religious truth. The key to Loisy's approach to the issue of foundations was his introduction of critical history as an autonomous discipline in theology. For once critical history was introduced, Scripture and Tradition became literary and historically conditioned expressions of the Christian community. As such, they ceased to be the unchanging and normative depositum fidei from which doctrines could be drawn. The new foundations for this historically-minded theology, in keeping with Loisy's emphasis on the anthropological component of revelation, would have to be the individual believer's consciousness of God. Doctrines are grounded in this consciousness in the sense that they give it symbolic expression. Loisy did not say, however, that doctrinal development is merely a matter of human reflection and symbol-making, and that development therefore has no supernatural dimension. Rather, he asserted that this supernatural dimension cannot be objectified and isolated from the human and historical dimension. In Autour d'un petit livre he describes the process of development as follows: "C'est l'homme qui cherche, mais c'est Dieu qui l'excite; c'est l'homme qui voit, mais c'est Dieu qui l'éclaire. La révélation se réalise dans l'homme, mais elle est l'oeuvre de Dieu en lui, avec lui, et par lui."97

Loisy's turn to the subjective and non-conceptual dimension of

96 Autour, pp. 119-120; see Gospel, pp. 122, 210.211.
97 Autour, pp. 197-198.
faith for the foundations of doctrine echoed Schleiermacher's theology. Schleiermacher, whose theology was an attempt to meet the demands of post-Kantian critical philosophy, also located the starting point of theological reflection in human consciousness. In this framework doctrines were defined by him as "accounts of the Christian religious affections set forth in speech." As external expressions of internal experiences, doctrines have their root, explained Schleiermacher in his Speeches on Religion, in "contemplation of feeling, . . . that, like your conceptions from experience, [are] nothing but general expressions for definite feelings. They are not necessary for religion itself, scarcely ever for communicating religion, but reflection requires and creates them." Loisy followed Schleiermacher in this emphasis on the internal in that he maintained that there is no revelation of the divine unless it is realized in the consciousness of the believer. Loisy employed what came to be known as the method of immanence. Louis Cardinal Billot defined this method as "...consisting in demonstrating the religious truth, or the credibility of the Christian faith, purely from the aspirations, exigencies and energies which belong to the human spirit as such." Within this framework the norm of doctrine


100 De Immutabilitate traditionis contra modernam haeresinm evolutionismi (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1904, 1923), pp. 79-80; cited
was not, as the neo-Scholastic theologians held, the objective content of Scripture and Tradition. Rather, the norm of doctrine was the individual believer's religious experience; in effect, Scripture and Tradition had been replaced by the believer's religiosity as the depositum fidei. 101

The proposal made by Loisy and other modernists for a new foundation for theology elicited a condemnation from the Vatican in 1907 in Pascendi Dominici Gregis. The condemnation, which was rooted in the neo-Scholastic view of theology, argued that a fundamental weakness in Loisy's position was his inability to ground the permanence of doctrine in these new foundations. In its discussion of modernism

In Pascendi the Vatican called attention to the aspects of Loisy's position we just mentioned: that the essence of religion and the norm for doctrine was not an external and unique revelation (Scripture and

in Sanks, Authority, p. 88, n. 6. The following from George Tyrrell illustrates the application of this method to revealed truths: "As things are, the only test of revelation is the test of life—not merely of moral, but of spiritual fruitfulness in the deepest sense. It must at once satisfy and intensify man's mystical and moral need. It must bring the transcendent nearer to his thoughts, feelings and desires. It must deepen his consciousness of union with God. Any other "sign", be it miracle or argument, will appeal only to the faithless and perverse. It may puzzle them, but it will never convince them; it may convert them to the Church, but it cannot convert them to God; it may change their theology—it cannot change their hearts." (Christianity at the Crossroads [London: Hillery House, 1963], p. 87. See above, pp. 37-41 on how this method was inconceivable to the neo-scholastic theologians.

Tradition) but rather man's religious experience. This stress on the immediacy of the believer's contact with God, according to Pascendi, precluded a proper appreciation of Christianity's transcendent nature. Moreover, to put the foundations of theology in religious experience led to dogmatic relativism, the position that doctrines were changeable because all expressions of the ineffable object of man's religious experience could be improved. Pascendi argued that this dogmatic relativism was in direct contradiction to the teaching on the permanence of doctrine and cited two passages from Vatican I to that effect.

The doctrine of the faith which God has revealed has not been proposed to human intelligences to be perfected by them as if it were a philosophical system, but as a divine deposit entrusted to the Spouse of Christ to be faithfully guarded and infallibly interpreted. Hence also that sense of the sacred dogmas is to be perpetually retained which our Holy Mother the Church has once declared, nor is this sense ever to be abandoned on the plea or pretext of a more profound comprehension of the truth.

Let intelligence and science and wisdom, therefore, increase and progress abundantly and vigorously in individuals, and in the mass, in the believer and in the whole Church, throughout the ages and the centuries—but only in its own kind, that is, according to the same dogma, the same sense, the same acceptation. 102

Modernism's historical-mindedness, argued Pascendi, did not secure but rather undermined this normative basis of doctrine and theology.

The approach taken in Pascendi Domini Gregis to modernism was characteristic of the neo-Scholasticism of the time. The document's concern was to secure the eternal, unchangeable and divine element of doctrine

102 Pascendi Domini Gregis, in Yzermans, All Things in Christ, p. 109
at the expense of the historical and personal element. For without a clear affirmation of the former element, it was felt that the normative foundations of theology and belief would be lost. However problematic this neo-Scholastic approach to doctrine may be, we feel that _Pascendi_ nonetheless did point to a fundamental fault in Loisy's position.

_Pascendi_ pointed out that Loisy's transposition of the foundations for doctrine from Scripture and Tradition to religious experience left the believer and the theologist without a critical norm by which to judge the adequacy of particular expressions of Christian truth. The reason for this, if our analysis of Loisy's position on doctrine is correct, is that Loisy held that religious experience could not be adequately objectified. According to Loisy all attempts at religious expression - including Scripture and Tradition - represented only impoverished and therefore perfectible objectifications of the truth of Christianity. Far from being permanent, such religious expression could and must change with variations in culture and history. One can say, then, that on Loisy's model religious experience proved to be the _foundation_ for doctrine, doctrine being the articulation and conceptualization of this experience; but that these foundations proved not to be the _permanent_ and _normative_ basis for doctrine, their objectification in language being no less subject to the vicissitudes of history than any other expression. Although Loisy did provide a historically-minded account of doctrine and doctrine's foundations, he was unable to provide a historically-minded account of the normative character of doctrine that was so central to _Vatican I_. In this evaluation of Loisy's position on doctrine we are in agreement with his contemporary Blondel, who described the deficiency of
Loisy's historical approach to theology in the following way:

...when criticism is called in to help, after promising us a grand staircase, the ground floor has been so effectively occupied that there is no room to go up higher, dogma is respectfully left at the door, or rather on the upper floor. 103

Blondel did not doubt that there was a need for Catholic theology to come to terms with historical-mindedness. However, he felt that Loisy's attempts in this regard tended to reduce doctrine to history rather than to mediate and integrate doctrine and history.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been twofold: i) to discuss the modernist program of Loisy in order to provide a concrete instance of the transition from classicism to historical-mindedness that we will discuss in detail in the next chapter; and ii) to define the problem of a historically-minded approach to the development of doctrine as it came to be understood in modern Catholic theology: The problem, as the preceding analysis shows, was the formulation of permanent and normative foundations for doctrine within the horizon of historical-mindedness.

In the words of Pascendi, the modernist program failed in this regard because theologians like Loisy were...

...under the sway of a blind and unchecked passion for novelty, thinking not at all of finding some solid foundation of truth, but despising the holy and apostolic traditions, they embrace other and vain, futile, uncertain doctrines, unapproved by the Church, on which, in the height of their vanity, they think they can base and maintain truth itself. 104

...in our examination of Lonergan's position on the development of doctrine.

103 Blondel, History and Dogma, p. 263

104 Pascendi Domini Gregis, in Yzermans, All Things in Christ, p. 96 (emphasis added)
we will focus on this foundational question, and argue that Lonergan's historically-minded approach to doctrine does not contradict Vatican I's assertion of the permanence of doctrine. His method in theology, we argue, therefore meets the problem of doctrinal development. However, before we begin this examination, we must first establish both the context (Chapter I) and the basis (Chapter II) of Lonergan's position.
CHAPTER TWO

THE EXIGENCIES OF THE PRESENT: LONERGAN AND THE
TRANSITION FROM CLASSICISM TO HISTORICAL-MINDEDNESS

'The alarming thing is', he said, 'that this time it isn't only the changeable things that are changing, but the unchangeable as well. Anyhow, that's the danger--even for me. Not only chess and manners and bank-balances and the social order, but the sea and the sky--and Westminster Abbey.'

- Charles Morgan

What are the roots that clutch, what branches grow Out of this stormy rubbish? Son of Man, You cannot say, or guess, for you know only A heap of broken images, where the sun beats. The dead tree gives no shelter, the cricket no relief, And the dry stone no sound of water.

- T.S. Eliot

These changes recoil upon him, upon his decisions and desires, both individual and collective, and upon his manner of thinking and acting with respect to things and people. Hence we can already speak of a true social and cultural transformation, one which has repercussions on man's religious life as well.

- Vatican II, "Gaudium et Spes"

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The quotations on the previous page bespeak a concern for the many and widespread changes affecting the modern world. The root of these changes, according to Lonergan, is a transition from a now waning classicist outlook to a new and developing historically-minded one. In this chapter we will explicate Lonergan's understanding of the nature of this transition and its implications for contemporary theology.

The topic of this chapter is important for our study of Lonergan's thought on the development of doctrine for two reasons. First, the transition to historical-mindedness and the exigencies it imposes on Catholic thought have been the context for Lonergan's later (post-1965) reflections on the method of theology and the development of doctrine. Secondly, the challenge to any claim for permanent and normative truths posed by historical-mindedness has proven to be the starting point for most modern Catholic thought on the development of doctrine. It follows that a full appreciation of Lonergan's position on the development of doctrine, and the distinctiveness of that position vis-à-vis modern Catholic thought requires an understanding of his reflections on the transition from classicism to historical-mindedness.

This chapter is divided into two parts: i) a discussion of the way Lonergan's definition of theology leads him to regard the transition to historical-mindedness as of crucial importance for contemporary theological reflection and ii) a longer discussion of what Lonergan identifies as the essential features of that transition.

1. **The Definition of Theology**

   The terms classicism and historical-mindedness are adopted by
the later Lonergan, i.e. in his work after 1965 in which the primary concern is the method of theology.¹ Lonergan's emphasis on the importance of the transition to historical-mindedness reflects the basic orientation of his theological program. An indication of this orientation is given in the definition of theology presented in the introduction to Method in Theology: "A theology mediates between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of religion in that matrix."² A logical consequence of this definition is that adjustments in theology will be required whenever there is a significant change in the state of a culture. According to Lonergan, such adjustments lie at the core of contemporary theological reflection. He sees recent developments in


²It should be noted that although in Insight Lonergan distinguishes "classical" from "statistical" methods in science, this is not what the later Lonergan intends by the contrast between classicism and historical-mindedness. The former pair of terms refers to methods within modern science and therefore within what Lonergan terms historical-mindedness. (See Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding [London: Longmans, Green and Co. and New York: Philosophical Library, 1957], chapters II-IV, especially p. 68, for Lonergan's analysis of classical and statistical methods.)

theology as a response—although for some a belated response—to modern science, scholarship and philosophy. As he put it in "Theology in its New Context", "... just as theology in the 13th century followed its age by assimilating Aristotle, just as theology in the 17th century resisted its age by retiring into a dogmatic corner, so theology today is locked in an encounter with its age." 3 Indeed, a significant difference between contemporary theology and its classicist predecessor consists in the fact that the latter was unable to come to terms with the historical-mindedness so characteristic of modern thought. Let us briefly consider the classicist definition of theology in order to explain why this was so and to provide a preliminary indication of why Lonergan finds it necessary to abandon it.

1. The Classicist Definition of Theology

Lonergan contrasts his historically-minded definition of theology with what he terms the classicist definition of theology. The classicist defines theology as the science of God and all things in relation to Him. This definition has its roots in medieval theology's pursuit of Anselm's directive, fides quaerens intellectum. 4 When this

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3 "Theology in its New Context" in Second Collection, p. 58; see Method, p. 353; Philosophy of God, p. 22; and "Belief: Today's Issue" in Second Collection, pp. 97-98.

4 Jan H. Walgrave, Unfolding Revelation, pp. 92-105. It is interesting to note that much of Lonergan's early work
pursuit was undertaken within Aristotelian categories, there came to be an emphasis on logic and certitude in theology. For example, in the twelfth century Alan of Lille drew up a statement of regularae theologicae as the basis for all theological propositions and Nicholas of Armiens labored to construct a set of axioms for theology on the model of mathematics. For both theologians the articles of faith, provided by the lumen fidei, functioned in theological science as did the basic principles of metaphysics, provided by the lumen rationis, in rational science:

Aquinas sought to make theology's scientific status more


5W. Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science, pp. 228-29. See Owen Chadwick, From Bossuet to Newman, pp. 21-49 for the influence of this model of theology on the understanding of doctrinal development in the later Scholastics.

6W. Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science, p. 229. See below, pp. 109-12 and our discussion of Lonergan's reflections on the importance of the deductivist ideal for the classicist horizon. Cf. his remark to the effect that the secret of fourteenth century skepticism was the emphasis on certitude and vigorous demonstration without a parallel emphasis on understanding. (Verbum, pp. 211-14)
precise by specifying the nature of theology's formal object. The appropriate formal object for theological science, he argued, was God and all things in relation to him. Hence Aquinas writes,

"Everything considered in this science is either God himself or things which are from God and ordered to God, precisely under this formality, just as the physician considers signs and causes and many similar things inasmuch as they are in some way related to health. Hence the closer anything approaches to the true nature of Divinity, so much the more properly is it considered in this science."

Aquinas went on to define theology's relationship to the other sciences on the basis of this definition. Because theology's formal object is God, that is, God as the first existing truth and the cause of all created truth, theology alone is in a position to judge all knowledge. Aquinas describes theological wisdom in the *Summa*, with reference to theology's fundamental stance:

That person, therefore, who considers maturely and without qualification the first and final cause of the entire universe, namely God, is to be called supremely wise. ... and whatsoever is encountered in the other sciences which is incompatible with its truth should be completely condemned as false. ...

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7 See Elisabeth Gossman, "Classical Scholasticism", *Sacramentum Mundi*, vol. 6, where she notes that the search for theology's formal object was the search for "...the highest or most general principle from which all that exists may be deduced." (p. 27).

8 *Summa*, 1a, 1, 7; see Karl Rahner, "Theology", *Sacramentum Mundi*, vol. 6, p. 236.


10 *Summa*, 1a, 1, 6
Because its formal object is the cause of all things, theology is architectonic with respect to the other sciences and relates to them as their queen and arbiter.

Aquinas appropriated Aristotelian logic and science in the interest of establishing a coherent set of concepts by means of which the truths of faith could be systematically understood. His successors, however, neglected Aquinas' emphasis on systematic understanding as the ideal of theology and replaced it with the ideal of logical coherence. According to Lonergan this left them unable to meet the scientific revolutions of the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. We can cite two reasons for this inability, both of which we will develop in the second part of this chapter. First, modern science's uniqueness consists in a claim to autonomy. Because of this the modern scientist refuses to allow anything but a critical study of the data to determine his results, methods, etc. Thus, when it began to emerge in the seventeenth century, modern science inevitably found itself at odds with a system like Scholasticism that claimed to be universally competent and architectonic for the other disciplines. Likewise, theology, understood as a closed, static and logically coherent system,

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*We discuss this below on pp. 97-8. See Method, p. 94; "Transition from a Classicist World-view to Historical-Mindedness", in Second Collection, p. 5; and Lonergan's "Ongoing Genesis of Methods", Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuse, vol. 6, n.4 (1976-77), p. 342. The basis of this emphasis on autonomy is clearly articulated by Kant: "Enlightenment is man's release from his self-inflicted tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. Self-inflicted tutelage is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere aude: 'Have courage to use your own reason.'--that is the motto of the enlightenment." (On History, ed. and intro. by Lewis White Beck [Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1963], p. 3)*
could not but regard the new developments of this new autonomous science as an aberration. Secondly, and more fundamentally, the emphasis on logical coherence in theology fostered an outlook in which one could not readily understand such things as the concrete, dynamic and pluralistic methods of modern natural and historical sciences. We saw in the last chapter that this was the case with the Church's condemnation of the modernism of Loisy. For the neo-Scholasticism which informed that condemnation precluded any real appreciation of the changes in theology required by the rise of the positive and historical studies in the 19th century. In pointing to the inability of the classicist outlook in theology to deal with modern historical studies we are not arguing that the Aristotelian and Scholastic notions of science cannot provide an adequate basis for theology. Rather, we are suggesting, along with Lonergan, that these notions of science, particularly as they were interpreted in 19th century neo-Scholasticism, proved inadequate to deal with certain key issues that came to be with the rise of modern thought.\(^{12}\) The point to be appreciated here is that in order to meet these key issues Lonergan has found it necessary to shift out of the classicist model of theology as the science of God and all things in relation to God to a more dynamic and historically-minded model in which method is of paramount importance. We will discuss these issues and the importance of method in the next part of the chapter; at present we continue our discussion of how Lonergan's vision of the task of contemporary theology is informed by his concern with the exigencies of the

\(^{12}\) See "Theology and Understanding" in *Collection*, p. 135.
current transition to historical-mindedness.

2. Lonergan's Historically-Minded Definition of Theology

Lonergan, as we noted above, defines theology as reflection on religion within a cultural matrix. We will discuss the structure of theology proper to this definition, the functional specialties outlined in Method in Theology, in Chapter Four. For the present we concern ourselves with a more general discussion of the nature of theology's relation to the contemporary cultural matrix.

Lonergan's definition of theology is based on the distinctions he draws between the social, the cultural and the cultural suprastructure. The social refers to the ways in which persons live together in community. It is to be found in family, society, Church, etc. However, besides the operations of daily living there exist the meaning and value that inform such living, and so there emerges the cultural. The cultural strives to reflect on and give expression to the meanings and values of a way of life; it stands to the social on analogy to the way the soul stands to the body. 13 "Not on bread alone doth man live. Over and above mere living and operating, men have to find a meaning and value in their living and operating. It is the function of culture to discover, express, validate, criticize, correct, develop, improve such meaning." 14 The third distinction, the cultural suprastructure, arises

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14 Method, p. 32.
within advanced cultures. It consists in the objectification and mediation of the meanings and values of the cultural. So to art there is added art criticism, to common sense proverbs there are added philosophical reflection and science, to religion there is added theology. "Besides the meanings and values immanent in everyday life there is an enormous process in which meanings are elaborated and values discussed in a far more reflective, deliberate, critical fashion."15

Lonergan conceives of the relationship between theology and religion as that of the cultural suprastructure to the cultural. Theology is therefore distinct (but not separate) from religion. This means that changes going forward in the rest of the cultural suprastructure—in the natural and human sciences, philosophy, history, etc.—will affect theology in its form and structure but not in its content, religion. Two cultural suprastructures may be distinguished, the classicist and the modern. The classicist is rooted in what Lonergan terms the theoretical differentiation of consciousness evident in Greek philosophy and literature; the modern cultural suprastructure, which is gradually replacing the classicist, is rooted in what Lonergan terms the interiorly differentiated consciousness evident in historical-mindedness. Lonergan contends that the changes affecting theology and belief today are a function of this shift in the cultural suprastructure; they are therefore not a matter of a new revelation or a new faith, but rather

15 "Belief: Today's Issue", in Second Collection, p. 91; see "The Absence of God in Modern Culture", in Second Collection, P. 102 and Method, pp. 28-30, 92.
of a new cultural context. It follows, then, that if theology is to mediate successfully between a religion and its cultural context, it will have to come to terms with the fundamental change in the cultural suprastructure represented by historical-mindedness.

The task of shifting theology from the classicism that was so basic to the medieval synthesis to the historical-mindedness of modernity, according to Lonergan, invites theologians to the "Herculean labors" of formulating what he describes as a method in theology.

Only a theology structured by method can assimilate the somewhat recently accepted hermeneutics and historical methods and it alone has room for developing doctrines and developing theologies. The key task, then, in contemporary Catholic Theology is to replace the shattered thought forms associated with the eternal truths and logical ideals with new thought forms that accord with the dynamics of development and the concrete style of method.

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17 "Dimensions of Meaning", in Collection, p. 266.

18 "Philosophy and Theology", p. 202 in Second Collection. That almost every article in Second Collection makes mention of this task shows that it has been a dominant concern in Lonergan's mind while writing Method (see, e.g. Second Collection, pp. 44, 58, 99, 108-111, 138, 159,
The formulation of this method is to function much as Aquinas' appropriation of Aristotle did in the medieval synthesis. That is, method will enable theologians to reflect on and clarify the operations proper to their endeavor. In this respect method plays an integral part in what Lonergan describes as Christian philosophy, viz., the attempt to express the philosophic basis of Christian faith, theology and doctrine. Such a formulation is especially critical today, argues Lonergan, because without the critical foundations supplied by method, the transition to historical-mindedness can be to the detriment rather than the enrichment of Catholic theology.

Lonergan stresses that . . .

... our disengagement from classicism and our involvement in modernity must be open-eyed, critical, coherent, sure-footed. If we are not just to throw out what is good in classicism and replace it with contemporary trash, then we have to take the trouble, and it is enormous, to grasp the strength and the weakness, the power and the limitations, the good points and the shortcomings of both classicism and modernity.20

160, 184, 197ff., 211, 277, 279). Yves Congar has called attention to this task with reference to Vatican II's call for Aggiornamento in stating that the modern era, characterized as it is by radical change and cultural transformation, "calls for a revision of 'traditional' forms which goes beyond the level of adaptation or aggiornamento, and which would instead be a new creation. It is no longer sufficient to maintain, even by adapting it, what has already been; it is necessary to reconstruct it." ("Renewal of the Spirit and Reform of the Institution", in eds. A. Müller and N. Greinacher, Ongoing Reform in the Church, Concilium, vol. 73 [New York: Herder and Herder, 1972], p. 47)


Our discussion of Loisy in the previous chapter serves to illustrate this problem of method. For we argued that as justified and correct as Loisy was in his effort to "reshape theology from top to bottom" in light of the new historical-mindedness, his program failed in so far as he was unable to transpose the permanence and normative basis of theology from a classicist to the historically-minded context. We argued that the reason for this failure consisted in his inability to formulate critical foundations for the new theology. Perhaps Karl Barth's remark concerning nineteenth-century liberal Protestantism is particularly applicable to Loisy in this respect. Barth said of liberal theology's openness to modern thought"...that through the open windows and doors came so much stimulation for thought and discussion that there was hardly time or love or zeal left for the task to be accomplished within the house itself."²¹ In the discussion to follow in the next part of this chapter we will explicate Lonergan's position on the transition from classicism to historical-mindedness. Our purpose will be to highlight what Lonergan takes to be the positive features of historical-mindedness for theology and the ways in which those positive features can be complemented by the


critical foundations supplied by method.

II. The Transition from Classicism to Historical-Mindedness.

In Chapter One we argued that the two opposed theologies that made Modernism a crisis, neo-Scholasticism and Modernism, were each rooted in the more fundamental outlooks or horizons of classicism and historical-mindedness. In the remainder of this chapter we will analyze Lonergan's understanding of each of these two horizons in order to bring to light what he takes to be the exigencies imposed on Catholic theology by the transition to historical-mindedness.

It should be noted that "horizon" is a technical term in Lonergan's work. We will have occasion to discuss it in more detail in Chapters III and VI. For the present discussion, however, we use the term in the more general sense of the extent of one's conscious perspective and interest. Thus, in Method Lonergan states that a horizon is "...the limit of one's field of vision ... Beyond the horizon lie objects that, at least for the moment, cannot be seen. Within the horizon lie the objects that can now be seen."22 The term "horizon" is used with

22 Method, pp. 235-236; see also p. 85 and "Natural Right and Historical-mindedness", p. 17. The term horizon takes on a more technical meaning not only in Lonergan's approach to history (see Method, pp. 220-224 and passim) but also in his assertion of the priority of cognitional theory over metaphysics (see e.g. "Metaphysics as Horizon", in Collection, pp. 202-220). For a brief discussion of the significance of this term and its import in Lonergan's thought see Bernard Tyrrell, Bernard Lonergan's Philosophy of God (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974) pp. 49-55. In Ch. III we will clarify our use of the term where we define transcendental method as "basic horizon" (see pp. 152-3). And finally, we will clarify the meaning of the term as Lonergan uses it in assigning the functional specialty Foundations the task of setting the "horizon" in which doctrines can be apprehended. (see Ch. VI, pp. 249-57).
reference to classicism and historical-mindedness with the intention of showing that each represents a mentality or Weltanschauung wherein what is a viable position on man, science, theology, etc. within one is unintelligible within the other. For Lonergan, then, the transition from classicism to historical-mindedness is not so much a matter of new data or new interpretations of the old data as it is a fundamentally different way of understanding one's world. In using the term horizon in this way, Lonergan intends something like what Kuhn meant in his use of the term "paradigm" in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. According to Kuhn, there hovers behind every science a paradigm which is for the most part undefined, but nonetheless informs and influences all of the science of an era. The paradigm will remain operative until there occurs a breakdown in the conceptual field (as with Galileo and Darwin) at which time the paradigm will begin to be replaced.

Therefore, at times of revolution, when the normal-scientific tradition changes, the scientist's perception of his environment must be re-educated—in some familiar situations he must learn to see a new gestalt. After he has done so the world of his research will seem, here and there, incommensurable with the one he had inhabited before.

23 Cf. Gilkey's use of the term Geist to "...refer to that deep, preconceptual attitude toward and understanding of existence which dominates and forms the cultural life of any epoch, the way men of a given time characteristically apprehend the world they live in and their place within it; their fundamental self-understanding of their being in the world." (Naming the Whirlwind: The Renewal of God-Language [Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1969] p. 32)


See Lonergan's "A New Pastoral Theology" (the Larkin-Stuart Lectures, Trinity College, 1973; unpublished, available from the Lonergan Center, Regis College, Toronto), p. 1 where he explains that he sees the
Lonergan believes that the present shift to historical-mindedness is like the revolutionary change described by Kuhn. In our discussion we will bring to light the meaning of this shift to historical-mindedness by outlining four of its more prominent features: the impact of modern science, the new science of man, the new conception of culture, and the new mediation of meaning.25

1. The impact of modern science

Lonergan singles out the emergence of modern science as a central factor in the transition to historical-mindedness. According to him, modern science has affected modernity's cultural suprastructure more than anything else, and for this reason Lonergan identifies the rise of historical-mindedness with the origins of modern science toward the end of the 17th century.26 It must be stressed, however, that what Lonergan current changes in theology as a revolution in the sense that Kuhn used the word in the Structure of Scientific Revolutions: as the ongoing effort of a community to work out the implications of a decisive breakthrough. See also Nicea, pp. 14, 15, n.8 where Lonergan relates Butterfield's attempt to get at the origins of modern science—and not particular modern laws or theories—with his own attempt to get at the ante-Nicene development of Trinitarian dogma. Kuhn cites Butterfield's The Origin of Modern Science: 1300-1800 (London: 1949) (pp. 1-7) on p. 85, n.8.

Finally, see Lonergan's review of E. Barbotin, et al in Gregorianum 44 (1963) where he favorably cites and summarizes Breton's suggestion that modern changes in mathematics, logic, and natural sciences are "... neither the result of this or that discovery nor the work of this or that school. Rather they are the crumbling of an ancien régime, the outcome of a many-sided and complex historical process, in which events and discoveries occurring independently and in different fields have led opposed schools of thought and different climates of opinion to analogous conclusions." (p. 372)


finds significant is not that modern science is a new field, or a new and better science, but rather that it constitutes "a methodical breakthrough", a change in the very notion of science itself. Because the breakthrough initiated by modern science was one of method, Lonergan feels justified in stressing the continuity between the emergence of modern natural science in the seventeenth century and modern historical science in the nineteenth century. He quotes Alan Richardson to this effect:

We should never forget that it was one and the same movement of critical enquiry which first culminated in the seventeenth century scientific achievement and later in the emergence of the fully developed historical-critical method of the nineteenth century. . . . The historical revolution in human thinking, which was accomplished in the nineteenth century, is just as important as the scientific revolution of two centuries earlier. But they are not two separate revolutions; they are aspects of the one great transitional movement from the mediæval to the modern way of looking at things.28

in Modern Culture", p. 103 in Second Collection. Note the qualification concerning the term "classical science" on p. 82, n. 1 above.


In stressing the importance of modern science in Lonergan's account of historical-mindedness we do not want to obscure the difference between Lonergan's earlier work, in particular Insight, and Lonergan's later work, in particular Method (see our "Introduction", pp. 15-17.) However, there is a continuity in the sense that the question of method, although addressed in different contexts, remains a constant concern. Indeed, when put within this perspective Lonergan's more recent emphasis
Lonergan maintains that the modern notion of science developed in conscious opposition to the classicist model found in Aristotle. We will present the ways in which modern science contributes to what Lonergan terms historical-mindedness by contrasting it with its classicist predecessor on seven distinct methodological precepts.

From necessity to verifiable possibility

According to Lonergan a key to classicist science is an emphasis on necessity. Lonergan attributes this emphasis to a strict adherence to Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*. Essentially, the method of science portrayed in the *Posterior Analytics* consists in the logical deduction of conclusions from first principles expressing objective necessity. In opposition to the Aristotelian model modern science has relegated necessity to the status of a marginal idea and has replaced it with the ideal of verifiable possibility. Modern science's aim, therefore, is the intelligibility not of what must be so but of what is in fact possible and probably verified. Thus, for example, modern science views the laws of nature as hypothetical and in need of verification; they could conceivably

...on the Geisteswissenschaften in his later work complements the emphasis on the Naturwissenschaften in *Insight*.

be other than they in fact are. 30 Lonergan points out that Galileo's shift from the category of "the nature of..." to that of "the state of..." is paradigmatic of this aspect of modern science. For Galileo first measured and only then did he formulate the mathematical expression of free fall; and the intelligibility reached, then, was that of the empirically verified, not of the necessary. 31 The overall effect of this shift to the empirically verified is that the claim to necessary truth and knowledge as permanent acquisitions is replaced by the goal of ever better approximation to the truth. 32

Earlier we noted the way in which the Aristotelian notion of science informed medieval theology. Lonergan claims that the skepticism and subsequent decline of Scholasticism in the 15th century can in part be attributed to an over-emphasis on Aristotle's use of the idea of necessity in his later works. Lonergan contends that the "cult of necessity", associated with Aristotle's demand that not only conclusions be logically necessary but that they as well be drawn from necessary


32 Method, p. 259. Modern philosophy has followed suit with its assertion that analytical principles must be verified. (Method, p. 316; Insight, pp. XI, 304-309; 363-364, 402-408, 671, Tracy; Achievement, p. 86.
premises, is a thing of the past. Non-Euclidian geometry, quantum
theory, and Keynesian economics have discredited such demands. Modern
science will still aspire to conclusions that follow necessarily from
premises, but instead of being absolute truths, the premises are freely
and hypothetically postulated. And this shift will undoubtedly affect
the method of modern theology.

From certitude to probability

Lonergan contends that modern science aims not at certain truth
about reality, as did its classicist predecessor, but only at a probable
account of that reality. That is, modern science is geared only to ever
better approximations of the truth, an ideal that is to be attained
through an increasingly more adequate but never complete understanding of
the relevant data. In Insight Lonergan cites Darwin's use of proba-
bility as a principle of explanation as an example of the shift away

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33 Method, p. 311; Philosophy of God, p. 6; "Philosophy and The-
ology", in Second Collection, p. 261. The emphasis on necessity, coupled
with an over-exaggeration of system, contributed to this decline because
it allowed philosophical problems to dominate theology. ("Theological
Understanding", p. 23)

34 Method, pp. 280, 315.

35 Method, p. 94; Philosophy of God, p. 32; Insight, pp. 405-406;
"The Future of Thomism", p. 51; "Belief: Today's Issue", p. 94; "The
Absence of God in Modern Culture", p. 104; "Theology and Man's Future", p.
141 in Second Collection. Lonergan's critique of conceptualism in favor
of Aquinas' dynamic intellectualism is buttressed by his analysis of mod-
ern science. For the conceptuialist is guilty, on Lonergan's account, of
overstressing certitude at the expense of the act of understanding in its
conception of science. See Verbum, pp. 210-212 and the statement "Just as
man does not live by bread alone, science does not live by certitude
alone." ("Theological Understanding", p. 31) The first ten chapters of
Insight, which aim to awaken in the reader awareness of the act of under-
standing by drawing examples of insights from modern science, are in this
sense also a critique of conceptualism.
...the explanation presents an intelligibility immanent in the data, grounded in the similarities and differences, in numbers and their states of change, in distributions over the surface of the earth and throughout the epochs of geology. 36

One need only contrast Darwin's use of probability with its use by the classicist scientist Laplace to appreciate the difference between the modern and classicist understanding of science's proper object. Laplace thought Newtonian physics true because of its explanatory powers. Gaps in the system that prevented complete knowledge of the universe were due only to ignorance of the universe's original conditions and the inadequacy of measuring instruments. Laplace held, therefore, that the gaps could conceivably be replaced by certain knowledge. Laplace's classicist theory of probability, worked out in The System of the World and A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities, was designed to effect such knowledge. On the basis of probability he sought to work out a mathematical formula by means of which any world situation could be deduced from information on another situation. In his quest for the necessary Laplace had to rule out the non-systematic. 37 The modern scientist, on the other hand, regards the non-systematic element as a positive object of inquiry. Contrary to Laplace, probability theory does not make up for ignorance of initial conditions; rather, it is indicative of the absence of complete knowledge of the whole of reality. And such absence of complete knowledge is due to the undeniably probable character of scientific knowing.

36 Insight, p. 132; cf. Lonergan's notion of emergent probability, pp. 121-132.

37 Insight, pp. 39, 56, 112, 132, 204, 205; Heelan, Quantum Mechanics, pp. 19-20, 39-41.
as such.

A corollary of the shift from certitude to probability is a change in the conception of causality. For Aristotle perfect science was certain knowledge of things through their causes. Causality was conceived as material, formal, efficient, or final. The modern scientist, for whom scientific knowledge is no more than probable, drops this fourfold scheme and identifies scientific knowledge with correlation. The reason for this shift to correlation is that the Aristotelian scheme of causation violated modern science's canons of selection and relevance by leading the scientist away from the data at hand. Again Galileo's law of falling bodies provides us with an example of modern science's emphasis on probability and verifiable possibility. In the words of Lonergan, "Galileo was uninterested in the final cause of falling, he drew no distinction between the different materials that fall, he made no effort to determine what agencies produce fall."  

From system as true and permanent to systems as ongoing

A system is defined by Lonergan as a set of basic terms and relations. A system is related to experience through the derivation of

\[38\] Method, p. 315; "The Future of Thomism", in Second Collection, p. 51; Verbum, p. 211.


\[40\] Insight, p. 33; H-Efan, Quantum Mechanics, p. 141, where he draws the reader's attention to Kant's discussion of substance (#212) and causality (#218) in the Critique of Pure Reason.
secondary terms and relations from the basic set. Because of his emphasis on logic Aristotle conceived system statically. He saw it as a permanent expression of truth equally valid for all times and places. Of chief concern for Aristotle was the perfect exactitude, rigor and universality of the system rather than its adaptability to particular instances. Because of this, the system's definitions and implications were thought to be perpetually the same; as Longeman puts it, they had the "... eternal quality of Plato's ideas...". This notion, according to Lonergan, stemmed from an overly strict adherence to the ideals of deductive logic. For Aristotle "[s]ystems are either true or false. True system is the realization of the deductivist's ideal that happens to be true and, in each department of human knowledge, there is only one true system." 

The modern view of system stems from modern science's de-emphasis of certain truth. In modern science system is ongoing and changing, adjustments being required with each advance in the understanding of data. The breakthrough to this view of system was initiated, according to Lonergan, by the introduction of non-Euclidean geometry and Gödel's theorem into mathematics and by the emergence of quantum theory in

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41 Philosophy of God, pp. 5, 6.

42 Insight, p. 575; Philosophy of God, pp. 6, 34; Cf. Heelan, "Traditional physics was not just a particular view of physics which might be subject to revision. It was classical physics." (p. 24). Heelan notes that its authority stemmed chiefly from its "... logical splendor." (Ibid.)

43 Philosophy of God, p. 49; cf. Longeman's criticism of Aristotle as unaware of the exigencies of system (Philosophy of God, pp. 7, 29; Method, p. 311).
physics. Modern scientists were led to see that the whole of a particular field of knowledge could no longer be enclosed within one system. No matter how many systems were formulated, and no matter how adequately they accounted for the data, there would always be the possibility of the discovery of further relevant data and hence of the formulation of more and better systems. This meant that the foundation of scientific inquiry could no longer be the coherent, logically rigorous and static system of the classicist. Rather, the appropriate foundation, as we will see, lies in the "...method that keeps generating, improving, replacing theories and systems."45

The possibility of new and ongoing systems means that pluralism cannot be avoided. Thus, as we noted earlier, in the field of theology there is now passing the classicist understanding of theology as one universally true system neither requiring nor tolerating diversity. This classicist view is giving way to a historically-minded one in which theology becomes reflection on the role and significance of a religion in a culture. Pluralism becomes an essential feature of theology; for each different cultural context will give rise to a different theology. 46 So

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44 Philosophy of God, pp. 6, 7, 47.

45 "The Future of Thomism" in Second Collection, p. 52; see Method, pp. 94, 225, and Insight, p. 508.

46 Philosophy of God, pp. 33, 34. This is similar to the insights of the sociology of knowledge. (See Method, pp. 36-41, esp. n 15, and Insight, pp. 324, 703-718.) For example, Segundo describes his theology as "Latin American Liberation Theology" to indicate that it arises in and is addressed to a particular socio-political context. (On this point see the introduction to his series, A Theology for Artisans of a New Humanity, in vol. 1, The Community Called Church, trans. John Drury (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1973), pp. vii-xii.)
today we not only have different fields (e.g., biblical, patristic, medieval, etc.) and subjects (e.g., Hebrew history, Semitic languages, Christian theology, etc.) in theology; we also have different types of theology, each associated with a distinct cultural context (e.g., Latin America Liberation theology, North American Black theology, etc.).

From the abstract and universal to the concrete and particular

As we noted above, Aristotle held that certain and universal knowledge was the proper end of science. The result was what Lonergan identifies as the recurrent antinomy of Aristotelian science: all science is of the universal, all reality is particular, therefore science is not of reality. 47 Lonergan explains the Aristotelian problem as follows:

What is variously termed the materia in individualis, materia designata, materia signata, the hic et nunc, cannot be an explanatory factor in any science; it is irrelevant to all scientific explanation; it is irrelevant apriori; time and space as such explain nothing, for the reason for anything, the cause of anything, is never this instance at this place and time, but always a nature, which, if found here, can be found elsewhere, if found now, can be found later. 48

47 Verbum, p. 154. Aristotle met this difficulty by distinguishing science in potency (universal) and science in act (determinate). Aquinas met it by distinguishing two types of abstraction: formative (universal apart from determinate conditions) and apprehensive (universal in determinate conditions). (Verbum, pp. 154-156, 179-180; see Insight, pp. 88-89 on abstraction as 'enrichment'.) Aquinas traced the problem to Plato's separate ideas: "Since he [Aristotle] accepted the opinion of Cratylus and Heraclitus that everything sensible was in a perpetual flux, he had to choose between denying the objectivity of definitions and of science and, on the other hand, positing universal and necessary objects. He chose the latter..." (Verbum, pp. 153, 169).

48 Verbum, p. 39; "The Future of Thomism", in Second Collection, p. 47; Method, pp. 3-1-302.
According to Lonergan a key to Aristotle's emphasis on the universal to the neglect of the concrete was that Aristotle had not formulated an adequate theory of probability. Only with a theory of probability that can take into account the non-systematic can the concrete and contingent be brought into the sphere of scientific knowledge.  

Modern science is not involved in the Aristotelian antinomy because it makes no pretense to universal and complete knowledge. Modern science is concerned with the concrete, and its methods are empirical and statistical. For example, Heisenberg said of modern physics that it "... is concerned not with the essence and structure of the atom but with observable events and thus places emphasis on the measurement process." The complexity and richness of concrete reality demands that it be approached not in a single uniform way, but asymptotically, in a number of different ways, each of which does not pretend to capture the essence of reality in its entirety.

From metaphysics to cognitional theory as basic science

The basic terms and relations of a system are supplied by a basic science. The basic science for the classicist is metaphysics. The basic terms and relations on this account pertain to philosophy,

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49 Insight, p. 129; see pp. 86-91, 124, 130-131, 617; "Transition from a Classicist World-view to Historical-mindedness" in Second Collection, p. 3; (Aristotle's Metaphysics VI(E)2, 102, 7a 19 f.) See Insight, p. 129 on Aristotle's "contingent necessity."

50 Insight, p. 53.

51 Erkenntis II (1931) pp. 182-183; cited in Heelan, Quantum Mechanics, p. 138, n. 1.

52 See Tracy, Achievement, p. 89.
and the sciences are a continuation of philosophy in the sense that they are further determinations of its basic categories. For example, psychology for Aristotle was a faculty psychology that derived its terms and relations (matter and form, potency, habit and act, efficient and final causality) from a priori metaphysics.

Modern science proceeds in a different manner. As we noted above, it prides itself on autonomy. And because the proper object of science is sensible, observable data, modern science has worked out its own methods independent of any higher discipline. Its terms and relations are derived not from a priori metaphysics, but rather from empirically established laws (e.g. the periodic table of elements). The basic discipline appropriate to modern science will have to take into account modern science's autonomy and supply basic terms and relations that will not interfere with its critical and empirical methods. Lonergan contends that because modern science has taken the data of sense as its exclusive object, the basic discipline will have to go elsewhere for its basis. Rather than the data of sense, the basic science will turn to the prior data of consciousness. And the basic discipline will be a cognitional theory that determines not the content of the sciences, but the operations of their general method. Its focus is not objects, as it was in Aristotle, but subjects. And, the basic science's relation to the other sciences will not be in terms of logic, as it was on the classicist model,

53 Philosophy of God, pp. 4-8, 29, 32, 48-49; Method, pp. 94, 274.
54 Method, pp. 95, 259.
55 Method, pp. 94, 95, 274.
but in terms of method. As we will see in the next chapter, on this model the other sciences supply the categorial determinations of what Lonergan terms transcendental method. 56

From theory and practice as distinct to their identity

The modern scientific ideal, as we noted above, is to attain approximate but never final knowledge of reality. Modern science therefore replaces the quest for necessary truth in Aristotelian science with its own asymptotic approach to truth. Lonergan argues that the rejection of the ideal of scientific truth in favor of verifiable possibility has led to "the dethronement of speculative intellect or of pure reason." 57 And with the dethronement of the speculative or contemplative mind has passed the typically classicist separation of theory and practice.

According to Lonergan the separation of theory and practice rested on the separation of the universe into necessary and contingent spheres. The essential contrast for Aristotle was between the necessary, that which always happens, and the contingent, that which may or may not happen. Aristotle accordingly drew the parallel contrast between theory and practice:

...insofar as the universe was necessary, human operation could not change it; it could only contemplate it by theory; but insofar as the universe was contingent, there was a realm in which

56 See "Revolution in Catholic Theology", in Second Collection, pp. 235-236; Philosophy of God, pp. 32, 49; Insight, pp. 603-604; Method, pp. 20-25, 121-122, 274-275, 316-317. Note that Lonergan has recently begun to substitute the term "generalized empirical method" for the term "transcendental method" (see, e.g., "Natural Right and Historical-Mindedness", p. 17).

57 "Revolution in Catholic Theology" in Second Collection, p. 236; see Method, p. 94.
human operation could be effective; and that was the sphere of practice. 58

According to Lonergan, modern science has from the start intended to be practical. Both theory and practice regard the same object, for they both represent successive approaches to it. Because of this identity of object, the pure theory of, e.g., mathematics can go hand in hand with an applied science looking only to the practicable (recall Bacon's dictum, "Tantum possimus, quantum scimus"). 59 Theory and practice are not "...put in separate compartments; on the contrary, our practice is the fruit of our theory and our theory is orientated to practical achievements." 60

58 Insight, p. 129; see "Ongoing Genesis of Methods", p. 342-343; Method, p. 95. Lonergan's view is confirmed in N. Lobkowicz, Theory and Practice: History of A Concept from Aristotle to Marx (Notre Dame: The University of Notre Dame Press, 1967). For Aristotle, the first Greek to explicitly contrast theory and practice, theory had to do with the divine order and its eternity, and thereby transcends man's most distinctive feature, his mortality. (pp. 4-7) The objects of the three theoretical sciences were the universal and imperishable forms of nature, the mathematical realm and the first causes. (p. 8; see also pp. 26-57, 70-78) Practice, on the other hand, had to do with political activity, i.e., with guiding human activity which, by definition, is particular and contingent and therefore does not lend itself to the precision and certainty of theory. (p. 14) Lobkowicz stresses that this distinction has its root in Aristotle's conception of the object of science as necessity. "What he suggests is that only those things can be known in the strict sense of the term and thus contemplated which cannot be other than in fact they are; all objects of knowledge and contemplation exist of necessity and are eternal." (p. 13) Aquinas made the same distinction. (see Werner Post, "Theory and Practice", in Sacramentum Mundi, vol. 6, pp. 216-217; F. Muniz, The Way of Theology, pp. 34-35; and Summa Theologica, 1a 1, 7 and Appendix 6 in the Blackfriar's edition, pp. 68-69.)


60 "Dimensions of Meaning" in Collection, p. 260; see "Theology and Man's Future" in Second Collection, p. 140.
From logic to method

The shift from logic to method, which we have already had occasion to mention, is for Lonergan the most fundamental aspect of the development of modern science. The shift is essentially a move from a static to a dynamic viewpoint. As we noted above, logic is the key to the classicist conception of system. On the basis of logic both derived and basic terms and relations are determined, postulates are set forth, and rules for valid inference are established. The resulting clarity, coherence and rigor provide a suitable home for eternal, immutable and abstract truths. 61 Modern science, however, is dynamic; it conceives of system as ongoing and so logic loses its priority. In Lonergan's words,

Logic will bring to light the eternal presuppositions and the eternal implications of an absolutely precise account of any position. But the scientist never possesses an absolutely precise account of his present position; for his position is system on the move. It increases in precision inasmuch as it keeps moving from one logical position to another. 62

The starting point of the modern scientist, then, is method; for method is dynamic and therefore able to establish the related and recurrent operations guiding such activities as observing, discovering and verifying. Modern scientific method is a contextual process in which different answers to the same questions are distinguished, in which progress is cumulative and never absolute, and in which the intelligi-

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61 See "Philosophy and Theology" in Second Collection, pp. 197-198, 201; Philosophy of God, p. 45 and our Chapter 1, pp. 33-41 in reference to the neo-scholastic approach to doctrines as eternal truths.

62 Insight, p. 508.
bility attained is not necessary but probable. Thus, where Aristotle in his *Posterior Analytics* placed his reliance on first principles he considered necessary, the modern scientist places his reliance ultimately not on his basic laws but on his method. To repeat, logic does have a function in modern scientific method, but that function is not as central as it was for the classicist. Logic's achievement, according to Lonergan, is no longer permanent; it is recurrent.

In brief, like the mortician, the logician achieves a steady state only temporarily. The mortician prevents not the ultimate but only the immediate decomposition of the corpse. In similar fashion the logician brings about, not the clarity, the coherence, and the rigor that will last forever, but only the clarity, the coherence, and the rigor that will bring to light the inadequacy of current views and thereby give rise to the discovery of a more adequate position.

What enables one to move from one coherent position to another is not logic but method.

It should be noted that the shift from the static viewpoint of logic to the dynamic viewpoint of method does not mean the end of metaphysics according to Lonergan. He has continually argued against the identification of metaphysics *per se* with static thinking. On his view the root of static thinking is not metaphysics, but a one-sided attention to logic, as in the later Scholastic's application to theology of the

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64 "Ongoing Genesis of Methods", p. 343

65 *Philosophy of God*, p. 47; see "Theology and Praxis", pp. 4, 5.
ideals of clarity, coherence and rigor adopted from the Posterior Analytics. In the discussion of metaphysics in Insight Lonergan argues against those who would seek the basis of metaphysics in the deductive methods of logic.

The fascination exerted by this method lies in its apparent promise of automatic results that are independent of the whims and fancies of the subject. The deducing proceeds in accord with rigorous technique; the primitive premises are guaranteed by a self-evidence that claims to exercise objective compulsion to which the subject must submit if he is not to be guilty of a lapse in intellectual probity. In fact, however, it is not so easy to leave the subject out of one's calculations. . . .

Because method concerns itself with the subject, it is the basic science. Accordingly, there corresponds to the shift from logic to method a shift from objects to the subject and his operations. This shift is at the


67. Insight, p. 408; see pp. 402-408 and 390-396.

heart of Lonergan's invitation to self-appropriation in *Insight* and is the basis of the understanding of theology presented in *Method*. We will address this in the next chapter in our discussion of transcendental method.

2. **The New Science of Man**

As there is a science of nature, so also there is a science of man. And, as we noted above, Lonergan contends that the development of a new science of nature cannot but lead to a new science of man. In this section we will examine Lonergan's understanding of how the new science of man has contributed to what he terms historical-mindedness by contrasting it with its classicist predecessor on four distinct methodological precepts.

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From essential, necessary, and universal to accidental, contingent and particular

According to Lonergan the classicist science of man ignores the concrete, the particular and the contingent. Like Aristotelian natural science, it is . . .

. . . limited to the essential, necessary, universal; it is so phrased to hold for all men whether they are awake or asleep, infants or adults, morons or geniuses; it makes it abundantly plain that you can't change human nature; the multiplicity and variety, the development and achievement, the breakdowns and catastrophes of human living, all have to be accidental, contingent, particular, and so have to lie outside the field of scientific interest as classically conceived. 70

Because he holds that all change is accidental, the classicist believes that the same principles are equally applicable in all circumstances. Within this framework, the concrete and the changing, the accidental, are irrelevant; and because of this, there can be no serious concern for history and historical changes. 71

The modern science of man, on the other hand, is empirical; it sees scientific knowledge as "...the result of an accumulation of related insights and scientific insights grasp ideas that are immanent not in what is imagined but in what is given." 72 And what is given is

70 "Dimensions of Meaning" in Collection, p. 262.


72 Insight, p. 235.
concrete human action in its myriad forms. Thus Hume, following this
principle, held that the proper way to know human nature is the empiri-
cal science of man; and Dilthey, in reaction to the latent idealism
of the German Historical School, took the proper object of the Geistes-
wissenschaften to be concrete human living. According to Lonergan, the
modern science of man has taken over the Enlightenment's dedication to pro-
gress but has abandoned the Enlightenment's tendency toward abstract
thinking; the new science of man has appreciated Hegel's turn to the
concrete, and world history but has repudiated his a priori methods.

Where the classicist science of man identified the end of scholarship
with the attainment of human eloquence, the modern identifies the end
of scholarship with the ideals of the early nineteenth-century Philologie:
"...the historical reconstruction of the constructions of mankind." Dilthey operated within the same context as is evident in his statement,
"Whatever life may be, history shall inform us of it." The modern

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73 Insight, p. 528.

74 Method, 210; "Ongoing Genesis of Methods", p. 346. Because
history as a science is empirical, it tends to collapse the distinction
of theory and praxis, for it finds the concern with universal categories
irrelevant. See above n. 63 and Lobkowicz, Theory and Practice, pp. 259-
426; Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, Part One, ed.
pp. 57-66 and 127-133.

75 Method, p. 310; see pp. 97ff, 210, 315; Philosophy of God, p.
ix; "An Interview with Fr. Bernard Lonergan, S.J." In Second Collection,
p. 226; "Ongoing Genesis of Methods", pp. 346-348. According to Richard-
son, the word "humanist" originally meant "classicist", especially
"Latinist". In contemporary times it is usually prefixed by the word
"scientific", and denotes the confidence of man in making himself at
home in the world. (History, Sacred and Profane, p. 278)

science of man, therefore, endeavors to study every human phenomenon in its unique particularity; and its proper object is not man as such, man in the abstract and universal, but every particular man in each and every particular time and place.  

From human nature to human historicity

The classicist study of man, because of its concern with the essential and abstract, determined a priori that human nature was unchanging.

One can apprehend man abstractly through a definition that applies omni et soli and through properties verifiable in


77 "Natural Right and Historical-Mindedness", p. 3. Cf. Richardson's discussion of the difference between the purpose of ancient and modern historiography. The aim of classical history was to edify; in Cicero's words, history was "testis temporum, lux veritatis, vita memoriae, magister vitae". The aim of modern history is to determine what happened; in Ranke's words, history was to ascertain "wie es eigentlich gewesen" (p. 281; pp. 104, 173). See Lonergan's contrast of critical and pre-critical history in Method, pp. 185ff. Richardson notes the impact of the development of modern science on the modern view of historiography. "It was not until after the new science of Galileo and his fellows had overthrown the scientific cosmology of the ancient world that literary men dared to imagine that modern achievements in literature, drama and history might equal or even surpass the masterpieces of the ancients...[it was]...the superiority of modern science which eventually effected the change of view." (History Sacred and Profane, p. 277). Note that Lonergan cites Collingwood's claim that in becoming critical and constructive the study of history underwent something of a Copernican Revolution (Idea of History, pp. 236, 240; see Method, p. 205). Lonergan recognized in 1964 that this new science of history was a "datum" that Catholic theology could not ignore. "Modern scriptural, conciliar, patristic, medieval studies are 'science' not in the ancient Greek but in the modern sense of the term, and the dogmatic theologian has the task, if not of arranging for their baptism, at least of finding himself at home with them." ("Review", Gregorianum, 44 (1969), p. 373.)
every man. In this fashion one knows man as such; and man as such, precisely because he is an abstraction, also is unchanging. 78

The focus of this view of man is not the subject but the substance or the soul. This is not to say that the classicist is unaware of the subject. Rather, it is to say that because the subject changes and is therefore accidental it cannot be the object of a science that pertains only to the unchanging and necessary. 79 However, the substance

78 "The Transition from a Classicist world-view to Historical-mindedness", in Second Collection, p. 5; see "Philosophy and Theology" in Second Collection, p. 194.

79 It is interesting to note that Lonergan believes that Augustine and Aquinas, although they did not discuss it explicitly and systematically, nonetheless had a grasp of what is meant by the subject. He attributes this to their "extraordinary grasp of the facts of consciousness." ("Christ as Subject: A Reply" in Collection, p. 174, n. 11; see Verbum, ix, ff.) "If I may hazard a surmise, I should say that the discovery of the subject, attributed to German idealism and subsequent philosophies, was simply an unbalanced effort to restore what implicitly existed in Aristotle and St. Thomas but had been submerged by the conceptualist tendency. . ." ("Christ as Subject: A Reply", p. 192, n. 50) (See our discussion of how the conceptualism in neo-scholasticism did lead to a neglect of the subject [Ch. 1, pp. 37-41]) However, Lonergan does not want to suggest that this meant that historical-mindedness was also implicit in their thought. For example, Lonergan says that Aquinas' work, though methodical, has a basic defect: "It was not informed by historical consciousness, and so is projected, as it were, on a flat surface without the perspectives of time and change which can properly be apprehended only as the successive strata as an ongoing process." ("Changes in Roman Catholic Theology", Boston College (1973) [Unpublished, available at the Lonergan Center, Regis College, Toronto] p. 27). See our Introduction on this point with reference to the development of doctrine. (p. 7, n. 6) Lonergan's reading of the medieval period here is different from those of Karl Rahner and P. Danielou. For instance, Rahner remarks that in medieval thought "...the 'subject' is treated as one object among others." ("Theology", Sacramentum Mundi, vol. 6, p. 243). And Danielou states that the categories of historicity and subject are foreign to Scholasticism; and "...since it affirms reality to be in essence more than in subjects, it has nothing to do with the dramatic world of persons, of the concrete universals..." ("Les orientations présentes de la pensée religieuse", Etudes (April, 1964); cited in Anthony Lee, "Thomism and the Council", The Thomist, v. 27 (April, 1963), pp. 464-465.
or the soul, because it remains ever the same, can be the object of
classicist science. Aristotle's purely objective psychology of the soul
and its a priori distinction between potency, habit, acts and objects
therefore proves to be an adequate account of human nature.

The approach of the modern science of man, in contrast to its
classicist predecessor, is a posteriori. It speaks with the existen-
tialists in their language of the self and their reflection on the sub-
ject as concrete and incarnate. It follows Hegel in his recognition
of the reality of the subject in addition to the substance. And,
according to Lonergan, the importance of the subject as incarnate is what
Vico meant in asserting the priority of poetry.

To proclaim with Vico the priority of poetry is to...open
the way to setting aside the classical definition of man as
a rational animal and, instead, defining man with the cul-
tural phenomenologists as a symbolic animal or with the per-
sonalists as an incarnate spirit.

There follows from this turn to the subject as incarnate a stress on
understanding and meaning in the study of man. Dilthey argued that the
proper aim of the Geisteswissenschaften was understanding (verstehen)
as opposed to explanation (erklären). Following "..Vico's claim
that it is human affairs that men best understand, for human affairs
are the product of human understanding:...", Dilthey stressed the

80, "The Future of Thomism", p. 45; "The Subject", pp. 72, 79-86
in Second Collection; Method, pp. 175-180; Verbum, p. x.

81 See n. 73 above.

82, "Dimensions of Meaning" in Collection, p. 236; See Method, p.
73; see "The Subject" in Second Collection, pp. 69-73 on the neglect of
the subject and a note on Kant's Copernican Revolution.

subjectivity and self-understanding of the interpreter of human action. This, in turn, meant that meaning was to be a central category in the Geisteswissenschaften. For in emphasizing understanding over explanation as the human science's distinctive object, Dilthey had shown that the Geisteswissenschaften studied not just intelligibility, but an intelligent intelligibility. What led Dilthey to this conclusion, according to Lonergan, was that he had recognized human living to be, unlike nature, constituted by meaning.

In explaining what is meant by man's historical nature Lonergan takes Dilthey's emphasis on meaning as his starting point. Historicity, Lonergan states, refers to...

...a dimension of human reality that has always existed, that has always been lived and experienced, that classicist thought standardized yet tended to overlook, that modern studies have brought to light, thematized, elaborated, illustrated, documented. That dimension is the constitutive role of meaning in human living.84

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On "historicity" as a translation for the German Geschichlichkeit see George Kehm's Translator's Preface to Pannenberg's Basic Questions in Theology, vol. 1. Kehm prefers "historicism" because 1) it best represents the contrast between historisch and geschichtlich and 2) it refers more to the fundamental structure of human existence whereas "historicity", at least in current theology, refers more to an event verified by historical research. On the first point see Lonergan's contrast between the history that is written and the history that is written about. As to the second, Lonergan uses "historicity" in a way that includes both senses, i.e., it refers to the fundamental structure of human existence (the constitutive role of meaning) and to the fact that the products of man's making, e.g., cultures, have histories and are accessible via historical research (as opposed to the a priori approach of classicism).
For meaning is flexible and subject to change; and so too is the being who freely makes himself by choosing the meanings that are to constitute his living. Lonergan distinguishes two aspects of man's ontology, nature and historicity, the former invariant and the latter changing. However, the two aspects are not separate, one not affected by the other. For, according to Lonergan's interpretation of Aristotle, nature is not a thing but a principle; it is the immanent principle of movement and rest (Physics 11 1 192b, 22). With respect to human nature this principle is dynamic; it is, in Lonergan's words, "the quite open structure of the human spirit" as raising (movement) and answering (rest) questions. Human nature, then, is not static, universal and unchanging. Rather, it is a dynamic principle, and because of this Lonergan speaks of historicity as an essential part of human nature.

History, then, is the realm in which there takes place man's making of man; and just as the study of nature reveals natural processes, so does the study of history reveal "...man, the self-completing animal, in the manifold variety of his concrete existing." One may now speak, according to Lonergan, of the "semantic reversal" that has occurred with reference to the word "subject". Where "subject" was once a pejorative term, thought to violate the norms of objective truth, it has now come to be associated with the rejection of a

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85 "Natural Right and Historical-Mindedness", p. 5; Method, p. 302; "The Transition from A Classicist World-view to Historical-Mindedness" in Second Collection, p. 6.

86 "Ongoing Genesis of Methods", p. 351; see "Theology in Its New Context" in Second Collection, p. 61; Method, pp. 218, 219, 221.
misconceived objectivity and an affirmation of the individual's autonomous and authentic self-making.

Freely the subject makes himself what he is; never in this life is the making finished; always it is still in process, always it is a precarious achievement that can slip and fall and shatter. Concern with subjectivity, then, is concern with the intimate reality of man. It is concern not with the universal truths that hold whether a man is asleep or awake, not with the interplay of natural factors and determinants, but with the perpetual novelty of self-constitution, of free choices making the chooser what he is.\textsuperscript{87}

Accordingly, to accept and come to terms with the notion of historicity entails a shift from the classicist "substance" to the modern "subject", for it is the subject and not the substance that responsibly makes himself what he is to be. As Lonergan puts it, "[a]utonomy decides what autonomy is to be."\textsuperscript{88}

\textsuperscript{87}"Cognitional Structure" in \textit{Collection}, p. 239; see pp. 236-237 and "Dimensions of Meaning" in \textit{Collection}, p. 255.

\textsuperscript{88}"Existenz and Aggiornamento in \textit{Collection}, p. 242; see "The Subject" in \textit{Second Collection}, p. 79, and Blondel's remark "La substance de l'homme, c'est l'action: il est ce qu'il se fait." (cited in J. Lacroix, \textit{Maurice Blondel: sa vie, son oeuvre} [Paris, 1963] p. 20). This emphasis on autonomous self-constitution is clearly articulated in Marx and Engels' \textit{German Ideology}: "...we must begin by stating the first premise of all human existence and, therefore, of all history, the premise, namely, that men must be in a position to live in order to be able to 'make history'." (p. 48)

Leo Strauss draws out this same point in discussing the difference between the subject (for Strauss, the self) and the soul in his \textit{Liberalism: Ancient and Modern} (London and New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1968): "The self is obviously a descendent of the soul, that is, it is not the soul. The soul may be responsible for its being good or bad, but it is not responsible for its being a soul; of the self, on the other hand, it is not certain whether it is not a self by virtue of its own effort. The soul is part of an order which does not originate in the soul; the self is not certain whether it is part of an order which does not originate in the self." (p. 261). See also his \textit{Natural Right and History} (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1953), e.g., on Weber, for whom "[t]he dignity of man consisted in his auton- omy." (p. 44); George Grant, \textit{Technology and Empire} (Toronto: The
From faculty psychology to intentionality analysis

In his 1968 introduction to the Verbum articles Lonergan contrasts the different approaches to man of Augustine and Aristotle. Where the latter's approach was based on a psychology of the soul in terms of metaphysics, the former's approach was based on Augustine's discovery of himself as a subject and an awareness of his interiority. This contrast is useful to keep in mind when studying Lonergan's Insight and his Method in Theology, for in both works he goes with Augustine and his turn to interiority rather than with Aristotle and his turn to a priori metaphysics. We will discuss this turn to interiority in the next chapter; for the present we will only note how Lonergan sees it as basic to the modern science of man.

As we noted above, classicist psychology is essentially a metaphysics of the soul; that is, it is a faculty psychology that treats of the soul entirely in an objective manner. According to Lonergan, part of the root of this approach lies in the classicist emphasis on necessary first truths. Such emphasis, he suggests, leads to a neglect of the subject in the sense that philosophy and science are


89 Verbum, pp. x-xii (The introduction was originally published under the title "Subject and Soul"). What is lacking in Augustine's account is the elevation of introspection to a scientific technique. (p. xiii). See also "Religious Commitment", pp. 58-59. Cf. Austin Farrer on the rise of modern science in the 17th century on the basis of its criticism of Aristotelian science, primarily with reference to the notion of substantial form. (Reflective Faith: Essays in Philosophical Theology (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publ. Co., 1972) pp. 93-98.

thought to be so objective that they can get along without the mind of
the philosopher or scientist. Objectivity on this approach is
thought of in terms of rigorous inferences, "...as the fruit of
immediate experience, of self evident and necessary truth." Subjective
differences may be acknowledged, but, because the basic approach
is objective, they are thought to be only accidental and therefore of
no account. Moreover, the Aristotelian faculty psychology, because it
focused on objects, gave priority to metaphysics. The priority of meta-
physics meant that the intellect assumed a priority over all other
faculties and so supported the classicist emphasis on theory over practice
pure over practical intellect. 91

The modern account of man, on the other hand, is phenomenologi-
cal. 92 It brings the operations of the concrete conscious subject into
prominence. Modern philosophy, being both critical and empirical,
eschews metaphysics and adverts to the significance of interiority,
taking as its proper object the data given in consciousness. 93 As a
result, Aristotle's faculty psychology, with its alternatives of "... volun-
tarism, intellectualism, sentimentalism, and sensism...", is
rejected; and one turns, with Husserl, to an intentionality analysis

91 "Ongoing Genesis of Methods", p. 351; "Mission and Spirit", in

92 Philosophy of God, pp. 13, 48; "The Subject" in Second Collection, pp. 70-71; "Theology and Praxis", p. 18.

73; "Bernard Lonergan Responds" in Foundations of Theology, p. 226
"...that distinguishes and relates the manifold of human conscious operations."

So, as we saw above, the basic discipline for the modern view, method, finds its basis not in a faculty psychology but in a cognitional theory grounded in cognitional fact. In so adverting to the subject and his conscious operations, method, which presupposes no prior metaphysical framework, becomes the foundation for the modern science of man.

**From first principles to transcendental method as foundational**

We have already suggested that the foundations of the science of man are conceived differently by the classicist than by the historically-minded. The former's foundations are abstract. Because classicist science is deductivist, its proper foundations lie in the certain knowledge of self-evident and necessary first principles. Because deductive logic is the way to such knowledge, the foundations of one's apprehension of man are what is logically first in a static system. One fills out the picture of man by operating on these first principles and deducing the doctrines, norms, criteria, etc., that constitute one's eternally valid knowledge of human nature, knowledge applicable to all men everywhere.

Modern science, however, is ongoing; what is fixed is not system but method. The foundations for the modern view of man, found-


95 The Transition from A Classicist World-view to Historical-mindedness", p. 3; "Theories of Inquiry: Responses to a Symposium", p. 39 in Second Collection.

96 "The Future of Thomism" in Second Collection, p. 52.
tions which reflect this dynamism, cannot lie in any one part of the science, in its laws, principles or conclusions, for these are subject to revision. But what is foundational, as we saw above, is the method by which the scientist generates these revisions.\textsuperscript{97} Where classicist philosophy adopts the static deductivist ideal of logic, modern philosophy strives to recognize this primacy of ongoing methods.\textsuperscript{98} According to Lonergan this requires a shift to interiority through which the foundational reality is located in the structural features of the conscious operating subject.\textsuperscript{99} What is foundational, then, is not "... a set of verbal propositions named first principles..." but the dynamic reality that the concrete human subject is.\textsuperscript{100}

3. The New Conception of Culture

Lonergan argues that a central feature of the transition to historical-mindedness is the breakdown of classicist culture and the rise of a modern conception of culture. On the classicist view of culture there is but one universal culture, culture with a capital "C". Because it was universal classicist culture could be imposed on all men in all times and places.\textsuperscript{101} To be cultured meant, in this framework,

\textsuperscript{97} "Theology in Its New Context" in Second Collection, pp. 64-65.

\textsuperscript{98} Method, p. 270; "The Future of Thomism", in Second Collection, pp. 48-52.

\textsuperscript{99} "Theology in Its New Context" in Second Collection, p. 65; see "Theories of Inquiry: Responses to a Symposium", p. 39.

\textsuperscript{100} "The Transition from a Classicist World-view to Historical-mindedness", p.6; see "Philosophy and Theology", p.207 and "Theology in Its New Context", p. 64 in Second Collection; and Method, Ch. 1.

to meet the standards to which the learned aspired and the barbarians did not.

It was a matter of acquiring and assimilating the tastes and skills, the ideals, virtues, and ideas, that were pressed upon one in a good home and through a curriculum in the liberal arts. This notion...stemmed out of Greek paideia and Roman doctrinae studium atque humanitatis, out of the exuberance of the Renaissance and its pruning in the Counter-Reformation schools of the Jesuits. 102

The main defects of the classicist view, according to Lonergan, are its particularity and inability to change. Classicist culture could not in principle make any provision for the possibility of a serious change of context, much less the changes that led to its own collapse. "It included a built-in incapacity to grasp the need for change and to effect the necessary adaptations." 103

The modern notion of culture is both empirical and historicist. It is empirical because it defines culture as the set of meanings and values that inform a way of life. 104 On this definition cultures are known by studying the diverse embodiments and expressions of these meanings and values in institutions, in literatures, in technologies, in

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103 "The Subject", in Second Collection, p. 82; see "The Future of Christianity", p. 162 and "Philosophy and Theology", p. 206 in Second Collection; Doctrinal Pluralism, pp. 52-53; and Method, pp. 124, 326. Cf. Schoonberg's contention that "[t]heologians who thought they wrote for all times show, through this very fact, that they were historically-conditioned. They belong to that stage of history in which man was not at all or sufficiently aware of his own historicity." (Man and Sin: A Theological View, transl. by J. Donceel [Notre Dame University of Notre Dame Press, 1965], p. 192)

104 Method, pp. xi, 301; Nicea, p. 106; "Belief: Today's Issue", in Second Collection, p. 91
religions, etc. The modern notion of culture, as a result, is also
historicist. For through empirical historical studies the modern has
come to realize that cultures are man-made. Critical history has pro-
ven that the classicist emphasis on the normative and the universal,
the permanent and the stable aspects of its culture are illusory. 105

The modern view of culture therefore includes an appreciation of the
historicity of man. As meaning is constitutive of human living, the
world in which man lives and makes himself, culture, will change with
each new realization of meaning. Cultures, then, are not above his-
tory; rather they have histories in so far as they develop, "... for
development is a matter of coming to understand new meanings and accept
higher values". 106 The modern therefore knows his culture as one among
many cultures, and so no longer identifies it with what ought to be in
a universal sense. The classicist culture with its sense of the uni-
versal and normative has been replaced by a modern one with a sense
only for the historical and the diverse. "Modernity," says Lonergan,
"lacks roots." 107

Realism", p. 249 in Second Collection; Method, pp. 154, 300-302, 315,
326, Doctrinal Pluralism, p. 9. For Lonergan in an autobiographical
vein, see "An Interview with Fr. Bernard Lonergan, S.J.", pp. 209-210
and "Insight Revisited", p. 264 in Second Collection.

106 "Revolution in Catholic Theology", in Second Collection, pp.
115-21.

107 "Belief: Today's Issue", in Second Collection, p. 99; see
Method, pp. 154, 226, 363. See also Leo Strauss, "Jerusalem and Athens",
where he points out that the modern view of culture is the object of
Nietzsche's entitling one of his Zarathustra's speeches "1,000 Goals and
Lonergan argues that this shift from a classicist to a modern conception of culture has affected the Catholic Church in a significant way. When one is operating out of the classicist conception of culture, the Church is a societas perfecta and cannot change; when one is operating out of the modern conception, the Church is a Selbstvollzug, a process of ongoing self-realization, and the Church must change as it comes to realize new Christian meanings and values in new, ever-changing situations. As our analysis of Modernism suggests, this shift from societas perfecta to Selbstvollzug had been resisted by the Catholic Church in the nineteenth century and early part of the twentieth. The reason for this resistance was that the Catholic Church had become thoroughly entrenched in the classicist point of view. The neo-scholasticism given expression in Vatican I, Aeterni Patris and Pascendi so emphasized the a-historical and unchangeable character of the Church

105. "Revolution in Catholic Theology," in Second Collection, pp. 233-234; Method, pp. 123-124, 363. See Avery Dulles, Models of the Church (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., Inc. 1974), Ch. 1 for a discussion of the societas perfecta as the prevailing image of the pre-Vatican II Church. For critiques of this image see Segundo, The Community Called Church, pp. 44-45, and C. Butler, "The Aggiornamento of Vatican II" in ed. John H. Miller, Vatican II: An Interfaith Appraisal, pp. 7ff. Both these commentators applaud Vatican II's adoption of such new images of the Church as "People of God" and "Pilgrim Church" (see e.g. The Documents of Vatican II, ed. Walter Abbett and J. Gallagher (American Press/Association Press, 1966), "Dogmatic Constitution on the Church", arts. 10, 23 and "Decree on Ecumenism", arts. 5-7.)
that participation in the achievements of historical-mindedness was inconceivable. As Lonergan puts it,

[from that enormous development the Church held off; it could praise the ends; it could not accept the means; and so it could not authentically participate in the process that eliminated the standardized man of classicist thought and ushered in the historical consciousness of today.]

Vatican II marked a breakthrough in this respect, for the modern conception of culture shaped the new self-understanding of the Church. This turn to the modern understanding is especially evident in the Document on the Church in the Modern World, where there is stressed the "necessarily historical", "the changeable and social aspects" of culture. Men are the "artisans and authors of the culture of their community", recognized the Document, from which fact there necessarily follows "a plurality of cultures". Theologians are therefore urged to "seek continually for more suitable ways of communicating doctrine to the men of their times" so as to allow the meaning and values of Christian living to inform the proper development of the modern world. Lonergan

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109 "Existenz and Aggiornamento", in Collection, p. 247; see Method, pp. 273, 317. See the Introduction by E. Schillebeeckx to Schoof's Survey of Catholic Theology, pp. 1-5; and Karl Barth who in The Humanity of God makes a similar point with reference to what he perceives to be the nineteenth century Roman Catholic Church's "far from exemplary return to Thomism". (p. 32). Unlike their Protestant counterparts the nineteenth century and early twentieth century Catholic theologians shrank from an encounter with their age. (pp. 16-18, 31-2)

regards this shift positively, as his definition of theology as reflection on religion in a culture indicates. However, he recognizes that it will not unfold without difficulties. Because the Catholic Church has only recently begun to face "the chill winds of modernity" it finds itself in the unenviable position of "coming on the scene with too little and too late: Churchill's famous phrase." 111 To help fill this lacuna and so facilitate Catholic theology's transition to historical-mindedness has been a primary aim of Lonergan's formulation of a method in theology. To this topic we return in later chapters.

4. The New Mediation of Meaning

We have drawn attention to the distinction Lonergan makes between the cultural and the cultural suprastructure. The former consists in reflection on and expression of the meanings and values informing human living; the latter consists in objectification and mediation of those meanings and values in a critical, reflexive and deliberate manner. Lonergan identifies this function of the cultural suprastruc-


Latin Liberation theologians Segundo and Gutierrez take this shift to the modern understanding of culture as a justification of their theologies. The former titles his five volume study Liberation theology after the phrase cited above from the Document on the Church in the Modern World, "artisans of a new humanity"; and the latter stresses the concern for Christian praxis reflected in this shift (A Theology of Liberation: History Politics and Salvation, tr. and ed. C. Inda and J. Eagleson (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1973) pp. 8-9, 59, n. 5 and 105).

ture as the control or mediation of meaning. Lonergan feels that this function is so crucial that he links changes in the control of meaning with what Jaspers terms "axial shifts"., stating that they "...mark off the great epochs in human history." 112

Lonergan identifies the present cultural crisis with the shift from the classicist mediation of meaning to a modern one. He contends that the crisis is due to the fact that the classicist mediation, although almost entirely jettisoned, has not yet been replaced by a comparable modern mediation. Modern culture finds itself in the condition of having many highly developed tools of analysis but with very little in the way of comprehensive synthesis. Thus, the modern endeavor has developed a historical-mindedness that...

...interprets our dreams and our symbols, that thematizes our wan smiles and limp gestures, that analyzes our minds and charts our souls, that takes the whole of human history for its kingdom to compare and relate languages and literatures, art forms and religions, family arrangements and customary morals, political, legal, educational, economic systems, sciences, philosophies, theologies and histories. 113

The present cultural crisis stems from the fact that the development of the horizon of historical-mindedness is incomplete. It is not yet complete, according to Lonergan, because there has not yet been discerned foundations sufficiently comprehensive and normative to synthesize and assess the fragmentary results of the historically-minded apprehension of man and his world.


113 "Dimensions of Meaning", in Collection, pp. 265-266.
The key to the remedy of the cultural crisis, argues Lonergan, is to find foundations for the modern enterprise that will ground a mediation of meaning that can both intelligently and critically direct man in his self-understanding and self-making in history. In what will these foundations consist? They are not to be found in the abstract and universal propositions of the classicist apprehension of man, for the classicist approach has been undercut by modern empirical and historical studies. Nor will the foundations consist in a new set of ideas on the level of modern technology or politics or economics; for there is needed a higher viewpoint in terms of which this level of man's making of man may be judged noble or ignoble, authentic or inauthentic. Rather, the foundations of historical-mindedness are to be found in the "...structural features of the conscious, operating subject, by a method that has come to be named transcendental." The new mediation of meaning, then, will be grounded in a transcendental method that unveils in the concrete existing subject the immanent norms of all human activity. And this mediation of meaning will be successful in so far as modern man realizes that "...these norms are equipped with sanctions which man does not have to invent or impose." "

Lonergan contends that the foundations for the historically-minded mediation of meaning has been the concern of such diverse thinkers as Kant, Dilthey and Blondel. For each of these thinkers has

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114 "The Transition from A Classicist World-view to Historical-Mindedness", in Second Collection, p. 6.

115 Insight, p. 234; see pp. 233-240.

sought, in varying ways, to transpose the universality and normativeness of classicism into the horizon of historical-mindedness. This effort has led each of them into an investigation of the concrete subject and his operations. This means that where the classicist mediation of meaning was rooted in the theoretical differentiation of consciousness the modern one will be rooted in the differentiation of consciousness Lonergan terms interiority. Just as the appropriate foundations for classicism's abstract and universalist apprehension of man and his world were logical and necessary first principles, so the appropriate foundations for historical-mindedness' dynamic and concrete apprehension of man and his world will be the concrete, operating subject.

Lonergan argues that the key to the thematization of these foundations is the self-appropriation of the subject as intellectually, rationally and responsibly self-conscious. Lonergan gives expression to the scope of these foundations in the Introduction to *Insight*:

> Thoroughly understand what it is to understand and not only will you understand the broad lines of all there is to be understood but also you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding.\(^\text{117}\)

The mediation of modern culture's meanings and values will have to be discerning and critical. In order for this to be so there must be uncovered the invariant norms and recurrent structures that have been immanent in past and will be immanent in future human self-making.\(^\text{118}\)

\(^{117}\) *Insight*, p. xxviii.

\(^{118}\) See Appendix II for a brief discussion and chart of the outline of Lonergan's account of meaning. As the account of meaning is rooted in the invariant structures of interiority, it provides one with
These foundations, which are the key to the completion of the horizon of historical-mindedness, will be discussed in the next chapter.

Conclusion

We have discussed four aspects of Lonergan's understanding of the shift from classicism to historical-mindedness. Our purpose has been to expose Lonergan's understanding of the cultural matrix in which contemporary theology is to be undertaken. We have seen that historical-mindedness refers to a horizon in which the science of nature stresses verifiable possibility instead of necessity, probability instead of certitude, systems as ongoing instead of system as true and permanent, the concrete and particular instead of the abstract and universal, cognitional theory instead of metaphysics as basic science, the identity of theory and practice instead of their separation, and method instead of logic. We have seen that historical-mindedness is a horizon in which the science of man and the conception of culture lay stress on the categories of meaning and history. For it is by changing and appropriating new meanings that human subjects make themselves, their cultures, and their histories. To know such changing and developing meaning one studies man and his world not abstractly and universally, but concretely and contextually. Lonergan describes this orientation as follows:

It is that to understand men and their institutions we have to study their history. For it is in history that man's making of man occurs, that it progresses and regresses, that through such changes there may be discerned a certain unity in an

a means to understand and evaluate the making of man that has taken place in the past and will take place in the future.
otherwise disconcerting multiplicity.\footnote{119}

As historicity (\textit{Geschichtlichkeit}) is an essential feature of human nature, so history (\textit{Historie}) is the key to understanding man and the world he makes. Finally, we have seen that historical-mindedness is a horizon in which there is emerging a new but not yet complete mediation of meaning that is grounded in an apprehension of the invariant and normative structures of human interiority.

We have discussed these four aspects of Lonergan's understanding of the shift to historical-mindedness in order to set the context in which Lonergan works out his method in theology and his understanding of the development of doctrine. In Chapter One we identified the problem of the development of doctrine as the formulation of an account of doctrine and doctrinal development that is, on the one hand, historically-minded, but that on the other hand does not controvert Vatican I's teaching on the permanence of doctrine. We saw with our study of Loisy that this is no mean task, for a horizon that emphasizes the historical and contextual, the dynamic and the changing, the existential and the subjective does not easily lend itself to the grounding of truths that are permanent and normative. In the second part of the thesis we will see how Lonergan undertakes such a formulation on the basis of his method in theology. However, we have yet to complete our setting of the context for Lonergan's position. We have seen that Lonergan argues that the transition to historical-mindedness will not be complete until it is complemented by a grasp of critical and normative foundations. The

\footnote{119}{Natural Right and Historical-Mindedness", pp. 3-4: C f. Strauss, \textit{Natural Right and History}, pp. 12, 18, 26-27.}
same holds for theology. For it is Lonergan's position that a shift to a historically-minded theology and understanding of the development of doctrine will not be complete until it is complemented by a grasp of critical and normative foundations appropriate to theology. Our discussion in the next chapter will be concerned with this latter point.
CHAPTER THREE

FOUNDATIONS IN TRANSCENDENTAL METHOD

We have seen that for Lonergan the lack of critical foundations in modern historical-mindedness is its most serious defect. Thus, in transposing theology from a classicist to a historically-minded horizon one of his chief concerns has been to formulate these foundations. Such a formulation is particularly urgent for Catholic theology in that the demise of classicism in general and Scholasticism in particular has left many Catholics without a basis or Weltanschauung for their faith. Lonergan maintains that without such a basis the possibility of critically assimilating the new and discerningly disengaging from the old remains nil. He therefore proposes to formulate such a basis, arguing that it is to be found in transcendental method. It is his position that transcendental method is the proper foundation for a historically-minded theology because it provides a means by which the modern emphasis on the historical, the empirical, and the subjective can be appropriated without theology falling prey to the modern philosophies of historicism, empiricism, and subjectivism. As we saw in our discussion of Loisy such a foundation is of paramount importance for an account of the development of doctrine. For without a proper foundation it will not be possible to hold together both the historicity and the permanence of doctrine.
Lonergan defines a method as "...a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results."  

One may speak of transcendental method when the method in question concerns the exigencies and the opportunities not of this or that particular field or subject but of the human mind itself. The basic operations thematized in transcendental method are experience, understanding, and decision. Because he takes these operations to be basic to and operative in all human knowing and doing, Lonergan states that transcendental method is applicable to all fields of inquiry, including theology. In this chapter we will discuss Lonergan's formulation of transcendental method in three steps: i) we will set the context of that formulation through an examination of the four exigencies of meaning; ii) we will analyze that formulation through a discussion of intentionality analysis and Lonergan's thematization of the subject's operations; and iii) we will explain the basis for Lonergan's claim that transcendental method is invariant and normative. With the conclusion of this discussion we close the first part of the thesis; for with our discussion of transcendental method we will have completed the examination of the context in which Lonergan works out his historically-minded conception of the development of doctrine. That conception itself will then be taken up in Part II of the thesis.

1. The Four Exigencies of Meaning

In his discussion of meaning in Method Lonergan introduces the notion

\[\text{Method, p. 4}\]
of the exigencies of meaning. He lists four exigencies: the systematic, the critical, the methodical, and the transcendent. Lonergan states that each exigence gives rise to a new and distinct differentiation of consciousness and a corresponding new and distinct realm of meaning. A new realm or world of meaning arises when there emerges a new set or field of objects into which one may inquire; a new differentiation of consciousness arises when there emerges a new set of cognitional operations appropriate to these new objects. Lonergan contends that the systematic, the critical and the methodical exigencies mark off distinct stages in the history of western thought, and that the transcendent exigence has been variously operative throughout each stage. Roughly speaking, the systematic exigence has characterized Greek and classical thought, the critical exigence has characterized modern thought since the seventeenth century, and the methodical exigence characterizes contemporary thought. In the discussion that follows we will examine first the transcendent exigence, and then the systematic, critical and methodical exigencies. We will show the genetic development that Lonergan finds to exist among the latter three, and focus in particular on the methodical exigence to which Lonergan's formulation of transcendental method is directed.

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2 See Method, pp. 81-83, 257; "An Interview with Fr. Bernard Lonergan", in Second Collection, pp. 226-27; below, Ch.IV, pp.213-15

3 Note that although the stages are temporal in the sense that one advances from one to the next, they are not chronological in that various segments of the community may be involved in differing exigencies at the same time. (See Method, p. 85; "Natural Right and Historical-Mindedness", pp. 12 ff.)
1. The Transcendent Exigence

The transcendent exigence arises out of man's unrestricted tendency to question. There is inherent in human inquiry, suggests Lonergan, an unrestricted demand for intelligibility, in human judgement an unrestricted demand for the unconditioned, and in human deliberation an unrestricted demand for the good beyond the finite values of this world.

Man's transcendental subjectivity is mutilated or abolished, unless he is stretching forth towards the intelligible, the unconditioned, the good of value. The reach, not of his attainment, but of his intending is unrestricted. There lies within his horizon a region for the divine, a shrine for ultimate holiness. It cannot be ignored. The atheist may pronounce it empty. The agnostic may urge that he finds his investigation has been inconclusive. The contemporary humanist will refuse to allow the question to arise. But their negations presuppose the spark in our clod, our native orientation to the divine.\(^4\)

This unrestricted intending constitutes the transcendent exigence. It takes one beyond the worlds correlative to the systematic, critical and methodical exigencies to a distinct world of meaning. It is in this world, according to Lonergan, that God is encountered through love.

Lonergan holds that man reaches the fulfillment of his unrestricted drive to question only through the gift of God's love. He defines this gift as religious conversion, and explains that without negating or diminishing the importance of human endeavor conversion enriches that endeavor by placing it within a cosmic context and purpose. The gift of God's love alters the horizon of one's knowing and doing and "... sets up a new horizon in which the love of God will transvalue our values and the eye of love will transform our knowing."\(^5\) As we will

\(^4\)Method, p. 103  \(^5\)Method, p. 106
see in the next part of the thesis Lonergan ascribes to religious
conversion, as the fulfillment of a dynamism inherent in the subject,
a foundational role in theology and doctrine. 6

2. The Systematic Exigence

The systematic exigence moves one beyond the realm of common
sense and into the realm of theory. Within the realm of common
sense consciousness remains relatively undifferentiated. The cog-
nitional activities appropriate to it are not the highly refined
ones of science but rather those of the self-correcting process of
learning. The world of common sense is...

...the visible universe peopled by relatives, friends,
acquaintances, fellow citizens, and the rest of humanity.
We come to know it, not by applying some scientific method,
but by a self-correcting process of learning, in which
insights gradually accumulate, coalesce, qualify and
correct one another, until a point is reached where we
are able to meet situations as they arise, size them up
by adding a few more insights to the acquired store, and
so deal with them in an appropriate fashion. 7

There emerges the need for this consciousness to become differentiated
when new questions that cannot be answered by the procedures of common
sense are raised. These new questions represent the emergence of the
systematic exigence.

According to Lonergan we have an example of the systematic exigence
in Plato’s dialogues and Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics. In the former

6 See Method, pp. 84, 101-3, 105-6, 111, 115-16, 242; “Existenz
and Aggiornamento”, in Collection, p. 249.

7 Method, p. 81; see pp. 93-4 and Insight, Chapters VI and VII. On
the difference between common sense description and scientific explana-
tion see Insight, pp. 247, 291-92, 245-46, 345, 415, 436, 504-5, 538-39,
546-47.
there is discerned the beginnings of the systematic exigence in Socrates' constant questions concerning the nature of virtue, courage, temperance, etc. As the Dialogues abundantly illustrate, these questions cannot be answered through the procedures of common sense. In Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, however, we find the procedures that can answer these questions, as is illustrated in the interrelated sets of definitions given by Aristotle. The Ethics therefore can be said to complete the process initiated by the Dialogues. "The systematic exigence not merely raises questions that common sense cannot answer but also demands a context for its answers, a context that common sense cannot supply or comprehend. This context is theory and the objects to which it refers are in the realm of theory."8 While both the man of common sense and the man of theory are concerned with virtue, courage and temperance, the latter apprehends these in a manner not envisaged by the former. There is not a change on the side of the object; but there is a significant development on the side of the subject. To take another example, no one would argue that Maxwell's equations and common sense are not two radically different ways to view the world. And yet the difference lies not in their objects, but in the way they apprehend those objects: common sense describes things in terms of hot and cold whereas the equations explain things in terms of the electromagnetic field. And to take an example from theology, both the man of common sense and the man of theory seek to describe the same religious experience. However, the former emphasizes the immediacy of feeling

8 Method, p. 82
and has recourse to symbols where the latter emphasizes system and has recourse to; e.g., metaphysical categories. The emphasis on system was particularly evident in the theoretical theology initiated in the medieval period. Lonergan sees in this shift to system, to what Georg Simmel has described as die Wendung zur Idee, a significant moment in the development of Christian theology. However, as we will see in the next chapter, the theoretical phase in theology is giving way to yet another distinct phase, one that is based on a new differentiation of consciousness. 9

3. The Critical Exigence

The critical exigence arises in the form of questions concerning the relationship between the two worlds of common sense and theory. To answer these questions, one is forced into the distinct and prior world of interiority that is the ground of both.

Lonergan holds that prior to modern science the critical exigence did not fully emerge. For example, in Aristotelian philosophy distinctions are made between episteme and doxa, sophia and phronesis, necessity and contingency. But these distinctions were not, properly speaking, drawn between common sense and theory. Moreover, Aristotle and the theoretically differentiated consciousness in general tended to see a continuity between philosophy and science, the latter supplying the determinations of the basic categories of the former. 10 With the emergence of modern science this continuity broke down. As we saw in

9 See Method, pp. 120-24, 144-45; Tracy, Achievement, p. 225; and our Ch. 11, pp. 86-88.

10 See Method, pp. 94-6; and our Ch. 11, p. 86, n. 11.
the last chapter, modern science sought to derive its basic categories and concepts not from the prior categories of philosophy but rather from the data of sense. Science became an autonomous discipline. In doing so it gave rise to a sharper and more explicit division between the worlds of common sense and theory. This division, which Lonergan describes as the "troubled consciousness" of modern man, has found expression in the various bifurcations of modern thought - e.g., Descartes' mind in a machine, Galileo's two qualities, Spinoza's two known attributes.11 The troubled consciousness manifests itself within religion, where one finds not only the distinction but the opposition between the common sense and the theoretical apprehension of religious experience. The former, in which symbols evoke what cannot be put into words, is rich in feeling; the latter, in which theory is used to clarify religion, is rich in definitions and theorems. "So the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob is set against the God of the philosophers and theologians. Honoring the Trinity and feeling compunction are set against learned discourse on the Trinity and against defining compunction."12 This tension, argues Lonergan, cannot be resolved within either the realm of common sense or of theory; and so there emerges the critical exigence.

According to Lonergan Kant's Copernican Revolution in philosophy marked a breakthrough with regard to modern man's troubled consciousness. For with Kant philosophy turns from theory and common sense inward to

11 Method, p. 84; see pp. 95-6, 263-64; Insight, pp. 386, 413-14; and our Ch. 11, pp. 115-24
12 Method, p. 115; see Nicaea, pp. 3-11.
the realm of interiority that is the ground of both. "For only through the realm of interiority can differentiated consciousness understand itself and so explain the nature and the complementary purposes of different patterns of cognitional activity." Lonergan maintains that to undertake such an explanation one must first confront the basic questions of cognitional theory (What am I doing when I am knowing?), epistemology (Why is doing that knowing?), and metaphysics (What do I know when I do it?). These questions move one into the distinct realm of interiority and call for "...the appropriation of one's intentionality, one's subjectivity, one's operations, their structure, their norms, their potentialities." As we will see in the next part of the thesis, Lonergan thinks that this turn to interiority will require significant changes in the method of theology. In particular, theology will find its foundations not in Scripture and Tradition but in the subject's religious experience. And these new foundations for theology will require a fundamentally different conception of the development of doctrine than had existed before.

13 Method, p. 115; see "Religious Commitment", pp. 48-9.
14 See Method, pp. 25, 83, 261-63.
15 Method, p. 83
16 Lonergan links this turn to interiority to "...what Karl Rahner has named die anthropologische Wende, the turn to the study of man as basic." ("Religious Commitment", p. 49; see pp. 58-60) See our discussion of Lonergan's Christian Philosophy in Ch. V, pp. 223-32.
4. The Methodical Exigence

Both the methodical exigence and the critical exigence pertain to the realm of interiority. However, the turn to interiority cannot be an end in itself; there must be a return to the world of objects and the procedures proper to that world. In this return the methodical exigence takes one beyond the self-knowledge proper to the critical exigence and leads one to undertake a differentiation of the procedures of science, common sense and history as well as an enucleation of their common foundation.17 This undertaking requires that one formulate the transcendental method that Lonergan describes as "post-Kantian" in the sense that it attends "...not just to the object [systematic exigence], not just to the subject [critical exigence], but to each in itself and in its dependence on the other [methodical exigence]."18

Lonergan links the methodical exigence, like the critical exigence, to the rise of modern science. As we have seen, Lonergan believes that modern science, in its drive for autonomy, disengaged itself from philosophy and began to derive its categories and concepts solely from the data of sense. Since the sciences took the data of sense as their proper object modern philosophy had to turn to the data of consciousness for its proper object. Lonergan holds that this led philosophy to cease in a concern with the objects of the sciences, as in Aristotle, and to begin in a concern with their methods.19 As a result there has emerged

17See Method, pp. 83, 77; "Natural Right and Historical-Mindedness", pp. 15-6
18"Christology Today", p. 14
a methodically differentiated consciousness the aim of which is a formulation of a transcendental method. Transcendental method, argues Lonergan, supplies philosophy with the tools to investigate and to discern the unity of the methods of the sciences. It does so by providing a basic cognitional theory, epistemology and metaphysics of proportionate being.\(^{20}\) The basic tools supplied by transcendental method enable one to unveil and critically formulate the normative foundations of scientific methods and therefore becomes a significant means by which the modern problem of the unification of the sciences can be met.

It is in the measure that special methods acknowledge their common core in transcendental method, that norms common to all the sciences will be acknowledged, that a secure basis will be attained for attacking interdisciplinary problems, and that the sciences will be mobilized within a higher unity of vocabulary, thought, and orientation, in which they will be able to make their quite significant contribution to the solution of fundamental problems.\(^{21}\)

Lonergan cites the work of Dilthey as particularly illustrative of the methodical exigence. Dilthey sought to work out the foundations for the Geisteswissenschaften. He saw this task as complementing Kant's Critique of Pure Reason for it included a critique of the historical sciences that would parallel Kant's critique of the natural sciences. According to Lonergan, "[j]ust as Kant had asked how a priori universal principles were possible, Dilthey set himself the question of the possibility of historical knowledge and, more generally, of the human sciences...

\(^{20}\)See "Natural Right and Historical-Mindedness", p. 13; Method, p. 84; and our Ch.11, p. 109, n. 61.

\(^{21}\)Method, p. 23
conceived as Geisteswissenschaften. The methodological issue of the
Geisteswissenschaften, according to Dilthey, was the formulation of
foundations sufficiently comprehensive and normative so as to make
possible a critique and synthesis of the fragmentary results of their
historical apprehension of man. Dilthey undertook this task by dis-
tinguishing the natural and the human sciences. He maintained that the
latter's concern was not simply external data but, beyond that, the
meaning that is constitutive of human living and the source
of human historicity. He went on to argue that the condition of the
possibility of historical knowledge lay in the uniqueness of the his-
torical sciences' concern. For both the interpreter and the object of
his inquiry, the dynamic whole of human history, are engaged in the
use of the human mind to interpret and express meanings. In Dilthey's
words: "[t]he human studies differ from the sciences because the latter
deal with facts which present themselves to consciousness as external
and separate phenomena, while the former deal with the living connections
of reality experienced in the mind." The foundations for the

22Method, p. 210; see p. 225, and the following sources on Dilthey:
H.P. Rickman, ed., Wilhelm Dilthey, Selected Writings (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 207-45 and the editor's Intro-
duction, pp. 15-6; S. Hughes, Consciousness and Society: The Re-Orien-
tation of European Social Thought 1890-1930 (New York: Vintage Books,
1958), pp. 192-200; M. Lamb, "Wilhelm Dilthey's Critique of Historical
Reason and Bernard Lonergan's Meta-Methodology" in Language, pp. 115-
vii, 61, 100-02, 151, 342, 373.

23"Ideas About a Descriptive and Analytical Psychology" (1894);
in Rickman, Wilhelm Dilthey, p. 89; see p. 171 and Lamb,"Wilhelm Dilthey's
Geisteswissenschaften, then, lie in the very being of the interpreter. "The first condition of possibility of a science of history is that I myself am an historical being, that the man who is studying history is the man who is making history."24 In the self-presence of the interpreter to himself, argued Dilthey, there could be discerned what he took to be the recurrent structures of self-interpretaion and expression common to and the basis of all historical experience, past, present, and future.

Lonergan maintains that Dilthey, although his work does reflect an awareness of the methodical exigence, was unable to meet that exigence adequately. Lonergan attributes this inability to a faulty view of knowing, the view that Lonergan has termed "naive realism". The naive realist places the criteria for knowledge of the real in experience; and reality is defined by him as the "already out there now" or the "already in here now" to be known by some form of intuition.25 Lonergan states

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that Dilthey's naive realism and emphasis on intuition led him to view theoretical or conceptual accounts of the foundational reality of the interpreter's self-presence as at best inadequate representations. For if the real is the already in here now to be known by an intuition, or by taking an inner look, then it cannot be present in theoretical constructions. This meant that this foundational reality could only be immediately experienced; it could not be mediated in knowledge. Dilthey's account of the basic structures of interiority, therefore, could not be normative; for on his position the basic structures of interiority remained psychological events bearing no relation to the objects of the world mediated by meaning. 26 As we will see in the remaining sections of this chapter Lonergan is able to meet the methodical exigence and formulate normative foundations because he holds that the structures of interiority given in the immediacy of consciousness can be successfully mediated. For on Lonergan's account of knowing, those structures given in the data of consciousness can be mediated through the cognitional operations of understanding, judgement and decision. Lonergan's formulation of transcendental method is just such a mediation.

11. Transcendental Method

Lonergan describes his account of the structural features of interiority as transcendental method. The structural features, as we noted above, are the cognitional operations of experience, understanding, judgement and decision. Lonergan claims that the thematization of these

26 See Method, pp. 211,219; "The Absence of God in Modern Culture", in Second Collection, p. 105.
features in transcendental method follows the "empirical principle" of modern science. By this he means that just as the natural scientist verifies his terms and relations in the data of sense so too does the individual engaged in transcendental method verify his terms and relations in the data of consciousness. In this section of the chapter we will explain Lonergan's notion of transcendental method in two stages: (i) by discussing the manner in which that method is derived from consciousness; and (ii) by discussing in detail the features and implications of that method. In the third and final section of this chapter we will show on the basis of this twofold explanation why Lonergan finds his formulation of transcendental method to be normative and comprehensive.

1. intentionality analysis: the subject as subject

In the last chapter we noted that the transition from a classicist to a historically-minded science of man included a shift from the soul to the subject and a shift from a faculty psychology to intentionality analysis. Recall that according to Lonergan a faculty psychology derives its terms and relations from a prior metaphysics whereas intentionality analysis derives its terms from the data given in consciousness. Where the former starts from the abstractions and objects of metaphysics in its apprehension of man, the latter starts from the concrete and prior reality of the subject as subject. Lonergan argues that a

27 "Ongoing Genesis of Methods", pp. 6, 18
28 See "Lectures on Existentialism", pp. 25-8; and "Mission and Spirit", pp. 73, 75-9,
significant result of this shift is that metaphysics can no longer be the basic science or horizon for all other disciplines. The reason for this is that the method of metaphysics presupposes the prior activities of the subject who is inquiring into the nature of reality. He therefore takes issue, e.g., with Emerich Coreth's conception of metaphysics as the Grundwissenschaft, the basic horizon, and argues that...

 meta-physics, as about being, equates with the objective pole of that horizon; but metaphysics, as science, does not equate with the subjective pole. In my opinion Fr. Coreth's subjective pole is under a measure of abstraction that... is to be removed when one is concerned with the total and basic horizon....For latent in the performance of the incarnate inquirer not only is there a metaphysics that reveals the objective pole of the total horizon but also there is the method of performing which, thematized and made explicit, reveals the subjective pole in its full and proper stature.29

Lonergan's position is that metaphysics is a valid and necessary endeavor. However, he argues that if it is to be properly formulated it must be critically grounded in a cognitional theory that is concerned with the concrete subject's operations. For the terms and relations of the cognitional theory are found in the operations of each and every subject; and they are operations of which each and every subject is conscious and is able to verify in his or her experience.30 For instance, the metaphysics worked out in Insight is said to be critical because it is based on the self-affirmation of the knower. In Insight's account of metaphysics Lonergan starts from the fact that one is a knower; for the self-affirmation of oneself as as a knower is an event that is

29 "Metaphysics as Horizon", in Collection, pp. 219-20
30 See Philosophy of God, p: 60
inescapable and verifiable in one's own consciousness. Such a metaphysics is critical because its basic terms and relations are derived from the operations of one's cognitional process; for, according to Lonergan, "...this affirmation of oneself as a knower also is an affirmation of the general structure of any proportionate object of knowledge...".\textsuperscript{31} The reason for this identification is that, on Lonergan's analysis, there exists an "isomorphism" between the subject's cognitional operations and the reality proportionate to those operations. And this means that the validity of a metaphysical term or relation can be judged by an appeal to one's consciousness of the cognitional operation from which it is derived.\textsuperscript{32}

Intentionality analysis provides the basic science in that it studies the basic reality of the subject as conscious of himself. However, transcendental method is not simply consciousness; rather it is a knowledge and thematization of consciousness. We must therefore investigate how Lonergan's notion of consciousness allows for a thematization of its features that is both critical and normative.

The notion of consciousness

According to Lonergan our cognitional operations of experience, understanding, judgement and decision have two distinct characteristics: they are both conscious and intentional. As intentional our cognitional operations make objects present to the subject; as conscious our cognitional operations make the subject present to himself. In the former

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Insight}, p. 523

\textsuperscript{32} See \textit{Method}, pp. 21, 343; \textit{Insight}, pp. 390-401, 483-87, 488-509.
instance the word "present" refers to the presence of a spectacle to a spectator; in the latter instance the word "present" refers to the presence of the spectator to himself, not as a part of the spectacle, as an object, but as the spectating subject. \(^{33}\) We need to explore further the sense in which the subject is present to himself in consciousness, for it is a key to Lonergan's analysis of self-knowledge.

In his discussion of consciousness in "Christ as Subject: A Reply" Lonergan distinguished \textit{conscientia experientia} from \textit{conscientia per-ceptio}. \(^{34}\) The distinction is important, he argued, because the former conception of consciousness yields an account of the subject as an "I" to be perceived as a percept. If consciousness is so conceived, explained Lonergan, then it has no constitutive effect on either the subject or the object; consciousness merely makes manifest objects as they existed prior to the cognitional act named awareness. On this model one is conscious of oneself only as an object to be perceived. However, if consciousness is conceived as experience there is revealed the psychological subject, a subject on whom consciousness has not only a cognitive but also a constitutive effect.

One can appreciate the significance of the constitutive effect of consciousness if one simply contrasts experience asleep with experience awake. When one is asleep consciousness exercises little or no constitu-

\(^{33}\) See \textit{Method}, p. 8; and "Christology Today", p. 12.

\(^{34}\) In \textit{Collection}, pp. 164-97. This article was a response to a criticism of Lonergan's \textit{De Constitutione Christi: ontologica et psychologica} (Rome: P.U.G., 1956, 1958). Fr. Timothy Fallon, S.J., has translated \textit{De Constitutione} into English, and the text of the translation is available at the Lonergan Center, Regis College, Toronto.
tive effect on one's subjectivity. One dreams, as it were, unconsciously. However, when one awakens and begins to participate in his world consciousness constitutes his or her subjectivity in the sense that consciousness makes possible the activities of asking questions, formulating hypotheses, etc. The point is that consciousness is not experience of a known object but rather is experience of a knowing subject and his cognitive operations.

The alternative [to conscientia-perceptio], I suggest, is to deny that consciousness is a matter of knowing an object; the alternative is to deny that only objects are known; the alternative is to reject the tacit assumption that unumquodque cognoscitur secundum quod est objectum (everything that is known, is known insofar as it is an object), and to put in its place the familiar axiom that unumquodque cognoscitur secundum quod est actu (everything that is known, is known insofar as it is in act).

One encounters oneself in consciousness, then, not as an object present to be perceived but as the subject present in act. Lonergan therefore holds that knowledge of the subject can occur concomitantly with knowledge of objects.

...[O]n this view the object is known as id quod intenditur (what is intended), the subject is known as is qui intendit (he who intends), and the act is known both as the intendere (intending) of the subject and the intendi( being intended) that regards the object.

The self-presence of consciousness is therefore not to be confused with introspection. One heightens one's presence to oneself not by taking a

35"Christ as Subject" in Collection, p. 177! C.f. Insight, p. 320, "To affirm consciousness is to affirm that cognitive process is not merely a procession of contents but also a succession of acts." See also pp. xvii, xxv-xxvii, 73, 81, 320-21, 324-25, 349, 432, 486, 515, 644.

36"Christ as Subject" in Collection, p. 177
harder "look" at one's activities; rather one raises the level of one's activity. This means that one can be conscious of one's cognitional operations only to the degree to which they are brought to act.

Since consciousness is of the acting subject qua acting, the experience of one's rationality is identical with one's rationality bringing itself to act; the experience of one's intelligence is identical with one's bringing one's intelligence to act; and the experiencing one's sensitivity is identical with one's sensitivity coming to act.

However, consciousness of itself is not knowledge; rather it is one's experience of one's intentional operations. We therefore need to explore further the way in which consciousness can be known.

Consciousness as known

Because consciousness is constitutive of subjectivity, Lonergan holds that knowledge of consciousness should yield an account of the nature and implications of the structural features of human subjectivity. Such an account is of importance for the question of method for it i) could be verified in the data of each and every subject's consciousness and ii) could illuminate and guide all activities that employ the structural features of human subjectivity. It is therefore of central importance to establish the manner in which consciousness can be known according to Lonergan.

Transcendental method is not simply consciousness of the dynamic structures of our consciousness; it is knowledge of those

37 "Cognitional Structure", in Collection, p. 227; see Insight, p. 320; Method, p. 14

38 "Cognitional Structure", in Collection, p. 226
structures. Central to transcendental method, therefore, is the notion of the intelligibility of consciousness: "...the one who is conscious of himself and his acts is not conscious of something unintelligible but of something intelligible...". The reason for this is that consciousness contains within itself an exigence for self-knowledge. For consciousness is experience of our operations of experience, understanding, judgement and decision. And the relationship between those operations is that of a self-transcending dynamism: experience gives rise to intelligent inquiry, understanding gives rise to rational reflection, and judgement gives rise to the deliberation that terminates in decision. Therefore, in experiencing one's cognitional operations in consciousness one is compelled to move to inquiry into their nature, to reflection on the results of that inquiry, and to deliberation about the results of that reflection - in short, to know them.

Lonergan maintains that self-knowledge is twofold: there is the subject as directly known in the data of consciousness and there is the subject as reflexively known in the process Lonergan terms 'objectification': "...in direct activity the subject is known once, as subjective; but in reflexive activity the subject is known twice, as subjective by consciousness and as objective by the reflexive activity." The reflexive knowledge, or objectification, consists in the application of

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our operations as intentional to our operations as conscious, for "...what is conscious, can be intended."\(^{41}\) Self-knowledge in objectification, then, consists in a duplication of the structure of our knowing. For once an individual has heightened the level of his conscious activity he can move through the data of consciousness in the same way he moves through the data of sense. "Just as we move from the data of sense through inquiry, insight, reflection, judgement to statements about sensible things, so too we move from the data of consciousness through inquiry, understanding, reflection, judgement to statements about conscious subjects and their operations."\(^{42}\) Such self-knowledge requires the deliberate act of self-appropriation. For we are conscious of our operations of experience, understanding, judgement and decision whenever we are knowing; but "...our attention is apt to be focused on the object, while our conscious operating remains peripheral."\(^{43}\) The self-appropriation in question takes place when the subject applies the operations, as intentional not only to objects but to himself as a conscious subject knowing objects. This involves, then, experience of one's experience, understanding, judgement and decision; understanding of one's experience, understanding, judgement and deliberation; judgement of one's experience, understanding, judgement and deliberation; and deliberation on one's experience, understanding, judgement and deliberation.

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\(^{41}\) *Method*, p. 14

\(^{42}\) *Method*, p. 9

\(^{43}\) *Method*, p. 15
There is, then, a difference between consciousness of one's cognitional operations and knowledge of one's cognitional operations. Transcendental method is based on the former but only emerges with the latter. It is helpful to note in this respect the distinction that Lonergan draws between the infrastructure and the suprastructure of our knowing. The infrastructure refers to the latent or potential transcendental method immanent in every subject; the suprastructure refers to the transcendental method that is the explicit thematization and elucidation of that infrastructure. In terms of our discussion of consciousness, the infrastructure is...

...consciousness as distinct from self-knowledge, consciousness as distinct from any introspective process in which one inquires about inquiry, and seeks to understand what happens when one understands, and endeavors to formulate what happens when one understands, and endeavors to formulate what goes on when one is formulating, and so on for all the inner activities of which all of us are conscious and so few of us have any exact knowledge. 45

While transcendental method is a difficult and long process, it is nevertheless a possibility for every individual. For it is the conscious and intending subject that is the ground of transcendental method. And it is to this ground that every individual will be able to appeal in judging the adequacy of any thematization of the structures of our interiority, including the one that Lonergan proposes.

45 "Prolegomena to the Emerging Religious Consciousness"", p. 4; see "Religious Experience", pp. 4-8
2. Transcendental Method: The Thematization of the Subject as Subject

In the previous section we discussed Lonergan's emphasis on intentionality analysis and the subject's presence to himself in consciousness. This emphasis is central to Lonergan's transcendental method for it reveals the ground of that method, the concrete performance of the subject as subject. The importance of this turn to the concrete subject is reflected in the following from Insight's Introduction:

Besides the noema or intentio intenta or pensée pensée..., there also is the noësis or intentio intendens or pensée pensante that is constituted by the very activity of inquiring and reflecting, understanding and affirming, asking further questions and reaching for further answers. Let us say that this noetic activity is engaged in a lower context when it is doing mathematics or following scientific method or exercising common sense. Then it will be moving towards an upper context when it scrutinizes mathematics or science or common sense in order to grasp the nature of noetic activity. And if it comes to understand and affirm what understanding is and what affirming is, then it has reached an upper context that logically is independent of the scaffolding of mathematics, science, and common sense. Moreover, if it can be shown that the upper context is invariant, that any attempt to revise it can be legitimate only if the hypothetical reviser refutes his own attempt by invoking experience, understanding and reflection in an already prescribed manner, then it will appear that, while the noema or intentio intenta or pensée pensée may always be expressed with greater accuracy and completeness, still the immanent and recurrently operative structure of the noësis or intentio intendens or pensée pensante must always be one and the same.

Lonergan's transcendental method is an attempt to thematize the structure of the upper context he finds to be immanent in consciousness. After a brief clarification of Lonergan's use of the term transcendental, we will examine his formulation of transcendental method. In the final

46 Insight, pp. xxv-xxvi; see Philosophy of God, pp. 38, 60; "Metaphysics as Horizon", in Collection, pp. 218-19; and our Ch. 11, 130-31.
section of this chapter we will take up Lonergan's claim to the invariant nature of that formulation.

The term "transcendental"

Lonergan's transcendental method is the fruit of "...a reflective grasp and specialized application of...the dynamic structure immanent and recurrently operative in human cognitional activity." The method is transcendental in two related senses. It is transcendental in the **Scholastic** sense of the term, for the method is all-inclusive and universal. Lonergan contrasts it with categorial or determinate methods because these methods change in description and formulation with changes in circumstances, data, etc. Transcendental method, on the other hand, admits of no change, for it applies in all circumstances, to all data, etc. And although Lonergan does not identify himself with the transcendental turn of contemporary Thomism (Marechal, Coreth, et al), he does hold that his method is transcendental in the **Kantian** sense of the term, for the method "...brings to light the conditions of the possibility of knowing an object in so far as that knowledge is a priori." The two senses of the term transcendental are related in that transcendental method's universality stems from the fact that its

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47 *Insight*, pp. xxi-xxii; see *Method*, p. 274

48 *Method*, p. 14, n. 4; see "Philosophy and Theology", in Second Collection, p. 207; "Metaphysics as Horizon", in Collection, pp. 206-7, 218-19. C.f. Kant's statement, "I call that knowledge transcendental which concerns itself in general not so much with objects as with our manner of knowing objects in so far as this must be a priori possible." (**Kritik der reinen Vernunft**, ed. R. Schmidt [Hamburg, 1952], B. 25; cited in W. Richardson, "Being for Lonergan: A Heideggerian View", in *Language*, p. 341, n. 34.)
scope is correlative to the exigencies and the opportunities of the structures of the human mind.

In order to discuss Lonergan's formulation of transcendental method we will divide that formulation into four parts or stages: operations, levels of conscious intentionality and subjects, transcendental notions, and transcendental precepts. These five stages are directly related to one another, as the following chart indicates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>LEVELS OF CONSCIOUS INTENTIONALITY</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>TRANSCENDENTALS</th>
<th>TRANSCENDENTAL PRECEPTS</th>
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<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>Empirical</td>
<td>Incarnate</td>
<td>Attentiveness</td>
<td>Be Attentive</td>
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<tr>
<td>Understanding</td>
<td>Intelligent</td>
<td>Incarnate</td>
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<td>Judgement</td>
<td>Rational</td>
<td>Incarnate</td>
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<td>Be Reasonable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision</td>
<td>Responsible</td>
<td>Originator</td>
<td>Values</td>
<td>Be Responsible</td>
</tr>
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In the discussion to follow we will comment on each of the four stages.

**Operations and the question as operator**

Transcendental method begins from the data of consciousness. According to Lonergan, these data include the operations of experience, understanding, judgement, and decision. As transcendental method is developed, one starts with each of these operations and moves to thematize its nature, implications, norms, etc. However, besides these operations there is the operator that is the dynamism linking the operations one to the other. In both **Insight** and **Method** Lonergan describes this dynamism as the force of the questions that move the subject from one level of conscious intentionality to another. In **Insight** the questions pertain primarily to the first three levels of conscious intentionality and are an expression of the pure desire to know. In **Method** there
is added the fourth level of conscious intentionality. For with the
later Lonergan's emphasis on value and the existential subject the
questions for deliberation that pertain to the fourth level come into
prominence. 49

The operators that are the dynamism that link one's conscious and
intentional operations together are a priori. 50 They may be described
as follows: i) questions for intelligence that ask, What is it? , Why?,
etc. with respect to data; ii) questions for reflection that ask, Is it so?
with respect to insights, surmises, guesses, etc.; and iii) questions
for deliberation that ask, Is it worthwhile and truly good? with re-
spect to what is understood and judged to be so. 51 The subject who
moves through these questions is described by Lonergan as "self-trans-
scending".

By experience we attend to the other; by understanding we
gradually construct our world; by judgement we discern its
independence of ourselves; by deliberation and responsible
freedom we move beyond merely self-regarding norms and make
ourselves moral beings. 52

49 This point is discussed By F.E. Crowe in "An Exploration of
Lonergan's New Notion of Value", Science et Esprit, v. xix (Mai-Septembre,
1977), fasc. 2, p. 129. See Insight, pp. 465-69, 532, 546, 609, 636; and
Method, pp. 7-8. On the distinction between the early and later Lonergan
see our Introduction, pp. 15-17.

50 "Mission and Spirit", pp. 73-4

51 Method, pp. 73-4; "Natural Right and Historical-Mindedness",
pp. 6-7

52 "Mission and Spirit", p. 74
Because the subject is self-transcending, there must be more than one level to his conscious intentionality. And because each level is distinct from the others, there must be more than one mode in which one can be a conscious subject.

Levels of conscious intentionality and subjects

The three types of operator yield four levels of conscious intentionality. Experience supplies the substratum from which there unfolds with the rise of each question as operator the additional levels of understanding, judgment and decision. Lonergan holds that each level yields a qualitatively different mode of being a conscious subject. For as experience is different from attentive inquiry, inquiry from reasonable judgement, and judgement from responsible decision, so too are the subjects performing these activities distinct from one another. This means that one can be a subject by degrees. However, the difference is qualitative and not quantitative; that is, there are not four separate subjects, unrelated to one another. Rather, there is the one conscious, psychological subject whose levels of conscious intentionality are dynamically related to one another. Lonergan describes this relation as "vertical finality" or "sublation".

Vertical finality is a process or hierarchy of distinct entities whereby the ends of the lower are subordinated to the ends of the higher. Lonergan maintains that each level of conscious intentionality is an instance of vertical finality in the sense that it prepares for and is

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53 See Method, pp. 7-11, 15-16; and "The Subject", in Second Collection, p. 80
the substratum of the next level. However, Lonergan does not mean to suggest that the activities of each successive higher level diminishes the achievement of the lower levels. He therefore states that the higher sublates the lower. Lonergan uses the term "sublation" in Rahner's sense of the term rather than Hegel's to mean that...

...what sublates goes beyond what is sublated, introduces something new and distinct, puts everything on a new basis, yet so far from interfering with the sublated or destroying it, on the contrary needs it, includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context.

On this account the subject reflects the self-transcending dynamism that unfolds through the structure of our conscious and intentional operations. This dynamism, while not violating the integrity of the level of experience, propels the subject on to the distinct and successively richer ends of understanding, judgement, and decision. As we will see in Part II of the thesis, this notion of self-transcendence is central to Lonergan's account of doctrine, for it is the basis by which he can hold together the immediacy of religious experience and the mediation of that experience through doctrinal formulations.

Transcendental notions

The notion of sublation means that our levels of conscious intentionality

54 "Mission and Spirit", p. 70; see "Finality, Love and Marriage", pp. 16-53 and "The Natural Desire to See God", pp. 84-95 in Collection; and Method, pp. 40, 122.

are a unified whole. They are unified because they are functionally interdependent in the sense of the higher presupposing and completing the lower. However, in addition to being united by function they are also united by a common origin, this being the "...unfolding of a single thrust, the eros of the human spirit."\textsuperscript{56} The eros of the human spirit is constituted by a transcendental intention of plural and interchangeable objectives. These objectives are what Lonergan terms the transcendental notions. The transcendental notions correspond to the Scholastic transcendents of \textit{ens}, \textit{verum} and \textit{bonum}. The transcendental notions are obtained by objectifying the subject's conscious and intentional operations in the following manner: from intelligent intending one derives the notion of the intelligible; from reasonable intending one derives the notions of the true and the real; and from responsible intending one derives the notion of the truly good or of value.

The transcendental notions, though plural, are unified. The reason for this unity is that each level of conscious intending contains an exigence for the next level. The unity, then, is dynamic, each objective representing a further unfolding of the intention of the previous level. Thus, the intention of the intelligible that promotes us from experience to understanding unfolds in the intention of the true and the real, for "...the desire to understand, once understanding is reached, becomes the desire to understand correctly..."\textsuperscript{57} And the intention of the

\textsuperscript{56} Method, p. 13; see "The Subject", in Second Collection, p. 81

\textsuperscript{57} "The Subject", in Second Collection, p. 81
intelligible, the true and the real becomes the intention of the truly good "...when the already acting subject confronts his world and advert to his own acting in it." 58

The transcendental notions as the objectives of the operations of our conscious intentionality are central to Lonergan's analysis of the knowing process. For it is his position that the knowing subject and the known object are related immediately only through the transcendental notions. 59 Lonergan holds that this position is the contrary of that of the idealist, who places this immediate relation in intuition or Anschauung. In Lonergan's rejection of the idealist Anschauung we again find his emphasis on the concrete operations of the conscious subject. He argues that the knower is related to the known only through the concrete performance of asking and answering questions. 61 He defines all that there is to be known through asking and answering questions, being, as the objective of the pure desire to know that unfolds through the successive levels of our conscious intentionality. 62

58 "The Subject", in Second Collection, p. 81

59 See Method, pp. 12-3, 24, 33, 36, 73-4, 105, 282; "Cognition of Structure", in Collection, pp. 228, 249; and Insight, p. 566


61 Method, p. 85; "The Origins of Christian Realism", in Second Collection, p. 249; "Cognition of Structure", in Collection, pp. 228-29, 235-36

62 Insight, pp. 348-75, 673, 676
The transcendental notions are the condition of the possibility of asking questions and formulating answers and as such are as unrestricted as all that there is to be known. And again, like being, the transcendental notions as comprehensive and all-inclusive are not abstract; rather they are utterly concrete, and "...the concrete is the real not under this or that aspect but under its every aspect in every instance." \(^{63}\)

Lonergan makes a basic distinction is assigning a universal and comprehensive function to the transcendental notions. He distinguishes the notions as objectifications and as questions. As objectifications they admit of further clarification, refinement, etc. and are therefore subject to revision. However, as questions the transcendental notions are rooted in the basic structures of our conscious intentionality and are not subject to change. For as questions the transcendental notions...

...constitute the very dynamism of our conscious intending, promoting us from mere experience towards understanding, from mere understanding towards truth and reality, from factual knowledge to responsible action. That dynamism, so far from being a product of cultural advance, is the condition of its possibility; and any ignorance or error, any negligence or malice, that misrepresents or blocks that dynamism is obscurantism in its most radical form. \(^{64}\)

We will return to the issue of the un revisability of the various aspects of Lonergan's formulation of transcendental method in the next section of the chapter.

\(^{63}\) Method, p. 36; see "Natural Knowledge of God", in Second Collection, p. 128

\(^{64}\) Method, p. 12
Transcendental precepts

The final stage in Lonergan's formulation of transcendental method i.e. the transcendental precepts. These precepts are obtained by making explicit and thematic "the built-in-normative" of one's conscious intentionality. According to Lonergan this normative is inherent in the transcendental notions. The transcendental precepts, therefore, are derived from the notions and are as follow: Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, and Be responsible. Because they are rooted in the transcendental notions the precepts are permanent and unrestricted; they apply not just to this or that situation, but to any situation whatsoever. And, just as the transcendental notions are the condition of the possibility of the human activity that constitutes culture, so too is adherence to the precepts the condition of the possibility of cultural progress. The precepts, it must be noted, are not eternally valid propositions or truths; rather they are concrete and they can be discerned whenever there are concrete subjects being true to the demands immanent in the structures of their conscious intentionality. And because they are immanent in the a priori structure of our conscious intentionality, they are normative for every instance in which the mind is operating. As we will see in

65 F.E. Crowe, "Bernard Lonergan", in Modern Theologians, p. 132; see Insight, p. 395


67 Method, pp. 53, 103; "Mission and Spirit", p. 74
the next part of the thesis, the norm of the transcendental precepts is central to Lonergan's account of the foundations of theology and doctrine.

3. Transcendental Method as Invariant

As we noted in the previous chapter, Lonergan finds that historical-mindedness is in need of foundations that are both normative and invariant. The formulation of these foundations is no easy task given that historical-mindedness seems to reveal nothing but the relative and constantly changing. The problem then is to discern amidst the dynamic and ever-revisable products of human activity a guide, a norm that is itself un revisable. As our discussion in this chapter has revealed, Lonergan does not hold that such an un revisable norm can be found in the abstract and universal first principles of the classicist. Rather, he holds that it can be found in the structural features of the subject's conscious intentionality that he thematized in transcendental method. The structural features are given in the data of our consciousness; and the normative pattern relating these operations one to the other is...

...the conscious dynamism of sensitive spontaneity, of intelligence raising questions and demanding satisfactory answers, of reasonableness insisting on sufficient evidence before it can assent yet compelled to assent when sufficient evidence is forthcoming, of conscience presiding over all and revealing to the subject his authenticity or his unauthenticity as he observes or violates the immanent norms of his own sensitivity, his own intelligence, his own reasonableness, his own freedom and responsibility.68

Transcendental method does not consist in a set of theories, laws or doctrines that ought to be foundational for all human inquiry and activity; rather it consists in a thematization of the reality that makes all theories, laws or doctrines and is in fact operative in all human inquiry and activity. It is the appeal to the concrete de facto operations given in consciousness — to what Lonergan terms consciousness' "natural infallibility" — and not to an abstract and eternal set of propositions that grounds the normative character of transcendental method.  

And this means that humans come to realize the normative character of transcendental method to the extent that they discover in themselves and appropriate... the dynamic structure of their own cognitional and moral being.  

Transcendental method is a matter of performance. It consists in both the performance of the operations of experience, understanding, judgement and decision and the performance of appropriating these operations. Lonergan therefore describes transcendental method as "...both concrete and practical...", and states that its source is "... the difficult domain of matters of fact." Lonergan is indebted to Newman in this emphasis on the facts of our cognitional activity. He repeatedly

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69 Christ as Subject: A Reply" in Collection, pp. 180-81, n.18; see "Theology in its New Context" in Second Collection, pp. 64-5.

70 Method, p. xii

71 Insight, p. xvii
refers to the importance of following Newman's method of credulity rather than Descartes' method of doubt in matters of knowledge. "For universal doubt leaves one with no basis for advance, while universal belief may obtain some truth that in time may gradually drive out the errors." The point of adverting to and accepting the facts of cog-nitional activity can be best appreciated by quoting the following concerning Newman's account of knowledge in his Grammar of Assent:

My object in the foregoing pages has been, not to form a theory which may account for those phenomena of the intellect which they treat, viz., those which characterize inference and assent, but to ascertain what is the matter of fact as regards them, that is, when it is that assent is given to propositions which are inferred, and under what circumstances....There are those who are arguing a priori, maintaining, that since experience leads by syllogism only to probabilities, certitude is ever a mistake. There are others, who while they deny this confusion, grant the a priori principle assumed in the argument, and in the consequence are obliged, in order to vindicate the certainty of our knowledge, to have recourse to the hypothesis of intuitions, intellectual forms, and the like, which belong to us by nature and may be considered to elevate our experience into something more than it is in itself. Earnestly maintaining as I would, with the latter school of philosophers, the certainty of knowledge, I think it enough to appeal to the common voice of mankind in proof of it....How it comes about that we can is not my business to determine; for me it is sufficient that certitude is felt.

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For Lonergan, too, cognitional theory starts not from a priori deductions and unverifiable hypotheses, but from the actual performance of knowing. He writes in Insight:

The ultimate basis of our knowing is not necessity but contingent fact and that fact is established, not prior to our engagement in knowing, but simultaneously with it. The skeptic, then, is not involved in a conflict with absolute necessity. He might not be; he might not be a knower. Contradiction arises when he utilizes cognitional process to deny it.74

The importance of this emphasis on the fact of our knowing is that Lonergan makes his appeal to it in claiming that transcendental method is invariant and unrevisable. In order to investigate this claim we will clarify the exact sense in which Lonergan's thematization of the subject's cognitional operations may not be revised.

Lonergan maintains that even though knowledge of the subject and his operations will constantly be developing, the pattern of operations that is thematized in transcendental method will not. It is useful to recall here Lonergan's distinction between the infrastructure and the suprastructure of our knowing. The infrastructure refers to our intensional operations as given in consciousness; the suprastructure refers to the knowledge and thematization of those operations. When Lonergan claims that transcendental method is unrevisable he is referring

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74 Insight, p. 332; see pp. 329-32; 387, 391-93. Cf. E Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, tr. W.P. Alston and G. Nakhnikian (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970) Lecture 11, pp. 22-32; where, in his presentation of the conditions of the possibility of a critique of cognition, Husserl insists on an appeal to the data of consciousness as absolutely given. E.g., he states that consciousness "...is given as something that is, that is here and now, and whose being cannot be sensibly doubted." (p. 24)
to transcendental method as infrastructure and not as suprastructure. Thus, in the passage from *Insight* quoted above the contradiction from which the skeptic suffers has to do not with Lonergan's thematization or objectification of our cognitional operations, but with those operations themselves. Change or revision of transcendental method, then, "...can affect nothing but objectifications. It cannot change the dynamic structure of human consciousness. All it can do is bring about a more adequate account of that structure." However, this is not to suggest that Lonergan's actual thematization of those structures, or transcendental method as suprastructure, is open to radical revision. Indeed, Lonergan argues to the contrary.

Lonergan explains that a system will have to be revised whenever there emerges the possibility of more adequate and complete explanations of the data at hand. The revised system would consist in a higher or broader explanatory viewpoint that would require a revision of the terms and relations of the prior system. To speak of a revision of transcendental method, then, is to posit a revision of its basic terms and relations. However, the basic terms and relations in question are the subject's own cognitional operations and the dynamism linking them together. And this is where the crux of the issue lies for Lonergan. He argues that the potential reviser would be involved in the quite impossible position of going beyond the conditions of the possibility of the act of revising, viz. his own conscious and intentional operations. For such a revision would include attending to the data of consciousness.
more closely, understanding that data more thoroughly, judging the adequacy of that understanding more critically, and deciding what to do on the basis of that judgement more responsibly. 76 The point of Lonergan's argument is that the unrevisability of transcendental method lies in the potential reviser himself, in his own inability to avoid using the operations of experience, understanding, judgement and decision. 77

"In brief, conscious and intentional operations exist and anyone that cares to deny their existence is merely disqualifying himself as a non-responsible, non-reasonable, non-intelligent somnabulist." 78

Transcendental method's normative and invariant character stems not from its claim to authority, nor from its probable success, but from the "native spontaneities and inevitabilities" of one's conscious and intentional operations. 79 Because one's operations are indisputably given in one's consciousness, there can be no "deeper foundation" than the transcendental method achieved through the self-appropriation of these operations. 80 Lonergan therefore describes transcendental method as "...a rock on which one can build." 81 There is the possibility of

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76 See Insight, pp. 336, 393-94; Method, p. 18

77 Method, pp. 19, 343-44; "Bernard Lonergan Responds", in Language, p. 307; and Insight, pp. 329-32, 429, 568

78 Method, p. 17

79 Method, p. 18; see "Metaphysics as Horizon", in Collection, p. 220.

80 Insight, p. 332

81 Method, p. 19
of further clarifying and extending the objectifications of our conscious and intentional operations; however, all such clarifications and extensions...

...are to be derived from the conscious and intentional operations themselves. They as given in consciousness are the rock; they confirm every exact account; they refute every inexact or incomplete account. The rock, then, is the subject in his conscious, unobjectified attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility. The point to the labor of objectifying the subject and his conscious operations is that thereby one begins to learn what these are and that they are.\(^{82}\)

And because un reversible and universal this "rock" provides the appropriate foundations for the diverse and fertile historically-minded apprehension of man. Transcendental method is appropriate, for like historical-mindedness it too turns on the concrete, the dynamic, the personal. And transcendental method is foundational because it is the basic horizon that is not open to radical change and variation. It therefore provides the permanent and normative standard in terms of which the changing and varying realizations of human horizons and purposes can be defined and judged.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter we have explicated Lonergan’s formulation of transcendental method. We have shown that he believes such a formulation is necessary in order to provide the thematization of the structures of human interiority required by the methodical exigence. We went on to argue that the distinctiveness of Lonergan’s thematization lay in his use of intentionality analysis and his notion of consciousness. We

\(^{82}\) *Method*, p. 20
then analyzed four stages of transcendental method, showing that each stage was rooted in the structural features of human consciousness. And finally, we explained Lonergan's claim that this rootedness in consciousness is the key to the invariant and normative character of transcendental method.

With this explication of transcendental method we close our discussion of the context of Lonergan's position on the development of doctrine. This context consists in both Lonergan's appropriation of the horizon of historical-mindedness and his formulation of the foundations of that horizon. In the next part of the thesis we will undertake a detailed examination of Lonergan's position on the development of doctrine. Our concern will be to establish whether or not Lonergan is able to meet what we explained in Chapter I to be the modern problem of the development of doctrine, viz., the need to critically hold together the permanent and the historical, the normative and the relative aspects of doctrine. We will argue that Lonergan is able to meet this problem to the extent that his position is truly informed by his analysis and appropriation of historical-mindedness presented in Chapter I and his formulation of transcendental method presented in this chapter.
PART TWO

LONERGAN'S POSITION

ON DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT
CHAPTER FOUR

LONERGAN'S METHOD IN THEOLOGY

AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE

In Part I of the thesis we set the context for the detailed study of Lonergan's position on the development of doctrine that is to follow. We did so in three steps: i) in our discussion of Loisy we showed that a key to the modern problem of development has been to formulate a historically-minded account of doctrine; ii) we presented Lonergan's analysis of both the advances and shortcomings of historical-mindedness; and iii) we presented the basis for Lonergan's appropriation of historical-mindedness in theology, transcendental method. The second part of our study will be more detailed. We will examine Lonergan's explicit discussion of the development of doctrine, particularly within the framework of *Method in Theology*'s eight functional specialties. Our goal will be to establish the extent to which Lonergan's position on the development of doctrine is underpinned by his analysis of historical-mindedness and his formulation of transcendental method.

Part II of the thesis contains three chapters. In Chapter IV we will trace the developments in Lonergan's reflections on the impact of historical studies on theology and the development of doctrine. We will show that both the early and later Lonergan affirm the permanence of doctrine, but that the context for this affirmation, *viz.* a fully historically-minded theology, is substantially different in the later
Lonergan. In Chapter V we will examine what may be termed Lonergan's Christian philosophy in order to determine one way in which transcendental method provides the foundations for a historically-minded account of the permanence of doctrine. And in Chapter VI we will address the critical question of Part II of the thesis within the framework of Method in Theology's eight functional specialties. We will do so by examining whether or not Lonergan's affirmation of doctrine's permanence is grounded in the historically-minded foundations of transcendental method and religious conversion. This is the critical question of our study, for we have suggested that it is precisely this foundational aspect of Lonergan's theology that enables him to avoid the denial of the permanence of doctrine that flawed Loisy's account of doctrinal development.

1. Restatement of the Problem of Doctrinal Development

In our discussion of Loisy's modernist program we showed that a key to the modern problem of the development of doctrine has been the integration of historical studies and an affirmation of the permanence of doctrine. We saw that in his concern to guarantee historical exegesis's autonomy Loisy separated the "theological" from the "historical" study of Scripture. Each study has a different end: the end of the historical is an examination of the changing and contextual word
of man; the end of the theological is an examination of the permanent and revealed word of God. These two ends proved to be irreconcilable in Loisy's conception of the development of doctrine. He was therefore led to conclude that the historicity of the Christian Tradition and Scriptures revealed by critical history had rendered Vatican I's claim to the permanence of doctrine untenable. Historical-mindedness, at least in Loisy's work, did not prove to be a fertile ground for permanent truths.

The present chapter deals with the way in which Lonergan has met this problem. We will show that both the early and later Lonergan conceived the development of doctrine as a problem of the method in theology. For the question of development involves the place of historical studies in theology in general, and in the theological apprehension of doctrine in particular. Lonergan's thought on this problem has developed from a method that distinguished two ways in theology, the via inventionis and the via doctrinae, to a method that distinguishes eight functionally interdependent specialties in theology. We will see that this development has been accompanied by a shift in his understanding of the foundations for theology that has significantly altered the framework in which Lonergan approaches the development of doctrine. The shift has been from a dogmatic theology in which Scripture and Tradition are truths to a historically-minded doctrinal theology in which Scripture and Tradition are data. In our discussion of the early and later Lonergan we will pay particular attention to the ways in which the difference between these two frameworks entails a change in his conception of the development of doctrine and his account of the permanence of doctrine.
II. Early Lonergan on History and Doctrine

David Tracy has argued that the eight functional specialties in *Method in Theology* are the fruition of over thirty years of struggling with the problem of the method of theology. A significant aspect of this struggle has been Lonergan's growing awareness of the historicity of doctrine and the implications of this historicity for theology. In this section we will study part of this development of Lonergan's thought by tracing his early reflections on the method of theology and the problem of a historically-minded approach to doctrine.

1. The Two Ways of Theology

Central to Lonergan's early reflections on the method of theology was his use of Aquinas' "rough but serviceable distinction" between the two ways of theology: the *via inventionis* and the *via doctrinae*. The end of the former is a limited but fruitful understanding of revealed mysteries and truths; the end of the latter is the certitude that is proper to faith. From this distinction it follows that revealed

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2 Following Lonergan's suggestion in "Theology and Understanding" (in *Collection*, p. 138) Tracy calls this development in Lonergan's thought a transposition of the medieval reason illumined by faith to a modern method illumined by faith. (*Achievement*, p.204) See the four brief reviews in *Gregorianum* 44 (1963) pp. 369-373 for indications of the early Lonergan's awareness of the need for this transposition.

3 See "The Assumption and Theology", in *Collection*, pp. 70, 75-6, n. 17.
truths and mysteries can be considered under two different formalities: as true and as intelligible. When one considers such truth formally as true the proper operation of the intellect is to inquire An sit? When one considers such truth formally as intelligible the proper operation of the intellect is to inquire, Quid sit? The aim of the former is certitude in matters of faith and it pertains to the via doctrinae; the aim of the latter is understanding through reason and it pertains to the via inventionis. 4

Lonergan argued in "Theological Understanding" (1957) that the two ways of theology were intrinsically related. This followed from Aquinas' definition of theology as a subalternated science, i.e., as a science that derived its basic principles from the truth of revelation. Because of the priority of the truth of revelation the relationship between the two ways was one of subordination. It must be remembered, argued Lonergan, that theology in the via inventionis, the end of which is understanding, begins not from a probable truth but from a certain


truth. Furthermore, the understanding proper to the via inventionis grows "...in such a way that it consistently adheres to the same truths, and this adhesion is so necessary for theology that if it attempted to understand a truth other than revealed, that understanding would not be theological." Thus, it will always be the case that the theologian will regard the end of understanding as subordinate to the end of certitude that is the proper object of the Church's teaching authority.

We must now inquire to what extent Lonergan held that this account of the relationship between the two ways of theology provided adequate means for the synthesis of historical inquiry and the permanent truths called doctrines.

2. A Synthesis of History and Doctrine?

Ideally, the question of history and doctrine could be resolved on the basis of the distinction between the via inventionis and the via doctrinae. For one need only include historical studies under the via inventionis and its end of understanding, and so make the aim of the historian subordinate to the certitude of the via doctrinae. However, Lonergan recognized that the synthesis of history and doctrine could not be so easily obtained. Why did he think that this was the case?

According to Lonergan a key to the problem of synthesizing doctrine


6 See "Theology and Understanding", in Collection, pp. 134-35. Lonergan here relates this subordination in theology to the natural subordination of understanding to judgement in the human knowing process.
and history was the critical historian's claim to autonomy. This claim meant, as we saw with Loisy in Chapter 1, that if the historian was to perform his task properly he could not subordinate his inquiries to a limited but fruitful understanding of the certain truths of the via doctrinae. Indeed, the modern historian has little or no drive for the synthetic understanding of such truths that was characteristic of Aquinas' use of the via inventionis; rather the modern historian is concerned only with an ever better understanding of all the relevant data. While Lonergan recognized this aspect of modern history as perhaps a positive development for theology, he had certain misgivings about it. In "Theological Understanding" he wrote:

This new step in comprehension has been in preparation for a long time, thanks to so much biblical, conciliar, patristic, medieval, liturgical, ascetical and other research; but its synthetic character has not yet clearly appeared because of the fact that today's scholars resemble 12th century compilers rather than 13th century theologians, so too those today who with solid scholarship investigate biblical, patristic and other areas can certainly look forward to a future theology which will be more concrete and comprehensive. However, the legitimate expectation of a future event is one thing; the bold and premature assertion that it has arrived is quite another.

The modern historian does not find a continuous unfolding of the truths of Scripture and Tradition throughout history; rather he finds varying expressions of the Christian community through multiple developments and

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7 See Ch. 1, pp. 45-57.
8 "Theological Understanding", p. 67; see pp. 70, 87; "Theology and Understanding", in Collection, p. 137; "The Absence of God in Modern Culture", in Second Collection, p. 108 and the review article in Gregorianum 44 (1963) p. 373.
and contexts. The results of such study are not synthesized because i) the historian himself does not aim at a synthesis of his results; ii) the attempt by non-specialists to synthesize the results is unwelcome; and iii) even if a synthesis were to be effected, it could only be a temporary one as the results of historical scholarship are perpetually subject to revision. And without a drive toward synthesis historical studies do not readily serve the end of a fruitful understanding of certain and revealed truth.

This is the framework within which history and doctrine must be synthesized; and the distinction between the two ways of theology cannot provide a means for synthesis because it does not properly allow for the critical historian's autonomy. To answer the question of whether or not the ongoing methods of history are fruitful means to understand revealed and certain truths Lonergan would have to move beyond this distinction. Parts of Lonergan's "Theological Understanding" and his later and more extensive De Deo Trino contain reflections on the role of history in theology that represent significant advances along this line.

3. The Transcultural Problem

In addressing the question of history and doctrine in his early writing Lonergan consistently emphasized the priority of certain truth over historical understanding. However, there can be detected in the development of his early work a growing appreciation of the role of history in theological reflection. Lonergan's De Deo Trino, the first

9 "Theology and Understanding", in Collection, pp. 135, 137-38; see F.E. Crowe, "Dogma versus the Self-Correcting Process of Learning", in Foundations, pp. 25-6.
part of which was written in 1957 and was published in two parts in
1964, reflects this appreciation; so much so that the discussion of
history and doctrine in De Deo Trino forshadows Method's notion of
functional specialization. Of significance for our present discussion
are the ways in which Lonergan treated what he termed the "transcultural
problem".

Lonergan's 1957 "Theological Understanding", which was later included
in De Deo Trino as the Pars Systematica, did contain a section on the
importance of the historical dimension for theology. However, in that
work Lonergan was careful to point out that this emphasis on history
should not detract from the certain and permanent character of doctrine.
He stated that the theological understanding achieved through historical
studies should in no way contradict Vatican I's assertion of the perma-
nence of doctrine: that "...the sense of revealed truth remains the same,
dogma remains the same, and the meaning of faith remains the same."11
Theology still remains a subalternated science, and its starting point
is not inquiry advancing into a hitherto unknown truth, but a truth
already known to be so.

Natural sciences, since they begin from sensible objects and
grow in understanding through the discovery of increasingly
probable and useful theories, cannot arrive at truth until
they understand everything perfectly. With such sciences theology can in no way be equated, because it begins from a
believed truth and grows in such a way that it constantly
adheres to the same truth; and this adhesion is so necessary
for theology that if it attempted to understand a truth

10 See F.E. Crowe, "Early Jottings on Bernard Lonergan's Method
in Theology" for a brief discussion of this point.

and Insight, p. 739
other than revealed, that understanding would not be theological. 12

However, in stressing doctrine's permanence in "Theological Understanding" Lonergan did not want to adopt doctrinal immobility. He therefore recognized what he called the transcultural problem. The problem stems from the nature of Christian revelation: a revelation that is on the one hand universal in the sense of normative for all times and places and is on the other hand particular in the sense of being given to a particular people at a particular place and time. To meet this problem there is needed an account of how this universality and normative nature of revelation has been mediated through the diversity of human cultures in which Christianity has found itself. Lonergan attempted to work out such an account by distinguishing three moments in doctrinal development: the cultural, the theological and the dogmatic.

Lonergan based this threefold distinction on the difference between the prior quod nos - what is prior to us, or the priority of the level of experience - and the priora quod se - what is prior in itself, or the priority of the level of understanding. The three moments of doctrinal development are then explained as follows. In the first moment there is a shift from one relative cultural context to another on the level of the quod nos (e.g. the developments in Christology from the Judaic to the Hellenic context in early Christianity). In the second moment there is a shift from the level of the quod nos to the level of the quod se through systematic theological understanding (e.g. Athanasius' 12 Theological Understanding", pp. 65-6; see pp. 59, 60, 63, 67.
use of the term *homoousion* in his Christology). In the third move-
ment there is a shift from the systematic to the dogmatic level through
a definition of a revealed truth by the Church (e.g. the Christological
doctrines of Nicea and its use of the term *homoousion*).¹³ Lonergan
argued that the same truth is being given different expression in each
moment. And the term of the development, the doctrinal definition,
because it is on the level of the *quaod se*, is not bound to a particular
cultural context; it is catholic and universal and can remain unchanged
throughout the centuries.¹⁴ Such is the solution to the transcultural
problem presented in "Theological Understanding".

4. Positive and Dogmatic Theology

The position of *De Deo Trino*, published with revisions seven years
after "Theological Understanding", reflects a deeper appreciation of the
historical moment in theology. In the latter publication Lonergan had

¹³ "Theological Understanding", p. 75, 77-80; see *Insight*, pp.
739-40 (Note, in reference to this passage, the importance of the em-
pirical notion of culture for the later Lonergan's reflections on the
method of theology and the development of doctrine.); "Theology and
Understanding", in *Collection*, p. 134; "A New Dogma", Canadian Messenger
of the Sacred Heart, 61 (January, 1951) pp. 11-15; and R. Richard, "Con-
tribution to a Theory of Doctrinal Development", in *Spirit as Inquiry*,
pp. 211-20.

¹⁴ In *De Deo Trino* Lonergan stresses the systematic character of
dogma. For example, he compares their systematic character to that of
Euclid's *Elements*: "Yet to mathematicians the meaning of Euclid's
Elements is so clear and precise that they present almost no problems of
interpretation and therefore little ground for dispute among commen-
tators or the never-ending labor of exegeses. And as the mathematician
views Euclid, so the theologian views the dogmas of the Church." (*Nicea*,
pp. 4-5)
recognized that theological understanding could be achieved through more than one means: "...it is unreasonable to judge theological works as if there were but one end, one formal object, one type of operations, one order of questions, one class of formal concepts, one way of considering errors." In De Deo Trino Lonergan applies this notion by outlining not two but three parts to theological reflection, adding historical or positive theology to the systematic and dogmatic theology reflected in the via inventionis and via doctrinae. In doing so he was again careful to maintain the permanence of doctrine. He contrasted dogmatic and positive theology, again maintaining that the former took the certain truths of faith as its given starting point. Dogmatic theology's end was to understand the dogmas of the Church by showing that "...the doctrine defined by the Church is contained in the sources in that same sense in which it was defined." Positive theology, on the other hand,

15 "Theological Understanding", pp. 73-4; see pp. 68 ff. The early Lonergan's growing recognition of the need for functional specialties in theology is evident in this passage. C f. his remark in a 1970 interview, "For example, Lyonnet does a new exegesis of Romans 5:12 and people say 'Oh, you're just a heretic,' well it's too fast. That's true if theology is just one plain deductive system. But with an ongoing process that is interdependent, once there is a new exegesis of Romans 5:12, then you can no longer argue for original sin from that text the way you could before that interpretation. You have a new situation. You haven't got a new heretic." ("An interview with Fr. Bernard Lonergan, S.J.", in Second Collection, p. 211

16 On this distinction see De Deo Trino, I, p. 3; "An interview with Fr. Bernard Lonergan, S.J.", in Second Collection, p. 213; Donn O'Donovan, "Translator's Introduction", in Nicea, p. xvii; Nicea, pp. 16-17; and Tracy, Achievement, pp. 199-203.

17 De Deo Trino I, p. 13; cited and translated in Quesnell, "Theological Method on Scripture as Source", in Foundations, p. 248, n.45.
did not take the certitudes of faith as its starting point. Positive theology's end was to understand the context within which the truth was defined, the questions to which it was addressed, the peculiarities of the individuals involved, their time and place, etc.

Positive [theology]...places only the questions which arise from the evidence, wants only the intelligibility which can be seen in the evidence, and corrects and increases its understanding only by means of new evidence or by more careful examination of the evidence it has...It does not pass over the uncertain, the obscure, the exceptional in order to concentrate on the certain, the clear and the ordinary. Rather it gives greater attention to those points which show need of clarification. Its end is that the sense, the mind, the teaching of any author being studied should some day be brought to light in all its parts, according to all its aspects--some day, not right now. And if, as the skill of investigators grows and enough time passes by and if almost innumerable studies should be made so that finally all the authors of some one past age would come to be known thoroughly, then indeed the particular spirit and almost the living image of that culture would seem to be reconstituted before our very eyes. But the positive theologian wants that kind of overall view of the whole thing only if it arises from intimate knowledge of all the individual facts.18

Rather than placing the two methods and their apparently conflicting ends in separate and water-tight compartments Lonergan attempted to integrate the two. In doing so he moved to an acknowledgement of doctrine's historicity. Lonergan argued for the importance of historical studies in the realization of the end of dogmatic theology. However, he did not subordinate historical to dogmatic theology; on the contrary, he stated that to understand the certain truths called dogmas one must

18 De Deo Trino, 1, pp. 8-9; cited and translated in Quesnell, "Theological Method on Scripture as Source", in Foundations, p. 248, n. 45; see De Deo Trino, 1, p. 10 (cited and translated in O'Donovan, "Translator's Introduction", in Nicea, p. x.
study them historically in the context in which they were defined.

Too many students have been misled into believing that, by some kind of mysterious intuition, they can see at once in scripture something which emerged originally only with the passage of time and with great labor; something which many resisted and many denied; something which it took great minds to grasp, and which only gradually received acceptance in the Church.\(^{19}\)

The reason for this emphasis on history lies in what Lonergan termed "differentiation of consciousness".

In _De Deo Trino_ explains how the differentiation of consciousness became a factor in the development of doctrine by asking what the difference is between the statements of Scripture and the Fathers on the one hand and the dogmatic definitions of the later Councils on the other hand. To answer this question he first identifies an objective aspect of a change in the literary genre: the Gospels appeal to the whole man, to his imagination, affections, heart and will; the Councils, however, bypass these aspects and appeal to the intellect in a quest for a clear declaration of what is true.\(^{20}\) Next Lonergan contends that such objective change in literary genre involves a subjective change in man himself.\(^{21}\) In the case of the early Councils the corresponding change in man consisted in a shift from a relatively undifferentiated consciousness to a differentiated consciousness. Lonergan explains that such a shift occurs whenever an individual ceases to

\(^{19}\) _De Deo Trino_, 1, pp. 8-9; cited and translated in O'Donovan, "Translator's Introduction" in _Nicea_, p. xi

\(^{20}\) _Nicea_, pp. 1-2

\(^{21}\) _Nicea_, p. 2
operate indiscriminately and equally on all levels of consciousness and begins to concentrate on and subordinate the other levels to the achievement of the end of a single level. Thus, in the early development of doctrine there is to be discerned a shift from the undifferentiated consciousness of the Gospels and their multi-faceted expression of the truth of Christianity to the differentiated consciousness of the Councils and their theoretical expressions of that truth. This is not to suggest that there are two different truths in the Gospels and the Councils. Rather, the one truth is apprehended and expressed differently in different contexts. For this reason Lonergan did not feel that the Councils represent a "hellenization" and therefore distortion of the Gospel message. The development that occurred was necessary because the early Christian community was beginning to participate in the theoretical differentiation of consciousness. Because religion functions with regard to the whole of one's person, mind as well as heart, as consciousness develops and expands its functions so too must religion develop and expand its functions. Such is what took place at the Council of Nicea. When the non-scriptural term Homoousion was introduced at Nicea the religious doctrine of the New Testament was not abandoned in favor of a foreign hellenism. Rather, different categories, theoretical ones, were used to explain and affirm the same truth expressed in the Gospels, that Christ was the Son of God.

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22 Nicea, pp. 2-3

The importance of Lonergan's use of the notion of the differentiation of consciousness in De Deo Trino's analysis of development is that it represents a significant change in his position on the relationship between history and doctrine. Although the claim to the status of doctrine as a permanent truth is not denied, the use of this notion does reflect a deeper appreciation of the historical dimension of doctrine. This appreciation of the historical dimension led Lonergan to shift from an approach to doctrine in terms of Aquinas' two viae to an approach to doctrine in terms of the threefold division of dogmatic, systematic and historical theology, the latter division playing a key role. This means that in De Deo Trino Lonergan had begun to recognize that because doctrines are formulated and expressed in differing cultural contexts in order to reach an understanding of their meaning the theologian must have recourse to the techniques of the critical historian.

We now turn to a discussion of Lonergan's later reflections on history and doctrine. In our discussion we will show the ways in which Lonergan's appreciation of the importance of history in theology comes to full term in Method's functional specialties in theology. In doing so we will be concerned to establish the framework in which Lonergan must consciously work out a more historically-minded account of the permanence of doctrine.

III. Later Lonergan on History and Doctrine

We have sketched Lonergan's early reflections on the place of history in theology in order to show the genesis of his later position on history and doctrine. We have seen that in his earlier discussions
of theological understanding Lonergan was concerned to adhere to Vatican I's affirmation of the permanence of doctrine. He recognized, however, that the more seriously the role of history in theology is taken, the more difficult it becomes to adhere to this affirmation. We found, therefore, that changes in Lonergan's understanding of the task and structure of theology led to changes in his understanding of the development of doctrine. In reference to the former, we traced Lonergan's early concern to integrate the ongoing procedures of history with the synthetic procedures of systematic and dogmatic theology. We saw that in order to effect this integration that Lonergan began to move beyond Aquinas' model of theology as a subalternated science and the two ways, the via inventionis and the via doctrinae. For it became evident that in so far as the historian does not take Scripture and Tradition as truths foundational for all theological understanding it would not be possible to subordinate the results of his work to the ends of the two vias. The threefold division of theology into dogmatic, systematic and historical in De Deo Trino represents a significant phase in Lonergan's attempt to meet this issue. In reference to Lonergan's early position on the development of doctrine, we traced his appreciation of the historical dimension of doctrine. We noted that his awareness of the problem of history in theology was coupled with a growing recognition of and emphasis on the historicity of doctrine. This emphasis was reflected in Lonergan's explanation of doctrinal development in De Deo Trino, where he employed the notion of the differentiation of consciousness. For this notion implies that the same truth can be
expressed in differing historical and cultural contexts, and that in
order to apprehend the meaning of this truth one must engage in concrete
historical studies.

Lonergan's stand on the issue of history and doctrine, and par-
ticularly how that stand informs his position on the development of doc-
trine, is the concern of the remainder of this chapter. Our focus is
the historically-minded theology and approach to doctrine that is pre-
sent in Method in Theology. We will discuss first Lonergan's notion
of functional specialties in theology and his shift from a dogmatic
to a doctrinal theology. We will then discuss three features of his
understanding of the development of doctrine within the framework of the
doctrinal theology presented in Method.

1. Functional Specialties in Theology: From Dogmatic to Doctrinal
   Theology

One reason Lonergan wrote Method in Theology was to formulate a
theology reflecting the transition from classicism to historical-
mindedness. He felt that the rise of historical critical studies in the
nineteenth century were so significant as to have rendered the methods
and conclusions of classical theology inoperative. Lonergan describes
this situation as follows:

It is the development of modern hermeneutics and history that
has forced Catholic theology out of the manualist tradition.
The old style dogmatic theologian was expected to establish
a series of propositions, theses, from the Old Testament and
the New, from patristic writings and the consensus of theo-
logians, and from the ratio theologica. But modern scholar-
ship set up an endless array of specialists between the
dogmatic theologian and his sources. With the specialists
the dogmatic theologian just could not compete. Without an
appeal to his sources the dogmatic theologian had nothing to
say. Such has been a basic and, as well, a most palpable
element in the crisis of contemporary Roman Catholic theology. Along with the changes in the notion of science and the notion of philosophy, it has been my motive in devoting years to working out a Method in Theology.\textsuperscript{24}

Lonergan has identified a key problem of theology within this new framework as the place of history in theology. His concern in Method is to so structure theology that "...we have neither history without theology nor theology without history, but both."\textsuperscript{25} To achieve this end there is required more than a re-arrangement of the parts of the classical theology found in Aquinas; there is needed an entirely new method and foundation for theology. This new theology is given expression in Method's eight functional specialties. We will explain the significance of these specialties for the problem of history and doctrine by examining i) what Lonergan takes to be the shortcomings of classicist dogmatic theology; ii) how Lonergan arrives at the eightfold structure of Method's functional specialties and iii) the place of doctrines in functional specialties.

**Dogmatic theology and Melchior Cano's De Locis Theologicis**

Lonergan states that the dogmatic theology found in Cano's De Locis Theologicis is rooted in the presuppositions of classicism. For Cano theology was neither historical nor empirical; it was logical. Scripture and tradition were not data to be understood in their historical contexts; rather they were premises from which theological conclusions...


\textsuperscript{25} "Theology and Man's Future", in Second Collection, p. 136
were deduced. The classicist method of theology, as we saw in our discussion of neo-Scholasticism in Chapter I, proved to be incompatible with the presuppositions of historical-mindedness. The classicist theologian "...thought not in terms of evolution and development, but of universality and permanence. Vincent of Lérins had proclaimed God's truth to be quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus...", and it was theology's proper task to ensure that it remained so.26

When Melchior Cano wrote his De Locis Theologicis in 1563 two concerns relating to the Reformation were on his mind. These were first, that Catholic theologians should be able to defend the certainties and necessities of their theological conclusions; and, secondly, that in doing so Scripture and Tradition be taken as the scientific basis of theology. Cano therefore structured theology with an eye to proof, and worked out ten loci which were to provide the principles or sources from which the theologian could deduce the certain conclusions of theology.

26 "Theology in its New Context", in Second Collection, p. 59. See our Chapter I, pp. 35 - 40 and our argument that Vatican I and the neo-Scholasticism that ensued was caught up in classicism to such an extent that it could not but see modern culture as hostile to its purpose and foundations.

One finds Vincent's teaching in the conception of doctrine classically expressed by Bossuet, the great counter-Reformation polemicist: "In the course of succession, doctrine is always the same....So then, if at any time someone says that the faith includes something that yester-day was not said to be of the faith, it is always heterodoxy, i.e., another doctrine which one opposes to orthodoxy; and all false doctrine will betray itself at once, beyond doubt and discussion, whenever it appears, by its novelty, inasmuch as it always will be something not perpetually known." ("Première instruction pastorale sur les promesses de l'Eglise", Œuvres complètes, 17: pp. 111-12; cited in Walgrave, Unfolding Revelation, p. 132) See E.L. Macall for his comments on this in reference to Lonergan's thoughts on the transition to historical-mindedness in Nature and Supernature, pp. 14-19; and our Introduction, pp. 8-11 in reference to Vincent of Lérins and Vatican I.
The ten loci outlined by Cano were: (i) Scripture, (ii) Tradition, (iii) Dogma, (iv) Councils, (v) Roman Church, (vi) The Fathers, (vii) Theologians (Scholasticism), (viii) Natural Reason, (ix) Philosophers, and (x) Historical Proof. Of the ten Scripture and Tradition were fundamental because they contained the entire truth of revelation and so provided theology with an undisputable and certain source. 27

Lonergan criticizes the dogmatic theology of Cano's De Locis on three counts. First, he states that the emphasis on certitude over understanding in theology was symptomatic of the decline of Scholasticism in the 15th and 16th centuries. Proof and logic, not understanding, dominated Cano's concerns in De Locis. The traditional fides quaerens intellectum had been reduced to "...a set of arguments proving Christian truth and refuting contrary error." 28 The task of theology became the propagation of what had been said in Church documents - a model of theology Rahner labels "Denzinger theology", P. Charles "Christian


positivism.\textsuperscript{29} The second reason Lonergan criticizes Cano's theology has to do with the classicist notion of science presupposed in the De Locis. Although Cano was exceptional among sixteenth century Scholastic theologians in his effort to include a study of the sources within theology, he was still unable to sufficiently integrate a properly positive with dogmatic and speculative theology. The reason for this was that Cano's De Locis synthesized positive and dogmatic theology in terms of the deductivist science derived from Aristotle. The De Locis presupposes that truths and principles are immutable, that change is accidental, and that on each issue there is only one true position.\textsuperscript{30} Accordingly, when a new notion of science emerged in the seventeenth century this synthesis gave way. In particular, there is the problem of a historically-minded apprehension of Scripture and Tradition. In keeping with the empirical bent of modern science critical history treats Scripture and Tradition as historical data rather than as sources for timeless theological premises and conclusions. The results of critical history's study of the data will at best be probable, and most assuredly not certain demonstrations. The new critical and historical exegesis with its drive to autonomy has removed Scripture and Tradition from the province of the dogmatic theologian and has returned them to the pre-dogmatic context of the history of religions. As a result, the dogmatic theology of the De Locis has been cut off from its

\textsuperscript{29} Method, pp. 270, 330-31

\textsuperscript{30} Method, p. 333 and "The Absence of God in Modern Culture", in Second Collection, p. 109
The third reason Lonergan criticizes Cano's theology has to do with Cano's notion that one theologian could master what he took to be the ten loci of theology. Lonergan contends that this may have been a possibility in the a-historical viewpoint of classicism, but that it is not a possibility in the viewpoint of historical-mindedness and the highly specialized methods of modern historical study. In this respect Lonergan refers to the period in which he taught at the Gregorian University in Rome (1953-64), where to be a professor in dogmatic theology was to be a specialist in such diverse fields as Old and New Testament, Apostolic Fathers, Scholastics, etc. He describes this situation as one that was "...hopelessly antiquated, but that had not yet been demolished." The influx of scholarly studies and the emergence of myriad specialties that came along with historical-mindedness meant that a theologian could no longer be expected to single-handedly master all the relevant specialties. Theology had to become a collaborative effort. This last point brings us to our next topic, Lonergan's notion of functional specialties in theology.

Method's eight functional specialties

As we saw in Chapter II Lonergan believes that the rise of historical-mindedness entails a new understanding of theology, and consequently a

31 "Method", p. 155; "Philosophy and Theology", in Second Collection, p. 198; and Bernard Lonergan, "Dogma and Exegesis", Tape Recording of a Lecture delivered at Regis College, September 3, 1963 (available at the Lonergan Center, Regis College, Toronto) side two.

32 "An interview with Fr. Bernard Lonergan", in Second Collection, p. 212; see pp. 211-13, "Revolution in Catholic Theology", in Second Collection, p. 231 and F.E. Crowe, "Introduction", in Collection, pp. x, xi.
new structure of theology. Lonergan defines theology as the mediation between a cultural matrix and the significance of religion in that matrix.\footnote{33} He holds that in order to effect this mediation theology must be divided into two phases. "If one is to harken to the word, one must also bear witness to it....If one assimilates tradition, one learns that one should pass it on. If one encounters the past, one also has to take one's stand toward the future."\footnote{34} Lonergan therefore speaks of a mediating phase of theology, theology in oratione obliqua, wherein the past is assimilated; and a mediated phase of theology, theology in oratione recta, wherein the present is confronted.

Lonergan holds that this twofold division alone is not sufficient. The data with which theology is concerned is complicated, massive and too much for one or two theologians to master; and the techniques of theologians in studying the data are diverse and complex. There is, then, a problem of ordering and integrating various tasks, approaches and stages in the theological endeavor. Lonergan maintains that this problem is a problem of method. He therefore proposes that the introduction of transcendental method can offer much in the way of meeting this problem. As we saw in Chapter III, Lonergan contends that all disciplines find their foundations in transcendental method as the thematization of the recurrent patterns operative in all cognitional activity. In the case of theology, then, transcendental method is

\footnote{33}{See our Ch. II, pp. 88-93.}

\footnote{34}{Method, p. 133}
foundational in so far as it provides the anthropological component of the basis for the theological enterprise. Lonergan argues that the introduction of transcendental method in this sense is not a new theology, nor a new source for theology; rather, it is simply a means to illuminate the method peculiar to theology. His point is that if the problems of the structure of theology are to be met, theologians will have to "...advert to the fact that theologies are produced by theologians, that theologians have minds and use them, that their doing so should not be ignored or passed over but explicitly acknowledged in itself and in its implications." In Method Lonergan attempts to draw out these implications through the formulation of eight functional specialties in theology.

Lonergan's formulation of functional specialties in theology follows from his fourfold analysis of human cognitional operations (experience, understanding, judgement and decision). There follows from the very structure of human inquiry four distinct operations, and since in theology there are two phases, one is led to eight functional specialties in theology. In the first phase, theology in oratione obliqua, there are Research, Interpretation, History and Dialectic. In the second phase, theology in oratione recta, there are Foundations, Doctrines, Systematics, and Communications. These specialties can be placed in

\[35\] *Method*, pp. 24-5
the following scheme:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experience</th>
<th>in oratione obliqua</th>
<th>in oratione recta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Understanding</td>
<td>(1) Research</td>
<td>(8) Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judgement</td>
<td>(2) Interpretation</td>
<td>(7) Systematics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision</td>
<td>(3) History</td>
<td>(6) Doctrines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) Dialectic</td>
<td>(5) Foundations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each of the functional specialties operates on all four levels of cognitive activity to attain the end proper to one particular level. The eight distinct specialties are said to be "functionally' interdependent; they are unified in the sense that they constitute a collaborative effort to achieve the mediation of a religion within a cultural context. 36

Transcendental method is foundational for the collaborative effort of theology in the sense that it provides a means by which such collaboration may be thematized, structured and ordered. However, as we noted above, transcendental method supplies only the anthropological component of the foundations proper to theology. For there is needed to complete these foundations a specifically theological component. This Lonergan places not in Scripture and Tradition, as did Cano in his De Locis, because these are not appropriate foundations for a theology that is ongoing, historical and empirical. Rather he places this specifically theological component in reflection on and objectification of religious conversion. For theology is reflection on religion; and fundamental to religion according to Lonergan is conversion; and so in religious conversion theology finds the appropriate "...foundation that is concrete,

36 Method, p. 126
dynamic, personal, communal and historical."\textsuperscript{37} We shall return to Lonergan's understanding of conversion as foundational in the next section of this chapter; and we will analyze it more thoroughly in Chapter VI.

**Functional specialties and doctrine**

Lonergan outlines what he calls doctrinal theology within the framework of the eight functional specialties. Doctrinal theology differs from its classicist predecessor, dogmatic theology, in several ways. Doctrinal theology begins from and builds on what dogmatic theology had regarded as auxiliary disciplines - Research, Interpretation, History; what had formerly been considered the foundations for theology - Doctrines - is not reached until all doctrinal formulations have been placed under the critical scrutiny of the five previous specialties, the new foundations for theology being placed in the reflection on conversion undertaken in Dialectic and Foundations; and what formerly served to prove the truths of faith and confirm Christians in their faith - Systematics - now offers an understanding of the doctrines of the sixth functional specialty and so guides the Communications of the religion in varying cultural contexts.\textsuperscript{38}

What is the status of doctrines within this new doctrinal theology? In answering this question it must be again stressed that the notion of functional specialization represents a significant development in

\textsuperscript{37} Theology in its New Context, p. 67; see pp. 63-67 in Second Collection; and Method, pp. xi, 130-32.

\textsuperscript{38} Philosophy of God, pp. 34-5; Method, pp. 127-33
Loneran's thought on the place of history in theology and its relation to doctrine. On the one hand there can be seen a continuity in this development from the early to the later Loneran on this issue. For there is a steady line of concern for and thought on the place of history in theology: from the "rough but serviceable distinction" between the via analytica and the via synthetica in his 1954 "Theology and Understanding"; to its more precise exposition and the inclusion of the historical dimension in the 1957 "Theological Understanding"; to the further distinctions between positive, dogmatic and systematic theology and the stress on the concrete and dialectical method in the 1964 De Deo Trino; and finally, to the eight functional specialties of Method in Theology in 1972. Indeed, this line unfolds so steadily that David Tracy was led to conclude that Loneran's functional specialties in Method represent "...the breakthrough towards which all his prior work had been aiming and in the light of which his former work seems relatively un-integrated."39

On the other hand the development of functional specialties represents a marked change in Loneran's view of the relation of history to theology and doctrine. In his discussion of the definability of the Assumption in his 1948 "The Assumption and Theology" Loneran argued that the development in understanding proper to theology is of a different order than that of the empirical sciences: "...the reason for

39 David Tracy, Achievement, p. 266; see O'Donovan, "Translator's Introduction", in Nicaea, pp. xxiii-xxiv; and "An Interview with Fr. Bernard Loneran", in Second Collection, p. 213.
this is ultimately that the development in science regards sensible
data while the development of understanding in Christian doctrine
regards, not sensible presentations which intellect has to raise to
the order of truths, but a divine revelation which already is in the
order of truth." \(^{40}\) "Theological Understanding" (1957) also emphasized
the given starting point of theology to be truth: Scripture and Tradi-
tion were said to contain certain truths about God and all things in
relation to God; these truths were to be taken as premises for further
theological propositions; and the meaning of these truths was to be
determined finally by the Church and not imperfect human intelligence.
\(^{41}\)
In his 1964 De Deo Trino Lonergan still conceived theological under-
standing on this model: doctrines were conceived as truths implicit
in Scripture, and theology was said to rest not on data but on truth.
\(^{42}\)
However, in Method theology, as we noted above, is said to begin with
data viewed in its historical context. With this emphasis on data there
comes the recognition that doctrines are expressed in differing his-
torically conditioned contexts, and that these contexts are subject
to change throughout time. The ongoing and empirical methods of history
are emphasized in grasping the meaning of doctrines, for the intelli-
gibility of doctrines is "the intelligibility immanent in historical process."\(^{43}\)

\(^{40}\) "The Assumption and Theology", in *Collection*, p. 76

\(^{41}\) "Theological Understanding", p. 57; cf. *Philosophy of God*,

\(^{42}\) See De Deo Trino, I, p. 20: "...non a datis sed a veris
incipit." (cited in F.E. Crowe, "Dogma versus the Self-Correcting Process

\(^{43}\) *Method*, p. 319
In turn, the truth of doctrine is not given at the start of theological reflection, but is something that is reached only through the unfolding and interaction of the successive stages of the theological process.

The above outlined development reflects the character of Lonergan's notion of doctrinal theology. For doctrinal theology is historical and empirical, its end being an understanding and communication of doctrine via the eight interdependent functional specialties. In such a theology Scripture and Tradition are not the foundations for theology; rather, religious conversion is. Lonergan does not mean to say that Scripture and Tradition are not sources for theology, however.

They remain sources, but they are considered in a series of different manners. In the first instance, they are data for general and special research. In the second instance, each item is acknowledged to possess a meaning, and this meaning is determined by the exegete. In the third instance, the many items come together in an ongoing process, history. In the fourth instance, the history is acknowledged to manifest the values and disvalues brought about by persons, and the conflicts brought to light are cataloged and compared. In the fifth instance, a decision is taken with respect to the conflicts. Only in the sixth instance, do we come to the truths contained in the sources.44

Lonergan's position is that the truth of doctrine is not a given for theology that is to be found implicit in Scripture; nor is it that the truth of doctrine is to be found in the abstract theorizing so characteristic of Scholasticism. Rather he holds that its truth is to be ascertained through a critical and historical study of the sources.

Given this position on the truth of doctrine, one may ask whether or not the claim that the truth of doctrine is ascertained through the

44 "Bernard Lonergan Responds", in Foundations, p. 229; see Method, p. 326
ongoing methods of history is compatible with Vatican I's assertion of the permanent and normative character of doctrine. More precisely, one may ask how the truth of a doctrine emerges from its status as data? Lonergan is not unaware that such a question could be put to his position. He recognizes that the introduction of a historically-minded theology in place of Scholastic theology can and often does lead to a softening of the dogmatic component of Catholicism. 45

While traditional theology had felt it could proceed deductively from Scripture to the councils, modern scholarship has revealed a sea of change. Where traditional theology retained an ideal of necessary and self-evident truths, modern reflection scrutinized a field of contingent developments, developments that were contingent both in proximate objects investigated and in the merely probable conclusions reached by investigators. 46

Lonergan argues that in spite of this development that a historically-minded theology can allow for the permanent and normative character of doctrine. The key to his argument is the notion that the proper foundations for this new type of theology lie in transcendental method and religious conversion. We will deal with why Lonergan believes this to be the case in Chapters V and VI. For now we continue with our discussion of the understanding of the development of doctrine that is found in Method's doctrinal theology.


46 Bernard Lonergan, "A New Pastoral Theology", p. 21
2. Development of Doctrine in Method

In the remainder of this chapter we will clarify the approach to the development of doctrine that Lonergan works out within the framework of functional specialties in theology. We will do so by discussing three points: the historicity of doctrine, doctrine and the differentiation of consciousness, and the permanence of doctrine.

The historicity of doctrine

In Method Lonergan states that the historicity of doctrine follows from the historicity of human thought and action. The latter, Lonergan explains, can be expressed in the following four premises:

(1) that human concepts, theories, affirmations, courses of action are expressions of human understanding, (2) that human understanding develops over time and, as it develops, human concepts, theories, affirmations, courses of action change, (3) that such change is cumulative, (4) that the cumulative changes in one place or time are not to be expected to coincide with those in another.47

Given that doctrines are in part products of human understanding, and that human understanding necessarily changes in history, there follows the historicity of doctrine.

Lonergan states that the recognition of the historicity of doctrine requires a shift from the perspective of eternal truths to the perspective of developing doctrines. This shift reflects, as we noted above, theology's assimilation of the concrete and empirical methods of history in its apprehension of doctrines in the place of the logical

47 Method, p. 325
approach of classicism. Lonergan explains this as follows. One may speak of eternal truths that are not subject to the vicissitudes of history only if they exist in an eternally unchanging mind. And one may speak of the human mind as eternally unchanging only if two provisos hold: that human nature is unchanging and that the contexts of human statements remain the same. However, critical history has revealed that as a matter of fact neither proviso holds true. As a result, one must acknowledge the incarnational aspect of all human

\[48\] "Theology and Man's Future", in Second Collection, p. 136. Cf. Leslie Dewart's statement that "...the fact of which we have recently become aware is not that Christian doctrine has begun to develop in recent times, but that it has always existed in a process of development. It is only the awareness of this fact that is new.... It can be no coincidence that Christianity reached this awareness concerning itself at the same time that mankind reached the same awareness of its own historicity and its evolutionary nature in every other respect. It is because human experience in general has become aware of its historical character that Christianity has become aware of its own." (The Future of Belief: Theism in a World Come of Age [New York: Herder and Herder, 1966] pp. 78-79). C. George Lindbeck, The Future of Roman Catholic Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970) pp. 98-99 and Langdon Gilkey, "The Spirit and the Discovery of the Truth Through Dialogue", in ed. P. Huizing and W. Basset, Experience of the Spirit, Concilium, v. 9, n. 10 (New York: The Seabury Press, 1975[61]) pp. 61-62.

statements, including doctrines, and accept that their meaning is expressed and therefore must be understood in historical contexts.\footnote{See N. Lash, "Continuity and Discontinuity in the Christian Understanding of God", The Irish Theological Quarterly, vol. XLIV, n.4 (1977) p. 297.}

The historicity of doctrine, then, stems from the fact that as contexts change so too must the doctrines originally expressed within the contexts change.\footnote{Philosophy of God, pp. 57-8; Method, p. 302. See G. Berkouwer, The Second Vatican Council and the New Catholicism, tr. Lewis B. Smedes (Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans Publ. Co., 1965) for a discussion of the centrality of the notion of the historicity of doctrine at Vatican II.}

The emphasis on doctrine's historicity is related to Lonergan's definition of theology as the mediation of a religion within a cultural matrix. For on this definition theology and doctrine will undeniably be tied to the flux and changes of the historical process: "...theology as a whole functions within the larger context of Christian living, and Christian living within the still larger process of human history."\footnote{Method, p. 144}

As we noted in Chapter II Lonergan links the notion of historicity to the recognition of the constitutive role of meaning in human living. Because man's existence is a hermeneutical one, i.e., it is affected by the individual's self-understanding, man can transform himself and his world through the realization of new meanings. Cultures, then, are not "fixed and immutable entities"; rather, they are products of changing human understanding and self-transformations.\footnote{Method, p. 78}
relate and introduce Christian values and meaning into such changing cultures, they too must be subject to transformation. Thus, Lonergan states that doctrines are expressed "...not in some vacuum of pure spirit but under concrete historical conditions and circumstances." 54

Such expressions must undergo change if "...religion is to retain its identity and yet at the same time find access into the minds and hearts of men of all cultures and classes." 55 Thus, Lonergan holds that there has been significant development of doctrine throughout the history of the Christian tradition. One of the more significant causes of this development lies in what Lonergan terms the differentiation of consciousness. To a discussion of this notion we now turn.

**Doctrine and the differentiation of consciousness**

According to Lonergan the question of the development of doctrine is not whether developments have occurred; for doctrinal development is a fact. Rather, the question is how such development is possible: "How is it that mortal man can develop what he would not know unless God had

54 *Method*, p. 319; see pp. 112-13, 298

55 *Method*, pp. 132-33. This emphasis on doctrines as constitutive meaning is related to the distinction between human nature and human historicity. Cf. E. Cassirer's statement that "[i]n order to endure the works of man must be constantly renewed and restored. A physical thing remains in its present state of existence through its physical inertia. It retains its same nature so long as it is not altered or destroyed by external forces. But human works are vulnerable from a quite different angle. They are subject to change and decay not only in a material but also in a mental sense. Even if their existence continues they are in constant danger of losing their meaning. Their reality is symbolic, not physical; and such reality never ceases to require interpretation and reinterpretation." (Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944) pp. 184-85
Longergan holds that this question can no longer be answered adequately with the Scholastic explanation of doctrine as the development of what is implicitly revealed in Scripture. For the Scholastic view presupposes that Scripture is a body of true premises, not data. Moreover, the Scholastic view depends on the abstract viewpoint of logic, not on today's dynamic and concrete viewpoint of method. According to Lonergan an answer that is adequate to a historically-minded approach to theology is what he calls the differentiation of consciousness. "The possibility of the development of doctrine arises whenever there occurs a new differentiation of consciousness, for with every differentiation of consciousness the same object becomes apprehended in a different and more adequate fashion."  

We introduced Lonergan's notion of the differentiation of consciousness in Chapter III. There we explained that on Lonergan's view consciousness becomes differentiated as it meets different exigences begins to operate in different realms of meaning, and develops the operations appropriate to each realm. Lonergan distinguishes four exigences: the theoretical, the critical, the methodical, and the transcendental; and corresponding to these exigencies he distinguishes four realms of meaning: common sense, theory, interiority and transcendence. We saw that in *De Deo Trino* Lonergan applied the notion of the differentiation

56 Method, p. 302
57 Philosophy of God, pp. 57-8; see "Theology and Praxis", p. 20
58 See our Ch. III, pp. 137-49.
of consciousness to the development from the Gospels to the Councils, the latter representing the emergence of theoretically differentiated consciousness in the Christian community. In Method he includes the other two possible differentiations and extends its application to the entire history of Western Christianity. He suggests that the transcendent exigence has been operative throughout western thought, and that the other three exigencies have characterized successive stages of its development. Following Bruno Snell he labels the entire development of western thought "the ongoing discovery of mind". To this there has corresponded a development of Christian doctrine, for the ongoing discovery of mind results in a series of different cultural contexts, each successive one necessitating a development in doctrine. For if the consciousness of the culture in which religion exists becomes differentiated, then "...a corresponding development in the expression and presentation of religion becomes necessary." 59

In Method Lonergan links what he sees as key developments in Christian doctrine to the successive cultural changes that result from the ongoing discovery of mind. In the first instance, where consciousness constructs its world symbolically, there is the reinterpretation of a religious tradition through symbols in order to give expression to new insights. An example of this is the Old and New Testaments' authors' purification of myths and motifs drawn from their cultural contexts to express their understanding of God. In the second instance, where

59 Method, p. 139; see pp. 85-99, 112-14, 118, 150, 305-6, 327, 344; "Philosophy and Theology", in Second Collection, pp. 206-8; and "Theology and Praxis", pp. 3, 4, 20.
consciousness leans towards philosophical reflection, there is the purification of anthropomorphism in speech about God, as in Clement of Alexandria advancing beyond the symbolic apprehension of the biblical authors. In the third instance, when consciousness begins to make use of theoretical terms and techniques, there is the beginning of the employment of systematic meaning in Church doctrine. Lonergan identifies this stage with the various definitions given by the early councils with respect to the Christological question. He points out that at Chalcedon and Nicea the context was logical and not theoretical. The latter emerges more fully only in the fourth instance, the systematic theological doctrine that is found in late Scholasticism and its reliance on Aristotle. In the fifth instance, there is the interaction of theological and Church doctrine in which the Church derived a clarity and precision from Scholastic theology. This interaction, which Lonergan terms a "post-systematic" phase, lasted right up to Vatican II. However, with Vatican II there is the emergence of a new phase which Lonergan associates with the methodically-differentiated consciousness of modern science, scholarship and philosophy. This phase represents the historical-mindedness that we discussed in Chapter II, and it is this differentiation of consciousness that Lonergan believes is the new context for modern theology and doctrine.

Lonergan's notion of the differentiation of consciousness means that

60 Method, pp. 307-8
the history of the Christian tradition and doctrine is an ongoing process. "As the process advances, the context within which events are to be understood keeps enlarging. As the context enlarges, perspectives shift." 62 And this means that when contexts are open or could be re-opened, later events shed light on earlier events, thereby placing them in a new perspective. Applied to the development of doctrine this means that the context in which a question was originally answered and a doctrine defined remains open in that it can be re-understood in light of subsequent developments. Indeed, as Lonergan's survey of the role of the ongoing discovery of mind in the Christian tradition shows, the same doctrine can be revealed in one context, defined by the Church in another and understood by theologians in a third context. 63 For example, the context in which the Council of Nicea made its Christological definition remained open in the sense that Nicea's questions and definition were understood and expressed anew in the subsequent councils of Constantinople, Ephesus and so on through the middle ages up to the present. The present context of historical-mindedness has presented Catholic theology with a new context and with "...the dilemma of reverting to an antinicene Christology or of advancing to a thoroughly modern position." 64 There remains, then, the inevitability of pluralism and development of doctrine. Because doctrine is essentially historical

62 Method, p. 192

63 Method, p. 325

64 Method, p. 319; see pp. 313-14, 347; Doctrinal Pluralism, pp. 48-50; Nicea, pp. 1, 4; and "Theology and Praxis", pp. 20-21.
its development and meaning are to be understood only through concrete and historical inquiry into the questions asked and the answers given in each different context. Whether or not this squares with the permanence of doctrine we will begin to discuss in the next and final portion of this chapter.

**Permanence of doctrine**

We have outlined some elements of doctrinal development when it is approached within the framework of Lonergan's functional specialties in theology. We have emphasized the historicity of doctrine that stems from the historicity of man; and we have seen that successive differentiations of consciousness require correlative developments in doctrinal expression. The question now to be asked is the following: Is this historicity compatible with the permanence of doctrine? Lonergan's answer is affirmative. In Method Lonergan addresses this issue through an interpretation of Vatican I's definition of the permanence of doctrine in the constitution Dei Filius.

Lonergan explains that the intention of Dei Filius was to clarify the relationship between dogma on the one hand and faith and revelation, the natural light of reason, reason illumined by faith, and reason stepping beyond its competence on the other hand. Within this context the permanence of doctrine was defined:

...the doctrine of faith, which God has revealed, has not been proposed as some sort of philosophic discovery to be perfected by human talent. It is a divine deposit given to the spouse of Christ, to be guarded faithfully and declared

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65 See "Philosophy and Theology", in Second Collection, p. 200.
infallibly. Hence there is ever to be retained that meaning of the sacred dogmas that once was declared by the Church. From that meaning there is to be no departure under the pretext of some profounder understanding (DS 3020).

In his discussion of the position of Dei Filius Lonergan introduces three qualifications that he believes help one to see how Vatican I's declaration of the permanence of doctrine is compatible with the historicity of doctrine. First, he distinguishes revealed mysteries and revealed truths. Both are revealed by God and taught by the Church; but the former lie beyond the competency of reason and the latter do not. Lonergan asserts that in teaching the permanence of doctrine Dei Filius intends only those doctrines that are revealed mysteries and therefore only these "...stand beyond the status of the products of human history." Doctrines that are revealed truths, then, are subject to development in history through increases in human understanding. Secondly, Lonergan distinguishes the meaning and the expression or formulation of doctrine. It is only the meaning, not the expression of revealed mysteries that lies beyond the competency of human understanding and is permanent. Changes in expression, then, do not necessarily mean a change in the meaning of a doctrine, be it a revealed mystery or truth. Finally, Lonergan suggests that it is

66 Method, p. 322

67 Method, p. 323; see p. 326.

68 Method, p. 323. Lonergan's position here reflects the official stance of the Catholic Church; see, e.g., the following from Vatican II's Gaudium et Spes: "...the deposit of faith or revealed truths are one thing, the manner in which they are formulated without violence to their meaning and significance is another." (in Documents of Vatican II,
more appropriate to speak of the "permanence" of dogma rather than the "immutability" of dogma. For permanence better reflects the meaning of the Latin "...perpetuo retinundus...numquam recedendum...ne sensus tribuendus sit alius...". Moreover, the word permanence is in accord with the Council's assertion of an ever better understanding of the same doctrine.

Such is the permanence of doctrine that Lonergan says is compatible with the historicity of doctrine. His discussion of Dei Filius in Method provides an indication of how such permanence is compatible with historicity by distinguishing revealed mysteries and truths, meaning and expression, and permanence and immutability. However, we need to raise a further question, one which will be addressed in the final two chapters of this thesis. For we have suggested that the adequacy of Lonergan's position on the development of doctrine stems from the new foundations for theology that he has developed. And yet the discussion of the permanence of doctrine in Method makes no explicit reference to these foundations. The reason for this appears to be that in his discussion of the functional specialty Doctrines in Method Lonergan is simply explaining how one who ascribes to Vatican I's doctrine on the permanence of doctrine may go about reconciling it with the historicity of doctrine. He is not, however, attempting to ground critically the

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art. 62; see also the decree Unitatis Redintegratio, art. 14, 17 and 18.) Indeed, Pope John makes use of this distinction in his explanation of Aggiornamento in his opening speech to the Council in 1962. (see Documents of Vatican II, p. 715)

69 Method, pp. 323, 347, 353; Doctrinal Pluralism, pp. 45-6
the permanence of doctrine. There remains to be discussed, therefore, the critical question regarding the permanence of doctrine: On what grounds can it be held that doctrines, involved as they are in the vicissitudes of the historical process, are nonetheless permanent? As our discussion in the next two chapters will show, the logic of Lonergan's historically-minded theology requires that these grounds lie in the new foundations of theology in transcendental method and religious conversion.

Conclusion

In this chapter we traced the ways that developments in Lonergan's reflections on the method of theology have altered his position on the development of doctrine. We have seen that the move from the two viae in theology to Method's eight functional specialties gave rise to a move from doctrines as truth to doctrines as data. These complementary movements have reflected a growing appreciation of historically-mindedness and the historicity of doctrine. However, we have seen that throughout this movement in Lonergan's thought the affirmation of the permanence of doctrine has remained a constant. And this has raised a question for us. For if the later Lonergan advocates a historically-minded theology and view of doctrine, then one would expect that the grounds for the permanence of doctrine would be elaborated with reference to the foundations of a historically-minded theology. But in the chapter on Doctrines in Method this appears not to be the case. For in that crucial chapter we are presented only with a concise interpretation

70 See Method, pp. 332-33.
of Vatican I's *Dei Filius* and the meaning of its declaration that doctrines are permanent; there is no explicit reference to the foundations of theology. Our question now is the following: In arguing for the compatibility of doctrine's historicity with its permanence does Lonergan critically ground the permanence of doctrine in the new foundations of transcendental method and religious conversion; or does he simply appeal to a particular Church doctrine, Vatican I's doctrine on the permanence of doctrine, to justify his position? If the latter is the case then Lonergan's account of the development of doctrine has failed to provide a historically-minded basis for the affirmation of the permanence of doctrine. Our next two chapters will address this question.
CHAPTER FIVE

FOUNDATIONS AND THE PERMANENCE OF DOCTRINE

Our question in this and the next chapter is as follows: In what way does Lonergan's account of theology's foundations as transcendental method and religious conversion inform his conception of the development of doctrine? In both chapters we concentrate on the problem of the permanence of doctrine and explore the ways in which Lonergan relates this problem to his account of the foundations of theology. In the next chapter we address this issue in terms of Lonergan's functional specialties, particularly the specialties of Foundations and Doctrines. In this chapter we discuss this issue within the framework of Lonergan's Christian Philosophy. Our concern here is to explain Lonergan's position that transcendental method is the anthropological key to the conditions of the possibility of there being doctrines that are permanently true.

This chapter consists of three sections: i) a brief explanation of Lonergan's transcendental method as a contemporary Christian Philosophy; ii) a discussion of the way in which transcendental method grounds an account of doctrines as true; and iii) a discussion of the way in which transcendental method grounds a truly historical approach to doctrines that are permanent.
1. Lonergan's Christian Philosophy

According to Lonergan the end of Christian philosophy is not a certain proof that Christianity is true; rather, its end is an understanding of how Christianity may be true. In this respect Lonergan accepts the basic principle of Aquinas' distinction between the two ends of theological discourse, certitude and understanding. According to Aquinas...

...every activity is to be carried on in a manner consonant with its end. Theological discussion, however, can be ordered to a double end. Some discussions aim at resolving doubts as to whether a thing is so; and in this type of theological discussion, those authorities should be used who are accepted by those with whom one is discussing...But there is another type of discussion used by the masters in the schools, which aims not at the removal of error but at the instruction of the listeners, that they may be led to an understanding of the truth in question; and in this type, one ought to employ reasons which penetrate to the roots of the truth and make known how the proposition is true; otherwise, if the master answers the question merely by appealing to authorities, the listener will be certain that the thing is so, but he will not have gained any knowledge of understanding, and will go away with nothing in his head.¹

Lonergan explains that the end of understanding that is appropriate to Christian philosophy should be undertaken within the framework of reflection on man's total situation. In a very fundamental way such Christian philosophy will endeavor to show that constitutive of man's

¹ Quodl., IV, a. 18 as cited in Bernard Lonergan, "Theological Understanding", p. 59. See F.E. Crowe's comment that this passage "...has been directive for Lonergan during his whole career." ("Editor's Introduction", in Collection, p. xxv) Note that we are suggesting that Lonergan accepts the basic principle of the distinction between the ends of understanding and certitude; as we saw in the last chapter, Lonergan has found this distinction wanting as a basis for the method of theology.
very being there is...

...a region for the divine, a shrine for ultimate holiness. It cannot be ignored. The atheist may pronounce it empty. The agnostic may urge that he finds his investigation has been inconclusive. The contemporary humanist will refuse to allow the question to arise. But their negations presuppose the spark in our clod, our native orientation to the divine.2

To the degree that this openness to the divine is unveiled there will be provided the anthropological basis of the Christian faith in general.

And to the degree that this openness can be related to the possibility of a self-identical revelation of God through history there is provided the anthropological basis of Christian doctrine in particular. According to Lonergan both these facets of Christian philosophy can best be realized in transcendental method.

I am led to believe that the issue, which goes by the name of Christian philosophy, is basically a question on the deepest level of methodology, the one that investigates the operative ideals not only of scientists and philosophers but also, since Catholic truth is involved, theologians.3

With respect to the permanence of doctrine the problem that Lonergan as a Christian philosopher must address is how transcendental method provides the basis for the claim that doctrines are permanently true. This involves, it seems, the effort to relate the nature and structure of doctrine to Lonergan's analysis of the invariant features of the subject as contained in transcendental method. In order to clarify Lonergan's stance on this issue we will relate his position to those of two theologians who have undertaken similar endeavors, Maurice Blondel and Karl Rahner.

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2Method, p. 103

1. Blondel: the Exigence for the Supernatural

In Chapter 1 we cited Blondel's critique of Loisy's account of doctrine. Blondel recognized that Loisy's attempt to work out a historically-minded theology had a major weakness in its failure to provide normative foundations. Blondel argued that because such foundations were lacking in his work Loisy's historical-mindedness could not but lead to a historicist exclusion of the permanent and revealed element of Catholic doctrine. Blondel went on to suggest, however, that the permanence of Catholic doctrine can be reconciled with the historical approach provided that approach was grounded in the foundations of what he termed the "method of immanence".

Blondel saw the method of immanence as a way to avoid the half-truths of extrinsicism and historicism. Extrinsicism, according to Blondel, was rooted in a neglect of the inner act of faith. This neglect was manifest in the divorce between thought and feeling, Catholic doctrine and living thought in what Blondel saw as the impotent rationalism of nineteenth century Scholasticism. The divorce between doctrine and the inner act of faith led to a one-sided view of the relation between doctrine and history whereby doctrines were claimed to be absolute, static truths extrinsic to the relative movements of time. Historicism, on the other hand, so rooted doctrine in history that one could find no doctrinal formulation to be of a divine and lasting significance. The historicist claimed that historical science was the only reliable means to approach doctrine. As a result the historicist interpreted everything "sub specie motus humani", and was easily led to persuade himself that
"...religion can be reduced to the facts of history."⁴ The weakness of both historicism and extrinsicism was that neither could supply a basis for discerning the relation between history and permanent doctrines, and how one could pass from the former to the latter.

In criticizing both extrinsicism and historicism as half-truths Blondel sought to synthesize history and doctrine; indeed, he felt that the two continually verified and vivified one another. Blondel therefore argued against the postulate he thought both half-truths had in common, "...the thesis of the watertight compartment between history and dogma, and of the incommensurability of assertions of faith and truths of fact..."⁵ In order for there to be a synthesis of history and doctrine, he argued, Tradition cannot be statically conceived as the conservation of an objective depositum fidei. On the static model of tradition the whole emphasis was placed on what was handed down, with little or no thought as to how it was handed down. However, to see how doctrine and history vivified one another, one first had to realize that the deposit of faith, while divinely fixed for all time, nevertheless becomes a truth only in the subjective assimilation, personal, historical and communal, of that deposit.⁶

The key to Blondel's emphasis on subjective assimilation in his concept of Tradition stemmed from his method of immanence, the cornerstone of his Christian philosophy. This method consisted in the effort

⁴Blondel, History and Dogma, p. 256
⁵Blondel, History and Dogma, pp. 258-59, n. 1; see p. 224
⁶See the "Prefatory Note", in History and Dogma, pp. 214-17.
to establish an exigence for the supernatural in man through an analysis of the subject's inner experience. Blondel regarded the method of immanence as a key to a historically-minded apologetic because he saw it as the means by which modern man's emphasis on autonomy and subjectivity could be reconciled with the Christian and Catholic claim to permanent and normative truths. Blondel described the tension of this reconciliation and hence the logic of the method of immanence as follows:

Modern thought with jealous sensitivity regards the notion of immanence as the very condition of philosophy. This means that if among current ideas there is one achievement which it clings to as representing progress, it is the idea, which is fundamentally correct, that nothing can enter into man which does not come out of him and which does not correspond in some way to a need for expression, and that not historical fact, traditional teaching, or obligation added from without can be accepted as true or admitted as precept unless it is in some way autonomous and autochthonous. 'On the other hand, there is nothing Christian or Catholic that is not...strictly supernatural; which means that it is impossible for man to draw out of himself what is, nevertheless, imposed on his thought and will.'

If doctrine and history are to be reconciled, and the abiding relevance of doctrine to man's ever-changing self-experience and self-understanding established, then there must be discerned in human subjectivity a perpetual need for transcendent truth. Blondel's aim was therefore to establish a correlation between the subject on the one hand and the normative truths of the Christian tradition on the other. For if the former were to be correctly and honestly analyzed, there would be dis-

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covered "an imperious appetite" for the supernatural that is fulfilled in the revealed and permanent truths proclaimed by the Christian tradition.

2. Rahner: Dogmatic Theology as Theological Anthropology

Karl Rahner follows Blondel in the effort to correlate the doctrines of the Christian tradition to man's inner experience and capacity for the supernatural. Rahner undertakes this task within the framework of the contemporary transcendental turn in theology. Rahner's position is, in the words of Lonergan, that "...all theological questions and answers have to be matched by the transcendental questions and answers that reveal in the human subject the conditions of the possibility of theological answers." This means that Christian philosophy will involve a philosophical or theological anthropology not unlike Lonergan's transcendental method. Applied to the question of doctrine, this anthropology will seek to establish that "...there is a transcendental necessity for man as mind and spirit (and consequently for every human society) to affirm certain truths absolutely." Rahner's contention is that this analysis of the subject will show that doctrine, far from alienating man from his true nature and autonomy, in fact is correlative to man's a priori and natural openness to divine revelation.

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8 Lettre, p. 15; cited in Bouillard, Blondel and Christianity, p. 54
9 "Theology and Man's Future", in Second Collection, pp. 147-48
10 Karl Rahner, "Dogma: I. Theological Meaning", in Sacramentum Mundi, 11, p. 95; see also his entry "Church and World" in vol. 11, pp. 346-57
11 See Rahner's "Experience of the Spirit and Existential Decision"
Rahner feels that one implication of the transcendental approach to doctrine is that dogmatic theology will have to become theological anthropology. In his "Theology and Anthropology" Rahner cites two reasons by way of explanation of this position. First, he argues that contemporary theology cannot ignore the richness of the subjectivist orientation of modern philosophy; "...Bultmann has really won the day over Barth in European theology." Rahner is aware, however, that this subjectivist orientation in and of itself does not easily ground absolute truths, and that the relation of modern philosophy to theology may have to be that of *simul justus et peccator*. Rahner's second reason for his position that dogmatic theology must become theological anthropology stems from what he sees as the nature of theological inquiry itself. Inquiry about an object, explains Rahner, is necessarily inquiry about the knowing subject insofar as the subject is the *a priori* horizon for the possibility of knowledge. This, he states, is the significance of Kant's transcendentalism: "Transcendental questioning asks about a thing from the point of view of the necessary conditions in the subject itself that makes it possible for that thing to be known or done by the subject concerned." In the case of theology all facets of theological inquiry, including

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13 "Theology and Anthropology", p. 2; see our Ch. III, pp.160-61 and n. 48 on the way in which Lonergan uses the term "transcendental".
dogmatic theology, will presuppose the question of man as essentially
open to revelation. Given this, Rahner suggests that "...anthropo-
centricity and theocentricity are not contradictions but are strictly
one and the same thing from two different aspects, and each aspect is
unintelligible without the other."\footnote{Rahner's approach means that any
doctrine, including the doctrine of the permanence of doctrine, will
have to be shown to correspond to man's inner experience and self-under-
standing for it to be properly understood and appropriated.}

3. **Christian Philosophy as Foundational**

Blondel, Rahner, and Lonergan have each tried to relate doctrinal
formulations to the foundational reality in man as answer to question.\footnote{Blondel, Rahner, and Lonergan have each tried to relate doctrinal
formulations to the foundational reality in man as answer to question.}
However, it must be emphasized that for each this does not amount to the
deduction of a doctrine's truth from human experience, but rather to the
correlation of a doctrine and human experience. Thus Blondel saw as the
goal of his method of immanence the unveiling in the human condition of
the need for and therefore the possibility of revealed truths. "To
establish that it is impossible to validate a negative solution in this
matter is not to maintain that 'it is' (faith being, by hypothesis, a
gratuitous gift), but that 'it is possible', since it is not possible

\footnote{"Theology and Anthropology", p. 1. Cf. C. Geffré, A New Age
in Theology, tr. R. Schillenn with F. McDonagh and T. L. Westow (New
York, Paramus and Toronto: Paulist Press, 1974) for a discussion of
Rahner's view on the transcendental character of all theology and the
related suggestion that fundamental and dogmatic theology should inter-
penetrate. (pp. 22-3; 46 ff.)}

\footnote{See Bernard Lonergan, "Theology and Praxis", pp. 7-13, 17-19.
In these passages Lonergan is discussing Eric Voegelin's "The Gospel and
Culture", in eds. D.G. Miller and D.Y. Hadidian, Jesus and Man's Hope, vol.
2 (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, 1971), pp. 39-102.}
to prove its impossibility."16 Rahner, too, argues that to relate doctrines to human experience is not to claim that they can be deduced from the subject. "Transcendental inquiry does not presume that the total reality of the object examined can be deduced from the transcendental conditions in the subject for knowledge of it..."; it would be "heretical modernism" to insist that one must "...deduce all theological propositions from this experience which man has of himself."17

The approach to doctrine in Lonergan's Christian philosophy is based on the same point, that Christian philosophy aims at the elucidation of the correlation between human experience and doctrinal formulations. As we saw in Chapter IV, the use of transcendental method in theology does not mean a new theology, nor a new source for theology; rather it means a new method for theology. Lonergan has developed his Christian philosophy with full cognizance of the need not to compromise the distinction between the natural and supernatural orders.18 It is his position that there can be formulated an account of human interiority that is in harmony with the acceptance of Christian doctrine; but he does not


17 "Theology and Anthropology", p. 29

18 See Tyrrell, Bernard Lonergan's Philosophy of God, p. 17; the m.s. The Early Latin Works of Bernard J.F. Lonergan (Regis College, 1973), "Editor's Introduction" to Lonergan's 1964 De Ente Supernaturali; "Natural Desire to See God", in Collection, pp. 84-96 (this article is in part directed to the controversy surrounding Henri de Lubac's Supernatural) and Lonergan's later "Natural Knowledge of God", in Second Collection, pp. 117-134.
argue that such an account should replace or nullify the necessarily supernatural character of doctrine. There is a philosophy, he states, "...that is open to the acceptance of Christian doctrine, that stands in harmony with it and that, if rejected, leads to a rejection of Christian doctrine." But the use of such a philosophy in approaching the doctrine of the permanence of doctrine in no way replaces the revealed character of that doctrine.

In the case of the development of doctrine, transcendental method does not prove the truth of the assertion that doctrines are permanent; it does, however, unveil the conditions of the possibility of accepting such an assertion as true. And insofar as it unveils these conditions transcendental method grounds a genuinely historically-minded approach to doctrine that does not lead to the subjectivism and relativism that was characteristic of Loisy's position. We now turn to a discussion of why Lonergan holds this to be the case. We will discuss first how Lonergan's transcendental method grounds an account of doctrine as permanently true, and secondly how Lonergan's transcendental method grounds an account of doctrines as permanently relevant.

11. Doctrines as True

The assimilation of historical-mindedness in theology is not without its difficulties in regard to doctrine, as the following quotation from


Langdon Gilkey indicates.

Where are the ultimate events of revelation when all in history swims in the relativity of time; what is the Word of God amidst the welter and variety of historical words in Scripture; what is the mind of the Church in the manifold of changing historical minds, each rooted in and so directly relevant to its own epoch? The divine bases for authority in theology seem to have fled with this historicizing of everything historical, leaving us with only the tatters of merely human authorities...21

The "historicizing of everything historical" poses problems for those who would affirm doctrines to be permanently true statements of what is so, for the relativism and subjectivism that can accompany such an emphasis on the historical seems to make it impossible to ground objectively true statements about anything, including the Word of God.

In his efforts to appropriate historical-mindedness Lonergan has attempted to come to grips with this problem. As we saw in the last chapter, one of his concerns in introducing transcendental method into theology was to overcome the softening of the dogmatic component that has been characteristic of some recent Catholic theologians. It is his position that the acceptance of historical and empirical methods does not necessarily imply the acceptance of a historicist and empiricist philosophy. However, he recognizes that this may be, and in fact has been the case in modern Catholic theology. Because of this he argues that theology should not assimilate historical-mindedness without a sound cognitional analysis and epistemological critique of the procedures

of critical history and hermeneutics. This means that Lonergan's historically-minded approach to doctrine will be based on what he takes to be the only valid epistemological stance, that of critical realism. For it is only the critical realist, he argues, that can provide an account of doctrines as true judgements of what is so.

1. De Deo Trino's Three Realisms

In De Deo Trino Lonergan distinguished three types of realism: naive, dogmatic, and critical. Each assigns different grounds for why what is known is the real. The naive realist holds that knowledge is obtained through sense experience. For example, the naive realist knows that this mountain is real because he has seen, touched, felt and walked on it; to search for any other grounds for his conviction is either perverse or silly. The critical realist, on the other hand, goes beyond sense experience, holding that knowledge of the real is attained only in a correct judgement. That the mountain is sensible is undeniably correct; but the matter is more complex. Sensation alone does not constitute knowledge, and so the critical realist investigates the matter more thoroughly seeking to establish grounds for a true judgement. The dogmatic realist, whether through a strong increment of natural reasonableness or through being indirectly influenced by the revealed word of God, agrees with the critical realist about the criteria for knowledge of the

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See "Philosophy and Theology", in Second Collection, p. 207; Method, p. 208; Insight, p. 236; Discussion of Lonergan's "Theology in Its New Context" at the Congress on the Renewal of the Church (August 20-25, 1967) at the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Toronto, pp. 5-8; and his remark in Nicea that "...not without reason are philosophical studies placed before the study of theology." (p.8)
real without being able to explain why he does.\textsuperscript{23} Lonergan's notion of dogmatic realism is central to the analysis of the Nicene development in \textit{De Deo Trino}, and we will therefore discuss it in more detail.

Dogmatic realism is dogmatic both in the sense of pertaining to the very nature of dogma and in the sense that it is posited without philosophical reflection. The former sense is stressed by Lonergan in \textit{De Deo Trino}. He explains that there is a realism implicit in the Word of God on two accounts: i) that the Word of God is not to be contradicted (the Yes, Yes and No, No of Matthew, 5: 37) and ii) that the Word of God claims to correspond to reality as it actually is. Athanasius' rule - what is said of the Father is to be said of the Son, except that the Son is not the Father - best exemplifies this implicit realism. For without being conscious of it, in accepting Athanasius' rule the Nicene Fathers were implicitly affirming the critical realist's view that truth is attained neither in experience nor in conception, but only through true judgements. This is realism, argues Lonergan, for realism quite simply "...consists in this, that the truth that is acknowledged in the mind corresponds to reality."\textsuperscript{24}

Lonergan claims that the dialectical development of the early Church's doctrine is rooted in the Church's inevitable effort to transcend all traces of naive realism. For the Word of God is intelligible and is addressed not merely to the individual's experience, but to all

\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Nicea}, pp. 131-32
\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Nicea}, p. 128; see "Origins of Christian Réalism", in \textit{Second Collection}, pp. 239-261.
levels of his consciousness; and to be faithful to that word therefore requires an individual to go beyond experience to understanding, judgement and decision. Thus in De Deo Trino Lonergan argues that it is of the very essence of doctrine that it be a true affirmation of what is so, and not merely a description of religious experience.

For there is no doubt that the categories derived from religious experience will contain a reference to the subject who has the experience, but "the word of God is not tied", restricted to speaking of things as related to us and unable to speak of things as they are in themselves.25

The Nicene development, then, consisted in the transition from religious beliefs in relation to experience to religious beliefs as they are in themselves; and correspondingly, from the Word of God as tied to a particular place and time to the Word of God as addressed to all places and all times.26 If this view of doctrine as permanently true affirmations is to hold within historical-mindedness, then it must be shown that the notion of objective statements about what is so is not incompatible with the stress on the subject that is so essential to historical-mindedness.

2. Subjectivity and Doctrine

A significant implication of the shift from eternal truths to developing doctrines that we discussed in Chapter IV is that truth and therefore doctrine is recognized to be historically-conditioned. The reason for this is that doctrines as truths are products of human understanding, and because human understanding is dynamic and ever-changing

25 Nicca, p. 130
26 Nicca, pp. 136-37
so too must be the doctrines that are the products of understanding. In emphasizing this point Lonergan, like Blundel, is suggesting that the development of doctrine should not be studied only with an eye to what was handed down; one must also study development with an eye to how it was handed down. This means that Lonergan has chosen to focus on the subjective element in doctrine. Indeed, he takes this to be especially important, for "...if at the present time among Catholics there is discerned a widespread alienation from the dogmas of faith, this is not unconnected with a previous one-sidedness that so insisted on the objectivity of truth as to leave subjects and their needs out of account..."  

Lonergan identifies the emphasis on truth's objectivity at the expense of awareness of its subjectivity with what he terms "conceptualism". The conceptualist limits his attention to concepts, and not their source, understanding. Because concepts are abstract, immobile, and, unlike understanding, ever the same, the conceptualist falls easily into a deductivist and a-historical immobilism. A case in point is the Scholasticism of Suarez, De Lugo, et al. Because they neglected the rootedness of concepts in understanding, they found themselves in the embarrassing position of syllogistically demonstrating the mysteries of faith.

What God reveals is a truth in the mind of God and in the minds of believers, but it is not a truth in the minds of non-believers; and to conclude that the mysteries of faith are truths in the mind of God or in the minds of believers in no way suggests that the mysteries are demonstrable. But this simple way out seems to have been missed by the theologians. They seem to have thought...
of truth as so objective as to get along without minds. 28

The key to Lonergan's position here is the central role critical realism assigns judgement in the knowing process.

On Lonergan's critical realist account of knowledge knowing is a compound of operations: experience, understanding and judgement. It follows that objectivity is not a single property but is rather a compound of distinct properties found in distinct types of operation. One may distinguish, then, the experiential objectivity of attention to the given data of sense and consciousness, the intelligent objectivity of adherence to the exigence of intelligence, and, finally, "...a third terminal, or absolute type of objectivity, that comes to the fore when we judge, when we distinguish sharply between what we feel, what we imagine, what we think, what seems to be so and, on the other hand, what is so." 29

It follows from Lonergan's account of knowledge that truth, contrary to the conceptualist, is grounded in the mind of the knower, in the self-transcendence of correct judgement: veritas formaliter est in solo iudicio.

Intentionally [truth] goes completely beyond the subject, yet it does so only because ontologically the subject is capable of an intentional self-transcendence, of going beyond what he feels, what he imagines, what he thinks, what seems to him, to something utterly different, to what is so. Moreover, before the subject can attain the self-transcendence of truth, there is the slow and laborious process of conception, gestation, parturition. But teaching and learning, investigating, coming


29. "The Subject", in Second Collection, p. 70
to understand, marshalling and weighing the evidence, these are not independent of the subject, of times and places, of psychological, social, historical conditions. The fruit of truth must grow and mature on the tree of the subject, before it can be plucked and placed in its absolute realm.30

The objectivity of the truth of doctrine, then, is not reached by what is independent of the concrete, historical subject. Rather, objectivity is the fruit of the concrete subject's self-transcendence, and doctrines are true in so far as they reflect such self-transcendence.31

As our present discussion illustrates, Lonergan would appreciate the subjectivist approach to doctrine that is found in the historically-minded thought of Loisy. However, in doing so Lonergan would not adopt the position that doctrines are merely subjective, as did Loisy. As we saw in Chapter I Loisy emphasized the anthropological component of revelation, viewing doctrine as imperfect and symbolic representations of the believer's experience of the divine. Doctrines were therefore not normative for Christian self-understanding, their importance paling in comparison to the immediate experience of the divine. On the critical realist approach to doctrine, Loisy's mistake was to place the criteria for knowledge of the real in experience, and not in judgement. For the real is not what is immediately experienced; rather the real is what is understood and affirmed to be, what is so through the mediation of the operations of understanding and judgement. When Lonergan approaches doctrine he does find that it is rooted in religious experience. However,

30 "The Subject", in Second Collection, pp. 70-1; see Verbum, pp. 61-3.

31 See Method, pp. 37, 45, 338; Insight, pp. 377-80; and our discussion below in Ch. VI, pp. 258-72.
Lonergan holds that the subject's cognitive operations are self-transcending, and that each level of operation contains an exigence propelling one to the next level. For the subject intends multiple objects; what promotes him from experience to understanding is the intention of intelligibility, and what promotes him from understanding to judgement is the intention of correct intelligibility, or truth. This means that doctrines, although rooted in religious experience, are the product of a movement beyond experience through understanding to judgement. It is because of this critical realist account of knowing that Lonergan is able to assert the subjective element of doctrine without denying, as did Loisy, the truth status of doctrine. Indeed, a full appreciation of how doctrines can be permanently true is to be had more on Lonergan's emphasis on doctrine's subjective element than on the conceptualist's one-sided emphasis on their objective element.

III. **Doctrinal as Permanent**

Today, with the breakdown of classicism and the loss of the sense of permanence and normativeness that accompanied it, many are confronted with what seems to be an endless relativism. Catholics especially face this difficulty when they try to discern the permanence that the Catholic Church claims to abide through the changes in doctrine that critical history has brought to light. As we saw in the previous chapter Lonergan's functional specialties contribute to the solution of this problem. For through the cumulative interaction of the eight functional specialties the meaning of doctrines can be transposed from the contexts

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32 Doctrinal Pluralism, p. 56; "The Origins of Christian Realism", in Second Collection, p. 258
of yesterday to the contexts of today. In the next chapter we will
discuss this notion of transposition with reference to the problem of
permanence, focusing on the key juncture in the process, the move from
Foundations to Doctrines. In the remainder of this chapter we will
pursue the more fundamental issue of the conditions of the possibility
of such a transposition, conditions which Lonergan places in the invar-
i ant nature of transcendental method.

1. The Transposition of Truth

In the previous section we argued that Lonergan affirms the histor-
icity of doctrine only on the basis of an epistemological critique. He
emphasizes doctrine's historical and subjective aspects; but, on the basis
of the critical realist account of knowing, he is able to do so without
compromising doctrine's status as objective truth. Lonergan's position
is that although the meaning of a doctrine is inescapably tied to its
historical context, this does not mean that a doctrine's meaning is destined
to fade when the context to which it is tied fades. He argues that...

...truths that are not eternal are relative, not to a place and
time, but to the context of a place and time; but such con-
texts are related to one another; history includes the study
of such relations; in the light of history it becomes possible
to transpose from one context to another; by such trans-
positions one reaches a truth that extends over places and
times.33

The grounds for the assertion that different contexts are related and
that a truth can be transposed from one context to another lie in Loner-
gan's account of transcendental method. For what endures through
changing contexts is not an unchanging tradition or a set of timeless

33 "philosophy and Theology", in Second Collection, pp. 207-8
concepts, but rather the invariant and normative structure of the human subjects involved in the changing contexts; in Lonergan's words,

...we are not relativists, and so we acknowledge something substantial and common to human nature and human activity; but that we place not in eternally valid propositions but in the quite open structure of the human spirit - in the ever immanent and operative though unexpressed transcendental precepts: Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible. 34

A key element in how transcendental method, as the thematization of this structure of the human spirit, provides the basis for the transposition of a doctrine from one context to another lies in what Lonergan terms the universal viewpoint.

2. The Universal Viewpoint

The problem of positing a truth lasting through changing contexts stems from the critical historian's failure to synthesize his findings. In a lecture delivered in 1960 on the philosophy of history Lonergan posed this problem in the form of a question:

Can the weakness of technical history, the problem of going beyond the sure points where the data interlock, of having a systematic type of bridge work between the strong points, those (as it were) piers, be achieved by the introduction of an upper blade into historical method? 35

What does Lonergan mean by the term "upper blade" in this passage?

The best way to explain the notion of the upper blade is to recall

34 Method, p. 302; "Natural Right and Historical-Mindedness", pp. 8-9, 15-16

35 "Philosophy of History", p. 5; see the unpublished Introduction to Lonergan's Ph.D. thesis, "A Study in the Speculative Development in the Writings of St. Thomas of Aquin" (Rome: Gregorian University, 1940) (available at the Lonergan Center, Regis College, Toronto), pp. 4 ff.
the distinction we drew in Chapter III between basic and relative contexts. Basic context refers to the pure desire to know unfolding through experience, understanding, judgement and decision. Relative context refers to the products of such unfolding in, for example, an interpreter's understanding of the statements and actions of particular individuals. The basic context, explains Lonergan, is related to the relative context as the upper blade is related to the lower blade in what he takes to be the scissors-like structure of empirical scientific method. In the latter instance the upper blade consists in a set of generalities demanding specific determination, and the lower blade consists in the actual determinations of the data provided by the concrete measurements, correlations, working hypotheses, etc. (E.g., the laws and principles of physics are the product of the interaction between the upper blade of differential and operator equations and the lower blade of increasingly organized data. 36 ) In the case of basic and relative horizons, the upper blade consists in the thematization of the structure of the subject's intentional consciousness, and the lower blade consists in, e.g., the data and views supplied by the a posteriori research of critical historians and scholars. 37 Through the scissors-like interaction of the two blades

36 See Insight, pp. 38-43, 312-13, 461, 532-33, 577-78, 580-81, 586-87; and Method, p. 293.

37 See Method, p. 150; "An Interview with Fr. Bernard Lonergan", p. 212 and "Philosophy and Theology", pp. 205-6 in Second Collection; Tracy, Achievement, p. 42; and especially Lonergan's "Hermeneutics" (Notes for Lectures During the Theology Institute, Regis College, Toronto, July 20, 1962) pp. 14-16. In these lectures Lonergan cites an example from his study of the development of doctrine, that of placing a variety of authors within a genetic-dialectical unity. In doing so,
there is effected a synthetic viewpoint within which the interpreter may link together various and diverse expressions of human meanings and values.

In the discussion of interpretation in Insight Lonergan presents an approximation of the upper blade appropriate to critical history as the universal viewpoint. He defines the universal viewpoint as "...a potential totality of genetically and dialectically ordered viewpoints..." which function as "...a heuristic structure that contains virtually the various ranges of possible alternatives of interpretations..." This means that the universal viewpoint provides the interpreter with a framework in terms of which there can be envisaged the totality of possible contents and contexts of all human meanings. The reason for this universality is that the universal viewpoint rests on a grasp of the immanent source of all human meaning, the structure of the subject's conscious and intentional operations. As we saw in Chapter III, he explained, one goes beyond the intentions of each individual author, and attempts to understand what was going forward in the development. This means that one explains not only what the authors explicitly intended but also what they implicitly did or failed to do. Thus, in linking Tertullian, Origen, and Athanasius in a single context, the historian goes beyond the intentions of each of these authors who had themselves intended no such linking. The discussion of this interpretive technique in De Deo Trino can be found in Nicea, pp. 13-17. Finally, cf. Kant's remark that "...it is by no means unusual, upon comparing the thoughts which an author has expressed in regard to his subject,...to find that we understand him better than he has understood himself." (Critique of Pure Reason, tr. Norman Kemp Smith [London: MacMillan and Co., 1929], p. 310 B 370).

38 Insight, pp. 564 and 738-39

this structure is an immanent law of human consciousness that cannot be contradicted under any circumstance whatsoever. This structure is operative wherever there is an instance of human knowing and doing, for according to Lonergan this structure regards "...every inquiry, every judgement, every decision and choice." The thematization of this structure, then, provides a transcultural principle that refers to realities that are not the product of any culture but, on the contrary, [are] the principles that produce cultures, preserve them, develop them. And a grasp of this principle provides the interpreter or group of interpreters, with a means by which to link together all human expressions of meaning and thus with the conditions of the possibility of transposing a truth from one particular context to another.

Lonergan holds that relative contexts can be known and related to one another and that a truth can be transposed from a past context to the present context. One may ask, however, whether or not the universal viewpoint enables one to know a future context. For it seems that unless the nature of a future context has been ascertained, then the doctrine that it is to be transposed into the present could be involved in a position that is subject to radical change.

Lonergan's position in response to this question is that future

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41 "Dimensions of Meaning", in Collection, p. 249; see "Philosophy and Theology", in Second Collection, p. 203.

42 Method, p. 282
contexts cannot be known in detail. However, he contends that the outlines of the future context can be known. The reason for this is the heuristic function he assigns to the universal viewpoint. The universal viewpoint functions heuristically in so far as it enables an interpreter to designate and name an intended unknown through a grasp of the acts by which the intended will eventually become known. The applicability of a particular doctrine to a future unknown context, then, can be discerned because the acts by which it will be accepted can already be known:

...for while the content of a future cognitional act is unknown the general characteristics of the act itself not only can be known but also can supply a premise that leads to the act. A heuristic notion, then, is the notion of an unknown content and it is determined by anticipating the type of act through which the unknown would become known.43

The principle and intelligibility of all human understanding and action is the dynamism of our conscious intelligibility. The thematization of this dynamism is the basis for discerning the unity of past, present, and future contexts, for this thematization is of the basic horizon of which all determinate horizons are relative expressions. It follows, then, that the basic horizon provides theology with a ground on which not only to understand past truths, but as well to transpose those truths in such a way that they will not be open to radical change in the future. For the basic horizon, far from being open to revision, is itself the principle of all revision.

43 *Insight*, p. 382; see pp. 304-342, 484-85, 596, 617; *Doctrinal Pluralism*, pp. 11-12; *Method*, p. 141.
Conclusion

In this chapter we have shown one aspect of the way in which Lonergan’s formulation of transcendental method informs his conception of the development of doctrine. We have seen that the aim of Lonergan’s Christian philosophy, like that of Blondel and Rahner, has been to provide an anthropological basis for the Christian faith. With reference to the permanence of doctrine this aim is achieved through a turn to the subject in order to establish the conditions of the possibility of there being doctrines that are permanently true. We have seen that transcendental method provides an epistemological stance that allows for a recognition of the historical and subjective elements of doctrine that does not contradict the objective truth of doctrine. And we have seen that transcendental method provides a basis by means of which the permanence of doctrine can be maintained through a transposition of a doctrine from one relative context to another. Throughout we have emphasized that Lonergan proposes to locate the grounds for the permanence of doctrine not in the homogeneity of undifferentiated consciousness, nor in the abstractions of the theoretically differentiated consciousness of classicism, but rather in the thematization of the conscious and intentional operations of the interiorly differentiated consciousness. In this regard it can be said that Lonergan’s transcendental method does provide a basis for the affirmation of the permanence of doctrine that is found in Method. However, there still remains the question of whether or not such is the case within the framework of Lonergan’s functional specialties, and especially in the relation between Foundations and Doctrines. To a discussion of this question we now turn.
CHAPTER SIX

METHOD'S FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTIES IN THEOLOGY
AND THE PERMANENCE OF DOCTRINE

A concern of these final two chapters is to ascertain whether or not Lonergan's affirmation of the permanence of doctrine is grounded in the foundations he maintains are proper to a historically-minded theology, viz., transcendental method and religious conversion. In Chapter V we argued that this is in fact the case within the context of Lonergan's Christian philosophy. For Lonergan's transcendental method does establish the conditions of the possibility of a permanently true doctrine. In this present chapter we will address our question within the context of Lonergan's functional specialties in theology. We will examine the specialties of Foundations and Doctrines, and in doing so we will explain the ways in which the foundations in transcendental method and religious conversion are operative within the eight functional specialties. On the basis of this examination we will judge whether or not Lonergan's affirmation of the permanence of doctrine in Method is critically grounded within the ongoing process of the functional specialties.

Our discussion is divided into three main parts: i) the nature of the functional specialty Foundations; ii) the nature of the functional specialty Doctrines; and iii) Lonergan's critical approach to
doctrine.

1. The Functional Specialty "Foundations"

As we saw in Chapter IV Lonergan's functional specialties constitute what he takes to be the proper structure of a historically-minded and methodical theology. Within the eightfold scheme of specialties the fifth, Foundations, occupies a pivotal place. Foundations is rooted in the first, mediating phase of theology in as much as its end is to resolve the conflicts revealed by the preceding specialty Dialectic. And Foundations is rooted in the second, mediated phase of theology in as much as its end is to direct the specialties Doctrines, Systematics, and Communications. According to Lonergan this twofold end can be achieved only if the basis of Foundations is the individual theologian in his attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness and responsibility. Such a conception of Foundations constrasts markedly with its classicist predecessor.

Lonergan explains that the classicist conceived theology's foundations as "...logically ordered operations on propositions within the context of a medieval distinction between nature and grace and a Cartesian separation of philosophy and theology." On this conception foundations involved five steps: i) natural theology and proofs for God's existence; ii) ethical justification of man's duty to worship; iii) arguments for Christianity as the true religion; iv) arguments for the Catholic Church

\[1\] Method, pp. 131-42

\[2\] "Variations in Fundamental Theology" (1973), p. 18
as the true Christian Church; and v) the solution to all theological disputes through obedience to the Church's teaching authority. Lonergan states that this model is being replaced by one that takes seriously die anthropologische Wende, the turn to the subject. Within this new framework the foundations for theology will not be the acceptance of a set of doctrines. Rather, the foundations will emphasize the religious experience of the believer prior to the acceptance of doctrine. "The gift of God's revelation is also a revelation of man to himself, so that, as Ricoeur has it, revelation as such is an opening experience of existence, a possibility of existing, or as Schillebeeckx put it, understanding the faith and self-interpretation cannot be separated." The end of Foundations, then, is to thematize the prior basis in the subject, what the Thomists have called the lumen fidei, for believing in doctrine. 

For Lonergan this basis is the presence and thematization of religious conversion.

1. Religious Conversion and Foundations

Lonergan's position is that because conversion is basic to religious living, the objectification of conversion provides theology with the

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3 "Variations in Fundamental Theology", p. 14

appropriate foundations for its reflection on religion. Conversion effects the personal stance of the individual theologian. "Conversion is existential, intensely personal, utterly intimate." It is because of this Lonergan stresses that the foundational reality of theology is the theologian himself as undergoing conversion.

The threefold conversion is, not a set of propositions that a theologian utters, but a fundamental and momentous change in the human reality that the theologian is. It operates, not by the simple process of drawing inferences from premisses, but by changing the reality (his own) that the interpreter has to understand if he is going to understand others, by changing the horizon within which the historian attempts to make the past intelligible, by changing the basic judgements of fact and of value that are found to be not positions but counter-positions.

As defined religious conversion is the criterion by which all else is to be judged. Its objectification, therefore, is the basis on which theology is to move from the indirect discourse of theology in oratione obliqua to the direct discourse of theology in oratione recta. Central to this movement, as we will see, is the moment in Foundations when a decision is reached as to "...which doctrines were true, how they could be reconciled with one another and with the conclusions of science, philosophy, history and how they could be communicated appropriately to the members of each class in every culture." Foundations, as reflection on conversion, provides the horizon

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5 Method, p. 130
7 Method, pp. 283-84
8 Method, p. 267
within which the meaning of doctrines can be apprehended. The reason
for this is as follows:

Just as in religious living 'a man who is unspiritual re-

duses what belongs to the Spirit of God; it is folly to him;
he cannot grasp it' (1 Cor. 2, 14), so in theological re-

duction on religious living there have to be distinguished
the horizons within which religious doctrines can or cannot
be apprehended; and this distinction is foundational.9

This distinction involves personal reflection and self-appropriation on
the part of the theologian; it is foundational in that it is rooted in
the unquestionably basic reality of conversion. Because of this we can
say that Foundations serves a critical function with respect to doc-
trines. By the word "critical" we do not mean that past doctrinal
formulations are necessarily false or incorrect and in need of criticism.
And in the framework of functional specialties: the word critical does
not denote only the transcendental reflection on the conditions of the
possibility of doctrine that is an aim of Lonergan's Christian philo-
sophy. Rather, the word critical means that past, present, and future
doctrines must be related to and grounded in the religious experience
which they objectify. Joseph Powers has described this critical function
of Foundations as a "...pretheological phenomenological reflection on a
contemporary human experience, discerning there 'religious interests'
to which the faith of Christianity could address itself...."10 Powers
suggests that because of this critical emphasis the shift from the

9Method, p. 131; see "Bernard Lonergan Responds", in Foundations,
pp. 228-29.

10Joseph Powers, "Faith, Morality, Creativity: Toward the Art of
mediating phase of theology to the mediated phase consists in the...

...attempt to discover the experience which gave rise to these articulations in the past and remain faithful to that experience by bringing that experience to expression in terms which are effective for the handing on of that experience in varying historical and cultural settings.\(^\text{11}\)

A key moment in the attempt in Foundations to relate doctrines to their basis in religious experience is the formulation of the theological categories. As we will see, the categories are critically grounded in the sense that they involve both transcendental method and reflection on religious conversion.

2. *Theological Categories*

In general theology makes use of categories in order to clarify and make coherent its procedure and thought about its object. In Method's account of the functional specialty Foundations Lonergan discusses the categories that are appropriate to a methodical theology. He distinguishes general from special theological categories. General theological categories are derived from the realm of interiority and are rooted in transcendental method. They pertain to objects that come under the scope of both theological and non-theological discourse. Special theological categories are derived from the realm of transcendence and are rooted in religious conversion. They pertain more strictly to the activity of theology.

General theological categories are necessary because theological reflection requires a transcultural base. The reason for this is that Christian theology reflects on a religion that has developed through many

\(^{11}\) Powers, "Faith, Morality, Creativity", p. 656
and diverse cultures and is to be preached to all people in all places and times. As we saw in our discussion of the universal viewpoint, the appropriate transcultural base is not a set of eternal truths, but rather the source and principle of all truth and expression, the invariant structure of the subject's conscious and intentional operations. This means that the theologian who is to derive the categories will himself have to undertake the self-appropriation integral to transcendental method. For he will be able to understand and link together the diverse religious expressions of his tradition only if he himself has discovered and appropriated the foundations of such expression that lie in the realm of interiority.\footnote{See Method, pp. 114-15, 282, 286; and above Ch. IV, pp. 203-4; and Ch. III, pp. 169-75 on the invariant nature of transcendental method.}

Special theological categories are necessary because the functional specialties require a properly theological principle. This principle, as we have already noted, Lonergan takes to be religious conversion. However, religious conversion is integral to Foundations not only because it is the key to theological reflection on religious living. Religious conversion also supplies theology with an additional transcultural base.\footnote{See "Theology in Its New Context", p. 67 and "The Future of Christianity", p. 162 in Second Collection.} For on Lonergan's analysis God's gift of his love in religious conversion "...is not restricted to any stage or section of human culture but rather is the principle that introduces a dimension of otherworldliness into any culture."\footnote{Method, p. 283; see pp. 267, 271-72, 282, 327, 352, 360, 367; Doctrinal Pluralism, p. 59}
We can therefore speak of the categories appropriate to a methodical theology as both general and special, their base being the transcultural realms of interiority and transcendence. Because of this Lonergan stresses that the categories pertain not to Scripture and Tradition but to the prior reality of the subject who is doing theology.

The derivation of the categories is a matter of the human and the Christian subject effecting self-appropriation and employing this heightened consciousness both as a basis for methodical control in doing theology and, as well, as an a priori whence he can understand other men, their social relations, their history, their religion, their rituals, their destiny.15

Lonergan notes that although the derivation of the theological categories may have a model in medieval theology, there is an important difference. Medieval theology operated in a theoretical framework whereas today's theology, according to Lonergan, will have to operate in a methodical framework. This means that the basic terms and relations appropriate to theology will not be metaphysical, as in medieval theology, but psychological. For to speak of God's gift of his love as foundational is to move from the realm of theory to the realm of interiority.

To speak of being in love with God pertains to the stage of meaning when the world of interiority has been made the explicit ground of the worlds of theory and of common sense. It follows that in this stage of meaning the gift of God's love is first described as an experience and only consequently is objectified in theoretical categories.16

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The derivation of the categories, following Method's sketch, would begin with an appeal to the subject's interiority and God's gift of his love as manifest in conversion. The next step would be to move from the individual subject to subjects in community and history in order to listen to the outer word of Tradition that is rooted in God's gift of his love. This turn to the communal and historical would be coupled with an effort to discern the ways in which the Christian tradition makes explicit the intention of God that is implicit in the subject's conscious intentionality. Finally, there would be the attempt to differentiate authentic and inauthentic realizations of Christianity and the progress and decline that stems from these realizations.  

The categories that are derived in this manner, because they are rooted in a transcultural base, provide theology with a means by which to link together religious expression tied to diverse histories, cultures, differentiations of consciousness. The categories thus prove to be a central moment in theology's move from the past to the present, from theology in oratione obliqua to theology in oratione recta. Indeed, they help to constitute the horizon in which doctrines can be apprehended. For the categories are rooted in an objectification of religious conversion that establishes "...the existential stance opening on the horizon in which Christian doctrines are intelligible, powerful, meaningful, in which, as the Epistle to the Hebrews puts it: '...the word of God is alive and active.'"  

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17 See Method, pp. 290-91, 327-28; Doctrinal Pluralism, pp. 58-60.
18 "The Future of Christianity", in Second Collection, p. 162
According to Lonergan the categories can be used as models, that is, as sets of interlocking terms and relations. Such sets of interlocking terms and relations function with respect to the mediating phase of theology in much the same way as the upper and lower blades of the scissors analogy we discussed in Chapter V. The theological categories supply the upper blade of the theological method. Because theology is an ongoing process, this upper blade is integrated with the lower blade of the data supplied by Research, Interpretation, History and Dialectic on the origin and development of Christian self-understanding. The interaction between the two blades supplies categories that will be used in any of the eight functional specialties. However, in Foundations the categories serve only as models; their acceptance as statements about reality, about what is so occurs in the remaining specialties of Doctrines, Systematics, and Communications. To a discussion of this task of the functional specialty Doctrines we now turn.

II. The Functional Specialty 'Doctrines'

The end of the functional specialty Doctrines relates to the third level of intentional consciousness, judgement. For this specialty is concerned with judgements of fact and judgements of value in regard to the Christian tradition. On the one hand, Doctrines is the basis for the functional specialties Systematics and Communications; for Doctrines supplies the materials which these latter two specialties seek

20 Method, pp. 292-93
to understand and to relate to the individuals of a given culture. On the other hand, Doctrines receives its basis from the first mediating phase of theology; for Doctrines "...have their precise definition from dialectic, their positive wealth of clarification and development from history, their grounds in the interpretation of the data proper to theology." And most importantly, Doctrines is rooted in Foundations in so far as the latter supplies the horizon within which doctrines are to be understood. In the remainder of this chapter we will bring out the implications of this relation to Foundations for the question of the development of doctrine.

1. The Term "Doctrine"

In the chapter on the functional specialty Doctrines Lonergan explains that there are a variety of doctrines. He lists five possibilities. First, there is the doctrine of the original message that is distinct from the further proclamations yielding doctrines about this original doctrine. References to this original message are found, e.g., in 1 Corinthians, 15: 3 ff. and Galatians, 1: 6 ff. Secondly, there is the Church doctrine that emerges as the community meets new questions and has to formulate new answers. Lonergan describes this process as a series of identity crises wherein new answers are formulated according to the differentiations of consciousness present in a particular time and place. Examples of this second type of doctrine are the Christological definitions of the early councils. Thirdly, there is the

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21 Method, p. 132

22 See Ch. IV, pp. 213-17 for Lonergan's analysis of the history of the Christian tradition in terms of the ongoing discovery of mind; and
theological doctrine that is the object of theological reflection on
the revelation of Scripture and Tradition. Examples of this third type
of doctrine are the medieval summa. As we noted in Chapter IV, theo-
logical doctrines often provide the content for subsequent Church doc-
trines.⁴³ Fourthly, there is the methodological doctrine that is the
fruit of reflection on "...what one is doing when one is doing theo-
logy...".⁴⁴ On the basis of a sound cognitional theory, epistemology and
metaphysics such doctrines are to determine how theologians do and should
carry out their task. Today, methodological doctrines will be concerned
especially with the problems of the historicity of Christian witness, of
the diversity of cultures, and of the varying differentiations of consci-
ousness. Lonergan's functional specialization is an example of a
methodological doctrine. Finally, there is the doctrine that is meant by
the title of the sixth functional specialty, Doctrines:

These are theological doctrines reached by the application
of a method that distinguishes functional specialties and
uses the functional specialty, Foundations, to select doc-
trines from among the multiple choices presented by the
functional specialty, Dialectic.⁴⁵

We now have to ask, Which of these five varieties of doctrine make
use of the general and special theological categories formulated in the
functional specialty Foundations? For an answer to this question will
provide us with a means to determine the extent to which Lonergan intends

Lonergan's Nicaea for his detailed study of the genesis of the early
Christological doctrines.

⁴³See Method, pp. 311, 314, 331.
⁴⁴Method, p. 297.
⁴⁵Method, p. 298; see p. 131.
to ground the normative and permanent character of doctrine in the basis of the theological categories, religious conversion and transcendental method. We will begin our discussion of this question with a preliminary clarification of the ways in which Lonergan uses the term normative with respect to doctrines.

2. **Doctrines as Normative**

Lonergan defines doctrines in general as expressions and judgements of meanings and values. According to him they function according to all four functions of meaning: effective, cognitive, constitutive, and communicative.\(^{26}\) In addition to these functions of meaning there is also the normative function of doctrine. Doctrines, explains Lonergan, are expressions and judgements of meanings and values that are to guide and direct individual and communal Christian living. What is the source of the normative character of this or that particular doctrine?

Lonergan outlines two sources of doctrine's normative character. First, there is the norm that is rooted in Scripture and Tradition as the Revelation of God.\(^{27}\) Vatican I's doctrine on the permanence of doctrine is presented in *Method* as normative in this sense. Indeed, in his chapter on Doctrines, Vatican I's declaration is the only doctrine that Lonergan accepts as given.\(^{28}\) There is, however, a norm that is "...distinct from and dependent on the normativeness attributed to divine revelation, inspired Scripture and Church doctrine."\(^{29}\) This is the norm that is

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\(^{26}\) *Method*, pp. 244, 269, 297, 311; *Doctrinal Pluralism*, pp. 59-60. On the functions of meaning see *Method*, pp. 76-81 and Appendix II below.


\(^{28}\) *Method*, p. 332

\(^{29}\) *Method*, p. 299
rooted in the foundational reality of religious conversion and transcendental method. The fifth type of doctrine mentioned above, the doctrines that are the aim of the functional specialty Doctrines, is normative in this sense. There needs to be clarified, then, both the way in which Doctrines' doctrines are normative as well as the way in which they relate to the doctrines that derive their normativeness from Scripture and Tradition. Lonergan's notion of the purification of tradition provides us with a good place to begin to answer this question.

3. The Purification of Tradition

According to Lonergan a tradition is in need of purification when either its members or the tradition itself become inauthentic. The root of inauthenticity is, on Lonergan's analysis, lack of conversion. The lack of conversion in individuals inevitably leads to their inauthentic appropriation and therefore distortion and devaluation of traditional language and the expressions of doctrine.

There follows an inflation, or devaluation, of this language and so of the doctrine it conveys. Terms that denote what the unconverted is not, will be stretched to denote what he is. Doctrines that are embarrassing will not be mentioned in polite company. Conclusions that are unacceptable will not be drawn. Such unauthenticity can spread. It can become a tradition.30

Lonergan maintains that to root out such decay in a tradition its members must purify it by becoming authentic human beings and Christians. This requires that they undergo and give expression to conversion.

Lonergan's eight functional specialties are a way in which a tradition may be purified. The first, mediating phase of theology begins in Research, moves through History and Interpretation and terminates in Dialectic. In Dialectic evaluative hermeneutics and history are employed to the end of detecting the presence or absence of conversion in the past tradition and laying bare the past tradition's truths and errors.\(^{31}\) The second mediated phase of theology begins in Foundations. In Foundations there is an appeal to the foundational reality of conversion in order to make a choice among the many options made available in Dialectic. Foundations functions as a "selective principle" guiding the remaining specialties of Doctrines, Systematics and Communications. The purification of tradition takes place when there emerges doctrines that, "...based on conversion, are opposed to the aberrations that result from the lack of conversion."\(^{32}\) These doctrines have a normative function because they stand to counteract the waywardness of inauthenticity that can plague a tradition. It must be emphasized that this normativeness is the result of a determinate method, and that it is rooted in Dialectic and Foundations. Such doctrines are not merely repetitions of the past tradition, nor are they simply logical developments of the past; rather they are purified, i.e., authentic expressions of the past tradition. The process of purification is ongoing and dialectical because traditions are historical and so always subject to decline as well as development.

\(^{31}\) Method, pp. 245-46, 302, 312, 320

\(^{32}\) Method, p. 299; see "Ongoing Genesis of Methods", pp. 349, 353.
We will now focus more directly on how the foundational reality of
transcendental method and religious conversion guides this process of
purification.

4. The Inner and Outer Word

In the chapter on Religion in Method Lonergan distinguishes the
inner word and the outer word of religion. The best way to describe the
two words and their relationship is to transpose the distinction we em-
ployed in our discussion of transcendental method, that between the
infrastructure and the suprastructure. The inner word is the infra-
structure of religion that is prior to and foundational for the outer
word that is the suprastructure of religion.33 The infrastructure per-
tains to the world of immediacy; the suprastructure to the world mediated
by meaning. As religious experience the infrastructure is "...the
dynamic state of being in love in an unrestricted fashion, a conscious
content without an apprehended object."34 This experience of God's gift
of his love, according to Lonergan, "...withdraws man from the diversity
of history by moving from the world mediated by meaning and towards a
world of immediacy in which image and symbol, thought and word, lose
their relevance and even disappear."35 This religious experience may be
objectified in the world of immediacy; in rituals, sacred places and

33See "Sacralization and Secularization" (1974), p. 19 where
Lonergan cites Toynbee's remark that the "...pith of primitive religion
is not belief but action, and the test of conformity is not assent to a
creed but participation in ritual performances."(A Study of History
(1957), p. 95)

34"Prolegomena to a Study", p. 26; see Method, pp. 240-46.

35Method, p. 112; see pp. 240, 241, 242, 342; and "Origins of
Christian Realism", in Second Collection, p. 260.
times, etc. In such immediate objectification creeds are mere words and insistence on assent to creeds is regarded as an alien intrusion. However, the religious experience may be objectified in the world mediated by meaning. (The classic Christian objectification of religious experience according to Lonergan is to be found in Romans 5:5.) There occurs in such objectification a move beyond immediacy into the suprastructure in the world mediated by meaning where words and creeds take on significance.

Lonergan states that this process of moving from infrastructure to suprastructure, from the immediacy of religious experience to its objectification in tradition, is at the heart of a religion. In stressing the prior and foundational nature of the inner word Lonergan is not, therefore, devaluing the doctrinal language of a religious tradition as did Loisy with respect to Catholicism. Religious experience is personal, but it invites community; and a community can develop expressions of their common experience. As the community develops through history it can become a tradition, and its expressions will be adapted to varying social and cultural conditions. The Christian tradition is historical in this respect, for it functions in the world mediated by meaning and will change as such meaning is mediated in different contexts. Being in love with God...

...is not tied down to place or time, culture or epoch. It is catholic with the catholicity of the Spirit of the Lord. Neither is it an abstraction that dwells apart from every place and time, every culture and epoch. It is identical with personal living, and personal living is always here and now.

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36. "Sacralization and Secularization", pp. 19-20; see our Ch. V, pp. 236-40 where we discuss the exigence that drives one beyond experience to its objectification in the world mediated by meaning.
in a contemporary world of immediacy, a contemporary world mediated by meaning, a contemporary world not only mediated but also constituted by meaning.\textsuperscript{37}

Moreover, the Christian tradition does not consist merely in the objectification of God’s gift of his love to individual believers. For religious conversion, on Lonergan’s analysis, is a response to a divine initiative. And that initiative "...is not just God’s gift of his love. There is the personal entrance of God himself into history, a communication of God to his people, the advent of God’s word into the world of religious expression."\textsuperscript{38} This means that both the inner and outer words have their source in God; and as a result the outer word that is contained in Scripture and Tradition, far from being superseded by, complements, illumines and enriches the inner word that is religious conversion.

There is, then, the necessarily historical character of doctrine to which we referred in Chapter IV. Doctrinal language is a mix of the infra- and the suprastructure, of the inner and outer words. To the former element attaches the unifying basis and permanence of doctrine; to the latter element attaches the plurality and changeability of expression in doctrine. The developments that occur in the purification of tradition are rooted in a grasp of the original and foundational infrastructure and the formulation of a new and more appropriate suprastructure. Such developments presuppose a discernment of the inner word that lies within

\textsuperscript{37} "Existenz and Aggiornamento", in Collection, p. 250; see "The Response of a Jesuit", in Second Collection, p. 175

\textsuperscript{38} Method, p. 119; see pp. 113, 123.
all doctrinal formulations. For without such discernment of the permanently abiding element, the mediation of the meaning of God's word into human history and the related purification of tradition would not be possible. 39

5. The Source of the Inner Word's Discernment

Lonergan places the discernment of the permanently abiding inner word of doctrine in what he calls the "eye of religious love." He states that the eye of religious love pertains to a realm in which love precedes knowledge. For he holds that in addition to the factual knowledge reached through experience, understanding and judgement there is the

39 Cf. the decrees from Vatican II, Gaudium et Spes, arts. 53-63 and Unitatis Redintegratio, arts. 5, 11, 14, 17. In the latter there is recognized the need to distinguish between the expression of doctrine and its foundation, and there is reference made to the possibility of deficiency in past doctrinal expressions (art. 5). Later on reference is made to the "...hierarchy of truths, since they vary in their relationship to the foundation of Christian faith." (art. 11) (in W. Abbott, The Documents of Vatican II). It is useful to keep in mind here that while this distinction is helpful in understanding the development of doctrine, it may raise as many problems, although of a different type, as those it serves to solve. The distinction is not, in the words of L. Vischer, a "magic wand" to be waved at the difficulties arising from doctrinal development until they cease to exist: "Is the matter really so simple? Are not substance and expression much more intimately related? Would not a new formula involve far more radical surgery than is commonly thought?" (Bericht über das zweite Vatik. Konzil, Document Centrum Concili; cited in G. C. Berkouwer, The Second Vatican Council and the New Catholicism, tr. Lewis B. Smedes [Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1965], p. 84, n. 55). Rahner has addressed this issue in a recent article, "Basic Observations on the Subject of Unchangeable and Changeable Factors in the Church" (in Theological Investigations, vol. 14, pp. 3-24). He reaches a conclusion similar to that of Lonergan, viz., that such a distinction must be drawn and in a sense is the goal of theology; but that one cannot suppose that in doing so the essential historicity of all doctrinal formulation can be surmounted. Thus, he suggests, the issue becomes one of theological hermeneutics, an ongoing "experiment" (pp. 22-3) wherein the concern is a constant "concrete synthesis" via a discernment of the spirits of the changeable and unchangeable in each doctrine. (p. 21)
knowledge proper to the fourth level of deliberation: a "...kind of knowledge reached through the discernment of values and the judgements of value of a person in love." When one turns to religion then one may speak of the knowledge born of religious love. Knowledge born of religious love is faith. Of it Pascal wrote in saying that the heart has its reasons which reason does not know. Faith arises when to one's apprehension of human value there is added the apprehension of transcendent value. As the level of deliberation sublates the level of judgement, so too does the value that is a product of God's love flooding the heart sublate the value that is a product of human love. "So the gift of God's love occupies the ground and root of the fourth and highest level of man's existential consciousness. It takes over the peak of the soul, the apex animae." When such an event occurs there emerges the "eye of religious love". Because the source of faith is the same as the source of the authentic core of doctrine, being in love with God, the eye of religious love is the basis that...

unites the religious community, that directs their common judgements, that purifies their beliefs. Beliefs do differ, but behind this difference there is a deeper unity. For beliefs result from judgements of value, and the judgements of value relevant for religious belief come from faith, the eye of religious love, an eye that can discern God's self-disclosure.

The notion of the purification of tradition places a heavy emphasis on the praxis of the theologian engaged in the task of Foundations. For

40 Method, p. 115; see pp. 119, 123.
41 Method, p. 107; see "Faith and Beliefs", p. 12
if there is to be established a "selective principle" for the formu-
lation of authentic doctrines, then the theologian will be required to
both undergo and adequately reflect on religious conversion. Indeed,
as we noted above, such reflection is the touchstone of the functional
specialty Foundations, and is the source of the authenticity of the
theologians engaged in the purification of tradition. It is helpful
to recall here that for Lonergan the key to authentic subjectivity is
fidelity to the drive to self-transcendence. This fidelity consists in
"...total surrender to the demands of the human spirit: be attentive,
be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible, be in love." Like all
human development, religious development is dialectical, for it is a
struggle between authenticity and inauthenticity, between the self as
transcending and the self as transcended. Thus, authenticity on the part
of the subject is a delicate and never serene possession. However,
through religious conversion there emerges what can be called a "graced"
subjectivity. The reason for this is that on Lonergan's analysis reli-
gious conversion is the fulfillment of man's capacity and desire for
self-transcendence.

43 Ongoing Genesis of Methods", pp. 344-45; see "Religious
Commitment", p. 49. On what appears to be a fifth demand, "Be in love",
129 where he suggests that Lonergan has begun to move from four to five
levels of conscious intentionality, the fifth being that of love. Lonergan
himself has suggested that he has begun to think of religious ex-
perience occurring on a fifth level; for religious experience, God's gift
of his love, is such that it sublates all that goes before it. (See
"Lonergan Dialogue Session", in the 1977 Boston College Lonergan Work-
shop [available at the Lohengran Center, Regis College, Toronto], pp.
7-9.)
Questions for intelligence, for reflection, for deliberation reveal the eros of the human spirit, its capacity and its desire for self-transcendence. But that capacity meets fulfillment, that desire turns to joy, when religious conversion transforms the existential subject into a subject in love, a subject held, grasped, possessed, owned through a total and so an other-worldly love.44

Religious conversion secures or grounds the authentic praxis of the subjects doing theology.45 It is therefore the source of the objectivity and non-arbitrariness of the decision in Foundations that is the selective principle for doctrines. And so the key to the purification of doctrines, and what makes the doctrines that result from that process normative, is the presence and authentic objectification of conversion in the theologian at the level of Foundations.

6. Creativity in Doctrines?

We have been discussing Lonergan's notion of the purification of tradition, and the related issue of the discernment of the relation between the inner and outer words. We undertook this discussion in order to clarify the sense in which the doctrines of Doctrines are normative. We have seen that the primary source of their normativeness is not Scripture and Tradition, but rather the foundational reality of trans- scendental method and religious conversion. The reason for this is that

44Method, p. 242; see p. 111 and "Faith and Beliefs", p. 10.

The term "human spirit" is used by Lonergan to describe the dynamism of our conscious intentionality that is thematized in transcendental method. It is used repeatedly throughout the articles brought together in Second Collection (see pp. 152, 156, 165-67, 174) and is found in Method (pp. 13, 103, 268, 308, 141-42) and other more recent writings (e.g., "Theology and Praxis", p. 14 and "Natural Right and Historical-Mindedness", pp. 5-7).

45 See "Ongoing Genesis of Methods" for a discussion of the centrality of authentic praxis in theology.
the purification of tradition, of which these doctrines are the product, is the authentic subject's fidelity to the demands of the human spirit that is the fruit of religious conversion. One may go on to ask, then, whether or not the norm of Foundations preempts the norm of Scripture and Tradition. For it seems that within the framework of the functional special the guiding principle and source of theology is the former and not the latter. If this be the case, it appears that Lonergan's functional specialization implies a commitment "...to radical creative work in the area of doctrine." 46 For in stressing the priority of Foundations it seems that doctrines are grounded not in adherence to the normative word of the past as contained in Scripture and Tradition, but rather in the present and normative authentic praxis of the theologian. There needs to be addressed, then, in more detail the issue of the relationship between doctrines that are produced in Doctrines and the doctrines of the inherited tradition.

This issue will occupy us in the remainder of the chapter. We will see that the relationship between the two types of doctrines and their respective normative sources is central to Lonergan's position on the development of doctrine. The centrality of this issue is particularly evident in regard to Lonergan's assertion of the permanence of doctrine. For, as we have already noted, it seems that in the chapter on Doctrines in Method Lonergan grounds this assertion not in the norm of Foundations but rather in the norm of Scripture and Tradition. Indeed, the discussion

46 F.E. Crowe, "Doctrines and Historicity", p. 117
of the permanence of doctrine in Method has led some critics to argue
that Lonergan's position is uncritical and therefore lends itself to an
inauthentic interpretation of Vatican I's decree, viz., that doctrines
are a-historical, immobile truths independent of the minds and hearts of
the faithful. If this be the case, then Lonergan's conception of the
development of doctrine is not sufficiently historically-minded; for it
will mean that he has failed to ground a historically-minded account of
the permanence of doctrine in the foundations of a methodical theology.

III. Lonergan's Critical Approach to Doctrine: Some Criticisms

In this final section of the chapter we will examine and respond to
two critiques of Lonergan's position on the development of doctrine.
Both critiques have to do with the relationship between the functional
specialties: Foundations and Doctrines and the nature of the doctrines
produced in Doctrines. The first critique we will address was raised by
participants in a colloquium on Lonergan's Method held at Perkins
School of Theology in 1973. Their concern was the status of the

47 See, for example, Paul Misner's reflections in "A Note on the
Critique of Dogmas"; Theological Studies, vol. 34, n.4 (December, 1973),
pp. 690-700. Misner states that what he misses "...in Lonergan's dis-
cussion of the permanence of dogmas, Method in Theology, 324-33 and
elsewhere, is the clear recognition that culturally determined concepts
remain an ingredient of doctrine, even after it has been promoted to
dogmatic status..." (p. 696, n. 20). Misner therefore detects an un-
critical attitude on Lonergan's part to doctrines like that of Vatican
I's definition of the permanence of doctrine, and suggests that theo-
logians like Lonergan find themselves in the following position: a
"...Catholic may describe difficulties in the way of accepting an official
dogma and admit defeat in dealing with them qua apologist or fundamental
theologian; but he may not call them into question in a way which amounts
to saying 'Show me!'" (p. 699)

48 The presentations are published in "Review Article: A Colloquy
on Bernard Lonergan", Perkins School of Theology Journal, vol. XXVIII,
n. 3 (Spring, 1975), pp. 22-39. We will be summarizing five of the
doctrines of the functional specialty. Doctrines vis-à-vis Christian Scripture and Tradition. In taking up this critique we will clarify the relationship between the norm of Scripture and Tradition and the norm of Foundations. The second critique of Lonergan's position on the development of doctrine we will address was raised by several participants in the International Lonergan Conference held in Florida during Easter, 1970. Their concern was whether or not Lonergan's stance in regard to doctrine, particularly the doctrine of the permanence of doctrine, is sufficiently critical. In taking up this criticism we will clarify the senses in which the foundations in transcendental method and religious conversion do and do not ground a critical approach to doctrine.

1. The Perkins Critique: Doctrine's Normative Character

The criticisms raised by the Perkins Colloquium members dealt with the status of the doctrines formulated in Doctrines in light of Christian Scripture and Tradition. In particular, their concern was that Lonergan is compromising the normative character of Scripture and Tradition in making the objectification of conversion that occurs in Foundations the selective principle for the doctrines formulated in Doctrines. Their challenge can be phrased as a question in terms of Lonergan's two phases of theology: When theology moves from mediating the past, theology in oratione obliqua, to take its stand toward the present and the future, theology in oratione recta, what happens to the inherited doctrines.

of the Church? Loner
gan's explanation of the first phase of theology suggests that doctrines must be apprehended as data, not truths. It seems, therefore, that the inherited doctrines can in no way be normative for theology. Their status as data means that they are not regarded as truths revealed by God but merely as one of many historically conditioned expressions of the Christian faith. The doctrines of the tradition, then, cannot be authoritative statements of Christianity, the norm against which all subsequent understandings and expressions of that faith are to be judged.

The criticism raised by the Perkins Colloquium participants can be met in part by clarifying the relationship between the two sources of the normative character of doctrine, Scripture and Tradition on the one hand and transcendental method and religious conversion on the other.

Let us phrase their question in the form of a dilemma: is theology in possession of its doctrines prior to the functional specialty, Doctrines, or does theology only come to possess its doctrines subsequent to the functional specialty, Doctrines? If the former is the case, then it appears that there is no need to formulate critically doctrines; and if the latter is the case, then it appears that there is no commitment to the normative role of Christian Scripture and Tradition.

49 "A Colloquy on Bernard Lonergan", pp. 84-5, 35-7. Compare Chadwick's question in regard to Newman's theory of development: "...these new doctrines, of which the Church had a feeling, or inkling, but of which she was not conscious - in what meaningful sense may it be asserted that these doctrines are not 'new revelation'?" (From Bosquet to Newman, p. 195).

50 In this formulation of the problem I am following F.E. Crowe, "Doctrines and Historicity", pp. 118-120, who raises the issue in a
This dilemma can be resolved by examining more closely Lonergan's notion of functional specialization and the key idea of transposition. First, it must be stated that while Lonergan does distinguish the two phases of theology, he does not separate them. He holds that the theologian is committed to the past doctrines of a tradition, such doctrines being part of God's revelation and therefore normative for theology. However, there remains the need for theology to take a stance toward the present and the future. Such a stance is the central work of the functional specialty Doctrines. While the doctrines formulated in Doctrines receive their normative status from the foundations in transcendental method and religious conversion, this does not mean that the normative status of past doctrines is denied, nor does it mean that they are abandoned. Rather, it means that the old doctrines must be recast to retain their meaning in a new situation. For doctrines of the past are, as Rahner has remarked of Chalcedon, not an end but a beginning.

But if the formula is thus an end, the result and the victory which bring about simplicity, clarity, the possibility of teaching and doctrinal certainty, then in this victory everything depends on the end also being seen as a beginning.51

The norm that attaches to Foundations complements, as we argued in the previous section, the norm of Scripture and Tradition in so far as it provides the basis for an authentic appropriation and interpretation of Scripture and Tradition for today and tomorrow.

discussion of Giovanni Sala's Dogma e storia nella dichiarazione "Hysterium Ecclesiae" (1976) and Lonergan's Method.

Secondly, it must be stressed that the new doctrines are genuinely related to the past ones. This relation, however, is not that of conclusion to premise (Scholastics), nor that of evolutionary growth to seed (Newman). The relation of the new to the past doctrines is that of transposition. According to Lonergan, there is needed a transposition whenever there is a new mentality or new situation in which the word of God is to be understood. Lonergan therefore holds that there must necessarily be "developmental pluralism": "...there exist disparate cultures and diverse differentiations of consciousness; and such differences are to be bridged by working out the suitable transposition from one culture to another or from one differentiation of consciousness to another."\(^52\) This means that a transposition is not a change in a doctrine's permanent meaning. Nonetheless, a transposition does represent a substantial change in doctrine. For as we saw in Chapter IV there is the historicity of doctrine that stems from the fact that as understanding changes, so must concepts, theories, explanations, etc. change. The meaning of a particular doctrine, because it was defined in a particular place and time, has a history. To grasp such meaning one must study the doctrine's context. And if there is a new context in which it is to be understood today, then one cannot ignore this fact.\(^53\) Rather,

\(^52\) Method, p. 150; see K. Rahner, "A Century of Infallibility", Theological Digest, vol. XVIII, n. 3 (Autumn, 1970), pp. 217-20 where he suggests that because today the inevitability of pluralism is so widely accepted it is hard to imagine that the Church would define a doctrine as a binding expression of the faith consciousness of the entire Church.

one must transpose the doctrine. And the continuity of meaning is secured not by merely laying claim to an unchangeable essence. Rather, it is secured by employing the results of the concrete and historical investigations of the first four functional specialties and turning to Foundations. In Foundations there is discerned the revealed and abiding inner word that is permanent by appealing to the foundational reality of transcendental method and religious conversion. When the result of that discernment is objectified and formulated in the doctrines of the functional specialty Doctrines one has a new expression of the permanent meaning. The norms of Scripture and Tradition and Foundations thus coincide; for, as we saw in our discussion of the purification of tradition, the latter is the key to securing in a new context an authentic expression of the permanent meanings of the former.

2. The Florida Conference Critique: Doctrine’s Critical Character

Where the participants in the Perkins Colloquium found that Lonergan’s approach to Scripture and Tradition was too critical, some participants in the 1970 International Lonergan Conference found that Lonergan’s approach was not critical enough. Lonergan’s adherence to key tenets of Christian theology has been criticized as uncritical before, particularly with respect to his use of Aquinas’ apparently "classicist" view of God. A case in point is the discussion that has centered around Insight’s Chapter Nineteen on knowledge of the transcendent. The critics argue that at a crucial point in Insight Lonergan uncritically imports the classical category of actus purus intellectus, a category not justified by his analysis of scientific and cognitional methods and his version of the reformed subjectivist principle presented in the previous
eighteen chapters. To meet this criticism Lonergan has had to show that one can critically ground what appears to be the alien intrusion of the traditional view of God, and he has attempted to do so on several different occasions.  

A similar problem has emerged with respect to Lonergan's stance on the permanence of doctrine. For as we have noted, at a crucial juncture in Method's explanation of doctrine Lonergan seems to import the apparently classicist category of permanence, a category that seems to be unjustified given his analysis of and stress on the subjective and historical elements of doctrine in the previous eleven chapters of Method. This adherence to the doctrine of the permanence of doctrine in Method and other works has led David Tracy, Charles Davis and Langdon Gilkey, three participants in the Lonergan Conference, to criticize Lonergan's position on doctrine. We will briefly re-state their criticisms, and then move toward a response through a further clarification of the ways in which Lonergan's position on doctrine is critical.

The three criticisms

Tracy raised his objections to Lonergan's position in a paper entitled "Lonergan's Foundational Theology: An Interpretation and Critique". Tracy asks whether or not transcendental method is given

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54 See, for example, "Insight Revisited", pp. 275-77, "Theories of Inquiry", pp. 40-2, and "Natural Knowledge of God", pp. 117-33 in Second Collection; and Philosophy of God and Theology, particularly the transcripts of the question and answer sessions following each of the three lectures presented by Lonergan, pp. 15-20, 36-44, and 60-68.

55 In Foundations, pp. 197-222
sufficient scope in Lonergan's theology. He suggests that Lonergan does employ transcendental method to understand how a certain doctrinal formulation, once accepted as true, can be understood; but he goes on to argue that Lonergan does not employ transcendental method to answer the prior and critical question of a doctrine's truth. A key to Tracy's challenge is his use of the term "critical".

Tracy uses the term "critical" in the sense of the critical exigence. As we saw in Chapter III, this exigence moves the inquirer to withdraw from the world of objects to the world of interiority, and to establish the conditions of the possibility of, in the case of theology, all facets of the theological endeavor. Doctrines, Tracy feels, should not be immune from such critical inquiry. For in so far as doctrines are related to the human mind's activities of experience, understanding, judgement and deliberation they come under the critical scope of transcendental method. When Tracy discusses the functional specialty Foundations he develops this line of inquiry by posing the following question: Is Lonergan's theology critical or dogmatic in its mediation of the language of the Christian religion and tradition?

Is it mediated by dialectical reflection upon the results of earlier historical theology - thereby assuming (as a dogmatic affirmation) the truth-value of the data (presumably religious) interpreted and critically investigated by the historian? Or is it, too, to be critically mediated, thus transcendently justifying the use of religious - in fact of a specific religious - God-language? If the former alone be the case then Lonergan's enterprise may be dialectically foundational for

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See our Ch. iii, pp.137-49 on the exigencies, and pp. 164-67 on the universal scope of transcendental method; see Tracy, "Lonergan's Foundational Theology" pp. 201, 215, 216 and "Bernard Lonergan Responds", in Foundations, p. 205.
a collaborative methodological theological enterprise for all those theologians (of whatever tradition) who accept an authoritative (and, in that sense, dogmatic) grounding for all genuine theological work. But it will not be for those (viz., in the Liberal, Modernist or neo-Liberal traditions) who demand a critical dialectical mediation of religious and theological meaning and language.57

Tracy finds that in Method the critical question of an adequate thematization or objectification of conversion is raised, but that the answer is uncritically found in the given doctrines of the Christian tradition. Tracy feels that a genuinely critical approach to doctrine would itself unveil and critically justify the criteria and means for the mediation and validation of the Christian religious meanings and expressions as true. For the task of Foundations, which Tracy associates with Schleiermacher, is "...not merely to thematize authoritatively accepted religious and theological meanings but to develop the means to validate that acceptance."58 The problem with Lonergan's account of the functional specialties of Foundations and Doctrines is that he does not allow Foundations to be sufficiently foundational. As we will see, other


58. "Lonergan's Foundational Theology", p. 220. For Tracy's position on foundational theology see his Blessed Rage for Order, especially pp. 32-4, 43-56, and his "The Task of Fundamental Theology", The Journal of Religion, vol. 54 (1974), pp. 13-34, and the following statement in particular: "... the major insight remains the insistence present in theological reflection at least since Schleiermacher: the task of a Christian theology intrinsically involves a commitment to investigate critically both the Christian fact in its several expressions and contemporary experience in its several cultural expressions. In this important sense, I, at least, continue to find Schleiermacher's famous slogan for the task of theology still accurate: The theses of faith must become the hypotheses of the theologian." (p. 16)
critics have found this to be the case especially with regard to the permanence of doctrine.

Tracy's complaint about Lonergan's uncritical approach to doctrine found an echo in Charles Davis' paper, "Lonergan and the Teaching Church". Davis focused directly on the doctrine of the permanence of doctrine, arguing that Lonergan's assertion of the permanence of doctrine in Method remained just that, i.e. an assertion that is neither proven nor critically grounded. He goes on to argue, moreover, that Lonergan's failure to ground this particular doctrine is indicative of a fault in Lonergan's entire theological program; for Lonergan's adherence to this particular doctrine of the Catholic Church has prevented him from fully appreciating the challenge and significance of modern historical-mindedness. Davis concludes that Lonergan's attempt to translate critically Catholic theology from classicism to historical-mindedness has failed: "...Lonergan has a theology that is 'adjectively modern and substantively Roman Catholic'".

In his paper "Empirical Science and Theological Knowing" Langdon Gilkey also argued that Lonergan's adherence to the permanence of doctrine has discredited his theological endeavor. Gilkey wonders if there have not been two Lonergans: the one who wrote Insight and had obviously understood and appreciated the implications of the radically empirical and relativist character of modern scientific method; and

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59 In Foundations, pp. 60-75.
60 "Lonergan and the Teaching Church", p. 74.
61 In Foundations, pp. 76-101.
another who is attempting to develop a modern theological method but has "...left untouched his classical sense of the given, substantial and unproblematic status of the referents of doctrinal language." 62

Gilkey is of the opinion that the classicist elements of Catholic theology cannot be fully and critically transformed without a jettisoning of the traditional notions of the absoluteness and authority of doctrine. That Lonergan has not jettisoned these notions is indicative of an uncritical, and therefore failed, attempt to formulate a viable historically-minded theology. 63

We have outlined three criticisms of Lonergan's position on doctrine raised by participants at the International Lonergan Conference. Each criticism raises, in one way or another, the question we have already posed in this thesis, viz., whether or not the new foundations for theology, transcendental method and religious conversion, provide the basis for Lonergan's account of the permanence of doctrine. We will now move toward a more definitive answer to this question by responding to these three criticisms. In doing so we will draw on our analysis thus far in the thesis of the relationship between the functional specialties

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of Foundations and Doctrines. We will first respond to Tracy by clarifying the significance of the term "critical" in Lonergan's approach to religious conversion and doctrine. On the basis of this clarification we will respond to Gilkey and Davis with respect to the sense in which Lonergan's approach to the permanence of doctrine is critical.

Response to Tracy: doctrines as critical

Tracy contends that Lonergan does not allow transcendental method to provide the critical grounds for accepting doctrines. As we noted, Tracy appears to use the word "critical" in the same way Lonergan does. Generally speaking, the term pertains to the cognitive operation of judgement. As Tracy notes, transcendental method serves a critical function in so far as one is concerned with judging the conditions of the possibility in the subject for knowledge of something. However, Lonergan finds that there are two exceptions to such a critical grounding, one of which Tracy appears to overlook.

The first exception to the need to ground critically the conditions of its possibility refers to the basis of our knowing, one's rational self-consciousness. As we saw in our discussion of transcendental method, Lonergan places the un revisability of his account of knowing in the "regressive" character of any attempt to critically ground the basis of knowledge. "If any...inquiry has to be preceded by a critical inquiry on its possibility, then critical inquiry has to be preceded by pre-critical inquiry on the possibility of critical inquiry, the

64 See our Ch. III, pp. 142-44.
pre-critical needs a pre- pre-critical inquiry, and so on indefinitely. With regard to his account of transcendental method, Lonergan argues that any attempt to revise it would have to be based on a critical appeal to some data that Lonergan's account does not cover. However, in such critical inquiry the potential reviser would have to be attentive, intelligent, reflective and responsible. Thus, in the very act of "critical" revision the reviser would in fact verify the un revisability of transcendental method. There is, then, an exception to the need to critically ground the conditions of something, this exception being the fact of rational consciousness:

"...if rational consciousness can criticize the achievement of science, it cannot criticize itself. The critical spirit can weigh all else in the balance, only on condition that it does not criticize itself. It is a self-assertive spontaneity that demands sufficient reason for all else but offers no justification for its demanding." 66

The possibility of knowledge does not rest on a deduction from some prior set of conditions; rather it rests on the fact of knowledge and the attentiveness of the knower with regard to that fact. 67

The second exception to the need to ground critically the conditions of its possibility refers to religious conversion, the subject's experience of God's gift of his love. As we saw earlier in this chapter Lonergan understands religious conversion as foundational, that is, as "...a fully conscious decision about one's horizon, one's outlook.

65 Insight, p. 634

66 Insight, p. 332; see our Ch. III, pp. 150-59 and 169-75.

67 See Insight, pp. 639-40 and "Insight: Preface to a Discussion", in Collection, pp. 162-63.
one's worldview." As such it is a change in the reality of the concrete subject. Such conversion, like knowledge, is a fact given in consciousness; it is, following Oliver Rabut, an "unassailable fact". However, Lonergan argues that religious conversion, even though it constitutes a profound change in the subject, requires no justification for itself other than its occurrence; "...there is no need to justify critically the charity described by St. Paul." In an interview at the Lonergan Conference Lonergan explained this self-justifying love by analogy to the love between persons:

I put the question the other night. A person was demanding that I critically ground this religion and he was talking to Professor So and So and I went up to him and, said 'Would you require Professor So and So to critically ground the love he has for his wife and children?' Being in love is a fact, and it's what you are, it's existential. And your living flows from it. It's the first principle, as long as it lasts. It has its causes and its occasions and its conditions and all the rest of it. But while it's there it's the first principle and it's the source of all one's desires and fears, all the good one can see, and so on. And critically grounding knowledge isn't finding the ground for knowledge. It's already there. Being critical means eliminating the ordinary nonsense, the systematically misleading images and so on; the mythical account.

In emphasizing the given and self-justifying character of religious conversion Lonergan holds that transcendental method, or any other method, cannot critically ground or develop the means of the acceptance of conversion, for only "...God can give that gift, and the gift itself

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68 Method, p. 268
69 Method, p. 290
70 Method, p. 284
71 "An Interview with Fr. Bernard Lonergan", in Second Collection, p. 229
is self-justifying. There is, as we saw in Chapter V, a Christian philosophy that is in harmony with Christian doctrine. And in this respect transcendental method does pertain to the foundations of doctrine. However, transcendental method in the framework of a Christian philosophy pertains to doctrine in the sense that it unveils in the subject the capacity for affirming doctrines; it neither proves nor produces the grounds for doctrine. "There is no philosophy that sets up an exigence for God's gift of his love, or that constitutes a sufficient preparation for that gift." Religious conversion, like rational self-consciousness, is verified when the theologian engaged in Foundations is authentically deciding with respect to the truth of the word of God. And the theologian is critical with regard to conversion's foundational character not by appealing to Descartes' methodical doubt nor to the ideals of a presuppositionless science. Rather, he is critical simply by adverting to this experience of religious conversion and by appropriating and thematizing it in an authentic manner. Within the framework of Foundations, then, transcendental method functions with respect to the ground of doctrine in the sense that only the theologian who has appropriated the demands placed on him by the transcendental precepts - be attentive, be intelligent, be rational, be responsible - can authentically inquire into and objectify the religious experience of conversion.

72 Method, p. 123
73 "Bernard Lonergan Responds", in Language, pp. 308-9
If it is not the theologian's task to establish critically the
ground of doctrines, he must nevertheless be critical with regard to
doctrinal formulations. For, as we saw in our discussion of the purifi-
cation of tradition, it is the task of Foundations to assess critically
the varying objectifications and expressions of religious conversion that
have been produced and are being produced in the Christian tradition.
This critical assessment in turn sets the horizon in which the doctrinal
formulations of that tradition can be apprehended and transposed. The
criticism, to repeat, applies not to the ground of religious conversion
but to the objectification of that ground. The theologian's task is to
discern through the "eye of religious love" born of faith, the difference
between the inner word of God and its mediation in the outer word of
tradition. While this task does not necessarily mean that the theologian
must be committed to a particular tradition, it does mean that he him-
self must have undergone and authentically objectified religious conver-
sion.74 For religious conversion is the foundation of doctrinal lan-
guage and therefore the condition of the possibility of its acceptance.

Response to Davis and Gilkey: the permanence of doctrine

We have argued in the thesis that Lonergan's formulation of tran-
scendental method is the basis for an approach to doctrine that, with
suitable qualifications, can be termed critical. Transcendental method

74 Although he does not do so himself, Lonergan's point here could
be linked to Ricoeur's explanation of the hermeneutical circle in The
347-57. For instance, Ricoeur speaks of criticism of the language of a
tradition as "restorative" as opposed to "reductive" (p. 350). Such criti-
cism is undertaken within the hermeneutical circle that is given ex-
pression in Augustine's maxim, "We must understand in order to believe,
but we must believe in order to understand." (p. 351)
makes a critical approach possible because it provides a means for the appropriation and thematization of the foundations for doctrine. We have seen that transcendental method does so in two ways. First, transcendental method is the basis for a Christian philosophy that can ground both an account of man as open to divine revelation and an account of the conditions of the possibility of such revelation being self-identical through history. Secondly, transcendental method provides the anthropological principle that, coupled with the theological principle of religious conversion, constitutes the normative basis for the theological reflection proper to the functional specialties. In the functional specialty Foundations there occurs the theologian's self-appropriation of himself as attentive, intelligent, rational, responsible, and finally, undergoing religious conversion. This appropriation is the basis for the theologian's critical judgement of past doctrinal expressions, his discernment of their revealed and unchanging root, and the authentic transposition of their permanent meaning. Such are the two lines of a critical approach to doctrine that we have outlined in the last two chapters.

We must now answer the specific question raised at the end of Chapter IV regarding the permanence of doctrine. For we can still ask, along with Davis and Gilkey, whether or not Lonergan's approach to this specific doctrine of the permanence of doctrine is critical. We have seen that Lonergan has tried to shift theology from a classicist to a historically-minded horizon with such notions as functional specialization, conversion, historicity of doctrine, doctrinal (vs. dogmatic) theology,
etc. We are asking, then, if within this framework Lonergan has critically
grounded the permanence of doctrine? We will respond to this question in
terms of the two ways in which we have suggested Lonergan’s approach to
doctrine is critical.

When one examines Lonergan’s Christian philosophy an affirmative
response to our question can be given. For Lonergan’s Christian philo-
sophy is concerned with the critical grounds for the acceptance of a
doctrine. The grounds can be said to be critically established in the
sense that they are transcendental; that is, they have to do with the
conditions of the possibility in the subject for the affirmation of a
permanent and revealed truth. There is, then, a Christian philosophy
within which one can speak of a correspondence between human nature and
Christian revelation. And it can be said in response to Gilkey and Davis
that, as we argued in Chapter V, Lonergan has provided a historically
minded justification for the acceptance of the traditional doctrine of the
permanence of doctrine. For transcendental method allows for an account
of doctrine that takes into account — indeed, emphasizes — its historical
and subjective character without compromising its permanent character.

However, when one examines Lonergan’s functional specialties as
presented in Method it seems that a negative response to our question,
albeit with some qualifications, must be given. For, as we saw above,
Method’s account of the permanence of doctrine makes no appeal to the
critical role of transcendental method in the functional specialty Fon-
dations. Recall here that we have distinguished two sources of the norma-
tiveness of doctrine, Scripture and Tradition and Foundations. In Method
Lonergan takes the doctrine of the permanence of doctrine as normative only with respect to the former source. He makes no explicit attempt to explain that doctrine as normative with respect to the latter source of Foundations. 75

We have said that our negative response concerning the critical grounds for the permanence of doctrine in Lonergan's functional specialties can be qualified. We say this because it seems that Lonergan's functional specialization, and particularly the ideas of transposition, purification of tradition, and the inner and outer words do in principle allow for a critically viable mediation of the doctrine of the permanence of doctrine. The key to such a mediation is the functional specialty, Foundations. For in Foundations the "eye of religious love" enables the theologian to discern what is inauthentic in a doctrine and to purify and transpose the doctrine's permanent meaning for the present context. In the case of the permanence of doctrine such purification and transposition appears especially necessary today, given that historical-mindedness and pluralism have rendered the claim to permanence problematic in a way that it was not for Vatican I in 1871. Lonergan's Christian philosophy in part meets this problem. But Christian philosophy merely provides one with the elucidation of an already accepted doctrine. And there is required something more. For as Lonergan has noted, in defining the permanence of doctrine Vatican I did not deal directly with the problem of historical-mindedness.

75 See our Chapter IV, pp. 217-20.
But as I earlier remarked about Nicea, so now must we repeat about Vatican I that its statements lie not only within the prior context of the thought of 1870 but also within the consequent context that attends to issues from which Vatican I saw fit to prescind....Vatican I...did not attempt to deal with the underlying issue of the historicity of dogma that since has come into prominence.\textsuperscript{76}

If this be the case, then what is required today is a purification of Vatican I's doctrine on the permanence of doctrine undertaken within the framework of functional specialties and based on the critical foundations of transcendental method and religious conversion. For with such a purification the permanent meaning of Vatican I's affirmation would be retained, its formulation being recast anew in today's context and differentiation of consciousness.

That Lonergan himself has not undertaken a transposition of the permanence of doctrine, then, does not mean that such an undertaking would not be possible. Indeed, the reason for Lonergan not making such an attempt in \textit{Method} may rest simply on the fact that, as he repeatedly warns the reader, the book is concerned not with theology but with method in theology.\textsuperscript{77} Be this as it may, we do hold that Lonergan's functional specialties, particularly his formulation of the interplay between the crucial specialties of Foundations and Doctrines, provides the means to undertake a contemporary and historically-minded transposition of Vatican I's doctrine. Such a new, transposed doctrine would

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Method}, p. 324

have its source not only in the past declarations of the Church, but also in the theological categories derived from the foundations in transcendental method and religious conversion. There would be, then, a correspondence between the norm of Scripture and Tradition and the properly historically-minded norm of Foundations. For the permanent and normative meaning of Vatican I's affirmation would be complemented, or perhaps better put, more authentically appropriated, and therefore preserved by being grounded in the norm of religious conversion and transcendental method. Should such a transposition be undertaken, then what is potentially a historically-minded account of the permanence of doctrine in Lonergan's theology would be made an actuality. It is our hope that our discussion will have contributed to such an effort through what Lonergan has formulated as the ongoing collaboration of theology.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have discussed the relationship between the functional specialties Foundations and Doctrines. We have focused on the way in which transcendental method and religious conversion provide, through the use of the theological categories, the normative basis for the doctrines of the functional specialty Doctrines. We went on to distinguish this norm from the norm that attaches to Scripture and Tradition, and analyzed the idea of the purification of tradition to illustrate the difference. In our response to two different critiques

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of Lonergan's position we argued that in Lonergan's methodical theology the two norms could be held together. However, with regard to the specific doctrine of the permanence of doctrine we concluded that Lonergan has not given sufficient weight to the role of the norm of Foundations in his account of the basis for that doctrine.
CONCLUSION

In our Introduction we cited a question posed by E.L. Mascall concerning Lonergan's theology: Has Lonergan actually provided the means to relate a permanent and normative revelation to the developing contexts in which it is expressed? In the foregoing pages we have argued for a positive answer to this question. We have shown that Lonergan accepts the challenge of a historically-minded approach to Christian religion and doctrine. And we have shown that he has endeavored to provide an account of Christianity's claim to a normative and permanent revelation within this framework. Lonergan has been able to synthesize the normative and permanent and the historical and changing elements of the Christian religion by unveiling the foundations in human nature for both these elements. These foundations, which he has thematized in transcendental method, provide the basis for the historically-minded account of theology presented in Method in Theology. In the remainder of our Conclusion we will summarize our analysis of Lonergan's theology and clarify what we see as the scope of this study.

Summary of the Study

We have studied Lonergan's historically-minded account of Christianity's permanent and normative nature by focusing on the modern problem of the development of doctrine. In our discussion of Modernism in Chapter I we showed that this problem lies at the heart of contemporary theology. The controversy of Modernism in the Catholic Church
at the turn of the century was a function of the general cultural upheaval brought on by the transition from classicism to historical-mindedness. We saw that Loisy sought to address this upheaval by approaching Catholic religion and theology with the methods and tools of modern critical history. In so approaching Catholicism Loisy came to the conclusion that that religion's claim to permanent and revealed doctrines was untenable. We argued, however, that Loisy's conclusion stemmed not from the impossibility of synthesizing history and doctrine, but rather from his inability to supply the normative foundations for such a synthesis. And it is on this foundational level that we introduced and examined Lonergan's position on doctrinal development.

In Chapters II and III we analyzed the background to Lonergan's position on doctrinal development. In Chapter II we discussed the context in which Lonergan formulates his position, viz., his analysis of the transition from classicism to historical-mindedness. We showed that Lonergan finds that the horizon of historical-mindedness, although positive in many respects, suffers from a grave defect: as of yet historical-mindedness has not yielded normative foundations in terms of which man and his history may be understood and evaluated. In Chapter III we analyzed Lonergan's effort to formulate such foundations in what he terms "transcendental method". We showed that transcendental method provides the suitable foundations for historical-mindedness because it is both dynamic and normative; dynamic in the sense of being the principle

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of all human knowing and doing; and normative in the sense of being an invariant standard against which such knowing and doing can be judged.

In the second part of the thesis we focused on Lonergan's position on the development of doctrine. Our aim was to demonstrate that Lonergan's analysis of historical-mindedness and his thematization of transcendental method are the key to his thought on doctrinal development. In Chapter IV we sketched the developments in Lonergan's reflections on doctrine and history. We focused in particular on his shift from a dogmatic to a doctrinal theology in the form of Method's eight functional specialties. We analyzed the position on development appropriate to such a historically-minded doctrinal theology. We then asked whether or not Lonergan's account of the permanence of doctrine is consistent with this doctrinal theology; more specifically, whether or not that account is grounded in the historically-minded foundations of transcendental method and religious conversion.

This question regarding foundations and the permanence of doctrine was taken up in the final two chapters of the thesis. In Chapter V we analyzed Lonergan's Christian philosophy, and argued that in this framework he does provide a historically-minded foundation for the permanence of doctrine. For in transcendental method he has thematized the conditions of the possibility for human beings, immersed as they are in the flux of history, to affirm normative and permanent truths of revelation. In Chapter VI we analyzed Lonergan's functional specialties in order to see if a positive answer could be made within this framework as well. We focused on the crucial specialties of Foundations and Doctrines, and showed the normative basis of doctrine to be twofold; there is the norm
that attaches to Scripture and Tradition, and there is the norm that attaches to foundations in religious conversion and transcendental method. The former is based in the outer word through which God communicates himself as he really is; and the latter is based on the inner word through which God floods the individual's heart with love. We then analyzed the relationship between these two norms, arguing that it was the crux of the issue in Lonergan's position on doctrinal development.

In our discussion of the relationship between the two normative sources of doctrine we argued that on Lonergan's account of the method of theology the one complements the other. According to Lonergan doctrines are not mere objectifications of the inner word of religious experience, for this definition neglects God's self-revelation in human history. Nor are doctrines merely logical extensions of the outer word of Scripture and Tradition, for this definition neglects the historical and subjective elements of religious truth. Rather doctrines are rooted in both norms. Just as the love between two people comes to fruition in word and deed, so too does the inner word of God's love flooding the individual's heart come to fruition in the historical and communal outer word of Scripture and Tradition.

Besides completing our personal self-transcendence in the secrecy of our hearts, God would also address his people as a people, announce to them his intentions, send to them his prophets, his Messiah, his apostles. In that case religious beliefs would be objectifications not only of internal experiences but also of the externally uttered
The key to the mutuality of these two sources of doctrine is Lonergan's notion of functional specialization. The grasp and thematization of the inner word in the functional specialty Foundations provides for the discernment of the revelation embodied in the historically-conditioned outer word of the past. This discernment then provides for the apprehension and expression of the permanent meaning of the word of the past in language and categories appropriate to the present and the future. Because neither the historical nor the permanent, neither the individual and concrete nor the normative are lost on this account, one can say that Lonergan has indeed provided the means for a truly historically-minded mediation of the permanent revelation of Christianity.

In analyzing Lonergan's understanding of the particular doctrine of the permanence of doctrine, however, we found that what holds true for Method's approach to doctrinal formulations in general does not hold true for this particular doctrine. For in Chapter Eleven of Method Lonergan explains the permanence of doctrine only with reference to Vatican I, that is, in terms of the norm of Scripture and Tradition. There is no explicit relation of that doctrine to the norm of the functional specialty Foundations that rests in religious conversion and transcendental method. We therefore concluded that with respect to Vatican I's teaching Lonergan has provided a historically-minded justification of that affirmation of permanence within the framework of his

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Christian philosophy. However, we went on to suggest that such a justification alone is not sufficient; for there is required a transposition of Vatican I's affirmation as well. Such a transposition is necessary because Vatican I's formulation is, as we saw in Chapter I, rooted in the ahistorical mentality of classicism. As a result many find themselves in a dilemma in the face of Vatican I's teaching on the permanence of doctrine: either one must reject it outright and affirm the historicity of doctrine, or one must affirm it uncritically and reject the historicity of doctrine. To remedy this situation there is required a purification of Vatican I's formulation such that its permanent meaning can be authentically appropriated in the historically-minded context of today. This purification will require a transposition through the functional specialties in which the permanent meaning of the doctrine is apprehended and re-expressed on the basis of both the norm of Scripture and Tradition and the properly methodical norm of religious conversion and transcendental method.

Scope of the Study

In the Introduction we placed our study in the context of what Lonergan calls the "second enlightenment". We did so because our discussion of Lonergan's approach to doctrinal development brings to light a significant feature of his contribution to the realization of the second enlightenment, his formulation and use of critical and normative foundations for the historically-minded apprehension of man. Lonergan argues that without such foundations there will be no way to meet and overcome what Nietzsche has described as the "deadly truth" of historical-
mindedness: that modern critical history has undermined the apprehension of a normative basis for man's self-constitution through history that is itself not subject to the vicissitudes of the historical process. Lonergan recognizes that the appeal to the self-evident norms and truths of classicism can no longer be the guide for human knowing and doing. He therefore attempts to face the issue of a norm for human endeavor squarely in terms of the assumptions of the horizon of historical-mindedness. In this effort he is in agreement with the sociologist Peter Berger, who poses the problem of normativeness as the need "to see the relativity business through to its very end." Berger argues that only when one has given up all claim to immunity from the relativizing effects of history can the issue of normative truths be adequately met.

When everything has been subsumed under the relativizing categories in question (those of history, of the sociology of knowledge, or what-have-you), the question of truth reasserts itself in almost pristine simplicity. Once we know that all human affirmations are subject to scientifically graspable socio-historical processes, which affirmations are true and which are false? We cannot avoid the

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3 The truth of historical-mindedness is "deadly" in the sense that "...[u]nderstanding kills action, for in order to act we require the veil of illusion." (F. Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and the Genealogy of Morals, tr. F. Goffling [Garden City: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1956], p. 51) G.P. Grant explains this assertion in the following way: for Nietzsche the historical sense "... casts a blight upon living. Great living comes forth from those who are resolute in the face of chaos. Such resolution has been sustained by the horizons within which men lived. Horizons are the absolute presuppositions within which individuals and indeed whole civilizations do their living... The historical sense shows us that all horizons are simply the creations of men." (Time as History, p. 29; see our Introduction, pp. 11-15.)

question any more than we can return to the innocence of its pre-relativizing asking. This loss of innocence, however, makes for the difference between asking the question before and after we have passed through the 'fiery brook'.

Lonergan's transcendental method is an attempt to formulate a means by which one may pass through the "fiery brook" described by Berger. As we saw in Chapters II and III Lonergan finds historical-mindedness in its present form to be an incomplete and therefore misleading account of man. However, he does not dismiss historical-mindedness outright; rather he proposes to complete it with the foundations appropriate to its dynamic and concrete orientation, viz. transcendental method. In transcendental method the norm of man's making is not reduced to the vicissitudes of history; nor is it located in eternal truths independent of human history. In transcendental method the norm is unveiled within the historical process of man's self-making as the demands placed upon him by the structure of his consciousness: Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible. In the measure that one grasps and adheres to this norm there emerges the possibility of an open-eyed and just making of man through history.

In a very immediate way our analysis of the issue of doctrinal development speaks to this foundational problem of man's self-constitution. For it is through doctrines that a religion informs the meaning and values that make up human knowing and doing.

Lonergan holds that man's making of man is a dialectical process of progress and decline. Progress is rooted in the actuation of man's drive to self-transcendence revealed in the transcendental notions; and

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5A Rumor of Angels, p. 40
decline is rooted in the scotosis that obscures that drive. Religious faith, he argues, has a crucial role to play in this dialectical process.

For faith and progress have a common root in man's cognitive and moral self-transcendence. To promote either is to promote the other indirectly. Faith places human efforts in a friendly universe; it reveals an ultimate signficance in human achievement; it strengthens new undertakings with confidence.\(^6\)

If decline is to be offset and progress realized, there is required the hope brought to be in religious love. "It is not propaganda and it is not argument... but religious faith that will liberate human reasonableness from its ideological prisons. It is not the promise of men but religious hope that can enable men to resist the vast pressures of social decay."\(^7\)

Faith has this effect because it places all human endeavor and value in the context of a transcendent endeavor and value. In the light of faith the good man brings to be is not merely human good; it becomes part of an all-encompassing good. In the light of faith man's world and human development reach beyond themselves to God's world and holiness. In this process there is made manifest the "self-sacrificing love" that encourages and underpins the authentic adherence to one's drive to self-transcendence.

There is then the role of religion in man's dialectical self-transformation. Doctrines are one manner in which theology and religion participate in the transformation of man and the realization of progress. As judgements of religious meaning and value doctrines inform the

\(^6\) Method, p. 117

\(^7\) Method, p. 319; see "Ongoing Genesis of Methods", p. 350.
community of mankind of the love experienced as the *mysterium fascinans* et *tremendum*. To harken to and appropriate doctrine authentically is to awaken and orient one's own and one's fellow man's living toward the self-sacrificing love that is the key to human progress. Theology will contribute to the offsetting of decline and the promotion of progress to the extent to which its doctrines successfully mediate its religion in today's world.

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8 *Method*, pp. 106, 108, 116-17; and "Ongoing Genesis of Methods", pp. 348-52
APPENDIX I

The Tübingen School and the Development of Doctrine

In the nineteenth century Tübingen school one finds perhaps the first full-fledged attempt within Catholic theology to come to terms with the historical consciousness that dominated the Protestant thought of that time. As A. Vidler pointed out, because of their close proximity to the Protestant theologians within the German universities, these Catholic theologians found it impossible to disregard the modern developments in post-Kantian philosophy and biblical criticism. The result of this interaction with the Protestant faculties was an attempt to change the Catholic position on the nature of the Church, tradition and doctrine. Schoof describes the theology of the Tübingen school as the attempt to justify. . .

. . .the historical development of dogmas and to enrich the faith of the Church by assimilating traditional data that had become blurred into theology. Henceforward the possibility of development or re-interpretation of the Church's dogmas would be an issue in theology. This question was to be discussed with some acerbity in Modernism.²

The clash between the Tübingen school and the neo-scholastic theologians of the Vatican over such issues as the development of doctrine set the stage for the modernist crisis. In order to clarify why this was so, we turn to a discussion of the works of two of the more prominent Tübingen theologians, Johann Sebastian von Drey and J. Adam Möhler, and their contemporary Anton Günther. We will focus particularly on their historically-minded conception of doctrinal development as it is this issue that led to such a strong reaction against them by Rome.

Drey: Science, History and Development

Johann Sebastian von Drey (1777-1853) was a professor of apologetics and dogmatic theology in the Catholic faculty of Ellwangen until 1817 when the faculty was transferred to Tübingen, where he taught until 1846. In his study of nineteenth century Catholic theology McCool documents Drey's indebtedness to Schelling's philosophy of history and of revelation, and suggests that Drey's theological method was inspired by Schelling's Vorlesungen über die Methode des Akademischen Studium. In his theology Drey reacted against the separation of science and history that he took to be characteristic of the Enlightenment. This was especially evident in his emphasis on the historicity of the development of doctrine and his corresponding rejection of what he saw as the Enlightenment-informed view of doctrine as timelessly true and certain. Again, over against the more traditional emphasis on the possibility of natural

3 See Aubert, Le Pontificat, who notes that "les vraies racines de la crise moderniste se situent sous le pontificat de Pie IX." (p.500).

4 See McCool, Catholic Theology, pp. 67-87.
knowledge of God, Drey emphasized the necessity of Revelation and especially Tradition. In Drey's theology Tradition was based on the Kingdom of God. This idea, which was manifested to man throughout history, made the diversity of Christian revelation and tradition an organic whole. The history of the Tradition was the history of the development of the Church's consciousness of this idea of the Kingdom of God.

Because the Church's consciousness of the idea of the Kingdom of God developed over time, Drey held that the intelligibility of Tradition was in principle historical. Consequently, he found it necessary to integrate his ideal construction of Tradition with the freedom, contingency and heresy that characterized the actual historical development of Christian doctrine. He sought to effect this integration by positing a historical dialectic of opposition (a principle derived from Schelling) according to which an idea is progressively realized only by defining itself over against its opposite. On this model the development of doctrine was a dialectical process: a community, animated by its awareness of the idea of the Kingdom, continually confronts and rejects the false possibilities presented by heresies, the result being the affirmation of a doctrine. "In the midst of those movements which constantly cross one another in the struggles and shiftings of opinion, the invisible spirit attains its goal: a growing perfection in the unfolding of revelation, a greater coherence in the system of

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6 McCool, Catholic Theology, pp. 52-75.
faith. The operative principle in this dynamic process was the opposition between intelligible necessity (this necessity being rooted in the consciousness of the idea of the Kingdom) and the unintelligibility reflected in the actions of those individuals who misused their freedom and contradicted the true apprehensions and judgements of the communal spirit. Within this framework history is conceived to be, in McCool's words, "...the intelligible process by which the architectonic idea that informs a spiritual community realizes its virtualities through the dialectical process of negation." History and science are held together, then, by a dialectical conception of tradition in which the historical process necessarily reflects the movement of the idea.

On the basis of this understanding of history Drey argues that historical inquiry into concrete events was capable of grasping the necessary intelligibility of the whole process of development as it is realized in the historical dialectic of opposition. This in turn led Drey to affirm both the scientific status of theology and the central place of history in theology; for theology's object was the architectonic idea of the Kingdom of God as it unfolded in the process of revelation. In his Kurze Einleitung in das Studium der Theologie Drey divided


8 McCool, Catholic Theology, p. 77, see p. 74.
theology into three parts: Apologetics, Historical theology and Dogmatic theology. Apologetics' purpose was to establish the Christian religion as the one authentic bearer of revelation. The purpose of the Historical and the Dogmatic theology was to study the history of Revelation as contained in the Catholic tradition. However, according to McCool, Historical and Dogmatic theology were distinct; where the historical theologian established through history "...the factualness of the historical content of the Catholic tradition..."; the dogmatic theologian established "...through intellectual intuition the ideal essences contained in the factual content of the Christian tradition." Within this framework dogmatic theology had both a positive and a speculative function. Although history and dogma were distinct, they were not separate. Thus dogmatic theology had a positive function because it served to reveal the intelligibility of each particular historical event by relating it to the necessary development of the idea of the Kingdom of God through history. In this respect dogmatic theology's purpose was to "...provide a scientific vindication of the authentic development of revealed doctrine through the dialectic of history."  

Möhler: The Church's Consciousness and Development

J. Adam Möhler (1796-1838), perhaps the most famous member of the Tübingen School and the best-known of Drey's students, was a professor of Church history at Tübingen from 1825-1835, and then at Munich.

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9 McCool, Catholic Theology, p. 77.
10 McCool, Catholic Theology, p. 77.
from 1835 until his death in 1838. Möhler, along with Newman, is credited with replacing the Scholastic's logical and intellectualist approach to the development of doctrine with a historical and intuitive approach. He followed Drey in his earlier Die Einheit in der Kirche and emphasized the organic unity, based on the Holy Spirit, of Tradition. Möhler held that this dynamic unity was the source and guide of all doctrinal development. The process of development was therefore a dynamic one and "...cannot but be an unfolding of something which from the start is given in its fullness, in such a way that the later originates from the earlier and this positively in living gradualness of transition." This vital tradition, however, is not merely the historical development of the Church; it has as well an interior and mystical element that governs its whole organic development. "That spiritual power of life which is transmitted and inherited in the Church, is the tradition, its inner, mysterious side, beyond any power of perception."
This emphasis on the interior and mysterious aspect of Tradition led Möhler to diminish the normative function of doctrines in the Church. He argued that although this mysterious element is mediated through language, it precedes and transcends external expressions such as doctrines.

Christianity does not consist in expressions, in forms, in phrases. It is an interior life, a holy force; and all its dogmas have validity only in so far as they express the substance which is presupposed. . . .\(^{14}\)

Within this framework the proper foundations for theological reflection and doctrine cannot be the depositum fidei; rather, the foundations consist of the inexhaustible and constant transformation of Tradition by the Holy Spirit. And the locus of this transformation is the experience of the believer. The corollary of Möhler's de-emphasis of objective language, then, was a heavy emphasis on the subjective and interior aspects of the affirmation of a doctrine.

That which is positively given, when once it has been assimilated by us, provides the matter of which the activity of the mind may take hold in order to produce a scientific structure . . . ; the faithful as such has become for himself an object for reflection; faith, unconscious at first, has become conscious.\(^{15}\)

Because this faith is inexhaustible, doctrines are able to capture it and give it expression only imperfectly. Thus, doctrinal development

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has no effect on doctrine's object; rather it has to do with the subject and his need to give new expressions in varying circumstances. And the process of development is unending, because what is important about doctrine is its existential element. "Since Christianity is a new divine life given to man and not a dead concept, it is subject to development and elaboration." 16

Günther: Semi-Rationalism and Development

Anton Günther (1783-1863), although not formally associated with the Tübingen School (he pursued his scholarly activity in Vienna independent of any University), was nonetheless concerned with the same problem: the harmonization of historical Christian revelation with the demands of scientific knowledge. His work was condemned and put on the Index in 1857, and his semi-rationalist theology was again censured at the First Vatican Council in the Constitution Dei Filius. 17

Günther, like Drey and Möhler before him, undertook the task of harmonizing revelation and science within the context of the evolutionary rationalism of the post-Kantians and Lessing. His contribution to this task was what he described as "an ideal reconstruction of Christianity." 18 The key to this reconstruction was his stress on the compatibility of revelation and philosophical reflection. He held that faith

16 J. A. Möhler, Die Einheit in der Kirche, p. 43; cited in Walgrave, Unfolding Revelation, p. 289.


18 Cited in Schoof, Survey, p. 179.
had to be transformed into knowledge through active intellectual reflection, and likewise that Catholic theology had to be transformed into a philosophy of Revelation. It therefore was theology's task to reformulate and thematize the incarnate intelligibility of the Christian Tradition in a new and more penetrating manner for each new cultural and scientific context. Günther maintained, according to McCool, that...

...Christians of every age and culture will always reflect on the same revelation. But, given the reality of scientific and cultural development, Christians of different ages cannot have the same theology. The urgent concern of the Church must always be that in each generation the Christian faith is thematized through a theology whose breadth of vision and systematic rigor meet the demands of contemporary culture.¹⁹

This meant that doctrinal development was rooted in philosophical reflection and was merely the quest for a more profound understanding of the truths of faith. Doctrines, as the result of such reflection, were valid only for a given place and time in that they were by definition susceptible to progress and, with the advance knowledge, correction and better formulation. This meant that they were merely, albeit necessary, moments in the Christian community's constant and ever expanding reflection on the truths of Revelation.²⁰

¹⁹McCool, Catholic Theology, p. 108

²⁰See Schoof, Survey, pp. 177-179.
APPENDIX II

The Structures of Meaning

According to Lonergan, a key feature of the transition from classicism to historical-mindedness is the emergence of a new mediation of meaning. He argues that historical-mindedness is in the process of yielding profound and diverse insights into man, nature and history, but that the results of this process have been fragmentary. There is needed, he suggests, foundations by which to understand, relate and assess the myriad expressions and mediations of meaning by which man makes himself. These foundations, which will be both concrete and universal, are found in neither the homogeneity of undifferentiated consciousness, nor the abstractions of the theoretically differentiated consciousness of classicism. Rather the appropriate foundations lie in the account of the concrete human subject that Lonergan calls transcendental method.

In turning to transcendental method for the foundations of historical-mindedness, Lonergan argues that one will be able to understand and judge man's self-making through meaning only if one has appropriated in oneself the structures of the source of all meaning. The root of these structures is thematized in transcendental method as the fourfold pattern of experience, understanding, judgement and decision. Lonergan states that...

...it is only the objectification of such conscious operations, of our acts of understanding and formulating, of reflecting, weighing the evidence, and judging, of deliberating, evaluating, deciding, that we can reach any real apprehension of the
mediation that meaning effects, of the broad and the fine
structures of the world that meaning mediates.¹

Lonergan argues that if one can formulate an account of the structures
of meaning that is rooted in transcendental method, then it will pos-
sess the same degree of un revisability as does that method. However,
the un revisability attaches only to the structures of meaning; the
contents of those structures are variable and change as new meanings
are realized.² Lonergan suggests that although different individuals
in a historical community will express and realize different meanings
in different contexts, the structures by which they do so will be the
same. And, as we saw in our discussion of the universal viewpoint in
Chapter V, the appropriation and thematization of those structures
yield a means by which to relate these diverse expressions and realiza-
tions of meaning.

In the third chapter of Method Lonergan provides a sketch of
an account of meaning based on transcendental method. The sketch is
illustrated in the following chart on pg. 314. We will discuss briefly
the four main headings in the following order: exigencies and realms,
sources, acts and terms, and functions.

We discussed the exigencies and realms of meaning in Chapter
III. There are four exigencies according to Lonergan: the systematic,
the critical, the methodical and the transcendent. Each exigence

¹ "The Origins of Christian Realism", in Second Collection, p.
244; see "Dimensions of Meaning", in Collection, p. 226; Insight, pp.
319-324, 348, 364, 567, 584-585; and Lamb, "History, Method and The-
ology", p. 244.

² See Method, p. 81.
gives rise to a new differentiation of consciousness and a corresponding realm of meaning. Lonergan links the systematic exigence to the theoretically differentiated consciousness and the realm of theory, the

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3This chart is adapted from M. Lamb, "Wilhelm Dilthey's Critique of Historical Reason and Bernard Lonergan's Meta-Methodology", in Language, p. 165. See also T. McPartland, "Horizon Analysis and Historiography", p. 68 for a more expanded version of Lamb's chart.
critical exigence to the interiorly differentiated consciousness and the realm of interiority, the methodical exigence to the methodically differentiated consciousness and the mediation of the realm of interiority, and the transcendent exigence to the religiously differentiated consciousness and the realm of transcendence. As we saw in Chapter III, the methodically differentiated consciousness is the key to Lonergan's analysis; for the methodically differentiated consciousness results from the self-appropriation of the structures of interiority and is therefore the basis for the thematization and linking of the other differentiations of consciousness and realms of meaning.

The sources of meaning are the conscious acts and intended contents of the four levels of intentional consciousness. Lonergan distinguishes transcendental and categorial sources. The former refer to "the very dynamism of intentional consciousness", the transcendental notions, that are "...a capacity that consciously and unceasingly both heads for and recognizes data, intelligibility, truth, reality, and value." The latter, the categorial sources, refer to the answers to or determinations of the transcendental notions reached through the operations of experience, understanding, judgement and decision.

The terms and acts of meaning are based on the four-fold structure of conscious intentionality. The act refers to the operation

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4 Method, p. 73. See our Ch. III, pp. 161-62, and n. 49 where we note a shift from Insight to Method: in Insight Lonergan places the source of meaning in the pure desire to know, whereas in Method he places the source of meaning in the transcendental notions.
by which meaning is intended, and the term refers to what is meant. To experience there corresponds the potential act of meaning. On this level there is no distinction between meaning and meant: sensible in act and the sense in act are one and the same. To understanding there corresponds the formal act and term of meaning. The operations of conceiving, supposing, defining, represent the emergence of a distinction between meaning and meant, for the meant is what is intended by these operations. To judgement there corresponds the full act and term of meaning. Full acts of meaning go beyond formal acts in order to determine the status of the formal term of meaning: is it an object of thought, or a hypothetical object, or a reality within or perhaps beyond the world of human experience? And to decision there corresponds the performative or active act and term of meaning. Through active meanings one determines one's response to and the value of what has been settled as a full term of meaning.⁵

Lonergan distinguishes four functions of meaning. The cognitive function of meaning emerges in language. It represents the transition from the infant's world of immediacy to the adult's world mediated by meaning, from the world of what is felt, seen, touched, etc., to the world of what is absent as well as present, possible as well as factual, communal and historical as well as familiar, etc. The effective function of meaning emerges in man's making of his world. Man's work is intelligent; that is to say, it is preceded by planning, investigating, imagining, weighing pros and cons of courses of action, etc. Thus, at

⁵See Method, pp. 73-76.
the base of man’s making lies meaning, and such meaning is effective
in so far as what is made is first intended in acts of meaning. The
constitutive function of meaning was discussed in our analysis of
Lonergan’s definition of historicity in Chapter II. There we noted
that man is a historical being because he is constituted by meaning,
for a change in the meaning that informs human living results in a
change in the cultures and institutions within which human beings find
their existence. The communicative function of meaning emerges when
the individual communicates through intersubjectivity, symbols, lan-
guage, etc. that he means to another individual. Meaning thereby becomes
common meaning; and because communities develop over time, such common
meaning will have a history in which it can be clarified, enriched and
transformed or misunderstood, made empty and distorted. 6

The foregoing represents a sketch of Lonergan’s account of the
structures of meaning. Like the universal viewpoint, this structure
provides the interpreter and the historian with a means by which to
link together mankind’s variable expressions and realizations of mean-
ing throughout history. The efficacy of this account will rest on the
degree to which the individual interpreter or historian has himself
undertaken transcendental method. For the account will remain a mere
chart unless he has become familiar with the realities upon which it is
based.

6 See Method, pp. 76-81, 356-358; “Dimensions of Meaning”, in
Collection, pp. 252-255, 265-266; “Transition from a Classicist World-
View to Historical-Mindedness”, pp. 5-6 and “The Absence of God in
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