MAJORITY-MINORITY RELATIONS IN SWITZERLAND

MAJORITY-MINORITY RELATIONS IN A MULTICULTURAL

SOCIETY: THE CASE OF SWITZERLAND

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ABSTRACT

Switzerland, a country which has managed to weld
four different language groups and two major religions
into a harmonious unity has long been a major enigma in
an age of cultural nationalism. Currently it is one of
the few national communities without a shared culture
whose overall political unity is not threatened. This
work attempts to trace major sources of Swiss coexist-
ence as well as some of the problems now facing Switzer-
land. Because most of the literature in race and ethnic
relations has focused on causes of conflict and discord,
majority-minority relations in Switzerland has received
relatively little attention.

The first part of the study investigates various
attempts to explain the Swiss case. Explanations such
as cross-cutting cleavages and the politics of consoci-
ational democracy are given special attention. The
hypothesis of cross-cutting cleavages, which currently
represents the dominant explanation of Swiss coexistence,
says in essence that cross-cutting cleavages such as
religion, language, etc., tend to create cross-pressures
among the population that serve to moderate the intensity
of political conflict. While this view helps explain the
stability and cohesion of the Swiss polity it is shown to

be overly simplistic and reductionist. Another major explanation is that of consociational democracy. Although it, too, contributes to our understanding of Swiss harmony, by emphasizing the conscious and deliberate efforts of autonomous elites it neglects the role of popular sentiment and public opinion.

This study focuses on the transmission of values, and the relationship between public opinion and attitudes and cores values in a multicultural setting. In order to explore the salience of popular sentiment and public opinion in contributing to Swiss coexistence, an analysis of Swiss history textbooks from French and German, Catholic and Protestant Switzerland was carried out. It was found that in contrast to Canada and South Africa, the school curriculum tends to unite rather than divide the various cultural groups by de-emphasizing those historical themes which feed intergroup resentment. Even though the authors present various interpretations of some events, there is an underlying consensus of what the Swiss state should stand for. In addition, the textbooks promote a positive sense of Swiss identity which transcends a narrow linguistic or cultural definition of nationhood.

A survey administered to French and German Swiss youth reinforces this interpretation. A variety of indicators show that the German Swiss who comprise

three-fourths of the population lack what may be called a "majoritarian outlook". While the opposite is not completely true of the French Swiss minority, they do not display that sense of relative deprivation that is often associated with sociological minorities. When asked why they were proud to be Swiss, both French- and German-speaking youth gave political answers considerably more often than any other reasons. Thus, there appears to exist "a certain Swiss outlook" which unites the Swiss cultural and linguistic groups.

This does not mean that Switzerland has solved all problems of a cultural and ethnic nature. The Jura question and the foreign worker problem remain two problematic issues in the conduct of majority-minority relations in Switzerland. A solution to the Jura situation now seems to be in sight. In contrast, the foreign worker problem which involves a non-national minority remains unresolved. This points to the fact that Swiss policy toward non-citizen minorities is at variance with the treatment of citizen minorities.

In concluding this study we propose an important corollary to pluralist thought which posits an implicit correlation between social heterogeneity and political instability. Our basic proposition is that a "civic culture", moderates social conflicts and promotes stability in multicultural societies.

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To Peter

Without whom

this work would

not have been.

PREFACE

I first became interested in majority-minority
relations in Switzerland during a stay there in 1970-71.
Growing up in the more homogeneous American culture, it
was fascinating to live in the midst of four language
communities. I was often struck by the orderly and
matter-of-fact way in which cultural and linguistic
differences were treated in this small multicultural
society. My interest in questions of cultural coexist-
ence and conflict was once again awakened upon moving
to another plurilingual society. In Canada, however,
matters of language and culture excited the temperaments
and sentiments of both linguistic groups. Against this
backdrop, I decided to seriously pursue the study of
intergroup relations in Switzerland.

In the course of this study I became indebted to a
large number of people who have provided me with informa-
tion and assistance. Dr. Heinz Ries, formerly of the Vor-
bereitüngsstufe der Hochschule Aargau, and his wife Marie-
Louise, provided me with continual help and hospitality
during my stay in Switzerland. Mr. Bruno Kehrli of the
Centre suisse de documentation en matière d'enseignement
et d'éducation aided me in the construction of the sample
design and in carrying out the questionnaire.

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CHAPTER I

ATTEMPTS TO EXPLAIN THE SWISS CASE

In a world riddled with racial and ethnic con-
flicts there is an urgency to study not only those nations
which exhibit hostile relations among the various cultural
groups, but also those countries which have been able to
achieve harmonious inter-ethnic relations. Unfortunately,
the mainstream of the recent literature draws attention to
sources of conflict and discord, often at the expense of
those factors associated with cultural coexistence.
Switzerland, a nation which has managed to weld four
different language groups and two major religions into a
stable and harmounious unity, provides an especially strik-
ing example of cultural coexistence. There are several
reasons which make a study of majority-minority relations
in Switzerland particularly timely. Writing in 1965,
Etzioni (1965:22, 35) mentions Canada, the Union of South
Africa, Switzerland, Belgium, Nigeria, and India as in-
stances of national communities without a shared culture
that enjoy relatively high levels of political integration.
Of these six multicultural societies today only Switzer-
land can still serve as a convincing example of a frag-
mented culture whose overall political unity is not

threatened.

Intergroup-relations in Switzerland have largely escaped the attention of students of ethnic relations. The paucity of literature appears to be related to a number of reasons, such as an over-emphasis on fortunate accidents of history and geography. These claims of Swiss "exceptionalism"[1] have tended to conceal important elements of public policy and common problems faced by other multicultural societies.

Some Historical Remarks on the Status
of Swiss Linguistic and
Religious Minorities

As McRae (1964:5) notes "There seems to be a widespread impression that the current happy condition of linguistic equality in Switzerland has its roots deep in

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[1]This view is expressed in such titles and subtitles as "Der Sonderfall der Schweiz" in Karl W. Deutsch (1976), Die Schweiz als ein paradigmatischer Fall politischer Integration and Die Schweiz als Antithese by Herbert Lüthy (1969, esp. 10-12). The paucity of literature on majority-minority relations in Switzerland has also been exacerbated by some Swiss authors who, enamored by the "uniqueness" of the national experience have tended to take an insular view of Swiss politics and interethnic relations, as well as some comparative scholars who, lacking a thorough understanding of the Swiss case, have neatly pigeonholed it as "deviant." See, for example, Jean R. von Salis, La Suisse diverse et paradoxale (1971) and Allan Rabuska and Kenneth Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability (1972:208-212).

Swiss history." At best, this explanation is only partially true. The cultural and linguistic variety of Switzerland is something comparatively recent. The first five centuries of the Confederation as well as the fundamental tradition of Switzerland belong to the German-speaking population. Of the thirteen cantons[2] admitted into the Confederation before the Reformation, only Fribourg had any significant French-speaking population, and during this time it was ruled by an urban aristocracy which made repeated efforts to Germanize it.

From the sixteenth century onwards French, Italian and Romansch speaking populations were associated in various ways with the Confederation. The League of the Grisons, Valais, Neuchâtel, and the ecclesiastical principality of Basel (which became the Jura district of Bern) were associated as allies of the Confederates. Ticino, Vaud as well as part of present-day German Switzerland (including the present-day canton of Thurgau and much of Aargau) were ruled as subject territories by one or several cantons. These allies and subject territories did not obtain equality with the thirteen cantons of the Old Regime until much later. A strong heritage of

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[2]The thirteen cantons were Zurich, Bern, Lucerne, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Glarus, Zug, Basle, Fribourg, Solothurn, Schaffhausen, and Appenzell.

communal independence which can be traced back to the beginnings of Switzerland, however, helped to mediate a tendency to dominate the minority language groups by the ruling cantons (Meyer, 1952:358-360). This respect for local autonomy and linguistic diversity was an important factor in attracting the allegiance of the subordinate areas, which when they had the option, decided to remain with their overseers and protectors.

The invasion of the French army in 1798 spelled the end to the ancient Confederation of thirteen cantons. The old Confederation with its outmoded and elaborate network of feudal obligations and aristocratic privileges could not maintain itself under the impact of the ideas of the French Revolution. It was replaced by the Helvetic Republic whose constitution was based on the conceptions of the Enlightenment and the rights of man. Drafted in the French tradition of centralization and authoritarian executive power the new regime found support only in a few areas like Vaud and Aargau, which were en-joying their newly acquired independence. Despite opposi-tion, it transformed Switzerland almost overnight into a modern state. The 1798 Constitution abolished all privileges, and established equality of individuals and territories. For the first time it also created a common Swiss nationality with a parliament representing the

whole country (Bonjour, 1938:323).

In addition, it had important consequences for the relationship between the language groups as many authors have pointed out (Kohn, 1956:47; McRae, 1964:6).

> . . . .By raising the French and Italian subject districts to the status of cantons with equal rights, the Helvetic republic founded a multi-lingual Switzerland. In this way it checked the growth of a different language for rulers and ruled wherever there were signs of it . . . . Helvetic laws and resolutions were printed in German and French and in Italian if required. In this way a new application was given to the principle of equality before the law which was to illuminate the future and help to solve the problem of nationality (Bonjour et al., 1952:230).

The spiritual leaders of the Helvetic republic were sufficiently inventive to draw up a plan patterned on existing conditions, rather than on unity of language which had previously been considered the deciding national characteristic. When it was possible to make German, French and Italian speaking people into one nation, one arrived at a point at which "the barbaric prejudices broke down, which make men rivals, then enemies and finally slaves" and a greater, truly European unity was produced in which "there was a marriage of German profundity with French elegance and Italian taste" reasoned La Harpe, a native of Vaud and one of the framers of the Helvetic constitution. The ultimate goal was to overcome the differences which divide men until all nations become one (Weilenmann, 1925:288).

Despite its benefits to the linguistic minorities, the Helvetic republic conflicted too strongly with the entrenched sentiments of local autonomy and of traditional diversity. The citizenry revolted against uniformity and widespread unrest rendered the constitution unworkable. In 1803 Napoleon intervened and imposed his mediation, which restored to each canton its own government. The new constitution of 1803, which was intended to keep Switzerland in a state of weakness and dependence on France was, however, more in harmony with the country's mood than that of the Helvetic republic (Bohnenblust, 1974:380-381). It maintained the chief gain of the Helvetic period, old subject districts were abolished; all privileges of place or birth and intercantonal or foreign alliances were prohibited. The linguistic equality of 1798 was also maintained with the inclusion of the cantons of Ticino and Vaud. The other subject German-speaking territories of Aargau and Thurgau, and the associated lands of Grisons and St. Gallen were admitted as cantons with equal rights, bringing the total of sovereign cantons to nineteen. Despite the harsh demands of Swiss troops in Napoleonic service, the Mediation period secured ten years of well-being and order for the nation at a time when most European lands suffered from wars and revolutions. The 1803 Constitution remained a source of inspiration for the

Swiss liberals in the troubled decades after 1815.

After Napoleon's downfall, the cantons resumed most of their old authority, and reverted to German as the offical language. On the verge of civil war, it was only under the influence of the Allied powers that Switzerland reached an understanding on a new constitution in 1815. Under the new Federal Pact Switzerland became once more a confederation of sovereign states united for only two purposes: common defense and the maintenance of internal order. The Congress of Vienna had allowed the return to Switzerland of its ancient allies Valais, Neuchâtel and Geneva, which now took their place as independent cantons. With the addition of these territories Switzerland assumed the basic boundaries it has today.

Through the extension of civil rights initiated by the 1830 revolutions, language differences gained in political importance in Switzerland. This was especially the case when the followers of the progressive and conservative parties did not belong to the same language group. In the canton of Bern the French and Catholic districts of the Jura attempted to break away from the old German-speaking protestant canton, in Fribourg the German and protestant district of Murten defended itself against the French and Catholic majority of the canton, in Catholic Valais a civil war broke out between the

German-speaking groups of the Upper Valais and the more liberal French-speaking groups in Lower Valais (Weilen-mann, 1925:207-208).

Religious bitterness which had temporarily died down now also reappeared. The division between Catholic and Reformed has been a moving force in Swiss history since the Reformation. Religious differences, even in those instances where religious and linguistic boundaries reinforced each other, have always been more salient than linguistic ones in Switzerland.

The Reformation split Switzerland in two opposing camps. From the first religious battle in 1529 until the nineteenth century the division between the two faiths was clear and remained unchanged. The present-day cantons of Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden (both halves), Lucerne, Zug, Fribourg, Solothurn, and Valais as well as Appenzell Inner Rhoden remained Catholic, while Zurich, Bern, both Basles, Schaffhausen, Appenzell Outer Rhoden, Vaud, Neuchâtel and Geneva adhered predominantly to the Protestant faith. In Glarus, St. Gallen, Grisons, Aargau, and Thurgau the two faiths existed side by side. The religious division was influential in shaping the Weltanschauung of the ordinary citizen. A man was born into either a Protestant canton or a Catholic one. Conversions were rare. Most of the Catholic cantons had declared Roman Catholicism to be the

state religion. Some would not even allow Protestants
to settle. In mixed cantons, hostility between the two
religions was increasing. Liberty of conscience did not
exist in either Protestant or Catholic cantons. Even
under the Act of Mediation, where most of the rights of
man were insured the constitution did not guarantee
freedom of religion or freedom of conscience. A change
of religion or marriage with a person of a different
faith could be punished by withdrawing citizenship (Bohnen-
dust, 1974:382).

Switzerland after 1815 was a collection of small
states jealously guarding their sovereignty not very
different than it had been before the Napoleonic times.
It had no effective central authority. Hamilton, and
Madison (1941:119), in fact, had cited the example of the
Swiss Federation in The Federalist as a warning of the
dangers of weak government. "Whatever efficacy the union
may have had in ordinary cases," they wrote, "it appears
that the moment a cause of difference sprang up, capable
of trying its strength, it failed." This difference came
about with the revival of the spirit of the French
Revolution in the Switzerland of the 1830s.

In 1832 the seven leading "regenerated" cantons
(Zurich, Bern, Lucerne, Solothurn, St. Gallen, Aargau,
and Thurgau) united to protect their new constitutions

and to press for a revision of the 1815 Pact along more liberal lines. Spearheaded by the decision of the Confederation not to enforce article 12 of the Federal Pact (which guaranteed the maintenance of religious orders in the cantons--against the canton of Aargau) seven Catholic cantons formed the Sonderbund (or separatist confederation) in 1845. This conflict was aggravated by religious and economic differences as well as by memories of former religious battles. The cantons of the Sonderbund (Lucerne, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Zug, Fribourg, and Valais) were Catholic, rural, and conservative; they feared the prevailing liberalism of the Protestant cantons and their drive towards Swiss unification, from which they expected a threat to their religious and political traditions. By 1847 the Radicals had a majority in the Diet and demanded that the Sonderbund be dissolved because it was incompatible with the Federal Pact. When the Catholic cantons refused to acquiesce the Diet ordered the dissolution by force of arms.

Foreshadowing the spirit of compromise which was to settle the civil war, the Diet appointed a moderate, Guillaume-Henri Dufour from Geneva, as commander-in-chief. The Catholic cantons were defeated in 25 days with a loss of only 128 men on both sides. Dufour helped to heal the wounds which existed by his repeated appeals to his

troops to spare the opponents' civil population. In his

proclamation he stressed the fact that Catholic soldiers

from Solothurn, Ticino, and St. Gallen were fighting in

his army while the general commanding the Sonderbund

forces was a Protestant.

Tocqueville (1961:351-352) was able to say in

1848 of the short-lived Sonderbund civil war that:

> Nowhere else has the democratic revolution . . . .
> occurred in the midst of such complicated and
> strange circumstances. A single . . . . people
> made up of several races, speaking several
> languages, professing several religious beliefs
> and different dissident sects . . . . and two
> Churches equally established and privileged, with
> all the political issues soon turning into ques-
> tions of religion and all religious issues ending
> up as questions of politics: in short, two
> societies . . . . the one very old, the other very
> young . . . . married in common bond despite
> their age differences, such is the likeness
> Switzerland offers today.

The victors in the Swiss civil war were free to

lay the foundation for the new nation. Although it was in

their power to impose upon Switzerland a centralized

authority, disregarding the need of the religious and

linguistic minorities, instead they chose to compromise

between the excessive federalism of the old regime and the

complete unity advocated by the more extreme Radicals.

Although it underwent a thorough revision in 1874 the 1848

Constitution in its basic aspects remains the constitution

of Switzerland today.

The 1848 Constitution established a Council of

States (or Ständerat) on the model of the old Diet and of the United States Senate; each canton being represented by two deputies. This Council allowed the linguistic and religious minorities--taken together--to have a blocking vote in federal legislation. In the National Council (or Nationalrat, patterned after the American House of Representatives), on the other hand, each canton is represented by delegates in proportion to its population. The 1848 Constitution guaranteed the complete equality of languages by declaring that German, French and Italian are the national languages of Switzerland. Religious freedom was also secured. It was asserted that "Freedom of conscience and belief is inviolable."

Our brief examination of Swiss history warns against accepting too literally an interpretation of Swiss harmony based primarily on fortunate accidents of history. The so-called "fortunate accidents" have often been more attributable to public policy and statesmanlike responsibility than sheer luck.

On balance, there are a number of "accidental" and human factors that have shaped the current situation of intergroup relations in Switzerland. It is one of the fortunate accidents of Swiss history that the linguistic and religious boundaries do not coincide. Language conflict was moderated since both religions had their

adherents in every language area. Another fortunate event that has tempered the relations between the language groups is the fact that the smaller language groups were never forced to struggle for their rights. Rather, linguistic equality was imposed upon the old Confederation under the inspiration of the French Revolution. It should be pointed out, however, that there was by and large a heritage of fair language dealings prior to the Helvetic republic, and in a less conducive setting it is possible that linguistic equality imposed from a conquering force could have later had detrimental effects when the alien power was no longer present. Responsible leadership has also played an important role in the success of the Swiss state. For example, the rulers of the twelve cantons who were victors in the Sonderbund war chose as their commander-in-chief Guillaume-Henri Dufour, a moderate, even though more radical candidates were available. His is a recurrent type in Swiss history; steadfast in character, impartial, and honest. Switzerland is one of the few countries whose heroes are often mediators and symbols of unity--figures such as Landaman Aebli of Glarus or Schulheiss Wengi of Solothurn at the end of the wars of religion, or Max Huber and Walter Stuckli in the 1920s and 1930s, or General Guisan in the second World War. Finally, the more-than-fair treatment and over representation of

minorities in public life is another noteworthy factor influencing cultural coexistence in Switzerland.

Cross-cutting Cleavages

Another explanation often invoked to explain the stability and cohesion of the Swiss polity rests on a hypothesis based on "cross-cutting cleavages." This hypothesis says in essence that cross-cutting cleavages such as religion, language, etc., tend to create cross-pressures among the population that serve to moderate the intensity of political conflict. From the outset one of the difficulties of the cross-cutting cleavages hypothesis is that it has become so popular and so frequently used in such a wide variety of circumstances that it is in danger of losing much of its explanatory power.[3] Despite this and other difficulties it currently represents one of the dominant views of Swiss society held by social and political scientists.[4]

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[3]The cross-cutting hypothesis has on some occasions been invoked by writers who are seeking to provide an explanation for exactly opposite phenomena. This is the case, for example, when cross-cutting cleavages are said to account for the instability of the Third and Fourth Republics, and for the stability of the Helvetic Confederation (for the French example see David Thompson, Democracy in France (1958:38) and for the Swiss example André Siegfried, La Suisse, démocratie tèmoin (1956:57-58).

[4]The cross-cutting hypothesis has been used as the main, or at least partial explanation of Swiss cultural coexistence by many Swiss authors. See, for example,

One of the most extreme proponents of this
hypothesis as applied to the Swiss case is Kurt Mayer.
He attributes the general civic harmony in Switzerland
to its unique social structure. However, he also notes
that in the one instance; the Jura, where these conditions
are absent, conflict occurs. Mayer states that:

> . . . . the Swiss "miracle" of unity in diversity
> rests upon a peculiar equilibrium of cross-
> cutting cultural divisions which is historically
> unique and cannot be duplicated under different
> conditions. Interestingly, and largely unknown
> to the outside world Switzerland itself furnishes
> proof that if the divisions between the lingu-
> istic and religious groups do not overlap but
> coincide the result is conflict instead of
> harmony (Mayer, 1968:707).

For Mayer, the conflict situation in the Jura
serves as a confirmation of the salience of the cross-
cutting hypothesis. While he points out that the purpose
of his article is "neither prediction nor advocacy" there
are paradoxically, undertones in his analysis of an al-
most deterministic belief in the explosive potential of
what he terms "cultural divisions." This tendency is
evident in his mechanical manner of applying the cross-
cutting hypothesis. Peaceful coexistence is seen

Kurt Mayer, The Population of Switzerland (1952) and by
the same author "The Jura Problem: Ethnic Conflict in
Switzerland" (1968). In addition, it has been used in
conjunction with other explanations by authors such as
Jürg Steiner, Amicable Agreement versus Minority Rule:
Conflict Resolution in Switzerland (1974), as well as
older Swiss authors such as Karl Meyer (1952).

primarily as a function of certain characteristics of social structure which he summarizes as follows: "First, and perhaps foremost, is the fact that the linguistic boundaries do not coincide with but cross cut across the religious boundaries. . . . (Second is) "the fact that the dividing lines between the languages do not coincide for the most part with the cantonal boundaries" . . . . and third "the fact that economic differences do not coincide with linguistic boundaries" (Mayer, 1968:714-720). Public policy and the political art as well as other factors such as religious-ideological differences expressed in the party system and the political process occupy a secondary importance in Mayer's analysis.

By itself the cross-cutting hypothesis seems insufficient to explain Swiss coexistence. Why do the Murteners not attempt to separate from the canton of Fribourg? Like the Catholic, French-speaking Jurassian they occupy a double minority status in the canton (they are Protestant and German-speaking in a predominantly Catholic, French-speaking canton) and were annexed to a canton against their will. In addition, both French- and German-speaking Swiss observers have noted that the German-speaking minority in Fribourg has been the most disadvantaged linguistic minority in all of Switzerland (Pichard, 1975:184-191; Allemann, 1968:373-374). Still,

there is no longer any separatism (some attempts were
made to separate from Fribourg and join Bern with whom it
shares its religion and language in the nineteenth
century) and certainly no violence. It seems unlikely
that we can attribute this difference in behavior ex-
clusively to the fact that the Murtener is part of a
religious and linguistic majority in the nation although
a double minority in the canton, while the North Jurassian
is part of a double ethnic minority in both canton and
nation.

The Jura conflict illustrates yet a further limi-
tation of the cross-cutting hypothesis. Even though the
Catholic, French-speaking citizens of the Jura occupy a
cumulative minority position in the canton of Bern and
the Confederation; the Jura district of Bern itself ap-
pears to offer a classic example of cross-cutting
cleavages. Almost 24 percent of its residents speak
German, and 41 percent of the Jura population adhere to
the Protestant faith. Moreover, of the six French-
speaking districts, three are mainly Protestant and three
mainly Catholic (Kommission der 24, 1968:92-101). The
seventh district is overwhelmingly German-speaking and
Catholic. As one Swiss political scientist has observed:
"In the Jura, neither political particularisms nor the
distribution of languages explains or justifies a

separatist movement; it would seem rather that the extreme overlapping of tongues, the relative equilibrium of religions . . . . ought to lead the different groups to agreement" (Reymond, 1965:36).

Unfortunately this has not been the case. Cross-cutting cleavages do not eliminate polar opposite groups, but merely reduce their size relative to groups halfway in between, in this case to German Catholics and French Protestants. Thus, if one assumes that French Catholics are not only the most separatist but also the source of most of the violent acts, one can note an interesting limitation of the cross-cutting hypothesis. As Keech (1972:404) notes "Since it does not take more than a handful of people to commit the acts of violence which make ethnic conflict in the Jura 'intense,' cross-cutting cleavages do not help much to reduce violence." Rather, it is the _perception_ of cleavaged as congruent which can reinforce the self-consciousness of ethnic groups. This opens up a series of difficult questions about the relative salience and intensity of cleavages and perception of cleavages which is rarely asked by adherents of the cross-cutting hypothesis.

Too often authors which utilize the cross-cutting hypothesis treat the divisions in society as static properties. One example of this tendency is seen

in the work of Jürg Steiner (1974). In his book
Amicable Agreement versus Majority Rule, he attempts to
explain the way in which intersubcultural hostility is
moderated in Switzerland in terms of sixteen hypotheses.
These descriptive propositions are, however, explicitly
linked to a specified period, the 1960s and early 1970s,
a time when most ideological and political divisions had
lost their previous salience. Thus, at times Steiner's
argument appears to be circular--he explains Switzerland's
ability to regulate its "intersubcultural hostility" by
appealing, essentially, to a set of hypotheses that
describes that present happy state. Nordlinger makes a
similar criticism of Steiner when he notes:

> The author claims to be explaining that
> society's (Switzerland's) success in regulating
> its intense religious and linguistic conflicts.
> Yet, the linguistic conflict never became in-
> tense religious conflict was regulated in the
> nineteenth century, and (the author) deals al-
> most exclusively with contemporary Swiss social
> and political patterns. . . . (Nordlinger, 1972:
> 15).

Steiner (1974:255) basically accepts the cross-
cutting hypothesis concluding that "there is usually a
cross-cutting rather than a verzuiling (cumulative seg-
mentation) between political parties, economic interest
groups, voluntary associations, and newspapers."[5] His

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[5]According to Steiner (1974:255) the one excep-
tion to cross-cutting ". . . exists with the trade

position seems to be that Swiss society is characterized

by a set of multiple, cross-cutting political cleavages

of which none is so dominant as to exclude the influence

of the others on the political process. While this

assessment of Swiss society is probably currently correct

it has not always been the case. McRae (1975), for ex-

ample, is an insightful paper observes that Switzerland

between the World Wars was sharply segmented along party

and ideological lines, and that the well-balanced pres-

sures which exist today (and about which Steiner writes)

are a recent phenomenon. By failing to take into con-

sideration the changing hierarchy of cleavages and their

successive replacement over time Steiner is in danger of

ignoring the regulatory processes previously responsible

for the depoliticalization or ontzuiling of the cleavage

structures which are important contributing factors to

the current moderation of intersubcultural hostility.

Myths and Realities of the Swiss Case

In a recent distinguished lecture series entitled

"History and Social Change: Some Myths and Realities,"

Guy Rocher (1976) has elaborated three groups of factors

which have influenced the patterns of history and social

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unions which show a strong verzuiling with different
political parties."

change. The first group of factors is attached to man
and human action. The second group of factors, which he
observes is "usually put first" is a series of determin-
isms or constraints. Among these are demographic limi-
tations such as the composition of the population accord-
ing to language, religion, etc. Finally, there is "sheer
good, or bad luck, chance, coincidence, that also enter
into the fabric of history, under the form of some acci-
dental events or circumstances that bring together speci-
fic conditions favorable or unfavorable to the orientation
of history in one direction rather than another one"
(Rocher, 1976:10-12).

If we analyze the case of Switzerland in terms of
these three factors we find that   most attempts to explain
Swiss cultural coexistence have relied almost exclusively
on the last two, largely neglecting the role of man and
human action. This tendency, according to Rocher (1976:
11), is apparent in the social sciences as a whole which
often emphasizes some general laws at the expense of
various human factors.

Consociational Democracy and the
Swiss Experience

A recent challenge to this tendency is seen in
the model of consociational democracy. Basically it

argues that the role of the elite is a critical factor
in promoting the political stability of countries that
have been characterized by substantial cultural fragmen-
tation. The consociation model was developed in the late
1960s as an attempt to elaborate and extend Gabriel
Almond's classification of Western-style democratic
regimes. His typology contrasted stable two-party systems
based on alternating majority governments as exemplified
by the "Anglo-American type" with the more volatile "con-
tinental European type" which is characterized by multi-
party systems based on fluctuating ministerial coalitions
(Almond, 1946:391-406). When it was observed that the
political behavior of the smaller European countries did
not fit either of these categories there was a tendency
to dismiss them as deviant cases, or as an intermediate
category combining characteristics of the two.

The consociation model was, then, a response to
the limited ability of earlier pluralist theory to explain
the segmented but nevertheless stable smaller European
countries of the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, and
Switzerland. The accommodationist patterns and processes
connected with these countries have been termed by various
authors as "consociational democracy,"[6] "concordant

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[6]
    Arend Lijphart "Typologies of Democratic Systems"
(1968:17-35) and "Consociational Democracy" (1969:207-

democracy (or Konkordanzdemokratie)"[7] and "proportional
democracy (or Proporzdemokratie).[8]

Arend Lijphart who first coined the term "con-
sociational democracy" is perhaps the most widely known
among the consociational theorists. He attributes a
vital importance to the capacity and good will of the
elites. As Lijphart (1968:21) says, "the essential
characteristic of consociational democracy is not so much
any particular institutional arrangement as overarching
cooperation at the elite level with the deliberate aim
of counteracting disintegrative tendencies in the system."
Implicit in his reasoning is the assumption that only the
deliberate joint effort by the elites can stabilize the
sharp cleavages in the system. He mentions four require-
ments which must be fulfilled if consociational democracy
is to be successful. First, the elites must be able to

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225); Hans Daalder, "On Building Consociational Nations:
The Cases of Netherlands and Switzerland (1971:355-370);
and "The Consociational Democracy Theme: A Review
Article" (1974:604-621).

[7]Gerhard Lehmbruch, "Konkordanzdemokratie im
polischen System der Schweiz: Ein Literaturbericht"
(1968:443-459); Heinz Niemetz, "Zur schweizerischen
Konkordanzdemokratie" (1970:66-89).

[8]Gerhard Lehmbruch, Proporzdemokratie: Politi-
sches System und politische Kultur in der Schweiz and
Gesterreich (1967); Jürg Steiner, "The Principles of
Majority and Proportionality (1971).

recognize the dangers of fragmentation; secondly, they must have some commitment to maintaining the system; thirdly, they must be able to transcend subcultural cleavages at the elite level so they are capable of working with the elites of the other subcultures, and finally, they must have the ability to forge appropriate solutions to accommodate the demands of divergent interests of the subcultures (Lijphart, 1968:22-23).

Beyond these prerequisites, Lijphart (1968:25-30) also identifies a number of characteristics of social structure and political culture which are conducive to the establishment or maintenance of consociational politics among elites in a fragmented system. He singles out the following factors: the existence of external threats to the country, a relatively low total load on the system as a whole, a popular acceptance of government by elite cartel, distinct lines of cleavage, and a balance of power among the subcultures.

The model of consociational democracy when applied to the Swiss case leaves many issues unsolved. By emphasizing the conscious and deliberate efforts of autonomous elite politics it presupposes that popular sentiment and opinion plays a negligible role in sustaining harmonious inter-ethnic relations. This is, at least, a questionable proposition. Secondly, one wonders

if the conditions of subcultural segmentation stipulated
in the consociational model really hold today for the
Swiss case. Consociational theorists have generally
neglected to differentiate between cultural diversity and
subcultural segmentation. As Daalder (1974:615) points
out "demographic variables are often assumed to be of
attitudinal importance with little investigation of the
degree to which this is actually true." The present in-
vestigation attempts to clarify these and related issues.

Chapter II focuses on the underpinnings of Swiss
pluralism, giving an overview of some of the more impor-
tant factors which influence the interaction between
majorities and minorities in Switzerland. The discussion
concentrates on structural, and demographic factors as
well as legal, governmental and informal practices.

The transmission of values is the major emphasis
of Chapter III. Many recent studies of school textbooks
in Canada and South Africa have shown that there are two
historical traditions which are mutually exclusive
(Trudel and Jain, 1970; Hodgetts, 1968; and Auerbach,
1965). Furthermore, they conclude that the schools of
both linguistic groups do little to encourage a mutual
understanding of their separate attitudes, aspirations,
and interests. We might expect similar findings in
Switzerland. Of course attitudes expressed in textbooks

are only one of many factors which ultimately determine the relations between cultural or ethnic groups living in the same nation state. Nevertheless, the topic is too important to be ignored. The nature of Swiss or any partnership depends largely on what the groups believe about each other.

Chapter IV examines the core values and attitudes of French- and German-speaking Swiss youth. In contrast to the vast literature emphasizing the role of political institutions, social structure, and elite accommodation, there is very little written about the attitudes of the common citizen toward multiculturalism. This is an essential and largely unexplored area in the study of majority-minority relations in Switzerland.

Diversity and social relations in a general theoretical framework as well as in Swiss society in particular is the subject of the concluding chapter. It analyzes integrating as well as disruptive forces in Swiss society such as the separatist movement in the Jura and the Gastarbeiter or foreign worker problem. Finally it considers implications for other countries with discernible ethnic and cultural minorities.

A well known Swiss historian has observed that:

> Good family portraits are never painted by members of the family concerned, and it would take a non-Swiss to produce a really good portrait of Switzerland. Usually the members

of a given family are conscious of being
individuals with marked physical and mental
differences, and they are not necessarily
very fond of each other. Only to the out-
sider do they appear to have the same nose
or the same style of behavior--that is a
"family air" (Lüthy, 1962:23).

The following chapters will attempt to sketch a
portrait of Switzerland and the factors that have influ-
enced intergroup relations in this small multicultural
society. As an outsider viewing the Swiss panorama of
ethnic relations from the vantage point of a divided
Canada my picture of Switzerland will likely be different
from that painted by a family member. "A stranger"
Tocqueville (1969:20) observed, "often hears important
truths at his host's fireside, truths which he might not
divulge to his friends."

CHAPTER II

THE ETHNIC FACTOR: FOUNDATIONS OF A

MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY

Interaction of Minorities and Majorities

The study of minorities and the interaction
between majorities and minorities (or majority-minority
relations) is complicated by the problem of definition.
Gargas distinguishes between variable and constant minori-
ties, depending on whether the characteristcs differenti-
ating members of the minority last for a relatively short
time or endure over several generations, or more (Schäppi,
1971:59). Unlike variable minorities, constant minorities
have little chance to recruit new members in order to be-
come a majority.[1] For this reason, they always are a
minority and stand in relation to a majority which wields
the power to decisively influence the society in which
they live. Because of this important relationship,

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[1]A minority political party such as the Parti
québecois, may be able to recruit enough new members to
become a majority in the province of Québec. On the
other hand, it would be most difficult for racial,
linguistic, or religious minority groups to attract, or
convert enough new members to transform themselves into
a majority.

students of majority-minority relations have tended to focus their attention on constant rather than variable minorities. The most important sociological characteristics which distinguish constant minorities are race, religion, and language or culture.

For the purpose of this work, the term minority will be defined in accordance with normal Swiss usage rather than in the usual sociological sense, as personal or regional groups that are set apart from the majority in terms of religion and/or language. Implied in this definition is the fact that these groups face certain disadvantages because they are less numerous (cf. Kägi, 1959; Fasel, 1959; and Peer, 1975).

On the other hand, the sociological definition of "minority" or "minority status" emphasizes the following characteristics: differential and unequal treatment, a subordinate position with regard to the distribution of power, the possession of certain distinguishable group traits, and group consciousness (cf. Simpson and Yinger, 1965:16-17 and the references cited therein). Probably the most frequently cited definition in the area of minority group studies is that of Louis Wirth. According to him "we may define a minority as a group of people who, because of their physical or cultural characteristics are singled out from others in the society in which they

live for differential and unequal treatment and who there-

fore regard themselves as objects of collective discrimi-

nation" (Wirth, 1945:347). It is not an uncommon experi-

ence for numerical minorities to find themselves faced

with the problems of prejudice and intergroup discrimi-

nation. However, this need not be the case. Several

authors have pointed out that Switzerland provides a

striking example of a case where "numerical minorities"

are not synonymous with "sociological minorities."

> For several centuries the French and Italian
> Swiss have not been minorities in our (soci-
> ological) sense of the term, nor have they
> given up lingual and cultural differences
> from the German Swiss, who make up three-
> fourths of the population (Simpson and Yinger,
> 1965:22).
>
> . . . . No effort whatsoever is made by the
> Swiss Germans who are in the overwhelming
> majority numerically to assert any linguistic
> dominance. There are no linguistic minorities
> either in a legal or in an informal sense
> (Mayer, 1951:162).
>
> . . . . The attitude of the Swiss to their
> religious differences is much the same as
> their attitude to their language differences.
> After a long rivalry which once attained a
> degree of passionate violence difficult to
> imagine today, religious peace prevailed. And
> now there is not a single Swiss who imagines
> the national unity could be furthered by any
> particular confessional preference (Siegfried,
> 1956:50).

What are the foundations for linguistic and

religious coexistence? What disadvantages do the minori-

ties face? Are there mechanisms in Swiss society that

help to compensate for their numerical weakness? These
are the questions which will be addressed in this chapter.
First we shall turn our attention to the composition and
demographic characteristics of the Swiss population.

Linguistic and Religious Composition

Switzerland combines great linguistic and religi-
ous diversity into one small area. There are 6.3 million
inhabitants according to the 1970 census who speak four
languages, as well as several dialects, and are divided
into two major religions and several minor religious
sects. If we look at the proportion of Swiss citizens
only, we find that in 1970 some 74 percent were German-
speaking, 20 percent were French-speaking, 4 percent were
Italian-speaking, and 1 percent spoke Romansch, a minor
language spoken in a few Alpine valleys in the canton of
Grisons. Since the Reformation, Switzerland has been
fairly evenly divided along religious lines. Fifty-five
percent of the Swiss citizens are Protestant and 43
percent are Roman Catholic (Annuaire Statistique de la
Suisse, 1976:28,30). Figures II-1 and II-2 show the
geographic distribution of the different linguistic and
religious groups.

Focusing first on the linguistic diversity, we
find that the proportions speaking the four languages

Map labels: Schaffhausen, Thurgau, Basel, Aargau, Zurich, Solothurn, Appenzell, Zug, St. Gallen, Lucerne, Schwyz, Neutchâtel, Glarus, Unterwalden, Bern, Uri, Vaud, Fribourg, Grisons, Geneva, Valais, Ticino

Legend:
- German
- French
- Italian
- Romansch

FIGURE II-1

Geographic Distribution of Language Groups in Switzerland

FIGURE II-2

Geographic Distribution of Religions in Switzerland

Legend:
- 0-25 % Protestant
- 25-50% Protestant
- 50-75% Protestant
- 75-100% Protestant

have not changed significantly in recent decades (see

Table II-1). At most, we can discern a slight increase

in the number of German-speaking Swiss resulting from

the fact that the birth rate is higher in the German-

speaking cantons, particularly in the Catholic ones.

Although the difference in fertility might at first

glance be expected to disturb the linguistic balance, it

is offset by two compensating factors. First, the differ-

ence in fertility between the French- and German-speaking

areas of the country has been partly mitigated by the

relatively high birth rate in the predominantly, French-

speaking, Catholic cantons of Fribourg and Valais.

Secondly, and more noteworthy, are the differences in

internal migration. The French regions of the country

have proved much more attractive to German-speaking mi-

grants than the German regions to French-speaking Swiss.

Furthermore, the German Swiss migrants tend to become

rapidly assimilated. By comparison, the few French

Swiss who move into the German-speaking part of Switzer-

land take much longer to assimilate (Mayer, 1952:167-70;

Siegfried, 1956:75).[2]

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[2]As an example, I met a Romand family, whose son
after living in Zurich for the majority of his life,
returned to French Switzerland to attend university
Likewise, the parents returned to French Switzerland
after retirement. Other families I encountered had re-
tained French as their family language after three or more

TABLE II-1.--Percentage of Swiss citizens by mother tongue (with
figures for total resident population including foreigners
in parentheses)

Census	German		French		Italian		Romansch	
1880	--	(71.3)	--	(21.4)	--	(5.7)	--	(1.4)
1910	72.7	(69.1)	22.1	(21.1)	3.9	(8.1)	1.2	(1.1)
1930	73.7	(71.9)	21.0	(20.4)	4.0	(6.0)	1.2	(1.1)
1950	74.1	(72.1)	20.6	(20.3)	4.0	(5.9)	1.1	(1.0)
1960	74.4	(69.3)	20.2	(18.9)	4.1	(9.5)	1.0	(0.9)
1970	74.5	(64.9)	20.1	(18.1)	4.0	(11.9)	1.0	(0.8)

Source: Annuaire Statistique de la Suisse (1976:28).

As in the case of language, there has also existed a religious equilibrium for many years as shown in Table II-2. Among the Swiss citizens, the proportion of Catholics has increased slightly since 1910, partly as a result of the naturalization of Catholic aliens, of whom 70-80,000 were granted Swiss citizenship between 1910 and 1930, but mostly as a result of fertility differentials between Catholics and Protestants (Mayer, 1952: 180-181). On the other hand, if we consider the entire population of Switzerland, including resident foreigners, we find that the increase in the Catholic population is much more dramatic. This is due to the large number of foreign workers, primarily from Italy, who adhere to the Catholic faith.

Taken together, the linguistic and religous components provide a mosaic of great complexity. It is one of the fortunate accidents of Swiss history that the linguistic and religious boundaries do not coincide, but often serve to offset one another. Thus, there are Protestant majorities in two French-speaking cantons, Vaud with 61 percent and Neuchâtel with 58 percent. Geneva is divided between the two faiths, and Valais and

---

generations in German Switzerland. A large French church in Zurich (known locally as the französische Kirche helps to unite the Romand community).

TABLE II-2.--Percentage of Swiss citizens by religion (with figures
for total resident population including foreigners
in parentheses)

Census	Protestant		Catholic		Jew		Others	
1880	--	(58.5)	--	(40.8)	--	(0.3)	--	(0.4)
1910	61.4	(56.1)	37.8	(42.5)	0.2	(0.5)	0.6	(0.9)
1930	60.0	(57.3)	38.6	(41.0)	0.3	(0.4)	1.1	(1.3)
1950	58.5	(56.3)	40.3	(42.2)	0.2	(0.4)	1.0	(1.1)
1960	57.1	(52.7)	41.9	(45.9)	0.2	(0.4)	0.8	(1.0)
1970	55.0	(47.8)	43.4	(49.7)	0.2	(0.3)	1.4	(2.2)

Source: Annuaire Statistique de la Suisse (1976:30).

Fribourg, the two bilingual cantons with French-speaking majorities, are both strongly Catholic. German Switzerland also reflects a great diversity of religion. Nine German-speaking cantons or half cantons are predominantly Catholic, and seven cantons or half cantons have Protestant majorities, with Aargau split almost exactly between the two faiths. Ticino, the only Italian-speaking canton is overwhelmingly Catholic, but the Romansch-speakers of the Grisons like the French and German-speaking Swiss are divided into Protestant and Catholic areas (see Table II-3).

Federalism and the Ethnic Factor

One of the most important characteristics of the Swiss linguistic and religious pattern is its close link with federalism. Switzerland is a federation of twenty-five cantons and half cantons which are sovereign in all matters except those expressly delegated to the federal government. The great majority of the cantons are officially unilingual. Therefore, although Switzerland maintains more than one official language, the languages are spoken in clearly defined territorial areas. The cantons of Geneva, Vaud, and Neuchâtel are French-speaking, Ticino is Italian-speaking, and the cantons of Zurich, Bern, Lucerne, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden (composed of two half cantons; Obwalden and Nidwalden), Glarus, Zug, Solothurn,

TABLE II-3. --Percentage of Protestants and Catholics in the population of the Swiss cantons, 1837-1970

Cantons	Protestants						Catholics					
	1837	1860	1888	1910	1941	1970	1837	1860	1888	1910	1941	1970
Appenzell A. -Rh.	100. 0	95. 4	91. 6	88. 0	86. 6	69. 8	0. 0	4. 5	8. 2	11. 8	13. 0	27. 6
Zurich	99. 6	95. 3	87. 1	75. 9	74. 5	59. 5	0. 4	4. 2	11. 8	21. 8	23. 1	36. 7
Schaffhausen	99. 0	92. 8	86. 9	77. 8	78. 2	64. 2	1. 0	7. 0	12. 6	21. 8	21. 0	31. 9
Vaud	98. 1	93. 6	90. 9	82. 0	82. 1	60. 7	1. 9	6. 0	8. 7	16. 3	16. 7	36. 1
Neuchâtel	95. 9	88. 3	87. 3	84. 2	83. 5	57. 9	4. 1	10. 6	11. 5	13. 9	15. 2	38. 4
Basel-Land	94. 2	80. 7	78. 6	74. 8	75. 3	57. 7	5. 8	18. 9	20. 9	24. 7	23. 8	39. 1
Bern	87. 0	86. 8	87. 0	84. 9	85. 8	75. 2	13. 0	12. 5	12. 5	14. 2	13. 6	23. 3
Glarus	86. 4	82. 7	76. 7	72. 0	68. 4	55. 5	13. 6	17. 2	23. 1	27. 9	31. 4	49. 3
Basel-Stadt	85. 0	75. 0	67. 9	63. 7	64. 9	52. 7	15. 0	24. 0	30. 0	33. 5	30. 7	40. 7
Thurgau	76. 2	75. 2	70. 9	63. 4	67. 0	55. 0	23. 8	24. 4	28. 9	35. 9	32. 6	43. 5
Geneva	62. 6	48. 3	48. 3	45. 5	54. 6	38. 0	37. 4	50. 8	49. 6	49. 6	41. 8	53. 4
Grisons	61. 6	56. 0	54. 8	51. 0	51. 5	45. 9	38. 4	44. 0	45. 1	48. 6	48. 0	52. 9
Aargau	51. 6	53. 6	54. 9	55. 7	57. 8	47. 3	48. 4	45. 5	44. 4	43. 6	41. 5	48. 8
St. Gallen	37. 0	38. 5	40. 4	38. 3	39. 8	34. 8	63. 0	61. 4	59. 3	60. 9	59. 4	63. 6
Fribourg	9. 9	14. 7	15. 6	13. 7	13. 4	13. 4	90. 1	85. 3	84. 3	86. 1	86. 3	85. 8
Solothurn	9. 5	13. 8	25. 3	33. 3	40. 5	37. 3	90. 5	86. 1	74. 4	66. 1	58. 6	59. 1
Lucerne	4. 4	2. 0	5. 7	10. 2	13. 0	13. 4	95. 6	98. 0	94. 1	89. 1	86. 2	85. 2
Valais	0. 4	0. 8	0. 8	2. 3	3. 6	4. 4	99. 6	99. 2	99. 2	97. 0	96. 1	94. 9
Zug	0. 0	3. 1	5. 9	9. 1	14. 8	17. 4	100. 0	96. 8	93. 9	90. 7	84. 9	80. 6
Schwyz	0. 0	1. 2	2. 0	4. 0	6. 5	7. 9	100. 0	98. 8	98. 0	95. 9	93. 4	91. 3
Appenzell I. -Rh.	0. 0	1. 0	5. 2	6. 3	3. 8	4. 7	100. 0	99. 0	94. 8	93. 7	96. 0	94. 9
Obwalden	0. 0	0. 7	2. 2	3. 0	4. 0	4. 2	100. 0	99. 3	97. 8	97. 0	95. 9	95. 4
Uri	0. 0	0. 3	2. 1	5. 7	8. 3	6. 6	100. 0	99. 7	97. 8	94. 1	91. 6	93. 1
Nidwalden	0. 0	0. 4	0. 9	1. 7	6. 8	8. 9	100. 0	99. 6	99. 1	98. 3	93. 0	90. 2
Ticino	0. 0	0. 1	0. 8	2. 4	5. 5	7. 8	100. 0	99. 9	98. 9	94. 0	92. 6	89. 8

Source: Bickel, Bevölkerungsgeschichte (1947:299) and Annuaire Statistique de la Suisse (1976:36).

Basel (which is divided into Basel Stadt and Basel Land),
Schaffhausen, Appenzell (which consists of Appenzell Inner
Rhoden and Appenzell Outer Rhoden), St. Gallen, Aargau,
and Thurgau are German-speaking. Only three are bilingual,
German and French being spoken in the cantons of Bern,
Fribourg, and Valais, and one in trilingual, German,
Italian, and Romansch being spoken in the Grisons (see
Figures II-1).

The federal principle and the geographical concen-
tration of the languages have given rise to the principle
of territoriality (Territorialitätsprinzip or Territori-
alprinzip). It maintains that the four national languages
are not only guaranteed their usage in public, but
furthermore, each language territory has the right to pro-
tect and defend its own linguistic character and to insure
its survival (Schäppi, 1971:59). The principle of terri-
toriality is not expressly guaranteed in the Constitution.
However, as the Swiss jurist Walter Burckhardt has noted:

> It is now a tacitly recognized principle that
> each locality should be able to retain its
> traditional language regardless of immigrants
> of other languages, and consequently that
> linguistic boundaries once settled should not
> be shifted, neither to the detriment of the
> majority nor of minorities. It is trust in
> this tacit agreement that provides a foundation
> for peaceful relations among the language
> groups. Each group must be sure that the others
> do not wish to make conquests at its expense
> and diminish its territory, either officially or
> by private action. Adherence to this rule, as
> well as respect of each group for the

individuality of the others, is an obligation
of Swiss loyalty. It is no less sacred because
it is not laid down in law; it is one of the
foundations of our state itself.[3]

Swiss authors refer to the ability of the canton
to regulate all cantonal affairs involving language, not
explicitly designated to the federal government, as
"kantonale Sprachhoheit" or linguistic sovereignty. Thus
the canton (in accordance with the principle of terri-
toriality) determines the official cantonal language (or in
a few cases languages). The cantonal language is the
medium of instruction in the public schools. In addition,
all cantonal laws and regulations are issued only in the
official language(s). While compromises are made in
practice, the cantons have no legal obligation to provide
translations or deal with citizens in languages other than
their own.

In contrast to the principle of territoriality
which operates at the cantonal level, is the principle of
personality (Personitätsprinzip) which functions on the
federal level. It regulates the relations between the
individual and the federal government. According to

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[3]Walter Burckhardt, Kommentar de schweizerischen
Bundesverfassung quoted in McRae (1964:11-12). See also
Cyril Hegnauer, Das Sprachenrecht der Schweiz (1947:56)
and Mario M. Pedrazzini, La lingua italiana nel diritto
federale svizzero (1952:114).

Article 116 of the Constitution, in direct dealings

between the citizen and the Confederation, and vice versa,

the federal government must adapt to the language of the

individual within the limits of the official languages.

As we have previously noted "German, French, and

Italian are the official languages of the Confederation."

This simple provision has been construed to allow for the

complete equality of the languages. Members of both Swiss

houses of Parliament are free to speak in the language of

their choice. The texts of federal laws are published in

all three languages, and all three texts have equal status

before the courts. However, because Italian (which is

spoken by only 4 percent of the Swiss citizens) is the

weakest of the three official languages, and is not under-

stood by a majority of French- and German-speakers, it

suffers practical disadvantages in both the public and

governmental spheres (McRae, 1964:18-19, 24-25).

In 1938 Romansch was recognized as the fourth

"national language." As opposed to the three "official

languages," it does not have official status in the parli-

amentary, administrative, and judicial sphere of the

federal government. The Romansch group that compaigned

for the recognition of its language as one of the national

languages of Switzerland was aware of the burden and ex-

pense of an additional administrative language. It wanted

a commitment to the principle of a fourth national
language, rather than to have Romansch recognized as an
official language. By adopting a referendum to this
effect, the Swiss people stressed the political and cul-
tural importance of the Latin element in the Confederation,
and in so doing they helped to neutralize the effects of
irredentist propaganda eminating from Fascist Italy claim-
ing that Romansch dialects were forms of Italian. Cur-
rently, the Confederation authorizes yearly sums for the
preservation and furtherance of the cultural and linguistic
individuality of the Ticino and the Italian- and Romansch-
speaking communities of the Grisons.[4]

At the cantonal level, there has been a tendency
toward equality of languages in the multilingual cantons.
However, even today this equality is not in all cases
complete. The Grisons have had a long history of peaceful

---

[4]In 1970 the annual subsidy to the Ticino and the
Italian valleys of the Grisons was 285,000 Swiss francs,
while the Romansch-speaking group in the Grisons received
a yearly sum of 190,000 Swiss francs. The general aim of
these federal grants is to protect and strengthen the
cultural and linguistic heritage of the region. This
includes a wide range of activities including courses on
language and literature, encouragement of writers and
artists, subsidies for publication, etc. Although the
sums have increased slightly in recent years, especially
for the Romansch-speaking group, the psychological value
of federal support often seems more valuable than the
monetary sum. See, Peter Schäppi, Der Schutz sprachlicher
und konfessioneller Minderheiten   (1971).

relations among the German-speaking majority and the Romansch- and Italian-speaking minorities. Of the four multilingual cantons it is the only one that has never been ruled by one linguistic group (Weilenmann, 1925:153). It is also noted for its extreme local autonomy, wherein the local communities are able to regulate to a considerable degree their own affairs regarding language and other matters, most notably the schools (Casaulta, 1966:41; Allemann, 1965:537, 548). While German, Italian, and Romansch are all official cantonal languages, and although each language group is more or less proportionately represented in official positions, in practice Romansch suffers serious disabilities in the publication of laws and decrees, in the cantonal administration, and in the courts. German is the main working language of the cantonal authorities, and only the German version of cantonal laws is recognized as authentic in the courts. Nevertheless, the German speakers in the Grisons make no effort to exert political power over the smaller language groups.

In Bern the problems of bilingualism arose as a consequence of the annexation of the Jura district in 1815, when the victorious powers at the Congress of Vienna awarded the predominantly French-speaking Jura, the old ecclesiastical principality of Basel, to Bern in compensation for Vaud and Aargau which were taken away. The Jura

was not consulted about this decision and at least latent tension has existed between the predominantly French-speaking Jura and the German-speaking old canton ever since. Nevertheless, the thrust of the problem seems to be centered around the issue of autonomy rather than linguistic grievances (Kommission der 24, 1968:92-101). French became recognized as an official language of the canton in the liberal constitution of 1831, but full equality of the languages (including authenticity of both languages in courts of laws), did not take place until 1950.

In Valais, in its 1844 Constitution, both French and German were declared official cantonal languages. Up until the French Revolution, however, the German-speaking Oberwalliser were politically dominant over the French speakers, and there was considerable tension between the language groups. The current situation is one of language peace. Both languages are used in public life. The French and German language groups being proportionately represented in elective and appointive public life. The legal status of the two languages is also equal with both texts of a law considered authentic by the courts (Grichting, 1959:74-80).

Fribourg, like Valais, was ruled by a German-speaking population until the French Revolution, and was

marked by linguistic conflicts in the first part of the nineteenth century. However, in contrast to Valais, when the French majority came to power after 1830 it attempted to dominate the German Fribourgers. It made French the only official language of the canton, and the only language to be used in civil courts. With the reaction of 1814 German once again became dominant, while the liberal constitution of 1831 turned the table once more making French the official language of the canton. Only in 1857 were both German and French admitted as administrative languages (Weilenmann, 1925:212-215). Even today the French text of cantonal laws is considered authoritative.

Communal autonomy helps to safeguard linguistic minorities in the multilingual cantons. Here the principle of territoriality finds application so that in most of these communities only one language is spoken. This insures that local communities can preserve their own identity. In predominantly French-speaking Valais and Fribourg, which tend to see themselves as part of French Switzerland and which are sensitive to their minority language position in the Confederation as a whole, the minority protecting function of local autonomy benefits the German language group. The German-speaking citizens constitute almost one-third of the population in both cantons. Communal autonomy is also important for the

Romansch-speaking group who only comprise a majority when the smallest unit of government is taken into consideration. On the level of the next highest adminstrative unit, the district (Kreis) we find only three Romansch-speaking Kreise. However, when communes are considered there are seventy-six which contain over 70 percent Romansch speakers (Schäppi, 1971:143-144).

Religious, as well as linguistic pluralism is closely linked with federalism in Switzerland. Although the principle of territoriality no longer holds in matters of religion, it was a ruling principle until 1848.[5] The Reformation plunged the Confederation into two hostile camps. After the second Kappel War in 1531 this situation was resolved in an uneasy peace that established the principle that each "sovereign" canton decided on its own religion. There were in fact, if not in law, two Confederations then--one Catholic, the other Protestant. The

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[5]Christopher Hughes (1975:75) comments, that since 1848 in religion the personal principle has prevailed over the territorial, while with language the territorial has taken precedence over the personal. Previously the position was reversed. "The old regime dealt with the religious problem on the territorial principle, and the language problem on the personal principle--the Bernese spoke French to their Vaudois subjects, and the administration of the Italian bailiwicks was chiefly in Italian." The Catholic religion, however, was unlawful in the Protestant territories, as was the reformed in the Catholic ones.

Catholic cantons, allied in a separate league since 1586, had a Diet of their own in Lucerne, while the Protestant cantons had theirs in Aarau.

As we previously observed, it was not until 1848 that the two major faiths were reconciled. The constitution of 1848 broke down the main barriers that had separated the Swiss cantons for over three hundred years. It guaranteed the right of migration to Swiss of both Christian faiths. The Jews, however, did not gain full equality of citizenship until 1866. The constitution also contained until 1973 articles banning the Jesuits and prohibiting the establishment of new monasteries or religious orders. These provisions were specifically directed against the Catholic Church and were influenced by the Kulturkampf (a struggle between the Catholic Church and the lay powers of the state) and the excitement created in Switzerland by the Pope's proclamation of infallibility. Today religious intolerance has given way to mutual tolerance with the majority of the cantons recognizing both Christian faiths.

Under the Federal Constitution matters pertaining to primary education and marriage,[6] and the registration

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[6]Codding (1961:52) notes that the "right to marry" was placed under the protection of the Confederation to curb earlier practices of the Catholic church. As a result the civil ceremony of marriage is the only one legal

of births and deaths are under the jurisdiction of the federal government. However, in keeping with the decentralized and federal character of the Swiss state, the cantons are free to pass laws concerning state-church relations so long as they do not violate the freedoms and rights mentioned in the Federal Constitution. They may create a single state church, or many, or none as they deem appropriate. Although the control of the public schools must come under the civil authority, this does not exclude priests from participating as members of school boards or on cantonal supervisory commissions (Stöckli, 1970:42). Freedom of religion is not so much a principle for the shaping of the public schools and their educational system, but rather, negatively, a guarantee for the individual, that his religious freedom shall be preserved in the school. Article 27 states that:

> The public schools shall be such that they may be attended by adherents of any religious confession without any offense to their freedom of belief and conscience.

Instruction, with the exception of religious classes, which are not compulsory, must be in matters of faith neutral. But this protection is relative. It does not mean that the instruction has to be unreligious. It

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in the eyes of the law. Burial laws were likewise de-confessionalized.

is quite possible for clergymen (with the previous long-
standing exception of the Jesuits) to be teachers. This
is, in fact, very much the case in the rural areas of the
Catholic cantons. Article 27 does not require that each
public school has to be open to students of all faiths
although this is by far the predominant practice, but only,
that for each faith a public school has to be open which
does not offend the above stated principle. This com-
promise allows the Catholic cantons to preserve their
identity without either offending the principle of the
separation of church and state, which has often been a
source of contention between the liberal urban Protestant
cantons and the more conservative rural Catholic cantons,
or having to resort to two school systems, as in the case
of Canada.

Through the federal system of government, the
linguistic and religious minorities have been able to pro-
tect substantially autonomous bases for their own cultures.
The system of local autonomy, coupled with a high ethnic
concentration, allows most Swiss to live in relatively
homogeneous territories, even though they are citizens of
a highly diversified nation. Hans Huber (1964:10), a past
Justice of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, has noted
that the purpose of the federal structure is to protect
linguistic and cultural minorities. However, most

institutions are not aimed primarily at giving protection
to minorities against majorities. Rather, they are the
pillars of the Swiss federal system and their minority
protecting functions are a fortuitious by-product.

In addition, federalism as practiced in Switzerland
today has multiple effects on the moderation of political
conflict. By granting substantial powers to the cantons,
the Constitution not only provides for an elaborate set of
checks and balances, but it also "gives its seal to a
horizontal segmentation of social and political life" (Kerr,
1974:27-31; 1975:7; Lijphart, 1977). Many issues are medi-
ated on the cantonal or communal level which might be more
intractable at the national level.

Nevertheless, while the laws and institutional
arrangements governing linguistic and religious minorities
in the Confederation do provide the necessary preconditions
for the well being of minorities, they do not completely
explain the secret of Swiss coexistence. To grasp with
any clarity the interrelationship between the linguistic
and religious groups one must turn to the social milieu
within which they interact.

Informal Practices and Social Patterns

One of the most notable factors in the realm of
language is the widespread use of dialect in German-

speaking Switzerland. This, oddly enough, has many important consequences for the relations between the majority and minority language groups. There are over 20 different German Swiss dialects that can be distinguished. They differ both from each other and from high German (Schwanzenbach, 1969). Swiss German or Schwyzerdütsch, in one of its many forms is the normal language of the German Swiss in daily life and at all levels of society. Although Swiss German does not enjoy official recognition the German-speaking cantons hold tenaciously to their own dialects as a means of preserving their individual identity. There are few things that are more deserving of caricature than relatives or friends who speak a different dialect. These "foreigners" may live but a short distance away. For example, I once heard a Zurcher joke that he could barely understand his Solothurner girl friend, by which he meant that a few words were incomprehensible to him. One of the consequences of this diversity within German Switzerland, is that it is viewed as less of a threat in the eyes of the other language groups than would be a monolithic language block of the same size.

While all German Swiss children learn high German in school, it is simply never used in ordinary conversation. When ninth grade students and their teachers were asked their opinion about dialect and high German they

replied that the dialect was more sympathetic, honest and personal, as well as easier to understand and express oneself in. In addition, it gave one the feeling of belonging together. In contrast high German was constraining, artificial, and formal (Joos, 1975; 1974). The tension between "speaking a language they do not write, and writing a language they seldom speak" may well give German Swiss more motivation to learn additional languages.

The Italian- and Romansch-speaking Swiss also have their own dialects. The Ticinesi, learn standard Italian in the schools just as the German Swiss learn high German. On the other hand, Romansch is sufficiently distinct in the different mountain valleys, that cantonal authorities publish elementary school texts in four different Romansch idioms. The two main forms of Romansch are Surselvisch, spoken in the predominantly Catholic gorges of the Rhine, and Ladin, spoken in the Engadin. Between the two areas are Sutselvisch and Surmeirisch, which only became written languages in modern times (Peer and Pult, 1974; Peer, 1975).

Unlike the other Swiss groups, the French Swiss do not, on the whole, speak dialect. Their language like that of the French-speaking Walloons is simply a regional variation of standard French. Siegfried (1956:63) remarked in 1950 that while "there are Franco-Provencal

patois in use between the Jura and the Alps, for the French-speaking Swiss the French tongue is something quite different from what German is for the Alemanic Swiss. French is both a spoken and a written language for the Swiss Romands. It is not merely a language for familiar everyday use, but one for cultural and business affairs as well."

Although in everyday dealings, the average Swiss citizen is usually in the presence of others that share his mother tongue, when Swiss of different language groups converse, either face to face or through written correspondence, pluralingualism is put to a test. There has been little research on bi- and multilingualism in Switzerland, however, one can not fail to notice that many Swiss have a command of one or more foreign languages. A recent representative sample of French-and German-speaking Swiss, 20 years and older, found that two-thirds had a working knowledge of at least one other official language. Sixty-five percent of the German Swiss had a knowledge of French, while fifty-two percent of French Swiss had a command of German (Scope, 1973:8, 11). This fact has important consequences for the linguistic situation in Switzerland.

For many reasons--numerical, psychological, and social/political--the most important majority-minority

relation in Switzerland today is the one between French-
and German-speaking Swiss. Therefore, it is significant
that when French and German Swiss speak together, or
correspond with one another, the language is most apt to
be French not merely in French Switzerland but in German
Switzerland as well. In part, this is done as a courtesy
to a minority language group. However, this explanation
is not adequate for this courtesy is not extended to the
other minority languages. Two factors appear to explain
this tendency. First, as we have seen, there is the obvi-
ous factor of competence--more German Swiss have some
knowledge of French than do French Swiss of German.
Second, is the prestige of the French language in Switzer-
land which, McRae (1964:17) observes "serves as an effec-
tive counterbalance to its numerical weakness." "We have
the numbers, but the Romands have the culture" one German
Swiss university student remarked to me. This prestige
can be traced back to the use of French by ruling aristo-
cracies in several German cantons from the seventeenth to
the end of the eighteenth century, and to its use long
afterward as a language of culture and diplomacy. The
relative decline in the international prestige of French
has not been felt as severely in Switzerland as in some
other countries. One prime reason for this situation is
the horror at which the Swiss viewed the period of Nazi

domination in Germany. This event destroyed all traces
of Pan-Germanism in cultural and linguistic matters, and
thus most of the incentive to assert the merits of the
German language and civilization vis-a-vis the French
culture.

Although French is now facing a strong competition
from English, German Swiss endeavor to learn French,
sometimes spending a "Welschlandjahr" in French Switzer-
land for this purpose. The French Swiss seldom recipro-
cate on this point[7] both because they find the Swiss
German dialects difficult to grasp and because they prefer
to learn "le bon allemand." Even when a French Swiss is
capable of speaking German, he will usually attempt to
converse in French. A French-speaking teacher from Biel
told me he always started conversations in public places
in French, resorting to German only if necessary. This,
in spite of the fact that he spoke both fluent high German
and dialect. Nevertheless, this same teacher was con-
cerned about the French and German language groups going
their separate ways in Biel and was looking into the

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[7]"Welsche" (originally meaning foreign) is the
word used by the German Swiss to describe the French Swiss.
A recent exchange program between young adults in French
and German Switzerland met with a qualified success. Few
Romand applied for the project while there were many will-
ing German Swiss. See Der Brückenbauer, January 1, 1977
(Zurich).

possibility of having German and French secondary students combine for art and physical education classes. This case illustrates some of the paradoxes of the Swiss language situation.

Another informal language practice which deserves mentioning is the use of high German rather than dialect on occasions when German Swiss address their fellow citizens of other languages, in their own tongue. This is done as a convenience and a courtesy to the other language groups, who would have more difficulty understanding dialect.[8] On less formal occasions, such as when a compatriot of another language group or a foreigner asks directions, the German Swiss also almost always replies in high German.

Informally as well as in administrative-judicial matters, the linguistic territories are recognized. For example, the ticket collector walks down the train calling for tickets in German until the invisible frontier is passed at which time he continues through the train in French. Furthermore, infringements of other languages in

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[8]One exception to this situation occurs in the canton of Bern. The Bernese have had a long tradition of speaking Bärndütsch in the Grand Council. While this practice reinforces the peculiar identity of Bern, at the same time it has irritated the French-speaking Jurassians. See Werner Hadorn, Stefan Kaspar, et al. (1971:18).

their territorial space--particularly in the case of the
minority language areas of French and Italian--are likely
to come under fire. Recently there was a loud protest
when the restaurant chain "Silberkugel" wanted to open up
a branch under its German name in Lausanne (National
Zeitung, Basel, October 16, 1976).[9] In the Ticino,
threatened by an onslaught of germanizzazione a particularly
dramatic measure was taken. The canton in 1931 passed a
language decree insisting that Italian signs precede any
other language, and that translations, if they appeared,
be limited to letters no more than half its size. In addi-
tion, these signs were subject to a small tax.[10]

Italian, in contrast to French and German which
meet on more or less equal terms, is spoken by relatively
few French- and German-speaking Swiss. Thus the Italian
Swiss must be fluent in either French or German or both
for any career that transcends the purely local level.
For professional jobs this condition becomes a necessity

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[9]There appears to be more of a sensitivity toward
German than toward other languages. A McDonald's ham-
burger stand was constructed in Geneva without any com-
ment. Whether this is due to the more international
atmosphere of Geneva or to the lesser sensitivity to the
English language is difficult to ascertain.

[10]The Federal Tribunal later ruled that while
cantons are legally competent to regulate language usage,
it would be against the spirit of the Federal Constitution
without compelling reasons. Only the restriction on the
letter size of words was struck down.

since there are no Italian-speaking universities in
Switzerland,[11] although there are two chairs in Ticino
law at the University of Bern and some classes (particu-
larly introductory ones and those of a cultural nature)
are offered at the Federal Institute of Technology in
Zurich. In fact, a great many Ticinesi are fluent in
German and French, and assimilate rapidly in a German or
French milieu. The opposite, however, is less true.
Particularly when the German Swiss migrates to the Ticino,
assimilation proceeds much more slowly.

The position of Romansch is even more precarious
than Italian. Although a few classes are offered at the
Volkshochschule in Zurich, a negligible number of other
Swiss learn the language. Thus, the Romansch Swiss must
adjust to the use of a second language everywhere he turns
outside a few mountain valleys in the Grisons. In
general, Romansch speakers have met this challenge, and
are known for their mastery of other languages. It fol-
lows that they easily adapt to a new language milieu. On
the other hand, when the German Swiss moves to the Grisons

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[11]There is, of course, the possibility of attend-
ing university in Italy. The question of a Italian-
speaking university has been discussed for over a century.
The general consensus seems to be that the Ticino does not
have the financial means to support one. See M.M.
Pedrazzini, La lingua nel diritto federale svizzero
(1952).

it is the Romansch Swiss who faces the greater risk of
assimilation by the far stronger German culture. In some
cases, communal autonomy has proved a danger rather than
a safeguard to the survival of Romansch. For it is the
privilege of a community to change its school language,
which quite a few have done in recent years, preferring
the utility of German to the limited usage of Romansch.
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that there are
limited possibilities for jobs in the Romansch-speaking
areas. The extent of this problem becomes obvious when
one realizes that over 2,500 Romansch-speaking people live
in Zurich, where they are more numerous than in any other
commune with the exception of Chur (3,300), and that
approximately one-fourth of the 50,000 Romansch speakers
live in German or French Switzerland or abroad (Hughes,
1975:58; Peer and Pult, 1974:4). Table II-4 illustrates
the difficulty of preserving the Romansch tongue, even on
its home ground.

From an economic standpoint, there are no out-
standing disparities between French and German Switzerland[12]
(see Table II-5). The three monolingual French-speaking

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[12]Nevertheless, there is an awareness among some
French Swiss that much of the real economic wealth and
power is located east of the Sarine in Zurich, Basel, and
Bern, and that many key posts in Swiss industry are monopo-
lized by German-speakers.

TABLE II-4.--Romansch-speakers in the confederation and the canton of Grisons

	Swiss population	Romansch	%
1941	4,265,703	46,456	1.1
1950	4,714,992	48,862	1.0
1960	5,429,061	49,823	0.9
1970	6,269,783	50,339	0.8
	Population of Grisons	Romansch	%
1941	128,247	40,187	31.3
1950	137,100	40,109	29.2
1960	147,458	38,414	26.1
1970	162,086	37,878	23.4

Source: Steinberg, Why Switzerland? (1976:115).

TABLE II-5.--Gross cantonal product, 1975

Canton	Gross Cantonal Product Per Capita Sfrs.	Relation- ship to the Swiss Average %	Gross Cantonal Product Million Sfr.	Percentage of Swiss National Product
Basel Stadt	32,831	172	7,163.7	5.87
Geneva	27,128	143	9,190.8	7.54
Zug	26,886	141	1,978.8	1.62
Zurich	23,245	122	26,269.9	21.57
Basel Land	20,113	106	4,471.1	3.67
Vaud	18,771	99	9,883.1	8.11
Glarus	18,614	98	685.0	0.56
Schaffhausen	18,273	96	1,306.5	1.07
Aargau	18,262	96	8,190.3	6.72
Neuchâtel	18,169	95	3,054.2	2.51
Solothurn	17,627	93	4,011.9	3.29
Bern	16,585	87	16,568.9	13.59
Nidwalden	16,023	84	429.4	0.35
Thurgau	15,964	84	2,982.2	2.45
Ticino	15,910	84	4,240.1	3.48
Grisons	15,901	84	2,649.1	2.17
Lucerne	15,468	81	4,550.6	3.73
Appenzell Outer Rhoden	15,330	81	735.8	0.60
St. Gallen	15,199	80	5,904.8	4.84
Valais	14,494	76	3,126.4	2.56
Schwyz	13,102	69	1,223.8	1.00
Uri	13,132	69	453.1	0.37
Fribourg	12,996	68	2,371.7	1.95
Obwalden	11,739	62	302.9	0.25
Appenzell Inner Rhoden	11,398	60	153.9	0.13

Source: "Das Volkseinkommen der Kantone, 1970-1975," published by the Schweizerischen Bankgesellschaft, Zurich, 1976.

cantons (Geneva, Vaud, and Neuchâtel) have per capita incomes which are above the majority of German-speaking cantons. On the other hand, the two predominantly French-speaking cantons of Valais and Fribourg are considerably below most of the German-speaking cantons, and even below Italian-speaking Ticino. It is noteworthy that the disparities are far greater within each linguistic group than between them. On the whole, French Switzerland is economically represented in almost exact proportion to her numerical strength. In 1975 the French Swiss comprised approximately 20 percent of the Swiss population, produced 22.4 percent of the Swiss national product, and earned 22.7 percent of the income received in Switzerland, an average of Swiss francs 19,297 per capita compared to Swiss francs 19,036 per capita for Switzerland as a whole (Tages Anzeiger, Zurich (foreign edition), December 21, 1976). Even the major cities are well distributed with two of the five largest in French Switzerland (Geneva and Lausanne) and three in German Switzerland (Zurich, Basel, and Bern).

In contrast to French and German Switzerland, Italian Switzerland is poor, although among all the cantons it ranks approximately in the lower middle range. It has no major industries and only limited agricultural land. In recent years Ticino has attracted many tourists and German-speakers from German Switzerland and Germany. However,

although this migration has brought needed revenues, it
has also intensified the weak linguistic position Italian
Switzerland occupies in the Confederation. Despite this
situation, the relationship between German Switzerland
and Ticino does not only have negative aspects. A
strong feeling of togetherness also plays a role, a
feeling which Vollenweider (1975:74) points out "is
stronger between the Ticino and German Switzerland than
between German and French Switzerland."

From a cultural standpoint it is of considerable
significance that Switzerland's three official languages
are of major and approximately equal importance. German,
French, and Italian Swiss accept the culture of Germany,
France or Italy as their own and contribute to the liter-
ary life of their respective language group. Neverthe-
less, as Brooks (1930:186-187) points out, Swiss in-
structors emphasize the part played by their own country
men and reject the excesses of the chauvinistic spirit
accompanying the foreign culture abroad, distinguishing
sharply between the culture and the political organiza-
tion of other nations.

An old and often asked question is whether there
exists a Swiss culture (cf. Fick, 1919). The Swiss
literary traditions differ very little from those of the
three larger cultures with which they interact. On the

other hand, Swiss of all language groups seem to share certain values that are foreign to their cultural kin outside Switzerland. These include a devotion to local autonomy, and particularisms, as well as to direct democracy. We shall consider the values and attitudes that both unite and separate the two largest linguistic groups in a later chapter.

Unlike the informal linguistic patterns in Switzerland, the religious patterns are more difficult to characterize. Returning once again to Table II-5, we observe that the per capita income in the predominantly Catholic cantons, with the exception of Zug, are lower than in the majority of old Protestant cantons. The Catholic cantons are, on the whole, rural, mountainous, and lack an industrial base. Although in 1970 nine and one half cantons (including Apenzell Inner Rhoden) re-mained overwhelmingly Catholic (90 percent or more) they encompassed only 34 percent of all Catholics in Switzer-land. While no statistics are available it appears that Catholics who have migrated to the industrial cantons share the same high standard of living as their Protes-tant neighbors. One survey also indicates that religious differences do not seem to have any effect on the values, attitudes, and ethical principles concerning basic areas of life. In 1964 Boltanski (1967) found that both

Catholics and Protestants see religion as a guide to behavior, favor rigorous, authoritative education for their children, hard work and fulfillment of duty, and attitudes generally encompassed by what has come to be called the Protestant ethic.

The total rapprochement between Catholic and Protestant is a relatively new phenomenon. Urs Andermatt in Der Weg der Schweizer Katholiken ins Ghetto has traced the slow evolution of Swiss Catholics out of the ghetto towards full integration into Swiss society. After considerable setbacks, a critical period came in the first two decades of the twentieth century with the founding of the Schweizerischen Katholischen Volksverein in 1905, and the Catholic Conservative Party in 1912. This period was followed by the building of a vast associational federation that came to include hospitals, denominational schools, a Catholic trade union, and various social clubs and sports organizations. Thus Andermatt (1972:21) writes that:

> A Catholic might be born in a Catholic hospital, attend Catholic schools from kindergarten to university, read Catholic newspapers and magazines, and vote for the Catholic party and take part in Catholic clubs or associations. It was not unusual for a Catholic to insure himself against sickness or accident with a Catholic company and put his savings in a Catholic savings bank.

Gradually, the organizational completeness and

recognition of the strength of these institutions enabled members of the Catholic subculture to participate with growing confidence in the hitherto liberal-dominated and secular federal political arena, and finally to gain acceptance and complete integration into the larger society. Nevertheless, this was a slow process. One Swiss woman I spoke to informed me that her sister, although Catholic, was not hired at a public school in a predominantly Catholic town in the canton of Aargau because she was not "black" (i.e., traditional) enough. Even a young man in Zurich in his early thirties could remember as a boy that the Catholic paper advertised, shops which good Catholics were urged to patronize. This pattern of withdrawal into a ghetto, which provides self-confidence and economic support as a means to integration into the larger society is a familiar one in the annals of ethnic relations in America.[13]

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[13]See, for example, Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot (1970). Black nationalism may also be seen as a step up the ethnic ladder to full participation in American society. Charles Hamilton and Stokely Carmichael (1967:44) seem to advance this interpretation when they observe:

> The concept of Black power rests on a fundamental premise: Before a group can enter the open society, it must first close ranks. By this we mean that group solidarity is necessary before a group can operate effectively from a bargaining position of strength in a pluralistic society. Traditionally, each new ethnic group in society has found the route to social and

The linguistic cleavage has never reached the intensity of the religious one. Still, a strong pull of conflicting nationalisms was felt during the early years of the twentieth century. Swiss Germans venerated the new Germany produced by Bismarck and looked admiringly toward Heidelberg and Berlin. These attitudes were not shared or comprehended in French Switzerland. A strong wave of irredentism in Italy, which was directed in turn against parts of Austria and southern Switzerland, found support among a small radical circle of intellectuals in the Ticino. The outbreak of World War I in 1914 found Switzerland divided between its three linguistic and cultural groups. A deep fissure which came to be known as the trench or Graben, opened between French and German Switzerland, and threatened to destroy the moral unity of the country. The Swiss Federal council found it necessary in its appeal on October 1, 1914 to reassert "the ideal of our country as a cultural community and as a political idea above the diversity of race and language" (Kohn, 1956:128). Carl Spitteler, a famous Swiss poet, re-echoed this sentiment in 1914 in an address before the New Helvetic Society, entitled "Unser Schweizer

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political viability through the organization of its own institutions with which to represent its needs within the larger society.

Standpunkt." As the war dragged on relations between
French and German Switzerland became entangled with the
issue of neutrality. General Ulrich Wille came under
suspicion for his pro-German bias and Arthur Hoffman,
the Federal Counciller who headed the Political (foreign)
Office was finally forced to resign for his breach of
neutrality. However, by deliberate effort and self-
control neutrality was preserved and the country was
precariously held together.

Twenty years later, when World War II approached,
Switzerland found herself in a strategically more pre-
carious but intellectually more secure position than in
1914. The rise of the European dictatorships led to a
reinforcement of national unity. Italian and German
Switzerland recoiled against the savage nationalism
propagated in Italy and Germany. Even the ties between
French Switzerland and France cooled down after the
establishment of the Vichy regime. McRae (1964:22) ob-
serves that "war-time isolation was temporary, but the
unity that it fostered has been more lasting. If Switzer-
land's three main cultures have had in recent years a
community of outlook that they have never known previously,
they owe it in no small measure to the threat levelled

against them by Hitler and Mussolini."[14] The decades
after World War II have brought some critics to question
whether this commonality of outlook still prevails. The
debate, however, tends to be localized[15] with no clear
consensus and appears rather, to be a symptom of the
general Helvetic malaise.[16]

Recognition of Minorities

Part of the secret of Swiss cultural coexistence
is their recognition and often over-representation of the
minority linguistic and confessional groups. The Federal

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[14]External threats have, on many occasions,
united the Swiss cultural and religious groups. In fact,
this is a recurrent theme in Swiss history.

[15]This issue is currently the subject of an on-
going discussion in Biel-Bienne, a bilingual city in the
canton of Bern. In general, the debate revolves around
whether French and German Swiss communities live together
(miteinander) enriching one another culturally or only
physically exist side by side (nebeneinander). Curiously
enough the main advocate of the miteinander side is a
Belgian, Jacques Lefert, the official town translator,
who is aware of the more polarized nature of Belgian
society. On the side of the nebeneinander interpretation
is German Swiss freelance journalist, Werner Hadorn. See
Jacques Lefert "Le bilinguisme biennois tel que le ressent
un polyglotte" Journal Du Jura, Bienne, October 11, and
October 18, 1976, and Werner Hadorn, "Zuviel Imponier-
gehabe der Majorität?" National Zeitung, Basel, October
16, 1976.

[16]The phrase "Helvetic malaise" was coined by Max
Imboden (1964) to describe the general discontent and
preoccupation with problems of the day. See also Jean
Rohr, La Suisse Contemporaine (1972:21-22).

Council, which is elected by Parliament to a four year term, is composed of seven members from the four major parties; two Liberals, two Catholic Conservatives, two Socialists, and one member from the Farmers Party. This allocation of positions on the Federal Council (which has been called the Magic Formula) is roughly proportional to the parties share of the popular vote. The practice of having all or most major parties represented on the council has a long tradition in Swiss political history. The last step was taken in 1959 when the Socialists were accorded a proportionate share of seats.

Efforts are also taken to include individuals who represent not only the largest parties but also the various subcultures in Swiss society. The constitution provides that no two Federal Concillors may come from the same canton. But a complex network of rules has, in fact, shaped the pattern of representation. Zurich, Bern, and Vaud have been almost continuously represented since 1848, with the Vaud seat assuring at least one French-speaking Councillor. Generally there are two non-Germans, with a seat occasionally going to a Ticinese.[17] Two Catholic seats are assured by the

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[17] Hughes (1962:76) notes that after a turn of not being represented, an Italian-speaker (which usually means a Ticinese) obtains a strong claim to one seat.

composition of the parties, the Catholic Conservatives naturally choosing Catholics. The Liberals and the Farmers select Protestants, and the Socialists a personality whose confessional loyalty is not too pronounced (Hughes, 1962:74-80). Thus the collegial executive may be considered as an expression of the linguistic, religious and regional differences within Swiss society.

Similar conventions for the representation of the diversity of language and religion also apply to parliamentary committees, the judiciary, the public service, and federally supported corporations.[18] For example, even the small Italian-speaking group which comprises only 4 percent of all Swiss citizens is overrepresented in the civil service with 7.6 percent of all federal administrative employees, 6.0 percent of postal employees, and 11.9 percent of railway employees. Only at the upper levels of the administrative grade of the civil service is the proportion of Ticinesi and Italian Swiss from the Grisons precisely equivalent to their numbers in the population (Zenger, 1973).

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[18]The radio and television revenues, which are derived primarily from annual license fees are distributed in larger proportions to the minority language groups than would be expected by the amount collected in French and Italian Switzerland. The radio proportions are 45:33:22 for the German, French and Italian Swiss corporations, respectively (McRae, 1964:45-45).

Under the Swiss system of direct democracy the electorate has the last word in most important decisions. The popular referendum provides a substantial check upon the federal parliament. At the demand of 30,000 citizens most important legislation must be submitted to the electorate for acceptance or rejection. In addition, the compulsory constitutional referendum requires that all constitutional amendments must obtain a double majority in both the country as a whole, as well as in the cantons to succeed. The people also have a right of "initiative," which entitles any citizen or group of citizens who can obtain 50,000 signatures to propose legislation, through a referendum, without consulting the Parliament. Through the referendum process the linguistic and religious minorities can combine to form a majority, thus enabling them to constitute a check on the powers of the majority. While the political map of the electoral consultations in Switzerland is ever-changing, there is a recurrent tendency for French Switzerland to join forces with the conservative Catholic cantons of German Switzerland in opposing measures they feel to be either too centralizing or threatening to cantonal autonomy (cf. Siegfried, 1956:193-198; Ruffieux, 1962:262-264). Thus, although the referendum process is not a device for minority recognition as such, its operation has often enabled

the religious and linguistic minorities for structural

reasons to combine as a defensive measure against the

Protestant German, economically strong "center."

In addition to political factors, social ones

also play an important role in Swiss intergroup relations.

To understand how attitudes toward multiculturalism are

formed one must examine the role of the important social-

izing agents in Swiss society. The next chapter will con-

centrate on the role of the school and its curriculum.

CHAPTER III

THE TRANSMISSION OF VALUES:

ETHNICITY AND POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION IN SWITZERLAND

The school in literate societies is probably the
most natural starting place for the investigation of how
attitudes toward multiculturalism are formed. Since the
time of Plato those political philosophers who stressed
the importance of habits, manners, and tastes as the
foundation of a society saw the paramount status of edu-
cation in the politico-social order. Rousseau (1953: 176),
for example, wrote in Considerations on the Government of
Poland:

> It is education that should put the national
> stamp on men's mind and give the direction to
> their opinions and tastes which will make them
> patriots. . . .

He believed that only through education could
there develop a spirit of nationality, patriotism, and
civic responsibility. Durkheim (1961:8) also emphasized
this theme asserting that public schools must shape the
national morality, instill the collective consciousness
and maintain national solidarity.

Pestalozzi, on the other hand, while agreeing
with Plato and Rousseau on the close relationship between

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education and politics, stressed the individual instead
of the interests of the community as the true foundation
of education and of political life. He was convinced
that there is in the individual a potential faculty for
liberty which should enable him to resist the temptations
of his national being and of society. True civic educa-
tion according to Pestalozzi, then has to develop that
faculty of individual liberty. Since he saw in a nation
only an aggregate of individuals, and the character of
this aggregate was determined by the character of the
individuals which composed it, he believed that a state
which promoted the autonomy of its citizens assured the
strongest and most enduring basis for its own existence
(cf. Kohn, 1956:61-65).

The heritage of Rousseau and Pestalozzi, two
countrymen of international renown, has, it would seem,
made the Swiss more conscious of their educational system
than many other people. Several foreign observers have
commented on the seriousness with which the Swiss view
education (Soloveytchik, 1954; Rickover, 1962; Brooks,
1930). Brooks (1930:172) remarks that "seldom does the
discussion of any political evil which arises among them
proceed to any length without frequent and insistent
assertions that it is due to faults in the school system
of the country and it is to be cured radically only by

the improvement of the latter."[1]

In order for us to understand the part played by
the school in socializing inter-ethnic sentiments, this
chapter will present an overview of the Swiss educa-
tional system and its curriculum. The first section
documents the complex interaction between the Swiss
cultural groups and the federal system in the educational
sphere. The discussion then moves to foreign language
instruction in Switzerland. Next, we shall discuss the
role of the school curriculum from a general comparative
perspective. The second part of the chapter consists of
a content analysis of Swiss secondary school history
textbooks. In our investigation we shall include both a
quantitative examination of space allocated to the main
periods of Swiss history as well as a qualitative analy-
sis of some potentially controversial events.

An Overview of the Swiss

Educational System

The historical development, and political, re-
ligious, linguistic and geographical structure of
Switzerland has imposed upon it a very decentralized

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[1]A recent book by Arne Engeli (1972:16) links the
need to study political socialization in the schools in
Switzerland with the decreasing number of citizens who go
to the polls.

system of education. According to Article 27 of the
Constitution the cantons are charged with the duty of
maintaining the schools. The Constitution of 1874 also
makes education compulsory, general and free--every child
must attend school for at least eight years. Within this
framework all questions relating to curricula, the
methods of teaching, and the selection and appointments
of teachers are in the hands of the communes and cantons.
Although there are over 25 slightly different school
systems, they follow a similar sequence in preparing
their students for the adult world. Figure III-1 shows
a simplified diagram of the organization of education in
Switzerland.

The Swiss student first enters primary school.
Thereafter, most pupils go on to secondary school, after
the third year in one canton, the fourth in two, the
fifth in five, and the sixth in 17 cantons (Egger and
Blanc, 1974:13). The second phase of Swiss education
includes the upper levels of compulsory education. The
majority of students finish their formal education after
9 years of schooling, and then continue to an apprentice-
ship program which prepares them for a skilled trade or
a wide range of white collar jobs. A minority of students
(approximately 10-15 percent) enters the Mittelschulen.
These include the gymnasia, lycées or colleges which

FIGURE III-1

Simplified Diagram of the Organization of Education
in Switzerland

Source: Egger and Blanc (1974:14).

prepare students for the Federal Maturity Certificates.[2]

As we have noted previously, the language of instruction follows in general the principle of territoriality. The assimilation of migrants from other linguistic groups as well as children of foreign parentage is primarily accomplished through the schools. Only in a few bilingual areas such as Biel, Fribourg and Sion, do two state school systems exist side by side to accommodate different language groups. One exception is the privately-owned French school in Bern. Although Bern is a German-speaking city situated in a wholly German-speaking region of a bilingual canton, it is also the federal capital and therefore occupies a special position as the seat of government of plurilingual Switzerland. For a long time French-speaking civil servants, who viewed their sojourn in Bern as but one phase of a career that was rooted primarily in Western Switzerland felt aggrieved that their children were denied an education in their mother tongue. On the other hand, local opinion firmly opposed any official recognition of French-language facilities as a violation of the principle

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[2]Some authors also consider Seminare (teacher's colleges) and Handelschulen (business colleges) part of the middle school system. See for example, Ulrich Im Hof (1966:148). However, we shall restrict our discussion only to those schools which prepare students for university attendance.

of territoriality. Finally this issue was resolved by a practical compromise. A private French school which had been in existence since 1944, was incorporated as a private foundation in 1959 and awarded support by the canton and the confederation (Cf. McRae, 1964:67-70).

Despite the extreme decentralization of education in Switzerland, the Swiss have not ignored the path of intercantonal cooperation, or cooperative federalism. Article 27 bis of the Federal Constitution establishes the principle of federal subsidies to the cantons for the support of primary education. Every canton receives a basic annual grant in proportion to the number of students aged seven to fifteen, according to the latest federal census. Furthermore, the nine mountain cantons receive an additional payment per child to help cover their higher education costs and to supplement their more limited resources. Finally, the Ticino and the Grisons (which are also among the mountain cantons) receive a special linguistic supplement to help defray the heavy costs of issuing textbooks and training teachers. The total subsidy paid amounts to almost seven times the standard rate for each Italian child and over ten times for each Romansch child. McRae (1964:38) comments that scarcely can "a better example be found of the Confederation's generosity towards its weaker language groups."

Another effort toward intercantonal cooperation

was the establishment of the Swiss Conference of Directors of Education (known as the DIP--Directeurs de l'instruction publique--Conference), which met for the first time in 1897. This group now meets regularly, and has become the principal educational advisory board to cantons and the Confederation, although it has no official powers (Egger and Blanc, 1974:8-9)[3] In the 1960s this group attempted to harmonize the major discrepancies in the Swiss educational system by drawing a Concordat (agreement between the cantons) on School Coordination. The Concordat, which was approved unanimously by the DIP Conference on October 29, 1970, came into force on June 9, 1971 following the approval of the Federal Council and the electorate in 10 cantons.

In particular, it set the date for entrance into school at six years of age, the duration of obligatory schooling to at least nine years with a minimum of 39 weeks of school per year, and fixed the time between entering school and the maturity examination at twelve or thirteen years. It also established autumn as the

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[3] In addition to the DIP various professional associations of elementary and lower secondary school teachers, and maturity school principals have annual meetings.

beginning of the school year for all of Switzerland.[4]
The agreement pledged the parties to work toward more
freedom of movement for students between similar schools,
common recognition of degrees and diplomas, uniformity
of degrees and types of schools, a standard time for
passage to the second phase of compulsory schooling,
common teaching aids, and an attempt to achieve some
equivalency in teacher training. In addition, the
Corcordat provided for cooperation with the Confederation
on matters of educational planning, pedagogical research,
and educational statistics. Finally, to facilitate and
promote coordination it made a provision for the cantons
to be grouped into four regional conferences (the French
and Italian speaking region, the Northwestern, the
Central, and the Eastern regions of the country) (Egger
and Blanc, 1974:14).

After a good start the Concordat ran into diffi-
culties. By 1973, twenty out of twenty-five cantons

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[4]Currently, the starting dates for schools fluc-
tuate between cantons and even between communities in
the same canton. Most schools in the French-speaking
part of Switzerland begin in autumn while those in German
Switzerland tend toward spring opening dates. This pre-
sents many difficulties for students transferring from
one school to another. In Biel, a practical compromise
was agreed to, so that French-speaking students now begin
school in the Fall to coincide with the opening time in
French Switzerland, while German-speaking students begin
in Spring.

ratified it, but among the five missing were Bern and
Zurich, two of the largest Swiss cantons. According
to Jean-Daniel Perret of the Neuchâtel Department of
Education, the problem was not simply that two of the
largest cantons did not carry out the agreement. The
French-speaking cantons would continue their efforts at
coordination, but the actions of Bern and Zurich could
"create a new rupture between the French-speaking and
the German-speaking cantons" (Fondation pour la Col-
laboration Confédérale, 1973:201).

French Switzerland has made considerable progress
in harmonizing its efforts. By 1977 it had a uniform
curriculum for the first four years of primary education.
The common program for the first year and for mathe-
matics came into effect in September 1973, with the re-
mainder planned for progressive stages in subsequent
years. It is noteworthy that this coordination movement
was started by primary school teachers, who, since 1962,
have been pressing for an "Ecole Romande" (Egger and
Blanc, 1974:14). Besides facilitating coordination
between schools in French Switzerland, an Ecole Romande
is also intended to strengthen the position of the French
language and culture vis-à-vis German in Switzerland.

The school systems in German Switzerland, in
contrast to French Switzerland, continue to be more

diversified. There is, for example, still no uniform school opening date. However, some regions in German Switzerland are pooling their efforts. The Northwest Commission for the Study of History (which is composed of the cantons of Aargau, Basel-Stadt, Basel-Land, Fribourg, Lucerne, and Solothurn) is in the process of issuing a series of history books to be used in all the cantons in this region by grades 6 through 9.[5]

A second achievement of the Swiss Conference of Directors of Education was the formation in 1962 of the Swiss Educational Documentation Center (Centre d'information en matière d'enseignement et d'éducation) with headquarters in Geneva. Created jointly by the Conference and the Confederation, with the help of the Swiss National Commission for UNESCO, its task is primarily that of bringing together information on all aspects of the Swiss educational systems.

Foreign Language Instruction
in Switzerland

Swiss scholars have called attention to the historical role of the school in promoting linguistic

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[5] This series, which is called Weltgeschichte im Bild, is discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

peace. According to Weilenmann (1962:235) the relatively high state of cultural and professional education of the population as well as the insistence on compulsory education by all the cantons since 1830 has aided this development. Of obvious importance is also the high regard accorded the learning of the other national languages. This disposition facilitates assimilation and mutual understanding and reduces prejudice.[6]

Although there are over 25 different educational systems the introduction of the Federal Maturity Certificate has brought about a great deal of standardization of secondary, and to a certain extent primary education. Originally established as a uniform entrance standard for courses in medicine, dentistry, pharmacy and certain related fields, it has long been a recognized qualification

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[6] In a recent report on the introduction and co-ordination of foreign language instruction during compulsory education one of the arguments for beginning instruction earlier in the school curriculum is the following:

"In plurilingual Switzerland it is necessary for cultural-political reasons, that all children learn the language of another ethnic group. This would not only be helpful--particularly in bilingual and multilingual cantons--for purposes of communication, but could also contribute to the better understanding of fellow citizens and fellow human beings, which speak other languages. An early acquisition of a foreign language can help lessen prejudices against those who speak and think different from oneself, and perhaps even avoid their formation (Schweizerische Konferenz der kantonaler Erziehungsdirektoren, 1976:6).

for entry to a Federal Institute of Technology or to any of the faculties of the Swiss universities without further examination.[7]

The maturity certificate is gained by five different courses of study. In addition to certain core subjects,[8] the classical stream (Type A) requires two official languages plus Latin and Greek. The modern language streams as well as the scientific and commercial streams require two official languages, plus a third official language or English. Furthermore, for Type B Latin is required, for Type C descriptive geometry, for Type D a fourth language (in addition to the above three), which may include English or a third official language or another modern language (Spanish or Russian), and for Type E, economic sciences.

The general pattern is that French is studied in

[7]Although secondary education is not the concern of the Confederation, it was nevertheless obliged to legislate in this connection on account of Article 33 which provided that the cantons may require "proof of competence" from anyone who intends to engage in a liberal profession. Under the authority of these articles the Swiss government passed a law in 1877 on the freedom of domicile of medical personnel which permitted the Federal Council to issue a series of decrees which established the maturity certificate as a prerequisite for enrollment in schools of medicine, dentistry, pharmacy, and veterinary medicine.

[8]The core subjects are history, geography, mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, and drawing or music.

German and Italian Switzerland, while German is studied
in French Switzerland. For those who are in the modern
language or scientific stream, Italian has fought a
losing battle with English in most cantons. The only
group that regularly learns all three official languages
are Italian-speaking Swiss gymnasium students. This
situation was in some small way remedied by the federal
recognition of the maturity certificate Type D in 1972.
The students who select this stream often study Italian
in addition to German, French, and English.

Perhaps the most significant contribution of the
Federal Maturity program for the relations between the
linguistic groups in Switzerland is that it insures that
a certain minimum standard in at least one of the
national languages other than one's mother tongue is
upheld by all those pursuing a higher education. Given
the nature of the Swiss federal state, the establishment
of fixed standards did not come easily. Nevertheless,
particularly in the area of language learning, one
wonders if it would not also serve other multicultural
countries well to look at the Swiss example. At least
some of the concern which many French Canadians voice in
reference to the survival of their language and culture
might be attenuated if more Anglo-Canadians were capable
of speaking and reading French.

Brooks observes that both the attitude toward and results of language learning in Switzerland are quite different from the United States, and it would seem Canada too. He comments that:

> One is struck by the difference between Swiss nomenclature and our own on the subject. In referring to German, French, and Italian, we speak of "modern foreign languages" conveying, it is to be feared, some suggestion of the exotic or difficult and even of inferiority, by the term "foreign." To the Swiss one of these is his mother-tongue (Muttersprache, according to the federal maturity program), just as English is to us, but the other two are not foreign, instead they are second and third languages (zweite und dritte Landessprachen). . . . In any event, it is certain that the results attained in language study put to shame not only American high schools but American colleges, universities, and graduate schools as well. . . . At eighteen the young Swiss meets a maturity test involving a reading knowledge of one (or more) modern languages other than his mother tongue. . . (Brooks, 1930:184-185).

On the primary and lower secondary level instruction in a second or third language is a matter for cantonal regulation. Most cantons commence instruction in the second language in about the sixth or seventh year of the curriculum. Educators are divided as to whether language training should be started at a younger age. One common argument against earlier second language training is that Swiss children must first receive a thorough instruction in their mother tongue, particularly in German Switzerland, where, because of the predominance

of dialect, high German has many of the characteristics of
a foreign tongue. On the other hand, the DIP has recently
recommended that instruction in the second official lan-
guage begin in the fourth or fifth school year
(Schweizerische Konferenz der kantonalen Erziehungs-
direktoren, 1976:7). The goal of instruction in the second
national language during the compulsory school years is,
in the first place, to gain oral proficiency, and in the
second place to achieve competence in written expression.
Above all the student should learn to understand people
who speak the second language as their mother tongue and
to make himself understood in normal everyday conversa-
tion (Schweizerische Konferenz der kantonalen Erziehungs-
direktoren, 1976:12-13). There is little doubt that
Switzerland is successful in producing a large number of
bilingual and plurilingual individuals at all levels of
society. This can be attributed to many factors: the
effectiveness of language training, individual motiva-
tion, frequent language contact, and the direct economic
value of a command of modern languages.

The Role of the School Curriculum

Charles Merriam observed in The Making of
Citizens that of all systems appraised in the eight
countries studied the school plays the most important

role in inculcating the population with civic values.

It "emerges as the heart of the civic education of the political community and in all probability will continue to function in this role" (Merriam, 1966:344). What distinguishes the school from other institutions or activities is that it is the agency through which society makes the most deliberate attempt to shape the political outlook of its new citizens. As opposed to the family which is essentially private, it is possible for a given regime to design and implement a fairly uniform program for the vast majority of children and adolescents in the entire society (Dawson and Prewitt, 1969: 179). Through the crucial formative years the school provides the adolescent citizen with knowledge about the political world and his role in it. In addition, the school transmits the consensual values and attitudes of the society.

Many researchers have found that the curriculum affects the kinds of political values developed, especially when the values being taught are in harmony with those articulated by other socialization agents (Litt, 1963:69-75). It further has been shown that children's attitudes toward social issues and minority groups can be influenced by certain kinds of textbooks and other reading materials (Fisher, 1968:139-134; Litcher and

Johnson, 1969:148-152).

The curriculum is potentially one of the major instruments of political socialization. It serves as an initiator and reinforcer of cultural values.

As Pratt (1975:102) observes:

For many children, textbooks constitute the bulk of the reading material that they encounter, particularly throughout the formative elementary grades. Moreover, the textbook is not simply any book, it is an official book, authorized by the government, promoted by the school, acknowledged by the teacher. Textbooks, particularly those in such social studies as history, civics, and geography will provide students with their first introduction to many social issues. For some social and cultural questions, the influence of the textbook may remain decisive.

It is, of course, difficult to determine the influence exerted by any particular textbook. The teacher may modify or re-interpret the material contained in the text, and thus may leave in the students' minds an attitude quite different from that expressed by the author. Nevertheless, the experience from other countries shows, and current studies from Switzerland suggest, that the majority of teachers of history and civics allow the textbook to determine to a great extent the content of instruction (Hodgetts, 1968:24, 26-27, 45).[9]

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[9]Hodgetts (1968:26) notes that 87 percent of the 847 Canadian classrooms he and his coworkers observed in 1966-1967 "unquestionably followed the gray, consensus version of the textbook." In a Swiss study Altermatt and Utz also comment on the importance of the textbook in the teaching of history in Switzerland.

Many recent studies of school textbooks in multi-
cultural societies have shown that they serve to divide
rather than to unite the different cultural groups.
Williamson (1969) in a textbook analysis of French
Canadians, Indians and Americans in authorized Ontario
textbooks used from 1890-1930 found that although the
image of the French Canadian was clearly superior to
that of the Indian it was nevertheless stereotyped.
Even more striking are the results reported by Trudel and
Jain. Their study of a national sample of school text-
books concludes that there are substantial disagreements
between Anglo and French Canadian conceptions of Canadian
history. Not only do the two groups focus on different
eras of Canadian history (the French Canadians on the
pre-1760 period and the English Canadians on more recent
events) they also attribute different and sometimes
irreconcilable meanings to the same event (Trudel and
Jain, 1968). Hodgetts (1968:34) concludes that:

> Canadian studies in the schools of both
> linguistic communities do little to encourage
> a mutual understanding of their separate atti-
> tudes, aspirations and interests. Successive
> generations of young English and French speak-
> ing Canadians raised on such conflicting views
> of our history cannot possibly understand each
> other or the country in which they live.

Similar findings emerge from a study by Auerbach
(1965) comparing Africaner and English textbooks in South
Africa. He concludes that the educational system serves

to divide the South African population. Significant differences were shown to exist between the presentation of history to Afrikaans-speaking and English-speaking students. These arose from variations in interpretation and pronounced ethnocentrism, particularly in some of the Afrikaans textbooks. Furthermore, textbooks of both language groups characterized the black Africans as inherently inferior to whites.

Thus, given the evidence from other multicultural societies we might hypothesize that Swiss textbooks would also exhibit significant differences in interpretation between the various religious and linguistic groups. In order to test this hypothesis we shall examine a number of potentially controversial events in Swiss history, using a qualitative approach. This method should allow us to pinpoint areas of dissensus and consensus among the two main linguistic and religious groups. In addition, an analysis of recurring themes in Swiss history textbooks will provide many clues as to the values believed to be prerequisites for participation in Swiss society. As Bernard Pares, an English authority on Russia remarked in his autobiography, the best way to gain an initial acquaintance with a foreign country is not to visit it, but to read the textbooks used in its public schools (Bierstedt, 1955:103).

A qualitative approach to content analysis is not without its detractors (cf. Berelson, 1952; Osgood, 1959; Pool, 1959; Carney, 1972). However, after thoughtful reflection, this method of analysis was selected over those stressing a quantification of evaluative terms, concepts, etc., for a variety of reasons. First, so-called objective methods are incapable of tapping conflicting interpretations of history. Instruments such as the Evaluative Rating System (Osburn, Saporta and Nunnally (1956), and Evaluation Coefficient Analysis (Pratt, 1972) in one way or another come down to counting the frequency of occurrence of certain items. For example, the ECA (Evaluation Coefficient Analysis) index recently developed by Pratt is arrived at by calculating the percentage of favorable vs. unfavorable evaluative terms (i.e., descriptive adjectives, adverbs, and nouns in school textbooks). This procedure gives a score between 0.0 (totally unfavorable), and 100.0 (totally favorable).

While this index exhibits a fairly high degree of reliability it faces more serious criticisms in the area of contextual validity. In other words, while it is reproducible by various investigators one may question whether it does not overlook the complex interrelationships between events, cultural groups, etc. The results of a study carried out by Pratt and his associates

should elucidate this point. In a content analysis of thirty-four authorized textbooks in Ontario they found that in French texts the French Canadians obtained a significantly more favorable evaluation than that provided in the English texts (mean coefficient 86.6 for the French texts, as compared with 77.2 for the English texts). Furthermore, it was observed that the evaluation of the one in-group (French Canadians) studied in 69 textbooks was significantly more favorable than the evaluation of three outgroups (Arabs, Blacks, and Indians) in the same texts (Pratt, 1972:28). Yet the question remains: What does this index tell us about the Weltanschauung of the textbooks as a reflection of Canadian culture? Are we to conclude that the relationship between white Canadians (Anglophones and Francophones) and certain non-white minorities is more salient than that between French and English Canadians? An additional short-coming of this method is that it is unable to pinpoint factual inaccuracies or omissions which may distort certain historical events. Saporta and Sebeck (1959:142) observe that other quantitative approaches are also open to similar criticisms.

A qualitative analysis, on the other hand, is able to avoid some of these deficiencies. Unlike most quantitative approaches, which address themselves only

to manifest functions of school textbooks, that is, those
having to do with the transmission of the knowledge of a
culture, a qualitative investigation is able to shed
light on both manifest and latent functions of education
in transmitting inter-ethnic sentiments. While school
textbooks are designed primarily for the transmission of
knowledge, they have other functions as well. The latent
functions include communicating the myths and the mores,
the traditions and the legends, and the folkways and
the superstitions which are also an integral part of the
culture.

In our study we shall attempt to document both
manifest and latent functions of Swiss textbooks. The
analysis will concentrate on historical events which
may yield differing interpretations among the various
cultural groups. A qualitative approach of this sort is
not without precedent. Among others Trudel and Jain
(1968) in Canada and Auerbach (1965) in South Africa
have employed this method.

For our analysis, we have chosen the following
six events: the Reformation, the French occupation of
Switzerland, the Sonderbund War, the Kulturkampf, the
Graben or trench between French and German Swiss during
World War I, and the General Strike of 1918. The Refor-
mation, Kulturkampf, and Sonderbund War were chosen as

events which might polarize Catholic and Protestant opinion; the Reformation because it initially divided Switzerland into two opposing camps, the Sonderbund War because it pitted conservative Catholic against liberal Protestant cantons, and the Kulturkampf because it, too, divided sentiment along religious lines. The gulf which developed during World War I provides a crucial test of French and German Swiss interpretations of history. Finally, the French occupation of Switzerland and the General Strike of 1918 serve as general indicators of sympathies along a left-right continuum.

As indicated in the previous chapter, the most important linguistic relationship is the one between French-and German-speaking Swiss. The textbook analysis and a consideration of values and attitudes toward multiculturalism, which will be the subject of the next chapter will therefore focus on the two largest linguistic groups. A study of the smaller linguistic groups would be interesting in its own right, but it is beyond the scope of this work.

Selection of Textbooks

In Switzerland, one is confronted with a bewildering number of school systems, each with its own curriculum, and often with its own publishing house.

Furthermore, not only national history, but also local
history receives considerable attention by Swiss students.
In general, Swiss public schools proceed on the principle
"from the near to the far" (Vom Nahen zum Fernen).[10]
Thus, in the lower grades the elementary student studies
the home village or city, expanding to the history and
customs of the county and canton, and finally at the end
of the compulsory education, systematically studies Swiss
and world history. This sequence is followed in most
cantons. Since we are primarily interested in the treat-
ment of Swiss national history, rather than a more local
perspective, and the ways in which national and subnational
alliances are treated, we shall confine our analysis to
those history books used in the upper level of compulsory
school (usually grades six through nine). These influ-
ential grades provide the last formal education received
by the majority of young Swiss. However, many do go on
to more applied programs, particularly apprenticeships
of various sorts where some form of civics, and for
those seeking white collar employment, more foreign lan-
guage is taught.

Even after narrowing the scope of the textbooks

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[10]This approach is consistent with the particu-
larism of the Swiss and their traditional devotion to
their community and canton as well as with their broader
homeland.

to the upper levels of secondary school, we found over
20 different Swiss and foreign history books in use
during the 1975/1976 school year.[11] Our next step was
to eliminate foreign books written by French or German
authors, since they generally did not treat Swiss history.
All the German- and French-speaking cantons which use
foreign textbooks use them in conjunction with Swiss
materials. The final selection of ten books, six from
German Switzerland, and four from French Switzerland,
was governed by two further considerations. First, text-
books which were in use in more than one canton were
given priority over those with a more limited audience.
Secondly, an attempt was made to take into account religi-
ous, linguistic, and geographical factors.

The following is a list of the ten books which
were selected along with the cantons in which they are
used.

French Textbooks

Georges-André Chevallaz, Histoire Générale de 1789 à nos
jours, 1974.

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[11]A questionnaire was sent out to all the cantonal
departments of education in Fall 1975/Spring 1976 in order
to draw up representative lists by cantons of the text-
books used in the upper level of secondary school
(Sekundarschule Stufe I). These lists, compiled by Dr.
Hans Utz, were supplemented by additional information from
the documentation centre in Geneva.

This book, which is authored by a current Federal Councillor covers the period from 1789 to the present. It is part of a series under the direction of the University of Lausanne. Richly illustrated, it treats in addition to world and Swiss history, the political organization of Switzerland as a whole as well as of each Romand cantons. It is used primarily for the pre-gymnasium classes in the cantons of Vaud, Geneva, Neuchâtel, and Valais.

Henri Grandjean and Henri Jeanrenaud, <u>Histoire de la Suisse</u>, Vol. II, 1969. Cited hereafter as Grandjean.

Used in the cantons of Vaud, Neuchâtel, Geneva, and Valais, it first appeared in 1944 and was revised in 1969. It treats Swiss history from the founding of the Confederation to the present. Originally published for use in the canton of Vaud, it is representative of an older generation of textbooks used in French Switzerland.

Gérard Pfulg, <u>Histoire de la Suisse</u>, 1960.

Used in Fribourg and Valais, this book was chosen because it is typical of how Swiss history is taught in French Catholic Switzerland. It covers Swiss history from its beginnings to the present.

Gérard Pfulg, Michael Salamin, and Maurice Zermatten, <u>Histoire Générale</u>, 1974. Cited hereafter as Salamin.

This book, which deals primarily with world, rather than Swiss history, is used in the cantons of Valais, Fribourg, Geneva, Vaud, and Neuchâtel. Designed as a concise overview of world history for a French-speaking audience, it covers the period from antiquity to the present.

German Textbooks

Theodor Hafner, <u>Kurze Welt- und Schweizer Geschichte</u>, 1969.

This book first appeared in 1942, was revised in 1959, and updated in 1964. Although it is currently used

only as a supplementary textbook in the canton of Schwyz,
it was selected because it is typical of a past genera-
tion of textbooks used in the Innerschweiz (the old
Catholic cantons of German-speaking Switzerland).

Eugen Halter, Vom Strom der Zeiten, 1972.

      Used in St. Gallen, Appenzell Inner and Outer
Rhoden, Schwyz, Solothurn, Thurgau, Uri, Zug, Obwalden
and Nidwalden, it first appeared in 1942 and was revised
in 1965. This book, originally written for the canton
of St. Gallen, covers world and Swiss history from
antiquity to the present.

Arnold Jaggi, Vom den Anfängen der Reformation bis zur
Gegenwart, 1969.

      This book, which strongly bears the stamp of the
canton of Bern, is also used in the cantons of Thurgau,
Uri, Nidwalden, and Fribourg. It first appeared in 1942
and was revised in 1969. The book covers world and
Swiss history from the Reformation to the present.

Otto Müller, Denkwürdige Vergangenheit, Vol. I, 1968;
Vol. II, 1969.

      These two volumes, originating from the canton of
Aargau, are also used in Bern, Basel-Land, and Schwyz.
They cover world and Swiss history from antiquity to the
present.

Walter Rutsch. Welt- und Schweizergeschichte, Vol. II,
1966.

      This volume issued by the canton of Zurich was
first published in 1952 and revised in 1963. In addition
to the canton of Zurich, it is also used in the cantons
of Appenzell Outer Rhoden, Basel-Stadt, Schwyz, Solothurn,
and Thurgau. It covers world and Swiss history from the
French Revolution to the present.

Weltgeschichte im Bild, 6/1-2, 1974; 6/3, 7/1, 1975;
7/2-3, 1976; 8, 1977.

      As of 1977 this series contained seven richly

illustrated booklets for grades six through eight, covering world and Swiss history from antiquity to 1900. A further book for grade nine encompassing the period from the first World War to the present will be issued in 1978. The Weltgeschichte im Bild series is published by the Northwestern Commission for History Instruction, and authored by a team of experts with competence in the particular period of history. One important aim of these books is to coordinate the teaching of history in the cantons of Aargau, Basel-Stadt, Basel-Land, Bern, Fribourg, Lucerne, and Solothurn. They are presently being used in these cantons on a trial basis. The Commission has worked out a frame of reference within which the teacher is responsible for the interpretation of events, while the actual booklets provide the factual basis for classroom instruction.

The Organization of Swiss
History Textbooks

In the upper level of compulsory school, usually encompassing grades six through nine, world and Swiss history from ancient to modern times is perused. Appendix I gives an outline of the various topics treated in the four grades. Although there are some regional and cantonal variations, in general, one is struck by the similarity of chapter headings and sub-headings in the various history textbooks.

On the other hand, the amount of space devoted to Swiss as compared to non-Swiss history varies considerably. The newer books are less ethnocentric in outlook, devoting a larger space to nations other than Switzerland (see Table III-1). Swiss history occupies only 16 percent of

TABLE III-1. --Amount of space devoted to main periods of Swiss history

Textbook Author	Percentage Devoted to Swiss History	Early Swiss History 1291-1515	Reformation through French Occupation 1517-1815	Congress of Vienna through Sonderbund War 1815-1847	After Birth of Modern Switzerland 1848-Present
Chevallaz	16%	not covered	Begins with French Rev. 22%	22%	56%
Grandjean	84%	30%	37%	12%	21%
Pfulg	72%	35%	28%	16%	21%
Hafner	33%	51%	23%	11%	15%
Halter	35%	28%	31%	18%	23%
Jaggi	46%	not covered	65%	21%	14%
Müller Vols. I and II	26%	36%	30%	16%	19%
Rutsch	39%	not covered	Begins with French Rev. 39%	23%	39%
Weltgeschichte im Bild	17%	10%	32%	26%	covers only to 1900 32%

the space in Chevallaz's Histoire Generale de 1789 a nos jours, 17 percent of the contents in the new Welt-geschichte im Bild series. In the older German language textbooks, Swiss history plays a more prominant role, occupying roughly one-third or more of the contents of the various texts (Hafner 33 percent, Halter 35 percent, Rutsch 39 percent, and Jaggi 46 percent). In order to standardize part of the curriculum while maintaining the identity of the individual cantons, many schools in French Switzerland have adopted separate books for the teaching of Swiss and world history. Salamin, for example, provides the basis for the instruction of world history in many schools in the Suisse Romande, while history with a regional flavor is found in Grandjean (Vaud) and Pfulg (Valais and Fribourg).

In addition to Swiss versus non-Swiss history there are also fairly large discrepancies in the space devoted to the various periods of Swiss history. On the whole, the German books tend to give slightly more space to the period between 1291, when the Confederation was founded, and 1515, the date of the battle of Marignano, which marked the end of Switzerland's role as a big power, and the adoption of neutrality (see Table III-1). On the other hand, the older books from both linguistic areas seem to glorify this era. Grandjean entitles it

"La Suisse Héroique," while Halter refers to the four-
teenth century, during which time the tough Swiss
peasants won victories against the Habsburgs at Morgarten
and Sempach, as "Die Heldenzeit." The brand new
Weltgeschichte im Bild rejects this approach in favor of
an emphasis on more modern Swiss history, as does
Chevallaz's Histoire Générale. The teacher booklet ac-
companying Weltgeschichte im Bild notes that the series
will devote proportionately more space to Swiss history
as it approaches the present. Thus the period between
1291 and 1515 is documented in seven pages, while twelve
pages are devoted to the period between 1516 and 1653,
and thirty-five to the years between 1750 and 1900
(Weltgeschichte im Bild, Teacher's Manual, 1975:3).

The next major division of Swiss history is the
period between the Reformation and the French Revolution.
During this time all the books pay special attention to
the two Swiss Reformers, Calvin and Zwingli. In addition,
the Counter Reformation, the Swiss religious wars and
the time of absolutism are covered.

The downfall of the old Confederation of thirteen
cantons, the French occupation of Switzerland, the
Restauration, the Regeneration, and the Sonderbund War
provide the third principal period of Swiss history.
Because of the influential role France has played in

shaping modern Switzerland, more space is awarded to it
than any other foreign country.

The last period encompasses the years after the
birth of modern Switzerland in 1848. In Weltgeschichte
im Bild the authors note that:

> The period from 1830-1848 occupies an important
> place in the 700 year history of Switzerland.
> Many maintain that it is even more important
> than the time of the founding of the first
> Confederation around 1300. In fact, during
> this time the Confederation, which is still
> in existence, was formed, this before Europe
> received its new outline. The establishment
> of the new Confederation ended the internal
> squabbles, and in the end these efforts led to
> an autonomous and independent country.
> (Weltgeschichte, 8, 1977:100).

The amount of space awarded to the last main division of
Swiss history is, to a great extent, dependent on when
the textbook was written, with the older texts devoting
less space and the newer books giving more space to this
period. Most recent Swiss textbooks have attempted to
follow the guidelines of a UNESCO study from 1957 which
suggested that the so-called Heroic Period of the Con-
federation be de-emphasized (occupying not more than one-
fourth of Swiss history), with more attention being given
to Swiss history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
(Swiss National Commission for UNESCO, 1957:10).[12]

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[12]Swiss textbooks are often used for 15 to 20
years so that the suggestions recommended by the UNESCO
report in 1957 are only now being implemented. The

We shall now turn our attention to a qualitative
analysis of six potentially controversial events in
Swiss history.

Analysis of Events
The Reformation

What were the conditions and events according to
the textbook authors which precipitated the Reformation
in Europe, and more specifically, what were its reper-
cussions in Switzerland? At first glance it appears
that most Swiss authors give the same answers to this
question. The most commonly cited reasons for the Refor-
mation are the schism in the Church, with as many as
three popes at the same time proclaiming to be the
spiritual leader (Hafner, 1969:123,; Halter, 1972:17;
Müller, 1968:178; Pfulg, 1960:166-167, Salamin, 1974:151),
the secularization of the clergy (Hafner, 1969:123;
Halter, 1972:17; Müller, 1968:177; Jaggi, 1969:14-14;
Pfulg, 1960:167; Salamin, 1974:151; and Grandjean, 1969:

Chevallaz book, which was first issued in 1962 and
completely revised in 1974, was the first history text-
book to adopt these guidelines. This is typical of
the cultural situation in the Confederation, where
French Switzerland has had a head-start in centralizing
and updating the curriculum and administration of the
schools.

81), and the selling of indulgences (Hafner, 1969:123; Halter, 1972:17; Müller, 1968:178; Jaggi, 1969:16-17; Pfulg, 1960:108; Salamin, 1972:152; and Grandjean, 1969: 82). All the French language books as well as some of the German language books also look to technological inventions to explain the timing of the Reformation. They single out the discovery and development of book printing, which for the first time made it possible for a wide audience to read and interpret the Bible (Pfulg, 1960:167; Salamin, 1974:151-152; Grandjean, 1969:81; Hafner, 1969:112; Jaggi, 1969:35).

On closer examination, however, we find that differences in nuances and interpretations do appear. The most pervasive differences are found between Protestant and Catholic books. The Catholic authors cite humanism as an important cause of the Reformation, critizing it in no uncertain terms.

> Among the causes (of the Reformation) is humanism. Its followers took great care to live a good life. However, they did not organize it any longer with a view toward the afterlife. Furthermore, they believed that the human mind would be strong enough to guide its own way, without being directed by the Church. They considered the ministry of the church unnecessary and worthless. They despised the uneducated clergy and did not want to follow

it (Hafner, 1969:123).[13]

The Renaissance in humanities and the arts led
to a real return to paganism in morals. Cer-
tain humanists were so enthusiastic about the
works of antiquity that they strayed from
Christianity (Pfulg, 1960:167, see also Salamin,
1974:151).[14]

In addition both the German and French Catholic

books condemn the questioning of the Church doctrine

as weakening the faith (Pfulg, 1960:167; Salamin, 1974:

151; Hafner, 1969:124-125). For Hafner, this is a recur-

ring theme. He pictures Calvin and Zwingli, the two

Swiss reformers, as pious men who lost their way amid

attempts to reform the Church (Hafner, 1969:124-125).

Pfulg and Salamin rarely lapse into such orthodox inter-

pretations (see Table III-2). Pfulg is the only author

who speculates that the Reformation, although it

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[13]Dazu ist der Humanismus zu rechnen. Seine
Anhänger legten alle Sorgfalt darauf, hienieden ein
schönes (menschenwürdiges) Leben zu leben, ordneten es
aber nicht mehr auf ein Jenseits hin. Auch glaubten sie,
dass der menschliche Geist stark genug sei, sich selber
zurechtzufinden, ohne dass ihm der Weg durch eine Kirche
gewiesen würde. Das kirchliche Lehramt dünkte sie
überflüssig und unwürdig. Sie verachteten den ungebild-
eten Klerus und wollten von ihm nichts annehmen.

[14]La renaissance des lettres et des arts a amené
dans les moeurs un véritable retour au paganisme.
Certains humanistes s'enthousiasment à tel point pour les
oeuvres de l'Antiquité, qu'ils en arrivent à se détacher
du christianisme.

dissolved the religious unity of Switzerland, may have had the unexpected consequence of making it capable of surviving as an entity over the centuries. He observes that after being converted to Protestantism, Vaud was able to break the hold of the Savoyan empire. Thus by effectively becoming bilingual with the incorporation of French-speaking areas, Switzerland may later have been able to resist the nationalistic movements (pan-Germanism and irredentism) of the nineteenth century (Pfulg, 1960:179).

In contrast with the Catholic books, the books originating from the old Protestant cantons tend to take a more neutral stance toward religion. However, as we might expect they fill in the details leading up to the Reformation with anticipation, while the Catholic books introduce it with regret. Some of the Protestant books give a one-sided interpretation of the Counter Reformation, which does little to promote mutual understanding. The Council of Trent, which Pfulg notes, occupies an importance without equal in the history of the Church is too often passed over without interpretation (see, for example, Grandjean, 1969:102, 103).

While most authors, both French and German, and Protestant and Catholic give a fairly objective picture of Calvin and Zwingli, differences also emerge between the

various Swiss textbooks (see Table III-2). Two German
books, but none of the French books, note that Zwingli
was a loyal Swiss patriot who loved his fatherland and
occupied himself with the concerns of the Confederation
(Weltgeschichte im Bild, 7/2, 1976:38; Jaggi, 1969:33).
The French Protestant author Grandjean (1969:102)
praises the accomplishments of Calvin, classifying him
as one of the greatest writers of his time in the French
language. On the other hand, the Catholic authors
(especially Hafner) give a more reserved portrait of
these two men.

In short, the situation reported by the UNESCO
commission twenty years ago still holds true. It com-
ments that although there is considerable objectivity,
some Catholic books tend to give a one-sided interpre-
tation of the Reformation and reformers while some of
the Protestant texts slight the inner history and contri-
butions of the Catholic Church both during the Middle
Ages and after the Council of Trent (Swiss National
Commission for UNESCO, 1957:10-11). Another tendency
is simply to elude religious questions altogether.

It is encouraging, however, to observe that the
newer Swiss history books have attempted to reconcile
the two points of view. This trend would suggest that
the religious cleavage has lost much of its old importance.

TABLE III-2. --Treatment of important figures in Swiss history

	Calvin	Zwingli	Ochs	La Harpe	Napoleon	Dufour
Chevallaz	not covered	not covered	-in spite of high office favored French intervention, partly out of vanity and partly out of revolutionary conviction -instrumental in drafting Helvetic constitution -one of principal magistrates of the city of Basel p. 71	-talented advocate -teacher of Russian czar -animator of Helvetic club -petitioned France to intervene to free Vaudois people -demonstrated there was collusion of Swiss aristocrats with French loyalists -drew attention to Bernese treasury p. 71	-had natural authority, was and audacious and military genius -re-established order -institutionalized central administration -provided civil code and developed public education -didn't hesitate to put down opposition -normalized relations with Catholic church but also used it to help him keep order pp. 46-50.	-free of partisan passion -conducted campaign with speed and moderation and with little loss of blood p. 133
Grandjean	-greatest reformer of French origin -written work classifies him among the great French writers of his time -introduced strict rule of conduct -fought against those who criticized his doctrine	-relies only on text of Bible -strong adversary of mercenary and pension system -defends view in public discussion -preached against indulgences pp. 82-83	-emissary of Basel government to Paris -favors reorganization of Switzerland -like La Harpe favored French intervention -gave pretext to Napoleon for intervention p. 142	-banned by rulers of Bern -worked for independence of home country (Vaud) and to throw off yoke of Bernese rule -asked France to take Vaud under its protection p. 142	-stresses Napoleon's role as mediator in imposing Act of Mediation -Mediation Act was favorably received by most of the cantons -procured 10 years	-officer in Napoleon's army -helped organize federal army and served as instructor -made maps of Switzerland -conscious of responsibility given him

TABLE III-2. --Continued

	Calvin	Zwingli	Ochs	La Harpe	Napoleon	Dufour
Grandjean (cont'd)	-founded academy to consolidate his teachings	pp. 99-102			of peace for Switzerland -Napoleon forced Switzerland into military agreement with France pp. 151-157	-led the war quickly and with humanity p. 176
Pfulg	-in matters of faith and morals very strict -condemns those who criticize his doctrine -founds academy to consolidate his works p. 177	-declared enemy of mercenary and pension system -gives personal interpretation of the Bible -only considers institutions of early church as valid -defends ideas in public discussions -war-like pp. 170-171, 172	-Ochs and La Harpe mentioned together as prime collaborators of French propagandists in Switzerland -demand French support for Vaudois independence p. 237		-initiator of great works (in Switzerland road over the Alps, canals, ports, in France aqueducts and monuments) -gave Switzerland the Act of Mediation -didn't hesitate to ruin Swiss industry for the benefit of France pp. 245-247 -during protection of Napoleon, which lasted 10 years, Switzerland made considerable progress	-campaign carried out with speed and humanity -author of several works on military subjects -master work map of Switzerland -includes section covering Dufour's life pp. 263, 273

TABLE III-2. --Continued

	Calvin	Zwingli	Ochs	La Harpe	Napoleon	Dufour
Salamin	-adhered to doctrines of Luther when young. -later developed own ideas, discusses esp. doctrine of predestination -governs as absolute ruler in Geneva for 25 years, does not tolerate any opposition pp. 155-151	----	----	-not mentioned by name but says French army entered Vaud called in by some Vaudois p. 211	-genius goes beyond military domain, also great statesman of varied interests -profoundly marked life of French nation and Europe -man of unlimited ambition -instituted universal suffrage but this remained a fiction -under him liberal spirit prospered pp. 212-217	----
Hafner	-sharp mind and strong will, ascetic way of life -signed 58 death penalties and 78 bannings -saw primarily evil in the world -believed in predestination -wanted to make Geneva into a theocracy	-well educated humanist -good orator -explained holy scriptures rationally (questioned even "mysteries" of church) -at first worked in good faith against abuses within the church, then went too far	-rulers in Paris gave him task to write the constitution for "freed Switzerland" -Helvetic constitution patterned on French constitution p. 162	-educator of Czar -one of the main enemies of aristocrats in Paris -called for fight against Bernese government p. 159	-one of the greatest military leaders of all times and would also have been one of the greatest statesmen had he been more moderate and not abused the people as a tool of his ambition -goal was to make France a big power in Europe	-in carrying out his task he was exceedingly noble and moderate, a thing that cannot be said to the same extent about his troops

TABLE III-2. --Continued

	Calvin	Zwingli	Ochs	La Harpe	Napoleon	Dufour
Hafner (cont'd)	-founded academy to educate ministers -made life-loving Genevans into serious, hard working people thereby made them economically successful p. 127	-abolished mass, considered Bible as exclusive source of belief -wanted to spread his faith with means and might of the state p. 126			-Napoleon died in St. Helena as a repentent son of the Church pp. 155-158	
Halter	-introduced rigid rules for the city and church -Sevet, Spanish doctor put to death -made Geneva into a state of God -when he died he left behind a citizenry ready to sacrifice everything for their faith and their city -founded academy for educating ministers pp. 26-27	-humanist background -army chaplain made him passionate adversary of mercenary service -during time of sickness when he was between life and death formed new belief -considered Bible as only source of faith -tried to spread his new faith with arms pp. 20-22	-spent youth abroad and received French education -man of the world and quickly received high office but wanted to renew Switzerland -by keeping good offices with France made intervention easier -wrote Helvetic constitution according to example of France p. 69	-banned by Bernese -wanted to free Vaud from Bernese and make it equal part of Switzerland -hatred for Bernese had no limits and he was blinded by promise of French revolutionaries -asked French to intervene and free Vaud p. 69	-superior military leader -gave Switzerland Mediation Act -introduced strict central regime in France and civil code -also agreement with the Pope -was extraordinarily hard working man -was power hungry pp. 66-68	-noble thinking Genevan -managed to lead campaign almost without loss of blood p. 108

TABLE III-2. --Continued

	Calvin	Zwingli	Ochs	La Harpe	Napoleon	Dufour
Jaggi	-believed in pre-destination, rejected sacraments of the church -introduced very rigid rules in Geneva conc. personal and church conduct -ruled Geneva according to his own will, many dissenters were executed or exiled -founded academy -the enormous work for the new belief remained undisturbed because Calvin found in Geneva a place of refuge and Bern cared for its security* pp. 64-69 *-Because of that it exercised a powerful influence on world history.	-wasn't only spiritual and scholar, also occupied himself with concerns of fatherland -took strong stand against mercenary service -recommended strict neutrality -good orator -questioned auth. of church and believed in Bible as only authority -proclaimed as heretic by distractors -goes into considerable detail giving sympathetic picture of Zwingli but also outlining reasons for resistance of Innerschweizers to new faith pp. 33-41	-born into aristocratic Basler family, living most of his life abroad -spoke German like a German and French like a Frenchman, didn't learn Swiss German (dialect) -was very ambitious, hardworking and shrewd and quickly obtained a high position in Basel -was an ardent follower of the Enlightenment and so rejoiced the coming of the French Revolution -advised Napoleon to invade Switzerland -wrote Napoleon he was delighted about the invasion of Munster and St. Imier pp. 202-203, 226	-notes that passionate La Harpe behaved similar to character weak Ochs -hated the Bernese -attempted to incite Vaudois through pamphlets p. 203	-directly or indirectly brought the most important revolutionary thinking far over France's borders -removed privileges in guilds and commerce, and business so that everyone was equal before the judge and tax collector -of important consequence was also that the people through their body and soul had experience with the meaning of foreign occupation -mighty, clever and strong-willed Napoleon erred in thinking people liked to speak of freedom but in reality would be indifferent -perhaps the lesson of the violence was to awake the desire for freedom pp. 158-176	-commander of Genevan troops, member of the senate and engineer for the canton -in the Senate fought for the security and embellishment of his home city -not only the city of Geneva but also served ardently all of the fatherland -hesitantly accepted appt. as general of Confederate army saying opponents also Confederates -handled war with speed and moderation -was honored by Confederates and primarily proud

TABLE III-2. --Continued

	Calvin	Zwingli	Ochs	La Harpe	Napoleon	Dufour
Jaggi (cont'd)						he wasn't resented by Sonderbund cantons -many smoked pipes with his picture and named them Dufourli pp. 279-281
Müller	-most influential reformer after Luther -believed in pre-destination -after original sin thought nothing good left in man -only considered Bible as only true foundation of faith -instituted austere life in Geneva, forbid all pleasures in life -those disagreeing with Calvin were punished -undoubtably Calvin fought for glory of God,	-teachings dependent on Bible alone -against mercenary service because he had been military chaplain -he was very intransigent and did not want to stop before his faith was spread everywhere pp. 187-190	-told Napoleon revolution could only come about with French help, France would be endangered until Switzerland would be revolutionized p. 35	-intransigence of Swiss government to introduce any reforms led La Harpe and Ochs to ask the French to put pressure on Switzerland and invade if necessary p. 35	-ambitious and gifted officer -seemed to be born ruler, took reigns of state tightly in his hands -warlike--peace was not in his interest -nothing left of popular sovereignty but people had equality before the law -arranged himself with the Church and thought it would be good tool for ruler -limited equal rights and freedom when it was in the way of his power	-carried out war with speed and little loss of life -despite Dufour's warning the soldiers committed violent acts -showed a compromising attitude and humanity -even citizens of Sonderbund canton smoked pipes with his picture and called them Dufourli pp. 69-70

TABLE III-2. --Continued

	Calvin	Zwingli	Ochs	La Harpe	Napoleon	Dufour
Müller (cont'd)	living an austere life and working very hard pp. 193-196				-instituted civil code -was independent and tyrannical -died bitter and lonely pp. 23-33	
Rutsch	not covered	not covered	-enthusiastic follower of Enlightenment and French Revolution -had only despise for "run-down" Confederation -similar to La Harpe thought of revolution with French help -as an emissary to France he overstepped his authority when Napoleon gave him the task to write a new constitution -like La Harpe became traitor to his country -vane and had feeling he was involved in important event p. 43	-noble and educated Vaudois who didn't like Bern -educator of the Czar -wrote letters to the Directorate often exaggerating the harshness of Bernese oppression -his passionate love of Vaud made him a traitor to the Confederation p. 42	-was ambitious, self-righteous and efficient -in fairy tale manner rose to power and glory -conserved equality and unity of France, dropping old privileges but also arbitrarily dropped revolutionary changes -French had to sacrifice their freedom -time of Napoleon meant time of war pp. 22-36	-hesitated to take on responsibility of commanding Confederate troops -said "I am taking on horrible responsibility of Civil War. I will never overstep the borders of moderation and humanity" -Diet could not have made better choice -received military training in France later decided to serve his own country -important achievement Dufour map pp. 100-102

TABLE III-2. --Continued

	Calvin	Zwingli	Ochs	La Harpe	Napoleon	Dufour
Welt-geschichte im Bild	-didn't tolerate opposition -made Geneva theocracy, ruled almost alone, became known as reformed Rome -hard worker -thought God not impressed by good work or by honest faith rather believed in predestination -very strict and austere -took in refugees which supported political position pp. 27-29	-always felt like a Confederate and loved Confederation -scholar of humanism -as army chaplain was against mercenary service -popular and impressive preacher -defended his faith -wanted to spread his faith through arms pp. 38-40	-spent youth abroad -got high office -at first member of patriots who wanted to bring about revolution without French help then got under the influence of Napoleon -drafter of centralized Helvetic constitution -didn't realize that he would only be a tool of Napoleon -made first member of Helvetic Senat p. 95	-educator of Czar -fought for liberation of Vaud from Bern -invited French to invade Vaud -at Viennese Congress used good relations with Russia to win over the Czar to recognize Swiss independence p. 95	-skilled military leader -was very ambitious -he was intelligent enough to keep some of the more important reforms of the revolution -came to an agreement with Catholic church -one of main achievements: Civil code -gave Switzerland Act of Mediation -had good knowledge of Swiss circumstances pp. 25-28	-led war with moderation and speed and little loss of life -decided hesitantly to take over command p. 102

A conciliatory role is stressed in the two newer German

books by quoting a passage from Castellio, a disen-

chanted follower of Calvin who preached tolerance and

religious freedom (Müller, 1968:196-197, Weltgeschichte

im Bild 7/2, 1976:29). The French language author,

Chevallaz does not cover the period of the Reformation.

However, in his discussion of more recent history he

stresses the ecumenical spirit, presenting both the

Protestant and Catholic position (Chevallaz, 1974:379-

381, see also Salamin, 1974:316).

Even the older books, in spite of their varying

interpretations of the events and ideas connected with

the Reformation, seem to agree that the true Swiss way

should be through compromise and mediation of differ-

ences. The image of the two opposing sides sharing a

milk soup after the truce of the first Kappel War, with

the Catholic Innerschweizers supplying the milk and

the Protestant Zurichers providing the bread is referred

to (and illustrated) in almost all of the textbooks

(Müller, 1968:191; Jaggi, 1969:52-54; Weltgeschichte im

Bild, 7/2, 1976:41; Halter, 1972:23; Hafner, 1969:129;

Grandjean, 1969, 244; Pfulg, 1960:172, 1973). However,

the two French books covering this period relate this

event as well as a short reading about one of the medi-

ators of the first Kappel War, in two small selections

attached to the end of the chapter (Pfulg, 1960:181;
Grandjean, 1969:244-245), while in most of the German
books history and legend are blended together. On the
whole, the German language books put greater stress on
the role of the mediator in Swiss history. Hafner, whose
interpretation of the Reformation differs most from the
other textbook authors, emphasizes this spirit by noting
the "echt eidgenössische Rolle" (the role of a true
Confederate) played in Solothurn by Nikolaus Wengli as
well as referring to the successful mediation of the
Glarner Landammann Aebli (Hafner, 1969:129). Likewise
Müller refers to this event as "ein unvergessliches Bild
echt eidgenössischer Verträglichkeit" (an unforgettable
picture of true Confederate compatibility) (Müller, 1968:
191, see also Halter 1972:23, Jaggi, 1969:54-55).

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The French Revolution and its

Consequences in Switzerland

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How do the textbook authors evaluate the French
occupation in Switzerland? One might hypothesize that a
different interpretation would appear in those cantons
who lost subject territories and a share of their power
and prestige and those who were subject territories and
gained the status of full cantons.

This does not, however, seem to be the case. One

is struck by the unanimity of opinion displayed by the
textbooks. Regardless of cultural, or religious ori-
entation, or previous cantonal or subject status the
Helvetic Constitution is used as a concrete example of
the unsuitability of the centralized regime for Switzer-
land's diverse peoples (Grandjean, 1969:151; Pfulg,
1960:242; Hafner, 1969:164; Halter, 1972:75; Jaggi, 1969:
225-226). Grandjean (1969:151) notes that "The new
regime did not suit Switzerland, which was too diverse
to be unified."[15] This sentiment is also echoed in the
books from German Switzerland.

> The new constitution was indeed an artificial,
> shoddy work which was completely unsuitable
> for our country and our people. It created a
> strictly centralized state with a large state
> bureaucracy (Halter, 1972:75).[16]

> Its lesson that a centralized state is not
> suitable for our people with its diverse back-
> grounds has not been forgotten. The time of
> the Helvetic will furthermore serve to remind
> us forever, how much misery the foreign occu-
> pation brought to our land (Jaggi, 1967:225-
> 226).[17]

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[15]Le régime nouveau ne convenait pas à la Suisse,
trop diverse pour être unifée.

[16]Die neue Verfassung war in der Tat ein künst-
liches Machwerk, das für unser Land und Volk gar nicht
passte. Sie schuf einen straffen Einheitsstaat mit einer
starken Zentralregierung und einem grossen Beamtenapparat.

[17]Ihre Lehre aber, dass der Einheitsstaat für
unser vielstämmiges Volk nicht passt, haber wir nicht
vergessen. Die Zeit der Helvetik soll uns auch für immer
daran erinnern, was die Fremdherrschaft für Leid und
Elend über das Land gebracht hat.

Thus, rather than serving to divide the various cultural groups in Switzerland, the interpretation of the Helvetic period in the Swiss textbooks stresses one of the fundamental underpinnings of Swiss democracy--the necessity of a government system to accommodate the diversity of the country and the alien quality of the government which ignored this need.

In addition, the textbook authors from both language communities and religious groups stress that one of the adverse effects of the French occupation of Switzerland was the loss of her traditional neutrality and independence. Napoleon imposed upon Switzerland a neutrality favorable to France. He demanded that the Swiss supply 16,000 soldiers for his army, and imposed a continental blockade which was to the disadvantage of Switzerland's young industries (Hafner, 1969:165; Halter, 1972:81; Jaggi, 1969:231; Müller, 1969:58; Rutsch, 1966: 66, 70; Pfulg, 1960:241, 247; Grandjean, 1969:150, 155; Chevallaz, 1974:78, 121).

> Under the Helvetic Republic and the Mediation, Switzerland did not have her free will: she was a vassal of France and her neutrality - recognized by Napoleon - was no more than theory (Chevallaz, 1974:121).[18]

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[18]Sous l'Helvétique et sous la Médiation, la Suisse n'était pas libre de choisir: elle était vassale de la France et sa neutralité - reconnue par Napoléon - n'etait qu'une formule théorique.

Although Switzerland enjoyed ten years of peace and freedom amidst a war-torn Europe thanks to the French emperor, the Swiss auxiliary troops suffered heavy casualties on the battlefield and the continental blockade was very damaging to Switzerland. More serious, however, was the fact that our country was dependent on France. For fifteen years Switzerland had to give up her traditional neutrality. Only after the downfall of Napoleon was she again able to determine her own fate (Rutsch, 1966:70).[19]

Differences in emphasis, however, appear between the French and German textbooks authors in their assessment of the French occupation of Switzerland. The French authors observe that the Mediation period from 1803-1813 secured for Switzerland ten years of relative tranquility during which time considerable progress was made. Public education was furthered by Pestalozzi and Father Girard. A route over the Simplon was completed and the Linth canal was built to connect the lake of Zurich and lake of Walenstadt (Pfulg, 1960:247; Grandjean, 1969:154). Chevallaz points out that the new cantons served a useful

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[19] Wohl hatte die Schweiz dem französischen Kaiser ein Jahrzehnt der Ruhe und des Friedens inmitten eines von Kriegen zerrissenen Europas zu verdanken gehabt. Aber die Schweizer Hilfstruppen hatten auf den Schlachtfeldern grosse Verluste erlitten, und die Kontinentalsperre hatte der Schweiz schweren Schaden zugefügt. Bedenklicher aber war der Umstand, dass unser Land von Frankreich abhängig gewesen war. Für anderthalb Jahrzehnte hatte die Schweiz ihre traditionelle Neutralität aufgeben müssen. Erst nach dem Sturze Napoleons bot sich die Gelegenheit, das Schicksal wieder selbst zu bestimmen.

apprenticeship as sovereign cantons. Furthermore, in Vaud feudal privileges were suppressed, a cantonal hospital was built, and a penal and civil code of law were drafted (Chevallaz, 1974:78).

The German language authors, on the other hand, stress the price at which this freedom and tranquility was bought. They tend to see this period as one of hardship rather than one of great progress. Halter (1972: 83), for example, discusses the engineering feat of the Linth canal and its architect, Hans Konrad Escher, under the subtitle "a true patriot in a difficult time."

There is a tendency for the German language books to glorify the old Confederation and its inner freedom. The Landsgemeinde cantons which were ruled by all eligible males through a direct democracy are seen as particularly suffering under the Helvetic regime. Jaggi comments:

> And what must the inhabitants of the Lands-
> gemeinde cantons have thought, who, until then,
> used to get together under the open sky in
> order to determine themselves all their own
> affairs? Now they were given a governor who
> was appointed from outside, from the Helvetic
> capital. This reminded the people of the
> legendary feudal lords who they once had chased
> out of the country (Jaggi, 1969:215).[20]

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[20]Und was dachten wohl die Bewohner der Lands-
gemeindeorte, die sich bis dahin unter freiem Himmel
zusammengefunden und alle ihre Angelegenheiten selbst
geordnet hatten? Jetzt bezeichnete man ihnen von aussen

The tendency to glorify the old confederate spirit is also apparent in the German books by Hafner, Halter, Rutsch, and Jaggi, and the French book by Pfulg, which refer to the resistance of the Nidwaldners and Schwyzers to retain their old liberties and religious way of life against tremendous odds as a "heroic battle" (Hafner, 1969:169; Halter, 1972:75-76; Rutsch, 1966:58; Jaggi, 1969:219; Pfulg, 1960:240). Rutsch comments that although the Nidwaldners bravery was without effect they saved the honor of the country.

> The heroic resistance of the Nidwaldners appears
> to have been in vain. But once again the fight-
> ing spirit of the old Confederates was demon-
> strated. It saved Switzerland's honor and may
> have saved our country from an even worse fate
> (Rutsch, 1966:58).[21]

On the other hand, the French author Chevallaz observes that although Rousseau celebrated the direct democracies of these cantons as a model for government in the Social Contract:

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her, von der helvetischen Hauptstadt aus, Regierungs-
statthalter. Diese erinnerten das Volk leicht an die
einst verjagten sagenhaften Vögte.

[21]Der heldenmütige Widerstand der Nidwaldner
war scheinbar umsonst gewesen. Aber noch einmal hatte
sich der Kampfgeist der alten Eidgenossen gezeigt. Er
rettete die Ehre der Schweiz und bewahrte unser Land
wohl vor einem schlimmeren Schicksal.

The reality is less idyllic. Certainly, from
the age of 14 the men can participate in the
landsgemeinde. However, in fact, there are
privileged families which pass on among them-
selves offices and pension money in a hereditary
fashion. Furthermore, these free men have sub-
jects, the people in the Urseren valley and in
the Leventina, are subjects of the Urners. The
Schwyzers of the northern districts are subjects
of the Schwyzers of the original canton
(Chevallaz, 1974:66).[22]

Chevallaz also provides a critical commentary on the

governmental structure of the other cantons prior to the

French occupation which were either ruled by guilds or

an oligarchy of patricians (aristocratic families). Thus

he indicates the need for reform in the old Confederation

(Chevallaz, 1974:66-68).

While the textbooks cover a fairly wide spectrum

of opinion, none of the authors go so far as to praise

Peter Ochs and César Frédéric La Harpe, the two Swiss

who were instrumental in ushering in the Helvetic

Republic (see Table III-2). Most critical is the view

expressed by the German Swiss Bernese author Jaggi who

condemns Ochs and La Harpe for being weak in character.

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[22]La réalité est moins idyllique. Sans doute,
dés l'âge de 14 ans, les hommes participent à la
landsgemeinde; en fait, il y a des familles privilégiées
qui s'attribuent héréditairement charges et pensions.
De plus, ces hommes libres ont des sujets: les gens
de l'Urseren et de la Leventine sont sujets des Uranais;
les Schwytzois des districts septentrionaux sont sujets
des Schwytzois du canton primitif.

He even infers that Ochs could hardly be considered as
a true Swiss (Jaggi, 1969:202-203). In addition, both
language communities accuse Ochs of over-ambitiousness
and vanity. Chevallaz (1974:71) observes that in spite
of his high offices in Basel and his considerable
fortune, he favored the intervention of France out of
personal ambition as well as out of revolutionary convic-
tion. La Harpe is also looked upon as a traitor to the
Confederation. However, some of the books note that
this was the unfortunate consequence of his deep loyalty
to Vaud, his homeland (Weltgeschichte im Bild, 8, 1977:
95; Rutsch, 1966:42; Halter, 1972:69; Chevallaz, 1974:
71).

Napoleon Bonaparte, the main figure dealt with
during this period, receives a mixed treatment in the
Swiss textbooks (see Table III-2). Pfulg and Grandjean,
the two French language books which cover only Swiss
history, give a factual account of his leadership during
the French occupation in Switzerland but refrain from
further comment (Grandjean, 1969:151-157; Pfulg, 1960:
245-247). In contrast, Chevallaz and Salamin, the
French authors who assign a greater amount of space to
world than to national history, point to Napoleon's
military genius and to reforms in the wider civil
sphere such as the civil code and improvements in the

educational system (Chevallaz, 1974:46-50; Salamin, 1974: 212-217). While the German-speaking authors also point to the military genius of Napoleon, as well as to some of his civil accomplishments, consistent with their interpretation of the French occupation of Switzerland, they connect his name with widespread plundering and war, and the loss of independence (Hafner, 1969:155-158; Halter, 1972:66-68; Jaggi, 1969:158-176; Müller, 1969: 23-33; Rutsch, 1966:23-36). The textbook authors of both language communities are, however, unanimous in connecting Napoleon's name with France's self-interest. The harsh demand for troops, the crippling of Swiss industries by the continental blockade, and a weak Confederation during the Mediation period all served France's needs.

Finally, we shall investigate how the various cultural and religious groups treat the ideas and social changes ushered in by the French Revolution. Once again, we find a variety of interpretations. Four of the texts, two French language (Chevallaz and Grandjean) and two German language (Rutsch and Halter) books document the reforms brought in by the French Revolution but refrain from further comment. Among those books which do attempt to evaluate the significance of this revolution in thought, there is a fairly wide range between those giving reserved support and those expressing

unrestricted support for these ideas. The book by Hafner,
which is used in the cantons of German Catholic Switzer-
land, while affirming the rights of liberty, equality,
and faternity indicates that some Christian (or more
particularly Catholic) beliefs should be beyond ques-
tioning. Thus, Hafner observes that the authors who
supported the revolution "criticized the untenable situ-
ation with biting words, they made a mockery of everything
in existence including religion, they argued against the
privileges of the estates and the cities, however, thereby
they also attacked the established Christian teachings"
(Hafner, 1969:152).[23]

The French Catholic author Pfulg similarly con-
demns the French Revolution for its excesses against the
Church:

> Along with these favorable consequences (human
> rights), alas, go terrible calamities. The
> Revolution persecutes the Church, which in its
> eyes is associated with the old regime. It
> commits horrible massacres and wages war all
> across western Europe (Pfulg, 1960:234).[24]

---

[23] . . . . geisselten mit scharfen Worten die un-
haltbaren Zustände, sie gossen die Schale des Spottes
uber alles Bestehende auch über die Religion aus, sie
schrieben gegen den Luxus der Stände, griffen dabei aber
auch uralte christliche Lehren an.

[24] Mais ces conséquences heureuses s'accompagnent,
hélas! d'effroyables malheurs. La Révolution persecute
l'Eglise qui, à ses yeux, est compromise avec l'Ancien
Régime; elle commet d'épouvantables massacres et porte la
guerre à travers l'Europe occidentale.

The non-Catholic German Swiss authors are
divided in their analysis of the French Revolution. In
a section entitled "The Effects and Significance of the
French Revolution" the Bernese author Jaggi praises the
new freedoms in economics, industry, and trade, as well
as the new equality among the citizens on one hand.
On the other, however, he challenges this interpretation,
commenting that the Enlightenment thinkers had great
expectations but were terribly disappointed.

> The Swiss Lavater said at the time of the blood
> baths, "Oh French equality, you are ten times
> uglier than the inequality, which ruled pre-
> viously." And Pestalozzi complained "Revolutions
> always, in the end, bring out the biggest short-
> comings in human nature." However, he also
> compared the time of the French Revolution with
> a hot summer day "on which the fruits of the
> earth ripen under thunder and hail." Those who
> lived through these times suffered greatly. But
> their descendents were grateful for many things
> which the great revolution had brought (Jaggi,
> 1969:157-158).[25]

The German author Müller and the French author
Pfulg also indicate that the cost of the revolution

---

[25]"Oh, französische Gleichheit, zehnmal bist du
hässlicher als die Ungleichheit, die vormals herrschte."
Und Pestalozzi klagte: "Die Revolutionen bringen am
Ende immer die grössten Fehler der Menschennatur
obenauf." Aber er verglich die Zeit der Französischen
Revolution doch auch mit einem heissen Sommertag, "an
dem die Früchte der Erde unter Donner und Hagel zur
Reife gedeihen." Die Mitlebenden litten schwer. Aber
ihre Nachkommen waren für vieles dankbar, was die grosse
Umwälzung gebracht hatte.

should be taken into account. In fact, Müller prefaces

his discussion with the following question: "What then

were the results of this great revolution which cost so

much blood, and brought with it so much misery?" The

most important, he says, was the right of self-government

which now belonged to the sovereign people rather than

to the kings. Second, was the political equality of

all the citizens. Thirdly, he names faternity (Brüder-

lichkeit) (Müller, 1969:21-22). In contrast to the first

two he emphasizes:

> Brotherly feelings, however, could not be put
> into effect by any constitution or laws. They
> could only develop out of a change of the heart,
> such as Robespierre and others had hoped for.
> Each individual would have to learn to take the
> well-being of his fellow human beings as
> seriously as his own well-being (Müller, 1969:
> 22).26

Furthermore, we find in Weltgeschichte im Bild that

toleration, as well as liberty, equality, and fraternity

are underlined as pivotal values emanating from such

Englightenment thinkers as Voltaire, Montesquieu,

Leibniz, Lessing, and Rousseau (Weltgeschichte im Bild,

26Brüderliche Gesinnung liess sich aber durch
keine Verfassung und keinerlei Gesetzgebung verwirklichen.
Sie konnte nur aus einer Umwälzung der Herzen entstehen,
wie sie Robespierre und andere erhofft hatten. Jeder
einzelne musste lernen das Wohlergehen seiner Mitmen-
schen ebenso ernst zu nehmen wie das eigene.

8, 1977:5-7).

The French language author Pfulg, in addition
to re-echoing the above themes, observes two other im-
portant consequences of the French Revolution. Inter-
estingly, he is the only author to point out that the
bourgeoisie rather than the workers profited from the
Revolution. Pfulg's second major conclusion is that
along with human rights the French Revolution proclaimed
the principle of nationalities--the right of people of
the same tongue and the same culture to unite and form a
separate state. However, this principle while a step
forward in countering local interests as opposed to
national interests, when carried too far produced dis-
asterous effects. Excessive nationalism must be con-
sidered one of the bad effects of the Revolution (Pfulg,
1960:234-235).

> It was in the spirit of the right of so-called
> oppressed German minorities, that Hitler
> undertook some of his attacks.
>
> It was in the name of the same principles of
> 1789 that the Soviet Union pretended to defend
> the rights of the colonies and the under-
> developed countries (Arab states, North Africa)
> against the "tyranny" of the capitalist states
> (Pfulg, 1960:235).[27]

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[27]C'est en considération du droit des minorités
allemandes, soi-disant opprimées, qu'Hitler entreprendra
quelques-uns de ses coups de force.

C'est encore au nom des principes de 1789 que la Russie

Salamin also suggests that the ideas spread by the French Revolution have drasticly changed the face of Europe and the world.

> The revolution not only turned France upside down, it profoundly changed the face of Europe and spread ideas which have altered the social and political order in the world.
>
> The declaration of human rights will undermine the authority of the aristocrats. The people are invited to conquer the democratic power. . . . The revolution has given the people the desire to control their own destiny (Salamin, 1974:211).[28]

The Sonderbund War

Most of the Swiss textbook authors note that more than just religious differences kindled the Sonderbund War. The differences between liberal and conservative cantons, on one hand, Protestant and Catholic religious preference on the other, reinforced one another (Halter,

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des Soviets prétendra défendre contre la "tyrannie" des Etats capitalistes les droits des colonies et des pays sous-développés (Etats arabes, Afrique du Nord).

[28]La Révolution n'a pas seulement bouleversé la France; elle a profondément modifié le visage de l'Europe et répandu les idées qui ont change l'ordre social et politique du monde.

La Déclaration des droits de l'homme va miner l'autorité des princes. Les peuples sont invités à conquérir le pouvoir démocratique . . . La Révolution a provoqué l'aspiration des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes.

1972:104; Müller, 1969:67, Hafner, 1969:172; Grandjean, 1969:175; Chevallaz, 1974:130). The Protestant books of both linguistic communities note that religion was but the polarizing agent in this clash.

> Indeed, it was much less a religious struggle than a fight between conservatism and radicalism (Grandjean, 1969:175).[29]

> The conservative followers of the Restauration and the liberal defenders of the Regeneration often clashed with one another. Finally, because they had opposite views towards the Catholic Church, they became bitter enemies. In the eyes of the liberals, at least the fervent radicals, the Catholic Church was an enemy of progress, because it continued to give strong support to the Restauration (Müller, 1969:67).[30]

The German textbooks from Bern and Zurich tie the conflict specifically to the issue of whether the Confederation should have a new constitution (Rutsch, 1966: 98; Jaggi, 1969:285). The cantons desiring a new, more liberal constitution and those hoping to keep the Pact

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[29]En effet, il s'agissait moins d'une querelle religieuse que la lutte entre le conservatisme et le radicalisme.

[30]Die konservativen Anhänger der Restauration und die liberalen Verteidiger der Regeneration stiessen oft hart aufeinder und wurden schliesslich erbitterte Feinde infolge ihrer gegensätzlichen Einstellung zur katholischen Kirche. In der Augen der Liberalen, wenigstens der stürmischen Radikalen, war die katholische Kirche ein Fortschrittsfeind, weil sie sich eifrig für die Restauration einsetzte.

of 1815 which gave them more autonomy coincided with
Protestant and Catholic cantons, respectively.

This cleavage between liberal Protestant and
conservative Catholic made Switzerland more polarized
along religious lines than other countries. It is
significant that only the German Catholic author Hafner
(1969:172) alludes to this fact.

Who was to blame for the unfortunate events that
led to the Sonderbund War? Almost all the books agree
that both sides aggravated the rift between Catholic and
Protestant cantons (Halter, 1972:106; Müller, 1969:68;
Rutsch, 1966:96; Grandjean, 1969:173; Chevallaz, 1974:
130; Pfulg, 1960:262). Weltgeschichte im Bild expresses
this sentiment when it observes that "Both alliances
(Sarner Bund and Siebner-Kondordat) were detrimental to
peaceful co-existence and were clearly in violation of
the Federal Pact of 1815."[31]

Two German language authors do, however, try to
either find excuses for their own side or to tell only
part of the story. Jaggi denounces the action of the
Freischarenzüge (the radical volunteer groups which
retaliated against the conservatives in the canton of

---

[31]Beide Bündnisse schadeten dem eidgenössischen
Zusammenleben und verletzten eindeutig den Bundesvertrag
von 1815.

Lucerne) on one hand, but at the same time tries to find excuses for them. "In spite of this, a wise conservative assures us "that there were very valiant men among the Freischärlern. Many honestly believed that they were performing a duty for their fatherland" (Jaggi, 1969: 276).[32] Likewise he ridicules Leu von Ebersol, the leader of the conservative faction in Lucerne, as a forceful, somewhat stout farmer with small, but sharp eyes and a natural eloquence who asked the advice of the Catholic clergy in political as well as religious matters, and calls attention to the faults of Siegwart-Müller, a helper of Ebersol by quoting an "unnamed educated Lucerner, who was himself conservative" (Jaggi, 1969:275). The quoting of anonymous but supposedly informed persons often shades the historical interpretation of events in this book with a distinct bias.

The bias in the Hafner book, on the other hand, is more subtle. It correctly traces the increased tensions between Catholic and Protestant cantons to the abolishment of the monasteries in Aargau, which it notes violated the Pact of 1815. However, it fails to point

---

[32]Und doch gab es unter den Freischärlern, so versichert ein kluger Konservativer, "sehr wackere Männer und Jünglinge. Viele glaubten redlich, eine Pflicht gegen ihr Vaterland zu erfüllen."

out that the calling in of the Jesuits in Lucerne, while it was not unlawful, also served to polarize the situation. Neither the Hafner book nor the book by Pfulg acknowledge that by seeking help from abroad, the Sonderbund (a defensive pact created by the Catholic cantons of Lucerne, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Zug, Fribourg, and Valais) violated the Federal Pact.

Although there are conflicting interpretations among some Swiss textbook authors on the events leading up to the Sonderbund War, these are counter-balanced by a spirit of consensus when discussing the outcome of the war, and in particular the federal constitution of 1848.

Before examining the outcome of the Sonderbund War, it is worthwhile to briefly turn our attention to its main hero, General Dufour, the commander of the Confederate troops (see Table III-2). The textbook authors from the cantons which stayed loyal to the Confederation are unified in their praise of Dufour who they variously describe as a man "devoid of partisan passion" (Chevallaz, 1974:133) and "conscious of his responsibility" (Grandjean, 1969:176). Rutsch notes that the Diet could not have made a better choice (Rutsch, 1966:100). Many of the books quote Dufour's famous speech in which he appealed to his troops to

spare the civil population of the enemy (Jaggi, 1969:

283; Halter, 1972:108; Müller, 1969:69; Rutsch, 1966:102;

Weltgeschichte im Bild, 8, 1977:102; Grandjean, 1969:253).

Even the books from the Sonderbund cantons which

one might expect to glorify General von Salis-Soglio,

the commander of the Sonderbund troops, commend the merits

of Dufour. Hafner, the German Catholic author comments

that General Dufour "proved himself to be moderate in

carrying out his duty, which cannot be said to the same

extent for his troops" (Hafner, 1969:174).[33] The book

by Pfulg from the French Catholic cantons of Fribourg

and Valais, observes with many of the books from the old

federal cantons, that Dufour conducted the war rapidly

and with humanity (Pfulg, 1960:263; Grandjean, 1969:176;

Müller, 1969:70; Jaggi, 1969:281, 284; Halter, 1972:109;

Chevallaz, 1974:133; Weltgeschichte im Bild, 8, 1977:

102-103). In addition, Pfulg devotes an entire reading,

which is attached to the end of the chapter, to the

accomplishments of Dufour (Pfulg, 1960:273). On the

other hand, neither of the Catholic books dwell on

General von Salis-Soglio, who is mentioned only in passing

without commentary (Pfulg, 1960:263; Hafner, 1969:173).

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[33] . . . . hatte sich bei der Durchführung seiner
Aufgabe hervorragend edel und gemässigt gezeigt, was von
den Truppen selbst nicht im gleichen Masse behauptet
werden kann.

The constitution of 1848 is heralded as a diplomatic work of major proportions. Many authors contrast it with the over-centralized regime of the Helvetic period and the loose alliance of states characterized by the Pact of 1815.

> This constitution, the result of a compromise between different tendencies has proven to be a good work! It is the foundation of modern Switzerland. Thanks to the institutions introduced in 1848, our country has not only been able to enjoy peace in the middle of turmoil, but has also enjoyed considerable progress (Grandjean, 1969:179).[34]

> It combined in a most favorable way the old and the new tendencies. All the cantons and half-cantons remained independent states with their own government, even though they had to give up a part of their former sovereignty (Müller, 1969:71).[35]

> Both the large parties helped in the framing of the constitution for the new Swiss state. The Liberals wanted a strong Confederation, the Conservative strong cantons. The new

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[34]Cette constitution, résultat d'un compromis entre des tendences diverses, s'est révélée une oeuvre bonne. Elle a crée la Suisse contemporaine et, grace aux institutions nées de 1848, notre patrie a pu non seulement jouir de la paix au milieu des tourmentes, mais encore faire de réels progrès.

[35]Sie verband in glücklichster Weise die alten und die neuen Anliegen. Alle Kantone und Halbkantone blieben selbständige Staaten mit eigener Regierung, wenn sie auch einen Teil ihrer bisherigen Machtbefugnisse abtreten mussten.

Confederation is a compromise between the two (Halter, 1972:111).[36]

The two Catholic books voice their opposition to some aspects of the new constitution, observing that the Liberals showed their dislike of the Jesuits in the constitution by banning them and forbidding the founding of new monasteries (Hafner, 1969:175; Pfulg, 1960:264). Pfulg also adds that the constitution of 1848 sanctioned the victory of 1847, leaving the radicals in absolute control of the politics of the Confederation (Pfulg, 1960:264). Nevertheless, the overall assessment of the two Catholic authors is one of praise.

> The constitution of 1848 represented a compromise between the overly loose association of the pre-revolutionary times, the Mediation, and the Pact of 1815 on one hand, and the overly rigid organization of the Helvetic period. It allowed the individual cantons, in spite of the unification of the country, to live a life suited to their own special situation (Hafner, 1969: 175).[37]

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[36]Beim Neubau der Schweiz haben beide grossen Parteien mitgeholfen. Die Liberalen wollten einen starken Bund, die Konservativen starke Kantone: Der neue Bund ist die Lösung der Mitte.

[37]Die Verfassung von 1848 stellte einen Ausgleich dar zwischen dem allzu lockeren Staatenbunde der Vorrevolutionszeit, der Mediation und dem 1815er-Vertrag einerseits und dem allzu straffen Bundesstaat der Helvetik anderseits. Er ermöglichte den einzelnen Kantonen der vielgestaltigen Schweiz, trotz der Einheit ein ihren Verhältnissen angepasstes Sonderleben zu führen.

The constitution of 1848 represents an important step towards democracy. . . . (It) favors centralization, however, without rejecting federalism, which in our country is in accord with our nature and our traditions (Pfulg, 1960: 275).[38]

Chevallaz adds that the constitution of 1848 is of special importance because unlike the Helvetic constitution of 1798, and the Act of Mediation of 1803, which were imposed by France, and the Pact of 1815, which was established under the control of foreign powers, "The constitution of 1848 - worked out at a time when Europe was in a state of turmoil - was drafted and adopted in complete independence (Chevallaz, 1974:203,[39] see also Jaggi, 1969:288).

Thus, while the textbook authors put forth different interpretations of the events surrounding the Sonderbund War, they agree that the new constitution provided a harmonization between new and old tendencies. Liberals and conservatives cooperated and in the end were successful in molding modern Switzerland. The

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[38]La constitution de 1848 marque un progrés sensible vers la démocratie. . .La constitution de 1848 favorise la centralisation, sans toutefois rejeter le fédéralisme qui, chez nous, est conforme à la nature des choses et à la tradition.

[39]La Constitution de 1848 élaborée en un moment où toute l'Europe était en effervescense, fut délibérée et adoptée en toute indépendence.

Confederation was transformed by her own will. Her
nationhood was not based on language, race or culture,
but on general consent to a federalistic and democratic
order.

Kulturkampf

The struggle between radicals and conservatives
which broke out in Europe following the declaration of
papal infallibility in 1870 is known as the Kulturkampf.
Interestingly, the repercussions of this event in
Switzerland are discussed only by the two Catholic
authors. They point out that the Church was seen as
jeopardizing progress (Pfulg, 1960:276; Hafner, 1969:183,
184). "The Catholics are represented as being the
enemies of civilization; one accuses them of being
blindly attached to the holy seat, one starts to doubt
their patriotism" (Pfulg, 1960:276).[40]

However, the two textbook authors emphasize
different aspects of this movement. The French author,
Pfulg stresses the political repercussions of the
Kulturkampf, noting that its excesses in Switzerland
led to a sudden change to a conservative government in

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[40]Les catholiques sont preséntés comme des
ennemis de la civilisation; on leur reproche un attach-
ment aveugle au Saint-Siège, on se met à douter de leur
patriotisme.

Lucerne and in the Ticino. While there was a clear
majority in Lucerne, in the Ticino the conservatives had
to resort to gerrymandering the districts in order to
come to power. Unable to regain power within legal
means, the liberals resorted to a coup d'état. An
intervention of the army was necessary to maintain order,
and peace was restored only after both parties agreed to
institute the proportional system for electing the
cantonal parliament.

Pfulg further notes that the bishops of Basel
and Geneva were exiled, and that the clergy were expelled
from their churches in Geneva and the Bernese Jura.
Fortunately, the disastrous effects of this struggle
were of short duration. An outward sign of the rap-
prochement between radicals and conservatives was the
election of Joseph Zemp, a well known Catholic leader to
the Federal Council in 1891 (Pfulg, 1960:277-278).

The German Catholic author, Hafner, on the other
hand, in his short discussion of the Kulturkampf, con-
centrates on religious rather than political developments.
He comments that those who held true to the Pope were
persecuted in many countries (in Germany, Italy, France,
and Switzerland).

> The course of events was the same almost every-
> where. Disliked bishops were thrown in jail,
> seminaries were put under the supervision of the
> state, the holdings of churches were confiscated,

monasteries were abolished, religious orders were banned, worshipping was made difficult or impossible for the faithful. The Kultur-kampf in Switzerland was most violent in the Bernese Jura and in Geneva (Hafner, 1969: 184).[41]

Evidently, the events connected with the Kultur-kampf linger only in the memory of Catholic Switzerland. A few of the Protestant textbooks fleetingly mention it with reference to Germany (Chevallaz, 1974:214, Weltgeschichte im Bild, 8, 1977:46), however, it is totally ignored in the Swiss context. Its omission from the Bernese book by Jaggi, which devotes a considerable amount of space to specifically Bernese history, is particularly conspicuous. The Kulturkampf left a heri-tage of bitter memories in the northern Catholic districts of the Jura, which are now the center of most current separatist activity.

The Gulf between French and German

Switzerland during World War I

Only four of the textbooks mention the Graben or

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[41]Der Verlauf war fast überall derselbe: misslieb-iege Bischöfe wurden ins Gefängnis geworfen, die Priester-ausbildungsanstalten (Seminarien) unter die Aufsicht des Staates gestellt, das Vermögen der Kirchen und kirchlichen Stiftungen eingezogen, die Klöster aufgehoben, die Orden verboten, den Gläubigen der Gottesdienst erschwert und verunmöglicht. In der Schweiz verlief dieser Kulturkampf am heftigsten im Berner Jura und in Genf.

fossé between the language groups during World War I,
two German language books and two French language books.
All four note that the outbreak of the war found
Switzerland deeply divided, with the German Swiss in
sympathy with the German cause and the French Swiss
aligned with the French (Müller, 1969:148; Rutsch, 1966:
238; Chevallaz, 1974:420; Pfulg, 1960:290).

Chevallaz provides the most complete description
of the events which provoked this gulf between the two
language communities. Specifically, he singles out the
"affaire des colonels" and the Hoffman affair. Two
colonels regularly supplied the German military attaché
with the army staff bulletin. To the dismay of French
Swiss these two officers were given very light sentences.
A Federal Councillor (Chevallaz does not use Hoffman's
name) tried privately to arrange a separate peace be-
tween Russia and Germany, and had to resign over this
breach of neutrality (Chevallaz, 1974:420). Pfulg, the
other French language author, claims that the German
Swiss changed their mind in favor of the allies with the
invasion of Belgium, the burning of Louvain, and the
destruction of Ypres (Pfulg, 1960:297).

The two German authors, Müller and Rutsch, on
the other hand, do not relate the above details, but
rather use this incident as a vehicle for stressing that

fellowship (Brüderschaft) between Confederates should be regarded more highly than friendship with one's cultural kin (Müller, 1969:148; Rutsch, 1966:239). In this context they quote the "memorable" speech delivered by the Swiss poet Carl Spitteler during the war:

> We must realize that our political brother is closer to us than the best neighbor and racial kin. No one should depend on the friendship that exists between us and a neighboring people in times of peace. Before a military command, and the patriotic clang of the war trumpet all other sounds die down, even the voice of friendship. In spite of seeming intimacy, which makes us feel at home because of our common language, we must not take a different position toward the German Empire than toward any other state--the position of reserved neutrality. Then we take the right, the neutral, the Swiss standpoint (Rutsch, 1966:239; Müller, 1969:148).[42]

It is noteworthy, and perhaps characteristic of Swiss textbooks as a whole, that they stress topics of general agreement rather than dissensus. For example,

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[42]Wir müssen uns bewusst werden, dass der politische Bruder uns näher steht als der beste Nachbar und Rassenverwandte. Es verlasse sich nur niemand auf die Freundschaft, die zwischen uns und einem Nachbarvolke in Friedenszeiten waltet! Vor dem militärischen Kommandoruf und dem patriotischen Klang der Kriegstrompete verstummen alle andern Töne, auch die Stimme der Freundschaft. Bei aller Traulichkeit, die uns aus der gemeinsamen Sprache heimatlich anmutet, dürfen wir dem deutschen Kaiserreich gegenüber keine andere Stellung einnehmen als gegenüber jedem andern Staat: die Stellung der neutralen Zurückhaltung. . .Dann stehen wir auf dem richtigen neutralen, dem Schweizer Standpunkt.

rather than speaking about the gulf between the two language groups they stress the hardship of war and the role played by the Swiss Red Cross and other organizations in aiding war victims (Grandjean, 1969:213-215; Pfulg, 1960: 297-298; Jaggi, 1969:355-356; Hafner, 1969:204).

The General Strike of 1918

Almost half of the Swiss textbooks treat the General Strike in a few sentences (Hafner, Müller) or ignore it altogether (Jaggi, Grandjean). How, asks one critic, can the students understand the peace agreement between workers and employers, and why there are fewer strikes in Switzerland than in other countries, when the textbooks ignore this topic (Mattmüller, 1975:14-15)?

The textbooks that do treat the General Strike agree substantially in their interpretation of this event. According to the authors it was precipitated by the economic pressures of the war years which were most heavily borne by the working classes (Müller, 1969:149; Halter, 1972:149; Rutsch, 1966:241; Chevallaz, 1974: 420; Pfulg, 1960:298).

The French authors observe that the Swiss socialists were influenced by foreign ideas and inspired by the Russian revolution (Chevallaz, 1974:420; Pfulg,

1960:299). "The Swiss socialists during the war were under the influence of foreign revolutionaries--notably Russians--who had taken refuge in Switzerland. Among these was Lenin" (Chevallaz, 1974:420).[43] On the other hand, one of the German authors connects the General Strike with the presence of various undesirable foreign elements.

> Foreign elements infiltrated the cities, especially German deserters and Communist agents. . . . Political fanatics wanted to institute the "Dictatorship of the Proletariat" using the model of Russia. The overwhelming majority of the workers wanted a general improvement of the position of the lower classes (Halter, 1972:149).[44]

In general, one observes a more conservative outlook in the German language books. Rutsch, for example, remarks that the speed with which the strikers gave in to the Parliament and the Federal Council shows that Switzerland is not a country of passionate

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[43]Les socialistes suisses avaient, durant la guerre, subi l'influence de révolutionnaires étrangers réfugiés en Suisse, russes notamment, parmi lesquels Lénine.

[44]. . . .Wühlten in den Städten fremde Elemente, vor allem deutsche Deserteure und kommunistische Agenten. . . .Politische Fanatiker wollten nach russischem Vorbilde die "Diktatur des Proletariats" aufrichten; die überwältigende Mehrheit des Arbeitervolkes wünschte eine allgemeine Besserstellung der unteren Schichten.

revolutionaries. "Our political institutions are anchored too strongly in the people, and an attempt is made by the welfare state to alleviate vast differences and to help the weak" (Rutsch, 1966:241).[45]

Both German and French textbook authors agree that the most important demands of the workers were met: the 48 hour work week was introduced, wages were revised, and proportional representation in the Parliament was instituted (Chevallaz, 1974:420, Pfulg, 1960:299, Müller, 1969:149; Rutsch, 1966:241-242).

The General Strike posed a serious threat to the peaceful resolution of differences in Switzerland. Halter concludes that it was a dark page in the history of modern Switzerland.

> The general strike is a dark page in the recent
> history of Switzerland. Switzerland was at the
> threshold of a civil war. At fault was the
> fanaticism of some leaders of the workers,
> equally at fault were those who had no com-
> passion for the needs of the common man
> (Halter, 1972:150).[46]

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[45]Unsere staatlichen Einrichtungen sind zu stark
Volk verankert, und der Wohlfahrtsstaat versucht,
asse Gegensätze zu mildern und dem Schwachen zu helfen.

[46]Der Landesstreik ist ein dunkles Blatt der
eren Schweizergeschichte: Die Schweiz stand vor dem
gerkrieg. Schuld daran war der Fanatismus einzelner
iterführer; eine gleich schwere Schuld traf auch
, die für die Nöte des kleinen Mannes kein
tändnis zeigten.

Our analysis of six crisis in Swiss history
suggests that, in spite of differing interpretations
of some events, there exists a loose framework of
recurring values and attitudes which mould the various
cultural groups into a common citizenship. The text-
book authors repeatedly allude to certain political
values. What are these values and how are they related
to the interpretation of Swiss history? What type of
values are stressed? How are they connected to an
understanding of diversity and national and sub-national
alliances in Switzerland? These topics will provide the
focus for the next section.

Recurring Themes in Swiss History

The quest for freedom is an important theme
which is brought up time and time again in Swiss history
textbooks. This is, in fact, the fundamental idea
integrating Swiss history from its beginnings in 1291
through the so-called Heroic Age of the fourteenth century.
Thus one reads subtitles such as the following: "The
Waldstätten (founders of Switzerland) fear for their
freedom," "The national traditions surrounding the
liberation of the Waldstätten," "The Waldstätten found
the Confederation and fight for their independence"
(Grandjean, 1969:7, 8, 29), "The freedom of the

Waldstätten is menaced" (Pfulg, 1960:77), "The way to freedom," "The fight for freedom in the Appenzell" (Halter, 1972:89, 99), "Freedom efforts in the areas neighboring the Confederation" (Müller, 1968:105).

William Tell personifies the tradition of intrepid resistance to foreign oppressors. His name is mentioned in this connection in five of the six textbooks which cover this period, although only three of the books, two French and one German give a detailed account of his life (Grandjean, 1969:9-10; Pfulg, 80; Müller, 1968:92-93). His name is also recalled in other instances. For example, Müller notes that the leader of the Regeneration in the canton of Aargau (a political movement during the early part of the nineteenth century dedicated to drawing up new constitutions and placing more power in the hands of the citizens) was heralded as a "new Tell" with all the appropriate symbolism (Müller, 1969:66).

All the authors agree that the desire for freedom from foreign oppressors inspired the people from the valleys of Uri, Schwyz, and Nidwalden to sign a pact of perpetual mutual alliance on August 1, 1291. This event formally marked the founding of the Swiss Confederation (Grandjean, 1969:13; Pfulg, 1960:83; Müller, 1968:85, 90; Hafner, 1969:74; Halter, 1972:92; Weltgeschichte im Bild,

7/1, 1975:40).

> Now they were Confederates: united not through blood, but through a voluntary oath. Responsible before God they wanted to assist each other in fighting for, and protecting freedom and rights (Müller, 1968:90).[47]

> Every year the national holiday on the 1st of August reminds Swiss of the founders of the Confederation: a group of intrepid men who were able to defend their rights and their liberties (Pfulg, 1960:83).[48]

The growth of the Confederation to eight cantons through a variety of alliances was inspired by a common enemy, the Habsburgs, as well as a desire for freedom according to the textbook authors. This quest for freedom also prompted Appenzell, Valais, and the Grisons to enter into alliances with the Confederation.

The battles of the "Heroic Age" at Morgarten, Sempach, and Näfels are given a central place in the Swiss history texts. Inevitably they were directed toward "the independence of the homeland, and the well-being of the families" (Halter, 1972:94).

When speaking of newer battles and situations

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[47]Jetzt waren sie Eid-Genossen: verbunden miteinander nicht durch Bande des Blutes, sondern durch einen freiwilligen Eid. In gewissenhafter Verantwortung vor Gott wollen sie einander beistehen, Freiheit und Recht zu erkämpfen und zu wahren.

[48]Chaque année, la fête nationale du 1er août rappelle à la Suisse entière le souvenir des fondateurs de la Confédération: un groupe d'hommes intrépides qui ont su défendre leurs droits et leurs libertés.

the German books, and Hafner in particular, delight in
reviving the memory of these wars and the heroic spirit
of the old Confederates. One learns of the "old Heroic
spirit" (alten Heldengeist) of the Bernese at Grauholz,
and mourns that the "old spirit of community" (alte Geist
der Gemeinsamkeit) which led to the alliance of 1291 and
to the growth of the Confederation seemed no longer
present at the Diet of 1797 (Hafner, 1969:160, 161).

These references are less prevalent in the French
language books. Therefore, one might be inclined to
expect less enthusiasm for the old wars in the French
language books. This does not seem to be the case. Grand-
jean spends an entire chapter on the battles of Sempach
and Näfels, followed by a section on "Switzerland as a
Big Military Power" (La Suisse Grande Puissance Mili-
taire) (Grandjean, 1969:25-68). Pfulg also gives the
old battles a central, but less extensive treatment.

The quest for freedom is also re-echoed in the
later history of Switzerland. Freedom was not, however,
synonymous with equality of individual rights, not at
least, until the French occupation forced the same
human rights which had been proclaimed by the French
Revolution on the Swiss. As Chevallaz points out, these
reforms could not have much meaning as long as they were
enforced by French bayonets (Chevallaz, 1974:74). Nor,

add the German textbook authors, could one really speak

of true freedom (Rutsch, 1966:55; Jaggi, 1969:225-226;

Halter, 1972:73-75).

Prior to the French Revolution freedom had a

different meaning for the old Confederates. It meant,

as Müller observes, freedom for each canton or affiliated

territory to conduct its own affairs.

> The oath of the first Confederates--"We want to
> be one single people of brothers" must not be
> misunderstood. They had allied themselves for
> the preservation of freedom. Freedom meant,
> however, to be able to live according to their
> own will. Each canton looked after and pre-
> served its own individuality, and tolerated
> even within its own territory astonishing di-
> versity (Müller, 1968:211, see also Halter,
> 120).[49]

On numerous occasions this desire to conduct ones

own affairs divided the country into many quarreling

sections. Thus, one considered oneself first a Vaudois,

or Zurcher, or Bernese. How do the textbook authors

treat cantonal and national loyalties? Daalder (1974:

113) suggests that an inspection of the course content of

Swiss schools would probably reveal an insistence on both

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[49]Der Schwurspruch der ersten Eidgenossen - "Wir
wollen sein ein einzig Volk von Brüdern" - darf also
nicht missverstanden werden. Sie hatten sich zur
Wahrung der Freiheit verbrüdert, Freiheit aber heisst:
nach eigenem Wille leben können. Jeder Ort hegte und
pfegte seine Eigenheit und duldete sogar im Innern
erstaunliche Verschiedenheiten.

national and sub-national alliances typically regarded as fully compatible.

Indeed, this seems to be the case. While most of the books emphasize the history of their own canton, they appear to do this to instill pride and to inform the student about the canton in which he lives rather than to glorify one part of the country at the expense of the others. On the whole, the textbook authors seem to take for granted that one has dual loyalties to the canton and to the Confederation. The purpose of the Constitution of 1848, they indicate, was to provide for the continued existence of the cantons, as well as to insure the existence of a viable nation.

Diversity is treated by most of the authors with the same basic outlook. By and large it is a taken for granted aspect of Swiss life. None of the textbook authors indicate that homogenization is a desirable or even possible alternative. Halter writes that cantonal and communal autonomy is of utmost importance.

> It is the old Swiss freedom which our ancestors have been fighting for since the 13th century. . . .Thanks to it German Swiss are able to live different from the French Swiss or the Ticinese, the mountain people different from the people living in the low lands, and the city people different from the country people. It is also largely responsible for the fact that despite the four cultural groups Switzerland has never had racial or linguistic strife, and despite the

two religions has seldomly encountered religious problems (Halter, 1972:112).[50]

Two authors, one German and one French also express this attitude by quoting Gottfried Keller, a famous Swiss author of the nineteenth century. "How intriguing is it that there is not only one kind of Swiss, but that there are Zurchers, and Bernese, Unterwaldners, and Neuchâtelois, Grisoners, and Baslers, and even two types of Baslers; that there is a history of Appenzell and a history of Geneva. Isn't this diversity in unity truly a school of friendship?" (quoted in Pfulg, 1960:275; Müller, 1969:294).

Furthermore, Müller notes that great Swiss in modern times have seen in the diversity of their country a particular task for the Confederation—to show the world that diverse peoples can peacefully live together. He quotes the Swiss historian Carl Hilty who writes:

> Everything which nature, language, blood and tribal characteristics can do, pull the Swiss much more apart than draw them together - toward West, North, South, to their own tribesmen. The Confederation has set as its goal to

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[50]Es ist die alte Schweizerfreiheit, für welche unsere Ahnen seit dem 13. Jahrhundert gekämpft haben. Ihr verdanken wir es, dass die Deutschschweizer anders als die Welschschweizer oder Tessiner, die Bergbewohner anders als die Bewohner des Mittellandes, die Stadtleute anders als die Landleute leben dürfen. Sie hat auch viel dazu beigetragen, dass die Schweiz trotz den vier Volksstammen nie einen Rassen- oder Sprachenstreit, trotz den zwei Konfessionen seither nur selten konfessionelle Streitigkeiten erlebt hat.

form from these different people through the
beneficial action of close contact, a new,
distinct people. To be an example in this way,
that is its task in world history (Müller, 1969:
295).[51]

This, of course, does not mean that the textbook

authors have neglected the many occasions in which Swiss

have fought against one another or that they are unaware

of current problems. Still, they indicate that there

are strong forces, historical as well as political that

bind the Confederates together.

> Through the ages it (Switzerland) has experi-
> enced religious wars, civil discord, and foreign
> invasion. The Helvetic community contains, why
> keep it a secret? - elements of miscomprehension
> and misunderstanding, germs of division.

> However, our country undeniably enjoys a
> solid unity and its history has never stopped
> describing an ascending curve from the formation
> of the league of the first cantons to the present.

> Our ancestors had a restless and warlike
> spirit, they fought relentlessly in order to gain
> their freedom and to insure their independence.
> Many times they had disputes among themselves.
> They have collected glory on the battlefields of
> Europe.

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[51]Alles, was Natur, Sprache, Blut und Stammes-
eigenart vermag, zieht die Schweizer vielmehr auseinander
als zusammen, nach Western, Norden, Süden zu ihren
Stammesgenossen. Die Eidgenossenschaft hat sich das hohe
Ziel gesetzt, aus diesen verschiedenen Stämmen durch
wohltätige Vermischung eine neue, eigene Nationalität zu
bilden. Und in dieser Hinsicht ein Musterstaat auch fur
andere zu sein, das ist ihr weltgeschichtlicher Beruf.

They drew up a balance sheet of all these
adventures. In final account they came to the
conclusion that individuals and communities
have an interest to patiently support their
neighbors, to resolve conflict by arbitration
and to live in friendship with the whole world.
They found out with good reason that only the
cause of peace is worth the biggest sacrifices.
And the band which united them, and was quite
loose at the beginning, was transformed into an
indissolvable chain of twenty-two links (Pfulg,
1960:322).[52]

In summary, we have found that both Protestant

and Catholic, German and French textbooks emphasize

political values which transcend narrowly defined cul-

tural interpretations of national history. However,

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[52]Au cours des âges, il a éprouvé les guerres
religieuses et les discordes civiles et subi l'invasion
étrangère. La communauté helvétique renferme en elle -
pourquoi le taire? - des motifs d'incomprehension et de
mésentente, des germes de division.

Cependant, notre pays jouit indéniablement d'une
solide unité et son histoire, depuis la formation de la
ligue des cantons primitifs jusqu'à nos jours, n'a cessé
de décrire une courbe ascendante.

Nos aïeux étaient d'instinct remuants et
batailleurs. Ils ont guerroyé sans relâche afin de
conquérir la liberté d'assurer leur indépendance; ils se
sont maintes fois disputés entre eux; ils ont recueilli
la gloire sur les champs de bataille de l'Europe.

Puis ils ont dressé le bilan de toutes ces aven-
tures. En fin de compte, ils ont acquis la certitude que
les individus et les communautés ont tout intérêt à sup-
porter patiemment leurs voisins, à résoudre les conflits
par l'arbitrage et à vivre sur un pied d'amitié avec tout
le monde. Ils ont estimé, avec raison, que seule la
cause de la paix est digne des plus grands sacrifices. Et
le lien, assez lâche qui les unissait, à l'origine, s'est
transformé en une chaîne indisoluble aux vingt-deux
anneaux.

we do not want to idealize Swiss history textbooks.
Clearly, they are not immune from presenting a consensus
version of history, they too are sometimes flawed by a
narrow patriotism and an interpretation of events which
favors their own cultural, linguistic, or religious
group. But in contrast with textbooks in use in other
plurilingual countries, such as Canada and South Africa,
they provide a basis for a positive Swiss identity. In
Canada, Trudel and Jain conclude that there are few
themes in Canadian textbooks which unite Francophone and
Anglophone. For example, they observe that themes, such
as the struggle for autonomy, which should help the two
groups to "feel that they live in the bosom of a single
nation" become in the French Canadian textbooks "a
weapon in the hands of the province to be wielded against
Canada as a whole." Nationalism also conjures up differ-
ent meanings for the two groups. "While the English-
language books, seconded by one or two French ones,
declare themselves for unreserved dedication to the
nation as a whole, rather than to the provinces, there
are some French books, and these are the most influen-
tial, that give priority to provincial loyalty over
national" (Trudel and Jain, 1968:129). Auerbach
(1958:121) observes that a biased white consciousness
is promoted in the textbooks of both language groups

"by showing the African as inherently tribal and dangerous to whites when exposed to European influences. . . ." Nevertheless, there are also significant differences in the presentation of history to Afrikaans-speaking and English-speaking children, which he implies, divides the white population. Our basic conclusion, therefore, is that the distinctive emphasis on political values such as freedom from foreign or cultural domination, neutrality, federalism, and political and social accommodation promotes a common citizenship which transcends cultural, linguistic, and religious alliances--a foundation which is often absent in other multicultural societies.

Summary

In Switzerland, the school and its curriculum actively seek to instill a sense of national consciousness. A Bernese teacher's manual states:

> The teaching of history has a general human and a national task. . . . The general human task of the teaching of history is to help further and form the growing person as such with the means and material which are particular to the subject of history, by widening his/her horizon and by developing and forming reason and mind, conscience and will. The teaching of history fulfills the national task in Switzerland when it helps to train good Confederates. Good Swiss must have a certain knowledge of the essence of our state and our history, but also an understanding of the differences between us and others (Swiss National Commission for UNESCO, 1957:4).

As we have seen in our study of Swiss history
textbooks, this goal is largely realized. Even though they
present various interpretations of some events, there
appears to be an underlying consensus of what the Swiss
state should stand for. Political institutions, and
values, as well as informal arrangements which transcend
cultural, linguistic, or religious boundaries provide
the foundation for this consensus. All the books empha-
size the importance of decentralized federalism, can-
tonal autonomy, democratic institutions, and a foreign
and domestic policy of neutrality. In addition, histori-
cal themes such as the fight for freedom, and social
patterns such as an emphasis on the mediation of differ-
ences buttress this foundation.

For the textbook authors of both language groups,
diversity is a taken for granted part of Swiss life.
Neither German nor French Swiss view the other language
group as a single monolithic entity nor define one cul-
ture in contrast to the other. Many books expressly
speak of "our" country and none of them make a distinction
between "they" and "we" either in terms of language or
religion. Except for a few instances (such as when they
relate the developments in French and German Switzerland
during the Reformation, or the pull of nationalities
during World War I) the textbooks make few references to

German and French Switzerland at all as separate blocks.
Instead, history is unfolded on a national scale with
reference to individual cantons. Religion, on the other
hand, is a more salient source of division. However,
there are indications that it occupies a less dominant
role in the newer history textbooks.

The Swiss textbooks, unlike those of Canada and
South Africa, do not comprise two distinct camps or
world views. Rather, the history of past conflicts shows
that an effort is made in most instances to show both
sides of the dispute, or at least to emphasize that the
mediation of differences is an important aspect of the
"Swiss way of life."

This, of course, does not mean that all the text-
books present identical views of Swiss history. There
are some noticeable differences in tone between the
textbooks of the two language groups. In general, the
German language books are more conservative, put greater
emphasis on political values, and the mediation of dif-
ferences, and present a more insular version of history.
By contrast, the books from French Switzerland tend to
be more secular, less specifically politically oriented,
and more worldly in their outlook. We must keep in mind,
however, that these variations hold true only in the
broadest comparative perspective, for the differences

within the language groups are as significant as those between them. Pfulg, the book used in the French, Catholic cantons of Valais and Fribourg resembles the German books in its religiosity and conservatism as well as in its implicit emphasis on the mediation of differences. On the other hand, it presents a more liberal and less orthodox interpretation of world history than Hafner which is representative of the older Weltanschauung of German Catholic Switzerland. Among the newer Protestant books, or those from mixed cantons we find a more progressive spirit in the French book by Chevallaz and the new German Weltgeschichte im Bild series. The Bernese book by Jaggi, on the other hand, presents the most insular and ethnocentric view of Swiss and regional history.

Despite these differences, it appears that Switzerland's linguistic and religious minorities are united into a common civic culture. Obviously, there remain differences between the various groups which may provide a source of dissensus. It is important, however, that these differences, be they religious, linguistic, or cultural seem to be moderated by other things the groups have in common.

In order to obtain a real understanding of diversity and social relations in Switzerland it is

necessary to differentiate between official institutions, such as the school, whose task it is to socialize the consensus values of the society and the attitudes reported by the populace itself. The outlook expressed in the official school curriculum may or may not be the one internalized by Swiss youth. To further illuminate the relationship between public opinion and attitudes and core values in the Swiss setting the next chapter will focus on young people's attitudes toward multiculturalism.

CHAPTER IV

DIVERSITY AND SOCIAL RELATIONS IN SWISS SOCIETY:
THE ATTITUDES OF YOUNG PEOPLE TOWARD MULTICULTURALISM

What attitudes do young people in Switzerland
hold toward multiculturalism? This is an essential and
largely unexplored area in the study of majority-
minority relations in Switzerland. Dunn (1971:282)
concludes his study on social cleavage and party systems
in Belgium and Switzerland by noting "there is a glaring
gap in our knowledge in the field of survey research
into mass and elite attitudes" in these two nations. A
survey of attitudes of young Swiss will help us to fill
a portion of this gap, as well as to paint a more dy-
namic picture of interethnic relations in this small
multicultural society. In addition, it should aid us
in evaluating some of the tenets of the consociational
model. Are cultural diversity and what Steiner has
labelled subcultural segmentation (i.e., sharp cleavages
of a religious, linguistic and/or regional or class
nature) synonymous in Swiss society? To what degree
are language and religion important variables regarding
the formation of attitudes? If the various groups hold
similar attitudes, it would cast doubt on one of the

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major tenets held by consociational theorists--that sharp cleavages in the system can only be bridged by the deliberate efforts of the elites.

Research Procedure

Questionnaires were administered to 538 German and French speaking secondary students, aged 14 to 16, in the cantons of Zurich, Bern, Aargau, Solothurn, Zug, Vaud, Neuchâtel, Fribourg, and Valais (see Appendix B for the sample design). The questions focused on young peoples attitudes toward diversity in Switzerland. How do Swiss youth perceive the diversity of their country? How do they combine their various loyalties to the Swiss state, their canton, language, and religion? What are their attitudes toward multiculturalism and multilingualism? What are the areas of consensus and cleavage in Swiss life? Is there a set of core values that unite the various cultural, linguistic, and religious groups?

Approximately half of the questions were adapted from a study of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism by Johnstone (1969). The other half were drafted specifically for this study. A copy of the French and German questionnaires is given in Appendix C.

Awareness of Diversity

One important indicator of an awareness of
diversity is provided by the estimate young people made
of the linguistic composition of the Swiss population.
Respondents were asked to gauge what percent of Swiss
spoke German, French, and Italian as their mother tongue.
Interestingly, both French and German Swiss overestimate
the Italian-speaking population. Presumably this is due
to the fact that they include the resident foreigners
in their estimates (the majority of whom are Italian-
speaking). The data were therefore analyzed in two ways,
one taking into account the Swiss population, and the
other taking into account the total resident population
(see Table IV-1).

According to the 1970 census 74 percent of the
Swiss population spoke German, 20 percent spoke French
and 4 percent spoke Italian. Answers of 70-79 percent
German, 15-24 percent French, and 2-6 percent Italian
were recorded as accurate. The distribution of the
resident population in 1970 by mother tongue was 65 per-
cent German, 18 percent French and 12 percent Italian,
with 60-69 percent, 13-22 percent, and 9-13 percent
respectively designated as the correct answers.

The young people in the sample, whether con-
sciously or unconsciously, seem to include the foreign

TABLE IV-1. --Awareness of linguistic composition of resident and Swiss population, by language

What percent of Swiss, do you think, speak German (French, Italian) as their mother tongue?

How many speak German?	Swiss Population	Resident Population	German N=276 Swiss Population	Resident Population	French N=262 Swiss Population	Resident Population
Accurate Answer	(70-79%)	(60-69%)	9.4	35.2	15.6	35.5
High estimate			1.5	9.4	.4	16.0
Low estimate			86.3	52.5	79.0	43.5
No estimate made			2.9	2.9	5.0	5.0
		Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mean				55.5		56.2
Standard deviation				9.4		11.9
How many speak French?						
Accurate Answer	(15-24%)	(13-22%)	17.0	17.0	11.8	11.1
High estimate			77.9	78.2	82.8	83.6
Low estimate			2.2	1.8	0	0
No estimate made			2.9	2.9	5.3	5.3
		Total	100.0	99.9	99.9	100.0
Mean				28.5		32.6
Standard deviation				7.6		8.7
How many speak Italian?						
Accurate Answer	(2-6%)	(9-13%)	6.9	34.4	21.7	44.3
High estimate			90.2	55.1	72.9	25.6
Low estimate			0	7.6	0	24.8
No estimate made			2.9	2.9	5.3	5.3
		Total	100.0	100.0	99.9	100.0
Mean				15.2		11.4
Standard deviation				6.5		6.1

population in their estimates of the three language communities in Switzerland. The accuracy of the answers, particularly for the German and Italian groups improves considerably when the resident rather than the Swiss population is used as a base. It is not difficult to understand why secondary students aged 14 to 16 are more impressed by the size of the resident rather than the Swiss language communities. This cohort of young people has witnessed an increase in the Italian foreign worker population in their own life times and is confronted with their presence everyday. They hear Italian spoken on public transportation, on construction sites throughout the cities and towns in Switzerland, and in many public places they visit, such as restaurants and resorts.

Perhaps the most striking finding is the marked degree to which German Swiss underestimate their own presence in the population and overestimate the two minority linguistic communities. If we use the resident population as our standard, we find that over half of the German Swiss underestimate their own number in the population (by 10 percent). In contrast, they overestimate the Italian-speaking population by 3 percent and the French Swiss population by an overwhelming 11 percent. An examination of the French Swiss estimates reveals these

similar results. White they give a fairly
accurate estimate of the Italian-speaking group, the
French-speaking people also consistently underestimate
the German majority (by 9 percent) and greatly over-
estimate their own presence in the resident population
(by 14 percent).

In stark contrast, are the findings by Johnstone
from a Canadian national sample of young people, aged 13
to 20. Anglophones and Francophones in the 15 to 16 year
old age category showed a marked tendency to overesti-
mate their own numbers. On the other hand, older
Francophones were considerably more likely than younger
Francophones to overestimate the Anglophones. The per-
centage jumped from 17 percent to 39 percent between the
youngest and oldest groups. Johnstone (1969:43) con-
cludes "it would appear that during the adolescent years
Francophones not only become aware of the dominance of
the English language in Canadian society, but are so
impressed by this fact that they see themselves more
in the minority than they really are." This trend is not
likely to be found in Switzerland.

What emerges from this study, in short, is that
although the German Swiss are a statistical majority,
they lack the outlook that is usually associated with
this position. The ambiguous feelings the German-speaking

Swiss hold about their big neighbor to the north also weakens their majority outlook further.[1] Certainly they have not a shred of that sentiment derivative from a perception of being part of a pan-Germanic force.

Tables IV-2 and IV-3 highlight this relationship. Four different questions were used to measure the tie between the German and French Swiss and various countries. First, the young people were asked to select the countries they considered Switzerland's best friends. The evaluations are reported in Table IV-2. Part B indicates that a majority of both German and French speaking Swiss include France and Germany in their selection of Switzerland's three closest friends. It is noteworthy that over 50 percent of both groups name Germany. However, the French Swiss mention France relatively more often (by a margin of 24 percent), while the German Swiss favor Austria and Liechtenstein.

This tendency is even more pronounced if we consider only the closest friend named. Forty percent of

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[1]This same ambivalent feeling appeared when French- and German-speaking youth were asked to rate their relationship with their respective cultural kin. Eighty-one percent of the French Swiss qualified their relationship with France as either good or very good, while only 32 percent of the German Swiss gave similar answers when asked about their relationship with Germany.

TABLE IV-2.--Countries named as Switzerland's best friends, by
language

A. Best Friend

Country

	German N=276	French N=262
France	15.6	39.7
Italy	3.6	2.3
Germany	15.6	11.1
Austria	10.5	5.1
Liechtenstein	23.9	8.0
England	2.9	3.8
United States	7.6	14.1
Others	4.0	5.3
No country named	16.3	10.7
Total	100.0	100.0

B. Three Best Friends

France	55.8	79.9
Italy	27.7	29.9
Germany	50.2	53.4
Austria	44.2	24.4
Liechtenstein	34.6	15.4
England	13.0	18.8
United States	25.1	31.6
Holland	6.1	3.4
All other countries named	16.3	25.5
Total	273.0	279.3

TABLE IV-3.--Country named where respondent would most like to live,
by language

In which of these European countries would you most
like to live?

	German N=276	French N=262
Germany	10.2	9.2
France	30.1	45.8
Italy	3.6	4.2
Austria	23.2	10.7
Holland	18.1	22.5
Spain	7.2	3.0
No response	7.6	4.6

Country named where respondent would most like to
live, by language

	German N=276	French N=262
Germany	4.3	5.7
France	13.8	29.0
Italy	2.9	1.9
Austria	14.5	4.2
Holland	6.9	6.5
England	8.0	9.2
Canada	8.3	10.6
United States	12.3	13.7
Others	24.7	17.7
No response	4.3	1.5

the French Swiss name France compared to 16 percent for
the German Swiss. Surprisingly, Liechtenstein is more
often identified as Switzerland's best friend (24 percent)
by the German Swiss than either Germany (16 percent) or
Austria (10 percent). Although Liechtenstein is, of
course, not a part of Switzerland, in many ways it is
closely linked with its Helvetic neighbor. The princi-
pality maintains an embassy in Bern, but otherwise con-
fides its whole diplomatic representation to Switzerland.
In addition, there is a customs and monetary union by
virtue of which Liechtenstein is entirely absorbed within
the Swiss customs area, so that Swiss customs officials
collect customs at the frontier of Austria, in offices
bearing the joint emblems of both countries. By select-
ing Liechtenstein as Switzerland's best friend, it
appears that German Swiss youth are reaffirming their
own identity vis-à-vis Germany and a specifically German
culture.

The difference in the rates of no response be-
tween the French and German-speaking Swiss also attests
to the greater ambivalence of German Swiss youth. Six-
teen percent of the German Swiss as compared with 11
percent of the French Swiss did not give definitive
answers to this question.

A pattern of forces propelling the two Swiss

linguistic communities toward and away from their big cultural neighbors was also revealed when the respondents were asked in closed and open-ended questions where outside of Switzerland they would most like to live. When the question was limited to a number of European countries, France was chosen considerably more often than the other countries by both French and German speaking Swiss youth (see Table IV-3, Part A). Once again a higher percentage of French Swiss youths name France, while the German Swiss responses are split between France, Austria, and Holland. In fact, both groups favor the two latter democracies over Germany, Italy, and Spain, indicating a certain similarity of outlook.

When young Swiss adults were allowed to select the country where they would most like to live on a global basis, much the same picture appears (see Table IV-3, Part B). The French Swiss favor France (chosen by 29 percent), followed by the traditional immigrant countries of the United States (chosen by 14 percent) and Canada (chosen by 11 percent). The German Swiss are divided between Austria (with 15 percent) and France (with 14 percent), followed by the United States (12 percent) as the countries where they would most like to live. All other countries named were selected by less than 10 percent of the two subsamples.

Finally, forces attracting each of the Swiss
language communities toward their respective cultural
kin can observed in Table IV-4. Respondents were asked
how similar or dissimilar they thought each of the fol-
lowing groups are: Ticinesi and Italians, Ticinesi and
French Swiss, Ticinesi and German Swiss, German Swiss
and Germans, German Swiss and French Swiss, French Swiss
and Germans, and German Swiss and French. The pairs
were perceived as more dissimilar than similar by both
groups with the exception of the Ticinesi and Italians
and the French Swiss and French. In most cases, Swiss
young people from both linguistic groups attach con-
siderable importance to language and cultural factors
when evaluating the similarity or distinctiveness of
various groups of people. The one notable exception is
the similarity between the German Swiss and Germans:
the German Swiss see themselves as rather different (12
percent) from the Germans, while the Romands see these
two groups as quite similar (37 percent).

Another interesting finding concerns the degree
of distinctiveness the French and German speaking Swiss
perceive between themselves and others. The two Swiss
linguistic groups see themselves as generally more dis-
similar than similar. However, this direction is much
stronger among the French Swiss (56 percent) than among

TABLE IV-4. -- Perceived similarity between groups, by language[a]

	Dissimilar	Neutral	Similar

Ticinesi and Italians +96 / +74

Ticinesi and French Swiss -54 / -37

Ticinesi and German Swiss -61 / -72

German Swiss and Germans -12 / +37

German Swiss and French Swiss -23 / -56

French Swiss and French +78 / +61

French Swiss and Germans -75 / -68

German Swiss and French -76 / -81

German Swiss / French Swiss

Scale: 100 80 60 40 20 - 0 + 20 40 60 80 100

[a]
    The figures represent the percentage discrepancies between those saying the two groups are very similar or fairly similar and those responding that they were fairly unsimilar or very unsimilar. Percentages are computed only for those who gave substantive answers to the questions.

the German Swiss (23 percent). Nevertheless, we might
hypothesize that some sort of "national identity" does
intervene in the assessment of the two groups. The
French Swiss, while feeling themselves distinct from
the German Swiss, sense themselves to be even more
dissimilar from the Germans (56 percent from the
Alemands as compared to 68 percent from the Germans).
For the German Swiss this correlation is even more pro-
nounced (23 percent from the French Swiss as compared
with 76 percent from the French).

These findings highlight the observations made
by Siegfried (1956:75-76) of the two major linguistic
groups. He comments that:

> The sentiments of the Alemanic Swiss towards
> the Romands, though they may be marked by a
> secret distrust for the more brilliant defects
> of the latter, are balanced by a curious par-
> tiality for the gifts which they themselves do
> not possess, and finally by a semi-sentimental
> attraction to which they surrender themselves
> almost as to a fantasy. . . . It would be an
> exaggeration to say that the feeling was re-
> ciprocal, but if French-speaking Swiss have no
> such inclination, at least they have a very
> strong feeling made up no doubt more of calcu-
> lation and reason than sentiment.

Together, then, our findings describe a German
Swiss majority which is predisposed both to acknowledge
and to respect the linguistic minorities. However,
these conditions alone are not sufficient for cultural
coexistence. The majority as well as the minorities,

both linguistic and religious, must hold a positive
attachment to the nation and identify with it in order
for a stable and harmonious polity to exist.

For the Swiss, the idea of fatherland is not as
precise as it is for its major European neighbors, for
whom the fatherland is simply France, or Germany, or
Italy. As Rougemont (1965:199) suggests, for the Swiss,
fatherland often evokes a smaller entity, connected with
the place where one was born, has grown up or has lived.
This more local fatherland, however, does not preclude
in any way the attachment to other larger communities,
such as Switzerland.

Lüthy (1962:18) goes even further in this com-
parison noting that:

> A Breton, Basque, or Alsatian nationalist is very
> likely to be a bad Frenchman, a Welshman in favor
> of self-government for Wales will be a doubtful
> Britisher; in other countries too, separatist
> movements endanger national unity. . . . But the
> believer in self-government for the cantons of
> Valais or Grisons or Appenzell is a model Swiss
> patriot in fact the type of man to whom Switzer-
> land owes her existence. . . . All modern
> states have come into being through struggling
> against the regionalism of their component part;
> Switzerland, however, was a product of such
> regionalism and has been sustained in the often
> serious crises of her history, by the local
> patriotism of her "twenty-two peoples. . . ."[2]

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[2]The extreme variety of Jurassian nationalism
is, however, certainly an exception.

The next section will examine the multiple
loyalties of young Swiss adults to the nation, as well
as to their canton, and linguistic and religious groups.

Multiple Loyalties

Table IV-5 shows the strength of various loyal-
ties of Swiss in the two major language and religious
groups. The responses of all groups--German and French
Swiss, as well as their religious segments; German Swiss
Catholics and Protestants, and French Catholics and
Protestants--were roughly divided between those believing
that cantonal, linguistic, and religious affiliation
were important and those who thought they were unimportant.
On the other hand, all the respondents valued Swiss
citizenship very highly. Our findings thus indicate that
national identity for young people in Switzerland today
takes precedence over the various other loyalties.

The different groups also make similar appraisals
about the various loyalties. This tendency can be seen
more clearly when average ratings are ranked. In
general, German Swiss identify slightly more strongly
than the French Swiss with the nation, while the Romands
express more loyalty toward their religious and linguistic
groups and their canton.

TABLE IV-5. --The strength of various loyalties, by language

How important is it for you to be a citizen of your canton?

	N=276 German			N=262 French		
	Catholic	Protestant	Whole	Catholic	Protestant	Whole
Very important	12.0	13.7	12.7	29.4	8.7	22.5
Fairly important	43.3	23.1	34.1	27.2	24.6	26.7
Not very important	36.0	42.7	39.5	26.1	39.1	29.8
Not at all important	8.7	20.5	13.8	17.2	27.5	21.9
Mean[a]	2.41	2.70	2.54	2.31	2.86	2.49
Standard deviation	.81	.95	.88	1.07	.93	1.06

How important is it for you to be a German Swiss/French Swiss?

	Catholic	Protestant	Whole	Catholic	Protestant	Whole
Very important	19.5	15.4	17.8	27.4	17.4	23.8
Fairly important	32.9	30.8	32.0	33.5	30.4	31.8
Not very important	34.2	38.5	36.0	23.5	34.8	27.2
Not at all important	13.4	15.4	14.2	15.6	17.4	17.2
Mean[a]	2.42	2.54	2.46	2.27	2.52	2.37
Standard deviation	.95	.93	.94	1.03	.98	1.03

TABLE IV-5. --Continued

How important is your religion for you?

	N=274 German			N=262 French		
	Catholic	Protestant	Whole	Catholic	Protestant	Whole
Very important	18.9	9.4	15.7	18.3	24.6	21.4
Fairly important	42.6	34.2	35.3	46.1	36.2	42.0
Not very important	25.7	41.0	32.1	23.3	26.1	23.7
Not at all important	12.8	15.4	16.9	12.2	13.0	13.0
Mean[a]	2.32	2.62	2.44	2.29	2.28	2.28
Standard deviation	.93	.86	.92	.91	.98	.95

How important is it for you to be a Swiss citizen?

	N=276 German			N=261 French		
	Catholic	Protestant	Whole	Catholic	Protestant	Whole
Very important	58.0	49.6	54.0	51.1	42.6	46.7
Fairly important	30.0	33.3	31.5	31.1	35.3	33.0
Not very important	8.7	10.3	9.8	8.9	16.2	11.5
Not at all important	3.3	6.8	4.7	8.9	5.9	8.8
Mean[a]	1.57	1.74	1.65	1.76	1.85	1.82
Standard deviation	.79	.90	.84	.95	.90	.95

[a]
Based on scores of 1-4 with low scores indicating higher level of identification.   Excludes those with no opinions.

Average Ratings of Affiliation by Language[a]

	German	French
National	1.65	1.82
Religious	2.44	2.28
Linguistic	2.46	2.37
Cantonal	2.54	2.49

[a]Based on scores of 1-4 with low scores in-
dicating higher levels of identification.
Excludes those with no opinions.

Kerr and his colleagues discovered what, at
first sight, appears to be a contradictory finding.
When asked "Which of these terms best describes the way
you usually think of yourself"

- Genevois (for example)
- Swiss Romand (for example)
- Swiss

40 percent of the French Swiss mentioned the nation, 31
percent their canton, and 29 percent their linguistic
group. In contrast, 53 percent of the Alemands identi-
fied with the nation, 31 percent with their canton, and
16 percent with their linguistic group. Kerr (1974:21-
22) concludes that "the Swiss Alamans have a stronger
sense of specifically Swiss identity than do Swiss
Romands who express a stronger sense of linguistic
identification" (cf. also Sijanski, 1975).

These findings do not necessarily imply that
French Swiss feel less Swiss than their German-speaking
compatriots. In fact, Fischer and Trier (1962:80)

conclude in a study of the stereotypes that the two groups hold toward each other that "Whereas a Swiss Allemand brings his Swissness in full harmony with his native attachments to the German-speaking part of Switzerland, a Swiss Romand feels, in greater measure, a sense of belonging to the Swiss Romande and <u>as such Swiss</u>." In other words, the French Swiss also has an attachment to Switzerland but his loyalty is less direct than that of the German Swiss.

Still, we have not solved our puzzle. Why do the young Swiss in our sample, be they French or German speaking, identify more strongly with the nation than the respondents in Kerr's older national sample?

Table IV-6 gives a breakdown by age, of the strength of cantonal, linguistic, and national identification, as well as a pictorial account of the events which have influenced the responses of the different age cohorts. In general, we can observe a movement away from cantonal identification toward more national identification, signifying a process of political integration or nation-building in Switzerland. However, whereas the sense of attachment shifts steadily from the canton to the nation across generations in German Switzerland, one finds abrupt reversals in the progression of national identity among the French Swiss. Kerr

TABLE IV-6. --Sense of identity by language and age cohort

Age Cohort	Swiss Alamannic					Swiss Romande				
	Cantonal	Linguistic	Swiss	Total	N	Cantonal	Linguistic	Swiss	Total	N
20–29	26%	19	55	100%	(255)	24%	21	55	100%	(47)
30–39	29%	19	52	100%	(236)	35%	20	45	100%	(54)
40–49	29%	15	56	100%	(240)	29%	38	33	100%	(61)
50–59	32%	16	52	100%	(226)	28%	29	43	100%	(51)
60–69	39%	12	49	100%	(211)	23%	40	37	100%	(52)
70 +	42%	12	46	100%	(137)	43%	26	31	100%	(54)

AGE COHORTS AND CONTEMPORARY SWISS HISTORY

The formative period from age 15 to 20 of each generation, during which contemporary events have strongest socialising impact, particularly on sense of identity

Era of Radical pre-eminence

World War I Era General Strike

Initial Phases of Depression

Depression Peak Mobilisation

Postwar Recovery & Anti-Centralist Movement

Prosperity & Grand Coalition

Affluence & EEC Association

Source: Henry H. Kerr, Switzerland: Social Cleavages and Partisan Conflict (1974: 17, 23).

(1974:24) believes that these reversals are linked to the formative years of those now aged 40 to 49 and 60 to 69. Among these two generations, whose formative experiences were shaken by the two World Wars, one finds the highest levels of linguistic identification.

If Kerr's hypothesis is correct (that minorities react more intensely to specific historical experiences) we would expect the youngest generation pictured in his table to have the strongest sense of identification with the Swiss nation. These young Swiss adults, who in 1977 are 10 to 19 years old, have been reared during a time of affluence and tranquility in Switzerland. Our findings support this interpretation and suggest that this age cohort may have the highest level of national identification to date. Regardless of their linguistic, religious, or cantonal affiliation, they have a strong attachment to their country.

Is this consensus among young Swiss adults also extended to the way they perceive the various levels of government? In order to answer this question the respondents were asked which government (the communal government, the cantonal government, or the federal government) they felt did the most and the least for the people.

Piaget (1951) has observed that children by the

age of 10 or 11 are able to comprehend the notion of "country," that is, to understand the territorial relationships between a country as a whole and the various governmental levels which may function within it--communal, cantonal, federal (cf. Johnstone, 1969:16-17). However, for the Swiss students in this study, the various levels of government and their perceived effectiveness seem to remain part of an adult world with which they can only partially identify. Young people in Switzerland are, of course, aware that Swiss citizens cannot vote or take part in the various levels of government until they are at least 20 years of age (except in the new canton of Jura which has set the legal age at 18 years). Also, the functioning of government tends to be less politicized than in many countries. Perhaps these facts help account for the large number from both language groups who responded "I'm not sure." When asked which government did the most for the people 41 percent of the German-speaking and 26 percent of the French-speaking Swiss did not give a definitive response, while the respective figures are 61 percent and 39 percent for the government thought to be least effective. Apparently the majority language group feels less strongly about the various levels of government.

Because of the large no response rate, only

limited interpretations can be made from these questions.
Table IV-7 does, however, indicate a number of points of
similarity and difference in the reactions of the two
language groups. Considering the balance between posi-
tive and negative assessments in Parts A and B of the
table, we find that both German and French speaking
Swiss respond more positively than negatively to the
cantonal and communal governments. Among the German
Swiss there is a tendency to regard more highly the
governments closest to them. Thus they give the highest
net rating to the communal government (5.5 percent),
followed by the cantonal government (2.6 percent), with
the federal government in the last position (1.5 per-
cent).

In contrast with the German Swiss, the French
Swiss are more sensitive to the various levels of
government. On balance, they believe that the cantonal
government is by far the most effective (16 percent) in
doing things for the people. It is followed by the com-
munal government (8 percent). The federal government,
on the other hand, was rated more negatively than posi-
tively (11 percent) by the French speakers. Johnstone
(1969:20-21) observed a similar phenomenon in his study
of young Canadians. The Francophones expressed con-
sistently negative feelings toward the federal government,

TABLE IV-7.--Orientations to different levels of government, by
language

Which government would you say does the most for
people?

	German N=276	French N=262
The communal government	14.6	27.5
The cantonal government	13.6	27.9
The federal government	20.8	18.6
I'm not sure	40.8	25.9

Which government would you say does the least for
people?

	German N=264	French N=251
The communal government	9.1	19.5
The cantonal government	11.0	12.0
The federal government	19.3	29.9
I'm not sure	60.6	38.6

Direction and Strength of Orientation [a]

Negative   Neutral   Positive

Federal Govt.   + 1.5   German Swiss
        -11.3   French Swiss

                                        + 7.6   German Swiss
Cantonal Govt.   + 15.9   French Swiss

                                        + 5.5   German Swiss
Communal Govt.   + 8.0   French Swiss

    20   10   - 0 +   10   20

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
[a] The measures represent the percentage discrepancies between
positve and negative assessments of the three levels of government.
Percentages were computed only for those who gave substantive answers
to the questions.

that increased with age, while the attitudes of Anglo-
phones ranged from slightly positive to slightly negative.
This disaffection with the federal government is probably
a typical minority response of linguistic groups who
feel that the cantonal or provincial government is more
responsive to their needs.

The difference in attitude toward the federal
government between the majority and minority linguistic
groups is also linked with the tendency toward more
centralization by the federal government. In Switzerland,
this development is proceeding against the wishes of the
majority of the Swiss people who persist in regarding
cantonal autonomy "as a moral force inherent and comple-
mentary to their civic personality." However, as
Siegfried (1956:185) points out, this feeling is particu-
larly strong among the French- and Italian-speaking
minorities who seek to protect themselves against a
centralism from which they naturally have more to fear
than the German-speaking majority.

Another indication of a distinctive point of
view can be observed in the residential preferences of
the French-speaking population. The respondents were
asked to indicate which Swiss cantons they would like
to live in some day, and also where they would never
want to live. Table IV-8 records the cantons in which

TABLE IV-8.--Cantons in which respondents would most like to live in the future

	GERMAN			FRENCH	
Canton	Percent of positive responses	Number responding	Canton	Percent of positive responses	Number responding
Lucerne	80.9	94	Valais	89.4	141
Valais	78.8	99	Vaud	85.4	89
Bern	78.6	154	Neuchâtel	72.0	117
Grisons	77.2	101	Ticino	70.8	75
Ticino	70.3	145	Grisons	66.3	98
Geneva	70.0	120	Geneva	61.9	147
Neuchâtel	62.2	74			
Zug	59.4	64			
Zurich	57.7	163			
Aargau	51.9	81			
Solothurn	51.3	80			
Fribourg	50.0	96			
Vaud	50.0	74			

fifty percent or more of the two different language groups would prefer to live. Only six of the twenty-five cantons and half cantons were named as desirable places to live by the French Swiss. Of these, three are exclusively French-speaking (Vaud, Neuchâtel, and Geneva), one is bilingual, French and German (Valais), one is trilingual, German, Italian, and Romansch (Grisons), and one is Italian speaking (Ticino). No exclusively German-speaking cantons evoked a majority of positive evaluations.

On the other hand, the German Swiss rated a majority of cantons favorably. Among these are all the cantons named by the French-speaking Swiss. In addition, Lucerne, Bern, Zug, Zurich, Aargau, and Solothurn are favorably evaluated by a majority of German-speaking youth. To some extent the cantons reflect the composition of the sample. As was to be expected, young people in general give favorable ratings to their own cantons. Even so a majority of German Swiss responded positively to cantons outside their own linguistic and cultural influence.

In contrast to Canada, where both Anglophones and Francophones "by no means ignore bilingual and bi-cultural considerations when thinking about a future place of residence" (Johnstone, 1969:93) this was only

true for the French-speaking Swiss. The openness of
German Swiss youth toward living in the various cultural
and linguistic areas of their country is an important
factor in the formula of cultural coexistence in
Switzerland.

The next section will deal with attitudes of
young Swiss toward multiculturalism and multilingualism.
Do young adults share the same beliefs and opinions about
their country, and in particular its opportunity struc-
ture? How do French and German speaking Swiss assess the
importance of bilingual skills in their own lives?

Attitudes toward Multiculturalism
and Multilingualism

The way in which different cultural or ethnic
groups perceive the opportunity structure of their
society has important implications for peaceful inter-
group relations. For measuring the impressions of young
people regarding the structure of Swiss society, we
employed the procedure of Johnstone (1969:8) and asked
them to rate 10 different factors in helping a young
person to get ahead in Swiss life. These evaluations
included factors related to both ascribed and achieved
status. They therefore allow us to appraise the extent
to which members of different groups think the opportunity

structure of their society is open or closed.

Table IV-9, Part A shows the percentages of the two language groups which evaluated each factor as very important. On the average, German and French Swiss differed by 13 percent. This margin is substantially less than that between Johnstone's national sample of Canadian Anglophones and Francophones, which were divided by 20 percent (Johnstone, 1969:8). There was, however, a parallel between the majority and minority views of their respective social structures. On the whole the majority in both cultures rated the society as more open than the French speaking minorities. On the other hand, in contrast to the two Canadian groups which held widely divergent opinions on the importance of bilingualism (75 percent of the French Canadians as compared with 39 percent of the English Canadians rated it as very important in helping a young person get ahead in Canadian life)(Johnstone, 1969:8), the French and German Swiss groups were in complete agreement, both believing that it was an important factor for success in Swiss society (46 percent of both groups thought it was very important to be able to speak both French and German).

Looking at the differences and similarities between German and French speaking Swiss we find that

TABLE IV-9.--Images of Swiss opportunity structure, by language and religion

Percent who said each factor was very important in helping a young person get ahead in Swiss life

	German N=276	French N=262
Have a good personality	64.5	34.8
Get good grades in school	61.3	45.2
Speak both French and German	45.8	45.5
Get a university education	36.5	25.1
Be born in Switzerland	17.5	23.5
Work hard	16.7	43.7
Know the right people	11.1	37.5
Come from the right family	6.3	14.2
Have rich parents	1.5	8.9
Come from the right religious group	1.1	3.3

	Catholic	Protestant	Catholic	Protestant
Have a good personality	59.5	68.8	38.7	25.4
Get good grades in school	64.2	58.1	45.3	41.8
Speak both French and German	46.9	45.3	48.6	32.8
Get a university education	33.3	40.9	19.2	42.4
Be born in Switzerland	19.3	13.2	20.8	25.8
Work hard	10.2	26.3	46.9	34.8
Know the right people	14.2	7.9	37.8	37.9
Come from the right family	8.2	3.4	11.2	23.4
Have rich parents	2.7	0.0	7.6	14.1
Come from the right religious group	2.1	0.0	2.4	3.1

both groups rate the factors related to ascribed status lower than those factors related to achieved status. However, the Swiss Romands place slightly more importance on these factors than the German Swiss (social class--coming from the right family by 8 percent, economic background by 7 percent, place of birth by 6 percent, and religious background by 2 percent). In addition, French Swiss give a more qualified endorsement to three of the four factors related to achievement (good personality by 30 percent, good grades by 16 percent, and university education by 11 percent). Knowing the right people was also considered much more important by the French-speaking than by the German-speaking Swiss (by 24 percent). Thus, although both groups perceive the Swiss social structure as more open than closed, the French Swiss would appear to do so in much more qualified terms.

Another interesting finding concerns the importance attached by the two groups to work. Contrary to expectation, the French Swiss rated working hard much more highly than did their German-speaking compatriots. This probably reflects different cultural interpretations. The average German Swiss takes hard work for granted. Many foreign observers have characterized him as a conscientious, meticulous worker, and a respector of

discipline. The temperament of the French Swiss is in marked contrast to that of his German-speaking fellow citizen. It is livelier, more individualistic, and less disciplined (Brooks, 1930:304; Siegfried, 1956:59, 64). Thus it would seem, that the Romands are influenced by some of the cultural attributes of their German-speaking neighbors.

Table IV-9, Part B indicates that the primary variations in assessments occur among the Romands. One must exercise caution in the interpretation of the results due to the composition of the sample. For the most part the Romand Catholics are from the bilingual, conservative cantons of Fribourg and Valais while the Romand Protestants are from the more liberal and industrial cantons of Vaud and Neuchâtel. Thus regional considerations also play a part. In general, the French-speaking Protestants appear more cynical about the Swiss opportunity structure than the French-speaking Catholics (this was also evident by the comments they wrote on the margins of the questionnaires). They rated two of the ascribed factors higher (economic background by 7 percent, and social class by 12 percent) and two of the achieved factors lower (have a good personality by 13 percent, and hard work by 12 percent). Furthermore, fewer French-speaking Protestants than Romand Catholics

(who have considerably more contact with their fellow German speaking citizens) believed it was important to speak German as well as French. On the other hand, consistent with the so-called "Protestant ethic," the French speaking Protestants thought it was considerably more important to obtain a university education.

This tendency was reversed in the German-speaking sample. The German-speaking Catholics perceived the Swiss social structure as slightly less open (placing more importance on knowing the right people, by 6 percent, and social class, by 5 percent, and less value on having a good personality, by 10 percent, working hard, by 16 percent, and getting a university education, by 7 percent), than the German Swiss Protestants. Thus we have seen that there are intra-linguistic variations between French-speaking Catholics and Protestants, and German-speaking Catholics and Protestants, as well as inter-linguistic differences between French and German speakers as to how the Swiss opportunity structure is perceived. These tendencies help to alleviate potential sources of cleavage within the system.

The reactions of the two language communities toward learning a second national language provide an important indicator of their attitudes toward multi-lingualism. Lambert has designated two major

orientations for the learning of a new language. A
person is said to reflect an "integrative" orientation
when he primarily wants to broaden his cultural hori-
zons--to talk to members of the other language group, or
to learn more about their culture, and an "instrumental"
orientation when the new language is used primarily as
a stepping stone to some other goal, such as obtaining
a job (cf. Johnstone, 1969:84). Several of the situations
included in Table IV-10 reflect an integrative or an
instrumental orientation. Learning the second language
to get better grades, find a job, or advance in a career
all represent instrumental functions, while learning the
second language to talk with friends, to make new friends,
to date, or in order to read, or to watch television or
a movie are integrative functions. This distinction
should help us in discussing the orientation French and
German speaking Swiss assign to learning German or
French.

Table IV-10 shows the rates at which members of
the two groups thought bilingualism would be helpful in
various situations. The responses are ranked according
to the extent of variation between the two groups. The
French and German speaking Swiss give almost identical
ratings on six questions. Only on two items--in travel-
ling to different parts of Switzerland, and in reading

TABLE IV-10.--Perceived functions of bilingual facility, by language

Percent who said a good knowledge of French/German would be helpful in these ways

	German N=276	French N=262	Difference
In travelling to different parts of Switzerland	93.0	73.7	+19.3
In reading, or watching television or a movie	78.7	64.0	+14.7
In getting better grades in school	88.0	83.7	+ 4.3
In talking with friends	85.4	83.7	+ 1.7
In going out on dates	70.4	68.8	+ 1.6
In finding a job	89.3	93.0	- 3.7
In making new friends	79.7	80.9	- 1.2
In getting ahead in the line of work I hope to enter	84.0	84.5	- 0.5

or watching TV or a movie--did the French Swiss attach considerably less importance to learning German than the German Swiss did to learning French. These results are consistent with our previous findings. In general, the French minority tends to limit their geographical and cultural interactions to their own territorial and linguistic sphere.

Thus, although there is substantial agreement between the two language groups it is not surprising that the French speakers exhibit a more instrumental orientation than the German speakers to learning a second national language. The French Swiss rate finding employment highest, and career advancement second, while the German Swiss most frequently thought of French as useful for travelling, and finding a job. Both groups rated the functions of dating and cultural enrichment (reading, or watching TV or a movie) lowest.

All in all, whether young French Swiss actually use German to any great extent in their adult life (and there are many indications that they do so far less than German Swiss utilize French), it is important that both language groups believe they will gain similar kinds of benefits from being bilingual.

There are some indications that the importance of both French and German as second languages for Swiss

young people is eroding. When asked "What is the most important foreign language for you in the future?" the majority of both linguistic groups named English as their first choice (see Table IV-11). So far, Swiss educators have had the good sense to require a second national language as a compulsory subject in secondary school. It is unlikely that this position will change in the near future (cf. Tages Anzeiger, Zurich [foreign edition], January 4, 1977) although on occasion business interests and young students voice the opinion that English is more relevant than French or German. Nevertheless, by placing more importance on a non-official second language the two linguistic groups run the risk of slowly losing touch with one another.

Returning to Table IV-11 we find that German was mentioned by a majority of French Swiss and French by a majority of German Swiss as their second language choice. One somewhat striking observation is that twice as many French speakers in the high contact areas of Biel and Fribourg as in the other areas named German as the most important foreign language for their future, while the figures remained essentially unchanged for the German Swiss between high (Biel and Fribourg) and low contact areas (36 percent compared to 31 percent). Italian, which occupies a weak position in the Confederation as a

TABLE IV-11.--Most important foreign languages

Which foreign language do you think will be most
important for you in the future?

	Most important foreign language	
	German N=276	French N=262
French/German	32.3	31.7
Italian	4.9	.4
English	60.9	67.5
Other languages	1.9	.4

	Second most important foreign language	
	German N=276	French N=262
French/German	54.6	53.5
Italian	11.2	5.0
English	28.8	32.4
Other languages	5.4	9.1

whole, was mentioned by a small minority of Swiss.
However, among this number it is singled out more often
by German than French speakers.

Areas of Consensus and Cleavage
in Swiss Life

Following the procedure of Johnstone (1969:43-44)
we measured impressions about national unity by asking
young people the extent to which they thought different
groups in Switzerland would agree on questions regarding
Switzerland's future. These assessments were first made
for Swiss as a whole, and then separately for five pairs
of groups--Roman Catholics and Protestants, French and
German speaking Swiss, Swiss and foreign workers, people
from rich and poor families, and people from urban and
rural areas. The percentage distribution and the mean
level of consensus were calculated for all six questions
(see Table IV-12). The mean scores were figured by
assigning values of between one to five to the different
responses, with low scores indicating higher levels of
agreement. Mean scores lower than three thus represent
a tendency toward consensus, while scores higher than
three indicate a trend toward dissensus.

Both groups felt that Swiss in general would
agree more often than disagree. Part A of the table

TABLE IV-12.--Areas of perceived consensus and cleavage in Swiss
society, by language

A. Swiss in General

Suppose that votes were taken on a lot of questions about the
future of Switzerland. Do you think Swiss would agree on most
things about Switzerland's future, or they'd tend to disagree

	German N=276	French N=261
They'd agree on practically everything	1.1	1.9
They'd agree on most things	24.6	26.1
They'd agree on half and disagree on half	43.1	34.2
They'd disagree on most things	17.0	19.5
They'd disagree on practically everything	.4	2.7
I don't know	13.8	15.6
Mean[a]	2.91	2.93
Standard deviation	.73	.87

B. Religion

How about Roman Catholics and Protestants--would they agree or
disagree on Switzerland's future?

	German N=276	French N=261
They'd agree on practically everything	7.6	7.0
They'd agree on most things	39.1	26.7
They'd agree on half and disagree on half	28.3	27.9
They'd disagree on most things	10.1	18.2
They'd disagree on practically everything	1.8	2.7
I don't know	13.0	17.4
Mean[a]	2.54	2.78
Standard deviation	.89	.99

TABLE IV-12.--Continued

C. Ethnicity

How about French-speaking Swiss and German-speaking Swiss--would they agree or disagree on Switzerland's future?

	German N=276	French N=261
They'd agree on practically everything	5.8	2.3
They'd agree on most things	33.8	23.6
They'd agree on half and disagree on half	35.3	30.9
They'd disagree on most things	12.4	23.9
They'd disagree on practically everything	1.8	7.7
I don't know	10.9	11.6
Mean[a]	2.67	3.13
Standard deviation	.87	.99

D. Foreign Workers

How about Swiss and foreign workers--would they agree or disagree on Switzerland's future?

	German N=276	French N=261
They'd agree on practically everything	.4	1.2
They'd agree on most things	8.0	8.8
They'd agree on half and disagree on half	20.7	22.7
They'd disagree on most things	41.5	36.5
They'd disagree on practically everything	14.5	18.1
I don't know	14.9	12.7
Mean[a]	3.73	3.70
Standard deviation	.87	.95

TABLE IV-12.--Continued

E. Social Class

How about people from rich families and people from poor families--would they agree or disagree on Switzerland's future?

Responses	German N=276	French N=261
They'd agree on practically everything	.4	.8
They'd agree on most things	12.1	5.8
They'd agree on half and disagree on half	28.2	15.9
They'd disagree on most things	34.1	38.8
They'd disagree on practically everything	18.7	31.8
I don't know	6.6	7.0
Mean[a]	3.62	4.01
Standard deviation	.96	.91

F. Place of Residence

What about people from the big cities and people from the rural areas--would they agree or disagree on Switzerland's future?

	German N=276	French N=261
They'd agree on practically everything	1.1	1.5
They'd agree on most things	14.5	13.5
They'd agree on half and disagree on half	35.6	33.5
They'd disagree on most things	32.4	32.7
They'd disagree on practically everything	8.0	10.0
I don't know	8.4	8.8
Mean[a]	3.34	3.38
Standard deviation	.89	.92

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[a]Based on scores 1-5 with low scores indicating higher levels of perceived agreement. Excludes those with no opinions.

shows that ratings of agreement outnumbered those of disagreement by 26 percent to 17 percent among the German Swiss and 28 percent to 22 percent among the French Swiss.

On the other hand, when asked about the polarities noted above both groups saw more dissensus than consensus among a majority of categories within the population (the French four, and Germans three, out of the five groups), with levels of agreement rated slightly higher on all group comparisons by the German than the French Swiss. Both groups believed foreign workers and Swiss citizens, and Swiss from rich and poor families, and urban and rural locations would disagree more often than agree about Switzerland's future. In addition, the French speakers rated relations between German and French Swiss slightly below the threshold of consensus.

The two groups make similar appraisals on the areas of high and low consensus in Swiss life. This tendency can be more clearly noted when the average ratings are ranked. Except for inversions of the fourth and fifth positions these rankings are identical.

Average Ratings of Consensus and Cleavage
in Swiss Society, by Language

German		French	
Religion	2.54	Religion	2.78
Ethnicity	2.67	Ethnicity	3.13
Urban-Rural	3.34	Urban-Rural	3.38
Social Class	3.62	Foreign Workers	3.70
Foreign Workers	3.73	Social Class	4.01
National	2.91	National	2.93

We can conclude from these data that differences
between economic classes, and between foreign workers and
Swiss citizens pose the strongest threat to Swiss unity.
Urban-rural differences, which to some extent coincide
with social class, were viewed as the next most threat-
ening problem. Both groups agree that consensus would be
highest between Roman Catholics and Protestants, and
second highest among French and German speaking Swiss.
However, the French Swiss, are less optimistic on this
score.[3]

The average rankings were the same for German

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[3]When asked how they would qualify the relations
between the two language groups, a similar result was ob-
tained. Fifty-three percent of the German Swiss
answered very good as compared with 44 percent of the
French Swiss. Contact was an important variable among the
French, but not among the Germans. Fifty percent of the
French speakers from Fribourg and Biel believed the rela-
tions were good or very good as compared to 39 percent of
those in other areas.

Catholics and Protestants and French Catholics and
Protestants as those illustrated above, but a few sig-
nificant differences did present themselves. Among the
German groups, the Catholics perceive more dissensus
among the social classes than do the Protestants (3.70
as compared to 3.53). The opposite was true among the
French groups, where the Protestants see more dissensus
both between economic classes (4.18 as compared with
3.95) and between foreign workers and Swiss citizens
(3.83 as compared to 3.64). Again it would seem that
these differences help to offset one another.

Core Values and National Consensus

The last section will once again take up the
question of whether young people from different cultural
and linguistic backgrounds share similar conceptions and
beliefs about their country. Is there a common socio-
political culture in Switzerland to which the different
groups can relate?

Several authors have suggested that Switzerland,
unlike many multicultural societies, has a set of com-
mon values underlying its diverse linguistic and religi-
ous groups (cf. Naroll, 1963:4-9). Heiman (1966:338)
in comparing the Swiss with the Canadian situation notes:

Whether he is of French Swiss, German Swiss or
Italian Swiss background, the citizen of that
country subscribes to one common political
tradition. Such is not the case in Canada.

While there is an extensive literature to support

this statement in Canada (in particular, studies dealing

with the attitudes of young people [cf. Johnston, 1969;

Lamy, 1975; Richert, 1974]) very few investigators have

attempted to identify whether there is, indeed, a common

tradition underlying Swiss ethnic pluralism. This sec-

tion examines the people, events and values Swiss young

people most often associate with their nation.

One dimension of cultural identification was

investigated by asking Swiss young people to write down

the names of important persons in their country's his-

tory. In a similar study Richert (1974) found that

Canadian Anglophones and Francophones identified pri-

marily with symbols of their own cultural group. In

addition, the students identified with different eras

of Canadian history, the French Canadians with the

period prior to 1760 (the date of the fall of New

France), and the English Canadians with a slight prefer-

ence for the post 1760 era. Do French and German speak-

ing Swiss also reveal this duality? What historical

figures do young people in Switzerland identify with?

Table IV-13 displays the names of the persons

most often mentioned by young Swiss adults. The

TABLE IV-13.--Most cited historical figures, by language

N=276 GERMAN SWISS		N=262 FRENCH SWISS	
William Tell	36.3	William Tell	32.2
Henri Dunant	14.7	Henri Guisan	13.2
Arnold Winkelried	11.4	Niklaus von Flüe	11.5
Henri Guisan	11.4	Arnold Winkelried	6.9
Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi	5.7	Founders of Switzerland	4.0
Niklaus von Flüe	5.3	Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi	4.0
Ulrich Zwingli	4.5	Jean Jacques Rousseau	3.4
Adrian von Bubenberg	1.2	Henri Dufour	2.9
Henri Dufour	1.2	César Frédéric La Harpe	2.3
		Jean Calvin	1.7
		Henri Dunant	1.7
		Major Davel	1.7
TOTAL	91.7		83.5

percentages recorded exclude those who did not respond
to this question. It appears that the French Swiss had
more difficulty identifying Swiss personalities than
did their German-speaking compatriots. The no response
rates for the Romands is three times greater (34 percent
as compared to 11 percent) than for the German Swiss.
However, if we focus our investigation on those who did
reply to this question, we find that a similar pattern
emerges.

In contrast with the Canadian results, the two
Swiss groups are in substantial agreement. Seventy per-
cent of German Swiss and 73 percent of the French Swiss
refer to German Swiss heroes, while 30 percent of the
German speaking and 27 percent of the French speaking
Swiss named Romand heroes. Except for Nello Celio (a
past Federal Councillor), who was only mentioned a couple
of times, figures from the small Italian group were
ostensibly missing. Apart from this omission, the per-
centages of heroes from the two cultural groups are
almost in exact proportion to the population. The pre-
valence of German Swiss heroes is also related to the
history of the Confederation. The French Swiss cantons
with the exception of Fribourg (which was incorporated
in 1481) did not join Switzerland until the beginning of
the nineteenth century.

Over four decades ago Brooks (1930:5) observed
that the Swiss have little admiration for statesmen;
their heroes are all dead heroes.[4] This still seems to
be the case. Not only are they dead heroes, but they
appear to be mythological ones as well. Whether William
Tell is a real or only a legendary character, is in fact
a subject of current debate.[5] Nevertheless, he stands
out as the most often mentioned hero. Most Swiss were
in agreement with the reason given by a German Swiss
student from Solothurn who wrote, "He helped to free
Switzerland from her oppressors. He is our national
hero." As such he transcends cultural and religious
boundaries.

The legend and the symbol of William Tell is
inadvertently reinforced in the minds of Swiss young
people in a number of ways. In many cities, large and
small, a special school matinée of Schiller's play is a

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[4]A few present and past Federal Councillors
were named (Pierre Graber, Rudolf Gnägi, Kurt Furgler,
Georges-André Chevallaz, Ernst Brugger, Nello Celio,
and Rudolf Minger). However, even when they were coded
together they were mentioned by only 4 percent of the
German-and French-speaking Swiss.

[5]For an interesting account of the position and
symbol of William Tell in Switzerland, see Otto Marchi
"Wilhelm Tells geschichtliche Sendung" (1975:18-20).

time honored way of introducing pupils to the study of
Swiss history. In addition, his image appears on the
five franc piece (the so-called Fünfliber).

Over 50 different historical figures were refer-
red to, but only nine from the German Swiss group and
twelve from the French groups were mentioned by more
than one percent of the respondents as their first choice.
An examination of the nine most named figures reveals
that six, or two-thirds of the symbols appeared on both
lists: William Tell, Arnold Winkelried (the legendary
hero of the battle of Sempach), Henri Guisan (the com-
mander of the Swiss army during World War II), Johann
Heinrich Pestalozzi (the famous Swiss educator who advo-
cated education for the masses), Niklaus von Flüe (a
Swiss monk who is credited with saving Switzerland from
internal war), and Henri Dufour (the general of the
federal forces during the Sonderbund war). All of these
figures played a conciliatory roles in Swiss history.
Interestingly, not one Swiss youth mentioned Ulrich
Wille, the Swiss general during World War I, or Johann
Ulrich von Salis-Soglio, the general of the Sonderbund
troops.

Henri Dunant (the founder of the Red Cross),
and the three founders of Switzerland also provide
interesting examples of heroes which transcend cultural

boundaries. Henri Dunant, a Genevan, is named almost exclusively by German Swiss youth, while the three founders of Switzerland, who were obviously German Swiss, are mentioned more often by French Swiss.

Although a portrait of cultural unity emerges with respect to the heroes named, there are also discrepancies in some of the details painted. Adrian von Bubenberg (the Bernese commander at the battle of Murten) was mentioned exclusively by German Swiss, mainly from the canton of Bern, while Major Davel, the leader of a Vaudois revolt against Bernese rule is named exclusively by French-speaking Vaudois youth. Likewise Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and César Frédéric La Harpe (one of the fathers of the "Helvetic Republic") were named only by French Swiss. Sometimes the patterns are even more complicated. Niklaus von Flüe is made reference to by a considerable number of French Swiss Catholics, but is totally ignored by the French Swiss Protestants. On the other hand, he is mentioned by almost equal numbers of German-speaking Catholics and Protestants.[6] Zwingli

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[6]Siegfried (1956:143-144) observes that the canonization of Niklaus von Flüe in 1947 did not take place without causing some emotion in Protestant circles. To turn a national hero into a Catholic hero suggested a breach of an unwritten neutrality.

Interestingly, our study shows that the Romand Protestants have not accepted him as a national hero as has the rest of Switzerland.

is mentioned more often by German Protestants than
Catholics, but seldomly cited by French speakers of
either faith. Surprisingly, Calvin received few nomi-
nations by any group, which may point to the greater
secularization of Protestant Romand youth. The number
of respondents from Neuchâtel and Vaud (traditionally
French speaking Protestant cantons) who said they did
not belong to any religion was greater than in any of
the other cantons.

When the two language groups were asked to name
the most important battle in Swiss history a similar
pattern emerged. Both German-and French-speaking Swiss
are most impressed by the old battles against foreign
enemies (see Table IV-14). The battles of Morgarten
(1315), Sempach (1386), the Burgundy Wars (which invol-
ved the battles at Murten, Grandson, and Nancy in 1476),
and the battle of Marignano (1515) are named by 94 per-
cent of the German-speaking and 97 percent of the
French-speaking Swiss. The battles omitted are as
interesting as those included. The religious battles
and battles between Swiss cantons are seldomly mentioned.

Returning to Table IV-14, we find that the
German Swiss mentioned the older battles more often
(Morgarten by a margin of 17 percent and Sempach by 7
percent), while the French Swiss identified more readily

TABLE IV-14.--Most important battle, by language

	German	French
Morgarten (1315)	45.2	28.5
Sempach (1386)	10.9	3.4
Burgundy Wars (1476)	30.3	46.9
Marignano (1515)	7.2	17.9
Total	93.6	96.7

with the two more recent battles (the Burgundy Wars by
a margin of 17 percent and the battle of Marignano by
11 percent). This difference may be related both to
the time of association of the French-speaking cantons
with the Confederation as well as the practice of empha-
sizing historical events closer to home.

In sum, we have seen that the fight for freedom
captivates the imagination of all Swiss. It is sym-
bolized in heroes and battles which are overwhelmingly
chosen by French and German Swiss of both faiths. Swiss
history teachers are sometimes accused of "burying
themselves in epochs, safely remote from the hurly-burly
of modern politics" or at least of finding it convenient
to stop with the Old Confederation (1789) or the Act of
Mediation (1815) leaving students ignorant of more
modern events (Brooks, 1930:184). Whether this is
deliberate or whether, as many students told me, "time
simply runs out" before digesting all of Swiss history
is difficult to say. Nevertheless, it appears that with
few exceptions the "Freiheitskampf" or "la lutte pour
l'indépendence" and the heroes connected with it serve
to build the foundation of a Swiss culture.

Upon this common foundation, we have observed
that there also seems to exist "a certain Swiss outlook"
which unites Helvetic citizens of different linguistic

and religious backgrounds. All Swiss, Siegfried (1956: 140-141) and McRae (1964:21) suggest, no matter who they are hold fast to their communal and cantonal autonomy, based on a direct or quasi-direct consultation of the people in matters which concern the administration of their community. In addition, they share characteristic institutions such as the collegial organization of executive power, and a non-professional citizen army.

Do young Swiss also share this common outlook? What, in their eyes, are the factors which make them proud to be Swiss? What differences exist between the various groups? In order to answer these questions young people were asked to write in a few sentences why they were proud to be Swiss, as well as what they did not particularly like about Switzerland. Approximately 50 reasons to both questions were mentioned. These, and the method of coding the questions appear in Appendix B.

The reasons referred to by young people as to why they are proud to be Swiss are classified into nine categories. The first category includes political responses. Typical answers are that Switzerland is democratic (that one has the right to vote and has the right of initiative and referendum), is a neutral country, is not involved in wars and does not attempt to make wars.

In addition, many note that one is free in Switzerland
(having freedom of speech and the right to travel wher-
ever one wants as opposed to Eastern European countries).
Table IV-15 shows that political responses were given
considerably more often than any other reasons which
confirms that young people in Switzerland even before
they reach adulthood seem to have a "certain Swiss out-
look." Once said, it should be noted, however, that the
two language groups vary considerably in the frequency
with which they give this response. The German Swiss
give political answers almost twice as often as their
French-speaking compatriots.[7] This is not entirely sur-
prising since most of the political institutions of
Switzerland were inherited from German Switzerland.

It appears that what pulls people of hetero-
geneous origins into a common citizenship in Switzerland

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[7]On the whole, the Swiss Romands tend to be more
critical of the political institutions of Switzerland
than their German-speaking fellow citizens. For example,
8 percent of the French Swiss as compared to 1 percent
of German Swiss recruits in the military thought that
the international recognition of Swiss neutrality was
enough and that the army was therefore not necessary.
Likewise, only 40 percent of the Romands thought that
Switzerland was still definitely a neutral country as
compared to 51 percent of the German Swiss (Bericht
über die pädagogischen Rekrutenprüfungen im Jahre 1968,
1969:66, 110).

TABLE IV-15. --Reasons given for being proud to be Swiss[a]

Political
// 67.8
38.9

Socio-
economic
//////////////// 16.3
14.1

Quality of
Life
//////////////// 16.0
20.3

Swiss
Qualities
//////////// 11.3
16.0

Diversity
/// 2.5
3.1

Relations
with other
countries
///// 4.3
9.9

Landscape
///////////////////////// 27.5
21.3

Not particu-
larly proud
to be Swiss
//////// 8.0
24.0

Other reasons
////// 5.5
4.6

//////////////// German Swiss
French Swiss

[a] The percentages refer to those who gave one or more answers in each category among
a possible five coded responses.

--as in the United States[8]--is an abstract concept jointly
held of what the state should be. In other words the
state (or Switzerland) stands for something in the eyes
of Swiss youth. This is a critical element, particularly
in countries divided by language, religion and/or
ethnicity. When a unified political culture is absent it
is difficult for citizens in plural societies to obtain
a positive national identity. Unlike Swiss and Americans,
Canadians tend to base their national pride on other than
political values. Hodgetts (1968) found that most Anglo-
phone twelfth grade students admired their country mainly
for its geographic features--the beauty of the land and
its natural resources. French Canadian youth, on the
other hand, were primarily proud of their ability to
survive as a people. The lack of devotion to a "common
outlook" has rendered a Canadian identity difficult.

Returning to Table IV-15, we observe that there
is substantial agreement among six of the remaining eight
categories. The second most named set of reasons had to
do with the landscape of the country. Approximately a
fourth of both linguistic groups said they were

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[8]Almond and Verba (1963) found that the majority
(85 percent) of American adults associated their national
identity with a civil value--attachment to democratic
political institutions.

attracted to Switzerland because of its natural beauty. Socioeconomic reasons (such as the small difference between rich and poor, the high standard of living of the country and the lack of unemployment) come next, followed by factors associated with the Swiss quality of life (tranquil, clean, orderly) and the character-istics exhibited by the Swiss people (hard working, self-sufficient, possessing common sense).

On the other hand, more than twice as many French-speaking (10 percent) as German-speaking youth (4 percent) are impressed with Switzerland's relations with other countries. Among the factors noted are: that Switzerland plays a fairly large role (in compari-son to its size) in world affairs, it is the seat of many world organizations, Switzerland is a well re-spected country, etc. The close proximity of the Suisse Romande to Geneva is one probable reason that French Swiss are more aware of relations with other countries.

Two interesting observations stand out with re-spect to majority-minority relations in Switzerland. First, it is striking how few young Swiss mention di-versity as a source of pride in their country. It seems that most Swiss have come to take the heterogeneity of their country for granted neither regarding the multi-plicity of languages or religions as a particular

advantage or disadvantage, but rather as a marriage of
convenience. Nevertheless, the German-speaking partner
seems to be felt more at home in Switzerland. Three
times more French Swiss (24 percent) than German Swiss
(8 percent) reply that they are not particularly proud
to be Swiss, or that they could just as easily be citizens
of other countries. In part this response may be at-
tributable to the more carefree and less rigid tempera-
ment of the French Swiss than their German-speaking
fellow citizens.

Turning now to the reasons young people give as
to why they are not particularly proud to be Swiss, we
find that both groups also give similar responses (see
Table IV-16). Only three factors warrant further com-
ment. First, it is noteworthy that both groups rated
the restrictiveness and the mentality (which is con-
sidered together by many of the respondents and there-
fore coded in one category) of the Swiss as the feature
they disliked most. It should be noted, however, that
the Romands give this response considerably more often
than the German Swiss (23 percent as compared to 14
percent). The French Swiss are more critical of the
Swiss mentality because they believe it to be different
from their own. Fischer and Trier (1962:70) found that
there is a close affinity between the stereotype the

TABLE IV-16. --Reasons given for not being proud to be Swiss[a]

Reason		
Restrictive, Mentality	///////////// 14.2	
	22.6	
Elitism, Influence	/// 2.5	
	3.0	
Socio-Economic	//// 3.3	
	3.1	
Politics	///// 4.7	
	6.7	
Against Diversity	/////// 5.4	
	9.9	
Foreign Workers	////////// 9.1	
	3.1	
Over-Industrialized, Crowded	//////// 6.6	
	9.9	
Geography	/////// 5.8	
	3.4	
School	///////// 8.0	
	14.1	
Nothing They Dislike	///////////// 11.6	
	14.5	
Other Reasons	////////// 8.4	
	5.7	

///////// German Swiss

French Swiss

[a]
The percentages refer to those who gave one or more answers in each category among a possible five coded responses.

the German Swiss hold of themselves and of Swiss in
general. On the other hand, there is relatively little
convergence between the stereotype the Romands paint of
themselves and of all Swiss, which, instead resembles
the portrait they make of the German Swiss. This same
sensitivity is apparent when we look at the attitudes of
the two groups toward diversity. Twice as many French
(10 percent) as Germans-speaking Swiss (5 percent) ex-
pressed a dislike or at least an ambiguous feeling
toward diversity. Relieved from the same concern with
his position in the Confederation, the German Swiss
identifies himself more readily with other internal
problems. Nine percent named the foreign worker problem
as a reason why they are not proud to be Swiss as com-
pared to 3 percent of the Romands. Among the answers
given, approximately two-thirds are ashamed of the way
the foreign workers are treated, while the other third
believe that there is an excessive number of foreigners
in Switzerland.

Summary

Several attitudes rooted deeply in the Swiss
political culture assist in accommmodating the diverse
linguistic and cultural interests in Switzerland. We
have seen above that the Swiss Germans, although a

statistical majority do not possess what may be called a "majoritarian outlook." As a group Swiss German youth seem willing to acknowledge the diversity of their country. They overestimate the linguistic minorities and underestimate their own number in the population. The opposite is true of the French Swiss, who overestimate themselves, and underestimate the German-speaking population. In combination, these trends produce a healthy respect for the linguistic minorities by the majority language group, as well as a more self-confident French-speaking minority.

This tendency is strengthened by a number of factors. From a residential point of view, the German-speaking youth do not confine their positive evaluations to cantons located within their own linguistic and cultural influence. This attitude is not reciprocated by the Romands, who feel more secure in cantons where they predominate. On the other hand, the linguistic equilibrium between French and German Switzerland is strengthened by a consensus between both parties on the importance of bilingualism.

At least two conditions unique to Switzerland also contribute to the cohesion of the society. First we have observed an unusual case of cross-cutting. Although the two linguistic groups do not project the

same picture of the opportunity structure in Switzerland,
the various images are softened by counteracting religi-
ous tendencies within the two linguistic communities. In
general, the German Protestants and French Catholics see
the Swiss social structure as more open, while the
opposite view is more prevalent among the German Catholics
and French Protestants. The differential centrifugal
tendencies between the two linguistic groups toward their
respective cultural kin provides a second factor of
equilibrium between French and German Swiss. For histori-
cal reasons, the cultural attraction of German Switzer-
land toward Germany is weaker than the comparable force
propelling French Switzerland toward France.[9] As a
consequence the German Swiss attempt to distinguish
themselves from their formidable neighbor to the north,
a situation which in fact creates a stronger tie with
their French-speaking fellow citizens.

While German Swiss do not have the majoritarian

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[9]German Switzerland expressed great admiration
for the Germany of 1914. Even the German defeat in 1918
was not altogether sufficient to open the eyes of the
German Swiss. However, Hitler's Germany was too much
for these democrats and produced an almost instinctive
and violent reaction. There was even a tendency to
speak Swiss German on occasions when it had not formerly
been used. More than a quarter of a century after World
War II, German-speaking Swiss youth still feel ambivalent
toward their big neighbor to the north.

outlook that numbers would predict, the opposite is not entirely true of the French linguistic minority. This sensitivity can be detected in a variety of responses. Three times as many French Swiss as German Swiss answer that they are not particularly proud to be Swiss. In addition, they are more reserved in their evaluation of the opportunity structure and the federal government in Switzerland. An appraisal of the cleavage structure shows that the Romands perceive more dissensus between French-and German-speaking Swiss than do their Alemanic compatriots. On the other hand, other cleavages (those between rural and urban, foreign workers and Swiss citizens, and rich and poor) stand out in their eyes as even more salient sources of division within Switzerland.

In Canada, many of the same minority responses are observable among the French Canadians. However, in contrast with Switzerland there are few factors to mitigate against these feelings. Adolescent Francophones underestimate their numbers in the Canadian population, while many Anglophones in the 15 to 16 year old category believe they are more numerous than they actually are. Furthermore, the commitment to bilingualism seems to be largely one-sided. When questioned about the value of being able to speak both French and English in helping a young person to get ahead in Canadian life, 34 percent

more 15 and 16 year old French than English Canadians
evaluated it as being very important. It is hardly
surprising, then, that both groups perceive the cleavage
between French and English as the most threatening to
national unity.

In Canada we are faced with a situation where
majority and minority meet head on. While the response
of the French Canadian linguistic minority differs in
degree but not in kind from the French speakers in
Switzerland, this cannot be said of the English-speaking
majority. Unlike the German Swiss, the Anglo-Canadians
hold a majoritarian outlook <u>vis-à-vis</u> the Francophone
minority. The differential response between the majority
language group in Switzerland and in Canada provides one
of the most striking contrasts between the two countries.
The gloomy assessment put forward by M.G. Smith that
"Cultural diversity or pluralism automatically imposes
the structural necessity for domination by one of the
cultural sections" (Lijphart, 1977:18) need not be the
case.

The results of this study also suggest several
interesting reflections on, and perhaps limitations of
the consociational model, at least as applied to Switzer-
land in the 1970s. One major approach to consociational-
ism is based on the nature of the social cleavage

structure.[10] It maintains that the cleavage or cleavages
in the society must be sufficiently intense and durable
for maintaining organized segmentation. What happens
when these conditions are no longer met?

Although the religious-ideological cleavage,
which has historically been the most important in
Switzerland, became the basis and model for subsequent
organization, one wonders if it can continue to serve as
a rallying point among a new generation of Swiss citizens.
Swiss youth still attach considerable importance to
their religion. However, French and German Swiss of both
faiths now rate the religious cleavage lowest in im-
portance. This view was also expressed when young Swiss
were asked the salience of several factors in helping
young people get ahead in Swiss society. Religion was
rated by all four groups as the least important factor.

A second approach to consociationalism, associ-
ated primarily with the work of Lijphart singles out
the capacity and good will of the elites. However, by
emphasizing the conscious and deliberate efforts of
autonomous elites it neglects the role of popular
opinion and even suggests that it plays a negligible

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[10]See Kenneth McRae (1974:5-8), "Introduction"
in Consociational Democracy and the references quoted
therein.

role in sustaining harmonious inter-ethnic relations. Our
study suggests that rather than working as autonomous
elements in the society the elites have a broad base of
support from the citizenry. Moreover, this base is
buttressed by a common socio-political foundation or
what might be called a civic culture that unites Swiss
of diverse backgrounds. In short, the predominant
pattern today in Switzerland seems to be one of cultural
diversity rather than subcultural segmentation.

We shall explore the implications of these find-
ings in more depth in the concluding chapter. First,
however, we shall turn our attention to sources of inter-
group conflict which challenge the prevailing picture of
Swiss harmony.

CHAPTER V

REFLECTIONS ON DIVERSITY IN SWITZERLAND

The picture of Swiss coexistence is tarnished by
two problematic issues, the political status of the
Bernese Jura, and the fate of the Gastarbeiter or foreign
workers. The first is a conflict over competing goals
among those claiming different ethnic allegiances, while
the second concerns a voiceless non-national political
minority. The Jura situation offers a test case in the
politics of conflict regulation in the Swiss setting,
while the Gastarbeiter problem challenges the capacity
of Switzerland with its complex balance of ethnic forces,
to fairly treat a new minority.

The Jura Question[1]

Today's troubles are rooted in the confusion left
by Napoleon's new order. Before 1789 the Jura districts
had belonged to the prince bishop of Basel, who from the
tenth century onwards ruled the Jura and other adjacent

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[1]This section benefitted greatly from numerous
discussions with Kenneth McRae.

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territories within the framework of the Holy Roman
Empire. During the Reformation Basel as well as the
south Jura became Protestant while the north Jura remained
Catholic.

With the French Revolution, the Old Regime was
dismantled and for more than two decades the Jura remained
under the rule of France. During this time new ideas of
democracy were implanted and new institutions were intro-
duced: a centralized administration, and the Napoleonic
Code. After the fall of Napoleon in 1814, the victorious
powers met in Vienna in order to re-establish peace and to
regulate European borders. Among other Swiss questions,
such as the fate of Vaud and Aargau, and the destiny of
the Gex territory adjacent to Geneva, the Congress of
Vienna was also obliged to deal with the political future
of the Jura. A great deal of haggling ensued, but finally
the Congress awarded the Jura district to Bern as com-
pensation for Bernese territorial losses in Vaud and
Aargau. As Caro (1976:36) notes, "Neither Bern nor the
former Bishopric was entirely satisfied; acquiring
mountainous terrain at the expense of Mittelland left
Bern disgruntled; becoming Bern's unwanted acquisition
left most Jurassians nostalgic about the Bishopric."
Furthermore, as McRae (in progress) observes, unlike the
other plurilingual cantons which developed linguistic

pluralism within organically integrated communities, the new canton of Bern formed by the addition of the Jura territory, was a product of European diplomacy.

During the next century and a half, many events served to aggravate the situation between the Jura and the old canton. Table V-1 indicates the main periods of Jura separatism and its most salient features. The most serious source of friction in the century following the Act of Union in 1815 centered around religion. The most important violation took place in 1836 when the new liberal government in Bern, inspired by the Articles of Baden, attempted to nationalize the Catholic Church. These Articles included provisions which subjected the Catholic clergy to popular vote, and required a loyalty oath by the clergy to the canton. Troubles broke out in the North Jura and Bern backed down only after France threatened to intervene in favor of the Jurassians.

In the 1860s and 1870s even more serious and prolonged troubles arose with the Kulturkampf. The dispute between liberal cantonal authorities and the Catholic Church culminated with Pope Pius IX's declaration of papal infallibility. The Swiss cantonal governments feared the potential dependence of their clergy on Rome. In 1873, Bern demanded that the Catholic clergy break off religious communication with Lachat, the Bishop of the

TABLE V-1. --Main periods of Jura separatism and its most salient features

Parameters of the conflict	1826-1831	1834-1836	1838-1839	1867-1878	1913-1915	1947-1974
General situation	Penetration of liberal ideas	Religious conflicts in Switzerland 'Baden Article'		Kulturkampf	Pan-germanic tendencies. Split between Swiss French and Swiss German during World War I	Emergence of a post-industrial society
Explicit causes	— authoritarian control by Bern — Jura's cultural identity	id. 1826-31; plus the anticlericalism of the Bern government	id. 1826-31 and 1834-36	Discrimination against Jura Catholics	Tendancy to germanize the Jura	The Moeckli affair: the Bern government refused the nomination of a person from the Jura to the post of State Adviser for the Department of Public Works because French was his mother tongue
Aim of the movement	Creation of a canton or an autonomous region	— creation of a canton — attachment to France	Defend the traditions of the Jura Creation of a canton of Jura	Creation of a canton of Jura	Creation of a canton of Jura or of two half cantons, North and South.	Creation of a canton of Jura or of two half cantons or of a North Jura canton or of an autonomous Jura within the canton of Bern
Separatist movement leaders	— intellectuals from the Collège de Porrentruy 'Cercle Stockmar' — liberal groups	— Catholic intellectuals from the Collège de Porrentruy — Catholic Conservative party	Various Jura parties	Catholic Conservative party	Catholic conservative party	— The 'Rassemblement jurassien' — the Christian Social party — the young from various movements
Opponents	Bern government	Liberal party and Bern government	Bern government	Liberal radical party Bern government	Bern government	— Bern government — Liberal radical party — the 'paysans artisans et bourgeois' party — The 'Union des patriotes jurassiens'
Most adamantly separatist regions	Porrentruy	North Jura	Porrentruy	North Jura	North Jura	North Jura

Source: Bassand (1975: 142-143).

diocese of Basel within whose territory Bern fell. The cantonal order was ignored by ninety-two priests from the Jura. In rebuke, the cantonal government sentenced them to fines and imprisonment (Bonjour et al., 1952:297). Although pacification came less than five years later, these events left a heritage of bitter memories in the Catholic Bernese Jura. The French-speaking communes that were affected by the repercussions of the Kulturkampf of the 1870s were the same ones, with one or two exceptions, which later were to support the 1974 plebiscite for a separate canton.[2]

Linguistic awareness in the Jura was limited except for the sensitive period surrounding World War I, when it became caught up in the tide of pan-Germanism originating outside Switzerland (cf. pps. 68-69). It gained sudden importance three decades later when it was sparked by a display of cantonal insensitivity. In 1947, the Jurassian Georges Moeckli, was unanimously nominated by the Bernese government to the cantonal post of Director of Public Works. His appointment was opposed by Hans Tschumi, a deputy from Interlaken on the grounds that a post of that importance should be headed by a man whose

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[2]For an account of the history of the Jura see Bessire (1935), Gasser (1965), Henecka (1972), and Prongué (1973).

mother-tongue was German. Tschumi's motion to reject the nomination was carried. This action incited indignation from the French-speaking Jura population. However, a motion to reconsider Moeckli's appointment was lost by two votes.

The language question temporarily united both Protestant and Catholic, north and south in the Comité de Moutier. The committee's efforts eventually led to amendments to the cantonal constitution in 1950, which recognized the identity of a "peuple jurassien" and granted equal status to French and German as cantonal languages. In addition Jurassians were guaranteed at least two of the nine seats on the cantonal executive.

Some factions, especially in the north Jura, remained unsatisfied with this solution. Thus, during the 1950s a new movement, the Rassemblement jurassien, gained ground in the north and began a popular initiative for a separate canton. In 1959 this referendum was defeated, overwhelmingly in the old canton, and even narrowly in the Jura itself. Only the three northern districts of Delémont, Porrentruy, and Franches-Montagnes approved it by strong majorities.

Realizing that they were a minority of the total population of the canton and even of the Jura as a whole, the Rassemblement jurassien deliberately chose to escalate

the conflict to draw attention to its plight. In 1962
a small group of Jurassians, probably not numbering more
than twenty, founded the Front de Libération Jurassien
(FLJ), and between 1962 and 1964 set fire to two military
installations and bombed a cantonal bank. The RJ also
formed its own youth organization, les Béliers (the rams),
which organized pockets of separatist sentiment in a
number of Jurassian communes. Although the tactics em-
ployed by the FLJ aroused disapproval in both French and
German Switzerland, its extremist activities succeeded in
drawing considerable attention to the French-speaking
minority in the Jura, both in Switzerland and abroad.

Meanwhile, the Rassemblement, while not partici-
pating in the violence, took advantage of the publicity.
As Reymond (1965) points out, this turn of events enabled
the Rassemblement to build up a disciplined mass following
in the Jura that was too strong to be ignored or bypassed
in a search for a solution. As the Jurassian organiza-
tions continued to grow, Bernese officials once again were
forced to re-evaluate the Jura problem. In 1967 cantonal
authorities formed a Committee of 24 whose task it was to
investigate all aspects of the problem (Kommission der 24,
1968). A little over a year later, the Bernese govern-
ment announced that it would submit the question of creat-
ing a separate canton for the Jura to a plebiscite of

voters in the Jura alone. This procedure, which required
an amendment to the Bernese constitution, was accepted in
March 1970 by 90 percent of the electorate in the Jura
and 85 percent in the old canton of Bern. It opened the
way for a whole series of referenda that allowed the
electorate of the Jura full rights of determination as
to the creation of a future canton.

In the first referendum in June 1974 a slight
majority of the Jura population decided to form their
own canton. Under the constitutional amendment any of
the six Francophone districts that found themselves
opposed to the majority decision were given the opportuni-
ty to indicate in a second referendum whether they wanted
to secede or to stay with the canton of Bern. In March
1975 another vote was taken in which the southern French-
speaking Protestant districts of Courtelary, Moutier and
La Neuveville decided to remain with the canton of Bern
(see Figures V-1 and V-2). In September 1975 border
communes dissenting from the rest of their district were
able to decide whether they wanted to remain with their
old district or join one of their own persuasion. The
German-speaking Catholic district of Laufen which, with
the creation of the new canton of Jura, will be physi-
cally separated from the old canton, will have the right
to vote whether to seek attachment to another canton.

FIGURE V-1

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Location of Bernese Jura and Jura Districts

- - - Canton Bern

Jura Districts

Source: Caro (1976: XI)

FIGURE V-2

Linguistic and Religious Orientation, by Commune, 1970

	French-Catholic
	French-Protestant
G	German-Catholic
G	German-Protestant

g German-speaking minority of 33-49 percent

0   5   10
km.

Source: Caro (1976:43)

The last step will be a national referendum which will decide whether Article 2 of the federal constitution, which enumerates the cantons, will be changed by adding the canton of Jura.

What stands out above all in the Jura conflict is its particularly un-Swiss flavor of ultranationalism and a degree of ethnic confrontation practically unknown in modern Switzerland. The Rassemblement was quick to develop a conception of intense, self-conscious national-ism symbolized in the mystique of the "âme jurassienne." Included in this concept were overtones of ethnic op-pression and a united action of French Switzerland to resist German Swiss pressures. Such doctrines had hardly been heard in Switzerland since the threats of Pan-Germanism prior to World War I (McRae, in progress). In general, they received a wary reception in the rest of French Switzerland (Gonzague de Reynold, 1968).[3] While

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[3]Gonzague de Reynold insists that the Jura prob-lem is primarily one of the capacity of the Jura to form its own canton rather than being based on language or ethnicity.

Most French-speaking officials and teachers I interviewed were apalled by the Jura situation. In com-parison with many French-speaking Canadian intellectuals who side with the separatist parti québecois, their atti-tude seemed to be one of concern rather than identifica-tion. The German-speaking school officials, on the other hand, at least those in the city of Bern, indicated it was not their problem, but rather one which must be settled in the Jura itself.

the separatists did gain a considerable amount of atten-
tion, some of their demands could hardly be seriously
considered. Prior to the vote of June 1974, in which
the Rassemblement finally cooperated, it demanded that all
non-resident Jurassians living elsewhere in Switzerland be
allowed to vote and all "non-genuine" Jurassians, in
practice German-speaking residents, be excluded. Of
course, no democratic regime could possibly agree to an
electoral roll of that kind.

In the six months after the 1974 plebiscite the
anti-separatist youth movement sprang into life. The
Sangliers (the wild boars) promised to meet the Béliers
head-on in language too tragically familiar of Northern
Ireland. The worst violence came after the March, 1975
plebiscite. In a close vote, Moutier narrowly elected
to remain with the old canton of Bern (the vote was
2,524 for remaining in Bern and 2,238 for joining the new
canton of Jura). Sentiments polarized, and on April 24th
a demonstration of Béliers in Moutier got out of hand.
There were no fatalities but ten policemen were seriously
injured. Moutier remains the most polarized of the Jura
districts (Tages Anzeiger (foreign edition), Zurich, June
21, 1977).

In tracing the roots of the Jura question, like
most or all questions worth studying, no simple explanation

is possible. The separatist phenomenon is related to
multiple factors including a combination of linguistic and
religious characteristics, religious and political minori-
zation, economic and political marginality and a myth of a
centuries old Jura state. Of obvious importance also has
been a dedicated human element with an unswerving com-
mitment to Jurassian autonomy (McRae, in progress).

The outcome of the Jura problem remains unclear.
However, its resolution will be influenced by a number of
features which contribute to the Swiss political reality.
The first is the way the Swiss structure of politics acts
to focus on ever smaller and more precise geographical
units. "The very violence in the town of Moutier illus-
trates the peculiar Swiss attention to micro-politics."
As Steinberg (1976:72) notes "It is conceivable that in
the end Moutier will be divided by street into Jura and
Bernese enclaves." Second is the peculiar flexibility
of Swiss constitutions. Unlike the United States consti-
tution which is very difficult to amend, Swiss constitu-
tions, both cantonal and federal, can be altered easily
if circumstances require it. An amendment to the Bernese
constitution which was accepted by the voters in 1970
made it possible for Jura citizens to demand a vote on
separatism. Finally there is the Swiss spirit of accom-
modation, which is intertwined with cantonal autonomy and

a particularistic Swiss identity. The series of refer-
enda described above were designed to give full expres-
sion to the popular will. The separation issue was
tested subject only to practical limits down to the level
of the smallest commune. This procedure goes hand in
hand with Swiss identity which is based on the preserva-
tion of the smallest ethnic, linguistic and cultural
units. Because most Swiss are devoted to local autonomy
they are inclined to the view that if the Jurassians
themselves want a separate canton they should have it.
This outlook has been confirmed in a recent national
opinion poll in June, 1977 which showed that 62 percent
favored altering of the federal constitution to allow for
the entry of the new canton of Jura (Isopublic, 1977).
The final verdict will be sealed on September 24, 1978
when the Swiss people will vote whether or not to include
the new canton of Jura in the Confederation.

In a broader comparative perspective, the Jura
situation sheds light on two important aspects of plural-
istic nations. First, it demonstrates that even Switzer-
land, which is a model of long-lasting coexistence among
cantons of socioeconomic, linguistic and religious di-
versity, may also be plagued by ethnic troubles. The
latent possibility for ethnic conflict is always inherent
in societies that are composed of more than one ethnic

group. More importantly, however, Switzerland provides
one of the few examples where a solution is at hand among
what Bassand (1975) calls "nationalitarian movements,"
i.e., movements based on a search for identity, and a
more or less clearly defined desire for autonomy and
secession.

> . . . what differentiates Jura separatism from
> other movements, like those in Northern Ireland,
> Quebec, the Basque country, etc., is its unity.
> These nationalitarian movements have broken up
> into factions, tendencies, antagonistic groups.
> . . . These internal conflicts greatly paralyse
> these movements and bring them to a standstill.
> This absence of internal ideological conflict
> is perhaps the reason why Jura separatists
> could find a solution (Bassand, 1975:150).

While ideological solidarity is no doubt important,
Bassand neglects some of the most salient elements in the
solution of nationalitarian problems. Of primary impor-
tance is the adaptability of the political system. The
Swiss have tended to see politics as simply a process for
working out commonsense solutions. Thus political life
in Switzerland, including the operation of federal and
communal politics is more flexible than in many countries.
We have seen the relative ease by which the Bernese
constitution was amended in order to give full expression
to the popular will. In addition, the Jura question,
unlike most nationalitarian problems, may be dealt with
by dusting off an old technique of conflict resolution,

rather than by having to create a new pattern. The po-
tential solution to the Jura conflict, the creation of a
new canton (or half canton, a solution which was also
briefly considered) is one of the oldest conflict resolu-
tion techniques in Swiss history (Dunn, 1972). Of obvious
importance is also the willingness of the elite and the
populace to forge and undertake viable political solu-
tions. After much hesitation, both Bernese and federal
officials attempted to seek a workable compromise. The
final outcome is still undecided, however, most indi-
cators point to the acceptance of the new canton by the
Swiss citizenry. In these respects, the situation in the
Jura illuminates both the failings and successes of cul-
tural coexistence in Switzerland.

The Gastarbeiter Problem

The foreign worker problem is more intractable
than the Jura question. For unlike national minorities
which are continuously accommodated within the political
system, the foreign workers stand outside the political
system. They are a voiceless minority without the rights
of Swiss citizens.

In order to understand the foreign worker problem

in Switzerland it is necessary to put it into a broader
Western European perspective. There are approximately 8
million foreign workers currently employed in Western
Europe, accompanied by 4 to 5 million dependents. More
than four-fifths of these migrants are residents in West
Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland.
The rest have migrated to Holland, Belgium, Sweden and
Austria. All the receiving societies have experienced
rapid economic growth which has proceeded almost unabated
since World War II. At the same time the countries of
southern Europe, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey,
and Yugoslavia, as well as two northern countries,
Finland and Ireland, have experienced serious unemploy-
ment and underemployment. These eight countries have
provided approximately three-fourths of the foreign labor
employed in Western Europe, the remainder coming from
the former colonial territories of France and Britain
(Mayer, 1975:442).

The vast migration of labor into the industrial-
ized countries of Western Europe may be seen as part of
the rural-urban migration which has fuelled the indus-
trialization of Western Europe for over a century.
Indeed, in 1914 foreigners made up 15.4 percent of the
resident population in Switzerland, only slightly less
than in 1974 when they reached a new peak at 16.5

(see Table V-2 and Figure V-3). While all receiving
nations in Western Europe have, in recent years, become
dependent on foreign labor, no other country is as
dependent upon foreign manpower as Switzerland. In 1975,
20 percent of the Swiss labor force (excluding seasonal
workers and border crossers) as compared to 11 percent in
France, 10 percent in Germany and 8 percent in the United
Kingdom was composed of foreign workers (Werner, 1977:
301).

Switzerland, like the other labor importing
nations of Western Europe, does not think of itself as a
nation of immigrants in the traditional sense. Neither
it nor the other countries anticipated the coming waves
of migrants. On the contrary, at the end of World War
II, most experts believed that Western Europe would not
be able to provide employment for its own population.
When full employment was reached in Switzerland after
World War II this was regarded as a temporary phenomenon,
as were the labor shortages that prevailed in the fifties.
For this reason efforts were made to limit the influx of
foreigners to single young males, or those without fami-
lies, so they could easily be sent home if economic
conditions deteriorated.

Since then, even though Western Europe and
Switzerland, in particular, have become permanently

TABLE V-2. --Foreign resident population in Switzerland:[a] 1850-1976

Year	Absolute	In % of total population	Year	Absolute	In % of total population	Year	In % of total population
1850	71,970	3.0	1941	223,554	5.2	1971	15.9
1860	114,983	4.6	1950	285,446	6.1	1972	16.2
1870	150,907	5.7	1960	584,739	10.8	1973	16.4
1880	211,035	7.4	1965	810,243[b]	13.8	1974	16.5
1888	229,650	7.9	1966	844,987[b]	14.2	1975	15.8
1900	383,424	11.6	1967	890,580[b]	14.8	1976	15.1
1910	552,011	14.7	1968	933,142[b]	15.3		
1914	600,000	15.4	1969	971,795[b]	15.7		
1920	402,385	10.4	1970	982,887[b]	15.9		
1930	355,522	8.7					

[a] The foreign "resident population" is made up of foreigners with a permanent residence permit and foreigners with a yearly permit.

[b] Not included in these figures are members of international organizations and their families.

Source: Hoffmann-Nowotny (1974:3) and Annuaire Statistique de la Suisse (1977:16 ,89).

FIGURE V-3

Foreign resident population as % of total population:

1850-1976

dependent upon the presence of foreign labor for the
functioning of crucial sectors of their economy, the self-
image of Western European countries has not basically
changed. As Mayer (1975:443) observes:

> The very terms employed in the current debate
> proves this point: the discussion is always about
> guest workers, never about immigrants. Large sec-
> tions of the Western European public refuse to
> accept the idea that the foreigners in their midst
> could become permanent settlers. Any government
> that was to set out openly to invite foreigners
> to settle permanently on purely economic grounds
> would be voted out of office.[4]

In Switzerland, the federal government has con-
sistently taken a stand against widespread naturalization.
In 1969 it stated that naturalization should not serve as
a "decisive means" toward reducing the proportion of
foreigners: "The number of naturalizations will and must
continue to be small" (Bericht des Bundesrates, 1969).
The percentage of the foreign resident population being
naturalized has exceeded one percent only once since 1900

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[4] In contrast to Germany and Switzerland, Sweden
attempts to assimilate its foreign labor force, rather
than treating them as temporary workers. Oberg comments
that, "it was and still is out of the question to call
these immigrants 'guest' workers" (i.e., Gastarbeiter).
Consistent with this policy a work permit in Sweden is not
tied to a contractually limited period of employment.
After the first year, during which the immigrant is usually
restricted to a particular branch of industry, he or she
is able to move freely in the labor market. Swedish im-
migrants may also claim all the social benefits of Swedish
citizens.

(in 1941) when it was 1.5 percent. Currently it stands at approximately one percent (Werner, 1977:301). A considerable number of these naturalizations are women married to Swiss men, who automatically obtain Swiss citizenship.[5]

This poses a basic dilemma and represents an obvious shortcoming of the Swiss mode of integration of non-national minorities. While at first the intention of the migrant workers who did not plan to expatriate themselves coincided with the attitudes and intentions of the receiving countries, this situation is becoming increasingly illusionary. Both the length of stay and the percentage of foreign workers with year-round permits have been increasing steadily (see Table V-4). Concomitant with this change is a transformation in the distribution of the foreign labor force by type of work permit held. The proportion of workers holding year-round permits increased from 55.5 percent in 1956 to 65.2 percent in 1970. In both years the proportion of border crossers was 11.3 percent while the proportion of seasonal workers dropped

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[5]According to the Bundesgesetz über Erwerb and Verlust des Scheizer Bürgerrechts to become naturalized an immigrant must live in Switzerland for at least 12 years, and have been physically present in Switzerland for three of the last five years, and undergo a federal investigation.

TABLE V-4.--Length of stay of workers with year-round permits

Date of Enumeration	Percentages		
	Less than 3 Years	3 and more years	5 and more years
October 1955	75	25	11
February 1959	75	25	11
December 1970	40	60	44

Source: Mayer (1971:101).

from 33.1 percent to 23.5 percent in 1970 (Mayer, 1971: 97). This trend has continued through the late 1970s, with the number of year-round permit holders increasing at the expense of seasonal workers. There has also been a change in the composition of the foreign resident population with an increasing number of family members joining foreign workers. In 1970, 25 percent of the foreign resident population were children 16 years and under, many of whom have spent a considerable part of their life in Switzerland. The percentage in this age category increased from 13 to 25 percent between 1960 and 1970 (Tages Anzeiger (foreign edition), Zurich, March 7, 1972: 16).

Further evidence of increasing stabilization and decreasing rotation of the foreign labor force is evident in the rapidly increasing number of aliens who have been given the right of permanent settlement. They have increased from 4,000 in 1959 to 9,000 in 1964 to 31,000 in 1970, and will, unless anti-foreign sentiment intensifies, expand still further in the coming years because of the massive immigration ten years earlier (the time required to obtain permanent residency) in the decade and a half between 1960 and 1975. Thus, given the heavy reliance of Swiss industries on foreign workers and the increasing permanency of this labor force, the Swiss must accommodate

themselves to the presence of a large number of foreigners in their midst.

The official policy of the federal government is one of stabilization of the foreign population at the latest by 1980, and thereafter to reduce it step by step to a number that would be "politically acceptable" (Troxler, 1975:14). It is more vague, however, on the "assimilation" of foreigners. The Federal Consultative Committee for the Problems of Foreign Workers presented a program in 1973 (Tages Anzeiger (foreign edition), Zurich, July 31, 1973:2) but did not proceed beyond suggesting various measures. Five years later, the summary of the consultative committee concluded that assimilation was mainly the responsibility of the enterprises, the unions, and the employers organizations. They are to work primarily through language and vocational education, and to promote active participation in workers' committees (Tages Anzeiger (foreign edition), Zurich, February 21, 1978:3).

Of course, this can only be a stop-gap measure. While the number of foreigners has decreased from a high point in the early 1970s, it will probably stabilize around 10 of the resident population. Unless novel solutions are found for the integration and assimilation of foreign workers, and particularly their children, a

considerable portion of the population will be excluded from exerting those basic civil rights linked to citizen-ship. Having a large population of voiceless residents is a dangerous situation for any country as urbanization in South Africa has shown.

Until recently the majority of the foreign labor force in Switzerland has come from neighboring countries --Germany, France, Italy, and Austria. In 1860 these four countries accounted for 97.3 percent of the foreign workers, in 1910, 95.2 percent, and in 1960 87.1 percent. Not until the last decade (1970) has their share decreased to 75 percent. In addition, Switzerland has witnessed a decrease in the proportion of French and German immigrants and an increase in the proportion of Italians. By 1970 they comprised more than 50 percent of the Swiss foreign labor force (Annuaire Statistique de la Suisse, 1977:82).

There has also been a change in the social compo-sition of the foreign work force. Although the majority of the immigrants have always been members of the working class, the proportion has rapidly risen since 1941 (see Table V-3). Furthermore, there were in 1970 over 200,000 seasonal workers (so-called saisonniers), the majority of whom worked in unskilled or semi-skilled jobs. These figures point to the fact that the problem of foreign minorities in Switzerland is one of class as well as

TABLE V-3. --Foreign work force according to occupation: 1900-1960

Year	Self-employed	Directors	Leading technical employees	Other leading employees	Lower technical employees	Other lower employees	Skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers	Other	% Σ
1900	16.5			9.6			69.7	4.2	100.0
1910	19.2		1.62			9.4	65.3	4.5	100.0
1920	19.8	0.3	0.3	1.3	1.5	9.4	63.1	1.2	100.0
1930	17.0	0.2	0.4	1.5	1.9	8.8	65.6	4.8	100.0
1941	21.4	0.3	0.3	1.8	2.1	10.2	60.3	3.5	100.0
1950	10.8	0.3	0.5	1.6	1.7	9.3	73.1	2.8	100.0
1960	3.3	0.4	1.0	1.1	2.6	6.7	83.7	1.2	100.0

Source: Hoffmann-Nowotny (1974:6).

ethnicity.

Another important aspect of the foreign worker problem in Switzerland, as well as in the other Western European labor importing countries, is their distribution in the occupational structure. Several authors have pointed to the concentration of foreign workers in the lowest paying and lowest prestige jobs (Hoffmann-Nowotny, 1973, Castles and Kosack, 1973). Girod concludes that, on the whole, the percentage of foreigners in an industry is in inverse proportion to the advantages offered to them in terms of income, working conditions, and prestige (Castles and Kosack, 1973:70). Hoffmann-Nowotny (1974:8) speaks of the Ueberschichtung of the native population and the Unterschichtung of the immigrant population. "Unter-schichtung means that most immigrants occupy the lowest positions available in the social and occupational struc-tures of the immigrant country where they form a new social stratum at the very bottom of the occupational ladder." On the other hand, massive Unterschichtung opens up greater chances of upward mobility for the native population. Between 1950 and 1960 the number of foreigners occupying unskilled, semi-skilled, and un-skilled jobs more than doubled (from 12 to 28 percent), while the percentage of Swiss in these job categories decreased from 88 to 72 percent.

The labor unions, the too often protectionist allies of the working class population have taken an ambiguous stand on the incorporation of foreign workers into the Swiss labor force. While officially, most unions have special functionnaires or committees dealing with foreign workers, unofficially they have not always pushed the organization of foreigners for a number of reasons. These include economic problems such as the effect on productivity; social ones like the difficulties of integrating large numbers of foreigners; political fears connected with the presence of masses of second-class citizens not owing their loyalty to the Swiss state, the radicalization of workers with communist leanings, difficulties for the trade unions arising out of conflict with Swiss workers, and the unwillingness of foreign workers to join Swiss unions (Castles and Kosack, 1973:147; Dubs, 1970:3-4).

While the massive movement of foreigners into the Swiss labor market has increased the mobility rates of Swiss workers into the ranks of manual and white-collar jobs, it has also deprived the unions of part of their traditional membership. White-collar workers, in particular, tend to have low rates of union participation. Similarly, the socialist party has observed that the domestic working class and its political influence is

slowly eroding. Siegenthaler (1975:276) notes, "These concerns, which are seldomly openly admitted by the S.G.B.(Swiss Trade Union Federation) and S.P. (Social Democratic Party), have contributed to the rising criticism of employing large numbers of foreign workers."

On the other hand, there have been some efforts, particularly by union leaders to integrate foreign workers into the labor force and trade union movement. Beside demanding equal pay and conditions for foreign workers, on occasion they have protested against the expulsion of foreign workers because of political and trade union activity, and demanded recognition of their civil rights. Nevertheless, the xenophobic reactions of many rank and file unionists, especially during the hysteria of the early 1970s, have left many foreign workers feeling that the Swiss unions do not represent their interests.

Since Switzerland does not think of the foreign workers as a permanent labor force there is an absence of a true immigration policy. Instead one finds an elaborate set of rules governing admission into the country. First a foreigner must obtain a work permit, which, provided he or she does not come as a saisonnier, is issued for one year. When the year is up, the permit may be renewed for another year period, and after a stay

of five years for a two year period. The immigrant

however, has no legal claim to the prolongation of his

permit, which remains at the discretion of the authori-

ties. Furthermore, the foreigner needs special permission

to move to another canton or change jobs. In 1973 the

required time for changing work places or jobs was de-

creased from five to two years. Finally, after a stay

of ten years and a federal investigation the immigrant

is granted a resident permit which gives him equal rights

in the job market with Swiss citizens (Hoffmann-Nowotny,

1974:14-15). At this time he is also normally entitled

to unemployment benefits.

Other restrictions on the rights of foreigners are

applied with respect to their families. A foreigner who

is obliged to re-apply each year for a new permit is

allowed to have his family join him only after he has

spent 12 months in Switzerland. In order to do this he

must provide proof that he has obtained adequate living

quarters and that he is financially capable of supporting

them. Housing may not, however, be obtained at the ex-

pense of Swiss nationals (Hoffmann-Nowotny, 1974:15-16).

Another problem is the assimilation of children

of foreign workers. Should these children be educated

with the goal of eventual integration into Swiss society?

The lack of consensus about the nature of Swiss immigration

aggravates this problem. Although it is a generally
unexpressed understanding that immigration is a temporary
phenomenon, the Swiss educational system has ordinarily
held that the children of foreigners should be prepared
for longer term residence. Thus, they usually attend
the same schools and follow the same curriculum as Swiss
children. However, in addition to the regular subjects
some foreign children also receive instruction in their
mother tongue. This places an extra burden on these
children who too often have an insufficient knowledge of
both the national language and their native tongue.

Hoffmann-Nowotny further observes that:

> . . . .While there is no formal discrimination
> against foreign children, it is easy to under-
> stand why they are usually below the standard
> of native children and rarely succeed in going
> on to middle or higher education. . . . While
> in several places there are programs aimed at
> reducing the disadvantaged position of foreign
> children, these programs reach only a minority
> of children. . . . So the assumption that the
> foreign children will simply grow up to form a
> new sub-proletariat, replicating that of their
> parents today, will probably be confirmed
> (Hoffmann-Nowotny, 1974:19).

Braun (1970:437) refers to the double insecurity
reflected in the attitudes of the immigrants as Heimkehr-
illusion (the illusion of returning home). His extensive
survey of four middle-sized towns in German Switzerland
shows that a very high percentage of Italians, at the
moment of entry, and approximately five years later, have

no definite intended length of stay. Generally, there is a strong shift toward an increased time horizon the longer the actual length of stay (Braun, 1970:488). This evidence contradicts the assertions of Swiss (and other Western European) politicians who have maintained that Italian immigrants come with the definite intention of wanting to stay for only a year or two and then to return home.

In recent years immigration has become one of the most debated political issues. Pressure from groups campaigning against the foreign domination or over-foreignization (Ueberfremdung) of the country helped to force through regulations restricting the entry of new foreign workers in 1964 and subsequent years. The campaign against immigrants reached a climax in June, 1970 when every male Swiss citizen (women were not enfranchised until 1971) was asked to vote in a referendum on whether the proportion of foreigners should be limited to ten percent of the population in both the country as a whole as well as in each canton (with the exception of Geneva). Acceptance of this referendum would have meant the expulsion of a large number of immigrants from Switzerland. The move was sponsored by James Schwarzenbach and opposed by the Federal Council, the trade unions and all major political parties. Even so, it was defeated

by a modest majority--forty-six percent of the voters
supported the move and fifty-four percent voted against
it (Petersen, 1975:196).

Late in 1972 Schwarzenbach's right wing party, the
Nationale Aktion für Volk und Heimat (the National Movement
for People and Home) began to collect signatures for an
even more drastic proposal. Under its terms, there would
have been a sharp reduction in the number of foreigners--
two out of every five would have been expelled by 1978.
The referendum came to a vote in 1974, and was defeated
by about two to one. Since then for the third time in
seven years the Swiss citizens turned down an "Ueber-
fremdungsinitiative" in 1977--this time by an even more
decisive seventy-one percent. There are some indications
that the Swiss people are weary of the many "over-
foreignization" initiatives and that the Nationale Aktion
is less willing to introduce new measures which will almost
certainly be defeated.[6] Nevertheless, it is likely that
the Swiss citizens will resist any attempt of employers to
increase the already high proportion of foreign workers.

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[6]See, for example, ". . . und trotzdem neue Ueber-
fremdungsinitiativen" (Tages Anzeiger, foreign edition,
Zurich, September 25, 1976); "Kommt noch eine Initiative
mit Ausländersteuer?" (Tages Anzeiger, foreign edition,
March 15, 1977); and "Keine weitere Ueberfremdungs-
initiative" (Tages Anzeiger, foreign edition, May 29,
1977).

Seen from a more encompassing perspective reducing the number of aliens is only part of the problem. One must also consider the effect of the foreigners' presence on the relations between the religious and language groups in Switzerland. In 1960, 79.7 percent of the aliens, but only 41.9 percent of Swiss citizens gave their religion as Catholic. According to the same census, the respective percentage of Swiss citizens and aliens speaking the country's main languages were as follows: German 74.4 and 25.5 percent; French, 20.2 and 7.8 percent; and Italian, 4.1 and 54.1 percent. Italian, which was once more or less limited to the canton of Ticino, has become an important second language, especially in the cities of German Switzerland, where many of the immigrants work. In accordance with the principle of territoriality, if the immigrants are allowed to stay, they and particularly their children will adapt to the language of the area. Thus, the large immigration of Italians which has reduced German speakers to the lowest proportion in Swiss history may in the long run have the contrary effect of reinforcing the German language group at the expense of French (Mayer, 1972).

There are no easy solutions to the pressing problems of integration of the foreign workers. In the long run only the children can be truly acculturated. Public

policy must, therefore, pay special attention to this population group. Because the foreigners are over-whelmingly in the child-bearing ages (their birth rate is 30 compared to 14 for the Swiss), the number of foreign children will rise rapidly in the population. Thus, there is an urgency to find an equitable solution, which will both foster the equilibrium among Swiss cultural groups and slowly absorb and integrate those newcomers who have become indispensible to Switzerland.

In summary, of the two major problems facing Switzerland today the demand of French-speaking Catholics in the Jura for an autonomous canton is less disturbing in the long run than the disparity between the economic need for foreign workers and the unwillingness of many Swiss to have them integrated into the population. While the Jura situation has been a troubling chapter in Swiss history, a solution seems within reach. On the other hand, the integration of the foreign population both into the work force and into Swiss society in general remains a major problem in the conduct of majority-minority rela-tions in Switzerland.

A Portrait of Swiss Intergroup
Relations

Our portrait of Swiss intergroup relations is a

complex one. Swiss policy toward non-citizen minorities is at variance with the treatment of citizen minorities and is one of the most salient problems looming on the Swiss horizon. Our point of departure was not, however, non-national minorities, but rather the mode of integration of Swiss cultural minorities. One of the oldest pluralist propositions is the unspoken but implicit assumption that viable democratic governments face grave obstacles in so-called "plural societies," that is, societies with clearly discernible racial, linguistic, and religious differences.

In answer to this challenge many social scientists have traced Swiss cultural coexistence primarily to structural factors such as cross-cutting cleavages. This view represents the dominant outlook. We have shown that this argument by itself is overly simplistic and reductionist. The model of consociational democracy, although contributing to an explanation of Swiss stability, also leaves many issues unsolved. By emphasizing the conscious and deliberate efforts of autonomous elite politics it neglects the role of popular sentiment and public opinion. In fact, elite accommodation seems to be possible only in those societies where there is substantial agreement among the citizenry. Our study has focused on this important topic, concentrating on the transmission of values, and

the relationship between public opinion and attitudes and core values in a multicultural setting.

In order to explore the salience of popular sentiment and public opinion in contributing to Swiss coexistence we have made a distinction between official institutions whose task it is to socialize the general public and the values reported by the populace itself. To address the first question the role of the school and its curriculum was examined.

An investigation of Swiss history textbooks from French and German, Catholic and Protestant Switzerland was particularly revealing. In contrast to Canada and South Africa, the school curriculum tends to unite rather than to divide the various cultural groups by de-emphasizing those historical themes which feed intergroup resentment. The textbooks instill a sense of national consciousness. Even though the authors present various interpretations of some events, there is an underlying consensus of what the Swiss state should stand for. One may even hypothesize that there has gradually evolved in Switzerland a civic culture comparable to the civil religion[7] in the United States. Herberg (1955) and Bellah

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[7] Rousseau who coined the term, "civil religion" meant by it, the "purely civil profession of faith whose articles the sovereign is competent to determine" which

(1967) have argued that the mutual toleration among

Protestants, Catholics, and Jews in America is possible

because they all, majority and minority alike, partici-

pate in a common civil religion. The American civil

religion celebrates "the American Way of Life." Since

it does not align itself with any particular religious

theology, and since it was never anticlerical or militant-

ly secular, the civil religion was able to build up, with-

out any bitter struggle with the church, powerful symbols

of national solidarity and to mobilize deep levels of

personal motivation for the attainment of national goals.

Likewise, it appears that Switzerland's linguistic

and religious minorities participate in a common "civic

culture." This does not mean that all differences between

the groups have disappeared. But it does indicate that

the various groups have learned to accept their differences

---

induced man to "love his duties."

"The dogmas of the civil religion ought to be
simple, few, and precisely formulated, without explanations
or commentaries. The existence of a powerful, intelligent,
benevolent, foreseeing and providential God, the continu-
ance of life after death, the happiness of the just, the
punishment of the wicked, the sanctity if the social con-
tract and the laws, these are the positive dogmas. As for
the negative dogmas, I would limit them to one only,
namely intolerance" (Rousseau, 1953:153).

Lincoln's use of the term "political religion"
constituted by "reverance for the laws" is identical to
Rousseau's usage (cf. Jaffa, 1959:227).

by and large, and those differences, be they religious, linguistic, or cultural, are moderated by other things the groups have in common. This interpretation is strengthened when we turn to the results of the survey of French- and German-speaking youth. Political reasons were given considerably more often than any other reasons when Swiss youth were asked why they were proud to be Swiss (cf. Chapter IV). Even before they reach adulthood young people seem to have a "certain Swiss outlook."

Majority opinion also plays a special role in Swiss cultural coexistence. While the French Swiss display many indicators of what might be called a typical minority response such as their greater perception of dissensus among different Swiss subgroups, their preference for the cantonal over the federal government, their desire to live in a territory where they predominate and their reservations about their homeland (almost one-fourth said they were not particularly proud to be Swiss), the German Swiss do not display a parallel "majoritarian attitude." This is not the case, however, in Canada. An interesting indication of the non-majoritarian attitude of the German Swiss majority can be seen in their approximations of the three Swiss language communities. The German Swiss underestimate their own number in the population and overestimate the linguistic minorities, while

in general the opposite tendency is true of the French Swiss, who overestimate themselves and underestimates the German-speaking population. Linguistic harmony between the German, French, and Italian language communities is certainly fostered by this balance which favors the smaller groups.

As we have noted in Chapter II public policy also favors the linguistic minorities. In addition, there is substantial economic equality between the three language groups. Not to be overlooked is furthermore the emphasis on accommodation of differences. This attitude can be observed in the treatment of the mediator in Swiss textbooks (i.e., Kappeler Milchsuppe, Niklaus von Flüe, Dufour, etc.) and by the heroes chosen by Swiss youth.

Other factors influence the Swiss panorama of intergroup relations. Ethnic integration in multicultural states can take a whole range of alternatives from complete lack of official recognition of ethnic identity by the state to a full-blown official acceptance of the communal principle. In the first case the state merely recognizes territorial divisions and incorporates its citizens as individuals without giving to ethnic identity any legal status whatsoever. In the latter case, the state incorporates its citizens as members of officially recognized ethnic communities. Thus the recognition of

ethnicity is legally built into the structure of representation. Switzerland may be cited as an example of the first type of arrangement and Belgium or Yugoslavia as an example of the second. As Van den Berghe notes:

> In practical terms, a Swiss type solution based on territorial divisions without formal recognition of ethnicity by the state is preferable to, say, a Belgian-type solution. Territoriality allows the application of a simple unambiguous test of membership such as place of residence. Such a criterion gives every citizen a formally equal place, even when he chooses to live in the territory of another ethnic group. Certain regions may be de facto the turf of a given ethnic group, but the state gives no de jure recognition to ethnicity as such (Van den Berghe, 1976:253).

The incorporation of citizens as individuals rather than as members of officially recognized ethnic groups serves to de-emphasize ethnicity as well as to reaffirm the principle of legal equality of individuals so as to offer no points of collision within the foundation of the modern democratic state.[8]

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[8]The recognition of territorial divisions rather than ethnic groups is evident in the Swiss history textbooks. They rarely speak in terms of linguistic affiliation. Instead geographical regions serve as a basis of identification (i.e., General Dufour is described as a Genevan rather than as a French Swiss). This fact may, in addition, help explain the inaccurate estimates by French and German Swiss of their relative numbers in the population. I learned from interviewing several teachers from both language communities that such information rarely is treated in the school curriculum.

The strict application of the territorial principle in the area of language usage had led to another condition which has promoted linguistic harmony. In Switzerland there exist three separate linguistic melting pots--French, Italian, and German. Coupled with demographic trends mentioned in Chapter II which tend to stabilize the relative proportions of the three language groups, and the relatively rapid assimilation of new migrants, the Latin groups are able to be masters in their own homes without the threat of Germanization.

In broader comparative perspective the case of Switzerland offers important theoretical insights into the social conditions which foster stable and effective democracy in countries with discernible linguistic, religious and cultural differences. Our brief examination of public opinion and sentiment suggests that a common civic culture provides the foundation for toleration between Swiss linguistic and religious minorities and majorities. These groups are united by a self-conscious political definition of nationhood rather than by nationality defined in linguistic terms, as is the case of Switzerland's three large neighbors. By separating the concept of nationhood from any possible link with seemingly objective ethnic criteria of language, culture, or descent, Switzerland has been able, to a considerable

degree, to surmount political and social tensions in an age of nationalism.

In concluding this study we propose an important corollary to pluralist thought which posits an implicit correlation between social heterogeneity and political instability. Our basic proposition is that a civic culture moderates social conflicts and promotes stability in multi-cultural societies.

The moderating effect of a civic culture in societies with discernible cultural minorities opens up a number of salient questions for further investigation. Of obvious importance is the relationship between consociational politics and a civic culture. Is elite accommodation possible without substantial agreement among the general public? This continues to be a largely unexplored issue which has received little treatment by either proponents or opponents of consociationalism. Secondly, what is the relationship between structural factors and the existence of a civic culture? Are certain structural prerequisites necessary for a civic culture to exist? Finally, what are the possibilities of transferring a workable system from one country to another or even modifying a system by the devices used in another?

A basic premise of this work is that viable democratic governments are possible in countries with a

fragmented culture. In recent years, democratic pessi-
mists have too readily equated cultural diversity with
ethnic confrontation. Fellow-feelings can exist in plural
societies among people who speak different languages and
practice different religions. In this connection, the
case of Switzerland offers us important insights into the
relationship between heterogeneous states and cultural
and ethnic coexistence. In the course of history, the
Swiss people have come to realize that institutions and
sentiments that are dictated by majoritarian principles
are not consistent with cultural harmony. This fact may
be worthy of reflection in other multicultural societies
where it is customary to take either a fatalistic or
majoritarian attitude toward intergroup relations.

APPENDIX A

EXAMPLE OF HISTORY CURRICULUM FOR SECONDARY

GRADES 7-9

(Approved for the cantons of Aargau, Basel-Stadt, Basel-land, Bern, Lucerne, and Solothurn.)

Grade 6

Introduction: Man in Space and Time

    I.   Pre-history and the earliest civilizations

        a. The earliest men: hunters and gathers (Cavedwellers)

        b. The earliest agricultural and pastoral tribes ("Lakedwellers," Helvetics)

        c. The earliest civilizations in Egypt, Mesopotamia, India, China

        d. The assault against the early civilizations (nomads, Indoeuropeans)

   II.   Antiquity

        a. The Greeks

        b. The Romans

        c. Christianity

        d. Switzerland in Roman times

  III.   Barbarian Invasions

        a. The Germans

      b. The Slavs

      c. The Arabs

IV. The Kingdom of the Franks

      a. Christian missionaries

      b. Charlemagne

      c. The partition of the Carolingian Empire

      d. Feudalism

V. Dark Ages in the West, the flourishing of culture in the East

      a. Saracens, Hungarians and Normans plunder Europe

      b. Bagdad, Byzantium and Kiev as cultural centers

VI. The Rise of the Occident

      a. Monks

      b. Knights

      c. Bourgeoisie

      d. The fate of the farmers

      e. Emperor and Pope

Grade 7

I. Europe in the high and late Middle Ages

      a. Romanic and gothic architecture

      b. France (St. Louis, Joan of Arc)

      c. England (Magna Charta, Parliament)

d. The German Empire (Rudolf of Habsburg)

II. The Confederation (1291-1515)

a. Founding of the Confederation

b. Time of military strength and great crisis

III. Inventions and Discoveries

a. Gun powder - book printing - compass - cartography

b. Asia - Marco Polo - Portugal

c. America - Columbus - Spain

IV. Renaissance and Humanism
Leonardo da Vinci - Michelangelo - Erasmus - Copernicus

V. Reformation

a. Luther

b. Zwingli - Reformation in Switzerland

c. Calvin - Geneva

VI. The Catholic Reform and Counterreformation

a. Council of Trent

b. Ignatius of Loyola

c. Spain under Philip II

VII. Absolutism

a. France under Louis XIV

b. Mercantilism

c. Austria and the Turkish menace

     d. Russia under Peter the Great

     e. Baroque culture

VIII. The End of Absolutism

     a. The flourishing of Holland

     b. England (Constitutional monarchy, the balance of power in Europe, British Empire)

Grade 8

I. Enlightenment

     a. The rise of natural sciences

     b. Voltaire (toleration)

     c. Montesquieu (Constitution/the division of power)

     d. Rousseau (equality)

     e. Pestalozzi (poverty/education)

II. The time of the Bourgeois Revolutions

     a. The founding of the United States - Declaration of human rights

     b. French Revolution and Napoleaon (estates - constitutional monarchy - Jacobins - Empire)

     c. Congress of Vienna

     d. Struggle between new and old tendencies (1815-1848) (Metternich - France: July and February Revolutions)

     e. From the old Confederation to the Federal State 1798-1848

III. The Industrial Revolution

   a. Agricultural and technical revolution

   b. Population explosion

   c. Social questions

   d. Socialism

   e. Marxism

IV. Nationalism and Imperialism

   a. Unification of Italy and Germany

   b. H. Dunant and the Red Cross

   c. USA and Russia in the nineteenth century

   d. The old colonial powers (Holland, France, England)

   e. The second wave of industrialization

   f. Imperialism

Grade 9

I. World War I and the Treaty of Versailles

   a. The way into the war

   b. The course of the war

   c. Losses of the war

   d. The Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations

II. From British Empire to the Commonwealth
A look at the colonial and semi-colonial world
(Ghandi)

III. The Russian Revolution and the Soviet Union

    a. Causes of the Revolution (from 1861)

    b. Bolschevism (Lenin)- the year of the revolution 1917

    c. Communism during the war and the new economic politics

    d. Personal dictatorship and economic plans (Stalin)

    e. The Soviet Union after Stalin

IV. The Crisis of Democracy between the Two Wars

    a. The rise of European dictatorships

    b. The world depression

    c. The resolution of the economic crisis in the USA (Roosevelt and the New Deal)

V. National Socialism

    a. Weimar Republic

    b. Germany under Hitler

VI. World War II

    a. Causes and conditions leading to the war Japan's expansion politics, Italy's Mediterranean and African politics. Hitler's pan-Germanism, the Spanish civil war, Axis and Allies, the outbreak of the war

    b. The victories of the German armies - turning point - the victory of the Allies (Churchill, Stalingrad, the resistance)

    c. War loses

    d. The immediate results of the war: A weak Europe, occupation and partition of Germany, two world powers (USA, Soviet Union)

VII. World-wide Problems in the Time After the World

   a. The UN and its affiliated organizations

   b. Movements to unite Europe

   c. From the Cold War to the politics of co-existence - NATO and Warsaw Pact

   d. Decolonization and developing aid - Population explosion and hunger in the world

   e. Mao-Tse-tung

   f. Israel and the Arab world

   g. Current world powers and their differences, nuclear equilibrium, role of the UN

VIII. Switzerland in the Twentieth Century

   a. Switzerland in World War I

   b. Entrance into the League of Nations

   c. From the General Strike to the Labor Peace Agreement

   d. Switzerland in World War II (General Guisan)

   e. Problems of the present

IX. Man in the Crisis of Our Time

   a. Progress in science and technology: nuclear energy, space exploration, mass media

   b. Economic developments: market economy and planification, automation

   c. Social changes

   d. Movements in religion and art

Source: Weltgeschichte im Bild, Teacher's Manual Part B (1975:39-43).

APPENDIX B

RESEARCH PROCEDURE AND DESIGN

The questionnaire was designed to tap young peoples attitudes toward diversity in Switzerland, and more generally to record their perceptions about the nature of their country - its people, its culture, its history, and its problems. Approximately half of the questions were designed specially for this study. Both open and closed-ended questions were drafted to elicit responses about national and sub-national alliances, and core values and attitudes. The other half of the survey was either adapted or taken directly from Johnstone's (1969) study of Young People's Images of Canadian Society. Thus, we were able to utilize the Canadian results as a reference point from which to measure the Swiss findings.

Caution must be exercised, however, when comparing the results of the two surveys. Johnstone utilized a national random sample, while our study was exploratory in scope, providing an initial excursion into a completely untouched area. As far as the results can be projected beyond the samples of French and German Swiss youth used, it is to arrive at some trends describing the attitudes of the two linguistic groups toward diversity. A second

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consideration is the timing of the two surveys. It is
likely that Johnstone would find a more polarized cohort
of Canadian youth today than he did in 1965, when the study
was carried out. Thus, it is probable that the comparison
between Canadian and Swiss youth underestimates the dis-
tance between majority and minority opinion in the two
countries.

The questionnaire was written in English and then
translated into French and German. The next step was to
check the translations against one another for consistency.
Because of differences in dialect, it was decided to
translate the complete French version directly from
English rather than to rely on the corresponding French
translation of the questions adapted from Johnstone.
Prior to being administered the questionnaire was pre-
tested on a class of French-and German-speaking Swiss
students. A number of secondary school teachers and
students from both linguistic groups made valuable sug-
gestions and corrections in the translation and wording
of the questionnaire. The final version in German and
French appears in Appendix C.

The survey was given to Swiss students in the
last two compulsory grades of secondary school, usually
grades eight and nine during the months of September and
October, 1976. The students ranged in age from 14 to 16,
with a median age of approximately 15 among both French

and German Swiss subgroups. Not surprising considering the multiplicity of school systems in Switzerland, different methods had to be employed to gain entry to the individual classrooms in the various cantons. In some it was sufficient to get permission from the teacher while in others it was necessary to go through the principal or even the cantonal school authorities. In the majority of cases, the questionnaires were administered by the classroom teacher in my presence. This enabled me to obtain a 100 percent return rate, with the exception of a few absentees. In all, 596 questionnaires were distributed. Of these 68 were non-Swiss, and were excluded from further evaluation, leaving 538 usuable questionnaires which were almost evenly divided between French and German speakers.

After close consultation with Mr. Bruno Kehrli from the Centre suisse de documentation en matière d'enseignement et d'éducation in Geneva, and Dr. Heinz Ries from the Vorbereitungsstufe der Hochschule Aargau in Aarau, a sampling design was worked out. Regional, religious and linguistic factors were given special attention in an attempt to obtain the most representative sample possible considering the obvious limitations of time and money. Table A-1 shows the cantons sampled as well as their linguistic and religious characteristics.

TABLE B-1.--Sample size,[a] by canton and linguistic and religious characteristics

Canton	City	N	Characteristics
Vaud	Lausanne	16	French-speaking formerly Protestant, now religiously mixed canton
Neuchâtel	Neuchâtel	94	French-speaking, formerly Protestant, now religiously mixed canton
Fribourg	Fribourg	69 French-speakers 51 German-speakers	Bilingual, Catholic canton with French majority
Valais	Sion	68 French-speakers	Bilingual Catholic canton with French majority
Bern	Bern	48	Bilingual canton with German majority, primarily Protestant
	Biel/Bienne	22 German-speakers 50 French-speakers	Bilingual city
Solothurn	Solothurn	40	German-speaking primarily Catholic canton
Aargau	Aarau	47	German-speaking religiously mixed canton
Zug	Cham	48	German-speaking Catholic canton
Zurich	Zurich	43	German-speaking, formerly Protestant now religiously mixed canton
Total		596	

[a]Total sample, including foreigners.

Other factors also played a role in the selection
of the sample. Since we were primarily interested in the
attitudes of the common citizen, we attempted to restrict
our survey to what may be called "middle Switzerland"
both in terms of class composition of the schools and
place of residence. Those areas or cities which would
tend to express extremes in attitudes were excluded from
consideration. Thus, we omitted the Jura region which is
undoubtedly the most ethnically polarized area of Switzer-
land, as well as Geneva, which contains the highest per-
centage of foreigners (over 30 percent) of any Swiss city,
and whose atmosphere is more cosmopolitan then "typically
Swiss." On the other hand, in order to compare high and
low contact areas, we included French and German Swiss
students in bilingual cantons with German (Biel/Bienne)
and French (Fribourg) majorities.

Coding of Open-ended Questions

The open-ended questions (nos. 29 and 30) asking
Swiss young people why they were proud or not proud to be
Swiss were coded in the following manner. First, approxi-
mately fifty randomly selected questionnaires from the
two linguistic groups were perused to obtain a general
picture of the kinds and number of responses. Approxi-
mately forty categories were established. It was decided

to record a maximum of five answers for each subject.
Few respondents exceeded this number and many recorded
less than five reasons. If, for example, a subject wrote
he was proud to be Swiss because it was a democratic
country, provided for the welfare of the citizen, and was
a beautiful country, three responses were coded. In all,
forty-two categories were elicited as why they were
proud to be Swiss, while forty-three categories were
established as to why they were not proud to be Swiss.
The coding was carried out by two bilingual analysts. A
number of questionnaires were scored by both to assure
that there was a high degree of consistency.

After all the questionnaires had been coded, and
a frequency count of the answers tabulated, the responses
were regrouped into more encompassing categories which
appear in Tables IV-15 and IV-16. The percentages in
these two tables represent the number who gave one or
more responses in a particular category, i.e., 68 percent
of the German Swiss answering the question "Why are you
proud to be Swiss?" gave one or more political answers
(see Table IV-15). Tables A-2 and A-3 record the compo-
site categories listed on Tables IV-15 and IV-16, as well
as the individual responses of Swiss youth which make up
these categories.

TABLE B-2.--Reasons given for being proud to be Swiss, by composite
category, and individual responses

Political

- neutral, independent country
- not involved in wars, do not attempt to make wars
- democracy, especially where one can vote
- well governed, stable government
- one is free, also has freedom of speech, thought, human
  rights respected
- Switzerland doesn't have a monarchy

Socio-Economic

- there are small differences between rich and poor, small
  class differences
- rich country, plenty of everything, no poverty, high standard
  of living
- proud of Swiss banks
- stability of Swiss franc, can go anywhere with it
- welfare state, provides for the citizen
- little or no unemployment
- good opportunities for jobs

Quality of Life

- peaceful country, has internal tranquility
- clean country
- not polluted
- orderly country
- few strikes
- one lives well, good quality of life

Swiss Qualities

- are hard workers, careful workers, make quality products
- like Switzerland because I was born here, it's my fatherland
- Swiss have common sense
- Swiss are sympathetic people

Diversity

- have good relations between cantons, cultural groups, harmony
- like diversity of languages, customs

TABLE B-2.--Continued

Relations with Other Countries

- Switzerland plays a fairly large role in world affairs
- seat of world organizations
- Swiss are well liked, the country is well respected
- Switzerland helps developing countries
- trustworthy country
- people like to come to Switzerland, tourists, refugees

Landscape

- small country, well located geographically
- pretty country, beautiful landscape

Not Proud to be Swiss

- do not care if they are Swiss
- not particularly proud to be Swiss

Other Reasons

- have good army, can go in the army
- doesn't have many natural disasters
- proud of Swiss history and ancestors who fought for freedom
- adolescent answers (has good skiiers, etc.)
- adapts to times and conditions
- land not over crowded, not too much industry
- highly industrialized, modern

TABLE B-3.--Reasons given for not being proud to be Swiss, by
composite category, and individual responses

Mentality, Restrictive

- stagnant
- too conservative
- too restrictive
- people cold, petty, egoistic, chauvinistic
  otherwise dislike mentality
- too much censorship
- Swiss don't have much contact among themselves
- Swiss intolerant

Politics

- too much politics
- political lethargy, slow decision making, poorly governed
- against neutrality, non-alignment

Elitism, Influence

- too much influence of rich or aristocratic families or big
  companies
- difference between rich and poor, class differences

Against Diversity

- don't like diversity of religion, customs
- don't like diversity of language
- dislike on part of other language group
- dislike mentality of other language group
- lack of cooperation between different cantons and
  language groups

Foreign Workers

- dislike fact that Swiss hostile toward foreign workers
- don't like foreigners/foreign workers

Over Industrialized

- too much industry, large buildings, large cities
- over-populated
- too polluted

TABLE B-3.--Continued

Socio-Economic

- materialistic, capitalistic
- high cost of living
- high taxes
- too much unemployment
- lack of equality (e.g., for women, young people)
- Swiss franc too high

School

- too much school, otherwise don't like school
- difference in school systems

Nothing Dislike

- nothing that they basically dislike

Geography

- geography/weather   (doesn't lie on ocean, too cold, too rainy)
- no natural resources
- small country, poorly located geographically

Other Reasons

- give too much money to developing countries
- Swiss don't like to give developing aid
- Switzerland too weak, plays too small a role in world affairs
- Swiss not respected abroad
- rat race
- adolescent answers (not enough for young people to do, speed limit too low for mopeds
- too much prosperity, Swiss too soft
- shady dealings, bank secret

GERMAN AND FRENCH QUESTIONNAIRES

F R A G E B O G E N   Knr. ☐☐☐

Liebe Schülerin, lieber Schüler,

ich bitte Dich, mir bei einer Umfrage an verschiedenen Schweizer Schu-
len zu helfen. Ich will Dir eine Reihe von Fragen stellen. Bitte beant-
worte sie genau so, wie Du es für richtig hältst. Fürchte Dich nicht
vor falschen Antworten, denn oft gibt es kein Falsch und kein Richtig,
wo es sich um Deine Gefühle handelt. Es gibt ja auch keine Noten dafür
wie bei einer Probearbeit. Wenn Du da oder dort keine Antwort geben
kannst, dann lässt Du die entsprechende Linie einfach leer.

****

(bitte bezeichne die richtige/entsprechende Antwort jeweils mit einem X)

1) Wie ähnlich, glaubst Du, sind die folgenden Gruppen?

	sehr ähn- lich	ziemlich ähnlich	ich weiss nicht	ziemlich verschie- den	sehr ver- schieden
5(Tessiner + Italiener	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
6(Tessiner + Welsche	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
7(Tessiner + Deutschschweizer	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
8(Deutschschweizer + Deutsche	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
9(Deutschschweizer + Welsche	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
10(Welschschweizer + Franzosen	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
11(Welschschweizer + Deutsche	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
12(Deutschschweizer + Franzosen	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

2) Wie wichtig ist es für Dich, ein Bürger Deines Kantons zu sein?

13   1 ☐   sehr wichtig

      2 ☐   ziemlich wichtig

      3 ☐   wenig wichtig

      4 ☐   überhaupt nicht wichtig

3) Wie wichtig ist es für Dich, ein Deutschschweizer zu sein?

14   1 ☐   sehr wichtig

      2 ☐   ziemlich wichtig

      3 ☐   wenig wichtig

      4 ☐   überhaupt nicht wichtig

4) Wie wichtig ist Deine Religion für Dich?

  15   1 ☐   sehr wichtig

         2 ☐   ziemlich wichtig

         3 ☐   wenig wichtig

         4 ☐   überhaupt nicht wichtig

5) Wie wichtig ist es für Dich, ein Schweizerbürger zu sein?

  16   1 ☐   sehr wichtig

         2 ☐   ziemlich wichtig

         3 ☐   wenig wichtig

         4 ☐   überhaupt nicht wichtig

6) Stell Dir vor, dass eine grosse Umfrage über die Zukunft der Schweiz stattfindet. Glaubst Du, dass sich die Schweizer in den meisten Fragen einig wären?

  17   1 ☐   in praktisch allen Fragen einig

         2 ☐   in den meisten Fragen einig

         3 ☐   in der Hälfte der Fragen einig

         4 ☐   in den meisten Fragen uneinig

         5 ☐   in praktisch allen Fragen uneinig

         6 ☐   ich bin nicht sicher

7) Glaubst Du, dass Katholiken und Protestanten sich über die Zukunft der Schweiz einig wären?

  18   1 ☐   in praktisch allen Fragen einig

         2 ☐   in den meisten Fragen einig

         3 ☐   in der Hälfte der Fragen einig

         4 ☐   in den meisten Fragen uneinig

         5 ☐   in praktisch allen Fragen uneinig

         6 ☐   ich bin nicht sicher

8) Glaubst Du, dass deutschsprachige und französischsprachige Schweizer sich über die Zukunft der Schweiz einig wären?

  19   1 ☐   in praktisch allen Fragen einig

         2 ☐   in den meisten Fragen einig

         3 ☐   in der Hälfte der Fragen einig

         4 ☐   in den meisten Fragen uneinig

         5 ☐   in praktisch allen Fragen uneinig

         6 ☐   ich bin nicht sicher

9) Glaubst Du, dass sich Schweizer und Gastarbeiter über die Zukunft der Schweiz einig wären?

20   1 ☐   in praktisch allen Fragen einig

2 ☐   in den meisten Fragen einig

3 ☐   in der Hälfte der Fragen einig

4 ☐   in den meisten Fragen uneinig

5 ☐   in praktisch allen Fragen uneinig

6 ☐   ich bin nicht sicher

10) Glaubst Du, dass sich reiche und arme Leute über die Zukunft der Schweiz einig wären?

21   1 ☐   in praktisch allen Fragen einig

2 ☐   in den meisten Fragen einig

3 ☐   in der Hälfte der Fragen einig

4 ☐   in den meisten Fragen uneinig

5 ☐   in praktisch allen Fragen uneinig

6 ☐   ich bin nicht sicher

11) Glaubst Du, dass sich Leute aus grossen Städten und Leute vom Lande über die Zukunft der Schweiz einig wären?

22   1 ☐   in praktisch allen Fragen einig

2 ☐   in den meisten Fragen einig

3 ☐   in der Hälfte der Fragen einig

4 ☐   in den meisten Fragen uneinig

5 ☐   in praktisch allen Fragen uneinig

6 ☐   ich bin nicht sicher

12) Welches Land würdest Du als bester "Freund" der Schweiz bezeichnen?

23/24   bester Freund   ....

25/26   zweitbester Freund   ....

27/28   drittbester Freund   ....

13) Welche Regierung, glaubst Du, tut am meisten für die Bürger?

29   1 ☐   Gemeinderegierung

2 ☐   Kantonsregierung

3 ☐   Bundesregierung

4 ☐   ich bin nicht sicher

14) Welche Regierung, glaubst Du, tut am wenigsten für die Bürger?

30   1 ☐   Gemeinderegierung

2 ☐   Kantonsregierung

3 ☐   Bundesregierung

4 ☐   ich bin nicht sicher

15) In welchem dieser europäischen Länder würdest Du am liebsten wohnen?

31   1 ☐   Deutschland

2 ☐   Frankreich

3 ☐   Italien

4 ☐   Oesterreich

5 ☐   Holland

6 ☐   Spanien

16) In welchen Ländern möchtest Du wohnen, wenn Du nicht in der Schweiz wohnen könntest?

32/33   am liebsten   ....

34/35   am zweitliebsten   ....

36/37   am drittliebsten   ....

17) In welchen Kantonen möchtest Du in Zukunft einmal wohnen?
(bitte kreuze die entsprechenden Kantone an)

1	AG	AR	AI	BE	BL	BS	FR	GE	GL	GR	LU	NE
	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49

1	NW	OW	SG	SH	SO	SZ	TG	TI	UR	VD	VS	ZG	ZH
	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62

18) In welchen Kantonen möchtest Du bestimmt nie wohnen?
(bitte kreuze die entsprechenden Kantone an)

2	AG	AR	AI	BE	BL	BS	FR	GE	GL	GR	LU	NE
	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49

2	NW	OW	SG	SH	SO	SZ	TG	TI	UR	VD	VS	ZG	ZH
	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62

19) Welche Fremdsprache glaubst Du, ist für Dich später am wichtigsten?

    63   am wichtigsten   ....

    64   am zweitwichtigsten   ....

20) Wieviele Prozente der Schweizer, denkst Du, sind von

    65   deutscher Muttersprache? ....

    66   französischer Muttersprache? ....

    67   italienischer Muttersprache? ....

21) Wie würdest Du die Beziehungen zwischen der deutschsprachigen und der italienischsprachigen Schweiz beurteilen?

    68   1 ☐ sehr gut
         2 ☐ gut
         3 ☐ recht
         4 ☐ ziemlich schlecht
         5 ☐ schlecht
         6 ☐ ich bin nicht sicher

22) Wie würdest Du die Beziehungen zwischen der deutschsprachigen und französischsprachigen Schweiz beurteilen?

    69   1 ☐ sehr gut
         2 ☐ gut
         3 ☐ recht
         4 ☐ ziemlich schlecht
         5 ☐ schlecht
         6 ☐ ich bin nicht sicher

23) Wie würdest Du die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschschweizern und Gast-arbeitern beurteilen?

    70   1 ☐ sehr gut
         2 ☐ gut
         3 ☐ recht
         4 ☐ ziemlich schlecht
         5 ☐ schlecht
         6 ☐ ich bin nicht sicher

24) Wie würdest Du die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschschweizern und
    Deutschen beurteilen?

71 1 ☐ sehr gut

    2 ☐ gut

    3 ☐ recht

    4 ☐ ziemlich schlecht

    5 ☐ schlecht

    6 ☐ ich bin nicht sicher

25) In welcher Hinsicht, glaubst Du, könnten Dir gute Französischkennt-
    nisse nützlich sein, sei es jetzt oder in Zukunft?

		wäre nützlich	wäre nicht nützlich
72	zur Unterhaltung mit Freunden	☐	☐
73	um neue Freunde zu gewinnen	☐	☐
74	beim Ausgehen mit Freund oder Freundin	☐	☐
75	für bessere Noten in der Schule	☐	☐
76	um eine Stelle zu finden	☐	☐
77	um in meinem zukünftigen Beruf vorwärts zu kommen	☐	☐
78	beim Reisen in andere Teile der Schweiz	☐	☐
79	beim Lesen, Fernsehen oder im Kino	☐	☐

26) Wie wichtig, glaubst Du, sind die folgenden Dinge für junge Leute
    in der Schweiz zum Vorwärtskommen?

		äusserst wichtig	hilfreich	unwichtig
5	gute Noten in der Schule	☐	☐	☐
6	Beziehungen zu einflussreichen Leuten	☐	☐	☐
7	aus angesehener Familie stammend	☐	☐	☐
8	Universitätsausbildung	☐	☐	☐
9	aus der richtigen religiösen Gruppe stammend	☐	☐	☐
10	in der Schweiz geboren zu sein	☐	☐	☐
11	sowohl französisch als deutsch zu sprechen	☐	☐	☐

		äusserst wichtig	hilfreich	unwichtig
12	guter Charakter und um-gängliches Wesen	☐	☐	☐
13	harte Arbeit	☐	☐	☐
14	reiche Eltern	☐	☐	☐

27) Nenne die Namen von drei Personen aus der Geschichte der Schweiz, die Du besonders bewunderst. Erkläre bitte in einem oder zwei kur- zen Sätzen, warum Du diese Personen gewählt hast.

15/16 ....

....

....

....

*****

17/18 ....

....

....

....

*****

19/20 ....

....

....

....

*****

28) Welche Schlachten hältst Du für die wichtigsten Schlachten der Ge- schichte der Schweiz?

21/22 ....

....

....

29) Beschreibe bitte in zwei oder drei Sätzen, warum Du froh bist, Schweizer zu sein.

23/24   ....

....

....

....

....

....

....

30) Was gefällt Dir auf der andern Seite an der Schweiz weniger gut?

25/26   ....

....

....

....

....

....

....

31) Geschlecht

27   1 ☐   männlich

2 ☐   weiblich

32) Welche Sprache wird bei Dir zuhause gesprochen?

28/29   1 ☐ deutsch

2 ☐ französisch

3 ☐ italienisch

4 ☐ andere (welche?)   :...................................

30/31   ☐   zweisprachig (welche?) ....+...................

33) In welchem Schuljahr bist Du?

32 1 ☐ sechste

    2 ☐ siebte

    3 ☐ achte

    4 ☐ neunte

34) Wie alt bist Du?

33   . . . .

35) Welche Ausbildung hat Dein Vater?

34 1 ☐ Universität

    2 ☐ Mittelschule, Seminar

    3 ☐ Berufslehre

    4 ☐ keine Ausbildung

36) Welche Stellung hat Dein Vater?

35   .   .   . .

37) Welche Ausbildung hat Deine Mutter?

36 1 ☐ Universität

    2 ☐ Mittelschule, Seminar

    3 ☐ Berufslehre

    4 ☐ keine Ausbildung

38) Welcher Konfession gehörst Du an?

37 1 ☐ katholisch

    2 ☐ protestantisch

    3 ☐ andere (welche?)   . . . .

39) Bitte kreuze den Kanton an, in dem Du wohnst.

38/39

AG	AR	AI	BE	BL	BS	FR	GE	GL	GR	LU	NE
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12

NW	OW	SG	SH	SO	SZ	TG	TI	UR	VD	VS	ZG	ZH
13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25

40) In welchen anderen Kantonen hast Du schon gewohnt?

40/41

AG	AR	AI	BE	BL	BS	FR	GE	GL	GR	LU	NE
38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49

NW	OW	SG	SH	SO	SZ	TG	TI	UR	VD	VS	ZG	ZH
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62

41) In welchem Kanton hast Du am längsten gelebt?

63/64

AG	AR	AI	BE	BL	BS	FR	GE	GL	GR	LU	NE
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12

NW	OW	SG	SH	SO	SZ	TG	TI	UR	VD	VS	ZG	ZH
13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25

42) Wo wohnst Du?

65   1 ☐ in einer grösseren Stadt (Zürich, Basel, Genf, Bern, Lausanne, Winterthur, Luzern)

      2 ☐ in einem Vorort einer dieser Städte

      3 ☐ in einer anderen, kleinerer Stadt

      4 ☐ in einer Ortschaft auf dem Land

43) Welche Schule besuchst Du?

66   1 ☐ Gymnasium

      2 ☐ Sekundarschule

      3 ☐ Oberschule

      4 ☐ Bezirksschule

44) Bist Du schon für eine Zeitspanne von mehr als zwei Wochen in der welschen Schweiz gewesen?

67   1 ☐ ja

      2 ☐ nein

45) Hast Du Verwandte oder Bekannte in der welschen Schweiz?

68   1 ☐ ja

      2 ☐ nein

46) Welcher Nationlität bist Du?

69   1 ☐ Schweizer

      2 ☐ Italiener

      3 ☐ Franzose

      4 ☐ Deutscher

      5 ☐ andere (welche?) ....

Q U E S T I O N N A I R E

Knr. ☐☐☐☐

Introduction

Nous sommes en train de faire une enquête dans plusieurs écoles pour sa-
voir ce que les jeunes de votre âge pensent. Nous allons vous poser quel-
ques questions, essayez d'y répondre exactement comme vous pensez. Ne
croyez pas qu'il y ait une réponse vraie et une réponse fausse à chaque
question, car toute les réponses sont également valables.
Voici comment je vais vous poser ces questions: je vais vous lire à haute
voix les questions que vous voyez devant vous et vous allez répondre,
soit en écrivant ce que vous pensez, soit en mettant une croix dans la
case qui correspond à ce que vous voulez répondre. Il se peut que vous
ne sachiez pas la réponse, alors vous pouvez le dire aussi en mettant
une croix dans la case "je ne sais pas" ou en n'écrivant rien du tout.

****

1) Quelles sont à votre avis les affinités entre les groupes suivants?

		très sembla-bles	assez sembla-bles	je ne sais pas	assez dif-férents	très dif-férents
5	Tessinois + Italiens	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
6	Tessinois + Suisses romands	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
7	Tessinois + Suisses allemands	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
8	Suisses allemands + Allemands	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
9	Suisses allemands + Suisses romands	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
10	Suisses romands + Français	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
11	Suisses romands + Allemands	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
12	Suisses allemands + Français	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

2) Etre citoyen de ton canton, est-ce pour toi

13 1 ☐ très important
    2 ☐ assez important
    3 ☐ peu important
    4 ☐ sans aucune importance

3) Etre Suisse romand, est-ce pour toi

14 1 ☐ très important
    2 ☐ assez important
    3 ☐ peu important
    4 ☐ sans aucune importance

4) Quelle importance attaches-tu à la religion?

15 1 ☐ très important
    2 ☐ assez important
    3 ☐ peu important
    4 ☐ sans aucune importance

5) Etre un citoyen suisse, est-ce pour toi

16 1 ☐ très important
    2 ☐ assez important
    3 ☐ peu important
    4 ☐ sans aucune importance

6) Suppose que les Suisses votent sur plusieurs points importants touchant à l'avenir du pays. Crois-tu que les Suisses seraient

17 1 ☐ d'accord sur pratiquement tous les points
    2 ☐ d'accord sur la pluspart des points
    3 ☐ d'accord sur la moitié
    4 ☐ pas d'accord sur la pluspart des points
    5 ☐ pas d'accord sur quasiment tous les points
    6 ☐ je ne suis pas sûr

7) Crois-tu que les Catholiques et les Protestants seraient

18 1 ☐ d'accord sur pratiquement tous les points
    2 ☐ d'accord sur la pluspart des points
    3 ☐ d'accord sur la moitié
    4 ☐ pas d'accord sur la pluspart des points
    5 ☐ pas d'accord sur quasiment tous les points
    6 ☐ je ne suis pas sûr

8) Crois-tu que les Romands et les Alémaniques seraient

19 1 ☐ d'accord sur pratiquement tous les points

  2 ☐ d'accord sur la pluspart des points

  3 ☐ d'accord sur la moitié

  4 ☐ pas d'accord sur la pluspart des points

  5 ☐ pas d'accord sur quasiment tous les points

  6 ☐ je ne suis pas sûr

9) Crois-tu que les Suisses et les travailleurs étrangers seraient

20 1 ☐ d'accord sur pratiquement tous les points

  2 ☐ d'accord sur la pluspart des points

  3 ☐ d'accord sur la moitié

  4 ☐ pas d'accord sur la pluspart des points

  5 ☐ pas d'accord sur quasiment tous les points

  6 ☐ je ne suis pas sûr

10) Crois-tu que les gens riches et les gens pauvres seraient

21 1 ☐ d'accord sur pratiquement tous les points

  2 ☐ d'accord sur la pluspart des points

  3 ☐ d'accord sur la moitié

  4 ☐ pas d'accord sur la pluspart des points

  5 ☐ pas d'accord sur quasiment tous les points

  6 ☐ je ne suis pas sûr

11) Crois-tu que les citadins et les campagnards seraient

22 1 ☐ d'accord sur pratiquement tous les points

  2 ☐ d'accord sur la plupart des points

  3 ☐ d'accord sur la moitié

  4 ☐ pas d'accord sur la plupart des points

  5 ☐ pas d'accord sur quasiment tous les points

  6 ☐ je ne suis pas sûr

12) Quels sont à votre avis les trois pays les plus amis de la Suisse?
(Cite-en trois, par ordre d'importance décroissant)

23/24 meilleur ami ....

25/26 second ....

27/28 troisième ....

13) A ton avis, quelle autorité fait le plus pour le bien des citoyens?

29
- 1 [ ] le gouvernement communal
- 2 [ ] le gouvernement cantonal
- 3 [ ] le gouvernement fédéral
- 4 [ ] je ne suis pas sûr

14) Et quelle autorité fait le moins pour le bien des citoyens?

30
- 1 [ ] le gouvernement communal
- 2 [ ] le gouvernement cantonal
- 3 [ ] le gouvernement fédéral
- 4 [ ] je ne suis pas sûr

15) Lequel des pays européens suivants choisirais-tu comme domicile?

31
- 1 [ ] l'Allemagne
- 2 [ ] la France
- 3 [ ] l'Italie
- 4 [ ] l'Autriche
- 5 [ ] les Pays-Bas
- 6 [ ] l'Espagne

16) Dans quels pays aimerais-tu vivre si tu ne pouvais pas vivre en Suisse?

32/33	premier choix	....
34/35	deuxième choix	....
36/37	troisième choix	....

17) Dans quels cantons aimerais-tu vivre une fois? (mets une croix dans la case qui correspond à ce que tu veux répondre)

1	AG	AR	AI	BE	BL	BS	FR	GE	GL	GR	LU	NE
	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49

1	NW	OW	SG	SH	SO	SZ	TG	TI	UR	VD	VS	ZG	ZH
	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62

18) Dans quels cantons n'aimerais-tu définitivement jamais vivre?

2	AG	AR	AI	BE	BL	BS	FR	GE	GL	GR	LU	NE
	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49

2	NW	OW	SG	SH	SO	SZ	TG	TI	UR	VD	VS	ZG	ZH
	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62

19) Quelles langues étrangères crois-tu sont les plus importantes pour ton futur?

63   la première   ....

64   la seconde   ....

20) Combien de pourcents des Suisses, crois-tu, parlent l'allemand

65   comme première langue? ....

66   le français comme pre-
        mière langue?   ....

67   l'italien comme pre-
        mière langue?   ....

21) Comment qualifierais-tu les relations entre les Suisses romands et les Suisses italiens?

68   1 [_] très bonnes
     2 [_] bonnes
     3 [_] passables
     4 [_] mauvaises
     5 [_] très mauvaises
     6 [_] je ne suis pas sûr

22) Comment qualifierais-tu les relations entre les Suisses romands et les Suisses allemands?

69   1 [_] très bonnes
     2 [_] bonnes
     3 [_] passables
     4 [_] mauvaises
     5 [_] très mauvaises
     6 [_] je ne suis pas sûr

23) Comment qualifierais-tu les relations entre Suisses romands et travailleurs étrangers?

70   1 ☐ très bonnes

       2 ☐ bonnes

       3 ☐ passables

       4 ☐ mauvaises

       5 ☐ très mauvaises

       6 ☐ je ne suis pas sûr

24) Comment qualifierais-tu les relations entre Suisses romands et Français?

71   1 ☐ très bonnes

       2 ☐ bonnes

       3 ☐ passables

       4 ☐ mauvaises

       5 ☐ très mauvaises

       6 ☐ je ne suis pas sûr

25) A quels points de vue, penses-tu, une bonne connaissance de la langue allemande te serait utile (maintenant ou à l'avenir)? (Mets une croix pour chaque partie de la question)

	utile	inutile
72 pour discuter avec des amis	☐	☐
73 pour te faire de nouveaux amis	☐	☐
74 pour sortir avec une fille/un garçon	☐	☐
75 pour avoir de meilleures notes à l'école	☐	☐
76 pour trouver du travail	☐	☐
77 pour progresser dans le domaine où j'espère travailler	☐	☐
78 pour voyager en Suisse allemande	☐	☐
79 pour la lecture, la TV ou le cinéma	☐	☐

26) Que faut-il, à ton avis, pour qu'on réussisse en Suisse? (entoure une réponse, mets une croix pour chaque partie de la question)

	très important	assez important	sans importance
5 avoir de bonnes notes à l'école	☐	☐	☐
6 connaître les gens qu'il faut	☐	☐	☐
7 appartenir à une bonne famille	☐	☐	☐

		très im- portant	assez im- portant	sans ir- portance
8	avoir une formation uni- versitaire	☐	☐	☐
9	être de la confession qu'il faut	☐	☐	☐
10	être né en Suisse	☐	☐	☐
11	parler le français et l'allemand	☐	☐	☐
12	avoir un bon caractère	☐	☐	☐
13	travailler dur	☐	☐	☐
14	avoir des parents riches	☐	☐	☐

27) Cite trois personnes de l'histoire suisse que tu admires tout
particulièrement et dis pourquoi (en deux ou trois phrases).

15/16 ....

....

....

....

****

17/18 ....

....

....

....

****

19/20 ....

....

....

....

28) Quelles sont les batailles de l'histoire suisse qui te paraissent les plus importantes?

21/22

....

....

....

29) Dis en deux ou trois phrases pourquoi tu es fier/fière d'être Suisse.

23/24

....

....

....

....

....

....

....

30) De l'autre côté, qu'est-ce qui te déplaît en Suisse?

25/26

....

....

....

....

....

....

....

31) Sexe

27 1 ☐ garçon
    2 ☐ fille

32)   Quelle langue parles-tu à la maison?

  28/29   1 ☐ l'allemand
           2 ☐ le français
           3 ☐ l'italien
           4 ☐ une autre (laquelle?) ....
  30/31   ☐   bilingue   ....+................

33)   En quelle année scolaire es-tu?

  32   1 ☐ sixième
          2 ☐ septième
          3 ☐ huitième
          4 ☐ neuvième

34)   Quel âge as-tu?

  33   ....

35)   Quelle est la formation de ton père?

  34   1 ☐ formation universitaire
          2 ☐   ... collégienne
          3 ☐   apprentissage
          4 ☐   pas d'apprentissage

36)   Quelle est sa position présente?

  35   ....

37)   Quelle est la formation de ta mère?

  36   1 ☐ formation universitaire
          2 ☐   collégienne
          3 ☐   apprentissage
          4 ☐   pas d'apprentissage

38)   Quelle est ta confession?

  37   1 ☐ catholique
          2 ☐ protestante
          3 ☐ autre (laquelle?)   ....

39)   Dans quel canton habites-tu?

38/39

AG	AR	AI	BE	BL	BS	FR	GE	GL	GR	LU	NE
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12

NW	OW	SG	SH	SO	SZ	TG	TI	UR	VD	VS	ZG	ZH
13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25

40)   Dans quels cantons as-tu déjà habité?

40/41

AG	AR	AI	BE	BL	BS	FR	GE	GL	GR	LU	NE
38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49

NW	OW	SG	SH	SO	SZ	TG	TI	UR	VD	VS	ZG	ZH
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62

41)   Dans quel canton as-tu vécu le plus longtemps?

63/64

AG	AR	AI	BE	BL	BS	FR	GE	GL	GR	LU	NE
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12

NW	OW	SG	SH	SO	SZ	TG	TI	UR	VD	VS	ZG	ZH
13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25

42)   Où habites-tu?

65

1 ☐ dans une grande ville (Zurich, Bâle, Genève, Berne, Lausanne, Winterthour ou Lucerne)

2 ☐ dans la banlieue d'une de ces villes

3 ☐ dans une autre ville (plus petite)

4 ☐ dans un village (à la campagne)

43)   Type de ton école?

66

1 ☐ Gymnase

2 ☐ Ecole secondaires

3 ☐

4 ☐

44)   As-tu déjà été en Suisse allemande pour la durée de plus de deux semaines?

67

1 ☐ oui

2 ☐ non

45)   As-tu de la parenté ou des connaissances dans la Suisse allemande?

68   1 ☐ oui

           2 ☐ non

46)   De quelle nationalité es-tu?

69   1 ☐ Suisse

           2 ☐ Italienne

           3 ☐ Française

           4 ☐ Allemande

           5 ☐ autre (laquelle?) ....

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