GOD AND WORLD IN SCHLEIERMACHER'S

DIALEKTIK AND GLAUBENSLEHRE
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ABSTRACT

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The relationship between philosophy and theology in Schleiermacher's thought has been the subject of controversy ever since the incipience of scholarship devoted to the criticism of the nineteenth century theologian's work. This thesis attempts to contribute to an understanding of this issue through an examination of the relationship between God and World in Schleiermacher's seminal philosophical and theological works, respectively, the Dialektik and the Glaubenslehre.

The posthumously published lectures on Dialektik portray Schleiermacher's mature endeavors in philosophical reflection. Schleiermacher's point of departure in this work is specifically epistemological in nature, the nineteenth century theologian envisioning the task of the Dialektik as the ascertainment of both the principles and the laws for the proper conduct of contested thinking to the certainty of knowing. The former constitutes the task of the Transcendental Part of the Dialektik; the latter the task of the Formal Part. The interest of our study lies in the Transcendental Part of the Dialektik for it is here that Schleiermacher considers the God-World relationship.

A fundamental aspect of the Transcendental Part of the Dialektik involves the definition of the nature of thinking which knowing presupposes as its foundation. According to Schleiermacher, only real thinking (wirkliches Denken), which unites intellection and
sensibility, may provide such a groundwork. Real thinking occurs in the coalescence of the activity of reason (Vernunftthätigkeit) and the faculty of organization (Organisation). The former provides ideal, the latter real determination to the process of thinking. This necessary conjunction of the Ideal and the Real for the proper constitution of real thinking is expressed by Schleiermacher at the conclusion of the Transcendental Part of the Dialektik in terms of the God-World relationship. In Schleiermacher's view, the regulative principle Die Welt (Real) nicht ohne Gott (Ideal), Gott nicht ohne die Welt governs the proper expression of the God-World relationship which respects the requisite conjunction of the Ideal and the Real in human thinking. As such, Schleiermacher's delineation of the God-World relationship is noetic in intent and summarizes the purport of his entire epistemology.

The Glaubenslehre is Schleiermacher's magnum opus and has been acclaimed as the most influential Protestant dogmatics since Calvin's Institutes. In Schleiermacher's view, the task of dogmatics lies in describing the Christian determination of pious feeling or immediate self-consciousness shared by a particular Church at a given time. According to Schleiermacher, the substance or content of valid Christian doctrine must be derived solely from the pious experience of the Church; the philosophical, i.e., the logical or dialectical, interest may only play a formal role in dogmatics. The logical or dialectical interest may only contribute to the scientific construction of language and aid in the systematic interconnection of individual doctrinal propositions. The interest of our study in Schleiermacher's dogmatics lies in the First Part of the System of Doctrine, which is devoted to the exposition of those Christian doctrines which express the general relationship
between God and World: the doctrines of Creation and Preservation; the doctrine of the divine attributes of eternity, omnipotence, omniscience and omnipresence; and the doctrines of the original perfection of man and World.

It is the contention of our study that Schleiermacher's philosophical formulation of the God-World relationship in the *Dialektik* served as a principle with respect to which his exposition of Christian doctrine in the First Part of the *Glaubenslehre* was critically developed. We maintain that the noetic correlation of God and World in the *Dialektik*, which expresses the proper constitution of real thinking, shapes and determines those doctrines in the First Part of the *Glaubenslehre* expressing the general relationship between God and World. In our view, this influence of the *Dialektik* upon the *Glaubenslehre* may not merely be regarded as formalistic, but rather as substantive in nature. It was against this influence of the logical or dialectical interest upon the content of Christian doctrine that Schleiermacher argued throughout his career as a dogmatic theologian. As a result, we conclude that Schleiermacher failed to maintain the exclusion of the influence of the philosophical interest upon the content of doctrine demanded by his own view on the methodology of dogmatics.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The conclusion of any extended project inevitably brings to mind the debts of gratitude which one owes to those who have played some role in its completion. Unfortunately, the space allotted to the expression of such gratitude is rarely enough either to recognize sufficiently those who guided and assisted in the work itself or to acknowledge those who, through good will, hope, and encouragement, contributed to its completion.

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Sendschreiben: Friedrich Schleiermacher, Schleiermachers Sendschreiben über seine Glaubenslehre an Lücke, kritische Ausgabe neu herausgegeben und mit einer Einleitung und Anmerkungen versehen von Hermann Mulert, (Gießen: Alfred Töpelmann [vormals J. Ricker], 1908). Numbers in parentheses at end of citation refer to pagination of this text in SW, I, 2.

Th.: Friedrich Schleiermacher, Schleiermachers handschriftliche Anmerkungen zum ersten Theil der Glaubenslehre, herausgegeben von Carl Thönes, (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1873). In reference, number refers to pagination in Gl.; letter refers to particular marginal note on given page.


ZTK: Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The era following that period in the history of Protestant thought known as Orthodoxy witnessed the emergence of severe critical reactions against the formal categories in terms of which the theologians of the seventeenth century framed the doctrinal tenets of the Christian faith. One of these reactions, in fact, was so opposed to the state into which Protestantism had fallen that it denigrated the importance of faith and apotheosized reason in its stead. This approach, which for want of a better term may be called rationalism, can be seen as a development from the French philosophes, through the Enlightenment theologians, culminating in Kant's moral religion built upon the foundation of pure practical reason alone. Another reaction, Pietism, sought to overcome the formalism of Orthodoxy not through the rejection of faith and the assertion of reason, but rather through a flight from the world of the profane and in an emphasis upon a religion of inwardness. Based on its claim to an intensely subjective approach to religion, its spiritualism, and even certain mystical elements in the history of Pietism, one may rightly make the judgment that this critical reaction to Orthodoxy differed greatly from, and was actually opposed to, the critical reaction of rationalism. If rationalism and Pietism, however, are opposed with regard to the nature of their respective critical reactions against Protestant Orthodoxy, it should
be observed that both share an important common element. Rationalism and Pietism both turn to the experience of the human subject as the basis for the expression of religious truth.

The influence of these critical strains upon modern Christian theology can be seen as they merged in the thought of the nineteenth century theologian Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher (1768-1834). It was he who turned the Christian tradition in a new direction by incorporating both the Moravian influence of his early youth and the critical spirit of post-Kantian thought in a Christian dogmatics which attempted to unite these divergent strains while yet retaining their original critical stances against theological formalism. It is the co-existence of these two temperaments in Schleiermacher's thought which animates its essentially dialectical nature.

It is somewhat curious, however, that whereas both Pietism and rationalism, as expressions of dissatisfaction with the dogmatic presentation of seventeenth century Orthodoxy, lie at the basis of Schleiermacher's thought, it was Schleiermacher himself who developed the most influential Protestant dogmatics since Calvin's Institutes of the Christian Religion. This apparent anomaly is dissipated in the recognition that Schleiermacher's dogmatics, by his own admission, is developed solely with regard to the positive experience of the believing subject. It is this focus upon human experience, it should be recalled, which Pietism and rationalism share in common. In this thesis we shall explore the extent to which each of these divergent strains which coalesced in Schleiermacher's thought, Pietism and rationalism, contributed to the constitution of the spectrum of positive experience which, in his view, Christian dogmatics assumes as the basis of its expression.
I. The Problem of Schleiermacher Interpretation

In 1821/22 and in 1830/31 Schleiermacher published the first and second editions, respectively, of his *magnum opus* *Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt*, summarily referred to as the *Glaubenslehre*. The appearance of this work heralded a turning point in Christian thought. With the publication of the *Glaubenslehre* the modern era dawned in Christian theology in a determinative way, irrespective of confessional differences. In the *Glaubenslehre* the reader witnesses an attempt on the part of its author to interpret the traditional doctrines of the Christian faith with respect to the critical principles of modern thought.

This revolutionary place of Schleiermacher in the history of Christian theology was expressed by the nineteenth century theologian's famous biographer Wilhelm Dilthey in his referring to Schleiermacher as "der Kant der protestantischen Theologie."¹ In drawing this comparison, Dilthey calls attention to the many similarities and parallels between the work of these men. Both criticized the misdirected excesses of speculation in their respective disciplines; both attempted to develop their respective disciplines with regard to the concrete experience of the human subject. In Kant's philosophy, this concrete experience was seen as the positive dictates of practical reason; in Schleiermacher's theology it assumed the form of the positive emergence of the God-consciousness (*Gottesbewusstsein*) in human experience. For both men, this concrete experience was adopted as the norm and measure of

¹LS, II, p. 531.
criticism in their respective disciplines.

Yet, whereas scholars have explicated clearly the critical principles which lie at the basis of Kant’s philosophy, Schleiermacher’s scholarship has yet to achieve this same lucidity with regard to its own subject matter. Although Schleiermacher scholarship has consistently recognized the critical and modern propensities of the theologian’s work, it has failed to substantiate the principles upon which Schleiermacher’s theological programmatic is grounded. This thesis purports to be an exercise in this much needed work of substantiation.

Although the Glaubenslehre was regarded from the time of its first appearance as a work of major significance, its reception was, in the main, negative. It would not be too much to say that the complexity, and even ambiguity, of certain avenues of Schleiermacher’s thought prompted hasty and confused criticism rather than careful and scholarly assessment. Schleiermacher himself alludes to this situation in words which sarcastically express his frustration:

The best for me would only be that I am not the one for whom they (his critics) take me. I would indeed not say more, except perhaps still to those who have expressed something contradictory. For example, when one calls me a Gnostic, but another an Alexandrian, whom he precisely opposes to the Gnostics; and when one traces me to Schelling, the other to Jacobi; and when one ascribes to me the principles of monastic morality, the other thinks that I am (although not fully expressed just in this way) a Cyrenaic—I could only say to them that they should only settle this among themselves first.

---

2 In a letter dated Nov. 16, 1822, Schleiermacher’s long-time friend Johann Christian Gass conveyed his now famous and often quoted impression of the Glaubenslehre: “Das aber soll mir auch Niemand abstreiten, dass mit Deiner Dogmatik eine neue Epoche nicht nur in dieser Disziplin, sondern im ganzen theologischen Studium beginnen wird, und wenn dies auch nicht plötzlich und auf einmal, so wird es doch künftig geschehen.” Briefwechsel, p. 195.

3 “Das Beste für mich sei nur, dass ich nicht der bin, für den sie
Unfortunately, this reception of the *Glaubenslehre* has set the tone for Schleiermacher interpretation until the present day. Although the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed some progress in the careful exposition of Schleiermacher's thought, the work of the nineteenth century theologian has been used, more often than not, either as a buttress for the restatement of the position of Liberal theology, or as an exemplification of the position of this theological movement which is viewed by the critic as totally misdirected. The latter approach is illustrative of Schleiermacher interpretation promulgated by Dialectical theology. Although the critiques of Karl Barth and Emil Brunner have contributed much to the understanding of Schleiermacher and the theological movement which he fathered, they cannot be regarded as exemplary instances of Schleiermacher interpretation. Since both Barth and Brunner assess Schleiermacher's work from the perspective of a very specific, and often passionately advocated, theological position, their critiques, while undeniably valuable, may not be regarded as primarily scholarly in their interest and exposition. This criticism applies particularly to Brunner's work, *Die Mystik und das Wort.*

mich halten. Weiteres würde ich wohl nicht sagen; außer etwa noch denen, welche Entgegengesetztes vorgetragen haben, wie wenn der eine mich einen Gnostiker nennt, der andere aber einen Alexandriner, die er den Gnostikern gerade entgegenstellt, wenn der eine mich auf Schelling zurückführt, der andere auf Jacobi, der eine mir die Prinzipien der Mönchsmoral zuschreibt, der andere meint, ich sei, nur so eben nicht völlig ausgesprochen, ein Kyrenaiker—diesen könnte ich noch sagen, sie möchten nur zuerst dieses unter sich ausmachen . . ." Sendschreiben, p. 10 (581). All translations of passages from Schleiermacher's writings are my own except those of the *Glaubenslehre* quoted in the text. For these, the standard English translation by H. R. Mackintosh, J. S. Stewart, *et al.* entitled *The Christian Faith* has been employed.

is our intention in this thesis to delineate the critical principles which lie at the basis of Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre apart from the interests of both Liberal and Dialectical theology. As such, our study will focus not on the theological fruits of Schleiermacher's work, but on the methodological roots of his dogmatics.

II. The Dialektik and the Glaubenslehre

In this study we shall attempt to demonstrate the extent to (and the senses in) which Schleiermacher's critical methodology in the Glaubenslehre was governed by philosophical principles. The relationship between philosophy and theology in Schleiermacher's thought in general and the influence of philosophy upon the Glaubenslehre in particular has been the focus of the interpretation of the theologian's work since the beginning of scholarship devoted to its critical evaluation.  

Often, the relationship between philosophy and theology in Schleiermacher's thought in general has been obfuscated by the theologian's variegated interests and voluminous production in these disciplines. Throughout his career as a university professor, Schleiermacher conducted courses of lectures on ethics, the history of philosophy, aesthetics, and dialectics, as well as on practical theology, New Testament exegesis, Church history and dogmatics. In this study we shall explore the relationship between philosophy and

theology in Schleiermacher's thought by attempting to discern the influence of his philosophical lectures entitled Dialektik upon the mature product of his theological reflection, the Glaubenslehre. There is little doubt that Schleiermacher considered these seminal works to be representative of his respective endeavors in the disciplines of philosophy and theology. This is especially true of the Glaubenslehre. As well, we should be aware of the fact that Schleiermacher was preparing his lectures on Dialektik for publication at the time of his death in 1834. This work was chosen for formal presentation by Schleiermacher from among all of his philosophical works since it portrays his most developed philosophical thinking. This statement is made even in recognition of the tremendous importance of the Philosophische Ethik for Schleiermacher's mature philosophical thought. It is our contention that the proper point of departure for Schleiermacher interpretation with respect to the relationship between philosophy and theology in his thought lies in the determination of the influence of the Dialektik upon the Glaubenslehre. This is the course

6 In many ways it is not surprising that the question of the influence of philosophy upon the Glaubenslehre has taken Schleiermacher's philosophical ethics (Entwurf eines Systems der Sittenlehre, SW, III, 5) to be the center of its enquiry. The principle reason for such a point of departure is that Schleiermacher limited the substantive contributions of philosophy to the Introduction of the Glaubenslehre in which the methodological presuppositions of dogmatics are unfolded. Since Schleiermacher admittedly "borrows" principles from the discipline of ethics in establishing his own methodology, we might expect that commentators would look to this work in order to determine the critical propensities of his theological approach. We would assert that the entire discussion of the influence of philosophy upon the Glaubenslehre has far too long been mistakenly reduced to the question of the relationship of the Introduction of the Glaubenslehre to the System of Doctrine therein expounded. In this study we hope to rectify this mistaken approach by examining the influence of Schleiermacher's own philosophy upon his dogmatics proper.
we shall pursue in this study.

III. The Contention and Structure of the Thesis

The problems involved in relating such vast and significant works as the Dialektik and the Glaubenslehre are by no means few. As a point of departure for our delineation of the influence of the Dialektik upon the Glaubenslehre we have chosen the theme of God and World. This theme is a central aspect of Schleiermacher's development in both of these works.

The determination of the relationship of God and World concludes, and actually recapitulates, the purport of the entire first or Transcendental Part of the Dialektik. The Transcendental Part of the Dialektik is devoted to the exposition of an epistemology of which Schleiermacher's explication of the God-World relationship is illustrative. As well, the First Part of the Glaubenslehre is developed with regard to the dogmatic expression of the relationship of God and World. In the First Part of the System of Doctrine Schleiermacher sets forth the Christian doctrines which express the conditions and structures of pious self-consciousness. These conditions and structures, which constitute the basis of Schleiermacher's methodological development throughout the entire dogmatics, are also explicated in terms of the relationship of God and World.

This thesis will attempt to demonstrate the extent to which Schleiermacher's exposition of the God-World relationship in the Dialektik substantively influenced the presentation of the doctrines expressing this relationship in the First Part of the Glaubenslehre. The direct consequences of this influence may be seen in the significant,
if not revolutionary, reformulation which the doctrines of Creation and Preservation, the doctrine of the divine attributes, and the doctrines of the original perfection of man and the original perfection of the World received in Schleiermacher's dogmatics. These central tenets of the Christian faith, as doctrinal formulations of the God-World relationship, are interpreted so as to fall within the parameters of the God-World relationship set forth in the *Dialektik*.

Throughout his career, Schleiermacher insisted upon the exclusion of matters originating in philosophical interests from the sphere of dogmatics. While admitting that the logical or dialectical interest must necessarily play some role in dogmatic exposition, since it is the basis of the precise, scientific formulation requisite for this exposition, Schleiermacher intended to limit the influence of the dialectical interest to the form of the doctrinal proposition alone. He categorically denied any philosophical influence whatsoever upon the substance or content of doctrine. It is the contention of this study that although this was Schleiermacher's avowed intention, what he considered to be the preponderant importance of developing Christian doctrine with respect to the philosophical determination of the God-World relationship resulted in the influence of the dialectical or philosophical interest upon the content of the *Glaubenslehre* as well. In Schleiermacher's dogmatics, the Christian doctrines expressing the relationship of God and World are critically transformed so as to concur with his theory of knowledge set forth in the *Dialektik*.

Thus, through a comparative study of the *Dialektik* and the *Glaubenslehre*, two ends, one general, the other specific, may be accomplished simultaneously. First, we shall consider the relationship
between philosophy and theology in Schleiermacher's thought in general through an examination of his major endeavors in these fields. Second, we shall attempt to demonstrate the extent to which the *Dialektik* influenced the *Glaubenslehre*, as yet a moot point in Schleiermacher scholarship.  

We shall proceed by furnishing background material to the works examined in this study, by examining the problem with which it deals, and by assessing the all-important theory of religious experience which lies at the center of Schleiermacher's dogmatic methodology. These considerations will be explored in chapters two to four which respectively are entitled "The Principles and Methodologies of the *Dialektik* and the *Glaubenslehre*," "The Relationship between Philosophy and Theology in Schleiermacher's Thought," and "The Experience of Feeling in the *Dialektik* and the *Glaubenslehre*." The demonstration of the contention of our study will be pursued directly in chapters five to seven which investigate the influence of the philosophical determination of the God-World relationship upon the exposition of this same relationship in the doctrines of

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7 By no means do we mean to suggest that this study is the first to recognize or envisage the influence of the *Dialektik* upon the *Glaubenslehre*. As has been mentioned, the relationship between philosophy and theology in the thought of the nineteenth century theologian has been the central motif of Schleiermacher interpretation since its incipience. Owing to the fact that the *Dialektik* and the *Glaubenslehre* respectively represent Schleiermacher's major achievements in these fields, scholars have considered, although certainly not decided on, the connection between these two works as a possible solution to the problem of the relationship between philosophy and theology in his thought. In this respect our study is a response to the observation made by Emanuel Hirsch: "Es ist eine Streitfrage der Schleiermacher-Forschung, wieweit man die Philosophie Schleiermachers, d. h. aber vor allem seine *Dialektik*, nötig habe, um ihn als Theologen zu verstehen." Emanuel Hirsch, *Geschichte der neueren evangelischen Theologie*, V, (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 1954). What this thesis claims as original is the detailed analysis of the influence of the *Dialektik* upon the *Glaubenslehre* and the demonstration of this influence in terms of the theme of God and World.
Creation and Preservation, the doctrine of the divine attributes, and the doctrines of the original perfection of man and the original perfection of the World respectively. Chapter eight is devoted to a concluding summary and evaluation of Schleiermacher's theological methodology in the Glaubenslehre.
CHAPTER 2

THE PRINCIPLES AND METHODOLOGIES OF THE
DIALEKTIK AND THE GLAUBENSLERHE

This chapter attempts to sketch the principles and methodologies of Schleiermacher's central works: the Dialektik and the Glaubenslehre. This sketch constitutes a necessary propaedeutic to the concrete argumentation and demonstration of the contention of our study. As stated in the previous chapter, the influence of the Dialektik upon the Glaubenslehre will be discussed directly in chapters five through seven. Our intention at this point in our development is to provide an understanding of the respective foundations upon which these works rest so that, later in our examination, the more centered probes into the technical aspects of the Dialektik and the Glaubenslehre may be intelligible within their broader contexts.

I. The Dialektik

In 1809 Schleiermacher left his teaching position at Halle and accepted a post at the newly-established University of Berlin, a chair which he retained until his death in 1834. It was this period in his life which witnessed serious and concentrated efforts to develop his theological and philosophical systems. The Berlin period marks the commencement and fruition of his intellectual maturity.

Although Schleiermacher's career was quite diverse—he pursued academic, political, and ecclesiastical interests with more than casual
involvement—lecturing to his students at the University was by far his most customary and extended endeavor. In fact, a large portion of his collected works dealing with theological and philosophical topics consists of material posthumously culled from the lectures of this lengthy period. His Geschichte der Philosophie, Geschichte der christlichen Kirche, Das Leben Jesu, Die christliche Sitte, and, of most importance for our concerns, his Dialektik may all serve as examples of works which received their present form after their author's death.

The Dialektik is comprised of Schleiermacher's lecture notes, as well as material drawn from student notebooks, which were edited by his long-time friend and pupil Ludwig Jonas. There seems to be an element of injustice in all such cases of posthumous publication since the work published is often subject to rebuke and criticism for which the author cannot finally be held personally accountable. Such unfairness, though, appears to be obviated to a greater extent in the case of the Jonas edition of the Dialektik: Schleiermacher himself was preparing the work for press at the time of his death, completing only a section of the Introduction before his health failed. Realizing that he was unable to carry out the project, he commissioned Jonas to order the work for

1SW, III, 4, 1.
2SW, I, 11.
4SW, I, 12.
publication. This task was completed in 1839, five years subsequent to Schleiermacher's death. The Jonas edition of the *Dialektik* is published as a volume in the philosophical section of *Friedrich Schleiermacher's sammliche Werke*.  

While at Berlin, Schleiermacher lectured six times on *Dialektik* in the years 1811, 1814, 1818, 1822, 1828, and 1831. In the Jonas edition, the lectures of 1814 form the basis of the text; the lectures of 1818 supplement this basis, being included where pertinent in the body of the work. The lectures of 1811 are included in this edition as Appendix A; a fragmentary outline, most probably employed in the preparation of the lectures of 1818, forms Appendix B; the lectures of 1822, 1828, and 1831 are included as Appendices C, D, and E respectively. The Introduction which Schleiermacher was preparing at the time of his death is incorporated as Appendix F; Appendices G and H, which present material from the lectures of 1818, are not included in the Jonas compilation, being prepared and published thirty-nine years after the appearance of the first edition by the Schleiermacher scholar Bruno Weiss.  

From the above description of the form of the first edition, one can readily observe that Jonas did not consider his task to be the presentation of a single, canonized version of the *Dialektik*. The period of time in which the lectures were given spanned some twenty years. Within the course of this duration important transformations

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6*SW*, III, 4, 2.

occurred in Schleiermacher's estimation of, and approach to, the project of *Dialektik*. While Jonas centered his presentation on the lectures of 1814, which he considered to be the most elaborated among the literary remains, he recognized that the fragmentary nature of all the remains, as well as the developmental strain discernible throughout the lectures of particular years, demanded a compilation which included a representative cross-section of the extant material.

With regard to the form in terms of which the textual basis of the first edition, the lectures of 1814, was ordered, Jonas heeded a project proposed by Schleiermacher in a conversation eight days prior to his death on February 12, 1834:

> As you know, I wanted to give my *Dialektik* and my *Christian Morals* the form which the dogmatics has. But I have abandoned that project. I will hasten to bring them somewhat into the form which the Encyclopedia possesses. 8

The form of the dogmatics consists of propositions to which are appended elaborate, discursive explanations which examine the proposition from every quarter of interest. It is noteworthy that Schleiermacher's original, though abandoned, plan to give the *Dialektik* this form is preserved in the incomplete Introduction which he prepared for press. It is clear that this section of the Jonas edition (Appendix F) was modeled on the presentational form of the *Glaubenslehre*. Jonas, in accordance with Schléiermacher's change of mind, structured the text along the lines of the theological encyclopedia, *Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums*, which Schleiermacher first published in 1811.

The form of this work resembles that of the Glaubenslehre. Here too proposition and explanation are the means by which the content is unfolded, although in the Kurze Darstellung the explanation is far more concise and plays an almost secondary role in the presentation. As a result, the proposition advances to the foreground giving the work the character of an outline rather than that of a prose exposition. This is the form with which Jonas imprinted Schleiermacher's lecture notes of 1814 adopted as the basis of the text.

It is hardly surprising that subsequent generations of Schleiermacher scholars have considered such a form unsuitable for a work as important as the Dialektik. The sketchy form of the Jonas version has prompted several attempts to arrange the material in a more orderly and intelligible fashion; one by Isidor Halpern in 1903, \(^9\) and another by Rudolf Odebrecht in 1942. \(^{10}\) The former was a response to Dilthey's call for a critical assessment of the material; its point of departure was the lectures of 1831 in terms of which the lectures of the previous years were read. Halpern's justification for the structure given to the material in his edition was that the lectures of 1831, even though neither as complete nor as precise in their formulation as lectures of previous years, portray Schleiermacher's final and mature delineation of the project of Dialektik and, consequently, deserve to be regarded as the cornerstone of the work. The subsequent history of Schleiermacher scholarship has continually bypassed Halpern's version, considering his

\(^9\) Friedrich Schleiermacher, Dialektik, herausgegeben von Isidor Halpern, (Berlin: Mayer & Müller, 1903).

\(^{10}\) Friedrich Schleiermacher, Dialektik, herausgegeben von Rudolf Odebrecht, (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1942).
plan to be as arbitrary as, and even more deficient than, that of
Jonas. Odebrecht, on the other hand, bases his edition on the
lectures of 1822, supplementing Schleiermacher's own material with data
taken from the notebooks of students who attended his lectures. This
edition has been received more positively than that of Halpern although
its shortcomings have been recognized by a number of scholars. The
foremost deficiency of the work is that Odebrecht does not deem it
necessary to include the lectures of different years. Thus, the possi-
bility of discerning the development of the Dialektik during the course
of its delivery is negated: The only distinction made in Odebrecht's
ing edition is between material from Schleiermacher's own pen and that
extracted from student notebooks.

Let it suffice to say that the Odebrecht edition is of particular
value to the reader concerned directly with the lectures of 1822. By
no means, however, could the critical edition of 1942 serve as a
substitute for the Jonas edition. While both Halpern and Odebrecht

11 Cf. Georg Wehrung, Die Dialektik Schleiermachers, (Tübingen:
J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1920), p. 5: "Von seiner wissenschaft-
llichen Schätzung also ist zum grossen Teil die Auswahl des Stoffes
bedingt, ebenso ist die gebotene Ordnung im einzelnen von ihm (Halpern)
geschaffen. Zwischen den Forsher und das Rohmaterial ist eine
Zwischeninstanz geschoben, in anderer Weise zwar als bei Jonas, der
durch eingestreute Anmerkungen das Urteil des Lesers zu leiten bestrebt
ist, aber vielleicht nicht weniger gefährlich."

12 Cf. Martin Redeker, Schleiermacher: Life and Thought, translated
"Interesting as Odebrecht's attempt may be, the mixing of Schleiermacher's
original formulations from reliable sources with the lecture notes of his
students, which contain variations on these formulations, is nonetheless
quite precarious."

Row, Publishers, 1967), p. 33; Martin Redeker, op. cit., p. 153; Emanuel
Hirsch, Geschichte der neueren evangelischen Theologie, V, (Gütersloh:
have avowedly produced more readable versions of the text, it seems wiser, from a hermeneutical point of view, to abide by the Jonas edition in the present study. It is interesting to note that recent scholarship on the Dialektik, while recognizing the contributions of Odebrecht's edition, has decidedly centered the attention of its analysis and examination on the first edition. In spite of its unsatisfactory form, the Jonas edition seems to have retained its primacy for two reasons. First, it was arranged by a student of Schleiermacher who was directly associated with his thought, and to whom Schleiermacher himself entrusted the task of editing and publishing. Second, it retains the uniqueness of the lectures of particular years, thereby allowing the discernment of the development undergone by the Dialektik in the course of its six deliveries. Until a clear presentation is made available which respects, in a critical vein, the second of the above-mentioned reasons, the focus of studies on the Dialektik must remain the first edition.


15 In 1920, Georg Wehrung suggested a plan for a new edition of the Dialektik which would rectify the shortcomings of the Jonas edition. This plan was still recognized as valid by Martin Redecker in 1968. Cf. Georg Wehrung, op. cit., p. 6: "Eine sachgemässe wissenschaftliche Neuausgabe der Dialektik müsste den ältesten Entwurf A für sich voranschicken, dann die Fassungen von 1814-1828 synoptisch in Kolumnen nebeneinander ordnen, so dass die Beziehung der Formen B, C und D auf den von Jonas vorausgesandten Entwurf von 1814 immer greifbar vor Augen stünde und die beständige Umarbeitung ersichtlich hervortrete, schliesslich die letzte Gestaltung E ihrer Eigenart entsprechend wieder allein bringen."
In Schleiermacher's correspondence during his first year at the University of Berlin in 1810 there appears a letter written to his friend Joachim Christian Gass in which is found the following remarks:

I have already been asked to lecture on Ethics. But I have sworn to myself that as long as Fichte is the only professor of philosophy (at the University), I shall not deliver philosophical lectures. Should this situation change by Easter I would like first to attempt, as an introduction to my philosophical lectures, a course in Dialektik, which has occupied my thoughts for some time. That, however, is still far in the future.  

Although there was no change in the situation at the University, this made no difference with regard to Schleiermacher's contingent project. He shortly thereafter announced that he would lecture on the subject of Dialektik in the Summer semester of the academic year of 1811.

Schleiermacher's decision to lecture in philosophy while Fichte was the only professor in that discipline at Berlin cannot be traced to the fact that both men occupied chairs in different fields. Schleiermacher himself states that he was asked to lecture on Ethics, not a surprising invitation in view of the fact that he had published a work in 1803 which bore the title Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre. It should also be noted that Schleiermacher had worked consistently for some years on a translation of Plato's dialogues into German and that the majority of his earlier shorter...

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16 "Ich bin schon angesprochen worden um die Ethik. Allein ich habe einmal versprochen, so lange Fichte der einzige Professor der Philosophie ist, kein philosophisches Collegium zu lesen; und sollte sich das bis Ostern ändern, so hätte ich Lust, erst als Einleitung zu meinen philosophischen Vorlesungen die Dialektik zu versuchen, die mir lange im Kopfe spukt. Doch ist das noch im weiten Feld." Briefwechsel, p. 87.

17 Sw, III, 1.
writings, published in journals such as the Athenäum, the Erlanger Litteraturzeitung, and the Jenaische Litteraturzeitung, were critiques and reviews devoted to philosophical subjects.

Despite this background it is perhaps still possible to explain Schleiermacher's hesitancy to deliver philosophical lectures as an expression of his incertitude in an area of endeavor in which Fichte was far more accomplished. It is more likely, however, that Schleiermacher realized that the content of his own lectures would be a direct confrontation with Fichte's philosophy. The theologian's unwillingness can be seen as a desire to avoid that confrontation but, more importantly, his final decision to lecture on Dialektik reflects his commitment to offer an alternative, in the lecture halls of Berlin, to the thought of the philosopher. By his own admission, Schleiermacher was antagonistic toward the excesses of Fichte's idealism and had hoped for the appointment of his friend, Henrik Steffens (1773-1845),

18 Dilthey cites material which could be used to support such a view. LS, II, p. 148: "Der Entwurf von 1811 enthält den Kern der ersten Vorlesung. Braniß erzählte mir von dieser Vorlesung: 'ich hörte Schleiermacher und zugleich Fichte. Diese erste Vorlesung Schleiermachers über Dialektik von 1811 machte noch den Eindruck grosser Unsicherheit, zumal wenn man sie mit der Fichtes verglichen'."

19 With regard to Fichte's expulsion from the University of Jena on the grounds of atheism, Schleiermacher made the following judgment in a letter written to his friend Henriette Herz dated May 2, 1799: "Ein anderes Katheder findet nun Fichte gewiss nicht, und im Ganzen muss ich gestehen, halte ich es für ein vortheilhaftes Ereigniss, dass seine Philosophie vom Katheder, wohin sie gar nicht passte, vertrieben ist." Briefe, I, p. 222. For Schleiermacher's critique of Fichte's philosophy, see a review written for the journal Athenäum in the year 1800 entitled "Fichtes Bestimmung des Menschen, SW, III, 1, pp. 524-534; the Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre (1803), SW, III, 1, pp. 24-36; and a series of lectures published in 1807 entitled J. G. Fichte. Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters dargestellt in Vorlesungen, gehalten zu Berlin im Jahre 1804-1805, Briefe, IV, pp. 624-646.
to the faculty of philosophy at Berlin as a balance to the onesidedness of Fichte's intellectual approach. 20 When this appointment failed to be made, Schleiermacher himself assumed the challenge of this task, the fruits of which are preserved in Jonas' edition of Schleiermacher's lecture notes on Dialektik.

In examining the content of the Dialektik, two approaches which have been pursued in the history of Schleiermacher scholarship are at our disposal. The first approach, which may be termed the analytic-developmental, essays to trace the progression of Schleiermacher's thought in the Dialektik through an examination of the lectures of various years. This method has been followed by I. Halpern and, in a more extended fashion, by G. Wehrung. 21 The second approach, which may be termed the synthetic-interpretative, attempts to portray a single presentation of the problematic and thought structure of the Dialektik based on an interpretation drawn from all of the lectures. This methodology has been adopted in recent scholarship by L. Oranje and F. Wagner 22; its justification rests on the position that the fundamental stance of the Dialektik is the same in all of its individual plans. 23


22 Cf. L. Oranje, op. cit.; Falk Wagner, op. cit.

23 Cf. L. Oranje, op. cit., pp. 245-246: "Wir versuchen, ohne Vertuschung der Unterschiede, welche zwischen den Entwürfen bestehen, aber selbst indem wir von diesen Unterschieden bei der Interpretation Gebrauch machen, ein Bild des Grundgedankens der Dialektik zu geben, das u. E. in allen Entwürfen dasselbe ist." The importance and validity of this synthetic-interpretative approach has been implicitly recognized even by those who have followed the analytic-developmental method. Cf. Isidör Halpern, op. cit., p. 212: "Unser umfassender Versuch wird davon
The employment of the first approach in the present study would militate against the realization of our projected goals. The methodology of close, textual analysis centering on the individuality of the particular lectures would only be appropriate in a study devoted entirely to the *Dialektik*. Our intention is to demonstrate the influence of Schleiermacher's treatment of the God-World relationship in the *Dialektik* upon his dogmatic formulation of the same relationship. An in-depth study of the *Dialektik* would demand at least the time and space devoted to our entire project. As a result, recourse must be had to the synthetic-interpretative approach, which is commensurate to the needs of our project. Without failing to call attention to the uniqueness of the various lectures which comprise the *Dialektik*, the general tenor of the content of this work will here be presented in order to provide sufficient background for material to be treated later in our development.

1. Schleiermacher's Conception of Dialektik

*Dialektik*, according to Schleiermacher, is the philosophical endeavor which delineates the principles on which the unity, validity, and integrity of human knowledge are based, and which seeks to guide thinking in its development toward knowing. In the Introduction he prepared for press, Schleiermacher defines *Dialektik* as "the exposition of the principles for the proper conduct of dialogue in the sphere of..."
pure thinking." This final definition of his project bears a significant resemblance to qualifications found in the lectures of previous years. In the first lectures of 1811 Dialektik is called "the art of the exchange of thoughts, the art of persevering with another in an orderly construction of thoughts, out of which knowledge proceeds." In 1818 it is defined as "the art of directing and of conducting a dialogue. . . . Dialektik is the art of coming from a disagreement in thinking to agreement." These definitions are more readily intelligible if we recall the fact, already mentioned, that Schleiermacher spent the greater part of his career translating the dialogues of Plato into German, and was so enthralled with Plato's use of the Socratic method that he actually employed the dialogical form in a number of his early works. Die Weihnachtsfeier: Ein Gespräch (1806) is the best known example. Schleiermacher's admiration for the maieutic methodology of the Platonic dialogue, as an efficacious vehicle for the communication of the truth, was only equalled by his praise for the philosophical content therein unfolded. Schleiermacher expressed his intellectual indebtedness to the Greek philosopher in a letter dated June 9, 1800:


There is no author who has influenced me and who has initiated me into the Holy of Holies not only of philosophy but also of man in general more than this divine man (Plato), and for this I would like to offer him a proper expression of gratitude.  

While the form of the *Dialektik* does not overtly pursue the maieutic method, one would be shortsighted to fail to notice the dialogical spirit of both its structure and content. Each proposition and, where pertinent, its explanation seems to voice an individual opinion, the interconnection of these standpoints contributing to the movement and purpose of the work as a whole.

An attempt to outline the presuppositions of Schleiermacher's conception of Dialektik with respect to influences stemming from the history of philosophy would be difficult and even unfair should these influences be viewed either in a reductionistic or in a determinative vein. We need only mention two thinkers whose influence is unmistakably impressed on the *Dialektik*: Plato and Kant.

The influence of Plato's thought upon the form of the *Dialektik* has already been mentioned. With regard to content, Schleiermacher

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28."Es gibt gar keinen Schriftsteller, der so auf mich gewirkt, und mich in das Allerheiligste nicht nur der Philosophie, sondern des Menschen überhaupt so eingeweiht hätte, als dieser göttliche Mann, und dafür möchte ich ihm gern einen recht würdigen Dank bringen." *Briefe*, IV, p. 72.

29. By focusing on Plato and Kant, the influence of other philosophers, most notably Spinoza, Schelling, and Fichte is by no means denied. The study of L. Oranje, *op. cit.*, devotes itself to a consideration of these five thinkers. Among other secondary sources are Paul Wilhelm Schmidt, *Spinoza und Schleiermacher* (Berlin: C. Reimer, 1868); Hermann Süsskind, *Der Einfluss Schellings auf die Entwicklung von Schleiermachers System* (Tübingen: H. Laupp, Jr., 1909); Gustav Mann, *Das Verhältniss der Schleiermacherschen Dialektik zur Schelling'schen Philosophie* (Stuttgart: Stuttgarter Vereins-Buchdruckerei, 1914); Arthur von Ungern-Sternberg, *Freiheit und Wirklichkeit: Schleiermachers philosophischer Reifeweg durch den deutschen Idealismus* (Gotha: Leopold Klotz, 1931); the study of Falk Wagner, *op. cit.*, stresses the influence of Fichte's thought upon the *Dialektik*.
presupposes that all human thinking in itself is relative and that this relativity points to, and requires as its ground, a final consummate unity beyond thinking. Thinking abides in a never-ending process of development in the direction of this unity. Thus, from an epistemological perspective, a distinction is drawn between two realms: transcendent being and immanent becoming. This view, as developed by Schleiermacher in the Dialektik, bears a distinctly Platonic tone.

The Platonic side of Schleiermacher's philosophy also surfaces in his presupposition that the unity required and responsible for the elevation of thinking to knowing is reflected in human reason, but yet exists apart from it. Along these lines it may be said that, for Schleiermacher, the absolute transcendent unity is the ground of finite human knowledge. The finite, therefore, participates in the absolute.

Schleiermacher, however, was also a careful student of Kant and the Dialektik is colored with the hues of Critical philosophy, particularly in its acceptance of the Kantian distinction between the form and matter of knowledge. The consistent recourse in the Dialektik to an epistemological stance which respects the limits of thinking and knowing, as well as Schleiermacher's description of the epistemological process itself, can be traced to the influence of Kant. Consequently, the reader encounters in the pages of the Dialektik the seemingly incongruous union of a theory of participation and a critical scientific doctrine of knowledge. It is this coalescence of Platonic and Kantian emphases

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which lies at the basis of Schleiermacher's conception of Dialektik and which bequeathes this work an important, though long-neglected, place in the history of philosophy.

2. The Task and Structure of the Dialektik

In his Introduction to the Dialektik Schleiermacher distinguishes between pure (reines), practical (geschäftliches), and artistic (künstlerisches) thinking. The first, it should be recalled, is the proper sphere within which the activity of Dialektik is conducted.

Practical thinking is "all thinking for the sake of something else, which then always becomes some form of action; a changing of the relations of the external world to us." In other words, the salient characteristic of practical thinking lies in its ability to produce an effect. It is the activity of reason transformed into human action in the world. Artistic thinking is opposed to practical thinking in the sense that it is not pursued 'for the sake of something else.' To artistic thinking "belongs all thinking which is only distinguished by greater or lesser pleasure." It is the operation of the activity of reason in the realm of the aesthetic. Pure thinking defines itself against both practical thinking, in the sense that it is not other-directed, and artistic thinking, in that it is not limited by the moment

\[31\] "Zum geschäftlichen Denken, wobei letzteres Wort in dem weitesten Sinne genommen wird, rechnen wir alles Denken um eines anderen willen, welches dann immer irgend ein Thun sein wird, ein Verändern der Beziehungen des Ausser uns auf uns." Dial., Introduction (Appendix F), p. 569.

\[32\] "Zu diesem künstlerischen aber gehört alles Denken, welches nur unterschieden wird an dem grösseren oder geringeren Wohlgefallen." Dial., Introduction (Appendix F), p. 569.
in which the aesthetic experience comes to rest. The form of thinking examined in the Dialektik is thinking "which remains in itself and which elevates itself toward immutability and universality . . .".

According to Schleiermacher,

. . . pure thinking is thinking for the sake of knowing . . . But it is for the sake of knowing not in the sense that knowing would be something different, but because all pure thinking itself tends to become knowing.

This tendency or desire to become knowing, to which Schleiermacher refers in a nominalized form as Wissenwollen, is the impetus of human thinking which constitutes the proper object of the Dialektik. The task of this work, however, is not the exposition of the essence of knowledge itself. The task of the Dialektik ever remains the proper development of the Wissenwollen, not the formulation of a Wissen des Wissens. For Schleiermacher, thinking is based on mediate self-consciousness and, as such, is transient. It constantly exists in a process of construction. Dialektik is a methodological tool (Kunstlehre) which first, examines the structures in terms of which thinking operates; second, uncovers the principles on which knowing is based; and third, guides and directs the Wissenwollen in its quest to be grounded in the certainty of knowledge.

33 Dial., Introduction (Appendix F), p. 571.

34 "... das reine Denken . . . (ist) das in sich selbst bleibende und sich uns zur Unveränderlichkeit und Allgemeinheit steigernde . . ." Dial., Introduction (Appendix F), p. 571.

35 "... das reine Denken sei das Denken um des Wissens willen . . . Es ist aber um des Wissens willen nicht in dem Sinne, als ob das Wissen ein anderes wäre; sondern weil alles reine Denken selbst Wissen werden will."

Dial., Introduction (Appendix F), pp. 570-571.

36 Cf. Lecture of 1831: "Wir suchen eine Kunstlehre, eine Methode, aus streitigem Denken identisches zu bilden, und Principien, kaste sicherer Anfänge, auf die muss zurückgeführt werden, um verschiedene Gedanken, die mit gleichen Ansprüchen auftreten, richtig zu würdigen."
In the lectures of 1811 Schleiermacher asks and cursorily answers the question which for him expresses the central philosophical problem to which the Dialektik is devoted:

All knowing is thinking. But what thinking may be considered knowing? That thinking is knowing which all those who think are able to construe in the same way, or which corresponds to the object thought, or, to combine the two, the thinking which is the pure merging of reason in being.  

From the shape of the problem, as it is here envisaged, it is clear that the Dialektik is a work expressly epistemological in nature; its task lies in the development of a theory of knowledge. The Platonic influence, however, upon Schleiermacher's estimation of the project of Dialektik, defined as 'the exposition of the principles for the proper conduct of dialogue in the sphere of pure thinking,' leads him to seek a ground to assure epistemic certainty not only within but also, more importantly, beyond the realm of thinking. As such, the Dialektik attempts to discern both the logical and the metaphysical principles which render possible the attainment of knowledge proper. In Schleiermacher's view, metaphysics and logic must necessarily cooperate if the task of the Dialektik is to be realized. The former requires the structure and form of logic lest it sink to the level of the arbitrary and the fantastic. Logic without metaphysics, on the other hand, would


"Alles Wissen ist Denken. Welch es Denken ist nun ein Wissen? Was alle denkenden auf dieselbe Weise construiren können, und was dem gedachten entspricht, oder, beides zusammengefasst, welches das reine Aufgehen ist der Vernunft in dem Sein." Dial., Lectures of 1811, p. 315.
fail to achieve the status of real science. Although metaphysics and logic are mutually corroborative in Schleiermacher's development, the latter, by virtue of its heuristic contributions to the project of Dialektik, is the predominant philosophical form of the work. The content of the Dialektik is set forth under the form of logic, the metaphysical foundation of knowledge being explored from an epistemological perspective.

The specifically metaphysical and logical aspects of the Dialektik are respectively examined in Schleiermacher's two-fold division of the lectures into a Transcendental Part and a Formal or Technical Part. The former section of the work attempts to unveil the transcendent ground of agreement between thinking and being through an analysis of the structures and limitations of thinking itself. The Formal Part, on the other hand, essays to delineate the rules of connection in terms of which the correspondence of thinking and being may, in a particular instance, be validated as knowledge.


39 Cf. Lectures of 1818: "Allerdings ist also Dialektik ihrem Inhalte nach Logik und Metaphysik, aber nicht Aggregat von beiden, sondern beides in der Form der Logik." DIAL., p. 19,

40 Cf. DIAL., p. 33: "Vorles. 1818. Philosophireon = Feststellung des Wissens in Beziehung auf das Sein, und Feststellung der Verknüpfung alles Wissens; worin alles Wissen, was nicht schon auf ein reales Gebiet des Wissens übergangen ist, aufgehen muss." Cf. DIAL., p. 40: "Vorles. 1818. Im ersten Theil haben wir uns also der Beziehung unseres Denkens auf das Sein, im zweiten, durch welchen die Construction, der Organismus des gesammten Wissens unmittelbar zu Stande kommt, der Production des Wissens in der Verknüpfung zu versichern."
The task in toto of the Dialektik is two-fold: to know what is found in all pure thinking solely by virtue of the desire to know; and to show how one can proceed, from every point, in the approximation to knowing. ... The task in toto of the Dialektik must go back to what each who desires knowledge must presuppose in relation to thinking, and this is its regressive (Transcendent) Part. But then it must establish thinking as such and, from the form of thinking, the constitution of the uncontested, and that is its Formal Part.\(^1\)

The Transcendent Part deals, so to speak, with the idea of knowledge at rest in its quest for the basis of knowing; the Formal Part explores knowledge as movement, as a construction grounded on elemental instances which contribute to the formation of an organic whole.\(^2\)

\(^1\) "Die Gesammtauffgabe der Dialektik zerfällt in die beiden, zu wissen, was in jedem reinen Denken lediglich vermöge des Wissenwollens ist, und zu zeigen, wie von jedem Punkt aus in der Annäherung zum Wissen fortgeschritten werden kann. ... Sie muss zurückgehen auf das, was jeder, der das Wissen will, in Bezug auf das Denken vorausezezen muss, und dies ist ihr regressiver (transcendenter) Theil. Dann aber hat sie das Denken als solches, an der Form des Denkens die Beschaffenheit des streitfreien aufzustellen, und das ist ihr formaler Theil." Dial., Introduction (Appendix F), pp. 609-610. In this passage one notices the use of the word 'transcendenter' rather than the more customary 'transcendentaler.' These words are employed interchangeably in the Dialektik and, thus, Schleiermacher rejected the distinction between these terms which appears in Kant's technical vocabulary. See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B352\(\rightarrow\)353, pp. 298-299; KGS, III, pp. 235-236. Schleiermacher explicitly refers to his rejection of this distinction in the following passage: "Man hat dabei noch einen Unterschied gemacht zwischen transcendent und transcendental, von dem wir aber ganz abstrahiren. Das Denken, welches wir hier suchen, geht über jede mögliche bestimmte Erfahrung und jedes möglich bestimmte Denken hinaus, und darum nennen wir es transcendent, und den Theil unserer Untersuchung, der darauf ausgeht, es als den Anfangspunkt zu finden, den transcendentalen." Dial., Lectures of 1831, p. 38. In his study of Schleiermacher's thought, Robert Stalder adds to the understanding of the term 'transcendental' by stating: "Mit 'transcendentaler', wir sagten es früher schon, meint Schleiermacher stets die Beziehung des Endlichen zum Absoluten." Robert Stalder, Grundlinien der Theologie Schleiermachers, (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GmbH, 1969), p. 306. Cf. Dial., Lectures of 1828, p. 448: "Der Ausdruck transcendental rechtfertigt sich dadurch, dass dieses jenseits alles im gewöhnlichen Verlauf vorkommenden Denkens liegt." For Schleiermacher, the Transcendental Part of the Dialektik attempts to discern the transcendent ground of knowledge. It is here suggested that the Kantian distinction between the terms 'transcendent' and 'transcendental' is obviated on the basis of Schleiermacher's view concerning the participation of the unity of human knowledge in the unity of the transcendent ground.

\(^2\) Dial., Lectures of 1818, p. 174.
Although the fundamental problem treated in the Dialektik—the determination of what thinking may properly be considered knowing—is the same for both sections of the work, the Formal Part specifically progresses toward its solution. For Schleiermacher, however, such progress can only be made upon having adequately formulated the relationship between thinking and the transcendent principle which underlies epistemic certainty. As such, the Transcendental Part of the Dialektik becomes a necessary propaedeutic to the construction of knowledge.\footnote{Dial., Lectures of 1814, Propositions 83-85, pp. 37-38.} Our interest lies in this section of the work since it is here that the focus of Schleiermacher's attention is directed to the relationship between the Infinite and the finite, between God and World.

3. The Transcendental Part of the Dialektik

As mentioned above, there are two criteria or characteristics of knowledge which provide an answer to the question of what thinking is knowing: first, that thinking which is necessarily conceived in such a manner that it is produced in the same way by all possessing the ability to think; second, that thinking which corresponds to the object of its activity.\footnote{Cf. Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 87, p. 43.} The first may be termed the criterion of intersubjectivity, since it describes the agreement, requisite for proper knowledge, between the subjects of the activity of thinking. The second may be termed the criterion of objectivity, since it describes the agreement between the subject and object of thinking which is also necessary for the constitution of authentic knowing.

The relationship of agreement (Übereinstimmung) in the above-
mentioned criteria is of central importance in Schleiermacher's epistemology for this relationship alone validates thinking as knowing. Epistemic agreement must be established both from the standpoint of the human species (intersubjectivity) and in terms of the connection between thinking and being (objectivity). The former possibility of agreement is based on the ideal side of human thinking which contributes to the formation of knowledge through the intellectual function or, as it is also designated by Schleiermacher, the activity of reason (Vernunftthätigkeit). The latter possibility of agreement, which qualifies knowledge with respect to the connection between thinking and being, is based on the real side of human thinking, which affords its share to the constitution of knowledge through the activity of the organic function. In Schleiermacher's view, the organic function is the human capacity for sensibility; sense data being made available for experience through what Schleiermacher calls the faculty of organization (Organisation). Both the intellectual and the organic functions are inextricably conjoined as corroborators in the production of human knowledge due to the fact that their mutual collaboration constitutes real thinking (wirkliches Denken), the first step on the way to knowing. This conjunction of the intellectual and organic functions, as the foundation of real thinking, is negatively explained in the Dialektik.

45 In our use of the terms 'intersubjectivity' and 'objectivity' we have followed Falk Wagner, op. cit., pp. 58-65.

46 In the lectures of 1814, Schleiermacher defines knowledge with regard to the collaboration of the intellectual and organic functions in the following way: "Das Wissen, und hier zunächst das reale, ist also dasjenige Denken, welches nicht mit der Differenz sondern mit der Identität beider Functionen gesezt, und von beiden aus gleich ursprünglich auf das ausser ihm als Sein gesezte bezogen wird." Dial., Proposition 99, p. 52.
as follows:

The activity of the organic function without any activity of reason is not yet thinking. . . . The activity of reason without any activity of organization would no longer be thinking. 47

Self-consciousness emerges in this conjunction of both functions and is the basis of all mediate experience, i.e., experience predicated on a dichotomy between subject and object. The importance which Schleiermacher attributes to the requisite cooperation of the intellectual and the organic in the production of knowledge is responsible for the idealist–realist tenor of his epistemology. 48

As has been mentioned, one facet of determining what thinking may be considered knowing entails the examination of the structures in terms of which thinking operates. Schleiermacher devotes a major portion of the Transcendental Part of the Dialektik to such an analysis. According to the nineteenth century theologian, knowing originates in a process which begins in the activity of the organic function. This function presents a confused array of sense data to experience which is taken up by the activity of reason, the intellectual function, and


48 It is essential that Schleiermacher's realism in the Dialektik not be exaggerated. Schleiermacher's more positive estimation of the contributions of the real side of human experience to the knowing process is indeed unique, particularly in comparison with the philosophical milieu of his own day. This has led some commentators to over-emphasize this aspect of his thought, thereby distorting the careful balance which the Dialektik always manages to retain. See Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen, "Schleiermacher als Realist und Metaphysiker," Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 49, (1936), pp. 223-254. According to Schleiermacher, the philosophical positions of idealism and realism are mutually supportive. See Dial., Lectures of 1814, Propositions 168-171, pp. 95-98; Lectures of 1822, p. 411.
arranged in terms of categories which make the disjointed character of
sense impressions intelligible. As such, the Vernunftthätigkeit is an
ordering activity. Through the imposition of cognitive categories,
which Schleiermacher designates as unity (Einheit) and multiplicity
(Vielheit), upon sense experience, the activity of reason structures
the raw data mediated through the faculty of Organisation.

In all thinking, the activity of reason is the source of unity
and multiplicity, the organic activity, however, is the source
of the manifold. . . . Without unity and multiplicity the
manifold is undetermined; without the manifold the determined
unity and multiplicity are empty. Consequently, the role of
reason in thinking is the determination, the role of organiza-
tion is the animation.49

The terms 'manifold' (Mannigfaltigkeit) and 'multiplicity' (Vielheit)
should not be confused. In another context they could perhaps be
employed univocally though here their respective significations are
clearly different. The former--manifold--refers to the unrefined and
disordered impressions of sense prior to their arrangement and classifi-
cation by the intellectual function. As can be seen, Schleiermacher's
employment of this term closely follows that of Kant.50 The latter--
multiplicity--is an intellectual or cognitive category in terms of which
the manifold is structured and ordered. Multiplicity, however, is not
unrelated to the manifold. Although itself a category of the mind,
multiplicity is rooted deeper in the matter of thinking, sense experience,

49"In allem Denken ist die Vernunftthätigkeit der Quell der Einheit
und Vielheit, die organische Thätigkeit aber der Quell der Mannigfaltig-
keit. . . . Ohne Einheit und Vielheit ist die Mannigfaltigkeit
unbestimmt; ohne Mannigfaltigkeit ist die bestimmte Einheit und
Vielheit leer. Die Verrichtung der Vernunft im Denken ist also die
Bestimmung, die Verrichtung der Organisation ist die Belebung." Dial.
Lectures of 1814, Propositions 118, 119, pp. 63, 64.

50Cf. Rudolf Eisler, Kant-Lexikon, (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlags-
than is the category of unity. As such, multiplicity more closely reflects the real side of thinking. Unity, on the other hand, more closely reflects the ideal side of thinking since it is rooted in the form of thinking itself: the presupposed transcendent ground on which the agreement between thinking and being is based.

C. Sigwart, in his study of Schleiermacher's epistemology, has rightly noticed that the nineteenth century theologian, unlike Kant, never attempted to schematize in detail the categories of the understanding. He was content to envisage the structures of the understanding in terms of the comparatively simplistic schematism of unity and multiplicity. One should not, however, attribute such a schematism to the ineptitude of Schleiermacher's thought. For Schleiermacher, the categories of unity and multiplicity reflect the participation of the roots of thinking, the Ideal and the Real, in the epistemological process. In Schleiermacher's development, these categories are doorways to be opened in search of the transcendent ground of knowledge. Unlike Kant, Schleiermacher deemed it necessary to seek the metaphysical foundations of the categories of the mind. The Ideal and the Real are avenues to be traversed in establishing the principle and basis of epistemic agreement. This is Schleiermacher's task in the Transcendental Part of the Dialektik.

a.) **The Quest for the Transcendent Ground of Knowledge**

The union of the intellectual and organic functions, i.e., self-consciousness, is the locus of the relationship between thinking and being. The sense experience presented by the faculty of Organisation

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becomes real thinking through its analysis and synthesis in terms of the categories of Einheit and Vielheit. Yet, Schleiermacher insists that the central problem of the Dialektik cannot be resolved on the level of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness, in fact, itself is the source of the antithesis of subject and object; it is the basis of mediate experience and the cause of the relativity which characterizes all thinking. The task of the Dialektik is to conduct the Wissenwollen through the antithetical and the relative, the sphere of doubt and contention, toward the certainty and conviction (Überzeugungsgefühl) which accompanies all authentic knowing. Parenthetically, we should reiterate that this task is never fully accomplished. The oscillation between given positions and competing truth claims in the process of thinking necessarily results from the antithesis of thinking and being rooted in self-consciousness itself, and is never completely eradicated.

According to Schleiermacher, self-consciousness may serve as a principle guaranteeing the relationship between thinking and being, but not as a principle furnishing the ground of agreement between thinking and being. Thinking is constituted in the first connection, knowledge in the second. Against the Idealism of his own day, Schleiermacher maintains that even the principle of identity cannot establish self-consciousness as the ground of agreement between thinking and being, for even at this level of intellect the antithesis of thinking and that which is thought necessarily arises.

The universal thought forms, represented by the proposition $a = a$, also possess an organic side insofar as they contain the form of the process or express a condition of the same; and insofar as they contain no organic activity, nothing is thought in them.\(^{52}\)

\(^{52}\)"Die allgemeinen Denkformen, deren Repräsentant der Satz $a = a$,"
In order to posit the agreement between thinking and being requisite for the production of knowledge Schleiermacher asserts that a transcendent ground for epistemic agreement must be presupposed. The reason for the presuppositional character of this ground will be examined later in our development.

Throughout the Transcendental Part of the Dialektik, Schleiermacher attempts to justify his presupposition of a transcendent ground of knowledge by analyzing the transcendental roots of thinking reflected in the intellectual categories of unity and multiplicity. By way of the category of multiplicity Schleiermacher moves through the organic function and the manifold of sense impressions toward the transcendental root of the real side of experience: the World. In Schleiermacher's view, the World, as the real pole of thinking, is unable to provide a foundation of epistemic agreement since it constitutes the sphere of the antithetical itself posited in finite existence by self-consciousness. The World is the objective counterpart to the subjectivity of self-consciousness and thus one term in the subject-object dichotomy definitive of mediate experience. It is the task of the Transcendental Part of the Dialektik to seek the ground of agreement, not merely the relationship, between subject and object, thinking and being. The World is only the objective term in this relationship and, as a result, a major constituent in the problematic itself of the Dialektik. Schleiermacher remains convinced that the transcendent ground of epistemic agreement must be sought beyond the realm of the antithetical in a

haben auch eine organische Seite, sofern sie die Form des Prozesses enthalten, oder eine Bedingung desselben aussprechen; und sofern sie keine organische Tätigkeit enthalten, wird auch nichts in ihnen gedacht." Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 112, p. 59.
principle of absolute unity and identity. It is this unity and identity which is reflected relatively in the agreement which qualifies knowledge. In the lectures of 1814 Schleiermacher states:

The doubt whether in any thinking that which is thought agrees with being rests only on the following: that one does not believe to comprehend in what manner unity and multiplicity must be distributed in both in an equal way. But this equality, upon which the material perfection of knowing is based, can only be attained through approximation; the inner ground of this equality, however, is precisely the transcendental that is sought. 53

By virtue of its freedom from the oscillatory and relative nature of human thinking, this presuppositional principle of absolute unity is the basis of the intellectual category of unity, the foundation of the order imposed on sense experience by the activity of reason, and the ground of agreement between thinking and being. The transcendent ground is the transcendental root of thinking on the ideal side of experience and the source of the ideality required in all instances of epistemic determination. In the Dialektik, this principle is identified with the deity and is designated by the terms Gott and Gottesheit. 54

Here we encounter the Platonic perspective of the Dialektik to which we have called attention and which surfaces so often in Schleiermacher's thought. It is the spirit of this philosopher which urges and compels Schleiermacher to proceed further than does Kant in his quest

53"Der Zweifel, ob in irgend einem Denken das gedachte mit dem Sein übereinstimme, rührt nur daher, dass man nicht glaubt zu begreifen, wie so Einheit und Vielheit in beiden auf gleiche Art müsse vertheilt sein. Allein diese Gleichheit, auf der die materiale Vollkommenheit des Wissens beruht, ist nur durch Approximation zu erreichen; der innere Grund aber dieser Gleichheit ist eben das gesuchte transcendental." Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 1034, p. 54.

54Cf. Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 126, p. 69; Proposition 188, pp. 120-121.
for the basis of human knowledge. In distinction from his contemporaries, who considered themselves to be carrying out the critical project of Kant in the movement which has since come to be known as German Idealism, Schleiermacher speaks of the transcendent ground existing apart from human knowledge and yet retains a view of the participation of the ideality requisite for the agreement between thinking and being in the ideal pole of thinking. As we shall see, however, the Platonic tenor of the Dialektik is modified by Schleiermacher's recognition of the strictures and limitations of human knowledge ascertained by Critical philosophy. The Dialektik is clearly a post-Kantian epistemology. This is particularly evident in the fact that, for Schleiermacher, the transcendent ground of knowledge is a presuppositional principle, a point which is more readily grasped in light of the nineteenth century theologian's delineation of the forms of knowledge.

In Schleiermacher's view, "knowledge as thinking can occur under no other forms than those of concept and judgment." Concept fixes being as a unity. It is the refined cognitive representation of the image (Bild) of a given object presented as experience by the faculty of Organisation. The concept, therefore, is the end result of the synthesis and analysis of sense data by the activity of reason. Judgment, on the other hand, expresses the unity of being, formalized in the concept, as a development. This is executed by means of the connection of concepts, propositionally formalized in terms of subject and predicate. Through this form of logical construction, judgment promotes and furthers knowledge. The concept is the form of knowledge

55 "Das Wissen als Denken ist unter keiner andern Form als der des Begriffs und des Urtheils." Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 138, p. 81.
which constitutes the proper object of the Transcendental Part of the Dialektik; judgment is the proper object of the Formal Part. Just as both Parts of the Dialektik are interdependent and mutually supportive, so too are the forms of knowledge which constitute their respective objects of concern. Concept requires a multiplicity of predication in order to determine its unity more strictly. Judgment requires the unity of both subjective and predicative determination which stems from the concept in order to authenticate its construction. The forms of knowledge can only be defined reciprocally; each without the other is empty.

As previously mentioned, Schleiermacher constantly emphasizes the relativity of all human thinking and knowing throughout his development in the Transcendental Part of the Dialektik. Both thinking and knowing are radically subject to the limitations of the finite. Even though knowing, as opposed to thinking, is founded on agreement between thinking and being, this agreement can by no means elevate knowing to the level of the unconditioned. In other words, knowing itself cannot furnish the ground of the agreement between thinking and being on which it is based. Only the presupposed principle of absolute unity and identity can serve as such a ground. The certainty which accompanies all knowledge can only be regarded as a relative certainty. The polar dynamic of thinking, the elemental foundation of knowing, can never be completely dissipated.

Having examined the mutual qualification of the forms of knowledge, the origin of this relativity may more easily be traced. For Schleiermacher, it is clear that, owing to their definitions, concept and

56 Cf. Dial., Lectures of 1814, Propositions 138-144, pp. 81-84.
judgment may only emerge within the province of sensibility. Knowledge, whether in the form of concept or judgment, can only be produced under the conditions of time and space, for only in the finite realm to which sensibility is bound can an object of possible experience be presented. The relativity of thinking and, therefore, of knowing is established on the very antitheses of experiencer and experienced, knower and known, subject and object which are posited in the finite realm by the mediacy of self-consciousness. The requisite union of the intellectual and the organic functions for the constitution of real thinking and, thus, of proper knowing implies that both of these activities are tied to the world of sense experience. This is assured by the contribution of the organic function to the epistemic process. It is this fundamental connection to the real side of human experience which fixes the relative character of thinking and knowing.

Such an approach to knowledge, however, creates a problem with regard to the linking, the appropriate ordering, of metaphysics and logic attempted by Schleiermacher in the Dialektik. If knowing can occur only under the forms of concept and judgment, then can the transcendent ground, the principle facilitating agreement between thinking and being, be an object of knowing? Can the transcendent ground be framed in terms of concept and judgment? The answer is simply that it cannot. This is the reason for Schleiermacher's repeated insistence that the transcendent ground may only be posited as a presuppositional principle of agreement between thinking and being. It is this recognition of the limits of human knowledge which must be attributed to the Kantian influence on Schleiermacher's development in the Dialektik.

Although Schleiermacher proceeded further than Kant by attempting
to uncover the metaphysical foundations of the categories of the mind, he respected Kant's critical exposition of the limitations of knowledge, thereby rejecting the methodology of traditional metaphysics. In the lectures of 1818 Schleiermacher states:

Kant indeed polemicized against metaphysics but yet proceeded from the position that proper knowing is the agreement of thinking with being; and showed only that that way of making this clear (the way of traditional metaphysics), namely, to separate analytically in an organized knowing the essence of the spirit as subject and the essence of the thing as object, is of no value; for the ultimate knowing is not behind but within real knowing. Consequently his polemic directs itself only against the former form (traditional metaphysics) and comes close to our polemic.57

The reason why the transcendent ground could only be recognized as a presuppositional principle in the Dialektik becomes apparent. Although the transcendent ground of epistemic agreement, as absolute unity and identity, is reflected in all knowing ideally through the Vernunftthätigkeit, and in the forms of knowledge through the unity of concept, it itself cannot be grasped in terms of either concept or judgment and therefore eludes availability to knowing. From another perspective, the need for the contributions of sensibility to all real thinking means that the transcendent ground escapes assimilation by this activity as well.

Concerning the idea of the deity, on the contrary, we must admit to ourselves that we are never able to attain it either through an infinite process or by an intensified

57“Kant polemisirte wol gegen die Metaphysik, ging aber doch davon aus, das eigentliche Wissen sei Übereinstimmung des Denkens mit dem Sein, und zeigte nur, dass jene Art dies klar zu machen, nämlich das Wesen des Geistes als Subject und das Wesen des Dinges als Object in ein organisirtes Wissen auseinander zu legen, nichts tauge, denn das letzte Wissen sei nicht hinter sondern in realen Wissen. Seine Polemik richtet sich also nur gegen jene Form und ist eine Annäherung an die unsrige.” Dial., Lectures of 1818, p. 34.
organization. For if we could possess it, we would have to possess it 

uno actu, since there is no multiplicity in it at all. 58

From our brief exposition of Schleiermacher's development in the Transcendental Part of the Dialektik we can achieve a sense for the strange union of Plato and Kant in his philosophical thought. In spite of Schleiermacher's statement that his own polemic against traditional metaphysics is quite close to that of Kant, which maintains that the ultimate knowing lies within human knowing, the difference between Schleiermacher's understanding of this position differs markedly from that of Kant. Schleiermacher's epistemology is based on a theory of participation, the unity of knowing for him being grounded, and sharing, in the absolute unity of the transcendent principle. This position is distinctly Platonic in character. Kant did not hold such a view. For him the transcendent unity of apperception furnished the ground of the unity of knowledge. In the Critique of Practical Reason, the existence of God is regarded as a postulate necessitated by the moral employment of reason. 59 In the Critique of Pure Reason, the deity is a regulative idea of pure reason. 60 The influence of Kantian philosophy upon the Dialektik must be seen in Schleiermacher's recognition of the


60 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B713-714, pp. 559-560; KGS, III, pp. 451-452.
boundaries of thinking and knowing which limit these activities to the realm of objects of possible experience. This critical side of Schleiermacher's philosophy ultimately destroys the epistemic bridge between the realms of being and becoming characteristic of Platonic thought.

By way of conclusion we may remark that there seems to be a certain difficulty involved in this attempted union of these divergent philosophical temperaments. This problem is directly related to Schleiermacher's positing of a presuppositional ground for epistemic agreement. Although Schleiermacher endeavors to justify his presupposition of a transcendent ground of knowing throughout the Transcendental Part of the Dialektik by analyzing the transcendental roots of Einheit and Vielheit, one would expect that even the presuppositional character of the ultimate and final principle of knowing would be available to human experience in some way. In other words, the unity which qualifies human knowing, respecting Schleiermacher's Kantian perspective on the activities of thinking and knowing, would not, and could not, justify the appeal to a transcendent ground of knowing—even a presuppositional ground—if that ground were not able to be experienced in a more direct fashion.

According to Schleiermacher, the final ground of knowledge is presented to experience in feeling (Gefühl), the relative identity of physical and ethical knowledge, thinking and willing. In the Dialektik, feeling is the vital unity of self and world. It is the transitional point between moments of passive and active existence which provides the possibility of agreement between thinking and being. Feeling, designated

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by Schleiermacher as immediate self-consciousness, functions as an analogy of the divine in man which transcends the subject-object dichotomy on which mediate self-consciousness is based. In this respect, feeling bridges the gap between God and man encountered in the activities of thinking and knowing.

4. Postscript

In his development in the *Dialektik* Schleiermacher undertakes an examination of both the foundation itself of human knowing and the principles and rules for the proper construction of knowledge. The former is a metaphysical endeavor and constitutes the task of the Transcendental Part of the *Dialektik*; the latter is an exercise in logic and comprises the task of the Formal Part of this work. Our interest lies in the Transcendental Part of the *Dialektik* for it is there that Schleiermacher devotes his enquiry to a consideration of the relationship of God and World. This, it should be recalled, is the theme of our study.

In his work on Schleiermacher's thought, Martin Redeker has referred to the Transcendental Part of the *Dialektik* as a "metaphysics of knowledge." While this is certainly an appropriate description of the work, we conclude our discussion of the principles and methodology of the *Dialektik* by suggesting that this description be supplemented by another more general designation. In consideration of the importance played by the concept of feeling in Schleiermacher's epistemology, as the impetus for his positing of a transcendent ground for epistemic agreement, the *Dialektik* must also be described as a "metaphysics of experience."

The task of the Dialektik, fully stated, is what thinking, on the basis of the presupposed ground of agreement between thinking and being experienced in feeling, may be properly determined as knowing.

The Transcendental Part of the Dialektik concludes with an examination of the role played by feeling in human experience in general, as well as with an analysis of the relationship of God and World. These matters—Schleiermacher's concept of Gefühl and his epistemological determination of the God-World relationship—will be explored in detail in chapters four and five respectively.

II. The Glaubenslehre

A series of moments . . . in which sudden origination predominates presents a disrupting reversal of relations and forms an historical epoch.63

Schleiermacher lived in an age which undoubtedly fits his own definition of the term 'historical epoch.' Indeed, his life spanned those years which we in the present may recognize as a time in which significant contributions were made to the intellectual history of the West. Schleiermacher was well aware that such times in the historical process, particularly in the sphere of Church history, are instigated by "the life of the particularly influential individual."64

63 "Eine Reihe von Momenten . . . in denen das plötzliche Entstehen Überwiegt, stellt eine zerbörende Umkehrung der Verhältnisse dar und bildet eine geschichtliche Epoche." KD, Proposition 73, p. 32.

64 "Viewohl im ganzen in der christlichen Kirche die hervorragende Wirksamkeit einzelner, auf die Masse abnimmt, ist es doch für die historische Theologie mehr, als für andere geschichtliche Gebiete, angemessen, die Bilder solcher Zeiten, die, als, wenn auch nur untergeordnetem Sinne, epochmachend, als Einheit aufzufassen sind, an das Leben vorzüglich wirksamer Einzelner anzuknüpfen." KD, Proposition 251, p. 96.
It is in many ways ironic that Schleiermacher made these observations for, although it is certain that he regarded the times in which he lived as truly epoch-making in character, it is doubtful that he considered himself to be the individual, within the theological sphere, responsible for inciting the inauguration of a new era. Although a number of his contemporaries, such as his colleague August Neander, recognized the greatness of Schleiermacher's work for the future of theology, an estimation of his contributions commensurate with their significance was not achieved during his lifetime. Instead, posterity, from the vantage point of temporal distance, has born out Neander's eulogy and passed knowledgeable judgment on Schleiermacher's efforts in the sphere of theology. Even Karl Barth, his most respected opponent in the twentieth century, has granted the acumen of Schleiermacher's theological insights, as well as his influence upon modern Christian thought.

The first place in a history of the theology of the most recent times belongs and will always belong to Schleiermacher, and he has no rival. . . . The nineteenth century brought with it many deviations from Schleiermacher, and many protests against him; often his ideas were distorted to the point of unrecognizability, and he was often overlooked and forgotten. But in the theological field it was nevertheless his century.

Schleiermacher's place in the history of Christian theology, however, 


should not be divorced from the broader spectrum of the intellectual milieu which influenced the development of his thought. In other words, the full purport of the creativity and originality of Schleiermacher's theology can only be appreciated when viewed from the perspective of the intellectual world in which he lived. The claim that Schleiermacher initiated an epoch in the sphere of theology is far more cogent and intelligible if the influence of the philosophy of the late eighteenth century upon his theological project be taken into account. The genius of Schleiermacher's theological programmatic lies in his attempt to reinterpret Christian dogmatics with regard to the exigencies of scientific thinking posed by Critical philosophy. In the words of Wilhelm Dilthey, "Schleiermacher is the Kant of theology." 67

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant attempted to demonstrate that all thinking which strives to transcend the conditions and limits of human experience in the world is hopelessly doomed to fail. Traditional metaphysics, whether employed in its own right or as a methodological tool of speculative theology, could only lead its follower into the pitfalls of error and confusion. All adequate thinking and, therefore, knowing requires an object of possible experience that can be apprehended under the *a priori* forms of time and space. The theoretical employment of reason is relegated to the realm of physical reality in which objects of sense experience present themselves. Since traditional metaphysics carries its quest for the truth beyond the limits of finite experience, Kant discredits, and actually denies, its viability as a mode of

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philosophical endeavor. The practical or moral employment of reason is recognized by Kant as the only activity that serves the interests of theology.\(^6\)

This critique of traditional metaphysics led to the destruction of the *analogia entis*, witnessed most dramatically in Kant's rejection of the arguments for the existence of God,\(^6\) and, therefore, to a broken relationship between God and World. Although this development was anticipated in many ways throughout the history of Western thought, it had never before been given the precise, technical formulation that it achieved at the hands of Kant.

As one would expect, the inescapability of Kant's critique of traditional metaphysics has significantly shaped the development of modern theology. One would be more than justified in referring to the theology of the past two centuries as "post-Kantian" for, by whatever means, the theology of this period which has essayed to speak meaningfully to the modern situation of the Church in the world has responded to the challenge posed by Kant's philosophy. The accordance of 'first place' in the history of modern theology to Schleiermacher and the estimation of his thought as epoch-making are warranted on the grounds that it was he who first envisaged the principles and method of Christian theology in full realization of the limits of human experience established

\(^6\) Cf. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B664, p. 528; KGS, III, p. 423: "Now I maintain that all attempts to employ reason in theology in any merely speculative manner are altogether fruitless and by their very nature null and void, and that the principles of its employment in the study of nature do not lead to any theology whatsoever. Consequently, the only theology of reason which is possible is that which is based upon moral laws or seeks guidance from them."

by Critical philosophy. Although Schleiermacher severely criticized Kant's reduction of religion to morality—this critique being voiced most vociferously in his early work Über die Religion: Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern (1799)—the seriousness with which Schleiermacher took the Weltanschauung posed by the philosopher led him to formulate a new theological exposition of the relationship between God and World.

Despite the fact that Christian theology, in Schleiermacher's view, concerns itself with the outward expression of the inward religious experience of feeling, rather than with the delimitation of the proper employment of reason, Schleiermacher's point of departure must be seen as an extension of the Kantian project to the sphere of theology. Pious feeling, the experience of immediate self-consciousness engendered by the dynamic interrelation of God, man, and the World, constitutes the proper and sole object of theology. Only the experience of feeling, which emerges from the concrete situation of worldly existence, may be regarded as the cornerstone of theological exposition. All that does not occur in the original givenness of pious feeling, or, in more Kantian terms, all that does not constitute a possible object of religious experience, cannot be formulated theologically. According to Schleiermacher, the branch of theological science which presents the content of Christian pious experience as the doctrine of a particular

70 Schleiermacher's relationship to Kant can, perhaps, best be seen in terms of their respective attempts at Fragestellung. For Kant, the question to be confronted was posed in a number of ways: "How are a priori synthetic judgments possible?" Critique of Pure Reason, B19, p. 55; "How is pure science of nature possible?" Ibid., B20, p. 56; "How is metaphysics, as science, possible?" Ibid., B22, p. 57; KGS, III, pp. 39-40. Schleiermacher framed his question as follows: "Soll der Knoten der Geschichte so auseinandergehen: das Christentum mit der Barbarei, und die Wissenschaft mit dem Unglauben," Sendschreiben, p. 37 (614).
Church is called dogmatics.

Schleiermacher's Dogmatics, the Glaubenslehre, was first published in 1821/22 and underwent a second edition in 1830/31. This is Schleiermacher's magnum opus, the fruit of an extended project envisaged by the theologian throughout the course of his intellectual maturity. Compared with the numerous volumes which comprise his collected works, the literary issue which Schleiermacher himself published is surprisingly small. The only works, excluding articles and his translation of Plato, published during his own lifetime were the Reden (1799), Monologen (1800), Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre (1803), Die Weihnachtsfeier (1806), Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums (1811), and the Glaubenslehre (1821/22). The latter work is, both chronologically and qualitatively, the crowning achievement of an illustrious career, the work that set the stage upon which the drama of modern theology was enacted.

As was the case with the Dialektik, the Glaubenslehre had its beginning in the lecture hall. As has been mentioned, the Glaubenslehre, unlike the Dialektik, was published by Schleiermacher himself and even appeared in a second edition (1830/31). In the dogmatics, the mediacy of posthumous redaction does not constitute a problem with which the reader must contend.

The project of the Glaubenslehre antedates that of the Dialektik at least in its actual accomplishment in the lecture hall if not also in conception. The first lectures on Dogmatik originate from Schleiermacher's

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Halle period in the Winter semester of 1804/05. The first lectures on Dialektik, it should be recalled, were not delivered until the year 1811 in Berlin. A letter written to friends in October, 1804, gives an indication of the shaky beginnings which plagued Schleiermacher's early conception and execution of the theological project:

My lectures on philosophical ethics seem to develop into a felicitous whole and they, of course, will develop sooner and better through the approach of ever repeated adapting than through any other. This is also true of my Introduction to theological study. The lectures on fundamental doctrine, however, suffer somewhat because of the other lectures and develop very fragmentarily. But they will indeed achieve their final purpose: to teach people to seek the idea under the concept.73

The second course of lectures on dogmatics was delivered in the Winter semester of 1805/06. The popularity of his lectures on this subject was minimal in comparison with the student response to his lectures on ethics and Galatians which he also delivered in this year. Schleiermacher refers to this situation at the time of his second delivery of the lectures on dogmatics, expressing his hopes for the future development of this course.

It has been eight days since lectures have again commenced. According to my impressions I deliver those on ethics far freer and clearer than the first time, before a considerable number of listeners. In the lectures on dogmatics I have only a few, though they are receptive listeners and I think...

72 For my account of Schleiermacher's lecture activity I have relied in these pages on the section of Martin Redeker's Introduction to his edition of the Glaubenslehre entitled "Die Entstehung der Glaubenslehre Schleiermachers." GI, I, pp. XV-XXXII.

I say and effect much that is good. Thus, when I deliver them once again, they will find a larger audience. 74

In actual fact, Redeker reports that the enrollment in Schleiermacher's lectures of this year was as follows: Galatians, 120; philosophical ethics, 50; dogmatics, 15. 75

In the Winter of 1810/11, the inauguration year of the newly founded University of Berlin, Schleiermacher delivered lectures on his theological encyclopedia. He returned to dogmatics in the Summer semester of 1811 announcing a course of lectures bearing the title *Dogmatische Theologie nebst vorausgeschickten philosophischen Untersuchungen über die christliche Religion*. These lectures were followed by others held in the Winter semesters of 1812/13, 1818/19, 1820/21, 1823/24, 1827/28, and in the Summer semesters of 1816, 1818, 1821, 1825, and 1830. Including his lecture activity at Halle, Schleiermacher lectured thirteen semesters on dogmatics, the time devoted to this subject matter being greater than that devoted to any other during his career.

1. The Kurzdarstellung des theologischen Studiums and the Nature of Dogmatic Theology

An examination of the principles and methodology of the Glaubenslehre 76 presupposes an understanding of both Schleiermacher's estimation


75Cf. Redeker, "Die Entstehung der Glaubenslehre Schleiermachers," p. XVIII.

of theology in general and his division of theology into a number of distinct, yet inextricably related, disciplines. We shall begin our sketch of the background of the *Glaubenslehre* with a consideration of Schleiermacher's division of theology, for it is from the vantage point of his comprehensive classification of the theological enterprise that the unique position held by dogmatics with regard to the whole is elucidated. By the same token, Schleiermacher's definition of theology in general seems far more comprehensible upon having achieved a basic understanding of the interconnection of this science's various branches.

The object of our enquiry is Schleiermacher's *Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums zum Behuf einleitender Vorlesungen*, first published in 1811. This work provides the reader with a clear outline with regard to which Schleiermacher directed his extensive endeavor in the field of theology. The contributions made by the encyclopedia to a fuller understanding and appreciation of dogmatics are invaluable.

The *Kurze Darstellung* approaches theology from three perspectives, each of which complements the others and adds to the complete design of

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the theological enterprise. The first division, which Schleiermacher terms philosophical theology, takes its point of departure from "above" Christianity in the general concept of a community of faith.\textsuperscript{78} This point of departure is chosen in order to determine the relation of historically given conditions of Christianity to the "idea" of this religion itself.\textsuperscript{79} Philosophical theology—an unfortunate designation—assumes the task of evaluating the present state of Christianity with respect to the totality of the historical moments which comprise its past experience in order to preserve and maintain the distinctive nature of Christianity for the Church.\textsuperscript{80} This is accomplished through the activities of apologetics and polemics. Apologetics attempts to ascertain the unique identity of Christianity through a critical comparison

\textsuperscript{78}Cf. KD, Proposition 33, p. 14: "Die philosophische Theologie kann daher ihren Ausgangspunkt nur über dem Christentum in dem logischen Sinne des Wortes nehmen, d. h. in dem allgemeinen Begriff der frommen oder Glaubensgemeinschaft."

\textsuperscript{79}Cf. KD, Proposition 34, p. 14: "Wie sich irgend ein geschichtlich gegebener Zustand des Christentums zu der Idee desselben verhält, das bestimmt sich nicht allein durch den Inhalt dieses Zustandes, sondern auch durch die Art, wie er geworden ist."

\textsuperscript{80}Schleiermacher's estimation of the two-fold aim of philosophical theology is clearly expressed in KD, Propositions 32, 35, pp. 13, 15: "Da das eigen tümliche Wesen des Christentums sich ebensowenig rein wissenschaftlich konstruieren lässt, als es bloss empirisch aufgefasst werden kann: so lässt es sich nur kritisch bestimmen ... durch Gegeneinanderhalten dessen, was im Christentum geschichtlich gegeben ist, und der Gegensätze, vermöge deren fromme Gemeinschaften können voneinander verschieden sein. ... Da die Ethik als Wissenschaft der Geschichtsprinzipien auch die Art des Werdens eines geschichtlichen Ganzen nur auf allgemeine Weise darstellen kann: so lässt sich eben falls nur kritisch durch Vergleichung der dort aufgestellten allgemeinen Differenzen mit dem geschichtlich Gegebenen ausmitten, was in der Entwicklung des Christentums reiner Ausdruck seiner Idee ist, und was hingegen als Abweichung hiervon, mithin als Krankheitszustand, angesehen werden muss."
of the latter's own nature with those of other historical religions. Polemics, on the other hand, seeks to isolate and purge diseased, i.e., heretical, conditions of Christianity from the community of faith. With regard to the particular Church in which the activities of philosophical theology are practiced, apologetics is channeled in a completely outward direction, polemics in one totally inward.  

The second division, which Schleiermacher terms historical theology, is comprised of a number of subdivisions which, in other encyclopedic treatments, are not customarily grouped together under a single rubric. These subdivisions are exegetical theology, Church history, dogmatic theology, and Church statistics. Schleiermacher justifies his formulation of the division of historical theology on the grounds that "the historical knowledge of Christianity is, above all, the indispensable condition of all circumspect influence upon the further cultivation of Christianity." The above-mentioned subdivisions, which find their place under historical theology, all contribute to this cultivation.

Exegetical theology furnishes an understanding of primitive Christianity essential for the determination of the specific mode of faith which characterizes this religion. Church history, or historical theology proper, examines this essential mode of faith in the course of its historical development. Dogmatic theology and Church statistics portray the state of Christianity at the present time. Dogmatics

\[81\] Cf. KD, Proposition 41, p. 18.

\[82\] "Die historische Theologie ... ist ihrem Inhalte nach ein Teil der neueren Geschichtskunde; und als solchem sind ihr alle natürlichen Glieder dieser Wissenschaft koordiniert. ... Als theologische Disziplin ist die geschichtliche Kenntnis des Christentums zunächst die unannahmliche Bedingung alles besonnten Einwirkens auf die weitere Fortbildung desselben, und in diesem Zusammenhange sind ihr dann die übrigen Teile der Geschichtskunde nur dienend untergeordnet." KD, Propositions 69, 70, p. 30.
accomplishes this task through the exposition of Church doctrine; Church statistics, a theological discipline new to the nineteenth century, has its goal in "the presentation of the social situation of the Church in a given moment." Dogmatics is dependent on statistics for an adequate comprehension of affairs in the Church from a sociological point of view, an understanding which plays a role in the adequate exposition of Church doctrine.

The final division, which Schleiermacher terms practical theology, is the terminus in which philosophical and historical theology achieve their completion. Practical theology provides a curriculum of knowledge requisite for the effective conduct of an active Christian life in the form of Church leadership. With this third division, Schleiermacher strikes a careful balance between the theoretical and the practical in his view on theology.

If theology as a whole retains a sense of balance in Schleiermacher's encyclopedia, however, the fulcrum of the triadic division there presented is centered in the sphere of historical theology.

If historical theology presents each point of time in its true relation to the idea of Christianity, then it is, at

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83 With regard to the formation of Church statistics as a theological discipline in the early years of the nineteenth century and Schleiermacher's recognition of this discipline in his encyclopedia, Heinrich Scholz states: "Schl. denkt wohl an das grundlegende Werk des Göttinger Theologen C. F. Städlin, Kirchliche Geographie und Statistik, 2 Teile, Tüb. 1804. Er selbst hat, nach den Angaben des Berliner Lektionskataloges, Kirchliche (Geographie und) Statistik 5-stündig; im Winter 1826/27, Sommer 1827 und Winter 1833/34 gelesen." KD, p. 40.

84 "Die Darstellung des gesellschaftlichen Zustandes der Kirche in einem gegebenen Moment ist die Aufgabe der kirchlichen Statistik." KD, Proposition 95, p. 40.

85 Cf. KD, Proposition 260, p. 100: "Die praktische Theologie will nicht die Aufgaben richtig fassen lehren; sondern indem sie dieses
the same time, not only the foundation of practical theology but also the verification of philosophical theology. 86

Historical theology is the basis of all theological study, for this discipline endeavors to determine the essence of Christianity, its development throughout the course of time, and its constitution in the present historical moment. 87 Historical theology, through the particular efforts of its various subdivisions, discerns the substance and nature of Christianity which philosophical theology safeguards and with respect to which, in the sphere of practical theology, the exigencies of contemporary Church leadership are formed.

The centrality of the historical can best be perceived in Schleiermacher's famous definition of theology in general:

Theology, in the sense in which the word is here always taken, is a positive science whose parts are bound into a whole only through their common relation to a certain mode of faith, i.e., a certain form of the God-consciousness. Consequently, the parts of Christian theology are bound into a whole through their relation to Christianity. 88

voraussetzt, hat sie es nur zu tun mit der richtigen Verfahrensweise bei der Erledigung aller unter den Begriff der Kirchenleitung zu bringenden Aufgaben."

86"Wenn die historische Theologie jeden Zeitpunkt in seinem wahren Verhältnis zu der Idee des Christentums darstellt, so ist sie zugleich nicht nur die Begründung der praktischen, sondern auch die Bewährung der philosophischen Theologie." KD, Proposition 27, p. 11; cf. KD, Proposition 28, pp. 11-12: "Die historische Theologie ist sonach der eigentliche Körper des theologischen Studiums, welcher durch die philosophische Theologie mit der eigentlichen Wissenschaft, und durch die praktische mit dem tätigen christlichen Leben zusammenhängt."


88"Die Theologie in dem Sinne, in welchem das Wort hier immer genommen wird, ist eine positive Wissenschaft, deren Teile zu einem Ganzen nur verbunden sind durch ihre gemeinsame Beziehung auf eine bestimmte Glaubensweise, d.h. eine bestimmte Gestaltung des Gottes-
By 'positive science' Schleiermacher means a science grounded in the
givenness of historical experience and existence which is directed
toward the solution of a practical problem. From this orientation
it is clear that Schleiermacher's view on theology possesses a dis-
tinctly ad hoc character. This is true not only because of the
practical focus of the third division of theology, but also in the
sense that historical theology attains its fullest significance only
when the essence of Christianity, determined by this discipline, is
constituted in the present moment as the basis of both philosophical
and practical theology. Only in the experience of the present moment--
an experience which, with respect to the Church, always demands practi-
cal activity--does the complete undertaking of theology become relevant.
As a result, the proper execution of a discipline as seemingly academic
as historical theology depends on the extent to which it represents the
living faith of the believer in Jesus Christ.

Dogmatic theology lucidly illustrates the ad hoc character of
Christian theology to an even greater degree than the other subdivisions
included under the rubric of historical theology for dogmatics, together
with Church statistics, essays to portray the present situation of
Christianity. Since Church statistics plays a secondary role in this
project, serving the special activity of dogmatics as a tool to be
employed in acquiring an adequate estimation of the present, the

bewusstseins; die der christlichen also durch die Beziehung auf das
Christentum." KD, Proposition 1, p. 1.

Cf. KD, Proposition 1, p. 1: "Eine positive Wissenschaft über-
haupt ist nämlich ein solcher Inbegriff wissenschaftlicher Elemente,
welche ihre Zusammengehörigkeit nicht haben, als ob sie einen vermöge
der Idee der Wissenschaft notwendigen Bestandteil der wissenschaftlichen
Organisation bildeten, sondern nur, sofern sie zur Lösung einer praktis-
chen Aufgabe erforderlich sind."
responsibility of this portrayal ultimately falls on dogmatics.

For Schleiermacher, dogmatics is that branch of theological science which presents "the knowledge of doctrine now valid in the Evangelical Church . . .". This 'validity' is a function of faith; only he who is a committed member of the community of faith may serve the Church as a dogmatic theologian. The doctrines presented in dogmatics are formalized expressions of the form assumed by the God-consciousness of a particular Church in a given historical period. As formalized expressions, however, they are neither speculative elaborations nor intellectual constructions based on the activity of reason. According to Schleiermacher, the task of dogmatic theology, the formulation of the presently valid doctrine of a particular Church, can only be sufficiently and adequately accomplished if its object remain the historical manifestations of Christian faith. Doctrinal presentation, to be successful, must be grounded in the historical. Faith, the experiential basis of doctrine, is rooted in the historical appearance of the

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91Cf. KD, Proposition 196, pp. 74-75: "Eine dogmatische Behandlung der Lehre ist weder möglich ohne eigene Überzeugung, noch ist notwendig, dass alle, die sich auf dieselbe Periode derselben Kirchengemeinschaft beziehen, unter sich übereinstimmen." The theologian cannot present the doctrinal expression of a particular mode of faith unless he himself shares and participates in that faith. In this respect, the qualification of theological science as 'positive' refers to the requisite experiential sharing and participating of the theologian in the faith which he attempts to exposit, at least to the extent that this experience be understood as historical experience.
Redeemer and in the historical formation of the community of faith. 92
Dogmatics is the theological discipline which unites the essential and
identical elements of the faith of the past and the faith of the present
in the form of doctrinal expression. By the same token, this discipline
extracts from its presentation those doctrines traditionally considered
valid which no longer voice the contemporary experience of faith; or
modifies and adjusts those which are proper expressions of the present
experience of faith, but whose traditional expositions are far-removed
from that experience.

From the above it can be readily seen that Schleiermacher set
forth a very fluid and dynamic approach to the project of dogmatics.
His own understanding of this project, as the exposition of the doctrine
valid in the Evangelical Church at a given time, is founded on the
historicality of faith and unfolded with directed emphasis on the shape
which that faith possesses in the present historical moment. The object
of dogmatics is the contemporary experience of the believing community.
Although the individual who serves the Church as a dogmatic theologian
obviously plays a special and central role in doctrinal formulation, his
success is measured only by the faithfulness with which he portrays the

92 Schleiermacher considered the designation "systematic theology"
to be inappropriate for the theological discipline he calls "dogmatics"
partly for the reason that it conceals the historical character of this
discipline. Cf. KD, Proposition 97, p. 41: "Die Bezeichnung system-
atische Theologie, deren man sich für diesen Zweig immer noch häufig.
bedient, und welche, mit Recht vorzüglich hervorhebt, dass die Lehre
nicht soll als ein Aggregat von einzelnen Satzungen vorgetragen werden,
sonst der Zusammenhang ins Licht gesetzt, verbirgt doch auf der
anderen Seite zum Nachteil der Sache nicht nur den historischen
Charakter der Disziplin, sondern auch die Abzweckung derselben auf die
Kirchenleitung, woraus vielfältige Missverständnisse entstehen müssen."
content of the common experience of the group that he represents. The faith of the Church is the criterion of the authenticity of the faith of the theologian.

The fluidity of Schleiermacher's approach to the theological discipline under consideration is pointedly illustrated by his assertion that dogmatics is "endless in extent." This endless scope of dogmatics derives not so much from the limitless number of issues on which the dogmatic interest may be brought to bear, i.e., the boundless magnitude of possible doctrinal formulations, as it does from the sheer transcience and open-ended character of historical experience and existence. The ever-constant renewal of the present moment constitutes the basis of the mobility which characterizes Schleiermacher's view on dogmatics.

The methodological ramifications of this historical approach to the dogmatic presentation of the truth of Christianity can be seen in the nineteenth century theologian's assessment of the relationship between orthodoxy and heterodoxy. Dogmatics does not formulate an enchiridion to whose propositions the individual believer is bound to assent; nor is dogmatics chained to the doctrinal expressions of the

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93 Cf. KD, Proposition 197, p. 75: "Weder eine bewährende Aufstellung eines Inbegriffs von überwiegend abweichenden und nur die Überzeugung des einzelnen ausdrückenden Sätzen würden wir eine Dogmatik nennen . . . ."

94 "Die dogmatische Theologie ist in ihrem ganzen Umfang ein Unendliches, und bedarf einer Scheidung des Gebietes besonderer Virtuosität und des Gemeinbesitzes." KD, Proposition 218, p. 83.

95 This interpretation is supported by the fact that this qualification of 'endless in extent' is also applied to Church statistics, the discipline which shares with dogmatics the elusive goal of expositing the present situation of the Christian faith; the former from a sociological, the latter from a doctrinal perspective. Cf. KD, Proposition 99, p. 42.
past, no matter how central they be to the traditional understanding of the Christian faith. The term "orthodox," in its dogmatic employment by Schleiermacher, refers to "each element of doctrine which is construed in the sense of holding fast to that which is already generally recognized, together with the natural results of the latter." The term "heterodox" refers to "each element of doctrine construed in the tendency of preserving the mobile character of the concept of doctrine, and making room for other modes of comprehension." It is interesting to note that heterodoxy, for Schleiermacher, is not descriptive of a view foreign to, and suspected by, the Christian faith. The adjective "heterodox" describes Church doctrine which opens itself to the vital creativity and innovative propensities of historical experience and existence in the present moment. According to Schleiermacher, only a stilted and lifeless piety would reject the heterodox position as lying outside the bounds of proper doctrinal exposition. Owing to his view on the historical nature of dogmatic theology, Schleiermacher accorded a recognition of the importance of the heterodox element of doctrine commensurate with that of the orthodox, since it is through the

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96 "Jedes Element der Lehre, welches in dem Sinne konstruiert ist, das bereits allgemein Anerkannte zusamm den natürlichen Folgerungen daraus festzuhalten, ist orthodox; jedes in der Tendenz Konstruierte, den Lehrbegriff beweglich zu erhalten und anderen Auffassungsweisen Raum zu machen, ist heterodox." KD, Proposition 203, pp. 77-78.

97 Cf. KD, Proposition 205, p. 78: "Es ist falsche Orthodoxie, auch dasjenige in der dogmatischen Behandlung noch festhalten zu wollen, was in der öffentlichen kirchlichen Mitteilung schon ganz antiquiert ist, und auch durch den wissenschaftlichen Ausdruck keinen stimmen [sic] Einfluss auf andere Lehrstücke ausübt."

98 Cf. KD, Proposition 204, p. 78: "Beide (Orthodoxie und Heterodoxie) sind, wie für den geschichtlichen Gang des Christentums überhaupt, so auch für jeden bedeutenden Moment als solchen, gleich wichtig."
heterodox that the originality of the present historical moment is expressed.

In the pages of the *Kurze Darstellung*, Schleiermacher sets forth a technical sketch of the formal structures in terms of which the enterprise of dogmatics is to be developed. Although dogmatics is based on formal principles capable of encyclopedic classification, Schleiermacher considered the results of this theological discipline to be a witness to the living faith of the Church. Dogmatics does not present an insipid assemblage of Christian doctrine which poses, examines, and settles problems suggested by a merely intellectual estimation of the Christian faith. Rather, dogmatics attempts to depict, in doctrinal form, the Christian view on the vital relationship between God, man, and World. For Schleiermacher, this constitutes the task of the *Glaubenslehre*.

The *Glaubenslehre* is comprised of an Introduction, which delineates the principles and methodology of this work, and a body proper or System of Doctrine, in which the actual content of Christian faith is exposited. We shall proceed with our development by examining each of these two sections.

2. **The Introduction to the Glaubenslehre**

In his Introduction to the *Glaubenslehre*, Schleiermacher begins the task of dogmatics by focusing on the experiential basis of the doctrines which this theological discipline seeks to unfold. As has been mentioned above, the task of dogmatics is to formulate doctrinally the Christian view on the vital relationship between God, man, and World. For Schleiermacher, this relationship is experientially appropriated by the individual in pious feeling.
In his efforts to ground piety (Frömmigkeit) in the unassailable depths of human experience, Schleiermacher sought to avoid the ensnarements to which many of his contemporaries had fallen victim. In the view of the nineteenth century theologian, piety can be reduced neither to knowing, nor to doing; it can be neither a theoretical nor a practical activity. The experience of piety can only be envisaged as a determination of feeling (Gefühl) or of immediate self-consciousness, which, as pure receptivity, is opposed to thinking and willing, the activities of mediate self-consciousness. At the same time, feeling is the foundation on which the very possibility of transition between moments of knowing and moments of doing is based. According to Schleiermacher's exposition in the Glaubenslehre, pious or religious feeling assumes a form which may be described as the feeling of absolute dependence.

The common element in all howsoever diverse expressions of piety, by which these are conjointly distinguished from all other feelings, or, in other words, the self-identical


100Cf. Gl., I, Proposition 3, 4, p. 21.

101Cf. Gl., I, Proposition 3, p. 14: "Die Frömmigkeit, welche die Basis aller kirchlichen Gemeinschaften ausmacht, ist rein für sich betrachtet weder ein Wissen noch ein Tun, sondern eine Bestimmtheit des Gefühls oder des unmittelbaren Selbstbewusstseins."


103Cf. Gl., I, Proposition 3, 4, p. 19: "... das unmittelbare Selbstbewusstsein überall den Übergang vermittelt zwischen Momenten, worin das Wissen und solchen, worin das Tun vorherrscht."
essence of piety, is this: the consciousness of being absolutely dependent, or, which is the same thing, of being in relation with God.\textsuperscript{104}

It is important that what Schleiermacher calls the feeling of absolute dependence not be viewed as a philosophical or speculative description of man's being-in-the-World. Rather, the feeling of absolute dependence is a religious experience, a pious apprehension of the relationship between God, man, and World which arises totally from the inner life of the believing subject. This experiential focus of Schleiermacher's dogmatics must be seen in the light of the general anthropology bequeathed the Western religious tradition by the Protestant Reformation. As portrayed in Proposition 4 of the Glaubenslehre, pious feeling expresses the existential situation of man as one of creaturely dependence on God. This relationship is to be understood in the sense that God is the "Whence" of man's receptive and active existence;\textsuperscript{105} he is the ground of the three possible modes of human existence in the World: thinking, willing, and feeling.

This experiential motif is so central in Schleiermacher's dogmatics that the feeling of absolute dependence actually constitutes the highest stage of human self-consciousness from which, in connection with man's lower, sensible level of mediate self-consciousness, pious experience emerges. For Schleiermacher, the feeling of absolute dependence is the level of religious experience attained by the three great monotheistic

\textsuperscript{104}\textit{CP}, Proposition 4; p. 12; \textit{Gl.}, I, p. 23.

\textsuperscript{105}\textit{Cf. GL}, I, Proposition 4, 4, pp. 28-29: "Wenn aber schlecht-hinnige Abhängigkeit und Beziehung mit Gott in unserem Satze gleichgestellt wird: so ist dies so zu verstehen, dass eben das in diesem Selbstbewusstsein mitgesetzte \textit{Woher} unseres empfindlichen und selbsttätigen Daseins durch den Ausdruck Gott bezeichnet werden soll, und dieses für uns die wahrhaft ursprüngliche Bedeutung desselben ist."
faiths: Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. Yet each is distinguished from the other by virtue of the particular, determinative modification which the feeling of absolute dependence receives in each. The uniqueness of Christianity is established on the basis of the stamp imprinted on the feeling of absolute dependence by the self-communication of God in Jesus Christ:

Christianity is a monotheistic faith, belonging to the teleological type of religion, and is essentially distinguished from other such faiths by the fact that in it everything is related to the redemption accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth.  

The priority of Christ in the Christian faith stems from the fullness and perfection of his God-consciousness, manifested in his person and work, which, as the source of the grace communicated to the God-consciousness of the individual believer, continues to be efficacious throughout the course of the history of faith. In Schleiermacher's dogmatics, Christ is the model of faith; he is the archetype of perfect relation with God whose appearance in history is to be regarded "as a preservation of the receptivity, implanted in human nature from the beginning and perpetually developing further, which enables it to take into itself such an absolute potency of the God-consciousness." 107 The feeling of absolute dependence specifically imbued with Christian determination traces its origin to, and receives its power from, the perfect God-consciousness of Christ. The relationship between God and man is founded on the saving activity of the Redeemer who, by virtue of the ultimate state of blessedness which he achieved, enables the believer to approximate this state "through the communication of His sinless


perfection.\textsuperscript{108}

The definition of theology as a 'positive science' in the Kurze Darstellung may be attributed to the experiential foundation of this discipline in the feeling of absolute dependence. According to Schleiermacher, those who possess similar determinations of this feeling will inevitably express this commonly shared element in social form, thereby establishing a particular Church.

The religious self-consciousness, like every essential element in human nature, leads necessarily in its development to fellowship or communion; a communion which, on the one hand, is variable and fluid, and, on the other hand, has definite limits, i.e. is a Church.\textsuperscript{109}

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\textsuperscript{108}CF, Proposition 88, p. 361; Cl., II, p. 18. In his Zweites Sendschreiben an Lücke, Schleiermacher states: "Ich hätte gewünscht, es so einzurichten, dass den Lesern möglichst auf jedem Punkt hätte deutlich werden müssen, dass der Spruch Joh. 1,14 der Grundtext der ganzen Dogmatik ist, sowie er dasselbe für die ganze Amtsleitung des Geistlichen sein soll." Sendschreiben, p. 34 (611). In spite of this emphasis Richard R. Niebuhr has argued well that it would be incorrect to designate Schleiermacher's dogmatics as Christocentric in an unqualified sense. "The reader will not find Schleiermacher justifying all that he says about God and man by his doctrine of Christ. Christology is not the archimedean point by means of which The Christian Faith moves all the other doctrines of theology before the reader's view. It is not the absolute center about which everything else revolves. . . . In The Christian Faith the redeemer is only one among a plurality of objects of theological knowledge, but at the same time he is paramount and central as the agent who reforms and shapes anew the Christian's relations to God, the world and himself." Richard R. Niebuhr, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 211-212. Niebuhr proposes the term "Christo-morphic" as a more appropriate signification of the place of Christ in Schleiermacher's theology. This designation applies in two senses: "First of all, it asserts that Jesus of Nazareth objectively exhibits what human nature ideally is. . . . In this sense, then, the redeemer is the measure of human nature. And, in the second place, the redeemer is the historical person whose presence mediated through Scripture, preaching and the Holy Spirit becomes the abiding occasion for the reorganization and clarifying of the Christian's consciousness of his absolute dependence, of his identity in the world, and of his appropriate actions toward and responses to others." \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 212-213.
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\textsuperscript{109}CF, Proposition 6, p. 26; Cl., I, p. 41.
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Religious association is based on the positive character of pious experience. This positivity stems from the historical character of human existence and, in Schleiermacher's view, obviates the possibility of natural religion, which completely prescinds from determinate historical manifestation.

The reflection of the Christian Church on the basis of its constitution, i.e., the feeling of absolute dependence as determined by the redemption of Christ, is the task of dogmatic theology. In the Claubenslehre this discipline is defined as "the science which systematizes the doctrine valid in a Christian ecclesiastical society at a given time." This validity is determined by the particular form which pious feeling assumes in an ecclesiastical communion under the conditions of a given historical moment. Dogmatics, then, is theological reflection on the religious experience shared by a group of believers within the bounds of ecclesiastical life. From the above definition, an understanding is achieved of the relationship between the Church, the individual believer, and the individual believer who serves the Church as a dogmatic theologian. The task of the dogmatic theologian is to express adequately the pious self-consciousness of the Church, a pious self-consciousness comprised of the individual, yet shared, experiences of its members.


111 Cf. Gl., I, Proposition 10, Postscript, pp. 69-70.

The theologian may only speak on behalf of the faith of the Church.  

The Church for which the theologian speaks is the final criterion of the authenticity of his doctrinal presentation.

With regard to Schleiermacher's personal theological standpoint as a member of a particular Christian communion, dogmatics may be defined as that theological science which brings to language the innermost, essential, and distinguishing religious dispositions of the Evangelical or Protestant Church. Schleiermacher explained the purport of this definition succinctly by stating that "Christian doctrines are accounts of the Christian religious affections (Gemütszustände) set forth in speech." The formulation of doctrine, in Schleiermacher's view, may be seen as a type of hermeneutical enterprise; one in which the stream of interpretation flows from inward pious feeling to outward linguistic construction. Although doctrine bestows a certain level of cultivation to the affections without which they would remain on the level of inarticulate enthusiasm, it would be incorrect to view doctrinal formulation as an intellectually elaborated substitute for pious experience. Schleiermacher is adamant on this point: "... doctrines in all their forms have their ultimate ground so exclusively in the emotions of the religious self-consciousness, that where these do not exist the doctrines cannot arise."

113 This was Schleiermacher's expressed intention in the first edition of the Glaubenslehre, Schleiermacher offering this work as the first dogmatics of the newly-formed Union of Prussia. For a study devoted to a consideration of the Glaubenslehre as ecclesiastical expression, see Martin Stiewe, Das Unionsverständnis Friedrich Schleiermachers, (Witten: Luther-Verlag, 1969).

114 Cf. Proposition 15, p. 76; G1., I, p. 105.

In the Introduction to the *Glaubenslehre*, three forms of religious expression, which, according to Schleiermacher, have their origin in Christian preaching, are distinguished: the poetic, the rhetorical, and the descriptively didactic. The first is "based originally upon a moment of exaltation which has come purely from within, a moment of enthusiasm or inspiration."¹¹⁶ For Schleiermacher, poetic expression is "purely descriptive."¹¹⁷ Rhetorical language is based "upon a moment whose exaltation has come from without, a moment of stimulated interest which issues in a particular definite result."¹¹⁸ The poetic is clearly illustrated in the language of prayer and is intended primarily for the edification of the religious subject and those who share the inner experience from which this linguistic expression proceeds. The rhetorical is the language of dialogue: Outwardly directed, it issues as "combative and commendatory"; inwardly directed, as "disciplinary and challenging."¹¹⁹

The third form of religious language--the descriptively didactic--is the linguistic form employed by dogmatics for doctrinal formulation and expression.¹²⁰ The descriptively didactic represents the marriage of the poetic and rhetorical forms of language. It combines the descriptive character of the poetic and the critical, deliberate tenor

¹¹⁶ Cf. Proposition 16, 1, p. 78; Gl., I, p. 107.
¹¹⁷ Cf. Proposition 16, 1, p. 79; Gl., I, p. 108.
of the rhetorical to form a linguistic mode which suits both the vital
and the technical constituents of doctrinal exposition. Although these
constituents of doctrinal exposition are further examined in the Intro-
duction to the Glaubenslehre, we shall consider them in detail in the
following section of our study since they relate more directly to the
subject matter which is appropriately treated under its heading. 121

3. The System of Doctrine

In the Glaubenslehre, the System of Doctrine proper is divided into
two parts, each of which depicts the experience of pious self-consciousness
from a particular perspective. It is not our intention in this section of
the chapter to present the doctrines which comprise these two parts of
the System of Doctrine in anything more than a schematory fashion. At
this point in our development we must outline the principles of Schleier-
macher's view on Christian doctrine as such.

As has been mentioned above, Schleiermacher finds the descriptively
didactic form of language best suited for doctrinal expression since it
captures both the vital and technical requirements of dogmatic exposition.
These requirements or norms of dogmatic exposition are respectively
delimited by Schleiermacher as the two-fold value of the dogmatic propo-
sition: the ecclesiastical and the scientific. 122 The former "consists
in its reference to the religious emotions themselves." 123 As should be

121 For an in-depth study of Schleiermacher's Introduction to the
Glaubenslehre, see Doris Offermann, Schleiermachers Einleitung in die

122 Cf. Gl., I, Proposition 17, p. 112: "Dogmatische Sätze haben
einen zwiefachen Wert, einen kirchlichen und einen wissenschaftlichen;
und durch beide und das Verhältnis beider zueinander wird ihre
Vollkommenheit bestimmt."

123 Cf., Proposition 17, 1, p. 83; Gl., I, p. 113.
recalled, the object of dogmatic theology is the Christian determination of the feeling of absolute dependence. The ecclesiastical value of the dogmatic proposition, then, constitutes its substance, for the ultimate criterion of the authenticity of any individual proposition lies in the extent to which it expresses the common consciousness of man's relation to God experienced in pious feeling. As a result, "valid doctrine," Schleiermacher states,

is not by any means to be taken as signifying merely what is expressed in (confessional) Symbols, but rather all doctrines which are dogmatic expressions of that which, in the public proceedings of the Church (even if only in certain regions of it), can be put forward as a presentation of its common piety without provoking dissension and schism.\textsuperscript{124}

This, for Schleiermacher, is the primary norm of the dogmatic proposition. Only those doctrines which set forth the communal experience of a particular Church are to be included in the System of Doctrine. Although Schleiermacher delineates this central criterion from an ecclesiastical standpoint, he insists that this perspective finally be measured in terms of the foundation of pious feeling, Christ the Redeemer.

Thus, in all completely expressed dogmatic propositions, the reference to Christ as Redeemer must appear with the same measure of prominence which it has in the religious consciousness itself.\textsuperscript{125}

By virtue of the communication of the power of his pure God-consciousness, Christ is the cornerstone of the religious affections which comprise the pious life of the believer.

The second norm of the dogmatic proposition, that it be formulated scientifically, "depends in the first place upon the definiteness of the

\textsuperscript{124} CF, Proposition 19, 3, pp. 89-90; GL., I, p. 121.

\textsuperscript{125} CF, Proposition 17, 1, p. 83; GL., I, p. 113.
concepts which appear in it, and of their connexion with each other.\textsuperscript{126}

In the second place, the scientific value of the proposition "consists in its fruitfulness, that is to say, its many-sidedness in pointing us towards other kindred ones ..."\textsuperscript{127} By 'scientific value' Schleiermacher does not mean to imply that the connection and interrelation of individual propositions in the formation of the System of Doctrine stems from a deductive process. On the contrary, "no dogmatic proposition is based on another, and each one can only be discovered from contemplation of the Christian self-consciousness ..."\textsuperscript{128} The scientific value relates specifically to doctrinal presentation, rather than to the essence of doctrine itself. The scientific value lends to the dogmatic proposition the preciseness of reflection on, and the lucid articulation of, the pious feeling which is the living center of all Christian doctrine. As such, the scientific value is decidedly secondary to the ecclesiastical norm, enhancing the original experience of pious feeling through the order and structure of technical formulation. The scientific value, with regard to the role which it plays both in the conceptual construction of the single proposition and in the relation of the latter to others in the System of Doctrine, is responsible for the proper organization of the dogmatic material.\textsuperscript{129}

Schleiermacher was well aware of the precarious relationship between

\textsuperscript{126} Cf. Proposition 17, 2, p. 84; GL., I, p. 114.

\textsuperscript{127} Cf. Proposition 17, 2, p. 84; GL., I, p. 114.

\textsuperscript{128} Cf. Proposition 17, 2, pp. 84-85; GL., I, p. 114.

\textsuperscript{129} Cf. GL., I, Proposition 18, p. 115: "Die Zusammenstellung dogmatischer Sätze, um sie miteinander zu verknüpfen und aufeinander zu beziehen, geht von dem nämlichen Bedürfnis aus wie die dogmatische Satzbildung selbst, und ist nur eine natürliche Folge von dieser."
the ecclesiastical and scientific values of the dogmatic proposition. As has been noted, the scientific value, though not the basis of the dogmatic proposition, is an exigent constituent of doctrinal formulation. Through what Schleiermacher calls the "logical or dialectical interest," ordered reflection (scientific value) is brought to bear on pious feeling (ecclesiastical value) in such a way that the expression of religious experience in doctrinal form is achieved. This is the positive function of human thinking in the Glaubenslehre. Yet, Schleiermacher maintained that the logical or dialectical interest would militate against the very task of dogmatics were its influence to extend to the content itself of the dogmatic proposition. Were this influence to be actual, speculation would find its way into Christian doctrine. The inevitable result of such an admittance would be not only the formal determination of the conceptual construction of individual doctrines and their interrelation by this mode of dialectical endeavor, but also the influence of the given character of pious feeling. For Schleiermacher, theology, and dogmatics as a branch of theology, is a positive science. Its proper object is the historical and experiential reality of faith. The task of dogmatics consists in the doctrinal expression of the givenness of Christian self-consciousness: Since the logical or dialectical interest stems from mediate self-consciousness (the proper object of Schleiermacher's philosophical endeavor in the Dialektik) and not from pious feeling, it cannot, in Schleiermacher's view, substantively influence the dogmatic proposition. In his Zweites Schreiben an Lücke, the theologian states:

130 Cf. Gl., I, Proposition 16, Postscript, p. 111. For text see footnote 132.
... if I yet found a (dogmatic) proposition which, according to its content, were in some way speculative, or only for some reason could be perceived as such, then I would remove its inappropriate garment or strike the proposition.\textsuperscript{131}

With regard to the employment of the logical or dialectical interest in a fashion commensurate with the demands of proper dogmatic exposition, Schleiermacher limits the influence of this interest to the form of the doctrinal proposition alone.\textsuperscript{132} He is insistent that the content of the latter remain untouched by the specific contributions of the scientific value.

The centrality of the ecclesiastical value of the doctrinal proposition in Schleiermacher's dogmatics is highlighted in his delineation of three perspectives in terms of which the propositions of Christian doctrine are to be unfolded.

All propositions which the Christian Glaubenslehre is to establish can be conceived of either as descriptions of human states of life, or as concepts of divine attributes and modes of action, or as pronouncements regarding the constitution of the World; and all of these three forms have always co-existed beside each other.\textsuperscript{133}

\textsuperscript{131} "... wenn ich noch einen Satz fände, der irgend seinem Inhalt nach spekulativ wäre, oder nur mit einem Recht dafür könnte angesehen werden, so würde ich ihm dieses unhochzeitliche Gewand ausziehen, oder ihn ausstreichen." \textit{Sendschreiben}, p. 66 (651).

\textsuperscript{132} Cf. \textit{Gl.}, I, Proposition 16, Postscript, p. 111: "Wenn aber die Umbildung der ursprünglichen Ausdrücke zu dogmatischen Sätzen dem logischen oder dialektischen Interesse zugeschrieben wird; so ist dieses nur von der Form zu verstehen. Denn ein Satz, welcher etwa von der spekulativen Tätigkeit ursprünglich ausgegangen wäre, er möchte seinem Inhalt nach den unspringlich so verwandt sein, wäre doch kein dogmatischer mehr."

\textsuperscript{133} Translation mine. "Alle Sätze, welche die christliche Glaubenslehre aufzustellen hat, können gefasst werden 'entweder als Beschreibungen menschlicher Lebenszustände, oder als Begriffe von göttlichen Eigenschaften und Handlungsweisen, oder als Aussagen von Beschaffenheiten der Welt; und alle diese drei Formen haben immer nebeneinander bestanden.' \textit{Gl.}, I, Proposition 30, p. 163. The English translation of Proposition 30 of the Glaubenslehre incompletely renders 'menschlicher Lebenszustände' as 'human states.'
The first form of the dogmatic proposition—human states of life—refers to the temporal manifestation of the feeling of absolute dependence and, thus, to the pious experience of man in the World. In other words, this mode of description focuses on the positive determination received by religious feeling as it occurs in a particular instance in the broader spectrum of human experience. This propositional form most directly describes the feeling of absolute dependence, defined in the exposition of Proposition 30 as "a co-existence of God in the self-consciousness . . ." since the states of life expressed are those which mold and shape the experiential emergence of the God-consciousness. In turn, these states of life are themselves influenced by this very same emergence of inner pious experience.

The second and third forms of the dogmatic proposition—respectively, concepts of divine attributes and modes of action and pronouncements regarding the constitution of the World—ultimately have their source in the first, though both are based, more directly than the first, on the determination of sensible, mediate self-consciousness with which immediate pious feeling is experientially conjoined. Since they do not directly originate from the inner realm of piety, Schleiermacher recognizes that the second and third forms of the dogmatic proposition must be carefully developed so as closely to express the experience described in the first form if the task of dogmatics is to be realized. As such, Schleiermacher considers those doctrines expressing concepts of divine attributes and modes of action and pronouncements regarding the constitution of the World to be decidedly secondary to those doctrines expressing

134 Cf, Proposition 30, 1, p. 126; Gl., I, p. 164.
human states of life. The doctrines developed under the first form of the dogmatic proposition more directly describe the heart of all Church doctrine—the Christian determination of pious feeling—and thus accomplish the task of dogmatic theology to a greater extent than the doctrines developed under the second and third propositional forms.

In his Zweites Sendschreiben an Lücke, published one year prior to the appearance of the second edition of the Glaubenslehre, Schleiermacher voices his conviction regarding the second and third forms of the dogmatic proposition that "our Glaubenslehre will one day learn to manage without them." 135 Schleiermacher failed to carry out this project himself on the grounds that if anyone were to attempt at the present time to treat Christian Dogmatics in this way, his work would be left isolated without any historical support; and not only would it lack a really ecclesiastical character, but, however perfectly it rendered the content of Christian doctrine, it would not fulfill the real purpose of all Dogmatics. 136

The actual structure of the Glaubenslehre forms a complex masterpiece which attests to the synthetic nature of Schleiermacher's thought. As we have seen, the Introduction of the work is followed by Schleiermacher's dogmatic exposition of Christian faith in the System of Doctrine.

135 "Denn, wenn es wahr ist, das sie (die Nebenformen) nichts aussagen, was nicht seinem wesentlichen Gehalte nach schon in Sätzen, welche die Grundform an sich tragen, enthalten sei: so können jene beiden anderen ja gemischt werden. Und das ist auch in der Tat meine Überzeugung, womit denn auch die zusammenhängt, dass unsere Glaubenslehre einmal lernen wird, sich ohne sie zu behelfen." Sendschreiben, p. 47 (627). The terms which Schleiermacher employs to refer to the first (Grundform) and second and third (Nebenformen) forms of the dogmatic proposition connote his own estimation of the respective role which each plays in dogmatic exposition.

136 Cfr, Proposition 30, 3, pp. 126-127; Gl., I, p. 165.
proper, which consists of two parts. The first has as its task "the development of that religious self-consciousness which is always both presupposed by and contained in every Christian religious affection"; the second, "the development of the facts of the religious self-consciousness as they are determined by the antithesis of sin and grace." These two parts are unfolded in terms of the three forms of the dogmatic proposition. The following table provides a synoptic outline of the ordered presentation of Christian doctrine set forth in Schleiermacher's dogmatics.

The System of Doctrine

I. First Part

1. A Description of the Religious Self-consciousness insofar as the relation between God and World is expressed in it (Doctrines of Creation and Preservation)

2. The Divine Attributes which are related to the Religious Self-consciousness so far as it expresses the General Relationship between God and the World (Eternity, Omnipresence, Omnipotence, Omniscience)

3. The Constitution of the World which is indicated in the Religious Self-Consciousness, so far as it expresses the General Relationship between God and the World (Doctrines of the Original Perfection of Man; the Original Perfection of the World)

II. Second Part

A. Consciousness of Sin

1. Sin as the State of Man (Doctrines of Original and Actual Sin)

2. The Corresponding Constitution of the World (Doctrine of Evil)

3. The Corresponding Divine Attributes (Holiness, Justice)

B. Consciousness of Grace

1. The State of the Christian Consciousness of Divine Grace (Doctrines of the Person and Work of Christ; the Reception of Grace)

2. The Corresponding Constitution of the World (Doctrines of the Church; the Means of Grace; Eschatology)

3. The Corresponding Divine Attributes (Love, Wisdom)

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Between the First and Second Parts of the System of Doctrine one notices a variation in the order in which the three forms of the doctrinal proposition are treated. This alteration in the project is probably due to Schleiermacher's desire to move more smoothly from the First Part of the System to the Second, the doctrines of the original perfection of man and the World providing a related transitional theme from which to begin the dogmatic analysis of the consciousness of sin.\footnote{138} To the System of Doctrine, Schleiermacher appended an examination of the traditional doctrine of the Trinity which the theologian considered unfit for inclusion in the System of Doctrine itself on the grounds that it "is not an immediate utterance concerning the Christian self-consciousness.

The exact relationship between the First and Second Parts of the System of Doctrine has always been a problem for students of the \textit{Glaubenslehre} and one of which Schleiermacher was not unaware. It is clear that the Second Part directly has as its goal the description of the specifically Christian determination of the feeling of absolute dependence, while the First Part purports to set forth those doctrines presupposed by every religious self-consciousness that has achieved an advanced level of development. The problem of the relationship of the two parts of the System of Doctrine, then, may be formulated as follows: in view of the

\footnote{138} Claude Welch offers a more negative reason suggesting that Schleiermacher's concern with the "speculative" elements in his doctrine of God led him to change the order of treatment. Cf. Claude Welch, \textit{Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century}, Vol. 1, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 76, n. 34. Welch's point is that Schleiermacher wants to avoid the appearance that the First Part of the \textit{Glaubenslehre} culminates in a doctrine of God in which speculative elements are prominent.

\footnote{139} Cf. Proposition 170, p. 738; \textit{Gl.}, II, p. 458.
fact that the exposition of the First Part does not specifically and solely describe the Christian determination of pious feeling, can the doctrines there set forth be considered to be a genuine part of Christian dogmatics? Schleiermacher addressed himself to this question early in the Second Part of the System of Doctrine:

The propositions of the first part, which lay less direct stress on what is distinctly Christian, are on that account often treated as Natural Theology of an original and universally valid kind, and as such are overrated by those who are themselves less permeated by the distinctive element in Christianity. Others, again, underrate these propositions as attainable even apart from Christianity, and will only allow those propositions which express a relation to the Redeemer to rank as specifically Christian. Both parties are in error. For the former propositions are in no sense the reflection of a meagre and purely monotheistic God-consciousness, but are abstracted from one which has issued from fellowship with the Redeemer. Similarly, propositions expressing a relation to Christ are genuinely Christian propositions only in so far as they recognize no other criterion for relationship with the Redeemer than the measure in which the continuity of the God-consciousness is produced thereby...

Yet, while Schleiermacher valued the First Part of the Glaubenslehre as indispensable, he, as the above passage demonstrates, considered the doctrines there developed to be meaningful only in connection with the specifically Christian determination of pious feeling directly portrayed in the Second Part. In his Zweites Sendschreiben an Lücke the theologian states:

... the First Part indeed belongs to the structure itself, but yet only as an entrance and a vestibule; and the propositions of this Part, as they could be given there, are in reality only unfilled frames, and only attain their true content through their relation to that which is subsequently advanced (in the Second Part).

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140 CF, Proposition 62, 3, pp. 261-262; Gl., I, p. 344. See also Gl., I, Proposition 29, pp. 161-163; Sendschreiben, p. 33 (609).
141 ... der erste Teil gehöre zwar zum Gebäude selbst, aber doch nur als Eintritt und Vorbaal, und die Sätze desselben seien, so wie sie
Schleiermacher listened carefully enough to those who criticized the relationship of the two parts to consider reversing the order of their presentation in the second edition. He rejected this plan, however, giving as a reason his strong disinclination for the form of anticlimax.  

It should be noted that Schleiermacher develops the First Part of the System of Doctrine with regard to the theme of the relationship between God and World. This, it should be recalled, is the theme on which the present study focuses in order to illustrate its contention. Following a pivotal examination of Schleiermacher's view on the experience of Gefühl in chapter four, we shall, in chapters five through seven, turn to an in-depth analysis of the doctrines exposted in the First Part of the Glaubenslehre. Our goal in these chapters will be to determine precisely the influence of Schleiermacher's philosophical exposition of the God-World relationship upon this relationship as developed in the First Part of Glaubenslehre.

4. Postscript

In concluding this chapter a brief statement on the critical reception of Schleiermacher's dogmatics is in order. It is indeed
dort gegeben werden könnten, eigentlich nur unausgefüllte Rahmen, und bekämen ihren wahren Gehalt nur durch die Beziehung auf das, was erst hernach vorgetragen werde." Sendschreiben, p. 32 (607-608).

142 Cf. Sendschreiben, p. 35 (611-612): "Die Grille, mein Lieber, ist eine sehr starke Abneigung eben gegen jene Form des Antiklimax! Wenn die göttliche Weisheit und Liebe mir so wenig bedeuteten, wie es in einer pantheistischen Dogmatik . . . nicht anders sein kann: so würde es mir nicht möglich gewesen sein, ihnen die jetzige Stellung zu geben, so wie ich mich wohl gehütet hätte, mein Bestes gleich vorn weg zu nehmen."

surprising that a work subsequently accorded such a pre-eminent place in
the history of modern theology should have been so negatively received
in its own day. The major charges leveled against the Glaubenslehre
were those of pantheism, pure subjectivism, and disguised philosophizing.
The first was promulgated by those critics who insisted on reading the
Glaubenslehre from the perspective of the Reden; the second was voiced
by those who were convinced that Schleiermacher's emphasis on the
experiential basis of Christian doctrine was both inordinate and unjusti-
fied.

The third reproach—that the Glaubenslehre is, at least in many
fundamental ways, a disguised philosophy—was by far the most repeated
criticism of the dogmatics at the time of its publication and is one
which has continued to occupy the interest of Schleiermacher scholars
to the present day. 144 This objection was made in two forms. The first
is the directed charge launched by the Tübingen theologian Ferdinand
Christian Baur who claimed that Schleiermacher's christology was per-
meated with speculative elements which had their basis in idealist
philosophy. 145 Baur maintained that Schleiermacher mistakenly subordi-
nated the historical Jesus to an ideal representation of Christ, this
subordination being indicative, in Baur's view, of the gnostic propensities
of Schleiermacher's theology. 146 The second form of this objection

144 Cf. Ibid., pp. 110-111.
145 Cf. Ibid., pp. 114f.
146 Cf. Ferdinand Christian Baur, Die christliche Gnosis oder die
christliche Religionsphilosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung,
638f. See also Heinz Liebing, "Ferdinand Christian Bauers Kritik an
to this article is a letter from Baur to his brother written on July 26,
maintains more generally that Schleiermacher, whether consciously or unconsciously, violated his own methodological exclusion of philosophy from the sphere of dogmatics. 147 Our interest lies in the latter form of the objection for it expresses the very contention of our study. In this study, we intend to demonstrate specifically the extent to which Schleiermacher's dogmatic formulation of the God-World relationship in the Glaubenslehre was influenced by his philosophical determination of this same relationship in the Dialektik. The first step toward this goal will be taken in the following chapter which will examine both the relationship between philosophy and theology in Schleiermacher's thought in general and the determined, specific role which Schleiermacher assigned to philosophy in the Glaubenslehre.

1823, shortly after the Tübingen theologian's first reading of the Glaubenslehre, in which he conveys his impressions of the work. For Schleiermacher's response to Baur's critique, see S chreib, p. 11 (582); pp. 48-49 (628-629).

147 For the various nuances of this form of the objection as represented by such critics as De Wette, Rätze, Hase, and Wähner, see Hermann Mulert, "Die Aufnahme der Glaubenslehre Schleiermachers," pp. 111f.
CHAPTER 3
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND
THEOLOGY IN SCHLEIERMACHER'S THOUGHT

This study examines the extent to which Schleiermacher was successful in carrying out his proposed exclusion of a substantive philosophical influence upon Christian doctrine from the sphere of dogmatics. It is our conviction that this problem may best be explored through the theme of God and World. This theme, which is treated by Schleiermacher in his seminal philosophical and theological works, respectively the Dialektik and the Glaubenslehre, unfolds areas of inquiry which facilitate an understanding of the precise role played by philosophy in the Glaubenslehre, a matter long-contested in the history of Schleiermacher scholarship. In our view, the theme of God and World portrays the substantive influence of Schleiermacher's philosophy upon the fundamental exposition of doctrine in the dogmatics, a type of influence which Schleiermacher himself clearly disclaimed.

As has been seen in the previous chapter, the respective principles on which the Dialektik and the Glaubenslehre are based, as well as the methods employed in these works, are quite different. The Dialektik focuses on an examination of mediate, reflective self-consciousness through the methodologies of metaphysics and logic. The Glaubenslehre employs a descriptive method in expositing Church doctrine, which focuses on the experience of immediate, self-consciousness, i.e., pious feeling.
Although both works proceed from different principles and methods, each accords careful attention to the relationship of God and World. As will be shown in chapter five, the Transcendental Part of the Dialektik concludes with a discussion of the God-World relationship in which Schleiermacher delineates the boundaries of adequate philosophical representation of this relationship. The Glaubenslehre devotes the First Part of the System of Doctrine to a consideration of the God-World relationship from the standpoint of Christian dogmatics. The doctrines expounded in this section of the Glaubenslehre will be examined in chapters five through seven. Both the philosophical and the dogmatic treatments of the God-World relationship are extremely important constituents of the works in which they appear. The treatment of this relationship in the Dialektik summarizes the purport of Schleiermacher's entire epistemology. The First Part of the Glaubenslehre, on the other hand, develops the doctrines which express the fundamental structure of religious self-consciousness presupposed by and contained in the Christian determination of pious feeling. The theme of God and World thus provides a focal point in terms of which to consider the influence of Schleiermacher's philosophy upon his dogmatics.

I. Schleiermacher's Estimation of the Role of Philosophy in the Glaubenslehre

In the previous chapter we have briefly called attention to Schleiermacher's position on the role played by philosophy in the Glaubenslehre. The task of dogmatics, it should be recalled, consists in the description, in doctrinal form, of the Christian determination of pious feeling shared by a particular Church. Dogmatic propositions are
comprised of both ecclesiastical and scientific values. The ecclesiastical value is the extent to which the experience of pious feeling is expressed in the dogmatic proposition. This value constitutes the basis of the proposition. The scientific value is the extent to which the logical or dialectical interest contributes to the form and precision of this expression. This form and precision of expression are necessary for the critical delineation of the individual propositions, as well as for their systematic connection into an ordered whole. The ecclesiastical value reflects the heart and substance of dogma, i.e., pious feeling itself. The scientific value is based on the activity of reason and plays a decidedly secondary, though requisite, role in doctrinal formulation. The content or substance of Christian doctrine only properly stems from the 'evidence of pious, immediate self-consciousness'; the contributions of philosophy, or of the dialectical interest of mediate self-consciousness, to the exposition of doctrine are limited by Schleiermacher to the form of the dogmatic proposition alone. In Schleiermacher's view, philosophy, i.e., the logical or dialectical interest, may only assist the dogmatic enterprise by contributing to the preciseness and lucidity of how dogma is expressed; it may never constitute the basis of what is expressed. The content or substance of Christian dogma must be grounded solely in pious feeling. Should philosophy, i.e., the logical or dialectical interest, at all influence the substance or content of dogma, the dogma so influenced would cease

1Cf. Sendschreiben, p. 66 (650): "Lassen Sie mich also bei meinem timeo Danaos et dona ferentes immer bleiben und mich freuen, dass ich dem Vorsatz treu geblieben bin, meinem eignen philosophischen Dilettantismus, und wenn ich mehr auf diesem Gebiet aufzuweisen hätte, würde meine Maxime doch dieselbe geblieben sein, keinen Einfluss auf den Inhalt der Glaubenslehre gestattet zu haben."
to be thus qualified and would be instead a speculative construction.

The logical or dialectical interest, may only play a formal role in the task of dogmatics:

... when the transformation of the original expressions (of pious self-consciousness) into dogmatic propositions is ascribed to the logical or dialectical interest (dem logischen oder dialektischen Interesse), this is to be understood as applying only to the form. A proposition which had originally proceeded from the speculative activity (von der spekulativen Tätigkeit), however akin it might be to our propositions in content, would not be a dogmatic proposition.

In this statement of his position, Schleiermacher delineates two possible roles which philosophy may play in the Glaubenslehre. The first is the activity of the logical or dialectical interest directed to the form of the dogmatic proposition. This is the positive, accepted, and even requisite role which philosophy, according to Schleiermacher, plays in the dogmatic enterprise. The second is the role of the speculative activity which, when taken to be the original substance of the dogmatic proposition, completely violates the authenticity of dogmatic expression. Such a substantive influence of philosophy on dogmatics is completely inadmissible in Schleiermacher's view.

It is our contention that the relationship between these two possible roles of philosophy in the Glaubenslehre is both fragile and tenuous. Schleiermacher polemicized against the substantive influence of any philosophy whatsoever upon the content of dogmatics. It is important to realize that the two possible roles which philosophy may

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2 Cf. Proposition 16, Postscript, p. 81; Gl., I, p. 111.

play in the Glaubenslehre are defined in terms of their respective influences on the dogmatic proposition. The activity of the logical or dialectical interest, the fundamental philosophical disposition, is defined as such with regard to its influence upon the form of the dogmatic proposition. The speculative activity is defined as such with regard to its influence upon the content or substance of the dogmatic proposition, an influence which Schleiermacher vehemently prohibited. The activity of the logical or dialectical interest and the speculative activity are not two types of philosophy but rather two roles, one positive, one negative, which philosophy itself may play in dogmatics. Although the essential spirit of both roles is identical, the respective influences which they exert upon the dogmatic proposition constitute their difference. In other words, if the activity of the logical or dialectical interest extended its influence to the substance or content of the dogmatic proposition, this influence would imply the re-definition of this activity as speculative. It is this tenuous relationship between the two possible roles which philosophy may play in the Glaubenslehre which leads us to consider seriously the extent to which Schleiermacher's philosophical thinking, as set forth in the Dialektik, substantively influenced his exposition of doctrine in the dogmatics.

We should be aware that Schleiermacher's strict delimitation of the contributions of philosophy to dogmatics is initiated in the interests of the latter discipline. Any consideration of the place of philosophy in Schleiermacher's dogmatics must proceed from the recognition that his restriction of the logical or dialectical interest to the form of the dogmatic proposition is itself a theological statement and one which
expresses the nineteenth century theologian's position on the traditional problem of man's appropriation of knowledge of God.

Immediate self-consciousness which has attained the level of the feeling of absolute dependence is the seat of man's knowledge (more appropriately, in Schleiermacher's view, experience) of God. In terms of the vocabulary of dogmatics, the ecclesiastical value alone may serve as the foundation of doctrinal expression. The proper object of dogmatic exposition ever remains, for Schleiermacher, the Christian determination of the feeling of absolute dependence.

The centrality accorded to the Christian modification of the feeling of absolute dependence, as the locus of man's experience of God, is evidenced in Schleiermacher's treatment of the idea of revelation. In the Glaubenslehre, the theologian defines the idea of revelation as the originality of the fact which lies at the foundation of a religious communion, in the sense that this fact, as conditioning the individual content of the religious emotions which are found in the communion, cannot itself in turn be explained by the historical chain which precedes it.\(^4\)

To this qualification Schleiermacher adds that he is unwilling to accept the position that the original element essential to the idea of revelation "operates upon man as a cognitive being."\(^5\) Mediate self-consciousness, the basis of the logical or dialectical interest, possesses no experiential relation at all to the idea of revelation. The latter can be properly applied "only to the region of the higher self-consciousness."\(^6\) Schleiermacher totally rejects any distinction at all between mediate

\(^4\) *CF*, Proposition 10, Postscript, p. 50; *Gl.*, I, pp. 71-72.

\(^5\) *CF*, Proposition 10, Postscript, p. 50; *Gl.*, I, p. 72.

\(^6\) *CF*, Proposition 13, 1, p. 63; *Gl.*, I, p. 89.
and immediate revelation.\(^7\)

In Schleiermacher's view, the fact that the Christian (and specifically Protestant) determination of the feeling of absolute dependence is the object of the descriptively didactic presentation of the Glaubenslehre implies that the original element in the idea of revelation under discussion be identified solely with Christ. The appearance of the Redeemer in history constitutes the original revelatory event through which man is saved. It is through feeling that the recognition of Christ's salvific efficacy is achieved and the spiritual benefits of his saving work are appropriated.\(^8\)

The immediacy of religious self-consciousness conveys the ultimate significance of God's revelation to man. By the operation of the Savior's perfect and unbounded God-consciousness on the immediate self-consciousness of man, the economy of salvation unfolds in history. Although Schleiermacher considers both Scripture and symbolic books to be invaluable in setting forth the truth of the Christian faith, he insists that their validity be measured in terms of the immediate experience of pious feeling. In his letter to the philosopher Jacobi, Schleiermacher states that the Bible "is the original translation of Christian feeling . . .\(^9\)"

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\(^7\)Cf. Gl., I, Proposition 10, Postscript, p. 71.

\(^8\)In a letter to Karl Heinrich Sack dated April 9, 1825, Schleiermacher explicates this point: "Das Wort Joh. 1,14: Wir sahen seine Herrlichkeit u.s.w. ist der Keim alles Dogma, und gibt sich selbst für nichts anderes, als für die in Rede übertragene Affection. Ja auch was Christus von sich selbst sagt, wäre keine christliche Wahrheit geworden, wenn es sich nicht sogleich durch diese Affection bewährt hätte. Diese ist also und bleibt mir das Ursprüngliche im Christenthum und alles andere ist nur von ihr abgeleitet. Die wirksame d.h. auf eine bestimmte Art affiziere Erscheinung Christi ist die wahre Offenbarung und das Objective." Briefe, IV, p. 335.

\(^9\)"Die Bibel ist die ursprüngliche Dolmetschung des christlichen
latter always retains primacy in the theologian's view on man's
appropriation of religious truth. The symbolic books issued since the
birth of Protestantism are evaluated by Schleiermacher as indispensable
in highlighting the differences between the Evangelical and Roman
Churches. The proper object of their apologetical and polemical exposi-
tion, however, is Scripture and, consequently, the symbolic books remain
even further removed from the original data of the higher self-
consciousness.  

It is with respect to Schleiermacher's unfailing concern that the
truth of Christianity be portrayed completely in accordance with the
positive reality of pious feeling that his limitation of acceptable
philosophical influence in the sphere of dogmatics to the form of the
dogmatic proposition alone must be viewed. In the sphere of dogmatics,
the nineteenth century theologian recognizes and supports the contribu-
tions of "logically ordered reflection upon the immediate utterances of
the religious self-consciousness . . .," 11 which, he claims, have found
a place in the theological enterprise throughout its entire history.
Cognitive and linguistic determination are necessary in order to insure

Gefühls und eben deshalb so feststehend, dass sie nur immer besser
verstanden und entwickelt werden darf." Briefe, II, p. 351. The deri-
native character of Scripture is further accentuated in the letter of
Schleiermacher to Sack quoted above. Briefe, IV, p. 334: "Entstanden
muss er (Christus) nicht sein aus der Schrift, weil es sonst in zwei
Jahrhunderten keinen Glauben gegeben hätte; und also, konnte er auch
immer noch entstehen ohne Schrift. Feder und Tinte sind doch etwas zu
Unwesentliches. Die Schrift ist nichts für sich, sondern nur etwas als
der fortlebende vor Augen gemalte Christus, der denn in der Schrift wie
mündlich von sich selbst zeugt, und sein Zeugnis ist wahr."

10Cf. Schleiermacher's essay Ueber den eigenthümlichen Werth und
das Bindende Ansehen symbolischer Bücher, SW, I, 5, pp. 423-454.

11CF; Proposition 16, Postscript, p. 81; Gl., I, p. 110.
the ordered, systematic character which dogmatics, as a branch of theological science, presupposes. Schleiermacher is adamant, however, in his insistence that pious feeling be the object of dogmatic theology and that no foreign element substantively influence what he considers to be the proper locus of the appropriation of religious truth. The logical or dialectical interest may only play a formal role in the task of dogmatics. The content or substance of dogma remains the experience of immediate pious feeling:

The Evangelical (Protestant) Church in particular is unanimous in feeling that the distinctive form of its dogmatic propositions does not depend on any form or school of philosophy, and has not proceeded at all from a speculative interest, but simply from the interest of satisfying the immediate self-consciousness solely through the means ordained by Christ, in their genuine and uncorrupted form.\textsuperscript{12}

II. Schleiermacher's Theological Evaluation of Philosophy

Although Schleiermacher restricts the role that philosophy can play in the Glaubenslehre to the form of the doctrinal proposition, one must not judge his methodological regulation to be indicative of his being negatively disposed toward philosophy as such. Schleiermacher, who, it must be remembered, was a philosopher as well as a theologian, explicitly defended the complementary relationship of the philosophical and the religious temperaments. In his Zweites Sendeschreiben an Lücke he writes:

Thus, I also think that no one can doubt how I determine the relationship between religion and philosophy. I really believe, and always hope to believe (and that it will also be believed yet long after me, and then perhaps even more than now), that both can exist very well in the same subject, . . . (and) that a true philosopher can also be and remain a true believer, and precisely in the sense that one can be pious in his heart, and

\textsuperscript{12} Cf., Proposition 16, Postscript, pp. 82-83; G1., I, p. 112.
yet have and retain the courage to entrench himself in the
deepest depths of speculation.  

Being aware of the fact that theology, in Schleiermacher's view, is the
daughter of religion, his stance on the limitation of the role of
philosophy in the Glaubenslehre to the form of the dogmatic proposition
alone is difficult to reconcile with the positive evaluation of philo-
sophy as such expressed in the above-quoted passage.

As has been mentioned, Schleiermacher's definite and uncompromising
position on the role of philosophy in the Glaubenslehre must be traced
to his resolution to describe in this work the spiritual
experience indwelling in the Church solely from the standpoint of reli-
gious self-consciousness. This is Schleiermacher's estimation of the
task of dogmatic theology. The seminal importance of the philosophical
enterprise in Schleiermacher's life and work, however, as well as his
assertion of the compatibility of the philosophical and pious interests,
lead us to question the feasibility of Schleiermacher's theological

13 "So denke ich, kann auch niemand zweifeln, wie ich Religion und
Philosophie zueinander stelle. Ich glaube wirklich, und hoffe auch immer
zu glauben, und dass es auch noch lange nach mir und dann vielleicht noch
mehr geglaubt werden wird als jetzt, dass beides sehr gut in demselben
Subjekt bestehen kann, . . . dass ein wahrer Philosoph auch ein wahrer
Gläubiger sein und bleiben kann, und ebenso, dass man von Herzen fromm
sein kann und doch den Mut haben und behalten, sich in die tiefsten
Tiefen der Spekulation hineinzugraben." Sendschreiben, pp. 64-65 (648-
649). This passage finds support in Schleiermacher's so-called "last
sermon," the words spoken by the theologian on his death-bed and later
recorded by his wife. "... ich, muss die tiefsten speculativen Gedanken
denken und die sind mir völlig eins mit den innigsten religiösen

14 In his Erstes Sendschreiben an Lücke, Schleiermacher supports
Luther's approach to theology in the following words: "War nicht auch
unser Luther ein solcher und fing erst an, über seine Frömmigkeit nach-
zudenken, als es galt, ihren Besitz festzuhalten, so dass seine Theologie
offenbar eine Tochter seiner Religion war?" Sendschreiben, p. 16 (587).
Cf. Richard R. Niebuhr, Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion, (New York:
programmatic. Can the content and substance of Schleiermacher's dogmatics remain untouched by the influence of a discipline which played such an important role in Schleiermacher's thought? We shall be better able to recognize the importance of this question upon having considered Schleiermacher's theological evaluation of philosophy in his work prior to the publication of the Glaubenslehre. This examination will give us some insight into Schleiermacher's estimation of his own activities as both a philosopher and a theologian. We shall proceed by analyzing three writings which discuss the relationship of philosophy and theology: Jenisch, the Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums, and Schleiermacher's Brief an Jacobi.

1. Jenisch

Jenisch\textsuperscript{15} is a review article written against a Berlin preacher by the same name who had viciously attacked Schleiermacher in a published work. Schleiermacher's response, which is inordinately caustic and quite discordant with its author's customary even-tempered style, was written in 1804 and published in the Jenaer Litteraturzeitung in 1806. In our efforts to determine the relationship of philosophy and theology set forth in this article, we should recall that Schleiermacher's lectures on dogmatics commenced at Halle in the Winter semester of 1804/1805. Thus, the review article Jenisch was written during the same year in which the theologian first attempted to wrestle with the problems of

\textsuperscript{15} The complete title of this writing is Jenisch, Kritik des dogmatischen, idealistischen und hyperidealistischen Religions- und Moral-Systems, nebst einem Versuch Religion und Moral von philosophischen Systemen unabhängig zu begründen, und zugleich die Theologen aus der Dienstbarkeit zu befreien, in welche sich seit langer Zeit an die Philosophen verkauft hatten. Jenisch is reprinted in Briefe, IV, pp. 615-624.
dogmatics in the lecture hall. Although Schleiermacher scholarship has viewed the Halle period (1804-1809) as significant for the young theologian's conception of dogmatics, the Weihnachtsfeier (1806) has usually served as the object of critical interest, the roots of Schleiermacher's mature Christology being traced to this work. The review article Jenisch, though far more terse and undeveloped than the Weihnachtsfeier, is nevertheless important for its contributions to the understanding of the relationship of philosophy and theology in Schleiermacher's thought.

In his work, Jenisch had heralded the need to free religion and morality completely from their servitude to philosophy. The interests of philosophy, for Jenisch, can have nothing but a detrimental influence upon religion and morality, no matter how slight that influence may be. The Berlin preacher advocated the absolute exclusion of philosophy from matters of religious and moral concern. He found two of Schleiermacher's works, the Reden and the Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre, to be guilty of surreptitious philosophizing under the guise of religion and ethics.

Schleiermacher's objections to Jenisch's critical principles are two-fold. First; Jenisch, Schleiermacher claims, correctly recognizes religion to be something originally given, but mistakenly identifies religion with dogma. Although dogma is an expression of piety it cannot be equated with piety itself. The sphere of dogmatics by no means exhausts the sphere of the religious. Second, Jenisch, Schleiermacher asserts, has disparaged philosophy to the point of making it something arbitrary and inconsequential.16 This point is of particular concern.

16Cf. Briefe, IV, p. 623: "Denn wie gewöhnlich sind doch jene beiden Ansichten, die Religion als ein ursprünglich Gegebenes anzusehen, dabei aber sie selbst mit der Glaubenslehre, mit den Dogmen zu verwechseln, und
for Schleiermacher and specifically relates to the interest of our study in this writing. Jenisch's misrepresentation of the relationship of philosophy and religion is based on his denigration of the philosophical enterprise as such, a position which Schleiermacher strongly opposed.

Philosophy, though, is absolutely religious by nature if it is only actually living intuition; for it is not possible that he who possesses knowledge out of intuition should not also possess it as feeling.17

Philosophy and religion do not present antipodal, but rather complementary and mutually supportive perspectives on human experience and existence.

Schleiermacher maintains that the recognition of the "pure relation between religion and philosophy" must be made from the perspective of philosophy itself.18 Religion as well, particularly through the dogmatic expression of piety, must recognize the extent to which philosophy complements the experience of immediate, religious self-consciousness. According to Schleiermacher, dogmatics must "exhibit the formation of dogmas originally out of religious feeling and then compare the formation of dogmas with the utterances of pure speculation."19 The basis of this

die Philosophie hingegen als ein Gemachtes gewissermassen willkührliches und zufälliges!"

17 "Die Philosophie aber ist ihrer Natur nach schlechthin religiös, wenn sie nur wirklich lebendige Anschauung ist; denn es ist nicht möglich, dass, wer das Erkennen aus Anschauung hat, es nicht auch als Gefühl haben sollte." Briefe, IV, p. 623.

18 "Die endliche Anerkennung des reinen Verhältnisses zwischen Religion und Philosophie muss durch die Philosophie selbst bewirkt werden." Briefe, IV, p. 624.

19 This position is stated in the form of a rhetorical question to which Schleiermacher expects an unequivocably affirmative response: "Sollte man aber auch nicht von Seiten der Religion der Sache noch näher treten können durch eine gründliche Behandlung der christlichen Glaubenslehre, welche unmittelbar die Entstehung der Dogmen aus dem religiösen Gefühl zeigte, und sie dann mit den Aussprüchen der reinen Spekulation zusammenstellte?" Briefe, IV, p. 624.
comparison is the complementary relationship which, for the nineteenth century theologian, exists between the interests of piety and philosophy.

Although Schleiermacher's mature stance on the origin of the content of the dogmatic proposition is expressed in this early writing, it is important to realize that this view does not stem from a negative estimation of philosophy as such. The comparison which Schleiermacher insists may be drawn between the finished product of the dogmatic task and the utterances of speculation is grounded on the validity of the religious and philosophical interests, as well as on the complementary relationship that exists between them. The comparison of dogma and the speculative conclusions of reason for which Schleiermacher opts is not one weighted on the side of piety, but rather a comparison which, from the religious perspective, recognizes and positively evaluates the fruits of the philosophical activity.

2. Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums

The Kurze Darstellung devotes only two of its three hundred and thirty-eight propositions to a consideration of the role played by philosophy in dogmatic theology. These propositions avoid a detailed explication of the regulation of philosophy in dogmatics, the likes of which we find in the Glaubenslehre. On the contrary, Schleiermacher's point of departure in the Kurze Darstellung with regard to the role of philosophy in dogmatics is far more heuristic than proscriptive. In Proposition 213 the theologian states:

The strictly didactic expression which, through the correlation of individual formulas, gives the dogmatic method its scientific bearing, is dependent on the existing condition of the
philosophical disciplines. 20

Here we find Schleiermacher more concerned with asserting the manner in which the method of dogmatics is dependent on the contributions of philosophy than with maintaining that the substance or content of dogmatic expression must be preserved from the influence of the dialectical interest. Although this dependence is recognized in the Glaubenslehre, it is often overshadowed by the theologian's focusing on the dangers inherent in the unguarded acceptance of the philosophical spirit. In the Kurze Darstellung, this proscriptive emphasis is only perceptible in Schleiermacher's exclusion of the employment of philosophical systems inimical to the expression of pious self-consciousness.

The dialectical element of doctrine can connect itself to any philosophical system which in its claims neither excludes nor denies the religious element, either generally or in a particular form to which Christianity tends chiefly to belong. 21 Schleiermacher rejects the employment of "materialistic," "sensualistic," and all "specifically atheistic" systems. "It is difficult," he states, "to draw any narrower limitations." 22

20"Der streng didaktische Ausdruck, welcher durch die Zusammengehörigkeit der einzelnen Formeln dem dogmatischen Verfahren seine wissenschaftliche Haltung gibt, ist abhängig von dem jedesmaligen Zustand der philosophischen Disziplinen." KD, Proposition 213, pp. 81-82.

21"Das dialektische Element des Lehrbegriffs kann sich an jedes philosophische System anschliessen, welches nicht das religiöse Element, entweder überhaupt, oder in der besonderen Form, welcher das Christentum zunächst angehören will, durch seine Behauptungen ausschliesst oder ableugnet." KD, Proposition 214, p. 82.

22"Daher alle entschieden materialistischen und sensualistischen Systeme, die man aber wohl schwerlich für wahrhaft philosophisch gelten lassen wird—and alle eigentlich atheistischen werden, auch diesen Charakter haben—nicht für die dogmatische Behandlung zu brauchen sind. Noch engere Grenzen im allgemeinen zu ziehen, ist schwierig." KD, Proposition 214, p. 82.
This brief, though positive, estimation of the role of philosophy in dogmatics shows that the restriction of the influence of the dialectical interest to the form of the dogmatic proposition does not originate in a negative disposition on Schleiermacher's part toward philosophy as such. Proper philosophizing in the context of dogmatics—and Schleiermacher concedes a broad range to the valid practice of this activity—is necessary for the accomplishment of the task of dogmatics. It is through the logical or dialectical interest that the preciseness of cognitive and linguistic determination requisite for scientific doctrinal formulation is achieved. Philosophy is not merely acceptable by, but rather required for, theological reflection and expression in Christian dogmatics.

3. Schleiermacher's Brief an Jacobi\(^23\)

Schleiermacher's letter to the philosopher Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819) clearly portrays the general relationship between philosophy and theology in the nineteenth century theologian's thought. The letter was occasioned by a short correspondence between Jacobi and the philosopher Karl L. Reinhold (1758-1823) in which Jacobi discussed

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the relationship between faith and reason in his own work, declaring himself to be "thoroughly a heathen with respect to understanding, a Christian with respect to the whole inner life." 24 Schleiermacher was drawn into the exchange by Reinhold, who was aware of the theologian's interest in the matters under discussion.

Schleiermacher strongly objected to Jacobi's manner of posing the problem. Heathen and Christian, he maintains, "are, as such, opposed to each other in the same sphere, namely, that of religion." 25 The identification of reason with heathenism and the inner life with religion wrongly presupposes an antithetical relationship between the respective interests of philosophy and religion. Such an antithesis, in Schleiermacher's view, is completely inadmissible.

Religiosity is a matter of feeling; that which we, in distinction from it, call religion, but which is always more or less dogmatic, is only the translation, originating through reflection, of the understanding applied to feeling. If your feeling is Christian, can your understanding then translate in a heathen manner? Here I cannot follow you. 26

Immediate, pious self-consciousness and mediate, reflective self-consciousness are, for Schleiermacher, two avenues to the truth; they

24 "Durchaus ein Heide mit dem Verstände, mit dem ganzen Gemüthe ein Christ, schwimme ich zwischen zwei Wassern, die sich mir nicht vereinigen wollen, so dass sie gemeinschaftlich mich trügen..." Briefe, II, p. 349.


26 "Die Religiosität ist die Sache des Gefühls; was wir zum Unterschiede davon Religion nennen, was aber immer mehr oder weniger Dogmatik ist, das ist nur die durch Reflexion entstandene Dolmetschung des Verstandes über das Gefühl—wenn Ihr Gefühl christlich ist, kann dann Ihr Verstand heidnisch dolmetschen? Darin kann ich mich nicht finden." Briefe, II, pp. 349-350.
do not constitute a dilemma in which the acceptance of the interests of one implies the rejection of the interests of the other. In Schleiermacher's view, the recognition of the legitimacy of the theological enterprise does not concomitantly entail the rejection of philosophy. "In all eternity," he insists, "I will not relinquish my philosophizing." 27 Jacobi's statement of the relationship between faith and reason is recast by Schleiermacher as follows:

On the contrary, my proposition is, consequently, that I am a philosopher with regard to understanding, for that is the original and independent activity of the understanding; and with regard to feeling I am a pious soul, and indeed as such a Christian, and have completely renounced all heathenism, or rather have never had it in me. 28

In an effort to clarify his view, Schleiermacher employs the illustration of an ellipse, the two foci of which represent the roles played in his thought by reason and feeling. The relationship between these two foci is one predicated upon an oscillatory movement, this oscillation stemming from the nature of the foci themselves. 29 According to Schleiermacher, the oscillation between reason and feeling is not indicative of an antithetical, but rather of a complementary, relationship between these two determinations of self-consciousness. As well, this same complementary relationship exists between the disciplines

27 "... denn ich will mir auch das Philosophiren in alle Ewigkeit nicht nehmen lassen." Briefe, II, p. 350.


29 Cf. Briefe, II, p. 351: "Die Oscillation ist ja die allgemeine Form alles endlichen Daseins, und es giebt doch ein unmittelbares Bewusstsein, dass es nur die beiden Brennpunkte meiner eigenen Ellipse sind, aus denen dieses Schweben hervorgeht, und ich habe in diesem Schweben die ganze Fülle meines irdischen Lebens."
based on reason and feeling, respectively, philosophy and dogmatics.

Consequently, my philosophy and my dogmatics are firmly resolved not to contradict each other, but precisely for this reason both, also, must always remain incomplete; and for as long as I can recall they have always been mutually in accord with each other, and have also always drawn closer to each other. 30

From the general tenor of Schleiermacher's letter to Jacobi, as well as from his specific statements in the above-quoted passage, it is clear that Schleiermacher accords validity to the philosophical enterprise as such. This validity can be recognized not only from within the sphere of philosophy itself, but also from the standpoint of theological reflection. In Schleiermacher's view, philosophy and dogmatics, although different in their respective principles and methodologies, are disciplines which are complementary and 'mutually in accord with each other.'

From our examination of Jenisch, the Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums, and the Brief an Jacobi, we can see that both Schleiermacher's assessment of the philosophical enterprise as such and his evaluation of philosophy from a theological perspective are quite positive. Though distinct, the dialectical and the pious interests are complementary moments of human experience which respectively stem from the mediate and immediate determinations of self-consciousness. Since human experience is comprised of both, the efficacy and importance of neither may be denied. As Schleiermacher states in his letter to Jacobi, reason and feeling form the foci in

30 "Meine Philosophie...also und meine Dogmatik sind fest entschlossen, sich nicht zu widersprechen, aber eben deshalb wollen auch beide niemals fertig sein, und so lange ich denken kann, haben sie immer gegenseitig aneinander gestimmt und sich auch immer mehr angenähert." Briefe, II, p. 351.
the ellipse of his thought.

As we might expect, the disciplines based on the experiences of reason and feeling, respectively, philosophy and dogmatics, are also complementary in Schleiermacher's view. This position sheds some light on the nature of the theologian's regulation of the role played by the dialectical interest in the Glaubenslehre. Schleiermacher does not limit the influence of the logical or dialectical interest to the form of the doctrinal proposition alone because he is negatively disposed toward the discipline of philosophy as such. Our examination of the three writings treated in this chapter has demonstrated that both Schleiermacher's estimation of philosophy itself and his theological evaluation of the philosophical enterprise are clearly positive. It is with respect to Schleiermacher's unfailing concern to focus the appropriation of man's experience of God in the immediacy of pious feeling that his regulation of philosophy in dogmatics must be understood. For Schleiermacher, the content or substance of dogmatics must express the Christian determination of pious feeling. This substance or content must not express the experience of mediate self-consciousness though the logical or dialectical interest, which stems from mediate self-consciousness, is necessary for the formal expression of doctrinal content.

From Schleiermacher's treatment of this matter it is clear that he diverges sharply from the Reformers on the question of the relationship between philosophy and theology. Both Luther and Calvin rejected philosophy on the grounds that a positive estimation of this enterprise implies an exaggerated and distorted view on the natural capacities of man, thereby compromising the majesty of God and the utter gratuity of
grace, revelation, and salvation. The Reformers' condemnation of philosophy is an expression of their anthropology. The Reformation doctrine of the total depravity of man renders an independent employment of reason in the form of philosophical activity meaningless. Schleiermacher, on the other hand, recognized the validity of philosophy as such and its importance in achieving the formal, scientific character which Christian dogmatics requires. This recognition, however, again leads us to raise the question of the feasibility of Schleiermacher's avowed exclusion of a substantive philosophical influence from the sphere of Christian dogmatics. Can the substance or content of the dogmatic proposition, which in Schleiermacher's view is derived solely from the immediate experience of pious feeling, be exempt from the influence of the logical or dialectical interest? Is the restriction of the logical or dialectical interest to the form of the dogmatic proposition, to cognitive and linguistic determination, to the bare structure of expression, possible in the magnum opus of a man who proclaimed the fundamental importance of philosophy in his own life and who labored some twenty years at the development of his own philosophical system?

III. The Interpretation of the Relationship between Philosophy and Theology in Schleiermacher Scholarship

Although Schleiermacher's position on the relationship between philosophy and the branch of theology known as dogmatics is pointedly stated, Schleiermacher scholarship, since the publication of the

Glaubenslehre, has constantly debated the extent to which Schleiermacher was successful in abiding by his proposed dogmatic methodology. As his Sendschreiben an Lücke witness, Schleiermacher's success had been passionately denied by the critics of his own day. Their negative assessment of the nineteenth century theologian's position on the role played by philosophy in the Glaubenslehre has been reiterated again and again throughout the history of Schleiermacher scholarship until the present day. The undeniably modern character of the Glaubenslehre has frequently provoked the suspicion that the critical nature of Schleiermacher's explication of Church doctrine is attributable to the influence of philosophical reasoning upon his dogmatics. Although this question has been debated for some one hundred and fifty years, it has never been resolved and continues to be significant not only for an understanding of Schleiermacher's theology itself, but also for a proper comprehension of the development of Protestant thought since the early nineteenth century. As Gerhard Ebeling has stated, the relationship between theology and philosophy in the thought of the nineteenth century theologian "represents the essential problem of Schleiermacher-interpretation."

In the twentieth century, interest in the question of the relationship between philosophy and theology in Schleiermacher's thought has been renewed by the treatment of his work by early Dialectical theology, principally through the writings of Karl Barth and Emil Brunner. Both


33 For a brief history of the interpretation of Schleiermacher by
of these men, however, mainly considered Schleiermacher to be an opponent, one whose theology represented the antithesis of their own. As a result, their respective treatments of the relationship between philosophy and theology in the thought of the nineteenth century theologian, treatments which have exerted significant influence on Schleiermacher's interpretation since the 1920's, must be seen as critiques expressing the position of Dialectical theology against Liberal theology, the movement which Schleiermacher himself fathered.

According to Barth, Schleiermacher is "best labelled a theologian of Christian culture."\textsuperscript{34} This is a pejorative appellation for Barth who considers Schleiermacher's theology to be mistakenly based on human experience rather than on the Word of God. Barth claims that not only Schleiermacher's theology, but also, more generally, his entire thought, is dominated by what Barth calls Schleiermacher's "principle of the centre,"\textsuperscript{35} i.e., the experience of feeling, which Barth sees as the foundation of the nineteenth century theologian's anthropocentrism. Barth's claim that the experience of feeling is determinative for Schleiermacher's thought as a whole leads him to diminish, if not tacitly reject, the independence of philosophy and theology in the nineteenth century theologian's work. In Barth's view, Schleiermacher's philosophy, notably his \textit{Dialektik}, is ultimately based not on mediate, but on immediate self-consciousness or feeling. For Barth, Schleiermacher's


\textsuperscript{35}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 165f.
philosophy is a philosophy of identity which merely expresses the experience of feeling in a manner different from the form of its expression found in the Glaubenslehre. Thus, in Barth's estimation, the distinction between philosophy and theology upon which Schleiermacher insisted throughout his career is artificial.

In Brunner's work *Die Mystik und das Wort*, the polemical excesses of which even Barth has noted, Schleiermacher's theology is opposed to, and devalued in light of, Reformation theology. According to Brunner, Schleiermacher's theology is no more than a mystical celebration of life which has nothing at all to do with the Gospel. Again, in Brunner's work, the reader witnesses a blurring of Schleiermacher's distinction between philosophy and theology which closely resembles Barth's position on the relationship of these disciplines in Schleiermacher's thought.

For Brunner, Schleiermacher's philosophy is a psychologistic, idealistic, philosophy of identity based not on reason, but on feeling.

Although Barth's more cautious treatment has carried the weight of the criticism advanced by Dialectical theology against Schleiermacher, it would be fair to say that both Barth and Brunner criticized Schleiermacher from the standpoint of the theological movement which they spearheaded. Unfortunately, this mistakenly entailed their interpretation of the relationship between philosophy and theology in Schleiermacher's

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36 Ibid., pp. 170-171.


40 Ibid., pp. 77-78; 350-358.
thought in terms of what they considered to be the theologian's seriously misdirected point of departure: his definition of religion as a determination of feeling. By considering both Schleiermacher's theology and his philosophy to be expressions of the experience of feeling, Barth and Brunner denied the careful distinction made by Schleiermacher between theology and philosophy and the forms of self-consciousness which constitute their experiential bases, respectively, feeling and reason.

Friedrich Hertel has justifiably called Felix Flückiger's study, *Philosophie und Theologie bei Schleiermacher* 41 the first attempt to develop systematically the critique of Dialectical theology against Schleiermacher. 42 This work was originally written as a dissertation under Karl Barth and its interpretation of the relationship between philosophy and theology in Schleiermacher's thought reflects Barth's influence on its thesis. Although Flückiger follows Barth by arguing that only an artificial distinction exists between philosophy and theology in Schleiermacher's thought, his conclusion is based on different premises. For Flückiger, philosophy does not offer an alternate perspective on feeling, as it did for Barth. Rather, feeling or immediate self-consciousness is considered to be a philosophical construction which, according to Flückiger, deviates sharply from authentic religious experience and is foreign to the message of the Bible. 43 Ultimately,

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42 Friedrich Hertel, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

in Flückiger's view, Schleiermacher's philosophy and theology are both expressions of immediate self-consciousness.

While the general interpretation of Schleiermacher's thought set forth by early Dialectical theology has contributed much to our understanding of his influence upon the theological developments of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the interpretation of Dialectical theology with regard to the specific question of the relationship between philosophy and theology in Schleiermacher's thought has undeniably confused this important issue. This confusion stems from Barth's and Brunner's shared position that, for Schleiermacher, both philosophy and theology finally express the experience of immediate feeling. As such, both Barth and Brunner, as well as critics such as Flückiger who have raised the banner of Dialectical theology against Schleiermacher, are guilty of a form of reductionism. In their view, the distinction maintained by Schleiermacher between theology, which is based on immediate self-consciousness (feeling), and philosophy, which is based on mediate self-consciousness (reason), is denied. At the hands of Barth and Brunner, Schleiermacher's philosophy is transformed into a mere, subsidiary expression of immediate self-consciousness.

This reductionism lies at the basis of the broad generalizations which have characterized the treatment of the question of philosophy and theology in Schleiermacher's thought by Dialectical theology. It is in opposition to this approach that our own point of departure in the treatment of this question has been framed. The method here adopted in the examination of this question can be summarized in the following points:

1.) The independence of reason and feeling, mediate and immediate
self-consciousness, the logical or dialectical interest and the pious interest, philosophy and theology must be recognized and maintained. An examination of the role played by philosophy in the branch of theology called dogmatics can only be adequate if it proceeds from the standpoint that both disciplines are distinct and cannot be equated.

2.) The subject matter of our study must be restricted to Schleiermacher's central and mature philosophical and theological works, respectively, the Dialektik and the Glaubenslehre. Supportive references from other works which comprise the Schleiermacher corpus must remain decidedly secondary. The question of there being a substantive philosophical influence upon the Glaubenslehre must only be framed as follows: to what extent did the philosophical development of the Dialektik influence the content or substance of dogmatic propositions in the Glaubenslehre? Although Schleiermacher held that the logical or dialectical interest necessarily aided dogmatics by contributing to the formation of its language and to the systematic interconnection of its individual propositions, he unequivocally denied the further extension of philosophical influence. For Schleiermacher, the logical or dialectical interest may only influence the form of the dogmatic proposition, its scientific value, the "how" of its expression. The logical or dialectical interest may not extend to the substance or content of the dogmatic proposition, to its ecclesiastical value, to the "what" therein expressed.

3.) The examination of the influence of the Dialektik upon the Glaubenslehre must take the form of a critical analysis of the relationship between God and World, a theme treated in, and constitutive for, both works.

It is our contention that the influence of the Dialektik upon the Glaubenslehre may only be discerned and appreciated upon having achieved an understanding of Schleiermacher's view on human experience. For Schleiermacher, the experience of immediate pious self-consciousness is the proper object of dogmatic theology. As we have seen, the content or substance of the dogmatic proposition, according to the nineteenth century theologian, must express the experience attained in pious feeling alone. Yet, in Schleiermacher's view, the experiential is comprised not only of the utterances of immediate self-consciousness, but also of the specific determinations of mediate self-consciousness within which pious feeling always emerges. The contributions of both forms of self-consciousness to the constitution of Schleiermacher's thought in general must be recognized if the precise manner in which the Dialektik influenced the content of the Glaubenslehre is to be delineated. In the following chapter, the relationship between the constituents of Schleiermacher's view on the experiential--immediate and mediate self-consciousness--will be examined in order to provide a foundation for our subsequent discussion of the theme of God and World in the Dialektik and the Glaubenslehre.
CHAPTER 4

THE EXPERIENCE OF FEELING IN THE DIALEKTIK AND THE GLAUBENSLEHRE

The previous chapter, by examining the role played by philosophy in the Glaubenslehre and the importance of philosophy in Schleiermacher's thought in general, has sketched the problem with which this thesis deals. This problem is amplified by the very perspective in terms of which the subject matter of our present study is to be approached. To question radically the feasibility of the theological program set forth by a thinker of Schleiermacher's stature is, indeed, a task fraught with difficulties. The seriousness of our critical point of departure is augmented by the fact that the charge which we have leveled against the nineteenth century theologian is not directed from "outside" Schleiermacher's system. As such, our stance against and critique of Schleiermacher's thought does not address his position in the same fashion that critics such as Barth and Brunner have. On the contrary, it is our contention that Schleiermacher's violation of his own restriction of the role played by philosophy in the Glaubenslehre to the form of the dogmatic proposition alone was due to his own philosophical, specifically epistemological, presuppositions. The substantive influence of the formulation of the God-World relationship in the Dialektik upon the doctrinal exposition of this same relationship betrays Schleiermacher's failure to execute his proposed methodology in the Glaubenslehre, for it
is this influence which he strictly prohibits.

This chapter will examine Schleiermacher's view on the experiential; it will focus on the importance accorded to the experience of feeling (Gefühl) in his central philosophical and theological works, respectively, the Dialektik and the Glaubenslehre. In the preceding chapter, the principles and methodologies of these works were delineated and analyzed. Although the Transcendental Part of the Dialektik concludes with a discussion of the God-World relationship, it is important that the significance of Schleiermacher's treatment of feeling which immediately precedes that discussion not be minimized. It is in the experience of feeling that the dialectical oscillation of mediate self-consciousness realizes a point of rest; the relativity that characterizes mediate self-consciousness achieves a basis in a transcendent ground of knowledge, a principle experientially appropriated in immediate self-consciousness or feeling.

As our examination of the methodology of the Glaubenslehre has shown, the experience of feeling is accorded far greater importance in the Glaubenslehre than it is in the Dialektik. The task of dogmatics itself is the description of the Christian determination of pious feeling. The three possible modes of dogmatic expression, to which the structure of the Glaubenslehre corresponds, attempt to depict the experience of pious feeling shared by a particular Church. Remembering that this communal experience is the sum of individual experiences, we might say that, for Schleiermacher, dogmatic theology is the systematic portrayal of the believing subject's experience of being related to God, i.e., the experience of the feeling of absolute dependence.

Although this experiential approach to Christian dogmatics is
generally regarded as Schleiermacher's special contribution to the history of theology, his experiential approach has often been the brunt of attack by critics who have grossly misrepresented Schleiermacher's view. Such critics have mistakenly identified Schleiermacher's view on the experiential with feeling, the latter being seen as indicative of Schleiermacher's psychologic,\(^1\) mystical, and even heathen tendencies.\(^2\) Reproaches such as these fail to recognize the complexity of the experience of feeling in Schleiermacher's thought and are based on a misunderstanding of the relationship between feeling and other forms of human experience in the view of the nineteenth century theologian.

In this chapter we shall proceed first, by examining both the philosophical and religious milieu from which Schleiermacher's treatment of the experience of feeling arose; and second, by considering the role played by the experience of feeling in the Dialektik and the Glaubenslehre. The focus of this consideration will be the relationship that Schleiermacher posits between feeling (immediate self-consciousness), the proper object of dogmatics, and mediate self-consciousness, the proper object of the Dialektik. As we shall see, this relationship is significant for the dogmatic formulation of the God-World relationship.

1. The Religious and Philosophical Backgrounds of Schleiermacher's View on the Experience of Feeling

1. The Religious Background

Wilhelm Dilthey begins the second chapter of his renowned biography of Schleiermacher, a chapter that deals with the theologian's early


education, with the following sentences: "Religion, and indeed religion of Herrnhut impression, had been the atmosphere which surrounded the young Schleiermacher. Thus, his inner life also had first developed itself out of religious feeling." It is important that we, like Dilthey, seek the decisive determination of Schleiermacher's mature religious views in the spirit of Herrnhut, i.e., in Moravian Pietism.

At the early age of fourteen, Schleiermacher, together with his elder sister and younger brother, was entrusted by his parents to an educational institution in Niesky directed by the Moravian Church. The parents' hope was that their children would be educated in a milieu of Christian spirituality apart from the "soul-corrupting opinions, principles, and morals of the present times." The parents' choice of the Moravian tradition, as a haven from the secular realm in which their children's spiritual growth would be properly nurtured, was by no means capricious. The life of the Moravian Church was based on an institutionalized plan of rigorous spiritual cultivation that was almost monastic in character.

Although the Moravian Church did not emerge in history as the direct work of a single Reformer, as, of course, was the case with Lutheranism and Calvinism, it is generally held that Moravianism can be traced to a group of the followers of John Hus (1369-1415) who called themselves the Calixtines. In the year 1457, a congregation of Calixtines settled at

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4 These sentiments are expressed in a letter written by Schleiermacher's mother to her brother prior to the acceptance of the children by the Moravian community. Briefe, I, p. 22.
the village of Kunwald and distinguished themselves from the Church at large, adopting the name "Brethren of the Law of Christ," and later, the "Unitas Fratrum." Twenty years hence, the community took formal steps to separate itself from the Calixstines by ordaining their own bishops. Despite persecution, the Church endured. Although the sixteenth century was a relatively peaceful period in the history of the small Church, cordial relations being maintained with the major Reformers, the seventeenth century witnessed the outbreak of persecution. As a result of the aggression of John Casimir of Poland, the Church of the Brethren was destroyed; its surviving members continued only as a Diaspora community in Moravia until the early eighteenth century.  

The Brüdergemeinde, a name by which the Moravian Church had come to be known, had undergone an important renewal some sixty years prior to Schleiermacher's matriculation at Niesky. In the year 1722 the restoration of the Church was begun through the efforts of Christian David, a former Catholic who had converted to Moravianism. It was in this year that David became acquainted with a nobleman from Saxony who was building an estate in the village of Berthelsdorf for the purpose of providing a social framework within which those dedicated to fostering the virtues of a Christian life could live, work, and worship together. His name was Nikolaus Ludwig, Count and Lord of Zinzendorf and Pottendorf. At Zinzendorf's invitation, mediated by Christian David, the remnant of the Old Church in Moravia travelled to and settled at Berthelsdorf. The community was given the name Herrnhut, "The Lord's Watch." By 1727 Herrnhut had developed into a religious society that has since attained

a unique place in the history of Pietism. The interaction of Zinzen-
dorf’s own religious genius with the spirit of brotherhood which
characterized the Moravian Church produced a movement that stamped its
imprint upon the spiritual temperament of the eighteenth century. 6

The organization of religious life in the community was strictly
regulated by Zinzendorf. The sacred nature of all seemingly secular
intercourse was emphasized to the point that the secular was completely
volatized. Every aspect of day-to-day living was impregnated with
spiritual meaning. The strong permutation of mystical and even monastic
tendencies in Zinzendorf’s Herrnhut distinguish his religion not only
from the mainstream of the Protestant tradition, but also from the
Pietism of precursors such as Spener and Francke.

A distinctive feature of Renewed Moravianism was its zealous
endeavor in missionary fields. The spirit of Herrnhut constantly
sought to instate itself into the world from which it had first retreat-
ed. Missionary activity spread throughout Continental Europe, England,
America, and the West Indies, often directly under the leadership of
Zinzendorf himself.

Among the earliest results of this desire to share the fellowship
of Herrnhut life was the founding of educational institutions modeled
on the original community of the Brüdergemeinde. At the time of Schleier-
macher’s early youth, there were two such institutions in Germany, one at
Gnadenfrei in Upper Silesia, the other at Niesky in Upper Lusatia. There
was also an institution at Barby which functioned as the community’s

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6 So great was the impact of Zinzendorf upon the Moravian Church
that with the establishment of the community at Herrnhut under his
leadership, a new period commences in the history of the Church which
is given the name "Renewed Moravianism." Cf. Ibid., p. 139.
seminary. On June 14, 1783, Schleiermacher entered the school at Niesky.

The religiosity of the Brethren exerted a profound influence upon the spiritual development of the young Schleiermacher. It was in this milieu, which emphasized a simple pious devotion to Jesus, the milieu of a tradition entrenched in the value of intimate personal communion with the Savior, that Schleiermacher was first impressed with the overwhelming power of the inner religious life. At Niesky, this emphasis upon the inner spiritual life was nurtured in and complemented by the communal aspects of domestic life, worship, and academics.

The Moravian schools highly valued an education that could be described as humanistic in its leanings. Language study was encouraged. Schleiermacher read the Greek classics in the original, among them Homer, Hesiod, and Euripides; the study of the natural sciences and mathematics was pursued as well. The focus of Schleiermacher's education, however, remained, as it did for his fellow students at the Paedagogium in Niesky, religious in character. All facets of life were related to the inner, spiritual experience of personal communion with the Savior. The greater part of the institution's daily curriculum was devoted to the cultivation of this experience through private prayer and communal worship.

In September, 1785, Schleiermacher, at the age of sixteen, left Niesky and entered the local seminary of the Brüdergemeinde at Barby. The emphasis in the education of young men for the ministry at Barby was much more on the practical and the pastoral than on the theoretical and the doctrinal. In fact, the doctrinal side of Christianity had been disparaged in the Moravian tradition since its inception. This tendency

\[7\text{Cf. LS, I, pp. 19, 24.}\]
was even more exaggerated in the late eighteenth century, the Brethren being particularly suspicious of the novel interpretations of and attacks on Christianity which stemmed from the secular universities. Isolation from the world and an even more intense commitment to the inner life were seen, by the directors of the seminary at Barby, as the only means of preserving the original spirit of the Moravian tradition. The reading of modern belles-lettres and philosophy was forbidden by strict censorship. Contemporary writings were only available if smuggled into the community and studied in secret.

This intellectual Christianity, or, to be more precise, intellectualizing of Christianity, which threatened the Pietist movement, was represented by the Rationalist school in eighteenth century German theology. The interpretation of Christianity which it promulgated has since come to be known as Enlightenment theology. This approach to the Christian religion flourished in the secular educational institutions at Halle, which was geographically proximate to the seminary, and threatened to invade the segregated community from all quarters.

Enlightenment theology considered the more traditional doctrinal views of Christianity to be alienated from the true meaning of religion. For the Enlightenment theologians, the locus of religion was not in faith but in reason. The dictates of reason unfold themselves to the fullest in moral action. In opposition to the mainstream of the Christian tradition, the religion of reason stressed the perfectibility of man. In the view of Enlightenment theology, the human race is not bound by the shackles of sin but is engaged in a process of ever-increasing

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improvement. Since man is seen not as evil by nature, but only as more or less enlightened, more or less willing to serve his own reason, more or less moral, the death of Christ, as an expiatory offering for the sins of man, was considered unnecessary. Rather, Christ, in Enlightenment theology, was admired as a wise teacher, as a model or an archetype of the perfected state of man which all may, through reason, achieve.

Schleiermacher, attracted to the mood of the "new religion," found his sympathies to lie less and less with the religious views of the Moravian community. His religious doubts, recorded in a letter written to his father in 1787, clearly indicate the influence of Enlightenment theology upon his beliefs:

I cannot believe that he who called himself only the Son of Man was the eternal, true God. I cannot believe that his death was a vicarious reconciliation because he himself never expressly said so, and because I cannot believe that reconciliation was necessary. 9

The seminary could not tolerate the retention of one who bore such thoughts in its tightly knit community. By mutual, though hardly fraternal, consent between Schleiermacher and his superiors, the young man left Bärby in 1787 and matriculated at the University of Halle.

Although Schleiermacher's departure from the Brüdergemeinde occurred under the most difficult of circumstances—he found himself at odds not only with his superiors at the seminary, but also, more painfully, with his father—his experience in the Moravian community made a

marked impression on his adult life. In the Reden (1799), his first major publication, Schleiermacher cryptically, though unmistakably, refers to the spiritual foundation for his later years provided by the Moravian tradition:

Religion war der mütterliche Leib, in dessen heiligem Dunkel mein junges Leben genährt und auf die ihm noch verschlossene Welt vorbereitet wurde, in ihr athmete mein Geist, ehe er noch seine äusseren Gegenstände, Erfahrung und Wissenschaft gefunden hatte, sie half mir, als ich anfing, den väterlichen Glauben zu sichten und das Herz zu reinigen von dem Schutte der Vorwelt, sie blieb mir, als Gott und Unsterblichkeit dem zweifelnden Auge entschwanden .... 10

For Schleiermacher, religion, or the inner experience of piety, is more basic and fundamental to human experience in general than the ideas and conceptions engendered by reflection on inner experience. His spiritual and intellectual maturation did not entail a rejection of the religious experience of his early years, but witnessed the blossoming of the seeds which were planted and nourished in the soil of the Brüdergemeinde. 11

Our task in this section of our study is to discern the influence

10 "Religion war der mütterliche Leib, in dessen heiligem Dunkel mein junges Leben genährt und auf die ihm noch verschlossene Welt vorbereitet wurde, in ihr athmete mein Geist, ehe er noch seine äusseren Gegenstände, Erfahrung und Wissenschaft gefunden hatte, sie half mir, als ich anfing, den väterlichen Glauben zu sichten und das Herz zu reinigen von dem Schutte der Vorwelt, sie blieb mir, als Gott und Unsterblichkeit dem zweifelnden Auge entschwanden ...." Reden, pp. 11-12.

11 In a letter written in 1802 at Gnadenfrei, the location of a Moravian Paedagogium where Schleiermacher's family had spent a number of weeks awaiting the community's decision regarding the acceptance of the children, the following reflections are found: "Es gibt keinen Ort, der so wie dieser (Gnadenfrei) die lebendige Erinnerung an den ganzen Gang meines Geistes begünstigte, von dem ersten Erwachen des bessern an bis auf den Punkt, wo ich jetzt stehe .... Hier entwickelte sich zuerst die mystische Anlage, die mir so wesentlich ist und mich unter allen Stürmen des Skeptizismus gerettet und erhalten hat. Damals keimte sie auf, jetzt ist sie ausgebildet und ich kann sagen, dass ich nach Allem wieder ein Herrnhuter geworden bin, nur von einer höheren Ordnung." Briefe, I, pp. 294-295. For a brief treatment of Schleiermacher's Moravian education, see Georg Wehrung, "Der Durchgang Schleiermachers durch die Brüdergemeine," ZTK, 4, (1927), pp. 193-210.
of Schleiermacher's early religious development upon his mature regard for the experience of feeling as the locus of piety. Granting Schleiermacher's own recognition of the influence of Herrnhut piety upon his spiritual development, we must briefly examine the thought of Zinzendorf, whose theology animated the community in which Schleiermacher's religiosity was cultivated.

Educated at Francke's Paedagogium at Halle, the bastion of the mainstream of German Pietism, the unique genius of Nikolaus Ludwig von Zinzendorf (1700-1760) fully emerged in the embodiment of his plan to found a religious society totally dedicated to the teaching and work of Christ. As has been mentioned, the union of Zinzendorf's leadership with the tradition of Old Church Moravianism resulted in a religious movement that shaped the spiritual history of both Europe and the New World.

The difficulty involved in setting forth a clear, unequivocal interpretation of Zinzendorf's theology has been recognized by those engaged in Zinzendorfian scholarship.  

12 The ad hoc character of his religious thought is, more than any other factor, responsible for this ambiguity. The various strains and motifs which comprise Zinzendorf's theology are quite disparate when one assesses the entirety of his literary corpus

13 and takes note of the different periods of development in his life. In his study entitled German Pietism During the Eighteenth Century, F.

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12 Cf. Peter Baumgart, Zinzendorf als Wegbereiter historischen Denkens, (Lübeck: Matthiesen Verlag, 1960), p. 34.

Ernest Stoeffler points out that Moravian interpreters of Zinzendorf's thought have often tended to emphasize the differences between his thought and the broader religious movement known as Pietism, this emphasis being due to the negative critique of Pietism by Church historians of the nineteenth century.\(^{14}\) Stoeffler, however, opts for the inclusion of Zinzendorf's religion under the rubric of Pietism since it is based on what he considers to be the distinguishing characteristic of Pietism, i.e., "its emphasis upon a new state of being."\(^{15}\) Such a view on Zinzendorf's relationship to the religious milieu of his own time is perfectly acceptable if we only are aware that Zinzendorf considered the spirituality of Herrnhut to be a renewal of the entire Protestant tradition, including the movement of his own day which we designate as Pietism.

As the founder of Renewed Moravianism, Zinzendorf exerted a strong influence upon the subsequent history of the Moravian Church and, due to the ecumenical nature of his theology, upon Protestant thought in general. This influence, however, cannot be attributed to the comprehensiveness and organization of Zinzendorf's religious thought, for he was not a systematiser. He considered all attempts to construct an elaborate theology baseless and meaningless, the epitomy of human frivolity. According to Zinzendorf, true religion has little if anything, to do with human reason\(^ {16}\); rather, it is totally an affair of the heart, of

\(^{14}\)The most representative critique of Pietism remains Albrecht Ritschl, Geschichte des Pietismus, (Bonn: Adolph Marcus, 1880-1886).


\(^{16}\)Cf. Zinzendorf, Hauptschriften, I, Der Teutsche Socrates, p. 289.
inward experience. For Zinzendorf, true religion occurs in the depths of the intercourse that takes place between the Savior and the soul:

The one religion against which no arguments impinge, nor means are found to destroy it, is the heart-religion, whose members include only the Creator and each human creature. 17

Although great emphasis is placed on religious experience as a communal event in Zinzendorf's theology, the purpose of such collective experience lies in the enhancement of individual piety, the seed of the communal event. This piety may be described as a personal communion of the individual believer with God, an experience which forms the cornerstone of Zinzendorf's theology.

With respect to the specific task of our study, it is crucial to note that Zinzendorf uses the word "feeling" to express the nature of pious experience. For Zinzendorf, abstract reflection on the essence of God is of no spiritual avail. The workings of the Redeemer's saving grace must be experienced or, to be more precise, felt in the inner life (Gemüth). 18

"Die Religion kann ohne Vernunft-Schlüsse gefasst werden, sonst könnte niemand eine Religion haben, als der einen aufgeklärten Kopf hätte, und die wären die besten Gottesgelehrten, die am meisten Vernunft hätten, jenes aber ist nicht glaublich, und auch dieses streitet mit der Erfahrung."


18 Cf. Zinzendorf, Hauptschriften, IV, Gemeinreden I, p. 263: "Das ist das ganze geheimniss der religion, wenn einem der heiland was wahres, was hauptsächlich wahres, das einen einfluss in unser ganzes herz und gemütke auf einmal hat, vorweisen lässt, und das fassen wir, das gefällt uns: da wenden wir uns hin mit unserm ganzen gemütche, da bekümmern wir uns weder um beweis dafür, noch um die einwendungen dagegen, noch um allerhand einlenkungen; sondern wir sind mit der sache eins, sie steht uns an, und ist uns nach unserm herzen, das übrige befehlen wir dem lieben Gott."
There are two words in Zinzendorf's theological vocabulary which designate the manner in which inner spiritual communion with the Savior is experientially appropriated: Gefühl and Empfindung. Although these words came to possess different connotations in subsequent German intellectual history, they are used synonymously by Zinzendorf:

Das Factum ist richtig: der heilige Geist ist ausgesessen worden, und reichlich dazu, durch Jesum Christum unsern Heiland, die blutige Marter-Empfindung, das Gefühl von der Todes-Liebe des Lammes gegen uns, ist ausgesessen in Millionen Herzen, durch den heiligen Geist, wie Er gekommen ist.20

The following examples illustrate the manner in which Zinzendorf employs these words in his theology:

Gefühl: . . . und je näher die Seelen in der Erfahrung, in der Einsicht, in dem Gefühl und in der Liebe zum Heilande kämen; je mehr offenbarte sich solche Herzlichkeit und Vertraulichkeit gegen einander, die sehr weit gehet; das wäre ja recht.21

Wenn sie (fiducia implicita und explicita) aber allenfalls nicht beyenander seyn können, so ists genug, wenn nur das erste da ist, die Fiducia implicita, das unausgewikkelt aber gefühlige Gläuben im Herzen drinne.22

. . . darum komme uns lieber gerade ans Herz, lass uns lieber an deinen Wunden und von deinem Verdiene fühlen, ehe wir dich nennen können, ehe wir deinen Namen wissen, ehe wir was von deiner Grösse und Gottheit verstehen . . . 23

19 The clearest and most influential distinction between Gefühl and Empfindung was made by Kant. According to Rudolf Eisler, Empfindung is usually, though not always, distinguished from Gefühl within the context of Critical philosophy. Empfindung is regarded by Kant as "die 'Materie' der Anschauung. Sie (Empfindung) beruht auf der 'Affektion' der Sinnlichkeit . . . durch die 'Dinge . . .'"; Gefühl is characterized as "rein subjektiv, bezieht sich nicht auf das Objekt, ist kein 'Erkenntnisstück,' sondern drückt den Zustand des Subjektes aus." Rudolf Eisler, Kant-Lexikon, (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1969), pp. 115; 175.

20 Zinzendorf, Hauptschriften, IV, Gemeinreden II, p. 75.

21 Zinzendorf, Hauptschriften, VI, Neun Öffentliche Reden, pp. 177-178.

22 Ibid., pp. 62-63.  

23 Ibid., p. 104.
Empfindung: Die Religion muss eine Sache seyn, die sich ohne alle Begriffe, durch blosse Empfindung erlangen lässt . . .
An der Wahrheit in den Begriffen ist weniger gelegen als an der Wahrheit in der Empfindung . . .
Die Vernunft weicht der Empfindung. 24

. . . und die erste geistliche Freude ist ein Blik, ein Gefühl, ein Gedanke, damit nichts zu vergleichen ist, das übersteigt alles, was einem Menschen in seinem noch übrigen Leben begegnen kann, eine empfindliche Seligkeit. 25

It should be noted that of the two words, Gefühl is employed by Zinzendorf in his writings far more frequently than Empfindung, though both Gefühl and Empfindung are identical experiential modes in terms of which the grace merited by the suffering and death of Christ is appropriated by the believer. 26 For Zinzendorf, feeling is the locus of all religious experience. 27

This is not to say that feeling is a mere presentiment of the numinous which, Zinzendorf claims, even the impious may sense. 28 In his view, pious experience may never be dissociated from divine revelation.

The Gospel is the test of our anointing; our feeling must agree with it at all times. If it does not, then, to put it mildly,

24 Zinzendorf, Hauptschriften, I, Der Teutsche Socrates, pp. 289, 290.
25 Zinzendorf, Hauptschriften, VI, Neun Öffentliche Reden, p. 42.
27 In his study of Zinzendorf, Wilhelm Betterman goes so far as to state: "Wenn ich recht sehe, so hat Zinzendorf als erster das Gefühl als Erkenntnisprinzip in die Theologie eingeführt." Wilhelm Betterman, Theologie und Sprache bei Zinzendorf, (Gotha: Klotz, 1935), p. 12.
it is fantasy. 29

For Zinzendorf, feeling is the experience which brings the comforting assurance of being touched and transformed by the saving power of divine grace.

It is interesting to note that by denoting feeling as the experiential locus of the benefits of Christ, Zinzendorf introduces a strong element of sensuality into an otherwise stolid Protestantism. In this respect we might regard Zinzendorf's theology as a theology of the passion of Christ, a further and deeper development of Luther's theologia crucis. This theology of the passion, which is based on the experience of pious feeling, is most graphically expressed in Zinzendorf's litanies on the wounds of Christ. 30 Zinzendorf's interpretation of the Holy Spirit in feminine terms also strikes a strange chord in the Protestant tradition and is not unrelated to the importance of feeling in his theology. 31

It was in the milieu of Zinzendorf's heart-religion and his view on


the appropriation of religious experience in feeling that the young
Schleiermacher's spiritual life was cultivated. As we shall see as our
development continues, the influence of Zinzendorf's religious thought
upon Schleiermacher, through the latter's early encounter with Moravian-
ism, was decisive for the nineteenth century theologian's mature view on
the experiential basis of Christian theology.

2. The Philosophical Background

Although the pervasiveness of Zinzendorf's theology in the life of
the Brüdergemeinde exerted a strong, and even predominant, influence
upon the young Schleiermacher, it would be shortsighted to view this
influence as the sole determinative in Schleiermacher's mature regard
for the place of feeling in human experience in general. The dissatis-
faction which Schleiermacher experienced at Barby led him beyond the
constrained auspices of the community in pursuit of a secular education
at the University of Halle. It was here that he was for the first time
able to engage in a study of the philosophy of the day unhindered by the
directed concerns of his former superiors. At Halle, the need to con-
front the challenges of the intellectual life was at last fulfilled.

It is important that the reader be aware of the fact that Schleier-
macher's break with religion did not for him entail a rejection of the
spiritual dimension of human existence, but only of the inability of the
Brethren to incorporate the wider spectrum of human experience within
the purview of their religious world view. True, he did suffer a crisis
of faith, although there was constantly a searching character to this
time of difficulty rather than simple, outright rejection. As a result,
Schleiermacher did not consider his academic endeavor at Halle to be an
alternative to the religious world view of the community which he left, but rather its complement. Our consideration of the influence of the philosophical perspective on Schleiermacher's mature treatment of the experience of Gefühl in the Dialektik and the Glaubenslehre will be limited to two thinkers: Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi.

a.) Kant

The central scholarly pursuit undertaken in earnest by Schleiermacher during his student days at Halle, and one which he continued throughout his life, was the study of Kant. Although there is mention in his correspondence that he had read the Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics (1788), furtively no doubt, during his Barby period,\textsuperscript{32} serious examination of the work of Kant was not begun prior to his enrollment at the University. Kant's thought, for Schleiermacher, engaged in the problem of the right relationship between faith and reason with a sobriety commensurate with its importance. The admiration of the young man for the principles of Critical philosophy is expressed in a letter written to his father in 1787:

Concerning Kantian philosophy which you commend me to study, I have all along had very favorable opinions of it, since it refers reason back from the metaphysical wastelands to the fields which properly belong to it.\textsuperscript{33}

One should realize that Schleiermacher's 'favorable opinions' eventually assumed a critical tone, his discontent with the limitations of the new

\textsuperscript{32}Cf. Briefe, I, p. 66.

\textsuperscript{33}'Was die Kantische Philosophie betrifft, die Sie mir zu studiren empfehlen, so habe ich von je her sehr günstige Meinungen von ihr gehabt, eben weil sie die Vernunft von den metaphysischen Wüsten zurück in die Felder, die ihr eigenthümlich gehören, zurückweist.' Briefe, I, p. 66.
philosophy being heralded in the *Reden* (1799). It must be pointed out, however, that Schleiermacher's criticism never diminished his recognition of the urgency of the problem which Kant confronted. In order to evaluate the influence of the philosophy of Schleiermacher's own day upon the development of the experience of feeling in his thought, we must examine the role played by this experience in the Kantian system.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a revivified, and perhaps even novel, philosophical interest arose in the experience expressed by the German word "Gefühl," the French "sentiment," and the English "feeling." The turn to the subject which entered intellectual history in a unique way with the publication of Descartes' *Discours de la Méthode* was the direct cause of this interest. In this work, Descartes laid the foundation for a new era in the history of philosophy by emphasizing the importance and primacy of human reason in the attainment of truth. For Descartes, truth is realized in those ideas which, as he stated, "nous concevons fort clairement et fort distinctement . . ." This focus on 'clear and distinct ideas' highlighted, and

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34 Most notable among Schleiermacher's other critiques of Critical philosophy are a review, published in 1799, of Kant's *Anthropologie, Briefe*, IV, pp. 533-536; the *Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre* (1803), SW, III, 1; and an important treatise written late in his career entitled *Über den Unterschied zwischen Naturgesetz und Sittengesetz* (1825), SW, III, 2, pp. 397-417.

35 Cf. Dilthey's thorough analysis of Kant's influence upon Schleiermacher and the latter's critique of Kantian philosophy in his two chapters "Der kritische Standpunkt Kants als Grundlage der Untersuchungen Schleiermachers" and "Das System Kants als Gegenstand der Polemik Schleiermachers." *LS*, I, pp. 94-132.


37 René Descartes, *Discours de la Méthode*, édité par Étienne Gilson,
evoked interest in, those experiences of consciousness which were far less defined. Throughout the entire seventeenth and the greater part of the eighteenth centuries, the precise nature of the experience to which the words "Gefühl," "sentiment," and "feeling" referred remained a matter of contention. At times the word seemed to refer to the basest animal desires such as the sensations of thirst and hunger (Descartes); at others it connoted such distinctly human experiences as, belief (Hume) or the moral sense (Shaftesbury). As the Enlightenment progressed, the experience of feeling came to play a significant role in the sphere of aesthetics.

A clear example of the centrality of the experience of feeling in the sphere of aesthetics can be found in Kant's pre-critical writing Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen (1764). In this short work, Kant embarks upon an examination of the distinct objects of the feeling of the beautiful and the sublime; of the attributes of the beautiful and the sublime in man in general and in the interrelations of the sexes; and of the appearance, of the beautiful and the sublime in national characteristics. Although one notices definite departures from, as well as contributions to, traditional aesthetic theory in the pages of the Beobachtungen, the exact role played by the experience of feeling in the aesthetic moment and its precise relation to other modes of human experience are never technically formulated.

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38 Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, p. 82.

39 Ibid., p. 96.

The simple and modest approach assumed in this writing, as well as the almost lyrical tenor of its style, stand in sharp contrast to the systematic and philosophical presentation found in its author's later work. The pre-critical interests of the *Beobachtungen* did not require or fashion a technical delineation of the experience of feeling. Such a formulation became necessary as Kant explored the ramifications of the critical stance on human knowledge which he assumed later in his life.

In actual fact, it is somewhat surprising to discover that the experience of feeling occupies such an important place in the Kantian architectonic since Kant perceived the central task of his philosophy to be a critique of "the faculty of reason in general, in respect of all knowledge after which it may strive independently of all experience."41 The problem which he confronted was that of the possibility of *a priori* knowledge in the natural sciences, on the one hand, and in metaphysics, on the other. In what way did the undefined experience of feeling play a role in such an exacting project?

Kant realized that, if the new science, i.e., Newtonian physics, were to survive, an understanding of the knowing subject which furnished the epistemic grounds for such a science was in order. A truncated empiricism in which the mind passively received the impressions of sense would not suffice and, in fact, would deny the conditions necessary for the very possibility of the physical sciences: first, the condition that scientific knowledge be based on actual experience so as to facilitate the augmentation of knowledge, i.e., that scientific judgments be synthetic; second, the condition that such judgments be characterized by

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necessity and strict universality in order to enable the establishment
of laws which would be binding in the natural world, i.e., that scienti-
fic judgments be \textit{a priori}. As a result, Kant proposed that knowledge be
considered as the conformity of the objects of experience to the structure
of the mind. For Kant, the mind makes the object. The following words,
which begin the Introduction to the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} (1781),
capture the originality of Kant's recognition:

There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with
experience. For how should our faculty of knowledge be
awakened into action did not objects affecting our senses
partly of themselves produce representations, partly arouse
the activity of our understanding to compare these representa-
tions, and, by combining or separating them, work up the
raw material of the sensible impressions into that knowledge
of objects which is entitled experience? ...

But though all our knowledge begins with experience, it
does not follow that it all arises out of experience. For
it may well be that even our empirical knowledge is made up
of what we receive through impressions and of what our own
faculty of knowledge (sensible impressions serving merely as
the occasion) supplies from itself.\footnote{42}

Knowledge, for Kant, is authenticated in the ordering of the impressions
of sense by the \textit{a priori} categories of human understanding (\textit{Verstand}).
The mind itself establishes the interconnection of appearances which we
find in the phenomenal realm or the world of sensible experience.

Thus the order and regularity in the appearances, which we
entitle \textit{nature}, we ourselves introduce. We could never find
them in appearances, had not we ourselves, or the nature of
our mind, originally set them there. For this unity of nature
has to be a necessary one, that is, has to be \textit{a priori}
certain unity of the connection of appearances; and such syn-
thetic unity could not be established \textit{a priori} if there were
not subjective grounds of such unity contained \textit{a priori} in the
original cognitive powers of our mind, and if these subjective
conditions, inasmuch as they are the grounds of the possibility of know
of any object whatsoever in experience, were not at the

\footnote{42} Immanuel Kant, \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, B 1; pp. 41-42; KG S,
III, p. 27.
same time objectively valid. Kant terms the employment of reason described above theoretical; its proper sphere of activity is the phenomenal realm of the natural world in which possible objects of experience are intuited under the a priori categories of time and space. Due to the a priori grounds of the order perceived in natural occurrences, events in the phenomenal realm happen in accordance with strict necessity. Kant uses the term Naturlehre to describe the body of knowledge supplied by the laws which govern these physical occurrences.

As has been mentioned, the critique of the faculty of reason which Kant pursued led not only to an evaluation of the proper use of reason as a basis for the possibility of the natural sciences, but also to a consideration of the appropriate employment of reason in the interests of metaphysics. For Kant, metaphysics has forever strayed beyond the limits of its own capabilities, mistaking the phenomenal realm as the sphere, and a theoretical employment of reason as the basis, of its proper activity. Such a confused state of affairs inevitably involves reason in the poverty of dialectical illusion in which all certainty is amiss. In Kant's view, this misemployment of reason is not characteristic of metaphysics as such. On the contrary, Kant saw his task not in the discrediting and rejection of metaphysics, but in the constitution of metaphysics as a science.

Metaphysics, even if we look upon it as having hitherto failed in all its endeavors, is yet, owing to the nature of human reason, a quite indispensable science, and ought to contain a priori synthetic knowledge. 44

43 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 125-126, p. 147; KGS IV, p. 92.

44 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 18, p. 54; KGS, III, p. 39.
Just as the natural sciences require synthetic a priori judgments in order to achieve the status of a science, so too does metaphysics. The reason for the history of confusion in the latter discipline lies in its adoption of the employment of reason requisite for the former science, and in the forsaking of its proper mode of activity. According to Kant, metaphysics, if it is to be considered a science, must conduct its affairs from the standpoint of a practical, not a theoretical, employment of reason. 45

Whereas Kant rightly restricted theoretical employment of reason to the natural realm, the phenomenal world of appearances constituted by the a priori categories of understanding in which occurrences take place in accordance with necessity, he also seemingly confined practical reason to the moral realm of freedom, the noumenal world of things-in-themselves regulated by the categorical imperative, which reason itself makes. For Kant, metaphysics, as a scientific endeavor, must concern itself solely with the dictates of the categorical imperative, for only the moral law as a pure, practical, synthetic a priori judgment prescinds from empirical or heteronomous interest and, therefore, from an inappropriate theoretical employment of reason. Kant used the term Sittenlehre to connote the practical knowledge contained in the moral commands of reason.

Kant did not consider the problem of the possibility of a priori knowledge as outlined in the First Critique to be solved within the confines of that work. The manner in which Kant's writings were gradually published in the years following the appearance of the First Critique in 1781 clearly indicates that he considered Critical philosophy

as a project to be unfolded in successive stages. The *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* (1783) and the *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals* (1785) were written as contributions to this project and, as such, both possess an important heuristic value in the Kantian corpus. The next significant stage, however, in the development of the project of Critical philosophy was accomplished with the publication of the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788). It was this work which examined the practical or moral employment of reason based upon the a priori, and therefore necessary, idea of freedom. The significance of the Second Critique in the overall critical project is witnessed in Kant's assertion that the "concept of freedom, in so far as its reality is proved by an apodictic law of practical reason, is the keystone of the whole architecture of the system of pure reason and even of speculative reason."46 As such, the *Critique of Practical Reason* forms the center of the Kantian architectonic in a way other than mere chronological order.

Just as the project of the critique of reason, both in its theoretical and practical employments, unfolded, however, so too did its inherent difficulties. The most enigmatic of these, the seemingly irresolvable disjunction between Naturlehre and Sittenlehre, became keenly apparent to Kant himself subsequent to the publication of the Second Critique. Kant's third and final critique, the *Critique of Judgment* (1790) was offered as a solution to this problem.

The distinction brought about by the "Copernican Revolution" in philosophy between noumena and phenomena, the theoretical and the practical, necessity and freedom, physics and ethics, had led to a rift between

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the sensible and the supersensible spheres which seemed irreconcilable. Such a gap, in Kant's view, was theoretically tenable, and even necessary, since the theoretical employment of reason must, by definition, only be applied to given objects of experience in the sensible world. From the standpoint of practical reason, on the other hand, an absolute separation between the sensible and supersensible spheres denied the very possibility of the enactment of the moral dictates of reason since the end of such dictates could only be achieved through the practice of moral activity in the sensible or phenomenal world. Kant states this problem in the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment:

Now even if an immeasurable gulf is fixed between the sensible realm of the concept of nature and the supersensible realm of the concept of freedom, so that no transition is possible from the first to the second (by means of the theoretical use of reason), just as if they were two different worlds of which the first could have no influence upon the second, yet the second is meant to have an influence upon the first.\footnote{Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, translated by J. H. Bernard, (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1966), p. 12; KGS, V, pp. 175-176.}

For Kant, the task of the Critique of Judgment lies in demonstrating a way in which nature may be so conceived "that the conformity to law of its form at least harmonizes with the possibility of the purposes to be effected in it according to laws of freedom."\footnote{Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, p. 12; KGS, V, p. 176.}

It is at this point that the experience of feeling becomes the object of serious attention in the Kantian system. Although the First and Second Critiques had addressed themselves respectively to the cognitive faculties (Erkenntnissvermögen) and the faculties of desire (Begehrensvvermögen), Kant recognized that these did not exhaust the
faculties of human experience. A third, which he called the feeling of pleasure and pain (Gefühl der Lust und Unlust) had remained largely unconsidered by the first two critiques. In the Critique of Judgment, feeling is the experience which is the particular object of consideration and interest.

Respectively related to the three faculties of the mind, i.e., the cognitive faculty, the faculty of desire, and the feeling of pleasure and pain, are three specifically cognitive faculties (Erkenntnisvermögen): the understanding (Verstand), which provides the principles or categories necessary for the ordering of nature through theoretical cognition; reason (Vernunft), which determines the pure, practical imperative for the faculty of desire; and judgment (Urteilskraft), which legislates a priori for the feeling of pleasure and pain, though not according to concepts as is the case with understanding and reason. Of special interest for our purposes here is the fact that, for Kant, feeling fulfills a mediating function between the cognitive faculty and the faculty of desire; and that judgment, as the cognitive faculty which legislates to feeling, mediates between understanding and reason.

In the Third Critique, the mediating role of judgment, defined as "the faculty of thinking the particular as contained under the universal," is analyzed through two modes of its employment which exemplify the concept of the purposiveness of nature: aesthetical judgment and teleological judgment. The complex examination of these two types of judgment undertaken by Kant in the Third Critique need not be repeated here. Let it suffice to say that the purposiveness of nature, which finds expression in aesthetical and teleological judgments, was taken by Kant to be

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49 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 15; KGS, V, p. 179.
indicative of a representation of nature as a phenomenal (sensible) manifestation of noumenal (supersensible) reality. The representation of the beautiful and the sublime in nature as subjective purposiveness and the representation of the apparent teleology in nature as objective purposiveness establish the basis in Kant's system for a mediating link between the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom. The theoretical and the practical, physics and ethics, necessity and freedom are provided a basis of union; grounds are established for the possibility of actualizing the apodictic maxims of practical reason in concrete human action.

What is the role played by the experience of feeling in this involved problematic? Nothing less than furnishing, as a specific faculty of the mind, the very grounds of mediation between Naturlehre and Sittenlehre through the legislation of its proper cognitive faculty, the Urteilskraft. The particular modes of judgment, aesthetical and teleological, in themselves expressions of the purposiveness of nature, exemplify the motives for positing an interrelation of the noumenal and the phenomenal. Thus, it is feeling which binds the seemingly disparate elements of Kant's system by functioning as a mediating term between the theoretical and the practical employments of reason.

In our examination of the principles and methodologies of the Dialektik, it was cursorily mentioned that feeling is described by Schleiermacher in that work as an interim point between moments of thinking and willing. In feeling the presupposed transcendent ground of the knowledge attained through the activities of thinking and willing, respectively, physical and ethical knowledge, is immediately experienced. It was the influence of the mediating function of feeling in the Kantian

\[50\] Cf. Chapter 2, footnote 61.
architectonic upon the development of the *Dialektik* which determined Schleiermacher's treatment of the relationship between the experiences of feeling, thinking, and willing. This influence will be more discernible further in the development of the present chapter. 51

b.) Jacobi

In addition to occupying an important place in Kant's philosophy, the experience of feeling was a cardinal element in the work of the successors of Kant who comprised the Idealist tradition, particularly Fichte and Schelling. Although the connection between the incipient German Idealism of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and the development of Schleiermacher's thought is indisputable, brief attention will be given here to the place of the experience of feeling in the work of a man who criticized, rather than carried out, the project begun by Kant: Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi. The seriousness with which Schleiermacher approached the work of this philosopher and Jacobi's own original view on the nature of the experience of feeling justify such a focus.

It is difficult to determine the exact period of his life in which Schleiermacher first became acquainted with the philosophy of Jacobi. In a letter dated August 14, 1787, Schleiermacher mentions his familiarity with the philosopher's work, the ambiguity of Jacobi's philosophical terminology, and his desire for the further study of Jacobi's writings. 52


52 Cf. *Briefe*, I, p. 66: "... und die Jacobische Philosophie
Since this letter was written just a few months after his matriculation at Halle, it is probable that Schleiermacher secretly studied Jacobi, as he did Kant, during his years at Barby. Such a dating places the influence of Jacobi at the earliest period in the formation of Schleiermacher's religious and philosophical views.

Schleiermacher's indebtedness to Jacobi is pronounced. Not only were Jacobi's own writings significant for his intellectual growth, but also it is crucial to note that Schleiermacher's early and decisive exposure to the philosophy of Spinoza was mediated by Jacobi's Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn (1785). 53

In a letter written to his friend Brinkmann in the year 1800, Schleiermacher expressed both his concern for Jacobi's positive assessment of his recently published work, and his respect for the character and abilities of the philosopher.

It has never particularly been my intention to come to religion along the path of a formal law, and I hope that Jacobi will not be able to interpret the Reden in this way, if he reads them seriously. I wish that the kind man may, with the passing of time, also like me a little. He is the only one of our notable philosophers from whom I wish this. 54

vestehe ich bis jetzt noch immer nicht recht wegen der grossen Verrührung und Unbestimmtheit in seiner philosophischen Sprache und werde noch einmal alle zwischen ihm und Mendelssohn gewechselte Schriften lesen müssen."

53 With respect to his dependence on Jacobi's presentation for his own understanding of Spinoza, see Schleiermacher's treatise Kurze Darstellung des spinozistischen Systems, SW, III, 4, 1, pp. 283f.

In Schleiermacher's view, however, the philosophy of Jacobi did not go unchallenged. He considered the latter's radical attack upon Critical philosophy to be excessive, and his mysticism unnecessarily harsh in its negative assessment of the philosophical enterprise as such. 55

The following passages, which appear in his work *David Hume Über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus. Ein Gespräch* (1787), are illustrative of Jacobi's unique regard for the place of feeling in human experience in general. In his view, feeling is an experience which plays an important role in the epistemological process. For Jacobi, knowledge is based either on sense impressions or on feeling, the latter form of knowledge being appropriately termed a *Wissen im Glauben*:

If someone says he knows, we rightly ask him from whence does he know. Inevitably he must base himself in the end on one of these two: either upon sense impressions or upon the feeling of the spirit. We say that we believe that which we know from the feeling of the spirit. 56

The human capacity to experience and to know through feeling is portrayed as a faculty (Vermögen) which distinguishes man from the animals. Unlike its comparatively subordinate position in the Kantian system, feeling, for Jacobi, is the highest cognitive faculty and is identical with reason itself:

The faculty of feelings, we maintain, is the faculty in man elevated above all others; it is that which alone distinguishes him specifically from the animal and which elevates him over the animal in an incomparable way: the difference not being one of degree but of nature. The faculty of feelings, we

55Cf. *Briefe*, IV, p. 73.

maintain, is one and the same with reason. As a capacity 'elevated above all others,' the faculty of feelings distinguishes man from the animal not only because it is identical with reason, but also, and more importantly, because it is through the faculty of feelings that man experiences the super-sensible realities of his higher life:

The animals, to a certain degree, also possess intelligence; all living beings must possess it because they cannot be living beings without a connecting consciousness which is the root of the intelligence. But they completely lack the faculty of feelings identical with reason, the incorporeal organ for the perceptions of the super-sensible. . . . Where reason is not, there, also, are no objective feelings immediately presenting something outside of themselves to the consciousness. Where such feelings are, there, unmistakably, is also reason; there freedom, virtue, knowledge of God, wisdom, and art reveal themselves and actively emerge.

In the philosophy of Jacobi feeling is portrayed neither as an undefined experience, nor as an experience of consciousness playing a role secondary to that of reason. Jacobi parted with the traditions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by treating the experience of feeling as an autonomous, self-constitutive faculty of the mind, and as the life of reason itself. In Jacobi's view on feeling as the experience

57 "Das Vermögen der Gefühle, behaupten wir, ist im Menschen das über alle andere erhabene Vermögen; dasjenige, welches allein ihn von dem Thiere specifisch unterscheidet, ihn der Art, nicht blos der Stufe nach, d.i. unvergleichbar über dasselbe erhebt; es ist, behaupten wir, mit der Vernunft Eines und Dasselbe . . ." Ibid., p. 61.

through which the super-sensible is apprehended, we may perceive the beginnings of a motif which was elaborated in the thought of Schleiermacher.

Having examined the religious and philosophical backgrounds of Schleiermacher's development of the experience of Gefühl in his thought, we may now turn to an analysis of the role played by feeling in the Dialektik and the Glaubenslehre. Although the interest of our study lies in the treatment of this experience in the dogmatics, we shall begin with the Dialektik since this work provides valuable insights into Schleiermacher's fuller development of the experience of feeling in the Glaubenslehre.

II. The Role of the Experience of Feeling in the Dialektik

Although the experience of feeling plays a central role in many of Schleiermacher's writings, the measure of importance afforded to this experience reaches a summit in the Glaubenslehre. Whenever an assessment is made of Schleiermacher's unique contributions to the history of theology, his definition of piety as the "feeling of absolute dependence" is invariably given first consideration. It is surprising to find, however, that while the centrality of the feeling of absolute dependence for the dogmatics is clearly recognized, the relationship between this description of feeling and the important treatment of feeling in Schleiermacher's major philosophical work, the Dialektik, is more often than not overlooked. This situation is probably due to Schleiermacher's own

59 Recent attempts at exploring the relationship between the philosophical and theological treatments of the experience of feeling are: Doris Offerman, Schleiermachers Einleitung in die Glaubenslehre, (Berlin:
warnings against a confusion of theological and philosophical methodologies.

More surprising still is the separation made by commentators between the experience of feeling and the epistemological foundations of Schleiermacher's entire system of thought, as unfolded in the Dialektik. If what Schleiermacher in his Brief an Jacobi refers to as the ellipse of his thought is based on a vision of unity, then one would expect that the foci in this ellipse, the mediate experience of self-consciousness and the immediate experience of feeling, would in some way be related. It is the contention of this thesis that, beyond mere relationship, it is possible to discern the substantive influence of mediate self-consciousness (the proper object of the Dialektik) upon the presentation of Christian doctrine in the Glaubenslehre (which has as its proper object immediate, pious self-consciousness).

In this chapter we shall explore the relationship between mediate and immediate pious self-consciousness in the Dialektik and the Glaubenslehre. Our task here is to determine how, in Schleiermacher's own terms, the substantive influence of the logical or dialectical interest (which is based on mediate self-consciousness) upon the experience of pious feeling and its dogmatic expression was possible. We shall begin first with the Dialektik and then proceed to the Glaubenslehre. Since Schleiermacher's Dialektik remains largely unknown in the English-speaking world, it would be advantageous to preface our direct and focused examination of the role played by the experience of feeling in this work with a brief sketch of Schleiermacher's development in the Transcendental Part of the

Dialektik. As has been mentioned in chapter two, the Transcendental Part of the Dialektik concludes with an examination of the experience of feeling and the formulation of the general relationship of God and World. The former will be treated at this point in our development; the latter will be explored in-depth in chapter five.

In the lectures of 1811, Schleiermacher defines Dialektik as the "art of the exchange of thoughts ..."60 This qualification, which is made in the earliest conception of Schleiermacher's plan of Dialektik, reflects his perspective on the nature of human reflection. For Schleiermacher, all thinking is in a constant state of change and flux; all human knowledge is relative.61 Polarity is implied in the very nature of human reason itself. According to Schleiermacher, mediate self-consciousness is the basis of the antitheses of thinking and thought, subject and object, Denken and Sein, which characterize human experience and existence. In a later series of lectures, Schleiermacher defines Dialektik in a manner which indicates his recognition of the problem suggested by the antithetical dynamic of mediate self-consciousness and which calls attention to the task of the Dialektik itself. According to the lectures of 1818, "Dialektik is the art of coming from a difference in thinking to agreement."62 Thinking, for Schleiermacher, cannot be satisfied with its fragmentary and contentious character. The activity of thinking concomitantly gives rise to what Schleiermacher calls the

60 "Dialektik = Kunst des Gedankenwechsels ...," Dial., p. 17.

61 Cf. Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 127, p. 69: "Die Relativität des Wissens ist mit demjenigen zugleich gesehen, wodurch wir uns seiner in seinem Unterschiede von andern Operationen bewusst sind, also mit dem Bewusstsein des Wissens selbst gesehen und ihm wesentlich."

62 "Dialektik ist die Kunst von einer Differenz im Denken zur Übereinstimmung zu kommen." Dial., p. 18.
Wissenwollen, the desire to know, which is the tendency in thinking to strive toward the unity and agreement of knowing. In Schleiermacher's view, the task of the Dialektik, i.e., the determination of what thinking may be considered knowing, necessitates that a foundation be sought for the unity and agreement that characterize knowledge proper. Even though both thinking and knowing are human activities and are thus subject to the relativity of the finite, epistemic agreement, for Schleiermacher, requires a principle on which the unity of knowledge is based. The search for this principle is undertaken in the Transcendental Part of the Dialektik. In this section of his development Schleiermacher essays to delineate the metaphysical foundation upon which all epistemic construction rests.

It should be recalled that knowledge, in Schleiermacher's view, possesses two criteria or characteristics: intersubjectivity and objectivity. The former expresses the unity of the means of conceptualization in all thinking subjects; the latter expresses the need for these conceptions to correspond to being, i.e., to a given object of experience.\(^\text{63}\) These characteristics of knowledge reflect an antithesis between thinking and being which stems from the duplicity of the functions on which thinking is based. The first of these functions is designated by Schleiermacher as the organic, the second as the intellectual. The organic function is the means by which an uncultivated connection is achieved between the mind and the external world. This function conveys the impressions of sense, the confused manifold arising from the objective world, to the mind. The intellectual function orders this raw material of sense experience through the activity of reason.

\(^{63}\) Cf. Dialektik, Lectures of 1814, Proposition 87, p. 43.
(Vernunftthätigkeit), which structures the disordered array of sense experience in terms of the categories of unity (Einheit) and multiplicity (Vielheit). The intellectual function lends a priori determinateness to the impressions of sense mediated by the organic function. According to Schleiermacher, both functions are required for real thinking (wirkliches Denken); the negation of either cancels the very possibility of adequacy in the thinking process. The interrelationship of the intellectual and the organic functions is the basis of self-consciousness.

Although an end to the search for a ground of agreement in knowledge seems to be discovered in the interrelationship of the intellectual and organic functions, such is not the case. For Schleiermacher, this ground must be able to serve as a foundation for the agreement between thinking and being which all knowing requires. Although self-consciousness, i.e., the connection of the intellectual and organic functions, establishes a relationship between thinking and being, it cannot serve as the ground of agreement between thinking and being. Schleiermacher contends that self-consciousness is itself the seat of the antithesis of thinking and being, and thus the source of mediate experience itself. Since self-consciousness falls within, and is actually the origin of, the sphere of antithesis which characterizes all mediate experience, it cannot be the principle or ground of epistemic agreement. For Schleiermacher, this ground of agreement cannot itself be subject to the antitheses of finite experience and existence, but must be sought beyond the realm of time and space. According to the nineteenth century theologian, the ground of agreement between thinking and being must be a transcendent principle of absolute unity to which, in Schleiermacher's view, the idea of God

64 Cf. Falk Wagner, op. cit., p. 75.
corresponds.

At this point, a departure must be made from Schleiermacher's own development in the Transcendental Part of the Dialektik in order to call attention to a problem that vexes the entirety of his epistemology. Schleiermacher regards the ground of knowledge as a transcendent principle of absolute unity of being, expressed by the term "God." This principle is not deduced logically in the Dialektik. It is introduced only as a presupposition, the justification of which constitutes the task of the Transcendental Part of the Dialektik. In following this course Schleiermacher presupposes first, that the relationship between thinking and being established by self-consciousness is insufficient to provide a ground for agreement in knowing; second, that, consequently, the principle enabling the possibility of agreement between thinking and being must be a transcendent absolute unity of being; and third, that the idea of God corresponds to this transcendent principle. It is this third presupposition which seems strangest of all, especially in the context of a post-critical epistemology which refused to surrender itself to the Idealism of the day.

... and by positing this higher being we ascend to the absolute, to the deity, the transcendent source of all being and, in an ideal way, of all knowing, so that everything exists in us as being and thinking only as rooted in the deity....

There is hardly sound reason for identifying the ground of knowing with the deity. Yet, by presupposing such a transcendent principle and by maintaining that this principle is the ground of epistemic agreement,

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65"... und dies höhere Sein sezend steigen wir auf bis zum absoluten, zur Gottheit, der transcendentalen Quelle alles Seins und idealiter auch alles Wissens, so dass alles als Sein und Denken nur in uns ist als gewurzelt in der Gottheit..." Dial., Lectures of 1811, p. 319.
Schleiermacher unites these apparently disparate positions in an almost casual fashion. The problem of this presuppositional leap which Schleiermacher makes early in the construction of his epistemological system will be discussed later in our study. By way of anticipation, however, it may be said that the discernment of the ground of knowing by way of presupposition is not so much an instance of logic gone amiss as it is an indication of the role played by the experience of feeling in the Dialektik.

As has been mentioned, Schleiermacher, upon having postulated the ground of epistemic agreement, devotes the remainder of the Transcendental Part of the Dialektik to a justification of this postulate and to a consideration of its availability to human knowledge. To these matters we now turn.

Since Schleiermacher regards the transcendent ground as absolute, he maintains that it cannot be discovered within the finite realm, the sphere of the antithetical and the relative. As we have seen, the relationship between Denken and Sein established by self-consciousness could not serve as the principle on which the epistemic agreement of thinking and being is based. This was found to be so precisely because self-consciousness itself posits the antithesis of subject and object and thus falls within the scope of opposition. This opposition characterizes all mediate experience. The ground of knowing, according

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to the Dialektik, may only be found beyond the finite and the antithetical. For this reason, Schleiermacher delimits an antithesis which, by virtue of its comprehensiveness, expresses to the greatest possible degree the opposition that characterizes finite experience and existence. By examining the uppermost and lowermost limits of this inclusive antithesis from both ontological and noetic perspectives, Schleiermacher attempts first, to justify his presupposition of the transcendent ground of knowing, and second, to determine the possibility of attaining knowledge of the transcendent ground itself.

It should be recalled that the second characteristic of knowledge delineated by Schleiermacher, that that which is thought corresponds to being (objectivity), is illustrative of a positive estimation of the objective pole of human experience in his epistemology. For Schleiermacher, this significance of objectivity must constitute a fundamental aspect of the highest opposition which he terms the antithesis of the Ideal and the Real. Whereas the antithesis of thinking and being is posited subjectively, since self-consciousness is the source of this antithesis, the comprehensiveness of the Ideal-Real antithesis must as well incorporate the objective side of the epistemological process expressed in the second characteristic or criterion of knowledge. In other words, the Ideal-Real antithesis must be constituted on the ontological, as well as on the noetic, level.

Now since the activity of reason is grounded in the Ideal, but the organic activity, as dependent on the influences of objects, is grounded in the Real, so is being as much posited in an ideal way as in a real way; and Ideal and Real run parallel to each other as modi of being.67

67 "Da nun die Vernunftthätigkeit gegründet ist im idealen, die organische aber als abhängig von den Einwirkungen der Gegenstände im
Although such an approach to the objective side of experience indicates the presence of a realist strain in Schleiermacher's epistemology, it would be incorrect to radicalize the importance of the Real to the point that it be viewed independently of the Ideal. Intersubjectivity (the ideal criterion of knowledge) and objectivity (the real criterion of knowledge) must always be related and, since the task of the Dialektik involves the development of a theory of knowledge, the ontological may only be approached within the context and interests of the noetic. Being achieves significance in its relation to thinking.

There is no other positive explanation of this highest antithesis than that the Ideal is that in being which is the principle of all activity of reason, in so far as the latter completely prescinds from the organic activity; and the Real is that in being by virtue of which it is the principle of the organic activity, in so far as the latter completely prescinds from the activity of reason. 68

This passage demonstrates that although the noetic side of the lesser antithesis of thinking and being remains the focus of Schleiermacher's development in the Dialektik, the ontological side of this antithesis plays a central role in the formation of knowledge since the ideal and real modes of being are foundations on which the intellectual and organic functions respectively are based. The ontological, in fact, is an avenue which leads to the next phase of Schleiermacher's probe into the antithesis of the Ideal and the Real.

68"Es gibt keine andrė positive Erklärung dieses höchsten Gegensazes, als dass das ideale ist dasjenige im Sein, was Prinzip aller Vernunftthätigkeit ist, in wiefern diese durchaus nicht von der organischen abstammt, und das reale dasjenige im Sein, vermöge dessen es Prinzip der organischen Thätigkeit ist, in wiefern diese durchaus nicht von der Vernunftthätigkeit abstammt." Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 133, p. 76.
Self-consciousness emerges in the relationship or connection between the intellectual and organic functions. Thinking originates in the ordering of the confused manifold of sense impressions by the activity of reason. Schleiermacher's intention in the Transcendental Part of the Dialekтик leads him to isolate and to seek the ontological basis of each of these functions in order to justify the presupposed ground of agreement in knowing. Although the ontological bases of the intellectual and organic functions, which respectively correspond to the antithesis of the Ideal and the Real, are both transcendental modes of being in Schleiermacher's view, he maintains that only one justifies the presuppositional character of the transcendent ground of knowing.

As the above quoted passage from the Dialekтик states, the Real is 'that in being by virtue of which it is the principle of the organic activity.' The Real is thus present in thinking through the activity of the organic function. If the organic function be divorced from all order stemming from the activity of reason, then the lower extreme of the highest antithesis, the Real, the source of the manifold which constitutes the matter of thinking, is encountered. The Real, as a transcendental mode of being, cannot be an object of thinking since it completely prescinds from the determination of the form of thinking, i.e., the intellectual function. Schleiermacher terms this ontological mode "Chaos" and designates it as a boundary of thought.

If we take the determinability, which includes the first tendency of the intellectual function, away from the

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69 Cf. Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 136, p. 77: "Das transcendentalе, worauf wir von hieraus kommen, ist also die Idee des Seins an sich unter zwei entgegengesetzten und sich auf einander beziehenden Arten oder Formen und modis, dem idealen und realen, als Bedingung der Realität des Wissens."
representation of the undetermined manifold of impression, then that which remains is the "Chaos," which actually is no longer a representation, because we are able neither to fix it through characteristics nor to enliven it to a sensible image, but is a boundary of thought.70

By prescinding entirely from the organic function, the mode of being which is that mediated to the thinking process by the organic function is discovered. The Chaos, as transcendental being lacking all ideal determination, is the boundary of thought on the real side of the highest antithesis. Schleiermacher is clear in stating that the Chaos cannot itself be assimilated by the thinking process since it can only be realized by negating one of the functions requisite for thinking.71

Rather, the Chaos is that mode of being which constitutes a limit of thinking from the perspective of the Real.

Schleiermacher attempts to approximate the ideal, transcendental mode of being by traversing the opposite path. The Ideal is 'that in being which is the principle of all activity of reason.' For Schleiermacher, abstracting from all sense impression uncovers a mode of being which is the basis of the determination afforded to the thinking process by the Vernunftthätigkeit:

If we take away from the object the possibility that it would affect us organically, then there remains (corresponding to the Chaos) nothing but pure being without action. This is,

70 "Nehmen wir aus der Vorstellung von der unbestimmten Mannigfaltigkeit der Impression die Bestimmbarkeit, welche die erste Tendenz der intellectuellen Function in sich schliesst, hinweg: so bleibt übrig das Chaos, welches eigentlich keine Vorstellung mehr ist, weil wir sie weder durch Merkmale fixiren, noch zu einem sinnlichen Bilde beleben können, sondern eine Gedankengrenze." Dial., Lectures of 1822, p. 389.

likewise, only a boundary of thought, as one sees that it is only the indifference between antithesis and not-antithesis, and designates nothing other than the possible beginning of thinking from the intellectual side. 72

Being aware that being and acting express an antithesis posited in finite experience and existence by mediate self-consciousness, 73 it is clear that, for Schleiermacher, this ideal mode of being is a principle of unity and identity which precedes completely from the realm of antithesis. Schleiermacher terms this ideal pole of the highest antithesis Gott or Gottheit, 74 and designates it as a boundary of thought. In the Dialektik, the polar extremes of the Ideal-Real antithesis, Gott and Chaos, are modes of being on which the intellectual and the organic functions respectively are based. Even though they are boundaries of thought and, therefore, lie beyond the capacities of the activity of thinking itself, the ontological modes of Gott and Chaos are the roots of all knowing.

The significance of Schleiermacher's examination of the Ideal-Real antithesis can be summarized in two interrelated points. First, as has been mentioned, the ontological in Schleiermacher's epistemology is invariably treated from the perspective of the noetic. The ideal and real modes of being, respectively, Gott and Chaos, are only integral to Schleiermacher's development to the extent that these modes constitute


73Cf. DIAL., Lectures of 1811, p. 353.

74Cf. DIAL., Lectures of 1814, p. 60.
the bases of the requisite functions of thinking. This relationship between the ontological and the noetic is witnessed in the fact that, for Schleiermacher, both modes of transcendental being are, at the same time, boundaries of thought. Second, this relationship between the ontological and the noetic, between being and thinking, is corroborated in Schleiermacher's special regard for the ideal mode of being. According to the nineteenth century theologian, the pure unity and identity of the ideal mode of being legitimates the presupposition of a transcendent ground of agreement between thinking and being. Whereas Gott was posited earlier in Schleiermacher's development as the transcendent ground of knowing, the examination of the Ideal-Real antithesis provided some justification for this presupposition. Although the real mode of being upon which the organic function is based is regarded by Schleiermacher as the source of the manifold of experience and as the ontological foundation of the antithesis between thinking and being, the ideal mode of being, as a principle that completely transcends the realm of the finite, the absolute unity of being, provides a means of explaining epistemic agreement. For Schleiermacher, the unity and determination which the intellectual function brings to the organic in the construction of knowledge stems from the absolute unity of being of the ideal boundary of thought, i.e., Gott.

Schleiermacher's attempt to justify his presupposition of the transcendent ground, however, does not constitute a proof of this principle of epistemic agreement. The transcendent ground ever remains a presupposition in the Dialektik. The presuppositional character of this principle of epistemic agreement is further evinced in Schleiermacher's inquiry into the extent to which the transcendent ground may be grasped.
in terms of the forms of knowledge, i.e., concept and judgment. This
inquiry is undertaken through the examination of the Ideal-Real anti-
thesis from the noetic perspective.

The ontological polar extremes of the Ideal-Real antithesis were
posited by means of a separation and isolation of the intellectual and
organic functions. The unique ontological determination of the ideal
pole provided justification for the presupposition of the transcendent
ground. Such a procedure, however, violates the connection of these two
functions requisite for the integrity of human experience. In the
lectures of 1822, Schleiermacher states that this analysis of the
ontological extremes of the Ideal-Real antithesis through the separation
of the intellectual and organic functions can only be accomplished
"durch Fiction." 75 That in being which forms the ideal boundary of
thought can only be posited by seeking the unity of the intellectual
function apart from the manifold of organic affection. That in being
which forms the real boundary of thought can only be posited by seeking
the source of the manifold of sense experience apart from the unity of
intellectual determination. This separation, however, is only possible
by abstraction. Both boundaries of thought transcend the limits of real
thinking, the latter being established through the collaboration of the
intellectual and organic functions. The approximation of the Gedanken-
grenzen is only possible by violating this requisite collaboration. In
light of this rather tenuous justification of the presuppositional
transcendent ground, Schleiermacher supplements this "fictional"
(fictionsweise) 76 analysis of the Ideal-Real antithesis with one firmly

75 Dial., Lectures of 1822, p. 390.
76 Dial., Lectures of 1822, p. 390.
established in the actual situation of the thinking subject. This analysis is pursued by considering the epistemic availability of the transcendent ground in concept and judgment.

As mentioned in chapter two, knowledge, in Schleiermacher's view, must occur under the form of either concept or judgment. The former fixes being as a unity through the connection of various attributes, characteristics, and qualities; the latter connects different concepts by combining subject and predicate. The unity of concept is moored in the activity of reason and depicts being as stable; judgment, by binding concepts, portrays being as dynamic. Through judgment, the knowledge framed in the unity of concept is augmented. Both forms of knowledge are interdependent. Each relies upon the other for the lucidity and preciseness of its own epistemic determination.

Thus, judgments are the more perfect, the more the concepts are already formed. The concept is the more perfect, the more it rests upon a system of judgments.

Within the sphere of concept, Schleiermacher recognizes that it is possible to distinguish between concepts that are higher and concepts that are lower, owing to their respectively greater or lesser unitative determination of being. The relationship between genus and species

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77 Cf. Dial., Lectures of 1811, p. 316: "Der Begriff fixirt das Sein als eine Einheit; das Urtheil dagegen sagt von dem im Begriff fixirten als von Subject etwas aus, es combinirt Subject und Prädicat." Lectures of 1822, p. 400: "Begriff ist Verknüpfung von Merkmalen, Urtheil ist Verknüpfung von verschiedenartigen Begriffen."

78 Cf. Dial., Lectures of 1822, p. 401.

79 "Urtheile sind daher auch desto vollkommen, je mehr die Begriffe schon gebildet sind. Der Begriff ist desto vollkommen, je mehr er auf einem System von Urtheilen ruht." Dial., Lectures of 1814, Propositions 141, 143, pp. 82, 83.
serves as an example of this distinction. For Schleiermacher, the "sphere of the concept appears originally suspended in a relative antithesis of higher and lower, more general and more particular." The possibility of such a hierarchy of concepts is grounded on the antithesis of the Ideal and the Real itself. The extent to which a given concept expresses the unity of the ideal pole of thinking and being determines its position in the hierarchy of higher and lower, general and particular concepts. Higher and more general concepts express ideal being as power (Kraft); lower and more particular concepts express real being as appearance (Erscheinung). Pure power without appearance is the ideal boundary of thought; mere appearance which prescinds completely from power is the real boundary of thought. In real thinking (wirkliches Denken) power and appearance both contribute toward, and are mutually determining in, the construction of the concept. The particular level of unity attained by a given concept can be traced to the extent to which it portrays the ideality of power or, concomitantly, the reality of appearance.

In his development in the Transcendental Part of the Dialektik, Schleiermacher examines the apex and nadir of the Ideal-Real antithesis from the perspective of the hierarchy of concepts by pursuing a method comparable to that which delimited the ontological boundaries of thought.

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80 Cf. Falk Wagner, op. cit., p. 95.

81 "Das Gebiet des Begriffs erscheint ursprünglich schwebend in einem relativen Gegensatz des höheren und niederer, allgemeineren und besonderen." Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 145, p. 84.

We stress that this method is only comparable to the one pursued earlier in the nineteenth century theologian's development. Whereas the intellectual and organic functions previously were separated in order to determine the ontological poles of the highest antithesis, i.e., Gott and Chaos, Schleiermacher insists at this point in maintaining their connection. The transcendental scope facilitated in the ontological analysis by the separation of the intellectual and organic functions is curtailed by conducting an examination of the highest antithesis from a specifically epistemological perspective. Schleiermacher approaches the Ideal-Real antithesis from the standpoint of concept and judgment in order not only to seek a justification for the presupposed transcendent ground, but also to determine whether the transcendent ground can be grasped in terms of the forms of knowledge.

The gradation of higher and lower concepts, Schleiermacher contends, is an avenue leading to the extreme poles which, owing to the interdependency of the forms of knowledge, determine both concept and judgment. The upper or ideal boundary of concept is the idea of absolute unity of being which, since it prescinds totally from appearance (Erscheinung), embraces all other concepts within itself. This ideal boundary of the concept is the negation of the antithesis of thinking and being and, as a result, can no longer be considered a concept.  

83 The lower or real boundary of concept is "the possibility of a manifold of judgments"  

84 that are undetermined and totally devoid

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84 "Das Gebiet des Begriffs endet also nach unten in die Möglichkeit einer Mannigfaltigkeit von Urteilen, welche wieder mannigfaltig könnten zusammengefasst werden." Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 147, p. 85.
of the unity of concept. In other words, the lower boundary of concept is "the inexhaustible multiplicity of the perceivable." According to Schleiermacher, both boundaries of concept transcend the sphere of thinking and, thus, of knowing. The upper limit, however, again provides justification for the presupposed transcendent ground:

The idea of the absolute being as the identity of concept and object is, consequently, not knowledge. . . . It is, however, the transcendental ground and the form of all knowing. 86

Schleiermacher denotes the upper or ideal boundary of judgment as the absolute subject of which nothing more is predictable. The lower or real boundary of judgment is delimited as the infinity of predicates for which there are no determined subjects. In the absolute subject, the antithesis of judgment and fact is completely negated. The lower boundary of judgment, on the other hand, is further qualified as "an absolute communality of being" 87 which entirely prescinds from the unity of subjective referent. Again, Schleiermacher finds justification for the presupposed transcendent ground of knowing in the ideal boundary of judgment.

The more ontological determination is posited in a subject, the less ontological determination is excluded from it and, consequently, the less ontological determination is posited

85"Das heisst, die Grenze des Begriffs nach unten ist die umschopfliche Mannigfaltigkeit des Wahrnehmbaren." Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 147, p. 85.

86"Die Idee des absoluten Seins als Identität von Begriff und Gegenstand ist also kein Wissen. . . . Sie ist aber der transcendente Grund und die Form alles Wissens." Dial., Lectures of 1814, Propositions 153, 154, p. 87.

87"Das Gebiet des Urteils ist also begrenzt auf der einen Seite durch das Sezen eines absoluten Subjects, von welchem nichts prädictirt werden kann, und auf der andern Seite durch das Sezen einer Unendlichkeit von Prädicaten, für welche es keine bestimmten Subjecte giebt, d.h. einer absoluten Gemeinschaftlichkeit des Seins." Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 163, pp. 91-92.
as predicable of it. And the absolute subject is that in which all being is posited and of which, consequently, nothing can be predicated. 88

The absolute subject completely expresses the unity of being which characterizes the ideal pole of thinking and being.

In Schleiermacher's view, the upper and lower boundaries of concept and judgment are not unrelated. They are, in fact, identical. The coalescence of the boundaries of the forms of knowledge is clearly stated in the lectures of 1831:

The undetermined manifold of possible judgments (boundary of concept) and the absolute communality of being (boundary of judgment) are the same. The absolute unity of being (boundary of concept) and the absolute subject (boundary of judgment) are the same. 89

The former two express the real pole of thinking and being, the latter two, the ideal.

On the basis of his analysis, Schleiermacher concludes that the ideal boundaries of concept and judgment provide, as did the ideal boundary of thought, a justification for the presupposed transcendent ground of epistemic agreement. At their upper and lower boundaries, however, concept and judgment evaporated respectively either in ideal transcendentental unity or in real transcendentental manifold. Both forms of knowledge dissolved at their ideal and real boundaries. 90

88 "Je mehr Sein in einem Subject gesetzt ist, um desto wenigeres ist von ihm ausgeschlossen und also als von ihm prädicabel gesetzt, und das absolute Subject ist dasjenige, in welchem alles Sein gesetzt und von dem also nichts zu prädiciren ist." Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 160, p. 91.

89 "Die unbestimmte Mannigfaltigkeit möglicher Urtheile (Begriffsgrenze) und die absolute Gemeinschaftlichkeit des Seins (Urtheilsgrenze) sind dasselbe. Die absolute Einheit des Seins (Begriffsgrenze) und das absolute Subject (Urtheilsgrenze) sind dasselbe." Dial., Lectures of 1831, p. 506.

90 In his study of the Dialektik, Gerhard Spiegler maintains that
of whether or not the transcendent ground of knowledge could be grasped in terms of the forms of concept and judgment may only be answered in the negative. 91

Before abandoning the quest for the transcendent ground in knowledge, Schleiermacher distinguishes between the mode of knowledge which had hitherto formed the object of his examination, i.e., physical knowledge, and ethical knowledge. Although the futility of attaining physical knowledge of the transcendent ground has already been determined, Schleiermacher turns to ethical knowledge in hopes of discovering therein a solid epistemic foundation for the presupposed transcendent ground.

For Schleiermacher, physical knowledge originates in a system of actions in which human consciousness is influenced by the external world and in which it is predominantly passive. Ethical knowledge, on the contrary, originates in a system of actions in which consciousness exerts an influence on the external world and within which it is predominantly active. 92 Schleiermacher refers to physical knowledge as knowing (Wissen), though this qualification must be taken in a narrow sense; ethical knowledge is designated as willing (Wollen). One mode of knowledge may not

the boundaries of concept and judgment remain within the spheres of the forms of knowledge. Consequently, in Spiegler's view, the boundaries of concept and judgment may be considered instances of proper knowing. Gerhard Spiegler, op. cit., pp. 95-97. The above-quoted passages of the Dialektik show this not to be the case. See LS, II, pp. 122-126.

91Cf. Dial., Lectures of 1811, p. 322: "Die Gottheit ist eben so gewiss unbegrifflich, als ihre Erkenntniss die Basis aller Erkenntniss ist."

be considered more epistemically valid than the other. Each represents a mode of epistemic determination resulting from a particular relationship between man and the external world. Both together comprise the total spectrum of human knowledge.

The characteristics or criteria of ethical knowledge are, *mutatis mutandis*, the same as those which qualified physical knowledge. 

Wollen requires that all those possessing the capacity to will do so in the same way (intersubjectivity) and that this activity of willing corresponds to being (objectivity). 93 As was the case with physical knowledge, the two-fold criteria of intersubjectivity and objectivity indicate a disjunction between (ethical) thinking and being. Similarly, a ground must be sought for the agreement between thinking and being which characterizes all knowledge, whether it be ethical or physical in nature:

We are as much in need of a transcendental ground for our certainty in willing as we are for certainty in knowing, and both cannot be different. 94

Since ethical knowledge also must bridge the gap between the antithesis of thinking and being, a ground for epistemic agreement must be presupposed on which the unity of ethical knowledge may be based. For Schleiermacher, this ground must be transcendental. It must be free of the sphere of antithesis, i.e., finite experience and existence, in which the very problem of what thinking is knowing arises. Since

93 Cf. Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 212, 2, p. 148: "Beide Charaktere des Wissens, in sofern sie in der Ueberzeugung liegen, sind also auch auf das Wollen anzuwenden, und es gleicht also eine gemeinschaftliche Production des Wollens und ein dem Wollen entsprechendes Sein."

94 "Wir bedürfen eben so gut eines transcendentalen Grundes für unsere Gewissheit im Wollen, als für die im Wissen, und beide können nicht verschieden sein." Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 214, p. 150.
the same conditions and limitations of the forms of knowledge, i.e.,
concept and judgment, apply to ethical as well as to physical knowledge,
Schleiermacher maintains that the transcendent ground may not be grasped
in the epistemic mode of Wollen. The transcendent ground for agreement
in ethical and physical knowledge, however, must be the same lest the
positing of different transcendent grounds dichotomize human experience
and existence, thereby establishing bifurcation rather than the certainty
of epistemic agreement. Were this the case, the unity of the transcen-
dental presupposition itself would be denied.

Schleiermacher has now conducted the Transcendental Part of the
Dialektik to the point of its crescendo. We are in need, he insists,
of a ground for epistemic agreement in Wissen (physical knowledge) and
Wollen (ethical knowledge). This ground is introduced in the Dialektik
as a presupposed transcendent principle. It is regarded as a principle
of absolute unity of being which prescinds from the antitheses of the
finite. Schleiermacher’s analysis of the Ideal-Real antithesis from an
ontological perspective unveiled the boundaries of thought, the roots
of thinking and knowing, and provided justification for the presupposi-
tion of the transcendent ground. The analysis of the Ideal-Real anti-
thesis from a noetic perspective supported the presuppositional character
of the transcendent ground while confirming that this ground could not
be grasped in terms of the forms of knowledge, concept and judgment.
This limitation proved true of ethical as well as of physical knowledge.
Although the transcendent ground of epistemic agreement cannot be
known, Schleiermacher asserts late in his development that it can be

95 Cf. Dial., Lectures of 1814 Prop. 214, 2, pp. 150-151.
experienced. The nineteenth century theologian asserts that, although the transcendent ground cannot be epistemically grasped in the activities of thinking and willing, it can be experienced at the point where these two activities converge. The experience engendered by this convergence of thinking and willing is called feeling (Gefühl), which is defined in the lectures of 1814 as "the relative identity of thinking and willing." In the Dialektik, the experience of feeling constitutes the strongest justification for the presupposed transcendent ground of knowing.

As we have seen in chapter two, Schleiermacher lectured on Dialektik six times during his career, the period of time from the first lecture to the last being some twenty years. The differences that we meet in these lectures, differences which are at times subtle, at times marked, include the transformation of the role played by the experience of feeling in the Dialektik as Schleiermacher's philosophical and theological views gradually matured. In order to do justice to this developmental strain in his thought, we must examine Schleiermacher's treatment of the experience of feeling in the Dialektik as set forth in the individual lecture plans. Since the experience of feeling is only

96 "Dem gemäss nun haben wir auch den transzendenten Grund nur in der relativen Identität des Denkens und Wollens, nämlich im Gefühl." Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 215, p. 151. This manner of defining feeling, as an experience binding the activities on which physical and ethical knowledge respectively are based, achieves greater clarity when viewed in light of the role played by feeling in Kant's Critical philosophy. Kant, we should recall, employed feeling as an experience mediating between theoretical and practical reason. It is worthy of note that Schleiermacher did not consider Kant to have been as successful as himself in striking a balance between the ethical and the physical: "Philosophisch aber ist es Unrecht, nur die eine Wurzel gelten zu lassen und die andre zu verwerfen, wie Kant von der moralischen Seite, die meistens andern von der physischen gethan. Auch hat Kant die moralische nicht ganz recht gefaßt, weil sein Begriff von Glückseligkeit zu gemein ist." Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 214, 4, p. 151.
cursory mentioned in the lectures of 1811, our analysis will commence
with the lectures of 1814 and 1818, which are here treated together as
they are in the Jonas edition.

1. The Lectures of 1814 and 1818

These lectures contain Schleiermacher’s clearest and most elaborate
examination of the experience of feeling. As mentioned above, feeling
is defined in the lectures of 1814 as ‘the relative identity of thinking
and willing.’ It is interesting to note that even at this stage of its
development, the antithetical nature of the dialectical enterprise is
not cancelled. This is apparent in Schleiermacher’s definition of feel-
ing as a relative identity. Absolute identity transcends the limits of
finite experience and existence. The absolute unity of being, the pre-
supposed ground of physical and ethical knowledge, could not be grasped
by the forms of knowledge. Although the transcendent ground, in
Schleiermacher’s view, was necessarily presupposed as the principle for
agreement between thinking (physical knowledge) and being, and between
willing (ethical knowledge) and being, the antithetical character of
these activities, grounded on the dichotomy between subject and object,
egated the possibility of their attaining the transcendent ground under
the modes of knowledge which they respectively produced. For Schleier-
macher, God cannot be an object of knowledge since, as pure ideality, he
transcends the bounds of mediate, antithetical experience.

97 Cf. Dial., Lectures of 1811, p. 322.

98 For an excellent summary of the problem of the Transcendental
Part of the Dialektik explored in this section of our study, see Marlin
E. Miller, Der Übergang. Schleiermachers Theologie des Reiches Gottes
im Zusammenhang seines Gesamtprojekts, (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus
Schleiermacher maintains, however, that although the transcendent ground cannot be known it can be experienced. In examining the mutual dependence of thinking and willing, Schleiermacher claims that a point of identity emerges in the antithetical character of these activities which "exists in the oscillation as the final end of thinking and the beginning of willing." 99 This point of identity is feeling. Only in feeling, which Schleiermacher in these lectures calls immediate consciousness (unmittelbares Bewusstsein), can God, the transcendent ground, be experienced.

In feeling, the absolute unity of the Ideal and the Real, merely presupposed in thinking and willing, is actually accomplished; there the unity is immediate consciousness, original, whereas the thought of the unity, insofar as we possess it, is only mediated through the feeling and is only its imitation. 100

The experience of the transcendent ground in feeling is not an experience of God as he is in himself. In keeping with the tradition of the Reformers, especially Luther and Melanchthon, Schleiermacher asserts that "we know only of the being of God in us and in the things (of the external World), but hardly of a being of God outside the World or in himself." 101 While we shall return to the details of this passage it may at this point be understood as a description of the encounter of


100 "Im Gefühl ist die im Denken und Wollen bloss vorausgesetzte absolute Einheit des idealen und realen wirklich vollzogen, da ist sie unmittelbares Bewusstsein, ursprünglich, während der Gedanke derselben, sofern wir ihn haben, nur vermittelt ist durch das Gefühl, nur Abbildung desselben." Dial., Lectures of 1818, p. 152.

101 "Wir wissen nur um das Sein Gottes in uns und in den Dingern, gar nicht aber um ein Sein Gottes ausser der Welt oder an'sich." Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 216, p. 154.
the deity in human experience. It is important to realize, however, that the knowledge of which Schleiermacher speaks is only "knowing" as feeling and not knowledge proper under the forms of concept and judgment. 102 The identity of thinking and willing is regarded as "the divine in us." 103 For Schleiermacher the identity of these activities in feeling functions as an analogy of the transcendent ground in the human subject. 104

Schleiermacher is careful at this stage of his development not to claim too much for this point of convergence between thinking and willing. Feeling is carefully qualified in order to assure that its identity remains analogical to, and not the same as, the identity of the transcendent ground itself:

Now in feeling is the immediate, although only relative, identity of thinking and willing. Relative because the subject always passes over from one to the other. At times one is primary and the other secondary, at times the converse is true. 105

Strictly speaking, the dialectical interchange between thinking (whether it be physical or ethical) and being is never dissipated in Schleiermacher's view.

In the lectures of 1814/18, immediate consciousness or feeling is distinguished from reflective consciousness or self-consciousness proper,

102 This interpretation is supported by the marginal note appended to the above-quoted Proposition 216: "In wiefern wir nämlich unser Denken und Wollen als Eins fühlen."

103 "Diese Beziehung des Wollens auf das Denken und umgekehrt und die Einheit davon ist das göttliche in uns." Dial., Lectures of 1818, p. 155.

104 Falk Wagner has examined in detail the analogical function of the experience of feeling in the Dialektik. See Falk Wagner, op. cit., pp. 151-156.

the basis of mediate experience. The identity characteristic of immediate consciousness cannot be considered absolute since this mode of identity qualifies the unity of the highest being itself. The identity of feeling can only be regarded as relative since the activities of thinking and willing, in whose convergence feeling emerges, are themselves constantly in a state of flux. For Schleiermacher, immediate consciousness establishes the possibility of the transition from moments of thinking to moments of willing and vice versa, though immediate consciousness is not merely identical with the transition itself. In other words, feeling is an independent experience which cannot be reduced to a modicum of either thinking or willing.

It is important that the significance of Schleiermacher's qualification of the identity of thinking and willing not be overlooked. If Gefühl is defined in the Dialektik as immediate consciousness and is constituted as an independent experience, it is neither immediate nor independent in the sense that it is totally isolated from the experience of mediate self-consciousness. The relationship between immediate and mediate consciousness, in fact, is expressed in the qualification of the identity attained in feeling as relative. This relativity stems from the constant predominance of either thinking or willing over the other. Since these activities are grounded in the antithetical sphere of self-consciousness, this is as much to say that the relativity that qualifies the identity achieved in feeling has its provenance in the experience of mediate self-consciousness. This does not mean that the experience of feeling itself originates directly from the sphere of antithesis. Schleiermacher clearly holds the position that the identity of immediate consciousness cannot be based on the mediating operation of the organic
function. Feeling has no object in the World. The qualification of the identity of feeling as relative, however, is indicative of a connection between immediate consciousness and the antithetical (or relative) character of mediate self-consciousness. One would be incorrect in dismissing any relationship at all between immediate consciousness and mediate self-consciousness since the former emerges in experience as a point of convergence between the activities of thinking and willing. These activities are completely grounded in the antithesis of thinking and being established by mediate self-consciousness. It is to an examination of the extent of this relationship that we now turn.

According to Schleiermacher, feeling or immediate consciousness cannot be considered an experience devoid of relation to other modes of human experience, but rather must be seen as a part of mediate self-consciousness itself.

We can say that with our consciousness, the consciousness of God is also given to us as a constituent of our self-consciousness as well as of our external consciousness. Should the consciousness of God be isolated from mediate self-consciousness, the result would only be a "consciousless brooding." The immediate consciousness of God cannot be separated from our consciousness of the World. Schleiermacher essays to demonstrate this relationship between immediate consciousness and mediate self-consciousness by extending the analogy of the divine in feeling to the activities in whose convergence feeling emerges.


107 "Wollen wir das Bewusstsein Gottes isoliren; so gerathen wir in ein bewusstloses Brüten ..." Dial., Lectures of 1818, p. 153.
With regard to the activity of thinking, Schleiermacher states that the being of ideas in us is a being of God in us, not insofar as ideas fill a particular moment in self-consciousness as determined representations, but "insofar as they express in us all in the same way . . . the nature of being and in their certainty express the identity of the Ideal and the Real . . ."\textsuperscript{108} With regard to the activity of willing, Schleiermacher addresses himself to human conscience, the faculty which sets forth the normative principles of moral action. The being of the conscience in us, the nineteenth century theologian maintains, is similarly a being of God. This is true neither insofar as the conscience constructs individual moral principles nor insofar as these principles are applied in the world, since individual instances of both theory and practice may be in error. Rather, the being of the conscience is a being of God only "insofar as the conscience, in moral conviction, expresses the agreement of our willing with the laws of external being and, consequently, the same identity (of the Ideal and the Real)."\textsuperscript{109}

Schleiermacher's extension of the analogy of the divine in feeling to the foundations of the activities of thinking and willing, respectively, ideas and conscience, is illustrative of the relationship posited in his thought between immediate consciousness and mediate self-consciousness. In ideas and in the conscience the possibility of agreement between

\textsuperscript{108}"Das Sein der Ideen in uns ist ein See Gottes in uns . . . in wiefern sie in uns allen auf gleiche Weise . . . das Wesen des Seins ausdrücken und in ihrer Gewissheit die Identität des idealen und realen aussprechen . . ." \textit{Dial.}, Lectures of 1814, Proposition 216, 1, p. 154.

\textsuperscript{109}"Eben so ist das Sein des Gewissens in uns ein Sein Gottes . . . in wiefern es in der sittlichen Ueberzeugung die Uebereinstimmung unseres Wollens mit den Geszeen des äusseren Seins und also eben dieselbe Identität ausspricht." \textit{Dial.}, Lectures of 1814, Proposition 216, 1, pp. 154-155.
physico-ethical thinking and being is established. In feeling, the ground of this agreement is immediately experienced.

According to Schleiermacher, our consciousness of God in immediate experience and our self-consciousness or World-consciousness in mediate experience are mutually determining. The manner in which immediate consciousness determines mediate self-consciousness has already been outlined in our development. Feeling is the transition point between thinking and willing. In feeling, the transcendent ground of epistemic agreement sought in mediate self-consciousness is immediately experienced. In this respect, the unity of feeling, as an analogy in human experience of the absolute unity of the transcendent ground, is the experiential criterion of the unity of knowing.

And thus we can say that just as each self-consciousness includes, by the same token, the consciousness of the highest, so also in each objective consciousness, in each consciousness of the things (of the external World), the more perfect it is, the more perfect the knowledge of the highest is indirectly co-posed. 110

As has been mentioned, the relationship between our immediate consciousness of God and our mediate self-consciousness or World-consciousness should not be perceived merely in terms of the influence of the former upon the latter. In Schleiermacher's view, our mediate experience in the World, i.e., self-consciousness, seems to be requisite for the emergence of the immediate experience of our consciousness of God.

The identity of feeling, we should recall, is achieved in the convergence point of thinking and willing, activities based on the antithesis

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110 "Und so können wir sagen; dass ebén so wie jedes Selbstbewusstsein das Bewusstsein des höchsten mit in sich schliesst, eben so in jedem objectiven Bewusstsein, in jedem Bewusstsein um die Dinge, je vollkommen es ist, desto vollkommener das Wissen um das höchste Indirekt mitgesetzt ist." Dial., Lectures of 1818, p. 157.
of self and World. Thinking and willing are the activities of mediate self-consciousness. The movement from one activity to the other, a movement which itself stems from the antithesis on which these activities are based, is responsible for the qualification of the identity of feeling as relative. The extent of the relationship between immediate consciousness and mediate self-consciousness is further clarified in Schleiermacher's claim that feeling always arises in experience in association with a particular determination of mediate self-consciousness.

... for the consciousness of God ... is always (experienced) in another; only (as experienced) in the particular is one conscious of the totality, only (as experienced) in an antithesis (between our own being and that posited outside of ourselves) is one conscious of the unity. 111

The manner in which mediate self-consciousness influences or determines immediate consciousness is established in Schleiermacher's insistence that the consciousness of God is always "in another." 112 Feeling never emerges in actual experience alone, but only along with mediate self-consciousness. For Schleiermacher, mediate self-consciousness or

111: "... denn das Bewusstsein Gottes ist ... immer an einem anderen; nur an einem einzelnen ist man sich der Totalität, nur an einem Gegensatz (zwischen dem eignen Sein und dem ausser uns gesezten) ist man sich der Einheit bewusst." Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 215, 2, p. 152. In his analysis of these lectures, Georg Wehrung concludes that the above described relationship between immediate consciousness and mediate self-consciousness undeniably sets forth a pantheistic conception of the Absolute. With this interpretation we cannot agree. Throughout his treatment Schleiermacher clearly distinguishes between God as he is experienced by us in feeling, and God as he is in himself. See Georg Wehrung, Die Dialektik Schleiermachers, (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1920), p. 154.

World-consciousness provides an experiential substratum requisite for the immediacy of feeling. Although each originates differently, mediate self-consciousness and immediate consciousness require, and actually complement, each other. Mediate self-consciousness gives rise to the antithesis, the negation of which forms the relative identity of feeling. As well, mediate self-consciousness serves as an experiential substratum necessary for the emergence of feeling in actual experience. Immediate consciousness unveils, and functions as an analogy of, the transcendent ground in human experience, the principle of agreement between thinking and being and between willing and being.

2. The Lectures of 1822

In the lectures of 1822 we encounter an examination of the experience of feeling which supports and expands on the account of feeling found in the lectures of 1814/18. If we recall that the first edition of the Glaubenslehre was published in the years 1821/22, this expanded account of the experience of feeling in the lectures of 1822 can be attributed to the nineteenth century theologian's very centered interests at this point in his career.

In these lectures, feeling is again defined with respect to the activities of thinking and willing. An equation is made between immediate self-consciousness (das unmittelbare Selbstbewusstsein), which emerges in the identity of thinking and willing, and feeling. Feeling, Schleiermacher states, must be distinguished from reflective self-consciousness or the ego, which "expresses only the identity of the subject in the difference of the moments (of experience)" and, consequently, is based on the combining of the moments which at all times is something
mediated." Schleiermacher also distinguishes immediate feeling from sensation (Empfindung), which is characterized as "the subjective personal (element) in the determined moment (of experience) and, consequently, is posited by means of affection." Sensation is a lower sensible "feeling" originating in an object in the external world. In contradistinction to immediate feeling, sensation is an experience based on the subject-object antithesis and is thus mediated to the subject by the organic function. Only in immediate self-consciousness or feeling does one attain the relative identity of thinking and willing, an identity which is experientially analogical to the transcendent ground of knowing.

It is important to note the terminological shift between the lectures of 1822 and the lectures of 1814/18. In the latter (1814/18) feeling is described as unmittelbares Bewusstsein and is distinguished from Selbstbewusstsein or reflective self-consciousness. In the lectures of 1822, however, feeling is described as unmittelbares Selbstbewusstsein. Although calling feeling immediate self-consciousness seems to cancel the distinction made in the earlier lectures of 1814/18, such is not the case. What we witness in the lectures of 1822 is a terminological change.
resulting from a broader definition of self-consciousness on Schleiermacher's part. In the earlier lectures, self-consciousness was characterized as reflective. It referred to mediate experience based on the dichotomy of subject and object. In the lectures of 1822, self-consciousness is described not only as reflective and mediate but also as immediate. This extended conception of self-consciousness can be traced to Schleiermacher's description of feeling in the first edition of the *Glaubenslehre* and, we suggest, stems from his desire to clarify the relationship between feeling and mediate self-consciousness. By describing feeling as a form of self-consciousness, Schleiermacher emphasizes the close relationship between immediate and mediate experience.

In the lectures of 1822, Schleiermacher focuses directly on this relationship between mediate and immediate self-consciousness.

Immediate self-consciousness, however, is not only in the transition (between thinking and willing); but insofar as thinking is also willing and vice versa, immediate self-consciousness must also exist in each moment. And thus we also find feeling constant, always accompanying each moment, be it predominantly thinking or willing. By virtue of its connection with the activities of thinking and willing, feeling is related to mediate experience. Although immediate self-consciousness seems to vanish in the predominance of either thinking or willing, this does not actually happen. Feeling always accompanies

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116 In the first edition of the *Glaubenslehre* this qualification is clearly stated in the Anmerkung to Proposition 8: "Unter Gefühl verstehe ich das unmittelbare Selbstbewusstsein ..." 1. Auflage, p. 26.

117 "Das unmittelbare Selbstbewusstsein ist aber nicht nur im Übergang; sondern sofern Denken auch Wollen ist und umgekehrt, muss es auch in jedem Moment sein. Und so finden wir auch das Gefühl als beständig jeden Moment, sei er nun vorherrschend denkend oder wollend, immer begleitend." *Dial.*, Lectures of 1822, p. 429.
mediate self-consciousness. For Schleiermacher, immediate self-consciousness is always co-posed (mitgesetzt) in thinking and willing. In feeling, "the consciousness of God is always connected with a finitely determined consciousness, a consciousness combining ourselves and the object."¹¹⁸ In Schleiermacher's view, our consciousness of God and our consciousness of the World are experientially inseparable.

Although Schleiermacher's consideration of the experience of feeling had tended in the lectures of previous years to take into account the religious perspective on this experience, the development of the experience of feeling in the Glaubenslehre is brought directly to bear on the lectures of 1822. Schleiermacher here defines religious feeling as the universal feeling of dependence (allgemeines Abhängigkeitsgefühl), a qualification which will be examined in-depth in the final section of this chapter.

3. The Lectures of 1828

In the lectures of 1828 the experience of feeling is never explicitly mentioned. This silence must be attributed to the fragmentary nature of the lectures of 1828 themselves.¹¹⁹ Schleiermacher, however, devotes part of the content of these lectures to a consideration of the function exercised by external being (das Sein ausser uns) in the determination

¹¹⁸ "... im Gefühl immer das Bewusstsein Gottes verknüpft ist mit einem endlich bestimmten, unser und entgegengesetztes zusammenfassenden, Bewusstsein ... " Dial., Lectures of 1822, p. 430. With regard to the relationship between immediate and mediate self-consciousness in the lectures of 1822, see Doris Offermann, op. cit., pp. 78f.

¹¹⁹ Georg Wehrung considers the lectures of 1828 to be so concise that they are only intelligible in light of the more developed lectures of previous years. Georg Wehrung, op. cit., p. 215.
of our own existence. The higher experience engendered by the relationship of self and World clearly points to the experience which Schleiermacher terms Gefühl in the earlier lectures.

In its temporal (zeitlichen) development, this function of external being in determining human existence reveals itself as the condition of being-organically-affected (des Organischaffenheits). This condition, considered in itself, is one of mere passivity on the part of the subject and describes the dynamic of sense experience as such. For us and in us, however, the condition of being-organically-affected is raised to the level of intellection. This character of the determination of human existence by external being, which Schleiermacher calls its timelessness (Zeitlosigkeit), manifests itself as a transition to thinking or to transitive action. At the level of intellection, human existence is determined as willing being that thinks or as thinking being that wills. At this stage, consciousness is established not only as self-activity (Selbstthätigkeit), but also as self-consciousness (Selbstbewusstsein) through the certainty (Gewissheit) which accompanies physical and ethical knowledge. Schleiermacher asserts that this certainty is not grounded in the identity of both intellectual functions, i.e., in feeling, but rather outside them. This basis must be co-posited (mitgesetzt) originally in self-consciousness as a dependency upon the transcendent ground, a dependency which extends even to man's self-activity as a thinking-willing being. The experience of dependency, for Schleiermacher, is the religious element in human self-consciousness.

According to the nineteenth century theologian, this mode of possessing the transcendent ground in self-consciousness is immediate, since it does not first arise in the subject-object antithesis, and
universal, since it cannot be achieved through the employment of a
critical method. It is immediate certainty posited in human experience
itself. 120

4. The Lectures of 1831

The lectures of 1831 fail to mention both feeling and the qualifica-
tion of its experiential mode as immediate. Instead Schleiermacher
addresses himself to the relationship between the God-consciousness
(Gottesbewusstsein) and self-consciousness. The centrality of this
motif in the lectures of 1831 betrays Schleiermacher’s preoccupation
during this period with the publication of the second edition of the
Glauben Lehre (1830/31). Insignificant modifications in Schleiermacher’s
epistemological terminology are also encountered in these lectures.

For Schleiermacher, the God-consciousness is the determined mode in
which the transcendent ground of being and thinking is present in self-
consciousness. The God-consciousness is the manner in which the identity
of human existence in the transition from one operation to the other is
experienced. 121 Human existence finds itself in an oscillation between
abbildliches Denken (physical knowledge) and vorbildliches Denken
(ethical knowledge). The Gottesbewusstsein emerges in the identity of
both in self-consciousness. The being-co-posited (das Mitgesetzte) of
God in each transition from thinking to willing and vice versa enables
the transference not only of the ego (Ich), but also of the transcendent
ground from one series of activity to another. 122 The God-consciousness,

120 Cf. Dial., Lectures of 1828, pp. 474-475.
121 Cf. Dial., Lectures of 1831, p. 527.
122 Cf. Dial., Lectures of 1831, pp. 524-525: "Diese Identität (von
abbildlichem und vorbildlichem Denken) wird im Selbstbewusstsein
i.e., feeling, accompanies every developed activity of mediate experience. Feeling determines and is always determined by a specific form of mediate self-consciousness.

5. Summary

As we have seen, Schleiermacher directly undertakes the development of the experience of feeling in the lectures of 1814/18 and 1822. In the former, feeling is described as unmittelbares Bewusstsein and as a constituent of self-consciousness. In the lectures of 1822, Schleiermacher employs a slightly different, though significant, change in terminology, equating Gefühl and unmittelbares Selbstbewusstsein. In the lectures of 1814/18 and 1822, feeling is defined as the identity of the activities of thinking and willing and functions as an analogy of the divine in human experience. Schleiermacher makes every effort in these lectures to establish the relationship between feeling and mediate self-consciousness. Each is requisite for the experiential emergence of the other.

In the later lectures we meet accounts of the experience of feeling which, unfortunately, are undeveloped. The lectures of 1828 speak of the unity of feeling in terms of the certainty (Gewissheit) attained in knowing proper. This certainty is based on the transcendent ground of epistemic agreement in thinking and willing. The lectures of 1831, on the other hand, reflect the theological concerns which occupied Schleiermacher's interests late in his life. Rather than on feeling, his exposition centers on das Mitgesetzsein Gottes in the activities of aufgefasst als Gott, und das Mitgesetzsein Gottes in jedem Uebergang ist die Uebertragung wie des Ich so auch des transcendenten Grundes von einer Reihe zur andern."
thinking and willing. The being-co-posted of God in self-consciousness constitutes the integrity of the ego in its movement from one activity to the other.

It is clear that, to a greater or lesser extent, Schleiermacher is concerned in each set of lectures with establishing the importance of the interconnection between immediate and mediate (self-) consciousness. This is seen in all of the individual plans of the Dialektik in his relating the experience of Gefühl or its alternate descriptions (Gewissheit, das Mitgesetzseins Gottes) to the activities of mediate self-consciousness, i.e., thinking and willing. In all of these probes, with the exception of the sketchy lectures of 1828, there is a direct effort to delineate the interdependence between immediate (self-) consciousness and mediate self-consciousness. It is in the Glaubenslehre that we witness the full exposition of this relationship.

III. The Role of the Experience of Feeling in the Glaubenslehre

In chapter two, the principles and methodology employed by Schleiermacher in the Glaubenslehre were briefly examined. According to the nineteenth century theologian, dogmatics is the branch of theological science which systematizes the doctrine valid in a Christian Church at a given time. Christian doctrines are accounts of Christian religious affections set forth in speech. These affections are the experiential locus of the relationship between God and man. In the Glaubenslehre, the experience in which this relationship emerges is defined as the feeling of absolute dependence.

This section of our study proceeds in the analysis of the experience of Gefühl in Schleiermacher’s thought by focusing on the above-mentioned
qualification of feeling in the Glaubenslehre. As in our examination of the experience of feeling in the Dialektik, our study will direct its attention to the question of the manner in which immediate self-consciousness or feeling and mediate self-consciousness are related. The answer to this question, particularly from the standpoint of dogmatics, will enable us to appreciate the broad range which the experiential possesses in Schleiermacher's theology. As well, the answer to this question will establish how the influence of philosophy upon the content of Christian doctrine, an influence which Schleiermacher categorically denied, was possible given the theologian's own presuppositions concerning the nature of the experience of feeling.

1. The Definition of Piety as the Feeling of Absolute Dependence

In the Introduction to the Glaubenslehre, Schleiermacher attempts to portray the ecclesiastical nature of Christian dogmatics. The definition of dogmatics as that branch of theology which systematizes the doctrine valid in a Christian Church at a given time is a statement about the historical character of this discipline. The historical basis of dogmatics is the development of the Church in time and space.

For Schleiermacher, theology cannot be divorced from the life of the community of faith. The theologian cannot exist outside the Church. This is especially true for dogmatics and for the theologian who engages in this branch of theology. The proper object of the doctrinal formulation which dogmatics sets forth is the pious experience shared by the Church in the present. In an effort, then, to determine the specific form of pious experience which constitutes the basis of dogmatic exposition, Schleiermacher progressively delimits and defines the
particular ecclesiastical communion whose shared pious experience the
Glaubenslehre attempts to formulate doctrinally. Schleiermacher proceeds
first, by defining the nature of Church in general; second, by distinguishing
the form of religion under which the Christian Church may be classified;
and third, by determining the peculiar nature of the Christian Church whose
doctrinal exposition the Glaubenslehre ventures. Each of these three
steps, which progressively isolate the particular determination of pious
experience that constitutes the object of dogmatic expression, requires
the aid of a subordinate methodology in attaining a more exact understand-
ing of the nature of Church. The first step employs the methodology of
Ethics; the second, the methodology of the Philosophy of Religion; and
the third, the methodology of Apologetics.

According to Schleiermacher, ecclesiastical communion or Church
emerges in the dynamic of association or fellowship by those who share
similar determinations of pious self-consciousness. At this stage the
concept of Church is understood in the most generic sense possible. In
fact, Schleiermacher seems to imply that this general understanding of
Church may be equated with the concept of religion. Since, for Schleier-
macher, the Church "is a society which originates only through free human
action . . .", 123 it is to the discipline of Ethics, 124 he claims, that
one must look in defining the concept of Church. Although Ethics provides
methodological grounds for explaining the human dynamic of free ecclesiast-
tical association, Schleiermacher deems the experiential basis of such
association to be of central importance in his development. It is the

123 Cf., Proposition 2, 2, p. 3; Gl., I, p. 12.

124 Ethics is defined in the Glaubenslehre as "die der Naturwissen-
schaft gleichlaufende spekulative Darstellung der Vernunft in ihrer
experience of religious self-consciousness, we should recall, which is
the object of exposition in dogmatics. Schleiermacher defines the
experience of piety (Frömmigkeit) which underlies ecclesiastical
association as feeling or immediate self-consciousness.

The methodology of the Philosophy of Religion aids in determining
the relationship of the Christian Church to other ecclesiastical communions which share its general form. In Schleiermacher's view, Christianity, together with Judaism and Islam, must be classified under the rubric of monotheism. In these religions, the experience of piety is conditioned to such an extent by belief in one, supreme God that religious self-consciousness may not merely be described as a feeling, but rather as the feeling of absolute dependence.

As stated previously, however, theology, especially the branch of this science known as dogmatics, is always the theology of a particular Church. By employing the methodology of Apologetics, Schleiermacher delimits the precise nature of the Christian Church while at the same time making a statement about the form of pious self-consciousness which constitutes the experiential basis of this communion:

Christianity is a monotheistic faith, belonging to the teleological type of religion, and is essentially distinguished

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125 The Philosophy of Religion is defined in the Glaubenslehre as "eine kritische Darstellung der verschiedenen gegebenen Formen frommer Gemeinschaften, sofern sie in ihrer Gesamtheit die vollkommene Erscheinung der Frömmigkeit in der menschlichen Natur sind." Gl., I, Proposition 3, Postscript, p. 14.

126 Cf. Gl., I, Proposition 8, 2, pp. 52-54.

127 In the Glaubenslehre, Schleiermacher refers the reader to the Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums for his definition of Apologetics. See KD, Proposition 14, p. 17. The citation here given is to the first edition of the Kurze Darstellung incorporated as footnotes to the Scholz edition of the text.
from other such faiths by the fact that in it everything is related to the redemption accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth. 128

In Christianity, the feeling of absolute dependence is directly related to and specifically determined by the redemption accomplished by Jesus Christ.

Having traced Schleiermacher's progressive isolation of the proper experiential object of doctrinal exposition in the Glaubenslehre, i.e., the Christian determination of the feeling of absolute dependence, we must closely examine Schleiermacher's detailed description of the nature of this feeling.

In the third proposition of the Glaubenslehre, Schleiermacher defines, in both a positive and negative way, the experience which lies at the foundation of all religious association:

`The piety which forms the basis of all ecclesiastical communications is, considered purely in itself, neither a knowing nor a doing, but a determination of feeling or of immediate self-consciousness.'

Here we encounter the source of the terminological shift noted previously in the lectures on Dialektik from the year 1822. It should be recalled that in lectures of Dialektik from the years 1814/18 feeling was defined as unmittelbares Bewusstsein. The nineteenth century theologian described the consciousness of God, which emerges in the experience of feeling, as a Bestandtheil unseres Selbstbewusstseins, and not as a determination of self-consciousness itself. In the first edition of the Glaubenslehre (1821/22) 130 and in the Dialektik of 1822, feeling is defined not as

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128 CF, Proposition 11, p. 52; Gl., I, p. 74.


130 Cf. footnote 116.
immediate consciousness but as immediate self-consciousness (unmittelbares Selbstbewusstsein). When viewed in light of the Dialektik of 1814/18 this terminological shift seems strange since the lectures of 1814/18 clearly distinguish between the immediacy of feeling and the mediacy of reflective self-consciousness. In our analysis of the role of feeling in the Dialektik we attributed this subtle, though significant, change to a broader understanding of self-consciousness on Schleiermacher's part. We suggested that this broader understanding of self-consciousness is illustrative of Schleiermacher's desire to emphasize the close relationship between immediate and mediate experience in his thought. This relationship had been downplayed by the terminology employed in the lectures of 1814/18. Schleiermacher explores this close relationship between immediate and mediate self-consciousness in Propositions 3-5 in the second edition of the Glaubenslehre.

Schleiermacher was well aware that the new definition of feeling as

131 In positing a connection between the Glaubenslehre and the lectures on Dialektik of 1822 concerning the exposition of the experience of feeling we are in disagreement with Doris Offermann who emphasizes the independence of the developments. Doris Offermann, op. cit., p. 42. Werner Schultz, on the other hand, has recognized the connection between the Glaubenslehre and the Dialektik on this subject. Werner Schultz, "Schleiermachers Deutung der Religionsgeschichte," ZTK, 56, (1959), p. 68. While the connection between the two treatments of feeling is evident in the above-mentioned terminological change in the lectures of 1822, it is here suggested that not only the addresses on Dialektik of this year, but also those of the other years, harmonize with the Glaubenslehre with regard to the treatment of feeling. In his monograph on the Dialektik, Falk Wagner maintains that in the Glaubenslehre Schleiermacher exalts the experience of feeling differently than he does in the Dialektik by focusing on feeling "als wirkliches Bewusstsein, d.h. in seiner empirisch-zeitlichen Bezügliehkeit . . ." Falk Wagner, op. cit., p. 188. Granted, this motif is most fully developed in the dogmatics, although, as we have seen, this matter is by no means disregarded in the Dialektik but discussed in the context of the particular interests of the latter work.
immediate self-consciousness was in need of careful explanation.

Although, as has been mentioned, feeling is initially defined as immediate self-consciousness in the first edition of the Glaubenslehre, the definition is further emphasized, clarified, and developed in the second edition. This latter text will remain the focus of our exposition.

The purpose of Proposition 3 in the second edition of the Glaubenslehre is to explain the use of the term "immediate self-consciousness" and its significance for dogmatics as the seat of religious experience. The equation of feeling and self-consciousness, Schleiermacher insists, "is by no means intended to introduce generally a manner of speech in which the two expressions would be simply synonymous."¹³² The qualification 'immediate' distinguishes the determination of self-consciousness as feeling from the determination of self-consciousness "which is more like an objective consciousness, being a representation of oneself, and thus mediated by self-contemplation."¹³³ Representation implies mediacy. Feeling or immediate self-consciousness volatizes in the processes of reflection and representation which characterize mediate objective self-consciousness.

This clear distinction between immediate and mediate experience in Schleiermacher's thought, however, should not convey the false impression that no relation at all exists between feeling and mediate self-consciousness. On the contrary, as our study of the Dialektik has shown and as our analysis of the experience of feeling in the Glaubenslehre will demonstrate even more cogently, a significant and crucial

¹³² Cf., Proposition 3, 2, p. 6; G1., I, p. 16.
¹³³ Cf., Proposition 3, 2, p. 6; G1., I, p. 16.
connection exists between these two determinations of self-consciousness. In fact, the terminological shift in Schleiermacher's technical vocabulary to which we have called attention—the change from the use of the term unmittelbares Bewusstsein in the Dialektik of 1814/18 to the use of the term unmittelbares Selbstbewusstsein in the Dialektik of 1822 and in the first and second editions of the Glaubenslehre—is evidence of Schleiermacher's desire to emphasize the relationship between feeling and mediate self-consciousness. Although this relationship was directly posited in the Dialektik of 1814/18, the terminological contrast that we encounter in these lectures between unmittelbares Bewusstsein and Selbstbewusstsein accentuated the contrast between feeling and mediate self-consciousness. The use of the term unmittelbares Bewusstsein (feeling) as a technical term connoted that feeling was distinguished from Selbstbewusstsein (mediate self-consciousness) in too strict a way. Although the former experience has no given object in time and space while the latter experience emerges in the subject-object dichotomy, an important and necessary relationship between these two forms of experience yet exists. Both occur in the same subject. Both modes of experience require each other and are actually complementary. In the Glaubenslehre, the work to which we have attributed the terminological shift in the Dialektik of 1822, an attempt is made to augment the expression of the relationship between feeling and mediate self-consciousness found in the Dialektik of 1814/18. In the Glaubenslehre and in the Dialektik of 1822, self-consciousness does not merely refer to mediate objective self-consciousness, but is understood in a sense wide enough to be qualified as immediate as well.  

134 Schleiermacher briefly alludes to this extension of the
grounds are provided for a clearer understanding of the relationship between feeling and mediate self-consciousness. This qualification of feeling as unmittelbares Selbstbewusstsein is further explicated in Schleiermacher's development in the dogmatics, in which the relationship between knowing, doing, and feeling is next pursued.

In Proposition 3 of the Glaubenaehre, Schleiermacher distinguishes feeling from the activities of knowing and doing. It would be incorrect, the nineteenth century theologian claims, to identify the essence of piety with the activity of knowing since this would lead to the conclusion that "the most perfect master of Christian Dogmatics would always be likewise the most pious Christian." Such a position is untenable. Schleiermacher maintained a distance from outright rationalism throughout his entire career. On the other hand, the essence of piety, he claims, cannot be reduced to the activity of doing, "for experience teaches that not only the most admirable but also the most abominable, not only the most useful but also the most inane and meaningless things, are done as pious and out of piety." If the objection be raised that not the manifest deed but the intention itself is the basis of the activity of doing and that this intention is the essence of piety, Schleiermacher contends that underlying each intention is a certain determination of conception of self-consciousness to incorporate the immediacy of feeling in his Erstes Sendschreiben an Lücke: "Dieser Theologe (Breitner) leugnet die Identität zwischen Gefühl und Selbstbewusstsein, indem er mich auf bewusstlose Gefühle verweist. Hierin liegt nun nichts anderes, als dass er den Ausdruck Gefühl anders braucht als ich; aber über den Gebrauch von Selbstbewusstsein sind wir einig." Sendschreiben, p. 13 (584).

135 Cf., Proposition 3, 4, p. 9; Gl., I, p. 20.
136 Cf., Proposition 3, 4, p. 10; Gl., I, p. 21.
self-consciousness which can only be described as feeling. This mode of immediate self-consciousness is primary in experience. This treatment of the relationship between knowing, doing, and feeling in the Glaubenslehre parallels Schleiermacher's efforts in the Dialektik to discern the presence of the transcendent ground of knowing in the activities of thinking and willing. Here, as in the Dialektik, such an enterprise hopelessly founders. In order to delineate the locus of piety in feeling, Schleiermacher turns to an analysis of human experience in the World.

Life, he states, "is to be conceived as an alternation (Wechsel) between an abiding-in-self (Insichbleiben) and a passing-beyond-self (Aussichherausstreten) on the part of the subject." These two forms of life-movement express the possible modes of relation between self and World. Feeling and knowing belong to the first form, doing to the second. Knowing, however, only achieves full actuality in its concrescence in some type of activity and, as such, is also a passing-beyond-self. This, though, does not prove true for feeling. The latter experience resides completely within the subject and therefore stands in antithesis to knowing and doing.

137 Cf. Gl., I, Proposition 3, 4, p. 21. This phenomenological account of the dialectic of experience is a motif frequently employed by Schleiermacher throughout his writings. It is based on a Lebensanalogie which, although expressed in slightly modified forms, remains consistent. For example: "In dem Menschen nun ... ist das einzelne Leben als ein bewusstes und sich bewusst werdendes gegeben und erscheint dem zu Folge wesentlich in zwei Gestalten; die eine ist das bewusste Inscheinbilden, worin die Empfänglichkeit, die andere das bewusste aus sich heraus in die Welt hinüberbilden, worin die Selbstthätigkeit vorherrscht." Friedrich Schleiermacher, Ueber die wissenschaftliche Behandlung des Tugendbegriffes (1819), SW, III, 2, pp. 361-362.

138 Cf. Proposition 3, 3, p. 8; Gl., I, p. 18.
As regards Feeling, on the other hand, it is not only in its duration as a result of stimulation that it is an abiding-in-self: even as the process of being stimulated, it is not effected by the subject, but simply takes place in the subject, and thus, since it belongs altogether to the realm of receptivity, it is entirely an abiding-in-self; and in this sense it stands alone in antithesis to the other two—Knowing and Doing.

This description of feeling as the only proper abiding-in-self opposed to the activities of knowing and doing does not imply that feeling, the locus of piety, is divorced from the activities which result from the interaction between self and World. Schleiermacher asserts, in a manner reminiscent of the Dialektik, that "immediate self-consciousness is always the mediating link in the transition between moments in which Knowing predominates and those in which Doing predominates . . ."140

The continuity between this statement and the definition of feeling in the Dialektik of 1814 as 'the relative identity of thinking and willing' is clear. As the experience of transition between these two activities "it will fall to piety to stimulate Knowing and Doing . . ."141 If the situation stood differently than this "the religious moments could not combine with the others to form a single life, but piety would be something isolated and without any influence upon the other mental functions of our lives."142 By the same token, the experience of feeling, while not caused by the interaction between self and World, arises in the convergence of the activities of knowing and doing. The unity of knowing,

139 CF, Proposition 3, 3, p. 8; Gl., I, p. 18.
140 CF, Proposition 3, 4, pp. 8-9; Gl., I, p. 19.
141 CF, Proposition 3, 4, p. 9; Gl., I, p. 19.
142 CF, Proposition 3, 4, p. 9; Gl., I, p. 19.
doing, and feeling is "the essence of the subject itself ..." 143

Whereas the account of the experience of feeling in Proposition 3 of the Glaubenslehre follows, mutatis mutandis, the development of the Dialektik closely, Proposition 4, while not divorced from the development of the Dialektik, embarks upon an original treatment of the experience of feeling as the essence of piety.

The common element in all howsoever diverse expressions of piety, by which these are conjointly distinguished from all other feelings, or, in other words, the self-identical essence of piety, is this: the consciousness of being absolutely dependent (schlechthin abhängig), or, which is the same thing, of being in relation with God. 144

Here we meet Schleiermacher's well-known presentation of the essence of piety as the feeling of absolute dependence. What, however, are the reasons for this particular qualification of feeling? Does this definition concur with the more generic description of feeling given in Proposition 3 of the Glaubenslehre and in the lectures on Dialektik?


144 CF, Proposition 4, p. 12; Gl., I, p. 23. In anticipation of the exposition of Proposition 4, it is necessary to defend our acceptance of the English rendering of the German words "schlechthin abhängig" as "absolutely dependent." Claude Welch has suggested that "the translation of schlechthin as 'absolute,' and of das schlechthinige Abhängigkeitsgefühl as 'feeling of absolute dependence,' is to be avoided." In place of the qualification of dependence as 'absolute' he has suggested the adjectives "utter," "simple," and "unqualified." Claude Welch, Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Vol. I, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 65. Although the terms 'unqualified' and 'utter' are closer to the meaning of schlechthinig than the term 'simple,' it is our contention that it is best to abide by Schleiermacher's own explanation of schlechthinig appended to Proposition 4 in the form of a marginal note: "Schlechthinig gleich absolut." Th., 23a.
The basis of this novel qualification must be sought in Schleiermacher's development itself.

The nineteenth century theologian structures his exposition by appealing to the "analogy of life" motif to which we have referred earlier in our treatment. Schleiermacher states that in every state of actual consciousness we are conscious not only of an identity of the self, an ego, which remains constant, but also of a changing determination of the self. This changing determination stands in opposition to the identity of the ego and therefore can only be attributed to the influence of that which is other-than-self upon the self. The experiential reciprocity in life between self and other-than-self enables the discernment of two elements in self-consciousness: the first is a self-positing element (ein Sichselbstsetzen); the second, a non-self-posited element (ein Sichselbstnichtsogesetzthaben). The former element may also be termed ein Sein; the latter, ein Irgendwiegewordensein. For Schleiermacher, the element in self-consciousness that represents the source of its changing determinations, whether this element be designated as ein Sichselbstnichtsogesetzthaben or as ein Irgendwiegewordensein, "presupposes for every self-consciousness another factor besides the Ego, a factor which is the source of the particular determination, and without which the self-consciousness would not be precisely what it is." According to Schleiermacher, to these elements, self-positing and non-self-posited, correspond two states which describe the possible experiential

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145 Cf. footnote 137.

146 This section (Proposition 4, 1) of Schleiermacher's development is marginally entitled: "Analyse des Selbstbewusstseins in Beziehung auf das Mitgesetztssein eines Anderen." Th., 24a.

147 Cf, Proposition 4, 1, p. 13; Gl., I, p. 24.
dispositions of the subject in relation to the World. These states are, respectively, activity (Selbsttätigkeit) and receptivity (Empfänglichkeit).

It is important to note that this distinction between active and receptive states of the subject in relation to the World is instrumental in Schleiermacher's description of the essence of piety in the Glaubenslehre and that this description is not unrelated to his exposition of the experience of feeling in the Dialektik. In the latter work, the search for the transcendent ground in the activities of thinking and willing necessitated the isolation of two types of knowledge, respectively, physical and ethical, which arose in the "antithesis between those actions, in which consciousness only appears passive (leidend), and those in which it appears active (thätig)."\(^{148}\) This antithesis, and its relation to the experience of feeling, was examined not only in the Dialektik but also in Proposition 3 of the Glaubenslehre. In Proposition 4 we find a comparable, though augmented and re-directed, description of the self-World dialectic. At this point in the theologian's development, however, the states of activity and receptivity do not merely refer to the self-World dialectic on an epistemic level as descriptions of the disposition of the subject in ethical and physical knowledge respectively. Rather these states are illustrative of Schleiermacher's Weltanschauung or, as Ebeling has put it, his Wirklichkeitsverständnis as such. Activity and receptivity depict the state of the human subject within the fragmentary and oscillating world of finite experience and existence.

For the purpose of clarifying the difference between activity and receptivity and demonstrating the significance of these states for the dynamic of pious feeling, Schleiermacher embarks upon a hypothetical

\(^{148}\) Cf. footnote 92.
analysis of the self-World relationship. If, the theologian maintains, we could abstract ourselves from our co-existence (Zusammensein) with that which is other-than-self, i.e., objective existence, then all receptivity would be negated and self-consciousness would be totally active. This activity, however, would be an objectless "urge outwards, an indefinite 'agility' without form or colour." Human existence and experience, though, is and remains existence and experience in the World, a being-with-others which determines man's self-consciousness.

But as we never do exist except along with an Other, so even in every outward-tending self-consciousness the element of receptivity, in some way or other affected, is the primary one. . . .

So pervasive is the receptive state of experience that the self-consciousness which accompanies activity "is always related . . . to a prior moment of affective receptivity, through which the original 'agility' received its direction." In other words, even the state of activity can only be so defined with respect to a particular relationship between the self and the objective World.

According to Schleiermacher, the feeling of freedom (Freiheitsgefühl) is that sensible experience engendered by determinations of self-consciousness in which activity predominates; the feeling of dependence (Abhängigkeitsgefühl) is that sensible experience engendered by determinations of self-consciousness in which receptivity predominates. Freedom is a relational term which describes the influence exerted by the self upon all that possesses objective existence in the World;

\[149\] CF, Proposition 4, 1, p. 13; GL, I, p. 24.
\[150\] CF, Proposition 4, 1, p. 13; GL, I, pp. 24-25.
\[151\] CF, Proposition 4, 1, p. 13; GL; I, p. 25.
dependence is a relational term which posits the necessity of the non-self in the constitution of the self. As well, later in his development Schleiermacher will call attention to a relation of dependence in which no object given in time and space is constitutive of the relation. The experience of this special relation assumes the form of the feeling of absolute dependence.

Having examined the feelings of freedom and dependence from the standpoint of the hypothetical, Schleiermacher turns to a consideration of the actual co-existence of these feelings in human experience. The requisite relation between self and World in experience means that "the total self-consciousness made up of both together is one of Reciprocity (Wechselwirkung) between the subject and the corresponding Other."\(^{152}\)

This reciprocity portrays the character of human existence and experience in the World.\(^{153}\) World, which as a dialectical idea includes within its purview the idea of self, comprises all relations, both those of freedom and those of dependence, which occur in the sphere of finite existence and experience. For Schleiermacher, this entails that human self-consciousness is, at the same time, a World-consciousness which manifests itself in experience as "a series in which the feeling of freedom and the feeling of dependence are divided."\(^{154}\)

The nineteenth century theologian, however, is adamant in maintaining that the dynamic of self and World does not entail that the influence of either term in the experiential dialectic completely overcomes and negates the


\(^{153}\) In the Glaubenslehre, "World" is defined as "das gesamte Ausserums als Eines ... mit uns selbst zusammen als Eines (gesetzt) ..." Gl., I, Proposition 4, 2, p. 26.

other. Their relationship remains one of reciprocity. A feeling of freedom without a feeling of dependence is impossible in actual experience. Such an experience would imply that the self exhausts the World. By the same token, a feeling of dependence without a concomitant feeling of freedom would be an impossible state of affairs in actual experience, for such a situation would cancel the efficacy of the subject, the experiencer himself. And yet, strangely enough, Schleiermacher develops this view on the reciprocal nature of human experience in order to explain his definition of the essence of piety as the feeling of absolute dependence. If this reciprocal nature of experience is requisite for Schleiermacher's view on the self-World relationship, how must one understand this definition of the essence of piety?

According to Schleiermacher, the feelings of freedom and dependence are rooted in sensibility. Both emerge in the experiential intercourse between self and World. The feeling of absolute dependence, on the other hand, is not determined by an object in time and space. A sensible object would necessarily and at the same time be counter-influenced by the activity of the self. Schleiermacher maintains that the feeling of absolute dependence is an experience of dependence on that which transcends the finite, objective sphere of sensibility. In the view of the theologian, the feeling of absolute dependence "cannot exist in a single moment as such, because such a moment is always determined, as regards its total content, by what is given, and thus by objects towards which we have a feeling of freedom."\(^{155}\) Interestingly enough, though, Schleiermacher’s exposition of the dynamic of the feeling of absolute dependence is based on the feeling of freedom itself, an experience

\(^{155}\text{CF, Proposition 4, 3, p. 16; CI., I, p. 28.}\)
thoroughly grounded in the relation between self and World.

But the self-consciousness which accompanies all our activity, and therefore, since that is never zero, accompanies our whole existence, and negatives absolute freedom, is itself precisely a consciousness of absolute dependence; for it is the consciousness that the whole of our spontaneous activity comes from a source outside of us in just the same sense in which anything towards which we should have a feeling of absolute freedom must have proceeded entirely from ourselves. But without any feeling of freedom a feeling of absolute dependence would not be possible. 156

This passage indeed appears enigmatic. Although the manner in which a feeling of dependence could lead to a feeling of absolute dependence does not present inordinate difficulty for our understanding, the manner in which a feeling of freedom could lead to a feeling of absolute dependence does. Given the requisite presence of a feeling of freedom in human experience how can the dependence experienced in pious feeling be qualified as absolute?

The answer to this question can be found in Schleiermacher's definition of piety in Proposition 4 of the Glaubenslehre. Absolute dependence does not express an experiential relationship between man and World, but between man and God. There can be no reciprocity between the terms in this relationship. Since God transcends the finite sphere of existence in the World he cannot be influenced by self-activity. That very activity, however, which seemed to be a stumbling-block to the positing of a feeling of absolute dependence, actually incites the realization of pious experience. In this respect, the feeling of freedom is a necessary precondition for the experiential emergence of the feeling of absolute dependence. Whereas the ground of man's receptive existence and feeling of dependence could be theoretically traced to the World, the quest for

156 Cf., Proposition 4, 3, p. 16; Gl., I, p. 28.
the ground of man's active existence and the feeling of freedom evoked the awareness that this ground transcends not only the self, but also the World. For Schleiermacher, this transcendent ground of the feeling of absolute dependence is God, "the Whence of our receptive and active existence . . .". In the view of the nineteenth century theologian, God is the sole determinant of man's pious experience.

Although the Introduction to the Glaubenslehre possesses a speculative character, it would be incorrect to view Schleiermacher's treatment of the feeling of absolute dependence as a philosophical deduction rather than as a description of pious experience. What is striking in this phenomenological account is that Schleiermacher does not consider pious feeling to be isolated from mediate experience but deliberately pursues its description from the perspective of the self-World relation. The feeling of absolute dependence is the immediate self-consciousness that the sum of self-World relations, the reciprocity anchored in the human states of activity and receptivity, is completely dependent on God.

In the following section, we must further examine the relationship between pious feeling and mediate self-consciousness in Schleiermacher's

\[157\] Cf. Proposition 4, 4, p. 16; Gl., I, p. 28.

2. The Relationship between Pious Feeling and Mediate Self-Consciousness in Actual Experience

In setting forth the experiential object of Christian dogmatics, Schleiermacher's treatment in Propositions 3 and 4 of the Glaubenslehre focused on the essence of pious feeling as the immediate self-consciousness of absolute dependence on God. As we have seen, this feeling is not approached as an isolated experience in man's inner life, but as an experience which occurs in relation to and in conjunction with the broader scope of human experience in the World. In this section of our study we must examine closely the relationship between immediate pious feeling and mediate self-consciousness in the Glaubenslehre. This relationship will bring us to an awareness of the wide range which Schleiermacher was willing to concede to the experiential basis of Christian dogmatics. As we shall see later in our treatment, this extended conception of the experiential is the key to understanding the way in which Schleiermacher's development of the God-World relationship in the Dialektik substantively influenced his doctrinal exposition of this same relationship in the Glaubenslehre.

In Proposition 5 of the Glaubenslehre Schleiermacher considers the feeling of absolute dependence with respect to its appearance in the total experience of the subject:

What we have thus described (the feeling of absolute dependence) constitutes the highest grade of human self-consciousness; but in its actual occurrence it is never separated from the lower, and through its combination therewith in a single moment it participates in the antithesis of the pleasant and the unpleasant.\textsuperscript{160}

Schleiermacher’s intention is to explore the relationship between what he terms "two forms of self-consciousness," these being "the feeling of absolute dependence and the self-consciousness which, as expressing the connection with perceptible finite existence, splits up into a partial feeling of dependence and a partial feeling of freedom . . . ."\textsuperscript{161} This distinction contributes to an understanding of the relationship between pious, immediate and objective, mediate self-consciousness.

As described in the above-quoted passage (Proposition 5), the feeling of absolute dependence is pure religious self-consciousness and subjective in a way that seems to separate it from all direct relation to the objective World. Pious feeling appears to be completely isolated from mediate self-consciousness. The God-consciousness attained in the feeling of absolute dependence cannot be derived from any finite object.\textsuperscript{162} Yet we find that the self-consciousness which expresses 'the connection with perceptible finite existence,' in Schleiermacher’s view, incorporates not only immediate self-consciousness, i.e., the feelings of freedom and dependence, but also mediate self-consciousness, the subject-object antithesis of which gives rise to the feelings of

\textsuperscript{160} CF, Proposition 5, p. 18; Gl., I, pp. 30-31.

\textsuperscript{161} CF, Proposition 5, 1, p. 18; Gl., I, p. 31.

\textsuperscript{162} This statement provides the proper context in which the following marginal note in the Glaubenslehre is to be read: "Fast unbegreiflich, wie man mir hat Pantheismus zuschreiben können, da ich das schlechthinige Abhängigkeitsgefühl von der Beziehung auf die Welt ganz sondere." Th., 29a.
freedom and dependence. Since the feelings of freedom and dependence occur in the form of self-consciousness which expresses 'the connection with perceptible finite existence,' they are designated as "sensible":

\[
\ldots \text{by the word 'sensible' we understand the social and moral feelings no less than the self-regarding, since they all together have their place in that realm of the particular which is subject to the above-mentioned antithesis.}^{163}
\]

Social and moral feelings, as well as the feelings of freedom and dependence, are those which, in their experiential immediacy, embrace the antithetical nature of the World. Although, for Schleiermacher, these feelings take the form of immediate experience, they are to be distinguished from pious feeling since they, unlike the latter, are directly grounded in mediate self-consciousness. These "lower," sensible feelings depict the unity of subject and object on the level of the particular. Since these feelings stem directly from mediate self-consciousness, they participate in the antithetical character of finite experience and existence.

(In the) feelings which we have designated sensible, the corresponding co-determinant to which we trace the constitution of the present state belongs to the realm of reciprocal action; so that, whether we are at the moment more conscious of dependence or of freedom, we take up towards it, in a sense, an attitude of equal co-ordination, and indeed set ourselves as individuals \ldots over against it as another individual.\(^{164}\)

In other words, the feelings of freedom and dependence which indirectly give rise to the realization of the feeling of absolute dependence are based on man's capacity for sensibility. Since these lower, sensible feelings are grounded in mediate self-consciousness, they participate in the reciprocity inherent in all subject-object relationships. Although immediate in themselves, the sensible feelings present the unity of

\(^{163}\) CP, Proposition 5, 1, p. 19; Gl., I, p. 32.

\(^{164}\) CP, Proposition 5, 1, p. 19; Gl., I, p. 32.
mediate self-consciousness. 165

In order to clarify the relationship between the feeling of absolute
dependence and the self-consciousness expressing 'the connection with
perceptible finite existence,' Schleiermacher differentiates three levels
of self-consciousness:

Hence there seems to be no objection to our distinguishing
three grades of self-consciousness: the confused animal grade,
in which the antithesis (of the pleasant and unpleasant, subject
and object, etc.) cannot arise, as the lowest; the sensible
self-consciousness, which rests entirely upon the antithesis,
as the middle; and the feeling of absolute dependence, in which
the antithesis again disappears and the subject unites and
identifies itself with everything which, in the middle grade,
was set over against it, as the highest. 166

It is important to note that all levels of self-consciousness are defined
with respect to the antithesis posited in finite experience and existence
by mediate self-consciousness. On the lowest or animal level this antithesis
is non-existent since the differentiation of subject and object
cannot be attained. This antithesis is established, however, in the
middle grade of sensible or mediate self-consciousness which comprises
both objective consciousness and the immediate unitative experience of
the latter in sensible feelings. Finally, the feeling of absolute
dependence or the God-consciousness, now considered as a particular

165 For a more detailed analysis of Schleiermacher's view on the
nature of sensible feelings, see Yorick Spiegel, Theologie der bürger-

166 Cf. Proposition 5, 1, pp. 19-20; Gl., I, pp. 32-33. As indi-
cated in our parenthetical remarks in this passage, the antithesis which
Schleiermacher either affirms or denies on each level of self-consciousness
can be described in a number of ways. Werner Schultz, for example, has
portrayed the antithesis as that of "Gefühl und Anschauung." Werner
Schultz, "Schleiermachers Theorie des Gefühls und ihre theologische
Bedeutung," p. 84. It is our contention that the more general antith-
esis of subject and object, characteristic of mediate self-consciousness,
will better facilitate our understanding of Schleiermacher's exposition.
See Doris Offermann, op. cit., pp. 94-95.
determination of self-consciousness, embraces and volatizes the antithetical nature of the middle grade in a unity experienced as absolute dependence on God. According to the nineteenth century theologian, the highest and lowest levels of self-consciousness are incompatible. One disappears in the presence of the other. The middle grade or mediate self-consciousness, on the other hand, "must persist undiminished even when the highest has reached its perfect development." 167

Considered in itself, in its self-identical essence, the feeling of absolute dependence cannot be subject to the oscillating and ever-changing determinations of mediate self-consciousness. Viewed as the highest level of self-consciousness, pious feeling is "to be quite simple, and remains self-identical while all other states are changing." 168 Such a description of pious feeling, however, does not depict the emergence of the feeling of absolute dependence in actual experience, but is based on an abstraction in which pious feeling is isolated from the other determinations of man's experience in the World. In Schleiermacher's view, the feeling of absolute dependence always occurs in actual experience in association with a particular determination of sensible or mediate self-consciousness.

Now if it were impossible for it (the highest level of self-consciousness, i.e., the feeling of absolute dependence) to co-exist with the consciousness of the second grade (as it cannot with that of the third), then either it would never make an appearance in time, but would always remain in the concealment in which it lay during the predominance of the lowest grade, or it must drive out the second and exist alone, and, indeed, in ever-unchanging identity. Now this latter supposition is controverted by all experience, and indeed is manifestly impossible unless our ideation and action are to be entirely stripped of self-consciousness, which would irrevocably destroy the coherence of our existence for our own minds. It is impossible to claim a constancy

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167 Cf., Proposition 5, 3, p. 21; Gl., I, p. 34.
168 Cf., Proposition 5, 3, p. 21; Gl., I, p. 34.
for the highest self-consciousness, except on the supposition that the sensible self-consciousness is always conjoined with it.\textsuperscript{169}

This co-existence cannot, however, be one of fusion (Verschmelzen). Such a relationship would dissipate the distinction which Schleiermacher carefully drew between the highest and middle grades of self-consciousness. The antithetical character of the middle grade depicts the relationship between self and World; the simplicity of the highest grade portrays the relationship between self and God. Both relations exist together in the determination of a particular life-moment in the subject. Each requires the other if it is to appear in actual experience.\textsuperscript{170}

The relationship between the first and second grades of self-consciousness does not merely imply their simultaneous co-existence in a given moment of time, as if each were an autonomous monad which remained impassive during its confrontation with the other. The relationship, for Schleiermacher, rather implies "a co-existence of the two in the same moment, which, of course, unless the Ego is to be split up, involves a reciprocal relation of the two."\textsuperscript{171} According to the nineteenth century theologian, this "relatedness of the sensibly determined to the higher self-consciousness in the unity of the moment is

\textsuperscript{169} Cf. Proposition 5, 3, p. 21; Gl., I, p. 35. In the first edition of the Glaubenslehre Schleiermacher identifies levels of feeling with the three levels of self-consciousness and expresses the necessary experiential conjunction of the higher and lower levels as follows: "Die Frömmigkeit ist die höchste Stufe des menschlichen Gefühls, welche die niedere mit in sich aufnimmt, nicht aber getrennt von ihr vorhanden ist." 1. Auflage, p. 37.

\textsuperscript{170} Cf. Schleiermacher's marginal note to Proposition 5, 3: "Entweder die höchste oder die mittlere könnte ja nicht hervortreten, wenn sie nicht miteinander zugleich sein könnten." Th., 34b.

\textsuperscript{171} Cf, Proposition 5, 3, p. 21; Gl., I, p. 35.
the consummating point of the self-consciousness."\textsuperscript{172} It is at this point that actual human experience in the World is realized. Apart from pious feeling, sensible self-consciousness would be "a defective and imperfect state,"\textsuperscript{173} since the 'Whence' of receptive and active existence would fail to emerge in experience. The failure of the higher self-consciousness to bind the intercourse between self and World into a comprehensive unity would leave the sensible self-consciousness in a state of incompleteness. By the same token, were the feeling of absolute dependence to fill an entire moment of self-consciousness without the accompaniment of the sensible, this too would be an incomplete form of experience. In this situation, the feeling of absolute dependence "would lack the definiteness and clearness which spring from its being related to the determination of the sensible self-consciousness."\textsuperscript{174}

This relationship between the highest and middle grades of self-consciousness possesses the greatest significance for understanding the various modifications which comprise the life of pious experience. The intercourse between the self-identical feeling of absolute dependence and the antithetical character of sensible self-consciousness constitutes a particular religious affection. The feeling of absolute dependence is, in itself, the enduring element in the experience. The antithesis grounded in the nature of sensible self-consciousness accounts for the

\textsuperscript{172} CF, Proposition 5, 3, p. 21; Gl., I, p. 35.

\textsuperscript{173} CF, Proposition 5, 3, p. 21; Gl., I, p. 36.

variability in pious experience. The sensible self-consciousness is the channel through which the feeling of absolute dependence necessarily makes its appearance in actual experience. Actual experience incorporates both grades of self-consciousness at once, each exerting its influence upon the other. The nature of a given pious experience is molded by the specific determination of sensible self-consciousness with which pious feeling occurs. For Schleiermacher, the modifications in and variable character of religious experience "arises simply from the fact that it (the feeling of absolute dependence) becomes a different moment when it goes along with a different determination of the sensible self-consciousness."\(^{175}\)

Schleiermacher describes this variability present in pious experience as the antithesis of the pleasant and the unpleasant (Angenehmen und Unangenehmen) or as the antithesis of pleasure and pain (Lust und Unlust). The antithesis of pleasure and pain should not be understood in such a way that the former term is identified with the feeling of freedom and the latter term with the feeling of dependence. Schleiermacher is careful to point out that the feeling of dependence often brings with it pleasure, while the feeling of freedom is perfectly susceptible to the experience of pain. Rather, the terms in the antithesis of pleasure and pain refer to the possible relational modes between the feeling of absolute dependence and sensible self-consciousness in actual experience. In Schleiermacher's view, the antithesis of pleasure and pain "refers simply to the manner in which the two grades of self-consciousness are related to each other in the unity of the moment."\(^{176}\) In order to

\(^{175}\) CF, Proposition 5, 4, p. 23; Gl., I, p. 37.

\(^{176}\) CF, Proposition 5, 4, p. 23; Gl., I, p. 38.
clarify the dynamic of this relationship, Schleiermacher explicates the dialectic discernible in pious experience with respect to the emotions of joy and sorrow.

That is to say: as the emergence of this higher self-consciousness at all means an enhancement of life, so whenever it emerges with ease, to enter into relation with a sensible determination, whether pleasant or unpleasant, this means an easy progress of that higher life, and bears, by comparison, the stamp of joy. And as the disappearance of the higher consciousness, if it could be perceived, would mean a diminution of life, so whenever it emerges with difficulty, this approximates to an absence of it, and can only be felt as an inhibition of the higher life. 177

This very nature of the God-consciousness, as the experience of the relationship between God and man, implies its animation in the actual, temporal experience of the subject. In a given instance, however, the specific determination of sensible self-consciousness which emerges in experience can either facilitate or impede the blossoming of pious feeling in the broader scope of actual experience, thus producing moments in which either pleasure or pain respectively occur. The oscillation between such moments in pious experience is based on the antithetical character of sensible or mediate self-consciousness. It is in association with this form of self-consciousness that pious feeling must occur in order to constitute the integrity of actual religious experience.

3. Summary

The respective treatments of the experience of feeling in the Dialektik and the Glaubenslehre are conducted from the standpoint of the methodological concerns of their particular spheres of enquiry. The philosophical approach of the Dialektik secures a place for the experience of feeling which differs greatly from the assessment of this

177 CF, Proposition 5, 4, p. 24; Gl., I, p. 38.
experience in the Glaubenslehre. This difference in methodological perspective, however, must not prevent our calling attention to important similarities in the description of the dynamic of feeling which both treatments share.

The Dialektik completed its search for the experiential presence of the presupposed transcendent ground of agreement between thinking and being and between willing and being in the experience of feeling. The latter, defined by Schleiermacher as 'the relative identity of thinking and willing,' functions as an analogy of the divine in the experience of man. As immediate self-consciousness feeling mirrors the deity, the absolute unity and ground of all epistemic determination. The experience of feeling, as portrayed in the Dialektik, contrasts sharply with the "lower," sensible feelings discerned in the Glaubenslehre. One must not lose sight of the fact that Schleiermacher, in the Dialektik, regards feeling as an experience which unveils the presence of the divine in man. Feeling does not merely express a particular relationship between self and World, but rather the unity between God, self, and World.

Schleiermacher's definition of feeling in the Dialektik in terms of the activities of thinking and willing is indicative of the connection between immediate and mediate self-consciousness. The consciousness of God in immediate feeling always occurs 'in another' determination of self-consciousness. According to the nineteenth century theologian, this experiential coherence means that the immediate consciousness of God in feeling is animated by the wider scope of human experience with which it occurs. This scope includes, as an important constituent, the antithetical nature of mediate sensible self-consciousness. Since mediate and immediate self-consciousness require each other, the unity of the
consciousness of God is incited by the antitheses of sensible self-consciousness. For Schleiermacher, *Gottesbewusstsein* and *Weltbewusstsein* are complementary.

The *Glaubenslehre*, in its definition of piety as 'the feeling of absolute dependence,' pursues a motif which falls within the spectrum of theological concern. Like the *Dialektik*, the *Glaubenslehre* does not approach its examination of feeling from the perspective of deductive reasoning. The immediate self-consciousness of God in the feeling of absolute dependence renders the attempt to prove the existence of God superfluous. Rather, Schleiermacher's exposition of the dynamic of feeling in the dogmatics is a statement about the relationship between pious feeling and the broader range of man's experience in the World. In the *Glaubenslehre*, God is defined as 'the Whence of our receptive and active existence.' The dependence of all on God is centered in both the immediate and mediate experience of man. In Schleiermacher's view, feeling is an immediate existential relationship.

This relationship between pious feeling and the broader range of human experience is illustrated in Schleiermacher's distinguishing between grades of self-consciousness. Schleiermacher's intention in drawing this distinction can be traced to his concern to clarify the relationship between the feeling of absolute dependence and mediate

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180 Cf. *Sendschreiben*, p. 15 (586): "... so muss ich mich wieder darauf zurückziehen, dass, was ich unter dem frommen Gefühl verstehe, gar nicht von der Vorstellung ausgeht, sondern die ursprüngliche Aussage ist über ein unmittelbares Existentialverhältnis ..."
sensible self-consciousness. In the view of the nineteenth century theologian, each requires the other. Without the middle grade of self-consciousness the feeling of absolute dependence would not receive determination in actual experience. Without the feeling of absolute dependence the sensible self-consciousness would descend to the level of the animal. The emergence of the feeling of absolute dependence in actual experience is contingent on the association of this highest level of self-consciousness with a specific determination of mediate self-consciousness. Such a determination is the basis of the multiplicity and difference in the various moments which comprise actual pious experience. For Schleiermacher, the experiential foundation of Christian dogmatics incorporates not only the feeling of absolute dependence, but also the particular determination of mediate self-consciousness with which pious feeling is necessarily conjoined.

This requisite conjunction between the highest and middle grades of self-consciousness, however, suggests a problem which is central to our study. In the Glaubenslehre, Schleiermacher restricts the dialectical or philosophical interest to the form of the doctrinal proposition alone. The activity of human reason may only play a role in Christian dogmatics by aiding in the scientific formulation of the language which it employs, and by contributing to the logical ordering of the various propositions which comprise its content. The content or substance of dogmatics itself, though, must completely rescind from the dialectical or philosophical interest. Dogmatic propositions betraying the substantive influence of the dialectical interest must, in Schleiermacher's view, be excluded from the exposition of dogmatics. The content or substance of the dogmatic proposition must be totally derived from the Christian
determination of pious feeling shared by a particular Church. Given, however, the relationship posited by Schleiermacher between pious feeling and mediate self-consciousness, is this methodological exclusion of the dialectical or philosophical interest from the content of dogmatics justified, or even possible? Can the dialectical interest, which arises in the antithetical character of mediate sensible self-consciousness, be excluded from the content or substance of dogmatics if the object of dogmatics is the experiential conjunction of the feeling of absolute dependence and mediate sensible self-consciousness? If the feeling of absolute dependence and mediate sensible self-consciousness require and complement each other, then can the influence of philosophy, the rational side of human experience, be purged from the substance of doctrinal formulation as Schleiermacher's dogmatic project demands? In the following chapters, an attempt will be made to answer these questions.
CHAPTER 5

THE INFLUENCE OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL FORMULATION
OF THE GOD-WORLD RELATIONSHIP IN THE DIALEKTIK
UPON THE DOCTRINES OF CREATION AND PRESERVATION

The questions with which we have concluded the last chapter call
attention to the difficulty faced by Schleiermacher in maintaining his
proposed exclusion of the dialectical or philosophical interest from the
substance of Christian dogmatics. This difficulty stems from within his
own system of thought. It is Schleiermacher’s own view on the nature of
actual pious experience and his adoption of this experience as the basis
of dogmatic exposition which seems to imply the untenability of his pro-
posed method in dogmatics.

For Schleiermacher, the God-consciousness (Gottesbewusstsein)
cannot emerge in human experience except as determined by a specific
form of World-consciousness (Weltbewusstsein). The highest grade of
self-consciousness is conjoined with the middle grade of self-consciousness
in actual experience. The feeling of absolute dependence, however, is not
reduced to mediate self-consciousness by occurring in conjunction with
the latter in actual experience. In other words, the feeling of absolute
dependence remains immediate self-consciousness, as well as the highest
level of self-consciousness, even though it is, of necessity, conjoined
with a specific determination of mediate self-consciousness. Yet, the
feeling of absolute dependence is significantly influenced by the parti-
cular determination of mediate self-consciousness with which it is
connected in actual experience. In fact, the dialectic in religious experience between moments of pleasure and pain, between joy and sorrow, and between the consciousness of grace and the consciousness of sin has its basis in the unique determination of mediate self-consciousness with which the feeling of absolute dependence happens, at the moment, to be conjoined. World-consciousness, i.e., mediate experience, plays a central role in shaping the emergence of the God-consciousness in actual experience.

This close relationship between pious feeling and mediate self-consciousness, however, suggests the problem indicated above concerning Schleiermacher's intended expurgation of the substantive influence of the dialectical interest from the sphere of dogmatics. The task of the Dialektik, the proper conduct of the Wissenwollen from contested thinking to uncontested knowing, arises as a matter of course in the sphere of mediate experience. This task is a response to the disjunction between thinking and being posited by mediate self-consciousness itself. Mediate self-consciousness is the proper object of the Dialektik. In its Transcendental and Formal Parts, the Dialektik respectively attempts to determine the metaphysical basis for epistemic agreement between thinking and being, and the principles for the construction of knowledge. According to the nineteenth century theologian, these ends are achieved through an analysis of the constitution of real thinking. This analysis, for Schleiermacher, is a philosophical enterprise.

Since the dialectical or philosophical impetus necessarily arises in the sphere of mediate experience, we are indeed justified in questioning Schleiermacher's proposed exclusion of the influence of the dialectical interest upon the content or substance of dogmatics. Since the feeling
of absolute dependence is always conjoined with a particular determination of mediate self-consciousness in actual experience, is the purging of the dialectical interest (which arises in mediate self-consciousness) from the substance of Christian doctrine possible? Is Schleiermacher's restriction of the role played by the dialectical interest in dogmatics to the form of the doctrinal proposition alone tenable? If pious feeling never appears in experience as something pure or isolated but always in conjunction with mediate self-consciousness in which the dialectical interest is ever active, then can Schleiermacher's intended programmatic for dogmatics be actually accomplished? It is our contention that all of these questions must be answered in the negative.

This chapter begins our first, direct attempt to demonstrate the untenability of Schleiermacher's proposed exclusion of the influence of the dialectical or philosophical interest upon the substance or content of Christian dogmatics. This demonstration consists in an analysis of the manner in which the philosophical formulation of the God-World relationship in the Dialektik influenced the content of the doctrines expressing the relationship between God and World in the Glaubenslehre. As has been mentioned in chapter one, this study claims originality not in its recognition of the influence of the Dialektik upon the Glaubenslehre, but in its detailed analysis of this influence in terms of the theme of God and World. This theme is the focus of our development. In this chapter we shall examine first, the formulation of the God-World relationship in the Dialektik; second, the consequences of this relationship for philosophical and religious expression, also developed in the Dialektik; and third, the influence of the philosophical formulation of the God-World relationship upon the content of the Christian doctrines
of Creation and Preservation, which are developed from the standpoint of the God-World relationship in the First Part of the Glaubenslehre.

I. The Philosophical Formulation of the God-World Relationship in the Dialektik

Much of the Transcendental Part of the Dialektik deals with the problem of how the activity of reason (Vernunftthätigkeit) and the categories in terms of which it orders experience, unity (Einheit) and multiplicity (Vielheit), are related to the ideal and real poles of thinking and being. In this section of our development our task is two-fold: first, to demonstrate the manner in which the epistemic categories of unity and multiplicity are related to the ideas of God and World, ideas respectively associated with the ideal and real poles of thinking and being; and second, to analyze the relationship which the ideas of God and World possess with regard to each other.

In our brief presentation of the principles and methodology of the Dialektik, it was mentioned that Schleiermacher's rather simplistic delimitation of the epistemic categories as unity and multiplicity should not be cited as evidence of his incompetence as a critical thinker. Such a judgment could all too hastily be passed, particularly were Schleiermacher's epistemology to be compared with that of Kant. This two-fold classification must, on the contrary, be seen as an expression of Schleiermacher's estimation of the exigent constituents which contribute to all thinking, as well as of his concern to determine the metaphysical principles on which real thinking is based.

The negation of all organic contribution to the intellectual function, a hypothetical situation only attained through abstraction,
unfolds the ideal pole of thinking and being. Schleiermacher calls this ideal principle Gott or Gottheit. It is the ground of epistemic agreement between thinking and being and is reflected in human reason, ideally, in the category of unity. The absolute unity of being is the source and foundation of all conceptual unity. The more strictly determinate a concept is, the greater is its reflection of divine unity. All real thinking participates in God.

Yet, as we have seen, the deity can only serve as a presupposed principle of agreement between thinking and being. Gott, regarded by Schleiermacher as a boundary of thought (Gedankengrenze), is that in being which is the principle of all activity of reason. The idea of God is attained through abstraction by the activity of reason. It is the noetic representation of the absolute unity of being. The idea of God, although present in thinking, fails to meet the criteria of knowledge and, hence, can be framed neither in terms of concept nor of judgment. Both of these forms of knowledge require a basis in the real pole of thinking and being, as well as in the ideal. All real thinking requires the contribution of sense experience, mediated by the faculty of Organisation. The idea of God prescinds from all real determination.

The negation of all intellectual contribution to the organic function manifests the real pole of thinking and being. This pole, designated by Schleiermacher as Chaos, is also regarded as a boundary of thought. It is that in being which is the principle of all organic activity. The idea of the World is also attained through abstraction by the activity of reason. It is the noetic representation of the absolute multiplicity of being. Like the idea of God, the idea of the World cannot be structured in terms of concept or judgment, and thus remains beyond the
scope of knowledge. Although it is an idea present in thinking, the idea of the World prescinds from all unitive determination and lies outside the realm of real thinking.  

According to Schleiermacher, real thinking (wirkliches Denken) requires the specific and unique contributions of the ideal and real sides of experience. Without the former, the possibility of order and agreement is negated and thinking tumbles to the level of brute sensation. Without the real side of experience, thinking inchoately floats above the sphere of finite, worldly, and human existence. Yet, while each side of human experience necessarily plays a role in real thinking, neither apart from the other can alone provide a basis for real thinking. This necessary coalescence of the ideal and real sides of human experience

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1 Some further qualification must be given to Schleiermacher's distinction between the ideas of God and World and the ontological boundaries of thought, Gott and Chaos. The table below provides a schematism of this distinction, as well as the way in which these terms are related.

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<tr>
<th>Gott</th>
<th>Idea of God</th>
<th>Idea of World</th>
<th>Chaos</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal ontological boundary of thought immediately experienced in Feeling</td>
<td>Category of unity</td>
<td>Category of multiplicity</td>
<td>Real ontological boundary of thought mediately experienced through the Organic Function</td>
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God and World are designated as "ideas" since they are ordered by the activity of reason or the intellectual function. The idea of God is the noetic representation of the ideal side of being based on the order of the intellectual category of unity. The idea of the World is the noetic representation of the real side of being based on the order of the intellectual category of multiplicity. The fact that Schleiermacher turns his discussion of the ideal and real poles of thinking and being to a consideration of the "ideas" of God and World is crucial. In the Dialektik, Schleiermacher is only interested in the ideal and real poles of thinking and being as these are brought to bear on human thinking.
for the proper constitution of real thinking is illustrated by Schleiermacher's insistence that, although the ideal and real ontological bases of human experience cannot be objects of thinking, Gott (Ideal) and Chaos (Real) are the transcendental roots of thinking and knowing.

The positing of an absolute unity of being and the positing of an absolute manifold of appearance cannot be considered thinking, since they are neither concept nor judgment. But both are the transcendental roots of all thinking and, consequently, of all knowing.

The ontological ideal and real poles of thinking, noetically represented by the ideas of God and World respectively, afford the elements needed for the constitution of real thinking. Each idea finds its proper locus in the epistemic process: the idea of God in the category of unity; the idea of World in the category of multiplicity. Each idea considered alone, to the extent that it represents the Ideal apart from the Real or vice versa, cannot be deemed real thinking.

Although the Transcendental Part of the Dialektik culminates in Schleiermacher's examination of the experience of feeling, it actually concludes with a discussion of the relationship between the ideas of God and World. This relationship is illustrative of the general tenor of the epistemology developed in the Dialektik and possesses important consequences for Schleiermacher's theological thought. In examining this relationship we shall pursue the course adopted in our examination of the experience of feeling. The God-World relationship in the Dialektik will be analyzed with respect to the individual plans of this work. This

2 "Das Sezen einer absoluten Einheit des Seins und das Sezen einer absoluten Mannigfaltigkeit des Erscheinens ist kein Denken, da es weder Begriff noch Urtheil ist; aber beides sind die transcendentalen Wurzeln alles Denkens und also auch alles Wissens." Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 165, p. 92.
procedure is not presently adopted in order to demonstrate a developmental strain in Schleiermacher's thought, but rather to highlight the consistency of his treatment of the God-World theme throughout the twenty year history of the *Dialektik*. Since the lectures of 1814/18 present the clearest and most elaborate discussion of the God-World relationship, we shall begin with them, proceeding, then, to the other lectures.

1. The Lectures of 1814 and 1818

Schleiermacher's formulation of the God-World relationship in the lectures of 1814 and 1818, as well as in all the lectures on *Dialektik*, is an epistemological statement. In formulating this relationship, Schleiermacher expresses his view on the necessary noetic coalescence of the Ideal and the Real in the construction of real thinking, i.e., thinking which respects the limits of human experience and existence. For the nineteenth century theologian, the ideas of God and world, as noetic representations of the respective ideal and real ontological poles of thinking and being, are illustrative of the constituents which comprise real thinking. In the lectures of 1814/18, Schleiermacher first analyzes each idea separately in order to determine what each brings to the production of real thinking; and second, attempts to formulate the relationship of both ideas in order to define the nature of real thinking itself.

Schleiermacher, in the lectures of 1814, refers to the idea of the world as a "problematic thought." It is problematic because as "the totality of being posited as multiplicity," it "lies as well beyond our real knowledge." Schleiermacher is careful to point out that the idea

of the World should not be confused with the concept of the earth. The latter is a particular entity while the former comprises "the thought of the totality of being . . ." The problematic nature of the idea of the World stems from its relationship to the real pole of thinking and being. As Chaos structured in the form of idea, the World escapes all efforts directed toward its epistemic assimilation through the faculty of Organisation.

The idea of the World lies outside our real knowledge, knowledge which has been conceived in the augmentation of the idea of the World from the beginning of scientific cultivation. For the idea of the World can never be conceived by us as intuition in which speculative and empirical, ethical and physical elements of knowledge are permeated, but it always remains an unfilled thought to which the organic element stands only in removed analogies.

The idea of the World, as structured on the intellectual category of multiplicity, prescinds entirely from the unitative determination of the activity of reason. As the noetic representation of the real pole of thinking and being the idea of the World is transcendent. It lies beyond the scope of real thinking.

The idea of God, on the other hand, is also transcendent, though for a different reason. As the noetic representation of the ideal pole of thinking and being, the idea of God is entirely structured on the

4"Schon als Inbegriff von Erde und Himmel, in welchem letzteren
nicht eine Mehrheit von Weltkörpern gesez war, umfasste der Gedanke
die Totalität des Seins, und auch da schon als Vielheit, denn die Erde
als Identität von Masse und Kraft ist nur Ein Ding und keine Welt." Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 218, 1, p. 161.

intellectual category of unity. It prescinds entirely from the intellectual category of multiplicity and from the contributions of the organic function. In Schleiermacher's view, however, the idea of God is transcendental in a more determinate sense than the idea of the World. According to the nineteenth century theologian, although the latter remains transcendental and beyond the scope of real thinking, the manner in which this idea is attained does not remove the possibility that it could be actually completed in real thinking.

The idea of the World is attained through the faculty of Organisation. Unitative determination would structure the idea of the World as real thinking at the point in which the totality of being becomes an object of sensibility. This possibility, for Schleiermacher, can never, of course, be actualized. Since the World appears under the form of antithesis, the hinderance to determining the idea of the World as real thinking is found in "the infinity of the process (of thinking) and the limitation of our Organisation under the power of the earth."\(^6\)

Concerning the manner in which we attain the idea of God, however, Schleiermacher states that

we must admit to ourselves that we are never able to attain it, even through an infinite process (of thinking) or with an intensified Organisation. For if we could possess it, then we would have to possess it **uno actu**, since there is no multiplicity in it at all. But we are never able to possess it, because all knowing is organic; the idea of God, though,

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cannot be grasped organically.\footnote{Von der Idee der Gottheit hingegen müssen wir uns bekennen, dass wir sie auch durch einen unendlichen Prozess und auch bei einer gesteigerten Organisation nie erreichen können. Denn könnten wir sie haben: so müssten wir sie \textit{uno actu} haben, da es gar keine Vielheit in ihr giebt. Wir können sie aber deswegen nie haben, weil alles Erkennen organisch ist, sie aber organisch nicht zu fassen ist.} Although the idea of the World is transcendental, the manner in which it is attained does not violate the structures of human experience itself. Since the idea of the World is bound to the faculty of \textit{Organisation}, the possibility of completing this idea within the scope of real thinking is not negated in theory. Such a possibility is negated in practice, however, since the infinity of sense experience required for the actual completion of this idea could never be realized. This practical impossibility assures the transcendental character of the idea of the World. For Schleiermacher, the possibility of completing the idea of God in real thinking is denied in both theory and practice, for such an attainment would entail the denial of the sensible contributions of the organic function. In Schleiermacher’s view, the idea of God is transcendental in a more determinate sense since its completion would involve the violation of the structures of human experience itself.

Having isolated the distinguishing characteristics of each idea, Schleiermacher turns his development to a consideration of their relationship. According to the nineteenth century theologian, “one cannot approximate the idea of the deity . . .” It "lies at the basis of all particular knowing (without the idea of the deity no particular knowing could be actualized) in an equal way and without relation to the context
of knowing."  

As the noetic representation of the absolute unity of being, the idea of God presents, in every instance of thinking and knowing, the ideal determination requisite for the actual completion of these activities.

Schleiermacher unequivocally states, however, that the idea of the deity "is not the ground of our knowing considered as a progression." This basis is provided in the idea of the World. For Schleiermacher, one can say of the idea of the World that "the entire history of our knowing is an approximation to it." It is the end toward which knowledge as progression is directed; it is the ground of the impetus which leads to the linking of concepts under the form of judgment, and thus to the promotion of knowledge. As the noetic representation of the real ontological pole of thinking and being, the idea of the World presents, in every instance of thinking and knowing, the real, sensible determination requisite for the completion of these activities. If

8"Der Idee der Gottheit nähert man sich nicht; sie liegt allem einzelnen Wissen, welches ohne sie nicht könnte vollzogen werden, auf gleiche Weise zum Grunde und ohne Beziehung auf seinen Zusammenhang." Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 222, 1, p. 164.

9"Denn sie (die Idee der Gottheit) ist in jedem Act des bestimmten Wissens gleich sehr gegeben; sie ist das charakteristische Element des menschlichen Bewusstseins überhaupt." Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 221, 1, p. 163.

10"Die Idee der Gottheit nämlich ist nicht Grund unseres Wissens als eines fortschreitenden. Weder dadurch, dass sich das Wissen ausdehnt, kommen wir der Idee der Gottheit näher, noch dadurch, dass es sich vervollkommnet." Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 221, 1, p. 163.

11"Von der Idee der Welt hingegen kann man sagen, dass die ganze Geschichte unseres Wissens eine Approximation dazu sei." Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 222, 2, p. 164.
there were no transcendental principle other than the idea of the deity, then, Schleiermacher notes, "we would not strive to progress in knowing . . ." 12 This striving, which involves the proper conduct of the Wissenwollen from contested thinking to agreement, is based on the sensible side of human experience and is an essential constituent of real thinking. In Schleiermacher's view, a transcendental principle is required for the organic side of knowing. 13 The idea of the World is precisely this transcendental representation of the basis of human sensibility. As transcendental, however, as sheer multiplicity without unity, the idea of the World itself oversteps the bounds of real thinking. 14 Both the difference of the ideas of God and the World with respect to their transcendental properties and their relatedness in the constitution of knowing as such are expressed by Schleiermacher in the following passage:

As the idea of the deity is the transcendental terminus a quo, and the principle of the possibility of knowing in itself, so the idea of the World is the transcendental terminus ad quem, and the principle of the actuality of knowing in its becoming. 15

Each idea contributes something essential to the constitution of real

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12 "Also gäbe es kein anderes transcendentales Princip als die Idee der Gottheit: so würden wir zwar immer denken und wissen, aber wir würden nicht streben im Wissen fortzuschreiten, sondern dieses würde dem Zufalle überlassen bleiben." Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 221, 1, p. 163.

13 Cf. Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 221, 1, p. 163: "Lieg$^{\text{t}}$ nun in der Idee des Wissens offenbar die Tendenz zum organischen Wissen: so bedarf es auch eines transcendentalen Princips."

14 Cf. Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 221, 2, p. 164.

15 "Wie die Idee der Gottheit der transcendentele terminus a quo ist, und das Princip der Möglichkeit des Wissens an sich: so ist die Idee der Welt der transcendentele terminus ad quem, und das Princip der Wirklichkeit des Wissens in seinem Werden." Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 222, p. 164.
thinking: the idea of God ideal, the idea of the World real, determination.

The important conclusion reached by Schleiermacher with regard to the relationship between the ideas of God and World is that they are correlata. One should not hastily pass the judgment of pantheism on this determination of the God-World relationship. Schleiermacher, in fact, painstakingly refrained from identifying the ideas of God and World.

Both are not identical. For in thought, the deity is always posited as unity without multiplicity, but the World as multiplicity without unity. The World is filling space and time; the deity is spaceless and timeless. The World is the totality of antitheses; the deity is the real negation of all antitheses.

From a noetic perspective, however (and this is the only manner in which Schleiermacher considers the God-World relationship in the Dialektik), one idea cannot occur in real thinking without the other.

The World cannot be actually thought without God. If this were possible, the experiential product would assume the form of pure sensibility devoid of ideal determination. Thinking would fall to the level of animal sensation. By the same token, God cannot be thought without the World. Should one attempt to do so, then "one no longer possesses the same idea, but only an empty phantasm." The ideality of the

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17"Identisch sind beide nicht. Denn im Gedanken ist die Gottheit immer als Einheit gesezt ohne Vielheit, die Welt aber als Vielheit ohne Einheit; die Welt ist Raum und Zeit erfüllend, die Gottheit raum- und zeitlos; die Welt ist die Totalität der Gegensätze, die Gottheit die reale Negation aller Gegensätze." Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 219, 1, p. 162.

18"Zu denken ist aber eins nicht ohne das andre. Die Welt nicht ohne Gott. Die Polemik ist immer nur gegen irgend eine der inadäquaten Vorstellungen gerichtet; denn ohne jede von diesen kann die Welt auch
intellectual function must be impressed upon the sensible experience of the organic function if real thinking is to be produced. The correlate relationship of the ideas of God and World is, then, a critical adjunct to Schleiermacher's entire epistemology. Just as the intellectual function, the organ of ideality, and the organic function, the organ of sensibility, must cooperate in the production of real thinking, so too must the idea of God, the noetic representation of the Ideal, and the idea of the World, the noetic representation of the Real, occur correlatively in human thinking if that thinking is to be validated as wirkliches Denken. Although neither idea can be grasped in terms of concept and judgment, both are the transcendental roots of thinking and play essential roles in the proper production of this activity.

The qualification of the relationship between the ideas of God and World as one of correlation represents the proper relationship between ideality and sensibility in the formation of real thinking. The correlation of the ideas of God and World does not imply that these ideas are essentially one. In light of Schleiermacher's repeated insistence that these ideas are not identical, the charges of monism and pantheism against the Dialektik are completely unwarranted and unjustified. Schleiermacher's sole contention in the Transcendental Part of this work is that the ideas of God and World cannot properly be separated in human thinking. The formulation of the God-World relationship in the Dialektik focuses on the noetic representations of these principles and not on their ontological realities. Schleiermacher's point of departure is specifically epistemological.

wirklich gedacht werden. Gott ist auch nicht ohne die Welt zu denken; so wie man ihn gleichermaßen vor der Welt denkt, merkt man, dass man nicht mehr dieselbe Idee hat, sondern ein leeres Fantasma." Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 219, 2, p. 162.
Just as the intellectual categories of unity and multiplicity are correlates, so too are the transcendental ideas structured on these categories. In Schleiermacher's view, the ideas of God and World can comprise neither an identity nor an antithesis.

The positing of an identity and of an antithesis between both (ideas) is, in the same way, a departure from real thinking, and . . . does not follow from the mode in which both ideas are transcendent principles in us.\(^{19}\)

The correlation of the ideas of God and World is not only a prerequisite for real thinking, but also a pre-condition governing the adequate representation of the God-World relationship. For Schleiermacher, adequate representation is representation which falls within the scope of real thinking. In his words, "we are not authorized to posit a relationship between God and World other than that of the co-existence of the two."\(^{20}\)

As the Transcendental and Formal Parts are not separated, but are fundamentally the same in their treatment of the problem of thinking, so too must the principle of the possibility of knowing in itself and the principle of the actuality of knowing in its becoming not be separated in thinking. The idea of God is the former; the idea of the World the latter.\(^{21}\) Each requires the other in a state of relative balance. The

\(^{19}\)"Das Sezen einer Identität und eines Gegensazes zwischen beiden ist auf gleiche Weise ein Hinausgehen aus dem realen Denken, und . . . folgt auch nicht aus der Art, wie beide Ideen in uns transcendent Principien sind." \textit{Dial.}, Lectures of 1814, Proposition 224, p. 166.

\(^{20}\)"Wir sind nicht befugt ein anderes Verhältniss zwischen Gott und der Welt zu sezen als das des Zusammenseins beider." \textit{Dial.}, Proposition 224, p. 165.

\(^{21}\)Cf. \textit{Dial.}, Lectures of 1814, Proposition 226, p. 169: "Wenn nun . . . das transcendentale und formale nicht getrennt sind, sondern dasselbe: so muss auch in beiden Ideen der formale Gehalt sich verhalten wie der transcendentale, und also ist die Idee der Gottheit die Form
predomiance of the idea of God results in an empirically baseless theosophy which disparages scientific construction and the augmentation of knowledge. The predominance of the idea of the World, on the other hand, gives rise to a worldly wisdom, a strictly empirical knowledge which fails to recognize the metaphysical ground of epistemic agreement. 22

2. The Lectures of 1811

The inaugural lectures on Dialektik demonstrate that Schleiermacher's position on the correlative relationship between the ideas of God and World dates from the beginning of his conception of the philosophical project. The idea of the World is defined as "the identity of the relative antithesis of the Ideal and the Real" and may be conceived either as a unity or a totality. The conception of the World as a totality emerges from given experience; the conception of the World as a unity occurs in human thinking when the idea of the World is, necessarily, correlated with the idea of God. 23 The idea of the World, Schleiermacher states, "ought not to be a specific deduction out of the absolute, but ought to express only the relationship of both, insofar as they are different and
different."

jedes Wissens an und für sich, die Idee der Welt aber die Verknüpfung des Wissens." Cf. Lectures of 1818, p. 169: "Kehren wir nun zum Anfang unserer Untersuchung zurück: so fanden wir, die Regeln des Verfahrens müssten in der Verknüpfung des Wissens ganz dieselben sein als in jedem einzelnen Wissen; und hier haben wir gefunden, die Ideen Gott und Welt seien nicht zu trennen, aber relativ beziehe sich die eine mehr auf das Wissen, die andere mehr auf die Verknüpfung."


23 Cf. Dial., Lectures of 1811, p. 333.
insofar as they are the same." 24

Even though the idea of the World may be conceived as a unity, one
would be incorrect in qualifying this unity as absolute. Only the ideal
pole of thinking and being may rightfully be so designated. The idea of
the World is completely immersed in the antitheses of finite experience
and existence:

As the absolute stands under the form of identity, which,
however, includes the plenitude of antitheses under itself
and in itself, so the World and everything in it
stands under the form of antithesis. 25

Multiplicity, the category of the Vernunftthätigkeit, is the form
in terms of which reality is grasped from the standpoint of the idea of
the World. The idea of the World, like the idea of God, is "the boundary
of our knowing. . . . All operations of thinking, and also the entire
system of our concept-formation, must be grounded in it." 26 To the extent,
however, that the absolute is posited as the foundation of all thinking,
Schleiermacher asserts that "we are in conflict with those who separate
God from the World." 27

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24 "Die Idee der Welt sollte nicht sein eine eigentliche Ableitung
aus dem absoluten, sondern nur das Verhältniss beider aussprechen, in
wiefern sie verschieden sind und in wiefern dasselbe." Dial., Lectures
of 1811, p. 334.

25 "Wie das absolute unter der Form der Identität steht, welche aber
die Fülle der Gegensätze unter sich und in sich begreift: so steht die
Welt und alles in ihr unter der Form des Gegensazes." Dial., Lectures
of 1811, pp. 334-335.

26 "So bestimmt die Idee der Welt auch die Grenze unseres Wissens.
Wir sind an die Erde gebunden. Alle Operationen des Denkens, auch das
ganze System unserer Begriffsbildung, muss darin gegründet sein." Dial.,
Lectures of 1811, p. 333.

27 "Da wir das absolute als Fundament alles Denkens sezen: so
müssen wir annehmen die Idee der Gottheit sei in allem. Eben so sind
wir in Streit mit denen, welche Gott von der Welt trennen." Dial.,
Lectures of 1811, pp. 328-329.
3. The Lectures of 1822

In these lectures, Schleiermacher begins his consideration of the God-World relationship by stating that all formulas which attempt to depict the boundaries of thinking possess a dual validity. The first form of expression or the real validity is that of the totality of being, i.e., the World. The World represents the organic side of human thinking and knowing considered in its progression. The second form of expression or the symbolic validity is the noetic representation of the transcendent ground. Although this representation always remains incomplete, this inadequacy is supplemented by the immediate experience of the transcendent ground in feeling. In the view of the nineteenth century theologian, the task of the dialectician is the determination of the proper noetic relationship between the real and symbolic validities, respectively, the idea of the World and the idea of God.28

Schleiermacher confronts this task by reasserting the formula established in the lectures of 1814: Kein Gott ohne Welt, so wie keine Welt ohne Gott.

More specifically, one can say that neither of the two validities can be posited without the other. ... A positive expression cannot be attained because we would have to possess at least one validity completely. But the World is also, although in a subordinate sense, transcendent ... , namely, insofar as it can never and nowhere be given to us organically, not even in the infinite process of the assimilation of all experience, but can always only be thought. One side of the thought-function without the other does not result in complete thinking on the way to knowing. 29

28 Cf. Dial., Lectures of 1822, pp. 431-432.

29 "Bestimmtter kann man sagen, Keiner von beiden Werthen kann ohne den andern gesezt werden. Kein Gott ohne Welt, so wie keine Welt ohne Gott. ... Zu einem positiven Ausdruck ist nicht zu kommen, weil wir den einen Werth wenigstens vollständig haben müssten, allein die Welt ist auch, wenngleich in einem untergeordneten Sinne, transcendental ... , sofern nämlich als sie uns nie und nirgend, auch nicht im unendlichen Prozess der
Logically, Schleiermacher points out, one could think the relation in the following way: "God = unity with the exclusion of all antitheses; World = unity with the inclusion of all antitheses." Since logical expression fails, however, in the construction of the transcendental ideas, these are only hypothetical formulations. From a real perspective, the only valid determination of this logical formulation is: "Something in being = \( x \) must correspond to this logical expression."\(^{30}\) God cannot be thought without the World, for we only are able to think of God in terms of our experience in the World. The World cannot be thought without God, for such a thought would be insufficient and lacking in ideal determination.\(^{31}\)

For Schleiermacher, the idea of the World constitutes the **terminus ad quem** of knowledge. Real thinking, "insofar as it, through approximation, corresponds to the idea of knowing, is a part of the idea of the World ..."\(^{32}\) Each partial thought and each complex of thinking, on the other hand, stands in relation to the idea of the deity, the **terminus**...
a quo of knowledge. 33 Real thinking and, therefore, knowing, must be related both to the idea of God and to the idea of the World. The tendency toward the noetic determination of the idea of the World is termed worldly wisdom (Weltweisheit). If isolated, this tendency becomes either fantastic or atomistic. 34 The tendency toward the noetic determination of the idea of God is termed theosophy (Theosophie). If isolated, this tendency ends "in gymnosophistic brooding over the tip of one's nose." 35 In Schleiermacher's view, only the following expression of the God-World relationship "corresponds completely to the dialectical approach":

In reality we cannot identify both because both expressions are not identical; we also cannot completely separate them from each other because they are only two validities for the same claim; also because, apagologically, each determined relationship (of the ideas) is untenable, and without determined relationship no true separation occurs. 36

33 Cf. Dial., Lectures of 1822, p. 434: "Wogegen die Idee der Gott-heit in gar keinem Verhältniss steht zum Fortschreiten, sondern nur zu jedem einzelnen Denken an und für sich, und zwar so, dass jeder partielle Gedanke und jeder Complexus sich zu derselben gleich verhält, wie auch natürlich gross und klein, Einheit und Vielheit nicht für sie ist."

34 Cf. Dial., Lectures of 1822, p. 435: "Die erstere (weltweisheitliche Richtung) isolirt verliert den Unterschied zwischen dem Wissen und willkührlichen Denken, und wird fantastisch, wenn sie vom Denken im engern Sinne ausgeht; oder sie verliert den Unterschied zwischen der organischen Art der Erfüllung wenn sie vom Wahrnehmen ausgeht, und wird atomistisch."

35 "Die letztere (theosophische Richtung), weil Minimum und Maximum für sie gleich und keine Fortschreitung in ihr angelegt ist, endet, wenn sie sich isolirt, in das gymnosophistische Brüten über die Nasenspize." Dial., Lectures of 1822, p. 435.

4. **The Lectures of 1828**

In the lectures of 1828, Schleiermacher defines the idea of the World with respect to the ideal and real boundaries of judgment. It is, he claims, "the identity of the absolute subject and the absolute communality of being..."\(^{37}\) Notice here that the idea of the World is not considered in isolation from, but in connection with, the idea of God. It is regarded as both unity and multiplicity comprised together under the form of the latter. For Schleiermacher, the idea of the World is "the totality of manifestations merging in the complex of fixed forms of being,"\(^{38}\) i.e., the forms of Ideal and Real. Of the two, the latter form predominates. The problematic nature of the idea of the World is a function of its participation in transcendent being. As an infinity, unable to be assimilated by the organic function, the idea of the World constantly develops and becomes.\(^{39}\) It is the principle of knowledge considered as a progression. The idea of God, on the other hand, is the principle of knowledge in and for itself.

It should be recalled that real thinking participates in the ideal and real boundaries of thought, respectively, Gott and Chaos. In the same respect, though from a noetic rather than from an ontological perspective, all real thinking participates in the intellectual

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\(^{37}\) "Die Identität des absoluten Subjects und der absoluten Gemeinschaftlichkeit des Seins ist die Idee der Welt..." *Dial.*, Lectures of 1828, p. 476.

\(^{38}\) "(Die Idee der Welt ist) die Totalität der Erscheinungen aufgehend in dem Complexus der festen Formen des Seins." *Dial.*, Lectures of 1828, p. 476.

representations of these poles of thinking and being, respectively, the idea of God and the idea of the World. The relationship of these ideas expresses the very nature and bounds of real thinking. The significance of the relationship of these ideas implies, for Schleiermacher, that one must

so determine the relationship between God and World that the reduction of the anthropoeidetic remains set as a task without the expression for the transcendent being dissolved. 40

"The striving," Schleiermacher states, "to transform the transcendent formula into a living intuition is natural; but it is also clear that all real thinking concerning it, i.e., everything, consequently, which is intuitive, contains something inadequate." 41 In the expression of both transcendental ideas, the anthropoeidetic element must be controlled, at least to the extent that only expression which falls within the purview of real thinking and, at the same time, respects the transcendental nature of these ideas is constructed. As Schleiermacher points out, this applies particularly to the idea of God since it is transcendent in a more determinate sense than the idea of the World and because it is the object not only of the philosophical but also of the religious interest. It is absolutely essential that the ideas of God and World be adequately posed with regard to each other for, according to the nineteenth century theologian, all speculative questions may be reduced

40"Wie nun das transcendente und die Denkgrenze am nächsten verwandt sind: so ist also die Aufgabe das Verhalten zwischen Gott und Welt zu bestimmen so, dass die Reduction des anthropoeidischen aufgegeben bleibt ohne dass der Ausdruck für das transcendente aufgelöst werde." Dial., Lectures of 1828, p. 476.

41"Das Bestreben, die transcendentale Formel in eine lebendige Anschauung zu verwandeln, ist natürlich, aber klar ist auch, dass alles wirkliche Denken über sie, d.h. also alles anschauliche, inadäquates enthält." Dial., Lectures of 1828, pp. 166-167.
to their relationship. For Schleiermacher, the only proper expression of the God-World relationship is one which maintains the noetic correlation of these ideas.

The need for the proper regulation of the God-World relationship leads Schleiermacher to establish two Cautelen, i.e., safeguards or regulative principles, to govern adequate expression. No direct or isolated representation of these ideas is possible in real thinking. "Consequently, further than Cautelen," he insists, "we cannot proceed." The first regulative principle guards against any attempt at expression which negates either the transcendentally Ideal or the transcendentally Real by isolating one side of human experience. Schleiermacher formulates this principle in the lectures of 1828 in the same manner that he does in the previous lectures: "The World not without God, God not without the World." It assures "that the one idea is not cancelled through the other."

Our formula, of course, gives no closer determination of both ideas but we have it as a corrective and say: No formula of thinking which tends toward knowing is sufficient which does not harmonize with the co-existence of both ideas.

The second regulative principle, "Both ideas are not the same," serves

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43 "Weiter indess als bis zu Cautelen werden wir nicht gelangen können." Dial., Lectures of 1828, p. 167.
44 "Die Welt nicht ohne Gott, Gott nicht ohne die Welt, diese Formel sichert uns, dass nicht die eine Idee durch die andere aufgehoben wird." Dial., Lectures of 1828, p. 167.
45 "Unsre Formel nun gibt freilich keine nähere Bestimmung beider Ideen, aber wir haben sie als Correctiv und sagen, Keine Formel des wissenwollen Denkens ist genügend, die sich nicht mit dem Zusammensein beider Ideen verträgt." Dial., Lectures of 1828, pp. 167-168.
46 "Der zweite Kanon dagegen ist, Beide Ideen sind nicht dasselbe." Dial., Lectures of 1828, p. 168.
as a safeguard against any misunderstanding, notably the charge of pantheism, which might arise from the first, correlative principle. The ideas of God and World are not correlates essentially or ontologically, but only noetically. The correlation of the ideas of God and World are only necessary in thinking, and specifically in real thinking in which the Ideal (idea of God) and the Real (idea of the World) must always be conjoined. The inseparability of the ideas of God and World is only actual on the level of self-consciousness, which emerges in the coalescence of the intellectual (Ideal) and organic (Real) functions.

5. The Lectures of 1831

In this presentation, as in all the lectures, the problem which Schleiermacher confronts is the proper relationship between the ideas of God and World. Special attention is given in the lectures of 1831, however, to the problems suggested by identifying and equating both ideas.

According to Schleiermacher, identity cannot be posited between the ideas of God and World "because the World is a boundary of concept, but not the transcendent ground . . ."\textsuperscript{47} God is the foundational principle of epistemic agreement and should not be confused with World, the principle of knowledge considered as a progression. Both ideas are different and are by no means interchangeable. In thinking, however, a separation should not be established to the extent that God would be thought without the World "since indeed only in striving to complete the idea of the World do we come to the presupposition of God."\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{47}"Was das Verhältniss zwischen Gott und Welt betrifft: so ist es für uns keine Identität, weil Welt Begriffsgrenze ist, aber nicht transzendenter Grund . . ." Dial., Lectures of 1831, p. 526.

\textsuperscript{48}"Aber auch nicht eine solche Scheidung, dass wir uns Gott denken
Schleiermacher maintains that not only the mode of identification but also the mode of opposition (Entgegensezung) is an improper determination of the God-World relationship. Opposition, in the view of the nineteenth century theologian, implies constructions which separate the ideas of God and World to too great a degree, thus negating not only their proper correlative relationship, but also, which is to say the same, the requisite contributions of the Ideal and the Real to the constitution of real thinking. The speculative tendency, Schleiermacher states, must approximate those determinations of the relationship between the transcendental ideas "in which God and World are considered as belonging together, but are neither identified nor separated."

6. Summary

According to Schleiermacher, the ideas of God and World are correlates. This statement recapitulates and summarizes the purport of the Transcendental Part of the Dialektik. It is made solely from the standpoint of the task of this work: the proper conduct of the Wissenwollen from contested thinking to the certainty of knowing.

God and World noetically represent, under the form of idea, the ideal and real poles of thinking and being, respectively, Gott and Chaos. As the noetic representations of the transcendental roots of thinking, the ideas of God and World respectively afford the ideal and real

können ohne Welt, da wir ja nur in dem Bestreben die Idee der Welt zu vollziehen auf die Voraussezung Gottes kommen." Dial., Lectures of 1831, p. 526.

49 Cf. Dial., Lectures of 1831, p. 526.

50 "Die speculative Richtung musste sich aber von dieser Form sondern und der nähern, wo Gott und Welt als zusammengehörig betrachtet, aber weder identificirt noch getrennt werden." Dial., Lectures of 1831, p. 528.
determinants which qualify thinking as *wirkliches*. The idea of God is the transcendental *terminus a quo* and the principle of the possibility of knowledge in itself. The idea of the World is the transcendental *terminus ad quem* and the principle of the actuality of knowledge in its becoming. Although both cooperate, as the Ideal and the Real, in the formation of knowledge, neither can be regarded as a proper object of knowledge. Neither idea can be grasped in terms of concept and judgment. As a result, the correlation of the ideas of God and World is actual only on the level of human thinking. If this activity prescinds either from ideal (idea of God) or real (idea of World) determination, it ceases to be *wirkliches Denken*. In the *Dialektik*, the correlation of the ideas of God and World is asserted strictly from an epistemological perspective.

All of the lectures on *Dialektik* portray this understanding of the God-World relationship. Although some commentators have called attention to the predominance of a philosophy of identity in the lectures of 1811 and the tendency to stress the correlation of the ideas of God and World while downplaying their difference, such a tendency must, in the end, be attributed to the undeveloped character of the first lectures rather than to a conception of the dialectical project fundamentally different from those of the subsequent lectures. The ideas of God and World are not identical. This is plainly stated in the lectures of 1814 and in those thereafter. Thus, to direct the charge of pantheism against Schleiermacher's formulation of the God-World relationship in the *Dialektik* is completely unwarranted.

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52 We find Brunner's critique on this account to be seriously mis-directed. See Emil Brunner, *Die Mystik und das Wort*, (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1924), pp. 358-368.
In the lectures of 1828, the clearest presentation of the God-World relationship is achieved in a most dialectical fashion through the delineation of two Cautelen: Die Welt nicht ohne Gott, Gott nicht ohne die Welt and Beide Ideen sind nicht dasselbe. The relationship which these regulative principles essay to protect is a philosophical construct that defines the nature of real thinking itself. Although the ideas of God and World are transcendental and lie beyond the scope of real thinking, they noetically represent the ontological ideal and real poles of thinking and being. The correlation of the ideas of God and World expresses the proper relationship between the Ideal and the Real in all real thinking.

Before considering the influence of this formulation of the God-World relationship upon the doctrines of Creation and Preservation, we must turn to the consequences which this formulation possesses, in Schleiermacher's view, for philosophical and religious representation.

II. The Limits of Philosophical and Religious Representation of the God-World Relationship

As the previous section of our study has established, Schleiermacher considered both the separation and the identity of the ideas of God and World to be indicative of a miscarriage in the operation of real thinking.

From an epistemological standpoint, God and World, under the form of idea, 

53 In his study of the Dialektik, L. Oranje makes the following interesting remarks: "De eerste regel (Die Welt nicht ohne Gott, Gott nicht ohne die Welt) is volgens Schleiermacher uitdrukking van de filosofische interesse in de verhouding van God en wereld. . . . De tweede regel (Beide Ideen sind nicht dasselbe) is uiting van de religieuze interesse in de verhouding van God en wereld. . . . Met andere woorden: zowel de filosofie als de religie zijn gericht op de transcendente grond; de philosophie echter meer op de grond, de religie meer op het transcendent."

respectively represent the ideal and real elements which constitute real thinking. Any thinking which departs from the mutual corroboration of the Ideal and the Real or, in other words, from the correlation of the ideas of God and World, trespasses its limits and enters the realm of the fantastic.

Schleiermacher was well aware that the tendency to attempt to represent the God-World relationship is unavoidable. This proclivity lies not only in the religious interest, but also in the philosophical. Since the entire Transcendental Part of the *Dialektik* is devoted to an analysis of the participation of thinking and knowing in the transcendent ground, the desire to portray representationally the God-World relationship is hardly surprising and, indeed, to be expected. Due to the idealist-realist tenor of his epistemology and, to say the same, the position he sets forth in the *Dialektik* with regard to the basic constituents of thinking, Schleiermacher deems it necessary to inveigh against all representations of the God-World relationship which fail to respect the *Cautelen* established in the lectures of 1828: Die Welt nicht ohne Gott, Gott nicht ohne die Welt and Beide Ideen sind nicht dasselbe.

Throughout the various sketches of the *Dialektik* Schleiermacher critically calls attention to misguided representations of this all-important relationship which were prevalent in his own day, as well as to those which have appeared throughout the history of Western thought. Completely inadmissible, he states in the lectures of 1814, is the expression suggested by Schelling that finite being was a lapse from God. For if God cannot be thought without his lapse, then good is conditioned through
evil and evil possesses a reality equal to the necessity of God.\textsuperscript{54} 

This representation violates the second regulative principle \textit{Beide Ideen sind nicht dasselbe}. If the ideas of God and World are correlates, as they certainly are in Schleiermacher's view, the conception of the World as a lapse from God subjects the idea of the deity to a false and artificial anthropoideistic construction. The transcendental difference between God and World would thereby be negated. God would be drawn into a spurious antithesis in the realm of the finite and consequently would be stripped of ideal determination. The unacceptability of this representation is more clearly portrayed in the lectures of 1828:

If one says following older and newer systems that being as actual is a lapse from the absolute, a diminution of the absolute (in a system of emanation this diminution is posited as a gradual one and is conducted through gradations to mere matter), then with regard to our canon (\textit{Die Welt nicht ohne Gott, Gott nicht ohne die Welt}) the resulting expression would be that God cannot be thought without his lapse and, consequently, is conditioned through his non-being.\textsuperscript{55}

In the lectures of 1814 Schleiermacher cites another example which demonstrates the care that must be taken in the expression of the God-World relationship. The representation "that God is the original and the World the copy is only valid insofar as it is not posited that the original is

\textsuperscript{54}"Völlig unstatthaft ist deshalb der schellingische Ausdruck, dass das endliche Sein der Abfall von Gott wäre. Denn wenn Gott nicht ohne seinen Abfall gedacht werden kann: so ist das gute durch das böse bedingt, hat das böse eine der Nothwendigkeit Gottes gleiche Realität." \textit{Dial.}, Lectures of 1814, Proposition 225, p. 166.

\textsuperscript{55}"Sagt man mit älteren und neueren Systemen, das Sein als wirkliches sei ein Abfall vom absoluten, eine Verminderung desselben (im Emanationssystem wird diese als eine allmähliche gesetzt und durch Abstufungen bis zur blossen Materiegeführt): so heisst das, auf unseren Kanon zurückgeführt, Gott könne nicht gedacht werden ohne seinen Abfall, sei also bedingt durch sein Nichtsein." \textit{Dial.}, Lectures of 1828, p. 167.
also able to exist without the copy." In the most fundamental representation God and World must remain correlates.

The above representations of the God-World relationship fall victim to the pitfalls of the anthropoeidetic which has strayed from the narrow, dialectical path of meaningful representation. This is not to say that representation which respects the Cautelen set forth in the lectures of 1828 will completely vanquish the anthropoeidetic. Schleiermacher is adamant on this point. The lectures of 1828 painstakingly develop the position that the task of representation is "so to determine the relationship between God and World that the reduction (not the cancellation) of the anthropoeidetic remains set as a task without the expression for the transcendent being dissolved." Although a completely adequate expression of this relationship is not possible, representation which heed the limitations of the Cautelen, though inadequate, is nevertheless controlled and guarded. In the Dialektik, Schleiermacher determines the bounds of the anthropoeidetic which preserve a representation of the God-World relationship acceptable to the given constitution of real thinking.

Philosophical art can in no way recognize image-representations of the relationship of both (God and World) with which the

56 "Die Vorstellung, dass Gott das Urbild sei und die Welt das Abbild, ist nur in sofern gültig, als nicht gesetzt ist, das Urbild könne auch ohne Abbild sein." Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 225, p. 166. Schleiermacher seems to be referring to a representation which resembles the one found in Plato's Timaeus. In this dialogue, the eternal forms are the models from which the World is constructed by the Demiurge who is conceived as an artificer. In another passage in the Dialektik Schleiermacher points out the antithetical nature of the conception of the deity as absoluter Künstler. See Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 217, 2, p. 160: "Man denkt sich ... keine Conception ohne eine Differenz zwischen ihr und der Ausführung."

57 See footnote 40.
necessary co-existence of both does not harmonize. And such image-representations, which realiter express only co-existence, are of no help to anyone.\(^{58}\)

The proper co-existence of God and World as transcendental ideas is an "inner necessary fact,"\(^{59}\) and differs radically from representations of God and World which, while granting co-existence, fail to recognize the apodictic character of their co-existence in human thinking.

In his development in the Transcendental Part of the *Dialektik* Schleiermacher embarks upon an analysis of the God-World relationship which is far more systematic than his general critique of the inadequate representations mentioned above. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Schleiermacher's attempt to determine the ability of the forms of knowledge to grasp the transcendent ground led to an analysis of the boundaries of concept and judgment. Each of these forms of knowledge reaches a terminus point, from above, so to speak, in the Ideal, from below in the Real. The ideal limits of concept and judgment are, respectively, the absolute unity of being and the absolute subject. The real limits of concept and judgment are, respectively, the undetermined multiplicity of judgments and the absolute communality of being. In order to demonstrate

\(^{58}\)"Die philosophische Kunst kann auf keine Weise bildliche Vorstellungen über das Verhältniss beider anerkennen, mit welchen sich nicht das nothwendige Zusammensein beider verträgt. Und niemandem kann mit solchen bildlichen Vorstellungen geholfen sein, welche realiter nichts als dieses Zusammensein ausdrücken." *Dial.*, Lectures of 1814, Proposition 225, p. 166. The translation of *bildliche Vorstellungen* as 'image-representations' is offered in hopes of drawing a connection with Schleiermacher's use of the term *Bild* in his epistemology. *Bild* or 'image' is a sense impression conveyed to experience by the organic function. *Bild* is the raw material transformed into concept by the activity of reason. The anthropoelidetic element in all representation of the deity surfaces in the attempt to describe what is not given to the senses in terms of sense experience. Thus, we are presented with the inadequacy of all image-representations.

\(^{59}\)Cf. *Dial.*, Lectures of 1814, Proposition 224, p. 166.
the inability of concept and judgment to grasp the transcendent ground, Schleiermacher schematizes the representations of God and his relationship to the World which have traditionally been associated with each of these four boundaries, and proceeds by calling attention to the inadequacy of each. The representations which he examines are God as the Highest Power, God as Creator, the thought of Providence, and the thought of Fate. The first two are the representations respectively suggested by the ideal and real boundaries of concept; the latter two are representations respectively suggested by the ideal and real boundaries of judgment. In our treatment we shall begin with an analysis of concept and proceed, then, to judgment. By way of anticipation, we should be aware that all formulas are judged inadequate on the grounds

60 The diagram below is given in order to assist the reader in following the presentation of Schleiermacher's position in the pages to come:

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 Absolute Unity of Being
  /\                          /\ Absolute Subject
 HIGHEST POWER --- PROVIDENCE
 \    /                         \    /
 Concept---Ontology and       Freedom and ---Aetiology---JUDGMENT
 \   /                          \   /
 Creator                        Necessity
 \ /                             \ /
 Undetermined Manifold of Possible Judgments
 /\ Absolute Communionality of Being
 Chaos (Real)
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that they express the transcendent in terms of the conditioned antitheses of the finite, thus surrendering the deity to the World and violating the regulative principle *Beide Ideen sind nicht dasselbe*. As well, one representation, *creatio ex nihilo*, is found to be more fundamentally inadequate since it obviously violates the correlative principle *Die Welt nicht ohne Gott, Gott nicht ohne die Welt*.

1. **Highest Power**

Schleiermacher examines the boundaries of concept from the standpoint of ontology. This course is not chosen randomly but, on the contrary, stems from the very principles of Schleiermacher's epistemology. As was mentioned in our introductory remarks on the *Dialektik*, concept fixes being as a unity.  

61 Being, therefore, is noetically represented through conceptual determination. It is "captured," as it were, by the activity of reason predominantly under the intellectual category of unity. We should recall from our analysis of the Transcendental Part of the *Dialektik* in the previous chapter that Schleiermacher recognized a definite hierarchy within the sphere of concept, the distinction of genus and species serving as an example of this gradation. Some concepts are more general than others; some, on the other hand, are more particular. The sphere of concept constantly hovers in a relative antithesis between these two modes of determination.  

62 As an antithesis, however, its poles, the general and the particular, are relational, each being defined and constituted with regard to the other. The general provides a basis

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62 Cf. *Dial.*, Lectures of 1814, Proposition 145, p. 84: "Das Gebiet des Begriffs erscheint ursprünglich schwebend in einem relativen Gegensatz des höheren und niederer, allgemeineren und besonderen."
for the particular. The sum of the particulars contributes to the formation of the general. "If," Schleiermacher states, "there has to be knowledge under the form of concept so that being corresponds to that which is thought in the concept, then an antithesis of the general and the particular must occur in being as it does in concept." The ontological antithesis corresponding to the conceptual antithesis of the general and the particular is designated by Schleiermacher as that of power (Kraft) and manifestation (Erscheinung).

As the lower concept is groundé in the higher according to its possibility and represents the higher in the manifold of closer determinateness, but the higher is a productive comprehending of a plurality of the lower, so too lower being is something representing higher being, or is a manifestation of the higher, and according to its possibility is only grounded in the higher. The higher is the productive ground or the power for a plurality of manifestations.

Power is being as Ideal; manifestation is being as Real. Power is the basis of manifestation; manifestation is the form of power. Within the realm of actual experience one does not occur without the other. As the poles of a relative antithesis, power and manifestation, like general and particular concepts, are relational and are defined and constituted with regard to each other. By the same token, "each substantial power can be considered as manifestation and each manifestation as power, and

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63 "Soll es ein Wissen unter der Form des Begriffs geben, dass also dem im Begriff gedachten ein Sein entspricht: so muss im Sein auch wie im Begriff ein Gegensatz des allgemeinen und besonderen statt finden." Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 180, p. 111.

64 "Wie der niedere Begriff im höheren seiner Möglichkeit nach gegründet ist und in der Mannigfaltigkeit näherer Bestimmtheit jenen zur Anschauung bringt, der höhere aber ein productives Zusammenfassen einer Mehrheit des niederen ist; so ist auch das niedere Dasein ein das höhere zur Anschauung bringendes, oder dessen Erscheinung, und seiner Möglichkeit nach nur im höheren gegründet; und das höhere ist der productive Grund oder die Kraft zu einer Mehrheit der Erscheinungen." Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 181, p. 112.
precisely thereby the sphere of substantial being is limited." In other words, what is viewed as power in one respect can be viewed as manifestation in another, and vice versa.

In the lectures of 1822, Schleiermacher illustrates this reciprocity between power and manifestation with the example of human nature. Human nature, the nineteenth century theologian claims, is divided into functions, each of which is power that actually develops into differently modified actions. The individual man is a living unity of faculties or powers. Only the individual action in the individual man is mere manifestation. Considered with respect to the species, however, the individual man, though himself a unity of powers, can only be regarded as manifestation. In the same way, the individual man is manifestation with respect to his nationality, while the latter, as power in relation to the individual, is manifestation with regard to the race.

Although power and manifestation, as mentioned above, always occur together in actual experience, Schleiermacher, as is his custom, employs the methodology of abstraction in order to ascertain whether each determination of being, considered apart from the other, unveils an adequate conceptual representation of the transcendent ground.

If the totality of powers is considered in itself—the power, Schleiermacher states, not only of life but also of the earth—and the consideration is extended to include the entirety of finite power

65"Wie ein allgemeiner Begriff in anderer Beziehung auch ein besonderer, und ein besonderer ein allgemeiner sein kann, und eben dadurch das Gebiet des Begriffs beschränkt ist: so kann auch jede substantielle Kraft als Erscheinung und jede Erscheinung als Kraft betrachtet werden, und ist eben dadurch das Gebiet des substantiellen Seins begrenzt." Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 182, p. 112.

separated completely from its manifestation, we come to the representation of the transcendent ground as the highest power. This representation is associated with the upper boundary of concept—the absolute unity of being. Power viewed in this respect is unbounded and unqualified by manifestation. Approached from the perspective of manifestation, this representation, according to the lectures of 1822, assumes the form of "the unity of a World-forming power, itself not appearing."67 For Schleiermacher, "the highest gradation of the concept of power cannot be that which corresponds to the upper boundary of concept, namely, the deity."68 This is the pantheistic construction of the deity in which "the antithesis of concept and object is negated."69 The highest power has traditionally been conceived as natura naturans or, as the totality of manifestation, as natura naturata.70 In the lectures of 1818, Schleiermacher states that this representation corresponds to Spinoza's concept of the deity.71

67 "So kommen wir auf die Mehrheit der Weltkörper, und, weil wir hier bestimmte Verhältnisse wahrnehmen, auch der Systeme, und zuletzt also, wenn wir diese alle als Erscheinungen sezen, auf die Einheit einer weltbildenden selbst nicht erscheinenden Kraft." Dial., Lectures of 1822, p. 416.

68 "Eben deshalb kann die höchste Steigerung des Begriffes der Kraft nicht dasjenige sein, was der oberen Grenze des Begriffes entspricht, nämlich die Gottheit." Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 183, p. 113.

69 Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 183, 1, p. 113.

70 Cf. Dial., Lectures of 1822, p. 416.

71 The following passage tersely summarizes Schleiermacher's argument thus far: "Dem höheren und niedereren Begriff entsprach uns im Sein Kraft und Erscheinung. Der Begriff endete nach oben in diejenige Einheit des Seins, die nicht mehr Begriff ist, und nach unten in diejenige Mannigfaltigkeit, die auch nicht mehr Begriff ist. Damit hing die Frage zusammen, Was entspricht denn diesen Punkten im Sein? Nun sahen wir, dass, wenn wir aufsteigen von Kraft und Erscheinung, wir zuletzt auf eine Kraft kommen, die keine mehr über sich hat und der Grund aller Erscheinung
It is important to realize that the conception of the deity as highest power lies within the sphere of concept, thereby proving to be inadequate in its apprehension of the absolute unity of being, i.e., Gott. Since neither the ideal nor the real elements of conceptualization can be abstracted without the concept ceasing to be real (wirkliches), the transcendent ground cannot be grasped conceptually as the highest power. Such a representation, purportedly an expression of the purely Ideal, indirectly implies, for thinking, the contributions of the Real. Thinking attempts to resolve this difficulty by identifying the Ideal and the Real, hence the pantheistic construction. This representation violates the second of Schleiermacher's Cautelen: Beide Ideen (God and World) sind nicht dasselbe.

2. Creator

The lower boundary of concept—the undetermined manifold of possible judgments—also suggests a particular ontological state, though one completely devoid of unitative or ideal determination: chaotic matter or material chaos. Here we are confronted with Schleiermacher's conception of ultimately real being which seems to be in consonance with Aristotle's doctrine of prime matter. In Schleiermacher's view, chaotic or absolute matter can only be posited through abstraction since it does not constitute an object of actual experience. At this ontological


level, "the determined antithesis of unity and multiplicity is negated." 73
Absolute chaotic matter "does not lie in the same series with the
ascending and descending evolutions of power and manifestation ..." 74
The antithetical relationship between these two ontological modes, Kraft
and Erscheinung, presupposes a certain measure of determination from
which absolute chaotic matter prescinds entirely. According to the
lectures of 1818, chaotic matter does not manifest itself. It does not
appear within actual human experience "but is merely the ground of mani-
manifestation, merely that which could be thought if it attained form." 75
Matter is, as succinctly stated in the lectures of 1822, "the true non-
being ..." 76

The representation of the transcendent ground in terms of the lower
boundary of concept issues in a number of possible judgments which
attempt to express the relationship between the extreme ideal and real

73 "In diesem (das materielle Chaos) ist gesetzt eine unbestimmte
Mannigfaltigkeit. Der bestimmte Gegensatz von Einheit und Vielheit ist
aufgehoben dadurch, dass die Vielheit untergeht aus Mangel ihres Gegen-
sazes, der Einheit, und der relative Gegensatz des allgemeinen und
besonderen, mit welchem schon Form gesetzt sein würde, verschwindet im
Isoliren des besonderen." Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 185, 1,
p. 117.

74 "Die absolute Materie liegt nicht in einer Reihe mit den auf-
und absteigenden Evolutions von Kraft und Erscheinung, und sie hat also
nicht dieselbe Realität wie dieses Gebiet." Dial., Lectures of 1814,
Proposition 188, p. 117.

75 "Ferner hatten wir gesehen, der unteren Grenze des Begriffs
entspräche die Vorstellung von einer Materie schlechthin, und mit dieser
verhielt es sich nicht, wie mit der von der höchsten Kraft; denn die
chaotische Materie erscheint nicht mehr, sondern ist bloss Grund der
Erscheinung, bloss das, was gedacht werden könnte, wenn es Gestaltung
gewöhn. Die Gestaltung aber müsste ein Factum sein, und da das Factum
zum Urtheil führt: so ist das Chaos die unendliche Mannigfaltigkeit
der möglichen Urtheile." Dial., Lectures of 1818, pp. 118-119.

76 "Die Materie ist aber das wahre Nichtsein, da sie nur räumlich
gedacht werden kann, aber sinnlich unbestimmt sein soll." Dial.,
Lectures of 1822, p. 417.
ontological modes. This relationship is seen in terms of various types of efficacy which describe the origin of the World. Schleiermacher deals with these under two headings: the formation of the World from matter and the creation of the World ex nihilo.

a.) The Formation of the World from Matter

The first representation which Schleiermacher treats under this heading is one in which God is viewed as having formed the World from matter which itself existed from eternity. The deficiency in this representation, according to the nineteenth century theologian, is that God can no longer be regarded as the absolute unity of being since he is conditioned by the eternity of matter.\(^{77}\) In this representation, God and matter constitute a duality with which thinking cannot be satisfied. Thinking, in fact, is undermined in this representation; the transcendent ground of epistemic agreement between thinking and being is transformed into one term in a relative antithesis. Although God and World, the latter under the form of matter, are co-posited, the proper expression of the transcendent ground is annulled. The lectures of 1822 call attention to the inevitable surrender of the unconditioned character of the deity in this representation:

In the former form alone (God has formed the World out of eternal matter) God is not unconditioned, because that which is posited in him is yet, strictly speaking, the World-forming activity. Now if the World-forming activity is conditioned through the co-posited existence of a transcendent matter, then God is also

\(^{77}\) Cf. Dial., Lectures of 1818, p. 119: "Aber diese Ergänzung des Begriffs Materie gesezt und angenommen nun jenes, dass Gott die Welt aus der formalen Materie beider Art, der idealen und der realen, gebildet habe: so ist doch klar, dass dann die Gottheit nicht das ist, was wir darunter gedacht haben; denn sie ist dann nicht die absolute Einheit des Seins, weil immer durch die Materie bedingt."
conditioned through matter, as matter through him.  

The accommodation of the transcendent to the antitheses of the World is inescapable in this view.

Another representation, which falls under the heading of the formation of the World, attempts to circumvent the problem of subjecting the transcendent ground to the antitheses of the World by rejecting the eternity of matter. In this conception the deity first produces matter from which he then forms the World. Schleiermacher considers this representation to be one which merely postpones the conundrum of subjecting God to the antitheses of experience and existence in the World.

Now if one abandons the eternity of matter and says, 'God has first produced matter and has formed the World out of this', then that is the worst contrivance due to the empty moment between (production and formation).  

The Zwischenmoment itself becomes the foundation of an antithesis in God since a polarity is posited in the divine activity. Although this representation essays to restore the unconditioned character of the deity through the denial of eternal matter, the juxtaposition of the production and formation of matter succumbs to the same inadequacies which plague mere formation. This conception bears a resemblance to the representation of creation ex nihilo, which will be examined below.

78 "Nur in jener Form (Gott habe die Welt aus der ewigen Materie gemacht) ist Gott nicht unbedingt, weil das in ihm gesetzte doch eigentlich die weltbildende Thätigkeit ist; wenn nun diese durch das Mitgesetzsein einer transcendenten Materie bedingt ist: so ist auch Gott durch die Materie bedingt, wie die Materie durch ihn." Dial., Lectures of 1822, p. 417.

79 "Giebt man nun die Ewigkeit der Materie auf und sagt, Gott habe zuerst die Materie hervorgebracht, und aus dieser die Welt gebildet: so ist das die schlechteste Auskunft wegen des leeren Zwischenmomentes." Dial., Lectures of 1822, p. 417.
Yet a third representation of the relationship between God and matter under the rubric of the formation of the World is discovered in the lectures of 1814 and 1818. In this conception, "God envisages the World forming itself out of matter." Schleiermacher terms this the "Aristotelian conception," undoubtedly that of the unmoved mover, which was cultivated to the greatest degree in the Epicurean system. In this view matter is no longer properly defined as "the not-yet-being," but is mistakenly regarded as "the entire system of being." In this conception, matter possesses ideal and real determination which is activated into self-formation by the ideality of the deity. Consequently, the absolute unity of being, i.e., the transcendent ground, is conditioned by the ideal and real determination which inherently exists in self-forming matter. The attempt to represent the relationship between God and World in terms of the activity of formation founders in the unavoidable misrepresentation of the transcendent ground. In all expressions which portray the existence of matter as eternal, the regulative principle Beide Ideen sind nicht dasselbe is violated.

b.) The Creation of the World ex nihilo

The second heading which describes the divine efficacy leading to the origin of the World is limited to the time-honored construction of

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80 "Oder Gott betrachtet die aus der Materie sich bildende Welt. Dann ist auch in der Materie nicht die bloße unbestimmte Mannigfaltigkeit." Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 187, 2, p. 120.

81 "Ferner sagt man, Gott sei nur anzusehen als die aus der Materie sich bildende Welt betrachtend, welche Vorstellung man die aristotelische nennt, und die am meisten im epikurischen System ausgebildet ist, worin über ein vollständiger Dualismus gegeben ist, indem in Gott nur das ideale gesezt wird, in der Materie aber keinesweges, wie in der vorigen Ansicht, bloß das noch nicht seidende, sondern realiter das ganze System des Seins." Dial., Lectures of 1818, p. 119.
Christian theology: creation *ex nihilo*. Whereas in the representations of the formation of the World the positing of eternal matter resulted in conceptions in which the deity was conditioned, the representation of the creation of the World out of nothing attempts to safeguard the aseity of God by denying an original antithesis between God and matter.

We must carefully note that such a representation of the God-World relationship violates the first, correlative regulative principle explicated in the lectures of 1828: *Die Welt nicht ohne Gott, Gott nicht ohne die Welt*. According to Schleiermacher, the co-existence of the ideas of God and World, of the Ideal and the Real, is necessary for all real thinking. Since the conception of creation *ex nihilo* negates this co-existence, it is inadequate. To the surprise of the reader, Schleiermacher not only rejects this representation, but also demonstrates, on the basis of his epistemology and noetic determination of the God-World relationship, that this conception invariably transforms itself into one which presupposes chaotic matter as the first level of being. 82

In the lectures of 1828, Schleiermacher states:

> In Christian rational theology matter has been omitted and the World-forming power, God, opposed to nothingness. But the speculatively insufficient origination still manifests itself, since matter is placed in-between (God and nothingness) as the first produced.83

Even though God and nothingness are opposed in order to safeguard the

82 Cf. *Dial.,* Lectures of 1818, p. 119: "Eine dritte Ansicht steht freilich höher, nämlich die, dass Gott die Welt aus nichts erschaffen habe, wobei vorausgesetzt wird, dass die erste Stufe des Seins die chaotische Materie gewesen sei."

83 In der christlichen rationalen Theologie hat man die Materie weggelassen und die welthbildende Kraft, Gott, dem Nichts gegenübergestellt. Aber die speculativ unzureichende Entstehung manifestiert sich immer noch, indem man die Materie als das erstgeschaffene dazwischen stellt." *Dial.,* Lectures of 1828, p. 471.
unconditioned character of the transcendent ground, the incapacity of thinking to deal with such a representation shows itself in the inevitable noetic presupposition of prime matter as the first stage of being. Thinking cannot represent God without the World. It requires a second, in this case a real, transcendent principle in order to complete its operation.

But how does the expression that God made the World out of nothing appear compared with this expression (that God formed the World out of eternal matter)? Obviously posited in it indirectly is the need for yet another transcendent factor, if only a negative one, in order to think God as the foundation of actual being. 84

In the end, the representation of creation ex nihilo is merely another modification of the representation of World-formation, in which God first produces matter and then forms the World from it. In fact, Schleiermacher states that there is "little distinction in whether it be said that God has made the World out of eternal matter or that God has made the World out of nothing." 85 The construction of creation ex nihilo is ultimately transformed into images of the formation of the World. These images, although inadequate, respect the co-existence of the ideas of God and World which establishes real thinking.

From the above, the inability of thinking to grasp conceptually the transcendent ground, whether in terms of the upper or the lower limits of concept, is clear. Although the conception of natura naturans


85"Also an sich ist wenig Unterschied, ob gesagt wird, Gott habe die Welt aus der ewigen Materie gemacht, oder aus Nichts gemacht." Dial., Lectures of 1822, p. 417.
preserves the unity of the transcendent ground and the relation of the latter to the World, this pantheistic construction, in Schleiermacher’s view, is not transcendent enough. In the representations expressing the relationship between God and matter, a duplicity originates which cannot be eradicated. This duplicity appears in the representations of the formation of the World in the negation of divine transcendence by the eternity of matter. Since, in Schleiermacher’s view, the representation of creation ex nihilo is inevitably transformed into a representation of the formation of the World, an original duplicity between God and matter is inescapable in this representation as well. At this point in the Dialektik, Schleiermacher considers the representations of the God-World relationship suggested by the upper and lower limits of judgment.

3. Providence and Fate

Schleiermacher adopts an aetiological standpoint in his treatment of the boundaries of judgment. This course is not chosen arbitrarily. As was the case with the ontological perspective followed in the analysis of concept, the aetiological perspective is based on the principles of Schleiermacher’s epistemology. As a form of knowledge, judgment corresponds to being. Unlike concept, however, in which being is fixed as a unity, judgment attempts to capture the movement of finite existence in an epistemic form. Through the connection of subject and predicate, the progressive and dynamic aspects of conceptual interrelation are noetically framed. Judgment promotes and furthers knowledge.

86Cf. Dial., Lectures of 1822, p. 418: "... wenn natura naturans uns die Einheit im transcendenten bewahrt: so ist sie nicht transcendent genug; bei Gott und Materie aber kommt man aus der Duplicität nicht heraus."
As has been mentioned, judgment, as a form of knowledge, corresponds to being. If judgment portrays the dynamic of knowledge, then, according to Schleiermacher, there must be an ontological state to which this form of knowledge corresponds. "Insofar as being corresponds to the form of judgment," he states, "a communality of being or a system of the mutual influence of things must be posited."\(^87\) This system is the foundation of Schleiermacher's aetiological perspective in the analysis of judgment. Judgment attempts to express the communality of being through the interrelation of concepts. At the same time, the communality of being, which constitutes the lower boundary of judgment, is the same being which concept structures in terms of the antithesis of the general and the particular.

Consequently, all finite being merges as much in the system of causes and effects as it does in the system of substantial forms, and it is the same being which corresponds to the form of concept and which corresponds to the form of judgment.\(^88\)

For Schleiermacher, the statement that being is static is just as true as the statement that being is in a state of continual flux.\(^89\) The former is made from the perspective of the conceptual; the latter from

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\(^87\)"In wiefern der Form des Urtheils das Sein entspricht, muss gesezt sein eine Gemeinschaftlichkeit des Seins, oder ein System der gegenseitigen Einwirkung der Dinge." Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 193, p. 125. See Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 196, 1, p. 129: "Und wie im Wesen des Urtheils der Wechsel entgegengesetzter Prädicate liegt, weil nur das ins Urtheil eingeht, was sich gegen den Begriff indifferent verhält: so auch im Wesen des Causalitätsystems der Wechsel entgegengesetzter Einwirkungen und Zustände, und also der Oscillation im Zusammensein."

\(^88\)"Alles endliche Sein geht also eben sowohl auf in dem System von Ursachen und Wirkungen, als in dem System der substantiellen Formen, und es ist dasselbe Sein, welches der Form des Begriffs und welches der Form des Urtheils entspricht." Dial., Lectures of 1841, Proposition 195, p. 127.

\(^89\) Cf. Dial., Lectures of 1814, Proposition 196, p. 129: "Es ist also eben so wahr, dass das ganze Sein steht, als dass das ganze Sein in beständigem Fluss ist."
the perspective of the judgmental. In both instances, the same being is
described, though in each from a different point of view.

In keeping with his adopted aetiological standpoint, Schleiermacher
examines the upper and lower boundaries of judgment in terms of the
antithesis of freedom and necessity. Freedom is defined as "spontaneous
self-development" and is related to the ontological antithesis of power
and manifestation. According to the nineteenth century theologian,
freedom is manifestation "insofar as it is neither cause nor effect,
but is purely related to power." 90 The same, however, is not true of
necessity. For Schleiermacher, "all being, insofar as it represents
judgment, is necessary, not only as effect but also as cause . . ." 91

Freedom portrays a relation to the ontological basis of concept (Gott);
necessity portrays a relation to the ontological basis of judgment
(Chaos). With respect to freedom, this relation is described in terms
of the antithesis of power and manifestation. With respect to necessity,
this relation is described in terms of the system of cause and effect.

The antithesis of power and manifestation, the motif in Schleiermacher's
development which expresses freedom, corresponds to the upper boundary
of judgment. The system of cause and effect, which expresses necessity,
corresponds to the lower boundary of judgment. Just as concept is
related to judgment, so too is freedom related to necessity. 92

90 "Wogegen Freiheit nur die Aussichtselbstentwikkelung ist; also
uberall auch die Erscheinung, sofern sie weder Ursach' ist noch Wirkung,
sondern rein auf die Kraft bezogen." Dial., Lectures of 1822, p. 420.

91 "Alles Sein, sofern es das Urtheil reprasentirt, ist nothwendig,
nicht nur als Wirkung, sondern auch als Ursache . . ., weil es als
beides durch anderes bestimmt ist." Dial., Lectures of 1822, p. 420.

92 Cf. Robert Stalder, op. cit., p. 375: "Wir stellten ja vorhin
fest, dass einerseits 'Notwendigkeit', 'Ursache' und 'Wirkung' zusammengehen,
The lower boundary of judgment, i.e., the absolute communality of being, concurs with the lowest ontological state, i.e., chaotic matter. This boundary is reached by abstracting all conceptual determination from the form of judgment. The result is a pure system of cause and effect in which the preponderance of necessity has completely expelled freedom and in which nothing is posited for itself. Fate, in Schleiermacher's view, is the representation of the transcendent ground suggested by the lower boundary of judgment. Although Schleiermacher recognizes that this representation is philosophical according to its form, "since it seeks the original," he maintains that it is unphilosophical according to its content "because it rests upon non-being, namely, matter." This conception is judged to be inadequate since no unity is posited in sheer necessity considered as a material, transcendental principle. The transcendent ground, however, is the foundation of epistemic unity and agreement between thinking and being. The representation of the transcendent ground as fate surrenders God to the antitheses of the World,

anderseits aber 'Freiheit', 'Kraft' und 'Erscheinung'. Die zwei Reihen an Seinsbestimmungen entsprechen im Denken dem Verhältnis von 'Urteil' und 'Begriff'. 'Urteil' und 'Begriff' sieht jedoch Schleiermacher stets in ihrer Einheit, in ständiger wechselseitigen Beziehung, und so auch 'Notwendigkeit' und 'Freiheit'.


94 Cf. Dial., Lectures of 1822, p. 421: "Fragen wir nun nach dem den Urtheilsgrenzen entsprechenden transcendenten Sein: so ist offenbar, dass in der absoluten Gemeinschaftlichkeit keine Ausschließlichkeit sein kann, weil nicht für sich gesetzt ist, sondern nur Notwendigkeit, und die transcendenten Basis ist also die gebärende Notwendigkeit = Schiksaal, aus welchem die Freiheit nur als ein Schein hervorgeht, um immer wieder darin unterzugehen."

95 "Die Form der Vorstellung ist philosophisch, weil sie das ursprüngliche sucht, aber sie ist es nicht ihrem Gehalt nach, weil sie auf dem Nichtsein, nämlich der Materie, ruht." Dial., Lectures of 1822, p. 421.
thus violating the regulative principle *Beide Ideen sind nicht dasselbe*.

As one approaches the upper boundary of judgment, one witnesses the negation of judgment as it assumes the form of concept. This upper boundary of judgment, the absolute subject of which nothing is any longer predictable, coincides with the representation of the upper boundary of concept, i.e., the highest power. In this representation the absolute is totally self-determined. The deity is envisaged as pure spontaneous self-development, as unbounded freedom which encompasses the necessity of the system of cause and effect. According to Schleiermacher, the representation suggested by the upper boundary of judgment is that of providence. As pure self-determination, the representation of providence is inadequate for the same reason as the formula *natura naturans*.

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96 Cf. *Dial.*, Lectures of 1814, Proposition 200, pp. 134-135: "Das höchste Subject also, von welchem nichts mehr prädicirt werden kann, und welches alles Zusammensein unter sich begreift, fällt zusammen mit der höchsten lebendigen Kraft, welche unter keine höhere mehr subsumirt werden kann."

97 Cf. *Dial.*, Lectures of 1822, p. 421: "Die entgegengesetzte Grenze ist die συμφωνία des Urtheils im Begriff; denn absolutes Subject ist Grenze unter Begriffsform. Hat nun dieses Subject nichts prädicables ausser sich: so ist es die absolute Aussichselbstentwicklung, in Beziehung auf welche es aber auch keine andre giebt, sondern unter dieser giebt es überall nur durch die Coordination bestimmte Notwendigkeit. Diese nur Notwendigkeit gehörige Freiheit ist = Vorsorge." In the lectures of 1814 and 1818, providence and fate are both set forth as representations of the absolute subject, the difference between them being expressed as follows: "Das Schicksal ist das die Totalität aller Causalverhältnisse unter sich begreifende unter der Form des bewusstlosen. Die Vorsehung ist dasselbe unter der Form des bewussten." *Dial.*, Lectures of 1814; Proposition 202, 1, p. 136. In the lectures of 1818, such representations are deemed inadequate, for they are grounded in a duplicity inappropriate for the expression of the transcendent: "Aber eben aus dieser Duplicität sieht man schon, dass keine dieser Formen der Idee Gottes entspricht, denn der Gegensatz zwischen Gegenstand und Bewusstsein ist nicht darin aufgehoben." *Dial.*, Lectures of 1818, p. 136.

98 Cf. *Dial.*, Lectures of 1822, pp. 421-422: ". . . nun muss aber auch schon jeder organische Theil des Zusammenseins als in einem wenn man ihn nur völlig isoliren
Since the idea of providence portrays the deity's free determination of the occurrences in the World, this idea, like that of fate (although in a more positive fashion), identifies the deity with the system of cause and effect.\(^99\) Again, God is surrendered to the conditions of the World; the regulative principle \textit{Beide Ideen sind nicht dasselbe} is violated.

\section{Summary}

The four representations suggested by the upper and lower boundaries of concept and judgment—Highest Power, Creator, Providence and Fate—prove to be inadequate in their expression of the transcendent ground.\(^100\)

In all of these representations the attempt to depict the deity concomitantly results in an expression of his relationship to the World.\(^101\)

The pantheistic construction posits the World merely as the manifestation of divine power; the representations depicting the relationship between God and matter become statements describing the origination of the World through God; the representations suggested by the upper and lower

\begin{quote}
können, auf dieselbe Art ein absolutes Subject sein. Und da aus ähnlichen Gründen die Idee der \textit{natura naturans} nicht genügte: so kann auch die Vorsehung nicht der Forderung entsprechen."
\end{quote}

\(^99\)Cf. \textit{Dial.}, Lectures of 1822, p. 422: "\textit{Schicksal und Vorsehung gemeinschaftlich} (sind unzureichend) deswegen, weil sie sich nur auf das Geschehen, d.i. das Gebiet von Ursach und Wirkung beziehen. Vorsehung aber doch weit vorzüglicher, weil Schicksal sich nur auf die negative Seite stütz."

\(^100\) These representations are suggested by the boundaries of both forms of physical knowledge. In the lectures of 1822, 1828, and 1831, representations are presented from the forms of ethical knowledge. These are lawgiver (\textit{Gesetzgeber}) and World-order (\textit{Weltordnung}), which respectively correspond to the upper boundaries of concept and judgment. According to Schleiermacher both are inadequate since they are based on an antithetical relationship to finite, willing individuals. In the sphere of the finite, law appears as obligation since Gesetz and \textit{Sein} stand in antithesis. Cf. Falk Wagner, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 132-134.

\(^101\) Cf. L. Oranje, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 249.
boundaries of judgment are structured on the worldly system of cause and effect: providence from the perspective of freedom, fate from the perspective of necessity. All representations, with the exception of creation *ex nihilo*, rightfully co-posit God and World in the thinking process. The inadequacy of their formulations must be traced to their misrepresentation of the transcendent ground through the violation of the regulative principle *Beide Ideen sind nicht dasselbe*. In co-positing God and World, these representations surrender the absolute unity of the former to the antitheses of the latter, thus negating the transcendence of the deity.

The representation of creation *ex nihilo* is inadequate for more fundamental reasons. In Schleiermacher's view, it violates the regulative principle *Die Welt nicht ohne Gott, Gott nicht ohne die Welt* and is therefore in direct contradiction with the laws of real thinking. According to the development of the *Dialektik*, both the Ideal (God) and the Real (World) must contribute toward the constitution of real thinking. The elimination of one transcendent principle results in an impasse with which thinking may not deal. Consequently, Schleiermacher maintains that there is little distinction between the representation of the formation of the World out of eternal matter and the representation of the creation of the World out of nothing. Thinking unfailingly transforms the latter representation into the former in which God and World are co-positied. The representation of creation *ex nihilo* is untenable for real thinking.

As has been mentioned, Schleiermacher was well aware that the representation of the God-World relationship is inevitable. This is true not only for the philosophical interest of which the above conceptions
are examples, but also for the religious interest. In the lectures of 1814, the nineteenth century theologian states that we "can agree with all inadequate image-representations which represent religious feeling, only if we are conscious of the bounds of their validity." It is the religious interest which must attempt a closer determination of the ideas of God and World. Although the focus of the religious interest remains the feeling of absolute dependence, the representation of this immediate experience for thinking invariably takes the form of mediate anthropoeideitic construction. Such mediate, representative construction, in Schleiermacher's view, must not be considered knowledge unless it conforms to the rules developed in the Dialektik on the basis of the direct interests of thinking. In the following section of our study we shall explore the extent to which Schleiermacher's exposition of the doctrines of Creation and Preservation in the Glaubenslehre bears the influence of the direct interests of thinking.

III. The Doctrines of Creation and Preservation

In our attempt to demonstrate the contention of our study we turn to the Glaubenslehre, specifically to the First Part of the System of Doctrine. From our introductory remarks in chapter two, it should be


103 Cf. Dial., Lectures of 1828, p. 168: "Das religiöse Interesse allein muss eine nähere Bestimmung des Verhältnisses beider Ideen (Gott und Welt) versuchen, und es hat ein Recht zu fordern, dass man es gewähren lasse, aber wie es nothwendig der Ursprung alles anthropoeideischen ist: so sind seine Productionen dieser Art durchaus nur als mittelbare Darstellungen für das Denken und als Wissen nicht eher zu sehen, bis sie den Regeln gemäss, welche wir hier vom unmittelbaren
recalled that doctrinal exposition in this part of the dogmatics is approached from the standpoint of the theme of "the development of that religious self-consciousness which is always both presupposed by and contained in every Christian religious affection." Although the First Part of the Glaubenslehre consists in an analysis of the religious self-consciousness as such, Schleiermacher considered the doctrines therein set forth to be true and authentic descriptions of the specifically Christian self-consciousness. Consequently, the doctrines which form the content of this part of the Glaubenslehre—the doctrines of Creation and Preservation; the doctrine of the divine attributes; and the doctrines of the original perfection of man and the World—respectively correspond to the three forms of the doctrinal proposition explicated in Proposition 30 of the dogmatics: descriptions of human states of life; concepts of divine attributes and modes of action; and pronouncements regarding the constitution of the World. As developed in the First Part of the dogmatics, however, these three forms are modified, as the above-mentioned doctrines indicate, in a determinate fashion:

According to the criterion of the three forms established in (Proposition) 30 we shall have to treat, first, the relation present in the religious self-consciousness between the finite being of the world and the infinite Being of God; then, in the second section, the attributes of God in relation to the world as they appear in that self-consciousness; and lastly, in the third section, the constitution of the world as therein conceived in virtue of its absolute dependence on God.106

In view of the relationship between the feeling of absolute

104 Cf., p. 131; Gl., I, p. 171.
105 Cf. Sendeschreiben, pp. 29-30 (604): "Darum bleibe ich bei meiner Methode, und gebe sie getrost, auch was diesen Teil betrifft, für eine christliche Glaubenslehre, und glaube nicht, dass eine Protestation hiergegen einen bedeutenden Erfolg haben wird."
106 Cf., 35, p. 132
dependence (*Gottesbewusstsein*) and mediate sensible self-consciousness (*Weltbewusstsein*) delineated by Schleiermacher in Proposition 5 of the *Glaubenslehre*, the nineteenth century theologian's examination of the fundamental dynamic of religious self-consciousness in the First Part of the System of Doctrine in terms of the God-World motif is indeed consistent. This consistency extends, as we shall see, not only to the necessary interrelationship of the highest and mediate levels of self-consciousness, but also to the necessary noetic relationship between God and World in mediate self-consciousness itself.

According to Schleiermacher, the feeling of absolute dependence must always occur within the scope of mediate experience. It must always emerge in actual experience in conjunction with a particular determination of self-consciousness. Through the latter, the feeling of absolute dependence is imbued with the shades of positive, sensible experience which permeate the entirety of finite existence. *Weltbewusstsein* is an exigent propaedeutic of the experiential emergence of the *Gottesbewusstsein*. Yet, *Weltbewusstsein* is that particular determination of the relationship between man and World, subject and object, in which the enterprise of the *Dialektik* arises. *Weltbewusstsein*, the secondary or mediate level in Schleiermacher's view on self-consciousness, is comprised of experiences directly established on the subject-object dichotomy rooted in finite experience and existence by human self-consciousness itself: thinking, willing, and the "lower" sensible feelings, e.g., the feelings of relative freedom and relative dependence. In the *Dialektik*, the transcendental methodology employed by Schleiermacher established that, within the sphere of mediate self-consciousness (*Weltbewusstsein*), the ideas of God and World must necessarily be co-posed in order for
real thinking to be properly constituted. This noetic determination of
the God-World relationship is established on the basis of the direct
interests of thinking. For Schleiermacher, *wirkliches Denken* partici-
pates in both the ideal and the real roots of thinking. Since the
feeling of absolute dependence emerges in actual experience *only in
conjunction with, and as modified by*, the ideally (idea of God) and
really (idea of World) constituted mediate sensible self-consciousness,
we are more than justified in asking whether the Christian doctrines
expressing the God-World relationship (purportedly on the basis of pious
self-consciousness alone) were influenced, and substantively so, by the
noetic determination of the God-World relationship developed in the
*Dialektik*. The remainder of our study will attempt to answer this
question.

In the *Glaubenslehre*, Schleiermacher portrays the experience of
mediate sensible self-consciousness (*Weltbewusstsein*) as existence in a
universal nature-system (*allgemeiner Naturzusammenhang*). Through the
nature-system or, in other words, through the evidence of mediate self-
consciousness as it emerges in the interconnection of various life-
moments, the God-consciousness achieves concreteness in human experience:

> The feeling of absolute dependence is contained in every
Christian religious affection, in proportion as in the latter,
through its co-determining stimuli, we become conscious that
we are placed in a universal nature-system, i.e. in proportion
as we are conscious of ourselves as part of the world.107

For Schleiermacher, *Weltbewusstsein* and finding oneself placed in a
universal nature-system are one and the same.108 The system of nature


108 *Cf.* *Gl.*, I, Proposition 34, 1, pp. 180–181: "Das Sich-seiner-
selbst-als-eines-Teils-der-Welt-bewusst-Sein und Sich-in-einen-
ist und
comprises the entirety of finite relations, not only those which express
dependence but also those which express freedom; not only those consti-
tuted objectively, but also those constituted subjectively; not only
those which are physical, but also those which are spiritual. In
Schleiermacher's view, "the whole nature-system or the World is co-
posited in our self-consciousness insofar as we are conscious of our-
selves as part of the World." 109

The being of man within the universal nature-system depicts his
existential situation. It is within the structures of this being-in-the-
World that the God-consciousness is able to appear and to unfold in actual
experience; it is this experience-in-the-World which incites and nurtures
the feeling of absolute dependence. Put differently, the nature-system,
as it is co-posited in human self-consciousness, is nothing other than
the secondary, mediate level in Schleiermacher's theory of self-
consciousness, i.e., sensible self-consciousness. To say, then, that
pious feeling is never dissociated from some determination of sensible
self-consciousness is as much as to say that religious self-consciousness
and experience of and in the World are inseparable and intimately
related.

... no Christian religious emotion can be imagined in
experiencing which we do not find ourselves placed in a
nature-system. Whatever the emotion may express, and whether
it issue in action or in speculation (Betrachtung), we must
always be conscious of ourselves in this manner, and this
consciousness must also be united to the God-consciousness ... 110

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109 Translation mine. "... und so ist also der gesamte Naturzu-
sammenhang oder die Welt in unsearem Selbstbewusstsein mitgesetzt, sofern
wir uns unserer selbst als eines Teils der Welt bewusst sind." Gl., I,
Proposition 34, 1, p. 181.

110 Cf. Proposition 34, 3, p. 139; Gl., I, p. 182.
Since the relationship between *Gottesbewusstsein* and *Weltbewusstsein* forms the experience of the pious life which Christian dogmatics attempts to describe in doctrinal statements, Schleiermacher devotes the First Part of the System of Doctrine to a consideration of the God-World relationship. In this section of our study we shall examine the doctrines of Creation and Preservation.

The doctrines of Creation and Preservation are elaborated under the rubric of "a description of our religious self-consciousness in so far as the relation between the World and God is expressed in it." These doctrines, because they are developed as expressions of the primal form of the dogmatic proposition, i.e., human states of life, more closely delineate the basis of dogmatic formulation: the feeling of absolute dependence. It is, perhaps, easier to discern the relationship between *Gottesbewusstsein* and *Weltbewusstsein* in the secondary forms of the dogmatic proposition, the *Nebenformen*—concepts of divine attributes and modes of action and utterances regarding the constitution of the World. This relationship is subtler, however, in the first original form of the dogmatic proposition, in which the feeling of absolute dependence is more properly the object of description. Despite this subtler relationship between the God-consciousness and World-consciousness in the first form of the dogmatic proposition it is our contention that the Christian doctrines developed under this first form—Creation and Preservation—clearly demonstrate the extent to which Schleiermacher's development of the God-World relationship in the *Glaubenslehre* was influenced—not merely formally, but substantively—by his treatment of this relationship in the *Dialektik*.

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111 Cf., p. 142; GL., I, p. 185.
As we have seen in chapter three of our study, Schleiermacher limited the influence of the logical or dialectical influence upon dogmatics to the form of the doctrinal proposition alone. In the view of the nineteenth century theologian, philosophy plays a positive and necessary role in dogmatics by contributing to the preciseness and lucidity of how dogma is expressed. The logical or dialectical influence may never in any way influence what is expressed in dogmatics. Schleiermacher completely prohibits the influence of philosophy upon the substance or content of the dogmatic proposition. The substance of dogmatics must be solely grounded upon the experience of pious feeling. Should the influence of the logical or dialectical interest extend to the content or substance of the dogmatic proposition, this, according to Schleiermacher, would mean that dogmatics in some way depended on the speculative activity for the development of its content. In such a case, not only pious feeling, but also human reason would become the object of dogmatic exposition. Schleiermacher totally disclaimed the substantive contributions of the dialectic of human reason to the formulation of Christian dogmatics:

It is the contention of our study that one may perceive the substantive influence of Schleiermacher's philosophical determination of the God-World relationship in the Dialektik upon the Christian doctrines expressing this relationship in the Glaubenslehre. In our view, this demonstrates a number of points: first, that Schleiermacher was unable to abide by the principle of the dogmatic methodology which he himself established with regard to the exclusion of the influence of the philosophical interest upon the substance or content of Christian doctrine; second, that this substantive influence of philosophy upon Christian
dogmatics is structured on the principles of real thinking developed in the *Dialektik*; and third, that this influence provides an explanation of the modern propensities of Schleiermacher's dogmatics. If the modern propensities of Schleiermacher's dogmatics are to be traced to the centrality which he accords to the experiential basis of this branch of theological science, we must be aware of the fact that this experiential basis is not limited to pious feeling, but includes, as well, the rational aspects of human experience, i.e., the evidence of mediate sensible self-consciousness.

The argumentation which supports our co-positing feeling and reason as the constituents comprising the experiential basis of dogmatics has been pursued in the previous chapter. Feeling, as we have seen, always occurs in actual experience within the context of the self-consciousness which expresses a 'connection with perceptible finite existence.' It is thus formed, shaped, and even modified by its contact with mediate self-consciousness, a self-consciousness in which the direct interest of thinking, governed by the laws established in the *Dialektik*, unceasingly prevails. We would expect, therefore, that dogmatic exposition, which attempts to set forth the religious self-consciousness indwelling in a particular Church at a given time, would bear as well the mark of the dialectical spirit of thinking, not only in the formation of scientific terminology and in establishing cohesion between specific propositions, but also in the substance and content of the proposition itself. The doctrines of Creation and Preservation provide the first opportunity for the demonstration of our thesis. In these doctrines we can discern the substantive influence of the God-World relationship formulated in the *Dialektik*. 
Before specifically elucidating the manner in which the doctrines of Creation and Preservation are to be developed, Schleiermacher succinctly outlines his estimation of the task at hand, and does so to the point of anticipating his conclusions. This general sketch of his approach is an invaluable guide to the more directed and complex probes into the respective doctrines which follow.

Tradition, the nineteenth century theologian points out, has bequeathed dogmatics a two-fold expression of the God-World relationship which has assumed the form of the propositions that the World was created by God and that God preserves the World.\(^{112}\) Both propositions essay to express an experience which Schleiermacher considers to be at the heart of the pious, and hence dogmatic, interest: "that the totality of finite being exists only in dependence upon the Infinite . . ."\(^{113}\) Schleiermacher regards this as the original, pious expression of the God-World relationship. As far as credal expression is concerned, Schleiermacher insists that, from the standpoint of religious affection, the Roman confession 'I believe in God the Pantokrator,' most aptly voices the original expression.\(^{114}\) In this testament of faith no separation between Creation and Preservation is discernible.\(^{115}\) Since the doctrines of Creation and Preservation, however, have customarily been treated

\(^{112}\) Cf. GL., I, Proposition 36, p. 185: "Der ursprüngliche Ausdruck dieses Verhältnisses, dass nämlich die Welt nur in der schlechthinigen Abhängigkeit von Gott besteht, spaltet sich in der kirchlichen Lehre in die beiden Sätze, dass die Welt von Gott erschaffen ist und dass Gott die Welt erhält."

\(^{113}\) Cf. Proposition 36, 1, p. 142; GL., I, p. 185.

\(^{114}\) Cf. GL., I, Proposition 36, p. 185.

\(^{115}\) Cf. GL., I, Proposition 37, 1, p. 188.
separately in dogmatic presentation, the exigencies of valid expression
demand, for Schleiermacher, that both doctrines be developed as relational
and in a fashion so as to portray fully the interests of Christian piety.

As the Evangelical (Protestant) Church has adopted both
doctrines, but has not in her confessional documents given
to either of them any distinctive character, it behoves us
so to treat them that, taken together, they will exhaust the
meaning of the original expression.\textsuperscript{116}

Each doctrine considered in itself approaches the purport of the original
expression from a different perspective. The assertion that God created
the World "lays down absolute dependence, but only for the beginning,
with the exclusion of development . . ."\textsuperscript{117} In Schleiermacher's view,
the idea of Creation is not immediately given to self-consciousness as
positive experience and betrays, therefore, a speculative interest which
does not accord with the spirit of piety.\textsuperscript{118}

The doctrine of Preservation, on the other hand, is regarded by
Schleiermacher as more fully portraying the feeling of absolute dependence,
i.e., the God-consciousness, since it gives a closer account of the experi-
ential substratum of feeling, i.e., the evidence of World-consciousness.

We find ourselves always and only in a continuous existence;
our life (Dasein) is always moving along a course; consequently
just so far as we regard ourselves as finite being, apart from
all other things, our self-consciousness can represent this
being only in its continuity. And this in so complete a sense
that (the feeling of absolute dependence being so universal an
element in our self-consciousness) we may say that in whatever
part of the whole or at whatever point of time we may be placed,
in every full act of reflection we should recognize ourselves

\textsuperscript{116} CF, Proposition 37, p. 143; Gl., I, p. 187.
\textsuperscript{117} CF, Proposition 36, 1, p. 142; Gl., I, p. 186.
\textsuperscript{118} Cf. Gl., I, Proposition 36, 1, p. 186: "Der Satz hingegen, dass
Gott erschaffen hat, an und für sich betrachtet, sagt zwar auch schlecht-
hinlige Abhängigkeit aus, aber mit Ausschluss des Fortbestehens nur für
den Anfang, sei es nun der Welt auf einmal oder nacheinander ihrer Telle,
das uns im Selbstbewusstsein unmittelbar gar nicht
as thus involved in continuity, and should extend the same thought to the whole of finite being.\textsuperscript{119}

The above passage is a description of the dialectical interchange which predominates in all mediate, sensible experience. This interchange is comprised of moments of thinking and moments of willing, of physical and ethical knowledge, of feelings of dependence and freedom.\textsuperscript{120} It is in these forms of mediate, sensible experience that the problem of Dialektik arises. These forms of experience constitute the experiential substratum which both incites and modifies the feeling of absolute dependence. According to Schleiermacher, the proposition that God preserves the World harmonizes with the original expression of pious affection to a greater extent than does the proposition that God creates the World.

In the view of the nineteenth century theologian, the doctrine of Preservation mirrors the continuity of mediate, sensible experience in the World. It concurs with the experience of mediate self-consciousness in a direct and positive fashion; it violates neither the original expression of pious feeling nor the structures of reflection within which this feeling occurs and by which it is modified.

Although he points out that each doctrine can be transformed into the other, Preservation being viewed as the continuation of Creation and Creation as the beginning of Preservation, Schleiermacher considered it

\textsuperscript{119} CF, Proposition 36, 1, p. 142; GL., I, pp. 185-186.

expedient at the time of his writing to separate Creation from Preservation for the reasons mentioned above. Since the former, however, had been accorded such an established and pre-eminent position in the history of Christian doctrine, he thought its inclusion in dogmatic presentation wise in order that its employment be safeguarded against improper development. As such, the doctrine of Preservation is the positive (and this word possesses a double entendre) expression of the God-World relationship in the Glaubenslehre.\footnote{121}

1. The Doctrine of Creation

From Schleiermacher's treatment of the doctrine of Creation a sense for his estimation of the importance of tradition in light of his subjective, critical methodology in the Glaubenslehre is attained. As has been mentioned, Schleiermacher accords this doctrine no independent validity of its own. Its customary appropriation into Christian dogmatics is unacceptable since it is entrenched in interests other than those of piety. For Schleiermacher, "the question of the origin of all finite being is raised not in the interest of piety but in that of curiosity, hence it can only be answered by such means as curiosity offers."\footnote{122} The aim of dogmatics with respect to this doctrine is "to set up safeguards (Kauteilen) in order to ensure that nothing should insinuate itself which . . . might contradict what really belongs

\footnote{121}{Cf. Gl., I, Proposition 39, p. 193: "Die Lehre von der Schöpfung ist vorzüglich in der Hinsicht zu entwickeln, dass Fremdartiges abgewehrt werde, damit nicht aus der Art, wie die Frage nach dem Entstehen anderwärts beantwortet wird, etwas in unser Gebiet einschließe, was mit dem reinen Ausdruck des schlechthinigen Abhängigkeitsgefühls im Widerspruch steht. Die Lehre von der Erhaltung aber vorzüglich, um daran jenes Grundgefühl selbst vollkommen darzustellen."

\footnote{122}{Cf., Proposition 39, 1, pp. 148-149; Gl., I, p. 194.}
here."  

These safeguards are delineated in Proposition 40 of the Glaubenslehre.

The religious consciousness (sic. self-consciousness) which is here our basis contradicts every representation of the origin of the world which excludes anything whatever from origination by God, or which places God under those conditions and antitheses which have arisen in and through the world.  

In this delimitation of the bounds of admissible representation we can observe similarities with the Cautelem regulating philosophical representation of the God-World relationship in the Dialektik. The second determination, which denies the validity of representation that 'places God under those conditions and antitheses which have arisen in and through the world,' fulfills the same function as the philosophical canon: Beide Ideen (God and World) sind nicht dasselbe. Should God and World be identified, the inevitable result would be the negation of the transcendent, unconditioned character of the Divine, the pantheistic formulation of the God-World relationship serving as an example. If both ideas be confounded and confused, the representation of the World gains ascendancy and the absolute becomes entangled in the antitheses which permeate the real sphere. From the perspective of the Dialektik, God would no longer be the ground of agreement between thinking and being. The first determination, which calls for the elimination of 'every

\[123\] CF, Proposition 39, 3, p. 149; G1, I, pp. 194-195.

\[124\] CF, Proposition 40, pp. 149-150; G1, I, p. 195. The English translation of the Glaubenslehre mistakenly renders Selbstbewusstsein as "consciousness." This proposition is specifically developed in the first edition of the Glaubenslehre with respect to pious experience. 1. Auflage, p. 207: "Die rechte Verwahrung wird also am besten so gestellt. Unserm allgemeinen Abhängigkeitsgefühl von Gott widerspricht jede Lösung der Frage nach dem Entstehen der Welt, durch welche deren gänzliche Abhängigkeit von Gott gefährdet würde, und eben so jede, durch welche die Unabhängigkeit Gottes von allen erst in der Welt und durch die Welt entstandenen Bestimmungen und Gegensäzen gefährdet wird."
representation of the origin of the world which excludes anything whatever from origination by God,' sets forth the inseparability of God and World from the standpoint of the feeling of absolute dependence. The World is absolutely dependent upon God. This statement, for Schleiermacher, completely expresses the pious interest in the God-World relationship. As a declaration of the inseparability of God and World it bears a resemblance to the regulative principle which concluded the Transcendental Part of the Dialektik: Die Welt nicht ohne Gott, Gott nicht ohne die Welt. This latter principle, however, was not developed in the interests of piety, but in the interests of thinking. It is a delineation of the necessary constituents—the Ideal and the Real—of all real thinking (wirkliches Denken), structured on the basis of the logical or dialectical interest.

We must be cautious to observe that, whereas the principles developed in the Dialektik and the Glaubenslehre with regard to the expression of the God-World relationship resemble each other in fundamental ways, the roles played by these principles in their respective philosophical and dogmatic contexts appear to be quite different. In other words, to assert on the basis of the noted resemblance between the regulative principles for the expression of the God-World relationship in the Dialektik and the Glaubenslehre that the former work substantively influenced the formulation of Christian doctrine in the latter would be nothing more than vague, foundationless conjecture. We must first explore Schleiermacher's dogmatic treatment of both the doctrine of Creation and the doctrine of Preservation in order to determine the extent to which the philosophical formulation of the God-World relationship influenced the religious.
Schleiermacher commences his development of the doctrine of Creation with heuristic recourse to three passages from the New Testament which he deems normative to his treatment: Acts 17:24; Romans 1:19, 20; and Hebrews 11:3. These citations, Schleiermacher believes, "lead us to reject any more definite conception (Vorstellung) of the Creation." The expression cited from Hebrews, 'by the word of God,' erects a "negative character as a standard of criticism" against any representations which have erringly impinged upon the sphere of dogmatics. The New Testament passages which he cites in his treatment are deemed normative precisely because they do no more than portray the purport of what Schleiermacher considered to be the original expression of the God-World relationship suggested by the feeling of absolute dependence. According to Schleiermacher, the doctrine of Creation cannot be maintained as an independent, self-sufficient contribution to the exposition of pious feeling.

For as our immediate self-consciousness represents finite being only in the identity of origination and continuance, we find in that self-consciousness neither motive nor guidance for a treatment of origination taken by itself, and therefore we can

125 "The God who made the world and everything in it, being Lord of heaven and earth, does not live in shrines made by man . . ."

126 "For what can be known about God is plain to them. Ever since the creation of the world his invisible nature, namely, his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse . . ."

127 "By faith we understand that the world was created by the word of God, so that what is seen was made out of things which do not appear."

128 Cf. Proposition 40, 1, p. 150; Gl., I, p. 195.

129 Cf. Proposition 40, 1, p. 150; Gl., I, p. 195.

130 Cf. footnote 113.
take no particular interest in it. 131

These words give some indication of the reason for Schleiermacher's negative assessment of the independent treatment of the doctrine of Creation. This passage, however, is not exhaustive in its explanation, for it leaves an important qualification unsaid. According to the nineteenth century theologian's theory of self-consciousness, the feeling of absolute dependence does not emerge in actual experience unless it is modified by a particular determination of mediate sensible self-consciousness. The representation of finite experience as a series of moments of origination and continuance portrays the sensible level of self-consciousness in which the Dialektik of thinking and willing is ever operative. In his introduction to the doctrines of Creation and Preservation the coherence of this experience was described by Schleiermacher in terms of the conditions of the universal nature-system (Naturzusammenhang). As a result, it would be more exact to say that 'our immediate self-consciousness (as modified by mediate sensible self-consciousness) represents finite being only in the identity of origination and continuance ...' It is this modification, we suggest, that concomitantly imbues the feeling of absolute dependence with the determination of the God-World relationship made in the direct interests of mediate sensible self-consciousness: Die Welt nicht ohne Gott, Gott nicht ohne die Welt.

The independent adoption of the doctrine of Creation into the sphere of dogmatics would not in and of itself violate the original, pious expression of the God-World relationship. Schleiermacher was well aware of the fact that the doctrine of Creation expresses the dependence of the

World on God. The doctrine of Creation, however, is downplayed in the Glaubenslehre on the grounds that it does not fully harmonize with the experiential substratum of pious feeling. In Schleiermacher's view, the positive character of Christian theology necessitates the development of doctrine in consonance with the evidence of experience. It is the contention of this study that the experiential object of dogmatics cannot merely be identified with pious, immediate self-consciousness, but that the experiential basis of dogmatics comprises the determination of mediate sensible self-consciousness in conjunction with which pious feeling emerges in actual experience. Since God and World are correlates in human thinking, the doctrine of Creation, which represents the God-World relationship apart from the dialectical character of mediate experience in the World, cannot achieve the status of an autonomous and self-constitutive description of pious experience.

Having found no basis for the further development of the doctrine of Creation in the New Testament, Schleiermacher completes his examination of the scriptural evidence by considering the validity of the Old Testament account of the origin of the World. The nineteenth century theologian proposes two alternatives in assessing the Mosaic account of Creation. The account, he claims, is either figurative or an historical description narrated in an extraordinary way. If the former, then no harm is done in excluding it from dogmatics. The allegorical method obviates the centrality of the positivity of pious experience. If it be the latter, i.e., an historical account, then scientific insight is

132 Cf. Gl., I, Proposition 40, 3, p. 198: "Mit dem christlichen Charakter desselben (unseres frommen Selbstbewusstseins) aber, da dieser eine Erfahrung schon vorausgesetzt, kann eine Lehre von der blossen Schöpfung, weil sie auf das Fortbestehen keine Rücksicht nimmt; auch nicht in Widerspruch stehen."
benefited through the attainment of information not otherwise available. Such information, however, could never be considered an article of faith "for our feeling of absolute dependence does not gain thereby either a new content, a new form, or clearer definition."\textsuperscript{133} In whatever form developed, Schleiermacher considered the doctrine of Creation to be ultimately discredited in light of the advances of scientific understanding. In his Zweites Sendschreiben an Lücke, the theologian states:

And, therefore, I now suspect that we shall have to get along without much that many are still accustomed to think of as inextricably bound to the essence of Christianity. I hardly desire to speak of the "six days creation". But how long still will the concept of Creation, as it is usually construed (apart from reference to the Mosaic chronology and in spite of all rather insecure facilitations which interpretation has already produced), be able to maintain itself against the force of a world view formed out of scientific constructions from which no one can withdraw?\textsuperscript{134}

In his development in the dogmatics Schleiermacher states that the cultivation and elaboration of the doctrine of Creation stem from a period in which "material even for natural science was taken from the Scriptures" and in which "the elements of all higher knowledge lay hidden in Theology."\textsuperscript{135} Indeed, he was more than willing to surrender

\textsuperscript{133}CF, Proposition 40, 2, p. 151; Gl., I, p. 197.

\textsuperscript{134}"Und deshalb will mir nun nichts anderes ahnden, als dass wir werden lernen müssen uns ohne vieles behelfen, was viele noch gewohnt sind als mit dem Wesen des Christentums unzertrennlich verbunden zu denken. Ich will gar nicht vom Sechstaggewerk reden, aber der Schöpfungsbegriff, wie er gewöhnlich konstruiert wird, auch abgesehen von dem Zurückgehen auf die mosaische Chronologie und trotz aller freilich ziemlich unsichern Erleichterungen, welche die Auslegung schon herbeigeführt hat: wie lange wird er sich noch halten können gegen die Gewalt einer aus wissenschaftlichen Kombinationen, denen sich niemand entziehen kann, gebildeten Weltanschauung?" Sendschreiben, p. 36 (613). Besides the threats of modern science it is interesting to consider the extent to which Schleiermacher's regard for the Old Testament influenced his reasons for discrediting the Genesis account. See Gl., II, Proposition 132, pp. 304f.

\textsuperscript{135}CF, Proposition 40, 1, p. 150; Gl., I, p. 196.
the responsibility of the representation of the origin of the World to natural science, the doctrines of Creation and Preservation being formulated in the Glaubenslehre so as to avoid entanglement with this branch of Wissenschaft. 136

At the time of his writing, however, Schleiermacher was confident that the doctrine of Creation could be admitted into dogmatics. The only difficulty to be confronted remained the manner in which it was to be developed. In Proposition 41 of the Glaubenslehre Schleiermacher outlined the way in which the concept of Creation was to be elaborated in order to express appropriately the experiential basis of dogmatics:

If the conception (Begriff) of Creation is to be further developed, the origin of the world must, indeed, be traced entirely to the divine activity, but not in such a way that this activity is thought of as resembling human activity; and the origin of the world must be represented as the event in time which conditions all change, but not so as to make the divine activity itself a temporal activity.137

We should note that the principles here set forth assume a negative


stance with regard to the concept of Creation. The anthropoeidetic must be strictly regulated in order to maintain the purport of the original expression. Under the rubric of the above passage, Schleiermacher examines and evaluates a number of representations of the God-World relationship prevalent in the history of Christian thought.

The first representation considered is that of *creatio ex nihilo*. Although Schleiermacher states that this view of origination is harmless if it not be confused with the doctrine of Preservation, he is wary of the onerous implications which this representation possesses for modern dogmatics. The nineteenth century theologian's caution may be attributed to the fundamental irreconcilability of this representation with the principles of real thinking (*wirkliches Denken*). Schleiermacher's analysis and critique of the traditional doctrine of Creation out of nothing betrays the regulative influence of the noetic determination of the God-World relationship established in the *Dialektik: Die Welt* (Real) *nicht ohne Gott* (Ideal), *Gott nicht ohne die Welt*.

According to Schleiermacher, the expression *aus nichts* attempts to preserve the aseity of God. As was implied in the *Dialektik*, the true element in this representation is that it properly recognizes the transcendence of God.\(^{138}\) Within the context of the *Glaubenslehre*, such a representation establishes the cohesion of the feeling of absolute dependence.\(^{139}\) Schleiermacher, though, is quick to call attention to


\(^{139}\) Cf. *Gl.*, I, Proposition 41, 1, p. 200: "Der Ausdruck aus nichts leugnet, dass vor der Entstehung der Welt irgend etwas ausser Gott vorhanden gewesen, was als Stoff in die Weltbildung eingegangen wäre; und ohnstreitig würde die Annahme eines unabhängig von der göttlichen Tätigkeit vorhandenen Stoffes das schlechthinige Abhängigkeitsgefühl zerstören und die wirkliche Welt darstellen als eine Mischung aus dem, was durch Gott und dem, was nicht durch Gott da wäre."
the difficulties inherent in this view of origination, difficulties which result in this representation falling victim to the very problems which it sought to avoid.

The Transcendental Part of the *Dialektik* established that human thinking, if it is to remain real (wirkliches), cannot carry out the operations of intellection apart from sensible, organic determination. The Ideal cannot be presented without the Real; God cannot be represented noetically without some sensible experience corresponding to the idea of the World. This epistemological stance possesses significant ramifications for Schleiermacher's critique of the traditional doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo*. In the view of the nineteenth century theologian, thinking necessarily requires a real principle in order to complete its operation.

But since this phrase ('out of nothing') undeniably recalls Aristotle's category ἐξ  οὐ and is formed on it, it reminds us on the one hand of human methods in construction which give form to an already existing matter, and on the other hand of the processes of nature in the composition of bodies out of many elements.\(^{140}\)

Here, as in the *Dialektik*, Schleiermacher approaches general representations of the origin of the World from the position that there is little distinction between the statements that God formed the World out of matter or that God created the World out of nothing.\(^{141}\) The latter representation inevitably reverts to the former in thinking. Real thinking requires two transcendent principles, God and matter, if it is to accomplish its task. The representation of *creatio ex nihilo*, by invariably and necessarily transforming itself into an image of God

\(^{140}\) Cf. Proposition 41, 1, p. 153; *Gl.* I, p. 200.

\(^{141}\) Cf. footnote 85.
forming the World out of matter, demonstrates that God cannot be thought without the World. Since the representation of God forming the World out of matter (the noetic consequence of the representation of *creatio ex nihilo*) involves God in the antitheses and conditions of the finite, Schleiermacher deems it unfit for inclusion in Christian dogmatics.

Schleiermacher continues his critique of the idea of *creatio ex nihilo* by stating that implicit in the denial of matter lies the idea of the "pre-existence of form before things, though of course in God and not outside God."142 Such a position surfaces in the thought of Hilary and Anselm and leads to the same consequences mentioned above. Form (Gestaltung) is one term of an antithesis, i.e., the antithesis of form and matter (Stoff). The former is a principle of ideality; the latter, a principle of reality. Form and matter, the Ideal and the Real, God and World are necessary correlates in human thinking. This activity cannot be satisfied merely with the positing of an ideal transcendental principle. Consequently, to maintain 'the pre-existence of form before things ... in God' is a noetic impossibility. Should such a view be put forth, God, having been represented in accordance with the principles of *wirkliches Denken*, is drawn into, and subject to, the conditions and antitheses of the finite. If, Schleiermacher states, "the existence of forms in God prior to the existence of things but already related to it ... be called a 'preparation',"143 then the divine activity is conceived as a time-sequence, thereby violating the second regulative principle of Proposition 41.144 The divine activity would be conceived

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142 Cf. Proposition 41, 1, p. 153; G1, I, p. 200.
143 Cf. Proposition 41, 1, p. 153; G1, I, p. 200.
144 Cf. G1, I, Proposition 41, 1, p. 200: "Daher auch natürlich
as temporal, endangering, as a result, the feeling of absolute dependence.

The remainder of Schleiermacher's analysis of Creation is devoted to a number of philosophical problems which have originated in the traditional treatment of the doctrine. Only one such difficulty, the controversy over the eternal or temporal creation of the World, relates directly to our interests. Schleiermacher declares that this matter can be resolved into the question "whether it is possible or necessary to conceive of God as existing apart from created things..." While the nineteenth century theologian, respecting his avowed methodology, at first claims that the answer to this question is of indifference to the "immediate content of the feeling of absolute dependence," it is interesting to notice the extent to which his seemingly "disinterested" opinions on the subject accord with the interests of the experiential substratum of pious feeling, i.e., mediate sensible self-consciousness.

The view of temporal creation must explain the transition in God from non-activity to activity and must account for the position that God created the World through a free decree. These positions respectively place God within the temporal order and subject him to the antithesis of the necessary and the free. The involvement of the Divine in the

dieses Sein der Formen in Gott vor dem Dasein der Dinge als doch schon auf dasselbe sich beziehend ein Vorübergehen genannt werden kann. Allein hiedurch wird sogleich die andere Regel verletzt, und wir müssen dagegen Luthers Ausspruch geltend machen; denn Gott bleibt nicht mehr ausser aller Berührung mit der Zeit, wenn es zwei göttliche Tätigkeiten gibt, die wie Vorbereitung und Schöpfung nur in einer bestimmten Zeitfolge gedacht werden könnten." This discussion is faithfully recounted from the first edition of the Glaubenslehre. See 1. Auflage, pp. 199f.


conditions of the finite, however, is an unavoidable inadequacy from which no representation, whether philosophical or religious, may escape. The assertion of a temporal creation, as the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, is inadequate for inclusion in the sphere of dogmatics for a more fundamental reason: it attempts to portray God without the World, thereby negating the constancy of mediate sensible experience.

In view of the shortcomings of the doctrines of creatio ex nihilo and creation in time, Schleiermacher opts for a doctrine of eternal creation which, we might add, harmonizes fully with the evidence of sensible self-consciousness. In the representation of eternal creation, God and World remain correlates in thinking. As well, Schleiermacher adopts a christological approach to this doctrine in which an eternal creation of the World is posited through the Word which was with God from all eternity. In its dogmatic expression of the God-World relationship, such a perspective resembles the doctrine of Preservation far more than it does the doctrine of Creation.

2. The Doctrine of Preservation

In the Glaubenslehre the doctrine of Preservation is elevated to a position of pre-eminence unequalled in the previous treatment of this


148 In the appendices to the doctrine of Creation Schleiermacher examines the recurrence of the ideas of angels and the devil in the Christian tradition. Although he was willing to grant a liturgical employment to the former, while completely rejecting the latter, the theologian excluded both from strict inclusion in dogmatics on the grounds that these ideas are inconsequential with respect to the experience of pious feeling. Cf. Gl., I, Propositions 42-45, pp. 204-224.
doctrine in Christian dogmatics. It is the positive expression of the proposition which Schleiermacher considered to be fundamental to the pious determination of the God-World relationship: 'the totality of finite being exists only in dependence upon the Infinite.'

For Schleiermacher, pious feeling "is most complete when we identify ourselves in our self-consciousness with the whole world and feel ourselves in the same way as not less dependent." In other words, both the actual experiential emergence of pious feeling and its dogmatic expression are functions of the extent to which feeling is able to unite with, to impregnate and to be impregnated by, mediate sensible self-consciousness. In Schleiermacher's view, Gottesbewusstsein and Weltbewusstsein are mutually determinative. The nineteenth century theologian ever maintained that the feeling of absolute dependence, envisaged from an existential perspective, can only emerge in experience within the conditions and framework of a series of life-moments which, when conceived as a totality, both incites and modifies pious feeling. Since the feeling of absolute dependence occurs and blossoms in a consciousness of the World as the totality of finite particulars dependent upon the Infinite, such a view of human existence better lends itself to formulation in the doctrine of Preservation than in the doctrine of Creation. Whereas the latter asserts the dependence of the finite upon the Infinite, it fails to express this dependence within the given structures of mediate sensible self-consciousness. By setting forth the origination of the

149 Cf., Proposition 46, 2, p. 173; Gl., I, p. 228.

150 In the explanations which Schleiermacher included in the third edition (1821) of the Reden, we find a confirmation of this necessary connection between the feeling of absolute dependence and the sensible self-consciousness in the constitution of pious experience. Cf. Reden, pp. 136-137.
World in such a way so as to exclude development, the doctrine of Creation essays to formulate the experience of pious feeling apart from the noetic parameters which the actual experiential emergence of pious feeling presupposes.

According to the demands of its task, dogmatics must develop its tenets as expressions of the Christian determination of the feeling of absolute dependence and, in this way, form the positive content of this branch of theological science. The doctrine of Preservation is suited toward this end for it elucidates the God-World relationship from the perspective of Weltbewusstsein, the form of self-consciousness which is the proper object of the Dialektik. In Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre, the doctrine of Preservation attains ascendancy over the doctrine of Creation precisely because it respects the dictates of the experiential substratum of pious feeling. This does not merely imply that God and World are co-posed in the doctrine of Preservation for the reason that the God-consciousness presupposes and requires a particular determination of World-consciousness in order to emerge in finite experience, but, more importantly, that this co-posing itself concurs with the correlation of God and World which is necessarily set forth in the direct interests of thinking. 151 The doctrine of Preservation, while expressing the

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151 Cf. 1. Auflage, p. 235: "Da wir unmittelbar nicht von dem Sein der Dinge bewegt werden, sondern immer nur von ihren Tätigkeiten und Veränderungen: so scheinen wir den Begriff der göttlichen Erhaltung in engere Grenzen einzuschränken, als gewöhnlich geschieht. Allein es ist hier auch das alle Tätigkeiten des Wahrnehmens oder Erkennens begleitende Selbstbewusstsein ... mit in Anschlag zu bringen; sofern wir also wenigstens in dem Versuch begriffen sind, sie in ihrem Sein zu erkennen, ist unser begleitendes Selbstbewusstsein auch von diesem bewegt und bestimmt." The "narrower bounds" of which Schleiermacher speaks are noetic in character. This approach to the doctrine stands in contrast to the more extended consideration of the concept of Preservation in ontological terms.
God-World relationship from the perspective of piety, harmonizes completely, unlike the doctrine of Creation, with the noetic determination of the God-World relationship established on the basis of mediate sensible self-consciousness.

In his treatment of the doctrine of Preservation, Schleiermacher discusses the cultivated sensible self-consciousness which forms the experiential substratum of pious feeling in terms of the nature-system or the interdependence of nature (Naturzusammenhang):

The religious self-consciousness, by means of which we place all that affects or influences us in absolute dependence on God, coincides entirely with the view that all such things are conditioned and determined by the interdependence of Nature.152

The nature-system, according to a marginal note appended by Schleiermacher to this proposition, is posited as "the work of the divine Sole-Determination."153 In other words, the nature-system, envisaged as the context of pious experience, as mediate sensible self-consciousness imbued with the shadings of the feeling of absolute dependence, mirrors the divine governance of the finite realm.154

In Schleiermacher's development, the doctrine of Preservation accomplishes an agreement between pious feeling and the Dialektik of

152 CF, Proposition 46, p. 170; Gl., I, p. 224.

153 "Der Naturzusammenhang wird als das Werk der göttlichen Alleinbestimmung gesetzt." Th., 224b.

154 In his development of the doctrine of Preservation, Schleiermacher anticipates and counters the objection that the conception of a Naturzusammenhang implies the negation of the feeling of relative freedom requisite for the realization of the feeling of absolute dependence. Cf. Gl., I, Proposition 47, 1, p. 236: "Weder aber versteht jemand unter der Welt, welche der Gegenstand der göttlichen Erhaltung ist, den Naturmechanismus allein, sondern das Ineinandergreifen von diesem und den freihandelnden Wesen, so dass bei jenem schon auf diese so wie bei diesen auf jenen gerechnet ist."
sensible self-consciousness that was beyond the grasp of the doctrine of Creation. Preservation depicts the dependence of the World on God in a manner which accords with the given constitution and conditions of man's actual experience of this dependence. As well, Preservation posits (and this is the basis of the accord between pious feeling and mediate sensible self-consciousness) rather than violates the integrity of the noetic God-World relationship established in thinking. According to Schleiermacher's exposition in the Transcendental Part of the Dialektik, God (Ideal) and World (Real) are epistemic correlates. One cannot be separated from the other in wirkliches Denken. The doctrine of Preservation, then, is constructed not only upon the positivity of the original expression which arises in pious feeling, but also upon the positive, experiential substratum which pious feeling presupposes and in conjunction with which it emerges in actual experience. The former is the basis of the God-World relationship set forth in the interests of piety; the latter is the basis of the God-World relationship expressive of the direct interests of thinking. Both the positivity of pious feeling and the positivity of mediate sensible self-consciousness constitute the experiential object of the doctrine of Preservation. According to Schleiermacher, this doctrine asserts that "in each and every situation we ought to be conscious of, and sympathetically experience, absolute dependence on God just as we conceive each and every thing as completely conditioned by the interdependence of nature."\textsuperscript{155}

Since the God-consciousness occurs within and is modified by a particular determination of World-consciousness, a doctrine which essays to express the God-World relationship must strictly expoit the experience

\textsuperscript{155} Cf., Proposition 46, 1, pp. 170-171; \textit{Gl.}, I, p. 225.
of pious feeling with respect to the coherence of sensible self-consciousness. Taken one step further, the purport of the pious expression of the God-World relationship must conform to the noetic correlation of God and World necessitated by the evidence of the sensible self-consciousness. It is this conformation which establishes the substantive influence of the philosophical formulation of the God-World relationship in the Dialektik upon the exposition of this same relationship in the Glaubenslehre. This influence is rendered possible on the basis of Schleiermacher's view regarding the conjuction of the feeling of absolute dependence and sensible self-consciousness in actual experience.

For the most complete and universal interdependence of nature (Naturzusammenhang) is posited in this 'All-One' of finite being, and if we also feel ourselves to be absolutely dependent, then there will be a complete coincidence of the two ideas—namely, the unqualified conviction that everything is grounded and established in the universality of the nature-system (des Naturzusammenhanges), and the inner certainty of the absolute dependence of all finite being on God. From this follows, on the one hand, the possibility of pious self-consciousness in every moment of the objective consciousness, and on the other the possibility of complete world-consciousness in every moment of pious self-consciousness. 156

The doctrine that God preserves the World is developed in the Glaubenslehre with respect to both pious feeling and the principles of real thinking. Although the doctrine of Preservation is the most direct representation of the original expression of the God-World relationship, Schleiermacher fully realized that certain difficulties were inherent in its exposition. In the doctrine of Preservation, as in all religious representation, the Divine is, to a certain degree, brought under the antitheses and conditions of the finite. Specifically, Schleiermacher

156 Cf., Proposition 46, 2, pp. 173-174; Gl., I, p. 228.
recognizes that the manner in which this doctrine is explicated in the Glaubenslehre cannot avoid at least the "appearance" of pantheism:

If anyone should detect in this (doctrino) an appearance of Pantheism, he ought to bear in mind that so long as philosophy does not put forward a generally accepted formula to express the relation of God and the world, even in the province of Dogmatics, directly we begin to speak not of the origin of the world but of its co-existence with God and its relatedness to God, we cannot avoid an oscillation between formulas, on the one hand, which approach to the identification of the two, and formulas, on the other, which go near to putting them in opposition to one another. 157

With regard to the two poles in this oscillation, which stems from the nature of thinking itself, it is interesting to note that the first corresponds to the canon established in the Dialektik of 1828; Die Welt nicht ohne Gott, Gott nicht ohne die Welt; the second pole in the dialectical oscillation of thinking corresponds to the canon Beide Ideen sind nicht dasselbe. The former canon expresses the necessary correlation of the Ideal and the Real in all real thinking (wirkliches Denken); the latter canon is a religious statement negating the pantheistic construction of the God-World relationship. 158

The correlative canon set forth in the Dialektik comprehends and expresses the purport of Schleiermacher's epistemology. The treatment of the origin of the World in the Glaubenslehre is relegated to the periphery of doctrinal importance precisely because this representation of the God-World relationship fails to respect the poetic correlation of God and World demanded by the nature of proper thinking itself. The doctrine of Preservation, like the doctrine of Creation, inevitably expresses the Infinite in terms of the finite, the Divine in terms of


the human. Unlike the doctrine of Creation, however, the doctrine of Preservation expresses the God-World relationship in a manner which does not violate the noetic determination of this same relationship.

3. Summary

According to Schleiermacher, both the doctrine of Creation and the doctrine of Preservation are acceptable for inclusion in Christian dogmatics since each is capable of expositing the purport of the original expression of pious feeling: 'that the World exists only in absolute dependence upon God.'\textsuperscript{159} It is the manner in which these doctrines are expounded, however, which betrays the influence of the Dialektik upon the Glaubenslehre.

As has been shown, the doctrine of Creation is devalued in Schleiermacher's dogmatics for the reason that its approach to the original expression prescinds from the experiential basis of dogmatics. The experience from which this doctrine prescinds is not that of immediate pious self-consciousness. Schleiermacher conceded that the doctrine of Creation can, and in fact does, express the dependence of the World on God.\textsuperscript{160} The experience from which the doctrine of Creation does prescind, however, is that of mediate sensible self-consciousness. It is on this level of self-consciousness that the dialectical character of human thinking is established. It is on this level of self-consciousness that

\textsuperscript{159} Cf. Gl., I, Proposition 38, p. 190: "Aus jeder von beiden Lehren kann alles entwickelt werden, was in dem ursprünglichen Ausdruck enthalten ist, wenn nur in beiden Gott ebenso allein bestimmend gedacht wird, wie in jenem."

\textsuperscript{160} It should be noted that in traditional Christian theology the intention of the doctrine of Creation, particularly of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, was the expression of the dependence of the World on God. See Richard A. Norris, God and World in Early Christian Theology, (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1966), pp. 72-75.
the noetic correlation of the ideas of God and World is a necessary fact if thinking is to be properly constituted. It is this mediate sensible self-consciousness which provides the existential context in which pious feeling emerges in actual experience. This conjunction between pious feeling and mediate sensible self-consciousness is the logical connection which explains the possibility of there being an influence of the *Dialektik* upon the *Glaubenslehre* for the sensible self-consciousness, the proper object of the *Dialektik*, is itself the experiential context within which pious feeling emerges in actual experience. This means that the proper object of dogmatics, in Schleiermacher's view, is not merely pious feeling, but pious feeling as determined and modified by mediate sensible self-consciousness.

For the nineteenth century theologian, the historical nature of dogmatic theology requires a critical exposition of the God-World relationship which respects the given conditions and structures of experience in the World. The doctrine of Preservation is emphasized and elevated to a place of prominence in the *Glaubenslehre* for in this doctrine the above-mentioned critical exposition of the God-World relationship is achieved. The evidence of pious feeling is expressed critically with respect to the evidence of mediate sensible self-consciousness. Creation, concomitantly, is regarded as a doctrine to be regulated and controlled, at most a complementary perspective on the original expression embraced within the scope of Preservation. 161

161 Cf. *I. Auflage*, p. 208: "Selbst aber finden wir uns zu einem solchen Versuch nicht berufen, weil wir nur in demjenigen Umfang das Bewusstsein des endlichen Seins in uns tragen und vertreten, in welchem Schöpfung und Erhaltung dasselbe ist, die Schöpfung aber, welche sich streng von der Erhaltung trennen lässt, kann von uns weder wahrgenommen noch angeschaut noch gedacht werden, noch können wir eine Theilnahme
Although the methodologies of the Dialektik and the Glaubenslehre differ vastly, the manner in which Schleiermacher's philosophical formulation of the God-World relationship influenced the content of the dogmatic presentation of this relationship may clearly be seen. The noetic correlation of the ideas of God and World is based on the necessary participation of all real thinking in the ideal and real poles of thinking and being. As general regulative principles circumscribing the interplay of both ideas in thought, the Caufelen which Schleiermacher establishes in the Dialektik of 1828--Die Welt nicht ohne Gott, Gott nicht ohne die Welt and Beide Ideen sind nicht dasselbe--form the dialectical boundaries of any representation of the God-World relationship which remains within the scope of real thinking.

Whereas the Dialektik examines the dynamic and the limitations of mediate sensible self-consciousness, the task of the Glaubenslehre involves the description of the pious experience shared by a particular Church at a given time. As we have seen, this experiential basis of dogmatics does not merely consist in pious feeling, i.e., the God-consciousness, but in this feeling as determined by some form of mediate sensible self-consciousness. Since this latter form of self-consciousness shapes, forms, and modifies the appearance of pious feeling in actual experience, it is the contention of this thesis that the doctrinal presentation of the dogmatics is critically governed by the operations, laws, and limits of mediate sensible self-consciousness as these are delimited in the

dafür haben." It is interesting to consider the extent to which Schleiermacher's reasons for rejecting the traditional view of the miraculous, i.e., an absolutely supernatural event, coincided with his reasons for downplaying the independent development of the doctrine of Création. Cf. Cl., I, Proposition 47, pp. 234-242.
Dialektik. In other words, the existential determination of the feeling of absolute dependence is a function of the noetic framework developed in Schleiermacher's epistemology. The boundaries of this framework are expressed in an epistemic portrayal of the God-World relationship achieved through a transcendental methodology and regulated by principles which guard both the correlation and the non-identity of these ideas in human thinking. Only the doctrine of Preservation can respect these principles and the noetic determination of the God-World relationship which they attempt to maintain. It is this accommodation of Christian doctrine to the principles of thinking in Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre which renders tradition subservient to the positive basis of dogmatics, a positivity which consists in both the immediacy of Gefühl and the mediacy of Denken.  

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162 While recognizing that Schleiermacher's adaptation of the doctrines of Creation and Preservation ultimately rests upon his desire to reconcile the evidence of pious feeling and the evidence of mediate sensible self-consciousness, Martin Stiewe presents an interesting account of Schleiermacher's concern to develop the new formulations within the context of the Confessional writings of the Protestant Churches. See Martin Stiewe, *Das Unionsverständnis Friedrich Schleiermachers*, (Witten: Luther-Verlag, 1969), pp. 105-113.
CHAPTER 6

THE INFLUENCE OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL FORMULATION OF THE GOD-WORLD RELATIONSHIP IN THE DIALEKTIK UPON THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES EXPRESSING THE GENERAL RELATIONSHIP OF GOD AND WORLD

The doctrines of Creation and Preservation constitute the foundation of the First Part of the Glaubenslehre. As expressions of the first form of the dogmatic proposition (descriptions of human states of life), these doctrines portray, to a greater extent than those which follow in the First Part of the dogmatics, the central determination of the God-World relationship experienced in pious feeling. As such, the doctrines of Creation and Preservation set the tone of, and are normative for, the First Part of the System of Doctrine in which the structures of pious self-consciousness itself are examined. As has been stated in the previous chapter, these doctrines demonstrate in a clear and lucid fashion the extent to which Schleiermacher's noetic determination of the God-World relationship influenced the content of his exposition of this same relationship in the Glaubenslehre.

In this chapter we shall examine those doctrines set forth in the First Part of the Glaubenslehre as expressions of the second form of the dogmatic proposition—concepts of divine attributes and modes of action. ¹ This section of the Glaubenslehre is Schleiermacher's initial probe into the elaboration of a doctrine of God.

¹ Cf. GL., I, Proposition 30, p. 163.
Although Schleiermacher refers to the second form of the dogmatic proposition, as well as to the third—pronouncements regarding the constitution of the World—as Nebenformen, ² decidedly secondary to the first form which describes pious feeling in connection with human self-consciousness as such, it is crucial that we not overlook the importance of the Nebenformen in Schleiermacher’s exposition. Indeed, at the time of his writing, Schleiermacher considered the second and third forms of the dogmatic proposition indispensable for the proper ecclesiastical expression of pious self-consciousness. ³ The doctrines developed under the dogmatic proposition, respectively the doctrine of the divine attributes and the doctrines of the original perfection of man and the original perfection of the World are, according to the nineteenth century theologian, significant contributions to the explication of pious experience.

As we shall discover throughout the remainder of our exposition, both the doctrine of the divine attributes and the doctrines of the original perfection of man and the World, when approached as isolated entities, demonstrate the contention of our thesis in a less direct and convincing fashion than did the doctrines of Creation and Preservation. This difficulty is resolved, however, when the doctrines developed under the rubrics of the Nebenformen are viewed in the light of the central form of the dogmatic proposition. This was precisely Schleiermacher’s own intention in the methodology of the dogmatics. This relationship between the first form of the dogmatic proposition and the Nebenformen must be maintained if the influence of the Dialektik upon the doctrine of the divine attributes and the doctrines of the original perfection of man

²Cf. chapter 2, footnote 135.
³Cf. GI., I, Proposition 30, 3, p. 165.
and the World is to be ascertained.

The subject matter of our enquiry in this chapter is the divine attributes "which are related to the religious self-consciousness so far as it expresses the general relationship between God and the World." These attributes, which Schleiermacher designates as eternity, omnipresence, omnipotence, and omniscience, attempt to portray the various experiential modes of pious self-consciousness as such, apart from its specific determination by the antithesis of sin and grace. The attributes corresponding to the pious self-consciousness of sin—holiness and justice—and to the pious self-consciousness of grace—wisdom and love—are treated in the Second Part of the System of Doctrine. Since the attributes expressing the antithesis of sin and grace do not describe "the development of that religious self-consciousness which is always both presupposed by and contained in every Christian religious affection," a development unfolded in terms of the general relationship between God and World, they cannot be the object of our direct interest.

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4 Cf. p. 194; Gl., I, p. 255.

5 Cf. 1. Auflage, p. 272: "Es ist hier (First Part of the System of Doctrine, Proposition 65) nur von dem Abhängigkeitsgefühl an sich, ohne dass der Gegensatz mit darin berücksichtigt würde, die Rede; daher auch nur die Gleichheit dem Umfange nach in Betracht kommt, nicht jene, welche daraus entsteht, dass auch das fromme Gefühl an dem Gegensatz von Lust und Unlust teilnimmt."

6 Cf. p. 131, Gl., I, p. 171.

7 This is not to say that the attributes treated in the First and Second Parts of the System of Doctrine are unrelated. In fact, the attributes of the First Part achieve their full meaning only in the light of those developed in the Second Part. Cf. Sendebriefen, p. 32 (608): "Gewiss ist doch, dass eine Allmacht, von der ich nicht weiss, welches ihr Ziel ist und wodurch sie in Bewegung gesetzt wird, eine Allwissenheit, von der ich nicht weiss, wie sie die Gegenstände ihres Wissens stellt und schätzt, eine Allgegenwart, von der ich nicht weiss, was sie ausstrahlt und was sie an sich zieht, nur unbestimmte und wenig lebendige Vorstellungen
I. The Reception of the Doctrine of the Divine Attributes

As we have seen throughout our study, Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre has been the object of controversy ever since its first appearance in 1821/22. This controversy has been incited by the nature of Schleiermacher's project itself, i.e., his radical re-interpretation of Christian doctrine. Both acclaim and censure have been the fruits of this critical dialogue with the nineteenth century theologian's magnum opus. The doctrine of the divine attributes is no exception to this diverse, yet forceful, critical reaction. As has tended to be the case with the Glaubenslehre in general, particularly with respect to its earliest reception, Schleiermacher's treatment of the doctrine of the divine attributes has evoked, and has continued to evoke, a negative critical response.

Unfortunately, this negative critical appraisal of the doctrine presently under consideration has often stemmed from a prejudicial reading of the Glaubenslehre from the perspective of the Reden. The unique conception of God developed in the latter work of the young Schleiermacher unjustifiably served as a touchstone with regard to which Schleiermacher's exposition of the doctrine of the divine attributes in the dogmatics was interpreted. As a result, the charge of pantheism was frequently leveled

against this doctrine, an accusation completely unwarranted on the basis of Schleiermacher’s perspicacious exposition in the Glaubenslehre.

Schleiermacher caustically refers to this misinterpretation in his Erstes Sendschreiben an Lücke:

But that God-consciousness, which is said to be God himself, of which I have said nothing; that double God, one unchanging, the other subordinated to time, of which I have said nothing; and those three elements, which I am said to distinguish in the idea of God, of which I have said nothing: all of this, although these accounts hardly agree among themselves, and more of the like is linked to my presupposed pantheism.

The charge of pantheism against Schleiermacher’s work was not made only in the period immediately following the publication of the Glaubenslehre. Indeed, it has surfaced time and again in the history of Schleiermacher scholarship in the work of influential commentators. The critique of Wilhelm Bender serves as an example issuing from the late nineteenth century; the work of Emil Brunner is a clear illustration in the early twentieth century. In all instances is the interpretation of the doctrine of divine attributes in the Glaubenslehre as a pantheistic construction equally as much unjustified.

At the time of the publication of the Glaubenslehre the general


criticism that Schleiermacher's method in dogmatics rested upon philosophical principles was specifically advanced against the doctrine of divine attributes. As we have seen, Schleiermacher's response to this criticism was clear and uncompromising. As a servant of the Church, Schleiermacher envisioned his task as a dogmatic theologian to be the description, in doctrinal form, of the common pious experience presently indwelling in a particular community of believers. For Schleiermacher, the content of Church doctrine, including the doctrine of divine attributes, must express the experience of pious feeling alone. The fruits of philosophical reasoning are to have no bearing whatsoever on the content of doctrine. In adopting this approach, Schleiermacher assumed a polemical stance against the customary treatment of the doctrine of the divine attributes during his own time:

... if one wants to refer to the treatment of the doctrine of the divine attributes customary in the last hundred years as Church doctrine ..., then I know of no approximation to Church doctrine even in the history of my development, but only of an ever more decided remoteness. These propositions are a mixture of Leibnitzian-Wolffian rational theology and sublimated Old Testament expressions under both of which the truly Christian is nearly lost.12

The truly Christian, in Schleiermacher's view, can only be derived from the common pious experience of the Church and can only be appropriated through the immediacy of pious self-consciousness. For Schleiermacher, the doctrine of the divine attributes, as all authentic Christian doctrines,

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must be explicated solely with respect to the Christian determination of
the feeling of absolute dependence. Neither the philosophical tradition,
nor even the Old Testament itself may comprise the object of ecclesiasti-
cal expression.

While recognizing Schleiermacher's avowed intention in the methodology
of dogmatics we shall in this chapter attempt to discern the extent to
which Schleiermacher's formal determination of the conditions of real
thinking in the Dialektik influenced the content of the doctrine of the
divine attributes in the First Part of the Glaubenslehre. In order to
begin this task we must examine Schleiermacher's general introduction to
his actual development.

II. The Relationship of God and World in Schleiermacher's
Presentation of the Doctrine of the Divine Attributes

Schleiermacher commences his exposition of the divine attributes in
the first Part of the dogmatics by setting the bounds within which the
constitution of ecclesiastical doctrine may be properly developed. Our
interest in this section of our study lies in determining the extent to
which Schleiermacher's heuristic statements give indication of an effort
on his part to expost the content of Christian doctrine critically with
respect to the epistemology set forth in the Dialektik.

As previously mentioned, the doctrines found in the First Part of
the Glaubenslehre express the general relationship of God and World and,
unlike the attributes of the Second Part such as Holiness and Love, are
developed apart from the antithesis of sin and grace. The doctrines of
the First Part are envisaged by Schleiermacher as descriptions of the
structures of pious self-consciousness itself. The arrangement of doctrine
in this fashion attests to the original character of Schleiermacher's conception of dogmatics. This originality is especially evinced in the nineteenth century theologian's doctrine of the divine attributes. For Schleiermacher, the divine attributes are descriptions of particular moments in the pious experience of the believer which, when taken together, present the entire spectrum of the pious self-consciousness of God. 'Strictly speaking, then, Schleiermacher's development in the *Glaubenslehre* under the second form of the dogmatic proposition can only be called a doctrine of God to the extent that the latter is identical with the doctrine of the divine attributes and that these in turn are expressions of specific modifications of the Christian determination of the feeling of absolute dependence. In fact, Schleiermacher introduces his own treatment of the divine attributes by calling attention to the insufficiencies of the traditional doctrine of God.

Throughout the history of the Christian tradition, Schleiermacher claims, the speculative interest has regarded the divine essence as a viable object of thought and, as a result, has treated the divine attributes as representations of God envisaged either as the Original Being or as the Absolute Good. The nineteenth century theologian maintains that this approach to the doctrine is inadequate since it is estranged from the experiential basis of dogmatics: immediate pious self-consciousness. Although Schleiermacher praises the age of scholasticism for contributing "much that was profound and excellent" toward the regulation of the anthropomorphific in the representation of the divine attributes, he asserts that the subsequent separation between metaphysics and Christian doctrine led to the surrender of the doctrine of God to the interests of philosophy.

13 CF, Proposition 50, 1, p. 195; Gl., I, p. 256.
particularly to the philosophical discipline of natural theology. This method of treatment presumes that the divine attributes "present a knowledge of the Divine Being,"\textsuperscript{14} thereby mistaking the form of experience in terms of which religious truth is appropriated. God, in Schleiermacher's view, cannot be experienced mediately, but only immediately. The essence of God cannot be grasped through philosophical reasoning; the \textit{presence} of God may only be experienced in pious feeling. The \textit{Gottesbewusstsein} alone is the seat of the appropriation of religious truth.

According to Schleiermacher, God can only be experienced at the heights of man's self-consciousness; God cannot be known as he is in himself. As Schleiermacher reiterates throughout the First Part of the \textit{Glaubenslehre}, the experience in terms of which religious truth is appropriated, i.e., the feeling of absolute dependence, is relational. The two terms of this relation are God and World. Neither of these terms may be negated without destroying the unity of pious feeling, the proper object of dogmatic expression. Thus, the doctrine of divine attributes, as all authentic Christian doctrines, must respect this relational nature of pious experience and prescind entirely from any attempt to portray God as a \textit{se}.

All attributes which we ascribe to God are to be taken as denoting not something special in God, but only something special in the manner in which the feeling of absolute dependence is to be related to Him.\textsuperscript{15}

For Schleiermacher, the task of Christian dogmatics in the delineation of the divine attributes lies in striving after "that completeness alone which guards against letting any of the different moments of the religious

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Cf.}, Proposition 50, 2, p. 195; \textit{Gl.}, I, p. 257.

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Cf.}, Proposition 50, p. 194; \textit{Gl.}, I, p. 255.
self-consciousness pass without asking what are the divine attributes corresponding to them."

In this section of the Glaubenslehre, Schleiermacher's condemnation of the influence of philosophy upon the traditional exposition of the doctrine of God seems to equate philosophy with metaphysics. As we have seen, however, Schleiermacher's broader understanding of the methodology of dogmatics, as outlined in the Introduction to the Glaubenslehre and in his Sendschreiben an Lücke, carefully disavows the influence of any philosophical reasoning whatsoever upon the content of Christian doctrine. As we shall see, a circumspect examination of this section of the dogmatics discloses the influence of Schleiermacher's noetic determination of the God-World relationship in the Dialektik upon the content of the doctrine of divine attributes which attempt to portray this same relationship in the First Part of the Glaubenslehre. In order to recognize this influence we must re-examine the nature of the experience which, for Schleiermacher, constitutes the proper object of dogmatic exposition.

Schleiermacher's treatment of the doctrine of the divine attributes in the First Part of the Glaubenslehre takes the form of a description of the feeling of absolute dependence as the latter is expressive of the general relationship between God and World in human experience. As has been shown in chapter four of our study, the feeling of absolute dependence, the highest level of self-consciousness, does not emerge in actual experience other than as determined and modified by the sensible, or mediate level of, self-consciousness. In other words, pious feeling only occurs in experience in conjunction with mediate sensible self-consciousness, the proper object of the Dialektik. It is this necessary connection between

16 Cf. Proposition 50, 3, pp. 196-197; Cl., I, p. 258.
pious feeling and the sensible self-consciousness for the constitution of pious experience as such which, we have maintained, furnishes the grounds for the possibility of an influence of the Dialektik upon the content of Christian doctrine in the Glaubenslehre. The actuality of this influence can only be demonstrated through an analysis of Schleiermacher's exposition of Christian doctrine itself.

In chapter five, we have seen that Schleiermacher employs the term Naturzusammenhang to refer to the general conditions of human experience in the World. The experiential coherence of the Naturzusammenhang is the product of the correlation of the Ideal and the Real, of the activity of reason and sensibility. Through the operations of the intellectual function the impressions of sense conveyed by the organic function are refined, ordered, and raised thereby to the level of intellection. This is a description of the dynamic of mediate sensible self-consciousness examined by Schleiermacher in the Dialektik. The Naturzusammenhang, a technical term which does not appear in the Dialektik but which is central to Schleiermacher's development in the Glaubenslehre, portrays the experience of mediate sensible self-consciousness envisaged in the broadest sense possible. It is this experience of Weltbewusstsein which provides requisite and necessary determination for the feeling of absolute dependence in actual experience. In Schleiermacher's view, it is this actual pious experience which constitutes the proper object of doctrinal formulation in the dogmatics.

The divine attributes developed in the First Part of the Glaubenslehre portray the pious perspective on the order and coherence of experience in the World. Since the First Part of the Glaubenslehre examines the structures of pious self-consciousness both presupposed by and contained in
pious experience in general, such an approach is fitting and appropriate. The *Gottesbewusstsein* is determined and modified in actual experience by the *Weltbewusstsein*. This relationship between the highest and intermediate levels of self-consciousness cannot be overlooked. In Schleiermacher's view, the proper object of dogmatics is the feeling of absolute dependence determined by the sensible self-consciousness, for only this connection between the highest and intermediate levels of self-consciousness establishes actual pious experience in the World. For Schleiermacher, the actual character of pious experience, and therefore the description of that experience in dogmatics, must respect the conditions, dynamic, and laws of real thinking. In other words, the feeling of absolute dependence is always and necessarily bound to the sensible self-consciousness. It is this connection between the highest and intermediate levels of self-consciousness which furnish the grounds for the influence of the *Dialektik* upon the doctrinal content of the *Glaubenslehre*, for the delineation of the conditions, dynamic, and laws of real thinking, which doctrinal exposition critically respects, is precisely the task of Schleiermacher's philosophical project in the *Dialektik*. At this point in our development we must attempt to ascertain the influence of the philosophical formulation of the God-World relationship in the *Dialektik* upon the divine attributes expressing this same relationship in the *Glaubenslehre*.

The requisite connection posited by Schleiermacher between the highest and intermediate levels of self-consciousness for the constitution of actual pious experience is discernible in the nineteenth century theologian's critique of the traditional methodologies employed in order to delimit the divine attributes. In Schleiermacher's view, the *via*
eminentiae and the via negationis are inadequate approaches to the formulation of the attributes of God. Neither is able to explicate the affective state of pious self-consciousness in a particular life-moment since both methods prescind from the positive character of experience in the World. The via negationis formulates divine attributes by denying or negating various modes of finite existence and experience. The negation is then ascribed to God. The via eminentiae, for Schleiermacher, is merely another form of the via negationis. Its method consists in the removal of the limits of finite existence and experience in order to posit the infinitude of the result as an attribute of God. Schleiermacher maintains that the methodologies of the via negationis and the via eminentiae are identical. Both, in their efforts to qualify the divine essence, proceed by negating the actual character of experience and existence in the World. For this reason, both methods founder. Theology, in Schleiermacher's view, is a positive science grounded entirely on the reality of the existence of man and his experience of that existence. The via negationis and the via eminentiae are rejected in the Glaubenslehre since these methodologies are based on the negation of the very reality upon which theology is built. In terms of the theme of our study one may say that Schleiermacher denies the viability of the via negationis and the via eminentiae since these methods attempt to determine attributes which portray God a se, thus destroying the correlation of God and World insisted upon throughout the First Part of the Glaubenslehre. Of the traditional methods employed in the formulation of the divine attributes Schleiermacher recognizes the legitimacy of the via causalitatis alone, since causality "stands in the closest connexion with the feeling of absolute dependence
Causality describes the dynamic of the Naturzusammenhang, the coherence of which is structured upon the integrity of mediate sensible self-consciousness.

It is important to note that although Schleiermacher finds the traditional methodology of the via causalitatis acceptable to the purposes of the Glaubenslehre, since it respects the actual conditions of experience in the World, the positive character of the experience of causality differs significantly from the positive character of the feeling of absolute dependence. Although both are actual forms of human experience, the former portrays the positivity of Weltbewusstsein, the latter the positivity of Gottesbewusstsein. By stating in the above-quoted passage that the experience of causality 'stands in the closest connexion with the feeling of absolute dependence,' Schleiermacher asserts, first, that the experience of causality and pious feeling are fundamentally distinct; and second, that it is the positivity of the experience of causality, an experience of mediate sensible self-consciousness, which renders it acceptable to the methodology of the Glaubenslehre as a viable approach to the delimitation of the attributes of God. This acceptability lies in the fact that the experience of causality provides a positive substratum, a particular, actual determination of Weltbewusstsein, with which the feeling of absolute dependence may conjoin. As we have seen throughout our study, this conjunction between the feeling of absolute dependence and the sensible self-consciousness is simply a real and necessary condition of man envisaged as pious experiencer.

In Proposition 51 of the Glaubenslehre, Schleiermacher delineates the form assumed by the feeling of absolute dependence as conjoined to the

\[17\] Cf. Proposition 50, 3, p. 197; Gl., I, p. 259.
sensible self-consciousness considered with respect to the experience of the Naturzusammenhang:

The Absolute Causality to which the feeling of absolute dependence points back can only be described in such a way that, on the one hand, it is distinguished from the content of the natural order (des Naturzusammenhanges) and thus contrasted with it, and, on the other hand, equated with it in comprehension (dem Umfange nach).\(^\text{18}\)

The term 'Absolute Causality' (die schlechthinige Ursächlichkeit) specifically refers to the experience engendered by the determination and modification of the feeling of absolute dependence by the most extended form of the sensible self-consciousness: the Naturzusammenhang.\(^\text{19}\)

The absolute causality of God is the experience which constitutes the basis of Schleiermacher's development of the doctrine of the divine attributes. Only the feeling of absolute dependence can provide a foundation for such a doctrine; only the comprehensiveness of the Naturzusammenhang can assure that the divine attributes treated in the First Part of the dogmatics achieve completeness in their portrayal of the God-World relationship.

In the above-quoted passage, Schleiermacher sets limits which precisely define the relationship between pious feeling and the sensible self-consciousness. To each of these limits correspond the central divine attributes treated in the First Part of the Glaubenslehre. The second limit, which equates the absolute causality and the Naturzusammenhang, 

\(^{18}\text{CF, Proposition 51, p. 200; Gl., I, p. 263.}\)

\(^{19}\text{The consideration of the Naturzusammenhang as a form of mediate sensible self-consciousness and its significance in the development of the doctrine of the divine attributes is clearly, though tersely, expressed in the first edition of the Glaubenslehre. 1. Auflage, p. 272: "Da nun in jedem sinnlichen Selbstbewusstsein ein Naturzusammenhang gesetzt ist und umgekehrt: so muss auch die göttliche Causalität überall sein wo die natürliche ist."}
is expressed by the attribute of omnipotence. For Schleiermacher, the attribute of omnipotence "puts the whole of finite being under the divine causality." It depicts the entire range of Weltbewusstsein from the perspective of pious feeling. The first limit set forth in Proposition 51, which distinguishes absolute causality from the content of the Naturzusammenhang, is expressed by the attribute of eternity. In Schleiermacher's exposition, the attribute of eternity guarantees that the close connection between absolute causality and the Naturzusammenhang established in the second limit not be interpreted as a pantheistic construction. The attribute of eternity ensures that the Divine is not reduced to complete and total participation in the finite sphere of antithesis.

Although these limits or regulative principles resemble the Cautelen of correlation and non-identity established in the Dialektik, one must not precipitately judge that this resemblance is indicative of an influence of the Dialektik upon the Glaubenslehre. The first limit set forth in Proposition 51 in order to distinguish between the divine and natural causalities functions in a manner analogous to the regulative principle Beide Ideen (God and World) sind nicht dasselbe. Both function as safeguards against possible pantheistic interpretations of the God-World relationship. We should recall, however, that the regulative principle of non-identity established in the Dialektik is not a philosophical construction, but a religious statement about a philosophical construction. The regulative principle Beide Ideen sind nicht dasselbe guarantees a proper understanding of the noetic correlation of the ideas of God and

20 Cf., Proposition 51, 1, p. 201; Gl., I, p. 264.

21 Cf. chapter 5, footnote 53.
World. It is this correlation alone which may be envisaged as a philosophical construction. Since the regulative principles of non-identity in the Dialektik and the Glaubenslehre both issue from the religious interest as attempts to guard against the appearance of pantheism, they may be seen as one in purpose. This purpose, however, is not philosophical, but pious in tenor.

In turning our attention to the apparently corresponding regulative principles of correlation in the Glaubenslehre and the Dialektik we discover that their resemblance is not based on an essential unity of purpose and function. The regulative principle delineated in the Dialektik—Die Welt nicht ohne Gott, Gott nicht ohne die Welt—is a noetic determination of the God-World relationship expressive of the necessary correlation of the Ideal and Real for the proper constitution of real thinking. The regulative principle set forth in the Glaubenslehre—that the absolute and natural causalities be equated in comprehension—is not a philosophical construction but a principle expressing the necessary conjunction of the feeling of absolute dependence and sensible self-consciousness for the constitution of actual pious experience. 22 Consequently, one would be incorrect in maintaining the influence of the noetic correlation of God and World upon the principle governing the proper expression of the divine attributes portraying the God-World relationship in the Glaubenslehre. This latter principle, which equates the absolute and natural causalities, establishes the exigent connection between Gottesbewusstsein and Weltbewusstsein. Although this relationship between pious feeling and sensible self-consciousness is not a

22Cf. 1. Auflage, p. 272: "Die Gleichsezung dem Umfange nach beruht darauf, dass ... das Abhängigkeitsgefühl an sich mit jedem sinnlichen Bewusstsein sich einigen kann."
philosophical construction but the experiential basis of Schleiermacher's methodology in dogmatics, it establishes the possibility of the substantive influence of the Dialektik upon the Glaubenslehre. It is our contention that the actuality of this influence may not be discovered in the resemblance between the regulative principles which Schleiermacher explicates in the Dialektik and the Glaubenslehre, but in the influence of Schleiermacher's epistemology upon his exposition of the divine attributes in the First Part of the Glaubenslehre.

In addition to the attributes of eternity and omnipotence, Schleiermacher mentions two others which complete the description of pious self-consciousness. The first, omnipresence, complements the attribute of eternity by portraying the spatial, rather than the temporal, distinction between the divine causality and the Naturzusammenhang. The second complementary attribute, omniscience, is posited as an alternate expression of the equality in comprehension between the divine causality and the Naturzusammenhang. This equation is primarily expressed, for Schleiermacher, in the attribute of omnipotence. The attribute of omniscience, in the view of the nineteenth century theologian, prevents the misinterpretation of omnipotence as a lifeless, mechanistic operation of divine causality by envisaging this causality in terms analogous to the highest form of finite life, i.e., consciousness.

In order to ascertain the influence of the philosophical formulation of the God-World relationship in the Dialektik upon the content of the divine attributes portraying this same relationship in the Glaubenslehre, we must examine each of the attributes individually. In our analysis we shall depart from Schleiermacher's order of treatment in hopes of calling attention to the subtle role played by the théologian's epistemological
presuppositions in shaping the content of the divine attributes.

1. Omnipotence

Of the four main attributes examined in the First Part of the Glaubenslehre, Schleiermacher regards omnipotence as the fullest expression of the God-World relationship. As a result, this attribute is the focus of this section of Schleiermacher's dogmatics. The nineteenth century theologian begins his exposition of the attribute of omnipotence by re-asserting the close connection, yet distinction, between the divine causality and the causality experienced in the context of the Naturzusammenhang. The latter, it should be recalled, depicts the coherence and integrity of mediate sensible self-consciousness.

In the conception of the divine Omnipotence two ideas are contained: first, that the entire system of Nature (Naturzusammenhang), comprehending all times and spaces, is founded upon divine causality, which as eternal and omnipresent is in contrast to all finite causality; and second, that the divine causality, as affirmed in our feeling of absolute dependence, is completely presented in the totality of finite being, and consequently everything for which there is a causality in God happens and becomes real.

Our treatment will demonstrate that these two ideas are one and the same in purpose. Both intend to develop the attribute of omnipotence within the noetic limits and conditions of mediate sensible self-consciousness. These limits and conditions are expressed succinctly in Schleiermacher's philosophical formulation of the God-World relationship in the Transcendental Part of the Dialektik. It is our contention that the attribute of omnipotence, as well as all other attributes explicated in the First

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23 Gerhard Ebeling has recognized the fundamental nature of the attribute of Omnipotence in the First Part of the Glaubenslehre. See Gerhard Ebeling, op. cit., p. 142.

24 Cf., Proposition 54, p. 211; Gl., I, pp. 278-279.
Part of the Glaubenslehre, are developed critically so as to respect the noetic determination of God and World.

In Schleiermacher's view, the divine causality describes the efficacy of the power of God in the World. This particular perspective on the God-World relationship arises in the determination and modification of the feeling of absolute dependence by the sensible self-consciousness envisaged as the Naturzusammenhang. It is this conjunction of the highest and intermediate levels of self-consciousness in actual experience that evokes the pious apprehension dogmatically formalized in the attribute of omnipotence. The equality in extent between the divine and natural causalities stems from the requisite contributions of Weltbewusstsein to pious experience. The distinction between the divine and natural causalities assures that the Gottheitsbewusstsein itself remains an independent variable in the total experience and not one derivative of experience in the World. For Schleiermacher, the purport of this attribute is that "everything is and becomes altogether by means of the natural order (Naturzusammenhang), so that each takes place through all and all wholly through the divine omnipotence, so that all indivisibly exists through One."^{25}

Schleiermacher's view on the relationship between the divine and natural causalities in his interpretation of the attribute of omnipotence is not one which portrays the traditional understanding of the God-World relationship. On the basis of his reformulation of the God-World relationship, the nineteenth century theologian rejects any representation of the efficacy of divine power in the World which prescinds from the normal structures and conditions of human intellect. Completely inadmissible,

^{25} Cf., Proposition 54, I, p. 212; Gl., I, p. 280.
Schleiermacher maintains, is the traditional conception of miracle as an absolutely supernatural event which interrupts the natural chain of cause and effect. Rather, the close relationship between the divine causality and the experience of the Naturzusammenhang necessitates that the attribute of omnipotence be understood in such a way that "every effect within the natural order (innerhalb des Naturzusammenhanges) is also, in virtue of its being ordained by the divine causality, the pure result of all the causes within the natural order . . . ."

It is our contention that the correlative relationship between God and World which Schleiermacher maintains throughout his development of the attribute of omnipotence is not based on the content of pious feeling as such, but on the nature of the sensible self-consciousness with which pious feeling conjoins in actual experience. The correlation of God and World discernible in the attribute of omnipotence is engendered first and foremost by the need for dogmatic exposition to respect the conditions, limitations, and dynamic of mediate sensible self-consciousness. The structures and operations of the latter are delineated in the form of an epistemology in the Transcendental Part of the Dialektik. In Schleiermacher's view, real thinking (wirkliches Denken) is constituted in the proper ordering of sense experience by the activity of reason. All real thinking requires the integrity and coherence of the real contributions of the organic function and the ideal contributions of the intellectual

\[26\] Cf. Gl., I, Proposition 54, 1, p. 280: "Niemals also kann auf irgendeine Weise die göttliche Allmacht gleichsam als eine Ergänzung der Naturursachen in die Stelle derselben treten, indem sie dann auch ihnen gleichartig zeitlich und räumlich wirken müßte und, bald so wirkend, dann wieder nicht so, sich selbst ungleich wäre, wihin weder ewig noch allgegenwärtig."

\[27\] Cf., Proposition 54, 1, p. 212; Gl., I, p. 279.
function. With respect to the representation of the God-World relationship, this exigent corrélation of the Ideal and the Real for the constitution of real thinking is expressed by Schleiermacher in the regulative principle Die Welt nicht ohne Gott, Gott nicht ohne die Welt. This principle summarizes the purport of Schleiermacher's epistemology. It is the position of this thesis that Schleiermacher's exposition and development of the divine attributes expressing the God-World relationship unfolds so as to respect the philosophical formulation of the God-World relationship in the Dialektik. The regulative principle of correlation set forth in the Dialektik functions as a critical standpoint for the expression of the God-World relationship in dogmatics. In other words, Schleiermacher's exposition of Christian doctrine in the First Part of the Glaubenslehre is assessed critically with respect to the philosophical, specifically epistemological, principles established in the Dialektik. This criticism issues in the influence of the Dialektik upon the content of Christian doctrine. Although Schleiermacher's ostensible task in the Glaubenslehre was the description of pious feeling in doctrinal form, his efforts to develop this expression with respect to the conditions, limitations, and dynamic of real thinking resulted in the radical re-interpretation of the doctrinal content of the Christian faith and, hence, in the substantive influence of Dialektik upon the Glaubenslehre. This may be seen not only in Schleiermacher's correlation of the divine and natural causalities in his exposition of the attribute of omnipotence, but also in his critique of the traditional classification of the divine attributes.

According to the nineteenth century theologian, the treatment of the God-World relationship throughout the history of Christian dogmatics has
been based on a view which maintains a separation between what God is in himself and what he is in relation to the World. This view results in the classification of the divine attributes into schemas such as metaphysical/moral and inactive/active. Those attributes treated under the categories of metaphysical and inactive attempt to portray the divine essence or the "purely inward activity"\textsuperscript{28} of God, while the categories of moral and active depict God in relation to the World. The untenability of such classifications is clearly voiced in Schleiermacher's rejection of the inactive/active schema.

Apart, however, from the fact that the presupposition of a creation in time implies either that the active attributes first came into being along with time or must previously have been inactive (and on this assumption the division is meaningless), the result is always a duality in God—a purely inner life in virtue of the inactive attributes, and a life related to the world in virtue of the active attributes . . . \textsuperscript{29}

Schleiermacher's critique of the inactive/active schema is based on the same principles which led to his rejection of the traditional doctrine of creation. In fact, the inactive/active classification of the divine attributes is structured upon the very separation of God and World expressed in the doctrine of \textit{creatio ex nihilo}. Although the reasons for the rejection of this doctrine and the classification of divine attributes predicated upon it are only implied in the \textit{Glaubenslehre}, it is our contention that they are considered inadequate on the grounds that they violate the structures of mediate sensible self-consciousness with which the feeling of absolute dependence conjoins in actual pious experience. Both the doctrine of \textit{creatio ex nihilo} and the traditional classification of divine attributes deviate from the sphere of real

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{CF}, Proposition 50, 3, p. 198; \textit{Gl.}, I, p. 261.

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{CF}, Proposition 50, 3, pp. 198-199; \textit{Gl.}, I, p. 261.
thinking. Both attempt to portray the Ideal apart from the Real; both violate the regulative principle Die Welt nicht ohne Gott, Gott nicht ohne die Welt.

In addition to the correlation which he posits between the divine and natural causalities in developing the attribute of omnipotence, Schleiermacher's efforts to formulate this attribute in accordance with the interests of real thinking are also expressed in the second idea of Proposition 54: 'that the divine causality, as affirmed in our feeling of absolute dependence, is completely presented in the totality of finite being, and consequently everything for which there is a causality in God happens and becomes real.' For Schleiermacher this qualification is based on the fact

that in our sphere we only come to the idea of the divine omnipotence through the conception (Auffassung) of the feeling of absolute dependence, and we lack any point of connexion for making demands upon the divine causality which extend beyond the natural order (Naturzusammenhang) embraced by this feeling. 30

As a result, Schleiermacher claims that the question whether the divine omnipotence extends to the possible as well as to the actual is meaningless. According to the nineteenth century theologian, the divine attributes do not express something special about the being of God as he is in himself, but rather something special in the manner that the feeling of absolute dependence is related to him. The relation of the feeling of absolute dependence to God described in the attribute of omnipotence can only be elaborated in accordance with the given character of human experience. The latter, as the proper object of dogmatic exposition, comprises both pious feeling and its determination by mediate sensible self-consciousness. Consequently, the divine omnipotence must

be restricted to the actual experience of man in the World. The extension of divine omnipotence to the realm of the possible departs from the actuality of human experience, thereby negating the integrity of real thinking.

The idea of a potentiality outside the sum of the actual has no validity even for our minds; for not only does the religious self-consciousness not lead us to such a point, but, in addition, however we arrived at it, we should then have to accept a self-limitation of the divine omnipotence which can never be given in experience.\[31\]

In Schleiermacher's view, the experience uniquely responsible for the shape assumed by the attribute of omnipotence is that of mediate sensible self-consciousness envisaged as the Naturzusammenhang. In this determination of self-consciousness the correlation of God and World, the Ideal and Real, the intellectual and organic functions is necessary in order to guarantee the coherence of Weltbewusstsein. In Schleiermacher's development, the attribute of omnipotence fully expresses the interest of pious feeling and respects the integrity of mediate sensible self-consciousness. Both of these forms of human experience are criteria which mold the content of doctrinal formulation in the Glaubenslehre. The pre-eminence of the attribute of omnipotence in the First Part of Schleiermacher's dogmatics rests on the fact that this attribute, as developed by the nineteenth century theologian, critically complies with the philosophical determination of the God-World relationship in the Dialektik.

2. Eternity

As mentioned previously, the attribute of eternity is employed by Schleiermacher as a safeguard against possible misinterpretations of the

\[31\] CF, Proposition 54, 2, pp. 213-214; Gl., I, pp. 281-282.
attribute of omnipotence. The attribute of eternity militates against pantheistic interpretations of the correlation of the divine and natural causalities of which the attribute of omnipotence speaks. According to Schleiermacher, God and World are simply different. This is true not only of their realities experienced in pious feeling (the World is absolutely dependent upon God), but also of the ideas of these realities attained in mediate sensible self-consciousness (the Ideal and the Real are independent constituents of wirkliches Denken).

The attribute of eternity functions in the context of dogmatics in a manner analogous to the regulative principle Beide Ideen (God and World) sind nicht dasselbe of the Dialektik. This is illustrated in the definition of eternity stated in Proposition 52 of the Glaubenslehre:

By the Eternity of God we understand the absolutely timeless causality of God, which conditions not only all that is temporal, but time itself as well.\footnote{32}

As a statement not of the separation, but of the distinction between the divine causality and the temporal causality of the Naturzusammenhang, the attribute of eternity does not diminish, but protects the correlation of God and World expressed in the attribute of omnipotence.\footnote{33} In Schleiermacher’s view, the attribute of eternity must itself be developed in accordance with this correlative formulation of the God-World

\footnote{32}{OF, Proposition 52, p. 203; Gl., I, p. 267.}

\footnote{33}{This relationship between the attributes of eternity and omnipotence is more lucidly expressed in the definition of eternity in the first edition of the Glaubenslehre. See I. Auflage, p. 275: "Die Ewigkeit Gottes ist nur zu verstehen als allmächtige Ewigkeit, d.h. als das mit allem zeitlichen auch die Zeit selbst bedingende in Gott." This complementary relationship between eternity and omnipotence is also expressed in the second edition. See Gl., I, Proposition 51, 1, p. 265: "Anstatt also zu sagen, Gott sei ewig und allmächtig, würden wir besser sagen, er sei allmächtig-ewig und ewig-allmächtig, oder auch Gott sei die ewige Allmacht oder die allmächtige Ewigkeit."}
relationship, respecting thereby the conditions of mediate sensible self-consciousness.

If the eternity of God be separated from His omnipotence, which is here confined to its special relation to eternity, it becomes only a so-called 'inactive' attribute; and thus is often described as infinity or immeasurability applied to time.\textsuperscript{34}

Such a representation would violate the correlation of God and World demanded by the nature of real thinking.

According to Schleiermacher, pious self-consciousness of God "becomes actual only as consciousness of His eternal power."\textsuperscript{35} By treating the attribute of eternity in close connection with the attribute of omnipotence, Schleiermacher intends to express the dependence of the World on God in such a way that the correlation of God and World required by the laws governing \textit{wirkliches Denken} be maintained. The eternity of God must be expounded within the scope of the conditions, limitations and dynamic of mediate sensible self-consciousness if it is to be acceptable for inclusion in dogmatics.

3. \textit{Omniscience}

Schleiermacher's treatment of the attribute of omniscience, by which is understood "the absolute spirituality of the divine Omnipotence,"\textsuperscript{36} is an addendum to the expression of pious feeling as the latter is determined and modified by the sensible self-consciousness of the Naturzusammenhang. The attribute of omniscience complements the attribute of omnipotence by guarding against the misinterpretation of the latter. Although the attribute of omnipotence by no means posits a blind necessity

\textsuperscript{34} CF, Proposition 52, 1, p. 203; Gl., I, p. 267.

\textsuperscript{35} CF, Proposition 52, 1, p. 204; Gl., I, p. 268.

\textsuperscript{36} CF, Proposition 55, p. 219; Gl., I, p. 289.
or mechanism operative in the World, the intellectual climate in Schleiermacher's own day made such an interpretation plausible. As a result, the nineteenth century theologian develops the attribute of omniscience

much more to bring out the truth that the divine causality should be thought of as absolutely living than that a similarity should be definitely established between God and that which we designate as spirit in the existence presented to us. It is this vitality of the divine being's power in the World which is expressed in the attribute of omniscience. As such, the attributes of omniscience and omnipotence are essentially the same; the former describes the absolute dependence of the World on God from the perspective of knowledge, the latter describes this dependence from the perspective of will. Stated succinctly, the attribute of omniscience is a supplementary development of the correlation of God and World posited in the attribute of omnipotence. Both attributes viewed in their complementary relationship express the Absolute Vitality (schlechthinige Lebendigkeit) of God in relation to the World.

4. Omnipresence

The attribute of omnipresence is defined in the Glaubenslehre as "the absolutely spaceless causality of God, which conditions not only all that is spatial, but space itself as well." As we have seen, the

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38 Cf, Proposition 55, 1, p. 219; G1., I, p. 289.


40 Cf. G1., I, Proposition 51, 2, p. 267.

41 Cf, Proposition 53, p. 206; G1., I, p. 272.
attribute of omniscience complements and fills out the purport of the attribute of omnipotence. The attribute of omnipresence functions in the same fashion with respect to the attribute of eternity. It attempts to express the distinction between the divine causality and the causality of the Naturzusammenhang. Whereas the attribute of eternity expresses this distinction with respect to time, the attribute of omnipresence does the same with respect to space. According to Schleiermacher, the development of the attribute of omnipresence as a complement to the attribute of eternity is necessary since "in general . . . far more religious moments evoke the idea of omnipresence, and therefore it is a more living idea and has a more general currency (Geltung)."

As was the case with the attribute of eternity, Schleiermacher exalts the attribute of omnipresence in strict accordance with the attribute of omnipotence. In the view of the nineteenth century theologian this means that even the attribute of omnipresence, which asserts the non-identity of God and World, must yet respect the correlation of the divine and natural causalities posited in the attribute of omnipotence. In this regard, Schleiermacher disavows the traditional designation of omnipresence as an inactive attribute:

As far as other matters are concerned, the distinction between the divine omnipresence as an inactive and as an active attribute almost inevitably destroys the essential self-identity of the divine causality, and thus only produces confusion.

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42 CF, Proposition 53, 1, p. 207; Cl., I, p. 272.

43 CF, Proposition 53, 2, p. 209; Cl., I, p. 276. Schleiermacher continues his criticism of this schema by connecting the separation of God and World discernible in the active/inactive schema with the traditional doctrine of creation in time; the doctrine which most clearly illustrates the violation of the noetic correlation of God and World. Cf. Cl., I, Proposition 53, 2, p. 276: "Wenn man zum Beispiel unterscheidet, die Allgegenwart Gottes, so weit sie sich auf ihn selbst bezieht, und die Allgegenwart bezüglich auf die Geschöpfe, und nimmt
Such a distinction is based on a separation between God and World, a separation which exceeds the limits of real thinking in which the Ideal and the Real must necessarily be correlated. Since this view of the attribute of omnipotence volatizes the conditions of mediate sensible self-consciousness requisite for the emergence of pious feeling in actual experience it cannot be the basis for the development of this attribute in the Glaubenslehre.

The attributes of eternity and omnipresence, which respectively express the relationship between God and time and space, are essentially one. Both portray the distinction between God and World. Since time and space "everywhere represent externality," Schleiermacher claims that the attributes of eternity and omnipresence, which express the distinction between the divine and natural causalities, depict the "absolutely inward" (das schlechthin Innerliche) in God's relationship to the World.

III. Summary

Schleiermacher's exposition of the doctrine of the divine attributes in the First Part of the Glaubenslehre furnishes further evidence of the influence of the noetic determination of the God-World relationship upon the content of the doctrines in dogmatics expressing this same relationship. The treatment of the four main attributes delineated in the First Part of the Glaubenslehre—omnipotence, eternity, omniscience, and dëbei . . . eine Schöpfung in der Zeit an, so gab es vor dieser nur die erste Allgegenwart, und die spätere ist erst hinzugekommen . . ."

44 CF, Proposition 51, 2, p. 203; Gl., I, p. 267.

and omnipresence—attests to the broad methodological employment of the experiencer in Schleiermacher's dogmatics. As has been shown, the feeling of absolute dependence ever remains the proper object of dogmatic exposition in Schleiermacher's view. Pious feeling, however, is always determined and modified by a particular form of mediate sensible self-consciousness. It is this conjunction between the highest and intermediate levels of self-consciousness which comprises the experiencer object of the Glaubenslehre. It is this conjunction between pious feeling and sensible self-consciousness in actual experience which renders the influence of Schleiermacher's epistemological presuppositions upon the content of Christian doctrine possible. The actuality of this influence can be seen in Schleiermacher's efforts to develop critically the doctrine of the divine attributes in the First Part of the Glaubenslehre with respect to the principle set forth in the Dialektik expressive of the scope and limitations of real thinking: Die Welt nicht ohne Gott, Gott nicht ohne die Welt.

As we have seen, the attribute which most clearly complies with the noetic correlation of God and World expressed in the above formula is that of omnipotence. Consequently, the attribute of omnipotence is elevated to a position of pre-eminence in the First Part of the dogmatics. The attributes of eternity, omniscience, and omnipresence are envisaged by Schleiermacher as complementary expressions of the God-World relationship formulated in the attribute of omnipotence. Each attribute attempts to portray either the equation of or the distinction between the divine causality and the Naturzusammenhang. Omnipotence and omniscience are examples of the former; eternity and omnipresence are examples of the latter.
No attribute, however, even those which express the distinction between the divine and natural causalities, departs from the correlation of God and World set forth in the attribute of omnipotence. Only the attribute of omnipotence is able to express the pious apprehension of the God-World relationship within the purview of the conditions, limitations, and dynamic of mediate self-consciousness. For Schleiermacher, the noetic correlation of God and World, as expressive of the necessary constituents of real thinking, critically governs and regulates the doctrinal formulation of the God-World relationship in dogmatics. It is interesting to note the great similarity between Schleiermacher's respective developments of the doctrine of Preservation and the attribute of omnipotence. Both are elaborated with critical respect to the noetic correlation of God and World; both express the God-World relationship as an experience attainable not only in pious feeling, but also by mediate sensible self-consciousness. Both the doctrine of Preservation and the attribute of omnipotence are the central expositions of the God-World relationship under the first and second forms respectively of the dogmatic proposition; each attains ascendancy over and results in a re-interpretation of portrayals of the God-World relationship which had been accorded independent validity and significance in traditional Christian dogmatics: the doctrine of Creation in the case of Preservation, the attributes of eternity, omniscience, and omnipresence in the case of omnipotence. In fact, the strong similarity between the doctrine of Preservation and the attribute of omnipotence justifies our viewing Schleiermacher's exposition of the latter as a further development of the former. The attribute of omnipotence attempts to express under one of the Nebenformen of the dogmatic proposition what the doctrine of
Preservation expresses under the **Grundform**. 46

For Schleiermacher, the only valid classification of the divine attributes is that of original and derived. Such a schematism does not rest on a separation between God and World. Rather, the original attributes are those delineated in the First Part of the *Glaubenslehre* as descriptions of "the inner creative disposition towards God-consciousness apart from the consideration whether it is hindered or encouraged ..." 47

The derived attributes, on the other hand, are those examined in the Second Part of the dogmatics which depict the determination of pious self-consciousness by the self-consciousness of sin and the self-consciousness of grace.

Our interest in the original attributes lies in the fact that they portray the general structures of pious self-consciousness itself and that these structures are explicated in terms of the relationship between God and World. It is our contention that these attributes, as expressions of pious feeling, are formulated so as to respect the noetic correlation of God and World established in the *Dialektik*. This attempt on the part of the nineteenth century theologian to exposit Christian doctrine in such a fashion that it not only describes pious feeling but also conforms to the exigencies of real thinking betrays the substantive influence of the *Dialektik* upon the *Glaubenslehre*.

Schleiermacher himself recognized the innovative propensities of his

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46 Cf. G1., I, Proposition 54, 1, pp. 279-280: "Ferner indem die göttliche Allmacht nur ewig und allgegenwärtig gedacht werden kann, so ist einseitig unstatthaft, dass zu irgendeiner Zeit etwas durch dieselbe erst werden soll, sondern durch sie ist 'immer alles schon gesetzt, was durch die endliche Ursächlichkeit freilich in Zeit und Raum erst werden soll." For a more explicit mention of the connection between the doctrine of Preservation and the attribute of omnipotence, see 1. **Auflage**, pp. 288-289.

47 Cf., Proposition 50, 4, p. 200; G1., I, p. 263.
development of the doctrine of the divine attributes in the First Part of the Glaubenslehre, and yet remained confident that this approach would win acceptance in the future as an adequate description of the pious experience of the Church.

If the usual treatment of the doctrine of the divine attributes is really Church doctrine—all well and good; then my treatment, at any rate, would be heterodox. But I am strongly convinced that it is that divinatory heterodoxy which will timely enough become orthodox, although not at all precisely through my book and although only long after my death.  

48 "Ist jene Behandlung (die übliche Behandlung der Lehre von den göttlichen Eigenschaften) wirklich Kirchenlehre: nun wohl, so sei die meinige immerhin heterodox; aber ich bin fest überzeugt, es ist jene divinatorische Heterodoxie, die schon noch zeitig genug, wenn auch gar nicht gerade durch mein Buch, und wenn auch erst lange nach meinem Tode, orthodox werden wird." Sendschreiben, p. 29 (603-604).
CHAPTER 7.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL FORMULATION
OF THE GOD-WORLD RELATIONSHIP IN THE DIALEKTIK
UPON THE DOCTRINES OF THE ORIGINAL PERFECTION
OF MAN AND THE ORIGINAL PERFECTION OF THE WORLD

In our examination of the doctrines of Creation, Preservation, and
the doctrine of the divine attributes we have explored the critical
nature of Schleiermacher's methodology in dogmatics. As we have seen,
Schleiermacher's efforts in the First Part of the Glaubenslehre are
devoted to the exposition of those doctrines which express the experi-
ential conjunction itself between pious feeling and mediate sensible
self-consciousness. This development unfolds with respect to the theme
of the God-World relationship.

The theme of God and World is one which has been held in high
esteem throughout the history of Christian thought. The importance of
this theme lies in the fact that it facilitates not only the development
of a doctrine of God, but also the formulation of a particular doctrine
of man which that theology implies. This is precisely Schleiermacher's
point of departure in his exposition of the second and third forms of
the dogmatic proposition, the Nebenformen, respectively concepts of
divine attributes and modes of action and pronouncements regarding the
constitution of the World. In the previous chapter we examined the
former; here, we turn to the latter.

As we have seen throughout our study, the basis of Schleiermacher's
doctrinal exposition in the Glaubenslehre is the Christian determination
of the feeling of absolute dependence. The task of dogmatics remains
the didactic description of immediate pious self-consciousness. The
content of all authentic Christian doctrines is derived solely from
pious feeling. According to Schleiermacher, philosophy or the dialec-
tical interest may only play a formal role in dogmatics by shaping how
Christian doctrine is expressed. The dialectical interest, however,
must exert no influence whatsoever upon the content or substance of
doctrinal expression.

The centrality of pious feeling in the First Part of the Glaubens-
lehre is demonstrated by the manner in which Schleiermacher develops the
God-World relationship. In the First Part of the Glaubenslehre, the
nineteenth century theologian adopts a motif which portrays the absolute
dependence of the World on God. This perspective on the God-World
relationship is firmly rooted in the Christian, particularly in the
Protestant, tradition. Although Schleiermacher's insistence that it is
through feeling that this perspective on the God-World relationship is
experientially appropriated is hardly traditional, we must see Schleier-
macher's determination of the God-World relationship as a statement made
in the interests of piety, and not as a philosophical construction. The
attempt to explain the critical nature of the Glaubenslehre by main-
taining that the feeling of absolute dependence is a philosophical
construction is baseless.

It is our contention that the epistemology which Schleiermacher
set forth in his lectures on Dialektik furnished the grounds for his
critical interpretation of Christian doctrine. Since pious feeling is
necessarily conjoined with a determination of mediate sensible self-
consciousness, we would be more than justified in considering whether
the philosophical analysis of the conditions, limitations and dynamic
of mediate sensible self-consciousness, which Schleiermacher undertakes
in the Dialektik, exerts an influence upon the content of dogmatics.
As should be recalled, Schleiermacher's development in the Transcendental
Part of the Dialektik concludes with an examination of the God-World
relationship. Schleiermacher's formulation of this relationship summa-
rizes the analysis which he pursues throughout this first part of the
work.

According to Schleiermacher, the activity of reason may not function
appropriately in the production of thinking and in the construction of
knowing apart from a given object of experience. The intellectual
function requires the contributions of the organic function in order to
accomplish the activity of thinking. This is the primary rule governing
the dynamic of mediate sensible self-consciousness. In real thinking
(wirkliches Denken), neither the Ideal nor the Real can occur without
the other. This rule is expressed by Schleiermacher in the regulative
principle Die Welt (Real) nicht ohne Gott (Ideal), Gott nicht ohne die
Welt. It is the contention of our study that the First Part of the
Glaubenslehre is developed with respect to this regulative principle and
that this regulation of Christian doctrine is the basis of the critical
propensities of Schleiermacher's dogmatics. We have already encountered
this influence of the Dialektik upon the Glaubenslehre in chapters five
and six. At this point we must seek the influence of Schleiermacher's
epistemology upon the content of his formulation of the doctrine of the
original perfection of man and the doctrine of the original perfection
of the World.
I. Schleiermacher's Development of the Third Form of the Dogmatic Proposition--Pronouncements Regarding the Constitution of the World

Our examination of Schleiermacher's conception of dogmatics demonstrated that, in the view of the nineteenth century theologian, the proper object of this branch of theological science is the Christian determination of pious self-consciousness. The task of dogmatics is the descriptively didactic exposition of pious feeling; Christian doctrines are "accounts of the Christian religious affections set forth in speech."1 Schleiermacher's development of the doctrines of Creation and Preservation express the primary form of the dogmatic proposition: the description of human states of life.2 The subsequent and fuller exposition of pious feeling, however, necessitates the delineation of secondary propositional statements which portray pious feeling relative to the broader scope of human experience. We have already examined the first of these Nebenformen--concepts of divine attributes and modes of action--in the previous chapter. At this point in our study, we turn our attention to the second of the Nebenformen--pronouncements regarding the constitution of the World. This perspective on the pious experience of the God-World relationship takes shape in the doctrines of the original perfection of man and the original perfection of the World.

As was the case in our analysis of the doctrine of the divine attributes, we must recall throughout the present chapter that the doctrines of the original perfection of man and the original perfection of the World are secondary explications of pious self-consciousness.

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1 Cf. Proposition 15; p. 76; Gl., I, p. 105.

2 Cf. Gl., Proposition 30, p. 163.
As such, their development proceeds from and must be seen in light of the central expression of pious self-consciousness delineated in the First Part of the Glaubenslehre: the doctrine of Preservation. Our examination of the latter doctrine demonstrated the extent to which Schleiermacher's dogmatic exposition carefully respected the positivity of real thinking, the constitution of which the formulation of the God-World relationship in the Dialektik attempts to portray. As was the case in our treatment of the doctrine of the divine attributes, we shall discover that, viewed as independent entities, the doctrines of the original perfection of man and the original perfection of the World demonstrate the contention of our thesis in a less direct fashion than did the doctrines of Creation and Preservation. This is due to the secondary importance of the Nebenformen in Schleiermacher's development. In our analysis, however, we must unfailingly relate them, as Schleiermacher would have us do, to the Grundform of the dogmatic proposition. This procedure will enable us to discern the influence of the Dialektik upon the content of these doctrines.

Schleiermacher begins his development in the final section of the First Part of the Glaubenslehre by explicating the relationship between the feeling of absolute dependence and the third form of the dogmatic proposition. "The universality of the feeling of absolute dependence," he states, "includes in itself the belief in an original perfection of the World." The term 'perfection' in this passage must only be understood from the perspective of the connection between pious feeling and mediate sensible self-consciousness. According to Schleiermacher, the perfection of the World signifies "that the totality of finite existence,

\[3\] Cf., Proposition 57, p. 233; Gl., I, p. 307.
as it influences us ..., works together in such a way as to make possible the continuity of the religious self-consciousness. In Schleiermacher's view, the perfection of the World expresses the integrity of the conditions in terms of which pious feeling emerges in actual experience in the World. This integrity lies in the connection between the highest and intermediate levels of self-consciousness which, Schleiermacher maintains, is requisite for the actuality of pious experience.

For since the religious self-consciousness can only fill a moment when combined with an excitation of the sensuous (sinnlichen) self-consciousness, and every such excitation is an impression of the world, the demand that the God-consciousness should be able to unite itself with every sensuous determination of the self-consciousness would be in vain unless all the world-impressions (and this is only another way of saying the relation of all other finite being to the being of men) concurred in making the direction of the spirit to God-consciousness composable with them.

This intimate connection between Gottesbewusstsein and Weltbewusstsein requires that the co-determining factor in pious experience, i.e., World-consciousness, be seen as a willing partner, so to speak, in that experience.

The adjective 'original,' with which Schleiermacher qualifies his interpretation of the perfection of the World, must not be understood in a temporal sense; nor does it refer to "any definite condition of the

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4 Cf., Proposition 57, 1, p. 233; Gb., I, p. 307. The first edition of the Glaubenslehre clarifies the perfection here qualified as referring to the general structures and conditions of pious self-consciousness rather than to the modification of pious self-consciousness by the consciousness of sin or the consciousness of grace. 1. Auflage, p. 317: "Unter Vollkommenheit wird hier nichts anders als die Einheit und Vollständigkeit der Zusammenstimmung des gesezten in sich, ohne dass dasselbe irgendwie auf etwas anderes bezogen werde, verstanden."

5 Cf., Proposition 57, 1, p. 233; Gb., I, p. 307.
world or of men nor of the God-consciousness in men, all of which are a
developed perfection admitting of a more and less . . ."6 On the
contrary, the original character of the perfection of the World refers to
the "self-identical"7 nature of the conditions in terms of which pious
experience arises in the subject. 8 Schleiermacher's interest in the
exposition of the doctrines of the original perfection of man and the
original perfection of the World is restricted to "those relationships
which uniformly underlie the whole temporal development and throughout
it remain the same."9 For the nineteenth century theologian, the experi-
ential basis of the original perfection which the above-mentioned
doctrines set forth is that of "pure finite causality."10

... what underlies each moment as finite causality is
nothing but the totality of all enduring forms of existence
and all contrasted functions of the same; and consequently
the original perfection (of the World) is the coherence of
all these in virtue of which they are equal in compass to
the divine causality, and on account of the contrast evoke
the consciousness of it.11

Here, as in the entire First Part of the dogmatics, we find that
Schleiermacher's point of departure in doctrinal exposition is pious

6CF, Proposition 57, 1, p. 234; Gl., I, p. 308.
7CF, Proposition 57, 1, p. 234; Gl., I, p. 308.
8Cf. 1. Auflage, p. 317: "Ursprünglich aber heisst diese Vollkommen-
heit, sofern sie nicht erklärt werden soll aus dem als Stetigkeit des
frommen Wohlgefallens ausgebildeten Selbstbewusstsein, in welchem sich
der Welteindruck mit dem einwohnenden Bewusstsein des höchsten Wesens
leicht und unmittelbar einigt, sondern schon aus der beharrlichen
Richtung auf das absolute Abhängigkeitsgefühl an sich, und der dabei
nichtwendig vorausgesetzten Immergegenwärtigkeit Gottes in uns."
9CF, Proposition 57, 2, p. 235; Gl., I, p. 309.
10CF, Proposition 57, 2, p. 235; Gl., I, p. 309.
feeling as determined by mediate sensible self-consciousness envisaged as the \textit{Naturzusammenhang}. In our previous examination we found that Schleiermacher's exposition of this perspective was principally formulated in the doctrine of Preservation and in the attribute of omnipotence.

We should note that Schleiermacher assumes a very untraditional stance in his treatment of the original perfection of the World. In his view, original perfection does not refer to a pre-lapsarian state or condition of the World, but rather to the very conditions themselves of pious experience. The original perfection of these conditions consists in the facility with which the God-consciousness is able to emerge in World-consciousness. Here, as in the doctrines previously examined, we find that Schleiermacher's formulation of Christian doctrines proceeds in accordance with the given conditions of experience in the World. The particulars of this formulation with respect to the doctrines of the original perfection of man and the original perfection of the World will be examined in the pages to follow.

Although the third form of the dogmatic proposition centers on the theme of the constitution of the World, Schleiermacher's exposition of doctrine under this rubric actually focuses on the theme of the constitution of man as part of the World. Since the doctrine of the original perfection of man is more fundamental to Schleiermacher's development than the doctrine of the original perfection of the World, we shall begin our examination, as does Schleiermacher, with the latter and conclude with an analysis of the former.
II. The Doctrine of the Original Perfection of the World

Schleiermacher's treatment of the original perfection of the World in dogmatics attempts to provide a doctrinal formulation of the very structures and conditions of pious experience. In the view of the nineteenth century theologian, the doctrine of the original perfection of the World, as all doctrines in the First Part of the Glaubenslehre, explores the God-World relationship from an experiential perspective.

The doctrine of the original perfection of the World sets forth in dogmatic exposition the relationship between Gottesbewusstsein and Weltbewusstsein that enables the actuality of pious experience. In Proposition 59 of the dogmatics, Schleiermacher expresses this relationship from two points of view:

Every moment in which we confront externally given existence involves the implication that the world offers to the human spirit an abundance of stimuli to develop those conditions in which the God-consciousness can realize itself, and at the same time that in manifold degrees the world lends itself to being used by the human spirit as an instrument and means of expression.  

The doctrine of the original perfection of the World portrays, from the perspective of Weltbewusstsein, the conditions in terms of which the

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12 Cf., Proposition 59, p. 238; Gl., I, p. 313. Again, the first edition of the Glaubenslehre clarifies Schleiermacher's position that the structures and conditions of pious self-consciousness constitute the focus of development in the First Part of the dogmatics. This development proceeds with respect to the theme of God and World rather than from the standpoint of the antithesis of the consciousness of sin and the consciousness of grace. This is seen in Schleiermacher's qualification of the proposition in the first edition correlative to the one quoted above. See 1. Auflage, p. 324: "Bei den Reizmitteln bleibt hier völlig unbestimmt, ob sie durch das Medium angenehmer oder unangenehmer Empfindungen wirken, indem die menschliche Kraftentwicklung durch die einen so gut geleitet wird als durch die andern."
Gottesbewusstsein emerges in finite experience.

In explaining the details of the doctrine of the original perfection of the World Schleiermacher reiterates the religious significance of the theory of self-consciousness developed in the Introduction to the Glaubenslehre (Proposition 5, 3): "the God-consciousness may develop in every state of consciousness which has risen above animal confusion..." The contrast between subject and object appears in the intermediate level of self-consciousness, i.e., sensible self-consciousness, the context in which the feeling of absolute dependence emerges in actual experience. In the sphere of dogmatics, the doctrine of the original perfection of the World expresses the various experiences evoked in the pious subject by his relationship to the World. Schleiermacher focuses specifically on the activity and the passivity of the self in relation to the World.

In the dialectic between subject and object, i.e., on the level of mediate sensible self-consciousness, two possible experiential relationships are presented. First, the recognition of the givenness of the object implies the influence of the object upon the subject. The World determines the self. The experiencer is formed to a certain degree by that which is experienced. Schleiermacher terms this relationship between subject and object one of 'passivity.' In the view of the nineteenth century theologian, passivity describes a way of being-in-the-World. The first part of Proposition 59, Schleiermacher's doctrine of the original perfection of the World, is an attempt to formulate doctrinally the significant contributions of the passive side of human experience and

\[13\] Cf. Proposition 59, 1, p. 238; Gl., I, p. 313.
existence to the total character of pious experience. According to Schleiermacher, the original perfection of the World is founded on the premise that 'the world offers to the human spirit an abundance of stimuli to develop those conditions in which the God-consciousness can realize itself ...' This portrayal of human experience in the context of dogmatics is a doctrinal sanctioning of the sensible conditions of pious experience.

The passive determination of the subject-object relationship, however, does not exhaust the possible forms of human experience. The passive determination of human experience, as well as the possibility of experience itself, is grounded in the positing of an experiencing subject. The relationship between subject and object in which the influence of the former upon the latter predominates is termed 'activity' by Schleiermacher. The subject is not only influenced by, but also influences, the object encountered in experience. The subject in a certain respect transforms the World. For Schleiermacher, the passivity and activity of the self in relation to the World are correlational. Activity and passivity are modes of human experience and existence which are inseparable. Each implies the other. The contributions of the active determination of the subject-object relationship are formulated in the second part of Proposition 59: 'the world lends itself to being used by the human spirit as an instrument and means of expression.' As was the case with the passive mode of experience, this description of the active mode of experience in the context of dogmatics is a doctrinal sanctioning of the sensible conditions of pious experience. For Schleiermacher, the doctrine of the original perfection of the World explicates, from the perspective of Weltbewusstsein, the dynamic of the active and passive
determinations of mediate sensible self-consciousness with which pious feeling must conjoin in order to arise in actual experience.

... the original perfection of the world in relation to men consists primarily in this, that in it is temporally grounded the excitation of passive states which are to pass into active states (these we name incentives), or, in other words, that they sufficiently determine the receptivity of man to the awakening and shaping of his self-activity. 14

Schleiermacher continues his analysis of the conditions of experience by examining the constituents of the self which enable its active and passive experiential modes of being-in-the-World. The corporeal existence of the human subject is the foundation of the passive relationship between subject and object. The faculty of Organisation is the medium between self and World. The state of passivity describes the reception of sense experience by the subject. The spirit, which Schleiermacher calls the purely "inner side" 15 of man is the basis of the human subject envisaged "as a self-active being in whom God-consciousness is possible ..." 16 The relationship between spirit and body interpreted from the perspective of the doctrine under consideration implies that the whole of this aspect of the original perfection of the world can be summarily expressed by saying that in it there is given for the spirit such an organism as the human body in living connexion with all else—an organism which brings the spirit into contact with the rest of existence. 17

Spirit and body, the respective seats of Gottesbewusstsein and Weltbewusstsein, both contribute to the actuality of pious experience.

Schleiermacher also discusses the original perfection of the World

14 CF, Proposition 59, 1, p. 238; GL, I, p. 314.
15 CF, Proposition 59, 1, p. 238; GL, I, p. 314.
16 CF, Proposition 59, 1, p. 238; GL, I, p. 314.
in terms of human self-consciousness which, it should be recalled, is the foundation of the subject-object dichotomy. Self-consciousness is based on the intellectual function; objective consciousness is based on the organic function. Schleiermacher doctrinally expresses the contributions of the activity of reason (Vernunftthätigkeit) to the constitution of human experience by maintaining that "the knowability of existence is the ideal side of the original perfection of the world..." Schleiermacher doctrinally expresses the contributions of the faculty of Organisation to human experience by stating that "the natural subsistence of the human organism (Organisation) is the real side of the same perfection as directly related to human receptivity." 

Whether expressed in terms of passivity and activity, body and spirit, or physical and ethical knowledge, Schleiermacher's exposition of the doctrine of the original perfection of the World portrays the integrity of the conditions in terms of which pious experience is actualized. Weltbewusstsein or mediate sensible self-consciousness, Schleiermacher insists, facilitates, and actually incites, the realization of the Gottesbewusstsein in the pious subject. It is this role played by the World in human experience which constitutes its original perfection.

1. Schleiermacher's Critique of the Traditional View of the Original Perfection of the World

In the Postscript to Proposition 59, Schleiermacher characterizes the traditional view of the original perfection of the World as

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18 Cf, Proposition 59, 1, p. 239; Gl., I, pp. 314-315.

19 Cf, Proposition 59, 1, p. 239; Gl., I, pp. 314-315.
the assertion that there was a perfection of the world which can be called original, though not in the sense used above (Proposition 59), but in the sense that prior to its present condition it endured for a period of time and afterwards became changed into its present imperfect condition.20

This view, the nineteenth century theologian claims, is not solely limited to the Genesis account of a pre-lapsarian, paradisaical state of the World, but also is found in the traditions of most peoples as "the fable of a Golden Age previous to actual history."21 In this view, the conditions of experience and existence afforded by the constitution of the World are envisaged as sufficient "to assure satisfaction to man apart from any need on his part to develop self-activity."22 In the Genesis account, this aspect of the original perfection of the World is expressed in the representation of the pre-lapsarian condition of man as immortal. According to Schleiermacher, Christian dogmatics must address itself to the Genesis account since this explication of original perfection comprises an important part of the tradition which the present state of the God-consciousness, the object of dogmatic exposition, must evaluate. Two approaches to the text, Schleiermacher claims, are possible: either the Genesis account is an actual historical description or the account is "a kind of poetry"23 at the basis of which the interests of pious self-consciousness must be sought.

The former alternative, the acceptance of the biblical narrative as an actual event, creates certain problems for modern dogmatics. If the narrative refers to an actual condition of the World which, as original,

20 Cf., Proposition 59, Postscript, p. 241; C1., I, p. 316.
21 Cf., Proposition 59, Postscript, p. 241; C1., I, p. 318.
22 Cf., Proposition 59, Postscript, pp. 241-242; C1., I, p. 318.
23 Cf., Proposition 59, Postscript, p. 243; C1., I, p. 319.
occurred for a particular span of time until the Fall and which dis-
appeared at the time of the Fall, Schleiermacher strongly objects. Such
a portrayal would represent the original perfection of the World apart
from the actual conditions of human experience. The pre-lapsarian state
of the World is not a possible object of experience for mediate sensible
self-consciousness. The given conditions of human experience in the
World; exemplified by what Schleiermacher terms the Naturzusammenhang,
cannot be respected if the original perfection of the World is depicted
as a past historical event. This representation fails to harmonize with
Schleiermacher's central doctrinal exposition of the God-World relation-
ship in the First Part of the Glaubenslehre:

Now, if it (the traditional view of the original perfection of
the World as a condition limited to a pre-lapsarian time)
necessarily implies that the original perfection of the world
has not remained the same, it fails to maintain the unity of
the whole world-order in its relation to the Creation and the
continuity of the divine Preservation. 24

In other words, the traditional view of the original perfection of the
World portrays the conditions of World-experience and World-existence
apart from the given conditions of experience and existence. Such a view
cannot be deemed acceptable by dogmatics since it does not describe the
actual pious experience of the believer. Pious feeling, we should recall,
must always be conjoined to a particular determination of mediate sensible
self-consciousness in order to emerge in actual experience. This emergence
is only possible if the integrity of mediate sensible self-consciousness
be respected. The traditional view of the original perfection of the
World misrepresents the real conditions of Weltbewusstsein; in this view
the constituents of real thinking (wirkliches Denken) which establish and

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secure the integrity of mediate sensible self-consciousness are
dissociated. **The traditional view of the original perfection of the**
World **deprives the intellectual function (Ideal) from a possible object**
of experience (Real), thereby **precluding from the positive character of**
mediate sensible self-consciousness with which pious feeling must necessar-
ily **conjoin**. Succinctly put, Schleiermacher considers the traditional
view of the original perfection of the World to be an inadequate represen-
tation of the God-World relationship because it violates the regulative
principle **Die Welt nicht ohne Gott, Gott nicht ohne die Welt.**

If, on the other hand, the traditional view be regarded as poetry
motivated by pious self-consciousness, Schleiermacher maintains that this
description of pious self-consciousness is unfaithful to the experience
itself. **The position of the traditional view on the relationship between**
"sin and evil and sin and death"\(^{25}\) is inadmissible in dogmatics since it
is based on an alteration of the conditions of experience in the World.
For Schleiermacher, this modification of actual experience is best illus-
trated in the traditional view's positing of death as a punishment for
sin. According to the Genesis account, man prior to the Fall was immortal.
Such an account cannot be a description of pious self-consciousness since
it departs from the given constitution and conditions of man's experience
and existence in the World.\(^{26}\) **In the literal and the figurative exegeses**

\(^{25}\) *Cf.* Proposition 59, Postscript, p. 243; *Gl.*, I, p. 319.

\(^{26}\) *Cf.* *Gl.*, I, Proposition 59, Postscript, p. 320: "Nehmen wir nun
noch dazu, dass, wenn wir das allmäßliche Abnehmen der organischen
Kräfte, die Möglichkeit, dass der Organismus durch äussere Naturpotenzen
gestört werde, und das Verschwinden durch den Tod hinwegdenken, wir nicht
mehr Wesen unserer Art gedacht haben, und die eigentlich menschliche
Geschichte doch erst'da anfangen würde, wo dieses alles gesetzt ist . . ."  
This point is further developed in the first edition of the Glaubenslehre
under the rubric of an independent proposition. See *1. Auflage*, p. 329:
of the Genesis story, the Cautel expressing Schleiermacher's epistemology and governing the adequate representation of the God-World relationship is violated. The traditional view negates the integrity of mediate sensible self-consciousness by divorcing the ideal and real elements requisite for the constitution of wirkliches Denken. For Schleiermacher, only the development of the doctrine of the original perfection of the World unfolded in the Glaubenslehre is able to respect the positive exigencies not only of pious feeling, but also of mediate sensible self-consciousness. 27

III. The Doctrine of the Original Perfection of Man

The doctrine of the original perfection of man is the focus of Schleiermacher's development in the third section of the First Part of the Glaubenslehre. As we have seen, Schleiermacher's methodology in dogmatics takes its point of departure from the experiential. Christian doctrines are descriptions of specific modes of pious self-consciousness. This experiential perspective is clearly witnessed in Schleiermacher's exposition of the third form of the dogmatic proposition in the First Part of the Glaubenslehre. The nineteenth century theologian's examination of the constitution of the World proceeds in terms of an analysis of

"Dass in dem ursprünglichen Verhältnisse der übrigen Welt zu der menschlichen Organisation der Tod der menschlichen Einzelwesen und was damit zusammenhängt, bedingt ist, thut der ursprünglichen Vollkommenheit der Welt in Bezug auf den Menschen keinen Eintrag."

27 In addition to the interpretation of the original perfection of the World as a pre-lapsarian state, Schleiermacher also criticizes the doctrine of the best of all possible worlds in the Postscript to Proposition 59. According to Schleiermacher, this doctrine, especially as promulgated by Leibniz, arises in the interests of natural or rational theology rather than in the interests of pious self-consciousness and therefore must be deemed inadequate for inclusion in dogmatics. See Gl., I, Proposition 59, Postscript, p. 317.
the original perfection of Weltbewusstsein in enabling the blossoming of the Gottesbewusstsein in actual experience.

In an indirect fashion, Schleiermacher's formulation of the doctrine of the original perfection of the World expresses the purport of his exposition of the doctrine of the original perfection of man. Although both doctrines attempt to express original perfection with respect to the facility with which pious feeling and sensible self-consciousness are able to conjoin, the doctrine of the original perfection of man attains ascendancy in Schleiermacher's treatment since it focuses on the foundation of pious experience: the human subject. Whereas the doctrine of the original perfection of the World considers the objective constituent of pious experience, the doctrine of the original perfection of man envisages the subjective.

According to Schleiermacher, the doctrine of the original perfection of man must delineate the pious perspective on the ideal side of human experience. As was the case with the previously treated doctrine, which explored the real side of experience, the doctrine of the original perfection of man sanctions the conditions of human experience which enable the emergence of Gottesbewusstsein in Weltbewusstsein. In the view of the nineteenth century theologian, the doctrine of the original perfection of man must establish "that in our clear and waking life a continuous God-consciousness as such is possible ..." 28 Both the doctrine of the original perfection of man and the original perfection of the World share the task of describing the possibility of this continuity in doctrinal form. In Proposition 60 of the Glaubenslehre, Schleiermacher formulates the doctrine of the original perfection of man,

28 Cf. Proposition 60, 1, p. 245; G1., 1, p. 322.
calling attention in his exposition to two aspects of human subjectivity:

The predisposition to God-consciousness, as an inner impulse, includes the consciousness of a faculty of attaining, by means of the human organism, to those states of self-consciousness in which the God-consciousness can realize itself; and the impulse inseparable therefrom to express the God-consciousness includes in like manner the connexion of the race-consciousness with the personal consciousness; and both together form man's original perfection. 29

The first aspect of human subjectivity, which Schleiermacher designates as a faculty (Vermögen), is two-fold. First, the very distinction between body and soul in the human subject expresses the contrast between the two terms in experience--World and self. The contrast and interaction between self and World creates a dynamic which itself evokes the emergence of the God-consciousness in actual experience. 30 Second, the cognitive faculty of man, i.e., the operation of the activity of reason in connection with sensibility, forms the basis of mediate sensible self-consciousness. The capacity of the latter mode of self-consciousness to structure the experience of the Naturzusammenhang is requisite in the formation of pious experience. 31 According to Schleiermacher, both of

29 Cf., Proposition 60, p. 244; Gl., I, p. 321.

30 This aspect of human subjectivity is given more specific attention in the doctrinal expression of the first edition of the Glaubenslehre. See 1. Auflage, pp. 331-332: "Die ursprüngliche Vollkommenheit des Menschen besteht erstlich in der Belebungsfähigkeit seiner Organisation durch den Geist, oder in der Zusammengehörigkeit von Leib und Seele; zweitens in der Erregbarkeit seines Erkenntnisvermögens durch die umgebende Welt, oder in der Zusammengehörigkeit der Vernunft und der Natur; drittens in der Beweglichkeit des persönlichen Gefühls durch das Gemeingefühl oder in der Zusammengehörigkeit des Einzelnen und der Gattung; endlich in der Vereinbarkeit jedes Zustandes mit dem Bewusstsein des höchsten Wesens oder in der Zusammengehörigkeit des niedern und des höheren Selbstbewusstseins." In Proposition 60 of the second edition, Schleiermacher incorporates the first and final qualifications under the rubric of the second. As a result, his point of departure is both the cognitive faculty and the connection between personal consciousness and race-consciousness.

31 Cf. Gl., I, Proposition 60, I, pp. 322-323: "Demnächst nun die
these perspectives on human subjectivity and its place in pious experience are constitutive for the view on the original perfection of man delineated in the Glaubenslehre.

The second aspect of human subjectivity, which Schleiermacher terms 'race-consciousness' (Gattungsbewusstsein), portrays the original perfection of man with respect to the communal expression of pious feeling. For Schleiermacher, the fact that the human subject possesses not only a personal but also a race-consciousness establishes his ability to communicate personal pious feeling into the social spectrum at large. This ability enables the growth of fellowship "without which there can for us be no living and vigorous piety . . .". The human capacity for expression is an essential part of man's experience in the World and, consequently, must also be viewed as constitutive of his original perfection.

The emphasis which Schleiermacher accords to the cognitive faculty and to race-consciousness in his formulation of the doctrine of the original perfection of man stems from his avowed intention to develop Christian doctrine solely from the perspective of the experiential. As we have seen throughout our study, the experiential object of Schleiermacher's exposition of the Glaubenslehre is not only immediate pious feeling, but also mediate sensible self-consciousness. If dogmatics is

intellektuelle Grundbedingung, dass nämlich der Geist vermag vermittelst der Sinnesindrücke das sein Wesen mit konstituierende Wissen um das Sein, und um das, was wir selbst durch unsere Tätigkeit in und aus demselben hervorbringen können, in den mannigfaltigsten Abstufungen allgemeiner und besonderer Vorstellungen zum wirklichen Bewusstsein auszuprägen, und dass er dadurch zu dem begleitenden Bewusstsein' eines Naturzusammenhanges gelangt, an welchem sich das Gottesbewusstsein entwickelt."

32 CP, Proposition 60, 2, p. 246; GL, I, p. 323.
to accomplish its task it must respect the conditions, limitations, and dynamic of this latter modification of self-consciousness. The doctrine of the original perfection of man does precisely this. According to Schleiermacher, the original perfection expressed in the latter doctrine refers not to a pre-lapsarian state of man, but rather to the integrity of the subjective conditions of human experience which, in ordering sense experience and structuring human community in the world, establish the continuity and coherence of mediate sensible self-consciousness necessary for the emergence of the God-consciousness in actual experience.

1. Schleiermacher's Critique of the Traditional View of the Original Perfection of Man

Just as Schleiermacher's development of the doctrine of the original perfection of man parallels his development of the doctrine of the original perfection of the World, so too does his critique of the traditional view of the former doctrine parallel his critique of the traditional view of the latter. As we have seen from our analysis of the doctrine of the original perfection of man unfolded in the Glaubenslehre, Schleiermacher envisions his task to be the portrayal of original perfection solely from the standpoint of the given conditions of human experience in the world. Only from the experience of man may dogmatic exposition proceed. This experiential perspective is clearly evinced in Schleiermacher's exposition of the doctrine of the original perfection of man, for it, like the doctrine of the original perfection of the World, attempts to exhibit and to sanction doctrinally the very conditions which facilitate the actuality of pious experience. Both doctrines delineated in the third section of the First Part of the Glaubenslehre describe original perfection as a quality depicting the relationship between pious feeling
and mediate sensible self-consciousness.

Schleiermacher recognizes that the traditional view of the original perfection of man fails to express the purport of his own development. In the traditional view, original perfection refers to a pre-lapsarian state which differs qualitatively from the present state of man in the World. Since the state of man described in the traditional view of original perfection lies beyond our given experience, and thus does not accord with the present determination of God-consciousness, Schleiermacher maintains that it cannot attain the status of an authentic Christian doctrine.

Fulness of experience in the sphere of faith is due to the individual development, in virtue of this original perfection of human nature, of each human life brought into existence by procreation. But how, on the same presuppositions, the first men developed, history gives no account, and the hints we have on that subject cannot form a religious doctrine in our sense of the word.33

The nineteenth century theologian asserts that the actual development of the first men is not a matter of faith but of history. The manner in which the present conditions of experience were formed in the human race is a matter of fact in which the pious self-consciousness has no interest. Although a matter of historical fact, the incipience of the experiential capacities of the first men is beyond the scope of present human experience and, consequently, cannot be doctrinally formulated.

According to Schleiermacher, the Mosaic account does not portray actual historical circumstances and events, but attempts "to make good the lack of a historical account of the beginnings of the human race. . . ."34 He insists that

33 CF, Proposition 61, pp. 247-248; Gl., I, p. 325.
34 CF, Proposition 61, 3, p. 250; Gl., I, p. 328.
all attempts to form a historical picture of the first beginnings of human existence are bound to fail, because, as we have no experience of an absolute beginning, we have no analogy by which we could make the absolute beginning of rational consciousness intelligible.\textsuperscript{35}

It is important to note that Schleiermacher's assessment of the inadequacy of the traditional view of the original perfection of man proceeds directly from the motif in terms of which the entire First Part of the \textit{Glaubenslehre} is developed: the doctrine of Preservation. Just as the traditional doctrine of \textit{creatio ex nihilo} is deemed inadequate for inclusion in the sphere of dogmatics on the grounds that it cannot be grasped in terms of the necessary constituents of real thinking, so too is the traditional view of the original perfection of man deemed inadequate for the same reason. It prescinds from the contributions of the organic function requisite for real thinking and, consequently, is not structured on the positive character of \textit{Weltbewusstsein}. Just as Schleiermacher's interpretation of the doctrine of Preservation, which expresses the integrity of mediate sensible self-consciousness, is his point of departure in developing the first form of the dogmatic proposition, so too is Schleiermacher's interpretation of the doctrine of the original perfection of man, which views original perfection as descriptive of the very conditions of mediate sensible self-consciousness itself, his point of departure in developing the third form of the dogmatic proposition.

The traditional view of the original perfection of man is considered unacceptable by Schleiermacher for inclusion in dogmatics since it posits original perfection as a pre-lapsarian state of man which cannot be a possible object of experience for mediate sensible self-consciousness. The traditional view cannot be experienced since the state of man of

\textsuperscript{35} CF, Proposition 61, 3, p. 250; \textit{Gl.}, I, p. 328.
which it speaks cannot be assimilated by the faculty of Organisation. The traditional view of the original perfection of man is based on the production of the activity of reason apart from sensible determination. In this view, thinking represents the Ideal apart from the Real, thereby violating the regulative principle Die Welt nicht ohne Gott, Gott nicht ohne die Welt. The traditional view fails to respect the constituents of mediate sensible self-consciousness necessary for the constitution of real thinking, the context in which pious feeling emerges in actual experience.

IV. Summary

In Schleiermacher's exposition of the doctrines of the original perfection of man and the original perfection of the World we encounter a further illustration of his experiential interpretation of Christian dogmatics. Although the focus of the nineteenth century theologian's development remains the feeling of absolute dependence, it is important to remember that this form of self-consciousness only emerges, in Schleiermacher's view, in conjunction with a particular determination of mediate sensible self-consciousness. The positive character of pious experience is comprised of both of these forms of self-consciousness.

The doctrines of the original perfection of man and the original perfection of the World, as all doctrines which rightfully have a place in the sphere of dogmatics, are descriptively didactic expressions of a specific moment in the life of pious self-consciousness. As our analysis has shown, these doctrines sanction the relationship between the feeling of absolute dependence and mediate sensible self-consciousness which enables the actuality of pious experience. The centrality of pious
feeling in the enterprise of dogmatics is clearly substantiated by Schleiermacher himself. According to the theologian, dogmatics has its sole object in the Christian modification of the feeling of absolute dependence. Schleiermacher's project in the Glaubenslehre is the descriptively didactic exposition of the experiences attained in the highest level of self-consciousness.

In Schleiermacher's delineation of the methodology of the Glaubenslehre, however, the role played by mediate sensible self-consciousness and the dialectical interest in the formulation of Christian doctrine is decidedly secondary and formalistic. It is the contention of our study that the contributions of mediate sensible self-consciousness to the exposition of dogmatics are far more important and substantive than Schleiermacher was willing to allow. According to Schleiermacher, mediate sensible self-consciousness provides a context within which pious feeling emerges in actual experience. Since the logical or dialectical interest arises in the very nature of mediate sensible self-consciousness, it is our contention that the influence of this interest upon the content of both pious experience and its expression is unavoidable. We have explored this influence throughout our study by examining the extent to which the epistemology developed by Schleiermacher in the Dialektik, an epistemology which sets forth the conditions, limitations, and dynamic of mediate sensible self-consciousness, governs and regulates the content of Christian doctrine expounded in the Glaubenslehre.

This substantive influence is clearly evinced in the doctrines of the original perfection of man and the original perfection of the World. In the third section of the First Part of the Glaubenslehre, the doctrines expressing the general relationship between God and World are formulated
so as to respect the principle established in the Dialektik as an expression of the proper constitution of real thinking (wirkliches Denken): Die Welt (Real) nicht ohne Gott (Ideal), Gott nicht ohne die Welt. This principle, which summarizes Schleiermacher's entire epistemology, is the basis of the nineteenth century theologian's critique of the traditional Christian view on original perfection. In the doctrines of the original perfection of man and the original perfection of the World, as in all doctrines delineated in the First Part of the Glaubenslehre, Schleiermacher's philosophical formulation of the God-World relationship in the Dialektik constitutes the foundation of his radical re-interpretation of Christian dogmatics.
CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

In the preceding chapters we have examined the relationship between God and World in Schleiermacher’s seminal philosophical and theological works, respectively, the *Dialektik* and the *Glaubenslehre*. Through an analysis of the theme of God and World in these works, we claim to have achieved the goals outlined in the introduction to the present study. First, our project has contributed to a general understanding of the relationship between philosophy and theology in Schleiermacher’s later thought. Second, our study has specifically elucidated the extent to which the *Dialektik* influenced the *Glaubenslehre*, an issue perennial in the history of Schleiermacher scholarship. The concerns directly related to the latter accomplishment have remained the focus of our development in the present study. The relationship between philosophy and theology has only been examined indirectly through an in-depth analysis of the influence of the *Dialektik* upon the *Glaubenslehre*.

The God-World relationship, a theme treated in both the Transcendental Part of the *Dialektik* and the First Part of the *Glaubenslehre*, provided a focus in light of which the influence of the *Dialektik* upon the *Glaubenslehre* proved to be discernible. It is the contention of our study that Schleiermacher’s philosophical formulation of the God-World relationship in the *Dialektik* served as a principle with respect to which his exposition of Christian doctrine in the First Part of the *Glaubenslehre*
was critically developed. It has been maintained that the principle which Schleiermacher established in the *Dialektik* for the regulation of real thinking (*wirkliches Denken*) and for the proper expression of the God-World relationship shapes and determines the content of those doctrines in the First Part of the *Glaubenslehre* expressing the general relationship between God and World. In our view, this influence of the *Dialektik* upon the *Glaubenslehre* may not merely be regarded as formalistic, but rather as substantive, in nature. In the *Glaubenslehre*, the actual consequences of this influence are not limited to a modification in the manner in which Christian doctrine is developed, but rather result in a re-formulation of the content of dogmatics. It was against this influence of philosophy upon the content of Christian doctrine that Schleiermacher argued throughout his career as a dogmatic theologian. As a result, we must conclude that Schleiermacher failed to maintain the exclusion of the influence of the logical or dialectical interest upon the content of doctrine demanded by his own view on the methodology of dogmatics.

It has been the position of our study that this influence of philosophy upon the substance of doctrine exposited in the First Part of the *Glaubenslehre* is not to be ascertained solely on the basis of a comparative examination of the relevant sections of the *Dialektik* and the *Glaubenslehre*. The most that such an analysis could establish would be that the respective treatments of the God-World relationship in each of these works are parallel and in harmony with each other. On the contrary, we have argued that the possibility of there being a philosophical influence upon the content of doctrine developed in the First Part of the *Glaubenslehre* is furnished by Schleiermacher's own view on the nature
of pious experience. As has been constantly reiterated throughout our study, the feeling of absolute dependence, the proper object of dogmatic exposition, only emerges in actual experience as determined and modified by a particular form of mediate sensible self-consciousness. In fact, the different forms of dogmatic proposition and, hence, the multiplicity of doctrine included within the sphere of dogmatics may not be traced to variations in the feeling of absolute dependence but to the various determinations of mediate sensible self-consciousness with which pious feeling must conjoin in order to attain actuality of experience. Given this close connection between pious feeling and mediate sensible self-consciousness, we would expect the latter form of self-consciousness to exert an influence upon both the content of pious feeling and the content of the description of that feeling. Since only this description as formalized in the text of dogmatics may be accepted as the object of our study, Schleiermacher's formulation of Christian doctrine in the Glaubenslehre has ever remained the focus of the present study.

We should recall that the mediate sensible self-consciousness with which pious feeling conjoins in actual experience is the form of self-consciousness which constitutes the proper object of the Dialektik. It is this connection between pious feeling and mediate sensible self-consciousness which constitutes the possibility of, and the logical basis for, an influence of the Dialektik upon the substance of Christian doctrine. The actuality of this influence is evinced in Schleiermacher's development in the Glaubenslehre itself.

Throughout our study, we have attempted to demonstrate the extent to which the epistemology which Schleiermacher delineates in the Dialektik shapes and determines the content of doctrinal exposition in the
Glaubenslehre. According to Schleiermacher's development in the Transcendental Part of the Dialektik, the ideas of God and World are correlates. The idea of God is the transcendental terminus a quo of knowing and the principle of the possibility of knowledge in itself. The idea of God is the noetic representation of the ideal side of thinking and being structured in terms of the intellectual category of unity. The idea of the World is the terminus ad quem of knowing and the principle of the actuality of knowledge in its development. The idea of the World is the noetic representation of the real side of thinking and being structured in terms of the intellectual category of multiplicity. The ideas of God and World are noetic correlates since neither can occur in real thinking without the other. The ideas of God and World respectively represent the ideal and real determinants requisite for the constitution of thinking which purports to be wirkliches Denken in nature. The regulative principle specifically set forth in the lectures of 1828, Die Welt nicht ohne Gott, Gott nicht ohne die Welt, which expresses the necessary correlation of God and World in real thinking, not only determines the bounds of the God-World relationship, but also concisely summarizes Schleiermacher's epistemology itself. As such, this principle portrays the conditions, limitations, and dynamic of mediate sensible self-consciousness—the same form of self-consciousness which provides an existential context for the emergence of pious feeling in actual experience in the World. In our efforts to determine the influence of Schleiermacher's philosophical formulation of the God-World relationship in the Dialektik upon the doctrines expressing this same relationship in the Glaubenslehre, we examined the nineteenth century theologian's exposition in the First Part of the System of Doctrine.
The first form (Grundform) of the dogmatic proposition is central in Schleiermacher's development. Under this first form in the First Part of the dogmatics, Schleiermacher unfolds the doctrines of Creation and Preservation. His development of these doctrines clearly illustrates the intention of our thesis. As we have seen, Schleiermacher devalues the traditional doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo*. In the view of the nineteenth century theologian, the traditional doctrine of Creation expresses the dependence of the World on God, but does so in a manner which departs from the sphere of real thinking. The traditional doctrine of Creation fails to respect the conditions, limitations, and dynamic of mediate sensible self-consciousness and, consequently, violates the regulative principle *Die Welt nicht ohne Gott, Gott nicht ohne die Welt*. This devaluation of the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo* in the Glaubenslehre is hardly surprising to the reader of the *Dialektik* since Schleiermacher's critique of the various representations of the God-World relationship found *creatio ex nihilo* to be fundamentally inadequate. According to Schleiermacher, this representation cannot be produced noetically since such a representation would rest on the operations of the intellectual function (Ideal) prescinding entirely from organic determination (Real). Consequently, Schleiermacher elevates the doctrine of Preservation to a position of pre-eminence in the Glaubenslehre. In Schleiermacher's view, the doctrine of Preservation is worthy of such emphasis since it expresses the dependence of the World on God within the actual scope of real thinking, thereby respecting the noetic determination of the God-World relationship demanded by the *Dialektik*. The doctrine of Creation is only recognized as valid for inclusion in the sphere of dogmatics to the extent that it offers an alternate perspective on the doctrine of
Preservation.

The secondary forms (Nebenformen) of the dogmatic proposition, when envisaged as independent developments, demonstrate the contention of our thesis in a less direct fashion than the first form. In keeping with the methodology of Schleiermacher's dogmatics, however, these Nebenformen must be strictly related to the Grundform of the dogmatic proposition. When considered in this light, the doctrines developed in the First Part of the Glaubenslehre under the headings of the second and third forms of the dogmatic proposition support our contention that the Dialektik influenced the Glaubenslehre, an influence which surfaced so clearly in our analysis of the doctrines of Creation and Preservation.

As we have seen, the attribute of omnipotence attains ascendancy over all of the attributes treated in the First Part of the Glaubenslehre. For Schleiermacher, the attribute of omnipotence directly expresses the relationship between God and World without departing from the given constitution of real thinking. This attribute, which equates, yet distinguishes between, the divine and the natural causalities, is able to respect the noetic correlation of God and World established in the Dialektik. The attributes of eternity, omnipresence and omniscience are granted legitimacy by Schleiermacher as alternate expressions of the God-World relationship portrayed in the attribute of omnipotence.

The doctrines of the original perfection of man and the original perfection of the World also support the contention of our thesis when envisaged in light of the doctrine of Preservation. Schleiermacher's point of departure, however, differs from the approach assumed in the doctrine of Preservation and the doctrine of the divine attributes. The description of the original perfection of man and the World unfolded in
the Glaubenslehre doctrinally sanctions both the subjective and objective conditions which enable the emergence of the God-consciousness in actual experience. As such, Schleiermacher's view on the original perfection of man and the World doctrinally formulates the possibility of the influence of the Dialektik upon the Glaubenslehre which we have maintained throughout our study. Here, as in the entire First Part of the Glaubenslehre, Schleiermacher expositions Christian doctrine with respect to the given constitution of human experience in the World. The traditional view on original perfection, as a pre-lapsarian state or condition of man and the World, is deemed inadequate for inclusion in the sphere of dogmatics since it prescinds from the given constitution of real thinking requisite for the experiential emergence of pious feeling. The traditional view fails to respect the noetic determination of the God-World relationship with regard to which Schleiermacher's exposition of doctrine in the First Part of the Glaubenslehre is critically developed.

It is this influence of the Dialektik upon the Glaubenslehre which we have considered to be substantive in nature. This claim may seem to exceed the bounds of sound judgment, particularly in light of the fact that the Dialektik is, and was envisaged by Schleiermacher as, a formal enterprise—one whose task entailed the delineation of the operations of thinking and the proper qualifications of knowing. Yet it is our contention that, although the Dialektik itself is a formal enterprise, Schleiermacher's critical development of doctrine in the First Part of Glaubenslehre in accordance with the formal conditions of thinking and knowing resulted in an influence of the Dialektik upon the content of Christian doctrine. Hopefully, our study has demonstrated that Schleiermacher's philosophical formulation of the God-World relationship in the
Dialektik exerted an influence on more than language formation and the scientific interconnection of individual propositions in the Glaubenslehre. An influence which only extended thus far would, in Schleiermacher's view, be merely formalistic. It is our contention, however, that the noetic determination of the God-World relationship in the Dialektik influenced the actual content of the First Part of the Glaubenslehre.

In restricting the analysis of our study to the First Part of the Glaubenslehre our intention has not been to devalue the merit of considering the influence of the Dialektik upon the content of the Second Part of the System of Doctrine. Our study was limited to the First Part of the dogmatics because the theme of God and World is clearly elucidated in that section of Schleiermacher's work. This theme served as a touchstone in our attempt to determine the extent to which Schleiermacher's philosophy influenced his development of Christian doctrine. In fact, the determination of the influence of philosophy upon the Second Part of the dogmatics with special regard to this theme has been recognized in the past history of Schleiermacher scholarship.¹ The actual work of substantiating or disavowing such an influence must comprise the task of future Schleiermacher scholarship.

Beyond the specific and technical concerns examined in the preceding pages, it is hoped that a foundation has been laid for a more general consideration of the role played by philosophy in modern theological method. Although our study directly intends to contribute to our knowledge of the nineteenth century theologian's thought through an analysis of a crucial issue in Schleiermacher scholarship, such knowledge

is by no means self-contained and unrelated to broader matters of theological concern. In many respects, the theology of the past one hundred and fifty years becomes more intelligible when viewed from the perspective of the issues raised and examined in the present study. Since the theology of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has regarded Schleiermacher's theological method, whether in a positive or negative vein, as prototypical, a critical assessment of this method, and particularly of the role played by philosophy in it, is a necessary undertaking for anyone who today engages in the theological enterprise.

In conclusion, we must state that our study intends to offer a new perspective on the role played by philosophy in the Glaubenslehre, thereby contributing to our understanding of this very complex issue. The precise relationship between philosophy and theology in Schleiermacher's dogmatics is and will always be a matter of perennial interest; a question whose answer may never be proved or settled but only approximated. As such, we see Schleiermacher as a partner in dialogue and not as a figure of the past on whose work we may pass a final judgment. Our interpretation of the work of this great man does not intend to be the last word in this dialogue, but a moment in the Dialektik which Schleiermacher himself valued so highly.
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