THEODICY IN HARTSHORNE.
GOD, MAN, AND EVIL: THE QUESTION OF THEODICY
IN THE
NEOCLASSICAL METAPHYSICS OF CHARLES HARTSHORNE

By

BARRY LYN WHITNEY, B. A.

A Dissertation
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

McMaster University
January, 1977
To my wife, Mary
and
To our son, Christopher Jón
I am preparing a lecture, and as always I find it hard again. Our psychoanalytic house-mate at Bern told me that I should not worry so much about the meaning of this life. It affects my health and would never let me find rest. According to him I ought to take up some interest or other (temperance or something like that) to spend my energy on. That would be of more practical use for both myself and others. If only that were really possible! To put one's teeth firmly into something, to run along enthusiastically with something with the triumphant cry that this is it! Instead, my dominant feeling is one of nostalgic desire to show myself and others what life is really all about. That is why I cannot even rouse enough naivety in myself to patch together a touching little sermon or talk (Karl Barth).
TITLE: God, Man, and Evil: The Question of Thecaicy in the Neoclassical Metaphysics of Charles Hartshorne

AUTHOR: Barry Lyn Whitney, B. A. (Carleton University)

SUPERVISOR: Dr. John C. Robertson, Jr.

NUMBER OF PAGES: xii, 421
ABSTRACT

The dissertation is a study and critical assessment of certain fundamental issues which are involved in Hartshorne's theodicy. Such a study is important due to the dire lack of serious critical attention not only to "process theodicy" in general but to Hartshorne's "process theodicy" in particular. (Hartshorne's metaphysics has not been distinguished -- until most recently -- from Whitehead's, and his theodicy has not yet been appreciated for its uniqueness).

Hartshorne's approach to theodicy generally is understood to involve his revised conception of Anselm's ontological proof for God's existence, and the subsequent claim that if God can be shown to exist necessarily, then no empirical fact (e.g., evil) can count as evidence against that existence. This may, perhaps, be granted -- provided the ontological proof is valid; yet, Hartshorne's theodicy involves more than this thesis, and it is this "more" with which the dissertation is concerned. Specifically, Hartshorne's theodicy may be considered as an attempt to show how God as omnibenevolent (all-powerful and all-good) may be reconciled with the fact of evil, and with creaturely freedom and moral responsibility. Hartshorne's revised, "neoclassical" theism conceives God as "dipolar" (i.e., as having both necessary and contingent aspects), and such that He does not seem solely responsible for creaturely agency (as Hartshorne believes the classical Christian conception of God implies).
It is Hartshorne's contention, furthermore, that God functions in the world by (i) presenting ideal aims to creatures and persuading creatures to accept those possibilities, and by (ii) experiencing and eternally valuing the actualizations achieved by creatures. The dissertation suggests that the former relates especially (though not exclusively) to divine power and, as such, the issue which arises concerns the viability of Hartshorne's attempt to show how this divine power is reconciled with creaturely freedom. The latter relates especially (though, again, not exclusively) to divine benevolence and, as such, the issue here concerns Hartshorne's attempt to show how this divine benevolence is reconciled with the fact of evil: its source, nature, function, and overcoming. It is argued that Hartshorne's theodicy may be reconstructed and critically assessed by considering these two basic issues.

With respect to the first issue, Hartshorne's contention is that creatures have a certain undeniable freedom (based on a defence of psychicalism and a doctrine of "relative determinism", whereby materialistic dualism and pure determinism or indeterminism, respectively, are attacked), and that this freedom is coherent with a divine power which acts solely persuasively. The dissertation argues, however, that Hartshorne has not fully explicated the nature of the divine persuasive influence, and that a full analysis of this divine agency reveals a varying range of its effectiveness, some of which approaches a coerciveness. This thesis
is vital to Hartshorne's theodicy since only by acknowledging it can he hold (as he wishes) that divine power, as causal agency in the world, permits creaturely freedom only to the extent that creatures do not use that freedom to create an overabundance of evil and disorder: divine power must ensure that freedom is kept within suitable limits, and this implies an aspect of coerciveness.

Hartshorne's understanding of how divine benevolence is reconciled with evil -- the second basic issue -- reaches much the same conclusion; that is, while God is not solely responsible for evil (since all beings have some range of freedom or spontaneity), He overcomes evil to the extent that it never predominates over the good and the order in the world. Evil, furthermore, is understood as an aesthetic principle, with certain positive functions, and explained as unavoidable privation and loss.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to acknowledge, with deep gratitude, the learned and generous help and encouragement of my program and thesis supervisor, Dr. John C. Robertson, Jr. It was he who nurtured my interest in the exciting intellectual world of philosophical theology, and who first introduced me to the thought of Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne. His eminent command of the area has been of inestimable value and inspiration to me, and his teaching skills and personal concern are models which I would hope to emulate.

I wish to express special gratitude also to Professor Charles Hartshorne for his personal correspondence and for his warm kindness in making himself available to me in private interviews to discuss various aspects of this dissertation. I am indebted also to Professor Lewis S. Ford for his correspondence and interest in this study.

I must express deep appreciation to my undergraduate teacher of Religion, Dr. Robert E. Osborne, who first introduced me to the critical study of Religion, and to its rewards. I am indebted also to my undergraduate thesis supervisor, Dr. John Dourley, whose generous help and enthusiasm inspired me to go on to graduate studies. I owe special thanks also to my graduate teachers, Dr. Ian G. Weeks, Dr. G.B. Madison, Dr. G. Vallée, Dr. Yun-hua Jan, and in a less direct but still genuine way, Dr. George P. Grant. My gratitude extends also to Professor R.F. Aldwinckle, who, with Drs. Robertson and Weeks, read and commented...
upon the draft of the dissertation.

To my former rector, Archdeacon W. D. McL. Christie, I owe an inestimable debt for his instilling in me a deep sense of religious awareness; and to my good friends, Professor Duane J. MacMillan and Rev. Alan Gallichan, I am grateful for their help and encouragement in ways known to them.

The work that culminated in this dissertation was made possible by generous grants from McMaster University and The Canada Council, and to both I am sincerely appreciative.

I wish to express my thanks also to Mrs. Grace Gordon and Miss Carmella Marasco, who typed the final version of the dissertation.

Finally, I must express my deep appreciation to my parents, Mr. Earl and Mrs. Gwen Whitney, of Cornwall, Ontario, whose love and sacrifice enabled me to pursue a university career; and to my wife, Mary, whose support and unselfish concern made this study possible. To her, and to our son, Christopher, this dissertation is dedicated.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>xii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PART ONE: BACKGROUND</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION: THE STATUS OF THE QUESTION</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Ontological Argument and Theodicy</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Outline of the Dissertation</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER TWO: THE DOCTRINE OF GOD: HARTSHORNE'S THEISM</strong></td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Hartshorne's Method of Conceiving of God</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Dipolar Theism</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Divine Power</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Divine Goodness (Love)</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Conclusion</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER THREE: THE DOCTRINE OF MAN: CREATURELY FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY</strong></td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Psychicalism</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Relative Determinism</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Man as Free and Morally Responsible</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Conclusion</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PART TWO: CRITIQUE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER FOUR: DIVINE POWER AND CREATURELY FREEDOM</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Divine Persuasive Agency</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Divine Limits</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The Organic-Social Analogy</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Divine Influence in Perceptions</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Divine Influence in Memory</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Hartshorne's Doctrine of Possibility</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Divine Final and Efficient Causation</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Hartshorne's Understanding of Genetic Succession</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Divine Love and Creaturally Freedom</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Summary, Implications, and Conclusion</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER FIVE: DIVINE BENEVOLENCE AND EVIL ......................... 333

1. Creativity; Natural and Moral Evil ................................. 334
2. The Aesthetic Principle ............................................. 349
3. Evil as Loss, as Privation ........................................... 363
4. Evil "Overcome" by God ............................................. 373
5. Conclusion ............................................................. 394

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................... 403
ABBREVIATIONS*

Charles Hartshorne

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PPS</td>
<td>The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation</td>
<td>1934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BH</td>
<td>Beyond Humanism: Essays in the New Philosophy of Nature</td>
<td>1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MVG</td>
<td>Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism</td>
<td>1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR</td>
<td>The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God</td>
<td>1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSP</td>
<td>Reality as Social Process: Studies in Metaphysics and Religion</td>
<td>1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSG</td>
<td>Philosophers Speak of God</td>
<td>1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP</td>
<td>The Logic of Perfection and Other Essays in Neoclassical Metaphysics</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Anselm's Discovery</td>
<td>1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTT</td>
<td>A Natural Theology for Our Time</td>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSPM</td>
<td>Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS</td>
<td>Born to Sing: An Interpretation and World Survey of Bird Song</td>
<td>1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RM</td>
<td>Religion in the Making</td>
<td>1926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMW</td>
<td>Science and the Modern World</td>
<td>1926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>Process and Reality</td>
<td>1929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>The Function of Reason</td>
<td>1929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Adventures of Ideas</td>
<td>1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MT</td>
<td>Modes of Thought</td>
<td>1938</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For complete data on these works, please see the Bibliography.*
A reconstruction and exposition of Hartshorne's basic approach to theodicy, his doctrine of God, and his understanding of creaturely freedom
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION:

THE STATUS OF THE QUESTION

This dissertation is an examination and critical assessment of certain fundamental issues which are involved in Charles Hartshorne's theodicy. Such a study is justified, in part, by the dire lack of serious critical attention (especially outside North America) to process theodicy in general, and to Hartshorne's process theodicy in particular. With respect to the general lack of critical attention, the following complaint of E.H. Madden and P.H. Hare would seem to be an accurate assessment of the situation:

Although they have exercised much influence on Protestant theology, process theists have had disappointingly little influence on philosophical discussions of the problem of evil. Despite the fact that leading process theists have devoted a substantial part of their writings to the discussion of evil, we find publication after publication by philosophers on the problem of evil with hardly a mention of process theism. Nelson Pike's widely used anthology, God and Evil...contains no discussion of process theism, and John Hick's Evil and the God of Love...generally considered the most comprehensive treatment of the problem of evil to date, virtually ignores process theism. Although we might have hoped for a change of attitude, M.B. Ahern, the author of the latest philosophical book devoted to the problem of evil, persists in ignoring process
theism. In our book, *Evil and the Concept of God*... we seem to have been the exception in taking non-traditional as well as traditional forms of theism seriously.\(^1\)

Indeed, Hare and Madden (besides a few thinkers inside "the circle" of process philosophy) seem to be the exception to the trend in ignoring process theodicy. In their book, they give process theodicy serious consideration (albeit largely negative and incomplete) as one of four main types of modern Christian philosophical response to the problem of evil.\(^2\)

The process theodicy of Hartshorne, however, is not distinguished (by Hare and Madden, nor indeed, by the casual reader of process philosophy) from Whitehead's. For too long Hartshorne's metaphysics, and consequently his theodicy, have been understood merely as duplications of Whitehead's writings. As such, Hartshorne's uniqueness and originality of thought have been under-appreciated by his critics. Here, however, two recent essays by D. Griffin and L.S. Ford (both leaders in process thought) are important in that they have argued that, in spite of the generally recognized similarity between Hartshorne and Whitehead,


\(^2\) They argue that while the strategy of process theodicy is to modify the traditional concepts of theism, other strategies involve an evasion of the problem, or a denial of the problem, while many seek to solve the problem as a meaningful one within the framework of traditional Christian concepts. Hare and Madden's book is devoted to an analysis and critique of all of these positions.
there are certain real and important differences.  

I would suggest that some of these differences (see note 3) have important implications for the respective theodicies of Whitehead and Hartshorne, and that accordingly, Hartshorne's theodicy is not to be taken as merely a duplication of Whitehead's. There is need, then, 

---

Griffin notes several basic differences: (1) while for Whitehead God is a single actual entity, for Hartshorne He is an unending series of occasions; (2) Hartshorne rejects Whitehead's doctrine of eternal objects; (3) Whitehead believes that secondary qualities are ingredient in low-grade occasions which prehend them, while Hartshorne argues that secondary qualities are first emergent in the experience of high-grade occasions; (4) Hartshorne's philosophical method is perhaps more rationalistic than Whitehead's; (5) where Whitehead holds that contemporary occasions cannot prehend one another, Hartshorne once held (though he has since changed his mind) that contemporaries can prehend one another; (6) where it is disputed whether or not Whitehead believed that the subjective immediacy of an occasion is lost when it has "become" and is taken into God's experience, Hartshorne argues that it is not lost; and (7) where Whitehead postulates a theory of genetic succession within the occasion as it becomes ("concrecesce": from the Latin, "concrescere" -- "to grow together"), Hartshorne denies any inner (temporal) succession.

Ford has suggested four additional areas wherein Hartshorne and Whitehead differ: (1) while Whitehead believes that the laws of nature are immanent in the world, expressing the causal habits of creatures, Hartshorne believes that the laws are imposed by God; (2) because of Hartshorne's rejection of Whitehead's doctrine of eternal objects, Ford argues that Hartshorne cannot explain divine persuasive power in terms of providing initial subjective aims; (3) and likewise, Hartshorne cannot explain subjectivity in terms of the doctrine of the initial aim given by God; and (4) Whitehead and Hartshorne differ in their views of panpsychism. (See D. Griffin, "Hartshorne's Differences from Whitehead", in L.S. Ford, ed., Two Process Philosophers (Tallahassee: American Academy of Religion, 1973), 35-57. Hereafter cited as TPP; and L.S. Ford, "Whitehead's Differences from Hartshorne", in TPP, 58-83).

See also W. L. Sessions' "Hartshorne's Early Philosophy", TPP, 10-34. Sessions argues that Hartshorne "did not derive most (nor perhaps the most basic) of his philosophical tenets from Whitehead" (TPP, 10). Indeed, Sessions' study of Hartshorne's 1923 dissertation reveals "that most of his mature philosophy was developed independently of, because prior to, his contact with Whitehead (and Peirce)" (TPP, 34).
for a comprehensive and critical study of Hartshorne's theodicy, for
while there have been a handful of dissertations and articles which have
examined certain aspects of Whitehead's theodicy, Hartshorne's rather
unique theodicy has not been appreciated for its uniqueness, nor
critically studied as such. 4 In this present dissertation, accordingly,
this task is undertaken.

The dissertation is in two parts. "Part One" is largely back-
ground, and, as such, is mainly expository. It seeks to define

---

4The following works constitute the major writings on Whitehead's
theodicy: E.J. Thompson's 1935 dissertation for the University of
Chicago; L. Underhill's 1955-56 dissertation for Drew University;
R. Besancon's 1959-60 dissertation for Northern Baptist Theological
Seminary; R. Norman's 1961 dissertation for Yale University; S. Green-
field's 1973 dissertation for Fordham University; and D.D. Baldwin's
1975 dissertation for Claremont Graduate School. There have been,
also, a number of minor articles, most of which are listed in the
Bibliography.

Dissertations and articles on Hartshorne's theodicy have been
even more scarce than is the case with respect to Whitehead. There
is, however, E. Fulton's 1966 dissertation for the University of Iowa,
in which the views of Whitehead and four process thinkers (Hartshorne,
Cobb, Wieman, Meland) are surveyed according to their respective
theories concerning sin and salvation. R. Cavanaugh's 1968 dissertation
for the Graduate Theological Union, further, discusses the doctrine of
providence in the works of Tillich and Hartshorne. Neither of these
dissertations, however, is a satisfactory study of Hartshorne's theodicy,
and Fulton's especially is lacking in detailed analysis of the issues
involved.

For references see Process Studies 1/4 and 3/4, 1971 and 1973,
respectively.

Note that, in this study, I am concerned solely with Hartshorne's
theodicy, and as such, references to Whitehead and to the differences
between Whitehead and Hartshorne must be minimal.
the basic approach which Hartshorne's theodicy takes ("Chapter One"),
and to note the fundamental features of his doctrine of God ("Chapter
Two") and of his understanding of creatures as free agents ("Chapter
Three"). "Part Two" then proceeds to discuss critically the main issues
involved in Hartshorne's theodicy; specifically, his attempt to reconcile
divine omnipotence with creaturely freedom and responsibility for evil
("Chapter Four"), and to reconcile divine benevolence with evil as such
("Chapter Five").
1. The Ontological Argument and Theodicy

Hartshorne has offered us a philosophical theology which is, in many ways, bold and arresting. One striking aspect of it is his claim that it is possible to develop a concept of God that is both philosophically sound and religiously adequate. Indeed, he has argued that it is only by remaining faithful to the religious insight that "God is perfection" that one can resolve certain philosophical difficulties and be able to formulate an adequate metaphysics.

This claim about religious insight has immediate implications for recasting and resolving the age-old problem of theodicy. That problem is characteristically formulated as follows: can one reconcile (A) an all-powerful and (B) an all-good God with (C) the fact of evil? The critic argues that, given evil, (1) God must either be unwilling, if able, to prevent evil (and hence, not all-good), or (2) God must be unable, if willing, to prevent evil (and hence, not
all-powerful). Or indeed, (3) there is no God at all.  

Hartshorne would argue that this way of formulating the problem is questionable — specifically, since it unwittingly commits the

This formulation of the argument against the existence of God has been used widely since Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (cf. Parts X and XI). See, for example, its use by F.H. Bradley, John Stuart Mill, J.E. McTaggart, Antony Flew, H.D. Aiken, J.L. Mackie, C.J. Ducasse, H.J. McCloskey, W.T. Stace, etc. For references, see Bibliography, or Nelson Pike, ed., God and Evil (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1964), 86-87.

Note this important point: from Hartshorne's perspective, most of the current philosophical discussions of the problem of evil, which seek to show that the reality of evil is either evidence that God cannot be all-powerful or all-good or that He simply cannot exist, are irrelevant. Likewise is it with many theistic responses to such arguments which try to reconcile God's power and goodness with the reality of evil. Hartshorne would argue (though he has not done so directly) that both sides of this debate are misguided; for, quite simply, they both seem to presume the "classical" conception of God which is, for Hartshorne, incoherent: "the classical formulations and the classical refutations alike are unacceptable" ("God's Existence: A Conceptual Problem", Religious Experience and Truth, ed., S. Hook. N.Y.: N.Y. University Press, 1961, 219). He would grant the atheists that such a conception of divine power and goodness is incoherent with the fact of evil, and he would reject the theist's attempt to reconcile such a God with evil. (Let us note here, however, that the dissertation does not intend to critically assess Hartshorne on his understanding of this approach to theodicy: there are many complex issues here which cannot be discussed. Our purpose is simply to put forth Hartshorne's position, and then, later, to assess its implications). As will be argued later, Hartshorne redefines the conception of God so that (what he takes to be) the implications of the traditional Christian understanding of God (as "having all the power there is", and as such, being solely responsible for all things, including evil, such that creaturely freedom and responsibility is rendered illusory), are overcome: God's power is such that it permits a certain freedom and responsibility in all creatures. Likewise, His goodness (or love) is such that, rather than being complete in itself, it receives and benefits from the values actualized by creaturely-free experiences. In this way, he argues, God alone cannot be held responsible for evil, nor indeed, is its existence incoherent with His power and goodness. The chief purpose of this dissertation is to fully reconstruct and assess Hartshorne's argument in this respect.
category mistake of conceiving God's existence as a matter of contingent fact (see note 5). As such, it assumes that the present fact of evil in the world could count as evidence against God's existence while, in fact, the divine existence is an a priori necessity (and as such is immune to empirical evidence).

He bases this latter thesis upon his revision of the ontological proof of Anselm, wherein he seeks to show the validity of the argument that "God as perfection" implies that His existence is of another modal status than all other beings: serious consideration of God's perfection as "that than which nothing greater is conceivable" implies that either God necessarily exists or "God" does not denote an existential possibility at all. God, in other words, either necessarily exists or He necessarily does not exist. This, according to Hartshorne, is Anselm's great discovery (cf. AD 3 ff, and passim).

Hartshorne has devoted much of his attention, especially in the 1960's, to a defence and revision of Anselm's ontological argument. He thinks that the ontological argument, properly conceived, makes the problem of God's existence a purely conceptual affair, such that empirical considerations (such as evil) are quite irrelevant; that is,

---


7 See, for example, his AD and EP, both devoted entirely to this issue.

8 See, however, note 32.
in the sense that such do not count as decisive evidence either for or against the divine existence which, by definition, is an a priori necessity. One of Hartshorne's major revisions of Anselm's argument.

In this context, Hartshorne sides not with the verificational analysts (who hold that the test of the validity of any statement is whether or not it can be empirically verified), but with the falsificationists (especially with Karl Popper) who argue, rather, that the crucial test of assertions is whether they are falsifiable: "Empirical statements are falsifiable", he argues, "whether or not they are verifiable." (See his "A New Look at the Problem of Evil", in F.C. Dommeyer, ed., Current Philosophical Issues: Essays in Honor of Curt John Ducasse (Springfield, Illinois: C.C. Thomas, 1966), 201; see also, AD, passim). The verification test, in other words, is not a sufficient test of the meaningfulness of statements and propositions. "It is not enough," Hartshorne writes, "that experience can illustrate or confirm a proposition; if it is to be usefully called empirical, experience must conceivably be able to disconfirm it." (NTT 67).

When this test is applied to the question of God's existence, it implies that, in order to falsify (deny) the divine existence (or rather, statements which claim that God does exist) by some empirical evidence (of which evil is the most likely example), one would have to "observe some positive fact incompatible with that existence (see his "God's Existence: A Conceptual Problem", 217). But, as Hartshorne contends, the very "definition of God excludes this possibility" since "God is conceived as independent in his existence of all other things", and as such, "a fact incompatible with his existence would mean that, were he to exist, he would owe this existence to the nonbeing of the supposed fact." (See his "God's Existence: A Conceptual Problem", 217-218). But, according to Hartshorne, this would contradict the independence (or perfection) of God, for, as he explains:

Suppose for instance that some very evil but possible world would, if it existed, show that God did not exist; then God, if he does exist, owes his existence to the fortunate accident that the allegedly possible evil world does not exist. We should have to say to God, we owe our existence to you, but you owe yours to the lucky accident that no world incompatible with your existence happens to be. Thus the creator would virtually have a creator. ("God's Existence: A Conceptual Problem", 218).
has been, however, to insist that it is God's existence as such which is necessary, but not His actuality (as distinguished above: see note 9).

Further, against those (for example, Kant) who argue that God's existence cannot be either proved or disproved, Hartshorne suggests that "he [Kant] ought to have asked himself, what can it mean to say that a doctrine, against which there could be no evidence, yet might be false?" (See his "Can There Be Proofs for the Existence of God?", in R.H. Ayers and W.T. Blackstone, eds., Religious Language and Knowledge (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1972), 75). Hartshorne contends that there are but two alternatives here: "Either all conceivable facts properly understood must manifest God's existence, or no conceivable fact or state of affairs could manifest it". (See his "God's Existence: A Conceptual Problem", 218). Yet, no empirical experience could imply the non-existence of God since, according to Hartshorne's logic, "God must have eminent capacity to coexist with any conceivable universe and any experience that is possible". (See his "Deity as the Inclusive Transcendence", in C.N. Shuster and R.E. Thorson, eds., Evolution in Perspective: Commentaries in Honor of Pierre Lecomte du Noüy (Notre Dame and London: The University of Notre Dame Press, 1970), 159).

God's necessary existence is independent of the particular world which happens to exist. As such, the specific, contingent character of the world does not show us that God exists, for He would exist no matter what the contingent state of the world might be (see Hartshorne's "God's Existence: A Conceptual Problem", 218; and his "Tillich and the Non-Theological Meaning of Theological Terms", Religion in Life 35/5, Winter, 1966, 681-682). In other words, as Hartshorne argues, God exists necessarily, but He has contingent actuality (see his "Is God's Existence a State of Affairs?", in J. Hick, ed., Faith and Philosophers (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), 29). For Hartshorne, "actuality [that is, the "concrete state of a thing"] is always more than bare existence": God's necessary existence is always "somehow concretely actualized; but how it is actualized, in what particular state, with what particular content not deducible from the abstract definition, constitutes the actuality" (see his "What Did Anselm Discover?", in John Hick, ed., The Many Faced Argument (London: Macmillan, 1968), 329). In short, then, according to Hartshorne, it is necessary that God exists in some state or another, yet which state is not necessary but contingent.
the latter being contingent. Anselm, as an exponent of what Hartshorne takes as the traditional Christian view of God (which Hartshorne rejects), assumed that if God's existence is shown to be necessary, then all aspects of God (that is, all of His attributes) must, likewise, be necessary. Hartshorne's view is, rather, that God's nature is dipolar (or bipolar; to be discussed in detail later) such that He exists necessarily (abstractly) but has contingent (concrete) actuality. Hartshorne believes that the Anselmian version of the ontological argument, can be refuted by positivists who object to the very conception of God employed by Anselm, for as the positivists argue, the conception is incoherent.¹⁰ For the proof to hold, the conception of God employed

¹⁰Hartshorne writes:

The ontological argument confronts us with a trilemma: (1) The idea of God lacks consistent cognitive meaning (the positivistic position); (2) The idea of God has consistent meaning, and what it describes exists, but only in fact, not by any a priori necessity; (3) The idea of God has consistent meaning, but what it describes in fact fails to exist.

1. The greatest difficulty confronting the Anselmian is to disprove the first or positivistic horn of the trilemma ("Can There Be Proofs for the Existence of God?", 73).

To be sure, the positivistic critique does not deal solely with the question of coherence: it deals also with the verification/falsification issue (see note 9). The verificational analysts (e.g., the early Ayer) argue that (tersely put) "God" is not an idea that has an original in sense experience, and accordingly is meaningless or senseless. Hartshorne's response here concurs with the generally accepted criticism that the verification principle is itself problematic and not an adequate basis of testing the meaningfulness of our language and ideas (see, for example, F. Perré, Language, Logic, and God (New York: Harper and Row, 1961, 8 ff)). There are other critics of theism (and indeed many theists) who argue not for the generally rejected verification test but for the falsification criterion of meaning.
in it must be rendered coherent, and this can be done, according to

Antony Flew, for example (following the brilliant work of Karl Popper), argues that the idea of God can be falsified by the existence of evil and suffering. He argues, furthermore, that if the theist denies that evil and suffering can falsify (or deny the meaningfulness of) the idea of God, then the reference, "God", is meaningless: for it to have meaning, it must conceivably be falsifiable. Now, Hartshorne's argument here is to deny this conclusion. He argues that while the reference, "God", cannot be falsified, it is not thereby rendered meaningless, for besides the analytic and ordinary factual statements which are considered meaningful by the falsificational analysts (and which are referred to by Hartshorne as "non-restrictive, non-existential" and "partially restrictive"--of existential possibilities--statements), and besides the "totally restrictive" statements, there is, he contends, a fourth type of statement; namely, "non-restrictive existentials". The latter are not falsifiable by experience, but are necessary, a priori, and indeed are verified by any experience. Such statements are the substance of metaphysics, for metaphysics "tries to formulate non-restrictive or necessary existential truths" (CSPM 172). Hartshorne offers examples of such statements:

Necessarily, something exists.

Necessarily, experience occurs.

Necessarily, creative synthesis occurs.

Necessarily, there are concrete actualities all of which are both externally and internally related, both absolute and relative.

Necessarily, divine or infallible experience, having fallible experiences among its objects, occurs.

It is suggested that the last formulation sums up the others (CSPM 172).

For the details of Hartshorne's argument, see CSPM, chapter 8. Here we note only his basic point; namely, that there are non-restrictive or existential truths which are meaningful, even though they are not falsifiable. Hartshorne's argument is that no empirical state of affairs can falsify the divine existence, but that this does not imply -- versus the falsificational analysts -- that the idea of God or His existence is meaningless. Hartshorne's argument here, to be sure, is extremely complex, yet it cannot be further discussed nor critically assessed: the dissertation will deal solely with the implications of Hartshorne's position. In this light, attention will be focused upon his attempt to show that the concept of God is not rendered incoherent nor falsified by empirical considerations -- specifically, by suffering and evil.
Hartshorne, only be conceiving God's nature as dipolar. The traditional Christian understanding of God employed by Anselm and others is, for Hartshorne, somewhat incoherent and inconsistent. But before considering Hartshorne's critique of this conception of God, and his own (Hartshorne's) alternative view (which, he holds, escapes the positivists' criticism), we must briefly note the basic thrust of his understanding of the ontological proof for God's existence.

Anselm's argument has been debated by philosophers since its conception, and yet, Hartshorne believes that he was among the first to uncover a second argument for God's existence in Anselm's text. The two arguments are contained, basically, in Proslogium, "Chapter Two" and "Chapter Three". The first (in the former chapter), according to Hartshorne, holds (loosely summarized) that since existence is good, and since the most perfect being must have all goods, God must exist. To this, Kant (and before him, Gassendi) responded that existence is not a predicate which a thing simply can have or not have: "An idea or definition attributes properties hypothetically, it says what a thing of a certain sort must be like if there exists such a thing. Hence


12Besides Hartshorne, the two versions fairly recently have been taken seriously by K. Barth, and by N. Malcolm, J. Findlay, and Flint. For details, see Bibliography. For Hartshorne's arguments, see AD passim, and LP passim, etc.
existence is not one of the properties in question". Hartshorne agrees with Kant and the main historical tradition that this argument refutes the ontological proof — but only the version contained in Proslogium, "Chapter Two".

The argument in "Chapter Three" may be summarized, according to Hartshorne, as follows: "To exist necessarily is better than to exist contingently; hence the greatest conceivable being can exist only necessarily. Moreover, whatever could be necessary is necessary ("reduction principle" of modal logic)."  

Hartshorne argues that, while the first argument contains paradoxes, and is refutable, the second does not contain these same paradoxes and is not refuted by the objections to the first. The principle of the first proof may be taken, according to Hartshorne, as follows: "For any $x$ and $y$, $x$ exists (not merely in the mind) and $y$ does not, implies $x$ is greater than $y". This logic involves two paradoxes: (1) it is a truism to hold that any entity is an entity, and that hence a nonexistent $y$ is meaningless; to hold that a certain thing exists only in the mind is to say that there is no such individual in the mind or anywhere; and (2):

13 Charles Hartshorne, "What Did Anselm Discover?", 322.
14 Charles Hartshorne, "What Did Anselm Discover?", 322.
15 Charles Hartshorne, "What Did Anselm Discover?", 323.
if we define a property, and then ask if something having the property exists, we assume that the property in question is fixed and will not change according to whether the answer is yes or no. The notion that a property gets better by being exhibited in real individual existence is incoherent, since it is then not that property which is exhibited.

It was these paradoxes, according to Hartshorne, which led Gassendi and Kant to argue that existence is not a predicate.

The second of Anselm’s arguments, however, may be illustrated as follows: "For any x and y, x exists noncontingently and y exists contingently implies, x is greater than y".17 This argument, according to Hartshorne, escapes both of the paradoxes of the first. It is not, first of all, a comparison between one entity which exists and another which does not, but rather, between two existential entities which exist in different modal fashion. Secondly:

no property is supposed to alter according as it is or is not existentialized; for in the case of x the nonexistential status is by definition excluded as impossible (the meaning of "exists noncontingently") and does not enter into the comparison at all; while in the case of the y, its property or kind could perfectly well be the same if there were no y to illustrate it, this being what is meant by "contingently".18

Accordingly, since "the two paradoxes are precisely those which figure

16 Charles Hartshorne, "What Did Anselm Discover?", 323.
17 Charles Hartshorne, "What Did Anselm Discover?", 323.
18 Charles Hartshorne, "What Did Anselm Discover?", 323, 329; See also, AD 301.
centrally in the classical refutations (Gassendi, Hume, Kant, and Russell), Hartshorne can argue that the second version of the proof is untouched by the refutations of the first, for the paradoxes are not contained in the version of Proslogium, "Chapter Three". Hartshorne, accordingly, insists that many historical critics of the ontological argument are guilty of the "ignoratio elenchi" ("argument from convenient ignorance").

Hartshorne's statement of the second version of the proof, which he defends, takes the following form:

**Major Premise:** Whatever is coherently conceivable is either actual or an unactualized (but real, more than merely "logical") potency.

**Minor Premise:** God, or Perfect Being, is coherently conceivable.

**Conclusion:** God is either actual or an unactualized potency.

**Third Premise:** God is not an unactualized potency ("potency of perfection" being meaningless or self-contradictory).

**Conclusion:** God is actual.

Please note that it is not my intention to reconstruct fully and critically evaluate the many logical and philosophical subtleties involved in Hartshorne's conception of the ontological proof; indeed,

---

19 Charles Hartshorne, "What Did Anselm Discover?", 323.


such a task would, in itself, constitute the subject-matter of a dissertation. My intention, rather, in this chapter has been simply to state, in terse form, the basic outline of Hartshorne's position, and, in the pages to follow, to examine the implications for his theodicy of Hartshorne's use of the ontological proof.

Hartshorne's basic contention, in this respect, is that the ontological argument, properly conceived, makes the problem of evil impossible in principle, for nothing contingent (of which evil is the prime example) can count as evidence against the divine existence which, according to the ontological proof, is an a priori necessity. I do not wish to try to justify nor to dispute this thesis, but simply would accept it: if the ontological argument is valid, that is, if God's existence can be established as an a priori necessity, then nothing contingent could count as evidence against that divine existence. But there is an important problem here, one which renders problematic the claim that the ontological proof can solve the traditional problem.

---

22 There have been several dissertations in the last few years which deal directly with this particular issue: cf., for example, Nordulgen (1966), Speer (1967), Shofner (1972), and Lewis (1973). For details, see Process Studies 3/4, Winter, 1973, 304-307.

23 Hartshorne recently has confirmed this thesis:

a principle reason why I have been interested in the idea that the divine existence is necessary is that it makes the problem of evil impossible in principle, if the evils are taken as contingent empirical facts. For such facts could not conflict with unconditional necessity. (private correspondence to the present author, 1974).
of theodicy. The positivists' objection to the ontological proof must be considered, for they attack the minor premise of the proof, that "God is conceivable". Hartshorne is fully aware of this objection, and of its importance. He conceives that if the conception of God employed in the proof is incoherent, then the proof itself is invalid, as the positivists contend. Hartshorne admits, further, that the positivists' objection is the most serious objection that can be raised against the proof, and that indeed, it attacks the proof at its "weakest point", the minor premise. He points out, however, that the proof is directed not against positivists, but against atheists. For, according to Hartshorne, while the former contend that the idea of God is, in itself, incoherent, the latter concede that the idea of God is conceivable, and yet at the same time, wish to argue that God is nevertheless non-existent. Hartshorne argues that the ontological proof exposes this atheistic position as invalid; that is, since it is incoherent to say that God could exist but does not; that the concept of God is meaningful, yet that God does not exist in fact. Hartshorne's argument is that God either exists necessarily, or "God" does not refer

---


to an existential possibility at all.

To refute the positivists' objection, the minor premise of the ontological proof must be substantiated; it must be shown that the concept of God as perfection is a coherent, conceivable idea. The problem has been that the conception of God employed in traditional forms of Christianity is, according to Hartshorne, incoherent. Anselm, for example, represents this traditional understanding of God (termed by Hartshorne, "classical") wherein God is conceived as completely absolute, self-sufficient, and wholly necessary:

His [Anselm's] major mistake was that he failed to explore the possible ways of defining perfection [Anselm believed that God "was a being perfect in every way, and hence in power and goodness. And, it was supposed, a being perfect in power must be able to prevent anything undesirable from occurring. It was not noticed that this is already an absurdity"]. And for this and other reasons failed to realize that his own definition was incoherent and hence not an "idea" in the required sense.

---

26 Hartshorne argues that conceptual possibility is the same as real possibility — an arguable contention, perhaps, but one which cannot be taken up in this study.

27 Charles Hartshorne, "A New Look at the Problem of Evil", 202. Hartshorne, we must note, somewhat naively assumes that traditional Christianity conceives of God in only one way.

28 Charles Hartshorne, "Formal Validity and Real Significance of the Ontological Argument", 228. See also, "What Did Anselm Discover?", 328: "Anselm's own idea of God was in truth absurd, so that for this idea positivism is actually valid".
Hartshorne has long argued that while religious insight has conceived God as all-powerful and all-good (or as "omnibenevolent", a term which combines the attributes of power and goodness), traditional usage of the terms has been vague and incoherent. Hartshorne's revised theism is, thus, concerned to redefine more clearly what these concepts imply (as will be discussed in "Chapter Two"). Without this (somewhat radical) redefining of God's nature, the ontological proof falls to the positivists objection, and many of the traditional problems of theism (including, especially, the problem of evil) remain unsolved, and as Hartshorne would argue, unsolvable.

Now, with respect to the positivists' objection to the ontological argument, Hartshorne argues that that objection must be met by some "other means than the ontological proof" itself. In order to show, accordingly, that the concept of God is a coherent and conceivable idea, Hartshorne has employed various methods. He argues, for example, that if the idea of God is incoherent, it "ought to be possible to point to the features in it which, by their conflict, generate the 'incoherence.'" And, of course, "If this cannot be done, we have in this fact itself evidence that the idea is coherent, and

---

in the case of God this means evidence that its object is actual. 30

Hartshorne, however, does not rely solely on this defense. He offers more positive argumentation to substantiate his thesis that God is conceivable. He argues, for example, that "logic and ethics inevitably make at least implicit use of the idea of perfection" (i.e., God's), for our logic is sound in so far as it is aware of the discrepancy between itself and ideal (God's) knowledge, omniscience; and our moral actions are sound in so far as we are aware of the enlightened or perfect good will, the holiness of God. 31

The most important of the elements, however, involved in Hartshorne's substantiation of the minor premise of the ontological proof -- and the only one which will concern this present study -- is his life-long task to redefine the conception of "God", and


31 Charles Hartshorne, "Formal Validity and Real Significance of the Ontological Argument", 228. Further comments on this thesis cannot be made here, nor is Hartshorne's thesis to be justified here. Likewise it is with respect to his contention that other arguments for God's existence (that is, other than the ontological) support the ontological proof: cf. "Formal Validity and Real Significance of the Ontological Argument", 229; and "Can There Be Proofs for the Existence of God?", 73. He writes, for example, that the minor premise of the ontological proof is supported by the cosmological argument since "the assumption of coherence for our concept of [God's] perfection is the only way to meet the demand whose validity the cosmological argument establishes" ("Formal Validity and Real Significance of the Ontological Argument", 229). See also, NTT 53, 59, MVG 340, for Hartshorne's reference to the teleological proof.
consequently, of what it means to be a "creature". 32. The former

32 Hartshorne's meaning here has often been misunderstood. One critic, for example, has challenged Hartshorne with degrading theology to mere logical analysis, to "a kind of theological cybernetics" (J. Taubes, "A Review Article: Philosophers Speak of God", 122). This type of concern raises the question: is God, for Hartshorne, to be defined, or rather experienced as religious discovery? Referring to his classifications of the formally possible understandings of God (to be noted in "Chapter Two"), and in direct response to Taubes' critique, Hartshorne has written:

We do not remotely share the illusion of Leibniz that philosophical issues are to be settled by mere "calculation". Our symbolism is not a calculus. We do not dream of providing anything as to the divine nature by formal operations alone....The purpose of the symbolism is to facilitate the survey, almost at a glance, of the formally possible combinations of "Yes" and "No" answers to a certain set of questions which, in historical fact, and in our opinion rightly, are prominent in discussions about the meaning of "God." The procedure is not intended to decide automatically between "Yes" and "No" in each and any case but rather the opposite -- to prevent short cuts to decisions, to discourage the unexamined exclusion of any combination of answers, prior to discussion on a more than merely formal level. A further aim is to define, in as lucid a manner as possible, the differences and similarities between various "possible" (not obviously impossible) ideas about God, so far as they furnish answers to our set of questions ("The Kinds of Theism: A Reply", Journal of Religion 34,2 (April, 1954), 128).

Hartshorne's concern is primarily with applying "logical analysis to the religious idea of God" (DR ix). He does not deny that God is experienced or discovered in purely religious intuitions, etc.; but his main concern is to reflect rationally upon theological and philosophical uses of the conception of God. That the God who is intuited must also be rationally conceived or conceptualized is Hartshorne's point:
task directly involves the latter, for God is considered not solely in His necessary existence, but also in His contingent actuality (see above, note 9), both of which are aspects of His dipolar nature: He has both absolute and relative, necessary and contingent, infinite and finite (etc.), aspects of His nature (as will be discussed in the following chapter), the one aspect denoting His independent essence, the other implying, more particularly, His involvement with the world of creatures. This dissertation, then, seeks to reconstruct and critically assess Hartshorne’s understanding of "God" and, correspondingly, of what it means to be a "creature", and, in particular, of one critical issue which arises out of the interaction between God and creatures: the problem of evil. This study, furthermore, not only seeks to show how Hartshorne tries to substantiate the minor premise of the ontological proof, but constitutes, in itself, I would argue, the basis of a viable theodicy. For by showing how the conception of God is reconciled both with man (as a free and morally responsible being) and with evil as such (produced in part by man's creative freedom), we have, in this, the basis of a viable theodicy, whether or not the ontological proof

With Crisis Theology...our theory can agree that God is personal and self-related to the creatures, and that his acts of self-relationship are not rationally deducible, but require to be "encountered." However, as Barth and Brunner seem not to see, this is compatible with there being an essence of God which is philosophically explicable and knowable (DR xiii).
is considered!

There would seem to be, accordingly, two related aspects involved in Hartshorne's theodicy: (1) his ontological proof, by which God's necessary existence is to be established; and which, if valid, renders theodicy a "pseudoproblem"; and (2) his attempt to formulate a conception of God which is coherent and conceivable such that the fact of evil and suffering does not falsify, or appear incoherent with, the existence of God. Note that the latter supports the former where the former is weakest (that is, in the minor premise). In this present study, I am concerned solely with this latter aspect, and contend that it is, in itself, the basis of a viable theodicy; specifically, I am contending that the ontological proof is not the only basis in Hartshorne for his solution to the problems of theodicy. Hartshorne recently has substantiated this claim; he summarized his contribution to theodicy as involving "the use of [Whitehead's doctrine of] creative freedom...and the logic of contingency and necessity", with the corollaries, "a new perspective on the ontological argument, and a new defence of the possibility of metaphysics". The doctrine of creative freedom involves, I would argue, his attempt to redefine

---


34 Charles Hartshorne, "Ideas and Theses of Process Philosophers", in TPP, 102.
the range and extent of man's (and creatures' in general) freedom
of agency and moral responsibility (for good and evil), and
correspondingly, an understanding of God which is coherent and
consistent with such. It is this aspect of Hartshorne's theodicy
which this study seeks to reconstruct and assess; and it is, I am
arguing, the more viable basis of his theodicy, for the ontological
proof need not, and perhaps cannot (as he himself points out), stand
on its own (despite certain critics who imply or assume that
Hartshorne's ontological proof is the sole basis of his theodicy;
that is, since it would imply -- assuming the validity of the argument --
that theodicy is a "pseudoproblem").

The central issue of this study, then, is this: is the
conception of God in Hartshorne's metaphysics coherent and consistent
with the free agency and responsibility for evil of creatures in
general, and of man in particular? And indeed, is the conception of
God coherent with the nature of evil as such (specifically, with its
source, nature, function, and overcoming)? Hartshorne's conception of

35 Hare and Madden, to be sure, note the two aspects of Hartshorne's theodicy, yet argue that the two are incoherent (cf. their Evil and the Concept of God, 48 ff). See also D.D. Baldwin's brilliant reply to Hare and Madden on behalf of Whitehead's theodicy; but note his seeming misunderstanding of Hartshorne's theodicy which he takes to be solely an "argument for the existence of God which is immune to any empirical evidence that could occur in any world" ("Evil and Persuasive Power: A Response to Hare and Madden", Process Studies 3/4 Winter, 1974, 270).
God as omnibenevolent (all-powerful and all-good) will be considered, together with his understanding of God as dipolar, the latter implying that God is infinite in some (not all) of His aspects, and finite in some (not all) of His aspects. The task of the study is not, as noted above, to argue that God exists or that His necessary existence makes the problem of evil impossible in principle; it is rather to study Hartshorne's attempt to show that evil does not make God's existence inconceivable, that evil does not rule out God's existence from the outset. The study is critical in terms of the inner coherence of Hartshorne's argument. 36

---

36 Reference to the wider discussion of this issue in its historical and modern setting must be kept to a minimum since it will not be possible to assess Hartshorne's understanding of the ancient and medieval tradition, nor of modern discussions on the problem of evil. Such reference would involve this present study in extremely complicated and immense issues. It must suffice here to deal with the internal coherence of Hartshorne's own argument, for this is itself highly complex, and generally ignored or misunderstood by many writers and critics of theodicy.
2. Outline of the Dissertation

I am proposing to examine Hartshorne's theodicy with respect to assessing the viability of his attempt to offer us a conception of God which is both philosophically and religiously adequate, and as such, is coherent with (or, at least, not falsifiable by) the reality of evil and with creatures as free and morally responsible agents. Hartshorne's neoclassical theism\(^\text{37}\) expresses his attempt to conceive of God in such a way that is consistent with the whole of human experience and knowledge. He regards the question of the existence and nature of God as the most basic of all metaphysical questions (though he feels that traditional thinking on this matter is, largely, confused and incoherent).\(^\text{38}\) God must be conceived as coherent with the reality of human freedom (and creaturely freedom in general), for the latter seems to be presupposed by moral experience (and perhaps by other sorts

---

\(^{37}\) Hartshorne calls his theism "neoclassical" to distinguish it from the "classical" theism and metaphysics which, he argues, has predominated western metaphysics from the time of the ancient Greeks until the last few centuries. There has been, however, as Hartshorne argues, a minor movement in historical Christian theology which he understands as the predecessors of his own type of theism, beginning with Socinus (in the West) with anticipations in Origen, Tertullian, and Plato, etc. (LP x). More recently, the view has become, he contends, more common, with varying formulations in Schelling, Fechner, Montague, Berdyaev, Peirce, James, and especially Whitehead, among others (cf. DR xi; PSG 29-57, 233-365, and passim).

\(^{38}\) Cf., for example, DR, passim; PSG, passim; MVC, passim.
of experience). God must, furthermore, be conceived as consistent with evil as such; that is, with its source, nature, function, and overcoming -- or, at least, it must be shown that evil does not falsify or render meaningless the idea of an all-good and all-powerful God.

The dissertation, then, takes the following form:

"Chapter Two" is a study (which is largely expository rather than critically assessive) of Hartshorne's conception of God. It defines his understanding of the divine perfection and its expression in dipolarity and omnibeneicence. For purposes of systematic convenience, the study abstracts from divine beneficence both divine all-powerfulness and all-goodness. Each attribute is considered in turn, with reference to Hartshorne's revised interpretation of the concepts.

---

39 This implies that Hartshorne's theodicy involves, to an important extent, a version of the "free-will solution"; this implication will be defended later by a consideration of other aspects of Hartshorne's writings, and will then, in "Chapter Four", be critically discussed and assessed.

Please note, however, that while it may be acknowledged that the "free-will solution" may not be so central to theodicy in other historical and modern writers, the dissertation must preclude from historical questions, and from comparisons and evaluations. Such terms as freedom, free-will, reason, value, perfection, etc., have long and complex histories in philosophical and theological thought, and while it would be interesting and informative to study and critically assess Hartshorne's understanding of these historical views, such is not possible within the confines of this present study, which must limit itself solely to Hartshorne's own position.
Hartshorne's contention is noted, namely, that his revised conception of divine power and goodness, and of God as dipolar in nature, suggests a radical clarification of traditional views of "God" and, correspondingly, of what it means to be a "creature", and as such, implies a viable basis for the affirmation of creaturely freedom and moral responsibility for acts of good and evil; that is, vis-à-vis the divine causal agency.

"Chapter Three" examines Hartshorne's understanding of creaturely freedom and responsibility, specifically with reference to his "psychicalism" (which holds that all forms of being are -- to some varying degree -- sentient) and his "relative determinism" (which holds that all forms of being are -- to some varying degree -- free). The further issue of determining the moral responsibility of the free agency of man (as the highest form of creaturely being) is discussed. This latter issue is dealt with critically, and the parallel to certain issues discussed in later chapters is noted.

Having suggested, then, the basic approach of Hartshorne's theodicy, his revised understanding of God, and his theory of creaturely freedom, the study proceeds, in "Chapter Four", to critically analyze Hartshorne's attempt to reconcile divine omnibeneficence (considered here, for purposes of methodological convenience, especially with respect to divine power) with creaturely freedom -- and in particular, man's freedom and moral responsibility for evil. It is argued that, in spite of Hartshorne's insistence that God exerts purely "persuasive" influence upon creatures, there is implicit, in various of his theories,
aspects of "coerciveness" in the divine causal agency. This, we note, refutes the rather common interpretation of Hartshorne's God as being somewhat Deistic. Hartshorne's God does not merely "persuade" creatures to actions (implying a rather passive and largely ineffective influence) and then simply appropriate and preserve these creaturely experiences. To the query of D.D. Williams, for example, as to whether God acts, as opposed to merely listening, it is argued that Hartshorne's God is actively involved in (as he puts it) every stage of every creaturely experience; indeed, He is so eminently involved as to exert "coercive" influence at times. As such, man's freedom and responsibility for evil is somewhat limited, though man has sufficient freedom for morally decisive actions within the limits set forth by God and in spite of the divine coerciveness. It is argued, further, that the acknowledgment of the element of coerciveness in the divine causal agency is essential for Hartshorne's thesis that God never permits man to use his freedom to create an overabundance of evil vis-à-vis the goods in existence. Persuasiveness alone could not secure this end; and indeed, this end is important for Hartshorne's overall theodicy, for it implies that what evil there is, is permitted by God, and as such, it can be understood to be in less abundance than the goods actualized. Evil and chaos never predominate over good and order, and as such, the former can be reconciled with God, as all-good and all-powerful, while yet acknowledging and respecting creaturely freedom and responsible agency.

"Chapter Five" reaches a similar conclusion when Hartshorne's
understanding of God's omnipresence (especially, here again for methodological convenience, considered as all-goodness and love) is considered *vis-à-vis* the fact of evil as such; that is, its source, nature, function and overcoming by God. Hartshorne understands evil as arising inevitably from the creative freedom of all beings (since God does not simply create or determine all creaturely acts), and while its negative reality is strictly acknowledged, its function as an aesthetic principle and its overcoming by God suggest that there is always an aspect of good (of order, of value) in every new creative act, such that evil (chaos, disorder) never predominates over the good. As such, divine beneficence is reconciled with evil to the extent that, while God is not solely responsible for the evils created by the (limited) agency of creatures in general (and man in particular), He does ensure that all values and goods are appreciated and eternally preserved, and passed back into the world (such that future creatures may benefit from past goods). God ensures, furthermore, by His overcoming of evil and by His (at times) coercive influence, that evils never predominate over the goods, that chaos and disorder never predominate over order and value. As such, He does all that an all-good and all-powerful God can do, while respecting the creature's right to freedom, and considering the nature of evil as such.
CHAPTER TWO

THE DOCTRINE OF GOD:
HARTSHORNE'S NEOCLASSICAL THEISM

1. Hartshorne's Method of Conceiving of God

Hartshorne's conception of God arises from his intense consideration of what is involved in the understanding of God as "perfection" (based, especially, upon Anselm's understanding of God as "that than which nothing greater can be conceived"). God can be conceived, however, according to Hartshorne, only by first considering man. Knowledge of God (and of the rest of reality external to the self) begins with man's experience of himself. Following Whitehead, Hartshorne describes this starting point of epistemology as the "reformed subjectivist principle" (cf. PR 238-254; WP 57, etc.). This principle is distinguished from Descartes' "subjectivist principle" since Descartes' well-known location of the indubitable basis of knowledge in the thinking self does not go far enough, according to Hartshorne: it does not acknowledge that man does not merely think, but thinks something. The basic experience, then, according to the reformed subjectivist principle, is that man is aware of external reality; or rather, that he feels orprehends the causal data and synthesizes it into a new whole. This, according to Hartshorne and Whitehead, immediately wards off the
solipsist threat implied in the Cartesian position; that is, that our most basic experience is our own thinking; and further, it acknowledges the nature of reality as a creative process.

Hartshorne argues that certain basic or generic traits of human experience can be ascertained and then generalized to apply to all of reality as "cosmic variables". As Whitehead argued, "creativity", the "many", and the "one" constitute the "category of the ultimate"; that is, the basic characteristic of all reality (PR 31-32). All beings exemplify creativity, a self-determining freedom whereby the many of the causal data are unified into the one, a new creative experience. In Whitehead's succinct phrase, "The many become one and are increased by one" (PR 32). Hartshorne holds that this dictum may be considered as the central insight of Whitehead's metaphysical system, his "novel intuition" (WP 161-162 ff.). The other generic traits of reality are all implied in this basic category. These include, according to Whitehead, various categories of existence, of explanation, and obligation (cf. PR 32-42). Now Hartshorne, likewise, denotes various characteristics

---


2The term "variables" implies that while certain traits are exemplified in all of reality, the higher forms of life possess them in greater degree than do the lower levels (cf. BH 112).
which are found in human experience, and which can be generalized for
all of reality. In an early essay, he defines "cognition", "feeling",
and "volition" as such "cosmic variables" (BH chapter 8). This is
consistent with Whitehead's "category of the ultimate", and implies,
virtually, the same thing; that is, that all beings have these basic
characteristics by which (it follows) the past data are unified into a
new whole in every new, creative experience. More recently, Hartshorne
has more specifically defined twenty-one basic, "ultimate or metaphysical
contrarieties"; that is, the more specific generic categories exemplified
in all of reality (cf. CSF!, chapter 6; especially pages 100-101). In
every experience, for example, we may discern relativity and absolute-
ness, effect and cause, becoming and being, temporality and non-
temporality, concreteness and abstractness, actuality and potentiality,
contingency and necessity, finiteness and infiniteness, discreteness
and continuity, complexity and simplicity, etc.

Hartshorne contends that these traits of human experience can
be generalized to include all reality, indeed, from the electron to God
Himself. As such, they are called "cosmic variables". Now this, to be
sure, is an extremely bold claim; but it is substantiated, according to

3We must, Hartshorne contends, "stretch" the basic categories
(MVG 132) to obtain "maximal flexibility of concepts" (MVG 221).
Hartshorne, both by his defence of psychicalism (wherein it is argued that all of reality is sentient) and by his argument that our experience of ourselves as men depends upon the presupposition of our awareness of God as the chief exemplification of the metaphysical categories, of the cosmic variables. Hartshorne's psychicalism is discussed in "Chapter Three" to follow, and as such, we need mention here only that his defence of it resides, in part, in his denial of opposing theories as incoherent, and in his rejection of the mind-body dualism as especially mistaken. Hartshorne's position is, rather, that all reality consists of "psychical events" from which mindless matter and unextended mind are abstractions.

We must deal briefly with the other aspect of his argument; that is, that God is the chief exemplification of the categories. Hartshorne contends that man's very experience presupposes a perfect exemplification of the categories involved therein. As such, God is not to be seen as having been introduced arbitrarily, but rather, as being essential to the reality of creative, processive experience. We define our experience "in terms of the divine as the experience which is distinct and in a sense complete where ours is vague and partial" (MVG 327). Indeed, "we find Him in all our fundamental meanings, and if we try to purify them of involvement with deity we find that nothing unequivocal is left" (LP 159). Again: "we can explicate our insufficient understanding of worldly things by means of our direct
knowledge of God". 4

Now, whether or not Hartshorne's argument here is acceptable (we cannot pause here to deal with the question of its justification and viability in any detail; nor indeed, can we deal here with his related arguments for the existence of God -- nor, furthermore will any attempt be made in this chapter to critically assess any of the aspects involved in Hartshorne's understanding of God -- see note 21), what concerns us here are the implications of his argument that God is the chief exemplification of the categories. Hartshorne argues, let us note, that God exemplifies these categories eminently, indeed, literally, where all other beings do so imperfectly, partially, analogously. This may seem paradoxical at first sight; that is, since while basing our knowledge of God upon an analogy to human experience, Hartshorne proceeds to argue that it is human experience, in fact, which is analogical and the divine experience which is literal. Hartshorne is employing here his "negative anthropologism", the point of which is that our human experience has meaning only when it is literally applied to God's experience. (LP 141). He writes:

...there is a strange sense in which the analogical concepts apply literally to deity, and analogically to creatures. We say that human beings "know" various things, but then we have to qualify by adding

that this does not mean the possession of such evidence as to make mistakes impossible. What then does it mean? The entertaining of beliefs which by mere good luck happen to be correct? This is an odd meaning for "know." So we must mean that men have evidence, falling short of absolute proof, that certain beliefs are true. But how far short of conclusiveness can the evidence be, and still entitle the beliefs to be termed "knowledge"? We see that the term "know" in the human case turns out to have a rather indefinite meaning. In the divine case, the matter is simple: God, as infallible, has absolutely conclusive evidence concerning all truths, so that if knowledge is possession of perfect evidence as to the state of affairs, then God simply knows -- period. No such plain definition will work for human knowledge. In this sense, it is the theistic use only of psychical conceptions which has literal meaning, a meaning from which all other meanings are derived by qualification, diminution, or negation. So instead of the old "negative theology," one might propose a new "negative anthropology." (LP 141). 

The implications of this theory may now be discussed.

---

2. Dipolar Theism

Hartshorne's contention that God exemplifies the metaphysical categories has immense implications. It implies, specifically, that God must be conceived in dipolar terms, as opposed to the monopolarity of most of traditional theism. God is not "beyond" the categories (as Tillich held), nor indeed, ought He to be identified with but one pole of the ultimate categories. Traditionally, however, this latter position has been expressed in most of Christian theism, according to Hartshorne. God is conceived therein as wholly, immutable, absolute, eternal, etc., while the polar opposite categories of mutability, relativity, temporality, etc., are denied God. In support of his dipolar theory, Hartshorne summons Cohen's "Law of Polarity":

According to this law, ultimate categories are correlates, mutually interdependent, so that nothing real can be described by the wholly one-sided assertion of simplicity, being, actuality, and the like, each in a "pure" form, devoid and independent of complexity, becoming, potentiality, and related contraries (PSG 2).

Hartshorne complains that classical Christian metaphysics is an unjustified and incoherent bias toward one set of metaphysical categories at the expense of the polar opposites. As such, he contends that the classical conception of God is both religiously inadequate and philosophically incoherent (cf. DR passim, MVG passim, PSG passim).
Religious sensibility, for example, demands that God be intimately related to the world and its concerns; yet classical theism makes this impossible, according to Hartshorne, since it conceives God as solely absolute and self-sufficient. It conceives, further, divine omnipotence in such a way that human freedom is all but negated. This in turn implies a negation of divine love, since we are left with a situation wherein God "can give us everything, everything except the right to believe that there is a being who, with infinite subtle and appropriate sensitivity, rejoices in all our joys and sorrows in all our sorrows" (DR 54). Likewise, the classical conception of God is, according to Hartshorne, logically or philosophically incoherent since, for example, it cannot be held, as classical theists hold, that God is both completely necessary in His being, and that yet He knows the contingent world. Hartshorne contends that for God to know the world, it must be admitted that some aspect of God Himself is contingent. 6 "It simply cannot be that everything in God is necessary, including his knowledge that this world exists, unless the world in the same way is necessary and there is no contingency whatever" (DR 14; cf. 121 ff, 129).

6Cf. PI, 158-160.
Hartshorne often singles out "absoluteness" as the characteristic of classical theism which is most prominent and problematic. Against such an absolute God (implying, as it does, immutability and self-sufficiency) Hartshorne contends that the following consequences follow:

A wholly absolute God can provide no lasting good inclusive of human achievement save by the dubious notion of an everlasting prolongation of individual or racial human existence, and even then present human achievement is not intelligibly integrated into the permanent achievement. A wholly absolute God is power divorced from responsiveness or sensitivity; and power which is not responsive is irresponsible and, if held to settle all issues, enslaving. A wholly absolute God can make no use of the physical world or of sensory values, for such a God has no receptivity, nothing analogous to sense perception, as enjoyed, for example, in music or in sexual love. A wholly absolute God derives nothing from the physical or indeed the entire created world; to study that world is to study something that contributes nothing to the actuality of deity; to enrich that world is not to enrich the divine life, which is yet the measure of all value. A wholly absolute God is totally beyond tragedy, and his power operates uninfluenced by human freedom, hence presumably as infallibly determinative of all events, and therefore, it seems, there need be no tragedy. A wholly absolute supreme being is a contradiction in terms, since relativity is as truly good as nonrelativity, each in its proper role, the latter as abstract factor, the former as the principle of concreteness (DR 149-150).

Hartshorne has suggested various reasons why the western Christian tradition has remained predominantly absolutistic or monopolar in its thinking about God: (1) "it is simpler to accept one and reject the other of contrasting categories than to show how each, in its
own appropriate fashion, applies to an aspect of the divine nature. Monopolarity is simpler than dipolarity" (PSG 6); (2) it is simpler also to characterize deity in absolutistic terms than in relativistic terms; and (3) "there are emotional and volitional attitudes which favor stressing one polarity over the other" (PSG 6); for example, the preference for categories of being and permanence over the less emotionally secure categories of becoming and novelty. None of these reasons is, according to Hartshorne, sufficient ground for the rejection of dipolar logic, nor for the acceptance of monopolar logic.

It is, furthermore, Hartshorne's contention that because of the historical conception of God as monopolar, many of the traditional problems of Christianity have arisen, theodicy being an obvious example: if God is conceived (as Hartshorne believes the classical Christian tradition conceives God) as wholly absolute and immutable, etc., then it would seem to follow that all reality is His responsibility alone, including the evils in existence.7

Hartshorne has argued, accordingly, that our understanding of God must be radically reconsidered. And, as has been argued, he

7Traditionally, Christian theists have, to be sure, argued that their conception of God can be reconciled with evil such that divine causal agency does not simply negate creaturely freedom and responsibility. While Hartshorne rejects their various theories, this present study cannot pause here to assess the viability of his understanding of the Christian tradition.
bases his revised conception of God as dipolar not only on the contention that God literally exemplifies the metaphysical categories common to all beings, but also on his argument that only dipolar logic is logically coherent and that only it yields an understanding of God which is philosophically coherent and religiously adequate. He rejects classical Christianity for stressing only God's absolute nature at the expense of His relative, contingent aspects. As he puts it, classical theism sees God as eternal consciousness and omniscience, but affords far too little attention to His temporality and world-inclusiveness. As such, the classical position results in "the paradox of a knowledge where objects change, though the knowledge-of-these-objects does not change, and which is wholly necessary, though the objects are not" (PSG 18; cf. DR 123 ff).

Hartshorne's theory of internal relations is relevant here: he argues that the object known by a subject is internally related to the subject (cf. DR 6-18); that is, since the subject is internally affected by the object. On the other hand, the object is externally related to the subject, for it is not affected in any way by the subject (cf. DR 6 ff, 95 ff, 123 ff). This being the case, Hartshorne argues that if God knows the world, He must be in some way related to the world. There must, in other words, be admitted some relative or contingent aspect in God's nature. Classical theists, however, in Hartshorne's understanding of the tradition, do not come to this same conclusion. They argue, rather, that God's knowledge is different from human forms
of knowing. Aquinas argues, for example, that God's relation to the world is real in creatures, but not in God:

Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, and all creatures are ordered by Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is no real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are referred to Him.

Hartshorne argues, accordingly, that Aquinas' use of the term "know" is transplanted far from its ordinary meaning, and, as such, its use with respect to God is equivocal.

Hartshorne contends that a viable conception of God must acknowledge at least the following five essential characteristics: God must be ETERNAL (but only in some aspects of His reality); He must be TEMPORAL (in other aspects); He must be CONSCIOUS or self-aware, and OMNISCIENT in the sense that He can know a contingent world. As such, He must be WORLD-INCLUSIVE since all the objects of His knowing -- that is, the world of creatures -- are constituents

---

of His being (PSG 17). 9

Hartshorne argues, moreover, that there can be distinguished nine types of theism, but that only his own panentheism 10 has accounted for all five of the characteristics which he contends are necessary for a viable conception of deity. 11 As such, he contends that "the

---

A question which immediately arises here is this: why has he not included such characteristics of God as "will", "freedom", "personality", "power", "creation", and "goodness"? Hartshorne's response is that the correct interrelation of our five factors will constitute a fairly adequate definition of divine will, freedom, personality, power, goodness; whereas, without these five factors, the traditional terms will have no sharp conceptual significance but will be merely honorific or emotional, mere epithets (PSG 22).

Where Hartshorne's classification of the five essential characteristics of God, for example, stressed divine consciousness and knowledge over volition and power, Hartshorne sees this as advantageous since, as he argues, "a conscious being with complete knowledge, or one 'to whom all hearts are open,' can be trusted to use power in ways appropriate to the state of these hearts. This is the goodness of God" (PSG 23).

In this dissertation, I shall focus upon God's power and goodness in particular (for these characteristics are most relevant to the question of theodicy). Indeed, as will be argued below, it would seem to be God's power and goodness which is implied, respectively, in Hartshorne's contention that God functions with respect to the world in only two ways: (1) in setting limits and persuading creatures to obey His lure; and (2) in preserving and reintroducing all actualized values back into the world.

As will be explained shortly, Hartshorne's "panentheism" is a synthesis of the positive elements in traditional theism and in traditional pantheism: God includes the world, as pantheism holds, but He is also beyond the world, as traditional theism argues.

There are, of course, other possible conceptions of God, but Hartshorne believes that the 9 represented and discussed in his PSG are the only ones which are significant, historically or otherwise (cf. PSG 22).
history of theistic speculations" is "primarily a long experiment in omission"; the conceptions of God espoused are "truncated" (PSG 17-18). Classical Theism, for example (as noted above) utilizes only three of the essential characteristics, omitting temporality and world-inclusiveness. Aristotelian theism, furthermore, conceives God as simply an eternal consciousness, but not as temporal, omniscient, and world-inclusive. Thus, according to Hartshorne, this conception of God implies a "self-enclosed deity, whose entire being consists in 'thinking on thinking'; awareness concerned only with itself" (PSG 18). Further, Plotinian Emanationism omits all of the five characteristics except eternity; and Spinoza omits temporality in God. Hartshorne's detailed analysis of the nine possible views of God, accordingly, is intended to explore these views and to argue against eight of them as incomplete and incoherent (cf. PSG passim). The nine positions are as follows:

1. **Panentheism** (Hartshorne's position): God as eternal-temporal consciousness, knowing and including the world (represented also in Plato, Schelling, Fechner, Whitehead, etc.).

2. **Aristotelian Theism**: God as eternal consciousness, not knowing or including the world.

3. **Classical Theism**: God as eternal consciousness, knowing but not including the world (Philo, Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, Leibniz, etc.).

4. **Emanationism**: God as the eternal beyond consciousness and knowledge (Plotinus).
(5) Classical Pantheism: God as eternal consciousness, knowing and including the world (Spinoza, Royce).

(6) Temporalistic Theism: God as eternal-temporal consciousness, knowing but not including the world (Socinus, Lequier).

(7) Limited Panentheism: God as eternal-temporal consciousness, partly exclusive of the world (James, Brightman).

(8) God as wholly temporal and emerging consciousness (Alexander).

(9) God as temporal and nonconscious (Weiman) (cf. PSG 17, passim). 12

12 It is interesting to note that Hartshorne does not consider Hegel in his study of the various forms of theism, except to note that the dipolar logic he employs "may be traced back through Hegel to Heraclitus and Plato" (PSG 2). Hartshorne has been taken to task for this omission of Hegel (cf. J. Taubes, "Review Article: Philosophers Speak of God", 125.

In reply, Hartshorne admits that the "omission of Hegel was dubious", but that he regards Hegel as "an awkward author to comment upon, especially in his philosophy of religion" ("The Kinds of Theism: A Reply", 127). Hartshorne will not accept the contention that Hegel held the panentheist principle of the unity of the contraries, however, since Hegel's position is either pantheistic or an unresolved contradiction which both asserts and denies pantheism. Either way, Hartshorne contends, there is a contradiction in Hegel. While both he and Hegel affirm that "The truth is the unity of the contraries", it is Hartshorne's contention that "there are two versions of this principle, only one of which yields panentheism" ("The Kinds of Theism: A Reply", 127). The distinction is based on one's understanding of the unity which is achieved by the synthesis of the polar categories. If the unity is conceived to be itself necessary, universal, absolute, eternally the same, etc., this implies the pantheist position. In it, the synthesis of the polar contraries is lost; this is the case with Hegel, according to Hartshorne, and as such, "the polar principle is finally treated as illusory" ("The Kinds of Theism: A Reply", 127). Hartshorne's panentheistic position, on the other hand, holds that the synthesis which is the totality of the polar categories is itself relative, contingent, processive, etc. He explains:
Hartshorne is concerned to show that his panentheistic conception of God alone is valid and, especially, that it renders coherent the meaning of "divine perfection". He contends that a viable understanding of God as "perfection", as the "independent cause", as the "supreme Being", implies his dipolar view. There are, he argues, basically three main alternatives: those of traditional theism, traditional pantheism, and panentheism. According to the first, "God is the independent universal cause or source; the universe, his extrinsic effect or outcome". The universe is 'outside' the divine actuality, not a qualification or constituent of it" (PSG 500). Pantheism, alternatively, holds that "God is the inclusive reality and there is no ultimate cause distinct from and independent of the cosmic totality"

the togetherness of the contingent and the non-contingent is itself contingent, for had the least item in the totality been otherwise the totality would have been otherwise, and hence if the first was possible so was the second; but there may yet be something in the contingent totality which could not have been otherwise, i.e., which is necessary. The reflection of this in logic is that the conjunction of a necessary proposition and a contingent proposition is always a contingent proposition. The necessary is thus only an abstraction from the total reality, which must be just as contingent as any of its constituents.

As he argues, further: "The inclusive category...is the one which can contain the contrast which the category involves, while the non-inclusive is the one which, if taken as inclusive, would contradict the contrast and so destroy the basis of its own meaning" ("Process as Inclusive Category: A Reply", 96, and passim; also see, Charles Hartshorne, "Tillich's Doctrine of God", in C.W. Kegley and R.W. Bretall, ed., The Theology of Paul Tillich (New York: Macmillan, 1964), 164 ff; and DR 86 ff.)
(PSG 500). Hartshorne argues that his panentheistic position effects a "higher synthesis" which takes the best of these extreme polar positions; it conceives God's perfection as independent in some aspects, but as dependent in others (PSG 500). "God may have", he argues, "both an independent essence and dependent accidents" (PSG 504). As such, he argues, "the positive content of theism and pantheism can be consistently combined" (PSG 504). The positive content of classical theism is this: "God will exist and will be himself (and would have existed and been himself) no matter what particular world exists (or had existed) or fails (or had failed) to exist"; the positive content of classical pantheism is this: "God includes all reality in his own reality" (PSG 504). Now, Hartshorne argues that these positions are not mutually contradictory. They have, however, been construed as contradictory (such that only one of the positions was deemed correct; the other false) by the rather arbitrary negation added to the positive content. With respect to classical theism, on the one hand, while God is said to exist no matter what world exists, etc., the qualification was added that "he would exist in the very same state, or, rather, there is here no possible distinction between existence and state, or between essence (what makes God always himself) and accidents" (PSG 504). Likewise, with respect to classical pantheism, while God is said to be all-inclusive, it was often argued that His total actuality could not have been otherwise, that there are
no divine accidents. Hartshorne, to be sure, argues that these qualifications are purely arbitrary and do not follow from the positive content of either position. Indeed, as he argues, in both cases the qualifications seem to contradict the positive content. With respect to classical theism, he argues that

where there is no distinction between essence and accidents, between "himself" and "his states," there (as all the history of philosophy testifies) is no intelligible meaning for essence or existence or selfhood or any other concept (PSC 504).

Further, with respect to classical pantheism, Hartshorne argues that the positive content implies not the qualification added, but rather

the contrary is inferable; for, since the total reality must contain all there is, whether necessary or contingent, and since to deny the contrast between necessary and possible is to destroy the meaning of both, this contrast must be preserved and must fall within deity; and there must be divine accidents. But then there is no reason for denying that there is also a divine essence, independent of the accidents, and necessary (PSC 504).

In another analysis, Hartshorne presents another study wherein he seeks to define what is meant by the divine perfection in a way which is consistent with his dipolar logic. He contends that the conception of God in Anselm as "that than which none greater can be conceived" suggests two major equivocations: "none" has two distinct meanings, "greater", three. "None" may mean that "no entity other than that (the being said to be perfect) as it actually is", or "no entity
other than that as it either is or else could be or become", the
former implying that the perfect being "is unsurpassable in conception
or possibility even by itself"; the latter, that it "is unsurpassable
except by itself". Likewise, "greater" has various meanings: it may
mean greater "in some respects", "in all respects", or "in no respect"
(MVG 7 ff). By combining these various meanings of "none greater",
Hartshorne suggests that there are seven possible conceptions of
God's perfection, subdivided into three main views: God is absolute
perfection in all respects, in some respects (being relative in others),
or in no respect. God, then, may be conceived as (1) absolute
perfection in all respects; (2) absolute perfection is some respects,
relative perfection in all others; (3) absolute perfection, relative
perfection, and 'imperfection' (neither absolute nor relative perfection)
each in some respects; (4) absolute perfection in some respects, im-
perfection in all others; (5) absolute perfection in no respects,
relative in all; (6) absolute perfection in no respects, relative in
some, imperfect in the others; and (7) absolute perfection in no
respects, imperfection in all (cf. MVG 8, and all of "Chapter One").
This scheme is intended, in part, to show "how hopelessly ambiguous
are phrases like 'perfect being', 'finite God', 'absolute' and the like"
(MVG 10). Hartshorne's position is this: God, as the perfect being,
cannot be perfect in no respect; yet neither can He be perfect in all
respects, for not all values are compossible (that is, they could not
simply be entertained by God all at once, or eternally); God then, must be conceived as perfect in some respects; that is, all those to which the term perfection can apply, and imperfect in others; that is, where there is no ultimate point of perfection to be reached. Hartshorne is arguing that "there is a sense in which God should be conceived as perfect, [and] another sense in which perfection cannot apply to God" (MVG 6). He contends that the conception of God he defends (number "2", above) conceives of God as perfect in whatever ways perfection is really perfection. Perfect knowledge, for example, is not an omniscience which is eternally static and complete, but rather is knowledge which grows with each new actuality (that is, as God takes account of each new creative act of creaturely experience). Likewise, perfect power is not such that it leaves others with absolutely no power at all, but rather it is the greatest power that there is and can be, taking into account the necessity of there being some power in all forms (levels) of being. Further, Hartshorne argues that the intelligibility of time itself is threatened if one conceives God as purely absolute, for if this were the case, temporal process would be negated; that is, since God's eternal awareness of all events would make them all necessities, and temporal distinction would therein be blurred. Hartshorne's point is that those values which have traditionally been attributed to God -- omniscience, omnipotence, goodness, lovingness, etc. -- are not to be taken as being absolutely
static in God, nor such that the knowledge, power, goodness and
lovingness of all other beings is negated (that is, in face of the divine
attributes). God exemplifies these qualities as well as one Being
could; and yet, even for Him, such values are dynamic, in the sense
that they can be modified as God experiences the ever-continuing
new acts of creaturely self-creativity. These values are open, and not
statically complete. Only in this way is creaturely experience
meaningful, since it actually contributes to God's experience, rather
than being simply determined by God.

There are other values which are even more obviously open or
dynamic: there is no maximal point in which God has the values of
beauty, happiness, intensity of joy and variety. There is no upper
limit of these characteristics, but rather, God's experiences are
dynamic as the world proceeds in its self-creation of new experiences
which God then experiences.

God's perfection, then, must be conceived, according to Harts-
horne, as partly dynamic, since "a purely final or static perfection
possessing all possible values is impossible" (MVG 21). This is so,
also, since all values are not composable (as noted above). Harts-
horne contends that "there is no need [for God] to possess them
[new values] in advance of the others [other beings]; or to possess
them eternally" (DR 20). Hartshorne may contend, then, that while God must be absolute in some respects (for example, in His necessary existence), He is not absolute in every respect. His capacity for growth in some respects must be acknowledged. And yet, this capacity for change in some respects does not imply that He changes in every aspect: God "is ethically perfect [unchangeably so], yet aesthetically perfectible without limit" (MVG 29). He is perfect in His adequacy of approach, but dynamic in His concrete response to new actualities (cf. MVG 13 f).

Thus, Hartshorne describes God as the "self-surpassing surpasser of all" (DR 20), in the sense that there is nothing in creation greater than Him, but that He is able to surpass Himself by adding new experiences and new values (gained from creaturely acts) to His being as they become actual in the world. Hartshorne employs the term "surrelative" to connote this characteristic of God as being relative or changeable, both in a supremely eminent way. "Surrelative" is a conflation of "supremely-relative", and as such, synthesizes the relative with the abstract: surrelative "synthesizes into a higher unity 'relativism' --

---

13 Hartshorne's argument here is that God can see all possible values as possible values; yet, there is a difference between seeing a possible value and seeing (or enjoying) an actual value. God cannot see (or enjoy) all possible values as actual because not all possible values are composible; that is, the price of actualizing some values is exclusive of actualizing others. (This thesis is discussed in more detail in "Chapter Five").
all [concrete] beings are relative -- and 'absolutism' -- there is a wholly nonrelative [abstract] being" (DR ix). God is "The Divine Relativity".

Surrelativism, note, is not, according to Hartshorne, a mere eclectic assemblage of tenets but rather, as Hartshorne argues, a single tenet (cf. DR xii f). God, for example, includes the absolute as part of His being, but He is more than the absolute. "Absolute" is not identical with the supreme being of God, but rather is less than God. God is both absolute and relative. His essence is necessary a priori and abstract (independent of the world), while His concrete response to ever newly-becoming values is contingent upon those values. God alone is necessarily absolute and supremely relative: "Other beings are in no aspect strictly necessary, and in no respect maximally accidental, but always and in all aspects something middling under both categories. In this middling character lies their 'imperfection'" (DR 32; cf. 49-50, 82).

This argument employs what Hartshorne calls the "way of eminence" (DR 77): God is absolute eminently and relative eminently. He is the eminent (perfect) exemplification of the metaphysical categories. By analogy, just as a man changes while his essence remains basically the same (the changes take place within the same personal sequence, as will be discussed in the following chapter), so God, as the eminent exemplifier of the categories, has an abstract essence which is constant
while His concrete response is constantly changing to appropriate new creaturely actualities and values. Both God and man have two poles, two aspects of their nature: abstract and concrete. Yet only God exemplifies them literally, perfectly, supremely.
3. Divine Power

From Hartshorne's understanding of God's dipolar nature his revised interpretation of the divine attributes follows. For purposes of methodological convenience, I propose to discuss Hartshorne's understanding of divine "omnibeneficence" in terms of divine "omnipotence" or power, and of divine "benevolence" or goodness (love). As noted above, I will discuss, in later chapters, Hartshorne's attempt to reconcile divine omnipotence and creaturely freedom ("Chapter Four"), and his attempt to reconcile divine benevolence and evil ("Chapter Five"). (For reasons to be explained later, these two issues are understood to be the basic issues involved in his theodicy). This present section, and the next, serve merely to present, uncritically, the basis of Hartshorne's understanding of the concepts, divine omnipotence and benevolence (and this understanding will then be applied to the critical issues to be discussed in the fourth and fifth chapters of this study).

Hartshorne's revised conception of divine omnipotence is directly opposed to what he takes to be implied in the classical (traditional Christian) conception of God; namely, that God has "all the power there is" (MVG 30). He contends, rather, that a "division of powers" (MVG 30), of mutual influence between God and creatures, must be acknowledged explicitly and rendered coherently. God has
no monopoly of power, but in fact, all reality is freely creative and
in continual process of becoming by means of free decisions and acts.
Thus, "To say, then, that omnipotence is the power to do anything that
could be done is to equivocate or talk nonsense. There could not be
a power to 'do anything that could be done.' Some things can only
be done by local powers; some only by cosmic power" (DR 134). The
traditional conception of God, which regards God as the supreme cause of
all things, is misconceived, if it is taken to imply (as Hartshorne
thinks it does) that God is so powerful that He can control His
creation simply as He wills. This classical conception, Hartshorne
contends, becomes involved in "pseudoproblems" for it implies a denial
of the very conception of what it means to be a creature; that is, as
being freely self-creative (within limits). There can be no such
freedom in creatures if God is conceived as unqualified omnipotence.

He argues that

God neither will, not could monopolize decision-making, for this is logically impossible. Theologians
have generally agreed that God cannot do the logically
impossible, for to do that is not really to do anything...One does not limit God's power by refusing
to attribute this nothing to Him. To have creatures
without freedom would be to have creatures which
are not creatures. Divinity is supreme freedom.
The absolute negation of freedom is not creature-
hood but nonentity. Creaturehood is precisely
the status of freedom lacking the supreme qualities
of divine freedom. Between divine freedom and zero
freedom there is plenty of room for all possible
creatures. Those who think otherwise have a strange
view of divine freedom! One or two steps down
from it, they seem to suppose, lands one in no free-
dom. How illogical! Any number of steps down can
still leave some freedom. In short, Hartshorne contends that it is purely arbitrary to assume that an absolute line must be drawn between God's power and the power (free agency) of the rest of reality. He argues that if "power" means influence or control, then it must be exerted upon something, but that this something cannot be completely "powerless", or else "power" over it would be meaningless: it would be power over nothing, and this is really no power at all! The free-creativity of beings other than God must be respected. Indeed:

We are what we are, not simply because divine power has decided or done this or that, but because countless non-divine creatures (including our own past selves) have decided what they have decided. Not a single act of a single creature has been or could have been decided by divine action. In the cosmic drama, every actor, no matter how humble, contributes to the play something left undetermined by the playwright (CSPM 239).

Hartshorne argues, then, that the "minimal solution" to the traditional problem of evil is "to affirm the necessity of a division of powers" (MVG 30). With this division of powers comes a division of creative agency and responsibility (for good and evil), such that no one being can be held solely responsible for every (or -- as will be seen, any) action, the responsibility rather being shared, to some varying

---

degree, since all beings are, variously, self-creative (self-determining). It is precisely at this point wherein the central issue of "Chapter Four" is located; namely, to determine the range and extent of creaturely-free agency and responsibility vis-à-vis the divine power (causal agency).

It might seem that Hartshorne's God is, perhaps, illegitimately limited in power, indeed to the extent that His perfection is jeopardized; but Hartshorne has long been contending that this is not the case. He argues that the idea of a cosmic power which simply decides all events is an incoherent idea; and, indeed, to speak of God being limited by His not having such a power, accordingly, is nonsense. Rather, "God has as much power as anyone could have".\(^{16}\) He is the greatest power that there can be, while granting that "even the greatest possible power is still one power among others" (DR 138).

Hartshorne, we note, does not pretend to "dissolve" theodicy in its traditional Christian form by simply denying divine power nor by illegitimately limiting that power (though the latter must still be ascertained): such a position would imply a finite God (as in James, Brightman, and others), and this clearly is not Hartshorne's intention.

His contention is, simply, that the conception of divine power is ambiguous in its traditional usage, and that his own redefining of the concept implies that God has all the power that He could have and still be coherent with the reality of creaturely freedom and moral responsibility, and with religious sensibility. This theory will be critically examined in "Chapter Four".
4. Divine Goodness (Love)

As with divine power, so with divine goodness (or love):

Hartshorne contends that the traditional Christian use of this concept is ambiguous and incoherent. His critique of traditional Christian theology is based in part upon his insistence that if the formula, "God is love", is to be taken seriously, then it must be more clearly shown that there is a real and mutual interdependence of sorts between God and creatures:

To say, on the one hand, that God is love, to continue to use popular religious terms like Lord, divine will, obedience to God, and on the other to speak of an absolute, infinite, immutable, simple, impassive deity, is either a gigantic hoax of priest-craft, or it is done with the belief that the social connotations of the popular language are ultimately in harmony with these descriptions. (IR 26).

Hartshorne argues that it is an error to think of loving as nothing but giving. Loving, rather, involves sharing of oneself -- giving to be sure, but also letting the other be something for oneself, allowing the other to give of himself, and receiving and treasuring it for what it is.

Anselm often is singled out by Hartshorne as exemplifying the incoherence of the traditional formulation of divine love. Hartshorne contends that Anselm has not been able to reconcile God's absoluteness, His perfection, omnipotence, et al., with the attribute of
goodness or love. In this critique, Hartshorne strongly believes that he is contending against no mere strawman, and indeed, he insists that his rejection of classical metaphysics is not due to a lack of familiarity with the arguments and writers favouring the position (cf. CSPM xvii):

he cites Anselm's Proslogium, for example:

If Thou art passionless (i.e., nonrelative, independent), thou dost not feel sympathy; and if thou dost not feel sympathy, thy heart is not wretched from sympathy for the wretched; but this it is to be compassionate. But if thou art not compassionate, whence cometh so great consolation to the wretched?...

Truly, thou art compassionate in terms of our experience, but thou art not in terms of thine own. For, when thou beholdest us in our wretchedness, we experience the effect of compassion, but thou dost not experience the feeling. Therefore, thou art both compassionate, because thou dost save the wretched, and spare those who sin against thee; and not compassionate, because thou art affected by no sympathy for wretchedness. (ch 8; cf. DR 54).

Hartshorne complains, accordingly, that "Anselm's God can give us everything, everything except the right to believe that there is a being who with infinitely subtle and appropriate sensitivity, rejoices in all our joys and sorrows in all our sorrows" (DR 54).

This "supreme benefit which God and only God could give us" is denied God by Anselm (DR 55). But, as Hartshorne argues, if this were really the case, then God would do "less for us than the poorest of human creatures", for "What we ask above all is the chance to contribute to the being of others" (DR 55):
"To love," it has been said, "is to wish to give rather than receive"; but in loving God we are, according to Anselm and thousands of other orthodox divines, forbidden to seek to give; for God, they say, is a totally impassive, nonreceptive, nonrelative being (DR 55).

Hartshorne's point is readily available: for God to be conceived as loving, He must be conceived, in some sense, as mutable, as truly related and responsive to other beings in the contingent, changing world. "A new era in religion", he believes, "may be predicted as soon as men grasp the idea that it is just as true that God is the supreme beneficiary or recipient of achievement, as that he is the supreme benefactor or source of achievement" (DR 58).

It is Hartshorne's contention that the traditional conception of God undermines both our love for Him and our ethical choices, for one cannot love such a God nor can He love us. Neither would our ethical choices make any difference to Him since nothing can be added or subtracted from His eternal completeness. "Love of such a God and ethical choice are mutually irrelevant. This is the paradox at the heart of medieval theism" (MVG 156). 17

17 Hartshorne, furthermore, has only scornful reproach for traditional defences of such "paradox". The use of the concept is a ploy, he contends, whether conscious or unconscious, to cover up and ignore inherent contradictions: "A theological paradox, it appears, is what a contradiction becomes when it is about God...or indulged in by a theologian or a church rather than an unbeliever or a heretic" (DR 1). Hartshorne insists that many of the famous paradoxes and contradictions of traditional metaphysics and theology are not to be seen as the inevitable result of human limitations, as it is often claimed, but are rather "the natural yet avoidable result of haste and inattention to exact shades of meaning" (DR 4).
Hartshorne is aware, of course, that the tradition has attempted to reconcile its immutable God with the loving God of the Bible, as expressed, for example, in the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. In Hartshorne's opinion, however, both of these doctrines leave "the essential problem of the divine love unsolved" (MVG 164). Hartshorne, to be sure, does not claim to be a theologian, in the sense of a dogmatic or confessional stance. Hence, he does not pretend to go into the topic of Christology in any very extended way. He does, however, express support for the religious vision associated with Jesus; that is, of a God of love, tenderness, patience and non-coercive sympathy. This vision, he argues, is an advance over the Aristotelian view of God, and also over the Old Testament view, wherein God appears not unlike an oriental despot. The vision of the Gospels has been obscured by the Hellenization of the Gospels, and, as Hartshorne argues, the original vision must be restored. With regard to the doctrine of the Trinity, then, he writes:

The Trinity is supposed to meet the requirements of giving God an object of love which yet agrees with its absolute self-sufficiency, and also an object of love "worthy" to be loved with so perfect a love as the divine. This is done by making the lover and the beloved identical — yet not identical. But whatever be the truth of this idea — whose meaning seems to me just as problematic as its truth, for, once more, nonsense is only nonsense, however you put a halo around it — it leaves the essential problem of the divine love unsolved. For either God loves the creatures or he does not. If he does, then their interests contribute to his interests, for love means nothing more than this. If he does not, then the essence of religious belief in God is sacrificed and one still has the question, How then is God related to the creatures' interests? (MVG 164).

In place, then, of the traditional doctrine of the Trinity, Hartshorne would substitute for the three persons an infinity; that is, a continuing succession of divine selves. God, like all other beings, is in process of continual change and, as such, has a distinct personality at each stage of His life. Note: not a different being, but rather, at each stage He adds to His being so that it grows processively, accommodating all creaturely experiences in His perfect vision.
Hartshorne argues, furthermore, against what he takes to be a central element in the traditional Christian teaching concerning love; namely, that "the only really pure -- or, at least, the highest -- love is that which springs from no 'need' of the beloved, that which 'overflow' from a purely self-sufficient being who derives nothing from any other" (MVG 163). It is Hartshorne's contention that this teaching fails to distinguish among several senses of "need" and "sufficiency"; yet "everything depends upon discriminating them" (cf. MVG 163). God "needs" from the creatures "the intrinsic beauty of their lives, that is, their own true happiness, which is also his happiness through his perfect appreciation of theirs. This appreciation is love, not something extra as a motive to love" (MVG 163-164). There

With regard to the doctrine of the Incarnation, Hartshorne holds that it is valid if it teaches that Jesus, as literally divine, loves men, or if it means seriously that the position of Jesus is a valid symbol of God and God's own passion (suffering love). But Hartshorne thinks that the habit of traditional Christian theology is one of "simply adding Jesus to an unreconstructed idea of a nonloving God" (MVG 165); that is, adding an idea of a self-sufficient and wholly absolute and immutable God onto a vision of the perfect, tender love of Jesus. In this case, the Hellenization of the Gospels results in an unstable compound which weakens its religious force and philosophical viability.
is, in fact, a perfect agreement in God of altruism and egoism. In
man, however, self-interest conflicts with altruism; only God can
literally love others with the same intimacy as He loves Himself
(cf. RSP 150; MVG 151). In God the world is contained — there is no
external reality beyond God and the world — so that the world's good
is God's own good, via His omniscient sympathy, much in the same way
that man is interested in, or sympathizes with, his own bodily functions
(cf. RSP 140 ff).

Hartshorne's argument against (what he takes to be) the traditional
doctrine of love also involves his critique of what he understands to
be the traditional substance theories of the self (see above, "Chapter
Three"), for they imply, according to Hartshorne, the self-interest
view; rather than altruism. As such, they deny the second commandment,
to "love thy neighbour as thyself". "The most basic obstacle to a
literal acceptance of the Second Commandment", he argues, "is the doctrine
of individual spiritual 'substances' or 'souls,' each an entity put
into a human body at or before birth, remaining strictly identical
throughout life, and possessing in its turn each successive experience
of the individual in question". 18

In this account, there are two

irreconcilable forms of love: a self 'X' loving itself, and a self 'X' loving another self 'Y'. Hartshorne summons the support of Buddhism and of modern science and psychology in rejecting both understandings of love, referred to, respectively, as the identity and the nonidentity theories. His point is this: the relationship between the presently existing self and other selves is not one of sheer identity, nor yet of complete nonidentity. "The difference between self-love and love of others is not metaphysical, nor anything absolute, but a relative matter" (CSPM 201). Love for oneself and love for another cannot be two absolutely different forms of love, for then we could not "love our neighbor as ourselves". Rather, all love is sympathy for others, be these others external to ourselves or others (past or future) in the same personal sequence. "To love oneself as identical with oneself and the other as not identical with oneself is not, whatever else it may be, to love the neighbor as oneself. Rather it is to put a metaphysical difference between the two loves" (CSPM 200). In short then, Hartshorne believes he has suggested a theory of love wherein self-love and love for others are different only "relatively"; that is, since self-love consists in sympathy, not for an unchanging self-substance, but for other members, past and future, of the same personal sequence. Once this is accepted, then it can be seen that these "other members" may be also members of personal sequences external to the self.
God's love, according to Hartshorne, is likewise a sympathetic response to other selves, His own and those of creatures'. And yet, there is really no "outside" for God, since the world is His body, His mind. As such, His self-love perfectly coincides with His altruism, His love for others. In this light, then, Hartshorne concludes—

with reference to Whitehead's thesis on divine love (with which Hartshorne's views generally concur)\textsuperscript{19} that "Never before...has a really first-rate philosophical system so completely and directly as Whitehead's supported the idea that there is a supreme love which is also the Supreme Being" (RSP 197; cf. 212). Furthermore, he expresses the hope that "Theologians and philosophers might well join with Menninger in longing for the day when, as he says, 'We shall have accorded to love that preeminence which it deserves in our scale of values'" (RSP 109). Indeed, "A metaphysics of love, that is, of socially structured, and thus relative, creative experience, is what we need, whether in ethics, religion, or

\textsuperscript{19}Whitehead argues, in his famous passage:

There is...in the Galilean origin of Christianity...[a] suggestion which...does not emphasize the ruling Caesar, or the ruthless moralist, or the unmoved mover. It dwells upon the tender elements in the world, which slowly and in quietness operate by love; and it finds purpose in the present immediacy of a kingdom not of this world. Love neither rules, nor is it unmoved; also it is a little oblivious as to morals. It does not look to the future; for it finds its own reward in the immediate present (PR 404).
politics -- and indeed, in all our basic concerns" (CSPM 56). 20

20 See D.D. Williams, The Spirit and the Forms of Love (New York and Evanston: Harper and Row, 1968), a book with which Hartshorne generally concurs (as he told me in conversation, in 1975). Williams offers a view of Christian love based largely on Whitehead's process philosophy. He seeks, further, to base his understanding of love, on biblical motifs, of which the following are cited:

that the essence of God's moral nature is his willingness to be intimately involved in human history; that God's dealing with the world involves his own agonizing, longing and suffering;...that the love between God and his people is given and received on both sides;...that God's agape is motivated in that love seeks out the other; that all earthly, relative loves are accepted, transformed, and fulfilled by the divine love (agape); and that a new kind of moral freedom to find what love requires is made possible (as noted by C.M. Williamson in his review of Williams' book, in Process Studies 3/2, Summer, 1973, 121-122).
5. Conclusion

Hartshorne believes that his conception of God (as outlined, uncritically, in this chapter) is a significant departure from traditional Christian philosophical and theological thinking about God. He believes, furthermore, that his doctrine of God is the result of a radical re-defining of traditional concepts and categories by which he, along with Whitehead and others, has produced a new metaphysics which offers not only a re-defined understanding of God, but also of what it means to be a free and responsible creature. With respect, specifically, to the question of theodicy, he believes that his

---

21 This chapter (and most of the next) -- we must emphasize again -- is not intended to be a justification or critical analysis of Hartshorne's understanding of God (and, in the next chapter, of his understanding of creaturely-free agency): the purpose here is purely expository, to back up the issues which are discussed critically in the last two chapters of this study. Thus, with respect to Hartshorne's doctrine of God, as outlined in this present chapter, we press in any assessment of his understanding of the forms of Christianity which he attacks. We do acknowledge, however, that there is an important issue here, for various critics have argued that Hartshorne's understanding of the tradition is inaccurate and unacceptable. There have been dissertations devoted to this specific issue, and to them the reader is referred (see the lists of dissertation topics on Hartshorne in Process Studies 3/4, Winter, 1974, 304-307; see also later issues of that journal for abstracts of post-1974 dissertations on this issue). And, indeed, for one version of Hartshorne's direct response to this issue, see his reply to John Wild, in "The Divine Relativity and Absoluteness: A Reply", Review of Metaphysics 41/1, Sept., 1950, 47 (a reply to Wild's "Review Article: The Divine Relativity", Review of Metaphysics 216, Dec., 1948, 65-77). See also the criticisms of H. Meynell in "The Theology of Hartshorne", Journal of Theological Studies 21/1, April, 1973, 143-157, and M. Westphal, in "Temporality and Finitism in Hartshorne's theism", Review of Metaphysics 19/3, March, 1966, 550-564.
metaphysics offers a way to think together the divine power and goodness, on the one hand, with creaturely freedom and responsibility for evil, on the other hand. It is precisely this issue which this dissertation seeks to study (in the last two chapters); yet before undertaking that critical analysis, we have one further aspect of Hartshorne's metaphysics to consider as background to that study: his understanding of creaturely-free agency (abstracted, for the moment, from any consideration of God's agency and interaction in the world).
CHAPTER THREE

THE DOCTRINE OF MAN:
CREATURELY FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY

In this chapter, Hartshorne's understanding of creaturely freedom and responsibility will be presented. Creaturely freedom in general and man's freedom in particular must be established by Hartshorne to account for the origins, respectively, of natural and moral evil -- abstracting, for the moment, from any consideration of the coherency of this freedom vis-à-vis the divine causal agency and influence. He seeks to establish the former via his doctrine of "psychicalism" (wherein all reality is seen to be sentient -- to varying degrees, depending on the level of being) and via his doctrine of "relative determinism" (wherein all reality is seen to be free, within limits -- again, to varying degrees). He seeks to establish the latter -- that is, man's responsibility for moral evil -- by means of his theory of man as a continuing agent (as opposed to agency being attributed only to the individual psychic events). This latter issue will be discussed somewhat critically (for the basic criticism of Hartshorne's understanding of man's free agency to be noted here is analogous to one of the major issues to be discussed in the final two chapters, and indeed, the issue of man's freedom and responsibility

73
(for good and evil) is (when considered vis-à-vis the divine agency) the major issue of "Chapter Four", while the issue of creaturely freedom in general, as responsible for natural evil, is -- as far as this dissertation is concerned -- a more minor issue and, as such, is given less critical attention). The former issue, which concerns Hartshorne's psychicalism and relative determinism, will be dealt with uncritically -- the issue being too complex to assess or justify within the confines of this dissertation. This entire chapter, together with the former two chapters, serve, essentially, as background to the issues to be critically discussed in the final two chapters.
1. Psychicalism

Hartshorne argues for a "psychicalist" or "panpsychist" position (the latter, from the Greek, "all" and "soul"), the view that all things have a psychic aspect.¹ This position is offered as an alternative to materialistic and dualistic theories, the latter implying a "division of substances into those which do and those which do not possess a soul". (WP 44; cf. BH 165), and the former positing "the existence of atoms, [as] discontinuous, discrete, independent bits of matter, devoid of life and feeling, isolated except for accidental external relations, timeless and unchanging with respect to internal constitution and hence without growth or evolution".² Hartshorne rejects the materialistic position: the concept of "mere matter" has been shown to be superfluous by modern scientific advances and also by such philosophers as Leibniz, Bergson, Peirce, James, and Whitehead (cf. CSM 48). Hartshorne argues, further, that the dualism which holds


²As noted by A. Reck, the New American Philosophers (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968), 295; see also his "The Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne", Studies in Whitehead's Philosophy, Tulane Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 10 (New Orleans: Tulane University, 1961), 89-108. In Hartshorne's writings, see LP 191 f and PPS 11 f; etc.
that "mind" and "matter" are two ultimately different sorts of entities
is mistaken: they are, rather, "two ways of describing a reality that
has many levels of organization" (LP 217).

Hartshorne argues, in this light, that there have been,
historically, five main views wherein the question concerning the
defining of the general properties of the individual have been
considered. Four of these views, however, have "taken literally and
absolutely the etymological meaning of 'in-dividual' -- that is,
indivisible, without parts, simple" (WP 42). These views, Hartshorne
describes as cosmic monism (e.g., Spinoza), microscopic pluralism
(e.g., the materialistic atomism of the Greek atomists), materialistic
dualism (Aristotle), and subjectivism (e.g., Berkeley) -- the latter
two positions being forms of macroscopic pluralism (cf. WP 42 ff).
The fifth alternative, according to Hartshorne, is psychicalism.

Hartshorne rejects cosmic monism (exemplified, for example;
by Parmenides, Spinoza, Bradley, etc.) as a "highly paradoxical, a
fearful defiance of common sense and of science, and indeed, in itself,
a self-contradictory of meaningless conception" (WP 43). He contends
that to hold that the universe is a single, indivisible entity implies
that individuals really have no parts, and this, in turn, implies
that the universe is either: "the only individual or it is not
an individual at all" (WP 43). He then objects to these implications,
for they amount to a "refusal to consider the problem of the cosmic
totality", a problem which is "the characteristic and central one for philosophy" (WP 43). Monism has led, in India, to a rejection of common sense and science, and, according to Hartshorne, in the west it has hindered philosophy "from concentrating upon its chief problems". (WP 43; cf. 1P ch 7).

Hartshorne, likewise, rejects the theory of microscopic pluralism, (the materialistic atomism of the Greek atomists), the view that only imperceptible particles -- the atoms and the void -- are the real, positive existences, all else being but mere appearances or accidental collations of the basic reals. Hartshorne holds that this view fails to account fully and satisfactory for the void, for consciousness, for appearance, as well as failing to explain the totality formed by the atoms and the void and appearance together (cf. WP 43-44). We may note here that while Hartshorne's own psychicalism is an atomism of sorts -- as will be described below --, he finds the atomism of the Greeks deficient especially for its understanding of the individual atoms as "mere matter". Hartshorne, following Whitehead, conceives of the basic reals as "event-experiences" which are both mind and body; that is, as being constituted by both psychic and physical
characteristics. 3

While Hartshorne rejects the classical materialistic atomism of the Greek atomists and a similar theory which runs through western philosophical history (e.g., in Newtonian physics), and while he recognizes that this doctrine has been largely rejected as a result of recent revolutions in physics, there is, for him, still the issue of repudiating a lingering materialist understanding in psychology. As one interpreter puts it:

As long as psychologists adopt theories of sensation which treat sensations as discrete data, separated from each other, sharply distinguished from feeling, and isolated on the one hand from the internal neural processes of the sentient organism and on the other hand from the external physical stimuli, they are, unwittingly perhaps, adhering to an outmoded materialism (cf. A.J. Reck, The New American Philosophers, 295; see also, PPS, 1-20 and passim).

Now, Hartshorne's basic position, in opposition to such a view, is presented below. Yet note that any critical assessment of this issue, that is, of Hartshorne's understanding of modern forms of materialism, cannot be pursued here. While Hartshorne rejects the understanding of matter as lifeless BB's, most modern materialists would seem to concur with his position that, alternatively, the ultimate reals are not simply points in space and time, but some form of energy in process. If, further, these basic constituents of reality are conceived as possessing both physical and psychic aspects, then there is, in this, little difference from Hartshorne's position. Of course, if this is one of the positions of modern materialists, it might seem difficult to retain the term "materialism", for indeed the position seems psychist. Other modern forms of materialism may retain the view that the ultimate constituents are purely physical, or perhaps that they are physical from one aspect only, etc. The issue here is obviously far too complex to pursue.
Hartshorne, further, rejects (what he takes to be) "the Aristotelian view" of substance which acknowledged the reality of the macroscopic objects apparent to human sense perception but denied the reality of the alleged microscopic constituents (WP 44 f). Modern thinking, as Hartshorne notes, is now acknowledging that sense perception is not our only, nor indeed our primary, mode of knowing. There is another, more basic aspect of knowing: intuition or feeling (cf. Whitehead's MT; also BH 167, etc.). Modern science has shown that there are minute and active components in what to sense perception alone appears only as a single substance. All reality is composed of minute, cellular activity which is both sentient and creative (to varying degrees) (CSPM 50). Accordingly, Aristotle's primitive division of nature into inanimate (having no soul), vegetable, and animal (besouled), is no longer plausible. "All life is either unicellular

---

4Note: Hartshorne does not simply base his philosophy on modern science. Rather he sees in science illumination and confirmation of his psychicalism. He argues that his psychicalism (and his relative determinism) are the only rationally coherent positions. He writes: "I should...say that while we must take the theories of physics seriously, I do not think they should be considered necessarily definitive in so fundamental or philosophical a question as [for example] the structure of time or causality". Again: "I cannot believe that physics goes as deeply into the nature of things as biology and psychology. It may be more accurate and comprehensive then they, but at the price of not knowing what sorts of things it is dealing with, apart from human experiences of the things": "Creativity and the Deductive Logic of Causality", Review of Metaphysics 27/1, Sept. 1973, 63 and 68). Cf. BH 178. See also his "Perception and the Concrete Abstractness of Science", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 34/4, June, 1974, 456-476, where he argues that both science and perception are abstractions.
or multicellular, and a cell is a living individual which, in a certain measure, determines its own activity in response to stimuli from without....[Aristotle's] divisions of vegetable and animal have no deep significance at this unicellular level.  

Hartshorne, accordingly, criticises the Aristotelian commonsense view on various counts. Aristotle is wrong, for example, in referring to the growth of a plant solely as a whole, for rather, "it is cells which multiply and constantly form and reform themselves": the "growth of the visible plant is but our collective way of seeing these individual invisible actions". Aristotle is mistaken, further, "in referring his denial of individual sensitive response both to the entire visible plant and (tacitly and by omission) to its constituents as well". Again, it was Aristotle's obvious historical inaccessibility to our twentieth century scientific knowledge which can be seen to account for his "failure to put the right questions and answer them with due care". In short, according to Hartshorne, Aristotle's metaphysics (based, as it is, on perception) was a "bad guess": he simply "did not know that nature consists, or could possibly consist of the anima [souls] and the inanimate [lifeless bodies], in the absolute

---


sense which alone is relevant to the controversy concerning mind as such and matter”. Aristotle, in effect, knew only what is revealed through the senses, and he committed a methodological error in attempting to use this knowledge as the basis of his theory of reality at large. Aristotle did not face, according to Hartshorne, the metaphysical question regarding whether sense perception is a sufficient and complete guide to reality; and since only God has an adequacy of perception to reveal the true character of the things perceived, here, Aristotle’s was a "bad metaphysics: men like to play at being God".

Hartshorne has expressed concern and genuine bafflement over the way "one man [Aristotle] could have perverted the entire history of western thought for 1500 years". In this light, he has suggested several reasons why the Aristotelian, common-sensical, materialistic, dualistic view has persisted over the psychic view (cf. BH 175 ff). The most obvious reason is that common sense has a dualistic bias; that is, such that it seems untrue to common sense that inorganic nature could be sentient. Hartshorne, however, argues that this is an unjustified abstraction, as various modern philosophers as well as modern scientific advancements are revealing.

---

9 As reported by one of his former students; Process Studies 2/3, Fall, 1972, 182.
Another reason why the case for psychicalism has been damaged, historically, is its "superficial similarity to the doctrine of 'idealism' as founded by Berkeley, Kant, and Hegel" (BH 176); that is, the view that physical things are only ideas in the minds of high-grade individuals. Hartshorne's psychicalism, in distinction, does admit the reality of physical things, regarding them in fact as subjects, as real as the subjects for which they are objects. Hartshorne's position, then, is not idealism (though often mistaken as such by the casual reader of his metaphysics): it is rather a "psychic realism" (as will be discussed shortly).

A further reason for the downgrading of psychicalism is the behavioristic nature of modern physics: "physics describes the mere spatio-temporal outline of things, but says nothing about the qualitative stuff by which these outlines are filled in to constitute realities" (BH 178). The rejection of psychicalism is due, also, to the overshadowing of Leibniz (who suggested the first clearly formulated panpsychist theory -- though with certain flaws) by Berkeley, whose idealism determined philosophical development for 150 years (BH 179-180). Finally, the attack on idealistic theories by

10 Charles Hartshorne, "Panpsychism", 442.
Moore and Perry weakened the case for psychicalism. Yet, as Hartshorne argues, the case for a valid psychicalism is not hurt by the devastation of idealism; it is hurt, however, when philosophers fail to distinguish between it and idealism (cf. BH 182 ff). This confusion is no longer justified, due to the work of Whitehead and Hartshorne, especially, among others.

The fourth substance doctrine, Berkeleyan subjectivism, "the view that the only individuals are human minds or, at least, minds not vastly different from the human, with perhaps the exception of a single vastly superior or divine mind" (WP 45), is rejected by Hartshorne. His position is that besides minds, there are physical realities which are as real as the subjects for which they are objects (BH 176-177). Idealism boldly tried to simplify philosophy by proposing "to reduce all nature to the contents of higher-animal minds plus God", etc. This, according to Hartshorne, is absurd in that it ignores the fact of atomism, and the need that objects be given, etc. (cf. WP 45-48; BH 176 ff). 11

Hartshorne's psychicalism is offered as a fifth possible view. It was anticipated, as he notes, by Plato and the Greek

---

11 For details, see the texts cited; the issue cannot be considered further here.
atomists, and later developed by Leibniz, Peirce, Royce, and finally by Peirce and Whitehead.\textsuperscript{12} It was in Whitehead, however, that the doctrine was best and most fully expressed. His writings constitute, according to Hartshorne, "the major metaphysical synthesis of our day" (WP 55). The synthesis is one of idealism and realism, and of pluralism (unrelated individuals) and monism (undifferentiated being). The latter is expressed, in part, by Whitehead's doctrine of the "compound individual"; that is, the doctrine that macroscopic entities consist of microscopic subjects: "The human body is a vast nexus or interlocked colony of relatively low-grade individuals, which, in varying degrees, are subject to the control of the human mind" (WP 55). The various constituent parts feel (prehend, experience) each other. As such, the various experiences are "compounded", and the man can feel (and act) as a unified whole. This doctrine is, according to Hartshorne, Whitehead's "primary achievement" (WP 55).

The long struggle between idealism and realism has, in Hartshorne's opinion, "resulted at last in the discrediting of idealisms of the non-panpsychic variety, and in strengthening of positivism at the expense of materialistic or dualistic realism".\textsuperscript{13} Yet, as he argues,

\textsuperscript{12} For details, see WP 48 ff; "Panpsychism", 445 ff.

\textsuperscript{13} Charles Hartshorne, "The New Pantheism", 141.
since pure positivism is unacceptable to theology, psychicalism is the only present resource (that is, granting that theology is true). The theory is, as noted, a synthesis of realism and idealism, or as Hartshorne argues, it is a realism as the basis of a cogent idealism (cf. RSP 83-84). His argument is illustrated by the following four theses which, while representing realism, idealism and psychicalism, "are not in conflict with each other, but are rather complementary or mutually supporting" (RSP 71):

1. An "object", or that of which a particular subject is aware, in no degree depends upon that subject.
Principle of Objective Independence.
Common Sense, Aristotle, Moore, Perry, Whitehead.

2. A "subject", or whatever is aware of anything, always depends upon the entities of which it is aware, its objects.
Principle of Subjective Dependence.
Common sense, Aristotle, Whitehead.

1) and (2) constitute "realism".

3. Any entity must be (or at least be destined to become) object for some subject or other.
Principle of Universal Objectivity: "Idealism".
Berkeley, Whitehead.

4. Any concrete entity is a subject, or set of subjects; hence, any other concrete entity of which a subject, S1, is aware, is another subject or subjects (S2, or S2, S3, etc.).
Principle of Universal Subjectivity "Panpsychism".
Leibniz, Peirce, Whitehead. (RSP 70).

It is Hartshorne's contention that these four theses, representing realism (1 and 2) and idealism (3) and psychicalism (4), are not contradictory. They are all coherently synthesized in his psychicalism (as in Whitehead's). That 1 and 2 are reconciled is
explained by Hartshorne by the fact that "(1) provides the subject with something to know; (2) declares that this knowledge conforms to the known" (RSP 71). Likewise, 1 and 2 are compatible with 3: 1 "states that relation to a particular subject knowing an entity is extrinsic to that entity...", while 3 "states that relation to subjectivity in general is not thus extrinsic" (RSP 71). Panpsychism is compatible with the other three: "If what I know is another subject, it may still be true that in this knowing I depend upon that other subject, while it does not depend upon me....Panpsychism may be thus a wholly 'realistic' doctrine if realism is defined through (1) and (2)" (RSP 73). Hartshorne concludes:

the idealistic interpretation of reality as essentially relative to or consisting of mind, experience, awareness, that is, either Berkeleyan or panpsychic idealism is entirely compatible with a realistic view of the independence of the particular object and the dependence of the particular subject, in each subject-object situation (RSP 73).

The usual practice, then, of contrasting idealism and realism as though they are ultimate contradictions is "of doubtful convenience" (RSP 73).

Note that Hartshorne's panpsychism does not contend that only minds or souls exist: it is rather an alternative to the traditional dichotomy between there being either a "pluralism of discrete, unrelated individualities, atoms or monads", or "a monism of absolute undifferentiated
substantial being". Rather than there being either bodies or minds, or a dualism of both, Hartshorne's psychicalism contends that the basic or actual constituents of the world are "unit-experiences", or "experient-occasions" (Whitehead's "actual entities"). He notes, however, that the term, "panpsychism", is somewhat misleading (and indeed is never used by Whitehead himself). The term is useful, nevertheless, if it is used with the correct connotation; namely, as expressing not that there are various souls as unchanging substances, but that all things are constituted by event-experiences which have psychic aspects (and to be sure, physical aspects as well). There are, indeed, not two things, mind and matter; but rather, there is a myriad of levels of process from minute particles to man (and to God Himself). Each type of being can, further, be described in terms of both physical aspects (size, shape, motion, vibration rate, etc.) -- granting certain qualifications perhaps at the lowest levels -- and also in terms of psychic aspects (emotion, perception, memory, desire, etc.) (cf: LR, 225). Hartshorne contends that one cannot simply draw the line below which these psychic properties are no longer existent: this would be an unsubstantiated and arbitrary action. There is no such thing as "mere matter".

which is devoid of any psychic aspect, or at least that this is the case cannot be proven (cf. LP ch 8). Reality is the interaction of event-experiences wherein the event-experiences have each other as data (though, note, the past are data for the present and future, but not vice versa: process is asymmetrical). Thus, "The world may be conceived as the increasing specification of the theme 'feeling of feeling'" (PPS 208).

Both the psychic and physical aspects of the event-experiences, furthermore, are discontinuous: there are, Hartshorne suggests, perhaps up to 10-20 such experiences per second in man, and up to a thousand or million times more in the minute atoms (as Royce theorized). Yet, since there is a certain persistence of traits from one experience to the next, there can be recognized something like a "character" or "essence" in the sequence of events (as will be discussed shortly). These stabilities, note, are in the events, not vice versa. Certain physical and psychic events persist in a man, for example, throughout his existence of processive experiences: it is not the case, though, that there is a "man" as an unchanging substance to whom all these events simply happen.

Hartshorne's argument, then, is for an event-pluralism, or

---

16 Cf. Charles Hartshorne, "Panpsychism", 448; WP 119-120.
in other words, for a theory of processive, psychic events as being the fundamental constituents of reality. He argues that these microscopic and/or momentary experiences are the ultimate reals, whereas, alternatively, the macroscopic and/or enduring objects (for example, a man) are abstractions.\(^\text{17}\) It is the psychic-events that have both spatial and temporal extension, and not, as is usually assumed, the abstractions. Leibniz saw this clearly with respect to the element of spatial extension: he argued that "in diverse perceived 'places' are not merely parts of one extended thing, but always diverse things, collectives of which are what are perceived as extended."\(^\text{18}\) Whitehead extended this theory to include temporal as well as spatial considerations (Leibniz failing to see this clearly): in different moments of time, he argued, there are not merely different states of one thing, but rather there are different things. It is only sequences of such things that have temporal extension.\(^\text{19}\) It is a fallacy to consider spatial and temporal extension as being characteristics of only macroscopic things.

\(^{17}\) Note that event-experiences are not only to be understood as momentary, but are also either microscopic or macroscopic, depending on the type of being which is the subject of the experience. An event-experience may be at the level of a minute cellular structure, or it may be that of a man acting as a unified whole (as opposed to experiences being attributed only to the myriad of cellular constructs which constitute the man).

\(^{18}\) Charles Hartshorne, "Panpsychism", 450.

\(^{19}\) Cf. Charles Hartshorne, "Panpsychism", 450.
such are abstractions from the psychic events and their interrelationships. A single such event does not, to be sure, occupy a space-volume or a point in time; rather, spatial-temporal extension is the result of the group character, the interaction of psychic events.

"Space is the pattern of interaction between individuals, as time is the pattern of action or process within the same individual" (though, note: by "within a single individual", Hartshorne means within a sequence of events which constitute an individual; cf. BH 175). On the lowest levels of events, those of mere particles, such that have no organs of their own, extension is characterized via its relationships with other particles (cf. BH. 195, 197). This is the only logical meaning of extension, that is, as one event having relations with others, temporally and spatially: "two things are in the same neighbourhood if they act upon each other directly" (BH 175). Likewise, temporal extension implies relations of two or more events (the past being prehended by the present). Hartshorne has, accordingly, theorized about the basic ways in which these interactions occur, as for example, in "aggregates", "democracies", and "monarchies", in "low-grade" and "high-grade" societies, etc., as will be discussed in detail shortly.

This must end this section's account of Hartshorne's doctrine of psychicalism. The doctrine, to be sure, is not without contention, yet any fuller or critical treatment of it must be the issue of a work devoted more explicitly to this theme (and there have been several
dissertations on this specific topic). For the purposes of this present dissertation, we must proceed to discuss certain issues which arise out of the doctrine: has Hartshorne adequately shown that these event-experiences are also agents with a certain self-autonomy and freedom? And indeed, has he shown that such experiences are the experiences of subjects with some measure of continuing identity and agency? These questions are discussed within the context of Hartshorne's understanding of man (as the highest form of creature) as a free and morally responsible agent.

20 See the lists, for example, in Process Studies 1/4 and 3/4, Winter, 1971 and 1973.
2. Relative Determinism

While Hartshorne's psychicalism expresses his contention that all reality is sentient, his doctrine of relative determinism (or, alternatively, relative indeterminism) expresses his contention that all reality is also freely creative (versus being determined by external or internal causes). The free creativity of creatures is, he contends, a limited freedom, and it varies according to the level of mental sophistication of the being involved. Hartshorne's doctrine of relative determinism is, moreover, opposed both to pure indeterminism and pure determinism — at least in his understanding of these doctrines as implying, respectively, unlimited freedom and no freedom at all.  

The determinist, he contends, is mistaken in holding that events are fully implicit in the antecedent conditions; yet the indeterminist is, likewise, mistaken in holding that the antecedent conditions do not cause the new events. Hartshorne wishes to acknowledge the fact

21 The indeterminist theory, as Hartshorne sees it, is untenable, and a doctrine which no one could defend; the antecedent conditions of an event (or effect) cannot be completely irrelevant to that event. And thus, should the determinist seek to strengthen his case by — as Hartshorne puts it — committing this "lifeless effigy to the flames" (LP 162), this is to avoid the real issue, for what is at stake here is whether the antecedent conditions are the necessary and sufficient causes of an event; or whether there is some aspect of self-autonomy in the experiencing subject.
that all events have causes; yet, he insists that the causes (or, alternatively, the antecedent conditions) can never fully determine the effect. There is always an aspect of self-creativity in the subject which experiences the new event, and this aspect of novelty is not predetermined or implicit in the causes. The causes predetermine the limits within which the effect must fall, but do not simply predetermine the effect to the last detail (LP 162-163 ff). Herein lies the distinction between Hartshorne's relative determinism and what he understands to be implied by "absolute" or "classical" determinism: given, for example, a lighted fuse, TNT, and a confined space, there will almost surely be an explosion; yet "it does not follow that the exact details of the explosion, the behavior of each atom and particle, will be the only possible ones (in principle) under the circumstances" (LP 163). Determinism in its absolute form, as Hartshorne understands it, is wrong in holding the contrary position, and thus, as he contends, the basis of the determinist position is false, for it negates true becoming and real novelty in events. To hold that the antecedent

22It must be understood here that the determinism which Hartshorne rejects is, essentially, that form of determinism which he calls "absolute" or "classical" determinism, and which is "embodied in the standard medieval theological view that God knows the world simply by knowing himself as cause".
The cause was the superior entity, or if not, cause and effect were "equal". Effects were to be known in their causes, as well as in their effects. And so, if an event existed to be known it was nevertheless completely defined and ready to be known. (Or else it existed before it happened.)... Thus the effect was held to be implied by, logically contained in, though inferior to its cause, the cause minus something, and then what is the point of causal production?" ("Creativity and the Deductive Logic of Causality", 65).

Now, according to Hartshorne's understanding, this medieval scheme was taken seriously by Spinoza who "deduced the catastrophic consequence that the world must be in God, and in him taken merely as a necessary and eternal cause; i.e.; the world in all its details must be as necessary as God" ("Creativity and the Deductive Logic of Causality", 65). Now, I do not propose to challenge or critically assess Hartshorne's understanding of classical determinism, but rather wish only to note that it is this form of absolute determinism which he rejects as incoherent with, and contradictory to, his own theory of relative determinism.

An important point to consider here, however, is that classical or absolute determinism seems to be no longer held by most philosophers, but that, rather, the more prevalent view is that there is some freedom and some necessity in all events. Against classical theories and Newtonian physics, Hartshorne agrees with such authorities as Peirce, Bergson, Boutoux, Dewey, Montague, Whitehead, Popper, and many physicists, etc., that "the genuine causal laws are all approximate or statistical, not deterministic in the classical sense" ("Creativity and the Deductive Logic of Causality", 63). Accordingly, the relative determinism Hartshorne supports would seem to be fairly consistent with modern physics, and even, perhaps, with some modern accounts of determinism. I do not wish to consider the validity of this last statement, nor to compare and contrast Hartshorne's position with that of modern determinists (for this is clearly too complex an issue).

This is, however, not to say that Hartshorne's relative determinism is no different from modern deterministic theories. He finds fault, for example, with its expression in Cāsiṇer, Skinner, and Russell, etc. (cf. especially LP ch 6). Hartshorne argues, furthermore, that most modern defenses of determinism do not address themselves consistently to the issue which distinguishes between determinism and relative determinism; that is, "whether causes or conditions determine happenings absolutely, or whether they merely limit more or less sharply what can happen" (LP 163-164). Russell, for example,
conditions completely determine events, destroys, according to Hartshorne, the rational coherency of the world; that is, by making causes indistinguishable from their effects, by obliterating temporal succession (past and present are one and the same if cause and effect are indistinguishable) and freedom (that is, if causes necessarily determine events):

in his "Elements of Ethics", misses this distinction and, according to Hartshorne, "the argument proceeds as though one had two absolutes to choose between, one of which [pure indeterminism] no one could defend" (LP 163, note 2). Hartshorne argues that a "creative leap" must be acknowledged, that every new experience of a subject may be "influenced by its antecedent conditions, and requires them, yet it cannot...be required or precisely determined by them"; it is this aspect of creativity which the determinist "overlooks or denies" (LP 164).

The issue here is extremely complex, and while we must prescind from any critical analysis of Hartshorne's thesis vis-à-vis historical and modern versions of determinism, there is to be noted this point: it will be argued later in this chapter and again, from another perspective, in "Chapter Four", that Hartshorne's understanding of the limits to any new, creative experience is somewhat problematic, for his understanding of limits seems to preclude such creativity as defined by acts which effectively go beyond the confines of the past's limits, that is, to modify those limits. Hartshorne's theory may, accordingly, be closer to determinism than he thinks.
But then since everything is thus logically contained in everything else all distinction of ground and consequence, of fundamental and non-fundamental, of universal and particular, of logical relations in general - as Mr. Bradley honestly conceded - vanishes. Nothing can be more essential or comprehensive or "eternal" than anything else in a system in which all things necessarily enter into the being of all things....Thus, as Peirce was never weary of pointing out, absolute determinism applied to the entire cosmos amounts to sheer nominalism; the denial of all difference between general and individual, as well as between possible and real. 23

Hartshorne's rejection of this totally necessary world of absolute determinism and the consequent denial of such fundamental truths as the succession of time and freedom, is reinforced by his employment of dipolar logic. 24 This logic (as noted above) contends that a category has no coherent and sufficient meaning unless it is defined and modified by an actual comparison and contrasted with its polar opposite category. Accordingly, the concept of necessity, which is the basis of determinism, is meaningless without some synthesis with its polar opposite category, contingency. Necessity, taken in itself, is an incoherent idea: there must be an element of contingency with respect to necessity:


24 See above, "Chapter Two", "Section Two".
Logic rests on the notion of mutually exclusive alternatives, P and not-P. This is Morris Cohen's Law of Polarity, the law that categories run in contraries so related that neither of the contrary poles has meaning or application by itself. In every set of chances, there must be abstract common factors, that is, necessities; and there seems no intelligible meaning for necessity except as a common factor of a set of chances (RSP 86).

Necessity, for Hartshorne, is in fact ingredient in possibility: it is that in which a set of possibilities agree. "The necessity is thus a common or invariant factor in a set of possibilities." 25 Hartshorne explains:

The trouble... is that "there is but one possibility" seems to mean that there are no possibilities, properly so-called. For "possible" connotes "perhaps, but also perhaps not." Possibility is alternativeness. To say "the possibilities reduce to one" appears to collapse the contrast upon which both terms, possible and necessity, depend. There is, however, an interpretation which avoids this paradox. In any range of possibilities however defined as to its limits, there will be common factors which pervade the range. To these there will be indeed, within the range, no possible alternative. 26

Necessity, then, implies that there are no alternatives or possibilities, save one. Yet, Hartshorne argues that necessity without its polar


opposite category, contingency, is meaningless. Necessity has meaning only when it is seen to be a common or invariant factor within a set of contingent possibilities. He offers the following illustration of this thesis:

If, for example, there is for each man the possibility of living until he dies by disease, or until he dies in some other manner, but no possibility of living not subject to "until he dies by...", then this common element of the man's possibilities is a human necessity. It has no alternative; but not because eventually dying is a single, determinate, solely possible kind of event in his future, but because it is a common character of every possible sequence of events subsequent to this present state. The necessity is thus a common or invariant factor in a set of possibilities. This is true even of mathematical necessities.27

One possibility may be more likely to occur than others, but there is never the simple fact that this will -- necessarily -- occur. For any given situation there is a limited range of things which are possible such that "Nothing outside the range is to be even possible";28 this much is necessary; that is, that the possibilities are restricted to certain limits. Which possibles are actualized, however, is not predetermined to the last detail,


and to this extent is contingent.

Hartshorne's thesis, in sum, is that the determinists' argument that there are no real alternatives -- given the antecedent conditions of an event -- as to the nature of the effect, is simply incoherent. And, in contrast to what he understands as the absolute determinist position, Hartshorne wants to stress the fact that all reality is truly becoming, freely creative: "to be is to create" (CP5:1). He approvingly summons Peirce's support for this view, in particular, Peirce's argument that within the vast range of unpredictability of an event, the unknown causes of events (which are readily admitted by most determinists), there lies an infinite range of randomness:

If the calculus of probabilities has any purchase upon the question of absolute law it can only, as Peirce so pertinently said, declare an infinite improbability against it; for between any given finite value which observation might fix as the probable maximum of the hypothetically irregularity, and the zero value which causality taken as absolute requires, there can be an infinity of possible values, none of which is known to be more probable than another, so that the assumption that the value is exactly zero represents a probability of one over infinity. 29

29 Charles Hartshorne, "Contingency and the New Era in Metaphysics", 426. Hartshorne confirms this thesis elsewhere, as he writes: "...there is an eternal creative source of qualities such that, given any two actualized qualities, there is an inexhaustive possibility of intermediaries between them" ("Continuity, the Form of Forms, in Charles Peirce", Monist 39/4, Oct., 1929, 527, my italics). See also his "Husserl and the Social Structure of Immediacy", in Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl, ed. M. Farber (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940), 220: "...in addition to the aspects of the object actually given there is always an infinity of others virtually or potentially given, though as virtual these too are somehow given" (my emphasis).
This argument is intended to undercut one of the main determinist theses, that events are fully implicit in their antecedents. Yet, as noted above, while Hartshorne holds that causal events are, indeed, not absolutely or exactly predictable, he insists that the freedom of subjects is not without limitations. Pure necessity, pure determined causality, is an incoherent logic, but so too is mere randomness, mere chance (cf. LP ch 6). Rather, Hartshorne's synthetic position is one of "relative determinism" (LP 169); that is, that there is always some freedom, and some necessity. Both freedom and necessity are required (that is, for either to be meaningful). Necessity is that wherein a set of possibilities agree; their common, invariant factor. Thus, every event is both caused and free:

   every event is caused, that is to say, it
   issues out of a restricted or real poten-
   tiality; but also, every event occurs by
   chance, that is to say, it is more determinate
   than its proximate real potentiality, and just
   to that extent is unpredictable, undeducible
   from its causes and causal law (REP 88-89).

30 This question arises, however: can it be held (as Harts-
horne does hold, following Peirce) that there are restrictions upon each act, but that within the confines of the limitations there is an infinite range of freedom? This seems contradictory, for if there are limits, then how can the range for freedom be said to be infinite? And if the range is infinite, then how can there be limits? This issue is to be considered in the following section of this chapter, with respect to the limits imposed by a man's past character upon his present self, and again in "Chapter Four", "Section One" and "Section Six" with respect, respectively, to the analogous issues concerning the limits imposed by God and by the past world upon man's free creativity.
Having now reconstructed (uncritically) the basic outlines of Hartshorne's theories of psychicalism and relative determinism as the bases, respectively, of his understanding of creatures as being both sentient and free (within limits and varying according to the degree of mental sophistication), the following section will complete this background examination by considering Hartshorne's understanding of man (the highest form of creature) as a continuing being with free and responsible agency.
3. Man as Free and Morally Responsible

Hartshorne's argument, as I have (uncritically) reconstructed it, (it is not systematically presented by him), is, first, to establish the doctrine of psychicalism (that all reality is sentient), and then to argue that sentient reality is free (versus determined). He has argued against dualism and materialism in trying to establish the former thesis, and against determinism and indeterminism to help establish the latter. Now, without further comment on, or criticism of, these two theses, I shall proceed to discuss the issue which next arises (granting the preceding two theses); namely, that of establishing the continuing identity and free agency of the minute event-experiences as a whole, or rather, with respect to the whole of which they are parts. The issue is to assess Hartshorne's argument for creaturely freedom and agency (especially man's) as opposed to agency being attributed only to the minute constituents of creatures. This question has long been a point of contention to interpreters and critics of the process understanding of creaturely freedom: is it man who has free agency or only his constituent parts? Weiss and Sherburne for example, have argued that Whitehead's metaphysics implies that the only agency (and hence, moral responsibility) is in the actual occasions,
and not in man as a whole. As such, they contend, Whitehead's understanding of man is problematic. Sherburne takes literally Whitehead's phrase that "actual entities are the only reasons" (PR 29), implying, that is, that they are the only agents. It is not the man as a whole, it is not the nexus (a macroscopic society of actual entities) which is agent, but rather, agency is confined to the split-second event-experiences themselves.


32 This same criticism is reiterated, most recently, by Professor A. Shalom (of the Department of Philosophy, McMaster University), with specific reference to Hartshorne. Dr. Shalom argues, in his unpublished essay, "Professor Hartshorne and the Problem of Personal Identity", that Hartshorne has not shown how the totality of sub-decisions of the constituents parts of a man can be anything more than a cluster of psychically animated event cells. Hartshorne has not shown that such a myriad of sub-decisions can legitimately give rise to his thesis that there is a unified "man" who is the agent: "It is only by a leap of science fiction that clusters of psychically animated event-cells can be transformed into Peter's awareness -- either of the world or of himself". And, according to Shalom, it is Hartshorne's position that "the 'identity' of a 'person' is no more than the identity of a particular series of event cells". This may be true, in a manner of speaking, but the exact meaning of Hartshorne's thesis has not, it seems to me, been fully appreciated, as will be shown.
In reply to the above sort of criticism, it must be shown that, for Hartshorne, it is not the case that man is "no more than the identity of a particular series of event-cells" (see note 32): man is this, granted, but he is also more than this, since, according to Hartshorne, "man" is a "monarchical society" of event-experiences in which there is a dominant aspect which gives unity and direction to the individual constituents. In this way, the action of the whole man is more than the sum total of his constituents, for there is also the activity of the ruling and unifying members to be considered (cf. LP. ch 7). Granted, these dominant members are part of the body and thus the total decision is, in this sense, the sum total of the bodily constituents; yet, it is important to note that there is this ruling mind or soul which gives unity and direction to the other bodily constituents, and as such, man (as a whole) acts with a single purpose, and the momentary decisions of the individual parts must conform to this purpose and direction. The ruling members are, Hartshorne argues, like the monarch who exercises his authority over his subjects. He makes the analogy, here, that God is the monarch, the mind, the ruler, of the world, the latter being His bodily constituents. He is not just the world, but more than the world
in this sense (as will be discussed in more detail shortly). 33

Before discussing this issue further, we must note the following important point. There would seem to be three specific areas where the question of creaturely agency and freedom (man's agency, specifically) is at issue in Hartshorne's metaphysics. First, he must establish that "man" has agency, as opposed to agency being attributed to only the event-experiences which, in total, constitute the whole man. And indeed, further, he must establish that man, as such, is morally responsible for his actions. Second, man's free agency must be established vis-a-vis the causal influence of the external world, of the past causal nexus, which "bears down upon" each presently-experiencing subject. Third, man's free agency must be established vis-a-vis the causal influence of God's agency in the world. 34

The first issue is, then, this: Is agency applicable to man as a whole, or is it restricted to the constituent parts of this man? Hartshorne's answer to this question has already been noted; that is, via the suggestion that man is more than the mere constituents which

33 Note, to be sure, that Hartshorne does not consider the mind or soul of man to be the equivalent of the old substance doctrine such that it is understood to be a fixed, unchanging essence. It is rather a genetically identical and persistent part of man's being, as will be discussed in detail in the pages to follow.

34 Of the three issues, the first is discussed in this chapter, while the others are discussed in the following chapter (though brief reference is made to the second issue in this chapter).
make up his body: he has a controlling and unifying mind or soul. We must elaborate further on this point.

Hartshorne locates can among the "high-grade" societies of beings, as distinguished from "low-grade" societies, constituted by sub-human forms of life. He argues, as noted above, that all reality is both physical and psychic. This thesis constitutes a virtual synthesis of the extreme positions: materialism, which regards "matter in motion" as the basic reality, with mind a special event; idealism, which makes mind the basic principle and matter the special case; determinism, which regards law or causal order as universal, with freedom the special case where the laws govern motives and acts of will; and libertarianism, which makes freedom the rule, and law the special case where freedom is not as predominant (cf. RSP 31). The synthesis of these doctrines, that is, of what is positive in all of them, gives rise to what Hartshorne terms the conception of the "social" (RSP 31). Both law and freedom, matter and mind, are "inextricably blended" (RSP 31). Each society (that is, each group of entities which forms a certain sequence — lineal or temporal — and which, contemporaneously, forms a loose relationship within the group) has its laws and customs, yet the individual constituents of the society have a certain freedom, limited within the bounds of the society (as will be discussed in following pages). In low-grade societies, the freedom of the individual members is slight and the
element of law predominates to such an extent—that any freedom seems to be lacking—though there is, Hartshorne insists, always minimal freedom. Conversely, in higher-grade societies, the element of freedom predominates over law. Between these two extremes of minimal freedom and minimal order there are contained all beings, at almost infinitely various levels. There are, let us note, no beings which occupy either of the extreme positions, for this would imply an incoherence, since pure law or pure freedom cannot exist as such (for there would then be no contrast, and hence they would be meaningless; see above, Hartshorne’s reference to and use of Cohen’s Law of Polarity).

Hartshorne defends this social theory by arguing that his “social category fits all actual or conceivable facts of observation while non-social conceptions are at best required by no conceivable observations and contradicted by some” (RSP 32-33). He argues, further, (as noted above) that in order to know something about sub-human beings, we must conceive these as analogous to human beings:

The human specious present is the only epoch we directly experience with any vividness, just as the spatial spread of a human experience is the only atomic unit. In perceiving the non-human world we are always apprehending collectives, both spatial and temporal. To form even a vague conception of the singularens composing these collectives our only resource is to generalize analogically the epochal and atomic character of human experiences.

35 Charles Hartshorne, "Panpsychism", 450.
This is an expression of Hartshorne's (and Whitchoud's) "reformed subjectivist" principle. It is a "category stretching" which conceives of all levels of being as analogous to human experience. Hartshorne points out that modern developments in science and psychology are discovering that there are minute constituents of macroscopic objects which have not only some degree of sentience, but also a certain freedom. Here perception is no longer to be taken as the absolute guide to the nature of reality. Indeed, "The uncertainty principle and the impossibility or conceiving (not merely, as some say, of verifying) any but statistical uniformities in microphysics are now commonplace" (RSP 33). All reality is, to some degree, social, responsive and relatively free in its agency. That sub-human life is not social simply cannot be proven; that it is social is implied by modern sciences, and supplemented by the psychicalism and relative determinism which Hartshorne espouses. For example, the fact that man and the higher animals have nervous systems which are necessary for the subject to feel (prehérd, experience) does not mean that lower levels of things need, necessarily, have nervous systems. As Hartshorne puts it: "Lack of primitive organ does not spell lack of function, but primitive form of function" (PPS 244). Again: "Animals with no stomach nevertheless digest food, animals with no lungs can use oxygen... (and) as animals without muscles can nevertheless move, so those without nerves may feel, and may move in accordance with those
feelings" (RSP 34). The feeling, to be sure, is a feeling appropriate to the entity involved: man feels as only man can, a dog as a dog, and perhaps an amoeba as an amoeba.

Hartshorne illuminates his thesis that all life has some sentience and creativity (to varying degrees) by distinguishing the various (macroscopic) types of beings. There are three main types of societies, all of which are composed of myriads of event-experiences, of minute cells: aggregates, democracies and monarchies (cf. RSP ch 1). 36 "Aggregates" are societies whose constituent parts do not seem to act as a whole. The parts may have feelings, but such feelings are not felt by the subject as a whole. There is no dominant part, and no overall feeling. Aggregates are, then, nonsocial as a whole, while their parts are social, comprising "minute elements of freedom" (RSP 33: an example of an aggregate would be a pile of sand).

On a higher level are "democracies", societies whose constituent parts have "more functional unity than the whole" itself (RSP 35). Each part is influenced by the other parts, yet there is no part which is predominant. (A tree is one example of such a democracy).

On the highest level are "monarchies", societies whose

---

36 See also, LP 200. Hartshorne often omits the first (aggregates) in his discussion of the types of societies, though such are implied in this view (which, as Hartshorne acknowledges, was first used by Leibniz).
constituent parts are ruled by a dominant part. Animals and men are examples. The cells are subordinate to the whole subject which acts as a unit — it feels, desires, thinks and has purpose as a whole. (A. RSP 35): "A man's mind is king over his cells" (RSP 35). This expresses Hartshorne's doctrine (after Whitehead) of the "compound individual"; that is, of individual cells constituting greater wholes which unify the cells. He distinguishes, however, between "compound" and "composite" societies: the former is ruled by a dominant unit, whereas the latter is not. As such the latter is nonpersonal, while the former may be said to be a "personal" unit (cf. WP 57). The ruling mind of a monarchical society is referred to, variously, as the "ruling member", "king", "master-mind", as the "human personality", and as the "ruling power" (cf. RSP ch 1). The mind has "universal sway" over the other cells of the body, and, indeed, the entire body "acts with a functional unity comparable or superior to that of the various members" (RSP 38). Thus, a "unity of action can be imposed upon a society by a dominant member" (RSP 38). This predominant member not only gives unity to the body, but implies that there is in this agency an action which is more than the mere total of the bodily parts. As Hartshorne puts this: "the human mind is incomparably more powerful than any one of the individuals composing its body, so that the mind has a directing, 'forming' power not
otherwise found in the bodily system" (HVC 198). 37

Further, Hartshorne seeks to strengthen his case by arguing that without this ruling-unifying mind, the body would dissolve in chaos and cross-purposes. And, analogously, since the universe itself is composed of myriads of societies -- which are either monarchical in themselves (in the case of man) or are democratic or mere aggregates -- it requires the unifying and directing presence of a world-mind: this function is served by God, and is essential for the very survival of the universe:

Nothing would guarantee the continuance of the society from moment to moment save the infinite good luck that they all happened to use their freedom in ways servicable to the society. Each would have to be quite uncertain that its own efforts to serve the society would not be indefinitely nullified by the directions taken by the actions of others (RSP 39).

Thus, if the universe as a whole had no dominant member to set limits to the chaotic possibilities of individual freedom, it seems there would be no reason why the scheme of things would not dissolve in a chaos of unmitigated conflict, that is to say, in the cessation of all feeling and activity through the irresistible force of unbearable frustration (RSP 39).

37 Cf. LP 199 ff; 224: "A human experience is a unitary individual event, not a mere mosaic of events on the electronic level."
He concludes: the universe as a whole "must be a monarchical society, if it a society at all" (RSP 39). As monarch, God ensures that "there is enough involuntary or unconscious cooperation to make voluntary forms of cooperation possible without intolerable risks" (RSP 40). God's function is, in part, to provide a conserving and coordinating influence to ensure that there are possibilities always for free acts for creatures. Only under God's monarchy can the local freedom of the creatures, constituent of His body, function: "Democratic cooperation is possible only within an all-inclusive monarchy" (RSP 39). The extent of this freedom vis-à-vis God as world-Mind is the question, however, that must be asked, and is the general issue of "Chapter Four", to follow. For the present, we must continue to examine Hartshorne's understanding of man as agent and as freely creative: his understanding hinges upon his conception of man as a continuing, personal being, while yet not a subject in the traditional sense.

Hartshorne, in fact, raises various objections to the traditional substance doctrines of the self, against the view that there is in man a certain essence or character which remains unchanged as man proceeds through his existence. Such a doctrine is incoherent, he argues, since it implies that various predicates (attributes, experiences) can be variously applied to the same unchanging essence: a man, for example, cannot remain self-identical in his present state
together with his past states as a child. The two predicates (experiences) are incompatible when applied to the same supposedly unchanging subject: "The two belong in the same ordered sequence, but they are not one identical concrete reality" (CSPM 180); "no subject can have contradictory predicates" (CSPM 196). Rather, with each experience, the self becomes a new self which accommodates the successive new experiences: "life is cumulative, and hence asymmetrical in its relatedness. Thus the self as numerically the same is an abstraction, the latest self as new is the total concrete reality containing the former" (CSPM 184).

Perhaps one of the best accounts of Hartshorne's (and Whitehead's) criticism of the traditional substance doctrine of the self has been offered, recently, by Kirkpatrick (who, incidentally, is one of the foremost critics of Whitehead's and Hartshorne's alternative position regarding the self). The problem with the substance view, he contends, that behind every change an entity undergoes there is some unchanging essence, is this:

"it 'solves' the reconciliation between change and permanence at the price of an incoherence, in this case dualism. The substance does not change while its attributes do. But this entails that the substance and its attributes are two different realities, which in turn requires us to explain their relation to each other. We do not solve the problem of reconciling permanence and change; we merely recast it into different terms: substance and attributes. But we still need to explain their
relation to each other. And that proves as impossible as explaining the relation of change and permanence.\textsuperscript{38}

The substance doctrine has difficulties in explaining how a being is both "being" (that is, determinate complete) and "becoming" (changing). "The incoherence of the substance view resides in its insistence that a being can still become; that a substance which does not change...can be somehow involved in its own further becoming".\textsuperscript{39}

The Whiteheadian-Hartshornian view, alternatively, is not to argue that beings can become further (once they have become beings), but that the becoming takes place within the being as it becomes that being. This explains how a being can change and yet remain the self-same being; that is, because once beings have become, they no longer become. The only change is in the process of their becoming beings: once they have achieved this being, they exist only as data for others; that is, without having further conscious, sentient, subjective experience (further discussion of this theory is resumed in the following chapter, "Section Eight").

Hartshorne's alternative view to the substance doctrine of the self is an "event-pluralism" (cf. CSPM ch 9); that is, as noted above,


\textsuperscript{39} F.G. Kirkpatrick, "Subjective Becoming: An Unwarranted Abstraction?", 16.
the theory that man is a monarchical society, composed of a multitude of cellular constituents which are constantly succeeded by other, newer constituents about 10-20 times every second (WP 119-120). He finds support for this view in Buddhism and in certain comparatively recent western thinkers: Leibniz, Peirce, and Whitehead. He explains personal identity as follows: "If certain events, forming an apparently unbroken chain or sequence through time, exhibit some notably persistent characters, we speak of the chain as the history of some thing or person, otherwise not" (WP 135). Hartshorne points out that he is not denying the reality of enduring individual entities by denying the substance theory, but that he is rejecting the traditional substance doctrine that identity (being) is more real than change (becoming). "The process view is that the identity is somewhat abstract, and that this abstract reality, like all abstractions, must be defined through the more concrete, momentary actualities and their qualities and relations". 40 Hartshorne argues that the fixed character of a man is an abstraction, for the only reality is the concrete event of the moment. Man is a personal order of such events, with lineal links, and a certain basic unity, controlled as he is by a central organizing and guiding mind. The "character" or "essence" refers to

40 Charles Hartshorne, "Deity as Inclusive Transcendence", 156.
the "relatively permanent" abstraction concretized by the sequential
selves' momentary experiences:

What is an individual, a person? A person involves
a character, a complex of personality traits (in-
cluding bodily traits) which are embodied in success-
ive acts or experiences. These acts "express" the
character, but are not identical with or included
in it....The function of terms like "character"
is to point to a contrast between the at least
relatively permanent and the variable in the man
(RSP 197-198).

Hartshorne argues that a man, as a personal, lineal sequence, has
a certain "genetic identity", and that this sort of identity is less
strict than sheer logical sameness.\textsuperscript{41} He defines genetic identity
as involving: "(1) some 'defining characteristic' reappearing in each
member of a sequence or family of occasions; (2) direct inheritance by
appreciably positive prehensions of this character from previous
members".\textsuperscript{42} Further, Hartshorne distinguishes between linear,
"personally ordered societies", and non-linear societies, examples
of which are a man's stream of consciousness and a tree, respectively.
Man is an example, however, of a non-linear society which is
accompanied by a linear society of "presiding occasions", the mind or
soul. On this basis, then, Hartshorne defines "personal identity"

\textsuperscript{41}Charles Hartshorne, "Personal Identity from A to Z", Process
Studies 2/3, Fall, 1972, 211. Cf. "Strict and Genetic Identity",
in H.M. Kallen, et al., eds., Structure, Method, and Meaning: Essays

\textsuperscript{42}Charles Hartshorne, "Personal Identity from A to Z", 211.
as "the persistence of certain defining characteristics in a very complex bodily society endowed with a prominent linear society or 'soul'". He suggests, further, that the "character" of a personal sequence is maintained as long as some of the continuing contingent experiences of the subject resemble former ones (cf. RSP 205-206).

In referring to the "defining characteristics" or "personality traits" of the processive man, Hartshorne includes among such traits the "tendency to remember some of the earlier portions of the series of experiences called 'mine', and other types of relationships binding the various experiences into a single sequence" (RSP 206). He argues that the present subject has previous (past) entities as its data. The past entities are intuited by the present subject via memory and perception, both of which Hartshorne describes as forms of memory, personal and impersonal respectively.

Some process philosophers, notably Cobb, have developed the view that it is memory alone which accounts for the continuing personal identity of a man, or to be more precise, that personal identity is

---

43 Charles Hartshorne, "Personal Identity from A to Z", 212.
established via our memories in direct, immediate, unmediated hybrid prehensions of earlier occasions ("hybrid" prehensions are prehensions of the "mental" poles of the earlier experiences rather than their "physical" poles, implying that the prehension is most direct and unmediated). He argues: "personal identity obtains whenever there is a serially ordered society of primarily mental occasions (a soul) in which each occasion actually or potentially prehends unmediated the mental poles of all its predecessors".\(^{46}\) Cobb, let us note, rejects the notion (employed by Hartshorne) of a "common character" as establishing personal identity since such would imply a repetition of the past patterns, and hence, a virtual determinism, whereas "the decisive feature of life is novelty and not the repetition of past patterns".\(^{47}\) He suggests that the transition of a common character would, in fact, restrict the freedom of each new experience.

Cobb's position, however (for various reasons) seems to be not completely satisfactory and, in any event, Hartshorne does not agree that personal identity is to be based solely on memory -- in spite of the common understanding that he does.\(^{48}\) There are, according

\(^{46}\)J.B. Cobb, Jr., _A Christian Natural Theology_, 79.

\(^{47}\)J.B. Cobb, Jr., _A Christian Natural Theology_, 74.

\(^{48}\)Hartshorne, to be sure, often stresses the role of memory as the main element in personal continuity (cf., for example, LP 219; "Causal Necessities: An Alternative to Hume", 490 ff., 494; etc.), yet the fact that he wishes to acknowledge that there are other elements involved in personal continuity must be stressed. He expressed this view clearly to me in private conversations in 1975, though, it must be granted that it is not a view that he has stated as explicitly in his writings as we could wish. See his recent article, "Personal Identity from A to Z", 212.
to Hartshorne, rather, various elements by which personal identity is established, the unmediated memories of the soul being only one such element. We may appeal, for example, to bodily characteristics and skills, to mannerisms and dispositions and intentions, all of which indicate a persisting, common character. 49 He argues: "Contemporary analysts are, I think, right in holding that the persistence of the person includes that of the body; and I add, the mental persistence is in some ways a more limited and partial one". 50 The body's nervous system, its chemistry; its gene structure, is essentially stable, and it is unique in each person. Each body has a mass of memories, further, unique to the particular person. The body, then, is an important element in the understanding of the continuing person and his agency: the mind does not act simply in a vacuum, nor are we to think that its memories are the sole indication of its continuing identity.

In response, further, to Cobb's argument that the persistence of a common character would imply a determinism of the new experience,


50 Charles Hartshorne, "Personal Identity from A to Z", 212.
Hartshorne's position is that while the common characteristics set limits upon new experiences, they do not and cannot simply prescribe these new experiences. Indeed, we are able to change this common character — if ever so slightly — by means of our new acts and experiences. That, however, Hartshorne has shown how this can be conceived coherently is an issue to be discussed in detail later.

A most interesting and important criticism of Hartshorne's theory of the self has been raised recently by F.G. Kirkpatrick,\footnote{Cf. F.G. Kirkpatrick, "Subjective Becoming: An Unwarranted Abstraction?"; and also his "Process or Agent: Models for Self and God", Thought 18/188, Spring, 1973, 33-60. Other criticisms have been raised, some of which may, briefly, be considered here. One question, for example, asks: how can we hold that our experiences are momentary (up to 10-20 per second) when we experience not this discontinuity but rather an unbroken continuity of personal existence? Now, while Hartshorne readily admits that this is one of the most subtle and important of the considerations which his view must face (CSPM 198 f; cf. P.A. Bertocci, "Hartshorne on Personal Identity: A Personalistic Critique", Process Studies 2/3, Fall, 1972, 216-221, where this criticism is raised), his response is to argue that our experience of the continuity of process is an act of perception, and that perception, as such, is not to be taken as the sole and sufficient guide to the nature of reality. The experience of perception, he argues, is merely vague as to any discreteness which may be there. This vagueness is misread as a revelation of actual continuity. Experience is at most quasi-continuous, or pseudo-continuous. To say more implies a fundamental error in theory of perception, of what it could possibly accomplish (CSPM 194).} whose argument against Whitehead's theory may be taken, implicitly, to apply equally to Hartshorne's. He argues that Whitehead has not
adequately shown that there is a subject which "acts", since according to Whitehead's theory of concrescence (becoming), the subject as such

Hartshorne contends that neither continuity nor definite discreteness is given directly to our perception, in fact. Yet, a third possibility exists: "a real discreteness is vaguely or approximately given" (CSPM 195). Events occurring 'every 1/10th-1/20th of a second seem continuous to sense perception, yet this simply is not the whole truth of the matter, nor can it be proven.

Hartshorne offers a further consideration to help substantiate this thesis. G.H. von Wright is summoned: "a thing cannot have contradictory predicates at one and the same time; but, if change is continuous, no time can be found, unless an absolute instant, in which process is not both p and not p, for some predicate" ("Personal Identity from A to Z", 209). In this regard, Hartshorne follows Whitehead in extending Leibniz's argument (that "spatial extendedness requires a plurality of unitary entities, one here, another there" ("Personal Identity from A to Z", 209-210)) to include temporal as well as spatial considerations: "Temporal extendedness also requires such units, one now, another then. But in a continuum there are no definite units, only indefinite divisibility. Continuity is a matter of possibility, of ideality, not of actuality" ("Personal Identity from A to Z", 210; cf. CSPM ch 9; WP ch 4).

Another criticism of Hartshorne's view is based on the old Hindu argument which asks: "how could 'I' remember 'myself' doing such and such in the past if the self remembering and the self remembered were not the same? One remembers 'oneself'; not another self, as doing, feeling, thinking, perceiving, such and such" (CSPM 182). Hartshorne counters that this argument begs the question at issue, for the process view does not deny that a personal sequence of past experiences of one subject is distinct from those of another. Further, he denies that a personal sequence's past experiences are not connected to the remembering present experiences of the same subject. Memory cannot be explained by the substance account of the self which conceives the past and present subjects as identical: would not, in this case, the past self be able to foresee the present one? And, how can one escape the negation of time sequence? (cf. CSPM 182 f; WP 181-182).
does not exist until it has become. Thus, some agency other than the subject itself is responsible for the becoming of the subject! The subjective aim, given by God, and the data of the causal nexus concrescence to form a new unique experience, a new subject; yet, the subject itself would seem to have no part in this concrescence since it simply does not exist until the process of subjective becoming is complete. As such, the subject itself is not an agent, and accordingly, there can be no application of the concept of freedom to it (since, that is, it is determined by these other things). Kirkpatrick argues, further, that not only does the subject not operate as its own self-determining agent, but that it cannot act as agent with respect to other beings: "The self cannot relate to others until it is dead, and it cannot act on others until it is dead". 52 Without a subject as agent in its own becoming and in its influence on other subjects, Whitehead's system can account only for there being novelty and agency (as such), but without there being an agent!: "the most we can say on this model of process is that there is novelty and modification [of the initial aim] but any further attempt to locate that which modifies lands us back in the substance model". 53 He concludes:

52 F.G. Kirkpatrick, "Process or Agent: Models for Self and God", 42.

53 F.G. Kirkpatrick, "Process or Agent: Models for Self and God", 47.
in Whitehead's metaphysics, there is no "logical difference between an arbitrary coming together of feelings, a spontaneous 'happening', of novelty, and a free, considered decision among alternatives."  

Kirkpatrick's argument uncovers two basic problem-areas of the process view: the theory of concrecence and the question of immortality. It may be immediately admitted that these issues are unclear in Whitehead's (and Hartshorne's) writings, and as such have been the basis of much recent debate. While these issues are discussed more fully in the chapters to follow, certain considerations, which respond directly to Kirkpatrick's criticism, may be noted here.

The Whiteheadian concept of concrecence is no easy theory to comprehend fully, and consequently, there has been much debate concerning the interpretation of its central thesis that a subject becomes non-temporally, but that at the same time, it has aspects of temporality in that it must modify its initial aim into a new experience (subject). A dilemma arises here, for if there is temporal succession within the phases of a subject's becoming, then it can be argued that each new phase is determined by the succeeding ones; alternatively, if there is no temporal succession, then the subject does nothing.

vis-à-vis the initial aim supplied by God and the causal nexus, and one is left with a divine finalism. This dilemma has led some interpreters to argue that the genetic succession of a subject is to be understood neither as temporal nor as merely logical. The problem, then, has been to explain how this is so.

Now, Kirkpatrick's criticism of the process doctrine of genetic succession (concrescence) appears to me to arise from his misunderstanding of concrescence as, simply, temporal. This is a clear misunderstanding of Whitehead, or at least of his intention. The subjective becoming of an agent is not to be understood as purely temporal; as though one phase temporally follows another. Pols and Sherburne, among others, seem to have stressed this temporal view to the deprivation of the non-temporal aspects which Whitehead's theory of concrescence demands. The issue is, though, to show how concrescence can be non-temporal, and yet, not a merely logical successiveness.

This issue is discussed in "Chapter Four" to follow. We may note here, in passing, that Hartshorne is of little help on this issue; he has written very little about concrescence, and has suggested that the theory is of less than major significance for himself and indeed for Whitehead (who writes about it only once, in Process and Reality).

That Hartshorne has underestimated the importance of this issue, however, is witnessed by the problems which Pols, Kirkpatrick, and others have uncovered, and by the continuing debate among many of the major process thinkers.
The other of Kirkpatrick's arguments is that the subject, once it has fully become, cannot be an agent since it is, in fact, dead; there can be no further subjective becoming once the subject has completed its concrescence. Here Kirkpatrick has raised another widely discussed issue; namely, Whitehead's doctrine of "objective immortality". This doctrine has given rise to various interpretations, especially to the contradictory views of Hartshorne and Christian. Hartshorne would argue that Kirkpatrick, like Christian, takes Whitehead's words too literally: the occasion "perishes", granted, but this does not mean it is "dead", as Kirkpatrick says. Rather, the subject which has become lives on as data for future subjects, and as such, has an "objective immortality". Its "subjective immortality" is ended once its concrescence is completed ("satisfied"), and yet as objectively immortal, the subject contributes to the experiences of other concrescing subjects as data, as actual influence. In this sense are Whitehead's words -- entities "perish, yet live forevmore" -- to be understood, according to Hartshorne (WP 166). And indeed, this objective immortality is guaranteed eternal influence in that the experiences of all subjects

have been and are experienced by God and become part of His eternal nature, to be, consequently, passed back into the works as the initial aims (ideals, real possibilities) of the newly-becoming subjects. Kirkpatrick is wrong, then, to think that the agency of the subject is restricted only to its subjective becoming (and that, indeed, it is not its own agent here); rather, a subject's agency extends to its influence as an objectively immortal datum for present and future becomings. This entire question is discussed in more detail in "Chapter Five" to follow, and as such no further discussion need be pursued here.

Earlier, I suggested that there are three specific areas where the question of creaturely agency and freedom is at issue in Hartshorne's metaphysics. The first concerns his understanding of man as an agent and continuing being vis-à-vis free agency being attributed only to the multitude of cellular constituents which make up his body. This issue has now been discussed, but only in part: still to be determined is the moral responsibility of this man as a continuing being and free agent. To this question we turn.

Hartshorne contends that for a man to be morally responsible for his actions, there are required the following two necessary elements: (a) acts must causally flow from (antecedent) character...and (b) it must have been causally possible for the man in that situation with that past to have made a different decision" (CSPM 202). With regard to the first
point, Hartshorne argues that the present subject inherits causally from its past, thereby necessitating "that a certain class of possible successors to that past should not remain empty" (CSPM 202). Present experiences, then, are limited to a very large extent by the past nexus, particularly by the subject's own past, and by its character, such that the present experience must fall within a range of possibility dictated by that past. The present subject is free, but free only within the limits of the past character of its sequence (and within the limits of the past causal nexus at the particular moment). However, Hartshorne contends that each new experience, each newly-become subject in the personal sequence of a man, may alter the overall character of the man, and consequently, shift the possibilities and probabilities available to that sequence's future acts.

Thus, with respect to the second point, (b), Hartshorne contends that each becoming self does not merely express its antecedent character, but may freely create a new character and a new range of possibilities for future action. "One's past is subtly another, and even it must not be complete master of the new self", or else, for example, the child would be master of the man who follows in the same personal sequence (cf. CSPM 203). Hartshorne argues that the past (one's own and others') never completely determines the present decisions and experiences, for there is always some freedom — however small at times — to act in such a way that the past has not simply
predetermined to the last degree:

Many times a second we are creating something additional, however slight, in a mass of memories and bodily habits which makes up character, and...always this addition is incompletely specified in advance by the prior causal conditions. Just now one is almost, but not entirely, the slave of causal necessities (CSFM 203-204).

It seems, then, that while a subject's actions are greatly influenced and limited by the character of its personal sequence, there is, inevitably, a certain element of freedom whereby the subject is able to modify that character and (thus) the possibilities for actions of future selves in the same personal sequence.

Hartshorne's position can be made a little clearer by noting, at least briefly, how he deals with certain objections to his teaching concerning moral responsibility. Thus, for example, if it is objected that there can be no moral responsibility in the act of keeping a promise among mere sequences of short-lived selves, Hartshorne insists that each successive self in the sequence "inherits purposes from its predecessors, and the more it can accept and execute these purposes, the richer and more harmonious will be its own content" (CSFM 198).

Both past and present acts in a sequence represent that sequence and are, in this way, responsible to it.

This view is reinforced by his argument that beings generally seek long-run goods, rather than merely momentary goods, in spite of the fact that experience is momentary:
In my view a rational self, no matter how momentary, cannot be satisfied with less than a rational aim, and no aim short of some universal long-run good is fully rational. It must aim at a future good, although its own good is already complete (CSPM 198–199).

Against the argument, further, that remorse and repentence do not make sense in an event-pluralism (since at every moment there is a new self), Hartshorne points out that a person is part of his past, for the personal sequence is "cumulative" and involves a certain basic character or essence (cf. CSPM 199). One is obliged to repent if one has not, in further acts, become such a man as would have not done a certain past evil deed for which repentance is in order. This is Hartshorne's interpretation of the old doctrines of being "born-again" and of the "forgiveness of sins", for if present acts are of better moral quality than past acts, we become truly a different person. "Past misdeeds", he contends, "are evidence of the need for a partly new character, and until this emerges, and in order that it shall emerge, we should repent" (RSP 210). Again: "Forgiveness of sins means the literal innocence of the new self". He argues that

---

57 PI, 338.
"innocence and guilt is a new issue every moment". 58

Now, Hartshorne's understanding of moral responsibility raises other interesting and critical questions. He has spoken not only of the limitations on a subject's freedom attributable to the past character of its personal sequence, but also of the limitations which are the result of the subject's past causal nexus (the past world as a whole, at that moment), and of God's imposition of limits to freedom (called, the "laws of nature"). Thus, there would appear to be these three forms of limitation upon the freedom of the presently-becoming subject. Now, with respect to God's limitation, Hartshorne makes it clear that the limits He imposes cannot be changed except by Him (and only then for a new cosmic epoch). Man, then, must act within these limits and his acts do not induce the limits to change in any way. But is it the same with the limits set by the past nexus and character? It would appear not. Hartshorne holds that with each new act, a man's character is modified somewhat. And indeed, he argues that the past nexus never completely determines the new experience; but that rather, the becoming subject adds novelty to the world via its free creativity. God's limits, then, are understood to be

58 PI, 339.
strict than the other forms of limits since man has no ability to modify them (the former), and since man is restricted to free actions within them (the basic issue of defining the range of human freedom within such limits is discussed in "Chapter Four"). The limitations of character (and of the past causal nexus) on a becoming subject seem much less strict since man is able to modify and freely create novel experiences with respect to them. The character of a personal sequence is not an unchanging substance but is, rather, a flexible summation of the basic and general traits that the personal sequence in question has experienced over its lifetime. "What we call a man's character is a sort of composite photograph of his past acts, not an explanation of them" (LP 313). Thus, each new experience is never limited completely by the character of the sequence, and with the novelty each new act creates, the actions of future subjects in the sequence are modified. The question to be asked, however, is this: to what extent does one's character limit the newly becoming acts? And, indeed, to what extent must it do so for there to be continuing moral responsibility in the man as a whole (versus responsibility being attributed solely to the momentary event-experiences)?

Hartshorne seems to be arguing that man's continuing identity and moral responsibility demand that we are restricted to actions within the limitations of our character (and indeed, within the limits determined by the past causal nexus). He contends that these
limitations on the presently-becoming subject restrict that subject to actions within a certain range or class. This implies, to me, that the subject cannot act outside this range. But if this is the case, we must ask, can there really be freedom and novelty? Does not novelty imply that one is free to create new experiences which are not simply, confined to the limitations of the past? Hartshorne would argue here that within the confines of one's past character and causal past world, one's freedom is restricted to actions within a certain range or class but that there are infinite possibilities which can be actualized within this range. To this argument, however, I have suggested (above) that it renders that notion of limitation meaningless, for if one has infinite possibilities within a range or class of possibilities, this makes the range or class meaningless; one is simply infinitely free. If there are infinite possibilities, then there can be no limitations, no character, no probabilities.

Yet, perhaps Hartshorne's thesis can be interpreted differently, for in spite of the implication that he follows Peirce in holding that within a certain range of possibilities there is yet virtually an infinite number of ways in which the experiencing subject can actualize the class of possibilities available to it, Hartshorne may be interpreted, on the other hand, as arguing not that there are infinite possibilities, but rather than there are only many. If the former is held, there would be a complete indeterminism and the nature of the limits (of
the past, character, of the past nexus, and of God's laws) would be rendered meaningless. The latter position is, in fact, the more reasonable interpretation of Hartshorne's position (in spite of his reference to the Peircean theory which does remain troublesome), and it implies that man is able to act freely within the confines of certain limits since he always has a vast range of possibilities open to him which are not strictly predetermined by the character (or past nexus, or by God's laws) to the last detail. Man is, then, both limited in his actions, and free within these limits.

And yet, even on this interpretation there arises the question: if our actions are restricted by certain limits, can these acts be free and novel; that is, as opposed to their being such as to merely fill-in (make more determinate) the possibilities permitted by the limits? More specifically, we might query: can we modify our past characters (and the limits of possibility they define), as Hartshorne holds, if we are confined to actions within those limits of possibility? There would appear to be a problem as to how these two theses cohere in Hartshorne's writings. He can account for how we can modify our character only in the sense that each new act partially fills in, or rather, makes determinate, certain of the possibilities which arise from the past character; and, while this may more clearly define the character of a sequence of event-experiences, he has not shown how this would, in fact, modify or change the character. To change the character,
an action of a psychic event in the sequence would have to act outside or beyond the range of possibilities delimited by the past character of the sequence; that is, in a way not simply predetermined by that character. It is difficult to see how Hartshorne's event-pluralism can render coherent the fact that we are restricted to actions within the confines of our past character; and that, yet, we can modify this character by our own acts.

Now, Hartshorne does argue that new experiences in a sequence are not simply identical with the character of the sequence, that "not every change is a change in character" (RSP 198), and he argues that in this fact lies man's freedom; that is, since man is not simply determined by the causal influence of his past character (versus the traditional substance view of the self which succumbs to this conclusion, according to Hartshorne). But, while the character of a sequence does not restrict any new act in the sequence to any determinate actions, "to a single possibility for the given moment and circumstances" (RSP 198), as Hartshorne argues, the character of a sequence does limit any new act in the sequence to a certain range of possibilities:

59 Cf. Hartshorne's important essays, "Contingency and the New Era in Metaphysics," 463; "The Meaning of 'Is Going to Be'," Mind 74/293, Jan., 1965, 55; "Creativity and the Deductive Logic of Causality", .72; etc.
"our acts must fit the antecedent character". 60 This granted, I find it difficult to see how such actions could significantly modify the character; indeed, it would seem to be logically impossible that they do so, since they are confined to possibilities within a certain range, a range set by the defining traits of the series of events, and as such, at most, the new acts are creative only to the extent that they can make more determinant the possibilities envisaged by that range. For an act to modify the past character of its sequence, however, it must be able to act in a way which is not simply determined by the range of possibilities defined by the character of the sequence. If this is not granted, then it is difficult to see how Hartshorne can hold that new acts can modify the overall character of a sequence.

On the other hand, if it is granted, other problems arise: if new acts can modify the character of a sequence, then how much causal influence has the character of a sequence on a new experience in that sequence? And, what does this imply for the continuing moral responsibility of the sequence as a whole?

Hartshorne argues (as noted above) that for there to be moral responsibility, a becoming subject's "acts must causally flow from

(antecedent) character" (CPM 202), and that yet, they can modify this character. But he has not shown how this can be the case, for if we can modify our character we cannot, logically, be confined to its limits. It is not coherent to argue that man is restricted to certain limitations if he is supposedly free to modify those limits. Perhaps, then, we must conclude that the character of a sequence does not impose limits upon the newly-becoming subject, but that rather, it suggests only certain probabilities which may, or may not, be actualized, but which are most likely to be actualized. If they are actualized, then the defining aspects of the past character of the sequence are maintained. But in this case, it is difficult to see how the character can be said to be modified. A modification of character can result only from acts which are not restricted to the past characteristics of the sequence. Once such acts become part of the sequence, the overall character and its possibilities are modified. But, in this event, has the moral responsibility of the sequence as a whole been maintained?

In sum, Hartshorne wants to argue that our acts are limited to a range of possibilities determined by our past characters, and also that our acts are free, indeed free to the extent that they modify that past character and, thus, modify the limits and possibilities for future acts. I cannot see how Hartshorne renders these two facts coherent. Moral continuity is maintained in the sequence (in the
"man" as a sequence of selves) if the new acts conform to the limits imposed by the past character of the sequence; but in this case, man's freedom seems to be restricted to a mere filling-in of the possibilities determined by the past character. On the other hand, if Hartshorne wants to argue that the new acts do modify the character of the sequence, since within the limits imposed by that character there are an infinite number of possibilities for the creature to actualize, it is difficult to see how this is coherent with the necessity of there being limits. And, further, if it is argued that, rather than there being infinite possibilities within the range defined by the past character of the sequence, that there are only various possibilities, then it is still not clear to me how such acts could really modify the overall character and the limits it imposes on future acts. For, as acts which conform to the past limits of the character, it seems logically impossible for these same acts to modify the limits: how can limits be modified by acts which are confined to those very limits in the first place? If, furthermore, one wants to escape this dilemma by arguing that new acts can modify the character of a sequence, since they are not confined to the past limits, then it is difficult to see how this could be rendered coherent in Hartshorne's account. For new acts must be restricted to some sort of limits (or else, all is mere chaotic indeterminism), and hence, it is meaningless to hold that we can act beyond the limits which define the very possibilities
of our action. Actions must be both limited by the past character and yet free. This is Hartshorne's thesis; and yet, he has not succeeded in showing how these two requirements cohere; that is, so as to show that man is a continuing being with moral responsibility as such.

This must complete the discussion of the first of the areas wherein I have suggested that the question of freedom (and moral responsibility) can be located in Hartshorne's metaphysics. The analysis is not complete, to be sure, until the two other areas are considered. One concerns the freedom of man vis-à-vis God as world-Mind, and is the central issue of "Chapter Four" to follow. The second question concerning freedom and responsibility may be discussed, briefly, here (it is discussed more fully in "Chapter Four"). It asks: what is the extent of man's (and creatures in general) freedom vis-à-vis other men and the external world at large? Now, to be sure, this issue has already been discussed — though from a slightly different perspective — in the former section on Hartshorne's doctrine of relative determinism ("Chapter Three", "Section Two"). We need, then, simply refer to that analysis and indicate its relevance for the present issue.

Hartshorne's doctrine of relative (in)determinism is his alternative to purely deterministic and solely libertarian (indeterministic) theories of causality. His view is that while there is always a significant amount of causal influence by the past nexus upon the present
experiences of becoming subjects; there is nevertheless always an element -- however minute at times -- of real freedom and creativity in the subject. This is true of all levels of life, extending downward from man to the most minute forms of being. As noted above, Hartshorne's view is defended in his critique of materialistic dualism (which denies life to all but the highest forms of being) and by his critique of deterministic (and indeterministic) theories. Hartshorne admits that while the element of causal determinism is great in a presently-becoming subject, he insists that there is always some range for free creativity in the subject; that all levels of being have some sentience, some creativity: each new experience takes place every 1/10th-1/20th of a second (it may vary according to the level of being which is considered) and as such, it has to be admitted that the element of momentary freedom cannot be very large: "At a given moment, we are almost entirely a product, not a producer. And what productive power we have would be totally vacuous without inheritance from past actions, our own and those of countless others" (CSPM 190). But there is always some element of freedom for the momentary event-experiences.

The question of limits, however, is relevant here, for analogous to the issue just discussed (man's freedom and moral responsibility vis-a-vis the limits defined by his past character) is the issue of determining man's freedom vis-a-vis the limits defined by the past causal nexus which bears down upon each newly-becoming subject. A
complication in this issue arises when one tries to distinguish the limits (and their influence) of the past nexus from the limits (and their influence) of God's causal agency. In both cases, the question of determining the extent of man's freedom within these limits is at issue. Further discussion of these issues is resumed in the following chapter.
4. Conclusion

We might note, in conclusion, this last point; namely, that for Hartshorne, a "man" is essentially an abstraction from the psychic events which are the only reals, and which combine, in various ways, to constitute his being. Whitehead's insistence that there is no agency in abstraction from actual entities, then, would seem to imply that "man", as an abstraction, really has no agency. But this is not quite accurate, for as I have attempted to show, Hartshorne works to account for the continuing identity of a "man" throughout the process of the experiences of the psychic events which constitute the "man". It is granted that the "man" is an abstraction from the psychic experiences which are the only real constituents of the universe, but, this does not deny that there cannot be attributed to this man a certain continuing personal identity, and thus, a continuing agency. It is this Hartshornian thesis that I have sought to reconstruct and defend in this chapter. And, in spite of his generally cogent construction and defence of his event-pluralism, I would suggest that the success of his theory is tempered somewhat by the vagueness and seeming incoherence which plagues his account of how a self (as a whole, as a man -- as opposed to mere psychic events) can be a free and morally responsible agent and yet limited by its past character. The question of limits seems to be the crux of this problem, and I have more to say about
it in the next chapter.

In spite of this problem, (and, indeed, of others which have not been critically discussed, especially the question of justifying the theory which is the basis of the entire issue -- Hartshorne's psychicalism), his understanding of man as a free and morally responsible agent offers clear alternatives to traditional accounts and invites serious attention. We may acknowledge that his account -- in spite of the questions raised -- has gone far to establish one important aspect of his theodicy. But, immediately, there arises the further issue: having established that man is a free and responsible agent (as opposed to agency being attributed solely to his bodily constituents, to the processive "event-experiences"), it must still be established that this man is a free and responsible agent vis-à-vis the divine causal agency in the world (and indeed, vis-à-vis the past causal nexus which bears down upon each new experient subject). To these issues we turn.

---

61 I wish to emphasize again that this dissertation is concerned mainly with the question of man's free agency and not so much with creaturely agency in general. No attempt has been made to critically assess or justify Hartshorne's defense of creaturely agency in general (which he seeks to establish via his doctrines of psychicalism and relative determinism), via which he bases his understanding of the source of natural evil. Rather, his theories have been uncritically reconstructed, while some critical attention has been devoted to his understanding of man as a free and morally responsible agent. Man, as the highest level of creature displays in its highest form the complexity involved in the macroscopic groupings of event-experiences which are displayed, in nearly infinite variations, at each level of being. Man, in other words, is to serve as the test case for Hartshorne's theory of creaturely freedom in this study. In this way, we can examine Hartshorne's theodicy as a free-will solution on the human level and avoid the controversy which surrounds his psychical theory (at the sub-human level).
PART TWO

CRITIQUE

A Reconstruction-and Critical Evaluation

of Certain Basic Issues in Hartshorne's Theodicy
CHAPTER FOUR

DIVINE POWER AND CREATURELY FREEDOM

"Chapter Three" has discussed the issue of freedom in man as a whole and continuing being vis-à-vis the constituent components of his body, and vis-à-vis his external environment (this latter question to be more fully discussed in this chapter), in order to evaluate Hartshorne's conception of man as a creative and continuing being with moral responsibility for his actions. This present chapter faces another issue, the third, so defined, regarding the question of freedom; namely, that of determining and evaluating Hartshorne's conception of the range and extent of human freedom vis-à-vis God's causative influence. Hartshorne contends that he has shown how man's freedom is reconciled with divine power, such that neither man's freedom and moral responsibility for good and evil nor our conception of God as philosophically coherent and religiously adequate is jeopardized. As such, Hartshorne is arguing, essentially, for a revised "free-will solution" to the problem of evil. His contention is based on his revised conception of God, and on his understanding of what it means to be a freely creative creature -- both of which were discussed above, in "Chapter Two" and "Chapter Three", respectively. He contends that theodicy will remain problematic if one's conception of God is that of (what he takes to be) traditional Christianity, wherein God's omnipotence, for example, is conceived so as to hold that His is the only power, the only freedom.
Hartshorne believes that it is this conception of God which has given rise to the traditional Christian problem of evil, since it would seem virtually impossible to reconcile such a God with the fact of evil, or with human freedom and moral responsibility. (Here I only describe Hartshorne's account and critique of traditional Christian theism and do not try to assess the adequacy of his understanding -- i.e., its historical accuracy). In this sense, traditional theodicy is a "pseudo-problem", since it is based upon an inadequate and probably incoherent idea of omnipotence, and correspondingly, of what it means to be a creature. Hartshorne, then, has no argument with such modern atheists as Mackie, Flew, and McClosky, for example, when they argue that the traditional Christian concept of God cannot be reconciled with the fact of evil nor with creaturely freedom. Hartshorne, however, goes beyond the current debate that has arisen in this light, for he contends that the conception of God employed by both the atheists and the theistic defenders is inadequate. God is to be seen, rather, as dipolar, as active and, yet, receptive (as was noted earlier), such that His is not the only power: creatures, as creatures, must be freely creative and have some real measure of power in face of the divine causative and persuasive influence (or else the existence of anything in distinction to God is problematic). Hartshorne's free-will defense seeks to show how this can be so. And, once achieved, this would constitute the basis of a viable theodicy, though to be sure, it must be supplemented by a consideration of his attempt to reconcile divine benevolence with the fact of evil: its source, nature, function and overcoming.
Accordingly, this chapter deals with the former issue; that is, with the reconciliation of divine power vis-à-vis human freedom and moral responsibility, while the following chapter discusses the latter issue. This methodological approach is suggested by Hartshorne's statement that God's functions with respect to the world are two-fold: (1) He "decides upon the basic outlines of creaturely actions, the guaranteed limits within which freedom is to operate" (these limits being the "laws of nature"), and inspires creatures to acts of freedom; and (2) He "decides what use to make in his own life of what happens through creaturely freedom, just how the course of cosmic history is to be interpreted and enjoyed in the divine perspective". \(^1\) It is Hartshorne's contention that these "two forms of divine decisions... seem to be the only ones we...can clearly define". \(^2\) I would suggest that the former raises the issue of how this divine action can be reconciled with human freedom; while with respect to the latter, the issue is to determine how this divine action can be reconciled with evil as such. Further, the divine function of imposing limits and persuading creatures to acts of freedom may be taken — I would suggest — as an expression of divine "power", while that of preserving and evaluating creaturely experiences may be seen as divine "benevolence".

\(^1\) Charles Hartshorne, "A New Look at the Problem of Evil", 206.

\(^2\) Charles Hartshorne, "A New Look at the Problem of Evil", 207.
I suggest this since these would seem to be the main characteristics of God displayed, respectively, in the two functions He performs with respect to the world. Accordingly, the issues to be discussed are:

(1) how free and morally responsible is man vis-à-vis divine power (omnipotence); and (2) how is Hartshorne able to reconcile divine benevolence (love) vis-à-vis the fact of evil (its source, nature, function and overcoming)? The former issue is the concern of this present chapter, while the latter is discussed in "Chapter Five".

Note here that, while I have distinguished the two aspects of divine power and love, and have suggested that we proceed to discuss certain issues only with respect to one or the other of these aspects, the distinction cannot be taken as absolute. Indeed, as argued above, both divine functions may be understood as abstractions from the basic character of God as "omnibenevolent". There is but one God, and as such, the various issues discussed are relevant to both of His functions: the question of human freedom vis-à-vis divine power could also be considered vis-à-vis divine love; and likewise, the question of evil vis-à-vis the divine benevolence can also be discussed vis-à-vis divine power; and indeed, the entire nature of God, all His attributes, is implicitly relevant throughout this discussion. I have chosen, methodologically, to proceed as I have for the sake of more systematic tidiness, since the issues involved are extremely varied and complex, and in an effort to avoid repetition of certain points. And, to be sure, the procedure is appropriate in that theodicy, since Hume, has, more often than not, been discussed in terms of divine power and goodness.
The concern of this present chapter, then, is to reconstruct and assess Hartshorne's understanding of the interaction between creatures as free and responsible agents vis-à-vis divine power (divine causal agency). Hartshorne has defined God's power as being solely persuasive; that is, such that there is, in God's agency, no coerciveness. He understands coerciveness as "physical force"; while persuasiveness is understood as a "lure" or "charm" which creatures have the ability (freedom) to either accept or reject (whereas with respect to coercive power there can be no such free choice). This rather simplistic understanding of persuasiveness and coerciveness is, however, deceiving. For the interaction of God and man is an extremely complex affair, and one which -- as I shall argue -- cannot be explained solely in terms of persuasive influence. The thesis of this present chapter, rather, is that Hartshorne's

3 While Hartshorne argues that God does not and cannot simply coerce any creature, His lure is more effective with respect to the lower levels of creatures since they have not the conscious mentality of man to reject the lure. Because of the element of spontaneity in even the smallest of atoms, Hartshorne argues that there is, however, never simply a divine determinism, even on these low levels.

4 The problem here is that Hartshorne has not defined in any detail exactly what is involved in divine power. And nowhere in his writings does he state explicitly his understanding of persuasive and coercive power, particularly the latter. In a recent letter (1974), however, he refers to coercive power as "physical force": "Coercion I take to mean influencing by the use of threat of use of physical violence, or else by completely irresistible and completely determining suggestion, hypnotism, or something of the sort". Hartshorne's qualifier here -- "completely" -- is, however, the point wherein the issue lies: must there be a simple contrast between the complete coercion and complete persuasion, or rather are there not varying degrees of effectiveness? That the latter is the case, in fact, is the thesis argued in this present chapter.
use of the concept of divine persuasive power involves aspects of coerciveness -- or at least, a range of effectiveness of the divine agency, some of which is more effective than others. This is argued in spite of Hartshorne's contention that all divine power in the world is solely persuasive.

The chapter proceeds in the following manner.

"Section One" makes note of the various interpretations of leading process philosophers concerning divine power. Here it will be seen that the insistence of Whitehead and Hartshorne that God acts solely persuasively is not unchallenged, though the issue has not been discussed by most of these philosophers with sufficient clarity, thus far.

"Section Two" discusses Hartshorne's theory of the divine imposition of limits to creaturely freedom, and argues that this imposition by God must be regarded as a coercive act, or at least, as evidence that the divine agency is such that certain aspects are more effective than others.

"Section Three" examines the basis of Hartshorne's understanding of the divine-world interrelationship, his organic-social analogy, wherein God is conceived as the world-Mind, with creatures His bodily constituents. God, as such, has direct and immediate knowledge and control over His bodily parts, and -- as it is argued -- while this does not necessarily imply that creatures can have no freedom in face of this control, it does suggest (as will be argued in the following two sections) the basis for a highly effective divine causal agency; that is, since it enables God to offer lures to creatures which are the most appropriate and which are
what the creatures most need and want at any particular moment. As such, as it is argued in "Section Four", the divine lure is highly effective, indeed irresistible at times. It is, likewise, very effective in that it is prehended by creatures largely unconsciously and, as such, becomes part of their being without their conscious approval. "Section Five" makes this same argument with respect to the closely related theory that we are causally influenced by the lure of our memories of the past; for it is argued that our memories of the past are intricately involved with the divine lure (as World-Mind).

"Section Six" turns to consider a recent critique of Hartshorne's understanding of divine persuasive power which holds that Hartshorne's God, in fact, does not have available to him such persuasive influence; that is, since Hartshorne's doctrine of possibility does not permit God to provide initial aims (ideals) to becoming creatures. It is argued, against this view, that Hartshorne's understanding of possibility does not rule out (is not incoherent with) divine persuasive influence.

The nature and function of this persuasive lure, however, is questioned, in "Section Seven", wherein it is argued that Hartshorne has not been sufficiently clear in distinguishing the divine final and efficient causality from the efficient causality from the past world -- or, at least, that his understanding of the interrelationships of these two aspects of causal influence is not formulated satisfactorily.

"Section Eight" discusses various interpretations (including Hartshorne's) of Whitehead's understanding of concrecence (becoming) in order to more clearly define the interrelationships of creaturely
agency and the causal influence of God and the past world. It is argued that Hartshorne's failure to consider more carefully Whitehead's theory of concrescence leads to a lacuna in determining more precisely the interrelationship between God and man. Hartshorne's reluctance to consider more fully the theory of concrescence clouds the issue of determining the way creatures internalize the divine lure.

Finally, "Section Nine" examines Hartshorne's understanding of divine love, and it is argued that -- as is the case with respect to divine power -- God's love is not simply persuasive, but involves aspects of force or coerciveness, or at least a range of effectiveness of the persuasive lure.

The implications of this study for Hartshorne's theodicy -- as will be argued -- are such as to strengthen his position and eliminate certain incoherencies, for the problems suggested by an understanding of God as exerting solely persuasive influence are overcome by the acknowledgement that God acts coercively at times; or at least, that the divine lure has varying degrees of effectiveness. This implies that man's freedom is limited by God (not only in its general and abstract limits but) at each specific moment. God's agency is such as to ensure that there is always opportunity for creaturely agency, and that the "net increment" of value is always positive. The latter suggests that what evil there is is never such as to be greater than the goods, and that this fact is guaranteed by God. To this extent evil is to be accepted; divine power cannot eliminate it, for creaturely freedom must be respected. Yet God does ensure that creatures never use their freedom to destroy
the very basis of freedom.

While Hartshorne's position is not without its problems, it is clear that he argues forcefully that the notion of God totally controlling autonomous or even partially autonomous creatures is incoherent (hence, for Hartshorne, impossible); to be a distinct creature at all entails some powers of self-determination. This is not incompatible with there being an all-powerful God, if one properly grasps what that phrase would mean. Not even an all-powerful God could conceivably do incoherent things. It is not, of course, a slur on omnipotence to say He could not make square circles. Nor, according to Hartshorne, is it a slur to say He cannot completely determine the actions of individuals other than Himself while allowing them to be in some sense individuals. They must be allowed to have a hand in making themselves.
I. Divine Persuasive Agency

The interpretation of divine persuasive power among leading process philosophers has become more and more disputed; it would be helpful to note some of these interpretations before considering Hartshorne's position.

John Cobb represents the most common view that the process God of Hartshorne and Whitehead exercises only persuasive power. This, of course, is what Hartshorne and Whitehead themselves have argued; and yet, as I will contend, there would seem to be a range of this persuasive influence such that some of it approaches elements of coerciveness, others more properly being persuasiveness. It would seem that this thesis has not been considered by most process philosophers. Cobb is a good example: he argues that persuasive power is the "only power capable of any worthwhile result"; \(^5\) and that while coercive power -- if exercised by God -- would obtain the most desirable effects, it would do so only at the expense of creaturely freedom and autonomy. Now, Cobb is correct so far as he goes, perhaps, in seeing that the doctrine of persuasive power is "the key to the Christian solution to the problem of evil"; \(^6\) yet he seems to overstate the role of persuasiveness because of his (perhaps justified) reaction to what he takes to be the

---


\(^6\) John B. Cobb, Jr., God and the World, 87.
traditional Christian view which implies a large element of coercive power in God. I am suggesting that, while it is correct to reject a conception of God as solely coercive, it may be an over-reaction and equally one-sided to conceive of God as solely persuasive. It may perhaps be granted that God is, as Cobb holds, solely persuasive in His interaction with creatures; but the full workings of this persuasiveness have not been carefully worked out. To do so would be to uncover a range of persuasiveness, and indeed, elements of coerciveness, as this present chapter will show. What seems clearly to be the problem with respect to this issue is that the concept of divine persuasive power has not been fully analyzed; the range and extent of the effectiveness of the divine agency has not been fully constructed nor clearly explicated.

Another leading process philosopher, Lewis Ford, recently has argued that while Whitehead's God operates solely via persuasiveness with respect to the world, Hartshorne's God seems very coercive.\footnote{L. S. Ford, TPP, 58-83 passim.} For example, as Ford argues, while Whitehead's God supplies the initial aims to creatures as they concrese, (the initial aim having been chosen by God from among eternal possibilities, eternal objects), "Divine persuasion in Whitehead's sense is not really available to Hartshorne, since he rejects any need for the eternal objects".\footnote{L. S. Ford, TPP, 78.}
physics, rather than there being formal possibilities, possibility is seen as "the indeterminate potentiality of the past bearing on an indicated spatio-temporal region in the future". Consequently, there can be no subjective aim as such in a Hartshornian occasion because it has no definite ideal possibility functioning as an ordering and unifying principle whereby the indeterminate, multiple potentialities of the past can be reduced to unity. Presumably, it has no need for such a unifying principle, but this may be simply an argument from necessity, since there are no formal possibilities available to function in this role. Subjectivity seems to signify the self-creativity of the occasion, the final determination it makes over and above the determinations of the causal past to render itself fully actual. If so, subjectivity is simply another name for the creativity instanced in that particular occasion.

Ford suggests that Hartshorne's understanding of the becoming of a subject is similar, somewhat, to Bergson's metaphor of continuous motion, since, for one thing, specific, determinate ideals are lacking. What Hartshorne lacks, according to Ford, is an explanation of the becoming of a subject, of its concrescence, in which it can be seen how the subject achieves its determinate character. This can only be explained, Ford argues, by Whitehead's account of the genetic succession of a subject's concrescence. Creativity itself is a blind drive unless it can be explained how there is an initial aim to guide the individual concrescence.

9 L. S. Ford, TPF, 78.

10 L. S. Ford, TPF, 80.
Can Hartshorne's metaphysics be defended against this critical line of argumentation? It is unfortunate, we make note, that Hartshorne has published very little about the subtleties of the workings of genetic succession, of concrescence, and consequently, it is difficult to define the exact workings of the interaction of God and man, specifically in determining the persuasive range of effectiveness, so that the aspects of divine persuasiveness can be distinguished clearly from those of human autonomy and responsibility.

In spite of this, I am not convinced that Hartshorne's view of possibility and eternal objects is incoherent with divine persuasive power via creaturely initial aims. In later sections of this chapter, I shall argue for an interpretation of Hartshorne's position on these matters such as can be defended against the arguments raised by Ford.

Daniel Day Williams, further, has argued that there are both persuasive and coercive elements in divine power. He has, however, not elaborated upon this thesis. He suggests simply that, since "coercive aspects of being seem as necessary to a real universe as the persuasive aspects... no organism would survive five seconds on the exercise of [divine] tenderness alone". Williams contends that while Hartshorne has seen this, Whitehead has not, and therefore that "Whitehead's doctrine [of persuasive power alone]... leads him to ignore the wide ranges...

---

of types of force, or coercion, and of mutual interaction. These would seem to have their place in the necessities of being, and therefore require us to find their place in God's being. 12 By ignoring the coercive aspects in God's agency, he holds "Whitehead has underestimated the disclosure of the divine initiative in religious experience", and "has given a partially inadequate account of the relation between God and the world". 13 Here, as Williams contends, "Dr. Hartshorne is right in stressing also the coercive aspects of our religious experience.... There are large coercive aspects in the divine governance of the world". 14

Now, as far as he goes, I am in perfect agreement with Williams, as it concerns Hartshorne, through it is most unfortunate he has not elaborated this thesis; with respect to Whitehead, he may be wrong, for there may be some coerciveness by Whitehead's God as well, if Baldwin is correct (see below), and perhaps, indirectly, if the thesis of this present dissertation is correct.


Williams' argument has been directly attacked by K. F. Thompson in the latter's recent book. Thompson insists that while coercion may be a pervasive feature in the real universe, "it does not obviously follow that there must be coercive aspects in the nature of a real God". 15 Thompson then argues for the common interpretation concerning divine persuasive power; I shall, however, not pause here to consider his arguments, since he deals only with Whitehead, and ignores Hartshorne's position (and, as noted above, the two positions are different, and significantly so, in many ways). In any case, Baldwin's analysis updates this discussion with reference to Whithead.

W. N. Pittenger, like Williams, believes that besides the persuasiveness, there is an aspect of coerciveness in Hartshorne's God; and that yet, unlike Williams' and the traditional interpretation of Whitehead, he contends that Whitehead's God also has both coercive and persuasive elements. Unfortunately, Pittenger has not elaborated this intuition. He says merely that, "While God's action in the world is chiefly by lure, solicitation, or loving persuasion, it is not without some measure of coercion, to prevent [the] cosmos from becoming anarchy or chaos"; and indeed that this is the case for both Hartshorne and Whitehead, "but in different ways". 16 God is primarily persuasive,


he argues further, yet He is coercive in a secondary way. Now this, to be sure, is the issue; yet it cannot be left in the cryptic state in which Pittenger and others leave it.

Perhaps the most detailed work to date which rejects the use of the doctrine of divine persuasive power in process philosophy is that of Hare and Madden. They argue, in effect, that the God of process philosophy is too weak and restricted to be of adequate religious value. Persuasive power, they hold, is not sufficient for God to ensure the final victory of good over evil. The process God is limited, further, to such an extent that He neither creates nor controls actual occasions. 17 Now, while Hare and Madden ignore (or are unaware of any of) the differences between Whitehead and Hartshorne, and as such argue against the theodicy of process philosophy as though it is a homogeneous thing, their critique is interesting and important; and, as such, to some of its details we turn.

Their argument may be seen as involving 8 essential points. The first five points have been answered by Baldwin directly, on behalf of Whitehead, while the latter three have been answered by

17 P. H. Hare and E. H. Madden, "Evil and Unlimited Power", 281 and passim.
Hartshorne himself. 18

Hare and Madden argue, then, that (1) no "good reason has been
given why God's power must and should be solely persuasive". 19 They
grant Hartshorne and Whitehead that totally coercive power is morally
repugnant and incoherent; yet, they argue that "process theists fail
to notice that while totally coercive power may be objectionable, solely
persuasive power may also be objectionable". 20 In this thesis I believe
that they are correct, as in their questioning of the process theist's
interpretation of persuasion and coercion as mutually exclusive. There
are, as they insist, certain situations in which coercive power does
seem to be morally required and justified. There are degrees of freedom,
and not just the polar aspects of total coercion or total persuasion.

They are, further (2), unhappy with the way process theists

18 For the first five points, see P. H. Hare and E. H. Madden,
"Evil and Persuasive Power", 44-48, and D. D. Baldwin, "Evil and
Persuasive Power: A Response to Hare and Madden", Process Studies
3/4, Winter, 1973, 259-272. For the last three points, see P. H. Hare
and E. H. Madden, "Evil and Unlimited Power", 278-289, and C. Hartshorne,
"The Dipolar Conception of Deity", 282-289.

19 P. H. Hare and E. H. Madden, "Evil and Persuasive Power",
44.

20 P. H. Hare and E. H. Madden, "Evil and Persuasive Power",
45.
ignore the problem of the great numbers of people who are, it would appear, simply unaffected by the divine lure. They reject Ford's argument, in this context, that the "measure of persuasion...is not how many people are actually persuaded at any given time, but the intrinsic value of the goal proposed". 21 They argue that the merit and value attained by some people is valuable, but that this fact alone does not squarely face the issue of there being unpersuaded people, together with the evil and suffering which seems to follow from this situation.

(3) Against the position, further, that a persuasive God can maximize creativity and freedom, but not good acts, Hare and Madden object that process theodicy has not shown how evils are compatible with great persuasive power; that is, process theists must show that maximum freedom and creativity are being inspired by God. They argue, (4), that since process theodicy has not shown "that the extent and distribution of evil acts and experiences are compatible with great persuasive power"; 22 there could just as well be a persuasive power which is compelling us to do evil.

Finally, (5), they argue that process theists have not shown that the concept of divine persuasive power is a coherent idea. Against,


22 P. H. Hare and E. H. Madden, "Evil and Persuasive Power", 44.
especially, Hartshorne's criteria for the validity of a metaphysical system, -- namely that the system be conceptually coherent -- they argue that persuasive power in itself is an incoherent concept: "Does it make conceptual sense to speak of a sort of power whose nature and extent is in principle impossible to estimate experientially?"  

These five objections, raised by Hare and Madden in their 1972 essay (see note 18), are all directed, essentially, against the concept of a divine persuasive power. Earlier in their 1966 essay (see note 18), they raised certain more general objections against the concept of God in process theology. They objected there (1) to the fact that Whitehead and Hartshorne fail to distinguish between a "limited" and a "relative" concept of God; that (2) they fail to conceive God in such a way that will guarantee the ultimate triumph of good; and (3) that the conception of evil in Whitehead and Hartshorne is unsatisfactory. The aforementioned article is more relevant to this present chapter, and to it we turn: the latter article is relevant to the issues discussed in the following chapter and will be dealt with in the appropriate sections.

As noted above, Hare and Madden's critique has been answered directly, by Baldwin, on behalf of Whitehead (though very little mention is made of Hartshorne). In his response, Baldwin distinguishes various ways in which persuasive power is used by Whitehead, corresponding to

---

various aspects of human freedom.

In one sense, for example, Whitehead distinguishes a deterministic efficient causation and a persuasive final causation. Efficient causality refers to the way in which the past actual world bears down upon the present situation. Final causation is exhibited in the ideal aim which God offers, persuasively, to becoming entities as their final causes. Creatures are free to accept or reject both the persuasive final causation and the coercive efficient causation. That elements of the deterministic efficient causation can be freely rejected is essential for the world, or else there would be nothing definite: "The mere fusion of all that there is would be the nonentity of indefiniteness" (SMW 137). Some of the elements in the initial aim from God are also freely eliminated. This elimination is described as the freedom of whole response or of autonomous self-causation, in which the creature's mental pole interacts with the data of its physical pole, and together modifies the initial aim into its subjective aim. Both the physical and mental poles may be modified, and the outcome is therefore, internally and autonomously self-determined. The extent of this autonomous freedom limits the range of the freedom of conceptual innovation in which God, as the main actor, offers ideal aims to becoming creatures via their mental poles, as their final causation. And yet, while Whitehead's theory accounts for this real element of creaturely freedom in response to both the efficient causation of the past nexus and the final causation of God, there are aspects of both types of causation which cannot be rejected by creatures! That the
efficient causation of the past is to a large extent coercive is obvious, but that some element of it can be eliminated accounts for the necessary diversity and novelty of the world. That divine final causation can be rejected seems clear enough, according to Baldwin, but that some elements of it cannot be rejected is less certain. Whitehead refers to the way creatures are being "driven by their thoughts as well as by the molecules in their bodies, by intelligence and by senseless forces" (AI 58). He refers also to the "overpowering rationality" of God's "conceptual harmonization" (PR 526). And further, the most dramatic example of this "unavoidable persuasion" is, according to Baldwin, the vibrations of molecules: Whitehead explains this fact as "due to the origination of reversions in the mental pole" (PR 423). Baldwin offers this elaboration: "The variation in vibration is produced by persuasive power in that it originates in the mental pole as final cause, but it is coercive in the sense that it is not possible for autonomous activity to reject what is initiated". 24

A second use of persuasive power -- together with a corresponding use of coercive power -- in Whitehead, is defined by Baldwin as a persuasive power which is subject to morally responsible acceptance or rejection, and coercive power as not subject to such acceptance or rejection. Thus, for example, while the persuasive power of conceptual innovation in the vibration of molecules is not subject to the morally responsible free-

dom of rejection, man -- as a more highly developed mentality -- is subject to morally-responsible freedom: as such, the final causation of conceptual innovation is persuasive, and not coercive.

A third use of persuasive and coercive power is defined by Baldwin as a persuasive power which refers to the communication of information about the natural consequences which could occur, should certain alternatives be enacted, and coercive power as the inducement of certain modes of action through extrinsic motivation, threat of punishment and offers of rewards. Freedom, in this context, refers to the absence of coercive extrinsic motivation. Whitehead does suggest, however, according to Baldwin, that "A satisfactory cosmology must show that efficient and final causality are [in Whitehead's words] 'interwoven and required, each by the other' (FR 23)". 25 Man depends on the regularity and constancy of nature in order that there be a context in which to carry out his creative acts. Thus, he depends upon coercive efficient causality in which the past is carried to the present. But persuasive final causation is also necessary for developmental, corrective, and novel order.

Having made these distinctions concerning the various meanings of persuasive and coercive power, and of the views of freedom they imply, Baldwin proceeds to deal with the criticisms of Hare and Madden.

25 D. D. Baldwin, "Evil and Persuasive Power: A Response to Hare and Madden", 266.
Where Hare and Madden argue (1) that persuasive power is often not sufficient, but rather that coercive power is, at times, morally justified, Baldwin counters that Hare and Madden seem to conceive persuasive and coercive power according to the third set of meanings (as given above), but that God's action in the world is best understood in terms of the first and second set of meanings. Baldwin argues that God's action is limited to the persuasive conceptual innovation of final causation. God does not engage in coercive efficient causation to counteract evil. Yet as noted above, much of His persuasive final causation is coercive in the sense that it is automatically unavoidable. There is, however, room for creaturely freedom: it "does not cut off the expression of past responsible freedom carried by determined efficient cause".  

Hare and Madden complain, further, (2) that the process God's use of divine persuasive power is too weak to combat the obvious amount of evil in the world. Baldwin believes, however, that Hare and Madden conceive of divine persuasive power as a partial cause, such that the outcome will be proportional to the potency of persuasion involved. Baldwin suggests that, while some element of the conceptual innovation of God's final cause is not subject to morally responsible rejection, other elements can be so rejected. Accordingly, since there is always an element of creaturely freedom involved, "no amount of coercion could

secure the desired results....Even God could not apply enough coercion as extrinsic motivation to secure a right choice if it were a morally responsible free choice". 27

Hare and Madden argue (3) that divine persuasion fails to produce sufficient freedom and creativity. Baldwin suggests, however, that this argument confuses the various types of freedom that he has distinguished in Whitehead's metaphysics. He argues that "Maximum morally responsible freedom, could coexist with the freedom of absence of extrinsic motivation without massive evil if morally responsible freedom were determined by God": but this cannot be, since God cannot make man's decisions for him and have the decisions still be man's. 28

In response, further, to the contention of Hare and Madden that (4) there is just as much evidence that the world is persuaded by an evil power as by a good one, Baldwin contends that if this were the case, if there were no persuasive power for good to furnish positive ideals, then the efficient causality of the world would soon run down. That the world is not running down is, however, evidenced by the upward trend and increasing complexity of evolution.

The fifth criticism of Hare and Madden (5) is a protest against Hartshorne's attempt to affirm the existence of God in spite of the massive amounts of excess evil in the world. Baldwin seems to accept


this criticism with respect to Hartshorne, but he argues that Whitehead is immune to it. I believe, however, that this is a mistaken interpretation of Hartshorne, and that not just Whitehead, but Hartshorne as well, has taken full account of the empirical actuality of evil in the world; that is, that he has not evaded the empirical questions. This present dissertation works to explicate this fact; that in spite of the ontological argument, Hartshorne's theodicy acknowledges the reality of evil in the world as a problem which is not simply circumvented by the ontological proof.

There is this further criticism of Baldwin to be noted. While he has contributed much to the discussion of process theodicy and done much to refute the atheistic claims of Hare and Madden, his analysis has certain limitations. For one thing, his basic thesis seems to amount to saying that, while men are free vis-à-vis God (since God must use persuasive power to lure men, and cannot simply coerce freely responsible beings), on the other hand, sub-human levels of existence (atoms are singled out by Baldwin as his example), are not as free vis-à-vis God, since He exercises certain elements of coerciveness against them to which they have no real ability to freely respond except as compliance. Now, this would seem to me to be correct — as far as it goes: the real issue, however, is not directly discussed; namely, to define the range of freedom vis-à-vis divine power which is exercised by men.

I grant that sub-human levels of life have little freedom but to
follow the divine lure, which is quite coercive, since being without the human level of complex consciousness, there is little room for freedom. There is always an element of spontaneity, granted, but this is not at issue. What is at issue is whether, with regard to the human level of being, there is both divine persuasion and coercion, or rather, a range of persuasive effectiveness, as I prefer to put it. Baldwin has not considered this question adequately.

There is this further problem with Baldwin's analysis, specifically as it applies to Hartshorne's theodicy. Baldwin has restricted his study to Whitehead's writings, and has not given Hartshorne's theodicy any consideration (save one section on Hartshorne's view of possibility, with which I shall contend in a later section of this chapter). If Baldwin's thesis is applied to Hartshorne's metaphysics, however, there is a problem which immediately surfaces: Hartshorne has not devoted much writing to Whitehead's theory of concrescence, to the becoming of an entity, and accordingly, it is not as clear in Hartshorne (as in Whitehead) how we are to understand the workings of the initial aim, of divine final causality, of efficient causality — all within the genetic becoming of an entity. It is, therefore, not so easy to understand Hartshorne's position on just how to define the range of influence — by God and by the causal nexus — on the becoming subject; and accordingly,

29 This is held in spite of Whitehead's talk of God having to "persuade" the atoms to comply with the whole to which they belong: cf. PR 423; and D. D. Baldwin, "Evil and Persuasive Power: A Response to Hare and Madden", 262.
it is difficult to define the nature and range of creaturely freedom vis-à-vis these influences. With Whitehead, this can be more readily seen, though, granted, it is an area wherein various interpretations are being debated. Baldwin has opened new ground in Whiteheadian interpretation with his fine analysis of the various types of persuasive and coercive power, and the corresponding types of freedom, which operate in the genetic succession of an entity; yet, his analysis is, as I say, not altogether applicable to Hartshorne, nor does he consider, sufficiently, the more subtle issue of defining the range of persuasive-coercive effectiveness within the human level alone. This present dissertation seeks to shed light on this latter issue. It suggests, further, that Hartshorne's position can be understood not so much according to Baldwin's approach (that is, with respect to an analysis of genetic succession), but with respect to other issues: the imposition of limits, the organic-social analogy, and with the other issues which will be discussed in the following sections of this chapter.

Before suggesting how Hartshorne could respond to Hare and Madden's critique, we might note, in brief, the main line of argumentation of a recent article by Barnhart in which he defends the process theists' view (particularly that of Cobb) against Hare and Madden's critique. Barnhart has shed some light on the central issue of persuasion-coercion.

He points out that the concept of coercive power is highly ambiguous; for example, it does not imply mere external force, as opposed to an ineffectual persuasive power. Where Skinner defines persuasive power as ineffective and haphazard, and Cobb takes the opposite position that persuasive power is the only power which is effective, Barnhart argues that neither persuasive power nor coercive power are to be seen as good in themselves: both may be effective or ineffective. There is a confusion between Hare and Madden, and Cobb, he argues, on this point: while Hare and Madden want a more effective use of power by God to ensure His ideals, Cobb sees persuasive power as respecting the desires and wants of individuals. Barnhart argues that these positions are not necessarily in conflict. Hare and Madden advocate a quasi-coercive power to prevent new creaturely desires from coming into being; that is, if they do not stand much of a chance of gaining satisfaction or if they would disrupt the harmony already attained. The process view, however, is a give-and-take persuasiveness: to change creaturely desires, God does not have to coerce, since persuasive influence is able to bring about new desires by opening up new possibilities (and not by coercively frustrating desires which have already been experienced by creatures). To direct the desires of men, then, God does not have to coerce, but rather He changes Himself, and as the object of creaturely prehensions, He is compelling without being coercive. Coercion may be, at times, necessary, but God's rule is mainly by persuasion in which He takes account of the desires of the world. His ideals cannot, let us note, be completely unrelated to the world's desires, or else He
could not persuade the world's creatures to accept His lure.

My criticism with respect to this thesis is this: there is some question about how, precisely, God lures creatures toward new ideals. It is not necessarily simply a persuasiveness, but rather may involve some element of coerciveness, or at least a range of persuasive effectiveness. A more detailed construction of this argument follows in the sections remaining in this present chapter: Barnhart's study is incomplete here.

Now, while Baldwin has responded to Hare and Madden in defence of Whitehead, and Barnhart in defence of Cobb, Hartshorne himself (as noted above) has responded to the 1966 essay directly; and, to be sure, his probable response to the 1972 essay may be suggested via reference to his vast corpus of works. Only the latter essay and response is relevant to the issue presently under discussion, and to it we turn (Hartshorne's reply to the 1966 essay is discussed in various places in this and the following chapter of this dissertation).

The fifth criticism has already been answered on behalf of Hartshorne (above). Thus, we may consider the further criticism that there are some situations in which coercive power is morally justified, that there ought to be, in fact, a mixture of persuasiveness and coerciveness by God vis-à-vis creaturely actions. I accept this thesis and will argue that Hartshorne may best be interpreted and defended as implying that there is a range of divine effectiveness, such that some of it, being basically persuasive, permits a broad range of creaturely freedom in response to it, while yet there are also elements approaching coerciveness and to which there is little freedom
in response. This is not to argue, however, that Hartshorne's thesis
that God is solely persuasive is, necessarily, wrong or incoherent. It
is to suggest, nevertheless, that the range of effectiveness of this
divine lure must be more carefully explicated than Hartshorne has done.
To say that divine power is simply persuasive is not a little cryptic
and incomplete until the full extent of this persuasive effectiveness
is defined. When it is defined -- as I will argue -- there is revealed
a vast range of divine causal effectiveness, some of which seems coercive.
Hare and Madden do not find this in Hartshorne; yet their critique of
Hartshorne refers to only one of his essays, and not to the vast corpus
of his writings nor indeed to many of the complex issues he considers
and theses he argues. Hare and Madden are weak in this respect; and yet,
it is to their credit that they have put their finger on the important
contention that persuasive power, as used in process metaphysics and
theodicy, must be more carefully looked at.

With respect to their criticism, further, that a large number
of people seem to be simply unaffected by divine persuasiveness, and
that a great amount of evil in the world seems incompatible with divine
persuasiveness, Hartshorne's position is that all creatures feel the
presence of God -- whether or not they are aware of it. And further,
it may be suggested that Hare and Madden are, seemingly, seeking a
justification for evil, indeed for individual evils. But this, according
to Hartshorne, is not a legitimate query: evils cannot be justified
as such; they can only be explained as the inherent risks of freedom
from which both goods and evils arise. Ford has argued, further, that
"the measure of persuasion...is not how many people are actually persuaded at any given time, but the intrinsic value of the goal proposed". Hare and Madden, to be sure, reject this argument: they insist that the real question is not whether creativity is intrinsically valuable, but whether, in certain situations, more creativity, maximum creativity in fact, ought to be promoted by divine persuasive power. This argument, however, as in the aforementioned argument of Hare and Madden, seems to imply that some justification for evils ought to be given. It implies, also, that goods, at any one time, ought to predominate over evils. To this latter contention, Hartshorne would agree in the sense that, as he has argued, goods must be predominant, at least for God, or else the world could not go on (to be noted below).

Finally, to the argument that there seems to be as much evidence that the world is being lured by a persuasive power for evil as it is for good, Hartshorne's response would be that there is more order in the world than is often realized, indeed that there must always be more order and good than chaos and evil.

I am not here contending that these replies, on behalf of Hartshorne, are completely valid: this has yet to be determined. And indeed, as it is the concern of this chapter to reconstruct and critically assess his understanding of divine causative agency in the world, the argument will suggest, at least implicitly, that while his contention

---

that God's agency is solely persuasive may leave him open to some of the

criticisms of Hare and Madden, the more viable interpretation of his
understanding of divine causal agency implies an element of coerciveness.
As such, his account is rendered more forceful and coherent than it may
otherwise seem, for it can, then, more forcefully hold, for example, that
God is able to maintain the world order which makes possible creaturely
agency, and that He can ensure the balance of good over evil. To the
full explication of these matters we turn.
2. The Divine Limits

One of God's functions, as noted above, is to decide upon the limits of creaturely freedom. The issue, then, is whether this divine function in any way jeopardizes creaturely freedom, or rather, whether there can be a vital and real creaturely freedom in spite of its being restricted by divinely imposed limitations. As such, the issue is to define -- as clearly as is possible -- the extent of both God's and man's freedom, and thus, their respective responsibilities for good and evil. The question of defining whether the divine agency is persuasive and/or coercive is also relevant here.

It is Hartshorne's contention that creatures not only have freedom, but that they have it not despite the divine limitations, but because of it. This is so because if there were no limits to creaturely actions, there could be no life at all; there would be only chaos. Hartshorne explains:

Without God's ordering...individuals could not form even a disorderly world, but only a meaningless, unthinkable chaos in which there would be neither any definite good nor any definite evil. This is the same as no world. With God there is an order, a world in which good and evil can occur. 32

32 Charles Hartshorne, "A New Look at the Problem of Evil", 210. In private correspondence, Hartshorne has pointed out that "we tend to underestimate the infinite value of having cosmic order. any order, rather than hopeless confusion, unpredictability and the risks of evil unbalanced by opportunity for good proportional to the risks and their justification" (letter to the author, 1974).
The limits of freedom ensure that there is a world in which there is opportunity for the creation of good values, and to be sure, where there is also the risk of evil, for both good and evil arise from the same source: creative freedom. God sets limits, however, to ensure that the greatest opportunities for good are possible at each moment. Like the ideal ruler of an earthly kingdom, we ought to conceive God as setting "those limits outside of which freedom would involve greater risks than opportunities" (LP 231). God's very "perfection lies...in the wise and efficient limitation of the risks to the optimum point beyond which further limitation would diminish the promise of life more than its tragedy" (LP 203-204). God sets limits "which are maximally favorable to desirable decisions on the part of local agents" (DR 135). Yet, the more advanced the creature, the more is there the risk of evil: "Great opportunity and great risk seem in fact to go together" (DR 136). Man, being the most highly developed creature in the scale of being, is able to accept or reject the divine persuasive lure, whereas lower levels of creatures are little able to act on their own, lacking as they do the human development of consciousness.

Now, the important point to be gathered from this argument is that, for Hartshorne, it is God alone who decides upon the limits of creaturely freedom. (He refers to these limits, variously, as "the world-order", "the laws of nature", "divine decrees" (CSPM 125), as the "basic order", 33 as the "natural or cosmic laws", 34 etc.).


And further, not only does God alone decide these laws; but He does so in such a way that the laws are always beneficial to creatures, since the opportunities for good are maximal and the risks for evil, minimal:

Only God can decide natural or cosmic laws. Natural laws are the only laws which are always beneficial. Not that all results are good, but that the risks of having the laws are never comparable to the advantages. With human laws this may not be so; some laws may create greater risks than opportunities. 35

The last sentence implies that God is to be trusted to decide upon certain cosmic limits which will be of greater benefit to creatures than will the risks of evil which may arise. God must decide upon the limits, for only He could ensure this necessary element of order in the world. Without God's ordering there would be sheer chaos, for "a multitude of agents could not select a common world and must indeed simply nullify one another's efforts." (PSG 273-274). There must be some "common limitation or bias" which "pervades their acts" (PSG 274). This common limitation, however, "must be itself selected, for there is no one world order which alone is possible" (PSG 274); only God could select such an order.

It would seem useful here to compare Hartshorne's theory of the divine imposition of limits with Whitehead's view, since the two deans of process philosophy seem to have diverged on this important aspect of their respective metaphysics. This is the contention of one notable

critic, Lewis Ford, who argues that Whitehead has rejected the thesis that divine order is imposed upon the world, and holds rather that the laws of nature are immanent: "the order of nature expresses the characters of the real things which jointly compose the existences to be found in nature" (Al 142). Imposed law, for Whitehead, is that which is implied in the traditional Christian doctrine of the transcendent Deity who, supposedly, singly imposed fixed and definite laws upon the world (cf. Al 144-146, 200f). Ford argues that while the limits or laws are immanent in Whitehead's metaphysics (and in this Weiss agrees), they seem to be simply imposed in Hartshorne's metaphysics. Thus, when Hartshorne describes this divine function as a persuasiveness, Ford objects, for Whitehead's theory is "a radically different theory".

Ford bases this conclusion also on the fact that he believes that Hartshorne does not have available to him Whitehead's use of the initial aim which is given by God to creatures as their ideal. Hartshorne's God cannot give this initial aim to creatures since, according to Ford, Hartshorne's metaphysics does not accept Whitehead's theory of eternal objects from which the initial subjective aim is taken by God in the first place. As such the ability of Hartshorne's

36 L. S. Ford, TPP, 75-77.
37 L. S. Ford, TPP, 77.
God to exercise persuasive influence on creatures is problematic. I will argue later in this chapter against this latter aspect of Ford's thesis; but in this present section the issue will be discussed solely with respect to the divine imposition of limits to human freedom.

Hartshorne seeks to explicate his position by arguing that the limits of creaturely freedom are not coercively imposed by God but that, rather, God "must constantly 'persuade' things to obey these laws". He argues that creatures themselves cannot decide upon the cosmic order, but that it is the sole prerogative of God to do so. He contends, further, that while cosmic laws are modified by God from time to time (though never more than after long epochs of time), creatures do not have any influence upon God in regard to this modification. It is solely the divine prerogative. It is the chief example of the metaphysical principle of the "rule of the one", which God is, as World Mind. Hartshorne suggests that, on the other hand, if creatures did have some influence upon the establishment of the limits, then: (1) these laws would be

38 Charles Hartshorne, "Process and the Nature of God", in G. F. McLean, ed., Traces of God in a Secular Culture (NY: Alba House, 1973), 138. He has recently confirmed this position:

That God sets cosmic limits only means that he persuades all creatures to respond to certain patterns of order...God's entertainment of certain cosmic patterns of order is that to which all creatures respond. The response is only approximately and statistically determined by the lure of the pattern.

Accordingly, he continues, "I believe as strongly as Whitehead that God persuades"; that is, as opposed to simply imposing or coercing his will upon creatures (letter to the author, 1974).
unstable since they would be continually changing to meet the changing whims of creaturely desires; and in this case, there could be no real order, in fact, since a certain duration of stability is required for there to be order and meaningfulness; (2) God's initiative would be denied Him; and (3) men would have to be omniscient to know which laws would be best for them, but clearly, only God is omniscient. 39

Now, it may seem that Hartshorne has overstated the divine initiative here, in denying that some measure of creaturely activity can contribute to the nature of the limits of freedom. Such a view would, for one thing, give to the creature a greater significance than Hartshorne seems willing to grant to him. Yet, in addition to the above quoted points, Hartshorne adds this argument, in reply to such a critique: the significance of creatures does not lie in their ability to create the cosmic order of limits, but rather in their effects on other creatures. 40 And, further, a final and perhaps most

39 These points were made in private conversations with the author in the spring of 1975. They are not made so systematically in any particular text of Hartshorne, though they are implicit in various writings: cf. 273-274.

40 This point was relayed to the author by Hartshorne in private talks; I do not find it made explicitly in his published works, though it is implied, and consistent with his general theory. Cf. Hartshorne's "The Significance of Man in the Life of God", in Theology in Crisis: A Colloquium on the Credibility of God (New Concord: Muskingum College, 1967), 40 ff.
significant argument may be added -- though Hartshorne himself has not
used it: it would seem to me that it is simply impossible for creatures
to have some influence on the modification of the limits to freedom,
since they must act always from within those limits themselves. One
cannot change limits when one is confined to acting within those very
limits; or, at least, I cannot see how this could be the case; that is,
according to Hartshorne's arguments in this respect (see below).

I should think, then, that Hartshorne's position is clear re:
this question. It is God and He alone who establishes the a priori
limits of creaturely freedom. The implications of this view for the
reality and scope of creaturely freedom must now be examined.

One direct implication of Hartshorne's position would seem to
be that there is an aspect of God which is clearly coercive; that is,
since God alone chooses the cosmic laws within which creatures must act.
The exact nature of this coerciveness must be ascertained, especially
since Hartshorne denies that there is any coerciveness by God, the
imposition of limits implying, as noted above, only that God persuades
man to accept them. I must argue, however, that since God Himself
chooses these limits, that to this extent at least, He acts coercively
with respect to the world. I do not think that this fact necessarily
threatens creaturely freedom, but as Hartshorne says, 'it makes it
possible for there to be freely creative creatures at all, as opposed
to a chaos which would be the result of limitless freedom. There is
room for creaturely freedom within the limits imposed by God (though,
as will be argued, there are aspects of coerciveness by God with respect to His causal agency within the general limits. I shall argue in this section, however, that there is a range of effectiveness with respect to the limits of freedom: at one extreme, God would seem to exercise an element of coerciveness in that He simply chooses the limits within which creatures must act; at the other extreme, creatures can be seen as having much more freedom with respect to their acts within these limits. In this latter case, God operates more persuasively, and there is, accordingly, more ability for creatures to consciously oppose His will.

Now, granted, Hartshorne has insisted that there is only persuasiveness exercised by God, and that His choosing of the limits is no exception. Most process thinkers seem to hold to this thesis (with the possible exception of the two or three noted above). The task, then, is to work out more carefully the exact workings of the divine-human interrelationship, to define clearly the extent of the divine agency with respect to the corresponding extent of creaturely freedom that is coherent with it. This is no mean task, and while it is of vital importance, it has not clearly been worked out by the major process philosophers. The general consensus among them has been that God acts solely persuasively, as opposed to exerting a physical coerciveness. I am suggesting in this chapter, however, that there is a mixture of persuasiveness and coerciveness in the divine agency vis-à-vis creaturely freedom. There are many aspects involved in this issue,
the imposition of limits to freedom being but one.

I want to note here, in this respect, that while I am arguing that there is a range of effectiveness in the divine action with respect to man, that is, some of it being persuasive only while other aspects of it seem coercive, it may be, nevertheless, that the elements of coerciveness can be said to be elements within the persuasiveness, such that the coerciveness is never simply antagonistic to, or the negation of, persuasiveness; in short, that the divine persuasiveness may be said to have elements which appear to be a coerciveness, and other elements which are more clearly persuasive. In this suggestion, to be sure, I may be conceding too much, and that in fact there may be aspects of pure coerciveness in God which cannot be placed under the more general nature of persuasiveness. This rather complex question is one expression of the issue that this chapter faces, and it will be considered throughout the chapter in its various aspects.

In any event, we may note that while Hartshorne has provided for the fact that there is a perpendicular range of creaturely ability to respond freely to the divine causative lure, that is, according to the development of consciousness of the various levels of being, he has not dealt with the equally broad range which I am suggesting exists with respect to the divine-human encounter, that is, on the purely human level of being. It is this latter issue that this chapter explores.

Hartshorne holds that God does not simply determine all events to the last detail. Such a thesis was intended to be refuted by his
doctrine of *creative freedom* and by his modified doctrine of God (as noted above). The world, to be a world, "must consist of local agents, making their own decisions" (DR 138). The freedom of creatures, however, is restricted essentially to acts within the limits themselves. God and God alone chooses and modifies these limits as He sees fit. In spite of the fact that this divine action may be seen, as I am suggesting, as exemplifying an autocratic element, Hartshorne points out that we must see it for its merit, that is, since the imposition of limits by God is that act whereby He ensures that there is possible a world of free creatures. Without the limits, there would be no world, for the individual freedoms of all beings would come into conflict, one with the others, such that chaos would result. "But we can take legitimate comfort in the sense that what ought to be done for the world will be done [by God], and that what ought to be left to creaturely freedom will be left to it" (LP 296-297). That which God does for the world, which only He can do, is to choose the limits to the free acts of creatures; that which creatures can do is to act creatively, freely, within these limits. God "turns creatures loose to be each other's destiny, within wise limits of natural law" (NTT 121). Or again: "Divine decisions set rules for the game of creaturely interaction, but the rules allow countless options of detail". 41 While the conditions, the limits, decide what can be done, "what is done is always more determinate than

---

merely what can be done" (LP 131).

Two issues, I would suggest, are herein involved: what is the extent of man's freedom vis-à-vis the divine agency with respect to the imposition of limits to freedom?; and, what is the extent of man's freedom vis-à-vis the divine agency with respect to freedom within these limits?

There seems, to me, to be two senses in which the divine limits restrict man's freedom: God imposes laws for a cosmic era, and (together with the past causal nexus) He restricts that freedom in a more specific way, with respect to each particular situation. In the latter, the general cosmic limits are rendered more particular, according to the contingencies of the situation. These particular limits, called by Hartshorne "orders of preference", remain always within the more general cosmic limits. This is the difference, in one sense at least, between "general" and "real" possibility, the latter relating to the specific needs of the present situation, the former remaining largely abstract.

Now, in spite of the fact that Hartshorne never explicitly argues that there can be distinguished these two senses in which divine limits interact with man, I would argue that this distinction is implied in his writings; or at least, that it is an elaboration of his general position, and consistent with it. He refers, for example, both to the divine cosmic limits, and to God's lure for each specific moment. He refers to the cosmic limits as being imposed by God to
endure for long periods of time, indeed, for several hundreds, or more likely thousands, of years, for eons. These limits must be basically stable, for, as was suggested above, if the cosmic limits changed more rapidly than they do, there would arise confusion and loss of meaning, for all meaning would then become merely relative to the particular contingent situation. Hartshorne writes: "A divine prehension can use its freedom to create, and for a suitable period maintain, a particular world order. This selection then becomes a 'lure', an irresistible datum, for all ordinary acts of synthesis" (WP 164). Yet, furthermore, besides these general cosmic limits, Hartshorne refers to the divine influence upon creatures in each specific moment of creaturely becoming; God, then, effects the world not just cosmically or abstractly, but in each particular situation. Hartshorne explains:

God can rule the world and order it, setting optimal limits for our free action, by presenting himself as essential object, so characterized as to weight the possibilities of response in the desired respect...it is by molding himself that God molds us, by presenting at each moment a partly new ideal or order of preference...only he who changes himself can control the changes in us by inspiring us with novel ideals for novel occasions. We take our cues for this moment by seeing, that is, feeling, what God as of this moment desiderates (DR 142, italics mine).

The same view is expressed in the following: "there is nothing in particular that will be; there are only certain more or less general limitations imposed upon the future from the standpoint, not of eternity, but of each present" (RSP 201, latter italics mine).
These two aspects of the divine directives, the general and specific, may be somewhat what Professor George Allan had in mind when he suggested that God's ideals are concerned with both individuals and whole societies — though, neither Allan nor anyone else seems to have written explicitly of the matter in the way I am suggesting here. Specifically, I am postulating that there are these two aspects of the divine functioning with respect to the limits to creaturely freedom, and that — granting this — there can be defined a range of divine causal agency vis-à-vis man's freedom, such that aspects of divine persuasiveness, and also of coerciveness, can be ascertained. Hartshorne does not explicitly construct the matter in this way; and, in my opinion, this is one of the causes of the confusion which has existed concerning this question of defining the divine-man interrelationship with respect to the limits of creaturely freedom. For example, where Hartshorne refers to the divine lure as being "all-but-irresistible", and as being largely "unconsciously" accepted by creatures, it must be ascertained not only whether this divine action implies a coerciveness of sorts with respect to the imposition of the general laws, but whether the same element of coerciveness, (together with the aspects of persuasiveness in each case), is operative in the more specific moment, wherein God influences creatures at particular moments in their becoming, within

the general limits. Hartshorne speaks of the divine directives (lures) of each moment, and also of the cosmic laws; but, as I am suggesting, he does not clearly work out how the two aspects of divine agency interrelate. This failure has probably had much to do with the recent indications of the controversy which is arising over whether his God operates purely persuasively or purely coercively, or as both. As they stand, Hartshorne's writings are unclear on this point, and as such, his contention that God acts solely persuasively is not a little cryptic. But likewise cryptic are the arguments of certain critics who contend that Hartshorne's God operates solely coercively (Ford) or with a mixture of persuasiveness and coerciveness (Pittenger, Williams). What has not been done is to substantiate these various positions with detailed study. The aim of this present chapter, then, is to investigate this issue, and to evaluate its implications for Hartshorne's theodicy.

Hartshorne wants to argue that the general, cosmic limits are not absolute or fixed, that they are statistical and approximate only. He has not, however, shown clearly how this is the case. That the cosmic laws are not absolute may be, in fact, true, but they seem so only from God's perspective. They appear to man as absolute, since they seem virtually static for cosmic eons of time. That they must remain stable for a long period of time is insisted upon by Hartshorne, for otherwise, there would be loss of order and meaning in the world. God changes the limits, the laws, only after vast periods of time, when, for example, He wishes to permit a new range of general possibil-
ities, the former range being exhausted more or less, such that He has become bored with it. Thus, while at a particular moment in time (at each successive moment in creaturely becoming) the subject is confronted with specific limits upon its freedom (due to the past causal nexus and the divine ideals with which it is confronted, as will be discussed below), above and beyond these specific and particular limits and ideals there are more general limits within which the specific limits are confined as particularizations of the general. It can be argued, accordingly, that by this divine imposition of general limits, Hartshorne's God is exerting some element of coerciveness, for creatures have no choice but to comply: the limits are simply imposed by God and He alone, and there is nothing creatures can do about them, save to act within the limits so imposed. There would seem to be more freedom for creatures in their acts within these general limits than with regard to the imposition of the limits themselves. With respect to the latter, the divine action seems simply coercive, while in regard to the former, there is permitted a creaturely freedom which God can influence only by His great persuasive powers. The central issue of the remaining sections of this chapter, however, is to determine whether there are aspects of coerciveness also in this latter divine action within or in addition to His persuasiveness. But for the present, I am concerned to substantiate the thesis that there is a coerciveness about the divine imposition of the more general limits, the laws of nature, the cosmic laws.
Now, Hartshorne argues that the divine imposition of cosmic limits means only that God persuades creatures to respond to certain patterns of order, and that, as such, man's response is only approximately and statistically determined by the lure of the pattern. Hartshorne's contention, then, is that, rather than there being a coerciveness in God's imposition of cosmic law, there is rather a divine persuasiveness involved, since God must persuade men to accept the limits; that is, in the sense that man must act within them. I would suggest, however, that Hartshorne confuses the issue by failing to distinguish between God's general and specific functions with respect to the limits of creaturely action. By making this distinction, it can be argued that there can be located elements in God's action which suggest a coerciveness, that is, with respect to the general laws, while with respect to the specific lures and limits which confront creatures at each successive moment of their creative becomings, there can be distinguished elements of divine persuasiveness. By not making this distinction, Hartshorne's thesis, that there is only persuasiveness exercised by God, appears rather cryptic and incomplete; for while he speaks of the divine lure relative to each particular moment of creaturely becoming, as functioning solely persuasively, and since he does not clearly distinguish this divine agency from the divine function of imposing the cosmic laws, the implication is that God's action with regard to the latter is also a persuasiveness. He has not, however, shown this to be the case, and thus, has dealt incompletely with this

43 See above, note 38.
issue. It would appear, for one thing, that if it is held that God, and He alone, sets the cosmic limits, this in itself is a coercive act, since man has no choice but to act within these limits. I do not see what Hartshorne means when he argues that the setting of cosmic limits implies only that God "persuades all creatures to respond to certain patterns of order"; I should think that rather than this divine action implying a divine persuasiveness, it expresses and element of coerciveness by God. And I should think that Hartshorne's reference to divine persuasiveness ought more properly to refer only to the divine agency with respect to the lure and limits which bear down upon each new and specific present becoming of creatures. By not making explicit the distinction between the cosmic (general) and specific divine action with respect to the limits to human (and more generally, creaturely) freedom, Hartshorne leaves this issue quite unclear. Thus, in spite of the fact that Hartshorne does not like the term "coerciveness" applied to God's causal agency, I cannot see how the divine imposition of cosmic limits can be anything but coercive, since man has absolutely no say in choosing of modifying these limits, nor in acting except under their dictates. When Hartshorne speaks of divine persuasiveness, I should think that the reference is to the divine lure for the specific moment, and not to the general laws.

Now, we may ask: has man any more freedom with respect to the specific limits and lures than with respect to the general laws? That is, what is the extent of man's freedom with respect to his agency
within the general limits, and in particular, to his agency vis-à-vis the limits and lyres which confront him at each successive moment in his processive becoming?

It would seem obvious that man has more freedom with respect to his actions within the general limits than with respect to the divine imposition of these limits. And yet, there seems to be a sense in which man has more freedom with respect to the general limits, since the basic laws are simply abstractions which are made variously more particular; that is, as the limits and ideals of each specific concrete moment of creaturely life, according to the contingencies of that existence. One might ask, in this respect: what is the value of the cosmic limits; that is, since at each moment, man is confronted with specific limits and ideals. 

As such, are not these specific and particular limits all that is necessary for there to be order and continuing agency among creatures? What purpose, in other words, do the more general and abstract limits serve? In answer to this question, Hartshorne would reply that the general limits are necessary in the sense that they serve as God's values, as His outlines of the possibilities available, certain aspects of which are offered to creatures in particular moments as specific ideals. 44

The principal issue which the remainder of this chapter must seek to answer is that of defining the extent of man's freedom vis-à-vis

---

44 Hartshorne expressed this point in private talks with the author in 1975.
the specific lure (and limits) of God, (as distinct from the divine imposition of the general limits, and from the issue in the previous chapter which studied man's agency \textit{vis-à-vis} the individual psychic events) and \textit{vis-à-vis} the past causal world. In this section it has been contended that there is an element of coerciveness in the divine agency; that is, in the divine action of choosing the cosmic laws within which all creatures are confined in their individual agencies. Now, the question to be considered is whether there is also an aspect of divine coerciveness with respect to the divine function of luring creatures toward certain ideals at each particular moment of creaturely becoming. It must be noted here that, with respect to the influences and limits which bear down upon man at each moment, there must be clearly distinguished God's causal lure and the limits and possibilities permitted by the past causal nexus as a whole which bears down upon each new present. The interrelationship between these two forms of specific limits and influence upon the momentary present must be clearly ascertained, as must the extent of both divine and human agency, specifically as their correlation is understood by Hartshorne. Many issues are involved in this study, as the remainder of this chapter will reveal.

Before ending this present section, we might consider more precisely some of the issues which arise with respect to the thesis concerning the specific limitations to man's freedom.

We have been concerned to define how the divine imposition of
general limits differs from the specific limits of the divine lure upon the particular, momentarily-becoming being. Freedom must always be restricted to certain limits; and yet, the restriction of the abstract limits is not, it seems to me, the same as that of the more specific limits. For one thing, man is not able either to choose or modify the general limits, this being solely the prerogative of God. But, we then ask: is man able to choose or modify the more specific limits? Clearly, the specific limits do change, and they change somewhat with every creaturely action (albeit, the changes are generally only slight), such that each newly-becoming subject faces unique -- though largely continuous -- possibilities as the limits to his particular freedom, at every particular moment of becoming. The question here is this: what precisely is man's role in the continual modification of the specific limits? And, in view of this role, is man freer with respect to these limits than with respect to the more general limits? If there can be distinguished some range of human freedom with respect to the limits (defined, as I have suggested, in their general and specific natures), then there may be distinguishable certain elements in the divine-human inter-relationship, God being more coercive -- that is, less persuasive -- with respect to one form of limits than the other.

Now, I would argue that man's freedom with respect to the more specific limits can be best accounted for if it is shown that man is able to contribute something to the modification of those limits: we are aware that the limits are continually changing, and hence, man's
role in this change must be clarified. But let us note: by "specific limits", I refer to that aspect of the past actual world which bears down upon each new present, such that it limits the range of possibilities which are open to that new present. The present subject must act in accord with the limits and possibilities which the past actual world, as causal nexus, permits. 'If this seems to greatly restrict the freedom of the present agency, this is precisely what Hartshorne acknowledges: our momentary acts are almost -- though never completely -- determined by the past state of the world; that is, by the limits and possibilities permitted by that state. That there is always some element of freedom is, to be sure, insisted upon; for indeed, if there were no freedom there could be no novelty, and the world's creativity would surely run down. Present agency would be restricted to a mere filling-in, a making-more-determinant the possibilities defined by the past nexus. And if this were the case, it would be difficult to account for the fact of the modification of the limits, for all actions would be simply in accord with the former state of the world, such that the freedom of novelty would be denied. I would suggest that this point is analogous to that which was argued in the last chapter with reference to man's identity and character: if a man is simply limited by his past character, to the possibilities that it permits, then it is difficult to see how man could ever have the real freedom to change his character.

The difficult question here, however, is to show how a subject can modify the limits to its freedom if it is confined to acts within
those very limits! On a simple analogy we may note: if the limits of
a particular moment, say, that I am colour-blind, restrict me to seeing
colours other than reds, then it is doubtful that I am able ever to
change these limits and see red, for I must act within the limits of
red-colour-blindness. Another analogy is that of a man's character:
if one is limited by his past character, how can that character ever
change, (as we know it does change)?

Hartshorne argues that man is able to act in such a way that his
actions do, to some small but real extent, change the specific limits,
such that future acts face unique, though generally continuous, limits.
But can this modification of limits that we experience be accounted
for if our actions are confined simply to the limits of the past causal
nexus? Does this possibility of acting in such a way so as to modify
the specific limits not seem quite impossible, for can we be free to
act beyond the confines of the past if the only possibilities for action
that we have are limited by those confines? Herein would seem to lie
the reason why Hartshorne wants to argue that all our acts are confined
to possibilities which fall within the limits of the past world and
the possibilities it permits. But, I should think that if this is the
case, then it is difficult to see how our actions really contribute to
the modification of the specific limits; indeed, such a modification

45 If, on the other hand, actions do change the character of the
personal sequence to which the subject belongs, and change it to such
an extent that its moral position, for example, is quite at odds with
the former character, is there not here some problem about accounting
for the personal identity of the man as a whole? This issue was raised
and discussed in "Chapter Three".
cannot be accounted for on this view. But rather, it would seem that the extent of man's freedom is to make more-determinate, to fill-in, as it were, certain of the possibilities permitted by the past nexus. And, on this account, it is difficult to see how the continual novelty, so necessary for the creative process, is accounted for (since I reject Hartshorne's appeal to Peirce's theory that there can be an infinite range for freedom, and thus novelty, within the confines of certain limits).

Hartshorne, to be sure, seeks to account for this novelty by appealing to God, specifically, to the ideals which God offers to presently becoming creatures. These ideals are selected by God from among the possibilities open to the subject, and represent the best possible potentialities for the particular contingent moment. My objection to this point, however, is that real freedom and novelty are still not accounted for, that is, since the ideals chosen by God, it would seem, are confined essentially to possibilities within the limits which arise from the state of the past causal nexus. For there to be real novelty, some possibility must be available to the presently becoming subject which is not merely confined to the limits of the causal nexus at that moment. It is not clear in Hartshorne's writing how this can be so. And accordingly, it would seem that we must conclude that a subject's freedom is severely limited by the past nexus, since its future acts are confined within the limits of the nexus. But if this is the case, man's freedom has not been adequately accounted for, and
the entire issue remains problematic and incoherent.

I would suggest this possible solution, however, with regard to this issue. If the distinction is made between general and specific limits, as I have contended, then we are able to understand more clearly the extent of man's freedom vis-a-vis both the divine ideals and causal lure, and the past causal nexus, both of which limit the presently becoming subject at every specific moment. I would suggest that while man is limited to the general limits, to actions which must remain within the most general and basic laws of nature -- since these limits have been simply imposed by God, that man has an ability to act beyond the limits of the past causal nexus, beyond the limits and possibilities which the past actual world brings to the presently concrecing subject. But, as asked above, how can man act beyond the very confines of what is possible for him at any point in time? Is this not quite impossible, and as such, are we not driven back to Hartshorne's position (which I have argued to be problematic) that our actions must take place within the limits of the past? Now, in answer to this it may be suggested: the element of freedom and novelty which is available for the subject, and which alone can account for the modification (as opposed to a mere filling-in) of the past possibilities and limits, is made possible, as Hartshorne says, by the divine ideals. But I would suggest that God chooses these ideals not merely from among that which is possible according to the past causal nexus, but from the more infinite range of what is possible within the general limits. For there to be freedom
and novelty beyond the confines of the past nexus, it must be seen that becoming subjects have access to possibilities beyond the limits of the past nexus, and that these possibilities are offered to the subjects by God, as persuasive lures — these possibilities, though, falling always within the more general limits to freedom, within the laws of nature as a whole. It is only these latter limits within which presently becoming subjects must act; man has a certain freedom to act beyond the confines of the past causal nexus, beyond the more specific limits, as I would put it. Note here, however, that by not making clear this distinction between the types of limits, Hartshorne's theory of human freedom with respect to its limits is, I am suggesting, quite unclear and not a little cryptic. Unless some account can be given of the ability of man to act freely to introduce novelty, and hence, modify the specific limits of the causal nexus for future act, it is not clear how man is really free.

Note that to say we are able to go beyond the limits of the past nexus, is not to imply that those limits are simply disregarded or redundant. Rather, it must be seen that our present action is greatly influenced and restricted by the past nexus. The point is that it is never entirely determined by that nexus so as to deny freedom. Where I have objected to Hartshorne's view is that this element of freedom is not to be seen as being restricted to within the limits of the past, but rather, goes beyond them. Hartshorne, granted, insists that the past does not simply determine the present, and that man is free to
modify the limits of the specific moment in that his actions are free (and in the same way is a man's character modified); yet, he has not clearly shown how this can be so, for he wants to argue that we must act within the limits of the past and its possibilities, and that -- it may be implied -- even God's ideals operate within this past.

By making the distinction, as I have, however, between the general and specific limits, I have contended that it can be seen more clearly that man is not simply confined to the past limits, and that the divine ideals need not be restricted to the possibilities of the past world, but rather, may go beyond that past nexus -- though remaining always within the general limits, the abstract laws of nature. This is not to say that man has an infinite scope for action as long as it remains within the general laws of nature, as opposed to a more limited range for action if such is seen as confined to the past nexus; but rather, it can be acknowledged that the past nexus greatly determines all new becomings, while that, yet, there is an ability for the becoming subject to escape the confines of the past when it is offered ideals by God which, while being beyond the limits of the past actual state of the world, are never simply or totally different in nature from the past world. God, for example, cannot offer ideals which would tear man completely out of his past existence to become a completely different person. He can, however, offer possibilities for man which are not possible on the basis of the past state of the world, for novelty is accounted for by such possibilities.
The argument would apply, analogously, to the question raised in the former chapter concerning man's ability to change his character: man is able to modify his past character by enacting ideals offered by God which offer novelty beyond the limits of the past characters. The nagging question, however, is to determine how this can be so; that is, how one can act beyond the confines of his past character and external causal limits. The distinction between specific and general limits may lead to the beginning of a solution; yet the matter remains quite vague and problematic.

We may, in conclusion, briefly note some of the relevance of the issues discussed in this section for the overall question of Hartshorne's theodicy.

I have sought to reconstruct and clarify Hartshorne's theory of the limits to human freedom (and more generally, of course, of creaturely freedom as a whole -- though as man is the only rational being, and hence the only being for whom the questions of theodicy are relevant, with respect to moral evil, the analysis is more specifically concerned with man, or more precisely, with the extent of man's freedom vis-à-vis divine action -- and also, vis-à-vis the causality of the world). The question of the limits to freedom is, however, only one element of many wherein the question of man's freedom (and moral responsibility) is at issue. The remainder of this chapter will seek to study the other elements involved. The study is not complete until the various aspects of the divine causal agency and lure are examined to determine their
coherence with human freedom in response to them. This present section has argued that there may be defined a varying degree of divine effectiveness with respect to the limits of human freedom: God would seem to be quite coercive in simply imposing the absolute limits to man's acts of freedom, while there seems to be more freedom for men with respect to their actions within these limits. At this point, however, certain problems with Hartshorne's account were discussed, and while I have suggested certain means whereby Hartshorne's account can be made more coherent, or at least rendered more clear (where he is unclear and incomplete), it must be stressed here that the overall issue is far from settled; that is, what has yet to be reconstructed and evaluated is Hartshorne's understanding of the exact workings of the divine persuasive lure vis-à-vis man's actions. This section has considered only the extent of the divine agency vis-à-vis man's freedom with respect to the imposition by God of the most general limits to creaturely freedom; what has yet to be discussed in greater detail is the question of the coherence of the divine agency with respect to creaturely freedom within these general limits; that is, with respect to the divine lure at each moment.

With regard to the specific issue of this present section, certain points may be made concerning the relevance of this study for Hartshorne's overall theodicy, or more specifically, in view of the basic thrust of this chapter as a whole, certain points may be made regarding the relevance of the issue for the question of man's freedom vis-à-vis the
divine agency. Thus, I would suggest that the divine agency is not the
uniform persuasiveness that is simply assumed by most adherents and
critics of process thought. Rather, there would seem to be an aspect of God's
agency which is coercive, in that He simply imposes limits to creaturely
freedom. I cannot appreciate Hartshorne's argument that this divine
action is persuasive since, as he argues, God persuades man to accept
the limits. I should think that if the limits are simply chosen
and modified only by God, then this is a coerciveness, albeit a benefi-
cial one for us, in that while it restricts our freedom, it makes
creaturely life possible; that is, by giving order to the world which,
left to itself, would be consumed in the chaos of mutually conflicting
creaturely freedoms.

Another point is this: I should think that, in Hartshorne's
writings, man's freedom has not been adequately accounted for, or at
least that Hartshorne's argument is not clear nor free from incoherency,
specifically as concerns the question of the limits to that freedom
(and in other places, as noted above in former chapters, and as will
be discussed in the pages to follow). He seems to envisage man's
presently-becoming agency as restricted by the limits of the past nexus.
God's ideals lure man to enact the best possibilities which are permitted
within the past limits of the world, which bear down upon the present
subject in its concrescence. If this is indeed a correct interpretation
of Hartshorne, then it is difficult to see how man is free, in the
sense that he is able to introduce further novelty into the world; that
is, since all his acts would seem, rather, to be merely a filling-in, a making more determinate, certain of the possibilities envisaged (permitted) by the past state of the world. I should think, rather, that we must somehow be able to go beyond the past limits, and indeed, that we must be able to do so if we are to be freely creative and to contribute novelty to the world. This novelty is made possible by the divine lures, offered to man at each moment as the best possible ideals for actualization. I have suggested that this can be made coherent by holding that these ideals are not restricted to the past nexus, but only to the more general limits. Now, there are, to be sure, problems with this suggestion, for it is not clear how one is able to act beyond the limits of what is, in fact, possible for him. Granted, the divine lure may seem to make this possible, but the exact construction of this has not been worked out, and hence it remains unclear and problematic. Indeed, Hartshorne's position on this matter is not itself clear, for whether or not he holds to the view that man can or cannot act beyond the limits of the past is not clear. And further, as I have shown, on either position, there are problems of coherence. The one view seems impossible, the other seems to negate freedom.

The implications of this dilemma for the overall question of Hartshorne's theodicy are readily available: if he holds to the one position (that man is restricted to actions within the specific limits of the past), he has not shown how he can avoid the implication that this denies freedom and real novelty; and if he holds to the other
position (that man is able to act beyond the limits of the past nexus) the coherency of this has not been shown clearly. Thus, the question of man's freedom is herein left not a little vague. My suggestion is that the latter thesis is the most viable, and that it is substantiated, in part, by considering the distinction between the types of limits upon man's freedom. And yet, there are many complex problems which arise in its justification which cannot be discussed here. The point in all this, however, is that Hartshorne has not solved this dilemma; he has not shown sufficiently how man can be both free and yet limited. The implication, then, is that Hartshorne's account of man's freedom with respect to the limits to that freedom is not complete as it stands, and this incompleteness (or unclarity) may be construed as a weakness in the overall viability of his theodicy.
3. The Organic-Social Analogy

Of central importance for the understanding of the range and extent of man's freedom vis-à-vis God's agency, His lure and limitation of freedom within the more general laws of nature, is Hartshorne's "organic-social analogy", wherein God is conceived as the World-Mind and the world as His bodily constituents. The issue here is analogous to that discussed above; namely, the freedom of the parts (the body) vis-à-vis the whole (the mind), and vice versa. Hartshorne's understanding of man's freedom vis-à-vis God as World-Mind, must be reconstructed and assessed.

It will help in the understanding of Hartshorne's analogy of the divine-world relationship to refer back to his theory of "panentheism". Hartshorne argues that, whereas traditional theism and traditional forms of pantheism are inadequate and partial theories at best, his own alternative conception of "panentheism" combines what is best in both of these extreme positions. As indicated above (cf. "Chapter Two"), Hartshorne regards traditional theism as the view wherein "God is the independent universal cause or source; the universe, his extrinsic effect or outcome" (PSG 500). Traditional pantheism is described as the theory wherein "God is the inclusive reality, and there is no ultimate cause distinct from and independent of the cosmic totality" (PSG 500). Hartshorne's alternative position of "panentheism" is that God includes the world but is not exhausted by it. Thus,
with traditional theism, Hartshorne accepts the view that God must be logically independent of the world — that He is so is implied in Hartshorne's doctrine of God's Abstract Nature; and with traditional pantheism, he accepts the view that God is all-inclusive — that He is so is argued by Hartshorne's doctrine of God's Concrete Nature. The world and God are both externally and internally related; that is, God is both independent and dependent with respect to the world, and vice versa. This, indeed, is the thrust of Hartshorne's dipolar theism, and the basis of his argument against other views. He has rejected, for example, what he takes to be the view of the scholastics and the nineteenth century idealists and modern realists, all of whom contend that if there were external relations then there could be no all-inclusive reality. Against this view Hartshorne suggests:

>This [contention] appears not to follow. For to say that there is something all-inclusive is to say there is something that contains and is thus related to all other things; but from this it cannot be deduced that all other things are related either to the inclusive thing or to each other. True, all are contained, and co-contained, in the inclusive being, but the question is whether this relation of "being contained" or of "being co-contained" is a normal, external, or a real, internal, relation. It must be an external relation; for if the including things have relation to the including thing, then, since "to have the relation is to have the term," they would include the including thing, and all distinction between including and included would vanish. Thus, only if some relations are external, can there, in a significant sense, be an all-inclusive reality! (DR 92-93).
Hartshorne points out, however, that while God and nature are interrelated, that is, so that man "contains" God and God "contains" man, there is a clear distinction between God and man based on the difference between the intensity and extensiveness of their respective cognitive relations. Accordingly, "man, though extensively he is as inclusive as God (so far as coexistent with man), intensively is not so" (DR 93). God's knowledge is perfect, all-inclusive, while man's is indistinct and limited. Further, Hartshorne qualifies this thesis yet again by arguing that "even extensively God is more inclusive than man in that the God who coexists with man is only God during a certain portion of his everlasting endurance" (DR 93-94).

Now, Hartshorne's contention is that, in order for us better to understand the divine-human interrelationship, we can conceive of the interaction analogously to the way we are constituted as mind and body; this thesis is expressed by his so-called "mind-body", or "organic", analogy. It is, however, not quite sufficient to explain that which it seeks to explain, but rather must be combined with another analogy, the "social analogy", which is concerned with the interrelationships of one man with another (cf. MVG chapter 5).

My analysis begins with a reconstruction of the organic, mind-body, analogy. For Hartshorne, a man is constituted by a body which "is really a 'world' of individuals, and a mind...capable of thinking and feeling...[and which] is to that body something like an indwelling God" (MVG 177), "and over which its influence is dominant" (WP 30).
Such is man's body, and analogously, such is the world as God's body, influenced as it is by the divine mind. Modern science has indicated, according to Hartshorne, that sole reliance upon the macroscopically oriented sense perceptions are not to be understood as the sole and sufficient guide to the nature of things. Rather, it has indicated that there is a microscopic world of interacting and freely creative organisms; and it is by using this scientific view of man's body, as consisting of microscopic parts influenced by a central and controlling mind, that Hartshorne conceives, in part, the divine-human relationship.

Now, Hartshorne suggests that knowledge and power are variables through which mind and body are able to integrate their minute constituents. In this light, he has defined various degrees of knowledge and power with respect to scope, immediacy, distinctness, intensity, directness, and adequacy (cf. MVG 178; BH 111 ff). His study has led him to conclude that man has direct power (control) only over his own body. It is with respect to our own bodies that "we are Godlike in directness of power over individuals other than our own ego" (MVG 179). This reference to other individuals refers to our bodily parts, over which the ego or mind has direct power. The control is direct and immediate because man's nervous mechanism controls the bodily constituents directly: "there is no further mechanism between his will

46 Cf. R. R. Cavanagh, "Toward a Contemporary Construct of Providence" (dissertation for Graduate Theological Union, 1968), 280 ff.
and the nerves themselves" (MVG 179). For Hartshorne, direct power (control) implies "the ability to carry out a purpose" (MVG 178), and this man can do only with regard to his own body (since his volitions produce immediate changes in the body), and not with regard to things external to his body. The body as a whole, under the direction of a central mind, wills, and the parts of the body "respond" to this willing (cf. MVG 182).

As with control, so with knowledge: man has direct knowledge only over his own body. Man's awareness is immediate and direct with regard only to "certain aspects of the changes going on in the parts of the body" (MVG 183). No event, however, which takes place outside the body is known with such immediacy. Thus, for example, while a man cannever know infallibly, immediately, whether the object of his sense perception is, say, a snake or a stick, he does know immediately that he is in fact perceiving something. Following Whitehead here, Hartshorne argues that sense perception is not primary, but is, rather, secondary to a more immediate knowledge: "Item for item, the contents of the visual field, which appears so full of definite information concerning the external world, is full of even more definite information concerning the body (whether or not we are interested in this aspect of the matter as we usually are not)" (MVG 184; and cf. above, "Chapter Three").

Hartshorne does admit that our immediate knowledge of our own bodies is only a "blurred outline of the cell structure and activity"
(MVG 184), and not a direct awareness of the individual cells. He insists, however, that we have even less direct awareness and control of the cellular structures outside our bodies. The analogy is, as he admits, not perfect, but it is the best one available to explain what it seeks to explain.

When the mind-body analogy is applied to God's relationship with the world, it may be inferred that God has direct and immediate knowledge and control over His bodily parts, the world of creatures. (His knowledge and control, however, are perfect, whereas man's are imperfect). Hartshorne summarizes his view as follows:

...God's volition is related to the world as though every object in it were to him a nerve-muscle, and his omniscience is related to it as though every object were a muscle-nerve. A brain cell is for us, as it were, a nerve-muscle and a muscle-nerve, in that its internal motions respond to our thoughts and our thoughts to its motions. If there is a theological analogy, here is the locus. God has no separate sense organs or muscles, because all parts of the world body directly perform both functions for him. In this sense the world is God's body (MVG 185).

The organic, mind-body, analogy is not, as noted above, the full analogy of the divine-human interrelationship: the organic analogy must be combined with another analogy, the social, or human to human, analogy (cf. MVG 185 ff). The social analogy helps to explain how it is that we know and control others, and indeed, how our minds control our bodies. In other words, the social analogy fills the gap which the organic analogy leaves unanswered; that is, regarding how the
mind is immediately related to the body: "We know and control others", Hartshorne argues, "most intimately by sympathetic understanding, by sharing interests with them" (MVG 186). The social analogy describes this action.

While the social analogy contributes to the mind-body analogy where the latter is weak, so too does the mind-body analogy contribute to the social analogy where it is weak. The social analogy in itself cannot explain how one mind is able to express its feelings to another directly. Intermediaries are involved, and these can be explained only by the mind-body analogy. "Thus, we have two analogies, each of which is strong where the other is weak, and neither of which alone can suffice (MVG 187). Again: "The organic relation is factually immediate but mysterious or unintelligible as it stands....On the other hand, the human social relation, while intelligible, and a relation of mind to mind, lacks immediacy" (MVG 187). For the two analogies to be combined we must see that the mind-body relationship is immediately social. We have only to suppose, as Hartshorne argues, that the cells which form a body are to some degree sentient and influenced by the mind through an immediate sharing of feeling. 47

There arises the question, however: are immediate social relations in fact possible? And if they are possible do they jeopardize the freedom, the independence, of the individuals which are perceived by others?

47 On this point, see R. R. Cavanagh, "Toward a Contemporary Construct of Providence", 282.
In answering this question, Hartshorne distinguishes between the types of relationships which are possible: there are relations between things in which one is radically inferior; and there are relations between things in which the two are equal. It is clear that equals cannot have immediate social relationships; a man, for example, cannot have direct access to another man's mind. But where there are relationships in which one partner is radically superior and the other, correspondingly, radically inferior, there can be immediate and direct social relationships. Such relationships are "monarchical", since the superior partner has influence and direct knowledge over the other. Such is the case with God; He is the superior partner who, as such, has direct social relationships with men, his inferior partners (MVG 188 ff).

The question to be answered here is this: does this divine knowing and control of the creatures in the world, His body, jeopardize the latter's autonomy? And, we may well ask, what does this issue tell us about the range of divine persuasive influence vis-à-vis the world? Hartshorne's contention, to be sure, is that the relationship does not curtail creaturely autonomy. He attempts to explain this by arguing that just as would be the case if men could have immediate control over, and awareness of, his individual bodily cells, and that this would not enslave the cells, so likewise does God's direct power and awareness of His bodily parts not enslave them. The reason for this is based upon the fact that the two partners in this relationship are not equal, and so just as one's cells are inferior to the mind
which controls them and as such are not aware of the mind's control over them, so are we, as God's bodily cells, not fully cognizant of His control over us. Hartshorne, then, argues (so it would seem) that man's freedom is ensured *vis-à-vis* the divine knowledge and control because man, being inferior to God, is not fully cognizant of this divine action (cf. MVG 191).

But this thesis cannot be accepted. Man's freedom cannot be located merely in the fact that he is unaware of the full knowledge and control which God exercises over him. This would make man's freedom an illusion, a fraud. The fact that man is unaware of the full extent of the divine power and knowledge with respect to his actions cannot be a vindication of human freedom. The issue is not whether we are aware or unaware of God's knowledge and power *vis-à-vis* our own knowledge and power, but whether God's knowledge and power jeopardizes our freedom.

It would seem that, with respect to God's knowledge, we do have freedom, since we must act before God can have knowledge of our actions: there is, according to Hartshorne's metaphysics, no ability for any being, including God, to have knowledge of contemporaneous activities: there is knowledge only of past events. But, with regard to the issue of divine power and control over us, there does appear to be a problem: if this divine power is an immediate and direct control, as Hartshorne claims, then are we creatures able to maintain our autonomy? To say that we can do so because we are not aware of
God's full power over us is not to face the issue, and it is surprising that Hartshorne has, in this context, hinted at this view. He writes:

God is the one being who rightfully can invade all privacies. And the vagueness which inevitably limits the direct vision which we men could possibly have of God gives us plenty of freedom of interpretation of the divine datum, this freedom going all the way to denying that there is a God (MVG 191).

While this might be interpreted as an argument that we are free vis-à-vis God only to the extent that we are not fully aware of His power over us, this interpretation is not at all consistent with Hartshorne's intention, nor indeed, with many other numerous themes in which he discusses the divine-human interrelationship. It does seem to be, then, an inconsistency or oversight on Hartshorne's part. And yet, it may, perhaps, be taken as an example of the extreme pole of the range of divine persuasiveness vis-à-vis the world, that is, the coercive pole, since it reveals an aspect of God's power over which we have little control, and as such, implies that our freedom is limited. But, in any event, in terms of the analogy itself, Hartshorne's meaning can be ascertained: just as the freedom of a cell is not completely jeopardized by the mind's knowledge of and control over it, so neither is man's freedom vis-à-vis the World-Mind, God: in both cases, there is some freedom (as can be substantiated by our knowledge that the cells do have the ability to act without our direct intervention) as for example, in the case of muscular spasms).

Other questions which concern the viability of the organic-
social analogy in explaining the divine-human interrelationship have been considered by Hartshorne. For example, to the objection that God cannot share in the feelings of creatures and still be independent of them, as He must be, it is Hartshorne's contention that since God is dipolar, He may be understood to be independent in His necessary existence (His Abstract Nature), and dependent in his contingent actuality (His Concrete Nature). Hartshorne is here contesting what he takes to be the traditional doctrine of divine impassivity, and refutes it via his revised neo-classical theism.

Further, against the objection that the analogy does not allow for the traditional doctrine of God as creator, Hartshorne contends that while it seems to be true that man cannot produce new bodily cells, yet there is something new that is produced: man's mind affects the development of the cells, if not their generation. "Creation" for Hartshorne, is not "creation ex nihilo"; but rather, the "supreme influence upon growth" (MVG 193-194). Thus, in the same way that man's mind influences -- but does not create out of nothing -- the body, so does God as world-mind create the world, not out of nothing, but as the supreme influence upon the development of the world. (Discussion of this point is resumed in "Chapter Five").

Perhaps the most serious objection to the analogy is that which asks whether there can be evil and disorder in God, as there seems to be according to the analogy by which God's body is literally the world with its good and evils. Hartshorne insists that the evils of the
world are real, and not merely illusions, and as such they are part of God's all-inclusive body. And yet, the inclusion of evil in God does not make God Himself evil: God's concrete nature responds to and participates in all creaturely acts, and yet while creatures commit moral and cognitive evils, God cannot, since He does not have partial or selfish aims. God is, according to Hartshorne, qualified not by moral or cognitive evil, but rather by aesthetic evil alone: He "must suffer all things, for he must participate in all things to know them, but he cannot be said to choose all things for he has granted choices also to the creatures" (MVG 197). Moral evil is deliberately chosen and enacted; aesthetic evil is suffered. (Discussion of this issue is resumed in "Chapter Five").

Hartshorne has sought to defend his analogy against other analogies which have been used, all of which he thinks are less adequate than his own in their attempts to explicate the divine-world inter-relationship. God has been compared, for example, to a poet, with the world as His poem. Yet this analogy is insufficient in accounting for the immediate production of poetic effects in other minds, since the only poem that is immediately produced by a human poet is the poem of his own mind. Hartshorne does admit, to be sure, that the poetic analogy has merit in being an elaboration of the mind-body analogy, and as such is correct -- as far as it goes (cf. MVG 202).

Likewise, it is often suggested that God is like a Father; but Hartshorne feels that this analogy is not sufficient to explain that
which it seeks to explain, for it does not imply sufficiently the radical superiority of God with respect to His creatures. "To find radical superiority, together with an intimate relationship, between two individuals, we must turn to the bodily hierarchy of organisms within organisms, culminating in the universe" (MVC 202). This, of course, is precisely what Hartshorne's organic-social analogy seeks to do.

Finally, there is the traditional analogy of God as absolute monarch, all-powerful ruler, etc. Hartshorne contends that such a view denies creativity to anything but God; and as such, his dipolar theism has sought to revise this (as he sees it) incomplete and one-sided traditional view.

The most sustained criticism of Hartshorne's analogy, however, has been put forth by William Christian. 48 Where Hartshorne suggests, for example, that there are only three possible ways to conceive the divine-world interrelationship, Christian argues for a fourth view. Hartshorne's alternatives (cf. DR 90) include: (1) the view that "God is merely the cosmos, in all respects inseparable from the sum or system of dependent things or effects" (traditional pantheism); (2) God "is both this system and something independent of it" (Hartshorne's panentheism); and (3) God "is not the system but in all aspects independent" of it (traditional theism). Hartshorne has

48 W. A. Christian, An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics, 403 ff. Hereafter cited as IWM.
argued that panentheism combines the best of theism and pantheism, and produces the most adequate doctrine of God and His relationship with the world. Christian, however, argues for a fourth position, namely, "(a) God is not the cosmos, nor does he include (in Harte-
horne's sense) the cosmos; yet (b) his activity is always conditioned though never determined by the cosmos". The advantages of this view, he contends, are the following:

This view agrees with traditional theism, against traditional pantheism and panentheism, in asserting that God is neither identical with nor inclusive of the world. It agrees with panentheism and traditional theism, against pantheism, in asserting that God transcends the world. And it agrees with traditional pantheism and panentheism, against traditional theism, in asserting that God is conditioned by the world.

Christian is objecting here to two of the central features of Harte-
horne's analogy, to his panentheism: (1) that "God literally contains the universe" (DR 90), and (2) that God transcends the world in His essence, but not in His concrete actuality (DR 88-89). 

---

49 W. A. Christian, IWM, 404 and 407.

50 W. A. Christian, IWM, 407.

argues that God does not include every occasion subjectively: He includes them only when they have become and not when they are in the process of their own subjective becoming — so that, accordingly, they are objective to Him. God, then, is not inclusive, but is rather, exclusive of the process of becoming. "There are real processes of change", he argues, "of which God is not the subject". 52 Indeed, God is not even inclusive of the world objectively, until it becomes: "the principle of the nonprehension of contemporaries as concrete individuals applies to God's experience as well as to the experience of actual occasions". 53 Christian argues that Whitehead's theory does not permit, furthermore, the Hartshornian interpretation that God is a society of actual occasions with personal order. He bases this judgement on the contention that, since a society is, for Whitehead, a nexus with social order (PR 50, 136), and since "actual entities and nexus belong to different categories of existence, which is to say mutually exclusive classes of entities", and "since God is an actual entity, he is not a nexus and hence not a society of any kind". 54

52 W. A. Christian, IWM, 406.


54 W. A. Christian, IWM, 408. This, to be sure, is a much contested point, and while it cannot be further discussed here, we may refer to a recent essay wherein Hartshorne's view is defended: D. Brown, "Freedom and Faithfulness in Whitehead's God", Process Studies 2/2, Summer, 1972, 137-148.
Although I am not aware of any publication by Hartshorne in which he has replied directly to Christian's criticisms, his probable response may be suggested here. With regard to Christian's first basic criticism, that God does not literally include the world because He experiences actual entities only in their objective immortality, Hartshorne has argued that "finite entities retain their subjective immediacy in their objective immortality." 55 Christian and Hartshorne are clearly at odds here in their interpretations of Whitehead with respect to the issue of "how to interpret the relation between perishing and inheriting in general." 56 Hartshorne interprets Whitehead's term, "perishing", as implying "inheriting", and not as a literal perishing which would imply, as Christian holds, "that the perished entity is no longer actual and hence cannot be an efficient cause". 57 As one interpreter has noted:

Both interpreters [that is, Christian and Hartshorne] recognize that there are several passages [in Whitehead] that can only with difficulty be reconciled with their respective interpretations. But each believes that his own interpretation does more justice to the relevant texts and to the implications of the basic principles of the system. 58

55 As pointed out by D. R. Griffin, TPP, 53.
56 D. R. Griffin, TPP, 53.
57 D. R. Griffin, TPP, 54.
58 D. R. Griffin, TPP, 54.
Griffin has sided with Christian on this issue. He believes that the evidence marshalled by Christian for his position is impressive and that his literal interpretation of Whitehead is sound. In addition, he suggests that there seems to be two senses in which Whitehead uses the term "immediate" such that in only one sense is it the subjective immediacy of creatures which is retained in their objective immortality in God. In the other sense, Whitehead speaks of an immediacy which might not necessarily be lost: "it is contrasted not with objectivity as such but with abstraction in the sense of the kind of selection that is required when the characters of things are mutually obstructive (PR 517)". 59

Christian's second major criticism challenges Hartshorne's view that God remains exclusive of the world in His essence but not in His concrete actuality. Christian argues that God is exclusive of the world in both His aspects. He transcends the world in His concrete actuality, he holds, since He cannot apprehend occasions until they have become; that is, until they have obtained objective immortality. This argument of Christian's is based, I should think, largely upon the same issue as in his first major criticism; namely, upon the question whether God apprehends entities in their subjective or in their objective immediacy. Hartshorne's view is that the actual entity does not lose its subjectivity before it is objectified. "Rather, the loss of immediacy in this world is due solely to the limits of finite apprehenders, that they must abstract from things so much, and hence

59 D. R. Griffin, TPP, 55.
are not conscious of their immediacy". In short, "Hartshorne does not accept the idea that an occasion is first past and then objectified". While, accordingly, contemporaries cannot apprehend each other immediately, the objectified entity does retain its subjective nature in God's prehension, and thus, God's experience of it is inclusive.

Christian offers several other objections against the organic-social analogy of Hartshorne in which he attacks the idea of the divine organism as an inadequate conception of the divine-world interrelationship for any religious system, Whitehead's or otherwise. He lists several objections: (1) in everyday meaning, an organism has an environment, but the divine organism would not; (2) an organism has a beginning and an end, but the divine organism would not; (3) an organism has organic unity, that is, a mutual immanence among its cells, and a persistent pattern of unity in time, but the divine organism would not; (4) an organism occupies a region of space-time which is the sum of the regions of its cells, but the divine organism would not; (5) the cells of an organism have a different structure from the whole of which they are the parts, but the divine organism would have the same fundamental structure as the occasions which constitute its parts. There would seem to be, then, according to Christian, "some good reasons for

60 D. R. Griffin, TPP, 54.

61 W. A. Christian, IWM, 408-409.
not saying that...the universe is a divine organism", 62 that the relationship between God and the world is not that of a whole and its parts.

Now, while Hartshorne admits that the organic-social analogy is by no means free from various problems, he does insist that "inadequate though the resulting conception of God may be, the organic-social analogy must be the best means of constructing such a conception open to us" (MVG 204). It may be noted, furthermore, that Christian seems to be attacking the term, "organism", rather than the ideas involved therein. I find none of his criticisms devastating to Hartshorne's position (though this issue between Christian and Hartshorne cannot be argued further here).

Christian's objections to Hartshorne's organic-social analogy were intended, in large, to show that if God is inclusive of the cosmos, as Hartshorne contends, this would jeopardize the independence of the individual parts of the world. 63 With respect to this question,

62 W. A. Christian, IWM, 409. Christian, to be sure is not alone in this criticism. Austin Farrer, for example, likewise rejects the organic analogy: see for example his Reflective Faith (London: SPCK, 1972), 171-191; and his Faith and Speculation (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1967), 142-155.

it can be argued that Hartshorne's organic-social analogy does maintain the integrity of the parts vis-à-vis the whole; or, in other words, it does maintain human freedom vis-à-vis divine causal agency. To argue this, I shall draw upon some of the suggestions put forth by two leading process theologians who, likewise, have attempted to define the divine-human interaction in a way which is based upon Hartshorne's directive. I am referring to Ogden and Griffin, and while they have gone beyond Hartshorne in certain of their points, I believe that their arguments are concurrent with Hartshorne's general intention.

The approach is, in essence, to define two senses in which both God and man may be said to "act": a primary and a secondary sense. The former refers to the psyche's own act of self-constitution, its private purposes and projects, while the latter refers to the psyche's public action, its outer acts and deeds. The latter are, in fact, the outward expression and implementation of the inner decisions, whereby

64 Cf. S. M. Ogden, The Reality of God (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), "Chapter Six": "What Sense Does it Make to Say, 'God Acts in History'?"; also D. R. Griffin, "Schubert Ogden's Christology and the Possibilities of Process Philosophy", in D. Brown, R. E. James, Jr., and G. Reeves, eds., Process Philosophy and Christian Thought, 347-361 (republished from Christian Scholar 50/3, Fall, 1967; and "Is Revelation Coherent?", Theology Today 28, Oct., 1971, 278-294. While Griffin criticizes Ogden's approach as inadequate (though helpful), my purpose is not to enter into a debate of their differences; rather, I am concerned to take what is best in their theories and apply them to an understanding of Hartshorne.
the self is constituted. 65

Correspondingly, in strict analogy to man's acts, God's decisions have both a primary and a secondary sense. The former refers to His act of self-constitution in which He "participates fully and completely in the world of his creatures, thereby laying the ground for the next stage of the creative process". 66 This act is analogous to a man's relation with his own bodily states, especially with his brain cells. This action is immediate and direct. "We respond with virtual immediacy to the impulses that come from our brains and it is over our brains (or their individual cells) that our decisions as selves or minds exercise a virtually direct power or control". 67 God's primary action, accordingly, is immediate and direct with regard to the world, the world acting as His sense organ, as it were. This action of God constitutes a sympathetic response to the past state of the world and lays the foundation for its future states.

God's secondary acts are in effect the finite acts of creatures, because every act is influenced to some extent by God's aim for it. While the primary action of God is not an action in time and space,

65 Cf. S. Ogden The Reality of God, 176-177; and D. R. Griffin, "Schubert Ogden's Christology and the Possibilities of Process Philosophy" 352.

66 S. Ogden, The Reality of God, 177.

but rather transcends the finite realm — "just as, by analogy, our own inner decisions as selves are not simply identical with any of our outer acts of word or deed, but rather transcend or lie behind them as the decisions on which our words and deeds are grounded and to which they give expression" 68— His secondary acts are concrete as, by analogy, our secondary acts are outward expressions of our primary acts. Every creature is, to this extent, God's act, much as, by analogy, our bodily acts are our own acts. Yet in the same way that our bodily acts are not completely determined by our mind's inner decisions, but rather are free, within limits, not to obey the mind, so likewise are man's acts, as constitutive of God's body, not completely determined by God. Rather they have a range of limited freedom and spontaneity. In man this freedom is displayed, for example, when the body is unconscious or drugged, or when internal spasms occur. The psyche's control is not simply coercive or deterministic. To be sure, the body normally expresses the inner decisions of the mind; and yet, it does not always do so. Analogously, while the acts of creatures may express God's aims, they need not always do so. Or at least, it may be that they do so more or less adequately: sometimes more, sometimes less adequately. Man has the real range of freedom.

68 S. Ogden, The Reality of God, 179.
Man, then, is not responsible for his bodily actions if they do not conform to the psyche's inner decisions for them. Likewise, God is not responsible nor is He the sole cause of man's acts if they are not responsive to God's inner decisions for them. And yet, while similar, the two elements in the analogy are not completely so. Man, as a high-grade being, would seem to have considerably more freedom vis-à-vis God than do the cells of his body vis-à-vis their mind's control: the cells operate more as mob control than as individual freedom. Thus, while all creaturely events are, in a sense, acts of God (God's inner self-decisions, which are the source of the initial aims which He gives to creatures), in another sense, they have a certain freedom in their response to God's aims, although granted, this freedom is restricted by the limits imposed by the divine primary act, His self-constituting act which has provided the initial aim to creatures. Each creature becomes what it is only by its response to God's aim for it.

It may be argued that Whitehead's theory of the ideal aim which is offered to creatures as their ideal possibility implies a very strong incentive to respond as God so wishes, since God offers not only the ideal but also a certain valuation, a certain lure toward the ideal. Yet, that man is free in spite of this is insisted upon by process philosophers, for while the aim is very influential, it cannot be solely influential since this would imply a coerciveness and determinism that would go against the basic intention of the meta-
physics of freedom in the process view. While all acts are grounded in God's primary acts, that is, because they are offered to creatures as ideals, the concrete doing of the acts, of making decisions, is the free act of creatures—limited, to be sure, within the range of the possibilities determined by the divine primary action.

This thesis may be reinforced and clarified by seeking to locate that one, unique, concrete act of God: the event of Jesus Christ. This thesis goes beyond Hartshorne, but it has been argued by Ogden and Griffin that there can be unique acts of God only when God's aims for creatures are responded to fully and positively by creatures. Only in the case of Jesus, however, has this been accomplished, and here alone has God's act and man's act coincided completely. Analogously, a man's decisive act may be defined as one in which his body responds to his psyche's aims for it in a complete and positive manner. Accordingly, God's ideals are not completely effective unless the creature accepts them fully. Only Jesus has done this: the rest of creation has disobeyed, to some extent, the ideal aims for it.

In light of this thesis, which has been based on the analyses of Ogden and Griffin, Hartshorne's position may be clarified, and to it, more directly, we turn.

Hartshorne has argued, to be sure, that the freedom of both God and man is maintained by his teaching. Both God and man have a certain freedom with respect to the other. Thus, while God's Abstract Nature is independent of all things, His Concrete Nature is contingent
and dependent on the world -- though to be sure He is dependent on there being some world and not just this particular world. He argues that "since the essence of God is compatible with any possible universe, we can be allowed some power of decision, as between possibilities, without infringing the absolute independence of God in his essential character or personality" (DR 89). He argues, further, that it is meaningless to say that God is free to be without a world, since rather, freedom would imply some real choice: "It is a genuine enough freedom to have options between worlds without having an option between world and no world. It is freedom to be able to do this or that, but not freedom to have no options". 69 God's Concrete Nature contains all that is actual, but He does not simply determine all that is actual, for any number of possibilities may be freely actualized by creatures. God's freedom is maintained in this teaching, since "freedom means a personal character with which alternative concrete experiences or states are compatible", those actualized by creatures (DR 89). To this, Hartshorne immediately adds that while the actual states of deity are determined partly by creaturely acts, "this is simply the social character of the divine self-decision" (DR 89); that is, the actualization of God's primary acts of self-constitution wherein aims are given to creatures. Now, while this may perhaps be misunderstood,

69 Charles Hartshorne, "The Significance of Man in the Life of God", 43.
that is, as implying a divine determinism or coercion, this inference may be tempered by interpreting it in the light of Ogden’s distinction between the two senses of acts, or decisions: while all acts are grounded in God, and as such are the "social character of the divine self-decision", not all acts fully correspond to God’s aims for them, but rather, deviate from the ideal -- always within the range of freedom permitted by the limits imposed by the divine primary act (cf. DR 89). There is a sense in which all acts are God’s acts, since they are grounded in His ideals (and, as such, since they are confined to the limits imposed by God); and yet, there is another sense in which man’s acts deviate from the divine ideals, and for which God is, accordingly, not to be held responsible. God is not simply coercive: creaturely acts (save those of Jesus) deviate from their ideal aim to some degree, and in this way they reveal their freedom vis-à-vis the divine causal lure.

Now, while this would seem to be the conclusion of Hartshorne’s position -- though, granted, he never explicitly states it as such -- it may be too extreme for him. I am not sure whether he would allow that there are no creaturely acts (other than that of Jesus) in which the divine aim is fully actualized. The analogy to human acts with respect to the human psyche would imply that some of our ideals (our primary acts) are in fact fully enacted by our bodies (our outward, secondary acts). And as such, can not it be assumed that creatures fully enact some of God’s primary ideals? Here the analogy,
does not apply directly: no creatures can fully actualize the divine ideal for it: man's creative capacity is limited and finite. And, further, it may be argued that since not even God knows the future beyond a mere outline, there is no one specific ideal which could be understood by God to be the best for creaturely actualization.

In summary then: Hartshorne has sought to show that "actualities can be contained in other actualities and yet retain their own self-decisions" (WP 72). Each act is partly determined, limited, and partly freely creative. The whole, which is God, is constituted in part by the self-decided acts of its parts, which are the world of creatures. While the influence of the whole is great and dominant, Hartshorne insists that "God appropriates the actions, the decisions, of others, he does not decide just what they are to be....God's influence upon others is not decisive to the last degree of determination" (WP 72). This is what is meant by Whitehead's doctrine that creativity is wider than God (cf. WP 73). All acts are grounded in God's aims, but not all are the concrete embodiment of those aims.

The key to theodicy is, according to this logic, that man has decision-making power and that God simply does not make all decisions:
"Every creature decides something that God leaves undecided". 70

The question yet to be more fully discussed is whether or not God's direct and immediate knowledge and control over creatures is not

such that His volitions -- if not solely coercive or determinative --
exert a highly persuasive lure, some of which are (relatively) more
effective. Thus, for example, it will be argued that, as world-Mind,
God takes full advantage of His knowledge and control of creatures
such that he offers them lures which are such that they are uncon-
sciously prehended (as well as consciously accepted or rejected),
or that they are such that it seems difficult to imagine that creatures
would reject them (since they are constituted by what we most want
and need at any particular impasse). We turn, then, to some of the
implications of Hartshorne's organic-social analogy, together with
other basic aspects of his thought relevant to the issue at stake
in this chapter.
4. Divine Influence in Perceptions

The key to Hartshorne's teaching regarding the divine causal influence is, I believe, his view that since God is not wholly absolute and immutable, but rather is dipolar (with an absolute and concrete nature), He responds to each individual creature, and is directly and immediately involved in the processes of the world. And, further, creatures are aware of this divine involvement (variously, according to the level of mental sophistication): every creature has some sense of God's causal influence, though, to be sure, even on the highest level of creaturely existence -- that of man -- this awareness is "dim". 71 In other words, we may have an innate idea of God, but this does not imply that the idea must be "clear and distinct" (cf. CSPM 31-32 ff.). For man, to be sure, God is not to be seen as just another element in the causal nexus which contributes to the formation of a new experience; rather, He is "supremely influential". He is so since "he is the supreme actuality, supremely beautiful and attractive" (PSG 274). We are genuinely inspired by this divine influence; yet, it is we, in fact, who "make ourselves, utilizing His beauty as inspiration" (PSG 275). This experience of God is direct in man, in the sense that we respond to value, goodness,

and beauty — all of which God represents. God is influential, according to this logic, because He "offers to each creature what the creature most wants or appreciates in the way of intrinsic value. In short, the flat is uniquely eloquent and appealing"; "God can 'speak' to creatures so eloquently, beautifully, wisely, and hence relevantly to their natures that they cannot, except within narrow limits, even wish not to respond". 72 God is, then, a stimulus to which creatures respond; He is the eminent factor in the causal nexus from which new creaturely experiences arise. Hartshorne has referred to divine power in this way; that is, in terms of its being a stimulus-response mechanism: God is the lure, the stimulus to which we respond via our perceptions of Him. 73

It is Hartshorne's contention, to be sure, that in spite of the fact that the divine influence as an element in the causal nexus is a predominant force, it is never simply determinative of the creaturely experiences. As Hartshorne puts it: "Enslavement, even to the divine, cannot be absolute — not only because the divine is generous, but because power means influence of one free act upon another free act


73 Cf. Charles Hartshorne, "Religion in Process Philosophy", 262. Hartshorne refers to power also in terms of memory; this aspect of the causal influence of creatures will be discussed in the following section.
(or else we do not know wherein power consists.)" 74 This thesis must be examined now in order to determine the extent of human freedom which is possible vis-à-vis the divine causal influence as the preeminent element of our perceptions of the causal nexus, according to Hartshorne's view.

Hartshorne's organic-social analogy implies, as noted above, that God is immanent (note: He is also transcendent: cf. "Chapter Two"); the world is God's body, and He, its Mind. We creatures have, accordingly, an immediate awareness of God and He of us, though to be sure, His knowledge and Power is eminent while ours is finite and imperfect. All creatures have some awareness of God, of His influence, though as noted above, even in the highest of creatures -- man -- this awareness is far from "clear and distinct". Lower levels of creatures have correspondingly less awareness, and consequently it can be held that while there is never simply a divine determinism, the divine influence upon lower levels of life is greater than that upon man. Hartshorne explains: "Since they [the lower creatures] lack the power of thought, save on some minimal level, there is very little they can do with a [divine] suggestion, if they feel it at all, except to act in accordance with it". 75 One may look upon the divine influence on sub-human levels,

75 Charles Hartshorne, "Religion in Process Philosophy", 258.
it would seem, so as to acknowledge that they are all but coerced by the divine suggestion, such that there is little that they can do but to accept it (unconsciously, or in using whatever minimal consciousness they might, variously, have). Not only God, in fact, but the entire causal nexus bears down upon the present moment of creatures in the sub-human levels, allowing little freedom for creative variation.

It is here, as Hartshorne notes, that the illusion to the feeling of there being an absolute law seems strong, with God (and the past nexus) simply directing the present, with very little room for variation. 76

On higher levels, to be sure, there is more mental development and, consequently, more ability for free creativity vis-à-vis the content of the perceptions of God and of the past causal nexus. 77

But, the exact workings of this divine lure via human perception must be clearly defined, and the range of freedom in the human response to it must be made clear. To this issue we now turn; it is one in which Hartshorne has been insufficiently clear.

On all levels of creaturely existence, the divine influence operates as a stimulus to which we respond. With respect to the human level, we may note, our awareness of God "need not be conscious

---

76 Hartshorne recently wrote: "On very low levels there is little creaturely creativity, so the possible responses vary only trivially from one another. So here the illusion of absolute order easily arises" (letter to the author, 1974).

77 Here, "the possible responses differ much more widely and significantly" (letter to the author, 1974). See also, "Religion in Process Philosophy", passim.
In the sense of being introspectively evident”, 78 much in the same way, analogously, as immediate memories are not really conscious yet, nevertheless, they influence us directly, immediately. It is in this sense that the divine lure is "irresistible" (WP 164). If we object that we may be aware of God's ideal for us, and yet disobey it (as is evidenced by the great deluge of moral evil in the world), Hartshorne would agree; and yet, he would point out that there must be "some mode of divine power which cannot simply be disregarded”. 79 God controls us by inspiring us: creatures "directly feel his worshipful excellence and beauty, and this inspires and influences them"; God's influence is one of "appeal, attractiveness, or 'charm', acting either directly or indirectly". 80 The divine lure, we are told, is very efficacious. Some aspects of it cannot be disregarded and while there is a range of creaturely freedom in response to it, this freedom is often (indeed, almost always) slight. There is, then, this element of immense influence (which approaches coerciveness) in the divine lure: it is the eminent factor in the causal nexus of creaturely perceptions, and is appropriated in part unconsciously, irresistibly, such that it cannot be disregarded.

---

78 Charles Hartshorne, "Religion in Process Philosophy", 257.
If we ask: "Why is the divine fiat so efficacious?", Hartshorne replies, as noted above: "Because it offers to each creature what the creature most wants or appreciates in the way of intrinsic value. In short, the fiat is uniquely eloquent and appealing". 81 Creatures, then, are lured by God via His offering to them that which they find most appealing. Now, this would seem to be a highly persuasive lure, indeed approaching a coerciveness 82 -- in the sense that no one is likely to reject that which is offered if it constitutes, in fact, what is most appealing to him. It may be granted that there may be some element of freedom in the response, for example, since there are countless ways in which the creature is able to actualize the divine ideal; and yet, that God sets these very real limits to that action is to be noted. We are lured by God, as Hartshorne says, in such a way that what we need most is offered to us. We may actualize this ideal within the range of "real possibilities" which the divine lure contains. But note: this thesis does not imply that God simply lures us toward whatever we most want, be it good or evil: rather, Hartshorne's position is that He offers us what we most want (and


82 Note that to refer to the divine lure as "coercive" because it is very "persuasive" may seem paradoxical, but this is so only because the terms have various levels of meaning which are glossed over by Hartshorne's reference to the divine lure as being solely persuasive. Here Hartshorne is cryptic and insufficiently clear.
need) by way of intrinsic value! And, as he argues, we have enough sense, in principle at least, to know what is good and what is not good for us, and we know that God offers us only what is best for us, at each moment. That is why, according to Hartshorne, He is so effective.

But God is effective also because His lure is so subtly appropriated by us. It may be, in some aspects, apprehended unconsciously, as noted above, so that it becomes part of our being without our even knowing it. There is, further, this factor, not already noted: God alters us, Hartshorne argues, by altering Himself, since a "mind is influenced by what it knows, by its objects" (DR 139). Indeed, "to alter us he has only to alter himself. God's unique power over us is his partly self-determined being as our inclusive object of awareness" (DR 139). Now, I am arguing that there is an element in this divine causal influence which may be said to approach a coerciveness. Hartshorne argues: "as this object [of our awareness -- God] changes, we are compelled to change in response" (DR 139). God rules the world, we are told,

...by presenting himself as essential object, so characterized as to weigh the possibilities of response in the desired object. This divine method of world control is called "persuasion", by Whitehead and it is one of the greatest of all metaphysical discoveries....it is by molding himself that God molds us, by presenting at each moment a partly new ideal or order of

preference which our unself-conscious awareness takes as object, and thus renders influential upon our entire activity (DR 142).

While, however, this may imply an element of coerciveness, or at least that there are aspects of the divine action toward us which are so designed that His ideals are greatly influential, it would not appear to be a complete coerciveness. Thus, for example, while it is the case that "God can speak to creatures so eloquently, beautifully, wisely, and hence relevant to their natures that they cannot...even wish not to respond", the "exact manner of this response cannot possibly be compelled or determined by God" (DR 139). Indeed, "No stimulus can absolutely determine a response". 84 The situation is analogous, Hartshorne suggests, to a man's speaking to his brain cells in order to enact some muscular activity: the muscles are not simply coerced into acting, but are "charmed" into acting. Yet, they "cannot choose but hear" -- implying, I would suggest, the coercive element. 85 And, while this is not, it would seem, a complete coerciveness, it is equally -- I am arguing -- not indeed a mere persuasiveness wherein all of the factors are persuasive in the same sense: there is this


divergence of effectiveness by the divine agency, some of it being more effective than others. The stimulus "determines the range of possible or probable responses. God determines what creatures can do, but only they determine what they do do". 86 The former implies a coerciveness in that it sets the limits for the free action which can take place; the latter is more clearly a persuasiveness, since God must persuade creatures to act for the best within the limits He has set. That we acknowledge these limits unconsciously can be seen in Hartshorne's reply to the question as to why we accept the divine persuasive influence; he contends that we do so since otherwise "we should have no basic structure or meaning to our experience or thought. In the depths of consciousness [the sub-conscious, the unconscious?] we feel and accept the divine ordering without which there could be nothing significant or definite. The worst sinner still does this in his imperfect way". 87 Yet, to be sure, while each creature has some level of awareness of God, consciously and/or unconsciously, each creature responds to the divine lure imperfectly, since his awareness of God is imperfect. A's response to object B, which is the lure, cannot be merely B, but is always more than just A. There is "an infinity of ways in which beings whose mode of knowing


87 Charles Hartshorne, "A New Look at the Problem of Evil", 211.
is imperfect or inadequate can respond to an object. There is always a variety of ways of falling short of perfection and, therefore, the object cannot of itself determine the imperfect response" (DR 140). His contention is that while God's omniscience can know and hence offer to us what we most desire by way of value, there is for the creature an incomplete and indistinct awareness of the divine aim, and accordingly, it cannot be responded to perfectly. Indeed, even if it were completely distinct, the subject of the awareness would not simply experience the object, but would rather experience his own feelings of the object, and thus, the subject is always more than the object-stimulus.

Hartshorne, further, puts forth this argument against a theory of divine determinism: contemporaries do not cancel out each others' freedom, for they are "mutually determining, neither preceding the other as premise" (DR 140). In the case, then, of man's experience and the divine appropriation of it as object, each is partly free in relation to the other. If, further, an experience precedes the divine knowing of it, then the divine as object for the next successive experience is not in the former as object for the subject (cf. DR 142). Our decisions influence God, who then influences us. But God's ideal for us at any moment does not include the subject's act until that act is done. God does influence us in each moment; but His ideal is cognizant of the acts that we and others have accomplished.

Now, while Hartshorne's view is clearly that there is no divine determinism of events, but that rather God is confined to persuasive
lures, I have suggested that there is, rather, a range of divine causal effectiveness, such that some of it is more effective than others. The problem, however, has been to define clearly this range of causal effectiveness. It would seem, as I have argued, that there is an aspect of coerciveness in the divine causative influence upon creatures since there are aspects of the divine lure which are appropriated by man unconsciously, irresistibly, etc. And while it is granted that there can never be a complete causal determinism of the newly becoming subject by the past causal nexus nor by God’s lure, there are — as I am arguing — aspects of this causative influence which are more effective than others, in that there is less opportunity for the subject to act other than in accord with those aspects of the causal data.

To this extent, sub-human beings would seem to be more determined by the divine lure than man is, for only man is consciously able to reject aspects of the divine lure. That sub-human forms of life are not simply coerced by God, however, is implied by Hartshorne’s psychicalist logic whereby all levels of beings are seen to have some sentience. It is implied also by his relative deterministic logic whereby all creatures are seen to have some (varying) aspect of spontaneity and freedom. Those aspects of the divine lure, nevertheless, which are unconsciously apprehended by sub-human creatures (and indeed by man himself) would appear to be more effective (and thus, permit less creaturely freedom in response) than those aspects of the lure which are apprehended consciously by man (and which, as such, can be either
accepted or rejected). Here Hartshorne is unclear. He argues, for example that

...so far as the human self-conscious individual is concerned, what he cannot bring into consciousness is not really "his" in the full sense, so that, granted that my experiences grasp God himself, for example, it does not follow that I consciously possess him as constituent of myself. 88

I would argue, rather, that those aspects of the divine lure which are not consciously prehended are, rather, more effective than those consciously prehended, for creatures have less freedom with respect to the former. The fact that we may not consciously prehend God's lure is not the issue: the issue is whether our unconscious prehension of the lure implies that it has become part of our being. I am arguing that it has indeed become such. For, while we do not possess God's lure "in the full sense", consciously, sub-human lives do not have the conscious ability that humans do: but, yet, they do prehend the lure and are greatly affected by it. It is likewise the case with the unconscious prehension of aspects of the lure by man.

Now, the implications of this thesis for the question of man's freedom vis-à-vis God's causal agency are rather complex. Yet, in short, it can be argued that since man's freedom is somewhat limited and restricted by (the causal nexus and by) God's lure, man cannot be said to be solely responsible for the goods and evils he creates.

88 Charles Hartshorne, "The Structure of Givenness", 34.
Rather, the agency and responsibility of man is tempered somewhat by the causal influences. Thus, while Hartshorne argues that there is an element of freedom in every creaturely act -- vis-à-vis (the past world and) God's influence -- there is, as I am arguing, also an aspect of causal coerciveness, since there are aspects of the causal data (that is, of God's lure and the past nexus) that the becoming subject is simply little able to refuse, nor not appropriate. If "coerciveness" here is too strong a word, it may be rephrased to argue that there are aspects of the causal data which are more effective than others. Once this is granted, there arises immediately the question of determining the exact extent (as far as is possible) of God's agency and responsibility with respect to the good and evil which is created in the world. There is, I would argue, little hope in understanding the subtle and complex workings of divine and human agency with respect to individual human acts, yet certain general theories may be suggested, based on the above analysis of Hartshorne's view.

I have argued, for example, that man is never solely responsible for his actions, since there are aspects (of the causal nexus and) of the divine lure which are appropriated by man without his conscious consent, and indeed others which, while consciously appropriated, are such that they can hardly be rejected (for they are constituted by God to lure us to that which we most need). Thus, while there may be always some element of creative freedom in man, there is also to be acknowledged the fact that there is a range of effectiveness by the
causal data. Man is free and morally responsible with respect to those aspects of the data which he has prehended consciously (though he is less free with respect to the divine lure which is so constituted to lure him to what he most needs), while he is not as free and responsible with respect to those aspects of the data which he appropriates without his conscious consent.

One important implication of this thesis (to be discussed in detail in the following chapter) is that God's causal influence is such that it does not permit man to abuse his freedom to the extent that that very freedom is put in jeopardy. God simply does not allow creaturely freedom to produce so much evil as to destroy the balance of order over chaos in the world. Rather, He directs the creative process to the extent that there is a surplus, a balance, of good. God cannot permit man to create an overbalance of evil, for if this were the case, the world would dissolve via the chaos of incompatible and conflicting acts of men (and of all creatures). Man has freedom, then, only within these limits. And, as such, we may conclude that while God may exert persuasive influence in luring man to the best acts within the limits of freedom, He would seem to be more effective to the extent that He cannot permit man to act in such a way as to create an overbalance of evil. "Process would come to an end if limits were not imposed upon the development of incompatible lines of process" (WP 164). God permits freedom in man only to the extent that there is ensured a surplus of good over evil. Man's evil acts, though regret-
table and wasteful of the potentiality of the world, are tolerated by God only to the extent that they do not endanger the very possibility of there being a world, rather than hopeless chaos. To ensure this, God must, at times, exert a causal lure which is more effective than at other times (though, note: rather than implying that the distinction is temporal, it would seem to be qualitative: At every stage God's ideals for us are such that there are varying aspects of effectiveness contained therein, and correspondingly varying abilities in the creaturely freedom in response).

Now, this would seem to take some of the sting out of evil, since it suggests that God will not permit more evil than the world can accommodate. Man has a very real freedom of spontaneity in each moment of the creative process, and yet, this freedom is kept within tolerable limits by God. Evil is still evil; it is always to be seen as negative and wasteful (as will be discussed in detail in "Chapter Five"), and yet, we may assume that what evil there is has been tolerated by God, and this being the case, we can assume that the evil is never predominant over the good.

Note that while this thesis is put forth as the logical conclusion of the issues discussed in this section, it is important to see that Hartshorne has not been quite so clear on these issues as my analysis suggests. Indeed, Hartshorne denies that there is any coerciveness exercised by God, that He acts solely persuasively. But, as I am arguing, if this were the case, he could not explain the limiting
aspects of the divine agency which keep man's agency in control. In short, Hartshorne has not defined clearly enough this divine causal agency, nor considered its varying range of effectiveness. My analysis, accordingly, seeks to elaborate upon this important issue, and in doing so, to draw out more adequately and coherently the implications of Hartshorne's basic line of argumentation; that is, where Hartshorne has not always satisfactorily done so.
5. Divine Influence in Memory

The thesis of this chapter, that there is a varying range of effectiveness of the divine causal agency, may be elucidated by considering Hartshorne's understanding of the causal influence of memory. This latter theme is related closely to that of the preceding section, for Hartshorne has defined causal influence not only as perception but as memory. 89 Both forms of influence refer to the past causal data, since "all material which comes into 'the mind'...is from the past rather than the present....Thus memory and perception are basically alike". 90 To be sure, what we remember is our own past states of mind, while what we perceive is our own bodily members and the environment, the more "impersonal" world external to our minds (cf. CSPM 91, 218). Memory is "personal perception": perception, "nonpersonal memory". 91

The perception and memory of past data exert causal influence upon the present subject: "Experience is influenced by what it remembers of the past, and it is...the idea of memory which explains influence,


90 Charles Hartshorne, "Mind as Memory and Creative Love", 443.

91 Charles Hartshorne, "Mind as Memory and Creative Love", 444.
not vice versa"; indeed, "memory in the primary Bergsonian-
Whiteheadian sense...[implies a] direct possession of the past in and
by the present". In short:

To remember is to be influenced by what one
remembers. Memory is an effect or it is
nothing....we have direct awareness in immed-
iate memory of our own past experience....The
awareness need not be conscious in the sense
of being introspectively evident. Immediate
memory is mostly not conscious in this sense.
I begin a sentence, and without saying to
myself that I have begun it, I yet feel this
beginning so that I am able to go on
appropriately. 94

Our memories, then, are directly and immediately causally influential,
and in a way which need not be conscious. 95

Now, Hartshorne has made an interesting comparison between the
influence of memory on the present subject and God's influence on it:

How then does God influence us? If we can
have direct awareness of the divine fiat,
as we have direct awareness in immediate
memory of our own past experience, then this
fist will influence us. The awareness need
not be conscious in the sense of being intros-
pectively evident....In such fashion we
must be supposed to feel the divine fist,
without telling ourselves, or even being able
to tell ourselves, that and what we feel. 95

95 Charles Hartshorne, "Religion in Process Philosophy", 257.
It may be inferred here that God's causal influence, like that of our memory's, is direct and immediate, and as such, greatly effective. And, indeed, this thesis is substantiated by Hartshorne's organic-social analogy: as world mind, God influences the world, His bodily parts, as Mind over minds. Now, our experiences of the past data, that is, via perception and memory, may be seen, in one important sense, to be constituted not merely by the past world, but by "God's experience of that past world". As world-Mind, He experiences our experiences as constituents of His body, and we in turn experience the world as part of the divine experience. In other words, what we perceive and remember is not just the past data of the world, but God's experience of that data; the implication here is that God influences us in this most direct and immediate way -- not only in a way analogous to that by which our memories influence us, but also via those very memories!

Hartshorne argues, to be sure, that no causal data can be simply coercive or determinative of the present experience:

Mind, being essentially memory, is bound to be influenced by the past, for to be aware of the past, is to be influenced by it. Thus, one has in the idea of mind a clue to "causal efficacy." But one also has a clue to the limits of causality. The datum of memory comes from the past. But the past did not remember itself;

---

96 This point was made by Hartshorne in private conversations with the author in 1975. It is not made so explicitly in his writings, yet it is clearly implied there, especially in the context of his organic-social analogy.
the memory is an addition to the datum. Every experience is insofar a creation. 97

As is the case with all causal data, the data of memory cannot dictate their own use. There is, then, always room for free creativity. And this is so, furthermore, not only because of the element of spontaneity or freedom in every subject, but because the data of memory (and perception) are inadequately grasped. With respect to the latter, Hartshorne writes:

Mistakes of memory, or of perception, with respect to immediately past and spatially near objects are all mistakes of evaluation of the given, involving, in human beings, some element of verbalization, or other mode of symbolization. By the time we have said or judged what we remember or perceive, we must have run various risks of error, in the fallible process of formulating or interpreting. But something must be there to evaluate, or there cannot even be erroneous evaluation; and the theory that we "experience only our own mental states" is really the contention that we evaluate but our own evaluations of our own evaluations — of what? 98

Now, by this I infer that it is via mistakes of memory that Hartshorne locates one important aspect of man's freedom, for man cannot be determined or coerced by data if he cannot clearly or distinctly understand, interpret, or evaluate the data. This is consistent with the view attributed to Hartshorne (above, see "Section Three") that man's freedom may be located in the fact that he does not know fully or

97 Charles Hartshorne, "Mind as Memory and Creative Love", 459.

perfectly the elements in the causal data. If this is, in fact, Hartshorne's position, however, there would seem to be some problem here, for this thesis does not square with another for which I have been arguing; namely that our apprehensions of the causal data (of God and the past nexus) greatly effect us in both conscious and unconscious ways, the latter permitting relatively less freedom since the lure is appropriated by the subject without his conscious approval. This, as I have argued, may be inferred from Hartshorne's writings, though he has not explicitly stated it as such. And yet, Hartshorne seems to want to argue also that unless the divine lure (or causal data of the past world) is apprehended consciously, and as such, understood, interpreted and evaluated, it has little effect on us because, quite simply, it remains external to us. But this does not cohere with the fact that the divine lure is, in certain of its aspects, apprehended unconsciously by man (and indeed, by unconsciously aware sub-humans); or that the lure is often consciously perceived, yet irresistible, since it offers us what we most desire; or that the lure may coercively restrict certain "incompatible lines of process" (WP 164). In these situations creaturely freedom is greatly affected by the divine lure in spite of the fact that man does not have the ability to fully consciously -- comprehend the lure (or perhaps, to resist it).

This point may be illuminated by the following consideration wherein Hartshorne suggests that while the past data can be disobeyed, they cannot be disregarded.
is it not possible to be aware of a fiat without obeying it? Certainly the idea of disobedience to divine fiats is not without its standing in religion! On the other hand, there must be some mode of divine power which cannot simply be disregarded. Can the lower animals disobey God? His fiat concerns them too.

Let us recall that to disobey is not the same as to disregard. The disobedient is not uninfluenced by the command he refuses to accept; for it puts him in a state of rebellion or resistance to suggestion which is not the same as the state of simple unawareness of the suggestion. As for the lower animals, they have no great problem here. Since they lack the power of thought, save on some minimal level, there is very little they can do with a suggestion, if they feel it at all, except to act in accordance with it. ⁹⁹

The implication of this seems to be that while lower animals cannot consciously disregard or disobey the divine fiat, man can consciously disobey it, though he cannot disregard it. Now, if this is Hartshorne's position, then we may suggest that those aspects of the data which man cannot disregard are appropriated by man either consciously or unconsciously. But this thesis is not made explicit by Hartshorne, and indeed the issue is confused by him, particularly by the implication (noted above) that the lure must be consciously prehended for it to be effective. This clearly is not the case with respect to sub-humans who lack man's fully developed conscious awareness; nor indeed is this coherent with the thesis (argued above) that

there are aspects of the divine lure which are unconsciously appropriated by man. Hartshorne confuses this thesis by implying that it is only animals which cannot disregard the divine lure since they cannot consciously comprehend (and hence consciously accept or reject) that lure. But rather, as I have argued, there are aspects of the lure which man cannot consciously accept or reject. These aspects are highly influential, and exert more causal effectiveness, and hence permit less freedom in response, than other aspects of the lure.

There are, in sum, aspects of the divine lure with respect to which man has, relatively, less freedom than he does with respect to other aspects of the lure. Operating through both our perceptions and memories, God exerts a highly effective and direct influence, and indeed, one which is to be seen as exerting a varying range of effectiveness.

The issue to be faced, now, is that of more clearly defining how God operates as causal lure, specifically with respect to His final and efficient causality, and to determine, correspondingly, the range and extent of man's freedom and responsibility in response, according to Hartshorne's view.

To this issue we turn.
6. Hartshorne's Doctrine of Possibility

The issue of determining more precisely the range and extent of the interrelationship of divine and human agency may be elucidated further by reconstructing and critically assessing Hartshorne's understanding of the divine final and efficient causality in the world. This issue is of particular importance not only in illuminating the basic issue of this chapter but in light of a recent critique by one of the most prominent of contemporary process philosophers, Lewis Ford. Ford argues that Hartshorne's doctrine of possibility makes divine persuasive influence via final causality unavailable to Hartshorne's God. For, as Ford contends, if Hartshorne's God does not have available to Him specific eternal objects -- Hartshorne rejects this Whiteheadian theory -- then there can be no specific, eternally distinct ideals from which God selects the final causes for concrecing creatures as their initial subjective aims. Ford contends that for Hartshorne "possibility is simply the indeterminate potentiality of the past bearing on an indicated spatio-temporal region in the future", and as such, "there can be no definite formal possibilities for God to evaluate". Indeed, for Hartshorne, "God is not needed for the purpose of supplying the world with the formal possibilities which can order this indeterminate potentiality". 100

100 L. S. Ford, TPP, 78.
These are serious charges, for at stake here is the very viability of Hartshorne's argument that God exerts causal influence upon creatures via the final causality of initial aims. And indeed, the issue is all the more important if, as Ford argues, the theory of the initial aim is the distinctive mark of Whitehead's metaphysics, since it enables Whitehead alone (with the possible exception of Sartre) to take seriously the origin of subjectivity, and also of God's role there-in. Ford's contention is that while Hartshorne can account for the material causality of the past upon a becoming subject, he has not been able to account for the divine formal causality upon that creature. It is, however, the divine formal causation which makes the actualization possible; that is, since besides the material causality of the past, there must be some "formal pattern" in the emergence of the actual. Without this formal cause, self-creativity has no aim, and consequently amounts to an "illegitimate appeal" to self-creativity alone as the explanation of new actualizations. Thus, Hartshorne's

101 Cf. L. S. Ford, TPP, 80.

102 Ford prefers to speak in terms of the "formal" causality of God and of the "material" causality of the past world, while Hartshorne -- we must note -- prefers the other Aristotelian terms, "final" and "efficient" causality, respectively. For our present purposes, the sets of terms may be considered as synonymous.

103 L. S. Ford, TPP, 65.

104 L. S. Ford, TPP, 64.
account "slights" the divine formal causality in creaturely becomings. 105

For Hartshorne, "what is possible next is simply what is compatible with what has happened up to now" (CPM 68); yet, as Ford argues, "The possible is not merely compatible with the past out of which it grows, but provides the formal pattern for the emergence of the actual". 106 What is, in fact, possible at any moment depends, as Hartshorne holds, on the past world at that moment — and this is the material cause of the new experience; yet it also depends, as Ford argues, upon some eternal object as the formal cause. Such formal causality is, however, unavailable to Hartshorne's God. 107

The basic consequence of Ford's argument against Hartshorne's rejection of eternal objects is this: Hartshorne's God does not have available to Him Whitehead's doctrine of divine persuasive power, nor of divine final causality, because, according to Ford, if the doctrine of eternal objects is rejected, God then has no ideals from which to choose, nor to offer to becoming creatures as their initial aims, as their final causes. Along the same line of criticism, D. D. Baldwin, in a recently completed dissertation, argues that if there are no definite eternal objects, then there would be nothing to guide God

105 L. S. Ford, TPP, 65.

106 L. S. Ford, TPP, 62.

107 For the details of Ford's argument, see TPP, 58-65.
in His Primordial Nature so that "he would in his chance action be as
subject to the creation of discordant evil as occasions in the world;
in short, that neither God nor man would have guidelines or standards
for further creations. 108

These criticisms, which favour Whitehead's version of possibility
over Hartshorne's, are, however, not necessarily fatal to Hartshorne's
position. For indeed, his position has not been adequately reconstructed --
in my opinion -- and hence, it may seem susceptible to these criticisms
where in fact it is not. I will argue, then, that in spite of these critic-
isms, Hartshorne's doctrine of possibility is coherent with a divine
persuasive action, whereby final causes are given to concrescing creatures.
I will argue, for example, that Hartshorne's alternative to there being
strictly definite eternal objects is not, as is most often assumed by
his critics, a merely random and unstructured continuum, but rather, a
continuum with some real order, so that what is offered by God to be-
coming entities as their aims is not mere randomness but rather a range
of possibilities so ordered by God that it constitutes the best possible
ideals for the moment. There is no need for these possibilities to be
purely definite and specific; there is required only that they not be mere
randomness. There must be some probability-range: all possibilities
cannot be merely equally applicable to the present situation, or man

108 D. D. Baldwin, "A Whiteheadian Solution to the Problem of
Evil", dissertation for Claremont Graduate School, 1975, 307. Baldwin,
in fact, raises seven distinct criticisms of Hartshorne's position, all
of which, he contends, arise because of Hartshorne's rejection of
Whitehead's doctrine of eternal objects: 290-312.
(and God) would have no basis for their choice of ideals; and as such, all choice would be merely chaotic spontaneity and randomness. The interpretation of Hartshorne's position to be argued here, then, is that there is always some element of order or structure in the continuum, and correspondingly, in the ideals which are offered to each successively becoming subject, and as such, that there is available to God a persuasive activity and final causality.

Hartshorne has long argued that Whitehead's doctrine of eternal objects is "obscure, if not definitely erroneous" (WP 31). He has contended that Whitehead's use of the term, "eternal object", rather than the more conventional term, "universal", dangerously obscures the distinction which must be made between eternal universals and objective universals. The former refer to universals which are absolutely time-dependent and relevant to all conceivable stages of the cosmic process, while the latter refer to universals which are "identical in various spatio-temporally distinct instances" (CSPM 58). Hartshorne argues that both types of universals must be affirmed, that "Time-independence may have relative as well as absolute forms. There may be emergent as well as eternal universals" (CSPM 58). Whitehead's failure to take this adequately into account leads to a particular aspect of Platonism which Hartshorne strongly rejects. Following Peirce rather, he argues that "all specific qualities, i.e., those of which there can be negative instances in experience, are emergent, and that only the metaphysical universals are eternal" (CSPM 59). There is, he contends,
only one metaphysical universal (eternal object) — "God's fixed essence", which constitutes a "continuum of possible states of divine experience". From this continuum, specific qualities emerge as novel creations, as "sub-divisions" of the more general, non-specific universality of the continuum (cf. WP 95). There are no definite possibilities, nor distinct eternal objects as such, but only the general continuum of possibilities. The specific qualities are not definite before they emerge, but rather, become definite only as they are actualized, as they are made determinate.

Hartshorne argues that Whitehead's doctrine of eternal objects jeopardizes the reality of creation and of time, for if there are eternal possibilities that are definite, some of which are selected and actualized by creatures, then "actualization is thereby reduced to a mere shuffling (Whitehead's "selection" is all too suggestive of this view) of primordial qualitative factors. In short, creation in the proper sense is denied and with it the nature of time" (WP 32). Whitehead's view of eternal objects is "too Platonic" in that it fails to do justice to the truth that creation is the "production of new images", and "not the mere actualization of eternal patterns" (WP 187). If there are definite eternal possibilities, then actualization would accomplish nothing. There must, accordingly, be a "very clear division of essences into eternal and emergent" (WP 33). Specific qualities emerge in time as

definite, as determinate, where there was only a general universal continuum of possibility. Actualization, then, adds to this continuum a unique and particular quality, a definiteness; alternatively, "If all the 'forms of definiteness,' each perfectly definite in itself, are eternally given to God, it is not altogether clear...what actualization accomplishes" (WP 95). Each moment in time adds some definiteness of qualities. Specific qualities are not eternally definite as possibilities, and therefore, the idea of "eternal species" must be eliminated, while "retaining that of eternal highest genera, including the genus of specificity as such" (WP 97). There are eternal species, but each specific actualization of a species is unique, and is more than the mere species, since it adds definiteness to some generality. The actualization is accomplished by the free self-creativity of finite creatures.

There is no need for the qualities which are actualized to be eternally definite, but rather, "The only definiteness a particular instance of creative experience presupposes is that of previous experiences, including divine experiences, it may be" (CSPM 62). The past alone is definite, determinate: the future "is to be determined within the limits of causal possibility" (CSPM 64). These limits refer to the possibilities implicit in past actualizations (and to God's limitation, when such is needed to control chaotic lines of development, as discussed above). Against Santayana, who holds that there could be no choice between alternatives if there were no eternally distinct
possibilities, Hartshorne argues that there is a range of general possibility inherent in past determinates as determinables of which endless sub-divisions may be actualized (cf. WP 96). 110 Possibility, choice, "need not operate among eternal possibilities exclusively, but can involve those determinations of the ultimate determinables which have already been achieved in the past" (WP 96). The causal conditions of the past, then, limit what is possible, though, to be sure, "what is done is always more determinate than merely what can be done. The latter is a range of possibilities for action, not a particular act" (LP 231). Man's self-determinism, his freedom, "is the resolution of an uncertainty inherent in the totality of the influence to which the act is subject", that is, to

all the influences and stimuli, all "heredity and environment," all past experience, an indetermination removed only by the actuality (event, experience, act) itself, and always in such a fashion that other acts of determination would have been possible in view of the given total conditions up to the moment of the act (LP 231).

In this way, as Peters puts it, "the potential [is] a part of the actual". 111 What is possible next is simply what is compatible with what has happened up to now" (CSPM 68).


111 E. H. Peters, Hartshorne and Neoclassical Metaphysics, (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1970), 82 Cf. 86.
The issue, then, is this: does Hartshorne, in stressing the self-creativity of the present occasion in actualizing the potentialities of the past, make an illegitimate appeal to creativity so that, as Ford holds, something, (that is, particularity), is brought in from nowhere? And further, does his rejection of eternal objects lead to a negation of God's role as final (or formal) causation in supplying becoming occasions with their initial aims?

Now, Hartshorne has argued that God's causality is to be considered in terms of both efficient and final causality (as will be discussed in detail in the following section); prehensions -- both physical and hybrid -- convey the efficient causality of the past and of God. Physical prehensions convey the past world to present occasions (and this includes the indefinite potentials of the past which can be freely actualized); hybrid prehensions, conveyed also by efficient causality, contain God's aims, or in fact, his final causality. The question is, however, this: how can there be such final causality if there are no eternal objects from which God selects the aims which are then given to becoming creatures?

Hartshorne has argued that God's final causality is an indefinite purpose which can, as such, be made determinate in any number of ways, such that cannot be determined or precisely predicted. Final causality, then, does not determine the course of events, but is rather a general, universal continuum of determinables. "If there are purposes influencing events, they are efficacious universals; but no universal can determine
events in detail" (CSPM 67). The universals need not, however, be specific, for no specific result is envisaged by God. At most, He envisages a general outline of possibilities, so that His final causality may be described as that which furnishes a general purpose that some appropriate action ensue. That human creativity, however, does not simply render these indeterminables determinate without some further contribution by God is clearly implied in Hartshorne's teaching. For besides this general final causality which is indeterminate, fixed, and general, there is also a divine efficient causality which is expressed as God's total new being which takes into account every finite actualization that has occurred in the past. As such, it effects a more specific and relevant causality with respect to the situation and needs of the present moment. As new actualities are created, God's specific purpose is modified. This ever-changing purpose is conveyed to creatures through the efficient causality of the past, as the potentiality of the past; that is, as the indeterminate potentials of the past which, though indeterminate, are not completely random or chaotic, but rather effect a range of potentiality which is relevant to the specific moment. In this way, the creature is not the sole agent in the making definite of the potentiality of the past world, for God Himself plays a major role in the new, successive, creative acts. There is the element of divine final causality which, as final cause, ensures that some actualization does occur; and there is also an element of divine efficient causality which ensures that what is made definite by creaturely acts is not
simply the rendering specific of some aspect of an indefinite continuum of possibilities, but that the creativity of creatures is somewhat narrowed in possibilities (because the creature prehends not just the infinite potentiality but also the divine efficient causality which is somewhat more specific and which acts as a lure for the actualization of the most appropriate determinables). The divine lure is never that of a specific eternal ideal, for such does not exist, but rather is a range of possibilities which, if some are actualized, will produce the greatest good for the particular moment. Creaturally freedom, however, makes it a matter of chance or good luck that the best possibilities are indeed actualized. The chance element, to be sure, is not mere randomness (versus Baldwin), but is limited, directed, to some extent by the divine causality and by the past state of the world, both of which offer a certain range of potentiality as more alluring, more relevant, more probable, to be actualized somehow.

Thus far, I have argued against Ford's contention that Hartshorne's view implies that creaturally freedom is able to actualize potentials without help from any other principle; for indeed, Hartshorne's God operates through both final and efficient causation, and limits creaturally potentiality by the latter to a more or less limited range as the most relevant and alluring. I wish now to add some detail to this thesis,

and to draw some important conclusions from this study for the central issue of this chapter.

It cannot be denied, to be sure, that Hartshorne does emphasize the self-creativity of each particular occasion in determining its own becoming, and this would seem to ignore — or de-emphasize — the divine role. This emphasis is expressed, for example, when he writes: "The ultimate principle is experiencing as partly free or self-creative, and this principle, being ultimate, accounts for definiteness without help from any other principle" (CPM 62). This idea is expressed also in the following: an occasion is both

internally determined and externally free, which means that the antecedent conditions only limit the possibilities to a more or less narrow range, and that hence if one asks what has given the actuality its precise character the answer must be either the paradoxical, "It gives it to itself," or "Nothing gives the definiteness." It does not "come from" somewhere; rather it is created de novo in the becoming of the entity itself. It has no "cause," if that means an antecedent yet fully determining influence.... The definiteness is new, not implied by the antecedent or "external" situation; but there it now is. Since the determinateness has come about, it is in that sense an act. But it is an act of no agent unless one internal to the entity, i.e., the entity itself regarded as creating or free (WP 177).

Yet, in spite of this emphasis upon the self-creativity of creatures, Hartshorne does not ignore God's role in this creation and this fact must be equally stressed: Without God's causality, the concreteness of actuality would, as Ford argues, come in from nowhere, since there would be no formal (final) causality to direct the new
creation's use of the potentialities of the past. That Hartshorne has accounted for God's role, to be sure, is argued in his thesis concerning divine final and efficient causality, whereby it is contended that God has a major role in the self-creating activity of creatures. It is implied, furthermore, in the fact that the continuum of possibility, from which creaturely actualizations evolve, is not merely a chaotic randomness, but is, to a certain extent, limited and ordered by God. Hartshorne rejects the Whiteheadian view that there are definite eternal possibilities from which man simply selects (as his initial aim, given by God) some element for actualization. He prefers to conceive of possibilities as less definite; indeed, as I have argued, he understands the possibilities for each successive creaturely concrescence as a range of possibilities, and not as one specific ideal. This, however, does not imply that future possibilities are an unstructured randomness, in spite of certain critics (e.g. Baldwin), for Hartshorne makes it clear that God's causality limits the continuum of possibilities to a certain range, such that the best possible ideals for each particular situation are available to creatures, and indeed, are attractive as lures. Creatures are free to choose from among this more limited range, but until they have actualized some potentials no one, God included, could know the precise definiteness which was to occur: "Neither man nor God can intend the concrete course of events" (CSPM.66). No one can simply determine the future by himself or by causing another to act in a certain way, for there is no definite future until it has been actualized. There is no
need then for specific eternal ideals, since all that can be suggestive of the future is a range of possibilities. This range is provided for by the past nexus and by God's causative activity, both of which operate through prehensions, physical and hybrid. 113

This teaching of the somewhat limited range of the continuum, according to the specific situation, is not generally acknowledged by Hartshorne's critics, nor explicitly stated by Hartshorne, though, as I am arguing, it may be inferred by his writings, 114 and indeed is necessary to give coherence to his theory of divine final causality via initial aims; that is, since an understanding of the continuum of possibility as a somewhat ordered range is coherent with an understanding of initial aims as being constituted, likewise, by such an unstructured range of possibility. He writes, for example, that "Potentiality is a part of the individual essence of an existent, and it varies from one unit of experience to another". 115 He contends also: "Always a particular

113 Harshorne does not refer often to comparative feelings, for, as will be noted in a following section, he rejects the idea of "genetic succession", or "concrescence", as a temporal affair in which physical and then comparative and complex feelings are experienced.


character is covered by some range of possible diversity (rather than a mere diversity of possibilities, strictly speaking) within which range something must happen. This must be conditional, that is, granting the state of the world up to now. At an earlier stage, a different range was open for compulsory decision". Hartshorne argues that there must be a range (that is, limits) of indeterminables, for if all possibilities were equally determinate, equally relevant to the particular present, then there would be no basis for distinction between things, and "anything is anything". The more general a thing is, the farther away from determination it is: "The order of decreasing definiteness is the order of increasing generality". There are for every particular moment of creaturely experience certain possibilities which are more relevant than others, and these (the former) are offered to (and prehended by) the concreting creatures as the most desirable possibilities, or rather, range of possibilities. God is not concerned at each moment with all that is possible, but with only that which is most relevant to that moment. He offers a more or less limited

range of ideals to creatures. Creaturely actualization, therefore, is not determined by the mere mechanical selection of definite eternal possibilities, but is rather, "the determination of the somewhat indefinite [note: not the completely indefinite]" (My italics.) 120 The potential is somewhat limited, and thus, as Hartshorne says, it is "more or less [and not completely] indeterminate in character". 121

There is no need, then, for specific ideals to be offered to creatures, but only a randomness which is more or less limited so that a certain "range" of ideals is more attractive than others. 122 In this way, God is actively involved in the creaturely acts, so that it cannot be argued that His role is slighted in Hartshorne's metaphysics simply because he rejects Whitehead's doctrine of there being specific eternal objects. Nor, indeed, can it be argued that, as such, Hartshorne's God cannot exert persuasive influence via the final causality of initial aims. It cannot be argued, further, that there are no standards for new actualizations if there are no specific ideals, for Hartshorne has provided for a certain more or less specific range of possibilities relative to every particular situation. This also goes against the criticism that God and man create simply random actualizations derived from a


122 See, for example, Hartshorne's reference to the correct "notion of causality as that of a range of real possibility" (my italics) in "Order and Chaos", in P. G. Kuntz, The Concept of Order (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1968), 265.
purely chaotic and completely unstructured continuum (so that evil or discordant factors are inevitably introduced by God and man). Hartershorne would reject this argument, since it has not taken into account the range of more or less specific control which God (and the past) exert on the present. There is indeed a "hierarchy" of universals, with the most general being the only really eternal character and "at all times necessarily given some embodiment, some determination, or expression of its character as a determinable", while the less general or more determinate characters would be relevant, not to all time, but to stretches of time proportional to their generality. 123

The range of divine power can be somewhat defined, according to this analysis, for God's causative influence operates as final and efficient causality, with regard to general and specific ideals, though the latter is always a range and not simply one ideal. The range of human freedom, likewise, can be somewhat defined, for man is confronted by a range of ideals, aspects of which he then freely actualizes, such that could not be fully predicted beforehand. The divine persuasive lure operates through final and efficient causation in luring the subject toward a certain range of possibilities, rather than some other range. There would seem to be an element of coerciveness in the divine limitation of potentiality, in that God restricts man's acts to a certain range of ideals; yet, this is never a complete determinism since man

123 Charles Hartshorne, "Santayana's Doctrine of Essence", 150.
is quite free within this range to act and freely create, to make de-
finite and concrete certain possibilities available within the limits.

Now, while Hartshorne has, here, been interpreted so as to
show that his doctrine of possibility is not incoherent with divine
final causality via initial aims, there are, however, certain questions
to be raised about his understanding of these matters. We might query,
for example, whether the interpretation of Hartshorne herein argued
holds, for there is some question as to whether Hartshorne himself follows
Whitehead in holding that the initial aim presented by God to becoming
creatures is in fact one specific ideal or, as I have suggested, a
range of possibilities. It would appear that Hartshorne does, indeed,
follow Whitehead in holding that the ideal offered by God is one specific
ideal -- indeed, the best ideal possibility for any successive, par-
ticular moment of creaturely becoming. In this case, the freedom of the
becoming creature is to be seen in the fact that this ideal can be
actualized in a vast number of ways; the ideal never simply determines
the exact way it is to be actualized. There is always some freedom in
the becoming creature, in making the ideal determinate that is not
simply determined by the ideal itself. Now, I would suggest that if
this is Hartshorne's position (as it is generally believed to be), then
the question that arises here in this: can Hartshorne coherently hold
this position if, at the same time, he rejects Whitehead's doctrine of
eternal objects as the source of the specific ideals which are chosen
by God? Herein may lie the basis of the criticism of Ford and Baldwin,
for without specific eternal objects from which to choose the final causes which He offers to becoming creatures, how can there be such final causes as creaturely initial aims? In short: can there be specific final causes if there are no specific eternal objects from which they are chosen by God? Ford and Baldwin think there cannot be, and as such, Hartshorne is incoherent and inconsistent, and, accordingly, he cannot account for divine persuasive influence via formal (final) causality. This would seem to be an accurate assessment of the issue. However, I would argue that Hartshorne can be rescued from this serious incoherency by simply acknowledging that the initial aim of becoming creatures contains not just one specific ideal but rather a limited range of ideal possibilities. I would suggest that this thesis is more consistent with Hartshorne’s doctrine of possibility (which rejects the Whiteheadian thesis of specific eternal objects) than the view that there is a specific initial aim. The realm of possibility is not to be seen as constituted by specific objects, but rather by a structured, hierarchical range of possibilities, some more relevant than others to the particular creaturely becoming being considered. It is such an ordered range of possibility which constitutes the initial aim.

As noted above, however, it is not clear which position Hartshorne takes: he argues, for example, that the possibility open to a becoming creature is limited and somewhat hierarchical, that certain possibilities are more open and appropriate for a specific creaturely moment than
are others. And thus, it would seem that the ideal offered by God to a creature has its source in a realm of possibility which is not simply random or unstructured (versus certain critics who think otherwise); and yet, the realm of possibility is not to be seen as being so structured as to be constituted by definite ideals. The ideals, accordingly, chosen by God for becoming creatures, as their initial aims, would appear to be, likewise, neither completely random nor specific; they are, rather, constituted by a limited range of possibilities from which creatures are able to make determinant certain aspects. In not being clear, however, on this point, Hartshorne risks incoherence and misunderstanding, and as such, the overall strength of his theodicy is weakened. In order to present a viable account of man's freedom vis-à-vis divine final causation and to be coherent with his doctrine of possibility, he must hold that the initial aim is neither specific nor mere randomness.

In sum, then, it may be conceded that while some weight may be given to the arguments of certain critics (Ford and Baldwin) against Hartshorne's understanding of possibility and divine final causality via initial aims, Hartshorne, nevertheless, can be defended against this criticism, according to my interpretative suggestions herein formulated. The apparent incoherency with Hartshorne's thesis may be cleared up if it is seen that the initial aim is not a specific ideal but rather a range of ideal possibilities, and also if it is seen that the realm of possibility is, likewise, somewhat structured (and neither a mere randomness nor composed of specific ideals).
But, if we grant the availability of divine final causality by Hartshorne's God, another issue immediately arises: the nature of this final causality must be more clearly defined, for Hartshorne's theory is not without some question. It would appear, for one thing, that it is not only God who limits the range of possibilities for each moment, but the past world, as causal nexus, does so as well. The question which arises here is whether God is needed in this limiting function, or whether it is accomplished automatically by the past world. What has been actualized in the past clearly limits the possibilities for the future; is God then needed for this same function? It would appear that Hartshorne overlaps the two forms of limitation in that, as he argues, the past nexus which limits us and which we prehend is not simply the past world but is, rather, God's experience of that nexus. Indeed, if God were not involved somehow, if the only possibilities open for the future are those established by the past world, then there would be a running-down effect, so that eventually all novelty would cease. This is why Whitehead insisted upon there being eternal ideals as the source of fresh novelty. But Hartshorne has insisted that God's envisagement of the metaphysical categories is eternal and that subdivisions of such can be made definite. Thus, potentiality is located not only in that past world, as that which is left to be actualized, but more generally, in God's envisagement of the infinite continuum of possibility. That which is most relevant for future actualizations has been clearly limited and defined more or less by the past actualizations, and it is this
potentiality which is most definite and hence more clearly the nearest to possible actualization. God must operate through the efficient causality of the past, then, to direct this limited range of potentiality. But He also operates through a more general final causality, through which His abstract envisagement of eternal possibilities is transmitted to creatures as a lure to create at least something. It would appear that fresh novelty would enter the creature's experience through this final causation, for it is not simply dependent on the past, as is the efficient causality, in its possibilities. That this thesis of Hartshorne's is, however, not clearly worked out was, to be sure, suggested in a previous section. This rather crucial issue must be further examined, specifically now with respect to Hartshorne's understanding of divine final and efficient causality in the world. To this issue we turn.
7. Divine Final and Efficient Causation

God's influence, His persuasive power, is felt in the world because of its supreme and eminent nature. God is, in Hartshorne's words, "the supreme factor in all stages of each thing's genesis". He is directly involved in the becoming of each creature; His activity is not confined to the merely passive reception of past values (as some interpreters of Hartshorne have suggested). Yet, as I have contended throughout this chapter, while God's influence is persuasive, it has elements in it which approach a coerciveness. This entire question, to be sure, of defining how God is causally effective is a difficult and complex one; and indeed, as many modern philosophers have pointed out, the concept of "cause" itself is in a state of chaos. Hartshorne's position on this question must be further explored and, as such, my study of his understanding of the causal inter-relationship of God and man must be expanded to consider his thesis that God is both final and efficient cause.

Hartshorne's position is based, essentially, on his doctrine of panentheism, according to which God is both supreme cause of all

---


things, and all-inclusive of the world (see above, "Chapter Three", "Section One"). While traditional theism conceives of God as the independent universal cause of all things and as extrinsic to the world, and traditional pantheism, that God is the inclusive reality but not independent of the world totality, Hartshorne contends that his panentheism effects a "higher" synthesis which combines what is positive in these polar positions. That God would exist no matter what else exists and that God includes all reality in His own reality are the positive elements in traditional theism and pantheism, respectively, which are combined, synthesized, in Hartshorne's panentheism (cf. PSC 504).

Classical theism, in Hartshorne's view, implies a causal necessity which Hartshorne describes as "radically asymmetrical" (PSC 500): God, it holds, has made the world and is independent of it; the world requires God as cause, but God has no need of the world. The world exists because of the divine causality, but it might not have existed. In any case, God would be essentially the same whether the world existed or not. He is supreme, sufficient, complete in Himself. Now, Hartshorne argues that this position leads to the mistaken conclusion that God's effects do not follow from His causes: the world as effect requires God as its cause, but classical theism seems to deny -- against its own intention -- that the cause requires the effect (cf. PSC 500ff). Yet, as Hartshorne argues, this makes the divine causation distinctly different from what we ordinarily mean by causation: from a cause.
that is, we expect consequences; but from the divine causation, there appears to be no effects: He made the world and yet stays exactly as He is; and thus, His effects do not seem to follow from their causes.

Hartshorne's contention is that a cause is related to its effects not by necessity, but rather, by probability: a cause necessitates that there be some effect, though not this or that specific one:

The only way, I believe, to define "cause" which fits both scientific and theological requirements is as follows: A cause is something absolutely required for or involved in the existence of something else (its effect) but itself requiring or involving not this particular effect or that, but only that there be some effect or other of a given more or less general description. 126

In this way, Hartshorne contends, the one-sided dependence of the effect on the cause is preserved while a range of real freedom for the subject is also acknowledged. Hartshorne terms his position, "moderate asymmetry". He summarizes its differences from classical "radical asymmetry" as follows:

whereas radical asymmetry leaves open the possibility that not even the class or kind of effect is implied, "moderate asymmetry" holds the non-nullity of a class of effects -- though no particular member of the class -- to be ren-

dered necessary by the existence of the cause. On either view, causes are always independent of particular effects, effects always dependent on particular causes (PSG 502).

While God is supreme cause of all things, he is also dependent on the world: "On the neoclassical view...God is both before and after, both cause and effect, of all events" (NTI 60). God is the universal cause of all things, but he is also dependent upon the world. In His Abstract Nature, he is supreme cause; but in His Concrete Nature, he is dependent on the world and responds to each successive creaturely experience. God is not to be seen as the Cause of all things, but is rather "a (or the) supreme stream of causation which at the same time is the supreme stream of effects" (PSG 502). As supreme cause, God requires only that something exists as effect; it need not have been this particular world.

The divine as cause, further, may be seen to have "two senses, analogous to the double sense in which a man is cause" (PSG 502): (1) just as man, in each moment makes decisions which become, in turn, stimuli for other individuals, so too is God's activity more than mere acting: He is also acted upon. Here, "being cause" is inseparable from "being effect"; and further (2), just as man may have a persistent ideal which influences others, and which, once acquired, functions as a cause rather than an effect (even though the original acquisition was an effect), so likewise for God, there can be an unacquired ideal which was never an effect, and in His "mere possession of this ideal,
the primordial mind would be purely cause rather than effect" (PSG 502). In short, God's being contains both an "all-independent all-causative factor and the totality of events" (PSG 505). That "'God is truly independent and truly dependent' is no absurdity, unless by 'truly' one means, in all that he is, rather than in something that he is" (PSG 505). God is dipolar, and as such, the positive features of theism and pantheism can be synthesized. He is independent of the world in one of His aspects, and all-inclusive of the world in the other. As the former, He is the supreme and universal cause; as the latter, He is the supreme effect since He depends upon the acts of the entire world for the content of His contingent existence (cf. also "Chapter Two", above).

Elsewhere Hartshorne employs the Aristotelian term of "final" and "efficient" causation to illustrate this teaching of the divine-world interrelationship, as noted above. \[127\] As final cause, God furnishes to the present subject a general and fixed purpose, so that some appropriate action will ensue; in God's being is contained the total antecedent conditions of His present action and of all present action among creatures. But besides His having this abstract essence, which supplies creatures their final causes, God is also efficient cause: He is not exhausted by His general and fixed purpose, but rather, new

\[127\] Cf. Charles Hartshorne, Review Article: "Efficient Causality in Aristotle and St. Thomas", *passim*. 
experiences are added to His being at each moment, so that at each successive moment He has a new total being (note: not a totally new being). "The antecedent efficient cause is the previous total being, what is changed is God as a growing 'personal order society of occasions' (experiences)". 128 As pure abstract essence, according to traditional theism, God would seem to be unrelated to the world except as its primordial cause and determinator: but on Hartshorne's view, God is both supreme cause and responsive to the world, taking into His being the free acts of creatures, and basing His ideals for presently con- crescencing creatures upon what creaturely activity has actualized to date. Thus, while God can be said to create man in the sense that "all of man's being involves the divine creativity as its sustaining element", man in a less radical sense, can be said to create "(something in) God, in that certain of God's accidents could not have come into being without the free choice of man to perform certain acts". 129

In short, then, Hartshorne's God is the supreme final cause of the world, and yet, He is responsive to the acts of creaturely freedom, and experiences these acts as qualifiers of His contingent existence


129 Charles Hartshorne, Review Article: "Efficient Causality in Aristotle and St. Thomas", 32.
such that His new ideals for the successive moments of creaturely life are conveyed in an efficient causality which has taken the past actual state of the world into full account. Hartshorne has cryptically explained this as follows: God "is an efficient cause because he is a final cause, and vice versa" (WP 92). Efficient causality is transmitted through prehensions, both physical and hybrid: physical prehensions of the past given world and hybrid prehensions of God's conceptual prehensions. The latter contain aims and ideals and therefore are also final causes, though they are now qualified by the past state of the world. All causation of the present moment is from the past, (there is no causal interaction among contemporaries), and thus, all causation is, in this sense, an efficient causality. When some of this efficient causality contains divine ideals it is also a final causality. Thus, God's final causality is closely interrelated with His efficient causality. The one, however, is distinguished from the other by the fact that while His final causality is a general purpose that some action occur, His efficient causality is more particular and deals with the specific state of the world at each successive moment. The former refers to the causal agency of God's Abstract Nature, the latter to His Concrete Nature. 130

130 The divine final causality is distinguished from His efficient causality, also, to the extent that while the efficient causality effects a more or less specific aim in the creature, the final causality -- of which the specific aim is a particularization -- serves as the source and basis for God's general ideals for the creature. As such, the latter is more relevant to God than to creatures, His efficient causality being constituted by the more specific (and thus directly relevant) aims for the creature at each particular moment of the creature's concrescence. (This point was made by Hartshorne in answer to my query -- in 1975 -- as to what the relevance of the divine final causality is in view of the fact that the divine efficient causality, in presenting the creature with a more specific aim, seems to be all that is required by the creature. I do not find this specific point made by Hartshorne in any of his published writings).
A question arises, however, in relation to Hartshorne's understanding of the concrescing creature as being affected by the efficient causality of both God and the past world. It must be asked: how can these two forms of efficient causality be distinguished? How is the divine efficient causality different from that of the past world's? Are they, perhaps, so indistinguishable that there can be no distinction made? Now, it might appear that this query has already been answered, for it has been argued that the efficient causality of God, unlike that of the efficient causality of the past nexus, contains also certain ideals which are specific particularizations of God's final causality. If these ideals were not included in the efficient causality, the world would soon either drift into complete chaos or utter monotony, since there would no longer be the necessary reintroduction of continued order and novelty into the world. There remains, however, some question concerning this thesis. For, as argued above, if Hartshorne holds that God's (final and efficient) causal agency is constituted by the best ideals for any particular moment of creaturely concrescence as determined by the past actual state of the world at that specific moment, then there is some question whether the freedom and novelty of the world would run-down; that is, since it would seem to be implied here that the possibilities determined by the past world limit present and future creativity to actions within the limits determined by that past nexus. As such, new experiences would constitute essentially a mere filling-in, or making more determinate the possibilities permitted by the past world. For there to be novelty (and, as I argued, freedom),
however, it must be seen that the present experience is not simply restricted to the confines of the past nexus; rather, it must be argued that God's ideals are not chosen merely from the past world but rather from within the more general limits of possibility, which are not restricted to the particular confines of the past world — though they are always restricted to the more general and abstract limits of possibility represented by the cosmic laws. Hartshorne's reference, then, to God's provision of the initial aim of creatures as being chosen from among the possibilities permitted by the past world and offered to men by the Consequent Nature of God \(^{131}\) (which has taken account of the past world) is not quite correct, or rather, it does not seem quite coherent with the necessity of there being the constant introduction of fresh novelty into the world for there to be freedom and, indeed, for there to be a world at all (and not just a monotonous making more determinate of what really is). It must be shown clearly that God's Abstract Nature is also involved, and that besides its function of setting general limits to possibility, it must be seen as introducing new ideals, new possibilities for novelty, which are not merely those that are permitted according to the specific limits of the past nexus. In failing to make this point

\(^{131}\) Note that for Hartshorne, it is God's Consequent — or rather Concrete-Nature which offers the initial aim to creatures, and not the Primordial — or rather, Abstract-Nature. The Concrete Nature is best suited for this task since it is by means of this aspect of His nature that God conceives and takes account of the actual state of the contingent world.
clear, Hartshorne risks the critique of incoherence. The crux of the problem may, perhaps, lie in his failure (as argued above) to consider carefully enough the distinction between the two types of limits that as I have argued must be operative; he has not worked out sufficiently the exact nature of the interrelationship between the efficient causality of the past world, which bears down upon each new present experience as its data, and the causality of God which also is data for the new occasion.

In conclusion, we may note that while it was argued in a former section ("Section Six") that Hartshorne's doctrine of possibility may be interpreted so as to be coherent with divine causal agency via initial aims (and hence that Ford's argument against the availability of Hartshorne's God to exert persuasive influence does not necessarily follow), it has been argued in this present section, however, that there would appear to be some question about Hartshorne's understanding of the nature of this divine causal agency. The question has to do with the distinction between God's causal agency and that of the past causal nexus, both of which affect and limit the newly concreting subject. It is not clear, in Hartshorne's writings, how the divine causal lure can ensure that there is continued opportunity for novelty and freedom; that is, if that lure is constituted by those ideal possibilities which are determined by the past state of the world at any particular moment. Accordingly, his account of the divine agency, as a persuasive lure via final and efficient causality, is a little incomplete, and is plagued by some appearances of incoherence.
That his account, however, can be rendered more coherent may be inferred from suggestions made in the earlier discussion of the limits imposed by God upon creaturely agency (see "Section Two" of this chapter). There it was argued that, while man's agency is limited by the causality of the past world and by God's specific lure, God's more general purpose offers ideal possibilities to man which are not confined to these specific limits and lures, but which rather are limited only by the more general cosmic laws. In this way, creaturely freedom can be understood as being constituted by actions which are not simply restricted to possibilities determined by the past state of the world, but rather, are the result of actions made possible by ideals (offered by God), which are not confined to past possibilities. This thesis may be applied to this present discussion, for it concerns, essentially, the same issue — though here the emphasis is on God's final and efficient causality, and the efficient causality of the past causal nexus, while previously these same matters were discussed in terms of the specific and general limits upon the creature's agency.

Unfortunately, however, the earlier criticism of Hartshorne's position holds here as well: for one thing, he does not seem to have formulated the matter in the way suggested here, and accordingly, his argument, as it stands, seems to be unclear and incoherent. He argues, for example, that the ideals offered to creatures by God are constituted by what is best according to the possibilities determined by the past causal nexus at any particular time; yet, this thesis
has been rejected as denying real freedom and creativity, despite his belief that it does not. There is, furthermore, some question about the coherency of the alternative to Hartshorne's view herein suggested: it is not clear how the divine ideals which are offered to concrescing subjects could somehow go beyond the limits determined by the past nexus, for this would imply that the creature can act beyond what is, in fact, possible for him. This entire issue is left quite unclear by Hartshorne; and as such it must be concluded that one important aspect of his theodicy -- that of establishing the persuasive agency of God via final and efficient causality (or, in terms of the earlier discussion, via general and specific limits) -- is weak and insufficiently clear; and this, in turn, tends to weaken the viability of his overall theodicy.
8. Hartshorne's Understanding of Genetic Succession

The issue of this chapter has been to examine Hartshorne's understanding of divine causal agency in the world, and correspondingly, of the nature of creaturely response to it. It has been argued that Hartshorne's use of the concept of divine persuasive agency implies that there is a varying range of effectiveness by this agency (though Hartshorne has not systematically defined it thusly) -- some aspects of it being more effective than others, and as such permitting a varying range of creaturely freedom in response. Now, while this understanding of the divine lure operates according to the degree of freedom in creatures in response to it, not enough has been said about how this divine lure is internalized by the creature. The problem here is that Hartshorne has paid far too little attention to this critical theme. Indeed, his failure to discuss in sufficient detail the Whiteheadian theory of concrescence or genetic succession has led to a lacuna with respect to our understanding of his position concerning how the creature internalizes the divine lure (and indeed, the past data of the causal nexus). I would argue that it is only by an elaboration of the genetic succession of a creature that one can understand -- more fully -- how the creatureprehends and internalizes the divine lure (and the past data of the world). Here, where we would have hoped for illumination, Hartshorne's failure to elaborate upon his understanding of the issue is extremely disappointing. As such, for example, his understanding of the conscious and unconscious apprehensions of the divine lure remains somewhat vague, as indeed does his rather cryptic explanation
of the divine imposition of limits as being persuasive, etc. An elaboration or interpretation of Whitehead's theory of concrescence would have been invaluable in helping us to understand his (Hartshorne's) view concerning the various interrelationships among the becoming subject and the causal influences of God and the past world.

But, let us consider this issue by first noting some of the more prominent interpretations of the concrescence of the subject, and then by reconstructing Hartshorne's position in relation to them.

Whitehead's theory of genetic succession has been the focus of much difference of opinion among process philosophers. The argument centres largely upon how there can be successiveness (internal process or becoming) which is not temporal; that is, so that creaturely modification of the initial aim which is given by God is possible, and consequently so that a divine determinism can be avoided. For if there is no temporal modification of the initial aim, there would seem to be a divine determinism, since God has provided the aim. This complex issue is extremely important for the central question of this chapter—that of determining the range and extent of human freedom vis-à-vis God's causative activity. It has, further, specific reference to the question of possibility which was just discussed, for it contributes to our understanding of the roles of God and the past world in their influencing of the present subject.

D. W. Sharburne's analysis of Whitehead's doctrine of concrescence (genetic successiveness) has sought to locate the various stages within the inner becoming of an occasion, so that physical feelings,
conceptual feelings and more complex comparative feelings are distinguished. There is also distinguished the workings of divine final causation, which operates through the provision of the initial aims and prehended through hybrid physical feelings. Divine ideals are prehended through conceptual feelings, and such operations as conceptual reversion account for novelty.

I will not pause to consider in more detail Sherburne's fairly well known analysis, since it cannot apply directly to Hartshorne; that is, since he rejects such an analysis as implying an illicit inner temporal successiveness. Indeed, many critics have condemned Sherburne's analysis on this very point, insisting that Whitehead must not be interpreted in this way.

E. Pols, to be sure, does interpret Whitehead in this temporal sense, and then proceeds to show how the view leads to irrevocable paradoxes. He argues, however, that the non-temporal interpretation likewise fails. His argument, essentially, is this: if the genetic succession of a subject is non-temporal, if it is an "all-at-once" affair, then the subjective aim, which has been given by God, cannot be modified: as such, there is a divine determinism or finalism, and creaturely freedom is nothing but an illusion. Pols argues, further, that Whitehead

has not shown that, if there is temporal genetic modification, each phase is not caused by the preceding phase(s). In short, Pols holds that Whitehead's theory of genetic successiveness implies either a divine finalism (that is, if there is no temporal succession) or a radical deterministic mechanism (that is, if there is temporal succession): both are determinisms, and both negate creaturely freedom. For there to be creaturely freedom, vis-à-vis the divine causation via the initial aim, and vis-à-vis the determinism of the past efficient causality of God and the world, there must be a viable account of genetic succession wherein it is shown how the subject is able freely to modify the final and efficient causative influences. Yet, as Pols argues, Whitehead's theory of genetic succession implies a temporal succession such that there is causal dependence of the latter stages on the earlier. The conclusion, then, drawn by Pols is that there is not in Whitehead's account a viable understanding of creaturely freedom.

Cobb's version of Whitehead's doctrine of concrescence, however, is that there is really no temporal genetic successiveness -- in spite of Whitehead's misleading use of terms which suggest inner temporality (for example, "earlier" and "later" phases, "successive", "primary phase",

---

"initial phase", "antecedent phase", and "subsequent phase", etc.). Genetic succession is "all-at-once", according to Cobb, and as such, although an occasion's becoming is indivisible, it can nevertheless be analyzed -- intellectually -- into its component parts. When Cobb turns to explain how this successiveness of the phases can be explained non-temporally, however, he is quick to warn that it must not be understood as a merely logical succession. Whitehead, he suggests, introduced a new model of reality which required a new concept of succession beyond logical and temporal terms of explanation. This is also William Christian's interpretation of Whitehead's meaning, that is, that there is implied by Whitehead some third type of successiveness. 134 Christian, however, does not elaborate fully. Cobb has attempted an elaboration, in opposition specifically to the rival theories put forth by Ford and Pols. 135 While it is difficult not to conceive of an inner temporal successiveness, Cobb argues that the concrescence is "all-at-once".

The creative synthesis of data is not temporal, he insists, but rather:

the coming into being of the ingredients presupposes the self-actualization of the whole synthesis just as much as the self-actualization of the whole presupposes the coming into being


of the ingredients....Whole and part come into being together. The whole is equally the subject of the one act of becoming and the superject of the outcome. 136

Cobb argues that there is neither temporal nor causal relationships between the phases in genetic succession. Time, he argues, is to be seen with respect to macroscopic processes but not with regard to the microscopic concrescence. Likewise, "causal relationship exists only between occasions, not between phases within an occasion". 137 Cobb warns, further, that when he refers to the cause and effect as simultaneous, he does not wish to be interpreted (as Ford's criticism does) as seeing this relationship between the phases as symmetrical: the relationship is, rather, asymmetrical: "The simple ingredients are presupposed by and required by the complex integration in which the integration is not presupposed by and required by the simple integration". 138 In this sense, there is succession, though not as temporal or causal. We must acknowledge such succession, he argues further, since "there is a remarkable gap between the world as it


existed prior to the rise of the new occasion and the content, the definiteness, which the new occasion has"; an occasion could have had different ingredients, in fact, "so it is not dependent upon the ingredients in the same way that the ingredients are dependent upon the occasion". Cobb holds, finally, that it is the occasion as a whole which itself decides about itself, rather than some parts of the entity deciding about other parts. It is on this interpretation, Cobb concludes, that Whitehead's account of freedom can be defended, for it is the occasion itself which is self-causative, and not determined from without.

Ford, however, offers a third alternative to the interpretations of Cobb and Pols. Some meaning, he contends, must be given to Whitehead's use of such temporal references as "earlier" and "later", etc. Pols is correct (against Cobb) in his contention that if there is to be succession, there must be some analyzable divisibility within the concrescence of an occasion; yet, Cobb is correct (against Pols) in holding that there is no causal succession, for that would rule out creaturely freedom vis-à-vis a deterministic mechanism. Concrescence, according to Ford, is genetically, but not actually, analyzable into successive

---


decisions or phases. While each phase is causally influenced by its predecessors, this is not a causal determinism, for there is a lack of integration among the various feelings so inherited, as well as indeterminateness of the subjective aim. The self-determination of the occasion, its single, unified decision "must await the final satisfaction in which all feelings are integrated and all indeterminations of subjective aim have evaporated". 141 The antecedent phases in concrescence are not additional causal influences which the occasion must integrate, but rather, "the means whereby that causa sui expresses itself in the process of actualization". 142 In addition, then, to Sherburne's analysis of concrescence, which Ford terms "cross-sectional", and which seems to imply that the separate stages are separableprehensions, such that only the subjective aim may be seen to run through the entire concrescence as its unifying thread, Ford suggests a "longitudinal" analysis, wherein the concrescence is one prehension, one experience, which runs through several phases and, as such, physical feelings endure throughout the concrescence as does the initial aim. 143 The subjective aim does


not become fully determinate until it is integrated with all of the physical feelings, and the prehensions of the first phase do not have fully determinate subjective forms since they have not yet become fully integrated with the subjective aim. The causa-sui, or self-determinism, is constituted by the action in which the subjective aim and the prehensions are modified, adapted and actualized along with physical and mental feelings to form the experience of the becoming occasion. 144

Now, Hartshorne's position on this contested issue must be clearly set out and evaluated. We may note, first of all, that his understanding of concrescence differs from all of those suggested above. He argues, specifically, that while Whitehead seems to affirm two sorts of real succession, namely, "succession of actual entities, and succession of 'phases' within a single entity", only the former is to be accepted as a valid temporal succession. There can be "no successive genetic phases within an actual entity" (WP 178). There is no inner temporal succession; there is, however, a logical succession. He suggests that the attempt to find a type of succession beyond temporal and logical, as for example, in Christian and Cobb, is misguided. Hartshorne, like Cobb, holds that concrescence is "all-at-once", but

he does not seem to agree with Cobb about how this is possible. He wants to maintain a middle ground wherein "events are not instantaneous, nor are they endlessly analyzable into successive subevents". He acknowledges, for example, that "Any actual process is...composed of unit-events, each with finite, not zero or indefinite, time-length." Yet, he contends at the same time that there can be nothing but a logical succession: "To grasp \( X \) thinkingly logically presupposes grasping \( X \) somehow. In that sense the more physicalprehension, having \( X \) somehow as datum, is 'prior' to any particular complexity in the manner in which \( X \) is grasped" (WP 179). Again: "The datum is not first grasped, then thought about (intellectual prehension), but is grasped thinkingly... from the outset" (WP 178-179). Hartshorne argues, however, that the only succession is that between actual entities and not that which occurs within a particular entity (WP 179): "Perhaps part of what Whitehead ascribes to a single entity is really effected by a short sequence of entities, rather than a sequence of phases within one entity". Hartshorne argues, further, that the fact that a simple actuality corresponds to a finite time does not necessitate a concession to

---


temporal succession, but that, rather, it implies only that there is a possibility of external but contemporary succession: a single experience which takes place in finite time, within 1/20th to 1/10th of a second, can be contemporaneous with millions of other atomic actualities. This follows from Whitehead's "epochalism", termed by Hartshorne "temporal atomism" or "chronological pluralism": in different moments of time, there are not merely different temporal parts of one thing enduring through time, but rather, different things. It is in the sequence of these things that there is extention (endurance) through time. This theory is supported by physics and psychology, at least in the teaching that "Time-length is relational [that is, external to single entities], not an internal affair of successive parts within a single actuality".

It is unfortunate, however, that Hartshorne has written so little about his understanding of concrescence, for (as argued above) without this elaboration it is difficult to understand his thinking concerning the subtleties of the divine-human interrelationship within the subjective becoming of the creature. Specifically, it is difficult to understand his position concerning how the concrescing subject internalizes the divine lure and the past causal data of the world. Hartshorne avoids


150 Charles Hartshorne, "Interrogation of Charles Hartshorne", PI, 329-329. See also the argument above in "Chapter Three", "Section One".
the subtle and complex speculations of the other thinkers discussed with respect to the workings of concrescence, since he simply denies that there is, in fact, any temporal successiveness within an entity. Any experience, he argues, happens "all-at-once", and the only succession is that between one experience and another, and never within a single entity. There is, however, logical succession, since within entities a mental prehension logically presupposes physical ones; that is, to account for what has been grasped to be mentally prehended. In this logical sense, a physical prehension is prior to the mental prehension. This account, however, is vague and incomplete as it stands in Hartshorne's published writings. And indeed, as such, his position may well imply some of the problems referred to above. For example, if God offers initial aims to entities who then undergo concrescence "all-at-once", this could very easily be seen to imply a divine determinism, for as Ford and Pols have, variously, argued, if the initial aim is not somehow shown as being able to be freely modified by the becoming creature, then there is no freedom of self-determination vis-à-vis the divine final causation. It would appear necessary, as Ford argues, that some account must be given concerning how the subject undergoes its concrescence in time. And in this analysis, both God's role and the role of man, and indeed, the role of the past causal nexus, must be carefully delineated. Lacking this crucial elaboration, we may well query whether Hartshorne is able to account fully for the modification of the initial aim in a way which suggests that the self-determination of the individual occasion is not jeopardized. Hartshorne, of course, does insist that
man is free vis-à-vis God's aim, and yet, he shifts the terms of reference somewhat so that the modifications which take place do not take place within the individual creature, but rather between different creatures, including that between subjects belonging to the same personal sequence. Personal continuity is maintained as each subject remembers a previous event, not earlier parts of the same event. This is the temporal aspect of succession, and Hartshorne would argue that between such events, there is both efficient causality and an element of viable creaturely freedom. The efficient causal determinism of the past world bears upon the present which then must synthesize the influence into a new experience. The past influences are never completely determinative, for there is always some freedom in the becoming subject. That there is also freedom vis-à-vis the divine causative influence is perhaps not so clear, and indeed, Hartshorne's rejection of inner succession and thus of some detailed elaboration of its workings, makes both of these issues (of freedom vis-à-vis the past, and vis-à-vis God) difficult to understand. We must ask, specifically, how the initial aim is modified by a becoming subject if there is no inner temporal succession. That there is temporal succession between entities does not answer this question, for the basic question concerns the inner becoming of an individual entity. Hartshorne has not adequately discussed this matter.

Here, Ford is basically correct. I would argue, in his contention that some meaning must be given to inner temporal succession. Cobb's view, on the other hand, like Hartshorne's, in arguing that there can be no such successiveness, seems not a little cryptic and incomplete. Cobb, to his credit, honestly admits that his account is not really an adequate or complete account of genetic successiveness "that makes any positive sense of it". 152 I fear that this is all too correct; Cobb's insistence that temporal and indeed logical succession do not apply in any way leads him, like Hartshorne, to speak about concrescence only abstractly; that is, without the necessary detail regarding how it does occur within the entity.

Furthermore, it may be argued that, in spite of Cobb's rejection of Hartshorne's position of a logical succession, Cobb himself comes very close to such a view. Polk has seen this, and argues that

\[
\text{if you press the sense of time and the sense of dependence that Cobb was interested in pressing far enough, you move very close to a sense of logical dependency of part to part, of phase to phase, of compound to the total entity....(it) brings us seriously close to the notion of a tight, logical construction rather than something actually happening.} \ 153
\]


Here, at least, Sherburne, Pols and Ford are more helpful, for they try to make some sense of real temporal succession which yet is not contrary to Whitehead's genetic theory of time. However, while the analyses of Sherburne and Pols lead to the suggestion that there is a real temporal aspect involved, they have not taken the non-temporal aspect seriously enough, and hence, Pols is led to argue that there is a causal determinism involved. Ford's position is more sound, for he alone accounts for temporality while yet maintaining the essence of Whitehead's epochal doctrine, that concrescence is not in time as we understand it, but rather, "all-at-once". Ford's view is perhaps the closest to Whitehead's real meaning, and appears to be closest to the "truth" about the matter. It has been Hartshorne's failure, as it has been Cobb's, not to have developed their understandings of concrescence in more detail. 154

It must be noted, however, that while Hartshorne has not fully developed his understanding of concrescence, he has, I believe, gone far to escape the criticism of Pols that there is a divine and causal determinism of the becoming entity; that is, if there is no temporal modification of the initial aim given by God. Hartshorne escapes this particular criticism by means of his doctrine of possibility which holds, 154 This, to be sure, is more a criticism of Hartshorne than of Cobb, for the latter has done more to elaborate upon his understanding of this issue than, like Hartshorne, his view remains, finally, cryptic.
as I have interpreted it, that God does not offer specific ideals as final causative influences, but rather, only a broad range of potentiality, limited, to be sure, but never limited to the extent that it is simply specific. Consequently, the final causation is not deterministic, for the creature is free to actualize what it pleases within this range of possibility.

There is a problem, however, as to how the creature goes about this act of self-creation. Hartshorne has not been too helpful here because he has ignored a fuller treatment of how creatures become concrete, and accordingly, it is difficult to know how the divine causative influence interacts with elements of creaturely freedom and with aspects of the efficient causality of the past causal nexus. In this light, Ford has argued that Whitehead alone among philosophers has "taken the problem of the origin of subjectivity seriously (except perhaps Sartre), and to have seen the need for a divine source for the emergence of subjectivity", as noted above. 155 Ford argues that Hartshorne's account of possibility cannot accommodate Whitehead's theory of the initial aim, and this coupled with his failure to elaborate a theory of genetic succession, leaves him open to the charge of anti-intellectualism with which Bergson is likewise charged. What Bergson and Hartshorne do not do is to show how a subject becomes:

---

155 L. S. Ford, TPP, 80.
only Whitehead has shown this in detail. Now, while I have, to be sure, argued against Ford's contention concerning Hartshorne's doctrine of possibility, there is much truth in this charge that Hartshorne has left the problem of subjective becoming (of the internalization of the divine lure and the past data) in an unsatisfactory state. Hartshorne's procedure of changing the terms of reference from inner succession to external succession is, as I have argued, not satisfactory, for it ignores explanation of the crucial act of self-becoming and leaves, accordingly, a lacuna in the question of defining the range and extent of human freedom vis-à-vis God's causative influence and vis-à-vis the causative influence of the past actual world. The major issue, then, of this chapter is not advanced by the consideration of Hartshorne's understanding of concrescence, and accordingly, where we would have hoped to gain insight into the subtleties of Hartshorne's position, we are disappointed with his inattention to this matter.

156 L. S. Ford, TPP, 80.

157 In private talks with Hartshorne in 1975, he expressed his genuine bafflement over this question of concrescence, and, in noting that the issue is discussed only in one place by Whitehead, that he (Hartshorne) did not consider it of major importance. Now, this is unfortunate, since the recent debates have shown how centrally important this issue is for the question of defining more clearly Whitehead's understanding of man's freedom, vis-à-vis God and vis-à-vis the past causal nexus.
As such, we may conclude that his failure to be more informative here constitutes a weakness in his overall theodicy, for the issue is of central importance to that theodicy.
9. Divine Love and Creaturely Freedom

This chapter has discussed various aspects of Hartshorne's thought which are relevant to the issue of determining the range and extent of human freedom vis-à-vis the divine persuasive and causative influence. The emphasis has been more upon divine "power" than upon divine "love"; and yet, as argued above, it is not completely adequate to separate these two aspects of God with respect to the central issue being discussed. The procedure is simply a methodological convenience, though to be sure, there is good basis for it in Hartshorne's writings (as argued above). As such, I have chosen to deal with the question of creaturely freedom vis-à-vis the divine power, whereas the attribute of divine love (benevolence) will be discussed vis-à-vis the nature of evil and its overcoming. In an effort to maintain some balance, however, some comments about divine love may be offered here, specifically as concerns the central issue of this chapter.

Hartshorne, to be sure, often describes divine persuasive influence in terms of love. Ultimate power, he contends, is persuasive, sensitive; it is an ideal passivity and relationship; it is love. This, as he sees it, is in direct contention with the traditional Christian doctrine that God alone is active, and all else, correspondingly, passive. I would hope to show, however, that while for Hartshorne divine power, as love, is conceived in terms of a persuasiveness, there is a range of this loving persuasive effectiveness, some of which approaches a coerciveness; and this, to be sure, is consistent with the argument of
this present chapter.

Hartshorne argues that "all power is sensitivity", for the world is a vast and integrated social organism, with its constituent parts more or less sympathetically prehending one another (or, more precisely, the past being prehended by the presently becoming subjects). He modifies this thesis, however, by noting that while there is only the persuasive power of sensitivity with respect to another, there can be distinguished both a "direct and indirect causal action" (DR 155). God's action, he argues, is direct and persuasive, while man's action, being less perfect, is indirect and, as such, more coercive. It is so because it involves physical aspects:

God acts on all beings directly, as a man's thought acts on his nervous system, and he is acted upon by all things as a man's thought is acted on by his brain cells. But one man's purpose influences another man, telepathy apart, only by first modifying the man's bodily parts, and thence some factor in the inter-bodily environment of both men, such as sound waves. Now each direct link in this causal chain is interpretable, according to the social theory of reality, as constituted by bonds of sympathy, of "feeling of feeling" (Whitehead), for example, as between a human consciousness and the feelings in various nerve cells. But the final result may be that one man causes another man to be starved to death, without any appreciable feeling of how the other feels about this. Thus, "brute power" is an indirect relation, never a direct one (DR 155).

While divine love can be effective as purely persuasive, human love falls short of this ideal, and involves rather elements of coerciveness (since it must resort to physical means). Men are "bound to
coerce one another more or less unsympathetically" (BH 27), while God and He alone possesses "the degree of love which renders superfluous the nonsympathetic forms of power" (BH 26-27). Love, in its perfect form, is "the unique privilege of deity" (MVG 169).

Now, while this would appear to imply that God exerts solely persuasive influence, there can be distinguished, as I have argued, a range of effectiveness of this agency, and as is the case with respect to divine power, so likewise is it the case with divine love; namely, that there are elements of both which are somewhat coercive, relative to those aspects of the divine lure which is more properly persuasive (that is, permitting more creaturely freedom in response). There are situations in which God's love must express itself in terms which seem relatively coercive, even on Hartshorne's account—Hartshorne's claim to the contrary notwithstanding. For example, since God must ensure that man's freedom cannot be so free as to destroy itself, He must exert certain restraints:

The divine love is social awareness and action from social awareness. Such action seems clearly to include the refusal to provide the unsocial with a monopoly upon the use of coercion. Coercion to prevent the use of coercion to destroy freedom generally is in no way action without social awareness but one of its crucial expressions. Freedom must not be free to destroy freedom. The logic of love is not the logic of pacifism or of the unheroic life (MVG 173).

Again:

The best expression of belief in God is an attitude of social awareness which treats
all problems in the spirit of mutuality except where others insist upon treating them in another spirit, at which point we must in our local way, like God in his cosmic way, set limits by constraint to the destruction of mutuality (MVG 173).

God "tolerates variety up to the point beyond which it would mean chaos and not a world...[He] prevents reality from losing all definite character" (MVG 265). Such is 'an expression not only of divine power and omniscience, but also of God's love for creatures.

I would suggest that Hartshorne's discussion of pacifism has some relevance to this issue. He argues, for example, that the true pacifist is misguided if he thinks that his ends may be achieved by sheer persuasiveness alone. There are times when some coercion is necessary and morally justified: indeed, when it is freedom itself which is at stake, as noted above. Love, "in its highest as well as its lowest aspects -- involves passivity as well as activity". ¹⁵⁸ Even such exponents of pacifism as Jesus and Gandhi did not rule out the use of other means of activity. It is a mistake to exclude the use of force "where no superior method can be found" (MVG 171). Many means, "all means, including force" must be used as the situation demands (MVG 172). The difficult task of meeting the best "combination of firmness and generosity" must be the aim of true social awareness (MVG 172).

Now, while it may be acknowledged that man is driven to the use of coercive elements in certain situations where persuasive love is not sufficient to secure the good ends desired, and while even pacifists must not completely rule out coercive methods when all else fails, it must be acknowledged that Hartshorne does not directly link this thesis concerning pacifism with God's loving, causal influence (though there is, in my opinion, an implicit and obvious link: cf. the quote above, MVG 173). In short, he holds that while men must often resort to force, God need never do so: "It is God, not men, who can guide all things (subject to the limits assigned to freedom) by the persuasiveness of his sensitivity" (DR 154). God alone possesses that ability to persuade creatures without being "nonsympathetic" (that is, coercive: cf. BH 26-27). I would argue, however, that this account is misleading, for the parenthetical phrase in the above quotation must be more carefully noted: that God exerts solely persuasive influence except as "subject to the limits assigned to freedom", implies that He exercises a different type of agency with respect to these limits. In short, God limits our freedom when it threatens to destroy itself. And, on a more abstract level, He sets cosmic laws which limit the very natures of all creatures in a more general way. Hartshorne is not as clear on this point as we would wish, for he has not fully explicated the vast range and extent of the effectiveness of the divine causal agency. We may grant him that God's causal agency is solely persuasive, but the nature of this agency needs to be more clearly defined to determine the range and
nature of this persuasiveness. When this is done -- and this has been the central task of this chapter -- it would appear that some aspects of the divine agency are more persuasive than others, and accordingly, that these aspects of the divine omnipotence and benevolence are closer, in fact, to a coerciveness. Note that to argue, as I have, that certain aspects of the divine agency in the world are relatively coercive because they are very persuasive (that is, such that man has little choice but to obey) may seem paradoxical; but this is so only if the terms are not clearly defined. When the terms are studied, as begun here, it can be seen that there are various levels of meanings for each, and that accordingly, the divine causal agency may be seen to involve both; that is, since the divine persuasive agency has been shown to involve a vast range of effectiveness, some of which approaches a relative coerciveness. To argue that the divine causal agency is solely persuasive may be misleading; it is also quite cryptic and not a little incoherent until the various levels of meaning implied in the range of effectiveness of this agency are understood.

We must turn now to a summary discussion of the implications of the theses of this chapter for the question of theodicy in Hartshorne's metaphysics.
10. Summary, Implications, and Conclusion

In this chapter, various aspects of Hartshorne's metaphysics have been discussed with a view toward clarifying and evaluating one of the basic aspects of that metaphysics -- one which is relevant directly to his theodicy; namely, his attempt to show how man's freedom and moral responsibility (for good and evil) can be reconciled with the divine causative agency.

The first of Hartshorne's theses discussed concerned his understanding of the limits to creaturely freedom ("Section Two"). It was argued that since it is God and He alone who sets the cosmic limits to creaturely freedom, there is some coerciveness in this divine agency. This was argued in spite of the fact that Hartshorne has always contended that God acts solely persuasively in this and in all His functions with respect to creatures. It was suggested that Hartshorne's account is quite unclear on this point, however, since he has not adequately distinguished between God's setting general limits and His persuading creaturely acts within those limits; that is, with regard to their particular, contingent situations. It is only with respect to the latter that God acts persuasively, for in the setting of the general limits, He acts in such a way that man simply has no choice but to comply. Hartshorne argues that if there were no limits, there could be no world and no beings with freedom, for left to their own devices, the conflicting acts of creaturely freedom would surely result in a destructive chaos. God's limits, then, are necessary in that they
make freedom itself possible; and yet, since man has no say in their imposition or modification, the limits must be seen as coercively imposed by God.

The important implication drawn from this interpretation of the divine imposition of limits was this: God permits only a certain amount of evil and chaos; He is in control of the processes of creation to the extent that He will never allow evil to become predominant. His limits keep human freedom within suitable bounds (and indeed, as later sections of the chapter argued, He exercises both persuasive and coercive influence with respect to creaturely acts within these limits -- the coerciveness ensuring that the free acts of creatures do not lead to destructive chaos).

Now, while it was argued that man is freer with regard to his acts within the general limits than he is with regard to the limits themselves (their imposition and modification), certain aspects of unclarity in Hartshorne's account were uncovered. It was argued, for example, that while man cannot modify the general limits, he can modify the specific limits and in this way he asserts his freedom. The element of spontaneity, of free creativity in man (and creatures generally, varying with the level of mental sophistication), is thereby established. Yet, Hartshorne is not as clear on this issue as we would prefer. He argues, for example, that the possibilities for a presently-becoming subject are limited to those determined by the state of the past actual world at any particular moment: "What is possible next is simply what
is compatible with what has happened up to now" (CSPM 68); man's freedom
"is the resolution of an uncertainty inherent in the totality of the
influence to which the act is subject" (LP 231). But clearly, if this
were the case, any new experience would be merely a filling-in, a making
more determinate, the past state of the world, rather than constituting
a real freedom. The great causal influence of the past state of the
world must be acknowledged -- and indeed, it is a great force -- and
yet, man's freedom must not be restricted merely to the possibilities
therein contained. If this were the case, the running-down effect would
negate all further acts of creaturely freedom, and hence, of novelty.
Hartshorne, to be sure, does not want this conclusion to be inferred,
though he does, at times, imply it; but rather, he argues that man
does have an element of real creativity since the past can never be
solely determinative of the present (cf. his doctrine of relative deter-
minism, "Chapter Three"). The range of freedom is ensured because the
divine lure contains novel ideals which man is able to make determinate.
God envisages these ideals and offers them to creatures as the ideal
possibilities for any particular moment in creaturely experiencing.
The problem, however, is that Hartshorne then refers to these ideals
as being the best possible according to what is permitted by the past
actual world; that is, rather than these ideals being chosen by God from
among unactualized eternal possibilities. If this is Hartshorne's
position, then he seems to be back to the point of denying a real freedom
to man; that is, as opposed to a mere filling-in of the possibilities
permitted by the past world, to a making more determinate the past values
already existent. In this context it was suggested that if Hartshorne had more clearly specified that there are to be distinguished two aspects of the divine lure, it could be argued that man's freedom is made possible by his ability to actualize divine lures which are envisaged by God not merely as that which is possible according to the past causal nexus (which is, in effect, the more specific limit to each new act), but as that which is possible according to the more general limits. In this way, while the past nexus restricts man to specific possibilities, man is yet free to act beyond these confines since God presents to him ideals which are not confined to these past possibilities but yet which are confined to the more general limits, to the cosmic laws as such. Only by making the distinction between the general and cosmic limits can this be seen, and only by doing so can Hartshorne's account of creaturely freedom vis-à-vis the limits be made clear and coherent. As it stands, Hartshorne's account is quite incomplete, to the extent that he has not successfully shown how there can be a real creaturely freedom in man vis-à-vis the limits.

The issue here is quite complex, and indeed, it was argued that even if one accepts the distinction between the two types of limits as suggestive of a solution to this question, there immediately arises a most perplexing problem: is man really able to go beyond the specific limits and possibilities determined by the past nexus to create new experiences? An analogous issue, discussed in "Chapter Three", was this: if man is confined to the limits of his past character, can
he really be free to act so as to modify that character? In short, can man act from within certain (specific) limits to modify those very limits? Are not man's actions, in being confined to certain limits, restricted only to acts within those limits, and as such, is it not the case that he cannot modify those limits? If we consider the divine function of presenting to men new possibilities which are not simply restricted to the past nexus is the matter any further advanced? Can this be shown to be coherently possible? Hartshorne prefers to argue that the novelty introduced by God to us as ideals (final causes) is restricted to the possibilities permitted by the past nexus. Yet it was argued that this thesis greatly restricts man's freedom. On the other hand, however, if it is argued that the possibilities for freedom are derived from the divine lure which envisages ideals beyond the confines of the past nexus, we have the perplexing problem of how this can be so: how can man act beyond certain limits when he is restricted by the limits to actions within those very limits? This issue is not settled in Hartshorne's writings, and as such, it can only be maintained that a relatively important aspect of his theodicy is problematic, and hence, that the strength of his overall theodicy is somewhat weakened.

Now, while it was argued that there is a certain coerciveness by the divine agency with respect to the imposition of limits to freedom, the issue which the remainder of the chapter discussed was that of defining the nature of this divine agency vis-à-vis man's free agency within these general limits. In this context, many aspects of Hartshorne's metaphysics were discussed, beginning with a consideration of the basis
of his theory of the divine-human interrelationship, the organic-social analogy ("Section Three"). The analogy holds that God is the world-Mind, with the world of creatures His body; He is related to us immediately and directly as, analogously, our minds are related to our bodies. As such, the issue arose: if God knows and controls us immediately and directly, as we (our minds) know and control our bodies, does this not jeopardize our freedom? Hartshorne's argument, that we are not determined by God since we do not have perfect awareness of the divine fiat, was rejected. The issue is not whether we are aware of the divine agency but whether it determines our actions. The question is: can the parts (man) be free with respect to the whole (God)? The whole, or rather the Mind which unifies the whole, rules the parts as a monarch. Yet, while there is a ruling and dominant mind, there may still be local freedoms in the parts. By analogy, just as our own minds dominate our bodily parts, and just as that mind cannot be responsible for all of the individual actions of our bodily parts, so likewise, while God is the predominant Mind of the universe, this fact does not imply that He simply determines the activities of all His bodily parts, the world of creatures.

In this context, the arguments of Griffin and Ogden which seek to establish the freedom of the parts vis-à-vis the whole, based upon Hartshorne's analogy, were considered. By distinguishing two senses in which both God and man, analogously, can be said to act, it was argued that freedom is maintained and determinism denied. While God's acts provide the ideals for creaturely actions (and, according to Ogden
and Griffin, only in Jesus were these ideals fully fulfilled, or made fully determinate), man is always free to reject the divine ideals so that there can be no question of a complete divine determinism. As our bodily parts need not actualize (as secondary acts) the ideals of our minds (primary acts), so man's acts (as the secondary acts of God, as His bodily acts) need not fully actualize God's ideals (His primary acts). Man's acts are, as such, grounded in the divine primary acts; and yet they are not fully determined by these ideals. The implication here to be noted is that while God most surely plays an important role with regard to man's activity, yet, this does not necessarily imply that He simply determines that activity. To be sure, by His grounding of every creaturely act, the inference may be drawn that God ensures that man's freedom is kept within controllable limits; that God will not permit the freedom of creatures to become so chaotic that the very existence of that freedom is threatened. As such, there is an element of coerciveness exercised by God, or at least, an aspect of His persuasive agency which man has little, if any, ability to reject. He must persuasively lure creatures to accept His ideals, except where an overbalance of chaos threatens; here, He intervenes to divert that threat.

W. A. Christian's critique of Hartshorne's doctrine of the world as a divine organism was noted. For Hartshorne, the world is inclusive of God, as the parts are inclusive of the whole; and yet, it was argued that, in spite of Christian, this does not imply the negation of the freedom of the parts vis-a-vis the whole. Christian takes exception
to Hartshorne's thesis that God experiences the action of His bodily parts in their subjective immediacy after they have become; for Christian, God is not privy to the subjective experience of the parts as they become, nor when they have become, for once they have completed an experience, they perish and are reduced to unconscious objects for God's experience. In this event, Christian argues that God is not inclusive of the world, for He transcends it in His concrete actuality. Hartshorne's opposing view is that the concrete actuality of God contains the experiences of creatures in their full subjective immediacy, and as such, God is inclusive of the world. Hartshorne is not arguing that God is aware of the subjective immediacy of creatures as they become, but rather that after their experiences are complete, He experiences them not just as objects, but in their full immediacy — that is, just as they were. The creatures, however, do not go on experiencing in their full subjective immediacy in God; rather, they have perished and can experience no more. Hartshorne's point is that God retains their former subjective experiences exactly and completely as they were. Thus, He does not negate creaturely freedom by being privy to its subjective feelings at the very moment they are experienced by the creature in its becoming, as Christian seems to think is Hartshorne's view. God, rather, permits the free actions of creatures, and while He has a role in the causal nexus which effects those experiences, He cannot know how the creature will actualize that data until the act is done. This is the basis of human freedom: no cause can simply determine any action, for there is always an element of spontaneity in every new creation that has not
been fully determined by the data.

The relevance of Hartshorne's organic-social analogy for his understanding of how God persuades men in their specific, concrete actions was considered next ("Section Four"). Hartshorne argues that we perceive God as an element in our causal nexus as data, and since God is not just another element in that data but rather the eminent and most important element, and indeed, since He knows and controls us directly and immediately, His influence upon us is most effective. The question was, then: how effective is He, and correspondingly, how does His causal agency effect (cohere with) creaturely freedom? Hartshorne argues that we appropriate the divine lure directly and immediately—as analogously, our bodily cells are aware of our wishes, the commands of the mind for them. We intuit God, in fact, "unconsciously" at times, "irresistibly" to a degree, when His lure is appropriated without our conscious consent, or when we have little inclination to reject, consciously, His lure, as is the case when He offers us what we most want and need by way of value. He can influence us in this way since to change us He simply changes Himself as the data of our experience. Such considerations suggested an aspect of coerciveness in the divine lure since we have little choice but to appropriate those aspects of the lure. The coerciveness is, to be sure, never a complete coercion, for no stimulus can fully determine the response to it; there is always a small range for spontaneity, for novelty, which is not determined fully by the data (as argued in "Chapter Three").
The implications of this thesis for Hartshorne's theodicy were suggested as follows: man is not free (nor morally responsible) for those elements of the causal nexus (the divine lure and past data) which he appropriates unconsciously or irresistibly. Man is responsible for those acts of free agency wherein he has conscious and resistible choice. It was suggested, further, that since God's lure exerts an eminent effect in the becoming of all new experiences, this implies that He acts so as to ensure that the free acts of creatures are kept within suitable bounds, specifically, to ensure that the world is not destroyed by the unlimited acts of conflicting freedoms. Only God, being omniscient and omnipotent (in Hartshorne's revised conception) can ensure that creatures do not use their freedom to destroy the very possibility of there being further acts of freedom. For this to be ensured, a coerciveness must be acknowledged as ingredient in the divine lure, at times. The lure cannot be solely persuasive, for this could not account for the fact that God can and does restrict various lines of potentially chaotic actions. Hartshorne's insistence that God acts solely persuasively, then, is not coherent with his contention that God must limit certain threatening actions. This limitation, further, does not refer simply to the general cosmic limits, but is effective also in the more specific limits of concrete creaturely acts within these more general limits. Hartshorne is unclear on this point, for he has not considered sufficiently the question of the divine agency with respect, specifically, to the issue of the varying range of its effectiveness. To be consistent, Hartshorne must hold that
there is an element of coercion by God; that is, to explain how He prevents creaturely acts from creating an overbalance of evil. This granted, the implication of this thesis is that the evil which does exist is permitted by God, and is, accordingly, never greater than the good nor, as such, incoherent with it. It is never more than the world as a whole can bear — though it may be more than a particular individual, at times, can bear (though, to be sure, Hartshorne argues that even for the individual, there must be a surplus of good, or else nihilism would be more abundant than it now is: it would be the rule rather than the exception).

What was said regarding the causal agency of God as the eminent aspect in the causal nexus of every new experience was applied to Hartshorne's understanding of the causal effectiveness of memory ("Section Five"). Specifically, since memory and perception are more or less equated (for both are responsive to the causal data of the past), both affect the newly-becoming creature profoundly. Through memory we have direct and immediate access to our past states, and while we are fallible in analyzing and employing this data, the memory itself is basically infallible. Now, while it may be granted Hartshorne that memory concerns our own past states while perception concerns the past states of the world external to ourselves, yet since the past is, in effect, God's experience of that past, and since the past world is constitutive of God's body, God Himself is involved causally in the past data that we perceive in memory (as He is involved causally in our perceptions of that past). It was suggested that this is but
another aspect wherein the divine causative agency can be defined as containing some element of coerciveness, for that which weprehend directly and immediately in memory (as in perception) is greatly effective, indeed, to the extent that aspects of it are appropriated unconsciously; that is, since they are already part of our past and prehended in memory directly and fully.

The study of Hartshorne's doctrine of possibility ("Section Six") shed some light on the central issue (though it introduced incoherencies of its own), for it sought to defend Hartshorne from the criticism that he cannot account for God's persuasive role in affecting the newly creative experiences of creatures if he rejects the Whiteheadian thesis of there being specific eternal objects (definite possibilities) from which God selects His ideals for creatures, for their initial aims (their final causes). In reply, it was argued that Hartshorne can account for divine final causality in spite of the fact that he rejects Whitehead's doctrine of eternal objects. It was argued that the continuum of possibility is not constituted by either specific objects or a mere unstructured randomness, but rather, is a range of possibility which is somewhat structured and hierarchical. God's persuasive lure via the final causality of initial aims of creatures is effected, then, by His presenting to becoming creatures some range of possibility. Man's freedom is located in the fact that he is able to actualize certain ideals within this range of possibility. And here, God must resort to His persuasive lure to entice men to actualize the best possibilities which are offered.
A basic incoherence in Hartshorne's position, in this context, was suggested, since if Hartshorne rejects Whitehead's doctrine of eternal objects as specific ideals from which God selects the final causes (initial aims) for creatures, it cannot be held (as he does seem to hold) that the initial aims contain specific ideals. God's final causality and persuasive influence via initial aims, then, was questioned. A solution to this dilemma, however, was suggested: coherency can be restored to Hartshorne's metaphysics here if it is acknowledged that the initial aim is not a specific ideal but, rather, a range of possibility. That statements in Hartshorne's writings imply this view was argued, though the issue is clouded by Hartshorne's more common emphasis upon the initial aim as being specific: in this he is unclear and/or simply incoherent.

Granting that the divine persuasive influence is consistent with Hartshorne's doctrine of possibility, the issue next discussed concerned the nature of this divine agency, specifically as final and efficient causality ("Section Seven"). God effects His causal agency through both final and efficient causality whereby creatures prehend His ideals as elements in the causal data. The efficient causality which bears down upon the newly becoming subject is not just the past nexus, but is rather, God's experience of that past world, and, as such, the subject prehends not just the past world but also God's ideals. In this way, God's eminent effect upon the newly becoming creature can be appreciated: His final causality is a constitutive element in the efficient causality of the past nexus.
The question concerning man's ability to act beyond the specific confines was raised here, however, as was the question as to whether God's ideals contain only those possibilities permitted by the past nexus or, rather, ideals which are not confined to the past nexus but rather are beyond them. If the former is Hartshorne's position, then as was argued -- creaturely freedom is severely limited merely to making more determinate what already exists in that past; yet if the latter is Hartshorne's view, then the thesis that one can act from within certain limits to change those limits must be made viable. It would seem quite incoherent as it stands. But, in any event, Hartshorne's view appears to be the former (though the latter also is implicit -- without the interrelationship made clear). As such he is incoherent; and if the latter view is considered as an alternative, the incoherency arises again, though from another source. The issue, then, is left in a very incomplete and cryptic state by Hartshorne.

When we looked for elucidation of the central issue in Hartshorne's understanding of how a subject "becomes", that is, how it internalizes the divine lure (and the past nexus), we found him of little help ("Section Eight"). Whereas a full account of concrescence would have elucidated his understanding of the interrelationships of the freedom and responsible agency of man vis-à-vis the causal agency of the past actual world and of God, Hartshorne has written very little about concrescence (genetic successiveness). This seems to be the result of his denial that there can be any temporal successiveness within the concrescence of an actual occasion. The only succession is external to
the becoming entity, he holds, while within the actual concrescence the succession is merely logical -- that is, non-temporal. This position has, unfortunately, created a lacuna in our understanding of Hartshorne's attempt to define the interrelationships of God, man, and the past nexus. It was argued that, in light of the recent debates over this very issue (among Pols, Cobb and Ford in particular), the Whiteheadian doctrine of concrescence has been revealed to be of vital importance for our understanding of the complex interrelationships of man's free agency vis-à-vis the factors of the causal nexus and vis-à-vis divine causality. Hartshorne's failure to enter into this discussion is most unfortunate, and constitutes a weakening of the overall viability of his metaphysics and theodicy.

Finally, to balance the discussion of divine power, Hartshorne's understanding of divine benevolence was considered ("Section Nine"). Here, as was the case with divine power, it was argued that there is an aspect of divine coerciveness, or at least, a varying range of effectiveness by the divine agency.

What, in sum, can be said regarding the overall viability of Hartshorne's understanding of the divine human interrelationship? Has he adequately constructed an account of man's free and responsible agency vis-à-vis divine causative influence (and with the causal influence of the external past world)? It cannot be stated here simply that Hartshorne's theodicy either succeeds or fails; rather, it can only be concluded that, of the various aspects which constitute his theodicy, some are viable, others incoherent and inadequate -- as.
argued in the various sections of this chapter. It is, to be sure, essential for his theodicy as a whole that he show that man is a free and responsible being in face of the external world's efficient causality and vis-à-vis the divine final causality. Perhaps the most startling discovery made here is that Hartshorne's God is not to be seen as the solely persuasive influence that most process philosophers assume. Rather, this persuasive influence was seen to involve a range of effectiveness, and indeed approach a coerciveness, in certain aspects. It was argued that this thesis can be inferred from Hartshorne's writings, though Hartshorne himself has not stated it explicitly as such, for he has not sufficiently considered the full implications of his understanding of the God-human interaction.

The major implication of this thesis is that, while God permits creatures a vast range of free creativity in respect to which His power is confined to a persuasive lure, God will not permit man's freedom to destroy the very existence of such freedom, so that He limits and negates various creaturely acts. This latter aspect of the divine-world interaction suggests that God must act coercively at times, and that in respect to such action man is little able to act other than in accordance with the divine will. In short, then, Hartshorne has established that man is free and responsible for certain of his acts, but that God simply does not permit this freedom to go beyond suitable limits. This thesis implies that the evil in the world has been permitted by God and is consistent with a world where good predominates in spite of the amount of evil produced. In effect, evil is not seen
as incoherent with the world's good, nor with a loving and omnipotent God. Man is permitted a certain range of freedom and moral responsibility (indeed, unavoidably so, for in every new creative experience there is always an element of free spontaneity which cannot be predetermined by others external to that being), while God ensures that this freedom is kept within limits so that the evils produced never predominate over the goods.

Now, the issue of this chapter may be discussed and clarified further (if more indirectly) by considering the other aspect of the divine functioning with respect to the world: His preserving all creaturely values and re-introducing those values (with the evil "overcome") back into the world. We turn, then, to a study of the divine benevolence vis-à-vis the nature of evil as such, this constituting the second basic issue in Hartshorne's theodicy.
CHAPTER FIVE

DIVINE BENEVOLENCE AND EVIL

The previous chapter was essentially a discussion of Hartshorne's free-will defence, or in other words, of his attempt to reconcile God with creaturely freedom and moral responsibility for evil. The further issue to be discussed in this present chapter is that of reconstructing and assessing Hartshorne's attempt to show how God is reconciled with evil itself; specifically, how God, as benevolent (good and loving) is reconciled with evil as such: its source, nature, function and overcoming.  

The chapter proceeds as follows: "Section One" discusses Hartshorne's understanding of the source of evil in free creativity; it discusses, further, the nature of evil as "natural" and "moral". "Section Two" continues the discussion of the nature of evil, but with reference to evil as an aesthetic principle, and its function as such. "Section Three" then examines Hartshorne's understanding of the nature of evil as loss, as privation, and its function as such. Finally, "Section Four" discusses Hartshorne's theory of the overcoming of evil by God, and its implications are assessed.

\[Note\ here, \ to\ be\ sure, \ that\ while\ this\ particular\ aspect\ of\ the\ divine\ nature\ is\ isolated\ and\ studied\ in\ itself,\ it\ must\ be understood\ that\ this\ is\ not\ to\ imply\ that\ the\ other\ aspects\ of\ the\ divine nature\ are\ not\ involved\ in\ the\ issues\ to\ be\ discussed: \ it\ is,\ rather, to argue that the particular aspect emphasized here is most relevant to the issues now being analyzed.\]
1. Creativity; Natural and Moral Evil

Hartshorne employs the traditional terms, "natural" and "moral" evil, the former implying physical disorder and conflict; the latter, ethical perversity. In one place he defines moral evil as the "deliberate choice of the lesser good", and natural evil as the "frustrations and sufferings caused innocently by subhuman creatures, or by human creatures with perfectly good intentions" (CSPM 238). Basically, then, moral evil is the evil which is caused by the wilful decisions of human beings, who alone among creatures have the power of more fully developed consciousness and, accordingly, have the potentiality for the greatest perversity. (Hartshorne argues that the greater the level of freedom, of conscious choice, the greater is the risk of evil -- though, to be sure, so is the opportunity for greater good). Natural evil, on the other hand, is that evil not deliberately caused by conscious human beings, but rather is the result of the inevitable conflicts which arise from a creation which is -- to varying degrees -- freely spontaneous and creative. Both moral and natural evil, of course, cause mental and physical anguish in creatures at all levels of being.

Hartshorne seeks to explain natural evil as the result of the "aesthetic freedom" of creaturely existence: all reality, even in its most minute forms, has some degree of free spontaneity, which in the higher levels of creatures becomes more and more distinctly a conscious, "ethical" or moral freedom. Since all creatures strive for aesthetic
value and are freely creative, the conflict which is natural evil is inevitable. This basic understanding of evil is based upon and substantiated by Hartshorne's doctrines of psychicalism and relative determinism: each creature has a certain sentience and a degree of limited freedom, and to this extent is autonomous, and is not simply determined by things external to itself. Both goods and evils, he argues, arise from the same source: the free creativity of creatures. Here, he agrees with Whitehead in recognizing that both good and evil, order and disorder, are inevitable. "There is", as Whitehead argues, "no reason to hold that confusion is less fundamental than is order. Our task is to evolve a general concept which allows for both". (MT 70).

"Decay, Transition, Loss, Displacement belong to the essence of the Creative Advance" (AI 328) such are inevitable as the "many" of the causal data become the "one" of the new creation (cf, MT 70 f).

Hartshorne complains, however, that while this solution to theodicy has been repeatedly stated throughout history (though most recently), "it is missed 'as if by magic' by most writers". His version

---


of the solution is, to be sure, quite different from many (indeed, most!) of the modern versions, for the latter seek, according to Hartshorne, to reconcile a predeterministic, all-causative God with the reality of human freedom, whereas for Hartshorne, God is not the only free creator, but is, rather, the eminent creator alongside a world of free creatures who, in part, determine their own lives.

Certain basic questions have long been raised with respect to natural evil. For example, it may be asked: if there is an all-good and all-powerful God, why did He create a world in which good and evil arise from the same source? Or: could not God have created a world with less chance of evil, yet with still a great opportunity for good? Or, again: why could not God have created a world such that "every evil is prevented, so controlled that every process reaches a wholly desirable outcome?" Now, Hartshorne's understanding of the free creativity of all creatures, as opposed to the traditional understanding of God as being ultimately responsible for creaturely agency, leads him to regard these questions as off the point. Replying to the latter question, he argues:

The reader knows my answer by now: that I believe these are words with no clear meaning. The world is not and could not be a set of mere things, passively put and kept in their places, vessels of clay molded by the divine potter, and arranged each on its own appropriate shelf (LP 312).

Hartshorne's contention is that God has not simply created the world "ex nihilo" nor that His will exerts the sole agency in the
world. He regards the orthodox Christian doctrine of creation "ex nihilo" as "a dubious interpretation of an obscure parable, the book of Genesis" (DR 30). There is, he argues, no rationality in conceiving creation as having a beginning in time: if the creation of the world did have a first moment in time, then God, being both temporal and eternal (according to Hartshorne's neoclassical theism), would have had a first point in time corresponding to that of the world. But this cannot be ascribed to God, and as such, it cannot be the case that the world had a first moment "before" which nothing existed. He argues, further, that talk of a first moment is both meaningless and "self-contradictory, as Aristotle pointed out"; that is, since

Even a beginning is a change, and all change requires something changing that does not come to exist through that same change. The beginning of the world would have to happen to something other than the world, something which as the subject of happening would be in a time that did not begin with the world. God as changing furnishes such a subject, since he is in one respect (in Whitehead's terms, his primordial nature) ever identical, in another (his consequent nature) ever partly novel, and yet also -- by the indestructibility of the past -- containing all that he ever was as part of what he at any subsequent time becomes (HVG 233).

While Hartshorne's position here implies an infinite regress of past events without beginning, he insists that "all attempts to show this idea to be self-contradictory seem to have failed" (HVG 234).

Hartshorne's argument for the free creativity of all beings is based, in large, upon the argument that God does not have the sole
prerogative to create: all members of earthly society create -- in varying degrees. But this raises the question: is his conception of God not mistaken in conceiving God's power as limited? His response to such a criticism is to contend that any conception of divine power which conceives God as the sole power, as the sole creator ex nihilo, is the mistaken conception (as discussed above: see "Chapter Two").

The conception of power as it applies to God (and to man), he insists, must be carefully reconsidered, the traditional accounts being inconsistent. God, to be sure, is conceived in Hartshorne's account as eminent in all of His attributes: He has as much power, as much benevolence, etc., as any Being could have; that is, while at the same time acknowledging some degree of power in other beings.

The implication here is that God is not to be held solely responsible for the production of evil in the world; for, indeed, He is not to be held ultimately responsible for all the acts of creaturely life. It was, furthermore, simply not God's prerogative to have created a world in which less evil, or indeed, none at all, was the case. This is not the "best of all possible worlds", in spite of Leibniz, but rather, it is a world in which free creatures produce both good and evil. Leibniz represents, according to Hartshorne,

---

4 It is the best of all worlds in one sense, however; that is, since God can be counted on to maintain the world so that the opportunity for value is maximal, and alternatively, the risk of evil less than the opportunity for good. Yet the concept of the "best possible world" is ambiguous: there may be several world-orders of equal value, but incompossible. In any event, God is not solely responsible for what values are actually achieved.
the traditional view that there are no divine accidents (contingent predicates), and that the divine character eternally designates one world as the best possible world. One world would have had to have been considered the best possible, or else -- according to Leibniz -- God could have had no ultimate reason for its selection. Hartshorne contends, contrary to this position, that "if there is genuine contingency [as he insists there must be] there cannot be an ultimate reason specifying which possibles are actualized" (AD 185): God does not, before all creation, simply decide which possible world to actualize, for this would imply that all actuality is necessary or determined. It would also imply that creation is all-at-once, rather than processive; yet only in the latter case can there be real creaturely freedom. It would assume, further, that there is a beginning to the creative process itself, while for Hartshorne "all beginnings presuppose the process, not the other way" (AD 188). And finally, it would imply that there is a definite set of "possible things": Hartshorne holds, rather, that only the most abstract properties (not particulars or instances) are eternally distinct possibles, and since all are possible, there is no ultimate reason why one is better than the others. Many of these possibles will probably be actualized, "each in its due season", though to be sure, the infinity of possibilities defies exhaustion in actualization (AD 190).^5

^5While this seems to imply that there is a vast freedom for creatures to actualize whatever possibilities there are, it has been argued, above, that there are various forms of limitation upon every creaturely action.
Now, while God did not simply create the world the way it is, nor is the world the best possible world that could be, the world is not to be seen as a primordial entity which exists co-eternally with God. Hartshorne believes that the concepts of "creator" and "creature" can be maintained -- though not in the dubious sense of a creation "out of nothing" by God (cf. MVG 231ff). All creaturely acts depend upon there being an earlier world with potentials for transformation: "All making we ever encounter is transformation, enrichment of something already there" (MVG 231). The only creative activity of which we are aware is that which is a freely creative response to stimuli, and there is no logic, accordingly, in speaking of divine creativity as qualitatively different from this. God's eminent creativity consists, however, in the fact that He is never confronted by a world which antedates His own existence: His acts "refer only to antecedent events which themselves also embodied divine acts" (WP 194).

Note here that Hartshorne is not denying that God can be considered in se (that is, in abstraction, apart from the world); yet while God's nature has two aspects, His necessary existence and His contingent actuality, that God exists necessarily implies that He has contingent actuality: some world must exist. But which particular possibilities are actualized, in fact, are contingent.

It must be noted, furthermore, that the free creativity which all beings display is not to be understood as a "thing" or "substance" in its own right. Here, Hartshorne agrees with Whitehead that there
"are not two actual entities, the creativity and the creature. There is only one entity which is the self-creating creatures" (RM 102). All actual entities, including God, exemplify this creativity: all are "in the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground, the creative advance into novelty" (PR 529). God Himself is the eminent exemplification of the ultimate metaphysical categories, creativity included. Thus, granting real creativity in our creaturely experience, "it cannot be otherwise than that God should be in a situation of interaction with the nondivine individuals". Hartshorne contends that this view (Whitehead's) is "the first philosophy which gives 'Creator' a clear meaning by analogy with aspects of human experience".  

We must acknowledge, however, that this concept of creativity is no easy matter to understand and, thus perhaps, to accept. One recent author, W.J. Garland, has noted, for example, that the concept "is somewhat of an enigma to most students of... [Whitehead's] metaphysics", and that this may have been caused in part by Whitehead's apparent wavering in his own understanding of its nature.  

For example, in *Science and the Modern World* (1926), Whitehead refers to creativity "as as 'substantial activity' which is individualized into

---


a multiplicity of 'modes' (SMW 254ff), each of which corresponds to a single actual entity". This, according to Garland, "suggests that creativity is somehow more real than the actual entities into which it differentiates itself: it is a substance, whereas actual entities are merely its modes". Such an idea is missing in Whitehead's later publications, though in Religion in the Making (1926), he refers to creativity as the first of the three formative elements, along with actual entities and eternal objects. In Process and Reality (1929), while Whitehead still holds that creativity is ultimate, it is stressed that it has not the "final" or "eminent" character that its accidents, the individual actual entities, have. Creativity is seen as the most general trait which actual entities have in common, and is thus "the universal of universals characterizing ultimate matter of fact" (PR 31). Such a teaching, however, has led some interpreters, notably W.A. Christian, to reduce creativity to actual entities, for as Garland puts it, "If creativity is nothing more than a universal characteristic of actual entities, would it not be both possible and desirable to replace 'creativity' with 'actual entities' in our most-

---

8 W.J. Garland, "The Ultimacy of Creativity", 361.

Hartshorne's position on this issue is stated most clearly in his first chapter of \textit{Creative Synthesis andPhilosophic Method} wherein he clearly wants to regard creativity as the ultimate, fundamental principle of reality, and which is exemplified by both God and creatures. Like Whitehead (at least in \textit{Process and Reality}), he tries to escape the view that creativity is some "thing", some "force", which has an independent status of its own, apart from the actual entities which exemplify it: "creativity embraces all alternatives, and is indeed alternativeness itself; therefore, although particular becomings or instances of creation are contingent, that something or other becomes or is created is necessary" (CSPN 14). Again: "Becoming or creativity itself is necessary and eternal because it has nothing more general or ultimate above it" (CSPN 14). As Whitehead put it, "It lies in the nature of things that the many enter into complex unity" (PR 31).

A recent dissertation by E.P. Fulton argues that certain process
theologians, specifically Cobb, Weiman, and Meland, have identified — explicitly or implicitly — creativity with God.\textsuperscript{10} Such an identification, however, as Fulton argues, is not consistent with Whitehead's intention, and it has led to problems concerning theodicy; for, if God is creativity as such, then He is to be deemed responsible not only that things are, but also for what things are. And as such, He must be assumed responsible for all the good and evil in the world. For Whitehead, however, and for Hartshorne, creativity is responsible only that things are, but the reason for what, specifically, things are is the joint responsibility of the data of the causal nexus, the initial aim given by God, and the self-creativity of the becoming subject. God is not to be seen as the sole creator; but rather, all levels of being have some range of creative freedom, and hence, responsibility for the good and evil which they help to create.

The basis of Hartshorne's position regarding natural evil, then, is readily available: for Hartshorne, God is not the sole creator of the world's concrete actualizations; but rather, creativity is the ultimate principle of all things. With all levels of reality being to some extent self-causative, freely creative, there is inevitably

the conflict which is natural evil.\textsuperscript{11}

Now, we might pause here to note that, while Hartshorne does not wish to underestimate the negative and destructive nature of natural evil, he does suggest that it has been vastly overplayed in many traditional accounts. The issue of animal suffering is a case in point: to regard such suffering as unmitigated evil is, as he argues, "anthropomorphistic nonsense".\textsuperscript{12} Animals in fact, "are in general healthy (for the sick or injured cannot long remain themselves)", and live in accordance with their impulses. They do not suffer the gross frustrations of men, so that their existence can be termed "happy", at least so far as they are capable of it (cf. LP 310 f). Most animals live for millions of seconds, yet may undergo a few seconds of painful death. Death itself, indeed, is not to be seen as an unmitigated evil since, for many reasons, to go on living forever in this earthly life is not necessarily to be seen as a good (nor indeed would a heavenly eternity, for if creatures are to remain creatures, with their range of free creativity, then conflicts would continue to exist there also). As will be argued below, an overlong life would become boringly repetitive, and the evil of aesthetic monotony would set in.

\textsuperscript{11}Of course, as was discussed at length in the preceding chapter, God's creative role is by far the most eminent and important of the elements of the causal nexus of any subject.

\textsuperscript{12}Charles Hartshorne, "A Philosopher's Assessment of Christianity", 171.
Premature death, to be sure, would seem to be a great evil; and yet, it is to be understood as the result of the chance nature of things as they are. To make premature death avoidable, God would have to exercise absolute control over the world; and even if this were possible, it would result in an indiscriminate negation of creaturely freedom. Likewise, divine intervention in specific situations — wherein creaturely freedom would be momentarily suspended — would cause confusion with regard to the very meaningfulness of existence, since there would be no assurance that the laws and limits are constant and reliable. In any event, it is Hartshorne's reasoned contention that, except in the human case, even premature death is not much of an evil, "for it is not forseen as such nor is it long remembered by the survivors" in sub-human societies.13

Hartshorne notes, further, that there is little puzzling in the Christian Gospels and among naturalists over animals suffering, for both understand nature as "predominantly a spectacle of happiness as far as one can interpret it psychologically at all".14 For Hartshorne, "Nature apart from man is basically good. So is man, although he has unique capacities for evil as well as for good. This is because every increase in freedom increases the dangers

inherent in freedom. "Man is the freest, and hence, the most dangerous, of terrestrial animals" (BS 229).

Thus far, the discussion has concerned natural evil. Specifically, its source was located in the free creativity of all beings, at all levels of existence. With such freedom there is bound to be conflict among beings, and such is quite unavoidable unless one wishes God simply to determine all creaturely agency. Now, moral evil is but a more specific case of this natural evil; that is, since it is produced not by creatures in general, but specifically by man, by the latter's wilful and conscious free actions and decisions. Hartshorne does, to be sure, distinguish between a deliberate (moral evil) and an unintentional evil which man may create: he distinguishes between cognitive and ethical evil, the former implying "error, ignorance", and the latter, "decisions deliberately disregarding of legitimate interests". The latter alone is morally wrong.

Now, throughout this discussion of natural and moral evil, a basic assumption which has underpinned Hartshorne's position must be clearly noted; namely, his contention that "the risks of human freedom -- in scope extending far beyond that of the other animals -- are not

too high a price for the opportunities inherent in that same process.\textsuperscript{16}

Herein, then, lies the basis of his "solution" to the problem of evil:

**various levels and kinds of freedom are designed to make various levels and kinds of good possible and probable, although the probability of some negative values is inseparable from freedom.** Opportunities justify risks, but nothing justifies evils, nor needs to, since evils are not intended or designed at all, unless by more or less perverse human beings, or devils. Evils simply happen, as lines of free action intersect. In all this I presuppose a philosophy of freedom, such as is found in Bergson, James, Peirce, Dewey, and some other illustrious philosophers.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{16} Charles Hartshorne, "A Philosopher's Assessment of Christianity", 173.

\textsuperscript{17} Charles Hartshorne, "A Philosopher's Assessment of Christianity", 173.
2. The Aesthetic Principle

Hartshorne defines natural evil as aesthetic evil, or rather, as evil which is the result of aesthetic freedom. There is an inevitable aesthetic evil of partial harmony, of partial discord, due to the conflicts produced by freely creative creatures at all levels of existence. There is, however, in this discord of values an element of good, for both a "too tame order and a too wild and dangerous... disorder" are extremes, are "evils to be maximally avoided in some golden mean" (DR 136). Both extremes lead to destruction of life since pure monotony would run down the world's creativity just as surely as would pure chaos: both some order and some disorder are needed to avoid these two extremes. Aesthetic value is, then, measured by the extent of the golden mean achieved between the extremes; specifically, by the intensity and the harmony of the elements in the experience.

"There are [according to Hartshorne]...at least two relatively objective dimensions of aesthetic value: the dimension simple-complex; and the dimension integrated-diversified, or order-free. In both dimensions beauty is the mean between extremes" (BS 6). There must be some balance between order and disorder, and between the amount of triviality and complexity involved. "For each level of complexity there is a balance of unity and diversity [and of triviality and complexity] which is ideally satisfying" (CSPM 304); or as he puts it elsewhere,
there must be sought a balance among the "hopelessly monotonous" and the "hopelessly chaotic", and the "hopelessly complex" and the "hopelessly superficial". All life, in its bare existence, may be seen as ideally "a harmony in diversity, and all experience is in some degree an achievement. Beauty is the norm of this achievement, equally far from the four extremes or poles of failure" (BS 8).  

This is, to be sure, one expression of Hartshorne's dipolar logic, whereby the necessity of there being both aspects of the polar positions in synthesized balance is required.

One major criticism of Hartshorne's understanding of the aesthetic principle has been recently raised by Hare and Madden. They argue, in short, that the God of Whitehead and Hartshorne seems to be concerned with the achievement of aesthetic value at the cost of great suffering in creatures. They argue: "Certainly a God who is willing to pay any amount in moral and physical evil to gain aesthetic value is an unlovable being". Further, they contend that the aesthetic theory, which seeks to explain evils as simply components of a greater and more complex whole, cannot explain all

---

18 See Hartshorne's detailed explanation of this argument and his diagrammatical illustrations of it in his latest book, *Born to Sing*, "Chapter One"; see also CSPM, "Chapter Fourteen".

19 P.H. Hare and E.H. Madden, "Evil and Unlimited Power", 287.
the evil in the world. For there to be aesthetic gain, they argue, "it is not necessary to have all the physical evil in the world".\textsuperscript{20} And since God permits such an amount of evil, He cannot be either all-powerful or all-good.

Hartshorne's reply to such criticism is, first of all, to deny that either he or Whitehead has ever claimed that God wants both goods and evils to be produced for the sake of His overall aesthetic value. Rather, God seeks optimum opportunities for goods, while unfortunately, evils arise from the same source as do the goods: from creative freedom.\textsuperscript{21} Furthermore, he has argued that it is not correct to attribute all evils to God's agency (as argued above). Thus, Hare and Madden's argument that Hartshorne's God cannot be good or powerful, since He allows as much evil as He does, would appear to be a misunderstanding of Hartshorne's position. (Further discussion of the Hare and Madden -- Hartshorne debate follows shortly).

Hartshorne has sought to explain his aesthetic theory most carefully to ward off ill-considered criticisms of the view of evil it implies. Fundamental to his understanding of this theory is his view of the relationship between aesthetic and ethical goods: "being

\textsuperscript{20} P.H. Hare and E.H. Madden, "Evil and Unlimited Power", 287.

\textsuperscript{21} Charles Hartshorne, "The Dipolar Conception of Deity", 282 ff.
ethical is to will the aesthetic good for all concerned, goodness of will being itself both an element of harmony, as Plato saw, and productive of further harmonies". 22 Hartshorne contends that the triumphant, "goodness, truth and beauty", that is, "acting rightly, thinking rightly, and experiencing well or satisfyingly", ought to be reversed: beauty is the "basic value", and in it both goodness and truth are presupposed (cf. CSPM 303). Truth is a form of beauty, or in other words, of aesthetic value. Since the more truth one knows, the more one can order and also diversify one's ideas and make them fit one's perceptions...It is more illuminating to take truth as a form of beauty than beauty as a form of truth" (CSPM 308). Likewise, goodness "presupposes aesthetics", since goodness "is not the value of experiences themselves, but rather the instrumental value of acting so as to increase the intrinsic value of future experiences, particularly those of others than oneself" (CSPM 308; cf. RSP 44). As an example of the primacy of aesthetic value, further, Hartshorne points out that whereas animals do not experience ethical good and evil ("only man can be ethically good": CSPM 309), they do experience aesthetic value. Likewise, ethical values are not applicable to God: God's goodness is ever constant, while He continually grows aesthetically.

22 Charles Hartshorne, "The Dipolar Conception of Deity", 287.
"God can be endlessly enriched aesthetically; he can endlessly increase in achievement, though not in the rightness of his aim. The rightness is always [ethically] perfect" (CSPM 310). This teaching is explained in other words: ethical value is concerned with consequences, while aesthetic value is immediate (cf. RSP 44). "What basically is value?", Hartshorne asks: "It cannot be ethical value that is basic; for ethics is concerned with consequences, or with justice to others; and the goodness or badness of these consequences, or the good and bad that is to be justly distributed, must be measured by a criterion other than the ethical" (RSP 44).

Hartshorne is arguing here that all forms of life have some element of aesthetic value: all experiences are concerned with value, every act striving to realise some value. Aesthetics, then, is basic to metaphysics: "actuality could not not have value" (CSPM 307; cf. MVG 212). As long as an individual creature exists, it experiences harmonized contrasts, and functions as a unity amid diversity. Hartshorne insists that "we shall never understand ourselves or any other animal in a fully satisfactory way until we see that all activity is motivated by the sense of possible harmonies and by the flight from the twin evils of discord and monotony" (BS 2). "Creativity guarantees a minimum of value to every actuality" (CSPM 306). In every experience, there is the synthesis of past events and actualized ideals. There is also novelty and contrast with what went before and with what could have been (cf. CSPM 306). This is so for every creature, though to be
sure, in varying degrees, according to the level of mental development of the creature in question. Even the constituents of atomic and subatomic elements, for example, may be considered as acting in such ways that relieve the monotony of their existences by shifting their paths radically enough to achieve a real contrast from their former state (cf. RSP 46 ff). Likewise, "nature avoids monotony by flowing in waves" (RSP 48). Matter itself is not a lifeless substance, but rather, is composed of the contrasting aspects of continuity and discontinuity (termed "complementarity" in physics), and of living and dead matter, of efficient and final causes (cf. RSP 48). As with matter, so it is with time: harmony is displayed by the continuity aspect of expectation and fulfilment (RSP 49). Hartshorne's life-long study of birds has confirmed this teaching: always, he argues, there is conformity to the "anti-monotony" principle, there are always variations in the songs of birds (cf. BS, especially "Chapter Seven" and "Chapter Eight").

This teaching, that existence as such always has some value, some aesthetic worth, implies for Hartshorne that existence as such is a good. Every act is an aesthetic synthesis which produces the beauty of ideal harmony in varying (less-than-perfect) degrees. Every act, as such, has some real value, and in this, it has some good.  

---

23 In this, of course, Hartshorne is in agreement with the mainline of Christian theology which holds that Esse qua esse bonum est.
Now, this thesis is disputed by certain critics, notably by Hare and Madden, and while Hartshorne has replied directly to their arguments, it must be acknowledged that his reply is disappointingly brief and incomplete. In effect, he replies only that his own thesis is consistent with the classical doctrine that any actuality is on the whole good, while Hare and Madden seem to assume, rather, a "Schopenhauerian view". We must, nevertheless, consider the basic points of the argument of Hare and Madden against Hartshorne's position and suggest how he could reply. We may note, here, that the arguments of these critics are of varying value and portray a varying degree of understanding of Hartshorne's position. They seem clearly mistaken, for example, in arguing that rather than rejoicing in the maximum of value which He alone can experience, the process God ought to be more regretful that nothing better was possible. Here, it must be understood that the value achieved by God is not solely for Himself, but rather for the world of future creatures; that is, since God re-introduces His experiences into the world for the benefit of all future creatures. It must be understood, further, that God may,

24 P.H. Hare and E.H. Madden, "Evil and Unlimited Power".
26 Charles Hartshorne, "The Dipolar Conception of Deity", 286:
27 P.H. Hare and E.H. Madden, "Evil and Unlimited Power", 288.
indeed, regret that the world could not have been better, but if creaturely freedom is to be respected, there can be no guarantee that this could have been the case. 28

Hare and Madden argue, further, that while God may not have created the world ex nihilo (according to process philosophers) he was at least "with creation" from the "beginning", and presumably could see its limitations, so that he could have been able to "call the whole thing off", or at least nipped in the bud some of the more agonizing tendencies. 29 Here, Hartshorne's position is that God does indeed know the limitations, the risks, of creation, and that, yet, he knows its opportunities for value and good. It has, furthermore, been argued in this dissertation that Hartshorne's God does nip certain threatening lines of development so that the balance of good and order over evil and chaos is maintained. Hare and Madden may be right, nevertheless, in arguing that perhaps God ought to do more (as will be discussed later). Further, with regard to the question as to why God has not "called the whole thing off", Hartshorne's position is that the world would, in fact, run-down if there were more evil than good; for if this were the case, no beings, God included, would seek further experiences. The fact that this has not happened, then, is

28 See below "Section Four", especially the references to Fulton.
29 P.H. Hare and E.H. Madden, "Evil and Unlimited Power", 288-289.
evidence that there is indeed more good and order than evil and disorder (as will be discussed shortly).

Hare and Madden argue also that common sense suggests that some things simply ought not to be, implying that there do seem to be unmitigated evils, and that the best of what is possible, at times, may itself be rather ghastly. 30 Here, Hartshorne’s position is that every experience has some value, and that this value is experienced fully by God and then passed back into the world for the benefit of all creatures. Indeed, as just noted, if all life were not more good than evil, then it simply would not go on as it does.

Here, however, we may note this important point: it would appear that Hartshorne’s aesthetic theory must not be taken to imply that good and evil are, ideally, to be in perfect balance; since, rather, his argument is that good must predominate — for God and, indeed, for the world as a whole. As they stand, then, his writings suggest the inconsistent juxtaposition of the theories that the ideal of aesthetics ("beauty") is the perfect mid-point of the polar extremes (order-chaos) and that yet there is a surplus of order, of good. 31

In any event, the principal point to be noticed here is that

30 P.H. Hare and E.H. Madden, "Evil and Unlimited Power", 288.

31 It would appear that order is not necessarily good, nor disorder necessarily evil, and that while aesthetic balance seeks a medium of order and disorder, a balance of good over evil is sought. This does not seem coherent somehow, and Hartshorne has not been as clear here as we could wish.
it is Hartshorne's understanding of the value of existence as such that leads to his rather optimistic stance. He holds, for example, that there is no such thing as unredeemed evil, that indeed, there is some positive value in even the worst of evils. "Any evil has some value from some perspective, for even to know it exists is to make it contributory to a good, knowledge itself being a good" (NTT 80). This teaching would seem to follow directly from the view that creative choices are between incompatible goods, that there is aesthetic value in every experience (that is, or else there would be no experience, for there would be only negation of experience due to either sheer monotony or sheer chaos). And yet, while Hartshorne offers this general explanation of evil, he is by no means seeking to justify evil: evil can never be justified. It can, however, be somewhat explained; that is, as the result of creative freedom from which arises the incompatible choices of greater and lesser goods. "Risk of evil and opportunity for good are two aspects of just one thing, multiple freedom....This is the sole, but sufficient, reason for evil as such and in general, while as for particular evils, by definition they have no ultimate reason. They are nonrational" (NTT 81). The ultimate fact of creativity, of creatively-free creatures, makes conflicts inevitable. Yet, particular evils are not preordained; they are, rather, the chance outcome of the free actions of all creatures.

What is perhaps the greatest evil for many -- death -- has an aesthetic explanation in Hartshorne's theodicy. Animals, for example,
experience both harmony and discord as they strive for value. Yet, as animals grow old, the excitement for life, its diversity and freshness, becomes less stimulating as present experiences become more and more repetitions of former experiences. This leads Hartshorne to suggest that death has this ultimate reason: it is the release from boredom and lack of stimulation that old age brings. For an individual to go on living forever, Hartshorne argues, would mean that he would have no long-range memory, for there would simply be too many experiences to remember. Yet, without this memory, there is question as to whether there can be talk of a "continuing person". It would mean also that there would be an endlessly increasing monotony of experiences. 32

Thus, it is Hartshorne's contention that "the idea that death is essentially or in principle an evil [is] a sheer mistake" (CSPM 309). "Death at a certain time, or in a certain way, may be a great evil, but death as such is a good" (CSPM 309); death "is in principle a good, not an evil". 33

Death is merely a final incident in the fundamental transience of life, as it appears to us when we forget about God. On any day of his life a man has already died, so far as all but a tiny fraction of his past is concerned. A million or so of his experiences have already "perished" into the past (RSP 211; cf. WP 123).


Each successive experience "enjoys itself", and this is "all the reward it can ever have" (PSG 285). Hartshorne rejects the traditional accounts of immortality; that is, that a creature may endure death as consciously active. Yet, inspite of our not continuing in conscious life (called "subjective immortality") he believes strongly that we have an "objective immortality" (that is, life in others, most notably in God), since God remembers our present experiences exactly as they occurred, in their full immediacy. God also experiences our experiences not from within our narrow and finite perspective, but from His larger, perfect perspective, so that their full value is appreciated. This view, Hartshorne contends, is "the only way rationally to accept death"; we "must see that though at every moment, through forgetting, we yield up, die to, most of our previous reality, the forgotten experiences are not thereby lost, since they are one and all additions to the experiences of God, the all-cherishing or cosmically social being, to whom all hearts -- not only as they are but as they have been -- are open" (RSP 42). Men come and go, and so likewise do entire species, and indeed entire cosmic epochs; yet, because of God's perfect and everlasting memory, no value is ever forgotten, and all value is seen in its proper perspective, in its full good. This indeed is what makes our experiences valuable in the first place: they have everlasting and ultimate value (and thus, immediate meaning) for God. And because God's experiences are re-introduced into the world, our values live on not only in God but in the world as well. Each creature
has immediate value, immediate aesthetic enjoyment (to some degree), and this is its reward or punishment for its actions. There is no need for eternal reward or punishment that must be everlastingly and consciously endured by a creature. Thus, the death of one particular individual, or indeed, the demise of an entire species need not be looked upon as an unmitigated evil. There would be some problem, on the other hand, if that individual or species were simply to go on experiencing eternally, for then, as noted above, boredom, weariness, and loss of identity would be at issue.

Note that Hartshorne's aesthetic understanding of death is concerned not with particular deaths but with death in general. This is the same approach he takes concerning all evils as such: there can be no explanation for individual, particular evils, for the free interplay of self-determining creatures is involved in chance occurrences. Death and evil in general are all that can be explained. There is no cosmic determinism or predestination affecting individual creatures. Since God is not to be understood as the sole creator of all things, but rather as the most eminent creator who sets limits to creaturely freedom, who lures creatures to the best ideals in every situation, and preserves its values, there is a range for freely creative actions by all levels of beings. Because of the individual creativity of all beings (to varying degrees) there can never be a complete causal determinism of any action from past causes or events. Individual evils, then, are to be seen as the chance result of the
interaction of the creative freedom of all beings. We have reason for optimism, however, since God would not allow evil to predominate over the good, and since according to Hartshorne's aesthetic theory, there is some value (some good) in every new experience.
3. Evil as Loss, as Privation

Thus far, I have reconstructed and discussed, in brief, Hartshorne's understanding of natural and moral evil, and of evil as an aesthetic principle. Hartshorne's writings, to be sure, suggest that he understands evil in other ways, the most important of which is the evil of "loss". In this he follows Whitehead who argues that the "ultimate evil" in the temporal world is deeper than any specific evil. It lies in the fact that the past fades, that time is a 'perpetual perishing'. Objectification involves elimination. The present fact has not the past with it in any full immediacy" (PR 517). There is involved herein much that is lost, for indeed, while the past is lost, as present experiences proceed farther and farther from that past, lost also, at times, are higher experiences in favour of lower experiences (cf. RM 95). Furthermore, there is "loss to the social environment" (RM 97), since loss to one creature affects many other creatures because of the tightly knit social nature of the world; there is loss also of what is envisaged in favour of what is: man's "higher intellectual feelings are haunted by the vague insistence of another order, where there is no unrest, no travel, no shipwreck" (PR 516); "Each tragedy is the disclosure of an ideal.— What might have been, and was not: What can be" (AI 329). When higher experiences are lost in favour of lower ones, this may be called the evil of "triviality": it is loss
of intensity and greater harmony (beauty). Lost also are those ideals and aspects of the causal nexus which are not actualized in the present experience: their actualization is excluded, deprived. This latter aspect may be termed the evil of "privation", to use the traditional term.

This evil of loss, of deprivation, is not to be understood as unmitigated evil, that is, as a purely negative fact. For rather, there is this paradox: every actualization necessarily involves some loss, some deprivation, and yet, as an actualization, it also has some value, and as such, some good. Indeed, for there to be process at all, there must be the continual realization of values. That these involve also loss is inevitable: each act "excludes things which for some are genuine values. Always someone loses or suffers. This is an element of tragedy inherent in process itself" (RSP 99). Finite creatures can never fully actualize the infinite potentiality envisaged by God; there are always losses, shortcomings:

To be actual, concrete, particular, is to be definite, that is, definite -- limited, this but not that, or that but not this. Only pure potentiality can be unlimited, indefinite, and void of incompatibility. Real potentiality is always limited, exclusive; and actuality is the final portion of limitation or exclusiveness (RSP 99).

Hartshorne's "principle of positive incompatibility" expresses this thesis: it holds that any actualization necessarily excludes others, other goods. "Between positive values there can be no necessary or uniquely right choice. And always some goods must be renounced" (CSPM 311).
This being the case, Hartshorne can argue that the world "is basically good", for in spite of the evils, there is always some value, some good, actualized in every experience (BS 229; cf. LP 14). He argues, further, that "the opportunities of existence outweigh its risks" (LP 14). In each and every act there is some good, since there is some value made definite, determinate. There is also, inevitably, some evil as loss or deprivation in every action; yet, this negative aspect does not outweigh the good, for while good is positive value, evil is not completely, unmitigatedly negative. From one aspect, to be sure, evil is always to be seen as destructive, as loss, as negation: it is suffering, mental and physical, and always a higher good is desirable. And yet, there is a fundamental optimism in Hartshorne's theodicy, since evil is understood not only as negation, but in the more positive aspects concerning its nature and function as aesthetic value. For, as noted above, it is Hartshorne's contention that some discord is necessary in order that the world's creativity does not run-down due to a deadening monotony. Indeed, discord is necessary, as is order, to avoid the extremes of too much order and too much chaos. To term this element of discord an unmitigated evil would seem quite inaccurate, for it has the positive role to play in the necessary transition to new experiences and in the establishment of aesthetic harmony in present experiences. Hartshorne would agree with Whitehead who contends that "some admixture of Discord is a necessary factor in the transition from mode to mode... Discord may take the form of freshness or hope,
or it may be horror or pain" (AI 306). Some discord is essential, and while it is "in itself destructive and evil", it is also positive in the sense that it helps to stimulate a shifting of the creative aim "from the tameness of outworn perfection to some other ideal with its freshness upon it" (AI 296). Evil has this paradoxical function: it is both destructive, in that it is loss, privation, and yet, it has positive value in its role in the transition to greater goods and values and harmonies. It is in this light, I should think, that Hartshorne argues that some forms of evil seem compatible with the idea of a world fundamentally good (cf. LP 14; CSPM 240).

If we ask, however, whether evil, then, is to be understood as neutral, in that it has both negative and positive aspects, depending upon how one looks at it, both Hartshorne and Whitehead would insist that evil is not to be so understood, but that rather, evil is destructive and negative. The negative aspects of evil are not to be underplayed, and, indeed, while evil may serve a useful and necessary function, for example, in the attainment of aesthetic value and in the transition to fresh ideals, a lesser evil would, perhaps, have made possible an even greater good. As Hartshorne argues, while "God makes the best of evil...he can do better still with good". 34

34 Charles Hartshorne, "The Immortality of the Past: Critique of a Prevalent Misinterpretation", 106. There is, however, some lack of clarity in Hartshorne's position here: he seems to argue that while evil serves the positive function in the transition to future goods, etc., yet these future goods could have been better if there had not been the evil in the first place. The passage cited seems to imply this; that is; that goods can help create further goods more so than can evils. Yet, this position would seem to ignore the necessity and positive value of evils in the creation of the new goods.
Hartshorne's argument, then, is that evil is neither unmitigatedly destructive nor merely neutral. In this light, his reply to the nihilist's claim, that evils seem to be predominant over goods, indeed to the extent that existence seems a meaningless and unordered chaos, is to argue that if one really believed this claim, then one simply could not go on living. The fact that we do go on living testifies to the fact that life presupposes that there is value and meaning, for without this value and meaning there would be no stimulus for further life (cf. DR 46). Hartshorne argues; in fact, not only that there must be some good for there to be continual creative advance, but that there is a surplus of good, "a net increment" of value (DR 46). He argues that this is substantiated not only by the fact that we experience some value in every act, but that from the divine perspective, the evil we create is "overcome" (as will be discussed shortly); and he argues that if there were not more good than evil, not only we-creatures, but God Himself, would have no stimulus to seek new experiences:

For if there is always more satisfaction than dissatisfaction, then God should always have more reason to rejoice than to grieve over the world, and since he can retain the consciousness of past joys, there will always be a net increment of value accruing to God at each moment. Now if life were not more satisfying than otherwise, could it go on? Is there anything to maintain the will to live save satisfaction in living? I do not
Again, he expresses this theme: "every concrete experience as a whole is a value rather than a disvalue. When life offers us less than nothing, we do not live"; "the fact that God inherits all our feelings does not mean that he is in danger of finding disvalue overbalancing value. Even for us this does not occur". God retains in "subjective immediacy" (versus "objective immediacy" — see below) the entire history of cosmic events, goods and evils. From this perfect, complete,

35 Here, Hartshorne agrees with and probably learned from Bergson (as he has in many ways). Bergson, for example, writes:

No, suffering is a terrible reality, and it is mere unwarrantable optimism to define evil a priori; even reduced to what it actually is, as a lesser good. But there is an empirical optimism, which consists simply in noting two facts: first that humanity finds life, on the whole, good, since it clings to it; and then, that there is an unmixed joy, lying beyond pleasure and pain, which is the final state of the mystic soul. In this twofold sense, and from both points of view, optimism must be admitted, without any necessity for the philosopher to plead the cause of God. It will be said, of course, that if life is good on the whole, yet it would have been better without suffering, and that suffering cannot have been willed by a God of love. But there is nothing to prove that suffering was willed.


and immediate perspective, there is an overall predominance of good. While for us there may at times seem to be a predominance of evil, for "the total character of God's life", there is always an "overwhelmingly joyous" experience (WP 106).

But let us pause here to consider two points. The first concerns the contrast between the positions of Hartshorne and Teilhard de Chardin. For the latter, the world is progressing toward greater and greater values and goods, towards its final culmination in Christ. But, for Hartshorne, the world is progress, though not necessarily progressive; that is, it changes continually, but this does not imply that it is getting better or that it will get better. There is no one far off, ultimate point toward which the world is striving and wherein all evil is overcome. There is, rather, at each moment, a surplus of good over evil, and an overcoming of evil by God such that there is value acknowledged at each moment. The surplus of value is not to be attained in some future culmination, but exists for God at each moment.

Yet here -- this is the second point -- I would suggest that in spite of Hartshorne's arguments for there being a surplus of value, he may be seeking to establish too much: must there be a surplus of value for there to be further creative experiences? Or is it not, rather, the case that there need be only some value? Hartshorne, wants to argue for there being a surplus of value so that it may be implied that the evil in the world is never such that it predominates. If it did predominate, then God's power and benevolence would be in
question, for while He is not the sole creator of the world, He is the eminent creator, and as such, the most important influence in the causal nexus of processive new experiences of creatures. But, can it not be argued that even if evil were greatly predominate over good, there would still be reason for hope, for continued striving after new values, new experiences, since any measure of value we may have, any meaning we may have in this chaos of life, would seem to offer sufficient stimulus for one to carry on the struggle of the creative advance? This, to be sure, for Hartshorne, would seem to raise the question of God's power and benevolence, since if there were a predominance of evil, the reality of God would be at issue. And, indeed, it is this consideration which appears to be behind Hartshorne's attempt to establish the fact of there being a surplus of good: if life were predominantly evil, if it were predominantly suffering, it would be difficult to understand now it would continue, for there would simply be no will to live, no desire for further experiences. Yet, could it not be argued that life can be sustained and considered meaningful because of faith or hope for some future good, in spite of the fact that present evils and disorder seem to be predominant? If this is a valid argument, it would seem to contradict Hartshorne's contention that there must be a surplus of value. But, to be sure, Hartshorne rejects any post mortem after life in which we creatures would be consciously immortal, and accordingly, he would find meaningless any argument which was based upon such a hope. So,
perhaps, we are back to his position that there must be a surplus of value, rather than merely some value. And here, I should think that he is correct in contending that there must be a surplus of value for the world as a whole to continue — there must be order (that is, more order than disorder); and perhaps, furthermore, as Hartshorne argues, there must be a surplus of value and order in God's overall experience of the whole creative process. The question I raise, however, is whether there must be a surplus of value and order for each individual. To be sure, as noted above, Hartshorne's argument against the nihilists who contend that existence is meaningless is to argue that if this were in fact the case, the nihilist could not continue to function: "we do not live", he argues, "when life offers us less than nothing", and the fact that we do go on testifies that "every concrete experience as a whole is a value rather than a disvalue". 37 It is still not clear, however, that there must be a surplus of value for the individual at every moment for interest in further experience to be sustained. We may grant, to be sure, that suicides testify to the fact that life does become meaningless for certain individuals (though there would seem to be other reasons for suicide besides meaningfulness); yet, it would seem arbitrary to argue that meaningfulness is marked by the line

where the surplus of order and value has shifted to an overbalance of disorder and chaos. Could not an individual live with some overbalance of disorder? I am not certain Hartshorne is fully convincing here.
4. Evil "Overcome" by God

Having now discussed Hartshorne's understanding of evil — its source in creativity, its nature as natural and moral, as loss, as an aesthetic principle, and its function as such — we must next focus upon Hartshorne's understanding of the overcoming of evil by God (a doctrine he takes from Whitehead). Hartshorne's argument is that God overcomes evil, that He transforms it, and that, yet, this divine action does not simply negate the evil nor make it something other than it was for the creatures who have suffered it. Evil remains evil for God; but in its transformation in the divine Mind, the good which is contained in the evil is fully appreciated for its role in the synthetic harmony of the divine vision. This view, according to Hartshorne, is evidence of the benevolence of God, for besides His transformation of evil, He also passes back His synthetic vision into the world, to be apprehended by becoming creatures as their subjective aims, as elements of the causal nexus. This, in effect, constitutes the second function of God, as defined above; yet, that it establishes His benevolence is the issue to be considered here.

Hartshorne's thesis may best be understood by noting certain criticisms of his position, together with a consideration of his own response to such criticisms or with a suggestion as to how he could respond (that is, where he has not directly done so). It is fortunate
that Hartshorne, in essays ten years apart, has responded to two of the most serious critiques of his thesis (and of Whitehead's), and accordingly, we may consider some of the issues involved therein.

One area of contention is this: if God "overcomes" evil, does this not imply that creaturely experiences are not really valued by God for their own sakes, but that rather they are only the "instruments of God's [aesthetic] joy"? Hartshorne counters this argument with his contention that, in God, altruism and self-interest are perfectly coincidental; that is, since God's altruism toward creatures constitutes also His own self-interest "without being any the less altruism" (WP 103). Indeed, as he argues, "To expect God not to benefit by any benefits he bestows is to deny his omniscience; or it is to claim that a loving being could fully know the joy he produces in others and remain unpleased by this as well as untroubled by their suffering" (WP 103). Hartshorne holds that whereas man has inadequate and partial knowledge of things external to himself, for God all things are internal and immediate. Indeed, "only a mere machine that blindly passed out

---


benefits could conform to the notion of a benevolence that had nothing to gain from the success of its services to others" (WP 104).

Another issue is this: are we, as one critic argues, de-individualized when our experiences become part of God's being? God could not, according to the critic, "merge me and my values into an indefinitely immense system and still claim that I have maintained my individuality and my values".\(^{40}\) Hartshorne, however, has countered this line of objection with the doctrine of the "compound individual" (which, to be sure, he takes from Whitehead), wherein it is argued that the parts of a whole retain their individuality within the whole.

In the case of God as the whole and men as the parts (together with all beings), the parts are maintained in their complete and perfect immediacy, since God hasprehended them in their full subjective immediacy, "without loss of immediacy", and thus, in their full individuality (WP 107). Creaturely identities, then, are not lost in God after their earthly deaths, but rather are retained just as they were, forever as they were, in God. It is granted that while creatures live on in God's memory in all their subjective immediacy, they are only "objectively" (versus "subjectively" or consciously) immortal in themselves; that is, they are no longer conscious, and only their past lives and actions

\(^{40}\) S.L. Ely, The Religious Availability of Whitehead's God, 49.
continue to endure forever. This does not mean that creatures relive the past in God, but rather, it implies that their individual pasts are remembered perfectly and just as they occurred; that is, in their subjective, immediate aspects.

Some critics, however, cannot agree with this thesis, and argue that for God to really be merciful and loving (as is demanded by Christian faith), we ourselves would have to live consciously forever to receive compensation and rewards, and not just as objectively immortal (as data for others). Hartshorne and Whitehead have always found this longing for personal (subjective) immortality in some post mortem heaven a major indication of the grip of the substance doctrine and self-interest theories on our culture. Hartshorne has argued that a more adequate view is to see that it is not we ourselves (subjectively) who continue to live on immortally, but rather our past selves and actions are completely and perfectly retained in the mind of God. He claims, in fact, that this theory is a more adequate understanding of personal immortality than the traditional view; that is, since it is the perfect preservation of our actual life on earth, just as it took place from the inside, in the imperishable divine experience, which, having once received our experiences, never allows their vividness to fade. Thus our entire earthly personality is undying, even though perhaps we are given no post-terrestrial experience linked by our memories to the earthly ones (WP 108).

A closely related criticism defends Whitehead but attacks Hartshorne. It holds that, while Whitehead's teaching sees the world
as enriched by God's harmonized experiences, for Hartshorne, it is only God, and not the world, that is enriched: "For Whitehead, the final repository of value is the world; for Hartshorne it is God." 41 That this, however, is clearly a misunderstanding of Hartshorne's position (though a common one) must be insisted upon. For it may be true that God is the only infinitely existing being, and that accordingly, He alone lives everlastinglly in "subjective" (versus "objective") immortality to enjoy all actualized values; yet, creaturely existence is not to be seen as merely a means to the values experienced by God. It is, rather, an end in itself, and its own justification and reward. It is Hartshorne's contention, further, that the values experienced by God are re-introduced into the world and apprehended by becoming creatures, so that the values do not simply end with God's experience of them.

Another closely related criticism; however, is that the divine overcoming of evil implies that evil is not really evil for God, and that creatures are, accordingly; but the "tiny fragments of a pattern that they cannot ever appreciate". 42 To this, Hartshorne replies that for evil to be overcome by God, it is not to be inferred that the evil is no longer evil for God Himself. The evil that we have

41 Cf. E.P. Fulton, "A Critical Examination of Process Theology from the Perspective of the Doctrine of Sin and Salvation, with Special Attention to the Claim that it is a Natural Theology", 171.

suffered remains evil; and yet, from the divine perspective there is appreciated whatever good can be gotten from that evil. Creatures cannot, from their limited and partial perspectives, know this overall point of view (which, being God's view, is reality). Here, Hartshorne has worked to retain the critical balance between a position which conceives creatures as completely ignorant of the divine reality and that wherein there is complete coincidence of the divine perspective with the human. For, as one interpreter has put it, "If God's standard of value bears no relation to our own, then God's function in man's life is unknown and unknowable -- and it can be dispensed with. On the other hand, if God's goodness is identical with our own, what is the function of God?" Hartshorne seeks to retain the critical balance here (as does Whitehead) by arguing that God is the chief exemplification of the metaphysical categories and not their exception. And since in God altruism and self-interest coincide, He can be understood as willing the good for creatures such that if a creature acts according to His will, that creature will achieve satisfaction. In other words, we have this means of trusting that God's values do coincide with our own, whenever we seek and find that which is good. In this way, some

insight into the divine perspective is available to man without it being simply the same as the human perspective nor, indeed, the other extreme of being completely different from human values.

Thus, Hartshorne rejects the argument that Whitehead's (and, implicitly, his own) writings can be taken as but "a variant of the old conception that evil is an illusion of our short-sightedness; given the long view and the broad view -- God's view -- what seems to us evil is really not evil." 44 If this were in fact the case, then all of our values would be negated, in the sense that human values would have no ultimate or real (and hence no immediate) meaning. But this is not what Hartshorne nor Whitehead intended. Rather, their position is that while evil is overcome by God, it yet remains evil: it is overcome only in the sense that God is able, from His ultimate perspective, to see whatever value is contained in the evil.

That this teaching is a difficult one is evident by the general misunderstanding and argumentation against Hartshorne's position. It has been contended, for example, that if Hartshorne and Whitehead are to avoid affirming that God keeps past evils in existence, they must admit that God does not preserve all events of the past, but that, rather, He preserves only the good which has been actualized. It is concluded,

accordingly, that "something occurred, to wit past evils, which God does not preserve". 45 Hartshorne's position, however, has always been that "the entire past, and not a mere portion of it, ... is preserved". 46 He has never denied the reality of evil in the world, and in God's experience. It is indeed real for men who suffer it, and for God who likewise experiences (and suffers) it immediately and completely. Yet, while evils are eternally preserved by God, as are all the goods actualized, they are overcome in the sense that they are harmonized in God's ultimate (perfect, complete) perspective, such that the good contained in the evil is fully appreciated. Hartshorne argues, further, that not only is the past retained in God's experience but it is retained also by creatures. Only in God, however, is it preserved fully; in creatures it is preserved deficiently and imperfectly. He contends that "the very notion of truth seems to involve some continued reality for the [past] events, in all their details, about which there is truth:" 47 the meaningfulness of events lies in the fact


46 Charles Hartshorne, "The Immortality of the Past: Critique of a Prevalent Misinterpretation", 98.

47 Charles Hartshorne, "The Immortality of the Past: Critique of a Prevalent Misinterpretation", 103 f.; cf. WF 166.
that they have lasting existence in God, for this eternal (or ultimate) value gives them also their present worth and meaning.

The question that arises, however, is this: how can God retain all of the actualized values of creaturely experience (good and evils) if not all of these values are compatible? How can God preserve and synthesize all actualized data into a unified experience? Or, as Hartshorne puts it (in a slightly different context): "how is it possible for God to unite all initial data into one complex objective datum [that is, as the initial aim of a becoming subject]? Are not some of the initial data incompatible aesthetically with one another? God then may unite whatever may be united, but not even he can do more than this".48 Hartshorne readily acknowledges that there are indeed incompatibles which God cannot, at one time, synthesize; yet, he contends that such incompatibles could not be actualized in the first place: "certain combinations of occurrences cannot be actualized because they contradict one another". Thus, those values which are actualized can be considered composable in this sense, and as such, they "cannot be incapable of divine realization, at least not for the same reason".49


One important conclusion to be inferred from this particular aspect of Hartshorne's teaching is that the evils we experience are not ultimately incompossible or incompatible with the goods which exist — at least from the divine perspective (and this perspective is truth itself). If the evils were incompatible, they could not have come into actualization in the first place. This argument, however, let us note, is not intended to underplay the negative aspects of evil; it is, nevertheless, one of the bases of Hartshorne's rather optimistic view that the evil in the world must not be inferred to negate the fundamental goodness of the world; it is, indeed, further evidence for Hartshorne's contention that there is a balance of order and goodness in the world, for it denies that more disorder and evil than is compatible with the goodness of the world could not come into being (simply because such would be incompossible with the present order).

A further question, however, arises from Hartshorne's teaching that God does perfectly retain all actualized values: does this imply that God Himself is evil? Can God contain evil and yet not be evil? Hartshorne does contend (with Whitehead and Berdyaev) that because of the evil He experiences, God does indeed suffer our evil. God is that "being to whom suffering is never alien" (MVG 172), who "sorrows in all our sorrows" (DR 54), who is the "cosmic sufferer" (MVG 331). He is, in Whitehead's words, "the great companion — the fellow-sufferer who understands" (PR 532). Yet, while God contains our evil and suffers its negative values, Hartshorne argues that our evils are
in God only to the extent that, analogously, we have impulses within our own bodies which, as impulses, are beyond our control (see above: "Chapter Three"). The point is that one can have within oneself unintentional experiences which one has not consciously caused, and therefore, for which one cannot be held responsible. God's experience, by analogy, can contain our evil as His unintentional impulses, and yet this does not make God Himself evil. God experiences our actualizations without Himself having to will them. Hartshorne explains:

> it is an old doctrine that ethical evil lies not in impulses as such but in bad control of them. Yet, however controlled, they cannot be deprived of all their spontaneity, their self-determination, and still function as impulses. And without impulses, something involuntary, there is nothing for volition to do. According to this theory, the most wicked act is literally in God, and while wicked as our volition, as divine impulse it is not subject to ethical description, positive or negative. 50

Elsewhere Hartshorne explains his position thusly: "God feels wicked feelings not as his own feelings but as his creatures" (CSPM 241).

This is so according to the Whiteheadian category of "feeling of feeling", which implies a subject-object duality:

---

50 Charles Hartshorne, "The Immortality of the Past: Critique of a Prevalent Misinterpretation", 101. Hartshorne adds this note: "To many, such terms as 'impulse' will appear crude or degrading in application to God; but the point is that any psychological term, such as 'will' or 'knowledge', is equally so, unless taken analogically rather than literally".
The first feeling is the 'subjective form' of the experience, the second the 'objective form'. Both are feelings, but the second is the original (and temporally prior), the first is a participation in the second after the fact. Wickedness is in wrong decisions, God inherits our decisions, as ours, not as his. In feeling them he does not enact or decide them; for they are already decided (CSPM 241).

God's experiences, like the experiences of creatures, effect a new harmony, a new "one" from the "many" of the data: "The 'harmony' effected is not in the data as prehended (as objective data) but in the rightness of feeling with which God shapes his own ('universal') subjective forms, his feelings about our feelings, not our feelings simply as participated in by him, as 'objective forms' of feeling".51

The more can contain the less: God is more than the world and its actualized values. He is constituted not solely by His response to the world, but also by His response to His own antecedent responses, so that while He is affected by the world, He transcends the world (cf. MVG 195-196; DR passim).

We might ask, however, whether the fact that God suffers (and thus, contains) evil detracts from His religious perfection. In answer to this question, Hartshorne has tried to show that God's religious adequacy is not jeopardized, but indeed, that it is enhanced.

---

51 Charles Hartshorne, "The Immortality of the Past: Critique of a Prevalent Misinterpretation", 111.
since he conceives God as actively involved and genuinely concerned with the activity of the world—limiting, inspiring, and preserving in value all creaturely experiences, good and bad alike; yet, always as transformed according to His overall perspective and synthetic vision. 52

But we must now more specifically address the central and critical question; namely, how—as far as we can know—does God overcome evil values? and, indeed, of what significance is this overcoming for creatures who have suffered the evil? Here the question of confirming God's benevolence vis-à-vis evil is directly at issue.

We must notice, first of all, that Hartshorne interprets Whitehead's theory of the divine overcoming of evil metaphorically rather than literally. Thus, for example, while Whitehead speaks of God's "transforming" evil, of "reforming" it, of "overcoming" it, and of making immortal the "finer side" of events, Hartshorne understands these terms metaphorically, as follows: that evils are "overcome" by good implies that "deity realizes the most good which can be achieved through synthesis into new subjective forms, which include the evil to be sure, but much more besides". 53 It does not mean that the evil is simply obliterated by God. Further, that only the "finer side"

---


of events is retained by God everlastinglly is taken by Hartshorne as implying that the finer side is God's feeling about our feelings; that is, since God's experience, like ours, involves valuations, synthesis. It does not imply that evils are negated nor that goods, as the finer side, are alone retained.

Thus, in God, our evils become part of His everlasting experience, yet "not the evil alone, rather the evil with or in its ideal complement of vision"; God's experience, His valuation, is "sheer addition, not subtraction or omission". 54 Evils are not omitted, but rather, "God adds to all such evils a content which produces in relation to them, whatever good can be made to result". 55 God's experience of the present values is supplemented by His perfect retention of past values, so that His view is always "a net increment of value". God experiences, furthermore, more joy than evil since, in spite of some great present evil, He has perfect preservation of all past goods and of the processive synthesis of all evils with goods (cf. DR 46). Evils are not, then, simply overcome in the sense of being lost or negated, but rather, are harmonized into a greater synthesis within the experiences of God. The value that is in every act is seen clearly, and in its proper perspective by God. While man

54 Charles Hartshorne, "The Immortality of the Past: Critique of a Prevalent Misinterpretation", 106.

cannot see the full value in every experience, God does see the value, and accordingly, for Him, the balance is always toward good; for, as Hartshorne argues: "the fact that God inherits all our feelings does not mean that he is in danger of finding disvalue overbalancing value. Even for us this does not occur"; there is always more satisfaction than dissatisfaction both for God and for us: "every concrete experience as a whole is a value rather than a disvalue... We wring some kind of satisfaction, however poor or strained, out of pain and frustration; though we may feel very keenly how much better life might be." \(^{56}\)

We turn now to a discussion of Hartshorne's understanding of the Whiteheadian doctrine of the "Superjective Nature" of God (or the "super-subjective" nature -- to unwind the conflation of terms). This doctrine is important in establishing the relevance of the divinely experienced harmony of values for the world of newly becoming creatures. Hartshorne interprets the doctrine as implying "God's Consequent Nature as a potential for the general creativity", since God's experiences become data for newly becoming subjects by means of the functioning of His Superject Nature. \(^{57}\) The harmony experienced

---

\(^{56}\) Charles Hartshorne, "The Immortality of the Past: Critique of a Prevalent Misinterpretation", 102.

\(^{57}\) Charles Hartshorne, "The Immortality of the Past: Critique of a Prevalent Misinterpretation", 111.
by God is passed back into the world as data, or rather, as "particular providence for each particular occasion".  

This teaching has been misunderstood, or at least questioned, by many interpreters of Hartshorne (and Whitehead). G.F. Thomas, for example, contends that Whitehead's God does not seem able to exert such active and important influence in the world, but rather, as he argues (following D.D. Williams), Whitehead's God is restricted to the functions of setting general limits and in preserving values which creatures have brought into existence.  

As Williams puts it: "The question to be raised here is whether Whitehead's account of the divine causality leaves God without concrete power in the world...He sets limits to the creatures and absorbs the world's activities in a certain way. But does he act with power to transform the world beyond presenting it an ideal aim?". "Does God only listen or does he speak?". Thomas then adds: Whitehead's God is "not the Creator upon whose power the existence of actual entities depends, since they create themselves. Nor is He the Redeemer of the world who transforms His creatures by the power of His grace."  

58 Charles Hartshorne, "The Immortality of the Past: Critique of a Prevalent Misinterpretation", I.II: Hartshorne has quoted here from Whitehead, PR 532.


60 D.D. Williams, "Deity, Monarchy, and Metaphysics: Whitehead's Critique of the Theological Tradition", 368.

61 G.F. Thomas, Religious Philosophies of the West, 389.
Now, while I am not, in this dissertation, speaking directly to any of these issues with reference specifically to Whitehead, it must be argued that, with respect to Hartshorne's theory of divine causality, this criticism seems to be quite mistaken (assuming the criticism applies to Hartshorne — and I should think it does — at least, implicitly); for as this dissertation has laboured to show (in "Chapter Four"), there is more to the divine functioning in the world than the setting of limits, in presenting the initial aims, and in preserving the creaturely values attained. Rather, God's role is one of considerable influence which affects the creature both consciously and unconsciously, and which at times approaches a coerciveness. This influence includes His re-introduction into the world of His harmonized experience of past actualizations (via the Superject Nature) and indeed, it would appear that this divine function is involved in what Hartshorne understands by the divine lure (as Consequent Nature) as final cause in providing the initial aims for becoming creatures. It is, furthermore, this re-introduction of past-values (with the evil overcome and all the good acknowledged) that is the crux of Hartshorne's thesis that God is benevolent in spite of the evil in the world. We must elaborate, and test the coherence of this theory.

Hartshorne refers to our experience of the divine harmony as an intuition, a feeling of "peace", of beauty, of "Nirvana" (CSPM 308). Whitehead had described the experience as an "intuitive
"foretaste", and as a "trust in the efficacy of Beauty" which "comes as a gift" (AI 327). Now, to be sure, these concepts are vague, and they do not, in themselves, tell us enough about how the divine harmonic vision of creaturely experiences is reintroduced into the world for the benefit of future creatures. More helpful here is the analysis of the previous chapter wherein the functioning of the divine lure in its conscious and unconscious appropriation, and as both persuasiveness and coerciveness, was discussed. The criticism raised against Hartshorne's position there, however, was that if the divine causal lure is constituted by what is best according to the possibilities determined by the past state of the world at any particular moment, then this would seem to deny real novelty and freedom; that is, since the new acts of creatures would amount to little more than a filling-in, or a making more-determinate, the past actualities.

If we ask, then, how Hartshorne's understanding of the divine overcoming of evil and of the reintroduction of the overcome evil (now seen in its full value) into the world sheds light on this issue, the first question which arises is whether, for Hartshorne, the specific ideals offered by God to becoming creatures is not virtually the same.

---

divine function which is involved in the re-introduction of the divine synthesized experience. It would appear that the two are not distinguishable for Hartshorne, since, as noted above, he understands the Superject Nature as, simply, "God's Consequent Nature as a potential for the general creativity". Indeed, what else could the Consequent Nature provide but the harmonized, synthesized expression of the divine values, for according to Hartshorne, the lure takes into account the experiences of the entire past nexus and then offers to creatures what are the best possible ideals, according to those determined by that past? Yet, as argued above, must there not be some availability for the creature of novel ideals, of possibilities which are not simply determined by the past state of the world? Must not the divine lure offer ideals which are not so determined? Hartshorne seems to deny this, and argues that what is possible for a creature at any particular moment is determined by what has been actualized by previous creatures up to that moment. Hartshorne's argument concerning the divine overcoming of evil and of the re-introduction of the overcome evil into the world would appear to confirm this thesis; and accordingly, the earlier criticism of his position is applicable here as well.

Yet, there may be a way in which Hartshorne's understanding

63 Charles Hartshorne, "The Immortality of the Past: Critique of a Prevalent Misinterpretation", 111.
of the overcoming of evil by God and His reintroduction of value into the world can be understood so as to counter this criticism and render his understanding of creaturely freedom vis-à-vis the divine lure more coherent and meaningful. For it might be held that, when Hartshorne argues that the lure offered by God to becoming creatures is the best of what is possible according to the possibilities already actualized by the past world, this implies that the ideals are such that the full value of the past actualities has been appreciated by God and presented to the creature as such. This would imply that new possibilities are presented to the becoming subject -- the possibilities recognized by God -- and, as such, there may be genuine novelty and freedom in the creature in actualizing these possibilities.

Now, while this may seem to solve the dilemma raised above concerning Hartshorne's ability to account for creaturely freedom and novelty vis-à-vis the divine causal lure, there still appears to be something odd about this interpretative suggestion. Specifically, it would seem to be incoherent with the fact that there is a continuum of possibilities which God as Primordial (or, in Hartshorne's term, as Abstract) Nature envisages: on Hartshorne's account, it is difficult to see how this continuum is relevant to the world; that is, since he seems to account for the possibilities for the becoming creature according to those determined by the past actualities. And thus, where the common interpretation of Whithead holds that ideal possibilities are chosen by God from among eternal possibilities and
offered to creatures as their initial aims by the divine Primordial Nature. Hartshorne's account infers, rather, that it is the divine Consequent Nature (and, what appears to be the same thing, the Superfect Nature) which offers the lure to creatures. He holds this in spite of his acknowledgement that there is a continuum of possibility which God envisages in His Abstract Nature. It is, accordingly, difficult to see the relevance of this Primordial Nature of God for the world, for it would appear that it is not the possibilities envisaged by that Nature which are presented to creatures as their ideal lures.

It may be concluded, then, that Hartshorne's understanding of the divine reintroduction into the world of His synthesized experience of past values (with the evil overcome) is not as clear as we may wish, and that accordingly, this rather crucial element of his theodicy — that which is a central aspect of his argument for the benevolence of God vis-a-vis evil — is incomplete. Other elements of his thesis, to be sure, have been defended against various critical questions.

64 See, however, the recent interpretative insights concerning the functions of the "natures" of Whitehead's God wherein the overlapping of the various aspects, etc., is considered: J.W. Lansing, "The 'Natures' of Whitehead's God", and L.S. Ford, "Is There a Distinct Superjective Nature?", in Process Studies 3/3, Fall, 1973, 143-152 and 228-235, respectively.
5. Conclusion

Now, what can be concluded with reference to the particular issue at stake in this present chapter? Has Hartshorne successfully shown how the divine benevolence (and, to be sure, divine omnipotence, etc.) is reconciled with the fact of evil as such? Or, more specifically, has he been able to show how the source, nature, function, and overcoming of evil is reconciled with his conception of God as benevolent?

It was argued that God is not to be seen as the sola creator of all things and that, as such, He is not solely responsible for all the goods and evils in this world ("Section One"). This fact is established by the doctrine of creativity wherein it is argued that all beings have some range of freedom (though it is always within limits and directly correspondent to the level of mental sophistication in the nearly countless levels of being). This doctrine, together with an understanding of Hartshorne's revised theism (wherein the traditional doctrine of God is modified in such a way that His power and knowledge, etc., are not to be seen as the negation of creaturely agency and responsibility: cf. "Chapter Two") leads to the conclusion that God is never solely responsible for, or determinative of, all of the actions of creatures; and that man (and all beings, variously) have a certain range of freely creative agency and moral responsibility. The central and difficult issue of showing coherently that man is a continuing and unified being with agency and moral responsibility which
is (more or less) continuous was discussed in "Chapter Three". Having reconstructed Hartshorne's thesis regarding these matters, "Chapter Four" then proceeded to examine Hartshorne's understanding of how this agency is reconciled with the divine agency and causal influence upon man (and upon all beings). That God's agency is predominant and the most effective element in the causal nexus of a becoming creature was therein argued, while man's limited range of freely creative agency and moral responsibility vis-à-vis this divine causative influence was also discussed. The basic conclusion of this discussion was to argue that Hartshorne's God does all He can for the world; indeed, He does all an all-powerful and all-loving God can do, while yet acknowledging the reality of creaturely freedom -- setting limits, persuading (and coercing where necessary), such that He ensures that man's freedom will never be permitted to destroy the world. Creaturely freedom is guaranteed a certain range of expression within which the balance of order over chaos is ensured. In this light, God is adequately (for our conception of Him as God) both all-loving and all-powerful, for He does for the world what only He can do for it in maintaining a balance of order and good over disorder and evil, while yet guaranteeing a certain range of free creativity for all creatures. As such, man (especially of all creatures) must take responsibility for the evil created by his free actions; though we may be assured that God will not allow our freedom to destroy the coherency of the world.
Now, granting to Hartshorne his argument that God is not the sole creator nor an absolute despot who simply (pre)determines all creaturely acts and decisions, the fact that God is the eminent force in the causal nexus of every creaturely experience led to the question: why does God ensure only that there is a balance of good over evil when perhaps He could do more to prevent even more evil? Here, Hartshorne would argue that man's freedom is limited to the extent that there is ensured a balance of good; any further limitation would ensure, perhaps, that there is more good — for man's ability to do evil would be more restricted — yet this would jeopardize human freedom — a prospect Hartshorne cannot accept.

There was raised the further question as to whether there need be a balance of good: would it not be sufficient only that there is some good rather than a surplus? Here, could it not be argued that God could permit man more freedom so that his acts are not limited to the extent they must be to ensure a balance of good over evil? There would, however, be a greater risk of evil, and Hartshorne seems unwilling to grant this. His position is that anything less than a balance of good would lead to the running-down of the world; that is, since creatures would no longer be inspired to advance the creative process. His argument is simply that life would not go on if there were not more good than evil; and he insists that this is the case both for God and for creatures. We conceded here that it would seem correct to argue that there must be more order than chaos for there
to be a universe, and also that — as Hartshorne argues — there could be no world if there were not a "net increment" of value for God, for if this were not the case, He would withdraw His life-inspiring influence. Yet, for individual creatures this may not hold: must there be a surplus of good for any particular creature at any particular moment? Is not some good enough to sustain interest in future life? And indeed, would not hope for the future sustain this interest even though the present was disordered and overabundantly evil?

It is not clear that Hartshorne's argument for there being a surplus of value can answer this query — though, to be sure, his argument that God permits man (and all creatures in general) as much freedom as is possible while yet ensuring that there remains a balance of order and good over disorder and evil, is not to be taken lightly. To suggest that man could have more freedom or that there need be only some good — as opposed to a surplus of good — may not be consistent with what we, in fact, experience; and such experience is what Hartshorne seeks to describe. This entire issue may rest in answer to the question: do we, at any moment, experience a surplus of order and good, or only some order and good?

The fact that there is some value in every creaturely experience is the basic contention of Hartshorne's aesthetic theory ("Section Two"). Every experience is a new synthesis of the "many" of the causal data into the new creation, the "one". Each creature seeks
that "balance of unity and diversity which is ideally satisfying" (CSPM 304), and while the maximum of aesthetic value is not often achieved, each experience does create some new value: "actuality could not have value" (CSPM 307). Now, to be sure, there is also -- indeed, necessarily, inevitably so -- evil produced in every experience, since, for example, every experience, in actualizing aspects of its causal data, excludes other aspects and, as such, there is privation and loss of these values ("Section Three"). Despite this privation and loss, however, the new creation as a whole is a value rather than a disvalue. The choice of possibilities to be actualized by the new experience is one between various goods, so that while some good is always excluded, other goods are always actualized. This is not to say that all of the potential goods are equally valuable; there are goods which, if actualized, would be better than other goods, and thus, if the lesser good is chosen, there is created the evil of triviality, of loss of greater values, of privation of greater values. There is, however, no creation which is to be regarded simply as unmitigated or unredeemed evil: "Any evil has some value from some perspective" (NTT 80). It may function in the transition to future goods, or serve to balance an order which otherwise would be overly monotonous, etc.

Now, while this aspect of Hartshorne's theodicy has not directly advanced his thesis that there is a surplus of good -- though it does underpin this view by tending to establish the crucial fact that there
is at least some value in every new experience --, his optimistic understanding of the world as predominantly good is reinforced by his doctrine of the divine overcoming of evil ("Section Four"). While the surplus of good may not be clear from our partial perspectives (though it must be at least unconsciously felt as such), God's experience of the world's values is one in which the good and evil are put in their proper perspective. The evil is never simply negated in His experience, but when whatever good there is fully appreciated in conjunction with the evil, God's overall, perfect synthesis of vision is one in which the good is seen as predominant. If this were not the case, He would have no desire to continue to induce creatures to further experiences, and this would lead to a negation of all life. Hartshorne's position here involves two considerations: God experiences all creaturely values, both goods and evils; and He is able to synthesize them in His perfect vision. He regrets the evil and cherishes the good, and yet, He is able to appreciate the function of the evil (in the stimulation of further goods, for example, and in serving to avoid the deadening monotony of complete order). Further, Hartshorne argues that those values which would be completely incompatible cannot be actualized in the first place. As such, it may be inferred that only those values which are compatible are actualized. And this being the case, we may assume that the evils which exist -- though regrettable -- are compatible with the goods, and while greater goods could have been possible had better possibilities been actualized,
what evils there are do not negate the goods, nor predominate over them.

A question was raised at this point, however, concerning the coherence of Hartshorne's understanding of God's introduction of His harmonic experience of past creaturely actualizations (and of the overcome evil) back into the world. For it would appear that the newly-becoming creature's experience of this divine harmony is virtually the same experience as that which is involved in the initial aim given by God as the creature's final cause. It is difficult to imagine what the Superject Nature's function could be except to offer the final cause to the becoming creature; it is, as Hartshorne has argued, "God's Consequent Nature as a potential for the general creativity". This being the case, some questions were raised concerning the relevance of the continuum of possibilities envisaged by the Primordial Nature of God for the becoming creature. It was argued that Hartshorne's account does not show coherently how these primordial ideals are accessible to creatures, but that, rather, his account of the possibilities open to becoming creatures at any particular moment restricts those possibilities to those determined by past actualities. And, thus, there is some problem with respect to creaturely freedom and novelty.

---

65 Charles Hartshorne, "The Immortality of the Past: Critique of a Prevalent Misinterpretation", 111.
Despite this problem, however, Hartshorne's attempt to show how God (as good and loving benevolence) is reconciled with evil as such has been defended against various criticisms. His argument, that there is not only value in every experience but a surplus of value, of good, in the world, is, moreover, consistent with his thesis -- argued for in "Chapter Four" -- that God (as powerful omnipotence) is reconciled with creaturely freedom to the extent that God will not permit creatures to create an overbalance of evil. To ensure this, He must not only lure creatures, persuasively, to His ideals for them, but must exert a varying range of causal influence, some of which approaches a coerciveness. The incoherence in Hartshorne's argument here, which arises from his denial of any coerciveness by God, was done away with by showing that his understanding of the divine persuasive influence implies a varying range of effectiveness. Only by recognizing this can be held coherently that God ensures that man's freedom never produces a surplus of evil, but that rather, there is always a surplus of good. It is Hartshorne's contention that this assurance is sufficient to show that both creaturely freedom and evil are reconciled with an all-good and all-powerful God, and this, accordingly, is the justification of his claim that God — evil notwithstanding — is not inconceivable. In his effort to justify this claim, Hartshorne has sought, both to render more coherent the minor premise of the ontological argument (which, in turn, renders that argument more viable in its application to the question of theodicy)
and -- not withstanding this fact -- to offer another basis for a viable theodicy. It may be concluded that, despite some internal problems in certain of Hartshorne's arguments (this dissertation uncovers some not hitherto discovered), his theodicy is bold and a somewhat fresh approach to the ancient problem, and one which merits more critical attention than has hitherto been given it.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Books by Hartshorne


The Logic of Perfection and Other Essays in Neo-classical Metaphysics. LaSalle: Open Court, 1962.

Anselm's Discovery. LaSalle: Open Court, 1965.

A Natural Theology for Our Time. LaSalle: Open Court, 1967.


* For the complete Hartshorne Bibliography (387 items), see Process Studies 6/1, Spring, 1976, 73-93.
B. Articles by Hartshorne (Selected)


"Metaphysics for Positivists", *Philosophy of Science* 2, 3 (July, 1935), 287-303.


"The Reality of the Past, the Unreality of the Future", *Hibbert* Journal 37, 2 (Jan., 1939), 246-257.


"Three Ideas of God", Journal of Liberal Religion 1,3 (Winter, 1940), 9-16.


"Anthropomorphic Tendencies in Positivism", Philosophy of Science 8, 2 (April, 1941), 184-203.


Discussion: "Is Whitehead's God the God of Religion?" Ethics 53, 3 (April, 1943), 219-227.


"Philosophy and Orthodoxy", Ethics 54, 4 (July, 1944), 295-298.

Discussion: "Professor Hartshorne's Syllogism: Rejoinder" [to Elton], Philosophical Review 54, 5 (Sept., 1945), 506-508.


"Tragic and Sublime Aspects of Christian Love", Journal of Liberal Religion 8, 1 (Summer, 1946), 36-44.


"God as Absolute, Yet Related to All", Review of Metaphysics 1, 1 (Sept., 1947), 24-51.


"Chance, Love, and Incompatibility": Presidential Address, Western Division of the American Philosophical Association meeting, April, 1949, Philosophical Review 58, 5 (Sept., 1949), 429-450.


"Spirit as Life Freely Participating in Life", Biosophical Review 10, 2 (1953), 31-32.


"The Unity of Man and the Unity of Nature", Emory University Quarterly 11, 3 (Oct., 1955), 129-141.


"Whitehead and Berdyaev: Is There Tragedy in God?", Journal of Religion 37, 2 (April, 1957), 71-84.


"Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments", The Relevance of Whitehead (as above), 107-121.


"What Did Anselm Discover?", Union Seminary Quarterly Review 17, 3 (March, 1962), 213-222.


"Rationale of the Ontological Proof", Theology Today 20, 2 (July, 1963), 278-283.


"The Theistic Proofs", Union Seminary Quarterly Review 20, 2 (Jan., 1965), 115-129.

"Abstract and Concrete Approaches to Deity", Union Seminary Quarterly Review 20, 3 (March, 1965), 265-270.


"The Significance of Man in the Life of God", Theology in Crisis (as above), 40-43.


"The Case for Idealism", Philosophical Forum 1, 1 n. 4 (Fall, 1968), 7-23.


"Are There Absolutely Specific Universals?", Journal of Philosophy 68, 3 (Feb. 11, 1971), 76-78.

"Can Man Transcend His Animality?", Monist 55, 2 (April, 1971), 208-217.


"Personal Identity from A to Z", Process Studies 2, 3 (Fall, 1972), 209-215.

"Some Thoughts on 'Souls' and Neighborly Love", Anglican Theological Review 55, 2 (April, 1973), 144-147.


C. Secondary Books and Articles (Selected) *


Bennett, J. B. "Whitehead and Personal Identity", The Thomist 37, 3 (June, 1973), 510-521.


_________. "Natural Causality and Divine Action", Idealistic Studies 3, 3 (Sept., '73), 207-222.


__________________________________________________________


__________________________________________________________


__________________________________________________________


__________________________________________________________


__________________________________________________________

"God as King: Benevolent Despot or Constitutional Monarch?", *Christian Scholar's Review* 1, 4 (Summer, 1971), 318-322.

__________________________________________________________


__________________________________________________________

"Is There a Distinct Superjective Nature?", *Process Studies* 3, 3 (Fall, 1973), 228-229.

__________________________________________________________


_________, "Hartshorne's Differences from Whitehead", Two Process Philosophers, ed., L. S. Ford (as above), 35-57.


_________, "Evil and Persuasive Power", Process Studies 2, 1 (Spring, 1972), 44-49.


"Process or Agent: Models for Self and God", *Thought* 18, 188 (Spring, 1973), 33-60.


"Omnipotence", *Sophia* 1, 2 (1962).


———, "How Does God Function in Human Life?", Christianity and Crisis 27 (1967), 105-108.


"Does God Change?", *The Ecumenist* 9, 4 (May-June, 1971), 61-64.


Shalom, A. "Professor Hartshorne and the Problem of Personal Identity", unpublished essay.


Stokes, W. E. "God For Today and Tomorrow", *Process Philosophy and Christian Thought* (as above), 244-263.


"On Thinking of God as King", *Christian Scholar Review* 1, 1 (Fall, 1970), 27-34.


