

DEPENDENCE, UNDERDEVELOPMENT, AND THE PLANTATION

DEPENDENCE, UNDERDEVELOPMENT, AND THE PLANTATION:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE JAMAICA SUGAR INDUSTRY,
1945-1970

By

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the nature of the socio-economic changes which were generated in Jamaica as a result of foreign, corporate investment in the Jamaica sugar industry during the period 1945-1970. The main thesis advanced in this work is that such investment played a major role in the underdevelopment of various sectors of Jamaican society. Underdevelopment is conceptualized as a multidimensional, multifaceted phenomenon which unfolded in Jamaica primarily because of the way in which the country was incorporated into the world capitalist structure. The structural dependency approach, which underpins this perspective, posits that development and underdevelopment are dialectically related and are the products of the international class system.

The analysis focuses not only on the effects of the external, imperialist relations which existed between Jamaica and various metropolitan countries but also on the distorted, internal class structure which unfolded in Jamaica during the period under review. Multinational corporations, such as Tate and Lyle, and United Fruit Company wielded so much power that they imposed severe constraints on various aspects of the socio-economic development of Jamaica. In the agricultural sector, production relations operated in favour of foreign investors and their allies, and to the detriment of the peasantry and other rural classes. The exploitative class relationship which prevailed between the

corporate owners and sugar workers, limited, in varying degrees, the development of the sugar-plantation areas.

This work also analyzes the social dimensions of underdevelopment as they appear at the level of the plantation and in the wider society. In the case of the former, the extent to which the quality of life of sugar workers was circumscribed by foreign ownership of the sugar industry, is examined. Factors such as the deplorable living and working conditions of sugar-plantation labourers, as well as the unstable patterns of family life in the sugar-plantation villages, are shown to be causally related to the structure and organization of plantation labour.

The dissertation argues that many of the incidents of racial discontent, class cleavages, and violent social upheavals which gripped Jamaica in the 1960s and 1970s reflected the deep race-class divisions which permeated the country. Furthermore, the study demonstrates that in order to understand these phenomena, as well as the exclusion of African-Jamaicans from the Jamaican corporate economy, the role of the sugar entrepreneurs and the racial ideology which they espoused, must be examined. The conclusion reached is that the overwhelming predominance of foreign capital in the first major Jamaican capitalist enterprise - the sugar industry - resulted in inequities and distortions in important sectors of Jamaican society. It was against these kinds of structural constraints and obstacles to socio-economic advancement that many Jamaicans struggled.

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CHAPTER ONE

CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES:

DIMENSIONS OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

This study is primarily concerned with analyzing the economic and social changes which took place in Jamaica as a result of foreign investment in the Jamaican sugar industry during the period 1945-1970. It was during these years that foreign, corporate control of the industry was most extensive. After 1970, the Jamaican government not only endeavoured to purchase certain estates from the foreign investors, but made an effort to promote a system of cooperative ownership in which sugar workers would play a leading role in the decision-making process on some sugar estates. Both schemes met with only limited success.

The immense power wielded by the foreign corporations which controlled Jamaican sugar was, to a great extent, responsible for thwarting the initiatives undertaken by the government. Therefore, the twenty-five years under review constitute an important period for analyzing the dynamics of various aspects of Jamaica's underdevelopment and for assessing the role played by foreign entrepreneurs in many of the structural changes which were produced in the country.

The present chapter consists of three main sections. In the first part, the dimensions of the research problem, especially its historical and socio-economic perspectives, are established. The second part of the chapter is devoted to a presentation of the methodology and the theoretical framework on which the study is based. Finally, the primary sources from which data for the study were collected, are explained and discussed. The location of Jamaica in Middle America is shown below.

Figure 1.1

Location of Jamaica in Middle America



Source: Colin Clarke, Kingston, Jamaica. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975, p.155.

Historically, direct foreign investment in Jamaica has taken three principal forms. In the first kind, usually referred to as the "settlement type" investment, the investor settled permanently in the country with an investment, and became naturalized, and sometimes integrated into the local community. In the second kind, ownership and control of the investment remained

abroad although the management of the enterprise was carried out by local or expatriate personnel. This kind of investment sometimes incorporated local economic participation in the form of joint ventures. The third kind of investment has been that of the multinational corporation (MNC). These corporations are basically extensions of national enterprises, controlled by a single national centre, in so far as the location of investment and the international remission of profits are concerned.¹ Because of the power wielded by MNCs, their investments have been very pervasive in the Jamaican economy and have had the most profound impact on Jamaican society.

The three kinds of investment to which I have referred were all involved in the Jamaican sugar industry during the period under study. Such investments were concentrated in large estates -- the sugar plantations. Nevertheless, foreign investment in the Jamaican sugar industry is by no means a twentieth century phenomenon. In strict terms, the eighteenth-century slave master and the plantation owner of the mid-twentieth century were both foreign investors bent on extracting the maximum surplus from their investment.

Since the advent of European colonizers in the Caribbean, sugar production and its organization within the plantation have not only determined the dominant form of livelihood of most Jamaicans but have left indelible marks on their economic, social, and political relationships. It was through the brutalizing and the dehumanizing experience of the plantation that Jamaicans were first exploited by Europeans. However, even after the establishment of

the sugar industry, whenever new commodities or activities have been brought into Jamaica (e.g. bauxite or tourism), or whenever new national institutions such as the Civil Service or political parties have been established, the authoritarian and exploitative characteristics of the plantation have been very influential.² Thus, the plantation system has to be understood in the context of the evolution of capitalism and its stage of external expansion, the first phase of which is colonialism.

Since the post-war sugar plantation is a legacy of slavery, it must be analyzed in an historical context. In this regard, there are certain features which are worthy of note. First, the plantation system, and by this term I am referring to all the institutional arrangements which are involved in the production and marketing of sugar, not only separated labour from the means of production, from its very inception, but also integrated factory-type discipline into the process of production.³ Secondly, the plantation system played a major role in establishing racial divisions in Jamaican society. Although economic motives might have initially induced Europeans to enslave Africans, the former quickly utilized the ideology of racism to justify continued enslavement and exploitation of the latter.⁴ Finally, it was the plantation system which initiated many of the Euro-American economic institutions which have successfully penetrated Jamaican society.⁵

The basic proposition argued in this study is that foreign investment in the post-war Jamaican sugar industry generated underdevelopment within certain sectors of the society. I view

underdevelopment as a complex phenomenon which must be considered historically from the perspective of the changes which were produced in Jamaican society as a result of the incorporation of the country into the world capitalist structure.

The Jamaican mode of production constitutes an important part of this study. The "mode of production" refers to the combination of the productive forces and the characteristic social relations of production which are appropriate to these forces. From the late seventeenth century until the abolition of slavery in 1838, Jamaica was characterized by the slave mode of production. Although the slave plantation was a part of the overall structure of world capitalism, one should not regard the slave plantation as a capitalist institution. Since the basic ingredient of capitalism is the selling of labour power for wages, and since slaves obviously did not sell their labour power but were coerced to work, the mode of production was obviously not capitalist.⁶

During the first three decades after the abolition of slavery, a semi-capitalist kind of mode of production started to emerge in Jamaica. The main constraints against the development of a fully capitalist mode at this time was the fact that labour was not completely free and was subjected to various forms of tenancy and repression.⁷ Once these constraints were removed, a fully capitalist mode was implemented in Jamaica.

The mode of production in post-war Jamaica was thus capitalist. However, it was a capitalism in which foreign investment played a preponderant role.⁸ My argument that foreign

investment in the Jamaican sugar industry underdeveloped various sectors of Jamaican society stems from my contention that the underdevelopment of Jamaica was reciprocally related to the development of the advanced capitalist countries from which the capital came. The phases of capitalism through which the advanced countries like Britain passed -- mercantilism, competitive capitalism, and monopoly capitalism -- influenced the kind of development which took place in Jamaica. In the post-war period, foreign investment in Jamaica by MNCs like Tate and Lyle and United Fruit Company, was a feature of the development of monopoly capitalism in the advanced countries.⁹ A worthwhile analysis of the socio-economic effects of foreign investment must therefore be undertaken within the context of the mode of production of which foreign investment is a part. The extent of foreign investment in Jamaica between 1955-1970 may be gleaned from Table 1.1. Table 1.1 indicates the sources from which funds were obtained for the financing of gross domestic capital formation in Jamaica during 1955-1970. In 1955, corporate saving amounted to 41.0 per cent of these funds. By 1960 the contribution was 56.1 per cent. Corporate saving reached the highest point in 1965 when its contribution came to 62.3 per cent. In 1970 the figure was 47.5 per cent.

Table 1.1

Sources of Finance for Gross Domestic Capital Formation,
1955-1970 (Percentages)

	1955	1960	1965	1968	1970
(a) Source of Finance					
Corporate Saving	41.0	56.1	62.3	42.7	47.5
Personal Saving	7.3	15.3	8.1	14.5	-5.4
Government Saving	13.4	12.0	12.7	11.1	14.7
Total Domestic	61.7	83.4	83.1	68.3	56.9
Net Borrowing and Investment from Abroad	n.a.	16.3	16.8	31.6	43.1
(b) Direct Foreign In- vestment as percent of Net Domestic Capital Formation	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	58.6	64.9

Sources: Economic Survey of Jamaica, Kingston, Jamaica, various years. National Income and Product of Jamaica, various years. Annual Report of the Jamaica Industrial Development Corporation Year Ended 31st December 1970, Jamaica, 1971.

Personal saving fluctuated considerably. The greatest contribution was 15.3 per cent in 1960 and the lowest was -5.4 per cent in 1970. Government saving was fairly consistent and averaged 12.78 per cent. Net borrowing and investment from abroad went from a low point of 16.3 per cent in 1960 to a high level of 43.1 per cent in 1970. However, these figures do not present the complete picture of the extent of foreign investment in Jamaica. Since the vast majority of the large corporations in Jamaica were owned by foreigners, most of the corporate saving was produced by foreign firms. Therefore, when this factor was calculated, it was found that direct foreign investment amounted to 58.6 per cent of the net domestic capital formation in 1968. By 1970 total foreign investment reached 64.9 per cent of domestic capital formation.

It is now worthwhile to examine briefly various aspects of the Jamaican sugar industry. By focusing on its role in the export sector and in the labour market, I shall illustrate the position which this industry occupied in the Jamaican economy.

Table 1.2

Value of Jamaican Domestic Exports, 1958-1970 (\$ million)

Categories	1958	1960	1963	1966	1968	1970
Bauxite & Alumina	43.4	55.0	67.2	108.8	113.0	186.9
Sugar, rum and molasses	24.2	29.6	43.1	37.2	38.4	33.7
Bananas	10.0	9.6	11.9	12.6	13.8	11.8
Other agricultural products	8.8	9.0	9.4	10.6	9.5	10.0
Manufactured goods	2.2	4.2	8.1	9.0	10.8	13.4
Other products	5.0	4.2	5.0	6.4	8.2	12.4

Sources: Economic Survey of Jamaica, various years. A Review of the Development in Trade and Industry in Jamaica During the Period 1950-1975, Central Planning Unit, Jamaica, 1976.

Table 1.2 shows the value of domestic exports during selected years from 1958 to 1970. Bauxite and alumina, the most valuable products, increased steadily in export earnings. In 1958 they earned \$43.4 million; in 1970 the figure was \$186.9 million. Sugar, rum and molasses show the second highest export earnings. However, the value of these products shows some fluctuation. The figure moves from \$24.2 million in 1958 to a high point of \$43.1 million in 1963. After that, it fluctuates to \$33.7 million in 1970. Bananas, and other agricultural products were the next highest export earners although their values also show variation. The value of all these exports does not indicate how much money was repatriated to foreign

parent companies in cases where the firms which produced the commodities were foreign-owned.

From Table 1.3 we can see the level of production of selected commodities during 1958-70. In 1958, 335 thousand tons of sugar were manufactured. Increases in production continued until 1964 when the highest level of 472 thousand tons was reached. After that, there was a decline to a level of 368 thousand tons in 1970. The figures for the remaining commodities show the nature of economic production in Jamaica during the years which have been indicated.¹⁰

The contribution of the main items and types of products to domestic commodity exports during 1950-1970 are shown in Table 1.4. The decline in the percentage contribution of sugar-cane products is striking. In 1950, sugar, molasses, and rum contributed 53.4 per cent to such exports. However, in 1970 the figure was only 12.1 per cent. The percentage contribution of bananas also declined from 14.2 per cent in 1950 to 4.3 per cent in 1970. A similar picture is presented by other agricultural crops such as coffee, cocoa and citrus.

Table 1.3

Production of Selected Commodities in Jamaica,
1958-1970

Commodity	Unit	1958	1960	1964	1968	1970
Sugar	Thousand tons	335	424	472	445	368
Rum and alcohol	Thousand liquid gls	2,308	1,837	2,569	1,791	3,602
Molasses	"	18,450	25,543	24,727	23,719	25,256
Beer & stout	"	2,634	3,361	4,773	7,623	9,515
Carbonated beverages	"	4,701	5,750	8,891	n.a.	n.a.
Cigarettes	Million	783	694	1,002	1,049	1,261
Cigars	"	18	18	23	21	23
Copra	Thousand tons	11	15	16	19	17
Edible oils	Thousand liquid gls	1,602	1,788	2,065	2,531	2,697
Edible fats	Short tons	2,889	3,335	3,685	5,100	5,300
Soap	Tons	7,036	7,388	7,300	8,461	7,660
Condensed milk	Thousand pounds	28,432	30,218	35,130	49,525	51,164
Cornmeal	"	19,495	15,195	19,033	n.a.	n.a.
Textiles	Thousand yards	7,105	6,997	7,500	5,262	7,900
Cement	Thousand tons	176	209	277	402	450
Flour	Thousand pounds	-	-	-	36,600	87,998
Steel	Tons	-	-	-	9,888	12,007
Fertilizers	Long Tons	-	-	-	32,000	52,564
Tires	Thousand pounds	-	-	-	4,147	5,601

Sources: Economic Survey of Jamaica, various years; Five Year Independence Plan: A Long Term Plan for Jamaica 1963-1968. Kingston, Jamaica, 1963, pp.1-27; A Review of the Development in Trade and Industry in Jamaica 1965-1975. Jamaica, Ministry of Trade and Industry, 1976, pp.21-48.

Table 1.4

Contribution of Main Items and Types of Products
to Domestic Commodity Exports, 1950-1970
(Percentages)

Main Items	1950	1955	1960	1965	1968	1970
Sugar, molasses, rum	53.4	37.9	26.6	23.6	18.9	12.1
Bananas	14.2	15.4	8.6	8.1	6.8	4.3
Other Agricultural Products	17.6	13.3	8.1	6.8	4.6	3.0
Bauxite and alumina	-	26.8	49.3	47.1	55.5	65.4
Manufactured goods	4.4	2.8	3.8	6.5	7.2	8.4
Other	10.4	3.8	3.6	7.9	7.0	6.8

Sources: The Economic Development of Jamaica. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1952, pp.151-158. Economic Survey of Jamaica, various years. Ministry Paper No.54: Developments in Industry. Jamaica: Ministry of Trade and Industry, June 1971, pp.1-17.

These products fell from 17.3 per cent in 1950 to 3.0 per cent in 1970.

Nevertheless, the figure for bauxite and alumina show dramatic increases. In 1955 these commodities contributed 26.8 per cent to domestic exports. However, in 1970 the figure was 65.4 per cent. Manufactured goods decreased between 1950-1960. However, they showed moderate increases between 1965-1970. Table 1.4 shows clearly that between 1950-1970 the relative positions of sugar, molasses, and rum, on the one hand, and bauxite and alumina, on the other hand, were almost reversed. However, these five products were the principal commodity exports. In 1955 they contributed 64.7 per cent. In 1970 the figure was 77.5 per cent.

Table 1.5

Contribution of Various Economic Sectors to
Jamaican Employment (1970)

Industry	Employment		
	No.	% Agric.	% Total
Sugar Cane, Sugar, Rum, Molasses	58,277	20.2	7.7
Bananas & other agriculture	230,500	79.8	30.3
Bauxite & alumina	11,400	-	1.5
Tourism	8,700	-	1.1
Others	451,100	-	59.4
Total	759,977	100.0	100.0

Sources: National Income and Product of Jamaica, 1970.
Annual Report of the Sugar Research Department, Jamaica 1970, p.14.

The nature of the contribution of the sugar industry to the labour market may be gleaned from Table 1.5. In 1970, 58,277 workers were employed in the production of sugar cane, sugar, rum and molasses. This figure amounted to 20.2 per cent of all agricultural workers and 7.7 per cent of the labour force. The majority of the 230,500 agricultural workers, cited in the data, were peasants. Apart from bananas they produced coconut, citrus, cocoa, pimento, coffee, root crops, and livestock. Such workers constituted 79.8 per cent of all agricultural workers.

Industries such as bauxite and alumina, as well as tourism, are shown to be far less labour intensive than the agricultural industries. Bauxite and alumina, with 11,400 workers accounted for 1.5 per cent of the labour force. Tourism, with 8,700, represented 1.1 per cent of the labour force.

Table 1.6

Employment in the Jamaica Sugar Industry,
1967-1970

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total</u>
1967	63,244
1968	62,730
1969	61,132
1970	58,277

Source: Annual Report of the Sugar Research Department, Jamaica, various years.

The level of employment in the Jamaica Sugar Industry between 1967-1970 is presented in Table 1.6. The decline in the number of workers is noteworthy. Whereas in 1967 there were 63,244 workers, in 1970 the numbers was 58,277. These figures should be regarded with some caution, however. They show the maximum number of workers employed in a given year and do not indicate the wide variation which might take place in a particular year. Furthermore, these figures represent mainly the workers employed by the Sugar Manufacturers Association (SMA), and the Cane Farmers Association (CFA).

The brief picture which has been presented of the role played by the sugar industry in the export sector and in the labour market reveals the level of the contribution of this industry to the Jamaican economy. The basic importance of this study lies in the fact that it constitutes the first major attempt to analyze the socio-economic effects of foreign investment in the Jamaican sugar industry and to demonstrate that such investment gave rise to various forms of underdevelopment within Jamaican society. Indeed, the question of foreign investment has received scant attention from

West Indian academics. With the exception of Girvan's study of foreign capital in the bauxite industry,¹¹ the phenomenon of foreign investment has not been subjected to the kind of scrutiny which it deserves.

It is instructive to understand the ways in which the present study differs from previous works on Jamaican society. Attempts at explaining persistent underdevelopment in Jamaican society have, in general, relied on what may be described as the theory of plantation economy and society.¹² I will first of all mention some of the intellectual precursors of the plantation school. Then I will state briefly some of the tenets of the major contributors to the "plantation theory".¹³ Finally, I will point out the theoretical and methodological weaknesses of the plantation school and indicate the ways in which the present study redresses these shortcomings, and thereby offers a new perspective for the analysis of underdevelopment in Jamaica.

CRITIQUE OF THE PLANTATION SCHOOL

The plantation school owes an intellectual debt to various sources. One of these is Merivales' land/labour ratio analysis of the post-Emancipation West Indian economy in which the dominant role of the plantation in the economy is highlighted.¹⁴ Nieboer's concept of "open" and "closed" resource systems is also important since it recurs in the works of members of the plantation school.¹⁵ Eric Williams also provided some of the intellectual inspiration to the plantation school with his historical analysis of the structural

connections between the metropolitan and colonial economies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.¹⁶

Most plantation theorists would probably agree with Padilla's statement that

a modern plantation society can be defined heuristically as a kind of class-structured society whose major economic institutions are geared to large scale production and marketing of an export crop or crops for profit, and whose population depends directly or indirectly on the plantation for its livelihood and the realization of its economic wants.¹⁷

Like Padilla, Wagley sees the plantation as the defining characteristic of various societies in the Americas.¹⁸ He describes these as "Plantation America" and demarcates them as a "culture sphere which extends spatially from about midway up the coast of Brazil into the Guianas, along the Caribbean coast, throughout the Caribbean itself and into the United States".¹⁹ Wagley maintains that because of slavery and plantation agriculture, there has evolved "a series of cultural characteristics common to Plantation America which derive often from similarities in environment, often from common historical background and often from the presence of such a large population of African origin".²⁰

Other social scientists who write in the same vein include E. Franklin Frazier. He affirms that "in the tropical areas where racial frontiers have been created as the result of the economic expansion of Europe, the plantation has been the basis of the new societies".²¹ Similarly, Edgar Thompson contends that the plantation is the "lengthened shadow of the planter's agricultural and commercial purposes operating in a frontier situation".²² Vera

Rubin also uses the plantation to explain what she sees as "cultural continuities" in the Caribbean.²³ These writers, for the most part, tend to see the plantation almost in terms of Goffman's concept of "total institutions".²⁴ The effects of the plantation are, they seem to suggest, to maintain societies where "standards of living have remained low in relation to human needs, and poverty and disease are found on a large scale ... conditions of life that result from a social system that restricts services, does not provide opportunities for mobility, and limits achievements and life chances of the population".²⁵

The first group of members of the plantation school to whom I have referred, directly, or indirectly, influenced the second group. The latter, comprising social scientists associated with the University of the West Indies, are usually referred to as the "New World Group". Two members of the group who are relevant to this study are LLOYD Best and George Beckford.²⁶

According to Best, "plantation economy falls within the general class of externally-propelled economies".²⁷ In his theoretical model he distinguishes three broad historical phases: (1) Pure Plantation Economy, which covers the period from about 1600 to 1838 (2) Plantation Economy Modified which extends from 1838 to 1938 and (3) Plantation Economy Further Modified, which runs from 1938 onwards.²⁸ Best enumerates the features of the economic relationship between metropolis and hinterland in the pure plantation economy. These include the spheres of influence controlled by each other, the division of labour between metropole

and hinterland, the specification relating to the monetary system, the origin, destination and carriage of trade, and finally, the conditions affecting the sale of hinterland products in the metropolitan market.²⁹

Best also distinguishes between hinterlands of conquest, settlement, and exploitation. He bases this typology on the kind of production which is carried out in each colony. In addition, he traces the growth and development of the plantation hinterland and assesses the structural features of their economies.³⁰

In analyzing the characteristics of plantation economy modified and plantation economy further modified, Best affirms that the first phase was marked by most of the elements found in the pure plantation period as well as by the acute labour shortage felt on the plantations because of emancipation. In Best's view, the period of plantation economy further modified has been differentiated by the degree of self-reliance shown by the plantation society, the import-substitution policies of the government, and the attempt by the latter to implement development programmes.³¹

One major weakness of the plantation school, seen especially in the work of Lloyd Best, is the narrow focus on which the concept of underdevelopment is based. Best's description of pure plantation economy, plantation economy modified, and plantation economy further modified, does indicate that the plantation is integrated with capitalism at the international level. However, Best fails to demonstrate the relationship between West Indian underdevelopment and the dynamics of British capitalism. Thus, although Best's

analysis of plantation economy is supposed to be based on an historical approach, such an approach is not forcefully presented in his work.

There is no serious attempt to analyze internal processes of change by identifying the continuity and strength of social forces. The periodization portrays self-enclosed moments in time and static relations which are mechanically transposed from one period to another. And underlying all this is the unrealistic assumption that in the long interval between the establishment of plantations and the society of today, no significant developments have taken place.³²

Indeed, Best's concept of underdevelopment is very weak. At times, he refers to the relationship between metropole and hinterland are "the general institutional framework of collaboration".³³ The narrow focus and the lack of an analysis of the dynamic relationship between metropole and hinterland is also evident in the works of other members of the plantation school such as Wagley, Padilla, Frazier, and Thompson. In general, they fail to demonstrate the relationship between capitalism and colonialism. By stressing notions such as "culture spheres", plantation theorists fail to emphasize the fact that exploitation on plantations was a feature of metropolitan capitalism.

Drawing on some of the formulations enunciated by Best, George Beckford attempted to build a general theory of plantation economy in order to explain hinterland underdevelopment.³⁴ Beckford uses the concept of "plantation economy" as a theoretical framework and applies it to "those countries where the internal and external dimensions of the plantation system dominate the country's economic,

social and political structure and its relations with the rest of the world."³⁵

Basically, Beckford sees underdevelopment as emanating from the plantation which creates an underdeveloped society. This kind of society, he believes, will only attain economic development when the symptoms of underdevelopment are removed by "a radical change in the institutional structure of the plantation system".³⁶ In surveying plantations around the world, Beckford holds that "the greatest concentration of plantation economies is to be found in the Caribbean but the greatest concentration of population is in Ceylon and Southeast Asia".³⁷ He then concludes that

the common plantation influence gives the set of countries a certain homogeneity; each is fundamentally similar to the other, in terms of not only economic structure and economic problems but also social structure, political organization and other aspects of human life.³⁸

The fundamental weakness in the arguments of the plantation school lies in the attempt to utilize the concept of plantation as a theoretical framework to analyze underdevelopment. Attempts to define the term "plantation" and to correlate it with social, political, and economic phenomena have proven to be problematic when the term is being used to refer to a wide variety of plantations in a wide variety of countries.³⁹ The difficulties encountered by the various committees on work on plantations of the International Labour Organization in adopting a definition for "plantation" arose because of the large number of countries and territories where plantations exist, and because of the great diversity of economic, social, demographic and other conditions.⁴⁰

Critical writers have pointed to similar problems. Some analysts suggest that the word "plantation" has a vague connotation and that its modern application is sometimes little more than an expression applied popularly to certain rather ill-defined types of large centrally operated estates.⁴¹ At a conference held in Puerto Rico on "Plantation Systems of the New World", it was decided that an all-purpose definition of the term was undesirable since the definition would have to include slave plantations, later descendants of the slave plantations, the hacienda, the mechanized large farms of the temperate zone, now perhaps extending to the tropics.⁴² In addition, variation in labour and labour systems and their cultural correlates would have to be included for each type. Thus, the conference "rejected the possibility and even the advisability for arriving at a single definition of plantation".⁴³ Courtenay, likewise, maintains that "there is no generally accepted definition of a plantation".⁴⁴

Originally, the word "plantation" was used to describe the settlements established by colonists in an overseas area.⁴⁵ However, since the majority of European colonies became associated with the production of new agricultural products, from the seventeenth century onwards the concept of the plantation was applied primarily to an agricultural establishment which had been created for the production of export crops. Although sugar, which had been introduced by colonists from Portugal, had probably been the first plantation crop, in the eighteenth century British and French colonists in the Caribbean planted initial crops of coffee,

cotton and indigo. At later dates plantations were established in tropical Africa and south-east Asia for producing export crops.

Although plantations have generally been equated with large-scale methods of production and are different from small peasant holdings, it is not easy to classify them simply on the basis of size. What is a large or a small plantation depends on the country in which the plantation operates and the kind of product which is grown.

Let us consider the major characteristics of the plantation system. First of all, plantations are located mainly in tropical and subtropical areas. Secondly, plantations originally specialized in the production of a single export-oriented commodity. Thirdly, many plantations are characterized by scientific cultivation and a certain degree of operational efficiency. These last two features usually require large external inputs. Finally, many plantations employ hired workers on a regular basis. Nevertheless, even on the basis of the characteristics which have been cited - location, type of crop, export orientation, and the organization of labour, "it is difficult to arrive at a definition of a plantation which could be applied uniformly in all parts of the world."⁴⁶

One can clearly see that the notion of the plantation, because of its lack of conceptual clarity, provides an inadequate theoretical framework within which underdevelopment can be analyzed. I am not denying that the concept of the plantation can provide useful descriptive comments on certain colonial and post-colonial societies. However, such a concept has little independent

explanatory power unless it is contained within a theoretical framework such as structural dependency theory where the plantation can then be viewed as an aspect of the mode of production where, as in the case of Jamaica, foreign investment was a vital component.

Thus, the plantation is inadequate as a theoretical framework to analyze underdevelopment because of the lack of clarity produced by an application of the concept. This point does not, however, negate the fact that when the concept of the plantation is narrowed down to refer to a particular plantation crop, in a particular country, it can be effectively utilized to provide important descriptive details of the process of cultural change. This distinction is very important, for in this study the theoretical framework is structural dependency theory, but an examination of the operations of Jamaican sugar plantations is critical for an understanding of the ways in which foreign investment, operating through the plantations, was able to underdevelop various aspects of Jamaican society. The working definition of the plantation which this study utilizes is one which refers specifically to Jamaica and specifically to the sugar plantation.

A plantation is an export oriented, tropical crop-raising enterprise, characterized by an organizational pattern utilizing a large number of unskilled hired labourers, relatively large amounts of capital, and a small number of skilled managers. The plantation is centrally managed and practices division of labour to produce one or, in rare cases, two crops. Other characteristics which are common but do not always apply, are that ownership is usually in the form of a limited liability company which often is controlled from abroad, labour usually has been imported into the

region, and management and ownership are usually European.⁴⁷

There is little doubt that the notion of the plantation which is utilized by the plantation school requires revision if the concept is to be regarded seriously. It is worthwhile to examine the example of Cuba. Many of the features of socio-economic underdevelopment which characterized pre-revolution Cuba disappeared after the revolution took place.⁴⁸ In the past, most members of the plantation school have argued that Cuban underdevelopment, like that of other areas in the Caribbean, sprang from the existence of the plantation. However, the plantation has been maintained in Cuba after the revolution. How do we then explain the disappearance of various features of Cuban underdevelopment given the continuing existence of the Cuban plantations? The answer would seem to lie not in the existence of the plantation per se but in the operation of the mode of production. Pre-revolution Cuba had a capitalist mode of production with heavy foreign investment in the sugar industry. After the revolution, however, the mode of production became socialist, and the Cuban state became the owner of the sugar industry and plantations. Thus, it would seem that one of the crucial elements in Cuban underdevelopment had been the articulation of the mode of production, a mode in which foreign investment had played a vital role.

The nature and scope of this study do not require additional critique of the plantation school. We have seen that the plantation is too weak a conceptual tool to be used as a theoretical framework for the analysis of underdevelopment. The use of the structural

dependency perspective in this study therefore constitutes a radical departure from the analysis of the plantation school. Furthermore, the fact that plantation theorists have generally confined their studies to the Caribbean as a whole rather than to individual countries means that the Jamaica post-war sugar industry has not been studied in detail in many previous works. Thus, from a number of perspectives, the present work constitutes an original contribution to the literature on Jamaican society.

THE METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

The science of historical materialism constitutes the methodology on which this study is based. Marx and Engels formulated their materialist conception of history after rejecting the idealist versions prevalent in their time. As Engels stated:

The materialist conception of history starts from the proposition that the production of the means to support human life, and next to production, the exchange of things produced, is the basis of all social structure; that in every society that has appeared in history, the manner in which wealth is distributed and society divided into classes or orders is dependent upon what is produced, how it is produced and how the products are exchanged. From this point of view, the final causes of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought not in men's brains, not in men's better insight into internal truth and justice but in changes in the mode of production and exchange.⁴⁹

In the preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx stated clearly the importance which he attached to the material conditions of the productive process.

In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite state of development of their

material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. it is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, ⁵⁰ their social being that determines their consciousness.

As Hobsbawm affirms, there are three basic relations which characterize the Marxian study of history: (1) the theory of base and superstructure (2) a social evolutionary process (3) the concept of class conflict.⁵¹

The social system conceptualized by Marx consists of the interaction of different levels of society, the base and the superstructure. It is important to understand the concrete ways in which the two are connected. The controversy surrounding this aspect of Marxism stems partly from the fact that Marx, in his discussion of base and superstructure, sometimes stated that the one "determines" the other, sometimes that it "corresponds" to the other. Nevertheless, Marxists generally agree that changes in the base are necessary, but not always sufficient for changes in the superstructure. In other words, changes in the superstructure are connected to changes in the material base of society but do not occur in a simple mechanical manner. What Marx wanted to emphasize was the fact that an understanding of human society require, first of all, an examination of the material conditions of the productive process. This statement does not, however, imply an economic deterministic approach. Indeed, Engels' clarification of the Marxist position is important to note.

Marx and I are ourselves partly to blame for the fact that the younger people sometimes lay more stress on the economic side than is due to it. We had to emphasize the main principle vis a vis our adversaries who denied it, and we had not always the time, the place, or the opportunity to give their due to other elements involved in the interaction.⁵²

The social evolutionary focus of Marx's method is based on his view that as the level of the development of the productive forces increases they come into greater and greater conflict with the existing relations of production which hinder further growth. The result is revolutionary change where the change in the economic foundation transforms the entire superstructure. However, Marx believed that no social order would perish before all its potential productive forces had developed. He similarly did not believe that higher relations of production could ever appear before the material conditions of their existence have nurtured within the old society.⁵³ The transition from feudalism to mercantile capitalism, competitive capitalism, and monopoly capitalism is indicative of the dynamics of social change.

The concept of class conflict is also central to historical materialism because Marx posited that the whole history of mankind since the end of communal society has been a history of class struggle.⁵⁴ He considered that the progress of human society from one stage of social evolution to the next was due to the class conflict which, in turn, was based on the exploitative relations between classes.⁵⁵

Historical materialism is therefore historical in that it endeavours to understand the present in terms of the development of

its history. It is materialist since it seeks to explain social phenomena by examining underlying material causes. Furthermore, it is dialectical in that it regards everything as being in a process of dialectical change. In other words, changes result from the working out of opposing forces which are in contradiction to each other within society itself.⁵⁶ As Ollman contends, Marx viewed the world "relationally".

The relation is the irreducible minimum for all units in Marx's conception of social reality. This is really the nub of our difficulty in understanding Marxism, whose subject matter is not simply society but society conceived "relationally". Capital, labour, value, commodity, etc., are all grasped as relations, containing in themselves, as integral elements of what they are, those parts with which we tend to see them externally tied. Essentially a change of focus has occurred from viewing independent factors which are related in each factor, to grasping this tie as part of the meaning conveyed by its concept.⁵⁷

It is instructive to examine briefly some of the debates that have revolved around the concept of historical materialism. The view of Yuri Semenov, for example, is that no particular society has undergone the entire sequence of changes in modes of production that Marx envisaged.⁵⁸ He suggests, however, that many societies have passed through some of the stages of the transition from the ancient to the capitalist mode. Therefore, according to Semenov, it is only by examining human history as a whole that all the dimensions of historical materialism can be understood.

Indeed, there have been various attempts to consolidate and explain the basic evolutionary focus of the materialist concept. Some critics affirm that the most appropriate manner of classifying societies, from a historical and a Marxist perspective, is according

to their social structure as seen in the way in which they effectively control both human and non-human productive assets.⁵⁹

Nevertheless, G. A. Cohen asserts that the fundamental claims of historical materialism are functional in form.⁶⁰ J. Elster not only agrees with this perspective but maintains that because of the "functionalism" of the concept, the Marxist theory of history should be rejected.⁶¹

In recent years many tenets of Marxism have been increasingly subjected to scrutiny. The debate as to whether class struggle or the productive forces should be considered as the driving force in history, has divided many Marxists.⁶² Writers such as Robert Brenner⁶³ and Ellen Meiksins Wood⁶⁴ assert that it is, in fact, class power which determines property relations while the latter influence the rate of development of the productive forces. Such critics, therefore, deny that the level of the productive forces determine the economic structure.

Analysts have also been divided on the question of the way in which they should interpret Marx's assertion that the relations of production eventually impede the development of the productive forces and that this "fetter" produces an era of social revolution.⁶⁵ Some theorists have even utilized the term "Post-Marxism" to describe their perspective.⁶⁶ Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe fall into this category.⁶⁷ They not only deny the theoretical validity of the notion of base and superstructure, but also reject the idea that class position is the fundamental historical determinant of political and social identity. In

addition, Laclau and Mouffe discard the idea that the relations of production are of primary importance in explaining social change.

Other innovative approaches have been initiated. The proponents of Rational Choice Marxism (RCM), for example, contend that this perspective is a fully-fledged paradigm and deserve to be treated as such. They hold that "societies are composed of human individuals who, being endowed with resources of various kinds, attempt to choose rationally between various courses of action."⁶⁸ This approach, however, has been shown to be very vague. Even the supporters of RCM agree that its basic limitation lies in the fact that it does not explain what it treats as a presupposition of its explanations. Since the presuppositions frequently include the preferences of the actor as well as the social context in which the action takes place, rational-choice explanation usually fails to explain the preferences as well as the social context of the actor.⁶⁹

This brief glimpse of some of the debates which have centred on differing interpretations of various facets of Marxism, shows that there are aspects of historical materialism which still provokes much controversy. In view of the paucity of interpretative consensus of many of these questions, the "standard" Marxist elucidation of the materialist conception of history, which I initially examined, will remain as the basic methodology of this study.⁷⁰

PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT

It is worthwhile to clarify the concepts of development and underdevelopment and thereby explain the manner in which these terms will be utilized in this study.

At the level of social groups, development basically implies "an increasing capacity to regulate both internal and external relationships".⁷¹ One may say, from an economic perspective, that a society develops as its members jointly increase their capacity to deal with the environment. Nevertheless, the concept of development should not be viewed only from the economic perspective but should include the overall social process which is dependent on the outcome of the environment. Thus, the transition from communalism, through slavery, feudalism, and capitalism, represented development "in the strict sense that there was increased capacity to control the material environment and thereby to create more goods and services for the community. The greater quantity of goods and services were based on greater skills and human inventiveness."⁷²

When the concept of development is applied to countries like Jamaica which have experienced centuries of colonial exploitation, the concept would include a consideration not only of the factors of production such as capital, technology, and land, but also of class structure, the social relations of production, and the mode of production. In addition, the sustained growth of real income per capita is an inadequate indicator of development for areas like Jamaica. The reason is simply that it is quite possible for economies to grow without developing.⁷³ In other words, per capita

income gives no indication of the distribution of income in a country, or the extent to which the inhabitants take part in its economic life.

This study views socio-economic development as the process of expanding the capabilities of people. The ultimate focus of socio-economic development is human development.⁷⁴ The concept of development espoused here is one which is ultimately concerned with what people are capable of doing or being. In general terms, questions regarding life expectancy, levels of nutrition, standards of health, levels of literacy, and dignity and self-respect, are quite relevant.⁷⁵ This view of development is concerned with much more than expanding the supply of commodities. It embraces changes in the relations and the forces of production.

Thus, in this study, development is considered to be a multidimensional concept which embraces economic, as well as social and political dimensions. In addition, development implies changes in the structure, the institutions, and the output of society. Finally, development in regions like Jamaica must be seen within the context of an international system which is dominated by the advanced capitalist countries.

Like development, the concept of underdevelopment is a multidimensional one. Underdevelopment does not mean a lack of development since all people have developed in one way or another and to a greater or lesser extent.⁷⁶ Underdevelopment refers to the peculiar combination of productive forces and production relations among the peripheral countries of the world, which at the prevailing

level of human technological development constitute the basis of their poverty. This poverty is also a reflection of the inequalities of income and wealth which the world system of production and exchange reproduces.⁷⁷ Underdevelopment is best understood as "distorted", "restricted", "dependent", "uneven", or "asymmetrical" development. Indeed, "underdevelopment makes sense only as a means of comparing levels of development."⁷⁸ In so doing one can see the extent of the uneven development which has taken place between different nations.

The notion of exploitation is central to the concept of underdevelopment presented in this study. It is my contention that many of the countries of the so-called Third World in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean were developing independently until they are taken over by the advanced capitalist countries and exploited.⁷⁹ The relationship of exploitation between the two groups of countries resulted in the export of surplus from the colonies to the metropolis. Deprived of the benefits of their natural resources and labour, constrained by the trade and commercial practices of the advanced countries, the exploited regions were unable to generate the economic dynamism which is necessary for effective structural transformation. In other words, they were underdeveloped. The development of the advanced capitalist countries therefore generated underdevelopment in the peripheral countries, although this process must not be viewed as the simplistic determination of internal structures by external ones.

In the peripheral countries, underdevelopment manifests itself in economic, political, and social terms. Poverty, inequality, and unemployment are some of the basic indicators of economic underdevelopment. In addition, compared with advanced capitalist countries, underdeveloped countries show low per capita incomes, lack of heavy industry, low national savings, and structural dependence.⁸⁰

The political powerlessness of the leaders of underdeveloped countries vis à vis their counterpart in the advanced countries is an indicator of political underdevelopment. This political weakness is often the result of the economic weakness which has been produced by metropolitan exploitation. In the underdeveloped countries, political underdevelopment is often marked by elite rule, and the political repression of the mass of the people.

Social underdevelopment is frequently marked by inadequate social services, illiteracy, race cleavages, a comprador class, and rigid class distinctions in which race plays an important role.⁸¹

The underdevelopment of various features of Jamaican society which resulted from the colonialist and imperialist policies of the advanced capitalist countries must be understood in the context of the growth of capitalism during different stages. In this regard, it is worthwhile to note that the original ideas of Marx and Engels regarding the development of capitalism in backward regions were somewhat over-optimistic. Marx had postulated that in spite of the brutalities of European colonial expansionism in places like India, such activities were historically necessary in order to destroy the

un-changing and backward mode of production in such countries and to transform them to the capitalist mode of production.⁸² Such countries would then be able to progress to a socialist mode at the appropriate time. In Marx's view, backward countries would only develop fully after the penetration of European capitalism. He did not think that such countries could attain capitalism by the development of their own productive forces, as had been the case in Western Europe.⁸³ Marx apparently believed that capitalism would reproduce itself in whatever society it penetrated and that the capitalist mode which would develop in backward areas, through European expansionism, would, in time, come to be basically similar to the capitalist mode in Western Europe.

Although this basic view has been refined and modified by later Marxists, some social scientists will maintain this position.⁸⁴ What this study seeks to demonstrate, however, is that foreign capitalist penetration in a particular sector of the Jamaican economy brought about a distorted development which is termed "underdevelopment". Like many dependentistas, I believe that this kind of asymmetrical development has been the fate of many peripheral societies as a result of their incorporation in the world capitalist structure.⁸⁵ It is for this reason that while this study analyzes underdevelopment using the methodology of historical materialism, the theoretical framework is structural dependency theory. An elaboration of this approach is required at this juncture.

THE STRUCTURAL DEPENDENCY FRAMEWORK: HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL
CONSIDERATIONS

The intellectual preoccupation with the socio-economic disparities between nations has, especially since the Second World War, generated different theoretical conceptualizations of development and underdevelopment. Some of them, however, such as the modernization paradigm, display an over-reliance on the concepts of structural functionalism as well as various methodological shortcomings because of their emphasis on the narrow, dichotomous classification of societies into "traditional" and "modern". An ethnocentric bias stemming from certain normative, ideological pre-suppositions is also evidenced by the proponents of modernization theory. Although such theorists present cultural, psychological, and institutional approaches, their ahistoricism, reductionism, and evolutionary foci succeed merely in typifying and describing examples of underdevelopment without seeking to explain the reason for the existence of the phenomenon.⁸⁶

It is in the context of the failure of modernization theories to assess adequately the manner in which international capitalism obstructs development in peripheral areas that the genesis of structural dependency theory must be viewed. Whereas supporters of modernization theories generally hold that economic backwardness in the underdeveloped countries can be alleviated by their incorporation into the world capitalist economy, many dependentistas maintain that it is largely because of such incorporation that the underdeveloped countries suffer from high

unemployment, income inequality, economic stagnation, and regional disequilibrium.

DYNAMICS OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT

In this section, I shall first explore the intellectual heritage and theoretical roots of dependency theory; the contributions of the Economic Commission for Latin America⁸⁷ (ECLA), the diffusionist school of development, and Marxist theory will be appraised. Secondly, the basic tenets of dependency theory will be stated. The works of major Latin American dependentistas will be consulted. Finally, dependency theory will be critically assessed, qualifications of the paradigm will be posited in order to clarify some of the conceptual confusion which has plagued many writers on the subject. Such qualifications will also indicate the way in which the concept will be utilized in this study.

ECLA AND THE DIFFUSION MODEL

The formation of the Economic Commission for Latin America in the late 1940s heralded a fundamental re-thinking and re-evaluation by Latin American scholars of the role of foreign influences in the developmental process. Under the leadership of the economist Raul Prebisch, ECLA rejected the metropolitan orthodoxy which considered that Latin America's role in the international division of labour was primarily that of producing food and raw materials for the advanced capitalist centres. This rejection reflected ECLA's view that standard economic theory with

its focus on equilibrium and commodity exchange was inadequate to grapple with the lack of development manifested in the various regions of Latin America. ECLA felt that underdevelopment in Latin America had to be understood in terms of certain structural imbalances, within different historical contexts and national situations.⁸⁸

By the 1950s, Prebisch had marshalled his critique into four basic policy recommendations. One of his major propositions was that import substitution industrialization within the framework of protective tariff measures should be initiated. Prebisch considered such action to be vital for a reduction of Latin America's dependence on imports of foreign, high income elastic goods. This kind of measure, it was believed, would not only reduce surplus labour, but would also result in increased productivity within the region. ECLA saw undertakings of this sort as a means of acquiring technical innovation which, it was thought, would lead to an improvement of the lot of the masses. Thus, the "outward directed" growth which had characterized Latin America's economy prior to the formation of ECLA was now to be replaced by "inward directed" growth. Import substitution was to be emphasized as "a means of replacing or ensuring the supply of goods that cannot be bought with the foreign exchange available."⁸⁹

Another policy recommendation enunciated by Prebisch urged regional economic integration among the various countries of Latin America. ECLA thought that such a move would mean an increased

market size and thus overall economic benefits for the area as a whole.

Realizing that the falling prices of raw commodity exported from the periphery to the advanced, capitalist countries hindered the economic development of the former, Prebisch negotiated a scheme of "reciprocity" for such transferral of resources. He hoped thereby to arrest this economic drainage to the metropolitan countries.⁹⁰ This scheme eventually led to demand for preferential tariff rates for manufactured goods exported from the periphery.

Prebisch's later recommendations hinted at the formation of economic cartels in Latin America. Since he was cognizant of the extent to which price fluctuations of Latin American raw materials on the international market adversely affected the economies of that region, Prebisch suggested the organization of raw commodity control schemes in order to minimize the effects of such fluctuations.⁹¹

Prebisch's propositions are an accurate reflection of the major assumptions of the diffusion model of development which holds, as one of its chief premises, that development will take place in underdeveloped countries through the spread of capital, technology, and "modernizing" attitudes and values from the advanced capitalist countries.⁹² It is important to notice that both diffusionists and dependentistas identify Latin America's underdevelopment as being a product of its ties to the internationalist capitalist system. Where they differ, however, is the proposed solutions which they offer. Whereas many dependentistas reject many ties with international capitalism, diffusionists, such as Prebisch, seek

closer ties albeit under the kind of modified arrangements, some of which we have just reviewed.

This basic difference between the two schools of thought derives from a fundamental disagreement about the nature of underdevelopment. While dependentistas regard this phenomenon as a result of the international expansion of capital from the developed countries, diffusionists, and this is a second premise of the model, see underdevelopment as an original condition from which all countries emerge, although at different rates.

The third postulate of diffusionists concerns the societal arrangements through which development would be transmitted to the underdeveloped countries. It was held that development would take place in two stages, both of which would manifest a certain dualism. In the first stage, development comes from the advanced capitalist countries, the economic "centre", to the underdeveloped countries, the "periphery". In the second stage, development proceeds from the modern, urban, industrialized areas of a particular country, which is either an outpost of or in close contact with the international economy, to the traditional, rural, backward periphery. It was held that in this second stage of development, a sub-process would take place with development going from the nation's capital to regional trading centres and from there to the rural hinterland.⁹³

The importance of the concept of the dual society in the diffusionist approach must now be addressed. Diffusionists view the rural hinterland as being feudal, in the same sense as was medieval

England, and expect capitalism to replace feudalism. They also consider that the development of cities will be contingent on the expansion of adequate technology, on the one hand to augment agricultural production which might support urban populations, and on the other hand to facilitate the transportation of goods and services to the cities.

Urban areas, diffusionists believe, will stimulate commerce which will in turn encourage the activities of artisans and merchants. It will be the task of new bourgeoisie to bring the market to the countryside, to crush the power of the feudal lords, to exercise political dominance and to disseminate their ideology. Such measures, it was felt, would create the conditions for the inception of the industrial revolution and the birth of modern capitalist society.⁹⁴

The theories of the diffusionist school and the well-intentioned propositions of ECLA reveal, in many instances, an incorrect analysis of the nature of the socio-economic problems which plague Latin America. The assumption, for example, that development in Latin America would be spearheaded by the vigorous, commercial policies of a progressive, nationalist bourgeoisie has not been verified by historical experience. The fact that this class might have had a vested interest in maintaining the status quo of dependency in the underdeveloped countries apparently did not occur to diffusionists. Furthermore, they failed to examine in detail the nature of the links between this class and the metropolitan bourgeoisie.

Although there is some indication that by 1963 Prebisch had started to comprehend that the domestic bourgeoisie was retarding rather than advancing Latin American development, he was not able to diminish the power of this group. Since he was merely the agent of an international organization, this apolitical role restricted him to advocate to the ruling class the elimination of barriers to upward mobility, the removal of inequities in the distribution of wealth and income, and other institutional reforms.⁹⁵ Furthermore, although Prebisch did seek a reduction in military expenditure as a means of bolstering economic development, he failed to propose any decrease in the power of the armed forces. This is precisely one of the means which has been utilized by the ruling classes in Latin America to maintain their hegemonic position.

The inability of the diffusionists and ECLA to fathom the dynamics of the role of class structure in the development of Latin America led them to overemphasize what they perceived to be causative factors in this underdevelopment. Thus, I believe that the traditional or feudal oligarchies did not play a predominant role in the underdevelopment of Latin America as diffusionists contend. Such a role I would assign to the internal contradictions and uneven development of capitalist production.⁹⁶

Furthermore, diffusionists and ECLA failed to comprehend the ramifications of some of the solutions which they proposed for resolving Latin America's economic problems. The import substitution industrialization which was supposed to create an industrial infrastructure designed to satisfy the needs for those

goods which had previously been imported is a case in point. To begin with, the new industrial programme required a steady supply of foreign capital. Such capital was supplied by multinational corporations as well as by various foreign aid organizations, but little indigenous economic development took place since there was now an even greater dependence on international capital.⁹⁷

Because of factors such as the failure of import substitution industrialization to restrict dependence, the increase in unequal income distribution, widespread marginalization, the rapid growth and dominance of the multinational corporations, the burgeoning of the military-bureaucratic oligarchies, and the rampant socio-economic instability, it became obvious in the 1960s that diffusion theory had failed to understand Latin American underdevelopment and to prescribe the necessary solutions.⁹⁸ Dependency theory, which emerged as a response to this state of affairs, did not have its theoretical roots completely in diffusionist theory and the national recommendations of ECLA. Its genesis and development were also shaped by Marxist influences.

MARXIST ROOTS OF DEPENDENCY THEORY

The intellectual heritage of dependency theory is deeply rooted in Marxist sociology. Three main influences can be observed: 1. the ideas of Marx and Engels, 2. those of the classical Marxists, 3. those of the neo-Marxists.⁹⁹

Marx pointed out that the desire of capitalists to increase the volume of their profits constantly led them in search of new

markets. "The need for a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle somewhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere."¹⁰⁰ The dependency which the capitalist countries fosters on pre-capitalist societies as the economies of the latter are disrupted and controlled by the former was observed by Marx.

The bourgeois of the rapid movement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilization...It compels all nations, on pain of extinction to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst.¹⁰¹

Marx saw the growth of monopolies as the inevitable result of bourgeois economic policies and the structural imbalances of the international division of labour. Marx and Engels pointed out that the socio-economic decay suffered by nineteenth century China was largely determined by the capitalist coercion and colonial expansion of British and American trade to China.¹⁰² Marx also demonstrated the relationship between colonial finance and trade and the destruction of the cotton industry in India:

It was the British intruder who broke up the Indian hand loom and destroyed the spinning wheel. England began with driving the Indian cottons from the European market; then it introduced trust into Hindustani and in the end, inundated the very country of cottons with cottons.¹⁰³

The analyses of Marx and Engels of the economic development of China and India indicate that it was the commercial and trade interests of the capitalist classes in the metropolitan countries which determined the nature of the relationship between the metropole and the colony. In the case of both countries, colonial

trade is seen primarily as a system of plunder. Marx and Engels also considered that capitalist intrusion had resulted in the disorientation of the social and economic bases of Indian and Chinese societies.

In Marx's view, the development and spread of capitalism went hand in hand with the expansion of colonialism:

The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black skins, signalled the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production.¹⁰⁴

His comment on the way in which industrial capitalism developed during the period of imperialism is worthy of note.

Today industrial supremacy implies commercial supremacy. In the period of manufacture primarily so called, it is on the other hand the commercial supremacy that gives industrial predominance. Hence the preponderant role that the colonial system plays at the time.¹⁰⁵

Marx not only analyzed the institutionalization of colonial dependency from the epoch of agrarian capitalism to that of industrial capitalism, he also showed that the deliberate destruction by the Europeans of indigenous industries in the colonies facilitated the process of capital accumulation and the establishment of industrial capitalism in Europe.¹⁰⁶ Thus, Marx's defence of certain actions such as the conquest of Mexico and the annexation of Algeria by the French, and California by the United States, must be seen in the light of his belief in the potential for "the proliferation of autonomous capitalism"¹⁰⁷ which would ensue from such actions. Nevertheless, the analyses of Marx and Engels

did not focus in detail on the changes which resulted in colonies as a result of incorporation into the capitalist structure.

Classical Marxists such as Hilferding, Bukharin, Kautsky, Luxemburg and Lenin, addressed themselves to the question of imperialism.¹⁰⁸ They were chiefly concerned, however, with analyzing capitalist development in the Western world and although they sought to explain the reasons for the expansion of the capitalist system into non-capitalist societies, they did not pay much attention to the ramification of capitalism in the colonies.

Lenin, for example, drawing on the works of Hobson and Hilferding, pointed out that

Capitalism has grown into a world system of colonial oppression and of the financial strangulation of the overwhelming majority of the people of the world by a handful of "advanced" countries. And this "booty" is shared between two or three powerful world marauders armed to the teeth who involve the whole world in their war over the sharing of the booty.¹⁰⁹

Lenin thus saw World War I as an imperialist war fought for the partition of the world and the distribution of finance capital, spheres of influence and colonies. Wars such as this, he thought, were inevitable as long as the ownership of the means of production remained in private hands.

Lenin saw imperialism as the monopolistic stage of capitalism when capitalism, based on competition, became imperialism based on concentration. For him, imperialism was marked by the concentration of capital and production into monopolies, the joining together of bank capital and industrial capital into a financial oligarchy, and the tendency to export capital rather than

commodities. He also thought that under imperialism, international monopolies would divide the economies of the world and the most powerful capitalist powers would divide the territories of the world. Therefore, he claimed that imperialism intensified the difference in the rates of development of the various parts of the world economy.

Lenin observed that parasitism is inherent in imperialism. He cited the fact that monopoly manifests a tendency towards stagnation and decay and that the export of capital further isolates the renter class from production. Other examples of the parasitism of imperialism are the fact that numerous debtor states are controlled by a few usurer states and that a division exists between the proletarian masses and bribed, privileged workers.

In spite of this kind of analysis, Lenin failed to include a theory of underdevelopment as apart of his overall scheme of imperialism. In fact, Lenin's theory of imperialism emphasizes the structural changes in capitalism rather than upon the relations between the metropolitan countries and their colonies.

The emergence of Neo-Marxism as an academic phenomenon resulted not only from the omissions of conventional Marxist analyses but also from the attention focused on the problems of the 'new nations' in the post-World War II epoch. Writers such as Baran, Sweezy, Magdoff, Jalee, Debray and Fanon attempted to come to grips with the paucity of socio-economic development manifested by the underdeveloped countries. Thus, for Neo-Marxists, the question of underdevelopment was one of the most important issues to be

tackled. In general, they considered that the socio-economic backwardness of colonial or newly independent territories was due, primarily, to Western capitalism which had destroyed the potential for indigenous capitalist development and had left the countries in a state of economic disarticulation or underdevelopment.

Baran, for example, points to the relationship between the lack of autonomous economic development in colonies and the exploitation and appropriation of colonial surplus by the metropolitan countries.

The harmonious movement of capital from the advanced to the less developed countries that was expected to be propelled by the profit motive assumed in reality the form of embittered struggles for investment outlets, markets and sources of raw material. Western penetration of backward and colonial areas that was supposed to spread the blessing of Western civilization into every nook and corner of the globe, spelled in actual fact ruthless oppression and exploitation of the subjugated nations.¹¹⁰

A similar conclusion is drawn by Magdoff who states:

Underdevelopment can best be analyzed against the entire panorama of colonialism, economic expansionism, and rivalry among colonial powers, beginning with the earliest distortions introduced by the West into colonial world.¹¹¹

In analyzing the structural dynamics of capitalism in the metropolitan countries and the lack of internal momentum for growth manifested by capitalism in dependent territories, Baran focuses on the development and significance of the multinational corporation. He correctly points out that just as the transition from feudalism to competitive capitalism resulted not only in a great expansion of the economic surplus, but also in the transfer of a great portion of it from the feudal landlords to the capitalist businessmen, the

transition from competitive to monopolistic capitalism has similarly given rise to an enormous increase in the absolute volume of the economic surplus as well as a shift in control of the surplus from the relatively small capitalist to the giant corporations. Furthermore, in his view:

The monopolistic and oligopolistic firm operating under conditions of rapidly decreasing costs is even more anxious than its competitive predecessor to expand its sales abroad.... It must seek to maintain and to develop foreign sources of supply (of raw materials) and endeavour to secure as nearly as possible a monopolistic position with the help of investments in the source countries--investments that it can readily afford in view of the large amounts of capital at its disposal.¹¹²

Underdevelopment, therefore, for Neo-Marxists must be understood in the context of the international expansion of capital from metropolitan countries and the integration of the economies of underdeveloped countries into a world economic system which is dominated by the advanced, capitalist countries. Neo-Marxists made important contributions to the understanding of underdevelopment in the peripheral social formations because they built an overall theoretical framework within which the general features of underdevelopment can be analyzed. Dependency theory is an outgrowth of this kind of analysis. Most dependentistas, however, in their examination of underdevelopment have utilized the concrete historical realities of Latin America as their point of departure.

DEPENDENCY THEORY: TOWARDS A DEFINITION

It is important to affirm from the very outset that by the expression "dependency theory" I am not referring to a specific

theory nor do I conceptualize the term to indicate a "theory" in the positivist sense. Rather, this study conceives of dependency theory as a perspective on development and underdevelopment which embraces the works of analysts who, although their studies might evince different conceptual schemes, engage in analyses of the structures and processes of development problems and focus directly on the question of international inequality.¹¹³

Because of the different levels of analysis, ideological positions and methodological perspectives which inform the analyses of dependentistas, I shall utilize a thematic approach in presenting and in endeavouring to clarify and synthesize the major tenets of dependency theory. Furthermore, in seeking to extract the common denominators which undergird the dependency approach, I shall not attempt a comprehensive survey of all the nuances, subcurrents and deviations which are to be found in the literature.¹¹⁴ Rather, it seems to me that a certain disciplinary cohesiveness should be maintained by examining the core of theoretical-descriptive propositions which constitute the fundamental themes of dependency theory.

The principal purpose of dependency theory is to analyze the dynamics of underdevelopment in terms of imperialism. The frequently cited definition by Theotonius Dos Santos is indicative of a perspective generally held by many dependentistas:

By dependence we mean a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. The relations of interdependence between two or more economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the

dominant ones) can expand and be self-starting, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive or a negative effect on their immediate development.¹¹⁵

Dependency theorists have endeavoured to identify and analyze the nature of the restrictions imposed on Latin America because of its incorporation into the world capitalist system. Whereas traditional social scientists considered that domestic factors such as the absence of formalized institutional practices and procedures were of great importance in any assessment of underdevelopment, dependentistas have argued that Latin America's integration into international capitalism have caused it to become enmeshed in a structure of unequal exchange. This state of affairs has severely curtailed its ability to act autonomously in economic matters. Dependency theory is useful as an analytical tool because it not only provides a framework for explanations of underdevelopment and development but it also offers a perspective for analysing class struggle which might resolve societal contradictions.¹¹⁶

THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT

One of the earliest and most well-known proponents of the development of underdevelopment thesis is Andre Gunder Frank. He sees modernization theory as theoretically deficient, empirically inaccurate, and ineffective with regard to the formulation of adequate development policy. The paradigm, he argues, fails to

assess the role of historical, economic forces in the underdevelopment of Latin America. According to Frank:

Underdevelopment is not original nor traditional and neither the past nor the present of the underdeveloped countries resemble in any important respect the past of the now developed countries. The now developed countries were never underdeveloped, though they may have been undeveloped.¹¹⁷

As far as Frank is concerned, underdevelopment in the peripheral social formations has been brought about primarily because of the international expansion of capitalism. He thus rejects the notion that a feudal past or any domestic factors have been responsible for the lack of development.¹¹⁸

Frank bases his rejection of the dual society perspective on historical grounds. He points out that a mounting body of evidence indicates that capitalist expansion over the past centuries has penetrated even the most remote areas of the underdeveloped world. He concludes that the economic, political, social, and cultural institutions which are now in existence there "are the products of the historical development of the capitalist system no less than the seemingly more modern or capitalist features of the national metropolises of these underdeveloped countries."¹¹⁹ Frank believes that the concept of the dual society is invalid because Latin America, since the conquest, has participated in the general process of commodity exchange.

Frank outlines three contradictions of capitalism: the contradiction of expropriation/appropriation of economic surplus; the metropolis/satellite polarization and the contradiction of continuity in change. He believes that these contradictions

illustrate the mechanisms by which capitalism underdevelops the peripheral areas.¹²⁰

Frank, like Baran, Sweezy and other Neo-Marxists, argues that metropolitan countries expropriate most of the economic surplus produced by the periphery and appropriate it for their own development. International capitalism is therefore characterized by the constant flow of surplus from the underdeveloped to the developed countries:

The process of development and underdevelopment began when the European nations began their world wide mercantilist and capitalist expansion. Constellation of developing metropolises and underdeveloping satellites evolved, connecting all parts of the world system from its metropolitan centre in Europe, and later the United States, to the farthest outpost in the Latin American countryside.¹²¹

The underdeveloped countries thus find themselves in a structurally disadvantageous economic situation in a world dominated by the laws of capitalist production. Therefore, the economies in the domestic satellites become disarticulated and dependent thereby thwarting effective development.

The economic development that does occur in the more prosperous of the satellites is at best a limited or "underdeveloped" development.

It is constantly conditioned by relationships of dependence upon the metropolis. Economic development in Latin America, in other words, is a satellite development, which is not autonomous to the region, self generating, or self perpetrating.¹²²

According to Frank, the relationship of exploitation between the metropolitan countries and the periphery results not only in the external orientation of the economies of the latter but in the

imposition of a whole series of chain-like relations of domination in the periphery. He uses Chile as an example:

The monopoly capitalist structure and the surplus expropriation/appropriation contradiction run through the entire Chilean economy.... Indeed, it is the exploitative relation which in chain-like fashion extends the capitalist link between the capitalist world and national metropolises to the regional centres..., and from these to local centres, and so on to large landowners or merchants who expropriate surplus from small peasants or tenants, and sometimes even from these latter to landless labourers exploited by them in turn. At each point the international, national and local capitalist system generates economic development for the few and underdevelopment for the many.¹²³

The production of uneven development between metropolis and satellite is thus regarded by Frank as one aspect of capitalist exploitation. Another is the institutional patterns of dominance which result from the process of underdevelopment within the periphery.

Frank's first thesis of expropriation/appropriation of economic surplus leads naturally to his second--metropolis/satellite polarization. He points out that increasing polarization between metropolis and satellite is the inevitable consequence of the exploitation of the latter by the former. Since the satellites "remain underdeveloped because of lack of access to their surplus which is appropriated by the metropolitan countries,"¹²⁴ Frank concludes that "economic development and underdevelopment are the opposite sides of the same coin".¹²⁵ He affirms that "both are the necessary result and contemporary manifestation of internal contradictions in the world capitalist system."¹²⁶

Frank examines the nature of the metropolis/satellite polarization and analyzes the various levels at which the phenomenon might be conceptualized:

The metropolis satellite contradiction exists not only between the world capitalist metropolis and peripheral satellite countries; it is also found in these countries among their regions and between rapid development of the towns and industrial centres and lagging and decline in the agricultural districts. This same metropolis-satellite contradiction extends still deeper and characterizes all levels of the capitalist system. This contradictory metropolitan center-periphery satellite relationship, like the process of surplus expropriation/appropriation, runs through entire world capitalist system in chain-like fashion from its uppermost metropolitan world centre through each of the various national, regional, local, and enterprise centers.¹²⁷

Frank supports his thesis of the inverse developmental relationship between metropolis and satellite by pointing out that the satellites have experienced their greatest economic development when their ties to the metropolis have been weakest, such as during the World Wars or the depression. Similarly, the most underdeveloped areas are those which have had the closest ties to the metropolis.¹²⁸ The latifundia, he argues, were capitalist enterprises which responded to the demands of the national and international markets. Such rural areas are neither feudal nor are they backward because of isolation. Rather, "they have not been isolated since the beginning of the mercantile-capitalist age".¹²⁹

Frank's third thesis--the contradiction of continuity in change refers to the fact that the exploitative relationship between metropolis and satellite has remained the same everywhere during the development and expansion of capitalism. He affirms that, in spite

of the political independence or other political changes which many satellites have undergone, the basic contradictions of capitalism have remained the same.¹³⁰ While acknowledging the existence of certain socio-political changes in certain satellites, Frank's emphasis is on "the continuity of capitalist structure and its generation of underdevelopment".¹³¹

It is important therefore to understand the really fundamental contradictions, and not to confuse them with minor contradictions that are resolved more easily and at less cost but which change nothing essential in the end, and in the long run ever render the resolution of the fundamental contradictions more costly and/or more distant.¹³²

Frank's concept of dependency theory, therefore, revolves around the concept of the development of underdevelopment. His fundamental argument is that the development of metropolitan countries and the underdevelopment of the periphery were reciprocally determined. In his view, the contradictions of capitalist production are such that the countries of Latin America are doomed to perpetual underdevelopment unless they are able to break the bonds of capitalist economic domination by means of revolution.

Dependentistas such as Sunkel agree with the basic Frankian paradigm that development and underdevelopment are two components of a single unified system. He points out that "underdevelopment and development are simply the two faces of a single unified system".¹³³ He argues that from a historical point of view, development and underdevelopment were simultaneous processes which have interacted on the basis of certain functional prerequisites.

Similarly, Furtado affirms the importance of seeing the world economy as a total system within which the underdeveloped countries constitute sub-systems.¹³⁴ Cardoso and Faletto also argue that development/underdevelopment should be viewed not as separate junctures in a productive system but as functions or positions within a world-wide system of distribution and production.¹³⁵

DEPENDENCY AND THE CLIENTELE CLASS

Some of the tenets of dependency theory which evolved in the period after Frank had expounded his concept of the paradigm, constituted an attempt to critique and to refine the initial Frankian model. One of the major criticisms directed against Frank's development of underdevelopment thesis was that the concept of underdevelopment rested too much on external causation and too little on the role of the local ruling class.¹³⁶ Frank, however, has pointed out that his analysis of underdevelopment had not ignored the question of class alliances.

He emphasises that the problem is basically one of structural underdevelopment at the national and local level although it was created and is still aggravated by the structure of the world capitalist economy. Frank correctly points out that his thesis is not simply one of "external" underdevelopment.

The thesis of the book is precisely that in chain-like fashion the contradiction of expropriate/appropriation and metropolis/satellite polarization totally penetrate the underdeveloped world creating an "internal" structure of underdevelopment.... But precisely because underdevelopment is integrally internal/external, only

the destruction of this structure of capitalist underdevelopment and its replacement by socialist development can possibly constitute an adequate political policy to combat underdevelopment.¹³⁷

The role of classes in Frank's treatment of underdevelopment is brought out more clearly in his study of Lumpenbourgeoisie: Lumpendevelopment.¹³⁸ Here Frank affirms the necessity to define and understand underdevelopment in terms of classes.¹³⁹ His aim in this work is to "clarify the dialectical relationship between the actors and their changing setting".¹⁴⁰ In this study Frank traces the emergence of a lumpenbourgeoisie in Latin America. This class arose as a response to the demands of metropolitan capitalists for the production and export of raw material. It is this class, in Frank's view, which perpetuates underdevelopment through its use of the power of the state.

Class analysis is also a focal point for Bodenheimer in her discussion of dependency.¹⁴¹ She utilizes the concept of an "infrastructure of dependency". Under the rubric she lists institutions, social classes and processes such as industrialization and urbanization.¹⁴² Such aspects become a part of the dependency structure "when they function or occur in such a manner that responds to the needs or interests of the dominant powers in the international system rather than to the national needs or interests".¹⁴³ The institutionalization of dependency is thus perpetuated by this infrastructure which legitimizes and reinforces the relations of domination.

The benefits which are derived from this unequal relationship go to what Bodenheimer calls "clientele social

classes". Such classes have a vested interest in the structure of the international system and its satellite manifestation. "In return for carrying out certain functions on behalf of foreign interests, these classes enjoy a privileged and increasingly dominant and hegemonic position within their own societies based largely on economic, political or military support from abroad."¹⁴⁴

The clientele social class, in Bodenheimer's view, play the same role that historically was played by the comprador bourgeoisie, "export-import elite, whose strength, interest and very existence were derived from their function in the world market."¹⁴⁵ Current examples of Latin America's clientele classes are, in Bodenheimer's view, elements of the industrial bourgeoisie which are controlled by foreign corporations, and the state bureaucracy--professional and technical elites whose privileged position and actions are derived from their ties to foreign interests.

The emphasis by dependentistas on the way in which metropolitan economic interests help to determine the social class structure and political control in the satellite is an important aspect of dependency theory. The role of internal forces in the perpetuation of underdevelopment is thereby highlighted. Many dependentistas argue that it is utopian to envisage "autonomous development" or "national development" in the dependent society while the dominant traditional classes or modern allies of the dominant metropolitan bourgeoisie maintain their position.¹⁴⁶

This relationship between dependency on the one hand, and imperialism as manifested by the alliance of metropolitan and

satellite bourgeoisie on the other hand, has been forcefully affirmed by several writers of dependency theory. O'Brien, for example, maintains that "the basic point that it (dependency theory) makes--that the interplay between the internal Latin American structures and international structures is the critical starting point for an understanding of the process of development in Latin America--is of vital importance."¹⁴⁷ Whether one utilizes the term "comprador bourgeoisie", "dependent bourgeoisie", "clientele social class" or "lumpenbourgeoisie", one is essentially referring to the same phenomenon. In the words of Cardoso:

The main contribution of dependency theory has been to get beyond the generality of imperialism and describe specific mechanisms and ties between the local and international structures.... The principal enemy is not imperialism seen as something separate from local domination. The struggle against imperialism implies identifying its internal face which is the local monopoly industrial-financial sector and the local bourgeoisie to which it is allied in both city and countryside.¹⁴⁸

DEPENDENCY, IMPERIALISM, AND THE PRINCIPAL ENEMY

The debate between orthodox Marxists and dependentistas over what constitutes the "principal enemy" is worth examining since it sheds further light on the question of imperialism. Without doing undue violence to the differences between both groups, one may say, as a point of departure, that they both see imperialism as arising from capitalism and therefore they conceptualize the phenomenon as fundamentally economic in origin and secondly, as political, social and cultural.

Although some dependentistas have not endeavoured to make a clear distinction between dependency and imperialism,¹⁴⁹ most would argue that dependency is a state which arises from the structure or process of imperialism. Frank, among others, argues that because of the internalization of imperialism, the structure of the dominant classes of the satellites--the native financial-industrial bourgeoisie and the local rural bourgeoisie--reflects the predominant tendencies of metropolitan interests, i.e. the domestic manifestation of imperialism.¹⁵⁰ He therefore cites these classes as the immediate, though not the principal, enemy. The anti-imperialist struggle in Latin America, according to Frank, can only be waged on the basis of a class struggle for socialism. Such a struggle will result in a "stronger confrontation with the principal imperialist enemy than does direct anti-imperialist mobilization."¹⁵¹ Frank sees no beneficial features in the state machinery. He claims that since Independence, it has served merely "as an instrument of a coalition between the metropolitan bourgeoisie and the major sectors of the Latin American bourgeoisies who have always been the junior partners or even merely the executors of imperialism."¹⁵² Furthermore, the local bourgeoisie has too much to gain by maintaining satellite underdevelopment to ally itself with any anti-imperialist elements in Latin America. "The entire bourgeois class--including its comprador, bureaucratic and national segments (is joining) into ever-closer economic and political alliance with and dependence on the imperialist metropolis."¹⁵³

In the 1970s orthodox Marxists such as Fernandez and Ocampo¹⁵⁴ indicated their disagreement with the position adopted by Frank. They selected the ideas of Frank for attack "since he has been regarded as the clearest and most influential exponent of the dependentista position on the questions of the 'principal enemy' and the character of Latin American society".¹⁵⁵ They attack Frank on three main grounds. First, they insist that dependency theory is theoretically unsound and detracts from a genuine, vigorous Marxist analysis of imperialism. Second, they argue that Latin America is pre-capitalist or feudal, not capitalist as dependentistas propound. Thus, the development of the bourgeoisie is intimately connected with the development of capitalism. The bourgeoisie cannot, therefore, be regarded as the immediate enemy. Ocampo and Fernandez see imperialism as the principal enemy in alliance with the feudal landlords, whom, according to them, must be defeated before imperialism itself can be defeated. Their third point concerns the role of the bourgeoisie. They do not conceptualize this group from a monolithic perspective. They think that the bourgeoisie, far from being united, contains elements which might ally themselves with the proletariat in an anti-imperialist struggle.¹⁵⁶

The viewpoint of the dependentistas in this debate has been strongly supported by Cardoso¹⁵⁷ and Chilcote.¹⁵⁸ Cardoso's criticism of Ocampo and Fernandez is based on his claim that they persist in a reaffirmation of obsolete positions, dogmatic ideology, a failure to distinguish between different ideas of various dependentistas, and a refusal to distinguish between imperialism and

its allies in the dependent countries. Chilcote bases his support for the position of the dependentistas on Lenin's theory of imperialism. Lenin had asserted that capitalist control emanated from the export of finance capital. Such export eventually culminated in the direct control of foreign economies and ultimately in political control also. Chilcote quotes approvingly from Lenin:

Not only are there two main groups of countries, those owning colonies, and the colonies themselves, but also the diverse forms of dependent countries which, politically, are formally independent, but in fact, are enmeshed in the net of financial and diplomatic dependency.¹⁵⁹

Chilcote goes on to suggest that Lenin's analysis of dependency as well as internal control allows him "to combine internal with external forces in interpreting the national reality of a dependent nation".¹⁶⁰

The attempt of Bodenheimer to resolve some of the problems surrounding conceptualizations of imperialism is worthy of note.¹⁶¹ She focuses on non-Marxist theories, dependency theory, and Marxist theories. She rejects non-Marxist theories of imperialism on the grounds that they tend to posit military, political and ideological explanations rather than the economic power of the metropolitan countries. Similarly, she sees international relations theories as being of little use for an understanding of imperialism since they are based on the erroneous assumption that Latin American nations have autonomous decision-making capability--that is, the external economic forces influencing such decisions are ignored. She also argues that such theories establish a false dichotomy between internal and international structure.

As far as the dependency theory is concerned, she cites two weaknesses which hinder conceptual clarity. first, "by itself it is not very explicit about the reasons for the expansion of capitalism or the roots of the international system in the dominant nations."¹⁶² The second reason is that "it does not make explicit the relation between the state and private capital in the American political economy."¹⁶³

The theory of imperialism which she finds most conducive to analytical rigour is the Marxist one:

It implies an integral relation between the action of the U.S. government abroad and the structure of the American socio-economic system: it analyzes U.S. relations with Latin America as one aspect of American capitalism. In this sense American imperialism is not "irrational" or "accidental" but rather is a necessary extension of capitalism.¹⁶⁴

This perspective, in Bodenheimer's view, allows the analyst to understand that the military actions of metropolitan countries such as the USA in foreign lands are not the essence of imperialism "but rather the ultimate recourse, when the subtler mechanisms of imperialism are insufficient to contain a threat to the existing international system."¹⁶⁵

Bodenheimer concludes by suggesting that whereas dependency theory provides a view "from below" by showing how underdevelopment stems from the requirements of the world market and international capitalism, the Marxist perspective on imperialism provides a view "from above" by analyzing the nature of the international system and explaining the rationale behind the actions of the metropolitan

countries. Thus, she opines, the two theories complement each other.

The concept of imperialism is an important one in the dependency paradigm. It illustrates not only the external economic control exercised by the metropolitan countries but also the satellite class configurations which evolve because of this pattern of dominance.¹⁶⁶

DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT

Dependency theory does not exclude the idea that development in the periphery is possible. What is questioned is the nature of the development that does take place there. Some dependency writers admit that although the development of the metropolitan countries were predicated on the underdevelopment of the periphery, a kind of "underdeveloped development" does take place in the more prosperous of the satellites.¹⁶⁷ Other analysts also maintain that a limited development takes place in some peripheries, principally because of the benefits that foreign corporations derive from larger markets.¹⁶⁸

Cardoso is the dependentista who has been the principal exponent of the idea that development does take place in dependent regions.¹⁶⁹ His initial premise is that the modern manifestations of capitalism and imperialism are quite different from the concepts propounded by Lenin. Cardoso observes that Lenin's theory that imperialism was the highest stage of capitalism was based on the view that the concentration of production and capital inevitably led

to monopoly, that finance capital would supersede industrial capital, that surplus capital would be exported and raw materials imported. Because of low wages and salaries in the underdeveloped countries, the purchasing power in the local market would be curtailed. This kind of stagnation would mean that trade with the metropolitan countries was absolutely necessary. Such trade would ensure a steady supply of raw materials to metropolitan markets.

In Cardoso's view, although Lenin's theory had remained valid during the first period of imperialism, capital accumulation had changed since then. Many dependent states were no longer simply exporters of raw materials; they now had manufacturing sectors, many of which produced consumer goods for the local bourgeoisie. Furthermore, with the advent of the multinational companies, industrialization was now taking place in the periphery and was no longer solely a metropolitan phenomenon. Cardoso affirms that the multinational company is a dynamic element because its industrialization programmes include the manufacturing of products for local consumption. Such consumption requires a certain degree of purchasing power. Cardoso thus concludes that "to some extent, the interests of the foreign corporations become compatible with the internal prosperity of the dependent countries."¹⁷⁰ He therefore refutes the old theories of economic imperialism and points out that monopoly capital can work in harmony with satellite development. Such development Cardoso labels "associated dependent development".

Nevertheless, Cardoso still sees elements of dependency within this new relationship. First, the fact that this new kind of

development is based on the premise that control of technology remains in the hands of the international corporations, indicates that imperialism is a basic feature of this new kind of development.¹⁷¹ Secondly, Cardoso argues that the spread of metropolitan monopolies in the underdeveloped world will result in the creation of internal colonies in the latter. Such colonies will be those areas in the underdeveloped countries which economically and socially become increasingly subordinated to advanced areas in the same countries. The economic advancement of the latter group will be due to their links with the international capitalist system. The difference between the concept of internal colonies as espoused by Cardoso, on the one hand, and that supported by Gonzalez Cassanova,¹⁷² on the other hand, immediately becomes obvious. Whereas the former sees subordination of the backward to the advanced sectors of the underdeveloped countries as being a basic concept, the latter conceptualizes the internal colony as being a separate society. Cardoso thus views the dual society as resulting from capitalist expansion and thinks that it is functional to such expansion.

Cardoso also analyzes the nature of the struggle against imperialism. He contends that in the dual society such opposition will be muted because the presence of the imperialist, although evident in the form of monopolistic businesses, will not be all-pervasive or obviously exploitative. Such a situation will be due to the fact that within the advanced sectors of the underdeveloped countries, many categories of people, including members of the

working class, derive benefit from the presence of metropolitan capital within the country. Therefore, in Cardoso's view, in a situation of dependent development, a national bourgeoisie will not lead a struggle against imperialism.¹⁷³

Cardoso also comments on what he claims to be new, economic phenomena taking place in peripheral countries. He points out that with the gradual decline of metropolitan investments in these countries, they have had to finance development through local savings and the investment of profits. Cardoso correctly points out that during the period of monopolistic imperialist expansion, dependent countries, because of repatriation of profits, royalties, payments for patents, technical services, debt service on loans from international agencies, have become net exporters of capital to the advanced capitalist countries. The emergence of the joint venture enterprise where development programmes in the underdeveloped countries are financed by local state capital plus private national capital and international investment, is heralded by Cardoso. This state of affairs, he affirms, is indicative of the fact that foreign investment was no longer the ruthless, exploitative machinery that it was in the days of classical imperialism. Some analysts, however, disagree with Cardoso; they hold that his version of the dynamics of imperialism does not analyze in sufficient detail the negative effects which imperialism produces in the underdeveloped countries.¹⁷⁴

Cardoso's disagreement with the formulation of other dependentistas on the question of development hinges on what he

considers to be the inadequacies of such conceptualizations. he condemns their analysis as being based on the naive assumption that imperialism unifies the interests and reactions of dominated nations.¹⁷⁵ For him, this view is a clear over-simplification of what is really occurring. Furthermore, he asserts, imperialism does not necessarily result in the disarticulation of the economies of the dependent countries. Indeed, the increased cooperation between underdeveloped and advanced countries is revealing new and mutual beneficial patterns of production at the international level. Finally, the fact that industries in the underdeveloped countries are almost wholly owned by foreign capital is of minor importance since all industries, regardless of the nature of the ownership are linked to market investment and decision making structures located outside the dependent countries.

DEPENDENCY THEORY: A CRITIQUE

Ronald Chilcote's quotation of Bacha's cynical statement that there are many conceptions of dependency as there are authors,¹⁷⁶ is a worthwhile reminder of the intricacies of the vast literature which has come to be known as "dependency theory". However, before offering an assessment of some of the major criticisms of the literature, our understanding of the concept should be further explicated. It needs to be affirmed in the strongest possible terms that there is no dependency "theory" as such. What is being discussed is a certain orientation, a certain perspective held by analysts whose fundamental concern revolves around the question of

international economic inequality and the lack of development in peripheral areas. An attack on the position of a given dependentista, therefore, does not necessarily invalidate the dependency approach because of the wide variations which exist under the dependency umbrella. Furthermore, dependency theory should not be regarded as an economic determinist theory of imperialism; rather it should be viewed as an outlook on the socio-economic development of Latin America and how that development was shaped by its relationship with the metropolis.¹⁷⁷

Indeed, dependency theory should not be considered as some kind of definite causal law which seeks to posit a specific correlation between lack of economic development and dependency, but as a general framework within which the socio-economic development of peripheral countries can be analyzed.¹⁷⁸

A great deal of the criticism which has been levelled against dependency theory stems from three basic reasons:

- (1) Many dependentistas adopt widely conflicting positions on key questions of theory - e.g. those relating to capitalism.
- (2) Some critics of dependency theory see the paradigm as an ideology and treat it as such.
- (3) Many dependentistas are guilty of lack of conceptual clarity; that is, they have failed to arrive at any kind of enumeration of the basic characteristics of dependent states and to relate rigorously such dependence to the dynamics of underdevelopment.

Ever since the inception of dependency theory in Latin America, its proponents have been divided on two fundamental theoretical points: (1) the conceptualization of capitalism, and (2) the explanation of the mechanism of capitalist exploitation.

(i) CONCEPTUALIZATION OF CAPITALISM

The question of how capitalism should be conceptualized highlights a debate which goes back to Marx and Weber. Whereas Marx regarded "production relations" as being the essential feature of capitalism, Weber considered "market relations" as being the significant element in his definition. During the 1950s the two main proponents of this debate were Maurice Dobb¹⁷⁹ who defined capitalism according to the Marxian view of production relations and Paul Sweezy¹⁸⁰ who opted for the Weberian conceptualization of market relations. Dobb contends that the dynamics of society are characterized by the nature of the production relations and that class relations are indicative of the way in which the economic system functioned. Sweezy, on the other hand, holds that societies such as those which existed under feudalism did not break up primarily because of the emergence of a new class but because of changing market relationships which disrupted the economic system and brought about innovations of an economic as well as of a social and political nature.

This debate has divided analysts into two main groups. Those who view capitalism in terms of production relations include Cardoso, Dos Santos, Laclau¹⁸¹ and Bettelheim. Those who espouse

the market relations view include Frank, Amin, Emmanuel and Wallerstein.¹⁸² Frank maintains that capitalist underdevelopment started in the sixteenth century with the rise of the world market, that is, the development of a vast commercial network which included Italian cities, North Western European towns, the Mediterranean world, Sub-Saharan Africa and the adjacent Atlantic islands "until the entire face of the globe had been incorporated into a single organic mercantilist or financial system whose metropolitan centre developed in Western Europe and then in North America and whose peripheral satellites underdeveloped on all the remaining continents."¹⁸³

However, there are a number of problems with the conceptualization of capitalism, based as it is on trade and investment relations. "Firstly, long before the establishment of social formations based on the capitalist mode of production, capital in the form of merchant capital was accumulated."¹⁸⁴ Frank's apparent oversight of the fact that long distance trade and commodity markets predate the advent of capitalism has left him open to the kind of criticism which John Taylor makes:

How can we speak of European 'capitalism' when in the sixteenth century it is clear that the structural preconditions for capitalist production did not, as yet, exist? Its fundamental precondition--a coexistence of accumulated capital with workers selling their labour power on the market was clearly absent during this period, which was characterized by the dominance of a feudal mode of production, whose reproduction requires a non-separation of the direct producer from his means of production.... If capitalism was not the dominant mode of production during this period, how can it be argued that 'capitalist expansion' promoted 'capitalist underdevelopment'.¹⁸⁵

Frank, and by extension Amin and Wallerstein, seem to be therefore on theoretically weak ground when they assume that participation in simple commodity exchange is indicative of capitalism. The difference between simple commodity production and capitalist commodity production is important. Whereas in simple commodity production, serfs or slaves are not completely separated from their means of production, albeit restricted in terms of liberty, in a capitalist form of production, wage labourers are separated from the means of their production although they enjoy far greater liberty than slaves or serfs.¹⁸⁶ Thus, in the capitalist system of production, wage labourers own neither the means of production nor the product of their labour. They possess only their labour-power for which they receive wages from the capitalists. Under capitalism, therefore, the means of production become private property and the system of commodity production becomes one of capitalist production.¹⁸⁷ The relations of production is thus the social factor which should be considered in any attempt to determine the nature of a given society. Under the capitalist system, goods are produced for exchange within a definite system of relations of production.

The second problem with the 'market relations' definition of capitalism is the confusion, as Laclau¹⁸⁸ pointed out so well, which exists between capitalism and capital in such formulations. Laclau's critique of Frank focuses on Frank's weak conceptualization of capitalism. Laclau first notes that by defining feudalism and capitalism as social systems marked by particular sets of exchange

relationship rather than as modes of production, Frank abandons Marxist theory. He also contends that such an approach makes it almost impossible to obtain a definite account of the different forms of the transition from feudalism to capitalism. Laclau affirms that it is possible for one to support the thesis of the existence of pre-capitalist relations of production in the Latin American agrarian sector without being at the same time, a supporter of the dual society thesis. He concludes that the fact that different modes of production exist within the world capitalist system is indicative of the specific capitalist epoch of European expansion. Laclau suggests that a more useful analytic framework would be one based on Marx's concept of a 'mode of production' which would define capitalism not in terms of a world market but by the productive relation of wage labour or by the free exchange of labour power for wages.

Laclau's critique of Frank reveals some of the theoretical weaknesses involved in a definition of capitalism in terms of market relations. However, various analysts¹⁸⁹ deny that feudal structures and social relations, have remained in the Latin American countryside. Other critics of the conceptualization of capitalism according to the dependency paradigm adopt a position halfway between that of Frank, on the one hand, and Laclau, on the other. Their view is that if the unit of analysis is the nation state, then feudal or semi-feudal relations must be seen as having prevailed until recently in Latin America. They argue, however, that if the unit of analysis is the economy of the world, capitalist nations and

their satellites, then capitalism must be seen as having been the predominant mode from the eighteenth century onward.¹⁹⁰

(ii) MECHANISM OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT

The second major division among dependentistas, on theoretical grounds, concerns specification of the mechanisms by which underdevelopment is maintained in the peripheral social formation. Frank's fundamental thesis is that the drainage of economic surplus from the periphery to the centre, through unfavourable terms of trade, was how underdevelopment was initiated and is still being maintained. The periphery is unable to obtain its economic surplus for reinvestment and thus becomes underdeveloped. It is worth recognizing the fact that Frank in Lumpenbourgeoisie and Lumpendevlopment¹⁹¹ replied to his critics who claimed that he overemphasized the vertical relationship between centre and periphery without giving due weight to the horizontal relationship between dependent and metropolitan countries. In that work, Frank had emphasized the role of the comprador bourgeoisie in maintaining underdevelopment in the periphery. In spite of his assertions, however, there is little doubt that Frank's main emphasis is based on his theory of capital drain, "the development of underdevelopment". This is the kind of thesis which is held by writers like Jalee¹⁹² who bases his theory of the pillage of the Third World on the grounds that capital accumulation at the centre resulted in the disarticulation of the economies of the periphery. Wallerstein's emphasis on the way in which unequal trade relations

have exploited the resources of underdeveloped countries is only slightly removed from Frank whose "development of underdevelopment" had been conceptualized in terms of investment capital. What is important to note, though, is that Wallerstein, like Frank, does not give any detailed account of the mechanism by which capital is appropriated and transferred.

It was Emmanuel¹⁹³ who endeavoured to specify some of the mechanisms of exploitation with his concept of "unequal exchange". Emmanuel argues that the inequality in wages between the periphery and the metropolis, a phenomenon he labelled "unequal exchange", is the primary method by which the metropolis exploits the periphery. Basing his thesis on the view that wage is the value of the labour power which in turn is equal to the price of the commodity, Emmanuel argues that metropolitan countries exploit the workers in the dependent countries by selling goods produced there at a higher price on the world market. Such workers are paid much less for their work than the value of the goods sold on the world market. He furthermore asserts that exploitation is also manifested in the fact that people in dependent countries are obliged to purchase in exchange goods produced in the metropolis which required fewer hours of labour.¹⁹⁴ This concept of "unequal exchange" is used by Emmanuel "to convey the idea that on the world market, the poor nations are obliged to sell the product of a relatively large number of hours in order to obtain in exchange from the rich nations the product of a smaller number of hours of labour".¹⁹⁵

The concept was further utilized by Amin¹⁹⁶ who demonstrated that, especially in the African continent, trade with metropolitan countries has broken down traditional productive activities with two main results: (1) depressed real wages (2) the advent of a mass of surplus labour. This "industrial reserve army" which is usually a basic requirement for the capitalist development of industry does not fulfil this role in the periphery because of the trade mechanism of unequal exchange--i.e. the hidden transfer of surplus value from the periphery to the metropolis. Whereas Frank, Wallerstein, Emmanuel and Amin tend, on the whole, to see exploitation of the periphery by the metropolis in terms of "loss of surplus", "trade mechanisms", or "unequal exchange", other dependentistas regard such external causation as being subordinate to what they regard as "internal productive focus" or "internal class formations".

The relevance of the internal structure of the periphery in perpetuating underdevelopment is emphasized by Dos Santos who suggested that "the process under consideration, rather than being one of stabilization as Frank believes, is a case of the formation of a certain type of internal structure conditioned by the international relationship of dependence".¹⁹⁷ He also contends that the world capitalist system creates certain institutions and classes within the periphery in order to further their control. The internal structure of dependency restricts the possibilities for development in the periphery.

Thus for Dos Santos, dependency is not merely the situation in which a satellite economy allows itself to be exploited by a metropolitan country. For him it is a "basic relation that constitutes and conditions the internal structures of the dominated or dependent regions. Dependency implies an economic, social, and political situation in which the structure of society is conditioned by the needs, actions and interests of other and dominant nations".¹⁹⁸ Dos Santos enumerates the three structures of dependency which have characterized the three different epochs of Latin American history. First, there was colonial dependence which was characterized by the acquisition of mines, land, and manpower in the colonized territory. Secondly, there was financial-industrial dependence which was marked by the installation, within the periphery, of structures which were geared to the export of raw materials to the metropolitan countries. The third kind he cites as technological industrial dependence which is characterized by the investment of multinational corporation in the periphery:

Each of these forms of dependence corresponds to a situation, which conditioned not only the international relations of these countries but also their internal structures: the orientation of production, the forms of capital accumulation, the reproduction of the economy, and simultaneously their social and political situation.¹⁹⁹

Other dependentistas have also placed emphasis on the internal structure of the periphery in the maintenance of underdevelopment. Bettelheim,²⁰⁰ for example, in his debate with Emmanuel maintains that underdevelopment is maintained not by the unequal exchange of trade but rather by a polarized development of

the productive forces of the world. Such polarization, he affirms, has ensued from the domination of the world by the capitalist relations of production. "Ultimately it is the unequal development of the productive forces under conditions of world domination by capitalist production relations that is the basic fact explaining the international economic inequality."²⁰¹ Bettelheim argues that the productive forces of the periphery were blocked by capitalist penetration which has resulted in the unequal development of the former. "The production relations and the productive forces at the dominated pole are increasingly subjected to the requirements of expanded reproduction of capital at the dominant pole."²⁰² Bettelheim therefore maintains that what manifests itself in the form of unequal exchange is in fact the unequal development of the productive force between the dominant and the dominated countries. He contends that the development of the metropolitan countries "is based less on the exploitation of the underdeveloped ones, which would imply their development, than on keeping undeveloped the enormous wealth possessed by those countries."²⁰³ Thus Bettelheim, like Dos Santos and Bodenheimer, whose concept of the infrastructure of dependency I have already discussed, emphasize "internal structures" in their conceptualizations of underdevelopment. Such formulations are in contrast with those expounded by Frank, Amin, Wallerstein and Emmanuel.

This kind of dichotomy has drawn various responses from critics of dependency theory. John Taylor, for example, attacks Frank's basic concepts pointing out that Frank fails to explain how

capitalism generates underdevelopment and further capitalism. He also takes issue with Frank's conceptualization of economic surplus:

The concept of economic surplus, for example, precludes any rigorous analysis of the structure, reproduction and development of modes of production. hence it cannot provide an adequate basis for analyzing either the development of capitalist penetration of non-capitalist modes.²⁰⁴

Although Taylor presents a valid critique of Frank's concepts from his definition of capitalism to his lack of specification of the mechanism of capitalist exploitation, Taylor's rejection of the dependency paradigm merely because of the theoretical weaknesses in Frank's arguments is unsound. Many of Frank's concepts were refined and developed by other writers of dependency theory. To treat Frank as the sole representative of the dependency school, as Taylor apparently does, constitutes an inaccurate assessment of the paradigm.

The same kind of error is evident in the criticism expressed by Petras.²⁰⁵ His critique of dependency theory is limited to a consideration of the works of Frank whose formulation of "the development of underdevelopment" he considers to be vague. He accuses Frank of utilizing terms like "lumpendevelopment" to conceal his inability to explain the industrial development now taking place in the Third World. He finally claims that dependency theory demonstrates a lack of analysis of class relations both within the periphery and between the periphery and the metropolitan countries. Petras does not seem able to understand that short, pithy terms like "the development of underdevelopment" are merely useful labels which summarize certain dialectical relationships which need to be

thoroughly examined in order to be fully understood. Furthermore, his statement about class analyses is applicable largely to Frank since other dependency writers like Bodenheimer utilize class analysis as an integral part of their work. Finally, Frank never denied that a certain kind of development could take place in peripheral countries. What he always maintained was that such development was conditioned by the relationship of dependence which existed between the satellite and the metropolis. The result was that only an 'underdeveloped' kind of development could take place there. Even Cardoso, though he is enthusiastic about Third World development, views it as "associated dependent development".²⁰⁶

Whereas many analysts of dependency theory claim that dependentistas fail to specify the mechanisms by which the advanced capitalist countries exploit the underdeveloped ones, other critics, apparently do not even believe that such exploitation is taking place. Such theorists usually assert that the general economic growth of some dependent countries is more rapid than those of some "non-dependent" ones. According to this view, those aspects of underdevelopment which are frequently attributed to dependency, should not be considered to be causally related in a direct manner since they are inherent in the capitalist mode of production whether or not it takes a dependent form.²⁰⁷

Some critics of dependency theory suggest that a certain level of industrial growth has been taking place in many underdeveloped countries since the war.²⁰⁸ These analysts then mistakenly equate industrial growth with development and assume that

they are the same phenomenon. Indeed, there is much evidence to show that the socio-economic gap between the advanced capitalist countries and underdeveloped ones has been steadily widening.²⁰⁹ In addition it has often been shown that the underdeveloped countries are net exporters of capital to the advanced capitalist countries and that foreign aid, because of the terms and conditions under which the aid is offered, does not alleviate the bleak economic picture to any appreciable extent.²¹⁰

One of the reasons why there is so much uncertainty concerning the levels of development which exist in peripheral countries lies in the confusion surrounding the concepts of development and underdevelopment. Until such terms are operationally defined, confusion will remain at both the theoretical and empirical levels.

The mechanisms of capitalist exploitation as presented by some dependency theorists tend to emphasize either external features, i.e., "unequal exchange" or "internal class formations". I want to suggest, however, that these should not be rigid dichotomies, and such conceptualizations do complement rather than contradict each other. Many dependentistas would agree that capitalist penetration into the underdeveloped countries creates clientele social classes which functioned in such a way as to serve the interest of the metropolitan bourgeoisie. Capitalist exploitation can thus be seen to be a two-way process. The external mechanism of unequal exchange generates certain internal structures which also perpetuate the process of underdevelopment.

(iii) DEPENDENCY AND IDEOLOGY

One of the major criticisms of dependency theory which emerged in the 1970s was that the term "dependency theory" should be changed to "linkage politics" since such a name "encompasses the basic components of dependency theory, but without the ideological predilection of the latter."²¹¹ The argument is then made that linkage politics posits four different levels of analysis: the character of the international system, the internal groups and their relationship to the polity as well as to external groups, and the character of the polity itself. Such an approach, Ayres²¹² contends, allows the analyst to distinguish between lack of self-sufficiency and dependency, as well as to explain more clearly the dependency which arises, on the one hand as a result of the workings of the international system, and that which arises on the other hand, from internal structure.

However, supporters of the term "linkage politics" have failed to analyze adequately "the ideological predilections" which they see in dependency theory. The fact that many dependentistas are political activists does not, in any way, diminish the validity of the framework, and to label them as "ideologists" on the basis of their activism is unsound. What is of far greater importance and significance is the manner of reasoning which lies behind the conceptual constructs offered by theoretical explanations. Superficial semantic quibbling does not resolve theoretical problems.

Nevertheless, the allegation that dependency theory reflects a certain ideological bias has been put forward in a more comprehensive manner than in the way advanced by the supporters of linkage politics. One of the main proponents of this perspective is Carlos Johnson.²¹³ He argues not only that the basic postulates of dependency theory reoccur throughout capitalist history but that they represent an ideological substantiation of capitalism in countries where capital/labour relations have not yet become dominant and reflect "the class needs of competitive capitalism in the face of monopoly capital".²¹⁴ For Johnson, therefore, "dependency theses are one example of how specific classes formulate ideological discourses on the needs of capital appropriation/accumulation within the context of the struggle for control of capitalist production at the international level."²¹⁵ Dependencistas, then, he contends, are merely nationalist ideologues for the local dominant classes who are intent on "retaining larger portions of the surplus values which they have already extracted from the working classes of their respective countries."²¹⁶ Johnson concludes that since dependencistas are little more than mouthpieces for the local ruling classes, their theses carry nationalistic overtones. "The ideological nature of dependency theory can be better understood when it is realized that dependency theses represent a specific stage of capital/labour relations, that is, the struggle between monopoly capital and competitive capital."²¹⁷

The major failing of the Johnson critique is that nowhere does he indicate how specific dependentistas represent the interest of their local ruling classes. Even a cursory reading of the dependency literature shows that the various approaches²¹⁸-- the "conservative" one of Pinto and Wionczek, the "moderate" one of Furtado, Sunkel and Dos Santos, or the "radical" one of Frank, Cockcroft, Johnson and Petras--indicate no class alliances with the traditional ruling classes. Indeed, dependentistas generally support the struggle against monopoly capital not because they represent the interest of the local ruling class but because they are opposed to the underdevelopment which, in their view, monopoly capital has generated in peripheral societies.

The inconsistencies which are evident in the arguments put forward by Johnson and others stem, it seems, from an incomplete understanding of the relationship of dependency theory to certain aspects of Marx's thought. According to the Marxist approach, all social theory is basically class ideology since it is based on the class contradictions of society. Orthodox Marxists generally argue that non-Marxist theorists of underdevelopment, because they represent the interests of the ruling classes, fail to base their study of the roots of underdevelopment on the class relations of production. Such theorists, the argument goes, define the causes of underdevelopment according to their class interests.²¹⁹ According to this view, the functional framework of modernization theory accepts and justifies the relations existing between the advanced and the underdeveloped countries rather than attempt to grapple with

the question of dialectical change of the international capitalist system. Modernization theory therefore provides justification of the imperialist policies of the bourgeoisie of the advanced capitalist countries and thus serves as the ideology of this class.²²⁰

There is little doubt that there is merit in the contention that modernization theory reflects certain class interests of their proponents. However, the contention that dependency theory reflects a similar bias is difficult to substantiate. Most dependentistas recognize that the internal structures of the underdeveloped countries have been fashioned, to a great extent, by their external relations. They therefore posit that development and underdevelopment are dialectically related at the regional, national as well as at the international level. Development, therefore, they conclude, can only take place when the entire class structure is profoundly changed. The argument that such theorists are spokespersons for their local ruling classes must therefore be rejected.

DEPENDENCY THEORY: SOME QUALIFICATIONS

The vastness of the dependency literature and the conflicting positions adopted by many of its proponents on certain key questions of theory indicate that the dependency approach, on various points, require severe qualifications if it is to be taken seriously as a methodology for the analysis of concrete situations of underdevelopment.

Because of the lack of rigour in the analyses of some dependentistas, very little effort has gone into enumerating those characteristics of dependent economies which are not to be found in non-dependent ones. Even less effort has gone into any systematic attempt to demonstrate the manner in which the characteristics of dependent economies adversely affect the development of such countries. It is this inability of many dependency theorists to enumerate the essential factors of dependency which is the greatest failure of the paradigm.²²¹ Indeed, if the characteristics of the so-called dependent economies can also be found in non-dependent ones, then the whole conceptual scheme becomes unreliable. Furthermore, if little attempt is made to relate the characteristics of underdevelopment to dependency, then theorists run the risk of presenting merely a number of features--economic, social and political--which are indicative of underdevelopment without elaborating on the true dynamics of the situation. At times, one has the impression that many dependentistas present a somewhat circular argument. On the one hand, they state that dependent countries are those which lack the capacity for autonomous growth. On the other hand, they state that such growth is lacking because the structures are dependent.²²²

What is required is a conceptual scheme which will eliminate such ambiguities by stating the characteristics of dependence and explaining the relationship between them and the dynamics of underdevelopment.²²³ A study of a dependent economy should therefore make some attempt at systematic theorization. In other

words, such a study should focus on the specific form or forms of dependence in specific sections of the economy which might provide a firm analytical base on which underdevelopment might be examined in concrete terms. In this study, for example, dependency will be limited to a consideration of foreign investment and control of a key sector of the Jamaican economy--the sugar industry. The socio-economic ramifications of such control form the basis on which the question of underdevelopment will be explored. One might attempt to rebut the validity of this criterion of dependence by pointing out that some "non dependent" countries, e.g. Canada, also have heavy foreign investment. However, what is crucial here is the "degree" or "scale" of dependence which is involved. What I wish to affirm is that foreign domination and control of a "plantation society," i.e. a society whose economy is largely based on a monocultural system of agricultural production, will be far more pervasive than in a country with a diversified economic structure and advanced technology.

Apart from the need to operationalize their concept of dependence, dependency theorists need to give greater cohesiveness to the paradigm by formulating clearer definitions of certain important concepts. The question of "development" is one which comes most readily to mind. Since dependentistas state or imply that the underdeveloped countries, because of historical and economic reasons, cannot achieve the kind of development reached by the advanced capitalist countries, it seems obvious that some attempt should be made to clarify what 'development' should mean for

the underdeveloped countries or how such a goal is to be achieved by them.²²⁴

In the 1970s some dependentistas did not even address themselves to such questions. Furtado²²⁵, for example, does not go beyond predicting that if dependence persists in Latin America, instability and consequent repression will be the result. He gives high priority to the ramifications of cultural dependence. He suggests that this phenomenon is maintained because of the desire of the bourgeoisie of the underdeveloped countries to imitate the lifestyle of the counterparts in the advanced capitalist countries. Furtado believes that the introduction of new products is a fundamental aspect of this process. Product innovation, he argues, results from competition in the advanced capitalist countries and is transferred by import and later by import substitution to the bourgeoisie. Since such goods are, after a while, manufactured locally from imported parts, but become increasingly capital intensive, industrial growth in the underdeveloped countries becomes "characterized by a growing capital coefficient: this increases the concentration of income, limits the widespread diffusion of technical progress and its fruits throughout the population and brings about a progressive marginalization of the Latin American population".²²⁶ Such a situation, concludes Furtado, can lead to social unrest. Nevertheless, although Furtado points to what he considers to be important factors contributing to underdevelopment, he does not advance any proposal as to how development should be achieved.

Dos Santos proclaims what he considers to be the turbulent political situation which many governments in Latin America will face:

Everything now indicates that what can be expected is a long process of sharp political and military confrontations and of profound social radicalization which will lead these countries to a dilemma: governments of force which open the way to fascism, or popular revolutionary governments which open the way to socialism.²²⁷

Dos Santos contends that the multinational corporations bear a major responsibility for the dependence and inequality which they claim are responsible for the political turmoil. Other theorists²²⁸ likewise point out that the multinational corporations create, by their advertising campaigns, the desire for a lifestyle which is beyond the reach of the vast majority of the people in the underdeveloped countries. A production structure which generates inadequate consumption is also created. The resulting frustration of the masses, it is suggested, will lead to increased social upheavals. However, Dos Santos and many dependency writers are not explicit about what development should mean for the underdeveloped countries, nor how it should be achieved.

Other dependentistas are more forthright. Gunder Frank, for example, in the preface to his book on Latin American underdevelopment or revolution affirms that "these essays were written to contribute to the revolution in Latin America and the world".²²⁹ Bodenheimer equates the infrastructure of dependency with a formal colonial apparatus which has become institutionalized and internalized by all classes in Latin America to the point where

it is much more difficult to destroy than a formal colonial structure:

A total rupturing of dependency as an internal condition of development requires simultaneously--and indeed as a precondition for lasting autonomy or independence from the international system--a profound transformation, an anti-capitalist, socialist transformation, of their own socio-economic order.²³⁰

Thus for, dependentistas like Frank, Bodenheimer and many others, development seems to be equated with socialism and the path seems to be through revolution. However, since dependency writers generally do not carefully elaborate on the concept of "socialism", their concept of development is still not as precise as it should be.

Walter Rodney's²³¹ view of development, which was previously cited, is perhaps the most comprehensive of the various writers on underdevelopment. According to Rodney, "at the level of social groups ... development implies an increasing capacity to regulate both internal and external relationships".²³² Implied in this definition is the fact that development is a many-sided process and cannot be seen as purely an economic one, although economics plays a major role. Such a definition therefore takes into consideration not merely the so-called "factors of production" but also the relation of production and the combination of the two into a distinctive mode of production. Unless this kind of view of development is taken, analysts run the risk of assuming that underdeveloped countries cannot develop outside the context of capitalist exploitation. The opinion of Joan Robinson on the subject is eloquent testimony of this kind of belief: "As we see nowadays in South East Asia and the Caribbean, the misery of being

exploited by capitalists is nothing compared with the misery of not being exploited at all."²³³

Precise formulation is required not only in the conceptualization of "development" but also in that of "underdevelopment". Nevertheless, some critics of dependency theory are unrealistic on this point. The suggestion that the centre-periphery metaphor should be replaced by a concrete typology of centres and peripheries would mean the production of a static schema which would fail to underline the dynamics of underdevelopment.²³⁴ At this stage, what dependency theory should focus on is "levels" or "degrees" of development or underdevelopment. In other words, "underdevelopment makes sense only as a means of comparing levels of development."²³⁵ Dependency theorists need to emphasize this point and to underline the fact that "it is possible to compare the economic conditions at two different periods for the same country and determine whether or not it had developed; and (more importantly) it is possible to compare the economies of any two countries or sets of countries at any given period of time."²³⁶ By so doing writers on dependency theory might be able to make the theoretical distinctions which are necessary for adequate analysis of situations of underdevelopment. Clarification must be extended not only to the quantitative economic indicators of underdevelopment, e.g. per capita income, levels of industrialization, levels of food consumption, and the extent of social services but also the political and social consequences which flow from such conditions.²³⁷

LEVELS OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT

The version of dependency theory that I am postulating in this study suggests that development and underdevelopment are interdependently related in the world capitalist system. This perspective also suggests that underdevelopment is not an original condition but was brought about primarily by the international expansion of capitalism in the peripheral societies. The class relations of production which subsequently unfolded in many of these regions was one in which a distorted social structure was geared to the needs of foreign rather than domestic interests.²³⁸

Various aspects of the history of Jamaica (1655-1940) which I analyze in Chapter 2 of this study vividly illustrate this phenomena. In 1655 the British invaders captured the country from the Spanish after the latter had decimated the native Amerindian population. Africans were subsequently seized and brought to Jamaica by the British to labour as slaves on sugar plantations. Throughout the long period of British mercantilism, competitive capitalism, and the transition to monopoly capitalism, the economy of Jamaica was structured to serve British needs. The capacity of African-Jamaicans to develop was severely constrained by slavery and the savage racism which it incorporated. Later the white Jamaican plantocracy utilized state repression and economic coercion to crush the socio-economic and political aspirations of African-Jamaicans. Therefore, the Jamaican class struggle, from its inception, was also a struggle for racial justice.

Dependency theory posits that metropolitan exploitation of underdeveloped countries takes place on two fronts. On one front, there are exploitative external market relations in which the economies of the underdeveloped countries become structured to satisfy the requirements of the advanced capitalist countries. Such economies therefore remain disarticulated and unable to generate the internal momentum for growth. On the second front, there is a comprador social class which maintains the interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie within the underdeveloped countries.

It is in the light of this affirmation that the question of multinational corporations and monopoly capitalism must be addressed. The phenomenon of multinational corporate investment in underdeveloped countries has generated considerable debate and has been subjected to a wide variety of interpretations in both the academic and policy making fields. Among the analysts who are in favour of such investments are the supporters of the "business school" and the "traditional economic" approaches to development.

The proponents of these schools are, for the most part, firm advocates of capitalist ideology, and tend to accept uncritically the economic stagnation of the underdeveloped countries and the unequal income distribution which is to be found there. Such theorists are wont to focus their attention on what they consider to be the economic advantages which underdeveloped countries derive from foreign investment. The disadvantages are generally considered to be of minor importance and rarely receive the elaborate attention which they deserve.²³⁹

However, there have been numerous arguments critical of the role of foreign direct investment in underdeveloped countries.²⁴⁰ Dependency theorists are among those who have contributed vigorously to this kind of theoretical perspective.

Dependentistas usually recommend that certain restrictions should be placed on the operations of foreign firms in peripheral societies. Dependentistas usually emphasize their belief in development policies which are geared towards national economic self-sufficiency rather than towards reliance on foreign entrepreneurship. Many supporters of dependency theory are critical of the entire capitalist developmental process and see foreign investment simply as one feature of this system. For them, foreign direct investment is a form of imperialist exploitation. They consider that a break with international capitalism is a necessary first step in the implementation of socialist development.

Various efforts have been made to define the essential characteristics of multinational corporations. There is general agreement on two fundamental elements: (1) MNCs operate in a significant manner in several countries. (2) There is unified management so that the operations in a given country come under the integrated direction of a centralized decision making headquarters. The rapid growth of these vast enterprises since the end of World War II has resulted in what may be described as the internationalization of production and finance capital. In other words, the entire production process of a given commodity, from primary resource exploitation to the final stage of assembling and

the retail marketing, is performed by subsidiaries of the MNC located in various parts of the world. Also, local as well as foreign finance capital are utilized and the marketing process is carried out through the vertically integrated structures of the corporation.²⁴¹

Because of their immense size, their vast financial resources, their voluminous sales, and their access to the most advanced technology, multinational corporations wield tremendous influence in the economies of underdeveloped countries. In these areas, their oligopolistic control of investment is usually located in the dynamic sectors of the economy.²⁴² This kind of financial strength places MNCs in a very flexible position when policies must be formulated and decisions made with regard to the governments or national firms of underdeveloped countries.²⁴³

In Jamaica, MNCs like Tate and Lyle and United Fruit Company invested heavily in the sugar industry. Such corporations wielded so much power that they imposed severe constraints on various aspects of the socio-economic development of the country. First, African-Jamaicans were excluded from management positions within the sugar industry. Second, a comprador class consisting of settler investors and ethnic Jamaicans helped to maintain the dominance exercised by the MNCs. Third, the post-war Jamaican sugar industry became organized and structured in such a way that the development of certain indigenous manufacturing enterprises were restricted. Thus I show in Chapter 3 that these examples of underdevelopment

contributed to the dependent status of Jamaica in the world capitalist structure.

However, in this study underdevelopment is not conceptualized merely as a spatial phenomenon caused by relations of exchange between the advanced and underdeveloped countries. What is to be emphasized is that both development and underdevelopment are dialectically interrelated and arise from the class system on an international scale. Underdevelopment must therefore be seen as a class phenomenon with its origin in production. In other words, factors such as the transfer of surplus and unequal exchange which are prevalent under monopoly capitalism, are determined, to a great extent, by the relations of production.

The fourth chapter of this dissertation demonstrates the distorted agricultural structure which emerged in Jamaica as a result of the impact which the sugar industry had on the agricultural sector of the economy. The production relations operated in favour of foreign investors and their supporters and to the disadvantages of the peasantry and other classes associated with agriculture. The acreage for sugar production possessed by MNCs and their allies was so vast that many peasant farmers who were producing for the domestic market were forced to subsist on land that was too small to be economically viable. Furthermore, since foreign investors in sugar occupied the best land, domestic agriculture was often relegated to unproductive holdings.²⁴⁴

Underdevelopment also manifested itself in distorted labour relations which limited the labour supply of the peasantry. The

power wielded by foreign investors in sugar enabled them, rather than the peasantry, to have easy access to local capital. Indeed, the Jamaican government, under the influence of MNCs, devoted most of the agricultural planning and research to "cash crops" such as sugar cane while neglecting crops geared to the domestic market.

In analyzing the structure of labour and the level of production which took place on Jamaica sugar plantations, I posit, in the fifth chapter, that the exploitative class relationship which existed between the corporate owners and sugar workers resulted in considerable socio-economic distortions in Jamaican sugar plantation areas. Since no attempt was ever made to coordinate work in the sugar industry with activities in other sectors of the economy, sugar labour remained essentially a low-skill, seasonal, poorly paid kind of work. Foreign investors did not establish retraining schemes which would enable the many displaced workers to find employment in other areas of the sugar industry. In addition, the technology utilized by MNCs often proved to be inappropriate to various factors of production existing in Jamaica.

Furthermore, the organization which was largely responsible for the marketing of Jamaican sugar was tightly controlled by corporate owners. Thus, although sugar cane peasant farmers made a substantial contribution to cane production, they were never accorded a position in the sugar industry which was commensurate with their economic output. These African-Jamaicans therefore played a subsidiary role to foreigners in the decision-making process. Uneven development may be seen in the antagonistic

relations which existed between the dominant class of foreign corporate owners and the subordinate classes of agro-proletariat and peasants.

An integral aspect of this study, presented in the sixth chapter, is the social dimension of underdevelopment which operated at the level of the sugar plantation. It needs to be strongly emphasized that, in this dissertation, underdevelopment is considered to be a multidimensional phenomenon and that it makes little sense to analyze only the narrow "economic" aspect of the problem. The extent to which the quality of life of sugar workers was circumscribed by foreign ownership of the sugar industry is therefore a valid subject for analysis. Thus, the deplorable living and working conditions which many sugar workers had to endure stemmed largely from the fact that foreign entrepreneurs were primarily concerned with maximizing profits and paid scant attention to the subsequent wretched conditions that their workers were forced to tolerate.

Furthermore, an understanding of the distorted development, the rigid class structure, and the lack of upward mobility which were experienced by sugar workers is not possible without a careful consideration of the role of the foreign ownership of the Jamaican sugar industry. The sugar plantation class system, which had its genesis in slavery, was a rigid, racist structure that was steadfastly maintained by plantation owners. At the base of social pyramid was the mass of black, unskilled and semi-skilled workers. In the middle were the white or fair-skinned plantation

administrators. At the apex of the hierarchy were the white corporate owners. During the period under study, upward mobility was severely restricted for black workers since race was a vital factor in such a transition. African-Jamaican sugar workers suffered not merely because of their position as members of the proletariat but also because the class system was buttressed by institutional racism.

In addition, the distorted and unstable patterns of social relationships which characterized family life in the sugar plantation villages can be traced directly to the way in which plantation labour was structured and organized. Indeed, the influence of these patterns were often perceived far beyond the borders of the plantation. It is not surprising, then, that the hatred that many Jamaican labourers felt for the sugar industry seemed to have been so intense and was manifested in such diverse ways.

The final level of underdevelopment is examined in the seventh chapter of this study. What is analyzed at this stage is the extent to which foreign investment in the Jamaican sugar industry and the changes that were produced, affected various aspects of Jamaican society. Thus, the uncontrolled urbanization which took place in Jamaica during the period under review cannot be fully understood without a knowledge of the extent to which the sugar industry underdeveloped domestic agriculture and displaced many members of the peasantry and the agro-proletariat from their rural setting. The high rates of unemployment which plagued post-

war Jamaican cities can also be largely explained by the persistent heavy influx of rural migrants.

It is also virtually impossible to understand fully why African-Jamaicans were totally excluded from the Jamaican corporate economy without comprehending the role played by the sugar entrepreneurs. Since sugar was the first major Jamaican industry, it was the owners of this industry who were first able to establish close ties with the petty bourgeois Jamaican leadership and to form alliances with the comprador entrepreneurial ethnic elite. Therefore, the kind of institutional racism which had been deeply embedded in the structure and organization of the sugar industry, came to permeate every aspect of commercial and industrial development in Jamaica. During the period under study, African-Jamaicans were barred from major managerial roles in the commercial and industrial sectors of the economy because race and colour were vital determinants of upward mobility.

A knowledge of this level of underdevelopment is vital for an understanding of the emergence of radical black movements such as Rastafarianism and Black Power, as well as the violent race and class cleavages which gripped Jamaica in the 1960s and 1970s.

It must be clearly understood that I am not arguing that foreign investment in the Jamaica sugar industry produced, in a mechanistic, deterministic manner, various forms of underdevelopment in Jamaica. Such an approach would be frivolous and simplistic. What I am examining, at this juncture, are the indirect consequences, the "ripple effects" of foreign corporate ownership of

the Jamaican sugar industry and the role that they played in the specific internal production relations in the country. This study, therefore, proceeds at two levels. At the first level, the direct effects of foreign investment are analyzed. Chapter Seven focuses on some of the ways in which the indirect effects were manifested in Jamaica.

Nevertheless, one would be naive to believe that other factors were not at work in shaping certain social relations in Jamaica. However, these were minor factors. For example, it is likely that some rural migrants to urban areas like Kingston - St. Andrew, were attracted by the glamour associated with a major urban centre. In addition, although the race/class configuration in Jamaica undoubtedly gave rise to the violent response of Rastafarianism and the Black Power movement, it is quite possible that the highly publicized struggles of African-Americans for racial equality could have inspired their Jamaican counterparts.

One of the greatest contributions of dependency theorists to the literature on private foreign investment in underdeveloped countries has been to extract from the term "multinational corporation" some of the propagandistic and apologetic connotations injected into it by many conventional writers.²⁴⁵ Whereas some of these seem to believe that the international corporation will serve as a force for a more egalitarian distribution of the wealth and resources of the world and suggest that the MNCs will act as an integrative force in the international system, dependentistas have demonstrated that the ascendance of the multinational corporation is

a result of the process of economic concentration in the industrial countries.²⁴⁶

Nevertheless, the major weakness in the arguments espoused by some dependency theorists is the tendency to treat multinational investment as a monolithic concept and thereby to oversimplify what is, in fact, a very complex phenomenon. First, it is necessary to remember that major differences may exist between MNCs operating in the same industry. Secondly, MNCs and host countries may have a wide range of interests - mutual as well as conflicting. Finally, one must remember that the relationship between MNCs and underdeveloped countries is a dynamic rather than a static one.

It is instructive to note that, in the case of Jamaica, the relationship of MNCs like Tate and Lyle with Jamaica was not entirely one of underdevelopment. For example, some rural road systems might never have been built as early as they were if the sugar industry, motivated by self-interest, had not pressured the government to do so. Also, since the sugar industry needed water for its irrigation schemes it was also able to convince the Jamaican government to make some improvements to certain rural water supply systems. Nevertheless, as we have seen, these few examples of positive development were overwhelmed by the numerous examples of underdevelopment which were produced by the foreign corporate ownership of the sugar industry.

PRIMARY DATA SOURCES

Most of the fieldwork for this dissertation was carried out in Jamaica during the late 1980s. The greater part of the research was undertaken at the Jamaica Archives, the museum of the Institute of Jamaica, the library of the University of the West Indies, the Institute of Social and Economic Research of the same university, and various government offices in Jamaica. In addition, I was able to obtain data from some of the sugar estates which I visited.

All relevant archival materials were consulted. Unfortunately, some of the records were not always consistently maintained and the condition of others showed deterioration. Furthermore, certain data had to be used with discretion. For example the Blue Book of Jamaica 1866-1914 was an annual government publication which provided detailed statistical information on many aspects of life in the country. Nevertheless, the Governor's Report on the Blue Book 1866-1914 could not be accepted at face value. This was an annual report written by the Governor of Jamaica explaining and interpreting the statistical information provided in the Blue Book. In some cases the Governor's interpretation seems to have been biased.

I consulted and classified a wide variety of government reports. These ranged from early documents such as the eighteenth century Jamaica Almanack to modern reports issued by the Department of Statistics. By comparing the government published development plans with statistics of the actual achievements, I was also able to determine the many failures of the government to develop important

sectors such as agriculture. I consulted all census reports from 1871, the date of the first one, to that of 1970, the date at which the study ends. The Jamaican census was held roughly every ten years.

I was able to glean very useful materials from the numerous newspapers which I perused. One of my principal sources of information was The Daily Gleaner which, for many years, was the only daily newspaper in Jamaica. Although this newspaper was first published in 1875, the earliest copy which the Archives possessed, dated from 1895. Some early weekly Jamaican newspapers, which I consulted, had been short-lived. One may note The Jamaica Advocate, 1902-1905, The Falmouth Post and Jamaica General Advertizer, 1840-1874, and a The Colonial Standard and Jamaica Dispatch, 1839-1893.

I also found useful data for the analysis of the post-war period in Jamaican newspapers such as Daily News, Public Opinion, and The Star. A few overseas newspapers provided useful data on Jamaica. Some of these were The Sunday Observer Review, Montreal Gazette, Montreal Star, New York Times, The Globe and Mail, and Guardian Weekly.

My analysis of the race and class cleavages which gripped Jamaica in the late 1960s would have been impossible without the data from non-mainstream Jamaican newspapers. In spite of their lack of editorial sophistication, their sporadic appearance, and their obvious militancy, these newspapers were invaluable. They included Rasta Voice, Abeng, Moko, and Liberation. These newspapers gave expression to the voices of the African-Jamaican proletariat,

those people in the country who were desperately struggling against oppression and racism.

I obtained data on the Jamaican sugar industry from various sources. First, there were the reports published by the multinational corporations. Some of these included Tate and Lyle Times International, Tate and Lyle Directors Reports and Accounts, The United Fruit Company in Middle America and Booker McConnell Reports and Accounts. Unfortunately, the companies represented in these publications refused my request to furnish additional data on their holdings in Jamaica.

Nevertheless, there were other sources in Jamaica which provided detailed data on the operation of the Jamaica sugar industry. These included the reports of the various Commissions of Enquiry which the government had launched over the years. I supplemented this material with a study of the many reports published by the United Nations.

When I undertook the field work for this study there were certain research procedures which I considered, but rejected. For example, if I had circulated a questionnaire among sugar workers to elicit information on their status, such information would have been outside the scope of this study. Since this study examines the sugar industry between 1945-1970, information gathered in the late 1980s would not have been relevant especially in view of the changes which the government tried to implement in the sugar industry in the post 1970 period.

However, I did visit the various sugar estates and spoke to as many of the older workers as I could. Indeed, in 1989 I lived near the Frome estate for several months, gathering various data. My efforts to obtain relevant documents from estate management proved to be only partially successful. For example, I was not officially allowed to peruse estate records contained in the famous Black Books. On a few occasions, however, this material and other records were made available to me.

I indulged in considerable personal observation in Jamaica both at the level of the plantation, in the urban bureaucracies, and in the urban slums. My intention was to see to what extent certain sectors of Jamaica had changed since I had emigrated from the country. I also wanted to discuss with all classes of Jamaicans their views concerning the reasons for many of these changes. Such discussions helped me to clarify my opinions concerning the nature of Jamaica's development and underdevelopment.

FOOTNOTES

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3. A Report of the Impact of Structural Changes in Plantations: Jamaica as a Case Study. Geneva: ILO Sectoral Activities Programme, Working paper SAP 2.3/WP.4, 1986.
4. For an indication of the extent to which racial ideology influenced the framing of laws, see Acts of Assembly Passed in the Island of Jamaica, from 1681-1769. Spanish Town: Jamaica Archives, 1771.
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6. Colin Clarke, "Slavery and Dependency: Studies in Caribbean Subordination," Journal of Latin American Studies, 19, May, 1987, pp.157-167.
7. Report of the Jamaica Royal Commission, Spanish Town: Jamaica Archives, 1868.
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19. Ibid, p.5.
20. Ibid., p.7.
21. E. Frazier, "Introduction", in V. Rubin, op.cit., p.vi.
22. E. Thompson, "The Plantation Cycle and Problems of Typology" in V. Rubin, op.cit., p.31.
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24. E. Goffman, Asylums, New york, 1961.
25. E. Padilla, op.cit., p.24.
26. The works of these two writers represent generally the plantation theorists of the West Indies.
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28. L. Best and K. Levitt, Externally Propelled Growth and Industrialization, Montreal: McGill University, Centre for Developing Area Studies, 1969.
29. L. Best, "Outlines", op.cit.
30. Ibid.
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32. T. Sudama, "The Model of the Plantation Economy: The Case of Trinidad and Tobago," Latin American Perspectives, 20, 1979, p.75.
33. L. Best, op.cit., p.287.

34. G. Beckford, Persistent Poverty: Underdevelopment in Plantation Economies of the Third World, New York: Oxford University Press, 1972.
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37. Ibid, p.15.
38. Ibid.
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58. Yuri Semenov "The Theory of Socio-Economic Formations and World History", in E. Gellener, (ed.) Soviet and Western Anthropology. London, 1980, pp.29-58; For a useful summary and critique of some of the debates, see S. Aronowitz, The Crisis in Historical Materialism. New York, 1981. Aronowitz presents a somewhat pessimistic view regarding the unifying force of historical materialism. See also Ronald Aronson, "Historical Materialism, Answer to Marxism's Crisis", New Left Review, 150, 1985, pp.74-94; Christopher Bertram, "International Competition in Historical Materialism", New Left Review, 183, 1990, pp.117-128.
59. C. Bertram, op.cit., p.118. For an example of the practical applications of the evolutionary theory, see R. Nelson and S. Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Cambridge, Mass.: Praeger, 1982.
60. G. A. Cohen, History, Labour and Freedom, Oxford, 1988.
61. J. Elster, "Further Thoughts on Marxism, Functionalism and Game Theory", in J. Roemer (ed.) Analytical Marxism, Cambridge, 1986.
62. The rejection of Marxian methodological distinctiveness may be seen in J. Roemer, A General Theory of Exploitation and Class. Cambridge, Mass., 1982.
63. Robert Brenner, "Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Preindustrial Europe", in T. Ashton and C. H. Phillips, (eds.) The Brenner Debate, Cambridge, 1986.
64. Ellen Meiksins Wood, "Marxism and the Course of History", New Left Review, 137, 1984, pp.95-107.
65. For an affirmation of the "standard" Marxist position, see Boris Kagarlitsky, "The Importance of Being Marxist", New Left Review, 178, 1990, pp.29-36.
66. For an analysis of this trend, see Norman Geras, "Post-Marxism?", New Left Review, 163, 1987, pp.40-82.

67. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, "Post-Marxism without Apologies", New Left Review, 166, 1987, pp.79-106. The concept of "Post-Marxism" has been utilized to describe the approach of some Latin American commentators. See Ronald Chilcote, "Post-Marxism, The Retreat from Class in Latin America", Latin American Perspectives, Spring 1990, pp.3-24.
68. Alan Carling, "Rational Choice Marxism", New Left Review, 160, 1986, p.26. For various perspectives on this debate, see Ellen Meiksins Wood, "Rational Choice Marxism: Is the Game Worth the Candle?" New Left Review, 177, 1989, pp.41-88; Alex Callinicos "The Limits of 'Political Marxism'", New Left Review, 184, 1990, pp.110-115.
69. Alan Carling, "In Defence of Rational Choice: A Reply to Ellen Meiksins Wood", New Left Review, 184, 1990, p.98.
70. For a useful commentary on this approach, see Eric Hobsbawn, "Marx and History", New Left Review, 143, 1984, pp.39-50.
71. W. Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, London, 1972, p.10.
72. Ibid., p.14.
73. S. Irvin and X. Gorostiaga, Towards an Alternative for Central America and the Caribbean. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985, p.27.
74. Amartya Sen, "Development: Which Way Now?" Economic Journal, Vol.93, 1983; K. Griffin, "Human Development: The Case for Renewed Emphasis", Journal of Development Planning, 19, 1989, pp. 1-39.
75. World Development Report 1984, World Bank: Oxford University Press, 1984, pp. 66-70; Adjustment with a Human Face, United Nations Children's Fund: Oxford University Press, 1987, pp.230-241; The Current Literacy Situation in the World, Paris: UNESCO Office of Statistics, May 1987, pp. 4-16.
76. Socio-Economic Indicators for Planning: Methodological Aspects and Selected Examples, Paris: UNESCO, 1981.
77. C. Thomas, Dependence and Transformation, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976, p.25.
78. W. Rodney, op.cit., p.21.
79. This is the basic position of most structural dependency theorists.
80. Report on International Definition and Measurement of Standards of Living. New York: United Nations; E/CN; 5/299, 1987.
81. Employment, Growth and Basic Needs, Geneva: ILO, 1976; "Report of the Commission of Inquiry appointed under article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization to examine the observance of certain International Labour Conventions by the Dominican Republic and Haiti with respect to the employment of Haitian workers on the sugar plantations of

- the Dominican Republic", Geneva: ILO Special Bulletin, Vol.LXVI Series B, 1983.
82. K. Marx, "The Future Results of the British Rule in India" cited in K. Marx and F. Engels On Colonialism, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1978, pp. 81-87.
 83. Ibid.
 84. B. Warren, Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism, London, 1980.
 85. Contents and Measurement of Socio-Economic Development, Geneva: United Nations, 1981. The Quest for a Unified Approach to Development, Geneva: UNRISD, 1980; International Survey of Programmes for Social Development, New York: United Nations, 1980.
 86. For a critique of this perspective, see D. Lal, The Poverty of "Development Economics", Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985.
 87. Later the designation "ECLA" was changed to "ECLAC" in order to indicate the new title "The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean".
 88. For Prebisch's early views, see R. Prebisch, Economic Survey of Latin America, Santiago, Chile, 1949.
 89. -----, Theoretical and Practical Problems of Economic Growth, Mexico City, 1951. The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems. Lake Success: ECLA, 1950.
 90. Prebisch clarified many of these views in the 1960s. See R. Prebisch, Towards a New Trade Policy for Development: Report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. New York: United Nations, 1964.
 91. Development Problems in Latin America. New York: ECLA, 1970.
 92. For an analysis of this perspective, see David Harrison, The Sociology of Modernization and Development. London: Unwin Hyman, 1988.
 93. In the 1960s, such ideas were vigorously expressed by their supporters. See W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. Cambridge University Press, 1960; Marvin Levy, Modernization and the Structure of Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.
 94. The notion that a progressive national bourgeoisie will be able to initiate development in Latin America has been dismissed by many dependentistas, See Jorge Larraín, Theories of Development: Capitalism, Colonialism, and Dependency. London: Polity Press, 1989; Diana Hunt, Economic Theories of Development: An Analysis of Competing Paradigms. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989.

95. R. Prebisch, "Towards a New Trade Policy," op.cit.
96. For an analysis of these processes in Argentina, Chile and Peru, see William Ascher, Scheming for the Poor: The Politics of Redistribution in Latin America, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984.
97. As early as 1970 this kind of perspective was being presented. See J. Lewinson and Juan de Onis, The Alliance That Lost Its Way. Chicago: Quadrangle Publications, 1970. The author's critique of the Alliance for Progress, which was launched in 1961, provides useful data on some of the ramifications of diffusionist ideology.
98. After Prebisch left his post as Secretary-General of UNCTAD, he refined many of his views on peripheral capitalism, the accumulation of surplus, and the accumulation of reproductive capital. He also developed a new focus based on the dangers of the consumer society. See R. Prebisch, "The Global Crisis of Capitalism and its Theoretical Background". CEPAL Review, 22, Santiago, Chile. 1984.
99. -----, "Notes on Trade from the Standpoint of the Periphery", CEPAL Review, 28, 1986.
100. K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, Vols. 1-2, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1951, p.35.
101. Ibid. p.36; See also Enrique Dussel, "Marx's Economic Manuscripts of 1861-63 and the Concept of Dependency," Latin American Perspectives, Vol.17, no.2, 1990, pp.62-101.
102. K. Marx and F. Engels. On Colonialism. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1978, pp.19-26.
103. Ibid, p.74.
104. K. Marx, Capital, Vols 1-3. Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1962, p.754.
105. Ibid, p.758.
106. Ibid, p.751-760.
107. V. Kierman, "Marx on India." Socialist Register 1967, London: Merlin Press, 1967, p.183. For a discussion of Marx's position on such actions, see H. Davis, "Nations, Colonies and Social Classes: The Position of Marx and Engels", Science and Society, Vol.29, No.1, 1965, pp.26-43. For a controversial analysis of the racial views of Marx and Engels, see Carlos Moore, "Were Marx and Engels White Racists: The Prolet-Aryan Outlook of Marxism", Berkeley Journal of Sociology, Vol.19, 1974-75, pp.125-155.
108. R. Hilferding, Finance Capital, Vienna, 1910; N. Bukharin, Imperialism and World Economy, London: Martin Lawrence, 1929; K. Kautsky, "Ultra Imperialism", New Left Review, Jan.-Feb., 1970 (originally published in

- 1914); R. Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital. London, 1951; V. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, New York: International Publishers, 1939.
109. V. Lenin, "Imperialism", Op.cit, p.10. The commentary which follows is based on the views expressed by Lenin in this work.
 110. P. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957, p.6.
 111. H. Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970, p.10.
 112. P. Baran, op.cit, p.60.
 113. A select bibliography of studies utilizing the dependency perspective is provided in the bibliography of Bill Warren's Imperialism. London, 1980.
 114. For an analysis of some of these trends, see G. W. Rama and E. Faletto, "Dependent Societies and Crisis in Latin America: The Challenges of Social and Political Transformation". CEPAL Review, 25, 1985, pp.129-147.
 115. T. Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependency", American Economic Review, 60, 1970, p.231.
 116. Cristobal Kay, "Reflections on the Latin American Contribution to Development Theory", Development and Change, 22, 1991, pp.31-68.
 117. A. G. Frank, Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969, p.4.
 118. This is one of the fundamental theses expounded by Frank. It is also reflected in his other works. See A.G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967.
 119. A.G. Frank, "Underdevelopment or Revolution", op.cit, p.5.
 120. Ibid, pp.9-14.
 121. J. Cockcroft, A.G. Frank, and D. Johnson, Dependence and Underdevelopment. New York: Doubleday, 1972, p.xi. Some critics of dependency theory have used this kind of comment to suggest, incorrectly, that dependentistas believe that people in underdeveloped countries can liberate themselves from the rule of capital merely by improving the conditions of exchange or terms of trade with the advanced countries. See H. Veltmeyer, "Dependence and Underdevelopment: Some Questions and Problems", Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory, Spring-Summer, 1978, p.56.
 122. J. Cockcroft et al, op.cit, p.xi.

123. A.G. Frank, "Capitalism and Underdevelopment" op.cit, pp.7-8. Writers who distinguish between the "stagnationist" and the "growth" version of dependency, place Frank's perspective in the former category. See F. Fitzgerald, "Sociologies of Development". Journal of Contemporary Asia, I, 1981.
124. A.G. Frank, "Capitalism and Underdevelopment", op.cit, p.9.
125. Ibid.
126. Ibid.
127. Ibid, p.10.
128. Ibid.
129. Cockcroft, Frank, and Johnson, op.cit, p.xii.
130. A.G. Frank, "Capitalism and Underdevelopment", op.cit, p.12.
131. Ibid, p.13.
132. Ibid.
133. O. Sunkel, "Transnational Capitalism and National Disintegration in Latin America", Social and Economic Studies, Vol.22, No.1, 1973, 135.
134. C. Furtado, "Development and Stagnation in Latin America: A Structural Approach". Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol.7, No.4, p.20.
135. F. Cardoso and E. Faletto, Dependency and Underdevelopment in Latin America. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979.
136. E. Laclau, "Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America". New Left Review, Vol.67, 1971, pp.19-38.
137. A. G. Frank, "Capitalism and Underdevelopment" op.cit., pp.xxi.
138. A. G. Frank, Lumpenbourgeoisie: Lumpendevelopment. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972.
139. Ibid, p.1.
140. Ibid, p.8.
141. S. Bodenheimer, "The Ideology of Developmentalism. The American Paradigm-Surrogate for Latin American Studies", Comparative Politics, Sage, 1971.
142. Ibid, p.38.

143. S. Bodenheimer, "Dependency and Imperialism: The Roots of Latin American Underdevelopment," in K. Fann and D. Hodges (eds.), Readings in US Imperialism. Boston: Porter-Sargent, 1971, p.5.
144. Ibid.
145. Ibid, p.163.
146. Mark Gasiorowski, "Dependency and Clientcy in Latin America", Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol.28, No.3, 1986, pp.47-65.
147. P. O'Brien, "A Critique of Latin American Theories of Dependency," Occasional Papers No.12, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Glasgow, 1974, p.5.
148. F. Cardoso, "The Paper Enemy", Latin American Perspectives, 1, Spring 1974, p.66.
149. G. Gilbert, "Socialism and Dependency", Latin American Perspectives, 1, Spring 1974, pp.107-123; K. Bollen, "World System Position, Dependency and Democracy: The Cross National Evidence." American Sociological Review, 48, 1983, pp.468-479.
150. A. G. Frank, "Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution", op.cit, p.371.
151. Ibid, p.372.
152. Ibid, p.393.
153. Ibid, p.396.
154. R. Fernandez and J. Ocampo, "The Latin American Revolution: A Theory of Imperialism not Dependence," Latin American Perspectives, I, Spring 1974, pp.30-61.
155. Ibid, p.31.
156. In the 1980s, this kind of criticism was expressed even more strongly. Some analysts, apparently ignorant of the wealth of the literature on dependency, works which had not been translated from Spanish and Portuguese, hastily proclaimed the demise of the paradigm. For some of the misinterpretations of the dependency perspective, see Gary Howe, "Dependency Theory, Imperialism, and the Production of Surplus Value on a World Scale". Latin American Perspectives, 30-31, 1981, pp.82-102.
157. F. Cardoso, "The Paper Enemy", Latin American Perspectives, 1, 1974, pp.66-74.
158. R. Chilcote, "Dependency: A Critical Synthesis of the Literature," Latin American Perspectives, 1, 1974, pp.4-29.

159. Ibid, p.8.
160. Ibid, p.18
161. S. Bodenheimer, "Dependency and Imperialism", op.cit., pp.169-178.
162. Ibid, p.169.
163. Ibid, p.172.
164. Ibid, p.173.
165. Ibid, p.176.
166. For an analysis of some of the attempts made by underdeveloped countries to resolve their unequal position in the world economy, see Heraldo Munoz (ed.) From Dependency to Development: Strategies to Overcome Underdevelopment and Inequality. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981.
167. Frank, Cockcroft and Johnson, "Dependence and Underdevelopment, op.cit, pp.71-111.
168. The debates concerning the "benefits" that underdeveloped countries derive from their position in the world economy are highlighted in Mitchell Seligson (ed.) The Gap Between the Rich and the Poor: Contending Perspectives on the Political Economy of Development. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984.
169. F. Cardoso, "Dependency and Development in Latin America," New Left Review, 74, 1972, pp.83-95.
170. Ibid, p.90.
171. F. Cardoso, "Associated-Dependent Development: Theoretical and Practical Implications", in Alfred Stephen (ed.) Authoritarian Brazil. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973, pp.142-150; Cardoso's basic views changed little over the years. See F. Cardoso, "Democracy in Latin America", Politics and Society, 15, 1987, pp.23-41.
172. P. Gonzalez-Cassanova, "Internal Colonialism and National Development," in I. Horowitz, J. De Castro and J. Gerassi (eds.) Latin American Radicalism. New York: Random House, 1969.
173. F. Cardoso, "Dependency and Development", op.cit.
174. Ronald Chilcote, "Post Marxism," op.cit, pp.3-24. Juan Carlos Feres and Arturo Leon, "The Magnitude of Poverty in Latin America," CEPAL Review, 41, Santiago, Chile, 1990, pp.133-154; For a critique of some of Cardoso's early views, see J. Meyer, "A Crown of Thorns: Cardoso and Counter Revolution," Latin American Perspectives, 2, Spring, 1975, pp.33-48.

175. F. Cardoso, "Dependence and Transformation", op.cit., p.94.
176. R. Chilcote, "Dependency: A Critical Synthesis", op.cit., p.9.
177. The contribution of Latin American analysts to this perspective has been voluminous. See Cristobal Kay, "Reflections on the Latin American Contribution", op.cit.
178. Various analysts have questioned whether dependency should be regarded as a theory or a group of theories. See Colin Hemfrey, "Dependency, Modes of Production, and the Class Analysis of Latin America," Latin American Perspectives, 30-31, 1981, p.19.
179. M. Dobb, Studies in the Development of Capitalism. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1956.
180. P. Sweezy, The Theory of Capitalist Development, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1956.
181. E. Laclau, "Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America," New Left Review, 67, 1971, pp.19-38.
182. C. Bettelheim, "Economic Inequalities Between Nations and International Solidarity," Monthly Review, 22, 1970, pp.19-24.
183. A. G. Frank, "Capitalism and the Underdevelopment," op.cit., p.14. Although, in the past, both Frank and Wallerstein have referred to capitalism as a mode of production--production geared to profit on a world market--their conceptualization seems to be closer to that of "productive systems" than to traditional Marxist concepts. See H. Veltmeyer, "A Central Issue in Dependency Theory", Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 17, 1980, p.200.
184. H. Veltmeyer, op.cit., p.204.
185. J. Taylor, From Modernization to Modes of Production. London: McMillan, 1979, p.86.
186. K. Marx, Capital, Vol.1, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971, p.706.
187. Ibid.
188. E. Laclau, "Feudalism and Capitalism", op.cit. The comments which follow are based largely on this source.
189. It is generally felt that large elements of the Latin American agrarian economy cannot be properly understood if one uses the concept of a feudal mode of production. See Hamza Alavi, "India and the Colonial Mode of Production," in Ralph Miliband and John Saville (eds.), The Social Register, London, 1975, p.401; For a similar view, see Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State. London, 1975, p.401.

190. M. Sternberg, "Dependency, Imperialism and the Relations of Production," Latin American Perspectives, 1, 1974, pp.75-86.
191. A. G. Frank, Lumpenbourgeoisie: Lumpendevlopment, op.cit.
192. P. Jalee, The Pillage of the Third World. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968.
193. A. Emmanuel, Unequal Exchange, New York, 1972.
194. Ibid, p.270.
195. Ibid, p.272.
196. Samir Amin, Accumulation on a World Scale, New York, 1974.
197. T. Dos Santos, "The Crisis of Development Theory and the Problems of Dependence in Latin America" in H. Bernstein (ed.) Underdevelopment and Development. Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1974, p.80.
198. -----, "The Structure of Dependence", America Economic Review, 60, 1970, p.30.
199. Ibid, p.231. For an analysis of the different ideological positions which the kind of perspective has evoked, see R. Chilcote, "Capitalist and Socialist Perspectives in the Search for a Class Theory of the State and Democracy". Paper presented to the Conference, Comparative Politics: Research Perspectives for the Next Twenty Years, New York, City University Graduate School, September 7-9, 1988.
200. C. Bettelheim, "Economic Inequalities," op.cit.
201. Ibid, p.22.
202. C. Bettelheim, "Theoretical Comments", in A. Emmanuel (ed.) Unequal Exchange. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972, p.318.
203. -----, "Economic Inequalities," op.cit.
204. J. Taylor, "From Modernization to Modes of Production," op.cit., p.85.
205. James Petras and Kent Trachte, "Liberal, Structural and Radical Approaches to Political Economy: An Assessment and an Alternative," in James Petras (ed.), Critical Perspective: Imperialism and Social Class in the Third World. New York, 1978, p.9.
206. F. Cardoso, "Associated-Dependent Development," op.cit., p.143.
207. T. Weiskopf, Dependence as an Explanation of Underdevelopment: A Critique, University of Michigan, 1976. Weiskopf's uncritical acceptance and use of certain figures indicating industrial growth in some underdeveloped countries appear to be unsound.

208. B. Warren, "Imperialism and Capitalist Industrialization", New Left Review, October, 1973, pp.3-44. Warren's positive comments on colonialism, which he considers to be a vehicle for progressive change in underdeveloped countries, reflect the narrow perspective from which some analysts conceptualize the phenomena of development and underdevelopment.
209. James Petras and Howard Bull, "Latin America Transnational Capitalists and the Debt: A Class-Analysis Perspective", Development and Change, 19, 1988, pp.179-201.
210. Margaret De Vries, Balance of Payments Adjustments, 1945-1986: The IMF Experience. Washington, 1987.
211. C. Bath and D. James, "Dependency Analysis of Latin America," Latin American Research Review, Vol.2, No.3, 1976, p.33.
212. Ibid, p.37.
213. C. Johnson, Dependency Theory and the Capitalist Socialist Process. Montreal: McGill University, Centre for Developing-Area Studies, 1979.
214. Ibid, p.5.
215. Ibid, p.1.
216. Ibid, p.3.
217. Ibid, p.5.
218. This is the kind of typology utilized by C.Beth and D. James, "Dependency Analysis of Latin America", op.cit.
219. See K. Marx, "Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy" in K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, 2 vols., Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962, I, pp.362-363.
220. The bias which is to be found in the works of some social scientists is well documented. See G. Joseph, V. Reddy and M. Searle-Chatterjee, "Eurocentrism in Social Sciences," Race and Class, 31 (4) 1990, pp.1-26.
221. R. Chilcote, "Issues of Theory in Dependency and Marxism", Latin American Perspectives, 30-31, 1981, pp.3-16.
222. P. O'Brien, "A Critique of Latin American Theories of Dependency," op.cit.
223. There are some analysts who utilize this kind of approach. For an excellent example, see Clive Thomas, "Dependence and Transformation," op.cit. Thomas' analysis of the strategy required to bring about the transition to socialism shows the kind of conceptual clarity which is lacking in many works on underdevelopment.

224. A. G. Frank, Crisis In the Third World. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981.
225. C. Furtado, "The Concept of External Dependence in the Study of Underdevelopment" in C. Wilber, (ed.) The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment. New York: Random House, 1973, pp.118-128.
226. Ibid, p.121.
227. T. Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence," op.cit., p.117.
228. E. Paus, "Direct Foreign Investment and Economic Development in Latin America: Perspectives for the Future," Journal of Latin American Studies, 21, 1989, pp.221-239.
229. A. G. Frank, "Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution," op.cit., p.ix. Although Frank refined some of his ideas over the years, his basic perspective concerning the nature of underdevelopment has not varied very much. See. A. G. Frank, World Accumulation, 1492-1789. London: McMillan, 1978;
_____, Reflections on the Economic Crisis, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981;
_____, Critique and Anti-Critique. New York: Praeger, 1984;
_____, "The Underdevelopment of Development" and "Bibliography of Publications 1955-1990." Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives, 10, 1991, pp.1-150. Frank has continued to be a vigorous supporter of dependency theory.
230. S. Bodenheimer, "Dependency and Imperialism," op.cit., p.164.
231. W. Rodney, "How Europe Underdeveloped Africa", op.cit.
232. Ibid, p.10.
233. J. Robinson, Economic Philosophy. London: Pelican, 1964, p.46. This kind of view fails to comprehend the multidimensional nature of the concept of development. See M. Radcliff, Sustainable Development. Exploring the Contradictions. London: Methuen, 1987; R. Stavenhagen, "Ethnodevelopment: A Neglected Dimension in Development Thinking," in R. Anthrope and A. Krahll, (eds.) Development Studies: Critique and Renewal, Leiden, Holland: Brill, 1986. The uses and abuses of development policies have been highlighted by the CBC. See, "Redefining Development," CBC "Ideas" Transcripts, November, 1990. The kind of unrestrained capitalism which Jean Robinson favours for underdeveloped countries has been sharply criticized. According to Stackhouse, "The whole African experiment would collapse in the hands of the new missionaries--the proselytizers of free votes and free markets". See John Stackhouse, "Africa Inc., Where the Bottom Line is Starvation", Globe and Mail, September 14, 1991, p.D3.
234. Dale Johnson, "Economism and Determinism in Dependency Theory, Latin American Perspectives, 30-31, 1981, pp.108-117.

235. W. Rodney, op.cit, p.21; I tend to agree with Hettne who states that "there can be no fixed and final definition of development, only suggestions of what development should imply in particular contexts." See Bjorn Hettne, Development Theory and the Three Worlds, New York: Wiley, 1990, p.2.
236. W. Rodney, op.cit, p.21.
237. J. Moreno demonstrates, in a convincing manner, that social revolutions in the Caribbean can be best comprehended if a dependency perspective is utilized. See J. Moreno, "Class, Dependency and Revolution in the Caribbean: Preliminary Considerations for a Comparative Study of Aborted and Successful Revolutions", Journal of Developing Societies, VI, 1990, pp.43-55; A dependency analytical framework is also used by Carmen Deere to study the ways in which US policies have contributed to underdevelopment in the Caribbean. See Carmen Deere, In the Shadow of the Sun: Caribbean Development Alternatives and US Policy. Boulder, Co., Westview Press, 1990; Clive Thomas analyzes the development of the peripheral Caribbean state through the colonial period to independence. This work is significant since it demonstrates so clearly many of the political ramifications of underdevelopment. See Clive Thomas, The Rise of the Authoritarian State in Peripheral Societies. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1984.
238. The level of exploitation generated by the comprador class has varied from country to country (Note #94). In Jamaica this class often played an ambivalent role (Chapter 3). Members of the class usually shared economic and political power only when compelled to do so.
239. World Economic Outlook 1986. Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1986; R. Newfarmer (ed.), Profits, Progress and Poverty: Case Studies of International Industries in Latin America. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985.
240. External Debt and Economic Development in Latin America, Washington, D.C.: Inter American Development Bank, 1984; V. Bornschier and C. Chase-Dunn, Transnational Corporations and Underdevelopment. New York: Praeger, 1985.
241. Rhys Jenkins, Transnational Corporations and Industrial Transformation in Latin America. New York: St. Martin's press, 1984.
242. World Development Reports, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1980-85.
243. Louis Goodman, Small Nations, Giant Firms. New York: Homes and Meir, 1987.
244. This kind of oppression is a typical "colonial pattern" and is reflected in other countries. See Louis Faron, From Conquest to Agrarian Reform: Ethnicity, Ecology, and Economy in the Chancay Valley, Peru, 1533 to 1964. Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Department of Anthropology. Ethnology Monographs, no.8, 1985. Although Faron tends to emphasize racial rather

than class factors, the analysis is quite valid. See also Brooke Larson, Colonialism and Agrarian Transformation in Bolivia: Cochabamba, 1550-1900. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988.

245. This kind of position was especially prevalent in the 1960s. See C. P. Kindleberger, American Business Abroad: Six Lectures on Direct Investment, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1969; H.V. Perlmutter, "The Tortuous Evolution of the Multinational Corporation," Columbia Journal of World Business, Jan-Feb, 1969, pp.9-18.
246. O. Sunkel, "Transnational Capitalism", op.cit. For an analysis of the relevance of a "modes or production" approach to the Caribbean, see C.Y. Thomas, The Poor and the Powerless: Economic Policy and Change in the Caribbean. London: Latin American Bureau, 1988.

CHAPTER TWO

SUGAR AND JAMAICA:

AN OVERVIEW OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT, 1655-1944

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I shall trace the origins of the role played by the Jamaican sugar industry in the underdevelopment of various sectors of Jamaican society. This analysis will be undertaken within the context of a changing international economic and social order. The main purpose of this chapter will be to demonstrate that the underdevelopment of Jamaican society stemmed largely from a monocultural system of agricultural production, imposed by capitalist, metropolitan interests, which severely limited the productive forces in the peripheral economy and generated structural and institutional changes within the society. It will also be shown that this underdevelopment arose from certain, definite, historical events which originated in Europe--that is, the growth and development of the capitalist mode of production. Capitalism resulted in the destruction of feudal society, the initiation of European expansionism through colonialism and, in Jamaica, the forceful intervention by European colonizers in the social process of the indigenous inhabitants, the subjugation of these inhabitants and the transformation of their social formation.¹

One of the basic assumptions of this study is that the level of the development of the productive forces of a society determines the level of cultural development.² The productive forces in Jamaican society have been constrained since the advent of colonialism. In the case of the indigenous inhabitants, the Arawak Indians, their communal mode of production was destroyed by the colonists who introduced a new mode, commodity production, which dominated all forms of social relations. The driving force behind European conquest was brought about by the transition from the feudal to the capitalist mode of production. The productive forces of the native people were thus transformed to meet the requirement of European capitalists for gold and silver.³

When most of the indigenous people had been destroyed, Europeans maintained the exploitative relationship of domination with Africans seized and brought to the New World to labour as slaves on sugar plantations. The labour of the slaves was thus transformed into a commodity for the production and reproduction of surplus value. The implementation of this relationship of commodity exchange throughout Jamaica heralded the incorporation of the country into the world capitalist system.⁴

The dependent relations between Jamaica and metropolitan countries which have shaped the underdevelopment of the former, are thus a product of the world capitalist system. Therefore, a proper understanding of these relations must begin with the way in which the internal structure and dynamics of Jamaican society were conditioned by its relation with the metropolis in accordance with

the expansive interests of the latter. The Spanish conquest, British mercantilism, competitive capitalism, and the transition to monopoly capitalism constitute the specific historical framework within which the dynamics of the concrete manifestations of Jamaican underdevelopment will be analyzed. It is only by showing the extent to which the development of the productive forces of Jamaica were restricted and shaped by metropolitan interests that the structure and process of contemporary dependence and underdevelopment can be fully understood.⁵

THE SPANISH CONQUEST

The conquest and colonization of the Americas by the Spanish in the latter part of the fifteenth century resulted from profound socio-economic and political changes which were taking place in Europe. The transition from a feudal to a capitalist mode of production was one of the most important. The conquest of new territories and the subsequent growth of markets and new sources of raw materials were important elements in this transition.

From the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries Europeans slowly took over the rest of the world. They plundered, enslaved and ruled so as to extract the maximum from their subjects (all in the name of God and the spread of Christianity). Such havoc was created that ancient and culturally advanced civilizations disappeared, as in Peru and West Africa; and progress was set back hundreds of years by the destruction of native industries as in India ... the plunder was so great that it constituted the main element in the formation of European capital, and provided the foundation for prosperous trade and eventual industrialization.⁶

In Jamaica, the Amerindian society was quite simple. Its mode of production was a communal one in which the people engaged in

basic agriculture, hunting and fishing. There was a fundamental unity between production and appropriation since land was the essential means of labour and belonged to the society as a whole. All production was based on use value and remained at the subsistence level with the exception of a small surplus to support the class of non-producers such as priests and elders. The products of labour were thus distributed according to definite rules established by the collective and laid down in tradition.⁷

The advent of the Spanish in 1494 marked the beginning of the end of Arawak civilization in Jamaica. The population of the indigenous people was rapidly decimated through involuntary labour, the transmission of foreign diseases and wanton murder. In their desperate but fruitless quest for gold in Jamaica, the Spanish colonists ruthlessly destroyed the native population and thereby the labour force.⁸ The period of Spanish colonization which lasted until the middle of the seventeenth century is an accurate example of Marx's portrayal of capitalism during the phase of primitive accumulation.⁹

Nevertheless, although Spain had preceded many European countries in colonial conquest, and had reaped vast wealth from the labours of the indigenous peoples of the Americas, it was not able to utilize this wealth for the development of its own industrial, capitalist infrastructure.¹⁰ Various reasons may be cited for this failure. First of all, overall production and shipping in Spain in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries were inadequate to supply the needs of the colonies. Spain's reliance on Italian

merchants and financiers for the training and organization of convoy navigation as well as for the foods and products required in the colonies meant that Italian businessmen were able to gain control of a large area of colonial trade. Later in the sixteenth century, Spain's indebtedness to German financiers allowed German merchants to gain vital concessions from the Spanish Crown. Furthermore, other European merchants such as the Dutch, English, and French were able to supersede the Spanish navies.¹¹

Another reason for Spain's failure to become a fully developed capitalist state was the fact that the wealth accumulated during Spain's colonial forays remained in the hands of the Spanish aristocracy and state. Since Spain lacked "a national bourgeois or a merchant capital group capable of stimulating indigenous growth"¹², and since capital accumulated from the colonies were being appropriated by other European merchants and financiers because of Spain's reliance on foreign finance, Spain's industrial output gradually declined. The defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588, the weakness of the Spanish monarchs after the death of Philip II in 1598, the general economic deterioration exacerbated by the decline in the production of silver in 1630, all culminated in ineffectual policies and a steady decline in resources. It was inevitable that other European powers would challenge the sovereignty of Spain over possessions in the Americas, some of which, like Jamaica, had been neglected for so long.¹³

MERCANTILISM AND THE BRITISH COLONIZATION OF JAMAICA

The British capture of Jamaica from the Spanish in 1655 was a reflection of the intense inter-metropole rivalries for capital, goods, and markets which characterized Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Since colonial development mirrored the qualitative development of European capitalism, it is worthwhile to examine first the nature of British mercantilism and then to demonstrate how the people and the natural resources of the Jamaican colony were exploited for the benefit of the capitalist metropolitan ruling classes.

(i) BRITISH MERCANTILISM

During the period of mercantilism (circa 1648-1760), the rise of the merchant class was facilitated by the growth of long distance trade and foreign conquests. The profits from overseas trade and plunder generated capital accumulation and enhanced the position of successful merchants who were able to gain and consolidate vast commercial powers.¹⁴ The rivalries among European powers for overseas areas rich in minerals and raw materials culminated in wars between Britain, Holland, France, and Spain during this period. From these encounters Britain emerged as the supreme military and economic power. In the words of Hobsbawn, "The result of this century of intermittent warfare was the greatest triumph ever received by any state; the virtual monopoly among European powers of overseas colonies, and the virtual monopoly of world-wide naval powers."¹⁵

The ideology of mercantilism required economic expansion under the direction of the state and backed by the forces of the state.¹⁶ This kind of viewpoint gave impetus to the seizing of the possessions of rival mercantile states and the belief that "the best if not the only way to get wealth and welfare was to take it from somebody".¹⁷ Some of the military and economic innovations which were implemented included (1) trade barriers designed to prohibit the entry of the goods of other nations into England (2) joint stock companies which were formed by the state to extract raw materials from the colonies and to transport them to the metropolis for consumption or processing.¹⁸

The mercantile system was a system of exploitation through trade which was regulated by the state and which played a vital role in the growth of capitalist industry. It was basically the economic policy of an age of primitive accumulation. Mercantilism was considered to be so important that many of its supporters came to regard the gain from foreign trade as the only form of surplus, and therefore as the only source both of accumulation and of state revenue.¹⁹

The principal features of the British mercantile system were embodied in the Navigation Acts of 1651, 1660, 1663, and 1673.²⁰ These legislative codes were designed to regulate colonial trade, to define the relationship between the metropolis and the colonies and to exclude the Dutch who were doing a brisk trade with the New World colonies of the seventeenth century. According to the Navigation Act of 1651, colonial products could only be imported into England

in English ships.²¹ Furthermore, it decreed that European goods exported to British colonies could only be undertaken in British ships or in ships of the country from which the goods originated.

The Navigation Act of 1660 extended the provisions of the Act of 1651.²² Henceforth, goods could no longer be imported into or exported from any British colony except in ships of British, Irish, or colonial origin. Furthermore, the captain and three quarters of the crew had to be British, and aliens were prohibited from acting as merchants in the colonies. The Act also stated that goods such as sugar, cotton, wool, tobacco, indigo, ginger, fustic and other dye woods, could be shipped only to England, Ireland, or to another British colony. Finally, captains engaged in the British West Indian trade had to post bonds of £1,000 to £2,000 which were forfeited if the law was broken.

The Staple Act of 1663 was designed to curb the illegal trade between the British colonies and Europe which, in spite of the previous Acts, still persisted, albeit in a reduced form.²³ According to this Act, all goods which were intended for the colonies, British as well as non-British, had to be shipped from a British port. Direct trade between Europe and the British colonies was prohibited.

The Plantation Duties Act of 1673 was enacted by Britain to strengthen its control over inter-colony trade.²⁴ Goods which had been placed on the restricted list by the Act of Navigation (1660) were being sold illegally to foreigners who, under the guise of participating in inter-colonial trade, were then selling such goods

to other British colonies without paying customs duties. In order to arrest this traffic, British authorities, through the Act of 1673, imposed a substantial import duty on the goods enumerated in the Act of 1660 when shipped from one colony to another.

The Navigation Acts were "thoroughly mercantilist in spirit and object and formed the economic framework of the old colonial system".²⁵ The Navigation Acts excluded foreign ships from the colonial trade, prohibited the exportation of various articles from the colonies to foreign countries, and generally limited colonial imports to goods shipped from England. These actions helped the English government to increase English shipping and sea power and obviated the necessity of importing from foreigners, goods which the English could not produce. The Acts also gave English manufacturers a monopoly on the colonial market by discouraging, through the imposition of various economic penalties, the colonial consumption of foreign goods.²⁶

It is important to consider the economic wealth and military power accumulated by Britain during the mercantilist period.²⁷ In the mid-1700s, Britain owned over 6,000 mercantile ships of perhaps a half million tons. Over 100,000 seamen were employed by mercantile companies. Joint-stock companies such as the East and West India companies carried on commerce with the economic as well as military backing of the state. These commercial enterprises were instrumental in setting up plantations in overseas territories, and in transporting the settlers who were to wield power and maintain the interests of the metropolis. Britain was thus able to use its

colonies as areas to relocate its surplus population and to sell its manufactured goods.²⁸ During the eighteenth century, the plantation trade provided Britain with tremendous profits.

The nature of the triangular trade has been quite clearly documented. The slave ships set out from the home port with a cargo of manufactured goods. These were exchanged at a profit for slaves on the African coast. The slaves were traded on the West Indian plantations, at another profit, in exchange for a cargo of colonial products which was taken back to the home country. As the volume of trade increased, the triangular trade was supplemented by a direct trade between home country and the West Indies.²⁹

This trade provided a triple stimulus for British industry during the eighteenth century. The Africans were purchased with British manufactured goods and transported to the plantations. There they produced sugar, cotton, indigo, molasses and other tropical products. The processing of these goods created new industries in England. The maintenance of the African slaves and their owners also provided another market for British industry, New England agriculture, and the Newfoundland fisheries. By 1750, most trading or manufacturing towns were connected with the triangular or direct colonial trade. The profits provided a major boost to the accumulation of capital in England.³⁰

It is little wonder, then, that the West Indies became "the hub of the British Empire, of immense importance to the grandeur and prosperity of England".³¹ It was the African slaves, exploited by British capitalism, who "made these sugar colonies the most precious

colonies ever recorded in the whole annals of imperialism".³² In the words of Prostlethwayt, they were "the fundamental prop and support of the colonies".³³ There is ample documentation to support this kind of assertion. Britain's total trade at the end of the seventeenth century brought in a profit of £2,000,000. The plantation trade accounted for £600,000; re-export of plantation goods £120,000; European, African and Levant trade £600,000; East India trade £500,000; re-export of East India goods £180,000.³⁴ It was estimated that in 1775, British West Indian plantations represented a value of fifty million sterling.³⁵ In 1788, the sugar planters put the figure at seventy million.³⁶ Indeed, in 1798 Pitt assessed the annual income from plantations in the West Indies at four million pounds compared with one million from the rest of the world.³⁷ Adam Smith could write, with some justification, "The profits of a sugar plantation in any of our West Indian colonies are generally much greater than those of any other cultivation that is known either in Europe or America".³⁸

The triangular trade and the associated trade with the Caribbean sugar plantation islands, because of the navigation they encouraged, became more valuable to Britain than her tin or coal mines. The colonies were ideal areas for exploitation. Their tropical products did not compete with those of the home country. These islands showed few signs of the kind of industrial development which might have aroused opposition on the mainland. The brutalities and atrocities which plantation slave owners unleashed against their African slaves were usually considered by many Britons

to be the necessary and effective remedy for rebellion. The ideology of the times was one which justified white racism against "primitive" people. A colony like Jamaica existed primarily for the production of sugar. As Sir Dalby Thomas wrote, "The pleasure, glory and grandeur of England has been advanced more by sugar than by any other commodity, wool not excepted."³⁹

The triangular trade was, therefore, Britain's most important economic venture during the mercantile era. It contributed greatly to the development of shipping and ship-building, and thus to the growth of the great seaport towns of Bristol, Liverpool and Glasgow. It stimulated directly or indirectly industries making goods required for the colonial trade, e.g. wool and cotton. It also contributed to the development of industries for the processing of colonial produce, e.g. sugar refineries and rum distilleries as well as the metallurgical industries.⁴⁰

However, British domestic industries flourished not only because of the triangular trade but because of the protective barriers directed against European manufactures. These restrictions, plus a stable domestic market for finished goods, as well as lucrative foreign markets, assured the rapid growth of British domestic products. The output of home industries increased by 7% from 1700 to 1750 and by 7% from 1750 to 1770. Industries producing for export increased by 76% from 1700 to 1750 and by 80% from 1750 to 1770.⁴¹

The economic successes reaped by Britain through her mercantile policies cannot be doubted. Whereas in 1650 British overseas possessions were few, by the end of the eighteenth century there was a tremendous growth in the number of such possessions. In 1700 colonial trade amounted to 15% of British commerce. However, by 1775 it constituted as much as one third.⁴² British imperialism of the eighteenth century represented a movement away from the traditional pattern of European expansion which, in previous centuries, had been characterized by the explorations of Spanish, Italian, and Portuguese merchants or German city states in the area of the Mediterranean. The new centres of expansion were the maritime states bordering the North Atlantic and the North Sea. The change was not simply geographical but structural. The new kind of relationship between the "advanced" areas and the rest of the world tended constantly to intensify and widen the flows of commerce.⁴³

There were three factors on which such changes rested: (1) the development in Europe of a large and extendible market for overseas products for everyday use (2) the creation of overseas economic systems for producing such goods, e.g. slave-operated plantations (3) the conquest of colonies designed to serve the economic advantage of their European owners.⁴⁴ In fact, Wallerstein is quite right when he argues that European mercantilism heralded the genesis of a world economy.

For what Europe was to develop and maintain now was a new form of surplus appropriation, a capitalist world economy. This was to be based not on direct appropriation of agricultural surplus in

the form of either tribute or of feudal rents, as in the past. On the contrary, the system which developed was one in which there was the appropriation of a surplus which was based on more efficient and expanded productivity, first in agriculture and later in industry by means of world market mechanism with the non-market assistance of state machineries, none of which controlled the world market completely.⁴⁵

(ii) BRITISH COLONIZATION

When England captured Jamaica from Spain in 1655, a new epoch in colonization was initiated. Whereas Spain had utilized the island primarily as a defensive stronghold from which the wealthier areas in the Caribbean and the Americas could be protected, England was interested in Jamaica for settlement.⁴⁶

Initially, British colonial production consisted of settlers on small family farms. These settlers came from Britain as well as from other Caribbean islands. Most of those who came from Britain were people who had been unable to make a living there, misfits, outcasts, and those who had been uprooted from a traditional way of life. "In several respects, they were victims of the process of transition to capitalism which wrenched them from their customary roles in feudal society and threw them in the cities as cheap labour for the factories of emergent capitalism."⁴⁷ There were also colonial administrators as well as merchants who commuted between the metropolis and the colony.

At first, the settlers cultivated various food crops. However, when the production of sugar cane was introduced, it proved to be a great economic success because of the demand for sugar in Britain.⁴⁸ The small family farms were gradually taken over by large sugar plantations. Early plantations consisted of fields of 200-300 acres per factory. Because large-scale sugar production requires an abundant labour force, the need for large supplies of cheap labour was felt. The traditional sources could not be utilized. The Arawak population had been decimated by the Spanish and the few Africans in the island had retreated to the hills.⁴⁹ Until about 1685, dispossessed Europeans were used as indentured servants on sugar plantations. However, this arrangement gradually died out.

One reason for its decline was that planters found it uneconomical to pay wages to Europeans to work on sugar plantations especially when such people usually had the option, under the terms of their contract, of striking out on their own on unoccupied Crown land or returning home, after the lapse of a certain period.⁵⁰ Another reason was that mercantilist ideology required a large domestic population in England in order to keep down the cost of labour.⁵¹

The problem for the capitalists was solved by actively engaging in the slave trade. From the mid-sixteenth century the Royal Africa Company had been participating in this venture but with the great demand for cheap labour in the West Indies, added impetus was given to British merchants to secure larger numbers of slaves.

By the late seventeenth century, England was established as a major slave trading nation, and for the next century and a half Jamaica functioned as a slave plantation society, established for the production of sugar cane for export to England.⁵²

UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN JAMAICAN SLAVE PLANTATION SOCIETY

It must be emphasized that by the term "underdevelopment" I am referring (1) to the asymmetrical and dependent kind of development which takes place in the periphery as a result of metropolitan exploitation and (2) to the structural features that define that condition.⁵³ As Hindess and Hirst point out in their discussion of the slave mode of production:

It is a mode of production subordinated to the capitalist mode of production within the international division of labour and the world market created by capitalism. The conditions of reproduction of the Slave Mode of Production under these circumstances depended upon the capitalist system; upon world demand for the commodities it produces, competing regions and methods of production, alternative sources of investment, etc.⁵⁴

The slave mode of production was therefore quite distinctive and was based on a particular combination of land, capital and labour power. The fundamental contradictions of slavery was not that of capitalism, between social production and private appropriation of the profit, but rather the fact that the slave combined within his/her person both fixed capital and labour power.⁵⁵

In Jamaica, the slave plantation society presents a striking example of the dynamics of underdevelopment. The slave mode of

production which was created and controlled by English capitalism was completely dependent on the English market. It received its inputs from English factories and its product was sold to English consumers. English merchants supplied the capital in the form of finance to purchase slaves, and imports and exports were carried out exclusively by English ships.⁵⁶ Indeed, many planters were deeply indebted to English merchant houses and had to follow strictly the wishes of the latter. Since the metropolitan market was also the source of credit and capital, it dictated the terms of Jamaica sugar production.⁵⁷ The fact that slave society was heavily dependent on English capitalism which, in turn, used the surplus extracted from slave production to expand, meant that the slave mode of production was never able to utilize its surplus for the development of capitalism in Jamaica.⁵⁸

The slave mode of production, plus mercantilist ideology, resulted in a paucity of development in the sectors outside of sugar. As Taylor points out with reference to Brazil, "satellite economies could have been generated only if they had produced something too perishable or bulky to import."⁵⁹ The same situation was true for Jamaica under slavery. Planters did not usually invest their profits outside of the sugar sector since such profits were reinvested in the sugar industry or were spent on importing luxury goods.⁶⁰ Furthermore, since plantations had little economic transactions with each other, the slave mode of production was unable to create an internal market. Since each plantation secured its supplies from foreign sources and disposed of its output through

such sources, inter-plantation economic transactions were minimal. Therefore, neither producing units nor consuming units in Jamaica slave society displayed great structural interdependence. Most of the economic effects of sugar plantation activities such as the formation of savings and investment, and the creation of income were felt in the metropolis. While contributing to the development of the metropole, Jamaica slave society remained dependent and underdeveloped.⁶¹

The underdevelopment of technology which characterized the slave mode of production in the West Indies can be demonstrated by the example of Jamaica. First of all, the technology which was utilized in the sugar factory was provided by the metropolis and there was very little developmental innovation in the periphery. In the second place, since sugar production under slavery was established on and depended on vast amounts of cheap labour, agricultural innovations of a mechanical nature would have contravened one of the basic ideologies of the slave mode of production.⁶² Under the slave mode of production, the labour that was required at harvest determined the number of slaves that were bought. Since it was usually not possible to adjust this number to seasonal variations, all the slaves had to be kept busy, a fact that resulted in excessive labour intensive methods.⁶³ Finally, although some slaves acquired the skills of boilermen, carpenters, coopers, and maçons, their activities were confined largely to the plantation, thus restricting the possibilities of the development of artisans with related skills outside the plantation.⁶⁴

The underdevelopment of the economic structure of Jamaican society during the eighteenth century resulted from the demands of British capitalists for sugar. Although initial sugar production had been plagued by the uncertainties caused by natural disasters, falling prices, and wars, by the 1720s the price of sugar was increasing steadily.⁶⁵ Jamaican society became structured to accommodate the increased demand for sugar.⁶⁶ There was a dramatic increase in the number of slaves imported into the island.

Table 2.1

Size and Racial Composition of the
Population of Jamaica, 1670-1834

Year	Population of Jamaica	Slave	White
1670	15,196	7,196	8,000
1692	45,000	38,000	7,000
1704	48,500	45,000	3,500
1722	87,100	80,000	7,100
1734	94,190	86,546	7,644
1746	122,428	112,428	10,000
1755	142,000	130,000	12,000
1775	209,617	192,787	12,734
1778	223,681	205,261	18,420
1787	235,894	210,894	25,000
1792	291,400	250,000	30,000
1800	370,421	300,939	26,000
1807	379,351	319,351	15,000
1834	371,071	311,070	16,127

Sources: Inventories, Vol.26, 1740-1777 Jamaica Archives; O. Patterson, Sociology of Slavery, Jamaica, Sangsters, 1973, p.95; Jamaica Almanacks, 1790-1834, Kingston: Institute of Jamaica.

Table 2.1 shows the size and racial composition of the population of Jamaica from 1670 until the abolition of the slave trade in 1834. The rapid increase in the slave population in the late seventeenth century and in the eighteenth century is clearly indicated. The population of the free coloureds was haphazardly

calculated by census takers. This fact accounts for the apparent imbalance in the figures for 1775, 1792, 1800, 1807, 1834.

Sheridan correctly points out that "during the century from 1673 to 1774, the white population increased by a little more than two-fold, slaves by some twelve-fold."⁶⁷ Production also increased. In 1670 the 57 sugar estates in Jamaica produced 1,710,000 lbs. of sugar (963 tons). This yielded approximately £23,000 sterling. Other staples combined yielded as much as sugar. Total exports amounted to about £46,000. Nevertheless, from this small beginning, aggregate exports to Britain rose quickly. In 1701-1704 such exports averaged £325,000. In 1736-1740 they came to £652,000. Between 1751-1755 they were £1,025,000. Between 1739-1775, these figures amounted to £2,400,000.⁶⁸

Table 2.2

Expansion and Distribution of Sugar Plantations
in Jamaica, 1740-1786

County	1740	1770	1775	1786
Cornwall	79	146	180	272
Middlesex	203	240	254	323
Surrey	145	268	349	388

Sources: Inventories, Vols.26/27, 1740-1790 Jamaica Archives; R. Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, op cit., p.223.

Because of the increased demand for sugar there was also a marked tendency toward agglomeration of productive units.⁶⁹ Table 2.2 shows the growth of sugar plantations in Jamaica between 1740 and 1786. In the county of Cornwall there were only 79 plantations in 1740. By 1786 there were 272 plantations. The county of Middlesex showed a growth from 203 to 323 plantations in the same

period. In Surrey there were 145 sugar plantations in 1740. By 1786, there were 388 sugar plantations in this county.

From about the middle of the eighteenth century, although the majority of land and slave owners were resident in Jamaica, the distribution of slaves and land was so greatly skewed in favour of a few proprietors, most of whom lived in England, that, in effect, most of the slaves and land in Jamaica, from this time on, were owned by absentee landlords.⁷⁰

Absenteeism contributed to the socio-economic underdevelopment of Jamaican society from two viewpoints. First of all, the absentee planters, now resident in England, devoted their energies to investing the surplus derived from the plantations into profitable commercial ventures in England. The productive forces in Jamaica were thus deprived of much of the surplus which might have been utilized to expand the material base of the production units. Consequently, it was only a matter of time before the forces of production, bereft of needed capital to augment their reproductive capacity, would suffer a significant decrease in output.⁷¹

Absenteeism also contributed to the economic mis-management of the economy of Jamaica during the eighteenth century.⁷² Overseers who had been left in charge of plantations by absentee owners were supposed to be supervised by attorneys but it was impossible for an individual attorney to supervise the various estates of absentee-owners for whom he acted as an agent. The result was that the management of an estate was left almost entirely in the hands of the overseer. Since the latter was paid on a

commission basis, he fervently attempted to maximize the profits from the estates in order to increase his fee. The result was that capital equipment was depleted in the drive to increase output.⁷³

No attention is paid to fences, to the clearing of pasture lands, or to the repairs of the buildings. Large cane fields were planted without manure; weeds were seen luxuriating in the midst of the canes as they grow up, and all classes, young and old are out at work, under the scourge of the lash, from four in the morning until after dark at night.⁷⁴

The capital which was destroyed in the drive for profit included not only buildings and equipment but also the slaves. One observer pointed out that "it was generally understood where planters resided themselves, their slaves were better taken care of than under the direction of Overseers."⁷⁵ Another commentator affirmed:

It was more the object of the overseers to work the Slaves out, and trust for supplies from Africa; because I have heard many of the overseers say, "I have made my employer 20, 30, or 40 more hogsheads per year than any of my predecessors ever did; and though I have killed 30 or 40 Negroes per year more, yet the produce had been more than adequate".⁷⁶

Indeed, many of the attorneys who were supposed to be supervising the overseers did little to prevent the excesses indulged in by the latter. The attorneys themselves were also paid on a commission basis and thus, like the overseers, had a vested interest in exploiting the resources of the plantation to the maximum.⁷⁷

The underdevelopment of Jamaican slave plantation society also stemmed from the legal power wielded by the planter-dominated state and the official representative of the Crown, the Governor. Since the holders of economic power, the plantocracy, also wielded

political power, the interests of the slaves were rarely represented at an official level.⁷⁸

The planters faithfully copied every article of English law in their own hastily enacted legislations, and where peculiar local conditions demanded new laws, the declared intention of the Jamaicans was to pass laws "not repugnant to the laws of England".⁷⁹

Ignoring English legal judgments such as that of Lord Mansfield in 1771 which declared slavery to be illegal in Britain, the Jamaican plantocracy sanctioned slavery and legitimized the status of slaves.⁸⁰ The existence of slavery not only blocked the emergence of a wage-earning proletariat but also prevented the development of other classes or groups which one generally associates with the maturation of capitalism in metropolitan countries.

The social relations through which the slave mode of production was carried out was thus fundamentally contradictory and antagonistic. In the first place, production was organized by a class of property owners who owned not only the land and all the other means of production but the slaves as well. Secondly, although slaves were compelled to perform arduous work and were frequently punished, the fruits of their toil belonged totally to the slavemaster.⁸¹ The fundamental element in colonial slavery was that the slave did not have the right to sell his labour power, much less to sell it to the highest bidder. The essence of capitalism, the exchange of labour power for money, was absent in the slave mode of production.⁸²

Under this mode, the petty food production of the slaves was of a dependent kind, tied as it was to the interests of the planter

class. Provision grounds were made available to the slaves for cultivation.⁸³ However, it must be noted that the foodstuffs and other goods which the slaves produced for their own consumption allowed the planters to retain a portion of the monetary outlay which they would normally be required to utilize for the maintenance of the slaves. This state of affairs existed particularly when less production of sugar was required because of a decline of prices on the international sugar market. Under this kind of situation the lot of the slave was somewhat easier since excessive demands on his labour were not usually made.⁸⁴

When there was an economic upturn, however, the lot of the slave became worse. Now he was subjected to rigorous labour in order to maximize production of sugar and the time normally allotted to the cultivation of his provision ground was radically altered. Unlike workers under industrial capitalism, therefore, the lot of the slave worsened when prices improved since he was obliged to work much harder for the planter and much less for himself. When prices fell, however, his lot improved.⁸⁵

The contradictions inherent in the colonial slave mode of production may be seen especially in the patterns of social stratification which existed in Jamaica under slavery. The social stratification which existed under slavery was a reflection of the stratification which existed on the plantation. Class lines were drawn rigidly according to race and colour.⁸⁶ In the seventeenth century, there were two principal classes. At the top of the social scale were the white European planters and managers. At the bottom

of the ladder were the African slaves. From about 1760 there developed an intermediary class of whites--merchants, professionals, middle-sized farmers, clerks, etc. There also developed a mulatto petty bourgeois class. The members of this class were the offspring of the rape of African slave women by white planters.⁸⁷ From its inception, this class, often referred to as the "Free Coloureds", played the role of broker between the two main classes. It displayed seemingly ambivalent class interests and sided with the dominant or the exploited class when it was in its own interest to do so. This pattern of support has left indelible marks on the subsequent history of Jamaica.⁸⁸

Of greater importance, however, is the fact that because of the rigid pattern of social stratification, the Africans who comprised the vast majority of the population, had no social mobility within the society as a whole. There is little doubt that the diminished opportunities for economic and social advancement which characterized the lot of black Jamaicans for most of the history of the country were rooted in the race-class pattern of stratification established in slavery and the subsequent ideology of black inferiority which was utilized to justify its continuance.⁸⁹

The economic base--the slave mode of production--affected the Jamaican slave plantation society in such a profound manner that some of the effects, quite apart from race cleavages, can be seen in modern Jamaica. One of the worst is the negative attitude towards agricultural labour still held by many Jamaicans. Slavery was such a brutalizing experience for Jamaicans that agricultural work became

generally despised and identified with the worst kind of oppression.⁹⁰ The contempt for education displayed by many planters and the neglect in establishing educational institutions for Africans meant that long after the abolition of slavery, development in Jamaica was hindered by the existence of a labour force that was largely uneducated and unskilled.⁹¹ Finally, the slave mode of production resulted in the disintegration of the institution of marriage. "This breakdown of sexual mores and the institution of marriage among the Negroes occurred all over the New World. But in no other area was the degree of sexual abandonment so great as in Jamaica."⁹² The high rate of illegitimacy in modern Jamaica can be traced back to the deleterious effects which slavery had on the institution of the family.⁹³

THE RISE OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM IN BRITAIN

In order to understand how Jamaica was underdeveloped during the period 1760-1865, it is necessary to examine some of the important qualitative changes which were taking place in British capitalism during this period. These changes profoundly affected Jamaican society.

There is no doubt that mercantilism contributed greatly to England's export trade and enriched those who were involved in such trade, e.g. ship builders, petty as well as long distance traders, the state, and manufacturers who depended on long distance trade for the acquisition of their capital.⁹⁴ However, as industries expanded in England, manufacturers began to criticize the protectionist

ideology of mercantilism. There were two main reasons for their criticism: (1) They considered that raw materials from the colonies were too expensive and wished to purchase from alternative sources. (2) They wished to sell their products in those markets barred to them by the terms of the Navigation Acts.⁹⁵

Industrialists, therefore, espoused the ideology of free trade and were encouraged by the support they received from economists like Adam Smith.⁹⁶ Smith and other economists who shared his conviction of "laissez-faire" argued that the intervention of the state in production and trade, as manifested by protective tariffs and joint-stock companies, had increased the cost of domestic and foreign raw materials as well as the price of finished products. "Laissez-faire" advocates wanted the international market rather than the state to determine the worth of commodities. They believed that economic competition was vital for the growth of British industries.⁹⁷

If we examine the consolidation of capitalism during the Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century, the perspective of the industrial capitalists can be seen more clearly. Let us recall that during mercantilism, the capital which had been accumulated through the expropriation of the English landed nobility and the exploitation of colonial people had become concentrated in fewer and fewer hands. There was thus the potential for this capital to be transformed into equipment, machines, buildings, and various other means of production.⁹⁸ Under industrial capitalism, capital gradually took complete charge of production. The process

of accumulation created vast reserves of cheap labour in English cities. The English worker was forced to sell his labour power to the capitalist or face starvation. Another important aspect of the Industrial Revolution was the fact that it created "the technological basis for realizing the potential for capitalist production: that is, for bringing capital and labour together in the most modern production organization, the factory".⁹⁹ Finally, "there was the domination of the entire economy--indeed, of all life--by the capitalists' pursuit and accumulation of profit."¹⁰⁰

Capital now determined the form and manner of production. Large groups of workers could now be brought together because of the ability to harness and utilize steam power.¹⁰¹ The revolution in technology culminated in the production of sophisticated new equipment and machines of iron and steel which stimulated the process of mass production. The specialization of tasks required by the factory plus the invention of new sources of power led to tremendous increases in the productivity of labour.¹⁰²

This new organization of production was characterized by two important features. First, the cheap manufactured goods which English factories poured out were far in excess of the absorptive capacity of the domestic market. When we consider the low wages paid to English workers and the conditions of exploitation which they suffered, this fact is not surprising.¹⁰³ The second feature was that capitalists constantly reinvested their profits in new technology and equipment which, in turn, accelerated the productivity of labour and hence the volume of goods searching for

markets.¹⁰⁴ The cumulative impetus of the revolution in technology was joined by "a growing productivity of labour, and hence (given stability, or at least no comparable rise of real wages) a growing fund of surplus-value from which fresh capital accumulation could be derived, and towards a growing concentration of production and of capital ownership".¹⁰⁵

The lines between those people in England who favoured the continued protection of mercantilism and those who advocated the "laissez-faire" of competitive capitalism were fairly clearly drawn. The political forces supporting the former were British farmers, the owners of plantations, and merchant companies.¹⁰⁶ The supporters of the latter included the British consumer, petty shopkeepers and craftsmen, industrial capitalists producing for the home or export markets, as well as those people who favoured indigenous development in the periphery.¹⁰⁷ The argument of the advocates of free trade was a forceful one. Sugar, for example, from the English slave colonies was more expensive at the end of the eighteenth century than beet sugar produced by capitalist farmers in Europe.¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, because of the tax levied on foreign grain under the provisions of the Corn Laws, English consumers were not able to acquire the cheaper French grain. Instead, they had to purchase domestic grain in order to protect inefficient English farmers.¹⁰⁹

The ideological differences in Britain on the question of free trade, the economic depression of the 1820s, and the general poverty of the labouring classes, led to conflicts of various kinds in Britain during the middle of the nineteenth century.¹¹⁰ During

this period, the views of those who favoured "laissez-faire" gained the ascendancy and the protectionist policies of mercantilism were gradually repealed.¹¹¹ The Navigation Laws were modified in 1825 so that direct colonial trade could be carried on with any part of the world.¹¹² The East India Company lost its monopoly. The Crown Laws were abolished as well as the British preference for sugar from the West Indies.¹¹³

In their zeal to overthrow the protectionist policies of mercantilism, and to crush the power of the merchants, the industrial capitalists threw their support behind the struggle to abolish slavery.¹¹⁴ Since merchants generally derived their economic power from slave plantations and the profitability of sugar production had been assured by high tariffs against its competitors, industrialists attacked the very base of the power of the merchants--the sugar plantation. They were, for the most part, little concerned by the morality of slavery or the social conditions of slaves. Their main aim was to free the British economy from interference by the state. The slave trade was abolished in 1807 and the institution of slavery was abolished in the British colonies in 1838.¹¹⁵ The effect that these changes in British capitalism had on Jamaica must now be examined.

Table 2.3 indicates that whereas the British West Indies supplied 4,205,000 cwts. of sugar on the world market in 1825, in 1850 the amount supplied was 2,590,000 cwts. The Jamaican share fell from 1,361,960 cwts. in 1825 to 592,487 cwts. in 1850. The repeal of the British preference for West Indian sugar contributed

to this decline. There was a noteworthy increase in production from other areas of the world.

Table 2.3

World Production of Sugar: 1825 & 1850 (cwts.)

Output in 1825	Source	Output in 1850
4,205,000	British West Indies	2,590,000
(1,361,960)	(of which, Jamaica)	(592,487)
503,000	Other British Producers	2,200,000
1,270,000	Cuba and Puerto Rico	5,920,000
533,000	Brazil	2,200,000
397,000	Louisiana	2,480,000
1,700,000	Other foreign producers	5,260,000
137,000	European beet sugar	3,800,000
8,745,000	Totals	24,450,000

Sources: Blue Book of Jamaica, 1850, Jamaica Archives. Jamaica Almanack, 1825, Jamaica Archives. D. Hall, Free Jamaica, YUP, 1959, p.83.

THE ROLE OF THE PLANTOCRACY IN THE UNDERDEVELOPMENT OF POST-EMANCIPATION JAMAICA

(i) THE EMERGENCE OF THE PEASANTRY

Jamaican slavery was destroyed by the dynamics of British capitalism as well as by the struggles of the slaves for liberation. Emancipation was finally granted in 1838 after an apprenticeship period during which the planters endeavoured to exact as much labour as they could from their former slaves while disputing some of the terms of apprenticeship laid down by the British authorities.¹¹⁶ Indeed, "the intensity of work required of the apprentice for that part of his work which was paid in wages was higher than that which had been required on the average under slavery".¹¹⁷

When apprenticeship was terminated, some ex-slaves fled the plantations to set themselves up in peasant agriculture in the hills. It is estimated that by 1840 the number of workers who quit the plantation was half of the actual labour force.¹¹⁸ The number of freehold properties in which these ex-slaves settled increased from 2,014 in 1838 to 7,484 in 1840.¹¹⁹ By the end of the 1840s over nineteen thousand families had settled in more than one hundred peasant villages. Other ex-slaves whose economic situation did not allow them to leave the plantations were forced to continue to work there for subsistence wages.¹²⁰

Although about half of the labour force of the plantations left the plantation after slavery, not all of the workers became independent freeholders. Indeed, it is quite likely that not only did the people in general not move away from the plantations and pens, but in many cases what they did was to go and rent on another property. When they did purchase property, it was usually only a house spot and when they did purchase "grounds", these were minuscule.¹²¹

The evidence provided by the reports of the Stipendary Magistrates indicates that the majority of the people in Jamaica were converted from the state of slavery to that of dependent tenants "renting house and grounds from the planters at a rate of two days' labour per week payable in cash or labour and subject to eviction by the planter at one week's notice".¹²²

Whether one agrees with the views of those writers who emphasize the economic growth of the peasantry¹²³ or those who

stress the burdens of tenancy, what is important and relevant to this study is the fact that the development of both sectors were circumscribed by the existence of the plantocracy.

We must now examine the nature of capitalism which emerged in Jamaica in the post-Emancipation period in order to understand the uneven development which took place in the island after 1838. Let us recall that the slave mode of production consisted of two "complementary" but antagonistic elements.¹²⁴ In one part, gangs of slaves under the direction of a "driver" raised cash crops. In the other, the slaves were allowed to grow foodstuffs in their own provision grounds and were sometimes permitted to sell the surplus at Sunday Markets which emerged in the country.¹²⁵ When slavery was terminated, the slave plantation economy was thus radically changed. Labour was obtained from those ex-slaves who were willing to work for the subsistence wages offered by the plantations. Alongside the Jamaican capitalist economy which was "shaping itself to fit the metropolitan links of export production and working with metropolitan capital",¹²⁶ there emerged the peasant economy built by ex-slaves.

It is worthwhile to emphasize that these two kinds of production developed during the nineteenth century as structures in contradiction with each other. In other words, the development of the peasantry was impeded by the existence of the plantation system. The plantation not only limited the accessibility of resources to the peasant but maintained an institutional setting where economic and political repression were utilized to work against the interest

of the peasantry. These two features helped to restrict the development of the peasantry and other workers in Jamaica during the period 1838-1865.¹²⁷

Let us consider the question of land, perhaps the most important resource required by the emergent peasant producers. Many planters had been disturbed during the apprenticeship period by the fact that some ex-slaves had been buying plots of land which they might cultivate when emancipation came. As one planter stated, "If the lands in the Interior get into the possession of the Negro, goodbye to lowland cultivation, and to any cultivation. You are aware, I dare say, that many of the Apprentices are purchasing their Apprenticeship and buying 5, 10, 15, 50 and even 100 acres."¹²⁸

Various schemes were contrived by the planters to thwart the ex-slaves' desire for land. A programme to attract European immigrants to settle as plantation labourers in the interior of Jamaica was proposed.¹²⁹ Although a few thousand immigrants did, in fact, come from Britain and Germany to settle in the interior, the scheme was poorly managed and thus had to be abandoned.

Nevertheless, some ex-slaves were able to purchase land from estate owners who, because of the metropolitan competitive capitalism, were unable to make a profit on sugar production, and were forced to abandon or reduce their holdings by selling them.¹³⁰ However, what is important to notice is that the lands that the ex-slaves were able to buy or seize as squatters were marginal. These were for the most part, harsh, hilly terrain which were unsuitable for sugar cane plantations. Peasant producers were never able to

obtain the best land. The fertile plains of the country were reserved for sugar cane production. Peasant plantation was therefore circumscribed by the existence of the plantation and was carried out under unfavourable agricultural conditions.¹³¹

There was another dimension to this question of land ownership. Although some planters did divide up part of their estates into lots and sold them to peasants who were able to afford them, peasants suffered various kinds of problems relating to the ownership of the land.¹³² In some cases, peasants were not given proper titles to the land and planters would sometimes sell the same property to other buyers. The situation arose partly because of the chaotic state of the legal rights to ownership which had developed from the financial crisis of 1847-48. It was quite possible for a property to bear a number of different mortgages, some referring to the entire estate, others only to certain parts. When such mortgages were called in, there were competing claims of ownership which hindered the transfer of titles. Nevertheless, even when such difficulties did not exist the planter class was extremely reluctant to permit the subdivision of its properties.¹³³ It is not surprising, therefore, that many peasants, unable to prove their claim to their land, were evicted as squatters.

Another resource which was of vital concern to the capitalist planters as well as to the peasantry in post-Emancipation Jamaica was labour. Planters were determined to keep wages at the minimum level of subsistence in order to ensure that production costs would not mount. By enacting vagrancy laws to exploit the

landless where they could, planters managed to create a surplus labour situation which ensured a steady labour supply for the plantation.¹³⁴ With the birth of the Jamaican proletariat, the capital-labour relation became an important aspect of sugar production.¹³⁵

In spite of different agricultural problems, peasants were able to achieve a certain degree of success. Thus by 1850, peasants who owned less than twenty acres of land produced about ten per cent of the coffee and bananas in the island, including sugar for home consumption.¹³⁶ By 1890 their share went up to about thirty nine per cent.¹³⁷ Some peasants in the post-Emancipation era lived in "free villages" established by the Baptist missionary William Knibb.¹³⁸ It has been estimated that by 1842, 150-200 villages comprising about 100,000 acres of land had been established.¹³⁹ In 1845 the number of peasants with holdings of less than ten acres was 19,397. It is claimed, furthermore, that by about 1866 there were 600,000 peasants with less than fifty acres each, "though this included squatters without titles to their land".¹⁴⁰

The successes achieved by the peasants do not, however, negate the fact that they became a reserve for the emerging capitalist sugar economy. It was a reserve labour force which planters were able to utilize at harvest or whenever there was an expansion in sugar production. As a reserve army, it served to depress the wages paid on the plantations since planters would have little difficulty finding labourers who were willing to accept the wages offered.¹⁴¹ Furthermore, those peasants who did not wish to

have recourse to the plantation but to concentrate on cultivating their plots, found it very difficult to attract hired labour since even the low wages paid by the plantation were more than what most peasants were able to pay.¹⁴²

The economic development of the peasants was also impeded by their lack of access to capital and credit. Although independent small farmers were able to satisfy most of their needs on a subsistence basis, or by exchange within a limited area, they required a certain minimum amount of cash for purchasing commodities such as clothing.¹⁴³ Peasants could usually obtain the cash required for such purchases by selling foodstuffs to wage labourers working on the plantation. However, when peasants required additional capital and credit to expand their material base, e.g. to buy more land, they were faced with severe problems. First of all, the banking system which was established in Jamaica was geared to financing plantation production and the associated import-export trade. Peasants were not able to obtain credit from these institutions and consequently found it difficult to acquire additional land.¹⁴⁴ Secondly, peasants were impeded in their economic development because export activities had been based primarily on plantation products and not on peasant cultivation.¹⁴⁵ The third problem faced by peasants was the difficulty in transporting their product for sale within the island. The roads in the country had deteriorated to such a state that many times they were impassable.¹⁴⁶

It is not difficult to see why the internal road system was, in the post-Emancipation period, worse than at any other time during the previous century. The main road system, and to a great extent, local roads as well, had been built to accommodate the sugar estates. When these estates began to collapse in the post-Emancipation period, little attention was paid to the roads many of which consequently fell into a state of disuse. It is ironic that at a time when the new distribution of the Jamaican population necessitated improved road conditions, such improvements were not taking place.¹⁴⁷

Finally, even attempting to raise cash by selling their produce to plantation labourers often proved to be problematic for peasants. Since the cash market for provisions depended on the cash receipts of estate workers, the persistent stagnation of the estate sector of the economy limited severely the cash flow in the peasant sector. The ramification of this lack of access to cash is not difficult to imagine. Peasants were constrained in their attempt to purchase more land. This inability may help to explain the slowness with which peasants acquired additional property once they had spent whatever savings they might have acquired under apprenticeship.¹⁴⁸

(ii) THE ECONOMIC UNDERDEVELOPMENT OF THE JAMAICAN LABOUR FORCE,
1838-1865

After Emancipation, the plantocracy was ruthless in its execution of economic power. When the effects of the passage of the Sugar Estates Act of 1846 caused planters' profit from sugar to fall

drastically, planters did their utmost to extract from the people as much income as possible via unpaid labour, fines, low wages, high rents, high taxes.¹⁴⁹

Let us consider the question of wages and rents.¹⁵⁰ Planters often forced down wages below the level they paid during apprenticeship. In the Eastern part of St. Thomas, for example, the planters of the Plantain Garden River district conspired in 1839 to pay only ten pence to one shilling and three pence per day wages after Emancipation in spite of the fact that they had paid two shillings and six pence per day in the apprenticeship period. Furthermore, they demanded a rental of seven and one half pence per day. The wage structure for labourers in Portland in that year reflected the same kind of injustice. In order to obtain a house and ground, an able-bodied man was required to pay three shillings and four pence or to give two days' labour per week to his landlord. His wife had to pay one shilling and eight pence or one day's labour, and his children had to pay two shillings or give one day's labour.

Planters indulged in other unjust practices in order to keep labourers in subjection.¹⁵¹ Some planters refused to pay any wages unless a labourer had worked a full week. Thus, if a labourer worked three days out of five he received nothing. The report of the British House of Commons select committee on West Indian colonies of 1846 reveals that in St. James, the planter, S. G. Barrett, gave work to people only on condition that they worked on his property and not elsewhere. The report also indicates that in

St. Andrew, Dr. H. S. Spaulding, a planter, exacted double rent from the tenants on his property when they did not work a full five days for the week. There is also evidence to indicate that in June, 1839, wages on some estates in the Nassau Mountains had not been paid for two months. Knibb also testified in 1842 that in Trelawny, people had not been paid for three or four months even though they had gone to court more than once in order to recover their wages from the planter.¹⁵²

The standard of living of Jamaican working people was thus being eroded by the direct reduction of wages as well as by the indirect method, ie. irregular payment and the withdrawal of a certain portion of workers' pay on flimsy grounds. As one labourer stated:

Sometimes we labour for nothing; for when Friday comes, which is our pay day, there will sure be some fault or the other found with the work, and we are obliged to go starving until the next Friday.¹⁵³

The distorted nature of Jamaican capitalism in the post-Emancipation period is obvious. Instead of being paid in money, labourers were paid partly in wages and partly in kind. Furthermore, labourers were not relieved of all means of production and subsistence. As was the case during slavery, labourers were encouraged to retain some means of subsistence. Since labour in the post-Emancipation was not completely free, it would be a misnomer to refer to the plantation system in that period as being fully capitalist.¹⁵⁴

It was this kind of system which exacerbated the underdevelopment of the Jamaican sugar industry after Emancipation.

Instead of using modern agricultural methods in the fields and up-to-date technology in the factories, most planters persisted in exploiting oppressed, semi-enslaved and, by definition, inefficient tenant workers.¹⁵⁵

At this juncture, it is worthwhile to comment on the economic decline suffered by the Jamaican sugar industry after Emancipation. What I wish to point out here, is that the decline of the industry, which was brought about by the economics of British competitive capitalism as well as by the mismanagement and semi-capitalist policies of the Jamaican plantocracy, exacerbated the unemployment of the Jamaican labourers.

Under mercantilism the price of Jamaican sugar on the British market had reached 72 shillings per cwt.¹⁵⁶ When the slave trade was abolished in 1807, the price of sugar started to fluctuate and fell to 45 shillings per cwt. in 1816. The price continued to decline after Emancipation with the result that by 1846 sugar was being sold at 33 shillings per cwt. However, in that year the Sugar Duties Act lowered the differential between free and slave-grown sugar and finally abolished this duty in 1854. Because of this Act, the price of Jamaican sugar fell to 27 shillings per cwt. in 1847 and 20 shillings in 1848.

In Jamaica, the production of sugar subsequently declined. Whereas the country had exported 743,000 cwt. in 1845, it exported only 421,000 cwt. in 1853.¹⁵⁷ Many sources of credit also disappeared. Many planters had little choice but to abandon their estates. Between 1836 and 1852 some 243 estates were abandoned.

Some were sold through the Incumbered Estates Court, others were turned into cattle pens while the rest were completely neglected.¹⁵⁸

The effect of this decline in sugar production on the Jamaica labour force was disastrous. Reports of people wandering all over Jamaica in search of work were common.¹⁵⁹ Furthermore, since sugar production was seasonal work, after May there was very little possibility of finding agricultural work on plantations. The difficulties in finding work were compounded by the fact that newly-arrived indentured labourers from India and China were competing with Jamaicans for work. Some planters used children "picanniny gangs" for certain aspects of plantation work, a fact which increased the unemployment situation for adults.¹⁶⁰

The slump in the sugar industry affected employment in the urban areas of Jamaica. Tradesmen such as shoemakers, bricklayers, bakers, and carpenters were, in many cases, unable to find work. Unemployment among women working as domestics also increased.¹⁶¹

When one considers that between Emancipation and 1865, about 300 sugar estates had been closed and that during this same period the population had increased from 350,000 to 450,000, it is possible to comprehend the problems in employment faced by working class Jamaicans.¹⁶²

The increases in prices which took place during this period added to the economic burdens of the workers. Local as well as imported goods were increased in price, primarily through taxes imposed by the Jamaican state. In many places clothing increased in

price by fifty per cent. Food prices also increased dramatically. Basic items in labourers' diet such as saltfish, cornmeal, and flour were affected. The price of ground provisions also increased. The poor quality of the soil, the floods of 1864, and the severe drought of 1865 meant that peasants' productive capacity declined with the result that local produce could only be partially used as a substitute for the heavily taxed imported goods.¹⁶³

(iii) STATE REPRESSION

After Emancipation, the Jamaican colonial state was used as an instrument of the ruling class to repress the mass of the people and to circumscribe their development. The state consisted of the judiciary, the militia/police system, the English governor representing the British crown, his personally appointed Privy Council, and the Legislative Assembly which served as a consultative body of the governor. As was the case during slavery, the planters dominated the Assembly, the judiciary, and the Vestry--the body which administered local affairs. This state of affairs existed until 1865.¹⁶⁴

One of the fundamental ways in which the state limited the political development of Jamaican workers was by constantly denying them the franchise. The Franchise Act of 1840, for example, decreed that prospective voters had to own land valued at a minimum of £6, pay or receive rent on real estate valued at £30; or pay £3 in direct taxes.¹⁶⁵ Later, the restrictive nature of the franchise was further increased. In 1841, the state required evidence of

complying with the above rules and in 1852 a "hereditament" tax of 12 shillings was introduced. According to a new electoral law which was passed in 1858, each registered voter had to pay a stamp duty of 10 shillings. Although this law was modified in 1865 so that the stamp duty applied only in certain cases, this duty did not apply to the voter hoping to qualify under the £6 real estate provision unless he paid 20 shillings in taxes before the 30th September. Because so few people were able to meet the qualifications for franchise, only 1,457 people out of approximately 450,000 voted in the election of 1863.¹⁶⁶

The mass of the people was also effectively barred from running as candidates in the Legislative Assembly because of the high property qualifications which were required. In 1840, in order to become a candidate for the Assembly, one had to have £180 income from land, or £1800 worth of real estate, or £3000 in personal and real property. The executive branch of the state--the governor--showed little interest in ameliorating the lot of the masses and in fact appeared to have been more concerned in gaining more power for itself vis à vis the planter-controlled Assembly.¹⁶⁷

When one considers the control of finance, and the powerful legislative and executive functions carried out by the Assembly, it is not difficult to see that the mass of people was being denied the right to decide its own destiny. Since the people did not have the franchise, they had no right to elect representatives to the Vestry. The result was that even in matters such as the control of the local

constabulary and the imposition of taxes, the great majority of the people did not have a voice.¹⁶⁸

In fact, the question of taxes requires further comment. Since planters controlled both the central and local government, they were able to place the burden of taxation on the mass of the people. Many of the basic necessities were taxed. For example, the tax on clothes increased between 1840 and 1862 from 20 shillings per £100 of value to 120 shillings per £100.¹⁶⁹ The tax on salt fish, a staple, was increased from 9 pence to 3 shillings and 9 pence per 200 lbs. Taxes on other food items such as mackerel and herring were also increased. Taxes were also increased on donkeys and horses. Boats and canoes which had been tax free in 1840 were assessed a tax of 20 shillings in 1865. Carts, other than those used for plantation purposes, were taxed at 13 shillings each, annually.

The unfair nature of the tax burden can be seen from the fact that taxes on items required by planters were light, if in fact they existed at all. Thus, although supplies required for plantations carried a tax of 20 shillings per £100 value in 1840, by 1865 this tax had disappeared.¹⁷⁰ Taxes on wood and imported lumber were reduced from 25 shillings to 12 shillings per 1,000 square feet between 1840 and 1865. Taxes on rice, a food then consumed only by the more prosperous Jamaicans, was reduced by fourteen per cent between 1840 and 1865. Furthermore, under the Main Road Law, most of the taxes for road repairs were used to fix roads leading to estates and great houses; the parochial roads over

which the peasants and labourers walked were rarely repaired. As one commentator points out, "when there is no sugar estate near, the roads are almost given up so that carts can scarcely pass, and are often broken. The bridges are in such a bad state that horses and saddles have been lost by falling through."¹⁷¹

Another aspect of state repression during the period under consideration was the oppressive judicial system which worked against poor people. The judicial system was dominated by planter-attorneys. The example of the parish of St. Thomas where 24 of the 28 Justices of the Peace were either proprietors, attorneys, estate managers or lessees is indicative of a widespread practice.¹⁷² In this particular case, the other Justices of the Peace were two shopkeepers, the clerk of the vestry, and the collector of dues--positions which the average Jamaican could not hold. The picture of the judicial power of planters was basically the same in the rest of the country.

There is overwhelming evidence to suggest that justice was meted out harshly to defendants, the great majority of whom were labourers involved in cases where the plaintiffs were planters. Thus, the judiciary played an important role in the state repression of the mass of Jamaicans during this period.¹⁷³

The economic and social repression of Jamaicans plus the poverty and general social disarray combined to produce profound tension within the society. Petitions from the people to Governor Eyre were generally ignored. It is not surprising, then, that the people revolted. In October 1865, an uprising took place in St.

Thomas.¹⁷⁴ People were protesting the administration of justice. The demonstration caused a riot during which twenty-one people were killed. Governor Eyre interpreted this protest as a rebellion against British rule and savagely suppressed it. The result was that 439 Jamaicans were killed, 600 flogged, including women, and 1,000 homes were destroyed.¹⁷⁵

When the Legislative Assembly met a month later, Eyre persuaded it to abandon the old representative system and to accept direct rule by the Crown. This act restricted the political development of Jamaicans and underlined the inability of the ruling class to come to grips with the socio-economic and political ramifications of Emancipation.

THE TRANSITION TO MONOPOLY CAPITALISM IN BRITAIN

An analysis of Jamaican society in the period 1866-1944 requires a brief examination of some of the profound changes which capitalism was undergoing during these years in Britain.

The transition from competitive to monopoly capitalism was the most important change. This transition arose from the dynamics of competitive capitalism itself as well as from the slow economic growth which characterized metropolitan countries during the 1870s.¹⁷⁶ "Those who survive capitalist rivalry do so by absorbing or by destroying the lesser firms...they are best able to respond effectively to technology, and are best able to survive intermittent blasts of depression."¹⁷⁷

Monopoly capitalism was marked by concentration of capital, centralization of production, and the vertical integration of the production process within firms. Initially, corporations were dominated by finance capital. The tremendous capital assets controlled by banks such as Morgan and Rockefeller were indicative of this trend. However, as industrial corporations accumulated greater capital, they were able to promote their commercial ventures without reliance on finance capital.¹⁷⁸

Industrialists endeavoured by various means to prevent competition from smaller firms and to maintain or increase their profit levels. They utilized price fixing, mergers, trust formation, and market allocation. Such devices resulted in increased centralization of production and concentration of capital.¹⁷⁹ It was during this period that the huge multinationals such as United Fruit Company, Alcoa, and Tate and Lyle, which were to play such an exploitative role in the Jamaican economy, emerged.

Under monopoly capitalism, trade was replaced by foreign capital investment as the principal form of imperialism. Much greater profit was to be made for the giant monopolies in underdeveloped countries where there was an abundance of cheap labour rather than in metropolitan countries. Metropolitan states fully supported the commercial ventures of giant corporations in exploiting the resources of underdeveloped countries. Many such countries were incorporated into the British Empire or into the spheres of influence of other metropolitan countries.¹⁸⁰

Under monopoly capitalism, protectionism became a basic policy of Britain as it had been during the mercantile era. Industrialists in Britain wanted protection against competition from American and German products and technology. The dominions and dependencies also favoured this policy since their products would be guaranteed a preferential market within the British Empire. The first world war resulted partly from the rivalry among metropolitan powers for economic colonies to obtain resources and markets.¹⁸¹

The impact of these changes in British capitalism in the period under consideration had important ramifications for underdevelopment in Jamaica and were manifested especially in the nature of the economy, class relations, and the role of the state.

SUGAR AND THE UNDERDEVELOPMENT OF THE JAMAICAN ECONOMY, 1866-1944

During the period 1866-1944, the Jamaican economy was characterized by dependence on the agricultural export sector. This dependence meant that the economy of the country was at the mercy of movements in the terms of trade between Jamaica and metropolitan countries which were adverse to the former.

A second feature of restricted development was the lack of sectoral balance in the growth of the economy. In other words, development became so concentrated in and dependent on the agricultural export sector, that in the non-agricultural sectors, growth did not keep a proportionate pace with increases in population. The stagnation in the manufacturing sector as well as

the low levels of capital accumulation were indicative of this trend in underdevelopment.¹⁸²

We have seen that by 1854, and with the implementation of British free trade policies, the most uneconomic sugar estates had to be abandoned. The surviving members of the plantocracy wanted to reestablish sugar once more on a firm footing as an export commodity. Such a goal, it was realized, required reorganization of the industry.

Planters understood that it would be necessary to introduce technological innovations. Thus in 1866, although there were fewer estates in cultivation, better equipment had been introduced and the plantations were better cultivated and better managed than hitherto.¹⁸³ The sugar crop of 1867-68 was the largest since the one of 1861-62. The colonial state encouraged greater investment in sugar by removing the ad valorem tax on ploughs, mills, sugar pans, steam engines and most of the other machinery required for sugar production.¹⁸⁴ The introduction of the Vacuum Pan and centrifugal apparatus in 1866 enabled estates to produce crystallized sugar and thus compete with Demerara for the United States market. Of the 224 estates producing sugar in 1880, 94 were using this new apparatus. Other technological innovations in the sugar industry included the use of multitubular boilers, steam clarifiers, Wetzel pans, and Aspinall pans.¹⁸⁵

Apart from new manufacturing techniques, planters made efforts to improve the cultivation of sugar in order to place the commodity on a firmer export basis. The use of irrigation,

artificial manure, and the introduction of numerous new varieties of new canes, beginning in 1870, improved the quality of sugar production.¹⁸⁶ Although more sugar estates had to be abandoned between 1879-80, the sugar crop of 1881 was quite large in comparison with former years.¹⁸⁷

One of the reasons for the abandonment of some estates was the fact that they could not operate at a profit in competition with beet sugar from Europe. When Britain removed the last elements of the sugar duties in 1873, all sugar entering Britain had to compete on equal terms. The result was a decline in the price of Jamaican sugar. The price of sugar which had declined in 1862 to 20 shillings per cwt. and had risen to 25 shillings and 6 pence in 1871, began to decline in 1874, and by 1883 was a mere 19 shillings per cwt.¹⁸⁸

From 1884, the sugar industry suffered two decades of decline marked by low prices on the world market and low productivity in Jamaica. Many planters refused to engage in enterprises which might compete with sugar. Schemes such as central sugar factories were proposed to restructure the sugar but were not implemented. Attempts at reciprocal trade agreement with Canada and the USA were largely unsuccessful.

The provisions of the Brussels Sugar Convention of 1903 helped to pull the Jamaica sugar industry out of its slump by assuring the industry a market in Europe.¹⁸⁹ The amalgamation of estates, the establishment of central sugar factories, and the formation of limited liability companies ensued. Peasant farmers

also started to devote some of their lands to the cultivation of sugar cane. Most estates came to depend on the cane from peasant farmers. In 1905, for example, of the 300 acres of cane cultivated in Westmoreland, 100 acres belonged to small farmers.¹⁹⁰ The trend for peasant farmers to cultivate crops for export rather than for local consumption is significant and indicates that a decline in the food production for the local market would result.

The Jamaican sugar industry was greatly aided by the effects of World War I. Since the European beet production was seriously impeded by the war there was a great demand for West Indian sugar. By 1920 the price of Jamaican sugar was 58 shillings per cwt.¹⁹¹

The fluctuations which characterized the sugar industry continued in the late 1920s and 1930s. Thus, once peace was established in Europe after the first World War, the beet sugar market recovered, and in the late 1920s once more provided competition for West Indian sugar. The Jamaican sugar industry was able to survive by assistance from Britain and by international agreements to limit the output of sugar on the world market.¹⁹² In 1919, Britain gave a guaranteed market to sugar producing countries within the British Empire. At the Empire Conference in 1930, an agreement was reached according to which mutual preferences were to be granted to all members of the Empire. Although Jamaican sugar was guaranteed a market, Jamaica was obliged to purchase highly priced food and manufactured goods from Britain, Australia, and Canada, an action which helped to negate efforts at local production.¹⁹³

From the late 1930s to the 1940s, the Jamaican sugar industry was marked by the entrepreneurial ventures of the giant metropolitan monopolies. Let us recall that in 1891 only three sugar estates in Jamaica were owned by companies and that these companies had shortly after gone into banana production.¹⁹⁴ Let us also recall that although there were a few limited liability companies owning estates in the early twentieth century, these estates were still largely individually owned with capital and entrepreneurship supplied not by foreign capitalists but by local merchants. Nevertheless, the amalgamation of estates and the establishment of central sugar factories which took place in the 1920s and 1930s were indicative of the trend toward centralization of production. Thus, whereas the size of the average sugar estate was 368 acres in 1920, it was 661 acres in 1930.¹⁹⁵ In 1937 the giant British corporation Tate and Lyle started to buy up vast acres of sugar land in the parishes of Westmoreland and Clarendon under the subsidiary company, West Indies Sugar Company (WISCO) which was based in Jamaica.¹⁹⁶

The agricultural export sector of the Jamaican economy included not only sugar but also bananas. The production of bananas was initiated by peasants after Emancipation. Later merchant-planters, realizing the profitability of this commodity on the world market and the declining demand for sugar, engaged in the cultivation of bananas. Bananas were first exported in 1869. There was such a demand for them on the world market that by 1890 they replaced sugar as the leading export crop.¹⁹⁷ In 1930, 57 per cent

of all domestic export was bananas. Nevertheless, banana production collapsed in the 1940s because of a disease which destroyed the plants and because of the Second World War which depressed the world market.¹⁹⁸

From the foregoing account of the nature of the agricultural export sector of the Jamaican economy during 1866-1944, it is not difficult to see the extent to which the Jamaican economy depended on the export sector. Yet fluctuations on the world market for sugar and bananas often played havoc with the Jamaican economy. Metropolitan economic forces were, therefore, the primary agent in the underdevelopment of the Jamaican economy during this period.

Let us examine a second feature of the Jamaican economy during the period under review--the lack of sectoral growth. Although from 1890 to 1910 there were factories engaged in the production of commodities such as tobacco, matches, and beer, and although there was some growth in these and other industries, their growth rate failed to keep pace with increases in the labour force of the country.¹⁹⁹ Between 1870 and 1930, for example, the average annual growth rate of the Jamaican population was only 1.2 per cent. Nevertheless, neither the manufacturing nor the agricultural sectors were able to accommodate the increased labour force.²⁰⁰ In the manufacturing sector, there were not enough factories and those which existed were not labour-intensive enough to absorb the population growth. In the agricultural sector, the decline of sugar and the growth of banana production did not absorb the increased

labour force since banana production, unlike sugar, is not a labour-intensive activity.

When the proportion of Jamaican workers engaged in agricultural work fell from 67 per cent in 1880 to 54 per cent in 1930, this was a clear indication that unemployment was growing among the Jamaican labour force.²⁰¹ The lack of growth in the numbers of skilled craftsmen such as artisans is another indication of the stagnation of the economy. The only category of workers which indicates significant growth in the period under review was that of petty traders and domestic servants. Between 1861 and 1921 this category of workers increased from 10 to 18 per cent of the labour force. In 1943, they represented 16 per cent of the labour force.²⁰² Since monopoly capitalist corporate plantations supplied most of their own resources, the provision of goods and services to the plantation was retarded. The rise in the number of petty traders and domestic workers seems to indicate the declining labour requirements of the plantation.

CLASS RELATIONS

The transition from competitive to monopoly capitalism in Britain influenced Jamaican class relations in several ways. By the early 1900s the sugar industry was starting to recover from almost two decades of slump. The reorganization required by the industry to enable it to be successful in export engendered changes in Jamaica's class relations. First of all, since many estates were eliminated in this process of reorganization, the surviving members

of the plantocracy, by utilizing modern technology, free labour, and scarce capital, were able to consolidate themselves into a capitalist class.²⁰³ Secondly, the Jamaican capitalist class consisted not only of former members of the plantocracy but also members of the merchant class who, from the early 1840s, had started to invest in agriculture. This movement of merchant capital into agriculture stemmed from the increased demand for the circulation of commodities,²⁰⁴ once the self-sufficient estates had been abandoned. What is important to note here is that the Jamaican capitalist class "had not consolidated itself as a national phenomenon but, as an instance of British and to a lesser extent North American capitalism, involving the participation of the Jamaicans".²⁰⁵ Therefore, the nature of class relations in Jamaica was, to a considerable extent, a reflection of the dynamics of world capitalism.

Table 2.4

WISCO Expenditure in Jamaica, 1936-39

Expenses	Sugar Estates	
	Frome (Westmoreland)	Monymusk (Vere)
Land	80,144	96,493
Dwellings	118,453	41,550
Original Factories	138,095	112,407
Special Expenditure	345,020	-
Transport System	134,261	56,247
Other Items	79,174	49,997
Total	895,147	356,694

Source: Records of the Accounting Department, Kingston, WISCO, 1940.

Table 2.4 provides some idea of the early financial investment of Tate and Lyle in Jamaica. By the end of 1939, Tate and Lyle had

spent £895,147 on the Frome sugar estate and £356,694 on the Monymusk estate. The expenditure entitled "original factories" was the sum used to purchase and amalgamate some local sugar estates.

As I mentioned previously, foreign capital channelled from Tate and Lyle through WISCO was instrumental in the reorganization of the Jamaican sugar industry in the late 1930s. The influence of foreign capital was also felt in the banana industry. In this case, the capital and organization of the export trade was provided by the United Fruit Company. Many old, abandoned sugar estates were purchased and used for the cultivation of bananas.

Initially, the production of bananas was made by the peasantry and the rapid rise of the commodity as an export crop accentuated certain differences among the ranks of the peasantry. "As early as the 1850s differentiation was appearing among the peasants, based on the distinction between those who specialized in export crops...and those who grew food crops purely for local use."²⁰⁶

This stratification among the peasantry constitutes another aspect of Jamaican class relations during 1866-1938. The rural class structure became marked by a distinction among rich, middle, and poor peasants. During the slump in the sugar industry, particularly in 1890, peasants with less than twenty acres produced 39 per cent of cash crops and 75 per cent of all agricultural production.²⁰⁷ Nevertheless, the forces of production of the peasantry manifested certain weaknesses as peasants of all strata competed with the capitalist farmers in the production of goods for

the world market. To compete successfully, peasants had to develop their forces of production. However, their productive structure itself was an obstacle. The poor and middle peasants gradually increased in numbers after the turn of the century. They utilized a non-capitalist form of production which depended largely on family labour. However, the important marketing of peasant produce for exports was controlled by the capitalists. Thus capitalist relations dominated Jamaican agriculture at the higher levels of production and in the import-export mode of exchange. Nevertheless, it was an uneven structure based upon two unevenly developed and combined structures of production rather than one.²⁰⁸

Class relations in Jamaica between 1866 and 1944 produced conflicts of various kinds. The conflict over the question of land was of major importance. With the growth and importance of the banana industry, the peasantry found itself in a struggle for land with foreign capitalists as well as the consolidated Jamaican capitalist class. The colonial state sided with the big capitalists to ensure the continued profits of the latter and the existence of a surplus of free labour.²⁰⁹ Thus, in 1867, the Lands Department of the Crown Colony was created to repossess land held by squatters. By 1912 more than 240,000 acres of land had reverted to the Crown.²¹⁰ Therefore, even after the Jamaican capitalist class had consolidated itself towards the turn of the century, it was not sufficiently developed to utilize anything like the whole of the free labour which was being created by the pressures on peasant agriculture. Many landless peasants were therefore forced to work

as wage labourers.²¹¹ Some sold their labour power abroad by migrating to Panama to help to dig the canal or by migrating to Costa Rica to help to build the railroad. Others went to work in Cuba.²¹²

Nevertheless, migration did little to ease the chronic unemployment and underemployment which characterized Jamaica in the 1920s and 1930s. The effect of the depression being experienced in the western world exacerbated the situation in Jamaica. At this time the proletariat included not only workers in plantation but also workers on the docks, in transportation, and clerical and domestic workers.²¹³ The ranks of the lumpenproletariat also swelled. There were two possible reasons for this increase. First of all, between 1921 and 1936 the population of Kingston increased by about 73 per cent. That of St. Andrew, a suburb of Kingston, increased by 135 per cent.²¹⁴ When one considers that Jamaica's total population only grew by forty-four per cent during that period, and that the labour-absorptive capacity of places like Kingston was declining, it is not difficult to see that the lumpen elements in the population would grow.

One must also note that, between 1929 and 1934, the real value of exports declined.²¹⁵ Since production for the domestic market failed to expand sufficiently during this period, real income per capita also fell. The growth in the ranks of lumpen elements and of the unemployed also took place, because, although real income per capita recovered after 1935, Panama and Cuba were closed as outlets for migration.

THE STATE

Under Crown Colony government, minor social reforms were made by the state. Thus, there were slight improvements in the educational system, minor expansion in peasant proprietorship in 1930, and modifications in the legal and municipal system. Nevertheless, the fact remained that the mass of Jamaicans had no say in how they were governed. First, let us examine some of the elements in the political struggle which culminated in the constitutional change of 1944.

Between 1866 and 1944, the political struggle in Jamaica became more broadly based than hitherto. On the one hand, there were the capitalist planters and the colonial state. On the other hand were the peasantry, elements of the mulatto petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat. We have seen that the alliance between the capitalists and the state had thwarted the development of the peasantry by expropriating their land. Nevertheless, the peasantry had grown in importance, primarily because of the production of bananas to the point where in 1930, 41 per cent of all exports came from peasant production.²¹⁶

In order to understand the change in alliance of the members of mulatto petty bourgeoisie, we must remember that under the Crown Colony government they, like the peasants and the proletariat, had been effectively barred from the franchise since it was extended only to men of substantial poverty. Therefore, although many members of the mulatto petty bourgeoisie were successful farmers,

shop-keepers, and Civil Servants, their lack of franchise made them side against the ruling class.²¹⁷

Another important element in the people's struggle was the race/class configuration which had been established since the era of slavery. Under Crown Colony government the oppressors were still white and the oppressed were overwhelmingly black. The class struggle was therefore also a race struggle. Black pride was stimulated by the activities of Marcus Garvey and his followers, the racial doctrines preached by the growing Rastafarian movement, and the Ethiopian resistance to Italian aggression in the 1930s.²¹⁸

In 1938, the working class was unable to tolerate any longer the economic, political, and social inequities under which it was being oppressed by the colonial representatives of British imperialism. The working class was primarily an agro-proletariat. Since the 1930s, manufacturing, and hence the industrial proletariat, was virtually insignificant. A series of demonstrations, confrontations and disturbances, spearheaded by the proletariat, spread throughout the island in 1938.²¹⁹

Table 2.5

Proportion of Labourers Employed by
Various Industries in Jamaica, 1938

Industry	Number	Per Cent
Agriculture	141,000	61
Stevedores	6,000	3
Road and Construction	29,000	13
Misc. and Unemployed	55,000	23

Source: Report of Labour Conditions in the West Indies. London: HMSO, 1939, p.98.

Table 2.5 shows the proportion of workers employed by various industries in 1938. The majority of workers, 61 per cent, were employed in the agricultural sector. Stevedores comprised only 3 per cent, while road and construction labourers accounted for 13 per cent. The remaining 23 per cent were employed in miscellaneous categories or were unemployed.

Nevertheless, the rebellions of 1938 did not become a revolutionary movement. The primary reason was the fact that leadership of the struggle which had been initiated by the working class with the support of the peasantry, soon passed into the hands of the petty bourgeoisie. The colonial authorities found this class to be more acceptable, and more "able" to assume national, political responsibility than the angry black masses.²²⁰ Whereas African-Jamaicans appeared to be intent on removing the whole oppressive social apparatus, the mulatto petty bourgeoisie had a vested interest in maintaining many elements in the status quo.

To be sure they demanded political rights for everybody but their real interests were in securing a share of political power for themselves. At the same time they shared with the ruling class the fear of total and complete destruction of the social order, in which they too had an important stake.²²¹

Table 2.6 indicates the racial composition of Jamaica and the percentage of Jamaicans who earned more than 100 shillings per week in 1943. Whereas 92.8 per cent of the white population, 1.4 per cent of the coloureds and 5.0 per cent of Chinese earned more than one hundred shillings per week, only .5 per cent of East Indians and .3 per cent of blacks earned this kind of wage. The enormity of the disparity between blacks and whites is accentuated

by the fact that the whites accounted for only 1.1 per cent of the population while 78.3 per cent of Jamaicans were black.

Table 2.6

Racial Composition of Jamaica and Wage Earnings
According to Race, 1943

	<u>Black</u>	<u>Coloured</u>	<u>White</u>	<u>Chinese</u>	<u>East</u> <u>Indian</u>
Racial Composition	78.3	17.5	1.1	1.0	2.1
Per cent earning more than 100 shillings per week	.3	1.4	92.8	5.0	.5

Source: Census of Jamaica, 1943.

When the new system of Adult Suffrage was granted in 1944, political leadership remained firmly in the hands of the mulatto petty bourgeoisie. Both political leaders, Norman Manley of the People's National Party (PNP), and Alexander Bustamante of the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), were members of this class.²²² After an initial flirtation with Marxist theory, the PNP quickly accepted the capitalist ethic of the JLP. Neither party wanted to alienate international capital by unfriendly economic and political posturing. The Jamaican economy was still firmly tied to monopoly capitalism and Jamaica's development would continue to reflect the interest of metropolitan policies.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has been an attempt to demonstrate that the underdevelopment that plagued Jamaica in the post-war period had its

origin in the earlier colonial period and resulted primarily from the economic policies emanating from the metropolis. These policies, furthermore, were a reflection of the stages through which capitalism passed: mercantilism, competitive capitalism, and monopoly capitalism.

At each stage in the development of capitalism, Jamaica's productive forces became structured to conform to the changes in the metropole. The institutional arrangements within the periphery also reflected the dialectic of colonial society. The economic weakness, political powerlessness, and social disarray in Jamaica were therefore primarily the results of the dynamics of metropolitan capitalist developments.

The asymmetrical and dependent development which arose from the imposition of the sugar plantation in Jamaica as well as the pattern of dominance imposed by the metropolitan capitalists constitute the basic ingredients in Jamaica's underdevelopment during 1655-1944.

FOOTNOTES

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CHAPTER THREE

THE POST-WAR JAMAICAN SUGAR INDUSTRY

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will be devoted to an analysis of the extent to which various sectors of the Jamaican economy were underdeveloped by the operation of foreign capital in the sugar industry during the post-war period. Since underdevelopment constitutes a concrete expression of the structural constraints imposed on the Jamaican economy by capitalist, metropolitan interests, it is necessary to analyze the phenomenon at the different levels at which it manifested itself in the country's productive forces.

One of the most significant effects of the penetration of foreign capital in the Jamaican sugar industry was the fact that African-Jamaicans, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the population of the country, were excluded from effective, economic, decision-making and policy formulation. Such a situation arose because the sugar industry was controlled by foreign entrepreneurs or settler investors and their families. This class thus owned the means of production and the dominance which it exercised may be seen in the structure and organization of the sugar industry. It was the Sugar Manufacturers' Association (SMA), an elite body of expatriates

and ethnic Jamaicans, which directed the marketing of Jamaican sugar and which played the most powerful role in the industry as a whole.

The second aspect of underdevelopment stems from the fact that the alliance between the SMA and foreign capital resulted in considerable distortions at various levels within the Jamaican economy. Moreover, although Jamaican sugar was sold abroad through various imperial preference systems and international commodity arrangements, which were supposed to be favourable to the Jamaican economy, these schemes required the country to purchase manufactured goods from the metropolis. Such an arrangement retarded the development of indigenous manufacturing enterprises in Jamaica.

Economic dependence has been one of the most profound manifestations of this aspect of the underdevelopment of the post-war Jamaican economy. The dependence on a few developed, capitalist countries, primarily the United States, Great Britain, and Canada for Jamaican imports, markets for its products, finance, and technology, has meant that the internal dynamics of the Jamaican economy have been determined more by events taking place in the metropolis than by any independent processes within the satellite economy. Therefore, it must be emphasized that under monopoly capitalism, factors integral to the expansion of capital from the metropolis have impeded the development of the Jamaican economy.

It is, of course, a truism to state that all countries are "dependent" on others to a certain degree. However, what determines whether this is a healthy interdependence is the degree to which the particular country has the internal capacity to adjust to changing

external conditions. "A truly interdependent economy is not one which has no ties with the outside world, but rather one which can constantly take advantage of developments within the world economy and not remain a passive agent buffeted about by external developments."¹

An additional example of underdevelopment may be seen in the fact that the alliance between foreign investors and the Jamaican state resulted in a serious distortion of public policy in certain sectors of the Jamaican economy. The paucity of backward and forward linkages between the sugar industry and the rest of the economy provides further evidence of Jamaica's asymmetrical economic development.

FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND AFRICAN-JAMAICAN EXCLUSION

In order to understand the dynamics of the exclusion of African-Jamaicans from meaningful economic participation in the operation of the sugar industry and the marketing of its products, it is necessary to examine the nature and scope of foreign ownership and control which existed in the industry during the period under review. My basic argument is that whether the foreign investment was that of the multinational corporation (MNC) or the settler investor, the fact that African-Jamaicans were excluded from important management roles in the sugar industry, constituted, for Jamaica, a form of underdevelopment.

Table 3.1

Sugar Cane Factories in Jamaica, 1945-1970

Parish	1945	1966	1970
St. Andrew	-	-	-
St. Thomas	2	2	2
St. Mary	1	1	1
Portland	-	-	-
St. Ann	2	1	-
Trelawny	4	2	2
St. James	3	1	-
Hanover	1	-	-
Westmoreland	2	1	1
St. Elizabeth	3	2	2
Clarendon	3	3	3
St. Catherine	5	5	4
Total	26	18	15

Source: Sugar Research Department, Annual Report. Kingston, Jamaica, 1971, p.23.

Table 3.2

Acreage and Output of Cane and Sugar, 1952-1970

	1952	1956	1960	1964	1968	1970
Acreage	106.5	113.6	137.9	151.6	153.2	152.3
Reaped (000)						
Cane Milled (000 tons)	2,469	3,220	4,326	4,643	4,399	4,040
Sugar Produced (000 tons)	265.9	356.3	418.3	474.3	455.8	389.0

Source: Sugar Manufacturers' Association, Annual Reports; Cane Farmers Association, Annual Reports, Jamaica.

Certain changes which took place in the sugar industry during the post-war years require brief mention. First of all, as Table 3.1 shows, amalgamation and rationalization had reduced the number of sugar estates from twenty-six in 1945 to fifteen by 1970. This kind of change, however, took place as sugar production

steadily increased. As one can see from Table 3.2, the amount of sugar cane reaped rose from 106.5 thousand acres in 1952 to 152.3 thousand acres in 1970. The amount of cane that was milled went from 2,469 tons in 1952 to 4,040 tons in 1970 and the amount of sugar produced increased from 265.9 thousand tons in 1952 to 389 thousand tons in 1970.

The most prominent kind of foreign direct investment in the sugar industry during the period under consideration was that of the multinational corporation and the most dominant producer among the MNCs was the West Indies Sugar Company (WISCO), a subsidiary of the Tate and Lyle group of companies which was registered in the United Kingdom.²

Table 3.3

Properties Acquired by WISCO to form
the Present Monymusk Estate in Vere in 1937

Property	Acreage	Evaluation
Amity Hall	980	11,000
Beacham-Beuachamps	1,833	11,800
Chesterfield & Suttons	2,622	11,699
Hillside	5,422	15,500
Monymusk Farm	8,170	3,100
Morelands	10,909	25,000
Pusey Hall-Salt Savannah	3,989	15,500
Springfield	2,550	19,000
TOTAL	36,475	112,500

Source: Collector General List of Properties, Jamaica, 1937.

It was as early as 1937 that Tate and Lyle made its first commercial venture into Jamaica by buying up a number of sugar estates in the fertile Vere Plain of the parish of Clarendon. Table 3.3 indicates the extent of some of the acreage obtained by this

corporation. These areas were amalgamated to form the Monymusk estate. The programme of expansion initiated by Tate and Lyle in the 1940s continued during the next two decades. The result was that by 1970, WISCO's factory capacity amounted to 33 per cent of the total in the entire country. The company owned 36 per cent of the total estate area and 41 per cent of all the estate acreage under cane. In addition, the bulk-loading and refining facilities in the island were owned by WISCO.³

British investors, therefore, occupied a prominent position in the Jamaica sugar industry. Table 3.4 provides some indication of the extent of British investment in Jamaica up to the end of 1967. Investment was heavily weighted in favour of agriculture. Of

Table 3.4

Stock of Direct Private Investment by Britain
in Jamaica. End 1967 (US \$ million)

Petroleum	2.0
Marketing	2.0
Agriculture	39.6
Manufacturing	7.2
Trade	4.3
Public Utilities	4.0
Transport	6.1
Banking	1.0
Tourism	5.0
Other	1.6
<u>Total</u>	<u>72.8</u>

Source: Development Assistance Directorate, Stock of Private Direct Investment by Member Countries of the Development Assistance Committee in Developing Countries. End -1967. Paris: OECD, 1972, pp. 68-80.

the \$72.8 million invested in the country, \$39.6 million was devoted to agriculture. Large sugar plantations accounted for most of this sum. However, it is necessary to look beyond Jamaica to understand

fully the wide range and the character of the Tate and Lyle operations. Such an examination is essential in order to understand how Jamaica fits within this vertically integrated multinational corporation. Tate and Lyle is the largest corporation in the world in the field of sugar production and refining. Its holdings in sugar cane cultivation and manufacturing include not only WISCO in Jamaica, but Caroni Ltd. in Trinidad, Chirundi Sugar Estates Ltd., in Zimbabwe, The Zambia Sugar Company Ltd., Belize Sugar Industries Ltd., Plantations Ltd., and the Colonial Agricultural Development Company Ltd in British Honduras. Tate and Lyle has a monopoly control of sugar refining in Britain where it owns a number of refineries. It also has majority shares in refineries in Canada, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Nigeria, Belgium, and France. In the field of the purchase, transport, storage and distribution of molasses, Tate and Lyle has worldwide holdings which include companies in the USA, Canada, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad, Mozambique, South Africa, Holland, Mexico, Belgium, India, Indonesia, Switzerland, Mauritius, and Zaire.

In addition, the corporation runs and operates road haulage equipment in Britain, and possesses a fleet of ships for the bulk transportation of sugar and molasses. The corporation also owns other companies which engage in a wide variety of commercial undertakings. The vast holdings of Tate and Lyle emphasize the tremendous economic power which this corporation is able to wield in its commercial dealings with the underdeveloped countries.⁴

Another multinational corporation operating in Jamaica during the post-war period was United Fruit Company which owned Jamaica Sugar estates Ltd. and Bernard Lodge Company. The factory capacity of these two estates was 34,800 tons of cane per week. Although this capacity was less than half that of WISCO, it still represented the second largest MNC operating in the country. United Fruit Company possesses vast holdings in sugar cane, bananas, and various other tropical products in many countries in the Caribbean and Latin America. Jamaica, Trinidad, Nicaragua, Mexico, Ecuador, Columbia, Costa Rico, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, and Brazil are some of the countries in which their plantation activities take place. Their investment include not only the cultivation of tropical products but also livestock, railways, tramways, wharves, boats and steamships.⁵

Even when joint ventures existed between Jamaican companies and MNCs, the latter owned the majority of the shares and thus kept effective control of the operation. The case of Booker McConnell Ltd., provides a good example. By 1969 this corporation owned the majority of the aggregate capital in Innswood Estate Ltd. The total factory capacity of these three estates was about 30,000 tons per week. The Booker McConnell corporation, like the two MNCs previously described, possessed extensive holdings. Apart from its estates in Jamaica, it has sugar manufacturing subsidiaries in Guyana, Trinidad, Zambia, Canada, and Britain. It is vertically integrated and owns operations engaged in ocean and coastal shipping, trawling, warehousing, and stevedoring. Its engineering

firms manufacture sugar machinery, mining equipment, and hydraulic presses and pumps. In addition, Booker McConnell engages in the wholesale and retail distribution of sugar and related products.⁶

Other large foreign companies involved in the post-war Jamaican sugar industry included Trelawny Estate Ltd. The estate represented by this company, like the others we have cited before, was formed from the amalgamation of several smaller estates. This process which had been taking place from as early as 1921 under the direction of the Scottish owner, the firm of Sheriff and Co., was accelerated in 1953 when the Canadian firm, Seagrams Ltd., purchased the property. The factory capacity of the estate was 13,700 tons of cane per week.⁷ The eight estates to which I have alluded so far were dominated by foreign ownership and control. These estates occupied 69 per cent of the total estate land in the country and accounted for 76 per cent of the total estate acreage devoted to the production of sugar cane.⁸

Settler investors also kept the ownership and control of their plantations and factories strictly to themselves. African-Jamaicans were excluded. Let us illustrate this assertion by referring firstly to the family-owned kind of plantation. Worthy Park Estate provides a useful example. This estate has been in the possession of the Clarke family since the early twentieth century. The patriarch of this family was Henry Clarke, an Englishman, who migrated to Jamaica in 1846 at the age of 18. Fred Clarke, one of his five sons, purchased Worthy Park in 1918 from another expatriate owner J. V. Calder. On the death of Fred Clarke in 1932, the

ownership of the estate passed to the four remaining sons of Henry Clarke. The ownership and top management of Worthy Park Estate remained firmly entrenched in the hands of Anglo-Jamaicans. This situation which did not change in 1949 when the family partnership was transformed into a limited liability company, continued without modification until 1970.⁹

The marketing of Worthy Park sugar was also controlled either by expatriates or by foreigners. In the 1920s and 1930s, the firm of Lascelles de Mercado served as agents. From 1934, the British firm of Hankeys performed this role. Later, the Sugar Manufacturers Association was appointed by the state to undertake the marketing of Jamaican sugar. Thus, African-Jamaicans, who comprise more than 90 per cent of the population of the country, were excluded from the management of Worthy Park and the marketing of its products.¹⁰

Indeed, the surplus derived from sugar was utilized by the owners of Worthy Park primarily to accelerate the accumulation of capital for their factory or to pay off debts to foreign-owned companies such as the Westmoreland Building Society. Since, from the very beginning, "the attitude of Worthy Park's new master to his Negro labourers was much more akin to traditional paternalism than to modern industrial relations"¹¹, it is not surprising that the economic development of sugar workers was never advanced to a great degree by the surplus obtained from sugar production.

Other family-owned plantations of settler investors included that of Hampden in the parish of St. James. It has been estimated

that this plantation has passed through the hands of nine generations of the Farquharson family, an Anglo-Jamaican family.¹²

If all the countries of the world have their dynastic families, certainly the Farquharsons comprise one of Jamaica's own family dynasties. They have made sugar in Jamaica continuously from 1672 through 1981. From their earliest settlement at Spring Vale plantation in St. Elizabeth to John Farquharson making sugar at his Hampden sugar factory in St. James today is over three hundred years of sugar.¹³

Thus, the Farquharson family of the mid-twentieth century was the direct descendants of slave owners of an earlier epoch in Jamaican history. Like the Clarke family, referred to previously, the Farquharsons did not open top management positions to African-Jamaicans. The commercial enterprises, apart from sugar, in which the family engaged were usually geared to the export market and involved other foreign investors.¹⁴

Settler investors in sugar did not limit their economic activities to family-owned plantations. They often used this base to launch other companies. The latter maintained the policy of excluding African-Jamaicans from management positions. For example, by the late 1940s, the Henriques brothers, who owned New Yarmouth Sugar Estate, were able to establish the major engineering firm catering to the sugar industry. They also developed the Jamaica Match Industry and owned The Kingston Industrial Garage, which was the only representative of the Ford Motor Company in Jamaica.¹⁵

The owners of Appleton Sugar Estate also followed a similar pattern. The estate was owned by the firm of Wray and Nephew Ltd. The largest single shareholder of Wray and Nephew was Lascelles de Mercado who held 43.7 per cent of the company's capital share. De

Mercado was also majority owner of a cement company, Western Terminals. In the late 1960s Lascelles de Mercado became partners with Guinness Overseas Ltd. in setting up a brewery in Jamaica.¹⁶

The exclusion of African-Jamaicans from management roles was quite definite. In the case of MNCs, important decisions regarding the Jamaican sugar industry were made in metropolitan head offices or by expatriate managers living in Jamaica. In the case of settler investors, it was the Anglo-Jamaican family or the ethnic, corporate executives who made the major decisions. The SMA merely represented these interests.

ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE OF THE SUGAR INDUSTRY

It is important to illustrate the power wielded by the Sugar Manufacturers' Association in order not only to demonstrate the extent to which this body dominated the Jamaican sugar industry, but also to indicate the structural constraints which was produced by this arrangement.

The SMA was formed in 1929 to prevent the various millers from competing for control of the local sugar market.¹⁷ Once the organization was formed, the proceeds of sugar produced for local consumption were distributed on a pro rata basis among producers, after a profit margin had been set. In 1935, the SMA became incorporated. Its policies were now formulated by a Board of Directors consisting of a Chairman and the representatives of the various estates.¹⁸

One of the most important roles of the SMA was the marketing of all export sugar, molasses, and distilled spirits. The proceeds from the marketing of export as well as locally consumed sugar were distributed to manufacturers and sugar cane farmers in accordance with a fixed formula.¹⁹ In addition, the SMA was responsible for supervising and controlling the production and distribution of local sugar.

It was also the SMA which recommended all quotas, export and local, annually to the Sugar Control Board, and allocated to each manufacturer his proportion of these quotas. The manufacturer's share of the export and local markets was determined by an estimate of his production expressed as a proportion of the estimated total production of the whole crop. The SMA was also able to make substitutions whenever such changes were required.²⁰

The SMA not only represented the interests of the sugar industry to the Jamaican state but was also entrusted with the job of representing Jamaica at Commonwealth and international sugar conferences. Thus, it represented Jamaica on the board of the West Indies Sugar Association (WISA), which was instituted in 1944 to "co-ordinate, promote and protect the sugar industries of the Eastern Caribbean sugar-producing islands, Jamaica and Guyana".²¹

Furthermore, the SMA was responsible for the management of industrial relations. It negotiated with the labour unions on wages and working conditions on behalf of the various sugar manufacturers.²² Its Industrial Relations Department was empowered to deal with issues that had not been resolved at the level of the

estate, between management and workers. In addition, the SMA owned and operated a Research Department, the main function of which was to improve the efficiency of sugar production in the cane fields as well as in the factories.

When one considers that the production and distribution of sugar, molasses, and distilled spirits for the local as well as the export market were rigidly controlled by the SMA, one can comprehend the extent of the dominance exercised by this body.

In contrast, other bodies within the Jamaica sugar industry either did not have the wide range of powers possessed by the SMA, or when they held extensive powers, the mechanism for their exercise was circumscribed. The Sugar Industry Control Board (SICB) furnishes a worthwhile example.

The first attempt by the Jamaican state to regulate the sugar industry was by the Sugar Industry Aid Law, enacted in 1929, which granted a subsidy of £2 per ton on export sugar.²³ The law also prescribed that a Sugar Control Board should be instituted. This board would regulate (a) the licensing of imported sugar (b) the grades, prices, and distribution of sugar for local consumption (c) the machinery for fixing quotas for export sugar.

A new Sugar Industry Control Law was passed in 1937 which refined some of the provisions of the 1929 law, and instituted a new SICB vested with wider powers. Its major goal was to distribute equitably any restriction in sugar production among sugar manufacturers themselves and among estates and cane farmers. This law decreed that no new factory could be set up without the

permission of the Government and that henceforth cane farmers had to be registered with factories in order to control the flow of cane which was delivered to the factories.²⁴ In addition, the law made provisions for fixing the price which manufacturers would pay for farmers' cane and for the appointment of arbitration authorities to mediate disputes between cane farmers and manufacturers. Furthermore, the law empowered the SICB to regulate the methods of examining or testing cane, standards of sucrose content, methods of weighing farmers' canes as well as the examination and correction of weighbridges.²⁵

However, what was remarkable, as the Sugar Industry commission (1966) discovered, was the fact that although the Sugar Industry Control Law as "a comprehensive piece of legislation, designed to assure the orderly conduct and welfare of the industry",²⁶ this potential was never realized. In other words, the SICB was prevented from fulfilling its role as intended by the legislation. In the words of the Commission of Enquiry:

Little if any attempt has been made to match these large powers with functions. Most of the powers have not been exercised nor the Board equipped to exercise them. The Board has no permanent technical staff, its establishment presently consisting of an Acting Secretary and four clerical officials. The functions of the Board have evidently been tailored to fit this meagre complement. The active functions are mainly confined to the registration of farmers, collecting and paying over to the Cane Farmers Association a cess of 6d (sixpence) per ton on cane farmers' deliveries, and since 1965 an additional cess of 4d per ton for the Association's fertilizer scheme.²⁷

Apart from checking the scales used by sugar manufacturers during crop season and settling minor disputes between cane farmers and

sugar manufacturers, the SICB performed no other roles. "All the crises and conflicts of interest which are endemic to the sugar industry (were) left to the parties to resolve between themselves."²⁸ The SICB was not allowed to adjudicate such disputes. The conclusion reached by the Sugar Commission, namely that "government was content to permit the respective parties--manufacturers and cane farmers--to settle their differences without external intervention as much as possible",²⁹ provides only part of the answer, in my view. It seems likely that the SMA, because of its alliance with the Jamaican state, was able to dissuade the latter from full implementation of the powers of the SICB. In this way, the SMA was able to dominate in disputes with the unions and cane farmers and thus coerce the latter to accept SMA's terms. Therefore, my argument is that sugar manufacturers were powerful not only because of the powers wielded by the SMA but also because of their alliance with the state and the influence which they were able to exert in other bodies within the Jamaican sugar industry.

Substantiation of this affirmation may be gleaned from the composition and function of some of the other boards in the Jamaican sugar industry. For example, the Capital Rehabilitation Board (CRB) which administered the capital rehabilitation fund was easily controlled by the SMA and its allies. The board had eight members--the Financial Secretary who was Chairman, the Chairman of the SICB, three members nominated by the SMA, two members nominated by the Cane Farmers' Association (CFA) and one member by the unions.³⁰ This arrangement ensured that the voice of the rural proletariat,

represented by the unions, and that of the peasantry, represented by the CFA, would never hold sway against the combined forces of the SMA and its allies. Thus, in matters concerning expenditure from the rehabilitation fund, the opinions of foreign investors and other elites were certain to predominate.

The operation of the Sugar Industry Labour Welfare Board provides further evidence of the kind of power that the SMA was able to exert in the formulation of the terms of reference of statutory boards within the Jamaican sugar industry.³¹ Although the funds from this Board were derived from a tax imposed on export sugar, the beneficiaries of this fund did not include cane farmers, most of whom were poor peasants. Various categories of other workers were covered. It is little wonder, then, that the CFA complained bitterly about the manner in which the funds from the Sugar Industry Labour Welfare Board were administered. It was an open secret that the SMA frequently tried, through various methods, to limit the strength and influence of the CFA. The Cane Farmers' Association asserted that although a great number of self-employed small farmers were in a worse financial situation than some estate workers, the former had no entitlement to benefit from the Board. This situation existed in spite of the fact that small farmers had contributed to the Board's fund.³²

The SMA wielded so much power within the Jamaican sugar industry that the organization and structure of the latter reflected to a great extent the dominance exerted by the former. This state of affairs is a striking example of structural underdevelopment.

The fact that the CFA, representing thousands of peasant farmers, had no say in the marketing of Jamaican sugar and the fact that the SMA was closely tied to organs of the Jamaican state such as the Ministry of Labour and National Insurance, the Ministry of Agriculture and Lands, and the Ministry of Finance, are further evidence of my assertion. The Jamaican sugar industry was therefore underdeveloped to the extent that its organization and structure were defined by the operation of foreign capitalist interest. Nevertheless, a comprehension of this aspect of underdevelopment is not complete without examining the leadership of the SMA as well as the kind of ideology supported by the Jamaican state with regard to foreign investment.

The Chairman of the SMA from 1945 until 1970 was the Englishman, Sir Robert Kirkwood.³³ It is important to observe his family ties. His father was Major John Kirkwood, former Member of the British Parliament for Southend, Essex Division. His mother was the eldest daughter of Sir Robert Park Lyle--one of the founders of Tate and Lyle. It must be remembered that this corporation was the result of the amalgamation of two family refining firms which united "to cease competing and to fight the foreigner by forming the biggest sugar company of the day".³⁴

Robert Kirkwood joined Tate and Lyle in 1922 at the age of eighteen. His acquisition of power and influence in Britain rapidly grew. Between 1929 and 1936, he was managing director of United Sugar Company. He was also director of Yorks Sugar Company from

1932 to 1936, and Central Sugar Company from 1929 to 1936. In 1935, Kirkwood became a member of the board of Tate and Lyle.³⁵

Kirkwood's direct involvement in the Jamaica sugar industry started in 1937 when he was appointed managing director of the West Indies Sugar Company, Jamaica. At the same time he was also made director of Caroni Ltd., Trinidad. Kirkwood represented Jamaica on the Colonial Sugar Committee of 1937 and represented the West Indies at international sugar conferences during most of the post-war period. Such was the power of Kirkwood that he was Chairman of the West Indies Sugar Association for more than a decade, and between 1944 and 1960, he was Chairman of the Citrus Growers' Association of Jamaica. Between 1942 and 1962, he was also a member of the Legislative Council of Jamaica. Kirkwood's international prestige may also be seen from the fact that from 1956 to 1966, he was president of the Sugar Club of New York and in 1966 he was elected chairman of the International Sugar Council.³⁶

Kirkwood's local and international power and prestige caused him to be regarded with awe by Jamaican government and the officials of the sugar industry. What should be emphasized, however, is that this man, who had the most influential weight in the most important decisions regarding the operation of the Jamaican sugar industry, was also inextricably linked to foreign capital.

Nevertheless, the structural underdevelopment of the sugar industry was also abetted by the kind of ideology espoused by the Jamaican state with regard to foreign investment. The post-war capitalist economic policies in Jamaica sprang from the application

of conventional economic thought regarding the relationship which should exist between the economy of the metropolis and that of the periphery. The notion that self-sustaining economic development in satellite economies could be best assured by the rapid infusion of foreign capital was widely held.³⁷ In the Caribbean, economists such as W. Arthur Lewis and C.J. Burgess popularized the concept of "industrialization by invitation" based on the so-called "Puerto Rican model" of development.³⁸ Nevertheless, although the tenets of this model were based primarily on the manufacturing sector of the economy, their application became widely accepted in all sectors of the economy, and gave rise to the kind of disequilibrium which we have seen in the organization and structure of the sugar industry.³⁹

FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND PROFITABILITY

Foreign ownership and control of the Jamaican sugar industry restricted the development of the post-war economy of the country at various levels. The allocation of capital and credit to foreign companies provides a useful example of this phenomenon.

It is my basic contention that the plantation sugar sector was able to secure a very large share of its working capital from Jamaican banks in preference to other customers, primarily the local peasantry.⁴⁰ The commercial banking system has, indeed, been often criticized, and justly so, for not paying enough attention to the development of locally oriented sectors of the country and for concentration on the traditional large borrowers.⁴¹

However, a full understanding of this aspect of underdevelopment requires an examination of certain aspects of the relationship between foreign capital and the Jamaican commercial banking system. During the period under review, the system consisted of seven commercial banks and a network of their branches which were spread throughout the country. These banks were dominated by foreign capital. Five of them were wholly-owned subsidiaries. The sixth was a 75 percent-owned subsidiary of an international consortium, and 49 per cent of the seventh was owned by a United States commercial bank. The latter provided management services and maintained a close relationship. Thus, the so-called "local banks" in Jamaica were little more than the representatives of foreign capital.⁴² These banks were not only closely integrated with their overseas parent companies but they also operated in a Jamaican money market which was highly integrated with that of the UK. In fact, there was automatic convertibility between Jamaican currency and sterling at its base.⁴³

The relationship between the Jamaican plantation sugar sector and the commercial banking system is not difficult to establish. First, of all, the metropolitan-based branch banking system was developed in order to service plantation production and was thus geared to the associated export-import trade. The British bank, Barclays, was the first to be established in Jamaica. This took place in the period after emancipation. The emergence of the bank was directly related to the operation of the plantation system. The transition from slave labour to wage labour caused the labour

market to become monetized. The need for monetary assets was, therefore, felt especially by the owners of plantations.⁴⁴ The banking system was thus instituted primarily for the benefit of the planter class, and planters were able, in the majority of instances, to secure enough credit for whatever capital expansion they planned. Furthermore, foreign-owned corporations were always able to draw on the resources of their metropolitan parent companies. The Jamaican peasant producers, on the other hand, were limited in their access to external financial capital. Consequently, they were obliged to rely almost completely on their meagre savings, supplemented sometimes by personal loans. The credit assistance which the state provided to the peasantry proved to be, in most cases, either inadequate, or oppressive in its terms of payment.⁴⁵

This kind of distorted development may be highlighted by the fact that although sugar agriculture made less of a contribution to the GDP than other agriculture, the commercial banks accommodated the former to a greater extent than the latter.

Table 3.5 shows that in 1961, loans and advances granted to sugar producers amounted to 10.8 per cent of the total amount. In 1964 this figure increased to 14.2 per cent. In 1966 it was 10.8 per cent. In 1968 it was 9.5 per cent and in 1970 it was 8.7 per cent. Loans and advances made to other agricultural producers was only 2.0 per cent in 1961, 3.0 per cent in 1964, 2.4 per cent in 1966, 2.1 per cent in 1968, and 1.0 per cent in 1970. Furthermore many of these producers were large landowners.

Table 3.5

Distribution of Bank Loans and Advances,
1961-1970 (Percentages)

	1961	1964	1966	1968	1970
Sugar Plantation	5.8	9.9	4.0	6.1	2.5
Agriculture					
Other Agriculture	2.0	3.0	2.4	2.1	1.0
Mining	8.4	3.0	2.0	2.5	2.8
Manufacturing	14.3	19.8	20.8	20.5	20.7
Sugar, Molasses & Rum	5.0	4.3	6.8	3.4	6.2
Construction	4.1	5.0	3.3	5.1	12.7
Public Utilities	-	0.5	1.1	2.1	6.9
Government	3.5	2.3	2.2	2.0	2.2
Distribution	29.0	25.3	25.7	23.0	18.4
Tourism	4.7	3.2	2.6	2.1	2.4
Professional & Personal	14.0	13.7	18.5	23.0	20.5
Services					
Other	9.2	10.0	10.6	8.1	3.7
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Sources: Bank of Jamaica, Annual Reports; Annual Abstract of Statistics, Department of Statistics, Jamaica; Economic Survey, 1961-1970, Jamaica.

Table 3.6 reveals the contribution made between 1955 and 1970 by sugar cane and its products to the Jamaican GDP. In 1955 this amounted to 7.2 per cent. In 1960 it was 5.8 per cent. In 1965 it totalled 5.5 per cent. In 1968 it was only 4.2 per cent and in 1970 it came to 2.3 per cent. During the same years, the contribution made by agriculture, forestry and fishing to the GDP was much higher. The highest, 18.9 per cent, was in 1955 and the lowest, 9.3 per cent, was made in 1970.

Table 3.6

Contribution of Industrial Groups to the
Gross Domestic Product at Factor Cost,
1955-1970 (Percentages)

<u>Industrial Groups</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1970</u>
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing	18.9	11.0	10.6	9.9	9.3
Sugar Cane	5.2	3.4	3.3	2.7	1.3
Mining, Quarrying and Refining	3.9	8.6	8.7	11.7	13.4
Bauxite and Alumina	3.8	8.1	7.8	9.8	10.3
Manufacturing & Processing	12.9	12.5	13.0	12.7	13.7
Sugar, Molasses & Rum	2.0	2.4	2.2	1.5	1.0
Construction & Installation	8.7	9.7	9.7	10.1	10.3
Electricity, Gas & Water	.6	1.0	1.4	1.3	1.7
Transport, Storage & Communication	6.1	6.6	6.4	6.4	6.4
Distributive Trade	16.2	16.0	13.4	11.0	11.1
Financial Institutions	1.8	2.6	3.4	3.5	3.2
Ownership of Dwellings	3.4	2.0	2.4	2.9	2.6
Public Administration	4.3	5.1	6.4	6.9	6.3
Miscellaneous Services	<u>12.2</u>	<u>11.0</u>	<u>11.3</u>	<u>9.6</u>	<u>9.4</u>
	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>

Sources: Economic Survey of Jamaica 1955, p.34. Kingston, Jamaica, 1962. Economic Survey of Jamaica 1960, p.47. Kingston, Jamaica, 1961. National Income and Product Accounts, 1965, 1968, 1970.

There is little doubt that foreign investors realized ample profits from the operation of their capital in the Jamaican sugar industry. Thus, between 1954 and 1966 the annual private returns to the sugar industry increased by about £6m. Furthermore, during the same period, the total profits of sugar estates totalled about £17m.⁴⁶ In spite of these gains, however, such figures do not represent an accurate picture of the surplus which accrued to the Jamaican social economy. Thus, what I am postulating in this part of the study is that foreign investment in the Jamaican sugar industry hindered the development of the economy of the country at

two additional levels: (1) Such investment resulted in the diminution of the surplus which became available for reinvestment in the Jamaican economy. (2) Such investment actually inhibited the maximization of surplus accumulation.

At the first level, one must consider the net returns which accrued to the economy of the country from the sugar industry. It seems that since the gross private return was quickly reduced by factors such as repatriated profits, payments for imported materials and equipment, as well as by various diseconomies, the actual return to the social economy was considerably reduced. The question must not be considered merely as one of the private returns per acre of land. What is of importance is the net returns which accrue to the country from the various resources which have been put into the industry.⁴⁷

The proposition that I am advancing at the second level is that inefficiency was so widespread in the management of many sugar estates that the costs of the manufacture of sugar were subsequently exacerbated. Even in the polite language of a conservative report such as that of the Sugar Industry Commission (1966), the high costs of manufacture were attributed first and foremost to "wide variations in the efficiency of supervision and the organization of the flow of work".⁴⁸

Let us now consider each proposition in additional detail. The nature of repatriated profits may be clearly seen in the revelations made by the Sugar Industry Commission (1960) concerning the actions of WISCO in the late 1940s.

In 1949 the West Indies Sugar Company Limited, owner and operator of Frome and Monymusk estates, issued for cash consideration 1,400,000 new ordinary shares of £1 each and £100,000 33/4 debenture stock. The new shares were sold by way of a pro rata offering to the existing shareholders. The proceeds were utilized to repay £300,000 of debenture stock due for redemption, and the remainder largely to discharge temporary borrowings and otherwise to finance, to completion the large new sugar factory at Monymusk.⁴⁹

This pattern of investment and subsequent dividend outflows were marked features of the Jamaica sugar industry during the post-war period. Thus, the Sugar Industry Commission (1966) noted that head offices withdrawals and dividends paid during 1965 amounted to almost a half a million pounds. In addition, the payment for imported materials such as fertilizer, insecticide, and weed killer as well as for imported technology such as tractors and factory equipment all contributed to the flight of capital from the Jamaican social economy.⁵⁰ For example, between 1954-1968 the sugar industry earned a gross profit of about £17m. However, because of factors just cited plus others such as devaluation, the net incremental purchasing power of sugar imports was about £2.5m.⁵¹

Table 3.7

Percentage Distribution of the Sugar Industry
to Various Aggregates

	Gross Domestic Product	Wages	Merchandise Exports	Exports of Goods and Services
1955	7.2	10.6	46.4	30.5
1970	2.3	6.3	20.5	12.5

Sources: Economic Survey of Jamaica, 1955, 1970, Central Planning Unit, Jamaica.

Thus, as we can see from Table 3.7, the relative contribution of the sugar industry to various aggregates declined substantially between 1955 and 1970. The contribution to the GDP declined from 7.2 per cent to 2.3 per cent. Wages, merchandise exports, and the exports of goods and services also showed a decline.

The question of diseconomies is a vexed one partly because of the difficulty in quantifying the net diseconomies of the industry. Nevertheless, typical examples would consist of the industrial turmoil generated by the industry as well as the social and economic costs which are entailed in its preservation. Indeed, various aspects of diseconomies are developed as this study progresses, and do not require a detailed evaluation here. My comment at this juncture is meant to reinforce the point that the economics of the sugar industry must be viewed within the context of the total social economy of Jamaica.

One of the major reasons for the high cost of the manufacture of Jamaican sugar during the post-war period was the general inefficiency of estate management. Furthermore, the problem was compounded by the fact that management steadfastly refused to acknowledge its own shortcomings and instead blamed every conceivable factor in order to excuse its own failures. The exasperation felt by the Sugar Industry Commission (1966) at the imputative attitude of estate managers was evident in the tone of certain parts of the report.⁵²

Throughout the hearings too ready recourse was taken to blaming others or Fate. If factories cannot maintain

full operation, it was due to the intransigence of labour and the failure of cane farmers to honour obligations. If the crop yield fell below expectation, the studiously erratic performance of farmers and of labour were solely responsible. The lack of technical and supervisory staff is due to other industries spiriting away trained staff. The absence of widely organized training schemes or schemes for agricultural guidance to farmers derive from the failure of others to co-operate, as shown by earlier efforts.³³

Table 3.8

Man Hours Per Ton of Sugar
Excluding Reaping

Cuba	30
Dominican Republic	42
Jamaica	53
Puerto Rico	33
Louisiana	33.5
Florida	9.8
Hawaii	10.4

Source: Sugar Industry Advisory Council, Annual Report, Jamaica, 1968, p.37.

An example of inefficient administration may be seen in the fact that the quality of the nutrition on which sugar workers were forced to subsist was quite poor. There is little doubt that this kind of nutrition had a negative effect on the productivity of workers. The low manpower output of the Jamaican sugar industry was directly related to the poor nutrition of estate workers. In Table 3.8, we can see that the man hours per ton of sugar required by Jamaican estate workers were extremely high in comparison with other sugar producing countries of the world. Whereas Jamaican workers required 53 hours, excluding reaping, to produce one ton of sugar, other countries were more efficient. Although variables such as salary, worker morale, and levels of mechanization would, without

doubt, affect such figures, such factors are not enough to explain the wide gap between Jamaica's figure and those of other countries.

Indeed, the Sugar Industry Commission (1966) attributed this discrepancy partly to "the effect of poor nutrition on the rate of hand work".⁵⁴ It further added:

Cane cutting and loading are not jobs for weaklings; to assure acceptable earnings they must be men of stamina and endurance. Moreover, no machine, human or mechanical, can operate successfully without an adequate source of energy. The workers must therefore be well fed, and this does not mean merely an adequate morning and evening meal. We have been shown records which demonstrate that a well-nourished cane cutter, operating under favourable conditions, can cut ten tons of cane in eight hours; exceptional individuals have reached 20 and even 30 in the same period. But they must restore their energy by eating at regular intervals during the working day. While some estates fully appreciate the significance of nutrition and offer facilities for the infield supply of food, there is still a margin for improvement in many parts.⁵⁵

One of the arguments which was put forward very often by estate managers was that the high cost of the production of canes was due primarily to the rapidly increasing cost of labour. However, as one can see from Table 3.9, a survey of seven years reveals that labour costs for cane production actually declined. While labour costs fell from 64 per cent of total cost in 1959 to 54 per cent in 1965, "other costs" rose from 36 to 46 per cent of total costs during this period. Although this period was marked by a substantial increase in field mechanization, "the overall effect has been accompanied by an additional 2.3 per cent to production costs".⁵⁶ In fact, the cost of labour per ton of sugar showed an even lower percentage than that for the production of the canes.

Table 3.9

Broad Allocation of Sugar Production Costs,
1959-1965

	Wages			Other Costs			Total		Labour Costs As % of Total	
	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.	
1959	1	14	8	0	19	10	2	14	6	64
1960	1	12	1	1	0	6	2	12	7	61
1961	1	12	5	1	3	3	2	15	8	58
1962	1	12	8	1	6	0	2	18	8	56
1963	1	16	8	1	4	10	3	1	6	60
1964	1	17	9	1	7	7	3	5	4	58
1965	1	16	10	1	11	2	3	7	2	54

Source: Report of the Sugar Industry Commission, 1966. Jamaica, 1966, p.56.

Table 3.10

Cost of Labour Per ton of Sugar
(1964-65 average)

	£	s.	d.	%
Cultivations	5	19	2	13.1
Reaping	8	4	3	18.1
Factory operation	3	2	8	6.9
Overheads - Field	3	15	6	
- Factory	0	13	2	9.7
	21	14	9	47.8%

Source: Report of the Sugar Industry Labour Welfare Board, Jamaica, 1965, p.15.

Table 3.10 shows that labour costs accounted for only 47.8 per cent of the total production costs of the manufacture of sugar, including the costs of the growing of canes.

It is important to examine some of the other costs incurred by sugar manufacturers because it is here that additional examples of costly management inefficiency will come to light. The cost of the supervision of labour is a case in point. In 1964-65, this item

accounted for 12 per cent of total costs. This was the equivalent of one fifth of the total labour bill.⁵⁷ Even the Sugar Industry Commission (1966) found this cost to be excessive. "We repeat that a saving in workers' wages must normally be accompanied by a proportionate saving in office and managerial costs."⁵⁸ This kind of viewpoint is supported by Jefferson who states, "it is evident that the low level of labour productivity and consequently the high cost structure of some estates can be partially corrected by raising of the levels of management efficiency".⁵⁹ This inefficiency is also reflected in Table 3.11.

Table 3.11

General Index of Efficiency, 1952-1970

	1952	1956	1960	1964	1968	1970
Tons Cane per Ton Sugar	9.3	9.0	10.3	9.8	9.6	10.5

Source: West Indies Sugar Association Annual Report 1966, 1971, Barbados.

This table indicates that the average amount of cane required to produce a tone of sugar increased from 9.3 tons to 10.5 tons between 1952-70. This index tends to suggest that there was a decline in the physical efficiency of the sugar industry. Nevertheless, the extent to which inefficient management aggravated the production costs of sugar cannot be analyzed outside the context of the foreign ownership of the sugar industry. Since the sugar industry was owned by competing foreign investors, with little direct control by the state, modifications within production units did not take place in a planned, definite manner within the

framework of the total, economic developmental plan of Jamaica. The result was a lack of cohesion in sugar manufacture. Indeed, as one critic warned:

The industry will not return to a healthy state until decisions are taken urgently regarding the size, structure, and organization of the industry. It is likely that the trend toward amalgamation of factories will continue. However, this should not be allowed to take place in haphazard manner, as has been the case in the recent past, but should be guided within the framework of an overall agricultural policy including the zoning of areas for different uses.⁶⁰

However, this kind of warning was ignored by the SMA. Consequently, rationalization of factories into larger and more viable units was rarely considered by the SMA. As the Sugar Industry Commission (1966) pointed out:

In-plant manufacturing, repair and maintenance costs per ton cane are relatively high in the Jamaican sugar industry. In part this is because of the small size of most of the factories. Maintenance costs have risen about 20 per cent over the period 1960-65 while repair costs have increased 35 per cent.⁶¹

As we can see from Table 3.12, the relatively small size of most of the factories in the Jamaican sugar industry was a contributing factor to the lack of economic efficiency. Since the volume of sugar production serves as a base over which the fixed cost of the plant must be spread, when the base is small, unit costs are high. This was true particularly for wages and overheads, and the 1965 data for Jamaica factories generally support this. The largest units were able to utilize their labour force to best advantage while overheads were spread over a higher production tonnage. One must not be confused by the data for Louisiana. Although the figures suggest that the Louisiana factories are not

comparable in production capacity, one must remember that because of climatic reasons, the Louisiana season is less than half that of Jamaica.

Table 3.12
Comparison of Factory Size--
Selected Sugar Areas, 1966-67 (Thousand Tons)

Factory Size	Volume of Cane Ground					
	Jamaica	Louisiana	Florida	Australia	South Africa	Puerto Rico
Less than:						
5 tons	1	-	-	-	-	-
5-100 tons	1	5	-	1	1	-
100-125 "	2	8	-	-	-	1
125-150 "	3	7	-	1	1	1
150-200 "	4	11	-	-	1	2
200-300 "	2	11	1	5	1	4
300-400 "	2	3	1	6	3	5
400-500 "	1	-	1	3	-	3
500-600 "	-	-	2	7	2	1
600-700 "	-	-	-	4	3	1
700-800 "	1	-	-	1	1	2
800-900 "	1	-	1	-	2	1
900-1000 "	-	-	-	-	2	-
Over 1000"	-	-	3	1	-	1
Total Factories	18	45	9	31	18	22
Total Sugar Pro-						
duction (Tons)	474,278	561,375	640,867	1,883,364	1,006,665	873,405
Average Sugar						
Production						
(Tons)	26,349	12,475	71,207	60,762	55,926	39,700

Source: Report of the Sugar Industry Commission, 1966. Jamaica, 1966, p.98.

The wide variation of cost of sugar production can be seen

Table 3.13. Cost of producing a ton of sugar varied from £37.11s.8d. to £72.14s.6d. It seems that "the wide variations in cost per unit of output appear to indicate equally wide variations in standards of management".⁵² If we regard the proper function of management to be "to obtain, develop, and combine resources,

less than one third of the depreciation allowance. Indeed, half the estates spent less than 67 per cent. This state of affairs tends to indicate that several estates not only failed to modernize their factories but also neglected to maintain the equipment at its present level.⁶⁵

It seems that some foreign investors were actually in the process of liquidating their factories and were, therefore, unwilling to make further investments. However, such actions were not taken within the context of an overall plan for the sugar industry as a whole. The fact that incentives provided for capital improvements were under-utilized while some factories remained in a run-down state, provides strong evidence of mismanagement. Thus, sugar production was curtailed not so much because of the cost of labour, but because of the ramifications of inefficient management.

THE MARKETING OF EXPORT SUGAR

The marketing of Jamaican export sugar affected the economy of the country at two important levels. First, the various sugar agreements established between the advanced, capitalist countries and the satellites left peripheral economies such as that of Jamaica heavily dependent on external metropolitan markets and entirely at the mercy of their terms of trade. Secondly, such dependence impeded the development of indigenous manufacturing enterprises in Jamaica. Since the marketing of Jamaican export sugar was handled by the SMA, the representative of foreign capital, the underdevelopment of certain aspects of the Jamaican economy which

ensued from the marketing procedures and pacts undertaken by the SMA must be seen as the result of the alliance between metropolitan capitalists and their Jamaican counterparts. Jamaica's economic dependence may be illustrated by an examination of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement and the International Sugar Agreement within which the former operated.

(i) THE INTERNATIONAL SUGAR AGREEMENT

The initial attempt to control the world production of sugar was made in 1938 with the signing of the International Sugar Agreement (ISA). Both producing and consuming countries were included. However, this agreement was nullified because of the outbreak of the second world war. The second ISA was signed in 1953 and subsequently renewed in 1959. The UK government acted on behalf of the West Indies.⁶⁶ One of the stated objectives of this agreement was to assure supplies of sugar to importing countries and markets for sugar to exporting countries at stable and equitable prices. The participating governments agreed that in order to avoid a depression of living standards and the introduction of unfair, competitive conditions in international trade, they would seek to maintain fair labour standards in the various sugar industries.

The ISA regulated the export of sugar from exporting countries by a system of quotas. It also limited stocks on hand. Each participating country agreed to adjust the production of sugar by regulating its manufacture or the acreage of plantings as might be required. The government of the UK, on behalf of the West

Indies, Guyana, Mauritius, Fiji, Australia, and South Africa agreed that the net export of sugar by the exporting territories covered by the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement would not exceed 2,500,000 English long tons in 1959 and 2,575,000 English long tons in each of the calendar years of 1960 and 1961. An attempt was made to build certain qualifications within the terms of the ISA. Thus, the International Sugar Council was authorized to increase or reduce quotas according to changes in the world price of sugar. If the prevailing price was below 3.25c. per lb., export quotas were to be reduced at once by 2 1/2 per cent, but they were not to be reduced below 90 per cent unless the world price fell below 3.15c. per lb. In any case, quotas could not be reduced below 80 per cent of the basic export tonnage.

However, there were certain weaknesses in the operation of the ISA. Some importing countries accepted only a few obligations and some free-market exporters enjoyed mere token privileges. The International Sugar Council also found it difficult to deal with protective tariff barriers which had been enacted by some countries.⁶⁷ Therefore, the operations of the ISA were suspended in 1962. Nevertheless, we can see from the activities of the ISA between 1953 and 1962 that the Jamaican colony was simply an appendage of the UK and that the development of the former was heavily dependent on the workings of the UK sugar markets which operated under the umbrella of the ISA.

When the ISA was renewed in 1968, it stated a number of objectives, among which was the intention to provide adequate

participation in, and growing access to the markets of developed countries for sugar from the developing countries.⁶⁸ However, an analysis of the evolution of free markets exports and prices in 1969-72 strongly suggests that the ISA failed to realize this objective. Although countries such as Canada, Finland, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom promised not to raise their production-consumption ratio of sugar in order to import more sugar from underdeveloped countries, the total consumption of sugar in the developed countries just cited was either stagnant or grew very slowly.⁶⁹ This failure was remarkable especially since one of the objectives of the ISA of 1968 was to raise the level of international trade in sugar in order to augment the export earnings of underdeveloped exporting countries.

Because the USA imported about 45 per cent of its required sugar on a preferential basis, and because of the decline in the production-consumption ratios of the European centrally planned economies, it was the European Economic Community which could offer most of the possibilities of market expansion for the underdeveloped countries. However, during the period under review, the EEC was reluctant to make such concessions. Thus the marketing of Jamaican export sugar depended on the terms of trade set by the advanced, industrialized countries. The operation of agreements such as that of the ISA of 1968 demonstrated that the extension of the free market to underdeveloped countries was quite limited. Additional details of the dependence of the Jamaican economy may be gleaned from the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement.

(ii) THE COMMONWEALTH SUGAR AGREEMENT

The Commonwealth Sugar Agreement (CSA) enacted between the government of the United Kingdom and the sugar producers in the Commonwealth was signed on December 21, 1951. The producers which were originally covered by the CSA included Australia, South Africa, the British West Indies, Mauritius, Fiji, the East African territories, and British Honduras.⁷⁰ Although one of the stated objectives of the agreement was to encourage economic development in the various colonies by promoting an assured market for their products, there was another aspect to this seemingly altruistic arrangement. It was simply the fact that this agreement was intended to "alleviate Britain's acute dollar shortage by encouraging an expansion of sterling supplies to meet her import requirements".⁷¹ Thus, the long-term assurances made to Commonwealth products probably sprang more from metropolitan economic self-interest than from any overriding concern with Commonwealth development.

Imperial sentiment and United Kingdom self-interest pointed in the same direction, for on the revival of non-dollar supplies hinged the prospects of an early removal of sugar rationing. The very policy that wartime events had partly frustrated thus became the means of postwar salvation. As the dollar shortage persisted, and with it rationing, the commitments to colonial and Commonwealth sugar producers were not only continued but by their mere continuance became more firmly established for the future.⁷²

According to the terms of the CSA, the exporters of sugar had an overall agreement quota (OAQ) which set the maximum quantity of sugar that could be exported to the preferential markets of the UK and Canada. The OAQ comprised two quotas: (1) The negotiated

price quota (NPQ) which represented the fixed quantity of sugar that the UK agreed to purchase at prices negotiated every three years.

(2) The free quota which was primarily intended to cover exports to Canada or additional exports to the UK, if such supplies were required. The free quota was sold at prevailing world market prices plus the UK or Canada preference as the case may be. The difference between the NPQ and the free quota was known as the "international quota". It was divided between the Commonwealth territories and could only be exported to non-preferential markets. For example, according to the 1958 terms of the CSA, the OAQ was set at 2,500,000 tons. Of this Jamaica's OAQ was 291,500 tons. Its NPQ amounted to 187,000 tons; the free quota was 83,000 tons, and the international quota was 21,500 tons.⁷³

Table 3.14

Ratio of NPQ to Benefiting Countries
Sugar Exports and of These Exports to Production

Country	Ratio of NPQ to total net sugar exports 1966-70	Ratio of Net sugar exports to production 1966-70
	%	%
Australia	20.0	70.2
British Honduras	38.8	88.5
Fiji	43.2	95.0
India	10.8	7.2
Mauritius	63.8	94.0
Swaziland	58.0	91.0
Uganda	23.0	20.0
Guyana & West Indies	71.0	84.7
- Barbados	(71.0)	(91.0)
- Jamaica	(71.0)	(78.8)
- Leeward & Windward Is.	(71.0)	(87.5)
- Trinidad & Tobago	(71.0)	(78.8)
- Guyana	(71.0)	(91.6)

Source: Structure of the International Sugar Market and its Impact on Developing Countries. Paris: OECD, 1976, p.27.

It is worthwhile to examine some of the effects which this kind of arrangement produced in the Jamaican economy. First, there was the heavy dependence of the peripheral economy on metropolitan markets and their terms of trade. Table 3.14 shows that between 1966 and 1970 the ratio of the Jamaican NPQ to total net sugar exports amounted to 71 per cent.. During these years, the ratio of net sugar exports to production was more than 78 per cent.

Table 3.15

Average Export Price of Jamaican Sugar,
1964-1969 (\$ per ton)

<u>Destinations</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>
United Kingdom	94.52	86.31	90.68	90.82	91.62	91.20
USA	97.12	84.67	88.94	96.46	114.49	120.50
Canada	89.75	44.36	38.70	39.07	46.75	54.70
Average Net Price	96.72	76.32	80.62	85.66	83.80	94.79

Source: Economic Survey, Jamaica, 1969.

Secondly, during the period under study, the terms of trade became more onerous for countries like Jamaica. Let us recall that, according to the terms of the CSA, the negotiated price was to be determined on the basis of providing a "reasonable remuneration to efficient producers".⁷⁴ However, although this price was not intended to subsidize the inefficient, the "relatively efficient producers" and their costs were never specifically indicated. Since the production of the mythical "efficient producer" was never quantified, and since the UK, a preferential buyer, was bargaining in a buyer's market, the price of Jamaican export sugar showed a slow evolution over the years 1953-70.⁷⁵ Table 3.15 is indicative

of this trend. In 1964 the price of sugar sold to the UK was \$94.52 per ton. In 1969 it had dropped to \$91.20 per ton. This decline and the poor showing of the Canadian market may be contrasted with the increase in the American market in the late 1960s.

During the period 1953-1970, the price paid to underdeveloped countries rose by only 14.4 per cent. However, since the price index of exports from various countries to the UK rose by 59 per cent between 1953 and 1971, and because 46 points of this increase occurred after 1963, it seems quite obvious that over the period 1953-71 the terms of trade of sugar exported under the NPQ had deteriorated considerably. In fact, such deterioration accelerated after the devaluation of the pound in 1967. Between 1967 and 1971 the price of exports to the UK rose by 28 per cent. In spite of such increase, however, the NPQ was maintained during 1969-71 at its level of 1966-68.⁷⁶ The dollar equivalent of the negotiated price also indicates the effect of this devaluation. At 11.2 cents/kg in 1968-70, this price was lower for countries like Jamaica than it had been in 1953-57.⁷⁷

Because the Jamaican sugar economy was so closely tied to that of the UK through the CSA and the activities of metropolitan capitalists, it was not able to take full advantage of more favourable economic arrangements which were possible in alternate external markets. I do not imply here that the price of sugar sold on the world market was higher than that of NPQ sugar. Indeed, quite the contrary was the case. However, the NPQ price was much lower than that received from US quotas. Between 1964-70 the gap

between these two prices became increasingly wider. At the end of this period, the price received under the US quota was 47 per cent higher than that of the NPQ.⁷⁸ Jamaica was unable to take advantage of this kind of buoyancy and was limited to the small "international quota" in its sales to the USA. The average purchasing power in the UK per unit of sugar exported under the NPQ declined between 1953 and 1971 by about 28 per cent for the underdeveloped countries. Compared with free market conditions such countries were better off. However, because of the deterioration of their sugar terms of trade with the UK, they were worse off in 1965-71 than they were in 1953-57.⁷⁹

It is instructive to examine certain aspects of the role played by foreign investors in this asymmetrical development. Prior to the second world war, each Jamaican sugar manufacturer sold his export sugar through brokers to purchasers in the UK or Canada at whatever times he considered to be the most economically advantageous.⁸⁰ However, the UK's wartime agreement to purchase all available sugar at a fixed price and the inception of the postwar CSA dramatically changed the marketing procedures. The most profound result was that now the marketing of export sugar was to be handled by a single agent. Since 1955 the handling of all Jamaican export sugar has been managed by the most powerful foreign investor in the country--WISCO.⁸¹ This company not only disposed of the NPQ to the Statutory Sugar Board in London through the intermediary of sugar brokers, but also arranged the sale of the free quota to the various Canadian refineries. Sales to the United States were also

made through WISCO sugar brokers in London and New York. Thus, Tate and Lyle, the owners of WISCO, not only "negotiated" the terms of trade between Jamaica and the UK through its control of the SMA, but also controlled the marketing of Jamaican sugar through WISCO. Tate and Lyle was apparently quite unconcerned about the obvious conflict of interest which was produced by its various roles and the underdevelopment in the Jamaican economy engendered by this arrangement.

It is in the light of this affirmation that the Tate and Lyle's reaction to the British negotiations for entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) must be examined. The policy of Tate and Lyle was to urge the Jamaican Government into seeking "association". The argument advanced by the corporation was that once Britain became a member of the EEC, it would not be difficult for Jamaica to gain "associated status" with the EEC and thereby to obtain the high internal EEC price for sugar.⁸² However, this kind of assumption was far from being certain. According to the agreement for the entry of the UK into the EEC, there was a promise that some arrangement would be worked out for the sugar interests of the underdeveloped countries. However, the very existence of that promise had gradually been put in doubt since no firm commitments had been made.⁸³

The Jamaican sugar economy was so tightly controlled by foreign entrepreneurs that the state paid little attention to the question of relinquishing its overreliance on export sugar by the initiation of programmes geared to the diversification of

agricultural production. Foreign corporations had a vested interest in encouraging the dependence of Jamaica on export sugar even in the face of uncertain market conditions. In the late 1960s, faced with the imminent entry of Britain in the EEC, Tate and Lyle bought shares in the largest French refinery and gained access to Belgian, German, and Italian sugar businesses.

In April 1966, Tate and Lyle announced that it had formed, jointly with the Belgian firm Raffinerie Tirlemontoise, a firm known as European Sugars S.A. Its goal was to expand in the European sugar market. Tate and Lyle and Raffinerie Tirlemontoise also made a consortium bid for a substantial holding in the share capital of Raffineries Sucreries, the largest sugar producing and refining company in France. The other large scale European sugar companies associated in the consortium were F. Boghen S.A., Eridania of Italy and Saddeutsche Tucker of Germany. The French Beet Growers' Association played a minor role in the consortium but was represented on the Board. The consortium was known as Compagnie Europeenne d'Industrie Sucriere (CEIS). Tate and Lyle and Raffinerie Tirlemontoise also intended to form a new joint company--European Sugars (France) which would hold 51 per cent of the consortium company CEIS.⁸⁴

The significance of these arrangements lies in the fact that Tate and Lyle was taking every economic precaution so that if Caribbean sugar was rejected by the EEC, Tate and Lyle would be firmly established in the European beet sugar business. Thus, even

while Tate and Lyle urged the Jamaican government to seek associated state with the EEC, it probably suspected that

Any amount of sugar the enlarged community (EEC) may agree to take from these countries could be put forward as a voluntary favour. And since "beggars cannot be choosers", these poor countries would have to accept whatever is handed out to them. But how much of their NPQ will be safeguarded, and what forms these safeguards will take is not yet clear.⁸⁵

Indeed, as a Vice-Chairman of Tate and Lyle bluntly explained:

It is, of course, unthinkable that we should just go out of business.... However, sugar is our business and that is where our skills lie. It would therefore seem unlikely that if we cannot continue our business of sugar refining, we shall seek an outlet for our energies in the production of sugar from beets: for, of course, if raw cane sugar outputs are curtailed, a vacuum will be created in Britain either to be filled by the products of Continental farmer or those of our farmers.... We hope and expect to continue as we are. If this proves impossible, we would hope to enter the home-grown business; in any case, we shall have a foothold in the Continent.⁸⁶

The underdevelopment of the Jamaican economy thus stemmed from the fact that because of the pattern of dominance imposed by foreign investors, the internal capacity of the country to adjust to external changes became severely constrained. At a time when the Jamaican state should have been undertaking self-sustaining economic growth by means of agricultural diversification, based on the structural transformation of its externally oriented sugar economy, its leaders were naively acquiescing to the dictates of Tate and Lyle. Such leaders were apparently oblivious of the fact that there was "no necessary proportionate correspondence between the sugar company's interest and the overall social and economic interests of Jamaica."⁸⁷ This kind of underdevelopment is especially noticeable

when one considers the effects of the free quota on the Jamaican economy.

The case of the sale of Jamaica's free quota to Canada presents another vivid example of the way in which the Jamaican economy was hampered. It is worthwhile to remember that Canada was not a signatory of the CSA and only became a party to the agreement by virtue of Article 3 which stated, "It is agreed that the parties to this agreement will give priority of sales of Commonwealth sugar to Canada and subject to market considerations will make sugar available for sale to Canadian refineries through normal commercial channels in such quantities and from such sources as they may require."⁸⁸ Therefore, Canada bought Commonwealth sugar only at world prices plus a preference of \$1.00 Canadian per 100 pounds of sugar. However, these terms of trade proved to be quite onerous to peripheral economies such as that of Jamaica. The fact was simply that, with the exception of 1963 and 1964 when world sugar prices were quite high, the price that Canada paid for Jamaican sugar in the late 1950s and in the 1960s was so low that in some years it did not even cover the cost of production.⁸⁹ This kind of blatant underdevelopment can only be understood in the context of the foreign ownership of the Jamaican sugar industry and the position occupied by the country in vertically integrated MNC's such as Tate and Lyle.

Tate and Lyle owns refineries in Canada, as it does in Britain and, in part at any rate, in the European Common Market. Tate and Lyle also owns estates and manufactures raw sugar in Jamaica for export. Now when Tate and Lyle Canada buys sugar exported by Tate and Lyle Jamaica, Tate and Lyle can't lose. If the price of

raw sugar is high, Tate and Lyle Jamaica shows gains and Tate and Lyle Canada shows losses. If the price is low, Tate and Lyle Jamaica shows the losses and Tate and Lyle Canada the gains. It is purely a matter of internal accounting for the world-wide Tate and Lyle organization. One might almost say that whatever happens to sugar, Tate and Lyle will come out on top. But one certainly cannot say the same for Jamaica or any other of the Caribbean producers of sugar.⁹⁰

CONSEQUENCES OF THE MARKETING STRUCTURE

The underdevelopment of certain features of the manufacturing sector of the Jamaican economy was one of the major consequences of the manner in which the country's export sugar was marketed. This aspect of underdevelopment may be viewed from various perspectives. First, because of the reciprocal nature of marketing arrangements, Jamaica was obliged to purchase manufactured goods from its metropolitan trading partners at above average costs. In other words, the Jamaican state was not able to purchase such goods from cheaper, alternative sources, in the Far East, or Eastern Europe, for example.

Although the impression was usually given that the metropolitan treasury bore the cost of the imperial preferences, what was rarely officially stated was the fact that the underdeveloped countries gave quid pro quo preferences to manufactured goods coming from the metropolis. The result was that underdeveloped countries usually had to pay higher prices for manufactured goods than they would if the preference system did not exist.⁹¹

The question of reciprocity is indeed of great importance since altruism is rarely a hallmark of international trade. We must

remember that as early as 1919 when Britain first attempted to introduce an imperial sugar preference, the colonies were asked to reciprocate.⁹² Thus, even if reciprocity was not a formal condition embodied in the CSA, there is little doubt that the British Board of Trade welcomed the agreement as a means of obtaining trade advantages in the colonies after the war.⁹³ Thus, the subsidy granted by Britain for Jamaican NPQ sugar was indirectly borne by the Jamaican people since "the cost of this preference really fell on the colonies who granted reciprocal tariffs to Britain."⁹⁴ It was indeed ironic that Canada which frequently purchased Jamaican sugar at a price which was lower than that of the cost of production also enjoyed this kind of reciprocal agreement.

The second aspect of the underdevelopment of the manufacturing sector of the Jamaican economy relates to the factor that the development of indigenous enterprises within this sector was thwarted because of the reciprocal features of the arrangements established for the marketing of the country's sugar. For example, since Jamaica was prohibited by various trade agreements from shipping refined sugar to metropolitan countries,⁹⁵ facilities for sugar refining were never developed to any great extent in the country. Indeed, even in the late 1960s, the only factory which manufactured refined sugar was Monymusk. The result was that, in many cases, the type of sugar that was sold to Jamaican consumers was "Grade D" sugar. This kind of sugar was basically little different from the "raw" sugar that was produced for export. The cost of refined sugar was quite expensive; sometimes exceeded by

more than 40 per cent of the cost of "Grade D" sugar.⁹⁶ Nevertheless, the quality of this "Grade D" sugar, on which many Jamaicans were forced to rely, was not very high. Indeed, the Sugar Industry Commission (1966) viewed this product with deep misgivings. Many Jamaicans regarded this sugar as unhygienic.

The recommendations of the Commission reflected its dissatisfaction with the procedures surrounding the manufacture of "Grade D" sugar:

We recommend that the subject of the manufacture and marketing of "D" grade sugar be carefully reviewed as to quality, control and economics.... Factories which produce sugar for local consumption should be required to comply with regulations to ensure that sugar is produced under hygienic conditions. Sugar sold for local consumption should be required to meet reasonable standards of freedom from suspected solids.⁹⁷

Table 3.16

Average Price of Sugar Sold in Jamaica,
1960-70 (J\$/ton)

Year	Average Price
1960	79.48
1961	81.89
1962	83.14
1963	83.14
1964	83.71
1965	83.24
1966	85.56
1967	86.37
1968	93.67
1969	93.28
1970	113.63

Sources: Economic Survey, Jamaica, various years; SMA Combined Accounts, Jamaica, various years.

The constraints imposed on sugar refining facilities in Jamaica may be clearly demonstrated by the fact that (1) many Jamaicans were

forced to subsist on an inferior brand of sugar (2) the country was frequently forced to import refined sugar from abroad. Table 3.16 shows that whereas in 1960 the average price of sugar sold in Jamaica was \$79.48 per ton, by 1970 the price was \$113.63. This latter figure reflects the fact that the imported refined sugar had pushed up the average price.

My principal contention, at this juncture, is that the marketing of Jamaican export sugar set the pattern for trade relations between the satellite Jamaican economy and the metropolis, and created severe obstacles for the development of secondary industries in Jamaica. It is important to recall that even in earlier epochs, the official metropolitan attitude toward the growth of Jamaican secondary industries was a negative one. Even in the eighteenth century the British Government was unwilling to agree to the expansion of the number of towns in Jamaica because it feared that this kind of development would lead to the establishment of domestic manufacturing industries which would restrict the flow of British exports to the Jamaican market. Nevertheless, new towns did develop and with them the growth of small-scale industries. However, the British government strongly discouraged the establishment of secondary industries during the period of Crown Colony government.⁹⁸

Therefore, the pattern of production which had been established from the inception of the plantation economy, namely the export of agricultural products and the importation of the vast majority of the requirements of the country's manufactured goods,

remained largely unchanged in the 1940s.⁹⁹ Even the Moyne Commission which was set up by Britain to investigate the Caribbean riots and unrest of the late 1930s and to make recommendations for development, did not encourage the establishment of indigenous manufacturing industries. The Commission's recommendations strongly suggested that it was unwilling to promote industrialization in Jamaica--or in the rest of the West Indies. Thus, the Commission rejected completely the idea that a cement factory should be

Table 3.17

Value of Jamaican Imports, 1958-70
(\$ million)

Categories	1958	1960	1964	1966	1968	1970
Food	26.6	29.2	41.5	45.2	58.0	69.0
Beverages and tobacco	3.1	3.5	3.4	3.3	4.7	6.0
Crude materials	4.4	5.5	6.8	6.2	8.5	10.2
Minerals, fuels, lubricants, etc.	11.4	12.8	23.3	19.1	22.9	27.9
Animals and vegetable oils	1.3	1.1	1.0	1.5	2.0	2.5
Chemicals	10.5	12.3	18.3	19.4	25.3	32.8
Manufactured goods	32.5	39.3	52.3	64.1	82.0	113.8
Machinery (not electric)	12.2	14.3	20.0	28.4	49.1	73.7
Electric machinery	5.8	7.7	7.4	11.7	20.6	34.7
Transport equipment	10.1	15.1	15.6	16.7	20.5	31.4
Miscellaneous manufactured goods	11.4	13.8	16.6	17.7	26.1	32.6
Miscellaneous commodities	0.1	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.7
Total	129.3	155.0	206.6	233.7	320.3	435.3

Sources: External Trade of Jamaica, 1958-70; Economic Survey of Jamaica, 1958-70.

established, backed by funds from the Jamaican government, and directed by a nominated board. It also refused to consider the establishment of other local manufacturing enterprises.¹⁰⁰

The data of Table 3.17 indicate the high cost of manufactured goods imported into Jamaica. Whereas in 1958 the country paid a total of \$43.9 million for such goods, by 1970 the amount was \$146.4 million. There are, of course, various factors which would have contributed to this increase. However, the inequitable terms of trade which arose from the way in which Jamaican export sugar was marketed abroad and the effects which such terms had on the manufacturing sector doubtlessly played a role.

Table 3.18

Direction of Imports, 1950-1970 (Percentages)

	1950	1955	1960	1965	1968	1970
United Kingdom	42.9	40.3	34.4	24.5	21.3	20.8
United States	14.3	20.8	24.4	31.2	37.4	38.6
Canada	12.0	11.9	10.1	11.3	9.5	8.5
European Common Market		5.8	9.7	10.5	11.4	9.9
Commonwealth Caribbean	30.8	3.6	5.0	2.1	1.0	2.4
Rest of the World		17.6	16.4	22.4	19.3	19.8
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Sources: External Trade of Jamaica Annual Reports; Bank of Jamaica Annual Reports.

The data of Table 3.18 support my hypothesis concerning the dependence of Jamaica on the metropolitan countries of the UK and the United States. It was from these countries that most Jamaican imports came during the period 1950-70. The nature and scope of

this study do not require a detailed examination of the reason for the relative decline or increase in the imports from one metropolitan trading partner or another. There is little doubt that the post-war dollar shortage in the Sterling Area, the growth of the Jamaican bauxite industry--owned by American and Canadian interests, the rapid growth of the tourist industry and the pronounced shift of the post-war Jamaican consumer preference towards American products were important contributing factors.¹⁰¹ Thus, one may note that the proportion of imports supplied by the United States increased while that from the UK decreased. In 1950, Jamaica imported only 14.3 per cent of products from the United States. By 1970 this figure had reached 38.6 per cent. On the other hand, in 1950 Jamaica's imports from the UK were 42.9 per cent. However, by 1970 this figure had dropped to 20.8 per cent. Canada's share fell from 12.0 per cent to 8.5 per cent during that period. Imports from the European Common Market went from 5.8 per cent in 1955 to 9.9 in 1970; those from the Commonwealth Caribbean went from 3.6 per cent to 2.4 per cent during 1955-70.

In spite of shifts in the direction of trade, these figures reveal that in 1970 imports from the UK and the United States totalled 59.4 per cent. This dependence on a few trading partners, while reflecting international monetary forces and changes in the relative importance of various commodities, also suggests that the import structure of the Jamaican economy which had developed from the way in which Jamaican export sugar was marketed abroad, had not changed much. In other words, since the colonial Jamaican state was

obliged by the various sugar agreements to import metropolitan manufactured goods, to the detriment of local manufacturing initiatives, the need for consumer goods, industrial machinery, luxury goods, the wide range of products required for the rapidly growing tourist industry, could not be filled locally. Such goods had to be purchased abroad, usually in the USA, because the growth of local industries had been thwarted.

The lack of growth in the manufacturing sector was also caused by the fact that an indigenous entrepreneurial class capable of seizing and exploiting suitable opportunities developed very slowly in Jamaica. Since the ownership of the means of production of Jamaica's earliest industry, the sugar industry, was concentrated in the hands of foreigners, it was inevitable that foreign investors would be the ones to whom wealth would accumulate. The mere fact that the major industries established in the post-war period--mining and tourism, as well as the financial system--were owned by overseas interests to whom a large proportion of the multiplier effects accrued, indicate that metropolitan-owned export enterprises played the major role in the Jamaican economy.

Enterprising Jamaicans who had access to capital but were not fully engaged in agriculture tended to enter the distributive trades. Since the colonial Jamaican state had to reflect the official metropolitan hostility to indigenous manufacturing enterprises, many local business people were forced to limit their economic ventures to distributing imported goods. Not only did this activity place a severe limit on the capacity of the economy to

provide jobs, but it left the manufacturing industry underdeveloped and encouraged a certain colonial "trader mentality".¹⁰² The colonial Jamaican state thus adhered to the metropolitan dictates concerning the nature of the relationship which should exist between the centre and the periphery. The marketing of export sugar was supposed to serve as a model of how such a relationship should function. Consequently, opportunities for import substitution were rarely grasped. As one local newspaper editorial stated, "Practically every manufacturing enterprise that has been started in Jamaica has had to run the gauntlet of opposition or apathy from the commercial community."¹⁰³ The commercial classes diversified their interests into manufacturing enterprises only at a gradual pace.

Another obstacle which retarded the development of secondary industries was consumer resistance. The Jamaican consumer, conditioned by years of negative metropolitan propaganda regarding the capacity of African-Jamaicans, tended to regard local products as inferior to imported ones. Such a view was reinforced by the fact that many members of the commercial classes regarded indigenous manufacturing enterprises with scepticism and distrust. Foreign investors not only decided how Jamaican sugar should be marketed but also, because of their power and influence, conditioned the consumption patterns of many Jamaicans. It became possible to circumvent some of the opposition only by government incentive legislation and the appeal to nationalist, economic sentiments. Such appeals increased after the granting of political independence from Britain in 1962. The improvement in the quality of some

locally manufactured goods and the gradual interest in manufacturing ventures by certain members of the commercial classes also helped to stimulate industrialization.

PUBLIC POLICY

The power and influence wielded by foreign investors in the Jamaican sugar industry contributed to the dissemination of a Jamaican public policy which, instead of promoting self-sustaining economic growth and development, merely exacerbated the structural dependence which characterized the peripheral economy. Although members of government, planners, and directors of government agencies usually spoke of the need for structural change, their policies usually maintained or reinforced the degree of external dependence.

Public policy restricted some aspects of the Jamaican economy since the interests of foreign capital were accorded precedence over that of local labour and since local resources were frequently directed to the foreign sector at the expense of balanced sectoral development. In addition, such a policy also decreased the tax base of the country, increased the public debt, and promoted borrowing from metropolitan sources to finance development.¹⁰⁴ The economic development of the country was left largely in the hands of foreigners. The Jamaican government felt that in view of the costs involved in a programme of industrialization and the economic risks involved, such activities should be left to the private sector. The state felt that the role of the public sector should be limited to

infrastructural assistance.¹⁰⁵ The Jamaican state therefore enacted various kinds of incentive legislation designed to attract capital into the manufacturing and industrial sectors.

However, whereas incentive legislation, geared to the promotion of indigenous industries by local entrepreneurs, was quite beneficial to the economy, most incentive legislation was primarily designed to entice foreign private capital. In order to illustrate the dynamics of the underdevelopment which resulted from incentive legislation aimed at foreign capital, it is worthwhile to examine certain example of such legislation. Let us consider first the Pioneer Industries (Encouragement) Law of 1949.¹⁰⁶ Under its terms an investor was allowed, during each of any five years during the first eight years of operation, to write off one fifth of permitted capital expenditure against income derived from pioneer manufacturing operations. Furthermore, the manufacturer was allowed to import, free of customs duties and tonnage tax, all building materials, tools, plant and machinery, etc. used to construct, extend or equip the pioneer factory. The government seemed oblivious to the fact that such legislation would encourage the establishment of capital-incentive industries which, because of the absence of a capital goods sector, would make a minimal contribution to the stimulation of employment. Thus, the Jamaican people were the ones who bore the brunt of the cost of the establishment of new sugar factories.

But the "generosity" of the Jamaican state was not limited to new sugar factories. In 1949, for example, the state established

the Sugar Industry Capital Rehabilitation Fund.¹⁰⁷ The regulations defined "rehabilitation" as "an expenditure on replacements, improvements or additions of a capital nature to existing buildings, plant, machinery or equipment pertaining to sugar factories or their ancillary services, and on new cultivations, and includes expenditure on deferred maintenance or on new capital development."¹⁰⁸ Sugar manufacturers derived great benefits from the allocations obtained from the fund. Between 1960-65 they received the sum of £1,642,799 or an average of £273,800 per year. Of greater importance, however, was the fact that such sums of money were not regarded as income and therefore were not taxed.¹⁰⁹

The sugar industry was able to take advantage of additional tax holidays offered through the Industrial Incentives Law 1956.¹¹⁰ According to the terms of this legislation, incentives could be applied to all industrial projects whether or not the industry was already established in Jamaica. The Jamaican state apparently gave little thought to the fact that a broad application of tax holidays made no distinction between industries of differing profitability. Thus, in cases where an industry made high profits in its early years, the tax exemption was quite unnecessary and merely reduced the revenue which was available to the state. Additional incentives were granted by the state with the passing of the Export Industries (Encouragement) Law in 1956.¹¹¹ Under the provisions of this legislation, an investor was allowed to choose the concessions granted under either the Pioneer Industries (Encouragement) Law or the Industrial Incentives Law. However, in addition, the investor

was allowed to import raw materials, containers and supplies for use in the manufacturing process as well as items for repair or replacement of equipment, completely free of duty.

Table 3.19 provides data about companies producing non-food and food products which operated under industrial incentive laws. Of a total of 188 firms, only 13 produced food products while 175 produced non-food products. This kind of figure helps to explain why Jamaica had such a high level of food import.

Table 3.19

Companies Operating Under Incentive Laws
Producing Non-Food and Food Products

<u>Incentive Law</u>	<u>Non-Food Products</u>	<u>Food Products</u>	<u>Total</u>
Pioneer Industries (Encouragement) Law	16	2	18
Industrial Incentive Law	120	7	127
Export Industry (Encouragement) Law	39	4	43
Total Number of Firms	175	13	188

Source: Summary of Approvals Under Incentive Laws of Jamaica, Jamaica: Industrial Development Corporation, September, 1970, pp. 1-5.

Moreover in the 1960s, the sugar industry received additional grants from the government. In 1964, for example, income tax deductions in amounts ranging from 10 per cent to 60 per cent of the value of buildings and equipment added during 1964-66 was granted by the government.¹¹² Furthermore, in 1969 the government raised the price of local sugar thus enabling sugar manufacturers to realize a windfall of \$J. 2.2 million. In the same year also sugar manufacturers were granted an excise duty rebate of \$J 650,000, an

extension of the fertilizer subsidy at a cost of \$J 60,000, and an investment allowance of 40 per cent on all new capital invested in plant and equipment.¹¹³

Table 3.20

Companies Operating Under Incentive Laws Producing
Capital and Consumer Goods

Incentive Law	Capital Good Companies	Consumer Good Companies	Total
Pioneer Industries (Encouragement) Law	2	16	18
Industrial Incen- tive Law	25	102	127
Export Industry (Encouragement) Law	1	42	43
Total number of companies	28	160	188

Source: Summary of Approvals Under Incentive Laws of Jamaica.
Jamaica: Industrial Development Corporation, September,
1970, pp. 1-5.

Table 3.20 indicates that of the 188 companies that operated under incentive legislation, 28 were capital good companies while 160 produced consumer goods. The absence of a strong capital goods sector suggests that important aspects of the development of the country were being ignored.

One of the major features of restricted development which emanated from the kind of public policy that was espoused by the Jamaican state was the growth of a disarticulated economy, that is, an economy with severe sectoral imbalance. Nevertheless, the role of public policy should not be evaluated in simplistic terms. One must remember that in backward, capitalist economies like Jamaica,

the state was forced, because of the disadvantageous and underdeveloped position which it occupied in the world capitalist economy, to make concessions of all kinds to foreign capital.

Table 3.21 provides data on the ownership and fixed capital investment of firms which operated under incentive legislation. Firms wholly owned by interests from the USA had more than \$13 million dollars in investment. Bahamas had more than \$9 million invested. Jamaica had in excess of \$7 million while Canada and the UK had more than \$2 million in investment. Joint ventures totalled

Table 3.21

Fixed Capital Investment of Incentive Firms
Classified by Ownership (J\$)

Nature of Ownership 100% owned by interests from:	Pioneer Industrial (Encouragement) Law	Industrial Incentive Law	Export Industry Encourage- ment Law	Total
Jamaica	533,000	7,042,000	194,000	7,769,000
U.S.A.	1,120,000	10,071,000	1,815,000	13,006,000
U.K.	41,000	1,994,000	362,000	2,397,000
Canada	1,431,000	1,020,000	46,000	2,497,000
Bahamas	-	9,829,000	-	9,829,000
Panama	-	237,000	-	237,000
Joint Ventures) Jamaica and) others)	3,316,000	32,200,000	2,130,000	37,646,000
TOTAL	6,441,000	64,523,000	2,417,000	73,381,000

Source: Consolidated Data-Ownership of Companies Operating Under Incentive Laws as at Dece.31, 1969. Jamaica, Industrial Development Corporation, 1970, p.1.

more than \$37 million. It must be understood that these figures give only a partial picture of the total investment picture in Jamaica. First, sugar estates which were placed on the category of "joint ventures" were almost completely owned by British or American interests. A few token shares were owned by Jamaicans. Secondly, British investors often used the Bahamas as their home base for investment in the Caribbean. This allowed them increased tax advantages. Finally, many of the companies which were wholly Jamaican owned had been established through generous loans and grants made by the state-owned Jamaica Industrial Development Corporation (JIDC).¹¹⁴

Thus, in spite of the fact that the Jamaican government had intended to play a minimal role in the development of manufacturing, it was obliged, because of the influence of the local capitalist class and their foreign allies, to make concessions to private as well as foreign capital. In addition, the state was obliged to respond to the demands of the local comprador, capitalist class and was often able to enact only the kind of tax legislation which was acceptable to that class. Furthermore, the widespread Jamaican acceptance of conservative, metropolitan ideologies such as the Puerto Rico model of development, the supposed shortage of risk capital, and the competition among various underdeveloped countries for foreign capital, all impelled the Jamaican state to a sometime overenthusiastic promulgation of incentive legislation.¹¹⁵ Therefore, it is in the light of factors such as these that the post-war Jamaican economic sectoral imbalance must be seen.

Table 3.22

Major Functions of the Jamaican Industrial Development Corporation
as Ranked in Importance by Various Opinion Groups in Jamaica

Functions of JIDC (As ranked by all respondents taken as a group)	Opinion Groups										
	Political and Government Leaders	Senior Civil Servants	Senior Industrial Executives	Senior Labor Leaders	Bank and Insurance Leaders	Commercial Leaders	University Professors	Commercial and Professional Leaders	Non-Jamaican, nonresident Businessmen	International Organization Officials	U.S. Government Officials
1. Publicize industrial development in Jamaica	1	1	1	2	1	3	1	1	1	1	4
2. Conduct market feasibility studies for new industries	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	3	2	2	1
3. Provide technical services to industrial firms	3	3	3	3	3	5	4	2	3	3	3
4. Develop industrial sites or estates	4	4	5	4	4	4	5	6	4	4	2
5. Evaluate requests for participa- tion in tax-exempt programs	5	5	4	6	6	6	3	4	5	5	6
6. Provide factory buildings for industrial firms	7	6	6	7	5	2	7	5	6	6	5
7. Protect local industry from foreign competition	6	7	7	5	7	7	6	7	7	7	7

263 (a)

Source: A Report of the Jamaica Leadership Survey. Jamaica, JIDC, 1970.

Table 3.23

Measures Which Should be Used to Judge the Performance of the
Jamaican Industrial Development Corporation as Ranked by Various
Opinion Groups in Jamaica

Measures of Performance (As ranked by all respondents taken as a group)	Opinion Groups										
	Political and Governmental Leaders	Senior Civil Servants	Senior Industrial Executives	Senior Labor Leaders	Ranking and Insurance Leaders	Commercial Leaders	University Professors	Community and Professional Leaders	Non-Jamaican Businessmen	International Organization Officials	U.S. Government Officials
Number of people employed in as- sisted firms	1	1	1	1	6	6	1	1	7	5	3
Value of production of firms assisted	5	3	2	7	3	3	4	3	4	4	4
Amount of new investments in plant and equipment	9	4	7	8	1	5	6	2	1	1	1
New foreign capital brought into Jamaica	7	7	3	9	2	2	9	7	2	2	2
Value of local materials/services purchased	4	5	4	5	5	1	8	6	5	6	8
Value of exports of firms assisted	6	2	5	10	4	4	7	6	3	3	5
Valuation of payroll	3	6	6	4	8	7	3	5	8	8	10
Number of firms in areas of high un- employment	2	8	8	2	9	9	2	4	10	9	9
Whether firm has made a profit	10	9	9	6	7	8	10	10	6	7	7
Number of people trained by JIDC	8	10	10	3	10	10	5	9	9	10	6

263(b)

Source: A Report of the Jamaican Leadership Survey. Jamaica: JIDC 1970.

Table 3.22 reveals the kinds of opinions expressed by leaders of various groups in Jamaica regarding the JIDC. Of the 11 groups, 8 ranked the "protection of local industry from foreign competition" in the lowest category. Even political and government leaders did not place great emphasis on protecting local industry from foreign competition. The 11 groups represented the elite of the Jamaican socio-economic and political scene. Many of them were allies of the sugar investors and other foreign investors and wielded considerable power with the government.

As we can see from Table 3.23 the measures of how the performance of the JIDC should be ranked varied widely among certain groups. Whereas political and government leaders, senior civil servants, senior industrial executives, senior labour leaders, university professors, and community and professional leaders believed that the employment figure was a vital indicator, others such as banking and insurance leaders, commercial leaders, non-Jamaican businessmen, officials of international organizations viewed the employment indicator as unimportant. The second group thought that new foreign capital brought into Jamaica was an important indicator whereas most members of the first group did not. The fact that the government was so generous with the terms of this incentive legislation indicates the extent of the influence and power of the commercial classes.

Table 3.24 shows the kind of loss which the Jamaican government suffered from certain investments. Of a total investment

of \$2,110,760 made in certain companies, \$1,663,338 had to be written off.

Table 3.24

JIDC Total Investments and Investment
Writeoffs (As of March 31, 1963)
(\$ Jamaican)

<u>Form of Investment</u>	<u>Total Investment</u>	<u>Writeoff</u>	<u>Balance</u>
Shares of 6 Companies	125,220	93,066	32,154
Debentures of 19 Companies	1,839,038	1,513,312	325,726
Secured Loans of 12 Companies	71,848	-	71,848
Unsecured Loans of 9 Companies	76,654	56,960	17,694
Total	2,110,760	1,663,338	447,422

Source: JIDC Auditor's Report for 15 Months Ending March 31, 1963, Kingston: JIDC, 1964, Schedule 8, pp. 8-9.

Table 3.25

Employment in Manufacturing Companies
Approved Under Incentive Laws
As of December 31, 1969

<u>Incentive Law</u>	<u>No. of Firms</u>	<u>No. of Workers</u>
Pioneer Industries (Encouragement) Law	19	962
Industrial Incentive Law	127	5,998
Export Industry Encouragement Law	39	6,367
Total	185	13,327

Source: 1969 Statistical Report of Manufacturing Enterprises Approved and Operating Under Industrial Incentive Laws, Jamaica, JIDC, July 1970, pp. 14 and 19.

The data on employment provided by Table 3.25 indicate that the 185 incentive firms provide employment for 13,327 at the end of 1969. This figure seems low in view of the \$73,381,000 of fixed capital

which had been invested in these firms (Table 3.21). It seems likely that the technology involved was capital intensive rather than labour intensive. The increasing use of mechanization by the sugar industry in the planting and harvesting of sugar cane is a good example. The fact that many of these industries furnished few linkages with the rest of the economy, had duty free importation of vast amounts of their input, were mainly assembly-type branch plants of MNCs and had created only 13,327 jobs after 10 years in the country whose labour force was increasing by 25,000 per annum makes one realize that the gains from incentive legislation were minimal for the Jamaican economy.

At a time when foreign capitalists and their allies were prospering in Jamaica, the Jamaican educational system, health service, and the various local government services were starved for funds. The widespread illiteracy, and unstable primary education, the low level of medical and dental care as well as the inadequate transportation and other infrastructural service were all indicative of the lack of sectoral balance in the Jamaican economy.¹¹⁶

The inequitable income distribution was also a reflection of the lack of economic sectoral balance. In the 1960s, for example, the top 20 per cent of Jamaican householders received 61.5 per cent of the national income. The bottom 20 per cent, on the other hand, managed to obtain only 2.2 per cent.¹¹⁷

The incentive legislation enacted by the Jamaican state produced a second major feature of underdevelopment, namely, the decrease of the tax base and consequently, the decline of the

revenue which was available to the country. This fact, plus the fact that the contribution of foreign investors to the total social economy of the country was less than what was expected, compelled the government to borrow from overseas sources. The foreign debt of Jamaica increased substantially over the years--from J\$ 9.0 million in 1946 to J\$ 39.0 million in 1962 (political independence) to J\$ 100.2 million in 1970. Since 1960 the foreign debt has increased at an annual average of 18.1 per cent.¹¹⁸

In this study I do not view foreign borrowing in the ahistorical and mechanistic manner that is common to many diffusionist theorists. Nevertheless, at first sight their argument appears to be fairly plausible. They usually contend that since underdeveloped countries are lacking the capital necessary to promote meaningful economic transformation, it is necessary to fill this gap by foreign borrowing. Thus, foreign capital generates an increase in the growth rate of the economy with the result that the rich countries assist in the economic development of the poor countries.

However, by arguing in this way, diffusionists not only ignore the extent to which the borrower has to forego purchasing power in order to service the debt, but also the international fiscal ostracism faced by the underdeveloped countries in the event of default in debt repayment. However, the weakest aspect of this kind of argument is that it fails to see in the entire system of public debt an underlying principle of capitalist accumulation identifiable in its historical perspective.¹¹⁹ What must be

emphasised, therefore, is that finance capital functions in accordance with the laws governing the movement of any capital. Thus, foreign finance capital is primarily concerned with realizing and repatriating surplus value to its metropolitan homeland or to other countries.

Foreign finance capital may be divided into productive capital and loan capital. The MNC investment of Tate and Lyle in Jamaica is a good example of the former. In this case millions of dollars were repatriated to the metropolis during the period under study. In the case of loan capital, a stream of surplus value in the form of interest and other costs were drained out of the Jamaican economy. Thus, although analytical clarification necessitates the distinction between productive and loan capital, these two forms of capital exports may be seen as features of imperialist expansion and tend to reinforce each other.¹²⁰

Nevertheless, in peripheral economies like Jamaica, the underdevelopment produced by the infusion of foreign finance capital should not be seen simply in terms of decapitalization. First, these kinds of capital inflows encouraged a dependence on such sources and thereby helped to prevent any fundamental examination of the system of economic relationships and the true nature of the economic problems in the Jamaican economy. Secondly, such capital, because of strict stipulations, encouraged the dependence on foreign contractors, foreign technicians and foreign materials. Third, the stringent conditions imposed by foreign government "donors" as to which sectors of the economy should be financed, contributed to

sectoral disarticulation.¹²¹ Finally, many elements in the local capitalist class were granted easy access to finance which was channelled to them through agencies like the Jamaica Development Bank (JDB) and the Jamaica Industrial Development Corporation (JIDC). The fact that corporate tax payments by both local and foreign capitalists have been declining since 1967, is further evidence of the asymmetrical development of the Jamaican economy.¹²²

LINKAGES

The question of the lack of linkages between the Jamaican sugar industry and the rest of the economy is important since it helps to elucidate the nature of the underdevelopment which plagued the country.

In spite of an acute and increasing awareness by Caribbean political leaders since the 1950s of the need to exercise some control over the sugar industry, the plantation sector has operated throughout the post-war period with little or no control by Caribbean governments, and no effort to integrate it into the rest of the economy.¹²³

During the post-war period, there was a marked lack of both backward and forward linkages.

One of the major indicators of the lack of backward linkages was the fact that the sugar industry purchased the vast majority of its imports from abroad. Thus, all the machinery and equipment and most of the supplies required by sugar manufacturers such as Tate and Lyle were obtained through metropolitan affiliates of the corporation. Consequently, the multiplier effects of this kind of

transaction accrued to metropolitan sources rather than to Jamaica. The major domestic input purchased by the sugar industry was local labour and, as I shall show in Chapter 5, the majority of sugar workers were unskilled labourers, whose socio-economic advancement was constrained by their inequitable wage scale.

The shipping of Jamaican export sugar provides another example of how poorly the sugar industry was integrated with the rest of the economy. Although the cost of freight was quite high, and had to be borne by the local economy, the Jamaican state played no role in shipping and thereby deprived the local economy of the value added which would otherwise have accrued to it. All the shipping was done by boats owned by Tate and Lyle.

The fact that the sugar industry provided no training schemes or apprenticeship programmes for its skilled and semi-skilled workers, is further indication of the poor backward linkages between the industry and the local economy. The paucity of social and economic amenities such as water supply, roads, and recreation supplied by the sugar industry to its workers furnish additional evidence of the lack of backward linkages.

One of the important indicators of the lack of forward linkages between the sugar industry and the local economy was the fact that, by law, sugar manufacturers were the only body permitted to produce distilled spirits. This legislation, The Spirits Control Law, was enacted as early as 1934.¹²⁴ This law prevented the inception of free market competition by licensed local distillers. Such competition would certainly have lowered the price of local

spirits which was largely fixed by the SMA. The legislation also ensured that the SMA was the major party which would benefit from such sales. Between 1959-65, for example, the sugar manufacturers earned a net income of more than £8 million from the sale of spirits.¹²⁵

The production and marketing of molasses, a by-product of sugar, also support my arguments concerning the lack of forward linkages. In 1962 the Spirits Control Law was modified which gave the SMA a monopoly over the sale of molasses. Although the CFA received certain benefits from such sales, it had no voice in the marketing procedures. As we saw in the case of sugar, it was the SMA which controlled the transaction. The major metropolitan buyer of molasses was the United Molasses Company Limited, a subsidiary of Tate and Lyle.¹²⁶

Of equal importance is the fact that because molasses was regarded primarily as a commodity for export by the SMA to its metropolitan allies, this product was never widely utilized in the local community. For example, if molasses had been extensively used as feed for livestock, the local dependence on imported grain would have been reduced and the dairy livestock industries would have been greatly assisted. In fact, very little research was undertaken in Jamaica during the period under study to assess the nutritional benefits which people might derive from a judicious consumption of molasses. Since molasses is rich in minerals and is used by many people in some countries, this product could have been utilized to ameliorate the general health of the population of Jamaica.

Another by-product of sugar manufacture which, with proper research, would have been a boon to the Jamaican economy was bagasse. Although this material has been used as a source of cellulose for the production of both hard and soft boards, pulp, agricultural mulch, and animal litter, its use in Jamaica was extremely limited. Indeed, the most widespread use of bagasse was as a fuel. However, even in this respect, the potential of the commodity was never fully exploited in Jamaica. As the Sugar Industry Commission (1966) suggested, "A well designed modern sugar factory will require all of its bagasse production for steam generation."¹²⁷ But few manufacturers even attempted to undertake the required modernization. Moreover, although bagasse showed good promise as a fuel for tractors and other machinery, this possibility was not widely explored. In many cases, sugar manufacturers simply dumped their bagasse.

The final by-product of sugar was filter-cake. This material which was rich in organic matter, nitrogen, phosphate and lime, showed excellent possibilities for use as fertilizer. However, in most cases this product was simply dumped. The fact that it was wet and bulky and posed problems for transportation, has often been cited as an explanation for the fact that it was not widely utilized. I suspect, however, that MNCs supplying fertilizers to their affiliates in Jamaica would have been less than happy to find that their market was being undercut by a local product. Thus, another possibility of forward linkage between the sugar industry and the Jamaican economy was thwarted, and the

underdevelopment which for so long had characterized this country, was steadfastly maintained.

CONCLUSION

Foreign investment in the Jamaican sugar industry underdeveloped the economy of the country at various levels. It is therefore important to understand underdevelopment as a dynamic rather than a static process. Thus, the exclusion of African-Jamaicans from positions of power in the sugar industry, the tremendous power wielded by foreign corporate executives and their allies, the rampant economic distortions and dependence which plagued the Jamaican economy, as well as the disarticulated public policy, all emphasize the multidimensional character of underdevelopment.

During the post-war period, the exploitative nature of monopoly capitalism played havoc with economic development in Jamaica. Underdevelopment was clearly evident in the unequal economic relationship between the periphery and the metropolis. By analyzing Jamaican underdevelopment in terms of Western capitalist surplus accumulation, appropriation and subsequent reinvestment in the periphery, I have tried to remove some of the confusion and ideological predilection which, in the works of some writers, have obscured conceptual clarity and have thus impeded a comprehension of the phenomenon of underdevelopment.

FOOTNOTES

1. Understanding the Jamaican Economy: Report of the National Savings Committee of Jamaica. Kingston, Jamaica, 1979, p.3.
2. Development Assistance Directorate Stock of Private Direct Investment by Member Countries in the Development Assistance Committee in Developing Countries, End 1967. Paris, OECD, pp.68-90.
3. Tate and Lyle Times International, Feb. 1970, p.18.
4. See Tate and Lyle Directors Reports and Accounts, London, 1968, p.9; S. Beckford, Persistent Poverty, New York: OUP, 1972, pp. 134-137.
5. United Fruit Company, The United Fruit Company in Middle America: (Company Pamphlet) Boston, 1965, pp. 2-13.
6. Booker McConnell Reports and Accounts. New York, 1968, pp.20-22.
7. Daily Gleaner, Jamaica, May 5, 1976, p.12.
8. Report of a Long-Range Plan for the Jamaica Sugar Industry. Kingston, Jamaica, 1971, p.14.
9. Daily Gleaner, May 8, 1976, p.14. For a useful study of Worthy Park, see M. Craton and J. Walvin, A Jamaican Plantation, The History of Worthy Park, 1670-1970. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971.
10. Census of Jamaica, 1970.
11. M. Craton and J. Walvin, op cit., p.266.
12. Daily Gleaner, Nov. 9, 1981, p.23.
13. Ibid.
14. A similar pattern may be seen in other family-owned plantations operated by settler investors, e.g. Serge Island, Sevens, and United Estate.
15. Statistical Yearbook of Jamaica, 1969, p.64.
16. Ibid, p.72.
17. Report of the Sugar Industry Commission (1966). Kingston, Jamaica, 1966, p.15 (Henceforth referred to as Sugar Report, 1966.
18. Ibid.
19. This is discussed in Chapter 5.
20. Sugar Report, 1966, p.15.

21. Ibid.
22. Ibid, p.16.
23. Statistics of the Sugar Industry of Jamaica, Jamaica, 1930, p.28.
24. Sugar Report, 1966, op cit, p.113.
25. Ibid, pp. 11-12.
26. Ibid, p.11.
27. Ibid, p.193.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid, p.12.
31. Ibid, p.13.
32. Ibid, p.14. For examples of how the SMA often undermined the authority of the CFA, see Daily Gleaner, July 14, 1965.
33. Sugar Digest-Report of the Sugar Industry Authority. Jamaica, 1973, p.16.
34. Tate and Lyle Times International, 1969, p.5.
35. Sugar Digest, op cit., p.16.
36. Ibid.
37. This view was widely expressed by the Caribbean Commission, the Anglo-American body which was set-up in the Caribbean in the post-war period. It had various specialized agencies, one of the most important of which was the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. For a summary of the views of the Commission, see: Caribbean Commission Central Secretariat, The Promotion of Industrial Development in the Caribbean. Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, 1952.
38. See A. Lewis, "The Industrialization of the British West Indies" Caribbean Economic Review, Vol.2, 1950, pp. 1-61; C.J. Burgess, "Pre-War Industrial Development", Caribbean Commission Monthly Bulletin, Vol.6, No.4, November 1952.
39. See Five-Year Independence Plan 1963-1968: A Long Term Development Plan for Jamaica. Kingston, Jamaica, 1963.
40. See A Report of Commonwealth Caribbean Financial Statistics. Jamaica, 1970, p.27.

41. Understanding the Jamaican Economy: Report of the National Savings Committee of Jamaica, op cit., p.22.
42. These banks and the date of their establishment were Barclays Bank (1836), Bank of Nova Scotia (1889), Royal Bank of Canada (1911), Canadian Bank of Commerce (1920), Bank of London and Montreal (1959), Jamaica Citizens Bank (1967). See Digest of Statistics, Department of Statistics, Jamaica, 1969, p.32; see also C. Callender, The Development of Capital Market Institutions in Jamaica, Jamaica, 1965, p.47.
43. Monetary Statistics, Department of Statistics, Jamaica, 1968, p.47.
44. Report of the West Indian Royal Commission, Jamaica, 1945, pp. 4-7.
45. For a discussion of this topic and some of its ramifications, see Report to the Government of Jamaica on Planning Agricultural Development, Rome, Food and Agricultural Organization, 1963, pp. 30-58.
46. Bank of Jamaica, Annual Report 1967, p.25.
47. Daily Gleaner. February 24, 1968, p.18.
48. Sugar Report, 1966, op cit., p.55.
49. Sugar Report, 1960, op cit., p.35.
50. Sugar Report, 1966, op cit., p.41.
51. Speech made by Havelock Brewster, on "The Social Economy of Sugar", University of the West Indies, Feb.22, 1968.
52. Even if one argues that the data can suggest that the rest of the Jamaican economy was growing faster than that of sugar, one must bear in mind that retained export earnings dropped from about 30 per cent in 1955 to 15 per cent in 1970. See Economic Survey of Jamaica, 1956, 1971, Central Planning Unit, Jamaica.
53. Sugar Report 1966, op cit., p.193.
54. Ibid, p.55.
55. Ibid, p.190.
56. Ibid, p.56.
57. Ibid, p.60.
58. Ibid.
59. O. Jefferson, The Post-War Economic Development of Jamaica, Jamaica, ISER., p.86.

60. Ibid, p.98. This kind of comment should not be interpreted as a plea for state management but simply for more careful planning by the state.
61. Sugar Report 1966, p.67.
62. Ibid, p.61.
63. Ibid, p.291.
64. Ibid, p.67.
65. Ibid. Also, see Daily Gleaner, Feb. 25, 1968, p.5. The question of technology is discussed in Chapter 5.
66. The International Sugar Agreement. London, HMSO, 1953; The International Sugar Agreement. London, HMSO, 1959. The data which follow are based on these sources.
67. The World Sugar Economy: Structure and Policies, United Nations, 1963, pp. 18-24
68. Structure of the International Sugar Market, Paris: OECD, 1970, p.70.
69. Ibid, p.71.
70. The Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, London, HMSO, 1953.
71. M. Moynagh, "The Negotiation of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement", Journal of Commonwealth Comparative Politics, Vol.XV, July 1977, p.170.
72. V. Timoshenko and B. Swerling, The World's Sugar. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1957, p.115.
73. Statement of Combined Sugar Sales for the 1958 Crop. CFA, Jamaica, 1958.
74. Structure of the International Sugar Market, op cit, p.28.
75. Ibid, p.29.
76. Ibid, p.28.
77. Economic Survey, Jamaica, 1957, 1970.
78. Sugar Year Books, 1964-1970, International Sugar Council, London. Jamaica's US quota was increased after the USA refused Cuban sugar.
79. Structure of the International Sugar Market op cit., p.29.
80. Sugar Report, 1966, op cit., p.146.
81. Ibid.

82. Daily Gleaner, June 15, 1968, p.18.
83. Structure of the International Sugar Market op cit., p.30.
84. Tate and Lyle Times, London, June 1967, p.4.
85. Structure of the International Sugar Market, op cit., p.30.
86. Tate and Lyle Times. London, June 1967, p.5.
87. H. Brewster, "Sugar Our Life or Death." in N. Girvan and O. Jefferson (eds.) Readings in the Political Economy of the Caribbean. Jamaica: New World Group Ltd., 1971, p.47.
88. Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, op cit., Article 3.
89. See Table 3.14 for some indication.
90. Daily Gleaner, Feb.20, 1968 (Letter by W. Perkins).
91. G. Beckford, Persistent Poverty, New York: O.U.P., p.181.
92. Sugar in Jamaica, Kingston, Jamaica, SMA publication, 1965, p.3.
93. "Minutes of Meeting between Britain and Colonies" Commonwealth Sugar Conference 1949, London: HMSO, 1949.
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95. This was a feature of the various sugar agreements.
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97. Ibid, p.156.
98. O. Jefferson, op cit., p.127.
99. The Statement of Policy on Colonial Development and Welfare. London: HMSO 1940.
100. Report of the West India Royal Commission, 1938-39, London: HMSO.
101. See A National Plan for Jamaica 1957-1967. Jamaica, 1958.
102. For a vivid analysis of the "colonial trader mentality" see the speech of Michael Manley in Jamaica Hansard: Proceeding of the House of Representatives of Jamaica, Kingston, Jamaica, June 4, 1969.
103. Daily Gleaner, May 26, 1963.

104. For an analysis of public policy in the Caribbean, see M. Odle, "Public Policy", in G. Beckford (ed.) Caribbean Economy. Jamaica, ISER 1975, pp.130-146.
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111. Ibid.
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115. See C. Kirton, "A Preliminary Analysis of Imperialist Penetration and Control via the Foreign Debt: A Study of Jamaica," in C. Stone and A. Brown (eds.), Essays on Power and Change in Jamaica. Kingston: Jamaica Publishing House, 1977, pp.73-75.
116. Five-Year Independence Plan 1963-68: A Long Term Development Programme for Jamaica, Kingston, Jamaica, 1963. This plan highlights some of the socio-economic problems facing the country.
117. Ibid.
118. External Trade Report of Jamaica, Kingston, Jamaica, 1970, p.27.
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120. Ibid.
121. Tax Holidays for Industry: Why we have to Abolish them and how to do it. Report of the New World Group, No.8. Jamaica, 1973.

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123. I. Jainarain, Trade and Underdevelopment. Guyana: Institute of Development Studies, 1976, p.251.
124. Sugar Report, 1966, p.159.
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126. Ibid, p.162.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE SUGAR INDUSTRY AND THE UNDERDEVELOPMENT
OF JAMAICAN AGRICULTURE

INTRODUCTION

Since agriculture plays an important role in the socio-economic development of a country, it is important to analyze, in this chapter, the manner in which foreign investment in the Jamaican sugar industry contributed to the destabilization of the agricultural sector of the economy.

One of the most striking indicators of underdevelopment was the unequal land distribution which plagued post-war Jamaican agriculture. The acreage held by foreign investors operation in the sugar industry was so vast that many peasant farmers who were producing for the domestic market were forced to subsist on holdings which were too small to be economically viable. In addition, since the sugar industry possessed some of the most fertile lands in the country, peasant agriculture often had to be undertaken in areas which were unsuitable for intensive cultivation

Sugar plantations also limited the labour supply of peasant farmers. Although the wages paid by plantation were quite low, many peasant farmers were so destitute that they could not compete with even this kind of wage scale in order to attract workers. Indeed,

many members of the peasantry, because of the poor returns from their unproductive holdings, were themselves obliged to quit their farms and seek employment on the sugar plantations. These two factors serve to accentuate the distorted nature of labour relations experienced by the peasantry. When one realizes that local capital, which was desperately needed by the peasantry in order to improve the efficiency and yield of their farms, was often channelled into the hands of foreign investors, one can understand the extent to which the aspirations of peasant farmers were thwarted and their productive capacity severely constrained.

The final example of underdevelopment may be seen in the neglect of domestic agriculture which characterized the programmes and policies which were initiated in post-war Jamaica. Because of the power wielded by foreign investors, the amount of planning and research devoted to "cash crops" such as sugar was far superior to the planning and research undertaken on crops that were geared to the domestic market. The nutritional concerns of the local population were therefore sacrificed to the interests of multinational corporate profits. This neglect of domestic agriculture was also manifested in the inadequate marketing structure for local crops and in the high food imports which marked the Jamaican economy during the period under review.

LAND DISTRIBUTION

It is important to recall that the total land area of Jamaica consists of only 2.8 million acres. Of this, between 1.5

and 1.7 million acres were under cultivation during the post-war period. Nevertheless, the aggregate holdings of foreign investors in sugar plantations amounted to over 200,000 acres.¹

In order to understand the disadvantageous position occupied by the peasantry, it is necessary to examine carefully the structure of the agricultural sector of the economy. As one can see from Table 4.1, the distribution of farm acreage by size groups of farms was quite uneven during the period under review. In 1954, for example, farms of less than 5 acres represented 69.9 per cent of farms but only 13.9 per cent of farm acreage.

Table 4.1

Distribution of Farm Acreage by Size Group of Farms, 1954 and 1968

Size Group	<u>1954</u>		<u>1968</u>	
	% of Farms	% of Farm Acreage	% of Farms	% of Farm Acreage
Less than 5 acres	69.91	13.93	77.96	14.85
5 acres to under 25 acres	26.66	23.87	19.88	22.13
25 acres to under 100 acres	2.82	10.76	1.62	8.30
100 acres to under 500 acres	0.44	11.41	0.38	9.85
500 acres and over	<u>0.17</u>	<u>40.03</u>	<u>0.16</u>	<u>44.87</u>
	<u>100.00</u>	<u>100.00</u>	<u>100.00</u>	<u>100.00</u>

Sources: Census of Agriculture 1954, Jamaica, 1955.
Census of Agriculture 1968, Jamaica, 1969.

Furthermore, although farms of over 500 acres accounted for only 0.17 per cent of farms, they occupied 40 per cent of the acreage.

By 1968 this uneven distribution had become even more pronounced. Although farms of over 500 acres still accounted for

almost the same share of farms, their portion of farm acreage had increased from 40.03 to 44.87 per cent. At the same time farms of less than 5 acres augmented their share of the number of farms from 69.91 to 77.96 per cent. However, their share of farm acreage did not increase by much - from 13.9 to 14.85 per cent. This unequal division of farmland assumes an even more inequitable perspective when one realizes that between 1954 and 1968, more than 280,000 acres had been lost from the farming area. Table 4.2 shows that whereas in 1954 the total acreage of farms was 1,788,660, by 1968 this figure had been reduced to 1,507,397 acres.

Table 4.2

Number and Acreage of Farms by Size Groups 1954 and 1968

	0 to under 5 acres	5 to under 25 acres	25 to under 100 acres	100 to under 500 acres	500 and over	
	5 acres	25 acres	100 acres	500 acres	and over	All Farms
Number of farms						
1954	139043	53024	5603	881	332	198883
1968	144604	36881	3004	699	295	185483
Acreage of Farms						
1954	249079	426976	192411	204131	716068	1788660
1968	223818	333548	125014	148501	676426	1507397
Acreage per Farm						
1954	1.8	8.0	34.3	231.7	2156.8	9.0
1968	1.5	9.0	41.6	212.4	2293.0	8.1
Sources: <u>Census of Agriculture 1954, Jamaica, 1955.</u>						
<u>Census of Agriculture 1968, Jamaica, 1969.</u>						

Nevertheless, the unequal land distribution in Jamaica was marked not only by the vastness of the acreage held by foreign investors in the sugar industry but also by the fact that a sizeable portion of

such land was not devoted to the production of sugar. For example the Sugar Industry Commission (1966) reported that although the aggregate holdings of the eighteen estates was over 200,000 acres, only about 90,000 acres were planted in sugar cane.² Some bodies, such as the Sugar Manufacturers' Association (SMA) attempted to justify this state of affairs by arguing that certain portions of this land had severe agronomic limitations while other sections were devoted to crops other than sugar.³ However, this kind of argument does not, in any way, rebut my basic contention that foreign investors contributed greatly to the unequal land distribution in Jamaica. Indeed, a survey of 13 of the 18 estates carried out by the SMA itself reveals that 80 per cent of the arable land was devoted to sugar cane cultivation, 9 per cent was in pasture, and only 3 per cent had been turned over to the cultivation of crops such as corn, bananas, citrus. This last portion was, therefore, quite negligible.⁴

Nevertheless, the question of the unused land is of primary importance. If, as the SMA contends in its survey of 13 estates, only 54 per cent of such land was arable, and only 12 per cent was devoted to pasture or other crops, then one must question the use to which the remaining land was being put. It seems unlikely that domestic, recreational or squatters' acreages would have accounted for very much. One is thus left to conclude that the sugar industry kept vast areas of idle lands. Indeed, the Sugar Industry Commission (1966) pointed out that in recent years the sugar industry had reclaimed some 8,000 acres of swamp lands and salina.⁵

A brief look at the data on some sugar plantations will support the major thrust of my argument.⁶ At the Appleton estate, for example, 3,742 acres of land were being used to cultivate sugar canes in 1966. However, 4,971 acres were in forest, and, only 129 acres were in pasture while 756 acres were used for "other" activities. Indeed, no other crops were recorded as being cultivated on this estate. At Bernard Lodge, one-third of the estate area was left in forest. At Frome estate, 14,605 acres were in sugar, no other crops were recorded but more than 7,000 acres served "other" purposes. At Monymusk, 19,586 acres were in sugar, but 19,686 acres served "other" uses. A similar proportion existed at Jamaica Sugar Estates.

It seems quite clear that in many cases foreign investors owned more forest lands than lands devoted to sugar canes. We have seen such examples in the case of Appleton, and Monymusk. The same picture prevailed in the case of Serge Island Estate - 2,700 acres for sugar canes and 5,003 acres in forest, in the case of Trelawney estate with 4,488 acres in sugar canes and 7,750 in forest, as well as in the case of Worthy Park where 1,589 acres were in sugar canes and 6,036 acres were in forest.

It is important to affirm that the land labelled "forest" was simply idle land. It was in no sense a planned afforestation programme. Many areas devoted to "other" activities were also little more than idle land.⁷ It seems obvious that in a poor country with an economy based largely on agriculture, there should not be so much "idle" land. In fact, one might not be wrong in

attributing ulterior motives to sugar manufacturers for removing so much land from production. In the first place, land ownership can be a means of increasing political power. Secondly, ownership of land can increase the flexibility of accounting since its valuation can be used to raise the value of the capital stock and thus to adjust the rate of profit. Finally, land can be utilized as a means of protection if there is a possibility of nationalization and if current market prices are a part of the compensation arrangements. Therefore, it is not difficult to see why foreign investors in Jamaican sugar had a vested interest in holding excess land and keeping it from production.⁸ Thus, the unequal land distribution engendered by the foreign ownership of sugar plantation areas retarded the development of industries which might have developed with a planned afforestation programme, for example a pulp and paper industry. When one considers that in the late nineteen sixties, the Jamaican import of pulp and wood paper amounted to over J\$24 million, then the extent of the savings which would have accrued to the country by the establishment of such an industry becomes obvious.⁹

In addition to the fact that sugar manufacturers possessed extensive acreage, a large portion of which was unused, the areas in which sugar canes were grown contained some of the most fertile soil in the country. During the period under study, most of the sugar estates were situated in the coastal plains, although there were a few in the inland basin areas. It was in these areas that most of the rich loam and the light alluvial soil were found. It has been

clearly demonstrated that these soils are among the most fertile in the entire country.¹⁰

It is now instructive to examine the question of land distribution among the peasantry in order to illustrate the extent to which their underdevelopment ensued from foreign corporate investment in the sugar industry. In the early twentieth century, especially with the growth of the banana industry, the various strata among the peasantry had become more sharply defined.¹¹ However, my predominant concern is with the poor peasants - those who owned less than five acres of farmland, and the middle peasants - those who owned between five and twenty-five acres of farmland. These two categories comprise the so-called "Jamaican small farmer".¹² As we can see from Table 4.1, by 1968 the small farmer occupied 97.84 per cent of all farms in the country. However, his percentage of farm acreage amounted to only 36.98 per cent. In other words, the last three owners of farm land namely the "well-to-do peasants," the export-oriented capitalist farmers and the "land barons", owned 2.16 per cent of farms, but 63.02 per cent of farm acreage.

Although foreign investors were to be found in the last two categories, the middle category of rich peasants consisting primarily of mulattoes, ethnic Jamaicans and a small portion of African-Jamaicans, were, in many cases, also members of the petty bourgeoisie which had gradually emerged after the emancipation of slavery.

For the Jamaican small farmer, paucity of farm land was one

of the major restraints on productive capacity. Let us recall that the main Jamaican post-war export crops were sugar, bananas, cocoa, coffee, citrus, ginger and pimento. Although the export market was dominated by the produce of wealthy farmers and MNCs, the peasants also participated in growing crops for export since the price structure and marketing procedures of such crops ensured fairly certain sales. However, because crops geared to the domestic market were grown predominantly by the peasantry and peasants did not possess large acreages, small farmers were not able to satisfy the demand for crops grown for local consumption.

Table 4.3 shows that in 1968 the production of vegetables and legumes amounted to only a little over 73,000 tons, while potatoes totalled only 34,146 tons. Since, at this time, the per capita consumption of vegetables was about 7.5 lbs per year, and about 18lbs per year for potatoes, and since such figures conceal vast disparities in a country where most of the population was under-consuming vegetables at the desired nutritional level¹³, it seems quite clear that the peasantry could not satisfy the requirements of the local population for important foodstuffs. Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that the other domestic crops produced by small farmers met most of the nutritional needs of the Jamaican public.

Nevertheless, there are other factors which we must consider in the analysis of the productive capacity of the small farmer. The topography of the land cultivated by such people is of crucial importance. Since MNCs possessed the most fertile lands in

coastal areas, the peasantry had to pursue its cultivation in mountainous areas with inferior soils. A brief note on the topography of Jamaica is important.¹⁴

Table 4.3

Production of Main Domestic Crops

Crop	Production (short ton)
Legumes	7,044
Vegetables	66,410
Condiments	3,753
Fruits	12,400
Cereals	5,658
Plantains	24,826
Potatoes	34,146
Yams	134,435
Other Tubers	48,860

Source: Census of Agriculture 1968, Jamaica, 1969.

From a topographical point of view, the country may be divided into three main physiographic regions, each of which is characterized by different types of land forms: (1) the interior mountain ranges; (2) the limestone plateaus and hills, and (3) the coastal plains and interior valleys. The last named area was the most fertile in the country. It was here that many sugar plantations were located.

The interior mountain ranges comprise the core of the island. The most prominent is the Blue Mountain range which runs lengthwise for 44 miles at the eastern part of the country. The peak is 7,402 feet. The Port Royal Mountains, a complicated series of ridges, form a chain of foothills which run parallel to the western part of the main ridge. They consist of several peaks above 4,000 feet in height. In Jamaica there are 26 other principal peaks

ranging from 1,500 to 6,000 feet.

Table 4.4 indicates the elevation above sea level of the parishes of Jamaica. The total area of the country is 4411.21 square miles. Areas below 1,000 total 2261.73 square miles. The areas between 1,000 - 3,000 feet amount to 1966.48 square miles. Areas between 3,000 - 5,000 feet come to 144 square miles. The highest areas 5,000 feet and above comprise 39 square miles. Much of the areas below 1,000 feet was occupied by towns and villages. The mining of bauxite, the most important economic mineral, also took place in this kind of locality. Large deposits are to be found in Clarendon, St. Catherine, Manchester, St.Elizabeth, St. Ann and Trelawny. The mining of gypsum and other minerals such as copper, lead and zinc also took place on a small scale.

The rich, fertile, alluvial plains included the Liguanea Plain in Kingston and St. Andrew, the Rio Cobre and St.Dorothy of Plains in St. Catherine, the Plain of Vere in Clarendon, the Pedro Plain in St. Elizabeth and the George's Plain in Westmoreland. St. Thomas also had fertile valleys formed by the Plantation Garden River and the Yallahs River. Foreign investors in sugar flourished in these areas. Very few Jamaican small farmers were to be found here. Such people had to eke out their existence on marginal hill-side plots.

Table 4.5 present a slope analysis of the Jamaican landscape. Level land accounts for 39 per cent of the total area while 28 per cent is of a moderate slope. Fairly steep and steep areas total 33 per cent.

Peasant farmers in the north-eastern section of the country had either gently to steeply rounded hills with few abrupt changes or rocky hills.¹⁵ The soils were largely clay; in some cases the soils had limestone rock outcrops. Although fertility was moderate, in many cases when erosion took place the effect was

Table 4.4

Area above Sea Level according to Parishes

Parishes	Area below 1,000ft	1,000ft. to 3,000ft	3,000ft. to 5,000ft	5,000ft. and upwards	Total area in sq. miles
Kingston	9.35	.75	--	--	10.10
St. Andrew	60.3	87	31	3	181.30
St. Thomas	141.17	102	42	15	300.17
Portland	97.53	143	67	21	328.53
St. Mary	112.04	138	4	--	254.04
St. Ann	88	393.05	--	--	481.05
Trelawny	172.55	180	--	--	352.55
St. James	142.11	98.5	--	--	240.61
Hanover	168.08	9	--	--	177.08
Westmoreland	244.39	76	--	--	320.89
St. Elizabeth	339.94	134.5	--	--	474.44
Manchester	47	292.79	--	--	339.79
Clarendon	304	163.89	--	--	467.89
St. Catherine	335.27	148	--	--	483.27
<u>Total</u>	<u>2261.73</u>	<u>1966.48</u>	<u>144</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>4411.21</u>

Source: The Handbook of Jamaica, Jamaica, 1953, pp.11-27.

Table 4.5

Slope Analysis of Landscape in Jamaica

<u>Slope</u>	<u>% of Total Area</u>	<u>Acreage</u>
Level Land	39	1,068,000
Moderate Slope	28	760,000
Fairly Steep	22	585,000
Very Steep	11	293,000

Source: National Plan of Jamaica, 1970-1990, Jamaica: Central Planning Unit, 1970.

very serious because the subsoil was so deficient in organic matter. Peasants in the eastern part of the island had farmlands consisting of ridges with moderate to steep slopes. The thin soil was composed of clay and was poorly drained. There were frequent cases of soil erosion.

In the south-eastern section of the country, peasant farmlands ranged from precipitous to hilly terrain. The area was deeply dissected, and slopes normally varied from 25 degrees to 40 degrees with most of the slopes outside this range being steeper. Although erosion had been quite severe, a state of equilibrium had been reached so that under present conditions, the low yield was unlikely to decline further as long as gully erosion did not occur. The drainage was excessive and the soil was largely clay loam.

Peasant holdings in the southern part of the country displayed many of the features to which I have previously referred. For example, those which were in the deep interior had rolling ridges with long steep or moderately steep slopes. Much of the soil was a mixture of tuffs, conglomerates, shales, and clay. Although some of these soils were fairly easily cultivated, they were

extremely erodible and low in nutrients. Nevertheless, parts of the southern section of the country had some of the better peasant holdings. There were cases where the land consisted of gentle rolling plains and where the clay was mixed with old alluvial loam. However such soils tended to be acidic and to be plastic when moist and friable when wet. Furthermore many such farmlands showed only moderate to low fertility.

In the south-western part of the country, many peasant holdings consisted of a mixture of moderately sloping planes and rocky hills. However, although such soil was plastic even when damp, it was seldom wet because it was extremely permeable. Furthermore it was liable to wind erosion when bare.

Peasant holdings in the western part of the country were located on moderate to steep hills. Most of the soil consisted of a mixture of clay, limestone, shales, conglomerates and tuffaceous rocks. The fertility ranged from medium to low. Much of the soil was quite eroded.

As one observes the topography of the farm land occupied by the peasantry, one may note that the terrain not only had limited fertility but frequently received inadequate rainfall. Although rain fall in some areas ranged between 60 and 80 inches per year and was fairly well distributed, in other areas especially in the south, rainfall was small and unreliable with the result that severe droughts were quite common. Therefore, the plight of the peasant farmer was quite onerous.

In order to understand fully the underdevelopment of

peasant farmers which arose from the inequitable distribution of land in Jamaica, it is necessary to examine some of the ramifications which sprang from such distribution. One of the most notable was fragmentation. This term refers to a situation where a farmer, not just a hired operator, owns and/or runs a holding comprising more than one parcel. Many peasant farmers were forced to fragment their lands because of the physical constraints imposed by harsh, geographical factors associated with the kind of terrain they were forced to cultivate.

The question of fragmentation is indeed a vexed one since arguments in favour of the phenomenon are often correctly made where land barons hold vast, fertile farm lands and prevent the peasantry from participating in agriculture.¹⁶ One must also remember that in post-war Jamaica, there were also various socio-cultural factors which might have contributed to fragmentation. However, those aspects fall outside the scope of this study. My emphasis on the physical factors in the case of the Jamaican small farmer is meant to highlight the fact that such people were unable to cultivate wherever they wanted on their small plots because certain sections were inoperable. The result was that only one-third of the small farms each consisted of one piece of land, just over one-third consisted of two pieces and the remainder consisted of more than two pieces. It is not surprising, then, that during the period under review, the farms of many peasants were too small to be economically viable, yields were generally low and thus many members of the peasantry were obliged to look for work off their farms in order to

supplement their meagre incomes.

UNDERDEVELOPMENT OF AGRARIAN STRUCTURE

(i) LABOUR RELATIONS

The ownership of vast areas of the best agricultural lands by the sugar industry left small farmers in such precarious economic straits that they were unable to compete with the sugar estates for workers, in spite of the deleterious conditions which existed on the sugar estates themselves.

A report on labour supply in rural Jamaica, commissioned by the government of Jamaica, highlights certain aspects of this problem. Part of what this study did was to label some of the areas of the country in which small farmers experienced severe labour shortages as "bad" areas and to label the areas in which such farmers did not experience great shortages as "good" areas. An attempt was then made to establish causes for the phenomenon in the various sections.

As we can see from Table 4.6, 66.7 per cent of farmers owning one acre of farm land in "bad" areas complained about labour shortages. Similar complaints were also voiced by 37.5 per cent of farmers owning two acres, 27.2 per cent of those who owned five acres, 23.4 per cent of those who owned 10 acres, 23 per cent of those owning twenty acres and 40 per cent of those who owned thirty acres. Even in the "good" areas, one might note, 20.8 per cent of

Table 4.6

Employers of Farm-Labour in Good and Bad Areas, Classified by Available Acreage; and Percentage of Complaints of 'Labour Shortage' in Each Class.

Unit=Percent

GOOD " AREAS			"BAD" AREAS		ALL AREAS		COM- PLAINTS
ACREAGE	%	%	%	%	%	%	AS % OF
	total	com-	total	com-	total	com-	255 IN-
	employ-	plaint	employ-	plaint	employ-	plaint	INTER-
	ers	in	ers	in	ers	in	VIEWEES
		acre-		acre-		acre-	
		age		age		age	
		cate-		cate-		cate-	
		gory		gory		gory	
1	7.4	9.0	5.7	66.7	6.7	29.4	2.0
2	12.7	15.8	7.5	37.5	10.6	22.2	2.4
5	30.8	13.0	27.3	27.2	29.4	18.7	5.4
10	25.3	15.7	26.3	23.4	25.9	37.0	7.0
20	16.1	20.8	12.4	23.0	14.5	21.6	3.1
30	2.2	-	4.7	40.0	3.1	25.0	0.8
50	1.3	-	5.7	16.7	3.1	12.5	0.4
100	0.7	-	2.8	66.0	1.6	50.0	0.8
100+	3.5	20.0	5.7	50.0	4.3	36.4	1.6
Not Known	-	-	1.9	-	0.8	-	-
Total	100.0	Av=14.7	100.0	Av=35.8	100.0	Av=23.5	23.5

Source: A Report on Labour Supply in Rural Jamaica, Jamaica, 1956, p.38.

farmers who owned twenty acres also complained. These figures indicate quite clearly that labour shortages were felt very sharply by the farmers who owned small amounts of land. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to note that in "bad" areas, 66 per cent of farmers who owned 100 acres also complained of labour shortage.

Table 4.7 shows that there was a high degree of complaints about labour shortages among the poorest peasants in the "bad" areas. In these areas 41.5 per cent of those who complained earned less than 25 shillings in the week preceding the enumeration. Among

farmers who earned fifty shillings, 43.5 per cent complained, and among those who earned 75 shilling, 44.5 per cent complained. It is interesting to observe that in "bad" areas, some of the wealthiest farmers complained. However, the small samples of this group tend to skew the data.¹⁷

Table 4.7

Employers of Farm-Labour in all Eight Areas Classified by Income During the Seven Days Preceding Enumeration; and Percentage Complaint of Labour Shortage in Each Class

Unit = percent

Seven Days Income (Shillings)	"Good" Areas		"Bad" Areas		All Areas		Com- plaints as % of all Employers
	Employ- ers	% Com- plaint in Cate- gory	Employ- ers	% Com- plaint in Cate- gory	Employ- ers	% Com- plaint in Cate- gory	
25	34.2	11.5	27.3	41.5	31.6	22.2	7.0
50	34.2	15.7	22.1	43.5	29.4	24.0	7.0
75	7.4	17.2	8.65	44.5	7.7	30.0	2.4
100	4.7	14.3	11.4	8.3	7.4	10.5	0.8
150	2.7	50.0	4.7	20.0	3.4	33.3	1.2
200	2.0	-	0.95	-	1.6	-	-
300	2.7	-	5.7	50.0	3.8	33.3	1.2
300+	1.4	50.0	1.9	50.0	1.6	50.0	0.8
Not Known	10.7	12.5	17.3	23.0	13.5	33.0	3.1
Total	100.0	Av=14.7	100.0	Av=35.8	100.0	Av=23.5	23.5
# Involved	151	22	107	38	258	60	60

Source: A Report on Labour Supply in Rural Jamaica, Jamaica, 1956, p.41.

Table 4.8

Percentage of the Potential Labour Force Looking for Work,
by Sex and Age Groups and Type of Area

Unit = Percent

Those Seeking Work as Percentage of Age-Group

Age-Group	Males		Females	
	"Good" Areas	"Bad" Areas	"Good" Areas	"Bad" Areas
15-24	66.5	67.5	45.5	44.5
25-39	75.0	74.0	42.0	49.0
40-54	63.0	68.0	26.4	38.4
55-69	39.0	41.0	21.0	16.4
70+	5.0	13.0	-	-
All Age Group	61.9	63.2	34.5	38.1

Source: A Report of Labour Supply in Rural Jamaica, Jamaica 1956, p.41.

Table 4.8 demonstrates certain aspects of the potential rural labour force. The data indicate that there was a high proportion of rural people looking for work. In the age group 15-24 years, 66.5 per cent of males in "good areas" and 67.5 per cent in "bad areas" were seeking employment. In the age group 25-39 years, 75.0 per cent of males in "good areas" and 74.0 per cent in "bad areas" were searching for work. In the age - group 40-54 years, 63.0 per cent of males in "good areas" and 68.0 in "bad areas" were looking for works. The figures were less for older men, as well as women of all ages. As the labour report correctly points out, one of the major reasons for the labour shortages experienced by small farmers was the existence of alternate employment on the sugar plantations. It needs to be emphasized, in the strongest possible terms, that although many workers despised various aspects of sugar plantation

labour which they regarded as degrading, they generally found too many uncertainties associated with working for small farmers.¹⁸ There is little doubt that "the farmworker who depends on local employment by small farmers finds the demands for his services, irregular, short-term and somewhat unpredictable."¹⁹

Table 4.9

Average Earnings Per Worker in Selected Industries, 1964

	<u>Average Weekly Earnings (J\$)</u>	
	Skilled Workers	Unskilled Workers
Agriculture (excl. Sugar)	19.2	5.8
Agriculture (Sugar Cane)	20.2	6.1
Mining	49.4	27.0
Sugar (Factory)	21.8	11.0
Other Manufacturing	19.4	10.0
Construction (Private)	28.8	13.8
Construction (Government)	20.4	6.8
Public Utilities (Electricity)	37.4	10.6
Public Utilities (Water & Sanitation)	19.6	7.0
Commerce	28.6	11.4
Transportation, Communication	27.8	14.0
Miscellaneous Services	20.8	11.2

Source: Employment and Earnings in Large Establishments, Jamaica: Department of Statistics, 1964.

Indeed, the wages which unskilled agricultural workers received were the lowest of all the occupations cited by the Jamaican Department of Statistics (Table 4.9). Unskilled agricultural workers earned only \$5.8 per week in 1965. On the other hand, \$6.8 was paid to government labourers working in construction, \$7.0 to workers in certain public utilities and \$6.1 to unskilled sugar workers. Skilled agricultural workers received a salary of \$19.2 per week. Nevertheless, skilled sugar workers

received \$20.2. Therefore, both unskilled and skilled sugar workers received slightly better wages than their counterparts who worked in other spheres of agriculture.

Table 4.10 illustrates the decline in the number of agricultural workers classified by size groups of farms between 1954 and 1961. The small farmer was the hardest hit by this decline. Farms up to under 5 acres showed a decrease of 49.4 per cent. Farms of 5-under 25 acres declined by 37.9 per cent. The lowest decline was shown by the largest farms. Thus farms over 500 acres showed a decline of only 13 per cent. Although the increasing use of mechanization as well as migration obviously played a role in the decline of agricultural workers, there is little doubt that this decline, especially among small farmers, was intensified by the inability of workers to obtain employment with adequate remuneration in agriculture.

Table 4.10

Number of Agricultural Workers Classified by
Size Group of Farms, 1954 and 1961

Size Group	1954	1961	% Decrease
0-under 5 acres	105,700	53,457	49.4
5-under 25 acres	75,639	46,970	37.9
25-under 100 acres	21,795	13,999	35.8
100-under 500 acres	11,132	8,617	22.6
Over 500 acres	48,334	41,807	13.5
Total	262,600	164,850	37.2

Source: Census of Agriculture 1961, Jamaica, 1962.

Small farmers were obliged to resort to various methods in order to recruit labour. Informal means such as "day for day",

"morning sport", and "land and livestock tenancies" proved to be inadequate and contained various disadvantageous features.²⁰ Nevertheless, formal methods of labour recruitment frequently failed to meet the needs of small farmers.

The two main forms of hiring were "day" work and "task" work. According to the practice of day work, a farmer would hire a labourer for a working day of a set number of hours, recognized by local custom for which the man would be paid a certain sum of money. There was an assumption by the farmer that a reasonable amount of work would be done.

According to task work, the worker agreed to complete a specific amount of work in return for the payment of a definite sum of money. There was an understanding that the work was to be done in a satisfactory manner. The worker was free to complete the task at his convenience as long as he completed it in a reasonable time.

There were some important differences between day work and task work. Whereas in day work, the farmers often worked in the field beside his hired workers in order to encourage a lively pace and to safeguard his crops from theft, in task work, the farmer was unable to supervise the task since he frequently did not know when the worker was in the field. Furthermore, the day worker was provided with meals but the task worker was expected to bring his own. In addition, the task worker often asked for and received advances of money. However, since such advances did not usually add up to the value of the work already done the worker had to complete the task in order to be fully paid.

In order to understand some aspects of the distorted labour relations among the peasantry, it is important to grasp the dynamics of these two forms of hiring farm employees. Task work was disliked far more by workers than day work. In the areas which had very severe labour shortages, the prevailing pattern of farm labour employment was task work performed by casually recruited labour. This point, of course, does not mean that farmers offering day work did not experience inadequate labour supplies. What is meant is that such farmers did not experience shortages of the most severe kind.

Table 4.11

Employers of Farm Labour in Good and Bad Areas,
Classified by Modes of Employing Farm Labour; and the
Percentage Complaint of Labour Shortage in Each Class

Modes of Employment	"Good" Areas Employ- ers	% Com- plaint in cat- egory	"Bad" Areas Employ- ers	% Com- plaint in cat- egory	All Areas Employ- ers	% Com- plaint in cat- egory	Com- plaint as % all Employ- ers
Day work	56.0	8.4	7.5	25.0	35.8	9.9	3.1
Task work	7.0	30.0	70.8	42.5	33.6	41.2	14.0
Day work & Task work	31.0	19.6	21.7	17.4	27.0	18.2	5.1
"Day-tasks"	4.0	16.7	-	-	2.4	16.7	0.4
Not known	2.0	66.7	-	-	1.2	66.7	0.8
Total	100.0	Av=14.17	100.0	Av=35.8	100.0	Av=23.5	23.5

Source: A Report of Labour Supply in Rural Jamaica. Jamaica, 1956, p.43.

Nevertheless, it is quite easy to explain the preference of the small farmer for hiring people to do task work rather than day work. First of all, task work was, in the final analysis, cheaper and more convenient for the farmer than day work. Many "day

workers" would not put in a full day's work unless they were closely supervised. This meant that a farmer might have to neglect work on some other part of his farm in order to maintain such supervision. It is, of course, obvious that when day workers did not work as hard as they should, they imposed a financial burden on farmers. In addition, many small farmers found it financially difficult to provide meals for day workers. Task work, therefore, held certain advantages for small farmers. Table 4.11 shows that among employers of day workers in good areas, 8.4 per cent complained of labour shortage while 25.0 per cent complained in bad areas. The data also show that among employers of task workers, in good area, 30.0 per cent complained of labour shortage while, in bad areas, 42.5 per cent of complaints were received.

The distorted labour relations on small farms may be seen in the fact that the system of day work which was generally favoured by many workers was disliked by small farmers because they found it to be too expensive. On the other hand, the system of task work, which small farmers usually preferred, was regarded with distaste by many workers.

An important difference between the use of task work on the estate and that of the small farmers was in the standardization of the task. Task work, in a strict sense, meant work measured in certain standard units, as for instance, the weeding or forking of a field of 50 square yards. Task work also involved an agreed and accepted standard of performance between the parties, based on comparisons between the effort of an individual worker and that of

his colleagues. In a formal setting such as an estate, various kinds of tasks could be apportioned without too much difficulty. However, on the plot of the small farmer where there was a great variety of jobs to be done, workers often objected vociferously to what they regarded as the wide discrepancy between the wage they were to be paid and the nature of the task at hand. Workers also found negative comparisons between their work and that of their employer or of other workers to be quite odious.

A second major area of discord in the system of task work was the question of supervision. When an employer found that the performance of a task had been unsatisfactory, he would withhold payment until the job had been satisfactorily performed. This type of action, once done, normally broke up casual worker-employer relationships. The worker would not return, the employer would not want him back. Although some employers might pay without protest they would certainly refuse to offer work to those labourers again.

Another deficiency of task work was the problems associated with the question of measurement. Although small farmers did not normally measure work given out, they still rated the work in terms of square chains, acres, or in hundred of yam hills, potato hills and so on. Where the work was constant, for example, in the digging of yam hills, picking coconuts, harvesting pimento, or harvesting other crops, there were few problems of measurement. But when the task formed an area of work, and measurement was imprecise, delayed or otherwise unsatisfactory, disputes frequently developed and labour sometimes withdrew. Indeed, labourers frequently complained

that small farmers were under-paying them by allocating tasks of a greater magnitude than that on which agreement had been made. Thus, measurement of certain tasks, especially weeding and general cultivation, often gave rise to friction in a system of task work. Such a problem would not arise in a system of day work.

The final structural deficiency in the system of task work revolved around the question of payment. It was mentioned previously that workers frequently requested and received part of their wages before the task was completed. However, some workers were in the habit of receiving their advance and then delaying completion of the work for long periods. Moreover, some workers sometimes took so much of the entire payment in the form of an advance that it was impossible for the employer to withhold a great deal in order to ensure an adequate level of work. The problem of payment was sometimes complicated for many small farmers by the fact that for money they had to depend on the sale of their produce which their wives took from the farm to the market. When such sales were incomplete or did not reach the expected sum, the farmer would be unable to pay his workers. This kind of farmer, and those who had a reputation for delaying payment on grounds regarded by workers as quite flimsy, often found that their crops were destroyed or stolen by disgruntled labourer.

The question of payment for task work is very important because it is only if one has a proper grasp of the dynamics of this situation that one can understand why a worker who detested sugar plantations would do task work there but would hesitate or refuse to

do it for a small farmer. Labourers who did task work for small farmers needed to get pay on Fridays in order to cover the expenses, eg. shopping, which their family would incur during the weekend. Because payment for task work on small farms was uncertain, such workers preferred to work for farmers according to a system of day work, a method generally disliked by farmers.

Table 4.12

Men Wanting Work, by Preferred Types of Wage-Arrangements

		Unit = Percent		
Wage arrangements		All Areas	"Good" Areas	"Bad" Areas
Weekly Work	Cash only	41.7	43.0	39.8
"	" Cash & Meals	1.8	2.4	0.9
"	" Cash & Room	4.9	2.1	8.7
"	" All Found	8.2	8.2	8.2
<u>Total Weekly Work</u>		56.6	55.7	57.6
Day Work		26.5	25.4	28.5
<u>Task Work</u>		16.9	18.9	13.9
Totals		100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: A Report of Labour Supply in Jamaica. Jamaica, 1956, p.135.

On the other hand, labourers who did task work in sugar estates were paid on Friday for whatever part of the task had been completed up to that time. It was this regularity of payment which often made workers undertake the loathed sugar plantation work rather than work for small farmers. Therefore, although small farmers might quite legitimately insist that their workers would receive no further advance until the task had been finished, in such a case most workers would have little choice but to look elsewhere for the money that was required at home. Table 4.12 illustrates the kinds of wage arrangements preferred by workers. In good areas 43.0 per cent of workers preferred weekly work with wages paid in

cash. The figure for bad areas was 39.8 per cent. In good areas 25.4 per cent of workers preferred day work while 18.9 preferred task work. In bad areas the figures were 28.5 per cent for day work and 13.9 per cent for task work.

It is not difficult to see that small farmers were faced with difficult problems in a distorted system of labour relations. Not only were informal methods of labour recruitment quite unsatisfactory, but the formal methods of hiring by day work or task work were also structurally deficient and fraught with problems and uncertainties of various kinds. It is not surprising, then, that small farmers whose destitution and underdevelopment had been produced largely by the influence of the sugar plantations, were frequently obliged to seek outside employment to supplement their wages. By an ironic twist, it was to the despised sugar plantations to which many small farmers were obliged to turn for employment even as they neglected their own farms in order to become a part of the agro-proletariat. Support for the statement may be gleaned from the fact that during the period under review only about 53 per cent of small farmers farmed full-time.²¹

One international organization has described Jamaican small farmers as "the most inefficient, partly because they have the least desirable land, partly because their agricultural techniques are the most backward."²² However this kind of description is only partly correct since it ignores the distorted labour relations which plagued such farmers.

Thus the proletarianization of significant portions of the

Jamaican peasantry ensued largely from their relationship with the sugar plantations. Almost half of all small farmers had to seek full-time or part-time employment, usually on the sugar plantations in order to support themselves. Many peasants were being transformed into a wage earning proletariat. The Jamaican peasant combined within himself both the owner of the means of production as well as labourer. His mode of production was encompassed and dominated by the larger capitalist mode, represented by the sugar estate. This kind of situation was advantageous to the capitalist sugar plantation, since it created a supply of cheap labour to serve its own interest.

(ii) CAPITAL AND CREDIT

In Chapter 3 it was shown that the banking system which developed in Jamaica was directly geared to the financing of plantation production and the associated import-export trade. Therefore, plantations had no difficulty in obtaining sufficient credit for whatever capital expansion they planned. During the period under review, however, the Jamaican small farmers had very limited access to outside financial capital. They, therefore, had to rely almost completely on their limited savings or on loans from friends or relatives. It has also been demonstrated that in spite of the fact that agriculture, other than sugar, made a greater contribution to the GDP, commercial banks accommodated sugar agriculture to a greater extent than all other agricultural products.²³

Many small farmers were in desperate need of some of the capital which was being directed to the sugar plantation sector. Many small farmers who tried to get loans from lending agencies were either refused completely or else could only get a small portion of what they wanted. Other farmers, discouraged by the thought that they would not be able to satisfy the security requirements of the banks, refrained from applying for loans.²⁴ Nevertheless, the reluctance of banks to extend loans to small farmers cannot be fully understood outside the context of the foreign ownership of much of the Jamaican economy. The foreign-dominated banks which worked in harmony with MNCs operating in Jamaica, showed little interest in or understanding of the attitudes and needs of the Jamaican small farmer. One of the major reasons why the peasants were reluctant to borrow from the main banks was that the latter required land as a security against the loans. There were various reasons why farmers were unwilling to comply with this demand. First of all, even if there was a remote possibility that the loan might not be repaid in time, farmers would be unwilling to borrow, since the loss of their land or their home would have been a major disaster.²⁵

Another reason why farmers were frequently unable to acquire loans concerned the question of land tenure. Since the acreage cultivated by many farmers was family land, they often did not have complete ownership of the land. Banks were unwilling to accept the title of land from a farmer if the land had not been registered in his name. Apparently banks failed to realize that joint ownership of land was a phenomenon that was deeply rooted in

the agrarian structure of Jamaican small farmers. There was an attempt by the state to assist farmers who owned land outright but were unable to produce a title. According to the Facilities of Titles Law (1955) farmers who formerly lacked legal titles to their lands were able to obtain such titles after establishing proof of ownership.²⁶ The purpose of the law was to increase the security of the farmer and to provide him with an instrument which he would be able to deposit as a security against loans. However most farmers were unwilling to risk the loss of their lands.

Table 4.13

Forms of Ownership and Number of Owners on Farms of
Less than 10 Acres

Titles:	Total Occupants	-	216,845
	Registered Titles		46,114
	Common Law		49,778
	Tax Receipts		71,195
	No Title		49,758

Source: Census of Agriculture, 1954, Jamaica, 1955.

Table 4.13 indicates the farms of ownership and number of owners which existed on farms of less than 10 acres.²⁷ Of a total of 216,845 occupants, 46,114 had titles of land registered in their name. There were 49,778 people who had common law titles. Such titles could be forms of conveyance which were filed with the Registrar General or the so-called "Post Office" titles which were transfers negotiated through preferred forms which were distributed by rural post offices. Tax receipt titles were usually held by people who did not have an official title to the land but who had paid the taxes on the holding. The 49,758 people shown by the data

as having no title to the land were joint owners, partial owners or tenants. The majority of those small farmers who were eligible for bank loans were reluctant to deposit their titles as security because they were not completely convinced that they would have an increase in production which would make it possible for them to repay the loan without risking the loss of their land.²⁸ The result was that when farmers did borrow against their land, they kept the risk as low as possible by participating only in "safe" investments. Examples of these include the purchase of land, as well as the kind of investment which would provide a cash surplus in the short run. This surplus would be used to repay the loan. Thus livestock was preferred because of its high liquidity and because its chance of surviving and improving its value in the short run were also quite high. Bank loans were also used by farmers to invest in short term and semi-permanent crops as long as there was not a serious possibility of natural hazards overtaking them.²⁹

By insisting on having a registered title to land as a security against a loan, the foreign-dominated lending institutions showed remarkable insensitivity to the needs of Jamaican small farmers. Furthermore, by channelling local capital to their allies in the sugar industry, the banks demonstrated that the growth in the productive capacity of the plantation sector was taking place at the expense of the development of the peasantry.

AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMMES AND POLICIES(i) PLANNING AND RESEARCH

In order to understand certain aspects of the neglect of domestic agriculture that resulted from foreign investment in the Jamaican sugar industry, it is necessary to examine various features of the structure of the state agricultural bureaucracy. It will then be possible to demonstrate the extent to which their policies, influenced by foreign capitalist interests, undermined the development of the peasantry.

In Chapter 2, it was shown that the protests and rebellions of the peasants in the 1930s had resulted in certain constitutional changes in the Jamaican state. With the establishment of universal adult suffrage in 1944, there grew a more representative parliament, one which was supposed to be more responsive to the needs of the masses. In 1944 also, British colonial officials established the Agricultural Policy Committee of Jamaica with the following terms of reference:³⁰

1. To define the objective of a policy for the utilization of the land resources of Jamaica.
2. To formulate a policy of agricultural development, including conservation of soil and water resources, land settlement, the production, processing and marketing of plant and animal products, and the improvement of amenities for rural communities.
3. To make proposals for co-operation between producers and

for the collaboration of producers' organization with Government.

4. To submit proposals for the co-ordination of Government services or Government appointed agencies concerned with rural development.

The Committee proudly boasted of the wide base of its members.

The Committee desires to draw attention to the fact that it includes representatives of land owners, small farmers, large-scale agriculture, labour, industry, law and commerce. The object of appointing a Committee made up in this way was to attempt to obtain agreement on the basic essentials of long-term agricultural policy amongst persons holding various opinions on political, economic and social matters.¹¹

However, a close examination of the Agricultural Policy Committee reveals that this advisory body represented, to a great extent, the interests of planters and merchants.

As we can see from Table 4.14, which provides data on the group affiliation and class composition of the Committee, there was a preponderance of planters and businessmen involved in the formulation of agricultural policy in Jamaica. With the exception of the Jamaica Welfare Ltd. and the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union (BITU), all the organizations which were empowered to nominate members to the Committee were dominated by planters or merchants, some of whom represented the interests of multinational corporations. Manley and Bustamante were leaders of the two major political parties in the country. It would appear that the reason for the inclusion of these men stemmed from the fact that the Committee wanted to give the impression that it was broadly based.

Table 4.14

Group Affiliation & Class Composition of
Members of the Agricultural Policy Committee

<u>Names</u>	<u>Nominating Organizations</u>	<u>Class & Identity</u>
A.J. Wakefield		Civil Servant
O.K. Henriques	Legislative Council	Industrialist &
	Privy Council	Planter
A.B. Lowe	Legislative Council	Planter
R.O. Terrier	Legislative Council	Small Businessman
R.A. Burke	Jamaican Agricultural Society	Planter
G. Seymour Seymour	Jamaica Agricultural Society	Planter
R.D. Lindo	Jamaica Imperial Association	Industrialist & Planter
P.A. George	Chamber of Commerce	Merchant
R.L.M. Kirkwood	Sugar Manufacturers' Association	Planter
R.F. Williams	Jamaica Livestock Association	Planter
N.W. Manley	Jamaica Welfare Ltd.	Lawyer & Party Leader
W.A. Bustamante	BITU	Trade Union & Party Leader

Sources: Report of the Agricultural Policy Committee, Jamaica, 1945, p.1; C. Stone, "Political Aspects of Post-War Agricultural Policies in Jamaica", Social and Economic Studies, Vol.23, No.1, March 1974, p.160.

Nevertheless, a group such as the Jamaica Agricultural Society, which was usually considered to be representative of the interests of small farmers, was, in fact, dominated by conservative well-to-do farmers. Also, the Jamaica Imperial Association was a powerful lobby representing the interests of planters and merchants which wielded tremendous influence in the formulation of the social and economic policy of the state. The Chairman of the Committee, A.J. Wakefield, was an English colonial bureaucrat.

It was obvious, from the very inception of the Committee, that, in spite of the apparent concerns expressed by the members about the state of domestic agriculture, export agriculture was, in fact, the domain which would receive their greatest attention. In their view, "the economic structure of Jamaica depends largely on the sugar industry. The crop is the best suited to the natural condition of the island. Production now stands at 160,000 tons, this amount could be at least doubled."³² It was decided that the facilities for research on sugar cane should be removed from the Department of Science and Agriculture. It was also decided that such facilities should be greatly expanded and updated and that they should be controlled by the Sugar Manufacturers' Association (SMA) and located in a separate research department established by the SMA.

During the period under study, the department consisted of a director of research and staff of fully qualified scientists. There was also a number of junior technical officers who were engaged primarily in laboratory work and field experiments. Specific problems in the fields of agronomy, chemistry, entomology, pathology, soil physics, and chemistry were treated. The department kept close ties with the other sugar producing areas in the Caribbean. Through the activities of the West Indies Sugar Association, a Central Cane Breeding Station was established in Barbados. One of the major functions of the station was to produce cane seeds in order to provide its members with the means of propagating new sugar cane varieties. The research directors also

met periodically in order to pool the benefit of the findings from their special research.

The research department was well equipped to deal with most of the problems of the sugar industry which related to field activities. Experiments were conducted to determine the deficiencies of plant nutrient and the requirements of crop fertilizer. Soil studies as well as foliar analytical techniques and diagnoses supplemented these experiments. Scientists also paid close attention to soil properties insofar as they affected the cultivation and irrigation of sugar cane. Insects and diseases which adversely affect the growth of the sugar cane were also closely watched by scientists.

Let us now examine the kind of research which was undertaken on domestic crops. In the section of their report dealing with research, the Agricultural Policy Committee had stated:

Modern agriculture is a science. The full productive capacity of the land cannot therefore be realized without research. Well-planned and properly equipped research programmes are required to determine the best use of land, to introduce new systems of farming, to raise the output per acre of the major crops including grass and livestock, to breed, select or introduce improved strains of crops and livestock, to improve processing of agricultural products, to secure the preservation and storage of foodstuffs, and to control plant and animal pests and diseases.³³

The report also classified research into three areas - 1) fundamental research or abstract research; 2) long-term applied research is designed to solve certain types of practical problems and 3) short-term applied research which includes the adaptation to local practice of the results obtained by fundamental research.³⁴

However, at this point, the tone of the report suddenly changed. There was an obvious reluctance on the part of the Committee to endorse a widespread research programme which might improve the yield of small farmers.

It is obvious that the range of research is so wide, and as much of the basic and applied research is so complex in character, that Jamaica could never afford the cost of even a small part of a comprehensive research programme. In the main we can only undertake investigations of type 3 to deal with the concrete problems which the Jamaican farmers have to face. But so long as this is done without the necessary fundamental knowledge provided by types 1 and 2, a good deal of local experimentation will be too speculative and may fail in its aims.³⁵

Thus, while the sugar cane and its products were subject to thorough research and analysis, the products of many small farmers received little attention. Let us recall that in 1938 agricultural officers had reported as follows:

Facilities for research were meagre in the extreme, and having little opportunity for assessing the research needs of the small farmer, they tended to recognize only those problems which concerned the main export industries - banana and sugar cane.³⁶

Twenty years later, (1958) a senior officer of the Department of Agriculture commented as follows in a newspaper report:

Research in the Ministry of Agriculture had not proceeded to the point where the scientists knew for certain the things to do with food crops that would give predictable results.³⁷

Therefore, in spite of the fact that the Agricultural Policy Committee had stated an interest in seeing to "the provision of food to provide for minimum nutritional standards for all people,"³⁸ its fundamental focus was geared to the expansion of export crops. Such an approach resulted, without doubt, from the

alliance established between the multinational corporations, e.g. Tate and Lyle and their allies, the planter-merchant bureaucracy. The paucity of planning and research undertaken on domestic crops must be analyzed in the light of these facts plus the fact that the Agricultural Policy Committee had a pervasive influence on formulation of state policy. Indeed, this report formed the basis for agricultural development projects for the next twenty years, supported and reinforced by "foreign experts" and their allies in the sugar industry. The influence of foreign investors, such as the multinational sugar interests, was so formidable that in the 1960s their views were widespread in agriculture on important ministerial advisory and administrative bodies. Consequently, the state often acquiesced to the wishes of the planter - merchant elite and complied with the demands of foreign corporations.³⁹

The neglect of domestic agriculture may also be seen in the fact that the various initiatives undertaken by the state with the aim of assisting the small farmer did not accomplish very much. Since 1949 there have been a wide variety of schemes ostensibly geared to encouraging agricultural development. The Farm Improvement Scheme of 1949 gave way to the Farm Recovery Scheme 1952-55, and the Farm Development Scheme 1955-60, the Agricultural Development Programme 1960-65, and the Farmers Production Programme 1963-68. Although the main thrust of these schemes was to provide loans and subsidies to small farmers, their overall impact on production was insignificant.⁴⁰

Table 4.15

Subsidies Approved and Disbursed (£)

	Grants Approved	Grants Disbursed
Farm Improvement Scheme (1949-1955)	318,000	272,511
Farm Recovery Scheme (1952-1955)	565,855	361,816
Farm Development Scheme (1955-1960)	1,379,305	780,950
Agricultural Development (1960-1965)	844,868	149,080
<u>Total</u>	<u>3,108,028</u>	<u>1,564,357</u>

Source: Ministry of Agriculture Annual Reports, 1955, 1956, 1960, 1965, Jamaica.

First of all, the amount of money which was disbursed was substantially less than that which had been approved (Table 4.15). The data on some grants show that although a total of \$3,108,028 was approved under four schemes, only \$1,564,357 was disbursed. Secondly, many grants, loans, and subsidies tended to be more beneficial to the big planter than to the small farmer. This situation arose because subsidies usually did not cover more than half the cost of any one project and loans carried heavy interest rates.⁴¹ Finally, it is likely that many small farmers, whose poverty forced them to live in dilapidated houses, used too much of their grants to repair these buildings and therefore had insufficient money to spend on agricultural investment.

This trend is suggested by the data on some small farmers living in the Rio Minho Valley of Upper Clarendon. (Table 4.16). Farms of up to 4 acres devoted almost half of their total investment in dwellings, £129. This figure was 4 times more than the

investment in dwellings spent by farms of 20-25 acres.

Table 4.16

Capital Investment Per Acre, By Size Group (£)

Size of Farm	# of Farms	Total Investment	Investment in Dwellings	Total Investment excl. Dwellings
0-4 acres	5	263	129	134
5-9 "	5	146	52	94
10-14 "	2	146	54	92
15-19 "	3	128	50	78
20-25 "	2	140	32	108
25+ acres	1	115	43	72

Source: The Economic Organization of Small Scale Farming in the Rio Minho Valley of Upper Clarendon 1958-60. Jamaica: Ministry of Agriculture and Lands 1960, p.28.

The bureaucracy which controlled the activities of small farmers was characterized by inadequate planning. The role of the extension service presents a good example of this fact. Such a service was vital for small farmers since it was the job of the extension officers to convince the small farmers of the necessity of using new techniques in order to improve their productivity. However, many extension officers were never provided with the kind of technical expertise in agriculture nor the sort of knowledge of the peasant environment which they required in order to be successful. The disorganization within the extension service resulted in the duplication of work and caused considerable confusion among peasant farmers. Thus the work of commodity organization such as the Citrus Growers Association and the Banana Growers Association was not coordinated with that of the representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture. Since the average small farmer produced more than one kind of crop on his small

holding, he was often subjected to conflicting and erroneous advice, which, in the long run, limited his productive capacity. When one compares this situation with the planning and research devoted to the sugar cane, one can understand the extent to which growth in the sugar industry took place at the expense of the development of domestic agriculture.

Table 4.17

Current Expenditure of the Jamaican Government 1961-1970

	1961	1964	1967	1970
(a) Current Expenditure (J\$M)	63.4	83.3	122.9	185.1
(b) Current Expenditure as % of GDP at Market Prices (%)	13.1	14.1	16.5	18.2
(c) Percentage of Current Expenditure on:				
Personal Emoluments	38.0	40.0	40.8	44.5
Interest on Public Debt	5.4	7.0	7.1	5.1
(d) Consumption Expenditure (J\$M)	48.3	62.5	92.2	146.4
(e) Distribution of Consumption Expenditure (%)				
Administration	25.5	37.3	35.0	30.6
Education & Research	20.1	17.8	16.9	21.9
Medical Services	18.0	10.6	13.4	16.5
Housing & Other Special Welfare Activities	8.9	9.0	10.0	9.4
Public Works	13.2	10.7	9.6	6.1
Agriculture, Forests and Lands	8.9	8.0	7.8	7.6
Other	5.4	6.6	7.3	7.9

Source: National Income and Product, Jamaica.

Table 4.17 provide data on the current expenditure of Jamaica during 1961-70. The consumption expenditure increased from \$48.3 million in 1961 to \$146.4 million in 1970. Nevertheless, expenditure on agriculture decreased during those years from 8.9 per cent of the Consumption Expenditure in 1961 to 7.6 per cent in 1970. These figures suggest that the agricultural sector was being given inadequate financial support by the state. The sharp decline in the

expenditure on public works suggests that the government was neglecting its role of constructing and maintaining civic amenities.

One result of the poorly planned policies directed at small farmers was the fact that, although many such farmers were plagued by labour shortages, few attempts were ever made to raise the level of their technology. Although major mechanization would have been inappropriate for small hill-side farms, no attempt was made by the state bureaucracy to implement the use of the kind of technology which might have aided farmers. Data from the Census of Agriculture of 1961 and 1968 support this assertion.

Table 4.18

Units of Machinery & Equipment by Size Group of Farm, 1961

Type	Size Groups				
	Less than 5 acres	5 acres to under 25 acres	25 acres to under 100 acres	100 acres to under 500 acres	Over 500 acres
	5 acres	25 acres	100 acres	500 acres	acres
Number of Units					
<u>No. of Farms</u>	113,239	40,769	3,803	779	351
<u>Vehicles</u>					
Trucks, Station					
Wagons etc.	-	165	275	169	594
Trailers	-	60	52	238	2,078
Carts & Drays	136	210	223	95	250
<u>Tractors</u>					
Rotary Hoes & Motor					
Scythes	-	-	53	62	270
Wheeled Tractors	-	124	97	103	638
Crawlers	-	64	32	48	392
<u>Implements</u>					
Ploughs					
(Tractor drawn)	-	92	77	125	367
(Animal drawn)	-	30	44	29	57
Other Implements					
(Tractor drawn)	-	-	61	139	665
(Animal drawn)	-	-	48	24	69

Source: Census of Agriculture 1961. Jamaica, 1962.

Table 4.18 shows the use of the units of machinery and equipment by size group of farms. Small farmers operating less than 5 acres had no tractors, no ploughs, no trucks and no station wagons. They had to rely on carts and drays. Small farmers in the second group, those who owned between 5 and 25 acres had only 122 ploughs, 124 wheeled tractors, 165 trucks and station wagons. These numbers were based on 40,769 farms. One may contrast the status of the small farmer with that of the large farms where technology in the form of vehicles, tractors, and implements of various kinds were present.

Table 4.19

Use of Irrigation & Fertilizer by Size of Farm, 1961
(Percentage of Farms)

	Less than 5 acres	5 acres to under acres	25 acres to under acres	100 acres to under acres	More than 500 acres
<u>Irrigation</u>					
No Irrigation	97.7	96.5	92.0	88.4	79.7
Hand Watering	2.2	2.7	2.2	2.7	1.7
Irrigation	0.1	0.8	5.8	8.9	18.6
<u>Fertilizers</u>					
No fertilizer	78.8	65.1	60.1	45.5	28.6
Farmyard Manure	11.0	14.7	14.1	14.2	16.0
Inorganic Fertilizer	10.2	20.2	25.8	40.3	65.4

Sources; Census of Agriculture 1961, Jamaica, 1962; Annual Report of the Ministry of Agriculture, Jamaica, 1962.

Small farmers also used inadequate amounts of irrigation and fertilizers. As we can see from Table 4.19, only 0.1 per cent of farms of less than 5 acres used irrigation whereas farms between 5 and 25 acres used 0.8 per cent. The figure increased with the

size of the farms. Small farmers' use of fertilizer was also quite deplorable. 78.8 per cent of farms less than 5 acres used no fertilizer, while 65.1 per cent of farms between 5 and 25 acres did not use any. The bigger the farm, the greater was the use of fertilizer.

Table 4.20 also indicates the use of artificial fertilizer and the crops to which it was applied in 1968.. Whereas, the small farmer, as shown by the first four categories, used about 19,000 tons of fertilizer, farms which were of 500 acres and over used more than 66,000 tons.

There are two important reasons why the consumption of fertilizer per acre should be high in Jamaica. First, it has been shown quite convincingly that, in the wet tropics, even poor soils can produce abundant crops if they are well fertilized. Secondly, in Jamaica abundant quantities of fertilizers are required to restore the fertility of areas where the top soil has been destroyed by erosion.⁴² In 1951-52, 80 per cent of the fertilizer that was consumed was used by the sugar industry.⁴³ This point, in addition to the fact that extension officers were rarely given the training to impress upon small farmers the importance of using fertilizers, once more points to a situation where agricultural policies benefitted corporate interests to a far greater extent than domestic producers.

Table 4.20

(Part 1)

Use of Artificial Fertilizer and Crops to Which AppliedBy Size Groups

Size Groups	Fertilizer			No. of Farms & Crops To Which Fertilizer Applied			
	Tons	Cwt.	Lbs.	Sugar Cane	Citrus	Yams	Banana
Less than 1 acre	1,230	2	85	463	126	2,776	1,256
1 to under 5 acres	7,304	3	87	5,773	828	9,142	7,822
5 to under 10 acres	5,271	15	60	2,958	540	2,772	3,125
10 to under 25 acres	5,198	-	76	1,422	406	1,510	1,500
25 to under 50 acres	2,275	5	90	294	118	274	290
50 to under 100 acres	2,672	13	87	104	52	67	117
100 to under 200 acres	2,837	10	54	69	38	21	75
200 to under 500 acres	4,964	-	26	87	46	12	62
500 acres and over	66,135	8	100	90	45	5	66
All Farms	97,889	1	105	11,260	2,199	16,579	14,313

Source: Census of Agriculture 1968, Jamaica, 1969

Table 4.21

(Part 2)

Use of Artificial Fertilizer and Crops to Which AppliedBy Size Group

Number of Farms and Crops To Which Fertilizer Applied								Size Crops
Irish Potato	Coconut	Cocoa	Coffee	Corn	Vege- tables	Grass	Other	
574	25	93	151	370	1,419	3	2,309	Less than 1 acre
2,766	120	738	1,310	2,136	6,638	83	9,783	1 to under 5 acres
877	110	499	698	805	2,479	117	3,683	5 to under 10 acres
430	81	258	447	544	1,465	199	2,209	10 to under 25 acres
85	29	42	91	116	312	99	428	25 to under 50 acres
26	23	17	31	28	85	83	126	50 to under 100 acres
6	17	9	10	9	17	89	39	100 to under 200 acres
4	17	4	6	9	9	97	31	200 to under 500 acres
-	31	2	8	4	14	131	28	500 acres and over
4,768	453	1,662	2,752	4,021	12,438	901	18,636	All Farms

Source: Census of Agriculture 1968, Jamaica, 1969.

One of the major reasons for the poor results of so many agricultural policies was simply the fact that bodies such as the Agricultural Policy Committee were guided by the same kind of ideology espoused by the proponents of modernization theory.⁴⁴ In other words, the manifestations of underdevelopment in agriculture were often examined without reference to the underlying causes. Thus, during the period under study, few attempts were made to diversify the agriculture sector.

Agricultural diversification and restructuring were impeded by foreign investment in the sugar industry. Foreign corporations and their Jamaican allies wielded so much influence that very little agricultural diversification was attempted. The result was that crops geared to the domestic market did not receive the agronomic attention which they deserved. It is instructive to note that, according to the report of the Sugar Industry Commission, (1966) even some state bureaucrats were convinced that diversification of agriculture was urgently required.

In their testimony, senior officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and Lands said that in the national interest there should be more diversity of crops on cane farms and estates. They justified this opinion on two grounds: firstly, there were crops such as vegetables that could return a higher output and profit per acre than sugar. Secondly, the cane farms and estates should make a greater contribution towards feeding the growing population of Jamaica by growing food crops.⁴⁵

I affirmed earlier in this chapter that the peasantry was unable to satisfy the requirement of the local population for important foodstuffs like vegetables. It is not difficult to discern some of the advantages which would ensue from increased

vegetable production. First, locally grown vegetables offered the possibility of utilizing indigenous foodstuffs for processing and canning. Secondly, the subsequent contribution to output, income and employment would not be limited simply to the yield of output per acre multiplied by price, but to the wide variety of activities which follow from locally grown vegetables.⁴⁶ Even the report of the Sugar Industry Commission (1966) conceded that much of the vegetables that are imported for tourist hotels could be locally grown.⁴⁷

Table 4.21 shows that \$1,241,252 worth of vegetable was imported by the tourist industry in 1972.⁴⁸ It is quite likely that a sensible programme of agricultural diversification would have drastically reduced such imports.

The Sugar Report (1966) also pointed out that under favourable conditions, crops such as carrots, onions, cucumbers, tomatoes, peas, Irish potatoes and sweet potatoes could all give a higher output per acre than sugar.⁴⁹ Thus, the important question which has to be posed is why the peasantry was not actively engaged in vegetable production. The answer suggested by the report of the Sugar Industry Commission (1966) was that the peasantry lacked the skill to grow, grade, and market such crops effectively. However, in my view this answer was not only incorrect but reflected the kind of bias that upper class Jamaicans have tended to display towards the peasantry.

Table 4.21

Food Items Imported by the Tourist Industry (J\$M)

Items	1972
Meat & Meat Preparations	6,384,400
Fish (smoked, fresh, frozen)	1,382,400
Fish (canned)	475,200
Crustaceans and Molluses	356,500
Vegetables (frozen, fresh)	1,241,552
Fruit (canned)	712,800
Cheeses	461,400
Butter & Other Dairy Products	367,200
Soups (canned or powdered)	453,600
Cereals	86,400
Rice	367,200
Oils and Vegetable Shortening	291,748
Cake Mixes	21,600
Bakery Products	86,400
Sauces	124,600
Dressings & Toppings	190,400
Pickles	72,800
Cherries/Olives	100,400
Spices	48,200
Vinegar	21,600
Syrups	86,400
Jams, Jellies, Preserves	129,600
Edible Nuts	64,800
Food Preparations	86,400
Dried Fruits	64,800
Tomato Paste Puree	21,600
Other Food Products	2,000,000
Total	15,300,000

Source: Report of the Ninth West Indies Agricultural Economic Conference, Jamaica, 1974, p.138.

As one commentator has noted, this kind of bias stemmed from "the contemptuous and partly racist view of the inherent backwardness and low potential for progress within the black small peasantry regardless of what attempts could have been made to redefine their relationship to the land."⁵⁰ Proof of this attitude may be seen in the type of accusation levelled by an English colonial Governor against proponents of the idea that greater

economic self-sufficiency could be sustained in Jamaica by a policy of import substitution.

It seems to me a fallacy to suggest that a really substantial portion of our imports could somehow be dispensed with without in any way reducing the standard of living of our people....There is no large group of home producers upon whom the burden of maintaining export industry can be placed and the skill, physical endurance and willingness to work of the Jamaican people together with local resources are not adequate in Jamaica as in New Zealand to make a replacement of imports by home production economically fairly sound.⁵¹

The kind of opinion expressed by the Governor is very important because it seems to demonstrate the extent of the alliance between foreign corporate interests and the colonial bureaucracy.

In post-war Jamaica, foreign investors in the sugar industry refused to acknowledge that agricultural diversification and restructuring were very important and that the peasant could play a vital role in such a transformation. Instead, the peasant was defined as the main obstacle to agricultural development. Multinational holdings in sugar plantations prevented significant agricultural diversification not only in vegetables but in meat and dairying as well. In order to appreciate the urgent need for diversification into dairying, it is important to realize that in 1965, milk imports equalled 20 million lbs. Imports of butter came to 7 million lbs., and cheese and curd 3 million lbs. More than 4 million lbs. of beef were imported.⁵²

Although the report of the Sugar Industry Commission (1966) did admit that beef production and dairying were logical areas for agricultural diversification, it suggested that economically, beef production could only be justified on lands which were too shallow

or too steep for arable production. The objection was also made that although a few estates which had utilized such lands for rearing beef cattle had, in fact, shown "a consistent if not dramatic profit,"⁵³ one should not think that this kind of out-turn could, in economic terms, justify the conversion of cane lands to livestock production. On the question of dairying, the report of the Sugar Industry Commission (1966) acknowledged that such an enterprise could produce an output per acre of similar order to sugar. The report also stated that "the country faces a growing demand for liquid milk and for milk products."⁵⁴ Nevertheless, it objected to large scale diversification into this area. First of all, the report suggested, the peasantry did not possess the skills necessary to undertake such an enterprise. Secondly, labour disputes would harm such an industry.

Nevertheless, the objections to diversification into large scale beef production and dairying raised by the report of the Sugar Industry Commission (1966) can be rebutted fairly easily. Let us consider, for example, the question of the level of skill required for dairying. There is no reason to assume that if the peasants were properly taught how to manage and develop a dairy farm, they would not be able to do so. Indeed, referring to the supposed deficiency of farming skills which Jamaican peasants are supposed to display, Thomas correctly viewed the situation quite differently.

This to me is the utmost nonsense. I have seen (as anyone who has lived in the U.K. or the U.S.A. can attest) our so-called illiterate people hurled literally overnight into the most complex modern industrial societies and adjusting quite easily. As long as the incentive is there, the peasant can do it. And the only

way to provide the incentive is to produce agricultural crops for ourselves by ourselves.⁵⁵

Other writers have commented on the important kind of practical knowledge which the peasants possess. One newspaper commentator reported as follows:

I remember, after years and years of intensive engineering training, I went into a very rural area to do practical work - road, bridge building, etc. The first thing the local peasants taught me was how to use bamboo scaffolding instead of costly imported lumber. Then with the aid of complicated engineering formulae, I calculated the high flood level of a stream likely to result after heavy rains. A local man showed me the actual height to which it had repeatedly risen. He was correct, I was wrong. Another man showed me how to recognize good limestone for use as aggregate. He was an expert having broken many cubic yards by hand. Indeed, I was taught a lot and soon learnt how essential it is to appreciate and use the advice of the people who have lived in an area all their lives.⁵⁶

The objection concerning labour disputes is also a frivolous one. Any industry, in most parts of the world, can be affected by labour disputes. It is untenable to use this fact as an excuse for not encouraging desperately needed agricultural diversification.

The objection, on economic grounds, expressed by the report regarding the question of livestock production is also short-sighted. One of the most important aspects of large-scale enterprises such as vegetable or beef production would be the dynamic multiplier effects which would accrue. The growth of the domestic meat processing industry and the development of a leather industry would be two obvious areas. Furthermore, since Jamaica imported more than 50 million lbs of foodstuffs in the late 1960s, the development of a major foodstuff industry to replace this import would be quite possible.

Another major area of agricultural diversification which was blocked by the presence of sugar plantations was the production of maize. Even in the report of the Sugar Industry Commission (1966), enthusiasm was expressed for maize as a large-scale alternative to sugar. The report pointed out that maize was a crop which lent itself to mechanization and bulk production. Although the output per acre was, with current varieties, less than that for sugar, maize could, with high yielding varieties and favourable circumstances, be more profitable than sugar. In the view of the report, one of the major advantages of maize was that, from the national point of view, home-grown maize could replace imports and thus save valuable foreign exchange. "As a crop in its own right maize has a useful part to play in the agricultural industry."⁵⁷ The fact that the local cereal food industry was almost wholly based on the importation of wheat and maize⁵⁸ shows the important contribution that a local maize industry could make.

The question of why the large-scale production of maize was not initiated in Jamaica, in spite of all its obvious merits, is not difficult to answer. The report of the Sugar Industry Commission provided part of the answer. "While from the national point of view, maize could well be a useful substitute for sugar produced in excess in the Commonwealth and American quotas, nothing short of enforced regulation could secure a partial conversion from cane to maize."⁵⁹ In other words, a change to the production of maize would not take place because foreign investors in the sugar industry wielded so much power within Jamaica, and were part of such powerful

multinational corporations and their allied financial institutions that a small state like Jamaica would have found it almost impossible to implement large-scale diversification of agriculture. Thus the pattern dictated by foreign investors would continue, a pattern which, even a prominent neoclassical economist, like Arthur Lewis, has criticized.

In the last eighty years the tropical countries have put practically all their agricultural research and extension funds and efforts into trying to raise the productivity of export crops like cocoa, tea or rubber and virtually no effort into food productivity. From their point of view, this effort was wholly misdirected.

(ii) THE MARKETING OF DOMESTIC CROPS

One of the major manifestations of the neglect of domestic agriculture was the lack of an adequate marketing system for food grown for local consumption. This state of affairs arose primarily from the fact that because of the power wielded by foreign corporations which had plantation interests in Jamaica, the state was obliged to spend such a tremendous amount of time and effort seeking out overseas markets for those "cash" crops that domestic crops were consequently neglected. Bodies such as the Cocoa Industry Board, the Banana Board and the Sugar Manufacturers' Association played powerful roles as marketing intermediaries for the various producers.

In Chapter 3, I discussed the activities of the Sugar Manufacturers' Association (SMA), and the various preferential quotas by means of which Jamaican sugar was sold on the

international market. Between 1945 and 1963 no official marketing organization existed for handling domestic food such as root crop, eggs, poultry, fruit, and vegetables. This task was usually undertaken by women known as "higglers" who brought the produce from the peasants and sold it in the local markets.⁶¹ There were various disadvantages in the system. First of all, higglers were poor people with little capital. The stock which they could afford to buy from peasant farmers was usually limited. Therefore, the amount of foodstuff which reached the local markets was far less than that needed by the general population. Secondly, higglers did not have facilities for storage or refrigeration. Since perishable goods which were not sold quickly had to be destroyed, the public was deprived of important food and the profit margin of the higglers was reduced.

It was not until 1963 that an Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC) was established by the state. The main functions of the AMC were:

1. To provide and maintain adequate marketing outlets for agricultural produce grown primarily for domestic consumption.
2. To buy and sell agricultural produce.
3. To provide for the collection, transportation, storage, grading, packing, and processing of agricultural produce.
4. To distribute agricultural output in the local economy.⁶²

However, in spite of the fine goals embraced by the AMC, this body, even in the late 1970s, handled only about 20 per cent of the output of domestic crops.

Although it would not have been possible for the AMC to handle the marketing of all the crops produced for local consumption, it seems quite clear that the corporation was working far below what might be regarded as an accepted level of efficiency.⁶³ Thus, in spite of the fact that the AMC had a few retail stores in the Kingston Metropolitan area, 8 central markets and various buying stations throughout the country, many small producers living in hilly areas were completely ignored by the AMC. It is not surprising, then, that the higgler system handled about 80 per cent of domestic food crops. Even though there developed an intermediary group of wholesale higglers who sometimes reaped, assembled, and transported foodstuffs to retail higglers, the higgler system, during the period under study, was given no official recognition from the state.⁶⁴ The nutritional concerns of the local population thus did not receive the attention which it deserved.

Table 4.22

Major Source of Farm Income (%)

<u>Produce</u>	<u>Less than 1 acre</u>	<u>1 - 5 acres</u>
Export Crops	23.47	43.23
Domestic Crops	43.03	46.68
Cattle	2.28	2.31
Pigs	11.05	2.39
Poultry	13.55	1.52

Source: Census of Agriculture 1968, Jamaica, 1969.

Since the marketing system for export crops was better organized than that for domestic crops, many peasant farmers often replaced their domestic crops with "cash crops". This action restricted domestic agriculture to an even greater extent.

Table 4.22 shows that even small farmers with the least amount of land were producing export crops. Those with less than 1 acre produced 23.47 per cent of export crops and 43.03 per cent of domestic crops from their holding. Those farmers with land of 1-5 acres produced 43.23 per cent of export crops and 46.68 of domestic crops.

TRENDS IN FOOD IMPORTS

Post-war Jamaica was characterized by increasingly high imports of food. Table 4.23 reveals that whereas in 1950 total imports of food amounted to J\$9.7 million, by 1970 this figure had reached J\$69.0 million. Consumption of food in 1950 was J\$60.7 million but by 1970 this figure was J\$253.4. What is noteworthy about the data is the fact that the cost of imports of food (constant prices) increased at such a fast rate relative to the cost of the food consumed.

There is little doubt that the neglect of domestic agriculture played a preponderant role in the high imports of food. Although other factors such as population growth and the development of the tourist industry doubtlessly played a part, it seems likely that one of the most powerful influences was simply the lack of an adequate supply of domestic food.

Table 4.23

Consumption and Imports of Food, 1950-1970

	1950		1970	
	Consumption (J\$M)	Imports (J\$M)	Consumption (J\$M)	Imports (J\$M)
Bread & Cereals (incl. rice)	12.2	5.0	50.4	15.5
Meat	5.2	0.9	37.6	13.6
Fish	5.0	2.0	23.4	10.7
Dairy Products (incl. eggs)	4.9	0.8	38.5	10.9
Fruits, Vegetables	16.3	0.4	41.0	8.6
Other	17.1	0.6	62.5	9.7
Total	60.7	9.7	253.4	69.0

Sources: Economic Survey, 1950, 1970.
External Trade of Jamaica, 1950, 1970

The data of Table 4.24 highlight the difference between the acreage devoted to export crops and that utilized for domestic crops. The former had 459,000 acres while the latter had only 86,000. Among export crops the acreage held by sugar cane was 200,000. This area was twice the size of the next export crop, coconut.

Table 4.24

Examples of Acreage Devoted to Export & Domestic Crops

Export Crops	Acreage	Domestic Crops	Acreage
Sugar Cane	200,000	Tree crops	27,800
Coconut	100,000	Ground Provisions	16,300
Banana	84,000	Legumes	17,000
Cocoa	30,000	Vegetables	14,500
Citrus	30,000	Others	11,000
Coffee	15,000	Total	86,600
Total	459,000		

Sources: Land Tenure in Jamaica, Report of the Ministry of Agriculture and Lands, Jamaica, 1970; Agricultural Statistics Report, Jamaica, 1970.

Table 4.25

Distribution of Farms by Main Source of Income (1968) (%)

<u>Size Group</u>	<u>Livestock</u>	<u>Export Crops</u>	<u>Other Crops</u>
Less than 5 acres	18.9	36.2	44.9
5-under 25 acres	11.8	51.2	37.0
25-under 100 acres	26.6	45.7	27.7
100-under 500 acres	40.6	50.0	9.4
500 acres & over	44.3	52.0	3.7

Sources: Census of Agriculture 1968, Jamaica, 1969.
Labour Force Survey, Jamaica, 1969.

In order to understand fully the extent of the disarticulation of the import structure for food products, it is important to review certain aspects of the bias which was directed against domestic agriculture. The largest plantations, those over 500 acres, devoted 52.0 per cent of their lands to export crops and only 3.7 per cent to domestic. (Table 4.25) This pattern of preference for production of export crops is shown among the next three types of farms.

Table 4.26

Value of Imports, 1961-1965

(\$ 000)

<u>Sections</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>
Food	14,438	16,195	17,134	20,791	20,388
01 Meat & Meat Preparations	1,771	2,150	2,418	3,160	3,240
02 Dairy Products, eggs & honey	1,972	2,540	2,741	3,495	3,436
03 Fish and fish prepara- tions	2,397	2,622	2,670	2,992	2,869
04 Cereals and cereal preparations	5,199	5,763	6,214	7,355	7,662
05 Fruits & Vegetables	1,279	1,384	1,408	1,832	1,425
08 Feedingstuffs for animals	878	952	904	1,034	875

Source: Economic Survey. Jamaica, 1965, p.26.

It seems that domestic food consumption was outpacing domestic food suppliers to such an extent (Table 4.23) that the structure of agricultural production required drastic changes. However, instead of the rapid allocation of resources of labour, land, technology, and entrepreneurship to domestic agriculture, this sector was neglected in favour of export crops, principally sugar. As we can see from Table 4.26, the food items which were most in demand were meat and meat preparations, dairy products, fish and fish preparations, cereals and cereal preparations, fruits and vegetables.

Table 4.27 provides a fairly detailed account of the kinds of foodstuffs which were imported into Jamaica in certain years. Imports of rice, for example showed a substantial increase rising by 13.4 million lbs. or 22.0 per cent from 60.6 million lbs. in 1964 to 73.9 million lbs. in 1965. One government report stated,

Since 1960 a large number of rice producers have turned to other crops and as a result production has declined.... Some farmers attribute the decline of interest to a shortage of skilled labour, while others have shifted their interest to sugar cane and other crops which they consider easier to grow and more remunerative.⁶⁵

Table 4.27

Imports of Selected Foodstuffs, 1962-65

Commodity	Unit	1962	1963	1964	1965
<u>Cereals</u>					
Rice	'000 lb	41,900	49,745	60,573	73,924
Corn	'000 lb	33,114	36,972	57,605	50,865
Cornmeal	'000 lb	8,838	6,477	10,464	8,490
Baking Flour	'000 lb	94,063	94,034	111,851	103,522
Counter Flour	'000 lb	93,336	92,939	79,765	90,827
<u>Vegetables, etc.</u>					
Beans, Peas, etc.	'000 lb	7,405	6,633	9,192	6,633
Onions	'000 lb	7,000	7,834	8,503	9,076
Other vegetables (fresh & dry)	'000 lb	1,430	1,233	1,651	724
Potatoes*	'000 lb	12,006	10,788	7,042	3,138
Soups (vegetable)	'000 lb	713	788	1,189	1,109
<u>Meat and Fish</u>					
(Fresh, Chilled & Frozen)					
Beef and veal	'000 lb	3,354	4,800	6,094	4,785
Mutton & Lamb	'000 lb	872	740	1,015	1,470
Pork	'000 lb	105	1	22	183
Poultry meat	'000 lb	2,734	3,567	3,843	4,338
Other Meat	'000 lb	2,588	3,319	5,164	4,728
Beef & veal(smoked, dry & salted)	'000 lb	1,410	2,089	2,269	2,129
Corned beef	'000 lb	2,455	2,045	2,771	2,566
Salted Pork	'000 lb	3,295	4,077	4,230	4,113
Fish, fresh, chilled & frozen					
	'000 lb	435	556	670	581
Codfish	'000 lb	20,463	19,654	17,040	14,588
Mackerel, salted	'000 lb	4,442	6,266	9,015	10,889
Sardines, canned	'000 lb	3,943	3,632	4,516	4,906
Herrings, canned	'000 lb	2,474	3,013	3,181	2,675
<u>Dairy Products</u>					
Milk & Cream, dry	'000 lb	13,777	12,160	13,986	14,389
Eggs in shell for eating	'000doz	26	43	11	36
Butter, fresh	'000 lb	6,030	6,319	8,699	6,875
Cheese and curd	'000 lb	2,391	3,078	3,739	2,868
Tonic Foods	'000 lb	2,140	2,346	2,909	1,609
Malt	'000 lb	6,571	6,491	7,407	8,852
(*) Including seed potatoes					

Source: Economic Survey. Jamaica, 1965, p.27.

The data on imported vegetables and fruits show a decrease in the case of beans, potatoes, and other vegetables, fresh as well as dried. There was an increase in the quantity of onions imported between 1962 and 1965 as well as vegetable soups. In the case of potatoes there was a remarkable output of 28 million lbs. in 1965 compared with a figure of 19 million lbs. in 1964. Imports showed a sharp drop from 7.0 million lbs. in 1964 to 3.1 million lbs in 1965. It is quite possible that the banana "export war" between Jamaica and the Windward Islands which caused a glut of bananas on local markets in 1965 might also have accounted for the low imports of potatoes. Indeed, one would be correct to suggest that if the state paid more attention to the cultivation of banana as a crop for local consumption instead of for export, this indigenous crop could be utilized by the public instead of resorting to imported foodstuffs. The low level of import of legumes in 1965 stemmed from the import restrictions placed on the import of red peas in 1965. Local farmers were supplied with the "Charlevoix" variety for planting.

The data in Table 4.27 also indicate that, with the exception of codfish, imports of meat and fish were higher in 1965 than they had been three years before. There were significant increases in imports of mutton and lamb, poultry meat and fresh pork. The imports of dairy products also showed substantial increases in certain areas.

Table 4.28 presents a clear picture of the decline of the acreage devoted to the cultivation of rice and the subsequent

Table 4.28

Acreage and Production of Rice, 1953-63

Year	Estimated Acreage	Estimated Production
		of Clean Rice (Tons)
1953	10,000	6,600
1954	12,800	7,800
1955	20,000	12,000
1956	18,000	10,000
1957	10,000	5,500
1958	10,600	5,800
1959	10,500	5,600
1960	4,000	2,000
1961	6,000	3,000
1962	6,200	3,500
1963	6,300	3,300

Source: Annual Report of the Ministry of Agriculture and Lands, Jamaica, 1963, p.47.

Table 4.29

Trends in Corn Imports

Year	Total Imports of Unmilled Corn		Local Purchases of Corn by Marketing Dept	
	Quantity (tons)	Value f.o.b. £	Quantity (tons)	Value f.o.b. £
1952	830.6	25,399	5,540	135,576
1953	740.5	12,361	4,764	116,987
1954	1,091.5	25,458	5,754	141,296
1955	411.4	9,050	2,400	58,934
1956	1,000.0	25,320	3,784	92,924
1957	5,592.0	207,882	1,734	42,580
1958	11,889.3	291,580	1,144	25,126
1959	14,847.2	351,427	1,407	36,170
1960	12,714.7	314,834	1,442	35,154
1961	13,715.7	320,542	1,246	30,338
1962	14,782.8	403,889	1,527	36,758
1963	16,498.2	472,913	1,123	29,815

Source: Annual Reports of the Ministry of Agriculture and Lands, Jamaica, 1963, p.46.

decline in production. In 1953, there were about 10,000 acres of land devoted to the cultivation of rice. About 6,600 tons of rice were produced. In 1963, however, only 6,300 acres of rice were cultivated and the production amounted to only 3,300 tons.

Imports of corn also showed a significant increase between 1962 and 1965. In 1962, 33,114 lbs of corn were imported. By 1965 this figure had reached 50,865 lbs. (Table 4.27).

Table 4.29 indicates the quantity of corn imported into Jamaica and its cost. In 1952, 830.6 tons of corn costing £25,399 were imported. In 1963, 16,498.2 tons of corn costing £472,913 were imported. One can also see the decline in the amount of local corn purchased by the Marketing Department. In 1952, 5,540 tons of local corn were purchased at a cost of £135,576. In 1963, only 1,123 tons of local corn costing £29,815 were purchased by the department. The examples of the imports of rice and corn provide vivid evidence of the extent to which the cultivation of local produce declined and was subsequently replaced by imported foodstuffs. One of the unfortunate results of this process was the fact that once many middle class Jamaicans acquired a taste for the imported varieties of corn or rice, they refused to purchase local types and insisted on having foreign brands. Of greater importance was the fact that considerable amounts of foreign exchange could have been saved if the state had encouraged import substitution by means of agricultural diversification and had provided small farmers with fertile lands on which indigenous crops such as breadfruit, cassava, and yam could have been cultivated.

The tendency for the price of exports from underdeveloped countries to fall in metropolitan markets, while the prices of imports from the metropolis rose in underdeveloped countries, posed severe problems for many people in places like Jamaica. The simple reason was that many imported foodstuffs, which were quite expensive, were the very kinds of food that were vital for proper nutrition. These included dairy products, milk, eggs, cheese, meat of all kinds, and vegetables.

Table 4.30

Percentage Distribution of Personal Consumption Expenditure
by Commodity Groups in Jamaica 1959-1968

Commodity	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
Food	36.0	34.0	32.4	32.2	32.3	31.6	30.2	29.9	29.6	28.0
Beverage	7.6	7.4	7.6	7.8	7.6	7.8	7.7	7.8	7.7	7.7
Tobacco	3.5	3.2	3.0	2.9	3.2	3.6	3.2	3.3	3.1	2.9
Clothing & Personal Effects	9.2	10.9	11.2	11.2	10.8	11.5	10.8	10.9	11.1	11.0
Rent & Water	6.1	5.5	5.4	5.6	5.6	5.4	5.2	5.2	5.2	4.9
Fuel & Light	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.6	1.6	1.7
Furniture & Furnishings	5.1	5.8	5.7	5.4	5.9	6.0	6.9	7.1	7.6	7.9
Household Opera- tion	7.5	6.3	7.5	6.7	6.5	6.0	5.8	5.5	5.5	5.2
Personal Care & Health	2.5	2.4	2.7	2.4	2.6	2.8	2.9	2.8	2.7	2.8
Transport & Com- munication	9.7	11.8	10.6	11.9	11.7	11.8	12.4	12.3	11.4	11.6
Recreation & Entertainment	7.1	7.4	8.1	8.4	8.3	8.0	9.1	9.3	9.8	11.9
Miscellaneous Services	4.3	4.0	4.6	4.2	4.2	4.1	4.4	4.3	4.7	4.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: National Income and Product, Jamaica, Department of
Statistics, 1969, p.96.

Table 4.30 shows that food was the item on which Jamaican households had the greatest expenditure. In 1959 it accounted for

36.0 per cent of expenditure and in 1968 it amounted to 28.0 per cent. Nevertheless the lack of substantial diversification in Jamaican agriculture and the subsequent emphasis on expensive food imports meant that the nutritional levels of many Jamaicans were quite low since such people were often unable to afford costly imported food.

Table 4.31

Average Consumption Levels

	1950	1958	1960
Meat gms/day		47 gms.	41 gms.
Fish gms/day		31 gms.	26 gms.
Eggs gms/day		12 gms.	4 gms.
Milk gms/day		157 gms.	154 gms.
Protein gms/day	53.7 gms.	57.9 gms.	52.6 gms.
Low income families			
Calories/day	1950 cal.	1971 cal.	1900 cal.

Source: Income Distribution in Jamaica, New York: United Nations, 1972, p.7.

In Table 4.31 one can see examples of the consumption levels of Jamaicans during 1958 to 1960. What is noteworthy is the decline in the consumption of protein. The average intake of food such as meat, fish, eggs, and milk all showed a decline. The low calorie intake is also significant. The average for low income families of 1,971 and 1,900 calories in 1958 and 1960 was below the 3,000 calories which are usually accepted as adequate.

The study by the United Nations on the food consumption levels of Jamaicans corroborates earlier findings. A report on the nutritional levels of small farmers in the 1950s claimed that some people had food intakes well below the levels that poor countries

usually showed. In some areas, protein and calories intakes were so low that the farmers would have been unable to maintain several hours of intensive work each day.⁶⁶

A report by the Medical Research Council concerning the nutritional condition of babies and young children also found deplorable levels of health.

Among these babies there is much malnutrition approaching in rare cases to starvation. Instances are also found of a nutritional disease of infants which, if untreated, is fatal in about 50 per cent of cases.⁶⁷

The situation of older children was equally grim.

It is fortunate that in many places in Jamaica the clinics accept children up to the age of 4 years, and one was thus able to see a number of children 2 years old and upwards. In this age group there was much evidence of severe malnutrition: for instance at Warsop, in Trelawny, a girl aged 4 weighed 14 lbs. - about one third of the correct weight. This is not an isolated instance. At Rock, in Clarendon, out of 20 children the nutritional state was extremely bad in 8. In some it was good, and in all there was some evidence of deficiency.⁶⁸

According to this report, the food that was most urgently required by babies and young children was milk. It would have been possible, to produce much greater quantities of milk in Jamaica if strong policies regarding agricultural diversification had been formulated and implemented. Such policies would have reduced Jamaica's food imports to a considerable degree.

The high levels of food imports, therefore, not only reflected many of the flaws which existed in the agricultural sector of the economy but also was an important factor in undermining the nutrition of many Jamaicans. It must be remembered that many people could not afford to purchase expensive imported food.

CONCLUSION

Foreign investment in the Jamaica sugar industry underdeveloped domestic agriculture at various levels. The fact that the sugar industry possessed vast acres of the most fertile lands in the country meant that peasant agriculture had to be pursued on small plots located on marginal lands.

The labour problems which harried Jamaican small farmers were also due, in large measure, to the fact that many such farmers were unable to compete with the sugar plantation for workers. In addition, since the policies and programmes of Jamaican agriculture were geared so much toward export crops, the most important of which was sugar, domestic agriculture rarely received the attention it deserved.

It is also worthy of note that many land settlement schemes which were promoted by the state resulted in failure because those peasant settlers were plagued with many of the same problems which had proved so onerous to Jamaican small farmers.

FOOTNOTES

1. Economic Survey, Jamaica: Central Planning Unit, 1965, p.49.
2. Report of the Sugar Industry Commission, Kingston, Jamaica, 1966, p.68 (henceforth referred to as Sugar Report, 1966).
3. Report of the Sugar Manufacturers' Association. Jamaica, 1967, p.14.
4. Ibid.
5. Sugar Report 1966, op. cit p.69.
6. Sugar Research Department, Annual Report, Jamaica, 1966. pp.20 - 55. The data on the sugar estates which follow are based on this source.
7. Some estates included squatters' averages in this figure.
8. G. Beckford, Persistent Poverty, New York: OUP 1972, p.67.
9. Economic Survey, 1965, op cit.
10. Report on Agriculture in Jamaica. London: HMSO, 1942, p.5; A Survey of the Yields of Sugar Cane in Jamaica, Jamaica: Department of Science and Agriculture, 1938.
11. Agricultural Development Since 1938 and the Programme for 1955-60. Jamaica: Ministry of Agriculture and Lands, 1955.
12. Digest of Agricultural Statistics, Jamaica: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1963. pp.1-2. This is a widely accepted description of the term "Jamaican small farmer".
13. Report of the Medical Research Council of Jamaica, Jamaica, 1969, p.15.
14. The data which follow are based on Economic Geology and Mineral Resources of Jamaica. Jamaica: Geological Survey Department, 1951, pp.1-61; The Gleaner Geography and History of Jamaica. Jamaica: The Gleaner Company, 1973, pp.1-5.
15. The data on peasant farmers which follow are based on Agriculture Development Since 1938 and the Programme for 1955-60, Jamaica: Ministry of Agriculture and Lands, 1955; Economic Geology and Mineral Resources of Jamaica, op. cit. p.1-61; D. Edwards, An Economic Study of Small Farming in Jamaica. Jamaica, ISER, 1961 pp.50-66.
16. M.Taussig, "Peasant Economies and the Development of Capitalist Agriculture in the Cauca Valley, Columbia." Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 5, no.3, 1978.
17. D. Edwards, op. cit p.29.

18. A Report of Labour Supply in Rural Jamaica, Jamaica, 1956, p.3.
19. Ibid p.2.
20. The data on problems in labour recruitment are based on "A Report of Labour Supply in Rural Jamaica". op. cit. pp. 1-24; See also The Small Farmer in Jamaican Agriculture: An Assessment of Constraints and Opportunities. United States Agency for International Development, Report of the Agricultural Assessment Team, Washington: USAID, 1978.
21. Report on Customs, Excise and Internal Revenue, Jamaica: Department of Collection General, 1969, p.27.
22. The Economic Development of Jamaica, Baltimore: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1952, p.13.
23. Tables 3.5 and 3.6.
24. Annual Report of the Small Businesses Loan Board, Jamaica, 1968, p.28.
25. For an analysis of this phenomenon, see C.S. Morris, Small - Farm Financing in Jamaica, Jamaica, ISER, 1957.
26. Jamaican Hansard: Proceedings of the House of Representatives of Jamaica, Jamaica, March 17, 1955 p.6.
27. This kind of data was not supplied by the Census of Agriculture of 1961 and 1968.
28. Among many rural Jamaicans ownership of land ranks high as an indicator of status.
29. S. Morris, op. cit.
30. Report of the Agricultural Policy Committee, Jamaica, 1945, p.1; henceforth referred to as APC. Apart from the Chairman, no member of the committee was selected by the Government. The colonial Governor formed the Committee directly from nominations made at his request by the principal organizations concerned with agriculture, commerce, and labour.
31. APC op. cit. p.36.
32. Sugar Report, 1966, op. cit. pp. 213-214. The data on research facilities are largely based on this report.
33. APC op. cit. p.20.
34. Ibid p.27.
35. Ibid.

36. Agricultural Development since 1938 and the Programme for 1955 -60, Jamaica: Ministry of Agriculture, 1954, p.4.
37. Daily Gleaner, August 16, 1958, p.1 (The Farmers' Weekly).
38. APC op. cit p.6.
39. For a useful analysis, see C. Stone, "Political Aspects of Post-War Agricultural Policies in Jamaica". Social and Economic Studies. Vol. 23, No. 1, 1974.
40. Ministry of Agriculture Annual Reports 1955, 1959, 1961, 1968, Jamaica, "Agricultural Development since 1938," op. cit.
41. Ibid.
42. Report to the Government of Jamaica on Land and Water Conservation and Utilization. Rome: FAO, 1956.
43. "The Economic Development of Jamaica," op. cit. p.201.
44. I allude to this theory in chapter 1.
45. Sugar Report 1966, op. cit. p.71.
46. For an analysis of some of these possibilities see C. Thomas, "Diversification and the Burden of Sugar to Jamaica" in N. Girvan and D. Jefferson (eds.) Readings in the Political Economy of the Caribbean, Jamaica: ISER 1971.
47. Sugar Report 1966, op. cit. p.72.
48. Ibid.
49. Data for previous years were unavailable.
50. C. Stone, op. cit. p.162.
51. Minutes of the Legislative Council of Jamaica. Jamaica, 1941, p.27.
52. Economic Survey, Jamaica, 1965.
53. Sugar Report, 1966, op. cit. p.73.
54. Ibid.
55. C. Thomas, op. cit. p.73.
56. Daily Gleaner, April 6, 1981, p.14.
57. Sugar Report, 1966, op. cit. p.63.

58. See Proceedings of the Sixth West Indies Agricultural Economics Conference, Trinidad, 1971, pp.177-180.
59. Sugar Report, 1966, op. cit. p.73.
60. A. Lewis, Aspects of Tropical Trade 1883-1965, London, 1967 p.25.
61. For useful analyses of the Jamaican marketing system, see S. Mintz, "The Jamaican Internal Marketing Pattern," Social and Economic Studies, Vol.4, No.1, 1960. M. Katzin "The Business of Higglering in Jamaica," in M. Horowitz(ed.) Peoples and Cultures of the Caribbean, New York. The Natural History Press, 1971, pp. 340-381.
62. Ministry of Agriculture Annual Report, Jamaica, 1963, pp. 5-15.
63. See The Farmer, (Agricultural News) Jamaica, May 1977, p.10.
64. Ibid, July 1970, p.8.
65. Economic Survey, Jamaica 1966, p.19.
66. Report of a Nutritional Survey of Small Farmers in Jamaica, Jamaica: Medical Research Council, 1956, p.194.
67. Nutritional Condition of Babies and Young Children in Jamaica, Jamaica: Medical Research Council, 1956, p.1.
68. Ibid p.3; For similar views, see A Study of Levels of Living with Special Reference to Jamaica, London: HMSO, 1957.

CHAPTER FIVE

LABOUR AND PRODUCTIVITY ON JAMAICA SUGAR PLANTATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Although the major contribution of the sugar industry to the Jamaican economy has been the utilization of local labour, such labour has generally been cruelly exploited. The fact that Jamaican sugar is sold on the world market at prices fixed by metropolitan countries has meant that the maximization of profits for foreign corporations has depended on the minimization of production costs. Attempts to reduce such costs have been made at the expense of the socio-economic development of the labour force.

Various examples of underdevelopment may be briefly stated. First of all, the low skill content of plantation work has prevented the labour force from acquiring the skills necessary to advance the development of the local communities as well as of the country as a whole. In addition, since plantation work is of a highly seasonal nature, the lack of marketable skills placed a severe economic burden on sugar cane workers during periods when they were not engaged in sugar production. Secondly, the periodic unemployment and subsequent loss of wages were compounded, for sugar workers, by the fact that their wage structure was a low one.

A third feature of underdevelopment was the labour displacement which characterized the Jamaican sugar industry in the post-war period. This displacement was brought about primarily

because of technological innovations introduced by plantation owners in an effort to reduce production costs. The unemployment which resulted from such policies was particularly onerous for Jamaica which is a primary-producing country with a high unemployment rate and an economy which is not highly diversified.

My assessment of the labour displacement aspect of underdevelopment is therefore undertaken within the context of the appropriateness of the technology utilized in sugar production. Thus I demonstrate not only that field technology displaced workers but that it often proved to be inappropriate to various Jamaican factors of production. In addition, I point out that much of the failure of factory technology resulted from the fact that competing foreign investors, intent on maximizing profits, frequently did not standardize and modernize their equipment, failed to centralize their spare parts inventory and thus were unable to facilitate repairs in their factories. Such examples of inappropriate technology impeded sugar production in post-war Jamaica.

The retrenchment policies of plantation owners and the poor wages and working conditions of the labour force culminated, over the years, in bitter industrial relations between workers and owners. During the post-war period, workers demonstrated their opposition to their oppressed status by frequent work stoppages and strikes. Therefore, the cost-cutting measures of plantation owners not only gave rise to industrial unrest and conflicts of various kinds, but also retarded the productivity of the sugar industry.


Finally, although the supplies of cane furnished by peasant cane farmers to the sugar factories on the plantations constituted a vital input for the operation of the Jamaican sugar industry, such farmers were rarely accorded a position in the sugar industry which was commensurate with their role. Their position vis à vis the sugar manufactures and foreign corporations was a secondary one. The development of the peasant cane farmers was, therefore, dependent on policies dictated largely by foreign interests.

PLANTATION LABOUR: THE METHOD OF SUGAR PRODUCTION

An understanding of the dynamics of plantation labour requires an initial examination of the method by which sugar is produced.¹ The sugar cane, Saccharum officinarum, is an enormous

Figure 5.1

Schematic Flow Chart of a Sugar Factory



Source: David Forsythe. Appropriate Technology in Sugar Manufacturing. World Development, 5, 1977. p. 192.

grass which consists of roots, stalk, and leaves. It grows to a height of about ten to fifteen feet; its stalk is a tube of about two inches in diameter with an outer hard rind filled with softer fibrous matter in which the sugar is contained.

Cane fields are established by planting short pieces of cane called "dibbles" which are cut in such a way that three joints with "buds" or "eyes" are included. A new cane comes from each bud and roots itself in the ground, developing a new plant and growing to maturity after about twelve months.

Canes are usually harvested between December and June. The cane stalks are cut as close as possible to the ground and the green tops removed. The "stools" which remain in the ground after harvesting produce fresh cane which, in the following year, are referred to as "ratoons". Although this process can continue indefinitely, the yield of sugar per acre of land gradually diminishes. Thus plantation managers normally allow the process to be repeated for only five or six years after which the land is ploughed up and replanted.

The harvested canes are transported to the factory by truck. There, they are tipped into a pit and conveyed mechanically to the crushing mill.² At the crushing mill the canes are passed through shredding knives and crushing rollers which break up the hard rind of the canes and expose the soft inner fibre.³ At intervals the crushed canes are sprayed with water to maximize the extraction of juice. The canes are next conveyed to the squeezing rollers where the juice is extracted. During this process as little water as

possible is added since it later has to be evaporated. In addition, a balance has to be struck between the value of the extra sugar which can be extracted and the cost of evaporation. The fibre which remains after the juice is extracted is known as "bagasse".

The next stage involves the heating of the cane juice. At this juncture, lime is added so that the impurities which collect together can either be skimmed off or allowed to settle as sediment. After this, the clear juice is concentrated in evaporators. Since large amounts of water have to be evaporated, a system of "multiple-effect evaporators" is utilized. This system allows maximum evaporation to take place with a minimum consumption of steam. Next, the concentrated juice from the evaporators is boiled in steam-heated vacuum pans until a mixture of "massecuite" of sugar crystals and syrup remains. The massecuite is then spun in centrifugal machines. These rapidly rotating tubs have perforated walls which allow the sugar crystals commonly known as "raw sugar" to be separated from the "molasses". The major steps of the procedures in a sugar factory are shown in Figure 5.1.

THE SKILL CONTENT OF PLANTATION LABOUR

The dynamics of plantation labour will now be examined in order to illustrate the skill content of this kind of work.⁴ Sugar plantation labour consists of two basic parts (1) sugar cane cultivation and (2) harvesting.⁵ The first procedure in sugar cane cultivation is land preparation. If the land is being prepared from pasture or from an old cane field, it first has to be "harrowed"

i.e. heavily ploughed. The soil next has to be broken up, a process known as "knifing". After another harrowing, the soil is then planed so that the ridges might be removed and the depressions filled in. Finally the soil is furrowed and the infield drains and irrigation channels are established. In preparing ratoon canes, damaged fields have to be repaired, banks and furrows have to be reformed and canes have to be supplied to fill in gaps between ratoons.

Planting of the sugar cane usually involves three separate groups. One group cuts the nine inch pieces of cane which are to be planted, i.e. the "dibbles". Another group supplies them to those areas where they are required and a third group does the actual planting. In planting the dibbles, workers first thrust a metal rod in the cane banks in order to make deep holes. The dibbles are then inserted in these holes at an angle of about 30° . Planting is usually done in rows spaced five and a half feet apart.

Weed control is another important aspect of sugar cane cultivation. On most sugar estates this is a difficult task. The major weed problem is para grass. However, the only spray capable of destroying it is also harmful to sugar canes. Since para grass sends down new roots if it is pulled out and left lying on the ground, workers have to pull this weed up by the roots and collect it immediately.

In addition to land preparation, planting, and weed control, sugar cane cultivation involves irrigation and drainage. These two jobs are usually carried out by workers under the supervision of

Field Engineers or Field Managers. Once the supervisory field officer has acquired the irrigation water and established the pattern of distribution, it is the job of the "irrigation men" to distribute the water and maintain the irrigation canals. Most estates utilize a two week irrigation cycle and during this period an irrigation man is expected to cover about forty or fifty acres of cane land.

Maintenance of the drainage system is quite important in cultivating sugar canes. Once the canes start to grow, it is necessary to deepen the furrows and build up the cane banks. This procedure not only assures the best conditions for the canes to develop healthy roots but also reestablishes the drainage system. The drainage system in the fields consists of a network of interconnected ditches. During the rainy season, which lasts from May until November, labourers are required to spend considerable time and effort to make sure that the irrigation drains are free of debris. Workers have to make sure that the furrows on either side of each row of cane are carrying excess water to the field drains which, in turn, carry it to the large channels which feed into the local rivers. Maintenance of a proper drainage system is important because, although sugar canes require a fair amount of water, any excess water causes the roots to rot and the crop to be destroyed.

Fertilizing the canes is another aspect of sugar cane cultivation. The fertilizer which might be ammonium sulphate, potash, or phosphate, is usually applied as soon as the canes begin to grow. In addition, "filter press mud", a by-product of sugar

production, which is rich in lime, nitrogen and phosphate is sometimes applied in the cane fields. Women are often involved in the job of applying fertilizer to the canes. Each fertilizer "gang" usually consists of one labourer who mixes the fertilizer, a group of eight or ten labourers who spread it at the cane roots and one person who directs the gang.

The general description of sugar cane cultivation that has been provided indicates that this kind of work has a low skill content. Although skilled and semi-skilled workers are required to operate the tractors in the initial stages of land preparation when the harrowing, knifing, planing, etc. are carried out, many aspects of sugar cane cultivation, during the period under study, required little more than unskilled labour. As one can see from Table 5.1, in 1945 84.1 per cent of the work force in the Jamaican sugar industry consisted of unskilled labourers, 14.4 per cent were semi-skilled and 1.5 per cent were skilled workers. As late as 1966 the planting of canes and certain aspects of the application of fertilizer were manual operations requiring little skill.

Cane planting has continued as a manual operation, mainly due to the practice of using as planting material top setts cut from mature stalks at harvest time. We question the economics of this procedure and recommend that the feasibility of establishing special seed nurseries be studied ... Fertilizer application has remained a manual operation with both plant and ratoon crops, but we are informed that it is becoming more difficult to get labour to perform this work.

At the WISCO plantations, up to 1967, the manual removal of weed was necessary since aerial spraying was insufficient to destroy all the varieties of weeds. At Innswood, all irrigation ditches

Table 5.1

Classification of Field Workers by Occupational Skill Levels

Sugar Estates	Total for All Skills = 100%	SKILL LEVEL					
		Skilled		Semi-skilled		Unskilled	
		No.	% of Total	No.	% of Total	No.	% of Total
All Estates	4,854	73	1.5	699	14.4	4,083	84.1
1. Appleton	60	2	3.3	5	8.3	53	88.3
2. Bernard Lodge	282	6	2.1	45	16.	231	81.9
3. Bog	55	1	1.8	2	3.6	52	94.5
4. Barnett	99	2	2.	11	11.1	86	86.8
5. Caymanas	240	24	10.	216	90.
6. Cambridge	57	7	12.3	50	87.7
7. Frome	994	22	2.2	144	14.5	828	83.3
8. Grinan Estates	122	2	1.6	12	9.8	108	88.5
9. Gray's Inn	219	1	.5	19	8.7	199	90.9
10. Green Park	60	1	1.7	11	18.3	48	80.
11. Hampden	149	6	4.	4	2.7	139	93.3
12. Holland	60	7	11.7	13	21.7	40	66.7
13. Innswood	231	6	2.7	225	97.4
14. Ironshore	94	9	9.6	85	90.4
15. Jamacia Sugar Estates	380	2	.5	24	6.3	354	93.2
16. Kew	60	7	11.7	53	88.3
17. Llandoverly	59	9	15.2	50	84.8
18. Long Pond	175	25	14.3	150	85.7
19. Monymusk	513	8	1.6	194	37.8	311	60.6
20. Raheen	100	3	3.	97	97.
21. Richmond	114	33	29.	81	71.
22. Rose Hall	180	2	1.1	34	18.9	144	80.
23. Serge Island	178	10	5.6	11	6.2	157	88.2
24. United Estates	193	1	.5	18	9.3	174	90.2
25. Vale Royal	60	14	23.3	46	76.7
26. Worthy Park	120	14	11.7	106	88.3

Source: Report of an Economic Survey among Field Workers in the Sugar Industry. Jamaica, 1945, p. 19.

were cleaned by hand even in 1968 and prior to 1964, when the backhoe was acquired, all drains had to be made and maintained by hand.⁷

The second major feature of sugar plantation labour is harvesting. There are three consecutive operations in sugar cane harvesting, (1) cutting, (2) loading, and (3) transportation of the canes to the factory. Cutters usually work in pairs and each pair is allotted a daily quota by the plantation Field Manager. The canes which are cut are placed across two central rows for loading. Cutters work in pairs in order to ensure that at the end of the day, individual output can be ascertained without difficulty. Cutters are paid according to the tons of canes which they cut.

Loaders usually work in groups of four to six. Each member of a group is expected to do his fair share of the work. A typical loading group consists of a headman who usually selects his own assistants, one man who stands in the truck and stacks the canes, and two or three men who throw up the canes in bundles from the ground to the truck. The loading operation varies depending on the method used to convey the canes from the fields to the weighing scale. The methods include horse drawn drays, tractors with trailers, and railways. On the Appleton plantation where the heavy clay soil and the high rainfall combined to make haulage by tractor difficult, cutters were required to carry the cut canes on their heads to the roadway where they dumped them on the ground. Loaders then collected the canes from there.

The system of loading canes on railway cars instead of on

road vehicles like trucks is worthy of note. Large sugar plantations such as Innswood utilized rail gangs. Table 5.2 shows the composition of a rail gang at Innswood in 1970. Cutters were allowed to work either in pairs or singly and were assigned definite portions of cane to cut. It was the job of the eight linemen to place and remove the portable infield track.

Table 5.2

Composition of a Rail Gang (1970)

Title of Job	Number
Cutters	58
Loaders	58
Linemen	8
Loading Head Man	1
Cutting Head Man	1
Stump Head Man	1
Driver for infield locomotive	1
Coupler for infield locomotive	1
Driver for large locomotive	1
<u>Couplers for large locomotive</u>	<u>2</u>
Total	132

Sources: Sugar Research Department Annual Report, 1970. Cane Farmers' Association Annual Report, 1970

The loaders usually worked in pairs. One loader, called the "hander", picked up the canes, removed the trash, and handed them to his partner who stacked them in the cane cart. After about three carts were filled with cane, a small locomotive moved them to the permanent track where a larger locomotive would transport about twenty or thirty carts to the factory. The job of the couplers was to couple and uncouple the carts and to assist the drivers. The loading headman inspected the loading operations and made out waybills for each cart. He had to record who cut the various quantities of canes and who loaded them. The cutting headman

assigned the cutters to the areas where they were to cut, while the stumping headman, his assistant, made sure that the canes were properly cut.

It is not difficult to see that, like sugar cane cultivation, the job of harvesting has a low skill content. Although the transportation of canes required a few skilled and semi-skilled workers to operate the vehicles used in this process, the vast majority of the labourers, the cutters and loaders, were unskilled. Indeed, as we shall see later, the introduction of mechanization in cutting and loading resulted not in an upgrading of skills of most workers but in the displacement of workers.

SEASONAL EMPLOYMENT

In the post-war period the vast majority of sugar cane workers were employed on a "task work" or "piece work" basis. This kind of employment was of a casual nature for once a worker had completed his assigned task, he had no guarantee of obtaining additional employment. Task workers were recruited by the estate "headmen" who were charged with the supervision and allocation of work. Workers were paid on the basis of the work performed rather than on the length of time required to complete it.⁸

The unemployment which was caused among labourers by the seasonal nature of sugar cane cultivation and harvesting is worthy of note. Once the tasks of land preparation, planting, weeding, irrigation, drainage, and fertilizing were completed, little labour was required until it was time to harvest the cane crop. In

addition, there was an optimum time for cutting canes. They had to be cut when the sucrose content was highest. Since the sucrose content began to decline as soon as the canes were cut, newly cut canes had to be ground as soon as possible. Employment in the sugar factories as well as in the cane field was thus of a seasonal nature and the peak labour requirements of both sectors took place at the same time. Furthermore, once the sugar factories began to operate, plantation owners considered it uneconomical to let them stand idle for any length of time. The result was that during the harvest season, grinding was normally a round-the-clock operation while, between harvests, the mills were shut down except when maintenance work was carried out.⁹ Table 5.3 illustrates the fluctuations in the labour requirements of sugar plantations from one part of the sugar cane season to the next. In 1961, for example, the average number of workers required per week during crop period was 31,217. This number fell to 15,739 in the out-of-crop period.

Table 5.3

Employment Patterns in the Jamaican Sugar Industry -
Selected Years

<u>During Crop</u>	<u>1958</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>
Average number per week	42,413	39,895	36,633	31,217
Highest number in any one week	52,997	47,599	43,197	36,489
Lowest number in any one week	28,123	25,798	26,767	21,377
<u>Out-of-Crop</u>	<u>1958</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>
Average number per week	23,354	23,428	18,219	15,739
Highest number in any one week	32,753	31,619	25,592	21,422
Lowest number in any one week	13,347	14,361	10,902	8,953

Source: Annual Report of the Ministry of Labour, Jamaica, 1961,
p. 7

Factory workers in the sugar industry generally worked full-time during crop period. During the out-of-crop period only about half of these workers were able to find employment. Table 5.4 indicates that the reduction in the number in the 1940s was about 3,000.

Table 5.4

Fluctuations in Employment in the Jamaican Sugar Industry

Class of Worker	Crop Period	Out-of-Crop Period
Factory Worker	6,552	3,503
Field Workers	23,738	15,142

Source: Report of the Sugar Industry Commission, Jamaica, 1945, p. 147.

Some semi-skilled and unskilled factory workers were able to obtain field work on the estates during the out-of-crop period while many of the skilled workers were able to obtain intermittent employment either on the estates or elsewhere, in work for which their particular skills fitted them. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that the vast majority of sugar workers, over eighty per cent, were the field labourers. Such workers, as we have seen, were largely unskilled and were employed on a task work or piece work basis.

The inability of field workers to obtain full employment on the sugar plantations during the year would not be of great importance if they were able to obtain employment from other sources or were profitably employed on their own account when not working on the plantations. However, the development of these workers was

hindered because of the fact that the vast majority of them were unable to secure gainful employment when their services were not required by the plantations. While many sugar cane workers had small holdings around their homes where they planted local ground provisions, such plots cannot be considered as income-producing units since they were utilized primarily to provide food for consumption in the homes.¹⁰

The unemployment suffered by the cane workers in Jamaica where the sugar industry was dominated by foreign capital may be compared with the situation in post-revolutionary Cuba where the entire economy of the country is coordinated in such a way that much of the work in other sectors is carried out in the period between sugar harvests, thus releasing the required labour to harvest canes.¹¹ This kind of arrangement would have been impossible to institute in Jamaica during the post-war period primarily because of the extent to which the economy was dominated by foreign interests.

WAGE STRUCTURE

During the period under study, the earnings of Jamaican sugar workers were based on a wage structure which was not only low in comparison with salary scales in other sectors of the economy but which also contained various inequitable features. This wage structure played a role in hampering the socio-economic development of sugar workers.

Prior to 1939, wage rates in the Jamaican sugar industry were determined, not by collective bargaining, but by agreement

between employers and workers on an individual basis. Each sugar manufacturer established his own pattern of wage rates and working conditions.¹² It was only in the aftermath of the riots at the Frome estate in 1938 that sugar workers were first organized in a trade union. Indeed, the West Indian Royal Commission which was appointed in 1938 to investigate the social and economic conditions in the West Indies following the riots reported as follows:

It appears to be recognized on every side that under present conditions, the interests of the workers have been virtually unprotected. On the other hand, employers in the West Indies have long been associated for purposes of trade and in some cases - for example among sugar manufacturers - their organization has attained a high state of efficiency. It is a fair generalization to say that while agricultural employers are comparatively well organized, the workers are either completely unorganized or at best only partly organized. In this position, collective bargaining in the British sense has been virtually an impossibility, and wage rates have followed standards laid down by the employers alone.¹³

The West Indian Royal Commission reported that in 1938 daily rates for workers varied from one shilling and six pence to two shillings and six pence for men and from ten pence to one shilling and six pence for women. It also reported that earnings from task work ranged from one shilling and three pence to four shillings for cutting cane, from one shilling and six pence to four shillings and three pence for forking, and from one shilling to one shilling and nine pence for weeding.¹⁴

Although workers were allowed the right to engage in collective bargaining, with the advent of trade unions in 1941, their wage scale did not improve to any great extent, even as late as 1945. Table 5.5 shows that average weekly wages was seventeen

Table 5.5

Average Weekly Earnings from all undertakings according to production periods on Sugar Estates as disclosed by field workers

Sugar Estates	Number of Cases Studied	Specific Average Weekly Earnings from all Sources for the Year £ s. d.	WEEKLY EARNINGS ON SUGAR ESTATES			WEEKLY EARNINGS BY OTHER SOURCES (not including work on own account)		
			For the Sugar Year £ s. d.	In the Crop Period £ s. d.	In the Out-of-Crop Period £ s. d.	For the Year £ s. d.	During the Crop Period £ s. d.	During the Out-of-Crop Period £ s. d.
All Estates	4,854	0 14 8	0 14 4½	0 17 7	0 12 6	0 0 3½	0 0 1	0 0 5½
1. Appleton	60	0 13 10	0 13 10	0 14 9	0 13 4
2. Bernard Lodge	282	0 16 4½	0 16 3	1 2 6	0 12 10	0 0 1½	0 0 2	0 0 1
3. Bog	55	0 14 10½	0 14 9	0 16 2	0 14 2	0 0 1½	0 0 1	0 0 2
4. Barnett	99	0 9 10	0 9 8	0 11 3	0 8 10	0 0 2	..	0 0 3
5. Cambridge	57	0 8 5	0 8 5	0 10 4	0 7 4
6. Caymanas	240	0 16 11	0 15 7	1 0 8	0 12 10	0 1 4	0 0 3	0 1 11
7. Frome	994	0 13 8	0 13 8	0 16 5	0 12 2
8. Grinan Estates	122	0 16 11½	0 16 11	0 18 2	0 16 3	0 0 0½	..	0 0 1
9. Gray's Inn	219	0 14 6	0 13 9	0 17 11	0 11 5	0 0 9	0 0 4	0 1 0
10. Green Park	60	0 13 9½	0 13 6	0 16 2	0 12 1	0 0 3½	..	0 0 5
11. Hampden	149	0 12 7½	0 12 7	0 13 7	0 12 0	0 0 0½	0 0 1	..
12. Holland	60	0 16 11	0 16 9	0 19 5	0 15 4	0 0 2	0 0 2	0 0 2
13. Innswood	231	0 15 4	0 14 9	0 19 2	0 12 4	0 0 7	0 0 5	0 0 8
14. Ironshore	94	0 10 5½	0 10 5	0 12 4	0 9 4	0 0 0½	..	0 0 1
15. Jamaican Sugar Estates	380	0 16 1	0 15 6	1 0 0	0 13 0	0 0 7	..	0 0 11
16. Kew	60	0 10 9	0 10 9	0 12 7	0 9 9
17. Long Pond	175	0 13 3	0 13 0	0 15 10	0 11 6	0 0 3	0 0 3	0 0 3
18. Llandoverly	59	0 13 9	0 13 9	0 17 4	0 11 9
19. Monymusk	513	0 17 3½	0 16 9	1 0 6	0 4 8	0 0 6½	..	0 0 10
20. Raheen	100	0 10 2½	0 9 2	0 11 2	0 8 0	0 1 0½	0 0 4	0 1 5
21. Richmond	114	0 16 10	0 16 10	0 19 1	0 15 7
22. Rose Hall	180	0 10 2	0 10 0	0 13 6	0 8 1	0 0 2	..	0 0 3
23. Serge Island	178	0 13 8½	0 13 5	0 15 11	0 12 1	0 0 3½	..	0 0 5
24. United Estates	193	0 12 4½	0 11 11	0 13 8	0 10 11	0 0 5½	0 0 2	0 0 8
25. Vale Royal	60	0 15 4	0 15 4	0 18 9	0 13 6
26. Worthy Park	120	1 2 6	1 2 6	1 4 5	1 1 6

Source: Report of an Economic Survey Among Field Workers in the Sugar Industry, Jamaica, 1945, p. 43.

shillings and seven pence during the crop period and twelve shillings and six pence during the out-of-crop period.

Additional evidence of the low earnings of sugar workers can be gleaned from the kinds of wages such workers earned in the 1950s. The evidence suggests that "the wages of the sugar workers are unreasonably low, and that such increases, as have been granted have even failed to offset the rise in the cost of living."¹⁵ The record indicates that the workers received a wage increase of one and a half pence in the shilling in 1950, one and a half pence in the shilling in 1951, two pence in the shilling in 1952, and one and a half pence in the shilling in 1957. Although crop bonuses were paid in the years 1953-1957, there was neither a wage increase nor a crop bonus in 1958. Furthermore, there were no increases granted in 1959.

One of the most inequitable features of the sugar rates paid to sugar workers was the repudiation of the concept of equal pay for equal work. According to an agreement struck between the Sugar Manufacturers Association (SMA) and the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union (BITU) in March 1948, sugar factories were divided into Class 1 and Class 2 factories. The agreement also enacted two sets of minimum wages, one for the Class 1 and another for the Class 2 factories. Class 1 factories were those producing more than 4,000 tons of sugar and Class 2 were those producing less than 4,000 tons.¹⁶

In 1951 the system was modified and factories were now divided into three groups. Table 5.6 indicates the groupings. The estates in Category A1 had a common minimum daily rate which was higher than the rate in Category A estates. The latter rates were,

in turn, higher than those in Category B estates. This system, which imposed different rates of pay on workers doing exactly the same kind of job, was a definite obstacle to the development of the Jamaican sugar workers. In the words of the Arbitration Tribunal of 1955:

This system which needs further independent examination appears to be curiously arbitrary and seems to us to be unsound. It is claimed that this practice is based on "ability to pay". This claim appears to be based on an elementary misunderstanding of what economists normally describe as the capacity to pay as determined by well-known and not arbitrary principles of assessment in a healthy industry. In this matter, current practice in Jamaica is chaotic, disincentive, and a concealed subsidy.¹⁷

Table 5.6

The Grading of Sugar Estates

<u>Category A1</u>	<u>Category A</u>	<u>Category B</u>
Frome	Barnett	Rose Hall
Monymusk	Vale Royal	Richmond-Llandoverly
Caymanas	Hampden	Holland
Innswood	Appleton	
Bernard Lodge	Sevens	
Serge Island	Worthy Park	
Jamaica Sugar Estates	United Estates	
Gray's Inn	Long Pond	
New Yarmouth		

Source: Report of the Sugar Industry Commission, Jamaica, 1960, p. 24.

The lack of standardization of wages was reflected at all levels in the sugar industry. During the post-war period the only wage rates which were standardized according to the estates' categories were the minimum daily rates for daily paid workers and the minimum weekly rates for weekly paid workers for a 48-hour working week. The task rate for cane cutters and for cane loaders showed fluctuations among estates in the same category. Jobs such

as that of clearing of lands in new areas in preparation for planting, the establishment of irrigation canals, the tillage of the land, the internal drainage of fields, planting, the application of fertilizer, weed control, the transportation of canes to the factory showed wide disparities in wage rates.

Such disparities existed not only among estates in different categories but also among estates in the same category. The Commission of Enquiry which was set up to investigate the workings of the Jamaican sugar industry in 1960 was amazed at the chaos which existed.

The wage structure in the industry is chaotic. It is estimated that there are some 1,000 different rates. Prior to 1941 the rates were fixed by the management of each estate and there was little uniformity as between estates or even on the same estate. When the first increases were negotiated in 1941 all existing rates were frozen and became the base rate for each occupation on each estate. In 1950 a new base rate was adopted which consolidated all wages with their percentage increases since 1941. Increases since then have continued to be related to the 1950 base with the result that the structure has remained chaotic.¹⁸

Table 5.7 shows that at the Monymusk plantation for the week ending May 3, 1958, 44 different task rates were paid to 72 different workers. There is little doubt that foreign investors were able to manipulate the wage paid for task work in order to reduce production costs and thus to maximize profits. Plantation owners refused to keep records of the time spent by workers in the performance of their tasks. Therefore, they were able to frustrate the efforts of anyone who wanted to judge the reasonableness of task rates or to compare the average earnings which they might yield with the average earnings of daily paid workers on the same estate.¹⁹

Table 5.7

Statement of Task Rates in a Small Section of Field Payroll on the
Monymusk Estates

	<u>Number of Tasks</u>	<u>Rate per Task</u>	<u>Number of Task Rates</u>	<u>Number of Employees</u>
<i>Morelands No. 1</i>				
<i>- Cultivation</i>				
Drainage	3	2/11½
	3	6
	46½	11/10½
	51½	2/-
	138½	5/3
	138½	10½
	51	9
	2½	7/3¼
	2½	1/2½
	27¼	1/9
	4¼	8/3¼
	3½	3/8½
	30¼	1/6
	20	3/-
	12	1/3
	9¼	6/6¼
	9¼	1/1
	2	3/6
	23½	6/0½	19	26
Weeding	476	2/3¼	1	25
Cultivation and Tillage				
	17	11/7¼
	7½	20/-
	30	1/1¼
	30	1
	1	8/6
	½	11/-	6	11
Maintenance of Main Drains				
	10	5/6
	¼	4/-
	16¼	3/6
	7½	3/-
	10	2/6
	13	2/-	6	6

continued over

	<u>Number of Tasks</u>	<u>Rate per Task</u>	<u>Number of Task Rates</u>	<u>Number of Employees</u>
<i>Morelands No. 2</i>				
<i>- General</i>				
Ferguson Operators	66	2/3
	141	4½
	24	6¼
	4	5/1½
	5	8/-
	5	3/-
	65	1/5
	1	12/-
	5.85	3/4½
	25	2/1½
	2	4/6
	½	11/-
			12	4
			44	72

Source: Report of the Sugar Industry Commission, Jamaica, 1960, p. 93.

Most of the inequitable features in the wage rates paid to sugar workers during the 1940s and 1950s continued during the next two decades. The Commission of Enquiry which was set up to investigate the sugar industry in 1966 reported that one of the main roots of conflict was "an irrational wage structure".²⁰ The contrast between the cane cutter earning twelve or fifteen shillings a day for work that requires heavy physical effort in the heat of the day with the tractor driver earning two or three times as much for a job that requires much less effort and frequently no great amount of skill was one of the anomalies which the Commission rightly criticized.

The inequitable wage rates paid to Jamaican sugar workers were also a reflection of the long tradition of work specialization which existed on sugar plantations. Since the "specialist" workers

Table 5.8

Comparison of Ranges for Daily Wage Rates
Between the Sugar and Other Industries, Jamaican Dollars*

Job Description	Sugar Estates	Bananas	Building	Govt. Agriculture	Bauxite Agricultural Operations	Bauxite & Alumina Production	General Manufact- ing
Daily Paid Workers	1.08- 1.50	0.65- 1.08	2.36	1.85 2.00	1.43- 3.60	6.64- 6.80	1.20 7.12
MALE							
Tractor Drivers Heavy Units	1.65- 3.59	1.96- 2.88	6.88	3.33	2.16- 4.56	11.12 13.60	2.40- 7.36
Mechanics	1.48- 3.50	3.28- 8.38	3.93- 6.40	2.90- 4.00	3.84	9.36- 12.93	1.92- 12.00
Carpenters	1.35- 3.50	-	4.00- 6.00	2.90- 4.00	-	7.28- 10.64	2.00 9.84
Electricians	1.48- 3.50	-	4.00- 6.00	-	-	9.04- 12.96	3.28- 11.84

(*) For 8-hour day

Source: Jamaican Sugar, United Nations, New York, 1970, p.237.

often found themselves without employment for long periods when their particular skills were not required, their total year's salary frequently did not amount to much.²¹ One may contrast this situation with the one which exists in metropolitan countries like the United States and Britain. Here farm workers are often expected to perform a much wider variety of tasks. Consequently, they can be employed for most of the year.

Table 5.8 indicates that Jamaican sugar workers were poorly paid in comparison with workers in other sectors of the economy.²²

TECHNOLOGY AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT

(i) MECHANIZATION AND LABOUR DISPLACEMENT

The increasing use of field mechanization was one of the most important developments in the Jamaican sugar industry during the post-war period. Sugar manufacturers endeavoured to increase the use of machines in an effort to reduce sugar production costs and to maximize profits.

Mechanical loaders were first utilized on an experimental basis in the 1950s at Monymusk. By 1961 they were being operated commercially. In the 1960s the number of mechanical loaders and the proportion of the crop that was mechanically loaded increased quickly. The result was that by 1969, 70 per cent of estate cane was loaded mechanically. Although the mechanical harvesting of cane was introduced at a later date, in 1967 various types of mechanical cutters and combine harvesters were being used in the sugar

industry.²³

Indeed, the Sugar Industry Commission of 1966 found that by 1966, other facets of sugar production were being rapidly mechanized. Inter-row cultivation was now almost completely mechanized except at sections where tractors were unable to turn. Subsoil ripping, ploughing, levelling, and the first digging of infield drains were almost all completely mechanized. The job of finishing the drains and cleaning them still required manual workers. Tractor-mounted fertilizer distributors were also being increasingly used. Thus, although manual workers were still being used in field operations, by 1970 machines were steadily taking the place of men.²⁴

With increasing mechanization, unemployment among sugar workers intensified as their places were taken by machines. The average employment of non-staff workers on sugar plantations during the harvest season fell from approximately 43,700 in 1955 to 28,400 in 1965. In the factories, employment fell from approximately 8,000 to 6,100, and in the fields it fell from 35,700 to 22,300. These numbers include workers who became redundant from the bulk handling of sugar - about 160 workers. The out-of-crop average employment fell by 9,400; from 20,900 in 1955 to 11,500 in 1965. Although these figures suffer from certain limitations since the work force in the field was not stable and therefore these arithmetic averages not give a full picture of man-hours worked, such figures are still significant.²⁵ Their significance lies in the fact that at the same time that unemployment was rising among sugar workers, the total

acreage devoted to sugar plantation was increasing. Table 5.9 is indicative of this trend.

Table 5.9

Trends in Field and Factory Employment on Jamaican Sugar Estates

Year	No. of Field Employees per 100 Acres Under Cane (Estates Only)	No. of Field Employees per 1,000 Tons Sugar Produced (Estates and Farmer' Canes)	Acres Under Cane (Estates Only)
1950	52.8	21.3	51,977
1951	49.0	21.6	56,039
1952	47.7	20.0	58,256
1953	48.2	18.3	60,030
1954	46.9	16.6	62,500
1955	44.1	15.6	62,713
1956	44.7	17.1	61,007
1957	43.2	16.7	61,839
1958	39.9	17.8	64,924
1959	38.7	15.7	64,988
1960	31.2	13.9	71,278

Sources: Handbook of the British West Indies Sugar Association, Barbados, 1958, pp. 13-15; E. Rubens and B. Rubens, Labour Displacement in a Labour Surplus Economy. Jamaica, 1962, p. 21. do

Socio-economic problems among sugar workers stemmed not only from the fact that they were being declared redundant but also from the fact that not many of these displaced workers qualified for severance payments. Between 1955 and 1965, 906 factory and ancillary workers received severance pay. This number was a little less than one half of the total number that had been declared redundant. During these years, of the 13,400 in-crop work force that was displaced, only 1,352 qualified for severance pay. In 1966 only 273 workers, that is, 112 field workers and 181 factory workers qualified for severance.²⁶

The small number of workers who qualified for severance pay

was a reflection of the provisions of the Severance Pay Agreement. According to this agreement, which was first reached in 1958 and modified in 1960, displaced workers were given severance pay according to a scale: (1) one week's pay for each year after three years of service; (2) one and a half week's pay for each year from the fourth to the fifth year of service and (3) two weeks' pay for each year from and after the sixth year of service. The value of a week's pay was calculated on the basis of the total wages earned in the twenty-four calendar months immediately preceding the redundancy divided by 104.²⁷

Although provisions were later made to cover the cases of workers whose work had been broken because of illness, the terms of the Severance Pay Agreement worked against the interest of sugar workers. Since casual labour was the main type of work on sugar plantations, workers frequently moved from one employer to the next as the work that was suitable to them became available. Their total work with a given employer would therefore not be of a continuous nature. Lack of continuity also arose from the fact that agricultural casual workers spent an appreciable amount of time cultivating their own lands or working in non-agricultural jobs where such work was available. The underdevelopment of sugar workers stemmed, therefore, not only from the fact that they were displaced and unemployed, but also from the fact that the social security measures of sugar manufacturers which were supposed to ease the economic impact of displacement on workers benefitted only a minority of such workers.

Measures implemented by the state demonstrated similar weaknesses. The Prime Minister's Redundancy Fund provides a good example. According to the terms of its provisions, persons qualifying for benefits were limited to ex-employees of sugar manufacturers who (1) have worked at least five years with a sugar manufacturer; (2) have been made redundant as a result of mechanization, rationalization, or the substitution of some new process for an existing one; (3) are incapacitated, whatever their ages, and incapable of working or (4) are aged 65 for men and 60 for women, unemployed, and are not entitled to a pension under any other pension scheme. The terms of the provisions of this Fund were so restrictive that at the end of 1966, only fifty people had qualified for assistance. They received only fifteen shillings per week.²⁸ Foreign investors made few efforts to counteract the effect of displacement on sugar workers. No schemes were set up to facilitate the re-employment of displaced workers. Counselling programmes were not established. Retraining programmes were not provided. The Sugar Industry Commission (1966) was quite surprised by the absence of basic training programmes

We are particularly struck by the absence of any organized attempt to promote increased efficiency in cane-cutting. With the number of personnel constantly declining, it would surely be in the best interests of the estates and large farms to organize this.²⁹

Since there was no basic training on sugar plantations, retraining programmes did not exist. In addition, because the Jamaican sugar industry was owned by different private companies, there were no provision for inter-company transfer and relocation.

Unemployment was therefore the fate of most sugar workers who were displaced by mechanization.

(ii) INAPPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY IN SUGAR PRODUCTION

The question of the extent to which foreign investment in the Jamaican sugar industry undermined the development of various sectors of Jamaican society cannot be adequately resolved without a consideration of the inappropriateness of the technology utilized by sugar manufacturers in the production of sugar. The notion of appropriate technology refers to the fact that technology does not consist only of machines and equipment. Technology suggests a "package" where the hardware functions interdependently with the organization of the production process, managerial methods, the extent of the operations, the quality of the labour supply, etc. The concept of appropriate technology suggests that, where possible, production methods should be matched with the circumstances of a country, its environmental conditions, and resource endowment.³⁰

Much of the technology utilized by foreign investors in the Jamaica sugar industry was inappropriate for the Jamaican factors of production. The case of mechanical loading provides a good example. In Jamaica the kind of loader which is used is the grab loader. The machine grabs a load of cane from the ground, lifts it and deposits it in a side wagon. During the period under study, there were two types of grab loaders being used in Jamaica - the rotation grab and the push piler. The former was self propelled and consisted of a 360° rotating grab attached to a mobile power unit.³¹ The machine

loaded canes from heaps and was capable of loading more than two rows of heaps in one pass. It thus reduced the amount of traffic over the field. However, this machine was expensive and required costly modifications in order to operate under Jamaican conditions. In addition, under local conditions the machine was subject to varied mechanical failures. The other kind of grab loader, the push piler, had only a 90° rotation boom. Thus it could load only one row at a time. The canes were deposited in rows with individual stalks placed perpendicular to the rows. The loader pushed the cane stalks along the rows and picked up the piles as they were formed.³²

One of the greatest disadvantages of mechanical loading in sugar production is the increase in extraneous matter which is collected in the cane that is ground. Any material other than the cane which is to be milled is considered extraneous matter. Things such as cane tops, cane roots, cane leaves, trash, soil and stones are all extraneous matters. In 1970, for example, the amount of extraneous matter in the canes ground in Jamaica was as high as ten per cent.³³ The accepted normal level of extraneous matter in canes that have been harvested manually is three per cent. The extra seven per cent can be attributed to the operations of the mechanical loaders.

Extraneous matter hinder sugar productivity in various ways. First of all, the cost of harvesting is increased since a greater load of material has to be loaded, transported, and handled at the factory. The harvest season is therefore lengthened and the cost of grinding increased. In addition, the increased tonnage which has to

be ground and the increased mineral extraneous matter, result in greater costs in the replacement, maintenance, and repairs of machinery. Finally, the increase in extraneous material reduces the extraction and recovery of sugar. The sugar which is lost with the increased amount of bagasse cannot be recovered.³⁴

Table 5.10

Percent Composition of Extraneous Matter in Combine Harvesters,
Jamaica, 1970

	MF 201	Don Mizzi 740
Immature Tops	60.1	55.0
Trash	21.8	20.4
Roots	3.8	9.8
Dry Cane	1.3	2.2
Soil Clods	5.1	4.0
Stones	4.0	4.0
Other	3.9	4.6
Total	100.0	100.0
Percent Extra Matter	9.1	9.3

Source: Sugar Research Department Annual Report, Jamaica, 1970, pp. 65-66.

The mechanical cutting of sugar canes was introduced in Jamaica at a later date than the mechanical loading. Nevertheless, by 1970, there were three types of combine harvesters operating in Jamaica. These were the MF201, the Cameo "Cost Cutter", and the Don Mizzi 740.³⁵ The basic operation of the MF201 and the Don Mizzi 740 consisted of removing the leaves from the upper part of the canes, cutting the canes at the base, and drawing the canes into the machines. In the case of the MF201, the cut canes were conveyed by a series of rollers to a chopper. Once the canes were chopped they were lifted by two elevators and dropped into the cane tractor which

was towed alongside. In the case of the Don Mizzi 740, unlike the MF201, canes could be cut from one side only and the machine had only one elevating device. The Cameo "Cost Cutter" was the only one designed primarily for cutting canes and depositing them on the ground. However, modifications for loading could be implemented.

There is little doubt that certain features of mechanical cutting, like mechanical loading, were inappropriate to the Jamaican factors of production. The question of cane variety can immediately be cited since the variety of the cane is definitely one of the more important factors affecting machine performance. The growth habit of canes vary. While some varieties remain upright and are relatively light, others are heavier and tend to be recumbent. Jamaican canes generally fall into the second category.³⁶ However, mechanical cutters perform best when harvesting canes belonging to the first category.

Mechanical cutters are inappropriate for recumbent canes because when these kinds of canes are cut, the trash usually does not fall to the ground but remain hanging from the stems. The result is that the combine takes in a large amount of trash with the canes. In addition, recumbent canes may be gathered but are not properly presented for topping. Thus, mechanical cutters are frequently choked and cane tops become included in the canes that are chopped. The time spent in reversing the augers in order to clear the chokes results in the loss of productivity. The kinds of combines which operated in Jamaica in the post-war period were designed primarily for the erect, free trading, light weight, high

sucrose varieties of canes which are to be found in countries like Australia.³⁷

As was the case with mechanical loaders, the operations of mechanical cutters resulted in a high proportion of extraneous matters in harvested canes. One must bear in mind that a worker who is cutting canes can sever the top of the stalk at the correct height and cut the cane exactly at soil level. The mechanical cutter, however, has to be set to cut the cane top at an average height and to cut the stalk at about soil level. In Jamaica, difference in the heights of canes as well as in the gradient of fields resulted in increased quantities of extraneous matter added to the harvested cane. The level of extraneous material in combined harvest in cane in the crop of 1970 was about nine per cent.

Extraneous matter generally reduced the performance of mechanical harvesters in Jamaica. The cutting efficiency of many machines was impaired by the constant contact of the blades with the soil. Sometimes machines were also damaged by the presence of stones and pieces of iron in the soil. Most sugar manufacturers, apparently fearful of increased production costs, did not complement the machines with manual workers, as suggested by a United Nations study.

Ideally the cane cutter should work in conjunction with the machine. Cane topping should be performed manually while the severing of the stalk at soil level, and loading of the cane, may be performed mechanically. Employing the joint operations will lighten the task of the cane cutter and will increase his productivity considerably.³⁸

The question of the appropriate technology in sugar manufacturing is not limited to a consideration of factors such as the employment provided by such technology or the machinery utilized in the harvesting of sugar canes. Criteria such as the provenance of the factors of production and the distribution of the returns, the degree of dependence on foreign technicians, and the extent of the need for spare parts and services, may all be relevant.³⁹

The role of spare parts and services in the operation of the Jamaican sugar factories may be considered. During the period under study, the sugar processing plants in Jamaica were owned by competing foreign interests. Therefore, little effort was made at standardization of equipment which inhibited sugar production in various ways. First of all, because "each plant had its own individuality" and because of the variation in machinery,⁴⁰ the stocking of spare parts was an expensive undertaking. Each factory had to keep its own inventory of spare parts which, in most cases, were not interchangeable with those stocked in other factories. The United Nations study of the Jamaica sugar industry undertaken in 1970 reveals some of the problems presented by the lack of standardization in the fifteen processing plants.

Even the most standard items, such as valves, are stocked in great quantities at each mill in order to be available when needed. The result is a high priced spare parts inventory, possibly exceeding \$100,00 for a factory producing 17,000 tons of sugar and represents a capital investment of six per cent for spare parts on the value of sales. Even then, all the spare parts cannot be stocked due to physical limitations of plant size, and have to be ordered separately when needed. This causes delays in repair and maintenance schedule.⁴¹

Table 5.11

Hours Lost in Grinding Due to Failure of Machinery in 1970

<u>Factory</u>	<u>Time Lost, Hours</u>	<u>Per Cent of Total</u>	<u>Time, Hours</u>
Monymusk	280	7.8	3,607
New Yarmouth	288	9.1	3,153
Appleton	197	9.3	2,114
Jamaica Sugar Estates	323	11.9	2,708
Bernard Lodge	583	18.0	3,246
Frome 1	303	10.4	2,923
Frome 2	127	3.9	3,237
Worthy Park	52	1.7	3,048
Gray's Inn	209	9.1	2,288
Sevens	355	9.8	3,618
Long Pond	246	8.0	3,090
Innswood	394	11.6	3,305
Hampden	128	3.9	3,312
Serge Island	157	4.8	1,922
Bybrook	297	9.0	3,283
Holland	266	13.9	1,911

Source: Jamaican Sugar. United Nations, New York, 1970, p. 236

Table 5.12

Comparison of Lost Time, Jamaica and Other Sugar Areas Lost Time

	<u>% of Total Time</u>
Australia	25.37**
Louisiana	12.40*
Florida	6.53***
Jamaica	33.40*
Panama	19.43****
South Africa	12.59**

* 1966 crop
 ** 1965 crop
 *** 1966-67 crop
 **** 1967 crop

Source: Report of the Sugar Industry Commission, Kingston, Jamaica, 1966, p. 101.

Table 5.13

Comparison of Man-Hours Requirements: U.S.A. and Jamaica Cane Sugar Factories, U.S.A. - 1965 and Jamaica - 1966

<u>Factory</u>	<u>Tons Cane Per Day</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Man Hours Ton Cane</u>
Little Texas	1,317	Louisiana	0.700
Vida	1,467	Louisiana	0.631
United Estates	1,417	Jamaica	1.3324
Columbia (c)	1,632	Louisiana	0.5000
Appleton	1,688	Jamaica	1.5805
Louisa	1,920	Louisiana	0.6031
Bernard Lodge	1,903	Jamaica	2.3826
Smithfield	2,004	Louisiana	0.5150
Trelawny Estates	2,005	Jamaica	1.0913
Moorehaven*	3,749	Florida	0.4267
Monymusk*	3,840	Jamaica	1.0565
Sterling	4,773	Louisiana	0.3892
Frome	5,037	Jamaica	0.8424

Source: Report of the Sugar Industry Commission, Kingston, Jamaica, 1966, p. 99.

Table 5.11 indicates the number of hours lost in grinding in 1970 because of the failure of machinery in the Jamaica sugar factories. As we can see from Table 5.12, the percentage of factory time lost in Jamaica was high in comparison with that of other sugar

producing areas in the world. Therefore, the time required to produce a ton of sugar in Jamaican factories was longer than that required to produce the same amount in factories of similar sizes elsewhere. Table 5.13 indicates this trend. It is important to understand, therefore, that the increase in sugar production in Jamaica between 1955 and 1970 was not due to the increased efficiency of sugar manufacturers but simply to the fact that the acreage under sugar cane was expanding and therefore more canes were being ground, and thus more sugar manufactured.⁴²

Apart from the failure of sugar manufacturers to standardize their equipment and to centralize their spare-parts inventory, there were other factors which hindered production. The condition of the machinery in the factory may be cited. While a few sugar manufacturers made some attempt at modernization, others made no attempt whatsoever. The latter group replaced equipment only when forced to by the failure of the original equipment. A report on one small north coast factory concluded,

It would be an understatement to say that, taken as a whole, the Kew factory is a jumble of junk. The mill and subsidiers are old and the evaporators inefficient and only worthy of scrapping. There are no crystallizers and, while one of the boilers is in good condition, the other is leaking so badly and so corroded that it was only under difficulty that the boiler inspector was persuaded to allow it to carry on.⁴³

In 1970, sixty per cent of the factories were considered to be in poor condition. In some cases there was equipment dating back to the 1900s.

No records have been maintained but if someone had taken the time to keep such records on the costs of repair and maintenance, both labour and parts, the total amount

spent on keeping certain pieces of machinery operational would prove staggering."⁴⁴

The inadequate performance and low productivity of Jamaican sugar factories compared with those in other countries should be placed in a historical context. In the post-war period the price paid for Jamaican sugar on the international market was fixed by metropolitan countries. These agreements which were modified from time to time stimulated the cultivation of sugar cane. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Jamaican government also encouraged the cultivation of sugar cane. Although there was some closure and amalgamation of sugar factories in the post-war period, few attempts were made to install additional equipment or to construct new facilities in order to handle the increased amounts of canes delivered to the factories. What sugar manufacturers did, instead, was to extend the crop period, thereby increasing the use of the machinery in the factory. "Instead of using the machinery four months per year and devoting the balance to reconditioning, management is faced with grinding periods often in excess of seven months."⁴⁵

We may consider some of the ramifications on productivity caused by the prolonged crop period. First of all, the wear and tear on factory machinery during this extended period was heavier than during the former period. Difficulties in repairing machinery was now exacerbated because of the shorter time available to do it. "Thus, an already tight repair schedule has become even more strained in recent years. Subsequently, the cost of repairs has skyrocketed and machine parts have to be replaced at ever increasing

rates."⁴⁶ Secondly, the fact that the expansion of the crop period took place during the months that were marked by rainfalls, meant that the factories would face certain problems. Not only were more canes being delivered at factories since the institution of cane-burning prior to harvesting meant that increased quantities of canes could be cut, but the introduction of mechanical loaders meant that the amount of extraneous material gathered with canes in the wet season increased dramatically. The abrasive action of soil is detrimental to most machinery.

Carrier chains and sprockets, juice pumps and mill rolls wear much more quickly than before. Soil also reduces the combustible quality of bagasse and results in difficulty in maintaining steam pressure and forcing an increase in utilization of fuel oil, an expansive commodity in Jamaica.⁴⁷

The controlled burning of cane fields to destroy the dead, dry leaves and some of the green ones, can cause a manual cane cutter to double his productivity. Nevertheless the suggestion has been made that burning facilitates bacterial infection and polysaccharide synthesis and the subsequent deterioration in the quality of the cane juice.⁴⁸ Since the burned cane, which is harvested during the wet season, was often left on the ground for several days before being processed, it is obvious that the sucrose content of the canes would have decreased considerably by the time they reached the factory.

My argument regarding the underdevelopment of the productivity of Jamaican sugar cannot be refuted merely by pointing to increased production of sugar during 1955-1970. The fact remains that such productivity was not keeping pace with the increasing

acreage under canes and that Jamaican productivity, by many measures, was inferior to that of many sugar manufacturing areas in the world.⁴⁹

(iii) INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

An adequate assessment of the role of foreign capital in the underdevelopment of sugar workers requires an examination of certain aspects of Jamaican industrial relations, since it was from the thousands of workers engaged in sugar production that the unions initially acquired the bulk of their membership.

The development of trade unionism in Jamaica must be seen within the context of the development of capitalism, since the structural pre-requisite for trade unionism - wage labour - exists only under conditions of capitalism. Industrial relations in the post-war Jamaican sugar industry affected sugar workers from three main view points. First of all, Jamaican trade unions were affiliated with the major political parties. This fact meant that unions were incorporated into the state structure. Therefore, unions were able to obtain socio-economic benefits for their members only to the extent that the state, which strongly supported foreign capital, was willing to allow. Also, as trade unionism developed in Jamaica, unions often competed with each other for membership among sugar workers. The result was that bitter political and union rivalries often developed among the various members. Thus party allegiance sometimes hindered union solidarity and prevented the presentation of a united front against management abuses.

The second major aspect of industrial relations is closely linked to the first and arose from the fact that unions could advance the socio-economic development of workers only to a certain degree. The reason was simply that the structural position occupied by trade unions within capitalism did not allow them to transcend capitalism itself. In other words, although Jamaican trade unions were able to improve the condition of workers, such unions posed no threat to the continued existence of the capitalist mode of production. Unionism was, therefore, able to alter only moderately the oppressed state of sugar workers.

The final indicator of the restricted development of Jamaican sugar workers, as it was reflected in industrial relations, was the work stoppages, strikes, and bitter disputes which took place in the industry in the post-war period. Such actions fully demonstrated the resentment and frustration felt by workers at their oppressed condition. Let us now consider each proposition in additional detail.

The affiliation between trade unions and political parties had its genesis in the popular uprisings of 1938 when the broad mass of the people demanded better wages and working conditions, more land and effective political representation.⁵⁰ The Bustamante Industrial Trade Union (BITU) which was formed at this time was closely allied with the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP). Alexander Bustamante, the leader of that union, was elected the first Prime Minister of Jamaica in 1944, under a new constitution which initiated a system of representative government. The leader of the

opposition was Norman Manley, head of the Peoples' National Party (PNP). This party was affiliated with the Trade Union Council (TUC) which was formed in 1938.⁵¹ However, ideological differences between the PNP and the leftist TUC caused many PNP members to revoke their membership. Consequently, in 1952 the National Workers Union (NWU) was formed. Norman Manley was elected its first president. It was these three major unions, the BITU, the TUC, and the NWU, which represented the interests of sugar workers in the period under study.

In order to understand the nature of the socio-economic changes sought by trade unions for sugar workers, it is necessary to comprehend the ideological position of the political parties which controlled the unions and determined their policies. Both the PNP, which was formed in 1938, and the JLP, which was formed in 1943, were basically reformist parties. Bustamante, the messianic demagogue and Manley, the middle class intellectual, rejected revolutionary change and sought broadened political participation within the existing institutions of government.

Nevertheless, there were differences between the two parties. In the PNP there was a leftist faction which favoured revolution and socialism. Initially, Manley tried to balance the revolutionary stance of this group with the reactionaries and reformers on the other side. When this move failed, he sided with the latter and expelled the leaders of the left from the party. Although some people within Jamaica still regard the PNP as a leftist party, its officers for the most part were "typical

representatives of the liberal democratic bourgeois intelligentsia."⁵² In fact, when the popular insurrections broke out in 1938, Manley, a noted lawyer, was at the Frome plantation representing Tate and Lyle in the inquiry into the violent disturbances which had taken place on the estates. Nevertheless, later Manley did broaden the base of the party by appealing to proletarian elements within the country. The result was that in the 1950s the newly formed NWU was able to overtake and surpass the amount of members held by the TUC, the union which had been strongly linked with leftist elements in the PNP. Although the PNP won the elections of 1955 and 1959 and Manley often used socialist rhetoric, the PNP was fundamentally reformist and nationalist.

Whereas the PNP initially had a revolutionary group within it, the JLP had no such elements at any time. From the very inception its aim was to effect minor reforms in the material condition of the workers and peasants. Indeed some members of the JLP agitated for a long time against self-government. It was this kind of conservative thinking which made the JLP oppose Jamaica's membership in the proposed West Indies Federation in the late 1950s.⁵³ When the JLP won the referendum which was launched in Jamaica to decide the issue, Jamaica was forced to secede from the federation which subsequently collapsed.

The most remarkable feature of the JLP under the leadership of Bustamante was the willingness of the party to seek accommodation with the colonial authorities and foreign capitalists and their local lackeys. The JLP won the elections of 1944, 1949, 1962, and

1967. The party was strongly supported by foreign interests since they viewed Bustamante as the lesser of two evils and were also pleased by his political views.⁵⁴

The JLP, therefore, held no radical leftist view. Bustamante was little more than a demagogue who propagandized rather than politicized the masses. His eagerness to acquire wealthy financial backers, and his frequent concessions to and compromise with foreign capitalist interests, meant that his support for the masses did not aim at revolutionary changes in their oppressed status. When, in 1962, Bustamante declared "I am determined not to destroy the rich even if I could,"⁵⁵ his ideological support for the local elites was quite clear.

In the 1940s when trade unionism was starting to gain ground in Jamaica, foreign investors allied themselves with certain elements of this movement for their mutual advantage. Thus in 1945 when the SMA recognized the BITU as the sole bargaining agency for sugar workers, the SMA not only agreed to give preference in employment to members of the BITU, but also promised to facilitate the collection of union dues.⁵⁶ The BITU, on the one hand, was able to augment and strengthen its membership while negating the legitimate aspiration of other workers. The SMA, on the other hand, was able to maintain a workforce controlled by a compliant union leadership.

The state of affairs gradually changed, and in 1956 the Labour Relations Agreement recognized the three major unions, the BITU, the TUC, and the NWU as the exclusive bargaining agents of

sugar workers. However, the fact that the unions were so closely allied to the major political parties and these parties supported foreign capital, meant that the overall socio-economic position of workers was not fully represented. According to the Agreement of 1956, matters of a general nature affecting all workers were to be dealt with by the SMA and the three unions. The latter had equal right to be present and take part in the negotiations. Whenever questions regarding a single estate were to be resolved, the major union was to negotiate on behalf of the workers, with the minor union having the right to be present and to participate. Minority unions were given the right to negotiate grievances affecting their members. However a worker had the right to select either the majority or minority union to represent him in negotiation.⁵⁷

The potential for inter-union rivalries and political dissension in this sort of arrangement appears obvious. Of greater importance, however, was the fact that the SMA was able to utilize such rivalries to secure its own advantage. By appearing to side with one group or another whenever it was expedient to do so, the SMA was able to gain its own way in most deliberations.⁵⁸

Foreign investors were able to gain the upperhand in most negotiations not only because of their economic and political power but also because of certain structural weaknesses of Jamaican unions. Often a few leaders at union headquarters were able to make decisions and exercise authority with the minimum involvement by rank and file workers.⁵⁹ The democratic structure of the union was frequently infringed. When one considers that some sugar workers

were functionally illiterate, it is not difficult to see that union leaders, with their organizational skill, their control of communication inside the union, their close ties with the political parties and foreign investors, were frequently able to dominate the workers.

There is little doubt that the political affiliations of unions complicated industrial relations in Jamaica and that many issues were fought on the basis of politics and the desire to promote the interests of particular parties.

Inter-union rivalry accentuates industrial disputes and encourages the shifting of membership from one union to another with the result that there is no continuing membership of the workers in the union of their original choice. Each union allegedly makes bigger promises than the other and compromise settlements are difficult.⁶⁰

What is important to note, however, is that the development of trade unionism in Jamaica is a reflection of the evolution of Jamaican capitalism. In other words, the high levels of unemployment and under-employment within the working classes, the predominance of foreign capital, and the support of such capital by the state placed a high premium on political patronage as a means of obtaining employment. The integration of trade unions with political parties and the links between foreign capital and the state enabled the state to utilize patronage and state power to repulse competition from new trade unions which might have radicalized organized labour.⁶¹

Let us examine the extent to which the unions were able to advance the development of sugar workers in Jamaica. The first union to sign an agreement with the SMA was the BITU. This took

place in 1941. Furthermore, since that date, the BITU has been able to win improvements in the wages and working conditions of workers. Nevertheless, it was this union which, in 1948, started to undermine the position of sugar workers by agreeing to a differential wage scale for workers, based on the classification of factories. This agreement, which was renewed in subsequent years, negated the concept of parity among sugar workers and limited the extent of their development.

The BITU was able to advance the development of sugar workers only to the extent that the SMA was willing to permit. Thus the "basic rate" to which the increases of 1948 were related was the rate payable to the worker as far back as 1940. The overtime pay, vacation, and sick leave increases for daily paid factory workers which the union won in 1948 were limited to those who worked not less than 250 days during the year. The seasonal nature of sugar work effectively limited such benefits to a small minority of workers.⁶²

This pattern of uneven development among sugar workers continued for the next two decades. It is instructive to note that when the TUC became the bargaining agent for two estates in 1951, it agreed to the reclassification of estates into groups A1, A, and B with new minimum daily rates for each group. By agreeing to this lack of parity among sugar workers, the union restricted the development of many of their members.⁶³

However, the economic and political power wielded by the SMA cannot be overlooked. In 1953 this association, backed by the

Arbitration Board, abolished the concept of fixed wage increases. Instead, a crop bonus was to be paid. It consisted of 8 1/3 per cent on total earnings from the date on which the canes were first cut for passing through the mills to the day on which grinding ceased. Since a crop bonus was based partly on the amount of canes cut and the quantity of sugar produced, figures which could be easily manipulated by sugar manufacturers, the economic fate of sugar workers frequently depended on the arbitrary decisions of foreign investors. The repressive nature of the 1953 agreement can be seen from the fact that it stipulated that if a strike took place on any estate after the publication of the award, and before the completion of that year's crop, this action would disqualify such workers from taking part in the award.⁶⁴

The Labour Relations Agreement of 1956 contained many of the repressive features of previous agreements. The system of grading estates and paying different salaries to workers doing the same kind of work was maintained. The system of paying a crop bonus instead of regular salary increases was also kept. Thus, in spite of the fact that workers were able to gain some improvements in certain terms and conditions of their employment, their socio-economic position was still being circumscribed because of the power wielded by the foreign investors through the intermediary of the SMA. Indeed, in 1958 workers were not only refused increases in salary but were also refused the usual crop bonus.⁶⁵ This kind of action on the part of the SMA continued during the late 1960s and led to industrial unrest of various sorts.

The nature and scope of this study do not require a detailed examination of the strikes which took place in the sugar industry in the post-war period. My main argument is that the various strikes indicated the extent of the disenchantment and frustration felt by the workers at their oppressed status. It is also my contention that the number of man-days lost because of strikes retarded the productivity of the sugar industry.

Table 5.14 indicates the extent of some of the strikes which took place in the sugar industry during the 1960s. In most cases workers went on strike to protest their low wage scale and poor working conditions. Disputes often centred on the questions of sick leave and vacation leave, shift premium, severance pay,

Table 5.14

Strikes and Work Stoppages in the Jamaica Sugar Industry

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total Strikes and Stoppages</u>	<u>Total Duration (Approx.)</u>
1960	31	150 days
1961	29	215 "
1962	31	156 "
1963	29	163 "
1964	58	276 "
1965	46	382 "
1966	37	255 "

Source: Report of the Sugar Industry Commission, Kingston, Jamaica, 1966, p. 184.

statutory public holidays, the duration and retroactivity of salary agreements, and the intolerable field conditions endured by cutters and loaders.⁶⁶ Indeed, the strikes of the 1960s merely accentuated a pattern which had been prevalent in the two previous decades. Thus the Commission of Enquiry which investigated the strikes of 1959 reported as follows:

While the strikes which occurred prior to the notice given by the unions following the breakdown of negotiations violated the terms of the collective agreement which must be presumed to have continued in effect during such negotiations, the strike formally called on March 11th was legal. The parties were not obligated by their agreement to resort to arbitration. The strike was the result of, and primarily caused by, an industrial dispute arising from the failure of the parties to reach agreement on the terms and conditions of a new contract. The fact that no bonus was paid with the announcement of the decision of the SMA that it was not in a position to offer higher wages or improved working conditions for 1958⁶⁷ was a contributing factor to the bitterness engendered.

The fact that many strikes in the sugar industry were initiated by workers without official permission from the union executive is important. It seems that the major reason for this action arose from the fact that unionized labour distrusted the unions' ties with political parties and foreign capitalist interests.

Unionized labour is no more favourable disposed towards the BITU and NWU leadership than are the manual classes as a whole. As much as 40 per cent of unionized urban labour is convinced that the BITU and the NWU leadership do not adequately represent the interests of the working class ... Indeed, the tactics of collective labour relations cannot be understood without reference to these negative worker attitudes towards the dominant trade union leadership.⁶⁸

Once the workers initiated a strike, the leaders of the unions were forced into a position where they had to rationalize and defend the position of the workers. This point, however, does not negate the fact that union leaders often presented the case and demands of the workers and then called a strike when the demands were not met. What I wish to emphasize is that many workers did not believe that the unions did their best to negotiate equitable contracts.

Strikes were not only a reflection of workers' disenchantment with their oppressed status, but were also quite an accurate indication

of the tone of the relationship between unions and the SMA. The attitude of the sugar manufacturers was an overbearing, patronizing, cynical one. Their contempt for workers can be clearly seen in their submission to the Commission of Enquiry of 1966.⁶⁹ Indeed the Commission was so struck by the disparaging attitude of the SMA that it reported

We cannot but observe that the tone adopted too easily supports the general claim of the unions that management is determined to maintain the intolerant relationships between servants and masters of the colonial days.⁷⁰

Foreign ownership of the Jamaican sugar industry often contributed to prolonging strikes. As union leaders so frequently pointed out, estate management often sent representatives to negotiation meetings without authority to take effective decisions. The fact that most matters had to be referred to the Boards of Directors of the estates meant that local representatives, however sympathetic they might have been to union claims, had little power to act without time-consuming consultations with the agents of foreign capital. Union leaders also pointed out that much of the delays and frustrations stemmed from the inability of the SMA to produce either financial accounts and data, or even reliable estimates of the previous crop, when these were vital to negotiations.⁷¹

THE UNDERDEVELOPMENT OF SUGAR CANE FARMERS

Cane farmers made a significant contribution to the total output of cane in post-war Jamaica. As Table 5.15 demonstrates, their production increased from 32 per cent in 1945, to 48.3 per cent in 1970. Table 5.16 indicates the distribution of farmers by quantity of cane

delivered. One aspect of the data that seems quite striking is the vast number of small farmers engaged in cane farming. If one assumes that farmers who delivered up to 49 tons of cane were largely "small farmers", as this category was previously defined,⁷² then one sees that there were 15,425 such farmers. They made up 77.2 per cent of all cane farmers and produced 14.5 per cent of all cane grown by cane farmers. There were 4,158 farmers who supplied between 50 and 499 tons of cane. They made up 20.7 per cent of all cane farmers and produced 21.3 per cent of farmers' cane. This category probably included many of the well-to-do peasants. Most of the cane was supplied by the 409 farmers who delivered 64.1 per cent of all farmers' cane. These people constituted on 2.1 per cent of all cane farmers.

Table 5.15

The Contribution of Cane Farmers to the Jamaican Sugar Industry.
1945-70 ('000 tons)

Year	Estate Production	%	Farmer Production	%	Total
1945	903.9	68.0	419.2	32.0	1,323.1
1948	1,363.4	72.5	518.7	27.5	1,882.1
1950	1,710.7	69.1	764.1	30.9	2,474.8
1955	2,181.0	61.1	1,383.9	38.9	3,564.9
1960	2,463.2	57.0	1,863.1	43.0	4,326.3
1961	2,352.9	53.9	2,009.3	46.1	4,362.2
1962	2,152.5	52.4	1,963.3	47.6	4,115.8
1963	2,431.4	54.4	2,042.4	45.6	4,473.8
1964	2,502.3	53.9	2,142.3	46.1	4,644.5
1965	2,327.3	49.2	2,400.7	50.8	4,728.0
1966	2,492.2	51.0	2,390.0	49.0	4,883.1
1967	2,423.5	54.6	2,018.5	45.4	4,442.0
1968	2,373.4	54.0	2,017.8	46.0	4,391.2
1969	1,987.1	49.6	2,016.4	50.4	4,003.5
1970	2,185.1	51.7	2,040.2	48.3	4,225.3

Source: Sugar Research Department Annual Reports, Jamaica.

Table 5.16

Distribution of Farmers by Quantity of Cane Delivered (1970)

Tons Delivered	Number of Farmers	% of Farmers	% of Farmers' Tons
0 - 4	1,093	5.5	0.2
5 - 19	7,749	38.8	4.8
20 - 49	6,583	32.9	9.5
50 - 99	2,553	12.7	7.3
100 - 499	1,605	8.0	14.0
500 - 999	173	0.9	5.8
1000+	236	1.2	58.3
Total	19,992	100.0	100.0

Source: Report of the Cane Farmers' Association of Jamaica, Jamaica, 1970, pp. 16-17.

In spite of the increased production of cane farmers that was shown in table 5.15, the socio-economic development of such farmers was restricted because of the way in which foreign capital operated in the sugar industry. The SMA, which represented foreign capitalist interests, played a noteworthy role in limiting this development.

The restricted development of peasant farmers arose from two basic facts: (1) the arrangements surrounding the purchase of farmers' cane for sugar manufacturers were generally unfavourable to the farmers; (2) peasant farmers were never accorded a significant share in the management of the sugar industry.

One of the major disadvantages suffered by cane farmers was the fact that each one had to be registered with a particular sugar manufacturer and was compelled by law to sell his cane to that factory (Table 5.17). In addition, the prices which farmers were paid for their cane were not determined by the interplay of supply

Table. 5.17

Total Number of Registered Cane Farmers According
to Size Group at Each Factory

Factory	Size Categories (tons)			
	19	20 - 99	100 - 499	500 tons
1. Monymusk	207	317	91	25
2. Frome	1893	1923	407	109
3. New Yarmouth	72	153	172	63
4. Sevens	1945	1084	160	31
5. Bernard Lodge	68	83	44	25
6. Jamacian Sugar Estates	82	147	46	14
7. Hamden	425	824	114	31
8. United Estates	726	314	60	20
9. Innswood	371	173	52	16
10. Trelawney Estates	1095	875	122	25
11. Grays Inn	195	51	16	4
12. Serge Island	363	289	32	10
13. Appleton	1134	672	64	20
14. Holland	211	78	13	4
15. Worthy Park	1579	1128	73	2
16. Richmond Llandoverly	24	8	1	1

Sources: Sugar Research Department Annual Report. 1970, p. 10;
Report of the Cane Farmers' Association of Jamaica.
1970, pp. 16-24.

and demand under conditions of free competition, but were fixed according to certain fluctuating formulas which benefited the sugar manufacturers to a far greater extent than the peasant farmers.⁷³

The economic freedom of Jamaican cane farmers was, therefore, severely limited, and farmers, quite rightly, viewed with suspicion a system which limited their right to sell at will but left open the price which they were paid for their cane.

The formation of the Cane Farmers Association (CFA) stemmed from the general discontent of peasant cane farmers concerning the price which they were paid for their cane.⁷⁴ One of the tasks of the Association was to bargain on behalf of farmers. The initial attempt of the CFA to reach an acceptable agreement with the SMA ended in failure. The Sugar Control Board subsequently issued the Sugar Cane (Minimum Price) Order in 1942. This order lasted for only a year since both manufacturers and farmers were dissatisfied with some of its provisions. It must be noted, however, that the terms of this order not only assured manufacturers a profit margin and a depreciation allowance, but also the cost of the manufacturing and the handling of sugar.⁷⁵ The provisions of this order seem to have been far more disadvantageous to cane farmers. Since the prices paid for farmers' cane depended on the cost of the manufacture of sugar, such prices could be lowered dramatically because of inadequate factory operation and equipment. In addition, the fact that the cost of the maintenance of factory equipment and the cost of depreciation were deducted from the price paid for farmers' cane indicated the extent to which farmers were controlled by manufacturers.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s bargaining between the SMA and CFA did succeed in resolving some issues. In fact, in these

years, the cane farmers participated in some of the proceeds from sugar, molasses, and rum. The agreements between the CFA and the SMA during 1944-54 were reached by a process of bargaining often referred to as "horsetrading". All these agreements contained the basic provision that the price to be paid to cane farmers for a ton of cane should be derived by adding (1) a basic percentage of the sugar value of one ton of cane (as defined) and (2) 50 per cent of the by-products value, as defined, per ton of cane ground.⁷⁶ Although cane farmers, for want of better terms, agreed to these provisions, their socio-economic development was still heavily dependent on sugar manufacturers. Such a situation stemmed especially from the fact that the basic percentages which determined the price of farmers' cane were decided upon through a process of bargaining between the CFA and each factory separately, and the percentage varied from factory to factory. "No analytical process appears to have been applied, the CFA having described the process to us as one in which the percentage was arbitrarily determined for each factory based on (a) factory capacity and (b) efficiency."⁷⁷ After 1954 the CFA and SMA were unable to reach acceptable terms.

The appointment of Sir Archibald Cuke as arbitrator in this dispute indicated a strengthening of the alliance between foreign investors and the state. Cuke's support for the SMA was unmistakable. Cuke's recommendations, which were accepted by the state, not only required that farmers should deliver their cane to the factory themselves, thereby incurring additional expenses for transportation, but also excluded them from any benefits derived

from the manufacture of rum and spirits. In addition, Cuke introduced a new formula for the purchase of farmers' cane. According to the formula, factories were classified into four groups, based on their capacity. The proportion of the sugar and molasses proceeds which was to be paid to the farmer was based on a percentage which varied from one group of factories to another. The agreement was to cover the years 1958-1960.⁷⁸

In 1960, the CFA attempted to persuade the SMA to review the Cuke formula in order to (1) increase the percentages applicable to each factory; (2) reclassify the factories for the purpose of the payment of cane; (3) restore the value of all by-products (including rum) on the basis of price settlement. The SMA refused to accept the proposals of the CFA and the disenchantment of cane farmers concerning the price they received for their cane continued to increase.⁷⁹

In 1962, H. Biggs was appointed to head another commission to inquire into the dispute. However, Biggs made no radical amendment to the Cuke formula. "With some reservations and amendments, the Biggs Commission generally endorsed the Cuke's formula."⁸⁰ In Biggs' view the Cuke formula provided a readily understandable method for arriving at the total proceeds for division. Although the Biggs Commission reduced Cuke's original four group of factories to three and raised the minimum proportion of sugar proceeds paid to cane farmers to 65 per cent, such actions did not resolve the fundamental problems which cane farmers wanted to be addressed.⁸¹

Even as late as 1966 when John Mordecai was requested to head another Commission to investigate the sugar industry, cane farmers still believed that their returns from sugar cane production was inequitable. The fact that farmers who supplied cane to an inefficient factory received a lower price than they would for the same cane delivered to an efficient factory indicated the uneven development experienced by farmers. By refusing to pay farmers the same price for sugar cane of the same intrinsic quality, regardless of the factory to which it was delivered, SMA restricted the development of many cane farmers.⁸²

It seems only logical that a fair and equitable method for the division of the proceeds from sugar would be one in which the sugar manufacturer and cane farmer would receive their respective costs of processing and growing cane at a reasonable standard of efficiency. In such an arrangement the balance of the proceeds or the burden of loss would be divided between the farmers and manufacturers in proportion to the relative capital utilized.⁸³ Such arrangements were far from being the case in Jamaica in the 1960s. The reluctance of the SMA to utilize a "sliding scale" formula as a basis for cane payment is worthy of note. The "sliding scale" involved a special incentive payment made for canes of above-average recoverable sugar content, and a corresponding penalty for sub-standard cane. It also included a standard average factory efficiency index which was incorporated in the price formula, so that factories of higher efficiency would be rewarded for their performance while sub-standard factories would be obliged to carry

their own burden for inefficiency.⁸⁴ Although the SMA accepted a sliding scale for use in certain factories in the 1952-54 agreement, this aspect of the formula was dropped once the contract had expired. In fact, the Cuke formula abandoned the sliding scale completely.

The manner in which the cost of the manufacture of sugar was calculated worked against the economic development of cane farmers in other ways. As the Sugar Industry Commission pointed out, the cost of manufacture should include the cost of handling and sampling of delivered cane, grinding, juice processing and the handling of sugar to the factory bulk storage bin. This definition of sugar manufacturing should not include shipping and distribution costs. To include this in millers' costs would be misleading since a proportion was now borne by the farmer under a heading Sir Archibald Cuke described as the "shipping expenses differential."⁸⁵ The shipping expenses differential was basically the difference between the costs of the bags, bagging and stacking of sugar and the cost of transportation of sugar to the port and storage. Since the costs of these two main operations varied from factory to factory, an adjustment, the shipping expense differential, was made in order to relate the cost incurred by each factory to the average cost.

These amounts were applied to the value of farmers' sugar after calculating the respective percentage of net sugar value for each factory. Cuke however stipulated that there should be "increases in wharfage charges over which the manufacturer has no control - such additional charge should be taken into account by

increasing or reducing the additions."⁸⁶

It seems that Cuke expected that this kind of adjustment would operate for a period of three years and would then be subjected to review. However, such a change did not take place and cane farmers continued to express disapproval of the scheme.⁸⁷ The formula stood, with some modification, for a long time, and manufactures have continued to adjust the shipping expense differential annually, or as required in accordance with alterations in shipping charges. Over the period 1958-66, this has increased by amounts as much as eighteen shillings and ten pence per ton of sugar, and the farmers' percentage of sugar proceeds has been eroded accordingly.⁸⁸

A large portion of the shipping expense differential in the 1960s was apparently based on increased transportation rate for raw sugar, with increased charges also for wharfage and lighterage. However, such an action seemed to have placed a very broad interpretation on the term "wharfage" as used by Cuke.⁸⁹ Thus the prices that cane farmers were paid for their cane were reduced because of the way in which the SMA exploited the provisions of the shipping expense differential. Moreover, "if sugar haulage charges are increased, surely cane haulage costs of the farmers would also increase and in far greater degree when calculated on a ton of sugar basis."⁹⁰

The underdevelopment of cane farmers stemmed not only from the arrangements surrounding the purchase of their cane but from the fact that they were never accorded an important role in the

management of the sugar industry. Because farmers' cane had a potential value but no actual value until it was cut, delivered to a factory and its sugar extracted, and because cane farmers had no say in the marketing of export sugar, the CFA remained in a subsidiary position vis à vis the SMA and its foreign entrepreneurs. The action of Cuke in 1958 in removing from cane farmers any share in the benefit from spirit sales, which, hitherto, they had received, indicated that cane farmers were little more than vendors whose dependent position obliged them to accept inequitable commercial terms.

Management in its relationship with cane farmers, by a resistance to tender full detailed data on transactions where equal interests are involved, by its battery of professionals constantly able to prevail in negotiations, by its exposure to a charge of being overbearing, and by other examples, invites the conclusion that the foremost group in the industry has been slow to modify its value in a changed industry pattern.⁹¹

The CFA was never considered as an equal partner of the SMA in the production of Jamaican sugar. Its lack of power amply demonstrated that foreign investors and their allies were the ones who wielded the upper hand in the Jamaican sugar industry.

CONCLUSION

The sugar industry limited the development of various aspects of Jamaican society in different ways. The low skill content of plantation work, the poor wage structure of plantation labourers, labour displacement, industrial unrest, and the powerlessness of cane farmers are all valid indicators. Because of

their corporate power and their alliance with the state, foreign investors were able to maintain their dominance. This dominance may be seen especially in their relationship with the Cane Farmers' Association. As we shall see in the next chapter, the power and authority wielded by the corporate elite in sugar indirectly distorted the quality of life of various members of the sugar proletariat.

FOOTNOTES

1. Report of the Sugar Manufacturers' Association, Jamaica, 1965, Chapter 1.
2. The Massey-Ferguson System of Mechanized Sugar Cane Production, London: Massey-Ferguson, 1969, pp. 29-34.
3. The data on the operation of the sugar factory are based on Sugar Research Department Annual Report 1969, 1970, Jamaica; Personal observation in Jamaica.
4. The premises adopted for differentiating between the skill levels of various manual occupations are as follows:
 - (i) Where the occupation is one connected primarily with the operation and maintenance of mechanical equipment or with the plying of a craft or trade, the worker is generally classified as "skilled".
 - (ii) Where the occupation is one predominantly concerned with merely rendering assistance to the above group, the worker is defined as "semi-skilled".
 - (iii) Where the occupation is one involving the execution of simple duties that may be learnt in a short while and requiring little or no independent judgement, association for some time with the occupational background and environment being the only desirable factor, then the worker is classified as "unskilled".
 See Report on an Economic Survey among Field Workers in the Sugar Industry, Jamaica, 1945.
5. The description of sugar plantation labour is based on personal observation in Jamaica.
6. Report of the Sugar Industry Commission, 1966, Jamaica, 1966, p. 84 (Henceforth referred to as Sugar Report).
7. Sugar Research Department Annual Report, 1969, Jamaica, 1969, pp. 14-17.
8. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Sugar Industry of Jamaica, Jamaica, 1960, p. 17.
9. Sugar Research Department Annual Report, 1960, Jamaica, 1961, pp. 14-18.
10. For a general analysis of problems faced by sugar workers in the dead season, see F. Sticks, "Making a Living during the Dead Season in Sugar Producing Regions of the Caribbean", Human Organization, vol. 31, no. 1, Spring 1972.
11. For an analysis of Cuban sugar policies, see H. Brunner, Cuban Sugar Policy From 1963 to 1970, University of Pittsburg Press, 1975, pp. 77-95.
12. Sugar Report, 1960, op. cit., p. 19.

13. Recommendations of the West India Royal Commission, London, HMSO, 1945, p. 79.
14. Ibid.
15. Sugar Report, 1969, op. cit., p. 22.
16. Ibid., p. 24.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., p. 30.
19. Ibid., p. 17.
20. Sugar Report, 1966, op. cit., p. 180.
21. "Specialist" workers included both skilled and unskilled workers; See Report of the Serge Island Committee, Jamaica, 1968.
22. The data in table 4.9 show that in 1965 agricultural workers outside the sugar sector were the lowest paid. The data for 1970 (table 5.8) also show that banana workers were generally paid less than sugar workers. However, workers in every occupation except banana production received better wages than sugar workers by 1970. Many banana labourers were those who worked for small farmers.
23. Annual Abstract of Statistics, Jamaica, Department of Statistics, 1970, p. 14.
24. Sugar Report, 1966, op. cit., p. 116.
25. Ibid., p. 211.
26. Wage Rates, Jamaica: Department of Statistics, 1968, p. 45.
27. Sugar Report, 1966, op. cit., p. 206, Digest of Statistics, Jamaica: Department of Statistics, 1961, p. 7.
28. Sugar Report, 1966, op. cit., p. 207.
29. Ibid., p. 205.
30. G. Hagelberg, "Appropriate Technology in Sugar Manufacturing, A Rebuttal," World Development, vol. 7, 1979, p. 893.
31. Report of a Symposium on Mechanical Loading, Jamaica: Association of Sugar Technologists, 1971, pp. 27-30.
32. Ibid.

33. Sugar Research Department Annual Report, Jamaica, 1971, p. 63.
34. Ibid., p. 65; Handbook of the British West Indies Sugar Association. Port of Spain, Trinidad, 1969, p. 23.
35. The description of mechanical cutting is based on the Massey-Ferguson System of Mechanical Sugar Cane Production op. cit., pp. 37-50; R. Symes, "Sugar Cane Mechanization and Machine Productivity." International Sugar Journal, vol. 74, November 1972, p. 327; Sugar Research Department Annual Report, Jamaica, 1970, pp. 14-20.
36. Sugar Research Department Annual Report, op. cit., 1970, p. 16.
37. Report on the Expansion of the Sugar Industry in Australia, Brisbane, Australia, 1963; For a useful analysis of problems in the mechanized harvesting of sugar cane, see H.D. Franks, Mechanized Harvesting of Sugar Cane, University of the West Indies, Trinidad, 1968.
38. Jamaican Sugar, United Nations, New York, 1970, p. 34.
39. Appropriate Technology in Sugar Manufacturing, op. cit., p. 893.
40. Jamaican Sugar, op. cit., p. 34.
41. Ibid.
42. Sugar Report, 1966, op. cit., p. 100.
43. Report Concerning the Sale of Kew Sugar Estate, Jamaica, 1943, p. 4.
44. Jamaica Sugar, op. cit., p. 37.
45. Ibid., p. 38.
46. Ibid., p. 39.
47. Ibid.
48. Manual of Industrial Project Analysis in Sugar Cane Factories in Developing Countries. Paris: OECD, 1968, p. 91-108.
49. Sugar Report, 1966, op. cit., pp. 99-101.
50. Report of the Commission to Enquire into the Disturbances which Occurred in Jamaica between the 23rd May and the 8th June, 1938. Kingston, Jamaica, 1938.
51. Data on the political parties are based on The Trumpet (official voice of the PNP) Jamaica, 1960-1970; The Voice of Jamaica (official voice of the JLP) Jamaica, 1960-1970.

52. Trevor Munroe et.al., Struggles of the Jamaican People., Jamaica: Workers' Liberation League, 1977, p. 126.
53. Report on the Conference on the British Caribbean Federation held in London in February, 1956., Jamaica, 1957 (The negative tone of the JLP may be found throughout the report).
54. Parliamentary Government in the Colonies: Report of the Hansard Society., London: HMSO, 1952, p. 63.
55. Daily Gleaner, February 12, 1962, p. 2.
56. Sugar Report, 1960, op. cit., p. 23.
57. Ibid., p. 21.
58. Sunday Gleaner, January 23, 1970.
59. Daily Gleaner, Editorial, January 29, 1970.
60. Sugar Report, 1960, op. cit., p. 25.
61. For an analysis of the historical origins, the organization and the ideology of the small worker-led unions, see the pamphlet The Independent Trade Unions, Kingston, 1970.
62. Sugar Report, 1960, op. cit., pp. 18-24.
63. For a description of the conflicts caused by this action within the TUC as well as without, see TUC Newsletter, September 1951, pp. 6-9.
64. Sugar Report, 1960, op. cit., p. 26.
65. Ibid.
66. Sugar Report, 1966, op. cit., p. 184.
67. Sugar Report, 1966, op. cit., p. 184.
68. C. Stone, Class, Race and Political Behaviour in Urban Jamaica. Jamaica, ISER, 1973, p. 144.
69. Sugar Report, 1966, op. cit., p. 185.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid., p. 187.
72. See Chapter 4, note 12.

CHAPTER SIX

THE QUALITY OF LIFE OF JAMAICAN SUGAR WORKERS

INTRODUCTION

The social relations which take place between people in the process of production are important for analysis not only because they indicate the nature and extent of the ownership of the means of production but also because such relations characterize societies and govern their direction. In capitalist societies, for example, where the means of production are privately owned, social class relations are marked by domination, exploitation and conflict. One may thus conceptualize the social relations of production as "the way in which the products of human labour are appropriated, the social conditions under which labour takes place, as well as the principles of distribution, the modes of thought and ideology and so on."¹ The phenomenon of social classes is closely related to that of social relations.

The concept of social classes which is utilized in this study is drawn primarily from the definition expounded by Lenin as he sought to consolidate the Marxian position.

Classes are large groups of people differing from each other by the place they occupy in a historically determined system of social production, by their relation (in most cases fixed and formulated in law) to the means of production, by their role in the social organization of labour, and consequently, by the dimensions of the share of social wealth of which they dispose and the mode of acquiring it.²

Lenin's typology suggest that under capitalism, there is a class of producers as well as a class of non-producers. Under such relations of production, it is the latter which controls the means of production and appropriates the surplus value that is produced by the former. Lenin also contends that it is the working class which performs the functions of unity and cooperation with other instruments in the process of production, while the non-producers perform the function of surveillance and control of the whole process. Finally, Lenin postulates that in societies marked by class divisions there will be a class whose share in social wealth will be the appropriation of surplus value while the other class will obtain only the equivalent of the value of its labour power.

When this basic typology is applied to the post-war Jamaican sugar industry, it is fairly easy to distinguish the role played by foreign investors and their allies--the capitalist owners of the means of production, and the role played by the sugar workers--the agricultural proletariat.

In this chapter, I will examine the extent to which the quality of life of Jamaican sugar plantation workers was undermined by the operation of foreign capital in the sugar industry. An adequate assessment of the lifestyle of sugar workers should be undertaken within the context of the social relations of production which prevailed.

Since the plantation was established by metropolitan capitalists for the commercial exploitation of export sugar, the socio-economic distortions which characterized the lives of sugar

workers during the period under study must be analyzed as an aspect of the inequalities generated by the structural imperatives of a dependant capitalist social formation. In other words, the systematic reproduction of inequalities of power and privilege which was endemic in the lives of sugar plantation workers stemmed from the manner in which the Jamaican economy was incorporated into the world capitalist structure.

In the post-war period, the sugar industry, controlled by foreign capitalists, not only played a pivotal role in the peripheral Jamaican economy but also distorted the quality of life of the vast majority of sugar workers. Such distortions were a reflection of the antagonistic class relations which existed between the exploited Jamaican labourer and the foreign capitalist exploiter. The class struggle was, therefore, quite definitely, rooted in the process of production.

One of the most salient aspects of distorted development was the deplorable living and working conditions under which most plantation workers were forced to exist. Foreign entrepreneurs were primarily concerned with maximizing profits and paid little attention to the deleterious effects which their capitalist ventures produced.

The development of sugar workers was also circumscribed by the rigid class structure which permeated the Jamaican sugar plantation. In addition, the strong correlation between colour and class effectively barred the African-Jamaican agricultural proletariat from any upward mobility.

A third example of restricted development may be seen in the fact that the sugar industry, through the plantation, undermined the institution of the family. The unstable social family patterns which were characteristic of the sugar estate villages arose from various factors associated with the structure and organization of plantation labour.

The final example of the way in which the quality of life of Jamaican sugar plantation workers was circumscribed may be illustrated by the repugnance which such labourers felt towards their work. What I wish to argue is that the loathing with which sugar workers generally regarded their jobs was a striking indicator of the oppression which they endured and which stemmed from the social relations of production that were maintained on the plantation. Therefore, I postulate that the antipathy with which most sugar workers viewed plantation work was a direct manifestation not only of the antagonistic contradiction that existed between capital and labour but also of the fact that sugar workers generally associated the foreign-dominated sugar industry with the cruel exploitation which foreigners of an earlier epoch had brutally imposed on African-Jamaicans during the period of slavery.

LIVING AND WORKING CONDITIONS OF SUGAR WORKERS

Let us first consider the question of housing. There were two main types. One kind was provided by the estates on its premises for some of its workers. The second was the type obtained by other workers in the adjacent villages. As we can see from Table

6.1, the sugar estates were able to provide housing for 37.5 per cent of their work force in 1945. The report of the economic survey of the sugar industry in 1945 also stated that of the 37 per cent of the field workers who lived in quarters provided by the industry only 8 per cent lived in detached housing. The rest lived in barracks.³

Table 6.1

Distribution	Number	% of Total
1. Living exclusively on estates	1,823	37.5
2. Living exclusively off estates	2,974	61.3
3. Living on and off estates	96	.6
4. Squatters	31	.6
Total	4,854	100.0

Source: Report of the Economic Survey Among Field Workers in the Sugar Industry. Jamaica, 1945, p.71.

The barracks were really crude shelters.

Holdings erected on Sugar Estate lands by the management were predominantly of wooden construction, both walls and flooring being of "undressed lumber" with galvanized zinc sheeting fixed to wooden lathes for the roofing and the whole structure anchored to concrete pillars by steel bolts or pinned to hardwood posts. Windows and doors provide the necessary means of ventilation and entry. Windows are predominantly without shutters or jalousies and provide little ventilation when closed.⁴

Furthermore, the accommodation which workers were able to obtain outside the plantation was, in many cases, just as bad as the barracks.

Holdings built or rented elsewhere by the workers were less substantial in construction. Walls were mainly of mortar (mixture of clay, lime and sand), earthen floors and thatched roofs. Structures of this nature built on the north side of the island suffered severely from the recent hurricane in August last year and much of the

ravages it created was in evidence during the week of the survey.

During the 1950s, there were few changes in these kinds of housing conditions. Indeed, as late as 1960 the Sugar Industry Commission (1960) was appalled at the kind of accommodation which sugar workers were forced to accept.

The Commission visited two estates and the neighbouring villages or communities from which they draw labour and which provide "homes" for some of the migratory workers employed during the crop season. It found living conditions in these villages and in some of the old barracks on the estates to be deplorably low. The overcrowding in the one-room hovels which people call "homes" and for which people pay rent is subhuman.⁶

The deplorable living condition of sugar workers stemmed not only from the fact that their salary scale was quite low and allowed little more than a subsistence existence but also from the fact that plantations owners made few attempts to see that their workers were adequately housed on and off the estate. Nevertheless, there was another aspect to this question. It concerns the fact that many of the villagers close to the plantations did not own the land on which their houses were built. Such land was the property of the sugar estate owners who charged rent for its occupancy. Since many villagers had no control over their land, they often developed a certain sense of insecurity especially because many times people were forced off their house sites by the Company when the sites were in the path of new lands being put into cane production.⁷ This sense of insecurity also retarded whatever desire some villagers might have had to improve their homes. The result was that homeowners made little effort to improve their dwellings for fear

that, sooner or later, the plantation owners would drive them off the land.

The Jamaican South Clarendon sugar belt furnishes further data on the living conditions of sugar workers. During the period under review, this area was dominated by the Monymusk Estates which covered over 36,000 areas of land. It is worthwhile to remember that large estates such as Monymusk and Frome were divided into a number of "farms" of about 2,000 acres. The workers' compound was usually located in a central area within the boundaries of the farm. At Monymusk, the Morelands compound, one of the largest of the estate, shows the extent to which the housing provided for sugar workers was inferior to that occupied by other members of the staff. Whereas the workers were forced to subsist in small wood-frame quarters, the houses of the overseers were larger and of better quality while the residences of the technical and professional staff were far superior to that of the sugar workers or their overseers.⁸ The poor accommodation provided for sugar workers was an accurate reflection of their underdeveloped and dependent status.

The living conditions of sugar workers in the villages close to the Monymusk Estate showed many of the features of destitution which existed in the case of the Frome Estate villages. In the settlement of Lionel Town, for example, even in the late 1960s, 64 per cent of all households had no electricity.⁹ In many cases, plantation authorities simply refused to make such a service available to workers. Furthermore, about 70 per cent of all households did not have running water inside the houses. Water had

to be obtained from standpipes in the yards. In addition, about 19 per cent of the households had access to neither interior running water nor nearby standpipes. People in such households were forced to obtain water from standpipes located as far as a mile from their dwellings.

The examples which I have cited of the poor accommodation that sugar workers were obliged to accept were indicative of a country-wide pattern. No further elaboration is therefore required. However, the question of the health of sugar workers merits analysis since it is a prime indicator of the quality of workers' lives. Prior to 1948, neither the state nor the plantation owners paid much attention to the health of sugar workers. In 1948 the Sugar Industry Labour Welfare Board (SILWB) was established by the state to help to alleviate the social ills suffered by sugar workers. Health services for these workers were tentatively established.

Nevertheless, even after this date, sugar workers, whether they lived on the estate or in the estate villages, showed a high degree of ill health. In the estate village of Lluidas Vale, which is adjacent to the Worthy Park Estate, the incidence of yaws and venereal disease was extremely high.¹⁰ The reason was simply that two years after the establishment of the SILWB, no health service had yet been established on the plantations. It was only in 1951 that clinics were established on 16 of the 23 sugar estates. At the Worthy Park Clinic in that year, 331 cases of yaws, 250 of syphilis and 28 of gonorrhea were treated. The high incidence of contagious

diseases such as yaws provides eloquent testimony of the poor living and working conditions of sugar plantation workers.¹¹

However, one should not imagine that the establishment of clinics on sugar estates led to the rapid improvement of the health and welfare of sugar workers. Indeed, as late as 1960, the activities of the SILWB scarcely affected many such workers.

Reference has been made to the influence of such factors as poor housing conditions and low standards of living on productivity. Although, through the efforts of the Sugar Industry Labour Welfare Board, housing conditions on the estates are improving, the improvement does not extend to the depressed unskilled field workers. To solve the problem in his case will be very costly but some amelioration must be attempted.¹²

Since the health and welfare of a large portion of sugar workers were not affected by the activities of the SILWB, one may safely conclude that whatever benefits occurred did so largely to the technical and professional staff, the overseers, headmen, and a minority of labourers. In fact, many unhygienic situations were never treated by the SILWB.¹³

The private ownership of the Jamaican sugar industry made it virtually impossible for strong, concerted action to be taken to improve the welfare of sugar workers. Foreign investors, on the whole, simply felt that the well-being of workers was no concern of theirs, and they were often antagonistic to the efforts of the SILWB. When the SILWB was established in 1948, its funding was obtained by a statutory levy of 10 shillings per ton on sugar. Therefore, neither the government nor the Sugar Manufacturers' Association (SMA) made any direct contribution to the finances of

the SILWB. Nevertheless, the SMA was highly critical of the role of the SILWB and viewed its social work with deep suspicion.

The contention of critics is that the panoply of senior, junior and Community Development Officers (44 in all) are mainly engaged in services which it is the duty of Local Governments and not the sugar industry to provide.¹⁴

What the SMA conveniently ignored was the simple fact that many of the activities of the SILWB were necessitated precisely because of the low wages paid to sugar workers by the sugar industry. These wages permitted the workers little more than a subsistence existence, which, in turn, precipitated a whole range of social problems. In fact, the earlier report of the Sugar Industry Commission (1960) had been quite explicit.

That these earnings, whether of daily paid workers or of task workers, are low is indicated by the deplorable living conditions ... and by the social problems and periodic industrial unrest.¹⁵

Another aspect of the health and welfare of sugar workers relates to the inadequate diet on which most workers were forced to subsist. In 1960, it was noted by the Sugar Industry Commission that "while it is difficult to provide many comforts for the men working in the fields under the tropical sun, it would be in the interest of the employers to provide more of such minimum necessities as field shelters and adequate cold drinking water."¹⁶ As late as 1966, "the fairly simple project of organizing for field workers (at cost) a mid-day meal 'had been tried' on several estates and quietly dropped."¹⁷ In other words, plantation owners made few efforts to see to it that their workers were adequately fed. The

nutritional standards of plantation labourers was so low that the Sugar Industry Commission (1966) bluntly stated,

No machine, human or mechanical, can operate successfully without an adequate source of energy. The workers must therefore be well fed, and this does not mean merely an adequate morning and evening meal ... they must restore their energies by eating at regular intervals during the working day.¹⁸

The inadequate nutrition of sugar plantation workers resulted in considerable ill health.¹⁹

The working conditions of plantation labourers were quite severe. What I wish to argue is that the kind of remuneration which workers received did not adequately compensate them for the hardships and dangers inherent in many of their tasks. This type of disparity presents a vivid illustration of the exploitation of workers by foreign capitalists. Cane cutters, for example, not only had to work under the broiling, strength-sapping sun, but also had to contend with flies, mosquitoes and a wide variety of tropical insects.²⁰ The serrated edges of cane leaves as well as the sharp, pointed, cane stalks often injured cane workers. One of the greatest dangers for a cane cutter, however, came from the machetes of his fellow workers. These long, razor-sharp, knives were at times carelessly wielded and inflicted severe injuries on cane cutters. On many sugar plantations, injured workers had to rely on their own meagre resources once their few days of disability pay were exhausted.

There was an additional, if somewhat insidious, danger which dogged sugar cane workers. This was a health hazard which plagued

plantation labourers who worked in recently burnt cane. Such men often acquired serious lung damage from the soot and dust which settled after canes were burnt. This kind of injury usually became chronic and sometimes prevented workers from engaging in strenuous physical labour.

There is little doubt that the poor living and working conditions of sugar plantation workers reflect "a background of poverty, unemployment and underemployment in an underdeveloped country."²¹ However, it seems that such factors merely point to the fundamental cause, namely the nature of Jamaican capitalism. Competing foreign investors in the Jamaican sugar industry showed no interest in restructuring the organization of the industry in order to eliminate or reduce the seasonal employment and the subsequent irregular demand for labour.

With the concentration of the harvesting of the cane crop in the early months of the year, the peak of employment comes in the crop season extending from January to June or July. In the out-of-crop season employment declines very considerably reaching its low point in November or December. The resulting variation in the demand for labour during the year combined with the use of task work on a large scale has favoured the growth of a system of casual employment.²²

This system of casual employment, which stemmed from the manner in which foreign investors organized the sugar industry, plus the inadequate wages for labour, culminated in the deterioration of the lifestyle of sugar plantation workers. Nevertheless, there were other factors which contributed to this restricted development. The plantation class structure was an important one.

PLANTATION CLASS STRUCTURE

In Chapter 2, I discussed certain aspects of the class relations which emerged on the sugar plantation during and after slavery as well as the manifestation of class conflict during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. In the post-war period, the antagonism of interests between the sugar plantation agricultural proletariat and the owners of the estates, the capitalist class, was steadfastly maintained.

The plantation class structure was a rigid one. At the apex of the plantation organization was the capitalist class which was frequently resident overseas and was represented by a Board of Directors. This class also included some settler investors.²³ The capitalist class controlled the means of production, distribution and exchange on the sugar plantation and was thus able to reproduce the material conditions of domination. In order to maintain its class power, the plantation capitalist class had to purchase different kinds of labour power. One source which served this need on the plantation was the middle class.

The members of the middle class played an important role in the socio-economic structure of the post-war Jamaican sugar plantation. For example, the management of the estates of Tate and Lyle in Jamaica was entrusted to the West Indies Sugar Company Ltd (WISCO) which was, in turn, managed by its own Board of Directors.²⁴ The Managing Director of WISCO in Jamaica directed and administered the overall coordination of operations for both plantations (Monymusk and Frome) and was responsible to the Board of Directors

as well as to the general officers of Tate and Lyle, the parent firm in London.²⁵ At both estates, there was a resident General Manager who was in charge of his particular estate. The executive staff consisted not only of the Managing Director, the General Manager, and the Board of Directors but the various division managers who reported to the General Manager.

Three of the most important division managers were those of tractor transport, factory, and cultivation. The tractor transport manager had the job of keeping in good working condition all the trucks used for transporting cane and sugar as well as the heavy machinery used in harvesting. This manager was also charged with the overall responsibility for harvesting operations. The factory manager was in charge of the general operation of the factory, and was the head of a varied and complex work force which included some unskilled workers and various kinds of skilled workers. The job of directing the planting, fertilizing, irrigating, and cultivation of all the canes on the plantation fell to the cultivation manager. Below him there were two area managers, one in charge of operations in one of the two areas of the sugar estate.²⁶

The nature of the relationship between the middle class and the working class on the plantations is important for analysis, for it not only indicates the dynamics of the plantation class structure but also shows whether there was any possibility of middle class radicalism and alliance with workers. The activities of the Sugar Manufacturers Association (SMA) provide useful evidence with regard to the kind of ideology which was espoused by the representatives of

the middle class on the plantation. My analysis of the role played by the SMA in the structural underdevelopment of the sugar industry (Chapter 3) as well as the description of the activities by the SMA in the industrial relations of the post-war Jamaican sugar industry (Chapter 5) strongly suggest that the middle class was generally more interested in preserving its own status rather than in forming any alliances with the working class. Since the position of the middle class in the social structure was partially defined by the antagonistic contradiction between capitalists and workers, the middle class was unwilling to join the workers in their struggle.²⁷

The formation of an alliance between the middle class sugar plantation staff and the workers would clearly indicate that there was an antagonistic contradiction between the middle class and the capitalist owners of the plantation. In the post-war Jamaican sugar plantation, such a situation did not exist. The major reasons were that since the surplus labour of the middle class did not directly create wealth, and since the existence of this class was almost wholly conditioned by the capitalist owners of the plantations, most members of the middle class had a vested interest in preserving the status quo.

The structural tendency of capitalism, even in dependent capitalist formations, to reduce some members of the intermediate classes to the status of workers, did not take place to any great extent on Jamaican sugar plantations.²⁸ First, those members of the middle class who were forced down into the ranks of the working class were mainly from the lower personnel of the middle class e.g.

shop clerks. Secondly, the process did not add the lower personnel as a whole to the working class; individuals merely changed their role according to the cyclical reproduction of capital.²⁹

At the bottom of the plantation structure were the workers. The analysis which I have presented in this study shows that sugar plantation workers were paid low wages, were largely unskilled, and generally had to subsist in poverty, amidst deplorable living and working conditions. What I am arguing in this chapter is that the plantation class structure, instituted by foreign capitalists, was instrumental in maintaining workers in this underdeveloped status.

One of the greatest factors which maintained the rigidity of the sugar plantation class structure and preserved its exploitative nature was racial oppression. In chapter 3, I pointed out that because of foreign investment in the Jamaican sugar industry, African-Jamaicans were excluded from major decision-making as well as the formulation of economic policies within the industry. The exclusion of African-Jamaicans was even more sharply drawn on the sugar plantations where the class structure was also a racial structure: the capitalist class was white, the middle class executive staff was white or fair-skinned while the working class was black.³⁰ A recognition of this division is necessary in order to understand that the lack of upward mobility experienced by sugar plantation workers was due not merely to their membership in the proletariat but also because of racial exclusion.

Indeed, the post-war Jamaican plantation structure cannot be fully understood without reference to the institution of slavery as

it was practised in Jamaica. Under slavery, racial characteristics determined the division between masters and slaves.³¹ The abolishment of slavery did not completely erase this caste line. In fact, whatever modifications took place in the class structure of Jamaica did not change the race of those who were found in the lowest rung of the socio-economic ladder.³² Emancipation and its aftermath simply produced a shift from the horizontal position which maintained all black people in the category of plantation labourers. Although in Jamaica, the twentieth century witnessed the rise of black professionals and administrators, these groups were almost wholly absent from the plantation during the period under review.³³

Table 6.2

Race/Class Composition of Jamaica Sugar Plantations

<u>Occupational Class</u>	<u>Race/Colour</u>
Capitalist Owners	White
Executives	White
Professionals(eg. technologists)	White or Fair-skinned
Labourers	Black

Source: Who is Who in Jamaica 1970

Jamaica Sugar Digest, Jamaica: Standard Publishers, 1970.

Table 6.2 shows that in 1970 the capitalist and executive classes on the sugar estate were white, the professional class was white or fair-skinned, and all the labourers were black. The emphasis that I have placed on the racial factor is important since there is a tendency to neglect it on the part of certain well-intentioned but mistaken "progressive" Latin American analysts.³⁴ Nevertheless, it must be clearly understood that I am not saying that the racial

factor is of overwhelming significance in an assessment of the post-war Jamaican sugar plantation. What I am postulating is that any class analysis of the plantation which does not include an assessment of the question of racial oppression is quite inadequate.

The power of foreign investors in the Jamaica sugar industry and the lack of upward mobility endured by sugar plantation workers did not rest completely on the fact that the former owned the means of production. The power of the capitalist class over the agricultural proletariat also resulted from the fact that class dominance was buttressed by institutional racism.³⁵ Even if one wants to point out that, in the Jamaican situation, the sugar workers were not totally powerless as evidenced by their strikes and work stoppages, it must be remembered that such actions posed no threat to the existence of the capitalist or their allies in the Jamaican state bureaucracy.

The balance which must be struck between race and class or, more precisely, the importance of a consideration of the dynamics of a class perspective, is highlighted by C.L.R. James.

The race question is subsidiary to the class question in politics and to think of imperialism in terms of race is disastrous. But to neglect the racial factor as merely incidental is an error, no less grave than to make it fundamental.³⁶

This type of caveat is important especially in view of the nature of this study which aims to show the extent of the underdevelopment which arose from foreign investment. I believe that many members of the plantation school, although they present useful empirical

details, misrepresent the role of the plantation. Beckford, for example, states

The predominant social characteristic of all plantation areas of the world is the existence of a class-caste system based on differences in the racial origins of plantation workers on the one hand and owners on the other.³⁷ (emphasis added)

One is immediately struck by the theoretical and methodological weakness in this kind of argument. By using the "plantation" as a theoretical framework, Beckford fails to see that oppression is not necessarily an intrinsic part of a plantation system. The oppression, I contend, arises from the manner in which the mode of production is articulated through the plantation system. Thus, in the socialist plantation of post-revolutionary Cuba, workers were not subjected to oppression while in pre-revolutionary Cuba the reverse existed.³⁸ What I maintain, therefore, is that under a capitalist mode of production, and especially one marked by heavy foreign investment, it is the structural features of peripheral capitalism and its role in the internal division of labour which promote underdevelopment in dependent countries.

SUGAR PLANTATION FAMILY STRUCTURE

The question of the extent to which foreign investment in the Jamaican sugar industry destabilized the institution of the family on sugar estates and sugar plantation villages is a complex one. Therefore, I shall first comment briefly on certain historical aspects of the problem. Then I shall indicate some dimensions which

require consideration. Finally, I shall indicate the factors which will be utilized to demonstrate the underdevelopment of the family.

There is little doubt that the unstable social family patterns in the post-war Jamaican sugar plantation areas had their genesis in the epoch of slavery and in the social relations which were established between the planters and the African slaves. Under slavery the nuclear family was vigorously discouraged by slave masters. Where such families existed, the male head could not assert his role as father or husband since his "wife" was legally owned by another man. The woman was also unable to assume the moral duties of wife and mother.³⁹

The institution of slavery removed most social distinctions between males and females. Not only was a woman required to work just as hard as a man, but she was subjected to the same kind of brutal punishment. In addition, she was a prey to all sorts of sexual exploitation by her owner or other white men who wielded power on the slave plantation. The male slave, furthermore, not only became completely demoralized, and lost all pretensions to masculine pride, but also developed the kind of irresponsible parental and sexual attitudes that were to be found in Jamaica long after emancipation.⁴⁰ I thus support the thesis that it was the relations of production on the slave plantations which gave rise to the situation where the woman became the dominant, often the sole factor in the rearing of the creole slave during the eighteenth and nineteenth century.

At this juncture, it is necessary to reaffirm that when I refer to the "underdevelopment" of the post-war Jamaican plantation family structure, I am alluding primarily to the weakened family cohesion and unstable patterns of relationships which characterized such families. A class perspective is of great importance in this kind of analysis since marriage in the middle class sense of a legal sanctioned arrangement, often with the blessing of a church, was not the normal situation in many Jamaican families. Such a status was confined largely to the middle class and to older working class couples.⁴¹

In order to demonstrate how the nature of sugar plantation labour aggravated the lack of cohesiveness in the structure of families close to the sugar plantations, there are certain qualifications which have to be stated in order that I may clarify the limits of the analysis. First, an illustration of the underdevelopment of the sugar plantation families can only be adequately demonstrated by indicating the extent to which weaknesses in such families stemmed from their relationships with the plantation. In addition, such weaknesses must be shown to have been minimal or absent among other rural lower classes - the peasantry, for example. It is for this reason that I utilize a comparative perspective in much of this part of the analysis.

My major proposition, therefore, is that the loose or informal family structure which characterized some working class Jamaican families was exacerbated among sugar plantation families because of the pattern of the labour force participation. Marital

and kinship relations provide a useful indication of the differences in the lifestyle of sugar workers and the peasantry. In the sugar plantation villages, seasonal employment and migratory labour contributed greatly to the lack of stability shown by the population in such areas. A sugar plantation required a large labour force for about half of the year but only a limited number of workers for the rest of the year. The incoming population changed the routine and pace of life in the villages, aggravated the housing shortage, changed the constitution of households, set up new conjugal relations, and altered existing ones. Among the peasantry, on the other hand, population movement was relatively minor. In addition, many peasants owned their land and their homes, and a family usually worked as a unit in order to promote its own well being.⁴²

Table 6.3

Percentage Distribution of Women in Unions among the Peasants and in Sugar Plantation Areas in Jamaica by Type of Union and Age Group, 1970.

Group Type of Union	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44
Peasants Married	4.5	10.4	25.7	32.6	35.2	38.4
Plantation Married Villagers	0.6	3.7	10.4	12.4	16.7	17.1
Peasants Common Law	22.0	28.7	30.3	28.7	26.5	25.4
Plantation Common Law Villagers	38.1	47.3	57.3	63.8	60.3	60.1
Peasants Single	73.5	60.9	44.0	38.7	38.3	36.2
Plantation Single Villagers	61.3	49.0	32.3	23.8	23.0	22.8

Sources: Census of Jamaica, 1970
Commonwealth Caribbean, 1970
Demographic Statistics of Jamaica, 1970

There is little doubt that migratory workers exacerbated the incidence of concubinage and illegitimacy in the sugar estate

villages. Table 6.3 shows that legal marriage was far higher among the peasantry than among the sugar plantation villagers whereas common law unions were more numerous at all age levels, among the sugar plantation villagers. In the age group of 25-29 years, 25.7 per cent of the peasant women were married but only 10.4 per cent of women in the plantation villages were married. In the 20-24 age group, 28.7 per cent of peasant women lived in common law relationships while the figure for the plantation villagers was 47.3 per cent. In the age group of 30-34 years, 32.6 per cent of the peasant women were married whereas only 12.4 per cent of the women from the plantation villages were married. In this age group, common law relationships among women in the plantation villages were 63.8 per cent. The figure for peasant women was 28.7 per cent.

Table 6.4

Percentage Distribution of Illegitimate Children among the Peasants and in Sugar Plantation Areas of Jamaica, 1968

Groups	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44
Peasants	10.7	32.1	37.3	31.7	30.3	25.2
Plantation Villagers	70.2	77.3	76.4	78.2	70.3	68.6

Sources: Proceedings of the First Conference on the Family in the Caribbean, Puerto Rico, 1968
Census of Jamaica, 1970
Abstract of Statistics, Jamaica, 1970

Table 6.4 shows that the rate of illegitimacy was far higher among women living in sugar plantation villages. In the age group of 20-24 years, for example, 77.3 per cent of women in plantation villages and 32.1 per cent of the peasantry had illegitimate

children. Among women in the 40-44 years age group, 68.6 per cent of the plantation villagers and 25.2 per cent of the peasants had illegitimate children. The other age groups show the same pattern.

The importance that I have attached to the dynamics of marital relations as an element of the underdevelopment of the plantation family requires additional comment. First of all, although the pattern of informality and illegitimacy was dominant among working class Jamaican unions, especially in the plantation belt, the persistence of this pattern cannot be adequately explained outside the context of class relations.⁴³ There is little doubt that many working class people regarded marriage as a desirable goal, although they tended to idealize the institution.⁴⁴ Such a view was not surprising and can partially be explained by the fact that a wide range of institutions and organizations in Jamaica, such as the Church and the educational system inculcated the values of the dominant classes into the lower classes. Nevertheless, although the working class internalized the value system of the capitalist and middle class, it was unable to participate extensively in legal marriage primarily because of the economic expectations associated with this kind of marriage.

Lower class Jamaicans viewed wedlock as an economic and social way of life and considered that a fairly high degree of personal economic success and social stability were important prerequisites for marriage.⁴⁵ The emphasis that was placed on the importance of individual achievement and the great difficulty of actually achieving the desired socio-economic goals resulted in

loose marital ties and weak family structures. This kind of situation is most clearly portrayed in the sugar estates and sugar plantation villages. The underdevelopment of these kinds of families must, therefore, be seen partly as the result of the contradiction between the demands made by the dominant values of the capitalist and middle classes and the ability of the sugar plantation working class families to live up to them.

Therefore, it must be clearly understood that I am not arguing that concubinage was unique to sugar plantation working class families. On the contrary, this kind of union was fairly widespread among working class Jamaicans as a whole. What I wish to affirm, however, is that the weak, informal family structure of concubinage was exacerbated in the sugar plantation family not only as a result of class relations but because of the migratory labour and seasonal employment which foreign investors established as an integral part of the dynamics of plantation labour.

Additional aspects of the destabilization of the sugar plantation family may be considered within the context of the Jamaican class structure. In this country, social relations were juridically fixed, not by the working class but by the ruling class. Thus, concubinage was not recognized as a conjugal union in the Jamaica legal system during the period under study. Therefore, no legal safeguards were provided for the woman living in concubinage. Her spouse was not liable for her maintenance nor for her necessities of life. Although there were legal prescriptions for legal marriage, there were no such requirements for concubinage.

Apart from the general prohibition against incest, there was no prescription in regard to common law relationships. There was also no redress for the woman if she was ejected by the man or if he brought another woman into the house.⁴⁶ The operation of the Maintenance and Bastardy Laws of Jamaica is worthy of comment.⁴⁷ Although this law made a man liable for the support of his illegitimate children who were under age, it was very difficult to invoke it successfully against migratory workers once their period of employment on the plantation was finished.

Indeed, in order to make a maintenance claim, a woman had the onus to prove that a particular man was the father of her child. There were other constraints which hindered the implementation of this law. First, since concubinage was an institution of the poor, it made little sense for a woman to invoke it against a man who was unemployed and did not have the means to maintain a family. Secondly, rural police forces regarded cases involving maintenance and bastardy as being unimportant and were often reluctant to pursue them.⁴⁸

Since common law marriages were transitory in nature, took place in a fortuitous manner and placed the women in an inferior status, such unions held few punishments for the unscrupulous men who often abandoned their mates as well as their offsprings. In addition, since the common-law relationship had low status in the eyes of both men and women and entailed few mutual obligations, the children of such offspring were often subjected to a high degree of stress during childhood. Such children often grew up with little

physical or emotional support from their parents. The lack of family stability and family life as well as the constant possibility of abandonment by the father meant that the main functions of the family were not fulfilled.⁴⁹

In many cases, the children of working class plantation families carried over into adult life strong recollections of paternal indifference, harshness, and outright neglect. When such unions broke up, as they did quite frequently among migratory workers, the children were generally regarded as the responsibility of the woman. If she was destitute, the children were generally sent to relatives or given away to friends. Sometimes some of the children were able to join her when she was able to make a home for them. If the woman entered into another conjugal union, she usually did not bring her children with her. It was not unusual, therefore, for siblings and half siblings to be dispersed among a number of widely scattered households.⁵⁰

In the sugar plantations areas of Jamaica, many migratory workers really lived in two worlds. One was the household and local community in which they were currently living and working. The other was the household and area of their origin. This kind of arrangement destabilized sugar plantation families, especially where the orientation of the migrant labourer was geared not to his common-law wife on the sugar plantation but towards his village of origin. In such cases, workers of this kind invariably returned to their village of origin, leaving their common law spouses on the plantation to struggle for survival. Even when such men chose to

remain on the sugar plantation area, the lack of work in the slack period often forced them to quit their plantation family in search of employment. Such actions, of course, were simply additional factors which contributed to the destabilization of the family.

SOCIAL ATTITUDES OF PLANTATION WORKERS

An adequate analysis of the constraints placed on the quality of life of sugar workers requires not only an examination of the plantation class structure, which I have already undertaken, but also some indication of the reaction of workers to their oppressed status. I maintain that sugar plantations workers generally exhibited strong antipathy towards their work and that this manifestation of repugnance may partly be examined within the context of the antagonistic contradiction that existed between capital and labour.⁵¹

One of the ways in which this dislike was manifested was simply the refusal of many labourers to work on the plantation or, on the other hand, to consent to work there only in desperation when there was no other viable source of employment available. For example, the Caymanas Estate which was located close to Kingston, the capital of the country, was constantly plagued by labour shortages since sugar workers often quickly abandoned the plantation in order to seize the first urban jobs that materialized.⁵² The Barnett Estate, located close to the tourist resort city of Montego Bay, faced similar labour shortages. In the 1960s, many sugar workers left that plantation in order to work in the tourist

industry or on the wharf which served as a loading station for the banana boats.⁵³

At estates such as Gray's Inn, on the north-east coast, Serge island, and the Jamaica Sugar Estates, many sugar workers often went to work in the coconut and banana industries rather than continue in the sugar plantations. Indeed, at Serge Island in 1966, the cane cutter shortage increased to the extent that the estate was 30 per cent short of its stated requirements. In the same year, Holland Estate reported a serious labour shortage three or four weeks after the start of the crop and pointed out that the estate never had surplus cane cutters. The picture was the same for Bernard Lodge Estate.⁵⁴

The reluctance of labourers to work on the sugar plantation arose from the inequitable social relations of production which foreign investors instituted in the Jamaica sugar industry. The job on the sugar plantation which workers regarded with the greatest abhorrence was that of cutter. The job of cutting canes was regarded as being at the base of the pyramid in the hierarchy of occupations. Even the loading of canes was considered to be a better occupation. Since the job of cutter was considered to be socially degrading, many of the younger labourers refused to take it up.

The refusal of many sugar workers to cut cane may be regarded as an example of their reaction against an oppressive and exploitative system. The result was that cutters, who were really the backbone of the industry, were frequently in short supply. In

addition, many of the men who performed the task of cutting cane hated their jobs and preferred instead to be loaders. For example, the Jamaica Sugar Estates in the mid-1960s experienced severe labour shortages. In some years the estate had to start the crop season with only 75 per cent of its labour requirement. The shortage took place especially among the cutters. Since cutters on this estate preferred to be loaders, there was a continual transfer of labour to the loading group at the expense of the cutters.⁵⁵

The dislike that was felt for cutting cane may also be demonstrated from the example of Trelawney estate. There, only the transient workers were cutters, and they had very little prospect of getting jobs in a loading group. The experience of Gray's Inn Estate in 1963 also highlights the abhorrence with which cane cutting was viewed. In this year, Gray's Inn Estate was so besieged by labour shortages for cutters that the estate appealed to the Ministry of Labour and advertised in the press. Various workers were sent down by the Ministry, but the majority never started to work at all, and the rest departed very quickly.⁵⁶

Most of the people who worked on sugar plantations did so out of desperation when no other kind of work was available. Such people generally despised their jobs and usually sought the first opportunity to work elsewhere. In fact, the preference shown by workers for loading compared with cutting should not be misunderstood. Loading was merely less disliked. It was nothing more than the lesser of two evils. Indeed, a job in the factory was probably the only kind that a sugar worker would seek with alacrity.

Thus, although the sugar plantations found it difficult to recruit and keep labourers, the labour shortage existed side by side with the demands of people clamouring for work. Let us recall that my basic position is that I am analyzing sugar workers' antipathy to plantation labour as an indicator of the level of their underdevelopment. My analysis, in Chapter 5, of the strikes and work stoppages which plagued the post-war sugar industry, may be regarded as an expression of the general discontent of sugar workers.

In this Chapter, I have pointed to two additional features of the discontent felt by workers. First, there was the general reluctance of labourers to work on the plantation. Secondly, even when workers accepted plantation jobs, they abhorred cane cutting and often refused to do it. Another manifestation of the labourer's displeasure with sugar plantation work was the high rate of absenteeism which was evident among workers on many sugar estates.

One reason for the high absenteeism from work, particularly among workers hired from the general locality, was simply the fact that fatigue prevented them from working for very long periods.⁵⁷ Of greater importance, however, was the fact that some members of the agro-proletariat were also a part of the peasantry. Certain aspects of this phenomenon were examined in Chapter 4. It is worthwhile to recall, at this juncture, that many plantation workers often had small holdings in the hills. Thus, around April, when the rainy season came, many such workers would abandon the sugar plantation in order to go and plant their crops in the hills. At

Appleton, for example, as many as 60 per cent of the field workers would depart.⁵⁸ In this way they indicated that sugar plantation work ranked far below the importance which they attached to cultivating their own small holdings.

The final manner in which labourers indicated their displeasure with plantation work was by arson. Although data on this phenomenon are somewhat limited, it appears that workers frequently gave vent to their rage against the plantation system by burning cane. However, this situation should not be confused with the controlled use of fire which was used by some plantations to remove leaves. The plantation of Innswood provides a useful example of the prevalence of arson. It was in 1966 that arson became a major problem at Innswood. Whereas 470 acres of cane were burned in 1965, the figure rose to 1,378 acres in 1966. An estimated loss of 2,316 tons of sugar took place. This number represented just under 10 per cent of the total tonnage of sugar produced in the 1966 crop.⁵⁹ Although incidents of arson were a reflection of the poor labour relations on the estate, it is not unlikely that, in some cases, cutters burnt cane in order to make their job easier and thereby to augment their paltry wages when payment was made on a task work basis.

A comprehension of the nature of foreign investment in the Jamaican sugar industry is very important in order to understand the distorted development which characterized the lives of sugar workers. In the post-war period, according to Patterson,

...there is a gross discontinuity in the status hierarchy because the owners, the ultimate source of

power, are still absentees. Thus certain abuses of authority by the managerial class which might have been checked by a resident ownership, go in fact unchecked.⁶⁰

Patterson's assumption that a resident capitalist class might have checked managerial abuses and thus might have alleviated the underdevelopment of sugar workers does not appear to be a valid one. In the first place, certain elements within the capitalist class were, in fact, resident in Jamaica. In Chapter 3, I showed that the Anglo-Jamaican settler investor constituted one stratum of the capitalist class. Furthermore, earlier in the present chapter, I pointed out that the contradiction between the middle class and the capitalist class was a non-antagonistic one since the structure of the consciousness of the middle class did not contain the elements to provide it with a total opposition to the system that employed it. In fact

Two kinds of "caste" attitudes, then, an already outdated English social rigidity and a deeply felt racism, fused in the consciousness of the Jamaican capitalist and upper middle classes to produce a closed and arrogant ruling group.⁶¹

It is doubtful whether the presence, in Jamaica, of all the foreign investors in the Jamaican sugar industry would have reduced the underdevelopment of sugar plantation workers. There were various conditions of work which might have improved the lot of sugar workers. The work would have had to be congenial and rewarding as well as regular and reliable.⁶² These conditions did not exist in the post-war Jamaican sugar industry. On the contrary, what existed was an exploitative labour process which was dominated and shaped by the accumulation of capital.

The social attitudes of plantation workers represented concrete manifestations of the contradiction between labour and capital. Such attitudes also provide useful insights into the nature of the underdevelopment of the workers. However, the underdevelopment of plantation workers cannot be understood merely as an expression of the contradiction between capital and labour. There was another aspect to this question. The proposition that I want to advance at this point, therefore, is that, in the minds of the agro-proletariat, the sugar plantation was always associated with the institution of slavery and the vicious oppression meted out by foreigner investors to African slaves. Let us recall that many of the expressions used to describe various categories of supervisory personnel such as "headman", "overseer", "driver" and "busha" had their origin in slavery but were still frequently used in the post-war Jamaican sugar plantation.⁶³ In addition, as I partly showed in the discussion of industrial relations in Chapter 5, the attitude of many plantation owners and managers towards their workers was a patronizing, deprecatory one. Company officials refused to consider that many of the social attitudes of their workers arose from the poor wages, deplorable living and working conditions, the insecurity generated by seasonal employment and casual work, as well as by the contemptuous attitude of many members of the supervisory and managerial staff. As far as most officials of sugar companies were concerned, sugar workers were lazy and ungrateful. However, such a view is far from the truth.

No one who has seen the Jamaican working on his own land could support this view. The truth is that the Jamaican

worker loathes and hates the sugar estate and rightly so. It is my contention that it is immoral and perverse for anyone not to sympathize with and understand this dislike on the part of the rural working class. For if the members of the rural upper classes, and the urban middle classes have forgotten slavery and the horrible association of the sugar estate with that cruel and ghastly institution, the Jamaican countryman has not.⁶⁴

There is no doubt that an accurate analysis of the social attitudes of the post-war Jamaican sugar workers necessitates an historical perspective. Such a framework must view present attitudes within the context of past oppression.

The memory of that cruel and brutalizing experience still lives on, and the fact that there is no articulate group among the folk to express their feelings on this matter is no reason to think that they do not still remember with horror what the sugar estate has meant. Do we ask the Jew to live and work in the concentration camps of Germany? Do we ask a recently released prisoner who has been unjustly imprisoned for the better part of his life to continue living in his cell? Do we expect him to like it? Is it not natural for him to loathe it and despise it? Why then, is it that when the ex-slaves and their descendants express an abhorrence for the sugar estate we do not accept the obvious explanation? Why do we seek to pervert a natural moral response by calling them lazy or by talking nonsense about hatred for manual labour.⁶⁵

CONCLUSION

The underdevelopment of the quality of life of sugar plantation workers manifested itself in various ways. The poor living and working conditions, as well as the rigid class structure and racial oppression, are valid examples. In addition, sugar workers showed a high degree of instability in their family relationships.

The social attitude of plantation workers reflected the discontent which they felt about their deplorable status. Such attitudes, in many cases, took the form of antipathy towards and resistance against the plantation system. The erosion of the quality of life of sugar workers can be best analyzed within the context of the social relations of production which were established by foreign capitalists on the plantations.⁶⁶

FOOTNOTES

1. B. Davey, The Economic Development of India, London: Spokesman Books, 1975, p.1.
2. V.I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol.3, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971, p.231.
3. Report of an Economic Survey Among Field Workers in the Sugar Industry. Jamaica, 1945, p.71.
4. Ibid p.79.
5. Ibid.
6. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Sugar Industry of Jamaica, Jamaica, 1960, p.65 (henceforth referred to as Sugar Report 1960).
7. Daily Gleaner, September 4, 1960, p.4.
8. Population Trends and Housing Needs, Jamaica, Department of Statistics, 1966, p.14.
9. For data on Lionel Town and areas like it, see Daily Gleaner June 14, 1967, p.11; Jamaican Rural Shelter Improvement. Proposals and Recommendations for the Review of the Development Loan Committee Washington, D.C, USAID, 1977.
10. M.Craton and J. Walvin, A Jamaican Plantation, The History of Worthy Park 1670-1970. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1971, p.308.
11. Ibid.
12. Sugar Report 1960, op. cit., p.190.
13. Workers often complained unsuccessfully to the SILWB about the raw sewage that was to be found close to their barracks. Daily Gleaner, September 17, 1962, pp.18-20.
14. Report of the Sugar Industry Commission 1966 Jamaica, 1966, p.190 (henceforth referred to as Sugar Report, 1966).
15. Sugar Report 1966, p.190.
16. Ibid.
17. Sugar Report 1966, p.190.
18. Ibid.
19. Jamaica Daily News. May 31, 1973 p.47. In some areas there were cases of severe malnutrition and kwashiorkor.

20. The section on working conditions of sugar workers which follow are based on personal observation in Jamaica especially at the Frome estate.
21. Sugar Report, 1960, p.17
22. Ibid.
23. See Chapter 3.
24. Tate and Lyle Times International June 1968, p.27.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid. An area included four or five farms of about 2,000 acres each.
27. See K. Post, Arise Ye Starvelings. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978, p.83.
28. This situation must not be confused with the one cited in chapter 4 where members of the peasantry were forced to join the ranks of the agricultural proletariat.
29. K. Post, op. cit, p.83.
30. Facts on Jamaica: Population and Vital Statistics Jamaica: Department of Statistics, 1970 pp.20-23.
31. Acts of Assembly Passed in the Island of Jamaica from 1681-1769, Jamaica: Jamaica Archives, 1770; The Consolidated Slave Law, Jamaica Jamaica Archives, 1827.
32. See Census of Jamaica, 1970.
33. For useful comments see G. Beckford, Persistent Poverty. New York, O.U.P. 1972, p.72.
34. See N. Girvan, Aspects of the Political Economy of Race in the Caribbean and the Americas Jamaica: ISER, 1975 p.1.
35. For an account of how the views of foreign investors were echoed by the officials of the Jamaican state, see Jamaica Hansard Proceedings of the House of Representatives, 1965-1970, Jamaica.
36. Cited in The Daily Gleaner, November 14, 1963, p.3.
37. S. Beckford, op. cit p.67.
38. See A. Ritter, "Growth Strategy and Economic Performance in Revolutionary Cuba; Past, Present and Prospective." Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 21, no.3, September 1972; E.Boorstein, The Economic Transformation of Cuba. New York, 1968.

39. See The Consolidated Slave Law, op. cit; The Laws of Jamaica, passed by the Assembly and confirmed by His Majesty in Council, June 1808 Jamaica: Institute of Jamaica, 1810.
40. See O. Patterson, The Sociology of Slavery. Jamaica: Sangesters, 1973, p.168.
41. Personal observation in Jamaica.
42. Survey of Rural Housing, Jamaica: Department of Statistics, 1969 p.39.
43. Handbook of Jamaica, Jamaica, 1961 pp. 45-48.
44. Proceedings of the First Conference on the Family in the Caribbean, Puerto Rico 1968, pp. 1-29.
45. Labour Force Participation in Historical Perspective: Proletarianization in Jamaica: Geneva: ILO 1977, p.20.
46. Laws of Jamaica, Chapter 237 (Marriage Law).
47. Bastardy (Amendment) Act, Jamaica, 1963.
48. Daily Gleaner, March 1, 1968 p.18.
49. Daily Gleaner, April 22, 1969; G. Cumper, "The Jamaican Family: Village and Estate," Social and Economic Studies, 7(1), 1958, p.24.
50. E. Clarke, My Mother who Fathered Me. London: Allan and Unwin, 1957, p.109; Personal observation in Jamaica.
51. As I explained in chapter 4, some labourers selected sugar plantation work in preference to work for "small farmers" largely because of the numerous uncertainties associated with the latter.
52. Daily Gleaner, October 14, 1965 p.23.
53. Ibid; See also R. Davison, Labour Shortage and Productivity in the Jamaica Sugar Industry, Jamaica, ISER. 1965, p.23.
54. Daily Gleaner, February 27, 1966, p.20.
55. R. Davison, op. cit. p.23.
56. Daily Gleaner, September 18, 1963.
57. Personal observation in Jamaica.
58. Daily Gleaner April 7, 1966.
59. Daily Gleaner May 14, 1966.

60. O. Patterson "Social Aspects of the Sugar Industry" in N. Girvan and O. Jefferson (eds.) Readings in the Political Economy of the Caribbean Jamaica: New World Group, 1971, p.65.
61. K. Post, op. cit, p.91.
62. R. Davison, op. cit, p.20.
63. Frome Black Book, 1966, Compilation of comments held by the field department of Frome plantation. These commentaries were not organized but they indicated the distaste with which workers viewed plantation labour. Conversation with a supervisory officer, O. Falconer, at Frome Estate, December, 1988.
64. O. Patterson, "Social Aspects" op. cit p.66.
65. Ibid.
66. In places like Guyana, where the labour force was racially heterogenous, the phenomenon of inter-group conflicts increased the dimensions of oppression.

CHAPTER SEVEN
THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL RELATIONS IN JAMAICA:
SOME INDIRECT EFFECTS OF FOREIGN CORPORATE INVESTMENT
IN THE SUGAR INDUSTRY

INTRODUCTION

In order to assess the socio-economic effects produced by the extensive foreign ownership of the Jamaican sugar industry, I have examined, in previous chapters, the manner in which underdevelopment operated at the level of the plantation. However, the study of these direct effects must be followed, at this juncture, by an analysis of some of the indirect effects which were generated in Jamaican society as a whole. Therefore, in this chapter, I wish to argue that the sugar industry produced such profound qualitative changes in the social structure of the country that the development of Jamaican society, in various ways, became severely constrained.

One of the most noteworthy examples of this indirect effect was the movement of vast numbers of the peasantry and the agroproletariat from the rural to the urban areas in search of employment. My basic contention is that this migration of people, which was produced, to a great extent, by the underdevelopment foisted on Jamaican domestic agriculture by the sugar industry, resulted in uncontrolled urbanization and the growth of an urban population which included many marginalized, unemployed and lumpen elements. The high rate of unemployment which was evident in cities

like Kingston was definitely related to the influx of rural migrants who flocked to the cities in a fruitless quest for work.

A second example of restricted development may be seen in the fact that the close relationship that was established between the petty bourgeois leadership and multinational corporate interests in sugar gave rise to the kind of capitalist social structure where important alliances were developed between the state and the representatives of foreign capital as well as with the comprador, entrepreneurial ethnic elite. The result was that African-Jamaicans, who comprise the vast majority of the population of the country, were excluded not merely from the sugar economy, as I documented in Chapter 3, but from the total corporate economy of the country. It is only by understanding this aspect of underdevelopment that the third example can be comprehended.

This aspect refers to the fact that since so much of the economy of the country was dominated by Europeans or white Jamaicans who also utilized institutional racism to maintain and justify their position, race and colour became vital determinants of upward mobility. The result was that the apex of the Jamaican social pyramid was tightly controlled by expatriates or ethnic Jamaicans while African-Jamaicans were confined to the lowest classes. The frustration and anger felt by many Jamaicans because of their underdeveloped status pushed such people to espouse radical causes which in turn gave rise to social turbulence and upheavals. Social movements such as Rastafarianism and black power arose, to a great extent, from the fact that African-Jamaicans were excluded from the

white corporate power structure and subjected to various forms of institutional racism by foreign capitalists and their allies.

By analyzing these three examples, one can understand the extent to which foreign dominance in the sugar industry and the kind of social structure which was subsequently produced were ultimately responsible for the distortion of important aspects of social relations in Jamaica.

INTERNAL MIGRATION AND URBANIZATION

The underdevelopment of domestic agriculture, which I documented in Chapter 4 and the fluctuations of employment patterns on the sugar estates, which I analyzed in Chapter 5, caused many members of the peasantry and the agroproletariat to migrate to the cities in search of work. As we can see from Table 7.1, the number of agricultural workers on farms of up to 4 acres dropped from 105,700 in 1954 to 53,459 in 1961. This was a decrease of 49.4 per cent. Farms between 5 and 24 acres showed a drop in the number of workers from 75,639 to 46,970. This decline amounted to 37.9 per cent. Larger farms also showed considerable reduction of workers. Thus, whereas in 1954 there were 262,600 agricultural workers, by 1961 this number was only 164,850 - a diminution of 37.2 per cent.

Table 7.1

Number of Agricultural Workers Classified by Size Groups
of farms, 1954 and 1961

Size Group	1954	1961	Percentage Decrease
0 - 4 acres	105,700	53,457	49.4
5 - 24 acres	75,639	46,970	37.9
25 - 99 acres	21,795	13,999	35.8
100 - 499 acres	11,132	8,617	22.6
Over 500 acres	48,334	41,807	13.5
	<hr/> 262,600	<hr/> 164,850	<hr/> 37.2

Source: Agricultural Census 1961, Bulletin No. 3, p. 38.
Kingston, Jamaica, 1962.

The number of peasants who gave up their farms was also quite high. In 1968-69, according to Table 7.2, 6,363 farms were abandoned by small farmers. There is little doubt that many of the peasants and rural labourers who left the countryside moved to the urban centres. The proportional distribution of population by parish shown in Table 7.3 provides useful data on the phenomena. The data show a consistent decline in the population of the rural parishes and an increase in the number of residents of the major cities.

Table 7.2

Number of Farms and Acreage Abandoned by Size Groups
of Farms 1968

SIZE GROUPS	Total	Total	NUMBER OF FARMS				
	No.	Acreage	Sugar Cane	Citrus	Yams	Banana	Irish Potato
Less than 1 acre	880	333.5	83	5	117	97	53
1 to under 5 acres	3,019	2,086.0	541	13	241	449	143
5 to under 10 acres	1,278	1,866.2	296	6	86	227	47
10 to under 25 acres	776	2,235.8	141	2	56	151	44
25 to under 50 acres	178	1,261.8	35	5	17	42	8
50 to under 100 acres	75	444.3	24	1	5	14	-
100 to under 200 acres	46	406.8	12	1	3	9	2
200 to under 500 acres	47	919.6	19	5	2	9	1
500 acres and over	64	4,601.0	16	3	2	15	1
All Farms	6,363	14,155.0	1,167	41	529	1,013	299

Source: Census of Agriculture, 1968, Kingston, Jamaica, 1969, p. 82.

The expansion of Kingston - St. Andrew (over 500,000 people in nineteen square miles by 1970) is attributable to internal migration from the rural parishes which averaged about 1,000 per year in the 1930's and over 5,000 per year during the past twenty years.¹

We can see from Table 7.3 that the largest increase took place in the parish of St. Andrew. In 1943 this parish represented 10.36 per cent of the population of the country. By 1960 this figure had climbed to 18.39 per cent and in 1970, 22.81 per cent of Jamaicans lived in urban St. Andrew. It must be understood that urban St. Andrew and Kingston, the capital of the country, together constitute the "Kingston Metropolitan Area."

Table 7.3

Proportional Distribution of Population by Parish,
1921 - 1970

<u>Parish</u>	<u>1921</u>	<u>1943</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u>
Kingston	7.42	8.90	7.67	5.94
St. Andrew	6.36	10.36	18.39	22.81
St. Thomas	4.95	4.91	4.27	3.85
Portland	5.71	4.91	4.01	3.75
St. Mary	8.32	7.35	5.85	5.43
St. Ann	8.27	7.77	7.10	6.63
Trelawny	4.03	3.84	3.48	3.35
St. James	4.89	5.14	5.16	5.56
Hanover	4.46	4.18	3.35	3.15
Westmoreland	8.02	7.28	6.81	6.26
St. Elizabeth	9.24	8.10	7.25	66.91
Manchester	7.45	7.50	6.94	6.65
Clarendon	9.62	9.98	10.18	9.75
St. Catherine	11.26	9.78	9.54	9.96

Source: Recent Population Movements in Jamaica, New York: United Nations, 1974, p. 25.

Another area which showed growth between 1960 and 1970 was the parish of St. James which moved from a representation of 5.16 per cent to 5.56 per cent of the population of the country. It is in this parish that the resort city of Montego Bay is located. The parish of St. Catherine also showed an increase in population from 9.54 per cent to 9.96 per cent. Spanish Town, the former capital city of Jamaica, is situated in this parish. The biggest urban centre in Jamaica, the Kingston Metropolitan Area, had a population of 376,520 in 1960. The second largest was Montego Bay with a population of 23,610. The smallest was Spanish Town which had 14,706 people.² Between 1960 and 1970, 82 per cent of Jamaica's population growth took place in the urban areas of the country. However, most of this increase took place in the Kingston-St. Andrew area.

The intensity of internal migration may be seen in Table 7.4. St. Andrew and St. Catherine show a net gain in immigrants. Many of the residents who left Kingston moved to urban St. Andrew. We may see from Table 7.5 the extent of the change in urbanization experienced by the various parishes. In this Table, only areas showing a population of 5,000 and over and having certain facilities and services such as electricity, banks, post offices, health, education, law and recreational, as well as certain physical infrastructure, were regarded as urban. The net gain or loss to the various parishes as a result of internal migration are detailed in Table 7.6. Between 1960 - 70 St. Andrews gained 40,912 male migrants and 58,539 female migrants. The only other parishes which

Table 7.4

Out-and In-Migration, and Net-Migration Balance by Sex and Parishes: 1959

Parishes	BOTH SEXES			MALE			FEMALE		
	Out-	In-	Net-	Out-	In-	Net-	Out-	In-	Net-
	Migration		---	Migration			Migration		
Kingston	11,221	4,592	- 6,629	5,324	1,882	-3,442	5,897	2,710	- 3,187
St. Andrew	1,293	18,810	+17,517	593	7,442	+6,849	700	11,368	+10,668
St. Thomas	2,135	1,862	- 273	932	826	- 106	1,203	1,036	- 167
Portland	2,361	1,982	- 379	1,028	890	- 138	1,333	1,092	- 241
St. Mary	4,345	3,234	- 1,111	1,862	1,512	- 350	2,483	1,722	- 761
St. Ann	4,335	2,919	- 1,416	1,779	1,264	- 513	2,556	1,655	- 901
Trelawny	2,338	1,516	- 822	948	658	- 290	1,390	858	- 532
St. James	2,963	2,436	- 527	1,256	1,033	- 223	1,707	1,403	- 304
Hanover	2,318	1,266	- 1,052	980	635	- 345	1,338	631	- 707
Westmoreland	3,636	2,316	- 1,320	1,571	1,056	- 515	2,065	1,260	- 805
St. Elizabeth	4,902	2,270	- 2,632	2,081	939	-1,142	2,821	1,331	- 1,490
Manchester	4,790	3,120	- 1,670	1,954	1,451	- 503	2,836	1,669	- 1,167
Clarendon	4,596	3,854	- 742	1,891	1,739	- 152	2,705	2,115	- 590
St. Catherine	4,338	5,394	+ 1,056	1,805	2,677	+ 872	2,533	2,717	+ 184
JAMAICA	55,571	55,571	-	24,004	24,004	-	31,567	31,567	-

Source: Internal Migration in Jamaica, Kingston: Department of Statistics, 1967, p. 14.

Table 7.5

Urban Population For Jamaica and Parishes 1943-1970

Parish	1943	1960	1970	% Population Urban 1943	% Population Urban 1960	% Population Urban 1970	% Population Change 1943-1960	% Population Change 1960-1970
Kingston	110,000	123,400	111,900	100.0	100.0	100.0	12.2	.9
St. Andrew	91,800	253,100	363,700	71.6	85.5	88.0	17.6	43.7
St. Thomas	-	7,300	15,100	-	13.6	21.7	-	106.8
Portland	5,500	10,600	13,800	9.0	16.5	20.5	92.7	30.1
St. Mary	-	7,600	17,900	-	8.1	17.8	-	135.5
St. Ann	-	13,600	23,000	-	13.1	19.2	-	69.1
Trelawny	-	5,300	7,700	-	9.4	12.7	-	45.2
St. James	11,500	23,600	43,800	18.1	28.4	43.5	10.5	85.6
Hanover	-	2,800	3,700	-	5.2	6.2	-	32.1
Westmoreland	-	9,800	16,600	-	8.9	14.7	-	69.4
St. Elizabeth	-	5,700	6,500	-	4.9	5.2	-	14.0
Manchester	-	12,800	25,600	-	13.9	21.2	-	100.0
Clarendon	6,000	21,200	39,100	4.8	15.4	22.5	253.3	84.4
St. Catherine	12,000	22,700	62,800	9.9	18.8	34.8	89.2	176.6
JAMAICA TOTAL	236,800	519,500	751,200	19.2	32.3	40.6	119.4	44.6

Source: United Nations, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

Table 7.6

Estimates of Net Gain (+) or Loss (-) To Parishes As A Result of Internal Migration 1960-1970

	MALES					FEMALES				
	Contiguous Parishes	Kingston	St. Andrew	Other	All Parishes	Contiguous Parishes	Kingston	St. Andrew	Other	All Parishes
Kingston	-	-	-11,005	- 4,475	-15,480	-	-	-11,699	- 838	-12,537
St. Andrew	+10,229	+11,005	-	+19,679	+40,913	+15,260	+11,699		+31,580	+58,539
St. Thomas	+ 53	- 23	- 1,474	+ 432	- 1,012	+ 143	- 283	- 2,311	+ 269	- 2,182
Portland	+ 63	+ 192	- 1,900	- 17	- 1,662	- 86	+ 80	- 2,907	+ 58	- 2,855
St. Mary	- 412	+ 667	- 3,684	- 12	- 3,441	- 584	+ 359	- 5,074	+ 231	- 5,068
St. Ann	- 1,265	+ 155	- 3,581	- 73	- 4,764	- 1,415	- 209	- 5,490	- 38	- 7,152
Trelawny	+ 398	+ 122	- 1,675	- 116	- 1,271	+ 101	- 177	- 2,657	- 292	- 3,025
St. James	+ 2,298	- 272	- 1,656	- 79	+ 835	+ 2,776	+ 40	- 2,345	- 146	+ 325
Hanover	- 715	- 56	- 1,038	- 526	- 2,335	- 1,049	- 156	- 1,771	- 417	- 3,393
Westmoreland	- 1,293	- 88	- 2,479	- 1,256	- 5,116	- 1,119	- 469	- 4,101	- 1,308	- 6,997
St. Elizabeth	- 809	+ 240	- 3,231	- 1,008	- 4,808	- 1,568	- 363	- 5,419	- 1,549	- 8,899
Manchester	+ 233	- 653	- 3,016	- 290	- 2,420	+ 778	+ 308	- 4,762	- 259	- 3,935
Clarendon	- 78	+ 400	- 3,003	+ 880	- 1,801	- 84	+ 24	- 5,035	+ 1,032	- 4,063
St. Catherine	+ 1,540	+ 1,941	- 3,171	+ 2,052	+ 2,362	+ 2,107	+ 1,684	- 4,968	+ 2,419	+ 1,242
TOTAL	+10,242	+15,480	-40,912	+15,191	-	+15,260	+12,537	-58,539	+30,742	-

Source: United Nations, op. cit., p. 40.

Table 7.7

Number and Proportion¹ Of Immigrants² Into
 Selected³ Constituencies of Parishes Kingston
 And St. Andrew From Rest of the Country: 1959

Constitutency	Number	Proportion
KINGSTON East & Port Royal	1,349	35.9
East Central	1,231	41.2
West Central	951	35.6
West	1,001	36.0
Total	4,592	37.2
ST. ANDREW East Urban & Sub-Urban	3,270	68.1
Central Urban	2,854	58.8
West Central	4,453	78.3
South Western	3,783	63.1
East Rural 'B'	1,786	81.4
Total	16,146	68.6

1 Per 1000 population

2 Including migration between Parishes Kingston & St. Andrew

3 With high rate of migration

Source: Department of Statistics, op. cit., p. 16.

elementary in nature and more widespread in developing countries, and contributes to their underdevelopment.⁴

In Jamaica, the Town Planning Department defined as overcrowded those dwellings which had more than two persons per habitable room and more than eight people to each hygienic water closet.⁵ When one applies these criteria to the census data of 1960 or to the sanitary survey undertaken in the same year, the areas which are shown to be the most overcrowded are the single storey tenements and yards of Western Kingston, and, to a lesser extent, certain regions of Central and East Kingston.⁶ One may say that population density in Kingston increased from north to south and from east to west. The highest densities were found in the areas of poor housing in Western Kingston.

Although overcrowding was widely associated with poor housing, its incidence could also be explained by the distribution and density of population. Thus overcrowding was experienced where densities exceeded ten persons per acre, and severe overcrowding was evident where densities surpassed 100 persons per acre. However, in spite of the cartographic relationship between high population densities and overcrowding, certain areas in Western Kingston which had low population densities also suffered from overcrowding. The reason was that most places in this region were outside the area served by the public sewage system. Population pressure could be clearly seen from the absence or poor quality of certain facilities such as cess pits in areas of the city which were sparsely populated.⁷

Table 7.8

Condition of Dwellings, 1943

Location	Total Dwellings	Condition					
		GOOD		FAIR		BAD	
		Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Jamaica	322,609	54,418	16.86	119,704	37.08	147,046	45.60
Kingston	34,789	7,795	22.41	17,668	50.80	9,275	26.70
St. Andrew	35,993	10,634	29.60	14,079	39.14	11,206	31.16

Source: Census of Jamaica, 1943.

Table 7.9

Construction of Dwellings, 1943
(In percentages)

	Jamaica	Kingston	St. Andrew
Type of dwelling			
Barracks	2.6	0.0	0.3
Single family one storey	85.0	62.0	80.1
Single family two storey	1.8	6.0	2.0
Duplex	0.1	0.0	0.2
Tenement	8.2	28.5	15.1
Other and not specified	2.2	3.3	2.1
Outside walls			
Wood	49.29	57.60	63.00
Concrete	3.90	16.99	10.09
Brick	1.89	10.71	1.29
Wattle	18.63	0.15	10.50
Nogging	4.11	11.56	10.04
Spanish wall	14.60	0.83	1.13
Thatch	2.30	-	0.14
Mortar	4.81	1.04	3.88
Other and not specified	0.54	0.11	0.44
Roof			
Wood	27.21	19.81	14.82
Galvanized iron	46.45	77.99	76.10
Thatch	24.51	-	6.72
Tile	0.29	0.08	1.09
Other and not specified	1.28	0.21	1.33
Floor			
Wood	89.59	99.36	94.70
Concrete	1.27	0.23	0.41
Earth	8.58	0.27	4.52
Other and not specified	0.44	0.14	0.55

Source: Census of Jamaica, 1943.

According to Table 7.8, 50.80 per cent of dwellings in Kingston were considered to be in fair condition in 1943 while 26.70 were considered to be in bad condition. In St. Andrew, 39.14 per cent of dwellings were regarded as being in fair condition while the condition of 31.16 was regarded as bad. Table 7.10 points to the kind of kitchen and toilet facilities which were available in most dwellings in 1943.

Table 7.10
Kitchen and Toilet Facilities, 1943
(In Percentages)

	<u>Jamaica</u>	<u>Kingston</u>	<u>St. Andrew</u>
<i>Kitchen facilities</i>			
In dwelling	3.2	8.1	13.2
Outside dwelling	83.6	84.7	72.5
None	13.2	7.2	14.4
<i>Toilet facilities</i>			
Water closet	10.9	65.0	25.4
Pit Latrine	69.7	34.4	73.2
Bucket	0.8	0.5	0.1
None	18.5	0.1	1.2

Since most migrants from rural areas were quite poor and did not have the means to purchase their own houses, they were forced to rely on rental accommodation. A comprehension of the question of house tenure is, therefore, important in order to understand the phenomena of overcrowding and inadequate housing. The vast majority of housing in West Kingston was rented in the form of tenements, flats, and rooms. In those parts of the city which had been built

before 1920, less than one-third of the dwellings were owned by the occupiers.⁸

In the 1970s, housing in West Kingston continued to be in short supply.⁹ Two major urban population movements may be seen. First, there was that of the rural migrants streaming into the urban ghettos. Secondly, there was the movement out of these areas by those residents who had the means to live elsewhere. The rapid growth of certain areas in residential St. Andrew may be explained by the second phenomenon. In Kingston, the rural migrants crowded into the older houses located downtown and in West Kingston. Many sections of these areas became even more dilapidated. This decline gave rise to slum conditions.

According to the Central Planning Unit of Jamaica, more than 80,000 people lived in overcrowded accommodations in Kingston in 1960. Most of these people lived in East and West Kingston. The census also showed that half of the household heads who were unemployed were also tenement dwellers.¹⁰ The number of people who were affected by unemployment as well as by overcrowding was quite similar. This fact suggests that the two phenomena were closely related.¹¹

Therefore, housing conditions in these urban areas were quite poor. Table 7.11 shows some of the social conditions under which a number of communities in West Kingston lived. In North Boys Town, for example, 94 per cent of households had no electricity. In Lower Greenwich Park East, as much as 82 per cent of households had only communal toilet facilities. Yet, this kind of situation must

be placed in proper perspective. Between 1943 and 1960, the percentage of households in Kingston which utilized pit latrines had fallen from 54 to 39. The proportion of people inhabiting dwellings made of concrete had risen from 13 to 53 per cent.¹² However, these improvements were off-set by uncontrolled urbanization - the rapid influx of rural migrants. The result was that by 1960 more than half of the households in Kingston still had no more than one room, and approximately one-third of the inhabitants were living in substandard accommodation.¹³

Table 7.12 shows that in the Kingston Metropolitan Area in 1960 there were 5.32 persons per dwelling. It must be remembered that many of these dwellings consisted of only one room.

As we can see from Table 7.13 the majority of dwellings in Lower Greenwich Park Estate-West were not in good condition. Over 90 per cent of the dwellings were in various stages of dilapidation. Of the dwellings occupied by their owners, only 8.9 per cent were considered to be in good condition. 55.6 per cent were regarded as being fair; 32.3 per cent were thought to be poor, and 5.2 per cent were viewed as unfit for human habitation. In this community, no rental accommodation was classified as being in good condition; 51.5 per cent were deemed to be fair, and 48.5 per cent were judged as poor. According to the Department of Statistics of Jamaica, "a dwelling unit in a 'fair condition' ... has one or more defects of an intermediate nature that must be corrected if the unit is to continue to provide safe and adequate shelter. A dwelling unit in

Table 7.11
Social Conditions in Depressed Communities, 1970

Community	% Unemployment (in week preceding survey) among Heads of Households	% Households with no Electricity	% Households with only Communal Toilet Facilities	% Household Income less than \$12 per week
Trench Town	31	63	70	67
Upper Greenwich Park & Ghost Town	-	55	77	64
Newland Town	-	79	62	62
Lower Greenwich Park East	-	59	82	62
Lower Greenwich Park West	-	77	61	73
Delacree Pen	26	45	71	52
North Boys Town	-	94	30	80

Source: Department of Statistics, Continuous Social and Demographic Survey Unit. Kingston, Jamaica, 1970, p. 28.

Table 7.12
 Kingston Metropolitan Area:
 Persons per Dwelling by Constituency, 1960

Parish and Constituency	Persons Per Dwelling
KINGSTON METROPOLITAN AREA	5.32
KINGSTON	3.36
East and Port Royal	4.18
East Central	3.30
West Central	2.93
Western	3.02
ST. ANDREW	3.78
East Urban and Sub-urban	4.04
Central	3.30
West Central	3.87
South Western	3.54
East Rural B	4.30
West Rural B	4.84

Source: Census of Jamaica, 1960, Jamaica Tabulation Centre, Bulletin, No. 18, 1962.

Table 7.13

Number of Dwelling Units Classified by Tenure, Vacancy Status,
and Condition of Dwelling Unit,
Lower Greenwich Park Estate-West, 1966

Tenancy and Vacancy Status	Total Dwellings Units	Condition of Dwelling Units								Unfit for Human Habitation	
		Excellent		Good		Fair		Poor		N	%
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%		
Occupied dwelling units											
Owner occupied	502			35	7.0	270	53.8	184	36.6	13	2.6
Renting tenant	372			33	8.9	207	55.6	120	32.3	12	5.2
Rent free	99					51	51.5	48	48.5		
Squatter	31			2	6.5	12	38.7	16	51.6	1	3.2
Other Tenure											
Vacant dwelling units	41			5	12.2	18	43.9	18	43.9		
Available for sale only	1			1	100.00						
Available for rent	28			3	11.5	14	53.8	9	34.6		
Vacant-not available	14			1	7.1	4	28.6	9	64.3		

Source: Department of Statistics, A Survey of Housing Conditions in Trench Town, 1967, p. 20.

'poor condition' does not provide safe and adequate shelter."¹⁴ Indeed, this government-sponsored study of Trench Town (West Kingston) stated that 63 per cent of the sample population lived in one-room accommodations. There was an average of 3.5 persons to one room.¹⁵

Other communities in West Kingston showed similar kinds of problems. In Lower Greenwich Park Estate-West, for example, 90 per cent of the dwellings had a total area of less than 199 square feet. Water facilities were quite poor; Table 7.14 shows that 18.9 per cent of the residents had to utilize a public stand pipe while 49.5 per cent had to share water with various families.

Table 7.14

Water Facilities in Lower Greenwich Park Estate-West, 1970

<u>Type of Facility</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Percentage (Adjusted)</u>
Piped water private	170	26.2
Piped water shared by families	321	49.5
Public stand pipe (piped water shared by community)	122	18.9
Piped water available but not specified	35	5.4
No information	31	
Total	679	100.0

Source: K. De Alberquerque: "Uncontrolled Urbanization in the Developing World: A Jamaican Case Study". Journal of Developing Areas, April 1980, p. 379.

TABLE 7.15

Toilet Facilities in
Lower Greenwich Park Estate-West, 1970

Type	N	Percentage (Adjusted)
Pit toilet	273	42.5
Flush toilet	235	36.6
Toilet available but type not stated	98	15.3
Toilet not available	36	5.6
No information	37	
Total	679	100.0

Source: K. De Albuquerque, op. cit., p. 379.

Toilet facilities were also inadequate. In the housing survey of Lower Greenwich Park Estate-West, only 25.2 of the households which had toilet facilities had exclusive use of the facilities. Of these, only 2 per cent were of the flush type. Although the data on toilet facilities presented in Table 7.15 are somewhat better than those just cited, it must be noticed that only 36.6 per cent of that sample had flush toilet. Indeed, only 6.1 per cent of that population had an installed bathtub or shower, and 11.6 per cent possessed no bathing facilities whatsoever.

The overcrowded living conditions and inadequate housing which plagued various areas of West Kingston in the 1960s and 1970s were, in many cases, just as bad or even worse than the conditions which existed in the 1940s. The various data concerning the housing conditions which rural migrants had to contend with in urban slums

present a picture of overcrowded, unsanitary living conditions where there were also inadequate water and toilet facilities.

Yet, the analysis of overcrowding and inadequate housing is not complete without some examination of the phenomenon of the shantytown. Many rural migrants whose domestic agriculture had been underdeveloped by the sugar industry had been rendered so destitute that when they came to the capital city, they were unable to afford even the most dilapidated rental accommodations. It was to the shanty towns of West Kingston that many of these people were forced to seek housing. In this study, a shanty town is considered as "any peri-urban collection of dwellings erected on land to which occupants, or at least initially, is not subdivided for housing purposes."¹⁶ Thus, it is to the inhabitants of the shanty town that we apply the term "marginalized masses."

In Kingston, shanty towns were generally located either adjacent to the tenement areas of West Kingston or on the border of the built-up areas of the city. The land on which shanty towns were established were usually owned by the government or its agencies. One of the oldest squatter settlements in West Kingston was to be found in an area known as "Back-O-Wall". This region which had been occupied by squatters as early as the 1940s had much higher population densities than in some of the newer settlements. In the shanty towns many dwellings consisted of little more than a one-room hut built out of packing cases, fish barrels, and cardboard. These structures were usually quite unstable and provided minimum protection against the elements. The attempt of the government to

deter squatters by refusing to build amenities and pit latrines did not succeed. Illegal latrines were dug and water was usually stolen from fire hydrants.¹⁷

This camp, like some of the others, was situated close to the major garbage dump of the city. Many squatters were so destitute that they were forced to rummage in the garbage to obtain many of the necessities of life.

In Jamaica, the expression "living in the 'dungle'" was quite often used to refer to the lifestyle of the dwellers of shanty towns. The "dungle" (garbage dump) became, for these squatters, the prime source of building materials and food. The sight of hordes of shanty town dwellers fighting with each other and against the vultures for the garbage, presents one of the most poignant pictures of Jamaican poverty.¹⁸ Thus the shanty towns, of West Kingston provide a striking example of population pressure which, in turn, reflects the socio-economic problems that plagued Kingston.

Squatting not only persisted in post-war Jamaica but intensified. A parliamentary report of 1950 stated that only one of the 1,282 squatter households possessed a bathroom, 75 per cent had no sanitary convenience, and 83 per cent were without a kitchen. Overcrowding was widespread in the shanty towns and many shacks housed four or five people. One of the most heavily populated settlements, Trench Town, had a population density of 216 persons per acre.¹⁹ When one realizes that at the start of 1961, approximately 1,000 people shared one stand pipe in one of the West Kingston squatter camps,²⁰ one can understand the extent of the

deprivation suffered by such people. Indeed, many of those who could not find the material to construct a shack were forced to live in the wrecked car bodies which were often found in the shanty towns.

One of the major results of the unsanitary conditions of both urban slums and shanty towns was the high death and disease rates of the inhabitants. Social disease affected most of the overcrowded parts of the city. Therefore, the squatter camps as well as the tenements and yards were afflicted.

Two of the main diseases were tuberculosis of the respiratory system and typhoid. The former was a feature of the overcrowding of rooms and the latter the result of contamination of food and water as well as inadequate sewerage disposal. Thus, while tuberculosis was associated with the yards and tenements, typhoid tended to be a feature of the squatter settlements.²¹

URBANIZATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT

Evidence of uncontrolled urbanization may be drawn not only from the acute population pressure that was experienced in urban areas, but also from the severe unemployment which prevailed there. Therefore, the phenomenon of urban unemployment can be best understood within the context of the underdevelopment suffered by rural domestic agriculture as a result of the operation of the sugar plantations and the subsequent rapid migration of the peasantry and the agro-proletariat to the cities.

It must be emphasized that I am not suggesting that unemployment rates were negligible in Kingston prior to rural migration. What I wish to argue is that although unemployment had always existed in urban Jamaica, its rates were greatly exacerbated by the steady influx of migrants from the rural areas, especially during the post-war period. Thus, although the Gross Domestic Product increased threefold, from £70 million in 1950 to £215 in 1960, the rate of unemployment continued to be high in Kingston. Migration from the rural areas was the major cause of this phenomenon. By 1960 the number of residents in Kingston reached 376,000. This increase meant that almost 25 per cent of the population of Jamaica lived in Kingston.²² Opportunities for employment were unable to keep pace with the rapid growth in population. Therefore, socio-economic development was hindered. Since by 1960, the annual increase in the labour force of Kingston was 10,000 persons, and since the economy of the country was not able to provide employment for all these people, those who were not able to find jobs were forced to join the steadily swelling ranks of the unemployed.²³

Unemployment and the subsequent decline in living standards was thus grim realities for many urban dwellers. According to the census of 1960, 18.4 per cent of the potential labour force in Kingston was unemployed. This was an increase of about 3 per cent over the rate of 1946.²⁴ One must note, however, that had it not been for the rapid pace of emigration to Britain and North America, such figures would have been considerably higher.²⁵ Nevertheless in

1960, more than 10,000 people in Kingston were in search of their first job. About 70 per cent of the group were under 21 years of age and they made up almost one-third of the total number of unemployed. Unemployment was also extremely high among school-leavers. The fact that 36 per cent of the males and 50 per cent of the females who were looking for their first jobs in Kingston were born in the rural parishes suggests that rural migrants were indeed increasing the urban unemployment rates.²⁶

The residents of the urban slums and shanty towns suffered not only from high rates of unemployment but also, in the majority of cases, from an inability to acquire skilled jobs. The reason was simply that most rural migrants lacked the skills required for urban jobs and therefore were unable to obtain adequate occupations. As we can see from the sample of workers in West Kingston shown in Table 7.16, 61.9 per cent described themselves as being unskilled,

Table 7.16

Occupation Status of Residents of West Kingston, 1970

Occupational Status	N	Percentage (Adjusted)
Skilled	132	20.6
Semiskilled	112	17.5
Unskilled	396	61.9
No information	39	
Total	679	100.0

Source: K. de Albuquerque, op. cit., p. 371.

17.5 per cent as semi-skilled and 30.6 per cent as skilled. It is more than likely that the last figure represents an over-generous estimate of their abilities by the workers who placed themselves in that category. In any case, unemployment was rampant in West Kingston. Table 7.17 shows that the unemployment rate in certain sections of West Kingston was as high as 55 per cent, three times higher than in the city as a whole. Unemployment was especially high in the tenements and shanty towns. Indeed, in Tower Hill, a housing scheme where some of the most poverty-stricken people had been relocated by the state, an unemployment rate of 57.5 per cent was recorded.²⁷

Table 7.17

Employment Status of Residents of West Kingston, 1970

Employment Status	N	Percentage (Adjusted)
Unemployed	365	55.6
Part-time employed (<20 hours weekly)	43	6.5
Self-employed	63	9.6
Employed	186	28.3
No information	22	
Total	679	100.00

Source: K. de Albuquerque, *op. cit.*, p. 373.

Table 7.18 shows that the unemployment rate for Jamaica as a whole was considerably less than that recorded in the major urban centre. Thus in 1960, 9.0 per cent of males and 19.4 per cent of females were unemployed. In 1970, 16.1 per cent of males and 23.3

per cent of females were without employment. Although such figures show an increase, they were lower than the unemployment figures recorded in Kingston and St. Andrews.

Employment opportunities for rural migrants were limited not only because of their lack of skill but also because of the fact that the number of job-seeking migrants far exceeded the amount of jobs that were available in the manufacturing sector. In fact, as I pointed out in Chapter 3, the manufacturing industry showed a growing tendency towards capital intensity, established few inter-sectoral linkages, and produced a dearth of export markets. This sector was therefore unable to challenge seriously the unemployment problem in Jamaica in general and in Kingston in particular. Table 7.19 shows that in 1943, 11.3 per cent of the male labour force was engaged in manufacturing. This figure increased to 12.1 per cent in 1960 and 15.2 per cent in 1970.

The female labour force in manufacturing went from 14.3 per cent in 1943 to 20.0 per cent in 1960 and fell to 17.7 per cent in 1970. The sector which employed the most people - agriculture, forestry, hunting, fishing - also showed a decline. In 1943, 61.0 per cent of men were employed there. By 1960 this figure had reached 52.2 per cent. In 1970, 43.6 per cent of the male labour force was employed in this sector. The percentage of agricultural employment for women fell from 25.5 per cent in 1943 to 9.1 per cent in 1970. Although other sectors show small gains in employment, the service sector show the most remarkable gain. Between 1943 and 1970 the employment rate for men

Table 7.18

Employed/Unemployed Sectors of Labour Force 1960-1970, Per Cent

	Employed				Unemployed				Increase in Unemployed 1960-70	
	Male		Female		Male		Female		Male	Female
	1960	1970	1960	1970	1960	1970	1960	1970		
Jamaica	91.0	83.9	80.6	76.7	9.0	16.1	19.4	23.3	+7.1	+3.9

Source: United Nations, op. cit., p. 70.

rose from 7.8 per cent to 15.1 per cent. In the same period, the rate for women rose from 44.7 per cent to 52.5 per cent.

Although urban unemployment was an important factor in the socio-economic problems of Jamaican society during the period under study, the presence of an unskilled labour force also played a role. Therefore, what I wish to argue, at this point, is that a second aspect of restricted development may be seen in the fact that the rapidly growing urban work force did not contain the kind of skilled people necessary to advance the development of the country as a whole. A sample survey of West Kingston strongly supports this argument. As we can see from Table 7.20, only 0.8 per cent of those polled had professional or technical qualifications. There was no one belonging to the administrative, executive and managerial category. Only 0.2 per cent of the population contained supervisory personnel.

What is also revealing is the high proportion of unskilled labourers - 28.1 per cent, as well as the large number of women working in household service and as domestics. Most of the unemployed West Kingston men worked at casual labour. Although a few of the artisans were skilled and worked in industry, many of them were self-employed and worked as furniture makers, metal workers, and sign painters. The kind of skilled professionals, technologists, and technicians which Jamaica required in the post-war period were not to be found in the mass of rural people who flocked to the urban centres. This problem of lack of skills may be

Table 7.19
Proportional Distribution of Labour Force By
Industrial Group, 1943-1970

Industry Group	Percentage Distribution					
	Male			Female		
	1943	1960	1970	1943	1960	1970
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Total - All Industries	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Agriculture, forestry, hunting, fishing	61.0	52.2	43.6	25.5	18.0	9.1
Mining, Quarrying	0.6	1.0	2.4	0.2	0.3	0.3
Electricity, gas, water	0.4	0.8	1.2	0.0	0.1	0.3
Manufacturing	11.3	12.1	15.2	14.3	20.0	17.7
Construction	10.2	12.9	11.3	2.0	1.2	0.4
Transport and Communication	3.6	4.5	4.9	0.3	1.1	3.0
Commerce	5.4	6.9	6.2	12.9	15.8	16.8
Services	7.8	9.6	15.1	44.7	44.2	52.5

Source: United Nations, op. cit., p. 75.

Table 7.20
Occupation of Residents of West Kingston

Occupation	Sex		Total	Percentage (Adjusted)
	Male	Female		
Professional and technical	1	1	5	0.8
Administrative, executive, and managerial	—	—	—	—
Supervisory	1	—	1	0.2
Clerical and sales	10	10	20	3.2
Artisans and skilled persons in industry	55	3	58	9.3
Self-employed artisans & independent producers	34	24	58	9.3
Petty traders and grocers	2	1	3	0.5
Higglers, peddlers, and venders	5	26	31	5.0
Sports and entertainment	—	1	1	0.2
Catering and other services	12	15	27	4.3
Independent craftsmen	11	4	15	2.4
Unskilled laborers-general workers	67	109	178	28.1
Semiskilled persons, trade helpers, and attendants in industry	40	32	72	11.5
Civil service and security forces	2	—	2	0.3
Domestics and household service	3	77	80	12.8
Farmers and fishermen	4	—	4	0.6
Housewives	—	39	39	6.2
Landlords	2	4	6	1.0
Pensioners, retired people, and paupers	10	15	25	4.0
Other	1	2	3	0.5
No information	14	39	53	
Total	274	405	679	100.0

494

Source: Census of Jamaica, 1970.

seen in the educational levels of the urban population. Table 7.21 shows that illiteracy among males in Kingston and St. Andrew was 10 per cent. Among females the figure was 8 per cent. We can also see from Table 7.22 that most of the population of Kingston and St. Andrew had achieved only 6 - 8 years of non-secondary education.

Of equal importance is the fact that many of the employed people were in fact underemployed and thus made a limited contribution to the development of the country. In 1957, for example, the Labour Force Survey not only reported an unemployment rate of 17 per cent but also showed that 16 per cent of the labour force worked for only three days or less in the survey week.²⁸ A similar pattern persisted many years later. Thus in 1968 the Department of Statistics showed that in the previous year 27 per cent of employed people worked for less than 8 months, and 40 per cent for less than ten months.²⁹

Indeed, during the periods when they were not working, many underemployed people were usually regarded as being "voluntarily unemployed". The designation was incorporated into the ideology which many officials of the state and various employers adopted in their dealings with the unemployed. It is important that we examine certain aspects of the phenomenon in order to illustrate the socio-economic problem which afflicted many Jamaican workers.

As I showed in Chapter 6, many sugar plantation owners regarded their labourers as inherently lazy and reluctant to perform hard or regular labour. Although this kind of stereotype was later

Table 7.21

Illiteracy Among the Population Aged Ten Years and Over, 1960

Literacy	Kingston		St. Andrew	
	No.	%	No.	%
Males				
Read and write	38,840	96.0	86,910	92.7
Read only	183	0.4	845	0.9
Illiterate	1,443	3.6	5,977	6.4
Population aged 10 years and over	40,466	100.0	93,732	100.0
Females				
Read and write	51,618	96.4	113,303	94.3
Read only	272	0.5	959	0.8
Illiterate	1,643	3.1	5,842	4.9
Population aged 10 years and over	53,533	100.0	120,104	100.0

Source: Census of Jamaica, 1960.

Table 7.22

Standard of Education Attained by Population Aged 15 Years and Over, 1960

Secondary Education	Kingston		St. Andrew		Jamaica	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Males						
Nil	1,381	3.9	5,410	6.6	83,811	19.0
Under 2 years non-secondary	102	0.3	426	0.5	3,737	0.8
2-3 years non-secondary	978	2.7	3,943	4.8	32,968	7.5
4-5 years non-secondary	5,378	15.0	14,184	17.4	95,526	20.9
6-8 years non-secondary	22,664	63.3	41,141	50.6	191,993	43.5
Jamaica local 2d and 3d year	908	2.5	1,547	1.9	6,194	1.4
No secondary school certificate ...	2,960	8.3	6,883	8.5	15,075	3.4
With secondary school certificate..	1,314	3.7	6,315	7.8	12,114	2.7
Degree	133	0.4	1,499	1.8	2,406	0.5
Total	35,818	100.0	81,348	100.0	440,823	100.0
Females						
Nil	1,607	3.3	5,573	5.2	68,804	13.6
Under 2 years non-secondary	184	0.4	493	0.5	3,528	0.7
2-3 year non-secondary	1,426	3.0	4,771	4.5	32,323	6.4
4-5 years non-secondary	7,824	16.2	18,978	17.8	106,224	20.9
6-8 years non-secondary	30,304	62.8	55,980	52.6	248,451	49.0
Jamaica local 2d and 3d year	1,380	2.9	2,646	2.5	10,795	2.1
No secondary school certificate ...	3,986	8.3	10,111	9.5	21,417	4.2
With secondary school certificate..	1,513	3.1	7,237	6.8	14,051	2.8
Degree	37	0.1	575	0.5	890	0.2
Total	48,261	100.0	106,364	100.0	506,483	100.0

Source: Census of Jamaica, 1960.

modified, the belief was still held that most workers had "target incomes" and were available for wage labour only when cash income was needed. In fact, as late as 1945, the Economic Policy Committee which was established by the colonial authorities to solve the problem of unemployment and to recommend measures to raise the standard of living of the country, stated that voluntary unemployment and underemployment were widespread in Jamaica because many workers had their own plots of land.³⁰ The Committee even went as far as to argue that workers did not have strong incentives to increase their work effort because there were not many places for the working class to spend money and because, in Jamaica, there was little need to construct houses or to purchase large quantities of clothing or other materials which would be essential in colder regions of the world.³¹

One can easily see that this report reflected the kind of bias generally held by many foreign investors in the sugar industry and by the Jamaican bourgeoisie as a whole. Therefore, this report helped to lend respectability to government policies which neglected the unemployed. The Committee also stated that workers had target incomes and that higher wages would result in a reduction of the labour supply. When one considers that the Committee suggested that many of these people who were registered as unemployed in the census of 1943 were little more than beggars, criminals, and prostitutes, one can understand the extent of the hostility and the contempt with which unemployed people were regarded. This patronizing tone is

evident even in the works of certain social scientists. In his study of unemployment in Kingston, W. Maunder concludes

In an industrialized economy unemployment brings frustration and discontent precisely because the unemployed are not adjusted to the situation. It is also fair to say that adjustment is much easier in a tropical, predominantly agricultural country than in the cold, grey industrial towns of the North of England where work is life, if a man is to lead a man's life.³²

The ethno-centric bias of the report and the lack of understanding of the ramifications of unemployment are quite evident.

The socio-economic difficulties faced by many urban workers, therefore, stemmed from unemployment and underemployment but were accentuated by the fact that the plight of such people was frequently treated with contempt, condescension, or neglect by the state and its allies. Thus workers were often regarded as being responsible for their poverty. One report from an international agency stated, "Employers, in the talks we had with them tended to say that if people were unemployed, it was often because they chose to be so."³³ A prominent researcher concludes that because workers aimed at obtaining target incomes and generally did not spend a lot of money, voluntary unemployment was the result. Officials of the state eagerly supported this kind of viewpoint, "Many unemployed persons consider certain types of jobs as undignified and inferior even though they are not qualified for better jobs."³⁴ Nevertheless, these assertions have never been adequately substantiated.

The seething frustration experienced by many unemployed people culminated in outbursts of turmoil. The waves of violence and crime which gripped Jamaica in the 1960s may be regarded largely

as an expression of the anger felt by many unemployed people at their underdeveloped and deplorable condition. It must be understood that I am not saying that poor housing conditions and high rates of crime were attributable in a simplistic, deterministic manner to foreign investment in the Jamaican sugar industry. The links of causation were indirect. Foreign capital in the first Jamaican industry, the sugar industry, caused the economy of the country to be distorted in various ways (Chapters 3 and 4). This uneven development resulted in, among other things, a rapid migration to the main urban centre by rural people with few skills that were required in an urban setting. This was the sort of urban social structure which gave rise to the kinds of situations that I have documented so far in this chapter.

AFRICAN-JAMAICAN EXCLUSION FROM THE CORPORATE ECONOMY

As we can see from Table 7.23, people whose ancestry is African or a mixture with African comprised more than 90 per cent of the population of Jamaica. Europeans made up only 0.8 per cent of the people of the country. Yet this small group wielded almost total corporate control. One of the major reasons for this state of affairs was the fact that when new economic activities or institutions were introduced into Jamaica, the exploitative features of the sugar plantation were frequently adapted to fashion their growth. The sugar industry was thus used to set the pattern and the tone for investment in other sectors of the economy. Such features included monopolistic business enterprises and close links between

corporations, both foreign and comprador, and the state. I alluded to this situation in Chapter One, and will provide empirical details in this chapter.

Table 7.23

Racial Composition of Jamaica (in Percentages)

Race	Kingston	St. Andrew	Jamaica
African.....	73.4	73.2	76.8
European.....	0.4	2.2	0.8
East Indian.....	0.6	2.0	1.7
Chinese.....	1.9	1.4	0.6
Syrian.....	0.1	0.3	0.1
Afro-European.....	14.2	12.9	14.6
Afro-East Indian.....	2.4	1.8	1.7
Afro-Chinese.....	1.7	1.2	0.6
Other.....	5.3	5.0	3.1
Total.....	123,403	296,013	1,609,514

Source: Census of Jamaica, 1970.

The petty bourgeois leadership in Jamaica therefore pursued policies which were in tune with the interests of the local capitalists and its own interests. The local capitalists, plus the multinational corporations which they often represented, indulged in policies which maintained the unequal distribution of economic power. Therefore, one of my major arguments is that the people who were able to take advantage of investment opportunities in Jamaica were the local bourgeoisie whose incomes were sufficiently high to do this. Since plantation sugar had been the earliest Jamaican industry, most of the people who were able to establish corporate enterprises were those who had been able, as

settler investors in sugar, or as the representatives of foreign sugar interests, to accumulate the necessary capital.

As I have pointed out in earlier chapters, foreign investment in the Jamaican sugar industry had largely reduced many African-Jamaicans to the status of agro-proletariat, peasant, and the unemployed. Such people were not in a position to participate in the corporate economy as owners or managers. This role was seized by European Jamaicans who steadfastly maintained white control of the corporate economy and, by extension, the underdevelopment of African-Jamaicans. This underdevelopment was accentuated by the monopolistic privileges granted to such corporations. A few salient examples from the manufacturing sector will suffice to prove this point.

The Jamaica Match Industry Ltd., for example, was given a monopoly to operate a match factory by the colonial Privy Council of Jamaica. The position of this corporation was safeguarded in various ways. Not only was it guaranteed a profit of 10 per cent, after tax, but whenever the guaranteed profit was not reached, the company was awarded a suitable amount of public revenue in order to attain this goal. The Commission of Enquiry that was set up to investigate the activities of this corporation discovered that between 1943 and 1953 this corporation had been reimbursed public funds totalling \$780,000.³⁵

Of equal importance was the discovery by the Commission that the Jamaica Match Industry Ltd. was a member of a group of related firms with interlocking directorates, all of which formed a part of

the Henriques Brothers enterprises.³⁶ As I pointed out in Chapter 3, the Henriques Brothers were intimately connected with the sugar industry. Their various firms such as Kingston Industrial Works, Kingston Industrial Garage, Kingston Industrial Agencies, and Henriques Brothers Ltd. served the needs of their sugar factories, their match industry and all their other businesses. Henriques Brothers Ltd. were European-Jamaicans who dealt primarily with other white entrepreneurs, foreign or local. African-Jamaicans were excluded from any meaningful participation in this corporate enterprise in spite of the fact that the Henriques Brothers had been given so much from the public purse.³⁷ The report of the Commission of Enquiry highlighted the situation.

The Jamaica Match Industry Ltd. has been run as a form of employment relief which the Government has contracted out to a private firm for a fixed return on its investment capital ... It is inadvisable except in very special circumstances for the Government to grant, directly or indirectly, monopolies to private companies. It is particularly inadvisable where the company is one of an interlocking group which is likely to engage in intergroup transactions.³⁸

However, the Jamaican corporate economy was heavily marked by the interlocking groups. Thus, Henriques Brothers with two other European-Jamaican groups, Ashenheim and Da Costa, owned the firm of Wray and Nephew Ltd. This firm, as I showed in Chapter 3, owned the Appleton Sugar Estates. However, it also owned interests in the New Yarmouth Sugar Factory and the Bernard Lodge Sugar Factory. A major shareholder of Wray and Nephew, Lascelles de Mercado, had controlling interests in another major firm, Western Terminals.³⁹

Table 7.24 provides evidence of the extent to which the Jamaican corporate economy was controlled by a few families. Of greater importance is the fact that the twenty-one families shown in the table were, with one exception, Lai, all European-Jamaicans. African-Jamaicans were virtually non-existent as far as control of the corporate economy was concerned. The ascendancy of the European-Jamaican families stemmed primarily from their close alliance with the Colonial Governments as well as from their ties with the sugar plantations.

In the 1940s, under the Safeguarding of Local Industries Law, various monopoly rights were granted to Jamaicans of European extraction.⁴⁰ Thus, Desnoes and Geddes were granted a monopoly to produce beer. It was also one of the largest producers of carbonated beverages. Desnoes and Geddes also became the largest shareholders of West Indies Glass Ltd. Desnoes and Geddes not only produced the various beverages but also most of the components which were required for the manufacture of their products.⁴¹

Jamaica Milk Products Ltd. was also granted a monopoly concession for the production of processed milk. A profit guarantee to the company was included as a part of the contract. The company was owned and operated by European-Jamaicans. A similar picture may be seen in other manufacturing companies in Jamaica. Carreras Ltd., for example, which controlled about 80 per cent of the market in cigarettes, was owned by the Hart and Ashenheim family groups.⁴² The Hart family was the largest local shareholders of Jamaica Flour

Table 24

The Jamaican Corporate Elite

Code	Family Groups Single Individuals	Corporations Number of Companies Represented	Directorships Represented
1.	Abrahams	4	5
2.	Ashenheim	15	20
3.	Brandon	2	2
4.	Brown	3	3
5.	D'Costa	4	5
6.	Desnoes	6	7
7.	Fletcher	5	5
8.	Geddes	7	7
9.	Graham	3	7
10.	Hart	8	11
11.	Hendrickson	3	4
12.	Henriques	9	14
13.	Issa	3	3
14.	Judah	5	5
15.	Lai	2	3
16.	Lake	5	5
17.	Matalon	4	10
18.	Mahfood	4	6
19.	Nunes	3	3
20.	Rousseau	4	6
21.	Stone	4	4

Sources: Who is Who in Jamaica 1965-1970;

S. Reid, "An Introductory Approach to the Concentration of Power in the Jamaican Corporate Economy and Notes on its Origin" in C. Stone and A. Brown (eds.) Essays on Power and Change in Jamaica, Kingston: Jamaica Publishing House, 1977, p. 37.

Mills Ltd. About 82 per cent of the flour consumed in the country was produced by this company. Products such as pulp, paper, and glass were also produced under monopoly control. One board consisted of an alliance of Ashenheim, Geddes and Henriques, and the other board was led by members of the Henriques, and Desnoes and Geddes family.⁴³ Furthermore, it is to be noted that although much of the banana produced in Jamaica was done by the peasantry, the sole shippers and marketing agents for bananas was the Jamaica Banana Producers Association.⁴⁴ This body was dominated by expatriates.

In the field of Communications, African-Jamaicans were similarly excluded. The only daily newspaper, during the period under review, was owned by the Ashenheim family.⁴⁵ One of the two radio stations in the country, Radio Jamaica, was completely owned by foreigners. Its directorate was dominated by European-Jamaicans.⁴⁶ The cinemas were almost completely controlled by Palace Amusements Ltd. This company was owned by the Abrahams and Graham families.⁴⁷

In the field of construction the only non-white company was that of the Lai Corporation. The other companies were the Caribbean Cement Company, Industrial Commercial Developments, Pan Jamaican Investment Trust, and National Continental Corporation.⁴⁸ The link between the sugar industry and construction may be seen in the fact that Lascelles De Mercado, the largest shareholder of Wray and Nephew, owned the shipping firm responsible for bringing in much of the material required by the construction companies. Kingston

Industrial Works, owned by the Henriques family, also played a role in this enterprise.⁴⁹

The manner in which the state aided the cement company is worthy of note. This company, like so many others, was given a monopolistic licence in 1949.⁵⁰ It was granted exclusive right to manufacture, sell, or import any kind of cement in Jamaica. The company was allowed a number of concessions. It was allowed to import material which were free of tonnage tax, customs duties, and other duties. Similar concessions were allowed for any building materials and machinery required for the factory. The Company was not only exempt from export duties but also from the payment of royalties to the state. It was also exempt from the payment of import duties on raw materials and fuels used in the manufacture of cement.

The Cement Company was also allowed to pay no royalties on its limestone, shale and gypsum operations. Finally, the company was exempt from taxation for a period of twenty-one years, 1949-1970. Because of its monopoly and the extremely generous tax concessions that had been granted to it, the Cement Company was able to realize a profit of over \$11 million during a ten-year period.⁵¹ Members of the corporate elite who were involved in the construction of the company and the manufacture of its products included Ashenheim, Matalon, Da Costa, Issa, Hendrickson and Rousseau. Other European-Jamaicans played a peripheral role. When one realizes that in spite of the vast concessions made to the Cement Company, concessions which had to be paid out of the public purse, not one

African-Jamaican held a management position or had a controlling interest, one can realize the extent of the socio-economic disparity which existed in Jamaica.

Members of the white families dominated the corporate sector at the expense of African-Jamaicans not only through their ownership of local enterprises, but also because they frequently played the role of a comprador bourgeoisie. In other words, multinational corporations (MNCs), in order to give the impression of being sensitive to the aspirations of Jamaicans, frequently appointed Jamaicans to the positions of local directors. However, here again, black people were ignored. The local directors were, without exception, members of the elite families. The alliance between the local elites and the MNCs was advantageous for both parties. The position of the MNC was often improved locally because of the influence which local elites were able to exert in the formation of state policies regarding the granting of patents, guarantee of profits, and the use of capital. The elites themselves were able to secure vast corporate profits.

The case of the Jamaica Flour Mills provide a worthwhile example. Although this company needed \$3.4 million in capital requirements, the Corporate foreign groups provided only \$760,000, less than 1/4 of the figure needed. Jamaican shareholders furnished \$1,000,000, and the Bank of Nova Scotia gave a line of credit of \$1.4 million. The net effect was that although the MNC provided only \$760,000, it was able to obtain nearly \$2,000,000 in fees and \$500,000 in dividends over five years.⁵²

In other cases, although MNCs made little use of local representatives, they were provided with generous benefits by the state. In 1950, for example, the Bauxite and Alumina Industries (Encouragement) Law was passed. According to its provisions, allowances were made for the remission of tonnage tax and customs duties on all plant, building materials and machinery required for the mining, treatment and transportation of bauxite.⁵³ Bauxite companies were able to realize vast profits not only because of the intrinsic profitability of the operations to the companies but also because of the low tax returns which accrued to the people of Jamaica under the initial agreement. During the period under review, there were four bauxite companies which operated in Jamaica: Kaiser Bauxite Company (subsidiary of Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Company, U.S.A.); Alcan (Jamaica) Ltd., (subsidiary of Aluminum Ltd. of Canada); Reynolds Bauxite Company (subsidiary of Reynolds Metal Ltd., U.S.A.); and Alcoa Minerals of Jamaica Ltd. (subsidiary of Aluminum Company of America).⁵⁴ Management position in these enterprises were reserved either for expatriates or members of the local elite. African-Jamaicans were excluded.⁵⁵

It was perhaps in the commercial banking sector that the exclusion of African-Jamaicans was most pronounced. This sector consisted largely of six foreign-owned banks of which the Bank of Nova Scotia and Barclays Bank were the most dominant.⁵⁶ During the 1950s and 1960s, African-Jamaicans were excluded not only from positions of management but from virtually any but the most menial position within the banks. It was only after the genesis of the

explosive black power movement in the late 1960s, and the social turbulence that gripped the country in the 1970s that the foreign owners of these banks nervously hired a few black people to minor positions within the banks. It is worthy of note, however, that even then, the top management positions in the banks were reserved for whites.⁵⁷

Although public utilities probably hired a higher percentage of African-Jamaicans to positions of management, most of the major positions were still held by expatriates or local whites. The fact that the Jamaica Omnibus Service, the Jamaica Public Service Company (electricity) and the Jamaica Telephone Company were foreign-owned meant that the pattern of capitalism established by the foreign ownership of the Jamaica Sugar Industry still prevailed. In the case of the Jamaica Omnibus Service Ltd., for example, the parent company was the main supplier of equipment and technical and advisory services. This meant that an annual payment of over \$100,000 had to be paid by the local to the parent company, British Electric Traction.⁵⁸ In addition, the fact that the company raised its fares quite frequently and often provided poor service tend to suggest that most Jamaicans have not received full value from this public utility.

In the case of the Jamaica Public Service (electricity), African-Jamaicans were inadequately represented in top management positions. In addition, rural Jamaicans frequently had inadequate access to electricity.⁵⁹ Because the Jamaica Public Service Company was privately owned, there was frequently a conflict between the

generation and distribution of electricity and the socio-economic development of the rural areas.⁶⁰

The fact was simply that available supplies of electricity tended to be found largely in Kingston and in some of the large towns. Indeed, in 1965 only 15 per cent of the population of the country had electricity for domestic uses. There is little doubt that various kinds of development projects such as irrigation schemes were severely retarded because of the lack of electricity or the slow pace at which it advanced. The major problem was that while the cost of providing electricity for homes or other rural projects was quite high, the incomes of the vast majority of rural Jamaicans were quite low. As late as 1970 only about 21 per cent of the population was able to utilize electricity for domestic purposes.⁶¹

A similar picture may be seen in the case of the Jamaica Telephone Company Ltd. This company, which was a subsidiary of an overseas holding corporation, was granted a monopolistic franchise by the state. In addition, the Jamaica Telephone Company was guaranteed a profit of 8 per cent after tax.⁶² Management positions in this public utility were dominated by foreigners. African-Jamaicans, although not excluded, were severely under-represented.

The pattern of African-Jamaican exclusion which had been set by foreign investment in the sugar industry was thus perpetuated by the corporate sector of the economy. Local subsidiaries of foreign corporations were controlled by members of the elite families. Locally owned companies were similarly controlled. Thus, although

twelve of the twenty-four insurance companies were locally owned, African-Jamaicans were excluded from positions of control within them.⁶³

One of the reasons why members of the elite families were able to maintain their economic power and the exclusion of African-Jamaicans from positions of influence with the corporations was the fact that there was a close alliance between the petty bourgeois leadership and European-Jamaicans. In Chapter 3, for example, we saw that the Chairman of the Sugar Manufacturers Association, Robert Kirkwood, had important ties to the state. In this part of the study, also, we have seen that the state frequently gave monopolistic economic concessions to members of the elite families. However, a few examples of the power wielded by elite families within statutory agencies is important to understand the extent to which their corporate power was aided and sanctioned at the level of the state. The Henriques held powerful positions in both the Sugar Industry Rehabilitation Board and the Coconut Industry Board.⁶⁴ The Matalons also played powerful roles not only in the Urban Development Corporation but also in the Jamaica Bauxite Association.⁶⁵ Similar roles were played by the Harts in the Jamaica Industrial Development Corporation and the Jamaica Investment Fund.⁶⁶

Major grants made by statutory boards to local companies inevitably went to companies owned by white Jamaicans. Thus, the Jamaican Development Bank actively promoted grants to the corporate economy. In 1970, \$500,000 was given to the Caribbean Steel Company

to begin operations. Later \$600,000 was also given to Communications Corporation, and \$400,000 was granted to the Gleaner Company Ltd.⁶⁷ Hendrickson, the Chairman of the National Continental conglomerate and Communications Corporation, was also Chairman of the electric utility, Jamaica Public Service.⁶⁸ Other key positions were also held by members of the elite families. Thus, the Ambassador to the United States for many years was Sir Neville Ashenheim, and the Director of the New York Office of the Jamaica Industrial Development Corporation was Carroll Da Costa. Furthermore, members of the Matalon family included a Minister of Security and the chairman of various development agencies run by the state.⁶⁹

RACE AND CLASS CONFLICT

The race and class conflicts which marked post-war Jamaica cannot be fully understood outside the context of the exclusion of African-Jamaicans from significant roles in the corporate economy, a situation which, to a great extent, was set in motion by the operation of foreign capital in the sugar industry. It was this exclusion plus the institutional racism that existed in Jamaica in the post-war period which combined to restrict the development of African-Jamaicans.⁷⁰ As late as 1964 the national newspaper had an editorial which stated, inter alia:

Many people in Jamaica still boast that they have never entertained a negroid person in their homes. They do not say it openly, but that is their boast nevertheless. Every change in our society that has enabled the people really to live like the nation's motto is pain and distress and "disaster" to them.⁷¹

According to Table 7.25 professional and supervisory positions were held by only 4.0 per cent of male African-Jamaicans in Kingston. The figure for European males was 42.5 per cent. Among African-Jamaican males in St. Andrew, only 5.1 held professional and supervisory roles. The figure for European males was 62.3 per cent. A similar kind of picture is shown for women. Furthermore, it should be noted that in low-paying manual and service jobs, African-Jamaicans predominated.

During the post-war period, therefore, Jamaican society was one in which capitalist development was uneven and one-sided, and did not benefit the mass of the people to any great extent. I have already given some indication, in the previous section of this chapter, of the kind of economic power possessed by the major capitalist owners of the means of production. The class consisted almost exclusively of European-Jamaicans.

Within the "middle class" there were various strata. Salaried professionals, fairly wealthy peasants, and the urban petty-bourgeoisie made up this class. Although there were some African-Jamaicans represented in these categories, especially the first two, they usually had a privileged socio-economic and educational background. In many cases, they endeavoured by means of dress, language, and social views to indicate their superior social status compared to the poor peasants and the industrial proletariat. In the 1940s and 1950s, many members of this class were mulattoes and regarded black, lower class Jamaicans with the same kind of racist views exhibited by European-Jamaicans.¹²

Table 7.25

Labour Force Aged 14 Years and Over, 1970

Main occupation	Total		African		European		East Indian and Afro- East Indian	Chinese and Afro- Chinese	Afro- European		Others	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<i>Kingston, males</i>	29,412	100.0	22,178	100.0	167	100.0	755	100.0	1,137	100.0	3,852	100.0
Professional and supervisory	1,620	5.5	898	4.0	71	42.5	51	6.8	232	20.4	270	7.0
Clerical and sales	4,986	17.0	3,114	14.0	35	21.0	164	21.7	571	50.2	763	19.8
Craftsmen and technical ...	12,817	43.6	10,083	45.5	29	17.4	323	42.8	176	15.5	1,661	43.1
Professional services	375	1.3	265	1.2	4	2.4	12	1.6	9	0.8	61	1.6
Manual and service	9,156	31.1	7,472	33.7	28	16.8	187	24.8	139	12.2	1,033	26.8
Not specified or ill defined..	458	1.6	346	1.6	0	0.0	18	2.4	10	0.9	64	1.7
<i>St. Andrew, males</i>	70,224	100.0	52,241	100.0	1,912	100.0	2,297	100.0	1,968	100.0	8,602	100.0
Professional and supervisory	6,860	9.8	2,645	5.1	1,192	62.3	246	10.7	533	27.0	1,534	7.8
Clerical and sales	10,761	15.3	6,017	11.5	334	17.4	448	2.0	1,025	52.0	2,212	25.7
Craftsmen and technical ...	25,478	36.3	20,833	39.9	165	9.0	715	3.1	258	13.1	2,705	31.5
Professional services	776	1.1	462	0.9	46	2.0	27	0.1	19	0.9	179	2.1
Manual and service	25,525	36.3	21,655	41.4	167	9.1	823	36.0	121	6.1	1,877	21.8
Not specified or ill defined..	824	1.2	629	1.2	8	0.0	38	0.2	12	0.6	95	1.1
<i>Kingston, females</i>	26,278	100.0	19,639	100.0	112	100.0	707	100.0	719	100.0	3,832	100.0
Professional and supervisory	482	1.8	298	1.5	14	12.5	15	2.1	33	4.6	91	2.4
Clerical and sales	5,876	22.4	3,834	19.5	41	36.6	209	29.6	482	67.0	962	25.1
Craftsmen and technical ...	4,634	17.7	3,487	17.8	9	8.0	122	17.3	64	8.9	738	19.3
Professional services	725	2.8	467	2.4	5	4.4	29	4.1	9	1.3	164	4.3
Manual and service	13,350	50.9	10,668	54.3	41	36.6	307	43.4	121	16.8	1,685	43.9
Not specified or ill defined..	1,161	4.4	885	4.5	2	1.8	25	3.5	10	1.4	192	5.0
<i>St. Andrew, females</i>	58,707	100.0	43,773	100.0	941	100.0	1,597	100.0	1,358	100.0	8,349	100.0
Professional and supervisory	1,553	2.6	691	1.6	188	20.0	48	3.0	87	5.4	395	4.7
Clerical and sales	14,450	24.6	8,156	18.6	482	51.2	675	42.3	1,024	64.1	3,129	37.5
Craftsmen and technical ...	9,080	15.5	7,135	16.3	25	2.7	221	13.8	72	4.5	1,232	14.8
Professional services	1,513	2.6	913	2.1	39	4.1	41	2.6	37	2.3	304	3.6
Manual and service	30,152	51.3	25,369	57.9	200	21.3	529	33.1	124	7.8	3,012	36.0
Not specified or ill defined..	1,951	3.3	1,509	3.4	7	0.7	83	5.2	14	0.9	277	3.3

Source: Census of Jamaica, 1970.

The "lower class" consisted largely of the agricultural proletariat, poor peasants, the urban proletariat, service and casual workers, and the unemployed. These were overwhelmingly black. The basis of the differentiation between the different classes was primarily economic with racial characteristics playing a strong secondary role. Thus, the unequal access to the socio-economic material resources of the country, plus the racism that Europeans had instituted and maintained in Jamaica, meant that African-Jamaicans, especially those who were in the lowest social class, were restricted in their development.

In spite of the myth of non-racialism which some Jamaican political leaders were eager to propound, it became obvious even to foreign observers that Jamaica was wracked by deep race and class divisions. As one foreign newspaper reported in 1969:

This is a dangerously sick and divided country. It always has been. The masters of the sugar plantations lived in constant and justified terror of slave uprisings, they stamped out even peaceful debate on moderate reforms. The colonial pattern persists.⁷³

Another report concluded that

... while thousands of white tourists gorge and tan and tango in the Caribbean rhythm, squalid black Jamaica throbs to a different tune - the ominous stirrings of poverty, unemployment and despair that could lead to bitter racial resentment.⁷⁴

Another newspaper pointed to "a littoral of affluence adjoining a hinterland of poverty on which the resorts with the North American names ... enjoy oases of privileges and extra-territoriality unknown since the days of Shanghai International Settlement."⁷⁵ In order to understand fully the nature of the underdevelopment which existed in

Jamaica, I shall examine certain radical Jamaican social movements. My main thesis is that the existence of such groups resulted largely from the bitter race and class conflicts which plagued the country.

It must be clearly understood that I am not saying that class divisions per se indicate underdevelopment. However, when socio-economic power is wielded by a racial group which represents only a small fraction of the total population, and when such a group utilizes racism to maintain its power, then such a phenomenon, in my view, indicates that the position of the vast majority of the people has been underdeveloped.

The pattern of structural inequality was obvious to some observers. As one newspaper reported in 1969

There have always been two Jamaicas. The one that has been visible - like the tip of an iceberg - has been a multiracial bourgeois society of about 100,000 people. These people have controlled the political, social, economic and academic life of the country; they have been articulate and influential so they have generally been accepted as 'Jamaica'.

There is another Jamaica - a nation of nearly two million people - who are poor, Black and uneducated. A large proportion is illiterate. So they have been virtually "invisible". Like the submerged section of the iceberg they're there, but they aren't seen until it's too late.⁷⁶

(i) RASTAFARIANISM

The anger and frustration felt by many African-Jamaicans at their deprived condition culminated in the establishment of the Rastafarian movement in the 1940s. This millenarian movement embraced a definite political and religious ideology, attracted a significant mass following, polarized Jamaican society, and

initiated social upheavals. In order to understand some of the violence and cleavages which characterized Jamaican society in the 1960s, it is important to examine some of the ideology espoused by Rastafarians (Rastas).

One of the most profound messages which Rastas delivered to the poor, oppressed, urban blacks who flocked to their cause was that of black pride. Through their newspaper Rasta Voice, Rastas disseminated a powerful message of self-worth. They glorified black historical achievement.

The oldest and most noted statue in the world bears the face of a Black. It is the Sphinx of Gizeh, which was worshipped as Horus, the Sun - God of Light and Life. It was erected at about 5000 B.C. The Devil which is now depicted as black, was once portrayed as white. When the black man dominated the planet he painted the forces of evil white. When the whites came to power they shifted the colours. But as late as 1500 the Ethiopians still depicted their Gods and heroes black, and their devils and villains, white. Father Fernandez, a Catholic missionary who worked among them says "They paint Christ, the Blessed Virgin, and other saints in black form; and devils and wicked men white."¹¹

The image of black goodness and white evil was maintained by Rasta Voice, especially in religious ideology. This action was doubtlessly intended to counteract the current Christian association of blackness with sin. Rastas were zealous in their attempt to uplift black religious pride.

Nearly all the ancient gods of Old and New World were black and had woolly hair. Buckley says, "From the woolly texture of the hair I am inclined to assign to the Buddha of India, the Fuhi of China, the Xaha of the Japanese and the Quetzalcoatl of the Mexicans, the same and indeed an African, or rather a Nubian origin. In the Bible, God or the Ancient of Days is described as having "hair like pure wool."¹²

Rastas, therefore, preached a message of black pride, which sometimes bordered on one of black supremacy. They cited numerous historical facts to support their case. Rastafarians were so disenchanted with the socio-economic, cultural, and racial oppression of African-Jamaicans that they demanded to be repatriated to Africa.⁷⁹ Rastas saw the Jamaican government and the police as representatives of the forces of Babylon, part of the white conspiracy against black people.⁸⁰ Rastas therefore rejected Jamaican society since it was one where European attributes were the norm in nearly all aspects of daily life. This was the society spawned by foreign investment in Jamaican sugar, a society that was spurned by Rastafarians. According to Rasta Voice, "The destiny of the black man must be controlled by the blackman. To be black is not just the colour of your skin. It is a way of life ... Think black, live black and love black for there is no one who can love and understand the blackman like self."⁸¹

Since in the view of Rastafarianism, Jamaican society denied the self-worth of African-Jamaicans, it was to Africa that black Jamaicans should look.

The Rastafari Movement in this country has been and will continue to be the vanguard of our people and that is why we are proud to say that Rastas have paved the way for true liberation and repatriation. One may ask why Rastas are the vanguard, but it is plain to see that over the years Rastas are the only people who speak of African Redemption and Repatriation; Rastafari are the only people who project a true African identity.⁸²

Rastafarians pointed to the relationship between their movement and other black liberation movements.

When one looks at the principle of our movement and compare it with the liberation struggle of our people especially our brothers in Southern Africa and Australia where our people are mercilessly oppressed by the illegal Apartheid System, we find that over the years that this movement has been giving solidarity to the African all over the world.⁸³

By the 1960s Rastas numbered about 70,000 in Jamaica. Nevertheless, many bourgeois and petty bourgeois Jamaicans regarded Rastas with hostility. The local newspaper, the Daily Gleaner, reflected this perspective

There may be a few sincere and decent Rastafarians, in this odd semi-religious, semi-political sect but it is self-evident that the majority are lazy, dirty, violent and lawless scoundrels mouthing religious phrases to cover up their aversion to work and their ill habits.⁸⁴

The polarization between the Rastas and many bourgeois and petty bourgeois Jamaicans was quite evident. Indeed, the latter thought that the movement should be repressed and viewed with suspicion anyone who attempted to sympathize with the cause of Rastafarianism.

What is oddest about all of them is that they should have been so long tolerated by authorities and public alike for they are mostly useless and quite unpicturesque. Jamaica could do without them, and though irresponsible "do-gooders" bleat whenever they are restrained, the banning of their sect and the repression of their habits is something that no Jamaica government that claims public spirit ought to hold back from.⁸⁵

The hostility with which Rastafarians were regarded by the Jamaican bourgeoisie and the mulatto petty bourgeoisie reflected the race/class antagonisms which characterized Jamaican society. Rastas who could be easily identified by their unkempt hair, (dreadlocks), beards, and their style of dress, were frequently abused, harassed, and detained by the police. Any urban African-Jamaican who voiced

support of Rastafarianism ran the risk of being similarly treated by the police. It is not surprising, then, that in spite of their motto of "peace and love", many Rastafarians fought back against their oppression. In 1958, for example, policemen on duty at a convention of Rastafarians at Coptic Theocratic Temple in Kingston were attacked and beaten by Rastas.⁸⁶ In March of the same year there was a major clash between Rastas and policemen in Kingston. Cars were damaged; Rastas, policemen, and journalists were injured. Some Rastas were shot dead by the police.⁸⁷

In May 1959, a serious clash took place between Rastas and policemen in Kingston at a local open-market. The incident which started with the severe beating of a Rastafarian by several policemen, escalated when groups of Rastas rushed to help their fellow cultist. In a short time there was a pitched battle between policemen and Rastas. Police cars and a fire truck were set on fire. Hundreds of policemen had now joined the battle. It quickly spread to the shanty towns inhabited by the Rastas. The police not only burned many shacks to the ground but also seized many Rastas, assaulted them, arrested them, and forcibly shaved them.⁸⁸

Although the police often claimed that they raided and attacked Rastas and their dwellings because the activists were known to be avid users of ganja (marijuana), one should not be misled by this kind of argument. In spite of the fact that Rastas did utilize ganga, especially as a part of their religious ceremonies, their motto "peace and love" and their religious ideology indicate that they were basically law-abiding. What the Colonial authorities

could not tolerate, especially in the 1940s and 1950s, was any radical black group which sought to challenge the dominant ethos of the racist society, the "white bias". The state was apprehensive about any individual or group which tried to elevate black pride and self-worth, and which tried to alleviate the underdevelopment which characterized the lives of most African-Jamaicans.⁸⁹ The state, therefore, by claiming that Rastafarianism was a breeding ground for criminals was able to attack and harass the cultists ostensibly in order to arrest criminals.

Rastafarianism should not be conceived of as monolithic phenomenon. Although the movement embraced various ideologies including religious and political ones, various Rastas attached greater importance to a particular ideology or to certain aspects of one ideology. Thus, some Rastas refused to have anything to do with Jamaican politics while steadfastly championing the cause of repatriation. Others devoted their energies almost completely to the religious aspect of Rastafarianism. Nevertheless, there were other Rastas who adopted a strong left-wing perspective. They not only thought that working-class Rastas should unite but also tried to encourage the unification of left-wing organizations. Such Rastas wanted a state that was organized and controlled by Rastas.

The Rastas Movement being the largest group in the country must work hard to bring about African unity among ourselves. Already there are a certain amount of existing organizations that we must come together with in order to move in one direction.⁹⁰

These Rastas thought that the most appropriate vehicle for the unification of African-Jamaicans was the Rastafarian movement.

Rastafarianism, it was held, would help to deliver African-Jamaicans from their underdeveloped status.

The only organization that Black people need is the organization of organizations. It is only the Rastafari Movement within the Ethiopian Orthodox Church that can bring to Jamaica true spiritual cultural, political, social and economic unity.⁹¹

The view that was propounded in Rasta Voice was that working class unity was vital in order to struggle against the uneven capitalist development which marked Jamaican society.

A strong political organization of the working class is now of the utmost importance. If we are to get anywhere in the struggle against capitalism and neo-colonialism in Jamaica, we have to start thinking and acting along this line. Rastafari would naturally be a part of this move since many brethren are wage workers and have a high level of class and racial consciousness. An independent organization of workers is the only real force that can lead a persistent and consistent class struggle against the desperate and absolutely frightening conditions of existence which many brethren have to battle from day to day.⁹²

These kinds of Rastafarians recognized that their underdeveloped status was a direct result of the capitalist exploitation to which their country had been subjected. Such cultists realized that the dimensions of underdevelopment included not only economic aspects but political and social ones as well. Their arguments pointed quite clearly to the fact that foreign capital had set in motion a process that had restricted the development of African-Jamaicans. Class struggle was inevitable. Rasta Voice often voiced this view:

Capitalist exploitation brings with it not only humiliation but political and cultural repression as well. Rastafari have been protesting not for the past forty years but during the last one hundred years as part of the landless peasantry and now the landless working class. The experiences of the brethren have sharpened their understanding of neo-colonialism. The

question of Rasta working class unity cannot therefore be based on the view that Rastas are a separate and distinct class from workers but as a class of poor peasant origin which has been forced into wage labour and unemployment by the development and intensification of capitalist relations in Jamaica.⁹³

It seemed almost inevitable that Rastas who espoused these kinds of views would seek confrontation with the Jamaican state. They fully realized that the two major political parties were, at best, mild reformists and would not undertake the radical dismantling of the racism and class inequities which were deeply embedded in the Jamaican social structure. These Rastas, therefore, called for unity among African-Jamaican working class people.

The brethren have sought numerous ways out of this situation of oppression - through Repatriation and self-help organizations, the Ethiopian World Federation and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. Rasta Voice has itself been calling for unity among the Brethren and has taken organizational steps to centralize the movement. These developments are a response to the increased coarseness by which imperialism maintains its stranglehold in this country. The ferocity of the PNP-JLP regimes in quelling any movement in resistance shows quite clearly that they are the political arm of our oppressors. Without our own political arm the exploited classes - workers, poor peasants, and sectors of the middle class - will remain impotent. It is good to see organizations move among Rastas and other groups but we must also remember that the Capitalists are well organized in the Chamber of Commerce, the Rotary Clubs, Kiwanis and Employers' Federation.⁹⁴

Rastafarians who voiced this kind of political perspective were eager for radical change in Jamaican society. Their attempt at armed revolution took place in 1960 when a Rastafarian group called the African Reform Church, led by the Reverend Claudius Henry, attempted a coup in Jamaica. This group was aided by a militant American black organization known as the First Africa Corps. In

April 1960, both groups established a camp in the Red Hills from which they hoped to launch their attack.⁹⁵ Although the police became aware of the plan and were able to capture some of Henry's followers by launching a pre-emptive raid on the camp, other cultists were able to evade the police. They quickly regrouped and later attacked various military and police units. It was not until June 27 that the combined operations of hundreds of policemen and soldiers were able to overcome the forces of the Rastafarians and quell the uprising. Many innocent people were shot dead during the fighting.⁹⁶

The Henry rebellion was a reflection of the social and political turmoil that was sweeping Jamaica. Although the rebellion which tried to provoke a revolution by means of armed struggle did not succeed, it demonstrated that radical Rastas were politically sensitized, were willing to resist white racism, and were conscious of the exploitative nature of peripheral capitalism. Black Jamaican revolutionaries had tried to destroy the colonialist state with the aim of establishing a government which represented the interests of the oppressed black masses.

We are tired and hungry, we want a good government to break with capitalism now. We must put ourselves in a position to demand from government our rights. If there is not a strong educational group in the country to make demands, then we cannot have a people's government. I would like to ask if that is our position, how will we the largest single group take part in running the country. If the government does not want to learn from the people, then it is doomed.⁹⁷

Nevertheless, although this kind of violent rhetoric was meant to inspire political consciousness among the Rastas and other

members of the urban proletariat, it had two major results. First of all, it alienated some Rastas who had been attracted to the movement because of its religion. Rastafarianism was thus split. Secondly, it tended to encourage the use of violence in a non-revolutionary context by certain elements within the Rasta movement. The so-called Coral Gardens incident, in Montego Bay, illustrates this point. In April 1963, a group of six Rastas attacked a gas station at Coral Gardens. They also attacked policemen and citizens of the area who had pursued them. The result was that eight people, including policemen, were killed and many were seriously injured.⁹⁸ This kind of incident, which was repeated fairly often in Jamaica in the 1960s also suggests the possibility that certain elements of the lumpenproletariat were being disguised as genuine Rastas.

During the 1960s Rastas were subjected to frequent harassment by the police. Often innocent people were caught in the crossfire between police and Rastas and were killed. Policemen sometimes killed Rastas with little provocation. In 1969, for example, several innocent Rastas were murdered by the police. Rasta Voice highlighted the incident.

In August the politicians once more used the police and the military to "clear up" Wareika Hills because they claimed "criminals" were using the hills as hideouts. The wanton dynamiting of caves resulted in the death of several brethren who lived in the hills and were not aware of what was going on because they chose to cut themselves off from living in the city. Almost daily one hears of similar brutal and murderous attacks against Rastafari.⁹⁹

Although the Rastafarian movement gave some degree of racial pride and a sense of self-worth to many African-Jamaicans especially

those in the urban areas, it was not able to reverse the socio-economic underdevelopment which characterized the lives of most of these people. Nevertheless, the movement reflected the deep race/class cleavages which existed in Jamaican society. Foreign investment in the Jamaican sugar industry had initiated the kind of uneven capitalist growth which, combined with the institutional racism that accompanied it, restricted the development of African-Jamaicans. The social turbulence that Rastafarianism evoked was indicative of the frustration felt by many Jamaicans at their deprived state. The black power movement also posed a challenge to the "white bias" in Jamaican society.

(ii) JAMAICAN BLACK POWER

The institutional racism introduced into Jamaica by foreign capitalists, and the exclusion of African-Jamaicans from positions of power within the corporate economy, gave rise to race and class conflicts that was manifested not only by Rastafarianism but also by the black power movement. A brief account of this phenomenon is therefore necessary since it helps us to elucidate the race and class aspects of African-Jamaican underdevelopment.

The black power movement emerged in Jamaica in the 1960s. It consisted of local university intellectuals, radical thinkers within the community, and a varied cross section of the urban proletariat. The movement was also influenced by the ideas and actions of Marcus Garvey and the American black power activists. Through their short-lived newspapers such as Moko, Bongo Man,

Liberation and Abeng, black power leaders provided a powerful critique of Jamaican society. It is important to understand the concept of black power. One of the most well known leaders of the movement was Walter Rodney. His definition of black power is instructive.

Black power in the West Indies means three closely related things: (i) the break with imperialism which is historically white racist, (ii) the assumption of power by the black masses in the islands, (iii) the cultural reconstruction of the society in the image of the blacks.¹⁰⁰

According to Rodney, black power is a doctrine about black people preached by black people for black people.

One of Rodney's most significant contributions was the fact that he emphasized the extent to which colonialism and imperialism distorted the lives of black people.

The essence of white power is that it is exercised over black people - whether or not they are minority or majority, whether it was a country belonging originally to whites or to blacks. It is exercised in such a way that black people have no share in that power and are, therefore, denied any say in their own destinies.¹⁰¹

The black power movement felt that it was important for black people to understand the relationship between colour and power in the imperialist world. The imperialist world, they held, consists of two basic parts, one that is dominant and the other that is dominated. In the dominant metropolitan areas, every country such as the U.S.A., France, Britain, West Germany, etc. has a large majority of white people. In the dominated, colonial parts of the world, on the other hand, every country as in most of Asia, Africa and the West Indies consists of non-whites.

Power, therefore, resides in the white countries and is exercised over blacks. There is the mistaken belief that black people achieved power with independence e.g. (Malaya, Jamaica, Kenya), but a black man ruling a dependent state within the imperialist system has no power. He is simply an agent of the whites in the metropolis, with an army and a police force designed to maintain the imperialist way of things in that particular colonial area.¹⁰²

Rodney's strong rhetoric was meant to stir black people to a realization of the reason for their underdevelopment.

You can put together in your own mind a picture of the whole world, with the white imperialist beast crouched over miserable blacks. And don't forget to label us poor. There is nothing with which poverty coincides so absolutely as with the colour black - small or large populations, hot or cold climates, rich or poor in natural resources - poverty cuts across all these factors to find black people. The association of wealth with whites and poverty with blacks is not accidental. It is the nature of the imperialist relationship that enriches the metropolis at the expense of the colony.¹⁰³

The black power leaders also rejected the concept of the non-racialism of Jamaican society as a myth. They held that the middle class sector of Jamaica which consisted of mulattoes, whites, and other groups such as Syrians, and Chinese, oppressed black people. Black power leaders did not believe that the incorporation of some blacks into positions of prominence by the elite was significant.

However, irrespective of its racial or colour composition, this power-group is merely acting as representatives of metropolitan-imperialist interests. Historically white and racist-oriented, these interests continue to stop attempts at creative social expression on the part of the black oppressed masses. It was only natural that imperialism and its local lackeys should have intensified the oppression of our black brothers.¹⁰⁴

This kind of view expresses the race and class cleavages which existed in Jamaica. Officials of the state, the bourgeoisie, and the petty bourgeoisie were furious and denounced the black power movement. The Prime Minister of Jamaica, Hugh Shearer, denounced black power speakers as "radicals" and "irrelevant". In his view, "they are pushing causes and voicing slogans that they have adopted from elsewhere. We have a black government, we have roles for everybody and we have got rid of colour discrimination." This kind of statement indicates quite clearly that the state refused to acknowledge the race/class underdevelopment endured by African-Jamaicans. The myth of a harmonious, multiracial society was one that had been vigorously projected, especially abroad by the petty bourgeois leaders of both major political parties.

Made up of people from all over the world, predominantly mixed blood, but also with large numbers of others, and nowhere in the world has more progress been made in developing a non-racial society in which also color is not psychologically significant.¹⁰⁵

Thus, the attempt which had been made by Rastafarianism to stimulate African-Jamaicans to the true nature of their oppression was continued by the black power movement. The negative reaction of the Jamaican bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie was highlighted by the Gleaner Company. In a major editorial this company denounced university social scientists in the strongest possible terms. Indeed, it suggested that the Faculty of Social Science should be abolished and the resources put into "useful disciplines" such as Medicine and Natural Sciences.¹⁰⁶

Unhappily from what we have seen of the products of social scientists in our midst, it appears that they

themselves are largely incapable of analysis in depth, uncreative in the sense of a true and individual economist such as the late Maynard Keynes, and full of Marxist and Fabian dogma and jargon, which had some pertinency in the days of Professor Laski and the London School of Economics in the thirties; but are significantly unhelpful in the mixed economies of the 1960s.¹⁰⁷

The reaction of the mulatto petty bourgeoisie to black power was vicious. Their viewpoint underlined the racial tensions and cleavages which existed in Jamaican society. This letter to the Gleaner vividly exemplifies the attitude of that class.

The fair skin Negroes will always be preferable by sensible civilized people unless the black Negroes can be led to become civilized, imaginative and thrifty ... What has the black Negro ever done for his race or any other race? ... And this is the reason why the Negro worms of today have refused to work and have been using white man's guns and knives to get what they want from anybody ... The brains of the non-black Negroes and white people are responsible for the running of this country. If we eradicate this element (brownies), a decent dog wouldn't want to live in Jamaica. Already it isn't quite fit for such a dog.¹⁰⁸

Another letter-writer, also a member of the mulatto petty bourgeoisie, equated black power with nazism and vigorously condemned the supporters of the movement.

I noticed a sign at Upper King Street reading "British Dogs go Home". Now Mr. Editor, I am a Jamaican as you are and I personally take great exception that some Jamaicans who can be classified as savages are permitted to scrawl insults to any ethnic race of people. These impertinent and ignorant people would soon be reverting to lower savagery if the British Dog did not buy Jamaican sugar, rum and bananas. Strict laws should be passed with heavy sentences to anyone who scrawls these defacing signs on people's walls. Jamaican Nazis must be struck down and struck down now.¹⁰⁹

It needs to be emphasized, as strongly as possible, that I am not arguing that the black power movement instituted race and

class divisions in Jamaican society. Such a task had been accomplished through imperialism and its local supporters. What the black power movement did was to explain fully to the African-Jamaican proletariat the real reasons for their underdevelopment. The angry response of the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie increased the racial and class tensions. In the inaugural edition of Abeng, the editor stated that the purpose of the paper was

to help us discover ourselves - not just the past, but also what we are today and what we can be tomorrow if we can move forward together ... in seeking possibilities for change.¹¹⁰

Abeng and the black power movement were dedicated to exploring the roots of African-Jamaican underdevelopment and exposing them to full view so that black Jamaicans could understand why they were so oppressed. Abeng thus created a greater sense of socio-economic awareness among African-Jamaicans. Many black power advocates were not afraid of being regarded as subversives.

There are another set of people in this country who from their pronouncements would like to see a change in the existing colonial situation. They want to "overthrow" suffering, to "destroy" the colonial heritage, to "upset" and "overturn" foreign domination of our lives so as to create a dignified existence for the people of this country. In short their ambition is to destroy what has proven bad for us and replace it with whatever will best serve the best interests of all Jamaicans. Abeng identifies with this set of people. And if the purpose outlined here is subversive, we want to be as subversive as can be.¹¹¹

Foreign investment in the Jamaica sugar industry had created a racist society, one in which African-Jamaicans were subjected to socio-economic oppression. It is because black power advocates vigorously addressed this problem that they were seen by their

detractors as "forces in our country today who are spreading divisiveness among us, setting race against race, district against district, colour against colour".¹¹² Metropolitan critics also regarded the articles of Abeng as "becoming increasingly anti-white, attacking the foreign-owned bauxite companies and naming four volunteer teachers - some Peace Corps and a Canadian couple as 'spies'".¹¹³ Yet, it must be emphasized that, in spite of minor deviations, the black power movement was not racist. As Abeng stated

In Jamaica true Black Power does not attack white as white, brown as brown. All men are equal. The attack is on white, brown or black as oppressing the Afro-Jamaican and as an oppressive economic and social class.¹¹⁴

Radical leaders like Clive Thomas correctly pointed out that foreign investors and their Jamaican allies had "helped to reduce a people of immense vitality and creativity, with a long history of struggle for freedom, to be the servile tool of foreigners."¹¹⁵

This kind of perspective was echoed in radical newspapers like Moko which analyzed the extent to which socio-economic control in Jamaica rested in the hands of a few elite families.¹¹⁶ Another radical newspaper, Liberation, painted the political parties, the JLP (Jamaica Labour Party) and PNP (People's National Party), as allies of the bourgeois and petty bourgeois elements in the underdevelopment of African-Jamaicans.

Who are the JLP and PNP helping?

Answer: The white, chinese and mulatto capitalists.

Who finances the JLP and PNP?

Answer: The white, chinese and mulatto capitalists.

In 1938 the black man owned more of the land area of Jamaican than in 1970. Who owns the land now?

Answer: The white, chinese and mulattoes.

Who is a comrade?

Answer: An African who has been taught to hate a labourite.

Who is a labourite?

Answer: An African who has been taught to hate a comrade.

Are black people sleeping on the sidewalks and fighting dogs for garbage in 1970?

Answer: They certainly are.

Who feeds us? Who clothes us? Who houses us?

Answer: The Chinese feed us; the Syrians clothe us; the Jews house us.

Do we have real power in Jamaica?

Answer: A people who cannot feed, clothe and house themselves are truly powerless.¹¹⁷

It must be clearly understood that my examination of the black power movement is intended to show the extent of the race and class aspects of the underdevelopment suffered by African-Jamaicans. In other words, the oppression borne by a people can be comprehended within the context of the activities of groups such as the black power movement which articulated a vigorous response against oppression. In some cases the black power movement seems to have acted as a catalyst causing some black Jamaicans to give vent to their rage against those whom they saw as their enemies. White tourists were particularly vulnerable to attacks. In 1962, for example, Stanley Motta, President of the Jamaican Chamber of Commerce, stated that attacks on tourists was such a problem that it had now become necessary to spend money for tourist protection.¹¹⁸ Incidents of tourists being shot were reported.¹¹⁹

One of the major race riots of the period was the anti-Chinese riots of 1965. These attacks were not surprising since the Chinese were seen as oppressors, just like the whites and mulattoes. Let us recall that although by 1963 there were only about 70,000 Chinese in Jamaica, they controlled 90 per cent of the dry goods

stores and 95 per cent of the supermarkets plus the ownership of most restaurants, laundries and betting shops.¹²⁰ The Chinese, following the pattern of the white-owned corporations in Jamaica, carefully arranged their economic affairs to exclude blacks.

Even as late as 1960, Amy Garvey, the wife of the early black nationalist said,

As black men and women you must stand up and claim your country, dedicate your life to Jamaica, acquire the economic stability that the 90 per cent of the population should have in relation to the 30,000 Chinese here.¹²¹

Chinese were seen, therefore, as little more than the allies of imperialism.

In the 1960s, tensions between blacks and Chinese was, therefore, quite acute. Thus in August 1965 when an altercation between a black employee and the Chinese owners of a store developed into a fight, this incident sparked a revolt. In one week, numerous Chinese places of business were attacked, looted and set on fire. The mob, consisting of hundreds of people, attacked Chinese wherever they could be found. Businesses in the centre of the city were particularly hard hit. Eight people were shot and ninety arrested.¹²²

In 1968, also, there were more riots in Jamaica¹²³ when Walter Rodney was banned from returning to Jamaica after attending a black power conference abroad. The riot started out as a march by students and various members of the urban proletariat to protest the action of the state in banning Walter Rodney. However, after this group was attacked by police throwing tear-gas, other African-

Jamaicans, many of them chanting black power slogans, joined the group. The property of foreign capitalists and Jamaican whites were subjected to fierce attacks. Barclays Bank, Bank of London and Montreal, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Pan American Airways, Royal Bank of Canada, Bata, Woolworth were only a few of the numerous businesses which were attacked. Buses were commandeered to smash down store fronts and shutters. Some people were killed in the riots. Property damage amounted to several million dollars. Thirty five buses were badly damaged and fourteen were totally destroyed.¹²⁴ This kind of social unrest and conflicts of race and class continued into the 1970s. Such incidents provide vivid proof of the frustration felt by African-Jamaicans at their underdeveloped status.

CONCLUSION

Foreign investment in the Jamaican sugar industry underdeveloped important aspects of social relations in Jamaican society. Uncontrolled urbanization, the exclusion of African-Jamaicans from the corporate economy and race and class conflicts constitute the main dimensions. Dependent capitalism contributed greatly to the creation of a racist society where African-Jamaicans were denied a significant role in the socio-economic development of their society. Radical groups such as the Rastas and black power advocates merely articulated what was deeply felt by numerous back Jamaicans. Underdevelopment in Jamaican society can therefore be fully understood by a careful examination of the ways in which the

sugar industry, the earliest Jamaican capitalist enterprise, distorted socio-economic relations in the country and initiated the kind of oppressive social structure that was so despised by many African-Jamaicans.

Nevertheless, it must be understood that the mere existence of the plantation and the presence of whites or other racial groups do not, in a deterministic fashion, result in black underdevelopment. The example of post-revolution Cuba shows quite clearly that this is not so. Peripheral capitalism, marked by heavy foreign investment, was, in the Jamaican case, one of the major factors which led to the underdevelopment of social relations in Jamaica.

FOOTNOTES

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CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

The major objective of this dissertation was to analyze the extent to which various sectors of Jamaican society were underdeveloped by foreign corporate investment in the Jamaican sugar industry during 1945-1970. Underdevelopment was conceptualized as a multidimensional, multifaceted phenomenon which unfolded in Jamaica primarily because of the way in which the country was incorporated into the world capitalist structure. However, this perspective is not meant to suggest that the concept of underdevelopment, as analyzed in this work, can simply be viewed as a vague, amorphous notion.

In fact, the study demonstrates that development and underdevelopment are dialectically interrelated and are the products of the international class system. The structural dependency theory which underpins this approach, posits that an analysis of the specific, internal production relations in countries like Jamaica is absolutely necessary in order to uncover the roots of underdevelopment. Nevertheless, such a framework, as this thesis shows, must analyze not only the distorted, internal class relations which permeated Jamaican society during the period under review, but also the nature of the effects of the external, imperialist relations which existed between Jamaica and the metropolis. These

two perspectives and their interrelationships shaped the direction and the focus of this dissertation.

Because of this broad theoretical conceptualization of underdevelopment, the analysis in this study was undertaken at various levels. In the historical overview of Jamaican society between 1655-1944, it was shown that various sectors of the country were underdeveloped largely because of the monocultural system of agricultural production that was imposed by capitalist, metropolitan interests. The early sugar industry not only severely limited the Jamaican productive forces but also unleashed a wide range of structural and institutional changes within the society. These societal constraints reflected the dynamics of metropolitan control. The Spanish conquest, British mercantilism, competitive capitalism, and the transition to monopoly capitalism influenced the kind of development which took place in Jamaica.

This assertion does not imply that events in Jamaica took place in a mechanistic, deterministic fashion as a result of metropolitan actions. The dynamics of the internal class structure which emerged in the country were important factors. Nevertheless, an institution such as slavery was the direct creation of metropolitan action. The brutal racism which subsequently unfolded, the lack of upward mobility, the repressive class structure, and the paucity of real political power were factors which severely restricted the development of African-Jamaicans during the period 1655-1914.

The sugar industry was such an important feature of life in Jamaica, that the relationship which governed its operation defined, to a great extent, the characteristic features and the dynamics of that society. In the post-emancipation period, the struggles of the peasantry, the Morant Bay rebellion, the race and class conflicts, and the rebellion of 1938 were a reflection of the seething rage felt by African-Jamaicans at the socio-economic and political repression imposed by the sugar plantocracy and its allies.

In the post-war period, the underdevelopment which resulted from foreign corporate investment in the sugar industry was manifested at different levels in Jamaica. Between 1945-1970, multinational corporations (MNCs) such as Tate and Lyle, United Fruit Company, and Booker McConnell controlled the Jamaican sugar industry. These corporations, aided and abetted by the Anglo-Jamaican settler investors, steadfastly excluded African-Jamaicans from management positions within the industry. During the period under study, the policy formulation and decision-making processes were, to a great extent, initiated and maintained by foreigners. The SMA (Sugar Manufacturers' Association) represented the interests of this group.

The various imperial preference systems and international commodity operations through which Jamaican sugar was sold abroad were arranged largely by foreign investors through the intermediary of the SMA and the connivance of the petty bourgeois Jamaican leadership. Not only was there a conflict of interest between certain members of the group that "negotiated" the terms of trade

for Jamaican sugar, on the one hand, and foreign corporations, on the other, but the implicit or stated quid pro quo nature of such schemes compelled Jamaica to purchase manufactured goods from the metropolis.

There were two major consequences which arose from these arrangements. First, the peripheral Jamaican economy became heavily dependent on the metropolis for markets for its products, finance, and technology. The internal dynamics of the country were thus frequently influenced more by metropolitan policies than by independent, internal factors. Secondly, the development of indigenous manufacturing enterprises within Jamaica was severely constrained. In addition, the influence of foreign investors was so great that Jamaican public policy, in many respects, became geared more to satisfy the requirements of foreign corporate interests rather than to ameliorate pressing national needs.

This phenomenon was clearly evident in the operation of the agricultural sector of the Jamaican economy. One of the most salient features of this structure was the unequal division of land between foreign, corporate investors and the Jamaican peasant farmers. The foreigners possessed such vast quantities of the most fertile lands that domestic agriculture frequently had to be undertaken on holdings which were not only unsuitable for intensive cultivation but also too small to be economically viable.

The sugar plantation also constrained the supply of labour which was available to peasant farmers. Although the wages paid by the estates were very low, the peasantry found it difficult to

compete with even this low scale in order to attract workers. Indeed, peasant farmers were themselves so destitute because of their inequitable circumstances that they often had to abandon their own small plots in order to augment their meagre earnings by seeking work on the sugar plantations, even though they heartily despised the foreign-dominated sugar industry.

The situation was compounded for peasant farmers because the capital which they desperately needed to develop their small holdings was sometimes channelled into the hands of the foreign investors. This kind of action thwarted the aspirations and the productive capacity of the peasantry.

Foreign control of the sugar industry also greatly influenced domestic agriculture in other ways. One notable example was the neglect of policies geared towards products destined for domestic consumption, and the emphasis that was placed on policies directed to the marketing of "cash crops" such as sugar. The state thus relegated the nutritional requirements of Jamaicans to a subsidiary position while hastening to satisfy the demands of multinational corporations. The extremely high food imports which characterized the Jamaican economy during the period under study were further evidence of this trend.

During this period, the vast majority of sugar workers were low-skilled, seasonal labourers. This kind of status deprived the local villages in sugar plantation areas of the kind of skilled labour force which would have contributed to the general development of such communities.

When the sugar industry started to accelerate the use of technology, the labour displacement suffered by sugar workers was particularly onerous since the sugar industry provided no retraining programmes for displaced workers. Furthermore, the benefits offered by the government were very meagre.

Field technology not only displaced workers but was frequently inappropriate to various Jamaican factors of production such as the type of sugar cane that was being cultivated, and the nature of the land that was in use. The failure of sugar manufacturers to standardize and modernize their equipment resulted in various instances of the breakdown of machinery.

The bitter industrial relations which existed between sugar workers and owners, and the subsidiary role which the organization of peasant cane farmers occupied vis à vis the SMA, all point to the underdeveloped status of African-Jamaicans involved in the sugar industry.

One of the main contributions of this dissertation has been to demonstrate the social dimensions which are encompassed by the concept of underdevelopment. Thus, the destabilization which characterized the lives of sugar plantation workers in post-war Jamaica can be linked directly to the way in which foreign investors organized and structured the industry.

The living conditions of workers, both on and off the plantations, were extremely poor. Sugar manufacturers were intent on maximizing profits and paid little attention to the wretched plight of their labourers. Accomodation for the latter usually

consisted of little more than crude shacks. Such structures were often found in unhygienic localities which lacked basic amenities. This situation, plus the arduous working conditions and inadequate nutrition, culminated in severe health problems among workers.

The sugar plantation also undermined the institution of the family. The high levels of illegitimacy and other unstable social family patterns stemmed largely from the way in which plantation labour was structured. The seasonal employment and migratory labour aggravated the housing shortage, altered existing conjugal relations and changed the constitution of households. This kind of instability may be contrasted with the stable unions which were to be found among the peasantry. If the sugar industry had been properly integrated into the total fabric of rural labour, the slack season in sugar would have run parallel with peak periods of labour demands in other rural industries. However, since the sugar industry was owned by different private corporations, such integration was impossible.

The profound hatred with which many African-Jamaicans regarded the sugar plantation arose not only from the physical conditions and constraints associated with plantation labour but also from the rigid, racist class structure. White, corporate owners buttressed their class dominance with institutional racism. The result was that some of the features of slave society remained intact in post-war Jamaica. Consequently, workers sometimes gave vent to their rage and despair by retaliatory attacks against the property of plantation owners.

Nevertheless, an analysis of the socio-economic effects which were generated by the foreign ownership of the Jamaica sugar industry cannot be examined simply at the level of the plantation. Such a perspective would present only a partial analysis of what is a complex phenomenon. It is for this reason that the dissertation attempted to grapple with some of the indirect effects which emanated from foreign corporate control. Phenomena such as uncontrolled urbanization, corporate institutional racism, and the subsequent violent, urban social upheavals which plagued Jamaica, can ultimately be traced, in varying degrees, to factors associated with the sugar industry.

The uncontrolled urbanization which beset Jamaica in the post-war years was definitely related to the fact that the sugar industry destabilized domestic agriculture and displaced many members of the peasantry from the rural areas. Such people were consequently obliged to move to urban areas in search of work. The high rates of urban unemployment is also related to this fact.

The extent to which African-Jamaicans were excluded from meaningful positions in the Jamaican corporate economy cannot be fully understood without reference to the extent to which foreigners and their allies among the settler investors were able to utilize the sugar industry, the first major Jamaican industry, as the springboard for a whole range of economic initiatives. The racism which had been endemic in the sugar industry thus became a dominant feature of corporate, economic life in Jamaica. The twenty one families which controlled the largest corporations in Jamaica by a

web of interlocking directorates did not include a single African-Jamaican family.

The anger and frustration felt by many African-Jamaicans can be gauged by the development of radical movements such as Black Power and Rastafarianism as well as by the violent race and class conflicts which shook Jamaica during the 1960s and 1970s.

However, the social relations which are discussed in the last part of the dissertation are not to be viewed in deterministic, uni-dimensional terms. Although the nature of the sugar industry was a powerful catalyst in many aspects of these relations, there were other factors. For example, the glamour associated with urban life might have attracted some rural migrants to the Kingston - St. Andrew area. In addition, although radical social movements undoubtedly owed their genesis to the socio-economic conditions which existed in Jamaica, such movements were probably also partly influenced by various concurrent African-American liberation movements.

The events which took place in the Jamaica sugar industry after 1970 fall outside the scope of this study. However, a few, brief comments are worthwhile. In 1971 the JLP (Jamaica Labour Party) government purchased the three largest sugar estate lands - Frome, Monymusk, and Bernard Lodge from their corporate owners. However, both Frome and Monymusk were immediately leased back to the Tate and Lyle subsidiary WISCO (West Indies Sugar Company). Although no lease back arrangement was made with Bernard Lodge, the changes, both purchase and lease, were merely cosmetic.¹ Indeed,

the three sugar factories on these estates were still completely owned by foreigners.

It seems that the sale of sugar lands was undertaken in order to serve the political and economic interests of the MNC. From a political point of view, the corporation was able to protect itself against the rapidly growing Jamaican nationalist sentiment while maintaining the profitable refining, milling, and shipping sectors. Economically, Tate and Lyle was able to foist the burden of inefficient agricultural production and militant unionism onto the state.²

In 1972, Norman Manley, leader of the PNP (People's National Party) was elected Prime Minister on a platform of democratic socialism. He launched a programme of reform in various sectors of the economy. Between 1974 and 1976, Manley instituted twenty-three sugar-worker cooperatives consisting of cane cutters, irrigation workers and other labourers. These cooperatives were established on the former Frome, Monymusk and Bernard Lodge sugar lands.³ The failure of the sugar worker cooperatives is a subject of much contention. It is probable that the opposition of the petty bourgeois state bureaucracy to any grass roots reform, plus opposition from conservative elements in the PNP as well as from the settler investor plantocracy, all doomed this reform movement.⁴

The socio-economic and ideological dominance exercised by foreign corporate owners and settler investors, plus the connivance of their petty bourgeois Jamaican allies were so pervasive that even moderate reforms were crushed. It appears that the successful

transformation of the agrarian structure of underdeveloped countries such as Jamaica cannot take place in a context which seems to threaten metropolitan investment.

In assessing the levels of socio-economic underdevelopment which emanated from the foreign corporate ownership of the Jamaican sugar industry, I have examined the interaction of this industry with various sectors of the rest of the rural economy as well as with the wider society. In peripheral societies such as Jamaica, underdevelopment should not be conceptualized in restricted "economic" terms. If this is done, a narrow, and somewhat inaccurate analysis, will emerge. What this study shows, is that many of the examples of class inequalities, economic oppression and the exploitative social relations in Jamaica can be traced back to the nature of the colonial penetration of Jamaica, and the establishment of the first major industry - the sugar industry.

The fact that this dissertation focuses on the underdevelopment which stemmed from foreign investment in the sugar industry does not imply that all forms of foreign investment brought identical results, or were regarded by Jamaicans in the same way. The bauxite industry, for example, was regarded far more favourably by workers because of various socio-economic factors associated with employment in this sector. The example of post-revolution Cuba also tends to suggest that the mere existence of the sugar plantation does not, in some mechanistic way, lead to many of the ills associated with underdevelopment. The question of the ownership of

resources, the articulation of the mode of production, and the nature of class relations are all relevant.

What the structural dependency perspective seeks to demonstrate is that many underdeveloped countries like Jamaica are largely the result of historical forces which were unleashed by the process of European hegemony. In colonial and post - colonial societies, the dynamics of underdevelopment manifested themselves in a wide variety of configurations. European colonizers utilized various exploitative techniques to ravage the so-called "backward societies." Nevertheless, regardless of whether one is referring to the activities of the East India Company in India, or the centuries of slavery which the sugar industry produced in Jamaica, the result was the same - underdevelopment. In the case of Jamaica, multinational corporations simply maintained a pattern which had been set in motion centuries earlier. Therefore, much of the exploitative class relations, the economic inequity, and the virulent racism which plagued post-war Jamaica can, to a large extent, be attributed to factors associated with the production of that "sweet malefactor"⁵ - sugar.

FOOTNOTES

1. Daily Gleaner, June 1970, p.14.
2. C. Feuer Jamaica and the Sugar Worker Cooperatives, London: Westview Press, 1984 p.34.
3. Daily Gleaner, September 1972.
4. While I was researching this dissertation in Jamaica I was informed by some left wing members of the PNP that the U.S.A viewed Manley's reform with great alarm. In fact, American authorities loudly branded Manley a communist and vocally expressed their opposition to him, especially since he was on friendly terms with Castro. The subsequent destabilization of the Jamaican economy helped to oust the PNP from power.
5. The term has been used in the past by some Caribbean historians. See W. R. Aykroyd Sweet Malefactor: Sugar, Slavery and Human Society. London: Cox and Wyman Ltd, 1967.

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