MATTHEW AND PAUL ON CHRIST AND THE LAW
MATTHEW AND PAUL ON CHRIST AND THE LAW:
COMPATIBLE OR INCOMPATIBLE THEOLOGIES?

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This present study is both exegetical (Part One) and analytical (Part Two). The exegetical effort aims at expressing as accurately as possible how the redactor of Matthew's gospel understood the relation of Christ to the law of Moses and how Paul, especially in Galatians and Romans, understood the relation of Christ and the law. The analytical effort aims at bringing these two views into relation to one another.

With regard to Matthew and Paul on Christ and the law: Matthew understands Christ to bring the law to fulfilment, i.e., to its appointed eschatological measure of completeness. Paul understands Christ to be "the end of the law" (Rom. 10:4); that is, for those who have found salvation in Christ the law ceases to enslave and condemn.

Such views may be contradictory or complementary or neither contradictory nor complementary but simply compatible. The thesis argues that the views of Matthew and Paul on Christ and the law belong to the third or middle category. The differences of view are real and remain intact, but the two are finally compatible theologies.
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Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Erma, who has both typed the dissertation and has given me the necessary encouragement to bring it to a conclusion.
The present thesis is concerned with the unity of the New Testament. The modern historical investigation of the New Testament has shown that it contains diverse points of view, and as Kümmel has noted, "the unity of the New Testament message . . . cannot be presupposed as obvious on the basis of strictly historical research." In fact, Käsemann has claimed that "the New Testament canon does not, as such, constitute the foundation of the unity of the church. On the contrary, as such (that is, in its accessibility to the historian) it provides the basis for the multiplicity of the confessions." These statements by Kümmel and Käsemann on the unity of the New Testament are in contrast to the Protestant Orthodoxy of the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. It assumed the Bible to be a unity without contradiction in whole or in part. This attitude is exemplified in M. F. Illyricus and G. T. Zacharia. Illyricus in his The Key to the Scriptures (1567) argued that any apparent contradiction is a false understanding. He posited the analogia fidei ("agreement with faith") by which the correctness of the interpretation of any scriptural text can be judged. Zacharia in his Biblical Theology (1771) viewed everything in the Old and New Testaments as on the same level and made no allowance for historical development.
Earlier, however, Martin Luther had recognized problems of disunity. He considered, for example, the impossibility of a second repentance in Hebrews as opposed to the demand for repentance in the Gospels and Paul, and justification in James and Paul, to be incompatible.6

Recently some German scholars have treated the question of the unity of the New Testament. Their discussion is in part a reaction to Protestant Orthodoxy (and perhaps a desire in some sense to be true to Luther). Examples would include Wolfhart Pannenberg, Hermann Diem, Herbert Braun, Willi Marxsen, and Ernst Käsemann. Pannenberg notes that historical research shows that a doctrinal unity of Scripture which had been presupposed by Protestant Orthodoxy on the basis of *analogia fidei* is not present in the New Testament. It contradicts itself on numerous historical details (such as the account of Jesus' death) and on points of theology which occasionally leave their imprint on an entire book and cannot be removed from its individual formulations or (since F. C. Baur) be understood as complementary parts of an organic unity.7

Diem notes that Biblicism whether in the form of Protestant Orthodoxy or Roman Catholicism levels Scripture into a codex of divine law. Contradictions such as those between Paul and James, Paul and the early Catholicism found in Luke, exclude a doctrinal harmonization.8 Braun agrees that there are many statements which cannot be harmonized -- statements concerning Christology, soteriology, the torah, eschatology, and the doctrine of the atonement. Therefore the subject matter of VII
the New Testament is not what it says expressis verbis in mutual contradiction.9

For Marxsen as well the New Testament contains many statements that cannot be harmonized (for example Mt. 5:17 and Gal. 3:13 on the law).10

Käsemann, in disagreement with Protestant Orthodoxy, claims that the New Testament is not concerned with a set of well-defined assertions so that the whole can be conceived of as a dossier of proof-texts, as a fixed number of dicta probantia.11 Examples of irreconcilable contradictions are Paul versus James on faith and works, the Fourth Gospel versus Revelation on eschatology, and Paul and John versus Luke on ecclesiology.12

Given such a situation, Käsemann posits the principle of "a canon within the canon". Luther had used this principle so as virtually to exclude James, Hebrews, and Revelation from the canon. Käsemann, however, applies it to the whole of the New Testament; justification by faith is the material principle by which the whole of the New Testament is to be judged.

Braun sees the unity of the New Testament in God conceived as togetherness.13 Diem takes it to be "the proclamation of Jesus Christ who proclaims himself".14 Marxsen,15 and Pannenberg16 find it in Jesus Christ even though many statements about Jesus are mutually exclusive.17

Each of the above writers seems to assume: (a) that there are major contradictions within the New Testament and
(b) that there is a unity of the New Testament. I believe that both assumptions are too cavalier. Not nearly enough consideration has been given to what it takes for two ancient authors, writing independently of each other, to be truly contradictory. It is a true contradiction to affirm that both "A" and "not-A" (when "not-A" is defined as that which excludes or contradicts "A") are true. If for "A", however, one substitutes a sequence of words (e.g., "the law is terminated") which is then both affirmed and denied, there is not necessarily a true contradiction. The contradiction might be verbal but not real. For a contradiction to be certain, the same sequence of words must refer to the same thing and in the same respect. In mathematical logic, however, a symbol (e.g. "A") carries the same nuance in each member of the syllogism. But in ordinary language we have not symbols, but sentences. It is logically possible that a statement (S) could be both affirmed and denied if in context the meaning of S varies in even the slightest degree. Thus two ancient authors responding to differing questions in differing situations may be only apparently and not truly contradictory. In fact, I would maintain that it is extremely difficult to be sure that two ancient authors are contradictory.

If the New Testament is filled with contradictions then it must surely be asked what constitutes disunity and under what circumstances one should cease to attempt to discover a unity.
If it is affirmed that the unity of the New Testament is broken if two New Testament authors take truly opposing viewpoints on central issues then the question of unity can be based on what the various authors intend. To take this position it is, I believe, by no means necessary to base the unity of the New Testament (as does classical Protestant Orthodoxy) on the dicta probantia, the analogia fidei, a leveling process, or a doctrinal harmonization. The present thesis maintains that the examination of the unity of the New Testament should be based on studying the intent of the New Testament authors. It maintains that more weight should be given to the possibility that two authors (particularly on central issues) are only apparently and not truly contradictory. This point will be argued in a test case, that of Matthew and Paul on Christ and the law.

Footnotes: Preface


4 Kümmel, op. cit., p. 29f.
In the eighteenth century, however, the view began to prevail that the New Testament needs to become an object of investigation as a collection of writings apart from the Old Testament without credal bias (ibid., p. 13). This attitude is exemplified in J. S. Semler and J. D. Michaelis. Semler in his Treatise on the Free Investigation of the Canon (1771-1775) declared that the word of God and Scripture were not identical and that not all parts of the canon were inspired or authoritative (ibid., p. 63). Michaelis' (1717-91) aim was to read and interpret the New Testament without dogmatic presupposition. He was prepared for the possibility that it might contain contradictions. But for him apostolic authorship guaranteed the inspiration of a New Testament book; Mark, Luke, Hebrews, James, and Jude, therefore, were not in the strict sense canonical. (See Stephen Neil, The Interpretation of the New Testament 1861-1961 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 5f.)

Kümmel; op. cit., p. 24.


Ibid., p. 100, 102f.

Braun, op. cit., p. 182f.


Marxsen, op. cit., p. 65.

For a more detailed description and evaluation of the views of Küsemann, Braun, Diem, Marxsen, and Pannenberg on the unity of the New Testament, see Appendix I. There I have also included the view of Heinrich Schlier who believes that the unity of the New Testament is not only to be found in the Christ-event, but also in the unity of the interpretations of the Christ-event.
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INTRODUCTION

Even a cursory reading of Matthew and Paul reveals that they make strikingly dissimilar statements on the law (Torah). For Matthew Christ fulfils it; he does not abolish it. The least commandment must not be relaxed. Till heaven and earth pass away not an iota or a dot is to pass from the law (5:17-19).

For Paul, on the other hand, Christ is the end of the law. Previously it was a task master (paidagogos; Gal. 3:24-25); it held us captive (Rom. 7:6); we were imprisoned (synkleiomenoi) under it; we were enslaved to it (Rom. 7:23, 25). But now we do not serve under the old written code (Rom. 7:6). We have died to the law (Rom. 7:4; Gal. 2:19); we have been discharged from it (Rom. 7:6); we have been redeemed from its curse (Gal. 3:13).

For Paul the law is aligned with sin and death. It is (seemingly) the law of sin (and death) (Rom. 7:23, 25; 8:2). Apart from it, sin lies dead (Rom. 7:8). But the law came in to increase the trespass (Rom. 5:20). It gives sin its power (1 Cor. 15:56). Our sinful passions aroused by it bore fruit for death (Rom. 7:5). Through it, sin, finding opportunity (aphormen), deceived and killed "me". It came, sin revived, and "I" died. To "me" the commandment which promised life
proved to be death (Rom. 7:9-11).

For Matthew the ceremonial law and the halakah appear to be valid. Private sacrifice (5:23), the temple service (17:24-27), alms, prayer, and fasting (6:1-18), the sabbath (24:20), and tithing (23:23) seem to be taken for granted. Paul, on the other hand, gives no hint that the ceremonial law and the halakah are to be observed. Circumcision is played down. Neither circumcision accounts for anything, nor uncircumcision (Gal. 5:6; 6:15; 1 Cor. 7:19). An uncircumcised man can keep the precepts of the law (Rom. 2:26). Abraham was already justified before he was circumcised (Rom. 4:10). If the Galatians receive it, Christ will be of no advantage to them (Gal. 5:2).

For Paul, righteousness is a free gift and does not come from obedience to the law (Gal. 2:16, 21; 3:2, 21; 5:4; Rom. 3:21-31; Phil. 3:9, etc.). In Matthew, on the other hand, one must be as perfect as his heavenly father (5:48). To enter the kingdom one's righteousness must greatly exceed that of the scribes and Pharisees (5:20).

One's first surmise might be that the two views are flatly contradictory. Many take this conclusion for granted. But even for those who do not, how they might be brought together is problematic.

Part One of the dissertation is exegetical and Part Two is hermeneutical. Even the reader unconvinced of the accuracy of the exegetical treatment may perhaps find the
hermeneutical considerations enlightening and valuable. The question of Part One is to discover what Matthew and Paul intend with regard to Christ and the law. The question of Part Two is whether their views are compatible or incompatible.

The problem as I intend to pose it is neither practical, nor sociological, nor historical, but intellectual. The problem is neither how a single community could live by both Matthew and Paul, nor how the early Church in fact "reconciled" the two points of view, but how two authors with diverse points of view might be brought into relation to one another in terms of modern critical and philosophical understanding.

Footnotes: Introduction


2 For example, George Eichholz, Auslegung der Bergpredigt (2nd ed.; Neukirchener Verlag, 1970), p. 162f., notes that Matthew can scarcely formulate that "der Christ "nicht mehr, unter der Tora" ist, weil er unter der Gnade ist (Rom. 6, 15). Für Matthäus ist die Tora von bleibender Gültigkeit." He concludes his exegesis of the Sermon on the Mount with the statement that this problem needs to be rethought (ibid., p. 165).

3 If this were the problem then even if there were very minor contradictions between Matthew and Paul on a matter of practice, one would be forced to make a choice between the two.
PART ONE: THE MATTHEAN AND PAULINE CONCEPTIONS
OF CHRIST AND THE LAW
The purpose of Part One of the thesis is to understand what Matthew (Chapters One, Two, and Three) and Paul (Chapters Four, Five, and Six) intend with regard to Christ and the law. Chapters One and Four of Part One will attempt to assemble the data on the law, to assemble that which is given which needs to be interpreted. Chapters Two and Five will endeavour to give an analysis, and Chapters Three and Six a synthesis, of their respective data.

In Chapter Two the analysis of the data on Matthew will attempt to show what is the Matthean Jesus' teaching with regard to the law. There are those who deny that Matthew has either a coherent theology or a coherent viewpoint on the law. Chapter Three, therefore, will raise this question, the question as to whether there is a redaction-critical unity in Matthew.

Unlike Matthew, Paul is not mainly concerned with giving Jesus' teaching on the law. In Chapter Five an analysis of the data on Paul is intended to show that primarily Paul relates the law to Jesus with regard to his saving activity, with regard to his death and resurrection. It is also intended to show what consequences Paul sees this as having for the Christian believer who will relate to the law. The text which is frequently considered to be the key is Rom. 10:4. In Chapter Six I will discuss what I consider its significance to be, how it fits in with, and how others see it as unlocking, Paul's total viewpoint.
CHAPTER ONE: DATA ON CHRIST AND THE LAW IN MATTHEW

Though the process of selection is to some extent inevitably interpretative, my effort in this chapter is simply to present in brief compass all the relevant data on the law in Matthew. In designating the selected motive as "data", I mean that it is merely "given", not yet investigated. To make the data manageable for their interpretation in the next chapter, I have ranged them under the rubrica: "teachings" and "actions" and (under "teachings") "principles" and "applications". The latter subdivision in particular should not be understood rigidly. It is a preliminary attempt to separate forthright statements on the law from what appear to be illustrations or applications of these statements.

I. Teachings: Principles and Applications

A. Principles

Matthew has Jesus⁴ say (5:17-20) that he has not come to abolish (καταλύσαι) the law and (ὁ) the prophets but to fulfill (πληρῶσαι) them (5:17). Till heaven and earth pass away not an iota or a dot is to pass from the law until all is accomplished (ὅσον ἀν πάντα γένεται) (5:18). The one who relaxes one of the least of the commandments and teaches men so is to be called least in the kingdom of heaven (5:19a); the one who does (ποιεῖσθε) them and teaches them is to be called great in the
kingdom of heaven (5:19b). Unless one's righteousness (dikaiosynē) exceeds that of the scribes and Pharisees, one can never enter the kingdom of heaven.  

In 5:21-48 ἐκούσατε ὅτι ἔφθασε (τοῖς ἀρχαῖοις) (5:21, 27, 31, 33, 43) is contrasted with ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ἡμῖν (5:22, 28, 32, 34, 39, 44). It was said that one was not to swear falsely (5:33), to commit adultery (5:27), or to kill, that whoever kills is liable to the ἰσχρίσια. But Jesus says that one is not to swear at all (5:34), that the one who looks at a woman lustfully has committed adultery (5:28), that the one who is angry is liable to the ἰσχρίσια (5:22).

"Whoever divorces his wife, let him give her a certificate of divorce" (5:31), "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" (5:38), and "love your neighbour and hate your enemy" (5:43) is what has been said, but Jesus says "love your enemies" (5:44), "do not resist one who is evil" (5:39), and "everyone who divorces his wife parektos logou porneias makes her an adulteress . . . whoever marries a divorced woman commits adultery" (5:32).

This section concludes with "you must be teleios as your heavenly father is teleios" (5:48).

One is to beware of practicing his piety (dikaiosynēn) before men in order to be seen by them (one who does this will have no reward from his Father who is in heaven (6:1).

The essence of the law is summed up in two passages --
7:12 and 22:36-40. In 7:12 Jesus says, "whatsoever you wish that men would do to you, do so to them; for this is the law and the prophets." In 22:36-40 he says that the first and great commandment is that one should love the Lord his God with all his heart, soul, and mind (22:36-38); that one should love his neighbour as himself, is the second commandment (22:39). It is on these two commandments that the law and the prophets depend (krematai) (22:40).

It is possible to tithe mint and dill and cummin and neglect the weightier matters of the law -- justice (tēn krisin), mercy (to eleos), and faith (tēn pistin). One ought (edēi) to do the latter without neglecting (aphienai) the former (23:23).

Twice Jesus quotes Hos. 6:6, "I desire mercy and not sacrifice" (Mt. 9:13; 12:7). Jesus uses this saying, on the first occasion, when the Pharisees criticize him for eating with tax collectors and sinners (9:10-13), and on the second occasion, when the Pharisees criticize him for allowing his disciples to pluck ears of grain on the sabbath (12:1-8).

To a certain one who asks what good deed he is to do in order to have eternal life (19:16), Jesus replies that he needs to keep the commandments (tas entolas). To the young man's reply, "which (commandments)?" Jesus responds that he is not to kill, commit adultery, steal, nor bear false witness against his neighbour; rather he is to honour his father and mother, and to love his neighbour as himself. To the young man's
response that he has observed all these, Jesus adds that if he would be perfect (teleios) (19:21) he is to go, sell what he has and give to the poor, and to come, follow him (19:16-21).

To the crowds and to his disciples Jesus says, "The scribes and Pharisees sit on Moses' seat (kathedras ekathisan), so practice and observe (poiēsate kai tēreite) whatever they tell you, but not what they do (kata de ta erga autōn mē poieite); for they preach, but do not practice (legousin gar kai ou poiōsins)" (23:2, 3). However, at 16:12 one is to beware of the leaven or teaching of the Pharisees and Sadducees.

The formula "the law and the prophets" (ho nomos kai ho prophētai) occurs at 5:17; 7:12; 22:40; and 11:13;5 reference has already been made to the first three occurrences. Mt. 11:13 is parallel to Lk. 16:16a. In Luke we are told that the law and the prophets were until (mechrí) John, and that since then the good news of the kingdom of God is preached. Matthew, instead of saying that the law and the prophets were until John, says that all the prophets and the law prophesied (e prophēteusan) until (heōs) John. In the previous verse (11:12) Jesus has said, "From the days of John the Baptist until now the kingdom of heaven has suffered violence, and men of violence took it by force."

The passages in which the word "commandment" (entolē) occurs are 5:19; 19:17; 22:36, 38, 40; and 15:3. In 15:3 (the only passage not yet considered) we are told that the
Pharisees and scribes transgress the commandment of God for the sake of their tradition.

In a few passages the word "law" (nomos) occurs where it is omitted in parallel synoptic passages. Lk. 11:42 has "But woe to you Pharisees! For you tithe mint and rue and every herb, and neglect justice and the love of God"; whereas Mt. 23:23 has "Woe to you scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! For you tithe mint and dill and cumin, and have neglected the weightier matters of the law (ta barytera tou nomou), justice mercy and faith."

In the synoptic parallels to Mt. 22:36 (Lk. 10:25; Mk. 12:28), Luke has "What shall I do to inherit eternal life?"; Mark has "Which commandment is first of all?"; whereas in Matthew the question is "Which is the great commandment in the law (en to nomo)?"

In Mk. 7:13 Jesus says that the Pharisees and scribes make void the word (ton logon) of God through their tradition which they hand on; whereas in Mt. 15:6 (in MSS N*, b C 084 f 13 1010 geo Ptolemy Epiphanius) they make void the law (ton nomon) of God through their tradition.

Matthew uses the word "lawlessness" (anomia) four times; a word absent from the rest of the gospels. On the judgment day Jesus will say to some, "I never knew you; depart from me you evil doers (hoi ergazomenoi ten anomian)" (7:23). In the parallel passage in Luke (13:27) -- and this is the only place
where there is a parallel to a Matthean anomia text -- the word adikia is substituted for anomia. In Mt. 13:41 we are told that the Son of man will send his angels, and they will gather out of his kingdom all causes of sin and all evil doers (tous poiountas ten anomian). To the scribes and Pharisees Jesus says that they are full of hypocrisy and iniquity (anomias) within, even though they outwardly appear righteous (23:28). Finally, Jesus says that a day is coming when most men's love will grow cold because wickedness (anomia) will be multiplied (24:12).

In Mt. 19:3-9 there seems to be a contrast between Jesus' teaching and that of Moses. In this passage the Pharisees, attempting to test Jesus, ask him if it is lawful to divorce one's wife for any cause. The discussion proceeds along the lines of rabbinic argumentation, but ends up with a contrast between Jesus' and Moses' teaching. Jesus says that Moses allowed (epetrepse) them to divorce -- not commanded (eneteilato) them to divorce as the Pharisees had indicated (19:6) -- but from the beginning it was not so (19:8).

B. Applications

In contrast to the commandment that one is not to kill (5:21) (whoever kills is liable to the judgment) Jesus says, "everyone who is angry with his brother shall be liable to judgment (tē krisei), whoever insults his brother (hos d' an eipē tō adelphō autou Rhaka) shall be liable to the council (synedrion),
and whoever says, "You fool!" shall be liable to the hell of fire (tēn geennan tou pyros)" (5:22). Jesus goes on to say that if one is offering his gift at the altar, and there remembers that his brother has something against him, he is to go and be reconciled to his brother before he offers his gift (5:23, 24); one is to make friends quickly with his accuser while going to court, lest he be handed over by his accuser to the judge (and by the judge to the guard), and be put in prison. When this happens to one he will not get out until he has paid the last penny (kordrantēn).

In contrast to "You shall not commit adultery" (5:27), Jesus says that one who looks at a woman lustfully has already committed adultery with her in his heart (5:28). One is to pluck out his right eye (or cut off his right hand) and throw it away if it causes him to sin, for it is better to lose one member than to have the whole body go into hell (5:29, 30). In contrast to "Whoever divorces his wife, let him give her a certificate of divorce" (5:31), Jesus says, "everyone who divorces his wife, except on the ground of unchastity (parektos logou porneias -- in Mt. 19:9 the exceptional clause is μὴ ἐπὶ porneia) makes her an adulteress; and whoever marries a divorced woman commits adultery" (5:32). 7

Instead of "You shall not swear falsely, but shall perform to the Lord what you have sworn" (5:33), Jesus says that one is not to swear at all; one is not to swear by his
head (for he cannot make one hair white or black) (5:36), nor by Jerusalem (for it is the city of the great king) (5:35), nor by heaven (for it is the throne of God) (5:34).

In 23:16-23 the scribes and Pharisees, according to Jesus, say that if one swears by the temple (23:16) or the altar (23:18) the oath is not binding; but if one swears by the gift that is on the altar (23:18) or by the gold of the temple (23:16) the oath is binding. But Jesus replies that they are "blind guides" (23:16), "fools" (23:17), and "blind men" (23:19): the gift is not greater than the altar that makes the gift sacred, and the gold is not greater than the temple that makes the gold sacred. The one who swears by the altar swears by it and by everything on it (23:20); the one who swears by the temple swears by it and by the one who dwells in it (23:21); and the one who swears by heaven swears by the throne of God and the one who sits upon it (23:22; cf. 5:34). One's word is to be simply "yes" or "no" -- anything more than that comes from the evil one (tou pornou) (5:37). Furthermore, on the day of judgment men will give an account for every careless word they utter (12:36).

Instead of "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" (5:38), Jesus says there is to be no resistance of one who is evil. For example, one is to turn the other cheek when struck (5:39), to give his cloak (himation) to the one who has both sued him and taken his coat (chitōna) (5:40), to go two miles
with the one who has forced him to go one mile (5:41), to give to the one who begs (5:42), and to lend to the one who wants to borrow (5:42).

Instead of "You shall love your neighbour and hate your enemy" (5:43), Jesus says one is to love his enemies (5:44); the one who only loves (or salutes) another when it is reciprocated does no more than a tax collector (or a Gentile) (5:46, 47). God, on the other hand, makes no distinction between evil and good, just and unjust when he makes the sun to shine or the rain to fall (5:46). Therefore one is to love his enemies and pray for those who persecute him so that he may be the son of his Father who is in heaven; he is to be perfect (τελείος) as his heavenly Father is perfect (5:48).

In 6:2-18 we are given examples of how one is not to practice his piety (δικαιοσύνη) before men in order to be seen by them (6:1). When one gives alms (6:2-4), prays (6:5-14), and fasts (6:16-18) he is not to be as the hypocrites (ὁι ὑποκρίται). When they give alms they sound a trumpet before them in the synagogues and in the streets (6:2); when they pray they love to stand in the synagogues and at the street corners (6:5); and when they fast they look dismal and disfigure their faces (6:16). In each case they are told that they have their reward (ἀπεχουσίν τὸν μισθὸν αὐτῶν) (6:2, 5, 16).

When one fasts he is to anoint his head and wash his
face (6:17); when one prays he is to go into his room and shut
the door (6:6); and when one gives alms he is not to let his
left hand know what his right hand is doing (6:3). If one
does this he will be rewarded (apodôsei) by his Father who
sees in secret (6:4, 6, 18).

In 23:4ff. we are given examples of how the scribes and
Pharisees preach but do not practice. 'They bind heavy burd-
ens, hard to bear, and lay them on men's shoulders; but they
themselves will not move them with their finger. They do all
their deeds to be seen by men; . . . and they love the place
of honour at feasts and the best seats in the synagogues and
salutations in the market places, and being called rabbi by
men" (23:4-7).

But Jesus says "to the crowds and to his disciples"
(23:1) that they are not to be called rabbi (for they have
one teacher, and they are all brethren) (23:8), or master (for
they have one master, the Christ) (23:10), nor are they to
call anyone father on earth (for they have one Father who is
in heaven) (23:9). The greatest among them is to be servant
(23:11); the one who exalts himself will be humbled, and the
one who humbles himself will be exalted (23:12).

The scribes and Pharisees "cleanse the outside of the
cup and of the plate, but inside they are full of extortion
and rapacity" (23:25); they are like whitewashed tombs, which
outwardly appear beautiful, but within they are full of dead
men's bones and all uncleanness. Outwardly they appear righteous to men, but within they are full of hypocrisy and iniquity (anomias) (23:27, 28). They are to fill up the measure of their fathers (23:32) and are unable to escape being sentenced to hell (23:33).

In 15:1ff. the scribes and Pharisees accuse Jesus' disciples of transgressing the tradition of the elders (parabainousin tēn paradosin tôn presbyterōn) since they do not wash their hands when they eat. Jesus responds (15:3f.) that, for the sake of tradition, they transgress the commandment of God (parabainete tēn entolēn tou theou). For example, they get around the commandment " Honour your father and mother" (Mt. 15:4; cf. Ex. 20:12; Dt. 5:16), and the consequences of the decree, "He who speaks evil of his father or mother let him surely die" (Mt. 15:4; cf. Ex. 21:7); they say (according to Jesus) "if anyone tells his father or mother, what you would have gained from me is given to God, he need not honour his father" (Mt. 15:5).

Jesus, however, authoritatively declares that what defiles a man is not what goes into, but rather what comes out of the mouth (15:11); what goes into the mouth passes into the stomach and so passes on (15:17), but what comes out of the mouth proceeds from the heart (15:18). Out of the heart come evil thoughts, murder, adultery, fornication, theft, false witness, and slander (15:19); it is these which defile a man,
but to "eat with unwashed hands (cf. 15:1) does not defile a man" (15:20). Consequently, the scribes and Pharisees are blind guides -- "if a blind man leads a blind man both will fall into a pit" (15:14).

In Matthew, certain features of the ceremonial law seem to be taken for granted. These are private sacrifice (5:23f.), the temple (17:24f.), alms, prayer, and fasting (6:1ff.), and the command concerning the sabbath (24:20). In the coming day of disaster Jesus tells his disciples to pray that their flight may not be in winter or on a sabbath (24:20). It is assumed that the disciples are to fast (6:16-18), pray (6:5-15), and give alms (6:1-4). In 17:24-27 Jesus and his disciples pay the half-shekel tax with a coin found in the mouth of a fish. In 5:23f. Jesus says that one must be reconciled to his brother before he offers his gift at the altar.

II. Actions

In apparent contradiction to Jewish law, Jesus touches a leper and heals him (8:2-3). Then Jesus commands him, "See that you say nothing to anyone; but go show yourself to the priest, and offer the gift that Moses commanded for a proof to the people (eis martyrion autois)" (8:4).

In 12:9-14 Jesus enters the synagogue and sees a man with a withered hand. The scribes and Pharisees, in order to accuse him, ask him if it is lawful (ei exestin) to heal on the sabbath (12:10). Jesus replies that if a sheep falls into
a pit on the sabbath they will lift it out, and a man is of much more value than a sheep (12:11-12); furthermore, it is lawful to do good on the sabbath. Jesus then heals the withered hand.

In 12:1-8 the Pharisees criticize Jesus for allowing his disciples to pluck ears of grain on the sabbath. Jesus points out that David, when he was hungry, ate the bread of the presence, which was lawful only for the priests (12:4). He then asks the Pharisees if they have not read in the law (ἐν τῷ νόμῳ) how on the sabbath the priests in the temple profane the sabbath and are guiltless (12:5). He goes on to say that something greater than the temple is here and that the Son of man is lord also of the sabbath (12:6, 8). This incident is reported in all the synoptic gospels (Mt. 12:1ff.; Mk. 2:33; Lk. 6:1ff.); however, it is only Matthew who notes that the disciples were hungry (12:1) and then connects the detail with what David did when he was hungry (12:3).

That Jesus' lifestyle is quite different from that of the scribes and Pharisees is shown not only in the sabbath controversies (12:1-14) but also in relation to the question of fasting (9:10-13), table-fellowship (9:14-17), and burial rites (8:21ff.). Jesus eats with tax collectors and sinners (9:11), and he and his disciples do not fast (9:14). On both counts the Pharisees disapprove of his actions. In the parable of the children in the market place he is accused of being a
"glutton and a drunkard, a friend of tax collectors and sin-
ers" (11:19). In Mt. 8:21f. a man who would first bury his
father before following Jesus is reprimanded; this is in marked
contrast to the practice of Palestinian Judaism. Judaism,
basing its practice on the fifth commandment, imposed the duty
on children of attending to the burial of parents (cf. Tob.
4:3; 6:13). According to M. Ber. 3:1 attendance to this duty
frees one from even the most binding religious obligations.

Jesus observes some customs that the scribes and
Pharisees also observe. For example, he attends the synagoge
services (Mt. 4:23; 9:35; 12:9; 13:54) and prays before meals
(Mt. 14:19; 15:35-36; 26:26-27). These, however, seem to be
an observance of pious customs rather than a conscious conform-
ity to specific pharisaic stipulations.

In 17:24-27 Jesus and his disciples pay the half-shekel
tax with a coin found in the mouth of a fish. It, however, does
not appear that the tax is binding on the disciples; the tax
is paid "not to give offense to them (hina de mē skandalisōmen
autōs)" (17:27).

Jesus' cleansing of the temple (Mt. 21:12-17) was,
according to Matthew, an attack on the temple-community of
Israel10: "You make it [i.e., the temple] a den of robbers"
(vs. 13). In place of the unworthy temple-community he sets
men who owe all they are and have to God, i.e., the blind and
the lame whom he cures. The cures incite a messianic
acclamation which in turn provokes a confrontation with the chief priests and scribes. Though Matthew highlights the twin themes of Messiah and messianic people, the violation of torah piety is inevitably an aspect of the narrative. Finally, we conclude with a reference, not to an action of Jesus against the law or the halakah, but to what Matthew presents as a judgment of God: at the death of Jesus, the curtain of the sanctuary was torn from top to bottom (Mt. 27:50ff.), signifying that God now abandoned the sanctuary of the temple (cf. Mt. 23:38).

Footnotes: Chapter One


2 In Chapters One to Three, whenever the word Jesus occurs, it is a reference, unless otherwise indicated, not to the historical Jesus, but to the Matthean Jesus -- Jesus as Matthew presents him.

3 A passage with close verbal parallels to 5:17-20 is the phrase "to fulfil all righteousness (plerōsai pasan dikaiosynēn)" (3:15): i.e., it corresponds to plerōsai (5:17), panta (5:18), and dikaiosynē (5:20).

4 All scripture quotations which occur in English, unless otherwise stated, are from the Revised Standard Version.

5 The exact phrase is only used at 7:12; in 5:17 ποῦ is substituted for kai; in 11:13 the order of ho nomos and hoi prophētai is reversed; in 22:40 the word krematai appears between the words nomos and kai.


7 For the treatment of divorce in 19:3-9, cf. above.
8 One is to practice and observe whatever the scribes and Pharisees tell him, but not what they do, for they preach but do not practice.


CHAPTER TWO: MATTHEW 5:17-48

A careful survey of the data on Christ and the law presents us with a number of problems. The opening statement on the topic is that Jesus has come to fulfil the law and the prophets (5:17); it occurs in the introduction to the Sermon on the Mount which is the first discourse in Matthew.¹ What significance does 5:17 have for the context of 5:17-48, and for the law as a whole? What role does Jesus play as the one who fulfils the law?

The form and content of the six antitheses ("You have heard that it was said . . . But I say to you") in 5:21-48 seem to raise further questions: With what kind of authority is Jesus speaking? Is Jesus criticizing the scribal interpretation of the law and/or the Mosaic law itself on divorce (5:31f.), adultery (5:27ff.), oaths (5:33ff.), the lex talionis (5:38ff.), and the command to love one's enemy (5:43ff.)? Is Jesus presenting us with a new law?

Data on Christ and the law from other parts of Matthew seem to be relevant to the questions raised here. Jesus' authority, for example, seems evident in his pronouncement that the disciples have one master, the Christ (23:10). The scribal interpretation of the law is criticized on the question of oaths (23:16-23), divorce (19:3-9), and the sabbath (12:1ff.; 15:1ff.). Yet at 23:2f. their teaching seems to be binding.
19:19 and 22:34-40 give further information on the love command.

Still further questions are raised with the demand for perfection (5:48), and a righteousness that is better than that of the scribes and Pharisees (5:20): What is the nature of the righteousness? What is the significance of the demand for perfection? Does the possibility of entering the kingdom depend on one's ability to be morally faultless?

These are the issues that seem to be raised by the data on Christ and the law in Chapter One. This chapter is an attempt to resolve these issues. In the process of doing this all other significant data from the whole of Matthew will be considered. Most of the really important data, however, seem to come from 5:17-48. On each issue this section of Matthew is of major importance, and on some issues it seems to be the only section with such importance. Therefore Chapter Two is entitled: "Matthew 5:17-48".

In dealing with this central text on Christ and the law, I will keep to Matthew's own order. It is clear from the outset, however, that a persuasive interpretation of even the first word of this text, "Think not that I have come to abolish the law and the prophets . . ." (Mt. 5:17), supposes some provisional grasp, at least, of the whole Matthean view of Christ and the law. From the start, then, I will be moving back and forth between general conception and particular
detail.

The chapter has been divided into two sections: 5:17-19 and 5:20-48. The reason for this is that the antitheses seem to be readily marked off from 5:17-19. The demand for a better righteousness (5:20) and for perfection (5:48) seem to epitomize the conduct demanded in the antitheses. ²

I. In What Sense does Jesus Fulfil the Law (Mt. 5:17-19)?

Jesus' role as the one who fulfils the law and the meaning of πληρόσαι in this context are questions rightly considered crucial to an understanding of the law as a whole in Matthew. In this section I will summarize and evaluate a representative, but by no means exhaustive, number of viewpoints on these two issues. The concrete issues raised in our next section (Jesus' teaching of a righteousness superior to that of the scribes and Pharisees (Mt. 5:20-48)) will show the full relevance of Mt. 5:17 to Matthew's view of Christ and the law as a whole.

Section one of Chapter Two has been further divided into A: "A Survey of Views", and B: "Critique". In the section entitled "A Survey of Views" six positions on the meaning of πληρόσαι will be represented: (a) "to do" or "to carry out"; (b) "to establish"; (c) "to set forth in its true meaning"; (d) "to keep intact"; (e) "to (have the redemptive event) take place"; and (f) "to bring to eschatological completion". ³ Under "Critique" I will evaluate the various
views and make an effort to come to a precise understanding of the meaning of plērōsai and the role Jesus plays in Matthew's view as the one who fulfils the law. In the process of evaluating the various views on plērōsai in 5:17, it will be necessary to take into consideration context (especially vs. 18 and 19) and linguistic background (in Judaism and the Old Testament). The critique will also deal with a topic which occurs in connection with the sixth view of plērōsai, namely, Jesus conceived as eschatological prophet, new Moses, incarnate Wisdom, teacher of righteousness, Messiah, or a combination of these.

A. A Survey of Views

(a) Plērōsai: "to do" or "to carry out"

Among the outstanding exponents of the view that plerōsai means "to do" or "to carry out" are Theodor Zahn, Julius Schniewind, and Adolf Schlatter. Zahn likens the word of scripture to an empty vessel which receives its content from deeds, events, and facts; the prophetic word is fulfilled when the predicted events take place and the commanding word is fulfilled when the actions which have been commanded are done. Schniewind argues that Jesus does not fulfil the law in a new sense. Jesus appears to transgress the order of God but in reality fulfils it, that is he observes it and respects it. The fulfilling of the law in Gal. 5:14 and Rom. 13:8 indicates a fulfilling in deed of what is demanded. In vs. 19
the least command must be done, and in vs. 20 the emphasis is on doing a righteousness that is better than that of the scribes and Pharisees.⁸

(b) Πλήρωσαι: "to establish"

"Fulfil" would then stand in opposition to "abolish" (καταλείπω). Jesus would be affirming the abiding validity of the work and will of God expressed in the Scriptures.⁹ This interpretation would see the underlying semitic verb to be the Hebrew הָגִים (or qîyam) and/or the Aramaic qayēm. Although in the LXX the usual Hebrew verb behind the LXX πληρόω is μαλε', and never הָגִים or qîyam, Bacher¹⁰ argues that in a few places such as 1 Kings 2:27; 8:15, 24; and Jer. 44:25 (LXX. 51:25) μαλε' is a synonym of הָגִים (qîyam). On the last text (Jer. 44:25) Fiebig¹¹ agrees with Bacher; and in addition to these passages Mackintosh¹² claims 1 Kings 1:14.

H. Ljungman¹³ points out that in the Old Testament הָגִים (but less seldom qîyam) specifies that a promise or an oath is kept.¹⁴ God keeps his covenant (e.g., Deut. 8:18; 9:5); man, on his part, must also keep it (i.e., Jer. 34:18; Neh. 5:13). As an expression for confirming or keeping his word, הָגִים declares that the promise which has been given will not be shaken or fall to the ground; he does what he has said (e.g., Num. 23:19; 2 Sam. 7:25). Man is obliged to keep (yaqîm) and do (עָשְׂוֹת) the word of the law (Deut. 27:26). It is through doing that the word stands fast; that God keeps his word.
follows from the fact that he is just (Neh. 9:8). The const-
ancy of his word is a proof of the truth of his speaking
(Num. 23:19).

Although Ljungman does not agree with this position,
he does point out that in the targums the passages emphasized
by Bacher and Fiebig translate malē' by forms of qayēm.15
Fiegig16 understands plērōsai in Mt. 5:17 in the light of the
Aramaic qayēm (to bring into effect) and rabbinic oath termin-
ology. The teachers of the law fulfil, teach, and obey the
law and the prophets in a judicial way which allows them to
declare much of the law not binding. Jesus, in 5:17 on the
other hand, knows only of a "fulfilling" of a "doing" of the
law; he lays hold upon a use of the law that is moral, reli-
gious, and inward.

Dalman17 is in a somewhat similar vein to Bacher and
Fiebig. In Mt. 5:17 plērōsai refers back to the Hebrew qiyam
and the Aramaic qayēm; katalysai refers back to the Hebrew
bittēl and the Aramaic battēl. Jesus has come so that the
law may endure ("bestehen") and not be brought to an end.
Jesus has not come to deny or destroy the enduring validity
of the law; rather he has come to affirm it and realize it.
This "not abrogating" and "making valid" of the law is done
not through "doing" but through "teaching"; this is exemplified
in the antitheses.18 Gerhard Barth argues that to translate
plērōsai by "establish" in 5:17 is supported by the context
(5:21-48) and by the fact that in Matthew's christology the
work of Christ is conceived of as the establishing of the will
of God; furthermore, the "fulfilling of all righteousness" in
Mt. 3:15 corresponds to this. However, more is meant by
"establish" than the rabbinic qyam (i.e., show laws to be
valid by teaching); rather πλήροσαι is more comprehensive. 19
(c) Πλήροσαι: "to set forth in its true meaning"

By setting forth the commandments in their true meaning
they are thus "perfected" or "completed". This view is held
by Wellhausen, Klostermann, Allen, Kümmel, Harnack, Dibelius,
and M'Neile. 20 For Harnack 21 Jesus deepens the intent of the
law through love and truthfulness; he opposes certain conce-
ssions of the law in the interest of moral perfection. He does
not "demolish" or "merely conserve" or "confirm"; rather he
perfects (vollenden) the law; he is the final law giver.
(d) Πλήροσαι: "to keep intact"

Albert Descamps, 22 an exponent of this view, states that,
in contrast to καταλύσαι, πλήροσαι in 5:17 means "keep intact".
Καταλύειν τὸν νόμον means that the law is no longer in force;
and καταλύειν τοὺς ψηφιστὰς means that a prophecy is impos-
able ("irréalisable"). Πληροῦν τὸν νόμον means "to perfectly
observe the law"; and πληροῦν τοὺς ψηφιστὰς means "realize
(réaliser) the prophets" -- as the Messiah does in his words
and deeds. 23

Hans Joachim Schoeps 24 also holds that Jesus keeps the
law intact, but in a very different way from Descamps. He interprets πληρῶσαι in 5:17 in the light of b. Shab. 116b. But Matthew misunderstood וְלָא for יָלָא, and consequently understood the passage to mean "I come neither to take away . . . nor to add" instead of "I came not to take away . . . but to add". Jesus is not expressing his opposition to the law itself but to the scribal tradition.

(e) Πληρῶσαι: "to (have the redemptive event) take place"

This view has been taken by Henrik Ljungman in his monograph on Mt. 5:17ff. and 3:15. He holds that when Jesus came to fulfill the law and the prophets he accomplished it with his death and resurrection. "Righteousness" (in 3:15) he takes to mean not "acts of righteousness" nor "ethical goodness" but rather God's eschatological judgment of the wicked and salvation of the elect. The "law and the prophets" (5:17) are taken to mean the scriptures. Jesus fulfils the scriptures in their totality by accomplishing the redemptive purpose of God as set forth in the scriptures. It is by Christ's work of sacrificial self-giving that the believer possesses the righteousness that exceeds that of the scribes and Pharisees (5:20).

(f) Πληρῶσαι: "to bring to eschatological completion"

Two somewhat different exponents of this view are W. D. Davies and Joachim Jeremias. W. D. Davies believes that "to fulfil" in 5:17 means Jesus has fulfilled the old law in
that he has brought new demands; the whole sermon is summed up in a "new commandment" in 7:12. These commandments he entrusted to his disciples (28:20). All of 5:17-19 could be connected with the circumstances of Jesus' own ministry.27 The solemn authority with which Christ speaks must be given full force; in particular he has in mind the phrase ἐγὼ δε λέγω ήμίν (5:22, 28, 32, 34, 39, 44) in the six antitheses; a similar phrase (ἀμὴν γὰρ λέγω ήμίν) occurs at 5:18. The ἀμὴν (5:18) is a way of speaking unique to Jesus, and adds weight to the above view. Πληρῶσαι in 5:17 has an eschatological connotation; he came not to annul but to fulfil in the sense that he revealed the ultimate intention of the law, or uncovered its radically absolute meaning. He believes that 5:21, 22a, 27f., 33, 34a support this conclusion.28 Davies further believes that the radicalizing of the law by Jesus in 5:17ff. leaves room for the validity of the old law in all its force, not only in parts. In order to maintain this position Davies has to explain away a literal meaning for "heaven and earth" (5:18) -- i.e., that the phrase "till heaven and earth pass away" refers to the end of the present age, the winding up of all things in the cosmos.29

The conservative attitude that Jesus has to the canonical law during his ministry, Davies would like to link up with the messianic secret; Jesus would not annul the ceremonial law in practice until he had proved the right to
do so in his death. However, at certain points he breaks the law. This Davies explains by the fact that the powers of the age to come were already present during his ministry. \(^{30}\)

Joachim Jeremias\(^{31}\) holds that Jesus has come to bring the law to its eschatological completion. He believes the crux of 5:17 is the word "fulfil" (p̄lerōsa') which could be translated "fulfil (through actions)", "keep" (i.e., Mt. 3:15, Rom. 8:4, etc.), which would apply only to the law and not to the prophets; or it could be translated "fulfil (promises)" (2:17, 23, etc.), which would apply to the prophets and not to the law. To escape this dilemma, Jeremias notes that Dalman conjectured the underlying Aramaic equivalent to be limeqayyāmā (confirm, make valid) with the meaning "to bring into effect". However, Jeremias believes the problem with this is that forms of q̄imum are never rendered in the LXX by p̄lerōun, and the New Testament tends to use histanai for the meaning "to bring into effect" (i.e., Rom. 3:31; Heb. 10:9). For him the wording of b. Shab. 116b is of more help; there, the saying is a mockery of the Christian message, but, more importantly, the explicit claim is that it comes from a gospel. Jeremias adopts the reading 'ellā\(^{32}\) (cod. M) (I came not to take away . . . but to add) rather than we'lā\(^{33}\) (cod. B) (I came neither to take away . . . nor to add). The latter means that Jesus leaves everything as it was; the former means that Jesus brings something new.
If b. Shab. 116b is linked with Mt. 5:17 katalysai would correspond to miphāt (take away) and plērōsai to 'ōsopē (increase, add, enlarge). This exegesis, Jeremias notes, matches the usual exegesis of 5:17b in Jewish Christianity (i.e., Pseud. Clem. Rec. I 39:1), and is supported by a Jewish source worked over by a Mohammedan author, which renders Mt. 5:17b as "I did not come to diminish, but on the contrary, to complete". If this is correct, Jesus is countering the insinuation (mē nomisēte) that he is antinomian—he is not dissolving the torah but fulfilling it. The rendering of 'ōsopē by plērōsai indicates that the purpose of the fulfilling is the reaching of the complete eschatological measure. "Fulfil" (5:17) is an eschatological technical term; Jesus is claiming to be the eschatological messenger of God, the promised prophet like Moses (Deut. 18:15, 18) who brings the final revelation and therefore demands absolute obedience--this is particularly brought out in the antitheses in 5:21-48.

B. Critique

These then are the various views of plērōsai in 5:17. Having stated them, it is incumbent upon me to evaluate them.

I do not believe (in disagreement with Zahn, Schniewind, and Schlatter) that plērōsai means merely "to do". Barth points out that this meaning agrees well with the linguistic usage but in the context it is not Jesus doing the law, but
rather his teaching of it that is decisive. Zahn's concept of the filling of a vessel is instructive, but it is questionable whether the law receives its content and is fulfilled when it is done. Ljungman and Strack-Billerbeck indicate that in Jewish thought a law and its being performed form a unity, so that one cannot reserve "doing" as a fulfilment of the law. 38

Another factor that calls the above interpretation into question is the usage of katalysai in 5:17. Since Jesus has come not to abolish the law but to fulfill the law or the prophets (ouk katalysai alla plērōsai) (5:17) therefore katalysai and plērōsai are mutually exclusive, and an accurate understanding of katalysai will in large measure determine the meaning of plērōsai. That katalysai and plērōsai are mutually exclusive is indicated by clauses that are parallel in form in Matthew — two of these have parallels in Mark. They are the following:

Mt. 5:17b ouk ēlthon katalysai alla plērōsai
Mt. 10:34b ouk ēlthon balein eirēnēn alla machairan
Mt. 9:13 (Mk. 2:17) ou gar ēlthon kalesai dikaiōs alla hamartolous
Mt. 20:28 ouk ēlthen diakonēthēnai alla diákonēsai

Mt. 10:34a and 5:17a are also parallel. 5:17a reads mē nomisēte hoti ēlthon katalysai ton nomon ē tous prophētas, and 10:34 reads mē nomisēte hoti ēlthon balein eirēnēn epī ten gén.

In 5:17 katalysai and plērōsai are mutually exclusive just as balein eirēnēn and (balein) machairan (10:34), kalesai
dikaious and (kalesai) hamartōlous (9:13), and diakonēthēnai, and diakonēsai (20:28) are mutually exclusive.  

Elsewhere in Matthew katalysai occurs at 24:2 (=Mk. 13:2; Lk. 21:6), 26:61 (=Mk. 14:58), and 27:40 (=Mk. 15:29). At 24:2 there "will not be left... one stone upon another (of the temple), that will not be torn down (katalythesetai)". At 26:61 and 27:40 the imagery is that of Jesus destroying (katalysai, 26:61; kalyvōn, 27:40) and rebuilding (oikodomēsai, 26:61; oikodomōn, 27:40) the temple in three days.  

In Paul the word occurs at Rom. 14:20; 2 Cor. 5:1; and Gal. 2:18. At Gal. 2:18 its usage is like Mt. 5:17 in that it refers to the law, and unlike Mt. 5:17 (but like Mt. 26:61 and 27:40) in that it is contrasted with oikodomō. At Rom. 14:20 Paul urges his readership not to "destroy (katalyve) the work of God", for the sake of food, and at 2 Cor. 5:1 he talks about the earthly tent, in which we live, being destroyed (katalythē).  

Elsewhere in the New Testament katalysein occurs only at Acts 5:38, 39 and 6:14. There it is used of the temple being "destroyed" (6:14), of a plan "failing" (5:38), and of "stopping" (5:39) the spread of Christianity.  

In the classical and Hellenistic sources there is widespread agreement that katalysein means "to abrogate" or "declare invalid" or "abolish". This meaning in relation to the law is indicated according to W. C. Allen in 2 Mac. 2:22; 4:11;
4 Mac. 5:33; and 17:9. In 2 Mac. 2:22 we are told that Judas Maccabees at the time of Antiochus Epiphanes "restored the laws that were about to be abolished (katalyesthai nomous)". In 4 Mac. 5:33 Eleazar, an old priest trained in the law, tells Antiochus that he does not so pity his old age so as to break the law of his fathers (hōste di' emautou ton patrion katalysai nomon).

In 2 Mac. 4:11 we are told that Antiochus "destroyed the lawful ways of living (tas men nomimous)"; and in 4 Mac. 17:9 we are told of a tyrant, who through violence desired to destroy the civil rights of the Hebrews (bian tēn Hebraion politeian katalysai). 44

Zahn 45 agrees that outside the New Testament katalysai, in relation to the law, means "to abrogate" or "to declare not binding", but that in the New Testament it only has this meaning in 5:17, and that elsewhere in the New Testament it is contrasted with oikodomein. Ljungman 46 goes further and argues that even in Mt. 5:17 katalysai is to be understood in terms of oikodomein; he points out that this is the contrast in relation to the law in Gal. 2:18. Even if the law and the prophets in 5:17 are seen in terms of the katalysein and oikodomein of a building, it is not clear to me how the law can be abolished if it is merely not done or not observed. 47 The law, rather, in order to be abolished must be "abrogated" or "declared not binding". This is the clear force of 2 Mac.
2:22 and 4 Mac. 5:33, and the meaning which must be accepted in Mt. 5:17. This, therefore, excludes the view of Zahn, Schniewind, and Schlatter that πληρόσαι merely means "to do" in Mt. 5:17.

The second view, that πληρόσαι in 5:17 means "establish" -- in particular the view of Dalman, Bacher, and Fiebig that πληρόσαι is to be traced back to the Hebrew hēqîm (or qîyām) and/or the Aramaic qayēm -- will now be considered. Albeit in a few Old Testament passages the targums do use forms of qayēm where the LXX has πληρόσαι, it is significant that the LXX never translates πληρόσαι for forms of qîyām, that in the Syriac translation of Mt. 5:17 the underlying verbs for katalysai and πληρόσαι are šērē and mālē respectively, and that usually mālē lies behind the LXX πληρόσαι. Gaechter also has a telling criticism against the particular form of this view that sees bittel and qayēm -- the binding and the loosing power of the rabbis -- behind katalysai and πληρόσαι in 5:17; he points out that these terms apply only to the law and not to the prophets. This whole view is therefore to be rejected as inadequate.

The third view -- that πληρόσαι means "to set forth the true meaning", "to perfect", or "to complete" -- has been criticized by McConnell on the grounds that if Matthew really meant "to complete" he would have used teleîn or teleioun. Against this, Trilling would argue that teleîn or teleioun
is a profane term for Matthew. He points out that teleioun is not used at all and that of the seven occurrences of telein, five (7:28; 11:1; 13:53; 19:1; and 26:1) indicate a completion of a speech of Jesus. Trilling also notes that Lk. 7:1 (=Mt. 7:28) has plêroûn instead of the Matthean telein. (The other passages in which telein is used do not have synoptic parallels). However, against Trilling, it should be noted that teleios belongs to this word group and that it clearly has a religious or theological meaning in its two occurrences in Matthew (5:48; 19:21). Delling, rather, is to be followed here: He notes that plêroô sometimes comes close to the meaning of teleioô but that it is distinguished clearly from it by the characteristic idea of filling up a measure.

Furthermore, a consideration of the phrase ton nomon e' tous prophêtas tells against the view of Descamps' that the law and the prophets can be fulfilled in different senses. Although the connective participle here is e' (not kai), it is not to be understood in a disjunctive sense. M'Niele notes that in negative sentences the disjunctive e' takes the place of kai, and that there is a similar usage in Mt. 5:18 and Jn. 8:14. Essentially the same point is made by Nigel Turner and Blass-Debrunner-Funk. Turner notes that it almost becomes copulative in questions, negative sentences, or synonyms; in this category, in addition to Mt. 5:17 and Jn. 8:14, he places Acts 1:7; 11:8; 1 Cor. 11:27; 1 Thess.
2:19. Blass-Debrunner-Funk note that in negative sentences (Jn. 8:14; Acts 1:7) and in interrogative sentences (1 Thess. 2:19) which are equivalent in sense to a negative sentence, εἶναι comes close to the force of a copulative conjunction.

This fact alone therefore eliminates Descamps' view that the law and the prophets can be fulfilled and abolished in different senses; they rather are conceived of as a unity, and are a designation for the entire Old Testament. The phrase the law and the prophets occurs in Mt. at 5:17; 7:12; 11:13; and 22:40. Ljungman argues that the "law and the prophets" in 5:17 refer to the heilsgeschichtlich redemptive promises of scripture. Against this position, Grundmann argues that in 5:17 "the law and the prophets" are to be understood, as they are in 22:40 and 7:12, as exegetes of the law and not as bearers of the promise ("Träger der Verheissung"). He admits that the phrase has this latter sense in 11:13 where, in the context of the kingdom of heaven suffering violence since the arrival of John, the word order of the phrase is changed to hoi prophētai kai ho nomos. Also, in place of ho nomos kai hoi prophētai mechri Iōannou Matthew has pantes gar hoi prophētai kai ho nomos heōs Iōannou eprophēteusan. However, it appears to me that even here it is possible that a revelation of the will of God is involved rather than a mere proclamation of promises or a foretelling of the future. At any rate, in 5:17 the commanding aspect
of scripture cannot be excluded, for the context is one of moral demand; also it is possible that the phrase "the law and the prophets" is to be understood as brackets; the content in between is in some sense an exposition of the moral requirements of scripture.  

Next, in order to evaluate Ljungman's (and Davies') position, it is necessary to give a careful consideration to the meaning of the clause **heōs an panta genētai** (5:18c). Along with Davies and Ljungman, this clause has also been taken by Olav Hanssen and Hamerton-Kelly to refer to the death and resurrection of Jesus. The difficulties of this clause are several; it is difficult to determine the precise force of each of its elements -- **heōs an**, **panta**, and **genētai** -- and the reason for its parallelism to the previous clause: **heōs an parelthē ho ouranos kai hē gē ktl.**  

Besides **panta** referring to the death and resurrection it has been viewed as referring to the fall of Jerusalem, the **parousia**, the end of the present era and the winding up of all things in the cosmos, the law (or alternatively, what the law demands), and as an added exhortation to obey the law. The last two interpretations make **panta** refer in some sense to **tou nomou** while the previous three have it refer, in some sense, to **ho ouranos kai hē gē**; under the first interpretation it could refer to either. In order for Davies' position to hold, **ho ouranos kai hē gē** must be interpreted
figuratively and must pass away with the death and resurrec-
tion of Jesus -- i.e., with this event a new world order is
created.  
If panta refers to tou nomou the problem is that
panta is plural and nomou is singular. However, the problem
is relieved somewhat if panta ta tou nomou is to be understood
for panta, or if panta is to be contrasted with iota hen e
mia keraia.  
A further complication is the precise meaning of
genetai. Apart from 6:10 and 26:42 (where ginesthai appears
to mean "do" ) Matthew seems to use ginesthai in the approx-
imately seventy other occurrences with reference to the hap-
pening of events. That ginesthai in 5:18 is to be under-
stood in this latter sense has been urged for several reasons;
three times a clause similar to 5:18, touto de holon gegonen
(1:22; 21:4; 26:56), refers to an event which fulfills
(plerothē or plerōthōsin either to rethen hypō kyriou dia tou
prophetou or to rethen dia tou prophetou (21:4), or hai graphai
ton propheton (26:56).  
Secondly, at 24:34 there is a clause
exactly the same as 5:18c except for the addition of tauta
(heōs an panta tauta genetai); it has possible reference to
the fall of Jerusalem or the parousia. Finally, Hamerton-
Kelly has urged hapanta ta genomena (Mt. 28:11) -- a phrase
which refers to the resurrection of Jesus -- as a parallel.
The interpretation of B. Weiss, however, is not to
be overlooked. He reads 5:18 in the light of the third
petition of the Lord’s Prayer (genetheto to thelēma sou) (Mt. 6:10). 5:18 would then mean "till God’s will is wholly done". Gottlob Schrenk points out that this petition "expresses not merely submission but consent to a comprehensive fulfilment of God’s will in keeping with the hallowing of his kingdom". At any rate, the context (esp. 5:19) indicates that the performance of a commandment is not to be excluded here.

Finally, the meaning of heōs an is not readily apparent. In the views examined above it has been pretty much taken for granted that heōs an -- which is always followed by the aorist subjunctive in Matthew -- denotes a temporal limit. This, however, is not necessarily the case. Elsewhere in Matthew, heōs an seems to indicate a temporal limit in 2:13; 5:26; 10:11; 23:39; however, in 12:20; 22:44; and 24:34 a temporal limit is probably not (and in 16:28 certainly not) indicated. To further complicate the matter, Eduard Schweizer notes that heōs, particularly if codex B is right in omitting an, expresses the expectancy of a future event and comes close to a final particle. Schweizer further notes that heōs an is not to be found earlier than Test. Iob. 21:2 and 22:3 in a definitely final sense, but that heōs an apodōs in Mt. 5:26 probably implies such a meaning.

At this point it is relevant to make reference to an article by A. M. Honeyman and the difficulty that the double
heōs an. clause appears to, and hardly can, purport a tautology. Honeyman notes that, to understand the two clauses and the double use of heōs, an understanding of the underlying Hebrew and Aramaic equivalents ('d yšr, 'd ῥ etc., and 'q̄ respectively) must be borne in mind. He points out that 'd can be either (a) exclusive or restrictive ("only up to the point that . . ., to the limiting stage at which") or (b) inclusive or comprehensive ("even in the stage where . . ., even after the point at which"). Also in the former usage there can be an apparently pleonastic insertion of the negative with the conjunction. Moreover, 'dd, 'dūȳ and their synonyms may be used not only of time and place, but also of degree, manner, or extent.

Furthermore, in certain Old Testament passages (e.g., Josh. 17:14; 2 Kings 17:20; Ps. 112:8; and Gen. 49:10) the clause introduced by 'd yšr etc., is parallel in sense to the main clause, so that the two are virtually coordinate in sense and climactic effect.

From all of this, Honeyman concludes that heōs an panta genētai (5:18), reproducing an Aramaic klh (or kl') 'd dytyqym, expresses in positive terms what is negatively expressed in the previous clause. The force of heōs is modal (not temporal) and inclusive — "... to the extent, so that (on the contrary) all (of it) will be fulfilled".

These considerations seem to exclude Davies' and
Ljungman's view that the validity of the law ends with the death and resurrection of Jesus. This leaves us to consider the view of Joachim Jeremias. 89

As has been noted, Jeremias claims that καταλύσαι is to be linked with μιθα ("take away") in b. Shab. 116b. This is an important insight because it makes καταλύσαι (5:17) agree very well with ἰότα ἡν ἐνια κεραία ou-με παρειλθεὶ ἀπο τού νομοῦ (5:18), and λυσὲ μιαν τὸν εντόλον toutōn 90 τὸν έλαχιστὸν καὶ διδαξῇ houtós anthropous (5:19) — i.e., all three verses state that nothing is to be taken away from the law.

That πληροῖσαι consequently is to be understood in terms of ἀσοπέ ("increase, add, enlarge") (b. Shab. 116b), and filling up a measure is also important, since it agrees well with the linguistic usage of πληροῦν. Besides the passages already cited by Zahn 91 and Jeremias 92 Gerhard Delling 93 notes that the Hebrew form underlying πληροῖ in the LXX strongly supports the idea of "to fill up the measure". These Hebrew forms are the following: malē (about 70 times), 9 tāmam (Lev. 25:29 = "of time"; Dan. 8:23), kīlāh (2 Chron. 24:10 = "to fill up to the top"; 2 Chron. 36:22 = "to fulfil a word of Yahweh"), sābā (Ps. 15:11, LXX Ps. 16:11; = "fulness" of joy), šēlēm (Dan. 5:26 is used with emetēsen and means "to complete" — a span of time), miggēs (Jer. 41:14, LXX Jer. 34:14 = "after a lapse of"), nāśa (Is. 40:4 = "to fill (the
However, I differ with Jeremias when he infers that \textit{plerōsai} in 5:17 merely refers to proclaiming a revelation; \textit{plerōsai} in 5:17 must be understood in light of Matthew's use of the fulfilment (\textit{plerōum}) of scripture elsewhere.\footnote{4} Of the sixteen occurrences of \textit{plerōum} in Matthew, only one (Mt. 26:56 = Mk. 14:49) has a synoptic parallel, and only one (13:48), referring to a net being full of fish, is non-theological. Besides 5:17 only 3:15 (\textit{plerōsai pasan dikaiosynēn}) and 23:32 (\textit{plerōsate to metron tôn paterôn hymōn}) are active. The remaining are passive; of these all except 13:48 refer to the fulfilment of scripture (a formula unique to Matthew). These passages are 1:22; 2:15, 17, 23; 4:14; 8:17; 13:35; 21:4; 26:54, 56; 27:9. All except 26:54, 56\footnote{5} make reference to a prophet (\textit{dia tou prophētou}), or a particular prophet (\textit{dia Iēremou tou prophētou} or \textit{dia Èsaiov tou prophētou}); of these all except 2:17 and 27:9\footnote{6} have the preceding phrase \textit{hina} (or \textit{hopōs}) \textit{plerōthē to rhēthen}. The Old Testament passages quoted in the fulfilment citations are from Ps. 78:2 (= Mt. 13:35); Is. 7:14 (= Mt. 1:23); Is. 9:1, 2 (= Mt. 4:15, 16); Is. 42:1-4 (= Mt. 12:18-21); Is. 53:4 (= Mt. 8:17); Is. 62:11 (= Mt. 21:5); Jer. 31:15 (= Mt. 2:18); Hos. 11:1 (= Mt. 2:15); and Zech. 11:12, 13 (= Mt. 27:9, 10). It is perhaps noteworthy that none of these texts are from the Pentateuch, and although the prophets are mentioned explicitly,
the law is not. However, at the same time, it is perhaps noteworthy that all of these scripture fulfilment passages refer -- albeit some of them indirectly -- to events in the life and death of Jesus. The indirect fulfilments are Herod's killing of the male children two years old and under (2:17), the flight into Egypt (2:15), the angel's appearance to Joseph in a dream (1:22), and the purchase of the potter's field (27:9). Direct fulfilments are Jesus' dwelling at Nazareth (2:23) and Capernaum (4:14), his casting out spirits (8:17), his manner of teaching (in parables) (13:35), his ordering of the disciples to fetch a colt (21:4), and his death (26:54, 56).  

The totality of Matthew's use of plērōn in part supports Barth's conclusion; he believes that plērōsai (5:17) signifies a more comprehensive event than a mere modifying or clarifying of the law. Therefore he concludes that it is unthinkable that the law should be abolished even when one "sees in the life and death of Jesus the plērōsai pasan dikaiosunēn (and that in the place of sinners! 3:15)". However, I would disagree with Barth when he asserts that plērōsai means "establish"; rather it has the idea of filling up the measure -- indeed, in agreement with Jeremias, of filling up the eschatological measure. Not only is the death and resurrection of Jesus eschatological in nature, but also his teaching is as well. Several indications support this
assertion. In addition to ἐλθόν (5:17) (cf. ἐλθόν 9:13; 10:34; 20:28)⁹⁹ and the fact that this teaching takes place on a mountain,¹⁰⁰ the eschatological nature of 5:17 -- and indeed the view that Jesus is the eschatological prophet -- is supported by the new Moses motifs absent in Mark and present in Matthew. Ferdinand Hahn¹⁰¹ gives a convenient summary of these. There are five main discourses, each followed by ἠδειάσθω ἐκτελεσθεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς κτλ. (7:28; 11:1; 13:53; 17:24; 19:1; 26:1) which perhaps correspond to the five books of Moses.¹⁰² The Sermon on the Mount takes place on a mountain in possible correspondence to Mount Sinai (where Moses received the law). In Mt. 2:13-22 the childhood of Jesus is related by analogy with the youth of Moses. Matthew (4:2) in contrast to Mark and Luke brings the story of the temptation into unambiguous relation with Moses. In 21:11, 46 the title Prophet is set beside the designation Son of David, and in 23:2, 8-10 it is Jesus and not the scribes who is the rightful occupant of the καθεδρα Μωϋσῆς. With reserve, Hahn also mentions that the seven beatitudes (5:3ff.) and the seven woes (23:13ff.) may answer to the seven blessings and curses of Deut. 28, and the close of the last discourse of Jesus in Mt. 26:1f. may answer to the phrase in Deut. 32:45 regarding the completion of all discourses of Moses to Israel.¹⁰³

In addition, Gerhard Friedrich¹⁰⁴ makes several other points with regard to the mosaic eschatological prophet in
Matthew. In Mt. 12:38 (=Mk. 8:11f.; Lk. 11:16f.) the Pharisees seek a sign from Jesus as a miracle of accreditation which would prove him to be the eschatological prophet. In Mt. 11:5, in response to John the Baptist's query, Jesus points out that the blind see, the lame walk, etc. -- i.e., he brings in the paradisial conditions of the wilderness period. The ten miracles of Jesus (Mt. 8 - 9) correspond to Moses' ten miracles in Egypt -- only they brought sickness and death, whereas Jesus removed them. Also Jesus' "I say unto you" (Mt. 5:22, 28, 32, 34, 39, 44) stands in sharp contrast to Moses' "thou shalt"; Jesus as prophet is not merely the mouthpiece of God who must introduce his preaching with "thus saith Yahweh", rather his "I say unto you" sets him directly at the side of God.

W. D. Davies argues as well that in Matthew Jesus is a new Moses and the proclaimer of a new Torah although he readily admits that none of this is brought out explicitly. The Exodus motif is brought out somewhat in Mt. 2:13 - 7:28. Mt. 2:13ff. records the flight of Joseph and Mary and the infant Jesus to Egypt. This is to fulfil the prophecy "out of Egypt have I called my Son" (Hos. 11:1). "Son" is a designation for Israel; Matthew sees the history of Jesus as a recapitulation of that of Israel. Herod (2:16ff.), in the slaughter of the innocents, takes the place of Pharaoh. The terms in which Moses is described as leaving Midian to deliver
Israel from bondage (Ex. 4:18ff.) are recalled in Mt. 2:19ff. when Joseph takes Jesus back from his refuge in Egypt to Israel. This would add some weight to the position that the mount on which Jesus delivers the sermon is a new Sinai.

Davies further argues for the concept of a new torah in Matthew on the basis of the Jewish messianic expectation. He points out that in the ideal future, the end was to be characterized by radical newness. There was the concept of a new Exodus, a new earth, a new Jerusalem, a new covenant, and a new temple. By the first century, this radical transformation of the existing order was included in the messianic ideal. Moreover, as a kingly figure, the Messiah would have to define his relationship to the law and the role of the law to the messianic age. He goes on to point out that Jer. 31:31-34, the Servant of Yahweh passages (Is. 42:1-4; 49:1-6; 50:4-11; 52:13 - 53:12), and Is. 2:1-5 (cf. Mic. 4:1-5) support the view that in the ideal future the imparting of torah would be a function of the deity or his agent. He further observes that the targums on Is. 12:3 and the Song of Songs 5:10, Midrash Qoheleth on 2:1 and 11:8, and Yalqut on 26:2 indicate a new torah in the messianic age.

Professor Davies' point is that Matthew (like other Christians) is conscious of living in the messianic age, and therefore the role of the torah would have occupied him. The messianic age brings a new teaching (twrh 'lpn) for Matthew
(7:28). 118

However the idea, according to Davies, that Matthew also sees Jesus in terms of a new Exodus should caution us against seeing Jesus exclusively in terms of the eschatological prophet in 5:17. Rather Matthew is invoking, not primarily a Moses typology, but an Israel typology in which Jesus is represented as the embodiment of the nation and the antitype of Israel's experience -- the Moses typology is expressed only within this larger framework.

This last point makes one wonder whether Jesus is also to be understood as king -- since a true king is the representative and embodiment of his people, and since Moses is also a kingly figure. 119

Indeed, the kingship of Jesus is a prominent feature (particularly of the earlier part) of Matthew's gospel. At the outset, Matthew (1:1-18), in contrast to Luke (3:23-38), especially makes the point that Jesus is the legal heir to David's throne. 120 His descent is traced from Abraham through David and the members of David's dynasty who occupied the throne after him. Luke, in contrast, traces Jesus' genealogy to Adam, and the generations after David are not kings but commoners. Luke emphasizes Jesus' solidarity with the human race; but Matthew establishes Jesus' title to the throne of David.

In Mt. 2:1ff. the magi seek the newborn king of the
Jews, and learn that the news of his birth causes Herod (another King of the Jews) to be agitated. Several times Jesus is hailed by various persons as Son of David -- i.e., Mt. 9:27 and 20:30f. (=Mk. 10:47 and Lk. 18:38); 12:23; 15:22; and in 21:9 (=Mk. 11:9f.) by the festal pilgrims on Jesus' entry into Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{121} Also, the kingship of Jesus is brought out in Pilate's questioning of Jesus (Mt. 27:11 =Mk. 15:2; Lk. 23:3; Jn. 18:33), the mocking taunt of the soldiers (Mt. 27:29 =Mk. 15:18), the title over the cross (Mt. 27:37 =Mk. 15:26; Lk. 23:38; Jn. 19:19), and the application of Zech. 9:9 (Mt. 21:5; cf. Jn. 12:15) -- "Behold your King is coming to you . . ." -- to Jesus' entry into Jerusalem. Perhaps also in Mt. 28:18ff. Jesus is to be understood as the king invested with universal sovereignty.

I believe that both the kingship of Jesus and his prophetic character are to be subsumed under his messiahship.\textsuperscript{122} With the possible exception of Mt. 1:1 Christos in Matthew appears to be a title; eleven times ho Christos\textsuperscript{123} is employed, once he is mockingly called Christe (vocative) by the crowd (26:68), and three times, once in the genealogy (1:16) and twice by Pilate, he is designated as "the one called Christ".\textsuperscript{124}

Finally there is the possibility that Jesus, in his own person, is torah. Jesus, in his own person, performs the functions that torah had in Judaism.\textsuperscript{127} If this were the case,
it would be consonant with other (Jewish) Christianity. Three times Clement of Alexandria (Strom. I:29, 182; Strom. II:15, 68; and Ecl. Proph. 58) quotes the second century Preaching of Peter, referring to Christ as both "law" and "word." Justin Martyr (Dial. 11:2, 4; 24:1; 51:3; 112:4; 118:3; 122:5) refers to Jesus as "another law", "the eternal and final law", "another covenant", "the new covenant for the whole world", and "God's covenant". The Shepherd of Hermas (Hermas, Sim. VIII 3:2) equates the law of God with the Son of God.

M. Jack Suggs takes a closely related approach; he equates Christ in Mt. 11:28-30:

Come to me all who labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you, and learn from me; for I am gentle and lowly in heart, and you will find rest for your souls. For my yoke is easy, and my burden is light.

with incarnate Wisdom, personified. This passage, he believes, belongs to the genre of Wisdom's invitation. In support, he gives some background in pre-Christian Jewish Wisdom literature. Sir. 6 (18-22; 24-31) presents Wisdom's invitation to instruction -- instruction in the torah; and Sir. 51 relates the invitation to take up Wisdom's yoke to both school instruction and the torah. The Wis. Sol. (9:9 and 6:4, 9) connects wisdom and torah closely. In the Qumran Is. Scroll (1:4), dābār (the word of either man or God) is corrected to
dibbur (divine revelation). The full identification of wisdom and torah is given in Sir. 24:3-23 and in Bar. 3:37 - 4:1. Wisdom is extolled as "the book of the commandments of God and the law that endures forever". It is against this background that Suggs believes Mt.11:28-30 is to be interpreted -- Jesus offers the invitation of wisdom and the yoke of wisdom and torah. He is not offering an alternative to the yoke of torah; Mt. 11:28-30 is not a polemic against the law as such, for Jesus is speaking as wisdom and as torah. In the incidents of the disciples gathering grain on the sabbath (12:1-8), and the healing of the man with the withered hand (12:9-14), the issue is not the rejection of the torah but rather its interpretation. The Son of Man is lord of the sabbath (12:8) and it is lawful to do good on the sabbath (12:12). Law (the yoke of the true torah of wisdom) is opposed to law (the pharasaic torah). This does not mean, however, that the "easy yoke" and the "light burden" imply the abolishing of the demands of the law.

It is in this light that the antitheses in the Sermon on the Mount are to be understood. They ascribe to him an unparalleled authority. The purpose of the "I say to you" is not, according to Suggs, to abolish, extend, or deepen the requirements of the law (although it may do the latter), it is rather an authoritative declaration of what the law is; it is not a dialectic exposition of the law (the rabbinic form) but an exposition of the true law.
In response to Suggs, it appears to me that Jesus is indeed wisdom, but that the Messiah is not to be understood in terms of wisdom, but vice versa; wisdom rather is only one strand in Matthew's conception of messiahship. Wisdom is not to be separated from the messiahship of Jesus as Mt. 11:2, 19 shows.

Indeed, another candidate for Jesus in Mt. 5 - 7 is that he is to be understood in relation to the teacher of righteousness at Qumran. Grundmann notes that the rabbis understood that the Messiah would be an expounder ("Ausleger") of the law, and would mediate the knowledge of the Torah. Further, between this concept of the rabbis' and the promise of a second Moses (Deut. 18:15, 18), there is the historical figure of the teacher of righteousness from Qumran. He brings each sharpening ("Verschärfung") of the Torah to its breakthrough ("Durchbruch") -- a sharpening which the Hasidim had begun. Just as the Pharisees awaited the Messiah who would be an expounder of the law, so the men of Qumran awaited the teacher of righteousness in the last days (C. D. 6:11).

Grundmann claims that it is with this background that Matthew paints the picture of Jesus as eschatological teacher of righteousness in union with prophet and teacher. Grundmann readily accepts the Mosaic motifs in Mt. 5, but also points out that the prophetic announcement of the coming kingdom of God is conceived of as teaching (4:23; 5:2); moreover the
theme of that teaching is "righteousness" -- righteousness which is better than that of the scribes and Pharisees. 

My response to this is that in some sense Jesus is a "teacher of righteousness" but I believe this "title" is to be subsumed under messiahship as well. In Mt. 23:8-10 the disciples have but one ho didaskalos (23:8) and but one kathēgētēs (23:10); he is hō Christos.

My conclusions, then, on the issues raised in 5:17-19 are as follows: In Matthew, Jesus, as the one who fulfils the law, is indeed eschatological prophet, new Moses, wisdom, and teacher of righteousness, but all these designations are to be subsumed under the comprehensive title of Messiah or ho Christos. In 5:17 Jesus fulfils the law and the prophets by bringing them to their full eschatological measure. This is done in his words and deeds; it is done by "teaching" and "doing". 

This concludes our treatment of 5:17-19.

II. The Better Righteousness (Mt. 5:20-48)

In this section I will discuss the issues mentioned on p. 22ff. that relate to 5:20-48. In the course of the discussion, the relevance of 5:17 to the issues raised here will be kept in mind.

The issues yet to be considered are the nature of Jesus' authority, the validity of the scribal interpretation of the torah, the validity of the Mosaic torah, the question of a new
torah, the nature of Matthean ethics, the nature of righteousness in Matthew (5:20), the significance of the demand for perfection (5:48), and the significance of the love command (5:43ff.). Each of these issues will now be considered in turn.

A. The Nature of Christ's Authority

First, let us examine the phrase εγὼ δὲ λέγω ἵμαν (5:22, 27, 32, 34, 39, 44). David Daube and Morton Smith have argued that this phrase and its antithesis ἐκούσατε ἢ ἐνερεθή (5:22, 27, etc.) can be seen in terms of rabbinic discussion. Smith cites a number of passages which run as follows: "Rabbi . . . used to say . . ., but I say . . .". Daube has isolated a rabbinic form which runs "I might understand or hear . . ., but you must say . . .". However, one problem, as Daube himself admits, is that there is a great gulf between the rabbinic saying and the supreme authority with which Jesus speaks. With regard to Smith, Suggs has pointed out that Smith only cites passages that are parallel to the second half of the antitheses; and they are within the framework of scholarly discussion. Whatever else the antitheses are, they are not mere academic debate.

A further discussion of εγὼ δὲ λέγω ἵμαν has appeared in an illuminating article by Eduard Lohse; after discussing many passages in which this same type of parallel occurs, he notes that the rabbinic formula is not second person "you
have heard", but first person "I might understand (swm' ny)". After citing many parallels, mostly from The Tosephta, Lohse concludes that the expression "but I say (wmr ny)" in the Tannaitic literature is used either to soften or contradict the opinion of a distinguished scholar. When someone wants an opinion to carry weight, it must be supported by scriptural quotation or illustration. However, when wmr is introduced, then opinion stands against opinion -- the majority against a single scholar; then a solution to the controversial judgment must be found through renewed questioning and examination of pertinent scriptural passages. Jesus, on the contrary, neither contrasts his egō de legō hymn with other scholars, nor does he ground it through scriptural exegesis; his word is marked with absolute authority -- an authority which is evident throughout Matthew.

R. Karpinski points out that in Matthew, everyone speaks of Jesus' authority -- Jesus himself (21:24, 27; 28:18), the Evangelist (10:1), the crowds (7:29), and opponents (21:23). At 7:29 the crowds are astonished at Jesus' teaching, "for he taught them as one who had authority (exousia) and not as their scribes". At 10:1 the Evangelist says that Jesus gave the twelve authority (exousia) over unclean spirits, to cast them out.

The clearest place in Matthew where Jesus speaks of his own authority is 28:18 -- "All authority in heaven and on
earth has been given to me (edōthē moi pasa exousia en ouranō kai epi gēs). There are other places, however, where Jesus' authority is clear, even though it is a little less direct. In the wisdom passage (11:25-30) Jesus says, "Come to me, all who labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest" (11:28); and "All things have been delivered to me by my Father (panta moi paredoθē hypo tou patros mou)" (11:27). In Mt. 19:16ff., the rich young man, even though he claims to have obeyed all the commandments (and Jesus does not dispute his claim), does not enter the kingdom because he does not obey Christ, and therefore does not follow him (19:21f.). It is those who will follow him who will receive eternal life (19:29).

There is one other consideration which indicates that, for Matthew, Jesus is much more than a rabbi with mere rabbinic authority. It is the way that Jesus is, or is not, addressed as rabbi in comparison with Mark. In the transfiguration scene, Peter addresses Jesus as kyrie rather than rabbi (Mk. 9:5; Lk. 9:33 = epistata). In Mt. 20:23 the blind man addresses Jesus as kyrie rather than rhabbouni (Mk. 10:51; Lk. 18:41 = kyrie). In the fig tree incident, Matthew (21:20) omits Mark's (11:21) rhabbie. In contrast to Mark and John, none of the disciples, with the exception of Judas Iscariot (i.e., Mt. 26:25; 26:49 = the betrayal scene), address Jesus as "rabbi". Matthew prefers to have the disciples address
Jesus as "Lord", and, as W. D. Davies has pointed out, this is no mere courtesy title, rather it is honourific.

B. The Validity of the Scribal Interpretation of the Torah?

A closely related issue is the question of rabbinic authority -- the question of whether or not the scribal interpretation of the law is recognized by the Matthean Christ. A few scholars (i.e., Bornkamm and Hummel) say that Matthew does recognize the validity of the scribal interpretation; however, those who disagree with this position seem, on the whole, to have the better of the argument. There is, nevertheless, some point to Bornkamm's opinion that 23:2f. supports the view of the authority of the rabbis. David Hill and K. Stendahl argue that 23:2f. is inserted in order to give maximum force to the subsequent denunciation of the Pharisees. F. Hahn suggests that a comparison of 23:2 and 23:8-10 indicates that it is Jesus, and not the class of scribes, who is the rightful occupant of the kathedra Mōsēs. 23:8-10 clearly indicates the singularity of Jesus' office as a teacher and from that emerges the claim to the kathedra Mōsēs. Ekathisan, in disagreement with Wellhausen and Klostermann, may well look back to a period now ended.

Hahn's suggestion is illuminating and probable. The context does not finally support the view that Matthew acknowledges the validity of the scribal teaching authority. At 23:2f., Jesus says to his disciples and the crowds, "the scribes and
Pharisees sit on Moses' seat; so practice (poiēsate) and observe (tēreite) whatever they tell you (eipōsin) but not what they do (kata de ta erga autōn mē poieite); for they preach (legousin), but do not practice (poiousin)". What the Pharisees do (erga), however, is bind heavy burdens, hard to bear (23:4), i.e., their erga refer directly to the scribal interpretation of the law. What they say (eipōsin), therefore, appears to be, "Obey the law of Moses" -- i.e., they sit on Moses' seat.

Another passage which possibly allows for rabbinic interpretation is 23:23. There the scribes and Pharisees tithe mint and dill and cummin, and have neglected the weightier matters of the law -- justice, mercy, and faith; "these", says Jesus, "you ought to have done without neglecting the others." The passage appears to mean that they are right in tithing mint and dill and cummin, and that their interpretation on this matter is right. 23:24 states, however, that the scribes and Pharisees are blind guides who strain at a gnat and swallow a camel. I take this to mean that the Old Testament command to tithe is valid, but not necessarily every rabbinic interpretation of tithing. The matter of tithing is relatively unimportant, and has been blown out of all proportion to its true significance.\footnote{153}

The texts considered, then, do not indicate that Matthew believes in the authority of the scribal interpretation.
There are also several positive indications that Matthew does not acknowledge the validity of scribal interpretation. For the sake of their tradition, the scribes and Pharisees transgress the commandment (τέν ἐντολὴν) of God (15:3), and make void the word (τὸν λόγον) or law (τὸν νομὸν) of God (15:6). The disciples are to beware of their leaven or teaching (διδαχή) (16:12). They are "blind guides" (23:16; 15:14), "fools" (23:17), and "blind men" (23:19). Although outwardly righteous, inwardly they are full of hypocrisy and iniquity (ἀνομία) (23:28).

Jesus rejects the scribal interpretation of sabbath laws (although not necessarily rejecting the sabbath itself). The disciples, when hungry are permitted by Jesus (but not by the Pharisees), to pluck and eat ears of grain on the sabbath (12:1-8). Jesus notes how David, when hungry, unlawfully entered the house of God and ate the bread of the presence on the sabbath (12:3f.). He also goes against rabbinic tradition by healing on the sabbath (12:9-14).

In the antitheses of the Sermon on the Mount itself (5:21-48) there are indications that Jesus is criticizing the scribal interpretation. At 5:43ff. Jesus is criticizing, if not a rabbinic halakah, at least somebody's halakah. "You shall love your neighbour and hate your enemy" (5:43) is an altogether different interpretation of Lev. 19:18.
than Jesus gives at 22:39 and 19:19. The interpretation which Jesus criticizes here is one that omits "as yourself" from, and adds "hate your enemy" to, Lev. 19:18. The love for one's neighbour in 5:43 is no better than what one tax collector has for another (5:46); loving one's neighbour and hating one's enemy (5:43), in context, appears to mean "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours". Lev. 19:18 at Mt. 19:19 and 22:39 means something vastly different.

Again, in the antitheses, Jesus criticizes the rabbinic teaching on oaths (5:33-36; cf. 23:16-23), and divorce (or at least the school of Hillel's view of it) (5:31f.; cf. 19:1-9). 154

C. The validity of the Mosaic Torah

The teaching of the Matthean Christ on oaths and divorce (and also on the lex talonios; 5:38f.) raises the question as to whether he is criticizing the Mosaic torah (and is thus contradicting 5:17-19).

In dealing with each of these problems, the Matthean Jesus quotes from passages of the Old Testament, which allow something which he prohibits — i.e., divorce (Mt. 5:31 = Deut. 24:1), oaths (Mt. 5:33 = Lev. 19:12; Num. 30:2; Deut. 23:21), and the lex talonios (Mt. 5:38 =Ex. 21:24; Lev. 24:20; Deut. 19:21). The question is whether or not Jesus is contradicting the commanding aspect of the Old Testament. An example of how Jesus can, at first sight, appear to criticize the
Mosaic torah and yet believe that it is valid is shown in the case of divorce in Mt. 19:3-9. The Pharisees ask Jesus why Moses commanded one to give a certificate of divorce and put her away (19:7). Jesus replies that for their hardness of heart Moses allowed (not commanded) them to divorce their wives, but from the beginning it was not so. It is also noteworthy that, in support of the interpretation, Jesus appeals to the authority of torah texts -- Gen. 1:27; 5:2 (arsen kai thēly epoiēsen) and Gen. 2:24 (heneka ... mian). In the beginning (Mt. 19:8), God willed that there should be no divorce (Mt. 19:4f.). Moses accepts the validity of the will of God as expressed in Gen. 2:24, but makes a concession (Deut. 24:1) because of the hardness of men's hearts. What is commanded (Deut. 24:1) is not divorce, but the giving of a certificate of divorce, and this is an advance over no certificate of divorce. In the case of divorce (Mt. 19:1-9; 5:31ff.), Jesus (as is the case in 5:17) does not take away from the Old Testament, but adds to it. The commands of Jesus are an interpretation of, and an advancement upon, the Old Testament; his commands are an expression of the pure will of God -- an expression at which the Old Testament aimed.

By analogy, the same conclusion could be reached in the case of oaths (5:33-36) and the lex talionis (5:38f.). Although in 5:33-36 Jesus' primary concern is not the Old Testament view of oaths, but someone's interpretation of them; at
the same time, he does go beyond the Old Testament. The Old Testament said that one is not to swear falsely (cf. Mt. 5:33), but Jesus says that one is not to swear at all. Jesus advances in the same direction as the Old Testament -- from a limitation of oaths to a further limitation of oaths. The Old Testament legislation was not intended to make one take an oath, but if one insisted on taking an oath, it prohibited him from swearing falsely; in the kingdom of heaven, however, there is no need to swear at all.

The lex talionis in the Old Testament also was not a command for vengeance, but a prohibition of unmeasured vengeance. Jesus advances in the same direction, and prohibits measured vengeance. 158

This conclusion, that Jesus does not contradict the commanding aspect of scripture, and that he advances in the same direction in which the Old Testament aimed, agrees well with Jeremia's view of πληροσάι in 5:17. Jesus does not take away from the law, but adds to it; he brings it to its full eschatological measure by teaching, by bringing the final revelation. It agrees, too, with the linguistic background which indicates the filling up of a measure. 159

Outside of the antitheses there are other positive indications, besides 5:17-19, that Jesus accepts the validity of the Mosaic torah. In 22:34-40 Jesus claims that all the law and the prophets depend on the whole-hearted love of God
and neighbour (a direct quote of Deut. 6:5 and Lev. 19:18, respectively); and in 7:12 the essence of the law and the prophets is expressed in the golden rule. The whole-hearted love of one's neighbour (Lev. 19:18) and the Decalogue -- i.e., that one should not kill, commit adultery, steal, or bear false witness, and that one should honour his father and mother -- are affirmed in Mt. 19:16-19; these are conceived of as the commandments (τας ἐντολας) and are necessary to keep in order to enter life. Further, in Mt. 12:7 and 9:13, it is the Old Testament (Hos. 6:6) which teaches "I desire mercy and not sacrifice". At 23:23 it is obligatory to do the weightier matters of the law -- justice, mercy, and faith -- and not neglect the others (tithing mint, dill, and cummin). Finally, Jesus commands a healed leper to show himself to the priest and offer the gift that Moses commanded as proof to the people (8:1-4).

In the passages thus far considered, Matthew accepts the validity of the Mosaic torah; however, there is a crux when it comes to his view of the cultic law. Matthew appears to take such matters of the ceremonial law as private sacrifice (5:23f.), the temple taxes (17:24f.), alms, prayer, and fasting (6:1ff.), and the command concerning the sabbath (24:20) for granted. It should not be assumed, however, that for Matthew it is necessary for the Christian to continue to perform the ceremonial law. Gerhard Barth points out that Mt. 24:20 --
"Pray that your flight may not be in winter or on a sabbath" -- hardly means that for the sake of conscience one should so pray because flight on the sabbath is sin, since in contemporary Judaism there are no longer any witnesses for such a strict attitude. E. Hirsch and A. Schlatter think of this passage as referring to the danger from hate-charged Jews. Hirsch points out that "a Christian congregation fleeing on the sabbath would have been as recognizable as a spotted dog." The severe tension between church and Judaism in Matthew's Gospel would make this attitude intelligible.

Similarly, Jesus and his disciples pay the temple tax, not because it is necessary in principle, but so that they "might not give offense to them" (17:27).

Perhaps also, Matthew is able to distinguish between the conditions of Jesus' ministry and the post-resurrection period. Just because the Matthean Jesus makes use of an illustration regarding private sacrifice (5:23ff.), alms, prayer, and fasting (6:1ff.) it does not mean that it is necessary for the Christian church to obey the ceremonial law. Even if Matthew should regard the ceremonial law as necessary, it is hardly the case that it needs to be carried out in order to effect atonement; since for Matthew, this is done in the death of Jesus. At 1:21 we are told that Mary is to call her son's name Jesus, "for he will save his people from their sins". At 9:2, Jesus forgives a paralytic of his sins. At 16:21, we
are told that "From that time (apo tote, cf. 4:17) Jesus began to show his disciples that he must go to Jerusalem and suffer many things from the elders and chief priests and scribes, and be killed, and on the third day be raised." At 20:18ff. we are told that the Son of man is to be "delivered...condemned to death...crucified...and raised". At 20:27 we are told that the Son of man "came not to be served but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for many." At 26:28 Jesus says that the cup "is my blood of the covenant, which is poured out for many for the forgiveness of sins." Furthermore, both the statement that "his name shall be called 'Emmanuel' (which means God with us)" (1:23), and the fact that at the moment of Jesus' death the veil of the temple is torn in two from top to bottom (27:51), indicate that with Jesus, a direct access to God is made available.165

D. The Question of a New Torah in Matthew

An issue closely related to the issues of the validity of the Mosaic law itself, the scribal interpretation of it, and whether any part of it has been abrogated, is the question whether Matthew has Jesus proclaim a new torah. This position is both affirmed166 and denied167 by many scholars. On the one hand, I would disagree with Hamerton-Kelly168 and Ulrich Luck169 that Jesus is merely proclaiming a new halaka on the torah. Jesus is much more than a rabbi, and the Mosaic motifs indicate that the teaching of Jesus is just as much
revelation and torah\textsuperscript{170} as the Mosaic torah. It is appropriate, I believe, to call the revelation which Jesus proclaims to be in some sense "new", but it is not "new" -- in disagreement with B.W. Bacon,\textsuperscript{171} G. D. Kilpatrick,\textsuperscript{172} and W. D. Davies\textsuperscript{173} -- if new is understood in the sense of a replacement of the old. As we have seen above (on 5:17-19), it is new in that it adds to the old. The Mosaic motifs in Matthew are to be understood in correspondence rather than in antithesis to Moses.\textsuperscript{174}

Robert Banks denies that Jesus' teaching is torah because: (a) his teaching transcends the law, (b) no legal category can describe the contents of Mt. 5:17-48, (c) the parables cannot be called legal material, and (d) the expectation of a new torah is absent in contemporary Judaism.\textsuperscript{175}

My reaction is that even if (d) were correct -- for a contrary view cf. above, p. 47ff. -- Jesus' words could still be torah. Points (a), (b), and (c) seem to be invalidated if torah is understood primarily as "instruction". Banks himself admits that this is the primary sense of both torah and Christ's teaching, and that Christ does refer to his own words as \textit{entolai}, and yet curiously, Christ's words are not "torah".\textsuperscript{176} I believe that all of Christ's words are torah because primarily they are instruction, and \textit{terein panta hosa enteila\mbox{\ae}}\textsuperscript{m} (Mt. 28:20) refers to the whole of the teaching of Jesus.\textsuperscript{177}
E. The Nature of Matthean Ethics

A further necessary consideration in relation to the antitheses is the nature of the ethic involved -- particularly, in light of the "I say to you", the demand for a righteousness that exceeds that of the scribes and Pharisees (5:20), and the demand for perfection (5:48). 178

The positions described by McArthur and/or Jeremias 179 are designated as the absolutist view, 180 the modification view, 181 the hyperbolic view, 182 the general principles view, 183 the attitudes, not acts view, 184 the double-standard view, 185 the two realms view, 186 the perfectionist view, 187 the interim-ethnic view, 188 and the impossible ideal view. 189 A further position is what might be designated as the Christological interpretation of Eduard Thurneysen, Karl Barth, and Dietrich Bonhoeffer. 190

Joachim Jeremiaş would agree with the Christological view inasmuch as it states that the sermon is not law but gospel. Jeremiaş claims that the problem with the impossible ideal view and the perfectionist view is that they understand the sermon in terms of law. While the law challenges man to rely on his own strength and do his utmost, the gospel brings man before the gift of God and challenges him to make the gift of God the basis of his life. The sermon is not so much "Christian ethics" (a term liable to misunderstanding) as lived faith (gelebter Glaube). The sermon is catechetical instruction
for those within the church, and as such it was preceded
something else -- the proclamation of the gospel. 191

A final view is the unconditioned divine will view 192
of Martin Dibelius. 193 For him, like Schweitzer, the sermon
is eschatological and unlike Schweitzer, it is eternal. We
are not able to perform it in its full scope, but we are able
to be transformed by it. The demand is not given in a Jewish
legal sense -- to do what is written and to omit what is not
written; it is not a demand to do something, but to be some-
thing. The aim of the sermon is the creation of a new type
of man who knows the will of God; the ultimate eschatological
aim of God, and who here and now, wants to live in accordance
with this will of God.

By way of evaluation, I would deny that the sermon is
to be understood in any way in terms either of praeparatio
evangêlica or of an absolute legalism, or of a spiritual and
a temporal sphere, or of two classes of Christians. 194 Further,
a view that refuses to see any figures of speech (i.e., 5:29
"If your right eye causes you to sin, pluck it out"), or that
modifies the commandment in order to get around the rigour of
its provisions, is also completely wrong.

The other views are all partially true, and are not nec-
cessarily mutually exclusive. In light of the love command-
ment (22:34-40) and the golden rule (7:12) there is some
truth in the position that Jesus in the antitheses is announ-

ing general principles through specific instances, and that he is more concerned with attitudes than with specific acts. Love at root, is preeminently an attitude, and in 22:34-40, it is the one principle on which all the law and the prophets depend. Also, there is a certain sense in which the sermon is not law but gospel, if law is understood legalistically. I believe, however, that this is a false antithesis, because torah (even in the Old Testament) is not to be understood in terms of the normal English sense of law, but in terms of revelation or instruction.195 & 196

Schweitzer, I believe, is wrong in his interim-ethic proposal, but right (as we have seen above) on the eschatological nature of the Sermon on the Mount. I am in agreement with Dibelius when he says that the ethic is both eschatological and eternal. With regard to the Christological position, Matthew (in disagreement with Thurneysen and Barth) is primarily interested, not in describing the person of Christ, or the prophecies concerning him,197 but rather in describing what God wills that men should do. Indeed, the view that the disciple is better able to obey the commandments by virtue of his participation both in the victory of Christ on the cross, and in the community thereby founded by Christ, is possible.

F. The Nature of Righteousness in Matthew

This point raises the question as to whether righteousness is a gift of God in Matthew. Certainly, there are verses
in Matthew, in addition to 5:20 (the demand for righteousness which far exceeds that of the scribes and Pharisees) and 5:48 (the demand for perfection), which can be interpreted as denying that righteousness is a gift, and affirming that one must put forth an extraordinary effort in order to enter the kingdom of heaven. For instance, in 7:13 those who enter into eternal life are few, for the gate is narrow and the way is hard; in 10:22 it is the one who endures to the end who will be saved; in 5:19 he who teaches and does the commandments will be great in the kingdom of heaven; and in three passages (7:21; 12:50; 21:28ff.) the emphasis is placed on doing the will (thēlēma) of God. Jesus says that it is the one who does the will of his Father in heaven who enters the kingdom of heaven (7:21), and is his brother and sister and mother (12:50). In the parable of the man who has two sons whom he orders to work in his vineyard (21:28ff.), it is the one who at first refuses to go and later repents -- and not the one who at first says he will go and later does not -- that does the will (thēlēma) of his father. The conclusion that Jesus draws from this, however, is that the tax collectors and the harlots will go into the kingdom of heaven before the chief priests and elders (21:31). If 5:20 is read both in the light of this parable and 9:13 -- "I came, not to call the righteous (dikaiouj), but sinners" -- then it is the Jewish leaders who are disobedient to God, and their righteousness is not true
righteousness. Further, even a tax collector or harlot who repents, does the will of the Father and will enter the kingdom (21:28-31). Indeed, in Matthew the theme of forgiveness is not absent. The implication of the parable of the two debtors (18:23-35) is that God's forgiveness of man is infinite (i.e., ten thousand talents); it is a forgiveness conditional only upon one's forgiving his fellowman the (in comparison) infinitesimal amount (i.e., one hundred denarii). Similarly, in the Lord's Prayer, one can presume upon God's forgiveness if he is willing to forgive his fellowman who has wronged him (Mt. 6:14-15). 198

Moreover, although the disciples' righteousness must far exceed that of the scribes and Pharisees (5:20), yet, in contrast to heavy burdens which the Pharisees bind (23:4), Jesus' yoke is easy and his burden is light (11:30); he will give rest to all the weary and heavy laden who come to him (11:28), and will give good things to those who ask him (7:11). Further, the blessed (makarioi) are the poor in spirit (5:3), the merciful (5:7), the pure in heart (5:8), those who mourn (5:4), those who hunger and thirst after righteousness (5:6), and those who are persecuted for righteousness' sake (5:10). The one who humbles himself as a child is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven (18:4, cf. 23:12). The one who gives even a cup of cold water to "one of these little ones (hena tôn mikrōn toutōn)" will be rewarded (10:42). The one who
receives a prophet and a righteous man receives the reward of a prophet and a righteous man (10:41). In the parable of the sheep and the goats (25:31ff.), the sheep are to inherit the kingdom prepared for them from the foundation of the world (25:34), for they fed the hungry, gave the thirsty to drink, welcomed the stranger, clothed the naked, visited the sick, and went to the one in prison. Inasmuch as they did that to the least of the king's brothers, they did it to Christ (25:35-40). In the parable of the marriage feast (22:1-11), the king's servants go into the streets and gather all whom they find, both good and bad, in order that the wedding hall might be filled with guests (22:9-10). In the parable of the lost sheep, it is the Father who seeks out the little ones who are lost (18:12ff.). Finally, the disciples are to give without pay, because they have received without pay (10:8).

In the above paragraphs, much is spoken of the forgiveness and gratuity of God, but at the same time, it in some sense seems to be conditioned upon moral performance. One might therefore conclude that the disciple is urged to perform good works in order to obtain eternal life. There are indications, however, that the opposite is the case. For Matthew, "the eye is the lamp of the body"; if one's eye is sound his whole body is full of light, but if it is not sound his body is full of darkness" (6:22-23). One does not become a sound tree by producing sound fruit; rather a sound tree cannot bear evil fruit nor can a bad tree bear good fruit.
(7:18) -- yet one can be known by his fruits (7:16, 20; 12:33).
Since the tree is known by its fruit, the Pharisees are to
make the tree and its fruit, either good or bad. They cannot
speak good when they are evil; the good man out of his good
treasure, brings forth good, and the evil man out of his evil
treasure brings forth evil. It is out of the abundance of the
heart that the mouth speaks (12:33-37).

If the point about the tree and its fruit in 7:16ff.
and 12:33ff. are to be correlated with 15:13, then being a
sound tree is itself a gift of God, for there the Matthean
Jesus says, "every plant which my heavenly Father has not
planted will be rooted up".

Repeatedly in Matthew, the decisive criterion for en-
trance into the kingdom is allegiance to Christ. Following
(akoloutheō) Christ is imperative for Peter and Andrew (4:19f.),
James and John (4:22), Matthew the tax collector (9:9), and
the rich young man (19:21). 200 It is the one who denies him-
self and takes up his cross (16:24), and who leaves posses-
sions and relatives for the sake of Christ (19:29; cf. 10:38)
who will receive eternal life.

It is in this light, therefore, that Matthew's concept
of righteousness is to be understood. In disagreement with
such scholars as Carlton, 201 Trilling, 202 and Strecker, 203
and in agreement with Barth, 204 and Hartmut Günther 205 I be-
lieve righteousness is a gift of God in Matthew. Günther goes
even further and states that one receives righteousness because of his relationship to Christ. First, however, several preliminary observations about righteousness in Matthew are in order. That dikaiosynē is a special word for Matthew is indicated by the fact that in the synoptic Gospels, apart from Lk. 1:75, it only occurs in seven passages, all of them in Matthew (3:15; 5:6, 10, 20; 6:1, 33; 21:32) -- five are in the Sermon of the Mount, and two of these (Mt. 5:6 = Lk. 6:21a and Mt. 6:33 = Lk. 12:31) have parallels in the Sermon on the Plain. Moreover, dikaiosynē is the theme of the Sermon on the Mount; the conduct demanded in 5:21-48 is clearly a description of the greater righteousness of 5:20, and in 6:1 dikaiosynē, as Barth notes, means all the pious exercises in 6:1-18 rather than its frequent meaning of eleemosynē in late Judaism. Outside the sermon, the word occurs in two of Jesus' statements (3:15 and 21:32) which are made, first to John the Baptist (3:15), and then concerning him (21:32). Mt. 3:15 ("for thus it is fitting for us to fulfill all righteousness plērōsai pasan dikaiosynēn") marks the first verse in which Jesus speaks in the gospel, and at the same time it characterizes his own deeds. 21:32 ("For John came in the way of righteousness -- en hōdō dikaiosynēs") marks the last verse in which Jesus speaks concerning the entire mission of John; a response of belief and repentance to this mission gains for the tax collectors and harlots, rather than the Jewish leaders,
admittance into the kingdom of heaven (cf. 21:31, 32b). Within the sermon, a distinction must be made between the absolute (ἡ) δικαιοσύνη (5:6, 10), δικαιοσύνη auton (6:33), and δικαιοσύνη ὑμῶν (5:20; 6:1). The δικαιοσύνη ὑμῶν of 5:20 and 6:1 is a human righteousness -- referring to both what the disciples are to be and do -- whereas the δικαιοσύνη auton of 6:33 is a divine righteousness. In 6:33 one is to seek the τὴν βασιλείαν (τοῦ θεοῦ) καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνη auton. Whether or not auton refers to θεοῦ or βασιλείαν, at any rate it is God's kingdom and God's righteousness which obtains in it; both, as in the Lord's Prayer (6:9-14), are to be sought before the daily provisions of life (6:31-34).

In 5:6 and 10 (ἡ) δικαιοσύνη is used absolutely. In 5:6 it is those who hunger and thirst after it (who long to receive it) that will be satisfied; in 5:10 there are close parallels to 5:3 and 5:11; the hoi πτοχοι τῷ πνεύματι (5:3) and the hoi δεδιογμένοι heneken δικαιοσύνες (5:10) are makarioi and of them estin (= present instead of the future in the rest of the beatitudes) ἡ βασιλεία τῶν ουρανῶν. The blessed are both those who are persecuted heneken δικαιοσύνες (5:10) and heneken ἐμοῦ (= Jesus; 5:11). This comparison of 5:10 and 11, therefore, seems to indicate that Jesus is equated with absolute righteousness, that one who is in relationship to Christ is in some sense related to righteousness, and that this right-
eousness is a present possession. In 6:33, it is righteousness which obtains within the kingdom, that must be sought at all costs, just as Christ, as we have seen above, must be followed at all costs. It is in this light that 5:20 and 6:1 are to be read; the dikaiosynē hymōn can be performed only by those who follow Christ, who are within the kingdom, and have access to the righteousness which pertains within it. This righteousness can be performed only by those who are "sound trees" (7:17, 18), and those who have "sound eyes" (6:22, 23); it can be performed only by those whose fundamental vision of things is correct rather than perverted, and who at the very core of their being hunger and thirst after righteousness. It is these who are in the kingdom and these who follow Christ. The followers of Christ, or the righteous ones, have allegiance, not only to the person of Christ, but also to the teachings of Christ; they, in contrast to the Pharisees, in no way try to get around the lasting radicalness of the law, and they also undertake to follow Christ in what he has said in addition to the law. It is in this sense that their righteousness exceeds that of the scribes and Pharisees (5:20), and that they are perfect, as their heavenly Father is perfect (5:48).

G. The Significance of the Demand for Perfection

This brings us to consider the meaning of the demand for perfection in 5:48. It was seen above that the reason
why the rich young man did not have treasure in heaven or perfection (teleios) (19:21) -- the only place in Matthew besides 5:48 where teleios is used -- was that he was of divided heart. This corresponds well with the meaning of teleios in the LXX\textsuperscript{212} where it means "unblemished", "undivided", "complete", "whole", and is especially used for \textsuperscript{yaleph} and tamim. In 1 Kings (=3 Bas.) 8:61; 11:4; 15:3, 14, and 1 Chron. 28:9 teleios is the translation for the Hebrew \textsuperscript{yaleph}, and is used of the heart which is undivided (pros kyrion or meta kyrion) in exclusive worship, without idolatry, and wholly obedient to God's will. Nor is the case different when tamim is translated by teleios; for instance, in Deut. 18:13 -- a verse which Mt. 5:48 is, perhaps alluding to -- the people are to serve Yahweh wholly and undividedly (teleios esè enantion kyrion), and Noah, in Gen. 6:9, was a righteous (dikaios) man, blameless (teleios) in his generation (cf. Sir. 44:17; Nòe heurethon teleios dikaios).

Another passage which is a candidate for interpreting Mt. 5:48 is Lev. 19:2 (and the parallel passages in Lev. 11:44, 45; 20:7, 26), even though hagios is used there instead of teleios. Lev. 19:2 (LXX) reads hagioi esè theot egō hagios (qèdòsìm) kyrion ho theos hymōn. It was distinctive of Israel that they were set apart for, and must reflect the character of, Yahweh; this point is made particularly in Lev. 20:26 "You shall be holy to me; for I the Lord am holy, and have
separated you from the peoples, that you should be mine. Israel's unique position was to result from, and be characterized by, their likeness to God. Now the disciples (Mt. 5:48) are to be perfect because they occupy this unique position.

It is along these Old Testament lines, in contrast to a Greek or Qumran view, that perfection is to be understood; the idea of a reflection of the character of God agrees well with 5:43-48, and the idea of a whole-hearted obedience of God agrees with what I have concluded on the rest of 5:20-48. Indeed, 5:48 is a fitting summary of both the command to love one's enemy (5:43ff.) and the rest of the antitheses. Indeed, it could be argued that the command to love one's enemy is a summary of the rest of the antitheses; at any rate the whole law is summed up in the love commandment (22:34-40).

H. The Significance of the Love Commandment

This last statement brings me to my final task in expounding 5:21-48 -- that is, to show the significance of the love commandment for Matthew as a whole, and to show how the antitheses can be understood in terms of love.

A comparison of Mt. 22:34-40 with its parallel passage in Mk. 12:28-34 reveals how central the love commandment is, not only for Matthew's total eschatological outlook, but in particular for his understanding of the law. Matthew omits the confession (Mk. 12:29) that God is one (akoue Israel)
kyrios ho theos homon kyrios heis estin), the favourable response of the questioner (Mk. 12:32-34), the reply of Jesus (ou makran ei apo tes basileias tou theou) (Mk. 12:34), and the phrase kai ex holês tes ischyos sou (Mk. 12:30); he adds peirazon auton (22:35), thus stressing the hostile intent of the questioner, en to nomo (22:36), thus stressing that it is a matter which has specifically to do with the law, autē estin hē megalē kai prōtē entolē (22:38), thus stressing the extreme importance of love of God, and homoia autē (22:39), thus showing that love of neighbour is of similar importance to love of God. Matthew also has exchanged several phrases for ones existing in Mark. The question concerns, not the commandment which is prōtē pantōn (Mk. 12:28), but that which is megalē en to nomo (Mt. 22:36). The questioner is not heis tôn grammateōn (Mk. 12:28), but a nomikos (Mt. 22:35). One is to love God en (not ex) holē tē kardia... psychē... dianoia (Mt. 22:37). Finally, Mark's (12:31) conclusion (meizōn toutōn allē entolē ouk estin) concerning the commandment to love God and neighbour has become en tautais tais dysin entolais holos ho nomos krematai kai hoi prophētai (Mt. 22:40). This use of megalē (Mt. 22:36), nomikos (a term unique to Matthew; Mt. 22:35), and en (22:37) may or may not be significant, but clearly the assertion en tautais... prophētai (Mt. 22:40) is of utmost importance, and is, along with 7:12; 9:13; 12:7; and 23:23, a statement on the essence of the law.
If Matthew means the same as similar statements in the writings of the rabbis, the meaning would be that the whole law and prophets can be exegetically deduced from the command to love God and neighbour (without reference to the precedence of either commandment). However, the megalē kai prōtē entolē (22:38) indicates the precedence of love over the other commandments; the twofold commandment to love is the essence of the law (22:40); it must be performed with one's entire being (kardía . . . psychē . . . dianoia; 22:37).

This statement on love agrees well with what Jesus says in the antitheses; it is not only the outward act, but also the inward motive from which the outward act issues, that is forbidden. Jesus thus forbids not only murder (5:21), adultery (5:27), divorce (5:31f.), oaths (5:33-36), or retaliation (5:39), but also anger (5:22), lust (5:28), and (at least by implication) the desire for either divorce (5:31f.), deception (5:33-36), or retaliation (5:38f.). Undoubtedly, if one loved God with his whole being and his neighbour as himself, these forbidden motives (and the outward acts which spring from them) would disappear.

Our discussion of the issues raised in 5:20-48 is now complete. I shall summarize the results. The ethics proclaimed by the Matthean Jesus are eschatological and eternal; they purport to express the unconditioned divine will of God. The ethical standard at which the Old Testament aimed, and
which is the summation of Jesus' teaching in Matthew, is the command to love God with one's whole being, and to love one's neighbour as oneself (22:34-40). The call to perfection (5:48) is a call to be whole-hearted and to reflect the character of God; as such it is a fitting summary to the love command in 5:43ff. and to the six antitheses as a whole. The demand for a better righteousness (5:20) is a demand to perform acts of righteousness out of pure motives; in order to do this, one must be related to Christ and be righteous inwardly.

In 5:20-48 and in Matthew as a whole, Jesus speaks with absolute authority. For Matthew, the scribal interpretation of the law and the ceremonial law itself are not, but the moral law is, binding. Jesus imparts torah; however, in so doing, he does not take away from the commanding aspect of the Old Testament. Rather, he advances in the same direction in which it aimed; he goes beyond the Old Testament and brings the final revelation. In short, what Jesus does in 5:20-48 refers to one aspect of plerósa in 5:17. In 5:20-48 Jesus fulfils the law; he fills up its eschatological measure by teaching.

Footnotes: Chapter Two

1 If 3:8-12 is to be excluded as a discourse.

2 If 5:21-48 is a criticism of the scribal tradition (as will be argued below) then 5:20 appears to be a natural
introduction to 5:21-48. 6:1 begins a new section with dikaiosynē hymōn; possibly 5:20 does the same.


5In support of this concept of an empty vessel, Zahn cites Mt. 23:32; 2 Mac. 6:14; Mt. 13:14; and Acts 13:32f. In Mt. 23:32, the scribes and Pharisees, in their sin, are to fill up the measure of their fathers (plerōsate ton metron tôn paterōn hymōn). In 2 Mac. 6:14 the Lord waits patiently to punish them until they have reached the full measure of their sins (ekplerōsin hamartían). The verbs used in Mt. 13:14 and in Acts 13:33 are anapleroutai and ekpeplerōken, respectively.


7Ad. loc., p. 54.

8Cf. also Schlatter, ad. loc., p. 153f.


15 Op. cit., p. 28. Ljungman, however, merely asserts that this is the case; he does not provide documentary evidence.


18 Dalman conjectures the same Jewish terminology behind histanein and kártargein in Rom. 3:31.


The supporters of this position disagree on the original Aramaic behind the expression. Klostermann (*ad. loc.*, p. 41) denies, but Allen affirms (*ad. loc.*, p. 46) that it goes back — albeit in a distorted form — to b. Shab. 116b ("I came not to diminish the law of Moses, but to add to it"). Kümmel (*op. cit.*, p. 34) believes it is possible that katalysai and plorōsai go back to bər and qyrm; however, he notes that the Syriac reads šr' and ml'.


23 For Descamps, the Hebrew verb underlying plërōn is mlə'; this verb, he claims, has the derived meaning "to realize" in 1 Kings 2:27; 8:15, 24; 2 Chron. 6:14, 15; 36:21, 22; Jer. 51:25. Cf. Ljungman, *op. cit.*, p. 17; *Les Justes*, *op. cit.*, p. 130f.; *Essai d'Interpretation*, *op. cit.*, p. 161.


26 *Christian Origins*, *op. cit.*


28 *Ibid.*, p. 44. He believes that 5:31-32, 43 are, contrary to the other antitheses, a contravention of the demand of God (*op. cit.*, p. 44). Perhaps, however, even these could reveal the ultimate intention of the Law. On this view, Davies
has taken up the position of Martin Albertz, *Die Synoptischen Streitgespräche* (Berlin, 1931).

29 *Ibid.*, p. 46. Davies maintains that the view of M.-J. Lagrange, *L’Evangelie selon Saint Matthieu* (Paris: Gabalda, 1927), that ἥν ὁ πᾶν παντα γένοται is to be tied very rigidly to the preceding phrase ἥν ὁ παρελθὼν κτίσις, can be accommodated to this schema. He prefers, however, the view of H. J. Schoeps who explains ἥν ὁ παρελθὼν as an addition to the previous words ἥν ὁ παρελθὼν ὁ οὐράνιος και ἡ γῆ, i.e., it then asserts the permanence of the law till the age to come arrives (*ibid.*, p. 61f., 64). He believes that Lagrange’s position is not excluded, because in the consummation envisaged by Jesus through his death, the final torah will prevail and preserve all that is valid in the old torah.


32 Jeremias (*ibid.*, p. 83f.) notes that this reading is preferred by Franz Delitzsch, Merx, Chivolson, Jastrow, Goldschmidt, Laible, Resh, A. Meyer, Zahn, Strack, Aufhauser, J. Weiss, Billerbeck, Fiebig, Klostermann, Ljungman, Stauffer, K. G. Kuhn, and Grundmann.

33 Jerémias (*ibid.*, p. 84f.) notes that this reading is preferred by Gudemann, Graetz, Chajes, Levy, Herford, Klausner, Dalman, Baeck, and Schoeps. Jeremias agrees that ἐλλάξ is a reshaping of the logion; it takes up the canonization formula which forbids alterations to the sacred text by deletions or expansions. ἐλλάξ, according to Jeremias, agrees with what Jesus says about the Old Testament elsewhere.


35 The concept of eschatological measure is seen elsewhere in the New Testament by Jeremias: i.e., "the full measure of sin" (Mt. 23:32), "the shortening of the measure of the time of distress" (Mk. 13:20), "harvest as the full measure of time" (Mk. 4:29), "the fullness of time" (Gal. 4:4), "the full number of martyrs" (Rev. 6:11), etc.


40 The above passages and their parallels are the only ones in the synoptics where katalýein is used transitively. It is used intransitively at Lk. 9:12 and 19:7 with the meaning of "halt", "rest", or "find lodging". Cf. Walter Bauer, A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature, trans. and adapted William F. Arndt and F. Wilbur Gingrich (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 415.


42 Ad. loc., p. 46.

43 Cf. Bauer, op. cit., p. 415. According to Bauer, this meaning occurs in Josephus Antiq. 16,35 and 20,81; Philo Somn. 2:123.

44 I would agree with Allen that the idea of "abrogating" or "declaring not binding" is involved in the passages quoted; however, in the passages quoted it appears to me that katalýein cannot be limited to this meaning. In 2 Macc. 2:22, Antiochus not only declares the laws not binding, but obviously forces the Jews not to observe the laws, just as Judas not only declares the laws binding but forces the Jews to observe them. In 4 Macc. 5:33, part of Eleazer's statement surely means that he will not break (i.e., "not observe") the laws of his fathers.
In 2 Macc. 4:11 and 17:9 as well, there is not only a "declaring" of what is not binding, but a "compelling" to not observe the laws.

Also, if kata lysai in Mt. 5:17 is to be compared with lysē...kai didaxē (5:19), then it is both a not observing and a teaching not to observe with the "not observing" being logically prior to the "teaching not to observe", i.e., lysē in 5:19 means "not observe" because lysē...kai didaxē are contrasted with poiesē kai didaxē; lysē is therefore the opposite of poiesē.

45 Ad. loc., p. 212, n. 72.
47 It does, however, make sense to say that the law and the prophets are abolished if they are understood in the heils-geschichtlich sense (as Ljungman so understands them) that the promises of scripture are incapable of being realized.

48 Cf. above, p. 26ff.
49 G. Barth's interpretation of plērōsai as "establish" I will deal with anon.

50 Cf. above, p. 26ff.
51 Cf. 94f., n. 25, and Kümmel, op. cit., p. 34.
53 For Dalman's view, cf. above, p. 27.
56 Ad. loc., p. 58.
59 Cf. above, p. 28.

The exact phrase ho nomos kai hoi prophētaī is used only at 7:12; in 5:17 α is substituted for kai; in 11:13 the order of ho nomos and hoi prophētaī is reversed; in 22:40 the word krematāi appears between the words nomos and kai.


Elsewhere in Matthew, prophēteuo has the idea of foretelling the future (15:7), of prophetically revealing what is hidden (26:68), and of proclaiming a divine revelation (7:22). On the judgment day, men will come and say "Lord, Lord, did we not prophesy in your name? . . .?" (7:22); Isaiah foretells of the hypocrisy of the scribes and Pharisees (15:7). At the trial of Jesus, his accusers say "Prophesy to us, you Christ! Who is it that struck you?" (26:68).

Cf. Grundmann, op. cit., p. 141ff.; Barth, op. cit., p. 73.


Davies, op. cit., p. 66, n. 75 notes that A. Feuillet takes this position.


Schniewind, ad. loc., p. 54.

Cf. Barth, op. cit., p. 65.

Georg Strecker, Der Weg der Gerechtigkeit: Unter-

73 My criticism of this is that if panta refers to ho ouranos kai hé gē, it is more natural to have it refer to the parousia or the end of history.
74 For an extensive argument in support of this view see Ljungman, op. cit., p. 36ff. It appears to me that this is the most likely interpretation of panta because of the emphasis placed on iōta hen é mia kerāia in its clause, because it asserts the indivisibility of the law, and because it agrees well with the contrast katalysai/plērōsaí, in 5:17, particularly if Jeremias' interpretation is correct.
75 Cf. Trilling, op. cit., p. 169, n. 11.
76 E.g., Eduard Schweizer, Theologische Literaturzeitung, op. cit., p. 481.
77 Other parallels of 24:34ff. with 5:18 are amēn . . . legō hymnī; ou mē paralthē, and ho ouranos kai hé gē. (Cf. Trilling, op. cit., p. 168).
79 Cf. Barth, op. cit., p. 70.
80 Furthermore, since the clause is absent from the Lucan version of the Lord's Prayer, it is possibly redactional in Matthew.
81 A note of caution should be added here: The exact phrase genēthētō to thēlēma sou is used at 26:42 where Jesus is willing to submit to the will of the Father in the matter of going to the cross. The point is that the phrase may refer, not only to the doing of God's will as an ethical requirement, but the doing of God's will in a heilsgeschichtlich sense; i.e., when Jesus goes to the cross he does the will of God and fulfills the Scripture. (Cf. 26:56 tóto de holon geγενον hina plērōthōsin hai graphai tôn prophētōn). Here, the distinction between "doing" and "happening" is a fine one, and (I think) not a mutually exclusive one.


86 In support he quotes Niddah 58b and Dalman, Jesus-Jeshua, op. cit., p. 237.

87 The passages which are quoted in support are from the Old Testament (Judg. 4:24; 1 Kings 17:17; Ezek. 34:21) and the Mishnah (Sheb. 1:4; Ter. 4:5, 10; Betz. 4:7; Bik. 1:2; Sot. 7:4; Mak. 2:4; Hor. 1:4; Men. 6:7; Bekh. 1:2; Arak. 9:8).

88 I find this interpretation convincing because of the linguistic considerations, and the fact that if vs. 18 is understood first in negative, and then in positive terms, it agrees with both vs. 18 and vs. 19. If this is true, then ἐλεφασι (5:17), πάντα γενήσαι (5:18); and ποιεῖς καὶ διδάξῃ (5:19) are similar (or at least complementary) in meaning and are to be contrasted with λύεις μιάν τὸν ἔντολον τὸτὲν καὶ διδάξῃ, ήτοίς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους (5:19), ἤν μία κεραία οὐ μὴ παρελθῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ ναμοῦ (5:18), and καταλαγῇς (5:17); these latter three are similar (or at least complementary) in meaning.

89 Cf. above, p. 31ff.


Others would claim that toutōn does not relate to anything within the context of Mt. 5:17-48, and that Matthew

Charles E. Carlson, "The Things that Defile (Mark VII. 14) and the Law in Matthew and Mark", New Testament Studies, XV (1968-69), 75-96, p. 79, n. 7, claims that the saying contains pre-Matthean elements, since mian . . . tön elachistön cannot refer to the following antitheses, whereas "these" commandments cannot, in Greek, refer to anything else. Eduard Schweizer, "Observance of the Law and Charismatic Activity in Matthew", op. cit., p. 215, makes reference to the above note by Carlson, and sees touton as referring to the antitheses which follow.


A final interpretation is that touton refers to iota hén e mia keraia (5:18). This view is held by Zahn, ad. loc., p. 218; Klostermann, ad. loc., p. 41, Ljungman, op. cit., p. 48ff., and Hans-Theo Wrege, Die Überlieferungsgeschichte der Bergpredigt (Tubingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 1968), p. 41, n. 3. In light of the parallelism mentioned above, I prefer this latter meaning; I believe, however, that the view of Jeremias and Barth is both possible and more plausible than the other views mentioned.

91 Cf. p. 93, n. 40.
92 Cf. p. 97, n. 36.
94 My difference in interpretation from Jeremias is partly due to the fact that he is interested in what the historical Jesus said; I am interested only in what Matthew says that Jesus said. Jeremias would not agree that there is a unified view in Matthew. (Cf. op. cit., p. 307, n. 1).
95 26:54 reads pōs oun pléōrōthōsin hai graphai hoti houtōs dei genesthai; and 26:56 reads touto de holon gegonen hina pléōrōthōsin hai graphai tōn prophētōn.
96 In both passages the introductory phrase is tote eplerōthē to rhēthon dia leremiou tou prophētou.
97 In 3:15 it is necessary for Jesus to be baptized by John in order to fulfill all righteousness.


100 The mountain in Matthew appears to be the place of revelation—i.e., compare the mount of transfiguration scene (17:1ff.) and the great commission passage (28:16-20). Jindrich Manek, "On the Mount -- On the Plain (Mt. V 1 - Lk. VI 17)", Novum Testamentum, IX (1967), 124-131 shows in detail how Matthew has an affinity towards, and how Luke studiously avoids, mountains.


103 The role of the eschatological prophet in Judaism is well founded. The scriptural basis is Deut. 18:15, 18. 1 Macc. 4:46 and 14:41 speak of "a faithful prophet" who should "come" or "arise". Sir. 48:10f. and Gen. R. 71:9 and 99:11 indicate that Elijah is the coming prophet who would inaugurate the final age and be God's restorer.

It was also believed that the eschatological prophet or the coming Messiah would have Mosaic characteristics. For this point in the Qumran literature see N. Wieder, "The 'Law-Interpreter' of the Sect of the Dead Sea Scrolls: The Second Moses", The Journal of Jewish Studies, IV (1953), 158-175.


105 For Jewish parallels to this phenomenon, see Rudolf Meyer, "didaskalos", in TDNT, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 826f.

106 Friedrich also believes that ho huios mou ho agapētos en hō eudokēsa akouete autou (Mt. 17:5 =Mk. 9:7; Lk. 9:35) may be a reference to the eschatological prophet. Cf. W. D. Davies, The Setting of the Sermon on the Mount (Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1963).

With regard to Mt. 5:17, Friedrich, s. v., p. 847, believes that in Mt. 5:17 Jesus brings the law to its eschatological fulfilment, so that it can be done.

W. D. Davies, The Setting of the Sermon on the Mount, op. cit.

Davies, ibid., p. 26, believes this motif can be expected a priori, because in the ideal future Jewish expectation was conceived of (at least in some circles) in terms of a new Exodus.

Ibid., p. 78.

Davies, ibid., p. 78ff., believes that there are other valid parallels to the Exodus. The magi may have a parallel in the wise men, sorcerers, and charmers of Egypt. In both cases, they are to subserve the purpose of Herod and the Pharaoh, respectively, but fail to do so.

Davies sees other new Exodus and new Moses motifs in Matthew (cf. pp. 25-93), in particular, in the Transfiguration (Mt. 17:1-8), ibid., p. 51ff.

He takes note that the new Moses motif is one strand in a mosaic of motifs, and is not predominant, ibid., p. 92. Furthermore, the reserve of the motif is striking (p. 93); there is not explicit reference to Mount Sinai, and no feature of the account of the giving of the law, as they are developed in Heb. 12:18ff., and the events of Sinai are not referred to, except in the antitheses in 5:21ff. (p. 93).

Ibid., pp. 109-190.

Ibid., p. 120ff.

Ibid., pp. 122-139.

Ibid., p. 173ff.; Davies takes note of the fact that the passages he cites are late. The absence of early passages which expressly claim a new Torah may be due to anti-Christian polemic. The "new law" in the Sermon on the Mount, and the "new commandment" (kairos entole) in John would have produced counter claims in Judaism. Such anti-Christian polemic is seen in Deut. Rab. 8:6; (ibid., p. 185f.).
118 Ibid., p. 188.


120 In Mt. 1:1 and 1:20, it is explicitly stated that both Jesus Christ and Joseph are huioi David.


122 Jack Dean Kingsbury, Matthew: Structure, Christology, Kingdom (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975), pp. 40-127 argues that all other Christological titles in Matthew are subsumed under "Son of God". I tend to think, however, that "Son of God", like "Son of David" (cf. above, p. 50), and "king" are subsumed under "Messiah". Eduard Schweizer, TDNT, op. cit., Vol. VIII, p. 349ff., observes that the king is called God's son at 2 Sam. 7:14; Ps. 2:7; 89:26f; all these instances represent one aspect of the Jewish view of the Davidic monarch which influences the subsequent Messianic promise (e.g., Is. 9:1-6). On the concept of the Messiah as Son of God in Judaism, see Eduard Lohse, TDNT, Vol. VIII, p. 360ff. In Matthew ho Christos and ho huioi tou theou are brought together at 16:16 and 26:63.


Also, in Mt. 1:18, although the vast majority of the manuscripts read tou de Iēsou Christou, I accept the reading tou de Christou. The first reading is intrinsically improbable since it is only in inferior manuscripts (Acts 8:37; 1 Jn. 4:3; Rev. 12:17) that the definite article is prefixed to Iēsous Christos (ibid., ad. loc., p. 7). The latter reading is supported, according to The Greek New Testament, ed. Kurt Aland et. al. (Stuttgart: United Bible Soc., 1966), ad. loc., p. 3, by the Vulgate Syriac (Euretius and Sinaiticus), Theophilus, Irenaeus, Theodore. Augustine, and Psuedo-Athanasius. The reference, then, is to the birth of the Messiah and its special features. The upshot is that the Messiah is Jesus (Mt. 1:21); cf. Walter Grundmann, "chriō", in TDNT, op. cit., Vol. IX, p. 531, n. 267, and Grundmann, Der Evangelist Nach Matthäus, ad. loc., p. 67.
Mt. 1:16 (Iēsous ho legomenos Christos); and Mt. 27:17, 22 (Iēsoun ton legomenon Christon). Grundmann, TDNT, op. cit., Vol. IX, p. 531, n. 265, argues that the meaning of this phrase is clarified by Simôna ton legomenon Petron in 4:18 (cf. 10:2). Legomenos gives the nickname the significance of a title and reminds us of its true meaning. Simon, who confesses Jesus as the Christ, is instituted by him as "Peter"; Jesus is similarly instituted as the Messiah by God.


Cf. W. D. Davies, op. cit., p. 479ff.


He sees wisdom's oracle of doom in 23:34, 36 and wisdom's lament in 23:37, 39.

Op. cit., p. 103ff; Suggs also lists other passages in which the wisdom motif is present; in Mt. 23:37-39 Jesus' lament over Jerusalem resembles wisdom's lament (op. cit., p. 31). In Mt. 11:2 ta erga tou Christou is parallel to hē sophia apo tôn ergon aute (op. cit., p. 33ff.); significantly also (according to Suggs) instead of Luke's edikaiote hē sophia apo panton tōn teknon autēs Matthew has edikaiote hē sophia apo tōn ergon auto (Lk. 7:35 and Mt. 11:19). For Matthew, the Messianic deeds are central to the whole section (op. cit., p. 56ff.). Mt. 23:34 changes Luke's (11:49) sophia tou theou to egō; thus an activity is specifically ascribed to Jesus which is characteristic of wisdom (i.e., the commissioning of prophets and scribes) (op. cit., p. 59ff.).

Ulrich Luck, Die Vollkommenheitsforderung der Bergpredigt (München: Chr. Kaiser, 1968), especially pp. 23-38, argues that Matthean ethics (and in particular the Sermon on the Mount) are to be understood in terms of wisdom teaching.

Op. cit., p. 107ff. That Jesus engages in rabbinic argumentation on the one hand (19:3-9), but yet concludes (19:8-9) with a contrast between his teaching and that of Moses, and with the authoritative pronouncement "I say to you" is puzzling to Suggs (op. cit., p. 113).

However, it seems to me that much of this idea of rabbinic argumentation can be explained away if (the Matthean)
Jesus' does not really believe in rabbínic methods of argumentation, but merely seeks a point of contact in discussing or arguing with his opponents.


135 Ibid., p. 117f.


140 Op. cit., p. 198f.; the context of Jesus' use of *lege* elsewhere in Matthew indicates the authority of Jesus. It is used in the following places: *amēn legō hymn* (Mt. 6:2, 5, 16; 8:10; 10:15, 23; 11:11; 16:28; 18:3, 13, 18; 19:23, 28, etc.); *plēn legō hymn* (Mt. 11:22, 24; 26:64); *dǐa touto legō hymn* (Mt. 6:25; 12:31; 21:43); *lege de hymn* (Mt. 6:29; 8:11; 12:6, 36; 17:12; 19:9); *lege gar hymn* (Mt. 5:20; 23:39); *palin de legō hymn* (Mt. 19:24); and *kagō de soi legō* (Mt. 16:18).


142 In this passage, however, it appears to me that his authority is challenged. This shows that the Matthean Jesus acts as if he had real authority.

143 In 1950, Otto Michel, "Der Abschluss des Matthäusevangeliums", *Evangelische Theologie*, X (1950/51), 16-26, especially p. 21, had recognized that 28:18-20 is the key text for summarizing the whole of Matthew. In this passage the authority of Jesus comes out most strongly. Of particular importance are the words *exousia* (2:18) and *eneteīlamēn* (28:20).

Other passages which show that following Christ is the crucial factor of discipleship are 4:19f., 22; 8:22; 9:9; 10:38; and 16:24f.

Rhabbei and rabbouni do not occur in Luke.


Bornkamm's point is that at 23:2 the scribes and Pharisees sit at Moses' seat and their teaching is declared binding, and that in the matter of divorce (i.e., Mt. 5:32 and 19:1-9) Jesus represents the school of Shamai.

Gerhard Barth, op. cit., p. 89, points out that at Mt. 5:1-20 the Matthean Christ does reject the rabbinic tradition but he does not do so in principle and as a whole.

R. Hummel, op. cit., pp. 46-49, notes that Matthew has changed Mark's "the tradition of men" to read "your tradition" (Mt. 15:3 = Mk. 7:8), but basically Matthew accepts the scribal tradition, rejecting it only on this point, on the sabbath (p. 44f.), and on divorce (p. 49ff.).


Op. cit., p. 24f., n. 93; 23:2-3 reads "The scribes and Pharisees sit on Moses' seat; so practice and observe (poisēte kai tōreite) whatever they tell (eipōsin) you, but not what they do (kata de ta erga autōn mē poieite); for they preach (legousin) but do not practice (poiousin)."

Ad. loc., p. 310.
23:13 does not imply that the scribes and Pharisees have binding and loosing powers, but rather that by their teaching, they blind men to the truth. I do not take the faithful and wise steward (24:45-51) to be the scribes and Pharisees—rather the parable is of a general application.

In direct contrast with Robert Banks, Jesus and the Law in the Synoptic Tradition (Cambridge: University Press, 1975), pp. 182-203, I hold that Jesus' ἐγώ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν is not merely a contrast with the Old Testament. If the Matthean Jesus' teaching on the law, as will be argued below, is in the context of a polemic against the scribes and Pharisees, then it seems a priori likely that, at least in part, Jesus is criticizing the scribal interpretation of the law.

David Daube, "Concessions to Sinfulness in Jewish Law", Journal of Jewish Studies, X (1959) 1-13, argues that when Jesus says that Moses made the bill of divorcement because of men's hardness of heart, he is using an established legal category of actions allowed out of consideration for wickedness or weakness. In this case the lesser of two evils is a merciful concession for the sake of the woman. The intention of Deut. 24:1, according to the Matthean Jesus, was not to make divorce acceptable, but to limit sinfulness and control its consequences. Deut. 24:1-4 was a witness to the evil which arose from a disregard of the creation ordinance of Marriage in Gen. 1:27; 2:24.

David Daube, "Repudium in Deuteronomy", in E. Earle Ellis and Max Wilcox, ed., Neotestamentica et Semitica: Studies in Honour of Matthew Black (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1969), p. 236ff., argues that the main reason for the certificate was to enable a woman to prove that she was divorced. Prior to the Mosaic provision, there might be severe consequences if she or her family wrongly believed that a divorce had taken place.

In the divorce clauses, a problem arises as to the correct meaning of παρεκτός λόγου πορνείας (5:32) and μή επί πορνεία (19:9 = Mk. 10:11; Lk. 16:18).

A recent interpretation with some merit is one that interprets πορνεία in Mt. 5:32 and 19:9 in light of Acts 15:20; 29 and Lev. 17 and 18. Heinrich Baltensweiler, Die Ehe im
Neuen Testament: Exegetische Untersuchungen Über Ehe, Ehe-
losigkeit, und Ehescheidung (Zurich/Stuttgart: Zwingli Verlag,
1967), p. 92f., argues that the commands in Acts 15:29 to
abstain from what has been sacrificed to idols, from blood,
from what is strangled, and from porneia (see Acts 15:20 for
a similar list in which porneia also occurs) are commands both
from the ritual sphere and from Moses (i.e., in 15:21 Moses
is explicitly mentioned); moreover, these four commands are
dealt with in the same order as the ritual commands of Lev.
17 and 18. If porneia is understood in this light it refers
to marriage within the forbidden degrees of kinship. These
marriages should be broken up. A potential problem with this
view might be that even if porneia does mean this in Acts, it
does not necessarily have the same meaning in Matthew.

This interpretation, however, is better than the typi-
cal protestant view which makes the two exceptive clauses
agree with Shammai's (rather than Hillel's) interpretation of
'ərwat dāḇār in Deut. 24:1. Hans-Theo Wrege, Die Überliefer-
ungsgeschichte Der Bergpredigt, op. cit., p. 68, gives a sum-
mary of this position and a list of the people who support it.

This view, however, problematic. The contexts of
5:32 and 19:3-9 indicate that the problem should not be seen
in agreement with rabinic discussion. In the antitheses,
Jesus seems to be radically criticizing the halakah of the
rabbis; in 19:3-9, the purpose of the Pharisees' question is
brought out in the phrase peirazonotes auton (19:3). Further,
19:8 indicates that Moses' concession (in all likelihood Deut.
24:1) is less than the pure will of God, and is not in accord
with the fact that in the beginning they were made arsen kai
thēly (Gen. 1:27; Mt. 19:4). Finally, this interpretation
assumes that porneia means moicheia but at the sole place
where moicheia occurs in Matthew (15:19) it is distinguished
from porneia.

The view which I adopt is one that makes Mt. 19:3-9 a
commentary on parektos logou porneias (5:32). Bruce Vawter,
"The Divorce Clauses in Mt 5,32 and 19,9", Catholic Biblical
Quarterly, XVI (1954), 155-167, pp. 163-165, followed by
Robert Banks, op. cit., p. 154, suggests that the exceptive
clauses in Mt. 5:32 and 19:9 are preteritions; they are
exceptions to the proposition itself, and not merely to
apolyō. In the phrase mē epi porneia (19:9) epi signifies a
circumstance or state, and mē is a negative participle nulli-
yzing epi; the phrase is parenthetical and would mean "porneia
is not involved". Parektos at 5:32 is taken in an exclusive
sense, but with the more moderate meaning "apart from";
porneia is given its most general meaning of "uncleanness" and
is considered to be a reference to 'ərwat dāḇār (Deut. 24:1).
The sense then is, whoever dismisses his wife -- the permi-
sion of Deut. 24:1 not withstanding -- and marries another,
commits adultery. If this interpretation is correct, it makes
19:9 agree with its context, a context in which Deut. 24:1 is discussed; it allows 19:3-9 to be a commentary on parektos logou porneias (5:32), and it agrees with my interpretation on how Jesus fulfills the law.

It should be noted, however, that there is a linguistic problem with this interpretation. In the LXX, the regular translations of ἐρωτ, ἐν, and ἀνή are ἁσκῆσεν, ἠμαθεύειν, and perneuain respectively -- pernuein never translates 'erwat; cf. Wrede, op. cit., p. 69. In spite of these linguistic difficulties, Wrede, and I, and many others see Mt. 5:32 and 19:9 in terms of Deut. 24:1.

158 Hans Hübner, Das Gesetz in der Synoptischen Tradition, op. cit., pp. 126, 196, claims the antitheses show that in Matthew, Jesus fulfills the law by "Modifikation". Thus Jesus as Lord over the sabbath, fulfills it by bringing it into line with the law of love.

I believe that the law in some sense may be modified, but not in the sense that what God has commanded is abrogated. What Jesus does in the case of the sabbath is in line with what the Old Testament itself does. In his interpretation of the sabbath in Mt. 12:1ff., Jesus cites the cases of David (1 Sam. 21:1-6) and the priests (Num. 28:9-10). In the case of the priests, it is explicitly noted that the law itself (Mt. 12:5) provides the precedent. Robert Banks, Jesus and the Law in Synoptic Tradition, op. cit., p. 39ff., argues that in the Old Testament the provisions of the law are related to specific situations; changing historical circumstances result in a corresponding re-interpretation of those provisions, so that torah is flexible in application.

159 Cf. above, pp. 31ff., 43ff.


161 Ad. loc.


163 For instance, at 15:24 Jesus says that he has only come to the lost sheep of the house of Israel. At 28:18, however, the eleven are to make disciples of all nations.

164 According to Jack Dean Kingsbury, "The Structure of Matthew's Gospel and his Concept of Salvation History", Catholic Biblical Quarterly, XXXV (1973), 451-474, p. 453ff., this phrase, which occurs here and at 4:17, marks the two turning points of the Gospel.
165 It should be noted that even if Matthew is still attached to Judaism, and even if his church is associated with the temple, it does not follow that he considers sacrifice necessary. For example, in Acts 21:26ff., Paul (or at least the Lucan Paul) goes into the temple and offers sacrifice, yet sacrifice was not necessary for him (or Luke).

If sacrifice is no longer obligatory for Matthew, it does not mean that he conceives of the Mosaic law as abrogated. The Qumran community very strongly asserted the validity of the Mosaic law, and yet rejected the cult and temple at Jerusalem.


167 It is explicitly denied, for example, by Trilling, op. cit., p. 186; Bornkamm, op. cit., p. 35; Barth, op. cit., p. 154ff.; Suggs, op. cit., p. 114f.; Hummel, op. cit., p. 75; Carleton, op. cit., p. 82; Hamerton-Kelly, op. cit., p. 22f.; and Ulrich Luck, op. cit., p. 24f.

170 If torah is understood as revelation or instruction (cf. below, n. 195) then the missionary command (28:16-20) and the regulations concerning church order and discipline (ch.18) are also to be understood as torah.

175 Jesus and the Law in the Synoptic Tradition, op. cit., pp. 229-235.

This view of Leo Tolstoy (and to some extent of Augustine, St. Francis of Assisi, and the Anabaptists) states that the commands are literal, absolute, and of universal application. E.g., 5:29 ("If your right eye causes you to sin, pluck it out") is to be taken literally. Cf. McArthur, *op. cit.*, p. 105ff.

I.e., those who modify without specific historical or theological principles. For example, in 5:22, the King James Version adds "without a cause" and in 5:42a Luther translates "give to him who begs of you, but not what he asks for". Cf. McArthur, *op. cit.*, p. 107ff.

This view, warned against by Chrysostom, originated because of such expressions as "no one can serve two masters" (6:24) and plucking out one's right eye (5:29ff.). Cf. McArthur, *op. cit.*, p. 109ff.

I.e., the sermon teaches general principles through specific instances (e.g., 5:39b, turn the other cheek). Augustine 5:39b-41 notes that the three situations cover all possible forms of injury. Cf. McArthur, *op. cit.*, p. 111ff.

This view, developed by Wilhelm Herrmann in a consistent pattern for the entire sermon, states that the sermon does not refer to specific acts representing types of acts, but rather to specific acts representing types of attitudes; for example, in places like 5:21f. and 5:27ff. the Hebrew mind would prefer the concrete to the abstract. The single attitude that is demanded is the integrity of the free spirit. Cf. McArthur, *op. cit.*, p. 112ff.

This traditional Roman Catholic view, developed by Aquinas, distinguishes between the "precepts" and the "counsels" of the gospel. Obedience to the "precepts" is essential for perfection (e.g., Mt. 19:16-30, "if you would be perfect").
In 19:10-12 not all can receive the precept on divorce, but only those to whom it is given. Cf. McArthur, op. cit., p. 114ff.

186. This view, put forth by Martin Luther in reaction to the Catholic and Anabaptist positions, states that the Christian participates in two spheres of human activity -- the spiritual and the temporal. Absolute obedience is required only in the spiritual sphere. Cf. McArthur, op. cit., p. 117ff.

187. This view of Hans Windisch, The Meaning of the Sermon on the Mount, trans. S. Maclean Gilmour (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1951), states that in the antitheses and Mt. 6 and 7, Jesus tells his disciples what he requires of them. This sermon is legalistic, a viewpoint considered totally heretical by Luther or by Paul. Nothing is said about the inability of man to do good, about Jesus' office as mediator, or about redemption through the blood of Christ. The sermon is the same as the Old Testament and Judaism -- obey, and then you shall live. Cf., Jeremias, op. cit., p. 1ff.

188. This view of J. Weiss and Albert Schweitzer states that Jesus is not promoting a long term cultural ethic, but a demand rooted in the terrible earnestness of the hour. This is the last opportunity for repentance. The laws of the sermon are valid only for the last phase of total war. Cf. Jeremias, op. cit., p. 91ff. and McArthur, op. cit., p. 122ff.

189. This view of Lutheran orthodoxy states that the sermon is praeparato evangelica. It is a reading of the sermon through Pauline eyes. (I.e., Gal. 3:24, "The law was our schoolmaster, to bring us unto Christ." King James Version)


For Thurneysen, the preacher of the sermon is himself the content of the sermon since the sermon deals with, and the preacher himself brings, the kingdom of God and his righteousness. Karl Barth expressly agrees with Thurneysen and sees the sermon in terms of the Old Testament prophecies concerning the person of Jesus. Bonhoeffer sees the sermon in terms of the victory that Christ had over sin on the cross. The Sermon on the Mount thus calls to obedience those who
participate in the cross of Christ and the victory of Christ. Consequently, the sermon is not law, but gospel. Jeremias sees the sermon in terms of the catechism of the early church. For a summary, see Grundmann, op. cit., pp. 185-187.


192 This is McArthur's (op. cit., p. 126f.) term.


194 In 19:16ff., the rich man does not follow Christ at all. 19:21 indicates that in order to be perfect, one must follow Christ. It says nothing about the followers of Jesus being divided into two classes.

Matthew offers no indication that he is speaking of a spiritual sphere and a temporal sphere, nor is there any indication in Matthew that these commands are merely præparato evangelica. That Matthew is not concerned with absolute legalism, will be dealt with below.

195 Cf. Gunnar Östborn, op. cit., p. 4ff.; Ragnar Bring, Christus und das Gesetz: Die Bedeutung des Gesetzes des Alten Testaments nach Paulus und sein Glauben an Christus (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1969), p. 63, notes that O. Linton (Svensk teol. Kvartalskr., 1945), p. 177, has come to similar conclusions. J. M. Myers, Grace and Torah (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975), argues, and I think rightly, that in both the Old and New Testaments, there is a consistent pattern of God's grace followed by the giving of his torah. He argues that this holds for the Exodus and the covenant of Sinai (pp. 3-21), for the earthly prophets (pp. 23-42), for Deuteronomy and the later prophets (pp. 43-62), and for Romans (pp. 63-82).

196 With regard to Jeremias' view that the sermon is to be understood in the light of catechetical instruction, he that as it may. The idea of a Christian school as the life setting of Matthew was first developed in 1954 by Krister Stendahl, The School of Matthew and its Use of the Old Testament (2nd ed.; Lund: CWK Gleerup, 1968).

197 Although if asked, Matthew would no doubt agree that Christ perfectly lived out the ethic of the sermon in his life, that he would agree that these commandments could have reference to the prophecies concerning Christ, is another matter.

198 At the same time, these two passages, along with
18:21-22 (that one should forgive his brother until seventy times seven) make it quite clear that our forgiveness of one another is to know no bounds.

To me it is not clear that the one who is expelled because he does not have a wedding garment did not achieve sufficient righteousness in his life. Rather, it is quite possible that, in the context of the parable, the wedding guest does not bring his own garment, but that wedding garments were dispensed by the king at the door. The guest who did not have one, did not have it because he refused it. If this is the case, then the parable does not teach that righteousness (if indeed the wedding garment refers to righteousness) must be achieved, but rather that it must be received as a gift.

Several details of 19:16ff. -- namely, that in order to have treasure (thauros) in heaven and be perfect (19:21), the man must give everything to the poor and follow Christ, and that he refused to follow because of his great possessions (19:22) -- must be read in light of other statements in Matthew. 16:19, 20 indicates that laying up treasure on earth and in heaven are mutually exclusive; 6:21 indicates that where one's treasure is, there one's heart is; and 6:24 states that no man can serve two masters (i.e., God and mammon). In light of this, the implication of 19:16ff. seems to be that the young man, although he claims to have obeyed the commandments, has treasure on earth but not in heaven, and that he cannot follow Jesus because his master is money. The decisive reason for his rejection is his divided heart.


It is difficult to be certain of the interpretation of plerōsaı̇ pasan dikaiosynēn (3:15) or en hōdo dikaiosynēs
(21:32). If our exegesis of πληροῦν (cf. above, p. 43ff.) is correct, then, in disagreement with Grundmann, Das Evangelium nach Matthäus, op. cit., p. 97f., πληροῖαι at 3:15 corresponds to the Hebrew 말ט and not מַעַּן. The context seems to be not of "establishing" righteousness, but of "doing" it. For a summary of various interpretations of this phrase see Otto Eissfeldt, "Pleroi pasan dikaiosyne in Matthäus 3:15", Zeitschrift für die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft, LXI (1970), 209-215.

With regard to ἡδὸν δικαιοσύνη (21:32), Grundmann points out that it has its background in the LXX at Job 24:13; 28:4; Prov. 8:20; 12:28; 16:31; 17:23; 21:16 and in the New Testament at 2 Pet. 2:21. He takes the verse to mean that John is the one who "den Weg der Gerechtigkeit zeigt und fordert." He also notes the observation of Ernst Lohmeyer, Das Evangelium nach Matthäus (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1956), p. 308, n. 3, that erchomai en can mean "etwas bringen". If John the Baptist brought the way of righteousness in that he pointed out what it is, and demanded that men follow in it, then δικαιοσύνη in 21:32 is similar to δικαιοσύνη hymon in 5:20 and 6:1. In all three cases there is a polemic against the scribes and Pharisees. The prerequisite of this δικαιοσύνη is repentance (cf. 3:7ff.).

208 The manuscripts are fairly evenly divided on whether τοῦ θεοῦ should be included. Cf. Metzger, A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament, op. cit., p. 18f.


210 G. R. Driver, The Judean Scrolls: The Problem and a Solution (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965), p. 94, argues that the Qumran characterization of the Pharisees is right; as expounders of the law, the Pharisees sought those interpretations which were the easiest for themselves and which offered them ways of evading the full rigour of its provisions. The Qumran community is critical of "the expounders of smooth things (דרש בבלגרא"), (CD 1:18), -- halakot "smooth things" may be a word play on halakot "the legal customs" which were the special interest of the Pharisees. Essentially the same expression occurs at 1QH 2:15, 32; 4Qp Nah. 1:2, 7.


212 Cf. Delling, op. cit., p. 72.


214 On the question of perfection at Qumran see Delling, op. cit., p. 69; Davies, op. cit., p. 211f.; and Barth, op. cit., p. 98f. In Qumran as in Matthew, there is an emphasis to do the whole law. Those who do it are ṭāmīm; however, as Barth notes (op. cit., p. 98), the "more" which ṭāmīm in 1QS means is that a larger quantitative number of commands are to be observed, whereas in Matthew, emphasis is placed on the intensive. Similarly Davies, op. cit., p. 212, writes "the difference between the perfection demanded by Matthew and that at Qumran, was rooted in Jesus' interpretation of the law in terms to ἀγάπη. Qumran demanded more obedience, Matthew deeper."

215 Jacques Dupont (op. cit.) argues, and I think rightly, that Matthew, by changing Luke's оικτίρμονες (6:36) to τελειος (5:48), has turned a particular injunction into a general principle.


217 The fact that the ἀνικήτος is one of the Pharisees (22:34); that his intent is hostile (22:35; περαζόν αὐτον), and that there is no hint of agreement between Jesus and him on the point at issue (i.e., the right interpretation of the law) sets the stage for the polemic which follows in Ch. 23. Cf. Allen, op. cit., p. 240, and Furnish, op. cit., p. 32.

CHAPTER THREE: IS THERE A REDACTION-CRITICAL UNITY IN MATTHEW'S CONCEPTION OF JESUS AND THE LAW?

In Chapter One the data to be interpreted were presented, and in Chapter Two they were analysed. In this chapter the main question is: does the decisive or final redactor have a coherent total view of Christ and the law? This question relates to the contemporary development in New Testament studies known as "redaction criticism". Whereas form criticism had regarded the synoptic evangelists primarily as collectors and transmitters of tradition, and investigated paragraph-size units of oral tradition, redaction criticism bears on the gospels as literary wholes. What was marginal for form criticism is central for redaction criticism: the concept of an editor or redactor as an author in his own right. Redaction criticism investigates the gospels primarily for their theological character, for the central sense of the gospels is theological. It is concerned with history, but with history as the evangelists understood it. The interest of form criticism in the earliest forms and functions of tradition now yields to interest in the world of the evangelist.¹

There are two quite distinct strategies currently followed in the practice of the redaction criticism of Matthew. The first, dependent on the classical "two-source theory"
(Matthew depends mainly on Mark and Q), seeks to define his specific theology by comparison of his final text with his presumptive "sources". The second, bypassing all particular theories about sources, interprets the individual parts of the work in the light of its overall design. The second strategy has increasingly laid claim to the name "composition criticism". The hypothesis at the root of both strategies is that each evangelist does his editorial work on the basis of a guiding concept whose influence is pervasive and decisive. The result, according to the redaction criticism hypothesis, is that the redactor has stamped the whole of his inherited material with his vision of things, and especially with his vision or theological interpretation of Christ. This further means that the redactor may incorporate into his work elements of tradition which may have other meanings originally than the meaning he attaches to them within the total context of his own work. The redaction-critical hypothesis does not exclude, however, the role of the evangelist as a transmitter of tradition (as if his vision of things were entirely individual, personal, and original in the manner of many modern theologies).

Not everyone agrees with the redaction-critical hypothesis. Let Joachim Jeremias represent the negative case with reference to Matthew. Matthew's "unconcerned juxtaposition of conflicting traditions" is, he says, "almost a character-
istic of his". For example, at 6:17 Jesus says that the one who fasts is to anoint his head and wash his face, whereas at 9:15 the disciples (wedding guests) do not fast as long as Christ (the bridegroom) is with them. At 8:12 the sons of the kingdom will be thrown into outer darkness, whereas at 13:38 (in the parable of the tares) the sons of the kingdom are the good seed. At 9:13b Jesus says that he has not come to call the righteous, but sinners, whereas at 10:41b the one who receives a righteous man because he is a righteous man, shall receive a righteous man's reward. On the one hand, Jesus commands his disciples, "Go nowhere among the Gentiles, and enter no town of the Samaritans, but go rather to the lost sheep of the house of Israel" (10:5, 6), and on the other hand, they are commanded to make disciples of all nations (28:18f.). On the one hand, in 16:17-19 only Matthew reports Peter as overwhelmingly praised, and on the other hand, omits καὶ τὸ πέτρο (Mk. 16:7) and adds the story of Peter's wavering faith (Mt. 14:28-33).

With specific relation to the law, Jeremias points out that in 12:8, Jesus relaxes the sabbath laws and claims that he is lord of the sabbath, yet at 24:20 the disciples are to pray that their flight not be on a sabbath. At 16:6 (cf. 16:12) the disciples are to beware of the leaven or the teaching of the Pharisees, yet at 23:2f. they are to practice and observe whatever the scribes and Pharisees tell them, since
they sit on Moses' seat. Finally, Jeremias\textsuperscript{5} claims that Jesus with his \textit{egō de legō hymni} has an unparalleled and revolutionary boldness to set himself up in opposition to the torah; thus Mt. 5:21-48 contradicts Mt. 5:18.

Jeremias is by no means alone in his view that what Matthew says concerning the law is contradictory. R. G. Hamilton-Kelly claims that in 5:18 there are three distinct attitudes to the law, namely: (a) a legally rigorist attitude which insists that the law of Moses continue to be observed in all its details according to the established halakah; (b) that some of the law has been abrogated by Jesus; and (c) the final composer's view that the authority of the traditional halaka has been replaced by the authority of the risen Christ, understood (among other things) as halakist.\textsuperscript{6} Furthermore, 5:21-48 does precisely what 5:17-19 prohibits; it declares certain parts of the law invalid.

Another scholar who has considered the question of Matthew's internal consistency with regard to the law is Günther Bornkamm.\textsuperscript{7} His emphasis is not that 5:21-48 contradicts 5:17-19, but that the antitheses themselves are inconsistent and that Matthew was not even aware of the inconsistency; the first, second, and fourth antitheses are a sharpening of the law, whereas the third, fifth, and sixth abolish it.

In similar vein, M. Jack Suggs\textsuperscript{8} states that "Matthew's presentation of Jesus' relation to the law makes jugglers of
all of us." The first and second antitheses make the law more stringent, whereas the remainder abolish it; most of the antitheses are aimed at a prevailing interpretation of the law, whereas the remainder take their point of departure directly from the written torah. In 19:3-9 the discussion of divorce proceeds along the lines of rabbinic argumentation but concludes as in the antitheses with the authoritative "I say unto you". On the other hand, the antithesis on divorce in 5:31-32 has no patience with debate and is formulated as sheer pronouncement.

Suggs\(^9\) also has problems with an internal consistency in Mt. 5:17-20, and as a result he does not derive his primary positive understanding of Matthew's relation to the law from this passage. He believes that there is no antecedent for "these commandments" in vs. 19; also in vs. 19 the opponents are least in the kingdom, whereas in vs. 20 they are excluded from it. 5:17-20 is composed of four isolated sayings with no pre-Matthean connection with each other.

Similarly, Wolfgang Trilling\(^10\) claims that in 5:17-20 there are four logia held together by the conjunction \textit{gar} (vs. 18, 20) and \textit{oun} (vs. 19). In vs. 17, it is the mission of Jesus to bring fulfilment by his teaching of God's will in the scriptures; vs. 18 is concerned with the enduring validity of the scriptures containing the prophetic pronouncements which are fulfilled by the events of history; vs. 19 is an instruc-
tion that all the commandments are to be observed; and vs. 20 summons the disciples to greater righteousness. Trilling sees three different ways of understanding the law in this passage, and four different Sitze im Leben. Vs. 17 refers to the theology of Matthew's church concerning the Messiah; vs. 18 refers to the theology concerning the law; vs. 19 refers to the discussion among Jewish Christians about the torah; and vs. 20 refers to the ethics of Matthew's church concerning the rabbinate. The law is intended to be brought to fulfilment (vs. 17); it has an inviolable, permanent character because all that is prophesied in it must come to pass (vs. 18); and it is a summary of all the individual commandments on the careful observance of the law -- a position in the kingdom depends on such observance.

Finally, C. F. D. Moule claims that Matthew in its present form takes in a diversity of tradition, and, as a result, does not have a consistent outlook. On the one hand, the Gentiles are to be evangelized, on the other hand, the church is the true Israel and Gentiles do not need to become proselytes. Mt. 10:23 ("you will not have gone through all the towns of Israel, before the Son of man comes") and 5:18 ("till heaven and earth pass away, not an iota, not a dot, will pass from the law until all is accomplished") are likewise inconsistent with the rest of the gospel.

Such are some of the recent criticisms made of the
hypothesis of coherence in Matthew, and especially concerning the coherence of his view of the law. In the vast majority of cases, however, the difficulties are illusory. To enumerate them in turn: Jeremias' problem with 6:17 and 9:15 can be explained simply by the fact that 6:17 describes the manner in which fasting is to be done, whereas 9:15 says when fasting is or is not to be done. A wedding is not an appropriate time to fast, but when fasting does occur, it is not to be done to be seen by men. The contradiction between 8:12 and 13:38 is verbal but not real; in 8:12 the sons of the kingdom are the Jews (as opposed to the Gentiles), while at 13:38 they are the true disciples of Jesus. 10:41b refers to a man who is truly righteous, whereas in 9:13b the reference is to those who consider themselves to be righteous. The context in 10:5, 6 refers to a limited mission in the pre-resurrection period of the ministry of Jesus, whereas 28:18f. refers to an unlimited mission in the post-resurrection period. The omission of kai to Petró (Mt. 28:7, cf. Mk. 16:7) perhaps does not have an immediately ready explanation; however, Walter Grundmann argues that 16:17-19 and 14:28-33 are connected in a noteworthy manner. In Tos. Ber. 4:18, the tribe of Judah receives the kingship because it is the first to walk into the sea and cry to the name of heaven and be saved. Likewise Simon Peter alone, in clear reminiscence of Ps. 69:2, walks on the water and cries for the Lord to save
him (Mt. 14:30). 16:17-19 is a sequel to this scene; it designates Peter as the rock which supports the community, and it invests him with full authority for its direction. Also similar to these two Matthean passages is 1 QH VI:22-28, where there is a close connection between the sea and the rock. In 1 QH a city founded by God upon a rock, a city which has towering doors through which no man can pass -- according to Grundmann this points to the power of the keys of the kingdom of heaven -- provides the refuge for a sailor tossed upon a turbulent sea.

With regard to the remaining views on Matthew's inconsistency, it must be said, in disagreement with Hamerton-Kelly, that Matthew is not talking about halakic and ceremonial details of the law, nor is he saying that Jesus merely has authority to proclaim his own halakah. Ἡ ἄν παντα γενέται does not mean that the law is in any way abolished in the death and resurrection of Jesus. Furthermore, both 5:21-48 and 5:17-19 insist on the validity of the Mosaic torah. Contra the views of Bornkamm and Suggs, the antitheses aim in the same direction and are not contradictory. Contrary to the views of Bornkamm and Suggs, Jesus' rabbinic method of debate, in disagreement with Suggs' view, is merely a way of having a point of contact with his opponents. 5:19-20 does not refer to two different kinds of opponents, but is merely a rhetorical way of giving maximum force to the subsequent denunciation of the Pharisees, and
"these commandments" (5:19) does have an antecedent. Finally, Trilling's view that 5:17-19 consists of four individual sayings which come from four different strata is possible, but not demanded; at any rate, the sayings as they stand in Matthew's text, are not in tension with each other.

This, then, is an account of redaction criticism and of solutions for ideas in Matthew which are thought to conflict. It is perhaps possible that not all of the traditions which Matthew takes over are in harmony with each other; nevertheless I am convinced that in examining Matthew's view of the law, we ought not throw up our hands in defeat, saying his statements are hopelessly contradictory. My examination of his view, at least of his characteristic view, of the law would indicate that it is carefully thought through.

My reaction to redaction criticism is that its basic theses should probably be accepted. I particularly like its emphasis on the written gospels and their unity, and on the creative role of editors in shaping the tradition and in shaping a conscious theological purpose. I like its guidelines for detecting the theological intention behind the selection and arrangement of the material.

The redaction critics have been largely successful in showing that Matthew's work is carefully constructed, that he does have a viewpoint on the law, and that the attempt to define it is not futile. Sometimes, no doubt, the redaction
critics tend to read too much into the alterations of indi-
vidual passages. Some are too cavalier in taking the priority
of Mark and the two-source hypothesis for granted. Though
this hypothesis is possibly sound, it seems unwise, as W. G.
Thompson\(^9\) has pointed out, to commit oneself to the "somewhat
acrobatic attempt to explain [Matthew's] editorial activity
from the viewpoint of Mark . . . ". The present exposition
of the law in Matthew does not, then, depend on the two-
source hypothesis; and, in fact, no source critical theory is
supposed.

One possible objection to the redaction-critical hypoth-
thesis might be its circular nature.\(^20\) From the form of the gos-
pel, redaction criticism makes conclusions about the author
and the situation in his community, which, in turn, provide
insight into the form of the gospel. But the circularity of
redaction criticism is simply a specific application of the
hermeneutical paradigm according to which we understand the
parts from the whole and the whole from the parts. The circle
is not vicious, for it is broken open by particular acts of
interpretive insight.\(^21\)

Basically, the redaction-critical hypothesis is sound.
But even if it were not, the present exposition on the law
would be affected only slightly. In any case, the Gospel of
Matthew shows some signs, at least, of careful construction.
On close examination, the arguments for lack of coherence in
Matthew seem to disappear.

The redaction-critical hypothesis with regard to Matthew is to be defended, at least, in its "soft" sense as opposed to its "hard" sense. If it is defended in a hard sense, then Matthew has consistently edited his materials in accord with an idée directrice of his own; his omissions, additions, and reformulations, however slight, would be designed to carry maximum freight of meaning in the service of a distinctly Matthean vision of things. By defending it in its soft sense, I place much less weight on his omissions, additions, and reformulations. Matthew, however, is an author with a theology and with a coherent total viewpoint.

In conclusion: Matthew does have a view of Christ and the law. Jesus is the ho Christos who fulfils the law by filling up its eschatological measure. This occurs chiefly by teaching; he is the eschatological messenger of God who brings the final revelation.

Footnotes: Chapter Three


With this method, Held concludes that the miracle stories in Mt. 8 - 9 abridge the narrative, and expand the
discourse material (ibid., p. 165ff.). They emphasize the themes of Christology, faith, and discipleship (ibid., p. 169). The healing of the deaf-mute (Mk. 7:31-37) and the blind man (Mk. 8:22-26) do not deal with these themes, therefore they are omitted (ibid., p. 209ff.; cf. p. 197ff.).

With regard to their form, their beginning and ending is formal (ibid., pp. 225-241); secondary people and actions are omitted (ibid., p. 233). Conversation is central (ibid., pp. 233-237), and catchword connections are used (ibid., pp. 237-239). More strongly than Mark or Luke, the actual circumstances of the faith which saves is brought out (ibid., pp. 239-241). In form and subject matter, a healing story is climaxed in Jesus' saying concerning faith (ibid., p. 242).

Jesus' miracles are the fulfilment of Old Testament promises (ibid., pp. 253-259), the performance, not of a wonder-worker, but of the servant of God in taking up the cause of the helpless. Jesus gives the disciples a share in his authority (ibid., p. 270ff.) and is the helper and lord of his community (ibid., p. 267ff.).

Faith is both a praying faith and a participation in the miraculous powers of Jesus (ibid., pp. 288-291). The disciples are repeatedly called men of little faith (8:26; 14:31; 16:8); their authority to perform miracles in faith is mentioned too (17:20; 21:20) (ibid., 291-294).

Gerhard Barth uses this method on the question of Matthew's understanding of the law. The following are a few of the points Barth makes: Mt. 11:13 (=Lk. 16:16a) emphasizes the abiding validity of the law (ibid., p. 63); Mt. 7:21 (=Lk. 6:46) adds doing the will of God as a condition for entering the kingdom of heaven (ibid., p. 47); and Mt. 12:1 (=Mk. 2:23) adds epeinasan to show that the disciples do not wantonly break the sabbath (ibid., p. 82). Concepts which belong to the judgment (krisis, hemera, misthos) and obedience (dikaiosyne, keleuein, terein) are more numerous than in Mark and Luke (ibid., p. 58f.). A detailed description of the last judgment (7:21ff.; 13:36ff.; 25:31ff.) occurs only in Matthew (ibid., p. 59). Doing the will of God is the concern of the exhortation to be vigilant (24:42; 25:13) and of the great debate with the Pharisees (23:1-39) (ibid., p. 61). All the passages in Mark about the disciples' failure to understand are omitted or interpreted differently (ibid., p. 106). Man's understanding is not an achievement but a gift, and an act of God in him (13:11ff., 16ff.) (ibid., p. 110).

3 For this distinction see Peter F. Ellis, Matthew: His Mind and His Message (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1974), p. 9. Ellis gives us an example of the second approach. On pp. 10-13, Ellis summarizes the structure of Matthew. In
the rest of the book he defends his view in an extensive and
detailed way. There are seven discourses, five major and two
minor, with alternating narratives which are a preparation
for the discourses. The discourses are: 3:8-12 (John the
Baptist's discourse), 5:1 - 7:29 (the true and ultimate torah;
the authority of Jesus in word), 10:1-42 (missionary mandate
to the apostles), 13:1-58 (parable sermon on the kingdom),
23:1 - 25:46 (condemnation of the Pharisees and coming of the
Son of man), and 28:16-20 (Jesus' final discourse). The nar-
rative sections are 1:1 - 4:25 (the Messiah and "true" Moses),
8:1 - 9:38 (the ten miracles; the authority of Jesus in deed),
11:1 - 12:50 (rejection of Jesus by the Jews), 14:1 - 17:27
(Christ acknowledged by the disciples; authority of Peter in
the kingdom), 19:1 - 22:46 (authority and invitation), and

There is a balance in length and thematic presentation
of the discourses which flank the central discourse (ch. 13).
Ch. 5 - 7 and ch. 23 - 25 are approximately the same length;
the first emphasizes the blessings of true discipleship, the
second the curses for false disciples. Ch. 10 and 18 are
about the same length; ch. 10 deals with the mission of the
apostles, and ch. 18 with the apostles' exercise of authority
in the new community. Vs. 8-12 of ch. 3, and 16-20 of ch. 28
are balanced in length, thematic presentation, and in their
emphasis on "doing" the commands of God (ibid., pp. 10-13).

4Joachim Jeremias, New Testament Theology: Part I:
The Proclamation of Jesus, trans. John Bowden (London: SCM,


6Cf. R. G. Hamerton-Kelly, "Attitudes to the Law in
Matthew's Gospel: A Discussion of Matthew 5:18", op. cit.,
p. 21.

7Cf. Günther Bornkamm, "End Expectation and Church in
Matthew", op. cit., p. 25.

8M. Jack Suggs, Wisdom, Christology, and Law in Mat-
thew's Gospel, op. cit., p. 112f.

9Ibid., p. 116.

10Wolfgang Trilling, Das Wahre Israel, op. cit., p.
184f.

11C. F. D. Moule, Birth of the New Testament (London:
12 Whatever theological difficulties 10:23 may present to us when we view it as a prediction of the parousia, this is not a difficulty for Matthew, since it is placed in the context of a limited mission in the historical ministry of Jesus.

13 For solutions, which are at least possible, to Jeremias' difficulties with 12:8 versus 16:6, 12 versus 23:2f., see above, p. 65f., 58f.


15 Cf. above, p. 61ff.; 32; 45ff.; 55ff.; 41ff.

16 Cf. above, p. 61ff.

17 Cf. above, p. 93, n. 102; p. 89ff., n. 71.

18 Cf. above, pp. 22-54.


21 For an exposition of the hermeneutical circle as fundamental to all understanding, see Emerich Coreth, Grundfragen der Hermeneutik (Freiburg, Basel, Wien: Herder, 1969), pp. 94-104.
CHAPTER FOUR: DATA ON CHRIST AND THE LAW IN PAUL

"Nothing is evidence," said R. G. Collingwood, "except in relation to some definite question."¹ The definite question entertained here is: What is Paul's view on Christ and the law? The main evidence is to be found in the Epistle to the Galatians and the Epistle to the Romans, but I shall deal with all the clearly Pauline letters in which the problem of the law occurs: Galatians, Romans, 1 Corinthians, 2 Corinthians, and Philippians.²

I. Galatians

Galatians reflects Paul's sense of the urgency of his readers' situation. They stood in danger of no longer adhering to the gospel as he had preached it because "false teachers" had come in to "trouble" (tarassontes), "unsettle" (anastatountes), and "bewitch" (ebaskanen) them (Gal. 1:7; 3:1; 5:12). The danger lay in "perverting" (metastrepsai) the gospel of Christ (Gal. 1:7).

The false teachers apparently said that in order to be saved, one had not only to have faith in Christ, but also to obey the law of Moses. Paul, on the other hand, urges that salvation comes only through faith in Christ. In Gal. 2:16 he three times states that a man is not justified "by works of the law" (ex ergōn nomōn); rather he is justified through
faith in Christ. Also, it is "by hearing with faith" (ex akoēs pisteōs) and not "by works of the law" (ex ergōn nomou) that one receives the Spirit (3:2, 5). Those who strive for salvation ex ergōn nomou are under a curse because, as LXX Deut. 27:26 says, "Cursed be everyone who does not abide by all things written in the book of the law, and do them" (3:10). A man is not justified before God "by the law" (en nomō), because Hab. 2:4 says that it is the one who is righteous by faith that will live (ho dikaios ek pisteōs zēsetai; 3:11); the law does not rest on faith (ho de nomos ouk estin ek pisteōs; 3:12). That Christ had to die is evidence for the fact that no one could be justified by the law. If justification (dikaiosynē) were to come through the law (dia nomou), then Christ would have died in vain (2:21).

As a Christian, Paul could say, "I through the law (dia nomou) died to the law (nomō), that I might live to God (theō) (2:19). To the Galatians he could say, Christ redeemed us "from the curse of the law" (ek tēs kataras tou nomou), having become "a curse for us" (hyper hemōn katara; 3:15).

In Gal. 3:15-18 the law, which could not bring salvation, is contrasted with the promises which were given to Abraham and to his offspring (Christ). Since the law only comes four hundred and thirty years after the promise, it no more nullifies the promise than a second party, by adding a codicil, could nullify a man's will. God gave the inheritance to Abra-
ham by promise (di' epangelias); it does not, then, come by means of law (ek nomou). This inheritance is nothing other than salvation. What, then, had been the point of the law (ti oun ho nomos; 3:19)? The answer is that the law was added "because of transgressions" (tön parabaseon charin) until the offspring (=Christ; cf. vs. 16) should come to whom the promise had been made. The phrase tön parabaseon charin is obscure (though the obscurity is dissolved in Romans); however, the main point is clear: salvation does not come through the law.

If the law adds nothing to the promise of the inheritance of salvation, is it ranged against the promise (ho oun nomos kata tön epangelion tou theou)? The answer is an emphatic no (me gemoito)! The law would be against the promise only if it pretended to compete with it by offering "life". True, if a law were given which could "make alive" (zopoiēsai) then "righteousness" (dikaiosynē) would indeed be by the law (ek nomou; 3:21). But this is of course contrary to fact. No code of law can breathe life into its subjects. Until faith came, argues Paul, we were confined under the law (hypo nomon ephouroumetha). The law was our custodian (paidagōgos) until Christ came (eis Christon), so that we might be justified by faith. But since faith had now come we were no longer under a custodian, but free (3:23-25).

If Gentile Christians were to adopt the prescriptions
of the law, they would return to bondage to "the elemental
spirits of the universe" (ta stoicheia tou kosmou, 4:3). This
statement presents the Mosaic economy in the harshest light.
When God sent his Son it was "to redeem those who were under
the law" (hina tous hypo nomon exagorasē, 4:5). Having been
set free from all claim of the law, why should the Galatian
Christians wish to be under it? It was in order that we should
stay free that Christ freed us, argues Paul in 5:1. "Stand
fast, therefore, and do not submit again to a yoke of slavery."

Since the Galatians had been set free, they were not
to submit to circumcision. If they were to do so, Christ
would be of no advantage to them; on the other hand, they
would be obligated to keep the whole law (holon ton nomon
poiēsai, 5:2-4). But the circumcised de facto do not "keep the
law" (nomon phylassousin, 6:13).

Being set free did not mean that the Galatians were to
use their freedom "as an opportunity for the flesh" (eis
aphormēn tē sarki). Rather, they were to serve one another
through love (dia tēs agapēs, 5:13). The command of love
epitomized the law in "the single word" of Lev. 19:18, "you
shall love your neighbour as yourself." This was possible for
one controlled by the Spirit as opposed to the flesh. There
is no law (nomos) or legal condemnation against the one who
manifests the fruit of the Spirit (5:22). The lives of the
Galatians were to be a fulfilment of "the law of Christ" (ton
nomous tou Christou, 6:2).

The Epistle to the Galatians sketches numerous themes central to Paul's view of Christ and the law, but it leaves several of these relatively unfinished, and consequently, somewhat paradoxical (i.e., the law given "because of transgressions", the impotence of "the flesh", the reduction of the Mosaic regime to the level of service to stoicheia or elemental spirits of the universe).

II. Romans

The Epistle to the Romans represents several changes of motif, and above all, offers a fuller expression of Paul's views, for here we find the most systematic exposition Paul ever wrote of his "gospel".

Its thematic keynote is struck in 1:16f., "He who through faith is righteous shall live" (Hab. 2:4; cf. Gal. 3:11). The first part of Paul's exposition deals with "righteousness through faith" (ch. 1-4); this is followed by a section on the results of righteousness (ch. 5-8), which might be set under the rubric of "life" ("he . . . shall live").

A presupposition of "righteousness through faith" is the unrighteousness of man without faith. In 1:18-30, Paul accordingly depicts mankind's bondage to sin. No one, neither Jew nor Greek, merits salvation. All are subject to the final condemnation of God.

Paul points out that all who have sinned "without the
law" (anomōs = Gentiles) will also perish "without the law" (anomōs), and all who have sinned under the law (en nomō = Jews) will be judged by the law (dia nomou, 2:12). It is not the "hearers of the law" (hoi akroatai nomou) who are "righteous" (dikaioi) before God; rather it is "the doers of the law" (hoi poiētai nomou) who "will be justified" (dikaiōthēsontai, 2:13).

When Gentiles who have not the law (ethnē ta mē nomon echonta) do by nature what the law requires (ta tou nomou), they are a law to themselves (heautōs eisin nomos), even though they do not have the law (nomon mē echontes). They show that what the law requires (to ergon tou nomou) is written on their hearts (2:14f.).

The Jew, on the other hand, relies upon the law, is instructed in the law (katechoumenos ek tou nomou, 2:18), "boasts in the law" (en nomō kauchasai, 2:23), and has in the law "the embodiment of knowledge and truth" (tēn morphosin tēs gnōseōs kai tēs alētheias en tō nomō, 2:20). Yet he dishonours God because he breaks the law (dia tēs parabaseōs tou nomou, 2:23). Since the Jew does not keep the law (nomon prassēs), his circumcision (peritomē) is no longer of value (ōphelei), in fact, it has become uncircumcision (akrobystia, 2:25).

Not only does one's circumcision become uncircumcision if he breaks the law, but one's uncircumcision becomes circum-
cision if he keeps the law. The man who is uncircumcised (ἠ ἀκροβυστία) but "keeps the precepts of the law" (τα δικαιόματα του νόμου φυλασσὲ) will have his uncircumcision (ἠ ἀκροβυστία αυτοῦ) regarded as circumcision (εἰς περιτοmos ὕποστήθεσται, 2:26). The physically uncircumcised (ἦ εκ φυσεῶς ἀκροβυστία) who "keeps the law" (τὸν νόμον τελοῦσα) will condemn those who have the written code and circumcision but "break the law" (2:27). Being a true Jew and having real circumcision is not outward, but inward (2:28, 29).

Paul's conclusion is that all men, both Jews and Greeks, are "under the power of sin" (ὑπὸ ἁμαρτίαν, 3:9); the scriptures testify to this (3:10-18).

The law, then, far from saving anyone, makes him accountable to God. What the law says (hosta ho nomos legei), it says to those who are "under the law" (ἐν τῷ νόμῳ) so that "every mouth may be stopped, and the whole world may be held accountable to God" (3:19). No one is justified "by works of the law" (ex ergōn nomou) because through the law (dia . . . nomou) one only receives the knowledge of sin (3:20).

Thus far Paul has been intent on showing that the need of redemption is universal, with the accent on the thesis that the Jews are no exception. Now (3:21 - 4:25) he presents what he names the manifestation of "the righteousness of God" (3:21f.): the concrete reality by which the universal need of redemption is met, namely, Christ's expiatory death (3:24f.).
This was the "redemption" (apolytrōsis, 3:24) by which Jew and Gentile alike could enter into and appropriate righteousness "as a gift" (dōrean). The result (3:27-31) was, first to exclude absolutely and totally the religious "boast" (kauchēsis), which for Paul was the capital sin of the religious man, and, second, to make the Gentiles candidates for salvation. Did this overthrow the law (i.e., the scripture)? On the contrary, it supported and established it. In the following chapter (4:1-25) Abraham provided the extended illustration and proof that such had always been God's style of operation; moreover, his making righteous "by faith" belonged to a single, consistent plan of salvation. Abraham was justified by faith in the promise, but "we" (cf. 4:24, δι' ἡμάς) by faith in its fulfilment (4:24f.).

In chapters 5 - 8 of Romans, Paul is concerned with the completion of God's saving act. Righteousness accepted in faith as a gift (ch. 1 - 4) (i.e., reconciliation to God by the death of Christ, 3:24f.; 5:10) is so stunning an act of God that the follow-up of full and final salvation is a fortiori secure (5:10). What stands in the way of full and final salvation? The bondage of man! The treatment of salvation, then, entails the breaking of man's bondage to sin and death and to their instrument, the law. This works out in detail as an account (a) not of the universality of sin (ch. 1 - 3), but of its source and origin, the sin of Adam (5:12-21);
(b) of the break with sin (6:1-23) which baptism into Christ's death makes actual as well as imperative (6:4); and (c) of the freedom from the law (7:4-6) and from the situation in which the law, "holy and just and good" (hagia kai dikaia kai agathē), could do nothing but condemn (7:7-23). Only then could Paul sketch the triumphant completion of the work of salvation (8:1-39).

Paul's distinctive treatment of the law had been announced in 3:19f.; 5:20; and 6:14f., passages which prepared for the treatment in Romans 7 making the points that the law could do nothing but make men conscious of sin (3:20), that the law came on the scene "to increase the trespass" (5:20), and that the dominion of sin over man depended on his living "under law" (hypo nomon, 6:14f:).

In 7:1-3, by use of a marriage analogy, Paul argues that by death to the law, the Christian is free of the law. He has died to the law through the body of Christ (ethanatōthēte tō nomō dia tou somatos tou Christou) so that he may belong to another (eis to' genēsthai hymas heterō, 7:4). Discharged from the law (katērgēthēmen apo tou nomou) he can now serve in "the new life of the Spirit" (kainotēti pneumatos, 7:6).

If one's sinful passions are aroused by the law (7:5), and if one has died to sin (6:2, 11) and to the law (7:4), the natural question arises: Is the law sin (ho nomos hamartia, 7:7)? The answer is an emphatic no (mē genoito, 7:7)!
Yet the law in fact has no positive role to play; it incites "me" to sin. Without the law (ἐι μὴ διὰ νόμου) "I" (ἐγὼ) would never know sin. If the law (ὁ νόμος) had not said "You shall not covet", "I" would never have known what it is to covet (7:7). But sin, finding opportunity (ἀφορμὴν) in the commandment (διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς) works all kinds of covetousness. Apart from the law (chéris gar nomou) sin lies dead (7:8).

The "I" (ἐγὼ) of Rom. 7 was alive once "apart from the law" (chéris nomon); but when the commandment (τῆς ἐντολῆς) came, sin revived (ἡ ἁμαρτία ἀνεζέσεν) and "I" died (7:9). The commandment which promised life proved to be death to "me" (7:10). Sin, finding opportunity (ἀφορμὴν), deceived and killed "me" (ἐγὼ, 7:11). The law (ὁ . .. νόμος) and the commandment (ἡ ἐντολή) are holy, just, and good (7:12). It was not the law (τὸ . .. ἀγαθόν), but sin (ἡ ἁμαρτία) which brought death to "me" (ἐγὼ, 7:13). The law is spiritual (ὁ νόμος πνευματικὸς ἐστίν) but "I" (ἐγὼ) ἃν κανάλ, sold under sin (ἐγὼ de sarkinos eimi pepramenos hypo tēn hamartian, 7:14). The "I" (ἐγὼ), by doing the evil that it does not want, agrees that the law is good (συμφῆμι τὸ νόμον ἐντὸς ἀλός, 7:16). It finds a law (τὸν νόμον) that when it wishes to do right, evil lies close at hand (7:21). The "I" (ἐγὼ) delights in "the law of God" (τὸν νόμον τοῦ θεοῦ) "in its inmost self" (κατὰ τὸν ἑσός ἀνθρώπον, 7:22), but it sees in its members "another law" (heteron nomon) at war with the law of its mind
(tō nomō tou noos mou) taking it captive to "the law of sin" (tō nomō tes hamartias) which dwells in its members (7:23). "I (of) myself (autos egō) serve the law of God (nomō theō) with my mind, but with my flesh I serve the law of sin" (nomō hamartias, 7:25).

The parenthesis of 7:7-25 completed, Paul in 8:1ff. resumes the argument of 7:6. The Christian has died to and is freed from the law; he serves in the newness of the Spirit (7:4-6). The law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus (hō ... nomos tou pneumatos tēs zōēs en Christō Iēsoū) has freed him from the law of sin and death (apo tou nomou tēs hamartias kai tou thanatou, 8:2). What the law could not do (to ... adynaton tou nomou) because it was weak through the flesh (ēn hō ēsthenei dia tēs sarkos), God has done. He sent "his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and for sin, he condemned sin in the flesh", so that "the just requirement of the law" (to dikaiōma tou nomou) might be fulfilled in us, who walk not "according to the flesh" (kata sarka) but "according to the Spirit" (kata pneuma, 8:3f.). The one whose mind is set on the flesh does not, and cannot submit to God's law (tō ... nomō tou theou, 8:7).

Following this systematic exposition of the gospel, Paul asks why Israel has not entered into messianic salvation. It is ironic that Israel had strained after a law promising righteousness, but "did not succeed in fulfilling that law"
(eis nomon ouk ephasen, 9:31). Since Israel was ignorant of the righteousness that comes from God (tēn tou theou dikaiosynēn) and sought to establish its own (tēn idian zētountes stēsai) it did not submit to the righteousness of God (tē dikaiosynē tou theou, 10:3). Christ, however, is the end of the law, that everyone who has faith may be justified (telos gar nomou Christos eis dikaiosynēn panti tō pisteuonti, 10:4).

In the paraenetic section of Romans, love is the pivotal motif. It leads the list of the exhortations in 12:9-21. At 13:8, Paul exhorts that Christians should owe no one anything except to love one another, "for he who loves his neighbour has fulfilled the law" (ho gar agapōn ton heteron nomon peplērōken). The specific commandments from the decalogue, not to commit adultery, kill, steal, or covet, or any other are summed up in the sentence "You shall love your neighbour as yourself" (Agapēseis ton plesion sou hōs seauton, 13:9, =Lev. 19:18 LXX). Since love does not wrong a neighbour, it is the fulfilling of the law (plērōma . . . nomou, 13:10).

The text of Romans is rich in challenges to the interpreter of Paul's thought on Christ and the law. Romans clarifies some aspects of his thought which had been obscure in Galatians (e.g., explaining at length in Rom. 4:5; 5:13f., 20; 7:7-13 what was meant by the theme that the law "was added because of transgressions"; Gal. 3:19). At the same time Romans
generates new puzzles. Of particular interest is the question how Paul could simultaneously announce that the law is finished (10:4; cf. 6:14f.; 7:4) and that love fulfils it (3:8-10). We shall return to this problem in the following chapters.

III. 1 Corinthians

In the themes in 1 Corinthians the law appears only in a relatively minor role. It is interesting, however, that at one point (9:8f.) Paul claims that the itinerant Christian missionary like himself has been guaranteed financial support not by human authority (kata anthrōpon) but by the law; for "it is written in the law of Moses 'you shall not muzzle an ox when it is treading out the grain'" (Deut. 25:4). The real scope of this law was not revealed until now!

At 14:21 Paul quotes from Is. 28:11-12 to support his view that speaking in tongues is a sign, not for believers, but for unbelievers. He introduces this quotation with "In the law it is written" (en tō nomō gegrapτai). At 14:34 Paul derives from the law ("the law says", Ho nomos legei) his prescription that women should keep silent in the church. At 7:19 he claims "neither circumcision (peritomē) counts for anything nor uncircumcision (akrobystia), but keeping the commandments of God" (tērēsis entolōn theou).

These are statements in 1 Corinthians where Paul views the law positively. At 9:20f., however, he mixes together
both positive and negative statements. He states that to those under the law (tois hypo nomon) he became as one under the law (hōs hypo nomon) even though he himself is not under the law (me ēn autos hypo nomon) that he might win those under the law (tous hypo nomon). To those outside the law (tois anomois) he became as one outside the law (hōs anomo). But he is not without law toward God (me ēn anomo theou) for he is "under the law of Christ" (ennomos Christou).

In one passage, however, the law is understood merely negatively, and is referred to in a way which supposes the whole elaborate scheme of thought that we find in Romans. In 1 Cor. 15:56 he states that "the sting of death is sin, and the power of sin is the law." This assertion was not necessary to Paul's immediate point; if it nevertheless appears here, it is an index to the importance he attaches to his distinctive vision of the economy of salvation.

IV. 2 Corinthians

The relevant passage on the law in 2 Corinthians is 3:1ff. Paul tells his readers that they are a letter from Christ (epistolē Christou) written, not with ink on tablets of stone (en plaxin lithinais), but written with the Spirit (pneumati) of the living God "on tablets of human hearts" (en plaxin kardiais sarkinais, 3:3). God has qualified him and his readers to be ministers of a new covenant (diakonous kainēs diathēkēs) not in the written code (to . . . grammā)
which kills (apokteinei) but in the Spirit (to ... pneuma) which gives life (zooopoiei, 3:6).

The Mosaic economy was the dispensation of death (he diakonia tou thanatou, 3:7) and condemnation (tes katakriseos, 3:9) carved in letters of stone. Yet it had come in such splendour (en doxe) that the Israelites could not look at Moses' face because of its brightness, albeit, a brightness that was fading (3:7). The dispensation of the Spirit (he diakonia tou pneumatos) and righteousness (tes dikaiosynes), however, is attended with far greater splendour (mallon perisseuei ... doxe, 3:8f.). Because of the surpassing splendour of the latter, the former, in comparison, has no splendour at all (ou dedoxastai, 3:10). The old dispensation, which faded away (to katargoumenon), came with splendour (dia doxes); the new dispensation, which remains (to menon), came with much more splendour (pollo mallon ... en doxe, 3:11).

V. Philippians

Phil. 3:1ff. is a particularly significant passage. A sort of "testament", it features an autobiographical passage in which the law appears in the importance it has as the essence of what Paul left behind him when he was converted to Christ. This existential aspect of Paul's stance towards the law gave a special bite to his warnings against Judaizers or Judaizing gnostics. Look out for dogs (kynas), evil doers (kakous ergatas), and for those who mutilate the flesh (ten
katatomēn, 3:2), for, says Paul, we in contrast to them are the true circumcision (hē peritomē). We worship God in spirit (hō pneumati theou latreountes), and glory in Christ Jesus (kauchōmenoi en Christō Lōsou), and put no confidence in the flesh (kai ouk en sarki pepoithotes, 3:4). Though he himself does not put confidence in the flesh, he could do so more than anyone, for he was "circumcised on the eighth day, of the people of Israel, of the tribe of Benjamin, a Hebrew born of Hebrews", and "as to the law a Pharisee (kata nomon Pharisaioi), as to zeal (zēlas) a persecutor of the church, as to righteousness under the law blameless (kata dikaiosynēn tēn en nomō genomenos amemptos", 3:6).

At one time he considered all of these things as "gain" (kerdōs, plural kerde), but now he considers them and everything else whatever, as loss (zēmian) for the sake of Christ (3:7ff.). He has "suffered the loss" (ezēmiōthēn) of all things and has counted them as "refuse" (skybala) in order that he may "gain" (kerdēsoi) Christ. He says that he has done this so as to "be found in him (en autō = Christ), not having a righteousness of my own based on law (me echōn emēn dikaiosynēn tēn ek nomou), but that which is through faith in Christ (tēn diá pisteōs Christou), the righteousness from God that depends on faith (tēn ek theou dikaiosynēn epi tē pistei", 3:9). The Pauline antithesis could hardly be drawn more pointedly. The law as it functions in the Mosaic economy is futile.
It is at the opposite pole from faith. Faith is defined against it.

What is most striking from this survey of the data is that Paul, since he makes both negative and positive statements with regard to the law, seems to be contradicting himself. What is more likely, however, is that Paul does have a coherent total viewpoint, and that we need to discover a key which will unlock it. Chapters Five and Six of this thesis will be such an attempt; it will be an attempt to give an accurate interpretation, an interpretation that does full justice to the negative and positive aspects of Christ and the law, as portrayed by Paul.

Before this can be done, however, I believe we must have some conception of what Paul means by nomos. Before proceeding to Chapter Five, therefore, I would like to make four points concerning Paul's use of nomos. These points are as follows: (a) no importance can be placed on the presence or absence of the definite article; (b) the negative statements on the law can in no way be restricted to the ceremonial law; (c) nomos can refer to the Old Testament as a whole or be limited to various parts contained within it; and (d) some uses of nomos perhaps do not refer in any way to the Old Testament or Jewish law. I shall now discuss each of these points in turn.
In the last century in particular, certain scholars argued that when *nomos* is used without the definite article Paul is referring, not specifically to the Mosaic law, but to law in general. That such a distinction is present has, I believe, been refuted by Eduard Grafe and Peter Blüser. Grafe points out that the equation of the two forms is seen in the usage of *hypo nomon* (Gal. 3:23) and *ho nomos* (Gal. 3:24), and in Rom. 2:23-27 where what the Jew breaks is *nomos* (vs. 23, 25) and what the uncircumcised person keeps is *ho nomos* (vs. 26, 27). George E. Howard also points out that in such passages as Rom. 2:17; 13:8; Gal. 6:13; and Phil. 3:5 the contexts require that *nomos* refer to the law of Moses. I might add that at several places it appears in the same verse both with and without the definite article, with no apparent difference in meaning.

When Paul speaks negatively of the law, with the exception of Ephesians and Colossians (if these are considered to be Pauline), he does not mean that the ceremonial law is abrogated. It will be argued below that the man outside of Christ is enslaved, not to the ceremonial law which Paul could perfectly obey without feeling enslaved (cf. Phil. 3:4ff.) and which he continued to obey when it suited his purpose (cf. 1 Cor. 9:20f.), but to the moral law. It is frequently held that Paul is at one with Judaism in seeing the ethical and ceremonial aspects of the law as making up one indivisible
My response is that when Paul refers to those who would be saved ex ergōn nomōu, a rough equivalent of the ma'āse mishōt (the works of the commandments) of the rabbis, he does not differentiate the halakic and ceremonial aspects of the law. But when an uncircumcised Gentile can obey the precepts of the law (Rom. 2:27), the reference must be to the moral, and not the ceremonial or halakic, aspects of the law.

Nomos, in Paul, can refer to the Old Testament as a whole, the Pentateuch, the Mosaic legislation, the Decalogue, the Old Testament prophets, and perhaps the creation narratives. Ἡ νομὸς λεγεῖ (1 Cor. 14:34) probably refers to the creation narratives of Gen. 1:26ff. and 2:21ff. (on which Paul has based the argument of 11:3ff.) rather than to Gen. 3:16. Tὸ nomō gegrapτai (1 Cor. 14:21) refers to Is. 28:11-12. The commandments ou klepseis and ouk epithymēseis in Rom. 13:9 are references to the Decalogue. The specifically Mosaic legislation is explicitly referred to in 1 Cor. 9:9 (ἐν γὰρ τὸ Μοῦσα νομὸς gegrapτi) and in Gal. 3:17 (ὁ μετὰ τετρακοσία kai triakonta etέ gegonōs nomos), and is probably referred to in Rom. 5:13a and 5:20. In the phrases τοῦ nomου kai tōn prophetōn (Rom. 3:21) τοῦ nomου refers to the Pentateuch; but in the clause ἡσα ὁ νομὸς λεγεῖ (Rom. 3:19) the reference is to the whole Old Testament, to the whole catena of quotations adduced in Rom. 3:10-18 from the Psalms and Isaiah.

Finally, there are passages where nomos may not refer
in any way to the Old Testament or Jewish law. One passage that does not refer to them is Gal. 6:2 where Paul urges his readers to fulfil the \textit{ho nomos tou Christou}. In passages where \textit{nomos} is contrasted with \textit{nomos} one would suspect that not both of them refer to the same thing. These passages are the following: In Rom. 3:27 (\textit{nomos}) \textit{ergon} is contrasted with \textit{nomos pisteōs}. At Rom. 8:2 \textit{ho nomos tou pneumatos tēs zōēs en Christō Iēsou} is contrasted with \textit{tou nomou tēs hamartias kai tou thanatou}. At Rom. 7:22f. \textit{tō nomō tou theou} is contrasted with \textit{heteron nomon} and \textit{tō nomō tou noos mou} seems to be contrasted with \textit{tō nomō tēs hamartias tō onti en melesin mou}. Finally, at Rom. 7:25 \textit{nomō theou} is contrasted with \textit{nomō hamartias}. One would naturally suppose that the expression (\textit{ho} \textit{nomos (tou) theou}) (Rom. 7:22, 25; 8:7) would refer to the Mosaic law and would correlate with \textit{ta logia tou theou} (Rom. 3:3) and \textit{nomothesia} (Rom. 9:4), both of which were privileges for Israel. But from a reading of Romans one could also surmise that (\textit{ho} \textit{nomos (tēs) harmartias} 7:23, 25) and \textit{ho nomos tēs hamartias kai tou thanatou} (Rom. 8:2), if the genitives are understood loosely, refer to the Mosaic law, because as we shall see below, the law is aligned with sin and death. Furthermore, from a reading of Romans one could also expect that \textit{ho nomos tou pneumatos tēs zōēs en Christō Iēsou} refers to the Mosaic law because at 7:14 he says \textit{ho nomos pneumatikos estin} and at 8:4 it is the one who walks
kata pneuma rather than kata sarka who is to fulfil the to
dikaiōma tou nomou.

My view is that it is difficult to know precisely what
Paul intends by nomos in each of these cases. But if the key
which I propose in the following chapters for unlocking Paul's
meaning is correct, then each of these phrases could refer to
the Old Testament law. 12

Footnotes: Chapter Four

1 The Idea of History (Oxford: University Press, 1946,

2 No position will be taken on the authorship of Col-
ossians, Ephesians, or the Pastorals. Occasionally evidence
which supports a point deduced from the clearly Pauline let-
ters will appear in the footnotes.

Colossians is frequently viewed as Pauline, Ephesians
somewhat less so, and the Pastorals rarely so. For a defence
of the Pauline authorship of Colossians see Werner Georg
Kümmel, Introduction to the New Testament, trans. A. J. Mat-
till, Jr. (London: SCM, 1966), pp. 240-244. For a defence of
the Pauline authorship of Ephesians see Marcus Barth, Ephe-
sians: The Anchor Bible (2 Vols.; New York: Doubleday, 1974),
Vol. I, pp. 36-50. For a defense of the Pauline authorship
of the Pastorals see Donald Guthrie, The Pastoral Epistles

3 In 3:21-31 the righteousness of God is manifested
and the justification of man is accomplished choris (ergon)
nomou (3:21, 28). Boasting is thus excluded, not dia (nomou)
ton ergon but dia nomou pistes (3:27). In this process, to
which the law (ho nomos) and the prophets bear witness, the
law (nomos) is not overthrown (katargein) but upheld (histanō,
3:21, 31).

In 4:13-16 the law brings transgression and wrath
(4:15). The promise to Abraham and his descendents does not
come dia nomou (4:13); it comes to all who share the faith of
Abraham and not only to "the adherents of the law" (hoi ek
nomou, to ek tou nomou, 4:14, 16).


Grafe, ibid., p. 5f.


Howard also points out that the anarthrous use of *nomos* refers to the Mosaic law in the Apocrypha (1 Macc. 4:12; Sir. 19:20, 24; 21:11; Bar. 4:12), Philo (de Ebriet 17, 25, 135; de Sobriet 21; de Congr. Quer. Erudit Gratia 169; de Somn. 214), Josephus (Antiq. 3,237; 12,256; 16,43), and the New Testament (Heb. 8:4; 10:8; Jas. 2:11; 4:11).

I.e., at Rom. 2:14, 23, 27; 7:1, 2, 7; Gal. 4:21.


If the solution proposed below is correct, then the moral law of the Old Testament could be described as *pneumatikos* (Rom. 7:14), as having the character of *pneuma* and *zōē* (Rom. 8:2), and as being God's law (Rom. 7:22, 25; 8:7). Yet in some sense it is also the law of sin and death, because, as we shall see below, it is aligned with sin and death. The law, perhaps, can be viewed on the one hand, from the standpoint of works, and, on the other hand, from the standpoint of faith (Rom. 3:27).
CHAPTER FIVE: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DEATH AND RESURRECTION OF JESUS FOR PAUL'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE LAW

It is one thing to review what Paul says about Christ and the law and another to understand it. To understand is to know why. To understand what Paul says is to know why he says it. Our present purpose is to find out why Paul says what he does about Christ and the law, and our principal question is: Why does he attribute so negative a role to the law?

This question will lead to a further question about how the death and resurrection of Christ relate to man's liberation from law.

I. The Law's Negative Functions

The law's negative functions are, specifically, to give "knowledge of sin" (Rom. 3:20; cf. 7:13; Gal. 3:19); to incite to sin (Rom. 7:8; cf. 5:20); and to condemn to death (2 Cor. 3:9; Rom. 2:12; cf. Rom. 8:1, 3; Col. 2:14). Though the law be "holy" and the commandment "holy and just and good" (Rom. 7:12), though "the oracles of God" (τὰ λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ, Rom. 3:2), and "the giving of the law" (ἡ νομοθεσία, Rom. 9:4) be in themselves blessings, the law in the concreteness of history has had no positive function. It has not met the
dilemma of man and relieved it; rather it has sharpened and worsened it.

This is entirely due to the situation of man the sinner. He is in bondage to sin (Rom. 6); and though he validates the bondage by his own evil acts (Rom. 5:12f.; cf. 6:23), he is above all, victim, "sold under sin" (pepramenos hypo tēn hamartian, Rom. 7:14). Sin (hamartia) is conceived of as a ruling power which is almost, if not altogether, personified. Although in a few passages the image is that of a king -- i.e., sin reigns (basileuei, Rom. 5:21; 6:12), has its arsenal of weapons (hopla, Rom. 6:13), and pays its wages (opsōnia, Rom. 6:23) of death --, the image in most passages is that of a slave master. Men serve (douleuein, Rom. 6:6) it, are its slaves (doulai, 6:17, 20), and are sold into its service (pepramenos hupo tēn hamartian, Rom. 7:14) or are set free (eleutherōthentes, Rom. 6:22) from it. Sin acts as lord (kyrieusai, Rom. 6:14), and has all men under (pantas huph' hamartian einai, Rom. 3:9), and all things consigned to (synekleisen . . . ta panta hupo hamartian, Gal. 3:22), it. 2

For man the ultimate consequence of this rule of, and enslavement to, sin is death. Being a slave (doulos) of sin leads to (Rom. 6:16), and sinful passions (ta pathēmata tōn hamartiōn) bear fruit for (Rom. 7:5), death (thanatos). The wages of sin (ta . . . opsōnia tēs hamartias, Rom. 6:23) as
well as the end (to...telos) of the one who sins (Rom. 6:21), is death (thanatos). To the "I" (egō) of Rom. 7 it was sin (hē hamartia) that was working death (egeneto thanatos, Rom. 7:13); when sin revived (anezēsen) the "I" (egō) died (apethanōn, Rom. 7:9).

The condition of man is ruinous. But this is not because of intrinsic self-explanatory defects in his make-up (as in Gnosticism). The defects in his make-up (Rom. 7:14-18) are not simply the source of sin; they are its result (Rom. 6:19-21; 7:5).

This point is made, above all, by Paul's view of Adam. Adam initiated the process of sin and bequeathed mankind a heritage of death. It was di' henos anthrōpou that "sin came into the world...and death through sin (dia tēs hamartias ho thanatos)" so that eis pantas anthrōpous ho thanatos diēlthen eph' hō pantes hēmarton (Rom. 5:12). It was because of one man's trespass (tō tou henos paraptōma) that death reigned through that one man (ho thanatos ebasileusen dia tou henos, Rom. 5:17). It was because of this sin that death reigned from Adam to Moses (ebasileusen ho thanatos apo Adam mechri Mōuseōs, Rom. 5:21).³

But the rule of sin and death is finally broken! What has broken it? The act of God whose victory over sin was accomplished in the death and resurrection of Christ (Rom. 8:3). In Rom. 6:7 Paul says that ho...apothanōn dedikaiōtai⁴
apo tēs hamartias. Sanday and Headlam argue that here the sense of dedikaiōtai is forensic; the idea is that of a master claiming legal possession of a slave. When a slave has died, the claims of the law are satisfied; the slave is no longer answerable and sin thus loses its case. In Rom. 6:10 Paul says that the death Christ died he died to sin, once for all (tē hamartia apethanon ephhapax). Verse 10 read in the light of verse 7, indicates that sin ceased to have any claim on Christ. Sin previously did have a claim on the one who knew no sin (ton mē gnonta hamartian, 2 Cor. 5:21) because he was made sin for us (hyper hēmōn hamartian epoiēsen).

The believer has died with Christ (apethanomen syn Christō, Rom. 6:8) and has been united with Christ in the likeness of his death (sumphytoi gegonamen tō homoiōmati tou thanatou autou, Rom. 6:5). He has been baptized (ebaptisthēmen) eis Christōn Iēsoun and eis ton thanaton autou (Rom. 6:3). His old self (ho palaios . . . anthrōpos) was crucified with Christ (synestaurōthē) so that his sinful body might be destroyed (hina katargēthē to sōma tēs hamartias, Rom. 6:6). Thus the believer, because of his identification with Christ, has died to sin (apethanomen tē hamartia, Rom. 6:2). The result is that he has been set free from sin (eleutherōthentes (de) apo tēs hamartias, Rom. 6:18, 22), is no longer enslaved to sin (tou mēketi douleuein . . . tē hamartia, Rom. 6:6), and will not have sin acting as lord over him (hamartia gar
hymōn ou kyrieusei, Rom. 6:14). 11

In the passage Rom. 5:12-21 it is clear that the situation of man is the result of the sin of Adam (vs. 15b-19, cf. vs. 12). But, as Paul elsewhere indicates, it is also the result of the sins of men (6:23a; 3:23a). Perhaps this point is also made in the clause eph' hō' pantes hēmarton (5:12d) which comes immediately after the statement (5:12abc) that it was through one man (Adam) that sin came into the world. 12

At the end of the Adam/Christ passage which sets "free gift" (charisma) over against "trespass" (paratōma), Paul evokes the theme of the law and locates it historically: it came to increase the trespass (hina pleonase to paraptōma, 5:20). This dark view of the law finds still more specific and severe expression in chapter 6: "For sin will not have dominion over you, since you are not under law but under grace" (hamartia gar hymōn ou kyrieusei, ou gar este hypo nomon alla hypo charin, 6:14). From the structure of this sentence it is clear that to be "under law" (hypo nomon) is fatal. But it is not merely owing to man's bondage to sin that law is fatal.

In conjunction with this we must momentarily anticipate our treatment of Rom. 7. The law is not sin (7:7). Yet it is precisely the law that leads "me" to sin and death. Prior to sin and death it occasions sin and death (7:7-12). It so stands at the root of sin and death that no real freedom from
them is conceivable which is not at the same time freedom from law. Hence the explicit antithesis of law and grace (Rom. 6:14f.; cf. 5:20f.). To be "under law" is, accordingly, not a neutral condition of itself, positive for the good man and negative for the man in bondage to sin. It is itself negative, for to be under law is to be lead to sin. There is more, then, to "law" than the "just requirement of the law" (to dikaiōma tou nomou, 8:4). The "just requirement" is what God wills, and this is in fact accomplished in those "who walk not according to the flesh but according to the Spirit" (tois mē kata sarka peripatousin alla kata pneuma, 8:4). But this abstracts from the law its one positive note (cf. Rom. 13:8-10; Gal. 5:14) which is and remains valid even for those "under grace". To be "under the law" is another matter, for prior to sin this is to be incited to sin (Rom. 6:14) and following on sin it is to be enslaved, to be anguished by knowledge of the enslavement, and to be condemned.

Our understanding of the law as involved in the process of sin and death is enhanced by a consideration of the ego of Rom. 7. Rom. 7:7-13 is sometimes taken to refer to Paul's own experience under the law. This view would interpret several phrases in this passage more or less as follows: ego de ezōn (7:9) would be a vivid figurative expression; ouk egnōn (7:7) and chōris . . . nomou would refer to childhood innocence; ἡ entolē (7:10) would be that part of the Torah which first
braught Paul consciousness of sin (or would refer to his becoming a bar mitzvah); and \( \text{egō de apethanon} \) would refer to the ensuing guilt.

This interpretation is difficult, however, in light of the context, Paul's statements elsewhere, and Paul's Jewish background. Such an interpretation hardly does justice to the phrases \( \text{egō de ezōn} \) (7:9) and \( \text{egō de apethanon} \) (7:10).

In Gal. 1:14 Paul says that he was zealous for the traditions of his fathers; and in Phil. 3:4-6 he points out his reasons for confidence in the flesh under Judaism -- as to righteousness under the law he was blameless. Furthermore, it is not likely that there ever was a time in Paul's childhood when he was \( \text{chōris nomou} \) (7:9).\(^{15}\) Furthermore, if Paul was a Pharisee trained in the law, it is unlikely that he felt this way, for the early rabbis, as E. P. Sanders\(^{16}\) has pointed out, consider the elect to be saved already; they continue in that state so long as they truly repent of transgressions as they arise.

It has been frequently maintained that Rom. 7:7-13 is to be understood in light of its parallels to the story of the fall of Adam in Gen. 3.\(^{17}\) Thus \( \text{ouk epithymēseis} \) (Rom. 7:7) is reminiscent of the tree which was to be desired (Gen. 2:17 ("of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat, for in the day that you eat of it you shall die."); \( \text{hē hamartia}: \ldots \text{exēpatēsen} \)\(^{18}\) is to be understood in light of Gen. 3:13 ("The serpent beguiled me"); and \( \text{apekteinen-} \)
is to be understood in light of Gen. 2:17; 3:3, 4; ἡ ἑντολὴ ἡ εἰς ζωὴν (Rom. 7:10) is comprehensible in view of the tree of life in Gen. 2:9, 3:24; finally anezēsen (Rom. 7:9) is not an obstacle to this view since it can be translated not only as "revived" but also as "rose up". 19

This view, I believe, should be accepted since it gives full weight both to ἐγὼ ἐν ζῶν ἐχόμενος (Rom. 7:9) and to ἐγὼ ἐν θανάτῳ. There was a time when Adam did live without law; Paul presents Adam's experience of coming under the prohibition (Gen. 2:16f.) as paradigmatic of mankind's coming under law.

The question remains as to what the ἐγὼ in Rom. 7:14-25 refers. Origen and the Greek fathers viewed it as referring to man under the law, whereas Augustine and the Latin fathers viewed it as referring to the Christian experience; both positions have been advocated by various people in modern times. 20 There are two considerations, however, which refute the latter position. First, the ἐγὼ in Rom. 7:14 is sarkinos, but in Rom. 8 the Christian walks kata pneuma, not kata sarka (Rom. 8:4); he is en pneumatikos, not en sarki (Rom. 8:9). Second, and most important, the ἐγὼ in Rom. 7:14 is pepramenos hypote hen harmartian; if this could in any way refer to the Christian it would contradict all that Paul has said about the Christian being set free from sin in Rom. 6. Also, the pepramenos hypote hen harmartian (Rom. 7:14) and the cry talaipōros ἐγὼ
anthrōpos tis me rhysetai ek tou somatos tou thanatou toutou (7:24) indicates that the plight of the egō in Rom. 7:14-25 is not primarily ethical but heilsgeschichtlich. 21

It is frequently maintained that the egō is to be understood in the sense of a Stilform or an indefinite tis. Kümmel 22 claims such a usage in one passage from Philo (de Somnis I:176), three from the rabbis (Mishna: Ber. 1:3; Gemara Ber. 3a; Pirke Aboth 6:96) and three from Greek Literature (Demosilhenes: Kata Philippou q 9:17; Pseudo-Xenophon: De republica Atheniensium 1:11; 2:11). Karl Georg Kuhn believes that this usage occurs in the Dead Sea Scrolls (1QS 11:9-10), 23 and that Romans 7 is to be understood in light of it. It is also sometimes claimed that Paul uses egō in this sense in passages other than Rom. 7. Stauffer sees a gnomic or general usage of egō in Rom. 3:7; 1 Cor. 6:12ff.; 10:29f.; 14:11ff.; and Gal. 2:18-21. 24

This interpretation is possible, but good sense can also be made of the passage if Paul is thinking either primarily or exclusively of himself. It is no doubt true, however, that Paul (if asked) would agree that the passage could be applied more generally.

I have concluded above that Rom. 7:7-13 refers to the fall of Adam and that Rom. 7:14-25 cannot refer to the Christian. This passage can, however, refer to Paul himself if we remember that it refers not to his self consciousness but to his self understanding. 25 Just as in Adam all die (1 Cor. 15:22; cf. Rom. 5:12, 17; 1 Cor. 15:21) so it may be in Adam, as
we have seen above, that all sin in terms of law. What is true of all men is also true of Paul. In Adam he was alive without law; in Adam the law came to him; in Adam he died (Rom. 7:9).

But that Paul is no longer thinking of the fall of Adam in Rom. 7:14-25 is evidenced by the switch from the past to the present tense. That he is not thinking of his present experience is evidenced by the ἄνω in 8:1 and the interjection of 7:25a -- ἐχάρις δὲ τῷ θεῷ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν. The present tense is thus in some sense historical.²⁶

If the ἐγώ is to be applied more generally, it cannot refer to the man described in either 1:18ff. or 2:1ff. The ἐγώ of Rom. 7:14 ff. certainly does not approve of immorality (cf. 1:23), and unlike the moralist of 2:1ff. understands the profound seriousness of his plight.

We are now in a better position to see how the law is involved in man's problem of sin and death. We have seen in Rom. 5:12ff. and Rom. 7:7-13 that the reign of sin and death begins with Adam and that the law is involved in the process. Let us now take a closer look at the role of the law in this process.

The law, far from restraining sin, makes it increase. Apart from the law, sin lies dead (ἐχορίς γὰρ ἡμῶν ἡμαρτία νεκρὰ, Rom. 7:8). The law both produces transgressions (ὅως δὲ οὐκ εστὶν νόμος οὐδὲ παράβασις, Rom. 4:15) and increases the trespass (νόμος δὲ πάρεισιθεν ἡνὰ πλεονάσῃ τὸ παραπτώμα,
Rom. 5:20). The law gives sin its power (ἡ ἐν δυνάμει τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἡ ἡμῶν, 1 Cor. 15:56), is an instrument of deception (ἡ γὰρ ἁμαρτία ἀφορμὴν λαμβοῦσα διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς ἐξεπαθήσεν με, Rom. 7:11), and arouses sinful passions which bear fruit for death (τὰ παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν τὰ διὰ τοῦ νόμου ἐνεργείτο ἐν τοῖς μελετὶς ἡμῶν εἰς τὸ καρποφόρησαι τὸ thanatὸ, Rom. 7:5). It is through the law that there is a curse (τῆς καταρας τοῦ νόμου, Gal. 3:13), wrath (ὁ γὰρ νόμος ὁργὴν κατεργάζεται, Rom. 4:15), and the charging of sin against one's account (ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐν οὐκ ἐλλογείται μὴ ὠντος νόμου, Rom. 5:13).

Not only is the law an instrument of deception (cf. Rom. 7:11 above); it is also an instrument of death (ἡ γὰρ ἁμαρτία ἀφορμὴν λαμβοῦσα διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς ἐξεπαθήσεν με καὶ δι' ἀυτῆς ἀπεκτείνει, Rom. 7:11). It is the very commandment which promises life that brings death (ἡ ἐντολὴ ἡ ἐις ζωὴν haute ἐις thanaton, Rom. 7:10). The ἑγὼ of Rom. 7 was once alive without law (chōris nomou, Rom. 7:9); when the commandment came sin rose up and the ἑγὼ died (ἐλθοὺς ἐστὶς ἐν ἐντολῆς ἡ ἁμαρτία ἀνεζητεῖ, ἑγὼ ἐστὶς ἀπέθανον, Rom. 7:9). It is because of the sin (ἡ ἁμαρτία, Rom. 5:12) and transgressions (paraptomati, Rom. 5:15) of Adam (ἡνὸς ἀνθρώπου, Rom. 5:12; τού ἡνὸς, Rom. 5:15) which is perhaps in terms of law (Rom. 7:7-13; 5:12ff) that mankind dies. 27 The whole period of the Mosaic economy is described as "the dispensation of
death" (ἡ διακονία τοῦ θανάτου, 2 Cor. 3:7). It is the law or "the written code" (τὸ γράμμα) which kills.

Finally, the law brings enslavement. It is the law (τοῦ νόμου) which holds man captive (ἐν ἡ διέξεισθαι, Rom. 7:6). The ἐγώ of Rom. 7 is enslaved (δουλεύω, Rom. 7:25) and made captive (αἰχμαλωτίζονται, Rom. 7:23) to the law of sin (τὸ νόμος τῆς ἁμαρτίας, Rom. 7:23) (νόμος ἁμαρτίας, Rom. 7:25). Just as man is ἡμὴ ἁμαρτιαν (Rom. 3:9), he is also kept under restraint (συνκλειόμενοι) and confined (ἐφρουροῦμενοι) ἵππος νόμον, (Gal. 3:23).

II. The Death and Resurrection of Jesus

At this point we should deal with the death and resurrection of Christ, for it is through them, according to Paul, that the life of man ἵππος νόμον, his bondage to sin, and his destiny of death are all broken and reversed.

Thus far in the argument we have seen that man is a slave of the law and that the law is involved in the process of sin and death. Our a priori expectation would then be that if man is freed from sin by Christ's death, he is also freed from the law by that death. This expectation is indeed confirmed in four passages -- Rom. 7:4-6; 8:1-3; Gal. 2:19-21; 3:13. Just as the Christian, by participating in the death of Christ is no longer enslaved to sin, likewise he has died to the law through the body of Christ so that he may belong to another (ἡμεῖς ἐθανατοθέτει τὸ νόμος διὰ τοῦ σώματος του
Christou eis to genesthai hymas hetero, Rom. 7:4). In the past his sinful passions aroused by the law were at work in his members to bear fruit for death (Rom. 7:5), but now he is discharged from the law, dead to that which held him captive (i.e., the law) so that he might not serve under the old written code (nyni de katergethemen apo tou nomou, apothanontes en hō kateichomethai hōste douleuein hēmas . . . ou palaiotēti grammatos.)31

In Rom. 8:1-3 the Christian has been set free from the law of sin and death (Eleutherosen me apo tou nomou tēs hamartias kai tou thanatou, Rom. 8:2).32 Since he is in Christ and has been set free from the law, the law can now no longer condemn him (ouden ara nyn katakrima tois en Christo Iēsou, Rom. 8:1). This being set free from the law (and sin) involves both the incarnation and death of Christ (the former as we shall see is stressed in Gal. 4:4f. while the latter is stressed in Gal. 3:13); God both sends his son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and as a sin offering condemns sin in the flesh (ho theōs ton heautou huion pempasas en homoiomati sarkos hamartias και peri hamartias katekrinen tēn hamartian en tē sarki, Rom. 8:3). Thus Christ does what the law could not do since it was weak through the flesh (to . . . adynaton tou nomou en hō ἐσθenei dia tēs sarkos, Rom. 8:3).

In Gal. 3:13 the Christian is redeemed from the curse of the law because Christ has become a curse for him (Christos
hēmas exēgorasen ek tēs kataras tou nomou genomenos hyper hēmōn katarα, Gal. 3:13).

These last two texts, however, require further elucidation. What is meant in Gal. 3:13 is to be read in light of what has been said about the believer's freedom from sin. Just as all men, both Jews and Greeks, are ὑπὸ ἁμαρτίαν, so all are both "consigned" (synkleiō) eis apeitheian (Rom. 11:32) and ὑπὸ νόμον (Gal. 3:23); they are ὑπὸ νόμον (Gal. 4:5) and under the curse of the law (hē katarα tou nomou, cf. Gal. 3:10, 13).

Christ's purpose is thus to redeem (exagorazō) those (i.e., all men, both Jews and Greeks) who are both ὑπὸ νόμον (Gal. 4:5) and under the curse of the law (tēs kataras tou nomou, Gal. 3:13). The redemption involves both our identification with him (Gal. 3:13; cf. above Rom. 6) and his identification with us (Gal. 4:4f.); it involves both his genomenon ek gynaikōs, genomenon ὑπὸ νόμον (Gal. 4:4) and his genomenos hyper hēmōn katarα (Gal. 3:13). In Gal. 4:4f. the means of redemption is Jesus' humanity and his submission to the law (cf. Rom. 5:19) whereas in Gal. 3:13 the means of redemption is his genomenos hyper hēmōn katarα. 37

We have here an allusion to the suffering servant in passages in Isaiah. 38 Christ by becoming a curse on our behalf and, perhaps, also in our place, redeems us from the curse of the law. 39 By the curse of the law Paul means "the punishment
imposed upon sin (which is here equated with transgression of the law). However, by becoming a curse (katara) he is not accursed (anathema); he does not become the curse of God, rather the curse is defined in relation to the law.

Finally, the Christian through the law has died to the law (egō gar dia nomou nomō apethanon, Gal. 2:19). The Christian has died to the law (nomō apethanon, Gal. 2:19, hymeis ethanatōthēte to nomō, Rom 7:4) just as he has died to sin (apethanomen tē hamartia, Rom. 6:2, cf. vs. 10); and just as he is dead to sin (nekrous . . . tē hamartia, Rom. 6:11) so by analogy he is dead to the law. He has died to the law because he has been crucified with Christ (Christō synestaurōmai, Gal. 2:20). Just as being crucified with Christ (synestaurōthē, Rom. 6:6) means that he is no longer enslaved to sin (tou mēketi douleuein hēmas tē hamartia, Rom. 6:6) so by analogy it means that he is no longer enslaved to the law; he has died to the law and thus belongs to Christ (eis to genesthai hymas heterō, Rom. 7:4).

Furthermore this dying to the law takes place dia nomou. This phrase does not mean that since the law can not be fulfilled what it does is to expose man to his sinfulness and point to the grace of Christ. Nor does it mean, by analogy with Rom. 7:9-11, that the law leads to sin which in turn causes the death of man, and that through death man is absolved from the law. Nor can law be understood in two different
senses here; under this view πνευματος would refer to the Mosaic
law and πνευματος to the nomos tou pneumatos (Rom. 8:2) and the
nomou pisteos (Rom. 3:27). Rather the believer's death to the
law takes place dia nomou because Christ was genomenon ek
gynaikos, genomenon hypo nomon (Gal. 4:4) and by becoming a
kata rha has redeemed those who were under the tes kataras tou
nomou (Gal. 3:13). Since this death to the law dia nomou thus
involves the incarnation and death of Christ, he can also say
that it takes place dia tou somatos tou Christou, (Rom.
7:4). 45 & 46

So much for the death and resurrection of Christ and
its role in putting an end to man's bondage to law, sin, and
death. By baptism into Christ's death (Rom. 6:3f.) "we have
died with Christ" (apethanomen syn Christo, Rom. 6:8) and ac-
cording to this logic "we shall also live with him" (syzeesomen
auto, 6:8). The believer not only participates in the death
of Christ, he is also destined to participate in the resurrec-
tion of Christ and, in fact, is already "alive to God in Christ
Jesus" (zontas de to theo en Christo Iesou, 6:11). Thus the
believer's ultimate participation in the resurrection is fu-
ture, 47 but there is also a present aspect. Believers, then,
"should yield" themselves "to God as men who have been brought
from death to life" (parastesate heautous to theo hosei ek
nekrnon zontas, 6:15). Just as Christ was raised from the dead
by the glory of the Father, the believer, too, is to walk in
newness of life (hina hōsper ēgerthē Christos ek nekrōn dia
tēs doxēs tou patros, houtōs kai hēmeis en kainotētī zōes
peripatēsōmen, Rom. 6:4). In Christ he has God's gift -- the
life of the age to come (ta de charisma tou theou zōē aiōnios
In his body he bears the death of Jesus so that the life of
Jesus may be manifested in it (pantote tēn nekrōsin tou Iēsou
en tō sōmati peripherontes hina kai hē zōē tou Iēsou en tō
sōmati hēmōn phanerōthē, 2 Cor. 4:10). Since he has been
crucified with Christ, he no longer lives, but Christ lives
in him (Christō synestauromai zō de oukèti egō, zē de en emoi
Christos, Gal. 2:20). He has died to the law that he might
both live to (hina theō zēsō, Gal 2:19), and bear fruit for
(hina karpophorēsōmen tō theō, Rom. 7:4), God. Since he is
no longer captive to the law he no longer serves under the
old written code but in the new life of the Spirit (hōste
douleuein hýmas en kainotēti pneumatos kai ou palaiotētī
grammatos, Rom. 7:6). It is the written code which kills, but
the Spirit which gives life (to gar gramma apokteinei, to de
pneuma zōopoiei, 2 Cor. 3:6);48 this life-giving Spirit is the
last Adam i.e., Christ (ho eschatos Adam eis pneuma zōopoioùn,
1 Cor. 15:45).49

These texts indicate that it is, the believer's participa-
tion in the resurrection of Christ which imparts life to
him. Paul furthermore links life and righteousness. One can-
not have life without having righteousness nor righteousness without life. This inseparable link is thematized in several passages. In the pre-Pauline faith formula cited in Rom. 4:25 "who was put to death for our trespasses and raised for our justification" (hos paredothē dia ta paraptōmata hēmōn kai ēgērthē dia tēn paredothē dikaiōsin hēmōn) the vocabularies of "raise", "resurrect", and right-" (dik-) are already conjoined. This correlation calls for us to exploit the Pauline themes of righteousness in order to group Paul's theology of the resurrection and the role of the resurrection in breaking man's bondage to sin, death, and the law.

Thus in full accord with the thought of Rom. 4:25, but going beyond it, Paul declares in Gal. 3:21 that: "If a law had been given which could make alive (hō dynamenos zōopoīēsai), then righteousness (hē dikaiosyne) would indeed be by the law." That is, if an A (nomos) had been given which could produce B (zōopoīēsai) then B (dikaiosynē) would have been by A (nomos). Thus in Paul zōopoīēsai and dikaiosynē are correlated.

The phrase eis dikaiosynēn is contrasted with eis thanaton and compared with eis sōterian. In Rom. 6:16 the Christian is an obedient slave of the one he obeys, either of sin (eis thanaton) or of obedience (eis dikaiosynēn). In Rom. 10:10 a man believes with his heart eis dikaiosynēn and with the mouth confession is made eis sōterian.

But simply because righteousness and life are linked
it does not follow that they are identical. For dikaiosyne is not only contrasted with thanatos but also with the legal term katakrasis (2 Cor. 3:9)⁵¹ and with such ethical terms as adikia (Rom. 6:13f.),⁵² anomia (2 Cor. 6:14; Rom. 6:19), akatharsia (Rom. 6:19) and hamartia (Rom. 6:18, 20; 8:10).

In order to understand the connection between ō and dikaiosyne it will be of benefit to have a clearer understanding of Rom. 5:12-21. Hans Wilhelm Schmidt⁵³ points out that the dia touto (5:12) refers back to the sothēsometha en tē ō autou (5:10). Paul's thought on the-saving power of the resurrection of Christ (5:10) provides the occasion for giving an extended comparison between Adam who initiates a process that culminates in death, and Christ who initiates a process that culminates in life (Rom. 5:12-21; cf. 1 Cor. 15:21ff.). It is Adam's one hamartia (5:12) (which as we have seen may be in terms of law)⁵⁴ and one paraptōma (5:15, 16, 17, 18) which brings condemnation (eis katakrima, 5:16; eis pantas anthrōpous eis katakrima, 5:18) and death (eis panta anthrōpous ho thanatos diēlthen, 5:12; hoi polloi apethanon, 5:15; ho thanatos ebasileusen, 5:17; ebasileusen ē hamartia en tō thanatō, 5:21) to all men. It is Adam's disobedience (parakoē) which makes the many sinners (hamartōloi); it is Christ's obedience (hypakoē) which makes the many righteous (dikaioi, Rom. 5:19).⁵⁵ Instead of Adam's paraptōma (5:15, 17, 18) Christ brings the to charisma (15a), the ē charis tou theou kai ē
dōrea en chariti (15b), the tēn perisseian tēs charitos kai tēs dōreas tēs dikaiosynēs (17), and the dikaiōma (18). Instead of condemnation (katakrima, 5:16, 18) Christ brings the dikaiōma (5:16) and the dikaiōsin zōēs (5:18); and instead of death (5:12, 15, 17) Christ brings life (en zōē basileusousin, 5:17; hē charis basileuse dia dikaiosynēs eis zōē aionion, 5:21).

In this process which culminates in life in Rom. 5:12-21, the dikaios word-group, since it occurs six times (dikaios, once, 5:19; dikaiōsis, once, 5:18; dikaiōma, twice, 5:16, 18; and dikaiosynē, twice, 5:17, 21), has a prominent role to play, and, like dikaiosynē in the previous cases, the meanings seem to overlap between the judicial, the ethical, and the vital.

In 5:19 the dikaiōi are contrasted with the hamartōloi (an ethical term); however the status of the latter is one which (in context) issues in death, and is the result of Adam's disobedience in terms of law; by contrast the status of the former is one which (in context) issues in life, and is the result of Christ's obedience in terms of law.

Since in 5:18 dikaiōma is contrasted with paraptōma and used synonymously with hypakoē (5:19), it seems to refer to a right act in fulfilment of a legal requirement. However in 5:16, since dikaiōma (along with the other words which end in -ma, dōrema, krima, katakrima, charisma, and paraptōmatōn) is used both for rhetorical effect and in contrast with
katakrima, it seems to refer to the sentence of justification and to be a synonym of dikaiōsis.\(^{59}\)

In 5:18 the expression which is contrasted with katakrima (and which is the result of Christ's just act (dikaiōma)) is not dikaiōma (as in 5:16) or merely dikaiōsis (sentence of justification),\(^{60}\) but dikaiōsin zōēs. Just as on the divine side (in contrast to the human) the sentence and its result (death) cannot be distinguished in the word katakrima,\(^{61}\) it also seems to be true that Paul cannot think of the sentence of justification (dikaiōsis) without having in mind its result (zōē). The phrase therefore probably means justification which is life\(^{62}\) rather than justification which issues in life;\(^{63}\) at any rate, dikaiōsis and zōē are correlative.\(^{64}\)

Of the dikaios group of words in Rom. 5:12-21, we have yet to consider the word dikaiosynē -- a word which, in this passage, is also related to life (although it is difficult to say in precisely what sense). \(^{65}\) I take the genitive tēs dōreas tēs dikaiosynēs (Rom. 5:17), in agreement with Käsemann, to be epexegetic; it is those who receive the gift which is righteousness who will reign in life. In Rom. 5:21 the contrast perhaps centres around the prepositions en . . . eis\(^{66}\) rather than en . . . dia\(^{67}\) -- i.e., the opposite of en tō thanatō is eis zōēn aiōnion rather than dia dikaiosynēs eis zōēn aiōnion. Perhaps, however, Käsemann is right when he
says that "Gnade, Gerechtigkeit, ewiges Leben sind nicht mehr zeitlich oder kausal zu trennen. In ihnen begegnet unter verschiedenem Aspekt der gleiche Sachverhalt der Basileia Christi." At any rate dikaiosyne (and also, as we have seen above, dikaios and dikaiosis) and zoe are mutually related. Just as sin and death come through Adam, so righteousness and life come through (and only through) Christ.

To say that righteousness could come by law is to deny the necessity of the death of Christ (ei gar dia nomon dikaiosyne arx Christos dorean apethanen, Gal. 2:21). Those Christians who would be justified by the law (en nomo dikaiousthe) are severed from Christ (Gal. 5:4) because they have denied, and are seeking to obtain, a status that they already have in Christ. Righteousness and life are available in Christ because they could not be made available through the observance of the law (ei gar edothē ho dynamenos zoopoiesai ontos ek nomou an en hē dikaiosyne, Gal. 3:21).

Man is unable to obtain righteousness and life by the observance of the law, not because a perfect observance would be unable to obtain such an end, but because he is unable to observe it perfectly. That a perfect observance of the law would bring righteousness and life seems to be indicated in several passages. In Rom. 2:13 it is not the hearers but the doers of the law who will be justified (ou gar ho akroahtai, all' ho poietai nomou dikaiothesontai). In Rom. 10:5
(quoting Lev. 18:5) it is the man who practices the righteousness based on the law who shall live by them (τὴν δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ομοῦ ὧτι ἡ ποιησάς ἄνθρωπος ᾧσεται ἐν αὐτῇ). 71 In Gal. 3:12, when referring to the law, Paul again quotes Lev. 18:5: ἡ ποιησάς αὐτὰ ᾧσεται ἐν αὐτοῖς. 72 In Gal. 3:10 the reason why those who rely on the works of the law do not obtain righteousness and life, but rather are under a curse (κατάρα) is because they do not do all of the law (Ἐπικαταράς πας ὅσο οὐκ ἐμμενεῖ πασαν τοῖς γεγραμμένοις ἐν τῷ βιβλίῳ του ποιήσαι αὐτα, Gal. 3:10; Deut. 27:26). Thus, because one cannot observe the law, the commandment which promises life brings death (ὅ ἐντολή ἡ εἰς ζωήν αὐτῆς εἰς θανάτον, Rom. 7:10).

My interpretation of these texts coheres with Paul's view that the law cannot bring life (Gal. 3:21). Since all have already sinned (Rom. 5:12) it is no longer even a theoretical possibility to obtain salvation by perfect obedience to the torah, if by perfect obedience is meant sinlessness during one's whole lifetime (past, present, and future). 73 At Rom. 2:13 and Gal. 3:10-12 the contexts indicate that Paul's purpose, far from exhorting one to live a better life, is to show that those who would gain salvation through obedience to the torah are condemned. 74

We said at the outset that to understand what Paul says is to know why he says it. In reviewing, now, the thrust of
this chapter, our effort will be to concentrate on the "whys" internal to Paul's vision of things. This will lead us to some concluding observations on "flesh" (sárkh) and "spirit" (pneuma).

Paul says that the law concretely functioned in ways which were damaging and, indeed, ruinous. Why? Doubtless because of law's relation to sin. Thus law made sin conscious and formal. It came in order that sin "might be shown to be sin" and thus become "sinful beyond measure" (hina phanē hamartia . . . hina genētai, kath' hyperbolēn hamartōlos, Rom. 7:13). One might say that "sin" is the key to Paul's dark view of the law.

But this is far from the whole of the matter, for insofar as law incited to sin, it had a negative role even prior to man's immersion in sin and bondage to it. Thus, Paul could say that sin would have no dominion over the believer precisely because "you are not under law" (ou gar este hypo nomon, Rom. 6:14). Could this mean for Paul the ultimate villain of history is law? Evidently not, for "the law is holy" (ho men hagios, Rom. 7:12).

The "why" of the law's injurious functions even prior to sin is indicated in Rom. 7:5. "While we were living in the flesh, our sinful passions, aroused by the law, were at work in our members to bear fruit for death" (hote gar ēmen en té sarki, ta pathemata tôn hamartiôn ta dia tou nomou enērgeito
en tois melesin hēmōn eis to karpophorēsai tō thanatō). Here the sequence is: life "in the flesh", "law", which incites "sinful passions" that, in turn, "bear fruit for death".

"Flesh" (sarx) is a presupposition of the injurious role of the law.

This "flesh" is antithetical to "spirit" throughout Paul. It is not to be equated with "body" though body is an element of it. It is the sphere of the merely earthly, life that takes the merely human for its norm. Such is the condition of man apart from God. But worse, it might be, and for Paul it was, the condition of man who knew God but accepted his word rather as a challenge to human striving than as a pure gift. Hence Paul's repudiation of the religious "boast" (kauchēma, Rom. 4:2) as an expression of "the flesh" (Phil. 3:3).

Is "flesh" then, the ultimate villain of history? Here we pose a "why" question bearing on Paul's view of law, sin, and death which he nowhere explicitly answers. He does, however, give some indication of an answer by his reflection on Adam. First, "sin came into the world through one man" (Rom. 5:12). Paul never says that the sin of the one man was fated, because he was of the earth, earthly (cf. 1 Cor. 15:47). On the contrary, he supposes that the man of dust might nevertheless have taken the way to life. On the other hand, the fleshly (sarkinion, sarkikon) is in the line of Adam, who
"became a living being" (eis psychēn zōsan, 1 Cor. 15:45).

In the concreteness of the history of sin, then, the ultimate villain is the undecipherable surd of sin, freely chosen. But the free choice was fateful. Underlying mankind's solidarity with Adam in sin (Rom. 5:12) is its solidarity with him in flesh (1 Cor. 15:47-49). Hence the reversal that is salvation must be not only freedom from death and therefore from sin and therefore from law; it must ultimately be a new principle to take the place of flesh. Paul's celebration of the victory of salvation (Rom. 8) accordingly takes the form of a pneumatology (vs. 2-27). Sin is condemned "in the flesh" vs. 3); now men may walk "according to the Spirit" (vs. 4), setting their minds on the things of the Spirit (vs. 5). Here is a final key to Paul's view of Christ and the law: "For the mind that is set on the flesh . . . does not submit to God's law, indeed it cannot" (dioti to phronēma tes sarkos . . . to gar nomō tou theou ouch' hypotassei, oude gar dynatai, Rom. 8:7). Men are saved, they cannot save themselves; they cannot become pneumatikoi by their own efforts. The torment of the victim in Rom. 7 lay in the unbridgeable chasm between the law that is pneumatikos and himself, -- sarkinos (Rom. 7:14).

Salvation, therefore, concretely consisted in the transition from thanatos to zōē, which is one and the same as the transition from sàrkh to pneuma (cf. Rom. 5:5; 8:10f.).

Both the death and resurrection of Christ contributed essentially to man's freedom from sin, death, and law, and his
entry into righteousness, life, and spirit. Whereas law incited to sin, the Spirit incites to the fulfilment of the law's dikaiōma or "just requirement". To live en nomo (Gal. 3:11; 5:4), ek (tou) nomou (Rom. 4:14, 16; 10:5; Gal. 3:18, 21; Phil. 3:9), dia nomou (Rom. 3:20; 4:13; Gal. 2:21), hypo nomon (Rom. 6:14, 15; Gal. 4:21; 5:18) is to die. This finally puts us in position to confront Paul's epitome affirmation that "Christ is the end of the law" (Rom. 10:4).

Footnotes: Chapter Five


2Bauer-Arndt-Gingrich, op. cit., p. 42f. also note that it enters the world (Rom. 5:12), revives (anezēsen, Rom. 7:9), or is dead (nekrā, Rom. 7:8).

3It is in light of these verses in Rom. 5 that the statements *di* anthropōu thanatos* (1 Cor. 15:21) and *en tō* Adam pantēs apothenēskousin * (1 Cor. 15:22) are to be read.

4Dedikaiōtaí is the verb which elsewhere in Paul means "to justify".


6Whether or not the idea of dedikaiōtaí is forensic here, the idea of sin as a slave master, as we have seen above, is clear. When a slave dies, his master has no further claim on him.

7In Rom. 6:9 it says explicitly that for Christ (but omitting any reference to the believer) death no longer has dominion (*thanatos autoi oukēti kurieuei*). That this is also
the case for the believer, and its significance for him, will be discussed below.

8 This verse is to be understood in light of 1 Cor. 10:2 and 12:13. In 12:13 all Christians, whether Jew or Greek, by one Spirit were baptized into one body (ἐν ἰδίᾳ πνεύματι ἐς ἑνὸς σώματος ἐβαπτισθήμεν). In 10:2 all Israelites were baptized into Moses (ἐς τὸν Μωϋσῆν ἐβαπτίζετο) in the cloud and in the sea. F. F. Bruce, The Epistle of Paul to the Romans (London: The Tyndale Press, 1963), p. 137 notes that just as baptism into Moses seals the Israelites' exodus from Egypt, so baptism in Rom. 6:2 seals the believer's exodus from the bondage of sin.

9 Compare the phrase Christον synestaurómai in Gal. 2:20.

10 The use of the perfects ἑγόναμεν (Rom. 6:5), δεδικαίωται (Rom. 6:7), and synestaurómai (Gal. 2:20) seems to indicate the enduring results of the believer's death to sin, whereas the aorists ἐβαπτισθήμεν (Rom. 6:3), ἀπέθανον (Rom. 6:2), synestaurothé (Rom. 6:6), καταργοθέ (Rom. 6:6), and ἐλευθεροθέντες (Rom. 6:18, 22) seem to indicate the once for all nature of the action. This is particularly the case in view of the fact that in Rom. 6 the character of the believer's death seems to be derived from Christ's death, and Christ died (ἀπέθανον =aorist tense) to sin, once for all (ἐφημαρτα). It is on this basis that the Pauline imperatives not to sin (Rom. 6:15), not to let sin reign (βασιλεύω) in one's mortal body (6:12), not to present ones members as weapons of wickedness to sin (μέει παριστανετα τα μελεῖς ἱμων ἄδικας τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, 6:13), not to present oneself as a slave of sin (6:16), and to consider oneself as dead to sin (λογίζεσθε ἑαυτούς εἶναι νεκρούς τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, 6:11), make sense. It is pointless to tell a slave not to act as one, because he has no choice in the matter; however, the case is otherwise with a freed slave.

12 The ἐπ' ὁ in Rom. 5:12 has given rise to an enormous literature, and to a wide variety of interpretations. No attempt will be made here to finally resolve the problems which it presents; rather an effort will be made to give a representative survey of, and proposed solutions to, it. For a selected bibliography on more recent literature see C. E. B. Cranfield, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans: The International Critical Commentary; Vol. I (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1975), ad. loc., p. 274ff.; and F. W. Danker, "Romans V. 12 Sin Under Law", New Testament
The various positions on eph’ hō in Rom. 5:12 can be summarized as follows: (a) hō is masculine; its antecedent is an implied nomos (Danker, op. cit., p. 428); (b) hō is masculine and ho thanatos is its antecedent (Hering, Stauffer); (c) hō is masculine and hēnos anthrōpou is its antecedent with eπί equivalent to (i) en (Augustine, W. Manson, N. Turner), or (ii) because of (John Damascene, Theophylact, Cerf, Cambier); and (d) hō is neuter and the phrase eph’ hō is a conjunction meaning "because". Within this view hēmarton has been taken to refer: (i) to men sinning not in their own persons, but by their participation in Adam’s transgression (Bengal, Lagrange, Prat, Huby, Bruce); (ii) to men sinning in their own persons independently of, but after the example of, Adam (Pelagius); (iii) to refer back to men sinning in their own persons but as a result of the corrupt nature inherited from Adam (Cranfield).

Cranfield (op. cit., p. 275f.) rejects (b) because it is difficult and forced, and the way pantes in 5:12d picks up eis pantas anthrōpous in 5:12c suggests that 5:12d is intended to explain why death came to all men. View (c), (i) is probably to be rejected because en would be more natural and eph’ hō elsewhere in Paul (Rom. 6:21; 2 Cor. 5:4; Phil. 3:12; 4:10) and in the New Testament (Lk. 5:25; Acts 7:33) does not have this meaning; finally, hēnos anthrōpou is somewhat far removed from the context. View (c), (ii) takes account of the difference between eπί and en, but it is open to the other objections of view (c), (i). View (d), (ii) is to be rejected because it does not do justice to the analogy between Christ and Adam, or to the solidarity of men with Adam in 5:12-21; furthermore, it seems to contradict 1 Cor. 15:22.

Danker, in propounding view (a) would counter the claim of Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament; trans. Kendrick Grobel (2vols.; New York: Scribners, 1951, 1955), I, p. 252, that 5:13 "sin indeed was in the world before the law was given, but sin is not counted where there is no law" is unintelligible. Danker argues and cites examples to show that both in classical and in koine Greek eph’ hō is used to express the formal contractual basis on which reciprocal obligations are met (op. cit., p. 429). He also argues that although the question is vexed, if eph’ hō is read in this light, good sense can be made of the remaining Pauline passages in which it occurs (Rom. 6:21; Phil. 3:12; 2 Cor. 5:4; Phil. 4:10; op. cit., p. 432f.). Danker also claims that eph’ hō understood in this way, makes very good sense in Rom. 5:12. If eph’ hō pantes hēmarton means "on the basis of what (law) all sinned",...
it has the advantage of associating eph' hō with nomos in 5:13 (op. cit., p. 428ff.). Rom. 5:12d, 13 is then paraphrased as: "on the legal basis in terms of which all (including the Gentiles) sinned. This must be maintained, for until the law (of Moses), sin was in the world and one must admit that sin cannot be charged up in the absence of law." With this interpretation, pantes is a reference to all men, both Jews and Greeks (cf. Rom. 3:9, 23; 11:32; 1 Cor. 9:19, 22; 10:13; and 15:22). Gar (5:13) has a typical elliptical usage; it explains what is implied but not explicitly expressed in the preceding words (cf. Mt. 27:23; Jn. 9:30; Acts 16:37; Rom. 15:26f.; 1 Cor. 9:10; 1 Thes. 2:20). The gar clause of 5:13 gives the reason for 5:12d, and the explicit use of nomos as applied to the Mosaic law arises out of the problem suggested by the broader definition of nomos implied in the relative hō. In 5:14, then, it is implied that, although all did not sin as Adam did by disobeying a direct command, all did sin by disobeying the law of which they were inwardly conscious. The references to nomos in 5:13, 14, 20 are introduced in a causal manner, and thus indicate they are to be understood in light of the preceding arguments concerning the law (op. cit., p. 428ff.).

It is difficult to know what to make of Danker's view. I believe, however, that, for Paul, Gentiles as well as Jews outside of Christ are hypo nomon. Paul says to his Gentile readers of Galatia: "Before faith came we were confined under the law" (hypo nomon ephrouroumetha, 3:23). At Rom. 2:15 the Gentiles show "the work of the law" (to ergon tou nomou) written on their hearts. And at Rom. 11:32 God has consigned all men to disobedience (apeithelai).

There are perhaps other ways, though, of making Rom. 5:13 intelligible. Cranfield, ad. loc., p. 282, takes the view that in the absence of law, sin is not the clearly defined thing that it becomes when the law is present. Ouk elogeitai is taken in a relative sense; only in comparison with what takes place when the law is present can it be said that, in the law's absence, sin ouk elogeitai.

Another way of making 5:13 intelligible has been proposed by Stanislas Lyonnet and Matthew Black, Romans: New Century Bible (London: Oliphants, 1973), ad. loc., p. 88f. Eph' hō is taken as a variation of view (d). For Black eph' hō does not mean "because" but "in view of the fact that." 5:12cd. could then be paraphrased "Death, passed from Adam to all men, whereby, from which it follows, that all men, like Adam, sinned." 5:13, 14 would support this exegesis as follows: 5:13a asserts that sin was in the world before the law (of Mosés); 13b raises the objection to this proposition; i.e., in the period where there was no law there could be no sin. But 5:14, proves there was sin in this period, i.e., death reigned.
The views of Danker, Cranfield, and Black interpret 5:12d as meaning that all men sin in their own persons. Sense, however, can be made of 5:13 if view (d), (i) is taken on eph' hō, if the direct command given to Adam is considered to be nomos and if all men sin by participating in the transgression of Adam (cf. below on Rom. 7:7-13).


15 Cf. Kümmel, op. cit., pp. 84-94; and Longenecker, op. cit., p. 91f.


17 A few recent exponents of this position are Longenecker, op. cit., p. 92ff., and Lyonnet, op. cit., p. 163ff.

19 For similar views on Rom. 7:7-13 see Longenecker, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-96; Stanislav Lyonnet, "St. Paul: Liberty and Law", *The Bridge*, IV (1962), 229-251, p. 234ff. Such a view also appears to be in agreement with the contention of George Foot Moore, *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era* (3 vols.; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927-1930), I, 263-280, that the rabbis believed in a pre-Mosaic torah. "The Jews", he says, "could no more conceive a world in the past without a revelation of God's will for man's life than in the present or the future. Accordingly they believed that certain laws for all mankind were given to Adam", (ibid., p. 274).


22 *op. cit.*, pp. 126-132.


25 As we have seen above (cf. Phil. 3:6 and Gal. 1:14) there is no evidence that Paul in his pre-conversion state had any concept of the extreme sinfulness of man such as is evidenced in IV Ezra or the Dead Sea Scrolls. (On sinfulness in the latter, see Kuhn, *op. cit.*, and Braun, *op. cit.*). Paul, rather, is viewing his actual condition from a Christian perspective.
26 If me is to be read rather than se in 8:2, then the present experience of the ἐγώ of Rom. 7 is ἐλευθερόσεν ἀπό τοῦ νόμου τῆς ἁμαρτίας καὶ τοῦ θανάτου. The second edition of The Greek New Testament, Kurt Aland et. al., ed., ad. loc., gives a C rating to me. However, the forthcoming third edition gives se a D rating (cf. Metzger, ad. loc., p. 516). Metzger points out that, although se is the more difficult reading and is more likely to have been replaced by me (which harmonizes better with ch. 7), se may be the result of the accidental repetition of the final syllable of ἐλευθερόσεν when the terminal -n represented by a horizontal line over the e, was overlooked.

27 On the reign of death in Rom. 5:12-21 cf. above, p. 147.

28 Here I take nomos not to be essentially different from its other usages in Paul. The genitive, if subjective, is the law which results in sin. This is in agreement with what has been said above concerning the law's connection with sin.

29 At Gal. 4:3 Paul says that he and his readers were at one time enslaved to the τα στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου and at 4:9 he cannot understand why his readers turn to the τα στοιχεῖα again. On the one side, among the στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου seems to be the torah with its statutes, and, on the other side, is the world of false gods whom the recipients of the letter once served, 4:8f. For the Galatians to be under the law is to be in as hopeless a position as non-Christian pagans.


30 The aorists ethanatōthete (Rom. 7:4), katērgethēmen (Rom. 7:6), apothenontes (Rom. 7:6), ἐλευθερόσεν (Rom. 8:2), exēgorasen (Gal. 3:13), genomenos (Gal. 3:13), and apethanon (Gal. 2:19) seem to indicate the once for all nature of the action, whereas the perfect synestaurōmai (Gal. 2:20) seems to indicate its enduring results (cf. above, p. 172, n. 10).

31 The point Paul makes in 7:4-6 is preceded by the illustration of marriage law (whether Jewish or Roman, be that as it may). The point is that a death has taken place and the woman is no longer bound to the law concerning her husband. However, the illustration would appear to be more apt if the
woman herself had died — i.e., the person no longer bound would be the one who has died.

32. The genitive here, is in some sense subjective; it is the law which results in sin and death.

33. This phrase is carefully chosen; it is neither en sarki (because this expression does not emphasize that human flesh was the realm in which sin gained a foothold and had domain), nor en homoiomati sarkos (because this expression is docetic), nor en sarki hamartias (because this expression would imply that there was sin in Christ whereas in 2 Cor. 5:21 we are told that he knew no sin — ton me gnonta hamartian) but en homoiomati sarkos hamartias. Cf. Bruce, ad. loc., p. 161.

34. Peri hamartias (and perhaps also hamartian epiesen in 2 Cor. 5:21) indicates that the death of Christ was a sin offering. In the LXX at Is. 53:10 (cf. Is. 53:6, 12) the background is that of the suffering servant and peri hamartias translates the Hebrew ‘āšām (guilt offering). However, in the LXX peri hamartias regularly translates the Hebrew word hātāh (or hatt’ī) (sin offering). Peri hamartias (or hamartion) occurs elsewhere in the New Testament at Heb. 5:3; 10:6, 26; 13:11; and 1 Pet. 3:18; with the possible exception of 1 Pet. 3:18 it expresses the idea of a sin offering. For a discussion of this phrase see Harold Riesenfeld, "peri", in TDNT, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 55.

35. Katekrinēn seems to mean that the sentence was passed and executed on sin (cf. Friedrich Büchsel, "katakrinō", in TDNT, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 951f.); en tē sarki refers to the human flesh of Christ. With this event, the power of sin is broken, cf. Rom. 6:6f.


37. Franz-Josef Ort kemper, Das Kreuz in der Verkündigung des Apostles Paulus (Stuttgart: Verlag Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1967), p. 17 points out that a comparison of these two verses reveals a close connection between the idea of representation or substitution (Stellvertretung) and the Old Testament idea of corporate solidarity (albtiblischem Solidaritätsgedanken).

39 Hyper ἡμῶν does not in itself imply substitution; however, R. E. Davies, "Christ in our Place -- The Contribution of the Prepositions", Tyndale Bulletin, XXI (1970), 81-90 (cf. Bauer-Arndt-Gingrich, "hyper", op. cit., s.v., p. 846) lists a number of passages in classical Greek (Thucydides I:141; Plato Gorgias 515C and Republic 590a; Xenophon Anabasis 7.4.9-10; Euripides Alcestis 689-701) and the LXX (Deut. 24:16; Is. 43:3-4; Judith 8:12) where the idea of substitution is implied. In the papyri there is an abundant use of hyper in the situation where one man has written a statement for someone else who was illiterate (ibid., p. 83). In the New Testament the translation "instead of" or "in place of", if not required for hyper, at least makes good sense in the following passages: Rom. 9:3; 1 Cor. 15:29; Phil. 13; Jn. 11:50f.; 1 Pet. 2:21; 3:18; Rom. 5:6-8; 2 Cor. 5:14, 21; Tit. 2:14; 1 Tim. 2:6. (Note the hyper ἡμῶν in Gal. 3:13; 2 Cor. 5:14, 21).


Ortkemper, op. cit., p. 16, puts it this way: "hyper ἡμῶν gibt den Grund dieses Geschehens an: an unserer Stelle und damit uns zugute; oder umgekehrt: uns zugute, weil an unserer Stelle."

40 Bultmann, op. cit., p. 297.

41 See Guthrie, ad. loc., p. 103.


In Col. 2:14 the clause *exaleipsas to kath' hêmon cheirographon tois dogmasin ho en hypenantion hêmôn is problematic especially the force of the dative tois dogmasin. E. Percy, *Die Probleme der Kolosser und Epheserbriefe* (Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1946) argues that it is to be taken with the following clause in order to avoid superfluous repetition of kath' hêmon. A second view is that of Bengel, Theodoret, and Chrysostom (cf. Gerhard Kittel, "dogma", in TDNT, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 231) who take the dative as instrumental and link it with *exaleipsas*, thus making the *dogmata* the new command or edict of God.

John A. T. Robinson, *The Body* (London: SCM, 1952), p. 43, n. 1, avoids the difficulty felt by Percy by interpreting to *... cheirographon tois dogmasin* as "our subscription to the ordinances" (thus it would be an example of a noun with a dative attribute, cf. Nigel Turner, in Moulton, *A Grammar of New Testament Greek*, Vol. III, *op. cit.*, p. 219). The *cheirographon* is "our written agreement to keep the law, our certificate of debt to it"; (he compares the undertakings of Ex. 24:3; Deut. 27:14-26). Our failure to keep the law has turned this certificate into a bond held against us to prove our guilt. Therefore it is the charge which the law brings rather than the law itself which is cancelled by Christ. I believe this view is to be preferred over the other two.

This future aspect is stressed in such passages as Rom. 6:6, 8, 10, 11; 1 Cor. 15:20, 22; 6:14; 2 Cor. 4:14.

On the believer's present possession of life see also Col. 2:12; 3:1, 3.

These texts (Rom. 7:4-6; 2 Cor. 3:6; and 1 Cor. 15:45) as well as others (e.g., Rom. 8:2, 10-13; Gal. 5:25; 6:8) indicate that, for Paul, if one has eternal life he also has the Spirit, and vice versa. That being a Christian is correlative with having the Spirit is also indicated in such passages as Rom. 2:29; 5:5; 8:4, 5, 6, 9, 14-16, 23; 14:17; 1 Cor. 6:11; 12:13; 2 Cor. 5:5; Gal. 3:2, 3, 5, 14; 4:6, 29; 5:5, 16, 25; 6:8.
50 Rom. 6:16. Thus dikaiosynē seems to be a virtual equivalent for life. At Rom. 8:10, however, it is connected with zōē in the same way that hamartia is connected with nekros. The phrase eis dikaiosynēn is also used at Rom. 4:3, 5, 9, 22; Gal. 3:6.

51 Although it is true that the katakrisis ends in death.

52 Cf. ἡ ἀδικία ἡμῶν versus theou dikaiosynēn in Rom. 3:5.

53 Hans Wilhelm Schmidt, Der Brief des Paulus an die Römer: Theologischer Handkommentar zum Neuen Testament (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1963), ad. loc., p. 97. Küsemann, ad. loc., p. 137, points out that if one sees the dia touto merely as a transition particle, as Zahn (ad. loc., p. 259f.), Lagrange (ad. loc.), and C. K. Barrett (ad. loc., p. 110) do; he overlooks the thought break which leads to a new argument. Küsemann sees Schmidt's interpretation as a possibility, but does not rule out the view of Otto Michel, Der Brief an die Römer: Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar Über das Neue Testament (4th ed.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966), ad. loc., p. 137, that it refers back to Rom. 5:1-11 in its totality.

54 If the hamartia is to be understood in terms of law, the other terms for sin -- i.e., paraptōma, parabasis, parakōē (and its opposite hypakōē) -- and the sentence (katakrisima) imposed are to be understood in terms of law as well.

55 In Paul, when pistis is used it refers to the believer's faith with the possible (probable) exception of the phrases dia (ek) pisteōs (Iēsou) Christou (Rom. 3:22; Gal. 2:16; 3:22; Phil. 3:9), dia pisteōs Christou Iēsou (Gal. 2:16), and ek pisteōs Iēsou (Rom. 3:26). If these phrases are subjective rather than objective genitives, they could be translated as "the faithfulness of Jesus Christ" (not as "the faith of Jesus Christ") and would stress the obedience of Christ (Rom. 5:19) and the fact that he met the full obligation of the law. This translation, although not widely accepted and certainly not demanded, both fits the context and is linguistically possible.

That the translation has not been widely accepted in the history of exegesis is indicated by Sanday and Headlam (op. cit., p. 83) who point out that it has been almost universally understood as an objective genitive; in more recent times, however, it has been understood by some to be in various
ways a subjective (or both a subjective and objective) gen-
itive. For a summary of these views see especially Markus
Barth, "The Faith of the Messiah", The Heythrop Journal, X
(1969), 363-370, p. 364, n. 2, and D. W. B. Robinson,
"Faith of Jesus Christ -- A New Testament Debate", The Re-
formed Theological Review, XXIX (1970), 71-81; Bauer-Arndt-
Gingrich, "pistis", op. cit., p. 668f., s.v.; and Longenecker,
op. cit., p. 149.

D. W. B Robinson (op. cit., p. 78), who argues for the
use of the subjective genitive, notes that neither in J. H.
Moulton and G. Milligan, The Vocabulary of the Greek New Testa-
ment (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1930), nor in the ninth
edition of H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, op. cit, -- in contrast
to earlier editions where two examples with the objective gen-
itive were given -- is an example of pistis with the objective
genitive cited; nor is there any such usage in the LXX. Rob-
inson (op. cit., p. 78) further agrees with George Howard,
The Harvard Theological Review (1967) that in the twenty-four
references in Paul where pistis followed by the genitive occurs
-- leaving out of consideration the usage of pistis Christou
or its equivalents -- the phrase refers to the faith of the
person, and never faith in a person. Of the twenty-eight
passages outside the Pauline corpus where pistis is followed
by the genitive of the person or a personal pronoun, Robinson
(op. cit., p. 78f.) argues that in only seven passages (Mk.
11:22; Jas. 2:1; Rev. 2:13; 14:12; Acts 3:16; Col. 2:12;
2 Thes. 2:13) is an objective genitive possible, and in none
of these is it demanded.

If, then, the phrase pistis Christou and its equiva-
lents (in Paul) are to be considered as subjective genitives,
they could rely on purely linguistic grounds either to the
"faith of Christ" or the "faithfulness of Christ". Several
linguistic considerations leave open the possibility that
pistis here means "faithfulness". Rudolf Bultmann, "pisteuo", in
TDNT, op. cit., p. 176f., s.v., p. 182 and Bauer-Arndt-
Gingrich, op. cit., p. 668, s.v., indicate that in Greek liter-
ature pistis should sometimes be translated as "faithfulness"
or "reliability"; also Arthur Weiser, "pisteuo", in TDNT,
op. cit., p. 182ff., p. 196, indicates that behind the
pisteuein word group in the LXX, the Hebrew stem 'mn is the
most important qualitative (although not the most important
quantitative) word.

In the actual Pauline usage of pistis, the idea of
firmness or faithfulness is probably not (especially in 2 Thes.
1:4, where the phrase tês hypomenês hymôn kai pieœs en pasin
tois diögois hymôn is linked with the single definite article
tês) to be excluded from the pistis of the Thessalonian Chris-
tians (i.e., 1 Thes. 1:3, 8; 3:2, 5, 6, 7, 10; 5:8; 2 Thes.

Furthermore, the phrases εἰς πάντας τους πιστευόντας (Rom. 3:22), τοῖς πιστεύουσιν (Gal. 3:22), and επὶ τῇ πίστει (Phil. 3:9) are simply redundant if πίστεος Χριστοῦ or its equivalents mean "faith in Christ". To counter this argument, John Murray, *The Epistle to the Romans* (2 vols.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1959, 1965), I, 112, claims that in Rom. 3:22 διὰ πίστεος Θεοῦ stresses the fact that salvation is only by faith and that εἰς πάντας τους πιστεύοντας stresses the fact that it is always operative when there is faith. This argument, however, cannot apply to Gal. 3:22 and Phil. 3:9, since there panta does not occur.

Finally, it should be noted that in the context of each of the passages where πίστεος Χριστοῦ or its equivalents occur, νόμος is explicitly mentioned; the phrase stands in contrast to νομόu (Rom. 3:22), εἰς νομοῦ (Phil. 3:9; Gal. 3:21), εἰς ἐργάνον νομοῦ (Gal. 2:16, twice). Thus one is "justified" (dikaiοῦ, Gal. 2:16), receives righteousness (dikaiosynē, Gal. 3:22) and the righteousness of God (dikaiosynē τοῦ θεοῦ, Rom. 3:22; τῶν εἰς θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην, Phil. 3:9), not by observance of the law, but by the faithfulness of Christ

56 Although the emphasis is on the phrase εἰς πίστεος in the clause ὁ δίκαιος εἰς πίστεος ζῆσεται (Rom. 1:17; Gal. 3:11) still it is the just (dikaios) who live (ζῆσεται).

57 Cf. Gottlob Schrenk, "dikaiōma", in TDNT, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 221, s.v. Schrenk also points out that in vs. 18 δί' ἑνός, in agreement with its other occurrences in 5:12-19, is to be read as masculine rather than neuter. Thus Christ, placed under the law (Gal. 4:4), fulfilled it negatively by having no knowledge of sin (2 Cor. 5:21) and positively by obedience unto death (Phil. 2:8).

58 According to Blass-Debrunner-Funk, *op. cit.*, p. 259, constructs in -ma "belong to the dainties of the Hell. artists of style". Cf. also Bauer-Arndt-Gingrich, "dikaiōma" (*op. cit.*, p. 197, s.v.).


60 This is the substantive which corresponds to the verb dikaiō. 

62 In agreement with Küsemann (op. cit., p. 147), Schmidt (ad. loc., p. 102), et. al.

63 In disagreement with Black (ad. loc., p. 91), Bruce, (ad. loc., p. 133), Murray (ad. loc., p. 202), et. al.

64 Dikaiōsis occurs elsewhere in Paul only at Rom. 4:25, and there it is linked with the resurrection. The clause paredothe δια τα παραπτωματα ημων is parallel to έγερθε δια τον δικαιωσιν ημων. Schrenk (op. cit., p. 224) points out that if the second δια is interpreted causally, the sense is in disagreement with the example of Abraham whose justification is the result of faith in God who raises the dead. Therefore it is best not to view both δια's as causal, or the first as causal and the second as final (contra Küsemann, ad. loc., p. 121; Schmidt, ad. loc., p. 88; Schrenk, op. cit., p. 224); rather both δια's in view of the fact that the clauses are parallel, are final. Christ was thus delivered up in order to atone for our transgressions and raised in order that we might be justified. Dikaiōsis thus appears to be a gift of the resurrected Christ. This seems to be in agreement with Rom. 5:10 where reconciliation (katalλαγητες) comes through the death of Christ, and salvation (σωθησομεθα) comes through his resurrection life (ζωη). Cf. Schmidt, op. cit., p. 88.

For a summary of the discussion on the liturgical derivation of Rom. 4:25, cf. Küsemann, ad. loc., p. 120f.

65 Ad. loc., p. 145.

66 Cf. Schmidt, ad. loc., p. 103.


68 Ad. loc., p. 149. Note the coming together of charis, dikaiosyne, and ζωη in Rom. 5:17. In Rom. 6:23 it is the charisma of God which is ζωη aiōnios.

69 Dikaiosyne theou is a closely related term; although a wide variety of views on its import have been expressed -- for summaries of these see Peter Stuhlmacher, Gerechtigkeit Gottes bei Paulus (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966), pp. 1-73; and J. A. Ziesler, The Meaning of Righteousness in Paul (Cambridge: University Press, 1972), pp. 7-14 -- it seems to have essentially the same meaning as dikaiosyne. This
righteousness of God, which is contrasted both with man's (rūn idian, Rom. 10:3) righteousness and unrighteousness (hē adikia hēmōn, Rom. 3:5), is attained only in Christ (en autō) as a result of his being made in hyper hēmōn (2 Cor. 5:21); it is revealed in the gospel — the gospel which brings life and is the power of God for salvation (Rom. 1:16f.). Dikaiosynē theou is probably not an objective genitive — i.e., the righteousness which is valid before God (Luther's view; see Ziesler, op. cit., p. 12); rather it is either a subjective genitive or a genitive of origin. Two recent examples of the former view are Ernst Küsemann, "God's Righteousness in Paul", Journal for Theology and the Church, I (1965), 100-110; and Stanislas Lyonnet, "Pauline Soteriology", in A. Robert and A. Feuilllet, ed., Introduction to the New Testament (New York-Rome-Paris: Tournai, 1965), pp. 820-865, who believe that it refers to God's saving activity. The latter view (which is the usual one today; see Ziesler, op. cit., p. 11ff.) holds that the righteousness is God's, that it proceeds from God to man, and that a relationship of man with God is thereby created. In light of the en autō in 2 Cor. 5:21 I believe the idea of relationship cannot be excluded.

70 In context it is clear that Paul believes that they do not keep the law. Cf. Gal. 6:13, "Those who receive circumcision do not themselves keep the law (nomon phyllassousin), but they desire to have you circumcised that they may glory in your flesh."


72 ἕσεται in verses 11 and 12 must refer to the same thing. In verse 11, Paul is undoubtedly making reference to the life of the age to come. Therefore in verse 12 ἕσεται cannot mean that the one righteous through the law shall live (receive strength and be preserved in life) through his obedience to the law. See Ragnar Bring, Commentary on Galatians (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1961), p. 136.

73 Thus Paul, when he says in Phil. 3:6 that as to righteousness under the law (kata dikaiosynēn tēn en nomō) he was blameless, he must be referring to his blamelessness from a Jewish point of view rather than from a divine point of view.

74 It is paradoxical that not only because of its transgression of the law (Rom. 2) but also because of its zeal for the law (Rom. 9:31ff.), Israel has been unable to obtain
righteousness and life before God. The reason Paul can make both points is that all have sinned (and are therefore slated for condemnation and death), and that righteousness and life can only come through Christ.


76 The various aspects of salvation that Paul expressly mentions as coming apart from observance of the law are: being justified (*dikaiōs*, Rom. 3:20, 21, 28; 4:2; Gal. 2:6, three times; 3:11; 5:4), (*dikaiosynē*, Rom. 4:6; 10:5; Gal. 3:21; Phil. 3:9), (*dikaiosynē theou*, Rom. 3:21, 22), (*ho epanagelia*, Rom. 4:16), (*charis*, Rom. 11:6), receiving the Spirit (*to pneuma elabete*, Gal. 3:2), being lead by the Spirit (*pneumati ageste*, Gal. 5:18), and being an heir (*klēronomos*, Rom. 4:14), (*hō klēronomia*, Gal. 3:18).

Boasting (*kauchēsis*, Rom. 3:27, *kauchēma*, Rom. 4:2) is thus excluded.

In Chapter Five we concluded that according to Paul, dying with Christ meant the end of the enslavement and condemnation brought by the law. Rising with Christ meant righteousness, life, and Spirit. Righteousness, life, and Spirit could only come through the death and resurrection of Jesus, in no way through the law.

In this chapter we will see how these conclusions correlate with Rom. 10:4 telos gar nomou Christos eis dikaiosynēn panti tō pisteuonti.

This verse, and especially the precise sense of telos is usually seen to sum up Paul's understanding of Christ and the law. I will divide my treatment into two parts: I. "A Survey of Views" and II. "Critique". Under "A Survey of Views" I will summarize representatives of three main views of telos: A. Telos means "End" or "Termination"; B. Telos means "Goal"; and C. Telos means both "End" and "Goal". Under "Critique" I will evaluate each view. In the process of the evaluation, the view defended here will emerge: Telos means "end" in a very special sense, one which agrees with the conclusions reached on the negative role of the law in Chapter Five, yet does full justice to the positive points that are made on
the law.

I. A Survey of Views

The main issue in this text (Rom. 10:4) to which scholars have devoted their attention, is the precise force of telos. Three views have been advocated: namely, that telos means goal,\(^1\) termination,\(^2\) or both goal and termination.\(^3\)

A. Telos means "End" or "Termination"

The usual view that telos means end or termination can be conveniently sub-divided into at least three categories -- the cosmological view of A. Schweitzer, the messianic age view of H. J. Schoeps, and the salvation history view of Conzelmann, Gutbrod and others.

Schweitzer believes that the law which belongs to the natural world and the rule of angels has no place in the messianic kingdom. The world which has already received its death blow is still maintaining itself for the present. Those who are in Christ are filled with death and resurrection forces; for them the supernatural world is already a reality and consequently angel dominion and the law have no more validity.\(^4\)

H. J. Schoeps, on the other hand, stresses the rabbinic background of Paul's thought.\(^5\) He believes that the abolition of the law is a "messianological" doctrine for Paul; the law ceases when the messianic age begins. Sanh. 97a; Ab. Zara. 9a; and Jer. Meg. 70d\(^6\) indicate that the world is to last six
thousand years. The first two thousand years is the time of
the Tohuwabohu, followed by the two thousand years each of
Mosaic law, and the messianic era. For Paul, the two thousand
year era of the Messiah has begun. Schoeps goes on to note
explicitly that "Paul deduces from his faith the Messiah has
come in the person of Jesus the conclusion 'Christ is the end
of the law (Rom. 10:4)'." This is an exact inference from the
standpoint of Jewish theology. 7 The reason why the rabbis
would not have agreed with Paul is that they did not believe
that the messianic age had begun with the death and resurrec-
tion of Jesus. 8

According to Schoeps, Sabb. 30a; 151b; Nidda 61b; Pes.
Rabb. 51b; Jer. Kilaim IX. 3 provide further background for
Paul's view that law is abrogated. 9 These are texts which
stress the fact that as soon as a man is dead he is free from
the obligation of the commands. He believes that here we have
the background of Rom. 7:1-6. The law is only binding on a
man during his life (7:1), and the man who is dead to this
aeon is free from the law.

In this vein Schoeps would see Gal. 3:10-13. 10 Paul's
statement that all who rely on the works of the law are under
a curse (Gal. 3:10; Deut. 27:26 LXX) contains the tacit assump-
tion that no one can fulfill the law; this is confirmed in Gal.
5:3 "every man who receives circumcision is bound to keep the
whole law" -- that is the whole law (holon ton nomon) in its six hundred commands and prohibitions. That no one can be righteous before God by relying on the works of the law is further proved by Paul by relying on the thirteenth exegetical principle of Rabbi Ishmael (sny ktwym hmkhysyn).\(^{11}\)

This principle states that if two verses are contradictory one should find a third verse in order to overcome the contradiction. Hab. 2:4 "He who through faith is righteous shall live" (a prophetic text) and Lev. 18:5 "He who does them shall live by them" (a torah text) are in contradiction; a further text from the torah which was previously quoted gives the solution: "Abraham believed God and it was reckoned to him as righteousness" (Gal. 3:6). Verse 14 recapitulates verse 6 in the word euologa. Therefore man's fulfilling the law does not usher in the messianic time. Christ is the one seed in whom all the people of the earth are to be blessed.

Schoeps goes on to note that in Galatians Paul takes the death of Jesus as a saving event as his starting point; he surveys retrospectively the meaning of the law and concludes that it was a paidagōgos eis Christon. Christ is the end of the law because through the atoning efficacy of his blood he has satisfied the requirement of the law; as one who fulfils the torah, Christ is the telos nomou, and in taking its place and in assuming its functions he takes its place of
honour and salvation. Hence the law culminates in Christ. The final consequence of the curse of the law for Paul is that only in the interim period up to its termination by the death of Christ did it have regulative significance. 12

W. Gutbrod, on the other hand, believes that Christ is the end of the law from the standpoint of salvation history. 13 Paul's negation of the law derives from his affirmation of what has taken place in Jesus Christ (Phil. 3:9; Rom. 8:1). Outside of the death of Christ and death with Christ man is still en kosmō and as a result is delivered up to the law (Col. 2:20). Christ succeeds the law (Rom. 10:4), not in temporal or religious history, but in salvation history. The transition has taken place only for the one who has faith; it takes place by participation in the death of Christ (Rom. 7:1ff.; Gal. 2:19; Col. 2:20).

There is, however, a positive link between the law and Christ, for the cross of Christ is an affirmation of the verdict of the law. The death to the law which takes place in the crucifixion of Christ takes place dia nomō (Gal. 2:19). Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law (Gal. 3:13). The law's sentence of condemnation is fulfilled in the cross of Christ (cf. Rom. 5:6ff.). Moreover, the cross is also a fulfilment of the law in that it is the full achievement of obedience to God and at the same time it is perfect love for men (Rom. 8:34ff.).
Conzelmann's position is similar. The law does not come to an end as a moral demand but as a way of salvation. Its requirements have been fulfilled by Christ; we are therefore ransomed from it and have died to it (Rom. 7:6). He believes, however, that the concept of salvation history alone is insufficient to give a proper understanding since Paul's outline of salvation history is fragmentary. In Gal. 3 and 4 the history from Adam to Abraham is missing, whereas in Rom. 5 there is a sweep from Adam to Moses with no reference to Abraham. Gal. 3 is concerned with the relationship between law and promise; Rom. 5 is concerned with the relationship between law and sin. In both cases the law is an intermediate factor; Conzelmann, however, can believe in the validity of the moral demand of the law because, in agreement with Bultmann, he finds a distinction between the law as the will of God which has absolute validity for all the world, and the law as an ordinance of Moses which has validity only for an intermediate period in one part of the world.

B. Telos means "Goal"

Against the position that telos in Rom. 10:4 means end or termination, Cranfield has reacted strongly. For him the significance of telos gar nomou Christos (Rom. 10:4) is that the ultimate goal and innermost meaning of the law is not the condemnation of sinners, but Jesus Christ. Christ is the goal of the law because (a) he is the only one who fully obeys the
law (Phil. 2:8; Rom. 5:19), (b) he is the fulfilment, meaning, and substance of the ceremonies contained in the law,18 (c) he is the only remedy for man's desperate condition which the law brings to light (Gal. 3:23f.), (d) the law sets the necessary forensic stage on which Christ's saving work is wrought, and finally, (e) the law bears witness to Christ (cf. Rom. 3:21) by virtue of the promises it contains.19

Cranfield then attempts to answer the arguments of those who believe that for Paul the law is ended.20 Chōris nomou in Rom. 3:21 means "apart from works of law"; and ou hypo nomon in Rom. 6:14 means "not under the curse of the law", and likewise Rom. 7:4-6. Tou nomou tēs hamartias kai tou thanatōu is not the law itself in its true character, but either the law as perverted by man's sin and turned into a law of sin and death, or the inner necessity of our fallen nature.

In 2 Cor. 3:1-12, what is contrasted is not two covenants themselves, but two ministries; the contrast is between expectation and fulfilment.21 In 2 Cor. 3:6 ou grammatos alla pneumatos is a contrast, not between the Old Testament and a spiritual religion, but between the legalistic religion of the Jews of Paul's day and the new religion of the Spirit. In verses 7-11 the point is that if the service rendered by Moses in the giving of the law (a service which effects condemnation and death; 3:7, 9) is accompanied with glory, much more must the service rendered by the Spirit (a service which effects
righteousness, 3:9) be accompanied with glory; by comparison with the second, the first splendour is no splendour at all (3:10). Because of the structure of verses 7-11 to \textit{katargoumenon} refers, not to the glory on Moses' face (as it does in vs. 13),\textsuperscript{22} but to the ministry of Moses at the giving of the law.

In Gal. 3:15-25 Cranfield admits that Paul, due to the polemical nature of the book and the Galatians false exaltation of the law, is forced in some measure to depreciate the law; he takes issue, however, with G. S. Duncan's interpretation of the details of Gal. 3:19.\textsuperscript{23} "Was added" means, not that the law was a mere addition in the mainstream of God's purpose, but merely that it was in fact given after the promise. "Because of transgressions" (that is, it exposes man's sin) is only one use of the law. "Till the offspring should come to whom the promise had been made" refers not to the strictly temporal reign of the law, but to the bare law in a narrow sense, the law as seen apart from Christ. "Ordained of angels" does not necessarily mean that the law is depreciated because in Acts 7:53 Stephen emphasizes the majesty of the law by referring to the angels' part in its giving.\textsuperscript{24 & 25}

For Cranfield, then, Christ is the goal of the law. Another somewhat different interpretation, but still interpreting \textit{telos} as goal in Rom. 10:4, is that of George E. Howard.\textsuperscript{26} He challenges what he believes are three unwarranted assump-
tions of the view that telos here means end. For him gar . . . de (Rom. 10:5, 6) does not mean "for . . . but", but as in Rom. 7:8f.; 10:10; 11:15f.; and Wis. 6:17ff., it means "for . . . and". He maintains that the Jews of Paul's day believed in salvation, not by merit, but by grace, and that they interpreted Lev. 18:5 (quoted in Rom. 10:5), not in terms of perfection, but in terms of making Yahweh's law the foremost aspect of one's life. Thus Paul is not contrasting two methods of obtaining righteousness, but comparing them. Rom. 10:1-13 is dominated by the theme of the inclusion of the Gentiles. In 10:3 the Jews are wrong in seeking to establish their own righteousness to the exclusion of the Gentiles; rather Christ is the goal of the law for all who believe (10:4). In 10:5, 6 Paul wants to prove that the law's ultimate goal corresponds to the work of Christ in unifying all nations; in 10:5 it is not the Jew but the anthrōpos (i.e., any man, Jew or Gentile) who practicēs righteousness; verses 6-10 also explain the system of faith in terms of the inclusion of the Gentiles. When it comes to the issue of the unification of all nations, both the systems of law and faith coincide.

C. Telos means both "End" and "Goal"

An exponent of the third view, that telos in Rom. 10:4 means both goal and termination, is Ragnar Bring.27 Christ is the end of the law in that he puts an end to law-righteousness and the condemnation which the law brings. He is the
goal of the law in that all that the law aimed at is summed up in him. The semitic background for telos is the Hebrew words סופ and גֶּשַׁם ("to bring something to a conclusion") and the Aramaic מֶלְאָל ("summation").

Salvation comes as a two act drama; the first act (the law) is a preparation for the second act (Christ). The ultimate goal in each act of the drama of salvation is to bring in the rule of God's righteousness. The first act (the law) fulfils this aim, not by a real expectation that men perform the prescriptions of the law, but in order that all men might be condemned and consigned under the rule of sin. The second act (Christ) does not abolish the prescriptions of the law, but by perfect obedience overcomes the condemnation which is brought in the first act and ushers in life and (the) righteousness (of God); thus the goal of the law is attained.

Christ as the one who does the law attains the righteousness of God; he attains what the Jews, who pursued a law of righteousness (διὸκον ὅμοιον δικαιοσύνης, 9:31), did not attain. The quotations of Is. 8:14; 28:16 in Rom. 9:32f. refer to Christ; their purpose is to show the relevance of faith in God's helping righteousness.

For Bring, then, "goal", and not "end", gives the primary emphasis of telos in Rom. 10:4; for others the centre of gravity of telos is the latter. Barrett and Bruce believe that εἰς δικαιοσύνην (Rom. 10:4) refers to Christ's embodiment of perfect righteousness; thus the law is fulfilled
because he realizes all that it stood for. For Barrett, it is terminated because the age to come is inaugurated. The old order of relations between God and man is ended; hence this relationship is in Christ. For Bruce the law is terminated because the old order of which it formed a part is replaced by a new order of the Spirit.

For R. N. Longenecker and G. E. Ladd eis dikaiosynēn indicates that Christ terminates the law in its connection with righteousness; it is terminated, not as the standard and judgment of God, but rather in its contractual obligation as a means of obtaining righteousness.

II. Critique

The above, then, are representative positions taken with regard to telos in Rom. 10:4 -- positions which I shall now evaluate. First I shall state agreements and disagreements with the above positions and then offer a positive statement of my own view.

On the basis of the New Testament's usage, none of the above positions can be ruled out; telos sometimes is used to mean "goal", sometimes to mean "end". Neither the cosmological view of Albert Schweitzer nor the messianic age view of H. J. Schoeps is viable, for neither does justice to the positive points Paul makes on the law. Hans Conzelmann, on the other hand, has rightly emphasized that the law as moral demand does not come to an end.
It does not, however, seem true to say that Christ has put an end to law as a means of salvation; for, in Paul's view, salvation never did come by the law. Moreover, Rom. 10:4 seems to state that Christ is the telos of the law for those who believe (only).

Most of the points that Cranfield makes are, no doubt, correct. It is true that for Paul Christ is the only one who fully obeys the law, that the ceremonies contained in the law point to Christ, that the Mosaic economy came with doxa, and that Rom. 6:14; 7:4-6 imply that man is no longer under the curse of the law. But that these premises demand a conclusion excluding telos in the sense of "end" seems to me a non sequitur.

George E. Howard is quite right to say gar ... de can mean "for . . . and". But his construing of the immediate issue in Rom. 10:1-13 as "the inclusion of the Gentiles" is excluded by the structure of the argument. The context is established by Paul's question: If Israel has failed to come into messianic salvation, does it follow that the word of God has failed? (9:6). In ch. 9 Paul answers that Israel's non-entry into salvation has lead, not to a failure of the word of God, but to an incredible success: the salvation of the Gentiles. The follow-up in ch. 10 is a variation on the same question: No, it is not the word of God that has failed, but Israel by its own fault, has failed. Howard's exegesis in no
way fits into the thematic sequence. Consequently, its plausibility is very sharply reduced and, in fact, is all but nil.

Some of Ragnar Bring's points are well made. Thus, Christ does indeed end the condemnation of the law (cf. Rom. 8:1) and does not aboish the prescriptions of the law. Again it is quite true that salvation for Paul is a two-act drama. However, that any of Bring's considerations demand that telos mean "goal" in Rom. 10:4 is unclear -- is, in fact merely gratuitous.

With regard to the positions of C. K. Barrett and F. F. Bruce, I would agree that for Paul, Christ in his own person does embody perfect righteousness. But this, as we shall see, does not define the force of eis dikaiosynēn in Rom. 10:4. The position of G. E. Ladd and R. N. Longenecker, that eis dikaiosynēn means Christ is the end of the law in its connection with righteousness, also seems ill-conceived. A positive proposal will be offered below.

In contrast to the views hitherto considered, the view I propose agrees, first, with what Paul says elsewhere about justification by faith, second, with the context of 9:30ff., and third, with the negative and positive points Paul makes on the law.

According to Rom. 10:4, Christ puts an end to the enslavement and condemnation which the law brings so that righteousness or salvation may come for every believer. This says
more concisely and apodictically what Paul says (a) in Rom. 7:4-6, where the believer has died to the law and so is set free from the law; and (b) with the Pauline view that man outside of Christ is hypostomón (Gal. 3:23; cf. 6:14). This is another way of stating what Paul has stated repeatedly in Romans, namely, that salvation comes by faith (Rom. 1:16f.; 3: 21-31; 4:3, 9, 22-25; 5:1; etc.).

This view also agrees with the context of Rom. 9:30-10:10 where Paul is contrasting justification by works and by faith. In Rom. 9:30f. he contrasts the Gentiles who have received righteousness on the basis of faith and the Jews who pursued it on the basis of works. Thus, in 9:30f. dikaiosynēn de tēn ek pisteōs is contrasted with nomon dikaiosynēs, and in 10:3 tēn tou theou dikaiosynēn is contrasted with tēn idian dikaiosynēn. This raises the presumption that in 10:5f. tēn dikaiosynēn tēn ek tou nomou is contrasted with hē de ek pisteōs dikaiosynē.

In Rom. 10:6-8 Paul gives a pesher-like Christian interpretation to Deut. 30:11-14 — an interpretation facilitated by the association of this passage with wisdom in late Judaism. One who bases his righteousness on faith does not say in his heart "Who will ascend into heaven?" because that would mean that Christ would not yet have come down and become incarnate (Rom. 10:6); nor does he say "Who will descend into the abyss?" for that would mean that Christ had not been raised. He accepts
the incarnation and resurrection of Christ and thus the fact that he has new life in Christ. Therefore, in contrast to the man in Rom. 10:5, he does not try to obey the law in order to gain life. He knows that the message of faith is in his stoma and kardia (10:8) for it is with the kardia that one believes, and with the stoma that one confesses and thus receives dikaiosynē and sōteria (10:10).

With regard to the phrase eis dikaiosynēn (Rom. 10:4) we have seen above that it is contrasted with eis thanaton (Rom. 6:16) and compared with eis sōterian (Rom. 10:10). This coupled with the fact that dikaiosynē is a virtual synonym for life, indicates that eis dikaiosynēn in Rom. 10:4 is a synonym of eis sōterian in Rom. 10:1. Also the closest verbal parallel in Paul is Rom. 1:16: to euangelion, dynamis gar theou estin eis sōterian panti tō pisteuonti. Thus in Rom. 10:4 eis dikaiosynēn is not related to telos but to panti tō pisteuonti. Telos (Rom. 10:4) is the equivalent of dynamis . . . theou (Rom. 1:16). Christos is not predicate, but subject. Christ is not the goal of the law in that he realizes perfect righteousness (in disagreement with Barrett and Bruce) nor is he the end of the law in its connection with righteousness (in disagreement with Ladd and Longenecker); rather he is the end of the law so that righteousness or salvation might come to all who believe.

This interpretation of telos in Rom. 10:4 has the advan-
tage that it adds nothing extraneous to what Paul has said about the law and justification by faith in either Romans or Galatians. If it is argued that telos as goal in Rom. 10:4 agrees with Gal. 3:24 where the law is a paidagōgos . . . eis Christon, it must be said that in Gal. 3:23 the law is a slave master, and in Gal. 3:23, 25 there is a contrast between then and now. In context, as Oepke and Schlier among others have pointed out, paidagōgos seems to be a task master rather than an educator, and eis seems to have a temporal rather than a final sense. 45

This interpretation also has an advantage over the views of Schweitzer and Schoeps in that it does full justice to the positive points that Paul makes on the law. These positive points are as follows: Of all the attributes there is none that is greater than love (agapē, 1 Cor. 13), and all of the law -- including the commandments not to commit adultery, kill, steal, or covet (Decalogue; Ex. 20:13-15, 17; Deut. 5:17-19, 21) -- is summed up in the one Pentateuchal commandment (Lev. 19:18): "You shall love your neighbour as yourself"; (Rom. 13:8-10; Gal. 5:14). It is the one who loves his neighbour (ton heteron, Rom. 13:8; ho plēsion, Rom. 13:10; Gal. 5:14) who has fulfilled the law.

Paul also views the law positively when he states directly that it is the law of God at Rom. 7:22, 25, 27 (ho nomos tou theou), and indirectly at several passages. The Corinth-
ian church is exorted to keep the entolēn theou (1 Cor. 7:19). It was a privilege for Israel that God gave them the law (nomothēsia, Rom. 9:4) and entrusted them with his oracles (episteuēthēsan ta logia tou theou, Rom. 3:2). For the Jew it is by understanding the law that God's will is known (Rom. 2:17f.), and by breaking the law that his name is dishonoured (Rom. 2:23). In 1 Cor. 9:8 Paul contrasts what the law says to his own human authority. In 1 Cor. 9:9 (=Deut. 2:54) and 1 Cor. 14:21 (=Is. 28:11-12; Deut. 28:49) Old Testament quotations are introduced with "it is written (gegraptai = divine passive) in the law (en gar tō Mōuseōs nomō, 1 Cor. 9:9; en tō nomō, 1 Cor. 14:21)". The law is holy, just, good, spiritual (Rom. 7:12-14; cf. 7:16), in accord with the promises of God (Gal. 3:21), contains the morphēsis of gnōsis and alētheia (Rom. 2:20), and (along with the prophets) bears witness to the righteousness of God (dikaiosynē theou, Rom. 3:21).

Only in Christ is one able to walk kata pneuma rather than kata sarka and thus fulfil the to dikaiōma tou nomou (Rom. 8:4); thus it is only for the one in Christ that the law has the character of spirit and life (ho gar nomos tou pneumatos tēs zōēs en Christō Iēsou, Rom. 8:2). The law, if viewed from the standpoint of pistis (in contrast to erga), excludes the possibility of human boasting (kauchēsis, Rom. 3:27). Through faith the law is not destroyed (katargoumen) but established (histanomen, Rom. 3:31).
In Rom. 7:4-6 Paul has stated that the Christian has died to, and is discharged from, the law. He then goes on to expound on its nature. He states emphatically that the law is not sin (ho nomos hamartia; me genoito, Rom. 7:7). In Rom. 7:13 it was not that which was good (i.e., the law) which brought death to "me" (egō); but it was sin working death in "me" through the law (dia tou agathou) so that sin might be completely exposed. (Note the statements hina phanē hamartia, and hina genētai kath' hyperbolēn hamartolos he hamartia.) The law is pneumatikos but "I" am sarkinos . . . . pepramenos hypo tēn hamartian; "I" am thus unable to attain salvation.

It would seem to follow that it is only the enslavement and condemnation of the law that is ended in Rom. 10:4. This is consistent with the view that the law is good, and equally, I believe, with the statements in Paul that tend to depreciate the law. By way of conclusion to this chapter, I would like to review the depreciatory statements to emphasize this consistency; then to qualify the exact sense of the phrase "end of law"; and finally, to specify the sense in which man, freed by Christ, is "under the law of Christ" (ennomos Christou, 1 Cor. 9:21; cf. tou nomou ton Christon, Gal. 6:2).

In Gal. 3:19f. it cannot be assumed that since the law was ordained by angels (diatageis di' angelōn, Gal. 3:19) it did not come from God. For Deut. 33:2 (LXX), Josephus (Antiq. XV:5:3), Jubilees 1:27ff., Acts 7:53 and in Talmudic passages

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the presence of angels in the giving of the law is a mark of its excellence. Perhaps Paul is contrasting the direct revelation of the promise with the mediated revelation of the law. The contrast, however, is not directly expressed.\textsuperscript{53}

Cranfield is surely mistaken when he says that Paul really wants to maintain the validity of the law but that he is forced to deprecate it owing to the polemical nature of the letter.\textsuperscript{54} Paul is not being carried away with statements he does not really mean; if he is polemical, it must be because the issue is crucial to him.\textsuperscript{55} Paul is not depreciating the law as such, but the Galatians' false use of the law; namely, their attempt to gain righteousness and life by it. Verse 21b indicates that the law was never intended for this purpose; otherwise, it really would be against the promises of God (cf. vs. 21). That the law could in any way be against the promises of God, Paul denies with an emphatic \textit{mē genoito}. If salvation could come by keeping the law, then God's promise to Abraham and his offspring (i.e., Christ, cf. 3:16), namely, that in him all nations of the earth are to be blessed (Gal. 3:8; Gen. 12:32 LXX), would be made null and void.

Since salvation cannot come through the observance of the law the obvious question is \textit{ti oun ho nomos}? The answer is the same as in Rom. 5:20 -- it was given to multiply transgressions until the offspring (or Christ) should come (tōn parabaseōn charin prosetethē, achrís hou elthē to sperma hō
epēngeltai, Gal. 3:19). Its purpose is to show the true plight of man and to show him his need for the promise, i.e., Christ. Man's true plight is shown up in that he is enslaved (note hypo nomon ephrouroumēthā synkleiomenoi, paidagōgos, hypo paidagōgon) to the law for a strictly temporal period. (Note pro . . . de, eis, de . . . oukēti, Gal. 3:23-25.)

How then are the passages which indicate that the law is aligned with sin and death, that the Christian has died to the law, that Christ is the end of the law to be reconciled with the fact that for Paul the law is valid? The answer is that the law is terminated only in a very special sense: the condemnation of and enslavement to the law is ended. But the law as an expression of the will of God is not ended, nor is its demand on the Christian ended, since love is the fulfilling of the law, and the Christian is commanded to love.

With regard to the salvation history views of Conzelmann and Gutbrod et. al. one ought not to say that the law is ended as a way of salvation if anything is implied by that which would designate the law as a genuine soteriological dispensation which now yields to what is one more, albeit superior, soteriological dispensation. Christ is the end of the law for every believer -- every believer Jew or Greek. The rock that the Jews stumble on (Rom. 9:33) can only be Christ (cf. 1 Cor. 10:4 hē petra de ēn ho Christos). In Rom.
Abraham, and all the righteous of the old dispensation, are saved by faith -- in Christ (cf. Cranfield's comments on Gal. 3:8 and Rom. 1:2f.; cf. below, n. 19).

The question remains: Is it not true that the ceremonial law is no longer necessary for Paul? For Paul, the apostle to the Gentiles, who insists that the Gentiles must not be circumcised (cf. 1 Cor. 7:18; Gal. 2:3; 5:2f.; 6:2), for Paul who has become "all things to all men" -- to the Jews he has become a Jew, to those outside the law he has become as one outside the law (1 Cor. 9:20ff.) -- the answer must be yes.

Is it not true, then, that Paul when he says that Christ is the end of the law, is referring to the abrogation of the cultic law and the halakah? The answer, in my opinion, is no. Only the moral law has come within the horizon of the discussion, only it is in mind when Paul raises the hypothetical possibility that a Gentile can by nature do what the law requires (physei ta tou nomou poiōsin, Rom. 2:14) and an uncircumcised man can keep the precepts of the law (ta dikaiōmata tou nomou, Rom. 2:26). Keeping the entolai theou has nothing to do with such external matters as circumcision or uncircumcision (1 Cor. 7:18f.). Nor is it in mind when Paul says that the law is spiritual but "I" (ego) am carnal, sold under sin (Rom. 7:14). Phil. 3:6 ("as to righteousness under the law blameless") indicates that in aspects of the law other than the moral, Paul was able to keep its precepts.
The ceremonial law or the halakah is not abolished if by that it is meant either that it is now wrong to observe it, or that it was ever necessary to perform it in order to gain life. Abraham was already justified when he was uncircumcised (Rom. 4:10; cf. 3:31; 4:9, 11, 12), and Paul, when he is among Jews, continues to observe the halakah and Jewish customs (1 Cor. 9:20ff.). He believes, however, that it is a denial of the gospel to compel Gentiles (and Jews for that matter) to do likewise. Paul's polemic against circumcision must be understood in the context of those who insist that it is necessary to submit to it in order to gain righteousness and life. In this matter it is neither circumcision nor uncircumcision which counts for anything, but a kainē ktisis (Gal. 6:15), pīstis di' agapēs energoumenē (Gal. 5:6), and tērēsis entolōn theou (1 Cor. 7:19). True circumcision is something which is spiritual and inward, and which the believer can possess whether or not he is physically circumcised (cf. Rom. 2:28f.; Phil. 3:3; Col. 2:11).

Therefore, for Paul the law that is valid is the moral law of the Old Testament. However, this is not the only law that is valid for him. He is ennomos Christou (1 Cor. 9:21) and urges the Galatians to fulfil the nomon tou Christou (Gal. 6:2). C. H. Dodd has argued that Paul is referring to the teaching of the historical Jesus as binding upon the Christian. He notes that the phrase ton nomon tou Christou
is in the context of a series of moral injunctions in the ethical section of Galatians. The implication is that by obeying these injunctions, the Christian fulfills (αναπληρῶ) the law of Christ; by acknowledging the binding character of such injunctions he is ennomos Christou. In Gal. 6:1-5 the main theme is that of a Christian who falls into sin. The pneumatikoi are to restore him in a spirit of prautēs (one of the fruits of the Spirit in 5:23). They are to bear one another's bare (6:2) and their own phortion (6:5); they are to restore the erring brother. Both of these injunctions have parallels in the Matthean tradition, the latter in Mt. 18:15-20 and the former in Mt. 23:4. The scribes and Pharisees, as teachers and pastors of the people, are criticized because they lay upon their people phortia barea which they will not touch with their finger.

Further support for the authoritative character of the teaching of Jesus is found in 1 Cor. 7 and 9. That those who proclaim the gospel should get their living by the gospel is something which the Lord commanded (ὁ κύριος διητάξει, 1 Cor. 9:14). In 1 Cor. 7:25 Paul denies that he has an epitagē kyriou concerning virgins and thus, by implication, affirms that the indissolubility of marriage is an epitagē kyriou in 7:10 (even though the word used there is parangello). Moreover, Paul contrasts the epitagē of Christ with his own gnōmē even though he believes that gnōmē to be directed by the Spirit.
(7:25, 40); the epitēgē kyriou remains uniquely authoritative. Dodd notes that although the precepts in 1 Cor. 7: 10-11 and 9:14 are the only ones expressly attributed to "the Lord", there are other references to sayings of Jesus. In Rom. 14:10-23 Paul proceeds from general ethical maxims which he expects his readers to accept, i.e., "that nothing is unclean of itself" (vs. 14) and that "everything is clean" (vs. 20). His ground for saying this is pepeismaī en kyriō ἱεσού. The saying is reminiscent of Mk. 7:18-19. The rhetorical question sy de ti krineis ton adelphon (Rom. 14:10) is reminiscent of Mt. 7:1-2; and sy ti exoutheneis (Rom. 14:10) is similar to Mt. 18:10. In Matthew the maxim is in the context of the danger of scandalizing (skandalizein) a little one (Mt. 18:6); Paul enjoins his readers not to put a skandalon in the way of the weak brother (Rom. 14:13). In Mark the sequence of the saying of "scandals" and "little ones" ends with eirēneuete en allēlois (9:50); this seems to be echoed in Rom. 14:19. Dodd concludes that Rom. 14 is full of reminiscences of what is accepted as the teaching of Jesus; the method followed is similar to that used in both 1 Cor. 7:10-11 and the rabbinic writings (whereby halaka is based on the precepts cited from the torah). This thesis is doubtless correct insofar as torah is understood in terms of revelation and instruction.

To conclude: Telos in Rom. 10:4 means "end" (cession), rather than "goal" or both "end" and "goal". Christ is the
end of the law in the sense that he puts an end to enslavement to the law (conceived of as the moral demands contained in the Old Testament) and condemnation by it. The law remains God's law and the believer both looks to it for instruction and, led by the Spirit, is enabled to fulfil it. It is true that for Paul the halakah and the ceremonial law are not valid; but such questions lie beyond the horizon of the discussion in Rom. 10:4

Footnotes: Chapter Six


Gerhard Delling, op. cit., p. 56, n. 51, observes that in H. Hellbardt, "Christus das telos d. Gesetzes", Evangelische
Theologica, III (1936), p. 345f. takes telos to be at once "end", "purpose", and "goal".


6 These passages are discussed by W. D. Davies, Torah in the Messianic Age and/or the Age to Come, Journal of Biblical Literature Monograph Series, Vol. VII (Philadelphia, 1952), p. 78ff. That the torah would at least be altered in the time to come is given further support by Davies: Lev. R. 9:7 (a late passage; ibid., p. 55f.) says that all sacrifices except thanksgiving would be annulled in the time to come; Yalqut on Prov. 9:2 (80-120 A.D.; ibid., p. 56) states that at that time all festivals but Purim will cease; Midrash Tehalim on Ps. 146:7 (ibid., p. 57f.) suggests changes in the laws concerning clean and unclean. Davies (ibid., p. 65) interprets b. Shab. 151b (A.D. 165-200) as an argument that the torah no longer holds in the messianic age so that questions about reward for observing it, and guilt and punishment for refusing to do so, do not arise.

Longenecker, op. cit., p. 132, further notes that the Qumran literature (1Q5 2:19; 8:9; 9:10-11; 1Q5 14:18-19) speaks of the enacting of laws which were to be in force only until the coming of the Messiah.

7 W. D. Davies, The Setting of the Sermon on the Mount, op. cit., p. 183, thinks that Schoeps is too confident in his claim that the torah was to cease in the messianic age.

8 Schoeps, op. cit., p. 173, notes that the same assumption was made by pseudo-messianic groups in later Jewish history. Sabbatai and the Frankists, believing the last age to have dawned with the coming of the Messiah, declared the Mosaic law annulled. It is not that the messianists turn against the law, rather they reject its further validity.

9 Ibid., p. 171.

10 Ibid., p. 175ff.

11 Ibid., p. 171.

12 Ibid., p. 180ff.


Rudolf Bultmann, "Christ the End of the Law", in his Essays Philosophical and Theological (London: SCM, 1955), pp. 36-66 gives an approach which should perhaps be labelled as "existential". Christ is the end of the law in that he gives man the freedom to live on a future basis and to live for the future released from his past and from himself" (ibid., p. 64). For him, Paul does not have the modern theory of evolution in mind whereby a stage in the development of the human mind has been surpassed as if a coherent knowledge of God has taken the place of an obscure or false one. Nor does Paul's rejection of the law follow from his belief in the worthlessness of Old Testament ethics; the law is holy, just, and good, and Christian morality is the fulfilment of the Old Testament demands (Rom. 13:8-10; Gal. 5:14). The polemic in Rom. 2:21-23 against the Jews presupposes the validity of the law (ibid., p. 40f.); however, its fulfilment is not the way to salvation (ibid., p. 41).


18 In 1 Cor. 5:7 (καὶ γάρ τὸ πασχαλέννυμεν οὐτῶν τῇ Χριστῷ) Christ is represented as the Church's passover lamb -- i.e., as the true and final Paschal Lamb to whom the other paschal lambs, sacrificed according to the law, were pointing forward. In Rom. 3:25 Christ is represented as a hilasterion; the background is sacrifice, probably with the ritual day of atonement (Lev. 16) in mind. Also in 1 Cor. 11:25 (τοῦτο τὸ ποτέριον ἡ καινὴ διαρρήκτη ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ ἐμαθητῇ) stamps Christ's approaching death with a sacrificial significance (ibid., p. 51f.).

19 In Gal. 3:8 it is the scripture (Gen. 12:3) which preached the gospel beforehand (προεφημερίσατο) to Abraham saying "Εὐνοοῦσιν οὖσαν ἐστὶν καὶ πάντα ἡ οἰκουμένη." In Rom. 1:2f. Paul refers to the "gospel of God which he promised beforehand (προεφημερίσατο) through his prophets in the holy scriptures, the gospel concerning his Son . . . " (ibid., p. 50). Cranfield also believes that in Rom. 10:6-10 Paul is contrasting a righteous status which men have through faith in Christ with the righteous status which Christ himself has by his obedience. Rom. 10:5 (ἐν χάριτος ἑνατοῦ ἁμαρτών καὶ σάφει ἐν αὐτῷ, = Lev. 18:5) explains the gar of Rom. 10:4; in accordance with Lev. 18:5 Christ has fulfilled the law by perfectly obeying its requirement and has thereby earned eternal life for himself and those who believe on him (ibid., p. 49f.). Finally it is in Christ that all the promises (ἐπαγγελία) of God find their yes (2 Cor. 1:20).
20 He had previously concluded (ibid., p. 49) that *telos* cannot mean "termination" on the basis of such passages as Rom. 3:31; 7:12, 14; 8:4; 13:8-10, and his frequent appeals to the Pentateuch.

21 Ibid., p. 58.

22 Cranfield (ibid., p. 59) argues, contra C. K. Barrett, *From First Adam to Last: A Study in Pauline Theology* (New York: Scribners, 1962), p. 52, n. 1, that in vs. 13 to *katargoumenon* is not the whole religious system based on the law; rather it is to be read in light of vs. 7. Verses 14-16 suggest, not that the law is done away with, but rather that only when men turn to Christ can they discern the true glory of the law; in Paul's time, when the law is read in the synagogue, its true meaning is veiled to the Jews (ibid., p. 59).


24 Ibid., p. 61f. At any rate, Cranfield, in disagreement with Duncan (op. cit., pp. 334-336), believes that angels of Gal. 3:19 are not to be identified with the *stoicheia* of Gal. 4:3, 9. If this were the case it would mean that the giving of the law would be the work of the *stoicheia* which are "weak and beggarly" (4:9) and "of the world" (4:3), ibid., p. 63. This identification he notes in light of the article by Gerhard Delling, "*stoicheion*", in *TDNT*, op. cit., Vol. VII, pp. 670-687 s.v., is by no means certain. Also, it would contradict Rom. 9:4f. where the giving of the law (*hē* *nomothesia*) is one of the privileges of Israel.

25 In Col. 2:14 the *cheirographon* which stood against us is not the law itself, but quite possibly the law's condemnation of us (ibid., p. 64, cf. C. F. D. Moule, *The Epistle to the Colossians and to Philemon: The Cambridge Greek Testament Commentary* (Cambridge: University Press, 1957), ad. loc., p. 97ff.).

In Eph. 2:15 the clause *ton nomon tôn entolēn en dogmasin katargēsas* means simply that in Christ's death there is no longer an obligation to observe the ceremonial ordinances.


28 Ibid., p. 40ff.

29 Ibid., pp. 41, 48f., 68f.
30 Bring (ibid., p. 62) believes that in Rom. 9:31ff. nomos means the same thing as dikaiosynē since God's law is a nomos dikaiosynē (9:31).

31 Ibid., pp. 50, 61, 69f.

32 Thus the only one who is ho poïēsas anthrōpos (Rom. 10:5) is the one who walks en Christō (ibid., p. 67).

33 Bring also believes that in 9:31 the phrase eis dikaiosynē tou nomou or eis telos tou nomou could be substituted for eis nomon; thereby telos would signify the deepest content and ultimate goal.

34 Ibid., p. 47.

35 Ad. loc., p. 197f.


40 Herman Ridderbos, op. cit., rightly asks that if Paul believed this, and if this were a Jewish doctrine, then why does Paul not appeal to it?

41 See below, pp. 202-204.

42 Cf. Bruce, ad. loc., p. 204.


44 See above, p. 166f.


46 Here nomothesia is ranked with "the sonship, the glory, the covenants, . . . the worship, and the promises".

47 Cf. ho nomos legei, 1 Cor. 14:34
The contrast of ho... nomos tou pneumatos tēs zōes en Christō lēsou with tou nomou tēs hamartias kai tou thanatou (Rom. 8:2) is to be understood in light of the contrast between pneuma and gramma in 2 Cor. 3:6 and Rom. 7:6 (since Rom. 8:1ff., after the parenthesis of 7:7-25, continues the thought of 7:6).

At 2 Cor. 3:6 to gramma is a reference to the decalogue which was engraved en plaxin lithinais (3:3), and to the whole Mosaic economy which was the dispensation of death (hē diakonia tou thanaton) and condemnation (katakrisēs, 3:7, 9). The old dispensation was one of impotence (adyunaton), condemnation, sin, and death (Rom. 8:1ff.; 2 Cor. 3:6ff.). The written code (gramma) kills (2 Cor. 3:6) in the sense that it does not empower one to keep the law, but pronounces the death sentence on the law-breaker (cf. Gal. 3:10 = Deut. 27:26 LXX; Rom. 7:5, 9-11; Deut. 30:17f.). Yet it came with doxa (2 Cor. 3:7, 9-11).

At 2 Cor. 3:6 to pneuma is a reference to Jeremiah's (31:31-34) new covenant (kaines diathēkēs, 3:6) which has now been written en plaxin kardiai sarkinais, (3:3). It is the dispensation of the Spirit (hē diakonia tou pneumatos) and righteousness (dikaiosynēs, 3:8, 9). As such, God's saving righteousness is manifested in it and new life is given (cf. 2 Cor. 3:6 to... pneuma zōopoieī, Rom. 8:10ff.; 1 Cor. 15:45b). The one who has God's law written on his heart (2 Cor. 3:3) is no longer enslaved and condemned. He has new life breathed into him; he walks kata pneuma rather than kata sarka and is thus able to fulfill the to dikaiōma tou nomou (Rom. 8:4).

Cranfield, ad. loc., p. 375f., notes that ho nomos in Rom. 8:2a has been variously explained as "the Holy Spirit himself", "faith", "the gospel", "the authority exercised by the Holy Spirit", "the spiritual life resulting from union with Christ", and "the religion which is possible in Christ".

In Rom. 3:27 nomos has been taken to mean such things as "principle", "ethical norm", "divine institution", "system", and "way of salvation"; cf. Cranfield, ad. loc., p. 219; and Kühemann, ad. loc., p. 95f; G. Friedrich, "Das Gesetz des Glaubens Röm. 3.27", Theologische Zeitschrift, X (1954), 401-417, however agrees that it refers to the Old Testament law. H. W. Schmidt, op. cit., notes Paul only dees away with the law where it is presented as a law of work (Werkgesetz) in the sense of a power which brings salvation (Heilsmacht). That, however, is not the proper character (Gestalt) of nomos. In its true nature it is spiritual (Rom. 7:14). The law and the age of the old covenant as a history of promise (Verheissungsgeschichte) can refer to the new covenant because the ultimate truth -- hitherto concealed and only in Christ revealed -- of the law is found in faith (2 Cor. 3:14). Sin has torn the law
from its christological and eschatological relation and has thereby made it into a law of works. In so far as the law is understood as a prophecy concerning Christ (= a law of faith) it sets up Paul's thesis in 3:31. (Ad. loc., p. 74).

For a discussion of various possibilities on the interpretation of Rom. 3:31 cf. Kühemann, ad. loc., p. 97. Katargein/histanein probably is equivalent to the rabbinic bittel (Aramaic bittel)/qiyym (Aramaic qayyem). Nomos seems to refer to the Old Testament. H. W. Schmidt, ad. loc., p. 75 argues that nomos is part of the Old Testament Verheissungsgeschichte. Paul's doctrine of justification by faith does not deny Old Testament history; on the contrary, only with the coming of Christ is its true meaning revealed. Only the law as Werkgesetz is set aside. Rom. 3:31 looks backward and forward, and is similar in meaning to Rom. 3:21. Rom. 4:1-25 is a discussion of the dikaiosyne theou as martyroumene hypcou nomou (Rom. 3:21).

Since Paul holds that the law is good he needs in the context of his argument to deny emphatically that it is sin. The natural supposition of the reader would have been that the law is sin since the Christian has died to both (cf. Rom. 6:2, 11; 7:4).

It is not the law itself which is sin but it is sin which avails itself (aphormen... labousa, Rom. 7:8, 11) of the law as its starting point. Georg Bertram, "aphorme", in TDNT, op. cit., Vol. V, p. 473 s.v., notes that in passages in the Pauline corpus where aphorme occurs it is not the "starting point" or "occasion" itself which is bad, whether it be the apostolic right to support (2 Cor. 11:12), widowhood (1 Tim. 5:14), Christian freedom (Gal. 5:13), or the law (Rom. 7:8, 11).

Cf. Lightfoot, ad. loc., p. 145; Longenecker, op. cit., p. 146, n. 109; and Ragnar Bring, op. cit., p. 82ff.

At any rate, the law has come through a mediator (en cheiri mesitou, Gal. 3:19) -- an undoubted reference to Moses. The following verse (ho de mesites henos ouk estin, ho de theos heis estin) has, however, given rise to over three hundred interpretations (cf. Burton, ad. loc., p. 191). I tentatively adopt the solution of Ragnar Bring (op. cit., pp. 78-93). In disagreement with Schlier (ad. loc., 10th ed., 1949; an argument deleted from the previously quoted 12th ed., 1962) the law is not a mediated treaty whose validity depends on Israel's performance of its prescriptions. Bring also disagrees with Oepke (ad. loc., pp. 80-84; and "mesites", in TDNT, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 618f. s.v.) who maintains that the law does not
stem from God but from a plurality of angels (op. cit., p. 80f.).

Paul's purpose is not to designate the law as an evil power, but to clarify its role in salvation history. Although all have not obeyed its prescriptions, the law is of universal validity and represents all as sinners. Therefore henos ouk estin indicates that Moses is a mediator, not only to the Jews, but also to the Gentiles (op. cit., p. 86ff.). Heis estin indicates that God is the God of Gentiles as well as Jews — a view expressly stated in Rom. 3:29 (op. cit., p. 88f.).


The same criticism applies to scholars such as W. Wrede, Paul, trans. E. Lummis (London: Green, 1907), p. 123; A. Schweitzer, The Mysticism of St. Paul, op. cit., p. 225; and W. D. Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism, op. cit., p. 222, when they claim that Paul's doctrine of justification is only a convenient polemic against Judaisers. To be sure, justification by faith is considered frequently in polemical passages, and is mentioned less often than union with Christ. These scholars fail to observe the depth of man's plight, a plight which can only be remedied by the death and resurrection of Christ, and by the believer's participation by faith in that death. For Paul, to deny justification by faith is to deny the necessity of the death and resurrection of Christ, the believer's present status in Christ, and the depth of one's plight under the law.

See above, pp. 156-160.

See above, p. 197ff.

Cranfield's criticisms against telos meaning "end" in Rom. 10:4 can be accommodated to this view.


See above, p. 191ff.

The law is ended for the Gentile as well as the Jew because outside of Christ, he is consigned hypo nomon (cf. Gal. 3:23; Rom. 2:15).

However, the halakah probably is included in Paul's use of the law when he states that the Jews, from their point of view, tried to gain righteousness and life by observing the law: i.e., Rom. 3:28; Gal. 2:16; 3:2, 5, 10, 11; 4:21; Phil. 3:6, 9. But when Paul states their actual plight from
God's point of view, it is hardly the case that they were enslaved to the halakah or the ceremonial law, or that it was necessary to observe these in order to gain life.

Two other passages where the moral law is not referred to are 1 Cor. 9:20 and Eph. 2:15. In 1 Cor. 9:20 τοις ἑπομον ής ἑπομον is similar in meaning to τοις ἱουδαῖοις Ἦς Τουδαῖοι and means simply that Paul, when among Jews, observed specifically Jewish customs. The second passage, which occurs in a letter generally regarded as non-Pauline, seems to refer to the abolishing of specifically Jewish items of the law, i.e., the ceremonial law and the halakah. At any rate, the fifth commandment of the decalogue is still valid for the author (cf. Eph. 6:2).


With regard to grammatical considerations, Burton, ad loc., p. 392, observes that just as the law of Moses (Lk. 2:23; Acts 13:37) is the law of God enunciated by Moses, here, "the law of Christ", is the law of God enunciated by Christ; by use of the term του Χριστου in preference to Ιησου or even Χριστου, its authoritative character is suggested.

Ibid., p. 106f.

PART TWO: THE MATTHEAN AND THE PAULINE CONCEPTIONS
BROUGHT INTO RELATION TO ONE ANOTHER
Part Two of this study bears on the question: "Are the theologies of Matthew and Paul on Christ and the law compatible or incompatible?" As I intend to pose it, it is a hermeneutical question concerned with relationships between meanings and with the relationship between meaning and truth. The inquiry has been divided into three chapters. Chapter Seven, concerned with the source and significance of diversity between authors, presents a general theory of "dialectic". Chapter Eight is designed to apply theory to the particular case of Matthew and Paul on Christ and the law in order to discover how their views stand with reference to one another. This, I hope, will bring the views of each into sharper focus.

In Appendix I, the insights gained in Chapters Seven and Eight are applied to the question of the unity of the New Testament. This question has numerous aspects. This, I hope, will help dissipate numerous confusions concerning "unity" as well as shed light on the unity and diversity within the early Christian movement, and enable us to see how diverse writings might intelligibly coexist within a single religious canon -- topics of no little interest both to the history of religions and to theology.
CHAPTER SEVEN: DIALECTICAL DIFFERENCES AND DIVERSE CONCEPTUALITIES

Matthew's and Paul's view of the law are strikingly different. For one the law is brought to its eschatological completion (Mt. 5:17); for the other the law is ended (Rom. 10:4). What is needed is a method that can deal with conflicts in general; a test case might be this conflict in particular, between Matthew and Paul.

At this juncture I shall draw on three sources of unequal importance to our present purpose: first and most important on Bernard Lonergan's cognitional theory,¹ which should prove useful for the work of Part Two of the thesis; second, on Emerich Coreth's treatment of hermeneutics,² which adds valuable complementary insights largely drawn from the tradition of German hermeneutics from Hegel and Schliermacher to Heidegger and Gadamer; third, on E. D. Hirsch's treatment of one key condition of validity in interpretation.³

Geared specifically to conflicts within the history of Christian movements, Bernard Lonergan's Method in Theology⁴ (particularly the chapter titled "Dialectic", pp. 235-266) is an attempt to develop a method that can deal with conflicts. How does the method of dialectic work? The aim of dialectic,
according to Lonergan, is to provide a comprehensive viewpoint. It seeks some single base or single set of related bases from which it can understand the character, the oppositions, and the relations of the many viewpoints. A study of the various viewpoints takes one beyond the fact of the conflict to its reason. Comparing them is designed to show where differences are irreducible, where they are complementary (and might be brought together within a larger whole) or where they are successive stages in a single process of development. Not every irreducible difference is a serious difference; those that are not can be put in second, third, or fourth place in order to concentrate on the ones that are serious and profound. Two authors may be contradictory on details, but not contradictory on the issues that are central. Once one has performed the proper textual criticism and has properly interpreted each author with regard to his own intent in the light of his historical background, then one is able to do the tasks of dialectic: namely, comparison (to seek affinities and oppositions), reduction (to move from the many manifestations of affinity and opposition to the unifying root), classification (to decide which of these roots result from dialectically opposed horizons and which have other grounds), and selection (to pick out the affinities and oppositions grounded in dialectically opposed horizons and dismiss other affinities and oppositions).

Dialectical differences in horizon stem from an explicit
or implicit cognitional theory, an ethical stance, or a religious outlook. They are to be overcome by intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. 10

Intellectual conversion is the eradication of the myth that knowing is like looking, that objectivity is seeing what is there to be seen and not seeing what is not there, and that the real is what is out there now to be looked at.

The myth overlooks a crucial distinction. Operations are "immediate" when their objects are present; thus, seeing is immediate to what is being seen. By imagination, language, and symbol, on the one hand, we operate immediately with respect to the image, word or symbol, but mediately with respect to what is represented or signified. This grounds the distinction between "the world of immediacy" (which is seen and heard, touched and tasted, smelled and felt) 11 and "the world mediated by meaning" (made present not by sensation but by representation). 12 Knowing, then, since it includes the grasp of the mediated, is not merely seeing; and the criteria of objectivity are not merely those of ocular vision. Rather, they correlate with what Lonergan calls "the facts of knowing" and are as complex as knowing itself. 13 The reality known is not merely that which is looked at; it is that which is given in experience, organized and extrapolated by understanding, posited by judgment and belief. 14

According to Lonergan, the naive realist (as opposed
to the critical realist) the empiricist, and the idealist are victims in different ways of one and the same cognitional myth. The naive realist knows the world mediated by meaning but thinks he knows it by looking. For the empiricist objective knowledge is limited to sense experience; all other activities are subjective. For the idealist knowing does include understanding as well as sensing; but the idealist retains the empiricist's notion of reality, and accordingly takes the world mediated by meaning to be not real but ideal. Empiricism, idealism, and realism name three totally different horizons with no common identical objects; that is, "an idealist never means what an empiricist means, and a realist never means what either of them means." 16

Moral conversion changes the criterion of one's decisions from satisfactions to values. When the two conflict, the morally converted man prefers values, "the truly good". Finally religious conversion is being grasped by ultimate concern. 17

All three conversions involve self-transcendence. To decide responsibly in favour of what is good on its own merits is moral or "real" self-transcendence. And religious conversion, according to Lonergan, is conversion to a total being in love as the efficacious ground of self-transcendence. 18

We are now in a position to consider how dialectically opposed horizons come into being. They are generated by the presence and absence of conversion, be it intellectual, moral,
or religious. For if one man lives for satisfactions and the other for values, they are bound to disagree and disagreements with this kind of rootage are likely to reach total impasse. The same is true of differences generated by the presence or absence of the other kinds of conversion. Since "conversion" relates to the most basic kind of stance, the differences that emerge from the state of being converted or unconverted are calculated to the most basic kind of differences -- the kind that trigger mutual incomprehension, lack of sympathy, and repudiation. With the attainment of sufficient sophistication each seeks a philosophy or a method that will buttress what he considers appropriate views of the intelligent, the reasonable, the responsible. "There results a babel." 19

To these general considerations on dialectically opposed horizons may be added some particular observations. Two authors (e.g., Matthew and Paul) may be said to differ dialectically if their views are truly and radically contradictory. Now what conditions would have to be met in order that a contradiction be acknowledged to be "true" and "radical"? First we are faced with a true contradiction when affirming that "A" is and is not simultaneously and in the same respect. 20 But in the concrete, the problem of isolating a true contradiction between writers lies (a) in the embeddedness of every act of meaning in a context, and (b) the diversity and diverse relatedness of contexts. Bare propositions uprooted from their
contexts may be only apparently and not truly contradictory. Second, for a contradiction to be radical the contradictories should be of central rather than peripheral significance. This, to be sure, is often difficult to determine, and it is among "the tasks of dialectic" to determine them. A fruitful question in the present case might be: What exactly is at stake in Matthew's (Paul's) affirmation that Christ completes (terminates) the Mosaic law?

Differences in horizon, according to Lonergan, may be complementary or genetic. An example of the former would be the various job specialists who make up a modern industrial society. Each specialized group has different interests and lives in a different world, yet each recognizes the need for the others in order for a communal world to function. Genetically distinct horizons are related as successive stages in some process of development. Each later stage presupposes, partly includes, and partly transforms earlier stages.

Differences in horizon may be due to diverse perspectives, to diverse brands of common sense, and to diverse differentiation of consciousness. The last exemplifies a genetic difference in horizon. The first may be illustrated from history. The work of historians writing different histories of the same sequence of events will result in differences but these may be merely perspectival rather than dialectical. From a perspectivist point of view the historical process and personal development give rise to different selective processes
and consequently to different histories. These are non-contradictory, but they are incomplete and approximate. 24

As for diverse brands of common sense there are as many as there are diverse languages, societies, and cultures. 25 Common sense is a spontaneous procedure, constantly going forward in individuals and groups. The result is an accumulation of insights that enable one both to deal successfully with recurrent situations, to notice what is novel in a new situation, and to proceed to deal tentatively with that.

Since the situations vary with time and place, there are as many brands of common sense as there are differing places and times. Common to common sense is its procedure, but not its content. 26 Common sense is common, not to all men of all places and times, but to the members of a community successfully in communication with one another. Among them, one's common sense statements have a perfectly obvious meaning. But statements may be transported to other communities distant in time or place. Horizons, values, interests, intellectual development, and experience may differ. 27 When a nucleus of insights is shared by a group it is the common sense of the group; when it pertains to the common sense of a different group it is considered strange. 28

Developments are possible because of the differentiation of consciousness. In fully differentiated consciousness there are four realms of meaning -- common sense (with its
meaning expressed in everyday, ordinary language), theory. Where language is technical, simply objective in reference, and so refers to the subject and his operations only as objects", interiority "where language speaks of the subject and his operations as objects, but rests upon a self appropriation that has verified in personal experience the operator, the operations, and the process referred to in the basic terms and relations of the language employed", and transcendence "in which the subject is related to divinity in the language of prayer and prayerful silence". Fully differentiated consciousness is the fruit of a prolonged development. In primitive undifferentiated consciousness, neither theory (science) nor interiority (cognitional theory) exist, while common sense and transcendence interpenetrate. The advent of civilization means an increasing differentiation of roles to be fulfilled and tasks to be performed. With each of these changes the functions of language expand and literature develops. When the critical exigence turns attention upon interiority the subject relates his different procedures to the several realms, and the several realms to one another. He shifts from one realm to another by consciously changing his procedures. The result is that the hitherto inadequately grasped differences between theory and common sense are now sharply and clearly distinguished. In Lonergan's view this coincides with the collapse of normative, classicist culture,
whose pretentions to universality are now exposed as a mere partial view. But the new differentiations are now complemented by a new unity in the self-appropriated subject. This unity is new, for it is far beyond the homogeneity of undifferentiated consciousness (which is likely to insist that if the procedures of common sense are correct, then theory must be wrong, and vice versa). Each person begins from undifferentiated consciousness, from common sense cognitional procedures, and from one of the multitudinous varieties of "ordinary languages" in which the endless varieties of common sense express themselves. By a laborious effort he manages to move beyond his original ordinary language and its common sense and to understand other ordinary languages, and their common sense. Again, it is only through "the long and confused twilight of philosophic initiation that one can find one's way into interiority and achieve through self-appropriation a basis, a foundation, that is distinct from common sense and theory, that acknowledges their disparateness, that accounts for both, and that critically grounds them both."\textsuperscript{33}

Such, then, is a general account of what causes differences in horizon. The task remains to discover just how the differences in horizon between Matthew and Paul are to be assessed, to find out whether the differences involve mutual repudiation or are due to other factors such as differing brands of common sense, or differing perspectives. Before
directly confronting this task, however, I should review the basis on which I distinguish truth from falsity and bring this to bear on the problem of interpretation. I will do this first as Lonergan has done it, by reference to classical medieval thought. But it may be well to follow this up with relation to modern and contemporary thought, as Emerich Coreth has done. This will allow us to return to the issue of objectivity in general and in interpretation. Finally I will look to E. D. Hirsch for one significant point on the objectivity of interpretation.

Reflection on truth as correspondence brings one to a famous conundrum: To judge that any knowing actually corresponds with the known would seem to involve a comparison between the two. But that comparison is impossible. For the known is considered either in itself or in my knowledge. If in itself, it is not known but remains unknown. If in my knowledge, then the problem is recurrent; I still have not got a standard by which to determine whether my knowledge corresponds with its object.

Aquinas, observed Lonergan, admitted the necessity of a standard in judgment. ... His standard was neither the thing-in-itself as thing-in-itself and so as unknown, nor was it some second inner representation of the thing-in-itself coming to the aid of the first in a futile and superfluous effort to be helpful. The Thomist standard lay in the principles of the intellect itself. ... 34

This "resolution into principles" has to do with the reflective
activity of the mind measuring its operations and so inferring (as Aristotle inferred) that knowledge is by the identity in act of intelligence and its object and further discovering (as Aquinas discovered) that in operations in accord with its own nature it comes to understand its own nature, namely, as relatedness to reality. In particular cases ultimately by reduction to such first principles as identity and sufficient reason, intelligence discovers its prospective judgments to correspond or not to correspond with objects.

Emerich Coreth has worked out his account of truth under a multiplicity of influences and in conversation with modern and especially contemporary philosophy and philosophical hermeneutics. From Martin Heidegger's treatment of truth in Being and Time Coreth fixed his attention on two points: Heidegger's rejection of the traditional concept of truth as aequatio intellectus ad rem or mere correctness (Rightigkeit) and his championship of Plato's concept in which truth (alētheia) is the unconcealedness (Unverborgenheit) or manifestation (Offenbarkeit) of being (Sein). Truth is the totality of being; but since Plato, a fateful forgetfulness of being (Seinvergessenheit) has set in. The revelation and concealment of being in history allows us at best only glimpses and aspects (Teilaspekte). Such is the reality mistakenly formulated in terms of truth and falsehood.

Coreth agrees with Heidegger that all truth is histor-
ically mediated and agrees that prior to truth as correspondence there is truth as Unverborgenheit or Offenbarkeit:

Denn sachgemässe "Richtigkeit" der Aussage setzt voraus, dass sich die Sache selbst zeigt oder offenbart . . . .
Wahrheit geht nicht darin auf, das die Erkenntnis oder die satzhafe Aussage ihrem Gegenstand entspricht", sondern
dies setzt ursprünglicher voraus, dass sich das, was ist
und wie es ist, selbst zeigt und dem Verstehen erschliesst.

Coreth's immediate concern is not to show how we come,
spontaneously or thematically, to grasp the relatedness of intelli-
gence to reality, but simply to establish that we have
no choice but to submit to "truth as correspondence", for it
is the fulfilled condition of the possibility of our knowing
and speaking:

Bedingung allen sinnvollen Denkens und Sprechens ist das
Wissen, dass wir damit die "Sache" erreichen und entsprechend
zum Ausdruck bringen können, d.h. das Wissen um die Möglichkeit,
dass unser Denken und Sprechen der Sache selbst entspricht,
der Sache gemäß ist, indem es sein "Mass" an der Sache
nimmt und diese, wie sie selbst ist, erfasst und ausspricht.
Diese Sachverhalt wird nicht aufgehoben durch einen geschicht-
lichen Prozess, sondern in diesem vorausgesetzt . . . . Dies
zeigt aber . . . in allem Denken und Sprechen -- als Beding-
ung ihrer Möglichkeit -- voraussetzen, dass Wahrheit möglich
ist, und zwar Wahrheit in dem ersten und unmittelbarsten
Sinn, den man als Satzthewahrheit oder Aussagewahrheit, auch als
"logische Wahrheit" bezeichnet und den die philosophische
Tradition als "adaequatio intellectus ad rem" definiert.
Sie ist immer und notwendig vorausgesetzt; selbst die
Negation der Wahrheit in diesem Sinn setzt diese im Vollzug
der Negation als Bedingung ihrer Möglichkeit voraus, nämlich
in dem Anspruch wahr zu sein, d.h. dem Sachverhalt zu ent-
sprechen.41

Coreth, however, is very much on his guard against the common
misapprehension that correspondence or "adaequatio" in the
analysis of truth as such is meant to signify total correspond-
ence or complete aequatio:
Es will nicht besagen, das eine Erkenntnis oder Aussage der Sache in dem Sinne "adhäquat" ist, dass sie den Sachverhalt oder Sinngehalt in voller Entsprechung wiedergibt oder abspiegelt. In diesem Sinn ist jede Erkenntnis und Aussage "inadäquat" da sie ihrem Gegenstand inhaltlich nie erschöpft, daher nie endgültig abgeschlossen ist, nie allen verstehbaren Sinn der Sache einholt. ... Das Wort "adhäquat" bedeutet hier nicht so viel wie "erschöpfend" im Gegensatz zu begrenzt oder bruchstückhaft; es bedeutet nur "zutreffend" im Gegensatz zu "unzutreffend". Die Formel hat also die kritische Funktion, wahr und falsch zu unterscheiden. 42

It will be noticed that the differences between Lonergan and Coreth on truth are only differences of formulation. But there is a margin of advantage in Coreth's formulation, for it correlates the Heideggerian theme of unconcealedness with the indispensable theme of correspondence, thus allowing us to draw on the riches of the first without sacrificing the validity of the second. With reference to our task of bringing the two worlds of meaning into relation to one another, it invites us to attend to the limits, the fragmentary revelation, which is each world of discourse, without suppressing the possibility that the access to "die Sache" which each of them has offered to us now lets us grasp also where, in fact, Matthean and Pauline meanings converge on a common object, be it ever so diversely meant and named.

E. D. Hirsch's contribution at this point lies merely in specifying in detail that the condition of valid interpretation (in the sense of correspondence or adaequatio or Richtigkeit) is that the object of interpretation be precisely the
sense which the author has intended the text to bear and which, in fact, he has managed to make it bear. This contention has the modest form of a conditional proposition. If one wishes to pronounce on validity in interpretation (correspondence, adaequatio, Richtigkeit) one must suppose the object of interpretation to be determinate. But, of the possible ways of conceiving the object of interpretation only one is determinate, fixed, knowable in principle. That is precisely the intention of the author objectified in the text.

I would add that in the context of the present project, that this is the antecedent condition of my effort to bring two worlds of meaning into relation to one another. I am not asking how one might translate Matthew and Paul into a higher synthesis nor how the early church in its own way might have done this. In Hirsch's terms, then, I am not inquiring after the significance of Matthew and of Paul nor after a synthesis of this significance, but after their meaning.

Significance is a meaning-to, let us say, of "Hamlet" to me, to us, to our generation. "Significance" is super-added meaning: Indeed it is all those meanings that accrue to a work in the course of its journey through time. Thus there is no limit to the significance of the shortest and most banal text, for its verbal meaning can be related to all conceivable states of affairs (historical, linguistic, psychological, physical, metaphysical, personal, familial, national) and to
different times and changing conditions. But I have evoked the theme of significance merely to specify what I am not dealing with in my effort to bring Matthew and Paul into relation to one another. I do not intend to facilitate the resolution of the problem by leaving aside the refractory concreteness of what each author himself deliberately wrote and meant.

The title of our chapter "Dialectical Differences and Diverse Conceptualities" already hints at the avenue I intend to take: I entertain the possibility, but already suspect the implausibility of finding genuine dialectical differences between Matthew and Paul. I do expect to find that the precisely intended meanings of Matthew and Paul are at home only within the total conceptuality of each writer and I expect to find that these conceptualities are distinctive and diverse. Having received some key notions -- the intended meaning of the author, the various differentiations of consciousness, the meanings of truth as unconcealedness and as correspondence -- we are now prepared to undertake the concrete comparison.

Footnotes: Chapter Seven


Ibid., p. 129.

Ibid., p. 130.

This task of interpretation can be perilous: it is possible that the author is thinking about "p" and the reader about "q". A **controversialist** will set about demonstrating the author's errors and absurdities. The interpreter will consider that he himself is at fault; eventually by a self-correcting process of learning he comes to see that the author is thinking of "p" (ibid., p. 158f.).

A horizon -- literally the bounding circle and line at which earth and sky meet -- is the boundary line of one's vision, knowledge, and interests. It is all that one knows about and cares about (ibid., p. 235f.).

Ibid., p. 249.

Ibid., p. 235.

The world of immediacy is a world apart from questions and answers. It is already (given prior to any questions about it), out (the object of **extroverted** consciousness), there (as sense organs, so too sensed objects, are spatial), **now** (for the time of sensing runs along with the time of what is sensed), **real** (for it is bound up with one's living and acting and so must be just as real as they are), ibid., p. 263.

The world mediated by meaning does not lie within anyone's immediate experience; nor is it the totality of all worlds of immediate experience. Meaning as an act does not merely repeat but goes beyond experiencing. What is meant is what is intended in questioning, and is determined not only by experience but also by understanding, and judgment, ibid., p. 77.

Lonergan, "Cognitional Structure", in his *Collection*, op. cit., 221-239, p. 227 believes that knowing results from such immanent activities as experiencing, understanding, and judging. He also believes (ibid., p. 224) that where knowing.
is a structure, knowing knowing must be a reduplication of the structure; it is not mere looking at looking (which it would be if knowing were merely looking) but it is a conjunction of (a) experiencing experience, understanding, and judging, (b) understanding one's experience of experience, understanding, and judging, and (c) judging that one's understanding of experience, understanding, and judging is correct.

14 Method, op. cit., p. 238.

15 Lonergan, Collection, op. cit., p. 229f. notes that empiricists, rationalists, and idealists have respectively found the ground of objectivity in experience, necessity, and coherence. Each is right in their affirmation but mistaken in their exclusion. The objectivity of human knowing is a triple cord, made up of an experiential, a normative, and an absolute component; the experiential component resides in the givenness of relevant data, the normative component resides in the exigences of intelligence and rationality guiding the process of knowing from data to judging, the absolute component is reached when reflective understanding combines the normative and experiential elements into a virtually unconditioned (a conditioned whose conditions are fulfilled). For further details on each of these components see Insight, op. cit., pp. 377-383.

Lonergan, Method, op. cit., p. 265 notes that once the ambiguities of naive realism, empiricism, and idealism are removed, once one distinguishes between object and objectivity in the world of immediacy and the world mediated by meaning (and motivated by value) then true objectivity is the result of authentic subjectivity; it is the result of genuine attention, genuine intelligence, genuine reasonableness, genuine responsibility.

16 Method, op. cit., p. 238f.

17 Ibid., p. 240.

18 Ibid., p. 241.

19 Ibid., p. 247. One's strategy is not to prove his own position and not to refute counter-positions, but to exhibit diversity and to point to the evidence for its roots. In this manner one will be attractive to those who appreciate full human authenticity and will convince those who attain it (ibid., p. 254).
I affirm the validity of logic, both deductive and inductive. In employing logic we do not need any sort of prior metaphysical commitment. The best argument for using it is not that it gives pragmatic success, or that it is justified by definition; rather it is justified by its necessary character. To argue against deductive logic is to employ it. The answer to the question "What would be a sound reason for believing an oracle rather than induction?" would be the past history of the oracle's predictions, or evidence that the oracle is the mouthpiece of God. In either case, relevant empirical data have to be collected and analysed; i.e., inductive procedure has to be employed. In order to disprove inductive method, relevant data against it must be collected; i.e., the inductive method must be used.

If one asks the question "Which logic do you mean -- Indian, Aristotelian, or mathematical?" the answer is that these types of logic are not mutually exclusive; each has certain insights into the nature of an inference. Norman Thomas, Modern Logic (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1966), p. 86, points out that even the most sophisticated mathematical logic cannot handle all the subtleties of ordinary language; yet mathematical logic is an advancement over Aristotelian logic. For example, the traditional logic did not have the concept of a null or empty class and consequently developed many clumsy and useless kinds of valid syllogisms (ibid., p. 39ff.). In 1883 Christine Ladd-Franklin observed that a valid implication between the premises and the conclusion cannot be reversed; for an argument to be valid, if the premises are true the conclusion must be true. However, it is possible to have true premises and a true conclusion and an invalid argument (ibid., p. 52); this insight constituted an advance over the traditional logic as (for example) do truth tables (ibid., pp. 61-115).

Indian logic has five members in a syllogism instead of three, cf; Heinrich Zimmer, The Philosophies of India (Princeton: University Press, 1951), p. 610ff. For an argument to be valid the middle term (hetu) must be possessed with five (instead of the Aristotelian seven) characteristics, cf; C. D. Sharma, Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banarasidas, 1964), p. 206. D. H. H. Ingalls, Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyaya Logic (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951) points out that the Navya-Nyaya logic is superior to Aristotelian logic on the following points: First in its understanding of conjunction, alteration, and their negates (ibid., pp. 63-65), and the class corollary of De Morgan's Law (ibid., p. 65ff.); second it never confuses the attribute of a class with the attribute of its members (ibid., p. 75ff.); and third in its concept of number it seems to anticipate the mathematical logic by several centuries (ibid., p. 76ff.).
different circumstances and without being influenced by the West, Indian logic developed in many respects the same problems and reached the same conclusions; cf. I. M. Bochenski, *A History of Formal Logic* (2nd ed.; New York: Chelsea Publishing Co., 1970), p. 446f.


22 Ibid., p. 236.

23 Ibid., p. 236.

24 Ibid., p. 218f.

25 Ibid., p. 276.

26 Ibid., p. 303.

27 Ibid., p. 154.

28 Ibid., p. 72.

29 The systematic exigence separates the realm of common sense from the realm of theory; it raises the questions that common sense cannot answer and demands a context, namely, theory, for its answers. Examples are mass, temperature, and the electromagnetic field; or when Socrates in Plato's Dialogues asks for a definition of this or that virtue (ibid., p. 81f.).

30 Ibid., p. 257. Later (ibid., p. 272) Lonergan adds the realm of scholarship and art. He notes that any realm becomes differentiated from the others when it develops its own language, its own distinct mode of apprehension, and its own cultural, social, or professional group speaking in that fashion and apprehending in that manner.

31 Ibid., p. 257. Lonergan proposes ten instances of the differentiation of consciousness: (1) the transition from "the world of immediacy" to a "world mediated by meaning"; (2) the development of skill in mastering the procedures of common sense; (3) the discovery of the transcendent in God's gift of love to man; (4) the appropriation and exploitation of symbol in literature and the arts; (5) the emergence of systematic meaning which devises technical terms, assigns them their inter-relations and constructs models in an effort to reach an explanatory view of some realm of human experience; (6) the adoption, first by the educated, of words, opinions, conclusions, etc., from systematic meaning into common sense.
usage; (7) the thematization of method by which systematic meaning moves from a static to a dynamic context; (8) the elaboration of scholarship by which in particular one recovers the common sense world of a past era; (9) the development of post-scientific and post-scholarly literature; and (10) the exploration of interiority which is the work of cognitional theory; 

ibid., pp. 303-305.

32 Ibid., p. 84.

33 Ibid., p. 85. Lonergan applies these insights on the differentiation of consciousness to the understanding and communication of Christian doctrine. He notes that differentiations of consciousness characterize successive stages in cultural development, and as each earlier stage fails to foresee subsequent stages, the series as a whole may be named the ongoing discovery of mind. This series contributes to an understanding of the development of doctrine. Doctrines have meaning within contexts; the ongoing discovery of mind changes the contexts, and the doctrines, in order to retain their meaning within the new contexts, have to be recast (ibid., p. 305). The meaning of a proposition becomes determinate only within a context, and contexts vary with the varying brands of common sense, with the evolution of cultures, with the differentiations of human consciousness, and with the presence or absence of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion.

Lonergan distinguishes between the religious and theological apprehension of doctrine. The religious apprehension is through the context of one's own brand of common sense, of one's evolving culture, of one's undifferentiation or differentiation of consciousness, and of one's own unceasing efforts to attain intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. The theological apprehension is historical and dialectical; it is historical, for it grasps the many different contexts in which the same doctrine is expressed in different manners. It is dialectical, for it discerns the difference between positions (statements compatible with intellectual, moral, and religious conversion) and counterpositions (statements incompatible with intellectual, moral, and religious conversion). It seeks to develop the former and reverse the latter (ibid., pp. 339, 249).

When one allows for the diversity of culture, the different brands of common sense, and differentiations of consciousness there can be a pluralism of expression of the same fundamental stance, and, once theology develops, a multiplicity of theologies that express the same faith (ibid., p. 271). The same gospel needs to be preached in different manners; it needs to be preached to every class in every culture in the manner that accords with the assimilative powers of that class
and culture. For the most part such preaching is to a consciousness that is little differentiated and therefore needs to be as multiform as the diverse brands of common sense (ibid., p. 328f.). To preach the gospel creatively within a given culture, one needs to exploit the resources of that culture (ibid., p. 362f.).

34 Lonergan, Verbum, op. cit., p. 60.


36 Op. cit., p. 74f. Lonergan in "The Dehellenization of Dogma", A Second Collection, op. cit., 11-32, pp. 14-17, notes that meaning by its nature is related to a meant -- we objectify the self by meaning the self, we objectify the world by meaning the world -- what is meant may or may not correspond to what is so. If it corresponds the meaning is true; if it does not correspond the meaning is false. Such is the correspondence view of truth. To deny correspondence is to deny a relation between the meaning and the meant. To deny the correspondence view of truth is to deny that when the meaning is true the meant is what is so. If one denies that when the meaning is true then the meant is what is so, one rejects propositional truths. If the rejection is universal, then it is the self-destructive proposition that there are no true propositions. Lonergan further notes that the statement "to believe in God by believing a proposition about God is to believe in a proposition and not to believe in God" is true only if the correspondence view of truth is false. Rather, the contrary assumption is that to assent to the truth of the proposition does not differ from assenting to what the proposition means.

37 Grundfragen, op. cit., p. 167ff.

38 Ibid., p. 168.

39 Ibid., p. 176.

40 Ibid., p. 179.

41 Ibid., p. 177.

42 Ibid., p. 178.

CHAPTER EIGHT: THE SOURCE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF DIVERSE CONCEPTUALITIES IN MATTHEW AND PAUL

There are some sources of difference -- diversity in theory of knowledge, diversity in stage of development, diversity between common sense and scientific theory -- that appear unlikely to be relevant to the relation between Matthew and Paul on Christ and the law. There are other categories of difference, however, which appear to be relevant to our question: different brands of common sense and, not to be excluded a priori, dialectically opposed horizons.

It should be noted immediately that "different brands of common sense" is a very general expression not only to spontaneously acquired practical know-how but also to the countless specializations of knowledge such as politics, literature, history, scholarship, and so on. There are even quite distinct specializations of common sense between lyric poets and dramatists, and among dramatists, between tragedians and comedians.

That there should be some differences between Matthew and Paul in this vast realm of the specializations of common sense is to be expected. But of exactly what do the differences concretely consist? This is not evident, nor is it evident that dialectical opposition is excluded. Our first
inquiry is addressed to the last question. Are the respective views of Matthew and Paul on Christ and the law dialectically opposed?

I. Dialectical Opposition?

As Lonergan proposes our strategy is first one of comparison, then one of reduction. The comparison settles on prima facie points of affinity and of opposition between Matthew and Paul. The reduction we propose is twofold: first, from "the particularity of the parts" in both Matthew and Paul to "the thrust of the whole", in order to assure ourselves that we are not dealing with what is peripheral to the two writers; second, from statement to value in order to secure our hold on the real rationale of the whole in each case. If these reductions appear excessively abstract at this point, I hope that presently they will become concrete and clear.

Some prima facie points of affinity: Both Matthew and Paul declare Christ to be the Son of God and saviour of the world. Both understand him as Wisdom. Both see him as the fulfilment of the scriptures. Both take this fulfilment as the supreme datum of history. Both present it as entailing a summons to faith (pistis) and to a fruitful (cf. karpos), moral life. Both suppose the law of Moses to come from God, the same God who sent his Son to save mankind. Both see in the law a prophetic attestation of the Son. Both affirm that the status of the law is changed by the coming of the Son.
Both see the law epitomized as the command to love, and so love as the essential fulfilment of the law. Both see the eschatological fulness of God's gift to depend on the death and resurrection of Christ. Both blame Judaism for misconceiving and refusing the gift of God. Both are opponents of the Pharisees; both are committed to the world mission. Both suppose and affirm baptism and the Lord's supper. Both are convinced that the mission to the Gentiles is the essential act of the church in the interim between the present and the consummation of the world.

Some prima facie points of opposition: Matthew affirms that with Christ the law finds its crowning completion; Paul affirms that with Christ the law comes to an end. For Matthew righteousness ( dikaiosynē) normally is the code which meets the standard of God's judgment and so makes possible entry into the Kingdom of God. For Paul righteousness ( dikaiosynē) normally is the graced, transformed state which man enters by faith. For Matthew faith (pistis) is usually the conviction that Christ can heal and wills to do so; for Paul faith (pistis) is the acceptance of salvation in the death and resurrection of Christ. For Matthew Christ is the new Moses; for Paul Christ and Moses represent antithetical dynamisms in history. Thus the Moses typology (Christ presented as the new Moses in the infancy gospel, the Sermon on the Mount, and the Transfiguration) has a certain centrality in Matthew. Paul is
cautious about such developments, lest they subvert his theology of justification (but see 1 Cor. 10:1-5). Likewise, there are significant themes in Paul which are entirely or almost entirely missing in Matthew such as the theme of the flesh (sark) and Spirit (pneuma), of freedom (eleutheria) effected by Christ, or the themes of "the body of Christ" (soma Christou), or of life "in Christ" (en Christo), or the thematically elaborated Adam/Christ typology.

But to assess the significance of these affinities and oppositions we must make detail manageable by the double reduction I referred to above. I will discuss this twofold reduction first in the Gospel of Matthew and then in Paul's Epistle to the Romans.

My interpretation of the reduction of the particularity of the parts of Matthew's gospel to the thrust of the whole is as follows: Matthew presents a narrative structured in the final redaction on diverse principles (a) a formal-topical principle whereby the story of the public career (3:1-26:1) alternates in form between narrative and discourse and the materials of both are chosen and arranged on a topical basis; (b) a geographical principle (Galilee: 4:12-15:20; Journeys: 15:21-20:34; Jerusalem: 21:1-28:15; Galilee: 28:16-20); and, above all, (c) a theological principle whereby the realization of God's purpose unfolds in phases (Initiation Events: 3:1-4:11; The Beginning of the Restoration of Israel: 4:12-16:12; The Consummation of the Restoration of Israel: 16:13-28:15;
The Mission of True Israel: 28:16-20). In the application of all three of these organizing principles, the Infancy gospel is not included but supposed, as prologue. The geographical organization of the text allows the substance of the story of Jesus to gain cohesion through a simplified scheme of settings: Galilee, Journeys, Jerusalem, Galilee. The formal-topical principle of organization lends the text a catechetical cohesiveness: five topically unified discourses and five stretches of topically unified narrative mark the progression of Jesus' encounter with Israel toward its climax. But the decisive organization of Matthew's gospel is indicated by three solemnly programmatic texts: 4:12-17, introducing Jesus' public career; 16:13-23, two related pericopes marking a new direction -- toward death -- and a new instruction of his disciples; and 28:16-20, climaxing the gospel with the risen Christ's missionary mandate. Here the essential drama of the gospel, the transaction between Jesus and Israel, is conceived in theological terms. It issues in election lost and gained: the self-exclusion of unbelieving Israel from messianic salvation and the coming-to-be of true Israel, defined by its acknowledgement of Jesus as its restorer, and destined to encompass the Gentiles.

That the inner form of Matthew's gospel is bi-polar (Messiah and messianic pepole) is confirmed by Matthean Christology. For in Matthew christological titles and themes are
always relational to man. Thus, "Son of God" relates Jesus to the believing church; "Son of man", to the whole world.

This is also the key to the Moses typology. As Moses brought Israel into being, Jesus brings into being the new and true Israel. Matthew's conception of Christ and the law is part and parcel of this context. The threefold task of proclamation, teaching, and healing keryssein, didaskein, therapeuein (Mt. 4:23; 9:35; cf. 11:5) defines the messiahship of Jesus in terms of Moses and exodus traditions (in the context of the new exodus theme in Is. 52, relate Is. 52:7f. and 61:1f. to Mt. 11:5c on proclamation; relate the prophet like Moses in Deut.18:15 to Mt. 17:5 on teaching; relate the new exodus text of Is. 35:5-7 to Mt. 11:5 on cures). The new Moses brings Israel the revelation that completes and fulfils the law. The Sermon on the Mount is eschatological Sinai. Thus, Matthew's conception of Christ and the law belongs to the central thematic -- let us call it the covenant thematic -- of his gospel.

To state this thematic in a single sentence: Jesus, the Christ, Son of man and Son of God, prophet like Moses, by his proclaiming, teaching, and healing, and by a death and resurrection which seal a new covenant, brings true Israel into being. I understand this central thematic as the summary of an action, namely, that of Matthew's narrative. If this summary may suffice as a reduction of narrative detail to the thrust of the whole we can now proceed to a second reduction, asking what
values Matthew's gospel was meant to promote and protect.

First, however, we should draw a distinction between serviceability and value. Serviceability has to do with the producing of the work, whereas value has to do with the meaning of the work produced. The covenant thematic was serviceable to Matthew insofar as it could help him in his craftsman's task. But the value which the thematic envisaged must be located in the responses it was designed to elicit.

The thematic, then, was serviceable. Matthew's work was a narrative, but a didactic or catechetical narrative. In terms of Matthean catechesis the covenant thematic provided an interpretative scheme at once comprehensible (familiar from the scriptures) and comprehensive (applicable to the whole story of Jesus: his infancy, his proclamation, teaching, and cures; his death as sacrifice; his following as true Israel).

But how should we define the values envisaged and served by the covenant thematic? We might ask what the readership was meant to gain by understanding Jesus as a new Moses, his commands as a new Sinai, his miracles and, indeed, the whole of his work as a new exodus effecting in his followers the eschatological restoration of Israel. The readership was certainly meant to gain a collective self-understanding informed by God's act in Christ and an understanding of God's act in Christ as the climax and fulfilment of the history of salvation. Moses, exodus, Sinai, and the miracles in the wilderness were
the type of salvation merely foreshadowing the future, incomplete and calling for completion. Jesus of Nazareth, Son of man and Son of God, the prophet like Moses, was future made present, whose proclamation, teaching, and cures brought this completion, and whose death and resurrection sealed a new covenant bringing Israel to its appointed restoration and giving the Gentiles access to the banquet of salvation. The value this writing serves is what the reader praises God for and what he makes a goal of his striving. In Matthew's case the main "values" would seem to be "the fidelity of God" as mediated by the fulfilment theme and "discipleship" as defined by the words of Jesus.

It should be remarked with reference to fulfilment that the overarching covenant thematic (Moses, exodus, Sinai, bread in the wilderness, etc.) is supplemented in detail by numerous other fulfilment motifs (e.g., the Isaian Servant texts). It is therefore clear that by referring the covenant thematic to a "value" such as the grasp of Christ's mission as "fulfilment", we are not simply translating the thematic into more generic terms. We are discovering an ulterior value which this thematic, in parallel with others, was meant to serve.

The specifically scriptural intelligibility of salvation in Christ and the affirming of this salvation as the fulfilment of the scriptures also has a polemic aspect. The scriptures and the whole history of salvation they attest really belong to
true Israel, the church. Matthew's gospel thus reflects a particular grasp of the issue "Jew and Greek". During his ministry the mission of Jesus had been limited to Israel. But Israel had refused salvation (Mt. 8:11f.; 10:17-25; 11:20-24; 13:11-15, etc.). So, now, in accord with the prophetic word of Jesus himself (Mt. 8:11f.; 21:43; 24:14), salvation passes to the Gentiles (Mt. 28:18-20). The claim to be set off from empirical Israel as the true heirs of the scriptures may be described as a value served by the covenant thematic in its polemic aspect.

We may now turn to Paul. The fullest expression of the Pauline gospel and Pauline vision of things is found in Romans. Is it possible to reduce the many particulars of Paul's thought in Romans to a formulation expressing the thrust of the whole? I believe this can be done. Once done, I will follow the pattern set up by the treatment of Matthew. First, I will locate Paul's view on Christ and the law within his central thematic. I will then attempt to define the value which this thematic was meant to serve.

The doctrinal section of Romans is headed by the citation "He who through faith is righteous shall live" (1:17). This text serves to plot a thematic progression in two phases. Phase one (Rom. 1-4) is concerned with righteousness through faith; phase two (Rom. 5-8) with "life" as the result. The pivot of the first eight chapters of Romans, then, is justifi-
cation (Rom. 3:21-26). But the central concern is with what follows from this.

First, the work of salvation is conceived of in terms of human dilemma and divine response. Though Paul had inherited from the earliest church faith formulas which made explicit the theme of salvation through Christ's death and resurrection (1 Cor. 15:3-5; Rom. 4:25; 8:34), it is far from clear that these formulas intended salvation as the solution to an otherwise irresolvable dilemma. But this is what Paul intended. The death and resurrection of Christ were conceived precisely as the solution to the human dilemma. Moreover, the dilemma was not only sin (in some way this had been supposed by all formulas thematizing the death of Christ as expiatory, e.g., 1 Cor. 15:3-5; Rom. 4:25; 8:34), but death. This death, however, was eschatological death, to which physical death belonged but of which it was nevertheless no more than symptomatic. Paul correspondingly thematized divine response to the human dilemma, extending its dimensions from "expiation" or purification from sin, to "new creation": By his resurrection Christ had become "a life-giving Spirit" (1 Cor. 15:45).

Paul in Romans wants his readers to understand that salvation is a free gift from God (3:24). In describing salvation as a free gift Paul's aim is to bring out the greatness and glory of God (cf. 11:32-36). The backdrop for bringing out the greatness of God is to show the profound plight of man.
Man left to himself is enslaved to the law, sin, and death (cf. 3:9; 5:12ff.; 7:14ff.; 6:14) and is powerless to do anything about his plight (7:14ff.). In this situation God's dikaiosynē is revealed; he sends forth Christ as a hilasterion in order that the one who has faith may be justified (3:25f.). In order to bring out the greatness of God Paul in some sense deprecates the law. If salvation could be attained by one's own effort to keep the law, then God would not have needed to show his grace and his mercy. But God has consigned all to disobedience in the first place in order that he might have mercy on all (11:32). This last statement evokes Paul's great doxology (11:33-36).

For Paul, if salvation were to come by one's efforts to obey the law, this would take away from God's mercy and grace. Paul, consequently, denies that the law has any positive role in bringing salvation. He in no way, however, deprecates the moral life or the law as such.  

Man was "in the flesh", "under the law", "sold" as a slave to "sin", subject to "death"; but freed "through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus". He is "in the Spirit", "discharged from the law", "dead to sin and alive to God ... in the new life of the Spirit". The essential drama is one of bondage and liberation. Paul's conception of Christ and the law belongs to the central thematic -- let us call it the redemptive thematic -- of his gospel.

It would seem that Paul's readership was meant to gain
a collective self-understanding informed by God's action in Christ and an understanding of God's act in Christ as an absolutely gratuitous liberation. It is God's own work: All things are "from him, and through him and to him" (11:36). The centre of this work is the obedience of Christ, undoing the disobedience of Adam. Except insofar as the saving end of history was promised (Abraham), the whole of the past belongs to the dilemma of man. The law had merely deepened it.

What values was this thematic meant to promote and protect? Paul himself, it would seem, has designated (Rom. 8:31-39) what the reader should praise God for: his love, absolute and indefectible, for it is a love "in Christ Jesus our Lord" (Rom. 8:39). A central motive is his loving us while we were yet sinners (Rom. 5:8). From the standpoint of the goal of human striving the "value" is life "according to the Spirit" (Rom. 8:4); concretely it is love for one's neighbour as "the fulfilling of the law" (Rom. 13:10) which says: "You shall love your neighbour as yourself" (Rom. 13:9). The Pauline theme is the end (=termination) of the law; the value it finally serves is the fulfilment of the law -- a possibility only for those "who walk not according to the flesh but according to the Spirit" (Rom. 8:4).

If our double reduction of theme to value in Matthew and Paul is accurate, the indicative-as-value (or what the reader is to praise God for) is, in Matthew, God's fidelity;
in Romans, God's love. The imperative-as-value (or what the reader is to make the goal of his striving) is, in Matthew, discipleship as defined by the words of Jesus; in Romans, life according to the Spirit.

If our reduction of particulars to the thrust of the whole in Matthew and Paul is well done, the insight which the readership is expected to gain is, in Matthew, God's act in Christ as the fulfilment of the history of salvation; in Romans, God's act in Christ as an absolutely gratuitous liberation.

These definitions describe the horizons of the works, saying what the readerships of Matthew and of Paul were expected to understand and to care about. They are meant to facilitate the otherwise exceedingly cumbersome task of finding a principle of comparability by which to bring Matthew and Paul into relation to one another. The first gain to be realized here is the grounding of a negative conclusion: It is clear that Matthew and Paul are not dialectically opposed to one another.

The point is simple but basic. Every religious statement exists within a larger world of religious meaning and every world of religious meaning incarnates religious values. At the merely verbal level Matthew and Paul might be taken as mutually contradictory on Christ and the law. But the larger worlds of meaning in which their theses on Christ and the law are embedded and especially the religious values which these worlds of meaning incarnate are perfectly compatible.
"Compatible", as I use the term, signifies the middle ground between "contradictory" and "complementary". Contradictory statements or themes cannot simultaneously be true. (There are, of course, insignificant or peripheral contradictions as well as dialectically opposed horizons.) Complementary statements or themes positively call for one another and cohere within the same framework of meaning. Between these two extremes "compatibles" are statements which do not belong to the same problematic or themes which do not belong to the same thematic but which nevertheless do not exclude one another. In a broad sense they may be complementary (e.g., if both are true) but they are not positively related within the same framework of meaning.

This leaves the differences between Matthew and Paul intact, but it relativizes their significance. Every thematicization of God's act in Christ is necessarily approximate and limited. But, some thematicizations are dialectically opposed to one another; e.g., Marcion's gospel is dialectically opposed to Paul's, for insofar as it repudiates Paul's identification of God the Father of Christ and Lord God of Israel, it subverts the entire Pauline world of meaning. So far as Matthew and Paul are concerned, the conceptualities are certainly different. But the sense in which according to Paul Christ is the end of the law is not contradicted by the sense in which according to Matthew Christ brings the law to comple-
tion. Each scheme of thought, moreover, is relative to and subordinate to what each would have his readership know and care about; and the things that each would have his readership know and care about in the case of Matthew and Paul are certainly not dialectically opposed. Moreover, there is much that is common between them, not only in isolated detail but in general tendency as we shall presently see.

II. Diverse Conceptualities

Although the conceptualities of Matthew and Paul are diverse, the character of the diversity remains to be defined. I will argue (a) that Matthew and Paul have many points in common, although the emphasis placed on these points may be different in each case; (b) that the polemic in Matthew is not against Paul (although Matthew writes later than Paul and must know of him); and (c) that Matthew's statement that nothing is to be taken away from the law and Paul's depreciatory statements on the law occur in quite different contexts in response to quite different issues. In the conclusion a summary statement on the nature of their diverse perspectives on Christ and the law will be given.

Both Matthew and Paul, as we have seen in the twofold reduction above, believe that eschatological salvation has come in Christ. Both see Christ in terms of Wisdom. Both stress the importance of pistis, dikaiosynē, and karpos. Both believe in the moral life. Both are opposed to anomia.
Both say the immoral will not be saved.

Both believe that δικαιοσύνη is a gift of God⁷ and a way of life⁸ that one ought to live. Matthew (7:21; cf. 12:50; 21:31; 6:10) notes that it is the one who does the will of the Father who enters the kingdom. Paul stresses the importance of obedience (ὑπακοή) at Rom. 1:5 and 16:26 (where obedience and faith go together); 6:16; 15:18; 16:19; 2 Cor. 7:15; 10:5, 6; Philem. 21. He notes that neither ἀδικοί, πορνοί, εἰδολολατραί, μοιχοί, μαλακοί, ἀρσενοκοιταί, κλεπταί, μηθυσόι, λοίδοροι, ἱράρχες, (1 Cor. 6:9f.) nor those who do the τὰ ἐργά τῆς σαρκός (Gal. 5:19-21) will inherit the kingdom of God.

The scribes and Pharisees (Mt. 3:8, 10; 12:33; cf. 7:16-20), and Israel throughout her history (Mt. 21:19, 34, 41, 43) -- the scribes and Pharisees are the culmination of this history -- do not produce fruit (καρπός). The parable of the sower shows that in the kingdom producing fruit is all important (Mt. 13:8, 23, 26). For Paul the same is the case with the Christian (Gal. 5:22f.; Phil. 1:11; Rom. 7:4; 6:21, 22; cf. Col. 1:10; Eph. 5:9).

Both Paul⁹ and Matthew say that salvation is a gift to be received by faith. Because of their faith two blind men have their eyes opened (9:27-30), the woman with the hemorrhage is made well (9:20-22), the centurion's servant (8:5-13), and the Canaanite woman's daughter (15:21-28) are healed; but
because of his faith a paralytic has his sins forgiven (9:1f.). The tax collectors and harlots are like a son who at first refused to work in his father's vineyard but afterwards repented and went; they have believed (episteusan) John the Baptist who brought the way of righteousness (ēlthen . . . en hodō dikaiosynēs). They, in contrast to the Jewish leaders, enter (proagousin) the kingdom of God. Scribes and Pharisees have not believed; they are like a son who promised to, but did not, go to work in his father's vineyard (21:28-32, cf. 21:25). They have neglected faith (pistis), one of the weightier matters of the law (23:23).

The whole Jewish generation at the time of Christ is faithless (apistos, 17:17). On one occasion Christ cannot do many mighty works because of the unbelief (apistia, 13:58) of the people. The disciples are frequently castigated for their little faith (oligopistia, 17:20; oligopistos, 6:30; 8:26; 14:31; 16:8). If they had faith (pistis) as a grain of mustard seed they could move mountains (17:20). If they have faith whatever they ask in prayer they will receive (21:21f.). It is the faithful (pistos, 24:45; 25:21; 25:23) disciple who will be rewarded. "Hos d' an skandalisē hena tōn mikrōn toutōn tō pisteuontōn eis emē", Christ says, is an offense of utmost seriousness (18:6).

For Paul agapēseis tôn plesion sou heōs seauton (Lev. 19:18 =Rom. 13:9; Gal. 5:14; Mt. 22:39; 19:19) is the fulfillment of the law (Rom. 13:9; Gal. 5:14). It is the summation
of the second part of the decalogue, not man's relation with God, but man's relation with his fellowman. Christians are indebted (opheilete) to love one another (Rom. 13:8), and to serve (douleuetē) one another in love (Gal. 5:13). Love does no wrong to a neighbour (Rom. 13:10; cf. 14:15). Love heads the list, and is perhaps the summation of the ethical injunctions in Rom. 12:9-21 -- injunctions which have many reminiscences to the Sermon on the Mount -- and the fruit of the Spirit in Gal. 5:22f.

1 Cor. 13 tells us what love is and what it is not. It is not jealous, boastful, arrogant, irritable, or resentful; it does not insist on its own way or rejoice at wrong. It rejoices in the right; it is patient and kind; it bears, believes, hopes, and endures all things (13:4-7). In short, what love is, is not unlike what is exhorted in Mt. 5:21-48; 7:1-6: In 1 Cor. 13 agapē is the greatest virtue (vs. 13); it, along with pîstis and elpîs, remains (vs. 13) while propheteiai, glôssai, and gnôsis will cease (vs. 8). Agapê is the sine qua non; without it neither propheteia, glôssai, gnôsis, nor pîstis -- no matter how great -- are of any account (vs. 1-3). It, rather than gnôsis builds up (1 Cor. 8:1; cf. Eph. 4:2, 15; 5:2).

Matthew and Paul thus have important agreements. I shall now argue that Matthew is not polemicizing against Paul. If Matthew were polemicizing against Paul -- and this has
indeed been maintained — it is likely, but not necessarily the case that (since Matthew may have misunderstood Paul), their views are truly contradictory. W. D. Davies\textsuperscript{10} gives a convenient summary of the arguments for an anti-Pauline polemic in Matthew.

First of all there are elements of "particularism" which could be interpreted as being hostile to Pauline universalism. At 10:5 Jesus sends out his disciples and charges them to go nowhere among the Gentiles, to enter no town of the Samaritans, but to go rather to the lost sheep of the house of Israel. At 10:23 Jesus tells them that they will not have gone through all of the towns of Israel before the Son of man comes; and at 15:24 he says that he was sent only to the lost sheep of the house of Israel.\textsuperscript{11} This is an argument from the general character of Matthew.

A second argument is the alleged polemic against Paul. In particular 5:17-19, where it is stated that nothing is to be taken away from the law,\textsuperscript{12} has been urged in support. The enemy (ho echthros) in the parable of the tares, who sowed the weeds among the wheat, has been taken as a cryptic reference to Paul (Mt. 13:25).\textsuperscript{13}

A final argument is that Matthew elevates Peter in order to deprecate Paul.\textsuperscript{14} Passages in which Peter is introduced in Matthew where he is absent from the parallel passages in the Synoptics are 15:15 and 18:21. In three passages
peculiar to Matthew -- the walking on the sea (14:28-31, 33),
the blessing of Peter (16:17-19), and the discussion of the
temple tax (17:24-27) -- Peter is given prominence.

In response to the first argument it must be said that
there is a marked universalism in Matthew. Jesus tells his
disciples (5:13ff.) that they are the salt of the earth and
the light of the world; at 12:18ff. Matthew quotes from Is.
42:1-4; God's servant will proclaim justice to the Gentiles
(12:18) and in his name will the Gentiles hope (12:21). Jesus
tells the Jewish leaders (21:43) that the kingdom of God will
be taken away from them and given to a nation producing its
fruit. At 24:14 we are told that the gospel of the kingdom
will be preached throughout the whole world, as a testimony
to all nations. At 25:32 we are told that the Son of man,
when he comes in his glory, will sit on his throne and before
him will be gathered all the nations. In 28:19 the Risen One
commands the eleven to make disciples of all nations. This
universalism not only runs throughout Matthew but is also
present in the introductory section. The visit of the magi
at 2:1-11 (cf. Is. 60:3, "And nations shall come to your light,
and kings to the brightness of your rising") to pay homage to
the infant king appears to be his epiphany to the Gentiles.
Finally the genealogy itself which confirms Jesus' royal status,
- hints at an interest in the Gentiles by the inclusion of four
pagan women -- Tamar the Canaanite (1:3), Rahab of Jericho
(1:5), Ruth the Moabitess (1:5), and Bathsheba wife of Uriah the Hittite (1:6).  

The final argument that Matthew elevates Peter is not cogent. There are passages in Mark and Luke which give prominence to Peter where in parallel passages in Matthew there is no such prominence -- Mt. 21:20 (Mk. 9:21); Mt. 24:3 (Mk. 13:3); Mt. 26:17ff. (Lk. 22:8); Mt. 4:18-22 (Lk. 5:1-11). Furthermore, Matthew is not the only gospel in which the pre-eminence of Peter is emphasized.

Matthew thus, in my opinion, is not opposing Paul. Gerhard Barth believes that the author is opposed to the antinomian teachers of heresy in the Christian community who say that the law was only valid until John the Baptist. He points out that the godlessness attacked is anomia (7:23; 13:41; 23:28; 24:12). Matthew has altered the weaker sequence "law-prophets" in Lk. 16:16 to the stronger "prophets-law"; this indicates that Matthew, in contrast to the Hellenistic community, holds to the abiding validity of the law. The word "all" (pas) is used in contexts associated with the law (3:15; 5:18; 23:3; 28:20); it indicates that there are those who would like to abolish part of the law. Mt. 7:12 sums up the meaning of the law and the prophets and refers back to 5:17ff.; what comes in between are the contents. His organization is meant to confirm the law's enduring validity. The false prophets of 7:15 and 24:11 are antinomian teachers.
within the community.

My estimate of these arguments is that they are not convincing. Of Barth's references to \textit{pas} only one in 5:18 is relevant. In 28:20 the context is the universal missionary command; in 3:15 its precise force is not clear (moreover the context is not polemical) and at 23:3 the polemic, if it is against anyone is against the scribes and Pharisees.\footnote{20} In 7:23 and 24:12 the contexts of \textit{anomia} are eschatological.\footnote{21} In 13:41 what is decisive against any \textit{corpus mixtum} view of the church, and against the view that antinomian teachers of heresy within the church are referred to, is the fact that the field is the world (\textit{ho de agros estin ho kosmos}, 13:38).\footnote{22} Finally at 23:28 \textit{anomia} is used with reference to the scribes and Pharisees.

This statement of \textit{anomia} at 23:28 raises the question whether Matthew's opponents are not the scribes and Pharisees (without excluding other Jewish leaders). This I indeed believe to be the case because these are the only opponents considered which are contemporaneous and explicitly mentioned — and in contexts which deal with the law at that. Furthermore Matthew's comments are perfectly intelligible, if his adversaries are the scribes and Pharisees. In polemical contexts (apart from the Passion narrative) which do not deal with the law, the following groups of Jewish leaders are mentioned negatively: scribes (17:10), Pharisees (9:32-34).

Likewise in polemical contexts where the law is under consideration the following groups of Jewish leaders are mentioned: scribes (7:29), Pharisees (9:10-13; 12:1-14; 19:3-9; 22:34-40), scribes and Pharisees (5:20; 23:2, 13, 15, 23, 27, 29), Pharisees and scribes (15:1-20), Pharisees and Sadducees (16:6, 12), and hypocrites (6:2, 5, 16; here they seem to refer back to the scribes and Pharisees of 5:20). Moreover, in all of the contexts where the essence of the law is stated (with the possible exception of 7:12), the polemic is against the scribes and Pharisees (or a similar group of Jewish leaders), i.e., 5:20-6:18; 22:37-40; 23:23; 9:13; 12:7.

Having argued that Matthew and Paul have much in common, and that Matthew is opposing the scribes and Pharisees rather than Paul, it will now be argued that the Matthean statement that nothing is to be taken away from the law builds on a polemical base in the gospel tradition to attack the rabbinic Judaism of his own time. In Mt. 5:17-19 the exceedingly emphatic point is made that nothing is to be taken away from the law. The point that Matthew is making is that, by their interpretation of the law, the scribes and Pharisees are taking away from it. According to Matthew they want to limit the law to the outward act (and even then they want to get
around the rigour of the outward demands; i.e., cf. criticism of their teaching on oaths 5:33-36; 23:16-23) and are not concerned with the inward motive. In each case in the antitheses (5:21-48) Jesus is criticizing a scribal interpretation (or an interpretation of some Jewish group) of the law, and in each case he takes it back to an inward motive. The demands of the sermon are prescriptive but before one can do something he must be something, i.e., to have one's whole being characterized by love. He must first be a good and sound tree (cf. Mt. 7:17f.; 12:33), and have a sound eye (6:22f.); then he will produce good fruit (Mt. 7:17f.; 12:33) and his body will be full of light (6:22f.). One cannot truly speak good when he is evil, for it is out of the abundance of the heart that the mouth speaks (12:34). It is what comes out of, rather than what goes into, the mouth that defiles a man (15:11). It is from the heart that evil thoughts, murder, adultery, fornication, theft, false witness, and slander come (15:8-20). The scribes and Pharisees are hypocrites (6:2, 5, 16; 23:13, 23, 25, 27, 29); they practice their dikaiosynē (6:1) to be seen by men (6:1, 5, 16). Outwardly they are dikaios but inwardly they are full of hypokrisis and anomia (23:28). That is why the righteousness of the disciples (dikaiosynēn hymōn, 5:20; 6:1) must far exceed that of the scribes and Pharisees because their righteousness is not true righteousness, it is merely outward and is done in order to
be seen by men; they, in contrast to the Pharisees, must be wholehearted (5:48). 29

Thus in Matthew the polemic is against the scribes and Pharisees who limit the law to its outward act and are concerned with being righteous only outwardly. In Paul, on the other hand, (especially in Galatians) the polemic is against those who would gain righteousness and life by an observance of the law (cf. Gal. 2:21; 3:21; 5:4); 30 to say that they could be attained by its observance is to deny the necessity of the death of Jesus. Whenever the law is depreciated, it is depreciated, not as an expression of the will of God, 31 but as a means of attaining salvation. Man left to himself is morally obligated, but unable, to obey the law (i.e., the command of God) and as a result is enslaved to and justly condemned by it. By dying with Christ the condemnation and enslavement which the law brings (due to the moral inability of man) is terminated; 32 by rising with Christ the Christian has life (the life which the law aims at and promises upon perfect obedience), 33 and is empowered by the Spirit to truly obey the requirement of the law (cf. Rom. 8:4). Thus for the Christian the law is still valid as a moral demand (cf. Rom. 8:4; 13:9), and it is to the law that one is to turn for ethical instruction (cf. 1 Cor. 9:8f.; 14:21, 34).

Thus for both Matthew and Paul the law is valid 34 and is to be obeyed. Their conceptuality of the law, which at
first sight appears to be so different, is determined to some extent by the nature of their polemical concern. Since the contexts are polemical it is not likely that either has organized his concept of the law in a comprehensive and systematic way. Their horizons are determined to some extent by the nature of the polemic. Moreover, each view is internally consistent and overlaps with the other. It is therefore quite possible that Matthew (if asked) would agree with Paul's view of the role of the Spirit in fulfilling the law since he believes that one must be changed inwardly before he can perform right action. It is also possible that if asked he would agree with Paul's view of the role of the law in salvation history since for him the death of Jesus as a saving event is necessary and of ultimate meaning. Indeed since he has this conception of the death of Christ it is difficult to see what other view he could come to. The horizon of what Matthew says about the law is determined by his polemical concern with Jewish leaders who would limit the requirement of the law to the outward act. It is this concern which causes Matthew to so strongly stress the validity of the law. If Matthew does not have Judaizing Christians within his church there would seem to be no compelling reason why he would need to stress (as Paul does) that salvation comes only through the death of Christ, that circumcision is of no avail for salvation, or that the law was unable to give life; nor would he need to
thematize the role of the law in salvation history (as Paul needs to). Paul thematizes (partly it would seem because of the Judaizing controversy) a "because you have been saved" ethic, but Matthew assumes it. On the other hand the horizon of Paul's discussion of the law is determined to some extent by the nature of his polemical concern. His primary concern is not with the pharisaic interpretation of the law and as a result he does not need to stress that nothing is to be taken away from the law or that the inward motive must precede the outward act. Yet Paul (if asked) would agree with both points since he indicates that the Jews break the law (cf. Rom. 2:13, 27), and that by breaking the law they dishonour God (2:23). Also being a true Jew is a matter of being one inwardly rather than outwardly and true circumcision is a matter of the heart. Thus Paul when his polemic is against Jews is remarkably similar to Matthew. That the inward motive must precede the outward act is assumed elsewhere. For Paul the love command is the summation of the law (cf. Rom. 13:8-10; Gal. 5:14), and one must be a kainē ktisis (2 Cor. 5:17; Gal. 6:15) and empowered by the Spirit before one can obey the law (Rom. 8:4); for Paul the indicative precedes the imperative (of moral action).

Perhaps Paul does not thematize (as Matthew does) the view that Christ fulfils the law by adding to it and by bringing out its radically absolute meaning because he does not
need to stress that only Christ (and not thescribes and Pharisees) is the true interpreter of the law (cf. Mt. 23:8, 10). Yet if Paul had so thematized Christ as the fulfiller of the law it would agree with the view that the words of Christ are torah. 39

In conclusion, Matthew and Paul have much in common. Both believe that salvation and dikaiosyne are gifts of God. Both believe in the moral life and agree profoundly of what morality concretely consists. Both believe that the moral law is valid:

The two views on Christ and the law are neither contradictory (in the sense that they exclude each other) nor complementary (in the sense that they positively call for each other), but compatible. What each would have his readers know and care about is not dialectically opposed.

Footnotes: Chapter Eight

1 Method, op. cit., p. 250.


3 In Galatians Paul is concerned to maintain that salvation is a free gift as well. But it is not so much an effort to bring out the greatness of God as to maintain that the death of Christ is meaningful. If salvation were to come by
means of the law then Christ would not have had to die; his
death would then have been in vain (2:21).

4 Cf. above, pp. 51-53; 1 Cor. 1:24, 30; and W. D.
Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism, op. cit., pp. 147-176.

5 Cf. e.g., Mt. 5:1-7:28; 18:1-35; 19:3-9; 19:16-30;
15:13; 1 Cor. 3:10-13; 5:1-6:20; 13:1-13; Gal. 5:1-6:10; Phil.
2:5-11. Note particularly Paul's virtue (1 Cor. 13; Gal. 5:
22-24; cf. Col. 3:12ff.) and vice (Rom. 1:29-31; Gal. 5:19-21;
1 Cor. 6:9f.; cf. Col. 3:5ff.; Eph. 5:3ff.) lists.

6 Mt. 7:23; 13:41; 23:28; 24:12; Rom. 4:7; 6:19; 2 Cor.
6:14; cf. 2 Thess. 2:3, 7; Tit. 2:4.

7 Cf. Mt. 5:6; Rom. 1:17; 3:21, 22, 25, 26; 4:3, 5, 6,
9, 11, 13, 20; 5:17, 21; 9:30, 31; 10:3, 4, 5, 6, 10; 1 Cor.
1:30; 2 Cor. 5:21; Gal. 2:21; 3:6, 21; Phil. 3:9.

8 Mt. 5:20; 6:1; Rom. 6:13, 16, 18, 19, 20; 14:17;
2 Cor. 6:7, 14; 9:10; Phil. 1:11; cf. Eph. 4:24; 5:9; 6:14;
1 Tim. 6:11; 2 Tim. 2:22; 3:16.

9 This is indicated in many passages in Paul. In the
following passages the verb πιστεύω occurs: Rom. 1:16; 3:22;
4:3, 11, 17, 18, 24; 9:33; 10:4, 9, 11; 1 Cor. 1:21; Gal. 2:16;
3:6, 22. In the following passages the noun pistis occurs:
Rom. 1:5, 17; 3:22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31; 4:5, 9, 11, 13,
14, 16; 5:1, 2; 9:30, 32; 10:6, 8; 11:20; 16:26; Gal. 2:16,
20; 3:2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26; 5:5, 6; Phil.
3:9; cf. also 2 Thess. 1:10; 2:12, 13; Col. 2:12; Eph. 1:13,
19; 2:8; 3:12, 17; 1 Tim. 1:16.

10 Cf. W. D. Davies, The Setting of the Sermon on the
Mount, op. cit., pp. 316-341.

11 Cf. Davies, Setting, op. cit., p. 326.


13 Cf. H. J. Schoeps, Theologie und Geschichte des
Judenchristentums (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1949), pp. 120,
127.


With regard to the second argument it will be maintained below that Matthew is not opposed to Paul in 5:17-19. That the enemy (Mt. 13:25) is Paul can hardly be maintained, since Matthew (13:39) explicitly says he is the ho diabolos.

Cf. Gerhard Barth, "Matthew's Understanding of the Law", in Bornkamm, Barth, and Held, Tradition and Interpretation in Matthew, op. cit., 58-164.


See above, p. 58ff.

Eduard Schweizer, "The Observance of the Law and Charismatic Activity in Matthew", op. cit., p. 216ff. can be criticized in like manner when he claims that in Mt. 7:22ff. Matthew is struggling with the same problem as Paul and Luke and in some sense John; "It is the enthusiastic life of faith which is living by the experience of the risen and exalted Lord and the present activity of the Holy Spirit, but, at the same time threatens to become more and more remote from the teaching of the earthly Jesus and the standard of his conduct" (ibid., p. 218). This led Paul to stress his apostolic authority; this led Luke to stress the contrast between the twelve and those who became Christians after the ascension; this led Mark to emphasize the life and death of Jesus, and John to describe the Paraklete who reminds the disciples of the words of the earthly Jesus (14:26). Schweizer concludes (ibid., p. 219) that all are combating an uncontrolled prophetism.

Thus basileias autou (13:41) refers to ho kosmos (13:38) and panta ta skandala kai tous poiountas ten anomian (13:41) refers to ta zizania (13:38, 40).

Similarly I believe that the division in the parable of the fish net (13:47-50) is not between two groups within the church but between the church and the world. The parables of the marriage feast (22:1-14), the ten virgins(25:1-13), and the sheep and the goats' (25:31-46) could perhaps be interpreted in a similar fashion. At any rate it is not evident to me that Matthew's concern in these parables is with contemporary opponents within his church.

See above, pp. 22-54, especially p. 43.

See above, pp. 58-61, especially p. 60f. Thus all of Barth's points on the validity of the law can be made to support an anti-Jewish polemic. In 5:19 I take the one who
relaxes one of the least of the commandments being least in the kingdom of heaven not to be an anti-Pauline polemic, but a rhetorical way of giving maximum force to the denunciation of the scribes and Pharisees.

25 See above, pp. 79-82.

26 See Dibelius' comment, above, p. 69.

27 In two contexts which are not polemical, emphasis is placed on the kardia. It is the pure in heart who shall see God (makarioi hoi katharoi tē kardia hoti autoi ton theon opsontai, 5:8). In the parable of the two debtors the point is made that one must forgive his brother from his kardia (18:35). The point would seem to be that the one who is forgiven ten thousand talents by God (18:24-27) and yet grabs his brother by the throat for one hundred denarii (18:28-30) has not truly experienced the grace of God and has not been changed inwardly (cf. above, p. 72).

28 They cleanse the outside of the cup and of the plate but inside they are full of extortion and rapacity (23:25). First they must clean the inside of the cup and of the plate that the outside also may be clean. They are whitewashed tombs which outwardly appear beautiful, but within are full of dead men's bones and all uncleanness (23:27). They are to fill up the measure of their fathers (kai hymeis plerōsate to metron tōn paterōn hymōn) who murdered the prophets (23:32). Cf. also above, p. 116, n. 210 where G. R. Driver makes the point that by trying to make the law practicable and livable the Pharisees have lessened its lasting radicalness.

29 See above, pp. 77-79.

30 See above, pp. 166f., 205.

31 See above, pp. 202-205.

32 See above, pp. 155-160.

33 See above, p. 166f.

34 I am convinced that Matthew and Paul are talking only about the moral law (cf. above, pp. 60-66; PP.202-205, 207f. I see no indication that Matthew is concerned with maintaining Jewish customs against Paul or against Gentile Christianity. There is no hint that circumcision is an issue. There is no evidence that in 5:17-19 Matthew is concerned with those who take away
from the ceremonial law or the halakah. There is no hint that in Matthew's church unclean foods (cf. Rom. 14:14; Col. 2:20-22; Acts 10:9-16; 15:7-29), or table fellowship with Gentiles (cf. Gal. 2:11-17; Acts 11:2-18) is an issue.

35 See above, p. 65f.

36 See Jeremias' comments above, p. 68f. and what Matthew says about a sound eye and tree (6:22f.; 7:17f.; 12:33).

37 Galatians is undoubtedly written in a situation of white hot polemic. Romans on the other hand, although it contains polemical elements, is much more systematic. However, it is not a systematic statement about everything on the law, but rather it is a systematic statement on the role of the law in the attainment of salvation.

38 Cf. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, op. cit., p. 332f. Georg Eichholz, Auslegung der Bergpredigt, op. cit., p. 56f. suggests that perhaps we have the same phenomenon in Mt. 5:13-16 ("You are the salt of the earth... the light of the world... Let your light so shine before men") and in the sermon in general.

CONCLUSION

What is at issue for Matthew and for Paul in their conceptuality of the law is neither the halakah nor the ceremonial law but the moral law.

To Matthew the scribes and Pharisees take away from the law by limiting it to the outward act; Christ on the other hand does not take away from the law but adds to it, fills up its eschatological measure, and brings the final revelation.

Thus what Matthew says on the law is positive; on the other hand what Paul says is frequently negative. Paul's negative statements stem from a consideration of the role of the law in the attainment of salvation. In this regard Paul has two fundamental starting points: (a) salvation can only come through the death and resurrection of Jesus, and (b) the Christian is part of the body of Christ. Outside of Christ man is enslaved to, and condemned by, the law. The Christian as part of the body of Christ participates in Christ's death and resurrection. By dying with Christ he dies to the law and is no longer enslaved to or condemned by it; by rising with Christ he obtains eternal life, the resurrection life of Christ. To attempt to attain it by obedience to the law is to deny the necessity of the death and resurrection of Christ.

What is at fault is not the law but man. Man is obli-
gated, but unable, to obey the law and is therefore enslaved and condemned. The purpose of the law in the history of salvation is to show man his need for a saviour. To the man in Christ the law remains God's law; consequently he looks to it for instruction.

Paul thematizes the role of the law in the attainment of salvation; Matthew does not. Yet for Matthew, salvation comes through (although he neither affirms nor denies that it comes exclusively through) the death of Jesus. Thus on the question of the law Matthew and Paul have different concerns. Both, however, believe in the validity of the law, both say its essence is love, both believe in the moral life, both believe the immoral will not be saved.

Matthew states Jesus' relation to the law in his earthly life (in his words and deeds). Paul states Jesus' relation to the law in his death and resurrection. In short, their differences on the law are perspectival.

What at first sight appear to be dialectically opposed viewpoints between Matthew and Paul on the law are differences in perspective. This conclusion should make us hesitant to assume that comparably opposing viewpoints elsewhere in the New Testament are contradictions. An application of the methodology employed in the present study to examine the compatibility of Matthew and Paul should prove helpful in discovering something of the sources and nature of other differ-
ences from among New Testament authors. It should be especially helpful in discovering whether there are any differences at all which could be accurately qualified as "dialectical".

In my opinion, the seemingly contradictory theologies of Matthew and Paul on Christ and the law occupy, in fact, a middle position between contradiction and complementarity. The Matthean and Pauline thematizations do not cohere within the same framework of meaning. But when each is seen in the full context of its own framework of meaning, neither can they be said to exclude one another. Though they are not complementary in the strict and proper sense of the term, they are complementary in a broad sense. Paul's powerful assertion of the gratuity of salvation has a counterpart in Matthew, but it accentuates what for Matthew has secondary thematic standing. Matthew's heavy accent on salvation as messianic, as mediated by the history of Jesus, as flowering in an unforeseen restoration of Israel has points of contact in Paul but no comparable Pauline thematization.

In the German discussion these points are sometimes obliquely acknowledged, but the acknowledgement is usually undermined by a simplistic reduction of all relationships to two categories: the harmonizable (which corresponds to our category of the strictly complementary) and the contradictory. This accounts for the frequently cavalier assumption that the
New Testament is "filled with contradictions". The large middle ground of relationships which are neither complementary in the strict sense nor contradictory is left unnoticed.

I have a general point to make. Views which appear contradictory may not be. Considerations such as those I have offered on Matthew and Paul on Christ and the law and on the nature of a contradiction, together with the considerations Bernard Lonergan has proposed on differentiations of consciousness, the various brands of common sense, perspectivism, and complementary and genetic differences in horizon should make New Testament scholars hesitant to claim quickly and easily that various views are contradictory and incompatible. If there can be a pluralism of expression within a fundamentally common horizon, this effectively counters Käsemann's and Marxsen's contention that from a conceptual point of view Christianity is a syncretism. If there are horizons among the various New Testament authors which are dialectically opposed, an application of Lonergan's method might help us discover where they are. But these writers have not considered what constitutes disunity, or under what circumstances the intentions of authors might be the basis for working out the issues of unity and disunity. There might be an element of bias in such formulations as that of Braun who considers the New Testament to be about God conceived as togetherness or that of Diem who says that it is the proclamation of Jesus Christ who
proclaims himself. The danger in Sachkritik is, again, the possibility of mere bias, preference, or caprice in its practice.

For a unity to be possible, the horizons of the various writers must not be dialectically opposed, i.e., opposed irresolvably (except by a basic conversion). Käsemann's³ and Schlier's⁴ point that the New Testament contains only fragments is nevertheless valid. We do not have anything like a complete account of the process of development.

Part of the reason for the fragmentary nature of New Testament theology is that no New Testament writer attempts or is concerned to give an account of this development or a totally exhaustive account of everything he knows about theology. The New Testament writers (Paul in particular) attempt to meet some of the particular problems which arise in the first century church; they are occasional writings which do not attempt to be exhaustive but are only attempts to deal with the particular issue at hand — writings that deal with different issues therefore may have complementary horizons. On occasion the New Testament does contain a systematic statement of a topic but does not attempt to be a systematic statement of a total theology.

However, even if each New Testament writer did attempt to give a totally exhaustive theology, these various theologies may be complementary. Three examples will illustrate
this. First, historians can write different histories, histories that exhaust the horizon of an individual historian, that are noncontradictory, but are incomplete and approximate portrayals of an enormously complex reality. No single interpretation of a literary text, nor all together, exhausts the meaning of that text; Hirsch observes that to the extent various interpretations bring into relief different aspects of textual meaning, the diversity of interpretations should be welcomed. In so far as the various interpretations are compatible, the more interpretations one knows, the fuller will be one's understanding. Finally, every true understanding corresponds to what is real but no understanding is exhaustive.

The three previous examples assume that the differing viewpoints are all referring to the same thing. The "thing" or "Sache" to which the New Testament writers refer, as Marxsen, Pannenberg, and Schlier in various ways have noted, is Jesus Christ.

Walter L. Liefeld gives an account of Jesus Christ as the focal point of the New Testament and of the growing church as the occasion and context of a developing theology with reference to Christ. For Liefeld, the word by and about Christ needs to be interpreted as the church is increasingly able to comprehend its significance. The message of the cross needs to be understood in all its implications and applied to Christian life. The experience of this revelation
could only be understood as the church experienced the opportunities and problems of the first Christian decades. The growing church itself was full of questions and provided the occasion and context for a developing theology. The success of the Christian mission in penetrating by stages beyond Palestinian Judaism into the diaspora called for reformulations of the Christian message. The growing church itself and its environment is the context for its maturing theology. Included in this context are the Jewish sects, the successive cultures penetrated by the gospel, and the heresies which challenged orthodoxy. The New Testament is a response to questions (the most important of which centred around the person and work of Christ) asked of and by the early Christian community. The missionary task necessitated a proclamation of the gospel in terminology understandable by each successive audience.

The rejection of the gospel by the Jews raised questions concerning the Jews as the people of God and the relationship of the Christian to the Jewish community, the Old Testament law, the temple, and the priesthood. Once the church viewed itself as the true Israel, questions arose concerning the church's nature and destiny, its worship, its ministry, its government, its place in salvation history. The delay of the parousia would have raised questions concerning the way Christians were to live meanwhile, the way converts from paganism were to change their former way of life, the necessary
response to increasing opposition from pagans, Jews, and heretical Christians. These are some of the issues that would have been raised in the Christian community of the first century.

The New Testament is a response to issues such as these. The New Testament writers, in giving answers, view themselves as being in continuity with the teaching of Jesus and with the earliest formulations of doctrine, i.e., the kerygma (1 Cor. 15:3-5), the confession made by new converts (e.g., Rom. 10:9; Mk. 8:29), credal statements (e.g., Phil. 2:6-11; Col. 1:13ff.), and collections of moral and ethical exhortations (e.g., Col. 3:5-4:5; 1 Pet. 2:11-3:9). This is true also of Paul who speaks of things he had received. There is a continuity of doctrinal development from Jesus to the initial affirmations of the early church, to the theological contribution of Paul and others, to the final corpus doctrine in the New Testament. 11

Footnotes: Conclusion

1 See above, p. ix, 226f.
2 See above, p. 227ff.
3 See below, p. 309, n. 11.
4 See below, p. 298.
5 See above, p. 244.
7 See above, p. 233f.

9 In this connection see the points made by Lonergan on the understanding and communication of Christian doctrine (cf. above, p. 241, n. 33). Cf. also his points on the varying brands of common sense (cf. above, p. 228).

10 Cf. Liefeld, op. cit., p. 81.

11 Ibid., p. 82.
APPENDIX I: A SURVEY OF VIEWS AND A CRITIQUE OF THE
GERMAN DISCUSSION ON THE UNITY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT

The method applied in the last chapter to Matthew and
Paul on Christ and the law in an effort to arrive at a just
estimate of how they stand with reference to one another would
seem relevant to the question of the unity of the New Testa-
ment. In this appendix I will discuss how the question has
been dealt with in the contemporary German discussion, where
the issue is most alive, and I will seek to relate the project
of the present thesis to this discussion. The views to be
considered are those of Ernst Käsemann, Hermann Diem, Willi
Marxsen, Herbert Braun, Wolfhart Pannenberg, and Heinrich
Schlier. First I shall summarize each view and then evaluate
them.

I. A Survey of Views
A. Ernst Käsemann

For Käsemann the New Testament contains not merely
"significant tensions" but "irreconcilable theological contra-
dictions". Examples are Paul's teaching on faith and works
and that of James; the eschatology of the fourth Gospel and
that of the Revelation; the ecclesiology of Paul and John and
that of the early Catholicism found in Luke, 2 Peter, and the
Pastorals. Primitive Christian soteriology, Christology, and

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ecclesiology do not present themselves as having a self-contained unity, or as growing from a single root in unbroken continuity, but rather fall apart into the multiplicity of divergent conceptions which reflect the changed historical situation of the community. Often this is a "misapprehending" community, unequal to the teaching of its Lord. Thus, when Jesus said "There is nothing outside a man which by going into him can defile him; but the things which come out of a man are what defile him" (Mk. 7:15), the Palestinian church was "blind" to this insight and the Hellenistic church adulterated it as well.

The New Testament is not concerned with a set of well-defined assertions so that the whole can be conceived as a fixed number of dicta probantia; it is concerned with answers to concrete questions, with the refutation of certain well-defined errors, and with the warnings and consolations addressed to concrete individuals. Looked at in the totality of its writings, it is the result of a late ecclesiastical process of selection, and the precipitate of a highly complicated historical development beginning with Apocalyptic Judaism, ending with early Catholicism, and affected throughout by profound crises.

Early Catholicism, whose chief characteristic is the message of the world-pervading church as the reality of the kingdom of Christ on earth and whose forerunner (both directly and indirectly, both in accordance with and against his will)
is Paul, marks the transition -- a transition completed with the disappearance of the imminent expectation of the parousia -- from earliest Christianity to the so-called ancient church, which understands itself as *Una Sancta Apostolica*. It is the historically necessary outcome of an original Christianity whose apocalyptic expectation has not been fulfilled.  

Paul's influence was swept away with the broad stream of the early Catholic mission; it is unlikely that his influence continued in Corinth, Galatia, or in Asia Minor (since neither the Revelation, Matthew, John, nor the Didache betray his influence or memory). Paul, held in honoured memory (for some of his letters survived and were circulated) but little understood, has been repeatedly and in various ways ecclesiastically domesticated (for example by Luke) first as a missionary and martyr and later as a dogmatician.

Amid the tensions, and at times contradictions, within the New Testament a unity is provided by an early catholicizing, and by a more or less orthodox church's interest in normative doctrine and discipline for congregational and everyday life. All of these things in Käsemann's view are bad. Contrary to the view of the second century church, unity is not secured by direct or indirect apostolic authorship of the documents.

With regard to the authority of such a canon Käsemann urges a dialectical approach, one which goes beyond historical
criticism and proceeds to Sachkritik. The principle of this critique is based on the contrast between "letter" (gramma) and "spirit" (pneuma) in 2 Cor. 3. This principle is not an analogical antithesis in the Greek sense of inward and outward, content and form. 13 Gramma, rather than being something outward or rigid and so unable to be assimilated by the pneumatic mode of existence, is scripture isolated from the Spirit. It is not understood nor interpreted according to the intention of the Spirit. Pneuma, rather than being divine or human self consciousness, is the divine power which, in opposition to the law of the old Mosaic covenant, conveys the righteousness of faith. When scripture is not illuminated by this power, it is understood as a call to a piety of merit and achievement and thus becomes gramma; but when it is rightly interpreted according to the righteousness by faith, 14 it becomes pneuma, and hence gospel. 15

This dialectical approach, Käsemann believes, is opposed to both "enthusiasm" and ecclesiastical traditionalism. Against enthusiasm, which tries to make itself master of the gospel by going beyond scripture, great weight is laid on scripture itself; against ecclesiastical traditionalism great weight is laid on the gospel as a critical court of appeal by the judgment of which even scripture itself must abide. 16 There is always the danger that this dialectic will surrender itself either to Protestant Orthodoxy (which tends to deliver itself over to a new traditionalism by identifying scripture
and the gospel\textsuperscript{17} or to the Enlightenment (which, by completely mislaying scripture in its quest for the gospel, arrived only at general religious truth and as a result delivers itself over to enthusiasm).\textsuperscript{18}

The authority of the Bible is the derived authority of the gospel. That we give it such authority\textsuperscript{19} is a decision of faith quite arbitrary to any outsider (since we can give him no objective reason for our decision). We, who are placed in a position of both freedom and responsibility vis-à-vis scripture are driven to test the spirits even within scripture itself; only with such an attitude can the word of God reveal itself within scripture.\textsuperscript{20}

It is only the faith which is gained through Christian preaching which is able to derive the certainty of the God who acts even from those fragments (i.e., the canon) which otherwise must remain a problematic piece of the history of ideas.

Whether the word of God is identified with the canon (Protestant Orthodoxy) or the Jesus of history (the Enlightenment), neither of which can give security to our faith (only the Holy Spirit can do this), there is an attempt to present the gospel objectively, and to guarantee faith by reference to an objectively measurable quantity.\textsuperscript{21} Unfortunately such attempts are in the Bible itself. Luke-Acts opens the way to early Catholicism by limiting the concept of Apostleship to the Twelve, and by emphasizing legitimate tradition and
succession in support of the continuity of its salvation history. In the Pastoral Epistles Gnosticism is combated by the presbytery and popularized Greek philosophy. 2 Peter defends a decadent non-Christian eschatology based on moral retribution and implies the congealing of faith into an intellectualized commodity. Thus, regrettably, the function of the Spirit was dissipated in many later New Testament writers who increasingly depended upon institutional or conceptualized restriction. Accordingly historical criticism renders a momentous service by recovering the diversity within the canon and rediscovering the primitive freedom of the gospel.

B. Hermann Diem

Diem, reversing the "revelation-positivism" of Barth that deduces historical positions from the theological premise of God's word, would approach theological truth through historical enquiry by viewing scripture as a "history of proclamation" (Verkündigungsgeschichte) which is begun with Israel, fulfilled in the preaching of Jesus, and extended throughout the apostolic preaching. From this perspective the entire content of scripture is summarized as "the proclamation of Jesus Christ who proclaims himself"; he is the initiator, object, and subject of this revelation.

In the New Testament there are contradictions -- for example, between Paul and James, Paul and the early catholicism of Luke -- which are not to be viewed in the light of
truth versus error but of scripture as proclamation. \textsuperscript{27} The proclamation history involves a unity within multiplicity, but not a doctrinal harmonization. Biblicism, whether in the form of Protestant Orthodoxy or Roman Catholicism, levels scripture into a codex of divine law or timeless truths apart from the event of preaching. \textsuperscript{28} The encompassing canon limits the disagreement and polemic of New Testament witnesses against each other. The witnesses acknowledge and protect one another; for example, Paul and James, although they cannot be amalgamated theologically, protect each other against the extremes of misinterpretation. Each witness takes on a mutual responsibility within the proclamation history; each points beyond himself and his own words; each renders service to the one self proclaiming Christ. \textsuperscript{29}

The New Testament writings are distinguished from the other early Christian writers \textsuperscript{30} because the word of God has been heard exclusively in these witnesses; only these may be used as the text for further proclamation. They are so broad that no historical or theological criterion is sufficient; they are self attesting and cannot be derived from any necessary principle or standard. \textsuperscript{31} The present canon cannot be narrowed; \textsuperscript{32} to do so by eliminating certain unpopular books or by using the principle of "the canon within the canon" (e.g., Käsemann's principle of justification by faith), which substitutes a Protestant theologoumen for a living event of
preaching supported by confidence in scripture's self evidencing power) is to substitute a human criterion for the freedom of scripture to interpret itself. 33

C. Willi Marxsen

Given the situation that many statements (for example, on the law in Mt. 5:17 versus Gal. 3:13) are contradictory and cannot be harmonized 34 Marxsen finds the unity of the New Testament in Jesus Christ. 35 All New Testament writings bear witness to him, and have him for their content and proclamation. He is a figure of proclamation, a proclamation which is not and cannot be made uniform, only in so far as "Christ" is understood as a title or predicate (Prädikation), and not as a name. 36

From a conceptual point of view Christianity is a syncretistic religion, but this conceptuality is only a means of expression (Ausdrucksmittel) and not the reality (Sache) itself. The conceptions stand in the service of proclamation; they are predicate, not subject. When we hear the proclamation of the New Testament as proclamation, when our relationship to God is decided in this Jesus of Nazareth, then we have Jesus as Lord, the church, and the unity of the church. 37 The unity of the church and the New Testament does not consist in the agreement of words (Wortlauten), concepts (Vorstellungen) or viewpoints (Anschauungen); the unity cannot be formulated, or proved, but as proclamation it can be believed.
D. Herbert Braun

Braun considers the problem of a theology of the New Testament to have a broader and narrower aspect. In its narrower aspect the New Testament does, and we do not, make the naive presupposition of the existence of a deity. In its broader aspect its authors make statements about Christology, soteriology, the torah, eschatology, and the doctrine of the atonement which cannot be harmonized; therefore their subject matter is not what they state expressis verbis in mutual contradiction.

He attempts to neutralize each of the above areas of difference into a higher unity. Each of these diversities refers to a still deeper problem, the problem of God as palpable and given and God as not palpable and not given, within the statements of the New Testament. God and his world are referred to as object, as thing; however, such objectifying does not correspond to the real trend of the New Testament. God, rather than being the one existing for himself, means the whence of one's being agitated. The whence of one's being is determined by the "I may" and "I ought", which in turn is determined by being taken care of and by obligation -- these approach one not from the universe but from one's fellow man. One can speak of God only where one speaks of man (and hence anthropologically), and where one's "I ought" is counterpointed by one's "I may" (and hence soteriologically).
In the final analysis the New Testament sets aside the inadequate objectifying of God; God is where one is placed under obligation, where one is engaged -- engaged in unconditional "I may" and "I ought". Therefore man as man, man in relation to His fellow man, implies God.\textsuperscript{42}

E. Wolfhart Pannenberg

Historical research, according to Pannenberg, shows that a doctrinal unity of scripture which had been presupposed by Protestant Orthodoxy on the basis of the analogy of faith (\textit{analogia fidei}) is not present in the New Testament. It contradicts itself on historical details (such as the accounts of Jesus' death) and on points of theology which occasionally leave their imprint on an entire book and cannot be removed from its individual formulations, or (since F. C. Baur) be understood as complementary parts of an organic unity.\textsuperscript{43}

This situation leaves open two basic possibilities for understanding the unity of scripture. It may on the one hand be grounded in a hermeneutical principle -- such as justification by faith as a canon of exegesis (Käsemann) or a unity of proclamation (Diem); in either case the unity must ultimately be constituted by the spirit of the interpreter and is not evident as an objective self-existent unity -- which is supposed to agree in spirit with the witnesses themselves.

It may on the other hand be discovered in the Christ-event attested by its different witnesses (Pannenberg's view).
To accomplish this, the Christ-event and the different forms of the primitive kerygma must be distinguished; the different forms of the Christian witness must show that they represent the unfolding of the inherent meaning of the Christ-event itself. The Christ-event, the resurrection and in retrospect the death of Christ, does not need to be clothed with a meaning by a kerygma different from itself; it is not value neutral, but rather has its meaning, in itself. To have such meaning it is to be referred to the nexus of events in which it originally stood (i.e., the ministry and message of Jesus, and the Jewish eschatological expectations of the period with their Old Testament background), and is not to be removed from its context as an "isolated fact". In this way it is possible to understand and verify the explication of the inherent meaning of this event in primitive Christianity's transmission of tradition which, along with the New Testament itself, receives its unity from the Christ-event.

This view of unity is closely bound up with Pannenberg's concept of revelation and history. In agreement with the consensus effected by Barth (although it was Hegel who first introduced the strict definition of revelation as the self-revelation of the absolute), revelation is not the imparting of supernatural truths about, but is essentially the self-revelation of God. There have been many communications and manifestations (i.e., in the Old Testament), but only one
disclosure of the essence (i.e., in Jesus), of God. Although eschewing some of the difficulties of German Idealism, he affirms that the totality of God's action in history is his revelation.

Pannenberg's concept of history is divided into "universal history" (Universalgeschichte) and "the history of the transmission of traditions" (Überlieferungsgeschichte). The latter, against the positivistic historiography espoused by the neo-Kantian philosophy and assumed by dialectical theology, embraces the intrinsic unity of event (Historie) and meaning (Geschichte). Events are never bare facts; they are always intertwined with understanding and transformations of understanding are themselves historical events. Traditions provide the linguistic context (the concepts, memories, and expectations) in which new events are meaningfully experienced, and through which they are transmitted.

Each event has its original meaning within the context of the circumstances and traditions in which it took place and through which it is connected to the present for its historical interests. The content of an event to be interpreted implies an anticipation of meaning which cannot be exhausted within any limited horizon of meaning or particular interpretation. All interpretations of an event in general and of the historical Jesus in particular, in order to explicate the meaning of a past event in a new historical context, are subject to a hermeneutical process involving the ceaseless revision of
transmitted tradition. Tradition initially provides the context for the expressed meaning of new events. It is revised in the light both of new experiences and expectations of the future and of the ongoing process of history. Thus, the resurrection breaks, but can only be understood within, apocalyptic expectation and tradition. The fourth Gospel is a reformulation for the Hellenistic world.

The history of traditions, because of its eschatological orientation and the presence of God in an event, is a viable impulse towards, but is not materially or conceptually identical with, universal history. Universal history denotes the binding of history's contingencies into a coherent whole. Each individual entity has its meaning only in relation to the whole to which it belongs; each particular event turns initially on its immediate context but broadens progressively to encompass universal (i.e., the whole of) history. Only in this context can one meaningfully ask whether or not God has revealed himself here or there in history. The eschatological history of Jesus is the anticipatory appearance of the end of history within history, and thus makes possible the understanding of history as a unitary whole.

According to Pannenberg's concept of revelation and history, revelation is God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ which occurs only in the context of universal history; scripture is a history of traditions (subjected to reinterpretation)
which binds together the unity of (Christ-)event and meaning (kerygma). This makes intelligible Pannenberg's view of the unity of the New Testament. Jesus Christ is the one res (essential element) of scripture which, in agreement with Luther, comes to light through the outer clarity of scripture (i.e., through the historical study of the Bible). In this way Jesus Christ becomes visible as a norm of, and a unity superior to, the kerygma of the church. 60

F. Heinrich Schlier

In discussing the unity of the New Testament Schlier recognizes that the New Testament writings are different in the situations which prompted them, in the literary genres to which they belong, in the purposes which they pursue, and in the abilities with which they are executed. 61 In it are contained a whole series of theologies each with different horizons, standpoints, ways of looking at things, concepts developed in very different ways, and themes of various kinds. 62 The task of New Testament theology is to draw the hidden unity -- a unity given by God and presupposed by the inspiration and canonicity of the New Testament -- out of its concealment; only in so far as this is done do its theological principles, which ultimately are not contradictory, show themselves in their full light. 63 To do this one must be involved not only in historical and linguistic criticism but also, in agreement with C. Spicq, in the reality to which the New Testament writers
bear witness; it is a matter of the intellectus fidei which penetrates to the thing itself (res) and its unity and so constitutes itself as theology. 64

The aim of New Testament theology is not to give an account of the history of early Christian religion, of salvation history, or of the propositions contained in the New Testament. Its aim is to grasp the revelation reality in the light in which, and to make it intelligible as, the New Testament understood it. As such it directs its attention not to the theology of its sources or to other early Christian literature but exclusively to, and in particular to the theological data as they appear in light of, the New Testament. 65

At first what emerges are a series of different theologies which seldom have a visible inner link, which often are incompatible in scope, degree of theological reflection, or intrinsic importance (i.e., Luke's theology of epochs of salvation versus the epiphany theology of Mark), and which represent only fragments of a theology. 66

The New Testament itself, however, indicates that we are to go beyond the fact and problem set by it. We are to extend its numerous broken lines and relate them to a single point. In the New Testament the one revelation-event has projected itself into manifold forms of believing thought; this thought addresses itself to a single theology, and the various theological tendencies are to be developed (by trial and error
in order to avoid premature harmonization) with reference to this unified theology. 67

In pursuing this task certain dangers are to be avoided. The unity, rather than being made too general, must be concrete and authentic. The individuality of a New Testament book must not lose its contours; one book or a group of books, with all other theological concepts subsumed under it, must not be made the norm. Finally, the unity is not to be based on one single theme such as the Christ-event in preference to the unity of the interpretations of the Christ-event. This would reduce the New Testament theology to Christology. 68

The structural unity of the New Testament is brought out by showing how its major themes (i.e., God, the kingdom of God, Jesus Christ, and the death and resurrection of Christ) are intrinsically related to each other. Such a unity is glimpsed at in the elementary theology of the credal faith formulas. 69 These formulas which exist before all books and theology were to dominate the whole of New Testament theology. They are the word or revelation of Jesus Christ as it voiced itself, and the primary response of the community as it threw itself open to him; they carry within themselves the primary explication — an explication developed in the writings, proclamation, and theology of the New Testament — of the salvific act of God in Jesus Christ. 70

This, then, is Schlier's view; it is a view which as
Alex Stock points out, is antithetical to present Lutheran and/or Bulmannian theology. The centre of scripture is Jesus Christ in his fleshly reality rather than a word or theologumen. These are only the occasion (Anlass) for getting to the centre of scripture. The kerygma with its dogmatic character mediates facts such as the resurrection of Jesus Christ as a salvation-historical happening and cannot be demythologized in the event of proclamation. Against the tendency to dissolve the canon from within by viewing it as a canon within the canon or as an event through which the word of scripture inflames inspiration, it is viewed as an objective norm.

II. Critique

The present study has been principally concerned with the relationships between meanings. But the German conversation makes it clear that both the religionsgeschichtlich issue of homogeneity versus syncretism and the theological issue of authentic versus inauthentic developments hinge on a successful thematization of the issue of truth.

The discussion has, indeed, failed to take the measure of this issue. Those who, like Wolfhart Pannenberg, thematically assert Christ to be the essential res of scripture or, like Heinrich Schlier, define the "centre" of scripture to be "Jesus Christ in his fleshly reality" have by that very fact laid the foundation for dealing with the issue of truth, for they have affirmed truth in the mode of aletheia (Unverborgenheit, Offenbarkeit): the measure by which diversities and
developments are to be judged. Those who like Ernst Käsemann, affirm the legitimacy and necessity of Sachkritik, have by that very fact affirmed (performatively, if not thematically) truth in the mode of orthotēs (Richtigkeit). And yet little has come of this in the German conversation on the unity of the New Testament. For, unless the truth issue is clarified thematically, it cannot be brought to bear fruitfully on variety and development.

Now, there are extraordinary developments attested by New Testament literature. But has the German discussion come to terms with them? Christ, to repeat the affirmations of Pannenborg and Schlier (but to reformulate them in accord with the terminology adopted by Coreth), is die Sache, and truth as orthotēs is correspondence to die Sache. It will not do, with Käsemann and Marxsen, merely to point to such diverse modes as apocalyptic, the mysteries, popular philosophy, torah piety, and early Catholicism in support of their view of early Christianity as a syncretism, for die Sache may find expression in all these modes and homogeneity and heterogeneity are a matter not of modes but of die Sache. Nor will it do with Diem to set aside the issue of truth as orthotēs in favour of a sequence of proclamations, for the whole question about the series of proclamations and about each proclamation in the series is its relationship to die Sache. My point is that without the resources of a flexible and accurate thematization of truth, any conversation about a unity or disunity of meaning
seems little likely to succeed.

In commenting on particular points made by the participants in the discussion my own vantage point is limited. I do not wish to comment on each writer's particular concerns and purposes (much less on his theology as a whole) but simply on discrete points of contact or conflict between each writer and the present study.

Schlier is quite right to insist on a "revelation reality" in the New Testament to be grasped in the light in which the New Testament writers understood it, and unity, no doubt, is glimpsed in the credal faith formulas. But it seems to me at best unnecessary (at worst, perhaps, a hindrance) to come to the task with some of Schlier's assumptions. It is unnecessary to make the inspiration and canonicity of the New Testament the necessary presupposition of its unity, to identify pre-symbol and kerygma (and make Paul its poor human tool), to make revelation a procedure in the literal sense in which God steps forth out of his hiddenness, to make the word of God a new ontology of being, or to insist that in the enterprise at hand one must be inferior in the world of reason.

Pannenberg is surely right to insist on the one res of scripture, on the Christ-event's intrinsic meaning (as distinguished from the view that it is intrinsically value-neutral and acquires meaning from outside, namely, from the kerygma,
which is thus a "creative" interpretation. But Pannenberg seems to be saying that the only unity of the New Testament is the Saché to which all of its writings point. He does not appear to be affirming, as does the present study with a narrower compass, theologies which, though they do not fit into another's conceptual framework, are nevertheless noncontradictory and compatible in their diversities.

Marxsen's view of the New Testament as syncretistic depends on an oversight. He has not entertained the possibility of a middle ground between contradiction and strict complementarity (in his terms an agreement of concepts and viewpoints).

Braun's view of the subject matter of the New Testament is merely posited. God as "the whence of my being agitated" seems to me a capricious and misleading use of the word "God". The mutual contradictions of the New Testament writers are likewise posited. The discussion of "objectifying" might have been revised if attention had been paid to the discriminations on this theme such as those offered by Lonergan and Coreth. Thus Lonergan is insistent that:

God is not an object in the naïve realist sense of what is already out there now, or already up there now, or already in here now. Further, he is not an object if one retreats from naïve realism to an empiricism, a naturalism, a positivism, or an idealism. But if by an object one means anything that is intended in questions and known through correct answers ... then a distinction can be drawn. 75
This distinction is as follows. As the term of an orientation to transcendent mystery, God is not an object, but a principle drawing man out of the world mediated by meaning into the "cloud of unknowing". But within the world mediated by meaning questions can be put such as: "Could the world be mediated by questions for intelligence if it did not have an intelligent ground?" The question intends the intelligent ground of questioning and a correct answer to the question reveals the intelligent ground of questioning. In this sense the intelligent ground of questioning, God, is an object intended by a question and known in and through a correct answer to that question. "Above all," adds Lonergan, in a religion that is shared by many, that enters into and transforms cultures, that extends down the ages, God will be named, questions about him will be asked, answers will be forthcoming. In still another manner God becomes an object in the very precise sense of what is intended in questions and known by correct answers. Nor is this meaning in any way invalidated by the fact that naive realism, empiricism, positivism, idealism, or phenomenology cannot think of God and consequently cannot think of him as an object.

Emerich Coreth offers a swift sketch of the transition from the dominantly "objective" thought of antiquity and the middle ages to modernity, in which knowledge of objects is mediated by knowledge of the pure subject. He traces the evolution of the turn to the subject from Descartes to the present, locating two thinkers, Hegel and Heidegger, in the middle ground between the scheme in which pure subject and pure object are given antecedent to knowledge and the schema
in which all differentiation between subject and object is suppressed. Coreth, though satisfied with neither Hegel's nor Heidegger's formulation (Hegel's "absolute knowledge" shatters on contact with reality and Heidegger's Sein finally takes on an almost mythical character), draws on both to stake out a position on the subject-object relationship which allows him to show "where and how, out of the totality of the self-experience and the self-understanding of man in the world, even in the world of today, an access of intelligence can be opened to that which we mean by the word 'God' and believe in as 'God'."

It cannot be assumed with Diem that the word of God is to be heard exclusively from within the canonical writings or that scripture has the freedom or capacity to interpret itself in any significant sense of the word interpret. In one sense scripture is sui interpres, namely, one passage throws light on another. But in the deeper sense scripture cannot be sui interpres for the light which one passage throws on another is mediated precisely by human intelligence. The ploy of evoking the old saw "scripture sui interpres" in order to skirt around the construing human mind, with all the problems and dangers it entails, is utterly useless as Lonergan aptly observes:

The principle of the empty head bids the interpreter forget his own views, look at which is out there, let the author interpret himself. In fact what is out there?
There is just a series of signs. Anything over and above a re-issue of the same signs in the same order will be mediated by the experience, intelligence and judgment of the interpreter. 82

Käsemann's Sachkritik and his canon within the canon approach have a flawless internal consistency; but this does not save them from the charge of being arbitrarily posited. Robert Morgan 83 points out that Sachkritik refers to the interpreter's criticism of the formulation of the text in the light of what he thinks the Sache to be. It is criticism of "what is said" by "what is meant". 84 Like allegorical interpretation, it allows the tradition to remain intact; it gets around obstinate pieces of tradition by reinterpretation instead of removing them. (What one generation finds irrelevant and even offensive might become profoundly meaningful for another generation in another historical context.) 85 The tradition thus becomes raw material for proclamations in which revelation might occur. But it sometimes needs correction in the light of the believer's apprehension of Christianity at the particular moment. This dialectic between the tradition and nonobjectifiable revelation accounts for the peculiarly ambiguous situation of Sachexegese. Bultmann's key move has been to claim that Sachkritik is necessary not only for theological but also for historical interpretation. 86 As part of historical interpretation Bultmann sometimes corrected what an author said in the light of his own grasp of die Sache. That there was a risk of reading one's own views into a text was, of
course, true. For example, the ideas of Paul which at first sight are the most prominent and which certainly were important to Paul (such as the whole closing scene of history) are explained away (weginterpretiert) whether by reinterpretation (Umdeutung) or by a critical analysis (kritische Scheidung). Bultmann can thus claim to know Paul better than Paul knew himself.

Carl F. H. Henry notes that for Bultmann the Biblical text is intended not to be an object of contemplation but an active subject which determines the reader's existence. Sachexegese achieves no permanently valid propositional meaning intended by the author but a new self-existence available to the reader in faith or trust. James D. Smart summarizes Bultmann's view succinctly: "The word of an author points to a reality beyond the author and its intention is to disclose that reality to others so that it will be an event for them." Richard E. Palmer notes that Bultmann's central contention is that objective meaning in history cannot be spoken of for history cannot be known except through the subjectivity of the historian himself.

At what point can Bultmann be criticized? He combines in practice what he knows to be conceptually distinct. (His insistence on the term "Sachkritik" shows his awareness of the special character of this "interpretation".) The result is to refuse to allow the historically intended sense of
New Testament texts to pose the problem of unity and diversity in its full refractoriness. When Bultmann claims that Sach-exegese achieves no permanently valid propositional meaning intended by the author, he denies the correspondence view of truth. His claim that objective meaning in history is impossible because it cannot be spoken of except through the subjectivity of the historian himself is countered by the fact that true objectivity is the result of authentic subjectivity. His view that revelation is nonobjectifiable does away with objectivity and leaves the subject-object distinction still undifferentiated.

Footnotes: Appendix I


2Essays, op. cit., p. 102f.

3In making such a statement he is perhaps reacting against 19th century idealism (which sees in the New Testament the unfolding of the divine Spirit in continuous development) and liberalism (which sees an organic development) cf. Problems, op. cit., p. 237f.


5Essays, op. cit., p. 101f.

6Ibid., p. 99.

7Ibid., p. 56. Examples of this process are the liberation of Jewish Christianity from the limits of Palestine, the fight against this liberation in the shape of a legalistic Jewish Christianity, the assimilation of the local churches and their doctrines to the Hellenistic mystery religions and gnosis; and the reaction against this in Pauline theology or the adaptation of popular philosophy in the Pastoral Epistles.

Paul's concept of the church paved the way for the early Catholic view. He inseparably linked ecclesiology and Christology and thus made the church an integral factor in the salvation event (ibid., p. 242f.).


Paul and early Catholicism, however, does not indicate the historical centre of earliest Christianity but is at best only a fragment from its bewildering variety (ibid., p. 249). In fact, the picture that the New Testament gives us of the history and message of Christianity is itself only fragmentary with no internal coherence (Problem, op. cit., p. 242).

Ibid., p. 238ff.


G. Clark Chapman, Jr., "Ernst Küsemann, Hermann Diem, and the New Testament Canon", Journal of the American Academy of Religion, XXXVI (1968), 3-12, p. 5, points out that for Küsemann justificatio impii is in effect Paul's interpretation of Christology thus allowing Christ himself to be the centre of scripture (Cf. Küsemann, New Testament Questions, op. cit., p. 14). Küsemann's criterion of a canon within the canon is thus roughly the same as Luther's; however, whereas Luther used the criterion of justification by faith and "Was Christum triebt" to exclude certain books (i.e., James) from the New Testament canon, Küsemann applies this criterion to the whole of the New Testament.


Essays, op. cit., p. 55.

What those who attempt to identify scripture and gospel are really doing is delivering themselves over to syncretism, (since the canon variously views Christianity as fervent apocalyptic, a mystery religion, a kind of popular philosophy, a religion of the law, or as early Catholicism), or to a hopeless conflict between confessions (ibid., p. 56f.). Küsemann gives other reasons for not identifying the canon with the word of God: we do not have an original text of scripture (and even if we did there would be an abundance of passages incapable of unambiguous explanation); the canon itself has been altered on the basis of new discoveries and improved insights into the original Greek texts; we do not
know which of all possible canons is to be our authority since the Hebrew, Greek, Latin, and German Bibles cannot simply be equated; and even the book in use and exposed to interpretation does not remain exactly the same for any one of us, let alone all of us taken together, throughout the whole of his lifetime (N. T. Questions, op. cit., pp. 263f., 292).

For KÜsemann the canon is not something between the covers, and as a result does not exist inseparably from its readers and hearers (ibid., p. 264). God may take up his dwelling between the covers of a book, just as he did within the crib and swaddling clothes; but he cannot be possessed as an object and does not speak out of his book on every occasion. Therefore the Bible does not make God superfluous (ibid., p. 273; cf. Essays, op. cit., p. 105). Those who believe that the canon is without error, perfectly evangelical and inspired in whole and in parts alike, have a docetic understanding of it; a canon in which there were no unevangeli-cal doctrine would be a book fallen directly from heaven (ibid., 277). To stick a pin into the Bible and then regard the passage thus marked out as a piece of guidance for one's self is to make the Bible an object of superstition, and to compel God to speak whether he pleases or not -- only the heathen can compel their gods to appear. In fact many sermons indicate that God has not spoken his word there (ibid., p. 272, cf. p. 9). For KÜsemann, however, the gospel is to be heard from within scripture.

KÜsemann also reacts against Protestant Orthodoxy, which puts everything in the Bible on the same level and allows God's word to meet us in statements removed from their contexts (as, for example, in the Herrnhut Readings; ibid., p. 268), and views of salvation history (ibid., p. 266).

\[18\] Essays, op. cit., p. 57.

19 The authority of the Bible is not done away with by historical criticism, for in the canon there is a reality; and the obligatory character of the whole of scripture lies in the exemplary witness to the reality of that history, which, grounded in the gospel, is found only in the whole of scripture. But the total of all the individual testimonies is not the gospel (N. T. Questions, op. cit., p. 9).

\[20\] Essays, op. cit., p. 57f. KÜsemann, however, later admits that the hermeneutical problem remains "completely unsolved" since those who identify the canon with the gospel also appeal to the illumination of the Spirit. Thus the dilemma seems to be the scientific method versus violence done by the devout (N. T. Questions, op. cit., p. 269). Yet on the next page he still advocates his gramm-pneuma solution.
21 Essays, op. cit., p. 62.

22 Ibid., pp. 85-92; 169-195. Kähsemann (ibid., p. 102f.) believes that in such passages as Jude 3 ("the faith once for all delivered to the saints"), 2 Pet. 1:12 ("the truth you already have"), 2 Pet. 1:4 (where Christians are described as partaking of the divine nature by baptism), and 2 Pet. 1:20 (where every unauthorized interpretation of scripture can now be prohibited) are the death knell of the primitive Christian doctrine of the Spirit (which is now dissolved into tradition) found in Paul and John and going back to Jesus himself.

23 Cf. Chapman, op. cit., p. 6f.; Kähsemann (N. T. Questions, op. cit., pp. 7f., 269, 273f.) insists that the Bible is an ancient document whose distance from us can be spanned only by historical research carried through with uncompromising and radical consistency.

24 For the following summary I am especially indebted to G. Clark Chapman, op. cit.

25 Ibid., p. 7.


27 Chapman, op. cit., p. 7; Diem, Dogmatics, op. cit., pp. 234-239.


30 The historical argument (of apostolic authorship and early dating) and the existentialist argument (of Kähsemann and others who state that no objective basis for the canon is possible, that it is solely a decision of faith) are insufficient bases for making this distinction. With regard to the second argument, an individual's faith is an unreliable foundation for such authority; the concensus of the church concerning the authority of the canon is too arbitrary. The first argument is rejected because the reception of a book into the canon established "apostolicity" and not vice versa (Chapman, op. cit., p. 9; Diem, Dogmatics, op. cit., p. 199f., 204-223; Schriftkanons, op. cit., pp. 161-166).

31 Chapman, op. cit., p. 9f.
For a newly discovered document to become canonical it would have to authenticate itself in the same way as, without questioning the adequacy of, the existing canon (Chapman, op. cit., p. 10; Diem, *Schriftkanons*, op. cit., pp. 169, 173).


The "institutional" and "liberal" solutions to the problem are rejected. The institutional solution connects the canon with the twenty-seven New Testament books; a decision is made with the help of the Holy Spirit for these books. The problems of contradiction are solved either by the teaching office (*Lehramt*) (which makes an instance outside of scripture, and not scripture itself, the norm) or by a decision about the essence of scripture (*vorlaufende Sachentscheidung*) (which also makes scripture itself lose its character as norm since it puts one central expression such as "justification" above all others), *ibid.*, p. 58f.

The "liberal" solution is more interested in the extent (*Umgang*) of the canon; it eliminates some writings because of early Catholicism or psuedonymous authorship. Rather than interpreting away the contradictions (as in the first solution), it eliminates them by some particular criterion. In either case scripture in its entirety is not the norm (*ibid.*, p. 59f.).


reference to the work of Küsemann (Essays, op. cit., pp. 169--195); Vielhauer, "Zum Paulinismus der Apostelgeschichte", Evangelische Theologie, X (1950-51), p. 1ff., and Marxsen and Ratschow, Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie, 1960, who points out that there are theological differences not only between the Synoptics and John, but also between Matthew and Luke.

Willi Marxsen ("Kontingenz der Offenbarung oder (und?) Kontingenz des Kanons?" in his Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie, pp. 355-364, esp. pp. 360, 363), states a principle of a "canon within a canon" in the form of a "primitive kerygma" which is highly problematic on historical grounds (a judgment based on the study of Ulrich Wilkens, Die Missionsreden der Apostelgeschichte, 1962, pp. 1-31; 187ff.) because Paul is not primarily the interpreter of a primitive tradition (cf. Gal. 1:12) but of the event itself, because such a normative, primitive kerygma would blunt, devalue, and relativize the diversity of the kerygmatic expositions of the redemptive event in primitive Christianity, and would make plain the need for an ever new exposition of the event itself (ibid., p. 195ff., n. 4).

Ibid., p. 198.

Wolfhart Pannenberg, ed., Revelation as History, transl. David Granskou (New York: MacMillan, 1968), p. 4, notes that the Enlightenment destroyed the seventeenth century orthodox view of identifying revelation with the inspiration of scripture and the transmission of supernatural and hidden truths. From the beginning of the nineteenth century there has been the suspicion that supernaturalism is superstition; the content of revelation can only be rescued by reducing it to God's self-revelation and excluding everything miraculous (ibid., p. 4).

In the Old Testament there are many manifestations that foresee the disclosure of God's deity over the whole of reality but there is no direct self-disclosure. (Each instance which could possibly be taken as such is rejected.) In disagreement with Protestant Orthodoxy and the theories of inspiration which it fostered, God communicates indirectly rather than directly. Indirect communication initially has some other content than that which is actually communicated; its content first reveals its actual meaning by being considered from another perspective. If, however, the indirect self-communication that resides in every individual act of God were considered to be revelation, then there would be as many revelations as there are divine acts and occurrences in nature and history, and the strict sense of revelation as God's self-revelation would be destroyed.
Jesus is the essence, since he is the final (though anticipatory) revelation of God.


Cf. Tupper, ibid., p. 96.

Ibid., pp. 96, 103.

Ibid., p. 103, Revelation, op. cit., p. 152f.

The historical problem (the Biblical text versus the event to which it refers) and the hermeneutical problem (the thought world of primitive Christianity versus that of the interpreter) are two aspects of the significance of the traditions of the past for the understanding of the interpreter in the present (Tupper, op. cit., p. 115). The distance between the horizon of text and interpreter must be maintained; the interpreter must enquire behind the text to its unspoken horizon of meaning in order to find the linguistic expression commensurate with its actual content. The two horizons can only be bridged through the continuum of the (universal) history that binds them together (ibid., p. 119).

Recent hermeneutical theory from Schleiermacher to Bultmann has failed; it attempts to bridge, but actually conceals and/or depreciates, the radical historical distance between the two horizons (by reference to some nonhistorical pre-given structure of human existence, ibid., p. 116; Basic Questions, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 100-115). Hans George Gadamer’s (Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischer Hermeneutik, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Siebeck), 1965, 2nd ed.) fusion of horizons concept is a marked advance; a new horizon, distinct from but comprehending the initially contrasting horizons of text and interpreter, is projected. In the process the interpreter’s own horizon is set in motion enabling him to transcend the limits of his own original pre-conception and formulation of the question (Tupper, op. cit., p. 117; Basic Questions, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 118-119).

However, eschewing the shadow of Hegel, Gadamer, by not following the direction of his reasoning fails to arrive at "universal history"; he turns to the linguisticality of the hermeneutical experience which suggests "conversation" (a fatal step) as the model of the hermeneutical process.

For Pannenberg, the hermeneutical process is linguistic, but the text does not "speak"; the interpreter rather finds a linguistic expression which combines the essential content with his own horizon (Tupper, op. cit., p. 117f.; Basic Questions, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 123f.). The fusing of hori-
zons is not the accomplishment of language; rather the form-
ination of a new manner of speaking is the expression of a
fusion of horizons accomplished by understanding (Tupper, op.
cit., p. 118). The unspoken horizon of meaning that accompa-
nies every text does not devaluate the significance of the
predicative language, for that horizon can be grasped only
when everything from the initial formation of the text to the
anticipated dimensions of its horizon of meaning is objecti-
fied into statement; This binds the interpretation of texts
transmitted through history to historical research (ibid., p.
118f.).

cit., pp. xviii, 140, 150.
55 Tupper, op. cit., p. 106f.
56 Ibid., p. 96f.
57 Ibid., p. 98. Basic Questions, op. cit., Vol. I,
p. 67.
58 Basic Questions, op. cit., p. 36; Tupper, op. cit.,

Pannenberg takes note of Luther's distinction between
the inner and outer clarity of scripture. The inner clarity
is bestowed by the Spirit, is experienced in the heart, and
makes one certain of personal salvation; the outer clarity,
which is charged to the ministerium verbi is the essential
content (res), and not every word, of scripture. The essen-
tial content which ultimately concentrates on Christ alone
has (in addition to the trinitarian and christological dogmas)
as its objects -- objects which are revealed by the resurrec-
tion -- the incarnation, substitutionary suffering, and
heavenly reign of Christ (Basic Questions, op. cit., Vol. I,
pp. 188-191). This outer clarity exists for both believers
and nonbelievers, and in opposition to the pope and enthusiasts,
must be demonstrable by historical arguments rather than by
appeal to the Holy Spirit (ibid., pp. 191, 162f.). Pannenberg
notes that Luther's view of "outer clarity" is similar (but
only similar since Luther did not distinguish between the wit-
ness of scripture and the event attested by it) in direction
to his own view that the history of Jesus embraces the revel-
atration of God in itself and can be grasped as history when it
is seen in its revelatory peculiarity (ibid., p. 61).


Ibid., p. 6.

Ibid., pp. 6ff., 19.

Ibid., p. 8.

Ibid., p. 30ff.

Ibid., p. 32.

Ibid., p. 33.

Ibid., p. 19f.

Ibid., p. 19.

Ibid., p. 13. In his 1951 essay "Kerygma und Sophia: Zur Neutestamentlichen Grundlegung des Dogmas", repr. in his Die Zeit der Kirche (4th ed.; Freiburg: Herder, 1966), pp. 206-232 (for an English summary of this article see Hermann Diem, Dogmatics, op. cit., pp. 41-52, 107-111), Schlier points out that these credal formulas are not to be understood simply as confessions of faith; as pre-symbols (Praesymbola) they are the self-proclamation of the risen saviour reflected in the words of the apostolic witness, and the outcome of the self-attestation of the risen lord in the presence of witnesses (ibid., p. 216, n. 17). By identifying the pre-symbol and kerygma, he places the genesis of dogma (dogma is merely kerygma in its later form) prior to the scriptural crystallization of the gospel text. Scripture grows up around the kerygma, and, as the historically oldest part of the tradition, has an important role to play, but it does not have normative significance for the development of dogma. This crystallized kerygma remains outside of, and prior to, all human seeking and inquiry, and even the apostle Paul himself can be but its poor human tool (ibid., p. 217ff.); it is the norm even of the Old Testament. Belief in the kerygma and the wisdom which it brings implies the surrender of all other knowledge for the sake of the sole knowledge of Christ and him crucified, and the decision to dare to be inferior in the world of reason (ibid., p. 224).

Schlier makes a distinction between original and historical man. Knowledge of the truth belongs to a man's original being, but this being is no longer apparent to the actual life of humanity (ibid., p. 229). The kerygma opens up once more the possibility of enlightenment but this arises not from
search and inquiry from within the human situation but from a direct revelation of the truth itself. There are records not only of man's own interpretation of his experience in the world, but records of God's interpretation of life summed up in the kerygma (ibid., p. 229f.).

The process by which revelation is extended in kerygma and dogma involves a procedure in the literal sense, a movement by which God steps forth out of his hiddenness, disclosing himself in the life, words, and works of Jesus whose authority is then extended by the committal of the deposit of revelation to the apostles by the genesis of scripture crystallizing around the symbol. The word of God becomes a new philosophy of being, an ontology which makes it possible for man once more to grasp truth and life of being after falling away from it through the fall and original sin, cf. Diem's summary, op. cit., p. 107. (Diem, ibid., p. 109, accuses Schlier of circular reasoning; the truth of the dogma, and the ontology derived as a principle from it, lies in the actualization of the kerygma as event, and the reality of the event attested in the kerygma is grounded in the truth of dogma.)


72 A question similar to the unity of the New Testament is that of the unity of the church. For Schlier it has a trinitarian ground structure; it has its unity in the one God and one Father who has in Jesus Christ revealed himself and its unity to mankind (Relevance of N. T., op. cit., p. 194f.). According to the New Testament that unity founded by and present in Jesus Christ unfolds itself in the Holy Spirit (ibid., p. 196). The unity of the church is manifested in the one gospel, baptism, the Lord's supper, the apostolic ministry, and by the charismata of the Spirit (ibid., p. 197ff.). According to the New Testament, its unity is always a prior datum, and not something that has to be brought about, is present and not merely future, is concrete and historical and not merely ideal or interior, and has to be grasped ever anew and be preserved by the individual Christian (ibid., p. 214).

73 Cf. above, p. 297.

74 See p. 314f., n. 70.


76 Ibid., p. 342.

77 Ibid., p. 342f.

Cf. Faith and Understanding, op. cit., p. 86; Morgan, op. cit., p. 49.


Bultmann's view of Sachkritik owes a great deal to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. For a comparison of Heidegger and Bultmann see John McQuarrie, An Existentialist Theology: A Comparison of Heidegger and Bultmann (London: SCM, 1955).

Cf. above, pp. 233; 242, n. 36.
94 See above, p. 238, n. 15.

95 With regard to the subject-object distinction, Emerich Coreth, *Metaphysics*, trans. & ed. Joseph Donceel (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), p. 71f. observes that when one inquires he knows himself as the inquirer and he knows about something else which stands over him as the object of his inquiry. When he knows he knows himself and something else as that which is known; this duality is that of subject and object. Both of them are posited in the act of inquiring or knowing; the difference of the subject and object in the act presupposes the difference of the subject in itself and the object in itself.
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