NAME OF AUTHOR/NOM DE L'AUTEUR: Bruce Kinsey Ward

TITLE OF THESIS/TITRE DE LA THÈSE: Dostoevsky's Critique of the West

UNIVERSITY/UNIVERSITÉ: McMaster

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED/GRÂDE POUR LEQUEL CETTE THÈSE PUT PRÉSENTÉE: Ph.D.

YEAR THIS DEGREE CONFERRED/ANNÉE D'OBTENTION DE CE DÉGRÉ: 1980

NAME OF SUPERVISOR/NOM DU DIRECTEUR DE THÈSE: Dr. I. Weeks

Permission is hereby granted to the NATIONAL LIBRARY OF CANADA to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film.

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's written permission.

DATED/DATE: October 9, 1980

SIGNED/SIGNÉ: [Signature]

PERMANENT-ADDRESS/RÉSIDENCE FIXÉ: 

L'autorisation est, par la présente, accordée à la BIBLIOTHÈQUE NATIONALE DU CANADA de microfilm er cette thèse et de prêter ou de vendre des exemplaires du film.

L'auteur se réserve les autres droits de publication, ni la thèse ni de longs extraits de cette-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans l'autorisation écrite de l'auteur.
DOSTOYEVSKY'S CRITIQUE OF THE WEST

By

BRUCE K. WARD, B.A., M.A.

A Thesis
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

McMaster University
Autumn, 1980
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (1980)  McMaster UNIVERSITY
(Religious Studies)  Hamilton, Ontario

TITLE:  Dostoyevsky's Critique of the West

AUTHOR:  Bruce Kinsey Ward, B.A. (University of Toronto)
          M.A. (McMaster University)

SUPERVISOR:  Dr. George P. Grant

NUMBER OF PAGES:  ix, 355.
ABSTRACT

This thesis is a study of Dostoyevsky’s critique of the West. Although Westerners interested in Dostoyevsky’s thought have noted his concern with the West, they have generally failed to give serious attention to his enunciation of what he considered to be the crisis of the modern West. The absence of a serious and thorough study of Dostoyevsky’s critique of the West can be attributed largely to the assumption that his observations about the West are unrelated to his best thought. Insofar as his observations about the crisis of the West are "political", they are thought to bear no genuine relation to his more profound "religious" thought. His teaching about the West tends to be related to the nationalist prejudice which supposedly characterized him as a nineteenth century Russian, rather than to the religious thought which speaks to all men. This thesis, however, argues that Dostoyevsky’s political analysis of the West, and his religious thought, are held together in his idea of the best human order. It is this idea which, above all, informs his elucidation of the Western crisis, and his recommendation for the overcoming of this crisis.

The primary intention of this study, then, is to expound Dostoyevsky’s teaching about the West, demonstrating that his political observations about the West constitute a coherent critique which is intimately related to his religious thought. This exposition is chiefly concerned with his critical assessment, in the light of his religious thought, of the attempt of modern Western thought and practice to resolve the problem of human order. This involves his consideration of modern liberalism and socialism, and of Western
Christianity. It is hoped that the fulfillment of the primary intention of this thesis will serve the larger purpose of ascertaining whether or not Dostoyevsky can shed any light on the situation in which the modern West finds itself.

Because the overriding concern of this study is to render Dostoyevsky's critique of the West more accessible to Westerners, it is primarily expository in nature. Some critical assessment, however, will be made of his teaching about the West in regard to the requirements of his own thought.
PREFATORY NOTES ON REFERENCES AND TRANSLATIONS:

(1) For the sake of convenience, Dostoyevsky's works are referred to in what follows by title alone. Complete bibliographic information is provided in the Bibliography.

(2) Almost all of Dostoyevsky's writings -- novels, short stories, journalistic articles, and correspondence -- are now available in English translation. Because he has generally been very well served by his English-speaking translators, and because one of the intentions of this thesis is to render his critique of the West more accessible to English-speaking people, I have referred to the English translations throughout the thesis. Whenever necessary, however, I have compared the English translation with the original Russian, and I have altered the former where accuracy required it.

(3) A great number of books and articles have been written about Dostoyevsky. As well as the secondary works referred to in the thesis, I have cited in the Bibliography those works which are particularly significant, either directly or indirectly, for the themes of this thesis. Where foreign language sources are quoted the translation is my own, unless otherwise indicated. (French works have for the most part been left in the original language).

(4) For the sake of accuracy and consistency, the transliteration -- Dostoyevsky -- is used throughout the thesis, as well as in the Notes and the Bibliography.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge, first, the contribution which my supervisor, Dr. George Grant, has made to the writing of this thesis. Dr. Grant's contribution, as a teacher and a writer, cannot be expressed easily and in a few words. Suffice it to say here that, in the most important sense, this thesis arises out of what I have learned from him. I would like to thank also Dr. John Robertson and Dr. Louis Shein for their helpful comments, particularly in the latter stages of the thesis. The final version owes much to their suggestions for improvement. I appreciate also the interest and the encouragement which I have received from Dr. Ian Weeks throughout the course of this work.

I thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for the financial support it gave me during the writing of the greater part of this thesis.

Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to my wife, Norma, whose support and encouragement never failed.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTRODUCTION</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER ONE</td>
<td>Dostoyevsky's Critique of Russian Westernism: The Historical Development of the Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>The Early History of Russian Westernism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>Peter the Great</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii)</td>
<td>Catherine the Great</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii)</td>
<td>The Decembrists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Dostoyevsky and the Russian Westernism of the 1840's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>Dostoyevsky's Intellectual Development Prior to 1845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii)</td>
<td>Belinsky's Intellectual Development Prior to 1845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER TWO</td>
<td>Dostoyevsky's Critique of Russian Westernism: The Theory and Practice of the &quot;Great Idea&quot; of Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Uprootedness and its Consequences for Human Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>The &quot;Great Idea&quot;: The Westernism of the 1840's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii)</td>
<td>Equality and Brotherhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Further Development of the &quot;Great Idea&quot;: The Westernism of the 1860's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>The Movement from the Critique of Russian Westernism to the Critique of the West itself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER THREE</td>
<td>The Historical Fate of the &quot;Great Idea&quot; in the West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>The Break-down of Traditional Western Order</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
II The New Order and the Western Peoples 115
  (i) France 115
  (ii) The English-speaking World 129
  (iii) Germany 136

III Towards a New World Order 145
  (i) Bourgeois Liberal Democracy 145
  (ii) Socialism 152

CHAPTER FOUR The Final Western Social Formula 164

I The "Legend of the Grand Inquisitor" 164
  (i) The First Temptation 171
  (ii) The Second Temptation 171
  (iii) The Third Temptation 183

II The Goal of the Final Western Social Formula 191
  (i) Reason and Love of Mankind 191
  (ii) The Man-God 211

CHAPTER FIVE Dostoyevsky's Judgement of the Final Western Social Formula 219

I The Silence of Christ 219
  (i) The Failure of the Nihilist to become the Man-God 219
  (ii) Dostoyevsky's Attempt at a Rational Refutation of Nihilism 225
  (iii) Dostoyevsky's Critique of Reason 228

II The Breaking of Christ's Silence 235
  (i) The Appeal to Eternal Justice 237
  (ii) Dostoyevsky's Showing Forth of the Divine Economy 243

III The Church as the Redemption of the "Great Idea" 254
  (i) Freedom 254
  (ii) Equality 256
  (iii) Brotherhood 256

CHAPTER SIX Dostoyevsky's Judgement of the West 259

I The Theory of Practical Christianity 260
  (i) The "First Step" 260
  (ii) "Russian Socialism" 262

II Russia's Religious Mission to the West 269
  (i) The Historical Development of Church and State in the West 270
(ii) The Historical Development of Church and State in Russia 280

(iii) Russia and the Modern Western Crisis 285

III Conclusion 289

APPENDIX 297

NOTES TO THE TEXT 302

BIBLIOGRAPHY 352
INTRODUCTION

The underlying concern of this thesis is the crisis of Western civilization. Recognition of this crisis is no longer limited to rare individuals or to rare moments of reflection; it is increasingly present for everyone in the midst of their practical activity. Indeed, the pervasive sense of crisis becomes an ingredient of the crisis. Yet the general acknowledgement of the existence of a crisis in the West does not entail consensus concerning its nature. There is even little agreement about whether the crisis is fundamentally outward — a question of the political, economic, sociological, and even ecological disintegrations besetting late capitalist liberalism; or whether it must be understood as an inner crisis. For those who adopt the latter approach to the crisis the material failures which threaten the West are really symptomatic of a more fundamental failure of the spirit. This approach assumes that the diverse elements of a civilization are bound together into an ultimate unity, and that this unity is to be perceived in the light of what is prior in human life. Yet the recognition among more thoughtful Westerners of a crisis of the spirit does not entail agreement concerning the reasons for such a crisis. Still less does it entail agreement about the resolution or overcoming of the crisis. The lack of certainty concerning these questions confronts Westerners with a task. This task requires the aid of those who have thought most profoundly about the crisis of the West. One such thinker is Fyodor Dostoyevsky.
Dostoyevsky's concern with the West is evident throughout his writings. The most cursory reading of his major novels yields an abundance of allusions to almost every aspect of Western civilization. This initial evidence of his concern is reinforced by his secondary writings -- his journalistic articles, unpublished notebooks, and correspondence -- in which the question of the West figures prominently and more completely than in his art. His preoccupation with the West commenced when, as a child, he listened "agape with ecstasy and terror" to his mother's readings of the Gothic horror tales of Hoffmann and Radcliffe.1 It came to an end only with his last public address, a speech in commemoration of the Russian poet, Pushkin, which he delivered near the end of his life (1880). Dostoyevsky's concern with the West was not merely an arbitrary whim, incidental to his more fundamental work as an artist. This concern occupies a place at the very heart of his life and his writings. The centrality of his interest in the question of the West is evinced, if somewhat negatively, by the fact that this interest sometimes impelled him to contravene the rigid requirements of his art. Prince Myshkin's speech about the Western crisis, in one of the highest moments of the *Idiot*, must doubtless be regarded as an aesthetic impropriety. Yet one of the perfect achievements of Dostoyevsky's art -- the "Legend of the Grand Inquisitor" in *The Brothers Karamazov* -- is inextricably associated with the question of the West.

The basis of Dostoyevsky's constant and deeply serious concern with the fate of Western civilization was his avowed conviction that the West was his "second fatherland".2 This avowal implies two things about his relation to the West. It implies, first, that as a son of Western civilization he knows this civilization intimately, and this knowledge is bound
up with a certain reverence and love. Secondly, it implies that he is not completely a part of the West, that he is sufficiently detached to be a clear-sighted observer of Western civilization. Dostoyevsky thought that he could understand the fundamental aspirations of the West while at the same time being able to separate himself from these aspirations. It is this claim which underlies his contemplation of the Western crisis.

The same claim has been made by some modern Western thinkers. In Dostoyevsky's case, however, there is less doubt that there really is a significant distance between himself and the West which he observes. Because of the pervasive influence of the European culture which was ushered into Russia by the reforms of Peter the Great, this distance is not as great as that centuries-old distance between Muscovite Russia and Europe, and more profoundly, between the Greek East and the Latin West. It is great enough, however, that Dostoyevsky was to repeat emphatically that a Russian is not a European. Is, then, the distance between Dostoyevsky and the West so great that he is unable to grasp the Western crisis in all its depth? This raises the question of the validity of his observations about the West, and the acceptability of these observations to Westerners. Yet the raising of this question is premature; for the observations themselves have yet to receive serious consideration in the West. Despite Dostoyevsky's evident preoccupation with the meaning and destiny of Western civilization, his critique of the West has not yet been adequately elucidated.

This is not to say that Dostoyevsky's interested involvement with the civilization of the West has been ignored. Dostoyevsky scholarship has explored at length his knowledge of the Western cultural heritage, particularly its literature, and the influence of this knowledge upon his
own art. Yet this thorough examination of his relation as an artist to the culture of the West has coincided with a general disregard for his enucleation of the crisis of that culture. This disregard is certainly not attributable to any reluctance to consider Dostoyevsky a serious thinker. The novel was in nineteenth-century Russia far more than mere "literature"; it was the primary vehicle for the expression of philosophical, religious, political, and even economic teachings. The initial Russian assessment of Dostoyevsky as a thinker of the highest rank has long been accepted in the West. The scholarly analysis of his artistic technique has thus proceeded hand in hand with expositions of his religious thought. The Western acknowledgement of Dostoyevsky's religious thought has not, however, been extended to his critique of the West. Where the two are found in conjunction, which they often are, the religious thought is separated from the associated observations about the Western crisis. To illustrate: the "Legend of the Grand Inquisitor" is generally acclaimed as a writing of the highest religious and artistic genius, but this acclaim is made conditional upon ignoring the fact that the "Legend" is set in the West, and its principal character is a Westerner. And insofar as this fact is recognized, it is not considered integral to our understanding of the more profound religious themes. Dostoyevsky's critique of the West is accorded the status neither of art nor of religious thought. Although he is regarded as a teacher of the first order about the crisis of the spirit, this does not apply to his teaching about the crisis of the spirit in the West.

The general absence of serious consideration of Dostoyevsky's teaching about the West would seem to be based on two assumptions. There is the assumption, first, that his observations concerning the West are
rooted in an essential ignorance. His knowledge of Western civilization is limited to its aesthetic phenomena, and does not include a knowledge of the sort required to enucleate the Western crisis. This is to say that his grasp of Western art is not matched by his grasp of the more fundamental historical basis of Western civilization. Apart from the dubiousness of thus divorcing Western art from Western civilization as a whole, it must be noted that Dostoyevsky's knowledge of the West was not restricted to its artistic heritage. There is evidence that, from his youth, his reading included Western works of history, politics, philosophy, theology, and even economics. (These were generally read, moreover, in the original French or German). The modern West was indeed opened to him by the art of Schiller, Beethoven, Hugo, Balzac, and Dickens; but he also came to know it through his engrossed encounter with Rousseau, Michelet, Kant, Hegel, and Ricardo. He was always in close touch, moreover, with the greatest Russian students of Western thought. This theoretical knowledge of the West was supplemented by a remarkably detailed acquaintance with Western practice. Dostoyevsky's occupation as an editor of various journals -- which were as much "political" as "literary" in content -- gave him occasion to familiarize himself with the most minute developments in Western politics, domestic and international. And this familiarity was made more tangible by prolonged travel and residence within Europe itself. Any final judgement concerning the quality of Dostoyevsky's knowledge of the foundational elements of Western civilization presupposes the adequate exposition of his critique of the West. The available biographical evidence permits the assertion here, however, that his acquaintance with the non-artistic aspects of Western civilization was not a scanty and superficial one, gleaned from inferior sources.
The second assumption which discourages the serious consideration of Dostoyevsky's teaching about the West is that this teaching is incompatible with his best thought. Insofar as his observations about the crisis of the West are "political," they bear no genuine relation to his more profound "religious" thought. According to this view, his critique of the West has its ultimate source in prejudice rather than thought. This prejudice is supposed to be that xenophobic nationalism which has justified the policies of expansion pursued by the Russian state throughout its history. Dostoyevsky's teaching about the West thus tends to be related to the political prejudice which characterized him as a Russian, rather than to the religious thought which speaks to all men. Once again, such an assumption can be finally judged only subsequent to the thoughtful consideration of what Dostoyevsky has to say about the West. Yet it can be remarked here that this assumption does him a great disservice. The distinction, which he never made, between his political observations about the West and his religious thought presumes a clearer understanding of his writings than he himself possessed. It presumes that his penetrating insight into the most difficult questions of human life did not extend to the relatively simpler matter of his own Russian chauvinism. Such a presumption casts a shadow on the acclaim which is otherwise accorded him as a thinker of the highest order. It may well be an obstacle to the complete understanding of his thought, and of the crisis in which the West finds itself.

Vladimir Solovyov, an intimate friend of Dostoyevsky and one of Russia's greatest religious thinkers, once wrote:
The general thrust of Dostoyevsky's entire work, or the meaning of Dostoyevsky, as a public writer consists in the attempt to resolve this two-fold question: what is the highest idea of social order and what is the genuine way to the actualization of this idea? This expression of the fundamental "meaning of Dostoyevsky" has not received sufficient attention in the West. Yet it may point the way to a true understanding of the apparent contradiction between his concern with the highest reaches of human spirituality and at the same time with the most detailed developments in domestic and international politics. This thesis is informed above all by the assumption that the two poles of this "contradiction" between his "religious" thought and his "political" analysis of the West are held together in the question of the best human order. It is this question which informs his elucidation of the Western crisis. It informs also his recommendation for the overcoming of this crisis.

The primary intention of this thesis is to expound Dostoyevsky's teaching concerning the West, demonstrating that his observations about the West constitute a coherent critique which is intimately related to the deepest aspects of his thought. This intention is not based on any assumption of a capacity to express his critique of the West better than he himself expressed it. It is assumed, however, that his teaching about the West can be rendered more systematic and explicit, and hence more accessible to those who are interested. For this critique is only implicit in Dostoyevsky's own work. Indeed, his many observations about the West are scattered in a seemingly random and unconnected fashion throughout his writings. Perhaps the requirements of art made a more systematic presentation extremely difficult, if not impossible. Even the prose articles directly concerned with the West, which appear in the various journals edited by him, are
characterized by a *feuilletonist* style quite unlike the more orderly style of a treatise or essay. My attempt to render Dostoyevsky's critique of the West more accessible will therefore employ a mode of organization and style foreign to him (although there is evidence that he himself was interested in giving his critique a more systematic form).  

This study will not constitute merely a judicious re-arrangement of the observations about the West scattered throughout Dostoyevsky's writings. Such a passive approach to his thought is precluded by the medium in which it is expressed. Although much of his teaching about the West is present in his journalistic prose, the height of this teaching is expressed in his art. It is expressed through fictional characters, none of which is obviously his spokesman. Indeed, his art as a whole can be regarded as an arena in which different teachings come into conflict, without the presence of a final arbiter. The elucidation of his critique of the West therefore requires an active interpretation of his writings. Yet such an interpretation must be careful not to ascribe to Dostoyevsky teachings which do not belong to him. Fortunately it can be ascertained from a careful study of his correspondence and prose articles what he himself thought about the diverse teachings present in his art. It is therefore possible to order the thought of his various characters in a manner which accords with his ultimate intentions.

It is hoped that the fulfillment of the primary intention of this thesis will serve a larger purpose. The essential concern of Dostoyevsky's critique of the West -- the question of the best human order -- is so intimately bound up with his whole thought that our study of the critique must serve to illumine that thought in a new way. This thesis should therefore contribute to the study of Dostoyevsky. My chief purpose, however, is
not to add yet more material to the ever-expanding field of Dostoyevsky scholarship; rather, it is to make some contribution, however small, to our understanding of the situation in which the West finds itself. This thesis should make it easier to ascertain whether or not Dostoyevsky can shed any light on this situation. Yet my concern is not to answer this question, but to render a thoughtful consideration of it possible by making his critique of the West more accessible to Westerners. Only subsequent to the clearest possible understanding of Dostoyevsky’s teaching about the West is it appropriate to judge its validity. This, then, is the fundamental limitation of the thesis. Within this limit, however, some assessment will be made of Dostoyevsky’s critique of the West in the light of the requirements of his own thought. In this sense only will my interpretation of his teaching be critical. Anything more would be outside the possible scope of this thesis.

My interpretation of Dostoyevsky’s critique of the West consists of six chapters. The first two chapters are concerned with his analysis of "Russian Westernism". It was through his involvement with this movement that Dostoyevsky came into contact with the West. His enucleation of Russian Westernism determines his approach to the West itself, and is therefore the best way of entry into his critique of the West. Chapter 1 provides an historical introduction to Russian Westernism, and an account of Dostoyevsky’s personal involvement with the movement. As I have noted, the approach of this thesis to Dostoyevsky’s teaching about the West is governed fundamentally by the question of the best human order. In this regard, chapter 1 is intended to establish the intellectual context in which the Western vision of the just order first appeared to Dostoyevsky and to Russia as a whole. Chapter 2 is concerned with Dostoyevsky’s interpretation
of the basic meaning of Russian Westernism. This consists of three parts: his account of what is at issue in the general question of human order; his exposition of the idea of the just order borrowed by Russian Westernism from the West; and his analysis of the development, in thought and practice, which the idea underwent in Russian Westernism.

For the reasons which are offered at the end of chapter 2, Dostoyevsky's analysis of the modern Western idea of order cannot be complete if confined within the context of Russian Westernism. He therefore turns to the West itself, but on the basis of his interpretation of Russian Westernism. The transition which is made from his critique of Russian Westernism to his critique of the West itself is not one which he himself makes explicitly. I think, however, that such a transition is true to his thought, and is required for the proper elucidation of his critique of the West. Chapter 3 is concerned with the historical fate of the Western idea of the just order within the West itself. This chapter, based on Dostoyevsky's most direct statements about the West, should demonstrate the consistency of his thought and the closeness of the relation between his critiques of Russian Westernism and of the West. For his observations about the modern West can be seen to correspond, in an external manner, to the inner development traced in chapter 2 (as well as the developments in intellectual history considered in chapter 1). Chapter 4 is concerned with Dostoyevsky's exposure of the inner meaning of the "final Western social formula". This is accomplished largely through two characters in The Brothers Karamazov — the Grand Inquisitor and Ivan Karamazov. Through the Inquisitor he offers a detailed account of the constituents of the Western social formula; and in Ivan he embodies his understanding of the fundamental meaning of the final Western solution to the problem of order. Through these characters he
discloses most explicitly the essence of his critique of the West.

Dostoyevsky's exposition of the Western vision of the best human order becomes inseparable from his judgement of that order. The subject of chapter 5 is this judgement, a judgement which takes us to the very heart of his religious thought. This judgement culminates in Dostoyevsky's affirmation of an alternative answer to the problem of order. Chapter 6, the concluding chapter of the thesis, explores the reasons for his association of one order with the West, and the alternative order with Russia. This final chapter, then, is concerned with Dostoyevsky's judgement of the very foundations of Western civilization.
CHAPTER ONE

DOSTOYEVSKY'S CRITIQUE OF RUSSIAN WESTERNISM: THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE MOVEMENT

If Dostoyevsky had written his critique of Russian "Westernism" in a systematic fashion, as he once intended, he would likely have begun with an account of its historical development. The study of Russian Westernism as an historical phenomenon is an integral aspect of Dostoyevsky's critique, for, whatever his understanding of its ultimate meaning, he regarded Russian Westernism as a "product of the historical evolution" of Russian society. Dostoyevsky was an ardent student of Russian history, and the greater part of his study was concerned with "pondering the ways in which Europe has been reflected in us at different times and, together with its civilization, has gradually imposed itself on us as a guest." The elements of Dostoyevsky's history of Russian Westernism are scattered throughout his rough notebooks, correspondence, and journalistic writings. These can be brought together into a coherent historical account of Russian Westernism (provided Dostoyevsky's brief observations are elaborated whenever it is appropriate for the sake of clarity). This account will reflect Dostoyevsky's own idea of what must be known about the history of this movement. It will thus serve as an appropriate introduction to the more fundamental aspects of his critique of Russian Westernism.

I The Early History of Russian Westernism

(i) Peter the Great

Russian Westernism begins, for Dostoyevsky, with the reign of Peter
the Great (1696-1725) -- it is "the consequence of Peter the Great." To Westerners Peter has been a compelling, yet ambiguous figure: boundlessly energetic, endowed with a versatile practical talent amounting to genius, deeply appreciative of Western technique; and yet, a figure shrouded in darkness, a barbarian who never learned to write properly, a tyrant who succeeded in imposing Western forms of life on his subjects with results that appeared, at best, dubious to Westerners. While for Westerners Peter is a somewhat bizarre, though highly important figure in Russian history, for Russians he has always presented an overbearing problem, incessantly demanding a solution. Dostoyevsky's abiding concern with the meaning of Peter is evident from the regularity with which references to him appear throughout his writings. He thought that Peter was a "genius" of immense will and boundless openness to new ideas; but he also regarded him as a "monster." He did not pretend to understand the man, Peter, whose personality "in spite of all the historical interpretations and researches of recent times, is still a great mystery." It was not Peter's extraordinary character which occupied Dostoyevsky so much as the nature of Peter's influence on Russia's historical destiny. Among historians it is agreed that Peter turned Russia decisively towards the West. While taking for granted this general view of the meaning of Peter's reign, Dostoyevsky was concerned with the nature of this immense turn to the West: its motives, its chief characteristics, and its most significant implications.

According to Dostoyevsky, Peter's turn to the West was prompted by very limited utilitarian motives, primarily of a military nature. The reform of the military (for the sake of the Northern war with Sweden) according to European methods entailed other reforms -- administrative, financial, educational, and social. If these reforms had as their end the realization
of any broad political conception at all, it was perhaps that of a Russian state modelled after the emerging European national states. Dostoyevsky, however, emphasizes "the pettiness and secondrateness of Peter's views." The tangible evidence of the superficiality of Peter's attempt to transform Russia overnight into a European state is present for everyone to witness in the building of "the most abstract and premeditated city on earth", Petersburg, which represents "a crude shift of centres."8

The unthinking desire to imitate the European states — especially England and Holland, where naval and industrial technique had attained the highest development in Europe — may explain an important reform of Peter's which bore no relation to military requirements: the subordination of the Russian Orthodox Church to the state. A collegial body, the Holy Synod, replaced the Patriarchate, which until then had been the head of an ecclesiastical organization which was virtually autonomous in ecclesiastical matters. The Holy Synod, on the other hand, was literally a department of the state bureaucracy, composed of clergy, but completely under the control of a lay chief procurator appointed by the state. As a result of this reform, Peter "practically turned priests into government functionaries."9

Peter's goal of transforming Russia into a European state required a rationalized military machine and a large, efficient bureaucracy to support it. These requirements presupposed a large number of capable men trained in Western military and administrative techniques. Russia at this time, however, knew no educational institutions except the two theological academies of Kiev and Moscow, and a few insignificant church schools. Peter accordingly laid the ground work for a new educational system by founding the Russian Naval Academy, an artillery school, and a school for army engineers.10 In addition to the educational institutions which would impart
the required technical knowledge to Russian students, Peter was in need of a reliable source from which to draw these students. It was the need for a constant supply of men prepared to devote their energies to the service of the state which induced Peter to introduce a practical reform of great consequence. Dostoevsky sums up this reform in the following manner:

Peter created the best men from the gentry and from the valour of people coming up from below. From the service, in the final analysis, and he tied up all the rest of the people with taxes. 11

In seventeenth-century Muscovy (in accordance with the Code of 1649) the gentry had owed only military service to the state, and only in times of emergency; they were thus free, throughout the greater part of their lives, to administer the landed estates on which the majority of them lived. Peter's state, however, required a much longer and more exacting term of service which, moreover, included civil as well as military duties. In the absence of strong opposition from the gentry Peter took measures to transform them into military and civil servants. All gentry and their children were henceforth registered with the state; their term of service began in boyhood and extended throughout most of their lives. With the institution of the Table of Ranks (1721), government service became the basis of noble status itself. This last measure, entailing as it did the subordination of rank according to birth to rank according to state service, was perhaps most instrumental in destroying the effective independence of the Russian gentry. 12

The state's need for capable servants did not leave the Russian peasantry untouched. Peter's new military and industrial establishment required masses of docile workers, and these were recruited from the peasantry. Moreover, as a material guarantee of the efficiency of their service to the state, the gentry's hold over the land and the peasants who worked it was strengthened. The most important of the enactments by which this was accomplished was an
extraordinarily heavy "poll tax" intended to finance Peter's reforms. This tax effectively deprived the Russian peasantry of any possibility of financial independence. It was during Peter's reign, and as a direct result of his reforms, that serfdom became an accomplished fact for the vast majority of the Russian people:

...the system of serf ownership was really the veritable golden heritage of Peter's reform; it corresponded entirely to its spirit, and was its principal fruit. 13

Although the gentry and their serfs both felt the harsh, impersonal power of the new state, subordination to this power involved different implications for each group. Beyond the obvious difference of socio-economic circumstances, there was a more important difference which originated in the general tendency of Peter's reforms. The service gentry brought into being by Peter was required to serve a state which was attempting to become Western, and the successful outcome of this attempt depended on the degree to which the service gentry itself could adopt Western methods. However, not content to educate forcibly the Russian nobility in Western military and administrative technique, Peter compelled the adoption of the Western way of life, even in regard to its most trivial details. The story of Peter trimming the beards of his palace officials on his return from Europe is merely one instance of the more bizarre aspect of his compulsion to emulate the West. 14 According to Peter's personal caprice, and the needs of the Petersburg state, the gentry supplemented their Western technical education with the outward appearance of Europeanism: wigs, beardless chins, and German and French clothes. However, the wholesale Europeanization of the gentry was not extended to the mass of the people who, although certainly harnessed to the requirements of the new state, were not compelled literally to become Frenchmen or Germans. The Westernization of Russia, thus, directly affected only the noble population,
and the majority of the people were left with their traditions intact.

This is of great significance for Dostoyevsky:

The people were exempt from the (German) reform from the very beginning; they were given up for hopeless. They were even allowed to keep wearing their beards... The people weren't considered essential at the time, but were looked upon as raw material, and as payers of the poll tax. Sure, they were closely guarded, but as to their internal, proper life, it was left to them in its entirety... The people were immediately exempt from the reform, at its very beginning, as it was deemed preferable to look upon them as mere raw material. 15

As the gentry came increasingly to accept their Westernization, the people regarded them, and the process of Westernization, with increasing distrust and hostility which Dostoyevsky interprets as an unconscious "protest" on behalf of their "Russian own, and against its suppression." 16

The separation of the gentry from the people effectively excluded them from those Russian traditions preserved by the people. The gentry, at first under compulsion and then voluntarily, had become uprooted from a set of traditions which still held the majority of their compatriots:

...the entire upper class of Russia ended up by being transformed into Germans, and, uprooted, got to love everything German and to hate and despise everything of their own... 17

The gulf thus introduced between the gentry and the Russian people came to be so impassable that Dostoyevsky characterizes it as a "schism." 18 Russian Westernism thus owes its most significant characteristic to Peter -- its restriction to an upper class minority uprooted from the living Russian traditions.

(ii) Catherine the Great

The next significant stage in the history of Russian Westernism, according to Dostoyevsky's account, was the effort of Catherine the Great to put herself into the forefront of the European Enlightenment. In one of
his few direct references to Catherine, Dostoyevsky calls her a "genius" in playing the "game" of Westernization. 19 Whereas Peter's turn to the West was determined by the strongly utilitarian bent of his nature, Catherine's Westernism could be said to have been determined by her vanity. Peter was anxious to learn from Europe; Catherine was more anxious that Europe should think well of Russia, and especially of her. She wanted all of Europe to acknowledge the truth of the declaration in her "Instruction" of 1767: "Russia is a European State." Not content with the favourable opinion of the rulers of Enlightenment Europe, Catherine sought the accolades of the philosophes themselves. Her initial success in this enterprise was demonstrated, for instance, by the high-flown praise which she elicited from Voltaire, who assured her that she was "la première personne de l'univers", his "passion dominante", and that Diderot, d'Alembert, and himself were "setting up altars" to her. 20 Catherine's upbringing in a German court and her early introduction to the writings of the French philosophes account for the ease with which she was able to play the "game" of Enlightenment. The fact that she was always more at ease with French than with Russian was to become a typical characteristic of Russian Westernism. Her predilection for the teachings of the Enlightenment, and her anxiety for the good opinion of the most progressive European thinkers — an anxiety which was to become another typical characteristic of Russian Westernism 21 — reached a zenith in her proclamation of the famous "Instruction" of 1767. This "Instruction" was a faithful expression of the political teaching of the Enlightenment about "enlightened monarchy," and it came to be regarded as a model for all of Europe. Nevertheless, Catherine remained content with the mere appearance of "enlightened despotism", and the "Instruction" had no
practical effect beyond bringing tears to the eyes of admiring philosophes. After the French Revolution Catherine's flirtation with the Enlightenment became much less pronounced as she came to fear that the mere presence of French ideas could encourage a similar revolution in Russia.

Catherine's own dedication to the teachings of the Enlightenment may have been fraught with ambiguity, but what of the Russian nobility? Dostoyevsky's first major writing about Europe, Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, begins with a brief account of the gradual Europeanization of the Russian gentry. In this account he pays special attention to the gentry of Catherine's era, whom he calls the "grandfathers" of Russian Westernism. These "grandfathers" are portrayed as comic figures and the age of "Russian Enlightenment" is exposed as a goodnatured sham:

We donned silk stockings and wigs and hung little swords on ourselves, and lo and behold, we were Europeans. This did no harm; it was even fun. In actual fact, everything remained as before ... We dealt with the house-serfs just as before; we treated our families just as patriarchally as before; out in the stable we flogged the small land-owner who lived nearby if he was rude to us, just as before; and we kowtowed just as obsequiously before higher placed personages ... In a word, all these gentlemen were a simple, hearty bunch; they never enquired how, when, or why; they took bribes, they beat, they stole, they kowtowed with feeling, and peacefully and abundantly lived out their time "in scrupulous childish depravity" ... some of them were probably great rogues; they had their own ideas about all the European influences coming from above. All this phantasmagoria and masquerading, all these French sartouts, cuffs, wigs, all those chubby, clumsy legs slipped into silk stockings, all those soldier boys in German wigs and boots.—it was all, I think, downright knavery, lackies tricking their masters, such that even the people sometimes noticed and saw through it. 23

It must have been this period of Russian Westernism, above all, which Dostoyevsky had in mind when he asserted elsewhere that "we ... started our European culture with debauch." 24

In Dostoyevsky's view, the Russian Enlightenment under Catherine was a façade, although it was so adroitly contrived that Europe was fooled
temporarily. However, it was during Catherine's reign that the first efforts towards an independent Russian intellectual culture, modelled after that of the West, were made by a few notable members of the Westernized gentry: Michael Lomonosov, an important scientist and poet; Gabriel Derzhavin, who became famous for his eulogies of Catherine; Alexander Radischchev, who achieved notoriety for his attack on serfdom in A Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow (Catherine's "enlightened" convictions did not prevent her from exiling Radischchev to Siberia); and Nicholas Novikov, a Freemason, who was responsible for the translation and publication in Russia of the most recent European writings. Dostoyevsky does not ignore the presence of these standard-bearers of the Russian Enlightenment, who are embodied, for him, in the person of Denis Fonvizin, a playwright and one of the foremost Russian literary figures of the eighteenth century. In the person of Fonvizin he subjects them to the same scrutiny as their more vulgar contemporaries. Although Fonvizin assumed that the "French apron-strings of that time ... were the most sacred, the most European apron-strings, and the loveliest guardianship", his "enlightened Europeanism" did not go very far below the surface:

That man was a big liberal for his time. But although all his life ... he wore a French surtout, powder, and a miserable little sword behind him to demonstrate his knighthly origin (which has never existed in Russia) ... no sooner had he protruded his nose beyond the frontier than, calling upon all the biblical texts, he began praying himself free of Paris, and decided that "the Frenchman has no sense" and even that he would consider it the greatest personal misfortune if he did. 25

Dostoyevsky is unwilling to acknowledge the presence of any special literary merit in Fonvizin's work. He implies that Fonvizin's literary prominence in the eighteenth century is merely relative, and he states that the best
elements in Fonvizin's work are "accidental." Whatever the merit of Fonvizin's writing, however, Dostoyevsky concedes that it definitely "produced an extraordinary effect" on his contemporaries, as did the writings of the few other prominent intellectuals of the age.

Catherine herself began the process of informing the Russian turn to the West with a distinct intellectual content; men such as Fonvizin extended her work through their writings and their translations of the most recent European works. These leaders of the Russian Enlightenment were not overly discriminating or consistent in their borrowing from Europe, and it is thus difficult to define with precision the intellectual content which they gave to Russian Westernism. France, Germany, Britain, Italy, and Sweden all contributed to the Russian Enlightenment; but of these, France was clearly the most important (although several Russians studied the writings of the French enlightenment in German universities). Throughout the greater part of Catherine's reign the intellectual content of Russian Westernism was derived primarily from the writings of Voltaire, Diderot, d'Alembert, d'Holbach, Helvétius, and Rousseau. Of these, Dostoyevsky singles out Rousseau and Voltaire as the most important. Voltaire was extremely influential throughout Catherine's reign, and by the end of the century Rousseau was beginning to exert a comparable influence. Although European thought, according to Dostoyevsky, was approached by Russian Westernism in a haphazard, superficial manner, it did become widely diffused throughout the Russian gentry. In the next important stage in Dostoyevsky's account of the historical development of Russian Westernism -- that of the Decembrist era -- this thought was to take much firmer root.
(iii) The Decembrists

Alexander the First (1801-1825) was known to be sympathetic to the modern Western ideas which were pervasive among educated Russians by the beginning of the nineteenth century. One of his first acts after his accession was the appointment of a special committee to draw up a Constitution for Russia. However, the outbreak of war with Napoleon in 1812 marked the end of Alexander's sympathy for the liberal state, which he identified with Napoleon. The effect on the Russian nobility of the war with Napoleon was curious. Although Alexander turned away from the idea of the liberal state, the gentry which commanded the Russian armies desired it even more intensely after their victory. While marching through France they had been affected by the still potent republican fervour of the Revolutionary era; and their susceptibility to this heady atmosphere was apparently compatible with a new-found Russian patriotism. Alexander's failure to satisfy their aspirations frustrated them, and they began to form secret societies for the overthrow of the government. Alexander's death and the subsequent confusion over his succession provided the opportunity for the coup d'etat of December 14. The Decembrist insurrection, though it was a dismal failure, is of great symbolic significance to Dostoyevsky.

The generation of the Decembrists, the "fathers" of Russian Westernism, is embodied for Dostoyevsky in the principal character of A. Griboyedov's comedy, Woe From Wit:

Remember Chatsky. This is no longer our naive and roguish grandfather ... Chatsky is a very special species in our Russian Europe; he is the charming, enthusiastic, suffering type ... Chatsky's character manifests the paradox which was so typical of the
Decembrists: he is an ardent Russian patriot who derives his deepest inspiration from Europe:

... he calls upon Russia and the Russian earth, and... nevertheless goes off again to Europe when he has to seek "a feeling of refuge for wounded feelings"...

Although Chatsky is intelligent and possesses a deeper, more sincere nature than the "grandfathers", he can accomplish nothing useful:

He is a phrasemonger and a chatterbox, but a sincere phrasemonger who deeply regrets his uselessness...

Dostoyevsky suspects that Chatsky's inability to find a suitable way of employing his gifts stems from a defect which he thought to be typical of Russian Westernism:

...if you insist on getting to the goal in a single stride, in my opinion that is not intelligence. It might even be called downright laziness. We do not like difficulties; we are not accustomed to advancing a step at a time; we prefer flying to the goal in a single leap or becoming a Regulus. That is certainly laziness. 28

In Dostoyevsky's view, laziness is not naturally inherent in the character of the educated Russian, but is determined more by the historical origins of Russian Westernism: "...we have become accustomed ever since Peter the Great, to be doing nothing...Peter the Great relieved us of participation in our affairs." 29 Since Peter, the gentry had not been compelled to work out its own forms of life, to set its own goals; indeed, these were imported, ready-made, from Europe. Despite the enthusiasm and intelligence of the Decembrists, their expression of modern French thinking amounted to no more than high-flown phrases and sentimental gestures. For Dostoyevsky regards the Decembrist insurrection itself as a futile gesture -- a "mad, Westernizer affair."

Even if the rebellion had been less ineptly undertaken and had succeeded, the Decembrists "would have disappeared without having managed to hold on for two or three days." If the Decembrists had advanced toward their goal of a liberal constitutional regime in Russia by
taking "one step at a time" they would have worked to enlarge the base of their support among the Russian people. Their failure to do so was indicative of something even more central to Russian Westernism than the lazy desire to reach the goal in a single leap. It reflected the nature of that relation between the Westernized gentry and the Russian people which is of such great concern to Dostoyevsky in his reflections on the historical development of Russian Westernism. In Dostoyevsky's view, the attitude of the Decembrists towards the Russian people differed little from that of their fathers during the final consolidation of serfdom under Catherine. The idea of abolishing serfdom "never entered the mind of the Decembrist, Chatsky."

Dostoyevsky was aware that Pestel, the leading figure of the Decembrist movement (whom he refers to as a "rascal"), had called for the abolition of serfdom, but he maintains that the serfs would have been emancipated without their land:

I bet you that the Decembrists would have definitely freed the Russian people, and without delay, but also definitely without their land -- for which the people would have definitely and without delay twisted off their heads ... What then? Why, even without their heads they wouldn't have been able to understand a thing, notwithstanding the fact that it was precisely their heads which, more than anything else, impeded their understanding.  

The separation of the Decembrists from the Russian people was even greater than that of the "grandfathers" who were "less foreign" to the peasant. The "grandfathers" had been divorced from the people by social and economic circumstance; the "fathers" were becoming divorced from the people by the force of ideas as well as by the force of external circumstance. Pestel's manifesto and Muraviev's proposed "Constitution" were indicative of the degree to which the Decembrists had gone beyond their fathers in appropriating that tradition of French liberal thought which was given
political expression in the Constitution of 1793. The prime legacy of the Decembrist generation, then, was a more profound gulf between the Westernized gentry and the people, as well as between the gentry and the monarchy. Dostoyevsky apparently thought, nonetheless, more highly of the gentry of Alexander's reign than of Catherine's, for his assessment of the Decembrists is tinged with a regret for the futile passing of so much selfless and energetic ability: "... with the disappearance of the Decembrists -- the as it were pure element of the Russian gentry disappeared."36

With the passing of the Decembrist era, Dostoyevsky's account of the history of Russian Westernism merges with his reflections concerning his own history. The principal stages in the development of Russian Westernism after the Decembrist era were, in his view, reflected in his own life. It is to his autobiographical reflections (rare and brief though they are) that we must turn for his account of this development.

II Dostoyevsky and the Russian Westernism of the 1840's

Dostoyevsky always emphasized that, unlike the majority of his educated contemporaries, he was brought up in a "pious Russian family" in which he was exposed to the Gospel "almost from the cradle."37 His grandfather and his uncle were Orthodox priests, and the deep piety of his parents (evident, for instance, in their correspondence) was expressed in the care that they took for the religious instruction of their children. His mother taught him to read from an eighteenth-century religious primer entitled "104 Sacred Stories from the Old and New Testaments",38 and as soon as he had learned to read he began to receive formal religious instruction from an Orthodox deacon, a highly skilful teacher (according to his brother, Andrei's, later recollection) whose lessons and stories, based on the
Scriptures, had a deeply moving effect on his young student. Dostoyevsky
was also, in early childhood, exposed to the visible heart of Russian
Orthodoxy: "every visit to the Kremlin and the Moscow cathedrals was, to
me something solemn." Although he spent most of his adult life in the
city built by Peter the Great, his earliest childhood impressions were of
Moscow, the city which he later came to regard as the true spiritual centre
of Russia. These early Moscow impressions were supplemented by annual
visits to the Holy Trinity monastery, just outside Moscow, which was
founded by St. Sergius, one of the most venerated of Russian Orthodox
saints. Later in his life, when considering the possibility of the
Russian monastery as a setting for a novel, Dostoyevsky wrote to a friend:
"I am an expert in this world, and I have known the Russian monastery from
childhood." Little can be learned from these autobiographical reflections
of the theological content of the early religious influences to which they
attest, but Dostoyevsky clearly regarded his religious upbringing as
thoroughly Orthodox.

Although, as Dostoyevsky emphasized, his Orthodox upbringing was
atypical of the Russian gentry, he too was exposed at an early age to Western
culture. He recalls, for instance, that he had longed to travel to Europe
since his childhood, when he used to "spend the long winter evenings before
going to bed listening (for I could not yet read), agape with ecstasy and
terror, as my parents read aloud to me from the novels of Anne Radcliffe." Dostoyevsky's secular education was largely European in content: he was
learning French by reading Voltaire (La Henriade) at the same time as he was
receiving Orthodox religious instruction from the deacon. His early contact
with Europe was mediated through the writings of Russian Westernism, especially
Karamzin's *Letters of a Russian Traveller*. This account of Karamzin's wanderings through Europe is replete with praise for Europe and European progress, although this praise is somewhat qualified by an uneasiness about the final consequences of the French Revolution. Russian literature was read and discussed a great deal in the Dostoyevsky household, but, other than Pushkin, the Russian writers whom he read as a boy had little influence on him. He quickly passed from them to the European literature which they imitated.

Schiller and Scott were the European writers who made the deepest impression on Dostoyevsky while he was still a boy. He himself attests to the influence which they exercised on his spiritual life when, late in his life, he was asked by a correspondent to recommend proper reading for a young girl:

> When I was ten years old, I saw at Moscow a performance of "Die Rauber", and I can only say that the deep impression which that performance made upon me has worked most fruitfully ever since on my whole mental development. At twelve I read right through Walter Scott during the summer holidays ... I got from it many fine and noble impressions, which gave my soul much power of resistance against others which were seductive, violent, and corrupting. 46

In his adolescent years, Dostoyevsky was introduced to the writings of Victor Hugo, Balzac, and George Sand (serialized in a periodical to which his father subscribed), and by the time his father sent him to the Engineering Academy in St. Petersburg (in 1838) his appetite for European literature had become insatiable. The requirements of a training in military engineering placed a constraint on this appetite, but did not diminish it in the least. It was during his years at the Engineering Academy that he read and assimilated a vast and varied amount of European literature. The scope of his familiarity with this literature is manifest in a letter which he wrote to his brother
Michael from the Engineering Academy; he refers, for instance, to Homer, Shakespeare, Hoffmann, Schiller, Byron, Hugo, Racine, and Corneille. This enthusiastic literary name-dropping is Dostoyevsky's own testimony to his familiarity with European authors. That this familiarity was genuine, however, is indicated by the ease and authority with which he discusses their work. It is apparent from this letter that, at nineteen years of age, he was already quite at home in the world of European literature.

It was during his years in St. Petersburg (1836-1849) that, as Dostoyevsky was later to declare, he "changed into a European liberal." He always attributed the decisive influence in this transformation to his meeting in 1845 with V.G. Belinsky — the founder of Russian literary criticism and one of the most outstanding figures in the history of Russian Westernism. Dostoyevsky describes the highlights of his relationship with Belinsky in two published articles, written late in his life ("Old People" and "One of the Contemporaneous Falsehoods", both written in 1873). These articles, although autobiographical, are clearly intended to portray a relationship of symbolic significance for the history of Russian Westernism. The grasping of this significance depends on the understanding, not only of what Dostoyevsky was being converted to, but of what he was being converted from. We must thus attempt to ascertain as clearly as possible the nature of the thinking of each man prior to their meeting.

(i) Dostoyevsky's Intellectual Development Prior to 1845

Dostoyevsky's reading of European literature was decisively influenced by an older friend, N. Schidlovsky, whom he mentions in a letter to his brother in almost the same breath as Schiller, Homer, Shakespeare, and Byron. This "marvelous, exalted being, the true sketch of man as Shakespeare and
and Schiller have shown him" was to exert the most powerful influence on
Dostoyevsky's intellectual life prior to his meeting with Belinsky.
Dostoyevsky himself attested to this influence when, late in his life, he
told a young writer who was gathering material for a biographical article
about him that he must "mention Schidlovsky ... without fail ... he was
a very important person for me then ..."⁴⁸ Schidlovsky, whom Dostoyevsky
met on his first day in St. Petersburg, embodied the typical characteristics
of the Russian Westernism — often referred to as "Russian Romanticism" —
which succeeded the Decembrist generation and was to predominate until 1840.

The transition from the Westernism of the Decembrists to that of the
Russian Romantics was occurring even as the Decembrists were planning their
insurrection. A group of young Russian intellectuals, styling itself the
"Society of the Lovers of Wisdom", was formed in 1823. Although most of
the members of this "circle" had older friends and relatives among the
Decembrists, they were not interested in political questions. Indeed, so
anxious were they to eschew political concerns that after the failure of
the Decembrists they voluntarily disbanded for fear that the government
should misconstrue the nature of their meetings. These were concerned
almost exclusively with the reading and discussion of modern German philosophy
— Kant, Fichte, and Schelling. The primacy of Schelling among these is
eloquenty attested to by one of the members of the "Society", Prince
Odoevsky:

Au commencement du XIXᵉ siècle, Schelling fut pour nous ce que
Christophe Colomb avait été pour le XVᵉ siècle; il a
devoilé à l'homme une partie inconnue de son propre être,
son âme, son esprit, au sujet desquels n'existaient jusqu'alors que des légendes fantastiques. Comme Christophe
Colomb, il avait trouvé ce qu'il avait cherché; comme lui,
il avait suscité des espoirs irréalisables; comme lui, il
avait imprimé une direction nouvelle à l'activité de l'homme.
Tout le monde s'est jeté vers ce pays admirable, splendide. ⁴⁹
Odoevsky's assessment of Schelling's influence at this time was hardly exaggerated, and this influence was to increase after the failure of the Decembrist movement. The "Society of the Lovers of Wisdom" was largely responsible for introducing Schelling's thought to Russia. The way in which they interpreted Schelling was to be decisive for the Russian reading of Schelling until the waning of his popularity in 1840. They particularly emphasized Schelling's teaching that knowledge should ultimately be identified with an apprehension attained through mystical intuition, rather than through speculative reason. This emphasis tended to justify the elevation of the artist to the level of the philosopher. It thus evoked a strong response in Russian thinkers who were conscious of the absence of a philosophical tradition in Russia, and yet were extremely proud of that flowering of Russian literature (inaugurated by Pushkin) which seemed to demonstrate the remarkable Russian capacity for artistic expression. Moreover, the apparent kinship of Schelling's philosophy of Identity with European mystical writings such as those of Boehme, which were already known through the publishing activities of the Freemasons, encouraged the Russians to regard Schelling as a religious guide. Schellingian metaphysics literally became, for Westernized Russians, a new religion directing them away from the world of appearance towards an Absolute which could be experienced by the individual only after a long and lonely inward journey.

This interpretation of Schelling encouraged the disregard for political and social questions, and emphasis upon individual salvation, which characterized Russian Westernism throughout the 1830's. The magnitude of Schelling's influence at this time, and the way in which he was read, had much to do with the position in which Russian Westernism found itself in the aftermath of the Decembrist insurrection. There was no significant
change in the socio-economic circumstances of Russian Westernism during
Nicholas I's reign (1825-1855). However, during this period it became
primarily an intellectual movement, and as such it was forced underground
by Nicholas' suspicion of Western thought. Any thinking which was in-
dependent of the teaching of "Official Nationality" was restricted to the
ubiquitous circles which were such a characteristic feature of Russian
society in this period. Many of these circles were social gatherings of
people interested in cards, gossip, or innocuous literary discussions; but
some served as the focal point for serious discussion of the most important
questions of the day. Dostoyevsky describes one of the latter sort as
follows:

In some "circles", though, the members conduct heated debates
about matters of importance. A number of well-educated and
well-meaning persons gather with enthusiasm, fiercely banish
all innocent amusements, such as gossip or "preference" ... and
with quite incomprehensible animation discuss all sorts of
important subjects. Finally, having discussed, talked about and
solved a number of problems of general importance and having
reached a unanimous decision, the entire "circle" lapses into a
state of irritation, into a kind of unpleasant state of limpness. 51

This description of a typical serious "circle" exposes the limitation which
was so fundamental to Russian Westernism after the failure of the Decembrist
revolt -- the absence of any relation between thought and practice. To
the sincere followers of Schelling his thought held out the promise of an
experience of an inner truth which bore no relation to the manifest im-
perfections of Russian social and political life. To the insincere hangers-
on it justified and concealed a propensity for affectation and a lazy
complacency.

Russian Schellingianism furnished Dostoyevsky with a philosophical
framework within which he could understand and direct his consuming love.
of literature. In a letter to his brother Michael (1838) he expresses the sort of thinking which inspired the best adherents of the Russian Romanticism of the 1830's:

Philosophy cannot be regarded as a mere equation where nature is the unknown quantity! Remark that the poet, in the moment of inspiration, comprehends God, and consequently does the philosopher's work. Consequently poetic inspiration is nothing less than philosophical inspiration. Consequently philosophy is nothing but poetry, a higher degree of poetry! 52

Schelling's thought apparently did not become a religion for Dostoyevsky to the extent that it did for so many educated Russians during the 1830's. Schidlovsky was able to reconcile Schelling's thought with Orthodoxy, and his example in this respect was doubtless of great importance to Dostoyevsky, who still professed Orthodoxy at the time he wrote the letter referred to above. 53 It is likely that Dostoyevsky's involvement with Russian Romanticism was limited to his interest in formulating a theoretical idea of the literary activity which was engaging him ever more deeply. Perhaps because Russian Romanticism did not make positive political demands on its adherents and because, in his case, it was apparently compatible with Orthodoxy, Dostoyevsky did not regard the influence of Schidlovsky as a decisive factor in his transformation into a "European liberal." Nevertheless, his involvement with the Russian Schellingianism of the 1830's made him more receptive to the influence of Belinsky, which he did regard as decisive. In this regard, Dostoyevsky's experience mirrored that of his educated contemporaries. Germany had replaced France as the teacher of Russian Westernism and, having received their philosophical education almost entirely from Schelling, the Russians were peculiarly open to the German thought which came after him. The thinker who was perhaps most responsible for the propagation of this thought in Russia was Belinsky. In his re-
collections, Dostoyevsky attributes his change into a "European liberal" entirely to Belinsky's influence. In the first article ("Old People") in *The Diary of a Writer* in which he discusses his relationship with Belinsky he declares that by 1847 he had "passionately embraced his teaching." In order to understand the implications of this statement it is necessary to know something of the content of the teaching into which Belinsky initiated him.

(ii) Belinsky's Intellectual Development Prior to 1845

Although he wrote as a literary critic, Belinsky's passion for philosophical speculation was so great that it prompted his acquaintances to call him "furious Vissarion." In his *Literary Reminiscences* Turgenev recalls Belinsky's indignation at the suggestion that a day-long argument be interrupted for a meal: "We haven't yet decided the question of the existence of God ... and you want to eat!" This love of speculation was combined with a temperament wholly unsuited to careful reflection: his highly emotional and enthusiastic nature prompted him to take immediately to heart new ideas without fully understanding them. According to Dostoyevsky, "Belinsky was not a reflective person, but all his life he was always a boundlessly enthusiastic individual." Belinsky himself was aware of the danger of "fanaticism" implicit in that impetuosity which propelled him from one intellectual conversion to another. However, this same quality of character made him a powerful teacher and propagator of ideas. By the sheer force of his personality he became the dominant intellectual figure in the Russian Westernism of the 1840's. The "furious" manner in which he approached philosophy is manifest in the remarkable intellectual transformation which he underwent prior to Dostoyevsky's association with him.
In the 1830's, like most of his educated contemporaries, Belinsky professed himself to be a follower of Schelling. Toward the end of the decade, however, Schelling's ascendency over Russian thinking was being replaced by that of Hegel, whose thought was promulgated by a "circle" consisting of such eminent figures as Turgenev, Bakunin, Stankevich, Granovsky, and Herzen -- all of whom, at one time or another, took courses from Hegel's students (Gans, Ranke, Werder) in Germany. The Russians turned to Hegel's thought with an extraordinary fervour to which Herzen attests in his memoirs:

They discussed these subjects incessantly; there was not a paragraph in the three parts of the Logic, in the two of the Aesthetic, the Encyclopedia, and so on, which had not been the topic of desperate disputes for several nights together. People who loved each other avoided each other for weeks at a time because they disagreed about the definition "all-embracing spirit", or had taken as a personal insult an opinion on "the absolute personality and its existence in-itself". Every insignificant pamphlet published in Berlin or other provincial or district towns of German philosophy was ordered and read to tatters and smudges, and the leaves fell out in a few days, if only there was a mention of Hegel in it. 58

This passion for Hegel was coupled with an impatient desire to understand and assimilate his thought immediately. Initially, he was interpreted in a manner which was most natural for educated Russians at this time.

The political writings and the political implications of his thought were disregarded in favour of the Logic, which was considered to be the culmination of Schelling's philosophy. Russian Hegelianism was, in essence, an extension of the Russian preoccupation with Schelling. Insofar as the political writings were read, they were interpreted in a manner which reinforced the tendency of Russian Westernists to ignore political and social questions, and to concentrate all their attention on the inner contemplation of truth (as revealed in the Logic). 59 In Belinsky's words:
... We rushed avidly into the alluring sphere of German contemplation and thought we could create for ourselves a charming inner world bathed in light and warmth apart from the surrounding reality. 60

Bakunin's interpretation of Hegel's well-known statement concerning the "rationality of the real" and the "reality of the rational" is indicative of the way in which Hegel was read at this time. He simply identified the "real" with all that one meets in the world, seeing no distinction in Hegel between authentic reality and empirically-known reality. Disregarding the role of negation in Hegel's notion of historical development, he apotheosized Nicholas' socio-political order. Belinsky, who did not know German, relied largely on Bakunin for his knowledge of Hegel. The derivative nature of his Hegelianism did not affect the ardour with which it was embraced, and Belinsky made his contribution to Bakunin's praise of the Russian government. A contemporary bore witness to this remarkable period in the lives of Bakunin and Belinsky:

The arrival of Bakunin in Petersburg in the winter of 1840 gave Belinsky great joy. Bakunin visited us almost every day and, full of monarchical ecstasy according to Hegel, related to us various anecdotes, which had been passed on to him ... to doubt the genius of Nikolai Pavlovich [the Emperor Nicholas] was considered a sign of ignorance. All this seemed a little strange to me; still, I too, following the authority of Belinsky and Bakunin, directed myself toward reverent admiration of the Monarch. 61

Belinsky's period of "reconciliation with reality", however, ended as abruptly and fervently as it had begun. His rejection of Hegel in the early 1840's was determined primarily by his deep concern with a problem which constituted the principal intellectual preoccupation of Russian Westernism throughout the nineteenth century -- the problem of Russia's proper relation to the West.
The question of Russia and the West is deeply rooted in Russian history. Russia's relatively late entry into Christendom originally prompted an anxiety over her place among the other Christian peoples which was allayed by appeals to Christ's parable of the labourers in the vineyard (Matthew 20). The next major expression of the question was prompted by the rise of Moscow as the political centre of Orthodoxy after the fall of Constantinople in 1453; the monk Philotheus' teaching that Moscow was the last and greatest temporal centre of Christendom -- the "Third Rome" -- demonstrated an enormous growth in the self-confidence of the Russian Church since the tenth century. The problem of Russia's proper place among the world's peoples received its first great secular expression in N. Karamzin's History of the Russian State, written in the early nineteenth century. Under the influence of French enlightenment thinkers Karamzin interpreted Russian history as the progressive evolution of the Russian state. His emphasis on the state rather than the church had as its corollary an emphasis on the problematic relation of Russia to the states of modern Europe, rather than to the Eastern or Western churches. Under the influence of German thought the secular expression of Russia's historical destiny was further developed and disseminated among educated Russians. Probably the most significant writing of Russian Schellingianism was Odoevsky's Russian Nights, in which it was asserted, in opposition to all preceding generations of Russian Westernism, that Russia had a positive contribution of her own to make to civilization (that is, Western civilization). But it was after the appearance of Hegel's thought in Russia that the German philosophical formulation of the old question of Russia's destiny came to be on everyone's lips. The question of the role which Russia was to play on the stage of world-history was a constant subject of discussion.
and debate among educated Russians of every description. However, the lack of certainty about Russia's proper relation to the West was responsible for a deep division within Russian Westernism.

This division was based on the common conviction, derived from Hegel's thought, that European civilization had reached its apogee and, at the same time, was coming to an end. The depressing thought that the World-Spirit had thitherto overlooked Russia was banished by the expectation encouraged by Hegel himself that the World-Spirit which was passing out of Europe may find a new home for itself further West, in North America, or to the East, in Russia. The Russian Westernists regarded the United States with curiosity, but with little respect, and certainly not as a likely centre of a renewed Western civilization. Herzen's dismissal of the United States as "... the last, well-produced edition of the same feudal-Christian text and, what is more, in a crude English translation"62 expresses the common view of educated Russians. They were convinced that the Russian people, by virtue of their proximity to Europe, their lack of identification with only one part of Europe and, above all, their greater spiritual depth, were the more likely bearers of a renewed civilization. This agreement within Russian Westernism, however, provided the impulse for the Slavophile-Westernist controversy, which dominated intellectual life after 1840. Herzen's well-known dictum concerning this controversy is particularly apt: "... like Janus, or the two-headed eagle, they and we looked in different directions while one heart throbbed within us."63 The Slavophiles thought that the fulfillment of Russia's historical destiny depended on the recognition and fostering of the unique spirit of the Russian people, although they themselves were very much the product of the
Russian turn to the West. For they received the initial impulse for much of their thought -- especially the concept of the unique "spirit of a people" -- from Schelling and Hegel. However, as they came to the realization that the content of the unique spirit of the Russian people was, first and foremost, Orthodox Christianity, their thinking came increasingly to reflect the teaching of the Greek Church Fathers. Although the Slavophiles went to "some German peterschule, sitting over a German book and repeating its everlasting German lesson", 64 this initial German schooling was merely a preparation for an attempt to return to the theology of the Greek Fathers, and by means of this theology to respond to the important questions faced by Russians in the modern world. This tendency was especially true of the two greatest Slavophiles: A. Khomyakov and I. Kireyevsky. 65 The Westernists, on the other hand, maintained that it was the very lack of uniqueness or "exclusiveness" of the Russian people in relation to Europe which made them peculiarly receptive to Western civilization. They argued that this receptivity destined the Russian people to provide a fresh and more abundant soil for what was best in Europe, and this they tended to identify with the civilization which arose out of the French Revolution. Belinsky was among this group.

The critical question of Russia's relation to the dynamic socio-political situation of Europe during the decade preceding the revolutions of 1848 required a sober appraisal of that "surrounding reality" which Belinsky had thitherto ignored in favour of the "charming inner world of German contemplation." 66 Ironically, Belinsky's return to the mundane realm of history was, at the same time, a renunciation of Hegel. Belinsky's character gave an added impetus to this renunciation: he was not naturally
given to contemplation, and the impetuosity of his temperament, as well as a deep sensitivity to human suffering, would have made it difficult for him to content himself for long with meditation on the sublimity of Hegel's logical categories. By 1842 Belinsky became convinced that socialism was the ultimate, and best, fruit of Western civilization which was to take up its new abode in a youthful, energetic Russia. He thus became allied with Herzen who declared that "the free and rational development of Russian national life coincides with the aspirations of Western socialism."\textsuperscript{66}

Socialism had become for Belinsky, in his own words, "the idea of ideas, the being of beings, the question of questions, the alpha and omega of belief and knowledge."\textsuperscript{67} The socialism to which he turned with such fervour was that French "utopian" socialism of Pierre Leroux, Louis Blanc, George Sand, Saint-Simon and Fourier, whose writings had been making their way into Russia at an increasing rate after 1840. It was under the influence of these French socialists that Belinsky penned his famous retort to Hegel on behalf of those whose suffering cannot be alleviated by reference to the "cunning of reason":

\begin{quote}
No thank you, Egor Fedorovich [Hegel], with all due respect to your philosophical cap; let me inform you, with all respect for your philosophical philistinism, that if I did succeed in reaching the top of the evolution ladder, I would demand even there an account from you of all the victims of the conditions of life and history, of all the victims of accident, superstition, the Inquisition, Philip II, etc., etc., otherwise I will throw myself headlong from the top rung. I will not have happiness if you gave it to me gratis unless I feel assured about every one of my blood brothers, the bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh. Disharmony is said to be a condition of harmony: that may be very profitable and pleasant for melomaniacs, but certainly not for those whose fates are destined to express the idea of disharmony. \textsuperscript{68}
\end{quote}

The sort of socialism which Belinsky professed after 1842 permitted Russian Westernists to direct a growing urge for practical activity in a way
which would not be totally incompatible with their previous lofty, un-worldly aspirations. Activity in this world would be for the sake of a world transformed in accordance with the true Christian teaching -- a world of freedom, equality, and brotherhood which had been proclaimed politically in the French Revolution, and had not yet achieved a complete social realization. In the article entitled "One of the Contemporaneous Falsehoods" Dostoyevsky notes the religious aura in which French socialism lived among the Russians:

... at that time the affair was conceived in a most rosy and paradisiacally moral light. Verily, socialism in its embryo used to be compared by some of its ring leaders with Christianity and was regarded as a mere corrective to, and improvement of, the latter, in conformity with the tendencies of the age and civilization. All these new ideas of those days carried to us, in Petersburg a great appeal; they seemed holy in the highest degree and moral, and -- most important of all -- cosmopolitan, the future law of all mankind in its totality.

Moreover, French socialism's emphasis on social rather than political action must have appealed strongly to men who knew that any political activity implied a confrontation with the formidable power of Nicholas' state.

Belinsky did much in his writing to propagate the "New Christianity" of Pierre Leroux, George Sand, Louis Blanc, Cabet, Lamennais, Saint-Simon, and Fourier. However, his own allegiance to this socialism was ultimately and uncharacteristically ambiguous. In "One of the Contemporaneous Falsehoods" Dostoyevsky depicts Belinsky as a fervent advocate of French socialism and he remarks elsewhere that at this time Belinsky bowed before France "with a reverence approaching weirdness." However, "Old People" reveals a different Belinsky. According to Dostoyevsky, Belinsky, as a socialist, felt "duty-bound to destroy the teaching of Christ, to call it fallacious and ignorant philanthropy, doomed by modern science and economic tenets." And he impugned not only the teaching of Christ, but Christ himself:
... there remained the radiant personality of Christ himself ... the beatific image of God-man, its moral inaccessibility, its wonderful and miraculous beauty. But in his incessant, unquenchable transport, Belinsky did not stop even before this insurmountable obstacle...

"Believe me that your Christ, if he were born in our time, would be a most imperceptible and ordinary man; in the presence of contemporary science and contemporary propellers of mankind, he would be effaced!"

He later accedes, however, to the suggestion of an interlocutor that if Christ returned to earth he would join the socialists. This ambivalence concerning the relation of Christ to socialism is highlighted by the list of thinkers to which Dostoyevsky ascribes the greatest influence over Belinsky at this time:

These propellers of mankind, whom Christ was designed to join, were then the French: George Sand, the now altogether forgotten Cabet, Pierre Leroux and Proudhon, who was then only beginning his activities. As far as I remember, at that time Belinsky respected these four most. -- Fourier had already lost much of his prestige. -- They were being discussed through whole evenings.

There was also a German before whom Belinsky bowed with great deference, namely, Feuerbach. (Belinsky, who all his life was unable to master any foreign language, pronounced the name of Feuerbach as "Fierbach." ) Strauss was spoken of with great reverence.

It is clear from Dostoyevsky's account that Belinsky's conversion to French socialism was being rapidly undermined by the teaching of the left-Hegelians, especially Feuerbach and Strauss. It is not clear whether or not Belinsky was dubious of the compatibility of Christianity with socialism before he encountered the teaching of these German thinkers. The unsuitability of his temperament for compromise of any sort makes this likely.

At any rate, the reading of Feuerbach's *Essence of Christianity* and Strauss' *Life of Jesus* was decisive for him. By 1845 he was proclaiming the logical necessity of the relation between atheism and socialism -- "he knew that the
revolution must necessarily begin with atheism." Although Dostoyevsky
does not refer specifically to the influence of Marx's thought on Belinsky,
it was apparently decisive also. After reading Marx's articles, "On the
Jewish Question" and "A Contribution to the Criticism of Hegel's Philosophy
of Right", Belinsky wrote to Herzen:

I have accepted the truth — and in the words "God" and
"religion" I see darkness, gloom, shackles, and the knout;
and now I love these two words as much as I love the four
that follow them. 72

Belinsky's fiery temperament, whether or not suited to careful re-
fection, imbued him with a passion for consistency and, with this passion,
an uncanny ability to sense evidence of intellectual compromise. His
atheism thus began to propel him beyond Feuerbach to Max Stirner's critique
of atheist humanism. By 1847 he was arguing that if there is no God then
there is no "humanity" (and no "love of humanity"), but only the selfish
"ego." His interest in Stirner's critique of humanism was supplemented by
an interest in the physical sciences (especially the physiology of Emile
Littré), which he was convinced would reveal the natural laws determining
the "ego" of Stirner's thought. Belinsky averred that modern science may
never be able to solve completely the "mystery" of the individual "personality",
just as it cannot tell precisely what electricity and magnetism are. But
he maintained that the scientific approach to man, in all his aspects, was
the only proper one. He thought that modern science may eventually "penetrate
the mysterious laboratory of nature, and by observations of the embryo ...
trace the physical process of moral evolution." 73

Belinsky's turn to Stirner and modern science did not signal a renewed
indifference to political and social questions. He was apparently convinced
that the scientific study of the individual "ego" would constitute the basis
for the construction of a society which would be a harmonious unity, and at
the same time fully in accord with the true nature of the individual. Belinsky dedicated himself to the construction of such a society for the sake of mankind's happiness. Thus, perhaps in the most important respect, he did not completely discard Feuerbach's humanism. In his "Letter to Gogol", written just before his death in 1847, Belinsky declares that Russia's salvation lies in the success of "enlightenment" and "humanity"; and he even appears to revert to his "utopian" socialism in referring to Christ as "the first to bring to people the teaching of freedom, equality, and brotherhood and set the seal of truth to that teaching by martyrdom." Belinsky was not quite willing, for the sake of his atheism, to reject the remnants of Christian morality inherent in the humanism of Feuerbach. This unwillingness, and the apparently contradictory position in which it placed Belinsky, is attested to in Dostoyevsky's recollection:

He knew that moral principles are the basis of all things. He believed, to the degree of delusion without any reflex, in the new moral foundations of socialism ... Here was nothing but rapture. Still, as a socialist, he had to destroy Christianity in the first place. He knew that the revolution must necessarily begin with atheism. He had to dethrone that religion whence the moral foundations of the society rejected by him had sprung up. Doubtless, he understood that by denying the moral responsibility of man, he thereby denied also his freedom; yet, he believed with all his being ... that socialism not only does not destroy the freedom of man, but, on the contrary, restores it in a form of un-heard of majesty, only on a new and adamantine foundation. 75

Belinsky's extraordinarily rapid movement from a Romanticism based on Schelling and Hegel to "utopian" socialism, and then through left-Hegelianism to some sort of "scientific" socialism represented, in a condensed form, the development which the mainstream of Russian Westernism was to undergo in the course of the nineteenth century. Two of the most illustrious names in the history of Russian Westernism underwent an intellectual development which was almost identical to that of Belinsky. Under the influence of the
German left-Hegelian, Arnold Ruge, Bakunin made amends for his earlier disregard of Hegel’s idea of negation. His energetic application of his principle that "the passion for destruction is also a creative passion" made him as famous (and as dubious) a Russian ambassador to Europe in the nineteenth century as Peter the Great had been in the eighteenth. Herzen's reading of Hegel was characterized by greater caution, consistency, and intellectual acumen than that exhibited by any Russian Hegelian of the nineteenth century. 76 This reading, nevertheless, led him very quickly to the left-Hegelianism expressed in his conviction that Hegel's thought is the "algebra of revolution." And his growing interest in the natural sciences, especially after the defeat suffered by European socialism in 1848, led him increasingly to combine his socialist hopes for a future "golden age" with a rigorous scientific "realism". For Dostoyevsky, it is clearly Belinsky, above all, who embodies the tendency in Russian Westernism which was manifest in all three. The picture which he presents of Belinsky initiating him into "European liberalism" signifies the intellectual influence of Belinsky on a generation of Russian youth.

This influence, however, was to be realized posthumously. Belinsky's tempestuous intellectual transformations were not shared by the majority of his Westernist contemporaries of the 1840's. Indeed, the rapid movement of Belinsky, Herzen, and Bakunin from French socialism to left-Hegelianism resulted in a division within Russian Westernism which became apparent shortly after the Slavophile-Westernist split. The chief issue of this new controversy is clearly indicated in the argument which took place in 1845 between Herzen and T.N. Granovsky over the immortality of the soul. 77 Granovsky, possibly the most attractive and certainly the most beloved of
Russian thinkers of the nineteenth century, is described by Dostoyevsky in an article entitled "Idealists - Cynics" in The Diary of a Writer:

Granovsky was the purest of all men of those days; he was irreproachable and beautiful. An idealist of the forties -- in the loftiest sense -- he possessed the most individually peculiar and original nuance among our progressives of a certain pattern of his time.

An extremely influential professor of European history at the University of Moscow, he was chiefly responsible, through his public lectures during the 1840's, for propagating Hegel's thought in Russia. His interpretation of Hegel remained consistently and stubbornly independent of the later left-Hegelianism of Belinsky, Herzen and Bakunin, which saw in Hegel a thinker afraid to face the revolutionary implications of his own thought. Granovsky's reluctance to give up some sort of belief in God led him to understand Hegel in a way which bears some resemblance to the early Hegelianism of Belinsky and Bakunin in its interpretation of Hegel's thought as a new religion. Granovsky, however, applied his religious interpretation of Hegel to political and social questions. He identified Hegel's Absolute with the Christian God whose Providence guides the free man towards the accomplishment of his moral destiny -- that is, life within a "humane" society of freedom, equality, and brotherhood. He derived from Hegel, above all, the notion of an historical progressivism which buttressed his hope for the eventual attainment of the realm envisaged by the "utopian" socialists. Granovsky's reluctance to give up some sort of belief in God also expressed itself in his continued adherence to the Romantic notion of an immutable truth existing beyond spatio-temporal limitations and manifesting itself as beauty to the intuition of the artist. He was, in Dostoyevsky's words, a preacher "of the beautiful and the lofty". Granovsky's thinking was typical of the majority of Westernists of the 1840's, but within a decade Belinsky's "scientific" socialism was to eclipse completely the attempt to combine some
sort of belief in God with an interpretation of history as a progress
toward a perfect society of freedom, equality, and brotherhood. Already
by the early 1850's Granovsky himself seemed to sense that he had lost his
prominent place in Russian intellectual life and, despondent, he spent most
of his time gambling at cards.

We must now return to the question of Belinsky's influence on
Dostoyevsky. Did Dostoyevsky, unlike the majority of Russian Westernists
(represented by Granovsky), "passionately" embrace all of Belinsky's
teaching after their first meeting in 1845? In "Old People" Dostoyevsky
does not say what aspect of Belinsky's teaching he embraced, although it
is in this same article that he is so careful to distinguish the principal
phases of Belinsky's intellectual journey. In the second article concerning
his "European liberalism" of the 1840's, "One of the Contemporaneous
Falsehoods", Dostoyevsky does state clearly that Belinsky initiated him
into the "New Christianity" of the French socialist thinkers:

Already in 1846 I had been initiated by Belinsky into the
whole truth of that future "regenerated world" and into the
whole holiness of the forthcoming communistic society. All
these convictions about the immorality of the very foundations
... of modern society, the immorality of religion, family,
right of property; all these ideas about the elimination of
nationalities in the name of the universal brotherhood of man,
about the contempt for one's native country, as an obstacle to
universal progress, and so on, and so forth -- all these
constituted such influences as we were unable to overcome and
which, contrariwise, swayed our hearts and minds in the name of
some magnanimity. 79

Dostoyevsky further reinforces the above statement when, in this article,
he characterizes his thinking during the 1840's as that of a "Petrashevetz".

Petrashevsky, founder of a circle which Dostoyevsky joined in 1848,
was an ardent follower of Fourier, and his adherence to French socialism
was generally shared by the members of his circle. Subsequent to the
European upheaval of 1848 the highly theoretical and diffuse discussions of
the circle became imbued with a new sense of practical urgency, and the members came increasingly to focus their attention directly on Russian political and social conditions. This practical concern expressed itself above all in the formulation of two objectives: the abolition of serfdom and the reform of the Russian legal system. It is notable that in the realm of practice the Russian "New Christians" had to resort to the familiar liberal goals of the Decembrists. They apparently found the writings of the French socialists of little aid in formulating clear practical objectives, as well as in deciding the best means of attaining these objectives. This question of means was the source of deep division in the circle. The once friendly and relaxed discussions concerning the intricate details of Fourier's "phalanstery" gave way to tense debates concerning the relative merits of peaceful propaganda among the people, or violent political agitation which would establish a political democracy or even a temporary dictatorship. The presence of this dissension (as well as the ever-increasing number of new members) prompted the formation of several satellite circles centred around the original Petrashevsky circle. One such circle devoted itself entirely to the theoretical elaboration of Fourier's doctrines; another, the Palm-Durov circle, was composed of those who were more interested in literature than in Fourier; and a third, the Speshnev circle, was formed to promote a revolution in Russia by sowing discontent with the established order everywhere, beginning with the young people in the schools.

It is evident, then, that the word "Petrashevetz" encompasses various possibilities. A reasonably precise idea of the sort of "Petrashevetz" which Dostoyevsky was can be gleaned from the recollection of his acquaintances, as well as from his own testimony and that of his fellow prisoners during the government's investigation of the Petrashevsky circle. All
such testimony indicates that Dostoyevsky's "European liberalism" at this time reflected, above all, the teachings of French socialism. Dostoyevsky was apparently familiar with the writings of Saint-Simon and Fourier, as well as with historical accounts of the French revolution by Thiers, Mignet, and Louis Blanc. He was known, moreover, to have borrowed the following books from Petrashevsky's library: Louis Blanc's Histoire de dix ans, which is concerned with the historical developments which led to the formulation of "utopian" socialism; a popularization of Fourierism by Paget, entitled Introduction à l'étude de la science sociale; and Etienne Cabet's Le vrai Christianisme suivant Jesus Christ. Although Dostoyevsky was later to remark that at this time he "believed in all the theories and Utopias", it is apparent that his dedication to the theories of French socialism was markedly less than that of Petrashevsky himself. In his testimony before the investigating tribunal Dostoyevsky admitted his sympathy for the intentions of French socialism, and he stated his admiration for the intelligence and fervent love of mankind manifest in its theorists. But he also asserted that the application of any of their proposed theoretical social systems would be impossible and undesirable, and not only in Russia but also in France. The circumstances of this declaration may cast some doubt on it, but it is generally corroborated by the observations of other "Petrashevtszi" concerning Dostoyevsky's participation in the circle. One of these, A. Milyukov, later recalled:

We all studied the Socialists, but all were far from believing in the possibility of the practical realization of their plans. Among these latter was Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoyevsky ... he read the Socialist writers, but regarded them critically. Agreeing that at the foundation of their doctrines there was a noble aim, he nonetheless considered them only as estimable visionaries.
It is clear, moreover, that Dostoyevsky's overriding social concern at this time was with the abolition of serfdom. At meetings of the circle he spoke often and fervently on this subject, whereas he evinced an indifference to discussions concerning the fine points of socialist theory. It is likely that Dostoyevsky's interest in French socialism and his involvement in the Petrashevsky circle was primarily an expression of a deeply felt need to give some sort of social expression to his intense inner life. He attests to this need in a letter to his brother written at this time:

> It is indeed true that the dissonance and lack of equilibrium between ourselves and society is a terrible thing. External and internal things should be in equilibrium. For, lacking external experiences, those of the inward life will gain the upper hand, and that is most dangerous. The nerves and fancy take up too much room, as it were, in our consciousness. Every external happening seems colossal, and frightens us. We begin to fear life.

The intense desire for some association between thought and practice did not prompt Dostoyevsky to accept entirely the easy association of the two offered in French socialism. His acceptance of the "New Christianity" was tempered, not only by a cool appraisal of the gulf between the socialist vision of a perfect society and its practical application but also by his continued loyalty to the aesthetics of the earlier Romanticism. The example of French social literature and, later, Belinsky's influence did not move Dostoyevsky to put his art at the service of the socialist cause. Although Belinsky hailed Dostoyevsky's first novel, Poor Folk, as "the first attempt at a social novel we've had", the young author resisted this sort of interpretation, even at the risk of forfeiting the acclaim which Poor Folk earned him. He refused to give up the idea of art which he formed during the period of his friendship with Schidlovsky, despite his intense desire for practical social action. This indicated a refusal to consider
the question of social order apart from the question of the individual's final destiny beyond any social order, which is partially revealed to the artist's intuition. It is clear from his writings during the 1840's (Poor Folk, The Double, Mr. Prokharchin, The Landlady, White Nights, Netochka Nezvanova) that Dostoyevsky did not think that a rational reorganization of society could be the necessary and sufficient solution to the problem of human suffering which he portrays so powerfully. From these writings it is evident that, for him, the laws arrived at by the natural and social sciences are not adequate to fathom the ultimate "mystery" of man. It could perhaps be maintained that underlying Dostoyevsky's adherence to both romanticism and "utopian" socialism was the stubborn, though inarticulate, presence of his childhood Christianity, which he apparently continued to profess throughout the 1840's. This Christianity seemed to be compatible with the twofold emphasis on an individual destiny free of the limitations of any social order, and a "golden age" of brotherhood realized on earth, which characterized Dostoyevsky's "European liberalism" during the 1840's.

The fact that Dostoyevsky was a "Petrashevetz", of the sort we have described, after meeting Belinsky seems to indicate that Belinsky did not initiate him into anything more radical than "utopian" socialism. Belinsky, however, certainly attempted to take him further. As Dostoyevsky recalls in "Old People":

I do not at all exaggerate his ardent attraction to me, at least during the first months of our acquaintance. I found him a passionate socialist, and, straight off the bat, he embarked upon atheism.

Belinsky immediately "embarked upon atheism", but Dostoyevsky would not renounce the vague Christianity which informed his liberalism. In "Old People" he recalls Belinsky's consternation at this:
"I am even touched to look at him", said Belinsky, suddenly interrupting his furious exclamations, turning to his friend and pointing at me. "Every time I mention Christ his face changes his expression, as if he were ready to start weeping..."  

Dostoyevsky's Christianity at this time apparently expressed itself as a devotion to the person of Christ; but he also parted company with Belinsky for the same reason that Granovsky rejected Herzen's left-Hegelianism. This is evident from a brief ironic note which Belinsky addressed to Dostoyevsky shortly before the rift between Herzen and Granovsky over the immortality of the soul: "Dostoyevsky, my soul (immortal) longs to see you." However vague and uncertain Dostoyevsky's conviction of the immortality of the soul may have been at this time, it clearly signified a refusal to acquiesce in Belinsky's atheism. Belinsky thus took Dostoyevsky as far as the mainstream liberalism of the 1840's represented by men such as Granovsky -- and no further.

In "Old People" Dostoyevsky states that he embraced all of Belinsky's teaching. His liberalism did entail implications which may explain this exaggeration. He refers to these implications in "One of the Contemporaneous Falsehoods", where he compares his political activity during the 1840's with that of the young people who followed the revolutionary socialist, Nechaev, in the 1870's:

How do you know that the Petrashevtsi could not have become the Nechaevtsi, i.e., to have chosen the "Nechaev" path, would things have turned that way? ... probably I could never have become a Nechaev, but a Nechaevetz -- for this I wouldn't vouch, but maybe I could have become one ... in the days of my youth.  

Evidence of Dostoyevsky's participation in the Speshnev circle indicates that this assertion is not an exaggeration. He was definitely a participant in a plot to print pamphlets designed to incite a violent insurrection of
the Russian peasantry. The moving force of this plot, N. Speshnev, was a remarkable figure who, like Belinsky, had traversed the road from the "New Christianity" to an explicitly atheist socialism. The reasons for Dostoyevsky's participation in Speshnev's conspiracy are obscure, but it seems clear that this participation did not signify any accord with Speshnev's atheism. Whatever the various circumstances which pushed him into participating in Speshnev's secret programme of political terrorism, it was clear to Dostoyevsky in retrospect that his liberalism, far from being incompatible with such practical activity, had actually rendered him peculiarly vulnerable to Speshnev's influence. Referring to this influence, he avows that he was then "unable to struggle against it. And so, why do you think that even murder (à la Nechaev) would have stopped — of course, not all, but at least, some of us — in those fervid times, in the midst of doctrines fascinating one's soul?"

Thus, in his autobiographical reflections on the development of Russian Westernism, Dostoyevsky deliberately associates his "European liberalism" with Belinsky's "scientific" socialism, and his practical participation in the Petrashevsky circle with that revolutionary socialism of Speshnev which gave practical expression to Belinsky's declaration that "men ... must forcibly be led to happiness." His concern in making these associations is not with strict autobiographical accuracy, but with indicating the basic direction of the historical development of Russian Westernism after 1840. The "European liberalism" of Dostoyevsky, which held the majority of Russian Westernists during the 1840's, was to find its true theoretical expression in the "scientific" socialism of Belinsky's last years, and its later practical expression in Nechaev's revolutionary socialism.
In 1849, Dostoyevsky's active participation in the Petrashevsky circle resulted in his arrest and sentencing to penal servitude and exile in Siberia. This marked the beginning of a decade of experience which was to alter profoundly his relation to Russian Westernism. In 1849 Dostoyevsky had been prepared to die for his "liberal" convictions. Ten years later he returned from Siberia to begin the critique of Russian Westernism which was to preoccupy him until his death. In one of his last autobiographical reflections he expresses the change wrought in him by saying that in Siberia "I received Christ into my soul once more whom I knew in the home of my childhood, and whom I all but lost when in my turn I changed into a European liberal." In a letter written to his brother just after learning that his death sentence was to be commuted to ten years of prison and exile in Siberia Dostoyevsky speaks of his future in a manner suggestive of his "European liberalism":

There will be men beside me, and the important thing is to be a man among men and to remain a man always, whatever the misfortunes, not to despair and not to fall - that is the aim of life, that is its purpose. He did come to know man in Siberia "not from books, not from abstract theory, but from experience". However, he found his "European liberalism" inadequate when confronted with this direct experience of man.

Dostoyevsky's experience of man in Siberia was, first, the experience of the Russian people. He wrote to his brother towards the end of his exile: "I have learnt to know the Russian people as only a few know them. I am a little vain of it. I hope that such vanity is pardonable." The men whom he came to know so well were criminals, but, in his view, they were nevertheless representative of the Russian people, and even "exceptional men... perhaps the most gifted, the strongest" of the Russian people. His initial
experience of the Russian people was an experience of the depth of his own separation from them. For the first time he came to know directly the distance which the years after Peter the Great had placed between the Westernized gentry and the bulk of the Russian people. He bears witness to this gulf throughout *The House of the Dead*. The "impassable" gulf was characterized not only by indifference but by an active, abiding hatred of the people for the gentry in their midst. Dostoyevsky describes this attitude in a letter to his brother:

Their hatred for the nobility is boundless; they regard all of us who belong to it with hostility and enmity. They would have devoured us if they could... A hundred and fifty foes never wearied of persecuting us -- it was their joy, their diversion, their pastime... 

This experience posed a grave problem for his "European liberal" convictions. His liberalism was perhaps primarily responsible for his persistent effort to establish contact with these Russian representatives of oppressed humanity; but it was precisely this liberalism which made contact so difficult. He found it difficult to see and accept the Russian people as they actually were, not as he and his fellow "Petrashevtsi" had imagined them to be in theory. But, more significantly, his liberal convictions had all but eclipsed in him that which the Russian people still held most dear -- their Orthodox religion. Dostoyevsky was surprised and impressed by the piety of his fellow prisoners. In *The House of the Dead* he describes the incredible transformation wrought during Christmas and Easter in the usually coarse, shameless, and cynical demeanour of these representatives of that people which Belinsky had characterized as "innately atheist":
[on Christmas Day] one heard nothing of the usual swearing and quarreling. Everyone realized that it was a great day and a holy festival ... [at the Lenten service preceding Easter] the convicts prayed very earnestly and every one of them brought his poor farthing to the church ... to buy a candle, or to put in the collection ... When with the chalice in his hands the priest read the words: "...accept me, O Lord, even as the thief", almost all of them bowed down to the ground with a clanking of chains, apparently applying the words literally to themselves. 98

In the "Epilogue" to Crime and Punishment Dostoyevsky reverses Belinsky's dictum by having the criminals from among the common people accuse the educated member of the gentry, Raskolnikov, of atheism. Whether deeply participated in or not, the customary observances of Orthodoxy were obviously cherished by the Russian people. Dostoyevsky thus found that his "European liberalism" excluded him from sympathetic communion in that which was held most dear by the people for whom he would have died. He was always to associate the Russian people very closely with Orthodoxy; but he never failed to distinguish the two and to state very clearly that, in the final analysis, he loved the Russian people only insofar as they were Orthodox — and not the contrary. 99 His concern for communion with the people was a secondary factor in a turn from liberalism to Orthodoxy which had its primary motivation elsewhere.

Through his experience in Siberia, Dostoyevsky discerned that his liberalism was simply unable to account for the fundamental mysteries of human life. One such mystery, which particularly overwhelmed him, was that of human evil. Among others, a criminal named Orlov, who had murdered children in cold blood, excited Dostoyevsky's horrified fascination:

"I can confidently say that I have never in my life met a man of such strength, of so iron a will as he ... His was unmistakeably the case of a complete triumph over the flesh. 100

Dostoyevsky could not accept that this man's
evil, in which was exhibited a "complete triumph" over the flesh, was entirely attributable to a corrupt or unjust social structure. The vision of the flowering of human goodness in a society of "freedom, equality, and brotherhood" based on reason appeared woefully inadequate in the face of Orlov's contemptuous laughter. Dostoyevsky discerned in Orthodoxy, however, an appreciation of the mystery of evil which was lacking in his liberalism.

In a letter written after five years in Siberia Dostoyevsky stated that his suffering had enabled him to "see the truth more clearly". This association of truth and suffering indicates that he was already moving from the "New Christianity" of French socialism to Orthodox Christianity. Finding the rational liberal account of the "mystery of man" insufficient in the face of actual experience, Dostoyevsky was turning towards Orthodoxy, and simultaneously, towards the Russian people who were the bearers of that Orthodoxy. (It should, moreover, be noted that his experience was constantly regarded in light of the New Testament, the only reading available to him for years in Siberia). This turning was the most significant of the transformations which, in his words to his brother, were "undergone by my soul, my faith, my mind, and my heart in those ... years". He clearly regarded the change wrought in him by his Siberian experience as the final significant alteration of his convictions. For his autobiographical reflections end with his release from the prison where he "received Christ into his soul once more". As we shall see at a later point in the thesis, this return to Christianity did not entail a renunciation so much as a redemption of his former "European liberalism".

When Dostoyevsky returned to the intellectual life of St. Petersburg
in 1860 he found that the debates within the Russian intelligentsia (especially the Slavophile-Westernizer controversy) were no longer confined to the polite conversation of the "circles". The intellectual life of Russia now lived, with much less restraint, in the plethora of journals which came into being in the early, relatively unrepresive years of Alexander II's reign. Moreover, there was a significant inner change in the Russian intellectual world. The Slavophiles had lost their greatest thinkers, A. Khomyakov and I. Kireyevsky. In Dostoyevsky's view, the thought of these men had been transformed by their more shallow disciples into a tiresome litany expressing an impotent yearning for the pre-Petrine past and a self-righteous indignation at everything new in the present. Slavophilism had degenerated into a futile conservatism of the Moscow gentry, and was no longer equal to the struggle with its Westernizer opponents. These opponents, too, had changed. The journal, The Contemporary, which Belinsky had founded in the 1840's was, in the 1860's, in the hands of thinkers such as Dobrolyubov, Pisarev, and Chernyshevsky, who were the mentors of a new generation of Westernists. The majority of this generation was well along the road which Belinsky had travelled so rapidly during the 1840's.

Dostoyevsky adopted an independent and conciliatory stance in relation to the Slavophile-Westernist controversy. This mediatary position is evinced in the articles written shortly after his return from Siberia for his own journal, Time. In these articles he defends the Slavophile return to the Orthodoxy of the Russian people against the enlightened and cosmopolitan atheism of the Westernists. And he defends the passion for truth and universality of the Westernists against the complacent and inward-looking religious nationalism of the Slavophiles. Dostoevsky never
abandoned his mediatory position between the two movements. In one of his last public statements, the Pushkin Speech in 1881, he called for a reconciliation between the Westernists and the Slavophiles, asserting that their controversy was a "great misunderstanding". He was able to call for a reconciliation because he never wholly identified himself with either movement, always distinguishing in both between that which he affirmed and that which he rejected. He was a "Slavophile" insofar as Slavophilism affirmed the truth of Orthodox Christianity, and the Russian people as bearers of this truth. He was a "Westernist" insofar as Westernism moved towards a truth for all men. Both of these positions will concern us in this thesis. But we must now turn to the question of what Dostoyevsky affirms and rejects in Russian Westernism. On the basis of this chapter's historical introduction to his critique of Russian Westernism, we shall now turn to the critique itself.
CHAPTER TWO

DOSTOYEVSKY'S CRITIQUE OF RUSSIAN WESTERNISM: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE "GREAT IDEA" OF ORDER

In his rough notes for The Possessed, Dostoyevsky states that the problem of Russian Westernism, and the chief concern of the novel, "amounts to no more than the question as to what ought to be considered 'truth'." The meaning of Russian Westernism is for him, above all, a question of the "truth" which is at its centre and which it voices. Dostoyevsky always associates a thought with a thinker, and thus our elucidation of the "truth" spoken by Russian Westernism must be concerned with two questions: what is being said and who is speaking. Dostoyevsky's response to the latter question could be expressed in one word -- the "uprooted". An exposition of this response is the concern of the first section of this chapter, which will draw widely from his primary and secondary writings. The question of his interpretation of what is being said in Russian Westernism will direct us primarily towards the two novels, The Possessed and A Raw Youth, in which he permits Russian Westernism to express itself most fully.

I Uprootedness and its Consequences for Human Order

Dostoyevsky's concern with the historical development of Russian Westernism is, as we have seen, primarily a concern with the process whereby the Russian gentry was uprooted from its native "soil":

59
Where did this society come from? Oh, you, historians of ours, celebrating the 200th jubilee [birthday of Peter the Great]; tell me, whose work this is, whatever caused or contributed to the uprooting from the soil? For Dostoyevsky, the "uprooting from the soil" signifies a separation from both the land and the people, a separation which implies the loss of those traditions which express the self-understanding of a particular society.

Westernization had always been closely associated with the consolidation of serfdom, and this tended to bind the gentry to the land rather than separate them from it. The uprooting of the gentry from the land, then, was not an immediate consequence of Peter's turn to the West. In an article in The Diary of a Writer ("Former Agriculturists -- Future Diplomats") Dostoyevsky points to the abolition of serfdom (1861) as the direct cause of the exodus of the gentry from the land. Uncertain, and frightened by the liberation of the serfs, many of the gentry reacted by selling their land and living off the revenues in St. Petersburg and Moscow, or abroad in Europe. Dostoyevsky was concerned with the threat posed to the Russian economy by this "devouring of fundamental capital", and more importantly, with the threat which it posed to the general health and stability of Russian society. He maintains in the same article that the soundness of any social order -- its domestic affairs, laws, morality -- depends on the establishment of a seriously and solidly organized system of land-ownership; and that the fundamental political character of a nation -- whether, for instance, it is to have an aristocratic or democratic regime -- is determined by the character of land-ownership. In Dostoyevsky's view, the question of who will ultimately own the land in Russia had become an open one. The land was continually being sold and re-sold, and the owners were changing
constantly.

The weakening of the traditional land-holding class had left a vacuum in the Russian social order which could not be filled by any other class. Their recent emancipation had thrown the peasantry into a condition of self-seeking confusion; because of the late industrialization of Russia the merchant class was not a significant factor in Russian society; and the urban bureaucracy was almost entirely restricted to the "abstract" city of St. Petersburg where, in virtual isolation from Russian life, it attempted to impose an artificial order from above. In any case, Dostoyevsky's conviction of the dependence of a healthy social order on a stable system of land-ownership would preclude any hopeful consideration of the urban classes, even if they did become powerful enough to usurp the traditional role of the landed gentry. In his view, a healthy society presupposes an established life on the land because the land is the most effective material support for the preservation of those traditions which constitute the fabric of social order. Life on the land, for instance, makes men less susceptible to the power of money, which Dostoyevsky regarded as a prime dissolvent of tradition.

The uprooting of the Russian gentry, however, had begun before its separation from the land. For Dostoyevsky regarded the gentry's divorce from the people as a more fundamental aspect of its uprootedness than its later divorce from the land. For nearly a century before the emancipation of the serfs the gentry had been effectively separated from the people by the influence of modern Western education. The land may be the most appropriate material frame-work for the preservation of tradition, but it is the people which is the actual bearer of tradition. Indeed, for Dostoyevsky, a people is nothing apart from its adherence to a certain set
of traditions.

Dostoyevsky thought that the ultimate source of those particular traditions which constitute the unique identity of a people lies in a human impulse which can be broadly termed "religious". He characterizes this religious impulse (through Shatov) in The Possessed as follows:

It is the force of an incessant and persistent affirmation of its [i.e. a people's] existence and a denial of death. It is the spirit of life, as the Scripture says, "rivers of living water", the running dry of which is threatened in Revelation. It is the aesthetic principle, as the philosophers call it, an ethical principle, with which they identify it, the "seeking of God" as I call it much more simply. The purpose of the whole evolution of a nation, in every people and at every period of its existence, is solely the pursuit of God, their God, their very own God, and faith in Him as the only true one. God is the synthetic personality of the whole people, taken from its beginning to its end. 9

As we shall see, Dostoyevsky's own thinking cannot be equated with Shatov's Russian nationalism. Nevertheless, he did think, with Shatov, that the religious impulse always precedes and determines the appearance of the socio-political traditions of a people. In the Pushkin Speech Dostoyevsky maintains that "always so soon as a new religion began, a new nationality was also created immediately". 10 By way of illustration he points to the formation of the Jewish nationality only after the promulgation of the law of Moses, and to the appearance of the Moslem nationalities only after the Koran; and Shatov maintains that the Greeks deified nature and their religion was philosophy and art, while the Romans deified the people in the State and bequeathed the State to the world. Any attempt to understand a people apart from the particular living religion at its centre would be, in Shatov's words, to transform it into dead "ethnographical material". 11

For Dostoyevsky, "uprootedness" is, above all, the loss of those traditions which have their source in religion. His unfolding of the
consequences of uprootedness thus depends on his understanding of the place of religion in human life. It can be inferred from his discussion of religion and nationality in the Pushkin Speech that he thinks that religion fulfills a double function for man: it gives man an idea of the ultimate meaning of his life; and it gives him a way of living out his daily life in accord with this idea. Dostoyevsky understands religion according to its most literal, and general, meaning of "binding together." Religion binds man's life together in providing him with an "order" within which to live.

Dostoyevsky thought that a religion effectively provided order for man to the extent that it was the source of both private and public meaning. In the rough notes for a projected article, to be entitled "Socialism and Christianity", he speaks of the "spontaneous" life which was possible for human beings in the "primitive patriarchal communities". In these ancient communities everyone obeyed implicitly the authoritarian patriarchal laws having their source in an idea of God which was "the collective idea of humanity, the masses, everyone." Dostoyevsky seems to think that "spontaneous" life was possible in these patriarchal communities because each individual was wholly integrated into the unity of the common life, and everything around him confirmed rather than threatened his idea of his final destiny and his active living out of this idea. The identity of public and private virtue, or of the religious and the secular, precluded any tension between the order of the individual and that of society. This complete order, "about which legends have been left", was superseded by "civilization". "Civilization", according to Dostoyevsky, is marked, above all, by the development of "personal consciousness" -- that is, the "disintegration" of the mass into individual personalities. The growth of
"personal consciousness", or individual "freedom", undermines the complete order of the community. The individual begins to develop a "hostile, negative attitude toward the authoritative law of the mass", and his denial of the authority of the patriarchal law entails at the same time a rejection of the God of his fathers. Dostoyevsky asserts that the "disorder" resulting from the "loss of a living idea about God" is, in fact, a "disease" which is recognizable in certain general symptoms:

"... man in this condition feels bad, is sad, loses the source of living life, doesn't know spontaneous sensations and is conscious of everything."

How was the complete order of the patriarchal community undermined? It is not clear, from the rough notes which we have been quoting, whether Dostoyevsky regarded "personal consciousness" as a symptom or as a cause of "civilization". In these notes he does not explicitly associate the divorce between public tradition and the private quest for meaning with the tension between the ancient city and philosophy, but he does claim that Christianity encouraged "the extreme development of the individual and personal will". The question of the relation between Christianity and the ancient city, however, is directly pertinent to his critique of the West, rather than the critique of Russian Westernism which concerns us now. In regard to the latter, Dostoyevsky's statements concerning the ancient patriarchal community are of importance to us primarily because they furnish the theoretical criterion according to which he assesses various degrees of "order". For him, the satisfaction of the human need for order is more or less total as there is a more or less complete harmony between the public and the private, the secular and the religious.

Dostoyevsky thought that the religious impulse of the Russian people had attained its most characteristic form in the idea of Orthodoxy and in
the pattern of traditions which gave expression to this idea. His conception of the precise nature of the relation between the Russian people and Orthodoxy will concern us at a later point in this thesis. Here, we shall merely note his contention that Orthodoxy is "a live sentiment which, in our people, has become one of those basic living forces without which nations cannot exist". Whether or not they are justified in this, the Russian people pride themselves, above all, on the name Pravoslavni ("Orthodox"), and denote the whole of their land of Russia and themselves as Khrestiantstvo (the "Christened"). Whatever the extent of the Russian people's comprehension or acceptance of the Orthodox idea, Dostoyevsky had no doubt that the customary observances of the Orthodox Church constituted the core of that pattern of traditions by which their lives were regulated. The uprooting of the Russian gentry from the people was thus, at the same time, a separation from the Orthodox way of life of the people. The steadily growing separation from the people after Peter's reform coincided with an increasing tendency to see in the Orthodox Church "nothing but dead formalism, segregation, ritualism, and ... even prejudice and hypocrisy". The growing inclination of the Westernized gentry to live their lives outside the order provided by Orthodoxy was, for Dostoyevsky, the most significant consequence of that "uprooting from the soil" to which he so often alludes. The order of pre-Petrine Russia was not so complete as that of the ancient patriarchal communities; but, insofar as Orthodoxy allowed itself to become a public cult, or civil religion, the inhabitants of Muscovite Russia lived within an order which afforded a high degree of "spontaneous" life. Russian Westernism's rejection of the Orthodox religion resulted in the loss of the order which it provided. Dostoyevsky thought that the rejection of Orthodoxy was so radical, and the ensuing gulf between
private conceptions of life and public tradition so vast, that the "disease" of disorder was able to ravage the Westernized gentry with particular virulence.

Dostoyevsky's treatment of the problem of disorder consists, in part, in a chronicling of the external social consequences of the loss of a common idea of the meaning of human existence. His deep concern with contemporary Russian social life is evinced by his almost obsessive reading of the newspapers and his repeated attempts to observe, at first hand, any significant social phenomenon which came to his attention. 16 His remarkable ability to discern significance in apparently unexceptional phenomena is attested to not only in his journalistic writings but in the novels themselves. (A study of the notebooks for the novels reveals the enormous role which the newspaper played as a source of material for his art). Dostoyevsky is possibly the greatest observer and chronicler of the social consequences of the uprootedness engendered by the Westernization of Russia. And his writing is an invaluable source for those who are interested in the social consequences of uprootedness wherever it occurs.

Dostoyevsky attached great significance to social phenomena such as suicide, alcoholism, the general aversion to work, and the disintegration of the family which he thought accompanied uprootedness. However, he was most deeply interested in a symptom of disorder which he regarded as more fundamental than these -- the appearance in society of the "underground" type of man.

Dostoyevsky considered that his own "glory" lay in his discovery of the "underground", which had been overlooked by those who shared his concern with the more superficial and easily identifiable consequences of
uprootedness. He speaks of this discovery in his rough notes for A Raw Youth where, with other Russian artists such as Tolstoy in mind, he reveals something of the intent of his art, and justifies its peculiarly dissonant quality:

They are passing by. They don't notice. There are no citizens, and nobody wants to make an effort and force himself to think and notice things. I haven't been able to tear myself away, and all the shouts of our critics ... who say that I am not depicting real life, haven't dissuaded me. Our society has no foundations, it hasn't worked out any rules of life ... And what about the underground and Notes from the Underground? I am proud to have presented, for the first time, the real image of the Russian majority, and to have exposed, for the first time; it's misshapen and tragic aspects ... "Underground, underground, Poet of the Underground", our feuilletonists have been repeating over and over again, as if this were something derogatory to me. Silly fools, it is my glory, for that's where the truth lies. 17

Dostoyevsky's attempts at an artistic portrayal of the "underground" bore fruit in characters such as Raskolnikov (in Crime and Punishment), Stepan Verkhovensky and Kirilov (in The Possessed), Versilov (in A Raw Youth), and the protagonist of Notes from Underground, to mention only those he specifies in the rough notes from which I have quoted. These various representatives of the underground share the common historical destiny of uprootedness: "the reason for the underground is the destruction of our belief in certain general rules ... as a consequence of the Petrine reforms in general". 18 Those who are deprived of order participate in that "tragedy" of the underground which Dostoyevsky describes as the tension between an "awareness of a better life" and the "impossibility of attaining it". 19

Dostoyevsky's most explicit treatment of the "tragedy" of the underground is to be found in Notes from Underground. The underground type's awareness of the possibility of a "better life" is an expression of that
need for order, or religious impulse, which Dostoyevsky considers to be so central to human beings. The protagonist of Notes from Underground consumes himself in dreams of "the sublime and the beautiful", and eagerly anticipates a destiny as vague as it is sublime:

I gave myself over entirely to dreaming -- dreaming away for three months on end, huddled in my corner ... What my dreams consisted of and how I was able to content myself with them would be hard to explain today ... I had faith, hope, love. That's just it, I had blind faith that, by some miracle, some force would push aside the confining screen, opening up a wide horizon, on which would be a worthwhile life-work, useful and sublime, and above all, all cut out and waiting for me... 20

The underground-man's identification of his yearning for "the sublime and the beautiful" with a desire for a life-work of some sort is indicative of a need to give practical expression to his most elevated aspirations. After months of dreaming, he is invariably overwhelmed by an urge to venture out into the world, and to throw himself on someone's neck and "hug all mankind in the concrete person of someone". As we have noted, Dostoyevsky understands the human need for order as a need both to have an idea of the ultimate meaning of life and to put this idea into practice. The underground-man's yearning is similarly twofold: his aspiration towards "a better life" is inseparable from his urge to give it a practical expression of some sort. The extent of the gulf between the dream and the practical realization is devastatingly demonstrated, however, by the outcome of the solitary dreamer's ventures into the concrete world.

This world is inimical to the seeker of meaning. Even as a school boy the underground-man was appalled at the incredible stupidity revealed on the faces of his school-mates, the pettiness of their thoughts, and the inanity of their games and preoccupations. He denies that they were grasping the real meaning of life, while he was escaping into a nebulous
dreamworld; on the contrary, "they didn't grasp a damn thing, and
certainly not the meaning of life", for they ignored life in their ex-
clusive worship of success. It is surely not remarkable that somebody
with any degree of spirit would experience difficulty in entering a world
in which, at sixteen, most young people were already interested only in
"nice, secure little jobs". Like the character in Pushkin's "Bronze
Horseman", the underground-man is a victim of society; a clerk in the
massive St. Petersburg bureaucracy, he too is relentlessly crushed by this
impersonal social reality. This, and the reminiscence of his early school
days, as well as the brutally off-hand manner in which he is treated at
Zverkov's dinner, elicits the reader's sympathy. The underground-man's
overweening pride in regard to those who live contentedly in a society
which is spiritually dead is perhaps understandable; after all, as he
himself asserts, he is merely guilty of being more intelligent than all
those around him. And yet, an admixture of envy is apparent in this con-
tempt for the "real, normal man of action". This envy is possible because
the underground-man cannot help despising himself: "after all, how can a
man with my lucidity of perception respect himself?" His pride is mingled
with self-contempt because in his moments of self-awareness he perceives
that the tension between thought and practice which he experiences is
located more within himself than in his relation to the outward social
structure. The way to the "better life" is barred by base impulses which
vie for precedence with his elevated aspirations. The more conscious he
is of "the good and the beautiful", the deeper he sinks into the mud, and
the more likely he is to "remain mired in it". 

It is evident, from his own confession, that the underground-man's
attempt to live a "better life" fails, not primarily because he is re-
jected by others, but because a perverse impulse within himself seeks this
rejection. In the depths of humiliation he discovers and admits that he
loves to be humiliated; indeed, he derives a pleasure not only from the
humiliation of social rejection but, in general, from the realization of
the inner contradiction of his nature. This realization, rather than
hindering his impulse towards dissipation, seems "to spice it up by
contrast, and, like a good sauce, helps bring out the taste". Even the
suffering which stems from his experience of the futility of his highest
aspirations is rendered ambiguous by his perverse impulses. He confesses
that his "moans", like those of all suffering nineteenth-century intellect-
uals, are not "ordinary" moans. They are malicious and spiteful, and
expressive of pleasure as much as pain. 22

The underground-man is really suffering from a profound inner dis-
order. He lacks religion, and hence the two-fold order which religion
offers: he possesses neither a definite idea of the meaning of life nor a
way of living out his life in accord with such an idea. His vision of a
"better life", inspiring though it may be, is a hopelessly uncertain
mélange of second-hand, half-understood notions derived largely from a
debased version of 1840's Russian liberalism. References to Byron,
Rousseau, Heine, and George Sand, and vague allusions to the "sublime
and the beautiful" and "love of mankind", do not constitute a clear idea
of human destiny. 23 And even if his notion of the "better life" was
sufficiently distinct, he would be unable to order his life accordingly,
for he is deprived of the disciplining effect of religion. In the
absence of a religious tradition offering guidance and discipline, the
underground-man has had no opportunity to acquire the self-control which
would enable him to bring the contradictory impulses of his nature into some sort of harmony. 24

In Dostoyevsky's thought the problem of individual order is ultimately inseparable from that of social order. Although it is clear from his portrayal of the underground-man that he does not regard the "tragedy of the underground" as the outcome of a certain structure of social relations, the problem of social order is nonetheless irrefutably present in his delineation of the underground type. The absence of religion in the life of the underground-man is undeniably associated with the social phenomenon of Westernization. His suffering is, after all, that of the nineteenth-century Russian intellectual who "has been uprooted from the soil and lost contact with the people". As Dostoyevsky asserts in a footnote to Notes From Underground:

... people like the author of these notes may, and indeed must, exist in our society, if we think of the circumstances under which that society has been formed. It has been my wish to show the public a character of the recent past more clearly than is usually shown. 25

The appearance of this type in society, moreover, is a fact of great import for the question of social order. Unable himself to attain the "better life", the underground-man comes to the conviction that everybody else is like him. He comes to regard his own disorder, not as an aberration, but as an immutable fact of human life. His own experience teaches him that man is fundamentally "whim", "caprice", or arbitrary "will". Pointing to this fact, he casts doubt upon the possibility of any social order on the ground that man will ultimately reject any order which demands the subordination of his will to an end other than itself:
So one's own free, unrestrained choice, one's own whim, be it the wildest, one's own fancy, sometimes worked up to a frenzy — that is the most advantageous advantage that cannot be fitted into any table or scale and that causes every system and every theory to crumble into dust on contact ... all man actually needs is **independent** will, at all costs and whatever the consequences. 26

Nonetheless, it is clear that, despite his awareness of the unattainability of the "better life", the underground-man will continue to yearn for it and will yet again reach out into the world to "hug all mankind in the concrete person of someone". He regards his disorder as a fact from which he even derives a voluptuous pleasure; but also as an affliction from which he yearns to be delivered. He loves his suffering; but this knowledge itself is a source of suffering. Out of his awareness that "we've all lost touch with life and we're all cripples to some degree", he is still able to long for "real life". This longing for "real life" or "spontaneous" life is actually a longing for order, for, as we have seen, Dostoyevsky thinks that the "spontaneity" of life is directly proportionate to the completeness of the order within which it is lived. The underground-man's yearning for "real life" is a desire for order, despite his doubts concerning the possibility of any human order. 27

The longing of the uprooted for order is, first, the longing for an idea, or "truth", which could serve as the source of order. In his rough notes for *The Possessed*, the novel which deals most explicitly with Russian Westernism, Dostoyevsky writes:

> To sacrifice one's self, to sacrifice everything for truth — that is the national trait of this generation. May God bless it, and may he give it a true understanding of truth. For the whole problem amounts to no more than the question as to what ought to be considered "truth". 28

This longing for truth is faced with the complete absence of a common "guiding idea". In the absence of a stable pattern of inherited convictions,
"personal consciousness" alone becomes the arbiter of truth: "Aren't there thousands of people each of whom has his own idea and, along with it, a belief that it is precisely his little idea that is going to save everybody?" The thirst for ideas, to the point of self-sacrifice, and the absence of an inherited intellectual concord could combine in an explosive manner. Dostoyevsky's fear of the possible negative consequences of such a combination is memorably expressed in Raskolnikov's dream in the "Epilogue" to Crime and Punishment, where this combination takes on the appearance of a "terrible plague" which eventually reduces the entire world to a condition of total anarchy. All of Dostoyevsky's uprooted characters seek an idea to which they can give themselves. Although their interpretations of truth vary in depth and clarity, as well as in content, they demonstrate a similar selflessness in the degree to which they give themselves up to an idea once they have found one. Indeed, they come to embody their truths. In his attempt to give artistic form to this situation, characterized by the absence of a binding idea and the consequent proliferation of ideas dependent on various "personal consciousnesses", Dostoyevsky employed a literary technique which can be termed "polyphonic". Russian Westernism speaks with many voices in Dostoyevsky's writing because those who speak are uprooted.

It is hoped that the condition of those who speak has been clarified sufficiently that we may pass on to the question of what, according to Dostoyevsky, is said in Russian Westernism.

II The "Great Idea": The Westernism of the 1840's

By the 1840's the dominance of European ideas and the intellectual confusion of the then completely uprooted Russian gentry had reached a
zenith. It almost appeared as though the only idea shared by Westernized Russians was that all ideas must come from Europe. In the *Diary of a Writer* Dostoyevsky emphasizes the difficulty of discerning a common idea within the chaotic milieu of second-hand European thought:

In fact, nothing in the world was ever as obscure, vague, uncertain, and indefinable as that "cycle of ideas" which we managed to accumulate in the course of the two centuries of our Europeanism; essentially, it is not a cycle, but a chaos of fragments of sentiments, of alien unintelligible ideas, inferences, habits, but particularly words, words, words ... 31

The range of ideas floating through the air in Russia was as extensive as nineteenth-century European intellectual life. As we have seen in the preceding chapter, Dostoyevsky nonetheless purported to discern an intellectual coherence in Russian Westernism which belied the immediate impression of chaos. Although, in his view, the majority of Russian Westernists perceived in Western teachings "nothing but a right to infamy", 32 the better among them had been captivated by a teaching which seemed to promise an end to their confused longing for order. The conception of a new order is first to be discerned in that liberalism of the 1840's which Dostoyevsky permits to express itself through Stepan Verkhovensky in *The Possessed* and Andrei Versilov in *A Raw Youth*.

In his rough notes for *The Possessed* Dostoyevsky indicates that he means Stepan Verkhovensky to embody the "pure and idealistic Westernizer in his full splendour". It is also clear from these notes that Verkhovensky is modelled chiefly after the historian, Granovsky, who, as we have seen, was the most outstanding figure in the mainstream of the Westernism of the 1840's. 33 Verkhovensky, too, has become painfully aware of his obsolescence with the passing of the 1840's, and he contents himself in his retirement with cards, drink, and the "amiable, jolly, typically Russian liberal chatter"
of a provincial "circle" of which he is the honoured mentor. The "liberal idealist" is a celebrity in the small provincial town; his name is spoken in the same breath as those of Belinsky, Granovsky, and Herzen. Judging from his activities towards the end of the 1840's, his notoriety is apparently well deserved: while a history professor at the university he crushed the Slavophiles with his brilliant thesis on the civic and Hanseatic significance of the German town of Hanau between 1413 and 1428; he courted the wrath of Nicholas' Third Section by his propagation of the ideas of George Sand; and he began a work of research into the causes of the "extraordinary moral nobility of certain knights of a certain epoch, or something of the kind". Verkhovensky's career as an influential Westernizer came to an abrupt end when Nicholas' secret police seized a manuscript of an unintelligible but evidently dangerously liberal poetic play, written while he was studying in Berlin and circulated in manuscript "among two literary dilettanti and one student". In anticipation of the government, he exiled himself. Although he surrenders to a self-pitying nostalgia for the time of his past greatness, Verkhovensky does not give up his faith in the "great idea" which inspired him then. Although the personal portrait which Dostoyevsky draws of the "liberal idealist" is, according to his own admission, a caricature of Granovsky, the thinking which he ascribes to Verkhovensky accurately reflects the teaching of the most prominent Westernizer of the 1840's:

Due to its "muddled" nature, Verkhovensky's "liberal idealism" does not lend itself to systematic exposition. Nevertheless, in the course of the novel he gives utterance, in a random way, to the thinking which characterized Granovsky and his followers. The intellectual configuration which emerges out of his various utterances can be seen to be that amalgam
of Russian Romanticism and French socialism typical of the mainstream of 1840's Westernism. This amalgam constitutes the external intellectual framework within which is located that "great idea" which Verkhovensky serves. But what, precisely, is the content of this idea which he has "long revered as sacred"? In order to come to this idea we must attend to the cardinal fact of uprootedness which, for Dostoyevsky, most fundamentally conditions Russian Westernism, and hence, Stepan Verkhovensky.

The Russian upper classes did not effectively resist their uprooting, but their acquiescence in this process was involuntary. Although it later became voluntary, their co-operation was a matter of expediency, marked primarily by opportunism, or servility before the power of the Petersburg state. In the liberal Westernism of the 1840's, however, the denial of roots became a matter of principle. The central element of Verkhovensky's "muddled" idealism is his theoretical denial of the Russian particularity. He concedes his inability to argue with Shatov's accusation that his liberalism is "antinational ... nurturing a personal hatred toward Russia", and he does not deny Shatov's contention that he despises his native country. Moreover, he seems to assent to Shatov's characterization of Russian Westernism as a denial of nationality on principle. He is quite willing to concede "the uselessness and absurdity of the expression 'native country'". Although he claims to love the Russian people, Verkhovensky is not willing to grant any respect to the particular traditions which constitute their identity. In this regard he cites Belinsky, whose love for the people certainly did not induce him to "seek salvation in lenten oil or turnips with peas". Dostoyevsky intimates in the *Diary of a Writer* that in this rejection of Russia there is an irreducible element of physical
hatred -- hatred for "her climate, her fields, her forests, her status, her liberated peasants, [her] history ... for everything". He thought that this instinctive hatred of the uprooted for the rootedness which is no longer theirs was especially characteristic of the more vulgar Russian Westernists. His chief concern, however, was with that denial of Russia "on moral grounds" which was so characteristic of the finest representatives of the Westernism of the 1840's. Stepan Verkhovensky's rejection of the Russian nationality on principle is, for him, a moral act; for it is in accord with the "great idea" to which he is devoted.

Dostoyevsky, however, never attributes to Verkhovensky a clear statement of this "great idea". Verkhovensky's rejection of the Russian tradition appears to depend on his assumption of the moral superiority of himself, and of those like him, to those who are still bound by their traditions. He declares that "the nobleman is everything, for the elements of civilization and leadership are concentrated in him". He is the bearer of "civilization", and this constitutes his superiority to, and hence, right to leadership over those who are still rooted in the Russian soil. His unreflective acceptance of his own superiority, though amusing, is not very instructive, for the nature of the "civilization" which he embodies is far from clear. The superiority of his "civilization" can hardly consist in the ability to intersperse his conversation with French aphorisms, nor even in an easy familiarity with the most recent European ideas. Such second-hand "Europeanism" may have satisfied the more vulgar majority of Russian liberals in their complacent assumption of superiority, but Stepan Verkhovensky is a "pure and idealistic Westernizer in his full splendour", a man capable, in his better moments, of generously and courageously defending his convictions. The "civilization" to which Verkhovensky aspires is something more than a faithful mimicry of Europe. Although he does not,
in the various expressions of his "liberal idealism", delineate the content of his "civilization" in a positive manner, some idea of it may be inferred from the negative emphasis of his assumption of superiority. Verkhovensky apparently derives a sense of moral superiority from his lack of attachment to any particular nationality. The "civilization" to which he aspires, then, must be one which excludes attachment to a particular rootedness as obsolete, "useless", and "absurd". Uprootedness is accorded its recognition and justification in the idea of the "universal man", for it would seem that only those who are not bound within a particular order could truly participate in a "universal civilization".

For further clarification of this idea of a universal order, which is vaguely discernible in Stepan Verkhovensky, we must turn to another of Dostoyevsky's "liberal idealists" of the 1840's— Andrei Versilov (in A Raw Youth). Versilov is a self-conscious "liberal idealist" who lacks the purity, but also the muddled naïveté, of Stepan Verkhovensky. Versilov, too, denies nationality on principle, but his affirmation of the "universal man" is much more explicit than Verkhovensky's. He maintains that the aspiration of the Russian gentry towards universality cannot be entirely understood as yet another instance of borrowing from Europe, for the Russian "concern for the world" is not manifest to the same degree among Europeans.

They still cannot understand that in Europe, Europe has produced noble types of Frenchmen, Englishmen, and Germans, but it still knows almost nothing about the man of the future. In order to serve mankind as a whole, and even just France for that matter, a Frenchman must remain thoroughly French. And the same goes for an Englishman or a German. Only a Russian— even in our time, that is, much earlier than the coming-to-be of universality— has fulfilled his deepest possibility, has become most Russian, only when he also feels completely European. And this is the most important difference between us and all the others, for we are different from the rest...
The acknowledged capacity of uprooted Russians to enter easily into the spirit of other particularities -- to be a Frenchman in France, a German in Germany, even a Hellene in ancient Greece -- is, according to Versilov, evidence of a capacity to prepare the advent of the universal "man of the future". This capacity is what distinguishes and ultimately justifies the existence of the uprooted Russian gentry -- and, indeed, the existence of Russia itself:

After centuries a certain higher cultural type has been produced which has not before been seen anywhere in the whole world, a type filled with a universal concern for all mankind. This type is purely Russian, and since it is still confined to the upper cultural layers of the Russian nation, I have the honour of belonging to it. There are, perhaps, at the present time no more than a thousand representatives of that type ... but, so far, Russia has existed in order to produce that thousand men ... I'm a pioneer of the Russian idea. 46

The "Russian idea", according to Versilov, is the idea which will reconcile all conflicting ideas, and will serve as the foundation of a future order of "universal citizenship". 47 Versilov's revelations are (to quote his son, Arkady) "incoherent", and the "Russian idea" is "of course unthinkable". 48 In the absence of an elucidation of its positive content, the "Russian idea" could be suspected of being synonymous with the absence of ideas, and the boasted reconciliation of all national ideas with the spreading of disorder among more rooted peoples. Such a surmise would have a natural plausibility in light of the evident uprootedness of the "chosen thousand". If the universalism of the Russian liberals is not directed towards a positive new order, then it is merely a rationalization of disorder. In this case, the finest representatives of Russian liberalism would merely lack the uncompromising integrity of the underground-man who confesses his disorder. Dostoyevsky, however, thought that the "great idea"
of the Russian liberals was much more than an eloquent justification of their own uprootedness. We shall now attempt to elucidate the positive vision of a new order by which Versilov is enthralled.

The nature of the uprooting of the Russian gentry would seem to render inevitable their understanding of their own uprootedness according to European thought. Versilov tends to equate the capacity for universalism with the ability to feel "completely European". The Russians may possess the capacity for a universal concern to a greater degree than the Europeans; but it is to Europe that Versilov turns for guidance in defining and directing this concern. Most Russian Westernists, as we have seen, turned to the promise of a universal order contained in the European liberal-socialist tradition. Dostoyevsky claimed that "nine-tenths" of those Russians who turned to Europe in the nineteenth century invariably joined the "liberal, the 'left camp', i.e. that camp which itself denies its own culture, its own civilization". They tended to gravitate towards the element in the "left camp" which was most uncompromising in its universal aspirations. Thus they preferred to become socialists rather than to "hover first in the lower grades of liberalism". When in Paris in 1870 Versilov may have deplored the burning of the Tuileries, but he did consider it "a logical act" and he is later described as a "champion of the Paris Commune". Russian liberalism borrowed from the European left according to its most powerful needs. On the basis of what it chose to emphasize and to ignore the product of this borrowing acquired a distinctive, Russian quality. Nevertheless, it was Europe which provided the fundamental content of the "great idea" which claimed the allegiance of the best Russian liberals.

Dostoyevsky designates the teaching adopted by the Russians as the
"Geneva" idea. He obviously considered Rousseau to be the greatest exponent of the thought which he designates as "Geneva" thought. However, he does not associate this thinking exclusively, or even primarily, with Rousseau. His "Geneva" designation refers to the entire stream of thought which found its original inspiration in Rousseau. When he speaks of the "Geneva" idea Dostoyevsky is thinking, at the most immediate level, of the slogan of the French revolution -- "freedom, equality, and brotherhood" -- and of the theoretical elaboration which was subsequently given to it. Broadly speaking, this would include French liberalism, the French socialism which appeared almost at the same time, and the German philosophical commentary on these movements. More specifically, "Geneva" thinkers would include such disparate figures as Rousseau, Saint-Just, Ledru-Rollin, Saint-Simon, Fourier, George Sand, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Feuerbach, and Marx. Dostoyevsky's account of the relative impact of these thinkers on Russian intellectual life has been considered in the first chapter of this thesis. Other than the general intellectual context established by this account, his elucidation of "Geneva" thought ignores questions of intellectual history, such as the question of which European thinker should be associated with particular aspects of "Geneva" thought. This question, and the question of whether the Russian liberals (and, for that matter, Dostoyevsky) were accurate in their interpretation of these thinkers, are beyond the scope of this thesis. Our concern here is not with intellectual history, but with Dostoyevsky's understanding of what is most fundamental in the "Geneva" idea which the Russian Westernists of the 1840's borrowed from continental Europe.
(i) Freedom

Versilov defines the Geneva idea as "virtue without Christ". The meaning of this definition is illumined in Versilov's thought and practice and, less clearly, in that of Stepan Verkhovensky. In his most explicit analysis of Versilov, in the rough notes for A Raw Youth, Dostoyevsky describes him as a man who has been deprived of the order provided by religion. Versilov is "convinced of the loss and of the stupidity of every ideal". Although he once attempted to force himself to believe in Christ, this attempt failed and "his whole faith went to pieces". Unable to recover the order of traditional religion, Versilov is compelled to rely on nothing but his own "conscious will"; he is compelled to acknowledge his freedom from any order which precedes his "conscious will." Although Versilov seems to think that freedom is inconceivable apart from the "conscious will", he does not define clearly the relationship between the two. It is clear, however, that he does not understand freedom as the emancipation of capricious desire -- doing what one pleases when one pleases -- nor does he understand it as a more rational emancipation of desire. On the contrary, for Versilov, freedom is intimately associated with morality and is thus set against natural desire. Versilov has lost his faith, but there still remains to him the "moral feeling of duty". This feeling of duty enjoins him to "strive for self-perfection and good actions under any circumstances ... regardless of any loss of faith". He does not give way to despair, but decides, instead, to start "straight from himself" in his quest for moral perfection. Sure of the connection between freedom and morality, he believes that he will "get somewhere, and that something will be revealed to him along the way".
(ii) Equality and Brotherhood

Versilov's Geneva thinking does not end with the rather austere notion of the moral striving of individual freedom. According to this notion, whatever their natural and conventional inequalities, all human beings are equal in the most decisive respect — the possession of a "conscious will", and hence the capacity for moral goodness. The fundamental equality of all men implies the possibility of an elusive, yet enticing vision of brotherhood which captivates Versilov. This vision is that of a perfect human society, a veritable "earthly paradise" or "Golden Age" in which man is not only perfectly moral but also perfectly happy.\textsuperscript{57} Versilov's association of this vision with ancient Greece may signify a yearning to return to the "spontaneous" life of the ancient patriarchal community. But the complete order of the ancient world excluded the individual freedom which the uprooted Versilov cannot deny, even if he wishes to. In the thinking of Versilov Dostoyevsky reveals a contradiction at the heart of Geneva thinking. It upholds individual freedom, and at the same time yearns for social unity; it associates moral goodness with an austere striving of the "conscious will", and yet it yearns for a fulfilled natural happiness. But Versilov does not resign himself to this contradiction. He transfers his vision of an earthly paradise from the Greece of "three thousand years or so" in the past to a future time, when "all the battles have been fought and the struggle is over".\textsuperscript{58} For Versilov, the future contains the hope of a social order in which the contradiction between individual freedom and social unity, and between morality and happiness, will be resolved.

Versilov points hopefully to a possible mediator of the contradiction —
love — which he thinks becomes effective in the world only when man is emancipated from the restraints of traditional religion. Versilov apparently thinks that love can become effective only independently of traditional religion because traditional religion divides men. Even Christianity, with its aspiration to universality, makes a general distinction between believer and unbeliever, if not between Greek and Jew. Those who do not live within any religious tradition are free for a love "encompassing all mankind". Versilov asserts, moreover, that love can be fully realized only when men acknowledge that their final destiny is an earthly one. Then the love which men have hitherto lavished on God will be freed for the earth:

With the great concept of immortality gone, they have to replace it with something, and the immense reserves of love that before were lavished on Him who was immortality are now directed toward nature, the world, fellow men, every blade of grass. The more clearly they come to realize how transitory and finite their own existence is, the more ardently they grow to love the earth and life, and that special love is different from anything they've felt before. They start noticing and discovering in nature moments and secrets that they never suspected until then, because now they look at it with different eyes, with the eyes of a lover looking at his beloved. On awaking, they rush to kiss one another in their haste to love, constantly aware that the number of their days is limited and that there is nothing left for them when these days are spent. They work for one another and each of them gives up all he has, and this giving is happiness-in-itself...because each is anxious for the life and happiness of each.

With this flowering of love the paradisiacal social order becomes possible. The free individual who stands over against nature will be reconciled to it through love. And the free individual who stands over against society will be reconciled to it through love. Love for men would induce the individual to give himself to society, and this same love would prompt society to devote itself to the good of the individual, because "each is for the life and
thus depends on the presence of a powerful love which can arise only when
man renounces his yearning for immortality, his fantasy ends with Heine's
vision of "Christ on The Baltic Sea". Apparently he cannot help
suspecting that men "couldn't manage without Him altogether". This
allusion to Christ may be merely a tacit acknowledgement of the indebted-
ness of Geneva thinking to Christianity. "Virtue without Christ" is thus
a radical rejection of Christianity, and at the same time an affirmation
of its work in preparing the way for the triumph of the Geneva interpre-
tation of freedom, equality, and brotherhood.

The "great idea" which Russian liberalism borrowed from the West to
give content to its universal aspiration is this idea of a universal
brotherhood of free and equal individuals who have renounced a yearning for
eternity for the sake of an earthly destiny. This idea of universal union
is the "virtue without Christ" which, according to Versilov, is the "idea
underlying today's civilization". It should be clear from Dostoyevsky's
account of the "great idea" that he regards it as a "political" idea only
in the broadest sense of the word. Russian liberalism, in his view, is
not concerned with constitutional reform or with the establishment of a
democratic regime, but with the attainment of a social order which will
fulfill man's ultimate destiny.

Dostoyevsky's emphasis on the atheism of Geneva thought is significant.
He clearly considers the interpretation given to Western liberal-socialist
thought by Russians such as Herzen, Bakunin, and Belinsky to reflect the
essence of that thought. Although Granovsky represented the majority of
Russian Westernists of the 1840's, his attempt to cling to the concepts of
God and immortality signifies, in Dostoyevsky's view, a failure to face the
consequences of his liberalism. In the context of Russian intellectual
history, Geneva thought could be regarded as that amalgam of Romanticism and "utopian" socialism characteristic of Granovsky, but with the explicit statement of the atheism which Dostoyevsky thought to be inherent in this amalgam. At this point in the thesis, however, we can merely note, without elaboration, Dostoyevsky's contention that the thought having its source in Rousseau essentially conceives man's final destiny to be earthly.

Through Versilov, Dostoyevsky presents not only his understanding of the essence of Geneva thought, which had captivated the best Russian Westernists of the 1840's, but also the ambiguity which he discerned at its centre, in the all-important notion of love. Versilov's dream of a love which will flow forth when man has turned to the earth is presented with all the powerful beauty of poetry. However, it is a dream which is unillumined by careful thought. Versilov cannot imagine men "turning into ungrateful and stupid animals" in the absence of God, but he can offer little in the way of a theoretical defence of this conviction. At one point in the rough notes Dostoyevsky does have him offer the following argument concerning the incompatibility of belief in God with the full flowering of man's potential:

If we believe in God, our respect for human reason must needs disappear, and from a disappearance of respect for human reason, also our respect for the image of man, which gave birth to reason, and consequently, also our respect for human dignity must disappear, and so our respect for one another...  64

When Versilov expounds his ecstatic vision of the "earthly paradise" in more prosaic language, he speaks, not of love, but of respect for the dignity of human reason. For Dostoyevsky this is an extremely significant characteristic of Geneva thought. When the Geneva vision is expressed with sobriety by its adherents, love tends to give way to reason as the basis of its
possibility. It is not surprising that reason should be of central importance in Geneva thought, because it is reason which criticized the traditional morality, thereby freeing men for a morality based on their own "consciences." — That is, for a rational morality. Dostoyevsky implies, however, that for Geneva thought reason not only emancipates humanity for the universal union of free and equal individuals. It tends also to be the ultimate foundation of this union. 65

The tendency towards the displacement of love by reason in Geneva thought is not surprising in light of the unreliability of love. Versilov finds that love is as uncertain in practice as in theory. Immediately after his confession of that dream of human harmony which filled him with the "sensation of universal love encompassing all mankind," he reveals the great difficulty which he has experienced in attempting to love just one human being — his common-law wife, Sofia. He claims that he did truly come to love Sofia; but the awareness of this love for her dawned on him only when he was far away from her, in Germany. This awareness came, moreover, only after he had formulated the idea that it is the duty of every moral and rational creature to make at least one person truly happy. Versilov maintains, in defence of his actual love for Sofia, that he did not put his idea into practice by attempting to make happy "any native German, man or woman, who happened to be close at hand." Instead, he sent for his Russian wife. Before she arrived, however, his love for her had been undermined by passion for another woman whom he met at a German spa. The evident dubiousness of Versilov's love for Sofia justifies his son's suspicion that this love is the literary notion of a Russian liberal, likely inspired by the reading of a book such as Poor Anton. 66
Arkady suggests that the love which Versilov thinks he bears for Sofia is actually derived from that "abstract, humanitarian love" that one feels for mankind as a whole. Although Versilov's love of mankind is "abstract" and not easily applicable in particular situations, it is, according to Arkady, a profound and completely sincere feeling. However, perhaps as a consequence of his own failure at an actual love -- "I have felt universal love, but I don't love Mother" -- Versilov himself casts doubts on the quality of his general love of mankind. He declares that it is impossible to love men as they actually are, that man is "physically unable" to love his neighbour. And yet his most ardent hope requires that he "must" be able to love mankind. Versilov suggests a way in which this contradiction can be overcome: "love of mankind" should be considered to be the love of an idea of man as he could be, rather than a love of man as he actually is. Otherwise, the concept of "love of mankind" is found to be "completely misleading". Thus, a balance could be struck between contempt for actual men and love for men as they could be in the future. Until the advent of the future man the best recourse is to follow the counsel of the Koran, according to which Allah bids the Prophet to look upon men as upon mice, do them good, and pass them by -- "it may sound haughty, but it's the right way."  

The notion of a gulf between men as they are and the "universal man" of the future determined the chief practical activity of Russian liberalism -- the "education" of the people. Assured of the superiority of the new universal order which could only come to be through uprootedness, they set themselves the task of making uprootedness a general condition. For the majority of Russian liberals, "education" was synonymous with the eradication of "prejudices". In Dostoyevsky's view, the zeal with which this was under-
taken tended to exhibit a self-righteous "despotism" towards the people. "Prejudice" was identified with anything which came to the people from their past. Thus, "enlightenment" of the people became synonymous with the people's renunciation of the past in favour of everything European, "... the refinement of European life, of European customs, clothes, drink, dances". Dostoyevsky curtly expresses the educational formula of the majority of Russian Westernists: "He who curses his past -- is ours!" He suggests that the despotism so manifest in the "education" of the people may be a natural extension of the historical relationship between the gentry and the peasantry, for the intense emphasis on education began at the same time as the weakening of the gentry's more direct physical power over the people. To Dostoyevsky, it was evident from the all-important practical activity of education that for most Russian liberals the balance between contempt for the people -- at times approaching "nausea" -- and love had been tipped towards the former.  

The "love of mankind" which is so fundamental to the "great idea" of Russian liberalism thus shows itself to be highly problematic, and this raises the question of whether the "earthly paradise" is realizable. This question is accentuated by Versilov's remark that the hoped-for mankind of his dream "has never really existed and never will". Nevertheless, he believes ardently in his vocation as a herald of "world citizenship" and "universal love". He is even willing to die for it. It would seem that Versilov believes in the "great idea" and works toward its realization, while at the same time knowing that this work will probably never be accomplished. The gulf between the "great idea" and the possibility of its actualization appears to be impassable. And yet Versilov does not despair. That "moral feeling of duty", commanding him to strive for "good
deeds" under any circumstances, banishes despair, if not the debilitating skepticism which continually threatens his vitality. He is still able to act, although the goal of his activity can only be a helpful inspiration, or guide, and not a certainty.

Dostoyevsky thus exposes a highly uncertain relation between thought and practice at the heart of Geneva thinking. The extent of this uncertainty determines the degree to which even the finest liberals are unable to overcome the disorder of the underground type. In them, disorder manifests itself, above all, as "ridiculousness". The startling contrast between Versilov’s elevated moral aspirations and his mad, pathetic behaviour in the climactic scene of *A Raw Youth* is one striking instance of this. Despite his "great idea", he is unable to control himself, to exercise self-restraint; for there is "disorder inside" him. Stepan Verkhovensky's purer, more self-assured liberalism is also replete with ridiculousness. As he himself concedes, his actual behaviour almost always fails to measure up to the loftiness of his ideas: "Et puis toujours des idées, et rien dans les faits".

In Stepan Verkhovensky and Versilov, Dostoyevsky presents what he understood to be the essential content of the "great idea" which inspired the best Russian liberals of the 1840's. And, at the same time, he discloses in them a gulf between the idea and its realization. The question remains as to what extent this gulf could be attributed more to the adherents of Geneva thought than to anything inherent in the thinking itself.

In his rough notes for *The Possessed* Dostoyevsky implies that the liberal idea could be regarded as a "seed" which, in the person of Stepan Verkhovensky, fell upon sand. Perhaps Verkhovensky and Versilov cannot provide good soil for this seed because, as "children of the age" of
transition, their living out of the idea is hampered by the remnants of the older tradition which they never succeed in discarding completely. Verkhovensky, for instance, still retains the traditional gentry fear of rebellion among the peasantry. And Versilov vacillates confusedly between his urge toward the order of the future and the traditional order embodied in Sofia. Such was to be the contention of those of the next generation of Russian Westernism, who maintained that the liberals of the 1840's were not sufficiently emancipated from the old traditions to permit the liberal idea to bridge the gap between dream and fulfillment. They regarded themselves as more fully liberated from the encumbrances of tradition, and hence a more suitable soil for the realization of the new order.

III Further Development of the "Great Idea": The Westernism of the 1860's

The relationship between the Westernism of the 1840's and that of the 1860's became, with the publication of Turgenev's Fathers and Sons, one of the central preoccupations of Russian thought. The Possessed was Dostoyevsky's version of Fathers and Sons. In this novel, and in the rough notes for it, Dostoyevsky encourages the most explicit self-expression of the Russian Westernism of the 1860's which is to be found in his writings. It will thus be the principal source for our exposition of his understanding of what was subsequently spoken in response to the "great idea" of Russian liberalism.

Dostoyevsky thought that the Westernism of the 1860's exhibited contrary extremities. On one hand he detected an appalling listlessness, a bored indifference to ideas of any kind and to life itself; on the other hand he found evidence of boundless energy, combined with fervently held convictions. According to Dostoyevsky, the former tendency was characteristic
of the sons of those vulgar liberals of the 1840's whose liberalism amounted to no more than a supercilious scoffing at tradition. Brought up without moral guidance, they were without any conviction which may have given shape and force to their lives. They were not even bequeathed the "outmoded" notion of filial duty and, in the absence of this notion, they sometimes roused themselves from their lethargy sufficiently to hate and despise the fathers who had failed them in the most important respect. The other sons, who were bequeathed the Geneva thinking of the finer representatives of 1840's liberalism, became men of energy and principle. But they too came to despise their fathers. Their contempt stemmed from a clear perception of the "ridiculousness" of the previous generation. They were determined to avoid this ridiculousness themselves, and hence to overcome the gulf between thought and practice which they discerned at its root. The "great idea" was to be translated from words into action, to be liberated from the interminable discussions of drawing-rooms and universities which have no issue in the actual world. Versilov's uncertain dream was to be made certain.

Although the Petersburg state had always been greatly interested in Western technology, as an intellectual movement Russian Westernism had never embraced modern science to the extent that it had embraced modern Western philosophy, history, literature, and even theology. By the 1860's, however, educated Russians were beginning to pay homage to scientific knowledge with a fervour which more than compensated their earlier lack of interest. The prestige of science in the West had become so great by the middle of the nineteenth century that a tendency to seek a scientific solution to the fundamental problems of human life became apparent. This tendency was so pervasive in Russia after 1860 that it was inevitable that
the discoveries of modern science would be applied to the "great idea" which had beguiled Russian Westernism since the 1840's. The initial product of this application -- "scientific" socialism -- proved extremely attractive to a generation which was interested in making the "great idea" an actuality rather than the plaything of cultured intellectuals. "Scientific" socialism was given its first significant expression in the writings of N.G. Chernyshevsky, the most outstanding Russian representative of the movement prior to Lenin. Chernyshevsky's political novel, What is to be Done?, became the catechism of "scientific" socialism. It is this novel to which Stepan Verkhovensky turns in a desperate attempt to ascertain the aspirations of the younger generation. What is to be Done? comes most explicitly under Dostoyevsky's scrutiny in Notes from Underground. Through the words of the underground-man Dostoyevsky expresses his understanding of the essential teaching of "scientific" socialism.

According to Dostoyevsky, "scientific" socialism teaches that man can be fully understood in terms of the necessary laws which science formulates. If regarded entirely as a product of necessity -- natural and social -- man is comprehensible as the sum of various calculable desires. Eventually the scientist of human nature will "find a formula at the root of all our wishes and whims that will tell us what they depend on, what laws they are subject to, how they develop, what they are aiming at in such and such a case, and so on and so forth -- that is, a real mathematical equation". When human desires have been identified, their relative strength assessed, and their origin (whether biological, psychological, or sociological) understood, it will be possible to organize them in the way which will ensure man's optimal satisfaction or "happiness". This organization will be increasingly complete as scientific knowledge of man expands to the point
at which it is possible finally to understand what actually governs what we now describe as our "free will". And such an understanding will one day be achieved, for "it is contemptible and meaningless to maintain that there may exist laws of nature which man will never penetrate". On the basis of a scientific understanding of man — that is, an understanding of man as he actually is — the realization of a complete social order (the image of which, for Chernyshevsky, was the London "Crystal Palace") is attainable. It will become merely a question of arranging relations among men so that the satisfaction of each individual's desires tends to cement social unity rather than to disrupt it. If necessary, man's desires can be changed so that they accord with the requirements of social organization. To the extent that this change can be effected with the voluntary co-operation of men, it is necessary to "re-educate" them to a knowledge of their true interests, so that they may act according to rational self-interest. To the extent that man's desires can be altered by the scientific manipulation of those social and physio-psychological factors which determine them, it is necessary to transform the social environment (first abolishing "irrational" social institutions such as the Church and the family) and, if possible, man himself. In undertaking these tasks, "scientific" socialism is encouraged by the assurance of success: history itself is moving progressively towards the actualization of the perfect social order, and man's agency is able merely to hasten or retard the progressive overcoming of the gulf between the "great idea" and its practical realization. For the sake of certainty, "scientific" socialism renders explicit a doctrine of historical progress which is much more subtle, and even ambiguous, in Geneva thinking.

The "reasonableness" of world history makes it a powerful guarantee
for the realization of the perfect social order. According to Dostoyevsky, it is the desire for such a guarantee which chiefly determines not only "scientific" socialism's turn to history but its attitude towards science itself. In his view, "scientific" socialism subordinates science to socialism. It regards the teaching of science as, above all, the most effective tool in the work of putting into practice the liberal idea of an "earthly paradise" embodying freedom, equality, and brotherhood. The overriding concern is with the "great idea", and science would be quickly renounced if it proved to be incompatible with this idea. As Stepan Verkhovensky remarks, "scientific realism" is a façade which conceals a more primary allegiance to "the sentimental and idealist side of socialism; its religious aspect, as it were; its poetry". The "science" of "scientific" socialism is that "half-science", unknown until the nineteenth century, before which "science itself trembles and surrenders in a shameful way". It is only a "half-science" because the quest for knowledge is not motivated by the concern for truth, as in genuine science, but by the concern for social order. This concern even determines the particular scientific disciplines which are adopted by the Westernists of the 1860's. The natural and social sciences of physiology, anatomy, psychology, and sociology, which make man their object of study, are of greatest interest to those whose primary concern is to organize men into a complete social order.

According to Dostoyevsky's presentation of Geneva thought, love is to mediate between the individual and the social union. However, as we have seen, the crucial but uncertain notion of love tended to give way to reason. This tendency was carried to its logical conclusion in the sons. Unwilling to tolerate any gulf between the Geneva idea and its realization, they excluded love completely from any role in binding together the new order.
Reason, instead, was to reconcile the individual and society. Although the "scientific" socialists continue to invoke "love of mankind" as the ultimate justification of their social teaching, they rely entirely on reason -- which they identify with modern science -- as the means for its actualization. 87 "Scientific" socialism assumes that a scientific understanding of man as entirely subject to natural and social necessity could be the basis of a social order which would embody not only the natural happiness of mankind but also the genuine morality of the free individual. Chernyshevsky points to history as the realm wherein science and morality, or necessity and freedom, are to be reconciled. But this view of history is an assumption in need of a reasoned justification.

And, whether or not such a justification is forthcoming in "scientific" socialism, a crucial question is not answered -- is the teaching that man "will have no choice but to become good" 88 compatible with the morality of the free individual which is so central to Geneva thinking? In Geneva thinking the concept of love promises to reconcile "personal consciousness" with social unity; but in "scientific" socialism "love of mankind" is invoked to justify a realizable social unity which threatens to undermine the "personal consciousness". This one-sided emphasis on social unity was bound to evoke a protest within Russian Westernism on behalf of the individual.

Among the opponents of "scientific" socialism were those liberals of the 1840's who did not, like Karmazinov in The Possessed, curry favour with the younger generation. 89 Stepan Verkhovensky, for instance, objects that in the future "Crystal Palace" nobody will have any kind of personal guarantee against the collective. 90 The moral basis of his concern with
the place of the individual in "scientific" socialism is evident in his
response to his son's assurance that in the new society personal charity
will be rendered obsolete by the re-organization of relationships among
people according to "strictly scientific natural definitions":

Why won't you leave the initiative to me! ... Leave me a
chance to satisfy a need of my heart, let me give freely
when I feel compassion ... leave me my personal freedom. 91

Verkhovensky thus insists that charity is good only if it proceeds from
"personal freedom". His defense of art against "scientific" socialism is
even more impassioned than his defense of a morality which is dependent
on the conscious will. Morality and art, for Geneva thinking, are a sign
of man's need and ability to strive for a destiny which is not equivalent
to the fulfillment of natural desires -- that is, they reveal man's freedom
from necessity. In opposition to "scientific" socialism's subjection of
men to natural and social necessity, Verkhovensky insists on man's need
for beauty. The strength of his insistence threatens to lead him away
from Geneva thinking entirely, and towards an aestheticism which is con-
cerned neither with an "earthly paradise" nor with morality:

I maintain that Shakespeare and Raphael are higher than
the emancipation of the serfs, higher than nationalism,
higher than socialism, higher than the younger generation,
higher than chemistry, higher even than almost all humanity,
for they are the fruit of all mankind, and perhaps the
highest fruition that can possibly exist. 92

Verkhovensky, however, does not renounce his love of humanity. He
remains loyal to the "great idea", and even acknowledges that this idea is
also the ultimate goal of "scientific" socialism. After reading Chernyshevsky's
What is to be Done?, he concedes: "I agree that the author's fundamental
idea is right ... It's just our idea -- yes, ours! We were the first to
plant it, nurture it, to get it ready". However, he then expresses his
reservations concerning the younger generation's appropriation of the liberal idea:

"But, good Lord, how they have expressed it all, distorted, mutilated it!" he cried, rapping on the book with his fingers. "Were those the conclusions we wanted to draw? Who can recognize the original idea here?" 93

Verkhovensky opposes, not the ultimate goal of "scientific" socialism, but that impatient desire to overcome the dissociation of thought and practice which prompts the sons to a dangerous reliance on modern science. In his view, it is "sheer stupidity" to expect to reach in a few days a goal which may require centuries to achieve. However, the liberal counsel of patient resignation to a gradual regeneration of man was construed by the sons as a rationalization of laziness or cowardice. The protest of the fathers against "scientific" socialism was dismissed as merely the posturing of "witty old fossils" or the whining of "civic-minded old women". It was from within the ranks of the sons themselves that the more powerful attack on "scientific" socialism was to emerge.

In Peter Verkhovensky, Dostoyevsky embodies a threat to "scientific" socialism which is much more radical than that of his "phrase-mongering" father. His portrayal of Peter Verkhovensky was inspired by a fascination with Sergey Nechayev, whose name is closely associated with Bakunin.

Bakunin was a prophet of revolution, a dreamer of the 1840's who pursued his vision of an "earthly paradise" quixotically throughout Europe; while Nechayev, a "realist" of the 1860's, was a new breed of revolutionary -- a technician of revolution whose genius for revolutionary organization was much admired by Lenin. Although Russian "scientific" socialism early claimed Nechayev as its first martyr, Dostoyevsky discerned in his ruthless
practise of socialist revolution a hidden possibility which threatened to undermine the very cause to which he devoted such boundless energy.

The desire of the youth of the 1860's to give practical expression to the liberal idea of an "earthly paradise" was not entirely satisfied by Chernyshevsky's "scientific" socialism. Even his prosaic "realism" appeared to some to be mere verbiage, more of the futile talk which had enveloped the liberal idea since its inception in the 1840's. Peter Verkhovensky maintains that there are now "better" things to read than What is to be Done?, and he dismisses Chernyshevsky as a "wind-bag". Increasingly dissatisfied, even with the "scientific" assurance of the not-too-distant triumph of socialism, a growing number of young Russian socialists wished to advance the moment of triumph so that they could witness it themselves. The hope for the future held out in Chernyshevsky's doctrine of historical progress inspired fierce impatience for activity rather than quietism. What Chernyshevsky promised for tomorrow, the youth of the 1860's was beginning to desire for today.

According to "scientific" socialism, history decrees the inevitable disappearance of the old order to make way for the new. According to Peter Verkhovensky's revolutionary socialism, this process could be hastened "by a blow of the axe". The "blow of the axe" was to be very carefully directed, however. An overwhelming impatience may have determined the revolutionary intent, but this did not exclude the careful formulation of an elaborate plan of action. Dostoyevsky's portrayal of this plan corresponds closely to the actual writings and testimony of Nechayev and his followers. The essence of Peter Verkhovensky's doctrine of revolution is expressed in the phrase "organized destruction". If, as "scientific"
socialism promises, the old order must inevitably give way to the new, then the advent of this new order will be hastened by the deliberate destruction of the old. This entails the undermining of religion, marriage, family and private property — "the foundations of life as it exists now". To this end, secret groups of five were to be organized throughout Russia with the task of undermining the people's faith in those traditions which are the source of social stability. This undertaking would be, in effect, merely a matter of enhancing the disorder already existing throughout Russia as a result of the uprooting process of Westernization. Verkhovensky's plan of action, to be carried out by each revolutionary cell, calls for:"increasing the incidence of villainies, crime, and suicides, so as to shake the morale of the people, to undermine faith in the stability of the existing order, and to get the criminal element among the people stirred up ... Increase sin and debauchery, liquor. Distribute money." Dostoyevsky portrays with great artistry Nechayev's successful accomplishment of this social demoralization in the provincial capital which is the setting for The Possessed. The measured prose of the first part of the novel, which is dominated by the liberal father living idly off the landed gentry, gives way, after the appearance of Peter Verkhovensky, to an increasingly frantic, disjointed narrative style which seems to have difficulty in keeping pace with the onrush of events — the sabotage of social functions, arson, murder, suicide, insurrection, sacrilege, mob violence and administrative collapse. Peter Verkhovensky hopes that the social demoralization ensuing from such events will lead to a situation of general insurrection. The Russian people, "crazed after a year of insurrection", will be thirsting for order at any
price, to replace that which they have lost. The time will then be right for the establishment of "a social republic, communism and socialism". 100

The advent of the socialist order is the ostensible justification of Peter Verkhovensky's doctrine of organized destruction. The revolutionary socialists believe that their programme is founded on truth, and they are willing "to shed blood because this blood will be the price of happiness". 101 People who refuse the new order will be killed "and so much the better". 102 Verkhovensky, however, is not concerned with the new order itself, but only with preparations for its coming. Much to the consternation of the more earnest of his followers, who yearn to have their fondness for discussions about "the future social organization of mankind" indulged, he refuses to engage in speculation about the future "earthly paradise". He protests that he has no idea what is going to happen after the revolution. The one essential thing is the activity of organized destruction, "and the rest is all so much idle talk". 102

Peter Verkhovensky's exclusive emphasis on action is not due to an inability to think, or to an ignorance of socialist doctrine. Dostoyevsky intimates that Verkhovensky is thoroughly familiar with all the socialist writings, and that he is much more a theoretician than he pretends. 104 His emphatic call for action has its basis in a reasoning which may be more consistent than that of Chernyshevsky; for Verkhovensky is not as quick to subordinate the scientific insight to the requirement of socialist order. He accepts the teaching that man is fully explicable according to necessary laws discoverable by science, 105 but his rigorous adoption of materialism ultimately excludes the "great idea" of a perfect social order of freedom, equality, and brotherhood. Verkhovensky regards the future "Utopia" of "phalansteries where people will be dancing and singing while mowing hay"
as an idea "made up for fools only", though perhaps useful as "bait". He rejects the "great idea" as a sort of "Christianity without Christ". And he does so, not because it distracts from the imperative of action, but because it is incompatible with theory. While emphasizing throughout his rough notes that Peter Verkhovensky is an "abstract" man, Dostoyevsky does not present an explicit account of the reasoning which leads him to reject "scientific" socialism. However, it is made clear that, for Verkhovensky, the theoretician par excellence is Shigalyov, whom Verkhovensky regards as a genius, greater, for instance, than Fourier. We must thus turn to the question of Shigalyov's "despair".

Shigalyov maintains that his attempt to resolve the problem of social order is the first to be based uncompromisingly on science:

Having devoted all my energies to the study of the social organization of the society of the future which is to replace our present one, I have come to the conclusion that all the inventors of social systems, from the ancient time to our present year, have been dreamers, story-tellers, fools, who contradicted themselves and had no idea of natural science or that strange animal called man. Plato, Rousseau, Fourier, aluminum pillars, all that is only good for sparrows, and not for human society, but as the future form of society is of the utmost importance now that we at last are ready to act, I am submitting to you my own system of the world organization so as to make any further thinking unnecessary.

The source of Shigalyov's "despair" is his realization of the final incompatibility of science and socialism. In the light of the logical investigation of the "facts of nature", Shigalyov finds himself compelled to renounce the "great idea" of a future order reconciling individual freedom and social unity; or rather, he subjects the "great idea" to a scientific re-interpretation. According to this re-interpretation, individual freedom becomes the prerogative of the strong minority who are worthy to exercise tyrannical rule over the remainder of mankind. Social
unity belongs to the weak majority, who have renounced their freedom. In the equality of slavery they are transformed into a herd, which by its unconditional obedience "will by a series of regenerations attain a state of primeval innocence, something like the original paradise". 109

There is something fantastically eccentric in Shigalyov's insistence that his social formula is the only certain theoretical foundation for an "earthly paradise". But his "grim and gloomy" certainty nevertheless poses a formidable threat to liberals and "scientific" socialists alike. Through Shigalyov, Dostoyevsky gives voice to the possibility that the gulf between thought and practice in the Geneva idea can be finally overcome only by an uncompromising alteration of the idea itself, so that it conforms with life as it actually is rather than as it ought to be. The place of reason in Geneva thinking is central, yet not absolute. But in "scientific" socialism reason is wholeheartedly adopted as the principal means whereby the "great idea" is to be realized; and finally, in Shigalyov's "system", the means apparently undermines the "great idea" itself. It is noteworthy, however, that Shigalyov continues to invoke "love of mankind" as the ultimate justification of his social formula.

IV The Movement from the Critique of Russian Westernism to the Critique of the West itself

Shigalyov's social formula is, for Dostoyevsky, the final word of Russian Westernism. With this word, his presentation of the various voices of Russian Westernism -- from the Geneva idea, through "scientific" socialism, to tyranny -- is complete. Now that this presentation has been set forth, it is possible to broach the question of Dostoyevsky's final understanding of what, most fundamentally, is spoken in Russian Westernism.
Although Dostoyevsky emphasizes the intellectual diversity which characterizes Russian Westernism, he seems to accept the usual division of the movement into two opposing groups: the Westernism of the 1840's and the Westernism of the 1860's. And it would appear that his sympathies are with the former in this conflict. The most severe indictments of the Westernism of the 1860's to be found in Dostoyevsky's writings (in Notes from Underground and The Possessed) are actually voiced by liberals of the 1840's. Moreover, Stepan Verkhovensky and Versilov are not entirely unattractive characters. Their principal fault seems to be their inability to give practical effect to their noble dreams; but, according to Dostoyevsky's portrayal of their dilemma, it is at least doubtful that they themselves are entirely responsible for the gulf between thought and practice which characterizes them. It is noteworthy that Stepan Verkhovensky, who eloquently pronounces one of the most direct condemnations of the Westernism of the 1860's to be found in Dostoyevsky's writings, meets his death with a greatness of spirit which seems to belie Dostoyevsky's characterization of him throughout the greater part of the novel. Versilov, too, is partially "redeemed" at the close of A Raw Youth. However, these indications of Dostoyevsky's evident sympathy for his liberal characters -- especially in relation to the often ugly face presented by the Westernism of the 1860's -- do not constitute an exoneration of the Westernism of the 1840's. In the illumination of his approaching death, Stepan Verkhovensky recognizes the inner relation between his "great idea" and the Westernism of the 1860's. After listening to the words of the Gospel of Luke 8:32, this purest representative of Russian liberalism confesses his own responsibility for the chaos which is engulfing his "sainte Russie".
You see, that's just like our Russia. Those devils who go out of a sick man and enter the swine -- those are all the sores, all the poisonous exhalations, all the impurities, all the big and little devils, that have accumulated in our great and beloved invalid, in our Russia, for centuries, for centuries! ... they are we, we and them, and Peter Verkhovensky, -- et les autres avec lui, and perhaps I at the head of them all, and we shall cast ourselves down, the raving and the possessed, from the cliff into the sea and shall all be drowned, and serves us right, for that is all we are good for. 110

Stepan Verkhovensky's confession is of the utmost significance, for it indicates that Dostoyevsky's understanding of the "truth" preached by Russian Westernism not only includes the liberalism of the 1840's, but focuses on it as the source of the later movements which apparently deny it. The analogy of the father-son relationship which is so central to Dostoyevsky's critique of Russian Westernism thus takes on its full significance. The mutual denial of father and son, vehement though it may be, cannot dissolve the bond which unites them; nor can it diminish the responsibility of the father for the fact that the son exists at all. This ascription of responsibility to the fathers does not pertain only to the question of education and upbringing, although, as we have noted, Dostoyevsky thought that a liberal upbringing played a significant role in rendering young people peculiarly susceptible to ideas of all sorts, including the most extreme. This susceptibility to extreme ideas was enhanced by that urge for action which Dostoyevsky thought characterized the Westernists of the 1860's. In the hands of these impatient young people, the delicate balance of the Geneva idea was upset by one-sided interpretations which lent themselves more easily to practical activity. However, Verkhovensky's final confession says more than this. Whereas earlier he had blamed the sons for misguidedly "distorting" the "great idea" which he serves, he finally perceives that, in essence, there has
been no distortion. He acknowledges an intrinsic relation between the liberal idea and the extreme products of the Westernism of the 1860's.

For Dostoyevsky, the fundamental word of Russian Westernism, uniting fathers and sons, is that of the "earthly paradise" founded on reason and justified by the appeal to love of mankind. As Versilov's "earthly paradise" is translated ever more single-mindedly from theory into practice, it gives way to Shigalyov's "earthly paradise". The "great idea" of a universal union of free and equal human beings points to a union in which a few are free and the rest are equal only in their slavery. Dostoyevsky's critique of Russian Westernism was concerned with enucleating its "great idea", and tracing the process of filiation whereby this idea issues in "scientific" socialism and, finally, in tyranny. By itself, this critique must be considered incomplete, for it leaves two extremely important questions unresolved. First, the theoretical necessity of the relationship between Shigalyov's tyranny and Geneva thought is not elucidated. Dostoyevsky does not reveal the "logic" whereby Shigalyov arrives at his cryptic social formula; he merely has him declare that such an undertaking would require ten evenings. A full response to this question perhaps presupposes the answer to a second, more immediate question: can Geneva thinking, which has its true home in the West, be adequately understood solely according to its expression within a Russian context?

Dostoyevsky himself emphasizes the differences between Russian and Western liberalism. He maintains that, in the West, liberalism is the mature product of a sustained, gradual, and painful effort of thought and practice; and that, whatever its aspirations in theory, it is subject to the moderating influence of an historical tradition with which it is intimately associated. Russian liberalism, however, mechanically imports
alien ideas which cost it no effort, and which are subject to no moderating influence because they are adopted by men who are uprooted from all restraining traditions. Moreover, Dostoyevsky notes the tendency of Russian Westernism, as a whole, to take Western ideas to extremes which would be inconceivable in the West. On the basis of distinctions such as these between Russian and Western liberalism it is possible that the direct relation between Geneva thinking and the various fruit which it bore in Russia -- the "ridiculousness" of the liberals of the 1840's, and the "scientific" and revolutionary socialism and intimations of tyranny of the 1860's -- could be attributed to the shallowness of the Russian soil into which the seed of the "great idea" fell rather than to something inherent in the idea itself. It is surely possible, as has been asserted in the West in this century, that Russian tyranny represents the triumph of a native "Oriental despotism" over the Geneva idea. So long as this is a possibility, the Geneva idea of freedom, equality, and brotherhood may still constitute the best conception of human order.

The demonstration of a relationship between tyranny and the "great idea" would have to be considered inconclusive if confined to Russian Westernism. Dostoyevsky's critique of Russian Westernism points inevitably towards his critique of the West itself.
CHAPTER THREE

THE HISTORICAL FATE OF THE "GREAT IDEA" IN THE WEST

The initial concern of Dostoyevsky's turn from "Russian Europe" to "European Europe" is the consideration of the Geneva idea in its Western setting. A fundamental aspect of this consideration is his account of the historical fate of the Geneva idea in the West. This account is found largely, though not exclusively, in his journalistic articles and in the rough notes for these articles. These writings contain observations about the West which, properly interpreted and ordered, constitute a detailed examination of the historical outcome of Geneva thought in the West. This examination, significant in itself, also serves as the necessary preliminary to the more profound aspects of Dostoyevsky's critique of the West.

I The Break-down of Traditional Western Order

It would be appropriate, first, to elucidate Dostoyevsky's understanding of the historical place of Geneva thought within Western civilization as a whole.

Dostoyevsky identifies the West according to the idea which has chiefly informed it; for, as we have noted, he thought that a civilization is founded, not on the "need to get along", but "always as a result of a great idea".\(^1\) The great religious idea which has made it possible to speak of a "Western civilization" is, for Dostoyevsky, that of Latin Christianity. He thought that Roman Catholic civilization had reached its apogee in the twelfth century. The buffoon, Lebedev (in The Idiot)
enumerates some of the horrors of famine and disease which attended life in twelfth century Europe, and he then relates a bizarre anecdote about a man who was reduced by starvation to cannibalism. This medieval man supposedly consumed, in the course of his famine-ridden life, sixty monks (notoriously fleshier than lay people) and several lay infants; and rather than take his terrible secret with him to the grave he confessed his crime, in the certain knowledge that he thereby faced a dreadful retribution. Lebedev draws a highly significant conclusion from this act of voluntary confession:

The criminal ends up by going and laying information against himself with the clergy and by giving himself up to the authorities. Now one cannot help asking oneself what tortures awaited him in that age -- the wheel, the stake, and the fire! Who induced him to go and inform against himself? Why not simply stop at the figure of sixty and keep the secret till his dying day? Why not simply leave the monks alone and live in penance as a hermit? Or why not, finally, become a monk himself? Well, here is the solution! There must have been something stronger than the stake ... There must have been an idea stronger than any calamity, famine, torture, plague, leprosy, and all that hell which mankind could not have endured without that idea that bound and guided men's hearts and fructified the waters of life!

Surveying the modern age, Lebedev observes that Western man is no longer held by an idea as forcefully as he was during the middle ages by the Roman Catholic idea:

Show me anything resembling that force in our age of lies and railways -- I'm sorry, I ought to have said in our age of liners and railways, but I said liars and railways because I'm drunk but just. Now, show me an idea that binds mankind together today with half the strength that it had in those centuries. And don't try to frighten me with your prosperity, your riches, the infrequency of famine, and the rapidity of the means of communication! There is more wealth, but less strength; the binding idea is no more; everything has become soft, everything is flabby, and everyone is flabby. 2

Since the twelfth century, the Roman Catholic idea had become "moribund". 3 According to Dostoyevsky, the crucial period in the under-
mining of Latin Christian civilization was the latter fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries -- the epoch of the Renaissance and the Reformation.

The Renaissance of classical studies, and in particular the intensive study of Aristotle, engendered modern science, which was to achieve its first great success in the "astronomical discoveries" of Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo. Dostoyevsky attributes the extraordinary success of early modern science to the triumph of the new scientific method, the work especially of Francis Bacon and Newton. The Roman Catholic order early came to regard modern science as a mortal enemy. This may have been proof of a remarkable prescience, for, just over a century after the trial of Galileo, the Encyclopaedists were to preach "to the whole world that science had come and that they could get along without the church and without Christ." Great "technological discoveries" accompanied the development of modern science very closely. The early intimate relation between science and technology was instrumental, for instance, in the discovery of America. The invention of book-printing was perhaps the most significant technological innovation because of its enormous contribution to the Reformation of the sixteenth century. Dostoyevsky regards the Reformation as a consequence of the "broadening of human thought" accomplished in the Renaissance, but he does not go into the question of its precise historical origins. The consequences of the Protestant rejection of the "mediation" of an external authority, embodied in the Papacy, were, in his view, decisive for Western civilization. The emphasis of Protestantism on the individual conscience as the ultimate guide of faith contributed immeasurably to that "disintegration of the masses into personalities" which is, for Dostoyevsky, the very definition of civilizational disorder.

The process of disorder which had its origin in the Renaissance and
the Reformation culminated in the most significant event in the history of the modern West -- the French Revolution:

Profound silence reigned throughout Europe when Frederick the Great shut his eyes forever; but never did such a silence precede so great a storm! ... In fact, who in Europe in those days, i.e., when Frederick the Great shut his eyes forever, could have foreseen -- even in a remote manner -- the things which would happen to men and to Europe in the course of the subsequent thirty years? 6

The teaching of "the rights of man" heralded the final emergence of the individual "personality" as an historical force in the West. This emergence had been prepared by the regard of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment for the unfettered human reason, and by the Reformation's sanction of the individual conscience. The development of the "personal consciousness" was, moreover, an inevitable consequence of the undermining of Roman Catholic order by these movements. With the French Revolution, the self-awareness of the "personal consciousness", in isolation from the mass, became the ineluctable destiny of the West. Western man had been irrevocably uprooted from that complete order, animated by the Roman Catholic idea, which had attained its consummate expression in the twelfth century.

Dostoyevsky thought that the French Revolution was both an end and a beginning for Western civilization. While completing the destruction of the traditional order, it held out the promise of a new order. The inspiring presence of a new idea of social order rendered even the work of revolutionary destruction systematic, and because of it the Revolution itself came to signify a negation for the sake of the positive fulfillment of mankind's most profound aspirations. The new idea of order was characterized in various ways: the order of "science" rather than "superstition", of the State rather than the Church, of the "rights of man" rather than feudal
obligation. For Dostoyevsky these are partial characterizations of a new order which can be defined, fundamentally, as an "order deduced solely from rational principles", that is, an order based entirely on a human reason liberated from the fetters of tradition. The unqualified affirmation in practice of the moral superiority of such an order, "for the first time in the history of mankind", was the fundamental work of the French Revolution. The slogan of "Freedom, Equality, Brotherhood", by which the new order came to be identified, expressed the conviction of a reconciliation between the development of the "personal consciousness" in the West and the need of the individual to be re-integrated into a cohesive social order.

The French Revolution aspired to be a European revolution, and indeed a world revolution. While negating the Roman Catholic aspiration to universality, it offered the West its new, rational formulation of "universal unity". The defence of the Revolution against the monarchs of Europe soon passed over into an active proselytism, carried on largely by the remarkably successful citizen-army. Under Napoleon the principles of the French Revolution began "to change the whole face of Europe". But Napoleon failed to unite Europe according to his interpretation of the principles of 1789, and his legacy appeared to put a union of any sort out of reach of the West. He had made it impossible once and for all for the West to return to the enfolding unity of the Roman Catholic order, for he had weakened irrevocably the remnants of the old feudal-Christian civilization. And his effort to realize a new universality had actually fostered an intense particularism among the Western peoples. The assertion of particularity had been a significant concomitant of the Reformation; it
became more aggressive as it found theoretical justification in the principles of 1789, and emotional justification in the unwelcome presence of arrogant French troops. French imperialism, according to Dostoyevsky, inspired a "new form of democracy", or "nationalism", which portended the almost endless fragmentation of the West. The right of peoples to self-determination may be theoretically compatible with the universality of the "rights of man", but the fervid assertion of this right in practice entailed consequences which did not bode well for the possibility of a new Western unity. The French Revolution had thus apparently dissolved the traditional bonds of European order without realizing its promise of a new civilization.

Dostoyevsky always insists upon the incalculable power of an idea to alter the shape of human affairs: "The tiniest fire can give birth to a universal conflagration. You have exactly the same thing with an idea -- one fiery spot in the deepest darkness (provided it is not extinguished)". The fundamental idea of the French Revolution had not been extinguished at Waterloo. Even the zealous vigilance of the Holy Alliance could not prevent the formula of "Freedom, Equality, Brotherhood" from becoming ascendant in Western intellectual life. The theoretical elaboration which this formula had undergone, particularly in France and in Germany, constituted for Dostoyevsky one of the supreme achievements of the Western intellect. The memorable variations on the theme of the new social order (which, as we have seen, he designates as "Geneva" thought in acknowledgement of its source in Rousseau) had come to constitute in the course of the nineteenth century the fundamental thought "underlying today's civilization".

Dostoyevsky looks to the West to discern the practical outcome of the
promise of a new universal order inherent in the intellectual hegemony of Geneva thought. Before turning to his analysis of Geneva practice in the West, it must be noted that this analysis is conducted in terms of the particular peoples of the West. Although he regards the divisive nationalism of the nineteenth century as a "new form of democracy", he recognizes the existence of actual particularities in the West which precede modern nationalism. Indeed, he was captivated by the "perfect organisms" of Europe, "the work of centuries". This is evident in his repeated avowals of reverence for the "sacred wonders" of Europe, and in the obvious delight with which he discusses the characteristics peculiar to the various Western peoples, while always relating these characteristics to the larger question of social order. Dostoyevsky appears to think that a tendency towards particularity existed even during the full flowering of Latin Christian civilization. The Reformation was thus concerned with the emancipation of peoples, as well as individuals, from the Roman Catholic order. With the final break-down of Western unity the assertion of particularity became increasingly relentless, so much so that in the modern West "even the most general philosophical and social teachings" acquire a "national shading":

... over there, everything rests upon a firm national foundation. Each nation believes in itself, to the point where it almost assumes that it is destined to conquer the whole world for its particular nationality.

Dostoyevsky's account of the historical fate of the Geneva idea in the West is thus inseparable from his scrutiny of the particular peoples of the West.
II The New Order and the Western Peoples

(i) France

It is natural that in his consideration of the West Dostoyevsky would turn, first, to France. Since the eighteenth century Russian Westernism had looked to France as the supreme model of civilization. Those Russians who strove to become Europeans strove above all to become Frenchmen. This worship of French civilization persisted into the nineteenth century, undiminished even by the war with Napoleon. Dostoyevsky suggests that the Russian attraction to France can be attributed to an inherent "taste for beauty". In The Gambler a Russian expounds this theme in a discussion with an Englishman concerning the love of a young Russian woman (perhaps symbolic of Russian Westernism) for a "disenchanted" French liberal:

A Frenchman, Mr. Astley, is a finished and beautiful type. You, as a Briton, may not agree; I, as a Russian, don't agree either — perhaps, if you like, from sheer envy; but our young ladies may be of a different opinion. You may find Racine affected, distorted and perfumed; you probably won't even bother to read him. I too find him affected, distorted and perfumed, even from one point of view ridiculous; but he is charming, Mr. Astley, and, above all, he is a great poet, whether you and I like it or not. The French national type, I mean the Parisian, had begun to be cast in an elegant mould while we were still bears. The Revolution was the heir of the nobility. Now the vulgarest Frenchman may have manners, modes of behaviour, ways of speech, and even ideas, of a thoroughly elegant form, without his own initiative, soul, or heart playing any part in it; he has inherited it all. In themselves they may be the shallowest of the shallow, the lowest of the low. Well, Mr. Astley, I must tell you now that there is no creature on earth more frank and trustful than a good, intelligent, not too affected Russian young lady. A de Grieux, appearing in some character, wearing a disguise, may conquer her heart with extraordinary ease; he appears in an elegant shape, Mr. Astley, and the young lady takes that shape for his own soul, the natural form of his soul and heart, and not for a garment he has inherited ... and Russians are very sensitive to beauty and have a taste for it. 18
When the Russians were converted to Christianity under Vladimir in 988, the decision for Byzantine Christianity was supposed to have been determined by the superior beauty of the liturgy which the Russian envoys witnessed in the Cathedral of Saint Sophia. 19 France, like Byzantium, satisfied a Russian love of beauty, and something more besides: France was to uproot Russians the true home of that Geneva thought which promised to satisfy their thirst for order. Although the Russians imbibed the Geneva idea in the cloistered tranquility of German universities, they assumed that this idea had its true home in the streets of Paris. Turgenev's depiction of the death of Rudin (in the novel of the same name) on a Paris barricade of 1848 captures perfectly the ethos of the Russian "liberal idealists" of the 1840's. Their passion for a truth which could be lived out in actuality could not be satisfied by theoretical speculation. In their impatience of any divorce between theory and practice they turned away from the German professors to the French intellectuals, who dared to conform the world to their ideas on the barricades and not merely in the lecture-room.

It is to a Russian need for beauty and for truth, then, that Dostoyevsky ascribes the fact that France, more than any other country in the West, is the "second fatherland" of Westernized Russians. Thus, in the revolutionary year of 1848 the Russians followed events in Paris as closely as if the fate of their own deepest aspirations was in the balance. 20 In 1870 they lamented over France's ignominious defeat by the Germans in the Franco-German war as though it were their own. Like Versilov, they regarded the defeat of France and the subsequent burning of the Tuileries during the Commune as equivalent to the sounding of the "death knell" over all Europe. 21

Napoleon III's defeat at Sedan in 1870 appeared to signify the final eclipse of France as a great power. Surely the nation which had experienced
the catastrophes of Waterloo and Sedan within a half-century must renounce any claim to European hegemony. France, however, still refused to give up her desire to play a leading role in the West. Dostoyevsky observed that, remarkably enough, most of the West was not averse to supporting France in her refusal: "To this day [1876] the most insignificant happening in France arouses in Europe more sympathy and attention than any important Berlin event". He maintains that the persistence of France's claim to the leadership of the West is not without foundation; for the ultimate justification of her pre-eminence has always really been, not the gloire militaire won by her armies, but her moral stature. France is "the nation of genius, par excellence", one of those nations which rules over mankind by virtue of the exercise of an influence which can best be compared to that of Athens over ancient civilization. France has long been the "land of the first step, the first test, the first ideational initiative". The magnificence of her attempt to embody the Roman Catholic idea had accorded her the spiritual leadership of the medieval West. The history of the modern West, moreover, actually dates from Louis XIV's apotheosis of the State:

It is a remarkable fact that in France everything dates from Louis XIV ... But most remarkable of all is the fact that everything in all Europe dates from Louis XIV ... Perhaps it is because he was the first to say, "L'état c'est moi". This thrilled everybody; it took all Europe by storm.

According to Dostoyevsky, France's "preponderant influence on all the European peoples" has been due for centuries to the brilliant determination with which she has striven to be the embodiment of a principle of social order which could constitute an inspiration to other peoples. Since 1789 France had devoted herself to the fulfillment of a new idea of order. The final outcome of this effort would determine whether or not she could continue, even after Waterloo and Sedan, to claim the leadership of the West.
Despite the epoch of revolution, imperial wars, and final defeat through which France had lived, she maintained throughout the nineteenth century an appearance of self-confident unity which Dostoyevsky found impressive, and sometimes oppressive. On his first visit to Europe, in 1862, he spent a month in Paris. His first direct experience of the land of the Geneva idea was not auspicious: after the polite and efficient customs inspectors at Erquilines, the first Frenchmen he met on French soil were four police-agents, who apparently boarded the train in order to observe foreign visitors and send their descriptions on to the authorities in Paris. Dostoyevsky makes much of this irony, devoting an entire chapter of Winter Notes on Summer Impressions to a disquisition on the efficiency of the French security system. The overwhelming presence of the state, brought to his attention in such a tangible manner, leads him to jest that social order in France may not have changed so radically since Louis XIV's "L'état c'est moi". Perhaps the French merely "had their fun and then returned to their former ways". Corresponding to the external regimentation imposed by the state, Dostoyevsky perceived what seemed to be a tremendous inner conformity emanating "from the very soul" of the French people. Paris in particular exuded an impressive sense of unanimity and stability: "What orderliness! What prudence; what well-defined and solidly established relationships; how secure and perfectly delimited everything is; how content everyone is..." 27 The apparent unity of French society bred that self-assurance which Dostoyevsky regards as a prime distinction of the French. The instinctive conviction that their mere existence is a source of comfort and happiness to other peoples 28 seemed undiminished, if somewhat chastened, since under Napoleon I they had "incited general European hatred against themselves by their intolerable haughty air, their boundless self-contentment
and their all-embracing beatitude."\(^\text{29}\) Dostoyevsky doubted the air of self-confident unity projected by France. His doubt concerning the genuineness of French unity became a certainty in the aftermath of the Franco-German war of 1870. France recovered her poise in a remarkably short time after her humiliating defeat; and the recovery of her faith in her right to the leadership of the West was buttressed by the astonishing material recovery which enabled her to pay off a huge indemnity to Germany within three years.\(^\text{30}\) Dostoyevsky nevertheless thought that the war had exposed profound and chronic fissures within the French social order. It had become clear during the war that there were no Frenchmen in France. There were only "party men", who "did not spare a thought for France". Monarchists (Bourbon and Orléanist) fought in the French army, but only "in the hope that there was at least a good chance for their party".\(^\text{31}\) The socialists, too, proved to be more devoted to their own cause than to France. For Dostoyevsky the burning of the Tuileries during the Commune was symbolic of their indifference to France: "'Since we have failed, let the whole world perish! -- for the Commune is more important than the world's weal, and France's!'"\(^\text{32}\) The Emperor himself demonstrated that he was the leader of the Bonapartist party rather than the leader of France, when he chose to surrender to the Germans at Sedan instead of retreating to Paris. He obviously thought that the Germans would be more generous to him and his dynasty than the Parisians, who would perhaps not forgive his ignominious defeat. His unconditional surrender of an entire army almost assured the rapid subjugation of France.\(^\text{33}\) One of his generals, Bazaine, also surrendered an entire army, as well as the fortress of Metz, to the Germans. Bazaine's easy capitulation indicated that he, also, did not think of France as a whole. A Bonapartist, he would not deign to
recognize the Republican government which had declared itself in Paris after the Emperor was taken prisoner. It was clear that he preferred to deal with the Germans rather than the French Republicans. Bazaine was later tried for treason for failing to acknowledge that, regardless of the personal fortunes of Bonaparte, "la France existait", but he was tried by those who were themselves "party men": "La république avant tout, la république avant la France" — that was there constant warcry". Dostoyevsky concludes an article on Marshal Bazaine's treason trial with the observation that "things have gone so far that it is quite impossible to put anyone on trial in France for quite unquestionable treason to his country, for they are all party men". 34

The behaviour of the various French parties during the Franco-German war revealed a truth about France which belied her impressive men of self-confident unity: "This is the misfortune of France: the loss of the general idea of unity, its total absence!" 35 Although in the aftermath of defeat the Third Republic under Thiers had mobilized France for the incredibly rapid payment of the indemnity, the unity of Frenchmen within the Republic was precarious, for it was strictly negative. The whole of France was united only in its desire to be rid of the occupying German forces (a condition of payment of the indemnity). Once this was accomplished, the stability of the Republic came to depend solely on the fact that it was, after 1871, the form of government which divided Frenchmen least. 36 Frenchmen would give "the devil knows what for unity". 37 But none of the various parties, despite their claims, appeared to possess an idea of order which could claim the allegiance of all Frenchmen. Dostoyevsky looks to the Revolution of 1789 as the source of the divisions within French society.
The historical event out of which France spoke a new word of universal unity to the West engendered those parties which militated against the unity of France herself, depriving her of a "healthy national unifying centre". 38

From the Revolution to the inauguration of the Third Republic in 1870, the rule of France had been shared almost entirely between the Monarchists (whether Bourbon or Orléanist) and the Bonapartists. Those of the nobility and clergy who would not reconcile themselves to the destruction of the traditional order refused to recognize any regime in France as legitimate, except that of the Bourbon monarchy. Throughout the Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras they aided the enemies of France. In the immediate aftermath of the Bourbon Restoration (1815-1830), they revenged themselves upon Revolutionary France in the "white terror"; and under Charles X (1825-1830) it appeared that they might actually succeed in a genuine revival of the old order, without any of the concessions to the principles of 1789 which Louis XVIII (1815-1825) had granted in his Constitutional Charter. The overthrow of their hopes in the revolution of 1830 which brought the more liberal Duke of Orléans, Louis Phillippe (1830-1848), to the throne made them no less intractable. The power which they continued to enjoy in rural France, where much of the peasantry still accepted the guidance of the local seigneur and the priest, and even in Paris, where the ancient family names were still held in awe by those with high social aspirations, encouraged them to adhere relentlessly to their hopes. Their determination was, for Dostoyevsky, the refusal of a "corpse" to acknowledge its own death. 39

The Bonapartist imperialism which arose in the wake of the Revolution was, in Dostoyevsky's view, the most successful political movement in France during the nineteenth century. But it was devoid of any idea of social
order, living or dead. The Empire, whether that of the uncle or the nephew, was predicated on military glory abroad and "order" at home. Neither bore a genuine relation to the liberal principles which the Bonapartes tended to invoke. Later avowals of the goal of a European union of liberal states notwithstanding, Napoleon I's imperialism had shown itself to have no ultimate end other than that of conquest for conquest's sake. While Napoleon III did further the cause of Italian liberation from Austria, his defence of Pope Pius IX against the Italian liberals, his hopes for the annexation of Belgium, and his attempt to transform the Mexican republic into a Roman Catholic empire ruled by the Archduke Maximilian of Austria, all bore a highly dubious relation to the universal furthering of "the rights of man". The incongruity, apparent in the Bonapartes' foreign policy, of the association of imperialism with liberal principles was less pronounced in their domestic rule. This bore unashamedly the stamp of military dictatorship, with a minimum of lip-service to the principles of 1789. Nonetheless, Dostoyevsky thought that, despite its lack of an idea, Bonapartism, or "Caesarism", had proven to be the most effective regime France had known since the Revolution. He points to France's peculiar susceptibility to the temptation of "Caesarism", a susceptibility which continually threatened the life of the Third Republic after 1870. France's tendency to place herself under the rule of the "legions" was the natural consequence of her inner dividedness:

Exhausted and worn out as a result of a century-old political disorganization, she would, in a most prosaic manner, calculate on which side strength lies, and she would submit to it. Strength is now in the legions ... 44

Social order in France since the Revolution had thus been most directly determined by those who were without an idea of social order, or by those
whose idea was dead. What had become of the Geneva vision of order which
was so intimately associated with the Revolution?

The original bearers of the Geneva idea during the Revolution had been
the Republicans. Prior to the founding of the Third Republic, they had
exercised political power for only two very brief periods: 1789 to 1795,
and 1848 to 1851. And it was quite possible, in Dostoyevsky's estimation,
that the Third Republic would be of short duration. Contemplation of the
meagre successes of French Republicanism since its birth leads him to
remark:

It is difficult to conceive unluckier men than the French
Republicans with their French Republic. Soon one hundred
years will have elapsed since, for the first time, this
institution came into existence. Since then every time (now
it is the third time) adroit usurpers have confiscated the
republic for their benefit, no one has risen in its serious
defense, save some negligible group. Not even once has
there been strong popular support. Besides, during periods
when the republic chanced to exist, only a few people re-
garded it as final, and not a transitory thing. Nevertheless,
no men are more convinced of the country’s support than the
French republicans. 45

Dostoyevsky points out that the transitoriness of Republican regimes has
much to do with the unfavourable circumstances which have attended their
establishment. The opportunity to realize the Geneva idea always came in the
wake of a traumatic upheaval which left most Frenchmen too anxious and in-
secure to give thought to anything beyond their immediate interests. The
circumstances in which the Third Republic was born were especially unfavour-
able: it had to accept most of the disgrace of defeat in a war which it
had not started, and yet refusal to continue Napoleon III’s war with the
Germans would have entailed the greater disgrace of conceding defeat too
easily. Although "disgrace was ahead of them, disgrace was behind them",
the Republicans enthroned themselves with "a light heart, despite everything".
For Dostoyevsky it is this complacency which makes their situation not only "tragically comical", but "comical". The "comical" aura which he attributes to the French Republicans is similar to that "ridiculousness" characteristic of the Russian liberals of the 1840's. Their failure since 1789 to give practical effect to their ideas made them appear to be entirely "abstract men" in whose parlance the word "republic" was something "comically idealistic". These bearers of Geneva thought had proven to be "quite impotent". By the latter part of the nineteenth century France could no longer take seriously the "liberal, gray-haired old men, making themselves look younger and imagining themselves still young".

Dostoyevsky thought that the fundamental factor in the practical impotence of the Republicans was their failure to gain the support of the bourgeoisie. The ascendency of the middle class in France had been a concomitant of the French Revolution; indeed, the French bourgeoisie was "a child of the republic". The Republicans had contributed directly to the rise of the middle class by confiscating and selling, at deflated prices, the enormous land-holdings of the nobility and clergy. Measures such as this so enriched the middle class that it was able eighty years later to finance payment of the huge indemnity to the Germans with remarkable ease. In general, these measures surrendered France to "the boundless sovereign power of the bourgeoisie", a sovereignty which Dostoyevsky considers to be the single most important factor determining the question of social order in modern France. Since 1795, however, the newly ascendant bourgeoisie had evinced a pronounced aversion for the Republic. This was not fully explained by reference to the natural mistrust, and even contempt, of the industrious and acquisitive for "abstract men" and "idealists". The bourgeoisie had come to consider the Republicans to be "unreliable", not so much because of their
comical aspect, but because of the close neighbourhood of the Republic with "communism". Having successfully ousted the nobility and the clergy from the foremost position in France, according to the saying -- "Ôte-toi de là que je m'y mette!"; the middle class did not intend to be ousted in turn by the "fourth estate" which their own industrial enterprise had brought into being. The formula of "Freedom, Equality, Brotherhood" had come to inspire the workers also, and the particular emphasis which they placed upon equality posed a distinct threat to the recently acquired power of the bourgeoisie. The spectre of communism had come to haunt the middle class even during the Revolution. Although the "Conspiracy of the Equals" (1796) led by Babeuf was easily crushed, the bourgeoisie had come to fear some of the possible implications of "Freedom, Equality, Brotherhood". When the opportunity came, in the person of Napoleon, the Republic was sacrificed to Imperial "order". Although, later, the bourgeoisie was not particularly pleased with the restored Bourbon monarchy, its ingratitude to the Republicans became obvious in its undisguised pleasure at the Orléanist regime ushered in by the Revolution of 1830. And it was even more pleased when the Revolution of 1848 finally resolved itself into Bonapartist rule rather than that of the Second Republic.

Though comical and pathetic "little old men", were not the Republicans still the bearers of the only living idea of social order present in modern France? Was it utterly inconceivable that this idea could eventually bear fruit? Indeed, was not their very rejection by the middle class indicative of the steadfastness with which they guarded the purity of the Geneva vision of order? Dostoyevsky's response to such questions is to attribute the impotence of French Republicanism to a misunderstanding on the part of the bourgeoisie. The middle class had been incorrect in its assessment of the
"unreliability" of Republicanism. For the Republic is "the most natural expression and form of the bourgeois idea", and Republicans are "an incarnation of the bourgeoisie in the strictest meaning of the term".  

The intimacy between the Republicans and the "third estate" during the Revolution had given birth to an idea of social order which Dostoyevsky designates as "bourgeois liberalism". "Bourgeois liberalism" is for him, most simply, that interpretation of Geneva thought which is wholly in accord with the needs and aspirations of the bourgeoisie. Freedom, for the French Republican, or bourgeois liberal, signifies the liberation of economic activity from the inhibitions imposed upon it by the Roman Catholic church, by outmoded feudal organizations such as the guild, and by the absence of an efficient system of coinage, transport, and communication. Freedom is thus linked more with comfortable self-preservation than with the moral striving so central to Geneva thinking:

What is liberté? Freedom. What freedom? Equal freedom for each and all to do as they please within the limits of the law. When may a man do all he pleases? When he has a million.  

Equality is understood as "equality before the law" rather than the equality of moral goodness which is implied in Geneva thought.

The interpretation which the French liberals give to freedom and equality makes it difficult to perceive in their talk of brotherhood anything more than a pious platitude. Brotherhood is invoked only in a negative manner, as a restraint upon the individual's pursuit of comfortable self-preservation. Even then the need for limit is preached, not in accordance with a vision of social harmony, but in reference to the right of other individuals to make their lives comfortable. According to Dostoyevsky, the reconciliation of individual freedom with social unity envisaged in Geneva
thought is nullified in bourgeois liberalism. The vision of social harmony is sacrificed to "a principle of individualism, a principle of isolation, of intense self-preservation". In a social order in which each personality "fights for what it wants, demands its rights, and desires to separate", social cohesion, insofar as it exists, is dependent on contracts between calculating individuals rather than on mutual love. 56

Since 1789 French liberalism had given ample proof of its loyalty to the bourgeois economic order. It was the liberals who ruthlessly defended the sanctity of private property against the Babouvists in 1796, and against the socialists and workers of Paris during the "June Days" of 1848 and the Commune of 1870. Dostoyevsky thought it abundantly clear that "no one on earth" was more hostile to the aspirations of the "fourth estate" than the "strict" republicans. In deference to the bourgeoisie, French liberalism had established as its highest goal the political form of the Republic:

The form is the whole hope of the republic...salvation is sought in the form... Most positively there dwells in every French republican the fatal conviction, dooming him, that the word "republican" suffices; that to call the country "a republic" suffices to make it happy -- at once and forever. 57

The vision of social order entertained by the French liberals was, in fact, identical in substance to that most bourgeois of all regimes, the "July Monarchy" of Louis-Philippe (1830-1848), with the sole difference that it was called a "republic" and there was "no king (i.e. of course, a 'tyrant')." 58 Symptomatic of this exclusive emphasis on the formal realization of the Geneva idea was the inordinate love of eloquence characteristic of French liberals. All those orations in the National Assembly, the Convention, and the club-houses during the Revolution may have been utterly sincere, but by the middle of the nineteenth century French liberalism had degenerated into a love of eloquence for eloquence's sake. 59 The tendency of the liberals to become
comic figures was nowhere more pronounced than in their love of eloquence. This was particularly so when they were out of power:

...the legislative body maintains six liberal deputies, six permanent, irremovable, genuine liberal deputies...there shall be no more of them, you can rest assured; nor shall there be fewer...Naturally, all necessary measures are taken to prevent them from talking too much. But they are allowed to chatter a little. Annually, at a set time, they discuss urgent questions facing the government, and the Parisian fairly melts with rapture. He knows that there will be eloquence and he is happy. Of course he knows very well that it will be eloquence and nothing more, that there will be words, words, and more words, and that nothing whatever will come of these words. But even so he is highly pleased... 60

Dostoyevsky predicted that the bourgeoisie would eventually recognize that they had nothing to fear from the Republic. The situation of the Third Republic was precarious indeed; its survival would indicate that the bourgeoisie had finally acknowledged French liberalism as a natural ally. The liberals clearly craved such an acknowledgement. The Third Republic, after all, had been erected on the corpses of the Paris communards. 61

To Dostoyevsky it was clear by the latter part of the nineteenth century that the "nation of genius" had failed to realize its own new word for mankind. France's attempt to embody a new social order based on the Geneva idea had proven "groundless", had "burst like a soap bubble". 62 The only promise uttered during the Revolution which had been fulfilled was that of the Abbot Siéyès: "What is the third estate? Nothing. What ought it to be? Everything." 63 The impressive outward show of order which France presented to the world was the expression, not of a unanimous adherence to an idea of social order, but of the successful domination of one social class. With the complete triumph of the bourgeoisie over Geneva ideas, France had apparently said all it has to say to the West. 64 Of all the hope, devotion, and energy inspired by the Geneva vision in France apparently the only thing
left was "the bourgeois liberal with his immortal principles of '89. Meagre sustenance". As an idea of social order bourgeois liberalism was perhaps "meagre" indeed: its emphasis on individual rights seemed to preclude a truly cohesive society, and it was, moreover, inextricably associated with the triumph of one part of the French people over the rest. Dostoyevsky, however, does not exclude the possibility that French liberalism might prove adequate to save France from the perpetual state of disunity threatening her. Also, he does not exclude the possibility that bourgeois liberalism could serve to unite the West as a whole. For his scrutiny of the other major peoples of the West left him convinced that Geneva thought had nowhere been perfectly realized, and that nowhere had an alternative idea of order been effectively spoken. We must now turn to this scrutiny.

Dostoyevsky thought that the most serious rivals to France's claim to the leadership of the modern West were the English-speaking nations and Germany.

(ii) The English-speaking World (England and the United States)

The Russian capacity for entering into the spirit of alien peoples, on which Russian Westernism prided itself, was faced with a formidable challenge in the English. Versilov is able to be a Frenchman in France, a German in Germany, and even a Hellen in ancient Greece; but he makes no claim to be an Englishman in England. Despite its eminent role in the development of the modern West, England's influence on Russian Westernism was slight compared with that of France or Germany. In The Gambler, Dostoyevsky has a Russian offer an Englishman a partial explanation of this relative lack of influence: "Much to your displeasure I must own that Englishmen for the most part are angular and inelegant, and Russians are
very sensitive to beauty and have a taste for it". The Russian, however, does observe that the Englishman's inelegance may very well conceal "originality of character", and even "beauty of soul". Dostoyevsky was, indeed, impressed by the obstinate "originality" of the English character. He thought that it is precisely this "originality" or "eccentricity" which makes the English so inaccessible to Russians and to other Western peoples. He suspected, moreover, that this inaccessibility is deliberately fostered by the English. In The Diary of a Writer he relates a "comical incident" involving an Englishman in Russia. A Member of Parliament came to Russia during the summer recess to write some articles for the Times concerning the Russo-Turkish War of 1877. The Russians found his behaviour more than a little peculiar. For instance: he always wore a large overcoat "of pea colour" and was never without a pith helmet on his head, even in the presence of the Tsar; at court he remained sitting in the presence of the Grand Duke while everyone else, including the Tsar himself, stood; and during a banquet attended by the Grand Duke he rose when he pleased, and at his departure treated a high-ranking Russian officer like a lackey by demanding help in putting on his overcoat. The Russian newspapers expressed amusement at the incurable English eccentricity which these incidents apparently illustrated. Dostoyevsky, however, is not content to subscribe entirely to the common Russian opinion, "learned from French vaudeville", that an Englishman must simply be regarded as a "queer fellow" and an "eccentric":

But what is a queer fellow? -- He is not always a fool or so naive that he cannot guess that not everywhere in the world are things run in the same way as somewhere at home, in his own corner. On the contrary, Englishmen are a level-headed nation with broad views. As navigators -- and besides, enlightened ones -- they have seen a great many people and customs in all countries of the world. They are extraordinary and gifted observers.
Dostoyevsky maintains that the eccentricity for which the English are notorious is not entirely due to an unconscious self-absorption which renders them blithely indifferent to the ways of other peoples. It is also a type of arrogance. English "queerness" stems from a "haughtiness" which refuses to consider the ways of any other people to be on the same level as those of a "son of old England". The chilly, dignified haughtiness of the Englishman has its source in an imperturbable national self-confidence which, for Dostoyevsky, is the most striking feature of the English character.

Thus, in England all Englishmen equally respect themselves, perhaps solely because they are Englishmen. This alone, it would seem, should prove sufficient for a close bond and the people's communion in that country.

Dostoyevsky considered England the most "solid" political entity in Europe; but political stability alone did not account for England's importance in the West. The pre-eminent position occupied by England was due chiefly to the prodigious growth of English commerce and industry in the nineteenth century. In a vivid passage in Winter Notes on Summer Impressions Dostoyevsky gives voice to a feeling of awe before the apparently boundless material power which confronted him in the London of 1862:

A city as unfathomable as the ocean, bustling day and night; the screech and roar of machines; railroads passing over the houses (and soon under them too); that boldness of enterprise; that apparent disorder which is actually bourgeois orderliness in the highest degree; that polluted Thames; that air saturated with coal dust; those splendid commons and parks; those terrible sections of the city like Whitechapel with its half-naked, savage, and hungry population. A city with its millions and its world-wide commerce, the Crystal Palace, the International Exposition... Ah, yes, the Exposition is astonishing. You sense the terrible force which has drawn these people without number from all over the world into a single herd; you become aware of a colossal idea; you sense that here something has been achieved, that here there is victory and triumph. You sense that it would require great and everlasting spiritual denial and fortitude in order not to submit, not to capitulate before the impression, not to bow to what is, and not to deify Baal, that is, not to accept the material world as your ideal...
A confident England spoke, in every corner of the world, with a voice too powerful to be ignored. But could England's social order serve as the basis of a renewed Western civilization? For Dostoyevsky, this is to ask whether English imperialism speaks to mankind by virtue of sheer material power, that is as "Baal", or by virtue of an idea capable of binding men together in a shared vision of their final destiny.

Dostoyevsky regards the "English parliament" and "Anglo-Saxon law" as the constitutive elements of the English social order. But in neither does he discern an idea of universal scope. What there is of fundamental thought about social order is, for him, to be found in the contending parliamentary factions of "Whig" and "Tory". These parties had been united in rejecting French liberalism, and yet they seemed to offer no alternative for the West as a whole. The traditional order which the Tories wished to preserve was specifically English; while the "liberty" for which the Whigs struggled seemed to be a liberty appropriate only for Englishmen. Dostoyevsky claims, furthermore, that the "liberties of Englishmen" do not even apply to all Englishmen. For the conflict between Whigs and Tories is conducted on the basis of a fundamental consensus which actually excludes a large part of the English people from genuine membership in English society. According to Dostoyevsky, the "solid" English unity is, in fact, a unity of the upper class minority inspired by a fear of the new social phenomenon which English industry had engendered -- the proletariat. The "parliamentary procedure of a free people" -- England's pride and the envy of other peoples -- does not represent the whole truth about English order. Dostoyevsky bears witness to the less edifying underside of modern England's political and economic success:
... in London you behold throngs of such dimensions and in such surroundings as you will see nowhere else in the world. 
... on Saturday night a half-million workers, male and female, together with their children, flood the city like a sea, flocking especially in certain sections, and celebrate the Sabbath all night until five in the morning; that is, they stuff themselves and drink like animals, enough to last the week. This disposes of the week's savings, of all that was earned with sweat and malediction... They all race against time to drink themselves insensate. The wives do not lag behind their husbands but get drunk with them; the children run and crawl about among them...

The people are everywhere the people, but here everything was so colossal, so dazzling, that you seemed to be actually touching what you had previously been able only to imagine. Here, in fact, you do not see a people, but rather, a systematic, submissive, fostered loss of consciousness. And you sense, as you behold these pariahs of society, that for a long time to come the prophecy will not come to pass for them, that for a long time to come they will be given neither palm branches nor white robes, and that for a long time yet they will appeal to the throne of the Most High, "How long, oh Lord!" ... These millions of beings, abandoned, expelled from the human feast, shoving and crushing each other in the subterranean darkness into which their elder brothers have pushed them, grope for any gate at all to knock at, and seek an exit in order not to be smothered in the dark underground. 78

In Dostoyevsky's view, England was actually made up of two different peoples. The parliamentary and legal institutions had become the instruments by which the lower class was prevented from discovering an exit out of the "subterranean darkness". He did acknowledge the efforts of the best Englishmen to alleviate the gulf between the two peoples. Yet England had produced a Malthus, as well as a Dickens. 79

The question of social order in England, as in France, was, for Dostoyevsky, tied to the emergence of the bourgeoisie as the dominant class. English order was, above all, bourgeois order. The "solid" unity of "old England" was a unity having its source in the dominance of one part of the English people over their countrymen. England thus lacked an idea which could guarantee the ultimate solidarity of her own people, let alone the West as a whole. Dostoyevsky certainly did not discount the possibility of such an
idea taking hold of the English people. Indeed, he observed that "in their overwhelming majority the English are extremely religious people: they are thirsting for faith and are continually seeking it". Their religiosity, however, was channeled into a Protestantism which seemed unconcerned with the question of social order. The "state Anglican religion", for instance, appeared to Dostoyevsky to provide no alternative to the bourgeois order: "It is the religion of the wealthy, and openly so". Although disregarded by the established Church, the lower classes did not direct their "thirst for faith" to the variants of Geneva thought which made their way into England in the course of the nineteenth century. The majority rejected the "earthly paradise", turning instead, with typical English eccentricity, to various forms of Protestant sectarianism. This may have saved England from the relentless struggle between rich and poor which rent France. However, the stable order thus achieved was, in Dostoyevsky's judgement, incapable of inspiring a renewed sense of universal unity in the West.

Dostoyevsky does not explicitly concur with Herzen's characterization of the United States as a cruder version of English civilization. The existence of an "Anglo-American" civilization was, however, assumed among Russians, and Dostoyevsky's assessment of the American role in the future of the West tends to reflect his view of England's possibilities.

The United States was, according to him, the only nation in the West other than England which had achieved a solid and durable political organization, if at the price of a civil war. Although he said very little about American civilization -- perhaps because it had as yet said little for itself -- he seemed to think that "Americanism" would be a predominant force in the West, eclipsing even the material power embodied in London. He alludes often in
his writings to the attraction which the bare thought of "America" held for uprooted Russians. For those cut off from the "living life" of an integrated social order, "America" signified a fresh, vigorous, renewed life. Yet Dostoyevsky thought that "Americanism", despite its impending success, would not breathe new life into Western civilization. With reference to the United States he reiterates his teaching that "the development of a people and its future life is determined only by what this people believes in, what it considers an ideal of good and truth". Such an idea may have been present at the origin of the "Northamerican States"; but the original "spirit" had rapidly disappeared. According to Dostoyevsky, the American liberal idea had early lent itself to the justification of man's exploitation of man. For instance, during the American civil war "many most advanced liberals declared themselves to be on the side of the plantation owners on the ground that Negroes were Negroes and inferior to the white race, and therefore that the right of might was the prerogative of white men". The victory of the North in the war, moreover, had merely established a new form of slavery, that of the worker in the northern factories. By the latter part of the nineteenth century American liberalism had clearly become the instrument of the commercial and industrial elite. "Americanism" was thus equivalent to the triumph of the bourgeoisie. The American bourgeois, furthermore, enjoyed his dominace without hindrance from the restraints still imposed on his French and English counterparts by the abiding presence of traditions from before the age of modern industry.

Dostoyevsky's understanding of "Americanism" as a massive attempt to organize men for solely material ends, combined with a boundless political self-confidence, is expressed by Captain Lebyadkin (in The Possessed) in a memorable image:
I read in the papers the biography of an American. He left his huge fortune to factories and to the applied sciences, his skeleton to the students of the academy there, and his skin to be made into a drum, with the proviso that the American national anthem might be beaten on it day and night. Alas, we are pigmies compared with the soaring thoughts of the United States of America. 90

The ultimate success of this attempt to organize the public realm on the basis of the pursuit of material gain was, for Dostoyevsky, called into question by the "great widespreadness of spiritualism" in the United States. 91 The American bourgeois order would perhaps manage to quell the anarchic tendencies implicit in the strange religious impulses which its own exclusive emphasis on material ends had done much to provoke. Yet even if it preserved itself, it would clearly have great difficulty in persuading the other Western peoples to regard it as their guide to a renewed civilization.

(iii) Germany

Although the Russians hesitated in the face of English queerness, they manifested no such reluctance to enter into the life of that other "great, proud, and peculiar people" -- the Germans. 92 The attitude of Russian Westernism towards the German people was that attitude of reverence which the pupil feels for the teacher; for, as Stepan Verkhovensky observed, the Germans had been the teachers of the Russians for two hundred years. Indeed, in the middle of the nineteenth century Russian Westernism was still "at school, at some German Peterschule, sitting over a German book and repeating its everlasting German lesson". 93 Dostoyevsky makes it clear that Stepan Verkhovensky and Versilov imbued much of their "liberal idealism" in Germany. The close association of education with the Germans in his writing reflects the common Russian perception of Germany as a land inhabited largely by professors. His own respect for the intellect of the people which produced
Kant, Schiller, and Hegel was profound.

The respect of the student for the teacher was not, according to Dostoyevsky, incompatible with a pronounced inclination among Russians to be critical of, and even "heartily dislike", the Germans. In a letter to his niece from Germany he himself expresses the suspicion that there may be something "limited" about the Germans, even though they are doubtless the most "scholarly" of peoples. In *The Diary of a Writer*, however, he suggests that this suspicion, shared by other peoples, may be mistaken:

As regards German wit and German apprehension ... there exist several opinions. The French, who ... never liked the Germans, always have considered, and now regard, the German mind as being a bit tight but, of course, by no means blunt. They perceive in the German intellect, as it were, some inclination to avoid always the straight issue in everything, and, on the contrary, to make out of a single proposition something bisyllabic, biarticulate. Among us, Russians, there has always circulated a great number of anecdotes about the tightness and dullness of the Germans, notwithstanding all our sincere admiration of their learnedness. But it seems to me that the Germans merely possess too strong a distinctiveness, too obstinate a national peculiarity, to the degree of haughtiness, which, at times, makes one indignant, and which, for this reason, leads to erroneous conclusions regarding them. However, at first, on a foreigner — especially if he is a newcomer to Germany — the German, in truth, sometimes produces a strange impression in social intercourse.

Dostoyevsky delights in relating anecdotes which illustrate the obstinate "national peculiarity" of the Germans. However, the distinctiveness of the German people, whatever its effect on other peoples, is in his view expressive of a genuine "national character" which has "grown organically". The German people thus possess that profound sense of nation so conspicuously absent among uprooted Russians. Because of their deeply-rooted national self-confidence, the Germans, like the English, do not exude a very great modesty; they too are not averse to contemplating their own image in a mirror. What expresses itself as haughtiness in the English tends in the Germans to
take the more vulgar form of boastfulness, an "unbecoming" and "surprising" trait of the German people: "They have too much right to pride themselves over many a thing -- even when compared with any other nation -- to be displaying such triviality."  

Although he refers to an inherent tendency towards self-complacency and "petty bragging" in the German character, Dostoyevsky considered German arrogance too important a phenomenon to be reduced to a mere question of character traits. His fascinated observation of the German people yielded a more significant explanation of their aggressive self-confidence. This explanation is concerned, most immediately, with the significance of the Franco-German war. While in Dresden in 1870 he witnessed the mobilization and departure of the Saxon troops for the front, and was impressed by what he saw:

... what vigour in those faces, what a serene, cheerful and, at the same time, grave expression in their eyes! They were all young men and, when looking at some company marching, it was impossible not to admire their wonderful military drill, their orderly step, their rigidly punctilious alignment, and, at the same time, the remarkable freedom which I had never before observed in a soldier ... these Germans marched without being driven with a rod -- as one man, with perfect resoluteness and full certitude in victory.

Dostoyevsky confesses to having felt afraid for the French, though he was then certain that they would defeat the Germans. Upon the return of the victorious German troops shortly thereafter, the inhabitants of Dresden became "drunk" with their success. Dostoyevsky was apparently most shocked by the manner in which scholarly Germany was taken up into the "raging chorus" of German nationalism. In a letter written to his niece from Dresden during the siege of Paris, he reports:

By far the greatest excitement and pride exists among the professors, doctors, and students... the professors are extraordinarily arrogant. I encounter them every evening
in the public library. A very influential scholar with silver-white hair loudly exclaimed the day before yesterday: "Paris must be bombarded!" So that's the outcome of all their learning. 102

The frenzy of self-congratulation which erupted in Germany in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian war was not simply the natural after-flush of a stunning military triumph. 103 The war was also a prodigious political event for the German people. Through it the final political unification of Germany was achieved. At Versailles a humiliated France bowed not only to Prussia but to the newly emergent German Empire. The Germans had long possessed "economic prosperity, civilization, science"; but until 1870 they had lacked political unity. The relative lateness of Germany's organization into a political unit thus rendered German nationalism more aggressive than that of Western peoples who had long taken their political self-articulation for granted. 104

The stridency of German nationalism also owed much to the manner in which Germany achieved political unification. In 1864, two years before Sadowa and four before Sedan, Dostoyevsky predicted that Prussia would "assemble Germany by force". 105 He continued, after the fulfillment of this prediction, to regard the German state as something "unnatural" and "forced", despite its apparent inevitability. Although Bismarck's reliance on "blood and iron" was doubtless effective, the political unity thus achieved was a "mechanical" and merely external unity. 106 Dostoyevsky doubted the durability of a state which owed so much to military triumphs:

That which today may seem durable is, maybe, nothing but a fantasy... the present generation of the Germans has been bribed with successes; it is intoxicated with pride; and is restrained by the iron hand of its leaders. Still, perhaps in the not distant future, when these leaders pass into another world, ceding their place to other men, the questions and instincts which have temporarily been suppressed will be brought to the foreground. It is also quite probable
that the energy of the initial impulse of the consolidation will be exhausted, and, instead, the oppositional energy will again be restored, and that it will undermine that which has been accomplished. 107

The fear, only half-acknowledged and yet hauntingly persistent, of political dissolution enhanced immeasurably the vehemence of German nationalism.

While pointing to the "unnatural" character of the modern German state, Dostoyevsky nonetheless affirms the complete naturalness of the yearning which brought it into being. He maintains that the ostentatious nationalism of modern Germany is the most recent manifestation of a conviction deeply rooted in the history of the German people. The German has for centuries believed that he is destined to speak the final word of social order to the West:

Throughout his whole history he has been dreaming of, and thirsting for, his unification, for the proclamation of his proud idea...the German is already fully convinced of his triumph and that no one can assume his place at the head of the world and of its renaissance. He believes in this haughtily and undeviatingly; he believes that there is nothing on earth higher than his spirit and his word, and that only Germany can utter it. To him it is even ridiculous to suppose that there be in the world, though merely in embryo, anything which Germany, predestined to lead the world, would fail to contain. 108

The Germans had persistently sought the political unification which their mission seemed to presuppose. Well before 1870 they would gladly have agreed to exchange "half of their scientific fame" for that political unity long ago achieved by England and Russia.109 The instinctive groping for a political foundation from which to speak the German word to mankind finally eventuated in the German Empire of Bismarck. The lateness and "unnaturalness" of Bismarck's state did not alter the fact that the German people had long felt summoned to unify the West according to a new idea of order. Indeed, the Germans felt the obligation of this summons as intensely as the French, and
perhaps more intensely than the English-speaking peoples. For Dostoyevsky, however, the content of Germany's vision of order was less definite than its desire to transmit this vision to the West.

There would be ample reason to conjecture that the German conception of order is closely related to the Geneva idea. Modern German nationalism first emerged decisively in opposition to French imperialism, but it derived much of its theoretical justification and practical efficacy from the "new form of democracy" which France fostered throughout the West. The intellectuals and politicians who attempted to rally the German people against Napoleon found inspiration in the notion of "the self-determination of a free people". Moreover, the Prussian state which defeated Napoleon at Leipzig had modelled itself after the rationalized French liberal state; and, in general, Napoleon's re-organization of the chaotic patch-work of German kingdoms, duchies, and principalities was indispensable to the political realization of German nationalism. The consolidation of German political unity in 1870 thus owed much to French liberalism. Yet Dostoyevsky thought that German liberalism would not exert a practical influence in Germany comparable to its counterpart in France, despite the modern German state's debt to French liberalism — and despite the genius with which German thinkers had formulated their variations of the Geneva theme.

"Liberal idealism" enjoyed a practical success in France only insofar as it became "bourgeois liberalism", and was thereby able to enlist the support of the dominant social class. Napoleon's policies had greatly furthered the ascent of the German middle class to economic dominance. Throughout the nineteenth century it gradually achieved a social recognition consonant with its economic mastery, and within the new German nation-state it was granted a glimpse of the political influence it was to wield with more
confidence after the turn of the century. Dostoyevsky considered the middle
class so important in modern Germany that he tends to cast the German people
as a whole in its image. There is a certain ambivalence in his depiction of
the German bourgeois. By way of contrast with the incapacity of uprooted
Russians for work, he praises the capacity of the German bourgeois for
sustained, methodical effort towards the achievement of a definite goal. Yet at the same time he professes amusement and consternation at this
capacity (in the words of Alexis in *The Gambler*):

... everywhere among these people every house has its Vater,
dreadfully virtuous and exceedingly honest: 'So honest,' in fact, that it's terrible to go near him. Every one of these Vaters has a family, and in the evening they all read im-
proving books aloud to one another. The elms and chestnut
trees rustle above the little cottage. There is the sunset,
and a stork on the roof, and everything is extremely touching
and poetic... Suppose the Vater has already got together a few
guilden, and is counting on handing over his trade or his bit
of land to the eldest son; to this end the daughter is not
given a dowry and remains an old maid. To this end also the
younger son is sold into bondage or the army, and the money is
added to the capital of the household... It is all done out of
nothing but honesty... things are no easier even for the elder
son; he has his Amalchen, with whom his heart is united — but
they can't get married because not enough money has been scraped
together yet. They wait virtuously, and, smiling in all
sincerity, they too go like lambs to the slaughter. Amalchen's
cheeks are sunken, she is growing withered. At last, after about
twenty years, the fortune has increased; the guilden have been
honestly and virtuously amassed. The Vater gives his blessing
to the forty-year-old son and the thirty-five-year-old Amalchen,
with her withered breasts and her red nose... Thereupon he weeps,
moralizes, and dies. The elder son is now transformed into a
Vater and the whole story begins all over again... and after some
five or six more generations there emerges Baron Rothschild him-
self, or Hoppe and Co., or the devil knows who. Well, sir, what
a majestic spectacle! A century or two's continuous labour,
patience, intelligence, honesty, strength of character, steadfast-
ness, foresight, and storks on the roof! What more can you want?112

Germany's evolution into a bourgeois liberal state seemed probable in light
of the strong presence of the bourgeoisie, and of a liberal thought eager for
practical effect and at least partially willing to accommodate itself to
bourgeois aspirations.
Dostoyevsky, however, discerned something in the German middle class which distinguished it from that of France, England, or the United States. This difference was for him extremely significant, though its nature was obscure. It was expressed most clearly in the unusual docility of the German middle class. Unlike its Western equivalents, the German bourgeoisie appeared willing to limit its dominance for the sake of an obedience not always in accord with its most obvious aspirations. Rather than adopt liberalism for its own ends, the German bourgeoisie had maintained a definite distance from it, in deference to a different vision of order. German intellectuals may have been enthralled by "Freedom, Equality, and Brotherhood", but the German middle class tended to pay homage elsewhere.

The object of this homage eluded Dostoyevsky's precise definition. However, the task of understanding the content of Germany's vision was, for him, obviously imperative. The emergence of Germany as the most powerful state on the European continent, consequent upon its victory over France, had made it a likely arbiter of Western civilization. In a letter written to his niece from Germany, just prior to the final capitulation of France, Dostoyevsky declares that "now the Germans will at last show us their real faces". If this face was not to be that of the bourgeois liberal, to whom would it belong? He did not find an adequate answer to this question in the still commanding presence of the Prussian Junker, nor did he think it was contained in Lutheranism. Other than a terse, inconclusive reference to "paganism" in modern Germany, he offers no positive indication of the uniquely German idea of order. Indeed, he indicates that the idea animating the German people may be, in essence, a negation. In The Possessed he translates the Franco-German rivalry in modern Europe into a musical analogy in
which the initially self-assured melody of the Marseillaise is gradually overcome by the increasingly authoritative strains of Mein lieber Augustin:

It began with the menacing strains of the Marseillaise:

Qu'un sang impur abreuve nos sillons!

A flamboyant challenge was heard, the flush of future victories. But suddenly, mingling with the masterly variations on the national anthem — somewhere on one side, from below, from some corner, but very close, came the trivial strains of Mein lieber Augustin. The Marseillaise ignored them; the Marseillaise reached the climax of intoxication with its own grandeur; but Augustin was gaining strength, it was getting more and more insolent, and suddenly the strains of Augustin began to blend with the strains of the Marseillaise. The latter was apparently getting angry; unable to ignore Augustin any longer, it tried to shake it off, to brush it off, like some obtrusive, insignificant fly, but Mein lieber Augustin was hanging on firmly; he was gay and self-confident, he was full of joy and arrogance, and the Marseillaise suddenly somehow became terribly stupid: it could no longer conceal its resentment and exasperation; it was a wail of indignation, tears, and oaths with arms outstretched to Providence:

Pas un pouce de notre terrain, pas une de nos fortresses.

But already it was forced to sing in time with Mein lieber Augustin. Its melody passed in a most stupid way into that of Augustin, it drooped and died. Only from time to time could a snatch of the original tune be heard: qu'un sang impur...but immediately they passed most mortifyingly into the horrible waltz. Finally, it was utterly subdued: it was Jules Favre sobbing on Bismarck's bosom and giving away everything, everything...But now it was Augustin's turn to assert himself: hoarse sounds were heard, one had a feeling of countless barrels of beer, the frenzy of self-glorification, demands for milliards, expensive cigars, champagne and hostages; Augustin passed into a wild roar. 117

Dostoyevsky intimates that the "wild roar" in which Mein lieber Augustin culminates may express no idea other than "long live German pride". 118

Dostoyevsky thought it no accident that the national day of the new German state commemorated the victory over France at Sedan. For modern Germany
seemed to be animated chiefly by a "terrible animosity" towards France. Bismarck would have reduced France to a "nonsense" if it had been within his power to destroy Paris and transfer the ownership of French land to Germans. As it is, he was prepared to attack France again at a moment's notice. For Dostoyevsky this animosity is not only "terrible" but also "significant". It is so significant that it cannot be restricted to Bismarck and the nineteenth century, but must be perceived as a fundamental constituent of the German spirit throughout its history. The German animosity towards France is, moreover, too significant to be reduced to talk of a racial enmity between German and Gaul. Dostoyevsky maintains, rather, that Germany has tended to reject, not France herself, but those ideas of social order -- first Roman Catholic and then Genevan -- which France has striven to embody. Thus, Bismarck's attack on Roman Catholicism within Germany (the Kulturkampf), otherwise inexplicable, was the latest manifestation of Germany's traditional denial of French visions of order. An understanding of the full significance for Dostoyevsky of the German rejection of France must await a later chapter. Suffice it here to state that, in his view, the modern Franco-German rivalry is "a battle of two civilizations very different from each other", a battle which the war of 1870 had failed to resolve decisively. The word which Germany was preparing to speak to the West from its new position of power would clearly constitute a radical rejection of the Geneva idea. But the positive content, if any, of its own vision of universal union remained shrouded in darkness.

III Towards a New World-Order

(1) Bourgeois Liberal Democracy

From his scrutiny of the Western peoples Dostoyevsky concluded that
the West is indeed moving towards a new unity, towards an embodiment of a "new formula of the union of men upon the earth". The possibility of this new union resides in the two crucial circumstances of the modern West: the emergence of the bourgeoisie everywhere as the dominant social class, and the intellectual hegemony of the liberal idea of order. The amalgam of these two sovereign facts of modern Western life gives rise to the social formula of "bourgeois liberal democracy". In this formula the West seeks the restoration of its lost unity, and ultimately the unity of all mankind. The "bourgeois social form" embodied so eloquently in France "now reigns throughout the world in imitation of the great nation." Whatever the particular form of the various Western regimes, the trend toward democracy, or universal suffrage, is unmistakable. And whatever the particular version of bourgeois liberalism which animates these democracies -- French, English, or American -- the modification of Geneva ideas is fundamentally the same. Freedom is not indissolubly associated with moral striving, but with the satisfaction of needs. The right of individual freedom is the right to "the multiplication and the rapid satisfaction of needs"; and men are encouraged in their natural tendency to interpret "need" in material terms. This emancipation of acquisitiveness accords an increasingly vulgar aspect to the West: "Europe believes only in money."

Bourgeois liberal democracy strives to establish "brotherhood", or the universal union of men, on the basis of its interpretation of individual freedom. This task must be accomplished in the absence of the traditional social bonds, for the bourgeois doctrine of individual rights has dissolved the traditional cement of social cohesion:
Europe's experience teaches that whenever all citizens are granted equal rights, there is a general weakening of the sense of honour and, therefore, of the feeling of duty. Selfishness displaces the old unifying principle, and the whole system breaks up into a multitude of individuals, each with a full set of civil rights. 126

According to Dostoyevsky, capitalist liberalism seeks social cohesion, not in any restoration of the sense of duty, but in the universal extension of the right to the multiplication and rapid satisfaction of needs. This all-encompassing extension of equal civil rights is the prerequisite of a social order in which "everything is settled by agreement", that is, a contractual social order. 127 The durability of the contractual bond can be no more than a function of its continued ability to satisfy the parties to the contract. In an age of "self-will" in which "the individualist isolationist instinct stands aloof and demands its rights with sword in hand", 128 the stability of contractual relationships seems highly dubious. Bourgeois liberal democracy, however, depends ultimately on only one fundamental contract -- the social contract. The permanence of this contract, according to an apologist in The Idiot, is guaranteed by "the universal necessity of living, eating, and drinking", which can never be adequately satisfied without some degree of "association" and "solidarity of interests". 129 This exclusive appeal to material self-interest may be an appeal to sheer "piggishness"; but, after all, "it is so alluring". 130 It is attractive not only to those who are concerned primarily with their own comfortable self-preservation but also to those who are anxious for a social order which promises peace and a modicum of happiness to a disjointed world. 131 Bourgeois liberal democracy, founded on a "realistic" appraisal of man, claims to be the only hope for a workable social order in a world ruled by the "individualist instinct".
Dostoyevsky was convinced that the world-wide social union which was coming into being under the auspices of capitalist liberalism is animated at its heart by the principle: "Everybody for himself, and only for himself, and every intercourse with men solely for one's self." He could discern in the coming liberal democratic order nothing more elevated than a "bourgeois solution to the problem of comfort." He maintained that capitalist liberalism, however, will go to some lengths to conceal the aridity of its contractualism with an attractive décor. While it assumes a relatively honest appearance in "Americanism", in French liberalism it adopts a façade of elegance, and even nobility. The French bourgeois "proclaims openly that money is the highest virtue and human obligation", and yet he loves "to toy with nobility of character". The longing of the French bourgeois for an aura of "ineffable nobility", which would not impede him from amassing capital, inspired melodrama, that incomparable contribution of France to the bourgeois world-order. Here the bourgeois beholds himself as in a mirror, and although he is sometimes portrayed as ridiculous, "in the end he is always informed that all is well":

...vaudeville, though it attracts the bourgeois, does not satisfy him fully. The bourgeois considers it trivial. He needs something lofty, he needs ineffable nobility, he needs emotion, and melodrama contains all of these. The Parisian cannot live without melodrama. Melodrama will not die as long as the bourgeois lives... The bourgeois takes great pleasure in lecturing himself and his [wife] at every opportunity, and even considers this a most sacred and pressing duty... The melodrama contains lofty characters and lofty sermons. Here there is no humour; it is rather the pathetic triumph of all that the bourgeois admires. What he likes most is political tranquillity and the right to amass money for the building of a more placid home. And this is the spirit in which melodramas are written nowadays.

Dostoyevsky thought that the wedding of the awesome material power called forth by capitalism with the "rights of man" would elicit the allegiance,
or at least the acquiescence, of an ever greater portion of humanity. The adornment of Anglo-American "knowhow" with French "moral order", and even "effable nobility", must surely prove irresistible. More than a century of the dynamic economic activity of the middle class had laid the material foundations of a new universal civilization. The railway and the telegraph -- "the reduction of distances and the transmission of ideas through the air", in Father Zossima's words -- and, above all, the stock-exchange are for Dostoyevsky "artistic expressions" of the movement towards a universal bourgeois civilization. Bourgeois liberal democracy may succeed where the Roman Catholic order finally failed; for, as never before, the world appears to be "getting more and more united and growing into a brotherly community" through "commerce, maritime navigation, markets, factories", and the principle of the "rights of man". Material necessity and individual egoism may thus eventually prove to be the solid, if unedifying, cornerstones of a new, unified Western civilization. The bourgeois, no longer compelled to persuade the West that he is the incarnation of human perfection, is now able to "pose tranquilly and majestically before the entire world".

Bourgeois liberal democracy is "terrifically cocksure", and at the same time it is permeated with fear and self-doubt. Dostoyevsky thought that there was ample reason for capitalist liberalism to be perennially ill at ease and "afraid of something"; for, while on the verge of its conclusive triumph, the bourgeois world-order was becoming increasingly overcast with "dark clouds". He attributed responsibility for the darkness hovering over Western civilization to two fundamental shortcomings within liberal democracy itself.

First, liberal democracy failed to tame the divisive nationalism to
which it made such an important contribution in the nineteenth century. The notion of the universal realization of the "rights of man" was proving less potent in the modern West than the kindred notion of the collective right of peoples to determine their own destiny. And these two notions showed themselves to be far less compatible than liberal theory had assumed. The increasing fragmentation being brought about by liberal nationalism in practice was exacerbated by the apparent emptiness of the promise of worldwide community contained in the dynamic economic activity of the bourgeoisie. To Dostoyevsky it was increasingly apparent, by the latter part of the nineteenth century, that the West's commercial and industrial activity entailed a divisive economic imperialism which could very easily plunge the world into conflicts of immense magnitude "for the sake of some trivial stock-exchange interests..." The agents of future world-union, the railway and the stock-exchange, had become the instruments of an intense rivalry among the bourgeois of the Western nation-states. Having manifested itself already in the scramble for markets and raw materials in the non-Western world, this rivalry must inevitably erupt with violence in Europe itself. The Franco-German war, moreover, had disrupted the tenuous concord which, with minor exceptions, had been maintained among the European powers since the Vienna Settlement of 1815. The bewildering array of alliances forged in Europe after 1870 had failed to restore the balance of power, and had actually heightened the international tension. Acknowledging that he would likely be deemed "crazy" for venturing such a prediction, Dostoyevsky nevertheless maintains that the "unnatural" political situation prevailing in the West will inevitably culminate in war:

...huge, final, disintegrating political war, in which all powers will have a share, and which will break out in our century,
perhaps even in the coming decade...Do you rely upon the wisdom of statesmen and upon their refusal to undertake a war? When was it possible to place reliance upon that wisdom? Do you put your trust in Parliaments, and believe that they will foresee the results and refuse the money for the war? But when have Parliaments foreseen results and refused money to the slightest insistence of a man in power? 144

The colossal destruction of war which awaited the West did not bode well for the "bourgeois solution of the problem of comfort".

The other great failure of capitalist liberalism is, if possible, even more significant. It was clear to Dostoyevsky that the offer of equal rights to all men was failing to secure the unanimous acquiescence in the fundamental social contract which liberal democracy presupposes. In The Idiot he has Lebedev observe that railways which bring material goods to satisfy the needs of mankind, "without a moral basis for that action", may quite deliberately "exclude a considerable part of humanity from the enjoyment of what they bring". 145 The lower classes were encouraged to multiply and satisfy their needs; but they were not granted the means of satisfaction. The universal extension of equal rights was thus arousing the envy and resentment of the poor rather than securing their acquiescence in the capitalist order. The possession of equal rights in a contractual order is meaningless without the power to participate effectively in defining and enforcing the terms of the contract. Those who do have this power, in effect, possess the rest "as a slave". 146 By the latter part of the nineteenth century the Western bourgeoisie, fearful of the possibly disastrous consequences of the slaves' resentment, had begun tentatively to move towards the "welfare state", to purchase the tranquillity of the lower orders. But Dostoyevsky doubted that the Western workers would be ultimately appeased by "little concessions". For the moment they seemed content to drown their
resentment in drink, but would they not, sooner or later, drown it "in blood instead of in drink"? 147

(ii) Socialism

The resentment of the "fourth estate" in Western industrial society came to be justified and directed by "political" socialism. In Dostoyevsky's view, the potent alliance of the workers' unsatisfied needs with socialism constituted a dire threat to the emerging bourgeois liberal order.

One small portion of mankind shall not possess the rest as a slave; yet it was solely for this purpose that all the civic institutions of Europe...have hitherto been formed... But the proletarian is in the street. Do you think he will wait and starve in patience as he used? After he has tasted political socialism, after the International, after the Socialist Congresses and the Paris Commune? No, it will not now be as it used to be. They will hurl themselves upon Europe... 148

"Political" socialism, however, promises more than the destruction of capital- ist liberalism. It professes itself the instrument of a more authentic realization of the "rights of man".

It is to the nation of "the first step", France, that Dostoyevsky looks for the genesis of "political" socialism. The birth of French liberalism was accompanied, well-nigh simultaneously, by the birth of French socialism. As early as 1796 Babeuf and Buonarotti had spurned those "positive acquisitions" which the liberals deemed sufficient to consider the French Revolution completed. They would not accept bourgeois liberalism as the fulfillment of the Geneva vision:

These proclaimed a new word of their own, namely, the necessity of universal fellowship not for the equal distribution of rights allotted to a quarter, or so, of the human race, leaving the rest to serve as raw material and a means of exploitation for the happiness of that quarter of mankind, but, on the contrary -- for universal equality, with each and every one sharing the blessings of this world...Progressive minds had only too well grasped the
fact that despotism had merely assumed a new guise...that
the new world-conquerors (the bourgeois) proved, perhaps,
even worse than the former despots (the nobility); that
"Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité" is but a high-sounding phrase,
and nothing but a phrase. 149

These "progressive" minds declared that the natural course of the Revolution
had been prematurely interrupted, that the realization of the "rights of man"
required a radical social, as well as political, transformation.

Dostoyevsky identifies three distinct, yet intimately related
varieties of French socialism: "utopian" or "idealist", "scientific",
and "political" or "revolutionary". 150 "Idealistic" socialism — which
he associates chiefly with the work of Saint-Simon, Fourier, Cabet, and
George Sand — made its appearance first. These socialists refused to re-
nounce "the Utopian meaning of these three words for which so much blood
had been shed". 151 Rather than adjust their vision of freedom, equality,
and brotherhood to accommodate the middle class which had risen to dominance
in the wake of the Revolution, they advocated the substantial equality of
goods as a pre-requisite to genuine freedom and brotherhood. Their explicit
attack on private property deprived them, at the outset, of the support
of the powerful. Instead of calculating ways and means of seizing power
themselves, they expected the persuasive effect of their teachings alone to
usher in the "new Christianity" or the "phalanstery". This adamant refusal
to compromise with actuality seemed tantamount to a preference for "dreams"
and "fantasy" over "realism". 152 While for Dostoyevsky there was certainly
something fantastic in the penchant of "utopian" socialism for drawing up
remarkably detailed blueprints of heaven on earth, he nevertheless regarded
it as a movement of paramount significance for the West. For "utopian"
socialism contained, in embryonic form, the fundamental components of the
later, more effective forms of socialism. First, it was infused with a high
moral earnestness which seemed very attractive beside the "realism" of bourgeois liberalism. The obviously genuine thirst for justice of "utopian" socialism led Dostoyevsky to assert that, on moral grounds, the leadership of France belonged to the socialists, "notwithstanding their apparent weakness and fantasticality".153 Secondly, the "idealistic" socialists assumed that their thirst for justice could be slaked by the actualization of formulations of reason. They were utterly confident that the problem of social order was soluble by human reason alone:

The [idealistic] socialist sets desperately to work on the future fraternity, defining it, calculating its size and weight, enticing you with its advantages, explaining, teaching, telling of the profit each stands to gain from the fraternity and just how much each will win; he determines in advance what each personality will look like and what burden each will carry, and determines in advance the division of earthly wealth; what part each one will merit and how much each in return must pay to the community at the expense of his individuality...There is undeniably much seductiveness in the idea of living purely according to the principle of reason...i.e. in living well, with everyone protecting you and demanding in return only work and harmony. 154

Dostoyevsky thought that "idealistic" socialism was beset by a contradiction at its very heart. It based its hope for the actualization of the "earthly paradise" on man's intrinsic moral goodness, "the spiritual thirst of mankind, and its longing for perfection and purity". Yet in the "earthly paradise" social harmony was to depend on a strictly rational or scientific ordering of human relations. The understanding of man as subject to natural and social necessity seemed to militate against the idea of the moral responsibility of the free human personality, which was such an abiding concern of George Sand for instance. 155

"Scientific" socialism tempered the contradiction inherent in "idealistic" socialism by placing its entire hope in the scientific understanding of man and society. The fulfillment of the free human personality may be the
ultimate goal of "scientific" socialism, but it purports to arrive there, not by appealing to the individual's longing for perfection, but by re-educating him according to the scientific truths of "utility" and "necessity". Socialism thus became less fantastic, and also less moral. However, the conviction of the moral superiority of socialism remained just as deeply rooted. The fervid self-righteousness of "idealistic" socialism tended to become, in "scientific" socialism, an imperturbable assurance of the inevitability of its triumph. This assurance was derived from a "scientific" doctrine of historical progress which purportedly corrected the a priori character of "idealistic" socialism, thereby rendering socialism at once more realistic and more certain of realization: "there is no right here whatsoever -- there is only history, a historical course of events". The notion of historical necessity, combined with the assumption of its moral superiority, made "scientific" socialism a theory which promised to bear potent fruit in the realm of practice.

This promise was truly realized only when "scientific" socialism allied itself with the resentment of the workers, and became "political" socialism. Whereas "idealistic" socialism had been wary of such an alliance, the "scientific" socialists eventually came to the conclusion that the bourgeoisie, as the product of a particular historical and social necessity, would never be educated to cede its place to another stage in the "historical course of events". The middle class would have to be forcibly ousted from its dominant position, just as it had previously ousted the nobility. According to Dostoyevsky, there were among the "political" socialists "moral ring-leaders ... who are great and fervent believers... seeking nothing for themselves and ... labouring for humanity"; but there were also "all sorts
of speculators" preparing to satisfy their ambition for power. Both, however, were agreed in affirming the need for violent revolution as a prelude to the "earthly paradise". The "moral ring-leaders" among the revolutionary socialists placed their hopes in the emerging working class because they identified it with the next stage in an ineluctable historical necessity, and because, influenced by the "idealistic" socialism which spawned them, they were vaguely convinced of the "moral right of the poor". The "rogues" and "speculators" among the revolutionary socialists turned to the working class out of an intuition of the tremendous power latent in "ten million proletarians" who may not be Frenchmen at all, but an insensate rabble, "which will gladly swallow up France, and perhaps Europe as well". They did not preach to the poor of their "moral right". Instead, they tempted them with the promise of plunder. 159

From the moment that French socialism became "political", declaring war on the bourgeoisie by proclaiming "liberté, égalité, fraternité ou la mort", 160 it had apparently doomed itself. The alliance of socialism with the "demos" made it anathema to the bourgeoisie, who were absolutely determined that their position in France was not going to be usurped by those who laboured for them. "Political" socialism thus brought down upon itself the terrible wrath, inspired by a mixture of fear and contempt, of the third estate. Dostoyevsky was aware of the efforts of the Second Empire to bring the "paupers" back within the fold of bourgeois France by means of social legislation and the granting of universal suffrage. But he thought that the apparent willingness of the bourgeoisie to compromise with the fourth estate did not alter the fact that both classes were engaged in a struggle to the death and that no concessions would be made which would fundamentally weaken the position of either. 161 Although largely conducted under the surface of
French life, the relentless struggle occasionally revealed its face to the world: in the eruption of June 1848, and again, even more terribly, in the Commune of 1870. Writing in 1863, Dostoyevsky remarked that the superior power of the bourgeoisie, so evident in the "June Days" of 1848, had "triumphed conclusively". Although the Commune of 1870 made this remark seem premature, the bourgeoisie had again triumphed. French socialism had apparently died with the Paris communards at the Cemetery of Père Lachaise.

Nevertheless, in the decade after 1870 Dostoyevsky's writings reflect a growing doubt concerning the conclusive nature of bourgeois liberalism's triumph over socialism. It was apparent to him that nowhere in the West had liberal democracy successfully assuaged the resentment of the lower classes. So long as this resentment continued to be fed by the tendency of the bourgeoisie to convert the poor into "a working force for its own welfare", and so long as the socialist idea did not become utterly extinct, then "political" socialism must be accorded a decisive voice in the future of Western civilization.

To Dostoyevsky it was increasingly apparent that the failures of liberal democracy were grave enough to call radically into question its aspiration — just on the verge of fulfillment — to a new universal order. The crisis of liberal democracy, in his view, entailed grave consequences for the West: the West faces an upheaval "such as there has never been before"; Europe is a powder-keg "just waiting for the first spark"; the time has come for something "sarpiternal, millenarian", something "colossal, elemental, and dreadful"; "immense cataclysms" await the West. Although he did not pretend to be a soothsayer, Dostoyevsky did attempt to illumine the thick darkness which he perceived descending upon the "land of holy miracles".
In this attempt he was led to make particular predictions concerning the future of the West — some of them "prophetic", and others less accurate. It must be emphasized, however, that the import of his account of the modern Western quest for social order does not depend on the accuracy of the scenario which can be constructed from his various predictions. What is important is the accuracy, or lack thereof, with which he discerned the lineaments of the crisis of order faced by the West.

At the centre of Dostoyevsky's thought about the future of the West are the two fundamental conflicts which, in his view, have their source in the nature of liberal democracy itself. As we have noted, he thought that the intense rivalry of the bourgeois nation-states would erupt into wars of thitherto inconceivable magnitude. He envisaged, also, an extension and intensification of the struggle between bourgeois liberalism and "political" socialism which would eventually see the entire bourgeois West threatened with an immense revolution. He did not explicate the relationship between these enormous conflicts, but he clearly associated them very closely, speaking of them almost in the same breath.

There are indications that he anticipated the outbreak, first, of a great war involving all the Western powers. The heart of the "inevitable and not far distant" war would be the struggle between France and Germany. The enmity between these nations had not abated in the aftermath of the Franco-German war of 1870, and the desire of France for a war of revanche was surpassed only by the desire of Germany for undisputed hegemony over Europe. The war between these great nations would draw in England, Austria, Italy, and perhaps Russia on one side or the other. Dostoyevsky thought that a war which will cost so much blood must unquestionably end quickly; but if
the outcome of the war was not definitive, then the West would in the future face "ten times greater" effusions of blood. He seems to have thought that the national struggles would likely eventuate in the emergence of Germany as the ruler of continental Europe, with a powerful English-speaking order on one side and Russia on the other. 167

Yet the elemental national struggles, whatever their outcome, are overshadowed in significance for him by the possibility of a "colossal revolution" posed by the diffusion of "political" socialism throughout the West. He did not explore the question of the workers' participation in the internecine bourgeois war, but his anticipation of an "all-European battle" indicates that he thought the Western workers may be persuaded initially to put national honour ahead of international proletarian solidarity. He seems also to have thought, however, that the bourgeois states would be terribly weakened by their wars, and that the workers would finally refuse to shed their blood in an alien cause. For he was convinced that revolution would come, and not long after the era of great wars. 168

Dostoyevsky predicted that "communism will surely come and triumph". Liberal democracy will perhaps prove so tenacious that the victory of communism will require "centuries of terrible discord", and cost "one hundred million heads" and "floods of blood". But "political" socialism, initially weaker than its adversary, will finally prove itself stronger. The bourgeoisie must at last yield to the inevitable: "The fourth estate is coming; it knocks and batters at the door, and if the door be not opened, it will be broken down." 169 Those who are bound by liberal democracy will doubtless be resolute in the defence of their material interests. Yet when defeat looms large before them they will "scatter like lightening"; for liberal democracy is fundamentally a union of men for the purpose of "filling
their bellies", and this is the most impotent of all the ideas which can bind men together. Bourgeois liberalism lacks an idea with moral appeal, and the conservative idea is little more than a "corpse". For Dostoyevsky, socialism thus embodies the highest moral idea present in the political life of the modern West. The socialist interpretation of Geneva thought is perhaps the only idea of social order which has a future in the West. This idea endows socialism with an unconquerable resolve which enables it to survive, and even transform into moral victories, defeats which would have utterly crushed its opponents.

Yet at the same time as he affirms the future triumph of communism, Dostoyevsky declares that "after a bit it will fall". Socialism may derive much strength from the relative attractiveness of its yearning for justice; but its potency in practice depends on its close alliance with the far less attractive envy and resentment of the dispossessed. In Dostoyevsky's view, this alliance detracts seriously from the moral appeal of the socialist idea. To the mass of the exploited workers socialism has come to signify simply the plunder of property-owners. The triumph of "political" socialism may thus ultimately entail no more than a transfer of economic power from one social class to another. To quote Versilov:

Un beau matin, despite all their "balanced budgets" and "absence of deficits", all the governments will get so hopelessly bogged down in their debts that they'll decide to suspend payment and declare themselves bankrupt...those who never held any shares, indeed, never possessed anything, that is, all the penniless beggars, will refuse to accept a liquidation based on former holdings, and the struggle will begin...Well, then, after 77 defeats, the beggars will wipe out the shareholders, take their shares away from them, and, of course, become shareholders themselves. Perhaps they'll introduce some innovations, and perhaps they won't. Most likely they'll go bankrupt too.  

The triumphant paupers may blithely ignore or even suppress socialist doctrine
so that they can concentrate on the enjoyment of their newly-won power, just as the bourgeoisie had ignored liberal ideas after successfully confronting the feudal order with its "Ote-toi de là que je m'y mette". A future union of workers for the sake of "filling their bellies" is, for Dostoyevsky, a distinct possibility. Such an eventuality would signify the indirect victory of the bourgeois ethos and the moral "fall" of socialism.

A more literal fall, moreover, awaits socialism. Any universal socialist order will face the protest of what remains in the West of loyalty to national particularities. In the vanguard of this protest will be Germany with her eternal denial of French principles of order. Socialism may perhaps manage to quell the nationalist protest -- especially since, as Dostoyevsky remarks, "Germany is eaten through with socialism" but this is merely one aspect of the fundamental "protest of individuality" inevitably evoked by socialism. The subjection of man to scientific necessity for the sake of a certainly realized social cohesion is bound to evoke a protest on behalf of the free individual. This protest has already been raised against socialism by capitalist liberalism, which has never hesitated to invoke the sacred right of individual freedom to protect bourgeois privileges. Insofar as liberalism allies itself with the protest of individuality engendered by socialism it may gain a renewed lease on life. Indeed, its appeal to individual freedom -- even if understood in the bourgeois manner -- may enable it to parade in the mantle of moral superiority discarded by the new regime of share-holders. The struggle between socialism and liberalism will thus be renewed, with the former appealing to "brotherhood" and the latter to "freedom". In neither liberal "freedom" nor socialist "brotherhood", however, is there an idea with sufficient moral
force to inspire the final acquiescence of all Western humanity in a new social order.

Dostoyevsky's inquiry into the problem of social order in the West leads him to conclude that the modern West is in the midst of a crisis for which it may be impossible to propose any solution. Yet in the absence of a new social order the West is faced with two equally desolate possibilities. It may undergo a lingering dissolution, continuing indefinitely to perform the outward bodily functions of a civilization, but dead at the heart. In this case it will continue to exist only as a magnificent museum in which, as Ivan Karamazov professes:

> every stone... speaks of such ardent life in the past, of such a passionate faith in their achievements, their truth, their struggles, and their science, that I know beforehand that I shall fall on the ground and kiss those stones and weep over them and — and at the same time be deeply convinced that it's long been a graveyard and nothing more. 180

Alternatively, the West may suffer "perturbations which the human mind refuses to believe, considering their realization as something fantastic." And perhaps both possibilities will come to pass.

This, however, is not Dostoyevsky's final word concerning the future of Western civilization. He distinguished on the horizon of the West the presence of a social formula which might serve as the final Western solution to the crisis of order. Perhaps the most concise expression of this barely glimpsed solution is found in his rough notes, immediately following a reference to future internecine conflicts in the West: "The Pope — leader of communism". Dostoyevsky thought that this social formula constitutes a possible culmination of Western thought and practice. It emerges as a final inference of his consideration of the historical outcome of the Geneva
idea in the West. The elucidation of this final Western solution to the problem of order will place us at the heart of Dostoyevsky's critique of the West.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE FINAL WESTERN SOCIAL FORMULA

I The "Legend of the Grand Inquisitor"

Dostoevsky presents his definitive elucidation of the final Western "social formula" in the "Legend of the Grand Inquisitor". This short writing, considered by him to be the "culminating point" of *The Brothers Karamazov*, can be regarded as the culmination also of his religious and political thought -- his "final statement" concerning the question of human order. The importance which he attached to his critique of the West is perhaps most conclusively established by the fact that his final statement about human order is also his final statement about the West. The "Legend" expresses with extraordinary conciseness his understanding of the fundamental meaning of the modern Western quest for order, and it expresses also his judgement of this quest. The thought about human order contained in the "Legend" is indeed of universal import. But clearly, for Dostoevsky, this thought is at least initially inseparable from the consideration of the particular times and places of Western civilization. It can hardly be an accident that the universal themes, which represent the distillation of years of his thought about the most important political and religious questions are expressed, insofar as this expression is explicit, by a Western character. The Grand Inquisitor is, with minor exceptions, the only attempt at a portrayal of a non-Russian figure in Dostoevsky's art. Dostoevsky's willingness thus to risk the aesthetic effect of his "final statement" bears eloquent testimony to the significance which the question of the West held for him.
Our concern with finding in the "Legend" an elucidation of the social formula — "The Pope - leader of communism" — will bring us inevitably into the presence of his universal thought. But the same concern will determine also the limits of our consideration of this thought.²

The exposition of the final Western social formula is the primary concern of the Grand Inquisitor's monologue. Apart from this monologue, the only constituents of the "Legend" are Ivan Karamazov's brief "literary introduction", and the silent figure of Christ. Ivan's authorship of the "Legend", and the presence within it of Christ, both serve to integrate it within The Brothers Karamazov as a whole. Yet although it thus points on the one hand to Ivan's "rebellion" against God, and on the other to the Christian teachings of Father Zossima, the "Legend" can be considered as an independent writing. Ivan himself maintains that, with regard to the Inquisitor's monologue, "the only thing that matters is that the old man should speak out, that at last he does speak out and says aloud what he has been thinking in silence for ninety years".³ This assertion is made in response to Alyosha's question concerning the meaning of that silent presence to which the "old man" addresses himself, and it could serve equally as a response to the question of Ivan's own relation to the "Legend". It is our intention to heed Ivan's assertion by examining the Inquisitor's monologue, at least initially, in isolation from the thought either of Ivan or of Father Zossima.

Before consideration of what is said in the monologue, note should be made of who, precisely, is speaking. The Grand Inquisitor, as Ivan points out in his "literary introduction", is a cardinal of the Roman Catholic church in sixteenth-century Spain "...during the most terrible time of the Inquisition, when fires were lighted every day throughout the land to the
glory of God... He therefore embodies Roman Catholicism, not at the time of its apogee in the twelfth century, but at the time of its desperately militant attempt during the Counter-Reformation to preserve itself by means of the Spanish sword. The Inquisitor, close to death at ninety years of age, stands near the end of Roman Catholic civilization in the West, and at the beginning of the modern quest for a new order. His vision extends in both directions to encompass the history of Western civilization, from the ancient Roman Empire to the new Rome which he anticipates after the fall of modern liberalism and socialism. Yet the Inquisitor's vision is that of a philosopher rather than an historian. His fundamental concern is to articulate the social order which most closely corresponds to what man is by nature. In this endeavour he looks to history for evidence of the truth of his teaching, and for an answer to the question of its realizability.

The Inquisitor sets his account of the best social order within the framework provided by the Biblical account of Christ's temptation in the wilderness (Matthew 4:1-10). He claims that the "prodigious miracle" of the story of the three temptations lies in the fact that the questions posed in them should have appeared among men at all, particularly at such an early date in human history. For the posing of these questions evinces an insight into everything which is most fundamentally at issue in the problem of human order, an insight arrived at prior to the centuries of historical experience which have since borne it out:

If it were possible to imagine, for the sake of argument, that those three questions of the terrible spirit had been lost without leaving a trace in the books and that we had to rediscover, restore, and invent them afresh and that to do so we had to gather together all the wise men of the earth — rulers, high priests, scholars, philosophers, poets — and set them the task of devising and inventing three questions which would not only correspond to the magnitude of the occasion, but, in addition, express in three words, in three short human sentences, the whole
future history of the world and of mankind, do you think that the entire wisdom of the earth, gathered together, could have invented anything equal in depth and force to the three questions which were actually put to you at the time by the wise and mighty spirit in the wilderness? From these questions alone, from the miracle of their appearance, one can see that what one is dealing with here is not the human, transient mind, but an absolute and everlasting one. For in those three questions the whole future history of mankind is, as it were, anticipated and combined in one whole and three images are presented in which all the insoluble historical contradictions of human nature all over the world meet. At the time it could not be so clearly seen, for the future was still unknown, but now, after fifteen centuries have gone by, we can see that everything in those three questions was so perfectly divined and foretold and has been so completely proved to be true that nothing can be added or taken from them.

The Inquisitor's social formula is founded on his own interpretation of, and response to, the three "everlasting" questions posed to Christ in the wilderness. To him, each question reveals a basic human need, actually present in men and verifiable in their historical experience. The only order which can be considered final is that order which satisfies the three fundamental human needs expressed in the temptations. This order will be rooted in the clear understanding of what man actually is, rather than in some notion of what he ought to be.

The Inquisitor's elaboration of his social formula proceeds in terms of the three fundamental human needs revealed in the temptations. This elaboration, however, assumes his recognition of one primal human need, which determines his interpretation of the others. Note must be taken of this chief need, of "torment", of man which constitutes the unifying theme of the Inquisitor's discourse. This need, of "every man individually and of mankind as a whole from the beginning of time", is the need for order itself. We have seen that in Dostoyevsky's thought the need for order is tantamount to the need for religion, in its broadest and yet most literal
meaning of "binding together". This teaching is reflected in the Inquisitor's assertion that "man's universal and everlasting craving... can be summed up in the words 'whom shall I worship?'". The need for religion inevitably becomes, according to the Inquisitor, the yearning for a common religion, for the existence of differing reverences casts doubt upon all of them:

It is this need for universal worship that is the chief torment of every man individually and of mankind as a whole from the beginning of time. For the sake of that universal worship they have put each other to the sword. They have set up gods and called upon each other, "Give up your gods and come and worship ours, or else death to you and to your gods!" And so it will be to the end of the world, even when the gods have vanished from the earth: they will prostrate themselves before idols just the same...In mankind and the suffering of its existence lies the task of finding that common thing before which the people can unmurmuringly bow down. Without that, man will not find peace and will not be able to construct a society. 8

According to the Inquisitor, the primal human yearning for order has never enjoyed complete and permanent satisfaction because the great movers of mankind have not been unanimous in according it the recognition it deserves. Throughout history the Caesars have been opposed by the Christs, who have placed the need for freedom higher than the need for order. In their sanctioning of the "personal consciousness" in separation from the mass, the preachers of freedom (encompassed symbolically for the Inquisitor in the figure of Christ), have repeatedly encouraged disorder among men. The Inquisitor accuses these preachers of behaving as though they hated man and wished to mock him, or, at best, as though they were blithely indifferent to the most elementary facts of human life. For surely those who truly love man would recognize and make provision for the fact that he suffers from disorder as from a disease — a disease which he is too weak to endure for the sake of freedom:
In respecting him so greatly, you acted as though you ceased to feel any compassion for him, for you asked too much of him — you who have loved him more than yourself! Had you respected him less, you would have asked less of him, and that would have been more like love, for his burden would have been lighter. 9

The Inquisitor interprets the entire history of the West in terms of the conflict between the advocates of order and the advocates of freedom, between those who take man as he actually is and those who estimate him too highly. According to his interpretation, the antique world was just within sight of success in its Herculean attempt at a permanent solution to the problem of order when it was undermined by the Christian affirmation of the "personal consciousness". It had been the enormous accomplishment of Roman Catholicism to salvage what remained of the ancient order, and on this basis to re-integrate the isolated individual within a "Christian civilization":

"...Was it not you who said so often in those days, 'I shall make you free!' But now you have seen those 'free' men", the old man adds suddenly with a pensive smile. "Yes, this business has cost us a great deal", he goes on, looking sternly at him, "but we've completed it at last in your name. For fifteen centuries we've been troubled by this freedom, but now it's over and done with for good...fortunately, in departing, you handed on the work to us. You have promised and you have confirmed it by your own word. You have given us the right to bind and unbind..." 10

For fifteen centuries the West had been in "fragments", but it had finally become "solid" again thanks to the Roman Catholic reconciliation of Rome with Christ. This "solidity" was, however, to be of short duration.

Turning towards the future, the Inquisitor anticipates with foreboding the dissolution of Roman Catholic order in the series of events being initiated in his own time by the "dreadful new heresy" which had arisen in the "north of Germany". 11 He does envisage, beyond this period of chaos, a renewed attempt at order; but he prophesies that this attempt will
be futile unless and until the variants of Geneva thought which will inform it give way before his social formula. Although he considers his formula to be the best for all men at all times, he clearly thinks that its actualization is most likely in the modern West, in the aftermath of the internecine struggle between liberalism and socialism. Addressing in the figure of Christ all the teachers of individual freedom, he nevertheless proposes his formula particularly in opposition to the Christ who is the "great idealist" of Geneva thought. 12

It is evident that the Inquisitor's social formula is founded, not only on the conviction of the primacy of the human need for order but also on the conviction that the satisfaction of this need is incompatible with the affirmation of freedom. The dissonance of freedom and order is sounded throughout his discourse. For the Inquisitor, as for Geneva thought, the affirmation of freedom is synonymous with the affirmation of man as a separate "conscious will". 13 The Inquisitor, however, knows that such an affirmation is ultimately incompatible with a genuine social unity. Because freedom and social cohesion are antithetical, freedom is an intolerable burden for man: "nothing has ever been more unendurable to man and to human society than freedom!...I tell you man has no more agonizing anxiety than to find someone to whom he can hand over with all speed the gift of freedom with which the unhappy creature is born." 14 The Inquisitor maintains that man's freedom, though intolerable, is a fact of life which cannot simply be abolished. It can, however, be transferred into the hands of a few rulers who will exact from the majority of men absolute obedience in all things large and small, thereby granting them the order for which they yearn. A final solution to the problem of order is possible for the Inquisitor only
on the basis of the positing of a radical inequality among men. Dostoyevsky has him state this inequality most explicitly in the rough notes: "But the strengths of mankind are various. There are the strong and there are the weak."\(^{15}\)

The Inquisitor's attribution to human beings of a fundamental need for order is therefore subject to a decisive qualification: there are those, inevitably a minority, who are strong enough to renounce the satisfaction of this need. The existence of two sorts of men can militate against order when the strong demand comparable strength from the weak. But when the strong are also compassionate, then the most complete order becomes possible. The "millions and scores of thousands of millions" of the weak, anxious to surrender the "personal consciousness" which alienates them from the spontaneous life of complete social integration, will be able to place their freedom in the hands of the "scores of thousands of the great and strong" who consent to "endure freedom and rule over them".\(^{16}\)

The appeal to an evident inequality among human beings by way of justifying the absolute rule of a minority of free individuals over the mass of men, who are equal only in their slavery and free only because they gratefully accept the assurance of their rulers that they are free, recalls Shigalyov's "scientific" re-interpretation of the Geneva idea. Unlike the taciturn Russian, however, the Spanish cardinal is more than willing to elaborate his formula for the only "earthly paradise" possible for men.

(1) The First Temptation

The first temptation to which Christ was subjected is interpreted by the Inquisitor as follows:
"And do you see the stones in this parched and barren desert? Turn them into loaves, and mankind will run after you like a flock of sheep, grateful and obedient, though forever trembling with fear that you might withdraw your hand and they would no longer have your loaves." But you did not want to deprive man of freedom and rejected the offer, for you thought, what sort of freedom is it if obedience is bought with loaves of bread? The rejection of the "loaves" constitutes a rejection of the first, and most self-evident, of the three principal means whereby man can be relieved of his burdensome freedom. For in this first temptation is revealed the truth that the weak will give up the prerogative of the "personal consciousness" to those who assure them that this prerogative is merely a chimera, that the real concern of human life is the multiplication and satisfaction of natural needs. According to the Inquisitor, "heavenly bread" -- synonymous with such notions as man's right to "freedom", or his "moral responsibility", or the "spiritual dimension" of his nature -- cannot compare in the eyes of the weak with "earthly bread". This preference has its source in man's fundamental need for at least the minimum satisfaction of his natural inclinations. Despite the obviousness of this need; its strength has repeatedly been underestimated by the preachers of "heavenly bread". Yet can the offer of "heavenly bread" have any impact upon men who are subject to the tyranny of unsatisfied natural desires? This is the question posed in the first temptation. Those strong enough for the most inflexible disciplining of their inclinations by the "personal will" may perhaps be able to contemplate virtue while suffering the pangs of hunger; but there still remain the weak, "numerous as the sand of the sea", who cannot ignore their hunger. For their sake surely the following declaration must be made: "Feed them first and then demand virtue of them!". This declaration is expanded upon by Dostoyevsky in a letter in which he discusses the meaning of the
Rather than go to the ruined poor, who from hunger and oppression look more like beasts than like men, rather than go and start preaching to the hungry abstention from sins, humility, sexual chastity, wouldn't it be better to feed them first? ... give them food to save them; give them a social structure so that they always have bread and order -- and then speak with them of sin -- Command then that henceforth the earth should bring forth without toil, instruct people in such science or instruct them in such an order, that their lives should henceforth be provided for. Is it possible not to believe that the greatest vices and misfortunes of man have resulted from hunger, cold, poverty, and the impossible struggle for existence? 18

Those teachers of humanity who have evinced an apparent indifference to man's material needs are accused by the Inquisitor of exhibiting a dire lack of common sense, or worse, a reprehensible severity.

Although the first temptation discloses a truth which is "absolute and everlasting", it anticipates also the "future history of mankind". For the issue which it raises was to be especially predominant in a certain epoch of history. The Inquisitor, present at the barely discernible incipience of this epoch, foresees the full course of its development:

You replied that man does not live by bread alone, but do you know that for the sake of that earthly bread the spirit of the earth will rise up against you and will join battle with you and conquer you, and all will follow him, crying "Who is like this beast? He has given us fire from heaven!" Do you know that ages will pass and mankind will proclaim in its wisdom and science that there is no crime and, therefore, no sin, but that there are hungry people. "Feed them first and then demand virtue of them!" -- that is what they will inscribe on their banner which they will raise against you and which will destroy your temple. 19

The historical epoch here anticipated is that of the modern West, which the Inquisitor thus defines as a reaction on behalf of "earthly bread" against Christianity, and more particularly against the order, or "temple", laboriously constructed by Roman Catholicism in Christ's name. The religion which the Inquisitor himself represents must face the consequences of its failure to provide adequately for man's natural wants: "... we shall again
the modern rebels will embark upon the construction of an alternative order: "A new building will rise where your temple stood, the dreadful Tower of Babel will rise up again..." The Inquisitor does not name the builders of the new "Tower of Babel", but the presence of "scientific" socialism in the forefront of the construction is clearly indicated in his words. In the letter previously quoted Dostoyevsky specifies the historical movement alluded to by the Inquisitor:

Here is the first idea which was posed by the evil spirit to Christ. Contemporary socialism in Europe...sets Christ aside and is first of all concerned with bread. It appeals to science and maintains that the cause of all human misfortune is poverty, the struggle for existence and an oppressive environment. 21

The Inquisitor thus anticipates, not only the destruction of Roman Catholic order by the "spirit of the earth" but also the overcoming of Geneva thought by this same spirit, in that materialism which characterizes both bourgeois liberalism and "scientific" socialism.

The ultimate impossibility of any order which fails to protect the mass of men from "hunger, cold, and poverty" is painfully demonstrated for the Inquisitor in the imminent break-down of Roman Catholic civilization. The future practical success of political materialism will constitute an indisputable lesson concerning the crucial place which material conditions occupy in human existence. The final triumph of socialism over its liberal rival will indicate that it has learned this lesson more thoroughly and has demonstrated a superior capacity for distributing bread efficiently. Nevertheless, in the face of the lesson concerning man's need for "earthly bread", the Inquisitor re-affirms the primacy of man's need for order, and, evaluating socialism in terms of this need, he finds it deficient. He certainly does not deny that materialism is capable of functioning as a religion for men;
indeed, he acknowledges that "earthly bread" may well be the most incon-
testable object of worship which can be offered to humanity. What could
be more evident to the perception, and the inclination, of the masses
than natural satisfactions? The meaning of "earthly bread" is obvious,
and it enjoins no troublesome chastisement of natural inclination for the
sake of some obscure "spiritual destiny". Rather than setting the "personal
will" against the natural impulses, the religion of "earthly bread"
encourages men to exercise the will only insofar as it serves these impulses.
The consequent atrophying of the "personal will" can only facilitate the
overcoming of the individual's isolation, and his re-integration within
the social unit.

Yet despite his appreciation of the religion of "earthly bread", the
Inquisitor judges it to be an inferior religion, ultimately incapable of
satisfying man's need for order. The futility of the modern attempt to
found a new order on the universal satisfaction of material needs will
finally become inescapably clear:

No science will give them bread so long as they remain free...
They will, at last, realize themselves that there cannot be
enough freedom and bread for everybody, for they will never,
ever be able to let everyone have his fair share! 22

Those who would give man "fire from heaven" will be compelled to recognize
that the universal and fair distribution of bread will never be realized
in a society which has not overcome individual freedom. For inevitably
there will be those who, unwilling to stulte their desires to the collective,
will demand more than their "fair share" of life's goods. What could induce
these more strongly desiring men to "make a sacrifice" for the whole?
The inadequacy of the materialist religion is manifest for the Inquisitor
in its inability to furnish a conclusive answer to this question. It can
ultimately appeal only to material "advantage", but the recalcitrant individual will surely claim the right to determine his own "advantage". The inability of socialism to secure the compliance of every "personal consciousness", or to overcome freedom, necessarily implies the failure, not only to distribute bread effectively among men, but to give them the order which they desire above all. The Inquisitor thus adds a significant qualification to his initial declaration that human obedience can be bought with bread. In summoning up the spectre of the rebellious individual against the new "Tower of Babel", he asserts that any renunciation of individual freedom called forth by the offer of material satisfactions can only be temporary. To assume that the alienated "personal consciousness" will be reconciled to the collective through a certain transformation of external material structures is to fail to penetrate to the roots of man's attachment to the "personal consciousness". The builders of the modern "Tower of Babel" do not grasp the significance of human freedom, and will thus never be able to possess it. They will break their hearts "for a thousand years" with their tower, without being able to complete it.

For the Inquisitor, the truth of modern political materialism lies in its appreciation of man's need for "earthly bread". Its fatal error lies in its disregard of man's continuing need for "heavenly bread". Socialism is correct in inscribing on its banner -- "Feed them first and then demand virtue of them!" -- but its tendency to concentrate on the first part of this slogan, to the exclusion of the second, betrays an incomplete understanding of human need. Thus, while castigating the "great idealists" for their failure to heed the teaching about human order expressed in the first temptation, the Inquisitor nevertheless acknowledges the ultimate
validity of their refusal to uphold "earthly bread" as man's highest end:

With the bread you were given an incontestable banner: give him bread and man will worship you, for there is nothing more incontestable than bread; but if at the same time someone besides yourself should gain possession of his conscience — oh, then he will throw away your bread and follow him who has ensnared his conscience. You were right about that. For the mystery of human life is not only in living, but in knowing why one lives. Without a clear idea of what to live for man will not consent to live and will rather destroy himself than remain on earth, though he were surrounded by loaves of bread. 24

"Earthly bread" is necessary, but not sufficient, for the final solution to the problem of order. Man can be finally relieved of the burden of his freedom only if the distributors of the "loaves" satisfy another human need — the need for a "moral enticement". 25 This need, and the means by which it can be met, are explained in the course of the Inquisitor's interpretation of the second temptation.

(ii) The Second Temptation

The second temptation to which Christ was subjected is interpreted by the Inquisitor as follows:

There are three forces, the only three forces that are able to conquer and hold captive for ever the conscience of these weak rebels for their own happiness -- these forces are: miracle, mystery, authority. You rejected all three and yourself set the example for doing so when the wise and terrible spirit set you on a pinnacle of the temple and said to you: "If thou be the son of God, cast thyself down: for it is written, He shall give his angels charge concerning thee: and in their hands they shall bear thee up..." 26

"Man is a born rebel"; and, according to the Inquisitor, the primary source of this "rebelliousness" is man's insistence on regarding himself as something more than the product of nature. Man's striving to transcend the limitations of natural necessity expresses itself particularly in the tendency to measure his existence against an ultimate good. Despite the
prenchant of the modern preachers of "earthly bread" for identifying the
eecessary with the good, their theoretical teaching rests on a doctrine of
ecessity which excludes the question of good and evil. In spinning its
ine web of necessity around man, socialism disregards his insistent need
to know that this necessity is also good. And if man cannot affirm the
goodness of the order which provides him with bread, then he will finally
reject this order and its bread, whatever the consequences for his natural
wants. Against the modern "Tower of Babel", then, the Inquisitor asserts
the human propensity for making moral distinctions. Whether or not man
is in truth entirely a product of chance and necessity, he is in fact a
being who insists on perceiving himself as something more. This tendency
seems so deeply rooted as to be impervious to any amount of re-education
according to the laws of "utility" and "necessity". Insofar as man tends,
not only to make moral distinctions, but to insist on making these dis-
tinctions for himself, his propensity for moral judgement is intimately
associated with the assertion of the "personal consciousness". The
"personal consciousness" can thus be more precisely designated the "personal
conscience". For the Inquisitor, the "personal conscience" is the sub-
stance of human freedom. Those who understand man's freedom as directed
primarily towards natural, rather than moral, ends will never be able to
possess it.

According to the Inquisitor, the "personal conscience" has been no
less important than the desire for "earthly bread" in inspiring that
"rebelliousness" which has undermined human order throughout history. The
nearly complete order of antiquity was doomed when man began to reject the
"strict ancient law" in order to "decide for himself with a free heart what
is good and what is evil". The ensuing moral chaos had been alleviated by Roman Catholicism's massive effort to establish a Christian morality which defined good and evil for all. But the Inquisitor perceives, in the "dreadful new heresy" appearing in his own time, a renewed assertion of the "personal conscience" which can only issue in another epoch of moral chaos. He knows that the "personal conscience" will resist the threat of fire with which the Roman Catholic order vainly defends itself, and he knows that it will finally resist also the offer of "earthly bread" with which the builders of the new "Tower of Babel" will attempt to tame it. These builders ignore at their peril the depth of the human attachment to the conscience. Like man's yearning for material goods, this attachment is an "eternal problem" which centuries of historical experience have made impossible to ignore, at least for those who are genuinely and intelligently concerned with human happiness.

This "eternal problem" does admit of a solution, according to the Inquisitor. Despite his appreciation of the obdurancy of the "personal conscience", he still insists on the primacy of the human desire for order. His conviction that man ultimately wishes to be induced to give up his freedom remains unshaken. For him, the proper estimation of the "personal conscience" is merely the prerequisite for capturing it: "...whoever knows this mystery of mankind's existence knows how to go about subduing him, and who can, subdues him". The "mystery" of the conscience is that "there is nothing more alluring to man than...freedom of conscience"; and, at the same time, there is nothing more tormenting. In this paradox resides the possibility of relieving man of his freedom.

According to the Inquisitor, man strives for an ultimate good, or God,
only in order finally to attain to a condition of happy repose. When the
longed-for tranquillity eludes man and the moral quest becomes a perpetual
striving, then the "personal conscience" becomes a torment. It becomes
particularly a torment for the "thousands of millions" of the weak, who
lack the spiritual capacity to sustain the arduous struggle for final
peace of mind. If there is indeed an ultimate end to man's moral quest,
surely knowledge of it will be vouchsafed only to the few thousand of the
strong, who are more like gods than men. For the weak, the freedom of
conscience which they find so alluring issues only in "unrest, confusion,
and unhappiness". To the Inquisitor this is demonstrable from the
historical experience of the West just as surely as is the tenacity with
which man upholds the prerogative of the "personal conscience". Gazing
past the Protestant "rebellion" into a more distant future, he predicts
that the mass of men will come to rue the day that simple acquiescence in
the given morality of the Roman Catholic order was rejected in the name
of the "personal conscience":

What does it matter if he does rebel against our authority
everywhere now and is proud of his rebellion? It is the
pride of a child and a school-boy. They are little children
rioting in class and driving out their teacher. But an end
will come to the transports of the children, too. They will
pay dearly for it. They will tear down the temples and
drench the earth with blood. But they will realize at last,
the foolish children, that although they are rebels, they are
impotent rebels who are unable to keep up with their rebellion.
Dissolving into foolish tears, they will admit at last that
he who created them rebels must undoubtedly have meant to laugh
at them. They will say so in despair, and their utterance will
be a blasphemy which will make them still more unhappy, for
man's nature cannot endure blasphemy and in the end will always
avenge it on itself. 33

The Inquisitor does not claim that man will cease to be a moral being, for
the need to make moral judgements is too deeply rooted in him. He thinks,
however, that in the aftermath of the trials in store for him man could be
persuaded to relinquish his right to decide for himself "with a free heart" what is good and what is evil. Yet the sacrifice of personal conscience, which modern man will be only too willing to make, will be merely temporary unless it is possessed by those with the knowledge to "hold it captive forever". 34

According to the Inquisitor, this knowledge is disclosed in the second temptation. The temptation, properly interpreted, not only reveals that man will surrender his freedom only to those who can fully appease his conscience, but reveals also the most effective means of appeasement: "miracle, mystery, and authority." The "rebels" have to be taught that the question of good is a "mystery" which must be believed rather than known, that it is not the "free verdict of their hearts that matters, but the mystery which they must obey blindly, even against their conscience". Remembering the "horrors of slavery and confusion" to which a "free mind" brought them, men will gratefully accept the assurance that the ultimate good is inaccessible to human knowledge. 35 The "authority" of those who preach the "mystery" will be confirmed, above all, by "miracles", or the appearance of miracles; for when freedom of conscience becomes too agonizing, then "what man seeks is not so much God as miracles". Man is ultimately unable to carry on without a miracle, so much so that even in an age which has banished miracles he will "create new miracles for himself, miracles of his own, and will worship the miracle of the witch-doctor and the sorcery of the wise woman, rebel, heretic, and infidel though he is a hundred times over". 36

The Inquisitor maintains that in the West the preaching of "miracle, mystery, and authority" has come within the special province of the Roman
Catholic church. And he foresees no serious rival arising to contend
the supremacy of Roman Catholicism in this matter. It would thus appear
that when modern men begin to yearn for "miracle, mystery, and authority",
they will have no choice but to turn to the traditional morality which
they have spurned. The Roman Catholic church may again be compelled to
hide itself in the catacombs, but the Inquisitor thinks it possible that
the day will come when it will be sought out in its hiding place and asked
to renew its possession of man's conscience. This time will come when
man's striving after knowledge of God becomes completely transformed into
the striving after knowledge for its own sake characteristic of modern
science:

Freedom, a free mind, and science will lead them into such
a jungle and bring them face to face with such marvels and
insoluble mysteries that some of them, the recalcitrant and
the fierce, will destroy themselves, others, recalcitrant
but weak, will destroy one another, and the rest, weak and
unhappy, will come crawling to our feet and cry aloud:
"Yes, you were right, you alone possessed his mystery, and
we come back to you -- save us from ourselves!" 37

The Inquisitor's social formula is based on his interpretation of the
first two temptations. It can therefore be stated now, as follows: those
who would rule over man for his happiness must be both distributors of
"loaves" and preachers of "miracle, mystery, and authority". Properly
interpreted, and regarded in the light of historical experience, the two
temptations reveal that men will ultimately consent only to an order which
provides them with both "earthly" and "heavenly" bread. Only to rulers who
satisfy both his physical and moral appetites will man give up his personal
freedom for the sake of that social re-integration which is his most
fundamental desire. Because it is based on two "eternal" or "everlasting"
truths about man, the Inquisitor's social formula applies to men everywhere
and always.

The very timelessness of the Inquisitor's formula, however, must inevitably render it more or less "abstract", despite his citing of concrete historical evidence for its validity. Yet "abstractness" implies a certain dissociation of theory and practice which the Inquisitor, of all people, must not admit. For he is concerned with the actual happiness of men, a concern which leads him to refuse to ask too much of man and to found his social formula on man as he actually is rather than as he ought to be. The Inquisitor cannot remain content with a teaching which is the best in theory, though it may never be realized in practice. For him, this would be equivalent to siding with the "great idealists", who do not love humanity sufficiently. His entire enterprise requires that his social formula be realizable. The confident assurance with which he does anticipate the realization of his formula has its source in his interpretation of the third temptation.

(iii) The Third Temptation

The third and last "torment" of man is the need for "universal unity", for the union of all mankind in a "common, harmonious, and incontestable ant-hill". The Inquisitor avers that man's yearning for order will not be satisfied by the idea alone of his ultimate good, even when this idea is given to him in conjunction with "earthly bread". For man needs also to give a practical living expression to that in which he believes, and he needs to do so in unity with other men. Man thus requires an actual social order corresponding to the "miracle, mystery, and authority" which he obeys, an order, moreover, which grants him at least the minimal satisfaction
of his material wants. This is to say that man will ultimately settle
for nothing less than the realization, not merely in a dream but in
actuality, of the Inquisitor's social formula.

The Inquisitor interprets the offer of the "kingdoms of the world"
in the third temptation as the offer of the most powerful instrument for
satisfying the human need for universal unity -- the universal state.
The universal state is, for him, the prime vehicle for the actualization
of the social order ruled by keepers of man's conscience who are also
distributors of his bread. History is important chiefly as the realm of
the appearance and development of this vehicle. For the Inquisitor, the
history of the West thus provides evidence, not only for the theoretical
validity of his social formula but also for its realizability.

According to the Inquisitor, the dawn of history coincides with the
first tentative efforts towards the construction of a universal order. The
persistence with which men have moved towards the universal state, even
in its most rudimentary form, reflects at least a half-conscious awareness
of its importance for their happiness:

Mankind as a whole has always striven to organize itself into
a world-state. There have been many great nations with great
histories, but the more highly developed they were, the more
unhappy they were, for they were more acutely conscious of the
need for the world-wide union of men. The great conquerors,
the Timurs and Genghis Khans, swept like a whirl-wind over the
earth, striving to conquer the world, but, though unconsciously,
they expressed the same great need of mankind for a universal
and worldwide union. 40

The work of the Timurs and the Genghis Khans is a striking manifestation
of the human impulse towards the universal state; but, in them, this impulse
remained merely unconscious, and hence failed to bear solid fruit. It is
in the West -- in Rome -- that the Inquisitor finds the first conscious
attempt to construct a world state.

Man had possessed, in the Roman Empire, a splendid and apparently "eternal" instrument for his happiness. Yet just when it seemed that the human struggle towards order had achieved final success, Rome was undermined by the rebellion of the "personal conscience", which found its most effective vehicle in Christianity. Despite its aura of finality, the Roman state had failed to understand properly the moral dimension of human life. This failure condemned humanity to a thousand years of the "disease" of disorder. The external political and legal structures of Rome proved extraordinarily durable, however, even after the life had gone out of them; the "sword of Caesar" remained at hand for the use of new architects of world-wide order. In its attempt to have Christianity serve order rather than disorder, Roman Catholicism did not spurn this sword, and the accommodation which it reached with the remnants of the Roman state gave birth to medieval order. Although it evinced a more profound appreciation of man's need for "heavenly bread", Roman Catholic order was also to be finally undermined by the "personal conscience", and, moreover, by the clamour for material goods. But in its rejection of Roman Catholic civilization, the modern West has not repudiated the "sword of Caesar"; indeed, it apotheosizes the state -- still fundamentally the universal state of Rome -- and opposes it to any other instrument of human order. Because of its wholehearted adoption of the "sword of Caesar", the modern West tends to overcome the divergence of loyalties rendered inevitable by the more or less uneasy accommodation between the Roman church and the Roman state. The modern state, moreover, in consciously founding itself solely on reason, is bound up with a science which holds out possibilities for the control of
human and non-human nature beyond anything dreamt of in the past. For these reasons, the modern Western state must be regarded as the most effective instrument of social order that the world has yet seen. The "sword of Caesar" could prove, in its modern embodiment, to be more powerful than it ever was in ancient Rome or in medieval Europe. But who will wield this formidable instrument?

As we have already noted, the Inquisitor predicts that it is socialism which will finally come into the inheritance of Caesar's sword. We have also noted, however, his expectation that the triumph of socialism will be short-lived unless it offers man something more than "earthly bread". In order to preserve itself socialism will at last be compelled to seek out preachers of "miracle, mystery, and authority". The Inquisitor thus foresees that socialism, following those driven to despair by the "jungle" into which freedom of conscience has led them, will turn to the Roman Catholic church for help. He expects, further, that the church will accept an alliance with the universal socialist state. This time, however, the relation between church and state will be more complete than the compromise of the past allowed. The two will enter into the indivisible union expressed in the formula -- "The Pope-leader of communism" -- which is the concrete historical expression of the Inquisitor's social theory. When socialism surrenders its highly organized system for the satisfaction of man's material needs into the hands of Roman Catholicism, then the keepers of man's conscience will also be the distributors of his bread. The problem of social order will be at last solved in actuality: "And then we shall finish building their tower ... and we alone shall feed them in your name..." 43

The Inquisitor's hopes rest on the possibility of a future historical
alliance for which he adduces very little tangible evidence. Yet such evidence is required because of the dubious, and even fantastic, nature of his surmise. A too specific consideration of modern Western history would perhaps have detracted from the "absolute and everlasting" atmosphere which Ivan attempts to convey in the "Legend". It would be appropriate at this point, however, to consider the evidence which Dostoyevsky offers elsewhere in his writings in defence of the Inquisitor's conjecture. The Inquisitor's conviction that socialism will be unable to complete the new "Tower of Babel" by itself should not require further elaboration. Among the socialists there will be those sufficiently "scientific" to realize that the full compliance of the individual in the socialist order will require a "moral enticement". But the assertion that they will find in the Roman Catholic church the necessary moral enticement depends on two questionable assumptions. First, it assumes that Roman Catholicism will remain sufficiently strong in the West to be considered seriously as the moral prop of the socialist state. Dostoyevsky certainly conceded that the humiliation of Pope Pius IX at the hands of the new Italian state (particularly in 1870) was symbolic of the position into which the church was being forced in the modern West. Pius' resolute defiance of modern Italy, and of modernity in general, had inspired merely the indifference, or laughter, of the liberal and socialist West:

...at the fatal moment when he had been deprived of both Rome and the last parcel of land, and when only the Vatican had been left in his possession, -- at that same moment, as if on purpose, he proclaimed his infallibility; and at the same time the thesis: Without mundane possessions Christianity cannot survive on earth... Oh, isn't it true that this would sound funny and insignificant to politicians and diplomats of Europe! The downtrodden Pope, imprisoned in the Vatican, appeared to them during the last years as such a nullity that it would have been a shame to pay any attention to him. Thus many progressives
of Europe have been reasoning, especially the witty and liberal ones. The Pope delivering allocutions and issuing syllabuses, receiving the devout, damming while dying -- in their view resembled a buffoon performing for their entertainment. 45

By the 1870's the Roman Catholic church had apparently become too insignificant even to inspire the anti-clericalism long fashionable among modern Europeans.

Dostoyevsky, however, argues that the dismissal of Roman Catholicism as a "trifling matter" in our age of "humanitarian ideas; industry, and railways" betrays a shallow understanding of religion, and an incomplete grasp of the most recent historical trends. A religion which has been "organically living in the world one thousand years" does not die "in an instant"; 46 and events in later nineteenth-century Europe demonstrated that Roman Catholicism was still very far from its death-bed. Although France had long before renounced Roman Catholic order in favour of the Geneva idea of order, it is to this nation that Dostoyevsky turns for indications of the enduring strength of Roman Catholicism. One of these indications was the fact that, "despite 1789", the Pope had been able to depend throughout the nineteenth century on French support of his temporal power. 47 France finally abandoned Rome to the Italian liberals only when forced to do so by the war with Germany in 1870. But for Dostoyevsky the most significant indication of the abiding strength of Roman Catholicism was the influence of ultramontanism in France, and throughout Europe. He focuses particularly on the crisis of Seize Mai (1876) in France, precipitated by President MacMahon's dissolution of the Republican assembly. According to his interpretation of the crisis, MacMahon's attempt to assume greater powers -- a situation amounting almost to a monarchist coup d'état -- was engineered by the clerical party in France, which aimed at attaining political
power through MacMahon in order to scotch Bismarck's Kulturkampf with French arms. Dostoyevsky's long and intricate discussion of the crisis in The Diary of a Writer is concerned with making the point that the Roman Catholic church remains a sufficiently powerful presence in the West to influence decisions concerning war and peace in the country which is the very womb of modernity, and to inspire the implacable hostility of Bismarck, the shrewdest and most powerful statesman in the West. He maintains that the evident strength of ultramontanism in modern Europe should give pause to those who merely laughed at Pius IX's proclamation of the dogma of infallibility at the Vatican Council of 1870. The weakness of the "throne" in the West did not necessarily imply the weakness of the "altär". The refusal of Roman Catholicism to die makes it a potential source of that moral enticement, or "consolidating force", required by the universal socialist state.

The second questionable assumption of the "Legend" is that Roman Catholicism would consent to an alliance with socialism. The Roman Catholic church had long associated itself with the monarchs of Europe, and continued to do so after 1789. For instance, in the crisis of Seize Mai the clericals had placed their hopes in the monarchist cause, embodied in the Comte de Chambord. Dostoyevsky argues, however, that it was the clericals who were using the monarchists rather than the contrary. And he points to signs in nineteenth-century France — for instance, the "social Catholicism" of Lamennais and Lacordaire — that once the clericals became convinced of the impotence of the European "right" they might be open to receiving support from elsewhere. All this, however, is not sufficient to substantiate the claim that Roman Catholicism would agree to an alliance with socialism,
and, indeed, would perhaps even initiate this alliance. Dostoevsky makes this latter claim most explicitly in a passage in *The Diary of a Writer* which expands upon the Inquisitor's declaration that the Roman Catholic church will again take up the "sword of Caesar":

Catholicism...will manage to seduce the leaders of the underground war. It will say to them: "You have no centre, no order in the conduct of the work: you are a force scattered all over the world, and now, after the downfall of France -- also an oppressed force. I shall be your rallying centre, and I shall attract to you all those who still believe in me"...One way or another the alliance will be formed. Catholicism does not wish to die; whereas social revolution and the new social period in Europe are indubitable: two forces, unquestionably, will have to come to an understanding, to unite... 49

Further explication of Dostoevsky's contention concerning the possibility of an alliance between the Roman Catholic church and communism must await consideration of his judgement of Western Christianity. Our concern at this point is that the meaning of "The Pope-leader of communism" as a social formula has been established with sufficient clarity. This formula, when realized in the future, will issue in the "earthly paradise" depicted in the ecstatic words of the Grand Inquisitor:

...the flock will be gathered together again and will submit once more, and this time it will be for good. Then we shall give them quiet, humble happiness, the happiness of weak creatures, such as they were created... They will grow timid and begin looking up to us and clinging to us in fear as chicks to the hen. They will marvel at us and be terrified of us and be proud that we are so mighty and so wise as to be able to tame such a turbulent flock of thousands of millions. They will be helpless and in constant fear of our wrath, their minds will grow timid, their eyes will always be shedding tears like women and children, but at the slightest sign from us they will be just as ready to pass to mirth and laughter, to bright-eyed gladness and happy childish song...And they will have no secrets from us...The most tormenting secrets of their conscience -- everything, everything they will bring to us, and we shall give them our decision for it all...And they will all be happy, all the millions of creatures, except the hundred thousand who rule over them. 50
II  The Goal of the Final Western Social Formula

(i) Reason and Love of Mankind

The modern Western quest for an "order deduced solely from rational principles" speaks its final word in the Grand Inquisitor's description of the future "earthly paradise". The Inquisitor presents his conception of the universal state in opposition to the universal state of "freedom, equality, and brotherhood" which was the original object of the modern Western project; but he clearly regards his tyranny as more a reformulation than a negation of Geneva thought. In the most important respects he is in accord with the Geneva vision: out of love of mankind he aspires to an "earthly paradise" which has its foundation in reason. This dependence on reason, not explicit in his own words, may seem incongruous with the crucial role which "miracle, mystery, and authority" play in his social formula. "Miracle, mystery, and authority", however, are for him merely instruments of order required by his "realistic" appraisal of man as he actually is. This "realistic" assessment of human nature is wholly free of any traditional religious or philosophical preconceptions. The Inquisitor's social formula is a logical inference, derived solely from the historical and natural evidence available to him. It is in this sense that his idea of order can be considered as "rational" as that of Geneva thought, despite his position as a representative of Roman Catholicism at its most militant. The Inquisitor's formula for tyranny, moreover, is not only in concordance with the original intent of the modern quest for a new order, but affirms it more fully. His deeper love of mankind inspires a more uncompromising, even ruthless, rationality than that evinced by the proponents of the Geneva idea. For him, where mankind's happiness is at stake,
hesitation before the consequences of reason is equivalent to a lack of charity; for the rational approach to human existence, if combined with courage and lucidity, does yield the solution to the problem of order. The Inquisitor's re-interpretation of the idea of "freedom, equality, and brotherhood", so that it corresponds to what man actually is, is thus presented as having its source in the most consistent possible affirmation of the foundational principles of the Geneva vision.

In its salient features the Inquisitor's social formula corresponds to Shigalyov's re-interpretation of the Geneva idea. As we have seen, Shigalyov, too, is a "fanatic lover of mankind", who therefore yearns for the "earthly paradise" in actuality rather than merely in a dream. This yearning for certainty leads him, too, to the most uncompromising application of reason to the problem of social order. The rigorous observation of man as he actually is yields to both Shigalyov and the Inquisitor the fundamental insight into human inequality. This inequality pertains not simply to obvious differences in natural endowment, but to something fraught with far graver consequences for Geneva thought: men are unequal in their capacity to endure freedom. This truth, vouchsafed by the truly reasonable assessment of man, requires that transposition of terms which turns the universal order of "freedom, equality, and brotherhood" into a tyranny. Freedom is only for the few who are able to endure it, and they in turn rule absolutely over the many, who are equal brothers in their utter subjugation.

In the thought of the Inquisitor and Shigalyov, then, Dostoevsky's critiques of Russian Westernism and of the West converge. The "great idea" which originally commanded the allegiance of the best Russian Westernists
is the same idea which stands at the centre of the modern Western project. In each case, the progressive self-revelation of this idea culminates in the word of tyranny. The question raised at the end of our exposition of Dostoyevsky's critique of Russian Westernism is decisively answered by him in the "Legend of the Grand Inquisitor". Due to the relative absence of solid foundations of life in Russia, Russian Westernism did indeed take Western ideas to extremes which tended to make them unrecognizable to the West itself. But this tendency immediately to regard as an axiom what is merely an hypothesis in the West discloses what lies concealed in the hypothesis rather than falsifying it. For Dostoyevsky, then, Russia may be likened to a "hot-house" in which Western ideas bear fruit more quickly than within the more mature, and hence delimited, cultures of the West. The Geneva idea of order ultimately expresses itself as a tyranny, not because it has been sown in improper soil, but because of what is most fundamentally inherent in the idea itself.

It would seem that the question of Dostoyevsky's judgement of the West can now be broached. For the enunciation of what is said in Russian Westernism, and in the West, has established that both speak with the same voice to him, and that this voice is the voice of the tyrannical universal state. His judgement of the West could thus be constituted simply in the exposure of the universal state as a tyranny. However, the Inquisitor and Shigalyov are clearly not "tyrants" in the usual sense of the word. Their aspiration to absolute power over others apparently has its source, not in self-love, but in love of humanity. The Inquisitor's social formula is justified by his love of humanity and validated by the extremely powerful arguments which Dostoyevsky encourages him to express. The question of order
for Dostoyevsky, as for Russian Westernism, is a question above all of truth. The possibility that the Inquisitor's social formula is true, and is inspired by a love of humanity, precludes the immediate rejection of the tyrannical universal state. Before the question of Dostoyevsky's judgement of the West can be raised, the meaning of the universal state must be explicated further. That Dostoyevsky's enucleation of what is being said in the modern Western project is not yet complete is indicated by the fact that the eloquent self-expression of the universal state, upon closer-examination, betrays itself as being other than it seems. The ambiguity which thereby reveals itself -- our concern for the remainder of this chapter -- centres on the relationship between reason and love of mankind, both of which are essential to the self-understanding of the modern project.

The Inquisitor has much to say about the means of ensuring the consent of the weak to the future universal state; but he is singularly reticent concerning those who are to rule. It is in this matter of the consent of the strong to the universal state that the ambiguity to which I have referred makes its appearance. It has been noted that the Inquisitor's aspiration to absolute rule is apparently motivated by an "incurable" love of humanity. His humanitarianism is expressed in the avowal that only consequent upon the actualization of his social formula will it be possible "for the first time to think of the happiness of men". Indeed, he asserts that all previous social orders have been founded on an insufficient love of mankind. In the rough notes Dostoyevsky has him declare explicitly that his idea of order is rooted in a love of humanity greater than that of Christianity, the "religion of love": "Inquisitor:
God as a merchant. I love humanity more than you do." The Inquisitor's love of mankind, moreover, is attested to by Ivan in response to Alyosha's accusation that the Spanish cardinal is nothing more than a tyrant in the usual sense:

What I'd like to ask you is why your Jesuits and Inquisitors have united only for some vile material gains? Why shouldn't there be among them a sufferer tormented by great sorrow and loving humanity? You see, let us suppose that among all those who are only out for filthy material gains there's one, just one, who is like my old Inquisitor, who had himself fed on roots in the wilderness, a man possessed, who was eager to mortify his flesh so as to become free and perfect; and yet one who had loved humanity all his life and whose eyes were suddenly opened and who saw that it was no great moral felicity to attain complete control over his will and at the same time realize that millions of other of God's creatures had been created as a mockery, that they would never be able to cope with their freedom, that no giants would ever arise from the pitiful rebels to complete the tower, that the great idealist had not in mind such boobies when he dreamt of his harmony. Realizing that, he returned and joined -- the clever fellows. That could have happened, couldn't it? 52

Ivan is responsible for the Inquisitor and his words, and therefore should be expected to know him intimately. His depiction of the suffering servant of humanity sounds the major chord in the self-justification of the rulers of the future universal state. The profound love of mankind animating the Inquisitor entails a voluntary assumption of suffering which imbues his figure with a certain "lofty sadness". 53 There is something undeniably attractive in the image of the exceptional man who, unable to cure himself of his compassion for lesser men, renounces his own solitary happiness in order to serve their happiness by bringing "some sort of supportable order" into their lives. Although Alyosha is the "hero" of The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoyevsky seems to be serving notice of the inadequacy of understanding the rulers of the universal state in terms of the picture which is usually conjured up by the word "tyrant". The rulers of the universal state will
portray themselves as men who have been compelled to acknowledge, finally and to their great sorrow, that tyranny is the price of human happiness, a price which will be paid by the tyrants themselves:

And they will all be happy, all the millions of creatures, except the hundred thousand who rule over them. For we alone, we who guard the mystery, we alone shall be unhappy. There will be thousands of millions of happy infants and one hundred thousand sufferers. 55

This image of the hundred thousand sufferers maintaining a lonely and loving vigil over their weaker fellow-men imbues the Inquisitor's social formula with a potent moral aura. This formula is thus able to evince the most sober "realism" without being in the least prosaic.

The Inquisitor associates his suffering with the guarding of a "mystery" or a "secret". Closer examination of this "secret" reveals that his love of mankind is rendered ambiguous by the very suffering which lends it such a heroic aspect. The Inquisitor's "sorrow" and Shigalyov's "despair" are only partially attributable to their realization that tyranny is the only possible solution to the problem of human order. For this realization points to the more fundamental insight into human life which is ultimately responsible for their suffering. The Inquisitor himself comes close to revealing this insight, which the rulers keep from the weak "for their own happiness", when he states that "beyond the grave they will find nothing but death". However, he then qualifies this assertion by adding that "if there were anything in the next world" it would not be for such as they. It is Alyoša, with Ivan's concurrence, who gives explicit expression to the Inquisitor's "secret": ...godlessness, that's all their secret. Your Inquisitor doesn't believe in God — that's all his secret!" 56 The Inquisitor's consideration of men as they actually are is indissolubly associated with the insight, implicit throughout his monologue,
that human life is a finiteness unencompassed by any over-arching meaning. It is the vision of human life as meaningless, perpetual becoming which will cause the suffering of the future tyrants. There is nothing spurious in their suffering, then, and in this regard the image of the sorrowing lover of mankind cannot be considered a deception. However, the insight into human life responsible for this suffering casts a profound shadow over the other component of Ivan's image. Is the knowledge that there is no answer to the "why" of human existence, other than the indifferent silence of death, compatible with a love of mankind? Can the Inquisitor love those whom he knows to be nothing more than "unfinished experimental creatures created as a mockery"? This question is rendered acute by the suspicion inevitably fostered in any attentive hearer of his monologue concerning his attitude towards his "flock". His refusal to demand too much of man, to estimate the "weak and base" creature too highly, treads too fine a line between loving solicitude and contempt. He thus invites the question which Dostoevsky poses to the builders of the universal state: "Do you love or despise mankind, you, its coming saviours?"

The issue of the compatibility of love of mankind with the insight into the finality of becoming remains largely implicit in the Inquisitor. To attribute such an insight too explicitly to a sixteenth-century Roman Catholic cardinal would perhaps run the risk of making him anachronistic, thereby detracting from the artistic power of the "poem" (which is what the "Legend" ultimately is, for Dostoevsky as much as Ivan). It is possibly for this reason that Dostoevsky's further analysis of the suffering "saviours" of mankind is embodied in Ivan, the modern Russian author of the "Legend". We have noted that Dostoevsky's critiques of
Russian Westernism and the West itself merge into one because of his conviction that modern Russia functions as a "laboratory" in which the final results of Western "hypotheses" become observable more rapidly than in the West itself. The conjunction of the two critiques is epitomized in Ivan. On the one hand, he represents the furthest development of Russian Westernism, in its Shigalyov phase. In a letter to his publisher Dostoyevsky refers to Ivan as the "synthesis of contemporary Russian anarchism", and in another letter, to Konstantin Pobedonostsev, he characterizes him as a "socialist of today" (1879). On the other hand, Ivan is the poet of the final Western solution to the problem of order. Dostoyevsky does place some distance between the young Russian socialist and the Grand Inquisitor; for instance, in reply to Alyosha's urgent question as to whether he is "with" the Inquisitor, Ivan laughingly refers to the "Legend" as "only a stupid poem of a stupid student, who has never written two lines of poetry in his life". But there is no such hesitation concerning Ivan's relation to the Grand Inquisitor in the rough notes for the novel. Here, the two characters are tersely but decisively united: "Ivan -- Inquisitor! Inquisitor!" Therefore, although the most subtle aspects of Dostoyevsky's further analysis of the universal state may be embodied of necessity in Ivan and other Russian characters, it should be clear that this analysis pertains equally to the West. Indeed, it pertains more to the West than to Russian Westernism. While in Shigalyov's "system" it is only vaguely hinted that a tyranny of humanitarians may be intrinsic to the West, in Ivan's "Legend of the Grand Inquisitor" this hint becomes a definite assertion.

In his rough notes for The Brothers Karamazov Dostoyevsky has Ivan state the chief point of his accord with the Inquisitor: "I am with the
old man's idea because he loves humanity more." Ivan affirms the
Inquisitor's universal state because it is the social order which
corresponds most faithfully to a genuine love of mankind. In the two
chapters leading up to the "Legend" ("The Brothers Get Acquainted" and
"Rebellion"), he makes it clear that for him the requirements of love
constitute the criterion against which all human thought and practice must
be measured; and in these same chapters he stipulates what love requires.
The first requirement of love is an infinite compassion for human
suffering. For Ivan, the measure of a man's love is the degree of agony
which he is capable of experiencing at the knowledge of the "human tears
with which the earth is saturated from its crust to its centre". So that
his "case" is clearer he speaks particularly of the suffering of the
innocent, and his cruel cataloguing of the tortures undergone by little
children evokes in Alyosha that very agony which is the mark of love.
This agony is not, however, the highest expression of love for Ivan; he
yearns, rather, for its overcoming in the actualization of justice. The
man who loves is the thirster after justice.

Ivan does not understand justice legalistically, as retribution for
the suffering inflicted by some human beings upon others. He seeks, not
vengeance, but the end of all suffering, including that of the torturers
who deserve to suffer. He yearns for an all-encompassing reconciliation,
in which "the mother will embrace the torturer who had her child torn to
pieces by his dogs, and all three will cry aloud: 'Thou art just, O Lord!'"
Ivan's thirst for justice thus reveals itself as a thirst for perfection
itself, for the "harmony" in which "all the offensive and comical spectacle
of human contradictions" -- of which human suffering is one principal
manifestation -- "will vanish like a pitiful mirage." Ivan's thirst for justice, however, can find no satisfaction in the thought of a harmony which transcends the earth, nor in the anticipation of a harmony to be attained in the indefinite future. He demands justice here on earth, and immediately. For if justice is actual only beyond the earth, or on the earth in some distant future, then the "spectacle" of human imperfection will persist as a source of pain to those who love man. Their pain will remain unassuaged, just as the suffering of the innocent will, in actuality, remain unexpiated. Out of the love he bears for mankind, then, Ivan rejects any notion of justice which postulates a gulf between the idea and its immediate actualization on earth. His return of the "entrance ticket" to any harmony which cannot be present for him here and now constitutes perhaps the most forceful expression of the modern repudiation of the concept of an unchanging or eternal justice. But no less does it represent a devastating attack on the modern notion of historical progress, an attack reminiscent particularly of Belinsky's well-known condemnation of Hegel:

Surely the reason for my suffering was not that I as well as my evil deeds and sufferings may serve as manure for some future harmony for someone else. I want to see with my own eyes the lion lie down with the lamb and the murdered man rise up and embrace his murderer. I want to be there when everyone suddenly finds out what it has all been for. All religions are, based on this desire, and I am a believer... Listen: if all have to suffer so as to buy eternal harmony by their suffering, what have the children to do with it -- tell me, please! It is entirely incomprehensible why they, too, should have to suffer and why they should have to buy harmony by their sufferings. Why should they too be used as dung for someone's future harmony? I renounce higher harmony altogether. It is not worth one little tear of that tortured little girl who beat herself on the breast and prayed to her "dear, kind Lord" in the stinking privy with her unexpiated tears! It is not worth it, because her tears remain unexpiated. They must be expiated, for otherwise there can be no harmony.
But how, how are you to expiate them?...if the sufferings of children go to make up the sum of sufferings which is necessary for the purchase of truth, then I say beforehand that the entire truth is not worth such a price. And, finally, I do not want a mother to embrace the torturer who had her child torn to pieces by his dogs! She has no right to forgive him...even if her child were to forgive him! And if that is so, if they have no right to forgive him, what becomes of the harmony? Is there in the whole world a being who could or would have the right to forgive? I don't want harmony. I don't want it, out of the love I bear to mankind...I'd rather remain with my suffering unavenged and my indignation unappeased, even if I were wrong. Besides, too high a price has been placed on harmony. We cannot afford to pay so much for admission. 64

Love of humanity requires, above all, the immediate realization of justice. For the sake of certainty concerning this realization, Ivan is willing to "lower his sights" when it comes to justice itself. The "Legend of the Grand Inquisitor" reflects this re-adjustment. Renouncing the perfect, but distant and perhaps unattainable, harmony, Ivan opts instead for the relief of man's estate promised in the Inquisitor's social formula. The universal state is a "paradise" which can at least be actual, rather than merely a dream. There seems to be no indication in Ivan's argument as to how the immediate achievement of human happiness would atone for past suffering; but the abolition at least of the present and future suffering of the majority of men is promised in the universal state. It should be repeated that although Ivan's thirst for justice does entail the rejection of progressivist liberalism and socialism, his social formula is not so much a negation of the Geneva teaching as a logical extension of the principles inherent in it. 65 His argument for justice on earth is meant to constitute the very heart of the self-justification of the modern Western project, both in its origin and in its furthest development. In Ivan, Dostoyevsky discloses that the question of the West is for him essentially
a question about justice. The builders of the new Tower of Babel are building "for the sake of bringing heaven down to earth". 66

Despite the emphasis on practice implied in Ivan's thirst for justice on earth, he shares in the fundamental characteristic which Dostoyevsky attributed to Russian Westernism -- the willingness to "sacrifice one's self, to sacrifice everything for truth". 67 Although Ivan ridicules the Russian "boys" and "professors" who "do nothing nowadays but talk of eternal questions", even while snatching a free moment in a pub, he himself is pre-eminently one of these Russian boys. 68 He cannot resist subjecting his own thirst for justice to a theoretical examination. The ambiguity which Dostoyevsky discerned at the heart of the universal state, implicitly present in the ambivalence of the Inquisitor's attitude towards his "sheep", is made the explicit subject of theoretical analysis by Ivan himself.

The nature and possibility of "love of humanity" is a question which preoccupies Ivan throughout the novel. If love of humanity is the major premise of his argument for the Inquisitor's social formula, it is a premise which is far from self-evident for him. Significantly, his most sustained argument for the universal state (in the chapter entitled "Rebellion", immediately preceding the "Legend") commences with a confession of his inability to comprehend the very "love of humanity" which inspires his "rebellion" against other conceptions of justice:

I never could understand how one can love one's fellow creatures. In my view, it is one's neighbours that one can't possibly love, but perhaps only those who live far away...To love a man, it's necessary that he should be hidden, for as soon as he shows his face, love is gone...Beggars, especially honourable beggars, should never show themselves in the streets, but ask for charity through the newspapers. Theoretically it is still possible to love one's neighbours, but at close quarters almost never. 69

Ivan's compassion impels him to repudiate any notion of justice which tends
to ignore actual human suffering. Yet his experience of the insuperable difficulty of loving actual men calls that compassion into question.

Ivan's passion for truth compels him to seek out the principle which might serve as the basis of a love for humanity. He is able to discern no such principle in nature, according to the testimony of another character in the novel, a liberal of the '40's, Miusov:

I will tell you...a very interesting and most characteristic anecdote about Mr. Ivan Karamazov himself. Only five days ago, at a certain social gathering, consisting mostly of ladies, he solemnly declared during an argument that there was absolutely nothing in the whole world to make men love their fellow-men, that there was no law in nature that man should love mankind, and that if love did exist on earth, it was not because of any natural law...70

Understood according to the modern science of nature, "humanity" is the chance product of an indifferent material necessity. Insomuch as the science of nature is able to provide any criterion at all for the behaviour of these "accidental" beings, it can only point to the satisfaction of natural needs as the chief concern of each. According to Ivan's scientific understanding of nature, then, self-preservation, and even comfortable self-preservation, would have priority over "love of mankind". Ivan's failure to love actual men is not counteracted by any natural principle which might ultimately encourage such love.

He is thus forced to acknowledge that his compassion for human suffering must be based on the love of a "hidden" humanity. Without the conviction of a "higher" humanity somehow present in actual men, love of humanity simply would not exist. Love of man is necessarily the love of an idea of man; it is a "duty" undertaken for the sake of this idea, rather than a natural impulse. We have seen that an important theme of Dostoyevsky's elucidation of the Geneva idea, particularly in its original liberal
expression, is the ambiguity of its professed love of humanity. In his presentation of Ivan's idea of order this theme becomes crucial. Ivan, while affirming "love of humanity" as the very cornerstone of the universal state, vehemently rejects the Geneva distinction between man as he actually is, and man as he could be and will be in the future. But the abolition of what little distinction Geneva thought retains between man as he is and man as he could be deprives Ivan of the foundation of his argument for justice on earth. He therefore faces an impasse. Unless he is willing to renounce his yearning for the actualization of justice, he must reconsider the possibility of an orientation towards a justice not rooted in the here and now. Ivan's acknowledgement of the necessity of the idea of "immortality" would seem to indicate his movement towards such an orientation. For him, the idea of an "eternal" humanity provides the most profound and comprehensive guarantee possible for the love of actual men. To quote Miusov again:

...he solemnly declared...that if love did exist on earth, it was not because of any natural law but solely because men believed in immortality. He added in parenthesis that all natural law consisted of that belief, and that if you were to destroy the belief in immortality in mankind, not only love but every living force on which the continuation of all life in the world depended, would dry up at once. Moreover, there would be nothing immoral then, everything would be permitted, even cannibalism. 72

Ivan, however, rejects the concept of immortality, despite his recognition of its necessity for that love which underlies his desire for justice. For Ivan, immortality is a "lie", and his love of truth compels him to reject it. He will not participate in the self-deception of a "John the Merciful":

I read somewhere about "John the Merciful" (some saint) who, when a hungry and frozen stranger came to him and begged him to warm him, lay down with him in his bed and, putting his arms around him, began breathing into his mouth, which was
festered and fetid from some awful disease. I'm convinced
that he did so from heart-ache, from heart-ache that
originated in a lie, for the sake of love arising from a
sense of duty, for the sake of a penance he had imposed upon
himself. 73

Ivan's turning away from eternity is expressed most explicitly in the novel
in his response, "over the brandy", to his father's anxious queries:

...But tell me all the same: is there a God or not? Only
seriously, mind! I want it seriously now!
No, there's no God.
Ivan, is there immortality, I mean just of some sort,
just a tiny little one?
No, there's no immortality, either.
None at all?
None at all. 74

This repudiation of the "lie" of God and immortality would seem simply
to be in accord with Ivan's status as a representative of atheist socialism. With his recognition of the final consequences of his insight into
the finality of becoming, however, he moves beyond socialism to "nihilism".

The term "nihilist" was first introduced into Russian intellectual
life by Turgenev. In Fathers and Sons he applied it to those of the
Westernists of the 1860's who sought the destruction of all the traditional
objects of reverence for the sake of a new, socialist order. According to
this popular usage of the word in latter nineteenth-century Russia,
"nihilism" and "revolutionary" socialism were indistinguishable. Dostoyevsky,
however, perceived in nihilism an independent theoretical stance which
ultimately excludes socialism. Ivan is a nihilist, not only because he
seeks the destruction of the old gods, but more importantly, because he
knows that all gods are man-made, that the moral ends to which men have
submitted themselves are not sustained in the nature of things. The source
of this insight is his "Euclidean mind", 75 that is, his reason -- reason,
however, which is more consistently and courageously applied than in liberalism or even "scientific" socialism. Ivan's recognition of the necessity of the idea of an eternal good -- both as a component of the Inquisitor's social formula and as the basis of that love of humanity which inspires the formula -- does not alter his fundamental insight.

At the outset of his argument for justice on earth, he quotes approvingly Voltaire's dictum (a favourite of Nietzsche's also):

_S'il n'existait pas Dieu il faudrait l'inventer._ And, to be sure, man has invented God. And what is so strange, and what would be so marvellous, is not that God should actually exist, but that such an idea -- the idea of the necessity of God -- should have entered the head of such a savage and vicious animal as man -- so holy it is, so moving and so wise and so much does it redound to man's honour. 76

Ivan immediately qualifies the preceding observation by maintaining that he decided long before not to speculate as to whether man has created God, or God has created man. Yet, as we have noted, for Ivan man's propensity to measure his existence against an ultimate good, expressing itself in notions such as "God" and "immortality", is manifestly a propensity for self-deception. The fact that he is careful to temper this insight in his discussion with Alyosha indicates that he, too, must be engaged in deception, if not of himself, then of those whom he is trying to convert to the universal state. For the unqualified avowal of the nihilist insight would negate the argument for justice on earth which follows. This insight consigns man entirely to the realm of chance and necessity, and, as we have seen, for Ivan there is no basis for the love of humanity in this realm. The fact that the accidental creature insists on deluding itself that its existence has some over-arching meaning can elicit only the contemptuous laughter, or in some exceptional cases the grudging respect, but never the love, of the nihilist. Shigalyov perceives
the incompatibility of science and socialism, but he is oblivious to the more fundamental incompatibility of science with the love of mankind which still underlies his system. In Ivan, however, the tension between the "Euclidean mind" and love asserts itself as a problem which must be resolved.

The contradiction between Ivan's love of humanity and his nihilism manifests itself in him throughout the novel. The "rebel" out of love of humanity is also the teacher of the formula par excellence of nihilism — "everything is permitted". Smerdyakov, his most proficient pupil, expresses the formula more precisely: "This you did teach me, sir, for you talked to me a lot about such things: ... if there's no everlasting God, there's no such thing as virtue, and there's no need of it at all". The direct practical consequence of this teaching is parricide, one of the most ignominious of crimes for those who live within the perspective of good and evil. Despite Ivan's horror when confronted with this consequence of nihilism, he never repudiates his "everything is permitted". Indeed, he signifies his theoretical acceptance of parricide when, speaking of his father and his brother, he is able to declare contemptuously: "One reptile will devour another reptile, and serve them both right!" That a professed lover of humanity could speak thus of his own family is, to say the least, paradoxical. Another, perhaps more striking instance of Ivan's "contradictoriness" is revealed by Lis Khokhlakov: the man who maintains that a single tear of an innocent child cannot be compensated by any yet-to-be attained harmony is apparently able to affirm the "goodness" of feeling enjoyment at the sight of the crucifixion of a four-year old child. Ivan's thought and practice reflects an irresolvable contradiction. The contra-
diction is stated most concisely by another of Dostoyevsky's nihilist characters, Kukilov (in The Possessed): "God is necessary and so must exist... But I know that He doesn't exist and can't exist." 79

It would seem that the very nature of Ivan's dilemma points towards his resolving it through the complete affirmation of the nihilist insight and its consequences. For he is, above all, a theoretical man, willing to sacrifice everything for truth. Moreover, the knowledge, once attained, that God is man's "invention" -- no matter how necessary an invention -- must surely preclude any genuine return to life within the horizon of good and evil. Ivan's profession of love for humanity must thus be regarded as more or less spurious to the extent that his movement into nihilism is more or less complete.

The implications of Ivan's nihilism for his vision of social order must now be considered. The question of the Grand Inquisitor's attitude towards those whom he would rule is susceptible of a clear answer. He cannot possibly love mankind; and, in the absence of love, his solicitude for human weakness must be regarded as an expression of contempt. His contempt may be mitigated by love to the extent that his nihilism is incomplete. But allowance for such a possibility does not alter Dostoyevsky's fundamental observation that the universal state will be ruled by tyrants who do not love mankind. What, then, will be the source of their aspiration to rule? Alyosha's initial, instinctive imputation to the Inquisitor of a lust for "filthy earthly gains" takes on a new force in the light of the preceding discussion. Dostoyevsky's entertainment of the possibility that the rulers of the future universal state will be driven by the desire for power is reflected particularly in Peter Verkhovensky's adoption of Shigalyov's "system". Verkhovensky himself admits to Stavrogin that his
enthusiasm for Shigalyov's social formula is the enthusiasm of a "rogue", that he is "not a socialist at all, but some sort of ambitious politician". This ambition has theoretical significance, however, for his disavowal of socialism ultimately stems, not from his "roguishness", but from his nihilism. Science has taught him to acknowledge the sovereignty of necessity. And this acknowledgment issues in an active, unappeasable ambition for power rather than in paralysis. The source of his frenzied activity is apparently the sheer desire to will power. In his case, then, nihilism and political order are compatible. He willingly consents to undertake the political role of tyrant, which is the only political activity appropriate to those strong enough to be nihilists. It may thus be a matter of indifference as to whether or not the rulers of the universal state love those whom they rule. The desire for power, if not love, will spur them to adopt the Inquisitor's social formula, thereby at once satisfying their power-lust and the yearning of the weak for order.

Nevertheless, Dostoyevsky implies that the relation between nihilism and the future universal state is highly uncertain. Verkhovensky adopts Shigalyov's system because he happens to be driven by the desire for power. Yet even if the desire for power over others were the chief passion of all nihilists, the result could be a perpetual struggle within the ranks of the strong rather than the formation of a stable social order. It is as easy to envisage titanic wars among various tyrannies in which the weak would be sacrificed to the power-lust of their nihilist rulers as it is to envisage the attainment of the final "earthly paradise". It is by no means clear, moreover, that there is any necessary relation at all between nihilism and the aspiration to power over others. There seems to be no
reason why the formula "everything is permitted" should entail political activity more than the private seeking of pleasure or -- if the vision of life's meaninglessness becomes unendurable -- self-annihilation. This uncertainty is reflected particularly in Ivan. Immediately subsequent to his justification and presentation of the Inquisitor's social formula, he seems to disavow any personal inclination to join the ranks of those who are constructing the universal state:

Why, goodness me, Alyosha, it's all a lot of nonsense! It's only a stupid poem of a stupid student, who has never written two lines of poetry in his life. Why do you take it so seriously? You don't think I'm going to go straight there, to the Jesuists, to join the company of those who are correcting his work? Good Lord, what do I care? I told you, all I want is to live to thirty and then -- dash the cup to the floor! 82

The "dashing of the cup to the floor" as a likely consequence of his nihilism is elaborated by Ivan in the rough notes for the novel:

I have reflected, perhaps one could steep oneself in gambling, in chess, become a banker and play the stock-market, become a courtier. But...I came to the conclusion that I...could not do these things. You can't get rid of the idea. It will continue to live like a worm. Only one thing remains: Beastly voluptuousness, with all its consequences, voluptuousness to the point of cruelty, crime, even to the point of the Marquis de Sade. That would carry you for a while. But in order to do this one has to develop within oneself for one's whole life a fire in the blood, but even if you could, it is reptilian, that's why one has to kill oneself. I have come to the conclusion that up to 30 you can get by with the power of life...with the fascination of the cup, that is, with deceptions, and then one has to destroy oneself. 83

Becoming a banker is as likely a "deception" for the nihilist as becoming a tyrant, and both possibilities are overshadowed by a yearning for release from the absurdity of existence. To quote Europe's "first perfect nihilist", the insight into the finality of becoming can be "deadly". 84

The threat which this insight poses to the possibility of sustained political activity is but one aspect of the threat which it poses to life itself.
Dostoevsky's analysis of those who would rule the universal state thus seems to indicate the impossibility of its actualization. There can apparently be no final solution to the crisis of order which has overtaken the West. For the modern Western quest for order, in its reliance on modern science, carries within itself the seeds of a nihilism ultimately inimical to any order.

(ii) The Man-God

Ivan, however, is the author of "The Geological Upheaval" as well as "The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor". If these two writings are looked at in conjunction, an extraordinary resolution of the problem which has been raised becomes dimly perceptible. Our knowledge of what is said in "The Geological Upheaval" depends on the following summary, offered by the "Devil" in conversation with Ivan:

"There are new men", you decided last spring, when you were about to come here, "who propose to destroy everything and start with cannibalism. The fools! They never asked my advice! In my opinion there's no need to destroy anything. All that must be destroyed is the idea of God in mankind. That's what we ought to start with! ... Once humanity to a man renounces God (and I believe that period, analagous with the geological periods, will come to pass) the whole of the old outlook on life will collapse by itself without cannibalism and, above all, the old morality, too, and a new era will dawn. Men will unite to get everything life can give, but only for joy and happiness in this world alone. Man will be exalted with a spirit of divine, titanic pride, and the man-god will make his appearance. Extending his conquest over nature infinitely, every hour by his will and science, man will every hour by that very fact feel so lofty a joy that it will make up for all his old hopes of the joy of heaven. Everyone will know that he is mortal, that there is no resurrection, and he will accept death serenely and proudly like a god." 85

Ivan's nihilism points beyond itself towards its overcoming in the "man-god", who is thereby revealed as the ultimate justification and guarantee of the
future universal state.

In order to grasp the significance of the "man-god" for the problem of order, we must first understand how he signifies the overcoming of nihilism. This requires that we turn for the moment from Ivan to Kirilov. This solitary eccentric who "hates discussions" expresses his ideas with great reluctance. Nevertheless, his disjointed and cryptic utterances, if properly interpreted, constitute the most sustained elucidation of the "man-god" to be found in Dostoyevsky's writings.

Kirilov shows the characteristic impatience for action of the generation of the 1860's. He claims that the nihilism which has appeared in the modern world is as yet merely a theory which has not been put into practice. The nihilist denies the existence of any over-arching limit or end to his willing:

If there is a God, then it is always His will, and I can do nothing against His will. If there isn't, then it is my will... 87

But the nihilist has not yet lived out his freedom from God; he has merely expressed it in little things "like a schoolboy". He is like "a beggar who has inherited a fortune and is afraid of it". Nihilism has not yet been acted upon in the most important point -- self-annihilation. According to Kirilov, the suicide which truly expresses man's new-found self-will must be committed with the clear intention of expressing the conquest of the fear of death; of the "millions" of suicides, the only one of significance would be he who kills himself only to kill the fear of death. It is this fear which underlies man's invention of the "next world" or "God". With the help of this "deception" he continues to live, even to "love" life, although "life is pain, life is fear, and man is unhappy". So long as men are unable to accept the transitoriness of existence they will
continue to console themselves with the notion of an over-arching meaning. Even the minority of the strong, who think that they have dispensed with God, continue to live in His shadow, for they still feel His absence. The sense of God's absence may induce suffering, or a frenzied willing with no other object than the satisfaction of base desires; but, whatever the case, its presence in even the strongest nihilist indicates an inability to accept the meaningless finitude of existence. Because nihilism itself is thus implicated in the religious deception, the final overcoming of God will signify the overcoming of nihilism.

The final "annihilation" of God presupposes the overcoming of the need for God, or the overcoming of the fear of death, so that "it makes no difference whether to live or not to live". Kirilov's indifference, however, is "unhappy", for he is bound to demonstrate his indifference to death in the most decisive manner because such indifference is not natural to him. Nonetheless, Kirilov's unhappy putting into practice of nihilism prepares the way for the happy indifference of the "new man". His annihilation of God is at the same time the annunciation of the man-god, for man cannot dispense with God without himself becoming a god. Kirilov envisages the man-god as a being to whom "it won't matter whether he lives or not", for he is able to accept the transitoriness of existence. But the man-god does not merely accept the vision of life as perpetual becoming; he affirms it, in all of its manifestations, as "good". According to Kirilov, he will affirm that "all's good" -- the "spider crawling on the wall" as much as the "bright green leaf" -- because he refuses to
judge life according to the distinction between "good" and "evil" which has its basis in the religious "lie". However, the man-god's movement of affirmation will not have its ultimate source merely in the refusal of moral categories, for this refusal could only lead to the less positive declaration that "all is what it is". The question of the fundamental source of the man-god's "happy" affirmation of life leads us to the mysterious centre of Kirilov's vision -- his intuition of eternity. He attempts to convey to Shatov one of these glimpses of eternity which have been vouchsafed to him:

There are seconds -- they come five or six at a time -- when you suddenly feel the presence of eternal harmony in all its fullness. It is nothing earthly. I don't mean that it is heavenly, but a man in his earthly semblance can't endure it. He has to undergo a physical change or die. This feeling is clear and unmistakable. It is as though you suddenly apprehended all nature and suddenly said: "Yes, it is true -- it is good." God, when He created the world, said at the end of each day of creation: "Yes, it is true, it is good". It is not rapture, just gladness. You forgive nothing because there is nothing to forgive. Nor do you really love anything -- oh, it is much higher than love! What is so terrifying about it is that it is so terribly clear and such gladness. 89

Apparently the man-god's affirmation that "all's good" will be possible by virtue of his participation in this eternity which Kirilov apprehends only briefly. This participation makes him a god, not only because he imitates God's affirmation of the goodness of creation, but because it would be impossible to live within this eternity while remaining a man: "a man in his earthly semblance can't endure it. He has to undergo a physical change or die." Also, the man-god's affirmation of life is bound up with his power over life. The analogy with the God who creates is significant in this respect, as is the statement that the attribute of man's divinity
is "Self-Will". The modern yearning to "bring heaven down to earth" seems to be intimately related to Kirilov's apprehension of eternity. For Kirilov understands eternity to be, not in a "future everlasting", but in "an everlasting life here". According to him, the man-god will attain to this earthly eternity through that complete loyalty to the earth which is signified in the affirmation that "all's good".

We must now turn from the mystery of the earthly eternity at the centre of Kirilov's thought to the question of social order. Kirilov's vision of the man-god seems to have political implications. He regards the appearance of the man-god as an event of tremendous import for all men, understanding his self-annihilation as an act which will save mankind: "I shall begin and end, and open the door. And I shall save." And he divides human history into two epochs: from the gorilla to the annihilation of God, and from the annihilation of God to the era of the man-god. Although he calls for the transformation of mankind in accord with the man-god's affirmation of the earth, Kirilov says nothing of the manner in which he thinks this transformation will be wrought. Nor does he seem interested in questions concerning the nature of the social order which would ensue in the wake of the man-god's appearance. It is in The Brothers Karamazov that the question of the implications of the man-god for social order comes explicitly to the fore. The "Devil's" mention, almost in the same breath, of "The Geological Upheaval" and "The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor" would indicate that they are meant to be seen together. The latter writing can, indeed, be considered the appropriate political expression of the former.

Ivan's vision of the man-god requires a corresponding political
teaching because the period in which "humanity to a man renounces God"
has not yet come, and it may not be attained "even for a thousand years."

There are, however, those who can and will achieve mangodhood now:

...everyone who is already aware of the truth has a right to
carry on as he pleases in accordance with the new principles.
In that sense "everything is permitted" to him. What's more,
even if that period never comes to pass, and since there is
neither God nor immortality, anyway, the new man has a right
to become a man-god, though he may be the only one in the
whole world, and having attained that new rank, he may light-
heartedly jump over every barrier of the old moral code of
the former man-slave, if he deems it necessary. There is no
law for God! Where God stands, there is his place! 93

The universal state of the Inquisitor, then, would serve as the instrument
whereby the one, or the few, who have attained to mangodhood will transform
others according to their truth. The fervid dream of a time when all men
are loyal to the earth -- when "men will unite to get everything life
can give, but only for joy and happiness in this world alone" -- would
become a grandiose, yet perhaps practicable, political task. It is not
clear from "The Geological Upheaval" whether Ivan envisages the possibility
of mangodhood for all "men-slaves". If so, then the Inquisitor's tyranny
will conceivably wither away when no longer required for hastening the
advent of the "new era". However, the radical emphasis on human inequality
which is so central to the "Legend" would seem to preclude the possibility
of universal mangodhood. Presumably, there will always be men who need
to have their consciences appeased. The universal state, then, will always
be necessary; and its most subtle task will be to appease the conscience
of the weak in a manner which turns them towards the earth rather than
away from it. The universal state of "The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor"
requires the man-god of "The Geological Upheaval" no less than the man-god
seems to require the universal state. For the goal of manhood would provide the tyrants with a unifying end for their rule which will not contradict their nihilism, but will at once justify and overcome it. And the presence of the man-god would absolve them of the responsibility of providing an object of worship for the masses, who will share their veneration of the "happy and proud new man".

Questions still remain concerning the relationship between the man-god and the future universal state. It is not perfectly clear, for instance, why the man-god's affirmation of the earth would lead him to a sustained effort to bring into being others capable of his supreme affirmation, and thus why he would consent to stand at the head of a tyranny dedicated to himself. Such questions, perhaps necessarily, are left unanswered in Dostoyevsky's adumbration of a possibility only barely perceptible on the horizon of modernity. Nevertheless, a definite conclusion can be drawn from his analysis of the motives of the rulers of the future universal state: the modern Western attempt to actualize justice on the basis of reason points to a tyranny which will be animated, not by love of man, but by love of the man-god.

The final word in the self-revelation of the modern Western project should perhaps be granted to the Grand Inquisitor, addressing Christ:

All I have to tell you is already known to you. I can read it in your eyes. And would I conceal our secret from you? Perhaps it is just what you want to hear from my lips. Well, then, listen. We are not with you but with him: that is our secret! It's a long time -- eight centuries -- since we left you and went over to him. Exactly eight centuries ago we took from him what you rejected with scorn... And so we have taken the sword of Caesar and, having taken it, we of course rejected you and followed him. Oh, many more centuries are yet to pass of the excesses of their free mind, of their science and cannibalism, for, having begun to build their
Tower of Babel without us, they will end up with cannibalism. But then the beast will come crawling up to us and will lick our feet and will bespatter them with tears of blood from its eyes. And we shall sit upon the beast and raise the cup, and on it will be written: "Mystery!" And then, and only then, will the reign of peace and happiness come to men. 94

With this allusion to the Apocalypse, Dostoyevsky's exposition of the modern Western quest for a new order passes over into his judgement of this order, and beyond this, his judgement of the very foundations of Western civilization.
CHAPTER FIVE
DOSTOYEVSKY'S JUDGEMENT OF THE FINAL
WESTERN SOCIAL FORMULA

I  The Silence of Christ

(1)  The Failure of the Nihilist to become the Man-God

Dostoyevsky's judgement of the modern Western project consists, first, in his exposure of the universal state as a tyranny destructive of man. Yet as we have seen, this tyranny, and the "destruction" or "overcoming" of man which it implies, receives its ultimate justification in the vision of manhood. The judgement of the universal state therefore presupposes the judgement of the man-god. This judgement is expressed, above all, in the failure of even the most courageous of Dostoyevsky's nihilists -- Stavrogin and Ivan Karamazov -- to move through nihilism to the man-god's joyful affirmation of becoming.

Stavrogin refuses to judge life according to a perspective outside of life: he finds the "same sort of beauty and equal enjoyment" in all of life's manifestations, perceiving no difference in beauty "between some voluptuous and brutish act and any heroic exploit, even the sacrifice of life for the good of humanity". He regards the distinction between good and evil as "just a prejudice", and lives consciously in the absence of any over-arching meaning. Life beyond good and evil is not merely a fashionable theory for Stavrogin. As with other representatives of the generation of the 1860's, thought rapidly passes over into action: his nihilism expresses itself in the abuse of an innocent child, a deed which, from a perspective within good and evil, is one of the most ignominious of
crimes. Stavrogin's nihilism appears to be so complete that he is able to play with convictions which could give some meaning to life, without himself being imprisoned by them. For instance, he inspires Shatov with a Russian religious nationalism, while at the same time disbelieving it himself.²

There is, nevertheless, something in Stavrogin's preoccupation with ideas which betrays a profound need for a conviction. He, in fact, suffers from his nihilism as from a sickness, and he himself admits this. He is unable to move from the "disease of indifference" engendered by his nihilism to the man-god's joyful affirmation of life as perpetual becoming. From Stavrogin, by his own admission, "nothing has come but negation -- and not even negation". Whereas Kirilov's negation is "magnanimous", Stavrogin's suicide does not point beyond negation to any affirmation; and it does not do so perhaps because it is not a sufficiently radical negation.³ Unlike Kirilov, he cannot affirm the goodness of that spider which symbolizes his violation of the innocent child, Matryona. Stavrogin's suicide is, above all, motivated by the desire to avoid a repentance to which he is being driven inexorably by a sense of guilt, and which almost drives him back within the confines of "good and evil". Stavrogin is finally kept from repentance, not by the magnificent and happy pride of the man-god, but by his inability to envelop himself within the Christian faith. The absence of a conviction of the efficacy of the Christian way of repentance renders him inadequately "prepared" or "hardened" for the humiliation which his pride would be required to undergo in the face of public contempt and even derision.⁴

It would seem, from the dynamics of Stavrogin's movement to and away from Christian repentance, that Dostoyevsky means to embody in him
not so much the problem of overcoming nihilism in the man-god, as the problem of moving from nihilism to Christianity. Seen in this light, Stavrogin's most extraordinary actions throughout The Possessed -- his endurance of Shatov's slap in the face, the duel with Gaganov; his marriage to the cripple, Maria Lebyadkin -- could be interpreted as the self-punishment of a man striving to forgive himself -- a man "looking for a burden" -- rather than the demonstration of a magnificent indifference to merely conventional moral codes. The failure of Stavrogin to affirm life beyond good and evil casts a grave doubt on Kirilov's hope for the man-god. If even Stavrogin, with his superhuman courage and beauty, his intelligence and strength of will, is unable to move through nihilism to its overcoming, then is such a movement possible? This doubt is enhanced by the manner in which Dostoyevsky portrays the prophet of the man-god. Kirilov is absurdly eccentric, a semi-literate engineer, regarded by Stavrogin as "insane" and by the narrator as "mad as a hatter"; and the suicide which is to herald the annihilation of God takes on, in the final moments, all the appearance of a grotesque farce. It is intimated also that Kirilov's apprehension of an "everlasting life" here on earth may be the product of an incipient epilepsy.

Ivan Karamazov's vision of the man-god, too, is associated with sickness -- in his case, "brain fever". And he, too, fails to move through nihilism to the realization of manhood. He fails because, like Stavrogin, he finds it impossible to be a perfect nihilist. He teaches that "everything is permitted", and yet he cannot live out this teaching fully. The lackey, Smerdyakov, notes, with mingled surprise and contempt, Ivan's reluctance to accept responsibility for the murder of his father:
"You were brave enough then, sir. Everything, you said, is permitted, and look how frightened you are now!" Yet Ivan's inability to affirm the consequences of his nihilism is not due to mere cowardice. It is rooted in a dilemma far beyond the grasp of a lackey, a dilemma which is perceptible, however, to the "Devil":

Oh, you're going to perform a great act of virtue! You're going to declare that you murdered your father, that the servant killed him at your instigation...you're going to perform a great act of virtue and you don't believe in virtue — that's what makes you so angry, that's what worries you...8

The nihilist who was willing to countenance the devouring of one "reptile" by another is inexorably driven by a sense of guilt to sacrifice himself in order to save one of these "reptiles". Ivan still feels the claim of good even though he knows that this claim is his own "invention". The abiding presence of this claim and the knowledge that it is not sustained in the nature of things is the source of that "contradictoriness" which is Ivan's chief characteristic. His appearance in court sets him upon the way undertaken by Stavrogin, the way of return to life within the confines of good and evil. Driven by an overwhelming sense of guilt into a way of repentance in which he cannot believe, Ivan will perhaps perish also, finding the resolution of his "contradictoriness" in madness or suicide. In Ivan, as in Stavrogin, Dostoyevsky finally embodies the problem, not of moving through nihilism to the man-god's joyful affirmation of perpetual becoming, but of returning from nihilism to the affirmation of an over-arching meaning. His nihilist characters betray at their very core that conflict between nihilist conviction and moral conscience which he expresses in his rough notes:
...the convinced person himself, keeping his conviction intact, stops because of some feeling and does not complete the act. He curses himself and feels contempt in his mind, but in his feeling, which means in his conscience, he cannot complete it and he stops (and knows, finally that it was not cowardice that stopped him). 11

This conflict is a motif which sounds throughout Dostoyevsky's art.

The phenomenon of "contradictoriness" is insufficient of itself to constitute a refutation of the man-god. For the question still remains as to how this contradiction is to be interpreted. Though suffering acutely from the contradiction between his nihilist insight and his moral conscience, Ivan nevertheless denies that this contradiction must be final:

Conscience! What is conscience? I invent it myself. Why, then, am I so unhappy? From habit. From the universal habit of mankind for the past seven thousand years. When we get rid of our habits, we shall become gods. 12

If the guilty conscience which afflicts Ivan, Stavrogin, Raskolnikov, and even Svidrigaylov (in Crime and Punishment) is ultimately a matter of "habit", of however long a duration, then the evidence of "contradictoriness" adduced against the possibility of the man-god cannot be considered conclusive. The nihilist insight into the nature of morality holds out the certainty of an eventual resolution of "contradictoriness" which will banish the moral conscience from human life, or at least reduce it to a salutary illusion for the weak. Habits may die hard, but they do finally die. To concede the truth of the nihilist insight is to concede the possibility that some will become capable of living beyond good and evil. And it is to concede the possibility that a man will emerge from among these perfect nihilists who will be capable of living beyond good and evil without regret, and even with joy.

The contradiction which besets Dostoyevsky's nihilists constitutes
a decisive argument against the possibility of the man-god only if it is
the manifestation, not of a peculiarly obstinate human habit, but of the
exclusive claim of an unchanging good. It is thus that Alyosha interprets
Ivan’s "contradictoriness":

He began to understand Ivan’s illness: "The agony of
a proud decision — a deep-seated conscience". God,
in whom he did not believe, and truth had gained a hold
over his heart, which still refused to give in. 13

There is a clear corollary to Alyosha’s interpretation of Ivan’s agony:
the nihilism which contradicts the claim of good reveals itself as evil.
That which Ivan interprets as a struggle between the "universal habit of
mankind" and scientific or "Euclidean" truth is thus transposed into a
struggle between good and evil, between God and the Devil, in which "the
battlefield is the heart of man". 14 Dostoyevsky points to such a
transposition by inducing a shift of perspective, a sense of "a new and
hitherto unknown reality", 15 in the nihilist characters themselves.
Raskolnikov finally comes to the realization that "...it was the devil
who killed the old hag, not I"; Stavrogin confesses to a belief in the
devil, "a personal devil, not an allegory"; and Ivan’s "Euclidean mind"
eventually betrays an openness to the presence of Satan. 16 Dostoyevsky,
however, does not impose such a shift of perspective upon his readers.
He goes to some lengths, for instance, to introduce an ambiguity into
the relationship between nihilism and the Devil by implying that the
Devil’s presence for Ivan and Stavrogin is attributable to the nervous
disorder which afflicts both of them. 17 This ambiguity is an aspect of
that larger silence which characterizes Dostoyevsky’s response to the
nihilist insight, a silence epitomized in the figure of Christ in the
"Legend of the Grand Inquisitor".

(ii) Dostoyevsky's Attempt at a Rational Refutation of Nihilism

Dostoyevsky clearly intends the figure of Christ to embody a judgement upon the final Western social formula. If this judgement is to be rendered explicit for the understanding, some attempt must be made to elucidate the silence by which it is expressed. Dostoyevsky himself furnishes the elements for such an elucidation, directly in his secondary writings, and less directly in his art. To turn first to his most explicit response to the nihilist insight: in his prose articles, unpublished notebooks, and correspondence he not only affirms the existence of an unchanging good, but attempts also to demonstrate the truth of this affirmation. The various "proofs" of the existence of God which he formulates appear to be intended as an experimental response to Ivan's "Legend" -- itself a sort of "trial balloon" for nihilism.18 One such proof appeals to the phenomenon of religion itself as "an historical fact that is staggering in its continuity and tenacity." The "tenacity" with which religion has persisted among men points ineluctably to the human need "to bow down before what is infinitely great". Man can best be defined as homo religiosus. The full import of Dostoyevsky's teaching about man's need for religion, or order, should now be apparent: the universal need to worship "what is infinitely great", while revealing the nature of man, points also to the existence of the "infinitely great" itself.19 Dostoyevsky offers the most elaborate version of his proof of the existence of God in a letter to N.L. Osmidov:
Every single organism exists on earth but to live -- not to annihilate itself. Science has made this clear, and has laid down very precise laws upon which to ground the axiom. Humanity as a whole is, of course, no less than an organism. And that organism has, naturally, its own conditions of existence, its own laws. Human reason comprehends those laws. Now suppose that there is no God, and no personal immortality (personal immortality and God are one and the same -- an identical idea). Tell me then: why am I to live decently and do good, if I die irrevocably here below? If there is no immortality, I need but live out my appointed day, and let the rest go hang. And if that's really so (and if I am clever enough not to let myself be caught by the standing laws), why should I not kill, rob, steal, or at any rate live at the expense of others? For I shall die, and all the rest will die and utterly vanish! By this road, one would reach the conclusion that the human organism alone is not subject to the universal law, that it lives but to destroy itself -- not to keep itself alive. For what sort of society is one whose members are mutually hostile.

It should be noted that the first premise of Dostoyevsky's proof is entirely in accord with the nihilist teaching. His claim that the nihilist insight is inimical, even deadly, to human life is nowhere expressed more forcefully than in his nihilist characters. It is Kirilov, for instance, who declares that God is necessary and so must exist; and it is Ivan who formulates not only the nihilist dictum -- "If God does not exist, then everything is permitted" -- but also its obverse -- "There is no virtue if there's no immortality". Agreement concerning this fundamental premise would presumably entail acquiescence in the entire proof, if only Dostoyevsky could move in convincing fashion from the necessity of the "sublime idea" of God to the actual existence of God. This he appears unable to accomplish. The second premise, that "every single organism exists on earth but to live -- not to annihilate itself" is clearly insufficient to produce the desired conclusion. It is based on at least two assumptions which are themselves in need of demonstration.
First, the notion that the "highest law" of life is always self-preservation rather than self-annihilation cannot be considered self-evident, and is disputed elsewhere in Dostoyevsky's writings. Secondly, the ascription of a purposiveness to nature would be contested by the very "science" to which appeal is made in the argument; for modern science, at its most rigorous, eschews the teleological explanation of nature in favour of explanation according to efficient causality. Yet even if the second premise were granted, the actuality of an unchanging perfection would remain undemonstrated. The necessity of the "sublime idea" to the preservation of human life, and the concern of nature with such preservation, may combine to endow mankind with the conviction of the existence of God. Yet the gulf between this conviction and the actuality of God is still not overcome.

Dostoyevsky's proof of the existence of God appears all too susceptible of incorporation within the nihilist interpretation of religion, as this interpretation is expressed, for instance, by Stavrogin in the rough notebooks:

...All these philosophical systems and doctrines (Positivism and Comte, etc.) have appeared before...and have suddenly disappeared in an awful hurry, without leaving a trace, and unnoticed by almost everybody. And not because they were refuted...oh, no -- simply because they did not satisfy anybody...whereas other ideas (Christianity, etc.) suddenly spread all over the world, conquered it, and certainly not because they were proven to be true, but simply because they satisfied everyone's needs...22

While Dostoyevsky's proof moves from the natural need for God to the existence of God, the nihilist argument moves from the natural need for God to the overcoming of this need in the man-god. If nature has made human beings so that they are unable to survive without God, then human
nature must be remade; man must be "physically transformed". Insofar as "science" has come to signify precisely this overcoming of nature by man, the nihilist argument must be considered more "scientific" than that of Dostoyevsky.

(iii) Dostoyevsky's Critique of Reason

The absence of rational proofs of the existence of God in Dostoyevsky's art indicates his awareness of the ultimate insufficiency of the proofs which he offers in his secondary writings. Yet the silence of Christ before the Grand Inquisitor is not a merely negative admission of the inability of the "infinitely great" to defend itself convincingly by means of rational argument. This silence has for Dostoyevsky a positive significance: it is the most appropriate possible response to those who assert the finality of becoming. The presence of silence highlights, by contrast, the compulsion of the nihilist to subject to rational speech that which cannot be encompassed by such speech. Nihilism betrays itself as missing the point entirely. The way in which silence itself can thus be understood as a refutation of the nihilist insight is revealed in the following observation of Prince Myshkin (in The Idiot) concerning the nature of religiosity:

"As to faith," he said, smiling..."In the morning I was travelling on one of our new railways, and I talked for some hours with a man I met in the train. I had heard a great deal about him before and, incidentally, that he was an atheist. He really is a very learned man, and I was glad of the opportunity of talking to a real scholar. He is, moreover, an exceedingly well-bred person, and he talked to me as though I were his equal in knowledge and ideas. He doesn't believe in God. One thing struck me, though: he didn't seem to be talking about that at all the whole time, and this struck me particularly because
before, too, whenever I met unbelievers and however many of their books I read, I could not help feeling that they were not talking or writing about that at all, though they may appear to do so. I told him this at the time, but I'm afraid I did not or could not express myself clearly enough, for he did not understand what I was talking about... the essence of religious feeling has nothing to do with any reasoning... it is something entirely different and it will always be so; it is something our atheists will always overlook, and they will never talk about that." 24

Dostoyevsky's thought about the relationship between reason and "religious feeling" is generally misunderstood. He is often regarded as a denigrator of human reason, or even as an advocate of irrationality. The notion that the silence of Christ before the Inquisitor signifies an appeal to irrationality is simply false. Dostoyevsky does not assert an opposition between reason and man's sense of the eternal; rather, he asserts that the latter is dependent upon a human faculty which is of a higher order than reason, and not simply opposed to it. Because it is so often misunderstood and yet so central to his silent judgement of the final western social formula, Dostoyevsky's critique of reason requires some elucidation. His most explicit analysis of reason is to be found in a letter which he wrote to his elder brother Michael:

What do you mean precisely by the word know? Nature, the soul, love, and God, one recognizes through the heart, and not through the reason. Were we spirits, we could dwell in that region of ideas over which our souls hover, seeking the solution. But we are earth-born beings, and can only guess at the Idea -- not grasp it by all sides at once. The guide for our intelligences through the temporary illusion into the innermost centre of the soul is called Reason. Now, Reason is a material capacity, while the soul or spirit lives on the thoughts which are whispered by the heart. Thought is born in the soul. Reason is a tool, a machine, which is driven by the spiritual fire. When human reason (which would demand a chapter for itself) penetrates into the domain of knowledge, it works independently of the feeling, and consequently of the heart. But when our aim is the understanding of love or of nature, we march towards the very citadel of the heart. 25
Dostoyevsky was only eighteen years of age when he wrote this account of man's knowledge of "nature, the soul...and God", but his thought about this question appears to have remained essentially unchanged throughout his life.

Fundamental to Dostoyevsky's account of human knowing is the distinction between "reason" and the "heart". The expression of this distinction may lack philosophical precision (Dostoyevsky averred more than once that philosophy was not his "specialty")\(^{26}\), but it is sufficiently clear to yield a definite epistemological teaching. It is evident, first, that Dostoyevsky considers knowledge of God to be accessible to man. Man owes the possibility of such knowledge, not to his reason, but to a higher spiritual principle within him (which Dostoyevsky calls the "heart").

Reason, itself essentially "material", cannot be the means of man's transcendence of material necessity. Indeed, reason alone is ultimately incapable of conceiving man, or anything else, as more than the product of chance and necessity. Only through cultivation of the spiritual principle within him can man know that perfection which is untouched by perpetual becoming -- that is, God.\(^{27}\) And only through the "heart" can man know himself as more than the creature of that becoming, as "soul".

The knowledge of the heart does not necessarily contradict that of reason, for reason is man's "guide" to the spiritual principle within him, a "tool" capable of conforming itself to that principle.

Although Dostoyevsky's youthful statement of the relationship between reason and the heart is perhaps most evidently indebted to Schelling's later religious thought, his final understanding of this relationship is best clarified with reference to the thought of the Slavophiles. The
magnitude of the debt which Dostoyevsky owes to the attempt of Khomyakov and I. Kireyevsky to restore the thought of the Greek Church Fathers is difficult to ascertain. Yet it is possible, without a complete answer to this question of intellectual history, to assert that the debt exists, and that it is particularly evident in Dostoyevsky's characterization of the relationship between reason and "religious feeling". Since this characterization is largely implicit in his art, it may be helpful to turn to the explicit prose of Kirèyevsky's treatise "On the Necessity and Possibility of New Principles in Philosophy". Kirèyevsky writes as follows of the ultimate accord of reason with Divine truth:

...the main difference in Orthodox thinking is precisely this: that it seeks not to arrange separate concepts according to the demands of faith, but rather to elevate reason itself above its usual level, thus striving to elevate the very source of reason, the very manner of reason, to the level of sympathetic agreement with faith.

The first condition for the elevation of reason is that man should strive to gather into one indivisible whole all his separate forces, which in the ordinary condition of man are in a state of incompleteness and contradiction; that he should not consider his abstract logical capacity as the only organ for the comprehension of truth; that he should not consider the voice of enraptured feeling uncoordinated with other forces of the spirit as the faultless guide to truth; that he should not consider the promptings of an isolated aesthetic sense, independent of other concepts, as the true guide to the comprehension of the higher organization of the universe; that he should not consider even the dominant love of his heart, separate from the other demands of the spirit, as the infallible guide to the attainment of the supreme good; but that he should constantly seek in the depth of his soul that inner root of understanding where all the separate forces merge into one living and whole vision of the mind. 28

Dostoyevsky does not reject reason, so long as it is the "believing reason" which seeks to participate in that "wholeness" of knowledge rooted in the spiritual principle. Reason enters into conflict with this.
principle only when it renounces its dependence on it. Yet, according to Dostoyevsky, this is precisely the tendency of reason, "which would demand a chapter for itself".

The claim of reason to an independent knowledge of man underlies the rejection of an unchanging good. Since reason by itself can ultimately know man only as the product of psycho-physical necessity, it cannot know that in man which transcends necessity. It cannot know that highest principle or "essence" of man which animates and expresses itself through his psycho-physical processes. Knowledge of man as an object of necessity is not knowledge of what it is to be a man. To penetrate to another man's essence, to know him as he is "in himself", it is necessary to somehow "become" that man; it is necessary to love him. Only reason informed by love can penetrate to the highest principle within man, can truly "know" man. And to know man truly is to know him as claimed by an unchanging good. For Dostoyevsky, the only valid proof of the existence of God is the proof through love formulated by Father Zossima:

...Strive to love your neighbours actively and indefatigably. And the nearer you come to achieving this love, the more convinced you will become of the existence of God and the immortality of your soul. If you reach the point of complete selflessness in your love of your neighbours, you will most certainly regain your faith and no doubt can possibly enter your soul. This has been proved. This is certain. 29

The positive significance of Christ's silence before the Inquisitor should now be apparent. It is appropriate that the silent kiss of love should constitute the defence of the idea of an unchanging good against the rational argumentation of the nihilist. Through this silence, as we have noted, Dostoyevsky intimates that the nihilist "insight" misses the point.
Silence not only highlights the failure of nihilism to penetrate to the heart of the matter; it also encourages nihilism to speak too much, thereby betraying itself as false. Dostoyevsky once remarked, with reference to Ivan and the Grand Inquisitor: "Even in Europe such force of atheistic expression does not now exist, nor did it ever." He encourages the final Western social formula to express itself without hindrance, and even with unsurpassed eloquence and lucidity, in order that it might reveal its own emptiness. Note has already been made of certain ambiguities which betray themselves in the course of the self-expression of the final Western social formula. Is the universal state rooted in love or contempt for mankind? Is perfect nihilism even possible in light of the "contradictoriness" which manifests itself in Stavrog in and Ivan? These and other ambiguities, however, tend to find their resolution in the vision of manhood: man is despised out of love for the man-god, whose advent will signal the overcoming of that "habit" of morality which obstinately persists in barring the way to perfect nihilism. The man-god is the cornerstone of the universal state, and it is the vision of manhood therefore which must betray itself as an illusion.

At the heart of this vision is the notion that man's orientation towards a timeless perfection has turned him away from loyalty to the earth. Now that this perfection has once and for all been exposed by the nihilist insight as an illusion, it is possible for men to return to the earth, to affirm it as their true and only home. In Dostoyevsky's art, however, the aspiration to manhood actually reveals itself as indifference to, and even hatred of, the earth. It thereby betrays itself in regard to the most fundamental question. This self-betrayal must be
understood in light of Dostoyevsky's critique of reason: the renunciation of eternity in favour of loyalty to the earth is rooted in a "knowledge" of life which is not really knowledge at all. The nihilist "insight" into the finality of becoming -- the theoretical basis of mangodhood -- is an "insight" into life which fails to penetrate to the essence of life. The man-god cannot truly know the earth to which he declares his sole allegiance. His supposed knowledge of life moves in a circle on the threshold of life, effectively excluding him from that genuine communion with the earth which he is meant to embody. Dostoyevsky strives in his art to give concrete representation to this exclusion -- most memorably in the figure of Stavrogin. The further Stavrogin moves through nihilism towards mangodhood the more he lapses into a condition of isolation from life which expresses itself in various ways. He becomes "shut up" within himself, moving constantly within the ever constricting circle of his own consciousness; he becomes increasingly "theoretical", "abstract", "disembodied", cut off from "living life"; he is unutterably bored, a boredom from which he finds it ever more difficult to distract himself; everything has become "all the same" to him, and so overwhelming is his indifference to life that even self-annihilation seems too definite an act. In Stavrogin the ascent to mangodhood betrays itself as a descent into nothingness.

In betraying itself as an aspiration towards nothingness the final Western social formula betrays itself also as evil. For Dostoyevsky stands within that theological tradition which understands evil as in essence the privation of good. The manner in which Christ's silence before the final Western social formula nevertheless constitutes a judgement upon
that formula should now be clear. It remains unclear, however, whether this implicit judgement is sufficient. In Dostoyevsky's art, the self-revelation of the final Western social formula inadvertently bears witness to the presence of an opposing and "hitherto unknown reality". This "reality" may be visible for those with the eyes to see; but what of those whose vision is turned away from the light, or those who acknowledge the "higher reality" without understanding how this acknowledgment ought to be lived out? Dostoyevsky's own understanding of what this acknowledgment requires led him to attempt to render the "higher reality" visible to all. The silence of Christ in the "Legend of the Grand Inquisitor" is broken in the "Discourses and Sermons of Father Zossima". The movement in The Brothers Karamazov from the figure of Christ to that of the Russian monk represents a descent, but it is a descent which illuminates Dostoyevsky's judgement of the West.

II The Breaking of Christ's Silence

Through Father Zossima, Dostoyevsky gives explicit voice to the refutation of the modern Western project implied in the silent figure of Christ. Yet even this more explicit refutation remains highly indirect; rather than a point by point refutation of Ivan and the Inquisitor, Zossima's teaching constitutes an opposing "world-conception...in an artistic picture". According to Dostoyevsky's own testimony, this Christian "world-conception" represents the whole of his own religious thought, although expressed in the "different form and different style" required in the artistic presentation of a Russian monk. A discussion of Dostoyevsky's entire religious teaching is beyond the scope of this
thesis, and we must thus undertake such a discussion only insofar as it illuminates his critique of the West. My approach to Zossima's Christian teaching will be limited by the requirement of discovering in it what most directly constitutes a response to the final Western social formula.

Zossima addresses himself directly to the claim that the universal state is the only possible means for the realization of justice on earth, that it is the only "earthly paradise" available to man. We have seen that Ivan's thirst for justice on earth reveals itself as ambiguous: it is rooted in a love of humanity which appears to be incompatible with his nihilism. Yet the nihilist insight and the aspiration to mangodhood implied in it are consequences of Ivan's exclusive reliance on reason, not of his yearning for justice. The yearning for justice and the reliance on reason may thus, in Ivan, prove themselves incompatible; but the earth remains saturated "from its crust to its centre with human tears". The author of "The Geological Upheaval" and the "Legend of the Grand Inquisitor" remains, in his "Rebellion", the most powerful witness to human suffering in Dostoyevsky's writings. Is it not possible that this witness is symptomatic of the good in that struggle between good and evil in which "the battlefield" is Ivan himself? It is difficult to understand how the condemnation of the final Western social formula can include the condemnation of that desire to wipe away the tears of human suffering with which it justifies itself. The presence of suffering in the world permits the Inquisitor to justify himself before God, even subsequent to his confession of an alliance with Satan:

They declare and prophesy that you will come and be victorious again, that you will come with your chosen
ones, with your proud and mighty ones, but we shall declare that they have only saved themselves, while we have saved all. It is said that the whore, who sits upon the beast and holds in her hands the mystery, will be put to shame, that the weak will rise up again, that they will rend her purple and strip naked her "vile" body. But then I will rise and point out to you the thousands of millions of happy babes who have known no sin. And we who, for their happiness, have taken their sins upon ourselves, we shall stand before you and say, "Judge us if you can and if you dare." Know that I am not afraid of you. 36

Although this self-justification may betray itself as the renunciation of justice and of life itself in favour of the "spirit of self-destruction and non-existence", such a betrayal needs to be rendered more explicit. It is precisely in an attempt to respond more directly to the demand for justice on earth that Zossima breaks the silence of Christ.

(i) The Appeal to Eternal Justice

In response to Ivan's thirst for justice "here and now" Zossima appeals to the mystery of "eternal justice", as it is revealed in the Book of Job:

...how could God give up the most loved of his saints to Satan to play with, take his children from him, smite him with sore boils so that he scraped the corruption from his sores, with a potsherdf, and why? Just to be able to boast to Satan: "See how much my saint can suffer for my sake!" But it is great -- just because it is a mystery -- just because the passing image of the earthly and eternal justice are brought together here. The act of eternal justice is accomplished before earthly justice...God raises Job again, gives him wealth again, and many years pass by and he has other children and he loves them. Good lord, but how could he love those new ones when his old children were no more, when he had lost them? Remembering them, how could he be completely happy as before with the new ones, however dear they were to him? But he could, he could: the old sorrow, through the great mystery of human life, passes gradually into quiet, tender joy; the fiery blood of
youth gives place to the gentle serenity of old age. I bless the rising sun each day, and my heart sings to it as of old, but I love its setting much more, its long slanting rays and, with them, my quiet, gentle, tender memories, the dear images of the whole of my long and blessed life -- and over it all Divine Justice, tender, reconciling and all-forgiving! 37

"The accomplishment of eternal justice", however, must ultimately be concealed for human reason, which is unable to encompass the eternal. The fundamental inaccessibility of eternal justice to reason implies that what seems unjust to man is actually just. Injustice may be merely an appearance in that through it the mystery of eternal justice is fulfilled. Yet although eternal justice is a mystery for reason, the heart renders man open to acquiescence in it. Even from the depths of affliction man is able to consent to an eternal justice, and beyond this consent, even to love it. He is able to raise the hymn from under the ground of which Dmitri Karamazov speaks:

Oh yes, we shall be in chains, and we shall not be free, but then, in our great sorrow, we shall arise anew in gladness, without which man cannot live nor God exist, for God gives gladness. That's his privilege, his great privilege...O Lord, may man dissolve in prayer! How can I be there under the ground without God?...If they banish God from the earth, we shall need him under the earth! A convict cannot exist without God, even less than a free man. And then shall we, the men beneath the ground, sing from the bowels of the earth our tragic hymn to God, in whom there is gladness! All hail to God and his gladness! I love him!...I shall overcome all things, all suffering; so that I may say, say to myself every moment: I am! In thousands of agonies -- I am, writhing on the rack -- but I am! I may sit in prison but I, too, exist, I see the sun; and if I do not see the sun, I know that it is. And to know that the sun is -- that alone is the whole of life. 38

The hymn from under the ground affirms the actuality of an unchanging good -- or God -- and at the same time it distinguishes sharply between this good and the human condition. For the underground prison can be
understood as an image of the realm of becoming, where chance and necessity reign. The appeal to eternal justice, in response to the insistent demand for justice on earth, is in essence a denial that justice can be brought forth out of necessity. Ivan's demand for justice on earth inevitably assumes such a bringing-forth when he ties this demand to a rejection of the eternal. His rejection of the "other world" implies that justice is to be rooted in this world — this world which he himself claims is nothing but chance and necessity. As we have seen, for Dostoyevsky, the attempt to ground justice in necessity can issue only in the man-god tyranny. In response to the modern Western aspiration to an "earthly paradise", Zossima exhorts men to recollect their "living bond with the other world", with that timeless good which is the true fount of justice. 39

Yet Zossima's affirmation of eternal justice is anticipated by Ivan. Ivan is not unwilling to "accept" God, or even to believe in "the eternal harmony into which we are all supposed to merge one day". But, even while accepting the existence of eternal justice, he returns his "ticket of admission" to the fulfillment of the mystery. For he considers the question of eternal justice to be irrelevant to his demand for justice here and now: "Please understand, it is not God that I do not accept, but the world he has created. I do not accept God's world and I refuse to accept it." 40 Ivan's willingness to admit that distinction between God and the world which preserves the eternal from all association with the realm of becoming is made explicit in the rough notes: "I will accept God all the more readily if he is the eternal old God who cannot be understood. And so let it be that God". 41 For Ivan, the obverse of God's total transcendence of the world is God's total
ineffectiveness within the world. Yet if good has no place within the world, then the world is indeed a prison. And the prisoner would appear to have no choice but to escape from his bonds, or to become so thoroughly the master of his prison that he is able to transform it into a home. The former choice entails self-annihilation, and the latter the actualization of the final Western social formula. Ivan may "dash the cup to the floor", or he may join those who are "correcting" God's world. 42 Neither choice, in his view, necessarily denies the existence of God.

The possibility that Ivan's willingness to accept the existence of God is genuine appears to cast doubt upon our previous emphasis on his nihilism. It must be noted, however, that Ivan's "acceptance" of God, no less than his nihilism, is rooted in his "Euclidean mind". Acceptance or rejection of God's existence are equally possible for him because the question cannot be resolved rationally — and reason is the final source of knowledge for man:

...if God really exists and if he really has created the world, then, as we all know, he created it in accordance with the Euclidean geometry, and he created the human mind with the conception of only the three dimensions of space. And yet there have been and there still are mathematicians and philosophers, some of them indeed men of extraordinary genius, who doubt whether the whole universe, or, to put it more widely, all existence, was created only according to Euclidean geometry and they even dare to dream that two parallel lines which, according to Euclid, can never meet on earth, may meet somewhere in infinity. I, my dear chap, have come to the conclusion that if I can't understand even that, then how can I be expected to understand about God? I humbly admit that I have no abilities for settling such questions. I have a Euclidean, an earthly mind, and so how can I be expected to solve problems which are not of this world. 43

This apparently modest acknowledgement by reason of its limitations is tantamount to the banishing of God from the world. At this point it must be asked whether there is a fundamental difference between the assertion
of the finality of chance and necessity, and the assertion that what is not subject to chance and necessity is utterly divorced from the realm wherein they hold sway. It is noteworthy that there seems to be no fundamental contradiction for Ivan between his acceptance of the "eternal...God who cannot be understood", and his teaching that "everything is permitted".

Is the insistence on the strict separation between necessity and goodness an adequate response to the modern Western project? This is the question forced upon us by Ivan's anticipation of Zossima's appeal to eternal justice. The question becomes even more compelling when the implicit parallel which Dostoyevsky draws between Ivan's rebellion and that of Job is recognized. The wise castigate Job for his reluctance to consent to the divine dispensation, but it is the "rebellious" Job who finally goes to "see" God, while the wise incur the divine wrath. The more thoughtful interpreters of Dostoyevsky have regarded him as a profound critic of the modern attempt to "bring heaven down to earth". Yet this emphasis on his criticism of modern political utopianism cannot be considered the final word in the interpretation of his writings. The final word of the silent figure who confronts the Grand Inquisitor is not the strict holding apart of the good and the necessary. For the interpreter of that silence, Zossima, repeatedly affirms that "life is paradise" if only men wish it. And no less inspired than Versilov's vision of the "earthly paradise" in A Raw Youth is that of the Christian pilgrim, Makar Dolgoruky, who anticipates the day when:

...there will be no orphans, no beggars, everyone will be like one of my own family, everyone will be my brother... and our Earth will glow brighter than the sun and there will be no sadness, no sighs will be heard, and the whole world will be paradise. 45
The silence of Christ signifies for Dostoyevsky the simultaneous affirmation of eternal justice and of justice on earth. The interpretation of his judgement of the modern Western project must recognize this two-fold affirmation, and make some attempt to understand what underlies it.

It has been said that Dostoyevsky, unable to bear the consequences of his own radical distinction between necessity and goodness retreated from this distinction into a "utopian" or "rose-water" Christianity reminiscent of his youthful "European liberalism". There may indeed be a "contradiction" in his simultaneous rejection and affirmation of that desire for an "earthly paradise" which animates the modern West. But the contemplation of this "contradiction" takes us far beyond the problem of Dostoyevsky's personality. In a letter written to N. Strakhov in the aftermath of the Paris Commune, Dostoyevsky speaks as follows of the quest for the "earthly paradise":

Through the whole of the 19th century, that school has dreamed of the setting-up of earthly paradises (for instance, the phalansteries), and then, directly it came to action (as in the years 1848, 1849, and now), has shown a contemptible incapacity for any practical expression of itself. At bottom, the entire movement is but a repetition of the Russian delusion that men can reconstruct the world by reason and experience (Positivism). But we have seen enough of it by now to be entitled to declare that such impotence as is displayed can be no chance phenomenon...Have we not sufficient evidence by this time to be able to prove that a society is not thus to be built up, that quite elsewhere lie the paths to the common good, and that this common good reposes on things different altogether from those hitherto accepted? On what, then, does it repose? Men write and write, and overlook the principal point.

It is clear from this letter that Dostoyevsky does not reject the quest for the "earthly paradise" as such, but the quest for an "earthly paradise" which is founded exclusively on reason. To repeat Dostoyevsky's own question: on what principle, then, does the possibility of justice on earth repose? What is the "principal point" which has been overlooked
by the West? The answer is contained in Zossima's most explicit re-
jection of the modern Western project: "Following science, they wish
to live a life based on justice by their reason alone...without Christ...
48
The silent presence of Christ not only signifies the condemnation of the
modern Western attempt to attain to the "earthly paradise" through reason
alone; it signifies, also, an alternative way to this paradise. According
to Dostoyevsky, Christianity possesses that principle on which alone re-
poses the true reconciliation of goodness with necessity.

This supreme principle is that of the simultaneous transcendence and
immanence of God in relation to the world. At the heart of Dostoyevsky's
thought about the "earthly paradise" is this profound contradiction or
paradox: God is totally beyond all finite determination, exempt from all
relationship and multiplicity, all becoming; and, at the same time, God
is present in all becoming, manifest in the multiplicity of finite things.49
The "contradiction" present in Dostoyevsky's critique of the attempt to
"bring heaven down to earth" must be explained with reference, not to
his personality, but to the paradox at the centre of Christianity. While
this is my contention, it must be noted that there is present in
Dostoyevsky's writing no direct consideration of the nature of God as
simultaneously transcendent and immanent. He is concerned with God as
present within the world without being confused with the world; he is
not directly concerned with the principle which makes this possible.
To use the language of the Christian tradition within which Dostoyevsky
speaks: his concern is not with "theology", according to the strict
meaning of the word, but with the divine "economy".50 He does not strive
to elucidate the Trinitarian principle (and particularly the distinction
between God's "essence" and "energies"), but the way of man's redemption
from the finality of chance and necessity. Due to the limitations of this thesis we can consider Dostoyevsky's attempt to show the presence of the eternal God within the realm of becoming only insofar as this attempt constitutes a response to the modern Western project. Yet it must be emphasized that, although Ivan's rebellion may underlie the attempt to show forth the divine economy, his demand for justice on earth in no way defines or compels the presence of good within the world. For Dostoyevsky it is the present good, rather, which delimits Ivan's rebellion, and where it transgresses this limit it stands condemned.

(ii) Dostoyevsky's Showing Forth of the Divine Economy

The nature of the relation of good to the world raises the question of the origin of the world. Creation itself is the primal manifestation of good within the world, and it lays the ultimate foundation for the continuing presence of this good:

Many things on earth are hidden from us; but in return for that we have been given a mysterious, inward sense of our living bond with the other world, with the higher, heavenly world, and the roots of our thoughts and feelings are not here but in other worlds. That is why philosophers say that it is impossible to comprehend the essential nature of things on earth. God took seeds from other worlds and sowed them on this earth, and made his garden grow, and everything that could come up, came up, but what grows lives and is alive only through the feeling of its contact with other mysterious worlds...

These words of Zossima -- Dostoyevsky's sole explicit reference to God as creator -- do not constitute a systematic doctrine of Creation. It is not absolutely clear, for instance, whether God created the world ex nihilo or by giving form to pre-existent and formless matter. Nevertheless, definite conclusions can be elicited from Zossima's words about creation. Of particular
significance is his assertion that man's "living bond with the other world" is at the same time a bond with the earth. The knowledge of the eternal, accessible to man by virtue of the spiritual principle within him, is knowledge also of the "seeds" — that is, the "essences", "ideas", or logoi — of everything which "lives and is alive" on earth. It is noteworthy that Dostoyevsky thus denies to reason working independently of the heart a genuine knowledge even of non-human nature.

Dostoyevsky does allude to the eternal Word or Logos which contains all logoi and which is God, but he does not elucidate the theological basis of his conviction that knowledge of the eternal is at the same time knowledge of the "seeds" of everything which "lives and is alive" on earth. The conviction itself is nonetheless clearly expressed, and it points to man as the "mediator" between this world and the "other world", between the realm of becoming and eternity. This mediation is realized in the ecstasy of Alyosha:

He did not stop on the steps, but went down rapidly. His soul, overflowing with rapture, was craving for freedom and unlimited space. The vault of heaven, studded with softly shining stars, stretched wide and vast over him. From the zenith to the horizon the Milky Way stretched its two arms dimly across the sky. The fresh, motionless, still night enfolded the earth. The white towers and golden domes of the cathedral gleamed against the sapphire sky. The gorgeous autumn flowers in the beds near the house went to sleep till morning. The silence of the earth seemed to merge into the silence of the heavens, the mystery of the earth came in contact with the mystery of the stars. Alyosha stood, gazed, and suddenly he threw himself down flat upon the earth.

He did not know why he was embracing it. He could not have explained to himself why he longed so irresistibly to kiss it, to kiss it all, but he kissed it weeping, sobbing and drenching it with his tears, and vowed frenziedly to love it, to love it for ever and ever. "Water the earth with the tears of your gladness and love those tears", it rang in his soul. What was he weeping over? Oh, he was weeping in his rapture even over those stars which were shining for him from the abyss of space and "he
was not ashamed of that ecstasy'. It was as though the threads from all those innumerable worlds of God met all at once in his soul, and it was trembling all over "as it came in contact with other worlds". 54

The notion of man's two-fold relation to the eternal and the earthly is the basis of Dostoyevsky's rejection of Kirilov's claim that it is the man-god who embodies loyalty to the earth. The affirmation of the earth is inseparable from the affirmation of "other worlds". To refer once more to Zossima's words about Creation:

God took seeds from other worlds and sowed them on this earth, and made his garden grow, and everything that could come up came up, but what grows lives and is alive only through the feeling of its contact with other mysterious worlds; if that feeling grows weak or is destroyed in you, then what has grown up in you will also die. Then you will become indifferent to life and even grow to hate it. That is what I think. 55

Zossima's words about Creation constitute the theoretical basis of that "earthly paradise" which Dostoyevsky depicts in The Dream of a Queer Fellow. The "Dream" has been interpreted as a parody of modern political utopianism. 56 But if, as we have argued, the strict divorce of "heaven" and "earth" is not Dostoyevsky's final word, then the "Dream" must be considered a serious attempt to portray life as paradise. It represents also an attempt to portray man as he is in essence, or as he is by nature; it is Dostoyevsky's version of the original state of nature. His natural man is in possession of knowledge of life higher than that of modern science:

...they did not aspire to a knowledge of life, as we aspire to knowledge, because their life was fulfilled. But their knowledge was deeper and higher than our science, for our science seeks to explain what is life, she aspires to know life, that she may teach others how to live; but they, without science, knew how to live. They showed me their trees, but I could not understand the depth of love with which they looked at them; exactly as though they spoke with their fellows. In the same way did they regard all nature — the animals which
lived at peace with them, did not attack them, but loved them, subdued by their love. They pointed out the stars to me and told me something about them that I could not understand, but I am convinced that in some way they were in contact with the stars of heaven, having connection with them not by thought alone but in some physical way. 57

By virtue of this knowledge man is by nature fully human, inwardly as well as in outward appearance: "Their faces gleamed with wisdom, and with a certain consciousness, consummated in tranquility". 58 Moreover, man is by nature fully social, living in a harmonious, complete order that has no need of civil institutions.

Since, according to the "Dream", the just order belongs to man by nature, the transition from the state of nature to civil society cannot be understood as the first step in man's progress towards an as yet unrealized justice. The "earthly paradise" is not a future possibility only; it is identified, rather, with the original state of nature which precedes the civil state. Man's egress from the womb of nature into the process of history is a "fall" from paradise. 59 Political order itself is a consequence of this fall; men are compelled to "invent" justice and to enter into civil unions for mutual protection against the passions of "voluptuousness", "jealousy", and "cruelty" which have come to dominate them. 60 The movement of mankind from the state of "unsocial sociability" to a final union in a "harmonious and reasonable society" 61 would be, for progressivist Geneva thought, the realization of paradise. But, for Dostoyevsky, such an understanding of how good arises out of evil merely reflects the potency of man's yearning for the original paradise which he has lost. His rejection of the Geneva teaching that the fall from the state of nature is a fall "upward" could not be more explicit:
"...But we have science and by her aid we will find the truth again, and this time we will accept her consciously. Knowledge is higher than feeling; the consciousness of life is higher than life. Science will give us wisdom; wisdom will reveal to us laws, and the knowledge of the laws of happiness is higher than happiness". That is what they said...that is what must be fought. And I will fight. 62

Dostoyevsky affirms the "earthly paradise" apparently only to interpose between it and man the insurmountable barrier of "sin". 63 The single most important consequence of the Fall, as it is portrayed in the "Dream", is the obscuring of the spiritual principle within man. Life according to the heart is usurped by a life according to reason alone. Man's failure to live by the heart — and hence in the right relation to God, to other men, and to nature — renders him entirely subject to psycho-physical necessity. And once he is the slave of necessity, man becomes incapable of recovering the spiritual principle or "image of God" within him. He cannot recover what is beyond material necessity by means of faculties which have become purely material, any more than a man can extricate himself from a swamp by pulling at his own hair. That reconciliation of good with the earth rendered possible in Creation is apparently abrogated by the Fall. Yet Zossima speaks of the "living bond with the other world" as though it were still an effective presence within man. Both Zossima and the "queer fellow" insist that "life is paradise" if only men want it. 64

For Dostoyevsky, paradise remains accessible to humanity thanks to that ultimate bridge between the "other world" and this world — the God-man. The explication of that silence which confronts the Inquisitor points finally to the meaning of the silent presence itself. According to Dostoyevsky, the ultimate meaning of Christ does not reside in his role as
a teacher: "...what really matters is the figure of Christ, from which any teaching must emerge". The "figure" of Christ represents a "conception of man so noble that one cannot grasp it without a sense of awe", an image of goodness, truth, and beauty which is the "undying ideal of mankind". The potency of this "ideal" is evinced, for Dostoyevsky, in the fact that those in the modern world who have rejected the religion of Christianity have been reluctant to include Christ himself in this rejection. The "liberal idealist" Versilov, for instance, finds that his vision of heaven on earth cannot dispense with Christ altogether. Yet the readiness of Geneva thought to invoke the "image of Christ" evinces its limited comprehension of this image. Christ is more than the perfection of human goodness, truth, and beauty. As the "only one without sin" he surpasses the limits of human nature; for the state of sin, or enslavement to material necessity, cannot be overcome by man as man. The perfection manifest in Christ thus signifies the descent of God himself into the realm of necessity.

The Incarnation effects the "salvation of all men" by restoring to them the spiritual principle of their being, which otherwise is an unattainable "ideal":

Isn't this precisely why Christ came down to Earth, to tell mankind that...the nature of the human spirit as they knew it might actually appear in such heavenly brilliance, and... indeed actually in the flesh, and not only in a mere daydream or ideal, this being both natural as well as possible. Because he is God also, the manhood of Christ is able to show forth that life in the spirit which is the fulfillment of man's original nature. This restitution of man is realized conclusively in the Crucifixion: the subordination of the psycho-physical self to the spiritual bond with the
eternal is accomplished in Christ's "obedience unto death" -- an obedience rendered even when, as the "terrible cry" of dereliction on the cross signifies, he could no longer see the sun. The crucifixion calls man to obedience to eternal justice, whatever the consequences for his earthly life.

The God-man's restoration of man to life in the spirit does not seem to entail the restoration of man to life in an "earthly paradise". Yet rejection of the eternal for the sake of this paradise would seem to have become once and for all unjustifiable. For consent to eternal justice, whatever the consequences for earthly justice, is offered by the Word of justice itself. In the Crucifixion, God himself suffers the separation between goodness and necessity which was inaugurated by man. Alyosha thus responds to Ivan's rebellion by pointing to Christ as that being who has the right to "forgive everyone...for everything", even for the suffering of the innocents, because "he gave his innocent blood for all and for everything". Ivan concedes (in the rough notes) that the Crucifixion may be "something big enough to equal" the suffering which he catalogues. And the Inquisitor acknowledges that Christ on the cross constitutes a "frightfully strong argument, an eternal argument".

Yet the Inquisitor holds fast to his idea, and Ivan with him. They are apparently able to entertain the "eternal argument" of the Crucifixion without renouncing their rebellion against eternal justice. This obduracy may reflect that "wicked pride" which, according to Zossima, characterizes those who have given themselves up entirely to evil. Yet, for Ivan, persistence in rebellion is justified by the realization that the gulf between goodness and the world is not overcome in the Crucifixion. Indeed,
the death on the cross seems to constitute shattering evidence of the
final exclusion of good from the world. This interpretation of the
Crucifixion is expressed at length in Ippolit Terentyev's vivid commentary
(in The Idiot) on Holbein's painting of "Christ Taken From the Cross":

It was a faithful representation of the dead body of a man
who has undergone unbearable torments before the crucifixion,
been wounded, tortured, beaten by the guards, beaten by the
people, when he carried the cross and fell under its weight,
and, at last, has suffered the agony of crucifixion, lasting
for six hours (according to my calculation, at least). It is
ture, it is the face of a man who has only just been taken
from the cross — that is, still retaining a great deal of
warmth and life; rigor mortis had not yet set in, so that
there is still a look of suffering on the face of the dead
man, as though he were still feeling it (that has been well
cought by the artist); on the other hand, the face has not
been spared in the least; it is nature itself, and, any man's
corpse would look like that after such suffering. I know that
the Christian Church laid it down in the first few centuries
of its existence that Christ really did suffer and that the
Passion was not symbolical. His body on the cross was there-
fore fully and entirely subject to the laws of nature. In
the picture the face is terribly smashed with blows, swollen,
covered with terrible, swollen, and blood-stained bruises, the
eyes open and squinting; the large, open whites of the eyes
have a sort of dead and glassy glint. But, strange to say, as
one looks at the dead body of this tortured man, one cannot
help asking oneself the peculiar and interesting question: if
such a corpse (and it must have been just like that) was seen
by all His disciples, by His future chief apostles, by the women
who followed Him and stood by the cross, by all who believed in
Him and worshipped Him, then how could they possibly have be-
lieved, as they looked at the corpse, that that martyr would rise
again? Here one cannot help being struck with the idea that if
death is so horrible and if the laws of nature are so powerful,
then how can they be overcome? How can they be overcome when
even He did not conquer them, He who overcame nature during His
lifetime and whom nature obeyed, who said Talith cumi! and the
damsel arose, who cried, Lazarus come forth! and the dead man
came forth? Looking at that picture, you get the impression of
nature as some enormous, implacable, and dumb beast, or, to put
it more correctly, much more correctly, though it may seem strange,
as some huge engine of the latest design, which has senselessly
seized, cut to pieces, and swallowed up — impassively and un-
feelingly — a great and priceless Being, a Being worth the whole
of nature and all its laws, worth the entire earth, which was
perhaps created solely for the coming of that Being! The picture seems to give expression to the idea of a dark, insolent, and senselessly eternal power, to which everything is subordinated, and this idea is suggested to you unconsciously.73

Despite his restored bond with the "other world", there seems to be no mitigation of man's enthrallment to the "dark, insolent" power of material necessity. Man seems still to be an involuntary participant in "a lie and a stupid mockery", a mockery evinced, for instance, in the stench of corruption which emanates from the body of Father Zossima after his death. Confronted with this cruel evidence of the exclusion of goodness from the world -- of the untrammelled reign of "blind, dumb, and pitiless laws of nature" -- Alyosha moves towards the same rebellion which he had censured in Ivan.74 If the "image of Christ" is identified solely with the crucified Christ, then it would seem that for Ivan, and for Alyosha too, God remains that "eternal old God who cannot be understood".

Alyosha's movement towards rebellion is quelled when he is bidden by the deceased Zossima to the eternal wedding feast presided over by the living Saviour.75 Zossima's appeal to the "image of Christ" is finally an appeal to the Christ who "overcomes" the world in the Resurrection.76 An attempt must now be made to grasp what is signified for Dostoyevsky in this "overcoming". For him the restoration of man to life in the spirit entails man's ultimate liberation from the rule of necessity -- a rule epitomized in the phenomenon of death. It is crucial to note, however, that this liberation signifies not a final "escape" from material necessity, but its "transfiguration". The psycho-physical self becomes the "spiritual body" which is no longer subject to death. But Dostoyevsky does not pretend to a clear grasp of the nature of this personal immortality:
But if man is not man -- what will his nature be? It is impossible to understand this on earth, but all humanity can have a presentiment about its law in direct emanations...77

The builders of the universal state can "accept" God, and even God Incarnate and Crucified. But they will not accept the Resurrected God. This is made explicit in the declaration which Dostoyevsky attributes to Ivan in the rough notes: "those who suffer his cross will not find anything that has been promised, exactly as he himself had found nothing after his cross".78 Ivan's rebellion stands condemned by that transfiguration of material necessity which is accomplished in the Resurrection. From the perspective of the Resurrection, those who attempt to reconcile goodness with necessity through the Inquisitor's social formula must be judged to have "joined Satan and his proud spirit entirely".79 Yet the question remains as to the nature of the relation between Christ's "overcoming" of the world and man's yearning for paradise. In response to this question it must be emphasized that, for Dostoyevsky, the final reconciliation of goodness with necessity is realized for man, not in a paradise on the present earth, but in the paradise of that "final...eternal life" which has been opened up to him by the God-man. Because man's final end is eternity, he is in a "transitory state" while on earth.80 This explicit avowal of the transitory nature of man's life on earth makes it impossible to attribute to Dostoyevsky a utopian or "rose-water" hope for heaven on earth. Dostoyevsky looks for the final satisfaction of man's thirst for justice, not in the realization of heaven on earth, but in a "new heaven and a new earth".81

Nevertheless, Dostoyevsky's appeal to the eternal life of the "spiritual body" has immediate implications for the question of a just order here and now. Turning away from the "impossible" task of illuminating the eternal life,
he devotes his attention to these implications. He teaches that men
are called to live within an order oriented towards the eternal, and thus
to attain "paradise" insofar as the present earth is capable of containing
it. Indeed, such an order has already been established on earth by the
God-man, as Father Paissy declares:

Our Lord Jesus Christ came for the sole purpose of setting
up the Church upon earth. The Kingdom of Heaven, of course,
is not of this world, but in Heaven; but you enter Heaven
only through the Church which has been founded and established
on earth. 82

Dostoyevsky offers no elucidation of the mystagogical or sacramental
functions of the church. He is apparently less concerned with the church
as the initiator of man into the way of personal immortality, than with
the church as the prototype of the best social order attainable by man on
earth. Indeed, the church is present in his writing as the genuine realization of that freedom, equality, and brotherhood to which the modern
West originally aspired. Versilov's suspicion that the Geneva idea
could not dispense with Christ altogether acquires its full meaning in
Dostoyevsky's delineation of the social order based on the God-man.

III The Church as the Redemption of the "Great Idea"

(i) Freedom

The freedom of the God-man order is that freedom from subjection to
material necessity which is dependent upon man's recovery of the spiritual
principle within himself. In its attempt to find man's freedom in the
"conscious will", the Geneva idea condemns man to the "tyranny of material
things and habits"; for reason and will are themselves rooted in material
necessity. To the "slavery" inherent in the modern Western notion of
freedom, Zossima opposes the "real, true" understanding of freedom:

I cut off all superfluous and unnecessary needs, I subdue my proud and ambitious will and chastise it to obedience, and, with God's help, attain freedom of spirit and with it spiritual joy! 83

Because the recovery of the spiritual principle is equivalent to the recovery of one's true or essential being, the attainment of freedom can be expressed as the finding of oneself within oneself. Yet this self-discovery implies also a self-renunciation, for the spiritual principle is overlaid by the material principles of reason, will, and desire, which together constitute a false self or "ego". The overcoming of the ego presupposes a hard discipline, a discipline which Dostoyevsky calls "self-mastery" or "self-conquest". 84

As we have seen, the Geneva idea of freedom also entails self-discipline, but because it locates the source of this discipline in the "conscious will", it is doomed to failure. The disciplining of material needs in Geneva thought inevitably gives way to that "right of multiplication of needs" characteristic of bourgeois liberalism and "scientific" socialism. 85

While Versilov starts "straight from himself" in his quest for moral perfection, Zossima knows that such perfection is possible for fallen man only due to the descent of perfection itself into the world. That "self-conquest" which true freedom requires is possible only through man's participation in the God-man. Although the consummation of this participation is an eternal matter, the means of a partial participation are available to man here and now in the God-man order. The church is the source of a discipline enabling man, while not yet a "spiritual body", to achieve an image of that complete overcoming of material necessity which is true
freedom.

(ii) Equality

Man's self-discovery is the discovery also of the true basis of his equality with other men. The attempt of the Geneva idea to overcome the distinction between master and slave finally issues in the Inquisitor's radical re-assertion of this distinction. The God-man order, while concurring in the Geneva assertion of the fundamental equality of men in their capacity for moral goodness, grounds this capacity in the common possession of the spiritual principle rather than in the common possession of reason and will. Dostoyevsky asserts that in the church there can be no masters and slaves, for such a distinction presupposes that human beings can be different in the most important respect. He does acknowledge, however, an inessential inequality among human beings, and hence the distinction between masters and servants. In the God-man order, men are able to affirm the created psycho-physical differences among themselves, without permitting this recognition of natural inequality to obscure their spiritual equality.

(iii) Brotherhood

As we have seen, the Geneva idea sought to resolve the contradiction between individual freedom and social unity (or brotherhood) through the mediation of love. Yet because it made this love dependent on the renunciation of eternity, it ended by rooting social unity in the natural necessity known to reason. And, for Dostoyevsky, the Inquisitor's social formula is the final outcome of the attempt to reconcile the individual to society by means of reason. The God-man order promises the reconciliation
of individuality with brotherhood through a love which is dependent on
the descent of God into the realm of necessity. Moved by love for
man, the God-man offers himself as the supreme model of this reconciliation:

...after the appearance of Christ, as the idea of man
incarnate, it became as clear as day that the highest,
final development of the individual should attain precisely
the point (at the very end of his development, at the very
point of reaching the goal) where man might find, recognize
and with all the strength of his nature be convinced that
the highest use which he can make of his individuality, of
the full development of his I, is to seemingly annihilate
that I, to give it wholly to each and every one wholeheartedly
and selflessly. And this is the greatest happiness. In this
way the law of the I merges with the law of humanism, and in
the merging both, both, the I and the all (in appearance two
extreme opposites) mutually annihilated for each other, at that
same time each apart attains the highest goal of his individual
development.
This is indeed the paradise of Christ. 87

The possibility of finding oneself, in giving oneself to others is
rooted in the essential unity of human beings, and indeed, of all life.
This fundamental unity, which man can apprehend only through reason taken
up into love, is expressed by Zossima as follows: "everything, like the
ocean, flows and comes into contact with everything else: touch it in one
place and it reverberates at the other end of the world." 88 Because the
unity of the whole has its basis in the inherence of the logoi of all
things in the eternal Logos which is God, it is a unity which preserves
rather than consumes particularity. Within the God-man order each man
is able to find in his unity with others also the highest development of
his own "personality". 89

The simultaneous affirmation of human beings as "persons" and as
manifestations of the common human nature is evident in the "brotherhood"
of boys founded by Alyosha at the end of The Brothers Karamazov. The
brotherhood, having its basis in a shared devotion to the little boy,
Ilyusha, is modelled on that order which has its basis in Christ:

"...I give you my word, boys, that I will never forget any one of you. I shall remember every face that is looking at me now, even after thirty years. Kolya said to Kartashov a moment ago that we did not care whether he existed or not. But how can I forget that Kartashov exists and that he doesn't blush now as when he discovered Troy, but is looking at me with his dear, kind, happy little eyes? You're all dear to me from now on, boys. I will find a place for you all in my heart and I beg you to find a place for me in your heart also! Well, and who has united us in this good and kind feeling which we shall remember and intend to remember all our lives? Who did it, if not Ilyusha, the good boy, the dear boy, dear to us for ever and ever! Don't let us, then, ever forget him, may his memory live in our hearts for ever and ever!"

"Yes, yes, for ever and ever!" all the boys cried in their ringing voices, looking deeply moved...

..."Karamazov", cried Kolya, "is it really true that, as our religion tells us, we shall all rise from the dead and come to life and see one another again, all, and Ilyusha?"

"Certainly we shall rise again, certainly we shall see one another, and shall tell one another gladly and joyfully all that has been", Alyosha replied, half laughing, half rapturously. 90

The final consummation of human freedom, equality, and brotherhood is enfolded in the mystery of eternal life. Yet insofar as man's transitory life on earth can contain it, the God-man order constitutes an alternative to the Geneva vision of order — and at the same time the redemption of that vision.
CHAPTER SIX
DOSTOYEVSKY'S JUDGEMENT OF THE WEST

Dostoyevsky avowed that his work as a whole constituted a "service" to an idea.¹ This idea is that of the church as the prototype of the best social order attainable by man. The "church idea", implicit throughout his major works, is given its most complete and direct expression in his last novel, *The Brothers Karamazov*. In this novel the universal church, oriented towards the final deification of man through the God-man, is explicitly opposed to the universal state, which is oriented towards the self-deification of man in the man-god. Because the ideas of church and state constitute, for Dostoyevsky, different religious conceptions, there can be no final accommodation or compromise between them (although "some overlapping of the elements" is inevitable).² The human need for order, or religion in the broadest sense, will not tolerate a perpetual condition of divided or confused reverences. To defend the permanent coexistence of the two orders is, for Dostoyevsky, merely to delay the inevitable triumph of one over the other. The church is called, not to separate itself from the state, but to enter into it and transform it so that it becomes worthy to participate in the truth of Godmanhood.

Dostoyevsky does not elucidate the nature of this transformation of the state into the church. He turns away from such speculation to the much more urgent question of the realizability of the church idea. This question is posed with particular force for him because he recognizes the overwhelming presence of the "state idea" within the world. In response to this presence
he attempts to develop a "theory of practical Christianity", a doctrine of Christian work which calls men to devote themselves to the actualization of the church idea insofar as the earth can contain it. Dostoyevsky's theory of Christian practice is of concern to us in our attempt to elucidate his critique of the West, for this theory culminates in his teaching about Russia's religious mission to the West.

I The Theory of Practical Christianity

(i) The "First Step"

The "first step" towards the actualization of the God-man order is, for Dostoyevsky, the "regeneration" of the image of God in man. This regeneration cannot be accomplished in one heroic leap. It must be a gradual process involving that "relentless self-discipline" for the sake of genuine freedom which has become so foreign to modern man. In response to those who work for the transformation of the political or socio-economic structure, Dostoyevsky calls for a different sort of transformation: "It is my idea that the world must be refashioned, but that the first step ought to consist of... working with one's self." There can be no brotherhood unless men first become brothers, and this presupposes that they become men.

Yet Dostoyevsky's teaching concerning the "first step" does not issue in a call for a monastic retreat from the world. His doctrine of "practical Christianity" advocates a monasticism within the world rather than out of the world. The "new type of man" who will "live in the world like a monk" is his answer to the "enlightened" intellectual who works for the actualization of the universal state. This "new man" is embodied in Alyosha, the "hero" of The Brothers Karamazov: he is eccentric and chaste, even morbidly so, and he resembles to some extent a "saintly fool"; but his
Christianity is distinguished by health rather than sickness, by intelligence and common sense rather than "fanaticism", and by yearning for truth rather than an impulse towards "mystification". In Alyosha, Dostoyevsky attempts to reclaim for the Christian worker some of the virtues which the secular intellectuals have arrogated to themselves. Zossima's teaching of the identity of the most selfless love of others with the most certain apprehension of the spiritual principle within one's self is the theoretical basis of Alyosha's monasticism in the world. Zossima commissions Alyosha to live out in practice this unity of love of God with love of neighbour. The young and ardent seeker of the truth, who turned to Christianity as a way of escape from darkness to light, is to attain to that light not by donning a long cassock, but by working in the world.5

Alyosha's chief activity within the world is to be the education of others to the "first step". Dostoyevsky speaks of education, in the broadest sense, as the scattering of "seeds", either by means of the written word or through direct example. His employment of this image emphasizes that the imparting of ideas to others has an effect which is not susceptible of any certain measurement.6 Because the "tiniest fire" can ignite a "universal conflagration",7 Dostoyevsky affirms education as one of the most significant of human activities. Education is of paramount importance, also, to the builders of the universal state. It is here in particular that the Christian worker must confront the secular intellectual. Alyosha is to go to the university, and there bear witness to the truth among those who will be most exposed to the state idea.8 Insofar as Dostoyevsky's own activity as a writer represents his fulfillment of the task of Christian education, it is evident that he thought the chief task of the modern
Christian educator is to encourage the universal state to reveal itself for what it is. As we have noted, such indirectness is for him required by the very nature of the Christian word. It is also required by the nature of the modern world in which that word is spoken. For the intellectuals who educate men towards the state have largely succeeded in making the church appear as darkness rather than light; and those who have recognized the light as light must still inhabit a world which has all but banished the possibility of translating this recognition into intelligible discourse. The Christian worker who does not understand the nature of modernity sufficiently to appreciate the need for concealment will be unable to speak the word of the God-man order in such a way that this word is also a "deed".  

There would appear to be a vast gulf between the education of others to the "first step" and the actualization of the universal God-man order. Yet Dostoyevsky envisages a bridging of this gulf in the possibility that the rare worker who inspires others to the "first step" may unite them also in a common orientation towards his word or his example. The Christian worker may be unable to discern the final fruit of the seeds which he scatters, but through his activity he can sometimes bring into immediate existence a community which points towards the universal church. The immediate outcome of Alyosha's mission of work in the world is the formation of the "Ilyusha brotherhood". Dostoyevsky himself hoped that the immediate outcome of his work as a writer would be the formation of a community which he designates as that of "Russian socialism".

(ii) "Russian Socialism"

The elucidation of Dostoyevsky's teaching about "Russian socialism"
brings us back to his consideration of the meaning and destiny of Russian Westernism. We have noted his presentiment that the yearning of the uprooted Westernists for justice and truth, to the point of self-sacrifice, would make them "promising raw material" for the builders of the universal state.\textsuperscript{11} For the same reason, Russian Westernism constituted a promise for those concerned with fostering a community which would point towards the universal church. Dostoyevsky's critique of the West is aimed chiefly at persuading Russian Westernism to find the end of its yearning for the just order in Christianity. While attempting to educate Russian Westernists to the "first step", he directed them at the same time towards the task of forming a new community, a task which would satisfy their desire for order.\textsuperscript{12} This new community was to have its being in the communion of Russian Westernism with the Russian people. The appeal to this communion is expressed throughout Dostoyevsky's writing as the call for a return to the soil.\textsuperscript{13} The re-rooting of those who have "torn themselves away from their native soil" entails, not a literal return to the land, nor even a return to all of those traditions of which the land is the repository. This re-rooting entails, rather, a return to that which chiefly animates the Russian people—the "Orthodox idea".

Although he does not ignore the "bestiality" of the Russian people, Dostoyevsky insists on the necessity of distinguishing between their "alluvial barbarism" and their beauty.\textsuperscript{14} The former is, in his view, a transient phenomenon attributable largely to historical circumstance, and in particular to the binding of the people in serfdom so that the gentry could have the leisure to acquire their "European enlightenment". The "beauty" of the people is manifest in the fact that they are still able to
long for truth and goodness in the midst of the "stench of sin". They refuse to affirm their own "likeness of the Beast" as the standard for human beings, to confuse the "is" with the "ought". According to Dostoyevsky, the consciousness of the Russian people that they are not what they ought to be is evinced particularly in their reverence for the holy, a reverence which says to itself:

If there is sin, injustice, and temptation among us, then there is at any rate someone somewhere on earth who is holier and superior; he has the truth, he knows the truth, which means that it is not dead on earth and will therefore come to us, too, one day, and rule all over the earth, as it was promised.

Dostoyevsky maintains, however, that the people suffer from their thirst for truth as from a painful disease, for this thirst has never been satisfied. Living since Peter the Great without the guidance, or even the sympathy, of the educated gentry, many among the Russian people have attempted to slake their thirst with narrow, rigidly exclusive interpretations of truth. Just as Dostoyevsky's writings attest to the bestial likeness of the Russian people, so they attest also to their predilection for a morbid sectarianism. He argues, however, that the majority of the Russian people have long aspired, in the midst of their suffering and moral confusion, to a truth which points directly to the actualized God-man order. This truth is that of the universal brotherhood of men. For Dostoyevsky, the most tangible evidence of this Russian aspiration to brotherhood is that harmonious reconciliation of individual freedom and social order which has been achieved in the Russian commune (obschina).

In a public letter to the French historian, Michelet, Alexander Herzen defended the Russian people against the charge that centuries of oppression had reduced them to a merely inert, unconscious mass with no thought or life
of its own. He pointed to the existence of the commune as evidence that the Russian people had by themselves evolved a rudimentary socialism. They would thus prove particularly receptive to the theoretical socialism of the West, which would crown their practical socialism with self-consciousness. While sharing Herzen's emphasis upon the uniqueness of the Russian commune, Dostoyevsky does not interpret its significance in the same manner. Nor does he share the tendency of the later Slavophiles to attribute the commune to the peculiar character of the Russian people. For him, the commune is not the expression of the Russian people per se, but of the Russian people insofar as they are permeated by Orthodox Christianity. Although he concedes that the people do not possess a clear grasp of Orthodox doctrine -- they could not pass an examination in the catechism, and no sermons are preached to them -- he nevertheless asserts that:

The overwhelming mass of the Russian people is Orthodox; it lives by the idea of Orthodoxy in all its completeness despite the fact that rationally and scientifically they do not comprehend this idea. Essentially, save for this "idea" there dwells no other in our people; everything is derived from it...

The people's knowledge of Orthodoxy is, according to Dostoyevsky, derived from their familiarity with hymns and prayers "which contain the whole essence of Christianity", their acquaintance with certain biblical stories and "lives of the saints", and, above all, from their devotion to the image of Christ throughout centuries of suffering.

While the manner in which the Orthodox teaching has been transmitted to the Russian people may be problematic, it is perfectly clear to Dostoyevsky what, principally, they grasped in this teaching. To the Russian people, the Orthodox idea is, above all, the idea of the universal
church:

I am not speaking of church buildings, or the clergy. I am now referring to our Russian "socialism," the ultimate aim of which is the establishment of an ecumenical Church on earth in so far as the earth is capable of embracing it. I am speaking of the unquenchable thirst in the Russian people for great, universal, brotherly fellowship in the name of Christ. 24

The brotherhood of the commune is rooted in a devotion to the higher order of the church, of "brotherly fellowship in the name of Christ" (sobornost').

The common aspiration to a universal order of freedom, equality, and brotherhood is to be the basis of that "spiritual communion" between the Russian people and Russian Westernism envisaged by Dostoyevsky. This communion must be initiated by the deference of the uprooted intelligentsia to the people, for in the "church idea" the people possess the way to genuine freedom, equality, and brotherhood. 25 The spiritual merger to which Dostoyevsky attempts to persuade Russian Westernism is expressed concretely in the "last pilgrimage" of that finest of Russian liberals, Stepan Verkhovensky. 26 Verkhovensky's pilgrimage is a return to the Russian soil which culminates in a return to Orthodoxy. Yet his conversion subsequent to receiving the last sacrament does not entail the renunciation of that "great idea" of a just social order which he has served. He has been brought to an awareness, rather, that the "great idea" must be grounded in man's orientation towards the eternal:

The mere presence of the everlasting idea of the existence of something infinitely more just and happy than I, already fills me with abiding tenderness and — glory — oh, whoever I may be and whatever I may have done!...The whole law of human existence consists merely of making it possible for every man to bow down before what is infinitely great. If man were to be deprived of the infinitely great, he would refuse to go on living, and die of despair. The infinite and the immeasurable is as necessary to man as the little planet which he inhabits. My friends — all,
all my friends: long live the Great Idea! The eternal, immeasurable Idea! Every man, whosoever he may be, must bow down before what is the Great Idea. Even the most stupid man must have something great. Peter, my boy -- Oh, how I wish I could see them all again! They do not know -- they do not know that the same eternal Great Idea dwells in them too! 27

Verkhovensky's "last pilgrimage" does not signify the self-annihilation of Russian Westernism before the Russian people. Dostoyevsky maintains that the merger with the people must be renounced unless Russian Westernism, too, can be a teacher: "We must bow [to the people] on one condition only, and this — sine qua non: that the people accept from us those numerous things which we have brought with us". 28 Of these "numerous things" which Russian Westernism brings to the people, the most important is "science" — the capacity for rational thought and expression. Dostoyevsky does not, of course, imply that the church idea attains to its complete truth only when "elevated" to the plane of self-conscious rationality. He does maintain, however, that the work for the actualization of the church idea stands in need of reason. 29 For, in proper subordination to the heart, reason is able to speak the word of the God-man order in a language which is accessible to those who have not yet consented to that order. By its very nature reason speaks to all men, and is thus an indispensable instrument for the education of all to the "first step". Verkhovensky's profession de foi expresses the church idea of the Russian people in words which every man can hear. Russian Westernism, with its possession of science and its sense of universal mission, is the natural vehicle for the propagation of the church idea.

Dostoyevsky's final word, then, concerning the problem of Peter the Great is that Peter's turn towards the West has made possible the "universal
service of mankind to which Orthodoxy is designated". For the aspiration to a universal order, inherent in the Orthodoxy of the Russian people, had been obscured and distorted by the circumstances of history. This obfuscation began when, in the centuries prior to Peter, the identification of Orthodoxy with the Russian nationality came to serve as the theoretical foundation for the expanding Muscovite state. In its close association with the emergence of Russia as a great power, Orthodoxy had tended to become merely an "attribute" of the Russian particularity. Through Peter's reforms Russia had become re-acquainted with her aspiration to universality:

With Peter's reform there ensued an unparalleled broadening of the view, and herein -- I repeat -- is Peter's whole exploit...Now, what is this "expansion of the view," what does it consist of, and what does it signify?...This is our urge to render universal service to humanity, sometimes even to the detriment of our own momentous and immediate interests...this is our acquired faculty of discovering and revealing in each one of the European civilizations -- or, more correctly, in each of the European individualities -- the truth contained in it, even though there be much with which it be impossible to agree. Finally, this is the longing; above all, to be just and to seek nothing but truth. Briefly, this is, perhaps, the beginning of that active application of our treasure -- of Orthodoxy -- to the universal service of mankind to which Orthodoxy is designated and which, in fact, constitutes its essence. Thus, through Peter's reform our former idea -- the Russian Moscow idea -- was broadened and its conception was magnified and strengthened. Thereby we got to understand our universal mission, our individuality and our role in humankind. Dostoyevsky thus affirms the universal aspiration of Russian Westernism in words reminiscent of those of the "liberal idealist", Versilov. Yet Dostoyevsky's great concern is that this aspiration be informed, not by the Geneva idea, but by that Orthodox idea which is still preserved among the Russian people. 
II Russia's Religious Mission to the West

Russian Westernism's sense of universal mission was, as we have seen, directed particularly towards the West. Dostoyevsky's affirmation of the universal concern of Russian Westernism implies his affirmation of a mission to the West. Although he did make this affirmation, he maintained that Russia must first turn away from the West in order to "become herself". In one of his last published articles he advocates that Russia relinquish her two hundred-year-old effort to be an accepted participant in Western civilization, and that she turn instead towards Asia. He calls for the overcoming of the "slavish fear" that the West will regard Russians as "Asiatic barbarians", for Asia may well be the principal outlet for Russia in her attempt to consolidate herself around her own idea of order. Yet despite his keen interest in anything associated with the exploration and settlement of Siberia, the turn away from the West towards Asia is for Dostoyevsky no more than a preparation, a putting of one's house in order.

Such a preparation is necessary if Russia is to present herself to the West, not with the "apish" countenance acquired through decades of servile imitation of Western forms of life, but with the human countenance which she will recover by learning to become herself. For Dostoyevsky is certain that Russia will turn again to the West, that her destiny is ultimately inseparable from that of the West. He predicts that when the crisis of order in the West becomes acute Russia will be called to intervene with her vast material power. Russia will inevitably be embroiled in the catastrophic conflicts which await the West, and her involvement could be decisive. The nature of this involvement will depend on whether Russian Westernism has succeeded in shedding its "apish" countenance; if not, then
Russia will come to the West only with "blood and iron". The final object of Dostoyevsky's own Christian work was to inspire Russian Westernism to appear in the West, not with the sword, but with the Word "of the great general harmony, of the final brotherly communion of all nations in accordance with the law of the gospel of Christ".

Dostoyevsky's teaching concerning Russia's religious mission to the West raises certain fundamental questions. First, why can the West not find within itself the resolution of its crisis? More specifically, does not the West also contain within itself the church idea, even if in an attenuated form? Secondly, is the intimate association of the Word with the historical destiny of a particular nation compatible with Dostoyevsky's own religious thought? Those who have not simply rejected out of hand Dostoyevsky's teaching about Russia's religious mission to the West have raised these questions. But sufficient consideration has not been given to the response to them which is present in Dostoyevsky's writing. Such a consideration does not necessarily imply a defence of his teaching about Russia's religious mission to the West. My object is, rather, to understand this teaching as fully as possible in the expectation that such an understanding will shed further light on his critique of the West. First, my concern will be to consider why Dostoyevsky associates the church idea with Russia, and not with the West.

(i) The Historical Development of Church and State in the West

Dostoyevsky justifies the association of the church idea with Russia rather than the West on the basis of a particular interpretation of Western history. In response to the Grand Inquisitor's account of the history of
the West in terms of the conflict between freedom and order, Dostoyevsky interprets Western history in terms of the conflict between two ideas of order -- those of the church and the state.  

According to Dostoyevsky, the idea which chiefly animated ancient Rome was that of the universal communion of mankind. This world-wide communion to which Rome aspired was "compulsory" because the boundaries of the communion were expanded by means of the sword. But more significantly, the communion was "compulsory" because it was rooted in the attempt to organize human life on the basis of reason alone. The Roman order was the fruit of a prodigious effort to enfold human beings within an earthly destiny, thereby subjecting them to the compulsion of material necessity. This compulsion achieved appropriate outward expression during the rule of the Emperors. For Dostoyevsky, the "Eternal City" of the Caesars is edifying only because in it the state idea has revealed itself with the minimum of concealment. Although there were gods in ancient Rome behind which the state could hide, little attempt was made to conceal the reduction of all theology to civil theology. In its adornment of Caesar's sword with an elaborate civil theology (or "miracle, mystery, and authority"), Rome is the first great historical embodiment of the Inquisitor's social formula. According to Dostoyevsky, the end to which this formula is dedicated is also discernible in Rome. That quintessential article of the imperial civil theology -- the divinity of the Emperor himself -- betrays the orientation of ancient Rome towards the man-god. The Eternal City ultimately aspired to be the vehicle of man's self-deification.

Rome was opposed by those peoples who wished to retain their gods, not as members of the Roman pantheon, but as guarantors of their own
particularity. In the forefront of this opposition were the Germanic peoples, who stubbornly resisted the Roman sword and the Roman civil theology. A far more profound opposition to Rome, however, appeared within its own borders. The Eternal City was confronted by an antithetical religious idea:

Then occurred the collision of the two most opposite ideas that could exist in the world. The Man-God met the God-Man, the Apollo Belvedere met the Christ. 41

The advent of Christianity in the ancient world is, for the Inquisitor, equivalent to the advent of disorder because it fostered the development of the "personal conscience". For Dostoyevsky, however, the appearance of Christianity signifies the possibility of an alternative order in which the "personal conscience" is reconciled with social unity and particularity with universality:

...remember what was the ancient Christian Church and what it aspires to be. It began immediately after the death of Christ, with a handful of people, and instantly, almost in the very first days after the death of Christ, it attempted to discover its "civic" formula, which was wholly based upon the moral expectation of satisfying the spirit by the principles of personal self-perfection. Then arose the Christian communities — Churches, then speedily began to be created a new and hitherto unheard-of nationality, a nationality of universal brotherhood and humanity, in the shape of the catholic oecumenical Church. But the Church was persecuted, and the ideal grew beneath the earth, and above it, on the face of the earth, an immense building was also being formed, a huge ant-hill, the old Roman empire, which was also the idea and the outcome of the moral aspirations of the whole ancient world. But the ant-hill did not fortify itself; it was undermined by the Church. 42

The Roman state, however, was not completely overcome by the church. It succeeded in preserving itself by means of a compromise: the Empire accepted Christianity, and the church accepted Roman law and the Roman state. Christianity permitted itself to become the new civil theology of the Roman empire. 43 Rome hoped that its acceptance of Christianity as a civil
theology would overcome that moral exhaustion which was undermining its will to preserve itself against the encroaching barbarians. And the church perhaps sought in the compromise a respite from persecution, as well as a prodigious instrument for the accomplishment of its work. Yet, whatever the motives for the compromise effected between the church and the state under Constantine and his successors, this compromise could not, according to Dostoyevsky, be permanent. For Christianity is by its very nature unsuited to fulfill the function of a civil theology. The clear-sighted among the devotees of the Eternal City perceived the absurdity of a compromise with the church. The futile effort of the Emperor Julian, for instance, to find within the antique world itself the spiritual resources necessary for its preservation may have stemmed from his recognition of the fundamental antithesis between Rome and Christianity. Those within the church who refused the compromise "went into the desert", and there continued to work for the actualization of the universal God-man order: "Christian communities once more appeared, then monasteries; and these were only attempts, attempts which have lasted even unto our day". Dostoyevsky does not maintain that the church simply ceased to be the church wherever it came to terms with Rome. The church ceased to be the church when it finally sacrificed its fundamental principles in favour of those of the state. According to Dostoyevsky, this overcoming of the church by the state occurred first in the Western part of the Roman Empire.

The triumph of the state over the church in the West coincides, for Dostoyevsky, with the first great schism within the church. The mutual excommunication pronounced in Constantinople in 1054 by the Patriarch of Constantinople, Michael Cerularius, and the papal legate, Cardinal Humbert,
is generally considered to be the decisive moment in the rupture between Western and Eastern Christianity. Yet Dostoyevsky implies, in the "Legend of the Grand Inquisitor", that this event represented merely the explicit acknowledgement of a division which had become critical as much as two centuries earlier. The Inquisitor avows that it was during the eighth century that his church first acquiesced in the third temptation. It was towards the end of the eighth century that the addition of the *filioque* clause to the Nicene Creed -- first proposed by the Spanish bishops at the Council of Toledo (633) -- was accepted by the Western church. In accord with his conviction concerning the primacy of ideas in determining the course of human affairs, Dostoyevsky attributes the decisive breach in Christendom to a differing interpretation of truth, rather than to political, economic, or cultural differences. For him, such a significant event cannot be attributed to merely material causes such as the economic rivalry between the Italian maritime cities and Byzantium, or the resentment of the East against the military oppression of the Latin crusaders. Nor can it be reduced to a squabble over the use of unleavened bread or the wearing of beards. Such matters are for him merely peripheral to the essential source of the schism: the alteration by the Bishop of Rome of the Christian representation of truth without the consent of the whole church. The question which must now be considered is this: what is the relation between the Bishop of Rome's alteration of the Creed -- with the concomitant assertion of his primacy within the church -- and the acceptance of "Caesar's purple" by Western Christianity?

The enthusiastic support accorded to the *filioque* clause by the Emperor
Charlemagne was decisive in persuading the Western church to alter the Creed. The Latin church did doubtless accept the *filioque* in order to gain Charlemagne's help in extending its influence over the barbarian peoples of Europe. Yet, for Dostoyevsky, the relationship between the *filioque* and "Caesar's purple" is of a more fundamental nature. The Church's acceptance of the new clause was not simply a matter of policy; or, if it was, this policy was the appropriate expression of a deeply rooted theological tendency. In Dostoyevsky's view, the *filioque* had its ultimate source in the tendency of the Western Church to conform the Christian mystery to human reason. The alteration of the Creed was the outcome of a propensity for rationalization which the Latin Church was unable to resist. Dostoyevsky does not indicate why the Latin West, unlike the Byzantine East, succumbed to this propensity. Nor does he indicate explicitly how the addition of the *filioque* clause to the Nicene Creed constitutes a rationalization of Christian truth. We can here only take note of his conviction, which reflects the teaching of Orthodox theology, that such a rationalization did take place in the West. According to the Eastern church, this rationalization of the Trinitarian principle entailed the overcoming of the paradox of God's simultaneous transcendence and immanence in relation to the world, the paradox which is at the heart of the Christian mystery. This paradox was overcome, however, only through the exclusion of one of its poles. Western Christianity had come increasingly to conceive God as transcendent only, and not at the same time immanent within the world.

In Dostoyevsky's view, the Western church effectively took up "Caesar's sword" when it attempted to organize Christendom on the assumption of God's absence from the world. The alliance with Charlemagne, and the adoption of much of the civic and legal apparatus of the Roman state, therefore represented merely the outward confirmation of an inner attitude. This attitude
"overcome" by him. As we have noted, it is the resurrected God-man whom the
Inquisitor will not accept. Turning away from the God-man who has overcome
necessity, the Inquisitor accepts the offer of the universal state held out
in the Third Temptation as the only order possible for man. We have seen the
manner in which, according to Dostoyevsky, the state ultimately achieves its
order. Insofar as the Western church was essentially a "continuation of the
Holy Roman Empire", it too realized its order through "compulsion" or
"coercion". Its unity was a merely material or "mechanical" unity, having
its source in the visible presence of the Pope in Rome rather than in the
invisible presence of the resurrected God in each local church. The re-
liance upon material compulsion in the service of the God-man is a tacit
admission of the ultimate impotence of good in the face of chance and neces-
sity. This admission is, for Dostoyevsky, the "essence" of Roman Catholicism.
The most typical outward expression of this essence is the Jesuit order,
with its implicit affirmation of "the righteousness of every means for
Christ's cause". This affirmation achieved final explicitness when Pope
Pius XII proclaimed his infallibility, and at the same time the thesis that
without mundane possessions Christianity cannot survive on earth; that is,
"strictly speaking, he proclaimed himself Sovereign of the world". In its
struggle to defend the last remnant of its earthly sovereignty against
Italian liberalism, the papacy revealed its animating idea to be "political"
rather than "spiritual" — to be, in fact, a reformulation of the ancient
Roman idea of the universal unity of man.

Dostoyevsky does not maintain that the image of Christ is obscured
for all in the West. He declares in his unpublished notes that he would
never say "such a stupid thing". Because he is often misunderstood in
this regard, attention must be drawn to his clear distinction between the
papal principle informing the mainstream of Western Christianity, and the
Christian principle\textsuperscript{56} which has continued to live within certain Westerners. Inadequate or false representations of the truth do not alter the truth itself. The church cannot "disappear entirely". Dostoyevsky's critique of Western Christianity is not, however, concerned with "individual representatives" of the Western church, in whose hearts the image of Christ unquestionably remains in all its "original truth and purity". He is concerned, rather, with Roman Catholicism in its essence.\textsuperscript{57}

Roman Catholicism finally failed to organize the West in Christ's name. It failed because there were too many Europeans whose "sacred, truthful, innocent, ardent feelings" were outraged by the papal distortion of Christ's image.\textsuperscript{58} This outrage finally erupted into historical effectiveness in the sixteenth century when it was given direction by the German monk, Luther. The Protestant movement, however, was fatally limited by historical circumstance. Cut off from the Eastern church by eight centuries of cultural prejudice and political conflict, and by the approaching tide of Islam, Protestantism declined to seek in Eastern Christianity the original church idea. Thus, while refusing the "compulsory communion" held out in the papal idea, Protestantism was unable to replace it with the "spiritual communion" of the genuine church idea. The Protestant churches which were established tended to be little more than vehicles of the desire for individual and national "segregation" which had been fostered by the coercive unity of Roman Catholicism. Despite its "good beginnings", the Protestant movement only contributed, in Dostoyevsky's view, to the further "segregation" and "isolation" of Western man. The limitations inherent in Luther's rejection of the papal idea inevitably implied a chaotic sectarianism:

A vessel is carried with some precious vivifying liquid. But presently people get up on their feet and begin to shout:
"Blind men! Why do you kiss the vessel? -- It is only the content, and not the container, that is precious; you are kissing glass, mere glass; you are adoring a vessel; you are attributing all the holiness to glass, so that you are forgetting its precious content! Idolaters! Throw away the vessel! Break it! Worship only the liquid, and not the glass!". And they break the vessel and the vivifying liquid, the precious content, is spilled on the earth and, of course, vanishes there. The vessel is broken and the liquid is lost. However, while the liquid has not yet entirely vanished in the soil, there ensues a hubbub: ... men break up in antagonistic groups, and each group carries away for itself a few drops of the precious liquid in special multiformed cups picked up at random, and the groups no longer communicate one with the other. 59

Unable to replace the corrupt vessel of Roman Catholicism which it had broken, the Protestant movement was consigned to the fundamentally negative stance indicated by its name. 60 For this reason it could be no more than a by-product of the papal idea, radically dependent on this idea for its very existence.

In Dostoyevsky's view, the ultimate dependence of the Protestant movement upon the papal idea is particularly evident in its rationalism. In their quest for a new vessel, Protestants turned to the only indisputable criterion available to them -- the Bible. Yet in the absence of a universally recognized authority for the interpretation of this criterion, it was inevitable that the final "banner" of Protestantism would become the individual's right to "freedom of inquiry". 61 Dostoyevsky does speak of the "sad and rapturous music" of Northern Protestantism, of "the illimitable mystic with his dull, sombre, invincible aspiration, and the impetuous power of his mystical dreaming". 62 But he discerns the most characteristic outcome of Luther's protest in the thought of Hegel. The Protestant intensification of the rationalizing tendency already at the heart of Roman Catholicism was to result finally in the negation of Christianity itself. 63
The dimming of the church idea in the West was most clearly evident for Dostoyevsky in the fact that the two poles of the idea -- freedom and unity -- had become antithetical. They had been placed in mutual opposition through their embodiment in the two great divisions of Western Christendom. Threatened with the perpetual disorder consequent upon such an opposition, the West turned to the promise of a new order held out in Geneva thought. The Geneva idea purported to reconcile the individual freedom of Protestantism with the universal unity of Roman Catholicism, and to do so on the basis of a reason liberated from the accumulated tradition of centuries. Yet despite its rejection of the past, the Geneva idea is actually the most recent metamorphosis of the old state idea:

The present-day French socialism itself -- seemingly an ardent and fatal protest against the Catholic idea on the part of all men and nations tortured by and strangulated with it, who desire by all means to live, and to continue to live, but now without Catholicism and without its gods -- this protest itself which actually began at the end of the last century (in fact, much earlier) is nothing but the truest and most direct continuation of the Catholic idea, its fullest, most final realization, its fatal consequence which has been evolved through centuries. French socialism is nothing else but a compulsory communion of mankind, -- an idea which dates back to ancient Rome and which was fully conserved in Catholicism.

We have noted Dostoyevsky's prediction that the final Western solution to the problem of order would be that alliance expressed in the formula: "The Pope -- leader of communism". It should now be clearer why he thought it possible that Roman Catholicism would consent to such an alliance. This consent had, in essence, been granted centuries before socialism made its appearance in the West.
(ii) The Historical Development of Church and State in Russia

Dostoyevsky's outline of the history of Western civilization constitutes his justification for associating the state idea with the West. His teaching concerning Russia's religious mission to the West depends also on his association of the church idea with Russia. In order to grasp this latter association more clearly we must consider briefly his account of the "collision" between church and state in the Eastern part of the Roman Empire.

Dostoyevsky revered Byzantium as the preserver and propagator of the "Divine image of Christ...in all its purity". The Western tendency to dismiss the Byzantine civilization as, in Hegel's words, "a disgusting picture of imbecility...and consequently a most uninteresting picture" would be, for Dostoyevsky, merely symptomatic of the Western distance from the "Divine image". Yet his gratitude to Byzantine theology for its unsurpassed theoretical formulation of the church idea does not preclude scepticism concerning Byzantine practice. He shares the usual Western judgement of the relation between church and state in Byzantium as one of "Caesaropapism". Thus, he asserts that the Byzantine church had already become separated from the true image of Christ before Byzantium was destroyed by the "sword of Mahomet". The destruction of the Byzantine state did not free Byzantine Christianity for the attempt at a genuine realization of its idea. For under the rule of Islam the church increasingly became little more than a vehicle for the national aspirations and "national insults and vexations" of Greeks, Bulgars, Serbs, and other subject peoples. Even where it did not confuse Christianity with nationality, the Eastern church was in no position to do more than preserve
the purity of the "Divine image" bequeathed to it by Greek theology. This task it accomplished largely through its monastic tradition. Yet, while Dostoyevsky venerates Mount Athos as the place where "the Orthodox doctrine has been preserved since olden times inviolate and in its brightest purity", he looks elsewhere for the actualization of the church idea.

The Eastern church did not engage in missionary activity with the same zeal or success demonstrated by the Western church in its mission to the barbarian peoples. Yet the activity of two Greek missionaries, Cyril and Methodius, kept the greatest part of the Slavic peoples outside the Roman fold. When the Russian Slavs finally renounced paganism in the tenth century and "accepted and exalted Christ anew", it was the Christ of the Byzantine church whom they embraced with such ingenuous devotion. So fervent was their adoption of Byzantine Christianity that they reacted with bewildered dismay to the accord between the Latin and Byzantine churches reached at the Council of Florence in 1439. No longer able to stand alone against Islam, Byzantium had finally been compelled to make overtures to the West. In return for Western military aid the Byzantine Emperor was required to secure the Eastern church's acceptance of the principle of papal supremacy. Although the accord of Florence was eventually rejected by the entire body of the Eastern church, it had a profoundly disturbing effect upon the Russians. The fall of Constantinople to the Turks fourteen years after the Council of Florence was interpreted by the Russian church as a judgement upon Byzantine Christianity, and by the Russian state as an opportunity to take up the Byzantine Emperor's fallen sword. The Grand Duke of Moscow, Ivan III, married
Constantine XI's niece, adopted the double-headed eagle of Byzantium, and styled himself "Czar" (Caesar), thereby proclaiming the succession of Moscow to Constantinople. The pretensions of the young Russian state found definitive expression in the doctrine of the "Third Rome" enunciated by Philotheus of Pskov:

The Church of old Rome fell for its heresy; the gates of the second Rome, Constantinople, were hewn down by the axes of the infidel Turks; but the Church of Moscow, the Church of the new Rome, shines brighter than the sun in the whole universe...Two Romes are fallen, but the third stands fast; a fourth there cannot be. 72

The Muscovite Czardom attempted to transform the church into its instrument, to employ Christianity as a civil theology. This attempt was to culminate finally in the explicit subordination of the Russian church to the state under Peter the Great, who "practically turned priests into government functionaries". Those "government functionaries" evinced an increasing concern with the material rather than the spiritual, a concern which had become shamelessly blatant by the latter part of the nineteenth century. The transformation of the Russian Church into a department of the state bureaucracy had, moreover, divorced it from the deepest religious aspirations of the people. 73 Dostoyevsky's scathing criticism of the Russian Orthodox church underlies his explicit assertion that the "real social formula" of the God-man order "has not yet been evolved in Russia". 74

Dostoyevsky's criticism of Russian Christianity does not preclude the conviction that Russia is the bearer of the church idea. For he does not identify this idea with the ecclesiastical structure of the Russian church. 75 He discerns the church idea, as we have noted, in the semi-conscious striving of the Russian people for a genuine brotherhood
(sobornost'). Yet, while he may have regarded the Russian people as the most promising "raw material" for the realization of the God-man order, their role is fundamentally passive. The active sower of the church idea among the people is the Russian monk. In the words of Father Zossima:

...they [the Russian monks] are verily prepared in peace and quiet "for an hour, and a day, and a month, and a year". In their solitude they keep the image of Christ pure and undefiled for the time being, in the purity of God's truth, which they received from the Fathers of old, the apostles and martyrs, and when the time comes they will reveal it to the wavering righteousness of the world. That is a great thought. That star will shine forth from the East. 76

Dostoyevsky's association of the church idea with Russia is rooted ultimately in his reverence for the Russian monastic tradition. The Russian nation is for him the bearer of the God-man order only insofar as the aspiration of the people is informed by the spirituality of Father Zossima.

Zossima speaks from within a tradition which had its beginning in the fifteenth century, in the struggle between the rival monastic orders of Nilus of Sorsk and Joseph of Volokolamsk. Nilus opposed the attempt of the Moscow Czardom to transform Russian Orthodoxy into a civil theology, while Joseph lent the support of his monastic order to this attempt. Nilus and his followers (called the "non-Possessors") emphasized the primacy of the task of recovering the inner spiritual principle through disciplined contemplation. This discipline entailed the renunciation of a concern with material possessions, and with worldly activity as a whole -- particularly the activity implied in that alliance of church and state proclaimed by Philotheus. Joseph and his followers (the "Possessors") maintained that it was permissible for the church to possess large landed
estates, and otherwise to employ the instruments of the world for the realization of Christian truth. This tendency brought them into a close alliance with the state. In return for the moral sanction of the church, the state was willing to guarantee its economic prosperity and to persecute heretics. Although the victory of the Possessors was to be decisive for the external structure of the Russian church, it did not determine completely the future of the church idea in Russia. For the followers of Nilus established an "underground" spiritual tradition which bore fruit with the appearance of the "starts" ("elders" or "spiritual directors") in the nineteenth century.

Father Zossima represents the outcome of Dostoyevsky's effort to give artistic form to the thought and practice of the Russian starts. 77 The ultimate doctrinal source of Zossima's spirituality is the theology of the Byzantine church, and particularly the "hesychast" (or "mystical") teachings of St. Symeon the New Theologian (949-1022) and Gregory Palamas (1296-1359). This teaching represents the height of the Eastern church's attempt to appropriate the truth of Christianity, not merely as dogma to be believed, but as the "way" of man's deification. Symeon and Gregory strove to communicate the way in which man is able to realize the spiritual principle within himself, to attain to the vision of "fire truly divine...fire uncreated and invisible, without beginning and immaterial." 78 Although this knowledge of the way to union with the eternal was incorporated to a remarkable degree within the "normal" sacramental life of the Eastern church, it did come to be associated particularly with the monasticism of Mt. Athos. The continuous pilgrimages made by Russian monks to Athos were responsible for the transmission of the
hesychast teaching to the Russian church, especially to that part of the church which followed Nilus of Sorsk. The centre of the hesychast movement in post-Petrine Russia was to be found in the succession of startsy at the monastery of Optino Pustyn. Dostoyevsky himself spent two days at Optino Pustyn; and the monastery and its staretz, Father Ambrosius, undoubtedly served as a major source of inspiration for his account of Russian monasticism in The Brothers Karamazov. This account is his witness to the living knowledge of the church idea still possessed by Russian Christianity in the latter nineteenth century. It was his hope that Russia would be the bearer finally of this church idea, rather than of a civil theology bent upon conquest by the sword.

(iii) Russia and the Modern Western Crisis

The crisis of the modern West is most immediately present for Dostoyevsky, as we have seen, in the struggle between France and Germany. In the light of his account of the history of the West, it can be understood more clearly how this struggle signifies for him an "eternal" battle of "two civilizations very different from each other". The modern German rejection of French socialism is the contemporary form of the Protestant rejection of the papal idea. This rejection is, in turn, a later historical form of the resistance of the German peoples to the ancient Roman idea of universal unity. Bismarck and Luther are the historical descendants of Arminius:

Germany's aim is one: it existed before, always. It is her Protestantism — not that single formula of Protestantism which was conceived in Luther's time, but her continual Protestantism, her continual protest against the Roman world,
ever since Arminius, --against everything that was Rome and Roman in aim, and subsequently -- against everything that was bequeathed by ancient Rome to the new Rome and to all those peoples who inherited from Rome her idea, her formula and element; against the heir of Rome and everything that constitutes this legacy. 81

Although Dostoyevsky does tend to identify the Western resistance to the Roman idea of order with the German people, there is no justification for asserting that he reduces this resistance to a matter of race. 82 Protestantism -- whether that of Arminius, Luther, or Bismarck -- is for him a possibility which transcends any particular Western people. 83 However, just as France must be regarded as a more historically significant bearer of the Roman idea than Italy, so Germany is for him the embodiment par excellence of the protest against Rome. Yet insofar as the Inquisitor's social formula purports to encompass within itself the protest of individuality, the actualization of this formula in the West would not simply signify the triumph of France over Germany. It would signify, rather, the reconciliation of the deepest aspirations of both nations.

For Dostoyevsky, the coming to be of the final Western social formula implies the destruction of man: Yet the failure to actualize this formula implies the more direct destruction of those "immense cataclysms" which will attend future disorder in the West. 84 The crisis of the modern West is total. And it is a crisis which the West cannot resolve by itself, for it has lost the way to the church idea which alone can regenerate it.

Impinging on the horizon of the modern West, however, is Russia, destined by virtue of her latent power to play a decisive role in shaping the future of the West. Dostoyevsky assumed that, despite its profound divisions, the West would be at one in its hostile suspicion of the emerging colossus. 85 His own account of the fate of the Geneva idea within
Russia would seem to justify this Western suspicion. A powerful nation in which the most tentative Western "hypotheses" immediately become "axioms" must indeed present an alarming aspect:

Our fateful troika dashes headlong on and, perhaps, to destruction. And for many, many years now the people of Russia have been stretching forth their hands and calling for a halt to its furious and reckless gallop. And if, for the time being, other nations stand aside from the troika galloping at break-neck speed, it may not be from respect, as the poet would have liked us to believe, but simply from horror. Remember that. From horror and perhaps also from disgust of her, and it is a good thing they stand aside, for one day perhaps they will no longer stand aside, but will stand like a wall before the on-rushing apparition and will themselves halt the frenzied gallop of our unbridled passions for the sake of their own safety, enlightenment, and civilization! We have already heard those alarmed voices from Europe. They begin to be heard already. 86

Yet this galloping troika is, according to Dostoyevsky, no more than the distorted reflection of the dominant idea present at the heart of the West itself. 87 The Western horror of the "on-rushing apparition" is a horror of the future which it has been preparing for itself. He holds out the possibility, however, that the Geneva idea within Russia might be redeemed by the Orthodox idea, that "the people will meet the atheist and overcome him." If the universal aspiration of the Russian Westernist were to be informed by the church idea of the Russian people, then an "astonished" West would be confronted, not with a fearful apparition, but with a "mighty, truthful, wise; and gentle giant". 88 The truth which this giant would bear is that Word which alone can illumine the darkness descending upon the West.

Dostoyevsky's hope that Russia will bear the Word rather than the sword to the West underlies his consuming concern with the "Eastern"
"Question". For him, the struggle itself between the Balkan Slavs and the decaying Ottoman Empire was incidental. What was of genuine significance was the decisive manner in which this struggle of obscure peoples in an obscure corner of Europe raised the question of Russia and the West. The West was drawn into the Eastern Question for two principal reasons: First, the Austrian Empire had a long-established interest in the Balkan Peninsula, and the European system of alliances was such that the interests of Austria inevitably became the interests of the rest of Europe. Dostoyevsky offers, in *The Diary of a Writer*, a remarkably detailed account of the manner in which the "unnatural" political situation of Europe would make it impossible for Germany and France to avoid embroilment in any serious Balkan eruption. If the Eastern Question were to become acute, then it would become inextricably associated with the Franco-German question. The West was drawn into the Eastern Question, secondly, because of its suspicion of Russia's intentions. The depth of Western fear and hatred of Russia was amply illustrated for Dostoyevsky by the Pope's open declaration of support for Moslem Turkey against Orthodox Russia when Russian support for the Balkan Slavs eventuated in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877.89

It was increasingly apparent to Dostoyevsky that the great questions which had agitated the civilized world for centuries were rapidly approaching a dénouement.90 In its raising of the Franco-German question in conjunction with the question of Russia and the West, the Eastern Question hastened the approach of this dénouement. For Dostoyevsky, the most fundamental issue, on which everything depended, was this: what is
the nature of that word which Russia was preparing to speak through her activity in the Balkan Peninsula? Dostoyevsky asserted that there could be only one justification for this activity: concern for the future of the church idea in the world. Dissociating himself from the aspiration to a "merely political" pan-Slav union under great Russian hegemony, he called for a disinterested involvement in the Eastern Question. Insofar as he did support the notion of a pan-Slav union under Russian auspices, he envisaged a union which would be "spiritual" rather than "political". This union would serve as a model to the world of a common unity which is at the same time "the assurance to each of his independent personality". Dostoyevsky discerned in Russia's involvement in the Eastern Question reason for hope, if not certainty, of her dawning consciousness of a mission of service to the church — a mission containing the possibility of a renewed life for the West. This mission, and this mission alone gives Russia a "moral right" to the guardianship of Constantinople, the symbolic centre of Orthodox Christianity:

Briefly, this dreadful Eastern question constitutes almost our whole future fate. Therein lie, as it were, all our tasks, and what is most important — our only exit into the plenitude of history. In this question is also our final conflict with Europe and our ultimate communion with her but only upon new, mighty and fertile foundations. Oh, how can Europe at this time grasp the fatal and vital importance to ourselves of the solution to this question? — In a word, no matter what may be the outcome of the present, perhaps quite indispensable diplomatic agreements and negotiations, nevertheless, sooner or later, Constantinople must be ours, let it be only in the future, in a century! 93

III Conclusion

The call for the liberation of Constantinople from Ottoman rule is
the culmination of Dostoyevsky's attempt to bridge the gap between the
church idea and its realization. It is the final consequence of his
effort to develop a theory of "practical Christianity" in response to the
overshadowing presence of the state idea within the world. Most inter-
preters of Dostoyevsky's thought have been disturbed by this final
response to the Inquisitor's social formula. For it appears to con-
stitute an acquiescence in that formula. This acquiescence is often
attributed to an atavistic Russian nationalism which tended to erupt in
Dostoyevsky from time to time, and which he fortunately managed to
confine largely to his journalistic writings. More sympathetic inter-
preters of his thought have understood his call for the liberation of
Constantinople in terms of a distinction between his exoteric and his
esoteric teachings (or between his "journalism" and his "art")..

According to this understanding, his teaching about Russia's religious
mission to the West must be regarded as an exoteric doctrine aimed at
reuniting a fragmented Russian culture around a "superior disinterested
idea" -- and thereby staving off the worst consequences of Westernization.
His esoteric teaching, according to this view, reveals the way to a
personal spirituality far beyond the realm of history or politics. Neither
of these explanations is ultimately satisfactory. As I have attempted
to demonstrate throughout this thesis, Dostoyevsky's concern with the
"political" question of Russia and the West is directly related to his
most fundamental religious thought. To attribute his teaching about
Russia's religious mission to an unthinking nationalism is to renounce
a genuine explanation, and hence to renounce a more complete understanding
of his whole teaching.

The more thoughtful distinction between his exoteric and esoteric teaching also avoids a genuine explanation, for it implies that his idea of Russia's religious mission to the West need not be taken seriously. This is not to deny that he took great care to present his teaching in the manner most appropriate both to the teaching itself and to those receiving it. There is undoubtedly a vast difference between the literary and the journalistic presentation of his thought; but there seems to be no justification for perceiving this difference as an indication of two different teachings intended for two sorts of people. While Dostoyevsky certainly employed journalism as a means of speaking to the people at large, a careful study of both his journalism and his art reveals no fundamental difference in thought between them. His most "cherished" ideas are present in both.  

The diminished expression which these ideas receive in the journalism must be attributed to the exigencies of the medium itself, rather than to any fundamental distinction made by Dostoyevsky in regard to his readers. For he considered men to be equal in the most important respect, and therefore equally capable of openness to the most important questions. He explicitly asserts that his appeal for a Russian religious mission to the West is the public revelation of his "intimate convictions." He also states, however, that this appeal is made in the "most extreme spirit" of his convictions.  

The question remains as to whether the teaching of Russia's religious mission to the West is too "extreme" to be consistent with Dostoyevsky's religious thought as a whole. Does he go too far in his attempt to overcome the gulf between the church idea and its realization?
Does this attempt issue in that very confusion of the good with necessity which he discerns at the centre of the West? Dostoyevsky's idea of Russia's religious mission may indeed be too "extreme". Yet if this idea is to be judged thoughtfully it is necessary to ascertain the precise point at which it becomes inconsistent with his essential teaching.

It could be said that this inconsistency appears where Dostoyevsky brings the church idea into association with the Russian sword. Yet he explicitly denies that the church will be borne to the West by Russian arms. His assertion in *The Pushkin Speech* that "our destiny is universality, won not by the sword, but by the strength of brotherhood and our fraternal aspiration to reunite mankind" is nowhere contradicted in his writings. Russia is not to conquer the West, but to "stand before" the West as a light, to allow the God-man to "shine forth in opposition to the ideas of the West". Dostoyevsky, however, does not altogether eschew the use of the sword, and this may be responsible for much of the confusion concerning his teaching about Russia and the West. In opposition to Tolstoy's pacifism, he justifies the use of the sword to defend the innocent from the evil which afflicts them. Ivan's description of the suffering of the innocent includes an account of the unspeakable atrocities committed by the Turks against Bulgarian children. Dostoyevsky, who derived this account from his own reading of the newspapers, maintained that such evil must be resisted — not for the sake of "mere vengeance", but in order to protect the innocent. According to his own testimony, it is for this reason only that he supports the use of the sword against the Ottoman Empire, and if need be, against its
Western allies. The argument that Dostoyevsky's teaching becomes too extreme wherever it countenances the sword presupposes the argument that the use of the sword, even to defend the innocent, is incompatible with Christian truth.

The charge that Dostoyevsky conceived a universal Russian military conquest as the precondition for the actualization of the church idea cannot find support in any careful study of his writings. Indeed, it must be asserted in the face of his explicit testimony to the contrary. Yet even if the suspicion concerning his attitude towards the sword can be dispelled, the "extremity" of his teaching about Russia and the West would continue to obtrude itself. The source of this extremity would seem to be his very tendency to associate the church idea with a particular nation, and to seek signs of its future realization in those events which constitute the history of that nation. This tendency exposes Dostoyevsky's thought to the possibility of that same confusion of God with nationality which Stavrogin detects in Shatov's words:

"...If a great people does not believe that truth resides in it alone (in itself alone and in it exclusively), if it does not believe that it alone is able and has been chosen to raise up and save everybody by its own truth, it is at once transformed into ethnographical material, and not into a great people...But there is only one truth, and therefore there is only one nation among all the nations that can have the true God, even though other nations may have their own particular great gods. And the only 'god-bearing' people is the Russian people..."

Stavrogin said, looking searingly at him, "All I wanted to know is whether you believe in God yourself."

"I believe in Russia. I believe in the Greek Orthodox Church. I believe in the body of Christ -- I believe that the second coming will take place in Russia -- I believe --"
Shatov murmured in a frenzy.
"But in God? In God?"
"I -- I shall believe in God." 102

Shatov's contention that the Russian god is the "true God" rather than merely a "particular great god" can be demonstrated only by the historical success of the Russian people. For he is unable to affirm any truth beyond history, beyond the "synthetic personality of the whole people, taken from its beginning to its end". This confusion of truth with historical necessity makes Shatov a proponent of the state idea. Dostoyevsky's own search for signs that the Russian people is a "god-bearing" people implies the possibility of a similar confusion. Moreover, the tendency to look to history for signs of the realization of the church idea exposes his thought in some measure to the judgement of history. This judgement can be particularly painful when, for instance, the declaration that the Russian people "will meet the atheist and overcome him" is regarded in the light of subsequent Russian history. Why, then, did Dostoyevsky risk such a judgement? And more fundamentally, why did he risk that confusion of necessity with good which characterizes Shatov's religious nationalism?

A declaration in Dostoyevsky's unpublished notes for The Possessed may help to illumine his reason for associating the church idea with the historical fate of a particular nation:

We are bringing the world the only thing we can give it, which is, however, the only thing it needs: Orthodoxy, the true and glorious, eternal creed of Christ and...a full moral regeneration in his name. We are bringing the world the first paradise of the millennium... And from amongst us, there will appear Elias...and Enoch, who will give battle to the Antichrist, i.e., the spirit of the West, which will become incarnate in the West. 103
This and other allusions to the Book of Revelation indicate that Dostoyevsky's teaching about Russia's religious mission to the West has its ultimate source in his effort to comprehend and affirm Christ's statement: "In the world you have tribulation; but be of good cheer, I have overcome the world". In this effort, he looks to history for "signs" and "portents" that the darkness of the modern world will be illumined by the church idea. If he is too "extreme" in this, then this extremity must be attributed to the manner in which he holds together the Revelation to John with the Gospel of John. A definitive assessment of the success or failure of this holding-together is far beyond the scope of this thesis. Such an assessment would presuppose a final answer to the question of the relationship between good and necessity in Christianity. It must suffice to repeat here that Dostoyevsky — as few others — has revealed the danger of confusing the two, and of holding them utterly apart.

It must also be noted that Dostoyevsky never secularizes the "last things". The church on earth remains in his thought merely the entry to man's participation in an eternal order, in a Kingdom not of this world, but of a "new heaven and a new earth". As for the question of when the universal church will be realized on earth, Father Zossima renounces any attempt to penetrate the "secret of times and fixed dates":

...This will be, it will be, even though at the end of time, for this alone has been ordained to come to pass! And one should not be troubled about times and fixed dates, for the secret of times and fixed dates is in the wisdom of God and in his foresight and his love. And what may seem still far off according to man's reckoning may by God's predestination be close at hand and on the very eve of its appearance.
Zossima's words express Dostoyevsky's clear recognition of the limits inherent in the attempt to discern in history evidence of the overcoming of the final Western social formula by the church idea. The first and the last word of his "theory of practical Christianity", then, is his appeal to each to "sacrifice, work, pray" for the true order — even if the whole world should refuse it. This is undertaken in the knowledge that the world is overcome by the truth, whether men recognize it or not.
APPENDIX

Although Dostoyevsky does not enter directly into the *filioque* issue in his writings, his account of the historical relationship between the "church idea" and the "state idea" clearly points towards this issue. I think it important therefore to attempt a brief elucidation of it. For our purposes it is appropriate to approach the issue from the perspective of the Eastern Church.

The Eastern Church has always maintained that the *filioque* clause betrays a misapprehension of the ultimate principle of Christianity. This principle is, for Eastern theology, that of the simultaneous transcendence and immanence of God -- a principle which is ultimately inaccessible to reason. We have noted Dostoyevsky's teaching that the merely "material" faculty of reason is prone to overreach itself, to "demand a chapter for itself". The formulation of the Trinitarian principle in the Nicene Creed was intended to preclude the intrusion of reason into a realm of apprehension open only to the higher spiritual faculty within man. This became necessary when its new role under Constantine as the civil theology of the Empire compelled Christianity to formulate its truth conceptually, in a creed which could be professed by all, regardless of whether or not they had realized the spiritual principle within themselves. An attempt to explain fully how the Nicene Creed renders the Christian truth conceptually explicit for all, without subjecting it to the reason of all, would be far beyond the scope of this thesis.\(^1\) It must suffice to state here that, according to the Eastern Church, the original Nicene formulation preserves the paradox of
the simultaneous transcendence and immanence of the Divine by means of a clear distinction. It distinguishes between the entirely simple, unknowable, and incommunicable Essence of the Triune God, and the hypostatic powers of each Person of the Trinity whereby God manifests Himself in such a way that all created being may be said to participate in Him. In this formulation, the unity of the Triune God has its source, not in the Essence which transcends any of the finite determinations inherent to reason or speech, but in the Person of the Father. This Person is the sole creative principle within the Trinity, and hence the source of the other two hypostases — of the Son by "begetting" and of the Spirit by "procession".

The Western Church was concerned that the original formulation of the Trinitarian principle did not assert the unity of God with sufficient force and clarity. This concern can be attributed to the threat posed to Christianity in the West by the Arianism of the Goths and the polytheism of pagan Gaul; and it can be attributed to the relative lack of philosophical sophistication within the Western Church at the time. The Latin theologians thus sought a more solid basis for the unity of the Triune God than that provided by the Person of the Father. This unity they found in the Essence common to the three Persons of the Trinity. Their desire to establish the unity of God in evident and unmistakable terms, and to do so with reference to the Divine Essence, resulted in a de-emphasizing of the hypostatic powers and energies whereby God can be "present in, sustain, and save the living, multiple, and changing world of known and perishable things". The theological divergence between the Latin West and the Greek East, which eventuated in the Western addition of the filioque clause to the Creed, has
been summarized as follows:

In effect, what Western theologians tended increasingly to stress was the idea of the *Summun Ens*, of the absolute One in whom no distinctions of any kind may be admitted. Indeed, one may go further and say that a certain restriction of spiritual understanding took place, in the sense that a perspective which envisaged in God both an unqualified Essence, a 'Divine Darkness' of an absolute and infinite potentiality, and a real distinction of hypostases, gave way to a perspective which tended to envisage the essential nature alone, and this considered, not as a pre-ontological, but as a purely ontological, reality -- as, in fact, Being Itself...

...The Essence, according to the tradition accepted by the Greeks, is, although entirely simple and unknowable, neither Being Itself, nor the cause of being in others. Further, there can be no causal, principal, or other relationship either between the Essence and something else, or of the Essence with Itself, for the Essence is both prior to, and cannot enter into, any relationship of whatsoever kind. It was on this account that the Greeks maintained that the cause and principle of being in the Trinity is not the Essence, but the hypostasis of the Father. If, however, Essence and Being describe one and the same reality, as they tended to do for the Latins, then it becomes meaningless to say that the hypostasis, and not the Essence, of the Father is the cause and principle of being in the Trinity. On the contrary, it must now be maintained that the cause and principle of being in the Trinity is the entirely simple Essence, and it is from this that both the Son and the Spirit derive their being. But as the Son is identical in Essence with the Father, and the cause and principle of being in the Trinity is the Essence, it follows that it must be in, or through, a single essential act that the Father and Son together 'project' the Spirit.

In the view of the Eastern Church, the *filioque* clause constitutes a rationalization of the Trinitarian principle because it implies the overcoming of that "paradox" or "contradiction" which signifies the ultimate inaccessibility of Christian truth to reason. The paradox is overcome, however, only through the exclusion of one of its poles. The tendency to emphasize the simple and indivisible Essence of God, to the point of disregarding the multiple and communicable powers and energies of the three
Persons, finally entails the exclusion of God from the world.

So fundamental an alteration in the understanding of the supreme principle of Christianity was bound to have far-reaching implications for other aspects of Christian doctrine and practice. One such implication, which manifested itself immediately, was a different conception of ecclesiastical organization and authority. For Dostoyevsky, the papal claim to primacy within the church -- a primacy not only of honour but of rights and powers -- was the first and most significant practical manifestation of the Western rationalizing tendency. It has been noted that for Dostoyevsky the church constitutes the reconciliation of personal freedom with unity, in that each person finds himself in himself through common participation in the God-man. This participation depends on the presence of the God-man in the church -- and not in one part of the church only, but wherever two or three are gathered together. The acknowledgement of God's complete and undivided presence in each of the many local churches is rooted in the paradoxical conception of God as absolutely transcendent of all created being and yet at the same time fully present within the multiplicity of created beings. The unity of the local churches is derived from their common participation in God, as is the unity of all creation. Such was the manner in which, at least theoretically, Eastern Christianity understood Christ to be the Head of the church. A consequence of this understanding was the Eastern insistence upon the equality of rights and powers of all bishops within the church. For the bishop is the visible
image of the presence of Christ within each local church, and Christ cannot be more or less present at one church than at another because He cannot be more or less than Himself. The Western tendency to rationalize the Christian paradox entailed a changed conception of the church, a change which has been expressed as follows:

Yet if the full reality of the idea of participation, according to which Christ may be recognized as without mediation the head and unifying principle of the local churches, ceases, as it did for the Latins, to have that effective vitality it had for the Greeks, while, on the contrary, what becomes an over-riding consideration, as it did for the Latins, is the totally transcendent and non-participable nature of God, then, to that extent, Christ cannot be recognized as the actual head and unifying principle of the local churches in His own Person. Thus, to that extent, this head and unifying principle must be sought for elsewhere, in another head and unifying principle which in a certain sense replaces the absent Person of Christ, and is the visible representation of His invisible, and totally transcendent, unity. One might say that the emphasizing in a somewhat exclusive manner of the transcendent and indivisible nature of God, of the conception of God as the Summum Ens, leads to the notion of a 'real absence' of God from the world, and hence to the idea that until His 'coming again' His place on earth must be taken by a visible head who claims His titles and powers and unites the visible and multiple local centres of the Church into a single organization under his directing leadership. Once such an understanding of things had become sufficiently general in Western Christendom to have practical effect, it was more or less inevitable that the Bishop of Rome would be regarded as possessing this divine controlling authority: the Roman See is the one Apostolic See of Western Christendom, while Rome itself was the scene of the martyrdom of two Apostles, St. Peter and St. Paul, the ancient imperial capital, and the place where ideals of an absolutism similar to that of the Caesars would naturally tend to focus. 6
NOTES TO TEXT

Introduction

1. Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, p. 36.

2. See The Idiot, pp. 585-88.

3. The Diary of a Winter, p. 581.

4. Those studies of Dostoyevsky's religious thought which I found most helpful are listed in the bibliography.


6. This evidence is provided, implicitly, by the allusions to such works which abound throughout Dostoyevsky's art. It is provided explicitly by his correspondence and the testimony of his wife, friends and acquaintances. Two studies of Dostoyevsky which treat this question in great detail are: J. Frank, Dostoyevsky: The Seeds of Revolt (Princeton, 1976); L. Grossmann, Dostoyevsky (London, 1974). This question is treated at some length in the first chapter of this thesis.

7. These included Alexander Herzen, Vissarion Belinsky, Vladimir Solovyov, and Nicholas Strakhov.


11. Dostoyevsky's understanding of the question of order, and of the way in which politics and religion are held together in it, will be discussed at length in the second chapter of this thesis.

12. See, for instance, his letter to Konstantin Pobedonostsev, in Letters and Reminiscences, p. 261:
   I am always compelled to express certain thoughts only in the basic idea, which always greatly needs a further development and argumentation.
   This thesis undertakes to provide such "further development and argumentation". See also Letters of F.M. Dostoyevsky, p. 116.

13. For an illuminating discussion of Dostoyevsky's "polyphonic" artistry see M. Bakhtin, Dostoyevsky's Poetics (Michigan, 1973), Chapter 3.
Chapter One

1. Dostoyevsky states his intention to write a long article "on Russia's relations to Western Europe, and on the upper classes of Russian society" in a letter to the poet, Apollon Maikov (August, 1867). See Letters of F.M. Dostoyevsky, p. 116. Dostoyevsky also refers to Russian Westernism as Russian "Europeanism".

2. The Pushkin Speech, p. 72. Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, p. 57. See also Correspondence de Dostoyevsky, II, ps. 178, 183.

3. It should be noted that Slavophilism and Westernism were not "movements" in the sense of organizations possessing specific political-social programmes. They were, rather, intellectual movements encompassing a wide range of thought and practice, a range which this chapter attempts to delineate.

4. The Notebooks for The Possessed, p. 357.


7. Ibid., p. 60.


9. Ibid., p. 6. Peter's church policy constituted an attack on the Russian Orthodox Church. See Kluchevsky, A History of Russia, (New York, 1960), IV, pp. 36-39 (Volume IV of Kluchevsky's History contains a highly entertaining account of Peter's personal idiosyncrasies). Peter's "reform" of the Church greatly increased the influence of Western theology on Russian Orthodoxy: see, for instance; J.H. Pain, Sobornost: A Study in Modern Russian Orthodox Theology (Unpublished Oxford doctoral dissertation). For a general account of Peter's subordination of the Church to the State, see N. Zernov, The Russians and their Church (London, 1968), Chapter XIII.

10. Peter also founded the Academy of Science which was devoted to less utilitarian studies. The Academy was modelled after a plan suggested to Peter by Liebniz, and it imported its faculty, as well as the majority of its tiny number of students, from Germany. For further reading concerning Peter's educational reforms, see Florinsky, Russia: A History and an Interpretation (New York, 1966), I, Chapter XV.

11. The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, II, p. 79 (see also p. 6).

12. For further details on the emergence of the service gentry (dvoriane) during Peter's reign, see M. Raeff, Origins of the Russian Intelligentsia (New York, 1966).
13. The Notebooks for The Possessed, p. 215. For a detailed study of the growth of serfdom, during and after Peter's reign, see J. Blum, Lord and Peasant in Russia (New York, 1965).


15. The Notebooks of The Possessed, p. 146.


17. The Notebooks of The Possessed, p. 146.

18. Ibid., p. 115.


21. For Dostoyevsky's discussion of these characteristics, see The Diary of a Writer, pp. 396-404, p. 1044. "This fear that Europe might regard us as Asiatics has been haunting us for almost two centuries."

22. "...the philosophes wept as they read these laws, laws so beautiful that it was the duty of all sovereigns of the world to take them as their example." F. de Labriolle, "L'é prosveschenie [enlightenment] russe et les lumières en France (1760-1789)", Revue des études slaves, vol. 45 (1966) pp. 75-91. Quoted in N. Riasanovsky, A Parting of Ways (Oxford, 1976) p. 75. For an English translation of the "Instruction" see W.F. Reddaway, ed. Documents of Catherine the Great: The Correspondence with Voltaire and the 'Instruction' of 1767 in the English Text of 1768.

23. Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, pp. 61-63.


25. Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, ps. 58, 53, 57, 65.

26. Alexander Radishchev (generally acknowledged as the first Russian "radical"), for instance, was exposed to the thought of Helvétius, d'Holbach, Rousseau, and Mably at the University of Leipzig.

28. Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, pp. 72-73. Griboyedov was very close to the Decembrists; the comedy Woe from Wit, extremely popular in Russia until the 1840's, expressed the "enlightened", critical attitude of the Decembrists toward Russian society.

29. The Notebooks for The Possessed, ps. 215, 357.


32. The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, II, p. 77. Pestel came from a German family, professed the Lutheran faith, and usually wrote in French.

33. The Notebooks for The Possessed, p. 115.

34. Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, p. 62.

35. For an account of the thinking of the Decembrists, with lengthy extracts from their own writings, see M. Raeff, The Decembrist Movement (New Jersey, 1966).


37. The Diary of a Writer, p. 152. The influence of Russian Orthodoxy was almost entirely absent in the upbringing of, for instance, Herzen, Tolstoy, and Turgenev. In their early instruction, Western secular writings, and even Western Christianity, far outweighed any Orthodox influence. See, for instance, A. Herzen, The Memoirs of Alexander Herzen (London, 1968), I, Chapters 2 and 3.

38. The Brothers Karamazov, pp. 340-45.

39. For an excellent, detailed account of Dostoevsky's family background and early life see J. Frank, Dostoevsky: The Seeds of Revolt, 1821-1849 (Princeton, 1976). See also L. Grossman, Dostoevsky (Great Britain, 1974) Frank's book contains the most thorough and thoughtful consideration, yet available, of the various intellectual influences which acted upon Dostoevsky prior to 1849.

40. The Diary of a Writer, p. 152.

41. Ibid., pp. 314-315.

42. St. Sergius, a leading figure in the successful Russian revolt against Mongol rule in 1380, embodied that combination of Christian faith and Russian patriotism which was so characteristic of Muscovite Russia.

43. Letters of F.M. Dostoyevsky, p. 188.

44. Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, p. 36.
45. It was presumably through this book that Dostoyevsky was first acquainted with the moral thought of Kant. During the course of his travels Karamzin met Kant; and Kant obligingly summed up the principal teachings of the Critique of Practical Reason for his Russian visitor. See N. Karamzin, Letters of a Russian Traveller, 1789-90 (New York, 1957), pp. 40-41.


47. Ibid., pp. 10-16. This letter was written in 1840.


50. According to Koyré:

la métaphysique avait réellement remplacé la religion, était devenue elle-même une religion véritable. Les "sages allemands" étaient, pour nos jeunes "philosophes" des apôtres d'un nouvel évangile. La philosophie était leur Dieu, et Schelling en était le prophète. Ibid., p. 41.

51. Occasional Writings, p. 12.

52. Letters of F.M. Dostoyevsky, pp. 6-7.

53. See J. Frank, Dostoyevsky: The Seeds of Revolt, 1821-1849 (Princeton, 1976), p. 98. During his years at the Engineering Academy (1838-43) Dostoyevsky, according to the recollection of a fellow student, was "...very religious, and zealously performed all the obligations of the Orthodox Christian faith...All this struck his comrades so much that they dubbed him the monk Photius." F.M. Dostoyevsky V Vospominaniakh Sovremmenikov, I, p. 97.

54. The Diary of a Writer, p. 9.


56. The Diary of a Writer, p. 6.


64. The Possessed, pp. 50-51.

65. The thought of the Slavophiles, and Dostoyevsky's relation to this movement, will be discussed in Chapter 6.


68. Ibid., pp. 149-150.

69. For the most characteristic expression of Belinsky's "New Christianity", see his "Letter to Gogol", *Selected Philosophical Works* (Moscow, 1948), pp. 503-512.


71. *Winter Notes on Summer Impressions*, p. 46. For the two quotations from "Old People", which follow, see *The Diary of a Writer*, pp. 7-8.


73. Ibid., pp. 368-69.

74. Ibid., p. 506.


76. This is evident in Herzen's "Letters on the Study of Nature", a series of articles on the history of philosophy, which Dostoyevsky read and greatly admired later in his life. See A. Herzen, *Selected Philosophical Works* (Moscow, 1956).

78. N. Riasanovsky quotes a Russian historian, P. Vinogradov concerning Granovsky: "No one did more to introduce into the consciousness of society the idea of universal history as a progressive movement towards humanness." N. Riasanovsky, A Parting of Ways (Oxford, 1976), p. 223. For a fuller account of Granovsky's Hegelianism, see G. Plancy-Bonjour, Hegel et la pensée philosophique en Russie, 1830-1917 (The Hague, 1974). For the quotation from "Idealists-Cynics", see The Diary of a Writer, p. 379.

79. The Diary of a Writer, pp. 148-149.

80. For a detailed account of the Petrashevsky circle, the nature of Dostoyevsky's participation in it, and his testimony before the investigating tribunal, see J. Drouilly, La pensée politique et religieuse de Dostoyevsky (Paris, 1971); J. Frank, Dostoyevsky: The Seeds of Revolt, 1821-1849 (Princeton, 1976); L. Grossman, Dostoyevsky (Great Britain, 1974).


82. Ibid., p. 275.

83. Ibid., p. 43.

84. For instance, Dostoyevsky apparently thought that a monarchy was the only practicable political arrangement for Russia. See Drouilly, La pensée politique et religieuse de Dostoyevsky (Paris, 1971), p. 107.

85. See Dostoyevsky's account of Belinsky's ecstatic reception of his first novel, Poor Folk, in The Diary of a Writer, pp. 584-88.

86. In a letter to his brother Michael (August, 1839), written when he was seventeen, Dostoyevsky declared:
Man is a mystery. One must solve it. If you spend your life trying to puzzle it out, then do not say that you have wasted your time. I occupy myself with this mystery because I want to be a man. Correspondance de Dostoyevsky, I, p. 26.

87. The Diary of a Writer, pp. 6-7.


89. The Diary of a Writer, p. 147.

90. For a detailed account of Speshnev, and of his influence over Dostoyevsky, see J. Frank, Dostoyevsky: The Seeds of Revolt, 1821-1849, Chapter 18.
91. Belinsky, Selected Philosophical Works (Moscow, 1948), p. 111.

92. The Pushkin Speech, p. 65.


94. Letters of F.M. Dostoyevsky, p. 66.

95. The House of the Dead, p. 351.


99. This question will be discussed more fully in Chapter 6.

100. The House of the Dead, pp. 86-87.


102. See footnote number 86.

103. In a letter written to his brother after five years in Siberia, he asked for the writings of the Fathers of the Church; it can be assumed that he received them while still in exile. See Letters of F.M. Dostoyevsky, p. 66.


105. See: Occasional Writings, p. 216; The Unpublished Dostoyevsky I, p. 54.

106. Some of these articles are available in English translation in the Occasional Writings.

Chapter Two

1. The Notebooks for The Possessed, p. 408.

2. The reader will also be referred to passages in Dostoyevsky's other writings which it would be worthwhile, but not necessary, to study in conjunction with The Possessed and A Raw Youth.

3. The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, I, p. 5. See also: The Notebooks for The Possessed, p. 214; The Notebooks for A Raw Youth, p. 513; The Pushkin Speech, p. 44.

4. The Russian word by which Dostoyevsky designates the "uprooted" is "bezpochemeniki" - "those without the soil".

5. See Chapter I.

6. The Diary of a Writer.

7. See The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, II, pp. 33-34.


11. See also Svidrigaylov's remark about the scholarly approach to the "sacred traditions of others", in Crime and Punishment, p. 503.

12. "Idea" (ideya or misl') is the word which Dostoyevsky himself would use here. The word has various meanings for him. In the context in which it is being used here, it signifies that frame-work of unquestioned presuppositions about the nature of things within which one thinks and acts.

13. The theme of man's need for "order" (poryadok) is everywhere present, explicitly or implicitly, in Dostoyevsky's writings. For explicit references, see, for instance: A Raw Youth, p. 563; The Notebooks for A Raw Youth, p. 522; The Brothers Karamazov, p. 477. At this point in the thesis our concern is with Dostoyevsky's understanding of religion insofar as this clarifies his analysis of uprootedness. We thus put aside for now the question of Dostoyevsky's judgement of the truth or falsity of a given religion, and of the "idea" on which it is based. He would maintain that, whether true or not, a religion does satisfy the human need for order.


15. The Diary of a Writer, p. 630.
16. Even when abroad, in Europe, Dostoyevsky made a point of searching out libraries which subscribed to Russian as well as European newspapers, and spent a part of every day perusing them. See Anna Dostoyevsky, Reminiscences (New York, 1975), ps. 153, 157. Dostoyevsky regarded his journalistic activity, especially The Diary of a Writer, as, among other things, a way of acquainting himself "down to the smallest detail...with everything -- current no less than historical events -- relating to that reality" which he attempts to "show forth" in his novels; see his letter to Mrs. Altaschevsky in the Letters of F.M. Dostoyevsky, p. 222.

17. The Notebooks for A Raw Youth, p. 426. "Disorder" was at one time to have been the title of A Raw Youth. That Dostoyevsky is here comparing his work with that of Tolstoy is clear from the article entitled "The Boy Celebrating His Saint's Day" in The Diary of a Writer. For Dostoyevsky's opinion of Tolstoy's artistry, see "Anna Karenina As A Fact of Special Significance" in The Diary of a Writer.


22. Ibid., ps. 137, 122, 186, 100.

23. Ibid., ps. 122, 137.

24. "Self-control amounts to discipline, and discipline is in the Church." The Notebooks for The Possessed, p. 163. An elucidation of Dostoyevsky's concept of "self-control" (samoobladaniyeh) would take us into the heart of his religious thought. We shall have occasion, at a later point in the thesis, to discuss it more fully. It will become clear, then, that "self-control" is not, for him, solely a question of the presence or absence of a stable tradition of discipline, but insofar as he regards uprootedness itself as a "historic necessity" (Pushkin Speech, p. 44), this is an important aspect of his teaching.

25. Notes from Underground, ps. 100, 90.

26. Ibid., p. 110.


28. The Notebooks for The Possessed, p. 408. Dostoyevsky here uses "truth" (pravda) in the same sense as he uses "idea" in relation to the human need for order. The emphasis on this being a "truth" which serves as the source or order is indicated in the Russian language by the fact that pravda also means "justice". Dostoyevsky does not use the word istina, which denotes theoretical truth only.
29. The Notebooks for A Raw Youth, ps. 477, 472.

30. He dreamt that the whole world was ravaged by an unknown and terrible plague that had spread across Europe from the depths of Asia. All except a few chosen ones were doomed to perish. New kinds of germs -- microscopic creatures which lodged in the bodies of men -- made their appearance. But these creatures were spirits endowed with reason and will. People who became infected with them at once became mad and violent. But never had people considered themselves as wise and as strong in their pursuit of truth as these plague-ridden people. Never had they thought their decisions, their scientific conclusions, and their moral convictions so unshakeable or so incontestably right. Whole villages, whole towns and peoples became infected and went mad. They were in a state of constant alarm. They did not understand each other. Each of them believed that the truth only resided in him, and was miserable looking at the others, and smote his breast, wept, and wrung his hands. They did not know whom to put on trial or how to pass judgement; they could not agree what was good or what was evil. They did not know whom to accuse or whom to acquit. Men killed each other in a kind of senseless fury. They raised whole armies against each other; but these armies, when already on the march, began suddenly to fight among themselves, their ranks broke, and the soldiers fell upon one another, bayoneted and stabbed each other, bit and devoured each other. In the cities the tocsin was sounded all day long: they called everyone together, but no one knew who had summoned them or why they had been summoned, and all were in a state of great alarm. The most ordinary trades were abandoned because everyone was propounding his own theories, offering his own solutions, and they could not agree; they gave up tilling the ground. Crime and Punishment, p. 555.

Dostoyevsky employs the metaphors of disease when speaking of the confusion of ideas in an uprooted society. He speaks of ideas "flying through the air" and "infecting" people, and of the need to "inoculate" people against "inappropriate" ideas.

31. The Diary of a Writer, p. 886.

32. Ibid., p. 271.

33. The Notebooks for The Possessed, p. 82. Throughout his rough notes for the novel, Dostoyevsky actually refers to Stephen Verkhovensky as Granovsky.

34. The Possessed, ps. 47, 27, 23; 24, 39-40.
35. The Notebooks for The Possessed, p. 131.
36. Ibid., p. 249.
38. The Possessed, p. 40.
40. The Possessed, p. 39.
41. Ibid., p. 51.
42. The Diary of a Writer, p. 711.
43. Ibid., p. 711.
44. It is possible that Dostoyevsky's portrayal of Versilov was inspired by Herzen. Dostoyevsky does not say so explicitly, but he does offer indirect indications that this is the case. Versilov, like Herzen, is "a gentilhomme russe et citoyen du monde". See: The Diary of a Writer, pp. 5-6; A Raw Youth, pp. 465-66; The Notebooks for A Raw Youth, ps. 84, 88, 523.
45. A Raw Youth, p. 470.
46. Ibid., pp. 469-70. The "Russian" idea is characterized by Versilov as the vseprimirenie idei — literally, the "all-reconciliation" or "all-harmonization" of ideas; and Arkady defines it (Ibid., p. 388) as vseoeedinienie idei — the "all-union" or "all-combining" of ideas.
47. Ibid., p. 483.
48. Ibid., p. 483.
49. The Diary of a Writer, pp. 351-52.
50. A Raw Youth, ps. 468, 565.
51. This designation is especially prevalent in A Raw Youth (for instance, ps. 104, 212); and The Notebooks for A Raw Youth, ps. 70, 73.
52. Those whom Dostoyevsky considers to be "Geneva" thinkers are members of that movement of thought which Leo Strauss has characterized as the "second wave of modernity".
53. It must be noted, however, that the French and German socialists can be included only insofar as their socialism is "humanistic" or "utopian", rather than strictly "scientific". "Scientific" socialism lies outside Dostoyevsky's "Geneva" designation, although, as we shall see, he considers the two to be intimately related.
54. A Raw Youth, p. 212.

55. The Notebooks for A Raw Youth, p. 344; see also p. 216. "Faith" in the Russian is vera, which can also be translated as "belief", and even as "religion". "Conscious will" is soznatel'naya volya. Soznatel'naya also means "conscientious", and thus the phrase could perhaps be rendered as "conscience". Volya means, not only "will", but also "freedom", with an overtone of "not forced" or "without limits".

56. Ibid., p. 344. For more references to Versilov's attempt at moral self-perfection without the support of Christianity, see Ibid., ps. 344, 345, 388, 444, 513.


58. Ibid., p. 471.


60. A Raw Youth, p. 472.


62. Cf. Herzen's statement that "the future is outside politics" in From the Other Shore (Cleveland, 1956), p. 89.

63. A Raw Youth, p. 472.

64. The Notebooks for A Raw Youth, p. 509.


66. A Raw Youth, ps. 475, 474, 478. Poor Anton, a short novel by D.V. Grigorovich, described the sufferings of the Russian serfs; it was very fashionable reading for liberal landowners of the 1840's who liked to have their sense of guilt stimulated. Ibid., pp. 7-10.

67. Ibid., p. 478.

68. The Notebooks for A Raw Youth, ps. 540, 280.


70. In an article entitled "Pedantry and Literacy" in his journal Time, Dostoyevsky describes one of these liberal "despots":
Some of these fellows will suddenly take up a position in the middle of the road, dressed like a fop, and start
eradicating prejudices, such as hypocrisy, bad treatment of women, idol worship, etc. etc. Many of them have written whole treatises about it; others have studied these questions at the universities, sometimes abroad, with learned professors, using most excellent books. And all of a sudden one of these "social workers" comes face to face with reality and becomes aware of some prejudice. He gets so fired with enthusiasm that he flings himself upon it with loud laughter and hisses, pursues it with mockeries and, in his honourable indignation, spits on this prejudice in full view of the people, forgetting and failing to realize that the particular prejudice is for the time being still dear to them... Occasional Writings, p. 172. See also The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, II, p. 105.

71. The Pushkin Speech, p. 40.

72. Ibid., p. 75. See also The Possessed, pp. 48-52.

73. A Raw Youth, ps. 214, 565.

74. For instance, A Raw Youth, p. 516.

75. The Notebooks for A Raw Youth, ps. 456, 513, 126.

76. The Notebooks for The Possessed, p. 392.

77. The Notebooks for The Possessed, p. 134.

78. See, for instance, The Notebooks for A Raw Youth, p. 513.

79. The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, I, pp. 8, 66.

80. The Possessed, p. 308.


82. Notes from Underground, p. 114. The Notebooks for The Possessed, p. 272, 'Cf. N.G. Chernyshevsky What is to be Done? ps. 86, 145, 165, 354. Unlike Marxian "scientific" socialism, there is no notion of dialectical movement in Chernyshevsky's doctrine of historical progress. Although he studied Hegel thoroughly, he early abandoned Hegel's dialectic in favour of Lamarckian evolutionism. For a detailed discussion of the relation of Chernyshevsky's thought to that of Marx, and of Lenin's commentary on both, see G. Planty-Bonjour, Hegel et la pensée philosophique en Russie 1830-1917 (The Hague, 1974).

83. The Notebooks for The Possessed, ps. 163, 354.

84. The Possessed, p. 89.
85. Ibid., p. 257.

86. Dostoyevsky refers to the socialist lieutenant who "in his room... had placed on three stands in the form of three lecterns, the works of Vogt, Moleschott, and Buechner, and before each lectern he burned a wax church candle." The Possessed, p. 349. The French physiologist, Claude Bernard is also, for Dostoyevsky, representative of the "half-science" which was so influential in Russia after 1860. See The Brothers Karamazov, pp. 690-91. Dostoyevsky's concept of "half-science" may be further illumined by Eric Voegelin's critique of "scientism", in "The Origins of Scientism", Social Research, XV (1948), pp. 462-94.

87. "You won't need any kind of love then ... but only knowledge, science." The Notebooks for The Possessed, p. 89. Cf. N. G. Chernyshevsky, What is to be Done? ps. 95, 229, 247, 271.


89. Karmazinov is meant to represent Turgenev. See: Dostoyevsky's letter to Maikov of August, 1867 in Letters of F. M. Dostoyevsky, pp. 120-24; his letter to Strakhov of June, 1870 in Letters and Reminiscences, p. 197; and his letter to his brother, Michael, in March, 1864, in Correspondance de Dostoievsky, II, p. 181.

90. The Notebooks for The Possessed, ps. 138, 139, 142.

91. Ibid., ps. 89, 189.

92. The Possessed, p. 483.

93. Ibid., p. 308.


95. Ibid., ps. 95, 97. The Possessed, p. 344.

96. For further reading about Nechayev and the revolutionary socialist movement in Russia, see: R. Payne, The Terrorists (New York, 1951); A Yarmolinsky, The Road to Revolution (New York, 1962).


Chapter Three


2. The Idiot, pp. 416-17. (See also p. 563). Lebedev is a buffoon, with a penchant for bizarre clowning. There is no doubt, however, that he here expresses Dostoyevsky's thought, though in his own inimitable manner.


4. See Dostoyevsky's letter to Apollon Maikov (May 15, 1869) outlining the salient features of the history of Russia and the West, in Letters and Reminiscences, pp. 72-76. The account of the distintegration of medieval civilization given in this paragraph is derived from Dostoyevsky's comments in The Unpublished Dostoyevsky II, ps. 30, 151 and Dostoyevsky et l'Europe en 1873, p. 149.

5. See Chapter 2, Section I.

6. The Diary of a Writer, p. 723.

7. Dostoyevsky et l'Europe en 1873, p. 149.

8. Ibid., p. 149.


10. Ibid., p. 457.


14. The Pushkin Speech, p. 36. See also Ibid., p. 45, and Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, p. 108.

15. Dostoyevsky does, of course, make observations about various Western peoples which bear no apparent relation to the concern with social order which chiefly determines his scrutiny of the West. These observations, primarily negative in character, are to be found mostly in his private correspondence, seldom in his rough note-books, and never in his published writings. The fact that comments concerning, for instance, the personal integrity and intelligence of the German common people or the drinking habits of the Swiss, are restricted entirely to his correspondence indicates that he himself certainly did not regard them as part of his important thought about the West. These comments may illustrate Dostoyevsky's capacity for extreme irritability but they contribute nothing to the understanding of his critique of the West, and certainly
15. (continued)

cannot be taken as evidence of a blind hatred of everything Western. We shall thus disregard them, as being of interest only in relation to his personal biography. This applies equally to those comments in his correspondence concerning, for instance, the Italian peasants, which are adulatory but which do not bear on the question of social order.

16. As we shall see, he thought that the Reformation could be interpreted as a protest of the German people against the Roman Catholic idea, as it had come to be embodied, above all, in the French people.


18. The Gambler, p. 159.

19. Mouravieff, A History of the Church of Russia (New York, 1971), p. 12. The parallel with the Russian turning to modern French thought is further indicated by the fact that early Russian or Kievan, Christianity was decidedly practical or ethical. The early Russian Christians looked to Christianity for a truth which could be immediately made practical. See G.P. Fedotov, The Russian Religious Mind (Harvard, 1946), I, p. 38.

20. This is according to Dostoyevsky's own testimony before the tribunal investigating the Petrashevsky circle. See J. Drouilly, La pensée politique et religieuse de Dostoyevsky (Paris, 1971).


22. The Diary of a Writer, p. 250. See also Dostoyevsky et l'Europe en 1873, p. 167.


25. Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, p. 126.


27. Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, ps. 126, 88, 87.

28. Occasional Writings, p. 41.


33. Dostoyevsky et l'Europe en 1873, pp. 105-106.


35. Ibid., p. 110.

36. Ibid., p. 66.


39. The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, III, p. 82.

40. Napoleon I and Napoleon III.

41. So far as Russians were concerned, Napoleon's attack on Russia in 1812 demonstrated the boundlessness of his military ambitions. See The Diary of a Writer, p. 1045.

42. The Diary of a Writer, p. 457.

43. See Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, Chapter II ("On the Train") and pp. 119-22.

44. The Diary of a Writer, p. 817. Dostoyevsky points, for instance, to the crisis of May 16, 1876. The President, Marshal MacMahon's, dissolution of the legislative assembly in an attempt to re-define the uncertain distribution of powers within the constitution precipitated the sort of crisis which Dostoyevsky thought could easily topple the Republic. In his view, the inability of the various parties to present a united front against MacMahon's unilateral extension of his powers, and MacMahon's popularity with the army and the common people, brought a military dictatorship within easy reach of France. See The Diary of a Writer, ps. 740-42, 816-21.

45. The Diary of a Writer, p. 813.

46. Ibid., pp. 815-17.

47. Ibid., ps. 814-15, 736-37.

48. Ibid., ps. 254, 251, 737, 253.

49. Ibid., p. 618.
50. Dostoyevsky refers to Napoleon I as the "executor of the first historical phase of the event which began in 1789," that is, the phase of bourgeois domination of the Revolution. *Ibid.*, ps. 834, 724.


53. For instance, in *The Unpublished Dostoyevsky*, III, p. 147.

54. *Winter Notes on Summer Impressions*, p. 109. Dostoyevsky was doubtless acquainted with the economic liberalism propounded by Adam Smith, Malthus, and Ricardo. See, for instance: *The Diary of a Writer*, p. 150; *The Unpublished Dostoyevsky*, I, p. 50. In the words of the aspiring businessman, Luzhin (in *Crime and Punishment*) he presents the gist of the teaching of these British liberals:

If, say, I've been told in the past, "Love thy neighbour as thyself," and I did, what was the result of it?...The result of it was that I tore my coat in half to share it with my neighbour, and both of us were left half-naked...But science tells us, "Love yourself before everyone else, for everything in the world is based on self-interest. If you love only yourself, you'll transact your business as it ought to be transacted, and your coat will remain whole." And economic truth adds that the more successfully private business is run, the more solid are the foundations of our social life and the greater is the general well-being of the people. Which means that by acquiring wealth exclusively and only for myself, I'm by that very fact acquiring it, as it were, for everybody... *Crime and Punishment*, p. 167.

Although clearly aware of the teaching embodied in English-speaking economic liberalism, Dostoyevsky's concern is with the teaching itself, not with questions of intellectual history associated with it. Thus, his account of French bourgeois liberalism ignores the question of any intellectual debt which it may owe to the English-speaking liberal tradition. Moreover, his account makes no direct reference to any particular exponent of bourgeois liberalism in France itself.

55. *Winter Notes on Summer Impressions*, p. 110.


63. Ibid., p. 109.

64. The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, III, p. 82. This could perhaps be considered, also, the triumph of the English-speaking liberalism stemming from Locke over the French-speaking liberalism originating in Rousseau.

65. Ibid., p. 147.


67. The Gambler, p. 159.


69. The Diary of a Writer, pp. 889-91.

70. Ibid., pp. 889-90.

71. Ibid., p. 890.

72. Ibid., ps. 263-64, 283; The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, II, ps. 143, 160.

73. Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, pp. 90-91. During his first trip to Europe in 1862, Dostoyevsky spent a week in London. Here, at the World Exhibition of 1862, he saw the Crystal Palace (built for the Exhibition of 1851), which was to become such an important symbol in Notes from Underground. He also visited Herzen several times, and apparently met with Bakunin. See L. Grossman, Dostoyevsky, pp. 265-69.

74. England is almost always associated with Parliament in Dostoyevsky's writing. For instance: in The Idiot, p. 410; The Brothers Karamazov, p. 854; The Diary of a Writer, pp. 889-90. For a reference to "Anglo-Saxon law" as the basis of English social order, as "democracy or... formal equality" is of the "French (Romance) world", see The Notebooks for The Possessed, p. 225.

75. See, for instance, The Diary of a Writer, p. 576.

76. See for instance, Governor von Lembke's proposition to Peter Verkhovensky in The Possessed, p. 319.

77. For instance, the "pugilist", Keller, in The Idiot:
   You know, I love reading in the papers about the English parliament. I - I don't mean what they're
discussing there (I'm afraid I'm no politician), but the way they talk to each other; the way they behave like politicians: "the noble viscount sitting opposite", "the noble earl who shares my opinion", "my honourable opponent who has astonished Europe by his proposal." -- I mean, all those flowery expressions, all this parliamentary procedure of a free people; that's what's so fascinating to a chap like me! The Idiot, p. 410.

Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, pp. 92-94.


The Diary of a Writer, p. 264.

The Diary of a Writer, p. 283. For a reference to the American civil war, see Notes from Underground, p. 108.


The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, II, p. 91.

The Idiot, p. 329. It can be assumed that Radomsky speaks for Dostoyevsky here. See also: Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, p. 63; Crime and Punishment, p. 61.

See The Possessed, p. 148.

The Brothers Karamazov, p. 899.

In Dostoyevsky's writing "America" possesses the same symbolic value as "railroads" or "bread." See, for instance, The Notebooks for The Possessed, p. 387.

The Possessed, p. 270.

The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, II, p. 91. Except for one reference to the use of Holy Scripture by Americans in the Southern states to prove the necessity of the slave trade (Winter Notes on Summer Impressions,
Dostoyevsky says nothing concerning traditional religion in the United States. He evidently thought that American Protestantism was content to leave the question of social order to the liberals. And his emphasis on the prevalence of spiritualism would indicate his doubts concerning the adequacy of American Protestantism to serve as a private religion.

The Diary of a Writer, p. 729.

The Possessed, p. 50. The Notebooks for The Possessed, p. 215. See Chapter I of this thesis for an account of the decisive influence of German thought upon Russian Westernism.

The Possessed, pp. 23-25 and A Raw Youth, p. 475. See also: The Possessed, p. 303 (Stavrogin, too), studied at German universities; The Brothers Karamazov, p. 652; The Diary of a Writer, ps. 221, 394; The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, II, p. 73; to Germans "the secondary school is something holy"; The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, III, p. 160; "with the Germans it's education first of all, and only then political thought, but with Russians it's the other way around", The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, II, p. 84.

The Diary of a Writer, p. 221; Letters of F.M. Dostoyevsky, p. 213.

The Diary of a Writer, p. 394.

See for instance, Ibid., pp. 394-95.

"...with them, things have grown organically from their national character." The Notebooks for The Possessed, ps. 212, 214.

The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, III, ps. 69, 74. The Diary of a Writer, ps. 457, 375.

Ibid., ps. 375, 732.

Ibid., pp. 374-75.


Dostoyevsky, however, takes this factor into consideration:

A people who have rarely been vanquishers but who have been so strangely often vanquished, -- that people unexpectedly conquered an enemy who nearly always conquered everybody! And inasmuch as it was clear that they could not help but conquer because of the exemplary organization of their innumerable army, on altogether novel principles, and, besides, because it was headed by such ingenious leaders, -- the Germans could not help but grow proud to the point of intoxication. The Diary of a Writer, p. 732.


107. The Diary of a Writer, pp. 731-33. Dostoyevsky also refers to the "illusory solidity" of Germany in The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, II, p. 71; and he observes that the image of the "colossus with feet of clay" may be applicable to the new German colossus in Dostoyevsky et l'Europe en 1873, p. 129.

108. The Diary of a Writer, p. 564. See also Ibid., p. 912.

109. Ibid., ps. 283, 731.

110. Dostoyevsky thought that the English, more than the other great peoples of the West, tend to live within themselves. The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, III, p. 47.

111. Dostoyevsky illustrates the German capacity for work with lengthy anecdotes drawn from his own experiences in Germany. See, for instance, The Diary of a Writer, pp. 391-95.

112. The Gambler, pp. 41-42. See also: The Notebooks for The Possessed, p. 214; A Raw Youth, pp. 76-77; The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, I, ps. 43, 99.

113. The Brothers Karamazov, pp. 651-52. Occasional Writings, p. 34.

114. Dostoyevsky seems to have thought it possible that the entire European continent would eventually come under German hegemony. The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, III, p. 80. The Diary of a Writer, p. 912.


119. The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, III, ps. 114, 170. The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, II, p. 41. Dostoyevsky thought that France's rapid material recovery after the Franco-German war was a source of great anxiety for Bismarck. He considered it very possible that Bismarck would, on the slightest pretext, scotch the French desire for a war of revanche before France became strong enough to wage it. See: The Diary of a Writer, ps. 565, 732-34, 909-10; The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, II, p. 147.
120. Dostoyevsky et l'Europe en 1873, ps. 167, 168.

121. The Pushkin Speech, p. 88.

122. Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, p. 141.

123. For Dostoyevsky, as we have seen, Germany does not quite come within the rubric of bourgeois liberal democracy; and insofar as it rejects this new formula of social order, its place in the West poses a grave problem. Dostoyevsky does not doubt that Germany is a Western nation which, moreover, aspires to hegemony over the entire West. Nevertheless, its apparent rejection of the new social formula being realized in France, Britain, and the United States, leads him to make an important distinction within the West. He distinguishes between the "outermost Western world" of the great liberal democracies, and the Germanic world. (See, for instance, The Diary of a Writer, p. 730).

124. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 369.

125. The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, III, p. 160. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 369. See also The Diary of a Writer, p. 669:
As a result of an excessive accumulation of riches in the hands of a few coarseness of feeling is being generated in the owners of wealth. The sense of the elegant is converted into thirst for whimsical excesses and abnormalities. Vulgarity spreads awfully. It generates cruelty and cowardice...intense and cowardly anxiety concerning one's own security which at times of lasting peace, invariably very soon converts itself into panicky fear for one's self and transmits itself to all social strata; this generates an awful thirst for the acquisition and accumulation of money.


127. The Idiot, p. 232.


129. The Idiot, pp. 411-12.

130. The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, II, p. 7. "...the modern idea that everything belongs to me, and I do not owe anything to anyone." Ibid., p. 5.


132. Oh, it goes without saying that man always, at all times, has been worshipping materialism and has been inclined to perceive and understand liberty only in the sense of making his life secure through money hoarded by the exertion of every effort and accumulated by all possible means. However, at no time in the past have these tendencies been raised so cynically and so obviously to the level of a sublime principle as in
our Nineteenth Century..."Everybody for himself, and only for himself, and every intercourse with man solely for one's self" -- such is the ethical tenet of the majority of present-day people, even not bad people, but, on the contrary, labouring people who neither murder nor steal. The Diary of a Writer, p. 649.

Dostoyevsky refers to two other popular liberal social formulas: "Chacun pour soi et Dieu pour tous" and "Après moi, le déluge", in The Pushkin Speech, p. 67.

133. Dostoyevsky uses this phrase in a letter to Apollon Maikov (written from Geneva in 1868), in Letters and Reminiscences, p. 41.

134. Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, ps. 104-107, 146-47. Dostoyevsky focuses particularly on the role of melodrama in endowing marriage with a sacrosanct and "ineffably noble" character; for he thought that, in actuality, marriage in France had become little more than a "wedding of assets." (Ibid., p. 139). For his corrosively satirical and highly amusing account of marriage in bourgeois France, and indeed of the entire attempt of the French bourgeoisie to conceal their "craving for personal material welfare" (The Diary of a Writer, p. 650) with a noble façade, see the chapters entitled "Essay on the Bourgeoisie" and "Bribri and Ma Biche" in Winter Notes on Summer Impressions. These chapters establish Dostoyevsky as perhaps the foremost pre-Revolutionary Russian critic of Western middle class mores. Whatever his final judgement of bourgeois liberalism - which will concern us at a later point in the thesis - he was repelled by the bourgeoisie itself.

135. "Moral ordre" became the favourite slogan of middle class France during the reign of Napoleon III.

136. The Idiot, p. 413. See also The Diary of a Writer, ps. 664, 670, for references to the stock-exchange. For Father Zossima's words, see The Brothers Karamazov, p. 369.

137. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 369. The Diary of a Writer, p. 601.

138. The Idiot, p. 411.

139. Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, p. 117.

140. For references to the self-assurance of the bourgeoisie, see Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, ps. 87, 90, 100, 124; and for references to bourgeois' fearfulness, see Ibid., ps. 90, 100, 102, 116-17, 124.


142. The Diary of a Writer, p. 670.

143. Ibid., p. 832. "...people are preaching peace, longlasting peace in Europe, and there are no grounds, they say, for it to be disrupted". The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, II, p. 158.
144. The Pushkin Speech, p. 87.

145. The Idiot, p. 413.

146. See: The Brothers Karamazov, p. 369; The Pushkin Speech, p. 85.


148. The Pushkin Speech, p. 87.

149. The Diary of a Writer, ps. 346-47, 729.

150. He refers to "political" or "revolutionary" socialism also as "communism".

151. The Diary of a Writer, ps. 148, 346, 729.

152. Ibid., p. 346.

153. Ibid., p. 252.


155. The Diary of a Writer, pp. 344-50.

156. Ibid., p. 620. The equality of people was to be structured, not through "universal love, utopia", but through "the law of necessity, self-preservation, and the scientific method." The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, II, p. 143.

157. The Diary of a Writer, p. 619. In this passage Dostoyevsky observes that the notion of historical inevitability first became effective in bourgeois liberalism.

158. Ibid., pp. 618-20.

159. Ibid., ps. 619-20, 146, 148, 252. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 371. Dostoyevsky et l'Europe en 1873, p. 158 (in reference to Spanish communists). Other than a single brief reference to Karl Marx and Bakunin (Ibid., p. 86), Dostoyevsky mentions no specific "ring-leaders" of Western "political" socialism.


162. Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, p. 116. In his rough notes for 1863-64, Dostoyevsky wrote:
   In forty-eight even the bourgeoisie agreed to demand its rights; but when it was driven further where it couldn't understand anything...then it began to defend
itself and prevailed... All the blood the revolutionaries raved about, all the uproar and underground work will lead to nothing and will come down on their own heads. The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, I, p. 42.

163. The Diary of a Writer, p. 618.


165. The Diary of a Writer, p. 721.

166. For instance, in The Pushkin Speech, pp. 86-87.


168. See: The Pushkin Speech, p. 87; The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, II, p. 150.


173. The Diary of a Writer, p. 252.


175. A Raw Youth, ps. 468, 470. The Notebooks for The Possessed, p. 357. The Diary of a Writer, ps. 250, 667. The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, II, p. 4. It should be noted that although Dostoyevsky was acutely aware of the still significant presence of national particularity in the West, and regarded socialism itself as a "French doctrine", he nevertheless considered it to be, like bourgeois liberalism, an essentially universal, cosmopolitan, and even anti-national doctrine. He had no doubt that any future liberal or socialist Western civilization implied the eventual dilution or even abolition of particularity. See, for instance: Ibid., p. 128; his remarks concerning Belinsky in Letters of F.M. Dostoyevsky, p. 220; and the remark which he ascribes to Gambetta in The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, III, p. 157.

176. The Diary of a Writer, p. 909.


180. *The Brothers Karamazov*, p. 269. See also: *A Raw Youth*, pp. 467-70; *The Diary of a Writer*, p. 63.


182. *The Unpublished Dostoyevsky*, II, p. 133. This appears in his rough notebook for 1876; and the same idea is expressed in published form in 1871 in *The Possessed*, p. 419.
Chapter Four


2. This chapter is certainly not intended to plumb all the "fathomless depth" of the "Legend", which has "never yet been properly explored" (N. Berdyaev, Dostoevsky [New York, 1957], p. 210). It is hoped, however, that a consideration of the "Legend" within the context of Dostoevsky's critique of the West will shed further light on its meaning. For a thoughtful, comprehensive introduction to the structure and themes of this extraordinarily complex writing, see E. Sandoz, Political Apocalypse (Louisiana, 1971). See also V. Solovyov, Lectures on Godmanhood (London, 1948), XI-XII.

3. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 293.

4. Ibid., p. 291.


6. The Brothers Karamazov, pp. 295-296.

7. See Chapter 2, Section I of this thesis.

8. The Brothers Karamazov, pp. 297, 198. The Notebooks for The Brothers Karamazov, p. 80.

9. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 300.

10. Ibid., p. 295.

11. Ibid., p. 290.


13. It is important to note that the Inquisitor shares the Geneva conception of freedom as grounded in the "conscious will". See Chapter 2, Section II of this thesis.

14. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 298.

15. The Notebooks for The Brothers Karamazov, p. 82.

16. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 297.

17. Ibid., p. 296.

18. Dostoyevsky to V.A. Alekseev, June 7, 1876, in Pisma, III, pp. 11-12.
20. Ibid., ps. 297, 296.
22. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 297.
23. See The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, II, p. 156. As Dostoyevsky has Father Zossima declare in The Notebooks for the Brothers Karamazov, p. 107:
   And don't dream, materialists; that mutual advantage will force you to construct an order like that of a regular society. This cannot be, for your society will require sacrifice from everyone, but a corrupt desire will not want to sacrifice. A strong desire and great talent will not want to be compared with mediocrity, and since there will be no moral tie... except for the mutual advantage of bread, then the great and powerful will arise with his savagery and confederates, and you will begin to destroy each other in eternal enmity and you will devour each other, and that's the way it will finish.
24. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 298.
26. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 299.
27. The Notebooks for The Brothers Karamazov, p. 80.
28. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 299.
29. The Notebooks for The Brothers Karamazov, p. 80.
30. Ibid., p. 80.
31. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 299.
32. Ibid., p. 301:
33. Ibid., p. 301.
34. Ibid., p. 299:
35. Ibid., ps. 301, 303.
36. Ibid., p. 300.
37. Ibid., p. 303.
38. Ibid., p. 302.
39. See the discussion of Dostoyevsky's account of the human need for order in Chapter 2, Section I of this thesis.
40. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 302.
41. Ibid., p. 302.
42. See, for instance, Ibid., p. 69.
43. Ibid., ps. 302-305, 297.
44. See Chapter 3, Section III (ii) of this thesis.
45. The Diary of a Writer, p. 736. Note also the consensus of Stepan Verkhovensky's liberal circle, in The Possessed, p. 48: We had long ago prophesied that the Pope would assume the role of a simple archbishop in a united Italy, and had no doubt whatever that this thousand-year-old problem was a trifling matter in our age of humanitarian ideas, industry, and railways.
46. The Diary of a Writer, p. 737.
47. Dostoyevsky et l'Europe en 1873, p. 46.
48. For his reference to these "greatest representatives of Catholicism" in the nineteenth century, see The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, I, p. 93.
49. The Diary of a Writer, ps. 256-58, 911-12.
50. The Brothers Karamazov, pp. 303-305.
51. See Chapter 3, Section I of this thesis. "Project" is used here in Nietzsche's sense of man's "projection" of a new "horizon".
52. Ibid., ps. 294-95, 300-301, 306-307. The Notebooks for The Brothers Karamazov, p. 75.
53. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 306.
54. See Dostoyevsky's foreward to The Brothers Karamazov.
55. Ibid., p. 304.
56. Ibid., ps. 304, 305, 307.
57. Ibid., p. 307.

59. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 288. Dostoyevsky's concern with presenting his thought while conforming to the requirements of art is evident, for instance, in his discussion of the character of Father Zossima; see his letter to N.A. Liubimov, in New Dostoyevsky Letters, pp. 92-94.


61. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 398. The Notebooks for The Brothers Karamazov, p. 75.

62. The Notebooks for The Brothers Karamazov, p. 79.

63. The Brothers Karamazov, pp. 285-88.


65. See pp. 181-192 of this thesis.

66. The Brothers Karamazov, pp. 26-27.

67. See Chapter 2, Section I of this thesis.

68. The Brothers Karamazov, ps. 273, 268.

69. Ibid., pp. 276-77.

70. Ibid., p. 77.

71. See Chapter 2, Section II of this thesis.

72. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 77.

73. Ibid., p. 276.

74. Ibid., pp. 155-56.

75. Ibid., p. 274.

76. Ibid., p. 274.

77. See Chapter 2, Section III of this thesis.

78. The Brothers Karamazov, ps. 309, 743.


82. *The Brothers Karamazov*, p. 308.

83. *The Notebooks for The Brothers Karamazov*, pp. 72-73.


85. *The Brothers Karamazov*, pp. 763-64.


89. *Ibid.*, ps. 586, 614-15, 242. Kirilov's teaching about the possibility of moving through nihilism to the apprehension of an earthly eternity appears similar to that of Nietzsche, who also attempted to move beyond the "deadly" insight into the "finality of becoming" to the contemplation of eternity (not as timelessness, but as endless time). Although Nietzsche was familiar with some of Dostoyevsky's writings (*Notes from Underground* and *Crime and Punishment*), it is almost certain that Dostoyevsky never read Nietzsche (whose major writings were published after Dostoyevsky's death).


92. *The Brothers Karamazov*, p. 763.


Chapter Five

1. The Possessed, ps. 260, 292.


6. The Possessed, ps. 667, 127, 587. See also The Idiot, pp. 258-59 for Prince Myshkin's doubts concerning the validity of an experience which has its source in a disease. As is well-known, Dostoyevsky himself suffered from epilepsy. It is possible that Myshkin expresses his own views on the subject.

7. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 733.

8. Ibid., p. 769.

9. Ibid., p. 768.

10. See pp. 207-208 of this thesis.


12. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 768.

13. Ibid., p. 771.


17. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 746. The Possessed, pp. 676-77.

18. The Notebooks for The Brothers Karamazov, p. 75.


20. Letters of F.M. Dostoyevsky, pp. 233-34. See also The Diary of a Writer, pp. 541-43.

21. See, for instance, The Brothers Karamazov, p. 298.

23. The Possessed, p. 126.


27. "God" is used here in the Platonic sense of an unchanging "perfection", or "good". For the purpose of clarifying Dostoyevsky's meaning, especially in this Chapter, I often use "good", in the Platonic sense, as a designation for God. This designation helps to bring out the crucial distinctions which Dostoyevsky makes in regard to the proper conception of God's relation to the world.


29. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 61.


31. See pp. 213-15 of this thesis. See also The Notebooks for The Brothers Karamazov, p. 74:

Inquisitor: Why do we need the beyond? We are more human than you. We love the earth - Schiller sings of joy.

32. See, for instance, "Stavrogin's Confession" in The Possessed, pp. 682-97. Another of Dostoyevsky's memorable "case-studies" of the "descent into hell" is Svidrigailov, in Crime and Punishment.

33. See The Brothers Karamazov, pp. 379-81. Cf. St. John of Damascus, Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, II, 4: "For evil is nothing else than absence of goodness, just as darkness also is absence of light."

34. See Dostoyevsky's letter to N.A. Liubimov in New Dostoyevsky Letters, pp. 93-94. See also his letter to Pobedonostsev, in Letters and Reminiscences, p. 251.

35. See pp. 203-207 of this thesis.

36. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 305.

37. Ibid., pp. 342-43.

38. Ibid., p. 695.

39. Ibid., p. 377. The Western aspiration to bring forth good out of necessity is, for Dostoyevsky, epitomized in Hegel's thought. See The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, II, pp. 102-103.
40. Ibid., p. 275. See also Dostoyevsky's letter to N.A. Liubimov in which he asserts that Ivan's rebellion signifies "the denial not of God, but of the meaning of his creation", in New Dostoyevsky Letters, p. 81.

41. The Notebooks for The Brothers Karamazov, p. 76.

42. The Brothers Karamazov, pp. 308-9.

43. Ibid., pp. 274-75.

44. Job 42:5.

45. The Brothers Karamazov, ps. 371, 374. A Raw Youth, p. 385.


48. The Brothers Karamazov, ps. 371, 373.

49. See, for instance: St. Maximus the Confessor, Mystagogia, P.G., 91, 664, A, C; Ambigua, P.G., 91, 1257 B. For an extended exposition of this principle of the simultaneous transcendence and immanence of God -- as this principle is understood by the Christian theological tradition within which Dostoyevsky speaks -- see: V. Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (London, 1957), Chapters 2, 3, 4; P. Sherrard, The Greek East and the Latin West (Oxford, 1959), Chapters II and III.

50. This can be defined as God's "descent into the world", or, more literally, His "construction" or "administration" of the world. See V. Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, p. 139.

51. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 377.

52. See V. Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, Chapter 5.


54. The Brothers Karamazov, pp. 426-27.

55. Ibid., p. 377.


57. The Dream of a Queer Fellow, pp. 22-23.

58. Ibid., p. 22.
59. Ibid., p. 22.
60. Ibid., pp. 26-27.
61. Ibid., p. 28.
62. Ibid., pp. 27-30.
63. Ibid., p. 22.
64. Ibid., p. 30. The Brothers Karamazov, ps. 352, 356.
65. The Notebooks for The Possessed, p. 218. Letters of F.M. Dostoevsky, p. 121. See also his letter to Mrs. N.D. Fonvisin, written while in Siberia, shortly after his return to Christianity:

...God gives me sometimes moments of perfect peace; in such moments I love and believe that I am loved; in such moments I have formulated my creed, wherein all is clear and holy to me. This creed is extremely simple; here it is: I believe that there is nothing lovelier, deeper, more sympathetic, more rational, more manly, and more perfect than the Saviour; I say to myself with jealous love that not only is there no one else like him, but that there could be no one.


Dostoevsky usually opposes this "undying ideal" to those "enlightened intellectuals", like Belinsky, who would set themselves up as humanity's new "guides". See his letter to A.N. Maikov, Letters of F.M. Dostoevsky, p. 121-22.

66. See Chapter 2, Section II of this thesis. As we have seen in the first chapter of the thesis, this evocation of the image of Christ would be characteristic of Geneva thought particularly insofar as it is informed by French or "utopian" socialism. Dostoevsky illustrates this tendency with reference to Renan; see The Unpublished Dostoevsky, I, p. 96.
67. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 288.
68. The Notebooks for The Possessed, p. 147. See also Ibid., p. 238.
69. The Notebooks for The Idiot, p. 106.
70. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 288.
71. The Notebooks for The Brothers Karamazov, ps. 75, 76, 77.
72. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 381.
73. The Idiot, pp. 446-47.
Yes, he went up to him, to him, the little dried-up old man, with little wrinkles on his face, joyful and smiling gently. The coffin was no longer there and he wore the same clothes as the day before...His face was uncovered, his eyes were shining. So he, too, had been invited to the feast, to the wedding at Cana of Galilee. How was that?
"Yes, my dear boy, I too am invited, invited and bidden", a soft voice was saying over him. "...Come and join us too!"

It was his voice, the elder Zossima's voice...The elder raised Alyosha by the hand, and he rose from his knees.

"Let us make merry", the dried-up old man went on.
"Let's drink new wine, the wine of new gladness, of great gladness. See how many guests there are here? And there's the bride and the groom, and there's the ruler of the feast, tasting the new wine...And do you see our Sun, do you see him?"

"I am afraid - I dare not look", Alyosha whispered.
"Do not be afraid of him. He's terrible in his majesty, awful in his eminence, but infinitely merciful. He became like one of us from love and he makes merry with us, turns water into wine, so as not to cut short the gladness of the guests. He is expecting new guests, he is calling new ones unceasingly and for ever and ever. There they are bringing the new wine..."

Something glowed in Alyosha's heart...till it ached, tears of ecstasy were welling up from his soul...He stretched out his hands, uttered a cry, and woke up...

The Brothers Karamazov, pp. 425-26.

For an interpretation, from the perspective of Eastern Christianity, of the deceased Zossima's "visit" to Alyosha, see V. Ivanov, Dostoyevsky (New York, 1971), pp. 161-62.

76. See John 16:33.

77. See The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, I, pp. 39-41. These pages, written while Dostoyevsky kept a vigil by the dead body of his first wife, constitute his most sustained and explicit consideration of the nature of personal immortality — a consideration to which he sets limits by the words which have been quoted. For an exposition of the Eastern Christian conception of personal immortality as the "transfiguration" or "deification" of man into a "spiritual body", see: V. Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, Chapters 7, 8, 12; P. Sherrard, The Greek East and the Latin West, pp. 41-47; V. Solovyov, The Meaning of Love (London, 1945).

78. The Notebooks for The Brothers Karamazov, p. 82.

79. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 381.

81. Then I saw a new heaven and a new earth; for the first heaven and the first earth had passed away, and the sea was no more. And I saw the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband; and I heard a great voice from the throne saying, 'Behold, the dwelling of God is with men. He will dwell with them, and they shall be his people, and God himself will be with them; he will wipe away every tear from their eyes, and death shall be no more, neither shall there be mourning nor crying nor pain any more, for the former things have passed away... Revelation 21:1-4.

The nature of Dostoyevsky's interest in the Revelation to John will be discussed in the next chapter of the thesis.

82. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 68.

83. Ibid., p. 370. See also Chapter 2, Section II of the thesis for an exposition of the Geneva idea of freedom, equality, and brotherhood.

84. The Pushkin Speech, p. 46. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 28.

85. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 369.

86. In Christianity, in true Christianity, there are and there will ever be, masters and servants, but a slave can never be even conceived. I speak of a true and perfect Christianity. Servants are not slaves. The pupil Timothy served Paul when they journeyed together; but read Paul's epistle to Timothy. Is it written to a slave, to a servant even? He is in truth his 'child Timothy', his beloved son. These, these are indeed the relations that will be between master and servant, if master and servant become perfect Christians. Servants and masters there will be, but masters will be no longer lords nor servants slaves. Pushkin Speech, p. 81.

For Dostoyevsky's account of the incompatibility of servitude with Christianity, see The Pushkin Speech, pp. 78-80. This passage demands the attention particularly of those who speak of Dostoyevsky's social "conservatism". In this regard, see also: The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, I, p. 106, II, ps. 64, 115, III, p. 16.


88. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 376.

89. For a discussion of the theological basis of this reconciliation of unity
89. (continued)

with particularity within the church, see V. Lossky, *The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church*, pp. 164-71. This brotherly unity which preserves and enhances free particularity is usually designated in Russian religious thought by the word *sobornost*'. This word, well-nigh untranslatable into English, is derived from the verb *sobirat*' - "to assemble, gather collect." The most etymologically correct translation of the noun, then, would be - "the ingathering, convening, or assembling of people." The Russian church used the adjective *sobornoi* to translate the Greek *Katholikos* (universal). The Slavophile theologian, Khomyakov, thus saw the catholicity of the church in the concord of those who are gathered together (sobran) in the name of Christ. See A. Khomyakov, *The Church is One*. Dostoyevsky once remarked that his understanding of the church is essentially that of Khomyakov. See *The Unpublished Dostoyevsky*, III, p. 158. For a helpful elucidation of Khomyakov's understanding of *sobornost*' see: J.H. Pain, *Sobornost: A Study in Modern Russian Orthodox Theology* (D. Phil dissertation, Oxford University); Louis J. Shein, "The Doctrine of *Sobornost* and Christian Unity", *Canadian Journal of Theology* (1965), pp. 174-82.

Chapter Six

1. He makes this statement in his reply to A.D. Gradovsk, in The Pushkin Speech, p. 94.

2. See The Brothers Karamazov, pp. 68-69:
   ...In this way (that is, with regard to the future)
   it is not the Church that ought to seek for itself a
   definite place in the State like "any other social
   organization" or like "an organization of men for
   religious purposes" ... but, on the contrary, every State
   on earth must eventually be entirely transformed into a
   Church, and become nothing but a Church, renouncing
   those of its aims which are incompatible with the
   principles of the Church. All this will in no way lower
   its prestige or deprive it of its honour and glory as a
   Great State... but will merely turn it away from the
   false... path to the right and true path which alone leads
   to the eternal goal.


5. The Brothers Karamazov, ps. 334, xxv, 17-21, 25-27, 65, 86. The Notebooks for The Possessed, 156.


9. The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, I, p. 34.

10. This motivation is most explicitly evident in Dostoyevsky's work on The Diary of a Writer. See K. Moehl, Dostoyevsky. (Princeton, 1967), ps. 536, 544. For his use of the term "Russian Socialism", see The Diary of a Writer, p. 1029.

11. See Chapter 2, Section I of this thesis.


13. See, for instance: The Possessed, p. 262; The Brothers Karamazov, p. 520.


16. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 31.


19. One of the foremost Slavophile thinkers, Konstantin Aksakov, described the Russian commune as follows:

   An obschina is a union of people who have renounced egoism, their individuality, and who express a common accord; this is an act of love, a noble Christian act, which evidences itself with varying clarity in other manifestations. An obschina thus represents a moral choir, and even as in a choir one voice is not lost but follows the notes of music and is heard in the harmony of all the voices: so in an obschina the individual is not lost, but renounces his exclusivity in regard for the common accord, and there emerges the noble phenomenon of a harmonious, shared existence of rational minds; there emerges a brotherhood, an obschina – a triumph of the human spirit. Found in J.H. Pain, Sobornost: A Study in Modern Russian Orthodox Theology (D. Phil dissertation, Oxford), pp. 124-25.

20. A Herzen, "The Russian People and Socialism", in Selected Philosophical Works (Moscow, 1956).

21. For Dostoyevsky's definition of his own "Slavophilism", see The Diary of a Writer, 779-83.

22. Ibid., pp. 1028.


25. See, for instance, The Diary of a Writer, ps. 1030, 204.


27. Ibid., p. 656.

28. The Diary of a Writer, p. 204.


33. The question raised at the end of the first chapter — concerning what Dostoevsky affirms and rejects in Russian Westernism — has now been answered.


35. See, for instance, *The Diary of a Writer*, p. 258.

36. Ibid., p. 239. *The Idiot*, p. 588.


38. Dostoevsky was evidently concerned with formulating a Christian interpretation of the history of the West as early as his Siberian exile. See his letter to his brother Michael (written in 1854, from Omsk, Siberia) in *Letters of F.M. Dostoevsky*, ps. 64, 66. See also V.V. Zenkovsky, "Dostoevsky's Religious and Philosophical Views", in R. Wellek, ed., *Dostoevsky* (New Jersey, 1962), pp. 142-44. For Dostoevsky's most concise expression of his interpretation of Western history, see *The Pushkin Speech*, pp. 88-89.


44. *The Brothers Karamazov*, p. 68.


47. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 302.


49. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 302.

50. The reliance of the Inquisitor on reason alone has been discussed in Chapter 4. See also Father Zóssima's assertions that this reliance is at the centre of Western civilization, in The Brothers Karamazov, ps. 371, 374.

51. See the "Appendix" to this thesis for further discussion of the filioque issue.

52. See p. 253 of this thesis.


54. The Diary of a Writer, ps. 911, 735-36, 728. The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, pp. 94-95. See also: The Diary of a Writer, p. 741; The Brothers Karamazov, pp. 305-306.

55. The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, III, p. 151. See also Ibid., p. 153: "Yes, even now there are Christians there..."

56. See, for instance, The Diary of a Writer, p. 736, where he states that "the religious idea and the papal idea are essentially different."


58. The Idiot, p. 585.


60. The Diary of a Writer, p. 193.

61. Ibid., p. 730.

62. The Pushkin Speech, p. 56.

63. The Notebooks for The Possessed, p. 355. Dostoyevsky accepted the "left-Hegelian" interpretation of Hegel propounded by Herzen. (See Chapter 1, Section II (ii) of this thesis). For an allusion to the intrinsic relation between Lutheranism and Hegelianism, see The Brothers Karamazov, p. 72. Cf. V. Solovyov, Lectures on Godmanhood (London, 1948), p. 202. Solovyov's account of Protestantism is very similar to that of Dostoyevsky.
64. The Diary of a Writer, pp. 562-64. The Pushkin Speech, p. 64.


66. The Diary of a Writer, p. 63.


68. The Pushkin Speech, p. 89.

69. The Diary of a Writer, ps. 905, 629.

70. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 390. Dostoyevsky once planned to visit Athos. See his letter to his niece, S. Alexandrovna, in Letters of F.M. Dostoyevsky, p. 200.

71. The Pushkin Speech, p. 89. For further discussion about the conversion of the Russians to Orthodox Christianity, and about the history of Russian Orthodoxy, see: G.P. Fedotov, The Russian Religious Mind (Mass., 1946-66); N. Zernov, The Russians and their Church (London, 1945).


73. See Chapter I, Section I (i) of this thesis.

74. The Pushkin Speech, p. 89. Because interpreters of Dostoyevsky have tended to regard him as an uncritical proponent of the Russian Orthodox Church, attention should be accorded to the criticism which he levels against it. See for instance: The Brothers Karamazov, p. 343; The Notebooks for The Brothers Karamazov, p. 101; The Diary of a Writer, p. 754.

75. See, for instance, The Unpublished Dostoevsky, III, pp. 74-75.

76. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 368.

77. See his letter to N.A. Liubimov (August 1879) in New Dostoevsky Letters, pp. 92-94. See also The Brothers Karamazov, pp. 25-30.

78. T. Ware, The Orthodox Church (Great Britain, 1963), p. 75.


80. See p. 145 of this thesis.

81. The Diary of a Writer, ps. 727, 730.

83. Dostoyevsky is well aware, for instance, that the English-speaking world has tended to refuse complete assimilation to the "Roman idea". See, for instance, The Pushkin Speech, p. 56.

84. See Chapter 3, Section II (ii) of this thesis.

85. The Idiot, p. 588. The Diary of a Writer, ps. 351, 1044.

86. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 852.

87. See pp. 192-94 of this thesis.

88. The Brothers Karamazov, p. 370. The Idiot, p. 588.

89. The Diary of a Writer, p. 696.

90. Ibid., p. 720.

91. The Diary of a Writer, ps. 360-65, 667. The Unpublished Dostoyevsky, III, ps. 31, 123: "In the Slavic question neither Slavdom, nor Slavism is the essence, but Orthodoxy."

92. Dostoyevsky's support for Russian intervention on behalf of the Balkan Slavs raises decisively the question of his attitude towards the Russian state. He tended to accept the Slavophile insistence on a radical distinction between the Russian state and the Russian people. The modern Russian state was for him essentially an artificial construction imposed upon the Russian people from without by Peter the Great and his successors. Yet he does concede that the state can, in some instances, express the aspirations of the people; and this is especially so insofar as the state understands itself according to the centuries-old symbolism of the Czar who is the father of all Russians. This self-articulation of the political structure in terms of the father-child symbolism is, for Dostoyevsky, intimately related to the tendency of the Russian people to organize themselves into the obschina, or "brotherhood" -- a manifestation, in turn, of sobornost'. (See: E. Voegelin, New Science of Politics [Chicago, 1952], Chapter I; The Diary of a Writer, pp. 1032-33). Because Dostoyevsky upheld the legitimacy of the Russian state only insofar as its activity manifested the spontaneous union of the Czar with the aspiration of the people towards sobornost', it was crucial to him that this aspiration be evident in the undertakings of the state. He was convinced that the Russian intervention in the Balkans was not merely the product of the desire for conquest on the part of the St. Petersburg military and bureaucratic establishment, but was a genuine manifestation of the best aspirations of the Russian people as a whole. (For his disagreement with Tolstoy over this issue, see The Diary of a Writer, pp. 793-813.)

93. Ibid., pp. 636-37.


97. This is not to say, of course, that there is an exact correspondence between his journalism and his art. Obviously, some ideas are present in one group of writings, while not being represented in the other. Nevertheless, to an amazing degree, his journalism, as well as his rough notebooks, constitute a "laboratory" or "testing-ground" for the most fundamental ideas present in his art. See, in this regard, his letter to Mme. Altaschevsky, in *Letters of F.M. Dostoyevsky*, pp. 222-24.


103. *The Notebooks for The Possessed*, p. 226. See also V. Solovyov, "Tri rechi v pamyat' Dostoevskogo," *Sobranie Sochinennii*, II-IV, p. 223. Solovyov states that Dostoevsky laid most emphasis upon the following passages from the Book of Revelation: 12:1-2, 19:6-8, 21:1-4. According to Solovyov, he identified Russia with the "woman clothed with the sun who is "with child and she cried out in her pangs of birth, in anguish for delivery."


105. These two books, more than any others, stand at the centre of Dostoyevsky's Christianity. See his letter to his niece, S. Alexandrovna, in *Letters of F.M. Dostoyevsky*, p. 142. See also: *The Brothers Karamazov*, pp. 422-27; V. Solovyov, "Tri rechi v pamyat' Dostoevskogo", *Sobranie Sochinennii*, II-IV, p. 223.

106. *The Brothers Karamazov*, p. 73.

Appendix

1. For a lucid discussion of this question, see P. Sherrard, The Greek East and the Latin West, Chapter II.


6. Ibid., pp. 85-86.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources


---------. The Devils. Translated by D. Magarshack. England: Penguin Books, 1953. Cited throughout the thesis as The Possessed in order to avoid confusion in regard to the rough notebooks, and as a more satisfactory translation.


Selected Secondary Readings

Works directly concerned with Dostoyevsky’s thought:


Other Works:

Bulgakov, S. The Orthodox Church. Translated by E.S. Cram. London: Centenary Press, 1935.


Khomyakov, A. The Church is One. [n.p., n.d.]

--------. L'Eglise Latine et le Protestantisme. Lausanne, 1872.


Ware, T. The Orthodox Church. England: Penguin, 1963.