PROBLEM OF TIME AND TEMPORALITY IN

SĀMKHYA-YOGA AND ĀBHIDHARMA BUDDHISM

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By

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SCOPE AND CONTENTS: In this work, we have analysed the problem of

temporality and its soteriological significance in the philosophico-

religious traditions of the Sāmkhya-Yoga and Ābhidharma Buddhism. The

basic concern is to demonstrate the possibility of accounting for temporal

determination without taking recourse to a reification of time category.

An attempt is made to bring out the soteriological implications of such a

perspective. The introductory section defines the problematic and methodolo-

gical issues in the present study. This is followed by Part I, which is

an expository section on Sāmkhya-Yoga. Here, the problem of temporality

is investigated against the background of the basic ontological perspective of

the Samkhya-Yoga. Part II is a critical exposition of the problem of tem-

porality in the Ābhidharma Buddhism. We have attempted to show how, accord-

ing to the Ābhidharma Buddhism, temporal determination is a feature of rea-

lity. The concluding section looks at the problem in comparative perspective.

In this section we have tried to show how the two philosophico-religious systems, despite certain basic differences, have some common structural and thematic congruity.

ABSTRACT

In the present work an attempt is made to study the problem of temporality in the religious philosophies of the Sāmkhya-Yoga and Ābhidharma Buddhism. The two systems are studied in comparative perspective to determine the degree of compatibility of the two on the specific issue of temporality and its significance for the world-transcendence. The systems under investigation have been selected on the ground that both of them look at temporality as a characteristic built into the structure of things. Reification of time, as an abstract category independent of entities, is alien to both the systems. Temporality is conceived not in terms of time as a transcendent condition of our being and cognition. Rather it is conceived in terms of the changefulness and becomingness, characteristic of phenomena as such and its relationship to the cognizing consciousness. This indeed is the most important perspective that they share against other religious philosophies of India.

Our interest in the two systems' articulation of the problem emanates from the conviction that the systems under investigation, instead of being diametrically opposed to each other, complement each other and in some significant ways share certain basic perspectives. The fact of their complementarity has been ignored in the earlier studies. There are some occasional statements about the possibility of some similarities between

the two. But no study of significance, except that of Stcherbatsky, has been undertaken to see if there is any significant correlation between the two. Most of the time scholars have treated them as representing two diametrically opposed ontological perspectives, Murti being the most prominent proponent of this position. That there are certain important differences between the two cannot be denied. But it has been our concern to demonstrate that, despite important differences in their ontological perspectives, the two systems are in close company, specially in their articulation of the problem of temporality and its soteriological implications.

The body of the thesis is divided into three major parts. The first part is a critical exposition of the problem in the context of Sāmkhya-Yoga. The second part deals with the problem with reference to Abhidharma Buddhism. And the third part is an attempt to bring out the correlation between the two systems with special reference to the soteriological implications of their conception of the problem under investigation.

The following are the major findings of the present work:

1. • Both the Sāmkhya-Yoga and Abhidharma Buddhism relativize the category of time. This relativization is part and parcel of their non-cosmological understanding of the temporal process.

2. Temporality is defined as a feature built into the structure of change and becomingness and its subjective experience.

3. For explaining temporal determinations of past, present and future implicit distinction between real and existent is admissible. The present alone is considered existent, while past and future are real.

4. The realm of the temporal is conceived in contradistinction with Eternity, the two being dialectically related. The temporality is seen in opposition to Eternity and yet providing a link with Eternity.

5. The transcendence of temporality is a function of consciousness. Reflection (contemplation) as an act of consciousness is a temporal act. But reflection is seen as having a built-in structure of transcendence. This transcendence of the temporal process takes place in the present. Accordingly, both the Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Abhidharma Buddhism are the soteriologies of the present.

I wish to record my deep sense of indebtedness to my friend Mr. K. N. Oh, who was kind enough to read some relevant Japanese materials and translate them for me. I also thank my friends, Miss Kausar Khan and Miss Bithika Mukerjee, for kindly going through the manuscript and checking typographical and other errors. I would like to thank my wife Manju for her love and patience without which it would have been difficult to complete this work.

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To

Ma and Babujee

with love and respect

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I

SĀMKHYA-YOGA

CHAPTER I

AIMS AND ASSUMPTIONS

Introduction:

The subject matter of the present dissertation is the problem of
time and temporality in the systems of Sāmkhya-Yoga and Ābhidharma Budd-
hism. For the purposes of this study, it is crucial that we make a con-
ceptual distinction between the categories of time and temporality. The
category of time is used for reification of time as an absolute category
with independent ontological status. Time is conceived independent of
entities and somehow influencing and conditioning the mode of being of
all entities. Temporality, on the other hand, is the expression used to
indicate the fact of change which characterises entities as their mode.
It is not what stands independent of them claiming a co-ordinate status
in relation to them, but is constituted of their very mode of existing.

Neither Sāmkhya-Yoga nor Ābhidharma Buddhism look at temporality
as a feature or function of time conceived as reified category. Tempo-
rality is not the adjectival synonym of time understood as the transcen-
dent condition of our being and cognition. More specifically, within the
context of these two systems, temporality may be defined in terms of the
changefulness and becomingness characteristic of phenomena as such and its
relationship to the cognizing consciousness. Thus, in this study, the term
temporality is used to connote both the fact of change and finitude of.

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phenomenal existence as well as its subjective experience.[1]

In this work we have used the hyphenated expression of Sāmkhya-Yoga to bring out the close correlation in the basic ontological perspective of the two schools of thought. The Sāmkhya system under investigation includes the thought of Sāmkhya Kārikā and Sāmkhya Sūtra and various commentaries thereon. Yoga, in the present context, is used for the classical Yoga or Rāja Yoga as expounded in the Patanjali's Yoga Sūtra and the various commentaries on it. In using this hyphenated expression we have tried to zero upon substantial agreement in the basic ontological perspectives of the two systems.[2]

The expression Abhidharma Buddhism is employed in this work to connote the 'school' of Buddhist thought whose ideas are systematically expounded in the Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu and commentaries thereon. The use of the expression is preferred for various reasons and in the absence of a more adequate label indicative of the scope of this study. Vasubandhu himself uses the term in Abhidharmakośa as a proper name to refer to the philosophical standpoint which is the subject matter of the Abhidharmakośa. Moreover, both Vasubandhu and his commentator Yasomitra seem to be in complete agreement in maintaining that the Abhidharmakośa presents in a concise and systematic manner the central ideas of the primary Abhidharma texts which are now lost to the Sanskrit tradition.[3]

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[1] See pp. 9-15.

[2] For further discussion see pp. 46-49.

[3] See pp. 150-152.

Setting of the Problem

The significance of time component in the religious symbolism of
a cultural subsystem has been noted by scholars. The time element is
an integral part, of no small consequence, of any developed. system of
meaning. The time component of the symbol system may be seen to provide
an important clue to the pattern of meaning structures, their emergence
and maintenance. A study of religion as a system of meaning cannot re-
main indifferent to this fact.

What is important, however, is not to look at symbol systems and
meaning structures in unidimensional and unilinear terms. Ignoring the
complex character and varieties of levels on which the symbol system
operates will lead to oversimplification or undermining of the essential
elements that go into the making of symbol system. This will also lead
to neglecting the fact of intricate dialectical relationship between dif-
ferent elements and levels of meaning structures. Study of time symbol-
ism in any meaning structure is no exception in this regard. A symbol
system dealing with the temporal dimension of reality may, for analytical
and heuristic purposes, be broken up and analysed on different levels.
It may be analysed in terms of its function on mythic level, or as an
element in the ritualistic participation in religious activities.[1] It

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[1]Eliade, Mircea, Myth and Reality, New York: Harper & Row,
1963.

may also as well be seen as a form of choice and commitment of faith.[1]
And, it may likewise also be considered in the context of the reflective
act of consciousness and its significance for world transcendence.[2]

It is important not to forget that these levels of meaning struc-
ture are not mutually independent; rather they interpenetrate. If we
emphasise the level on which time symbolism is related to the reflective
act of consciousness we do not intend to underestimate the value of the·
analysis which takes place on another level, nor do we tend to suggest
that they do not have any bearing on each other. However, many studies
of the problem of time in philosophico-religious thoughts of India have
fallen prey to the temptation of underestimating the complexity of the
meaning structure and the interpenetration of different levels. It may
be profitable to analyse some of these tendencies to situate our own
programme in a wider context.

Most studies of the problem of time in the specific context
of Indian thought have concentrated on the fact of continual downplay-
ing of the realm of the temporal.[3] Some scholars tend to

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[1]Wieman, H., "Time and Man's Ultimate Commitment", The Journal of
Religion, 34, 1954, pp. 173-186.

[2]Coomaraswamy, Ananda, K., Time and Eternity, Switzerland: Arti-
bus Asiae Publishers Ascona, 1942. This is the perspective that we in-
tend to develop in the present work. Here we will try to show this per-
spective in the context of Sāmkhya-Yoga and Abhidharma Buddhism.

[3]Reyana, Ruth, "Metaphysics of Time in Indian Philosophy", in Zeman
Jiri (ed.), Time in Science and Philosophy, New York: Elsevier Publishing
Company, 1971.

concentrate on the contrast between the Indian conception of time and the Judaeo-Christian understanding of time. The contrast has been brought out in two specific ways. The first in terms of cyclic and linear conceptions of time, the former considered characteristic.of Indian religions, including Buddhism and the latter of the Judaeo-Christian tradition including that of Islam.[1] The other approach to the problem in comparative perspective emphasises the fact that while Christian evaluation of time places premium on its being the realm of divine creativity and beneficence, the Indian conception tends to zero on time being the realm of the operation of divine's destructive and world obliterating power.[2] Thus it is stated that the contrast of Indian conception of time "with the Christian evaluation of Time is virtually absolute. Instead of Time as the field in which God's beneficent purpose majestically reveals itself, Indian thought has here identified God with the obliterating force of Time."[3]

What these perspectives on the problem of time in Indian thought have missed is the fact that any system of meaning (and conceptualization about time is part and parcel of a system of meaning) involves intricate layers or levels of meaning. What may be obvious on one level of meaning structure may not be the case at another level and a generalization based

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[1]Samartha, S. J., The Hindu View of History, Banglore: CSIRS, 1959.

[2]Brandon, S. G. F., History, Time and Deity, New York: Manchester University Press, 1965.

[3]Ibid., p. 3.

on one level may not be applicable to another level. For a comprehensive understanding of the significance of time component in the meaning struc- tures under investigation one must isolate these levels or layers and see them in their intrinsic character. The different levels may be seen in dialectical relationship, each of them influencing and moulding the other, and in turn being influenced and moulded by them.

As an instance of these tendencies to undermine the significance of different layers of meaning structures we may cite again S.G.F. Brandon.[1] Brandon, in his work overemphasised the transcendent character of time in Indian thought. This predisposition towards transcendent time led him to stress on the one hand the identity of time with the obliterating power of the divine and on the other of time being the receptum of all entities The inevitable result of such predisposition is a complete underestima- tion of the religious significance attached by the Indian mind to the tem- poral process itself. While some Indian systems do emphasise the tran- scendent character of time, that constitutes only one element of the meaning structure and holds true only partially. The other element of the structure remains opaque and consequently Brandon can only see "the Indian fear of time".[2]

On a different level of meaning structure, the level which seeks to exemplify the significance of the temporal process, the fear of time is counterbalanced by the hope of transcendence, the transcendence itself

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 35.

seen as a temporal act pointing to freedom (Moksa or Nirvana). The temporal process which is seen as coincident with pain and suffering is also seen as providing a clue to transcendence. For the generality of Indian philosophico-religious system, the present in which the individual is situated at a specific moment, is the moment of transcendence.[1]

It is important to note that 'moment' (ksana or nimesa) refers both to the "brief moment" as to measure of time and also to the moment without duration, the ideal condition of freedom, or transcendence. It is in the latter sense that Nimisa ("Twinkling of an Eye") as a synonym for divinity, is implied by the term naimisiyah (people of the moment).[2] And it is in this sense that Vasubandhu's statement that the great awakening (abhisambodhi) is "single instantaneous" (eka-ksana) is to be taken.[3] The notion of "instantaneous awakening"(ekasanabhisambodhi) continues to catch the fancy of the sadhaka (aspirant). The Yogic emphasis on the contemplation of the moment (ksana) as the means of realising eternity within a single compass of a 'now' only reinforces our thesis that temporal structure is also conceived as the structure of transcendence.[4] It is stated in Kālacakratantra: "The birthplace of the Royal Conquerors is in one constant moment (ekasminsamayeksare)".

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[1] Coomaraswamy, op. cit., p. 47.

[2] Chāndogya Upanisad, 1 2.13.

[3] Obermiller, E., "The Doctrine of Prajñā-pāramitā as exposed in the Abhisamayālamkāra of Maitreya", Acta Orientalia, 11, 1933, pp. 81-82.

[4] Yoga Sūtra, 3.52.

The identification of time and eternity finds a prominent place in Upaniṣadic scheme of things.[1] A distinctions between two forms (dvi rupe) of Brahman is made in terms of "Time and Without Time" (kālas-cākālas-ca): "What precedes the Sun is Without Time (akāla) and undivided (akāla); but what begins with Sun is Time which has parts (sakāla) and its form is the Year."[2] Mircea Eliade interpreting this passage observes:

> The expression "what precedes the Sun" may be interpreted
> cosmologically as relating to the epoch which preceded
> the Creation.....but its application is above all meta-
> physical and soteriological: it refers to the paradoxical
> situation of him who obtains illumination, who becomes a
> jivan-mukta, who is "delivered in this life", and thereby
> transcends time in the sense that he no longer partici-
> pates in it.[3]

Mircea Eliade has greatly enriched our understanding of the time symbolism in the Indian tradition. He attaches special significance to mythic symbolism and ritual re-enactment of a sacred temporal moment in the scheme of transcendence. In his thesis Eliade makes a distinction between two conceptions of Time, namely 'le temps sacre' (the sacred time) and 'le temps profane' (the profane time).[4] Myths and rites according to him are the mechanisms of transcending the painful and evil experiences of the profane existence. The rites are, thus, conceived as the mechanisms of re-enactment or renewal of the original act of creation

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[1]Brhadaranyaka Upanisad 2.3.1.

[2]Maitri Upanisad 7.2.8.

[3]Eliade, Mircea, "Time and Eternity in Indian Thought", Man and Time, ed. Campbell, Joseph, New York: Pantheon Books, 1957, p. 178.

[4]Ibid., p. 173.

and are supposed to possess the virtue of annulling history with all its misdeeds and misfortunes. Such a symbolic annulment of the past or history of the profane time synchronizes with the return to sacred time of the beginning.

Similarly, Myth too, according to Eliade is a structure of transcendence of the profane time. Through narration of myth, profane time is symbolically abolished. Thus:

> mythical or sacred time is qualitatively different from profane time, from the continuous and irreversible time of our everyday, desacralized existence. In narrating a myth, we reactualize, as it were, the sacred time in which occurred the events of which we are speaking. In a word, myth is supposed to take place in an intemporal time,...... in a moment without duration, as certain mystics and philosophers conceive of eternity.[1]

The importance of the above perspective cannot be overemphasised. Of special merit in his treatment is the recognition of the soteriological significance of time symbolisms. However, we find his treatment deficient in one specific way. While he puts great emphasis on the role of myth and rituals in the process of sacralization, he ignores other elements which may equally be operative in this process.[2] Reflection or contemplation along with commitment can play equally significant role in the process. Just as the narration of a myth or ritual enactment of a sacred act enables the individual to transcend the realm of temporality so does contemplation or reflection enable the individual to realize eternity. The soteriological significance of reflection as an act of consciousness consists in its being the structure of both world involvement and world

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[1] Ibid.,

[2] Mol, Hans, Identity and the Sacred, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1976, p. 15.

transcendence. Reflection is basically a temporal act. It is a function of consciousness which reflects upon itself as the structure of temporal becoming. But it is by the same act that the consciousness or the subject also comprehends eternity. Transcendence through contemplation or reflection, at least according to the generality of the Indian philosophical tradition, is the primary and authentic mode of transcendence. While the non-reflective avenues of transcendence are not denied, the contemplative approach is singled out as the true mode of realizing eternity in its limitless and accomplished character.[1]

The Problematic

The central issue for the present work is the possibility of interrogating temporality in terms of its givenness as an objective fact and its relationship to the cognizing consciousness. The term temporality is used to connote both the fact of change and finitude of phenomenal existence as well as its "subjective" experience. It is our assumption that neither of the two can be conceived in isolation from the other. Temporality is a feature of existence as a structure of world involvement. Thus articulated, the problem of temporality then turns out to be the problem of subjectivity as what is implied in the structure of world involvement. It may then be asked: is not temporality a feature of existence conceived in terms of the relation of subjectivity to time? What is the relationship of time to the cognizing subject? or,

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[1]Further implications of this perspective for consciousness and the temporal process will be worked out in detail at a later stage. See infra, p. 256.

How is time related to the subject? But then, is time anything other than the relation itself, or to be more precise, the structure of relation of the things to things and things to subject. This aspect of time as the structure of relatedness of things and beings of the empiric world, is an undeniable fact. Neither Sāṁkhya-Yogā nor Abhidharma Buddhism would deny the empiric reality of time conceived as the structure of temporal relatedness.

The basic issue, however, still evades us. Granting that the empiric time is the structure of the relatedness of things and beings which are perceived as constantly changing and in a relationship of priority and posteriority, we still have to ask the question of the relation of this structure to the subject as world-involved. Denial of the substantive reality of time as transcendental principle in favour of a conception of structure of temporal relationship does not exonerate us from seeking the answer to the question of the relationship of this structure to the subject which is intricably enmeshed in the structure.

Now the question of the relationship of the subjectivity to temporal structure can be approached in a variety of ways: The structure itself may be conceived in terms of a receptum in which the subject is situated; or the structure may be conceived as a function of a synthetic activity of the subject which is transcendent to it and constitutes the structure; or finally, that the structure of temporality is identified with the structure of subjectivity. In other words the alternatives open to us are either that the subject is contained in the time, or that the time is in the subject, or that the subject is time, i.e.,

subjectivity is the temporal structure.[1]   Both Sāṁkhya-Yogā and Abhi-

dharmika Buddhism would contribute to the third alternative on grounds

which will become obvious in the sequel during the course of the treat-

ment of the subject. But the following may be said by way of a critique

of the other alternatives. Any attempt to grasp the essence of tempo-

rality as a phenomenologically given fact in terms of these two alter-

natives would lead to some inexorable difficulties and implications for

the subject as the structure of world involvement. The first alternative

has to be excluded as a philosophically viable alternative perhaps for

the very reason that the position makes a philosophical questioning of

the problem of temporality impossible. A subject which is essentially in

time and is encased in it cannot, by the nature of case, reflect upon the

structure of which it is an element. A subject which is contained in

time, must of necessity be contained in the moment of present; while

time is the structure of the relationship in which stand things and beings

in the relationship of priority and posteriority, the subject which is

exhausted in this relationship in the moment of present cannot comprehend

past and future. If it necessarily and totally is contained in the moment

of present, then it cannot contemplate on temporality as exemplifying the

relationship of priority and posteriority of past and future. Subject, then,

must not be conceived as that which is contained in time; it is necessary

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[1]For a detailed treatment of the three philosophical alternatives,
see Sallis, John, "Time, Subjectivity, and the Phenomenology of Perception",
The Modern Schoolman, 48, 1971, pp. 347-357. The treatment of the subject
in this section draws up the conceptual apparatus proposed in this paper.

for the subject not to be himself situated in it, in order to be able to be present in intention to the past as to the future".[1]

The other alternative looks at temporal structure as a function of synthetic activity of the a-temporal subject. This alternative suggests that temporality is a constitutive activity of the subject which somehow "unfolds or constitutes time."[2] Now, the difficulty inherent in this position must be clear. A subject which is the transcendent condition of temporal constitution must of necessity remain external to the temporal structure. Total externality of the subject is an ideal condition of the subject that the Sāmkhya-Yoga proposes. The subject as transcendence must be free from all the vicissitudes of the temporal structure. But the subject which is totally external to the temporal structure cannot be the constitutive subject. In other words the constituting subject and the subject which is the transcendent condition of all constitution and reflection must be placed in two different realms.

However, the two subjects cannot be totally separated and be independent if the possibility of the transcendence of temporality as a function of reflective activity is to be retained. If the problem of transcendence is to be explained, instead of being explained away by declaring the realm of temporality as illusory, there is only one option open, namely to admit a dialectical contact between the two realms. The point of that

[1]Merleau Ponty, _Phenomenology of Perception_, (trans.) Colin Smith, New York, 1962, p. 414.

[2]_Ibid_.

contact, both for Sāmkhya-Yogā and Abhidharmika Buddhism, as we shall show, is the structure of reflection as an act of consciousness. This subject as the structure of temporal constitution must also retain a dialectical contact with the realm of transcendence, which in the case of Sāmkhya-Yogā is Puruṣa, and in Abhidharmika-Buddhism is Nirvāna.

The problematic of the relationship of the subject and the temporal structure can only be resolved if and only if we can show that subject as the structure of world constitution must be identical with the structuring of temporality. This is the intermediary position, a philosophical alternative which seeks to avoid the two extremes of situating subject in time or placing subject totally transcendent to time. The two alternatives, in a sense exemplify the two approaches to time which may be described in conventional terms, that of realism and idealism respectively. The first position is prepared to grant temporal structure an independent reality of its own, with the capacity of complete subsumption of the subject. The second alternative makes temporal structure a mere synthetic act of consciousness, denying the objectivity of temporal becomingness any reality status. In either case, consciousness of temporality becomes a problematic: in the first case because time is transcendent to consciousness, and in the second case because consciousness is transcendent to time. The philosophical position that we argue for takes its point of departure, not merely from the failings of these two positions, but also from the more positive ground of the possibility of dialectical interplay between the two.

The intermediary position operates with the datum of the temporal process as the datum for a cognizing consciousness. In that sense, it

partakes the character both of realism and idealism. It seeks to retain

the significant element of the first alternative which in effect situates

the subject in the present. This situating of the world involved subject

in the present is a necessary condition for the temporal experience that

the subject will have. It seems to be in answer to specifically to the

requirement underscored in the following statement:

> The subject must in a genuine sense be in the present. Time
> exists for me because I have a present. If I am able to
> have access to a past or a future, such access must be gained
> not by abandoning my present but rather from out of my pre-
> sent.[1]

However, this situating of the subject in the present must be com-

bined with an insight into the possibility of the subject performing the

synthetic activity in the present. Only then the present can become the

meeting ground of past and future. Only then temporal structure can

truly be grasped as the structure of the manifestation of the becoming-

ness of being. If subject is unable to perform this synthetic activity

in the present then the subject will remain encased in a block universe

with no experience of change and becomingness. Thus the third alternative

seeks to identify the structure of subjectivity with the structure of

temporality.

This position is considered extremely significant from the point

of view of the present study. It seeks to retain the autonomy of the

subject as consciousness. Without this autonomy the possibility of ref-

lection or contemplation as structure of world transcendence will have

to be ruled out. On the other hand, temporal process itself is not

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[1]Sallis, John, op. cit., p. 351.

dismissed as a fictitous construction of consciousness. It is an objec-
tive fact. Reality of the 'moment' is an objective reality which cannot
be reduced to mere projections of consciousness. However, the subject
through its synthetic activity enters into an intricate relationship
with the world of change and becomingness. In this act of relating the
subject assumes the character of temporality. Since this relatedness is
intrinsic to the structure of world participation the empiric subject is
essentially and intrinsically temporal. At the same time, through this
very character of relating to the object the subject also examplifies
transcendence.

A Note on the Method

The problem of method in investigating a theme pertaining to Indian
philosophy is a subject of considerable obscurity. Without being unduly
dogmatic one can formulate the requirement in this context as under: the
method of approach or investigation must be adequate to the nature of the
content. In the classical writings of Indian Philosophy this question has
received a very careful consideration. The metaphysical differences be-
tween the rival philosophical points of view are foreshadowed in the con-
text of a discussion of the problem of methods and criteria. Without
going into these issues, and in the present case our task being interpre-
ting Indian Philosophical themes in contemporary setting, we may concep-
tualize the method that is adopted in the present study as the method
of critical reconstruction.

In stating that the method is primarily critical we do not intend to emphasise polemics or set an undue premium on arguments and counter arguments. The latter could by themselves be themes for investigation as part of the study of the logical structure of statements and their refutations as understood by the Indian thinkers. But this is not our concern. Critical method is employed with a view to locate, isolate and situate a particular concept or body of concepts or ideas in the context of the basic ontological perspective of the systems under investigation. As part of this enterprise surely it will be attempted to delineate the major argument of each system in an expository way by situating it against the major objections and challenges to which they are susceptible. Attention will be paid both to the structure and the language of the arguments but always in terms of its basic ontological orientation vis-a-vis their ontological positions pitted against it. Critical reconstruction is conceived to involve the imaginative task of letting the system speak for itself by weighing other positions at variance with it.

A critical investigation surely does not have to be an expression of ones own philosophical preferences or biases. But it is not also bias free and completely objective. In the present case it is intended expressly to bring out the bias of the systems under investigation. Our exposition of the problem in specific context will be an attempt to indicate the basic ontological "bias" of the systems that are taken up for consideration in terms or by means of an analysis of the directly relevant texts. It is our hope that it is only in that way that we will let the meaning of each system's argument emerge on its own.

To that extent the method of approach may be described as descriptive and non-judgemental, a method which has come to be identified in recent times as phenomenological. Nor are we confining ourselves to any specific form of the development of this method. We employ this method in its most generalized form whereby critical reflection, by enabling specific meaning structures to disclose themselves in the light of their intentionality, also enters into a specific kind of relationship with them. It becomes more acutely aware of the meaning structures which it intends to grasp, and by the same token, it becomes part and parcel of that. We can thus call our critical reflection phenomenological if we keep in mind that the phenomenological method is:

> a method for changing our relation to the world, for becoming more acutely aware of it. But at the same time and by that very fact, it is already a certain attitude vis-a-vis the world, or more exactly a certain attitude vis-a-vis our relation to the world. Phenomenology combines the most radical break with out ordinary and natural attitudes vis-a-vis the world (in this sense it is an ascesis of the mind) with the deepening or the consecration of this original attitude (in this sense, it is respect for the real and engagement in the world). Consciousness takes its distance with regard to things: it gives itself complete freedom in respect to them, but one realizes at once that this is in order to be more faithful to our essential insertion in the world..... The phenomenological method thus permits pushing on simultaneously and with one movement towards the roots of subjectivity and the foundation of the objective world.[1]

What is attempted in the following sections may be described as examplifying a phenomenological approach in a more limited sense of as reflection on the meaning structures with the express object of becoming more acutely aware of them.

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[1] Thevenaz, Pierre, What Is Phenomenology, (trans.) Courtney, Brockelman and J. Edie, Chicago: Quadrangle, 1962, p. 91.

CHAPTER II

THE HISTORICAL AND TEXTUAL SETTING OF SĀMKHYA-YOGA

Pre-Classical Sāmkhya-Yoga

The historical question is not the primary concern of this study.
A precise historical investigation of the chronological relationship be-
tween the different stages of development of Sāmkhya-Yoga thought, in it-
self one of the most intriguing chapters in the history of Indian thought,
is beyond the scope of this study. However, drawing heavily upon the
findings of previous researchers in this field we will try to present a
systematic and hopefully coherent picture of the doctrinal development of
the system under investigation. The object of the study is to identify,
and delimit the area of Sāmkhya-Yoga so that a proper perspective is
gained for investigating the meaning of temporality within Sāmkhya-Yoga.

There have been several sincere and partly fruitful attempts to
trace Sāmkhya to the earliest traditions of Indian philosophical specula-
tions. True, any systematic exposition of Sāmkhya system is not to be
found in the earlier texts of Vedas, Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads. But certain
ideas and doctrines of these older philosophical literature might have

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[1]Larson, G. J., Classical Sāmkhya, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1969;
Rao, K. B. Ramakrishnan, Theism of Pre-Classical Sāmkhya, Mysore: University
of Mysore, 1966; Sengupta, Anima, The Evolution of the Sāmkhya School of
Thought, Lucknow: Pioneer Press Ltd., 1959; Frauwallener, E. Geschichte der
Indischen Philosophie, Salzburg: Otto Muller, 1953; Johnston, E. H., Early
Sāmkhya, London: The Royal Asiatic Society, 1937; Dasgupta, S.M., A History
of Indian Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922, Vol. I;
Keith A. B., The Sāmkhya System, Calcutta: Association Press, 1918; Van
Buitenen, J. A. B., "Studies in Samkhya", Journal of the American Oriental
Society, 77, 1957, pp. 15-25,88-107.

been appropriated and transmuted in the later Sāmkhya philosophical tradi-
tion. Within Upaniṣadic tradition, earliest reference to Sāmkhya-Yoga con-
cepts may be traced to <u>Katha Upaniṣad</u>.[1] However, the ideas and thought,
which may specifically be called to belong to the Sāmkhya-Yoga tradition,
are reflected in rather more discernible way in the <u>Śvetāśvatara</u> <u>Upaniṣad</u>.[2]
A more elaborate and distinctly Sāmkhyan tradition with theistic tinge ap-
pears in the <u>Ahirbudhnya</u> <u>Saṁhitā</u>[3] and the <u>Caraka</u> <u>Saṁhitā</u>.[4] The most dis-
cernible presence of a pre-classical sāmkhya tradition is to be noted in
the Mokṣadharma and the <u>Bhagavadgītā</u> which form parts of the great epic, <u>Mahā-
bhārata</u>.[5] Both the texts have been recognized by scholars as providing a
basis for an understanding of the earlier phases of the development of the
Sāmkhya thought. Though the later classical Sāmkhya tradition can be dif-
ferentiated from the tradition of the epic in significant ways, their close
affinity cannot be minimized. It is here for the first time in the history
of Indian thought, that the Sāmkhya-Yoga concepts and ideas figure singifi-
cantly and abundantly and one may even suggest that these constituted the

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[1]Johnston, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., pp. 81-82; also Keith, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., pp. 5-19.

[2]<u>Ibid</u>.; also, see Rao, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., pp. 297-339; and Johnston, E. H.,
"Some Sāmkhya and Yoga Conceptions in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad", <u>Journal
of Royal Asiatic Society</u>, 1930, pp. 855-878.

[3]See Dasgupta, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., pp. 220 ff.; Sengupta, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., pp. 103-110.

[4]Dasgupta, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., pp. 213 ff.; Rao, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., pp. 403-416; Sen-
gupta, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., pp. 112-119.

[5]Sengupta, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., pp. 70-88; Rao, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., pp. 139-197; Keith,
<u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., pp. 29-53; and Johnston, Early Sāmkhya, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., pp. 6-7.

immediate contexts for the formulation of classical Sāmkhya-Yoga.

We have tried to spell out in briefest possible way, the pre-classical Sāmkhya context of the later development. However, the classical Sāmkhya tradition considers itself as growing out of the tradition of Sastitantra, a text lost to the tradition long ago. The Sāmkhya kārikā claims that it represents the ideas of the Sastitantra[2] and the Ahirbudhnya[3] samhitā gives an account of Sāmkhya based on the Sastitantra. The Ahirbudhnya samhita and the Yuktidīpikā[4] assign the authorship to Kapila, the mythical sage, who is supposed to be the earliest teacher of the sāmkhya school of thought. According to Jayamangalā[5]Pañcasikha was the author of this work. Vācaspati-miśra,[6] on the other hand, suggests that it is the work of Varsaganya. Just as the tradition is divided on the question of the authorship of the text, it also offers varying versions of the content. Nothing definite can be said about the text on the basis of available evidences, except that probably Sastitantra was an old Sāmkhya-Yoga text which dealt with basic Sānkhya-Yoga thought and divided them under sixty categories or sub-headings.

For the purpose of this study, it is crucial to make a distinction

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[1]For place of Sastitantra within Sāmkhya Tradition, see Dasgupta, S. N., op. cit., pp. 220-222; Keith, op. cit., pp. 59-65; Hiryana, M., "The Sastitantra and Vārsaganya", Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, 3, 1929, pp. 107-112;V.M. Bedekar, "The Development of the Sāmkhya and the Problem of the Sastitantra", Journal of the University of Poona, 11, 1959, pp. 37-49.

[2]The Sāmkhya Kārikā, Kārikā 72.

[3]See Keith, op. cit., p. 74.

[4]See infra, pp. 28-29.

[5]See infra, p. 30.

[6]See infra, pp. 29-30.

between the Classical and pre-Classical Sāmkhya-Yoga.[1] The line of demarcation consists of the systematic exposition of the Classical Sāmkhya thought in the Sāmkhya Kārikā of Īsvarakrsna and of Classical Yoga in the Yoga Sūtra of Patanjali. The treatment of Sāmkhya-Yoga in the literature pre-dating Sāmkhya Kārikā and Yoga Sūtra is excluded from our purview.[2] On the other hand, later commentorial literature (Bhāsyas and vyākhyās) on Sāmkhya Kārikā and Yoga Sūtra are considered as representing a continuous tradition

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[1]In this work we have followed the classification laid down by Mircea Eliade, Yoga: Immortality and Freedom, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. There have been other attempts at classification; S. N. Dasgupta makes a threefold classification of Samkhya: 1. the first stgte is a theistic one, details of which are lost, but is preserved in a modified form by the Patanjali School of Sāmkhya (Yoga); 2. the atheistic Sāmkhya as represented by Pañcasīkhā; and 3. finally the atheistic modification of Sāmkhya in the orthodox Sāmkhya System (see Dasgupta, S. N., A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951). S. Radhakrishnan tends to disagree with Dasgupta and maintains that both Asurī and Pañcasikhā adhere to a theistic Sāmkhya and believe in the supremacy of Brahman. According to Radhakrishnan there are important differences between Pañcasikha and Sāmkhya (see Radhakrishnan, S., The Indian Philosophy, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927, p. 252). In a recent study, J. G. Larson makes a fourfold classification: 1. the earliest speculations as contained in the speculative Vedic hymns and oldest prose Upanisads; 2. proto-Sāmkhya speculations, including the middle Upanisads, Caraka Samhitā, Buddha Carita, the Bhagavadgītā, Moksadharma and Mahabhārata; 3. Classical Sāmkhya consisting of Sāmkhya Kārikā, the Yoga Sūtra and the related commentaries; 4. and finally later Sāmkhya thought present in Samkhyapravacan Sūtra and the commentaries of Aniruddha, Mahādeva and Vijñanabhiksu together with the Tattvasamāsasūtra. Larson, J. G., Classical Samkhya, Delhi: Motilal Bnarasidas, 1969.

[2]For a comprehensive study of pre-Classical Sāmkhya see Johnston, E. H., Early Sāmkhya, London: The Royal Asiatic Society, 1937; Sen Gupta, Anima, The Evolution of The Sāmkhya: A School of Thought, Lucknow: Pioneer Press Ltd., 1959; Ramakrishna Rao, K. B., Theism of Pre-Classical Sāmkhya, Mysore: University of Mysore, 1966. Also see relevant portions of Dasgupta, S. N., op. cit.; Larson, J. G., op.cit.; and Keith, A. B., The Sāmkhya System, Calcutta, Association Press, 1918.

of the Classical Samkhya-Yoga thought. As integral to this classical Samkhya-
Yoga tradition are considered other later texts and treatises following the
first formulation of the basic tenets of the school of thought in the two
primary texts mentioned, the justification being that they maintain alle-
giance to the basic ontological perspectives of the classical tradition.

The Samkhya Karika and Commentaries

The Samkhya Karika of Isvarakrsna[1] is the earliest extent systema-
tic formulation of the Samkhya thought. The Karika itself, however, does
not claim to be the original work of the school. The text concludes by
stating that the subject matter of the Karika is actually a concise state-
ment of the thought of the Sastitantra.[2] The Karika does not provide much
information on the identity of the author except that he belonged to the
tradition of the Samkhya expounded by Kapila and continued by Asuri and
Pancasikha.[3] According to a Chinese tradition, Isvarakrsna is supposed to
have belonged to a brahmin family of Kausika.[4] Following the Chinese

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[1]All the references to the text are from the Samkhya Karika of Isvar-
akrsna with Gaudpadbhasya, (ed. & trans.) Mainkar, T. G., Poona: Oriental
Book Agency, 1972. There are several excellent translations of this text.

[2]There is controversy among scholars on this Karika. The tradition
itself is divided on the authenticity of this Karika. According to Suvarna-
saptati, a commentary of Samkhya Karika (see infra p. 30) the karika is an
interpolation by some intelligent person (iha medhavi Kascidaha aryam
Yukti Dipika (see infra p. 28) too introduces the karika with 'aha ca' im-
plying that the karika in question has been uttered by someone else. But
all other commentators have accepted the karika to be the part of the ori-
ginal text.

[3]Samkhya Karika, 71.

[4]Takakusu, M. J., "A Study of Paramartha's Life of Vasubandhu", Journal
of Royal Asiatic Society (London), 1905, p. 48.

tradition, based on Paramārtha-the Buddhist monk who translated the _Kārikā_

in Chinese and also wrote a commentary on it during the 6th century A.D.,

Takakusu tends to identify Īśvarkṛsana with Vindhyāvasī.[1] Both A. B. Keith

and Richard Garbe also identify the author of the _Kārikā_ with Vindhyāvāsī.[2]

Though a little cautious in his approach to the problem of the authorship

of the _Kārikā_, Radhakrishnan too does not seem to disagree with this iden-

tification.[3] However, their contentions do not seem sustainable by the

evidence from the Indian tradition. Gunaratna in his _Tarkabhāsya_ considers

Vindhyāvāsī and Iśvarakrsna as two different persons.[4] The author of the

Yuktidīpikā too mentions Iśvarakrsna and Vindhyāvāsī as two different

Sāmkhya teachers.[5] Svapneśvara suggests that Iśvarakrsna was none other

than the great poet Kālidāsa.[6] This contention of Svapneśvara also finds

support in Ghanaśyāma who says that the name of the author of _Raghuvamsa_

Sakuntala, and _Kumārasambhava_ was Iśvarkrsna Bhartrmidha[7] Kumārila points

out that the Sāmkhya teacher named Vindhyāvāsī did not accept the notion of

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[1]_Ibid._, pp. 47-51.

[2]Keith, _op. cit._, pp. 68-69; Garbe, Richard, _Die Samkhya Philosophie_, Leipzig: H. Haessel, 1917, pp. 77-83.

[3]Radhakrishnan, S., _op. cit._, pp. 254-255.

[4]Gunaratna in _Tarkarahsyadīpikā_,pp. 102, 104 (vide _Ibid._, p. 254, n. 8)

[5]_Yuktidīpikā_, (ed) Pandey, R. C., Delhi Motilal Bnarasidass, 1967, pp. 3 and 91.

[6]Iśvarakrsnanāma Kālidāsena Krtah kārikāh, vide Radhakrishnan, _op. cit._, n. 1, p. 255.

[7]Ghanasyāma's commentary on Bhavabhuti's _Uttararāmacarita_, vide Mainkar, _op. cit._, p. 30.

subtle body, a concept so clearly mentioned in <u>Sāmkhya Kārikā</u>.[1] All these
evidences from the Indian sources seem to run counter to the thesis of
identification of Iśvarkṛṣna with Vindhyāvāsā. We do not, however, con-
sider these evidences from the traditional Indian sources conclusive and
incontrovertible. A final word on this matter will have to await further re-
searches. Until a more thorough investigation of comparative nature of
the writings of Iśvarakṛṣna, Vindhyavāsi and Kālidāsa is undertaken we will
have to remain in dark about the identity of the author of the <u>Kārikā</u>.

These conflicting claims about the identity of the author of the
<u>Sāmkhya Kārikā</u>, however, does not disprove the antiquity of the work. It
obviously belongs to a period prior to the 6th century when Paramārtha trans-
lated and wrote commentary on the <u>Kārikā</u> in Chinese. At the present stage
of historical research any statement beyond that will be conjectural. But,
while no positive statement can be made about the exact date of the <u>Kārikā</u>,
the ideas as present in the <u>Kārikā</u> seem to have been well known and assimi-
lated by the scholars of that period. One can legitimately hypothesize that
the ideas of the Classical Sāmkhya were already systematized and well arti-
culated by the third century A.D.[2] Moreover, if we take the suggestions of

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[1]Radhakrishnan, S., <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. 225.

[2]See Keith, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. 69. He is of the opinion that the Karika
belongs to the 4th century A.D. This, of course, is based on the assump-
tion that Iśvarakṛṣna and Vindhyavāsi were identical persons and that Vasu-
bandhu is supposeu to have written a refutation of the Kārikā authored by
Vindhyavāsi. Radhakrishnan places the <u>Kārikā</u> in the third century A.D.
He maintains that Iśvarkṛṣna definitely preceded Vasubandhu , and date of
Vasubandhu is now assigned by scholars to the 4th century A.D. Das Gupta
also believes that the Kārikā was composed somewhere about 200 A.D. Sug-
gestions of Belvalkar and others that the <u>Kārikā</u> belongs to an earlier
period does not seem to carry much weight.

Keith and Dasgupta seriously then probably the date of the Sāmkhya Karikā
should be placed between 200-300 A.D. Both of them are of the opinion
that the Sāmkhya Kārikā preceded the composition of the Yoga Sūtra which
evidently presupposes the Sāmkhya metaphysics as articulated in the Sāmkhya
Kārikā itself.[1] Even on the strength of the Chinese tradition it is rea-
sonable to assume that Iśvakrsna was a senior contemporary of Vasubandhu
and Vindhyāvāsi Date of Vasubandhu is now almost certaintly placed by
the scholars in the 4th century A.D.[2] The Sāmkhya Kārikā then cannot be a
later text. Even though one cannot be very dogmatic on this point, but
considering the significant similarities between the views of early Sarvās-
tivādin about the nature and structure of temporal determinations as re-
corded by Vasubandhu and the classical Sāmkhya-Yoga, one is tempted to
suggest that the early Sarvāstivādins like Dharmatrātā, Ghoṣaka, Buddhadeva and
and Vasumitra had before them the Sāmkhya-Yoga paradigm. Vasubandhu him-
self had indeed **yielded** to such a suggestion on the extreme congruity
between their views and that of Sāmkhya-Yoga.[3] If one accepts this argu-
ment then the date of the Classical Sāmkhya-Yoga will have to be placed
during the 2nd century A.D.

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[1]Both Keith and Dasgupta maintain that the composition of the Yoga
Sūtra seems to have followed the crystalization of classical Samkhya thought
as found in the Sāmkhya Kārika. The assumption seems to be well founded in
as much the general ontological presuppositions of the Kārikā are clearly
discernible in the Yoga Sūtra. See Keith, op. cit., pp. 54-59; also Das-
gupta, op. cit., pp. 228-229.

[2]Fräuwallner, E., "On the Date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasu-
bandhu", Serie Orientale Roma, 3, 1951; Takakusu, J., "The Date of Vasu-
bandhu, the Great Buddhist Philosopher", Indian Studies in Honour of Charles
Rockwell Lanman, Harvard University, 1929, pp. 79-88; and Peri, N., "A Propos
de la dak de Vasubandhu", Bulletin de l'Ecole Francaise d'Extreme, Orient,
Paris, 11, 1911, pp. 339-390.

[3]Abhidharmkośam, (ed.) Shastri, D., Varanasi: Bauddhabhāvati, 1972,
p. 807.

Through all these confusions about the identity and the date of the author one fact remains unquestionable: the Sāṁkhya Kārikā has continued as the principal work of the Sāṁkhya school of thought in known history. Several commentaries were written on it at different times. These commentaries, despite certain differences in their outlook and at times varying theological allegiances, have remained by and large true to the basic ontological perspective of the Sāṁkhya Kārikā.

Gaudapāda's Sāṁkhya Kārikā Bhāsya[1] is the most important and probably the earliest commentary on the Sāṁkhya Kārikā. For our own purposes we take his discussion of the role of antahkaraṇas in the appropriation of temporal determinations as providing an important link with the later explicit rejection of the transcendental reality of one, unitary and single Time. His elaboration of the Iśvarakṛṣṇa's distinction between the mode of functioning of the internal and external organs in terms of their relationship to temporal conditioning, merits special attention.

Regarding the identity of the author one need not take seriously the suggestion that he and the well-known Vedāntin Gaudapāda, were one and the same person.[3] Though there have been some attempts to find a connection

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[1]There are several editions of this text. All the references are to the Sāṁkhya Kārikā of Iśvarakrsna with Gaudpāda's Bhāsya, (ed. and trans.) Mainkar, T. G., Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1964.

[2]Ibid., p. 136-138.

[3]Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 255; Eliade, op. cit., p. 370; Keith, op. cit., p. 69; Ray, Amarnath, "The Māndukhya Upaniṣad and the Kārikas of Gaudapāda", Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol. XIV, 1938, pp. 564-569; Krishnamurti, B. N. S., "New Light on the Gaudapāda Kārikās", Review of Philosophy and Religion, Poona, Vol. II, 1931, pp. 35-56.

between this Gauḍapāda and the Gauḍapāda who wrote a <u>Kārikā</u> on <u>Māndūkyop-</u>

<u>aniṣad</u>, it is well established that the two were different individuals.

The latter shows definite Vedāntic leanings, while the former remains loyal

to the classical Sāṁkhya position. The date of this work can easily be

placed in the 8th century since Vācaspati Miśra shows acquaintance with

this work in his <u>Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudī</u> which belongs to the 9th century.[1]

The <u>Yuktidīpikā</u> (<u>authorship undecided</u>)[2] is an extremely important work

with special ramifications for this study. The commentator here has taken a

specific stand on the problem of the nature and status of time and temporal

relations. The text takes a decisive stand against Vaiśeṣikas by rejecting

the theory assigning an independent ontological status to time as a transcen-

dental principle. The authorship of the text remains clouded by vague claims

from different editors of the text. P. B. Chakravarti thinks that it might

have been written in response to Vasubandhu's <u>Paramārthasaptaśati</u>.[3] R. C.

Pandey assigns the authorship to one Rājā (Bhojarāja) and identifies the

work as the lost commentary called <u>Rājavārtika</u> mentioned and quoted by

Vācaspati Miśra.[4] Both Chakrvarti and Pandey are inclined to accept that

<u>Yuktidīpikā</u> predates Vācaspati Miśra's <u>Tattvakaumudī</u> and Gauḍapada's <u>Samkhya</u>

<u>Kārikā Bhāsya</u>. We do not have any positive evidence either to support or

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[1]Radhakrishnan, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. 255.

[2]<u>Yuktidīpikā</u>, (ed.) Pandey, R. C., Delhi: Motilal Banarasidas, 1967;
Also see <u>Yuktidīpikā</u>, (ed.) Chakrvarti, Pulinbehari, Calcutta: Metropolitan
Printing and Publishing House, 1938. There are some differences in readings
in the two editions.

[3]Chakrvarti, Pulinbehari, <u>Origin and Development of Sāṁkhya System of</u>
<u>Thought</u>, Calcutta: Metropolitan Printing and Publishing House, 1951, pp. 160-
162.

[4]Pandey, R. C., <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. xv.

contradict these contentions. Value of the work cannot be over-emphasized specially as a source of informations on different schools and teachers of Sāmkhya system as well on certain intricate points of debate between Sāmkhya and Buddhist philosophies.[1]

The Sāmkhyatattvakaumudī by Vacaspati Miśra[2] is a work of special significance for the present study. The author of the text takes specific stand against the Nyāya-Vaisesika's postulation of the reality of a single, undivided and unitary time as the transcendental reality independent of the act of cognition and experience. Against the Vaisesikas the text suggests that the temporal differentiation can be accounted for by reference to activities and events themselves. The category of Time is an unwanted reification to explain temporal determinations.[3] Modern scholarship is generally unanimous in holding Vacaspati Miśra to be the author of this text.[4] He is supposed to be the disciple of Mārtandatilaka Swāmin. A well-known treatise on Sāmkhya philosophy Tattvakaumudī itself has been subject of several commentaries on it.[5] The date of the text is fixed beyond doubt to be the 9th century A.D. on the testimony of the author himself.

[1] Ibid., pp. 68, 73, 132.

[2] The Tattva-Kaumudī, (ed. and trans.) Jha, Ganganath, Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1965.

[3] Ibid., pp. 112.

[4] Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 255; Dasgupta, op. cit., p. 212; and Keith, op. cit., p. 70.

[5] For different commentaries on Tattva-Kaumudī see Mainkar, T. G., op. cit., pp. 6-7.

There is another minor commentary on the Sāṃkhya Kārikā called the Jayamangalā.[1] This is supposed to have been written by Saṃkara. This Saṃkara is not to be confused with the great Vedāntic thinker, Saṃkarācharya. The commentary in certain respects follows the Yuktidīpikā reading of the Kārikā and differs from both Gauḍapāda and Vacaspati Miśra on certain points.[2] It is one of the minor commentaries of lesser doctrinal and philosophical value.[3]

The Suvarnasaptati[4] is a commentary on Sāṃkhya-Kārikā. It is not available in original Sanskrit. It has been recently restored to Sanskrit from its Chinese translation by Professor N. Aiyaswami Sastri. Belvalkar suggests that Suvarnasaptati is the same as the Mātharvṛtti.[5] Professor Sastri on the other hand is inclined to give it an independent status.[6] But R. C. Pandey finds some striking similarity between the Suvarṇaspatati and Mātharvṛtti and agrees with Belvelakar in holding that the two texts are identical.[7] One important point to be noted in this commentary

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[1]Jayamangalā,(ed.) Sharma, H., Delhi: Betab Printing Works, 1926.

[2]Pandey, R. C., op. cit., p. xvi.

[3]Eliade, op. cit., p. 369.

[4]Infra, note 6.

[5]Belvalkar, S. K. The Mātharavrtti and the Date of Iśvarakrsna, in Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1917, pp. 171-184.

[6]The Suvarnasaptati,(ed.) Sastri, N. Aiyasvami, Tirupati: Sri Venkatesvara Oriental Series, 1944.

[7]Pandey, op. cit., p. xvii.

is the absence of the karika 63 (<u>rūpaih Saptabhireva tu</u> etc.) from the text.[1]
It also suggests that the karika 72, which says that the <u>Sāṁkhya Kārikā</u> pre-
sents the basic doctrine of the <u>Sastitantra</u>, is interpolated by some intel-
ligent person (<u>iha medhāvi kaścidāha</u>).

<u>Mātharavrtti</u>[2] is yet another original commentary on <u>Sāṁkhya Kārikā</u> on
which scholars have made contradictory claims about the authorship of the
work. According to Belvalkar this is probably the original sanskrit text of
which the Paramārtha's commentary in Chinese is only a translation.[3] It has
been suggested that Gauḍapāda's bhāṣya is an abridgement of this text. But
Radhakrishnan differs from this contention. He points out that Mathra's is a
<u>vrtti</u> which traditionally is preceded by a <u>Bhāṣya</u>.[4] Moreover, it is important
to note that Gauḍapādabhāṣya does not comment on the last three kārikas where-
as Mātharavrtti does. It is conceivable that the Mātharavrtti is a later work.

The <u>Sāṁkhya</u> <u>Sūtra</u> <u>and</u> <u>Commentaries</u>

<u>Sāṁkhya</u> <u>Sūtra</u> <u>by</u> <u>Kapila</u>:[5] Besides Sāṁkhya Kārikā and commentaries on
it enumerated above the Sāṁkhya Sūtra or the <u>Sāṁkhya</u> <u>Pravacana</u> <u>Sūtra</u> and

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[1]N. Aiyaswami Sastri maintains that the Kārikā 63 is not genuine
since it has not been translated by Paramārtha. See Sastri, N. Aiyaswami,
<u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. xliii.

[2]<u>Mātharavrtti</u>, (ed.) Sharma, V. P., Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit
Series, 1922.

[3]Balvalkar, S. K., <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. 171-184.

[4]Mātharavrtti is a work of Sāṁkhya philosophy of which Gauḍapāda Bhāṣya
is reported to be an abridgement. But as a rule, vrttis come later than the
bhāṣyas, and that the Mātharavrtti comments on the last three verses of the
S.K., makes for its later date." Radhakrishnan, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. 255, n. 2.

[5]Sāṁkhya Aphorism of Kapila, (ed. & trans.) Ballantyne, J. R., Vara-
nasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series edition, 1963.

commentaries on it are our chief sources of important philosophical issues that concern the Sāmkhya school of thought. Tradition attributes the authorship of Sutra to Kapila which for reasons to be seen presently need not be taken seriously. Nor do we think that the claim of Svapneśvara is well groundèd when he assigns the Sāmkhya Pravacana Sutra to Pañcaśikha and traces its attribution to Kapila to the fact that the latter initiated the tradition.[1] The authorship of the Sāmkhya Sūtra remains a mystery and subject to educated guess only. The text has generally been assigned to 14th century A.D. Various considerations have weighed in dating the text during this period. Gunaratna, writing in 14th century, does not refer to the Sāmkhya Sūtra although he takes into consideration most of the existing Sāmkhya literature.[2] Vācaspati Miśra does not show any acquaintance with the Sūtra literature. Alberuni, who did most of his work in India during the second half of 11th century, shows familiarity with works of Iśvarakṛṣṇa and Gaudapāda but is totally unaware of Sāmkhya Sūtra. Madhava in his Sarvadarśanasamgraha does not make any reference to Sāmkhya Sūtra and bases his account of Sāmkhya thought exclusively on the Sāmkhya Kārikā.[3] Equally important is the fact that no bhāsya (commentary) on the Sūtra appears before 16th century. Moreover the text shows unmistakable familiarity with most of the existing philosophical systems against which it also takes stand. This goes to show its lateness.

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[1] Svapneśvara in Kaumudiprabhā, vide Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 255, n. 3.

[2] Vide Dasgupta, op. cit., p. 222, and Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 255, n. 4.

[3] Keith, op. cit., p. 90-91; also Radhakrishnan, op. cit., pp. 255-256.

The work itself contains six chapters. The first three chapters are essentially expository and are concerned with articulating basic Sāmkhyan position. The fourth chapter contains some illustrative stories and parables, fifth chapter is basically polemical directed towards other schools of thought; and sixth chapter offers a summary of the basic position. On the basis of this structure of the text Dasgupta tends to suggest that the text may be based on a late edition of the Sastitantrasastra mentioned in the last but one verse of the Sāmkhya Kārikā. Dasgupta writes:

> It is said at the end of the Sāmkhya Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa that the kārikās give an exposition of the Sāmkhya doctrine excluding the refutations of the doctrines of other people and excluding the parables attached to the original Sāmkhya works - the Sastitantrasastra. The Sāmkhya Sūtras contain refutations of other doctrines and also a number of parables. It is not improbable that these were collected from some earlier Sāmkhya work which is now lost to us. It may be that it was done from some later edition of the Sastitantra.....[1]

The lateness of the text, however, does not minimise its value as an important sourcebook of the basic Sāmkhya position. It is true that this text does show some leanings towards Upaniṣadic thought, but in essential it has preserved the classical Sāmkhya ontological perspective. Even the glimpses of Upaniṣadic monism in Sāmkhya Sūtra are only minimal and marginal and emmanates from its concern to relate itself to earlier Brahmnical scriptures. But still it does not accept the scriptural injunction uncritically and unequivocally. It is only in the commentarial literature on the Sūtra that these concerns are more conspicuously present. There too the commentators on the Sūtra face the uphill task of reconciling the

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[1] Dasgupta, op. cit., p. 222.

distinctly atheistic position of Samkhya with the theistic Vedanta. As

Dasgupta points out about Vijñanabhikṣu, who wrote his commentary on the

Sutra, that he "could not avoid the distinctly atheistic arguments of the

Samkhya Sutras, but he remarked that these were used only with a view to

showing that the Samkhya system gave such a rational explanation that even

without the intervention of Iśvara it could explain all facts."[1] We will

have more to say on Vijñanabhikṣu when dealing with his Samkhya Pravacana

Bhāsya.

❡ It is true that the cosmological interests of the pre-classical

Samkhya find themselves reiterated in the Sutra literature. But despite

these concerns with the doctrine of the periodic creation and destruction

of the universe the Sutra does not look at the Sarga doctrine in cosmol-

ogical terms alone as it has been suggested by some scholars who have based

their arguments solely on the authority of Vijñanabhikṣu's commentary on

the Sutra.[2] We will be adverting to this topic later on.

In the Samkhya Sutra itself we can distinguish two distinct tenden-

cies: a concern with the cosmological evolution and involution and a

truthful allegiance to Samkhya Kārikā's conception of Buddhisarga as non-

cosmological understanding of man's world. Here again commentarial

literature display significant differences. On many issues the two major

commentators, Vijñanabhikṣu and Aniruddha, give quite different interpreta-

tions; and one is left in confusion as to whose words are to be taken to

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[1] Ibid., p. 223.

[2] Keith is a case in point. His entire account of Sutra literature is
primarily based on Vijñanabhikṣu. See Keith, op. cit., p. 92 ff.

represent the classical Samkhya tradition. The only plausible norm by which to resolve the issue is by the extent of its compatibility or congruity with the Samkhya ontology as developed in the <u>Karika</u>. Using this criterion one can hope to see whether the commentator on the <u>Sutra</u> is expounding a classical Samkhya position or whether he is succumbing to the temptation of providing a rationalization for some other metaphysical or theological tradition to which he may be predisposed. For the purposes of this study, we have considered <u>Sutra</u> literature as constituting a continuum with the classical Samkhya of the <u>Samkhya Karika</u>. This is not to suggest that there are no important differences between the <u>Samkhya Karika</u> and the <u>Samkhya Sutra</u>. We have already made allusions to some of the points of disagreements. However, the degree of agreement on the issues of fundamental importance weigh heavily against the points of divergences. Accordingly, in our evaluation of the philosophical and doctrinal value of the <u>Sutra</u> literature we, therefore, tend to agree with Dasgupta when he observes: "there is no reason to suppose that the Samkhya doctrine found in the <u>Sutra</u> differs in any important way from the Samkhya doctrine as found in the <u>Samkhya Karika</u>.[1] It is equally reassuring to note that Keith too, despite his reservations about the claim of the <u>Sutra</u> being a pure exposition of Samkhya concedes that "the <u>Sutra</u> is a source of considerable importance and may contain a good deal of old matter."[2]

Coming to the commentatorial literature on the <u>Samkhya Sutra</u> we have

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[1]Dasgupta, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. 223.

[2]Keith, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. 92.

information about at least four commentaries on the S̄aṁkhya S̄utra:

1. Aniruddha's S̄aṁkhyasūtravṛtti belonging to the fifteenth century;

2. The Saṁkhya Vṛtti Sara of Mahadeva Saraswati also known as Vendānti Ma-
hādeva of 1600 A.D. This is primarily an abridgement of Aniruddha's work
and contains some original remarks by the author;

3. The S̄aṁkhya Pravacana Bhāsya written by Vijñānabhikṣu sometime during
the 16th century A.D.;

4. Laghusāṁkyasūtrvṛtti by Nagesa Bhatta Upadhhyaya. This is an abstract
of Vijñānabhiksu's work and is not of much philosophical value.

Aniruddha's[1] commentary along with Vijñānabhiksu's S̄aṁkhya Pravacana
Bhasya[2] are the two most important works on S̄aṁkhya S̄utra that we have taken
into consideration in the present study. Vijñānabhiksu, as it is well known,
inclines with deliberation in his understanding of the doctrine toward a
theistic S̄aṁkhya or Yoga. In the words of Radhakrishnan he tends to "mini-
mize the distinction between the S̄aṁkhya and the theistic Vedānta, which he
regards as the genuine Vedānta, while the Advaita Vedānta is its modern fal-
sification".[3] The theistic leaning of Vijñānabhikṣu accounts for some impor-
tant differences between his interpretation of S̄utra and that of Aniruddha's.

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[1] The S̄aṁkhya S̄utra Vṛtti, (ed. and trans.) Garbe, Richard, Calcutta:
Baptist Mission Press, 1888.

[2] The S̄aṁkhya-Pravacana-Bhāsya, (ed.) Garbe, Richard, Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1943.

[3] Radhakrisnan, op. cit., p. 256.

It may be instructive to refer to one significant example of the differences between their approach to the Sutra. Sutra 3.10 reads: "there is distinction of individuals, through the diversity of dessert (Vyaktibhedah karmviśesāt)."[1] Commenting on this Sutra from Vedanta position Vijnanabhisku observes: "Although, at the beginning of the creation, there was but one Subtile Body in the shape of that investment Hiranyagarbha, still subsequently, moreover, there becomes a division of it into individuals, a plurality, partitively in the shpe of individuals....."[2] Thus Vijñanabhiksu finds in Sutra an occasion to legitimate his own Vedāntic leanings and his hope to reconcile the Samkhya-Yoga with the scriptural utterances. Annirudha, however, does not find the Sūtra problematic at all;[3] and he contents himself with simply reading in Sūtra what is in conformity with the classical sāmkhya position — that the differences among the individuals may be accounted for by the differences in the karma (actions) of each individual.

The point at issue is that in approaching the Sutra-literature one has to exercise a certain amount of discretion and has to be extra cautious in interpreting them. It is for these reasons that in the present study we have subjected the commentatorial literature on the Sutra to a more rigorious analysis and have refused to accept the statements of the

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[1] Sāmkhya Aphorism of Kapila, op. cit., p. 231.

[2] Sāmkhya-Pravacana-Bhāsya,op. cit., p. 90; "yady api sarga-dau Hiranyagarbha- ¸ādhi-rupaṅ ekam eve lingam, tathā 'pi tasya paścād vyaktibhedo vyakti-rūpeṇā 'nasto nānātvam bhavati....."

[3] Sāmkhya Sūtra Vrttih, op. cit., p. 112.

commentators simply at their face value. In each case, the operating criterion had been the reconcilibility of the statement to the classical Samkhya ontological perspective as presented in Sāṁkhya Kārikā.

The Yoga Sūtra and Related Literature

Coming to the Yoga literature we find ourselves, luckily, in a less controversial region. Both the tradition and the modern scholarship is unanimous in regarding Patanjali to be the author of the Yoga Sūtra.[1] While the text is the earliest attempt to systematize the principle of Yoga, it would, be wrong to assume that Patanjali was the initiator of this school of thought. Vācaspati and Vijñānabhikṣu, who have extensively commented on the Vyāsabhāṣya on Yoga Sūtra, are in agreement in considering Patanjali to be the codifier of the Yoga Sūtra. According to Dasgupta, an analysis of the sūtras also brings the conviction that the sūtras do not show any original attempt, but a masterly and systematic compilation which was also supplemented by fitting contributions. " The systematic manner also, in which the first three chapters are written by way of definition and clarification, shows that the materials were already in existence and that Patanjali only systematized them".[2] It is important to note that Patanjali himself describes his work as "Anuśāsana" implying that his work is not the earliest or the first formulation of the system.[3] The text itself is divided into four sections or parts. The first

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[1]Pātanjala Yogadarśanam, Tattvavaiśāradisamvalit-Vyāsabhāṣyasametam, (ed.) Bhattacharyah, Ramasamkara, Varanasi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakasana, 1963. All references are from this edition.

[2]Dasgupta, op. cit., p. 229.

[3]Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 341.

three sections are purely expository in nature, describing the doctrine of the Yoga system with little polemical material. First section deals with the nature and goal of concentration or contemplation (Samādhi); the second part discusses the ways of attaining this goal (sādhanā); and the third section describes the supernatural powers (vibhūti) that the incumbent or the practitioner of Yoga may achieve. The fourth section deals with the nature of liberation (kaivalya). It is here that we find the polemical strands, an attempt to deal with other systems of Indian thought on the terms of Yoga's own metaphysical position.

It is interesting to note that the word "iti', implying the end of the work occurs at two places in the text; first at the end of the third section and secondly at the end of the fourth section. On the basis of this and the fact that most of the criticisms of other schools of thought take place in the fourth section, Dasgupta suggests that the fourth section on liberation is a later addition, and does not constitute an integral part of the text. According to Dasgupta,"the most legitimate hypothesis seems to be that the last chapter is a subsequent addition by a hand other than that of Patanjali....."[1]

Be as it may, we do not find any reason to dismiss the significance of this section for the excellent reason that we find the general slant of Sāmkhya-Yoga ontology is strictly maintained. Moreover, the discussion relating to the problem of time in this section is in continuity with the position spelled out earlier. Sutra 4.12 and 4.13 is in thematic continuity with the sutra 3.13; and sutra 4.33 is a re-affirmation of the sutra 3.52.

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[1]Dasgupta, op. cit., p. 230.

The possibility of it's being a supplementary to the original work by the same author cannot be ruled out unless a very precise analysis of the style and the content proves to the contrary.

Date of the work as well as the identity of the author has been the centre of great controversy especially in view of the celebrated author of the grammatical work in Mahābhāṣya of Pānini Sūtra being also known by the same name. Woods is of the opinion that the two are not the same. He convincingly shows that there is no evidence to show any significant congruity between the language or the doctrinal position of the two Patanjalis.[1] Keith too has expressed his reservations about the possibility of the two Patanjali's being identical persons.[2] Radhakrishnan agreeing with Woods maintains that there is no incontrovertible evidence to prove the identity of the grammarian Patanjali with the author of the Yoga Sūtra.[3] Dasgupta, however, is inclined to admit the possibility that the two Patanjalis were the same person. Thus he writes: "I have not been able to discover anything .... which can warrant us in holding that the two Patanjali's cannot be identified".[4]

The following finding made in the course of our study could have some significant bearing on this issue. On the issue of the identity of two Patanjali's the present author would like to present an important

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[1] Woods, J. H., The Yoga System of Patanjali, Varanasi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1966, pp. xv-xvii.

[2] Keith, op. cit., p. 57.

[3] Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 341, n. 4.

[4] Dasgupta, op. cit., p. 232.

evidence against the possibility of the two Patanjalis being identical. While Dasgupta and others have based their case on claims made by some later Indian writers[1] that the two Patanjalis are identical, we have found evidence going back probably to the 7th century where the tradition does not identify Patanjali the grammarian with the author of the Mahābhāsya. We would like to distinguish this evidence from the already noted fact that the great grammarians like Bhartrhari, Kaiyata, Vāmana and Nāgesa do not refer to grammarian Patanjali as being also the author of the Yogasūtra.[2] While both Radhakrishnan and Dasgupta noted this they somehow overlooked a significant fact within the tradition of the Bhartrhari which tends to distinguish between the two Patanjalis. In Helaraja's commentary on the celebrated work of Bhartrhari, the Vākyapadīya, we find that he maintains a distinction between the traditions of Patanjali the grammarian and of Patanjali the expounder of Samkhya-Yoga thought. In his commentary on Kalasamudesa, which is the ninth section (sammudesa) of the third part (kanda) of the Vakyapadīya, Helaraja, while analysing and elaborating the Samkhya-Yoga view of time refers to the views expressed in the Yoga-Sūtra-Bhāsya as that of the tradition of Patanjali.[3] But in the same work, when

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[1] Dasgupta, op. cit., pp. 230-231; Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 340; and Woods, op. cit., p. xii-xv.

[2] Dasgupta, Ibid., p. 231; Radhakrishnan, Ibid., p. 341.

[3] Vakyapadīyam Helarājakrtaprakāsakhyātīkāyuktam, (ed.) Sastri, G.D., Varansi: Krishna Das Gupta, 1928, pp. 361 and 365. It may also be noted that while introducing the karika 54 as presenting the view of Samkhya-Yoga, Helaraja uses the term "matāntare". This reading has been found in Varanasi edition. The Trivendra edition gives it as referring to the opinion of Mahābhāsya. We tend to think that Varanasi edition gives a correct reading on this (p. 362), for no where else the commentator identifies Patanjali's tradition as that of Mahabhāsya (on Panini).

referring to Mahabhasya on Panini he desists from using the name of Patan-
jali altogether. He always refers to it as <u>Bhasya</u> or <u>Mahabhasya</u>,[1] almost
as if taking special precaution not to confuse between the two Patanjalis

This may not be in itself very decisive but it clearly shows that the con-
fusion between the two Patanjalis is perhaps only a creation of later
period.

Regarding the controversy on the date of the work the findings of
historical research seems to weigh heavily against Woods, who is inclined
to place this work towards the close of 14th century.[2] Woods' main argument
rests on the assumption that Vasubandhu's thought is criticised in the <u>Yoga
Sutra</u> and that Nagarjuna does not make any reference to Yoga in his Karika.
Dasgupta opposes Woods on this point. He points out that:

> .... the supposed Buddhist reference is found in the fourth
> chapter which .... is a later interpolation; even if they
> were written by Patanjali it cannot be inferred that because
> Vacaspati describes the opposite school as being of the Vij-
> ñanavada type we are to infer that the sutras refer to Vasu-
> bandhu or even to Nagarjuna, for such ideas as have been
> refuted in the sutras had been developing long before the
> time of Nagarjuna.[3]

Concurring with Dasgupta on this point Radhakrishnan has conclusively shown
that the text definitely belongs a period earlier than 300 A.D.[4] He points
out that since Umasvati, who seems to have carried his work during third

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[1] <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 373, 375.

[2] Woods, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. xix.

[3] Dasgupta, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. 233.

[4] Radhakrishnan, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. 341, n. 3.

century A.D., refers to Yoga Sūtra 3.22 the text in question must have
been in existence before that. Moreover, on the question of Nagarjuna's
unawareness of Yoga, Radhakrishnan points out that Woods' argument does
not carry us very far in view "of the admitted fact the Chinese translation
of Nagarjuna's Upāyakauśalyahrdayśāstra mentions Yoga as one of the eight
schools of Philosophy."[1] This argument is cogent, provided, of course, that
the Nāgārjunas are the same. To all these evidences against Woods, we
would again like to point out that Bhartṛhari, who is generally assigned
to 5th century A.D., is well aware of the Yoga theories of time and tempo-
rality determinations. He makes clear reference to the views of Yoga on
time distinctions and seems to consider them as integral to the general slant
of Sāmkhya thought.[2] Thus by the 5th century, views of Yoga Sūtra were
well known and clearly assimilated by the philosophers of that period.

Vyāsa Bhāsya on Yoga Sūtra[3] is the earliest commentary on Yoga Sūtra
and of inestimable value in providing an intelligible understanding of the
thoughts of the author of the Sūtra. Vyāsa is unanimously accepted as the
author of this work. His date has been assigned to fourth century A.D.[4]
Like the Sūtra itself the Bhāsya too assumes the general metaphysical slant
of the Sāmkhya Karika and interprets the Yoga Sūtra within this framework.

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[1] Ibid., p. 341.

[2] Vākyapadīyam, op. cit., Karikas 49-61.

[3] All references are to the Pātanjali Yogadarśanam, (ed), Bhatta-
charya, Ramasamkara, Varanasi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakasana, 1963.

[4] See Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 342.

Of course, there are important differences between Yoga Sutra and Samkhya

Karika, and the Bhasya only accentuates those points on which they tend

to differ. But in its presentation of the classical Samkhya-Yoga under-

standing of the time and temporality we do not find evidence of their fun-

damental difference. It accepts the basic Samkhya position that the Buddhi

has a siginificant role in the constitution of temporal order, and that the trans

cendental reality of time does not have any independent objective status.

These and allied points shall be the subject matter of the following chap-

ters. In our treatment of these problems we have chosen to rely on the

Bhasya and the Yoga Sutra as well as on the Samkhya texts, for the views

expressed in the bhasya are both in congruity with and a continuation of

the classical Samkhya Yoga tradition.

Vacaspati Misra's Tattva Vaisaradi is a commentary written by Vacas-

pati on Vyasa Bhasya. We have already noted the significance of the con-

tributions of this great commentator to the classical Samkhya-Yoga tradition.

There is general concensus among scholars about his identity and the period

to which he belonged.[1] In essentials he tends to agree with Vyasa's under-

standing of the constitution of temporality or the subjective experience

of the temporal order. He agrees with Vyasa that "moment" alone is real

and that a sequence of moments do not have an objective reality. It is a

product of rational construction through abstraction. His interpretation

of the "omniscience" resulting from concentration on the "moment" is of

special significance. His distinction between omniscience implying a

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[1]See Supra, p. 29.

"knowledge of all without remainder" and omniscience as "the knowledge proceeding from discrimination" is particularly illuminating.[1] It is in this qualitative distinction between omniscience and the knowledge resulting from contemplation on the "moment" consists the true import of the soteriological significance of Sāmkhya-Yoga conception of time and temporality.

Vijñānabhiksu's Yoga Sāra Samgraha is a very useful manual of Yoga thought. Both Radhakrishnan and Dasgupta have recognized Vijñānbhiksu's contribution to Sāmkhya-Yoga tradition in general and to Yoga thought in particular.[2] As noted earlier he belongs to 16th century A.D. and displays an unmistakable leaning towards theistic Vedanta, especially as expressed in the Upanisads. He tends to disagree with Vācaspati on certain specific issues and makes heroic efforts to reconcile Sāmkhya-Yoga thought with the monistic theism of Upanisads.[3]

On the specific question of time and temporality we find some contradictions between Vijñānabhiksu's Yoga Sāra Samgraha[4] and his Sāmkhya Pravacana Bhāsya. While in the later work he suggests that Sāmkhya admits a distinction between eternal and empirical time, in the former he clearly maintains that Sāmkhya expressly denies transcendental or eternal time. Moreover, in

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[1]Tattvavaiśāradī in Patanjala-Yogadarsanam, (ed) Bhattacharya, op. cit., pp. 150-152.

[2]Dasgupta, op. cit., pp. 223, 229; Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 342.

[3]Radnakrishnan, op. cit., p. 342.

[4]Yoga Sāra Samgraha, (ed. and trans.) Jha, Ganga Nath, Adyar, Madras: Theosophical Publishing House, 1933.

the Yoga Sāra Saṃgraha he also tends to make a distinction between Sāmkhya
and Yoga conception of time and temporality.[1] However, we tend to disagree
with his interpretation on this point. In the present work we incline to
accept, based on careful study of the relevant texts, the homogeneity of
the Sāmkhya-Yoga tradition on the issue of time. On the fundamental onto-
logical questions, it is a common place that they agree, and the question
of time and temporality is no exception in this regard. We have advanced
our arguments for not accepting Vijñānabhikṣu's interpretation at its face
value at the appropriate place. This is, however, not to gainsay the impor-
tant place that Vijñānabhikṣu occupies within the Sāmkhya-Yoga tradition
The specific brand of theological affiliation in particular must not be
lost sight of in any interpretation drawing upon Vijñānabhikṣu.

Over the question of the homogeneity of Sāmkhya-Yoga tradition which
is the presupposition of the present work, it may not be out of place to
make some comments. True, the exact relationship between the pre-classical
Sāmkhya and Yoga remains a matter of pure conjecture. While Sāmkhya itself
contains the two trains of thought: theistic and non-theistic, Yoga always
seems to retain the theistic slant. There is no such a thing as atheistic
Yoga. However, it is our contention   that despite its unmistakable theis-
tic leaning the classical Yoga did not differ fundamentally on the basic
question of the nature of Puruṣa and Prakṛti and their interrelationship.
The present investigation concentrates primarily on this dimension of
Sāmkhya and Yoga systems. The question of temporality, i.e. the determination

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[1]Ibid., pp. 73-74.

of man's existence by the consciousness of the temporal distinctions and
its consequences for the reflecting self, falls within the realm of the
interrelationship between <u>Purusa</u> and <u>Prakrti</u>.   And in this respect the
differences between the two systems is inconsequential. Radhakrishnan,
after a careful analysis of the evolutionary scheme of the two schools
came to the conclusion that the "distinction between the Samkhya and the
Yoga account of evolution is not a serious one".[1] Dasgupta finds the
congruity between the two schools extremely significant:

> The affinity of the systems of Samkhya thought generally
> ascribed to a mythical sage, Kapila, to that of Yoga of
> Patanjali is so great on most important points of theoret-
> ical interest that they both may be regarded as two dif-
> ferent modifications of one common systematic ideas.[2]

The internal evidence within <u>Yoga Sutra</u> too weighs in favour of con-
sidering it as a continuum with the basic philosophical postulates of
classical Samkhya. The fact of fundamental convergence between the two
systems was accepted by Vyasa who wrote his commentary on Yoga Sutra. He
concludes his commentary on the <u>Yoga Sutra</u> by acknowledging at the end of
the Bhasya that Patanjali's Yoga system indeed is expressive of the words
of Samkhya. (iti sri Patanjale Yogasastre samkhyapravacane). The des-
cription of the Vyasa Bhasya on the <u>Yoga Sutra</u> as <u>Samkhya Pravacana Bhasya</u>
"brings out the intimate relation between the Samkhya and the Yoga."[3]

Basing their conclusions on historical evidences available on the

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[1]Radhakrishnan, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 342.

[2]Dasgupta, S.N., <u>Yoga as Philosophy and Religion</u>, Delhi: Motilal
Banarasideass, 1973, p. ix.

[3]Radhakrishnan, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 342.

date of the compilation of Yoga Sūtra both Keith and Dasgupta conclude

that the probability of Patanjali having modelled his Yoga Sūtra on Sāmkhya

Karika of Iśvarakṛṣṇa is extremely high. Keith writes:

> It is, however, not at all unlikely that the production of
> the Yoga Sūtra was more or less directly motivated by the
> revival of the Sāmkhya and its definite setting out in the
> Sāmkhya Kārikā of Isvarakrsna who was an earlier contem-
> porary...[1]

Concurring with this statement of Keith, J. G. Larson maintains that "the

final redaction (of Yoga Sūtra) is roughly contemporary with the composition

of the Kārikā, and .... its final compilation may have been occasioned by

the appearance of Iśvarakṛṣṇa's work."[2] Dasgupta goes even to the extent

of suggesting that the Yoga as presented by Patanjali is basically Sāmkhyan

in character. He even labels the Yoga as the "Patanjali school of Sāmkhya":

> Of the Pātanjala school of Sāmkhya, which forms the subject
> of the Yoga.....Patanjali was probably the most notable per-
> son for he not only collected the different forms of Yoga
> practices, and gleaned the diverse ideas which were or could
> be associated with the Yoga but grafted them all on the Samkhya
> metaphysics, and gave them the forms in which they have been
> handed down to us.[3]

For purposes of this study we have justifiably considered the sys-

tems of Sāmkhya and Yoga as integral and have not addressed ourselves to

the question of the possibility of the differences which may be derived

from terminological or nominal distinctions. The Sāmkhya system under in-

vestigation includes the thought of Sāmkhya Kārikā and Sāmkhya Sūtra and

various commentaries thereon. This is what has generally been considered

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[1]Keith, op. cit., p. 57.

[2]Larson, op. cit., p. 167.

[3]Dasgupta, History of Indian Philosophy, op. cit., p. 229.

by scholars as representing the Classical Sāṁkhya. Yoga, in the present

study, refers primarily to the classical yoga or Rāja-Yoga as developed

in the Patanjali's Yoga Sūtra and the various commentaries on it. Histo-

rically, the philosophy of Sāmkhya as a systematic exposition of the main

tenets of the school must have preceded the systematic exposition of Yoga.

While surely there is a general paucity of historical evidence in this

area the close connection in the classical period of their development is

transparent to keen and diligent students of Indian Philosophical thought.[1]

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[1]The position or point of view that is here adopted is in confor-
mity with the vogue of modern expository writings on the subject, to treat
the two as embodying 'differentiations in what was originally a single
doctrine' (Hĳriyanna, Outlines, p. 268). The Gita advocates the idea of
oneness of Samkhya and Yoga as representing true insight (ekaṁ sāmkhyam
ca yogam ca yah pasyati sa pasyati, V, 5) though it is true that the terms
do not so much refer to the scholastic versions of the two schools of
thought as to their respective stress on gnosis and action. However, for
a very detailed analysis of the difference between Sāṁkhya and Yoga in spe-
cific terms, i.e. inter alia of will and its place in spiritual life, see
Bhattacharya, K. C., Studies in Philosophy, Calcutta, Progressive Publi-
shers, 1956, p. 221. The difference is carefully delienated starting from
the differential stress on buddhi and ahaṁkāra, through a difference in
the presentation to consciousness of becoming and in the understanding of
'becoming' itself as continuing of the cause into the effect in a finalised
form, and finally, how their difference about the understanding of cau-
sality is reflected in their views on the nature of time. The treatment is
at its best plausible and even illuminating but lacks in textual support.
So far as the Sāṁkhya account goes, it is mostly an argument from silence
aside from the problematiç posed by Yukti Dipikā in this regard through
suggesting that time is the causal process itself (karaṇa parispauda) II,
8-9, and Vijñāna Bhiksu's very debatable reconstruction oꞁ one Saṁkhya
Sūtra: II, 12. As for the yoga account, the textual basis is the refer-
ence in the Yoga Sūtras and the Bhāsya wherein there is a clear statement
of the two aspects of time viz. ksana and krama, i.e. constant and sequence
of instants: III, 52; IV, 32. All these textual materials are utilised
and explored at appropriate places in the body of our present study but we
have tended, in the absence of clear textual mandates against it, to imply
a homogeneous understanding of the issue of temporality in relation to
consciousness.

CHAPTER III

SAMKHYA-YOGA ONTOLOGY AND THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The present analysis is primarily concerned with articulating the

basic ontological perspective of Samkhya-Yoga, which is of crucial signi-

ficance for developing an understanding of the Samkhya-Yoga analysis of

the structure and constitution of temporality. What we understand by the

structure and constitution of temporality and how we are to relate it with

the nature and structure of consciousness as such is a question that will

constantly be present as part of our investigation. Indeed, this is by no

means, conceivably, a settled question for the enterprise of philosophical

thinking. Its elusiveness for conceptual clarity constitutes both the

rationale for and the impetus of the present analysis.[1]

However, it is our contention that a systematic articulation of

Samkhya-Yoga's exposition of this dimension of the problem will help to

put certain basic concerns of the philosophical thinking in their proper

perspective and will be of immense help in developing a philosophical un-

derstanding of this crucial problem. More specifically, Samkhya-Yoga's

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[1]Problem of time has been one of the urgent concerns of philoso-
phical investigation in both the western and eastern traditions. For a
concise but comprehensive analysis of the problematic of time in the
history of western thought refer to Fraser, J. T., "The Concept of Time
in Western Thought", Main Currents, Vol. 25, Mr-Ap 72, pp. 115-124.
· For an excellent and insightful approach to the problem of Time
within India philosophical tradition see Pannikkar, Raymond, Philosophy:.
East and West, Vol. 24, No. 2, April 1974, pp.

contribution to the understanding of the problem of temporality and its

relationship to the transcendental consciousness will constitute the

subject matter of our discussion in the concluding section of this part.

Given this understanding of our task we have to spell out at the

very outset what tends to be the distinguishing feature of Sāmkhya-Yoga

ontology. It is only then that a methodologically valid and philosophic-

ally sound investigation of the problem of temporality can be undertaken.

Such an attempt will inevitably involve delimiting the ontological prob-

lems[1] that we consider to be significantly related to the problem of

temporality.

Though in one sense the Sāmkhya-Yoga figures among the earliest of

the 'metaphysical' endeavours of Hindu system - building, it is our assump-

tion that ⸱ Sāmkhya-Yoga, also transcends the limitations of the tradi-

tional Hindu metaphysics[2] by focusing its investigation to that realm

which may conveniently be described as the realm of immanent experiences.[3]

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[1]The present work does not look at philosophical investigation as an
attempt at compartmentalization of issues. Rather, the metaphysical, epis-
temological and ontological problems are seen in an intricate and complex
interrelationship. The ontological problems are seen to play an important
role in aritculating the basic issues which revolve around the Sāmkhyan de-
limitation of the realm of consciousness and the world. See Larson, G. J.,
Classical Samkhya, Varanasi: Motilal Baranasidas, 1969, p. 230.

[2]The Nyāya Sūtra of Gautama and the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra of Kaṇāda may
be cited as examples of providing categorial schemes typifying 'Hindu' me-
taphysical traditions. The ontic approach characteristic of these tradi-
tions may be contrasted with the existential-ontological nature of the
enquiry with which Sāmkhya-Kārikā commences its treatment.

[3]Expressions and notions like Svatahgrahyatva (spontaneous apprehen-
sion of validity), Sen Gupta, Anina, Classical Sāmkhya, Lucknow: United Press
Ltd., 1969, p. 70, are instances in point.

Of course, in making this claim the present author asks for a cri-
tical understanding of Sāmkhya-Yoga's philosophical investigations de-
manding a radical departure from the commonly accepted interpretation of
Sāmkhya-Yoga's analysis of the basic issues of human existence. It is
the author's conviction that Sāmkhya-Yoga is primarily an attempt at a
transcendental analysis of the facts of human experience:[1] As an analysis
it steers clearly away from the issues which demand either an a priori de-
cision about the nature of reality or alternately ask for a mere speculative
understanding of the status of being. What is accepted as the point of
departure is only the fact of human experience. From this is set out a
programme leading to an understanding of the essence of being precisely
in the context of the realm of consciousness. The concern here is with (what
may be described in phenomenological idiom) the eidetic structures of being
or its essences which are universally valid and are openly available to
the reflecting consciousness which cares to reflect upon itself. The phe-
nomenological overtones of this understanding of the basic task of
Sāmkhya-Yoga is not entirely a superimposition of modern mind; they may be
seen to emanate from the basic ontological concerns of the Sāmkhya-Yoga
philosophers.

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[1]Here attention is drawn to the underlying supposition of the intro-
ductory kārikās Proceeding from the fact of suffering as an integral part
of the world of experience, the kārikās point to that which is beyond the
givenness of experience. Experience presupposes the experiencer and the
experienced. The experienced world is constantly undergoing change. This
changing world of experience finds its ground in something which is of fun-
damental nature and is the transcendental basis of the experience of the
world. It is not the existence of the world as such that is the concern of
Sāmkhya-Yoga analysis. Rather it is the world given in our experience that
is the point of departure. (drstavadānuśrāvikāh sa hyʻaviśuddhiksayātiś-
ayayuktah tadviparītāh śreyān vyaktāvyaktajñyavijñānāt). The Sāmkhya Kārikā,
op. cit., Kārikā 2.

With these observations regarding the basic assumptions and the direction that the present analysis will tend to follow, we may now embark upon the task of a comprehensive understanding of Sāmkhya-Yoga ontology. However, we look upon our task not merely as an attempt at cataloguing these tenets of the Sāmkhya-Yoga thought which seem to coroborrate our understanding of the basic philosophical task. Our interpretation of Sāmkhya-Yoga will seek to bring to the fore the meaning-structures and thought patterns of Sāmkhya-Yoga literature in tune with the demands of the logic of the system itself. Such being our concern the enterprise will inevitably involve certain amount of conceptual clarification especially in view of the confusions and the mystique that seem to surround the meaning of Sāmkhya-Yoga. This will also involve re-constructing Sāmkhya-Yoga thought in the light of our findings by providing the missing links. We do not look upon philosophical analysis and investigation as an anatomical autopsy which is primarily interested in identifying the specific fissures or elements of the organism. Indeed, philosophical investigation is a living, ongoing process of creative understanding directed towards a better comprehension of the problems of human existence.

The Sāmkhya-Yoga analysis of the problem of the existence and nature of being proceeds from a recognition of the contradictions involved in the natural or the phenomenal realm, i.e. that which is immediately perceived (dṛṣṭvad). Both the perceptible world (dṛṣṭvad) as well as the one grounded in testimony are equally inadequate in resolving the basic contradictions. To Sāmkhya-Yoga way of thinking both belong to the realm of impurity, destruction and excesses (aviśuddhikṣayātiśayayuktaḥ). The reflecting consciousness is required to renounce this mode of understanding and rise to

a more radical understanding or a discriminative awareness of the manifest

(vyakta), the unmanifest (avyakta) and the knowing one or knower (i.e.

purusa).[1]

> The revealed (testified means) are like the visible (i.e.
> inefficient), for they are connected with impurity, des-
> truction and excess. A contrary method is better, and
> this consists in a discriminative knowledge of the
> Manifested (forms of world), the Unmanifested (prakriti),
> and the knowing (self).

This demand for a radical departure from the pre-conceived notions

and prevalent conceptions of reality occurs on the level of cognitional

analysis conceived as an analysis of the structure of experience. The

Sāmkhya-Yoga prefers. to shift the focus of philosophical investigation

from the question of the status and being of the world as such (of the

seen variety as well as of the one accepted on trust) to the question of

the status and being of the world that is given to us in direct exper-

ience. The first datum for the self-reflecting self is nothing but the

fact of consciousness which constitutes the ultimate point of departure

and the basis, as well as the existential foundation, of our understand-

ing of the real world. The real world is not denied but is accepted as

existing side by side with consciousness.[2]

The express concern of Sāmkhya-Yoga, therefore, is not to ascertain

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[1]dṛṣṭavad ānuś-avikah sa hy aviśuddhiksayātiśayayuktah tadviparitah śreyān vyāktavyaktajñāvijñānāt. The Sāmkhya Kārikā, op. cit., Kārikā 2.

[2]mūlaprakṭir ꞔ avikrtir ꞔmahadādyāḥ prakrtivikrtayah sapta sodaśakas tu vikāro na prakrtir ꞔna vikrtih purusah. Ibid., Kārikā 3.

the mode of being of the real world and its objects whose existence it does not question but takes for granted. Its primary concern is rather to conduct a transcendental inquiry into the domain of pure consciousness in order to determine (1) the mode of being of pure consciousness and (2) to discern the mode of the givenness of the world in immediate experience. This aspect of Sāmkhya-Yoga investigation we call transcendental. Now an enquiry is transcendental precisely in the sense that,

> It does not resolve the question of the existence of the
> world through its being directed towards the characteristics
> of the world, but in that it takes the domain of pure exper-
> ience as its point of departure, and attempts, as if by an
> indirect route, to find the cognitive foundation for the
> admission of the existence every object – of the real world
> in particular in the actual state and in the essence of the
> course of and activities of consciousness.[1]

It is important to note that it is by contrasting both the regions of being (world and consciousness), and discovering concurrently that one of them, the pure consciousness, is given in immanent perception, which guarantees its existence completely beyond doubt, Sāmkhya-Yoga also points to the method by which the whole question of ontology should be discovered. Ontological and epistemological problems are not two disparate problems. The problem of the existence and nature of being is not derivative in relation to the cognitional considerations; rather both constitute a continuum whereby one overlaps the other and cannot be considered in isolation from it. The raison-de-etre for Sāmkhya-Yoga's involvement with epistemological problems is to be found in its acceptance of both the existential and

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[1]Ingaradenen, Roman, Time and Modes of Being, Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 1964, p. 15.

operational priority of consciousness over the world. Sāṁkhya-Yoga correctly looks at the ontological and epistemological questions in their intrinsic relationship. For the sake of methodological clarity the system attempts to delimit the two realms and discuss the epistemological question as a way back to the fundamental question of ontology which seem to have been obscured by the metaphysicians.

To our way of thinking, the Sāṁkhya-Yoga, in and through a radical approach to the problem of being attempts to comprehend the essence of being in the immediate givenness on the level of consciousness. In Interpreting the system in this way, we are not departing from the spirit and motivation underlying the basic formulation of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga thought. The evidence on which we propose to base our understanding is so conspicuous that one may even say that it is the vogue of an excessive metaphysical tradition of long and reputed standing associated with its name that obscures the original motivation of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga thought.

One striking evidence that readily suggests to our mind in this regard relates to the Sāṁkhya-Yoga doctrine of <u>Sarga</u>.[1]   The Sāṁkhya

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[1]The term <u>Sarga</u> is derived from the root sṛj (to create) which is also the root of <u>Srsti</u> the sanskrit term for world or universe as creation. The term carries with it the cosmic connotation. But within the Sāṁkhya-Yoga scheme of things the meaning of <u>Sarga</u> loses its strict cosmic reference and the term is used in a rather specific sense.

philosophy admits 25 categories (tattva), which can be grouped into two

broader categories, the Self (Puruṣa) and the not-Self (Prakrti). It is

through the Purusa's coming together (sandidhi) with the Prakrti that the

process of Sarga involving the emanation of the 23 categories originates.

The Prakrti along with that which is seen to be the modifications of the

Prakrti constitute the 24 categories:

> Prakrti (the primeaval ground of manifestation);
> Mahat or Buddhi (the principle of intelligence);
> Ahamkāra (the principle of egoity or I-ness);
> Five Tanmātras (five subtle elements);
> Manas (the mind);
> Five Jñānendriyas (five organs of sense);
> Five Karmendriyas (five organs of action);
> Five Mahābhuttas (five gross elements).

The 23 categories (tattvās), which are also called modifications (vikrti),

are said to issue from the unmanifest ground (avyakta Prakrti), when the

Prakrti comes in contact (sannidhi) with the Puruṣa, the principle of

consciousness.

The Sāmkhya-Yoga explication of this process of Sarga has usually

been referred to, both in the traditional and modern understanding of the

system, as an account of the description of the process of evolution in

cosmological terms. The doctrine of Sarga, according to the generality of

such understanding, invariably refers to 'evolution' understood in strictly

cosmological sense.[1] Thus, Sarga has been seen as a process of 'evolution',

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[1]See Radhakrishnan, S., Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927, p. 266; Das Gupta, S. N., A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, Cambridge: The University Press, 1951, pp. 245-248; Mookerjee, Ṣatkari, "The Samkhya-Yoga" in History of Philosophy Eastern and Western, (ed.) Radhakrishnan, S., London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1952; Hiriyana, M., "The Samkhya" in The Cultural Heritage of India, Vol. III, (ed.) Bhattacharyya, Haridas, Calcutta: The Ramkrishna Mission Institute of Culture, 1969, pp. 41-52; Sen Gupta, Anima, op. cit.; Hiriyana, M., Popular Essays in Indian Philosophy, Mysore: Kavyalaya Publishers, 1952, p. 55.

leading through successive stages (emergence of 23 tattvas being a product
of these stages), to the final emergence of the manifest world (Vyakta).
However, we submit that the understanding of Sarga doctrine in strict cos-
mological terms is susceptible to the charge of misinterpretation. The
following considerations may be offered in support of the possibility of
a non-cosmological interpretation of Sarga doctrine:

1.   What is required is what may in contrast be termed as phenomenolog-
ical understanding of the process. The emphasis should not be on the
various stages in the evolution of the cosmos or the world but on the
structure of the consciousness in and through which the world is manifested.[1]
Sāmkhya-Yoga theory of Sarga acquires a new meaning and a somewhat differ-
ent orientation if approached from this angle. It is a description of the
structural arrangements of the field of the consciousness (ksetra) which
the knower of the field (ksetrajñā) discovers when it reflects upon it-
self. The world is perceived as world only as consciousness reflects as
what is aware (ksetrajña) of the world.

2. ·   If Sāmkhya-Yoga theory of Sarga is to be interpreted as a theory of
cosmological evolution then we run into the problem of explaining quantita-
tive multiplicity of evolution. Since there is a plurality of Puruṣas and
since evolution starts if and only if the Puruṣa comes into contact with the
Prakṛti,[2] there must be a multiplicity of the world that so evolves because

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[1]Larson, G. J., op. cit., p. 193.

[2]tasmāttatsamyogādacetanam cetanāvadiva lingam/guṇakartṛtve'pi
tathā kartevya bhavatyudāsīnah//purusasya darśanārtham kaivahyārtham tathā
pradhānasya/pangvandhavadubhayorapi samyogastatkṛtah sargah// The
Sāmkhya Kārikā, op. cit., Kārikās 20 and 21.

there will be different evolution for each _Puruṣa_. But obviously this is not the case according to Sāṃkhya-Yoga. While Sāṃkhya-Yoga accepts the plurality of _Puruṣas_ it does not subscribe to the view asserting a similar plurality of universes; instead it admits one common cosmos as the common referential point of all _Puruṣas_.

3.   Sāṃkhya-Yoga understanding of the _Vyakta-Avyakta_ appears somewhat baffling if seen in terms of the evolutionary interpretations of the _Sarga_ doctrine. _Prakṛti_ is the (unmanifest) _Avyakta_, the material ground of all manifestations of the world and its object (_Vyakta_). According to this interpretation the _Avyakta-Prakṛti_ includes in itself the potentiality of all things in the manifest world, both mental and physical. Thus _Avyakta-Prakṛti_ is not looked upon as the world but the ground of this manifest world. The 23 principles evolved from Prakriti are considered as constituting the ǎctual manifest world (_Vyakta_).[1] In this way of looking at Prakṛti in relation to the world one important circumstance which accounts for the precise difference between what is unmanifest and its manifestation seems to be overlooked. The distinction is one of not-being or being in relation to consciousness. _Prakṛti_ as _Avyakta_ refers to the world of objectivity which has not opened itself up to the presence of consciousness, (Puruṣa). And _Vyakta_ is the manifest world precisely in the sense that it is the correlate of consciousness. _Vyakta_ does not mean the world that is present out there as opposed to the witnessing consciousness but it is precisely the world of the witnessing consciousness. All the so-called evolutes

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[1]Mookerjee, _op. cit._, p. 244.

are not the product of the prakṛti in the usual sense of product. They are to be understood in a very special sense of being the structure of manifestation, the mechanisms through which the world unfolds itself in terms of increasing differentiation to the witnessing consciousness.

4.   The first category in the Sāmkhya-Yoga scheme is __Mahat__ or __Buddhi__ which is the locus of I-ness or __Ahamkāra__. To conceive the Sāmkhya-Yoga analysis of Sarga in cosmological terms will necessitate an assertion of a Cosmic Intelligence or Buddhi as the first principle of the manifest world of transcendent objectivities. /To be sure such an assertion has been ascribed to Sāmkhya-Yoga in certain sections of scholarship.[1] But such assertions imply overlooking of Sāmkhya-Yoga's basic concern with the individual nature of consciousness. Consciousness, for Sāmkhya-Yoga, is always individual and not an abstract or Absolute principle transcending the individual consciousness. While pure consciousness or __Purusa__ is individual but not personal, ego or I-consciousness is included in the __Buddhi-Ahamkāra__ structure. Thus what is commonly considered to be self-consciousness or ego is understood in Sāmkhya-Yoga to be other than the "__purusa__". Neither of the two, the pure consciousness and the Ego, need be conceived in mere cosmological terms as referring to some world-soul or an Absolute consciousness. The element of individuality is integral to the meaning of consciousness.[2]

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[1]See Bhattacharya, K. C., __Studies in Philosophy__, Vol. I, Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1956, p. 195-196.

[2]__Mahat tattva__, the Great Principle, is intelligence in an individual sense which contains the possibility of the next evolute viz. __Ahamkāra__, the sense of personal individuality which in turn preceeds man's psychic-empiric

The important question that arises in this context is: what is the exact nature of pure consciousness or Purusa and in what way is it related to empirical consciousness or the psycho-physical conglomeration in the conception of the I-principle. For Sāmkhya, Purusa or pure consciousness is what is precisely not characterized by the dispersions and the atomisms characteristic of the world and of the empirical consciousness in which the world is present. Instead of being the agent of action and volition, it is a mere witness or spectator of the drama involving willing and activity. It is in a condition of intrinsic isolation from all the manifestations of the world both mental and physical.[1] The best way to comprehend the essence of Purusa is to look at it as a mere fact of consciousness.

> It (Purusa) is the fact of man's experience which is apart from all of his feeling, inclinations, impulses, etc. It is the fact of man's experience which provides the basic for his freedom precisely because it is not a part of or determined by the world. By referring to Purusa as the simple fact of consciousness apart from all thought, feeling, etc., this also brings to mind such terms as transparent or translucent. It is only by the 'light' of Purusa that one sees the world, and it is only the fact of the world which renders Purusa aware of itself. The fact of

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(continued from previous page)...

life consisting of the working of his senses and manas which is the precursor of the world of matter. The world of experience is the outcome of the 'Purusa' confronting himself with the 'Prakriti', i.e. the permanent possibility of pleasure, pain and dullness of knowledge, action and even inertness (contrary to the belief that the world issues from prakriti as effect does from cause and that purusa as a teleological factor comes into picture as an after thought).

[1] tasmāc̄ca viparyāsāt siddhaṁ sāksitvam asya purusasya kaivaṣyaṁ mādhyasthyaṁ drastrtvam akartr-bhāvas̄ca. The Sāmkhya Kārikā, op. cit., Karika 19.

consciousness and the fact of the world are two irreducible realities.[1]

Buddhi along with Ahaṁkāra and Manas constitute the principle around which the whole personal world is centred.[2] This is the 'I'-principle in the proper sense of the term. And it is this 'I' or the empirical Ego that according to Sāmkhya-Yoga is the active willing subject of our conscious state.[3] It is this 'I' that posits an attitude and relates itself to the world around itself precisely because the emergence of this 'I'-principle coincides with the moment of the encounter of the world and pure consciousness. Apart from the active spontaneous willing dimension there is also the passive aspect, as may be seen in the circumstance that it is also the recipient of sense data to which it reacts.[4] The personal or the empirical ego is then both 'spontaneous' and 'quiescent', but in both the aspects it retains the intentional dimension of consciousness since it remains the subject of reference or the subject of intentionality. In the last analysis this empirical subject is essentially the subject of all intentionality and is not to be confused with what is given within the field of its consciousness.

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[1] Larson, J. G., op. cit., p. 185.

[2] Antaḥkaraṇam trividhamiti buddhyahaṁkāramanasām grahaṇam/ etat trividhamaṅtaḥ karaṇasaṁjñitam. The Māṭharāvṛtti, op. cit., p. 49; sāntaḥkaraṇetyādi buddherupāttatvāccesamahaṁkāro manaśchāntahkaraṇam/tābhyām yuktā buddhiḥ. The Jayamangalā, op. cit., p. 41.

[3] Antaḥkaraṇasya tadujjvalitatvāllohavadadhiṣṭhātṛtvam. The Sāmkhya Pravacana Sūtra, op. cit., I.99

[4] The Sāmkhya Kārikā, op. cit., 35, 23 and 26.

Thus the empirical consciousness is related in cognition to its surrounding world to things and beings which it experiences. The subject bears a necessary reference or relation to object, just as the object stands defined by being in relationship to the subject. The subject is in passive or active relation to object, which is present to the subject as the terminal point of reference. Thus in relation to the personal subject of intentionality, the object in the environment functions as "object" for it. This relation itself is, of course, not external, i.e. as between two terms in relationship, but one of intentionality. Viewed from the side of the object (prakriti) it signifies that the intended object (prayojya) motivates the subject (prayojaka).

It may thus be seen that the personal subject, i.e. the 'I' is world-involved by definition. It is the subject and the agent in actual or potential relation with the "object", which is either the object of knowledge or 'acquisitive' of action. The question that arises here may be: how does the world-involved 'I' stand in relation to pure consciousness? What is the relation between consciousness which may be called the transcendental subject (Purusa) and the personal subject (Buddhi-Ahamkara structure)?

We have seen that the empirical ego for Samkhya-Yoga constitutes the essence of the 'I'-ness which is the centre of all positing of attitudes. What is significant about this dimension of existence, i.e. existence of empirical ego, the 'I'-ness is that it serves as the pole which exercises specific acts of positing, and also what is posited, i.e. the object of such positing. So far as this personal Ego is the 'I' of the positing attitudes[1]

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[1] The Samkhya Karika, op. cit., Karika 23 and 24.

the world that is posited by the I also proves to be the result of the decision of the subject.

But then the question arises: are the empirical ego (Buddhi-Ahamkāra structure) and the transcendental subject (Puruṣa) two mutually exclusive and distinct principles? The immediate answer seems to be "yes" for the two are supposed to belong to two different realms. But, on closer examination, it appears that the distinction is more of operational nature than one of the thematic. "I" as a person, and as such belonging to the world of fellow-being and having a world around is in point of essence, the same "I" as the transcendental subject. It is the point of view concerned that separates the two kinds of approaches to the self-same principle. On purely transcendental analysis, the ego sets itself as the "transcendental ego", as the final point of reference which on further analysis may be seen to be the absolute region of pure consciousness, the source of all meaning of being. But when the position of the same transcendental subject is sought to be determined from the point of view of fact or actuality - the position in terms of concrete man and his surrounding world - the same transcendental ego appears to assume the form of the personal, empirical ego. Seen from the perspective of the actual existing person, so far as the latter consciously posits itself in positing attitudes, it is the empirical ego considered in itself, without the perspective it is promoted to the level of transcendental subject. In the mode of discriminative awareness (viveka) the world involved person, i.e. the one who acts, motivates and refers to the world, himself is what may be called the transcendental ego (Puruṣa). It is not a case of transformation of the one into the other.

There are no two existentially distinct entities. The world-involved person in his unreflective attitude proves to be the centre of all positing of attitudes. But the same one in his reflection, i.e. when he reflects on his world involvement, instead of positing attitude towards the world, is the transcendental subject. Thus it may be seen that the personal empirical ego itself provides the key to the transcendental ego-hood of the subject. 'I,' namely the person (Ahaṁkāra) is given as the object of reflective self apperception in the very wake of the development of the empirical perception of 'I²-ness (the Sarga being the process of this development). The stream of experience as pure consciousness is also at once the process by which the pure subject assumes the apperceptive form of the personal ego.

This way of looking at the relationship between the transcendental subject and the empirical ego may be questioned from the perspective of a purely cosmological approach to the meaning of Sāmkhya-Yoga. It may be asked: how the two subjects respectively referred to as pure consciousness and the one which is an evolute of Prakrti, be in principle one and the same? The two belong to the two radically different and opposed realms of being[1] so that it is not conceivable that they are identical. The objection rests on the traditional understanding of the Sāmkhya-Yoga as embodying a doctrine of evolution. The empirical ego is a product of real evolutionary process in the course of which it emerges from the womb of undifferentiated mass called Prakrti. What seems overlooked in this

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[1]Radhakrishnan, S., op. cit., pp. 287-291; also, Mookerjee, Sat-
Kari, op. cit., p. 242-257.

interpretation is the emergence of empirical subject as a specific moment in the dialectical relationship between the fact of consciousness and the fact of the world. The so-called evolution or the _Sarga_ is a figurative way of contemplating the fact of the givenness of the world in the immediate or original experience. Of course this fact remains dormant till consciousness stands in a reflective relationship to itself. It is only in and through objectification of consciousness that the true structure of the givenness of the pure consciousness can be grasped. The _Samkhya-Yoga_ has made this point very clear.

The _Samkhya Karika_ is quite specific on the question of the functional difference but substantive identity of the empirical subject and the transcendental ego. The fact of the substantive identity is clearly assumed in the passages enlisting the grounds for. the existence and plurality of selves (_Purusas_). A careful reading of the text shows that the transcendental subject and the empirical ego are existentially determined by the same set of factors. It is on the same considerations that the existence of _Purusa_ as the transcendental ground of all conscious willing and activity is established.

To explain. The argument offered by the Samkhya in favour of the existence of the _Purusa_ runs as follows:[1]

1.   Since the combinations (things existing as aggregation of three gunas) must have another as the one whose purpose is served, and since

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[1] sanghataparārthatvāt trigunādiviparyayād/ puruso'sti bhoktrbhāvāt kaivalyārtham pravrttesca. The Samkhya Karika, op. cit., Kārikā 17.

there must be something different from the three guṇas, there exists Puruṣa as this other (samghāta - parārthatvāt - triguṇādi - viparyayād).

2.　　Since, there must be control (of the world of things constituted of guṇas) there must be a presiding power or controlling being, that being is Puruṣa (adhiṣṭhānāt).

3.　　Becuase there must be someone to experience and enjoy, that experiencer is Puruṣa (bhoktṛ-bhāvāt).

4.　　Since there is the activity for the same of isolation or freedom there is Puruṣa who is free (kaivalyārtham).

The arguments adduced for the plurality of the Puruṣa must be read in conjunction with what has been stated earlier. There is plurality of Puruṣas;[1]

1.　　because there is separate regulation of birth, death and faculties;

2.　　because activities or functions (of beings) do not occur simultaneously; and

3.　　because beings differ on account of varying guṇas (attributes).

Thus, the main argument for plurality is based on the fact of natural diversity inherent in three guṇas (attributes or aspects). Vācaspati Miśra puts it in these words:

> The diversity or differentiation due to the distribution
> of the guṇas in the various entities, could not be explained

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[1] jananamaranakaraṇānaṁ pratiniyamādʒayugapatpravṛtteśca puruṣaba-
hutvaṁ siddhaṁ traiguṇyaviparyayācʒcaiva. Ibid., 18.

if the Purusas were one and the same in all. On the hypothesis of plurality, however, there is no difficulty.[1]

It is interesting to note that in all these arguments offered for the existence and plurality of the Purusa, the transcendental subject, it is assumed as if it were existentially identical with the empirical ego.[1] Not only this, but Saṁkhya-Yoga also goes even to the extent of implying admission of Suksma Sarira (subtle body) constituted of the empirical subject as the vehicle of the transcendental ego.[2] Moreover the existential equation of the transcendental ego and the empirical ego is further assumed in the Samkhya-Yoga postulation of dialectical understanding of their relationship. While empirical ego or Buddhi is regarded as mirroring the luminosity and the consciousness structure of the transcendental subject,[3] the Purusa, it in its turn also may be said to depend on the self-reflection of the Buddhi to understand and comprehend the essential difference between itself and the world of Prakrti.[4] It seems to us that

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[1]Tattva Kaumudi by Vacaspatimisra, op. cit., p. 66.

[2]The Saṁkhya Karika distinguishes between three kinds of bodies: subtle (suksama), born of parents (mataprtrjah) and the body of gross elements (prabhutais). Only suksama body is constant or permanent, i.e. which passes from birth and acts as the vehicle of consciousness. Others are perishable. See The Samkhya Karika, op. cit., Karika 39; also the Samkhya Pravacana Sutra, op. cit., 3.16; Jayamangala on Karika 39, op. cit., p. 44; and Matharavrtti on Karika 39, p. 53.

[3]Catalina, F. V., A Study of the Self Concept of Samkhya-Yoga Philosophy, Delhi: Munshirama Manoharlal, 1968, p. 68.

[4]sarvam pratyupabhogam yasmat purusasya sadhayati buddhih /saiva ca visinasti punah pradhanapurusantaram suksmam. The Samkhya Karika, op. cit.; 37; krtsnam purusasyartham prakasya buddhau prayacchanti. Ibid., 36.

this orientation of Samkhya-Yoga understanding of reality with respect to the question of existence necessitates conceiving of the relationship between the transcendental and the empirical subject in dialectical terms.[1]

Samkhya-Yoga does not concern itself with the absolute rupture between the world and the self; its point of departure is always the self in the world, the one that experiences the contradictions of the world, but at the same time is capable of transcending them by remaining neutral to it.

In viewing the personal ego (Buddhi) in the context of its development the other moment of the ego besides that of the higher stage of free transcendental subject, i.e., the subject of free act of witnessing, has also to be considered. The character of this so-called "unfree ego" is grounded in the passivity of sensuousness, i.e., natural dispositions, etc. Thus the transcendental subject or the spiritual 'I' - in the specific sense of the subject of autonomous acts of witnessing - finds itself dependent on a dark background of natural dispositions.

Here we should take note of the fact that Samkhya-Yoga makes a clear distinction between the neutrality of Purusa and the passivity of Manas. Spirit or Purusa is the foundational ground of all conscious acts and Prakriti exists for the sake of Purusa, for it is to the transcendental subject that the world orients itself and for which the world exists.[2]

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[1] See commentaries on Karika 36. .... puruṣasyārtham suksmasthula viṣayalakṣaṇam prakāśyābhivyaktim nitva .... tasyām ca viṣayopādhāno-paraktāyam buddhau puruṣa upalabhate. tatredamucyate - buddhyadhyavasitam-artham puruṣaścetayata iti. Jayamangalā, op. cit., p. 42.

[2] itya eṣa prakrtikrto mahadādiviśeṣabhūtaparyantaḥ/pratipuruṣavimok-sārtham svārtham iva parārtha ārambhaḥ//

As such it stands ever against Manas (mind) at the lower stage of sensibility. It must however be noted that at the same time, for Sāṁkhya-Yoga the Manas or mind of the lower sense level is one with the empirical subject of attitude, the Buddhi. Both form an unbroken empirical unity. And it is precisely at this level that the problem of temporality becomes enigmatic.

Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure, according to Sāṁkhya-Yoga, is both created and creative. It is the structure of world-involvement as well as the possibility of world-transcendence.

It is temporal, both in the sense that it has a beginning and an end as well as that it is the basic condition for the cognition of things in their temporal mode of being. In and through cognition the Buddhi-Ahamkara structure constitutes temporality as well as it is constituted as temporal. The temporal order on the phenomenal level is a conscious creation of the empiric subject (Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure). Time-order as the principle of continuity is constituted by the empiric subject (Buddhi parikalpita). Time is nothing but the relational mode of being (sambandhamātropakāri); and as such is a function of Buddhi (the empiric subject). But in the constitution of the temporal structure the empiric subject does not act as a principle independent of the objective flow or the flux of events characteristic of the world of change. The empiric subject, in the world involvement, is out and out-temporal.

(continued from previous page)
vatsavivṛddhinimittaṁ kṣīrasya yathā pravṛttirajñasya/ puruṣavimoksanimittaṁ tathā.pravṛttih pradhānasya// autsukyanivṛttyarthaṁ yathā kriyāsu pravartate lokah/ puruṣasya vimokṣārtham pravartate tadvadavyaktam// The Sāṁkhya Kārikā, op. cit., 56, 57-58.

What we see in the empiric subject as the principle of change and creativity (vikrta) is an essential drive, a lived tension and a continuous turning to new events and activities. As temporal, the empiric subject does not merely observe the flow of temporal events, but it participates in it. Thus the empiric subject (Buddhi-Ahamkāra structure) both constitutes and is constituted in and through temporal becoming. However, essentially temporal, the empiric subject is also the basic condition for the transcendence of temporality. Transcendence of temporality is a function of Viveka (discriminate knowledge). Viveka is the mode of cognitive awareness of the essential 'thisness' of Purusa (pure consciousness as unchanged and unmoved) and Prakrti (the permanent ground of all change and movement.

The transcendence of temporality is possible through viveka (the discriminative knowledge), a function of Buddhi. Viveka is the mode of cognitive awareness of the 'thisness' of Purusa (pure consciousness as unchanged and unmoved) and Prakrti (the permanent ground of all change and movement). Thus, Buddhi is both the structure of world involvement as temporal as well as the condition of world transcendence as eternity. More on this later.

CHAPTER IV

TIME AND TEMPORALITY IN SĀMKHYA-YOGA

The Category of Time: Grounds for its Rejection

The Sāmkhya-Yoga ontology can be best grasped in the context of
the relationship of mutual otherness between the real world and the cog-
nising subject. Real objects belonging to the real world are distinguished
by the fact that they can be, at least in principle, given originally to
the cognising subject. This subject knows them through a number of con-
scious acts of a determinate kind, namely through acts of direct "exper-
iencing". Direct experiencing remains the touchstone of objective reality
in Samkhya-Yoga understanding of the world.[1] Time as a single, all-pervading

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[1] The whole analysis of _Buddhisarga_ in the _Sāmkhya Kārikā_ bears tes-
timony to Sāmkhya's preoccupation with the realm of human experience, as it
is immediately and directly available to the reflecting self. The very
point of departure for the _Sāmkhya Kārikā_ is the fact of suffering or pain
as an integral part of man's life experience. Yoga too is in total agree-
ment with the basic Sāmkhya postulation on this specific question. Rather,
in Yoga, the analysis of the realm of experience is even more rigorous
than in Sāmkhya. For both of them the analysis of the cognitive exper-
ience is the basic modus operandi in approaching the ontological and meta-
physical issues:
"A thorough analysis of human experience is also the starting point
of the Sāmkhya Philosophy. Experience is the felt result of the operating
of the subtle tattva which is ordinarily imperceptible.....Experience is
not possible unless there are objects of experience, body, organs, ego-
sense, mind, etc., which will constitute the instruments and objects of
experience.....these are also not enough to bring about experience. Ex-
perience presupposes consciousness...the fundamental principles and cate-
gories of Sāmkhya were not dogmatically postulated, but they were discovered
and accepted after proper analytical study of experience".
Sen Gupta, Anima, _Classical Sāmkhya: A Critical Study_, Patna: The
United Press Ltd., 1969, pp. 74-75.

objective reality, if it were to be admitted,   must be experienced directly.   The question that Samkhya-Yoga asks is: where is the experiential basis for admitting a single, infinite all-pervasive time?   What is given in direct experience is the fact of change.   While admitting the reality of change in the real world, and also granting that the fact of change is universal, the Samkhya-Yoga philosophers do not find it necessary to admit the existence and independent reality of time as the ground of all change.[1] The postulation of Time as an independent reality is based upon a misunderstanding of the nature of change.   According to Samkhya-Yoga the acceptance of time as an independent reality, providing the ground for continuity and succession accounting for the relation of priority and posteriority, is gratuitous.   There is no such thing as an infinite all-pervasive time.[2] The notion of an infinite dimension extending through the phases of past, present and future, without beginning and end is a fictitious construction of __Buddhi__.[3]

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[1] __The Tattva Kaumudī__ of Vācaspati Misra, op. cit., p. 112.

[2] Here it must be borne in mind that in Samkhya system there is no category called Time.....Time and space are only relations between events and events.   There are only the events and not something external to them to relate them to one another.   Raja, C. Kunhan, ·__The Samkhya Kārikā of Isvarakrsna: A Philosophical Exposition__, Hosiarpur: Vedic Research Institute Publications, 1963, p. 123.

[3] sa khalavyam kālo vastusunyo buddhinirmānah.   __Vyāsa Bhāsya__ on the __Yoga Sutra of Patanjali__, op. cit., p. 151.
"The appearance of kāla as a separate entity is a creation of our Buddhi (__buddhinirmāna__) as it represents the order or mode in which Buddhi records its perceptions."   Das Gupta, S. N., __History of Indian Philosophy__, op. cit., p. 310.

According to Sāmkhya-Yoga, the idea of a transcendental or objective time is not the constitutive ground of all temporal determination in our cognition of an object. On the contrary, it is the very product of our experience or cognition of "limitedness" intrinsic to all the objects present within the field of the experiencing subject. Thus the idea of time must be conceived in the context of the 'finitude' or the 'limitedness' of actions or events. Whatever has a beginning and end, according to Sāmkhya-Yoga, is finite or limited. We find that various events that take place within the purview of the experiencing subject, are essentially limited in this specific sense. Thus according to Yuktidīpikā "time is the means of conceiving such limited existence or persistence of events" (kriyāṇam viśiṣta-avadhi-svarupa-pratyaya-nimittattvam).[1]

The denial or non-acceptance of the so-called transcendental time as the eternal background of all temporal determinations remains the running theme throughout the deliberations of Sāmkhya-Yoga philosophers. The reality of an unitary time is only a thought-construct whose essential unreality is disclosed to the reflective self only in the moment of self-reflection. Accordingly, then, the discriminative self comprehends the true essence of the moment, and in the process also knows what it is that the self in the natural setting tends to identify as the transcendental

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[1] na hi nah kālo nāma kaścida (padārtho) asti, kim tarhi kriyamāna kriyānāmeva (ādityagatigodohaghatastanitadinām) viśiṣta avadhisparūpa pratyaya nimittattvam; The Yuktidīpikā, op. cit., p. 73.

kalpyat iti kālah, viṣaya evatīto'nāgato vartamanaścocyate na tadyavatirekeṇa kālo'sti; The Jayamangala, op. cit., p. 40.

background of all temporal determinations.

It comes to see that it is the sequence of the moments that gives

rise to the notion of a continuous time, ubiquitous and one. As Vyāsa

puts it:

> The continuous flow of these (moments) is a sequence (karma).
> Moments and the sequence of these cannot be combined into a
> real (vastu). Thus time being of this nature does not cor-
> respond to any thing real, but is a product of mind, and
> follows as a result of (knowledge) by words; but the moment
> is objective and rests on the sequence. The sequence (karma)
> has for its essence an uninterrupted succession of moments
> which is called time (kāla) by experts.[1]

To argue that pure time notions are ultimately dependent on our ex-

perience of finitude or limitedness is another way of saying that time does

not have an independent status. It is not admitting the independent status

of time. Without subscribing to the metaphysical position of accepting

an independent reality of time Sāmkhya-Yoga remains confined to its ori-

ginal intention of clarifying basic epistemological or cognitional problems

as a way of explicating an original ontological perspective. Without posit-

ing the reality of time as the explanatory factor, how do we explain our

temporal concepts? What is the origin of our temporal concepts, and not

positing reality of time, is the task to which it addresses itself:

> For our knowledge of anything we must ultimately refer to
> our experience. In our experience we find events or ac-
> tions but never time as such. Therefore, we may say that
> pure or empty time as such is nothing nor is non-existent.

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[1]tatpravāhāvicchedastu kramaḥ. Ksanatatkramayonāsti vastusamāhāra...
....sa khavalyam vastuśūnyo buddhinirmānaḥ śabdajñānāupātī.....ksanastu
vastupatitah kramāvalambī. Kramaśca ksananantaryātma tam kālavidah kala
ityācaksate yoginaḥ: Vyāsa Bhāsya on Yoga Sūtra, 3.52.

It is nothing apart from actions or events that are re-
vealed in experience. If it is anything it is one with
them.[1]

The position stands in radical contrast to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's[2]

acceptance of time as an eternal substance existing by itself, extending

from the past through the present to the endless future.[3] True to their

metaphysical realism, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy accords independent status

to time. Time is considered as essential to the concrete changes of nature,

such as production, destruction and persistence of things. Arguing from

the facts of motion and change in the perceptible world, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika

concludes that since the discrete things are devoid of any power of self-

improvement, the fact of change and motion requires positing an indepen-

dent reality as the ground of the ordering of change and motion.[4] Thus,

time is posited by Nyāya Vaiśeṣika as the independent real, pervading

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[1]Sen, Sanat Kumar,"Time in Sāmkhya-Yoga", Indian Philosophical Quar-
terly, Vol. 8, September, 1968., p. 412.

[2]Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika are the realistic-pluralistic Hindu darśanas, in-
dependent in their origin, but because of their common ontological outlook
have come to be amalgamated in the course of history by their exponents.
The formal synthesis of the two systems seems to have taken place around
10th century. See Hiryana, M., Outlines of Indian Philosophy, London:
George Allen Unwin, 1956, p. 225.

[3]Kālakhātmadiśam sarvagatatvam paramam mahat; The Kiranāvalibhās-
kara, Padmanabha Miśra, Varanasi: Saraswati Bhawan texts, 1920, p. 137.

[4]Idānim gacchatītyādipratītstu idānim ravitityādipratītivat kāli-
kasambandhāvacchinnādhārādheya bhāvamavagāhate na tu samayasambandha-
vacchinnamiti. The Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, 5.2.26.

the whole universe and rendering ordered change and movement possible. The

relations of priority and posteriority, simultaneity and non-simultaneity,

as well as the notions of before and after have their basis in kāla.[1] For

there is only one time which is omnipresent as possesses the character of

individuation and the quality of conjunction and disjunction.[2]

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika looks at time as a substantive reality which is

the eternal basis of all our experiences. Though time is never given in our

perception it constitutes the objective ground of all our cognitions. Thus:

> According to Vaiśeṣika, time is said to have as its character-
> istic sign (by which its existence can be proved) the relation
> 'prior', posterior', etc., (Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra 2.2.6), it is all-
> pervading, single, formless and for this reason, because it is
> not produced, eternal, different from activity, the dividing
> factor of things by means of activity such as creation, etc.
> (creation, existence, transformation, growth, decay, and des-
> truction).[3]

It is in their understanding of the nature of change and its cogni-

tions that the Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems disagree fundamen-

tally.[4] While both of them agree that the distinguishing feature of time

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[1] Ibid., 2.2.6.

[2] Ibid., 7.1.25.

[3] The Kālasamuddeśa of Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya, (ed. and trans.),
Sharma, Peri Sarveswara, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1972, p. 43.

[4] Vaiśeṣika matvat trikālamābhyantaram karaṇa mityanena sāṃkhyācāryaih
kālah tattvāntaram svikriyate iti nāśaṃkanīyam tasyopādhāva ntarbhāvāditi
darśajyati - kālaśceti; The Kiraṇāvali on the Tattva Kaumudī, Haran, Swami-
narayana, Varanasi: Joytis Prakasa Press, 1937, p. 321.

determinations is the action or the activity that characterizes each moment

of existence, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regards association of activities with

time as a limiting adjunct or a superimposition on the essentially unitary,

indivisible reality of time. Against the Sāmkhya-Yoga conception of the

temporal determinations the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika would maintain that the dis-

tinction in time such as moments, etc., depends on some adjuncts (kṣaṇādih

syādupādhitah).[1]

The Sāmkhya-Yoga point of view involving a rejection of the position

of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is best maintained by Vyāsa. Vyāsa points out that the

moment itself is conceivable as the absolute and irreducible unit and that

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[1]Vaiśeṣikas postulate following as adjuncts that constitute tempo-
ral limitations.
1. Upādhibhedātakṣaṇādivyavahāraviṣayaḥ: The first adjunct consists of
the moment of Time that characterizes the interval between the action or
activity and the resulting appearance of disjunction in time. Contributing
the theory of Asatkāryvāda Vaiśeṣika maintains that the limiting action is
the cause or the reason for the production of the previous non-existent
disjunction in Time.
2. Upādhistu Svajanyavibhāgaprāgabhāvācchinnam Karma: The disjunction so
produced by an activity becomes the cause of the destruction of the pre-
vious conjunction. The interval between the disjunction and the dissolu-
tioṇ of the conjunction is the second momênt of Time produced by the acti-
vity constituting the limiting adjunct on the unitary Time. In other words,
the disjunction determined by the antecedent conjunction is the second
limiting adjunct.
3. Purvasaṃyoganāśavacchinnottarasaṃyoga-prāgabhāvo-vā: As the conjunction
so produced ceases, this cessation of the conjunction becomes the cause of
the subsequent conjunction. As such there must be an interval between the
two. Thus there is the previous non-existence of that conjunction, and
this constitutes the third moment in the activity constituting the limit-
ing adjunct of the one unitary Time.
4. Uttarasaṃyogāvacchinnaṃ Karma: Again, subsequent conjunction arises,
and the time associated with the action in this moment is further limited
in interval in terms of the limiting function of the activity in the ques-
tion. Siddhāntamuktāvalī, Visvanatha, Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1940, 46.
Kalastvako'pi upādnibhedātkṣaṇādivyavahāraviṣayaḥ upādhistu svajanyavib-
hāgaprāgabhāvacchinnam karma, purvasaṃyoganāśavacchinottava-saṃyoga-
prāgabhāvo vā, uttavasaṃyogāvacchinnaṃ Karma. Ibid.

apart from the reality of those moments, there is no infinite time. True, these moments are always presented to us together with the activity, admits Vyāsa, but it does not follow from this that they are determinations of unitary time in conjunction with this or that activity.[1]

It would be wrong to argue that moments determined by activity's association with time exists as parts existing in a whole. It is wrong because, as Vyāsa says, the two moments, by their very nature, cannot coexist and hence a series of moments does not exist in reality. What constitutes the essence of order in time is not an unitary indivisible reality, nor is it the fact of antecedence and subsequence between the moment that is existent and the moment that has just ceased to be. Thus, a series of moments is an ideal construction. The intellect pieces together these discrete moments. There exists only one moment, the moment of present, which contains in it the moments of past and future, which are real but inexistent.[2] Vyāsa says:

> Just as atom is the smallest particle, similarly the moment (ksana) is the smallest limit of time. (Moment) is the period of time taken by an atom to traverse the span between one point of space and the other. The continuous flow of these (moments) is a sequence (krama). However, there is no real (basis) for the combination of the moments and their sequence.....(Thus), time has no real (objective) existence, it is only a creation of buddhi, and follows on account of knowledge by words.....(However), the moment is objective (it has a basis in the real) and it is the basis (of ground)

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[1] Vyāsa Bhāsya on the Yoga Sūtra of Patanjali, op. cit., pp. 150-151.

[2] Tasmādvartamānah evaikah ksano na purvottaraksanāh santiti tasmānnāsti tatsamāhārah. Ibid.

of sequence; the sequence (krama) consists in the continu-
ous (uninterrupted) succession of moments, and it is this
that is called time (kāla) by yogins who know time (its
real nature).[1]

Now for Samkhya-Yoga, activity instead of being an external ad-

junct giving rise to our conceptions of temporal determinations, is the

very mode of temporal being.[2] To be determined temporally, i.e., to be

given in momentary existence is a special kind of being that constitutes

the essence of autonomy of a temporal moment. The autonomy in this con-

text refers to the fact that the cognition of a temporally determined

being does not depend on the independent existence of unitary time as

the eternal background of all such cognitions. Rather the existential

autonomy of the moment consists in the very activity that constitute

each moment of existence. In other words, temporal determinations are

self-constituted in the process of cognition.

Objection may be raised that if temporal determination of moments

is constituted in and through our cognitive process then how can one

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[1]yathāpakarṣaparyaut dravyaṁ paramaṇurevaṁ paramākarṣparyantaḥ kālaḥ
kṣaṇaḥ. yāvatā vā samayena calitaḥ parmānuḥ purvadeśaṁ jahyāduttaradeśamu-
pasaṁpadyate sa kālaḥ kṣaṇaḥ, tatpravāhā vicchedastu kramaḥ. kṣaṇatakrama-
yornāsti vastusamāhāra.....sa khalvayaṁ kālo vastuśunyo buddhinanirmaṇaḥ
sabdajñānānupātī.....kṣaṇastu vastupatitaḥ kramāvalambi. kramaśca kṣaṇā-
nantaryātmā. taṁ kalavidaḥ kāla ityācakṣate yoginaḥ. Yoga Bhāṣya 3.52,
op. cit., pp. 150-151.

[2]kim tarhi kriyamānakriyānāmevādityagatigodohaghatāstanitādīnām
viśistāvadhisarūpapratyayanimittatvam. We owe this clarification to
Yuktidīpikā, The Yuktidīpikā, op. cit., p. 73.

legitimately hold that the moment is the time taken by an atom to traverse its own unit of space as indeed Vyāsa clearly maintains. It is important to remember that in Sāmkhya-Yoga understanding space does not refer to the objective space existing independently and transcendent to consciousness. Indeed both Time and Space as transcendent realities are mere abstractions. Space, according to Sāmkhya-Yoga, is another name for the phenomenon manifesting itself in our immanent perceptions. The atom too, here, does not refer to physical atoms as such but to subtle elements (tanmātrās) as it were appearing to the consciousness.[1]

The problem with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is that it sees activity as somehow externally related to existence, so that it appears as an external adjunct. On the contrary, activity for Sāmkhya-Yoga is the very mode of temporal existence. Existing temporally and being active are not two different modes of being, but are one and the same. If we accept the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika interpretation of activity as separate from existence and thereby standing in an independent relationship to existence then we are forced to postulate another category as the relational term that relates the activity with existence. This will inevitably lead us to an _regressus-ad-infinitum_. However, Sāmkhya-Yoga by insisting on the ultimate inseparability of existence and activity is able to underscore a sharp-edged polemic against a realistic reification of time as transcendent to change and activity.

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The Question of Eternal and Empirical Time: Some commentators

on Samkhya-Yoga literature seem to suggest that the Samkhya-s theoretical

position admits a distinction between eternal and empirical time. That, in

other words, (at least according to some interpretations) Samkhya also

reifies time. Vijñanabhiksu in his commentary on the Samkhya Sutra have

suggested that the distinction between the eternal and empirical time has

been accepted by Samkhya-Yoga. Thus he writes:

> Eternal space and time are of the form of prakrti, or the
> root-cause of akasa, and are only the specific modification
> of prakrti.   Hence. the universality of space and time is
> established. But these, space and time, which are limited,
> are produced from akasa through the conjunction of this or
> that limiting object (uphadi).[1]

Thus, according to Vijñanabhiksu, there is a distinction between the

eternal and omnipresent (all-pervading) Space and Time and the empirical

space and time which appears to be limited and finite. The former appears

to be of the nature of akasa, and are nothing but particular modifications

of Prakrti.   On the other hand, the empirical Time which is limited and

finite is produced from akasa and as such is an effect of akasa. The empi-

rical Time is essentially akasa itself, but as particularized by this or

that upadhi. Thus, the finite space and time are conceived as the quali-

ties of Prakrti and to be all-pervasive and eternal. The eternal time and

space are conceived as the eternal background of our empirical notion of

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[1] nityau yau dik-kalau tavakasa prakrti bhutau prakrterguna visesaveva.
ato dikkalayorvibhutvopapttih; (akasa vat sarva gatas ca nitya) ity adi srutiy
uktam vibhutvam ca 'kasasyo' papannam. Yau tu khandadik kalau, tau tutattadup-
adhi samyogad akasad utpadyete ity arthah. The Samkhya Pravacana Bhasya of
Vijñanabhiksu, op. cit., p. 77.

space and time.[1]

However, there is hardly any evidence in the classical Sāmkhya-Yoga literature to lend support to this classification of Vijñānabhiksu. Text does not offer any basis for introducing the category of eternal time and much less for an omnipresent, self-identical one to be contrasted from a limited and finite time due to the particularization of the former. We tend to agree with A. B. Keith when he maintains that any such distinction between the eternal and empirical time is inconsistent with the basic Sāmkhya position. Expressing his disapproval of this approach he writes,

> "in the empiric world both (space and time) appear as limited, and are explained in a quite inconsistent way by origination from either (Ākāśa) through its qualification by the masses of corporeal nature on the one hand, in the case of space, and by the movement of the heavenly bodies in the case of time."[2]

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[1] Concurring with this way of looking at the Classical Sāmkhya understanding of the problem of time Radhakrishnan maintains that the Sāmkhya assertion of the infinite eternal time as a thought construct is a mere attestation to the fact that we do not have any perception of the infinite time. He seems to suggest that there is no real denial of the eternal time by Sāmkhya-Yoga. All that Sāmkhya has to say that since we have no perception of infinite time or infinite space, so they are said to be constructed by the understanding. Radhakrishnan, S., op. cit., p. 277.

[2] Keith, A. B., The Sāmkhya System, Calcutta: Association Press, 1924, pp. 121-122; While concurring with Keith in disregarding the distinction between the eternal and empirical time one may have reservations regarding the explanation adduced. It is extremely doubtful of the Akasa of which time is taken to be differentiation by Vijñānabhiksu refers to the bhūta. It is more likely that he means by it an aspect of Prakṛti itself, in which case nitya kāla would be another name for eternal becoming of Prakṛti. However, on the basis of the text we are not quite sure about the exact import of his statement. For a philosophical estimation of Vijñānabhiksu's view on time refer to Bhattacharya, K. C., Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 1, Calcutta: Progressive Publication, 1956, p. 235.

It may be appropriate to look for the textual context in which the distinction between the Eternal and the Empirical time is proposed by Vijñānabhikṣu. It is in his commentary on the Sāṁkhyasūtra 2,12 that Vijñānabhikṣu proposes the above distinction. The Sūtra states that the (notions of) "direction and time (arise) from Ākāśa" etc. (dikkālau ākāśādibhyaḥ). Aniruddha proposes a less radical interpretation of this Sūtra than Vijñānabhikṣu, when he explains it in the following way: "It is Ākāśa itself which, by different Upādhis or external conditions, is denoted by the term Space and Time. They are therefore included in Ākāśa."[1] The explanation lacks in conviction as it does not sound plausible. Aside from the obscurity of the notion of upādhi, it fails to explain what these upādhis are that constitute such limitations on the Ākāśa causing it to give rise to space and time.

It seems to us that both Vijñānabhikṣu and Aniruddha tend to look at Sāṁkhya-Yoga understanding of tattvas in cosmological terms. The notion of eternal time is invoked to account for the cosmological procession of tattvas from the Prakṛti. It is perhaps this pre-occupation, one·which he shares with many of his predecessors, responsible for concluding that the sūtra in question is concerned with the origin of the transcendental or eternal space and time. What the Sāṁkhya-Yoga seems really concerned with, in our way of understanding, is explaining the origination of the sense of time. The Sūtra under consideration can be

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[1]tattadupādhibhedādākāśameva dikkālaśabdavācyam tasmādākāśe'ntarbhūtau, The Sāṁkhya Sūtra Vṛttiḥ by Aniruddha, op. cit., p. 94

understood as an attempt to explain at what specific moment in reflective consciousness the essence of the idea of space and time shows forth.[1]

The reflective self, reflecting on the given structure of extension[2] as what is implied in the idea of ākāśa, also recognizes that extension gives rise to the idea of space and time. The emergence of the idea of Ākāśa is the specific moment in the reflective consciousness when the true essence of temporality as the finitude of moments and their sequence (krama) is disclosed to the reflective self. The reflective self comes to see the structure of the sequence (krama) of moments as they are, i.e. as mere sequence of moments without any extension or duration, which it sees as being the essential mode of the being of ākāśa. It is precisely in this sense that the Sutra seems to refer to ākāśa giving rise to the idea of Time and direction.

This fact is disclosed to the discriminative self only when it has come to grips with the essential structure of ākāśa as extension. Discrimination (viveka) is as much a reflective activity as the arising of the notion of time and space as a function of the Buddhi. Thus emergence of Viveka in the Buddhi is the termination of the process of Sarga. We will return to this point later. One final exegetical comment in this

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[1]This exegesis is in conformity with the general standpoint taken by us from which to approach the problematics of the Sāmkhya-Yoga. For arguments and defense see Supra, pp. 58 ff.

[2]The term extension is used in the sense of 'Prakrti' in its aspect of omnipervasiveness, the contention being the part of the basic Sāmkhya doctrine that the Prakrti persists along with the tattvas.

connection should not be out of place. The expression, etc. (ādi)[1] in

the aphorism cited above, though insignificant, may be of some exegetical

import. It refers to the fact that according to the author of the _sūtra_

it is only when the discriminating self has reflected upon the nature of

the phenomenal world in terms of its essential structure being constituted

of other (ādi) _tattvas_ along with the specific dimension of Ākāśa that the

true understanding of the essential nature of space and time can arise.

This way of looking at the _sūtra_ in question seems to us to be more

plausible and more consistent with the basic Sāṁkhya-Yoga ontology. It

goes without saying that to our way of understanding the problem of two

times in Sāṁkhya-Yoga as envisaged by Vijñānabhikṣu[2] is a fictitious prob-

lem arising from a misinterpretation of _sarga_ as cosmological evolution.

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[1] Aniruddha dismisses the term 'ādi' as occuring by accident in the Sūtra; ādiśabdah sampātāyātah, etc. The Sāṁkhya Sūtra Vṛttih, op. cit., p. 98; Vijñāna Bhikṣu maintains that the expression 'ādi' in the sūtra means that from the apprehending of this or that limiting object (the notion of relative space and time ariṣe): ādiśabdenopādhigrahanāditi, Sāṁkhya Pravacana Bhāsya, op. cit.; p.77.

[2] It is important to note that Vijñānabhikṣu himself in his Yoga-Sāra-Saṁgraha admits that the Sāṁkhya does not accept a separate entity as infinite time (Mahākāla) as the one all-pervading reality or the basis of temporal determinations of moments, etc. Moreover, Vijñānabhikṣu goes to a great length even to criticise the views of Sāṁkhya expressed in the Sāṁkhya Sūtra. We are also aware of his Vedantic leanings and his occasional attempts to reconcile Sāṁkhya-Yoga with the mainstream of Vedantic thought. This leads us to approach cautiously his interpretation specially when it seems to go against the basic ontological perspectives of the system under investigation.
Ksana rūpah kālo vyavasthāpyate.....Sāṁkhyistu 'dikkālāvākaśadibhyah' iti sūtrānimahākālo vā ksanādirvāprthakpadārtho nāsti, kiṁ tvākāśamevopādhibhirviśistam ksanādimahākālānt vyavahāram kurut iti manyate. The Yoga-Sāra-Saṁgraha of Vijñānabhikṣu, (ed. and trans) Jha, Ganganath, Madras: Theosophical Publishing House, 1933, pp. 73-74.

Our contention that the notion of transcendental time is inadmissible in the Sāmkhya-Yoga scheme of things is further substantiated by another important consideration. It is significant to note that within Sāmkhya-Yoga scheme of things the element of eternity in this sense of non-finitude or trans-temporality is applicable only to Puruṣa as the transcendental consciousness and to prakriti as the transcendental ground of all phenomenalization.[1] Apart from Puruṣa and Prakṛti, no other tattva is accepted as infinite and trans-temporal.[2]

The Constitution of Moment and the Status of Past, Present and Future.

Having established the reality of 'moment' and discerning it as the ground of all temporal determinations, Sāmkhya-Yoga is now faced with the problem of explicating the material and the formal structure of the moment in terms of which alone one can comprehend the temporal determinations of past, present and future. The problem that Sāmkhya-Yoga faces is: if the

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[1]In view of the above stipulation regarding the trans-temporality even to cosmological way of understanding the sarga doctrine, the problem of two times (eternal and empirical) in Sāmkhya-Yoga is inappropriate. Sen, who seems to accept a cosmological interpretation of sarga, also considers the anamolous character of the situation:

> In fact, since the Sāmkhya admits the possibility of regression (pratisancāra) of all the evolutes (the entire universe) into their ultimate ground, Prakriti, nothing save Prakriti and Puruṣa can be called eternal (in the accepted sense of being without beginning and end). Thus if even Ākāśa is not eternal, how can time, which is no distinct entity at all be so. Sen, op. cit., p. 410.

[2]On the Sāmkhya-Yoga conception of eternity, see infra, pp. 119-120.

moment alone is real and that an entity is always given only in the moment of existence then how do we distinguish between the moments of past, present and future? What is there in the moment that will distinguish it as present in relation to the moments of past and future? In other words, is there anything in the structure of moment which enables us to grasp the relationship between the moment determined as past and present or future? Does the moment depend on something external to itself for these temporal designations? Denying the reality of transcendental or cosmological time, Sāmkhya-Yoga is faced with the problem of accounting for temporal determinations.

To begin with, it must be acknowledged that Sāmkhya-Yoga does not deny the reality of the distinctions of past, present and future. Thus temporal distinctions indeed have an ontological basis. What grounds them or provides basis for them being the reality existing as moment? Thus observes Vyāsa on the reality of past, present and future:

> The past and the future exist in reality since the quali-
> ties of things manifest themselves in these three ways.
> The future is the manifestation which is yet to be. The
> past is that form which has alreayd, been experienced. The
> present is that which is still active. If these three did
> not exist in reality, then knowledge would not have been
> possible. Knowledge is not possible in the absence of the
> object of knowledge.[1]

It would be wrong to assume that Vyāsa here is endorsing the views

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[1] atītānāgataṁ svarūpato'styadhvabhedāddharmāṇām, Yoga Sutra, op.
cit., 4.12; Bhaviṣyadvyaktikamanāgatam, anu bhutvyaktikamtītam, svavyāparopā
rūdham vartamānam trayam caitadvastu jñānasya jñeyam. Yadi caitatsvarupato
nābhaviṣyannedam nirviṣayam jñanamudapatsyata, tasmādatītānāgatam svarūpato
'stīti, Vyāsa Bhasya on Yoga Sūtra, 4.12, op. cit.

of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika who also grants that past, present and future possess objective reality. According to the latter these moments are characterized by an independent existence which is mutually exclusive. Past, present and future surely are different modes of being. But, as Sāmkhya-Yoga would put, these modes do not exclude each other materially. They coincide and comingle in the same being.[1] Past, present and future are not three points of time in which things exist. They are the three ways in which things pass from unmanifest to manifest and vice-versa. Since being of a thing is not different from the moment in which things exist and since there is no coming of being from non-being it will be wrong to assume as the Vaiśeṣika does that the three moments of being imply their mutually exclusive existences. It is this existential inseparability and functional distinguishability of the three moments that is recognized and asserted by Vyāsa when he maintains that past, present and future exist in reality.

The fundamental difference between Sāmkhya-Yoga and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika lies in the latter's acceptance of the reality of non-being (Abhāva) as a self-subsisting mode of existence. For Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika past and future

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(continued from previous page)

Also see Samkhya Karika 33 and commentaries on it: trikālam̐ābhyantaram mano'hamkārabuddhirūpam karaṇam pravartate buddhivartamānam ghatam buddhyate atītam bhaviṣyantam ca smarati.....yat evam tasmāducyate trikālamābhyantaram karaṇam iti; Matharavrtti, op. cit., p. 50.
triṣvapi kāleṣu vyavasthitam viṣayamavagāhate gṛhṇāti yasmāt, tasmāt trividhamantahkaranam buddhyādi dvāri bhavati.....ebhirdvārabhūtaiyantahkaranam viṣayān gṛhṇāti. Jayamangala, op. cit., p. 42.

[1] tadetkālatattvasya padārthāntarātakhandanārthamah santu ta iti; Svaminarayan's Kirnāvali on the Tattva Kaumudi, op. cit., p. 321.

possess reality in the mode of non-being (abhāva). However, Sāṃkhya-Yoga

convincingly argues that such existence in the mode of non-being is in-

conceivable precisely because there is no non-existence, in a literal

sense, of an existing being. The present is nothing else but the mani-

fested form of the unmanifest past. The future, which has not yet come

to be manifested exists in the present in unmanifest form. Thus the past

subsists in the body of the present and future also is contained there in

the fullness of being. Supporting this existential comingling or the dia-

lectic of past, present and future it is pointed out by Vacaspati Miśra:

> If the past and future (the existence of being in sublatent
> and unmanifest form) are non-existent because they are not
> in the present, then the present (existence of being in the
> manifest form) also would be non-existent, because it is
> not in the past or future. The existence is applicable or
> characteristic of all the three forms, for it is real ir-
> respective of the characteristics of these.[1]

A more comprehensive and clear understanding of Sāṃkhya-Yoga position on

this important issue warrants a somewhat lengthy but extremely important

citation in the same tenor as above from Vyāsa where he has tried to pre-

sent the Sāṃkhya-Yoga position in a very clear way. Vyāsa puts his views

in the following words:

> ...And the mutation of time-variation is the restriction
> having the three time-variations, (that is) connected with
> the three time forms (adhvan). This (restriction) one may
> say puts aside the first time-form whose variation is yet

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[1]yadi tu vartamānatvābhāvādātītā nāgatayorasattvaṃ hanta bho varta-
mānasyāpyabhāvotītānāgatvābhāvāt, Vācaspati Miśra, _Tattva Vaiśāradī_, op.
cit., p. 166.

to come, and passes into the present time-variation, without however passing out of its state as external aspect. But in this (condition) it becomes manifest as being what it is. This is its second time-form. And it is not completely severed from past or future time-variations. Likewise emergence has the three time variations; it is connected with the three time-forms. Having put aside the present time-variation it passes over into the past time-variation, without however passing out of its state as external aspect. This is the third time form. And it is not completely severed from the future and the present time-variations. In the same manner, emergence completing itself again (as a phenomenalized form) having put aside the the future time variation, and not having passed out of its state as external aspect, passes into the present time-variation. In which (time), since this (emergence) manifests itself as it is, it obtains its functional activity. This is the second time-form of this emergence. And it is not completely released from the past and future time-variations.[1] (emphasis added)

Thus, according to Vyāsa what distinguishes the present mode of being from the past and the future is not existence in the mode of being (bhāva) and non-being (abhāva) as the Vaisesika maintains, but the "functional activity" (vyāpārah) that characterizes the present moment of existence. Now, we have seen that according to Sāmkhya-Yoga activity and existence are identical in the strictest sense of the term. If the two are identical, what is the justification for asserting that the functional activity belongs only to the present mode of existence? At this precise

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[1] Woods, op. cit., pp. 212-213.
    Laksanaparinamasca nirodhah trilaksanah tribhiradhvabhiryuktah. Sa khalvanāgatalaksanamadhvānam prathamam hitvā dharmatvamanatikrānto vartamānlaksanam pratipanno yatrāsya svarupenābhivyaktih. Esosya dvitiyodhvā na cātitānāgatābhyām laksanābhyām viyuktah.
    tathāvyutthānam trilaksanam tribhiradhvabhiryuktam vartamānamlaksanam hitvā dharmatvamantikrāntamatitalaksanam pratipannam.esosya trtiyodhavā. Na cānāgatavartamānābhyām laksanābhyām viyuktam. Evam punah vyutthānamupasampadyamānamanāgatam laksanam hitva dharmatvamanatikrāntam vartmānam laksanam pratipannam.yatrāsya svarūpābhivyaktau satyām vyāparah. Esosya dvitiyodhvā na cātitānāgatābhyām laksanābhyām viyuktamiti. Vyāsa Bhāsya on the Yoga Sūtra, 3.13, op. cit., pp. 110-111.

point that a careful understanding of the two kinds of activity or change

that the Samkhya-Yoga speaks of seems in order.

The Samkhya-Yoga distinguishes between two kinds of change that the

being undergoes. (1) Svarupa Parinama (homogeneous change) and (2) Virupa

Parinama (heterogeneous change). The being in its unmanifest stage·(Prak-

riti) undergoes the first kind of change. It is the stage where being has

not entered the realm of consciousness., i.e. it remains unmanifest.

Changes or activity that characterizes this mode of existence does not

involve encounter with the cognizing self. As such existence in this

mode remains inoperative or functionally neutral. It is only when exis-

tence assumes the present form, i.e.. enters into the field of conscious-

ness (kṣetra) that it becomes functionally active.

An objection may be raised at this point with regard to the exis-

tence of being in the mode of past moment which is described as devoid of

functional activity. The problem here, as it is stated by a classical

commentator, is:

> If only the being, which performs efficient activity alone
> is real, or ultimate, then how can (a being remaining in
> the past course) be real, for it (the efficient activity)
> is absent in the past course.[1]

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[1] anu yadevarthakriyakari tadeva paramarthasadityatitehdhvi tada-
bhavatkatham sattvam; The Vakyapadiyam by Bhartrhari with a Commentary
by Helaraja, Varanasi: Benarasa Sanskrit Series, 1928, 3.9.55, p. 363.

Samkhya-Yoga answer of the dilemma consists in their assertion that the existence of thing is not contingent upon their performing a purposeful action or possessing the quality of functional activity. Samkhya-Yoga does not consider the existence of a thing on account of the purposeful action that it performs. Rather they understand activity in its purest form as characterizing the existence of a thing per se. It is the principle of activity discernible in a thing in its purest state (pralaya) that ultimately constitutes the ground for functional activity in the manifest world.

The existence of material objects according to Samkhya-Yoga possesses three strata namely sattva, rajas and tamas. Thus:

> Just as the three gunas, characteristic of serenity (sattva) activity (rajas) and inertia (tamas), though existing simultaneously on account of their eternity, acquire the subordinate and principal relation and give rise to peculiar modifications in a way of their own splendour, same way, (the three) time divisions, by the magnificence of their own power, effect sequence in the difference (of beings).[1]

Thus, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas are considered as the three powers constitutive of the very existence of being.[2] It is on account of these powers that a being is capable of maintaining itself as existent in both

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[1]This discerful understanding of the tri-gunas relating it to the three divisions of time is attributed to Kapila by Helaraja in his commentary on Vakyapadiyam: Paramarsanye satataparinamisu sattvarajastamasam saktimatramatitadikalabhedasamakhyam, tatha ca sarvesam bhavanam gunatryarupattvacchaktitrayayogitve yathayatham saktyudbhavanubhyam sadasattvena vyavaharah.

[2]'Being' here is used in the sense of objective being, i.e. Prakrti. When we speak of existence being characterized by sattva, tamas and rajas, we, of course, refer to the existence of the being which is existentially grounded in Prakrti. Purusa or the transcendental consciousness is in principle untouched or unaffected by these gunas.

the manifest and the non-manifest states. Past and future moments of
being, on account of the preponderance of tamas are responsible for the
enclosing of   Enclosing is the nature of inertia precisely
because it is discerned as the one which is heavy and obstructing (guru
varanakam eva tamah).[1] The present moment is equal to illumination that
shows or manifests being and as such is characterized by sattva, for
sattva is considered to be the principle of illumination (sattvam laghu
prakāśakam istam).[2] But it is activity which is characterized by rajas
(upastambhakam calam ca rajah)[3]and as such belongs to all the three
moments of existence. As Helarāja comments in this context: "It (rajas)
is a peculiarity of time and it is connected with everything. Rajas,
being the inciter through suspension and permission, conformable to
function is indeed the soul of time."[4] Further it is pointed out that
the temporal status of the moment is determined by the predominance of
the powers of the gunas. Thus:

> Just like the three ingredients, having the characters of
> serenity (sattva), activity (rajas) and inertia (tamas),
> though existing simultaneously due to their eternity,
> acquire the subordinate and principal relation and effect

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[1]The Sāmkhya Kārikā, op. cit., 13.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Rajastu pravrttisāmānyamkālasvarūpam sarvatrānvayi pratiband-
hābhyanujñabhyām pravarttamānam preranārūpam rajah kālātmakameva.
Helarāja in the Vakyapadīya, op. cit., p. 361.

beings through their peculiar evolution, in a proper
manner in the splendour of their own course of action,
so also, these (three) time-divisions, by the magni-
ficence of their own power, (become) capable of effect-
ing sequence in external aspects (lit. in the differ-
ence of beings)."[1]

However, Helraja insists that this position of Sāṁkhya-Yoga ref-
lects inconsistency in as much as it tends to differentiate between the
external aspects (Dharma) and the possesser of the external aspect (dharmi).
Basing his argument on Patanjali's Yogasūtra stating that the "external
aspects possess three courses (dharmas tryadhvānah)" Helarāja concurs with
Bhartṛhari that Sāṁkhya-Yoga too like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is susceptible to
the charge that temporal determinations have as their referent the ex-
ternal limiting adjuncts.[2] However, it seems to us that the charge is
not quite fair and even tends to obscure Sāṁkhya-Yoga's basic theoretical
position.

It may be appropriate at this point to reproduce the passage on
which the aforesaid charge of Bhartṛhari is based. The passage under con-
sideration reads as follows:

The bearer of the external aspect (dharmi) does not
possess the three courses, the external aspects
(dharma) possesses the three courses; they (i.e. the
external aspects) characterized by them (i.e. the
three courses) and obtaining different states, are
referred to as different. (And this reference is)

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[1]Tadyathā trayaḥ sattvarajastamolakṣaṇā guṇo nityatvādyuga-
padavasthāna api.......yathāyatham svavṛttyullāse vicitrapariṇāman
bhāvānāmuparacayanti , tatheme kālabhedaḥ svaśaktimāhātmyādbhavabhedesu
kramoparacanacaturā ityarthaḥ. Ibid., p. 361.

[2]Ibid.

due to the alien state (of external aspects) and not due
to the alien substance. Likewise (an external aspect),
having forgone its future character, obtains the present
character. But (it is) not separated from (its) future
and past (characters).[1]

It is in the statement that "it is not separated from the (its) future

and past (character)" that the clue to the basic position of Yoga-Sūtra

lies. If Vyāsa were to agree that temporal determinations have as their

referent the external limiting adjuncts then he would not be able to

hold the position that the present moment is inseparable from the moment

of past and future. The statement that the dharmas tryadhvānah must be

read in the context of their discussion as to the origin and ground of

sequence perceptible in the phenomenal world. It is true that the

dharmas seem to pass through three courses and that as such they give

rise to the notion of sequence in objectivities. But it is precisely

this appearance of sequence in the phenomenal world that the Sāmkhya-Yoga

tradition tend to question. The point is made in the Bhāsya 3.13 and is

further clarified and illustrated in 3.52 where it is pointed out by

Vācaspati that the succession as such is only a conceptual product with-

out any ground in reality.

> In the present there is a single moment and there are no
> earlier or later moments. There is no combination of them.
> But those moments which are past and future are to be ex-
> plainted as inherent in the mutations. Accordingly, the
> whole world passes through a mutation in a single moment.[2]

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[1]Na dharmī tryadhvā dharmāstu tryadhvānah. te lakṣitā alakṣitāśca
tam tamavasthām prapnuvantónyatvena pratinirdiśyante°vasthāntarato na
dravyantaratah. Vyāsa Bhasya on the Yoga Sūtra, op. cit., 3.13.

[2]Tasmādvartmana evaikah kṣaṇo na purvottarakṣanāh santīti. tasman
nasti tatsamāhārah. ye tu bhutabhāvina kṣaṇās te pariṇāmanvitā vyākhyeyāh.
tenaikena kṣaṇena kṛtsno lokah pariṇāmam anubhavati. Ibid., 3.52.

According to Sāṁkhya-Yoga there is no togetherness of moments and there is no synthesis of them with succession either; a moment and its succession do not co-exist. It hardly makes any sense to speak of the succession of a single moment. Succession does not belong to any moment.[1] It is rather the relation (of priority and posteriority) or order of moments. But the relation is here no part of the relata. Moments do not possess succession as their constituent. Succession, therefore, is conceptual rather than real.[2] Each moment is real, which is neither a combination of moments nor their combination with succession. For combination is possible only of co-existing entities, and co-existence here, from the very nature of the case, is impossible..[3]

Grounds of Temporal Determinations

A realistic philosophy, which Sāṁkhya-Yoga is, denying the reality of one independent, transcendental unitary Time and accepting the reality of the Moment (ksana) alone is faced with the problem of explicating conceptually the ontological status of the moment as Now and its relationship to the moments which are described as the past and the future.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika advocates the fundamental oneness and conditional

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[1] .....tasmānᵕnāsti tatsamāhāraḥ.....Ibid.

[2] .....ayam kālo vastuśunyo pi..buddhinirmānah śabdajñānanupati...Ibid.

[3] Kṣanastu vastupatītaḥ kramāvalambī, kramaśca kṣanānantaryātmā... na ca dvau ksnau asahabhavatah. Kramaśca na dvayoh sahabhuvoh asambhavāt, pūrvasmāduttarasya bhāvino yadānantarya kṣanasya sa kramaḥ. Ibid.

manyness of the Time.[1] Time according to them, is one, unitary and indi-
visible in its essence but it acquires temporal distinctions on account
of its association with external limiting adjuncts. However, these
temporal determinations far from being unreal possess a conditional or
relative reality and are to be located within Time constituting its per-
ceptible limitations from which alone the reality of a single unitary
Time is to be inferred. Bhartṛhari and Helarāja, find it difficult to
concede to their acceptance of the reality (even conditional or relative)
of temporal determinations. According to them, these temporal determi-
nations are not constitutive of time, even though they are consequent to
Time's association with extraneous factors. Kāla by its own power by 'hind-
rance' (pratibandha) and 'let' (abhyanujña) produces the semblance of time-
succession in action.[2] Hence Time though essentially one appears as many. Kāla

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[1] There is only one time which is omnipresent in dimension, indivi-
dual in character, and has the qualities of conjunction and disjunction.
Conventional notions, as moment, minute, hower, etc. are derived by ab-
straction from concrete time. According to the Vaiśeṣika time is an
eternal substance and the basis of all experience.....

Temporal relations are dependent on the terms related. There is
no sooner or later, before or after, apart from events and actions. Time
is perceived as a qualification of objects, and is therefore a substantive
reality. Radhakrishnan, S., op. cit., p. 191.

[2] tamasya lokayantrasya sutradhāram pracakṣate pratibandhabhyanu-
jñabhyām tena viśvam vibhajyate //4//

pratibaddhāś ca yās tena citrā viśvasya vṛttayah tāh sa evānujānāti
yathā tantuḥ śakuntinaḥ //15//

pratibandhābhyanujñābhyām vṛttir yātasya śaśvatī tayā vibhajyamāno
'sau bhajate kramarūpatām //30//
Bhartrhari, The Vākyapadīya, op. cit., pp. 343, 347, and 352.

according to them is a power (Śakti)[1] of Brahman. This Time (Kāla) as

the power of Brahman is one, independent and indivisible, and all-pervasive.

Bhartṛhari declares unequivocally that all other generated, dependent

subject forces are pervaded by Kāla, which alone is independent and fol-

low the operation of this Śakti in their working.[2] It is further main-

tained that "Kāla is the instrumental cause in the creation, persistence

and destruction of all things that have an origin, etc. ... Kāla seems to

be itself diversified by the diversity of limiting adjuncts, (but) things

are diversified in conjunction with it."[3]

Thus the fundamental difference between Bhartṛhari and Nyāya Vai-

śeṣika lies in their understanding of the nature and structure of temporal

determinations. While Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika admits that it is because of the

conjunction with the external adjuncts such as the solar motion, activity

and change that the one, undifferentiated time becomes differentiated into

mutually exclusive determinations. For Bhartṛhari, Time though itself

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[1]Kalākhyā svātantryaśaktirbrahmaṇa itih, tatra Bhartṛharera-
bhiprāya..... Helaraja, Ibid., p. 365.

[2]Kālākhyena hi svātantryena sarvah paratantra jamavtyah śaktayah
samāviṣṭah kālaśaktivṛttimānupatanti. Ibid.

[3]Utpattau ca sthitau cāpi vināśe cāpitadvatām nimittam kālamevāhur
vibhaktenātmanā sthitam //3//
Saṁsarginam tu vo bhedo viśeṣās tasya te matāh sambhinnas tair-
avasthānām kālo bhedaya kalpate //8//
Ibid., pp. 343 and 344.

unchangeable, is the cause of all change, motion and order. Thus he
writes: "The division of the "Sun's" progress to the north and to the
south (āyana), the fixed movement of the heavenly bodies and the des-
truction and creation of all beings are due to time."[1] Commenting on
this Kārikā Helarāja elucidates:

> Why the sun rises and sets at regular hours, why the moon
> shines for the night and not for the day, why the sun
> moves for six months along the southern path (dakṣiṇāyana)
> and for six months along the northern path (uttarāyana),
> why the planets and stars move in particular order - all
> these can be explained as being due to the all-pervasive
> and all-powerful nature of Kāla. The coming into exis-
> tence and passing out of existence, the appearance and
> disappearance of all objects is caused by time alone.[2]

Thus the solar motion, activity and change the so-called external adjuncts
which are ascribed the function of limiting the infinite dimension and
constituting the Time determinations as   part and parcel of Time accord-
ing to Vaiśeṣika are conceived by Bhartṛhari as the very product of the
power of Time. It is equally important to note that only after having
established the nature of the adjuncts which in association with the uni-
tary Time give rise to the semblance of multiplicity and further by arti-
culating the status of these temporally distinct adjuncts that both Bhar-
trhari and Vaiśeṣika embark upon a conceptual clarification of the nature
and status of temporal determinations comprehended as past, present and
future.

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[1] Ayanapravibhāgaśca gatiśca jyotiṣām dhruvā nivṛttiprabhavāścaiva
bhūtānām tannibandhanāḥ //43// Ibid., p. 357.

[2] Dakṣiṇāyanamuttarāyaṇamiti kālakṛtamaryādāyattaḥ pravibhagaḥ,
nakṣatrāṇām ca niyatā gatirudayāstādirūpā kālamanupatati, mahābhūtānām
ca sargapralayasamaye janmavināśāvāvirbhāvatirobhāvalakṣaṇau kālāyattāviti...
Helaraja, Ibid., p. 357.

Sāmkhya-Yoga questions the validity of the assumption that temporal determinations are the product of conjunction of Time with external adjuncts.[1] Activities, change or motion which are supposed to be the external limiting adjuncts by the Vaiśeṣikas giving rise to the notion of temporal determinations themselves, Sāmkhya-Yoga would say, cannot be conceived in any other way except in terms of their identity with the moment in which that said activity or change takes place and is cognized. What is given in our perception is the activity or the change as such taking place in one specific moment. No activity or change can be conceived in abstraction from activity or change.

Yuktidīpikā maintains that all activities or change is constituted of a series of events or uninterrupted flow of events, each moment of the series containing in itself the previous moment in its sublatent form and the forthcoming moment in its potential form.[2] These moments in the series do not depend on any substantial reality of Time. The moments in themselves are the ultimate unit existing independently of any substantive reality conceived either as an infinite ubiquitous substance or as an ubiquitous power. It does not have a secondary or derivative reality as the Vaiśeṣikas maintain.

The Vaiśeṣikas are mistaken when they maintain that change cannot be explained without the postulation of Time as the eternal background of

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[1] The Tattvakaumudī of Vacaspati Miśra and also Swaminarayan's Kirnāvali; op. cit., p. 351.

[2] The Yuktidīpikā, op. cit., p. 74.

change. For them the postulation of an eternal background of change is a necessity for accounting the continuity and succession for the reason that it is of the nature of the effect to arise anew. All events and actions, according to Vaiśeṣikas, have a totally fresh origination and are liable to total annihilation. As such they need the category of Time to account for continuity and succession. But for Sāṁkhya, Time is not a factor which brings change in any entity. All entities are subject to change every moment; for the entity in itself contains the potentiality of the would-be state of itself. Change is only the manifesting of what is unmanifest. In and through change the thing is constituted in its diverse phases.[1]

Thus, Sāṁkhya-Yoga rejects the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas acceptance of Time as the material cause which in conjunction with external adjuncts give rise to temporally determined or distinct entities, a sequence or succession which is regarded by them characterizing the process of change. "According to the Vaiśeṣika time is one and cannot account future (distinctions) etc. Accoridng to them division of future, etc., is caused or originate from the superimposition of the distinction of adjuncts. According to Sāṁkhya teachers, (these distinctions of adjuncts alone can be the cause of future, etc., (divisions) etc., in need for another

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[1]See Das Gupta, S. N., History of Indian Philosophy, op. cit., p. 310.

tattva in the form of time."[1] The author of Yuktidīpikā emphasises this

point when he maintains that time is not a factor which brings any

change in any entity. If at all it may only be conceived as a concept

enabling or helping the intellect in comprehending the relation among

the moments of change, but not as a reality or entity existing for the

sake of change, i.e. causing change (kālastu sambandhamātropakārī na

vikrīyahetuḥ).[2]

Up to this point, our analysis of Sāṃkhya-Yoga understanding of

change has enabled us to see the theoretical inconsistencies inherent in

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas postulation of the absolute reality of Time and limited

or relative reality of the moment of change conceived as a product of the

external limiting adjunct. But we have not succeeded in meeting the

challenge posed by Bhartṛhari and Helarāja who, instead of ascribing a

relative status to the moment of change, totally deny any status of

reality independent of time, whatsoever. Their challenge to Sāṃkhya-

Yoga understanding of the reality of the moment is of a more serious

order and has far reaching consequences. It is in their criticisms of

Sāṃkhya-Yoga understanding of change and causation that Bhartṛhari and

Helarāja's greatest merit lies and it is on Sāṃkhya-Yoga's success or

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[1]kālaśca vaiśeṣikābhimata eko na anāgatādivyavahārabhedaṁ pravar-
tyitumaharti tasmādāyaṁ yairupādhibhedairanāgatādibhedaṁ pratipadyate
santu ta evopāyāḥ, ye'nāgatāvyavahārahetavaḥ, kṛtamatrantagadunā
kāleneti.sāṃkhyācāryaḥ. tasmānn kālarūpatattvāntarabhyupagamaiti. Sāṃkhya
Tattvakaumudī of Vācaspati Miśra, op. cit., p. 112.

[2]Yuktidīpikā, op. cit., p. 74.

failure in defending its theory of change and the reality of the moment that the viability of the theoretical foundation of Sāmkhya-Yoga depends.

Bhartṛhari tends to agree with the Sāmkhya-Yoga criticisms of the Vaiśeṣika proposition that the ground of temporal determinations is to be located in the external conditioning factors. Bhartṛhari unequivocally declares that any attempt to explain the reality of temporal determinations on the basis of the conditioning factor is bound to land itself in self-contradiction.

However, despite this initial agreement as to the untenability of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thesis of the conditioning factor being the ground of temporal differences, Bhartṛhari and Sāmkhya-Yoga part company on the further question of the ground of such temporal differentiations. While both of them agree that the locus or the source of temporal differentiations, change and activity must not be sought in the external conditioning factors, they radically differ in their discernment of the locus.

For Bhartṛhari, the locus of the temporal differentiation is Time itself. According to Bhartṛhari Time possesses the power of pratibandha and abhyanuja through which it gives rise to the semblance of temporal differentiations. But despite the fact that it is Kāla itself which is responsible for the temporal differentiations it also remains the eternal background of continuity and permanence. For Bhartṛhari this Kāla Śakti is identical with Brahman which alone is the transcendental ground of all phenomenalization.[1]

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[1]Kālākhyā svātantryaśaktirbrahmaṇa itiḥ; tatra Bhartṛharerabhiprāya... And also.....brahmatattvaṁ vidyāmayaṁ kālakalitamavidyāvaśatkramarūpopagrahena..... Helarāja, op. cit., pp. 365 and 366.

This interpretation of the ground of temporal determinations is in congruence with the Sabda Brahmanvadins understanding of the nature of causation and change. While agreeing with Sāmkhya's _Satkāryavāda_ that it is the cause itself that undergoes change and the entity retains its essential identity through change, Bhartṛhari modifies the _Satkāry-avāda_ to assert that the change as such can only be an appearance (_vivarta_), since the reality remains essentially identical in and through change. All the temporal differentiations then are nothing more than an appearance of it precisely because in and through these temporal differentiations it is the permanence of Time as the _Kāla-Sakti_ of _Brahman_ that is revealed. Moreover, since for Bhartṛhari and Helarāja _dharmi_ is not different from _dharma_,[1] _Brahman_ is not different from his power and as such it is _Brahman_ that constitutes the ground of all change and causation.

Now, Sāmkhya-Yoga philosophers would find this understanding of causation and change quite unacceptable. Starting from the datum presented to the cognizing self, Sāmkhya-Yoga thinkers conclude that the fact of change and causation becomes intelligible only in the context of the reality of the entities undergoing change. The permanence or the continuity

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[1] Bhartṛhari, _op. cit._, 3.9.54, p. 362; Helarāja, _Ibid._, 362.

through the moments of change that Bhartṛhari and Helarāja seek to account for by postulating Time as the eternal background of change actually is inherent in the very nature of things, for nothing which is existent can cease to be and the non-existent can never come into being. That which provides the continuity and permanence through change is nothing but the being itself which is undergoing change, and which retains its identity in and through change.[1] The entity which is constituted in and through its non-manifest and manifest phases itself is the ground of continuity and permanence. Temporal differentiations conceived by Sāmkhya-Yoga as moments of existence do not imply a transcendental reality of Time as the ground of this change and the basis of permanence and continuity.

Some Concluding Observations

There are fundamental points of disagreements between Sāmkhya, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Bhartṛhari on the question of the reality of Time and the ground and nature of temporal sequence and change. There is, according to the Samkhya, no unitary, transcendental and single entity which is given to us in our cognitions as the ground of all temporal change and succession. There is no such thing as a transcendental time which in conjunction with some external factors, conditions change and sequence

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[1] *Vyāsa Bhāṣya* on *Yoga Sūtra*, 3.13.

Change is inherent in the very nature of things and the continuity or
permanence through change is accounted for by the persistence of that
which changes. Thing or the being itself is the ground of both the
change and permanence.

The Nyāya-Vaisesika, on the other hand, maintains that it is
plausible to speak of transcendental time. Time is essentially indi-
visible and unitary. Temporal differentiations or multiplicity of the
empirical time notions are product of some external factors or adjuncts
that somehow limit the unitary, single and essentially indivisible time.
These external factors are the facts of change and activities such as
solar motion that operate as the limiting adjuncts on Time and therefore
give rise to a temporal experience of change and continuity. According
to Nyāya-Vaisesika, while the transcendental Time is essentially unitary
and indivisible, temporal differentiations and succession are introduced
into its structure on account of its conjunction with the external limit-
ing adjuncts. These temporal determinations are accorded a limited but
independent reality.

Bhratṛihari is in agreement with Nyāya-Vaisesika in accepting the
reality of one, unitary, indivisible and transcendental time. However, he
disagrees with Nyāya-Vaisesika on one important point. Temporal differ-
entiation according to Bhartrihari is not a product of external adjuncts
which tend to constitute a limitation on one and essentially indivisible
Time. Change or activities are not independent realities over against
the reality of Time. They cannot constitute any limitation on Time. How
then are we to account for the fact of change and continuity in the

manifest world? Bhartṛhari's answer is that Time has certain powers on account of which it gives rise to the appearance of change. Continuity is accounted by the fact that through all the changes Time continues as the eternal and transcendental background of all activities.

The Sāmkhya differs from both Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Bhartṛhari fundamentally. It does not accept the reality of one, unitary indivisible Time as the transcendental background of all change and continuity. Against both of them it maintains the reality only of the moment of change. The idea of change does not necessarily involve the notion of Time. Postulation of Time as the transcendental background of all change and motion is only a construction of intellect. More specifically, against Bhartṛhari it would argue that we do not need the category of Time to account for continuity either. Ground for continuity and permanence through all changes and motion is present in the very structure of being or thing. The thing itself persists through all change and motion, and that explains the element of continuity.

Significantly, for Sāmkhya-Yoga existence and activity are not two different things. Existence is invariably characterized by change, and even in the so-called Pralayāvasthā Prakṛti (the world) is constantly undergoing change. Change is the very nature of objective being and as such temporal determinations as various moments of change are not adventitious to its being. It is wrong to look for continuity and permanence outside the structure of change. Our notions of one eternal unitary indivisible Time is a product of such misconceptions.

The confusion of permanence with the Time arises from one's inability to see the possibility of change being inherent in the very structure of bieng. But Sāmkhya-Yoga proposes a strictly dynamic conception of reality where change is the very mode of objective being. In consonance with this conception it is quite feasible to conceive of 'timeless change' or change without Time. Sen in a recent article has successfully argued in favour of Sāmkhya-Yoga that time is not a necessary component in our notion of change and that the concept of 'timeless change' is not self-contradictory: He makes the following point:

> We are interested to know whether the concept of change
> (which signifies a very common and well-known phenomenon)
> invariably or necessarily contains the idea of time.
> Change as such means any kind of alteration and transfor-
> mation, which may be said to be one of the commonest facts
> of experience. It may be thought that the mere idea of
> alteration or transformation need not necessarily include
> the concept of time. Time may be thought to be necessary
> for the understanding or explanation of change, but that
> would be going beyond change to the intellectual compre-
> hension of its possibility.[1]

Our discussion of Sāmkhya-Yoga understanding of the problem of time and temporality, thus far, attempted to comprehend the objective element in the experience of temporality. We tried to show that for Sāmkhya-Yoga temporality is intrinsic to the structure of change as examplifying essential finitude of phenomenal existence. However, according to Sāmkhya-Yoga, finitude and change are only one aspect of reality, the other is infinitude or eternity of pure consciousness being the dialectical counterpart of the sphere of objectivity characterized by change and transformation. How is

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[1]Sen, S. K., op. cit., pp. 410-411.

this principle of pure consciousness or eternity related to the sphere of objectivity and change? What is the exact nature of their relationship? What are the implications of this relation for the subject or pure consciousness? These are the questions to which we will address ourselves in the following chapter.

CHAPTER V

TRANSCENDENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND TEMPORALITY

Subject and Subjectivity

We have reached a stage in our analysis where the question of the relationship of the transcendental subject (Puruṣa) and the subject as world-involved (Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure), which is the ground of all temporal constitutions, demands our immediate attention. Within Sāṁkhya-Yoga frame of reference, Puruṣa may be described as the pure subject or the transcendental consciousness which is the formal, ontological ground of all conscious acts and experiencing.[1] This pure subject is not the experiencer or the agent of any activity or willing. However, in its embodiment (Śarīrī)[2] as the subject which is at the same time world-

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[1] It is important to note that according to Sāṁkhya-Yoga agency does not belong to the Puruṣa. Agency and activity belongs to the antaḥkarana (the internal organs). But agency and activity, in as much as it involves conscious reflection, choice and decision, is contingent upon the antaḥkarana's reflection of the consciousness that is Puruṣa. Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure seems to involve the form of consciousness on account of its proximity to the transcendental subject. Equally important to remember that even though Puruṣa is not the agent or actor, it remains the bhokta (enjoyer) of the results or effects ensuing from these acts. Thus it is said: Akarturapi phalopabhogo'nnādyavat, The Sāṁkhya Sūtra, op. cit., 1.105; ahaṁkārah kartā na purusah, Ibid., 6.54; also, buddhyādhyavasit-amartham puruṣaścetayata, The Jayamaṅgalā, op. cit., p. 42.

[2] The empiric subject, the subject which is the agent of all activity and willing is always associated with a body. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga makes a distinction between three kinds of body. The empiric subject (Buddhi-Ahaṁkara) cannot be conceived in isolation from subtle body or the Sukṣma Sarīra.

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involved, it is none other than the agent of all activity and willing. As such the world-involved subject is essentially 'subjectivity'[1] (subject as activity). Subjectivity as embodiment is essentially the existent. Pure subject or transcendental consciousness is real, but is not exhausted by existence. The existent is that which is both real and active.[2] Actuality (being existent and active) is the mark of subjectivity. Pure subject (Puruṣa) however transcends the mode of actuality. The mode of being of pure subject or transcendental consciousness (Puruṣa) is, thus, inherently to be distinguished from that of subjectivity (Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure).

The Empiric Subject and Temporality

To maintain this essential difference in the mode of bieng of subject as embodiment (Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure) and of being of pure subject (Puruṣa) is important within Samkhya-Yoga ontological frame of reference. For Sāṁkhya-Yoga the former constitutes the core of our empiric

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[1]The distinction between subject as subjectivity and the transcendental subject is an important distinction. Transcendental subject is that which essentially is not involved in the world. Subject as subjectivity (Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure) is, the subject that orients itself to the world. To be more precise, world is the project of this subject, for it is the principle of activity and agency. Pure subject (Puruṣa), on the other hand, transcends the realm of activity and agency. It is pure consciousness, without any subject-object distinction.

[2]We consider this distinction between real and existent to be central for an intelligible articulation of the temporal mode of being. Temporality is constitutive of existent whereas it is not intrinsic to the real. Existent is always real, but real is not necessarily existent. The distinction, it may be noted, is not (contra Advaita Vedanta), as between real and what is not-real, but between different grades of reality. There is no ontology of counter reality in Sāṁkhya-Yoga.

being as the manifold of world-experience (adhyavasāya)[1] and is what is pre-thematically aware of itself.[2] It is in and through the mode of reflection that Buddhi comes to be self-aware and constitutes as such the core of the I-ness (Ahaṁkāra).[3] It declares its essential I-ness (Ahaṁkāra) as that which is possessed of thematizing capacity and is aware of itself as such (self-awareness). It is in this mode of reflection that it also discovers itself as that which is world-involved through its 'faculties' (Manas and Indriyas).[4] Thus subjectivity as existent is the structure of world-involvement which has its material ontological basis in embodiment. The empiric subject (Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra) is, definitionally, world-involved and includes both bodily acts or behaviour and different forms of acts of consciousness as modified by the structure of embodiment. Subjectivity, (subject as activity) then, is neither more nor less than these bodily acts and modes of consciousness as they are experienced by

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[1] adhyavasāyaśca niścayākhyastasyāsādharanī vṛttirityarthah..... asyāśca buddhermahattvam svetarasakalakāryavyāpakatvan-mahaisvaryacca mantavyam; The Sāṁkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya, Vijñānabhikṣu, op. cit., 2.13

[2] Buddhi is the structure of the emergence of consciousness without any self-awareness. It has innate possibility of all merits as well as the opposite. But it is not aware of its own possibilities nor does it identify itself as such. That is the function of Ahaṁkāra.
dharmajñānavairāgyaiśvaryānyapi budhaupādānakāni, nahaṁkārady-upādānakāni; budhereva niratiśayasattvakāryatvādityartha , Ibid., 2.14

[3] abhimāno ahaṁkārah; The Sāṁkhya Kārikā, op. cit., 24; ahaṁ karotītyahaṁkārah.....buddhyā niścita evārthe 'haṁkāramamakārau jayete; Vijnanabhiksu, The Sāṁkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya, op. cit., 2.16.

[4] In the use of the term there is no suggestion of a psycholgocial understanding involved. The use of the expression faculty is to indicate functional differences within one psyche. The Sāṁkhya Kārikā, op. cit. 24-26; The Sāṁkhya Sūtra, op. cit., 2.16.

the "I" (Ahaṁkāra), as they are 'lived' concretely and immediately by the subject aware of itself as such (self-aware).

It is true that our bodily existence is not devoid of awareness. A certain amount of awareness is built into the very mode of our being as an embodiment. However this awareness in itself (being of Buddhi) is pre-thematic and pre-reflective, but constitutes the phenomenal condition of thematization and conscious reflection. An implicit, non-thematic aware-ness attends experiential behaviour and acts of reflective consciousness (self-awareness) belonging to subjectivity (Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra). A more ex-plicit act of self-consciousness is conditioned by an experiential priority of the non-thematic awareness (the being of Buddhi).

However, it is precisely in the subject's act of reflection (the being of Buddhi) that the possibility of the recovery of the transcendental subject (subject transcending the act of self-consciousness and the realm of subjectivity) opens up. The mode of being of self as reflection (Buddhi) is also the mode of acquiring the discriminative awareness (Viveka) by the self-reflecting self.[1] In the mode of self-reflection, the self-reflective self makes the pre-thematic awareness of bodily acts and conscious acts thematically conscious, i.e. as object to the self-reflecting self. This is the mode of transcendence or objectification

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[1]kṣaṇatatkramayoḥ samyamāvivekajaṁ jñānam, The Yoga Sūtra, op. cit., 3.52; See Vyāsa's Bhaṣyas and Vacaspati Miśra's Tattva Vaiśaradī on the aforesaid Sūtra; ".....when by true wisdom the gunas are perceived as they are both the illusory notions of time and space vanish." Dasgupta, S. N., Indian Philosophy, op. cit., 256-257, n.2.; For a comprehensive analysis of the mechanisms of reflection and the different planes on which it operates see Dasgupta, Yoga as Philosophy and Religion, op. cit., pp. 150-165.

(making other) of the realm of subjectivity. This structure of transcendence by reflection (being of Buddhi) has its phenomenological correlate in the discriminative awareness (viveka) which is the condition for the recovery of the transcendental consciousness. Reflection is the rational mode of otherness. The relationship of otherness of the pure subject to the realm of subjectivity (subject as embodiment) is also the primary mode of the being of pure consciousness or the transcendental subject (Purusa) as a 'relation' of no relation bereft of all contents.[1]

Thus, the relationship of the transcendental consciousness (Puruṣa) to the things and being of the world (including the being of Buddhi and Ahaṁkāra as constitutive of subjectivity) is of a peculiar kind, i.e. it is a relation of no-relation or otherness (anyayoga) - it is precisely what things of the world are not.[2] The relationship is not external but dialectical.[3] It is a relationship of mutual opposition and cooperation,

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[1]The paradoxical expression of relation of no-relation or otherness is employed to suggest that even total otherness is given to reflection as a species of relation, rather than as no relation at all. In the discriminative self-reflection pure subject is understood with the help of the notion of the inoperative presence (sanniddhi) which constitutes the condition of the bondage and its absence which marks its freedom. Either way for reflection it is a mode of relation.

[2]See Sāṁkhya Sūtra, op. cit., 2.8; Larson, J. G., op. cit., p. 188; Radhakrishnan, S., op. cit., pp. 287-291; Dasgupta, S. N., History of Indian Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 238-241.

[3]See Jayamangala: etāni kimātmārtham svaṁ svām vṛttiṁ pratipadyante, kimanyārthamitāyah-puruṣārtha eva heturiti, puruṣasyārtho visayopabhogah kaivalyam ca sa vṛttihetuh, Jayamaṅgalā, op. cit., p. 38; Also see Mātharvṛtti: kim svārtha viṣayaṁ pratipadyante ahosvit parārthamityat rocyate. pararthamgamyate. yasmādāh-puruṣārtha eva hetuh purusārthah kartavya eva iti guṇa nām pravṛttih, p. 48.

of thematic exclusion but operational dependence.[1] Transcendental consciousness or the pure subject is not internally and necessarily related to the world of subjectivity, rather it is a relation of no-relation (or otherness). It is this relationship of otherness that gives rise to the emergence of subjectivity (Buddhi-Ahamkāra structure) as a specific moment in the dialectical relation between the world and pure consciousness. This subjectivity, the principle of I-ness, also constitutes the core of temporality.[2] It is a being which is essentially temporal. The actuality of our concrete experiential existence also provides the mode of the discernment of temporality. Herein we discover that the past is my past in my present. This synthesis of temporality as the mine-ness of subjectivity

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[1] The point emerges very clearly in the Sāmkhya Kārikā itself. Karika .55 expresses the contradiction and pain suffered by Puruṣa on account of its association with the body:

> tatra jarāmaraṇa kṛtam duḥkham prāpnoti cetanah puruṣaḥ
> liṅgasyāvinivṛtteḥ tasmād duḥkham svabhāvena, The Sāmkhya
> Kārikā, op. cit., Kārikā 55.

Kārikā 56 brings out the element of cooperation by stating that it is on account of prakṛti that puruṣa can gain liberation:

> ityeṣa prakṛtikṛto mahadādiviśeṣbhūtaparyantaḥ pratipuruṣa
> vimokṣārtham svārtha iva parārtha ārambhaḥ, Ibid., Karika
> 56.

The same idea of the thematic exclusion and operational dependence is continued in Kārikās 57, 58, 59, 60, 20 and 21.

[2] Temporality is defined as a function of internal organs which are the structure of the manifestation of the unmanifest prakṛti. These are Buddhi, Ahamkāra and Manas. Thus Sāmkhya Kārikā says:

> antaḥkaraṇam trividham.....trikālamābhyantaram karaṇam,
> The Sāmkhya Kārikā, op. cit., Karika 33.

Gauḍapādabhāṣya on the Kārikā reads as follows:

> trikālamābhyantaram karaṇam. Buddhyahamkāramanamsi trikāla-
> viṣayāni buddhirvartamānam ghatam budhyate atītamanāgatam
> ceti. ahamkāro vartamane 'bhimānam karoti atīte 'nāgate ca.
> tathā mano vartamāne samkalpam kurute atīte 'nagate ca. evam
> trikālamābhyantaram karaṇamiti, The Gauḍapādabhāṣya, op. cit.,
> p. 132.

(Ahaṁkāra structure) is an ontological relation which unites the past to the present. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga ontology would not claim that the past and present are identical. Evidently past is not present, i.e. there is a radical distinction between the two dimensions of temporal existence. But despite this fact that they are not identical, they are internally related through my subjectivity as my past and my present, i.e. they manifest a lived unity.[1]

The Transcendental Consciousness and the Temporal Structure

What then is the relationship of the transcendental subject (Purusa) which is, ontologically speaking, other than the world-involved subject (Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure), to the temporal structuring of this world-involved subject? Within the Sāṁkhya-Yoga framework time and temporal relations of past, present and future cannot, ontologically speaking, be grounded in pure-consciousness or the transcendental subject (Puruṣa) which is intrinsically non-temporal.[2] Any attempt to locate the ontological ground of temporal relations in the transcendental subject (Puruṣa) which is essentially non-temporal will imply the reduction of the temporal dimensions of being to pure duration or, not-endurance which is not a case of endurance, but will be a thorough past, present and future, or trans-temporal unity. In such an event one will have to face the question of

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[1]The three internal organs of Buddhi, Ahaṁkāra, and Manas operate as unity. As such they constitute the internal relations of past, present, and future. Together these three constitute the empiric self, both in its impersonal and personal dimensions. However, it must be noted that Buddhi is primarily impersonal though individual. But this Buddhi is a necessary condition for the operation or functioning of Ahaṁkāra and Manas as the structure of tmeporal constitution.

[2]Cataline, F. V., op. cit., p. 60.

how the temporal determinations can emerge from the unity (of pure con-
sciousness) per se. It may be argued that a pre-supposed unity alone is
the context in which the change or temporal determination can be grasped
and understood. However, Sāṃkhya-Yoga points out that only an unity which
has a built-in structure of differentiation can account for temporal per-
formance and temporal change.. Prakṛti is postulated as the realm of
being which has such a structure.[1] This indeed is precisely the point
that emerges in our analysis of Sāṃkhya-Yoga understanding of temporality.
Within the Sāṃkhya-Yoga frame of reference the subjectivity as the prin-
ciple of I-ness is the ground of the ontological distinction of past,
present and future (as my past, my present and my future) precisely be-
cause this principle has its objective reference point in Prakṛti (the
world) which is the ground of temporal permanence and change.[2].

The empiric subjectivity is not an a-temporal identity.[3] Nor can
it be described as a series of atomistic elements of consciousness which
are contained in time. The best way to look at subjectivity (Buddhi-
Ahaṃkāra structure) is to conceive it in its concreteness of the exper-
iential order: it is the structural unity or an identity which holds

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[1]parināminityatā guṇānāṃ, Vyāsa Bhaṣya on Yoga Sutra, op. cit.,
Sutra 4.33.

[2]See infra note 1, pp. 119-120.

[3]Only Puruṣa as the transcendental subject has an a-temporal identity.
A-temporal identity refers to the intrinsic unchangeability characteristic
of Puruṣa as the principle that transcends the realm of change and tempo-
rality. .This may be described as permanence without change, i.e. kutas-
thanityatā (vide Vyāsa bhaṣya on Yoga-Sūtra, op. cit., Sutra 4.33).

together the structural whole of temporal becoming. It must not be conceived in substantive terms. Subjectivity is not a substance underlying our experiences in different moments of existence. The substantive existence, the element of constancy and non-temporality belongs to the realm of pure subject or the transcendental consciousness (Puruṣa). Subjectivity (Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure), on the other hand, is continuously on the go. It is the structure of continual unfolding or manifestation of what is unmanifest.

Within the temporal structure, subjectivity (Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure) is not so much a subject present throughout any moment or a sort of substance. For according to Sāṁkhya-Yoga it is a continuous unfoldment or manifestation of that which has a relation of otherness with the transcendental subject as the constant witness of this unfoldment. The subjectivity then, is a kind of structure of temporal experience – the structure of the disclosing of the fact of change and movement within the very being of subjectivity. Thus subjectivity is a self-constituting synthesis of the temporal dimensions, a unification or identity of experience within the flux of that experience itself. It is the self-constituting unity of temporal experience itself.

Pure consciousness or the transcendental subject, however, is separated from this self-constituting unity of temporal experience in a radical way. Puruṣa is not temporal (either as change or as permanence)[1]. It is

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[1]The Sāṁkhya-Yoga makes a distinction between two types of permanence: the absolutely unchanging permanence (the principle of eternality which is essentially non-temporal in the sense that it is not subject to change) and

immovable constant (kūtastha). It is not affected by past, present and future mode of being, for it is what it is: unaffected, self-identical, unchanged and unmoved.[1] There is a past for a being who is what he is not and is not what he is, i.e. for a being who is in a state of dialectical relation to something which is of the nature of an other to it. This being in dialectical relation of otherness with Purusa is the necessary condition for the possibility of the strange experience of lived time as both unity and disjunction.[2] Pure consciousness or the transcendental subject on the other hand is a unity unto itself, a unity in isolation of its own being.[3]

While this phenomenon of subjectivity in the sense in which it is distinguished from the transcendental subject may be described as a case of identity in difference, the latter, i.e. the transcendental subject may

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the permanence in mutation. Permanence of the Puruṣa falls in the first category. Whereas the permanence of the guṇa which constitutes the essence of Prakṛti falls in the second category:

 Dvayī ceyamnityatā kūtasthanityatā pariṇāminityatā ca. Tatra
 kūtasthanityatā puruṣasya, pariṇāminityatā guṇānām, Vyāsa
 Bhāsya on The Yoga Sūtra, 4.33, op. cit.

[1]Kūtasthanityeṣu svarpuamātra pratisthesu muktapuruṣaʿṣu svarupāstitā,, Ibid.

[2]Past, present and future as temporal determinations of empiric being apply only to Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure. This is the structure of the manifestation of Prakṛti (the unmanifest world) which has a character of permanence in mutation. Thus Buddhi-Ahamkāra structure is the realm of the experience of time as both unity (permanence) and disjunction (change).

[3]See Supra, note 1.

be described as pure identity.[1] The former has a mode of being which contains at the very heart of it elements of dispersion and atomisms.

Subjectivity as the centre of egoity and individuality (Buddhi-Ahamkāra structure) is a self-constituting synthesis of the temporal dimensions. It is a no-structure of temporal experience itself. On the contrary, the pure subject or transcendental consciousness is given fully constituted from the very beginning.[2] Puruṣa does not emerge with time; it, rather, exists without beginning beginninglessly as a fully constituted being. More concretely, there never was a moment when it was not there. Not less significant is the fact that it may be discerned as existing in the fullness of its being in every subsequent instants of its existence. Its being contains all the properties that pertain to it in particular instants. It exists with its nature fully determined as already constituted - not just being constituted, i.e. becoming with the passage of time.[3]

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[1]This is a particular kind of bhedābheda which must be distinguished from the Vedāntic conception of identity indifference. The concept is employed here to bring out the fact that this being is also the structure of becoming which accounts for a continued identity through the specificity (vaiśiṣtya) and differentiation (bhedānām pariṇāmāt) that gives rise to the tattvas.

[2]What is the language of Vedānta would be described as bhutα or pariniṣthita vastu - i.e. the accomplished being given in all its fullness. (Vide Śamkara's commentary on Brahma Sūtra 1.11).

[3]The language employed here (fully constituted, existing in fullness, fully determined, etc. etc.) must be understood in respect of its negative emphasis - i.e. denying the opposite. It is analogous to descriptive statements about Brahman, like non-duality, etc., whose function as Samkara rightly points out is to negate its opposite. (ananyatvam vyatirekeṇa abhāvaḥ).

Subjectivity, on the other hand, refers to the aspect of being that is constituted in a manifold of phases. Thus in the realm of subjectivity one phase of actualization passes into another phase, the two phases not being disjunct and extends continually into further phases of actualization. This continuous passage from potentiality to actuality[1] is an on-going process in and through which the subjectivity as temporal is constituted.

Puruṣa as the transcendental subject, however, remains self-identical through the constantly arising new instants in which it exists. Subjectivity as being constituted on the basis of the developing phases that are pure activity, is transitory and passes into continual new phases. As such it requires to be grounded in some other being that remains identical despite the passage of time, and which, therefore, surmounts the diversity of constantly emerging new moments and by virtue of this is enduring and permanent. This being is Prakṛti which has the temporal mode of permanence (pariṇāmi nityatā).[2]

Thus temporality of subjectivity implies a secondary mode of being, a fissuration and dispersion taking place at the very heart of it. This fissuration and dispersion can be overcome only in the mode of discriminative awareness (viveka jñāna). Ironically, however, the self-reflecting

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[1] The expression here is used as rough translation of Vyakta and Avyakta in relation to Prakriti, Purusa being outside the point of this polar relation.

[2] See Supra, note 1, p. 119-120.

mode of being leading to discriminative awareness intensifies the problem for the world-involved subject (Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure). In the very act of overcoming dispersion the mode of being of the subjectivity comes to be dissolved. To be in the mode of discrimination is also to regain the original ground of subject as principle of pure consciousness.[1]

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[1]It is important to remember that Buddhi as the mode of being of reflection or as the reflecting mode of being is also the locus of discriminative awareness:

saiva ca viśinaṣṭi punaḥ pradhānapuruṣāntaram sūkṣmam,
The Sāṁkhya Kārikā, op. cit., Kārika 37.

PART II

ABHIDHARMA BUDDHISM.

CHAPTER VI

ABHIDHARMIKA BUDDHISM: ITS HISTORICAL AND TEXTUAL SETTING

Schools of Buddhism and the Abhidharmika Tradition

Traditional Buddhist sources give varying and, at times, con-

flicting accounts of the sects of Buddhism that emerged during the first

phase of its development.[1] Modern Scholars have tried in vain to create

a systematic and coherent picture of the internal development of Buddhist

tradition in its early stages. It is extremely difficult to discern with

any clarity the exact number of schools and their historical and doctrinal

interrelationship. This study does not intend to investigate this larger

and certianly hisotrically significant question, which lies outside

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[1]For the details of conflicting traditional accounts of early Budd-
hist sects see Keith, A. B., Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon, Ox-
ford: The Clarendon Press, 1923, pp. 148-159; Dutt, Nalinakisha, Early
History of the Spread of Buddhism and the Buddhist Schools, Calcutta:
Oriental Series, 1925; Thomas, E. J., The History of Buddhist Thought,
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1933, pp. 27-42; Conze, Edward,
Buddhist Thought in India, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1962, pp. 119-126;
Warder, A. K., Indian Buddhism, Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass, 1970, pp.
288-351; In our discussion, we have generally followed the evidences
brought in by these scholars which are largely based on the Pali and Sans-
krit material. For Tibetan sources, readers may also refer to Taranatha,
History of Buddhism in India, (trans.) Lama Chimpa and Alaka Chattopadhyaya,
Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1970; and, Bu-ston, History of
Buddhism, (trans.) Obermiller, E., Heidelberg, 1931-32.

the range and scope of the present work. However, leaving the larger
historical question aside, we are obligated to define and delimit that
area of Buddhism which may be described as Ābhidharmika Buddhism, and
to that extent it becomes imperative to address ourselves to the task
of delineating the historical and textual context of Ābhidharmika tra-
dition.

According to the Buddhist tradition, three different Buddhist
councils took place at different times to settle important questions
pertaining to the basic tenets of the order.[1] The primary factor res-
ponsible for the rise of different sects of Buddhism may be seen in the
context of varying interpretations of the word of the Buddha. All
these schools claimed to be true to the original teaching of the Master
and claimed themselves to be the true representatives of the doctrine.
The oldest Pāli accounts of schism within Buddhist order provide a

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[1]The first Council is reported to have taken place at Rajagaha
(modern Rajgrha) just after the demise of Buddha on the issue of Vinaya
(the rules of discipline) as laid down by Buddha. The second Council
was summoned by the monk Yasa, about a hundred years after Buddha's
death, at Vaisali in northern Bihar. This was probably the occasion
for the great schism between the Sthaviras and Mahasanghikas, which
was to later shape the growth of Mahayana Buddhism in India. The third
Council is assigned to the period of Asoka's reign, about two centuries
after Buddha's death, the basic issues of controversy being more of
doctrinal nature, rather than rules of discipline which was the case
in the first two Councils. It seems probable that the division between
Theravādins and Sarvāstivādins may have originated at this Council.
Scholars have widely differed both on the fact of the Council as well
as what transpired there. Most of the evidences are quite late and
sometimes very confusing. See Thomas, E., op. cit., pp. 27-41; also,
Keith, op. cit., pp. 148-156.

list of at least eighteen schools.[1] These sources tend to present con-
flicting accounts of the various doctrinal positions held by each of
them.[2] But it is difficult to construct any definite historical or
chronological order out of this list. Pāli versions too differ among
themselves on the question of the antiquity of one or the other of the
schools as indeed they differ from the claims that is made by Sanskrit
tradition.

The Pāli sources including Buddhaghosa's commentary on the Katthāvatu,
Dīpvaṁsa and Mahāvaṁsa, though differing on details of the schisms, agree
in maintaining that the first schism took place during the Council of
Vaiśāli, when the Mahāsanghikas seceded from the Theravādins.[3] From
within Mahāsanghikas arose the schools of Gokulikas and Ekabbohārikas.
The Gokulikas were further subdivided into Paññativādins and Bāhulikas;
and the Ekabbohārikas gave rise to the school of Cetiyavādins. On the
other hand, the Theravāda itself is reported to be subdivided into Mahiṅ-
sāsakas and Vajjiputtakas, as indeed it was on account of their differences

[1]See The Debates Commentary (Kathāvatthuppakarna-Atthakatha),
(trans.) Law, B. C., London: Oxford University Press, 1940, pp. 2 ff.

[2]Keith, op. cit., p. 148.

[3]The Debate Commentary, op. cit., pp. 2-4.

with the <u>Vajjiputtakas</u> on the important questions of discipline that

<u>Mahāsānghikās</u> separated. The <u>Vajjiputtakasa</u> gave rise to four branches:

<u>Dhammuttariyas</u>, <u>Bhadrayānikas</u>, <u>Channāgarikas</u> and <u>Sammitiyas</u>. <u>Mahinsāskas</u>

on the other hand were further divided into the <u>Sabbātthivādins</u> and Dhamma-

<u>guttikas</u>. From within <u>Sabbātthivādin</u> tradition arose the schools of <u>Kas-</u>

<u>sapikas</u>, <u>Sankāntikas</u> and <u>Suttavādins</u>. This accounts for the original

eighteen schools mentioned by Pali sources. Buddhaghosa, however, men-

tions six more schools.[1]

A Sanskrit tradition also gives a list of eighteen schools. The

list is given in Mahāvyutpatti.[2] The text belongs to Sarvastivāda and was

probably composed in the fifth or sixth century A.D. But this does not

minimise the value of the classifications, as it is quite obvious that it

draws upon older materials extant at that time.[3] The arrangement of

schools here is not chronological; rather they are grouped under the

original schools to which they belonged:

1. <u>Sarvāstivāda</u>: Mūla-Sarvāstivāda, Kāśyapīyas, Mahīsāsakas, Dharm-

    guptas, Bahuśrutīyas, Tāmrasātīyas, Vibhajyavādins.

2. · <u>Sammatiyas</u>: Kaurukullakas, Āvantakas, Vātsīputrīyas.

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[1] <u>Ibid</u>.

[2] <u>Mahavyutpatti</u>, vide Thomas, E. J., <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., pp. 37-41;

[3] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 38.

3.   Mahāsanghikas: Pūrvaśailas, Aparaśailas, Haimvatas, LokKttara-
vādins, Prajñaptivādins.

4.   Sthaviras: Mahāvihāravāsins, Jetavanīyas, Abhayagirivāsins.

It is extremely difficult to determine much from these names about the

doctrinal positions of these schools.   Names given are sometimes after

the original teacher of the school; sometimes, it applies to the geo-

graphical location, and occasionally, to doctrinal allegiance.

It is important to note that, according to Pāli sources, the Sabbā-

thivādins (Sarvāstivādins) come within the broader group of Theravādins as

opposed to the schools which emerged from the original secession of Mahā-

sanghikas.[1]   The Sanskrit sources also label Vibhājyavādins as a school

of Sarvāstivādins,[2] while the Pāli sources consider the Vibhājyavādins to

be the precursor of Theravādins who later came to be known by that name.

This shows that initially there was great affinity between Sarvāstivāda

and Theravāda.   But there are important differences between the two.

Theravādins, as it is well known, preserved their canon in Pāli.   Prof.

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[1]Dīpavaṁsa,   vide Keith, op. cit., pp. 148-149.

[2]Mahavyutpatti, vide Thomas, E. J., op. cit., p. 38.

Kern and Rhys Davids[1] among others agree in maintaining that the Pāli

canons contain the doctrines of the Sthaviras or Theravādins. The The-

ravādin tradition of Sri Lanka tends to identify them as Vibhajjyavādins.[2]

But it seems probable that the Vibhajjavāda was a more comprehensive term

and was also applicable to Sarvāstivādins. The Sarvāstivādins later came

to be called Vaibhāṣikas on account of their allegiance to Vibhāṣa, a com-

mentary on Jñānaprasthāna, the earliest Abhidharma text.[3] In the words of

Yamakami Sogen:

> In later times, the so-called Vaibhāṣikas came to be
> identified with the Sarvastivadins; and the two names
> became mutually interchangeable, although, properly
> speaking, the Sarvāstivādins originally formed a sec-
> tion of the Vaibhāṣikās.[4]

Both Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda acquired significant place in the

early stages of development of Buddhism and their contribution to the pro-

pogation and development of Buddhism outside India cannot be underestimated.

Though Theravāda later flourished in the south, there is no doubt that, for

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[1]Kern, H. Manual of Indian Buddhism, Strassburg, 1896;
Rhys Davids, T. W., "Schools of Buddhist Beliefs", in Journal of Royal
Asiatic Society, 1892, pp. 409-422.

[2]Keith, op. cit., pp. 148-149.

[3]See infra, p. 133.

[4]Sogen, Yamakami, Systems of Buddhist Thought, cf. Banerjee, A.C.,
op. cit., p. 4.

long, both Theravāda and Sarvastivada developed in north India at the
same time. The Sarvāstivāda was chiefly confined to the western centers
of Mathurā, Kāshmir, and Gandhāra, while the Theravādins operated from
Magadha and Kosala, the two earliest centers of Buddhism.

The split between the Sarvāstivāda and Theravāda (also called Vib-
hājyavāda) seem to have taken place during the reign of Asoka. "It ap-
pears that Asoka sided with the Vibhājyavādins, and that in consequence
the Sarvāstivādins went North, and converted Kāshmir, which remained their
centre for more than a thousand years".[1] However, the basis of division
in the present case was, instead of being the rules of discipline (vinaya),
the philosophical or metaphysical stand taken by Sarvāstivādins. Thus
Conze rightly observes:

> the split between Sarvāstivādins and Vibhājyavādins was
> occasioned by the pan-realistic ontological doctrine
> of Katyāyaniputra, who taught that not only the present,
> but also past and future events (dharmās) are real.[2]

This indeed is a decisive issue on which the Theravādins and Sarvāstivādins
disagreed fundamentally. It is not surprising that the Abhidharmā texts of
both the schools containing their basic philosophical positions, take dif-
ferent stands on important philosophical issues. Conze therefore is pro-
bably correct in holding that:

> the Abhidharma books were clearly composed after the
> third division of the schools. The contents of the

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[1]Conza, Edward, A Short History of Buddhism, Bombay: Chetana Ltd.,
1960, p. 20.

[2]Ibid., p. 20. For elucidation of the said ontological doctrine see
section VIII, infra, p. 173 ff.

seven Ābhidharma books of Sarvāstivādins differ from
those of the seven books of the Theravādins, who are
an offshoot of the Vibhajyavādins.[1]

The Two Abhidharmic Traditions

For long Buddhist scholarship was led to believe that the original

Buddhist canons existed only in Pāli. However, the evidence brought in

from Tibetan and Chinese sources, as well as the discovery of manuscript

fragments in Eastern Turkey, Nepal and Gilgit, confirmed the existence of

Buddhist canons in Sanskrit. It is now well established that Sarvāsti-

vādins used Sanskrit as the medium of their literary activity and that

their canon was entirely in Sanskrit. Sarvāstivādins too like Theravādins

divided their canon into three Piṭakas (literally baskets): the Sūtras,[2]

the Vinayas, and the Abhidharmas. Despite some differences in the arrange-

ment and classification of treatment there is substantial similarity be-

tween the Pali and Sanskrit Vinaya and Sūtra literature. Scholars, who

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[1]Ibid., p. 21.

[2]In Sarvāstivāda tradition, Sūtras are called Āgamas whereas Pāli
tradition uses Nikāya for sūtra piṭaka.

have made comparative study of the two sets of __Vinaya__ and __Sutra__ texts,
have noted substantial agreement between the two traditions.[1] However,
special significance attaches to the __Abhidharma Pitaka__ because it is
precisely here that the differences between the Pali and Sanskrit tradi-
tions seem to be remarkable.[2] This difference between the two sets of
__Abhidharma__ texts raises an important historical question regarding the
relationship between the two traditions. One may legitimately surmise
that the __Abhidharma__ texts were composed and compiled at a time when both
the traditions had been separated for long. It is quite probable that
the two traditions developed their __Abhidharma__ texts independently. How-
ever, any definitive statement on this issue will have to wait a thorough
and comprehensive analysis of the __Abhidharma__ literature of the two tra-
ditions. It will be interesting to investigate if the content or the
structure of the texts provide any basis for a reasonable conclusion
about the chronological order of the two sets of the __Abhidharma__ texts.
Though such an investigation is beyond the scope of this project we will
bring in, wherever possible, evidences that may be useful in resolving

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[1]For an excellent discussion or summary of the findings of such
comparisons, see, Banarje, A. C., __Sarvāstivāda Literature__, Calcutta:
Calcutta Oriental Press, 1957, pp. 18-50. Our own account of Sarvas-
tivadin literature draws heavily upon this work.

[2]See Takakusu J., "The Abhidharma Literature of the Sarvāsti-
vādins", __Journal of Pali Text Society__, 14, 1904-05, pp. 67-146; Dutt,
N., __Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinyana__, Calcutta:
Calcutta Oriental Series, 1930, pp. 5-6; Nyantiloka, __Guide Through the
Abhidhammapitaka__, Colombo, 1938, pp. 1-2; and, Keith, __op. cit.__, p. 152.

this important historical question.

There are seven _Abhidharma_ texts of Sarvāstivāda school which were originally composed in Sanskrit:

1. The _Jnānaprasthānasūtra_ of Ārya Kātyāyanīputra.

2. The _Sangītiparyāya_ of Mahākauṣṭhila.

3. The _Prakaranpāda_ of Sthavira Vasumitra.

4. The _Vijñānakāya_ of Sthavira Devsarmā.

5. The _Dhātukāya_ of Pūrna.

6. The _Dharmaskandha_ of Ārya Sāriputra.

7. The _Prajñāptiśāstra_ of Ārya Maudgalyāyana.

While manuscript fragments of **Sutra** and **Vinaya** literature of Sarvastivada have been discovered in **Sanskrit** originals, no Sanskrit originals of these _Abhidharma_ texts, except fragments of _Sangītiparyāya_ by Mahākauṣṭhila, is available. It is interesting to note that while the whole of Vinaya literature and some other later _Abhidharma_ treatises are found in Tibetan, none of the **Sanskrit** _Abhidharma_ texts, except the _Prajñāptiśāstra_ of Ārya Maudgalyayana, is available in Ṭibetan translations.

During the reign of and at the instance of **Kaṇiska** of Kusana dynasty,a council of Buddhist monks was called in the first century B.C. At this council, the commentary on _Jnānaprasthānasūtra_ called Vibhāsa was composed.[1] It is from this Vibhāṣa that the Vaibhāsika derive their name.

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[1]Keith, _op. cit._, p. 155.

Since the Vibhāṣa belongs to this period it is quite safe to conclude

that Jñānaprasthāna belonged to a period earlier than first century B.C.

Though there is no conclusive evidence to settle the date of this text,

there is no doubt that this is the oldest and most important of the seven

Abhidharma texts. According to the Chinese sources it was first trans-

lated into Chinese by Saṅghdeva and Dharmapriya (Ku Fo-nien) who brought

it to China from Kashmir during 4th Century A.D.[1] Hiuen Tsang also trans-

lated it in the 7th century A.D.[2] The tradition considers Jañānaprasthāna

to be the principal text, while the other six are regarded as supplementary

or ancillary. Yaśomitra in his Sphutārthābhidharmakośavyākhyā compares

the Jñānaprasthāna with the body of a being and the other six to its legs

or Padas.[3] It is this relationship between Jñānaprasthāna and other

Abhidharma texts that led Takakusu to suggest that "it stands to the other

treatises in such a relation as the Veda to the six Vedāṅgas".[4]

Keith has expressed his doubt about the antiquity of the Abhidharma

texts, and is inclined to believe that the entire body of Abhidharma texts

belong to a period much later than what is suggested by the traditional

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[1]Nanjio, op. cit., No. 1273.

[2]Ibid., No. 1275.

[3]śastramiti jñānaprasthānam tasya śarīrabhūtasya ṣat pādaḥ prakar-
anpādo vijñānakāyo dharmaskandhaḥ prajñāptiśāstram dhātukāyaḥ saṅgītipar-
yāya iti. Abhidharmakos'a-Vyākhyā of Yaśomitra, (ed.) Law, N. N., London:
Luzac & Co., 1949, p. 10.

[4]Takakusu, op. cit., p. 74.

sources. According to Keith, we cannot form any "definite idea as to the date of Jñānaprasthāna and its supplements, no faith can be placed on the alleged authors, the titles being manifestly intended to convey the impression of extreme antiquity".[1] The views expressed by Keith on the dates of the text in question contradict the claims of the tradition and echoes an attitude towards tradition best described in Conze's words as "superciliousness that belongs to a phase in the treatment of subject nations which has now passed".[2] We tend to agree with Frauwallener's observation that in the matter of historical research the importance of tradition should not be undermined unless the internal evidence completely contradicts it, or that we have overwhelmingly valid reasons against it.[3] In our opinion, the antiquity of the primary sanskrit Abhidharma texts is beyond doubt and, as we shall show, they are in all probability older than the Pāli Abhidharma texts.

The Saṅgītiparyāya is the first of the six auxiliary texts (pāda). The Chinese sources assign the authorship to Śāriputra, but Indian and Tibetan tradition mention Mahākausthila of Sarvāstivāda school as the author of the text.[4] According to Takakusu, there are some points of

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[1] Keith, op. cit., p. 154.

[2] Conze, Edward, Buddhist Thought in India, op. cit., p. 10.

[3] Frauwallener, E.,"On the Date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu," Serie Orientale Roma, 3, 1951, pp. 36-37.

[4] Takakusu, op. cit.

similarities between the Puggalapaññatti, a Pāli Abhidharma text, and the Sangītiparayāya.[1] He further suggests that the Sangītiparayāya is modelled on the Sangīti Sutanta.[2] The Prakaranapāda, the second of the ancillary Abhidharma texts, is attributed to Vasumitra.[3] According to B.C. law, the Prakaranapada is the counterpart of the Vibhangaprakarana of the, Pāli Abhidharmapitaka.[4] Nyayantiloka, however, maintains that the Vibhanga bears a closer affinity with Dharmaskandha.[5] The Vijñānakāya is attributed to Devaśarma of Srāvāsti, and is supposed to have been composed during the second hundred years of Buddha's parinirvana.[6] Authorship of the Dhātukāya according to the Chinese source, is attributed to Vasumitra in the 2nd century A.D. Against this Chinese tradition we have the authority of Yaśomitra and Bu-ston who regard Pūrna to be the author of this work.[7] N. Dutt is inclined to give greater weight to the Chinese tradition

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Keith, op. cit., p. 154.

[4] Law, B.C., A History of Pali Literature, Vol. I, p. 340, vide Banerjee, A. C., op. cit., p. 63.

[5] Nayantiloka, op. cit., pp. 1-2.

[6] Banerjee, A. C., op. cit., p. 64.

[7] Nanjio, op. cit., No. 1282.

specially "in view of the fact that this pada (Dhātukāya) is only an enlarged treatment of. the topics contained in section 4 of the Prakarnapada of Vasumitra".[1]. Poussin is prepared to accept the antiquity of this Abhidharma text and thinks that it, probably, is the source of Pāli Dhātukathā.[2] The Dharmaskandha is attributed to Maudgalyāyana by Chinese tradition, while Yasomitra and Buston mention Sariputra as the author of this work.[3] Takakusu attaches great importance to this text and considers this to be "the most impoxtant of the Abhidharma works and the fountainhead of the Sarvāstivāda system.[4] The Prajñaptiśāstra is attributed to Maudgalyāyana, and is the only Abhidharma text which seems to have been translated into Tibetan.[5] It might be construed from this fact that the Prajñānpatiśāstra is, probably, a late text which survived in its original form in Sanskrit, and was available to Buddhist scholars who worked in Tibet during the 7th century when Buddhism was introduced in Tibet.

The Pāli canons of the Theravādins also contain seven Abhidharma texts. However, the relationship among the Pāli Abhidharma texts is not

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[1]Dutt, N., op. cit., p. 293.

[2]Poussin, La Valee, vide Banerjee, A. C., op. cit., p. 65.

[3]Nanjio, op. cit., No. 1296.

[4]Takakusu, op. cit., pp. 3-12.

[5]Keith, op. cit., p. 154.

one of mutual complementariness, nor do they bear a relationship of pri-

mary and secondary texts like the Sanskrit Abhidharma texts.[1] The Pāli

Abhidharma texts are:

1. Dhammasaṅgaṇi

2. Vibhaṅga

3. Puggalapaññatti

4. Yamaka

5. Katthāvatthu

6. Dhātukathā

7. Paṭṭhāna

In Pāli Sutta and Vinaya literature there is no reference to Abhidhammapitaka.[2]

This has created some question about the authenticity of the tradition which

considers the Abhidhammapiṭaka to be the original words of Buddha. Scholars

have widely differed on the date of Abhidhamma texts. Prof. Rhys Davids

thinks that in terms of subject-matter and the style, the Kathāvatthu belongs

to Asokan period.[3] According to Mrs. Rhya Davids, the Dhammasaṅgaṇi is

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[1]See Supra, p. 133 ff.

[2]The Sutta and Vinaya Pitakas do not mention Abhidhammapitaka as a separate pitaka. The division recognized by the Pāli Canons is that of Dhamma, i.e. Sutta, and Vinaya with Matika. It is the Mātika (literally means lists) which probably later, was elaborated into Abhidhamma. According to Keith, the Abhidhamma Pitaka is a work of Vibhajyavādins of Theravāda tradition..."the Abhidhamma Pitaka, as we have it in the Pāli canon, is the definite work of this school, a systematic scholasticism based on the Suttas", Keith, op. cit., p. 153.

[3]Vide, Keith, op. cit., p. 22.

dated back to about 385 B.C.   She bases her contention on a comparison

of form and content of the Dhammasaṅganī and the Katthāvatthu which is

dated back to 247 B.C.   Keith however disagrees with this estimate of the

date of Abhidhamma Pitaka.[1]   He thinks that the texts are quite late, and

probably a late addition to the other two Pitikas which definitely are of

older origin.   We tend to agree with Keith when he observes:

> that the Abhidhamma has no claim to the antiquity asserted
> for it.   This is supported by the undeniable fact that,
> while the Sutta and Vinaya Pitakas have parallels in other
> schools, based on a common tradition, the Abhidhamma of
> the Sarvastivadins, of which we now have information, ut-
> terly disagrees with the Pali Abhidhamma.[2]

There is more than one reason to consider Pali Abhidhammas to be

later than the Sanskrit Abhidharma texts.   First, the earliest archeological

evidence that we have about the existence of an Abhidharma text as the third

Pitaka comes from Kaṇsika inscriptions.   It is in an inscription belonging

to the period of Kusana king Kanishka, we come across the term Tripitaka.

But there is no conclusive evidence that the Tripitaka referred to here

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[1]Keith, op. cit., p. 23.

[2]Ibid.

applies to the Pali Canon. On the other hand, we are certain that the Abhidharma texts of Sanskrit tradition belonging to the Sarvāstivādins or the Vaibhāṣikas existed at the time of Kauṣika Council. It is, therefore, conceivable that the term under reference related to Sanskrit Abhidarma.[1] The only available evidence about the existence of Pāli Abhidamma only points to the vogue of the study of the Abhidhamma Pitaka in Sri Lanka during the third century A.D.[2] It is also fairly certain that Abhidhamma Pitaka came to be considered authoritative about 5th century A.D. when Buddhaghosa wrote the Atthasalini, a commentary on the first book of Abhidhamma Pitaka, the Dhammasaṅgani, and also the Katthāvatthuppakrna-Atthakathā, a commentary on the Katthavatu. Beyond this, nothing certain can be said about the Pāli Abhidhamma texts.

It is equally important to note that within the Pāli tradition, the relationship between the Milindapañha and the Abhidhamma texts[3] also point to the possibility of the latter being later in chronological order. It has been suggested by some scholars that Milindpanha was originally written in Sanskrit or Prākrit dialect and was later rendered into Pāli. Even if we deny this possibility there is little doubt about its

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[1] Keith, op. cit., p. 23.

[2] Hardy, Eastern Monachism, p. 156, vide Ibid., p. 24.

[3] Milinda's Questions (Vol. I & II), (tr.) Horner, M.A., London: Luzac & Company Ltd., 1964.

northern origin and its possible affinity with the northern Sarvāstivāda tradition. One can take Keith's suggestion about the chronological order of Milindapañha and Abhidhamma texts quite seriously. His contention that the reference in Milindpañaha to Abhidhamma Pitaka can be discerned only in the passages and sections which are definitely later interpolations or addition[1] is confirmed by Winternitz's excellent analysis of the form and style of this text.[2] T. W. Rhys Davids' contention that at the time of Milindapañha, which can easily be dated between 100 to 200 B.C., all the three Pāli Pitakas were existent does not stand the text of historical research.

Conze has tried to date the texts of the Sarvāstivāda and the Therāvāda in terms of the traditional account of the separation of the school.[3] According to the Buddhist tradition both the schools separated during Asoka's reign. Conze maintains that the passages in which the texts of Theravādins and Sarvāstivādins agree almost word by word, we can assume that they were composed at a time preceding the separation of the two schools, which took place during Asoka's rule, i.e. about 250 B.C. Applying this criterion, it may be discerned that both Pāli and Sanskrit versions

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[1] Keith, op. cit., p. 23.

[2] Winternitz, A History of Indian Literature, Vol. II, Calcutta: Calcutta University, 19 .

[3] Conze, Edward, Buddhist Thought in India, op. cit., pp. 31-32.

of _Sūtra_ and _Nikāya_ literature antedate the separation of the school. Con-
tinuing influence of the common tradition on the two schools is quite pos-
sible during the subsequent one hundred years. It is during this period
that both the Sanskrit _Abhidharma_ literature and the Pāli _Milindapanaha_
may have been composed. The discongruity between the two _Abhidharma_ liter-
ature must have emerged with the passage of time. Employing Conze's cri-
terion, one can see not only the post-Asokan origin of Pāli _Abhidhamma_ li-
terature, but also discern the fact that a time lag existed between it and
the time of the separation of the two schools. If the Pāli _Abhidharma_ texts
were composed immediately after the separation of the two schools we would
expect some similarity between _Abhidharma_ texts of the two traditions. But
this is not the case.[1] On the other hand, as it has been mentioned earlier,
there is close affinity between the Pāli and Sanskrit _Sūtra_ and _Vinaya_
literature. No such affinity, however, exists in the case of _Abhidharma_
literature.

Takakusu, on the basis of a comparative analysis of the two sets of
Abhidharma texts, came to the conclusion that there is no real connection
between the two.[2] Nyanatiloka, pursuing the lead provided by Takakusu, con-
cluded that the Sarvāstivādin and Theravādin _Abhidharma_ texts have considerable
dissimilarity, a significant exception being the _Dharmaskandha_, which seems

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[1] Supra, pp. 143-144.

[2] Takakusu, _op_. _cit_.

to have closer affinity with the Pāli <u>Vibhaṅga</u>.[1] N. Dutt too arrived at similar conclusions and suggested that the two schools worked out their <u>Abhidharma</u> texts independently.[2] This contention of Dutt finds support in McGovern's statement that "there is no connection between two sets of works, that the Sarvāstivādin writing were composed by persons (who), it is scarcely possible to conceive, could have seen the Pāli works....."[3]

It is equally important to note that we rarely come across any early Sarvāstivādin work which shows any acquaintance with the Pāli works or takes a stand against Therāvādins.[4] On the other hand, we do have evidences within Pāli <u>Abhidharma</u>, specially Katthāvatu, where Sarvāstivādins are vehemently attacked.[5] All this seems to corroborate our contention that Pāli <u>Abhidhammas</u> are later in origin. However, the present author will like to qualify this by adding that a more thorough comparative analysis of the content and the structure of the two sets of Abhidharmas should be undertaken before the two Abhidharmas can be placed in their proper mutual historical relationship. It is our belief that a more

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[1] Nyanatiloka, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., pp. 1-2.

[2] Dutt, N., <u>Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayāna</u>, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., pp. 5-6.

[3] McGovern, W., <u>A Manual of Buddhist Philosophy</u>, p. 17.

[4] <u>Ibid</u>.

[5] See <u>Kathāvatavatthuppakarna-Atthakathā</u>, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., pp. 52-60.

comprehensive comparative account of the two Abhidharma traditions with special reference to the specific issues that concern them will greatly enrich our understanding of the historical and doctrinal developments of the two traditions on the Indian subcontinent. Till now, no such enter-prise, at the scale demanded by the nature and scope of the study, has been undertaken and we anxiously await the results of any such study that might be under progress.[1]

Abhidharma Philosophical Literature and Their Place Within the Tradition

The Abhidharmakośa[2] of Vasubandhu is the most important text where the basic doctrinal position of Sarvāstivāda is clearly brought out. This is basically a digest of the seven primary Abhidharma texts mentioned ear-lier. At the time of the composition of the text, the Vaibhāṣika or the

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[1]There have been some attempts at a comparative analysis of Thera-vādin and Sarvāstivādin Abhidharmika thought. See Philosophy and Psy-chology in the Abhidharma, Guenther, H. V. / Lucknow: Buddha Vihara, 1957, and A Comparative Study of the Abhidharmakośa with Pali Abhidhammapitaka, Choudhary Sukomol, Calcutta University (Ph.D. thesis in progress). Both these studies have concerned themselves primarily with comparing certain themes as expounded in the Abhidharmakosa of Vasubandhu, on the one hand, and Atthasalini and Kathavatthu on the other. No intensive comparative work on the primary Abhidharmika texts seems to have been undertaken, and the Buddhist scholarship has not gone beyond Takakusu in this matter.

[2]The Sanskrit original of this text was discovered by Rahul Sankr-tyayana in a Monastary in Tibet. He brought photo copies of the text which was later published by K. P. Jayswal Research Institute, Patna. All the references in the present work are to Abhidharmkosam, (ed.), Sastri, Swami Dwarikadas, Varanasi: Baudha Bharati, Vol. I: 1970, Vol. II: 1971, Vol. III: 1972, Vol. IV: 1974.

Sarvāstivādins seem to have a pre-eminent place within Buddhist tradition. In the Koṡa itself Vasubandhu claims it to represent the views of the Kashmir Vaibhāṣika.[1] According to Yaṡomitra the text is primarily based on the earlier works of Sarvāstivāda, the Jñānaprasthāna, etc., which provided the scriptural basis for its authenticity as a Vaibhāṣika text.[2] The Koṡa is primarily expository, and Vasubandhu never takes a partisan stand vis a vis the Vaibhāṣika position enunciated there. But Vasubandhu seems to have been influenced by the Sautrāntika school and in his Bhāṣya on the Koṡa he occasionally takes his stand against the Vaibhāṣikas. Sarvāstivādins of the period expressed their unhappiness with Vasubandhu's Bhāṣya and offered rebuttals to Vasubandhu on certain points of controversy between Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrantikas.[3]

For long, the original Sanskrit version of the text was supposed to have been lost to the Sanskrit tradition. However, the text was recently discovered by Rahul Sankrityāyana in Tibet. The text contains 600 Kārikās and has eight chapters or sections on: 1. Dhātus; 2. Indriyas; 3. Lokas; 4. Karmas; 5. Sanuṡayas; 6. Āryapudgalas; 7. Jñānas; 8. Samādhis, and a

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[1]Kāṡmiravaibhāṣikanitīsiddhaḥ prāyo mayāyaṁ kathito bhidharmaḥ. Ibid., 8.40.

[2]Yo' bhidharmo jñānaprasthānādiretasya madiyasya ṡāstrasyāṡrayabhūtaḥ. Tato hyarsadabhidharmadetanmadiyam sastram nirakrstam. Yaṡomitra's Sphutārthā, (ed.) Law, N. N., op. cit., p. 11.

[3]See infra, pp. 148-149.

refutation of ātmvāda. Two Chinese translations of the text are available, one by Hiuen Tsang and the other by Paramartha.

Vasubandhu's date has been a subject of great controversy. Takakusu on the basis of Chinese evidence, placed him during 420-500 A.D.[1] But the suggestion has been challenged from many quarters. Frauwallener has suggested that there were two Vasubandhus - first the Stahvira Vasubandhu, the younger brother of Asanga, the Yogacarin, who belonged to 320-380 A.D.; and the second, Ācarya Vasubandhu, who is supposed to have belonged to 400-480 A.D. According to Frauwallener, the first Vasubandhu was originally a Hinyānist Sarvāstivādin who later became converted to Mahāyāna under the influence of his brother Asanga. The second Vasubandhu, according to Frauwallener, was Sautrāntika, and is the author of the Abhidharmakośa.[2] However, the suggestion of Frauwallener, though quite ingenious, does not seem to carry much weight. His assertion that Vasubandhu, the author of Abhidharmakośa, belonged to 400-480 A.D. is not corroborated by the strong evidence from Indian sources. Basing his observation on Indian sources Peri has convincingly demonstrated that Vasubandhu must have belonged to early

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[1]Takakusu, "A Study of Paramartha's Life of Vasubandhu and the Date of Vasubandhu", Journal of Asiatic Society, London, 1905, pp. 33-53.

[2]Frauwallener, E., On the Date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu, op. cit.

fourth century.[1]

In this connection, we will like to bring one important evidence from the Indian tradition which seems to have escaped the notice of many Buddhologists. The evidence comes from Bāṇa Bhatta's Harścaritra belonging to the 7th century. Here we have reference to the fact that Dignaṅga was propogating and defending Vasubandhu's Kosa in various śastrārthas (debates).[2] This shows that Bana Bhatta in 7th century was aware of the traditional legend about Vasubandhu and Dignāṅga. This confirms the traditional Indian belief that Vasubandhu was a predecessor of Dignāṅga. If we accept this evidence then Vasubandhu, the author of the Kośa, could not have belonged to 5th century, as Frauwallener suggests. We tend to agree with Prof. Nakamura's suggestion that Dignāṅga's date should be 400-480 A.D.[3] Vasubandhu, being an older contemporary of Dignāṅga could not have belonged to fifth century, as suggested by Frauwallener.

The whole confusion about the identity and the date of Vasubandhu seems to arise from varying doctrinal positions taken by this philosopher in different works. We can discern three distinct phases in the development

[1]Peri, N., "A propos de la date de Vasubandhu", Bulletin de l'Ecole Francaise d'Extreme - Orient, Paris, 11, 1911, pp. 339-390.

[2]Samarabhārasambhāvanābhiṣekamiva cakār diṅnāgakumbhakūtavikatasya bāhuśikharakosasya vāmaḥ pānipallavaḥ. Harsacaritra, quoted by Narendra Deva, Abhidharma Kosa (Hindi), Allahabada: Hindustam Academy, 1958, p. 10.

[3]Nakamura, Hijiona, vide Bibliography of Indian Philosophies, (ed.) Potter, Karl H., Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970, p. 51.

of Vasubandhu's own thought. In the first phase he subscribed to Sarvāstivāda-Sautrāntika thought; the Abhidharmakośa belongs to this period. Second phase is a transitional phase when, still Sautrāntika, he displays Yogācāra leanings. His Karmasiddhi prakarna belongs to this transitional period in his intellectual history. And to the final phase belongs the Vimśatikā and the Trimśika, where the Mahāyāna influence is present in its full-blown form. Considering his close affiliation with his Yogācārin brother Asaṅga, this gradual movement towards Mahāyāna does not seem to be surprising. It is quite probable that he was an open-minded thinker and that the different works relate to different stages in the intellectual history of this great mind.

The Abhidharma Nyāyānusāra[1] of Saṃghabhadra is another important work where the basic tenents of Sarvāstivāda has been enunciated. Saṃghbhadra was a contemporary of Vasabandhu who disagreed with him on some important points pertaining to his interpretation of the Sarvāstivāda. He noted Vasubandhu's Sautrāntika leanings and attempted to offer a corrective to Vasubandhu wherever he felt that Vasubandhu had contravened the spirit of Vibhāṣā. His Abhidharma Nyāyānusara, also called Nyāyānusarsāstra, is purported to be a critique of Vasubandhu's interpretation of Sarvāstivāda, and, for this very reason, within Buddhist tradition, it was also called the

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[1]This work is not available in Sanskrit. All the citations are from fragmentary translations in Schayer, Stanislaw, Contributions to the Problem of Time In Indian Philosophy, Cracovie, 1938. We acknowledge our great indebtedness to this work for making available the relevant materials.

thunderbolt for the Kośa (Kośakarakā).[1] He agreed with Vasubandhu's formulation of Sarvāstivāda in the Abhidharmakośa karika, but differed with Vasubandhu's Bhāsya on it, where, according to Sāmghabhadra, Vasubandhu took partisan stand in the Sarvāstivāda-Sautrāntika debate on issues of fundamental import. The Chinese tradition informs us that Samghbhadra intended to discuss his work with Vasubandhu but was prevented by Samghabhadra's sudden demise.[2] Vasubandhu, on learning about Samghabhadra's work, in recognition of its great merit and non-partisan orientation, called it the treatise in accordance with logical, canons (Nyāyānusāraśastra). The text contains references to many old schools and works of early Buddhism and is an useful sourcebook for the study of doctrinal development of early Buddhism.

The Sphutārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā[3] by Yaśomitra is another important commentary on Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa. Yaśomitra belonged to the 9th century A.D. His commentary is the only commentorial literature available to us in original Sanskrit. This commentary mentions other two commentaries by Gunamati and Vasumitra which preceded it. Neither of the

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[1]See Upadhyaya, Baldeo, Bauddha Darsana, Varanasi, 1954, p. 178.

[2]Vide Abhidharmkośa (ed.) Narendra Deva, Allahabada: Hindustani Academi, 1958, p. 8.

[3]There are different editions of this text. All the references in this wrok are from Sphutārthā & Abhidharmakosa Vyākhyā of Yaśomitra, (ed.) Law, N. N., London: Luzac & Co., Vol. I, 1949; Calcutta: Calcutta Oriental Book Agency, Vol. II, 1957; and (ed.) Shastri, D., Abhidharmakosam, Vol. III, Varanasi: Baudha Bharata, 1972.

two is available to us now.[1] This work is not available in Chinese, though a Tibetan translation by Depal-brtsegs is extant. Being the only Sanskrit commentary on Abhidharmakosa available to us, the importance of this text for Abhidharmic studies cannot be gainsaid.

In the present work we have used Abhidharmik Buddhism to connote the school of Buddhist thought whose ideas were systematically expounded in the Abhidharmakosa of Vasubandhu. The school of Buddhism under investigation has generally been described as Sarvastivada or Vaibhasika. An examination of certain philosophical postulates of this school constitutes the subject matter of this work. However, we define it as Abhidharmika Buddhism precisely to distinguish it from its diffusion discernible in other schools of Buddhism. The appelation Abhidharmika Buddhism is indicative of the fact in our treatment of the problem of time we depend on the Vasubandhu's Abhidharma in connection with heavy dependence of the present work on Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosa and the commentaries thereupon as distinguished from the earlier Sarvastivada literature which is lost to the Sanskrit tradition and are mainly preserved only in Chinese translations. It is important to note that Vasubandhu himself mentions the views of Vaibhasika and Sarvastivadin's as that of Abhidharmika's. It is for the

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[1] gunamati vasumitradyaivyarkhyakaraih padartha-vivrtirya sukrta sabhimata me likhita ca tathayamartha iti. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 1.

first time in <u>Abhidharmakosa</u> that we find a systematic, concise and co-herent exposition of Sarvāstivāda or Vaibhāṣika. Of course, <u>Abhidharm-kosa</u> itself is supposed to be based on the primary <u>Abhidharma</u> texts, which as we noted earlier, are lost to the Sanskrit tradition.

Place of Vasubandhu, the author of <u>Abhidharmakosa</u>, within Buddhist tradition is a controversial issue. However, it is now widely recognized on account of the valuable researches of Poussin, Stcherbatsky, Takakushu and Schayer that the <u>Abhidharmakosa</u> of Vasubandhu offers a reliable index to the philosophical postulates of the Sarvāstivāda. In calling Sarvās-tivāda Ābhidharmika Buddhism we are in the good company of Buddhist scholars like Murti,[1] Conze,[2] and Keith.[3] In the present work we have assumed the validity of the historical researches in Buddhist study on this specific issue.

Our aritculation of Sarvāstivāda or Ābhidharmika Buddhism zeroes upon the account of the school as presented in Vasubandhu's <u>Abhidharmakosa</u>, his <u>Bhāsya</u> on it, Saṁghabhadra's commentary on Vasubandhu's <u>Abhidharmakosa</u> as well as Yasomitra's <u>Sphutārthā</u> on <u>Abhidharmakosa</u>. In addition, we have

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[1] The first attempt to synthesise the teachings of Buddha was the Abhidharmika system...Internal evidence of the Mahayana systems themselves and historical evidence unmistakably point to the Sarvastivada as the matrix from which the Buddhist systems developed as departures and devia-tions. Murti, T. R. V., <u>The Central Philosophy of Buddhism</u>, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1970, p. 56.

[2] Conze, Edward, <u>Buddhist Thought in India, op. cit.</u>, pp. 120, 130 and 131.

[2] Keith, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 154-155 and 165-166.

also stepped out of line of self-restriction and have referred to those Buddhist texts which are not basically Abhidharmika in orientation. The justification for this departure is that in those texts a discussion of Sarvāstivāda position, as articulated in Abhidharmakosa, provides the context of debate with Kamalsila's Panjika on it and the Mādhyamika-karika of Nāgārjuna along with Chandrakirti's Vrtti on it fall in this category.

CHAPTER VII

ABHIDHARMA ONTOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM OF TEMPORALITY

The Ontology of Non-being (Anattā)

Anattā is the Alpha and Omega of Abhidhhamika Buddhism. Non-substantiality of being, and the essential impermanence and imperson-ality of the empirical ego constitute the cornerstone of Abhidharmika ontology. The radicality of this ontological perspective built upon what is empirical and is open to reflective verification consists of a concern with the dynamics of change. The phenomenal world, the world that we dwell in and deal with, the world which is the constant reference point for all our thought, actions and feeling is constantly changing.. It ·is not only the world around us, but also the "I", the ego which belongs to the world is subject to incessant change. The ontology of non-being (anattā) is not a mere rejection of the existence of self,[1] as it has been understood by many students of Buddhism; it implies an all embracing world perspective which tends to reject the substantiality of being in any form, material or immaterial. Thematically, it is an extension of the nation of impermanance or anicca which is seen not as a mark (laksana) of being but the very mode of being, an element of

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[1] See Bhattacharya, H.D., "Early Buddhism", in History of Philosophy Eastern and Western (ed.) Radhakrishnan, S., Vol. I, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1967, pp. 161-163; Radhakrishnan, S., Indian Philosophy, Vol. 2, New York: The Macmillan Company, Thomas, E.J., op. cit., pp. 92-106; Keith, op. cit., p. 64.

its very structure.[1]

The significance for early Buddhism of the Anattā doctrine, in its twin aspects of non-substantiality and impermanence, can not be overemphasised. In its specific formulation the Anattā as the assertion of non-egoity remained the central concern of Ābhidharmika Buddhism.[2] Adhidharmikas have constantly retained the idea of Anatta as enunciated in the other two piṭakas recording basic insights of Buddha into the nature of phenomenal existence.

In the Saṁyukta Nikāya we have the words of Buddha to the effect that that which is embodied is not the self: "rupa is not the self......whatever form there is—past, future or present, inner or outer gross or subtle, low or exalted, near or far away—all that form is not mine, I am not this, this is not my self."[3]

The same assertion is made with regard to four other aggregates (skandhas) considered constituting the essential core of human existence; the feeling (vedāṇā), perceptions (samjñā), impulses or dispositions (saṁskāra), and, intellect or consciousness (vijñāna). The analysis that is made is to the effect that none of these can be the self; that all these are in reality, not merely in appearance,

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[1]See Murti, T.R.V., op. cit., pp. 69-76.

[2]Conze, op. cit, p. 39 "In its core the mark of not-self is. a simple corrolary of the impermanence of everything. There can be no lasting individuality because Skandhas have neither permanence or unity."

[3]Anattā-lakkhana - Sūtta, The Saṁyukta Nikāya 23.59.

Anattā i.e. devoid of self-hood or ego-hood.[1] The same insight under-
lies the systematic analysis of the idea of satkāyadrsti, the false
view of individuality. The Satkāyadrsti or the false view of indivi-
duality consists in considering the five-skandhas as the self just as
one tends to identify the flame of a lamp with the lamp. Satkāyadrsti
consist in viewing self as what owns or possesses the five skandha's,
just as one may say that the tree has (possesses) its shadow. The
five skandhas may be looked upon as being or residing in the self just
as the fragrance resides in the flower. Or alternately the self may
be seen as being in the skandhas just as we may speak of a gem in
the casket. All these ways of apprehanding the self, according to
the anattā doctrine, are essentially erroneous in as much as they
tend to identify self with the five skandhas, one way or the another.[2]

While these insights into anatta constitute the basic ontological
perspective present in the other two pitakas, Adhidharma Pitaka makes
special effort to work out the implications of the anattā doctrine in
terms of their understanding of dharmas. The non-substantiality and
the impermanence of the self, is only considered an instance of the
lack of substance and permanence characterising all phenomena. This
is the original sense of the word. Thus no phenomenon possesses any
substantiality or permanence. Phenomena as such are reduced to a mere

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., 3.66; 4.34.

conglomeration of independently existing distinct moments of exis-
tence called 'dharmas'. The dharmas are not some transcendent
reality behind or beyond the appearance of phenomena; rather they
are the only mode of reality. A dharma is 'a truly real event'[1] con-
stituting the irreducible, unique datum of the phenomenal world
presented to the reflexive consciousness in the moment of critical
awareness. Consciousness itself when objectified, i.e., when it
turns to itself in the moment of critical reflexion, it finds it-
self as nothing but a conglemoration of momentarily existing dis-
tinct dharmas without any substantial continuity. Thus the Ābhid-
harmika Buddhism may be described as:

> a radical pluralism erected on the denial of substance
> the acceptance of discrete momentary entities. Dharma
> is the concrete conception in this, as it is in the
> other systems of Buddhism. Change, becoming, is the
> central problem here.....The characteristic standpoint
> of the Abhidharmika system can be expounded as a polemic
> against substance, the permanent and the universal con-
> ceived as real in the systems of the ātma tradition.
> The real (dharma) is momentary; it is simple, unitary;
> it is particular, unique.[2]

The Abhidharmika conception of dharmas as the unique, ultimate and
irreducible limit point of existence needs to be distinguished from
normal understanding of reality in terms of idealism or realism.

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[1]We use this interpretation of dharma after Conze whose
defence of it is extremely convincing. See Conze, op. cit., pp.
92-106. For other interpretations of dharma see Stcherbatsky,
the Central Conception of Buddhism, Calcutta: S. Gupta, 1961.

[2]Murti, T.R.V., op. cit., p. 69.

Realism takes commonsense things at their face value and is prepared

to grant it a status independent of cognizing consciousness. Idealism,

on the other hand, ultimately reduces the elements of existence to a

mere ideal construction or manifestation of the cognizing conscious-

ness.[1] Dharma theory, however, transcends the inherent metaphysical

constructions incident to a popular understanding of reality by

viewing the dharmas as 'real events' perceived by the reflexive con-

sciousness. The dharmas are perceived by the reflexive consciousness

as constituting the reality of the common sense-world and also of

itself; the specific combinations of these dharmas go into the making

of the empirical consciousness or give rise to the variations of em-

pirical consciousness. Thus, dharmas are not real in the sense that

they are the objects confronting the subject nor are they ideal in

the sense that they are constituted of or produced by the conscious-

ness. Rather, they are the ultimate limit-points of existence which

go into making of the phenomenal world that the subject encounters

and to which it (the subject) belongs. Thus in Abhidharmika Buddhism:

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[1]The epistemological distinction of Realism-Idealism is not
applicable with respect to our understanding of the philosophical
schools under investigation. In sharp reaction to the ontologically
oriented speculations of the Upanisads, Buddhism, as it is well known,
inaugurates the critical phase of knowledge orientation, thus setting
the stage for the later pramanavada. The generality of Buddhist schools,
though biased in favour of an idealistic theory of knowledge, include
also a pronouncedly "realistic" prediliction for understanding reality
without reference to its mind-dependedness, as may be seen, for example,
in the case of Sarvastivada which is under discussion in this chapter.

> the common sense date are thus retraced to, transformed
> into or replaced by concepts which are both more intel-
> ligible and fundamental. The world therefore is per-
> ceived as composed of an unceasing flow of simple ulti-
> mates, called dharmas, which can be defined as (1) simple,
> (2) momentary, (3) impersonal, (4) mutually conditioned
> events.[1]

Given this understanding of the phenomenal reality and its constitution,

our enquiry must next direct itself to the Abhidharmika understanding of

the nature and constitution of consciousness. What are those dharmas ,

conglomeration of which, tend to give rise to a conception of Self or Per-

son as embodiment of empiric consciousness? If empiric consciousness or

person is nothing more than a conglomeration, i.e. only a name for what

are momentary and exist only for a limited duration, then how are we to

account for the phenomenal continuity in the world?

The Structure of Empiric Consciousness

Abhidharmikas propose a threefold classification of dharmas which

together go to constitute the phenomenon of empiric-consciousness.[2]

A. **Five Skandhas:** (1) Form, rūpa, is the material essence of the pheno-
   mena; (2) Feelings (Vedanā) can be pleasant, unpleasant or neutral;
   (3) Perceptions (Samjñā) are six corresponding to the six sense organs;
   (4) Despositions or Impulses (Samskāra) are all tendencies, impulses,
   volitions, strivings, emotions, etc.; (5) Consciousness (Vijñāna) de-
   termines and superintentends the other mental skandhas.

B. **The Twelve Sense-Fields (Āyatanas):** These are: eye; sight-objects;
   ear; sounds; nose; smell; tongue; taste; body; touchables; mind; mind-
   objects. Āyatana is used in the sense of āya-dvāra, which literally
   means the 'door of coming into' or 'the door of arrival'. It can also
   mean gaining as opposed to vyaya (loosing).

C. **The Eighteen Dhātus:** These are the six sense-organs, the six sense ob-
   jects, and the corresponding six sense consciousness.

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[1]Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, op. cit., p. 97.

[2]The following presentation is primarily based on Conze. For de-
tailed analysis of the dharma doctrine of Sarvāstivādins see, Tscherbatsky,
T., Central Conception of Buddhism, Calcutta: S. Gupta, 1961.

Person as the empiric consciousness or the subject of the
world experience is constituted of five skandhas or constituents,
which "define the limits of the basis of grasping after self".[1]
Whatever the individual comes to comprehend as constituting self,
as the ultimate reference point of his world-experience, whatever
he looks at as belonging to or somehow concerning the self, all
the facts of experience of individuals and objects in relation to
individuals are ultimately traceable to five skandhas. Similarly
sense-field (āyatanas) is concerned with the origin of the mental
dharmas of 'thought and its concomitants'. The reflective con-
sciousness in its discriminative stance is able to see that
thought and its cocomitants are nothing but collocation or con-
junction of sense-organs and sense-objects. Thus, as Edward Conze
puts it: "The sense-field are the reason (kāraṇa) why mental events
originate or take place, and are their birthplace, as the Deccan is
the locality where cattle are born."[2] Further elaborating the role
of Āyatanas Conze writes:

> It is wrong for me to regard 'my' thoughts as free
> creations of 'my' self or 'consciousness'. Manifestly
> they are in bondage of organs and object, which must
> be in contact for any act of consciousness to arise,
> and both of which are alien to me, for I cannot claim
> to have made either my biological constitution, or the
> objects of my thought. Both are given and imposed upon
> me.[3]

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[1] Ibid, p. 107.

[2] Ibid, p. 108.

[3] Ibid.

While these observations of Conze regarding the role and place of Āyatanas in the Buddhist understanding of the constitution of the phenomenal world are quite perceptive and essentially correct, we tend to disagree with his further observation to the effect that "the subjective components have an overwhelming influence in shaping the appearance of an object, which, as a 'thing in itself', is quite inaccessible".[1] The Abhidharmika ontology does not resort to the notion of subjective factors shaping the world of phenomena. And, likewise, it does not accept the idea of a 'thing in itself' or 'noumena' which remains inaccessible to us. The Abhidharmika ontological framework steers clear of these approaches to the reality. Dharmas, which are real, are neither a product of or projection of our consciousness which has a free hand in the construction of reality, nor are they the 'things in themselves' of which the phenomenal world is a mere appearance. Rather, dharmas are the ultimate constituents that go into the making of the phenomenal reality and are disclosed to us as such only when we acquire a discriminative stance which sets out to see the reality in its 'functional' aspect rather than in substantive terms. Anattā is an attestation to the non-substantiality of the reality both as subject and object. Subject and object are essentially placed on the same ontological footing.

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[1] Ibid., p. 110.

This functional understanding of reality in terms of discrete momentary dharmas, without any substantive support raised some problems in certain areas of early Buddhism. In reaction to the theory of dharmas as proposed by Sarvāstivādins there arose the school of Vatsiputriyas who advocated the reality of Pudgala (person) over and against the reality of impersonal dharmas. Pudgalvādins, who may be described as personalist Buddhists, maintained that the Sarvastivadin explication of the empirical ego in terms of five skandhas etc. suffered from the inexorable difficulty of explaining the continuity on the phenomenal level.[1] If the self were a mere appearance and the phenomenal being a mere conglomeration of incessantly changing dharmas (skandhas, etc.)`, how are we to account for those aspects of phenomenal existence which implies a continuity through the fleeting moments. The fact of memory, of karmic action and consequent retribution, the idea of agency and the realm of inter-subjective world examplified in the friendly dispositions are some of the reasons proposed by Vatsiputriyas in support of their unequivocal

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[1]For detailed analysis of the Pudgalavāda, see Abhidharmakośam op. cit., Vol. IV, 1973, p. 1189 ff.

assertion of individuality, called Pudgala, which according to Satkari Mukherjee "has the metaphysical virtue of explaining the continuity of the empirical ego to the avoidance of the fallacy of eternal self posited by the heretical thinkers."[1]

Significantly, for the Pudgalavādins, Pudgala as the psycho-physical complex which maintains its identity through the changing moments of empirical existence did not imply positing a self over and against the five skandhas. They seem to be eager to maintain their allegiance to the Anatta doctrine and as such tried to define the relationship of Pudgala to skandhas in a way that would exclude an 'erroneous belief in a self'. Pudgala is neither identical with nor different from the five skandhas.[2] And yet the "Pudgala can be conceived in correlation with the skandhas which have been appropriated at any given time inwardly".[3] According to Pudgalavādins just as fire is always found in correlation with the fuel it burns and on which it thrives, and is never apart from it, by itself, nevertheless, it is real, so does pudgala "manifests itself through the psycho-physical elements, and therefore co-exists with them, not as a separate thing, but as a kind of 'structural unity'."[4]

The position of Pudgalavādins has received favourable treatment

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[1] Mukerjee, Satkari, The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux, Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1935, p. 186.

[2] Tattva Samgraha, verses 343-343.

[3] Pratyutpanna-adhyātmika upatta-skandhān upādāya pudgalah prajñapyate. Abhidharma Kośa, 9.233. Vide Conze, Edward, op. cit.

[4] Conze, Edward, Buddhist Thought in India, op. cit., p. 128.

at the hands of some keen students of Buddhism, such as Edward Conze
and A.B. Keith. Not only have they considered the pudgalvada as consist-
ing of great philosophical significance, but have also maintained
that the notion of Pudgala is in strict accord with the basic formula-
tions of Buddhism. Keith commends the theory of Pudgala in following
words:

> Its merits, however, are obvious, it mediates in the
> best Buddhist manner, between phenomena with a basis
> and the permanent self of the Brahmanic tradition.
> It accords also, though the point seems not to have
> been noted, with the position asserted by Sariputta
> in his discussions with Sati for there we find that
> Tathagata is declared neither to be the five aggre-
> gates nor to be different from them. In truth the
> doctrine of the purely phenomenal self was one which
> presented interminable difficulties.[1]

Edward Conze too finds that the theory of Pudgala was a necessary
antidote to the damage caused by the Abhidarmika understanding of
self as a mere conglomeration of isolated momentary events or exis-
tences called dharmas. Conze maintains that Pudgalvādins corrected the
errors of Abhidharmist in at least two significant ways:[2]

1. It was clearly a mistake of lesser minds to deny
   categorically that the self exists, As the person-
   alists pointed out, it had been said that to say
   that the self does not exist, in truth and reality
   (satyatah sthititah), is a wrong view. The Buddha,
   as a matter of fact, in a famous dialogue with
   Vatsogotra had refused to commit himself on the
   question of the existence of the self.

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[1]Keith op. cit., pp. 83-84.

[2]Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, op. cit., p. 25.

2. In another respect also the one-sided philosophiz-
   ing of the Abhidharmist was bound to produce its
   own opposite....The Abhidharmists by insisting that
   only isolated momentary events are real, held on to
   processes to the exclusion of all substance, and
   gloried in denying the relative permanence of objects
   as well as their relative unity.[1]

Whether Ābhidharmikas or Pudgalavādins remained true to Buddha's teach-
ing is a purely historical question and lies beyond the scope of this
investigation. However, the charge of onesidedness of the theory of
Ābhidharmikas and its inadequacy in explaining the facts of phenomenal
existence is one that needs careful consideration. Whether the postula-
tion of Pudgala is a necessary pre-requisite for explaining the elements
of continuity in the realm of phenomenal existence and whether this
postulation of Pudgala is compatible with the Anattā doctrine as indeed
the Pudgalvadins claim, are the questions that require our immediate
attention.

The irreconcilibility of Anattā doctrine with the postulate of
Pudgala has been amply demonstrated by Vasubandhu.[2] Of course Vasubandhu's
repudiation of Pudgala as proposed by Vātsīputrīyas is basically from
Sautrāntika position. It is in Sautrāntika that the notion of Ego as
series of durationless momentary existences crystalizes in its clearest
and maturest form. The idea is not consistently worked out in Sarvāstivāda

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Abhidharmkosam, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 1189 ff.

or Theravāda. But Sautrāntikas, while in general dissociating them-
selves from Ābhidharmikas, did accept Anattā or non-substantiality of
the Ego as the cornerstone of Buddhist thought and took a stand against
the Vātsīputrīyas notion of person. In a nutshell the argument against
Pudgala takes the following form.

> "...any self (pudgala) which really exists must be
> something over and above the impermanent factors of
> empiric individuality. But such a self, which must
> be uncaused, eternal, and without change, would be
> without activity or practical efficiency
> (arthakriyākāritra) which is the essential charac-
> teristic of reality...there in the consciousness
> nothing more than the fact of a series of thought
> moments which are in causal relation...But there is
> continuity in the individual though not a self.[1]..

The urge to account for continuity in the phenomenal existence, despite
a clear rejection of an abiding self as a substance or a structural
unity as person is constantly present in the post-Sarvastivada Buddhist
literature. Thus the later Theravādins proposed a theory of a 'life-
continuum' (bhāvānga) which is subconscious and subliminal.[2] The con-
tinuity is accounted for by taking recourse to the notion of a sub-
conscious region where the mind is unceasingly functioning as the source
of all continuities. Mahāsanghikas too incorporated this idea in their
theory of a basic (Mūla) consciousness. Relegating the function of con-
tinuity to the realm of this basic consciousness they maintained that

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[1]Keith, op. cit., p. 175.

[2]See Saratchandra, E.R., "Bhavange and the Buddhist psychology
of Perception," University of Ceylon Review, I, 1943, pp. 94-102;
also by the same author, The Buddhist Psychology of Perception, Ceylon,
1958.

karma matures in the subconscious mind where thought has a definite object.[1] Mahisasika even proposed a distinction between three kinds of skandhas: skandhas which are instantaneous, skandhas which has a span of one life, and skandhas enduring until the Sansāra i.e. realiza- tion of Nirvāna.[2] Noticing these tendencies in Abhidharmika Buddhism. Conze observes:

> Concepts like these were designed to escape from the
> straight jacket of the Abhidharma, and try to establish
> the equivalent not only of an empirical but also of
> true self...All these theoretical constructions are
> attempts to combine the doctrine of 'not-self' with
> the almost instinctive belief in a 'self' empirical
> or true.[3]

One must pause here and consider if Conze is right in maintaining that these notions run counter to the Abhidharmika anattā doctrine. Are not these tendencies conspicuous in the Abhidharmika formulations as indeed in other cannonical literature? It seems to us that while Conze is right in noting that these tendencies are efforts to bring Atma doctrine from the backdoor, he is wrong in maintaining that they run counter to the basic tenets of Abhidharmikas. Our contention is that the tendencies are conspicuously present in the Abhidharmikas too.

The Abhidharmika Buddhism, far from being a simple and naive

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[1] See Silburn, L., Instant et Course, Paris, 1955, pp. 237-243.

[2] Conze. op. cit., p. 133.

[3] Conze, Ibid., p. 133.

process philosophy, is dialectical in its approach to reality. If it
is not strictly a vindication of á theory of reality as pure flux, it
is not also correct to say that it affirms the reality of a true abid-
ing self. True, elements of a self-theory are discernible in the
Ābhidharmika Buddhism, possibly under the impact of the Sāmkhyan model
or view. What, however, should not be overlooked is the prominent place
given alongisde these elements to the pre-Abhidharmika denial of the
self in it. Both subject and object, as we already   noted, are placed
on the same ontological footing. In this respect the Abhidharmika for-
mulations must be differentiated from the Sāmkhya-yoga, where subject
and object are distinguished in terms of Kūtastha (unaffected by change)
and Parināmi (the principle of change and movement). We will return
to the problem of the relationship between Sāmkhya-yoga and Abhidharmika
Buddhism later. Suffice it to say at this point that the tension of the
permanent and the changing, of continuity and discontinuity, of being
and becoming is integral to the Ābhidharmika Buddhism.

We have seen that dharmas are ultimate, irreducible units of
existence, which can best be described as 'real events'. The term
'dharma' has been often rendered as elements of existence. Such
renderings smack of atomism which may be true of Nyāya-Vaiśesika and
other such realistic systems, but are alien to the basic ontological
perspective of Buddhism. There are good reasons for rendering 'dharma'
as 'real events'. While events can be instantaneous, elements cannot.
And this instantaneousness or momentariness is constitutive of the very
existence of dharmas. The occurence of a certain state of affairs or

of a certain objective situation constitutes an event. The character-
istic of event is that they have no duration. This point has already
been made in the context of dharmas.

The question is:does the 'coming into being' and the 'passing
away' of dharmas as real events imply that the existence of dharmas
is 'punctual'? Is the existence of dharmas punctual?   The existence
of dharmas are called punctual only if it were the case that the instants
(kṣana) of their 'coming into being' and 'passing away' are but mere
"positions" in a one-dimensional temporal continuum. If the instants
in question are individual units of time which stand out distinctly in
a time-sequence then charge of 'punctuality' of existence of dharma as
an actual event does not extend beyond the span of a single concrete
now. A dharma having come into being does not endure awaiting to be
dislodged by other dharma from being 'actual'. After having occurred
once, the said dharma as a real event does somehow belong to the world
series (samtāna) in which it has occured. But it can be detected ex-
posed only by taking the actual present as our point of departure, be-
cause they are limited to one instant of effective existence. The
essence of time is only partially revealed in the dharma's present mode
of being, i.e. only in the actuality, which distinguishes the present.

The 'actuality' that events of dharmas are suffused with, per-
meates all events,but more specifically whatever is 'now', and in this
respect what is actual for Abhidharmika transcends the autonomy of an
object. Though self-existence is a necessary condition for actuality,
it is not sufficient to make something present i.e. actual.

Thus, there are no events in the realm of Nirvāna and Ākāśa (the Asamskrta dharma) precisely because they are non-actual and time-less.

It may be noted that within Abhidharmic framework the actual is characterized by being directly active, or, expressed differently by action or being operational. The actual may be said to "exist" precisely on account of the fact that it is active i.e. efficient. And it is in terms of this efficiency or activity that it conditions the emergence of what is to follow into being. The ground for the occurence of a causal connection within the compass of a present must be looked for in this function of what is actual.[1]

But a dharma does not cease to be real or does not become un-real when it ceases to be actual by losing its operancy. The relega-tion of a dharma into the past mode of existence means that the dharma as a real event has ceased to be operative in its immediacy. In other words it is condemned to an 'absence' forever from every new 'present'. And no recollection, not even the most vivid and accurate, can succeed in extracting it from that absence and in making it present again. At the same time a past dharma, although it has ceased to be strictly actual, has not been completely annihilated. It does not break off with each new instant of time, but retains a special mode

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[1]Infra, pp. 197-198.

of being, extending into the continuation of the same process. Thus, according to Ābhidharmika thinkers it is actuality or being operative and not existence that distinguishes the present dharma from the past and the future ones...[1] Neither the past nor the future is an absolute void. That which is past is past by virtue of having been actual. But that dharma which is future has not yet been realized, i.e. lacks actuality.[2]

The transience as a mode of being thus may be seen to be contingent upon a _dharma_ becoming actual and displacing a _dharma_ which was just present, but is no longer present. Transience, above all consists in perpetual transformation of the actuality of something present into that enigmatic "no-longer-being-present-any-more". This perpetual transformation, in which consists the essence of temporality, is ontologically speaking, an imperfection (samskṛtatva) which is constitutive of the nature of _dharmas_. It must be kept in mind, that it is not an accidental feature of the _dharmas_, brought about by some extraneous considerations. The 'imperfection' relates to the impossibility of persisting in actuality without sliding into the past. This, to some degree, partially discloses the peculiar Ābhidharmika way of accounting for

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[1] _Ibid._

[2] _Ibid._

continuity and permanence in the phenomenal world. The logical and
semantical difficulties involved in expounding the Buddhist theory
of instantaneous reality can be illustrated by the following observa-
tions of Frauwallener that:

> the becoming and arising of dharmas is not a real
> arising and disappearing, but a wandering of always
> existent entities from one period of time into
> another, Entities which seem to have newly arisen,
> in fact wander from the future into the present and
> when they perish, they are transferred into the past
> period. In the personal continuity also events do
> not arise and perish, but the continuity is a stream
> which flows from the future into the past.[1]

Thus from Abhidharmikas point of view Persons or <u>Pudgala</u> as a specific
conglomeration of certain dharmas may undergo change, but the <u>fact</u> of
this conglomeration '<u>once-having-been</u>' and maintaining its '<u>once-having-</u>
<u>been</u>' <u>mode</u> of reality does not undergo complete annihilation. It
acquires a somewhat different mode of reality which may provisionally
be classified as, retrogressively, derivative mode of being. The pudgala,
the existential base of one's having-been conglomeration of psycho-
physical skandhas, being radically transcendent in relation to an
'actual' existent conglomeration of psycho-physical skandhas capable
of acting in the present, remains in the realm of being because it
conditioned and interalia caused the present reality. But the some-
thing past remains in existence only as—so to speak—a retrogressively
derivative being—namely as secondarily derivative, proceeding,

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[1]Frauwallener, E., <u>Die Philosophie des Buddhismus</u>, 1956, pp.
140-141, cf. Conze, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. 139.

"backwards" from a certain actuality subsequent to it. The present as actual and active is ultimately grounded in the past which has a being characterized by the mode of non-actuality.

We will have occassion to work out the implications of this position in detail in our discussion of Ābhidharmika notion of time and temporality. Suffice it to point out at this juncture that the problem of continuity and persistence is integral to Abhidharma ontology and any suggestion to the contrary stems from a lack of appreciation of the fuller import of Ābhidharmika notion of impermanence and from an underestimation of their concern with the problem of permanence and continuity in the phenomenal existence. A somewhat more detailed investigation of this aspect of Ābhidharmika thought and its realtionship to the Ābhidharmika understanding of time and temporality will be the subject matter of the following section.

CHAPTER VIII

ABHIDHARMA CONCEPTION OF TIME AND TEMPORALITY

The Category of Time and the Theory of Dharma as Temporal

It is in early Ābhidharmika literature of Sarvāstivāda that we find
the first attempt to understand temporality as a process. The Ābhidhar-
mikas of Sarvāstivāda tradition disregarded the question of the substan-
tive reality of time as a factor in temporal determination. The basic issue
for them was not whether Time exists as an independent reality which in con-
junction with other realities or events constitute temporal determinations.
Their primary concern was to account for the knowledge of things as tempo-
rally determined and that they could do by acknowledging the reality of dharmas
as past, present and future. Thus Mahāvibhāṣā on Jñānaprasthāna declared that
everything is real, the past (atīta) and the future (anāgata) are as much
real as the present (prattyutpanna).[1] The theory proposed here does not make
any distinction between things in themselves such as past and future matter,
and the representations one has of them. It is here that we find the realism

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[1]The reality of past, present and future has been accepted by some
Pāli traditions also. Such a view is clearly propounded by Nāgsena in
Millindapannaha where he rejects the alternative offered by King Milinda
who suggests that only present is real. This point may go in favour of
views expressed by some scholars that Millindapannaha is a northern text
(belonging to northern school of Buddhism). However, there is one impor-
tant difference between Sarvāstivāda and the position of Nāgsena. For the
Sarvāstivāda the past, present and future cannot be conceived in separa-
tion from the entities (dharmas). They are not empty slices of time. Nag-
sena, however, is prepared to accord them independent status.

of Sarvastivada present in its most undeniably form. It is not the reality

of past, present and future as three points of time that is posited by

Mahāvibhāsā; rather, it is the reality of things or dharmas as past, pre-

sent and future that is admitted here. Time is no factor in the determina-

tion of things or dharmas as past, present or future. Rather it is the

operation of the Sanskrtalaksnas of jati, sthiti and jarā that accounts

for a dharma being past, present or future. In early Abhidharmic litera-

ture we come across an alternative to Kālavādins, when Sarvāstivādins point

out that the temporal determinations of things are built into the very

structure of the becomingness of a being. Thus Mahāvibhāsā points out:

> If all the three saṁskrtalaksanas have not yet been active,
> the dharma is called future. If one of them has already
> finished its activity and thus are just active, then the
> dharma is called present. If they have already finished
> their activity, the dharma is called past.[1]

It is important to note that early Abhidharmic literature never con-

sidered the determination of dharma's temporal quality to be a function of

transcendental eternal Time which somehow contains things in three recep-

tacles of time and is responsible for temporal designations of past, present

and future. Thus Mahāvibhāsā clearly rejected the option which would seem

to suggest that

> the svabhāva of Time is nitya, but the svabhāva of the
> saṁskrtadharmas is anitya. The saṁskrtadharma wander
> across the times just as a fruit from one pot to another
> or as man from one house into another. This is also the

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[1] Mahāvibhāsā, 394a, cf. Schayer, op. cit., p. 20.

case with the sanskrtadharmas: going out of the future they enter into the present, and they go out of the present and enter into the past.[1]

'In this rejection of the receptum notion of Time is implicit the basic Buddhist denial of the substantiality and permanence, a model set by Mahāvibhāṣā which is consistently adhered to by Sarvāstivāda. All Sarvāstivādin statements about the reality of past, present and future must be interpreted in correspondence with this understanding of temporal determinations. It is true that in Abhidharmic literature we come across Sarvāstivādin statements which state that "dharmas wander across the three Times, that nirvāna lies beyond the three Times; that there exists a Future, a Past, etc..." But all these statements, as Schayer has already noted, are expressed in colloquial sense and must be interpreted as metaphorical statements, rather than literally. Thus in the statement "each dharma exists in the three Times as future, present and past" the term "three times" is "consequently only a synonymous denomination (adhivacana) for Sanskrtadharma."[2] Early Abhidharmic literature clearly rejected any distinction between a dharma and its temporal determination. Temporal determinations, instead of being a function of an eternal transcendent Time, are built into the very structure of the becomingness of a dharma. Accordingly, they argued that there is no distinction between the temporality of a dharma and its conditionedness (sanskrta). What is given as temporal

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[1]Mahāvibhāṣā, 393a, cf. Ibid., p. 15.

[2]Schayer, op. cit., p. 27.

flow is nothing but an incessant flow of conditioned dharmas, apart from which time does not have an independent reality. In other words, time consists of conditional dharmas and conditional dharmas are time, and that the time is that the growth of which consists of the manifestation of **samskrta** dharmas. The theory, then, considers time as a mere modality of the conditioned dharmas, apart from which it does not have any reality.

Given this understanding of time and temporality in early Abhidharmic thought one feels intrigued to discover in later Buddhist literature a tendency to describe Sarvāstivādins either as Kālavādin (upholder of the reality of time) or trākālyavādin (upholder of the reality of past, present and future). It is important to remember that for early Abhidharmikas or Sarvāstivādins, time can only be concieved in terms of the functionality of a dharma, apart from which they do not have any independent status. It is not surprising, then that, in their technical discussion of the temporal qualification or determination of dharma, the terms time (kāla) never occurs.

Pāli Abhidharma literature disagrees fundamentally with Sanskrit Abhidharmic understanding of temporality. Herein we find an extensive refutation of the Sarvāstivīdin view that everything exists, understood in the sense that past, present and future equally exist.[1] Their very starting point it seems, therefore, erroneous. However, this fact is immaterial in determining the true import of Theravādins own exposition. They denied the reality of past and future and came to the conclusion that present alone exists.

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[1] Kathāvatthuppakarana - Aṭṭhakathā, (trans.) Law, B.C., The Debates Commentary, London: Pali Text Society, 1940, p. 52 ff.

The debate between Theravādins and Sarvāstivādins is presented in Katthāvatu as a debate on the reality status of things existing in past, present and future. The Sarvāstivādins are credited with accepting the existence of all dharma, but not always and everywhere in the same form. The Theravādins, however, take the Sarvāstivāda on its face value and confront them with the problems inherent in the proposition of sarvam asti. If everything exists then "does the right view (sammaditthi) which looks upon your wrong view (micchāditthi) as wrong exist?"[1] The acceptance of simultaneous existence of the views only points to the contradiction to which everything exists doctrine can lead.

The Theravādins attack Sarvāstivādins for accepting the existence of past and future dharmas. By equating past and future to present, the Theravādins propose that the existence of past and future should be predicated in the same way as of the present. This, however, is not admissible to Sarvāstivādins who propose a distinction in the mode of existence of past, present and future dharmas. Theravādins follow their argument by pointing out that if a rūpa-kandha (material-aggregate) becomes past by giving up its presentness (paccuppanbhāv), then it is also possible to conceive it as giving up its materiality (rūpa-bhāva).[2] Sarvāstivādins reply to this consist in their demonstration of the untenability of Theravādins argument as outlined above. They point out the lacunae in Theravādins argument in the following way: let a piece of white cloth be regarded as one

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[1] Ibid., p. 53.

[2] Ibid., p. 54.

inseparable object, when this piece of cloth is coloured, it abandons its whiteness, similarly past dharma gives up its paccupannabhāva (its existence as present).[1] Now can it be said of this piece of cloth that it also gives up its clothliness in abandoning its whiteness when coloured? Theravādins do not accept the alternative offered here. Accordingly, Sarvāsti-vādin's position that a rūpa-dharma is changing its temporal qualification does not abandon its materiality on the being of rūpa-dharma. However, Theravādin is not prepared to give in, and follows his argument in a different way. He points out that if the material aggregate (rūpa-dharma) does not give up its materiality (rūpabhāva), then the rūpa-dharma becomes permanent, eternally existing like nibhāna - a conclusion not acceptable to Sarvastivadins either, for they categorically deny that rupabhāva and nibpan-bhāva are identified. Only nibbānabhāva can be eternal, not the rūpa-bhāva.

The debate is carried on in Katthāvatu and Katthāvatu-prakarṇa Atthakathā further. One specific problem that Theravādin raises is that whether past (atīta) gives up its pastness (atītabhāva)? The Sarvāstivādins answer is negative. They point out that in asserting the existence of atīta-bhāva, they mean that anāgatabhāva (futurity) and paccupannabhāva (present-ness) do not exist in the same way as the atītabhāva. And similarly when they predicate existence of anāgatabhāva, they mean atītabhāva and paccu-pannabhāva do not exist like anāgatabhāva.[2] Thus Sarvāstivādin specifically deny that a dharma passes from an state into another. This Theravādin

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[1] Ibid., p. 54.

[2] Ibid., p. 55.

construes to mean that atītabhāva too (the being in the mode of past)
acquires a permanence or eternity, and therefore, is subject to the
earlier question about its likeness with the nibbanà or nibbānabhāva.

Theravādins come up with another problem which they think that
Sarvāstivādins asserting the existence of everything will have to face.
They point out the Sarvastivadins will have to accept the existence of past
(atīta) and of non-past (navatīta) as well as future (anāgata) and non-
future (navanāgata). They argue that:

1.   if the existence of past and non-past as also future and non-
        future is denied then Sarvāstiyādins should not assert that past
        and future exist; and, also

2.   if they do not accept the identity of atīta, paccupana and anāgata,
        they cannot say that atīta and anāgata exist.

The second argument is considered more elaborately, whereby applying the
dialectic of this being, that is, this not-being, that is not (hutvā hoti
hutvā hoti; na hutvā na hoti, na hutvā na hoti), Theravadins show the un-
tenability of Sarvāstivādins acceptance of temporal distinctions. The
Theravādins emphasise the inter-penetrability of past, present and future
and conclude that both past and future can be cognized only as that which
is present to the cognizer.[1] This being so only present exists; past and
future, if they exist at all, they can exist only as present.

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[1] Ibid., p. 57.

The following points emerge from this brief re-capitulation of Sarvāstivādin and Theravādin debate on the question of temporal qualifications:

1. According to Sarvāstivādin, the past or future, as usually understood, as the two slices of emply time in which dharma reside, do not exist; what we discern is the reality of a dharma which has already past (atīta) as well as that which has not yet come (anāgata);

2. It is wrong to assume that dharmas or Khandhas persist in the past, present and future. What persists may be the bhāva or the mode of being of a dharma which is constantly changing.

However, according to Theravādins:

1. The mode of being of a thing is not separable from the thing itself, and as such if the bhāva of a dharma or skandha persists through past, present and future, then it is permanent or eternal and possesses same status of reality as the nibbānbhāva. This, of course, would be an heresy unacceptable to Sarvāstivādins;

2. Secondly, for Theravādins the time distinctions are only conventional without any basis in the reality itself. There is no ontological basis for temporal qualifications, and that past and future can exist only as given in the present. Therefore, present alone exists.

In view of the above articulation of the Sarvāstivāda understanding of temporality, it is surprising to note a tendency among some modern scholars to suggest that Sarvāstivāda contributed to a view of time which conceived time as an ontological reality containing change. Drawing upon Pāli sources, David J. Kalupahana maintains that "the Sarvāstivāda represented a school of realism and.....they upheld the independent reality not only of things, but also of time."[1] John M. Koller agrees with Kalupahana's interpretation of the Sarvāstivāda and maintains that Nāgārjuna's critique of Time[2] is "directed primarily at the Sarvāstivādin, who took time to be an ontological container of change and divided the container into three segments: past, present and future."[3]

In the first place, both Koller and Kalupahana are mistaken in assuming that Nāgārjuna's critique of time is directed against the Sarvāstivāda. There is nothing in Nāgārjuna's kāla pariksa to substantiate their contention that the view of time criticised by Nāgārjuna is in fact the one held by the Sarvāstivādins.[4] As a matter of fact, it may be gathered from the Candrakirti's Vṛtti on Mulamādhyamakārikā that the target of Nāgārjuna's attack is a certain Kālavādin who does not subscribe to the

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[1]Kalupahana, David J., "The Buddhist Conception of Time and Temporality", Philosophy East and West, Vol. 24, No. 2, April 1974, p. 187.

[2]See Inada, Kenneth K., Nāgārjuna: A Translation of His Mulamādhyamakakārika, Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1970, pp. 117-119.

[3]Koller, John. M., "On The Buddhist Views of Devouring Time", Philosophy East and West, Vol. 24, No. 2, April 1974, p. 205.

[4]See Nāgārjuna, op. cit., pp. 117-119.

views of Buddha. The Kalavadin (the upholder of the reality of time) under attack of Nāgārjuna's relentless dialectic refers to Buddha as the teacher of his opponents.[1] It is equally interesting to note that while Nāgārjuna specifically rejects the reality of time, his critique never mentions the concept of dharma that is so central to Sarvāstivāda articulation of the problem.[2]

In arguing that the Sarvāstivādin believed in the reality of time both Koller and Kalupahana seem to be victims of confusing between a view which takes the reality of things or dharmas as past, present and future as the ontological givens and a view which accords time a primary ontological status as the container of things or dharmas. That the Sarvāstivāda position is not the latter will be set forth in the body of the

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[1] See Kanakura, Y., "The Question of Time in Connection of Milindapanhā, Abhidharma and Mādhyamikakārika", Osaki Gakaho, Vol. 115, 1962, pp. 1-17. This is one of the most illuminating papers on the subject. Its special merit consists in its ability to see the question of time as integral to the ontological question. The relationship of Milindapannaha to the Abhidharmika tradition has been well brought out.

[2] It is conceivable that Nāgārjuna would have opposed the Sarvāstivādin articulation of temporality in terms of the svabhāva of a dharma. (See infra, p. 208). But no explicit rejection of Sarvāstivāda can be discerned in the Kālaparikṣa nor is there any claim that Sarvāstivādins believed in the independent reality status of time. We tend to agree with Shoson Miyamoto when he observes: "Nāgārjuna agreed with the Sarvāstivādins' denial of the existence of time, but opposed their concept of entity-realism (svabhāvavāda). He drew the conclusion of the non-existence of time from the Madhyamika standpoint of non-substantiality (nihsvabhāvavāda), which was a restatement of the original Buddhist teaching of non-self." Shoson Miyamoto, "Time and Eternity in Buddhism", Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, Tokyo: Vol. 7, No. 2, 1959, p. 824.

thesis. It may be noted here that there is no evidence from the Abhidharmika sources to support the contention that the Sarvāstivādins believed in the reality of time. Time as a category is conspicuously absent from the Sarvāstivāda scheme of things. Secondly, as we will show, they are primarily concerned with the reality status of dharmas or elements of existence which are either relegated to a non-actual mode of existence or which are still to achieve actuality. Accordingly, the doctrine is primarily concerned with postulating the reality of dharmas as past, present and future rather than the reality of dharmas in past, present and future as three distinct slices of time which somehow contain these dharmas.

The Sarvāstivāda is an attempt to provide a coherent picture of reality in terms of a whole conceived as a process, and at the same time retaining the uniqueness of the irreducible events which go into the making of the process. In asserting the reality of all (sarvam asti), Sarvāstivāda insisted that dharma is the ultimate constituent of all phenomena, meaning by dharma what is discerned to be existent and real in all the three temporal phases. The reality, as such, of the conglomeration of these dharmas is specifically denied. The basis of this denial is our experience which consists only of a succession of dharmas. There is no warrant from experience to believe that cognition reveals such a thing as a continuing 'being' or 'self', the ultimate reference point being only the discrete dharmas which constitute as such the nature (svabhāva) of reality. Our cognition reveals only the being of dharmas (svabhāva) in the three temporal phases. The existence of reality of dharmas as past, present and

future is present to cognitional experience without any mutual contradic-
tion, experience being itself structured in terms of succession. It is
significant that the Sarvāstivāda does not recognize the existence of
dharmas in past, present and future moments of time, but recognizes their
existence as past, present and future. There is no transcendental or em-
pirical time in which real events may be conceived to take place or reside.
Time is not an empty mould in which dharmas are deposited as they arise,
stay and pass away. Time conceived as a transcendental background of our
cognition or as an over-arching receptum of entities is totally unaccep-
table to any school of Buddhist thought, Sarvāstivāda being no exception
in this regard. The Sarvastivādin's discussions are conducted on the
level where the concern is with lived time. The dharmas are temporal in
the sense of possessing reality by virtue of their own intrinsic nature in
the three modes of temporal existence.

Is There A Pre-Ābhidharmika Notion of Time as Receptum?

Scholars have noted the opaqueness of the course of development that the time conception in early Buddhism followed.[1] But more often than not the time conception in early Buddhism has been misunderstood. Schayer is a case in point. He suggests that the theories of time in pre-Ābhidharmika Buddhism tend to look at Time as the great container of all changes, a true reservoire of the changing entities or the phenomena.[2] According to Schayer, though we do not have any direct evidence to the effect that the pre-Ābhidharmika Buddhism contributed to the notion of Time as receptum of entities, a close study of some Ābhidharmika passages clearly indicates that this indeed was one of the immediate contexts of the Ābhidharmika enunciation of the notion of three times.[3] In Mahāvibhāṣā, we come across a passage which mentions the ideas contained in the following as an erroneous view to be guarded against:

> The svabhāva of Time is nitya, but the svbhāva of samskṛtdharmas is anitya. The samskṛitdharma wander across the times just as a fruit from one pot to another, or as a man from one house into another. This is also the case with the samskṛtadharmas: going out of the future they enter into the present, and they go out of the

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[1] See Bareau, Andre, "The Notion of Time in Early Buddhism", East and West (Rome), 1943, pp. 353-364.

[2] Schayer, Stainslaw, op. cit., pp. 15-17.

[3] Ibid.

present and enter into the past.[1]

It is important to remember here that Mahāvibhāsā mentions this position as an erroneous view to be guarded against. However, Schayer takes this to be a representative position of early Buddhism and draws the untenable conclusion that this theory of time as reservoire is only a later development of "the more primitive conception of Time as a unique, universal reservoir in which future, present and past entities are placed in layers, one upon another".[2]

However we must not forget the fact that Mahāvibhāsā, traditionally, is assigned to the Buddhist Council held during the reign of Kaniska,[3] and one of its specific purposes was to record various alternative Abhidharmika positions and, finally, to evolve a standard Abhidharmika formulation on the fundamental ontological and doctrinal concerns of Abhidharma.[4] What Schayer takes to be a reference to some pre-Hīnyānistic Buddhist Theory of Time was perhaps one of the current Abhidharmika positions which Mahāvibhāsa takes to be a wrong interpretation of the true Ābhidharmika understanding of temporal differentiations.

Another evidence that Schayer adduces in support of his contention that pre-Ābhidharmika Buddhism proposed a spatial understanding of Time

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[1] Mahāvibhāsā, 393a, cf. Ibid., p. 15.

[2] Schayer, op. cit., p. 15.

[3] See Warder, A.K., op. cit., p. 345-346.

[4] Ibid.

as the reservoir of entities comes from the Abhidharmakosa. The
Abhidharmkosa mentions a certain version of the traikalyavada which
maintains that the actualization in the sense of bringing into present
(vartamānikarana) of a future effect consists in 'dislocation'
(desāntarakarṣana).[1] Reaffirming his contention that early Buddhism
contributed to the reservoir ideal of Time conceived after a spatial
understanding of it, Schayer finds that in the pre-Abhidharmika doc-
trine, "the theory of spatial dislocation totally fulfils its object,
thus corroborating its archaic character".[2]

Schayer has failed to see that the language of reservoir which
has been discredited in the Abhidharmakosa is an unique version of
the Sarvāstivāda understanding of Time differentiations in terms of
"avasthā (states) whose spatial connotation should be taken in its
metaphorical sense only. The idea of reservoir that Schayer is so
willing to credit to some unknown pre-Abhidharmika sect is actually
a grossly misrepresented version of some Abhidharmika theories of
time differentiations. We will have occassion to refer to these
variations of Sarvāstvādin conception of Time.[3] But it must be noted
at this point that a reservoir ideal of Time is totally alien to the

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[1] kimidam varttamānīkaranam nāma? desāntarākarṣani ceti Abhidhar-
makośam, op. cit., p. 817.

[2] Schayer, op. cit., p. 16.

[3] Infra., p. 231 ff.

basic Buddhist ontological framework and it is very implausible to attribute it even to the pre-Ābhidharmika Buddhism.

It is not our intention to deny the possibility of a spatial understanding being the context against which the classical Sarvāstivāda formulation of temporality, in terms of "efficiency" (kāritra) as the distinguishing mark of the present,took place.[1] However, it is our contention that the receptum notion of Time, instead of being a remnant of pre-Ābhidharmika Buddhism forming the immediate background of the classical Sarvāstivāda enunciation of temporality was, in reality, a misunderstood version of the Ābhidharmika doctrine of temporal differentiation in terms of the avasthās of dharmas. It is this misinterpretation of avasthā theory in terms of reservoir that both the Mahāvibhāṣā and the Abhidharmakośa record as the immediate target of the sarvāstivadin's attack.

Refutation of such misinterpretation of avasthā theory became all the more imminent in the later stages of Sarvāstivāda developments. Certain opponents of Sarvāstivāda tended to take a spatial interpretation of temporal differentiation as the most definitive statement of Sarvāstivāda. Thus, Samghabhadra vehemently rejects the following argumentation of an opponent who denies the reality of three temporal differentiation, by alluding to their spatial characteristics:

> Past and future do not really exist because, if
> they existed, they would resist one another. In-
> deed, the elements of rūpa must occupy a definite

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[1]Infra. p. 239.

> place. If the already destroyed elements and the
> elements not yet born existed really then they
> would resist one another. All rūpa-elements, if
> they exist, possess impentrability (apratighatva)
> and whatever does not possess impenetrability is
> not a rūpa.[1]

This argument also presupposes that past and future are two receptacles

of finite volume. However the Abhidharma canons anticipating this pro-

blem attempted to resolve this by suggesting that spatialization is not

a necessary concomitant of dharmas. Thus Mahāvibhāṣā makes the following

point of clarification:

> If a dharma has the nature of rūpa, is it
> desāstha (localized or spatialized)? If a
> dharma is desāstha, it has necessarily the
> nature of rūpa; there exists, however, dharmas
> which have the nature of rūpa and which are not
> desāstha, viz, the past and the future rūpas...[2]

This was a conscious effort on the part of the Mahāvibhāṣā thinkers to

rectify the damage done by those Abhidharmikas who tended to look,

at the temporal differentiations of past, present and future only

in terms of the differences of avastha, of spatial position in one of

the three Time-phases.

Moreover, it is our contention that the Abhidharmikas of

Sarvāstivāda tradition, in their formulation of the theory of momentari-

ness, were closer to the legacy of early Buddhism than the Sautrāntikas.

Contrary to what Schayer suggests, Early Buddhism in point of fact seems

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[1] Nyāyānusāraśastra of Samghabhadra, 636a, (trans.) Schayer, op. cit., p. 1

[2] Mahāvibhāṣā, 395a, (trans.) Schayer, op. cit., p. 17.

to suggest a relativistic and experiential interpretation of Time.[1]

Early Buddhism avoids the two extremes of considering absolute time as the receptacle of entities and of reducing every form of experience into further indivisible moments. During the early period of Buddhism, the most dominant view of time was the one that recognized a finite segment of time as constituting the core of one's immediate experience.[2] Indeed the acceptance of this finite segment of time as a component of our temporality implied a positing of a certain duration of temporal experience no matter how infinitesimal this duration may be.[3] This stands in glaring contrast with the later Sautrantikas who looked at the moment as irreducible and durationless.[4] Impermanence in Early Buddhism revolved round this element of finitude of existence and was not built upon an idea of durationless momentary existence which indeed received a lion's share in Sautrāntikas. In the Sarvāstivādin's formulation of the problem, which served as the

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[1]See Kahpahana, David J., The Buddhist Conception of Time and Temporality, Philosophy East and West, 24, 2, April 1974, pp. 181-190.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid., p. 185.

[4]The Abhidharmikas classify dharmas as eternal and non-eternal, and ascribe all samskrta dharmas to the later category. But they do not make them strictly momentary. The Sautrāntikas, however, reduce all to a series of moments of coming to be. See Tattvasamgraha for Sautrāntika-Sarvāstivāda debate on the endurance of a moment.

Tattva Samgraha of Sāntarakṣita with the commentary of Kamalsila, op. cit. 1822-1833, pp. 511-513; also see Keith, op. cit., p. 107; Kalupahana, op. cit., p. 186.

paradigm for all Ābhidharmika formulations, the moment continued to be conceived as a finite segment of time characterized by a certain duration. This finite duration, according to the Sarvāstivāda contains four stages of phenomenalization of a <u>dharma</u>, the production or birth (<u>jati</u>), duration (<u>sthiti</u>), decaying or change (<u>jarā</u>), and the cessation or disappearance (<u>nirodha</u>). This conception of impermanence does not exclude the element of finitude of phenomenal existence and still somehow aims at retaining the element of continuity. And it is precisely in this context that the enigma of Sarvāstivāda becomes all the more acute. The paradox of Sarvāstivāda consists in its concern with an articulation of the process of temporality while at the same time being also concerned with elements that go into the making of this process. Though, methodologically speaking, the distinction between the dynamic and static aspects of reality is always admissible, in the final analysis (looking at in terms of concrete actuality) the seemingly static elements are part of the dynamic nature of things. Such is the predicament that the Sarvāstivāda faces inescapably in its formulation of the problem of temporal existence.

Reality of Past, Present and Future: Arguments From Cognition and Moral Law

The grounds for the reality of dharmas in the past, present and future mode of being are to be discerned within the framework of the empirically and realistically slanted epistemology of Sarvāstivāda. A careful review of the arguments offered by Sarvāstivāda in support of their assertion will serve to highlight the nature of their orientation to knowledge. The empiricistic-realistic approach to cognitional experience and its compatibility with the soteriological goal of realizing freedom (Nirvāna) are reflected in their arguments. The role of epistemology is conceived here, in conformity with the general tenor of Indian Philosophy, as ancillary pursuit in the service of soteriology, and a mutually reinforcing role is assigned to them.[1]

The following arguments are offered by Sarvāstivāda to support their assertion of the reality of dharmas in the three modes of existence. The arguments are present in the Abhidharmakosa, the Sphutārthā as well as in the Tattvasamgraha; and they claim to be valid both in terms

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[1]Thus Abhidharmika argued that past and future dharmas are real because Buddha had taught that an enlightened disciple (ārya-srāvaka) becomes indifferent to the past and future material objects (rūpa) only by concentrating on their rūpas: Uktam hi Bhgavatā atītam ched bhiksavo rūpam nābhavisyanna srutavānāryasrāvakotīte rupenapeksobhavisyat. yasmāttahryastyatītah rūpamtasmāccutavānāryasravakotite rupenapekso bhavati. anāgatam cedrūpah nabhavisyat na srutavānārya sravakaohāgatam rūpa nābhyana. ndisyat. yasmāttahryastyanāgatam rūpam iti vistarah.Abhidharmkosam, 1972 op. cit., p. 804. Also, see Sphutārtha on the above.

of experience and by means of its appeal to scriptural basis.[1]

1. **Dvayāśryam ca Vijñāna:**[2] According to Ābhidharmikas all cognitions are contingent on two factors:[3] (a) the objective correlate (viṣaya, ālambana) and the (b) cognizing consciousness (citta, vijñāna). While sense experience relates to the cognition or consciousness of the present the mental cognition refers to the past and future objects as well. If past or future objects (viṣaya) were denied reality, then on this basis, argues the Ābhidharmika, there could arise no cognition produced by the coming together of the viṣaya and the citta.

The Ābhidharmika seeks support for this common sense theory from the 'scripture' by referring to the unequivocal statement of Buddha to such effect.[4] The postulation of the existence of real in all the three

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[1]See supra, note 1, page 121 for reference to Buddha's words. The argument offered seeks to establish the reality of the past, present and future dharmas by taking recourse to the testimony of the Master. Thus, appeal is made to the scriptural authority. This is an important element in the argument for it clearly brings out the ultimate soteriological concern that is constantly present.

[2]The Tattvasamgraha of Sāmtarakṣita, op. cit., p. 504.

[3]dvayam pratītya vijñānasyotpadah, ityuktam. dvayam katamat?cakṣū rūpāni yāvat manodharmā iti. asati vātītānāgate tadālambanam vijñānam dvayam pratītya na syāt. evam tāvadāgamatoʼstyatītānāgatam. Abhidharmakosam, 1972, op. cit., p. 804.

[4]The vogue of appealing to Buddha vacana for justification of the validity of statement is comparable to the Brhaminical use of śabda pramāṇa (testimony as a valid means of knowledge). Historically, which is prior is very difficult to decide in this particular use, but there is a striking consensus among scholars over the question of the "priority" of the discussion of the "pramāna". At the hands of the Buddhist logicians like Vasubandhu, Dignaga and Dharmkirti. It was the latter that gave rise to the pre-occupation with pramāna in the different sūtra commentatorial literature in brhaminical Hinduism.

modes is implicit in this contention of the Master and a denial of it will amount to the contradiction of the scripture (āgamaviruddha). The upshot of the argument formulated above is the realistic conviction that whatever causes mental cognition has an objective existence or be objectively real.[1] There is mental cognition of past and future dharmas. The crucial datum, here, on which the Ābhidharmika builds or constructs his theory is the fact of the givenness of past and future dharmas to mental cognition. If they (past and future dharmas) are not objectively real how could there be mental cognition of them. Were they not real "knowledge" of them will not be different from phantasy: their cognition will transpire to be non-cognition. A cognition by definition must have a specific real as its object.[2]

Arguing against the position that cognition is possible without the objective correlate, which is the point of view of Sautrāntika, the Ābhidharmika argues: a consciousness (vijñāna) can only be defined qua 'what cognizes' (vijanati vijñānam); if there is no object to be cognized (vijñeya), then it necessarily follows that no consciousness as cognition can exist.

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[1]See Vasubandhu's Bhāsya on Abhidharmkosa, Karika 24.
sati viṣaye vijñānam pravrtate, nāsati. yadi cātītānāgatam na syādasadā-
lambanam vijñānam syāt. tato vijñānameva na syad; ālambanābhāvāt.
The Abhidharmkosam, op. cit., p. 805.

[2]atītājātayor jñānam anyathā'viṣayam bhavet; Tattvasamgraha, 1788,
op. cit., p. 504. Also see Panjika on it: prativastuvijñāptyātmakam
vijñānam, asati ca jñeye na kincidanena jneyam ity avijñānam eva syāt,
Ibid., p. 505.

The Sautrāntika alternative is that a consciousness as cognition may be defined just by the mere fact of its being the 'illuminating accompaniment' (bodhānugama) of all cognitions.[1] There is no warrant, according to them, for envoking the object of cognition as part of the definition. To this the Sarvāstivāda answers in the following way: the 'illumination' itself constitutes the objective correlate of consciousness as cognition. Cognition is defined as the coming together of consciousness (vijñāna) and its objective correlate (rūpa, vedana etc.). But the two factors (the subjective vijnana and objective rūpa, vedana etc.), according to the Abhidharmikas, stand on the same ontological footing in the sense that they are dharmas. As dharmas they carry their 'own nature' (svabhāva). 'Illuminating' element in the cognition is the 'own nature' (svabhāva) consciousness (vijñāna) which consists of the dharma being objectively real. Thus, illuminating accompaniment (bodhānugama) in cognition too is an objective element which has an independent reality as the svabhāva of vijnāna in the three phases of its existence. This is the thesis of the Abhidharmika.

2. **Karmātītaṃ Ca Niḥsattvaṃ Kathaṃ Phaladmiṣyate**:[2] The past karmas, according to the authority of scripture, are assigned retributive power. Accordingly, argues the Abhidharmikas, past, present and future

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[1] Bodhānugatimātreṇa vijñānamiti cocyate; The Tattvasaṃgraha, 1849, op. cit., p. 518.

[2] Ibid., 1789, p. 504.

alike must possess reality. "The past moral or immoral karmas, like the

present ones, are really existent in as much as they, like the latter,

become effective at the time of their fruition. If that were not the

case, the past moral or immoral (good or bad) karmas would bear fruit in

the present."[1] The "causal efficiency" (kāritra) being the criterion

of reality, then the past too like the future possessing as they do, as

much causal efficiency as the present (this is what is implied in the

assignment of retributive power to karmas must also therefore possess a

reality of their own. A non-existent past could not be the cause of an

effect which has yet to take place in the distant future. Admission of

this would imply the denial of the moral law; good or bad acts would not

produce their effects. The non-terminable character of the moral and

immoral acts is the condition of the moral law being effective. This

was the insight of Buddha.

The Sautrāntikas take strong exception to this proposition of Sar-

vāstivāda. Denying any reality to the past karma as possessing any causal

efficiency Santaraksita observes:

> We do not admit that a past moral cause (vipākahetu) gives
> a retribution (phala): The retribution is granted only
> as an effect of a whole series of conscious moments (vij-
> ñāna-prabandha), so far as it became permeated (vāsita)
> by the (the moral character of) this (past cause).

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[1] yadi cātītam na syāt śubhāśubhasya karmanah phalamyatyām katham
syat. na hi phalotpattikāle vartamāno vipakaheturstiti; The Abhidharma-
kosam, op. cit., p. 805.

(the whole samtāna) having been permeated or perfumed (vāsita) by the past karma becomes capable of producing retribution.[1]

The Sarvāstivādins are not prepared to accept this. They refer to the statement of the great teacher, Buddha: "A karma which is annihilated, reduced to naught and destroyed does not, nevertheless, cease to exist".[2]

Sarvāstivādins refuse to take the Sautrāntika proposition of 'permeation' (vāsita) seriously on the ground that the samtāna (continuum) which seems to be perfumed (vāsita) by the vāsanā, cannot be the cause of the production of an effect (phala), because santāna by its definition does not have a causal efficiency (kāritra) of its own. Arguing against the Sarvāstivādin postulation of the reality of past, present and future dharmas, the Sautrāntikas point out that the phala (effect) does originate directly from moral or immoral karma (act). According to the Sautrāntikas the karma leaves its impression on the consciousness-continuum (santāna). Thus permeated or perfumed (vāsita), the phala (effect) takes place in the continuum in its due course.[3]

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[1] vipākahetuḥ phalado nātītobhyupagamyate, sadvāsitattu vijñānaprabandhātphalamiṣyate; The Tattvasamgraha, 1850, op. cit., p. 518.

[2] yattarhi lagudasikhīyakān parivrajakānadhikṛtyoktam bhagavatāyat karmābhyatītam kṣīnam niruddham vigatam vipariṇatam tadastīti, kim te tasya karmaṇo bhūtapūrvatvam necchantisma; Abhidharmakosam, op. cit., 1972, p. 812.

[3] .....tatpūrvakāt samtānyiśeṣādityātmavādapratiṣedhe sampravedayiṣyāmaḥ.....; Ibid., p. 817.
    Also: vāsitam pramparayā phalotpādanasamarthamutpādītam; Panjika by Kamalsila on Tattvasamgraha, op. cit., p. 518.

Against the Sarvāstivādin's position the argument that is urged is

as follows: if both past and present exist or are real, then effect too

co-exist, with the cause (vipāka). What then is the relationship between

the two and which of the two should be held responsible for the production

(utpādas).[1] The Sarvāstivādin seeks to resolve the problem by asserting

that it is the causal efficiency (sāmarthya) of the act of production

which is responsible for the actualization of a pre-existent effect (phala).

This indeed is what is implied in the assertion that the production takes

place in the present. "Causal efficiency" is thus defined in the present

context as the "actualization through making present" (vartamānikarana).[2]

Actualization through making present (vartamānikarana) consists in a mere

modification of the temporal mode of past into the present mode of existence.

3. Atītanāgate Jñānam Vibhaktam Yoginām:[3] A final argument for the

reality of the dharmas as past, present and future comes from the recog-

nition of the possibility of yogins having the vision of past, present and

future. The argument takes for granted the validity of the scriptural

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[1]Abhidharmkośam, op. cit., p. 817; also Sphutārthā on above.

[2]Vartamānikarane tarhi sāmarthyam. Vasubandhu's Bhasya in Abhidhar-
makośam, op. cit., p. 817; also vartamānikaranasāmarthyam iti cet;
Tattvasamgrah Panjika, op. cit., p. 516.

[3]Tattvasamgraha, 1789, op. cit., p. 504. The view is assigned to
Vasumitra by Kamalśila in the Tattvasamgrah-Panjika. "How can such ideas
as one Mandhan Brahmdatta lived, the Chakravartti King Sankha will be the
Maitreya Tathāgata etc. (cognized) distinctly by Yogins. (such cognitions)
of the past and the future could not be possible (for) there is no distinc-
tion among things that are non-existent." Tattvasamgraha Panjika, op. cit.,
p. 505.

statement that Buddha was omniscient in the sense that he had an intuitive access to the reality in its past, present and future modes. This claim for the intuitive cognitive awareness of the past, present and future implies their intrinsic reality and to question that would amount to the transgression of the truth of the āgamas (scriptures containing the true words of Buddha).[1]

While the position of the Sarvāstivāda regarding the question of time and temporality thus seems clear enough, it does not of course follow that the arguments adduced to vindicate the position are conclusive. In fact, indeed in the way that it is outlined above, it has a circular character, and the opponent, who in this case happens to be the Sautrāntika, does not hesitate to criticise it. What, however, stands underscored in this enterprise, significant from the point of view of what it implies in terms of our understanding of temporality, is the theory of 'causal efficiency' (kārtira), a concept of overwhelming importance to be taken up for discussion in the next chapter.

Both the Sarvāstivāda and Sāmkhya-Yoga argue for the reality of the present as well as the past and the future. Not only is the past as real as the present, but the future also is real awaiting to become the actualized existence. The two traditions seek to support their argument in terms of different ontological bases. The Sāmkhya-Yoga, as it has

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[1]For a Sautrāntika critique of the scriptural basis for the reality of past, present and future dharmas, see Tattvasamgraha, 1847-1850, op. cit., pp. 517-518.

been shown, posits a dynamic continuant (pariṇāmi nitya) which admits

of being spoken of as the subject which has change as its predicate.

This material continuant, also significantly called the material cause

(upādāna kārana) provides the scope for one mode to supersede another

mode. It is the matrix for the criss-cross and supersession of quali-

ties (guna). Thus is established an ontological ground which makes

possible for reality to exist in all times without being unchangingly

eternal. The Sarvāstivādin likewise rests his argument for the exis-

tence of the future elements which are constitutive of reality in terms

of an ontology of a dynamic continuum of reals which may be described

as elements existent in their very essence in all times. There is no

unitary material cause into which the dharmas merge or from which to

emerge. And yet they are in a state of continuum whereby their exis-

tence in all times is derived from the continuance of their essence in

time.

The two traditions show, despite the differences in language and

also the conceptualization of their respective ontological base, profound

convergence over the question of the consideration which seem to have

weighed in favour of according reality to the future. Both seem to say,

in effect, through their varied and similar formulations of the issue,

that the essence of the present consists of its being preceded by the

past, its essence likewise includes in turn its relation of precedence

to the future awaiting actualization. Why do they say this? For both

thought systems moral law is a fundamental requirement. Good and bad

acts produce the results. Moral and immoral acts (karma) are continuous.

Accordingly, a doctrine of the reality that is in full accord with this requirement must view the present as implying at once the reality of the future as well as the past. If the future is simply nothing, i.e. if the future effects of acts were simply non-existent, it is not conceivable that good acts be done with a view to perpetuation in good results. What is equally inconceivable, the absolute non-existence will come into being, Should it be the case that the future effect lies latently in the material cause so that when it becomes actualized it will not be a case of novel production out of nothing. The good or bad act (karma) is the efficient cause (nimitta kārana) of the appearance of the future effects (satasca phalasyanimittam vartamānikarane samartham na purva janane).

In strikingly similar manner the Sarvāstivādin also argues: the past acts, moral or immoral like the present ones are really existent and likewise the future acts too exist in their fruition. Instead of employing the language of material cause or efficient cause the Sarvāstivādin employs the "logical" criterion of the real as causal efficiency. We can speak of something as real differently from what is not real only in terms of a difference that it makes (arthakriyā kāritra). To exist can be distinguished from non-existence only in terms of the difference that the former makes. In the Sarvastivādin's language the difference is the production of effect. Employing this criterion he argues that if future dharmas were denied reality status on the mere ground that future does not yet exist, then it would mean the denial of the moral law. According to the principle of moral law (Law of Karma), present acts,

good or bad, produce their future effects. It may thus be seen that in Sarvāstivāda as well as in Sāmkhya-Yoga traditions, what serves as the primary concern for a doctrine of reality and a consequent theory of time and temporality is the principle of _karma_.

CHAPTER IX

ABHIDHARMIKA CONCEPTION OF KĀRITRA AND TEMPORAL DISTINCTION

The most significant conceptual contribution of Sarvāstivāda to Buddhism is the notion of Kāritra. Kāritra is the mark of actuality (vartamāna). It is that element in the Real which accounts for its "efficiency". The existent in order to be actual must be efficient. Efficiency of the real consists in its capacity to project an effect (phala, kārya). That which is not capable of or does not possess the potency for the projection of kārya is not efficient, and by the same token lacks actuality. This wanting of actuality does not reduce the real to nothingness, or inexistence. Rather actuality is only one element of real, the other being the non-actuality. This non-actuality is the mark of existents or dharmas which are past or future. Dharmas as past and future are real but they are not actual because they are wanting in kāritra (efficiency). This in brief is the upshot of Sarvāstivāda doctrine of Kāritra.

Three Stages in the Development of Kāritra Doctrine

Concept of Kāritra in Mahāvibhāṣā: The earliest formulation of Kāritra as the determinant of temporal distinctions can be discerned in

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the Mahāvibhāsā. In this formulation an equation is made between the

svalakṣaṇa or svabhāva (the specific mark) of a dharma and its special

function (svakriyā, vṛtti, kāritra,svabhāga). This equation is further

exemplified in the definitions of the Abhidharma: "the essence of a

dharma, its svabhava as definiendum (= lakṣya) is defined by its kāritra

(= svakriyā or svalakṣaṇa) as definiens."[1] However, the relationship

between the svabhāva and kāritra of a dharma remains enigmatic for the

authors of Mahāvibhāsā, and although, accepting the equation of svabhāva

and kāritra of a dharma, Mahāvibhāṣā prefers to be non-committal as to

the specific nature of the relationship between the two. Further pressed

with the question whether kāritra and svabhāva are the same or different,

the Mahāvibhāṣa makes the following point:

> It cannot be said categorically whether they are the
> same or different. Just as the svabhāva of each
> sāsrava dharma possesses many lakṣaṇas as anitya
> etc., and it cannot be said categorically whether

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[1]This double logical and ontological meaning has been discussed
by Schayer in Ausgewahlte Kapital aus der Prasannapada (Krakowie, 1931,
p. 2) in a remark on Chapter V of the Madhyamakakārika where the problem
of the lakṣya and lakṣana is taken up by Nāgārjuna with reference to
ākāśa, and its svalakṣana, the anāvaraṇatva (quality of non-veiling).
Stcherbatsky has differed with Schayer on this matter and maintains that
these discussions do not have anything to do with the problem of dharm-
svabhāva and Kāritra. He accuses Schayer of failing to distinguish be-
tween lakṣana = svalakṣana and laksana = saṁskṛtalaksaṇā. (See Stecher-
batsky, S., "Die drei Richtungen in der philosophie des Buddhismus",
Rocznik Orientalistyczny, 10, 1924, p.35). However, it is important to
note that from the point of view of Abhidharmikas of Vaibhasika orienta-
tion even asamskṛtadharmās, e.g. ākāśa also have their svakāritra. See
de La Valée Poussin, Documents d'Abhidharma, Bulletin d l'Ecole Francaise
d'Extreme Orient, Paris, 1, 1931, p. 43.
Also, Schayer, Stanislaw, op. cit., p. 21.

they are identical with or different from (these lak-
saṇas), such is the case here. Therefore, (the rela-
tion between kāritra and svabhāva is not predicable.[1]

However, this unpredicability of the relationship between the two refers
only to the conceptual articulation of an ontological fact. While effi-
ciency must be grounded in the real (dharma), and it belongs only to
the real, it does not exhaust all the possibilities of the real. Pro-
ceeding from this assumption the Mahāvibhāṣā makes causal efficiency (kā-
ritra) the criterion of temporal distinctions:

> On what is based the distinction of Time-epochs? On the
> kāritra. The saṃskṛtadharmas which do not yet possess
> the kāritra are called 'future', the saṃskṛta dharmas
> which just now possess the kāritra are called 'present',
> the saṃskṛta dharma whose kāritra is already destroyed,
> are called past. Or: the rūpa, when it does not offer
> resistance just now, is called present, when it has al-
> ready ceased to offer resistance, is called past, etc.[2]

Difficulties inherent in this formulation of kāritra as the basis of tem-
poral distinctions are multifareous, and the Sarvāstivāda thinking had to
wrestle with the issues of great variety in order to propose a coherent
and comprehensive theory of temporal determination. Equation of kāritra
with the svabhāva of the dharma and the subsequent description of the re-
lationship as unpredicable involved difficulties that were to be overcome
by the later Sarvāstivādins. If the kāritra and the svabhāva of a dharma
were identical then, in what sense a dharma is said to come to possess its

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[1]Mahāvibhāṣā, op. cit., 394c,   cf. Schayer, op. cit., p. 25.

[2]Mahāvibhāṣā, op. cit., 393c,   cf. Schayer, op. cit., p. 22.

kāritra in the present mode of existence.[1] Further, in what sense can a

dharma's kāritra may be said to be destroyed (in the past)[2] for the des-

truction of the dharma's kāritra would amount to annihilation of the

dharmasvabhāva and consequently to admitting of the unreality of the

dharma (in the past mode of existence). Moreover, if a dharma is con-

sidered present only on account of the performance of the special func-

tion (kāritra) then we may have difficulty in discerning the status of the

being of eye (cakṣu dharma) which does not perform its special func-

tion of seeing during slumber or when obstructed by darkness. We cannot

deny that cakṣu dharma is present in either of the cases, but then ob-

viously it is not performing its special function. Difficulties inherent

in the simple formulation of the kāritra theory in Mahāvibhāṣā prompted

the Sarvāstivādins to pursue the analysis of kāritra as the determinant

of temporal distinctions further in this direction.

Vasumitra's Conception of Kāritra: Before we turn our attention to

the efforts of Sarvāstivadins like Saṃghbhadra to offer a more comprehen-

sive analysis of kāritra, we may consider another attempt to define the

notion in the context of original Mahāvibhāsā position. Such an attempt

was made by Vasumitra. According to this position manifestation of the

specific function of dharma A is the activity not of this very dharma, but

of other preceding dharmas, say P, Q, R, etc. by which the function of the

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[1]Supra, p. 229.

[2]Supra, p. 229.

dharma $\underline{A}$ is causally determined. The true activity of a dharma consequently is, its facility of determining other dharmas, i.e. of compelling future dharmas to manifest their special functions. This interpretation of kāritra seems to draw its strength from the well-acknowledged fact that the Abhidharmikas accepted six different kinds of such determinations: (1) sahabhukāraṇa (simultaneous cause), (2) samānāntarakāraṇa (an immediate cause), (3) sarvatragakāraṇa (an omnipresent cause), (4) vipākakāraṇa (a specific cause), (5) sabhāgakārana (homogeneous cause), (6) adhipatikāraṇa (a general negative cause).[1] Thus, according to this way of looking at the kāritra of a dharma, in the appearance of one specific dharma of, say, sight (cakṣurindriya), the said dharma is (a) the simultaneous determinant of the samskṛtalakṣaṇas, (b) the homogeneous determinant of all the future dharmas of sight which form the continuity (samtatati) of an eye, and, (c) the general negative determination of all other dharmas whose origination it does not hinder. Given this understanding of the operation of causal efficiency of a dharma, the kāritra of a dharma is no more its (svakāritra, svabhāga, etc.) but its hetubhāvāsthāna, its phalotpadansmarthya: its causal function and its facility of producing effects.[2]

This interpretation of kāritra as conceived by Vasumitra anticipates

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[1] Kāraṇ sahabhūścaiva sabhāgaḥ samprayuktakaḥ sarvatrago vipākākhyaḥ ṣadvidho heturisyate. Abhidharmkosam, (1970), op. cit., p. 279. For further discussion of this, see Vasubandhu's Bhāṣya on above as well as Yaśomitra's vyākhyā.

[2] yadhyevam, pratyūtpannasya tatsabhāgasya cakṣuh kiṁ kāritram? phaladānapratigrah atītanāmapi tarhi sabhāgahetvādināṁ. Abhidharmakosam, op. cit., 1974, p. 808.

sóme of the elements of Samghabhadra, but is unable to resolve the diffi-
culties pointed out earlier in our discussion. Indeed, by accepting this
interpretation of <u>kāritra</u>, we can explain the present character of eye
(cakṣurindriya) even in the state of slumber or under obstruction from
darkness. For, in these cases, it performs the function of being the
determinant of other <u>dharmas</u>. Here the <u>kāritra</u> of the <u>cakṣu</u> <u>dharma</u> does
not consist of its capacity of sight.[1] However, Abhidharma specifically
defines <u>kāritra</u> in terms of the <u>svabhāva</u> or <u>svakāritra</u> of <u>dharma</u>, its
nature which is sufficient unto itself; any attempt to interpret it re-
latively to the operations of some causal factors goes against its true
import. Moreover, even if we accept that the <u>kāritra</u> of a <u>dharma</u> is
defined by its relationship to other <u>dharmas</u>, as indeed the view under
consideration does, then we will have to enforce some other restrictions
on it, before it can serve the general purpose of defining the temporal
distinctions of <u>dharmas</u>. For example, accepting this definition of
<u>kāritra</u> in terms of a <u>dharma's</u> relationship to other <u>dharmas</u>, we may
face a situation where a past <u>dharma</u> will have to be regarded as present.[2]
The ·karmic retribution becomes ripe only some time after the act has been
committed. The <u>karmic</u> cause having ceased·in the moment of its appear-
ance, stay and disappearance (utpāda, sthiti and vyaya), the effect

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[1]tatsabhāgasya cakṣuṣaḥ kim kāritram. yadvi kāritralakṣaṇam svakarma
na karoti, tat tatsabhāgaḥ. tasya ca nāstikāritram darśanalakṣanam. kathaṁ
tat pratyutpannamityabhiprāyaḥ. phaladāmpratigrahaiti. <u>Sphutārthā</u> with
<u>Abhidharmakośam</u>, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., 1972, p. 808.

[2]atītānāmapi tarhi sabhāghetvādināṁ phaladānāt karitraprasango'rdha-
kāritrasya veti lakṣana samkaraḥ. <u>Abhidharmakośam</u>, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>. p. 808.

(phala) has not arisen yet. Thus the determination of a <u>dharma</u> by another <u>dharma</u> in this case lasts beyond the moment of the appearance, stay and disappearance of the first. Should we therefore accept that a past continues to be present as long as it has not produced its effect?[1]

Apparently these considerations led to a re-formulation of the Sarvāstivādin position. They accepted the possibility of the realization of the effect of a cause in the same moment in which the cause had previously arisen, stayed and passed away, or in the immediately subsequent moment or in some distant moment in continuum (<u>saṁtāna</u>) when the original causal determinant may not be present. Under this scheme the <u>sahābhukāraṇa</u> and <u>samanāntarakāraṇa</u> belong to the first category of causal operation, <u>sabhā-gakāraṇa</u> and <u>sarvatrāgakāraṇa</u> operate in the second or third manner and the effect of a <u>vipākakāraṇa</u> is realized in the third manner.[2]

<u>Samghabhadra on the Concept of Kāritra</u>: A revised version of <u>kāritra</u> theory is proposed by Bhadanta Samghbhadra which is in accord with the conception of causal operation just outlined. According to this theory, the <u>kāritra</u> of a <u>dharma</u> does not consist in a real production of an effect nor is it contingent upon its relationship to another <u>dharma</u>. Samghabhadra zealously defends the original position asserting the constancy of the <u>svabhāva</u> of a <u>dharma</u>, and still accounting for its temporal determination with reference to the operation of <u>kāritra</u> of <u>dharma</u>.[3] But <u>kāritra</u> is

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[1]See <u>Sphuṭārthā</u>, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. 808.

[2]<u>Abhidharmkośam</u>, (1970), <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. 288 ff.

[3]Supra, p. 230.

conceived not as a capacity to produce an effect nor as a causal determinant but as the potency to project an effect (phalākṣepaśakti). It is the presence or absence of this potency of a dharma that determines the presentness, pastness or futurity:

> The kāritra of a dharma is projecting a kārya, not producing it. The past (dharmas) do not possess this potency of projection and therefore cannot possess a kāritra.....kāritra here means vyāpāra, activity or operation, as seeing; (in another words) it is (the special potency) by which the eye is seeing, the ear is hearing, the nose is smelling, the tongue is tasting, etc; it is (further the special potency) by which consciousness (vijñāna) is active as cognizing; (and finally it is special potency) by which visual forms (rūpa) etc. are made objects of the corresponding sense-organs (svendriya gocaratva).

> The kāritra of the dharmas means potency (śakti) only of projecting results (phalākṣepa = grahana), not the actual generation (jñāna = dāna). Past causes, (sabhāga) etc. do not possess the potency of projecting results because the projecting takes place only in the state of presence. An (already) projected result is not, on its part, connected with (new potency of) projection, because otherwise a regresus ad infinitum would result. Therefore, no past dharmas can possess a kāritra and hence there is no confusion of time-marks.[1]

In this formulation of the kāritra theory Sǎmghabhadrá attempts to

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[1]yataḥ samprāptakāritro vartamāna uccyate, uparatakāritro'titaḥ, aprāptkāritro'nāgata ityadhvānaḥ kāritreṇa vyavasthitāḥ. kiṁ punaratra kāritramabhipretam.....darśanādilakṣaṇo vyāpārah, yathā pancānāṁ caksurādināṁ darśanādikam - yatascaksuḥ pasyati srotram sṛnoti ghrānam jighrati jihvā svādayatītyādivijñānasyāpi vijñātṛtvam vijānātīti kṛtva rūpādināmindriyagocaratvam....

dharmānāṁ kāritramucyate phalākṣepasaktiḥ, natu phalajanaṁ, nacātītānāṁ sabhāgahetvādīnāṁ phalākṣepa'sti, vartamānavasthāyāmevākṣiptatvāt. nacākṣiptasyākṣepo yukto'navasthāprasangāt. tasmādtītānāṁ na kāritrasambhava iti nāsti lakṣaṇasaṁkara iti. TattvasamgrahaPanjika, op. cit., p. 506.

meet three specific objections raised by Sautrāntikas against Sarvāstivāda

conception of kāritra. In order to present the Sautrāntikas objections

against kāritra being the basis of temporal differentiation we may refer to

its formulation in Tattvasamgraha:

1. If kāritra means vyāpāra, activity or operation of seeing, etc.,

   then how can we account for the eye-fascimile (tatsabhāga-cakṣu)

   being called present when it is not exercising its function of

   seeing (darśana).[1]

2. Acceptance of the function of phaladāna as the definiedum of kāritra

   would entail confusion or co-mingling of the determining character-

   istics (lakṣaṇasaṁkara) of the past and the present in the same

   dharma.[2]

3. If kāritra is conceived as including both phaladāna and phalagrahaṇ

   then this would imply the semi-presence (ardha-varttamānatva) of the

   past dharmas as sabhāgahetu or vipākahetu. In the case of sabhāga-

   hetu or vipākahetu at least one of the constituent factors of kāritra

   (phaladāna and phalagrahaṇa) is present. Consequently, it is past-

   cum-present - a contingency which is not free from the confusion or

   co-mingling of the characteristics (lakṣaṇasaṁkara).[3]

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[1]See Abhidharmkośam, op. cit., 1974, p. 808; Sphutartha, op. cit.,
1972, p. 808 ; and, Tattvasamgrah Panjika, op. cit., p. 506.

[2]Ibid.

[3]ardhakāritrasya va (prasaṅgah) lakṣaṇasamkarah. Abhidharmkośam,
op. cit., p. 808. Also see, Sphutartha, op. cit., 1972, p. 808.

However, in the reformulation of the _kāritra_ theory by Samghabhadra these difficulties are cleverly and adroitly avoided. By defining _kāritra_ as the potency (_sakti_) only of projecting results (_phalākṣepa = grahana_)[1] and not the actual generation of the result, Samghabhadra tends to overcome the objections of _laksanasamkara_ against the _kāritra_ theory. Samghabhadra avoids the difficulties that plagued Vasumitra's formulation by insisting that _kāritra_ must be defined only as the potency for _phalagrahana_ (also called _phalākṣepa_, acquisition of effectivity) and that this alone must be regarded as the sole criterion of a _dharma_ being called present. The past _dharmas_ have no such capacity, and therefore they are not even semi-present (_ardhavartamāna_).[2] To be present is to be vested with the potency for effectivity. The occasional coincidence of the actual generation of effects (_phaladāna_) with the acquisition of effectivity (_phalapratigraha_) does not imply a necessary concomitance of the two. The actual generation or production of effect is not the distinctive feature of presentness for it is also discerned in the past _dharmas_. But the projection of an effect (the act of throwing out) and the potency for this projection can be discerned only in the present.[3] The presence of _kāritra_ and its operation is thus possible only in the present _dharmas_. This possibility being excluded

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[1] See Supra, p. 234.

[2] See Samghbhadra cited in _Tattvasamgrah Panjika, op. cit._, p. 506.

[3] _Ibid._

from the past, the contingency of the confusion of the temporal character-
istic is thus avoided.

Samghabhadra further makes a distinction between sāmarthya and
kāritra of a dharma. In his response to the Sautrāntika critique that
kārtira cannot be the basis of time-distinctions in dharmas because it
involves a confusion or co-mingling of the time-marks (adhvalakṣaṇanam sam-
kāro bahvet), Samghabhadra points out the failure of Sautrāntikas to
appreciate the significance of the Sarvāstavādin's understanding of the
dharmasvabhāva. There is a distinction between the sāmarthya and kāritra
of a dharma. While both of them are śaktis of a dharma they are not iden-
tical. While sāmrthya may be obstructed by extraneous circumstances and
its operation may be subject to external hinderances kāritra is intrinsi-
cally constitutive of the dharmasvabhāva and accordingly it is immune from
the obstructions which may hinder the operation of the sāmarthya of a
dharma. All the difficulties that the Sautrāntika sees as diminishing the
explanatory value of kāritra theory emanate from their failure to appre-
ciate the distinction between the two. As Samghabhadra puts it;

> The śaktis of a dharma are of two kinds: one is called
> kāritra, the other is called sāmarthya. Kāritra has been
> defined as a phalākṣepasāmarthya, but kāritra is not al-
> ways identical with sāmarthya. There exists also a sāmar-
> thya which is different from kāritra. If for example, in
> darkness the eye sees the rūpas, its sāmarthya is obstructed
> by an āvaraṇa, but not its kāritra. The darśanasāmarthya
> is obstructed by the tamas and it is why, in darkness, the
> eye is not able to perceive the rūpas. But its kāritra
> (which is identical with) 'projecting an effect' (phalāk-
> ṣepa) is not obstructed by darkness. The eye is able to
> project an effect also in darkness.

Apart from the present condition (<u>avasthā</u>), karitra is absent, because it arises only in dependence with the present. (A <u>dharma</u>) the <u>kāritra</u> of which is destroyed, is not absolutely inactive (<u>niṣkriya</u>): when an other <u>svabhāva</u> originates, it may become its determinant. But this (determination) is not <u>kāritra</u>, it is only <u>samarthya</u>. Because (a <u>dharma</u>) can project an effect only when it is present. What is (absolutely) inactive cannot project its special effect (<u>na svaphalam aksipati</u>) and only the projection of a special effect is called <u>kāritra</u>.[1]

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[1] <u>Nyāyānusāraśāstra</u>, çf. Schayer, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., pp. 38-39.

Kāritra And The Svabhāva Of Dharma

The relationship of kāritra to the svabhāva of dharma has been problematic within the framework of Sarvāstivāda ontology. Sautrāntika have capitalized upon the ambiguity and mystification that infests the Sarvāstivāda explication of this relationship. Sarvāsitvāda postulates kāritra to be the mark of existent only in the mode of actuality and thereby tries to account for the temporal distinctions of dharma as real in terms of the actual operation of the potency of projection of effectivity (phalākṣepa or phalagrahaṇa) in the present. Sautrāntika, while accepting the proposition that causal efficiency or the capacity for effectivity is the mark of real as present, (arthakriyākāritra), further assert that there is no other way that real can exist. Effectivity or efficiency is the mark of the present and as such real can only be present; past and future lacking such efficiency are devoid of reality. Sautrāntikas reache at this conclusion through a comprehensive critique of the nature of kāritra and its relationship to dharmasvabhāva. Probably Sarvāstivādins too realized the difficulties involved in their formulation of the relationship and consequently settled for the unpredicability of this relationship.[1]

The Sautrāntika raised objections against Sarvāstivāda conception of Kāritra on the ground that it is neither different from nor identical with the dharmasvabhāva and as such it can not be the basis of temporal

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[1]See infra, pp. 246-248.

distinctions. Refusing to accept any other possibility of the relationship between the kāritra and the dharmasvabhāva the Sautrāntika proposes that the acceptance of any of the two alternative by the Vaibhāṣikās would imply consequences that are irreconcilable with the basic tenets of Vaibhāṣika thought. If we accept the substantial difference between the kāritra and the svabhāva of a dharma then we will have to accept the antecedent and subsequent unreality of dharmas because of the fact that kāritra has been accepted to be operative only in the present on account of which alone a dharma is held to be a hetu and saṁskṛta (that which conditions and is conditioned). If on the other hand, kāritra is identical with the svabhāva of a dharma then kāritra too will be permanent and eternal like the dharma and as such it cannot be the basis of temporal distinctions in dharmas. Śāntarakṣita maintains:

> These (sarvāstivādins) will have to admit that kāritra
> is either different from, or the same as, the dharma.
> There is no other way in which they can exist. If it
> is something different from the object, then the past
> and future states of present dharmas would have to be
> regarded without any reality, for they are causes and
> are embellished, and so forth like the kāritra. Other-
> wise (if they are not different) permanence will follow
> on account of the ever-presence of the svabhāva of a
> dharma. Indeed, besides substantial identity there is
> no other essential mark of permanence.[1]

The Sautrāntika formulates the following critique of kāritra theory:

Considering that the kāritra in question is different from the

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[1] taiḥ kāritramidaṁ dharmādanyattadrūpameva vā, abhyupeyaṁ yadanyā 'sti
gatiḥ kācinna vāstavī; Tattvasaṁgraha, op. cit., p. 506.
anyatve vartamānānāṁ pragurdhvaṁ va' svabhāvatā hetutvasaṁskṛtatvādeḥ
kāritrasyeva gamyatām; Ibid., p. 507.
anyatha nityatāpattiḥ svabhāvāvasthiteḥ sadā naitadrūpātiriktaṁ hi
vidyate nityalakṣaṇam; Ibid.

dharma the unreality (nihsvabhāvatā) of the present dharma in its

antecedent and subsequent states will have to be accepted. Reason

for the subsequent and antecedent unreality of the dharmas as pre-

sent consist in the fact that being different from the kāritra, it

must contain in itself the ground for its phenomenal existence

i.e. being a cause and being contingent or imbellished. In either

respect the dharma is like kāritra which also functions as cause and

is the ground of contingency and which is non-existent in the sub-

sequent and precedent states.[1]

5.　　If, on the other hand, the present dharma were not unreal (nihsvab-

hāva) in the past and future states, then all the samskṛta dharmas

which are defined as contingent and embellished will have to be

regarded as eternal. In other words "if there were no antecedent

and no subsequent unreality, then the permanence (nityatā) of all

which is contingent (samskṛta) would arise, because the svabhāva of

a dharma would continue to be always (sarvadā vyavasthitatvāt).

Indeed, apart from the constant reality (sadāsattva) there is no

other essential mark of permanence or eternality."[2] But according

to Sarvastivada only asamskṛta dharmas are eternal or permanent.

The thrust of the Sautrāntika's argument is that the postulation of

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[1]Tattvasamgraha, op. cit., p. 507.

[2]anyathā yadi prāgurdhva ca nihsvabhāvatā na syāttadā sarvasya
samskṛtasya nityatā prapnoti, svabhāvasya sārvadā vyavasthitatvāt, na ca
sadāsattvavyatirekeṇa nityatvalakṣaṇamasti; Ibid.

kāritra as different from the dharma implies consequences which are not compatible with the basic tenets of Sarvāstivāda. Moreover, the admission of kāritra as something different from the dharmas will amount to the contradiction of the fundamental thesis of the Buddhist doctrine contained in the declaration of the Buddha: All things (sarvam), Brahmanas, are included in the five skandhas, twelve āyatanas and eighteen dhātus. Thus the reality of a kāritra is obviously rejected by the great teacher.[1]

Sautrāntika then analyses the second alternative that the kāritra is identical with the dharma. Here too the primary concern is to show the incompatibility of the position with the basic tenets of Sarvāstivādins. The strategy employed is to propose two mutually exclusive alternative positions none of which can be acceptable to the opponent. Any other alternative having been excluded the opponents position is rendered redundant.[2]

Sāntarakṣita offers the following arguments against the proposition that kāritra is identical with the dharma:

> If, on the other hand, the kāritra is not different from the dharma, then, being inseparable from the dharma it will be there at all times, just like the nature of the dharma. And therefore the distinctions of Time could not be made on the basis of this (kāritra), for there would be no possibility of distinction between the cessation, attainment or non-attainment of that (kāritra).[3]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] This method of argument is called prasanga and has been extensively employed in the later Buddhist circles, specially by the Madhyamikas.

[3] ananyatve'pi kāritram dharmādyyatirekatah svarupamiva dharmasya prasktam sārvakālikam, Tattvasamgraha, op. cit., p. 507.
tatścādhvavibhago'yam tadvasānnaprakalpyate na hi tasva cyutih prāptirapraptirvā vibhāgatah, Ibid.

Accepting the non-difference of the kāritra from the dharma implies its inseparability from the dharma just like the svarupa of the dharma. And in that case kāritra would be something existing at all times. Accordingly there cannot be any distinction of times based on kāritra: that which has ceased its kāritra is 'past', that which has attained its kāritra is 'present' and that which has not attained its kāritra is the unarrived 'future'. It is only when the distinction of the attaininment and non-attainment of the kāritra is made that we can make any distinction of the past, present and future dharmas. But however, if kāritra is identical with the dharma then such distinctions are not possible. Conversely, if kāritra is non-different from the dharmā, the dharma too, like the kāritra, will have only a reality of the middle point, i.e. of the present only. The dharma, being like the kāritra, will be devoid of the previous and later states, and as such its total reality will be condensed in the present only.[1] The unreality of the past and future will result.

The Sarvāstivādins are unpurturbed by these prasangas proposed by the Sautrāntikas. They maintain that the two prasangas which accept only the possibilities of identity or difference of the kāritra and dharma do not exhaust all the possibilities. The Sarvāstivādins propose another alternative according to which kāritra and dharma are and are not identical:

> the two prasangas do not exhaust all possibilities of the
> problem. Indeed, besides difference and identity of

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[1] Ibid., p. 508.

káritra and dharma a third theory is possible according
to which káritra and dharma are and are not identical.
This is just our stand-point. We teach that káritra
does not exist independently as·something different
from the dharma, but we deny that the káritra is simply
identical with the dharma and that it lasts permanently.[1]

The Sarvāstivādins are wary of the prasanga argument on two counts:
First, they explicitly maintain that samskrta dharmas are not eternal.[2]
Eternality or permanence as opposed to the momentary existence is assigned
only to asamskrta dharmas. Samskrta dharmas are subject to the four
marks of impermanence or conditionedness and consequently they are not
eternal. Thus the element of eternality presupposed in the aforesaid
Sautrāntika argument is misplaced, for they admit all dharmas (except the
asamskrtas) as subject to the four characteristics of the conditioned, viz.
origination, decay, continuity and impermanence (asamskrta-laksana-yogan
na sāsvavaprasangah). Thus the prasanga that the non-difference of kā-
ritra with the dharma in the middle moment of present implies eternality
of the káritra is redundant. When dharma itself is not conceived as
eternal how can káritra be eternal? The prasanga in question is miscon-
ceived in as much-as it is based on the possibility of the eternality of
káritra being intrinsic to the Sarvāstivādin postulation of the identity
of káritra with the dharma. This tacit supposition is necessary for deduc-
ing the prasanga formulated by the Sautrāntika. This very starting point
is, however, erroneous. The Vaibhāsikas do not teach that kāritra possesses
the three times.

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[1]Schayer, op. cit., p. 42.

[2]Supra, p. 175-176.

The other prasanga, as we saw, points out that the kāritra and dharma cannot be different because their difference would imply the unreality (nihsvabhāvtā) of the dharma in its precedent and subsequent states. Other wise, if the unreality of the present dharma in precedent and subsequent states is not accepted then the permanence or eternality of saṃskrta dharma will have to be accepted. Moreover, the acceptance of kāritra as different from the dharma will amount to the acceptance of the existence of something other than the five skandhas, twelve āyatanas and eighteen dhātus.

The whole prasange is misconceived in as much as it tends to look at kāritra as an entity which is different from the dharma. Differentiation of the kāritra from the dharma past, present and future is based on the functional differentiation of the dharmas as past, present and future. Present dharma is distinguished from the past and future precisely in terms of the operation or actualization of the potency for effectivity. Kāritra in operation and kāritra as a mere potency having-been-realized and to-be-realized are basically functional terms which define the temporal distinctions of dharmas or kāritra. Moreover, Sautrāntikas can bring in the prasanga arguments against the kāritra only because they tend to confuse reality with existent. This becomes all the more apparent when they tend to define permanence in terms of constancy of reality (naca sadāsattvavyatireken nityatvalakṣaṇamasti). Eternality or permanence can only be defined in terms of constant existence (sarvadāstitva) and not in terms of the constancy of reality (sadāsattva). Moreover, the objection that

postulation of kāritra contradicts the fundamental Buddhist doctrine that 'all'. means skandhas, āyatanas and dhātus is also off the mark. For according to Sarvāstivādins kāritra is not an entity over and against the reality of the dharma.[1]

Impredicability (anirvacanīyatva) of Kāritra

The Sarvāstivādins are aware of the difficulties involved in their characterization of kāritra as the ground or basis of all temporal differentiations. It is the difficulties involved in providing a more intelligible understanding of the relationship between the dharma and the kāritra that led them to describe the relationship as essentially ineffable. The four theories mentioned in the preceding chapters were partial attempts to account for the temporal variations in terms of the identity and difference of the dharmasvabhāva and are only partially able to resolve the issues. However, Sarvāstivādins had already realised the futility of verbal explication of the extremely evasive nature of the relationship of kāritra and svabhāva as early as the Mahāvibhāsā where the relationship was described as one of identity and difference and consequently beyond the grasp of categories of logical thinking operating in terms of either-or relationship. In Mahāvibhāsā we come across the following discussion:

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[1] We are not here concerned with the realtive logical adequacy of either of the positions concerned by themselves. What has been attempted here is to vindicate the plausibility of the Sarvāstivāda position.

Are kāritra and svabhāva the same or are they different:
it cannot be said categorically whether they are identi-
cal or different. Just as the svabhāva of each sasrva-
dharma possesses many lakṣaṇas as anitya etc., and it
cannot be said categorically whether they are identical
with or different from (these lakṣaṇas), such as the
case here. Therefore (the relationship) between kāritra
and svabhāva is not predicable.[1]

Saṃghabhadra in Nyāyānusārśāstra accepts the Mahāvibhāṣā definitions

of the relationship and describes them as one of identity and difference

and considers them essentially ineffable. Thus he writes:

the relation between kāritra and svabhāva is, just in the
same manner, not accessible to determination as in the
case with the relation between the dharmas and the saṃ-
tāna. In one word: kāritra and svabhāva are and are not
identical.[2]

Samghabhadra has taken strong exceptions to Sautrāntikas ridicule

of the theory of asserting the identity and difference of the kāritra and

the dharmasvabhāva.[3] The Sautrāntika's have rejected the doctrine of

identity and difference of kāritra and the Svabhāva as not deserving

serious consideration. However, Saṃghabhadra, maintaining that the iden-

tity and difference of kāritra is not an instance of arbitrariness which

can become the caprice of divine beings, not meriting consideration from

the point of view of serious reflection.

Quoting from the earlier Piṭakas Samghbhadra points out that Buddha

Bhagvāna himself has made statements like: Tathāgata is and is not

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[1] Mahāvibhāṣā, 394c, cf. Schayer, op. cit., p. 25.

[2] Nyāyānusārśāstra, 633a, cf. Schayer, Ibid.; also see Tattvasamgraha
Panjika, op. cit., p. 509.

[3] kāritram sarvadā nāsti, sadā dharmaśca varṇyate dharmān·nānyac ca
kāritraṃ vyaktaṃ devaviceṣṭitam. Tattvasamgrah, op. cit., p. 508; svabhāvah
sarvadā cāsti bhāvo nityaśca neṣyate na ca svabhāvād bhavo'nyo vyaktamiś-
varaceṣṭitam. Abhidharmkośam, op. cit., p. 811.

lokkóttara'; 'the dharmatā of the pratītyasamutpāda is and is not nitya'.[1]

He asks whether Buddha Bhagvana too be made subject to ridicule for these

utterances.

> We accept that dharmas are real always, and at the same
> time we teach that dharmas are not eternal.....the terms
> 'eternal' and 'not-eternal' are used here in two differ-
> ent senses.....The dharma lasts eternally but the dharma-
> bhāva changes. When the samskṛtadharmas wander across the
> Times, they do not lose their svabhāva and the kāritra
> which arises depends on pratyayās. Immediately after its
> origination, kāritra disappears. Therefore, we teach:
> the dharma is eternal but the dharmabhāva is not eternal.[2]

Some Concluding Observations

1.   Three distinct phases in the development of the Sarvāstiavadin con-

ception of kāritra can be discerned. Earliest version recorded in the

Mahāvibhāsā tends to identify the svabhāva and kāritra of a dharma.

Svabhāva of a dharma is defined in terms of its svakāritra. Seeing

defines the caksu dharma, for it is the special function of the eye, the

performance of which constitutes the very essence of the being of the

caksu-dharma. In the second phase the kāritra came to be understood in

terms of phalākṣepa-śakti which included both the moments of phala-grahaṇa

and phala-dāna. This formulation of kāritra by Vasumitra was a definite

advancement upon the simplicity of the Mahāvibhāsā which tends to look

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[1]Nyāyānusarśastra, 633c, cf. Scheyer, op. cit., p. 26.

[2]Ibid.

at kāritra only in terms of the specificity of the svabhāva of dharma.
In Vasumitra's formulation of the kāritra theory ·the twin moment of pha-
ladāna and phalagrahana are conceived as constituting a continuum through
which the phalotpādansāmarthya of a dharma operates. Phalotpadansāmarthya
as the specific moment which acts as the causal determinant of an other
svabhāva of a ,dharma,as the concomitant factor in the emergence of it,
tends to define kāritra not in terms of svakāritra or svabhāga of a dharma.
Kāritra here acquires a new meaning when it comes to be understood in terms
of its function of concomitant determination of an other svabhāva. Sam-
ghbhadra, however, goes beyond Vasumitra when he restricts the kāritra within
the limits of a dharma's potency or capacity for the projection or concep-
tion (phalāksepa· or phalagrahana) of a phala.

2.   In his definition of kāritra Samghbhadra excludes the moment of
phaladāna (actual production of the effect) and thereby overcomes the ob-
jection of laksanasamkaratva brought by Sautrāntikas against the Sarvāst⸍-
vādin conception of kāritra. His theory also tends to retain the original
Mahāvibhāsā concern with the svabhāva or savkāritra of a dharma and thereby
does away with the ontological dispersion that tends to split up internal
unity of a dharma by distinguishing between the svabhāva and svakāritra of
a dharma. It is the kāritra of a dharma that defines the svabhāva of a
dharma in the three modes of its being. The difference between the past,
present and future dharma does not consist in the absence or presence of
its kāritra which also constitutes its svabhāva. However, the temporal
distinctions reflect the state (avasthā) of a kāritra (potency for

effectivity). This potency may either be latent or patent; accordingly

it will determine the presentness, pastness or futurity of a _dharma._

Thus:

> All _samskṛtadharmas_ in the state (_avasthā_) of _phalākṣepa_
> are called present. This state of _phalākṣepa_ is "pre-
> viously" and "subsequently" inexistent. In accordance
> (with this previous and subsequent inexistence) the dis-
> tinction of the three Times is established. Past and
> Future are real just as the Present. In brief: although
> the _svabhāva_ of all _samskṛta-dharmas_ remains always the
> same, yet the 'potencies' are different. In this manner
> although the _svabhāva_ of (the _dharmas_) as constituting
> the three temporal moments is the same, yet, their _kāritra_
> is not without differentiation.[1]

It seems to us that the relationship between the _dharmasvabhāva_ and

kāritra can only be udnerstood and defined as exemplifying the duality of

aspects of the _dharmas._ Professor Stcherbatsky has tried to define Sar-

vāstivādin ontology as asserting the duality "of two different planes

of two sets of elements".[2] However, we tend to see at Sarvāstivādin onto-

logy as implying only a duality of aspects. To our way of understanding

kāritra cannot be considered as supplementing the _svabhāva_ of a _dharma_;

neither can it be considered as the second element or the second nature of

the element. It is equally wrong to maintain that _kāritra_ is the _dharma_

itself or the _svalakṣana_ of the _dharma._ Indeed, Samghabhadra takes great

pains to reject this theory. Both _Tattvasaṁgraha_ and _Nyāyānusaraśastra_

record Sarvāstivādin's denial of this alternative. The duality of aspects

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[1]_Ibid._

[2]Stcherbatsky, _Central Conception of Buddhism_, _op. cit._, p. 42.

implied in the Sarvāstivādin ontology of dharmasvabhāva comes out very

clearly if we remember that the difference between kāritra of a dharma

as the phalākṣepśakti (power of projecting effects) and the svakāritra

of dharma, equivalent to the svalakṣaṇa of a dharma consisting both of

phaladāna (projecting effect) and phalagrahaṇa (receiving effect), is fun-

damental. Undermining this fundamental difference will lead to the pos-

tulation of total identity or total independence of the dharma and kāritra;

either of the two alternatives being unacceptable to the Sarvāstivādins.

The only alternative that seems to be admissible within the framework of

Sarvāstivādin ontology is the one which looks at the relationship be-

tween the essential nature of being and its phenomenal manifestation as

one of identity in difference. Indeed phalākṣepasakti is an accidental

characteristic of a dharma, it is only kadācikta (adventitous). But even

as kadacikta when it is operative it defines the total being and cannot be

conceived in isolation from the being of dharma. It is only when it is

not operative, i.e. when it is only a potency, that a conceptual distinc-

tion between the two is possible. However, as a potency it does not have

an independent status and actuality. Though it is distinctly discernible

it is not cognized as different from the dharma. This relationship we

prefer to describe one of bhedābheda or identity in difference. Instead

of characterizing it as a logically different position, different alike from

identity and difference, we prefer to understand this "identity in difference"

as implying the inherent character of the dual aspects intrinsic to reality.

Thus, the characterization of the relationship as ineffable simply expresses

the logical difficulty in expressing the relationship of kāritra and

svabhāva on lines of mere identity and difference.

While Santraksita and Kamalsila seem to have realized certain difficulties involved in the Sarvāstivāda doctrine of kāritra,their critique fails to see the real significance of the Sarvāstivāda formulations of the dharmasvabhāva. Dharma for Sarvāstivāda is not an eternal entity as Samtrakṣita seems to suggest. As a matter of fact, dharma is neither an entity nor eternal in the usual sense of the term. Sarvāstivāda is an assertion of the reality of all dharmas (sarvam asti), but it is·not the assertion of the existence of all dharmas in all times (sarvadā asti) as the Sautrāntikas would like us to believe. Given this understanding of the essential nature of dharma it would be wrong to postulate that dharma or dharmasvabhāva is conceived by Sarvāstivādin to be eternal or permanent. Permanence or substantial identity of dharma in all the three periods of time is not what Sarvāstivāda proposes. A dharma whether past, present or future is essentially momentary (kṣanika). Momentary existence of dharmas as real specific events that go into the making of phenomenal existence at one specific moment of its life history is indubitible. The reality of dharmas as past, present and future cannot be gainsaid. A dharma having lost its existence and actuality as present surely does not lose its reality. Its ongoing influence on the phenomenal existence through vāsanās attests to the continued reality of dharmas as past. An essential overlooking of what may be described as distinction between the existence and reality, or actuality and being of·the dharma lies at the basis of the Sautrāntika critique of Sarvāstivāda. The difficulties which,according to Sautrāntika's,beset its conception of dharmas as formulated by the

Sarvāstivādin, do not seem to be intractable once the significance of the above distinction is grasped. The explanatory value of a similar distinction was seen in an earlier context when we sought to interpret the Sāmkhya-Yoga distinction of the real and the existent.

PART III

SĀMKHYA-YOGA AND ĀBHIDHARMA BUDDHISM

IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

CHAPTER X

TEMPORAL BECOMING AND THE REAL:

THE ABHIDHARMIKA AND SAMKHYA-YOGA PERSPECTIVE

In this chapter we will attempt to look at the question of temporal

becoming in the context of its relationship to the thing which undergoes

change. We will try to show that for both, the Sāmkhya-Yoga and Abhidharma

Buddhism, the question of temporal becoming is integral to the question of

the reality status of that which undergoes change. However, there are

important differences between the two systems' understanding of the dy-

namism of the temporal process. According to Abhidharmika, real does not

have a mode of being other than the mode of becoming. A dharma is self-

subsistent; it carries its own nature (svabhāva). That which 'becomes'

changes in its totality. There is no residuum or constancy of a self-

identical substance. On the other hand, according to Sāmkhya-Yoga, the

temporal process involves only one aspect of the reality. This, the chang-

ing aspect of reality, is called dharma in Sāmkhya-Yoga terminology. But

this does not exhaust the real in its completeness. There is an aspect

of real which is constant and self-identical. This is the dharmin, the

common referrential content which remains constant through the changing

phases of the real. While for Abhidharma Buddhism temporal becoming exempli-

fies the constancy of the 'continuum' (samtāna), the Sāmkhya-Yoga speaks of

the constancy of the continuant (samtānī).

The Abhidharmika Doctrine of the "Mutual Otherness" (Anyathātva) of Temporal Distinctions

Abhidharmika sources record as many as four theories of temporality proposed by the Sarvāstivādins. These four variations of Sarvāstivādin's account of temporal differentiation are confirmed by different sources and the possibility of their having been proposed by different Sarvāstivādin thinkers at different times cannot be confirmed by any direct evidence drawn from the period. These four teachers probably belong to the period of the Buddhist Council at the time of Kanishka. The Vibhāsā or Mahāvibhāsā which is assigned to this period seem to mention these four versions of Sarvāstivāda. It seems reasonable to believe that the name of various teachers came to be associated with the different Sarvāstivāda position about the same time. While the historical question is not our primary concern, it may be of some interest to note that similarity be- tween some of these positions and certain facets of some Buddhist posi- tions mentioned as erroneous views on time by Vibhāsā is quite striking.[1]

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[1] These four variations of Sarvāstivāda is mentioned in Mahāvibhāsā, where the other three are rejected in favour of Vasumitra (infra, p.240). See Warder, A. K., op.cit., pp. 346-347. Later we find Vasubandhu echoing this tradition and accepting the Vasumitra's formulation as the best. Thus, trtiyah (Vasumitra's) sobhanah, Abhidharmakosam, op. cit., p. 808. The theories are also mentioned by Yosomitra, the celebrated commentator on Abhidharmakosa as well as by Sāmtarakṣita and Kamalsíla in Tattva- samgrahaand Tattvasamgrah Panjika respectively. But it is important to note that while the later tradition following Vasabandhu has invariably regarded them as four representative positions within Sarvāstivāda, Mahāvibhāṣa which was composed to settle the controversial issues within Sarvāstivāda tradition explicitly rejected the three in favour of Vasu- mitra's as the representative doctrine of Sarvāstivāda. See Warder, A. K., op. cit., pp. 346-347.

It seems to us that the congruity between later records reflecting Sarvāstivādin's understanding of temporal differentiation and the earlier records in Mahāvibhāsā is extremely important. It is on the basis of these passages in Mahāvibhāsā that Schayer argued that pre-Ābhidharmika Buddhism had a conception of Time as the reservoir or receptum of entities. It is our contention that not only the passages referred to do not belong to pre-Ābhidharmika Buddhism, but also that the conception enunciated there does not involve a reservoir ideal of Time.

The whole confusion specially with reference to Vasumitra, seems to have arisen from the ambiguity of the term avasthā which has both spatial and temporal connotations. Avasthā can be translated both as "a state of affair" or "a time span in the personal history" of an entity. A spatial reading or interpretation of the term avasthā in the passages of Mahāvibhāsā as well as in the context of the theories of the Ābhidharmikas to be considered, seem to have obscured a proper appraisal of Ābhidharmic conception of temporal determinations. It is an uncritical acceptance of the spatial rendering of the term avasthā that prompted Schayer, McDermott and others to suggest that temporal determinations in these four versions of temporality involves a conception of dharma as a free floating entity wandering through the three periods of time. However, a careful reading of the text does not substantiate their conclusion and it becomes clear that such spatial interpretations of avasthā theory seems quite off the mark.

The four theories proposed by these teachers may be looked upon as different ways to account for the fact of continuity (samtāna) in the phenomenal world despite it being the case that change is the characteristic

mark. It is a commonplace doctrine shared by the generality of all Buddhist Schools that the phenomenon of change characteristic of existence must be understood as total change. At the same time they also emphasise, in the same breath, the phenomena of continuity in keeping with the foundational insight of Buddha about the causal interconnectedness. To advert to the four theories propounded by the teachers of Sarvāstivāda. The upshot of the theories is: the dharmas, in the process of becoming, maintain their own nature (svabhāva), and changes which characterises existence relates to modes (bhāva) or character (laksana) or aspects (avasthā) or relational orientation (anyathānyathika) of the dharmas. The fact of change is acknowledged, but it is not supposed to affect the integrity of the nature of the dharmas. The differences within these theories refer to the specific understanding of change, but the persistence of "own nature" (svabhāva) through the entire spectrum of change is allowed. Change belongs to the very nature of dharmas and yet does not corrode them.

This basic insight is important for a proper appraisal of the Sarvāstivāda understanding of temporal becoming. What follows in the ensuing paragraphs is purported to be a descriptive account of the views of the four Sarvāstivādin thinkers. The exposition of the different theories is followed by a review of the parallelism of ideas in this connection that exists between them and the Sāmkhya-Yoga thesis, which also, formally stated, accords reality to the substantial permanence of things whose integrity remains unaffected by the modal changes.

Bhāvānyathātva of Dharmatrātā: According to Dharmatrātā, temporal becoming is nothing but transmutation of modes. A dharma acquires the

character of "ptherness" (ànyathātva) by a change in its modes. It is the differences in modes that constitute the distinguishing mark of a dharma's pastness, presentness and futurity.[1] A dharma remains identical in its own nature (dravyatah). Thus, according to Yaśomitra Dharmatrātā prescribes only the otherness of bhāva through the past, future and present mode of coming into existence; there is no otherness of the essence qua substance (dravyatah).[2] While Yaśomitra defines bhāva including both the form (ākṛti) and quality (guṇa),[3] Kamalśila mentions only quality (guṇa) being included under the definition of bhāva.[4] Kamlśila offers following rendering of Dharmtrātā's argument for bhāvānyathātva:

> When a dharma has entered into its course of actuality
> (dharmasyadhvasu) there is the ótherness only of bhāva,
> not of dravya. For example, the substance Gøld under-
> goes several changes in its qualities by virtue of which
> it comes to be called the 'armlet', 'necklet', 'ear-ring',
> etc., but there is no change of gold itself. Similarly,
> the dharma is differentiated in respect of the bhāvas of
> future etc. (like gold) the dharma, by abandoning its
> 'future' bhāva ,it attains the 'present' bhāva, and by
> discarding its present bhāva it acquires the past bhāva.
> And yet there is no .otherness of the dravya (of dharma),
> for there is no absence of the (dharma's) dravya (sarvatra
> dravyasyavyabhicārāt).[5]

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[1] bhāvānyathiko bhadantadharmtrātah. sa kilahaḍharmasyādhvasu pravar-
tamānasya bhāvānyathātvam. bhavati,.....dharmo'pyanāgatādadhvanaḥ pratyut-
pannamadhvāna⌐māgacchannānāgatabhāvam jahāti, na drayabhāvam.....Abhidharma-
kośam, op. cit., pp. 805-806.

[2] atītānāgata-pratyutpannasya bhāvasyā⌐nyathātvam bhavati, na dravyān-
yathātvam; The Sphutārthā, op. cit., p. 805.

[3] yathākramamākṛtiguṇanyathātvajñāpanārtham; Ibid.

[4] kah punarbhāvaste neṣtah?guṇayiśeṣah, yato'tītādyabhidhānajñāna-
pravṛttih; Tattvasamgrah Panjika, op. cit., p. 504.

[5] Ibid.

Kamalsíla equates <u>dravya</u> with the <u>svabhāva</u> of <u>dharma</u> and its trans-
lation as substance is only literal and misses the true import of the fi-
gurative use.[1] In Yaśomitra's formulation of the argument the true import
of <u>bhāvānyathātva</u> is well articulated. Thus, milk, when transformed into
curds, changes its qualities of taste, digestibility, etc., but its <u>rūpa</u>
<u>dharma</u> (material nature) remains unchanged.[2] Yaśomitra's formulation of
the argument clearly recognizes the continuity of the <u>svabhāva</u> or <u>svalak-</u>
<u>ṣana</u> of <u>dharma</u>, not without, but through the changes in its <u>bhāva</u>. Thus,
though <u>bhāvas</u> of <u>dharma</u> undergoes change "there is no otherness (temporal
distinction) of the <u>svalakṣana</u> of <u>rūpa</u> etc. (<u>dharmas</u>) on account of this
(na rūpādi-svalakṣanasyanyathātvam)."[3] The <u>bhāva</u> which consists of form
<u>(akṛti)</u> and quality <u>(guna)</u> passes away, but the rupa dharma (the material
nature), in which the bhāvas find their ground, does not cease to be.
"Thus, the examples of gold and milk given above refer to the transmutation
of form and quality respectively and show the continuity of the <u>rūpa dharma</u>."[4]

     Thus Dharmtrātā reduces becoming to <u>bhāva-anyathātva</u> or reciprocal

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[1] Jha seems to have missed this and has made preciesly this mistake.
However, the substance language as such is inappropriate to Sarvāstivādins.
See <u>Tattvasangraha</u> (tr.) Jha, Ganganath, Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1939,
Vol. 2, p. 862.

[2] Sphutārtha in the <u>Abhidharmakośam</u>, 1972, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. 806.

[3] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 805.

[4] suvarṇam kṣiram ceti dṛstāntadvayam yathākramamākṛti guṇānyathātva-
jñāpanārtham; <u>Ibid</u>., p. 806.

otherness in the bhāva (manner of being, manifestation or appearance) of a dharma which itself stands spanning the reciprocal distinctions.[1] The changes wrought on dharma are mere epistemological precipitates, its mode of manifestation to consciousness. The problem of temporal evolution is solved by assigning to it a modal status of reality instead of making it intrinsic to it. Accordingly, temporal becoming does not touch the essential core of being.

Laksana-anyathātva of Ghoṣaka: Ghoṣaka accounts for temporal differentiation in terms of the lakṣaṇas (character) of the dharma. There is simultaneity of the lakṣaṇas of past, present and future in each dharma and that a dharma is called past, present or future respectively when one of these lakṣaṇas are patent and other two are latent.[2] According to Ghoṣaka's laksana anyathātva:

> when the dharma has entered into its course of existence it is said to be 'past' when it has emerged as vested with the lakṣaṇa of past without however being, at the same time deprived of the lakṣaṇa of the future and the present. The futurity and the presentness (of a dharma) are to be explained the same way (as one may explain a man's not being disinterested in other women even though he is attached to his own. The empirical applicability

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[1]For a modern attempt to look at this doctrine in the light of contemporary logic of de-tensers see McDermott, A. Charles, The Sautrāntika Argument Against the Traikālyavāda, Philosophy East & West, 24.2, April 1974, pp. 193-200.

[2]laksanānyathiko bhadantaghoṣakah sa kilāhadharmo'dhvasu pravarttamāno'tīto'tītalaksanayuktah; anāgatapratyutpannābhyāmaviyuktah. evam pratyutpanno'pyatītānāgatābhyāmaviyuktah. The Abhidharmkośam, op. cit., 1972, p. 806.

(vyvahāra) (of temporal distinctions) rest on the fact of the acquisition of the character (vṛtti) of the specific lakṣaṇa.[1]

Thus the dharma as essence remains intact while its temporal phases vary on account of the pre-eminence of the specific lakṣaṇa of past, present and future.[2] A dharma, in the course of its existence, is vested with the character of 'past' on account of its pre-eminence; but the temporal phase of past does not totally exclude the phases of present and future. If the future were exclusive of the present and past, it would never become present or past, because what was not can never be (na bhutvā bhavah).[3] Significantly, it is not that the dharmas belong to the three time phases of past, present and future, but the lakṣaṇas of past, present and future belong to dharma itself. The future, the present and the past phases are thus found to co-exist together. The specific nature of the character of past, present and future remain unexplored in the explications of Ghosaka's view in the Abhidharma Kośa and the Tattva Samgraha. However, we have occasion to dwell upon this in our exposition of the Abhidharmika notion of Kāritra and its bearing on their understanding of the temporal becoming.

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[1] dharmo'dhvasu vartamāno'tīto'tītalakṣaṇayukto'nāgataprtyutpannābhyām lakṣaṇābhyāmaviyuktaḥ, yatha puruṣa ekasyām striyām raktaḥ śeṣāsvavirakta evamanāgatapratyutpannāvapi vācye. hyatītādilakṣaṇavṛttilābhāpekṣo vyavahara iti purvakādbhedaḥ. Tattva Samgraha Panjika, op. cit., p. 504.

[2] lakṣaṇānyathikasya lakṣaṇavṛttilābhāpekṣo vyavahārah. Sphutārthā, 5.26, op. cit., p. 806.

[3] vartamānam atītānāgatābhyām viyuktam anāgatameva vartamānam, vartamānamevātītam syāt. Ibid.

Suffice it to note here that the alternation in the temporal phases is not attached to the dharma's essence (svabhāva) itself. Rather, change is explained in terms of a dharma's adjuncts.

Anyathā-anyathika of Buddhdeva: The specific purpose of Buddhdeva is to explain the temporal becoming by distinguishing and defining the past, present and future existence of dharma precisely in the context of a dharma and its relationship to other dharmas. Temporal determinations are nothing but the expression of the relationship of one dharma to others. Thus a dharma is called differently as future or present or past with reference to the prior or the posterior dharma.[1] A dharma:

> is called future in relation to the past and the present which are prior to it; it is called present in relation to the past which is prior to it and in relation to the future which is posterior to it; it is called past in relation to the present and the future which are posterior to it.[2]

The case of the same woman being designated as mother in relation to her daughter, and daughter in relation to her mother is an instance in point. As Kamalsíla points out:

> Having entered the course of actuality a dharma is called one or the other in accordance with its relation to what has gone before and what is ahead. For example, the same

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[1] anyathānyathiko bhadantabuddhadevaḥ sa kilāḥdharmo'dhvasu pravṛrta-mānaḥ purvāparampekṣayānyo'nya ucyate avasthāntarataḥ, na dravyāntarataḥ. Abhidharmakosam, op. cit., p. 807.

[2] pūrvam̐evātītaṁ vartamānaṁ va̐pekṣyānāgata iti. purvam vatītam, aparaṁ vā'nāgatam apekṣyā vartmāna iti, apáram̐eva vartamānam̐ānāgataṁ va̐peksyātīta iti... Sphutārtha 5.26, op. cit., p. 807.

&

> women is called 'mother' and 'daughter'. Similarly the
> usage (of temporal distinctions) is also dependent upon
> the past and the future (dharmas). A dharma related to
> an antecednet but without any subsequent is called future;
> that which has its antecedent as well as its subsequent
> is called present; that which has only its subsequent
> but no antecedent moments is called 'past'.[1]

Thus, according to the theory of ananyathātatva temporal determination

is explained in terms of the diverse orientational features or relation-

ship of an invariant dharma.

Avastha-anyathātva of Vasumitra: Most celebrated of the four varia-

tions of Sarvāstvāda theories of temporality is attributed to Bhadanta

Vasumitra. Vasumitra equates kāritra (causal efficiency) with the avastha

of a dharma and accordingly proposes that dharmas are continuants, the

applicability of the temporal phases (avasthā) of 'past','present' and

'future' being due to each dharma's kāritra.[2] Vasumitra maintains:

> A dharma, having entered the course of actuality, it is
> designated variously according to the variations in avastha
> (conditions of states) and not on account of the dravya
> (or svabhāva). The dravya remains the same in the three
> time variations. Just as the clay counting piece in an
> abacus, when placed in the place of units is designated
> as one, in the place of hundreds is called "hundred" and
> in the place of thousands is called "thousand", similarly

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[1]dharmo'dhvasu vartamānah purvāparamapekṣyānyonya ucyate iti.
yathaikā stri mātā cocyate duhitā ceti. asya pūrvāparāpekso vyavahārah,
yasya pūrvamevāsti nāparah so'nāgatah, yasya pūrvamasti aparam ca sa
vartamānah, yasyāparameva na purvam so'tita. The TattvasaṁgrahaPanjika,
op. cit., p. 504.

[2]avastha'nyathiko bhadantavasumitrah.....advānah kāritren vyavas-
thitāh. yadā sa dharmah kāritram na karoti tadā anāgatah. yadā karoti
tada pratyupannah yada kṛtva niruddhastadā iti. Abhidharmakosām, op.
cit., pp. 806-808.

a dharma (bhāva), when it is in the state of kāritra,
is called present, having ceased its kāritra is called
past, and while it has not acquired its kāritra, is
called future. Thus the applicability of (time desig-
nations) depends on the avasthā (of karitra) just as
in the case of abacus.[1]

Thus a dharma is designated as future when it does not exercise its kāritra
. (causal efficiency); it gets the designation of present when it does exer-
cise the kāritra; and it is designated past when it has already exercised
its kāritra. The temporal designation of a dharma then is a derivative of
the variations in the states (avasthā) of causal efficiency (kāritra). Va-
riation is only of state not of essence. The dharma acquires different
temporal significations only on account of the variations in its kāritra
while the svabhāva of dharma does not undergo any change.[2]

A more elaborate treatment of the notion of kāritra and its relation-
ship to the svabhāva (own nature) of the dharma must remain in abeyance at
this point. But to anticipate the difficulties that it encounters in the
Vasumitra's formulation of it and its further elaboration in a later thinker,
Saṁghabhadra, the following may be ovserved: whether the kāritra is defined
as the capacity of giving or grasping a result (phala-dāna-grahaṇa) or as
the potency to project a result (phalākṣepaśakti), in either way, one can see

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[1]Dharmo'dhvasu varttamāno'vasthāmavasthāṁ prāpyānyo'nyo nirdiśyate'
vasthāntarato, na dravyataḥ, dravsya triṣvapi kāleṣvabhinnatvāt. yathā
mṛdguḍikā ekaṅke prakṣiptā ekamityucyate, śataṅke śatam, sahastrāṅke
sahastraṁ, tatha kāritre'vasthito bhāvo varttamānastataḥ prachyuto'tīta-
stadaprāpto'nāgata iti. Tattva Saṁgrah Panjika, op. cit., p. 504.

[2]See Sphutārthā 5.26, op. cit., p. 808.

it faces some unsourmountable difficulties. If the dharma's functionality

(kāritra) is regarded as an aspect of the dharmasvabhāva, distinguishable

from dharma, the difficulty in explaining it adequately seems obvious.

What is there in the structure of becoming that accounts for the holding

of kāritra in abeyance at one time and becoming productive at another?

There is again the important question of the relationship between the

svabhāva and kāritra of a dharma. Indeed these are the very issues raised

in the scathing critique of the thesis of three times (traikālyavāda) by

the Sautrāntikas.[1]

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[1]A. Charles McDermott, in his recent article on the question, has
offered an excellent summary statement of the Sautrāntika critique of the
Kāritra doctrine. He writes: "whether Kāritra be defined as, for exam-
ple, the capacity of giving or grasping a result (phala-dāna-grahana) or,
again, as the potency to project a result (phalākṣepas'akti) insofar as a
dharma's functionality is thereby regarded as (1) an aspect of the dhar-
masvabhāva, distinguishable from the dharma, cogent reasons for that
functionality's being held in abeyance at one time, and becoming produc-
tive at another, cannot be given. (2) Neither is a halfway house, namely,
the theory that the dharmasvabhāva and its kāritra or functionality both
are and aren't identical, a congenial resting place.. (3) Nor is there
much solace to be derived from the evasive stance that the relationship
between svabhāva and kāritra is ineffable. (4) If, finally, a dharma's
kāritra is alleged to have a merely nominal existence (prajñaptisat), he
will ipso facto have conceded the Sautrāntika's point. McDermott, A.
Charles, op. cit., p. 197. While the grasp of the Sautrāntika position
reflected in the above passage is beyond doubt, what seems to have been
overlooked is the import of Sarvāstivāda ontology and its implications
for understanding the Karitra doctrine. Moreover, by bracketing the so-
teriological question and its bearing on the problem of time, he tends to
ignore the true import of the Sarvastivada formulations. As we shall see,
the soteriological questions which are integral to the Abhidharmika for-
mulations have weighed heavily in accepting the reality of dharma - past,
present and future.

The Parallelism of Sarvāstivāda and Sāmkhya-Yoga Doctrine of Change

The similarity of the Ābhidharmika views of change recorded by Vasu-
bandhu, Yaśomitra and Kamalśīla to the Sāmkhya-Yoga understanding of the
problem is too striking to be ignored or even treated casually. In fact,
Vasubandhu himself, while expounding the first of the four theories,
namely Dharmatrātā's thesis of change as transmutation of modes, labels
this view as the Samkhya thesis (Sāmkhya Pakṣa).[1] Likewise, the second
theory, namely that of Ghoṣaka, which conceives change as the transforma-
tion of one temporal phase into another (lakṣaṇyathā) bears close affi-
nity with the lakṣaṇapariṇāma of the Yogabhāṣya both in respect of termi-
nology and conception - and also in the manner in which the two notions
are illustrated. In the same manner, the theory of change as variation
of states (avasthānyathātva) finds its close analogue in the avasthā
pariṇāma of Yogabhāṣya, by which is meant changes of states assumed by
the underlying substratum and the consequent differences in the values
acquired at different moments of existence. Finally, the view of change
as temporal relativity associated with the name of Buddhadeva is corrobo-
rated in the Yoga thesis and illustration of different dharmas being dif-
ferently designated with regard to their mutual relative positions while
the substratum itself remains non-relative, i.e. constant.

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[1] Abhidharmakośam, op. cit., 1972, p. 807.

It is useful to go into this question of parallelism in some detail and see if it is merely terminological or also conceptual. If latter, we have to face the problem of explaining how the Saṁkhya-Yoga solution which partakes of the general ātman doctrine of Brahmanical orthodoxy (āstika-vāda) could find its place in the heart of Sarvāstivāda school of Buddhism. It is by no means suggested that this problem will admit of satisfactory resolution merely by virtue of the fact that it is encountered in the present context. In the light of the unmistakable affinities which exists side by side with the obvious differences the issue may even serve the purpose of re-opening the question of the radical opposition between the two philosophical traditions, at least in the genetical state of their respective development. Maybe, there has been a history of interaction between the two schools that one can discern here, even though from the very nature of the case and the general paucity of historical data one is not able to substantiate it through independent sources.

Let us briefly examine the parallel ideas with respect to each of the four theories. Dharmatrata's doctrine of bhāvānyathātva indeed looks identical with the dharmapariṇāma of Yoga philosophy.[1] What is described as modal transmutation (bhāvānyathātva) by Dharmatrātā is described as formal transmutation (samsthāna pariṇāma) by Vacaspati Miśra.[2] Each dharma gives place to the next dharma disappearing   meanwhile in the common substratum.

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[1] dharmasya dharmini vartamānsyaivādhvasvatītānāgatavartamāneṣu bhāvānyathātvam bhavati, na tu dravyānyathātvam. Yogabhāṣya, op. cit., 3.13, p. 112.

[2] Tattvavaiśāradi of Vācaspati Misra, on the above, op. cit., p. 113.

While noting the obvious and commonplace similarity one cannot also fail to note the dissimilarity. The Sarvāstivāda speaks of dharmas indeed as discrete elements (dravyas), but which are conditioned (samskṛta), subject as they are to origination, decay, continuity and impermanence. The only thing the dharmas seem exempt from passing into non-being; the future is replete with the possibility of all conditioned dharmas, which become present given the assemblage of conditions in its fullness, and in the very next moment passes into the past mode of existence to remain forever as potential of the origination of future dharmas in course of time. Even though, the dharma as discrete element functions, as it were, as its own substratum throughout the three moments of existence in which its modes (bhāva) changes. This distinction in respect of function is intrinsic to the structure of dharmas and in this respect it may be conceptually distinguishable from the Sāmkhya-Yoga. We, therefore, do not agree with the criticism that there is, here, a distinction "between" the '"dharma qua continuant" and the "dharma qua transitory" which is "done explicitly by different names, dharmin and dharma".[1] The Sarvāstivāda terminology of dharma seeks to steer clear of the distinctions of dharmin and dharma and imports in its place the notion of continuum. The Sarvāstivāda strives to verbalize an ontology of particulars that steers clear of a rigid logic of exclusion, dialectic of which leads to the Sautrāntika critique of the

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[1]Tatia, Nathmal, Savāstivāda: The Nava Nalanda Mahavihara Research Publication, Vol. II, Patna: Nava Nalanda Mahavihara, 1960.

theory and also of a logic of inclusion of the kind advocated by the Jainas.[1]

The second theory of laksanāmyathātva shifts the burden of change from the modes (bhāvas) to the phases (laksanas) which are temporal and becasue of which the modes may be conceived as changing. It is well known that the Yoga Bhāsya speaks of the temporal characteristic of a dharma as laksana which accounts for the ontological sequence of change between two different dharmas occurring in succession. The example of the sequence of clay lump and clay jar vis a vis the constant of clay given in Yoga Bhāsya is a case in point. While clay lump is present, i.e. actual , the clay jar is future, i.e. that which shall arise when the clay lump passes off. This temporal sequence of change is what is described as the sequence of the transmutation of the temporal character-istic (laksana parināma kramā).[2]

The objection of the confusion of times implicit in the thesis of laksana parinama is faced by the author of Yoga Bhāsya in a manner which is similar to the account given by Vasubandhu of Buddhadeva's thesis. The Yoga Bhāsya resolution of the problem in terms of a constant dharmin which serves as the substratum of varying dharmas also serves to bring out the difference between the two theories of temporal becoming.[3] The Buddhist answer to the problem of co-mingling of times (adhvasaṁkara) is simple.

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[1] The Jaina logic of the manifoldness of the real (anekantavada) as-serts, contra the laws of excluded middle and contradiction, that A can be also AB, meaning by B, not -A. For an illuminating account of the Jaina logic of inclusion in its distinct form from the genre of Buddhist schools see Padmarajiah, Y. J., A Comparative Study of Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge, Bombay: Jaina Sahitya Vihara Maudala, 1963, pp. 247 ff.

[2] pindah pracyavate, ghata upajāyata iti dharma parināmakramah, Yoga Bhāsya, op. cit., 3.15, p. 119.

[3] Ibid.

There is no scope for a simultaneous activation of the three temporal phases in one self-identical state. The temporal phases (lakṣaṇas) of prior, present and posterior occur successively subject to the fulfilment of the conditions of their appearance. The Sarvāstivādin, in terms of his ontology of particulars, does not have to face the problem of the three temporal phases existing together. In sum, we witness again to the same situation of the two theories of temporal becoming appearing terminologically similar and yet standing apart in terms of their ontological implications.

The doctrine of change as temporal relativity (anyathānyathikatva) defines the temporal distinctions in terms of each other. The example of the same woman designated mother in relation to the daughter, and daughter in relation to the mother or sister with reference to the brother and vice versa, illustrates the theory according to which the past, present and future distinctions are purely relational.[1] A possible way of distinguishing between the Sarvāstivādin's version and the version of the Yoga Bhāsya would be with reference to the admission or the non-admission of a common non-relative substratum. What seems to be implied by the example of the same woman being designated differently because of relational differences seem to differ in the two points of view. According to the Yoga Bhāsya it is the identity of the self-same person which makes it not contradictory

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[1] yathā caiktvepi strī mātā cocyate duhitā ca svasā ceti, Yoga-bhāsya, op. cit., 3.13, p. 114.

to speak of the same person in different terms. Likewise, in the case of, the temporal distinctions the coincidence of the three times in one time could be explained. But according to the Sarvāstivāda it is not the self identity of a common person but the very matrix of relativity that permits designation of the persons in different terms. Likewise the successive moments of past, present and future are not found all at once and yet their distinction obtains with reference to the very relationality of the prior or the posterior dharma (purvāparamapeksyānyonyaucyate).[1]

The basic difference between the orientation shared by the schools of Buddhism and reflected in the Sarvāstivāda theories considered earlier and the orientation of Hindu thought typified in Saṃkhya-Yoga is obvious. The latter emphasizes substantial continuity to the point of underestimating change as qualified. Nothing can come into being afresh or pass away finally. This is the famous doctrine of identity of the effects with their cause (sat-kāryavāda). In sharp contrast to this stands the Buddhist thesis of the non-identity of the effect with cause. What is often overlooked in this way of understanding the difference between the two philosophical traditions, and this misunderstanding is prompted by the form of the contrast under which it is contemplated in the Hindu philosophical writings, the emphasis that Buddhism lays on the factor of continuity in causal relation. It is the causally dependent nature of things that constitutes the mark of the real. Keeping in mind this extreme significance of continuity that characterizes change accoridng to the Buddhist understanding we may restate the point at

[1] Abhidharmakośam, op. cit., 1972, p. 807.

issue between the two traditions, i.e. the Sāmkhya-Yoga and the Sarvās-
tivāda in the following terms. The former advocates a theory of the
identity of the continuant (saṁtāni) whereas employing the language of
identity the position of Sarvāstivāda may be described as a theory of
the identity of continuum (saṁtāna).

From the foregoing account the ontological outlooks of the Sarvās-
tivāda and Sāmkhya-Yoga doctrines emerge with clarity in terms both of
their similarities and dissimilarities. There is no gainsaying of their
convergence in their understanding of the problem of temporality despite
their radical opposition as metaphysical systems. The convergence, even
after making due allowance to the differences in their respective onto-
logies of particulars, is so striking that one may expect a similar con-
vergence between the respective soteriologies. To this question we will
address ourselves in the final chapter.

A Sautrāntika Critique of Vasumitra's Avasthā Theory

A detailed examination of the Sautrāntikas critique of Sarvāstivāda conception of Kāritra will be undertaken in a separate section. Currently, we will engage ourselves with the Sautrantika's critique of Sarvāstivādin's conception of states (avasthā) of a dharma and its implications for temporal determination. It is our contention that the Sautrāntikā's critique emanates from a rejection of the basic ontological slant of the Sarvāstivāda. There are, surely, difficulties inherent to Sarvāstivādin formulations of the problem and they cannot be gainsaid. But the difficulties involved in the understanding of temporal becoming must be viewed in the context of the wider ontological framework, so that they may appear in the light of their positive significance. The Sarvāstivādin's formulation of temporal distinctions are questioned by the Sautrāntikas. The Sautrāntikas maintain that differentiations of temporal determination on account of avasthās (states or conditions) or 'activity', 'inactivity' 'cessation of activity', etc. implies the continued existence of the self-same dharma in the three states. This self-same dharma in the three states must be undifferentiated (abheda). However, the possibility of the presence of 'activity', 'inactivity', etc. as the characteristic mark of the dharmas in the three states will not be without its difficulty. It amounts to asserting the co-existence of three mutually exclusive qualities in the undifferentiated dharma by which the distinction of successive states of future, past and present is thought to be established.[1] The Sautrāntika

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[1] .....kiṁ tadevātītānāgatāvasthamāhosvidanyat. yadi tadeva, katha-
mekasminnirviśiṣṭe'sminrūpādike vastunyakriyādayaḥ parasparaviruddhā dharmā
yujyante. Tattvasmagrah-Panjika, op. cit., p. 511.

argues: if, despite the presence of contradictory properties a real be considered to be identical, then all differentiation would disappear and the entire world will collapse into oneness.[1] The Sautrāntika's critique is based on the assumption that the self-same dharma passes from one state into another. If what is assumed were the case then surely the critique is valid. The three properties, which account for the temporal differentiations, cannot belong to the same undifferentiated dharma without disputing its unity.

It therefore remains to be seen whether this assumption is legitimate. The Sarvāstivāda certainly denies that the dharma or the vastu is undifferentiated. But what should not be overlooked here is that it also denies that the dharmas are identical (nirviśiṣṭa). In reality the dharma or vastu in the past, present and future stand differentiated by the difference of abandoning and grasp ng of causal efficiency (kāritra); it is, therefore, not the case that it is strictly undifferentiated.[2] To the question if states are different or non-different from the svabhāva (being, reality) of the dharma, the answer is that they are not different (abheda). If the dharma were different from its state (avastha), then, it is inconceivable how even in the present state (avastha) the activity of the being can set in. The dharma as such, different from the avastha or state, will not be able to act as an active agent; effecient activity (causal efficiency) as it is argued by the Sarvāstivādins, belongs

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[1] yadi hi viruddhadharmādhyāse'pyekatvam syāt, utsannā tarhi bhed-avyavasthā, tatasca sarvameva jagadekameva syāt. Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

only to the present <u>avastha</u> of the <u>dharma</u>:

> By virtue of the variations undergone in the process
> of abandoning one state and taking up another, the
> <u>vastu</u> in the three states is not entirely undifferen-
> tiated. If it is so, it is asked: are these states
> different or non-different (<u>abheda</u>) - why - because,
> in that case the inactivity of the being would be the
> consequence. Through positive and negative concomitance
> (<u>anvaya-vyatirekabhyām</u>), it has been ascertained that
> causal efficiency belongs only to the states. (Hence,
> by being different from the states, the vastu could
> not be an active agent).[1]

Some important observations can be made at this point. It is true

that Sarvāstivādins are not quite unequivocal about the exaxt nature of

the differentiation of the <u>vastu</u> as reflected in the three states of

past, present and future. They do not state clearly whether the differ-

entiation of activity, inactivity, etc. belong to the same <u>vastu</u> which

exists as past, present and future, or that the properties of activity,

inactivity, etc., are the properties of different <u>vastus</u> ex-

isting as past, present and future. Two implications can be drawn from

the statement that "by virtue of the variations undergone in the process

of abandoning and grasping of the states, the <u>vastu</u> is not conceived to

be entirely undifferentiated".:[2]

1.   The differentiation is caused in the same <u>vastu</u> on account of aban-

         doning one state and taking up another state.

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[1] athāpyavasthāparityāgaparigrahabhedena bhinmatvādadhvasu vastu
na nirviśiṣtamiti kalpate, evamapi kim tā avasthā bhāvādbhinnā āhosvi-
dabhinnā iti vaktavyam…bhidyante bhāvāditi sambandhah. kasmāt, bhāva-
syākarttṛ_tāptitah - akarttṛtvaprasangāt. anvayavyatirekābhyām tāsā-
mevāvasthānām kāryam prati sāmarthyasiddheh. <u>Ibid</u>. p. 511.

[2] See Supra, note, 2, p. 250.

2. The differentiation in different phases of the real consists in the different dharma's state of abandoning the state of kāritra (causal efficiency) and of taking up of kāritra in different moments of time.

The second interpretation of the statement in question seems to be more in conformity with the overall picture of reality assumed in Sarvāstivādin ontology. Accoridng to this picture the state and vastu or dharma are one (abheda). From this it will follow that the vastu in the state of activity is different from the vastu in the state of inactivity. If state and vastu are identical and not different, then definitely the vastu in the state of activity is different from the vastu in the state of inactivity. It is not the same vastu that is both active and inactive in two different moments. Rather in the saṁtāna or the life continuum, one vastu with activity (kāritra) is preceded or succeded by another vastu with activity, or secession of activity. Vastu which is active is both real and existent, but the vastu in the state of 'inactivity' or 'cessation of activity' is real but not existent. The vastu can be existent and non-existent. But it cannot be unreal. Reality (satva) and existence (astitva) are not one and the same thing.[1] Sautrāntika's critique of Sarvāstivāda rests on the confusion of the two which probably has its origin in the Vasubandhu's rendering of Sarvāstivāda (a theory of sarvam asti) as sarvadāstivāda (a theory of sarvadā astitva).

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[1] When we make this statement, it has to be recognized that though the distinction is crucial, it is only implicit in the Sarvāstivāda which does not speak the language of real (satta.) as a constant element which is more concretely applicable to the Brahmnical tradition.

Some Concluding Observations

It is instructive to be reminded that the 'sarvam' has a specific connotation in the Buddhist canonical literature. Sarvam does not include the multiplicity of the phenomental world as such. Rather, sarvam connotes only the dharmas classified as skandhas, dhatus, and āyatana. It is their conglomeration that constitutes the specific pluralities. "The people are saying 'all'; O Brahman! by all are meant the five skandhas, the twelve āyatanas, the eighteen dhātus".[1] Sarvam connotes the 'dharmas' which alone are real, specific combinations of them constitute the life continuum (saṃtāna). Saṃtāna itself is conceived to be only prajñaptisata or conceptually real. Momentary dharmas carrying their own svabhāva (being) alone are real. These dharmas come and go. Arising into existence they pass away. There is no continued existence of the dharma, and hence the question of the existence or continuity of same dharma in the past, present and future does not arise. Sarvāstivāda is the assertion of the reality of dharmas as past, present and future. It is not a doctrine maintaining the reality of the past, present and the future. Time, apart from the thing or the dharma, does not have any reality. From the Sarvāstivādin point of view "experiential events do not take place or flow in time. Rather, it would be more appropriate to say that events flow as time".[2] Seen from this point of view our awareness of time acquires

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[1] sarvam sarvamiti brāhmaṇa yaduta pancaskandhā dvādaśyatānāni, as-ṭādaśca bhava. cf. The Tattvasaṃgraha Panjika, op. cit., p. 507.

[2] Inada, Kenneth K., "Time and Temporality: A Buddhist Approach", Philosophy East & West, 24.2, April 1974, pp. 173.

altogether a new dimension. The emphasis shifts from the static element of existence to the very dynamism of the process. Dynamism itself, however, instead of being only a by-product of the relational thought seeing static elements in a series, is built in the very structure of the becomingness of being.[1] It is in the Abhidharmika Buddhism that a breakthrough is reached in the Indian speculation of time. It is here that the static concern with the time and its constituents give way to the dynamic concern with the temporality of being, the very structure of the becomingness of reality (dharmadhvasau). ' Thus what is generally true of Buddhism according is more specifically true of Sarvāstivāda:

> (Here) we are able to appreciate the deeper dimensions of
> being because now we must focus on the process itself, the
> becomingness of being. Here the sister concept of tempo-
> rality seems to appear almost naturally. Temporality at
> least moves us in the right direction and seems to permit
> us to have glimpses of what Buddhists call reality. It has
> a profound meaning in that it runs across but retains or
> contains the multiple set of conditions and factors at play
> in the empirical process.[2]

It may not be out of place here to refer to the Saṃkya-Yoga understanding of process and time and its close similarity with Buddhism. According to Samkhya-Yoga system also dynamism is rooted in the order of being built into it. The concept of **Prakrti** connotes allness (sarvam) and, as the dynamic matrix of reality, provides the basis for the temporality of existence. There is however, a difference, and this difference

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[1]See Coomaraswamy, Anada K., Time and Eternity, Switzerland: Artibus Asiae Publishers Ascona, 1941, pp. 58-59.

[2]Inada, Kenneth, op. cit., p. 174.

is by no means viewed an inconsequential (and is in fact the basis on which the two differ in respect of their generic essence). The difference is: what would be considered as belonging to the order of existence and reality alike in Sarvāstivāda would be assigned a reality status different from pure consciousness which in itself is a-temporal. The Sāmkhya-Yoga however, will concede that it is through the means of focusing on the temporal structure, the becomingness of being, that one can recover or re-gain the separation of pure consciousness.

CHAPTER XI

TRANSCENDENCE AND TEMPORALITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR A SOTERIOLOGY OF THE PRESENT

In this concluding chapter we shall attempt to grasp the significance of reflection as a special mode of being and the central role that it plays in the transcendence of temporality. Herein it will be argued that for both Sāṁkhya-Yogā and the Abhidharma Buddhism, reflection as a function of consciousness is the structure of the transcendence of temporality. Reflection itself is a temporal act and operates within the confines of the temporal process. But as a function of consciousness, which itself is always given as 'consciousness of', reflection has a built in structure of transcendence whereby it steps out of itself and relates itself to the object of reflection. The transcendence of temporality lies within the compass of reflection in terms precisely of its inherent capacity of stepping outside of itself. Objectification is the primary mode of being of the reflective consciousness. While this seems to be true of the structure of consciousness as part and parcel of temporal mode of being for both Sāṁkhya-Yogā and Abhidharma Buddhism there is one important difference between the two systems' articulation of the problem. For Saṁkhya-Yogā, the transcendence of temporality by reflective consciousness (Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure) means recovery of the pure or transcendental consciousness conceived as a mode of being — Puruṣa. For Abhidharma Buddhism, on the other hand, it implies a total extinction or dissolution

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of consciousness conceived on the model of a drying-up of a stream or flow. This basic difference emanates from a difference of ontological orientation. However, despite-this dissimilarity in their ontological perspectives they share a common trait of Indian soteriologies in emphasizing the possibility of transcendence of the temporal process in and through the moment of 'present'. This aspect of their soteriology we prefer to call "non- eschatological."

Consciousness And Transcendence of Temporality: The Sāmkhya-Yoga Perspective

We have argued that for the Sāmkhya-Yoga, 'to be present' is the primary mode of existence of the empiric being. But the empiric being, as the self-constituting synthesis, is also the locus of the ontological relation of the temporal modes of past, present and future. The empiric subject (Buddhi-Ahamkāra structure) comprehends past, present and future as distinct and yet not disjoined. By means of such comprehension is provided the order for these moments. It sees them as different but not as disparate. Seeing it thus it also constitutes its orderliness which comes to be grasped as objective time. Thus:

> The continuous flow of these moments, is a sequence (krama). However, there is no real (basis) for the combination of the moments and their sequence . . . (thus), time has no real (objective) existence, it is only creation of buddhi, and follows on account of knowledge by words . . . (However), the moment is objective (it has a basis in the real) and is the basis (a ground) of sequence; the sequence (krama) consists in the continuous (uninterrupted) succession of moments, and it is this that is called time (kāla) by yogins who know time (its real nature).

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1 ... tatpravāhāvicchedastu kramaḥ.ksanatkramayornāsti vastusamāhara... sa khavalyam vastuśūnyo buddhinirmānaḥ śabdajñānānupatī...ksanastu vastupatitaḥ kramāvalambī. kramaśca ksanānantar yātmā.Vyasa Bhāsya on the Yoga Sūtra, op.cit., 3.52.

Temporal order on the phenomenal level is a conscious creation of the

empiric subject (Buddhi-Ahamkāra structure). But the temporal flux or the

the flow of moments or events is ontologically pre-given in the objective

being or the sphere of objectivity (prakrti).[1] Time-order as the prin-

ciple of continuity is constituted by the empiric subject (Buddhi parikal-

pita). "As a matter of fact, there is no real aggregation between the

moments and their succession. Hence all such divisions of time ..... are

purely subjective".[2] Time is nothing but the relational mode of being

(sambandhamātropakārī).[3] But in the constitution of the temporal struc-

ture, the empiric subject does not act as a principle independent of the

objective flow or the flux of moments or events. The empiric subject it-

self is, out and out, temporal..

How then are we to look at the temporal flow and its relationship

to subjectivity as embodiment and the principle of I-ness? It is precisely

in the structure of the constitution of subjectivity, i.e. subject as lived

and embodied, subject as the centre of I-ness and agent of all activity

and willing that the essential structure of temporality, as the unity in

difference or the suffusion of fissuration, is manifested. What we see in

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[1]We see therefore that time, space, etc., are the limitations which
regulate, modify and determine to a certain extent the varying transforma-
tions and changes and the seeming differences of things, though in reality
they are all ultimately reducible to the three gunas (the constituents of
prakrti) .....Dasgupta, S. N., Yoga as Philosophy and Religion, op. cit.,
p. 79.

[2]The Tattva Kaumudī by Vacaspati Misra, op. cit., p. 215; also see
Dasgupta, S. N., History of Indian Philosophy, op. cit., p. 256.

[3]Yuktidīpikā, op. cit., p. 74.

subjectivity is an essential drive, a lived tension and a continuous turn-
ing to new events and activities. This is the mode of being of <u>rajas</u>,[1]
the element of activity and energy, the life impetus which is continually
operating in calling forth to existence that which lies dormant in the
future. The constant tension of <u>triguna</u> in the manifestation and non-
manifestation of existence mediated by the element of activity is most
vividly operative in the structure of subjectivity as temporality. It is
in the present that the subject acts and reacts and calls forth what is
not present within in the purview of its own field (<u>ksetra</u>). It is not
that subjectivity is located in the present through which events pass from
the future to the past. Rather, the future becomes the present by the
subject's act of making it present (i.e. through the preponderance of
(<u>rajas</u>). The subject does not observe the flow of temporal events, (this,
of course, is what lies under the purview of <u>Purusa</u> as the transcendental
subject, the pure subject of witnessing) it performs it; it is not carried
through time, it acts it; it does not have time, it exists temporally.
The form, the order and the course of time are the universal and necessary
structures of subjectivity (subject as activity). Thus "pure or empty
time as such is nothing or is non-existent. It is nothing apart from ac-
tions or events that are revealed in experience. If it is anything it is
one with them."[2]

For the Sāmkhya-Yoga the significance of the present is that it is

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[1] <u>Sāmkhya Pravacana Sūtra</u>, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., 6.50.

[2] Sen, S. K., <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. 412.

the moment of mutation. And as such it is also the moment of the suffusion of the temporal fissuration.

> In the present there is a single moment and there are no earlier or latter moments. There is no combination of them. But those moments which are past and future are to be explained as inherent in the mutations. Accordingly, the whole world passes through a mutation in a single moment.[1]

The moment of mutation, the present is also the moment of activity for the subject. The subjectivity, as activity, in the present, could not call forth that which is disjunct or independent of it. The suffusion of fissuration is possible only because the subjectivity as present is ontologically related to its past and future mode of being. The subjectivity (Buddhi) then exists as already-having been, presence-to, and beingpossible. Over against the past, the subject exists in the present and acts in order to actualize the future.

> Had there been no past (existence of being in its unmanifest form) the existence of the present (existence of being in its manifest form) would have been impossible. And the present contains the future mode of being in its potential form (existence of being in its unmanifest form). Had it not been the case, the future never could come into existence as manifest being.[2]

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[1]Thus, then, the present is but a single moment, there are no 'preceding' or 'succeeding' moments (in it), for there is no combination of these. The past and the future moments are, then, to be explained as inherent in the change (mutation). In that one moment (the present) the whole world experiences change (undergoes mutation).Vyāsa Bhāṣya, op. cit., p. 151.

[2]yadi tu vartamānatvābhāvāt atītānāgatyaḥ saṭtvaṃ hantobhovartamānasyā⁺pyaphāvo'titānāgatatvābhāvāt. adhvadharmyavisiṭataya tu sattvaṃ trayanamapyavisistamityabhiprayena.....Tattva Vaiśāradī by Vacaspati Misra, op. cit., 4.12.

The fundamental mode of the experience of subjectivity (subject as activity) is temporal. In the present the subject shoves back the former moments and makes present the future ones. This disengagement from one moment (ksana) and a turning toward another is what is given as the primitive phenomenon of succession (krama). A succession of events, however, is not the same thing as a conception or awareness of that succession. It is a pre-thematic mode of subjective being. Due to the process of making present over against 'having already been' (bhūta) and toward 'that which is to come' (bhavisya) life of the subject is lived as temporal flow. We live in a flux because the subjective experience is structured temporally. But the temporal subject is not aware of its temporality; to be aware of its temporality is to be self-aware, i.e. to objectify itself, to step aside and be able to look at itself as a totality, as an ordered whole. In doing this the subject does not act but reflects. This is that mode of being in which the sattva gets preponderance over rajas. Conscious reflection takes the place of purposive activity. Time-awareness emerges through self-conscious reflection upon our presence to and engagement in the world, as 'having already been' (bhūta) toward 'that which is to come' (bhavisya).

Through the complex interrelation of existential and conscious factors, each of the temporal dimensions appear as ordered despite their differences. At the same time, we become aware of the interdependence of each of the dimensions in so far as the conscious acts through which we have access to the past, present and future point beyond themselves to real aspects of a single subjective being.

Self-reflection being the mode of 'objectification' of the self-reflecting self is also the mode of the recovery of the transcendental subject or transcendental consciousness as the formal ontological ground of the self-reflecting self. It is in the mode of reflection that the true dialectical character of the being of the empiric subject (Buddhi) can be grasped. We have already noted this point. However, before bringing out the full implications of the transcendental consciousness let us attempt to grasp the significance for the subject which is essentially temporal.

In and through, reflection the essential structure of temporality as the manifold of subjective experiences discloses itself to the self-reflecting self. The self-reflecting self grasps the essential 'otherness' of the whole world of our ordinary experience. Reflection discovers our empiric existence in the self-reflecting act of subjectivity (being of Buddhi) as the mode of its world-involvement, of its entanglement in everyday situations and projects (adhyavasāya or vyavasāya).[1] As a structure of this 'everydayness' the self-reflecting self comes to discover the structure of temporality, i.e. the order of time, the form of time, etc.

Furthermore, in the reflective mode of being the subject discovers that as subjectivity it is present to various kinds of objects in its phenomenal mode of existence. It discovers that in being present to the world it is out there in the world of its own past and future. Past and future constitute the existential background over and against which

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[1]See Supra, p. 113.

subjectivity as <u>adhyavasāya</u> operates as being present to the world of
things which it is actively concerned with and which it uses for its own
purpose. Thus, in reflection the subject comes to see that it is ab-
sorbed in the objects to which it is present, and thereby it grasps that
an aspect of its existence is to be present-to and present alongside of
a multitude of objects.

The subject then through reflection discovers the essential mode of
being of subjectivity - it discovers as a unity which exists as already-
having-been, present to objects of various kinds and as a possibility
towards its own future. Through reflection, then, the subject becomes
conscious of its own existence as tri-dimensional. Thus in the mode of
self-reflection the subject gains access to the structure of temporality
vis-a-vis to subjectivity. It becomes aware of its own temporal exper-
ience as a lived unity of its own strivings and dispositions. Thus the
subject relates to itself as temporal. In the process, the subject sees
itself as the principle of I-ness, as the temporal becoming which tends
to appropriate the world as its own (Ahaṁkāra).

However, the dialectic of reflection also demands that by the same
act that the subject objectifies itself it also comes to grasp its formal
grounding in the pure subject or the transcendental consciousness. The
dispersion and fissuration of subjectivity also consists in the very
ontological structuring of it.[1] While it has its existential ontological

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[1]It is important to remember that subjectivity (<u>Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra</u>
structure) has a peculiar ontological character. On the one hand being
the realm of embodiment it is related to <u>Prakṛti</u>. On the other,

ground in the world (Prakṛti) its formal ontological grounding is in
the realm of transcendental consciousness itself. It is precisely this
formal ontological grounding in the pure consciousness that constitutes
the possibility of transcendence in the mode of self-reflection. The
moment of reflection for the empiric subject is also the moment of dis-
criminative awareness (viveka). In the discriminative awareness, the
subject discovers not only the essential otherness of its existence as
subjectivity, but it also comes to recover its own original mode of
being, its own formal ontological grounding in pure consciousness. In
this single instance of the being of consdiousness the subject-object
distinction is totally obliterated.[1] Here, in the mode of discriminative
awareness, the subject is precisely that which is subjectively identical
with itself and, therefore, is not an independent object to itself. The
Saṁkhya-Yoga "is not concerned at all with the world in itself except so
far as it is instrumental in the discrimination of the isolated or pure
Puruṣa."[2] And we may add, here, that the Saṁkhya-Yogā is typical of the
entirety of Indian Philosophy in the attitude to the world.

(continued from bottom of previous page)

reflecting the consciousness of Puruṣa, it seems to take the form of Puruṣa.
Thus empiric subject has a built-in structure of fissuration. Puruṣa is
its formal ontological basis because Buddhi tends to take the form of con-
sciousness that belongs to Puruṣa. Prakṛti, on the other hand, is the ex-
istential ontological basis, for subject (Buddhi) is essentially embodiment
and operates through Indriyas. See Jayamaṅgalā: .....buddhyādi dvārī
bhavati.....śesāni tu buddhīndriyakarmendriyāṇi dvārāṇi.....trailokyagataṁ
puruṣasyārtha sūkṣamasthuēaviṣayalakṣaṇaṁ prakaśyābhivyaktiṁ.....The Jaya-
mangalā, op. cit., p. 42.

[1]Dasgupta, S. N., Yoga as Philosophy and Religion, op. cit., p. 154.

[2]Larson, op. cit., p. 222.

Thus, in the act of reflection we can discern two specific moments; the moment of discovery and the moment of recovery. The first mode of reflection is operative within the framework of otherness, i.e. where consciousness sees itself as something out of itself, as something in and along with the world of objectivities. This is the mode of discovery of the being of the self as not-self. In this discovery of the essential being of the self as not-self (Buddhi-Ahamkāra structure), the self comes to constitute itself as of the world. Reflection as discovery (the being of Buddhi) is essentially the mode of the constitution of the self as not-self. Reflection as discovery is the realm of actuality and activity, and as such it belongs to the present for present alone is the moment of activity and actuality. Activity is the mark of otherness of the subject and the object; it is the mode of subjects acting on the object. It is precisely for this reason that reflection as acitivity of discovery is also the mode of the self-transcendence of the reflective self. In reflection as dis-covery the reflective self turns to itself as an object of reflection.

However, contrasted with this is the mode of reflection as recovery. Reflection as recovery 'isolates itself from the contents of consciousness. It is the mode of the dispossession of the objective contents of reflection founded on or individuality (Ahamkāra). Viveka (discrimination) is con-comitant with vairagya (dispossession). While reflection as discovery is the structure of the withdrawal of the self into the original mode of its being as pure consciousness. Reflection as recovery is pure contemplation and makes possible the being of consciousness in its pure form. The being of consciousness in its pure form, when seen from the perspective of

temporality, manifest the very characteristics of eternity precisely in the sense of 'non-temporality' (timelessness).[1] It is the dissolution of the inner structure of reflection as activity[2] (an act of the subjectivity) in the present which comprises the past and future as an ontological relation within the structure of subjectivity. Reflection as contemplation is deliverance from activity of the present; the present itself undergoes a metamorphosis in that it comes to be a pure present or a now which is essentially eternity. While the now of the subjectivity as temporality is always fragmentary and incomplete the now of the transcendental subject is essentially limitless in the sense that it is complete. It is infinite presence.

It must, here, be noted that this transcendence of the temporal now is itself a function of the present. The dialectical character of the relationship of the world and consciousness is nowhere more concretely discernible than in the structure of the present. The present which is eminently the moment of world-involvement and subject's activity is also at once the moment of the transcendence of the world of subjectivity. It is in the present that the self-reflecting self undergoes a complete

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[1] Vyāsa Bhāsya on the Yoga Sūtra 4.33, op. cit.

[2] The Sāmkhya-Yogā looks at reflection as an action and thus extrinsic to the essential being of Purusa as pure consciousness. For the modification of thought called "meditation" is the noblest of all modifications (incident to Soul, or pure Thought, whose blessedness, or state of emancipation, it is to have no modification at all).....meditation cannot belong to Soul essentially, because of the immobility of Soul (Purusa); whereas "meditation" is an effort.....The Sāmkhya Aphorisms, (trans.) Ballantyne, J. R., op. cit., pp. 218-219.

metamorphosis - it emerges essentially as what it is - as the pure con-
sciousness, bereft of all vicissitudes, dispersions and contradictions
of the realm of the objective being (prakrti).   It is in this sense,
Samkhya-Yoga is a soteriology of the present.   Salvation is attained in
the present, and   thus a soteriology which is non-eschatological.   It
is not without reason that the system speaks of the contemplation on the
'Moment' as the mode of the being of eternity.   In this Moment, the mo-
ment of the present on which the reflective self reflects, is also when
the whole universe seems to undergo a radical change.   This is also the
moment of the dawn of discriminative awareness which coincides with the
transcending of the realm of temporality (the realm of limited now) into
the realm of eternity (the realm of eternal now).   The realm of Purusa
in isolation from the world of activities is the realm of eternity - it
is the mode of the being of Infinitude.

Consciousness and Transcendence of Temporality: The Abhidharmika Perspective

We will now examine the structure of consciousness (vijñāna) and the pivotal role assigned to it in the Abhidharmika scheme of things.   Contrasted with the Sāmkhya-Yoga understanding of pure-consciousness in substantive terms the Abhidharmikas propose a purely functional understanding of consciousness. Emphasis here shifts from the givenness of consciousness as a transcendental condition of all reflection and cognition to the very process of the operation of consciousness, conceived as immanent in the functions of cognition and reflection. Consciousness is not the mode of being of a self-identical self which, essentially, is a-temporal and without differentiation and fissuration. Rather, consciousness (Vijñāna) as a dharma is continually on the go, is never self-identical; and as the structure of becoming and causal conditioning it is essentially temporal.[1] Change, differentiation and fissuration are built into the mode of being of consciousness as a dharma.[2] Temporality, therefore cannot be overcome by consciousness

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[1] Vijñāna is a samskrta dharma. By difinition samskrta dharmas are temporal (adhva) and impermanent: ta eva samskrtā gatagacchadgamis-yadbhāvā dadhvānah, adyante nityatayeti vā; Abhidharmakośam, (1970), op.cit. p. 26, adyante nityatayā bhaksyanta ityadhvāna iti samskrtā evadhvaśabdena bhagvatā desitāh; Sphutārthā Abhidharmakośā Vyākhyā, 1949, op.cit., p. 23.

[2] "samskrta dharmas are called temporal (dhva) precisely because change or impermanence (anityata) eats them up." Ibid

as long as it is consciousness. Overcoming of temporality, i.e.

transcendence of the realm of temporal existence would imply the

overcoming of the fissuration, change and becomingness of consciousness.

But since these are structural to consciousness it follows that its

transcendence would mean its dissolution. Nirvāna or freedom is not

the recovery of an original mode of being of consciousness; it is the

dissolution of any mode of being of consciousness. It is extinction of

the very structure of the consciousness as flow. Contrast with the

Sāṁkhya-Yoga ontology is obvious here.

Phenomenologically speaking, the distinction between the

overcoming of temporality in the recovery of consciousness and the

dissolution of consciousness is an extremely important distinction.

Loosing sight of this distinction will lead to an underestimation of

the differences between the basic orientation of the two systems. For

both the systems temporality is essentially an imperfection[1] character-

istic of the finitude and ought to be overcome in the mode of being

of the non-temporal. However; the mode of being of the non-temporal

has drastically different implications for the subject as the structure

of world involvement. While for Sāṁkhya-Yoga, Subject as pure con-

sciousness retains its individuated identity and is a case of recovering

of its original mode of being, for Abhidharmikas the subject must give

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[1] This is the connotation of the term vikrti characteristic of the
phenomena as modification of Prakrti in Sāṁkhya-Yoga. A similar
understanding of phenomena constituted of saṁskṛta dharma is present
in the Abhidharma literature.

up its original mode of being and its individuality in order to attain

nirvana. Nirvāna, though eternally existent and constantly present,

is not an original mode of being that the subject somehow lost and regains.

World (samsāra) as the structure of temporal becoming does not share

the ontological character of Nirvāna which for the Abhidharmikas is

eternally existent and beyond the operation of the forces of

conditionedness (samskrtatva).[1]

It is important to be reminded that for Abhidharmika Buddhism,

Nirvāna is not a negative concept; it is not an emptiness either in

the form of an ontological nothingness without any substance or a state

of being which is rendered non-existant on conceptual analysis.[2]

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[1] The question of the existence of Nirvāna as a separate dharma which is not subject to the forces of conditionedness has been a matter of controversy between the Sarvastivādins and the Sautrantikas. While the Sautrantikas deny that Nirvāna exists or is real, Sarvashivada affirms it's reality as a separate dharma. For the details of the argument and counterargument, see Abhidharmakośam, 1970, op.cit., pp 318-328. Also see Sphutartha Abhidharmakoṣa Vyākhyā, 1949, op.cit., pp. 145-152.

[2] The negativism as a philosophical doctrine (śunyavāda), if at all the ultimate philosophical position, is the one that is associated with Nāgārjuna. This is at least the historical truth even though it is increasingly questioned in modern times. Samkara criticised it as expressly a negative doctrine (See Śamkara's Bhāsya on Brahma Sūtra 2.2.31). The other exponent of negativism as a viable philosophical doctrine is Prajnākaramati, the author of the Panjika on the Bodhicaryāvatāra of Santideva.

As a paradigm of a negativism implying dissolution through conceptual analysis may be cited the Advaita Vedānta, according to which the state of being is rendered in retrospection non-existent by means of conceptual separation of the ground and the superimposed. See Mandana's Brahmasiddhi, Madras: Madras Law Journal Press, 1932, p. 136, ff.

Rather, Nirvāna is a mode of positive being, an eternal existence which

is acquired or reached and possessed (prāpti).[1] Nirvāna is eternally

existent and as a reality it is posited over and against the reality

of temporally determined dharmas. Within the Abhidharmika context it

is possible to discern distinction renmiscient of the Sāmkhya-Yoga

categories of permanence (parināmi nityatā) and eternity (kūtastha

nityatā). Samtāna or the continuum which, theoretically, is never-

ending and is in that sense 'permanent' is not, however, a case of

overcoming of temporality.[2] Endlessness is not conquering of

temporality at all, but rather it is a prolongation or perpetuation of

temporality's defect. Samtāna (continuum) may be described as having

a temporal mode of permanence in the sense that its coming to an end

is not part of its meaning as becoming. But this 'permanence' of the

continuum can not be ascribed the value of eternity because it is

only continuity of imperfection (conditionedness), prolongation of

non-perfection. Nirvāna, on the other hand, is described by Abhidharmika

as eternal (nitya) in a non-temporal sense. As dharma or reality

Nirvāna is eternity precisely in the sense that it transcends the

mode of imperfection or conditionedness (samskrtattva). Nirvāna is

unconditioned and eternal because it is not subject to the operation

of the forces of conditionedness, namely jati, jarā, sthiti etc.[3]

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1 Abhidharmkośam, 1970, op.cit., pp. 23, 211-212, 319.

2 nityam kuśalam cāsti dravyāntaram. tadvisamyogascocyate pratisamkhyā
(=nirvāna) nirodhasceti sarvamevāsamskrtamadrvyamiti, Ibid., p. 321.

3 etāni hi samskrtasya catvāri laksanāni.yatraitāni bhavanti sa dharmah
samskrto laksyate viparyādasamskrtah. Ibid., p. 253.

As the realm of eternity <u>Nirvāṇa</u> is fullness of spiritual being, a completedness which constitutes the horizon into which the individual as subject dissolves. Overcoming of temporality in the present case also is a function of reflection as a mode of the being of the subjectivity as consciousness. As reflection subjectivity is essentially in fellowship with what is contemplated. Reflection as an act of consciousness consists of a fellowship of what is contemplated and what contemplates.[1] Contrasted with Sāṁkhya Yoga, which admits the possibility of consciousness without content, Abhidharma proposes an essential reciprocity of the consciousness and its content.

In this reciprocity of consciousness and content consists the essential imperfection of consciousness (<u>samskrtatva</u>), for consciousness itself is both conditioning and conditioned by other <u>dharmas</u>.[2] Reciprocity and mutual conditioning also implies reciprocal otherness between the two. While the Sāṁkhya-Yoga makes the recognition of this otherness as the very condition for freedom, for the Abhidharmika the

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1 According to Abhidharmkos'a <u>citta</u>, <u>manas</u> and <u>vijñāna</u> are interchangeable terms used for consciousness. Consciousness is always dependent upon what it cognizes: cittaṁ mano'tha vijñānamekārtha pamcadha, Abhidharmakos'am, 1970, <u>op.cit.</u>, p. 208-209, samprayuktakahetustu cittachaittāḥ, <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 306; also saman ās'rayo yesāṁ te cittacaitta anyonyaṁ samprayuktakahetuḥ, <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 307.

2 Cittacaitaḥ sahavas'yaṁ sarva samskrtalaksanaih prāptyā, <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 185-186.

otherness must be dissolved. However, the dissolution of the other-
ness does not consist in the discerning of an identity overreaching
the different i.e., the consciousness claiming the object or the
content of it as its own (such would be a case of invetrate tendency
to conceptualize in terms being, the satkāyadrṣṭi,[1] which Ābhidhārmika
rejects.). It consists in the disclaiming of consciousness as well as
its content (visamyōga).[2]

Thus the overcoming of temporality, the process of becomingness
of the conditioned dharmas (samskrtattva) is essentially the dissolution
of the subjectivity in the mode of otherness. Subjectivity or con-
sciousness which loses the other through which alone could it express
itself, loses its subjecthood. Just as the object which become the
possession of the consciousness are not mere objects and must be
described as that which belongs to the consciousness (caitesika),[3]
so the consciousness which is bereft of its content must completely
lose its existing character as consciousness.

Thus, within Ābhidhārmika scheme, at least two moments in
consciousness can be discerned. Cognition is the mode of claiming of
object as other by the subject. Reflection is the mode of disclaiming

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[1] See Supra, p. 155.

[2] Visamyogaḥ kṣayo dhiyā
kṣayaḥ = nirodhaḥ dhi = prajñā . tena pratisamkhyānirodho visamyoga-
phalamityuktam bhavati, Abhidharmkosám, 1970, op.cit., p. 332.

[3] See Abhidharmkosám, 1970, kārika 23-33 and bhāṣya on them, Ibid, pp. 186-211.

of this otherness. It is the realization that all dharmas as conditioned
are essentially on the same ontological footing. It is the realization
that consciousness, as much as its content, is essentially impermanent
and conditioned. Reflection as an act of consciousness, then, inevitably
brings about as it were a perfect unity of the subject and object, but
this unity is nothing other than the abrogation of the subject by its
complete annulment. Temporality surely is overcome through the
negation of the distinction of the subject and object. But it must not
be forgotten that this in turn entails an overcoming of the subjecthood.
The eternity of Nirvāna as the stillness of consciousness (sthita)
overcomes the flow of temporality through complete extinction of con-
sciousness as the cognitional basis of all temporality. In this lies
the dialectical character of consciousness.

There is another implication of this dialectic of consciousness.
Consciousness, according to the Abhidhārmikas, takes the form of the
object that it cognizes.[1] Accordingly the consciousness which cognizes
Nirvāna must also become of the nature of Nirvāna. Consciousness
itself is temporal because it is both conditioning and conditioned.
It retains this character of temporality in its encounter with the
objects which themselves are temporal and conditioned (samskrta dharma).
But in its encounter with that which is unconditioned and beyond the
pail of temporality and becomingness, consciousness must of necessity
lose its own conditionedness and temporality. In other words it must
lose its character of consciousness.

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[1] Ibid., p. 208.

Eternity of <u>Nirvāna</u> in the sense of constant presence or 'eternal now', within the grasp of consciousness as reflection, brings out the true soteriological import of Ābhidharmika speculation about the structure of temporal becoming. Here too structural similarity and thematic congruity with the Sāmkhya-Yoga soteriology are quite prominent. For both the systems salvation is not in future, but it is in the present. It is not to be realized at some distant moment, when the temporal process shall come to an end. The process of temporal becoming as the structure of world participation is a given fact, and as a fact it cannot be annihilated or terminated. It will never come to an end. The process as fact is permanent (in the temporal sense). Its termination is not conceivable. Salvation therefore, of necessity, lies in the present. It is in the temporal present that the <u>Nirvana</u> can be attained. It is the present that constitutes the stepping stone to the 'eternal now.'

The realization of <u>Nirvāna</u> as eternity is possible precisely because it is an existent fact. It is not something previously non-existent which becomes existent in the present. It is eternally present and as such is the very opposite of the temporal now which is constantly moving. But the act of transcendence as an act of consciousness is performed within the compass of this temporal present. It is not without significance that the Buddhist canons exhort the aspirant: "Get ye across this sticky mire, let not the Moment pass (<u>khano</u> <u>ve</u> <u>mā</u> <u>upaccagā</u>), for they shall mourn whose moments past

(khannatīta hi socanti)".[1] Those whose "moment has been caught"

(khano vo paṭiladdho) are the fortunate ones, while those whose

moment has past" (Khanātīta)[2] are the unfortunate ones. The moment

of release is sudden and "contrasts with the length of the Way, the

aeonic time that is now and once for all escaped".[3]

Concluding Observations

In this final chapter we offered our interpretation of two

systems' articulation of temporality and its implications for con-

sciousness. The thrust of the argument was to bring out the structure

of metaphysical transcendentalism as represented in their conception

of eternity that the two systems imply. Of pivotal importance both

to Sāmkhya-Yoga and the Abhidarma Buddhism, was the analysis of the

experience of temporality defined as finitude, and to determine

whether or not experiencing of temporality necessarily implied

positing a transcendental time as the receptum of entities. In

other words, is temporality an experience of the flow of entities and

events as they are present to consciousness in the original mode of

their limitation i.e. finitude, or it is an experience of the flow of

entities and events as mediated through a transcendental principle of

time? It was our attempt to show that in both the systems temporality

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[1] Cited in Coomaraswamy, op.cit., p. 44 (Sn. 333, cf. Dh. 315, Tha. 403, 653, 1005, The. 5, 459.)

[2] Ibid., (S. 4, 126).

[3] Ibid., p. 45.

is explained in terms of our experience which is radically and essentially a revelation of our immediate contact with the world of dynamic change and flow exemplyfying finitude.

In pursuit of this insight we analyzed the Sāṃkhya-Yoga attempt to ground temporality in subjectivity. Our analysis was primarily an attempt to show that the Sāṃkhya-Yoga does not tend to reduce the experience of temporality to the consciousness of temporality for an atemporal transcendental consciousness. The two were placed in two realms of being, though with a possibility of the dialectical contact between the two. However, the dialectic of contact (saṃyoga) also implies the loss of the original mode of being of the transcendental consciousness, which can be regained or recovered through the dialectic of reflection, which itself, in the ultimate analysis, is part and parcel of the temporal mode of being. Thus from our point of view, the Sāṃkhya-Yoga's analysis of temporality can be regarded as an argument both directly for the possibility of temporal experience independent of time as a transcendental condition of this experience, and indirectly for the transcendence of temporality in the realm of eternity, which we saw to be the mode of being of Purusa. The important aspect of this argument is the implicit assertion that temporality as the experience of the becomingness of the world as a dynamic flow cannot be reduced to a mere appearance for a transcendental consciousness.

The temporal differentiation is not appearance to the pure subject, but enters into awareness as a specific fact in the life-history of subjectivity as the structure of world-involvement. On

this specific issue we found the basic positions of both the Sāmkhya-Yoga and the Abhidharma concurrent. In either case it can be said that any attempt to reduce temporality to appearance in and for atemporal consciousness would be an exercise in futility. For both the systems, experience of temporality for an atemporal consciousness must be ruled out. Both of them seem to agree in maintaining that experience of temporality entails subjectivity immanent to the structure of world-involvement (Buddhi-Ahamkāri structure in the case of Sāmkhya-Yoga and the structure of Skandhas in the case of Abhidharma Buddhism). Subjectivity as immanent in this structure is always losing its autonomy precisely in the sense that subjectivity as empiric consciousness is inconceivable without the content of consciousness. In the mode of being of subjectivity, the mutual otherness of the subject and object or consciousness and its content is constantly and steadily overcome. It is subject to systematic disappearance. This is what is implied by becoming aware of something. Awareness or experience, then, in a sense, is this very structure of the 'disappearance' of consciousness as consciousness i.e. as entailing the otherness of subject and object. This is the mode of being of empiric consciousness which always is "consciousness of" (citta, Buddhi). Phenomenologically speaking, this structure of 'disappearance' of consciousness discernible in the experience of temporal becoming or temporality also privides the clue for the transcendence of temporality. If empiric consciousness loses itself partially in the experience of temporality, it loses itself completely in the experience of eternity. This is accomplished through

self-reflection or critical reflection as a mode of transcendence which thus seems intrinsic to the very structure of consciousness as reflection.

Thus, above is a generalized picture of this common structure between the two points of view outlined in the course of this study. The constant concern with the analysis of moments in both the systems under investigation may be understood as the exemplification of a soteriology of the present, or what we have termed as the non-"eschatological" soteriology. Sāmkhya-Yoga, while not accepting the ksanikavāda of Buddhism (the momentary arising and disappearance) accepts the doctrine of the moment (ksana) over against the more popular Brahmanical doctrine of time (Kāla). Whether the doctrine is originally a Buddhist doctrine or a Brahmnical one is a question that evades any easy solution. We are not quite certain if Stecherbatsky's observation that "the origin of the theory of Instantaneous Being is probably pre-Buddhist"[1] has any positive historical evidence to support it. Nor is there any incontrovertible evidence to substantiate the claim that the Yoga-Bhāsya in its articulation of the problem of temporality agreed verbatim and accepted the doctrine of the Abhidhārmikas.[2] The historical question of the exact nature and extent of interaction between Sāmkhya-Yoga

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[1] Stcherbatsky, Th., _Buddhist Logic_, Vol I, The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1932, p. 108.

[2] Takagi, S., "A Comparative Study of Time in Yogabhāsya and Abhidharma Buddhism", _Mikkyo Bunka_, Koyosan, 1963, pp. 68-83.

and Abhidhārmika Buddhism is an important issue demanding further and fuller investigation by the historians of religions. This however, is beyond the scope of the present work. What we have attempted in these pages is to show a significant structural similarity in the articulation of the specific problem. This raises important questions about the philosophical postulates of the two soteriologies. Are the two systems really two distinct and opposed expressions of the philosophical spirit characteristic of the religious philosophies of India, or is it not perhaps the case that despite their differences they also profoundly share some important ontological nuances and stand together in contradistinction only to the "eschatological" soteriologies of Judæo-Christian traditions?

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