CHOOSING METHODS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: IS INDIVIDUALISM-COLLECTIVISM THE KEY?

By

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ABSTRACT

Researchers examining the influence of the individualism-collectivism value dimension on procedural preferences for conflict resolution (e.g., Leung, 1987; Leung, Bond, Carment, Krishnan, & Liebrand, 1990; Leung & Lind, 1986) have suggested that people from individualistic societies tend to prefer adversarial procedures such as arbitration, while collectivist persons tend to prefer bargaining and mediation. However, almost all of these collectivistic samples were drawn from Oriental societies where some unique values such as the Confucian work dynamism also have been identified. These values may independently influence preference. To replicate these results in non-Oriental societies, college students from both Canada (an individualistic society) and Nigeria (a collectivist society) were asked to indicate their preferences for using threats, accept the situation, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration procedures. The participants also completed Hui's (1988) Individualism-Collectivism Scale (INDCOL).

The outcomes did not support the previous research. Canadian subjects showed a stronger preference for negotiation and mediation than Nigerian subjects who, in addition to indicating a greater tolerance for threats, also tended towards arbitration. The INDCOL results also were unexpected; relative to the Nigerian subjects, Canadian subjects were collectivist on the
parent and coworker subscales while Nigerian subjects were collectivist on the neighbour subscale. Because the scenarios in the first study were constructed without anticipating that certain domains of individualism and collectivism could exist within the same culture, interpretation of the above results became problematic.

This problem was addressed in two subsequent studies which compared Canadian and Nigerian students on the three domains of individualism-collectivism in which they differed. To this end, Canadian and Nigerian subjects were asked to indicate their preference for methods of resolving a parent-child dispute, a dispute between neighbours, and a third dispute between coworkers. Because Canadians had been found to be more collectivist on the parent and coworker subscales, it was hypothesized that they would prefer negotiation and mediation over arbitration in resolving these conflicts while Nigerians would prefer to use arbitration in the same situation. Conversely, Nigerian subjects were expected to show greater willingness to use negotiation and mediation in resolving a conflict involving neighbours and Canadian subjects were expected to be more inclined toward arbitration. A subsidiary interest was to investigate whether or not people prefer to use different procedures in resolving interpersonal than in resolving intergroup conflicts.

The major hypotheses were confirmed. Canadians were more willing than Nigerians to use negotiation in the parent-child and coworker conflicts while Nigerians showed a greater willingness to use arbitration in both situations. The contradictory finding was the higher ratings by Nigerians on
mediation in the parent-child conflict. In the neighbour conflict, Nigerians were more willing to use negotiation while Canadians were more willing to use arbitration. Furthermore, when subjects were divided into high and low scorers on the parent subscale (culture/nationality ignored), a similar pattern of results as described above was obtained.

The analysis of the type of conflict variable revealed that arbitration is preferred to a greater extent in resolving intergroup than interpersonal conflicts. Implications of these findings for the theory of procedural preference and practice of conflict processing are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION

Conflict is a ubiquitous phenomenon, occurring in virtually all aspects of social life. Indeed, the seeds of conflict are part of the very process of interdependence that binds people to one another, leading them to work together towards common goals. Thus, it is hardly surprising that we often find ourselves in conflict with our peers, our superiors at work, our children, and practically everyone with whom we come into more than passing contact. Nor is conflict a phenomenon peculiar to the modern age. Human history is replete with different types of social conflicts of a political, military, economic, or familial nature, some of which have had serious, sometimes devastating, repercussions on the world at the time and beyond. In fact, it appears that advancement in technology is competitively paralleled by advancement in conflicts, both in terms of scope and complexity. What seems to have stagnated is the ability of humans to resolve these conflicts. For, despite impressive developments in several areas of endeavour, international and national wars still abound around the globe; legal systems almost everywhere are overburdened with litigation; serious quarrels and disagreements dominate among both married and dating couples; while employers and employees are continually opposed to each other. All these reflect the embarrassing ineptitude of human beings to resolve social disputes.
Functions of conflict

Although it is tempting to discuss only the negative consequences that are associated with conflict and conflict management, the picture is definitely incomplete if the several positive functions of conflict are ignored. Since the nineteenth century, prominent scholars from different fields have alluded to the usefulness of conflicts. For example, Charles Darwin's (1872) main focus was on the struggle within species for 'survival of the fittest', and he viewed the productive outcome of this struggle for survival in terms of the emergence of a misfit who happens to have a genetic anomaly that fosters survival. Therefore, the species as a whole is more likely to survive through random genetic adjustments that the struggle for survival entails. While discussing the various psychodynamic forces for control over the ego, Sigmund Freud envisioned individual growth and insight as emanating from the struggle to understand and address the conflicts within. Similarly, Karl Marx developed a political and economic analysis based on the premise that conflict is an inevitable part of society. In his dialectical materialism, Marx posits that conflict promotes further conflict, which inevitably results in change - a change that he claims predictably moves in the direction of an improved human condition (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986).

Other positive functions of conflict have been suggested by more contemporary writers. Coser (1956) suggests that conflict sometimes acts as a catalyst for social change. People who perceive their prevailing conditions in society to be unjust or who wish to introduce innovations often have to wrestle with the status quo before the changes are introduced. Second, conflict enhances the reconciliation of people's legitimate interests. Rarely does the
resolution of a conflict involve the victory of one position over the other. More often than not, it is a hybrid of the initial opposing views, resulting in the mutual benefit of the disputing parties and the larger group to which they belong. Coser argues that due to these two functions, conflict fosters group unity. Any group that lacks the capacity for social change or the reconciliation of individual interests is likely to experience a decline in group solidarity and group effectiveness, possibly resulting in group disintegration.

Notwithstanding the positive functions of conflict, the fact remains that conflict--both in terms of pervasiveness and intensity--is capable of destroying the whole society, making it one of society's most worrisome concerns. It is not surprising then that there is a growing interest by social scientists in the study of conflict resolution and control. The term 'control' and not 'elimination' is used here to reaffirm the position stated earlier that under certain circumstances, conflict is desirable. If conflict can be controlled or channeled in a constructive manner, and if the changes required by the conflict and its resolution can be brought about rationally, then it is likely that the more negative aspects of conflicts can be avoided.

Definition of conflict

Thibaut and Walker (1978) distinguished between two major types of conflict - cognitive conflicts and conflicts of interest. Cognitive conflicts (such as scientific inquiry) are concerned with the search for the "truth", and the interests of the parties are said to be coincident because the dispute is over which resolution is to the common advantage, since everyone's objective is to find the jointly preferred solution. In the case of conflicts of interest, the
respective interests of the parties are perfectly opposed because a particular position often stands to maximize the outcome of one of the parties only at the expense of the other. Since the focus in this study is on the latter, conflict is defined here as a situation of disharmony between two or more parties which can sometimes be peacefully resolved or which may, under certain circumstances, lead to aggression. Conflict therefore, involves a divergence of interest, or the belief that the interests of two or more parties cannot be achieved simultaneously (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). The looseness of this definition is intended to be adaptive. Due to the relatively undeveloped nature of conflict theory, a loose definition is more likely to accommodate a wide variety of issues under the conflict umbrella.

The main concern in this research was to examine factors that determine the procedural preference patterns of disputants in their attempts to resolve and control conflicts. Success or failure to resolve or control a conflict can be greatly influenced by the confidence of the disputants in the procedure that is used for the resolution effort. Yet, until recently, very little research attention was directed at conflict resolution methods and the disputants' feelings about these procedures. Moreover, of the emerging studies about procedural preferences, most were restricted to legal settings (e.g., Thibaut and Walker, 1975; Thibaut, Walker, LaTour & Houlden, 1974). In contrast, the research reported here focuses on conflicts at interpersonal and small group levels that use a variety of informal procedures, but which, nevertheless, share some important structural concerns with the more formal approaches. The choice of these types of conflicts was based on the contention that many more conflicts exist that are handled outside the formal legal setting than within it.
Furthermore, it is usually the failure to resolve conflicts at this rudimentary level that leads to their being referred to the courts and other formal settings.

**Background and approaches to the study of procedural justice**

Prior to 1974, the study of justice as a topic in social psychology had been limited to distributive justice - the distribution of the conditions and goods which affect individual wellbeing. The term procedural justice was first used by Thibaut, Walker, LaTour, and Houlden (1974) to refer to social psychological consequences of procedural variation, with specific emphasis on procedural effects and fairness judgments (Lind & Tyler, 1988). However, the first systematic study of the psychology of social decision-making procedures started with the work of John Thibaut, Laurens Walker, and their associates in the mid 1970s. This early research was dominated by studies that evaluated resolution effectiveness in terms of the perceived fairness of the outcomes of dispute settlement (cf. Leventhal, 1976a; Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1973). In the last decade however, another perspective on dispute resolution has emerged, focussing on the effectiveness of procedures used for resolving disputes. This perspective, initiated with research on mediation and arbitration in bargaining (see for example, Rubin, 1980 for a review), was spurred by Thibaut and Walker’s (1975,1978) research and theory of procedural justice.

Six procedures used in dealing with conflicts, covering much of the total range of procedures, are discussed throughout this thesis: Threats, wait and see, accept the situation, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. The crucial variables are the presence or absence of a third party and the basis of
the third party’s intervention, and the possibility of unilateral action by one of the disputants. The first three procedures involve unilateral action and also do not require a third party. With threats, one of the parties to the conflict tries to get his or her way by threatening the other party to the extent that failure to reach settlement will lead to his or her taking actions that will result in unpleasant consequences to the opponent. Although it is possible to obtain a settlement as desired by the initiator, this procedure often aggravates the conflict and impedes a peaceful settlement (Nader & Todd, 1978).

The next procedure, wait and see, involves the decision by one principal to do nothing and see whether or not the problem will go away. This is similar to the third procedure, accept the situation, except that with the former, no decision has yet been made to live with the problem as it is. Accept the situation is a procedural mode similar to what Felstiner (1974) termed "lumping it", and refers to a decision by an aggrieved party not to press his or her complaint or claim. The issue that gave rise to the disagreement is simply ignored, and the relationship with the offending party is continued. This unilateral decision to accept the situation may be based on feelings of relative powerlessness or on the social, economic, or psychological costs involved in seeking a solution (Galanter, 1974).

In negotiation, the two principal parties to the dispute are the decision makers, and the settlement of the conflict is one to which both parties agree, without the assistance of a third party. In this dyadic arrangement, the parties try to persuade each other, and seek to create the rules by which they can organize their relationship with one another (Gulliver, 1973). In contrast, mediation involves a third party who intervenes in a dispute to help the
disputants in reaching an agreement; both parties must agree to his or her intervention. The mediator may be an institutionalized neutral or a person of acknowledged prestige or ability who is not directly concerned with the issues and the potential outcome (Gulliver, 1979).

The sixth procedural mode, arbitration, requires that both parties to the dispute consent to the intervention of a third party whose judgment they must agree to accept beforehand. Each disputant is given a chance to offer information, opinion, and argument. In most cases, each party seeks to refute the other's presentation and to persuade the arbitrator to favour his/her case. Eventually, the arbitrator pronounces his/her decision on the issues, often sorting out and summing up the information presented by the parties and explaining his/her decision (Gulliver, 1979).

It should be noted that before the work of Thibaut and Walker, a number of social psychologists had conducted research on procedural issues that addressed some of the same topics now studied under the rubric of procedural justice. Some examples of this earlier research include the classic studies by Lewin, Leppitt, and White (1939; White & Leppitt, 1960). Lewin and associates manipulated three "social climates" introduced by adult counselors in boys' recreational groups: An "autocratic" climate that involved extensive counselor control over decisions about the organization of the group and the type of activities to be engaged in; a "democratic" climate where counselors encouraged participation of the boys in voting about these decisions; and a "laissez faire" climate that had almost no input from the counsellors on the decisions made by the group. The results showed that the autocratic climate produced the most task-oriented behaviour, but that the democratic climate
produced friendlier and more cohesive groups without much decrement in performance. Though not specifically targeted at decisional processes involving disputes, these studies are significant to the procedural justice research for two main reasons. First, they represent early demonstrations that variation in decision-making procedures does affect the behaviour and attitudes of those subject to the procedure. Second, and more importantly, knowing these effects of procedural variation made the focus on procedural variables initiated by Thibaut and Walker a reasonable step. In other words, it needed the focus of Thibaut and Walker on procedures per se for systemization of knowledge on procedural effects to occur, but when this shift of focus occurred, there was research other than that by the Thibaut and Walker group to be included in theories of procedural justice (Lind & Tyler, 1988).

This developing interest in research on the procedural aspects of conflict resolution, rather than a preoccupation with fairness of outcomes, is important for a number of reasons: First, it is extremely difficult to define the fairness of an outcome since many, often conflicting, standards exist for evaluating whether or not an outcome is fair (Leventhal, 1976b). Such standards include equity, equality, need, contract, precedent, intentionality, and legitimacy. Second, research on procedure suggests that participants in a dispute evaluate both procedural and outcome factors when determining satisfaction with the resolution of the dispute (Lind, Erickson, Kurtz, Mustante, Walker, & Thibaut, 1980; Thibaut and Walker, 1975).

Much of this research on the procedural aspects of conflict resolution has examined disputant preferences for resolving disputes in legal
settings. Typically in such settings, preferences for settlement procedures have been examined as a function of such diverse factors as the party's role in the conflict, defendant versus plaintiff (e.g., Lind, Erickson, Friedland, & Dickenberger, 1978), or third party versus litigant, (e.g., Houlden, LaTour, Walker, & Thibaut, 1978), the party's focus on legal as opposed to equity claims (Houlden et al., 1978), the strength of the opposing party's case (Thibaut, Walker, LaTour, & Houlden, 1974), the presence or absence of partisan representation (LaTour, 1978), and the outcome of the dispute (Houlden et al., 1980). More recently, some effects of culture, gender, and investigator status have also been investigated (Leung, 1987; Leung & Lind, 1986).

In general, results of disputants' procedural preferences have been supportive of Thibaut and Walker's (1975) original assertion that an arbitration procedure provides the optimal distribution of process (also termed the "voice" effect, Folger, 1977) and decision control between disputants and decision makers. Process control refers to control over the arguments to be presented while resolving a dispute, while decision control refers to the power to prescribe and enforce the resolution of a conflict (Lind et al., 1980). As a result, Thibaut and Walker (1978) have proposed a social psychological theory of dispute resolution procedures that explains the process control effect on perceived fairness and procedural preference. The theory begins with the assumption, based on equity theory and research, that conflicts of interest are thought to be best resolved by allocations that conform to the equity norm. Disputants anticipating the use of this norm will be concerned that all their contributions to positive outcomes and all the external circumstances that
contributed to negative outcomes be known to and considered by the decision maker, in order for him or her to be maximally persuaded by the disputant’s arguments. Only if such information is available, so the disputant believes, can a judge, jury or relevant third party apply the equity rule to produce a fair decision.

According to Thibaut and Walker, disputants will fear that this individual-specific information may not be presented in as favourable a light as possible if they themselves are not given complete control over the presentation of the evidence and arguments at a trial or hearing. In addition, having control over the presentation of evidence is likely to maximize each disputant’s outcomes not only because it increases the perceived likelihood that an opponent, or a neutral third party, will agree to a disputant’s claims, but also reduces the likelihood that an opponent will at some later time refuse to abide by an unfavourable decision because he or she believes that decision to have been based on insufficient information.

Thibaut and Walker point out that some research in social cognition, including that concerning the fundamental attribution error (e.g., Hansen & Lowe, 1976; Jones & Nisbett, 1971), may indicate that this fear has some basis. Uninvolved decision makers tend to overlook individual circumstances in favour of dispositional attributions. They thus suggest that, in general, people are likely to show preference for and perceive greater fairness in adversary procedures because process control is vested in the litigants, and because this in turn, assures litigants that all relevant information will reach the judge.

Results from some of the studies cited earlier have shown process
control to enhance the perceived fairness of procedures and preferences for using the procedures in question in a variety of contexts. Indeed, a number of studies (e.g., LaTour et al., 1976; Walker, LaTour, & Houlden, 1974) have found arbitration to be preferred over the moot, mediation, autocratic, and bargaining procedures across a variety of conflict situations. Perhaps the strongest support for this position is the finding by Lind et al., (1978) that subjects in four different countries (U.S., Britain, France, & W. Germany) preferred adversary adjudication, a procedure that assigns the responsibility for the development of issues and the presentation of arguments to the disputants in a legal trial (high process control), over inquisitorial adjudication, a procedure that assigns the task of gathering evidence and the development of issues to the judge (low process control), and this occurred despite the fact that the inquisitorial system is practised in France and West Germany.

The basic premise of Thibaut and Walker's theory and other research based on its conceptualization has been criticized on a number of grounds. The first criticism is that it is not really intended to be a theory of subjective justice. That is, the theory is an attempt to prescribe which procedures are best in certain circumstances, instead of an attempt to describe how people evaluate the fairness of procedures. For the purposes of this study, a more relevant criticism relates to the underlying model of the person from which they derive their predictions about control preferences. This model, known as the self-interest model (Lind & Tyler, 1988), is based on an egoistic conception of the person and suggests that people seek control over decisions because they are fundamentally concerned with their own outcomes. Thibaut and Walker view procedural justice concerns as
developing out of the operation of self-interest in the social arena.

Based on this underlying conceptualization, two anthropologists, Hayden and Anderson (1978) argued that this theory probably applies to European and North American societies, but not to more traditional societies in which the predominant focus is not the self, but others within the ingroup. Along similar lines, Nader and Todd (1978) argue that in societies in which people's circle of social interaction is limited and interpersonal relationships are stable and ongoing, procedures of conflict resolution such as mediation and negotiation that give room for compromising outcome decisions are preferred over arbitration, whereas procedures such as the latter that result for the most part in all-or-nothing decisions are preferred over negotiation and mediation in societies in which people's social sphere is large and constantly changing. Gluckman (1969) has suggested that in interdependent situations, negotiation is preferred over arbitration because in these situations, the people involved interact in relationships whose significance ranges beyond the transitoriness of the court or a particular dispute. The disputants may be in court today, but may be required to collaborate in the same work party tomorrow, thereby requiring certain kinds of settlement, such as compromise, which will allow the relations to continue. Consistent with this analysis, mediation is preferred to arbitration in Japanese society (e.g., Peterson & Shimada, 1978; Sullivan, Peterson, Kameda, & Shimada, 1981), Chinese society (e.g., Doo, 1973; Leung, 1987), and Mexican society (Nader, 1969). All three societies are said to place a high premium on stable interpersonal relationships (Leung, 1985).

Rokeach (1973) argues that social behaviour is greatly influenced
by one's value system, and that the effects on behaviour of social structure and extent of industrialization in a society may be mediated by their impact on a given person's value system. On the basis of this argument, and following Hofstede's (1980, 1983) identification of individualism-collectivism as one of the four dominant value orientations, some researchers (e.g., Leung, 1987; Leung & Lind, 1986) questioned the universality of the theoretical framework encompassing the prevailing research on procedural preferences. Because most of the work on procedural preference was conducted in societies termed "individualistic" by Hofstede, Leung (1987) and Lind and Leung (1986) compared preference patterns between subjects from an individualistic society (U.S.) and subjects from a collectivist society (Hong Kong). They found that, whereas subjects from the United States chose arbitration as a preferred method of dispute resolution, their Hong Kong counterparts preferred negotiation and mediation. The authors attributed the differences to the individualism of the Americans and the collectivism of the Chinese. It is important to note at this juncture that preference for one procedure or the other is usually in relative terms. This is due mainly to the various explicit and implicit notions about the range of options, the limitations of the various procedures, and the relation of procedure to outcome and consequences (Nader & Todd, 1978). Consequently, it is almost impossible for procedures used in studies of conflict resolution to be characterized on an absolute scale of preferences.

However, all participants from the collectivist samples were drawn from Oriental societies that are known to have some unique values such as the Confucian work dynamism (Chinese Culture Connection, 1987). The
Confucian work dynamism essentially reflects the teachings of Confucius. This dimension consists of items relating to such issues as having a sense of shame, protecting your "face", ordering relationships by status and observing order, reciprocation of greetings, favours, and gifts, and respect for tradition. The Confucian work dynamism is one of four factors from the Chinese Value Survey (CVS), an instrument developed by the Chinese Culture Connection, an international network of colleagues orchestrated by Michael H. Bond. In their study of 22 countries (including Canada and Nigeria), the Chinese Culture Connection identified four factors within the CVS instrument. Interestingly, with the exception of Brazil, all countries with positive scores on the Confucian work dynamism factor were from Asia. The CVS was developed solely as a measure of the basic values held by Chinese. However, the CVS dimensions have also been compared with Western-developed measures. For instance, when the CVS was compared with Hofstede's (1980) value dimensions, three of the CVS dimensions aligned with three of Hofstede's four dimensions (Hofstede & Bond, 1988). The non-matching CVS dimension was Confucian work dynamism. It should be noted that Hofstede's dimensions and the Rokeach Value Survey align closely (Hofstede & Bond, 1988).

It has been suggested that disputants in general attach great importance to saving face in the eyes of salient others and themselves (Rubin, 1980). Additionally, face-saving considerations have been found to influence the endorsement of procedures such as mediation for resolving disputes (e.g., Pruitt, 1982; Rubin & Brown, 1975). Because the Confucian work dynamism contains themes relating to "having a sense of shame" and protecting one's
"face", it is plausible that these elements, rather than collectivism per se, may provide rival explanations to the results reported by Leung and Lind. In order to develop a more complete framework that takes into account these differences in value orientation, and to determine the specific influence of individualism-collectivism, it is necessary to sample other identified but less frequently used individualistic and collectivist societies. If individualism-collectivism influences procedural preference in the manner suggested by other researchers, then the results of the proposed study should be similar to those obtained by Leung and his colleagues. In the next section, I will review the framework of cultural collectivism and the relation between collectivism and procedural justice.

Literature Review of Individualism-Collectivism and its Relation to Procedural Justice

Individualism and Collectivism: Definition, Conceptualization, and Behavioural Consequences

According to Webster's Third International Dictionary, the term "individualism" refers to the ethical doctrine or principle that the interests of the individual are or ought to be paramount in the determination of conduct (p. 1152). While this definition is widely used by psychologists and lay people alike, its counterpart, "collectivism", is less well understood by lay people. In a pilot study conducted by Hui (1983, cited in Hui, 1984) introductory psychology
students were asked to rate these two terms on a set of semantic differential scales. Whereas the subjects had no difficulty understanding individualism, about one quarter of them raised their hands and asked for an explanation of the term "collectivism". Collectivism is defined as a syndrome of attitudes, behaviours, and values consistent with the belief that a collective, rather than the individual, is the basic unit of survival, and therefore there exists a great readiness to cooperate with ingroup members (Hui, 1984). This definition subsumes ideas such as high interdependence, interpersonal sensitivity, conformity, readiness to be influenced by others, mutual sympathy, self-sacrifice for ingroup members, and external control (Triandis, 1988).

The emphasis in this conceptualization is on the ingroup, which may be very narrow (e.g., members of the nuclear family), somewhat broader (e.g., extended family members and friends), or very broad (e.g., members of one's alma mater, fellow nationals). "Ingroups" are used here to refer to groups of people about whose welfare one is concerned, with whom one is willing to cooperate without demanding equitable returns, and from whom separation leads to discomfort or even pain (Triandis, 1988). Determining who is included in an ingroup varies from culture to culture, but the most common categories frequently cited include parents, siblings, spouses, children, other relatives, friends, neighbours, coworkers, and probably members of any particular subculture. This suggests that there are different kinds of collectivism, and that the size of the ingroup is one of the relevant variables.

Although the concepts of individualism and collectivism have been discussed in various disciplines for decades (e.g., Berger, Berger, & Kellner, 1973; Douglas & Isherwood, 1978; Hsu, 1970; Kluckhohn, 1952; Parsons,
1977), it is only recently that individualism-collectivism has been empirically identified as a cultural value dimension. In a large scale study of 50 countries and three regions, Hofstede (1980, 1983) identified individualism-collectivism as one of four dimensions along which cultures varied. Countries that ranked high on the individualism index include: The United States, Australia, Great Britain, and Canada. On the lower end of the spectrum (collectivism) are countries/regions like Venezuela, Colombia, Pakistan, and West Africa. In Hofstede’s view, individualism is the emotional independence of groups, organizations, or other collectivities. Beginning from an Eastern (Chinese) culture’s vantage point, the Chinese Culture Connection (1987) conducted another culture-level study in 22 countries and found parallels with Hofstede’s factors, with collectivism as an underlying dimension (Kagitcibasi & Berry, 1989).

The identification of individualism-collectivism as an aspect of culture suggests that certain distinct behaviours or modes of thought can be linked with each value orientation. According to Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai and Lucca (1988), an essential attribute of collectivist cultures is that individuals may be induced to subordinate their personal goals to the goals of some collective, which is usually a stable ingroup (e.g., family, tribe, ethnic group), and much of the behaviour of individuals may concern the goals that are consistent with the goals of this ingroup. Furthermore, the relationship of the individual to the ingroup tends to be stable, and even when the ingroup makes very costly demands the individual stays with it. On the other hand, in individualist cultures there are many more ingroups (e.g., family, coworkers, clubs, professional associations), and much of the behaviour of individuals
concerns goals that are consistent with various ingroups. Due to the number and nature of ingroups in individualist cultures, people often drop those ingroups that are inconveniently demanding and form new ingroups. As a result, demands by ingroups on individual contributions are highly segmented, requiring contributions only at a certain time and place or of a certain kind. In contrast, in collectivist cultures the demands are diffuse.

Other differences in norms exist between individualist and collectivist societies. In the latter, people are born into extended families or kinship systems which protect them in exchange for loyalty. The sense of "we-ness" is very salient, and a person's identity is usually derived from the social system rather than from individual attributes (Hofstede, 1980). Privacy is reduced due to the heightened interaction between the individual and the collective. And in contrast with individualist societies where friendships are specific, friendships in collectivist societies are non-specific and predetermined by stable social relationships. Due to the belief in and reliance on group decisions, collectivist societies often emphasize particularistic values (Parsons, 1951).

Data consistent with Hofstede's classification and the behavioural characteristics outlined by Hofstede (1980), Parsons (1951) and Triandis et al. (1988) have been documented. For example, Jones and Bock (1960) found that the degree of endorsement by college students from five countries for the statement "sympathy, concern for others, restraints of one's self assertiveness" was: Indians (76), Japanese (71), Chinese (70), U.S. Blacks (61), and U.S. Whites (52). Similarly, Singh, Huang, and Thompson (1962) in a survey of the values of Chinese, Indian, and American students studying in
Hawaii, found that Chinese students gave most emphasis to the values of social life, and that self-centredness was socially disapproved in the Chinese culture. The most self-centred responses were obtained from the American students, while the scores of the Indian students lay between these two groups.

It should be noted that these behavioural differences depend to a great extent on a particular group's or culture's definition of the ingroup. People from collectivist cultures would usually share and show harmony, and subordinate their personal goals to collective goals, but only with members of the ingroup. With outgroup members, their behaviour tends to resemble that of individualists (Triandis, et al. 1988).

Extreme collectivism occurs when the needs, goals, attitudes, and values of both the individual and the ingroup are indistinguishable - the person actually enjoys doing what the ingroup demands. Under such circumstances, the individual and the culture are both collectivist. On the other hand, when there is no overlap between individual goals and goals of the ingroup one might have an individualist culture (where most people act with reference to their own goals) or a collectivist culture (where most people subjugate their personal goals to the goals of the ingroup). One can also imagine situations where an individualist lives in a collectivist or individualist culture (Triandis, 1988). At the psychological level, these differences are reflected in a personality dimension labeled allocentrism versus idiocentrism (Triandis et al., 1988). Allocentrism has been found to be positively correlated with social support and with low levels of alienation and anomie; idiocentrism has been found to be positively correlated with emphasis on achievement and perceived
loneliness (Triandis, Leung, Villareal, & Clack, 1985). Thus, idiocentrism-allocentrism reflects at the psychological level the dimension that has been termed individualism-collectivism at the cultural level, and therefore it is possible for each to be domain-specific.

Antecedents of Individualism and Collectivism

In order to provide a background as to how individuals become allocentric or idiocentric, and cultures collectivist or individualist, it will be helpful to examine in some detail, Triandis' (1989) synthesis of the relation between the self and social behaviour. According to Triandis (1989), statements that people make with regard to the self "have implications for the way they sample information (sampling information that is self-relevant more than information that is not self-relevant), the way they process information (sampling more quickly information that is self-relevant than information that is not self-relevant), and the way they assess information (assessing more positively information that supports their current self-structure than information that challenges their self-structure)" (p. 506). This means that the self is an active agent that promotes differential sampling, processing, and evaluation of information from the environment, thus leading to differences in social behaviour.

There exists considerable research evidence to support these assertions. For example, Kraut (1973) found that people whose self-concept was manipulated so that they thought of themselves as "charitable" gave more to charity. Similarly, people who were made to think of themselves as
"honest" were more likely to return a pencil (Shotland & Berger, 1970). In like manner, the more an attitude (an aspect of the self) is accessible to memory, the more likely it is to determine behaviour (Fazio & Williams, 1986). Also, people with high self-esteem have been found to be more likely to behave independently of group norms (Ziller, 1973).

The crux of Triandis' conceptualization is built around the distinction among three aspects of the self: the private, public, and collective self (Baumeister, 1986; Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984). The private self refers to cognitions about traits, states, or behaviours of the person - an assessment of the self by the self (e.g., "I am intelligent"); the public self involves cognitions concerning the generalized other's view of the self (e.g., "people think I am intelligent"); and the collective self, cognitions relate to a view of the self that is found in some collective (e.g., "my friends think that I am intelligent"). According to Triandis, people sample these three kinds of selves with different probabilities in different cultures, resulting in specific cultural consequences for social behaviour.

Sampling, as used in this context by Triandis, has two main elements: a **universe** of units to be sampled and a **probability** of choice of a unit from the said universe; this universe can either be simple or complex. Complexity is an important parameter since it refers to the number of distinguishable elements (few versus many), the differentiation within the elements (small or large), and the integration of the elements - the extent to which a change in one element changes few or many elements. According to Rokeach (1960) self-structures in which changes in one element result in changes in many elements are more complex than self-structures in which
such changes result in changes in only a few elements. Complexity of the universe is related to the probability of one of the three selves being sampled, in the sense that if for instance the public self is complex, there are more "public self units" that can be sampled, and thus the probability that the public self will be sampled will be very high. The same applies to the other selves - if they are complex, they have a higher probability of being sampled (Triandis, 1989).

One last point to be made about the conditions that determine what particular kind of self will be sampled relates to salience. Units of a particular self are likely to interact among themselves. Therefore, each time a unit is activated, adjacent and similar units will increase in salience. The salience of a unit increases its probability of being sampled. As stated earlier, sampling of a particular self will increase the probability that behaviours implicated in this aspect of the self will occur, if and when conditions favour such occurrence. For example, there is some empirical evidence that people from Europe and North America sample their private self more frequently than do people from East Asia. This means that elements about self autonomy and self-actualization will be more salient among Europeans and North Americans than among Asians.

One way in which differential sampling of a specific self occurs, along with the resultant type of behaviour orientation, is through socialization. Child-rearing patterns are different in collectivist and individualist cultures. The overriding concern of parents in collectivist cultures is obedience, reliability, and proper behaviour. These patterns are usually associated with rewards for conformity to ingroup goals, which results in the internalization of
these goals. Hence, people do what is expected of them, even if that may not be enjoyable. Bontempo, Lobel, and Triandis (1990) compared subjects from a collectivist culture (Brazil) and an individualist culture (U.S.) on two conditions of questionnaire administration: public and private. The questions were about how the subject was likely to act when the ingroup expected a behaviour that was costly to the individual, and how enjoyable it would be to act in accordance with this ingroup expectation. The results showed that the Brazilians gave the same answer under both the anonymous and public conditions, indicating that they would do what was expected of them and enjoy doing it. In contrast, the U.S. sample indicated they would do what was expected of them in the public but not in the private condition. It would appear that the Brazilians had internalized the ingroup norms so that conformity to the ingroup appeared enjoyable despite the inconvenience.

The primary concern of parents in individualistic cultures is self-reliance, independence, and creativity. Such child-rearing increases the complexity of the private self, and because there are more elements of the private self to be sampled, more of the private self elements are sampled. Thus, the probability that the private rather than the other selves will be sampled increases with individualism. Data suggest that in simple, agricultural societies, socialization is severe and conformity is demanded and obtained (e.g., Berry, 1979); in working-class families in industrial societies, the socialization pattern leads to conformity (e.g., Kohn, 1987); while in very individualistic societies such as the United States, the child-rearing pattern stresses self-reliance, independence, and creativity (Kohn, 1987).

The main antecedents of individualism seem to be cultural
complexity and affluence. The more complex a culture, the greater the number of ingroups that a person may have, so that a person has the choice of joining ingroups or even forming his or her own ingroups. The affluence of an individual affords him or her some independence from ingroups. If the ingroup makes costly or unrealistic demands, the individual can always opt out of the group. If I join, say a tennis club, and the demands on my time in terms of the number of mandatory activities becomes inconvenient, I could resign my membership of the club any time I desire. This is because there may be other tennis clubs around that I could join, or failing that, other substitute organizations through which I could fulfill most of the needs served by the tennis club. In addition to affluence, mobility is a potent factor for individualism. As people move - be it through migration or changes in social status - they join new ingroups and at the same time have the opportunity to join ingroups with goals which they perceive to be similar to theirs.

Furthermore, the more costly it is in a particular ecology for an ingroup to reject fellow members who behave according to their personal goals rather than those of the ingroup, the more likely that individuals in the said group will act in accordance with their own goals, and therefore the more individualistic the culture. Conversely, the more the benefits an individual receives due to his or her membership in an ingroup, the more likely it is that the person will use ingroup goals as guides for behaviour. The consequence of a person increasingly receiving rewards from ingroups (e.g., information, emotional security, status) is an increase in the individual's commitment to the group, and thus a higher collectivism in the culture.

According to Hofstede's (1980, 1983) data, the distribution of
individualism-collectivism contrasts most of the African, Asian, and Latin American cultures with most of the North American and North and Western European cultures. It should be cautioned that many cultures are close to the middle of this dimension, as well as on other relevance variables that have been shown to influence social behaviour. For example, urban samples tend to be more individualistic, and traditional-rural samples tend toward collectivism in the same culture (e.g., Georgas, 1989, in Greece). In the United States, Hispanic samples have been found to be much more collectivist than samples from Northern and Western European backgrounds (Marin & Triandis, 1985).

To summarize, this review suggests that the private, public, and collective selves are differentially sampled in different cultures. The frequency of sampling of each of the three selves has implications for social behaviour. Child-rearing practices which emphasize self-actualization, as well as conditions of affluence, often lead to the complexity of the private self and increases the probability of the private self being sampled, and generally results in individualism within a culture. On the other hand, socialization practices dominated by concerns for "what other people will think about you" tend to create a complex public self and increases the likelihood of it being sampled, with collectivism as a consequence. However, because the sampling of these three selves is done by the individual, and socialization practices vary even within the same cultures, it is possible to find individualistic (idiocentric) people within a largely collectivist culture, and collectivistic (allocentric) individuals in a predominantly individualistic culture.

In the next section, I review the literature dealing with the possible
influence of individualism-collectivism on distributive justice and procedural justice.

**Individualism-Collectivism and Distributive Justice**

The concept of distributive justice is concerned with the distribution of the conditions and goods which affect individual well-being (Deutch, 1975). Since its inception, equity theory (Adams, 1965; Homans, 1961; Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1978) has dominated both the explanation and prediction of distributive behaviour. Generally speaking, equity refers to a formula through which rewards are distributed among individuals or groups according to their contributions; that is, people who contribute more to a relationship, to a group, or to society should get proportionally more than those who contribute less. However, Deutch (1975) argues that equity is a limited perspective and should not be considered as the most adequate principle to be used at all times. He takes a functional approach which suggests that the best norm of distribution to be adopted by a group or society depends on what goals are being sought. According to Deutch, when productivity is the goal, it is wise for society to distribute resources in some manner which is proportional to the ability to use them for the benefit of society (equity). When interpersonal relations are a paramount goal, it makes sense that an equality or parity form of distribution will develop. Finally, it is reasonable for a society or group to take account of the relative helplessness of some of its members (the very old, those stricken by events to which all members are vulnerable). Under such circumstances, a distribution principle based on need is likely to
be applied and perceived as natural.

In addition to situational or functional variables, personality has been shown to influence the choice of a distribution norm. Swap and Rubin (1983) found that in reward allocation situations, subjects who scored high on a Personal Orientation Scale (high personal orientation is characterized by higher responsiveness to interpersonal aspects of relationships with others) used the equality norm to a greater extent, and subjects with lower scores were more likely to use equity.

Similar relationships have also been found at the cultural level. For example, Bond, Leung, and Wan (1982) observed that Hong Kong Chinese (collectivists), in order to preserve group harmony, were associated more with egalitarian assignment of rewards for task inputs than were U.S. subjects (individualists). Similarly, Berman, Murphy-Berman, and Singh (1985) allowed U.S. and Indian respondents to choose among the need, equality, and equity principles in the distribution of both positive and negative outcomes. They found that on the whole, there was a stronger tendency among Indians to favour need over merit than among American subjects. However, in the distribution of the negative resource, U.S. subjects distributed on the basis of need. That is, the American subjects refused to worsen the plight of the needy by rewarding merit in times of scarcity. This appears to confirm the functional perspective espoused by Deutch.

Other studies have shown that collectivists behave very differently when they divide resources between themselves and an ingroup member (e.g., friend) than when they divide resources between themselves and outgroup members. Recall that in an earlier discussion on the behavioural
characteristics of individualists and collectivists, it was suggested that whereas individualists' behaviour is not much influenced by the group membership of the target person, collectivists' behaviour is thought to be affected by whether a person is an ingroup or outgroup member (Triandis & Vassiliou, 1972). To test the effect of this differential behaviour by collectivists toward ingroups and outgroups on distributive behaviour, Leung and Bond (1984) gave Chinese (collectivists) and American (individualists) subjects a scenario about an allocator who worked with either ingroup or outgroup members, and whether the allocator had high or low inputs and used either an equity or equality norm to divide a reward. Comparatively, the Chinese liked an allocator more if the allocator divided the reward equally with an ingroup member, and regarded such allocation as fairer. When subjects were to assume the role of the allocator and hypothetically divide the reward, Chinese subjects followed the equity norm more closely than did U.S. subjects, when it was an outgroup member and input was low. However, when subjects' input was high and the recipient was an ingroup member, Chinese subjects favoured the equality norm to a greater extent than did their American counterparts who favoured the equity norm in both situations.

Thus, collectivists attempt to maximize harmony in ingroup situations and tend to prefer to use the equality principle; they are also more attracted to people who allocate rewards equally between themselves and friends. On the other hand, individualists are more attracted toward individuals who use the equity principle in allocating rewards between themselves and friends, as well as with outgroups.
Individualism-Collectivism and Procedural Justice

Even if there is complete consensus in society on the principles to be used in distributing the conditions and goods which affect individual well-being, there may exist wide disagreements both on how these principles should be implemented and the implementation of the accepted rules or procedures. Procedural justice relates to the process by which decisions of accepted principles of justice are made and how people are treated. Institutions operating according to a set of procedures perceived to be just will induce commitment and loyalty, a commitment and loyalty which will subsequently contribute to the stability of the institution over time (Cohen, 1985). It has been found that procedural justice affects behaviours and attitudes such as task performance, compliance with decisions and laws, and participation in institutional activities (Lind & Tyler, 1988). It is not surprising therefore, that much research attention has been focused on the variables that influence procedural justice.

Thibaut and Walker (1975) articulated a psychological model to explain why people prefer some procedures over others. Their model suggests that the distribution of control between the participants and the third party is the key procedural characteristic shaping people's views about fairness and desirability. Research subsequent to Thibaut and Walker (1975) has generally followed the control model by focusing attention on the distribution of control within various types of procedures. That research supports Thibaut and Walker's suggestion that the distribution of control within a procedure influences assessments of its procedural fairness, and this control
theory has been widely confirmed (e.g., Lind et al., 1978; Lind & Tyler, 1988). Most of these studies have found an overwhelming preference for the arbitration procedure and have explained this choice in terms of the optimal distribution of control inherent in this procedure. However, as indicated earlier, among other shortcomings of Thibaut and Walker's control theory is their underlying model of the person from which they derive their predictions about control preferences. As we have seen from the idiocentrism.allocentrism and individualism-collectivism distinctions, self-interest models such as the control theory fail to capture the universe of desired outcomes. Interestingly, the confirmatory evidence of preferences for adversarial procedures has been obtained from studies that used subjects from individualistic cultures.

Beyond control concepts, there are other psychological factors that may be important precursors to preference. It has already been argued that considerations such as maintenance of group harmony (at least with the ingroup) are usually top on the priority list of collectivists. Adversary procedures like arbitration generally place high process control in the hands of the disputants, and are thus more compatible with the individualist value of autonomy. In addition, adversary procedures involve direct confrontation of the disputants and are therefore in accord with the competitive orientation of individualists. For collectivists, the competitiveness involved in adversary procedures may lower their (collectivists') preference for these procedures.

Mediation has been found to offer substantially more opportunity for face-saving in making concessions than does unassisted negotiation (cf. Pruitt, 1982; Rubin & Brown, 1975), and it probably is much more effective in this regard than arbitration and adjudication. Concessions made in response
to the suggestions by a mediator do not carry the stigma of being weak, and the solutions thus produced may be more likely to permit continued good relations between erstwhile disputants because there is little resentment. In contrast, when arbitration is the method of dispute resolution, the high likelihood of an all-or-nothing outcome produces loss of face and the ascription of wrongdoing to the loser, which in turn makes continued relations difficult (Leung, 1985). Moreover, the competitive behaviour mandated by the adversary procedures may carry over into the relationship between the disputants and add another source of disruption. It has been argued that these processes are likely to be more salient to individuals from collectivist cultures, and therefore one would expect them to favour mediation over arbitration (Leung, 1985).

There is some empirical support for collectivists' preference for resolution methods that are amenable to tension reduction. For example, Bond, Wan, Leung, and Giacalone (1985) found that in a situation in which a high status third party tried to resolve a dispute between two disputants, Chinese subjects recommended that the third party consult the disputants separately to resolve the conflict, while American subjects recommended that the third party meet with the disputants together. One explanation of the Chinese rejection of a face-to-face meeting with a disputant is the fear that insult or other affronts will occur (Brown, 1977).

Another type of evidence for collectivists' preference for non-confrontational procedures comes from collectivists' discomfort with the competitiiveness in the adversary procedures. Tanabe (1963) has observed that although Japan operates an adversary legal system, litigants still rely on
the judge to provide facts of the case and ultimate justice. As a result, Japan initiated a process that would eventually integrate and produce a hybrid of the adversary and the inquisitorial systems in which the judge may clarify the case to ensure that its development is proper and fair. Despite this provision, litigants and their lawyers would still have the right to develop the case in any way they want.

More direct evidence of tension avoidance in conflict processing by collectivists has been obtained in a study of procedural preference among Chinese and American college students. Leung and Lind (1986) asked subjects to assume the role of the accused in a dispute and to choose between either an adversary or an inquisitorial procedure to settle the dispute. Consistent with some previous studies (e.g., Walker & Lind, 1984), American subjects preferred the adversary procedure over the inquisitorial procedure. In contrast, the Chinese showed no difference in preference for these procedures. Given that both the American and Chinese subjects in the same study preferred process control to a similar extent, Leung and Lind argued that the Chinese subjects regarded process control as desirable, but that this advantage of the adversary procedure may have been offset by the competitiveness and confrontation endemic in these procedures.

In a follow-up study, Leung (1987) compared Hong Kong Chinese and American subjects on preferences for methods of conflict resolution, but instead of using only the adversary and inquisitorial procedures, he added two other methods - bargaining and mediation. He found as predicted, that collectivistic Chinese subjects preferred bargaining and mediation to a greater extent, and the adjudicatory procedures to a lesser extent than did the
individualistic American subjects. Leung (1987) concluded that harmony-enhancing procedures are relatively more preferred, and confrontational procedures relatively less preferred, in collectivist than in individualist cultures.

In a recent study aimed at extending the findings of the influence of collectivism on procedural preference, Leung, Au, Fernandez-Dols, and Iwawaki (1992) decided not to compare procedural choices between an individualist and a collectivist culture, but between two collectivist cultures - one from Asia (Japan) and the other from Europe (Spain). They reasoned that if the individualism-collectivism framework relating to procedural preferences is valid, then the method preferences of these two cultural groups should be quite similar. The hypothesis was confirmed, attesting to the robustness of this effect.

**Psychological Mechanisms Underlying the Relationship Between Individualism-Collectivism and Procedural Preference**

The cross-cultural studies undertaken by Leung and his associates (Leung, 1987; Leung et al., 1990; Leung et al, 1992; Leung & Lind, 1986) have consistently found two factors that are thought to influence procedural preference. The first is animosity reduction, which relates to the perception that a procedure is capable of reducing the animosity between the disputants, and the second one is process control - the perception that a procedure affords one control over the development of the issues used in settling the conflict. Basing his proposition on the expectancy-valence framework (e.g., Atkinson, 1964), Leung (1987) proposed two plausible explanations for cultural
differences in procedural preference. One is called the *valence hypothesis* and suggests that cultural differences in procedural preferences are caused by cultural differences in the desire for animosity reduction and for process control. That is, because collectivists are thought to value interpersonal harmony in ingroups to a greater extent than individualists, a method such as mediation is probably more conducive to reducing the animosity between the disputants, and leads collectivists to prefer it over confrontational procedures like arbitration. The same logic holds in the reverse for arbitration.

In contrast, the *instrumentality hypothesis* suggests that cultural differences in procedural preference are caused by cultural differences in the perceived probability of the procedures in achieving animosity reduction and in granting process control to disputants. In other words, this hypothesis assumes that both collectivists and individualists have almost the same desire for animosity reduction and process control, the only difference is that collectivists may perceive a higher probability in attaining these goals by using methods like mediation, while individualists may see a greater likelihood of attaining the same goals by using arbitration. Thus, according to this approach, the difference between collectivists and individualists in their procedural preference reflects a different perception of the procedures rather than a different emphasis on animosity reduction and process control.

Although the instrumentality hypothesis sounds reasonable, and data so far seem to show stronger evidence for it than the valence hypothesis (e.g., Leung et al., 1990; Leung et al., 1992), there does not seem to be any valid theoretical basis for the instrumentality model. As has been shown in the review of the conceptualization of individualism-collectivism, a key defining
quality of individualism and collectivism lies in their different attributes - the individualist's tendency to be more concerned with the consequences of his or her own behaviour for his/her needs, interests, and goals, and the tendency for the collectivist to be more concerned with the consequences of his or her behaviour for ingroup members and the willingness to sacrifice personal interests for the attainment of ingroup goals (see also Hsu, 1981; Triandis, 1987, 1989). To explain differences in procedural preference between collectivists and individualists, not in terms of these underlying differences in motivational orientations, but in terms of differences in perceptions of the probability of attaining the same goals, though eloquent and tempting, must await a theoretical anchor.

Rationale for the Present Investigation

One of the aims of cross-cultural psychology is to identify those features of human psychological functioning that appear to be common across all populations. In an effort to accomplish this lofty objective, Amir and Sharon (1987) developed the first empirical research program explicitly assessing the generalizability and universality of social psychological laws (Kagitcibasi & Berry, 1989). In the area of procedural justice (especially with respect to procedural preference), the apparent effort to forge a pan-cultural model of procedural preference that is evident in recent research was not as deliberate. It has been consistently found that adversary adjudication or its variants (e.g., arbitration) is preferred over other procedures, even in countries like France
and Germany that practise the inquisitorial legal system (e.g., LaTour et al., 1976; Lind et al., 1978). This cross-cultural popularity of the adversary adjudication was attributed to the high level of perceived process control it engendered and the perception that a settlement arising from this procedure will be fair (Thibaut & Walker, 1978).

 Appropriately, Leung and Lind (1986) questioned the apparent universality of this phenomenon, arguing that its popularity had been demonstrated only in countries termed "individualistic" societies (Hofstede, 1980, 1983), but not in "collectivist" countries such as Japan and China. As stated earlier, most of the studies conducted by Leung and his associates (e.g., Leung, 1987; Leung et al., 1990) found that Chinese subjects preferred bargaining and mediation more, and arbitration less than their American counterparts, leading them to the conclusion that collectivism is responsible for the greater preference for harmony-enhancing procedures by the Chinese and individualism for the preference of the confrontational procedures by the American subjects. As stated in the introduction, on the basis of our current knowledge, it may be premature to accept a specified influence of individualism-collectivism on procedural preference. This position is based on a number of reasons.

 First, with the exception of the study by Leung et al. (1992), which, incidentally, was conducted well after this thesis began, all the collectivist samples used in the studies showing collectivists' preference for harmony-enhancing procedures have been drawn from Oriental societies where some unique values such as the Confucian work dynamism (Chinese Culture Connection, 1987) have been identified, and which may independently or in
interaction with some other value influence procedural preference. As indicated earlier in the introduction, without extending the same findings across non-Oriental collectivist cultures, it becomes difficult to ascertain exactly what is responsible for Oriental subjects' preference for harmony-enhancing procedures. We certainly cannot claim to observe a universal based on a single-culture result or on a behaviour pattern common to two or even a few cultures (Kagitcibasi & Berry, 1989).

Second, apart from Leung's (1987) study in which the U.S. and Chinese subjects were asked to complete the Friend and Coworker subscales of the Individualism-Collectivism Scale (Hui, 1984), the remaining studies that have investigated the influence of individualism-collectivism on procedural preferences have relied on the broad classifications of individualistic and collectivist cultures as identified by Hofstede (1980, 1983). The major problem here, as the review of individualism-collectivism clearly shows, is that who is defined as an ingroup or outgroup has considerable implications for social behaviour, especially for collectivists.

Also, collectivists typically have very few ingroups, and the type and range of people who fall into the ingroup category vary from culture to culture. It may thus be inappropriate to view large groups of societies as collectivists and expect some uniformity in procedural preference patterns. The failure to administer an individualism-collectivism scale in each culture to ascertain the specific domains of collectivism appears to be a vital omission. In addition to this already complex problem is the fact that some idiocentric persons can be found in collectivist cultures and allocentric people in individualist cultures. It may be necessary to confirm this influence both at the individual and the
cultural levels. One purpose of the present study was to extend the generality of the presumed influence of individualism-collectivism on procedural preference by comparing subjects from a non-Oriental collectivist society and a less frequently used individualist society while at the same time addressing some of the gaps in previous studies.

Another purpose of this investigation was to explore the underlying mechanisms for procedural preference. Some of the consistent variables found to mediate the effect of collectivism on procedural preference are: perceived fairness, perceived process control, and perceived likelihood of animosity reduction. Since the main aim of this research was to extend the generality of the findings in this area, these three variables were used to evaluate the procedures. In addition, two other variables, perceived favourability and the likelihood of a procedure not leaving the disputants holding grudges after the conflict were explored. Also examined was the effect of culture on the importance of these five characteristics of the procedures.

I was also interested in finding out whether people choose different methods in resolving interpersonal than intergroup conflict, and since individualism-collectivism is a major variable in this study, whether individualists and collectivists approach the two types of conflicts differently. Leung et al. (1990) made a preliminary test of this variable, but did not report the findings. In a follow-up study, Leung et al. (1992) failed to find the effect of nature of conflict. However, there is some basis to expect differences in handling interpersonal and intergroup conflicts. Using Tajfel's work on social identity (e.g., Tajfel, 1974), Brown and Turner (1981) suggest that the
distinction between personal identity and social identity functions to regulate behaviour under relevant conditions, such that the transition from personal to social identity corresponds to, and is responsible for, a shift from interpersonal to intergroup behaviour. As a result, it might be improper to directly extrapolate interpersonal processes to explain intergroup behaviour. Yet it is obvious that society's concern for disputes is not restricted to interpersonal conflicts. In fact, most conflicts that carry the potential for destructive consequences tend to occur between aggregates of people such as factions within business or political organizations, gangs, and rival ethnic groups. It is pertinent to examine what differences, if any, exist in the manner in which people process interpersonal and intergroup conflicts. This variable was thus explored throughout this investigation.

It is evident from this review that many issues are involved in the social psychological study of procedural justice in general, and procedural preference in particular. Cognizant of this fact, and the realization that the population from where the samples in this study are drawn has not been widely used, I felt it necessary to first conduct an exploratory study to examine some of the basic issues in procedural preference in order to establish a basis from which the subsequent comparisons would be made. The study presented in the next chapter was designed to explore these basic issues in procedural preference.
Chapter 2

The Exploratory Study

This chapter describes an exploratory study that was conducted to provide basic information essential for the testing of the variables used in the main investigation. The research method used in this and subsequent studies is described, and the rationale for using it is outlined.

Why conduct an exploratory study? A cursory glance through the introduction and the review of the literature in this dissertation indicates that many variables are thought to influence procedural preference, yet there is no agreement as to what these variables are, or the nature of their influence. Even when an accord exists on which variables are to be implicated in procedural preference, opinions often differ with respect to the underlying processes leading to the obtained outcomes. For example, there is a general agreement that people tend to prefer methods that afford them "voice" (Folger, 1977) or what Thibaut and Walker (1975, 1978) term "process control". However, while Thibaut and Walker attribute the preference for procedures that offer opportunities for expressing one's views to the likelihood of bringing about a more favourable outcome, other researchers (e.g., Tyler, Rasinsky, &
Spodick, 1985) suggest that this opportunity to "have a say" is valued in and of itself, irrespective of whether the expression of voice has some influence over the outcome of the decision (Folger, 1986).

Second, a disproportionate number of studies cited in the literature have examined only the procedural justice judgments of Americans. It clearly is necessary to replicate some of the basic findings using non-U.S. samples so that the resultant theorizing about conflict processing is not based on processes that are uniquely American. Thus the first question I was interested in was similar to that posed in the LaTour et al. (1976) study: If disputants were allowed to choose from a number of dispute resolution procedures, which one would they spontaneously choose and would the chosen method be consistently preferred across different conflict situations? It might seem obvious, based on Thibaut and Walker's (1975) research, to predict that arbitration would be the procedure most preferred by disputing parties. However, it is important to note that Thibaut and Walker's conclusions were explicitly qualified as being applicable only to disputes involving "high conflict of interest." It also should be noted that the confirmation by LaTour, Houlden, Walker and Thibaut (1976) that arbitration was preferred over other procedures was made under conditions of great time pressure and extreme conflict of interest (no possibility of compromise because of completely opposing interests). To the extent that many disputes have a mixed-motive nature, encompassing elements of both competition and cooperation, the same preference pattern may not be found. For example, others (e.g. Johnson & Tullar, 1972; Bigoness, 1976; Hiltrop & Rubin, 1982) report that under low conflict conditions, disputants preferred bargaining over mediation.
and arbitration. Given this theoretical uncertainty, no specific hypothesis was made about which procedure would receive the highest preference ratings.

Besides overall preference I also was interested in other questions relating to the evaluations of each procedure (e.g., fairness, favourability, intensity reduction, process control) in order to explore the underlying mechanisms that may influence preference for a given procedure.

Finally, I examined certain characteristics of conflicts that could affect the manner in which people handle disputes. Two such variables were explored in this study - the type of conflict and expected future interaction. Specifically, I was interested in finding out whether people choose different methods in resolving interpersonal than intergroup conflicts. Using Tajfel's work on social identity (e.g., Tajfel, 1974), Brown and Turner (1981) suggest that the distinction between personal and social identity functions to regulate behaviour under relevant conditions such that the transition from personal to social identity corresponds to and is responsible for a shift from interpersonal to intergroup behaviour. As a result, it would be improper to directly extrapolate interpersonal processes to explain intergroup behaviour. On the basis of findings from certain studies (e.g., Doise & Sinclair, 1973; Dustin & Davis, 1970) which have consistently found groups to be more competitive than individuals under the same conditions, I hypothesized that competitive procedures such as arbitration would be preferred in resolving intergroup conflict while non-competitive procedures like negotiation would be preferred in resolving interpersonal conflict.

Research in other domains has shown that expected future interaction has a noticeable influence on behaviour. For example, several
studies of reactance (Brehm, 1968) suggested that when a person perceives an effort by others to insidiously influence their attitudes, this attempt generates a reactance arousal which motivates the individual to restore the threatened freedom by rejecting the influence attempt (Brehm & Sensenig, 1966). However, Kiesler and Corbin (1965) suggested that under certain circumstances, rejecting another’s position is not the most obvious response. They led subjects to believe that their attitude was discrepant with that of an unattractive group to which they belonged. Half of the subjects expected to interact with the group on future occasions and half did not. It was found that greater attitude change toward the group’s position occurred in the high as compared with the low condition of expected future interaction. Kiesler (1968) suggested that commitment to future interaction makes certain alternative reactions, such as rejection of the group’s position, more difficult and hence less probable.

In the conflict resolution arena, research examining the role of relationships in conflict processing began in anthropology. For example, Nader and Todd (1978) summarize the research and arguments of Gluckman (1955, 1969) and Van Velsen (1969) indicating that disputants in multiplex and continuing relationships will rely on negotiation or mediation in settlement attempts which will lead to compromise outcomes, while disputants in simplex relationships will rely on adjudication or arbitration in settlement attempts which will lead to win-or-lose decisions. Though interesting, the above argument can be considered as indirect evidence of the role of likelihood of future interaction because future interaction is only implied in the above postulation. More direct evidence comes from the study by Lewicki and
Sheppard (1985) in which expectation of future relations between disputants was explicitly manipulated. These authors also found that when future relations are expected, people are more likely to choose mediation than when future interaction is unlikely.

Although Lewicki and Sheppard's (1985) study provides an important starting point for understanding the role of expected future interaction in procedural preference, it is limited in at least two ways. One limitation is that it focused only on procedures involving third parties. It is obvious that people engaged in disputes use non-third party procedures such as negotiation, threats, and accept the situation. It is pertinent to know how expectation of future interaction affects preferences for these other procedures as well. A second limitation is that the third parties were the ones asked to make the procedural choices. While the third party's perspective may be important in understanding people's choices of procedures, it must be treated as of at least equal importance to that of the disputants. To get a complete picture of the role of expected future interaction in procedural preference, one would need to examine the perspective of the third party as well as that of the disputants.

Procedures of conflict resolution can be ordered on a continuum ranging from conflict intensifying to conflict mitigating styles (Sternberg & Soriano, 1984; Sternberg & Dobson, 1987). On the strength of previous research and the notion that peaceful coexistence is one of the aims of attempts at conflict management and resolution, it seems reasonable to also expect that if an individual believes that he or she is likely going to have future dealings with a fellow disputant, this anticipation of future interaction will
influence preference for the procedure that will be used in the conflict resolution effort. Building on this background, I hypothesized that people engaged in conflict who expect to interact with fellow disputants in the future are more likely to prefer harmony-enhancing procedures such as negotiation and mediation while those anticipating no future interaction would likely choose more competitive and decisive procedures such as arbitration.

Method

Subjects

Eighty-five subjects (34 males and 51 females) participated in this study. They were McMaster university undergraduates enrolled in the introductory psychology program who participated in the study for partial fulfillment of course requirements.

Design

The experiment used a 2 (type of conflict: interpersonal vs. intergroup) x 2 (expected future interaction: high vs. low) x 6 (method: threats, wait and see, accept the situation, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration) factorial design. The whole design was within subject, that is, each subject received all the manipulations. The order in which the manipulations were presented was counterbalanced across subjects.

The Use of Scenarios

The Scenario approach to the study of procedural justice is a
variant of the laboratory experiment and involves the presentation of
descriptions of conflict situations, which respondents are asked to imagine
happening to themselves or to others, and the assessment of preferences,
attitudes or beliefs with respect to these scenarios. On the whole, the key to
valid scenario studies is to design the study to deal with situations the
respondents have experienced and understand (Lind & Tyler, 1988). To
ensure that this vital aspect of the study was achieved, I interviewed
undergraduates as well as Hall masters as to the most frequent causes of
conflict among students. The attractiveness of the scenario approach
becomes more evident when one considers that most social psychological
laboratory experiments as currently conducted typically involve 1-hour
encounters between strangers (Gergen, 1978). In such a context, it becomes
very difficult to manipulate the type of cooperative behaviours that become
important in actual or anticipated long-term group projects. This is especially
so when one is interested in the role of factors such as values and their impact
on interpersonal or intergroup behaviour. Consequently, the inputs of
members to the internal system (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) are likely to be
overlooked.

One remedy to this problem is the scenario method (Bond, Leung,
& Wan, 1982). Through scenarios, a verbal representation of sustained
interaction can be constructed and subjects asked to indicate their probable
behavioural intentions toward the actors involved (Triandis, 1964). As
subjects will all have had experiences similar to those depicted in the scenario,
this symbolic approach becomes a starting point with reasonable face validity.
For this reason, scenarios were used in the exploratory study as well as in the
subsequent studies.

Materials

The experimental materials were similar to those used by Sternberg and Soriano (1984) and Leung, Bond, Carment, Krishnan, and Liebrand (1990), with a few modifications (the former used 7 while the latter used 8 conflict resolution procedures; both used different scenarios from those presented in this study). The questionnaire package began with a half-page description of the conflict. The dispute was described as between two roommates from the same university in the individual condition (interpersonal), and as between two classes in the group condition (intergroup).

In the interpersonal condition, the conflict arose because one of the roommates had found a cheaper accommodation and so was proposing to move immediately lest he or she forfeit the new place. The problem was that he or she was not prepared to continue payment for the old apartment, and the roommate was unable to find someone else to share and pay the other half of the rent. Both parties then engaged in a heated exchange. While the first party claimed that the roommate was being unreasonable for wanting him or her to forfeit a cheaper place, the other party replied that they had agreed to share the rent for one school year and as such it was unfair for the roommate to not only intend to move out earlier than agreed, but to refuse paying his or her share of the rent.

In the intergroup condition, two different classes had projects which were due at about the same time. They discovered, however, that the computer facilities with which the projects were to be done were not sufficient
for both classes at the same time. The parties engaged in a heated exchange because each class stressed the importance and urgency of their projects and their rights to the computer facilities.

An expected future interaction manipulation was also introduced. In the condition involving high possibility of future interaction, the parties were described as having an on-going relationship. In the individual condition, the roommates were said to attend a number of classes together and so would be meeting each other frequently. In the group condition, both classes were said to be in the same department and so the students would likely be bumping into each other. In the condition involving low future interaction, it was stated that one of the students was going to leave the university after the school year, while in the group condition, one of the groups was a graduating class and so would be leaving at the end of the session. See Appendix A for complete versions of the scenarios.

Six methods of resolving the quarrel were then presented. No labels were attached to the procedures, and they were identified by the numbers 1 to 6 in order to avoid any evaluative connotation of the labels. The descriptions included brief summaries of the procedures, which are given below:

1. Threaten the other party and say that you will publicize their action and thus, damage their image and reputation.
2. Observe the situation and wait and see how the other party reacts to your strong arguments.
3. Accept the situation (i.e. comply in line with the demands of the other party).
4. Negotiate with the other party hoping that you both will compromise in order
to reach a solution that is acceptable to both parties.

5. Seek assistance from a third party, hoping to find a mediator who will assist in the negotiation (i.e. trying to reach a settlement by following the mediator's guidance).

6. Take the case to an arbitrator (i.e. someone with the power and authority to settle the dispute decisively), to whom both parties will explain their viewpoints. The arbitrator will then make a final decision that must be followed by both parties.

Note that the first four strategies do not involve third parties; a third party is introduced in the fifth method but his or her role is only that of helping the disputing parties to arrive at an acceptable solution, while in the sixth method, the third party's decision is binding. The methods thus vary in decreasing order of personal assertiveness. The first three involve unilateral actions, the fourth begins to include the other party, while the fifth and sixth involve third parties.

Subjects were asked to assume the role of the first party (the complainant) and rate their preference for using each of the methods to settle the quarrel by checking a seven-point scale. The two ends of the scale were labelled "strongly willing" to use this method and "strongly unwilling" to use this method respectively. Subjects were then asked to rate each procedure on seven other scales, using a similar seven-point continuum. These scales assessed the extent to which subjects thought each procedure (1) was favourable, (2) allowed the disputants control over the development of the quarrel, (3) was fair, (4) was likely to reduce the intensity of the conflict, (5) was likely to protect their interest after the quarrel, (6) was likely to make both
parties hold a grudge after the settlement of the conflict, and (7) allowed the disputants control over the process and procedures in settling the dispute. A number of these factors (2, 4, & 7) were taken from Leung (1987) in which they were found to form two orthogonal factors: Intensity reduction and grudge were to tap the animosity reduction factor, while control over the development of the quarrel and control over the process and procedure of the conflict were aimed at tapping the process control factor. It should be noted that ratings were used instead of rankings to see if some methods would be equally preferred or disliked.

**Procedure**

Subjects were run in small groups of 12 to 25 persons. The experimenter gave each subject a booklet containing the experimental materials in the order described. They were told to work through the booklet at their own speed and that there were no right or wrong answers. When they had completed the booklet, they gave it to the experimenter and received a debriefing about the purpose of the experiment.

**Results**

The data were subjected to a repeated measures Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) treatment. A 3-way MANOVA was run for the three fixed effects of type of conflict (2 levels: interpersonal vs. intergroup), future (2 levels: high vs. low possibility of future interaction), and procedure (6 levels: threats, wait and see, accept the situation, negotiation, mediation and arbitration) to test for preference of method.
Procedural Preference Ratings

The 3-way MANOVA yielded a significant main effect of procedure [F (5, 420)=143.02, p<.001]. An examination of the marginal means showed that the most preferred method was negotiation, followed by mediation and arbitration. The least preferred methods were accept the situation, threats and wait and see, respectively. The 3-way interaction between type of conflict, nature of future interaction, and procedure was also significant [F (5, 420)= 11.50, p<.001], so my main focus is on the result of this interaction.

The means of this interaction were subjected to Tukey's Honestly Significant Difference (HSD) test, a post-hoc multiple comparison procedure. For each method, the means of the type of conflict and nature of future interaction were compared. It was found that preference ratings for threats changed significantly from very unpreferable in the interpersonal conflict with high possibility of future interaction to just mildly unpreferable in the low possibility of future interaction. Negotiation on the other hand decreased from very preferable to simply preferable under the same conditions. These changes imply that when there is a low possibility of future interaction, people engaged in an interpersonal conflict increase their willingness to use threats while at the same time decreasing their preference for negotiation as a suitable method of resolving the conflict. Also, negotiation was rated as significantly more preferable than mediation and arbitration for the interpersonal conflict with high possibility of future interaction. However, when there was low possibility of future interaction, negotiation ceased to differ from mediation and arbitration (see Table 1 for the means of this interaction).
Table 1
Method Preference as a Function of Type of Conflict and Nature of Future Interaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Procedure</th>
<th>IPHF</th>
<th>IPLF</th>
<th>IGHF</th>
<th>IGLF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threats</td>
<td>1.92*</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>1.73*</td>
<td>2.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wait &amp; see</td>
<td>4.51</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>3.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accept the situation</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation</td>
<td>6.23*</td>
<td>5.28</td>
<td>6.01</td>
<td>5.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>5.04</td>
<td>5.71</td>
<td>5.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbitration</td>
<td>4.18</td>
<td>5.04</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>5.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Two asterisks indicate that the difference between two adjacent means was significant at .01 level. The larger the number, the higher the preference for method.

IPHF = Interpersonal conflict with high likelihood of future interaction.

IPLF = Interpersonal conflict with low likelihood of future interaction.

IGHF = Intergroup conflict with high likelihood of future interaction.

IGLF = Intergroup conflict with low likelihood of future interaction.

Except for the preference ratings on negotiation which were not affected by the nature of future interaction manipulation, all the changes in preference noted in the interpersonal conflict were similar to those in the intergroup condition.
Perceptions of Method

In order to explore the underlying mechanisms that may influence procedural preference, a 3-way MANOVA was performed on the seven aspects of subjects' perception of each procedure. A table containing the means for this analysis can be found in Appendix E1.

Because the main interest in the procedural perceptions was to find out how much of preference can be explained by these perceptions, procedural preference ratings for all six procedures were regressed on these perceptions for both types of conflict and both conditions of future interaction. Procedure-by-procedure analyses were conducted using the stepwise (forward) regression procedure and a tolerance of .01. The results of interest are the standardized beta weights and the $R^2$ values.

For the interpersonal conflict, favourability was found to be the main predictor of all six procedures in both conditions of future interaction. Fairness was a good predictor of negotiation, and intensity reduction was a good predictor of threats under the high likelihood of future interaction situation. In the low likelihood of future interaction condition, fairness again emerged as a good predictor of threats, negotiation and mediation while intensity reduction predicted the use of arbitration.

Favourability again emerged as the major predictor of all procedures in the intergroup conflict, irrespective of the nature of future interaction. Fairness was a good predictor of all the six procedures when the two groups were not likely to interact in the future. When future interaction was likely, the predictive power of fairness was limited only to threats, negotiation and mediation. Unlike the interpersonal conflict, intensity reduction was not predictive of any procedure in both conditions of future interaction. See Table 2 for the beta weights and the $R^2$ values for this analysis.
Table 2

Regression Coefficients for Favourability, Fairness, and Intensity Reduction in Predicting Procedural Preference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interpersonal Conflict</th>
<th>Favorability</th>
<th>Fairness</th>
<th>Reduction</th>
<th>R2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HF / LF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats</td>
<td>.46** .25*</td>
<td>.14 .49**</td>
<td>.30** .19</td>
<td>.49  .36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wait and see</td>
<td>.69** .50**</td>
<td>.10 .00</td>
<td>.02 .07</td>
<td>.48  .25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accept the situation</td>
<td>.52** .53**</td>
<td>.03 .13</td>
<td>.10 .04</td>
<td>.28  .43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation</td>
<td>.27** .37**</td>
<td>.40** .34**</td>
<td>.10 .01</td>
<td>.28  .35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td>.62** .43**</td>
<td>.10 .25*</td>
<td>.08 .12</td>
<td>.47  .30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbitration</td>
<td>.56** .59**</td>
<td>.13 .10</td>
<td>.10 .20*</td>
<td>.35  .35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Intergroup Conflict         |              |          |           |      |
| HF / LF                     |              |          |           |      |
| Threats                     | .45** .51**  | .29** .36**| .16 .02   | .48  .59|
| Wait and see                | .81** .27*   | .04 .44**| .03 .00   | .66  .42|
| Accept the situation        | .69** .34**  | .04 .27* | .03 .01   | .47  .26|
| Negotiation                 | .33** .45**  | .37** .27*| .10 .16   | .40  .49|
| Mediation                   | .29** .52**  | .30** .31**| .08 .02   | .25  .50|
| Arbitration                 | .52** .40**  | .20 .31**| .10 .17   | .45  .49|

Note: None of the Beta values on grudge, control over the development of the quarrel, likelihood of interest being protected after the conflict and process control were significant, as such they have been omitted from the table. All the R² values were significant at the .001 level. *p < .05, **p < .01

HF = High likelihood of future interaction; LF = Low likelihood of future interaction.
Because favourability emerged as a good predictor of all the procedures, I wanted to ensure that I was not measuring preference again under a different label. To this end, I correlated preference and favourability scores on all the twenty-four dependent measures. The obtained correlations ranged between .39 and .72. While these values are positive and moderate, I do not think that they are sufficiently high to be considered the same variable. Moreover, a similar correlation between preference and at least two other procedural perceptions did not result in markedly different coefficients (e.g., a range of .33 and .69 for fairness and .23 and .58 for intensity reduction).

Discussion

These results demonstrate that keeping the type of conflict and the nature of future interaction constant, subjects would most prefer to use negotiation in resolving their conflicts. This is followed, in order, by mediation, arbitration, wait and see, threats and accept the situation. This finding contrasts with the results obtained by LaTour et al. (1976) and Heuer & Penrod (1986) in which the subjects showed a clear preference for arbitration, followed by "moot" (a procedure whereby disputants freely present their evidence to a third party who does not have complete decision control but rather shares an equal vote on the final settlement with the conflicting parties), and mediation. Bargaining (an equivalent of negotiation in this study) came a distant fourth, with only the autocratic procedure being rated as less desirable. The findings in this study also are counter to the results and initial postulations by Thibaut and Walker (1975) who argued that opportunity for evidence
presentation may be the best predictor of the perceived fairness of a procedure and therefore, a crucial consideration for method preference. They are consistent with a number of other studies, however (e.g., Rubin, 1980; Hiltrop & Rubin, 1982), which indicate that disputants, if they can help it, would ordinarily prefer to settle their differences without the intrusion of a third party.

The higher overall preference for mediation over arbitration is consistent with recent suggestions (Houlden, 1981; Lewicki, 1982) that a reasonable implication of the procedural justice research is that when outcomes can be divided, disputants will prefer greater participation in both the evidence-presentation and decision-making phases of settlement process. Since mediation provides both but arbitration provides only the evidence-presentation, it seems reasonable that mediation should be preferred over arbitration.

The clear choice of negotiation over mediation and arbitration may have been due to the fact that the subjects did not consider the conflict to be of high intensity. Hiltrop and Rubin (1982) manipulated the conflict intensity variable and found that in situations of low conflict, disputants preferred bargaining over mediation and arbitration. However, in the high conflict condition, subjects preferred arbitration despite their opportunity for concession exchange. This finding reiterates the fact that the suggestion and subsequent finding that people involved in a conflict will choose arbitration as a preferred procedure for resolution as postulated by Thibaut and Walker may be limited to extreme conflicts of interest, and not generalizable to all types of conflict.

The result I find more interesting is the interaction between type of
conflict, the nature of future interaction and procedure. This suggests that preference for a procedure of dispute resolution is unstable, and is dependent on such factors as whether or not a conflict is between two individuals or between groups of people. It is also influenced by the kind of expectations the disputants have with respect to future dealings with one another. This is contrary to the findings from some other studies (e.g., Sternberg and Soriano, 1984; Sternberg and Dobson, 1987) which found strong consistencies in styles of conflict resolution within the same individuals across various interpersonal conflicts. The results in this study are more in line with contrasting views (e.g., Cantor, Mischel & Schwartz, 1982) which propose that interactions between persons and situations, rather than personal or situational factors considered alone, are better predictors of behaviour.

To a large extent the result of the interaction supports both hypotheses of this study. The higher preference for negotiation in the interpersonal condition and arbitration in the intergroup conflict are in line with the predictions. My post-hoc explanation for this is that due to self-presentation motives, people engaged in an interpersonal conflict, especially in cases where future interaction is anticipated, may want to present themselves in a good light and choose the most amicable procedure of conflict resolution. In a group situation however, the individual may not have such a problem due to diffusion of responsibility (Darley & Latane, 1968). This process may not occur in exactly the same fashion as in the bystander effect, but rather due to the fact that being in a group, the individual may be less likely to be singled out for blame or criticism for adopting an unpopular resolution procedure.
It is interesting that preference modes in both the interpersonal and intergroup conflicts were affected by the anticipation of future interaction. This indicates that people are more willing to deal harmoniously with those with whom they are likely to have future dealings. After all, who knows what might be required from these people at a later date? When this possibility is slim, then people feel that they can afford to be more assertive and competitive. This may explain why, for instance, in the intergroup conflict with a high possibility of future interaction, negotiation is rated as the most preferred method of resolving the dispute, but when future interaction is unlikely, negotiation is overtaken by mediation and tied with arbitration.

**Mechanisms Underlying Procedural Preference**

The analyses of the perceptions of procedures provide clues as to what considerations influence the preference for choosing a given procedure of conflict resolution. The MANOVA results of the procedural perceptions indicate that in addition to perceived fairness and process control already identified by Thibaut and Walker (1975), and animosity reduction and favourability (Leung, 1987), the likelihood of a procedure leaving the disputants holding grudges after the conflict may be related to procedural preference. The procedures that had high preference ratings were also perceived to be more favourable, fairer, more capable of reducing the intensity of the conflict, and were considered less likely to leave the disputants with grudge over the conflict. This emphasizes the need to expand the variables that are currently implicated in Thibaut and Walker's (1978) theory of
procedure.

Perhaps of greater significance is the fact that these results have exposed the limited contribution of process control in accounting for procedural preference. As the means from the MANOVA analysis indicate (see Table 1, Appendix E), under certain conditions, the process control ratings of threats were higher than those of arbitration. Yet, in no condition were preference ratings of threats higher than those of arbitration. Moreover, as can be seen from the regression analyses, process control failed to emerge as a significant predictor of any of the procedures under both types of conflict and nature of expected future interaction. I take this as an indication that more factors than just process control and fairness are needed to give a clearer picture of the processes underlying procedural preference. This interpretation is entirely consistent with the results of Lissak and Sheppard's (1983) surveys which identified a pool of criteria (e.g., airing the problem, speed of resolution, privacy, minimization of disruption of ongoing affairs) used by people to evaluate and choose procedures for resolving disputes. More factors may yet be identified in future explorations.

Analyses of the perception items also provide important information about the procedures. In contrast with the results of LaTour et al. (1976), negotiation and mediation were perceived as the fairest methods, while arbitration came a distant third. Negotiation was again seen as providing the most process control, followed by arbitration, mediation, threats, and wait and see, which (the four procedures) did not differ significantly. These two results do not support the suggestion by Thibaut and Walker (1978) that procedures granting decision control to an impartial third party are likely to be judged as
fair. It should be noted that the postulation by Thibaut and Walker applies specifically to extreme conflicts of interest. The implication of the results from this study is that the underlying process for procedural preference for disputes not involving extreme conflicts of interest may be different, for if it was not, threats should have been perceived equally as fair as arbitration, mediation, and wait and see.

It is not exactly clear why the findings in this study do not support some of the earlier basic assumptions about the theory of procedure. One tentative explanation is that although they may contribute to method preference, perceived fairness and process control are not as influential or dominant as previously expected. This is especially so because the basis on which their importance was demonstrated was in the restricted context of the legal setting with its limited and rather specific methods of resolution. A further examination of these variables in future research is required to assess their impact on procedural preference.

As was stated at the beginning of this exploratory study, one of the aims of making this preliminary investigation was to ensure that one was not unduly making general postulations about procedural justice phenomena based on processes that were uniquely American. The results of this study have shown that while some of the findings were not in accord with the initial postulations by Thibaut and Walker (1975), they were for the most part in line with other previous studies. Having established this, attention will now be focused on the main concern in this dissertation: the role of cultural variables, especially individualism-collectivism, in procedural preference. This issue is addressed in the next chapter.
Chapter 3

Cultural Factors in Procedural Preference: The Role of the Individualism-Collectivism Value Dimension

Prior to 1985, most studies of procedural preference (e.g., Lind et al. 1978; Kurtz & Houlden, 1981) confirmed the seminal finding by Thibaut and Walker (1975) that adversary adjudication is the most preferred procedure of dispute resolution. There were some studies that found higher preferences for methods other than adversary adjudication (a near equivalence of arbitration), but these differences were obtained under specific circumstances such as, conflicts of low intensity (e.g., Hiltrop & Rubin, 1982) and conflict situations which presented disputants with a possibility of an integrated settlement (e.g., Heuer & Penrod, 1986, study 2). Therefore, the generality of preferences for adversary adjudication procedures was not seriously questioned. This was more so because similar results to those by Thibaut and Walker were obtained with subjects from France and Germany both of which have inquisitorial legal systems (e.g., Lind, Erickson, Friedland & Dickenberger, 1978).

Despite this seemingly widespread preference for the adversary procedure across cultures, Leung (1985) and Leung and Lind (1986) pointed
out that its popularity had been observed only in countries such as the U.S., France, Germany, Britain, which are "individualistic" societies (Hofstede, 1980, 1983), and that no "collectivist" societies had been studied. In line with this distinction, and following the doubts about cross-cultural similarity in preference patterns and the underlying processes (e.g., Hayden & Anderson, 1979; Leung & Lind, 1986), Leung (1987) tested the effects of the individualism-collectivism value dimension on procedural preference by comparing two cultural groups that fall on the opposite ends of this dimension - U.S. and Chinese cultures. Contrary to the results obtained in Europe and North America, Chinese subjects preferred bargaining and mediation to a greater extent than Americans, who tended to prefer the adjudicatory procedure. The Chinese preference for bargaining and mediation was attributed to their collectivistic value orientation with its emphasis on interpersonal harmony and group solidarity, while the U.S. preference for arbitration was linked to the individualistic values in that culture (Leung, 1987). It should be added that some results common to both cultures were also obtained. For both countries, procedural preference was related to the perception of the extent to which a procedure granted disputants control over the process of dispute resolution and whether or not it was capable of reducing the animosity between the parties engaged in the conflict.

As stated earlier in the introduction, there is a problem in accepting the results and interpretations of Leung and his associates at face value because these studies investigating the impact of collectivism on procedural preferences have all used Oriental samples (e.g., Leung & Lind, 1986; Leung, 1987). This is in spite of the fact that some value orientations exist that are
unique to Oriental cultures. For example, the Confucian Work Dynamism has been identified as a separate and almost exclusively Oriental value (Chinese Culture Connection, 1987). It is quite possible that the Confucian value operating alone or interacting with collectivism or some other value, may be responsible for the obtained preference pattern.

The aim of the study reported here was to test the robustness of the effect of individualism-collectivism by comparing preference patterns of a non-Oriental collectivist culture (Nigeria) with another less frequently used individualistic society (Canada). In addition, I set out to verify the standings of these groups on the Individualism-Collectivism dimension by administering Hui's (1988) individualism-collectivism (INDCOL) scale. On the basis of the earlier studies cited above, I expected that Nigerians would respond in a more collectivist fashion on the INDCOL scale than Canadians.

A potential confound in testing the reactions of people from individualistic and collectivist societies to arbitration and other procedures is the possibility that their familiarity with procedures that are institutionalized within their societies may affect their preferences (Leung, 1985). Thus, if preferences are assessed for members of a collectivist society for which the legal system closely resembling mediation is used and the subjects from that society chose mediation over arbitration, it would not be clear whether the effect was due to actual underlying cultural differences or to the endorsement of the most familiar procedure. By choosing samples from Canada and Nigeria, both of which practise the adversary legal system, this potential problem was hopefully minimized. Based on the results of previous studies reviewed in the literature, I hypothesized that Nigerian subjects would more
strongly endorse harmony-enhancing procedures such as negotiation and mediation while Canadian subjects would endorse more competitive procedures such as arbitration.

Also, data analyses of the exploratory study revealed some interesting effects with regard to the impact of type of conflict and expected future interaction variables on procedural preference. However, since previous studies had not systematically investigated the role of these two variables, I wanted to test the robustness of these preliminary effects in this study.

Finally, on the basis of findings from previous research (e.g., Leung, 1987) which indicate that method preference is based on certain perceptions about the characteristics of the procedures, and the fact that some common findings were obtained for both American and Chinese subjects despite their differences in preference patterns, I examined five such perceptions, namely: Favourability, fairness, intensity reduction (the likelihood that a given method may reduce the intensity of the conflict), grudge (the likelihood that a given method will leave grudges between the parties after the conflict), and process control. This was done to observe whether some of the pervasive culture-general factors that influence procedural preference would be replicated.

Method

Subjects

A total of 230 male and female subjects (120 Nigerians and 110
Canadians) from the University of Jos, Jos, Nigeria and McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, participated in this study. Subjects' participation enabled them to meet the requirements of an introductory psychology course.

**Design**

I used a 2 (culture: Nigeria and Canada) x 2 (sex of subject: male and female) x 2 (type of conflict: interpersonal vs. intergroup) x 2 (expected future interaction: high vs. low) x 5 (procedure: threats, accept the situation, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration) mixed design. The type of the conflict and procedure variables were within-subject; all subjects received descriptions of both types of conflict scenarios as well as all five procedures for each type of conflict.

**Materials**

The experimental materials consisted of a half-page description of a conflict scenario. In order to use conflict situations that were realistic and feasible, I solicited the opinions of undergraduates in both Canada and Nigeria concerning the most likely causes of conflicts among students. In addition, interviews were conducted with some Hall Masters to find out the nature of the most frequent problems between roommates or groups within the residences that were brought to their attention. On the basis of this information, the conflict scenarios were constructed. A consequence of this approach was that subjects in each culture received realistic intergroup scenarios with a slightly different story line but which had, in my view, a similar conceptual undertone.

In the interpersonal condition, the conflict was described as
between two roommates at a university residence. One of the roommates had a habit of throwing things around, generally keeping the room in a mess. The effort by the other roommate at cleaning this mess seemed always to be frustrated by the roommate's persistence with this untidy habit. This was gradually creating some animosity between the two roommates, and so the problem had to be solved before it got out of hand.

For the Canadian subjects, the intergroup scenario contained a description of a conflict that arose because of the noise made by members of a certain floor in a university residence that invariably disturbed their counterparts on the floor on which the residence's recreation facilities were located. In the scenario presented to the Nigerian subjects, the subject of dispute was still disturbance (noise), but it was by members of a different residence, not members of different floors within the same residence. This is because unlike McMaster University, residences at the University of Jos do not have competitive activities between members of different floors within the same residence. The ensuing disturbance resulted in some conflict which had to be resolved.

The nature of future interaction variable also was manipulated for both types of conflict. Full versions of the scenarios can be found in Appendix B.

The scenarios were followed by five possible methods of resolving the conflict. No labels were attached to the procedures which were identified by numbers ranging from one to five to reduce evaluative connotations. Brief descriptions of the procedures as presented are listed below:

1. Threaten the other party and say that you will publicize their action and
thus damage their image and reputation.

2. Accept the situation as it is (i.e., yield to the arguments of the other party).

3. Negotiate with the other party hoping that you both would compromise in order to reach a solution acceptable to both parties.

4. Seek the assistance of a third party, hoping to find a mediator who will assist in the negotiation (i.e. try to reach a settlement by following the mediator’s guidance).

5. Seek the assistance of an arbitrator (i.e. someone with the power and authority to settle the dispute decisively), to whom both parties will explain their viewpoints. The arbitrator will then make a final decision that must be followed by both parties.

   The subjects, whose role was always that of the accuser, were then asked to rate (on a 7-point continuum from strongly unwilling to strongly willing to use this procedure) their preference of each method for handling the dispute. In addition, subjects rated each of the procedures on five other scales using a similar 7-point continuum. These scales assessed the extent to which subjects thought each procedure (1) was favourable, (2) fair, (3) was likely to reduce the intensity of the conflict, (4) was likely to leave both parties holding a grudge after the conflict, (5) allowed disputants control over the process and procedures in settling the dispute.

   Subjects were also presented with a slightly modified version of the INDCOL (individualism-collectivism) scale (Hui, 1988). The original version contains 63 items. However, on a pretest some of the subjects had problems understanding three items on the scale, and so those items were removed, thus reducing the scale to 60 items. The INDCOL scale has six subscales:
thus reducing the scale to 60 items. The INDCOL scale has six subscales: Spouse, Parent, Kin, Neighbour, Friend, and Coworker.

It can be seen that there are some changes between the exploratory study and the present study. In the former, subjects were presented with six procedures and were asked to make their preference ratings. After the analyses of the data, it was decided that one method, wait and see, would be dropped from the list of procedures to be used in this study. This decision was based on the fact that its (wait and see) ratings on almost all conditions were around the neutral region. My interpretation of this result was that wait and see may not have been considered as a procedure as such, but rather, a waiting period in which to make a decision on the most appropriate method to choose. For this reason it was excluded.

For similar reasons, two aspects of the perceptions of method--control over the development of the quarrel, and the likelihood of interest being protected after the conflict--were excluded from the present study because they yielded neither significant nor interesting results in the exploratory study.

Procedure

Subjects were tested in small groups of about 8-12 depending on subject availability. The experimenter gave each subject a booklet containing the experimental materials. The order in which the research materials were presented was completely counterbalanced across subjects. When they completed the task, they handed the booklets to the experimenter and were debriefed.
Manipulation checks

Statistical analyses were performed to determine the relative impact of the expected future interaction manipulation and the subjects' notion of competitiveness and harmony enhancing qualities of the procedures. A t-test was computed to test the effectiveness of future interaction for each type of conflict. The manipulation was successful in both situations; in each case the subjects rated a higher likelihood of the disputants interacting in the future in the high likelihood scenario than in the low likelihood scenario: \( t = 16.22, p < .0001 \) for the interpersonal conflict, and \( t = 14.76, p < .0001 \) for the intergroup conflict.

Two different analyses were performed to determine the competitiveness/harmony-enhancing qualities of the procedures. I first did a 1-way MANOVA using culture (nation) as a between group factor to check if Canadians and Nigerians differed in their ratings of the procedures on these two characteristics. Both analyses did not yield significant results (\( F (5, 224) = 1.07, \) n.s. for competitiveness and \( F (5, 224) = 1.52, \) n.s. for harmony-enhancing qualities of the procedures, respectively). Since the ordering of the procedures on both characteristics was similar across cultures, I ran two other 1-way within-subject MANOVAS to check if the procedures were rated differently on competitiveness and harmony-enhancing propensity. The ratings of both cultures (combined) were subjected to a dependent t-test matrix. All procedures were found to be significantly different on both characteristics. The mean ratings suggest the following order of competitiveness: Threats (6.19), arbitration (5.39), mediation (3.72),
competitiveness: Threats (6.19), arbitration (5.39), mediation (3.72), negotiation (3.08), and accept the situation (1.99). The ordering in terms of harmony-enhancing quality was: Accept the situation (6.35), negotiation (5.04), mediation (4.07), arbitration (2.24) and threats (1.47). The procedures can thus be said to vary in terms of competitiveness and harmony-enhancing potential.

The INDCOL Scale

The Cronbach alpha for the 60-item INDCOL scale was .67, which is almost the same as obtained by Hui (1988). Further computations based on what the reliability coefficients would be if each of the items were deleted, produced remarkably similar results (all alpha values in the .60s). An overall individualism/collectivism index was obtained by averaging the 60 item scores. A similar process yielded six subscale scores. The obtained means were then submitted to a culture x gender analyses of variance (ANOVA). There were no main effects of culture and gender on the overall scale. However, there was a main effect of culture on five of the six subscales. Table 3 presents the mean scores on the INDCOL and the subscales.
Mean Scores on the Individualism-Collectivism (INDCOL) Scale and the Subscales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDCOL</th>
<th>Nigerians</th>
<th>Canadians</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(entire scale)</td>
<td>199.16</td>
<td>199.0</td>
<td>199.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse***</td>
<td>25.66</td>
<td>22.59</td>
<td>24.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent***</td>
<td>51.17</td>
<td>54.81</td>
<td>53.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kin</td>
<td>26.69</td>
<td>27.33</td>
<td>27.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbour***</td>
<td>33.82</td>
<td>29.41</td>
<td>31.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend***</td>
<td>26.24</td>
<td>28.24</td>
<td>27.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coworker*</td>
<td>35.58</td>
<td>36.60</td>
<td>36.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Three asterisks (*** *) indicate that the difference between the means of the same row was significant at .001 level, one asterisk (*) indicates significance at .05 level. The higher the score, the more collectivist the orientation.

A further examination of the results of the analyses for the subscales indicates that Nigerian subjects responded in a more collectivist fashion on some subscales, while Canadian subjects responded to others in a more collectivist manner. More specifically, Nigerians tended to be more collectivist on the Spouse and Neighbour subscales \[ F (1, 236) = 42.73, \ p < .001 \] and \[ F (1, 236) = 45.96, \ p < .001 \]. On the other hand, Canadians showed greater collectivistic tendencies than Nigerians on the Parent, Friend, and Coworker subscales \[ F (1, 236) = 30.13, \ p < .001; \ F = 19.07, \ p < .001; \] and \[ F
= 3.96, p<.04] respectively.\(^1\)

There was no significant main effect of gender on any of the six subscales. However, gender interacted with culture on the Friend and Coworker subscales \(F(1,236) = 9.91, p<.002\) and \(F = 5.63, p<.01\). A post-hoc comparison of the means using Tukey’s HSD test revealed that the mean scores of the Canadian females were responsible for these significant interactions. Female Canadians responded in a more collectivist fashion on the Friend and Coworker subscales to a greater extent than male Canadians and both male and female Nigerians. None of the analyses of the Kin subscale were significant.

**Procedural Preference Ratings**

These data were analyzed using the Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) procedure. The five-way MANOVA yielded a significant main effect of culture, but the interaction between culture, type of conflict and procedure was also significant \(F(10, 217) = 6.59, p<.001\)\(^2\). The means of this analysis are shown in Table 4.
Table 4  
Mean Procedural Preference Ratings as a Function of Culture and Type of Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Nigerian</th>
<th>Canadian</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats***</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>2.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accept the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>situation</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>3.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation***</td>
<td>5.68</td>
<td>6.41</td>
<td>6.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>4.82</td>
<td>4.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbitration</td>
<td>4.63</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>4.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergroup</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>2.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accept the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>situation</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation***</td>
<td>5.42</td>
<td>6.19</td>
<td>5.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td>4.86</td>
<td>5.19</td>
<td>5.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbitration</td>
<td>5.77</td>
<td>5.39</td>
<td>5.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Three asterisks (***) indicates difference between the means of the same row was significant at .001 level.

An examination of the univariate analysis shows that, contrary to prediction, Canadians preferred negotiation to a greater extent than Nigerians.
However, Nigerians showed a greater tolerance for threats and accept the situation than Canadians. The two groups did not differ in their preference for mediation and arbitration. The interaction between culture and gender was not significant.

There was also a significant main effect of gender, but this effect is better understood in light of the significant interaction between gender, type of conflict and procedure \([F (10, 217) = 5.02, p<.001]\). The results of the univariate tests for the dependent variables showed that females preferred negotiation to a greater extent than males. However, males showed a greater tolerance for threats and accept the situation than females. There were no differences in preference on mediation and arbitration. Table 5 presents the means for this interaction.
Table 5

Mean Procedural Preference Ratings as a Function of Gender and Type of Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Procedure</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interpersonal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats**</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>2.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accept the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>situation**</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>3.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation**</td>
<td>5.82</td>
<td>6.27</td>
<td>6.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>4.65</td>
<td>4.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbitration</td>
<td>4.54</td>
<td>4.37</td>
<td>4.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intergroup</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>2.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accept the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>situation</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation</td>
<td>5.65</td>
<td>5.96</td>
<td>5.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td>5.12</td>
<td>4.93</td>
<td>5.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbitration</td>
<td>5.77</td>
<td>5.40</td>
<td>5.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Three asterisks (***') indicate that the difference between the means of the same row was significant at .001 level, two asterisks (**) indicate significance at the .01 level. The higher the number, the higher the preference.
for procedure.

All the analyses performed on the nature of future interaction variable did not produce any significant results. Therefore, this variable is excluded from subsequent analyses.

**Analyses of Procedural Perceptions**

In order to explore other factors—in addition to culture, gender and type of conflict—that may influence the preference for a procedure, five 2-way (culture and procedure) multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA) were run on five aspects of subjects' perception of each procedure. Since my main interest is in determining the extent to which these procedural perceptions account for preference, I will just give a brief summary of the significant results from the MANOVA analyses. Nigerians and Canadians differed significantly in their perceptions of threats, accept the situation and negotiation. Relative to Canadian subjects, Nigerian subjects perceived threats and accept the situation to be fairer and more favourable. In contrast, Canadians perceived negotiation as a fairer and more favourable procedure than Nigerians. In terms of the intensity reduction variable, Canadian subjects perceived threats, accept the situation and arbitration as less likely to reduce the intensity of the conflict than did Nigerian subjects. The two groups did not differ in their perceptions regarding grudge. A table containing the means for these analyses is presented in Appendix E2. Recall that the two groups differed significantly in their preference ratings on threats and negotiation.
Regression Analysis

In order to assess the extent to which procedural preference is related to the five characteristics of procedures (favourability, fairness, intensity reduction, grudge, and process control), procedural preference ratings for all the five procedures were regressed on these variables within each culture and for both the interpersonal and intergroup conflict using the stepwise (forward) procedure with a tolerance of .01.

Procedure-by-procedure analyses were conducted for the culture variable. The results of interest here are the beta weights and the $R^2$ values. For the interpersonal conflict, favourability was found to be a major predictor of preference for both Nigerians and Canadians for all the procedures. Fairness was a good predictor of threats, mediation and arbitration for Nigerians, but only a predictor of negotiation for Canadians. Intensity reduction and process control were good predictors of negotiation and accept the situation respectively, for Nigerians, while process control was a predictor of arbitration for Canadians.

For the intergroup conflict, favourability was again found to be a good predictor of all the procedures for both Canadians and Nigerians. Fairness was associated with preference for threats, accept the situation and mediation for the Canadians, but only associated with preference for accept the situation and mediation for Nigerians. Finally, intensity reduction was related to preference for threats, accept the situation and negotiation for Nigerians, but was not predictive of any procedure for the Canadians subjects. See Table 6 for the results of this procedure-by-procedure approach.
Table 6

Regression Coefficients for Favourability, Fairness and Intensity Reduction in Predicting Procedural Preference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interpersonal Conflict</th>
<th>Favorability</th>
<th>Fairness</th>
<th>Intensity Reduction</th>
<th>R2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nig / Can</td>
<td>Nig / Can</td>
<td>Nig / Can</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats</td>
<td>.26** .67**</td>
<td>.27** .11</td>
<td>.13 .00</td>
<td>.43 .52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accept the situation</td>
<td>.54** .55**</td>
<td>.15 .15</td>
<td>.02 .15</td>
<td>.62 .56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation</td>
<td>.24** .26**</td>
<td>.08 .38**</td>
<td>.32** .08</td>
<td>.39 .42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td>.27** .57**</td>
<td>.37** .07</td>
<td>.00 .07</td>
<td>.39 .47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbitration</td>
<td>.34** .68**</td>
<td>.31** .11</td>
<td>.10 .06</td>
<td>.61 .62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Intergroup Conflict

| Threats                | .42** .52** | .06 .27** | .28** .08 | .46 .50 |
| Accept the situation   | .31** .41** | .27** .19*| .24** .04 | .58 .31 |
| Negotiation            | .37** .53** | .17 .16   | .32** .21*| .50 .37 |
| Mediation              | .53** .53** | .24** .27**| .03 .03  | .52 .47 |
| Arbitration            | .35** .65** | .16 .08   | .00 .01  | .31 .50 |

Note: None of the standardized Beta values on grudge and process control were significant, as such they have been omitted from the table. All the R2 values were significant at the .001 level.

Nig = Nigerians; Can = Canadians

*p < .05, ** p < .01
Discussion

Accounting for Cultural Differences in Procedural Preference

Although cultural differences were found in procedural preferences, they were not in the hypothesized direction. Rather than Canadians showing a greater preference for such methods as arbitration, they were found to prefer negotiation to a greater extent than Nigerians. In contrast, Nigerians showed a stronger preference for threats than Canadians. In addition, Nigerians were more inclined toward arbitration, and Canadians leaned more toward mediation, although these differences were not significant. It should be noted though, that in both societies, harmony-enhancing procedures were preferred over those likely to cause friction between the disputants. The obtained differences are thus quantitative rather than qualitative. These results are not consistent with earlier findings (e.g., Leung & Lind, 1986; Leung, 1987) in which subjects from countries termed collectivist by Hofstede’s (1980, 1983) classification preferred such methods as negotiation to a greater extent than subjects from individualistic countries. A possible reason for our findings being different from the two studies referred to above is that in Leung’s study, the subject was always the accused whereas in our study, the subject was always the complainant. It may be that the difference between being an accuser versus the accused could have resulted in differential preference patterns. However, I think that this explanation is unlikely to account for the obtained results. If this had been the case, one might have expected even
higher ratings on the competitive procedures from the individualist since he/she was pressing the charges.

The critical issue here is whether one should have expected the hypothesized preference patterns in the first place. Hui (1988) suggests that individualism-collectivism should be treated as target-specific, since one simply cannot afford to be concerned about everyone in the world. Thus, a person could be high on coworker-collectivism but low on spouse-collectivism. As the INDCOL results show, Canadians were more collectivist on some of the subscales while Nigerians were more collectivist on others. Unfortunately, since this pattern of results was not anticipated, I had not formulated scenarios that would have enabled me to make this comparison. In retrospect, given the INDCOL scores, it is not surprising that Canadians preferred negotiation to a greater extent than Nigerians. Future studies will, on the basis of these INDCOL results, test this hypothesis by using scenarios that reflect the cultural differences obtained on the INDCOL subscales.

Another important issue relates to the very notion of expecting differences in procedural preference on the basis of the individualism-collectivism dichotomy. In general, these two values are presumed to function as group ideologies and as guides to individual behaviour. In fact, some have argued that they are part of broad syndromes of attitudes, self-concepts, and behaviours (e.g., Triandis, 1989). However, as Schwartz (1990) indicates in his critique, the individualism-collectivism dichotomy sometimes leads people to overlook values that inherently serve both individual and collective interests, disregards values that foster the goals of collectivities other than the ingroup, and promotes the erroneous assumption that individualistic and collective
values each form coherent syndromes that are always in polar opposition. Against this background, if individualistic and collectivist groups are compared on a value that expresses universal collective goals for the former, but at the same time does not express ingroup collective goals for the latter, the pattern of results such as found in this study would be expected.

**Gender Differences in Procedural Preference**

Females were found to show a greater preference for negotiation than males, while males indicated a greater tendency to use threats. Although the literature on gender differences is scanty, this result can be interpreted in light of some previous findings. Wyer and Malinowski (1972) found that females were less competitive than males against high achievers of both sexes than against low achievers, while males were found to be more competitive against other men and high achievers of both sexes. Since the conflict in this study was more or less between equals and with a very assertive opponent, this characteristic of the opponent might explain why females chose a less confrontational procedure. It may also account for males' greater tendency to use threats because males are more competitive against other males and high achieving females than are females.

Additional support for this interpretation can be found in Leung and Lind's (1986) study in which females preferred the non-adversary procedures in cases where the investigator (in Leung & Lind's study) was of high status, but favoured adversary procedures in low investigator status situations. Additional studies using sex as a variable are needed for a more definite
Additional studies using sex as a variable are needed for a more definite statement on the role of gender in procedural preference.

**Underlying Mechanisms for the Obtained Differences in Procedural Preference**

Analyses of the perceptions of the procedures shed some light on the processes underlying the differences in procedural preferences between Nigerians and Canadians, and the two types of conflict. For the most part, cultural differences in procedural preference were mirrored by similar differences with respect to perceptions of the said procedures in terms of favourability, fairness and intensity reduction. The main exception was on process control where Nigerian subjects displayed higher ratings than Canadians even on procedures on which the latter had indicated stronger preference. Additional information on the preference of procedures was obtained from the regression analyses. Favourability was found to be a culture- and procedure-general predictor of preference. Fairness was also culture-general but procedure-specific - it was a good predictor of threats, mediation and arbitration for Nigerians, but only of negotiation for Canadians. Intensity reduction and process control were culture- and procedure-specific, with intensity reduction being a predictor of negotiation, and process control a predictor of accept the situation and arbitration for Nigerians. This finding is not consistent with Leung (1987) and Leung, Bond, Carment, Krishnan and Liebrand (1990) in which expectancies based on process control and animosity reduction were found to be culture-general predictors of procedural preference. It is not exactly clear why these findings differ from previous ones.
However, the differences between the two groups on the expectancies based on fairness can account for the differences in preference of threats and negotiation. Further studies are required before any definite conclusion can be made.

The expectancies on intensity reduction and fairness appear to best explain the differences in preference between the two groups. For the interpersonal conflict, choosing Negotiation depends on Canadians' perception that it is fair, while for Nigerians, it is chosen if it is perceived as capable of reducing the intensity of the conflict. A similar pattern occurs in the intergroup conflict, except that here, fairness predicts the use of threats and accept the situation for Canadians, while for Nigerians, intensity reduction is a better predictor for the choice of the two procedures and for negotiation. The regression analyses seem to indicate that cultural differences in procedural preference are related to the goals of conflict management. It appears that for Nigerians, preference for a procedure rests on the potential a procedure has to reduce the intensity of the conflict, whereas for Canadian subjects, procedural choice rests on the procedure's potential to achieve fairness.

Although some of the key results of this study failed to replicate the major findings of previous studies, it is difficult to make strong statements concerning some theoretical implications, for two main reasons. First, my hypothesis regarding the preference pattern of both Canadians and Nigerians was based on the notion that Canadians would be found to be individualistic and Nigerians collectivist on the INDCOL scale. As the results showed, this was not always the case on all the subscales. This result put to question the appropriateness of the scenario on which the present comparisons were
made. Second, even though some interesting differences between the interpersonal and intergroup conflicts were found, I could not conclusively attribute them to the type of conflict because the scenarios depicting both types of conflict were different. It is thus plausible that the differences could be due to the scenarios and the type of conflict.

In order to eliminate these plausible rival interpretations of the results, it was necessary to conduct another study along the same lines, but one that would plug these loopholes. In addition to the two factors already mentioned, one other adjustment was made in the design. In the exploratory study, the nature of future interaction variable was found to have a significant impact on procedural preference. However, when it was made a between-subject variable in this study, this effect was not replicated. For this reason, it was decided that the type of conflict variable would also be made a between-subject variable in the next study to see if the effect found in the present study would be replicated. That study is presented in the next chapter.
Chapter 4

Reexamining the Impact of Individualism-Collectivism on Procedural Preference

In the preceding chapter, a study examining the role of individualism-collectivism on procedural preference was reported. The aim of that study was to extend the generality of the finding that people from collectivist cultures prefer to use harmony-enhancing procedures in resolving their conflicts, while those from individualist societies prefer to use competitive procedures. The overall results of the aforementioned study were somewhat surprising. In the first place, I had expected Nigerians to score high and Canadians to score low on the INDCOL. However, there was no difference between the two groups on the entire scale. However, an analysis of the subscales revealed that Nigerians were more collectivist than Canadians on the spouse and neighbour subscales and Canadians were more collectivist than Nigerians on the parent, friend and coworker subscales.

Second, I had expected, following Leung (1987), that Nigerians would prefer negotiation to a greater extent than Canadians, while Canadians would prefer arbitration to a greater extent than Nigerians. Rather, the reverse
was the case - Canadians showed a stronger preference for negotiation and an inclination to mediation than Nigerians who, in addition to indicating a greater tolerance for threats, also leaned more towards arbitration. There are a number of possible interpretations of these results. One interpretation is that individualism-collectivism is target-specific, since one cannot afford to be concerned about everyone in the world (Hui, 1988). The results of the INDCOL which revealed Canadians to be more collectivist on a number of subscales are in line with this proposition. It is possible that the conflict scenario used in the previous study was in the domain on which Canadians were more collectivist than Nigerians, thus influencing them to prefer negotiation.

Another possible interpretation is that individualism-collectivism may not be a relevant variable that influences procedural preference. If this is the case, it would not have made any difference on which value dimension the conflict was formulated, Canadians and Nigerians would likely have made the type of preference patterns that were found in the preceding study. Unfortunately, since this pattern of results was not anticipated, we had not formulated scenarios that would have enabled us to test this assumption. Therefore, the study reported in this chapter was conducted to get a clearer picture of the role of individualism-collectivism in method preference.

On the basis of the INDCOL results from the earlier study, it was decided that scenarios of conflict between a child and parent, between neighbours, and between coworkers would be used. It was hypothesized that if individualism-collectivism influences method preference as suggested by earlier studies (e.g., Leung, 1987), then Nigerians should show a greater
preference for using such methods as negotiation and mediation in resolving conflicts with neighbours while Canadians should prefer arbitration to a greater extent than Nigerians. Conversely, Canadians should show a greater willingness to use negotiation and mediation in resolving the disputes with parents and coworkers, and Nigerians should be more inclined than Canadians in using a procedure like arbitration. I deliberately did not make any specific predictions for threats and accept the situation due to the absence of consistent results on these procedures in the literature. However, one could speculate that collectivists would endorse accept the situation while individualists would prefer threats. If the group level results also hold at the individual level, we should expect that the more collectivist subjects, irrespective of nationality, should show preference patterns in the direction predicted at the group level.

Method

Subjects

A total of 160 male and female subjects (80 Canadians and 80 Nigerians) from McMaster University, Hamilton, and the University of Jos, Nigeria, participated in this study. Subjects' participation enabled them to fulfill the partial requirements for a psychology course.

Design

The study used a 2 (culture: Nigeria and Canada) x 2 (gender of subject) x 2 (type of conflict: interpersonal vs. intergroup) x 3 (type of scenario:
parent, neighbour, coworker) x 5 (method/procedure: threats, accept the situation, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration) factorial design. Three variables--culture, gender, and type of conflict--were between-subject, while type of scenario and method were within-subject. The dependent variables were the procedural preference ratings.

**Materials**

The experimental materials consisted of about a half-page description of a conflict situation. The conflict scenarios covered three broad areas of conflict. In the parent-child scenario, the child was described as an undergraduate who was living at home with his/her parents and attending school. The conflict arose because the parents were regulating the number of hours they felt their child should be staying out, and the kind of friends the child should bring into the home and for what duration. The undergraduate felt that the time had come for him/her to be allowed to do things his or her own way. However, the parents insisted that as long as the child was still living under the same roof, the child should abide by their rules. This had brought some tension between the child and the parents, and had to be resolved somehow before it deteriorated into an ugly situation. Due to the intricate structure of a parent-child interaction and the uniqueness of this relationship, the type of conflict manipulation was not applied to this domain.

Another scenario described a conflict between neighbours. The conflict was described as between two neighbours in the interpersonal condition, and between two groups of people within the same neighbourhood in the intergroup condition. In each case the participants were said to be living
in a clean and quiet neighbourhood. However, one of the property owners in the neighbourhood had submitted a request to convert his premises from a residential space into a baby milk factory. A hearing was arranged by the municipal council to decide whether or not the request for this change should be granted. In the interpersonal condition, one person (always the respondent) gave a submission supporting the change because they felt it was for a worthy cause. The neighbour on the other hand, was opposed to the proposed change because of the potential for noise and other types of pollution that it posed. In the intergroup condition, one group of people (including the respondent) were for the project and the other group against it. This had led to some arguments between the parties which resulted in some name calling and was threatening the hitherto good relations between the parties.

The third scenario was a description of a conflict situation between coworkers. Two people had disagreed over the formula for sharing a reward for a job that they had carried out. In the intergroup condition, instead of two people, I had two groups of people carrying out the task. Each person/group was involved in data collection for a certain professor. However, one person/group (always the respondent('s)) collected the data from two organizations in their university town while the other person/group travelled to another city two hours away and collected data from four organizations. The professor then gave the parties some amount to share whichever way they pleased. The person/group that travelled two hours away wanted a bigger share of the money, but the respondent's group wanted it shared equally because the other group's travel and meal expenses were paid for by the
professor. They charged the other group of being unfair, and this resulted in a serious quarrel that needed to be resolved. A complete version of the various scenarios can be found in Appendix C.

The scenarios were followed by five possible methods of resolving the conflict. The procedures were the same as those used in the preceding study. As in that study, no labels were attached to the procedures which were identified by numbers ranging from one to five to reduce evaluative connotations.

The subjects, whose role was always that of the complainant, were required to rate (on a 7-point continuum from strongly willing to strongly unwilling to use this procedure) their preference of each method for handling the dispute. In addition, subjects rated each of the procedures on five other scales using a similar 7-point continuum. These scales assessed the extent to which subjects thought each procedure (1) was favourable (2) fair (3) was likely to reduce the intensity of the conflict (4) was likely to leave both parties holding a grudge after the conflict (5) allowed disputants control over the process and procedures in settling the dispute.

Also included in the package was a slightly modified version of the INDCOL (individualism-collectivism) Scale (Hui, 1988). The original version contains 63 items. However, on a pretest some of the subjects had problems understanding three items on the scale. Those items were removed, thus reducing the scale to 60 items. The INDCOL scale has six subscales: Spouse, Parent, Kin, Neighbour, Friend, and Coworker.
Procedure

Subjects were tested in small groups of about 8-12 depending on subject availability. The researcher gave each subject a booklet containing the experimental materials. The order in which all the materials were presented was completely counterbalanced across subjects. They were told to work through the booklet at their own speed and to ensure that the ratings reflected their own feelings and not just what they felt other people would do in the same situation. When they completed the task, the researcher explained to them the details about the purpose of the experiment.

Results

The INDCOL Scale

An overall individualism/collectivism index was obtained by averaging the 60 item scores. A similar process yielded six subscale scores. The obtained means were then submitted to culture x gender analyses of variance (ANOVA). The scores on the overall scale ranged from 196 to 286. There were no main effects of culture or gender on the overall scale. However, there was a main effect of culture on two of the three subscales of interest - parent and neighbour. There was no significant main effect of culture on the coworker subscale. Also, none of the main effects of gender, and the interactions between gender and culture on the three subscales were significant. See Table 7 for the mean scores on the INDCOL and the parent, neighbour, and coworker subscales.
Table 7
Mean Scores on the Individualism-Collectivism (INDCOL) Scale and the Parent, Neighbour, and Coworker Subscales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nigerians</th>
<th>Canadians</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INDCOL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(entire scale)</td>
<td>249.15</td>
<td>247.17</td>
<td>248.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent***</td>
<td>51.33</td>
<td>54.80</td>
<td>53.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbour***</td>
<td>32.69</td>
<td>29.85</td>
<td>31.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coworker</td>
<td>35.87</td>
<td>35.42</td>
<td>35.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Three asterisks (***') indicate that the difference in the means of the same row is significant at .001 level. The higher the score, the more collectivist the orientation.

An examination of these results shows that Canadians responded in a more collectivist fashion than Nigerians on the parent subscale \( F (1, 156) = 12.29, p < .001 \). On the neighbour subscale, Nigerians responded in a more collectivist manner than Canadians \( F (1, 156) = 10.92, p < .002 \). These results replicated the findings in the preceding study in which the two cultures differed in the way reported above. However, no differences were found between Canadians and Nigerians on the coworker subscale in this study \( F (1, 156) = 0.68, \text{n.s.} \).
Procedural Preference Ratings

The data were subjected to a 5-way Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) with 3 between subjects factors (gender, culture, and nature of conflict), 1 within subjects factor (scenarios) and 5 levels of procedure/method (threats, accept the situation, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration). The main effect of gender was not significant at the multivariate level. Therefore, subsequent analyses of the gender variable are omitted in the presentation of the results.

There was a significant main effect of culture \(F (15, 138) = 4.03, p<.001\). An examination of the univariate analyses reveals there were some significant differences between the two cultures on a number of methods across all three scenarios. For each method, the means of the two cultural groups were compared. On the parent scenario, Canadians showed a greater preference for negotiation than their Nigerian counterparts while Nigerians preferred mediation and arbitration to a greater extent than Canadians. With the exception of the result on mediation, the cultural differences were consistent with our prediction. No differences were found on threats and accept the situation.

Only one result was significant on the neighbour scenario. Canadians again showed a greater preference for negotiation than Nigerians. This pattern of preference seems contradictory to our prediction. The speculations concerning this unexpected finding will be offered in the discussion section. See Table 8 for the means of this analysis.
Table 8

Procedural Preference as a Function of Culture and Type of Scenario

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Parent</th>
<th>Neighbour</th>
<th>Coworker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nig / Can</td>
<td>Nig / Can</td>
<td>Nig / Can</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>1.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>1.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accept the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>situation</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>2.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.02</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>2.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation</td>
<td>5.70***</td>
<td>5.52*</td>
<td>5.55**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.64</td>
<td>6.07</td>
<td>6.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td>4.60**</td>
<td>4.82</td>
<td>5.21*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.07</td>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>5.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbitration</td>
<td>3.72***</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>5.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>4.37</td>
<td>5.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Three asterisks (*** indicate that the difference between two adjacent means of the same row was significant at .001 level, two asterisks (**) indicate significance at .01 level, and one asterisk (*) indicates significance at .05 level. The higher the number, the higher the preference for the procedure.

Nig = Nigerians; Can = Canadians

Significant predicted cultural differences were found on two methods in the coworker scenario. Canadians preferred negotiation and mediation to a greater extent than Nigerians. Although the difference between the two groups’ means on arbitration was not significant, it was in the hypothesized direction.

There was no significant main effect of type of conflict at both the multivariate and univariate levels of analysis $[F (15, 138) = .55, \text{n.s.}]$. Neither
of the 2-way interactions nor the 3-way interaction between gender, culture, and type of conflict were significant.

It is worthwhile stating that all the differences in preference between the groups that have been mentioned above and elsewhere in the result section are quantitative rather than qualitative, since both groups preferred harmony-enhancing procedures over the competitive/confrontational procedures. The above point notwithstanding, I think that the differences are real, rather than due to differences in scale use, because the same preference pattern persists even though the preference scores were standardized to remove the differential scale use effect.

**Testing the role of Individualism-Collectivism in Preference**

In order to attribute the differences in the preference patterns of the two cultures to individualism-collectivism differences between them, it is necessary to show that subjects who scored high on individualism or collectivism on the relevant scenarios, irrespective of culture, showed similar preference patterns predicted at the group level. That is, Canadian and Nigerian subjects who scored high on the parent subscale should show a greater preference for negotiation than the other methods, while Canadian and Nigerian subjects who had low scores on this subscale should prefer arbitration or some of the other competitive/confrontational methods to a greater extent than their high-scoring counterparts.

To do this, subjects were divided into low and high scorers on each of the three subscales, using one standard deviation above and below the
mean scores on each subscale as a cut-off criterion. In order to establish the independence of the subscales, intercorrelations between the three subscales were conducted. The resultant correlation matrix revealed a coefficient of .06 and .26 for the parent-neighbour and parent-coworker, and .33 for the neighbour-coworker intercorrelations. Since we did not have the same individuals as high or low scorers on all three subscales, three separate MANOVA were conducted. To facilitate comparison, the three results are presented in one table. See Table 9 for the means of these results.

Table 9
Procedural Preference as a Function of Collectivism and Type of Scenario

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Procedure</th>
<th>Parent Ind / Col</th>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Neighbour Ind / Col</th>
<th>Coworker Ind / Col</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threats</td>
<td>1.68** 1.03</td>
<td>1.98 1.74</td>
<td>1.61 1.67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accept the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>situation</td>
<td>3.86 4.07</td>
<td>2.85 3.10</td>
<td>2.95 2.79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation</td>
<td>5.59** 6.72</td>
<td>5.51 5.81</td>
<td>5.29* 6.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td>4.24 4.10</td>
<td>5.12 5.00</td>
<td>5.55 5.33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbitration</td>
<td>3.46** 2.48</td>
<td>4.32 4.67</td>
<td>5.16 4.88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Two asterisks (**) indicate that the difference between two adjacent means of the same row was significant at .01 level, and one asterisk (*) indicates significance at .05 level. The higher the number, the higher the preference for the procedure.

Ind = Individualists; Col = Collectivists.
Beginning with the parent scenario, the analysis yielded a significant main effect of individualism/collectivism \[F(1, 64) = 2.74, p<.02\]. An examination of the univariate analysis reveals that the two groups differ significantly on threats, negotiation, and arbitration. The more collectivist subjects preferred negotiation to a greater extent while the more individualist subjects showed a higher tolerance for threats and arbitration.

The multivariate-level analysis of the coworker scenario did not yield a significant main effect. However, the univariate analysis revealed a significant difference between the two groups on negotiation \[F(1, 69) = 4.38, p<.03\]. As hypothesized, the more collectivist group preferred negotiation to a greater extent than its more individualist counterpart.

Contrary to expectations, none of the analyses on the neighbour scenario were significant. As mentioned earlier, speculations on the surprising results on the neighbour scenario are offered in the discussion.

A similar comparison between collectivist versus individualist people within each nation was made. The results were not significant in terms of the alpha levels chosen in this study perhaps due to small number of cases per cell, but a trend similar to the results of the pooled analysis was obtained on negotiation. For each scenario and within each sample, the more collectivist subjects (allocentric persons) preferred negotiation to a greater extent than individualists (idiocentric people), \(p<.09\) on the parent and coworker scenarios and \(p<.08\) on the neighbour scenario for Canadians; \(p<.09\) on the parent and neighbour scenarios and \(p<.07\) on the coworker scenario for the Nigerian subjects.
Perceptions of Procedure

As the earlier analyses have shown, only the culture variable has yielded very strong effects - gender has yielded significance on two methods at the univariate level, and type of conflict has not attained support at all. As a result, even though a 3-way MANOVA was performed, only the analyses of the procedural perceptions relating to the culture variable are reported. To briefly summarize the significant results from the MANOVA analyses, Nigerian subjects perceived mediation and arbitration as more favourable, more likely to reduce the intensity of the conflict, and as providing more process control than did Canadian subjects. On the other hand, Canadian subjects perceived negotiation and mediation as being fairer and less likely to leave the disputants holding a grudge after the conflict than did Nigerian subjects. A table containing the means for these effects can be found in Appendix E3.

There appears to be some similarity between the preference variable and the favourability item. To ensure that I was not measuring the same construct twice, I again correlated the preference and favourability scores on all the fifteen dependent measures. The obtained correlation coefficients ranged between .34 to .74. While these values are positive and moderate, I think that they are not sufficiently high to be considered the same variable.

Regression Analysis

In order to assess the extent to which procedural preference is related to the five characteristics of the procedures (favourability, fairness, intensity reduction, grudge, and process control), procedural preference
ratings for all the five procedures were regressed on these perceptions within each culture for the parent and coworker scenarios, using the standard regression procedure. I mentioned earlier in this results section that the analyses performed on the neighbour scenario even when they were significant were not in the hypothesized direction. Due to the inconsistency of results on this scenario, it has been excluded from the regression analysis. I offer an explanation for these results in the discussion.

Procedure-by-procedure analyses were conducted for the culture variable. The results of interest are the beta weights and the $R^2$ values. For the parent scenario, favourability was found to be the major and only predictor of preference for Nigerians on all five procedures. For Canadians, none of the five perceptions could predict the preference for threats. However, favourability and fairness were associated with the preference for accept the situation. Favourability and fairness also accounted for the preference for negotiation. Favourability was the only predictor of mediation. Finally, favourability, fairness, and intensity reduction were good predictors of arbitration.

For the coworker scenario, favourability was again found to be a good (though no longer the sole) predictor of all the procedures for Nigerians. In addition to favourability, intensity reduction was also found to be associated with the preference for threats; and fairness was related to preference for accept the situation, mediation, and arbitration. For Canadians, favourability emerged as a major predictor of all the five procedures. In addition to this, fairness was found to be a good predictor of threats, mediation and arbitration. See Table 10 for the results of this procedure-by-procedure approach.
Table 10

Regression Coefficients for Favourability, Fairness and Intensity Reduction in Predicting Procedural Preference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parent-Child Conflict</th>
<th>Favorability Nig / Can</th>
<th>Fairness Nig / Can</th>
<th>Intensity Reduction Nig / Can</th>
<th>Intensity R² Nig / Can</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threats</td>
<td>.31** .22</td>
<td>.13 .03</td>
<td>.16 .05</td>
<td>.34 .14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accept the situation</td>
<td>.60*** .45***</td>
<td>.15 .35***</td>
<td>.13 .09</td>
<td>.57 .48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation</td>
<td>.61*** .25*</td>
<td>.15 .31**</td>
<td>.13 .04</td>
<td>.61 .28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td>.42** .62***</td>
<td>.13 .05</td>
<td>.06 .09</td>
<td>.39 .64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbitration</td>
<td>.58*** .34**</td>
<td>.22 .26*</td>
<td>.13 .32**</td>
<td>.67 .61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coworker Conflict</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threats</td>
<td>.47*** .40***</td>
<td>.13 .47***</td>
<td>.24* .01</td>
<td>.63 .54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accept the situation</td>
<td>.47*** .57***</td>
<td>.36** .03</td>
<td>.00 .08</td>
<td>.68 .51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation</td>
<td>.49*** .39***</td>
<td>.08 .16</td>
<td>.19 .13</td>
<td>.50 .34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td>.47*** .64***</td>
<td>.26* .31**</td>
<td>.05 .03</td>
<td>.53 .63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbitration</td>
<td>.36** .46***</td>
<td>.41*** .31**</td>
<td>.15 .13</td>
<td>.67 .61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: None of the Beta values on grudge and process control were significant, and therefore, have been omitted from the table. With the exception of the R² value for Canadians on threats which was significant at .05 level, all the other R² values were significant at the .001 level.

Nig = Nigerians; Can = Canadians

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
Discussion

Accounting for Cultural Differences in Procedural Preference

It had been hypothesized that Canadians would prefer negotiation more and arbitration less than Nigerians for the parent and coworker scenarios, and the reverse pattern of preference was expected for the neighbour scenario. To a large extent, the hypotheses were confirmed. Beginning with the parent scenario, Canadians indeed showed a higher preference for negotiation than Nigerians, while Nigerians in turn preferred arbitration and mediation to a greater extent. The higher preference of Nigerians for mediation was not expected, and it is not clear why this should be the case. That result notwithstanding, I tentatively attribute the cultural differences on the parent scenario to the higher collectivism of the Canadians in this domain.

To support this collectivism interpretation, it is necessary to show that keeping culture constant, the same preference patterns would emerge. It is known that within collectivist cultures, there can be found persons who have individualistic tendencies. This pattern is equally applicable to individualistic societies where collectivist persons are also found. At the psychological level, these differences are reflected in a personality dimension labelled allocentrism-idiocentrism (Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1988). Allocentrism-idiocentrism reflects at the psychological level the dimension that has been labeled individualism-collectivism (Hofstede, 1980) at the cultural
level. When I divided subjects into idiocentric and allocentric categories on the parent scenario - using one standard deviation above and below the mean as a split criterion - and compared their preference pattern, I found as expected, that allocentric individuals preferred negotiation to a greater extent than the idiocentric persons. This supports the collectivism interpretation given above, although the evidence is correlational and should be treated with caution.

In the case of the neighbour scenario, I obtained results opposite to our predictions. Even though Nigerians were more collectivist on the neighbour subscale, Canadians ended up showing higher preference for negotiation. My interpretation is that this finding may be spurious and unstable, being the result of an inappropriate scenario. The conflict here was over the conversion of a residential plot into a factory site. With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to see that since most, if not all, subjects in our sample do not own landed property, they are likely to perceive their stay at any residence as temporary, and may thus not get really involved in an issue which they may rightly think has nothing to do with them. Some measure of support for this view comes from the fact that even when I split subjects into allocentric and idiocentric groups on the neighbour subscale, there was no difference in preference between the two groups on any of the five methods. A future study using an appropriate neighbour scenario is needed to verify this claim.

I failed to find differences between Canadians and Nigerians on the coworker subscale. However, on the basis of the result from the preceding study, I expected Canadians to prefer negotiation and mediation to a greater extent than Nigerians. In this case, the results were exactly as predicted, and although the difference between Nigerians and Canadians on arbitration was
not statistically significant, it was in the hypothesized direction. Dividing the subjects into allocentric and idiocentric categories also yielded similar results. Because cultural differences on the coworker subscale were not significant in this study, it is inappropriate to attribute the obtained differences in procedural preference on this scenario to cultural collectivism. However, due to the supporting evidence such as that stated at the beginning of this paragraph, one can not rule out completely the effect of collectivism on the preferences for the procedures in the coworker scenario.

What seems to emerge from the findings of this study and some of those from the preceding study is that like others (e.g., Leung, 1987), I find that collectivism influences greater preferences for such methods as negotiation and mediation. Unlike these studies, I find that it is not an attribute of cultures to be wholly collectivist or individualistic. One needs to identify a culture's or a person's value dimension with regard to the domain on which a conflict is based before any meaningful predictions can be made on which methods would be chosen or preferred.

**Underlying Mechanisms for the Differences in Method Preference**

My analyses of the perceptions shed some light on the processes underlying the differences in procedural preference between Canadians and Nigerians. Unfortunately, more elaborate statements cannot be made at this stage because I did not run a regression analysis on the neighbour scenario, believing (as mentioned earlier) that the scenario was inappropriate. This happens to be the scenario on which Nigerians were expected to show more
collectivist tendencies. Be that as it may, a number of things can be said about the results that have been obtained.

For the parent scenario, favourability alone predicts the preference of all the methods for Nigerians - no other considerations such as fairness come into play. For Canadians, they would seem to accept the situation (i.e., demands of the parent) if they perceive that this would be favourable and fair. To negotiate with a parent, Canadians seemingly only need to perceive that it is fair; it does not necessarily have to be favourable. To arbitrate, Canadians have to, in addition to the perception of favourableness and fairness, also perceive that this move would reduce the intensity of the conflict. Thus, Canadians may have shown higher preference for negotiation than Nigerians because they perceived it to be fair, and Nigerians did not perceive it to be sufficiently favourable. On the other hand, Nigerians would have viewed arbitration to be relatively favourable while Canadians did not perceive it to be sufficiently favourable, fair, or capable of reducing the intensity of the conflict. All these tend to tie in with Canadians’ collectivist orientation on the parent subscale. Despite this seemingly strong relationship, one has to be cautious in how far it can be stretched, because the results are correlational, not causal. What this pattern of results does is establish a strong basis on which studies aimed at establishing more concrete and causal statements can be conducted.

A similar pattern seems to emerge with the coworker scenario, albeit with a few modifications. Favourability is again a key predictor for Nigerians on virtually all methods. In addition to the favourableness of a method, they would use threats only if it is seen as capable of reducing the
intensity of the conflict, and mediation and arbitration if they are seen to be fair. The difference in Canadians' perceptions in the coworker scenario is that favourability now predicts all five methods. In addition, fairness predicts the preference for threats, mediation, and arbitration. These are small changes in perceptions, but they might imply that there may be either different types or at the very least different levels/degrees of collectivism. This is however, very speculative and needs further scrutiny.

Unlike Thibaut and Walker (1975, 1978) and Leung (1987), who found both fairness and process control as major predictors of preference, process control was not predictive of any method in our study. This may have to do with the type of conflicts that were used in these studies. Notwithstanding, the predictive values found for some of the perceptions in this study, together with the replication of fairness as a predictor suggests that people's expectations about procedures is important for the understanding of procedural preferences.

As interesting as these results sound, their significance is clouded by the unexpected and sometimes inconsistent results from the neighbour conflict. I have speculated above as to the reasons for these surprising findings. However, a sure way of uncovering what may have transpired is to conduct another study, taking into consideration the appropriateness of the substance of the conflict. This issue was tested in the next study.
Chapter 5

An Analytical Modification

Through the course of two studies, I have examined the role that individualism-collectivism plays in determining preferences for methods of conflict resolution. I will give an overview of the main findings from these studies. Two sets of results were obtained from the first of this series of studies. First, on the basis of the global classification of cultures or societies by Hofstede as individualist or collectivist, I had expected that Nigerians would score higher than Canadians on the INDCOL. The analysis of the entire scale found no significant differences between the two groups. However, an analysis of the subscales revealed significant differences between the two groups on five subscales. While Nigerians were more collectivist than Canadians on the spouse and neighbour subscales, Canadians were more collectivist than Nigerians on the parent, friend and coworker subscales.

Second, following Leung (1987), I had expected that Nigerians would prefer negotiation to a greater extent and arbitration to a lesser extent than Canadians. The results were the opposite of this prediction - Canadians showed a stronger preference for negotiation and inclination to mediation than Nigerians, who in addition to showing a greater tolerance for threats, also
leaned more toward arbitration. This pattern of results made a meaningful
interpretation very difficult. One could not conclude that individualism-
collectivism does not influence procedural preference in the manner
suggested by earlier researchers because the whole notion of certain domains
of both individualism and collectivism existing within the same culture was not
anticipated. Consequently, adequate scenarios were not constructed to
compare the two groups on the specific domains on which they differed with
regard to the individualism-collectivism value dimension. This then set the
stage for the second study in the series.

The INDCOL results in study 1 suggested that Canadians were
more collectivist on the parent and coworker subscales while Nigerians were
more collectivist on the neighbour subscale. It was felt that if one were to test
the influence of individualism-collectivism on procedural preference, the two
groups should be tested on the basis of scenarios constructed around these
domains. Based on the pattern of results obtained from previous studies, I
hypothesized that Canadians would show a greater preference than Nigerians
in using negotiation and mediation, and a lesser preference for using
arbitration in resolving a parent-child conflict as well as a dispute between
coworkers. The reverse of this prediction was made for a conflict between
neighbours. Again INDCOL scale was also administered to the subjects.

The scores on the INDCOL showed that Nigerians were collectivist
on the neighbour subscale while Canadians were more collectivist on the
parent subscale. The two groups did not differ significantly on the coworker
subscale although as before the Canadians leaned more toward the
collectivist end of the subscale. Comparisons between the two groups on the
parent subscale showed that as predicted, Canadians showed a greater preference for negotiation while Nigerians preferred arbitration to a greater extent. Recall an earlier discussion in the literature review section about the differences between individualists and collectivists. Being high on one or the other is usually accompanied by certain behavioural propensities. Whereas the individualist is principally concerned with his or her own interest, the collectivist typically subordinates personal goals to those of the ingroup. Thus, the finding that Nigerians preferred mediation to a greater extent than Canadians on the parent-child conflict was unexpected.

The pattern of preferences on the coworker scenario also showed Canadians to prefer both negotiation and mediation to a greater extent than Nigerians; and even though the difference between the groups on arbitration was not significant, the mean score of Nigerians was higher on this procedure than that of Canadians. I considered this as support for the earlier predictions even in the absence of a significant difference between the two groups on the coworker subscale of the INDCOL, for two reasons. First, results in study 1 had revealed a significant difference between the two groups on the coworker subscale. Second, even though the results were not significant, the mean score for Canadians tended toward the collectivist end of the subscale.

The analyses on the neighbour scenario were not only inconsistent, but also were not in the hypothesized direction. For example, contrary to the hypothesis, Canadians preferred negotiation to a greater extent on the neighbour conflict than did Nigerians. Furthermore, pooling the subjects and dividing them into collectivist (allocentric persons) and individualist (idiocentric persons) using one standard division above and below the mean as the split
criterion did not produce any difference in preference between the two groups on any of the five procedures. Due to the inconsistency of this result, it was difficult to proffer a theoretically meaningful interpretation. On careful examination of the scenarios, it occurred to me that this surprising finding may have been due to the inappropriateness of the conflict scenario. The neighbours were said to have had a conflict over the conversion of a residential plot into a factory site. Since most, if not all, subjects in my sample do not own landed property, it is plausible that they are likely to have perceived their stay at any residence as temporary, and may thus not have really considered it an issue that should receive thoughtful consideration. It was necessary therefore, to test this explanation by constructing scenarios that were appropriate for the subjects under consideration to see how this might influence their preferences. Having talked with many students from both McMaster University and the University of Jos, I realized that a sizable proportion of students rent rooms and apartments, and that a conflict scenario based on issues resulting from house rents would be more appropriate and realistic.

In addition, I took the opportunity to tie up some of the loose ends that had emerged from my earlier studies. For instance, unlike most earlier studies, I failed to replicate the dominant role of process control and fairness in procedural preference. Most of these previous studies found that procedures that have high preference ratings usually receive correspondingly high ratings on perceived fairness and process control. Aside from the story content of the scenarios, the main difference between my studies and others has been that the respondent in my case has always been the accuser, whereas the
respondent in the other studies has always been the accused. It is possible that having a weak or strong case may influence what method a person may choose in the resolution effort. This notion has some empirical validity. Heuer and Penrod (1986) found that weak-case disputants tended to prefer procedures with the least third party involvement. My failure to replicate some of the findings of previous studies may arise from the fact that being assigned the role of the accused, these subjects probably had a weak case, and this may have contributed to the obtained differences. To eliminate potential confounds such as a party’s role in the dispute as a reason for the differences, I decided to include the individual’s role in the conflict (accuser/accused) as a variable in the current study. This manipulation was intended to prune down the plausible alternative explanations for the results.

Method

Subjects

A total of 185 subjects (95 Canadians and 90 Nigerians) from McMaster University, Hamilton, and the University of Jos, Nigeria, participated in this study. In both locations, subjects’ participation enabled them to fulfill the partial requirements for a psychology course.

Design

The study used a 2 (culture: Nigeria and Canada) x 2 (gender of subject) x 2 (type of conflict: interpersonal vs. intergroup) x 2 (individual’s role in the conflict: accuser vs. accused) x 5 (method/procedure: threats, accept
the situation, negotiation, mediation and arbitration) factorial design. Preference for procedure (method) was the dependent variable. I reintroduced the type of conflict variable because it showed an effect when it was used as a within-subject variable in study 1, but this effect disappeared in study 2 when it was made a between-subject variable. I therefore included it again as a between-subject variable to test the consistency of this effect.

**Materials**

The materials consisted of a half-page description of a conflict that was described as between two neighbours in the interpersonal condition, and between two groups of neighbours in the intergroup condition. The individuals involved were said to be residing in two adjacent buildings with spacious yards. The rents were reasonably cheap, and the only stringent condition the Landlord imposed was that the premises of these apartments be kept clean at all times. The conflict arose because one party complained that the other party's dog(s) usually crossed over and not only dug in the flowers, but also deposited waste on their building's lawn, causing them to clean and mend things for which they were not responsible. The aggrieved party had tried to make the neighbour(s) get rid of the dog(s) or keep better control of it (them) but without success. Because this was creating a lot of ill-feelings between the parties, a way had to be sought to resolve the dispute. The manipulation of the party's role in the conflict was achieved by giving one group of subjects a scenario in which they were said to be the accuser, and the other group a scenario in which they were said to be the accused.

It should be noted that a clear difference exists between this scenario and the neighbour scenario that was used in the previous study. In
the earlier scenario, the problem was centred around relocation. As mentioned earlier, most of the subjects in the two populations where my sample is drawn do not own landed property, and may thus not have really been "involved" in the task. In the present scenario, the participants are tenants and the one party's action not only creates extra and unnecessary work for the other party, but also threatens his or her stay on the premises, since not keeping up with the cleaning of the mess made by the dog(s) could result in the tenant being evicted. I think that most subjects can identify with a situation like this, and are likely to really "get into" the task. (See full version of the scenario in appendix D).

The scenarios were followed by five possible methods of resolving the conflict. The methods were the same as those used in the two previous studies. As in those studies, no labels were attached to the procedures which were identified by numbers ranging from one to five to reduce evaluative connotations. The subjects were then asked to rate (on a 7-point continuum from "strongly unwilling" to "strongly willing" to use this procedure) their preference of each method for handling the dispute. In addition, subjects rated each of the procedures on four other scales using a similar 7-point continuum. These scales assessed the extent to which subjects thought each procedure (1) was favourable to them (2) fair (3) was likely to reduce the intensity of the conflict (4) allowed disputants control over the process and procedures in settling the dispute. Since the grudge item was not predictive of any procedure in the two previous studies, it was not included in this last study.

To obtain a more direct response from subjects with regards to their desire to have a harmonious relationship with their neighbours, they were
asked to indicate (again on a 7-point scale) how important it was for them to achieve interpersonal or intergroup harmony with their neighbours. Subjects also completed a slightly modified version of the INDCOL (individualism-collectivism) scale (Hui, 1988).

Procedure

Subjects were tested in small groups of about 8-12 depending on subject availability. The order in which the materials were presented was counterbalanced across subjects. The experimenter gave each subject a booklet containing the experimental materials. When they completed the task, they handed the booklets to the experimenter and were debriefed.

Results

The Neighbour Subscale on the INDCOL

Since the main concern here was on a conflict involving neighbours, only the analysis of the results on the neighbour subscale are presented. An individualism-collectivism index on the neighbour subscale was obtained by averaging the 10 items on the subscale. The obtained means were then submitted to a Culture x Gender analyses of variance (ANOVA). There was a significant main effect of culture \( F (1, 181) = 22.53, p<.001 \). An examination of the means suggests that Nigerians responded in a more collectivist fashion on the neighbour subscale (34.27) than Canadians (30.91). Both the main effect of gender and the culture by gender interaction were not significant.
Procedural Preference Ratings

These data were analyzed by using the Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) procedure. The 4-way MANOVA yielded a significant main effect of culture \([F (5, 165) = 6.37, p < .001]\). An examination of the results of the univariate analyses and the means suggests that Nigerians preferred negotiation to a greater extent than Canadians while the reverse was the case on arbitration, but this was especially so in the interpersonal conflict. The very low preference ratings by Nigerian subjects on arbitration in the interpersonal condition would be better described as a rejection of this procedure. There were no significant differences between the two groups on the other three procedures, including mediation on which differences were expected.

There was also a significant culture by type of conflict interaction \([F (5, 165) = 3.84, p < .002]\). A perusal of the univariate results and the means suggests that significant differences occur on three procedures - threats, accept the situation and arbitration. Nigerians seemed to show a greater tolerance for threats in the interpersonal than intergroup conflict (although both scores were very low). There were no differences on threats for Canadians. In the case of accept the situation, Nigerians preferred it more in the intergroup than interpersonal conflict, while the reverse was the case for Canadians. On arbitration, Nigerians again preferred it more for intergroup than interpersonal conflict. The preference scores for Canadians on arbitration were similar for both types of conflict. None of the other interactions involving culture were significant. Table 11 presents the means for this interaction.
Table 11

Procedural Preference as a Function of Culture and Type of Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Procedure</th>
<th>Nigerians</th>
<th></th>
<th>Canadians</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IP</td>
<td>IG</td>
<td>IP</td>
<td>IG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats*</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>1.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accept the</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>2.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>situation*</td>
<td>6.07</td>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>5.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation</td>
<td>4.70</td>
<td>4.77</td>
<td>4.87</td>
<td>5.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>4.90</td>
<td>5.20</td>
<td>5.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbitration*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: One asterisk (*) indicates that the means of the culture by type of conflict interaction on a given procedure was significant at \( p < .05 \) level. The larger the number, the higher the preference for the procedure.

IP = Interpersonal Conflict

IG = Intergroup Conflict

The main effect of the party's role in the conflict was not significant at the multivariate level, but was significant on arbitration at the univariate level \( F (1, 169) = 7.71, p < .006 \). An examination of the means suggests that subjects who played the role of the accuser preferred arbitration to a greater extent than those who were given the role of the accused. The accused on the other hand tended toward negotiation \( (p < .08) \) in comparison to the accuser. The interactions between the party's role in the conflict and the other independent variables were not significant. Also, none of the analyses involving gender were significant.
Another way of looking at the preference results is to make vertical instead of horizontal comparisons. To do this, I computed dependent t-tests within each nation for both types of conflict. The results showed that the preference hierarchy for Nigerians in the interpersonal condition was topped by negotiation which was followed by mediation and arbitration. It should be noted however, that only negotiation and mediation are on the preferred side of the preference scale; arbitration is not. All the inter-comparisons between these first three procedures were significant. Threats and accept the situation came last and did not differ significantly from each other. The hierarchy was the same for the intergroup conflict except that the difference between threats and accept the situation was now significant while that between mediation and arbitration was no longer significant.

The ordering of preferences was different for the Canadian subjects. While negotiation also emerged as the most preferred method, it was followed, in both the interpersonal and intergroup conflicts, by arbitration and then mediation. However, in neither case was the difference between mediation and arbitration significant. In fact, in the intergroup conflict, the ratings on all three top procedures were not significantly different. The obvious difference in the hierarchical structure of preference between Nigerians and Canadians suggests that the obtained results cannot be completely explained by factors such as differences in scale use within each nation. Given that different patterns of results were obtained from the parent scenario in the preceding study, the suggested influence of individualism-collectivism becomes increasingly attractive.

To further probe the role of individualism-collectivism in procedural
preference, all the subjects were collapsed across conditions within each cultural group and split into idiocentric and allocentric categories using one standard deviation above and below the mean on the neighbour subscale of the INDCOL scale as a split criterion. This process reduced the total number of subjects in this category to fifty seven; 27 (7 idiocentrics and 20 allocentrics) in the Nigerian sample, and 30 (19 idiocentrics and 11 allocentrics) in the Canadian sample. The two groups within each culture were then compared using a one-way MANOVA. The full design could not be used in this analysis because the reduced number of subjects resulted in some cells being empty. Beginning with the Nigerian sample, the results of the multivariate tests were not significant, but the univariate analysis revealed a significant difference on arbitration \( F(1, 25) = 3.99, p<.05 \). The idiocentric people (individualists) on the neighbour subscale preferred arbitration to a greater extent than their allocentric (collectivist) counterparts. Differences between the two groups on the other procedures were not significant, but trended in the hypothesized direction. The pattern of results was similar among Canadian subjects except that none of the differences were significant. See Table 12 for means of the idiocentrism-allocentrism effect.
Table 12

**Procedural Preference as a Function of Allocentrism-Idiocentrism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Procedure</th>
<th>Nigerians (n=27)</th>
<th>Canadians (n=30)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ID</td>
<td>AL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accept the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>situation</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>3.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation</td>
<td>5.71</td>
<td>6.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td>4.57</td>
<td>4.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbitration</td>
<td>5.00*</td>
<td>3.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: One asterisk (*) indicates that the difference between two adjacent means was significant at p<.05 level. The larger the number, the higher the preference for the procedure.

ID = Idiocentric subjects; AL = Allocentric subjects

**Procedural Perceptions**

As the preceding analysis on preference has shown, there was neither a main effect of gender nor its interaction with the other variables. Therefore, gender was left out of the analyses on the perceptions of procedure. As with the other studies, only a summary of these results is presented in the main text. In this neighbour conflict, Nigerian subjects’
favourability and fairness ratings on accept the situation were higher than those of Canadian subjects. In contrast, Canadian subjects perceived arbitration more favourably, and had higher fairness ratings on negotiation, mediation, and arbitration than Nigerian subjects.

On the intensity reduction item, Nigerians perceived a greater likelihood of accept the situation and mediation reducing the intensity of the conflict than did their Canadian counterparts. This aspect of procedural perception also depended on the type of conflict. Subjects perceived a higher tendency of accept the situation reducing the intensity of interpersonal than intergroup conflict, while the reverse was the case on arbitration. Interestingly, subjects who were assigned the role of the accused saw a greater likelihood of negotiation reducing the intensity of the conflict than those who played the role of complainant.

Finally, there was a culture by type of conflict interaction on the process control item. Canadian subjects perceived more process control in negotiation for the interpersonal than intergroup conflict. Whereas Nigerian subjects perceived more process control in mediation and arbitration for resolving intergroup than interpersonal conflict, Canadians saw more process control in mediation for interpersonal than intergroup conflict.

Regression Analysis

To determine the extent to which procedural preference was explained by the four characteristics of the procedures (favourability, fairness, intensity reduction and process control), procedural preference ratings on all
the five procedures were regressed on these perceptions within each culture using the stepwise regression procedure and a tolerance of .01. Procedure-by-procedure analyses were conducted for the culture variable. The results of interest are the standardized beta weights and the $R^2$ values. See Table 13 for the results of this procedure-by-procedure approach.

Table 13

Regression Coefficients for Fairness and Process Control in Predicting Procedural Preference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Procedure</th>
<th>Fairness</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nig / Can</td>
<td>Control</td>
<td>R$^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats</td>
<td>.44** .28**</td>
<td>.05 .00</td>
<td>.37 .64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accept the</td>
<td>.26** .08</td>
<td>.06 .03</td>
<td>.43 .49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>situation</td>
<td>.03 .04</td>
<td>.21* .17</td>
<td>.29 .22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation</td>
<td>.28** .17</td>
<td>.00 .13</td>
<td>.24 .50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td>.12 .26**</td>
<td>.06 .10</td>
<td>.57 .19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: None of the Beta weights on intensity reduction were significant, hence they have been omitted from the table. Likewise, favourability was omitted because all values for both groups were significant, therefore its inclusion would not provide any additional predictive information. All the $R^2$ values were significant at the .001 level.

Nig = Nigerians; Can = Canadians

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

For Nigerians, favourability was found to be a major predictor of
preference on all five procedures, and in the case of threats, accept the situation and mediation, fairness was also a key factor. Like Nigerians, favourability was a good predictor of all five procedures for Canadians. Fairness was another predictor for threats and arbitration among Canadians, and process control for negotiation among Nigerians.

**Interpersonal/Intergroup Harmony**

I was interested in finding out how important it was to the subjects to achieve interpersonal or intergroup harmony with their neighbours. This was with the view of seeing whether or not it might reveal certain information about preference. This question was analyzed using a 3-way (culture, type of conflict, and party's role in the conflict) ANOVA.

There was a significant main effect of culture \[ F (1, 169) = 20.95, p < .001 \]. Nigerians (mean = 6.28) indicated a greater desire to maintain interpersonal/intergroup harmony with their neighbour(s) than Canadians (mean = 5.54). This may be an indirect support for the underlying differences between Canadians and Nigerians on their ratings for negotiation and arbitration on this domain of conflict. That is, the kind of premium placed on interpersonal or intergroup harmony with a category of people may influence the choices of procedures they may use in dispute resolution. Neither the other main effects nor the interactions were significant.
Discussion

Cultural Differences in Procedural Preference

Differences between Canadians and Nigerians on procedural preferences were expected to be related to their level of collectivism or individualism in a given domain. On the basis of an earlier study, I had expected Nigerians to be more collectivist than Canadians on the neighbour domain. I had reasoned that if individualism-collectivism influences procedural preferences in the manner described by previous studies, then Nigerians should prefer such procedures like negotiation and mediation to a greater extent while Canadians should show a higher preference on arbitration than Nigerians.

The analysis performed on the neighbour subscale of the INDCOL scale showed that Nigerians were indeed more collectivist than Canadians on this domain. The preference results also showed that Nigerians preferred negotiation to a greater extent than Canadians while arbitration received higher preference ratings by Canadians than Nigerians. I think that this difference in method preference between the two groups implicates a possible role of individualism-collectivism in procedural preference. It by no means proves that individualism-collectivism causes the preference pattern found in this study, but that a certain relationship might exist between this value orientation and the choice of procedures such that being individualist or collectivist on a particular domain goes with a propensity to make certain procedural preferences of dispute resolution. This interpretation can be
supported by at least two pieces of evidence. First, when I divided subjects within each culture into idiocentric and allocentric categories (Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1988), the idiocentric people within the Nigerian sample showed a higher preference for arbitration (the results by Canadian subjects was not significant but indicative of the hypothesized pattern), and even though the difference on negotiation was not significant, the allocentric people trended toward the hypothesized direction. Second, in the earlier study in which Canadians were found to be more collectivist than Nigerians on the parent scenario, a reverse pattern to that described above was found - Canadians showing higher preference on negotiation, and Nigerians a higher preference on arbitration.

Having said that, it should be cautioned that on the strength of the evidence from this series of studies, it is only on two procedures--negotiation and arbitration--that one can say with reasonable confidence the manner in which their choice can be influenced by individualism-collectivism. That is, from the available evidence, one can say that if a person is involved in a conflict in a domain in which he or she is collectivist, such a person is more likely to choose negotiation as the preferred procedure, but if it is in a domain in which the person is individualist, he or she is more likely to resort to arbitration. No consistent results have been obtained about threats, accept the situation and mediation to proffer any meaningful explanation as to what factor(s) determine(s) when they would be used in resolving disputes.

Aside from individualism-collectivism, other factors also contribute to preference. The type of conflict is one such relevant variable. I have consistently found across studies that arbitration is preferred to a greater
extent in resolving intergroup than interpersonal disputes. This effect however, sometimes interacts with culture. In a dispute involving neighbours, it is only Nigerians who showed a greater preference for arbitration in an intergroup than interpersonal conflict; for Canadians, the type of conflict did not matter at all. Also, while Nigerians would be more willing to accept the situation in an intergroup than interpersonal conflict, Canadians would rather accept the situation in interpersonal conflict. This pattern may have implications for the underlying motivations governing the preferences for these procedures.

Interestingly, the party’s role in the conflict also influenced method preference. The accusers in the dispute were more willing to use arbitration while the accused persons tended toward negotiation. This is not surprising given the finding by Heuer and Penrod (1986) in which the weak-case disputants wanted the least third party involvement. My scenarios were such that the accused seemed to have a weaker case than the accuser. It makes sense therefore, that the accuser should prefer arbitration to a greater extent than the accused since this third party with decisive powers is more likely to rule in his or her favour.

Factors Underlying Procedural Preference

Even though I attributed the differences in procedural preference between Canadians and Nigerians on the neighbour conflict to collectivism, results of the procedural perceptions seem to suggest this influence may not be very direct. Rather, collectivism may affect preference by influencing the
way in which people perceive the procedures. For example, culture interacted
with the party's role in the conflict on favourability in such a way that Nigerians
who were accusers displayed a greater willingness to accept the situation than
did Canadians. On the other hand, Canadians who played the role of the
accuser perceived more favourability in arbitration. The collectivist, focussing
more on group harmony may see accept the situation more favourably in
terms of the general good than the individualist who may only be after what is
best for the self. The higher ratings by Nigerians on the importance of
attaining interpersonal/intergroup harmony is further support for this
postulation.

The results of the regression analyses suggest that for both groups,
in order to choose any method of conflict resolution, it has been seen to be
favourable. In the case of Nigerians engaged in this kind of conflict, fairness is
an additional determinant for choosing threats, accept the situation and
mediation. For negotiation and arbitration, only favourability seems to be the
key predictor. The combination of predictors is a little different for Canadians.
Favourability and fairness are good predictors of whether or not Canadians
would use threats and arbitration. Process control is an additional predictor of
negotiation, and only favourability considerations seem to count in the choice
of accept the situation and mediation.

I have been unable to replicate the dominant role of process control
in determining preference as indicated by earlier studies (e.g., Leung, 1987;
Thibaut & Walker, 1978) and the importance of intensity reduction, especially
among collectivists (Leung, 1987). It may be that process control becomes
important only when the methods from which an individual is going to choose
are similar on such factors as favourability and fairness. Future studies are needed to determine exactly when it is that process control plays a crucial role in procedural preference. With respect to intensity reduction, its relatively weak influence may be due to the floor effect. It is possible that subjects may not have perceived this dispute to generate a level of intensity serious enough as to make this variable of paramount importance. It will be interesting for future studies to use conflicts of very high intensity to see whether or not intensity reduction may become an important predictor of preference.
Chapter 6

Summary and Concluding Comments

The main objective of this thesis was to extend the generality of the finding that individualism-collectivism has important implications for procedural preferences in conflict resolution. Early work by Thibaut and Walker (1975, 1978) suggested that the main criteria determining which methods people involved in a conflict of interest would use are perceived fairness and process control. Furthermore, research following that theoretical trend (e.g., LaTour et al., 1976) found that arbitration was usually the most preferred procedure by disputants since it, more than the other procedures (moot, mediation, autocratic, and bargaining), seemed to possess these two important characteristics. However, Leung and Lind (1986) questioned the universality of this finding arguing that these conclusions were based only on studies conducted in individualistic societies, and that the trend may be different among collectivist societies. Accordingly, Leung (1987) compared procedural preferences of American (individualists) and Chinese (collectivists) subjects and found that whereas individualistic subjects chose arbitration as their preferred method of dispute resolution, their collectivist counterparts preferred bargaining and mediation. Leung (1987) attributed the differences to the
individualism of the Americans and the collectivism of the Chinese. Unfortunately, all participants from the collectivist samples were drawn from Oriental societies that are known to have some unique values such as the Confucian work dynamism. To eliminate this potential confound, I compared procedural preferences of subjects drawn from a non-Oriental collectivist society (Nigeria) with those of subjects from an individualistic society (Canada). To ensure that the presumed value orientations were consistent with Hofstede’s (1980, 1983) classifications, estimates of subjects’ individualism-collectivism were also obtained. Contrary to my expectation, no differences were found between Canadians and Nigerians on the general individualism-collectivism value dimension. However, more specifically, Nigerians were more collectivist than Canadians on the spouse and neighbour subscales while Canadians were more collectivist on the parent, friend and coworker subscales of the test.

To summarize the effect of individualism-collectivism on procedural preference, the results from the studies reported in chapters 4 and 5 are taken together. That is, the discussion of the neighbour effect is based on the study reported in chapter five. To test the individualism-collectivism effect, subjects were asked to indicate which procedures they would be most or least willing to use in resolving a parent-child conflict, a conflict between neighbours and a conflict between coworkers. Based on the standings of the two cultures on the INDCOL subscales, I hypothesized that Nigerians would be more willing to use negotiation and mediation in resolving a conflict involving neighbours while Canadians would be more willing to use arbitration in the same situation. Conversely, Canadians were expected to show greater willingness in using
negotiation and mediation in resolving the parent-child and coworker conflicts and Nigerians expected to be more inclined towards arbitration.

In both cases, the major hypotheses were supported. In the parent-child and coworker conflicts, Canadians showed a greater willingness than Nigerians to use negotiation. Nigerians in turn showed a greater willingness to use arbitration in both situations. The contradictory finding was the greater preference of Nigerians to use mediation in the parent-child conflict. The main hypothesis was also supported in the neighbour conflict. Nigerians in this situation were more willing to use negotiation while Canadians were more willing to use arbitration. The only snag was that the two groups did not differ in their willingness to use mediation. Furthermore, classifying people into idiocentric or allocentric orientation within each culture produced similar results, although the differences were not always significant, no doubt largely due to the reduced sample sizes resulting from the split criterion.

These results confirm the general supposition that collectivism influences the preference for harmony-enhancing procedures over more assertive or self-serving procedures. They also indicate that for the purposes of predicting what procedure a person or group is likely to choose in resolving a dispute, broad identifications of whether such a person or group is collectivist or individualist will not suffice. One has to specify the domain of individualism or collectivism for this information to be of predictive value. It should be cautioned that these results are correlational and therefore, do not demonstrate that individualism-collectivism causes people to make the kind of preferences found in the studies reported in this thesis. They do show, however, that a relationship exists between being individualist or collectivist on
a certain domain of conflict and a propensity to choose certain procedures of conflict resolution.

A possible way of experimentally testing the individualism-collectivism effect may be to artificially induce these feelings by showing a film or video depicting what may be termed individualistic or collectivistic acts and measure what effect they have on procedural preference. The problem with this type of manipulation is that, as was demonstrated in the review of antecedents of individualism-collectivism, these values develop gradually through such processes as socialization, involving differential samplings of the different types of the self. It is doubtful that such an elaborate process can be sufficiently produced through exposure to stimuli that may last at best a couple of hours, if all of that. Future studies can focus on ways through which causal factors linking individualism-collectivism to procedural preferences could be uncovered.

The finding of domain-specificity of individualism-collectivism can shed more light on other results that were presumed inconsistent with this framework in terms of broad classifications on this value dimension. For example, Leung, Au, Fernandez-Dols and Iwawaki (1992) tried to extend the generality of the collectivism effect by testing the procedural preferences of two collectivist cultures, one from Asia (Japan), and the other from Europe (Spain). They expected to find similarities in procedural choices across the two cultures but were surprised to find that the Japanese subjects showed a greater willingness to use mediation and arbitration than their Spanish counterparts. The researchers thus concluded that the results could not be explained under the collectivism framework. However, in light of the findings
from this thesis, it is possible that the problem may not be with the collectivism framework, but rather that unaware of the domain-specificity of individualism-collectivism, the researchers used a conflict situation that was in the collectivist domain of one group but in the individualist domain of the other. In that study, the dispute was between two roommates from a university residence. It is not clear whether a roommate is viewed as an ingroup in both cultures, or as an outgroup in one culture and an ingroup in the other. Future research in this area should take into consideration the different domains of individualism and collectivism within the same society, in order to reduce the confounds or ambiguities that may arise in the interpretation of research findings.

An obvious question arises from the foregoing analysis: What is the theoretical link between individualism-collectivism and procedural preferences? There does not seem to be any one theory that can account for all phenomena in the social psychology of procedural justice. However, Lind and Tyler (1988) have suggested two fundamental models of procedural justice, namely the self-interest model and the group-value model, one of which can explain the individualism effect and the other, the collectivism effect. The self-interest model is derived from such social psychological theories as social exchange and interdependence (e.g., Homans, 1961; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). In brief, the self-interest view suggests that people try to maximize their personal gain when interacting with others, therefore when they are involved in a conflict, would prefer procedures that grant them the greatest chance of a favourable outcome. Because the individualist focuses mainly on improving his or her position, this model can explain why the individualist
would choose a method such as arbitration, without regard for the feelings of the opponent. According to this model, even concerns for such things as process control is merely instrumental; that is, in situations involving conflicts so difficult to resolve that disputants must forego decision control, they try to seek indirect control over decisions (presumably favourable) through process control (Lind & Tyler, 1988).

Partial support for the self-interest model is the finding in one of the studies reported in this thesis that subjects who played the role of the accuser (and also happened to have a stronger case) were more willing to use arbitration than those who played the role of the accused (their weaker case counterparts). People who have a strong case and who wish to maximize their interest are better off using a winner-take-all procedure such as arbitration, instead of negotiating with the disputant or using a mediator who might persuade them to share the outcomes.

The model or theory that best explains the effect of collectivism is the group-value theory (Lind & Earley, 1992; Lind & Tyler, 1988). This theory links procedural justice judgments to values within a person's reference group and his or her desire to be, or at least be seen to be, a full-status member of the group or society using a particular procedure. Of particular emphasis is the view that group membership, especially as it relates to group identity, is a powerful aspect of social life. Since people believe procedures to carry information about what the group or society values, they endorse procedures that support and embody the fundamental values of their reference group. The theory suggests that "because people look to procedures for information about how they themselves are viewed by the group, they respond favourably
to procedures that grant them full status (Lind & Earley, 1992, p. 233)." Therefore, people are more likely to choose a procedure of dispute resolution if it is congruent with important group values or demonstrates that the person in question is a respected and valued member of the group. Collectivism has been linked to a strong tendency to be more concerned with the consequences of one's behaviour for the ingroup and to be more willing to sacrifice personal interests for the attainment of group goals (e.g., Triandis, 1989). In order to preserve good relations within the group, people with a collectivist bent are thus more inclined to use harmony-enhancing procedures such as negotiation and mediation, even if these procedures do not necessarily maximize personal outcomes.

The two models offer different explanations for the same phenomenon. While the self-interest model attributes the preference for procedures with high process control to an effort to obtain better outcomes for the self, the group-value theory attributes it to its value-expressive function. In other words, people endorse methods with high process control or "voice" because it offers them an opportunity for participation in the group process and this participation constitutes a visible marker of group membership. The problem that arises here is that it is difficult to tell which underlying process is operating at any given time. Lind and Tyler (1988) suggest that it is not even a question of some situations prompting reactions that fit one model and other situations prompting reactions that fit the other; they argue that one can find evidence of both processes in the same studies. Nevertheless, I think that it is important to be able to make independent predictions of underlying phenomena based on each model, and therefore clarifications on when a result is due to one or the other should be the focus of further research.
Another weak point in the link between individualism-collectivism and procedural preferences is the implied unidimensionality of the concept. It is commonly taken for granted that individualism and collectivism are mutually exclusive. However, Kagitcibasi and Berry (1989) suggest that this assumed unidimensionality is due largely to a methodological bias introduced by forced-choice techniques. Most measures of individualism-collectivism, including the one used in this thesis, are designed in such a way that high scores on individualism automatically mean low scores on collectivism. This approach is now being challenged by emerging evidence to the effect that both orientations can be seen in the same person at the same time, or at different times, depending on the target group or interaction goals (e.g., Kagitcibasi, 1987; Kashima, 1987). Much stronger evidence comes from the factor-analytic work by Triandis and his associates (1986) which suggests that it is more appropriate to conceptualize individualism and collectivism as orthogonal factors rather than as opposite poles of a continuum. Obviously, more cross-cultural work geared toward valid operationalization of the basic orientations is required before further conceptual progress can be achieved (Kashima, 1987; Triandis et al., 1986).

Whatever the role of individualism-collectivism, one thing is certain: it is not the sole determinant of procedural preference. It is sometimes mediated by factors such as the type of conflict. For example, even within Nigerian subjects' domain of collectivism (neighbour), they showed an equal preference for negotiation in both types of conflict, but clearly showed a greater willingness to use arbitration in the intergroup than interpersonal conflict. I had attributed this effect elsewhere to diffusion of responsibility.
However, in a collectivist society, it might assume a different meaning. It has been shown that the consideration of others’ interest by collectivists is usually limited to ingroup members (Triandis & Vassiliou, 1972). Therefore, when engaged in an intergroup conflict, the other-commitment generally shown for ingroup members is lacking because they presumably are "outgroup neighbours", thus harmony-enhancing motivations are no longer paramount.

The above point raises a serious question about the role of mediating or underlying factors in accounting for the willingness to use procedures of dispute resolution. These factors may be of more or less importance depending on the goal or value that is desired. It is interesting to note, from the individualism-collectivism perspective, that in almost every instance, the group that was collectivist in a certain domain also perceived the procedures such as negotiation as more likely to reduce the intensity of the conflict than the individualistic group. The same process worked in the reverse for ratings on process control. If one interprets high perceived ratings on process control to reflect a desire by a person to obtain favourable outcomes for himself or herself, then the self-interest model offers a more plausible account of its mediating role.

In conclusion, a number of interesting findings have arisen from these studies. The most important one seems to be that collectivism and its "opposite" individualism, influence procedural preference such that the individualist is more likely to prefer arbitration, and the collectivist, negotiation. Mediation seems to be problematic or at best nondiagnostic in that no consistent pattern of preferences on this procedure were obtained across the various studies in this thesis. However, unlike earlier studies (e.g., Leung,
1987; Leung & Lind, 1986) in which it was assumed that certain cultures were collectivist and were likely to act in a collectivist fashion in all conflict situations, and vice versa for individualism, my studies have shown that each culture has specific domains of individualism and collectivism that determine specific rather than general preferences for mechanisms of dispute resolution. Therefore, it is clear that meaningful predictions of procedural preference can be made only after the individualism or collectivism of the domain of a prevailing conflict has been identified. Also, my studies have consistently shown that arbitration is preferred to a greater extent in resolving intergroup than interpersonal conflicts. To my knowledge, no other study has used this variation of the type of conflict and found this effect.

In addition to these new contributions, these studies have replicated some earlier findings. For example, fairness (Thibaut & Walker, 1978) and favourability (Leung, 1987) have been found to be good predictors of procedural preference. And an earlier finding that a person with a weaker case is less likely to choose a method with serious third party involvement was also replicated. While many questions on procedural preferences are yet to be answered, this series of studies has provided plausible answers to some, and confirmed certain findings obtained by earlier studies.
NOTES

1. I do not have any theoretical explanation for the differences between Canadians and Nigerians on the INDCOL subscales. My speculation is that the nuclear family, comprising mainly of a father, mother and child or children in Canada as opposed to the typically extended family structure in Nigeria, and the relatively limited network of friends among Canadians might be responsible for Canadians being more collectivist than Nigerians on the parent and friend subscales. With regard to the spouse subscale, the increasingly business-like marriages as evidenced by such trends as the prenuptial agreements may be responsible for Canadians being more individualist than Nigerians on this subscale. In contrast, most marriages in Nigeria involve an intricate linkage of several families and is therefore likely to make for a more collectivist outlook. In the case of neighbours, it seems that there is much more interaction and interdependence between neighbours among Nigerians than there is among Canadians. It should be borne in mind, however, that these differences are quantitative rather than qualitative; subjects from both cultures were more on the collectivist than individualist end of these subscales.

2. Anytime a scale is administered to people in more than one culture, there is always the possibility that any obtained differences between the cultures could be attributed to cultural differences in scale use. One way to counteract this is to standardize the scores within each culture (e.g., Leung et al., 1992). When I standardized the scores of the data used in this thesis, the pattern of results was exactly the same with the non-standardized scores. To facilitate comparison of the means in the discussion, the non-standardized scores are used throughout the thesis.
APPENDICES
Appendix A: Materials Used in the Exploratory Study (Study 1)

SOCIAL INTERACTION QUESTIONNAIRE

SEX _____
AGE ______
FACULTY ______

Your assistance is required in helping us understand social interaction patterns in the Canadian Culture. On some of the following pages, a scenario is described. Please read each carefully and respond as to how you would handle the situation by answering the questions that follow. There are no right or wrong answers, so choose the answers which you feel are the most appropriate for each scenario. To ensure that your responses will be anonymous, please do not put your name on the questionnaire. Make sure that you do not skip any items. Thank you very much for your cooperation.
Scenario for Interpersonal Conflict with High Likelihood of Future Interaction.

Imagine that you have a room-mate and the terms of the place you have rented require that you both share equally, the amount of rent payable every month. This arrangement has been fixed until the end of the year. Somehow, your roommate has been offered a cheaper place, equally near the campus, by a friend who is leaving town. Your roommate does not want to miss this opportunity, so wants to move out immediately. You have tried to find another roommate but failed and this means that you are likely to have to pay the monthly bills alone. You feel that your roommate should either stay till the lease expires or continue to pay his share of the rent. He on the other hand feels that this would not be fair since he would no longer be staying at the house. Besides he argues, he would not have any money left over after settling the other rent. This has created a lot of tension between the two of you and so the problem has to be solved. You both attend a number of classes together, so will be meeting each other frequently.
Please read the following possible methods of dealing with this quarrel/conflict.

1. Threaten your roommate and say that you will publicize his action and this will damage his image and reputation.
2. Observe the situation and wait and see how the other party reacts to your strong arguments.
3. Accept the situation (i.e. comply in line with the response of your roommate).
4. Negotiate with your roommate in order to reach a solution that is acceptable to you both.
5. Seek assistance from a third party, hoping to find a mediator who will assist in the negotiation (i.e. trying to reach a settlement by following the mediator’s guidance).
6. Take the case to an arbitrator (i.e. someone with the power and authority to settle the dispute decisively), to whom both of you will explain your viewpoints. The arbitrator would then make a final decision that must be followed by you both.
7. Other (if necessary) - Please specify in the space below.
1. What is your degree of willingness to adopt the above mentioned methods? Please write the appropriate number in the blanks below.

1  2  3  4  5  6  7

----------------------------------------
least willing                        most willing

Method 1    Method 4    
Method 2    Method 5    
Method 3    Method 6    
Other (if applicable)    

2. How favourable do you think this method will be to you?

1  2  3  4  5  6  7

----------------------------------------
very unfavourable            very favourable

Method 1    Method 4    
Method 2    Method 5    
Method 3    Method 6    
Other (if applicable)    

3. What degree of control (i.e. your ability to take charge), do you think you would have over the development of the quarrel by using this method?

1  2  3  4  5  6  7

------------------------------------------------------------------------
very low                                      very high

Method 1  ______                    Method 4  ______
Method 2  ______                    Method 5  ______
Method 3  ______                    Method 6  ________
Other (if applicable)  __________

4. How fair would you rate this method?

1  2  3  4  5  6  7

------------------------------------------------------------------------
very unfair                                      very fair

Method 1  ______                    Method 4  ______
Method 2  ______                    Method 5  ______
Method 3  ______                    Method 6  ________
Other (if applicable)  __________
5. What is the likelihood that this method will reduce the intensity of the conflict?

1  2  3  4  5  6  7

.............................................................................................

very unlikely                                           very likely

Method 1 ______  Method 4 ______
Method 2 ______  Method 5 ______
Method 3 ______  Method 6 ______
Other (if applicable) ______

6. What is the likelihood of your interest being protected after the conflict by using this method?

1  2  3  4  5  6  7

.............................................................................................

very unlikely                                           very likely

Method 1 ______  Method 4 ______
Method 2 ______  Method 5 ______
Method 3 ______  Method 6 ______
Other (if applicable) ______
7. Are both parties likely to hold grudges after this quarrel by using this method?

1  2  3  4  5  6  7

very unlikely  very likely

Method 1  Method 4
Method 2  Method 5
Method 3  Method 6
Other (if applicable) 

8. What degree of control (i.e. your ability to take charge) do you think you will have over the process and procedures in settling this conflict by using this method?

1  2  3  4  5  6  7

very low  very high

Method 1  Method 4
Method 2  Method 5
Method 3  Method 6
Other (if applicable) 
Scenario for Interpersonal Conflict with Low Likelihood of Future Interaction.

Imagine that you have a room-mate and the terms of the place you have rented require that you both share equally, the amount of rent payable every month. This arrangement has been fixed until the end of the year. Somehow, your roommate has been offered a cheaper place, equally near the campus, by a friend who is leaving town. Your roommate does not want to miss this opportunity, so wants to move out immediately. You have tried to find another roommate but failed and this means that you are likely to have to pay the monthly bills alone. You feel that your roommate should either stay till the lease expires or continue to pay his share of the rent. He on the other hand feels that this would not be fair since he would no longer be staying at the house. Besides he argues, he would not have any money left over after settling the other rent. This has created a lot of tension between the two of you and so the problem has to be solved. Your room-mate is a different faculty, therefore you two are not likely to be running into each other frequently.
Scenario for Intergroup Conflict with High Likelihood of Future Interaction.

Members of your class have been given a project to undertake by your professor as part of the credits for his course. Much of the work on this project requires the use of the computer. Your class has discovered, upon going to use the available computer facilities, that another class has some work which also requires the use of the same facilities, which happen not to be adequate for both classes. The greatest problem is that each is stressing the urgency and importance of the project. The time limits within which both projects must be submitted are such that neither class can afford for the other to finish before undertaking theirs. Both classes have claimed to have attempted getting alternative facilities but have failed. Therefore, the problem has to be sorted out. The other class is within the same department as yours, so the students meet fairly frequently.
Scenario for Intergroup Conflict with Low Likelihood of Future Interaction.

Members of your class have been given a project to undertake by your professor as part of the credits for his course. Much of the work on this project requires the use of the computer. Your class has discovered, upon going to use the available computer facilities, that another class has some work which also requires the use of the same facilities, which happen not to be adequate for both classes. The greatest problem is that each is stressing the urgency and importance of the project. The time limits within which both projects must be submitted are such that neither class can afford for the other to finish before undertaking theirs. Both classes have claimed to have attempted getting alternative facilities but have failed. Therefore, the problem has to be sorted out. Members of the other class are in the graduating class, so the two groups are not likely to have continued interaction shortly after the conflict.

Appendix B: Materials Used in Study 2.
Appendix B: Materials Used in Study 2.

**SOCIAL INTERACTION QUESTIONNAIRE**

SEX _____ AGE _____
PLACE OF BIRTH_______
IF NOT BORN IN NIGERIA, HOW LONG HAVE YOU LIVED HERE?_______
FACULTY _____
WHAT LANGUAGES DO YOU SPEAK?_______
WHAT IS YOUR FIRST LANGUAGE?_______

Your assistance is required in helping us understand social interaction patterns in the Nigerian Culture. On some of the following pages, a scenario is described. Please read each carefully and respond as to how you would handle the situation by answering the questions that follow. There are no right or wrong answers, so choose the answers which you feel are the most appropriate for each scenario. To ensure that your responses will be anonymous, please do not put your name on the questionnaire. Make sure that you do not skip any items. Thank you very much for your cooperation.
SOCIAL INTERACTION QUESTIONNAIRE

SEX _____                        AGE _____
PLACE OF BIRTH_______
IF NOT BORN IN CANADA, HOW LONG HAVE YOU LIVED HERE?_____
FACULTY _____
WHAT LANGUAGES DO YOU SPEAK?_____
WHAT IS YOUR FIRST LANGUAGE?_____

Your assistance is required in helping us understand social interaction patterns in the Canadian Culture. On some of the following pages, a scenario is described. Please read each carefully and respond as to how you would handle the situation by answering the questions that follow. There are no right or wrong answers, so choose the answers which you feel are the most appropriate for each scenario. To ensure that your responses will be anonymous, please do not put your name on the questionnaire. Make sure that you do not skip any items. Thank you very much for your cooperation.
Scenario for Interpersonal Conflict with High Likelihood of Future Interaction.

You have been fortunate enough to be assigned a place in one of the residences on campus. However, you have ran into an unexpected problem. This is because your roommate is very untidy—he/she keeps dirty things lying around for days, and is fond of throwing things about carelessly—generally leaving the room in a mess. Your efforts at cleaning the mess seem to be frustrated by your roommate’s persistence with this habit, and your attempts to make him/her change do not seem to be having any effect. In desperation, you have made efforts to change roommates but have not been able to find anyone willing to swap rooms with you. This is gradually creating some animosity between you and your roommate. You would like to solve this problem because it is beginning to interfere with your studies. Both of you attend a number of classes together and so will do meet each other frequently even outside the residence.
Please read the following possible methods of dealing with this quarrel/conflict.

1. Threaten your roommate and say that you will publicize his action and this will damage his image and reputation.

2. Accept the situation (i.e. comply in line with the response of your roommate).

3. Negotiate with your roommate in order to reach a solution that is acceptable to you both.

4. Seek assistance from a third party, hoping to find a mediator who will assist in the negotiation (i.e. trying to reach a settlement by following the mediator’s guidance).

5. Take the case to an arbitrator (i.e. someone with the power and authority to settle the dispute decisively), to whom both of you will explain your viewpoints. The arbitrator would then make a final decision that must be followed by you both.
1. What is your degree of willingness to adopt the above mentioned methods? Please write the appropriate number in the blanks below.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

least willing most willing

Method 1 _____
Method 2 _____
Method 3 _____
Method 4 _____
Method 5 _____

2. How favourable do you think this method will be to you?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

very unfavourable very favourable

Method 1 _____
Method 2 _____
Method 3 _____
Method 4 _____
Method 5 _____
3. How fair would you rate this method?

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  

very unfair  very fair

Method 1 _____  Method 4 _____
Method 2 _____  Method 5 _____
Method 3 _____

4. What is the likelihood that this method will reduce the intensity of the conflict?

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  

very unlikely  very likely

Method 1 _____  Method 4 _____
Method 2 _____  Method 5 _____
Method 3 _____
5. Are both parties likely to hold grudges after this quarrel by using this method?

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6. What degree of control (i.e. your ability to take charge) do you think you will have over the process and procedures in settling this conflict by using this method?

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</table>
Scenario for Interpersonal Conflict with Low Likelihood of Future Interaction.

You have been fortunate enough to be assigned a place in one of the residences on campus. However, you have ran into an unexpected problem. This is because your roommate is very untidy—he/she keeps dirty things lying around for days, and is fond of throwing things about carelessly—generally leaving the room in a mess. Your efforts at cleaning the mess seem to be frustrated by your roommate's persistence with this habit, and your attempts to make him/her change do not seem to be having any effect. In desperation, you have made efforts to change roommates but have not been able to find anyone willing to swap rooms with you. This is gradually creating some animosity between you and your roommate. You would like to solve this problem because it is beginning to interfere with your studies. Your roommate will be leaving for another university at the end of the school year and so you are not likely going to interact with him/her in future.
Scenario for Intergroup Conflict with High Likelihood of Future Interaction (Canadian subjects)

You live in one of the residences on campus. Due to the organization of your residence, there are some competitive events (e.g., the cleanest floor) between the floors. This has drawn members of the same floor closer to one another than members between floors. It so happens that your floor is the one on which the recreation room is located. Members of your floor have noticed that many members of the floor directly above yours are in the habit of raising the volume of the TV to unusually high levels and for prolonged hours, with more than occasional cheers here and there. This is causing some inconvenience to most members of your floor. Your floor members have made a number of attempts to discuss this issue with members of the other floor, but with little success, because of their claims of their rights to use (without interference) facilities in the residence. This problem is now causing some tension between members of the two floors, and so has to be settled before it gets out of hand. Most members of each floor will likely be interacting with one another for some time to come because a majority of them are not in the graduating class.
Scenario for Intergroup Conflict with Low Likelihood of Future Interaction (Canadian subjects)

You live in one of the residences on campus. Due to the organization of your residence, there are some competitive events (e.g., the cleanest floor) between the floors. This has drawn members of the same floor closer to one another than members between floors. It so happens that your floor is the one on which the recreation room is located. Members of your floor have noticed that many members of the floor directly above yours are in the habit of raising the volume of the TV to unusually high levels and for prolonged hours, with more than occasional cheers here and there. This is causing some inconvenience to most members of your floor. Your floor members have made a number of attempts to discuss this issue with members of the other floor, but with little success, because of their claims of their rights to use (without interference) facilities in the residence. This problem is now causing some tension between members of the two floors, and so has to be settled before it gets out of hand. Most members of each floor will not likely be interacting with one another for some time to come because a majority of them are in the graduating class.
Scenario for Intergroup Conflict with High Likelihood for Future Interaction (Nigerian subjects)

You live in one of the halls of residence on campus. Due to the organization of activities of these residences, there are some competitive events (e.g., sports tournaments) between these halls of residence. This has drawn members of the same hall closer to one another than members between the halls. One recently, your hall won the volleyball and tennis tournaments. It so happens that most of the recreation facilities on campus are located just behind your hall. Members of your hall have noticed that many members of the neighbouring hall (which lost some of the matches played between your hall and theirs in the tournament) are in the habit of coming around to the recreational facilities behind your hall, to make a lot of noise and well into the night. This is causing some inconveniences for most members of your hall. Your hall members have made a number of attempts to discuss this issue with members of the other hall, but with little success, because of their claims to use (without interference) facilities on the campus. This problem is now causing some tension between members of the two halls, and so has to be settled before it gets out of hand.

Most members of each hall will likely be interacting with one another for some time to come because a majority of them are not in the graduating class.
Scenario for Intergroup Conflict with Low Likelihood for Future Interaction (Nigerian subjects)

You live in one of the halls of residence on campus. Due to the organization of activities of these residences, there are some competitive events (e.g., sports tournaments) between these halls of residence. This has drawn members of the same hall closer to one another than members between the halls. One recently, your hall won the volleyball and tennis tournaments. It so happens that most of the recreation facilities on campus are located just behind your hall. Members of your hall have noticed that many members of the neighbouring hall (which lost some of the matches played between your hall and theirs in the tournament) are in the habit of coming around to the recreational facilities behind your hall, to make a lot of noise and well into the night. This is causing some inconveniences for most members of your hall. Your hall members have made a number of attempts to discuss this issue with members of the other hall, but with little success, because of their claims to use (without interference) facilities on the campus. This problem is now causing some tension between members of the two halls, and so has to be settled before it gets out of hand.

Most members of each hall will not likely be interacting with one another for some time to come because a majority of them are in the graduating class.
Manipulation check for likelihood of future interaction.

1. What is the likelihood that the parties in this dispute will be interacting with each other in the future? Please circle the appropriate number.

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</table>

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very unlikely

very likely
Manipulation check for competitiveness and harmony enhancing qualities of the procedures.

The following are descriptions of some of the methods used by people in dealing with disputes. Please read them carefully and answer the two questions that follow.

1. Threaten your roommate and say that you will publicize his action and this will damage his image and reputation.
2. Accept the situation (i.e. comply in line with the response of your roommate).
3. Negotiate with your roommate in order to reach a solution that is acceptable to you both.
4. Seek assistance from a third party, hoping to find a mediator who will assist in the negotiation (i.e. trying to reach a settlement by following the mediator’s guidance).
5. Take the case to an arbitrator (i.e. someone with the power and authority to settle the dispute decisively), to whom both of you will explain your viewpoints. The arbitrator would then make a final decision that must be followed by you both.
1. Rate the competitiveness/assertiveness of the methods you have just read, ranging from least competitive to most competitive. Please write the appropriate number for each method in the spaces provided.

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</table>

least competitive  
most competitive  

Method 1  
Method 2  
Method 3  
Method 4  
Method 5  
Method 6

2. Rate the harmony enhancing quality of each method, ranging from least harmony enhancing to most harmony enhancing. Please write the appropriate number for each method in the spaces provided.

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<th>1</th>
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</thead>
</table>

least harmony enhancing  
most harmony enhancing  

Method 1  
Method 2  
Method 3  
Method 4  
Method 5  
Method 6
Your assistance is required in helping us understand social interaction patterns in this country. Below are some items which describe the way in which one may relate to different types of individuals. For each item, please indicate by placing an X in the appropriate column the extent to which you disagree strongly or think that it is false or whether you agree strongly or think that it is true.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Strongly disagree / Very false</th>
<th>Disagree / False</th>
<th>Not certain</th>
<th>Agree / True</th>
<th>Strongly agree / Very true</th>
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<td>11.</td>
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</table>
12. Teenagers should listen to their parents’ advice on dating.

13. Even if the child won the Nobel prize, the parents should not feel honored in any way.

14. It is reasonable for a son to continue his father’s business.

15. I would not share my ideas and newly acquired knowledge with my parents.

16. I practice the religion of my parents.

17. I would not let my needy mother use the money that I have saved by living a less than luxurious life.

18. I would not let my parents use my car (if I have one), whether they are good drivers or not.

19. Children should not feel honored even if the father were highly praised and given an award by a government official for his contribution and service to the community.

20. Success and failure in my academic work and career are closely tied to the nurture provided by my parents.

21. Young people should take into consideration their parents’ advice when making education/career plans.

22. The bigger a family, the more family problems there are.

23. I have never told my parents the number of sons I want to have.

24. I would help, within my means, if a relative told me that he/she is in financial difficulty.

25. If I met a person whose last name was the same as mine, I would start wondering whether we were, at least remotely, related by blood.

26. Whether one spends an income extravagantly or stingily is of no concern to one’s relatives (cousins, uncles).

27. I would not let my cousin use my car (if I have one).
28. When deciding what kind of work to do, I would definitely pay attention to the views of relatives of my generation.

29. When deciding what kind of education to have, I would pay absolutely no attention to my uncle's advice.

30. Each family has its own problems unique to itself. It does not help to tell relatives about one's problems.

31. I can count on my relatives for help if I find myself in any kind of trouble.

32. I have never chatted with my neighbors about the political future of this state.

33. I am often influenced by the moods of my neighbors.

34. My neighbors always tell me interesting stories that have happened around them.

35. I am not interested in knowing what my neighbors are really like.

36. One need not worry about what the neighbors say about whom one should marry.

37. I enjoy meeting and talking to my neighbors everyday.

38. In the past, my neighbors have never borrowed anything from me or my family.

39. One needs to be cautious in talking with neighbors, otherwise others might think you are nosy.

40. I don't really know how to befriend my neighbors.

41. I feel uneasy when my neighbors do not greet me when we come across each other.

42. I would rather struggle through a personal problem by myself than discuss it with my friends.

43. If possible, I would like co-owning a car with my close friends, so that it wouldn't be necessary for them to spend much money to buy their own cars.

44. I like to live close to my good friends.
45. My good friends and I agree on the best places to shop.

46. I would pay absolutely no attention to my close friends' views when deciding what kind of work to do.

47. To go on a trip with friends makes one less free and mobile. As a result, there is less fun.

48. It is a personal matter whether I worship money or not. Therefore it is not necessary for my friends to give any counsel.

49. The motto "sharing in both blessing and calamity" is still applicable even if one's friend is clumsy, dumb and causes a lot of trouble.

50. It is inappropriate for a supervisor to ask subordinates about their personal life (such as where one plans to go for their next vacation).

51. When I am among my colleagues/classmates, I do my own thing without minding about them.

52. One needs to return a favor if a colleague lends a helping hand.

53. I have never loaned my camera/coat to any colleagues/classmates.

54. We ought to develop the character of independence among students, so that they do not rely upon other students' help in their schoolwork.

55. A group of people at their workplace was discussing where to eat. A popular choice was a restaurant which had recently opened. However, someone in the group had discovered that the food there was unpalatable. Yet the group disregarded this person's objection and insisted on trying it out. There were only two alternatives for the person who objected: either to go or not to go with the others. In this situation, not going with the others is a better choice.

56. There is everything to gain and nothing to lose for classmates to group themselves for study and discussion.
57. Classmates' assistance is indispensable to getting a good grade at school.

58. I would help if a colleague at work told me that he/she needed money to pay utility bills.

59. In most cases, to cooperate with someone whose ability is lower than one's own is not as desirable as doing the thing alone.

60. Do you agree with the proverb "Too many cooks spoil the broth"?
Appendix C: Scenarios used in Study 3

Parent-child conflict

Due to your status as an undergraduate, you are not yet financially independent and must live with your parents. You feel that you are mature enough to make some of your own decisions, but have found that your parents still want to maintain certain rigid rules such as what time you must be back home at night, how many friends can come over at a time and for how long, and so forth. You are obviously not happy with this type of control and have tried to tell them that you can handle issues on your own, but they insist that you are too young to handle them properly. Besides, they say, as long as you are still under their roof, you have to follow their rules. Your financial position is such that you cannot move out on your own, but at the same time, you want to assert your independence and so have continued to do things your own way. This has created a lot of problems between you and your parents. You therefore want to resolve this conflict as soon as possible before it worsens.
Neighbour conflict (Interpersonal)

You live in a relatively quiet and clean neighbourhood. However, one of the property owners in this neighbourhood has submitted a request to convert his premises from a residential space into a baby milk factory. A hearing was arranged by the municipal council in order to decide whether they should or should not approve this change. You and your neighbour were at this hearing. In your submission, you opposed this conversion on the grounds that the factory might raise the noise level in the area, increase the amount of pollution, and cheapen the value of property in the area. In contrast, your neighbour stood up to argue that the change should be permitted because the nature of the products from this factory (food for babies) are worth more than the mentioned risks which in any case, might be highly exaggerated. This issue led to some arguments between you and your neighbour even after the hearing, and has resulted in some name calling and a few other unpleasant things. You therefore would like to settle this conflict to ensure a more peaceful coexistence with your neighbour.
Neighbour conflict (Intergroup)

You live in a relatively quiet and clean neighbourhood. However, one of the property owners in this neighbourhood has submitted a request to convert his premises from a residential space into a baby milk factory. A meeting was arranged so that the inhabitants of the neighbourhood could decide whether they should or should not approve of this change. One group of people (including yourself) are opposed to this conversion on the grounds that the factory might raise the noise level in the area, increase the amount of pollution, and cheapen the value of their property. Another group thinks that the change should be permitted because the nature of the products from this factory (food for babies) are worth more than the mentioned risks which in any case, might be highly exaggerated. This issue has split the neighbourhood along these lines and has resulted in some name calling and a few other unpleasant things. Members of your neighbourhood want to resolve this problem to ensure a unanimous decision. Also they do not wish to have ill-feeling in the community after the decision has been made.
Coworker conflict (Interpersonal)

Your professor, while working on his research, wanted to get data from some organizations in two cities. He chose two students (you and one other) to handle this aspect of the work for him. The first student took charge of a city that is two hours away and got data from four organizations. You collected the data from two organizations in your University town. After the exercise, this professor has decided to give $300.00 to both of you to share the best way you want. A problem has been created by the sharing arrangement because the other student a bigger share of the money on account of having travelled two hours away and covering four firms. You feel that the money should be shared equally because you both did the same type of job. Besides, you argue, the other student was assigned to the distant city by chance; plus, the professor had paid for the first student’s meals and transportation costs. This argument has suddenly developed into a serious quarrel and has to be solved before it degenerates into a more ugly situation.
Coworker conflict (Intergroup)

Your professor, while working on his research, wanted to get data from some organizations in two cities. He chose two groups of students from your class to handle this aspect of the work for him. The first group took charge of a city that is two hours away and got data from four organizations. Your group collected the data from two organizations in your university town. After the exercise, this professor has decided to give $300.00 to both groups to share the best way they want. A problem has been created by the sharing arrangement because the first group is claiming that since they travelled two hours away and covered four firms, it should take a bigger share of the money. Your group feels that the money should be shared equally because both groups did the same type of job. Besides, your group argues, the other group was assigned to the distant city by chance; plus, their meals and transportation were paid for by the professor. This argument has suddenly developed into a serious quarrel and has to be settled before it degenerates into a more ugly situation.
Appendix D: Scenarios used in Study 4

Neighbour conflict (Interpersonal--Accuser)

The house which you rent is one of a number of houses on the block owned by one person. Each house has a very spacious yard on which time was taken to plant a variety of flowers. When all is well, each yard is a beauty to enjoy. The rents on these houses are reasonably cheap, the only stringent condition the Landlord has imposed in return for the cheap rent being that the premises, especially the yard, be kept clean at all times. The problem you have started having is that your next door neighbour's dog sometimes crosses over and not only digs in the flowers, but also deposits waste on your lawn, causing you to clean and mend things that you were not responsible for. This really upsets you and you have tried to talk things over with your neighbour, but just when it appears as if things are okay, the animal does the same thing again. Your patience has now worn very thin and as such have tried to see if your neighbour could get rid of the dog or keep better control of the animal, but to no avail. Your neighbour insists that the dog is too precious to be gotten rid of, and that all efforts are being done to keep it in check. This has really created some ill-feelings between you and your neighbour. You want to resolve this problem because you want to live in peace with your neighbour. Besides, it is unlikely that you can get another house of such quality at an affordable rate.
Neighbour conflict (Interpersonal--Accused)

The house which you rent is one of a number of houses on the block owned by one person. Each house has a very spacious yard on which time was taken to plant a variety of flowers. When all is well, each yard is a beauty to enjoy. The rents on these houses are reasonably cheap, the only stringent condition the Landlord has imposed in return for the cheap rent being that the premises, especially the yard, be kept clean at all times. The problem you have started having is that your dog sometimes crosses over and not only digs in the flowers, but also deposits waste on your next door neighbour's lawn, causing your neighbour to clean and mend things that they were not responsible for. This really upsets your neighbour and your neighbour has tried to talk things over with you, but just when it appears as if things are okay, the animal does the same thing again. Your neighbour's patience has now worn very thin and as such has tried to see if you could get rid of the dog or keep better control of the animal, but to no avail. You insist that the dog is too precious to be gotten rid of, and that all efforts are being done to keep it in check. This has really created some ill-feelings between you and your neighbour. You want to resolve this problem because you want to live in peace with your neighbour. Besides, it is unlikely that you can get another house of such quality at an affordable rate.
Neighbour conflict (Intergroup--Accusers)

The building in which you live is one of two small adjacent apartment buildings on the block. Each building has a very spacious yard on which time was taken to plant a variety of flowers. When all is well, each yard is a beauty to enjoy. The rents on these apartments are reasonably cheap, the only stringent condition the Landlord has imposed in return for the cheap rent being that the occupants of these apartment keep the premises, especially the yard, clean at all times. The difference between your building and the next one is that tenants are allowed to keep pets in your building, but those in the neighbouring building are not permitted to do so. The problem you have started having is that some dogs from your building often cross over and not only dig in the flowers, but also deposit waste on the neighbouring building's lawn, causing them to clean and mend things that they were not responsible for. This really upsets your neighbours and they have tried to talk things over with members of your building, but just when it appears as if things are okay, the animals do the same thing again. Your neighbours' patience has now worn very thin and they have tried to see if you could get rid of the dogs or keep better control of them, but to no avail. You insist that the dogs are too precious to be gotten rid of, and that all efforts are being done to keep them in check. This has really created some ill-feelings between you (members of your building) and your neighbours. You want to resolve this problem because you want to live in peace with your neighbours. Besides, it is unlikely that you can get an apartment in another building of such quality at an affordable rate.
Neighbour conflict (Intergroup--Accused)

The building in which you live is one of two small adjacent apartment buildings on the block. Each building has a very spacious yard on which time was taken to plant a variety of flowers. When all is well, each yard is a beauty to enjoy. The rents on these apartments are reasonably cheap, the only stringent condition the Landlord has imposed in return for the cheap rent being that the occupants of these apartments keep the premises, especially the yard, clean at all times. The difference between your building and the next one is that tenants in the other apartment building are allowed to keep pets, but those in your building are not permitted to do so. The problem you have started having is that some dogs from the other building often cross over and not only dig in the flowers, but also deposit waste on your building’s lawn, causing you to clean and mend things that you were not responsible for. This really upsets you (members of your building) and you have tried to talk things over with members of the other building, but just when it appears as if things are okay, the animals do the same thing again. Your patience has now worn very thin and you have tried to see if they could get rid of the dogs or keep better control of them, but to no avail. They insist that the dogs are too precious to be gotten rid of, and that all efforts are being done to keep them in check. This has really created some ill-feelings between you (members of your building) and your neighbours. You want to resolve this problem because you want to live in peace with your neighbours. Besides, it is unlikely that you can get an apartment in another building of such quality at an affordable rate.
Appendix E1: MANOVA Table for Procedural Perceptions (Study 1)

Procedural Perceptions as a Function of Type of Conflict and Nature of Future Interaction

<table>
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<th>Favourability</th>
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<th>IPLF</th>
<th>IGHF</th>
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<tr>
<td>Wait &amp; see</td>
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Control over Development of the Quarrel

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<th>IPLF</th>
<th>IGHF</th>
<th>IGLF</th>
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<td>Accept the</td>
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Note: Two asterisks indicate that the difference between two adjacent means was significant at .01 level. The larger the number, the higher the ratings on a given perception.

**IPHF** = Interpersonal conflict with high likelihood of future interaction.

**IPLF** = Interpersonal conflict with low likelihood of future interaction.

**IGHF** = Intergroup conflict with high likelihood of future interaction.

**IGLF** = Intergroup conflict with low likelihood of future interaction.
Table Showing Means for MANOVA Analysis of the Procedural Perceptions (Study 2)

Mean Ratings on Procedural Perceptions as a Function of Culture and Type of Conflict

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Note: Three asterisks (*** indicates difference between the means of the same row was significant at .001 level, two asterisks (**) indicate significance at .01 level, and one asterisk (*) indicates significance at .05 level. The higher the score, the larger the number, the higher the ratings on a given perception of a procedure.
Appendix E3: Table Containing the Means for the MANOVA Analysis of the Procedural Perceptions

Mean Ratings on Procedural Perceptions as a Function of Culture and Type of Scenario

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## Intensity Reduction

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## Grudge

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<th>Neighbour</th>
<th>Coworker</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nig / Can</td>
<td>Nig / Can</td>
<td>Nig / Can</td>
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<tr>
<td>Threats</td>
<td>5.26 6.50</td>
<td>5.48 6.24</td>
<td>5.64 6.35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accept the situation</td>
<td>4.03 4.43</td>
<td>4.24 4.97</td>
<td>4.27 4.79</td>
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<tr>
<td>Negotiation</td>
<td>2.78 2.31</td>
<td>2.64 2.99</td>
<td>2.95 2.91</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td>3.68 3.70</td>
<td>3.61 3.45</td>
<td>3.34 3.45</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arbitration</td>
<td>4.22 4.60</td>
<td>3.95 4.26</td>
<td>3.86 4.06</td>
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## Process Control

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Parent</th>
<th>Neighbour</th>
<th>Coworker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threats</td>
<td>2.17***3.32</td>
<td>2.46**3.63</td>
<td>2.70* 3.60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accept the situation</td>
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<td>3.19 2.91</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Mediation</td>
<td>4.52** 3.80</td>
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<td>4.57 4.30</td>
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<td>3.91***2.72</td>
<td>4.35***2.99</td>
<td>4.53* 3.41</td>
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</table>

Note: Three asterisks (***') indicate that the difference between the means of two adjacent means was significant at .001 level, two asterisks (**) indicate significance at .01 level, and one asterisk (*) indicates significance at .05 level. The higher the number, the higher the perceived process control of the procedure.

Nig = Nigerians; Can = Canadians
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