MĀYĀ IN ŚĀNKARA
WITH REFERENCE TO ŚĀNKARA'S BHĀṣYA
ON THE BRAHMA SŪTRA FROM
A PHENOMENOLOGICAL VIEWPOINT

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MĀYĀ IN ŚĀṅKĀRA
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The conception "māyā" has been translated as "illusion" by many who interpret the Advaita Vedānta of Saṅkara. What we intend to accomplish in this dissertation is to determine if this translation is the correct one. This will be accomplished in two parts. The first will entail an historical survey of māyā in the early tradition and samvṛti in Mādhyamika Buddhism and pre-Saṅkara Advaita. Then we will review Saṅkara and the post-Saṅkara Advaita on māyā. Part Two is a phenomenological inquiry into māyā in the Brahma Sūtra bāṣya of Saṅkara. Here we will be concerned with the structures of the name-form complex, language, and analogue, and their relation to māyā. We will also point out other possible interpretations of the concept "māyā" in Saṅkara's thought.
PREFACE

This dissertation will focus on a concept that later came to be designated as mayāvāda in Śaṅkara's thought. I am proposing to do this strictly within the scope of his major work, namely his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra. This study is to be understood as a phenomenological study of mayāvāda in the sense that I am proposing. The specific slant in the method employed in approaching the problem.

The source material for this study will be the philosophical commentary of Śaṅkara. This study will be concerned with the concept of mayā in its specific occurrences and also related portions which illustrate and define mayā. Particular stress will be laid upon the use of analogue in the Brahma Sūtra as it is this method which lends the full import of mayā in Advaita Vedānta.

To understand mayā by the use of phenomenology means to see the world as containing structures of experience. These structures can be seen as the limits within which an investigation must take place. One of these structures is the nature of language and its strict relation to mayā. But this is not to ask the question of the meaning of language, i.e. vāk. Rather what is being investigated is the structures of experience and not the metaphysical implications. Another structure is the existence of mayā as an interpretation of the world as it confronts us as name and form. We see the world through both of these structures and it is by an examination and interpretation through the use of models of analogue that we
experience a change in the meaning of experience. Maya can be seen as relating to each of these structures directly. It is related to language because maya-language is essentially based on the need for discourse about Brahman and it is related to name and form because maya is said to be coterminous with the world: it is beginningless but not eternal. Thus what I shall consider is the way in which maya, through the use of argument from analogue, is dependent upon and/or essential for the ground of the structures of experience. It is my task then to view maya (strictly within Sākara's Bhaṣya on the Brahma Sūtra), through a phenomenological method, as a way by which it can be seen as an interpretation of the world.
In memory of my teacher
and my friend

Dr. A. D. Mattson, Jr.
1925-1971

Also to J.R., J.T., and A.J.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACF The Advaita Concept of Falsity: A Critical Study
AS The Agamastrva of Gaudapada
AT Religion as Anxiety and Tranquillity
BSS Brahma-Sutra-Shikshya
CHI Cultural Heritage of India
CPB The Central Philosophy of Buddhism
DpK The Doctrine of Mayyas
EKT Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge
Emptiness Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning
Facets Facets of Indian Thought
GSA Gaudapada: A Study in Early Advaita
Hb The Heritage of Saikara
HbP A History of Indian Philosophy
HPEW History of Philosophy Eastern and Western
Hymns The Hymns of the Rigveda
IAS Introduction to Advaitasiddhi
IP Indian Philosophy
Lb Divine Life: The Divine Life
LP "Language and Phenomena"
Lk "Language and Knowledge"
MAB "Mayyas as Discourse about Brahman"
MSS "Myths and Symbols in Indian Art and Civilization"
PBV The Pañcadasa of Bhartṛīrtha-Vidyārāṇya
PV The Principal Upaniṣads
RRAV Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedānta
STK An Introduction to Saikara's Theory of Knowledge
SA Studies: Four Studies in the Language of the Veda
SA Studies PS Studies in Post-Saikara Dialectics
VNAV Vacaspati Mīra on Advaita Vedānta
VPS The Vivarana-praṃsāya-saṅgraha of Bhartṛīrtha

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

THE PRESENT STUDY

The concept of \textit{may\~n} in the Indian religio-philosophical school of Sankara's Advaita Vedanta has been translated primarily as "illusion". This factor has lead critics to describe classical Indian thinking, as world-negating, pessimistic, and unproductive. These critics of the Advaita Vedanta include modern Indian and Western thinkers, i.e., Aurobindo and A. Schweitzer to name but two. Albert Schweitzer's book \textit{Indian Thought and Its Development} interpreted Indian thinking as "world-denying" and "life-denying". There is also Teilhard de Chardin who writes concerning the Grand Option:

On the one hand there are those who see our true progress only in terms of a break, as speedy as possible, with the world: as though the spirit could not exist, or at least could not fulfill itself, except, in separation from matter. And there are those on the other side, the believers in some ultimate value in the tangible evolution of things.\textsuperscript{3}

Teilhard places Indian thinking in the former and his own system in

\textsuperscript{1}Throughout this dissertation the Sanskrit "\textit{mâyā}" and "\textit{Brahman}" will not be underlined.


the latter which he sees as the only real option. Friedrich Nietzsche states of the Vedânta that:

the metaphysical pessimism of the Vedanta philosophy? Are all these not likewise phenomena of decay and sickness? To give excess weight to moral value or to fictions of the "beyond" or to social distress or to suffering in general: every such exaggeration of a narrow viewpoint is in itself already a sign of sickness.

This pre-conceived notion about the attitude and thinking of India must be reassessed in order to understand it. To translate "mâyâ" as "illusion" in the Advaita of Sâûkara is to gloss over the primary criteria and self-understanding that the term conveys. We must then look for a new way to translate "mâyâ" in the Advaita Vedânta of Sâûkara.

Thus this study concerns itself with the explication and understanding of mâyâ in Sâûkara's commentary on the Brahma Sûtra. This topic arose out of a broader interest in the discipline of comparative religion and is written so as to make a contribution to it. Our orientation will be two-fold, historical and philosophical. The historical section forms the general background from which the philosophical inquiry proceeds.

The Introduction presents the general criteria from which our study will develop. We will consider the different positions of what we term the "Jewish-Christian view" as compared with the view of "Indian thinking." We will then begin our historical section with

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5 By these criteria I am assuming the traditional or orthodox position of each type of thinking: This is not to imply that these
Chapter II will briefly investigate the corresponding term for māyā in the Buddhist tradition within the major work of Nāgārjuna so as to understand how within this one specific instance it was utilized. Along with this we will review the māyā concept in Gauḍapāda who is said to have been Śaṅkara's teacher's teacher. Chapter IV will look at the Advaita school of Śaṅkara and the over-all schema of his system. Concluding our historical survey, Chapter V will follow briefly the concept of māyā through the developments of the post-Śaṅkara Advaita until approximately the 17th century. This will complete our historical survey.

Part Two of the dissertation will be a philosophical inquiry. Here we will investigate the use of the term "māyā" in Śaṅkara's bhaṣya or commentary on the Brahma Sūtra. In Chapter VI we will concentrate on the relation between language and the name-form complex (nāma-rūpa) so as to see within Śaṅkara's thought how these are utilized within the over-all conception of the definition of language are the only possible positions within each tradition but are presented so that confusion between them is lessened.

The use of the word "tradition" in this dissertation is used to indicate the "orthodox" or Vedic schools and their general lines of heritage given by themselves. We are concerned more specifically with the Advaita Vedānta tradition in our inquiry.

Our purpose is not to determine once and for all the understanding of Nāgārjuna and Gauḍapāda but merely to give a general over-all view of their concept as understood by various scholars. This chapter exists only to give a general background within the tradition.
and the name-form complex as māyā. Chapter VII will concentrate upon the way in which māyā is related in terms of instruction by the use of analogue within the Brahma Sūtra and by extension the experiential grounding of māyā within the conception of Brahman and how this is communicated. Chapter VIII, which will conclude our study, will concentrate upon the centrality of māyā for an understanding of the name-form complex and language within the contextual frame of analogue as a means of comprehension. Here we will also examine an apparent shift in the māyā conception of Śaṅkara in the post-Śaṅkara Advaita and a modern criticism of Śaṅkara's māyā which does not recognize its full import. In this concluding Chapter, we will at last take up for consideration other terms related to māyā in Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta.

METHOD

As was mentioned above we have utilized two approaches, historical survey and philosophical inquiry, in this study. The historical part is a survey of the philosophical conception of māyā, and its affiliate term in Nāgarjuna's Mādhyamika Buddhism viz., samvṛti. The second part is philosophical or more precisely a phenomenological investigation of the concept māyā.

In our approach to phenomenology we are not concerned with a specific development of that method in Western philosophy as such.

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8 The term "analogue" in this dissertation is used as a description of a teaching method and must not be confused with the Western Scholastic "analogy" which is utilized to discuss theological questions.
Rather we are utilizing this method in its general definition. We can say with Pierre Thévenaz in his book *What is Phenomenology?*:

It is above all method—a method for changing our relation to the world, for becoming more acutely aware of it. But at the same time and by that very fact, it is already a certain attitude vis-à-vis the world, or more exactly a certain attitude vis-à-vis our relation to the world. Phenomenology combines the most radical break with our ordinary and natural attitude vis-à-vis the world (in this sense, it is an ascetic of the

The concept of analogy is one which contains great philosophical and theological implications in Western thinking. This can be traced back to Aristotle within the Greek world and, for Christianity, in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas. One great interpretation of St. Thomas is that contained in the work of Cardinal Cajetan, *The Analogy of Names and the Concept of Being*, (trans. E. A. Bushinski with H. J. Koren, 2nd edition Duquesne University, Ad Press Ltd. 1959). In this work he centers on the relation of God to his creation and how man can know God (which in Western theological circles is the dominant way of understanding analogy). He states that there are three general concepts of analogy which have seven variations: (1) Analogy of inequality, (2) Analogy of attribution, (3) Analogy of proportionality; the variations: (1) substance and accidents, (2) cause and effect, (3) God and creatures, (4) created beings as analogues, (5) being in act and potency, (6) being in reason, (7) analogy other than being. In addition to this work the theological and philosophical analysis of analogy is so vast that it is implicit and explicit throughout much of Western thinking to the present.

In this study we take note of the above understanding of analogy but are not concerned with it or with a comparative study of this concept as such. Rather than "analogy", analogue has been used in its much more general usage as a teaching method within the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara, with reference to such Sanskrit terms as māyā, avidyā, adhyāsa, ajnana, mithya etc. (with the added provision that each and every term for the Advaita must be meant only for discourse about Brahmān). We recognize that the words which express "analogue" in one language and religious context have perhaps correlate terms in another language but the religious context is so different that an identical translation of each terms would be inaccurate. Thus we are not concerned with "analogy" in the West but with "analogue" in the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara.
mind) with the deepening or the consecration of this original attitude (in this sense, it is respect for the real and engagement in the world). Consciousness takes its distance with regard to things: it gives itself complete freedom in respect to them, but one realizes at once that this is in order to be more faithful to our essential insertion in the world. . . . The phenomenological method thus permits pushing on simultaneously and with one movement towards the roots of subjectivity and the foundation of the objective world.  

The phenomenological method then brings about a new understanding of the world by an analysis of consciousness. This analysis delineates and analyzes the constructs by which one understands reality. It is a consideration of these basic constructs, those concepts and interpretations of the world, fundamental within any given view, that form the ground upon which one can approach a religion or philosophy. It calls for a moment in which the symbols of consciousness are gathered and interpreted. This is brought out by Professor J. G. Arapura: "By the phenomenological moment, I mean the most efficient gathering of all that there is, the interpretation of all symbols, with the proper use of subjectivity and culture subjectivity."  

In this study we are using the phenomenological method so as to understand the conception of māyā in Śaṅkara's bhaśya on the Brahma Sūtra. We are centering on this concept within the Advaita because it is a primary one in any understanding of the Advaita. We are not in any way attempting to . . .

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criticize the Advaita but rather to understand it. It is in this manner, and only this manner, that we may begin to comprehend the various ways in which different people understand reality. By phenomenology we mean the "... singling out and uncovering of a certain ultimate, self-constitutive and existential element of consciousness, by means of which a particular dynamic in the original manifestation (though not the origin as such) of religion will be made to reveal itself."\(^1\)

This specific investigation arose out of a context of a particular study of comparative religion, that is J. G. Arapura's work Religion as Anxiety and Tranquillity—An Essay in Comparative Phenomenology of the Spirit.\(^2\) Within his work Dr. Arapura begins by linking, following Husserl, consciousness and reflection. He observes:

Phenomenology's justification for starting with consciousness rather than with the phenomena outside it is that it is itself a unique phenomena, one that is always in the process of apprehending itself along with its own states (or moods), and by that means, of apprehending the world (or being of be-ings).\(^3\)

He begins then with the reflection of consciousness upon itself which gives rise to what he terms the sense of wrongness of existence:

The self-confrontation of existence takes place in consciousness' reflection upon itself. This sense of wrongness cannot be truly explained as a matter of constitution since in actual life there never is encountered


\(^2\) Ibid. Note p. 58 ff.

\(^3\) Ibid., pp. 50-1.
an alternative way of constituting the self or projecting existence. The only alternatives that are possible come in the form of myth which in turn are grounded on the sense of wrongness itself as an answer, remedy, solution, offering a structure of rectification. The sense of wrongness of existence is not to be understood as an ordinary discontent that can be removed by some special argument or analysis or knowledge, although quests in that direction are automatically launched from this ground. It should be assumed that it is as fundamental as wonder and curiosity which are regarded respectively as the sources of philosophy and science. 14

This sense of wrongness of existence is then looked at in terms of consciousness and this gives rise to the "spheres of the spirit" which variously interpret this reflection. Dr. Arapura sees this development as producing the "anxiety sphere" of the West and the "tranquility sphere" of Indian thinking. This present topic grew out of the analysis of Dr. Arapura's interpretation of the Indian "sense of wrongness of existence". We are centering on one unique example within the Indian "sphere" for our investigation, and even more specifically one topic within one specific understanding, namely māyā in Śaṅkara's commentary on the Brahma Sūtra. But before we proceed with the historical survey let us point out some general differences between these "spheres".

INDIAN AND WESTERN THOUGHT

Making some distinctions between the Indian and Western "spheres of the spirit" will allow our study to proceed by removing the confusion between them that has been one of the difficulties of comparative religion, i.e. interpreting Indian thinking within the structures of Western thought. In this section we will consider the

14 Ibid., p. 62.
Indian and Western: (1) view of history, (2) view of language, (3) view of man, (4) end of man, and (5) concept of philosophy. Our criteria for Indian thinking is the understanding of Advaita Vedānta and for the West it is the Jewish-Christian view of religion and the Greek view of philosophy.

(1) Meaning of History

We encounter in the Indian understanding of history a "cyclic" description of the cosmos within which man is subject to transmigration or rebirth. H. Zimmer remarks that:

The wheel of birth and death, the round of emanation, fruition, dissolution, and re-emanation, is a commonplace of popular speech as well as a fundamental theme of philosophy, myth and symbol, religion, politics and art. It is understood as applying not only to the life of the individual, but to the history of society and the course of the cosmos. Every moment of existence is measured and judged against the backdrop of this pleroma. 15

The cosmos has world cycles which are subdivided into four world ages or yugas. These ages take their names from the four throws of the Indian dice game and are called Krita (four), Treta (three), Dvapara (two), and Kali (one). 16 In the world of the present we are in the Kali yuga which is said to have begun on Friday, February 18, 3102 B.C. At the end of the Kali yuga, which is the last before dissolution, the cosmos will terminate and return to its ground in the Absolute. After a period of 4,320,000,000 years the cosmos will emerge again out of the Absolute and begin again with the Krita yuga. 17 Examples of this cyclic view are contained throughout the Scripture of India.


16 Ibid., p. 13.

17 Ibid., p. 16.
One example can be seen in the Puranic account of the sage Markandeya:

I shall tell you the wonderful scene beheld by the sage Markandeya at the time of Lord Viṣṇu's repose in the vast speck of water all by Himself. Swallowed up by Lord Viṣṇu, the sage Markandeya remained within His belly by His glory for many thousands of years and began to wander about there. . . . Then the sage devoted himself to meditation, to the performance of sacrifices, Japams and Homas, and asceticism by virtue of which he slowly came out of Viṣṇu's mouth. He did not know at all when he entered in His belly or when he came out of His mouth. This was due to Lord's Māyā. He saw the whole universe under the cover of Tamoguṇa and that vast expanse of water. He was afraid. The sage was then bewildered and lost all hopes of life. On seeing Viṣṇu he seemed to have remembered Nārāyaṇa and became glad. He became astonished and standing in that vast expanse of water did not know whether he was dreaming or deluded.—13-20.

. . . he immediately went again into His belly.—21-25.
Then after sometime coming out of Viṣṇu's mouth, the sage saw a boy sleeping on the branch of a banyan tree. He was seen playing all by himself without any anxiety in the universe bereft of creation. . . . The sage was much surprised and tried, . . . Then he thought to himself while floating on the water, I undoubtedly saw him before, but am doubtful as I might be deluded by Deva Māyā. . . . the Lord, in the form of that young boy, thundered to Markandeya "Son, Markandeya! do not be afraid. Come near me.". . . the longlived sage Markandeya with folded hands and with eyes struck with wonder most devoutly saluted Lord Viṣṇu after reciting his name and Gotra.

. . . Śrī-Bhagavāna said: . . . I am the Creator of the past, future and the present. Brāhmaṇa! whatever you see or hear about or think about, I am all those. I created this universe before and I am creating it now. Markandeya! I create this whole universe at the end of each yuga and then support it. Hear about my dharmas by joyfully entering within My belly. Brahmā, along with the Ṛgis and the Devas rests in My body. I am the avyakta Yogā, again I am Vyakta, the enemy of the demons. You attain to me. I am the one-lettered mantra and again the three-lettered mantra. I give dhārmā, artha, kāma; and again I am the giver of Mukti. I am the giver of salvation. I am "Om" the symbol of the sacred Trinity."—51-65.18

Also we find in the Bhagavad Gītā the god Kṛṣṇa remarking that:

12—Never was there a time when I was not, nor you, nor yet these princes, nor will there be a time when we shall cease to be,—all of us hereafter.

13—Just as in this body the embodied self must pass through childhood, youth, and old age, so too at death will it assume another body: in this the thoughtful man is not perplexed.19

Śaṅkara observes in his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra I.3.30:

With regard to this it is said—"Because of the same names and forms (recurring)—and even if such absorption and regeneration is accepted, we do have to accept the transmigratory existence as having no beginning. The Āchārya will hereafter expound, as to how transmigratory existence is without beginning, in the Sūtra 'It is reasonably sustainable and is also perceived to be so' (Bra. Su. II.1.36).20

The Western concept of history is linear. This is evident, for example, in Koheleth 3:11 when we hear about the beginning and the end of God's work:

What profit does one who works get from all his labour?
I have seen the business that God has given men to keep them busy. He has made everything to suit its time: moreover he has given men a sense of time past and future, but no comprehension of God's work from beginning to end.21

A Jewish account of this linear view is expressed by the thinker Philo in his De Opificio Mundi when he writes:


Then he says that "in the beginning God made the heaven and the earth", taking "Beginning" not, as some think, in a chronological sense, for time there was not before there was a world. Time began either simultaneously with the world or after it. For since time is a measured space determined by the world’s movement, and since movement could not be prior to the object moving, but must of necessity arise either after it or simultaneously with it, it follows of necessity that time also is either coequal with or later born than the world.  

The most exact account of this within the Christian community is that found in the Roman Catholic tradition of creatio ex nihilo. In a letter by Leo I in the fifth century he states:

Beside this unique consubstantial, eternal, and unchangeable deity (divinity) of the supreme Trinity there is absolutely no creature that is not in its origin created from nothing. (§285)  

A latter account in the thirteenth century by Innocent III states:

We believe that the one and the same God creator of the New and the Old Testament (that is the law of Moses and of the Prophets and of the Apostles), created everything from nothing, without changing in his Trinity. (§790)  

He again asserts the doctrine in a latter place:

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23 [VII. 38 Ορθ. δ’ ἂς "ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐστιν τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν," τὴν ἀρχήν παραλαμβάνων, ἂν οὐκ ἔστατι τούτων, τὴν κατὰ χρόνου χρόνος γάρ οὐκ ἔνεκα κόσμου, ἀλλ’ οὕτως γεγονέν ἢ μετ’ αὐτῶν ἐπεὶ γὰρ διάστημα τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κυριαρχεῖστος ἀπὸ χρόνου, προτέρας δὲ τοῦ κυνουμένου κύριος οὐκ ἐν γένοις, ἀλλ’ ἐναγγεῖον αὐτὴν ἢ ὑπὲρον ἢ ὑπάρχον ἢ ὑπάρξον ἢ ὑπάρκεια, ἂνγγεῖον ἡ ἀνάγνωσμα καὶ τὸν χρόνων ἢ ἱστολογικοῦ γεγονότα.


25 Ibid., p. 255. (Novi et Veteris Testamenti (id est Legis Moysi et Prophetarum et Apostolorum) unum eundemque (et Deum) auctorem credimus esse Deum (-'), qui in Trinitate, ut dictum est, permanens, de nihilo (-'), cuncta (omnia) creavit! . . .)
God... through his omnipotent power established, out of nothing, from the beginning of time both creatures, spiritual and corporal, that is angelic and worldly. (#3800)

At the council of Florence in 1442 it was stated:

(The council) believes most firmly and confesses and proclaims that one true God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, is the creator of all visible and invisible things: when he willed, by his goodness, he established all creatures, both spiritual and corporal; good because they were made by the highest good, but also changeable because they were made from nothing... (#1333).

(2) View of Language

Just as the Indian and Western views of history are different, so too are the two views of language. In terms of Indian thinking revelation as the origination of language means that revelation reveals itself. That is to say there is no giver of revelation as such; rather the Veda is that body of truth which has been seen by the Rgi and this body exists through all cycles of world emanations. Its character is that it is aparvusya or non-personal which means that it is not given in a personal or historical event; it has always existed. This language accompanies a cyclic view of history.

The cyclic view aims at being direct, essentially intuitive, with respect to knowledge. It tolerates no obstacles or obstructions except those that can be readily conditioned

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25 Ibid., p. 259. (... qui sua omnipotenti virtute simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam, spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam: ...)
26 Ibid., p. 338. (Firmissime credit, proflinet et praedicat, unum verum Deum. Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, esse omnium visibilium et invisibilium creatorem: qui quando voluit, bonitate sua universas, tam spiritales quam corporales, concitit creaturas: bonus guidem, quia a summo bone factae sunt, sed mutabiles, quia de nihilo factae sunt, ...). For a more detailed account of this difference in the meaning of history the reader is asked to refer to: Cosmos and History, Creation Legends of the Ancient Near East, and Philosophies of History (see Bibliography).
and rendered transparent and thus overcome. Hence language by definition is both unincentric and transcendentally originated. It is by definition also self-luminous and its purpose is revelation through vidiṣṭha (jnana, gnosis). 27

This can be seen in Śaṅkara's comments in the Brahma Sūtra bṛhadāraṇyaka.

He remarks at I.3.28 that:

... (the world i.e. everything) is created out of this (i.e. the word). It is out of the scriptural word, indeed, that this world i.e. everything including the Gods etc. is created. ... Similarly we understand that before creation, Vedic words occurred to Prājāpati the creator and thereafter he created the objects according to those words. That the Scriptures also say similarly viz., that he uttered the word "Bhūḥ" and created the Earth—which shows that words such as "Bhūḥ" etc. first occurred to the mind as words, and from them the worlds "Bhūḥ" etc. were afterwards created. 28

He continues at I.3.29:

"Hence it is that (the Vedās) are eternal." Thus—

it is also because this transitory world which consists of definite forms such as the Gods etc. is born from the Vedic words, that the eternity of the Vedic word should be understood. 29

In contrast to this conception of language is the Western Biblical view which sees language as given by a personal God and constituting an historical event. Language proceeds as an utterance of God for the Jewish world and this language is Hebrew.

When God was about to create the world by His word, the twenty-two letters of the alphabet descended from the terrible and august crown of God whereon they were engraved with a pen of flaming fire. 30

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Then the Lord came down to see the city and tower which mortal men had built, and he said, "Here they are, one people with a single language, and now they have started to do this (build the tower to reach heaven); henceforward nothing they have a mind to do will be beyond their reach. Come, let us go down there and confuse their speech, so that they will not understand what they say to one another.\textsuperscript{31}

Turning to the Christian conception of language we find that language (Logos) is a very important theme. This is probably seen most fully in the Gospel of John:

When all things began, the Word already was. The Word dwelt with God, and what God was, the Word was. The Word, then, was with God at the beginning, and through him all things came to be; no single thing was created without him.\textsuperscript{32}

Thus we see that the conception of the meaning of language differs between Indian thinking and Western thinking. This has rightly been observed by Professor Arapura:

\textsuperscript{31}Biblia Hebraica, p. 8. Genesis 11: 5-7

I may say that in the case of the one, language indicates, and is employed for, disengagement from phenomena and retreat into the one only centre of Reality, while in the case of the other, what language indicates and is employed for is engagement with phenomena. In the case of the one, phenomena are absorbed into that centre of Reality revealed in gnosis through the use of language. This means that every time it happens it is not a speaker who speaks but the self-same centre; hence speech is attached to no person; speech speaks by itself. Speech is apauruseya (non-personal) . . . In the case of the other, phenomena are not absorbed into a centre but proceed from a centre. Thus phenomena are put forth or brought into being. Every new point that emerges (in terms of linear procession) equally become an authentic centre from which language and phenomena can again proceed.33

(3) View of Man

The view of man in Indian thinking is summarized quite well in the Krishna-janma khanda of the BrahmaVaivarta Purâna which states:

Life in the cycle of the countless rebirths is like a vision in a dream. The gods on high, the mute trees and the stones, are alike apparitions in this phantasy. But Death administers the law of time. Ordained by time, Death is the master of all. Perishable unending cycles the good and evil alternate. Hence, the wise are attached to neither, neither the evil nor the good. The wise are not attached to anything at all.34

Another example is the statement of the Bhagavad Gîtâ that:

27--For sure is the death of all that is born, sure is the birth of all that dies: so in a matter that no one can prevent you have no cause to grieve.
28--Unmanifest are the beginnings of contingent beings, manifest then middle course, unmanifest again their ends: what cause for mourning here?
29--By a rare privilege may someone behold it, and by a rare privilege indeed may another tell of it, and by a rare privilege may such another hear it; yet even having heard there is none that knows it.

33 LP, p. 19.
34 MSS, p. 8.
30—Never can this embodied Self be slain in the body of anyone (at all): and so you have no need to grieve for any contingent being. 35

The Chāndogya Upaniṣad observes:

1—Verily, this whole world is Brahman, from which he comes forth, without which he will be dissolved and in which he breathes. Tranquil, one should meditate on it. Now verily, a person consists of purpose. According to the purpose a person has in this world, so does he become on departing hence. So let him frame for himself a purpose.

2—He who consists of mind, whose body is life, whose form is light, whose conception is truth, whose soul is space, containing all works, containing all desires, containing all odours, containing all tastes, encompassing this whole world, being without speech and without concern.

3—This is my self within the heart, smaller than a grain of rice, than a barley corn, than a mustard seed, than a grain of millet or than the kernel of a grain of millet. This is myself within the heart, greater than the earth, greater than the atmosphere, greater than the sky, greater than these worlds.

4—Containing all works, containing all desire, containing all odours, containing all tastes, encompassing this whole world, without speech, without concern, this is the self of mine within the heart; this is Brahman. Into him, I shall enter, on departing hence. Verily, he who believes this, will have no more doubts. Thus used to say Sāṇḍilya, yea Sāṇḍilya. 36


Man then is subject to countless rounds of rebirth which are contained within the cyclic historical process of the cosmos. Man himself is subjected to this cycle because of his attachments and this is his predicament. He finds himself in a state of ignorance (avidyā) because he thinks that attachments will help him out of the rounds of rebirth.

In order for man to obtain freedom from this bondage in ignorance he must gain knowledge (vidyā), as is seen in the above quotes, which will remove ignorance.

In Western thinking man is seen as a creature who is created by God:

So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them. (28) And God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth. 37

Man, however, rebelled against God and was cast out of the garden of paradise:

(21) Unto Adam also and to his wife did the Lord God make coats of skins, and clothed them. (22) And the Lord God said, Behold, the man is become as one of us, to know

good and evil: and now lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat and live for ever: (23) Therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the garden of Eden, to till the ground from whence he was taken. 38

In terms of Christian understanding, man, as a creature of God, is a being who is sinful. This is to say that in man's rebellion against God he placed himself outside of the garden. Thus the state of man's nature is that he is a fallen being who finds salvation through the grace of God. In India man is not sinful; he is in ignorance and it is only through knowledge that he may liberate himself from the wheel of rebirth. 39

(4) End of Man

India considers the end of man as the attainment of liberation. It is liberation from the world of action, duty and transmigration. It is in some sense a transcendent state beyond the tri-level cosmos of the earth, heavens, and hells. This idea is expressed in various ways within the tradition, according to the specific school or cult, but conceptually it is the same in terms of its structure. In fact

38 Ibid., Genesis 3:21-23, p. 3.

39 See A T, p. 76 ff.
the end of man, specifically within the Advaita Vedānta, is the concern of the study at hand. The Bhagavad Gītā, a basic text for the Advaita, remarks about it that:

19—When the watching [self] sees there is no agent other than [these] constituents and knows what is beyond them, then will he come to share in that mode of being which is mine.
20—Transcending these three constituents which give the body its existence, from the sufferings of birth, death, and old age delivered, the embodied [self] wins immortality. 40

The Western view of the end of man is that man and history become in some way perfected. An example of one specific view within the Jewish tradition is contained in the commentary on the crime of Cain:

The crime committed by Cain had baneful consequences, not for himself alone, but for the whole of nature also. While, before, the vine had borne nine hundred and twenty-six different varieties of fruit, it now brought forth but one kind. And so it was with all other species. They will regain their pristine powers only in the world to come. 41

In Christianity the end of man is concerned with the second coming of the Christ. This will mark the perfection, the end and fulfilment of time:

Behold, he is coming with the clouds! Every eye shall see him, and among them those who pierced him; and all the peoples of the world shall lament in remorse. So

it shall be. Amen. "I am the Alpha and the Omega", says the Lord God, who is and who was and who is to come, the sovereign Lord of all. 42

A new heaven and a new earth will be established:

Then I saw a new heaven and a new earth, for the first heaven and the first earth had vanished, and there was no longer any sea. I saw the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God, make ready like a bride adorned for her husband. I heard a loud voice proclaiming from the throne: "Now at last God has his dwelling among Men! He will dwell among them and they shall be his people, and God himself will be with them. He will wipe every tear from their eyes; there shall be an end to death, and to mourning and crying and pain; for the old order has passed away!" 43

Thus the Indian view of cyclic occurrence of man within the cyclic cosmos sees the end of man as outside the cosmos whereas the Western view finds its end in the fulfillment and completion of the will of God in history.

42 Revelation 1:7-8
7 Ἰδοὺ ἐρχεται μετὰ τῶν νεφελῶν, καὶ διῆλθεν αὐτὸν πάς ὁ δυσλόγος καὶ οἴτινες αὐτὸν ἔξεκέντησαν, καὶ κόψονται ἐπὶ αὐτὸν πᾶσαι αἱ φυλαὶ τῆς γῆς. ναι, ἀμὴν.
8 Ἐγώ εἰμι τὸ Ἄλφα καὶ τὸ Ω, λέγει κύριος ὁ θεὸς, ὁ ὄν καὶ ὁ ἐν καὶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος, ὁ παντοκράτωρ.

43 Revelation 21:1-4
21 Καὶ εἶδον οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καινὴν ὑπὸ πρῶτος οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ πρώτη γῆ ἀπῆλθαν, καὶ ἡ θάλασσα οὐκ ἦστιν ἐπὶ. 2 καὶ τὴν πόλιν τῆς ἁγίας Ἰερουσαλὴμ καὶ τὴν καταβὰν οὐκ ἢ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἑτοιμαζόμενην ὡς νυμφὴν κοινωνίζομεν τῷ ἄνδρι αὐτῆς. 3 καὶ ἦκονα δυνάμεις μεγάλας ἐκ τοῦ θρόνου λεγοῦσαν, Ἰδοὺ ἡ σκηνὴ τοῦ θεοῦ μετὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ σκηνώσει μετ' αὐτῶν, καὶ αὐτοὶ λαοὶ αὐτοῦ ἐσονται, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς μετ' αὐτῶν ἐσται, [αὐτῶν θεὸς]. 4 καὶ ἐξαλείψει πᾶν δάκρυν ἐκ τῶν δυσλόγων αὐτῶν, καὶ ὁ βάναυσος οὐκ ἦσται ὑπ` οὗτε πένθος οὔτε κραυγὴ οὔτε πόνος οὐκ ἦσται ἐτι. [ὅτι] τὰ πρῶτα ἀπῆλθαν.
(5) Concept of Philosophy

In India the concept of philosophy can never be separated from a view of liberation, because philosophy is always concerned with the analysis of existence so that knowledge (vidyā), which is of its very nature liberation for the Advaita Vedānta, can be attained. Western philosophy developed originally out of the Greek mind and was later brought into the Christian world i.e. Augustine and Aquinas. The fundamental difference between these two understandings is commented on by Betty Heinmann in her work Indian and Western Philosophy:

Let us examine then, the Western term "Philosophy" and its Eastern equivalent in the classical language of India, Sanskrit; and even at the outset we meet with fundamental contrasts. For the Greek term philo-sophia means literally "love of sophia", of human reason, measure, of judgment and discrimination. On the other hand, the Sanskrit term for philosophy is ānu-iksiki, the "survey of, literally the look along (ānu), all things," which means "along all existent facts." Thus contemplation of reality, not discrimination in a rational order, is the cardinal aim of Indian Philosophy, the Sanskrit name of which means no more than synopsis, comprehensive view and receptive contemplation. Further evidence of the profound gulf between East and West is provided by another fundamental philosophical term. Our word "system" (systema) is literally "putting-together," "com-position," in a rational order. It was Aristotle, the founder and organizer of Western exact science, a post-Sophistic scholar and the first great genuinely Western Philosopher, who invented the term sy-stema or sy-stasis, while his school, the Peripatetics, developed it to its full meaning. The human mind, then, thinks "systematically," prescribes the order of research, the selection, disposition and composition of ideas. Conversely Plato, the ontological and, indeed, the last great cosmic thinker of the West, continues under the influence of pre-Sophistic cosmic conceptions to apply to his own principles the pregnant term theoria, meaning literally "Intuitive-view," or contemplation. This use of Theoria, instead of the later sy-stema, reveals Plato's general attitude, his humble openness towards the phenomena as objects of contemplation, but,
not of selective research.

Now precisely the same concept of "system" as Plato's was conceived by Indian Philosophy and has been preserved to the present day, the Sanskrit term for system being either darsana or drsti, both derived from the root drs (Greek dorkomai)—to look, to contemplate, to be receptive—but in no degree implying any idea of regulating the facts of Nature. 44

We must comment however that Betty Heinmann's observations are not necessarily truly representative of the West but do clarify our point in the present context.

Thus what we term "philosophy" in India is something other than what is termed "philosophy" in the Greek (Aristotelian and post-Aristotelian) sense of the word. Philosophy in India is the quest for

44 Betty Heinmann, Indian and Western Philosophy, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1939), pp. 27-8. F. E. Peters observes: "Philosophia: love of wisdom, philosophy 1. By the traditional Greek account Pythagoras was the first to use the term philosophia (See D.L.1.12; Cicero, Tusc. V.3.8), and endowed the word with a strongly religious and ethical sense . . . which can best be seen in the view of the philosopher put forth by Socrates in Phaedo 62c-69e. In Aristotle is has lost these Pythagorean overtones (the same process is visible in Plato . . .): philosophia has now become a synonym for episteme (q.v.) in the sense of an intellectual discipline seeking out causes (Meta. 1026a). In the same passage Aristotle mentions 'first philosophy' (prote philosophia) or "theology" (see theologìa; "metaphysics" is a latter word) that has as its object not mutable things as does physics (also called "second philosophy," ibid. 1037a) or those connected with matter, as does mathematics, but being (on) that is eternal, immutable, and separated from matter." from F. E. Peters, Greek Philosophical Terms: A Historical Lexicon, (New York: New York University Press, 1967), p. 156.
knowledge that will remove ignorance and in turn bring freedom in liberation. This is true for almost all\textsuperscript{45} the Indian schools or systems of thought. The most important for our investigation is the Advaita Vedānta dārsāna.

\textbf{THE RISE OF THE ADVAITA DARSĀNA}

The Advaita Vedānta dārsāna, as with most Indian religio-philosophical thought, grew out of the conceptions which were set in the Veda and the subsequent tradition and commentaries that arose from it. This dārsāna or "system" of thought is one which developed out of the Sūtras of the Uttara Māmāsā dārsāna, viz. the Vedānta sūtras of Bādarāyana, and is seen in the present as having had a very profound imprint on the thinking of India. The Vedānta is perhaps the most well-known dārsāna of the six classic dārsānas:

Of the systems of thought or dārsānas, six became more famous than others, viz., Gautama's Nyāya, Kapīḍa's Vaiśeṣika, Kapila's Sāṁkhya, Patanjali's Yoga, Jaimini's Pūrva Māmāsā and Bādarāyana's Uttara Māmāsā or the Vedānta. They are the Brahmanical systems, since they all accept the authority of the Vedas. The systems of thought which admit the validity of the Vedas are called Āstika, and those which repudiate it nāstika. The Āstika, or nāstika character of a system does not depend on its positive or negative conclusions regarding the nature of the supreme spirit, but on the acceptance or non-acceptance of the authority of the Vedas. . . .\textsuperscript{46}

Thus we have in the Advaita dārsāna a restatement of the tradition so that the correct understanding, as far as the Advaita was concerned, of the Veda was given. Historically this was necessary because of the

\textsuperscript{45}The notable exception being the Cārvāka school.

rise of the nāstika systems, which repudiated the Veda, from the fifth century B.C. Most notably these were the Jaina and Buddhist systems of thought.

The Advaita Vedānta darsāna is that ninth century system which is the product of the genius of Śaṅkara. Śaṅkara formulated what he saw as the implicit doctrine of Brahman within the Upanisadic scriptures. This formulation arose from the encounter of the Vedānta with the other systems of thought present at that time. It attempted to correct various interpretations, which the Advaita saw as wrong, within the other nāstika systems and along with this challenge the nāstika systems, most notably the Mādhyamika school of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Thus the Advaita darsāna grew out of a complex cultural heritage that contained great varieties of religious, philosophical and cultic phenomena. But the Advaita did not see itself as original in its conception of Brahman. It is especially important to recognize that generally within the development of Indian philosophy the need was not to be "original" at all but rather to thread together the coherent ideas already in existence. Thus for example Śaṅkara is not one who thinks of himself as original for he relies upon and always refers to scripture as well as to a number of authors who preceeded him in his Sastra-Bhāṣya.

The philosophic position of the Advaita darsāna is one of absolute non-dualism. Advaita itself means non-dual. It conceives reality as being ultimately one, namely Brahman. Man is connected to Brahman by the fact that there is within him an inner core or soul which is Atman. This inner core is identical with Brahman. This
will be explained more fully at a later place in our study. Another position in Indian philosophy, one which holds that there is no core nor any such absolute as Brahman, is the Mādhyamika position of the Buddhists. These two taken together are what is called the "two traditions" of Indian philosophy by Dr. T. R. V. Murti. The former has its ground in the Ātman doctrine of the Upaniṣads while the latter is based upon the anātman doctrine of the Buddha. Speaking of the "two traditions" Dr. Murti observes:

The Upaniṣads and the systems following the Brāhmaṇical tradition conceive reality on the pattern of an inner core or soul (Ātman), immutable and identical amidst an outer region of impermanence and change, to which it is unrelated or but loosely related. This may be termed the Substance-view of reality (ātma-vāda). . . . The other tradition is represented by the Buddhist denial of substance (Ātman) and all that it implies. There is no inner and immutable core in things; everything is in flux. Existence for the Buddhists is momentary (kṣaṇika), unique (svalakṣaṇa) and unitary (dharma-mātra). It is discontinuous, discrete and devoid of complexity. The substance (the universal and the identical) was rejected as illusory; it was but a thought-construction made under the influence of wrong belief (avidyā). This may be taken as the Modal view of reality.47

Thus there is the Advaita darsāna which maintains the "substance" view of reality as distinct from the Buddhist or "modal" view. This distinction is quite basic and because of it other distinctions follow. Another distinction which we will note now is the different interpretations that each places upon language. The Advaita views language as originating extraneous to karma-samsāra whereas the

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Buddhist maintain that language is grounded and referent to karma-
samsāra. What this means is that the Advaita views, along with the
Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, language as given transcendentally (śruti) and the
Buddhist maintains that it is, along with other things, a momentary
becoming and hence conventional although in a different sense than
in the Nyāya. Professor Arapura expresses this idea of language in
the Vedānta:

All the human faculties are the means by which
Brahman manifests itself, etad va dipyate yad vācā
vadati. (This Brahman indeed shines forth, when one
speaks with speech).—so we read in the Kaushitaki
Upaniṣad. . . . However, among the faculties through
which Brahman (Atmān) shines forth, speech still remains
the first.48

Language in the Vedānta must be seen as an aspect of Brahman for:

Thus we are told that speech is Brahman (vāpyai brah-
meti). Speech is virūt. Speech is also everything.
It is the world (vāgeva ayam lokah), it is the gods
(devāh), it is agni, and so on. It is the Rgveda, it
is the one source of all the Vedas.49

In fact along with the Āstika systems, the Advaita maintains its
own view against others. One example of this is the relation of the
Advaita to the Grammarian conception of sphota-vāda:

. . . Bhartṛhari begins his Vākyapadīya by identifying
language and Brahman (anādi nidānam brahmā ābda-tattvam
yadakṣaram). Śaṅkara while not accepting this identity,
(and thus rejecting the sphota-vāda) still held that
"from the Svayambū self-born proceeded the vāk without
beginning and end" (Vedānta-Sūtra bhāṣya 1.3.28)

48 J. G. Arapura, "Some Perspectives on Indian Philosophy of
Language", lecture University of Rajasthan, April 1972, p. 17.
49 Ibid., p. 17.
The "supernaturalists" also accepted the Vedic view of cosmogony that the world evolved from the word. Bhartrihari held that the world arose as a vivarta of veda (Chandoghya eva prathamam etad visyam vyavartatā. Vākyapadīya 1.1.20). Sankara holds the same view (Vedānta sūtra bhāṣya 1.3.28). 50

In contrast to the Advaita position there is the Mādhyamika Buddhist conception of language as based in everyday speaking. Buddhist language as such is not grounded in any truth principle. It has a negative function in that it is useful for removing views; but it cannot be used for comprehending truths or universals. Ratnakirti writes in his Apohasiddhi:

(16.5.6) And what we perceive in clear perception is only the particular and this fact precludes admission of the (vicious) circle of (realistic pluralism) engendered by such imposed realities as, universals, attributes, actions, etc. 51

This conception sees language as "designation" rather than as participating in reality or "naming". Stcherbatsky writes that for the Buddhist reality is unutterable:

Ideality or thought-construction, being by its very definition something that can be expressed in a name, it is clear that reality, as pure reality, the contradictory


51 D. Sharma, The Differentiation Theory of Meaning in Indian Logic, (The Hague: Mouton, 1969), p. 89. p. 88 (vādhanam eva sāmānyagunakarmādy upādhiḍakṛṣya, kevalavyaktigṛhaṇaṃ patupratyākṣanam.) Sharma observes on p. 47 that, "According to the apohist view meaning in its logical aspect can only be a mental phenomenon, for it arises in the intellect and is based on our propositional attitude. It is in fact the instrument of the act of reference, rather than the object of reference. And thus there is only a creative mental function contained in the law of differentiation (apoha)."
opposed thing to ideality, must be something that cannot be expressed in speech. A reality which is stripped off from every relation and every construction, which has neither any position in time and space nor any characterizing quality, cannot be expressed, because there is in it nothing to be expressed, except the fact that it has produced a quite indefinite sensation.\textsuperscript{52}

The Buddhist idea of language is termed apoha-vāda:

\dots According to Apoha a word denotes the negation of contraries; the word "cow" denotes the negation of "non-cow". Apoha then is neither internal nor external, and different from cognition and object. Therefore the relation between word and object is unreal but a mere designation which colours a determinate cognition. Etymologically it means either the exclusion of this individual from another contradictory individual or the contradictory individual from as well as in this individual. The Buddhist Ratnakirtis Apohasiddhi is a definitive work for this theory. All Astika systems refuted apoha like one man.\textsuperscript{53}

Thus language can be classed for the Advaita under the rubric "name" and for the Buddhist under "designation". This point will be brought out more fully in Chapter III. Let us turn now to a general understanding of the fundamental conception of the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara.

The religio-philosophical thought of the Advaita darsāna can be summed up in the brief phrase: brahma satyam jagan mithya jivo brahmaiva na'parah (Brahman is Being, the world is non-real, the individual is non-different from Brahman). This is to say that one's individual being is identical with Being (Brahman) and this is true


\textsuperscript{53} Arapura, "Indian Philosophy of Language—Introduction", p. 13.
for all individual beings. It is from this view that the complex epistemological, metaphysical and ontological system that is called the Advaita darśana emerges. The Advaita Vedānta understands itself to be in direct line with the Vedic texts. Thus let us turn our attention to the earliest tradition and briefly consider the term "māya".
PART ONE

HISTORICAL SURVEY
CHAPTER II.

MĀYĀ IN THE EARLY TRADITION

The conception of māyā within the Indian tradition begins with the earliest writing of the tradition, the Rāveda. Within this collection of books the number of times the word māyā and its derivatives occurs is numbered by Gonda as over one hundred times. Another numbering of māyā and its derivatives is that given by P. D. Shastri in his Doctrine of Māyā where he gives the following list of one hundred one occurrences:

(1) māyāḥ (nominative and accusative plural twenty-four times)
I.32.4 I.117.3 II.11.10 II.27.26 III.20.3 III.53.8
V.2.9 V.31.7 V.40.8 VI.18.9 VI.20.4 VI.22.9 VI.44.22
VI.45.9 VI.58.1 VII.1.10 VII.98.5 VII.99.4 VIII.41.8
X.53.9 X.73.5 X.99.2 X.111.6
(2) māyāṃ (instrumental singular nineteen times)
I.80.7 I.144.1 I.160.3 II.17.5 III.27.7 IV.30.12
IV.30.21 V.63.3 V.63.7 VI.22.6 VII.104.24 VII.23.15
VII.41.3 IX.73.5 IX.73.9 IX.83.3 X.71.5 X.85.18 X.177.1
(3) māyinah (accusative plural and genetive singular of māyin fifteen times)
I.39.2 I.51.5 I.54.4 I.64.7 I.159.4 II.11.10 III.38.7
III.38.9 III.56.1 V.44.11 VI.61.3 VII.83.2 VIII.3.19
VIII.23.14 X.138.3
(4) māyābhīḥ (instrumental plural thirteen times)
I.11.7 I.33.10 I.51.5 I.151.9 III.34.6 III.60.1
V.30.6 V.44.2 V.78.6 VI.47.18 VI.63.5 VII.14.14
X.147.2

(5) māyinam (accusative singular of māyin ten times)
   I.11.7  I.53.7  I.56.3  I.80.7  II.11.5  V.30.6  V.58.2
   VI.48.14  VIII.76.1  X.147.2
(6) māyā (three times)
   III.61.7  V.63.4  X.54.2
(7) māyām (accusative singular three times)
   V.85.5  V.85.6  X.88.6
(8) māyā (nominative singular of māyin three times)
   VII.28.4  X.99.10  X.147.5
(9) māyinam (three times)
   I.32.4  III.20.3  III.34.3
(10) māyinī (two times)
    V.48.1  X.5.3
(11) māyinā (instrumental singular of māyin)
    VI.63.5
(12) māyini
    V.48.3
(13) māyāvinā
    X.24.4
(14) māyāvān
    IV.16.9
(15) māyāvinam
    II.11.9
(16) māyāvinah
    X.83.3

With these citations, we can say beyond any doubt that the word "māyā" occurs numerous times in the Rgveda. As to the specific meanings of the individual occurrences one should consult each of them separately.

Let us now look briefly at the three occurrences of māyā cited by Shastri. These are given as III.61.7, V.63.4, and X.54.2. III.61.7 is to Ushas (morning):

7—On Law's firm base the speeder of the Morning, this [sic] Bull, hath entered mighty earth and heaven.
   Great is the power of Varuṇa and Mitra, which bright hath spread in every place its splendour.


Gonda, commenting on this hymn, points out its resemblance to RV III.53.8 and VI.53.8: "... the important event of the sun's appearance into the world is attributed to the great mayà of Mitra and Varuṇa, that is to say to their 'power of creating or constructing' objects characterized by forms and dimensions." His previous comment on hymns III 53.8 and VI.53.8 brings this out more fully:

It seems hardly possible to escape the conclusion that mayà here refers to a special ability to create forms, or rather to the inexplicable power of a High Being to assume forms, to project itself into externality, to assume an outward appearance, to appear in, or as, the phenomenal world. It is perfectly intelligible that this text could be quoted in order to demonstrate that the universe is identity gone into difference...

V.63.4 is addressed to Mitra-Varuṇa.

4--Your magic, Mitra-Varuṇa, resteth in the heaven. The Sun, the wondrous weapon, cometh forth as light. Ye hide him in the sky with cloud and flood of rain, and waterdrops, Parjanya! full of sweetness flow.

Otto Harrassowitz, 1963) gives the Vedic Sanskrit as: (ṛtasya buddhānā vām iṣṭayān virṣā mahī rodasī ā viveśā/ mahī mitrasya varu pasya mayā cañḍrā bhānūm vídadhe purutā//). A different translation is given by H. D. Velanka², Bṛgya Māndala III, (Bombay: University of Bombay, 1968), p. 146: The bull of the dawns, urging her on, has entered the two great worlds at the bottom of ṭta. He, the great mayà of mitra and varuṇa, has distributed his light like a beautiful lady.

⁴Studies, p. 129.
⁵Ibid., p. 128.
⁶Hymns Vol. I, p. 534. Aufrecht: (mayā vām mitrā varunā divi śrīta śuryo 'yotiscarati citram āyudham/ tam abhrāga vrṣṭyā gūhatho divi parjanya drapsā mādhumanta īrate //).
Gonda remarks that, "By māyā Mitra and Varuṇa make the sun to cross, the sky and obscure it with cloud and rain..." Commenting on the previous verse:

In addressing Mitra and Varuṇa the poet of Ṛv. 5.63.3 states that they cause the sky to rain, not so much "durch die Zauber macht des Asura" as Geldner understands the phrase asurasya māyayā—which may, according to the same scholar also mean: "mit der Zauber macht, wie sie ein Asura besitzt"—, nor something like "divine dominion", a term used in this connection by Macdonell, but rather, with Śaṅkara: māyayā is to be understood as prajñānā Śāmarthyena.

Also:

... thus 5.63.3 where Mitra and Varuṇa are said to cause the sky to rain by their māyā "incomprehensible ability (to contrive important processes of this character)." See also 5.85.5 and 6 where Varuṇa measures and fixes the earth and makes the rivers debouch into the ocean. Thus the term is often employed in connection with the marvels of nature (see e.g. also 5.63.4), for instance also with the appearance of daylight and the foundation of the world. Those possessed of māyā, e.g. gods, could moreover attain results which are beyond the power of ordinary men. Although then māyā may from the human point of view by 'Zauber macht', it is in fact always the same incomprehensible ability. However, the surprising and incredible may easily be taken to be unreal or impossible, that is to say: not in accordance with what is from a certain point of view called or regarded as reality.

The God Indra is addressed in verse X.54.2:

2—When thou wast roaming, waxen strong in body, telling thy might, Indra, among the people, All that men called thy battles was illusion: no foe hast thou to-day, nor erst hast found one.

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7 Studies, p. 132. 8 Ibid., p. 130.


10 Hymns Vol. II, p. 457. Aufrecht: (yād ácaras tanrā vārvādhānābālānIndra praburānō jóneu/ māyāt sā te yānī yuddhān ēhūr
Concerning this verse Gonda makes the following observation:

RV. 10,54,2 is an interesting passage. If interpreted in the line of the above explications and without considering the context in which it is quoted in the Sat Br. 11,1,6,9 f., there is no coercive reason to render māyā by "illusion" or the German "trug" or "Blendwerk"... The meaning of the above words seems to be: "it was, indeed, māyā what they say to be your fights," that is to say: "they are no ordinary combats, but achievements of marvellous ability." It follows: "in fact, thou hast never met a mightier rival." This interpretation is very well adapted to the context, which praises the god's exploits, expressing astonishment with regard to their greatness and importance. However, the surprising and incredible may easily be taken to be impossible or unreal, that is to say: not in accordance with what is from a certain point of view called reality. When viewed in the light of those contexts where māyā denotes the power and ability to produce marvellous phenomena which lack a certain degree of reality, the above passage admitted of the interpretation given in the Satapathabrahmana... 11

Thus māyā, according to Gonda, must not be seen as "illusion" in these three verses, but as a marvellous power of creation. To continue our study then we may be content with a general meaning of the conception of māyā in the Rgveda. Shastri has provided us with one in his work, he states:

The two chief meanings, therefore, which the word is assigned in RV. are "power" (Prajñā, lit."knowledge") and "deception" ("Kapaṭa", Vāñcaṇā). The above examination of the various passages in which the word occurs has shown us that wherever it means "power" the idea of "mystery" necessarily goes with it; i.e., it does not mean any "physical" power, but "a mysterious power of the will" which we would translate into such Sanskrit expressions as sankalpa-śakti or icchā-śakti.12

nādyā śātrum nanā purā vivitse //).
Gonda is reluctant to follow Shastri in defining māyā in any primary sense as "deceptive" but would agree when māyā is seen as connoting "power". He observes:

Too often they appear to have lost sight of two facts: first, that this term is frequently used, in a variety of contexts, without any bearing upon the great problem of the "reality" of the phenomenal world as compared with Brahmā, and in the second place, that it does not always refer to illusions, fascination; delusions, that it is far from denoting always pseudo-realities, or realities or activities of an artificial or misleading character. It is true that the word is sometimes used in connection with jugglers and deceptive activities, but that is no reason for concluding that "illusion or delusion" are its main, or even its original meaning.\textsuperscript{13}

In fact, according to Shastri, the first time that the Sanskrit word māyā was translated by the word "illusion" is found in the English translation of the German translation of Sanskrit in W. D. Whitney's work on the Atharva-veda Saṁhitā. These are the verses:

\section*{Brhatī the measure (mātrā) was fashioned forth out of measure [as] a mother; illusion (māyā) was born from illusion, Mātali out of illusion. (9.5)}

\\textsuperscript{Note: The desire to play upon the root mā "measure, fashion," is the leading motive in the making of this verse. The pada-text gives the absurd reading māyāḥ at beginning of c; Ppp reads after it hi instead of ha.}

She ascended; she came to the Asuras; the Asuras called to her: O illusion (māyā), comel of her Virochana son of Prahrāda was young (vatsā), the metal-(āyas-) vessel was vessel; her Dvimūrdhas son of Ritu milked; from her he milked illusion; that illusion the Asuras subsist upon; one to be subsisted on becometh he who knoweth thus. (10.22 Viraj)\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{13} Studies, p. 126.

Commenting on the relation of the concept of māyā to the Vedic gods

Betty Heineman states:

The main gods, like Indra and Agni, are called pururūpavat, “having many forms”, all of equal importance. Because of this, their capacity of assuming many forms simultaneously and successively, they are also called māyā-vat or māyin—a term generally translated as "sorcerer" or "fraudulent illusionist" (though māyā, a derivative of the root mā, "to measure", indicates only that many measurable, visible forms, māyas, all transitory in their existence, are ascribed to them). The measurability, visibility and manifoldness are a reflection or manifestation of the Ultimate, but never the Ultimate itself. This lies before, and after, all its emanations. The Summun Bonum is hidden while manifested in apparent multiformity.15

Following the most ancient commentaries the conception of māyā is related to the idea of knowledge and measure:

Our earliest and most dependable guide to the original meaning of the word is obviously the Nighaṇṭu. According to it, māyā was one of the words for praṇa, praṇa-namani. Prajñā, as commonly understood, means wisdom, knowledge. However, the suggestion of the Nighaṇṭu takes us a step further. According to it, another synonym for prajñā was dhi. And the word dhi was also one of the words meaning action or karma – karma-namani. Evidently, to the early Vedic poets there was no wisdom that was not also action; or, the only wisdom they knew was the wisdom of practical activity. This action was kṛatu. The same word also meant prajñā or wisdom. Further, the word saci, too, was a synonym for both karma and prajñā. The implication is clear. The concept of wisdom was originally inconceivable without the concept of activity. Therefore, if māyā originally meant prajñā or wisdom, it could not have been wisdom in our sense of the word, i.e. wisdom as dissociated from action.16


In the **Nirukta** commenting upon the **Nighantu** we find that the word māyā, "... is derived from the root mā, to measure, with the suffix ya, meaning 'by which the objects are given specific shape.' **miyanté paricchidyante anaya padarthah.**\(^{17}\) Measure seen as māyā in the **Vedānta** of **Advaita** is the opinion of **Shastrī**:

The word "Maya" is derived from√mā, to measure—"miyanté anayā its", i.e., by which is measured, meaning thereby, as tradition has it, that illusive projection of the world by which the immeasurable **Brahman** appears as if measured. The same root gives further the sense of "to build", leading to the idea of "appearance" or illusion. **Śāyāna**, in his commentary on **R.V. I.11.7**, too derives the word from "māq mane" (i.e.,√mā, to measure). Further on, while explaining the form "māyayā" in **R.V. III.27.7** he derives it from√mā, to know, or to measure, and adds—"mīnite jānite karma, miyate anayeti vā māyā karmaviśayābhijñānam", i.e., (1)√mā, to know—by which the ritual, etc. are known, (2)√mā, to measure—by which the ritual, etc., are measured (i.e., understood, or performed); hence māyā = the knowledge of the object of the ritual, etc.\(^{18}\)

With this understanding of the concept of māyā as a basis various other extended meanings arose as the concept was interpreted. This extended meaning is commented on by **Betty Heineman**:

For instance, in **Rgveda** IX.89.9 and V.85.5 the difficult term māyā is taken up three times also by other derivations from its root, mā, "to measure" (manan, mamāte). As such the noun in question is illumined by linguistic forms of kindred descent. This eminently useful device is subsequently borrowed from the early texts by later commentators in their **bhāsyas** to the **Scripture**. Again and again they introduce other derivations of the term under discussion. In order to revive its root-meaning, they supply also its full verb or its related past participles or adjectives, as these, more than the noun itself, retain the living import of its root. At other


\(^{18}\) *Doctrine*, pp. 29-30.
times, synonyms are used which throw light on the term by their coextensive meaning and equivalence. 19

This extended meaning of the term māyā gives rise to a more popular conception. Heinrich Zimmer points to this in his work on Indian concepts.

The Hindu mind associates such ideas as "transitory, everchanging, elusive, ever-returning," with "unreality", and conversely, "imperishable, changeless, steadfast, and eternal," with "the real". As long as the experiences and sensations that stream through the consciousness of an individual remain untouched by any widening, devaluing vision, the perishable creatures that appear and vanish in the unending cycle of life (samsāra, the round of rebirth) are regarded by him as utterly real. But the moment their fleeting character is discerned, they come to seem almost unreal—an illusion or mirage, a deception of the senses, the dubious figment of a too restricted, ego-centered consciousness. When understood and experienced in this manner the world is Māyā—maya, "of the stuff of Māyā." Māyā is "art": that by which an artifact, an appearance, is produced. 20

An example of this is given by Zimmer from the Matsya Purāṇa which was set down in about the fourth century A.D. Here we find māyā attached to the god Vishnu. The sage Vyāsa tells of Vishnu’s māyā in the form of a tale:

"..."No one can comprehend my Māyā. No one has ever comprehended it. There will never be anyone capable of penetration to its secret. Long, long ago, there lived a godlike holy seer, Nārada by name, and he was a direct son of the god Brahma himself, full of fervent devotion to me. Like you, he merited my grace, and I appeared before him, just as I am appearing now to you. I granted him a boon, and he uttered the wish that you have uttered. Then, though I warned him not to inquire further into the secret of my Māyā, he insisted, just like you. And I said to him: 'Plunge into yonder water, and you shall experience the secret of my Māyā.' Nārada dived

19 Faceté, p. 70.
into the pond. He emerged again in the shape of a girl.

"Nārada stepped out of the water as Sushilā, 'The Virtuous One,' the daughter of the king of Benares. And presently, when she was in the prime of her youth, her father bestowed her in marriage on the son of neighboring king of Vidarbha. The holy seer and ascetic, in the form of a girl, fully experienced the delights of love. In due time, then, the old king of Vidarbha died, and Sushilā's husband succeeded to the throne. The beautiful queen had many sons and grandsons, and was incomparably happy.

"However, in the long course of time, a feud broke out between Sushilā's husband and her father, and this developed presently into a furious war. In a single mighty battle many of her sons and grandsons, her father, and her husband all were slain. And when she learned of the holocaust she proceeded in sorrow from the capital to the battlefield, there to lift a solemn lament. And she ordered a gigantic funeral pyre and placed upon it the dead bodies of her relatives, her brothers, sons, nephews, and grandsons, and then, side by side, the bodies of her husband and her father. With her own hand she laid torch to the pyre, and when the flames were mounting cried aloud, 'My son, my son!' and when the flames were roaring, threw herself into the conflagration. The blaze became immediately cool and clear; the pyre became a pond. And amidst the waters Sushilā found herself—but again as the holy Nārada. And the god Vishnu, holding the saint by the hand, was leading him out of the crystal pool.

"After the god and the saint had come to the shore, Vishnu asked with an equivocal smile: 'Who is this son whose death you are bewailing?' Nārada stood confounded and ashamed. The god continued: 'This is the semblance of my Māyā, woeful, somber, accursed. Not the lotus-born Brahmā, not any other of the gods, Indra, nor even Shiva, can fathom its depthless depth. Why or how should you know this inscrutable?'

"Nārada prayed that he should be granted perfect faith and devotion, and the grace to remember this experience for all time to come. Furthermore, he asked that the pond into which he had entered, as into a source of initiation, should become a holy place of pilgrimage, its water—thanks to the everlasting secret presence therein of the god who had entered to lead forth the saint from the magic depth—endowed with the power to wash away all sin. Vishnu granted the pious wishes and forthwith, on the instant, disappeared, withdrawing to his cosmic abode in the Milky Ocean."

"I have told you this tale," concluded Vishnu, before he withdrew like a cloud from the ascetic, Sutapas, 'in order to teach you that the secret of my Māyā is
Inscrutable and not to be known. If you so desire, you too may plunge into the water, and you will know why this is so.

Whereupon Suta-pa-s did. 21

Thus the concept of māyā in the early tradition developed within the frame or construction of such understandings as "wondrous power of the gods" which accounted for and included māyā as "measure" and "wisdom". But to determine a more exact meaning of māyā in the early tradition is not our primary objective and this would be beyond the subject matter of our inquiry. What has been presented merely points to the fact that this term is found in the earliest tradition and was used in a variety of senses, including "measure". In this chapter we have briefly reviewed the idea of māyā in the early tradition. It was necessary to accomplish this so that the framework of this present study could be made explicit, thus making the study more understandable in terms of a larger scope. This larger scope is needed so that we may later see how the classical conception of māyā is related to the māyā concept of the earlier tradition. Whether or not Śaṅkara's conception of māyā is seen as a "correct interpretation" of the early tradition is not a point of contention. Rather the point is that it is necessary to understand any concept within its own context, as much as this is possible. Let us now turn and consider briefly the time just before Śaṅkara, concerning ourselves with the Mādhyamika Buddhism of Nāgārjuna and Śaṅkara's teacher's teacher Gauḍapāda.

21 Ibid., pp. 30-1.
CHAPTER III

SAMVṛTI DOCTRINE FROM NĀGĀRJUNA THROUGH GAUḌAPĀDA

LIFE OF NĀGĀRJUNA

The third century\(^1\) Buddhist thinker Nāgārjuna\(^2\), who first systematically expounded the sūnyatā view, has a life story which is hidden in time and myth. In fact there exist various accounts of Nāgārjuna ranging from a skeptical attitude of whether or not he did exist to the positing of a number of "Nāgārjuna's", i.e. a

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\(^1\) Jan Yun-Hua, "Nāgārjuna, One or More? A New Interpretation of Buddhist Hagiography", *History of Religions*, X #2 (1970). Dr. Jan remarks concerning the Buddhist view of Nāgārjuna from Chinese records that: "To place the dates of the Buddha and eminent Buddhist leaders as early as possible was a fashion among Buddhists in medieval China. It was a result of the complex Buddhist-Taoist conflict and the traditional reverence for aged persons in Chinese society. Thus, the date of 700 years after the Nirvāṇa of the Buddha as the birth date of Nāgārjuna seems more plausible than the suggestion of 300 years after the great Nirvāṇa. If the date of Nirvāṇa of the Buddha be accepted as circa 480 B.C., the time of Nāgārjuna would be placed in the third century A.D. This tallies with the conclusion made by Lamotte and Robinson." (p. 149).

\(^2\) The name of Nāgārjuna is said to have come from the fact that "his mother had given birth to him under a tree. As the tree was called 'Arjuna' (he received) the name 'Arjuna'. As he obtained from the serpents guidance (lit: the way) he was called on account of the sign connected with Nāga (dragon) Nāgārjuna." M. Walleser, "The Life of Nāgārjuna from Tibetan and Chinese Sources", *Asia Major, Birth Anniversary Volume* (1923), p. 448.
"Tantric" Nāgārjuna, a "Medical" Nāgārjuna, etc. 3 Generally, however, we can say that:

According to early Buddhist sources, the main elements of the life of Nāgārjuna, though complicated by legendary accounts, remain clear: all the sources agree that he came from a Brahminical family, was well versed in magic power, and had a romantic life when he was young. After renouncing his worldly life and being initiated into the Buddhist Sangha, he studied Mahayana texts on the Snow Mountain, went to and obtained more important Mahayana scriptures from the palace of the Nāgas under the sea, and won the mind and support of the king of Satavahana dynasty. These sources also say that he settled in South India until the last days of his life. He had a long life, lasting several hundred years. 4

BASIS OF THE MĀDHYAMIKĀ

A systematic development of the Mādhyamikā view can be said to be found in Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakārikā. 5 In this work Nāgārjuna presents what he considers the correct interpretation of the teaching of the Buddha:

I reverently bow to Gautama (the Buddha) who out of compassion has taught the truth of being (saddharma) in order to destroy all views. XXVII 30 6

3 See Jan, "Nāgārjuna, One or More?" for a summary and review of these various opinions.

4 Ibid., pp. 140-1.

5 We will center on this text for our study as it is sufficient for our study of sāṁvṛti and paramārtha. The English translations with which we will work are: Inada, K.K., Nāgārjuna: A Translation of His Mūlamadhyamakārikā with an Introductory Essay, (Tokyo: The Hokusaido Press, 1970); F. J. Streng, "Fundamentals of the Middle Way", Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning, (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1967), pp. 183 ff. Latter cited hereafter as Emptiness.

6 K. K. Inada, Nāgārjuna, p. 171. (sarvārṣṭi-prahāṇīya yah saddharmādāsyaṁ anukampāmupādāya tam namasyāmi gautamaṁ//).
Nāgārjuna, following the Buddha, develops his thought within the "modal view" of reality, but he takes the modal view further than did earlier Buddhist thought, i.e. the Abhidharmika system. The Abhidharmika system held to a more dogmatic understanding of the message of the Buddha; they assert that the doctrine of anātma is another view over and against the ātma view of the Upanisads. Nāgārjuna, however, takes the message of the Buddha further and systematically develops the Mādhyamika system into the central or pivotal system of Buddhism. This development was accomplished by a radical understanding of the "Silence" of the Buddha. This "Silence" refers to the Buddha's refusal to entertain certain types of questions, the inexpressibles. These inexpressibles are said in Buddhist Sanskrit literature to be fourteen in number. The inexpressibles are given by Murti as:

(1) Whether the world is eternal, or not, or both, or neither;
(2) Whether the world is finite (in space), or infinite, or both, or neither;
(3) Whether the Tathagata exists after death, or does not, or both, or neither;
(4) Is the soul identical with the body or different from it?

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7 See Introduction, p. 26 ff.
10 CPB, p. 38.
The Abhidharma school understood these inexpressibles within their own system of speculative metaphysics based on a theory of Elements (dharma).\textsuperscript{11} This system reduces the inexpressibles to a difficulty of verbal formulation.\textsuperscript{12} One example of this kind of approach can be seen in the discussions about the existence of the ego between King Milinda and the Buddhist thinker Nāgasena. This discussion concludes as follows:

Then Milinda the king spoke to the venerable Nāgasena as follows:
"Bhante Nāgasena, I speak no lie: the word 'chariot' is but a way of counting, term, appellation, convenient designation, and name for pole, axle, wheels, chariot-body, and banner-stall."
"Thoroughly well, your majesty, do you understand a chariot. In exactly the same way, your majesty, in respect of me, Nāgasena is but a way of counting, term, appellation, convenient designation, mere name for the hair of my head, hair of my body . . . brain of the head, form, sensation, perception, the predispositions, and consciousness. But in the absolute sense there is no Ego to be found."\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{11} The conception of dharma as the central point of early Buddhist thought has been pointed out by Scherbatsky in his The Central Conception of Buddhism, 4 ed., (Varanasi: Indological Book House, 1970), p. 52. He states: "In the light of this conception Dharma Buddhism discloses itself as a metaphysical theory developed out of one fundamental principle, viz. the idea that existence is an interplay of a plurality of subtle, ultimate, not further analysable elements of Matter, Mind, and Forces. These elements are technically called dharma, a meaning which this word has in this system alone. Buddhism, accordingly, can be characterized as a system of Radical Pluralism (sanghata-vāda): the elements alone are realities, every combination of them is a mere name covering a plurality of separate elements."

\textsuperscript{12} See CPB, pp. 41-4, 184-95.

On the other hand the Mādhyamika sees the inexpressibles not as a difficulty of verbal formulation but as "conflict in Reason". In fact Nāgārjuna comments that the Buddha has nowhere taught the theory of Elements, i.e. concepts. "All acquisitions (i.e., grasping) as well as play of concepts (i.e., symbolic representation) are basically in the nature of cessation and quiescence. Any factor of experience with regards to any one at any place was never taught by the Buddha." As a "conflict in Reason" the Mādhyamika saw in the inexpressibles of the Buddha a rejection of all theories:

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14 This "conflict in Reason" is seen as the conflict inherent within the given metaphysical systems of that time. By this any view or philosophical position was shown by the dialectic as leading to absurd concepts. This "conflict in Reason" seems to be understood by Murti in a Kantian way. We however wish to use it in a more limited manner. This manner is in reference to the kind of method the madhyamika utilizes in rendering views "void". We are not taking-issue with Murti in our analysis because it would lead us away from our primary concern. But we recognize the inherent difficulty in the use of Kant by Dr. Murti. At this point the reader may wish to refer to the following: Jacques May, "Kant et les Mādhyamika", Indo-Iranian Journal, III (1959), 102-111. Here he refers to the relation of Kant to the Mādhyamika as "perfid" (treacherous). E. Conze has commented upon Murti's use of Kant in his "Spurious Parallels to Buddhist Philosophy", Philosophy East and West XIII (1963), 105-115. In review of this article Alex Wayman wrote "Conze on Buddhism and European Parallels" pages 361-64 of the same volume. Wayman also wrote a review of Streng: "Contributions to the Mādhyamika School of Buddhism", Journal of the American Oriental Society, 89 (1969), 141-52. Another attack upon Murti is that of R. C. Pandey entitled "The Madhyamika Philosophy: A New Approach", Philosophy East and West, 14 (1964), 3-24. In regard to this controversy see also R. H. Robinson, Early Mādhyamika in India and China, (Madison: U. of Wisconsin Press, 1967), p. 4 ff.

15 Inada, Nāgārjuna, p. 159, (saryopalambhapaśamaprapānacopaśamapālayah na kvacid kasya cākṣaściddharme buddhena desitaḥ//).
He (Buddha) starts with the total and interminable conflict in Reason as exemplified in the several speculative systems of his time. The untenability of each view, of all views, condemns them as mere subjective devices. The rejection of theories (dītthi) is itself the means by which Buddha is led to the non-conceptual knowledge of the absolute, and not vice versa. It is no accident then that Buddha concerns himself with an analysis of the various theories of reality and rejects them all. Buddha ascends from the conflict of Reason to the inexpressibility of the absolute. The consciousness of the conflict in Reason and the attempt to resolve it by rising to a plane higher than Reason is dialectic.  

The Buddha then does not answer the inexpressibles because he is aware of the implications of each with regard to the theories they propound. This awareness is not just an awareness of verbal formulation but is much deeper in that it recognizes that the Absolute (Nirvāṇa) cannot be clothed in theories. This is where Nāgārjuna and his followers, i.e. Chandrakīrti, begin their understanding of the dialectic; it is implicit in the "Silence" of the Buddha.

MĀDHYAMIKA DIALECTIC

The dialectic method, based on the inexpressibles, is the basis of the Mādhyamika. With it the Mādhyamika dialectic tries to remove the "conflict inherent in Reason" by rejecting both the opposites, taken singly or in combination.

The Mādhyamika is convinced that the conjunctive or disjunctive synthesis of the opposites is but another view; it labours under the same difficulties. Rejecting of all views is the rejection of the competence of Reason to comprehend reality. The real is transcendent to thought. Rejection of views is not based on any positive grounds or the acceptance of another view; it is solely based on the inner contradiction implicit in each view. The function of the Mādhyamika dialectic, on the logical level, is purely negative, analytic.  

16CPB, pp. 48-9.  
17Ibid., p. 128.
When the Mādhyamika dialectic rejects the opposites it rejects the four alternative views possible on any subject. This can be formulated with regard to the question of a next world as:

1. S is P, e.g. atthi paro loko (there is a next world)
2. S is not P, e.g. natthi paro loko (there is no next world)
3. S is and is not P, e.g. atthi ca natthi ca paro loko (there is and is no next world)
4. S neither is nor is not P, e.g. N'ev'atthi na natthi paro loko (there neither is nor is there no next world)\(^{18}\)

Murti expresses it as:

The basic alternatives are two: Being and Non-Being, Affirmation and Negation. From these two others are derived by affirming or denying both at once: both Being and Non-Being (ubhayasaṃkārābhedo), and neither Being nor Non-Being (ubhayapratisedhasvāb hāvatā).\(^{19}\)

This method uses epistemology as dialectic to render inefficient any ground from which to develop a view of reality, i.e. it uses dialectic to destroy any philosophic view.

When the dialectic destroys views it does not posit any new view or position:

How does the Mādhyamika reject any and all views? He uses only one weapon: By drawing out the implications of any view he shows its self-contradictory character. The dialectic is a series of reductio ad absurdum arguments (prāsangāpādānām). Every thesis is turned against itself. The Mādhyamika is a prāsangika or vaśāntika, a dialectician or free-lance debater. The Mādhyamika disproves the opponents' thesis and does not prove any thesis of his own.\(^{20}\)

\(^{18}\) EBTK, p. 335.

\(^{19}\) CPB, p. 129.

\(^{20}\) Ibid., p. 131.
Thus the center of the Mādhyamika system of Nāgārjuna is the dialectical method. This method is brought against all views, in fact the Mādhyamika begins with:

... The world illusion itself in all its directness and universality. He thus avoids the dogmatic procedure of analogical extension employed by the Vedānta and the Vijñānavāda. The world illusion is presented to the Mādhyamika as the total and persistent conflict of Reason—the interminable opposition of philosophical viewpoints. He is solely concerned with opposition of philosophical viewpoints. He is solely concerned with the transcendental illusion, as the several philosophical views are views of reality, the Mādhyamika, in being aware of the illusoriness of the views, is aware of the illusoriness of the world which is characterised by these views.21

VIEW OF TRUTH

Nāgārjuna declares that they do not understand the teaching of the Buddha who do not understand the distinction between relative truth (samvṛti-satya) and absolute truth (paramārtha-satya). He states:

The teaching of the Dharma by the various Buddhas is based on the two truths; namely, the relative (worldly) truth and the absolute (supreme) truth. Those who do not know the distinction between the two truths cannot understand the profound nature of the Buddha's teaching.22

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21Ibid., p. 216.
22Inada, Nāgārjuna, p. 146.
8--dve satye samupāśrītya buddhaṇām dharmadeśanā/ loka-samvṛtisatyam ca satyam ca paramārthataḥ//
9--ye 'nayorna vijñānanti vibhagam satyayordvayoḥ/ te tattvam na vijñānanti gambhiram buddhasāsane//
What then is the nature of these two truths, samvrti-satya and paramārtha-satya? In answer to this question we can say that samvrti-satya is truth so called. Chandrakirti gives three definitions of samvrti which in abridged form are:

(1) Etymologically samvrti means that which covers up entirely the real nature of things and makes them appear otherwise.
(2) It may also mean the relative nature of things i.e. their dependence upon something.
(3) It is that which is of a conventional nature and is usually accepted by common folk.23

Whatever is of a covering nature, be it expressed by the use of form or language, can be said to be samvrti. Everything is of the nature of samvrti which can be thought, spoken or experienced by man. All man's expressions whether in philosophic views or common everydayness are empirical or relative. Thus that which has a world is, by its very nature samvrti-satya.

Paramārtha-satya is absolute truth and it is the knowledge of the real which is not signified by language and belongs to the realm of the unutterable. It is:

... Knowledge of the real as it is without any distortion (akṛtrimaṁ vastu-rūpaṁ). Categories of thought and points of view distort the real. They unconsciously coerce the mind to view things in a cramped, biassed way; and are thus inherently incapable of giving us the truth. The paramārtha is the utter absence of the function of Reason (buddhi) which is therefore equated with samvrti. The Absolute truth is beyond the scope of discursive thought, language and empirical activity; and conversely, the object of these is samvrti-satya. It is said: "The paramārtha is in fact the unutterable (anabhilāpya), the unthinkable, unteachable etc."24

23 CFB, pp. 244-5.  
24 Ibid., p. 244.
Thus *samvrti-satya* and *paramarthasatya* constitute different perspectives of the real. Of course, the Mādhyamika would not call these perspectives but rather the correct approach to *nirvāṇa*. These different perspectives however are merely perspectives and do not set up a doctrine of one reality as against another. For:

The Absolute is not one reality set against another, the empirical. The Absolute looked at through thought-forms (*vikalpa*) is phenomena (*saṁsāra* or *samvṛti*, literally covered). The latter, freed of the superimposed thought-forms (*nirvikalpa*, *nispranaṇa*), is the Absolute. The difference is epistemic (subjective), and not ontological. Nāgārjuna therefore declares that there is not the least difference between the world and the absolutely real.  

Thus *saṁsāra* and *nirvāṇa* are not "different", as Nāgārjuna observes:

"The limits (i.e. realm) of *nirvāṇa* are the limits of *saṁsāra*. Between the two, also, there is not the slightest difference whatsoever."  

In fact there is no ontological-epistemic difference between the empirical and the Absolute. It is purely within the epistemic as is implied by Nāgārjuna when he states that: "The status of the birth cycle is due to existential grasping (of the *skandas*) and relational condition (of the being). That which is non-grasping and non-relational is taught as *nirvāṇa*."

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25 CPB, p. 141. See also R. C. Pandey’s “The Mādhyamika Philosophy: A New Approach” cited above for a different analysis of this topic and M. Sprung’s articles in Two Truths.

26 Inada, Nāgārjuna, p. 158, XXV 20 (*nirvāṇasya ca yā koṭīb saṁsārasya ca/ na tayorantarāpya kim citsūkṣmaṁmaṁapi viḍyate//

27 Ibid., p. 156, XXV 9 (*ya ṣaḷavamśaiva upādāya pratiṣṭya vā/ so 'pnaṭīṭyāṁupādāya nirvāṇamapadiṣṭye//)
J. G. Arapura states that this "identity" of nirvāṇa and saṁsāra must be seen as a counter-reality to the Vedānta:

... in Buddhism, as the counter-reality [to the Vedānta analysis of becoming] has no admitted ground other than itself, and hence it is what one must start with, it is only by countering it from within with the skill of dialectics that Reality (paramārtha-satya) can be attained. Nirvāṇa is that Reality ... from which all considerations must be expelled. Hence nirvāṇa and saṁsāra (the stream of becoming) are considered identical ... Therefore, the correct knowledge of saṁsāra is indispensable for the attainment of nirvāṇa.28

F. J. Streng also points this out when he states that:

The difference between nirvāṇa and saṁsāra applies only to the conventional norms of truth, for ultimately both of them are empty (śūnya). The "negative tendency" in dealing with nirvāṇa and saṁsāra as "undifferentiated" rather than as "the same" is important to prevent the misunderstanding that emptiness is an Absolute in the sense of Brahman in Advaita-vedanta thought. Nirvāṇa and saṁsāra have a "negative identity" whereby the nature of reality in nirvāṇa consists in the lack of self-sufficient reality in the factors that constitute saṁsāra. The emptiness of the phenomenal world is also the emptiness of any "non-phenomenal reality" that is conceived as self-existent. Saṁsāra is no more "empty than nirvāṇa; nor is nirvāṇa more "empty" than saṁsāra from the highest point of view—though nirvāṇa is more "empty" than saṁsāra from the conventional, practical perspective.29

The "identity" of saṁsāra and nirvāṇa does not constitute an identification on the worldly (samyrtī) level. Samyrtī admits of differences and degrees whereas "truth" from the standpoint of paramārtha-satya is one:

Samyrtī cannot be taken as a lesser, partial or incomplete form of truth and that it needs the addition of some other features to make it the whole truth. The Absolute in the Mādhyamika system is not made up of particular things; it

28 A&T, p. 105.
29 Emptiness, p. 75.
is not a synthesis or summation of different aspects and piecemeal views. The absolute and phenomena differ qualitatively, not in quantity. The concept of degrees is applicable only when the thing to which it applies is capable of quantitative measurement and when it increases or decreases with the accretion or subtraction of entities. To accept the degrees of truth is really to reduce the distinction between truth and falsity to one of size—the real is the bigger, the fuller, while the "false" is the smaller, the incomplete; the real is so much more of the false. This is to give up the qualitative distinction of the true and the false. Samȳti is totally false; and nothing of it is taken up in forming the paramartha. 30

PARAMĀRTHA AND THE ABSOLUTE

Even though the Mādhyamika is ultimately concerned with paramārtha-satya it is necessary to go through samȳti-satya, because the paramārtha can only be realized negatively by the removal of samȳti. This negative movement proceeds by negation of views. But this negation is not for naught for it is the heart of the dialectic which gives rise to śūnyata.

Negation is the threshold of intellectual intuition. Śūnyata is not only the negation of dṛṣṭi (view judgment), but is Prajñā. As spiritual life is born of the abandonment of the secular, intuition is made possible by universal negation. Śūnyata is negative only for thought; but in itself it is the non-relational knowledge of the absolute. It may even be taken as more universal and positive than affirmation. . . . It is the freeing of reality of the artificial and accidental restrictions, and not the denial of reality. Śūnyata is negation of negations; it is thus a reaffirmation of the infinite and inexpressibly positive character of the real. 31

Śūnyata being prajñā is the means to nirvāṇa. 32 Nirvāṇa as we have

30 CBP, p. 252.
31 Ibid., p. 160.
32 Ibid., p. 269.
already seen is the same as samsāra, MMK XXV 20, thus what the Mādhyamika means when it states that "samsāra (i.e. the empirical life-death cycle) is nothing essentially different from Nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa is nothing essentially different from samsāra." is that the difference between them is in "our way of looking at them; it is epistemic, not metaphysical," i.e. ontological. Mādhyamika then has no ontology; it is a pure epistemic analysis of all views so that prajña of sānyāsa can take place. When prajña of sānyāsa takes place in the Mādhyamika the truth of nirvāṇa is reached. As Nāgārjuna states, "The teacher (Buddha) has taught the abandonment of the concepts of being and non-being. Therefore, nirvāṇa is properly neither (in the realm of) existence nor non-existence."35

TRANSITION FROM NĀGĀRJUNA TO GAUDAPĀDA

There is general agreement that Gaudapāda can be seen as the one figure, standing historically between Nāgārjuna and Śaṅkara, who may have been influenced by Buddhist thought. In fact it has been held by some that Gaudapāda was a Buddhist. This opinion was

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33 Inada, Nāgārjuna, p. 158, XXV 19, (na samsārasya nirvāṇātīkhyā cidadī visesaptāh/ na nirvāṇasya samsāratīkhyā cidadī visesaptāh/)

34 CPB, p. 163.

35 Inada, Nāgārjuna, p. 156, XXV 10 (prahāpam cābravicchāścābhiḥvāsya vibhāvasaṁ ca/ tasmānna bhāvo nābhāvo nirvāṇamiti vujvate/) 

36 T. R. V. Murti briefly reviews the position of pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta and sees Gaudapāda as probably being influenced by Buddhist thinkers. See CPB, pp. 109–117. See also M. T. Sahasrabudhe, A Survey of Pre-Śaṅkara Advaita Vedānta, (Poona: University of Poona, 1968).
held by the historian of Indian philosophy, S. Dasgupta, who states:

Gaudapāda thus flourished after all the great Buddhist teachers Asvaghosa, Nāgārjuna, Asanga, and Vasubandhu; and I believe that there is sufficient evidence in his kārikās for thinking that he was possibly himself a Buddhist, and considered that the teachings of the Upaniṣads tallied with those of Buddha.37

He then goes on to briefly review the Mādhyākārikā by Gaudapāda and ends his survey by observing that:

It is so obvious that these doctrines are borrowed from the Mādhyamika doctrines, as found in Nāgārjuna's kārikās and the Viśṇuṇāvāda doctrines, as found in Lankāvatāra, that it is needless to attempt to prove it. Gaudapāda assimilated all the Buddhist Śāṅkara and Viśṇuṇāvāda teachings, and thought that these held good of the ultimate truth preached by the Upaniṣads.38

Another view which sees in Gaudapāda an attempt to utilize the logic of the Mādhyamika is that given by S. Radhakrishnan. He observes that:

Gaudapāda's work bears traces of Buddhist influence, especially of the Viśṇuṇāvāda and the Mādhyamika schools. Gaudapāda uses the very same arguments as the Viśṇuṇāvāda do to prove the unreality of the external objects of perception. . . . In common with Nāgārjuna, he denies the validity of causation and the possibility of change. . . . The empirical world is traced to avidyā, or, in Nāgārjuna's phrase, samvṛti. . . . The highest state beyond the distinctions of knowledge cannot be characterised by the predicates of existence, non-existence, both or neither. Gaudapāda and Nāgārjuna regard it as something which transcends the phenomenal. . . .39


38 Ibid., p. 429.

Thus we can see that there is probably a relation between the views formulated by Gauḍapāda in his Māṇḍūkyakārikā and the Buddhist thinkers.

LIFE OF GAUĐAPĀDA

As with Nāgārjuna and even more so with Gauḍapāda, the thinker that is presented is one shrouded in myth and legend. All that one can say for sure is that there is a philosophy which presents itself to us under the name Gauḍapāda. Following T. M. P. Mahadevan we can say that the tradition:

... regards Gauḍapāda as Śaṅkara's paramaguru (preceptor's preceptor). A verse which contains the succession list of the early teachers of Advaita gives the names of those teachers in the following order: Nārāyaṇa, the lotus-born Brahma, Vasiṣṭha, Śakti, his son Pārāśara, Vyāsa, Śuka, the great Gauḍapāda, Govinda-yogindra, his disciple Śaṅkaracārya, and then his four pupils Padmapāda, Hastarmalaka, Tṛotka, and the Vārtikakāra (i.e., Śuresvara).

Thus we are given a succession list but have scant reference to Gauḍapāda outside of this. There are, however, at least two references given us:

Ānandagiri, in his gloss (ṭīkā) on the Māṇḍūkyakārikā-bhāṣya, says that the teacher Gauḍapāda in those old days spent his time in Badārikāśrama, the holy residence of Nārāyaṇa, in deep meditation on the Lord, and that the Lord, Nārāyaṇa, greatly pleased, revealed to him the Upaniṣadic wisdom.

Bālakṛṣṇānanda Sarasvatī (17th century A.D.) writes in his Sārīrakāmānāṁśabhāṣyavārtika that there was in the country of Kurukṣetra a river called Hīrāvātī, on whose banks there were some Gauḍa people;

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that the pre-eminent of them, Gauḍapāda, was absorbed in deep meditation beginning from the Dvāpāra age; and so, as his proper name is not known to the moderns, he is celebrated by the class name of the Gauḍas. 41

GAUḌAPĀDA AND BUDDHISM

The major work attributed to the thinker Gauḍapāda in his Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā. 42 This work has been pointed out to be of central import to the problem of the relation of Gauḍapāda to Buddhist thought. Just as Daśagupta felt it was "obvious" that Gauḍapāda was a Buddhist, Radhakrishnan also asserts a definite relationship between Buddhism and the thought of Gauḍapāda. Each of these opinions is based upon a resumé of his Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā. Thus for purposes of understanding the thought of Gauḍapāda let us turn to a brief account of some scholars' opinions on the association of Gauḍapāda and Buddhism. 43

41 Ibid., p. 3. Also see Bhattacharya, The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda, (Calcutta: University Press, 1943), pp. lxiii-lxxix.

42 We will center on this text for our study as it is sufficient for our study of śamvṛti and māyā. The English translations consulted are: V. Bhattacharya, The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda, (Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1943); S. Nihalnanda, The Māṇḍūkya with Gauḍapāda's Kārikā and Saṅkara's Commentary, 5th ed., (Mysore: Sri Ramakrishna Ashrama, 1968). The Kārikā of Gauḍapāda is divided into four chapters (prakaraṇas): (1) The scripture (āgama) portion. (2) The analysis of illusoriness of self-experiences (vaitathya). (3) The portion on non-duality (advaita). (4) The quenching of the fire-Brand (alātasānti).

43 The point of this study is not to determine the questions about Gauḍapāda and Buddhism once and for all, for this is beyond the scope of our study; rather it is presented to indicate the groundwork for the development of the later part of this study.
Perhaps the greatest statement of the association of Gauḍapāda and Buddhism is contained in the work by Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya entitled *The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda*. In this great work Bhattacharya analyzes the sources, internal structure, and the inter-relation of the four chapters. He makes some very thoughtful conclusions in his analysis which we will now review. Bhattacharya first reviews the Māndūkya Upaniṣad and its relation to the Kārikās. He deduces that: (1) The Kārikās in Book I are not the exposition (vyākhyā) of the Māndūkya Upaniṣad. (2) The Upaniṣad is based mainly on the Kārikās and not vice versa. (3) Because of (1) and (2) it is the case that the Māndūkya Upaniṣad is later than the Kārikās. He next looks at the inter-relation of the four chapters and arrives at the conclusion that these four Books are four independent treatises and are put together in a volume under the title of the Āgamaśāstra.

Uniting Gauḍapāda and Buddhism Bhattacharya sees Buddhist influences in the specific kārikās in: Chapter II: Chapter II: 31-32, 35, (cf. 38), 44, 46, and in most of the kārikās in Chapter IV. He does note that Gauḍapāda is a Vedāntist. He states that, "It is, however, to be noted that Gauḍapāda, though much influenced by the

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44. V. Bhattacharya, *The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda*, p. xlvi. Cited hereafter as AS. Later on he concludes that the main source is the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, see p. ciii.

45. Ibid., p. lvii.

46. Ibid., p. lxxxiii.
Buddhist thoughts, maintains his position as a Vedantist.\footnote{Ibid., p. cxxxii.} What he
gives with one hand he takes away with the other for he immediately
goes on to say that, "It is true that he advocates the Viṣṇu
source, i.e., BU, IV. 3.14 ..."\footnote{Ibid., p. cxxxii.} In fact he ends his 'Introduction'
by stating that:

It may therefore be safely concluded that Gauḍapāda's Brahman
and the citta in Viṣṇu-pāramārtara of the Yogācāras are in
fact the same thing with the only one difference that while
the former is nitya the latter is dhruva.\footnote{Ibid., p. cxlii.}

T. M. P. MAHADEVAN

A different approach to Gauḍapāda and Buddhism is contained
in the study of T. M. P. Mahadevan entitled Gauḍapāda—A Study in
Early Advaita. Mahadevan deals with the same questions Bhattacharya
entertained but his conclusions are quite different. With regard to
the Māndūkya Upaniṣad being later than the Kārikās, Mahadevan proceeds
by an analysis of the contentions of Bhattacharya that the Kārikās
in Book I are not the exposition of the Māndūkya Upaniṣad and that the
Upaniṣad is based on the Kārikās. Mahadevan points out that the two
objections raised by Bhattacharya do not hold and because of this,

\footnote{Mahadevan's arguments are centered on the idea that the
Kārikās in Book I is definitely the exposition of the Māndūkya Upaniṣad
and also that the Kārikās is based upon the Upaniṣad and not vice
versa. See Mahadevan, p. 65 ff.}
his conclusion is invalid. Mahadevan observes:

The language of the Mandukya Upanisad is admittedly of a piece with that of the other prose Upanisads. Some of the terms used there, e.g. Vaisvanara and Turiya, are older than their corresponding expressions, Visya and Turiya, in the verses of the Karika. And so, there seems to be no cause for discarding the traditional view that the twelve prose passages constitute the Mandukya Upanisad which was made the basic text by Gaudapada for his work.51

Mahadevan next proceeds to the inter-relations of the four chapters. He reviews the position of Bhattacharya with regard to each chapter, and propounds his own view against each of them. He concludes that, "From the analysis of the four prakaranas given above, the scope of the Mandukya-Karika would have become clear by now. In this manual of Advaita Gaudapada sets forth the essentials of non-dualism."52

The next task of Mahadevan is to recapitulate the stand Bhattacharya takes on the various verses which contain Buddhist words and philosophic concepts.53 After an analysis of this recapitulation he arrives at the judgement that:

52 Ibid., p. 64.
53 For a line by line analysis the reader may wish to refer to the specific quotes. The verse is given followed by Bhattacharya's pagination and Mahadevan's pagination.

Our object in criticizing the view of those who hold Gauḍapāda to be an advocate of Baudha doctrines in his Kārikā is to show that the main aim of the teacher is to expound the philosophy of the Upaniṣads, and that he does not deviate from his purpose even when he adopts the arguments of the Baudha Idealists and dresses his thought in Buddhist terminology. This is recognized by those teachers of Buddhism who came after Gauḍapāda and who, while referring to his Kārikā do not regard him as a Baudha or as having been influenced by Buddhism. Śantirakṣita quotes in his Madhyamakālankarakārikā verses from Gauḍapāda's work, while discussing the views of the Apanisadas. Kamalaśīla refers to the Kārikā in the Panjiṣa as an Upanisāt-sastra. So, it is clear that the Baudhas themselves considered the Kārikā to be a work on Vedanta. Gauḍapāda is faithful throughout to the Upaniṣads. Even in the Alātāsāntiprabhāṣa karapa where he employs Baudha terminology to a great extent, he does not cut himself away (as we have seen) from the Upaniṣadic moorings.34

Mahadevan answers the last criticism of Bhattacharya by saying that Bhattacharya himself admits to the fact that Gauḍapāda is an Advaitan. Bhattacharya, however, goes on to say that Gauḍapāda advocates the Vijñānavāda position of Buddhism. In fact Bhattacharya states that he sees no difference between Gauḍapāda's Brahman and the citta of the Yogācāra except that the former is nitya and the latter dhruva. Mahadevan states that this is exactly the point, for:

Tha Ātman or Brahman of the Upaniṣads is nitya or ātāvata (eternal), while the vijñāna of the Baudhas is momentary (kāṣāṇī), and it changes every moment. The vijñāna does not, therefore, move forward as one and the same (ekam abhinnaḥ), but continues in an uninterrupted stream (santati) as the flood with its currents (erotasā aghavat). This continuity has no beginning, nor has it an end.

34 Ibid., p. 227.
... (anādi-nidhāna) till nirvāṇa. Now as through all the moments the Ālayavijñāna continues it is dhruva and not nitya. While the self is eternal and ever the same, in the view of the Advaitin, the citta or viññāna of the Baudhāya idealist is a series of momentary cognitions. 55

S. S. ROY

As Mahadevan has proposed an alternative interpretation of Gauḍapāda to Bhattacharya so S. S. Roy has proposed an alternative interpretation in his The Heritage of Śaṅkara. Roy feels that all arguments and evidence relating Gauḍapāda to Buddhism can be reduced to three points. He comments: "The evidence that possibly can be manipulated by such a critic of Gauḍapāda is of a three-fold nature (a) doctrinal, (b) methodological and (c) textual and terminological." 56 The doctrinal evidence used by the critic centers in the doctrines of (i) aparāsāyoga (contactless concentration) and (ii) ajātivāda (non-origination). Both of these criticisms are leveled at Gauḍapāda by Bhattacharya. 57 Roy, in opposition to Bhattacharya, proceeds by showing that "To maintain that Gauḍapāda subscribed to the doctrine of Aparāsāyoga and also argued in favor of Ajātivāda amounts to ascribing two different types of philosophical positions to him." 58 He then goes on to indicate the relation of Aparāsāyoga to Vijnānavāda and Ajātivāda to Mādhyamika and concludes that:

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55 Ibid., p. 207. Mahadevan includes a footnote comment that: "In view of this vital difference admitted by Prof. Bhattacharya himself, it seems to us that he is not justified in concluding as he has . . . ."


57 (i) AS p. 95-7. (ii) AS p. 102-5.

58 Heritage, p. 45.
The Ātman of the Advaitin is necessarily implied in the Ajñātivāda of the Mādhyamika and the Asparśāyoga of the Vijñānavāda, but neither the Mādhyamika nor the Vijñānavāda realized that the Ātman of the Advaitin, which is a self-comprehending (Svaprakāśa) existence (Sattā), alone contemplates in entirety, the truth only realized in a half-hearted manner by the Buddhist Absolutists. The Mādhyamika errs by not realizing the necessity of an absolute criterion for showing the self-contradictory nature of the categories. The Vijñānavāda is mistaken in lifting subjectivity to a transcendental pedestal, without ever taking transcendental subjectivity as the prior of all existence.\(^{59}\)

Thus it is apparent to Roy that Gauḍapāda is an Advaitin and utilizes the doctrines of Asparśāyoga and Ajñātivāda in such a manner.

The methodological evidence is the next approach used by the critic of Gauḍapāda. According to Roy the summation of this view maintains that Gauḍapāda utilizes dialectic and reason as more important than śrutī.\(^{60}\) The conclusion drawn from this is that:

The arguments given by Gauḍapāda were never given by any Vedāntin of the Brahmaṇical tradition. They are reminiscent of the Mūlāmādhyamakārikā and the Vigrahavyāvartani of Nāgārjuna and of the Mādhyamakāvataśra and Prasannapadā of Chandrakīrti. Nāgārjuna and Chandrakīrti, it appears, found an inlet into the Vedānta through Gauḍapāda.\(^{61}\)

In respect to this kind of approach to Gauḍapāda Roy asserts that, "Our submission in this respect is that the dialectic in Gauḍapāda is not independent of revelation. Everywhere the dialectic has one clear

\(^{59}\)Ibid., p. 50.

\(^{60}\)Ibid., p. 19.

\(^{61}\)Ibid., p. 19.
aim,--of supporting the scriptural texts. In fact:

Even the dialectic is not to be taken literally in the manner of the Mādhyamikas. In respect of Methodology, it would be a mistake in principle to say that Gauḍapāda follows either Pure Reason or Pure Revelation exclusively. His is a brief for Madhuvidyā, of which the whole world of experience, including Reason and Revelation, is only a symbol, a cypher to be read. Everything, including words (Śrutī) and reason (Prasaṅga), points to an Ens that transcends the Cypher and Symbol and yet communicates itself through them.

The next evidence that Roy reviews is that of the assertion of the critic on textual and terminological grounds that Gauḍapāda has an association with the Buddhists. The textual evidence he cites is that from the article of La Vallee Poussin entitled "Buddhists Notes' on Vedānta and Buddhism", and the terminological evidence is taken from Bhattacharya. Roy's reply to this kind of criticism is that:

The use of a word, which has its origins in this or that school of thought, should not be restricted to those only who coined it and gave it currency. . . . so the presence of the Buddhist philosophical terms in the Āgamaśāstra does not necessarily point to the conclusion that Gauḍapāda was a Buddhist. One has to make a deeper analysis of Gauḍapāda in order to consider the nature of the charge; and a deeper analysis of his philosophical doctrine only that Gauḍapāda was a Vedāntin, who was making an extensive use of Buddhist terms and the Buddhist art of disputation.

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62 Ibid., pp. 57-8. 65 Ibid., pp. 22-4.
63 Ibid., p. 59. 66 Ibid., p. 60. See also quote
64 Ibid., pp. 20-2, 189. #23 in this chapter.
In fact the use of similar words is not as important as the more basic philosophy of language upon which they are founded. This has already been pointed out in terms of the Buddhist *apoha-vāda* and the Vedānta conceptualization of language as having a ground in Brahman. The Buddhist interpretation of words is commented on by K. K. Raja:

Moreover, according to the Buddhist logicians there is no primary referent for a word; for the essential nature of an object transcends the pale of all forms of knowledge and expression. Each word is applied to its object only indirectly by a sort of transfer, or upacara. The think-in-itself (*avalaksana*) cannot be directly denoted by a word. It is only the mental image, or *vikalpa*, that is denoted by words, and this image is not an objective reality, being the negation of its counterpart (*anyāpaha*), the exclusion of all things other than itself.67

GAUḌAPĀDA AND BUDDHISM--A CONSIDERATION

What then can be the conclusion in respect to Gauḍapāda and his relation to Buddhism? Any definitive answer to this question takes us well beyond the scope of this study. However, perhaps it is not premature to say that we would tend to agree with T. R. V. Murti's appraisal of the situation when he states:

Gauḍapāda appears to us as the Brahmanical thinker boldly reformulating the Upaniṣadic idea in the light of the Mādhyamika and Vaiśeṣika dialectic. But there was more borrowing of technique than of tenets. The Vedānta philosophers did not and could not accept the Buddhist metaphysics--its denial of the self, momentariness, etc.; but they did press into service the Mādhyamika dialectic and the Vaiśeṣika analysis of illusion. No absolutism could be established without the dialectic and a theory of illusion.68

68 CPB, p. 13.
Gaudapāda comes to us then as one of the first Vedānta thinkers to seriously take account of the implications of Buddhist thought. He reformulates the Upaniṣadic philosophy and in this reformulation arrives at a more thorough-going critique of the thought of his time. But even this reformulation must be seen not as a break with the Āstika tradition for Gaudapāda considers himself an Advaitin. He observes, "The dualists obstinately cling to the conclusions arrived at by their own inquiries (as being the truth). So they contradict one another; whereas the Advaitin finds no conflict with them."

A further observation of Gaudapāda is given by Professor Arapura. He states:

It is a well-known fact that as a dialectical device māyā is a variant of the more general theory of saṃsvāti, explicitly fashioned by the Mādhyamika dialecticians, chiefly Nāgārjuna. It is Gaudapāda who introduced the Buddhist epistemological method into the Vedānta: this too is well-known. The schema adopted by Nāgārjuna necessitated the positing of an absolute reality (paramārthasatya) conceived as śunya as against a phenomenal reality (saṃsvātisatya). This division has a parallel in Vijnānavāda. However, what appears to be no more than a purely schematic division for the Buddhists was something quite different for Gaudapāda. The problem at issue is not whether paramārthasatya śunya is the Mādhyamika language, or parinimpanna in the Vijnānavāda language, is ontological reality rather than a mere speculative supposition, that whole matter being still controversial, but on what grounds it can be said to be so if it might be. We note a very deep divergence here between Gaudapāda and the Buddhists. Gaudapāda clearly attests to the fact that the doctrine of Brahmā and the consequent doctrine of māyā—along with that of the identity of the Jīvas with Brahmā—is strictly derived from the Upaniṣads and were not taught by the

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Buddha. Even his celebrated insistence on the primary use of reason as attested, for instance, by his declaration that śrutī (scripture), while it speaks of creation either from the existent or the non-existence, had to be given up in favour of that which is ascertained by reason, must not lead us to suppose that he used dialectic in the free and uninhibited manner of the Buddhists. His essential concern is Brahman, but it is only that he goes about demonstrating Brahman with the tools that the Buddhists had forged.  

GAUḍAPĀDA'S THOUGHT

Gauḍapāda, like all other philosophic thinkers, developed his thought out of a complex philosophical tradition. His thinking includes various references, both implicit and explicit, to the orthodox and heterodox views in vogue at his time. Thus let us scrutinize a few basic ideas of his without going into this relational digression in his thought. One of the important aspects of Gauḍapāda is the idea concerning non-origination. Regarding the view of such things as the interpretation of the gods Gauḍapāda observes that:

From the sacred texts "there is no plurality here" and also from "Indra through māyā, etc.," (it is to be known that) it is through illusion that he is variously born, though (in fact) he does not take birth.  

We can see, then, that "being born is a fact but only insofar as it is through māyā (illusion). This idea of non-origination means, then, that if there is no plurality then there can be no origination in fact. This is indeed so for, 'No individual soul is born, nor is


71 AS, III 24, pp. 62-3, (nneha nāneti cāmnāyaḥ indro māyābhīr ity api/ ajāyamāno bahudhā māyaya jāyate tu sab //).
there any possibility of it. This is that highest reality where nothing is born.\textsuperscript{72} The implication of this is that there is definitely a highest reality and that it is by recognition of non-origination that one can go beyond the common view that there is such a thing as origination. Gauḍapāda comments that this common view is a mistake just like the view of the rope as snake:

As in the dark a rope which is not determinately known is imagined to be a snake or a continuous line of water; etc., so is imagined the soul (Ātman = jīva).

As the rope being determinately known the thing imagined vanishes and there is non-duality—it is nothing but the rope, so is the ascertainment of Ātman.\textsuperscript{73}

Origination then is like the rope, imagined as snake, for when there is non-duality it is seen that there is the Soul (Ātman). The Soul is imagined to originate but in truth there is no origination. But what of the Soul, does it not need emancipating knowledge of the Ātman which is its real nature? No, it does not, for:

There is no disappearance, no origination; no one in bondage, no one who works for success; no one who is desirous of emancipation, no one who is emancipated.—This is the highest truth.

It is (Ātman) imagined in the form of things which are really non-existent through that which is non-

\textsuperscript{72}Ibid., III 48, p. 82, (na kaścit jāyate jīvah sambhavo 'syā na vidyate/ etat tad uttamaṃ satyam yatra kīścin na jāyate //).

\textsuperscript{73}Ibid., II 17-18, pp. 28-9, (17--aniscitrā yathā rajjur andhakāre vikalpitā/ asrpadharaṇīdyār bhāvajjī tadvad ātma vikalpitah // 18--aniscitrtyām yathā rajjivam vikalpo vinivartate/ rajjur eveti cādvināp tadvad ātmaviniścayah //).
dual, and the things (themselves), too, are
imagined through what is non-dual. Therefore non-
duality is blissful.\textsuperscript{74}

Therefore we have two views of truth. The first is of the nature of
common experience (form of things) and the second is the highest truth
which is of the nature of bliss and is Atman. How does one arrive at
this second truth? Should one use logic?

It is the adherence to (an idea of) a thing—
whichever it may be, by which bliss is constantly
covered and misery is unfolded. The glorious one
(dharmadhātu)—(i) is, (ii) is not, (iii) is and
is not, (i.e., both), or (iv) neither is nor is not
(i.e., not both)—with these (notions) the childish
obscure it (respectively in accordance with their
own ideas of its being) (i) steady, (ii) unsteady, (iii)
both, and (iv) the absence (of both).\textsuperscript{75}

It seems that one should use logic in order to get rid of an idea of
a thing. But when one arrives at this logical conclusion does this
logic also establish or uncover the highest truth or knowledge of
that truth? This logic does not suffice, for:

It is accepted that knowledge which is unborn
does not go (i.e., relate itself) to the elements
of existence, which are (also) unborn. As the

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Ibid.}, II 32-3, p. 39, 41, (32--na nirodho na cotpattir
na baddho na ca sādhakaḥ/ na mumukṣur na vai mukta ity eśa para-
mārthate//. 33--bhāvair asadbhir evāyam advayena ca kalpitah/
bhāvā apy advayenaiva tasmād advayatā dīvā//).

\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Ibid.}, IV 82, 83, 84, (82--sukham āvriyate nityam duḥkham
vivriyate sadā/ yasya kasya ca dharmasya grahega bhagavān asau//.
83--asti nāsty asti nāstīti nāstīti vā punah/ ca laṅkāro-
gharībhāvāvair ārṇoṇty eva bālīsāḥ //. 84--kotyaś cetasra etas’tu
grahaṁ yāsaṁ sadāvṛtaḥ/ bhagavān ābhir asprṣṭo yena drṣṭaḥ sa
sarvadṛk//).
knowledge does not go (to the elements of existence) it is declared to be free from attachment (asanga, i.e., free from any relation to its object).\textsuperscript{76}

Thus knowledge does not relate itself to logic. It is beyond the grasp of logic and epistemological method. It is knowledge which is given because it is unborn and the basis of these (unborn) methods. But this knowledge is knowable, Gaudapada states:

The jhana that does not imagine (i.e., indeterminate) and is (consequently) unborn is, they say, not different from the knowable. The knowable is Brahman, the unborn and eternal one. So the unborn (Brahman) becomes manifest through the unborn (jhana).\textsuperscript{77}

Therefore we see that Gaudapada's thought derives from Brahman and this pervades his entire Mangukya Karika.

We have briefly shown that Gaudapada begins with non-origination and an analysis of common experience and moves into logic and beyond these to the knowability of Brahman which is the absolute truth of non-duality. The status of this world as real is accepted or rejected under the canopy of Brahman. But the case is that if Brahman is non-dual then that which posits another, i.e., the world, must be rejected. This also includes any statements about a creator of the world. Why then do the scriptures speak of creation, and gods, and the universe?

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., IV 96, p. 209, (aiesv atom asamkranta dvarme su jhanam isyate/ yato na kramati jhanam asanga tena kirtitam/).

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., III 33, p. 68, (akalpam atom jhanam jneyabhinnam pracakgate/ brahma jkeyam atom nityam ajenajay vibudhyate/).
If the expansion of the (visible) universe (prapañca) were (really) existing it would have to cease to exist, no doubt, (if non-duality of Reality is to be realized), but this duality is mere illusion, in absolute truth there is non-duality.

False creation (vikalpa) would cease if it were created by (some one). This statement (of vikalpa) is for the sake of instruction. When (the Reality) is known there is no duality. 78

VIEW OF TRUTH--SAMŚṚṬI AND MAYĀ

We have seen two perspectives with regard to truth in Gauḍapāda. We have seen that he places everything under the absolute truth of non-duality or Brahman. He has also spoken of the various perspectives of false creation, the existence of the world, and illusive duality. Thus let us look at these various views to see where Gauḍapāda stands.

Gauḍapāda centers the fact of the appearance of duality in mayā. He states, "As owing to mayā the mind in dream moves with appearance (or image) of the two (viz., the percipient and the perceptible, or in other words, the subject and object), so owing to mayā the mind in the waking state moves with the appearance of the two." 79

Mayā is an expression of duality. But does this not mean that mayā is something other than the absolute even though we have seen that there is only non-duality? In other words, where is the dwelling place of mayā?

78 Ibid., I 17-18, pp. 7, 8, (17--prapañco yadi vidyeta nirvartata na sansāyāh/ māyāmātram idaṁ dvaitam advaitam paramārthataḥ/.
18--vikalpo vinivarteta kalpito yadi kenacit/ upadesād ayaṁ vādo jñāte dvaitaṁ na vidyate/).

79 Ibid., III 29, p. 66, (yathā svapne dvayābhāsaṁ spandate māyayā manah/ tathā jñāgrad dvayābhāsaṁ spandate māyayā manah/)
It is the self, the shining one, that imagines the self by the self through its own illusion (māyā), and verily it is that (self) which cognizes the things. This is the conclusion of the Vedānta.\(^{80}\)

Thus the dwelling place of māyā is in the self when it imagines itself as another self. This imagined self is an illusion, "It (Ātmā) is imagined as Prāṇa 'breath' or 'life' and other innumerable things. This is an illusion of it, the shining one, by which it itself is deluded."\(^{81}\)

Just as the Ātmā is imagined as innumerable things so other things are imagined by māya to exist, "As an elephant called up by illusion is said to exist owing to perception and common practice, so on the same ground it is said of a thing that it exists."\(^{82}\) That which exists, owing to perception and common practice, is of the nature of an illusion of the Ātmā. But what is the nature of illusion, does it exist separately from the objects of perception and common practice? Gauḍapāda answers that it does not, for it is of the same nature as the objects of perception and common practice.

In the practical truth (samvit) everything comes into being; hence there is nothing eternal. (On the other hand), every thing is naturally without origination; hence there is no annihilation.

\(^{80}\) Ibid., II 12, p. 22, (kalpayatvā Ātmātmanām ātma devaḥ svamāyayā/ sa eva bṛdhyate bhedān iti vedāntaniścayat).  

\(^{81}\) Ibid., II 19, p. 29, (prāpādibhir ānantais tu bhāvair etair vikālpitah māyaiṣṭā tasya devaḥ yavāyam mohitaḥ svayam/\)).

\(^{82}\) Ibid., IV 44, p. 132, (upalambhāt samācārān māyāhasti yathocayet/ upalambhāt samācāpād astī vastu tathocayet/).
The things which are said as generated are so in the empirical truth and not in fact. This generation is like illusion, and that illusion, too, does not exist.\textsuperscript{83}

What is the relation of practical truth to absolute truth in Gaudapāda? It seems from what we have already seen that it is useful for instruction and for the start of the uncovering of the Self (Ātman). Practical or empirical truth may therefore be used as a tool, but as with logic, a tool which is grounded upon absolute truth. As we have seen, absolute truth precludes discussion of origination, dependence, and existence.

Whatever exists in empirical truth (samvyāti) which is imagined (kalpita) does not exist in absolute truth (paramārtha), for one that is dependent (paratantra, for its existence or origination) may exist (only) in empirical truth which is the cause (of existence or origination), and not in absolute truth.\textsuperscript{84}

Thus epistemic truth leads to ontological truth because it is dependent on the absolute and it is an illusion of the absolute. What is the nature of one's recognition of this ontological reality? Gaudapāda describes it in the words, "It is intense abstract concentration (samādhi) which is beyond all expression, and above all thoughts,

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., IV 57-8, pp. 161-3, (57--samvyā̄tyā jāyate sarvam sāsvatam tena nāsti vai/ savbhāvena hy ājām sarvam uchchedas tena nāsti vai//. 58--dhe vā ya iti jāyante samvyā̄tya te na tattvataḥ/ janna māyopanaṁ teṣāṁ sā ca māyā na vidyate//).

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., IV 73, p. 174, (yo 'sti kalpitasmvyā̄tya paramarthanya nāṣy asau/ paratantra 'bhisamvyā̄tya syān nāṣyti paramārthaḥ//).
very calm and full of light, burning once for all, unwavering and without fear." 85

Not only is the above a description of the ultimately Real but it is also a description of the Real Self (ātman). What is necessary is that one recognize that the ultimately Real and the Real Self are the same. There is no duality only Brahman. One must become what one already is, i.e., Brahman:

Having realized the truth inward, having also realized the truth outward, one becomes the truth (itself), delighting therein and being such one should be unmoved from it. 86

TRANSITION FROM GAUDAPĀDA TO ŚAṆKARA

In fine we can make some general statements about Gaudapāda's thought. We have seen that Gaudapāda views everything from the point of the absolute and that that which is not absolute has some reason for being, i.e., for the purpose of instruction. The use of logic has also been shown to be a dependent method and not something which is its own base. All reality points beyond duality (saṁvṛti) to the non-dual, and hence duality can be overcome by becoming that which one already is. Meaning is obtained through the recovery of the non-dual. This is knowledge which, grounded in the non-dual, is completed by language, and emerges through the removal of duality.

85 Ibid., III 37, p. 72 (sarvābhilāpavicātāḥ sarvacintāsa-mutthitah/ suprasānataḥ sakṣajjyotih samādhir acalo 'bhavah').

86 Ibid., II 38, p. 47, (tattvam ādhyātmikam drśtvā tattvam drśtvā tu hāhyatah/ tattvābhūtas tadārāmas tattvād apracyuto bhavet/).
We have here a very basic difference between the thought of Nāgārjuna and Gaudapāda. In Nāgārjuna, as we have shown, *samyrti* is totally false and language finds its ground in *samyrti*. 87 *Samyrti* is false because all positions disappear under the scrutiny of the Mādhyamika dialectic. The dialectic removes all positions so that one can see that "*samāra* is *nirvāna*". In Gaudapāda *samyrti*, used correctly, has a positive purpose; in Nāgārjuna it is seen as having a purpose only in a negative way.

The paramārtha, however, can be understood and realized only negatively, only as we remove the *samyrti*, the forms which thought has already, unconsciously and begin-ninglessly, ascribed to the real. The Real is to be un-covered, discovered, and realised as the reality of appearances (dharmānām dharmatā). In the order of our discovery, the removal of *samyrti* must precede our knowledge of the paramārtha. Paramārtha is the end or goal that we seek to attain, and *samyrti* is the means; it is the latter or jumping board which enables us to reach that objective. It is therefore stated that *samyrti* is the means (upāyabhūta) and Paramārtha is the end (upeyabhūta). Basing ourselves on vyavahāra do we advance to the paramārtha. 88

The absolute is completely beyond speaking (*apoha-vāda*) and conception (*dūti-vāda*). However, Gaudapāda uses speaking and conception as a means of uncovering the absolute, as a means to the absolute, it is positive because speaking and conception are grounded upon the absolute. Thus Gaudapāda conceives of the absolute in terms of the Upaniṣadic tradition. This tradition of the Vedānta becomes the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara. Gaudapāda's thought forms the basis for the latter development of Gaudapāda's pupil's pupil Śaṅkara.

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87 Refer to Introduction. 88 CPB, p. 253.
CHAPTER IV

SAMARTI (MĀYĀ) IN ŚĀNKARA

ADVAITA AND THE UTTARA MĪMĀṂSĀ

The Advaita dārsāna, as we indicated in our first chapter, grew out of the Sūtras of Uttara Mīmāṃsā of Bādarāyaṇa and is synonymous with it. The Vedānta tradition beginning with Śāṅkara attributed the central text of the Uttara Mīmāṃsā, namely the Brahma or Vedānta Sūtra, to Bādarāyaṇa:

Tradition from Śāṅkara downwards attributes the Sūtra to Bādarāyaṇa. The fact that the name of the latter is mentioned in several places in the third person inclines one to think that Bādarāyaṇa is not its author. Such a use of the third person is not, however, an uncommon practice in ancient India, and it need not imply a different authorship. Indian tradition identifies Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the Sūtra, with Vyāsa. Śāṅkara's followers, Govindānanda, Vācaspati and Ānāḍgīri identify Vyāsa with Bādarāyaṇa; Rāmānuja, Madhva, Vallabha and Baladeva ascribe the Sūtra to Vyāsa. .. . It is not, however, clear what opinion Śāṅkara himself held. ¹

The Sūtra itself, and Bādarāyaṇa, are dated within the tradition between 500 to 200 B.C. A.B. Keith is of the opinion that Bādarāyaṇa cannot be dated later than 200 A.D. ² We may side with a date then between 200 B.C. and 200 A.D. For our purpose assigning an exact date is of little value, as we have no argument with either of the

²Ibid., p. 433.
above. Rather our intent is merely to gain a perspective in approaching the Advaita darsana. Either of the above dates places it well within the tradition and this is sufficient for our purposes. For a more developed analysis of the time between Bādarāyana and Śaṅkara we would refer the reader to the more traditional account given in the book Preceptors of Advaita edited by Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan. Much more important for our present study is the general content of the Sūtra itself.

The Brahma Sūtra is the exposition of the philosophy of the Upaniṣads. It is an attempt to systematise the various strands of the Upaniṣads which form the background to the orthodox systems of thought. It is also called uttara-mīmāṃsā or the investigation of the latter part of the Vedas, as distinguished from the mīmāṃsā of the earlier part of the Vedas and the Brahmanas which deal with ritual or karmakanda. All the commentators on the Brahma Sūtra agree that the Brahma Sūtra was intended to be a summary of the teachings of the Upaniṣads. The Brahma Sūtra is also called the Vedānta Sūtra or Sariraka Sūtra. It takes into account the systems of thought known at that time.3

As an exposition of the thought of the Upaniṣads the Brahma Sūtra, like all sūtras, is aphoristic. That is, as it exists by itself, it accommodates a wide variety of meanings which can be understood only by reference to a commentary or Bhāsyā. This commentary brings out the implicit meaning of the Brahma Sūtra and develops it into a cogent system.

The Brahma Sūtra contains four chapters of adhyāyas which are again divided into four parts or pādas. Each part in turn is subdivided into sections or adhikarāgas which are made up of sūtras.

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The śūtras themselves vary in number according to the topic considered. The Uttara Mīmāṃsā follows the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā in its analysis of each section or adhikarpa. Each section has five factors:

1. Viṣaya = subject matter,
2. Saṁśaya = doubt or uncertainty,
3. Pūrva-pakṣa = statement of an object,
4. Siddhānta = established conclusion,
5. Saṁgati = connection between sections.  

Concerning the contents of the Brahma Śūtra Dr. Radhakrishnan remarks:

The first chapter deals with samanvaya. It attempts to offer a coherent interpretation of the different texts of the Upaniṣads. . . . The second chapter deals with avirodha and shows that the interpretation offered in the first chapter is not inconsistent with the writings of other sages and views of other systems. Even when the śūtras were formulated, they reckoned with other views and objections from rival schools. Truth would not be sought so industriously if it had no rivals to contend against. The third chapter deals with sādhanā and is devoted to an exposition of the means for the realisation of Brahman. The fourth deals with phala or the fruit of knowledge.

LIFE OF ŚAṆKARA (788-820 A.D.)

According to Radhakrishnan in his Indian Philosophy there is some debate about the specific dates of Śaṅkara. 6 But there does exist a definite tradition, containing both facts and myth, about the life and death of the great man:

Śaṅkara belonged to the simple, learned and hardworking Nambūṭiri sect of Brahmans of Malabar, and is generally supposed to have been born a Kāladi, on the west coast of

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5 Ibid., p. 24. See also Deussen, The System of Vedānta.
6 I P , p. 447.
the peninsula. Though there is a tradition that Siva was the family deity of Śaṅkara, it is also held that he was by birth a Saktā. Early in his youth he went to a Vedic school, presided over by Govinda, the pupil of Gauḍapāda. In all his works, Śaṅkara subscribes himself as the pupil of Govinda, who evidently taught him the main principles of the Advaita system. Even while a young boy of eight he is said to have-devoured with avidity and delight all the Vedas. Apparently he was a youthful prodigy of Vedic learning and free intelligence. He was impressed with the mystery and importance of life, and had an early vision of the beauty of holiness. Before he learned the ways of the world, he rejected them and became a sannyāsin. But he was no passionless recluse. The pure flame of truth burned within him. He wandered as a teacher from place to place, engaging in discussions with the leaders of other schools of thought. According to the traditional accounts, he met, in the course of these tours, Kumārila and Maṇḍana Miśra, ... The story of his entering the dead body of Amarka shows that Śaṅkara was an adept in yogic practices. He established four mutts or monasteries, of which the chief is the one at Sringeri in the Mysore Province, ... A touching incident, about which tradition is unanimous, shows how full of the milk of human kindness and filial affection Śaṅkara was. In open defiance of the rules which govern the order of Sannyāsins, Śaṅkara performed the funeral rites of his mother, and thus incurred the serious opposition of his community. He died at Kedārnāth in the Himalayas at the age of thirty-two ... .

A modern scholar who is presently engaged in historical questions concerning Śaṅkara is Dr. Paul Hacker of Monast, West Germany. In his article entitled "Śaṅkara der Yogan und Sankara der Advaitin--Einige Beobachtungen", 8 he tries to determine whether Śaṅkara wrote a commentary on Vedavyāsa's Yogabhāṣya entitled Yogabhāṣyavivarana. Hacker maintains that such is

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7Ibid., pp. 447-8. See also S. S. Sastri, Śaṅkarāchariyā, (Madras: Natesan and Co.).

the case and this in turn points out that Śaṅkara was first an adherent of Patanjali’s Yoga and later became an Advaitin. The criteria for such a conclusion are found throughout Hacker’s articles on Śaṅkara. Whether or not such is the case has no bearing upon the present study as we are not concerned at present with any contested works of Śaṅkara.

For the tradition then, Śaṅkara, student of Govinda, lived a brief life of thirty-two years but in this time he synthesized one of the most important schools of philosophy in India. By reflectively thinking about Śruti he formulated the non-dualistic (Advaita) school of Vedānta. This school and Śaṅkara can be seen as one of the highest peaks of Indian spirituality because it is a point at which previous Vedic philosophy culminates and also a referent of most later thought.

In modern scholarship there is some disagreement about the exact relation of Śaṅkara to Gauḍapāda. For our purpose we need not enter into this discussion any more than we have already in the previous chapter. It is not essential for our study that Śaṅkara be in a direct line methodologically with Gauḍapāda. In this regard we would follow the traditional account without entering into critical exegesis. Traditionally it is accepted that there was strong influence from Gauḍapāda, but that this influence did not in any way hinder the creative thinking of Śaṅkara. Thus the thought of Śaṅkara can be approached as a self-sufficient whole.
WORKS OF ŚAṆKARA

The major works of Śaṅkara, aside from many minor works attributed to him, are his commentaries or bhāṣya on the triple foundation (prasthanatraya) of the Vedānta, namely the Upaniṣads, the Bhagavad Gītā, and the Brahma Sūtra. Each of these commentaries are concerned with presenting one coherent system, which Śaṅkara maintains, is the import of each of the texts.

In this study we will concern ourselves primarily with the Brahma Sūtra and Śaṅkara's commentary on it. The Brahma Sūtra, as Śaṅkara saw it deals chiefly with one topic and by extension two others, namely the nature of realization of Brahman and by implication the status of the world and the individual self. His commentary on the Sūtra brings out what he sees as the import of the Sūtra itself. This import is the coherent system of non-duality or Advaita. The Advaita maintains that there is only one Reality, Brahman. The world as name and form (nāma-rūpa) has as its foundation the only "Real" that is. This "Real" is the same for all things which participate in existence (sat). The world is real only in relation to its true ground or essence. Man must therefore embark on an inquiry into this "Real". Thus we find the opening sloka in the Brahma Sūtra: "Now therefore the desire to know Brahman". 10

9 Namely the Chāndogya, the Brhadāraṇyaka, the Taittirīya, the Aitareya, the Śvetāsvatara, the Kena, the Kaṭha, the Iṣa, the Praśna, the Māndūka, and the Māndūkya. See Radhakrishnan, IF, Vol. II, p.450 ff.
KNOWLEDGE--PRAMĀ AND PRAMĀNA

Pramā is the word used to describe true or valid knowledge. This definition and its relation to the pramāna is brought out by D. M. Dattha in his *The Six Ways of Knowing*:

A prama or knowledge, therefore, can be accurately regarded as a cognition the object of which is neither contradicted nor already known as an object (anadhi-gata-badhita-rtha-visayam jnanam).

The special source of a particular prama or knowledge is called pramāna. Pramāna is defined as the karana of a prama. A karana is conceived as the unique or special cause through the action of which a particular effect is produced. In the case of perceptual knowledge or pratyaksa prama, for example, a sense-organ (in the case of an external perception) or the mind (in the case of an internal perception) is said to be the karana or instrumental cause...

Śaṅkara in his works actually refers to only three pramāṇas but generally the Advaita system is said to utilize six. For our purpose it is not necessary to arrive at any conclusion on the specific uses of the various pramāṇas by Śaṅkara. This would take us well beyond our present study. We can say, however, that even though Śaṅkara may not have actually spoken of some pramāṇas, this doesn't imply that he didn't utilize them in his works.

For Śaṅkara the primary pramāṇa is testimony or śrutī. Śrutī is the scripture of the Vedānta. It is "transpersonal" in that it has always existed and was heard and set down by the ancient seers of...

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12 An analysis of the pramāṇas utilized by the Advaita is contained in Datta's SWK. The pramāṇas are: perception, inference, scriptural testimony, comparison, implication, and negation. See also Radhakrishnan, IP, Vol. II, p. 488 ff., and Deussen System of Vedānta, pp. 89-90.
the Indian tradition. For the Advaita sruti is contained in the Upanisads and they are concerned with Brahman:

Need it be mentioned, therefore, that it is not possible to explain the inscrutable nature of Brahma, without (the help of) the Scriptures? The Puranikas also say, similarly --"Do not employ reasoning to entities which are unthinkable. To be beyond the material effects (Prakriti) is the criterion of that which is unfathomable". Therefore, the realization of the supersensuous Brahma, as it is in fact, depends upon the Scriptures as its source.13

In the Advaita there is a distinction between two types of scripture, one connoting absolute truth or parā vidyā and relative truth or aparā vidyā. The parā vidyā scriptures are contained in the great statements of the mahāvākyas. The difference between the two types is based upon the knowledge that they give:

According to Sankara the authority of a scriptural passage is established if it is able to generate certain and fruitful knowledge. The Upanisadic texts are able to give such knowledge, which, Sankara says, is seen to result in the removal of evils such as ignorance, grief, delusion and fear which are at the root of transmigration. Further, the Upanisads themselves say that "for him, who sees unity there can be no delusion and grief." Some passages in the Veda such as "He (the god Fire) cried; so he was called Rudra (the crier)" may not give any certain and fruitful knowledge; and they have consequently no authority. Also texts like "the sun is the sacrificial post" have to be understood figuratively, because their literal meaning is contradicted by perception; and their purport does not lie in their literal meaning. But there are certain texts in the Upanisads, which by the application of the six-fold criteria mentioned in the previous chapter, are found to be their central theme. Since these texts give us fruitful knowledge not obtained by any other source and since they are found to be "important" as they

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have an independent meaning on their own, the Advaita school maintains that their purport must be accepted at all costs.14

There are four mahāvākyas: (1) "That thou art" (tat tvam asi/ Chhan. 6.8.7). (2) "I am Brahman" (aham brahmā īśmi/ Brīh. 1.4.10).

(3) "This Self is Brahman" (ayamatā brahma/ Brīh. 2.5.19). (4) "All this is Brahman" (sarvam khalv-īdam brahma/ Chhan. 3.14.1). Let us select the first mahāvāhya above and consider it for a moment.

"That thou Art" is found in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad from 6.8.7 on in the dialogue of a son with his father:

1. "Bring hither a fruit of that nyagrodha tree."
   "Here it is, Venerable Sir" "What do you see there?"
   "These extremely fine seeds, Venerable Sir." "Of these, please break one."
   "It is broken, Venerable Sir." "What do you see in these?" "Nothing at all, Venerable Sir."

2. Then he said to him, "My dear, that subtle essence which you do not perceive, verily, my dear, from that very essence this great nyagrodha tree exists. Believe me, my dear.

3. That which is the subtle essence, this whole world has for its self. That is the true. That is the self. That art thou Svetaketu." "Please, Venerable Sir, instruct me still further." "So be it, my dear," said he.15


15. Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upaniṣads, (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1969), p. 462. (1. nyagrodha—phalam ata āhare; īdam, bhagavah, īti; bhinddhīti; bhinnam, bhagavah, īti; kimatra praṣvaśīti; anyva ivemā dhānāḥ, bhagavah, īti; āsām angaikām bhinddhīti; bhinnā, bhagavah, īti; kiniatra prasvaśīti; na kīm ca, bhagavah, īti. 2. taḥ hovāca yam vai, saumya, etam asvimānam na nibhāyāsī, etasya vai, saumya, ego'opīma evam mahān nyagrodhas tiṣṭhati ēṛddhateva, saumya, 3. sa ya ego'nīma, aitād ātmyam īdam sarvan, tatah sarvan, sa ātma, tat tvam asi, svetaketu, īti; bhūva eva mā, bhagavān, vijñāpayitv īti; tathā, saumya, īti; hovāca). Cited hereafter as P U.
This declaration "That thou Art" indicates that the essence of the world and the self is Brahman. For Śaṅkara this statement contains the essence of śruti and opens the way to inquiry about Brahman.

Another aspect of Indian epistemology is the development of hypothetical reasoning or tarka. Tarka is not a pramāṇa because it produces no new knowledge or absolute certainty. It is based on speculation and is seen by Śaṅkara as unfounded (apratiṣṭhita). N. K. Devaraja gives an analysis of Śaṅkara's position with regard to tarka by responding to Śaṅkara's statement that:

Hence, in this case, how can an entity which is actually perceived as substantially existing according to its own nature by all the various means-of-proof, be said to be either possible or not possible (of existence), by raising such alternatives as that such external objective entities are either different or non-different (from Paramāṇus), when as a matter of fact they are actually perceived? It is not that because cognitions have the form of the objects of such cognitions, that destruction of such objects results, for cognition cannot have the form of external objects if such external objects themselves did not exist, and also because, such objects are as a matter of fact perceived to be external. Hence it is that, that an object and its perception are as a rule apprehended simultaneously, is to be understood to mean, that they have a relation of cause and effect between them, and not that they are one and the same, and have no distinction between them. 16

Devaraja adds this analysis:

This passage conclusively proves that Śaṅkara attaches far greater value to pramāṇas than to abstract reasoning. Reasoning cannot establish possibilities and impossibilities against the pramāṇas. The possible according to him is what can be apprehended through perception, inference, etc. Śaṅkara, in fact, has no patience with those idle speculators who, having renounced all dependence on śruti, constantly argue "it is, it is not; he is the agent, he is not the agent" etc., thus throwing the whole import

16 BSB, II.2.28, Apte, p. 398.
of the scriptures into confusion. He is even more furious with those who argue in opposition to the common experience of mankind. Śaṅkara reprimands the mentalist for disregard of common sense as no idealist of any brand has ever done. His conclusion is that "only that reasoning which has the backing of the Scripture and is therefore auxiliary of experience can be acceptable." Śaṅkara feels there can be no real opposition between Ā Śruti on the one hand and experience on the other.17

Thus tārka or speculative reasoning does not help one to attain knowledge of Brahman. Real experience and Ā śruti then are the ground from which one may inquire into Brahman. Tārka does not gain one anything and must be seen as indulgence in idle speculation.

In fine we can say Śaṅkara maintains that the pramāṇas give us correct knowledge insofar as that is possible. Scriptural testimony is the most efficacious pramāṇa and gives us truth of the nonduality of Brahman. This nondual conception is contained most explicitly in the Upanisadic passages known as the mahāvākyas. These are the core of the Veda and are seen as connoting absolute truth. Speculative reason is seen as idle speculation for it gives no new knowledge and leads one astray from the path of the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman. This path to the knowledge of Brahman is one which journeys through the labyrinth of ignorance (avidyā) to self-understanding (vidyā).

SELF (ĀTMAN)

The journey to reach knowledge of Brahman is undertaken in ignorance or avidyā. This journey brings one to a correct understanding of the Self by working through the things which falsely maintain that they are the Self. This methodology can be seen in the illustration of the argumentation of the vital breaths in Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad VI.1.7-13:

7. These vital breaths, disputing among themselves about their self-superiority went to Brahma and said, "Which of us is the most excellent?" He then said, that one of you is most excellent after whose departure this body is thought to be worse off.

8. (The organ of) speech departed and having remained absent for a year came back and said, "How have you been able to live without me?" They said, "As the dumb, not speaking with speech but breathing with the breath, seeing with the eye, hearing with the ear, knowing with the mind, procreating with the semen. Thus have we lived." Then speech entered in.

9. The eye departed and having remained absent for a year came back and said, "How have you been able to live without me?" They said: "As the blind not seeing with the eye, but breathing with the breath, speaking with the speech, hearing with the ear, knowing with the mind, procreating with the semen. Thus have we lived." Then the eye entered in.

10. The ear departed and having remained absent for a year came back and said, "How have you been able to live without me?" They said, "As the deaf not hearing with the ear, but breathing with the breath, speaking with the speech, seeing with the eye, knowing with the mind, procreating with semen. Thus have we lived." Then the ear entered in.

11. The mind departed and having remained absent for a year came back and said: "How have you been able to live without me?" They said, "As the stupid not knowing with the mind, but breathing with the breath, speaking with the speech, seeing with the eye, hearing with the ear, procreating with the semen. Thus have we lived." Then the mind entered in.

12. Then semen (the organ of generation) departed and having remained absent for a year came back and said: "How have you been able to live without me?" They said, "As the impotent not procreating with semen, but breathing with the breath, speaking with the speech, seeing with
the eye, hearing with the ear, knowing with the mind. Thus have we lived. Then the semen entered in.

13. Then as the life breath was about to depart, even as a large fine horse of the Sindhu land might pull up the pegs to which his feet are tied, even so did it pull up those vital breaths together. They said: "Venerable Sir, do not go out, verily, we shall not be able to live without you." "If I am such make me an offering." "So be it." 18

This illustrates, in one instance, the method employed in the uncovering of the true self, a journey in ignorance or avidyā. It is because one finds himself in ignorance that an inquiry into Brahman is embarked upon, as explained in Chapter One.

Man within Indian thought understands himself as existing in a state of ignorance. This ignorance has no historical origin, as such

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18 P U, pp. 306-8, (1. to heme prāṇāh, aham śreyase vivadām-ānāh brahma jagmuḥ; tadd hucuh; ko no vasisṭha iti. tadd hovāca, yasmin va utkrānta idam śarīram pápiyo manvate, sa vo vasisṭha iti.

8. vāg ghocakkāraṁ: sā saṁvatsaram proṣya, āgatya, uvāca. katham asakata mad rte jīvītum iti; te hocuh; yathā kalāh avadanto vācā, prāṇantah prāṇena, paśyantah caṇkuṣa, śrṇvantah śrotreṇa, vidvānā manasa, prajāyamāṇā retasa, evam ajīvīṣmati. pravīneṣa ha vāk. 9. caṇsus hoccakrāma, tat saṁvatsaraṁ proṣya, āgatya, uvāca katham asakata mad rte jīvītum ktk, te hocuh vathamhāh, apasāṅante caṇkuṣa, prāṇantah prāṇena, vadanto vācā, śrṇvantah śrotreṇa, vidvānā manasa, prajāyamāṇā retasa, evam ajīvīṣmati. pravīneṣa ha vāk. 10. śrotreṇa hoccakrāma, tat saṁvatsaraṁ proṣya, āgatya, uvāca, katham asakata mad rte jīvītum iti. te hocuh; yathā badhirāh asāṅvanantah śrotreṇa, prāṇantah prāṇena, vadanto vācā, paśyantah caṇkuṣa, śrṇvantah śrotreṇa, vidvānā manasa, prajāyamāṇā retasa, evam ajīvīṣmati. pravīneṣa ha vāk. 11. mano hoccakrāma, tat saṁvatsaraṁ proṣya, āgatya, uvāca, katham asakata mad rte jīvītum iti. te hocuh. yathā mughdhāh avidvānā manasa, prāṇantah prāṇena, vadanto vācā, paśyantah caṇkuṣa, śrṇvantah śrotreṇa, prajāyamāṇā retasa, evam ajīvīṣmati. pravīneṣa ha vāk. 12. reto hoccakrāma, tat saṁvatsaraṁ proṣya, āgatya, uvāca; katham asakata mad rte jīvītum iti. te hocuh, yathā klībhāh, prajāyamāṇā retasa, prāṇantah prāṇena, vadanto vācā, paśyantah caṇkuṣa, śrṇvantah śrotreṇa, vidvānā manasa, evam ajīvīṣmati pravīneṣa ha rētah. 13. atha ha prāṇa utkramgyan, yathā mahāṣa-hayaḥ saṁsthavaḥ pradvīsa-sāṅkhun saṁvhyet, evam haīvyenā prāṇān saṁvavara. te hocuh; mā bhagavah utkramyath, na vai caṇkuṣam tvadr rte jīvītum iti, tasya me balīṁ kuruteti, tatheti.)
so man cannot ask when this ignorance began. It is seen as beginning-
less but not as eternal. Ignorance can be overcome by knowledge which
will terminate ignorance, a path which seeks the true Self or Atman.
The statement "That art thou" means "Brahman is Atman". Thus, the
Atman is seen as identical with Brahman. This identity is the knowledge
with which ignorance is erased. Knowledge of Atman is not a new acquisi-
tion but merely the recognition of the truth that has always been
but which was obscured by ignorance. Thus no new knowledge dawns
rather correct knowledge dawns.

An inquiry into Brahman is an inquiry into Atman and it is
undertaken through ignorance. Ignorance is the forgetfulness of
Self. This Self is the Atman which is identical with Brahman. This
logic is simple and is not to be had by works but through knowledge.
As Dr. Arapura observes:

Sāṅkara's logic is rigorously simple. Eternity cannot
be attained. For it is either already here or not here.
He seeks to demonstrate that it is already here. If it
is not here no action or change or revolution or progress
can lead to it. Hence the 'quest' would be meaningless. But
the fact that eternity is already here—Nitya-buddha-mukta-
suddha—constitutes the problem. 19

Thus acceptance of this identity is what is necessary. This is what is
given in śruti and it is by śruti that this identity is affirmed.
As Radhakrishnan remarks:

19 J. G. Arapura, "Language in Advaita Vedānta", Seminar
Śaṅkara argues that it is impossible for us to know the self (Atman) by means of thought, since thought itself is a part of the flux belonging to the region of the non-self. If we grasp it by inducing a sort of sleep on all our critical and interpretative powers, then we do fail to have knowledge of the type we desire. Yet we cannot think away the self, for there is no consciousness or experience possible apart from it. Though it escapes our knowledge, it does not entirely escape us. It is the object of the notion of self, and is known to exist on account of its immediate presentation. It cannot be proved, since it is the basis of all proof and is established prior to all proof. Logically it is a postulate. We have to take it for granted.

This must be seen as the "dialectics of the sacred" as Dr. Arapura states:

. . . The problem is created by the extra-ordinary nature of its presence—here lies, parenthetically speaking—the real dialectics of the sacred. It is present and we do not know it. The whole matter is reduced to a question of knowing or not knowing. The fact is to be accounted for by avidyā, which is the dynamics of our becoming—existence. Words, even words pertaining to Brahman are part of avidyā, yet are avidyā destroying; here lies the dialectics. The words, therefore, break loose from avidyā on account of their altogether unique origin. Moksa is eternity. It is not accomplished by any new action (here lies a tremendous difference with Pūrva Mīmāṃsā). The purpose of Vedānta language is to make us aware of this already established fact. Hence Vedānta is vastu-tantra. The sentences of the Vedānta are not artha-vāda.

So the Atman is known by means of testimony or śrutī. It is declared that "The Atman is verily the Brahman" and as we have observed this declaration does not render a man to engage in some activity but instructs him straightaway regarding the nature of Atman. The Atman is known, then, because it is self-evident, self-luminous. This fact

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is illustrated by a discussion between Yājñavalkya and King Janaka in Brhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad IV.3.6 concerning the origin of light. After a brief analysis of the origin of light as being localized in such as the sun, moon and speech the King asks:

6. "When the sun has set, Yājñavalkya, and the moon has set, and the fire has gone out and speech has stopped, what light does a person here have?" "The Self, indeed, is his light," said he, "for with the self, indeed, as the light, one sits, moves about, does one's work and returns."

Thus Ātman is that upon which all is constructed and because of this knowledge of Ātman does not follow from anything. It is the essential, that from which all arises and to which all must eventually return. It is the same as Brahman for the philosophy of the Self is, when analyzed, itself the inquiry into Brahman.

BRAHMAN

The Real, Brahman, best described as "neti-neti" (not this--not that) means that Brahman can only be described actually via negativa as being not this or not that when compared to anything. But it is also the case that even though Brahman can best be described via negativa, the via positiva is also utilized. Brahman is spoken of as being the pure reality of existence (sat), consciousness (cit), and bliss (ānanda). Brahman is, of course, beyond conception and when

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22 PU, pp. 255-6, (6. astam ita āditye, yājñavalkya, candramasy astam ite, śānte āgnau, śāntāyām vāci, kim-jyotir evāyam pruusa iti, ātmaivāya jyotir bhavati, ātmanaivāya jyotisāste, palyayate, karma kurute, vipalayeti iti.).

23 Ibid., p. 286.
any conception is used in a descriptive sense it is always seen as falling short of the truth. Truth is brought about when one attains knowledge of Brahman which means identification with Brahman. Knowledge of Brahman occurs when there is an intuitive realization of the truths that one is in fact Ātman and Ātman is none other than Brahman, an identity which has always existed. Thus to know Brahman is to be Brahman or to have this gnosis is to return to that which you already were and have always been.

We have said that the via negativa is the most accurate description of Brahman. This idea can be seen clearly in the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad IV.4.22 which describes Brahman as the Self.

22. Verily, he is the great unborn Self who is this (person) consisting of knowledge among the senses. In the space within the heart lies the controller of all, the lord of all, the ruler of all. He does not become greater by good works nor smaller by evil works. He is the bridge that serves as the boundary to keep the different worlds apart. Him the Brāhmaṇas seek to know by the study of the Veda, by sacrifices, by gifts, by penance, by fasting. On knowing Him, in truth, one becomes an ascetic. Desiring Him only as their worlds, monks wander forth. Verily, because they know this, the ancient (sages) did not wish for offspring. What shall we do with offspring (they said), we who have attained this self, this world. They, having risen above the desire for sons, the desire for wealth, the desire for worlds, led the life of a meditator. For the desire for sons is the desire for wealth and the desire for wealth is the desire for worlds; both these are, indeed, desires only. This Self is (that which has been described as) not this, not this. He is incomprehensible for He is never comprehended. He is indestructible for He cannot be destroyed. He is unattached for He does not attach himself. He is unfettered, He does not suffer, He is not injured. Him (who knows this) these two (thoughts) do not overcome, for some reason he has
done evil or for some reason he has done good. He over-comes both. What he has done or what he has not done does not burn (affect) him.24

To describe Brahman as a thing or as having attributes then is to misunderstand the nature of Brahman and knowledge of Brahman. He who does so sees Brahman as just another thing among things even though perhaps higher in a kind of structure of existence. But Brahman is not a thing, as such; if one uses this type of description Brahman is the only thing and there is no other thing, including no-thing, besides it. Brahman is best understood, then, in terms of the description which uses the via negativa. Man however has difficulty understanding this kind of description so Brahman is also described via positiva. It is the fullness of pure existence (sat), consciousness (cit), and bliss (ānanda); Brahman is Satcidānanda. In terms of sat Brahman "is ever existent and the unreal is never existent--regarding the two, the Self and the non-Self, the real and the unreal,

24 Pu, pp. 278-9, (22). sa vai esa mahān aja ātma yo'yaṁ viṁśa- amayaḥḥ prāṇaḥ; ya esa'ntar-hṛdaya ṛṣiṣaḥ taṁ ni śete, sarvasya vaśi, sarvasyaśaśaṁ, sarvasyaśāhipati; sa na sādhunā karmāṇaḥ bhūyān no evāśa- dhūnā kanīyaḥ, esa sarvaśvarah, esa bhūtādhimaḥ, esa bhūtapālaḥ, esa setur vidharāṇa esa lokānām asambhedāya, tam etam vedānubhavaneṇa brahmaṇaḥ vīvidiṣaṇti, yajñena, dūnena, tapasānāśakena; etam eva viditvā munir bhavati, etam eva pravālina lokam icchantaḥ pravrajanti.

etadd ha eva vai tat pūrve vīv-dūṁsaḥ prajāṁ na kāmayanti; kiṁ prajāya kariṣyā‘maḥ, yeśāṁ no'yaṁ ātmanāṁ saṁ lokā ti. te ha eva putra- iṣaṇāyaś ca vīttaiṣaṇāyaś ca lokaiṣaṇāyaś ca vyuttāya, atha bhikṣa- caryam caranti; yā hy eva putraīṣaṇā sā vīttaiṣaṇā, yā vīttaiṣaṇā sa lokaiṣaṇaḥ; ubhe hy eti āsane eva bhavicah sa esa neti neti ātma; agrhyabhy, na hi gṛhyate; asīryah, na hi śīryate; asaṁghaḥ, na hi sajyate; asito na vyathate, na rīgivati; etam u haivaiṣa ete tarati, naināṁ kṣtakṛte tapataḥ.)
is always present before the minds of those who attend only to truth, to the real nature of the Brahman, the Absolute, the All..." 25

As cit Brahman in "All this (three fold world) is guided by intelligence, is established by intelligence. The support is intelligence, Brahman is intelligence." 26 In Śaṅkara's commentary on the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad.

III.47. Ānanda is discussed:

The above mentioned bliss which is the highest Reality and which is characterised by the knowledge of the Atman is centered in the Self. It is all peace, characterised by the cessation of all evils. It is the same as liberation. It is indescribable as nobody is able to describe it; for, it is totally different from all objects. This ultimate bliss is directly realized by the Yogis. It is unborn because it is not produced like anything resulting from empirical perceptions. It is identical with the Unborn which is the object sought by knowledge. The knowers of Brahman describe this bliss verily as the omniscient Brahman, as it is identical with that Reality which is omniscient. 27

So the description of Brahman as Satcidānanda imparts the idea that Brahman is the essence of existence, consciousness, and bliss. 28


28 In Ontology of Advaita R. Rao observes that, "Though Sat, Cit, and Ānanda as applied to Brahman are not found in this form in the early Upaniṣads, yet the bases of them can easily be recognised therein in the following ways: 'viṣṇum ānandam brahma'—Bṛih. Up. 3.9.28; 'satyam prajñā ānanda'—Bṛih. Up. 4.1; 'satym jñānam anantaṃ brahma'—Taitt. Up. 2.1. It is only in the very late Upaniṣads that we come across Brahman described as 'sat-cit-ānanda'; Rāmapūrva-pāṇiya Upaniṣad 52; Rāmottarā-pāṇiya Upaniṣad 2.4.5. p. 28."
we must not think of each of these terms as connoting a part of Brahman for they do not connote but denote. As T. R. V. Murti rightly observes when he writes:

The three terms of the definition, Sat, Cit, and Ānanda, are not synonymous (aparyāya). Although they all denote, not connote, one and the same entity, Brahman; the difference between them is not verbal; each denotes Brahman differently. The thing excluded, or the mode of approach (the vyāvartya), is different in each case; Sat excludes asat (non-being); Cit (will or intelligence) excludes matter (jada); Ānanda (bliss) excludes Duḥkha (pain). These terms are not concepts or predicates. It would be less of a mistake to take them denotatively as things or substances. Each is sui generis, a Self. Each is identical with Brahman, substantially, not conceptually.29

Thus whenever one refers to Brahman as either sat, cit or Ānanda it must be recognized that the other terms are necessarily included.

**TATASTHA-LĀKṢĀNA AND SVARŪPA-LĀKṢĀNA**

The definition of Brahman as satcidānanda is an essential or substantial one (svarūpa-lākṣāna). It can be termed a "naming" rather than a "designation". When Brahman is seen as the basis for the cause of the origin, sustenance and cessation of the world, it is referred to by an accidental or modal definition (tatastha-lākṣāna). Whichever definition is utilized it is still the non-dual Brahman that is being spoken of. In the order of phenomenal experience or discovery the tatastha-lākṣāna is first and Brahman is realized only when we understand that the essence of the tatastha-lākṣāna is the svarūpa-lākṣāna. Thus by its very nature the tatastha-lākṣāna view is

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grounded in a view beyond itself. The experiential movement is from
the basis of the world into that basis so that it is no longer seen
in terms of other but as Self. The progression takes place from
experience of other (world) to discovery of identity. This is a movement
from the non-real to the real for:

Our natural attitude is to take anything that appears
as real. For instance, we mistake the body for the self.
This is an unconscious process of identification: for none
can consciously fall into illusion. Then occurs the shock
of disillusionment. Consequent on this, we become reflec-
tive. Disillusionment, or the cancelling consciousness,
reveals the soul of the appearance by tearing off its
superficial ventures as it were. Only this experience pro-
vides us with the criterion of the real as abhâdhyâ (the
uncontradicted) and the illusory as bâdhayâ; and not any
a priori formal concept. 30

So the movement from the unreal to the real is a movement from the
contradictable to the uncontradictable. Brahman as satcidânanda
is uncontradictable. Brahman as the basis of the world is uncontra-
dictable also, but it has, as it were, derivatives which are contra-
dictable i.e. the experience of the world.

STATUS OF THE WORLD

The inner structure of the world is seen as both contradic-
table and uncontradictable. It is contradictable in that it somehow
participates in non-being (asat) but it is uncontradictable because
its essence is being (sat). Thus we have the idea that existence,
which means "to be", is identical with essence. 31 Thus when we think


31 This is distinct from the West which has many times seen a
distinction between essence and existence. For a further discussion of
this we would refer the reader to J.C. Arapura's Religion as Tran-
quility and Anxiety and A. G. Javadkar Axiometics. An interesting
of the status of the world for Śaṅkara we should see it as having Brahman for its ground while participating in that which is "other" than Brahman. However, it must always be remembered that there is none "other" than Brahman and thus whatever is referred to as "other" ultimately has its ground in Brahman.

The world is seen as an appearance of Brahman, an appearance which is at heart identical with Brahman. When the status of the world is questioned this consideration is not within the framework of a cosmogonical inquiry, as such, because this does not lead to knowledge of Brahman. Rather the world should be considered in terms of a cosmological frame. This is accomplished by Śaṅkara by the concept of māyā which is seen as the matrix of the universe:

Māyā theory has implications for several things, mainly experience, the world and language. The original motivation in articulating the theory was to rationalize these implications by making them cohere with the fundamental metaphysical position of Advaita Vedānta. In this sense it is clear that māyāvāda is simply a rational postscript of advaita vāda and is in no way prescriptive of it. 32

example of this kind of thought in the West can be seen in Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness when he states, "This self with its a priori and historical content is the essence of man. Anguish as the manifestation of freedom in the face of self means that man is always separated by a nothingness from his essence... Man continually carries with him a pre-judicative comprehension of his essence, but due to this very fact he is separated from it by a nothingness. Essence is all that human reality apprehends in itself as having been."

32 MDAB, p. 110.
The exemplification of this conception will concern us throughout the second part of this study. In fact it will be just these things, namely, experience, world (nāma-rūpa), and language, and their relation to māyā that our investigation will center upon.

For Śaṅkara, then, the world of experience is a fact as is implied when he suggests that we should no more pay attention to a man who while perceiving external things with his senses denies their existence, than believe the report of a man who while eating and experiencing the feeling of satisfaction states that he does not do so. The fact of the experience of the world is not questioned, rather what must always be the guiding premise is "an inquiry into Brahman".

COSMOCONICAL AND COSMOLOGICAL

The cosmological inquiry of Śaṅkara into the nature of the world is two-fold; the consequence of the given nature of Brahman and the experience of the world. This structure of conception in Śaṅkara is best seen in the dependency and difference of the "acomic" and "cosmic" understanding of the nature of the world. The "acomic" concept is understood in terms of the construction of the world given by Yājñavalkya when he answers the questions of Gārgi in Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad III.8.7-11:

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33 BSB, II.2.28, Apte, p. 397.
7. He said: "That which is above the sky, that which is beneath the earth, that which is between these two, sky and earth, that which the people call the past, the present and the future, across space is that woven like warp and woof. Across what is space woven like warp and woof?"

8. He said: "That, O Gārgi, the knowers of Brahman, call the Imperishable. It is neither gross nor fine, neither short nor long, neither glowing red (like fire) nor adhesive (like water). (It is) neither shadow nor darkness, neither air nor space, unattached, without taste, without smell, without eyes, without ears, without voice, without mind, without radiance, without breath, without a mouth, without measure, having no within and no without. It eats nothing and no one eats it."

9. "Verily, at the command of that Imperishable, O Gārgi, the sun and the moon stand in their respective positions. At the command of that Imperishable, O Gārgi, heaven and earth stand in their respective positions. At the command of that Imperishable, O Gārgi, what are called moments, hours and days and nights, half-months, seasons, years stand in their respective positions. At the command of that Imperishable, O Gārgi, some rivers flow to the east from the white (snowy) mountains, others to the west in whatever direction each flows. By the command of that Imperishable, O Gārgi, men praise those who give, the gods (are desirous of) the sacrificer and the fathers are desirous of the darvi offering."

10. "Whosoever, O Gārgi, in this world, without knowing this Imperishable performs sacrifices, worships, performs mysteries for a thousand years, his work will have an end; whosoever, O Gārgi, without knowing this Imperishable departs from this world, is pitiable. But O Gārgi, he who knowing the Imperishable departs from this world is a Brahmana (a knower of Brahman)."

11. "Verily, that Imperishable, O Gārgi, is unseen but is the seer, is unheard but is the hearer, unthought but is the thinker, unknown but is the knowers. There is no other seer but this, there is no other hearer but this, there is no other thinker but this. By this Imperishable, O Gārgi, is space woven like warp and woof."35

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35 PU, pp. 231-3, (7. sa hovāça, vad ērdhvam, gārgi, divaḥ, vad aviṅ prthivyāḥ, vad antaraḥ dvāvārthivā ime, vad bhūtām ca bhavac ca bhaviṣyate cety ākṣaṇe ākṣā eva tad otaḥ ca protaḥ cety; kasmin nu khālī ākṣā otaḥ ca protaḥ cety. 8. sa hovāca, etad vai tad aṅkṣaṃ, gārgi, brahmaḥ adhvadanti, asthīlam, anāpu, ahrasvam, adyāyaḥ, alohitam, anśehaṃ, aacchāyaṃ, atamaḥ, avāyav anākṣaṃ, aṣaḥsayaṃ, aurasam, apanthaṃ, aṅkṣaṃ. aṣtrotram, aṅkā, aṃnaḥ, aṭeṣaṃ, apraṃ, aṃukhaṃ, aṁśtraṃ, anantaranaḥ, abāhyam; na tad aṃhitā kiṃ caṇa, na tad
This understanding of Brahman or the Imperishable points beyond the apparent world to its logos. The "cosmic" participates at all times in this "acosmic". The "cosmic" itself has a fundamental place within this inquiry because it is only when one correctly views this two-fold structure that the "cosmic" can maintain its position as having a positive place for an inquiry into meaning (Brahman). If it is taken as having a meaning in and for itself it must be seen as not leading to knowledge of Brahman. The "cosmic" understanding is the conception that the world is attributed to Brahman in a form that man can understand, namely Iśvara or God. The world is seen as produced by Iśvara's power (şakti) and exists for the sake of Iśvara. Sāṅkara points this out when he states:

The word "this" in the following passage refers to this world of names and forms as caused by the intelligent Brahman alone. "This was, in the beginning, the one, non-dual Being; it saw within it the desire, "to become many and produce much", and so created the fire" (Cha. 6. 2 and 3); "This was in the beginning one Atman alone, and nothing else had the capacity to move. He saw within him the desire to produce the worlds, and produced them" (Ait. Ar. 1.1.1). . . . All this clearly shows, that the

aśnāti kaś cana. 9. etasya vā aksārasya praśāsane, gārgi, sūvyācan- 
dramasya vā vidhī tṛiṣṭhateḥ; etasya vā aksārasya praśāsane, gārgi, 
dyāvāprthivyavā vidhī tṛiṣṭhateḥ; etasya vā aksārasya praśāsane, gārgi, 
nimeśā, mūhūrtā, ahorātrya ardamāsa, māsa, rtavaḥ, saṃvatsara iti, 
vidhītās tṛiṣṭhanti; etasya vā aksārasya praśāsane, gārgi, prācyo' nva 
nadyaḥ svandante śvetebhjyāḥ parvatbhjyāḥ, prācyo' nvaḥ, vām vām cā 
diśan anu; etasya vā aksārasya praśāsane, gārgi, dadato manuṣyāḥ 
praṇāmaṁ bhatāḥ, darvīm-pitaro 'nvaṇaṁhitā. 10. yo vā 
etad aksaraṁ, gārgi, avidityāvīśmiṁ loke jhauṁ, yajate, tapas tapyate, 
bahunī vajra-sahāsāpy antād evāsya tad bhavati; yo vā etad aksaraṁ, 
gārgi avidityāvīśmā lokāt praitī, sa brahmaṇaḥ. 11. tad vā etad 
aksaraṁ, gārgi, adṛṣṭam draṣṭṛ, aśrutam, śrōty, anatam mantrāv, aviṇātaṁ 
vijñātṛ, nānyad ato' sti draṣṭṛ, nānyad ato' sti śrōty, nānyad ato' sti 
mantrāv, nānyad ato' sti vijñātṛ; etasmin nu khalv aksere, gārgi, aksa- 
otaś ca protaś.ca.)
cause of the world is the "seeing" of the intelligent Brahman and not that of the non-intelligent pradhana.\textsuperscript{36}

Again we can see this conception in the analysis given in Chāndogya Upaniṣad III.14.1:

Verily, this whole world is Brahman, from which he comes forth, without which he will be dissolved and in which he breathes. Tranquil, one should meditate on it. Now verily, a person consists of purpose. According to the purpose a person has in this world, so does he become on departing hence. So let him frame for himself a purpose.\textsuperscript{37}

In Śaṅkara's commentary on the Brahma Sūtra I.4.23 he counters the objection that Brahman can not be the material cause of the world:

Brahma should be understood to be both the material cause and the accidental cause, and not only an accidental cause, because (understood that way alone) there is no conflict between the Scriptural solemn statement and the illustration. It is in this way that a conflict between the Scriptural solemn statement and the illustration does not take place.\textsuperscript{38}

Thus Brahman, as Īśvara, is both the material and accidental cause of the world. But this creation by Īśvara must not be understood as a creation from a need or desire of purpose. Rather it is a creation by sport as is shown in Brahma Sūtra II.1.33: "But (the act of creation) is a mere sport (of the Lord) even as it is seen in the ordinary world." To which Śaṅkara adds the explanation:


\textsuperscript{37}PU, p. 391, (sarvam khalv idam brahma, tajjalān iti, sānta upāśīta; atha kratumayah purusah, yathā-kratur asmīn loke puruṣo bhavati tathetaḥ pretya bhavati, sa kratum kurvita.

\textsuperscript{38}BSB, VI.4.23, Apte, p. 270.
Just as in the ordinary world, in the case of a king who has attained all his desires or of his minister, their activities in sports and pastimes are merely of the nature of a sport and are indulged in without any particular aim in mind, or just as the inspiration or expiration etc. (or a man) takes place naturally, without any extraneous purpose, even so may the Lord also engage in such sportful activity without any purpose, and merely as the result of his nature. It is not possible to explain on the ground of reasoning or the Scriptures that there is any other purpose on the part of the Lord. It is not possible to question the nature (of the Lord). Though the creation of this world-sphere appears to us as a stupendous undertaking, yet to the Lord, it is but a mere pastime, because of his measureless power. . . .

Many examples of creation are given in śruti, but in fact one must always recognize that these accounts must be seen as a more

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39 Ibid., II.1.33, p. 338.

40 One may refer to various accounts of creation contained within the Rgveda and other śruti. Griffith translates them as follows: Rgveda X.82 (p. 498)—Viśvakaṇṭha, 1. The Father of the eye, the Wise in spirit, created both these worlds submerged in fatness. Then when the eastern ends were firmly fastened, the heavens and the earth were far extended. 2. Mighty in mind and power is Viśvakaṇṭha, Maker, Disposer, and most lofty Presence. Their offerings joy in rich juice where they value One, only One, beyond the Seven Rishis. 3. Father who made us, he who, as Disposer, knoweth all races and all things existing, Even He alone, the Deities' name-giver, --him other beings seek for information. In Rgveda X.90 (p. 517) we find the great hymn to Purusha: 1. A thousand heads hath Purusha, a thousand eyes, a thousand feet. On every side pervading earth he fills a space ten fingers wide. 2. This Purusha is all that yet hath been and all that is to be; The Lord of Immortality which waxes greater by food. 3. So mighty is his greatness; yea, greater than this is Purusha. All creatures are one-fourth of him, three-fourths eternal life in heaven. 4. With three-fourths Purusha went up: one-fourth of him again was here. Thence he strode out to every side over what eats not and what eats. . . . Also in Rgveda X.121 (p. 565) there is the hymn to Prajāpati—1. In the beginning rose Hiranyagarbha, born Only Lord of all created beings. He fixed and holdeth up this earth and heaven. What God shall we adore with our obligation? . . . 5. By him the heavens are strong and earth is steadfast, by him light's realm and sky-vault are supported; By him the regions in mid-air were measured, what God shall we adore with our obligation? . . . 10. Prajāpati thou only comprehendest all these created things, and none beside thee. Grant us our hearts' desire when we invoke thee; may we have store of riches in
symbolic or illustrative account rather than as literal. This is implied in the analysis of language in Advaita Vedānta (as well as in the Purva Mīmāṃsā) as being non-personal (apuruseya) and by implication beyond (transcendent) but at the same time moving into the heart of everything (immanent).

In Hindu thought language has to be impersonal. Brahman cannot speak and there is none else to speak the ultimate word; so speech is attached tenuously to Brahman and the whole of the phenomenal world as pervaded by name and form is hung from speech.41

Thus even though the conception of creation, with concepts such as material and accidental cause, is of some importance within Śaṅkara's work we must recognize that it is a symbolic and not a literal meaning that must be understood. As Śaṅkara states:

Nor should it ever be forgotten, that even this Scriptural statement about creation (by the Lord) is not so in the truest sense, but with reference to the perception of the transactions of names and forms being merely imagined through Nescience, and also because it purports to propound how Brahma is the Self (of everything).42

Accounts of creation, and an account of the cosmos, then, fulfill a necessary requirement in Śaṅkara because they make the world possession. Each of these hymns are from R. T. H. Griffith, The Hymns of the Rgveda Vol. II, (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies, 1963). In addition one may consult R. D. Ranade, A Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy, and Deussen, The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads.

41 LP, p. 24.

42 BSB, II.1.33, Apte, pp. 338-9.
of experience an ordered cosmos, but they do not answer the questions
of origins in relation to the experience. In order to discover
experience a question other than origins must be asked, and this is
one of meaning in experience rather than the origin of experience it-
self. The meaning question is inherent in the question already put
forward as central for a understanding of Śaṅkara, namely, "Now
therefore the desire to know Brahman."

MĀYĀ

The conception of the doctrine of māyā in the thought and
system developed by Śaṅkara is seen by some as the central issue of
the Advaita Vedānta. Much of modern scholarship has utilized the word
māyā to mean only illusion. But we must remember that the word
māyā is etymologically a word which means "to measure". Māyā, in
Śaṅkara, is the canopy under which reside the phenomenal world of
name and form, language and experience. Historically māyā has been
seen as a point of attack of many later thinkers within the Vedānta.

Rāmānuja and Madhva attack the Advaita on exactly this concept. The

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43 Rāmānuja's objections to the concept of māyā are seven in
number: 1. Aśrayānupapatti—locus of avidyā. 2. Tirodhanaanupapatti—
obscuration of Brahman. 3. Svūpānupapatti—nature of avidyā. 4. Anir-
vacanānupapatti—indeterminacy of avidyā. 5. Pramānānupapatti—
avidyā is not provable by the pramāṇas. 6. Nivartakānupapatti—no
remover of avidyā. 7. Nivṛttaṇupapatti—no removal of avidyā. Refer:
G. Thibaut, The Vedānta-Sūtras with the Commentary by Rāmānuja, S.B.E.,

Madhva's refutation of māyā is dependent upon interpretations
of the meanings of various "religio-philosophical" words and is not
set down in a given place, as Rāmānuja's. Thus the reader is asked
to refer to: K. Naraśa, A Critique of Madhva Refutation of the Samkara
School of Vedanta, (Allahabad: Udayaya Pub., 1964), p. 211 ff. and
H. N. Raghavendrachar, "Madhva's Brahma-Mīmāṃsā", The Cultural Heritage
of India Vol. III The Philosophies, H. Bhattacharyya editor, (Calcutta:
Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, 1937), p. 313 ff. See also
S. Dاس Gupta, A History of Indian Philosophy Vol. IV, (Cambridge, 1966),
pp. 101-319 inclusive.
great traditional arguments of the on-going discussion have been
covered in great detail within the philosophical literature of India
and a full analysis of it would be beyond this present study. To
cover this well-trodden soil would take us far afield from Śaṅkara.

Some interpretations of māyā in the Advaita see māyā as a
completely new development within the thought of Śaṅkara. We have
already seen in the second chapter that māyā is found in the oldest
text of the tradition, namely the Ṛgveda. Thus māyā must not be
understood as a completely new development within Śaṅkara's thought or
system. With regard to the idea of "illusion" this translation of
the Sanskrit māyā by the English word "illusion" was pointed out as
starting with W. D. Whitney in his work on the Atharva-Veda Śaṅhitā.

This translation is correct but to use it in reference to the Ad-
vaīta, in only this sense, is to do so without any reflective awareness
of the meaning within the traditional account from the Veda up to the
Upaniṣads. Thus we must begin to see māyā within Śaṅkara not only as
it has been seen by his opponents or later critics but within the
context of "an inquiry into Brahman". We must always recall that:

Śaṅkara was primarily what we could call today a philo-
sophical theologian, whose urgent interest was to explain
in the most cogent rational terms the central message of
the Vedānta. This led him to the theory of non-dualism
(advaitavāda), out of which by sheer force of logical im-
plication arose the subsidiary theory of illusion (māyā-
vāda, avidyāvāda). Śaṅkara realized that if duality (in
all such ubiquitous forms as subject-object, thinker-thought,
thinker-thing, etc.,) is to be avoided while explaining
(not explaining away) the world by māyā, the principal of
avidyā needs to be recognized as a concomitant condition,
for both mean illusion.44

44 MDAB, p. 109.
Thus while it is true that Śaṅkara did utilize māyā as "illusion" in certain instances it was not used to explain away the world but rather to explain the world. Māyāvāda must be seen as a rational postscript to Advaitavāda and is in no way prescriptive of it. To mistake it for other is not to do justice to the Advaita of Śaṅkara.

Concerning the word samvṛti we do not find it within Śaṅkara’s commentary on the Brahma Sūtra, rather we find the word samvṛta. This occurs at III.2.3, and is about the existence of dream objects in the waking world. Śaṅkara observes that, "There cannot possibly be sufficient space for a chariot in the limited space of a body." Thus samvṛta means in this instance "limited space", in fact within the Nirmaya Sagar edition there is an editorial comment that, "samvṛta means contracted". The use of the word by Śaṅkara has no reference to the technical usage that the Buddhists put it to. The Mādhyamika samvṛti and Advaita māyā have different origins; this has been brought out by Dr. Arapura when he comments:


46 BS, III.2.3, Apte, p. 563, (nāha samvṛte dehaśe rathā-dayo'vakāśam labheran). Gambhirananda (Brahma-Sūtra-Bhasya of Śri Śaṅkarācārya, Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1965) gives the following: "For instance, the space needed for a chariot etc. is not possible in dream; for within the narrow limits of the body, the chariot etc. cannot get sufficient room." (p. 590), and Thibaut (Vedānta Sūtras of Bādarāyana with Śaṅkara’s Commentary Part 1 and 2, Dover Pub., 1962): "... for those cannot find room in the limited confines of the body (vol. II, p. 134-5).

47 B. Sastrī, Brahma Sūtra bhasya of Śaṅkara, (Bombay: Nirmaya Sagar Press, 1938), p. 689.
It is possible to see that the māyā doctrine of the Vedānta has its origin in logical thinking while the saṃvṛti doctrine as set forth by all the relevant schools of Buddhism, particularly the Mādhyamika, has its origin in dialectical thinking. "Logical" here means making it possible for something to be said about Reality (Brahman in this context), taking, of course, the original meaning of "logos"; "dialectical" likewise means the discovery through talking, of that about which something may be said. The gist of this may be expressed this way: in the case of the one, there is Reality but it cannot be talked about without some sort of contradiction, and in the case of the other, the possibility of talk is accepted without inquiring, however, into the origin of talk—but there is no knowing what reality or reality-substitute, if any, it will lead to, and what significance it will bear. 48

Thus what we have then, in the case of Śaṅkara, with regard to māyā is its logical development out of Advaitavāda. This development will be further investigated within the context of the remainder of our study so that we may see the implications of it and the effects of these implications on the understanding of māyā in the Advaita darśana of Śaṅkara.

CONCLUSION

The Advaita darśana of Śaṅkara grew out of a response to the religio-philosophical milieu of its age. On the one hand, it formulated a cogent expression of the vedic tradition which responded to and went beyond the previous existing darśanas (Śaṅkhya, Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Yoga). On the other hand it brought to task the views of those systems of thought which were outside the vedic pale. It answered the questions of its age with insight and presented

48 MDAB, p. 113.
a view that has always been a powerful force up to the modern time. Various historical occurrences have shaped the system of Śaṅkara, and in fact the history of much of Indian philosophy is a history of the debates and discussions of the schools. After the passing of Śaṅkara, the Advaita darsana grew into a great tree which saw the branches of various interpretations of what Śaṅkara held develop. This complex history is vast and much work is necessary for us to glean a completely accurate picture of it. For an understanding of Śaṅkara, however, a brief inquiry into it is most important. Thus let us now turn our attention, however briefly, to the great tree of Advaita Vedānta which reaches into the heart of modern India.
CHART OF POST ŚAṆKARA ADVAITA VEDĀNTA (Partial)
CHAPTER V

MĀYĀ IN THE POST-SAŃKARA ADVAITA

The development of Vedāntic philosophical thought which grew out of the Advaita Vedānta formulated by Śaṅkara has a history, which is complex and great. It is great because it encompasses a vast number of philosophical positions stemming from those which were prominent during the writing of Śaṅkara through the dialectical argumentation which brings us up to the present. What we will concentrate on within the next few pages will be the time immediately following Śaṅkara, centering on the followers who developed his thought. These can be placed into two groups: first those who wrote as his contemporaries or immediate followers and second those who came to be known as the dialecticians. This history is complex because the philosophical dialogue occurred in the form of commentary. Thus when we consider this dialogue we are confronted with various commentaries written upon other commentaries. What we have then is a long line of works which can be traced back to Śaṅkara. This history is commented on by N. B. Chakraborty in The Advaita Concept of Falsity--A Critical Study. He observes, "The commentary of Śaṅkara on Brahmaṇḍa is known as Śārīraka bhāṣya. The post-Śaṅkara advaita philosophy originates out of the different interpretations and commentaries of Śārīraka Bhāṣya. The commentators of Śārīraka bhāṣya are fully manifest in their annotations. These annotations are mainly based on independent reasoning..."
and sometimes insurmountable dialectic also is resorted to."

What we intend here is to give a brief account of some of the post-Saṅkara thinkers on the problem of the meaning of māyāvāda and what this entails. This limits us in that we will not be able to develop the minute philosophical intricacies of these positions nor reconstruct the full dialectical argumentation. Positively however it means that we will see in what ways these thinkers, correctly or incorrectly, interpreted Saṅkara on a specific theory.

VIVARAṆA AND BHĀMATĪ SCHOOLS

We have seen in the previous chapter that the thought of Saṅkara contained the seeds for further growth. This growth was nurtured by the critical comments of various philosophical positions, the most important for our present study being that of the Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja and the Dvaita of Madhava. As the thought of Saṅkara took root and began to sprout, various adaptations emerged. Two important adaptations were the schools that grew out of the conceptualization of study, reflection and meditation, and their value for knowledge of Brahman. These schools are known as the Vivaraṇa school and the Bhāmatī school.

The Vivaraṇa school held that the activities of study or reflection and meditation are not the direct means to knowledge of Brahman:

The Advaitins differ with regard to the fixing of the relative values of study, reflection, and meditation. The

Vivaraṇa school maintains that all the three are not the direct means to Brahman-knowledge. The ascertainment of the purport of the Vedāntas through reasoning is "hearing" (śravaṇa); reflecting on the non-dual Brahman through reasonings which establish non-difference and condemn difference is manana; and the constancy of the mental flow of the form of Brahman without being clouded by the mode of the form of the not-self is meditation (nīdīdhyāsana). These three are aids to remove the notions that the non-dual Brahman is impossible and that the contrary of that is true. Doubts and delusions are destroyed by this triple means. But the direct means to knowledge are the Vedānta texts which come into contact with the sense of hearing. The avāntaravākyas which reveal either the nature of the supreme self or that of the jīva give us meditate knowledge. The mahāvākyas or major texts which assert the identity of the Supreme Intelligence and the jīva give us immediate intuitive knowledge. The contention that verbal testimony can yield only mediate knowledge is met in this manner. The knowledge through verbal testimony of an object which is remote is always mediate. But of an object which is proximate, verbal testimony gives both mediate and immediate knowledge. This point may be explained by citing the episode of the tenth man. Through the words of a trustworthy person the tenth man at first learns meditately that the tenth man is not lost, and then he realizes that he is himself the tenth man. Brahman is not remote; it is identical with the jīva; hence of it, immediate intuitive knowledge is possible through verbal testimony.

For Vācaspati (founder of the Bhāmatī school) who follows the tradition of Maṇḍana, verbal testimony of itself is not the cause of immediate knowledge. Uninterrupted contemplation of the cognition which results from verbal testimony ultimately causes the final intuition. The process of praśākhhyāna is indispensable for Brahman-intuition. This view which is urged by Vācaspati differs from the Vivaraṇa view. Uninterrertent meditation, and not mere hearing of the Vedāntas, takes the prominent and primary place as the means to intuition. The tendency to place more and more importance on meditation reached its climax in Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. His strong leaning to the path of devotion led Madhusūdana to maintain that bhakti is as good a means as jñāna for the realization of the attributeless Brahman.2

These are aids to show the truth of the non-dual Brahman for doubts

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and delusions are destroyed by this means for the Vivaraṇa. Thus the emphasis is on Sruti which is the only means by which knowledge of Brahman can be had. This school is considered to be the most representative school of those coming out of the teachings of Śaṅkara. The thesis of this school is based on the Pañcapadika Vivaraṇa which is an annotation on the Pañcapadika of Padmāpāda, who was a disciple of Śaṅkara. Because of his being a disciple of Śaṅkara it is held that he could most definitely and correctly know the implications of the Advaita better than any other. Therefore, the Vivaraṇa school, which is based on the Pañcapadika, is to be taken as the representative school of Advaita Vedānta.3

Just as the origin of the Vivaraṇa school is based on a text so too is the Bhāmatī school. The basic text of this school is the Bhāmatī of Vācaspati Miśra. For Vācaspati Miśra, who follows the tradition of Mandana Miśra and Śaṅkara as pointed out above, verbal testimony of itself is not the cause of immediate knowledge. It is rather uninterrupted contemplation of the cognition which results from verbal testimony. This contemplation ultimately causes the final intuition. The process of prasankhyāna is indispensable for intuition of Brahman. This is to say that intermittent meditation, and not mere hearing of the Vedāntas, takes the prominent and primary place as the means of intuition.

The school of Bhāmatī initiated by Vācaspati Miśra (9th Cent. A. D.) who wrote the tīkā, viz., Bhāmatī on the

Brahmasūrabhāṣya, however, traces Vedantic studies on the logical and dialectical place to the adhyāyanavidyā as the studies of Mīmāṃsā have also the same injunction at their origin. Sravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāṣana are not the fountain-heads of the Vedantic dialectical studies by way of injunctions. Nor even is sravaṇa the principal means toward Ātmadarśana. These pertain to the ken of iñāna or knowledge, pure and simple, where no injunctive force can exist. Knowledge arises as soon as the conditions of it are fulfilled. Hence what these three stages can do is only to show the way towards the Realization of the Self only indirectly by focusing our attention on several indirect methods. Sravaṇa is responsible, according to the Bhāmati School, for an indirect (parokṣa) knowledge of Self, as the means of knowledge, is mediate; manana is also responsible for such knowledge that is indirect; but by nididhyāṣana which engenders constant concentration upon the indirectly realized Self, there arises an immediate (pratyakṣa) knowledge of it. Hence nididhyāṣana is the principal organ of the knowledge of the Self where sravaṇa and manana are secondary. But all these three are never the object of any injunction, but are only objects of factual statement (vihitānuvādaka). 4

This tendency to place more and more importance on meditation reached its height in Madhusūdana Sarasvati. His strong leaning to devotion led him to maintain that bhakti is as good a means as iñāna for realization of Brahman. 5 Thus the Bhāmati school of Vācaśpati gives a place in Advaita for the primacy of meditation in the realization of Brahman. A chart which presents the two interpretations drawn up by Mahamahopadhyaya A. Sastri compares them as follows:

5 PBV, p. 171. See also ACF, p. 42 ff.
BHAMI:

(1) Jīva (individual self) -- locus of both cosmic and individual Avidyā (nescence).
(2) Avidyā is different in different jīvas. Avidyās are therefore many and not one.
(3) Avidyā has for its object Brahman. 
(4) Avidyā is only the efficient cause (nimitta-sahakāri) in the capacity of being a fault.
(5) Avidyā possesses the power of veiling (āvaraṇa-sakti) alone.
(6) Brahman alone is the appearing or illusory cause (vivartopadhāna).
(7) Perception is only mental (māṇasa) and not verbal (sābda).
(8) Mind is also an organ of sense (indriya).
(9) Deep meditation (nīḍidhyāsa) is the main factor in Spiritual Realization while study (śravaṇa) and deliberation (manana) are subsidiaries.
(10) Only the associated Absolute (upahita Brahman) is the object of Vedantic knowledge and not Pure Consciousness.
(11) Pure Consciousness is not the object of mental mode (vṛtti) nor of the reflected consciousness (phalacaitanya).
(12) Knowledge is a form of mental action, but does not come under the scope of injunction.
(13) There is no injunction in the act of study (śravaṇa) in the Upanisadic text -- śrōtavya, etc.
(14) Even the sense-organs, superimposed as they are on the witnessing self (sākṣin), are perceptible.

VIVARANA:

(1) a. Cosmic Avidyā (māya) located in Brahman.
   b. Individual nescience (avidyā) has for its basis jīva
(2) a. Cosmic Avidyā is one.
   b. Individual Avidyās are manifold.
(3) The same
(4) Avidyā is the efficient cause in the capacity of a fault and is also the material cause (upādāna).
(5) It possesses a twofold function a. veiling (āvaraṇa),
   b. projection (vikṣepa).
(6) Brahman and māya both are material causes: (i) Brahman is the illusory or apparent Cause, (ii) Māya is the really transforming material cause.
(7) Perception is both mental and verbal.
(8) Mind is not an organ.
(9) Śravaṇa (study) is the main factor in Realization, manana and nīḍidhyāsa are auxiliaries sic.
(10) Pure Consciousness (śuddha Brahman) also comes within the scope Vedantic knowledge.
(11) Pure Consciousness is the object of mental modification (akhaṇḍākāra vṛtti).
(12) Knowledge is not a mental action and does not come under the jurisdiction of Vedic injunctions.
(13) There is restricting injunction (niyama vidhi) in the śrōtavya text.
(14) Only the characteristics (dharma) of the sense-organs are imposed on the witnessing self and as such are perceptible.
(15) No mental modification is admitted in things directly illumined by the sākṣīn.

(16) Īśvara is the consciousness limited by a totality (samaśṭi) of limitations; while jīva is consciousness with individual limitations (vyāstra).

(15) Mental modification exists in such cases also; but such mind-modifications are not generated by any means of correct knowledge (pramāṇa).

(16) Īśvara is the prototypal consciousness (bimbacāntanya) while jīva is reflected consciousness (pratibimba) and not limited (avacchinna).

CONTEMPORARIES AND FOLLOWERS

The first great thinker with whom we will deal is the ninth century Advaitin Maṇḍana Miśra. His greatest work is called Brahmaśiddhi, which is an independent interpretation of Advaita Vedānta. It is supposed that Maṇḍana lived at the same time as Śaṅkara and wrote his work to promote his own view of Advaita. This work is divided into four chapters, the first of which is Brahma-kānda, which deals with the nature of Brahman as one and immutable, as pure consciousness and positive bliss. The method which Maṇḍana follows is to abolish the difference between subject (drśtr) and object (drśya) because there is something more essential, namely Brahman.

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7 For the controversy about who Mandana Misra is see HIP Vol. II, pp. 82-87.

This rejection of subject and object is centered on the concept of the self. The self does not undergo any change but only appears to transform itself. In reality it is through the self's reflection in the antahkaraṇa that we have the false appearance of transformation.

This false appearance is avidyā or māya for Maṇḍana. This avidyā is not a characteristic (sva-bhāva) of Brahman nor is it different from Brahman which is sat. In fact avidyā is neither existent nor non-existent. It is indescribable or unspeakable (aniṃrvacaniya); it belongs to the individual souls (jīva). But if it belongs to the jīva and is neither existent nor non-existent, there arises an inconstancy. Maṇḍana points out that these inconsistancies are of the nature of avidyā. They can be stated in formulation as: (1) the jīvas are essentially identical with Brahman, (2) the diversities of jīvas are due to imagination (kalpanā), (3) Brahman is devoid of imagination, (4) the jīvas are products of imagination. The question arrived at is to whom does the imagination which produces the jīvas belong? The answer is twofold, in the sense that the imagination belongs to māya, on the one hand, and, on the other, in the sense that avidyā is produced from the jīva and the jīva in turn is produced from avidyā. ⁹

The second chapter of Brahmāsiddhi is called Tarkakānda. In this chapter Maṇḍana refutes the philosophical concept of the perception of difference (bhedā). He begins by stating that bheda

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is wrongly thought to be revealed in perception. Thus he attempts to prove that bheda is never experienced by perception (pratyaksa). This he does by an analysis of perception which he says yields three possible alternatives: (1) that perception manifests a positive object; (2) that perception presents differences from other objects; (3) that perception manifests a positive object and distinguishes it from other objects. This third alternative in turn yields another three alternatives: (a) the simultaneous presentation of the positive object and its distinction from other object; (b) there is given first the presentation of the positive object and then the presentation of the difference; (c) there is given first the presentation of the difference and then the presentation of the positive object. Thus Mandana proceeds by a dialectical argument against all who hold that bheda is revealed in perception. This dialectic is especially directed against the Buddhists and those who hold that things are by their very nature different from one another (praktyaiva-bhinn-bhavan). All in all we can say with Dasgupta that:

The main point in his refutation of the category of difference consists in this that he shows that it is inconceivable and dialectically monstrous to suppose that the category of difference can be experienced through perception and that it is philosophically more convenient to suppose that there is but one thing which through ignorance yields the various notions of difference that to suppose that there are in reality the infinite agreements of unity and difference just as they are experienced in perception.10

The third chapter of Brahmasiddhi is called Niyogakanda. In this chapter Mandana refutes the Mimansa view that Vedantic texts are

10 Ibid., p. 98.
to be interpreted in accordance with the Hīṃsāsā canon of interpretation which states that Vedic texts imply either a command or a prohibition. In the fourth chapter called Sīdhikāṇḍa, Maṇḍana again puts forth the view that the import of the Upaniṣads is to show that the manifold world is illusion which is due to ignorance of the individual souls. 11

Maṇḍana has already been shown to have been the one who gave the necessary basis for the development of the Bhāmatī school of Vedānta by Vācaspati Miśrā. This school utilizes meditation as over against the Viśvānātha school which stresses the Vedāntic texts. For Maṇḍana meditation is indispensably necessary to uproot the saṃskāras (residual impressions) produced by anyathā-grahaṇa-avidyā (misapprehension avidyā). This avidyā is one kind of two, the second being agrahaṇa-avidyā or non-apprehension avidyā. This meditation is necessary as opposed to verbal knowledge of the contents of the Vedāntic texts, which is mediate (paroksā) which can never produce perception of the reality (Brahma-sāksātkāra) and liberation, unless the proper vr̥tti (mental image or modification) is formed through constant meditation. 12

An immediate follower of Śaṅkara is Sureśvara whose most famous works are Naigkarmyasiddhi, Bhadāraṇyaka-bhāṣya-vārttika, and

11 Ibid., p. 98.

12 Another interesting fact about Maṇḍana is that he accepted the theory of sphaṭa advocated by Bhaṭṛṛhari and others and he tried to harmonize the doctrine of the Śābッドadvaita with the Brahmadvaita of the Advaita. For Maṇḍana the word is Brahman, the word is all. See CHI, pp. 256-7.
Taittiriya-bhāṣya-vārttika. The best known, the Naiṣkarmyasaiddhi, will be looked at briefly after a few comments on Brahman as sat.

For Suresvāra Brahman is sat, the material cause of the world. Brahman is also unchanging and it is through māyā that the world appears. Māyā is the secondary or mediate cause of the world which it also pervades. From the standpoint of experience, the world and māyā exist; from the standpoint of Brahman there is no world or māyā but only pure sat, cit, and ānanda. Māyā is the same as avidyā and it veils the true nature of Brahman and makes it appear as the world. It is only through the Vedic texts that avidyā disappears and the knowledge of Brahman dawns. Thus Suresvāra holds more to the Vivaraṇa school of Vedānta which disagrees with Maṇḍana. This disagreement is discussed by D. C. Bhaftacharyya in his article "Post-Śaṅkara Advaita":

Unlike Maṇḍana, Suresvāra maintains that the Vedic texts are capable of producing immediate cognition of the self as Brahman. Suresvāra repudiates the necessity of meditation (dhyānābhyāsa) or repetition (prasāhkhyāna) as a means of producing immediacy (aparokṣavā). This view of Suresvāra and others is called Sadāparokṣavāda. He has also refuted the theory (maintained by Maṇḍana) that avidyā is of two kinds, stating that avidyā must be one, because it has only one supreme Self for its object and support. In the Brhadāraṇyaka-bhāṣya-vārttika he has also rejected the anyathākhyāti theory regarding the nature of error, and has established the theory of anirvacanīya-khyāti, which was accepted by all the later Advaitins.13

13 Different systems hold to different conceptions of error. Some of these are: (a) sat-khyāti of the Rāmānujites, (b) atma-khyāti and the asat-khyāti of the Buddhists, (c) Anyatha of the Nyāya and the Vaibhāṣika systems and (d) anirvacanīya-khyāti of the Advaitins. See CHI, p. 259-60.
In his Naśkarmyā-siddhi Suresvara deals first with the relation of Vedic duties to the attainment of knowledge of Brahman. He argues against the Mīmāṁsā view which maintains that emancipation takes place through Vedic duties. He holds that emancipation has nothing to do with the performance of action. Emancipation is not acquired by a combination of knowledge and performance of duties (jñāna-karma-samuccaya) as is held by Brahmadatta nor is it even necessary for karma to be performed as is maintained by the modified dualists like Bhartṛprapāṇca. Two considerations refute the latter view: that the conception of reality as both unity and difference is self-contradictory, and when oneness is realized through true knowledge and the sense of otherness and difference is removed, it is not possible for duties to be performed. The performance of duties always implies the experience of duality and difference. Knowledge of Brahman always implies unity and sameness. 14

The second chapter of Naśkarmyā-siddhi deals with the relation of self-realization to the proper interpretation of the Upaniṣads. When self-knowledge dawns, the experience of ego and what is included in the makeup of the ego vanishes. Duality is caused by the effects of antahkarana; knowledge breaks the bond of objectivity and illusory appearances. The world appearance is seen as a product of nescience (ajñāna). Thus all vanishes like the illusory silver in the conch shell. 15

The nature of ājñāna is the subject of the third chapter. Ājñāna produces the non-self which gives rise to apparent objective things. Ājñāna has its support in the self which is the same as Brahman:

It is the ignorance of the real nature of the self that transforms itself into all that is subjective and objective, the intellect and its objects. It is thus clear that according to Suresvara, unlike Vācaspati Miśra and Nāṇḍana, the avidyā is based not upon individual persons (jīva), but upon the pure intelligence itself. It is this ignorance which, being connected and based upon the pure self, produces the appearances of individual persons and their subjective and objective experiences.¹⁶

Thus Suresvara deals with the concept of avidyā in his third chapter. In the fourth and final chapter he summarizes the first three.

Māyā for Suresvara is only an instrument (dvāra) through which the one Brahman appears as many. It is positive but is not substance. It is like a veil which hangs on Brahman and covers up the One and draws attention away from it. Thus Suresvara’s māyāvāda itself has no new element. Suresvara introduces a new concept when this theory is transposed into a theory of error, namely anivivacanīya-khyāti. This contributes to the future development of Advaita in Indian philosophy.

The third Advaita thinker whom we will consider is Padmapāda (820 A.D.), the founder of the Vivaraṇa school of Vedānta. Two works are attributed to him: the first and most important is the Pañca-pādīka, which is a commentary on Śaṅkara’s commentary on the first four sutras.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 101.
of the Brahma-sūtra. For Padmapāda the terms māyā, avyākṛta, prakṛti, agraḥana, avyakta, tamabha, kāraṇa, laya, śakti, mahāsupti, nīḍā, kṣara, and ākāśa are synonymous with avidyā. Avidyā is that which obstructs the pure and independently self-revealing nature of Brahman. Avidyā stands as if it were a pointed canvas (citra-bhītī) of ignorance (avidyā), deeds (karma), and past impressions of knowledge (pūrva-prajñā-samskāra). All of these produce the individual persons (jīvatvāpādikā). Avidyā thus maintains itself in the jīva. The support and object of this avidyā is Brahman. This conception is against that of Vācaspati Miśra—who maintains that avidyā has Brahman as its object and the jīva as its support. This also is one of the points of difference between the Vivaraṇa and the Bhāmati schools.

Padmapāda has given two meanings to falsehood: (1) Falsehood is a simple negation (apahṛta-vacana). (2) Falsehood is the unspeakable and indescribable (anirvacanīyā-vacana). Dasgupta adds that, "It is probably he who of all the interpreters first described ajñāna or avidyā as being of a material nature (jātātmikā) and of the nature of a power (jātātmikā-avidyā-śakti), and interpreted Saṅkara's phrase 'māthya-jānana-nimittah' as meaning that it is the material power of ajñāna that is constitutive or the material cause of the world-appearace." This conception gives more substantiality to avidyā than existed in Saṅkara.

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17 Ibid., p. 104.  
18 Ibid., pp. 104-5.  
19 Ibid., p. 105.  
20 CHI, p. 263.
With this conception of material power Padmapāda distinguishes between avidyā and māya. When the power of concealing (āvarana) is predominantly ignorance, it is called avidyā, and when the power of projection or transformation (vikṣepa) is predominant, it is called māya.\textsuperscript{21} With regard to this transformation or creation he maintains that irrational and indefinable ignorance (anirvacanīya-avidyā) is the material cause of superimposition and the world appearance. This indefinableness is carried over into discussion about the falsehood of the world. According to Padmapāda the world is false in the sense that it is different from both what is sat (existent) and what is asat (non-existent). Anything that is neither existent nor non-existent is false. Thus the world is false and the only thing that is sat is Brahman.

Padmapāda's thought has a dominating, pervasive influence over the development of later advaitic thought. His system is less revolutionary and speculative than Maṇḍana's and thus draws a greater number of thinkers. It offers a more orthodox, comprehensible explanation of the riddle of existence. The sole distinguishing characteristic of Padmapāda is that it was the elaborate systematization of the metaphysical subtleties, often ignored by early thinkers, as bereft of any pragmatic value.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{21}Ibid., p. 263.

\textsuperscript{22}S.Hasurkar, Viścaspati Misra on Advaita Vedānta, (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1958), p. 206. Cited hereafter as VNAV.
The fourth Advaita thinker who followed both Śaṅkara and Madhava is Vācaspati Miśra (840 A.D.). Vācaspati wrote commentaries on all the systems of philosophy, the most important of which is probably the Bhāmati which is a commentary on Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya. In his view truth and reality are given as immediate self-revelation. He holds to two different kinds of ājñāna:

... as psychological and as forming the material cause of the mind and the inner psychical nature of man or as the material world outside. Thus he says in his commentary on the Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, I.iii.30, that at the time of the great dissolution (mahā-pralaya) all products of avidyā, such as the psychical frame (antahkarana), cease to have any function of their own, but are not on account of that destroyed; they are at that time merged in the indescribable avidyā, their root cause, and abide there as potential capacities (sūkṣmena-sakti-rūpaka) together with the wrong impressions and psychological tendencies of illusion.23

Thus we see that for Vācaspati avidyā or māyā is coexistent with Brahman, an accessory through which the creation of the world takes place. It hides Brahman and rests on individual persons who are themselves dependent upon māyā and māyā on them. The world appearance is not a mere subjective idea or sensation but has an objective existence, even though its nature is inexplicable and indescribable (anirvacaniya-avidyā). At the time of dissolution the constitutive material, both psychical and physical, will remain hidden in avidyā until the next creation.24

Vācaspati's contribution to the Advaita differs from Madhava in that:

24 Ibid., p. 48.
his predecessor [Maṇḍana] points to the ultimate undefinability of avidyā as the only explanation of mutually inter-dependent position of avidyā and its locus, the individual soul, Vācaspati, more logical and rational in his attitude, lays emphasis on the beginninglessness of the two entities interdependently involved, and thus refutes the charge of his rivals. . . . he is the first advaitin, known to us who, improving upon the original stand of Maṇḍana, states in clear-cut terms that the avidyā, the locus of which cannot be logically maintained to be Brahman, is not one common to all individual souls, its seats; but as many, differing with each and every one of them.25

Avidyā or ajñāna then abides in the many jīvās and not in Brahman, which is of the nature of knowledge.

As we have already noted, for Vācaspati there are two kinds of avidyā. The positive one, which produces the world, gives rise to the psychological avidyā. The former, mūlāvidyā or kāraṇāvidyā (primal nescience), produces the latter, tūlāvidyā or kārṇāvidyā (derivative nescience).26 Brahman as Īśvara is both the material (upādāna) and the efficient cause (nīmitta) of the world and is māyā. Māyā is coexistent with Brahman, an accessory in the creation of the world. Māyā hides Brahman and is dependent upon souls; the souls are in turn dependent upon māyā. But for Vācaspati the world appearance is not mere subjective idea or sensation; it has objective existence, even though its nature is inexplicable and indescribable.27

26CHI, p. 267.
DIALECTICIANS

By observing the chart of post-Śaṅkara Advaita we can see there are many omitted in our survey. This can be defended from two points of view, namely, a complete survey of every thinker would be beyond the possibilities and scope of this study, and those whom we have looked at represent major figures having the most impact on the tradition. We will now turn our attention to those thinkers who best represent the dialectical aspect of post-Śaṅkara thought.

The beginnings of the fully developed dialectic can be found in the work of Śrīharṣa (1150 A. D.). Śrīharṣa wrote many works which are not available, but the most important study philosophically is his Khāṇḍana-khanda-khādyā in which he attempts to refute all definitions of the Nyāya system, intended to justify the reality of experience, by proving that experiences are phenomenal and that all that is known is indefinable and unreal. This is because, "... indefinableness is in the nature of all things in the world and all experience (māyā-svabhāvānugāmānīṃ anirvacanīyatvā) and no amount of ingenuity or scholarship can succeed in defining the nature of that which has no definable nature of existence." Thus the arguments put forward by the Naiyayikas and the Vaiśeṣikas to support the reality of the pramāṇas (the means of valid cognition) and the prameyās (the objects of valid experience) are shown by the dialectic to be relative truths which are ultimately not valid.

28 Ibid., p. 127.
This negative method of destructive criticism (khaṇḍana) was originally started by the Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna. It was taken up by Śrīharṣa, Citsukha, Ānandagiri and a host of others.

Commenting on the dialectics' ties with Buddhism Śrīharṣa:

... admits the similarity of his philosophy to that of the nihilists (Sunyavādins); but he promptly points out the difference too, saying that while the Buddhists hold everything to be indeterminable and false, the Brahmanavādins (Vedāntins) hold knowledge (viśnāna) to be self-evident and real; that while the former hold that the world does not exist outside cognition, the latter assert that the world, though indeterminable as sat or asat, is different from cognition.29

Thus Śrīharṣa proceeds purely dialectically and tends to concentrate upon the destruction of other systems rather than developing his own. But he accepts Brahman and in fact says that the proof that may be demanded of ultimate oneness is seen in the fact that that very demand proves that the idea of ultimate oneness exists. This is to say that if the idea of ultimate oneness were not at all realized then no one could think of asking for a proof of it.30

Using the dialectic method Śrīharṣa shows that to try to define a concept of "difference" is impossible because the nature of the structure in which we use such a concept is indefinable. As Dasgupta points out:

The chief method of Śrīharṣa's dialectic depends upon the assumption that the reality of the things that one defines depends upon the unimpeachable character of the definitions;

29 CHI, p. 271.
but all definitions are faulty, as they involve the fallacy of argument in a circle (cakravāca), and hence there is no way in which the real nature of things can be demonstrated or defined. Our world of experience consists of knower, known and knowledge; if a knower is defined as the possessor of knowledge, knowledge can only be understood by a reference to the knower; the known, again, can be understood only by a reference to knowledge and the knower, and so there is a circle of relativity which defies all attempts at giving an independent definition of any of these things. It is mainly this relativity that in specific forms baffles all attempts at definition of all categories.\(^{31}\)

Following directly in Śrīharsa’s footsteps we have Citsukha, who not only used dialectical reasoning but also gave astute interpretations of some important concepts of Advaita.\(^{32}\) In his most important work, the Tattva-pradīpikā or Citsukhī, he refutes the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika categories and also develops and interprets Advaita theories. He begins his interpretation of Vedānta by giving a formal definition to the concept self-revelation or self-illumination. Citsukha is probably the first thinker to give such a definition in the thought of Advaita.\(^{33}\) He defines it as "... that which is entitled to be called immediate (aparokṣa-vyavahāra-yoga), though it is not an object of any cognition or any cognizing activity (avedyatva'pi)."\(^{34}\)

In other words self-luminosity is that which, without being an object of cognition, can be experienced or intuited immediately. This definition applies only to the self because the self is not an object of cognition. It is defined as consciousness—pure self-revealing consciousness (atmanāb samvid-rūpatva).

\(^{31}\)Ibid., p. 133. \(^{32}\)Ibid., p. 147 ff.  
\(^{33}\)Ibid., p. 149. \(^{34}\)Ibid., p. 149.
Falsity is defined as the non-existence of things in that which is supposed to be their abode or locus. This is commented on by Dasgupta:

Citsukha defines falsity (mithyatva) as the non-existence of a thing in that which is considered to be its cause. He shows this by pointing out that a whole, if it is to exist anywhere, must exist in the parts of which it is made, and, if it does not exist even there, it does not exist anywhere and is false. It is, however, evident that a whole cannot exist in the parts, since, being a whole, it cannot be in the parts. Another argument adduced by Citsukha for the falsity of the world appearance is that it is impossible that there should be any relation between the self-revealing consciousness, the knower (dr̥k), and the objects which are cognized (dr̥ṣṭya).  

Thus he uses the dialectic method to determine the implications of falsity in Advaita. This follows Śrīharṣa but uses new and different arguments:

... though the arguments of Citsukha are in many cases new and different from those given by Śrīharṣa. Citsukha's general approach to such refutations is also slightly different from that of Śrīharṣa. For, unlike Śrīharṣa, Citsukha dealt with the principal propositions of the Vedānta, and his refutations of the Nyāya categories were not intended so much to show that they were inexplicable or indefinable as to show that they were false appearances, and that the pure self-revealing Brahman was the only reality and truth.  

But because he did not deal with the Nyāya categories as strongly as did Śrīharṣa, this does not mean that he holds a different view about false presentations.

Citsukha maintained the fundamental viewpoints on the nature of avidyā, how it ceases, and where it has its support, that were

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36 Ibid., p. 156.
set down in the views of Sūmāvara and others. 37

Avidyā or ajñāna is a beginningless positive entity. It is called positive only in the sense that it is not negative. It is not the negation or absence of knowledge. Ignorance is not perceived by any sense process but is directly perceived by the self-shining consciousness (saksīn). Just before the cognition of an object there is ignorance covering the object which is then experienced by the saksīn as having been unknown (ajñātatavā). Thus all things are objects of the witnessing consciousness (saksīn) either as known or as unknown. The saksīn, according to Citsukha, is none other than the pure Brahman which is in the Jiva as its unchanging background. Citsukha explains error as the experience of a false presentation of an indeterminable nature (anirvacanīya-khyāti). 38

False presentations, then, though they serve all the purposes of a perceptual object, cannot be described as either sat or asat. They are unspeakable or indefinable and are illusion.

Following the dialectical movement of Citsukha we can see the breadth of his philosophical thinking. Generally his refutations of categories follow the same line of development found in Śrīhārṣa's work Khandana-khaṇḍa-kādya. Briefly then, he covers the following categories. In his refutation of time (kāla), he maintains that it can neither be seen as a thing nor can it be apprehended by the mind (manas). The same is also true of space (dīk). He refutes the Vāiszēśika theory of atoms by reference to the relation of part to the whole, as we have seen above. Contact (samyoga) and separation (vibhāga) cannot be understood. The same holds for the theory of

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37 Ibid., p. 153.
38 CHI, p. 273.
numbers, class-concept (jati), cause (karana) and effect (karya), substance (dravya) and qualities (guna). All fall under the dialectic and are seen, in the last analysis, to be inexplicable. 39

We have mentioned above the relation of Śrīharṣa, and by implication Citsukha, to the Buddhist thinker Nāgārjuna. Another obvious relation has been pointed out by Dasgupta, who states:

... though Śrīharṣa and Citsukha carried out an elaborate scheme of a critique of the different categories in order to show that the definitions of these categories, as given by the Nyāya, are impossible, yet neither of them can be regarded as the originator of the application of the dialectic method in the Vedānta. Saṅkara himself had started it in his refutation of the Nyāya and other systems in his commentary on the Vedānta-sūtras, II.ii. 40

This is a correct analysis but if carried too far it leads to a misunderstanding; tradition maintains that the post-Saṅkara Advaita brought out many of the ambiguities in Saṅkara and formulated them into a more coherent system. Saṅkara did not develop a distinct dialectical method. This opinion is also expressed by Dasgupta a few pages later when he states that:

Saṅkara, however, seldom indulges in logical dialectic like the above, and there are only a few rare instances in which he attacks his opponents from a purely logical point of view. But even here he does not so much criticize the definitions of the Vaiśeṣikas as point out the general logical and metaphysical confusion that result from some of the important Vaiśeṣika theories. It is easy to note the difference of a criticism like this from the criticisms of Śrīharṣa in his Khandana-khanda-khādyā, where he uses all the power of his dialectical subtleties to demolish the cherished principles of pure logic as formulated by the Nyāya logicians. 41

40 Ibid., p. 163.
41 Ibid., pp. 191-2.
The next major figure we will consider is Vidyārāpya Mādhava (1350 A. C.) who wrote the Pañcadasī, Vivarāṇa-prameya-saṅgraha, and the Jīvan-mukti-viveka. The most important for our study are the Pañcadasī and the Vivarāṇa-prameya-saṅgraha. In his Pañcadasī, Vidyārāpya repeats the Vivaraṇa view of Advaita. Speaking about the relation of Brahman and māyā he states that because the scripture declares Brahman to be "relationless" there can exist no real relation between Brahman and māyā. But just as there is an unreal relation between the sky and the color blue there is an unreal relation between Brahman and māyā. This relation is a superimposed one of identity, called anirvacanīya-tādatmya-sambandha (or indefinable relation of

42 There exists controversy over exactly who this thinker really is and what his name is. Dasgupta states that, "Vidyārāpya is reputed to be the same as Mādhava, brother of Śāyana, the great Vedic commentator." HIP Vol. II, p. 215. See also CHI p. 274. Another suggestion is that given by T. M. P. Mahadevan in his The Pañcadasī of Bhāratītīrtha-Vidyārāpya, he states, "In an earlier work, The Philosophy of Advaita, with Special Reference of Bhāratītīrtha-Vidyārāpya, I suggested that probably Bhāratītīrtha wrote the Pañcadasī and the Vivarāṇaprameya-saṅgraha, and not Mādhavācārya, the reputed author of such works as the Parāśara-mādhavīya, etc. The main authority for [sic] making this suggestion is Appayya Dīksita's Siddhān-talesa-saṅgraha where the Vivarāṇa-prameya-saṅgraha is ascribed to Bhāratītīrtha, as also the Pañcadasī from which passages are cited, attributing them to Bhāratītīrtha. The passages cited by Appayya Dīksita are from the Citradīpa (Ch. V), the Chyānadiya (Ch. XI), and the Brahmānanda-Yogānanda (Ch. XI). I gave also other evidence in support of my view that Bhāratītīrtha might be considered the author of the Pañcadasī, the Vivarāṇa-prameya-saṅgraha, and possibly of the Īṣa-drṣya-viveka also." See PBV, p. xiv-xv. See also Mahadevan, The Philosophy of Advaita, pp. 1-8.
identity). Mâyâ then acts as an obscurer of Brahman. It can be described as that power which produces the world appearance, power neither absolutely real nor unreal. Brahman is the absolute real. Mâyâ then is associated with Brahman. It is associated with that part of Brahman which transforms itself into elements and their modifications. Thus all objects of the world are a complex of Brahman and mâyâ.

The power which produces the world appearance is Īśvara plus the jīvas—joint creators of the world. Īśvara is the principal parent, the jīva is a subsidiary one. In respect to the world existence, Īśvara is the ground, whereas in respect to enjoyment, the jīva is the locus. The nature of creation for Īśvara is physical, for jīva it is psychical. Before this illustration is carried too far Vidyaranya reminds us that:

The universal and unitary Self appears to be split up as Īśvara and the jīvas. But in reality the Īśvaratva and the jīvatva are unreal superimpositions of the adjuncts, viz., mâyâ and the five sheaths. The sheaths were shown to be modifications of mâyâ. The māyāsakti belongs to Īśvara. It produces the world, regulates and governs it. Because of the reflection of Intelligence in it, it seems to possess consciousness. It appears to be alive and animating. Brahman seems to attain Īśvaratva, because of its apparent association with this sakti. When the five sheaths are superimposed on the Self, it becomes the jīva, the empirical self. But the principle, which appears as Īśvara when it is in association with mâyâ and as the jīva due to the superimposition of the sheaths, is the same Brahman. This is

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43 PBV, p. 19.
45 PBV, pp. 44-5.
comparable to a person becoming father to one and grandfather to another. Apart from the son and the grandson, that person is neither the father nor the grandsire. When we discard māyā and its effects and perceive their non-reality, Brahman is realized to be pure and infinite.\textsuperscript{46}

Discussing further the nature of māyā experientially and logically Vidyāraṇya remarks that:

māyā which is the material cause of the universe is of the nature of nescience. The evidence for this statement is experience itself. The products of prakṛti are experienced to be inert and delusive by all people from the wise to the ignorant. Inertness, indeed, is that which constitutes the nature of pot, etc.; and where the intellect is made blunt, that is called delusion. Sub-specie temporis all persons experience delusion and ignorance. Though immediately and universally experienced, māyā is indeterminable. Logic cannot determine the nature of māyā, which is neither real nor unreal. Māyā is not unreal, because it is manifest; it is not real, because it is sublated. Thus to logic māyā is a riddle. But sub-specie aeternitatis it is unreal. From the point of view of knowledge, māyā is that which is not. To those who have realized the purport of scripture it is not real at any time. For them there is no māyā at all. To the logicians it is like the Sphinx, indeterminable. It can be described neither as real nor as unreal. To the lay men of the world māyā appears to be real. Thus māyā is of three forms, unreal, indeterminable, and real.\textsuperscript{47}

The Pañcadasī of Vidyāraṇya, compared to the Vivaraṇaprameva-saṅgraha, is much easier to understand. The Vivaraṇaprameva-saṅgraha presents itself as a much more closely argued work, centering in great detail on those subjects covered in the Pañcadasī. Instead of going into these arguments in detail we will give a brief outline of the work by following the comments of the author. The work is

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., p. 38.

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., p. 71.
divided into four aphorisms made up of nine varnakas. Aphorism one varnaka one concerns itself with, "The unity with Brahman is the content of the prescription, through the mediation of the Vedānta; that together with its fruit was expounded in the previous section."48 The second varnaka begins with the statement, "For the prescription 'The self is to be heard', the direct content is the inquiry concerned with the Vedānta texts; that [content] is to be expounded in the present section."49 Following this, "Here, in the third varnaka, in order to strengthen [the conclusion about] the commencement of the śāstra, through commenting on the words of the aphorism, the senses of the words are inquired into."50 Fourth varnaka: "But the three, however, viz., the connection, the content and the fruit, were [only] briefly indicated; in the fourth varnaka all these [three] are objected to [discussed] and demonstrated."51 Second Aphorism fifth varnaka and third aphorism sixth varnaka: "In the second aphorism was stated the two-fold definition of Brahman. Here is stated by the aphorist the probans in respect of Brahman's omniscience, in the words 'Because of being śāstra-source.'"52 The seventh varnaka is a continuation of the


49 Ibid., p. 233.

50 Ibid., p. 277.

51 Ibid., p. 365.

52 Ibid., p. 446.
sixth. The fourth aphorism eighth varnaka discusses the validity of the Vedāntas as a means of valid knowledge in respect of Brahman. In the ninth varnaka the author refutes the view of those who think that there is significance in words only when associated with duties. Thus we have given a brief review of Vīvarana-prameya-saṅgrahā of Bhāratīrtha-Vidyāraṇya.

The last figure with whom we will concern ourselves is the most important figure among the later post-Śaṅkara Advaitins. He is Madhusūdana Sarasvati (1500 A. D.) whose major work is his Advaitaśiddhi. In this work he tries to refute the objections raised by Vyāsatīrtha (in his Nyayāmṛta) who is connected with the Madhva school of Vedānta.

It seems, however, that the Viśīṣṭa-dvaitā philosophy was not a source of perennial inspiration for the development of ever newer shades of thought, and that the logical and dialectical thinkers of this school were decidedly inferior to the prominent thinkers of the Śaṅkara and Madhva schools. There is hardly anyone in the whole history of the development of the school of Rāmānuja whose logical acuteness can be compared with that of Jayatīrtha or Vyāsatīrtha.

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53 Ibid., p. 461.  
54 Ibid., p. 483.  
55 Madhusūdana Sarasvati belonged to the family of Sri Rama Misra of Kotalipada (Dist. Faridpur, Bengal). His father’s name was Pramodana Purandaracarya. Madhusūdana was a Bengali Brahmana of the Pascātya Vaidika Srinī and wrote numerous works in addition to Advaitaśiddhi. He wrote: (1) Gūḍhārthādipika (a commentary of the Gītā), (2) Advaitaratnakaraṣaṇa, (3) Prasthānabhadra, (4) Bhaktirasāyana, (5) Vedāntakaḷpaṭalika, plus commentaries on: (6) Saṅkṣepasārīraka, (7) Mahimnāstaṭotra, (8) Bhāgavata, (9) Daśaśloka or Siddhantabindu. See Introduction to Advaitaśiddhi, Sastri, trans., 1934, cited hereafter as IAS.  
Madhusūdana's greatest work Advaitasiddhi is divided into four chapters. In the first chapter he proposes the theory that Brahman is given as the central unity around which all revolves. In the second chapter he meets all objections brought against the first chapter and criticizes all rival theories. In chapter three he discusses and delineates the ways and means to attain Brahmavidyā. In the fourth and final chapter he recounts the fruits of Brahmavidyā.

The relation of Brahman to the world appearance is discussed by Madhusūdana under three points: (1) Brahman is not subject to negation or sublation at any time, and is existent. (2) Non-entities: subject to eternal negation, and non-existent. (3) The characteristic common to both Brahman and the world-appearace is existence. The characteristic common to both alīka and the world-appearace is liability to negation. Hence, the world-appearace may be inferred to be both existent and subject to negation or sublation. Thus world-appearace is established as existent and subject to negation or non-existence. This point is brought out more fully in the comparison between the Dvaita and the Advaita on the truth or falsity of the world. Sastri points this out in a chart, the first point of comparison being given as: "Dvaita, (1) In cases of error, asatkhyati is recognized, so that the illustration of the shell-silver may not be put forward to establish the falsity of the world; Advaita, (1) In

57 IAS, p. 15.
such cases, anirvacanīyakhyāti is admitted, so that the empirical
world may be established as false in an analogy of the instances of
illusion."\(^{58}\)

For Madhusūdana:

Brahman which is absolute existence expresses itself in
and through the concrete manifolds, which, therefore,
partially share in the quality of existence. The "isness"
reflected in the world order is to be referred to Brahman
which forms its ultimate substratum. It is due to the ap-\(^{59}\)
parent identity with the permanent substratum Brahman that
the worldly appearances are cognized as true.

Thus Brahman is seen as the ground upon which the world-appearance
rests. Because this is so and because the world-appearance is
indescribable, Madhusūdana utilizes all five of the various definitions
of falsity given in Advaita. These can be summarized as: (1) Vācaspati
Miśra's--falsity is something quite distinct from both existence and
non-existence. (2) Vivaraṇa school--falsity is the absolute non-
existence of a thing in a locus where it appears. (3) Vivaraṇa school--
the falsity is the capability of being sublated by knowledge. (4)
Citsukha--falsity is the appearance of a thing in a locus where it
never existed in the pāramarthika or in its own form. (5) Ānanda-
bodha--falsity is something other than the object of valid knowledge.\(^{60}\)

\(^{58}\) Ibid., p. 78.

\(^{59}\) A. B. Shastri, Studies in Post-Saṃkara Dialectics, (Calcutta:

\(^{60}\) IAS, p. 37.
Madhusūdana then works with all the tools at his disposal to refute the arguments of his opponents. He begins by accepting anirvacanīya-khyāti:

The world is neither sat or asat. It stands midway between the two extremes, sat and asat. It is sat because it partially shares in the quality of existence and asat because it partially partakes of the character of non-existence, for though without a beginning, it has an end and will die out. The world, is, because it appears to us, and also is not, because it will cease to exist ultimately. It follows also that avidyā, the cause materia of this world exists because it appears to us, and at the same time it does not exist because it ultimately dies out of existence. So we find that both the world and its cause materia, avidyā, are neither being nor non-being but inexplicable in their nature. Madhusūdana Sarasvati thus maintains that the inexplicable character of nescience is neither sat nor asat nor both.61

In sum we can say of Madhusūdana that he

... supports many of the conflicting theories separately and independently, implying thereby that any of the theories may be resorted to in explaining the indeterminate false world, the main interest of the Advaitins being in the one absolute Brahman. Thus he analyzes and accepts the unity as well as the plurality of the Jīvas, the unity as well as the plurality of nesciences, Brahman as well as the Jīva as the locus of nescience, the objectivity of the world as well as the Vedāntic solipsism (Prati-pradīpi-vāda), and so on. He prescribes the different theories for different Vedānta students according to their fitness (adikāra). Himself a bhakta, he could easily harmonize bhakti with the Advaita doctrine of attributeless Brahman. Thus, just after the chapter where he strongly affirms the formlessness of Brahman, he indulges in a highly emotional description of his deity Kṛṣṇa who, he says, is the "highest" known to him.62

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61 Studies PS, p. 287.

CONCLUSION

Though Śaṅkara said that the world was māyā and was due to māyā the followers of Śaṅkara could not resist the urge to conceptualize the world on this basic concept of māyā. "The latter treated māyā, not as a concept of value, but as a principle of explanation and creation. However mysterious it may be, its workings must have a method, which they wanted to grasp rationally." The post-Śaṅkara Advaitins turned from a concern about knowledge of Brahman to the question of the relation between Brahman and māyā. Three views developed out of the controversy surrounding this problem:

(1) the ābhāsa-vāda or appearance theory; (2) the pratibimba-vāda or reflection theory, and (3) the avaccheda-vāda or determination theory.

In the first theory, according to Suresvara, Brahman is screened by avidyā and appears as sakṣin or witness, which is the same as Īśvara. Brahman is also screened by buddhi or intellect and appears as jīva.

In the reflection theory, "Īśvara is a reflection of the Brahman in māyā and jīva the reflection in avidyā, which is a part of māyā." 64

In the determination theory, given by Vācaspati,

"Māyā, though not real, can limit the nature of infinite Brahman; and jīva is thereby obtained. What is not so limited is Īśvara. The same Brahman as the object (visāya) of avidyā is Īśvara; but the āśraya (locus) of avidyā is

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64 Ibid., p. 295.
Thus avidyā becomes a determination of īśvāra and overwhelms him; but it is not a determination of īśvāra, and so He is not overwhelmed by it.65

From the epistemological standpoint it is difficult to pass from knowledge of the abstract to knowledge of the concrete:

In fact, it is somewhat difficult to establish the objective reference of knowledge by starting from knowledge. How knowledge passes from abstract to concrete is what logical intellect cannot fully apprehend. This is an epistemological implication of the māyā doctrine of Śaṅkara... This aspect has been more fully developed in Śaṅkarites than in Śaṅkara.66

It has developed because of the need of the Advaita to criticize and refute divergent theories. In this criticism new possibilities opened up for the development of his own theory. This has been seen in this study in terms of dialogue, "Maṇḍana, Suresvara, Pādmapāda and Vācaspati are the creators of four distinct lines of Advaita thought. Each has many followers. But it will not be right to say that these lines developed independently. The lines cross and recross each other; and as fresh problems were created by further controversies, their followers gave independent solution."67

We have seen in the course of this study that one of the primary concepts to emerge out of the post-Śaṅkara Advaita is the inexplicable nature of the world-appearance. This development is commented on by A. B. Shastrī in his Studies in Post-Śaṅkara Dialectics:

65 Ibid., p. 295.
66 Studies PS, pp. 9-10.
67 HPEW, p. 290.
According to Sāṅkhya, the cause and effect are identical, because it is the potentiality that comes into actuality. But Advaitism denies this truth and holds that the relation is inexplicable, anirvacanīya. So far as our experience is concerned we can say this much, that the effect cannot be understood independent of its material cause, i.e., pot cannot exist independent of clay. Thus it stands in opposition to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems that hold that the effect is a separate and independent entity. The relation is not identical; because the activity of the agent fails in this affirmation and the expression "the agent makes a think" is emptied of all meaning. Neither can it be considered as bhedabheda as these are two contradictory terms which cannot inhere in the same object at the same time. Hence the nature of the effect is unspeakable or anirvacanīya. This is the view of the Sāṁkarites.\(^6\)

In the Advaita any world-appearance should not be regarded as having independent reality like Brahman. Things appear to us as real because they are kindled with Brahman. They are seeming expressions of reality and not real existence. As Suresvara remarks, \(^6\)

the world has come out of sat, loses itself in sat, so the entire world is real, but viewed apart from sat is false.\(^6\)

In conclusion then we can say that māyāvāda or avidyāvāda has a threefold implication brought out by the dialectic: (1) The dialectic demonstrates the self-contradictions involved in the nature of thought. (2) The dialectic demonstrates the futility of thinking to know the ultimate truth. (3) The dialectic indirectly stresses the value of the other methods of approach.\(^7\) These implications plus the development of the Advaita on other lines make the Advaita

\(^6\) *Studies* PS, pp. 172-3.


the philosophical system that it is. What we have concentrated on is but one aspect in this system, namely māyāvāda. Māyā is the inexplicable, the mysterious, as A. B. Shastri observes:

To sum up, the real essence of the Anirvacanīya theory of the Advaita Vedānta as propounded by Samkara in his exposition of Adhyasa, and developed by other advocates of the monistic school, is that appearances are inexplicable and mysterious, as their cauṣa māteria avidyā is inexplicable and mysterious in its character. Avidyā as becoming principle creates new appearances in erroneous conception. Objects of normal perception as well come under this category; as the time-space-cause world also owes its origin to the mysterious power of Māyā and is superimposed on the Absolute Being. The principle therefore is the same in the normal and abnormal perception. But the Advaita Vedānta draws a distinction between the false percept and normal percept, the normal percept though superimposed persists to the last while the abnormal one is denied in our pragmatic life.71

71 Ibid., pp. 242-3.
PART TWO

PHENOMENOLOGICAL INQUIRY
CHAPTER VI

LANGUAGE AND REALITY (NAMA-RUPA) IN ADVAITA

LANGUAGE IN ADVAITA

The structure of language in Śaṅkara's thought is grounded in the premise of Vedāntic thinking that the nature of language is apauruṣeya\(^1\) which means non- or trans-personal. This is to say that language originates from Brahman and is one of the primary modes by which realization is gained. Language in its highest participation in Brahman is śruti and at its lowest is idle chatter. In fact not only language but reasoning itself is founded upon śruti for the Advaita:

Reasoning independent of scripture, says the Vedānta, depends upon the theoretical speculations of individuals, and speculations are unrestricted and devoid of proper foundation. The Vedānta feels called upon to give an epistemological account of this archimedian point. It sees the Veda or śruti as the foremost pramāṇa (knowledge by the very act of assumption which governs the character of reason). The only role of pramāṇa is to argue itself out of the context of knowledge and let truth remain.\(^2\)

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\(^2\)LK, p. 162.
Language then, has a structure which is ultimately dependent and given by Brahman. This language constructs and delineates the Weltanschaung of the Advaita. Language acts always as a participant and pointer to the Real. This is because in the Advaita the concern is about Brahman as such and not about the world or experience. All accurate language is language which is concerned with the acquiring of knowledge of Brahman. Language acts as a pointer to Brahman because it is through language that that which is unspeakable is provisionally spoken. The nature of Brahman is inscrutable.

Need it be mentioned, therefore, that it is not possible to explain the inscrutable nature of Brahman, without (the help of) the Scriptures? The Purāṇikās also say, similarly —"Do not employ reasoning to entities which are unthinkable. To be beyond the material effects (Prakṛti) is the criterion of that which is unfathomable." Therefore, the realization of the supersensuous Brahman, as it is in fact, depends upon the Scriptures as its source.3

The Advaita understanding of language grew out of a great heritage of the philosophy and meaning of language. It grew out of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā darśana in its formulation of a canon of interpretation, especially within the view of Kumārila within that darśana. The vast and complex work of the Grammarian thinkers such as Bhartṛhari influenced the thought of the Advaita position.4 The Buddhists,

3 BSB, II.1.27, Apte, p. 332.
4 For a further study of the whole approach to language in Indian philosophy refer to: Sastrī, The Philosophy of Word and Meaning; Iyer, Bhartṛhari; Pillai, Vaiśkāpadiya; and Iyer, Sphota-siddhi listed in the Bibliography.
with language philosophy as *apobhavāda*, provided the antithesis to the Advaita conception. However, each of these constitutes a system unto itself, containing an involved analysis of their own roots which is beyond the present inquiry. Our concentration must center on a less ambitious task, namely the Advaita view of language and its relation to nāma-rūpa and māyā.

**LANGUAGE AND NĀMA-RŪPA (GENERAL)**

The basis of the complex which is called the universe is found in the construct termed names and forms (nāma-rūpa). These names and forms are constructs of language, as Śaṅkara observes:

Brahma appears to become susceptible of (i.e. appears to be the basis of) all phenomenal behaviour by way of modifications etc. by reason of the distinctions of aspects or forms characterized by names and forms imagined through Nescience, which are at once both evolved and unevolved, and about whom it is not possible to predicate that they either are or are not Brahma, while in its truest nature Brahma subsists only in its unmodified aspect, and is beyond all phenomenal behaviour, and, as names and forms imagined through Nescience are but merely made current by speech, the fact that Brahma has no parts is not thereby vitiated. Besides, on the one hand this Scriptural statement about the modification (of Brahma) is not meant to propound the fact of modification itself, as such realization is not understood to have any fruits as such, while on the other hand it is intended to establish how Brahma which is the Self of all is devoid of any real phenomenal behaviour, as it is understood that a fruit results by such realization.5

and further:

Because (the world i.e. everything) is created out of this (i.e. the word). It is out of this Scriptural word, indeed, that this world i.e. everything including the

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5 BSB, II. 1.27, Apte, p. 333.
Gods etc. is creator. ... Similarly we understand that before creation, Vedic words occurred to Prajāpati the creator and thereafter he created the objects according to those words. That the Scriptures also say similarly viz. that he uttered the word "Bhūh" and created the Earth—which shows that words such as "Bhūh" etc. first occurred to the mind as words, and from them the words "Bhūh" etc. were afterwards created.6

But this abiding of name and form in language does not constitute either the essence or origin of nāma-rūpa. We have just observed that their essence is Brahman. Concerning the location or residence of name and form Śaṅkara asserts that:

... The Sūtrakāra replies—"But the apt arrangement of names and forms". The word "But" refutes the opponent's view. The evolving of names and forms by one who makes the triple agglomeration, indicates the Lord, because the Scriptures indicate that the agency which makes the triple agglomeration can indubitably belong to Him only. This evolving of names and forms such as the fire, the Sun, the Moon, and the lightning, or of Kusha-grass, Kāśa-grass, Palāsha tree or beasts or deer or man, is of various sorts, in so far as every species and every individual is considered in it, and it deserves to be the handiwork of the Lord alone, who is the creator of Teja, Water and the Earth. Whence is it so? Because of such instructions in the Scriptures. After the opening sentence "That this deity thought", and by the use of the first person singular, viz. "I shall evolve", the instruction given is that this evolving is the handiwork of the Highest Brahma alone.7

Name and form are evolved from the Lord orĪśvara. They reside in him because of nescience and the world is created, preserved and reabsorbed into him. In answer to an objection Śaṅkara remarks that:

... the omniscience (of Brahma as the Lord) depends upon the evolving of the seed of the nature of names and forms which are the result of Nescience, and on the

7Ibid., II.4.20, pp. 524-5.
Scriptural passage—"The Ākāsha was born of this very Self" (T afé, 2.1), and that the origin, preservation and resorption of the world proceed from the Lord who is of an eternally pure, wise, and free nature, and neither from the non-sentient Pradhāna nor from any other things, is what is declared (by the Sūtrakāra) by the Sūtra—"From whom is the origin etc. of this world" (Bra. Sū. I.i.4).\[8]

But we must not confuse the issue, for just as the Lord, as it were, evolves the name and form from out of his mind, it is not an actual modification (parigamā) of Brahman. The Advaita darsāna disagrees with this view and speaks rather of a seeming modification, an apparent one, but not an actual modification of Brahman. The Advaita maintains a seeming modification (vivarta) of Brahman because the basis of the construct of name and form is found in nescience. In fact it is made current by speech:

Brahma appears to become susceptible of (i.e. appears to be the basis of) all phenomenal behaviour by way of modifications etc., by reason of the distinctions of aspects or forms characterized by names and forms imagined through Nescience, which are at once both evolved and un-evolved, and about whom it is not possible to predicate that they either are or are not Brahman, while in its truest nature Brahma subsists only in its unmodified aspect, and is beyond all phenomenal behaviour, and, as names and forms imagined through Nescience are but merely made current by speech, the fact that Brahma has no parts is not thereby vitiated. Besides, on the one hand this Scriptural statement about the modification (of Brahma) is not meant to propound the fact of modification itself, as such realization is not understood to have any fruit as such.

\[8\]Ibid., II.1.14, p. 310.
while on the other hand it is intended to establish how Brahma which is the Self of all is devoid of any real phenomenal behaviour, as it is understood that a fruit results by such realization. 9

However in fact Brahman is absolutely changeless and does not contain any conception of "becoming":

... because it has been particularized as being absolutely unchangeable. It is not possible, that one and the same unchangeable Brahma can at one and the same time be the substratum of many (opposite) qualities, such as being fixed and yet capable of movement. We have already said that Brahma is unchangeable and eternal because of the denial (by the Scriptures) of its undergoing any modification. Nor is it, that just as the realization of the doctrine of Brahma being the only one Self leads to the fruit of Final Release, the knowledge that it is capable of modification in the form of this world also leads to some other independent fruit, because there is no authority for it. 10

Brahman is, however, the ground of the manifestation of names and forms for, as we know, there is nothing else but Brahman. This is the conjecture of scripture as we see in Brahma Sūtra I.3.41:

The Ākāśha (is Brahma) because of the mention of its being different (from names and forms).—41.

To which Śaṅkara comments:

A Scriptural passage mentions—"Ākāśha, verily, is the revealer of names and forms. That within which these (names and forms) are (contained) is Brahma, that is immortal, that is the Self" (Chhan. 8.14.1).

... It is the Highest Brahma alone that deserves to be expressed by the term Ākāśha. Why so? Because of the mention of its being a different entity (from names and forms) etc. The passage "That within which these (names and forms) are contained" indicates the Ākāśha as being something different from names and forms, because the

9Ibid., II.1.28, p. 333.
10Ibid., II.1.14, p. 309.
creation as such is precisely evolved by names and forms. Besides, the unfettered and free revelation of names and forms is not possible in the case of anything other than Brahma, because the Scriptures have mentioned the creative agency (Kartr̥ītva) of Brahma thus—"I will now enter (the creations) by the Jīva-Self and evolve names and forms" (Chhān. 6.3.2).

By the use of illustration Śaṅkara points out that just as one can know a jar by its derivation out of a clod of earth, just so, when one knows Brahman one understands the concept of creation:

As for this word "Ārambhāra", the Scriptures, after declaring that by knowing the one (i.e. Brahma) everything else becomes known, and with a desire to cite an illustration, say—"Oh mild one, just as by knowing one clod of earth, everything that is made of earth becomes known. The effect (viz. a pot etc.) is merely a name made current by speech, while that it is earth merely, is the truth" (Chhān. 6.1.1.). By this is meant that when a clod of earth is understood to be in essence but mere earth only, all things made of earth such as a jar, a trough and a water-pot, automatically become known, because, having the earth as their Self is common (to them all), and hence it is (that it is said) than an effect is merely a name made current by speech, and its existence as an effect is because of speech only. The effect viz. a jar or a trough or a water-pot is not in existence substantially as an effect as such, but is merely a name, and is false or untrue, and that it merely is but earth only, is the truth. This is stated as an illustration of Brahma. Therefore, because of the word "Ārambhāra" occurring in the Scriptures, it is understood that, in the case of the thing illustrated also, all creation as a class as such, has no existence as apart from Brahma.

The cause of the material world is understood to be the lower

Brahman, or Śavara:

Scriptural passages such as—"He who is omniscient in the comprehensive sense and who perceives everything in

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11 Ibid., I.3.41, p. 216.

12 Ibid., II.1.14, p. 303.
detail and whose penance is knowledge and from whom the
Brahma, names and forms and food were created" (Mund.
1.1.9.)—which have the purport of conveying that the
omniscient Lord is the cause (of the transient world),
should be adduced as instances.  

In addition when absorption (prāyāla) occurs at the end of the cycle
the names and forms return to their prior condition residing in
Īśvara's mind as seeds (biṭa):

... this very transitory world divided into various
entities by names and forms, was fit to be indicated by
the word "Āvyakta", when after having given up all its
names and forms (which made it manifest) it relapses
into its antecedent condition of a potential seed.  

This seed is seen as consisting of the nature of nescience which is
the same as māyā:

... This potential power of the seed is of the nature
of nescience, and it is indicated by the word "undeveloped"
(Āvyakta), and has the Highest Lord as its basis, and is
of the nature of an illusion (Māyā).  

Thus the aspect of the complex of name and form is based in māyā. As
such they are manifestations of the Real, i.e. Brahman, and are not
something arising out of nothing. As is commented on by Dr.

Radhakrishnan:

The forms are manifestations of the Real, not arbi-
trary inventions out of nothing. Form, rūpa, is the
revelation of the formless a-rūpa. Nāma, name, is not
the word by which we describe the object, but is the
power or the character of reality which the form of a
think embodies. The infinite is nameless for it in-
cludes all names.  

13 Ibid., I.1.5, p. 38.
16 PU, p. 87.
The name-form complex then is taught in the Vedānta (Upaniṣads) as abiding in the Lord:

This is the conclusion derived from all the Upaniṣads, viz., that the evolving of names and forms is the Lord's handwork, because of such passages as "The Ākāśa verily is the revealer of names and forms" (Chhūn. 6.14.1).

Therefore, this evolving of names and forms is the handwork of the Highest Lord who makes the triple agglomeration. ... 17

We have observed that true language or Veda is primary in relation to names and forms. 18 By definition the nature and meaning of language within the Advaita darsāna has its roots in forms, Dr. Arapura explains:

Language is the expression of the forms, and hence the Veda is composed in language. But insofar as language is rooted in the forms, it is not defined as human or other. Language is not an attribute of man or vice-versa; it is simply the case that they coalesce dynamically in the forms. Hence there is no problem of relating divine revelation to human language through the interrelation of two kinds of will and two kinds of act. Only the Veda is true language. For incorporeal beings like the gods, revelation is manifest of itself, but for man it is knowable only through human language. 19

It is not possible to say that the name-form complex is one with Brahman or that it is different from Brahman:

It is declared by both the Scriptures and the Smṛītaś that names and forms which are imagined through Nescience and which are as it were the Self of the Omniscient Lord, and about which it is impossible to say, either that they are one with Brahman or that they are different from it,

17 BSB, II.4.20, Apte, p. 525.

18 This is not to imply an identity between language and Brahman as we have in the Grammarian schools or language philosophies. This is absolutely rejected by the Advaita.

and which are the seeds of this entire expanse of transmigratory existence, are the illusion-causing power and nature (Prakriti) of the Lord.  

Neither can it be maintained that names and forms exist in any absolute sense:

Hence that (the conventional) distinction between the cogitional Jīva-Self and the Highest Self is due to the limiting adjuncts such as the body etc., which are produced by names and forms, which are projected by Nescience, and which do not exist in the absolutely real sense, is what should be understood by those who are the adherents of the Vedānta view, on the strength of the following Scriptural passages—"Sat alone was in the beginning, the only one without a second" (Chhān. 6.2.1), "All this is the Ātmā (Self)" (Chhān. 7.25.2), "All this is Brahma" (Mund. 2.2.11), "All this is that which is the Self" (Bṛih. 2.4.6), "There is no seer other than this" (Bṛih. 3.7.23), "There is no other seer, but this (Self)" (Bṛih. 3.8.11).  

Brahman alone exists in the absolute sense. All else exists, as it were, because of Brahman. In fact, within the above quote the "as it were" is an interesting conception. This is noted by Paul Deussen in his Philosophy of the Upaniṣads where he notes that, "Strictly speaking, such an 'as it were' or ivā should be supplied to every page and every line in which the Upaniṣads are concerned with something other than atman."  

This statement also holds true for the Brahma Sūtra commentary for the Brahma Sūtra is not an inquiry into name and form but an "inquiry into Brahman".

It is not here intended to speak at length about the creation. We neither see nor find it mentioned by the Scriptures that any particular consummation devoutly to be wished for by man (Purushārtha) is bound up with it.

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nor is it possible to imagine so, because it is understood from the introductory and concluding portions, that the details about creation are in complete conformity with passages in various places dealing with Brahman. The Scriptures further do indicate how the account of the creation in extenso has the purpose of making one understand Brahman from it.

LANGUAGE AND BRAHMAN

In the uniqueness of the nature of language in the Advaita darsāna, the complex of name and form emerges as an expression of Ṭāvra. Ṭāvra is the phenomenalization of Brahman from the perspective of the name-form complex. This is to say that the ideas or seeds present in the mind of Ṭāvra must be amplified to be understood. This activity is performed by language. Language itself is grounded in name and form because of the eternity of the Veda. But it is at the same moment the continuation of name and form. In fact name and form and language exist as long as one wishes it so. Language, then, is not the essence of Brahman even though language may be sacred (śruti). So the function of sacred language is referential, it refers to Brahman; it always acts as a pointer beyond itself to Brahman. Language makes possible the transcendence of itself by making itself fulfill its function of transparency. Thus we move through language to knowledge of Brahman which understands language primarily as "an inquiry into Brahman".

23 BSB, I.4014, Apte, p. 251.
LANGUAGE AND MĀYĀ

We noted earlier in this study the idea that the central question within the Advaitā centered on how one speaks about that which is beyond language. Two possible means to answering this question were briefly discussed, the via positiva and the via negativa. Another approach, which is more basic, is the utilization of language as discourse. This aspect of language follows from the view that true language is Veda and true speaking is by extention speaking so that the ground of speech is made the referent. This is using language as discourse about Brahman. As Dr. Arapura remarks:

. . . the central objective of the Vedānta in the advaitic form, which is to explain how speaking about Brahman, the Ultimate Reality, is made possible. The Vedānta knows that philosophy is about Brahman, not about the world or experience. Knowledge about these latter things arises as modes of the knowledge of Brahman. The inalienable connecting link is discourse itself.\(^{24}\)

This discourse takes place at all times within the predicament of ignorance or avidyā for it is through ignorance that one moves toward knowledge of Brahman. Avidyā is, for Advaita, the "sense of the wrongness of existence" and when it is:

Rendered into the language of phenomenology, avidyā may be described as the existential fact of consciousness as it confronts itself. Tat tvam asi means then that the transcendent essence of consciousness is ātman but whenever this truth is verbally expressed there will be a logical contravention of the existential fact of consciousness confronting itself, although the facticity of the fact cannot be

\(^{24}\) MDAB, p. 112.
intentionally purported. Distinction will not have to by presupposed if the truth remains strictly implicit. Undoubtedly, implicit truth is what is intended in śruti statements, but stated truth presupposes extension and therefore distinction. But is there a way in which implicit truth can remain implicit? There seems to be no direct way whatsoever. Nevertheless the irony of having to make implicit truth explicit may sometimes by dramatically expressed in silence.25

Dr. Arapura continues:

The difference between speech and silence is the analogical measure of the difference between Brahmān with distinction and Brahmān without distinction. The difference measured thus is māyā: here is the signifi-
cance of the etymology of the word, from mā, to measure. It thus becomes very instructive to note that Saṅkara himself concludes his narration of the episode with an explanatory quotation from śruti. "The cause, O Narada, of perceiving me as possessing the qualities of all beings is the māyā produced by me; (but) thou shouldst not know (think of) me as such."26

Thus the idea of māyā, along with avidyā, must be reconsidered when we approach the Advaita understanding of Saṅkara. The Advaita of Saṅkara has always understood the definite relation between māyā and avidyā and in fact within Saṅkara there is no differentiation between them except:

Saṅkara himself, who, it seems, on the one hand, thought of māyā as the structure of discourse about Brahmān, keeping in view the character of Brahmān, revealed in śruti, and therefore as the logos of the world, and, on the other, thought of avidyā as that which informs māyā. The idea of distinguishing the two even in a methodological manner clearly found no place in his thinking.27

25 Ibid., p. 115.
26 Ibid., p. 115.
27 Ibid., p. 116.
Thus language must be seen primarily as discourse about Brahman and the implicit concern then is not the removal of the world but rather with the speaking of that which cannot be reached by speech. There is no denial of the world:

Simply in the interest of accurate exposition, not partisan defense, a very widespread misunderstanding needs to be dispelled. Māyā does not mean denial of the world. The ultimate non-being of the world does not have to be stated as a theory, as it is strictly implied in the very definition of Brahman itself. As a theory it only seeks to translate the implicit into the explicit, thereby necessitating the complete phenomenological tracing, or retracing, of the paths through which the world-appearance has come into being. Māyā, therefore, is a provisional recovery of the world so that its ultimate non-being, along with Brahman's being, may be spoken. 28

This is implied by Śaṅkara when he writes:

It would be reasonably sustainable to understand that prior to the realization of Brahma as the Self of all, all transactions (of the phenomenal world) for the time being are real enough, even as the transactions in dreams are real enough (for the time being) until waking consciousness returns. As long as the truth of the one-ness of the Self is not realized, the knowledge, that all these effects, i.e. modifications, as characterized by the means-of-proof, the thing to be known, and the fruit, are unreal, does not arise in any one, and on the other hand, people in general under the influence of Nescience, consider these effects or modifications as being their own Selves, viz., that this body is myself, or that this

28 Ibid., p. 119. Also in "Realistic Idealism", Contemporary Indian Philosophy, p. 318, Hiralal Haldar states, "Epistemologically, Śaṅkara is a thorough-going realist... All that he maintains is that ultimately, from the highest point of view it (empirical world) has no independent existence apart from Brahma. Both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja maintain that even illusions are not unreal and merely subjective. They are as objective as the things of ordinary perception, the only difference being that they are not common to all, but individual and last only as long as they are experienced..."
is mine, by ignoring their own Brahmic nature. Therefore, prior to the realization of Brahman as the Self of all, all worldly and religious transactions based on the Scriptures, are reasonably sustainable i.e. valid, even as an ordinary man, while he is asleep and dreaming, sees all the high and low entities, and definitely considers his experiences quite as real as they are when they are directly perceived, and has no notion, then, of their having only an un-real appearance (of direct perception). 29

The world arises and maintains itself because of avidyā and māya for if one were to gain knowledge of Brahman this predicament would no longer exist. Another way of stating this is to say that by knowledge of Brahman all things are known in their true perspective. In fact when one knows Brahman one understands that there is nothing else to be concerned with.

Just as in the ordinary world, when an injunction to perform a sacrifice is given, it is necessary to know with what (material) and how one should perform the sacrifice, but when it is said "That thou art" or "I am Brahman" and one understands how the Atma i.e. Brahman is the Self of all, there is nothing which need be known beyond that, for it is only when there still remains something which ought to be known, that there can be any further desire to know, and as apart from one's unity with the Self nothing still remains which one would further want to know. 30

Thus we have the requisite of "an inquiry into Brahman".

MĀYĀ AS DISCOURSE ABOUT BRAHMAN

As we have observed above "true language" is considered to be śruti and "true speaking" is discourse about Brahman. We also noted that this discourse takes place within the name-form complex which in

30 Ibid., II.1.14, p. 308.
turn is spoken of as the framework of māyā. Māyā can be seen as the frame of the condition of the cosmos. It is that aspect of reality which contains a two-fold function. On the one hand māyā has its foundation in Brahman because of its potential to render itself transparent to knowledge of Brahman; on the other hand māyā has an attraction element that draws the viewer deeper into its structure as the frame of the cosmos. There is always the aspect which can provide for the continuation of saṁsāra.

As discourse about Brahman, māyā is an inquiry. If this inquiry we do not inquire into the nature of māyā itself because to do so is to engage in the continuation of saṁsāra which is not the proper perspective for the Advaita. This has exactly been the problem in certain interpretations of the Advaita conception of māyā. They understand māyā as something outside of Brahman.

Brahman is the referent of māyā and as such can never be omitted as the necessary element within which language and the name-form complex are substantiated. Māyā can be said to be the cosmic myth:

...Māyā is myth, the most generalized myth possible, the unbounded frame, the structure of all myths, unified into a single interpretative system. To permit myself a little rhetoric, it is the fathomless, boundless ocean, from which all things come and into which all things go. One may object that this last is the kind of talk that one makes about Brahman. Yes, precisely that is the point. ...meaning that whatever is said about Brahman is said in causal, ontological and teleological (or rather eschatological) terms of the world, is that under conditions of avidyā=existence Brahman talk also turns out to be māyā talk.31

NATURE OF REALITY IN ŚAṆKARA

When we approach the nature of the Real in the Advaita we have, as it were, answered the question before it is asked. But this comment leads into problems for we find two distinguishable sets of elements contributing to this confusion. These are Brahman, as seen as creator and Lord over the world within whom māyā as power (sākṛti) resides, and Brahman, who can be discussed by the negative description neti, neti. The first form of Brahman is termed saguna Brahman or also aparā Brahman. The second form is termed nirguna Brahman or parā Brahman and is beyond the name-form complex. But the differentiation between is merely one which is made current by speech for, "This same identical Brahman is understood to be propounded everywhere."32

Thus when the Sūtra speaks of Brahman as cause or through whom the language of the Veda and the manifestation of the cosmos appears they are strictly speaking through myth and actually intending discourse about Brahman. If one speaks of the function of the world without recourse to any substantial conception, namely Brahman, then one is involved in speculation which does not lead one into an inquiry into Brahman but takes them deeper into the frame and structure of name and form.

When a person entertains a notion that his body etc.—which are not the Self—are the Self, it is Nescience (Avidyā). This leads to attachment (Rāja) for the worship etc. of the body, and to hatred towards things which cause injury etc., to fear and delusion of mind at the

32 BSB,III.3.33, Apte, p. 678. See also Deussen, The System of Vedanta.
prospect of its destruction, and this continuous stream of manifold evils of countless different sorts, is directly known to us all. Conversely, this abode of the Heaven and the Earth, which is referred to as relevant to the present context, is indicated as that which is to be attained by those who have attained Final Release from such faults as Nescience, attachment and hatred, etc. How (is it so indicated)? Because, after mentioning, "The knots of the Hridaya are cut asunder and all doubts are resolved, and the Karma (aggregate of actions) of a person is exhausted when this (Brahma) which itself is both the cause (Para) and the effect (Avara) is realized (by a person)" (Mund. 2.2.8), the Scriptures say—"So the person who has realized (Brahma) and who is released from (the bondage of) names and forms, reaches the celestial Purusha (i.e. the Highest Self) which is greater than the great unmanifested" (Avyakta . . . 33

Within the Advaita then we find a kind of freedom, for those who wish to bear its consequences, to engage in speculation or tarka. The outcome of this speculation is the bondage of the wheel of samsāra. This bondage can be overcome not by works, as is the case in the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā, but only through knowledge. This knowledge is one which can begin with the correct inquiry:

. . . because there is but one and only one Brahma and it is of one uniform nature. That there could be a variety in the nature of Vidyās in the case of Brahma which is of one uniform nature, is not possible. If an entity is of one nature, and the knowledge of such entity is of a different nature, such knowledge can only be of an illusory nature. Now, again Brahma being but one and one only, if different Vijnānās (i.e. Vidyās or Upāsanās or Cognitions) of it are intended to be expounded by the Vedānta texts, then only one of them could be free from doubt, and the rest would necessarily be doubtful, and thus the predicament of a distrust of the Vedānta texts would result. Therefore it cannot be possible to entertain a doubt as to whether there are differences in the Vidyās relating to Brahma in the Vedānta texts, nor can it be maintained (even if it be so doubted) that because of the uniformity of

33Ibid., I.3.2., p. 145.
injunctions, there is non-difference between them, because the knowledge of Brahma is characterized by the absence of any such injunction about it (unlike the case of Dharma in Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā). It has already been said by the Āchārya (i.e. the Sūtrakāra)--in the Sūtra "But that (Brahma is to be known from the Scriptures) is established, because (all Vedānta texts) have that connected sequence" (Bra. Su. I.1.4.)--that the knowledge of Brahma supervenes, not through passages which purport to give injunctions (to act), but through passages about Brahma which culminate in the realization of Brahma as an entity. So how can any such discussion either about the difference or non-difference (between the Vidyās) be at all started?  

Language leads us to an understanding of reality, which is language as śruti:

If para Brahman is neti, neti there can be no vidyā (instructional technique) or language adequate to it: that it is so is evident from Śaṅkara's writings. But this truth too has to be brought under some devices of instruction and even of expression. Then the distinction between the para vidyā and aparā vidyā must be seen merely as a convention necessary for such devices, and not in any way suggesting a one-to-one correspondence with para Brahman and aparā Brahman respectively. Śaṅkara makes it clear that the purport of all statements are the para Brahman or paramātman, . . . Then the question arises why there should be negative statements in some places and positive statements in other places. Answer: In some places characteristics of a positive injunctional nature are mentioned (as in BSS III.iii.11) and in others negative conceptions are mentioned (as in BSS.III.iii.32) for the reason that such different considerations (cintābhedaḥ) will facilitate a full and detailed treatment of the subject of Brahman (para, that is).

The injunctonal elements and the negative elements should be taken as discourse about Brahman so that the subject can be treated fully.

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34 Ibid., III.3.1, p. 618-19.

35 J. G. Arapura, "Two Distinguishable Sets of Elements Contributing to the Building of Śaṅkara's 'System'", seminar paper, 27 Nov. 72, privately circulated, p. 1.
Thus language as śruti is the highest discourse form. Also we have previously observed that the distillation of śruti has taken place in the Advaita so that the essence of scripture about Brahman can be encapsulated. These encapsulations of śruti are the mahāvākyā statements, most notable of which is "That art thou" or Tat tvam asi, which is rendered into the formula Brahman-Atman. These statements are not to be confused as signifying any injunction for this they do not demand. They state something else, namely that we have forgotten what we are and instead have become infatuated with the frame of maya. Thus "true language" opens the way to the understanding of the ultimate mystery. As Dr. Arapura observes:

Śaṅkara knows that parā Brahman is the ultimate mystery to be taught by the Vedānta, and he brings about a continuation of the vidyās into new methodological expressions. The purpose of the method is precisely to do what the word ... indicates. Recall Ch. Up. 6.14. "As a man who has been brought blindfolded from the country of the Gandhāvas and then set free in the wilderness, goes astray to the east or north or south, ... but after someone has removed the blindfold and told him, 'in this direction lies the country of the Gandhavas, go in this direction', instructed and prudent, asking the road from village to village he finds the way home, even so the man who in this world has met with a teacher, becomes aware 'to this (world) shall I belong only till I am released, whereupon I shall go home'." The Vedānta (or the Vedāntas in the older sense) takes the place of the teacher, but is no more a resident of the "home country" than the kindhearted man, who removes the blindfolded person's blindfold and points to him the right direction is a resident of Gandhāva. The Vedānta has two essential functions to perform, (1) to logically elaborate (or even describe) the home-country, its essential character—pointing to the right direction, and (2) to be a guide to the wayfarer and to keep him on the right road and therefore to be present at every village ... to guide him along.36

36 Ibid., p. 2.
REALITY AND THE WORLD

To ask a question about the origins of the world in the Advaita is to sort out, as it were, the logical element of the cosmogonical and cosmological so that the question opens itself to inquiry into Brahman. The cosmogonical and cosmological elements are analogues to true language in that they open up the possibility for the removal of ignorance.

Strange as it may sound, māyāvāda implies a very strong affirmation of the reality of the world. In this respect it goes exactly as far as empiricism would want to go. No empiricism ever ascribes absolute reality to the world in any case. Analogical reasoning itself, which is so important in Vedānta philosophy, is based on the reality of the perceived world as it is on the reliability of experience. This is how one prefers the report of perceptions of the waking state to those of the dreaming state as clues to Reality. Likewise the real rope seen as rope rather than as snake, is truer to fact. The genuine philosopher must respect fact as against the would-be philosopher who denies what he sees.37

The world is the experiential grasping in everyday life of the name-form complex. It is the presentation of a kind of snare by which one becomes entangled in bondage. So questions about the world and its creation are secondary, as modes of discourse about Brahman. As such they contain the tendency to lead one deeper into the structure of the world itself. But it is exactly by travelling through the activity of this world that there arises the possibility of liberation. This is so because language and the world act as pointers to their respective grounding in Brahman. Thus the world, as it is actually or ideally perceived, is the common myth which

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37 MDAB, p. 111.
is experienced and it is through this myth that we see that:

To treat māyā as illusion is to misunderstand it. Truly speaking, it is the cosmic condition of which illusion is the model. All descriptions of māyā are given through analogy with human illusory experiences but to identify the terms of analogy is to mistake its purpose. Śaṅkara is very emphatic about the factual reality of the things that are mistaken for something else. The rope that is seen as snake is the objective foundation of the illusion. Likewise, to reverse it, the water that we see in a mirage is unreal but the water that we use is real. 38

MĀYĀ AND REALITY

Some have understood māyā as the "other" which is opposed to Brahman and have read the Advaita as maintaining the existence of two as Real as opposed to the non-dual. This is possible when one does not understand māyā as ignorance of knowledge of Brahman and instills it with a reality apart from Brahman. This confusion probably arises out of a confusion in the reading of the nature of language and name and form. It could be that this is where much criticism of the Advaita originates. In this one can see that the conception of māyā as illusion would have a place. But if we understand māyā as myth and the cosmic condition of which illusion is the model and relate both of these to the world by way of analogues, the confusion would cease to exist.

We may say for purposes of illustration that māyā exists, as it were, like a veil which is draped over a doorway. One has the option of remaining in the room from which one is observer or one may pass through to the outside. But there is more to the illustration,

38 ibid., p. 120.
for this veil is a beautiful panorama of changing exotic visions of bright hue and psychedelic colours. As such it is fascinating to observe and tends to shift its picture from one subject to another, or so it seems. It has a hypnotic effect and assails our senses with its power. But it is just a veil over a doorway and the correction is the Advaita approach to the understanding of māyā as the veil over the door. Māyā measures out the illustration by recalling our attention to the fact that this is a passageway. In this recalling the correct inquiry takes place. Māyā acts as the veil and the passageway. As the veil it is the conceptualization of language and the name-form complex. As the passageway it is inquiry into Brahman. In this latter aspect māyā is the measure of the immeasurable. Māyā acts as a pointer to Brahman through analogues of world experience in reference to knowledge of Brahman.

MĀYĀ AND NAME AND FORM

Māyā is the base from which the name and form complex (the world) arises. In defining the reality of the name-form complex the Advaita states that the name-form cannot be said to be Brahman nor

40 Ibid.
an it be said that it is non-different from Brahman. In the Advaita the name-form complex is defined by the technical term anirvacanīya which can be translated as "undefinable with regard to Brahman". Within the Sūtra bhūṣya Saṅkara uses the word anirvacanīya three times:

(1) I.1.5 Those names and forms—we reply—which are yet unevolved (avyākrita), but which are intended to be evolved, and with regard to whom it is not possible to say whether they are the same or different from Īśvara—are such objects.

The above quote of Saṅkara is against the opponents (in this instance the Saṁkhya) question concerning the Lord's object of knowledge before creation of the world:

(2) II.1.14 It is declared by both the Scriptures and the Smritis, that names and forms which are imagined through Nescience and are as it were the Self of the Omniscient Lord, about which it is impossible to say, either that they are one with Brahma or that they are different from it, and which are the seeds of this entire expanse of transmigratory existence, are the illusion-causing power of the nature (prakṛti) of the Lord.

This response is one which is directed to the Saṁkhya opponents' question about the contradiction of scriptures when it is asserted that there is non-duality and oneness.

(3) II.1.28 Brahma appears to become susceptible of (i.e. appears to be the basis of) all phenomenal behavior by way of modifications etc., by reason of the distinctions of aspects or forms characterized by names and forms

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42 See Chapter Five, pp.
43 BSB, I.1.5, Apte, pp. 39-40.
44 Ibid., II.1.14, p. 310.
imagined through Nescience, which are at once both evolved and unevolved, and about whom it is not possible to predicate that they either are or are not Brahma, while in its truest essence Brahma subsists only in its unmodified aspect, and is beyond all phenomenal behaviour, and, as names and forms imagined through Nescience are but merely made current by speech, the fact that Brahma has no parts is not thereby vitiated. . . . 45

This denies the conception of parts of Brahman to which the opponent raises objection.

The conception of anirvacaniya in the Advaita of Saṅkara has been discussed by N. K. Devaraja in his Introduction to Saṅkara's Theory of Knowledge. 46 In this book Dr. Devaraja discusses the term anirvacaniya and following the popular interpretation of the word he understands it as an adjective modifying the world. He concludes that Saṅkara does not deny the possibility of the knowledge of the world but rather its desirability. 47 But this is not exactly the point for Saṅkara, as has been observed by Sengaku Mayeda in a review of Dr. Devaraja's book. 48 Mayeda disagrees with Devaraja on the popular interpretation of anirvacaniya. He comments:

When we rely only upon Saṅkara's works and disregard his commentators' interpretations, we find the term anirvacaniya occurring only as an adjective modifying the unevolved name and form (avyākṛte nāmarūpa) which are used in the sense of the primary material of the world . . . 49

45 Ibid., II.1.28, p. 333.
46 Refer to Chapter Four and STK, pp. 158-63 ff.
47 STK, p.
49 Ibid., p. 432.
In regard to the conclusion of Dr. Devaraja regarding knowledge of
the world, Mayeda remarks:

This conclusion is not acceptable. In Sāṅkara's works
the term is associated with the compound "tattvāṇyatvābhyan" and never with the compound "sadasadbhyām" or "śatāsāt-
tābhyām". This constitutes a significant difference between
Sāṅkara and his followers, which Dr. Devaraja has failed
to notice. 50

Let us now return to the examples just cited and view them
after a brief discussion. We can agree with Mayeda that the word
anirvacanīya is qualified by tattvāṇyatvābhyan which leads us to
define it as "Indefinable as Brahman or different". This is further
discussed by Dr. J. G. Arapura when he remarks:

Definition (nirvacanam) is simply a matter of being able
to assert identity or difference. If we take anirvāca
(distributively or negative-alternative it can be said
to apply both to identity and difference equally. However,
difference has been denied concomitantly but separately.
But anirvacanīya is not here employed to eliminate difference,
which has already been accomplished by placing the world
through nāma-rūpa and avidyā kalpāna in Brahman (or Iśvara).
. . . The role of nāma-rūpa has to be noticed, and its
role is to deny difference. We may hark back to the
Upaniṣads themselves. The Chāndogya asserts that the
modification that occurs in the conversion of clay into
vessels of clay is "mere names, dependent on words"--
vācatraṁbhauṁ vikāro nāmadheyaṁ, Chāndogya 6.1.4.
. . . The bhāṣya goes even further and suggests, as it does,
that the whole universe, both the res extensa and the
res cogitans included, is name and form (nāma-rūpa-
praparca). This modification of form (rūpa-bheda) is a
burden laid on the conscious individual, the soul, by some
primeval necessity. . . . Avidyā is the same as mithyājñanam
(false knowledge), abhīmānām (illusory, self-pretension). It
is an existential fact encountered in consciousness, over against which must be set samyakdarśanam (perfect
knowledge). To look for the origin of avidyā is futile.

50 Ibid., p. 432.
It is to be apprehended only in reflection. We can only penetrate deeply into this fundamental existential problem perhaps by turning from logic to myths and similes. Śaṅkara thus turns to similes often as when he argues that the fact that a person suffering from the eye disease called ṭīmira (diplopia) sees two moons does not prove that there are two moons. (II:1.28).\(^{51}\)

Thus anirvacanīyā within the Advaita must be seen as directly related to name and form and in fact constitutes the definition of name and form as the explanatory principle of the origin of the world contained with the avidyā structure. The world then as anirvacanīyā cannot be defined as existent or non-existent, as either one with Brahman or different from Brahman. This consideration follows after the given point of departure, which is an inquiry into Brahman, and not an inquiry into the world. Thus when Meyeda adds at the conclusion of his review of Devarāja that:

> In the case of Śaṅkara the expression has not deep philosophical or ontological connotation as it does with the later Advaitins and is never used to describe the character of the world which is an effect of evolution.\(^{52}\)

Here Meyeda missed the point because indeed there is deep philosophical and ontological meaning if we place it into the inquiry into Brahman. We grant that the later Advaitins did do as he suggests but just because of this one may not assume that Śaṅkara did not understand anirvacanīyā ontologically, because anirvacanīyā is always spoken of in terms of Brahman knowledge.


\(^{52}\) Meyeda, Journal, p. 433.
BRAHMAN AND NAME AND FORM

The nature of name and form in relation to Brahman is defined as "indescribable as either one with Brahman or as different from Brahman." Thus in order to understand name and form we must conceive of it as arising out of the avidyā of the individual on the one hand and also, at the same time, arising out of the creative power of Tāvāra. But this understanding does not bring us to any real result for the Advaita. It is already assumed that the search after the world, whether of concrete forms and names or "seed" forms and names, in exclusion of an inquiry into Brahman will not lead to liberation or release from saṃsāra. Thus a simultaneity must be maintained. On the one hand, we must abide and consider the name-form complex within the world of change and chance and on the other recognize that if the former is pursued uncritically, it will lead to ignorance rather than knowledge. As is seen by Śaṅkara:

... to superimpose the non-self on the Universal Self is not inconsistent. Learned men consider superimposition of this nature as Nescience, (avidyā) and they further say that knowledge (vidyā) is the determination of the real nature of a thing by discrimination. This being so, that on which some other thing is superimposed is not in the least affected by the faults and merits of the thing superimposed, and it is by entertaining i.e. adopting the reciprocal superimposition of the Self and the non-self, that all worldly conduct and Vedic actions depending on the means of proof (pramāṇa) and the objects of knowledge, and all scriptural injunctions and prohibitions, known as Nescience, are promoted.53

53 Śaṅkara's Forward, BSB. Apte, p. 2.
It is precisely this superimposition that is to be removed by the
inquiry into Brahman. The inquiry into Brahman is not an injunction
and is not acquired by the performance of any act:

The knowledge of Brahman, on the other hand, has
for its result eternal bliss (nimshreyasa) and it does
not expect the performance of any act. . . . it is Brahman
which is actually eternally in existence, that is desired
to be known, and being thus eternal does not depend upon any
action on the part of man. . . . Injunction which is a
characteristic of religious duty instructs a person and
at the same time enjoins him to the performance of the same.
The science of Brahman however merely instructs a person
about Brahman, but it does not enjoin a man to any act
of acquiring knowledge.54

The science of Brahman instructs a person about Brahman. This
instruction is conducted through an inquiry into Brahman which by
inherent necessity must conceive knowledge of anything other than
Brahman as not leading to final Beatitude.55 Under the criterion of
right knowledge name and form must reside. This right knowledge is
brought about, for those who search after it, through instruction by
the Vedic passages. This, as has been pointed out by Dr. Arapura, is
accomplished by "turning from logic to myths and similies" or what
we would like to rephrase as a turning from logic to analogue or
illustrative argumentation.

This kind of reasoning concerning name and form can be seen
in the Advaita analysis of the Brahman's modification:

54 Ibid., 1.1.1., p. 6.
55 Ibid., 1.1.1., p. 9.
Just as in the ordinary world, milk and water, by themselves undergo modifications into curds and snow respectively without expecting any extraneous means, even so, it might be the case here (i.e. in the case of Brahma) whatever modification milk undergoes in turning into curds is by itself only, and whatever potentiality or the limit of potentiality which milk has in itself for the modificatory process of conversion into curds is but merely accelerated by heat etc., that is all. Because were milk not to possess in itself this potentiality of modifying itself into curds, it would never undergo such modification per force alone, by means of heat etc. Ākāsha and vāyu, for instance do not modify themselves per force into curds, by heat etc., and (in the case of milk) its capacity (for modification) is merely perfected by the assemblage of means. Brahma on the other hand is fully powerful by itself, and nothing else is necessary to make its capacity perfect. . . . Therefore, only one, as Brahma is, that it has diverse powers inherent in itself, and that it can, like milk, modify itself in diverse ways, is reasonably sustainable. 56

ANALOGUE AND NAME-FORM

In the inquiry into Brahma we begin from the name-form complex defined as indescribable, being different or not different from Brahma. This concept points to the understanding of and discussion concerning name-form as one taking place after the beginning of inquiry itself. The inquiry by the utilization of concepts within the name-form complex uses these concepts as illustrations which have the necessary built-in factor that they stand within the inquiry into Brahma. Thus when we define the name-form complex or draw out conclusions within the complex, both of these activities are furthered so that instruction into Brahma can be accomplished. In fact illustration or analogue can be seen as a primary method in the Brahma Sūtra. Thus we will now turn to a consideration of illustration or analogue within the context of an inquiry into Brahma.

56 Ibid., II.1.24, pp. 327-8.
CHAPTER VII

THE USE OF ANALOGUE IN THE BRAHMA SŪTRA

LANGUAGE AND ANALOGUE

We have seen in the previous chapter that māyā language must be seen always and primarily as discourse about Brahman. True speaking about māyā recognizes that māyā language originates and terminates on that truth that is given by hearing, which is śruti. The world as itself contains no ground for speaking of itself.

The Vedānta philosopher is also clear in his mind that the world offers no standpoint from which to speak about the world or to gain knowledge about it. Hence his insistence on śruti (revelation). What the world contributes to the knowledge of itself is analogies based on the distinction between fact and nonfact present in its very structure. When that transcendently originated (by definition) knowledge bodies forth with the aid of analogies provided by the phenomenal world we have a well-ordered and coherent knowledge of the world giving rise to a system of meaning and a framework for the aspiration towards liberation.¹

It is through these analogues that knowledge about the structure and meaning of the world is gained but this gain is always seen as a method by which one acquires a true perspective of meaning and not as an end in itself. Analogue must be seen always as an illustration of the truth which is contained in a deeper structure of language.

¹ MDAB, p. 6.
The use of analogue or illustrative language in Indian thought holds an important place. We can see that this type of language is used in teaching as one of the primary modes by which instruction is communicated. It is utilized when one speaks of the non-dual Brahman as is done in the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad II.4.12 when Yajnavalkya and Maitreyi discuss the Self:

As a lump of salt thrown in water becomes dissolved in water and there would not be any of it to size forth, as it were, but wherever one may take it is salty indeed, so, verily, this great being, infinite, limitless, consists of nothing but knowledge. Arising from out of these elements one vanishes away into them. When he has departed there is no more knowledge. This is what I say, my dear! so said Yajnavalkya.

For purposes of illustration in this discussion Yajnavalkya wishes to convey the idea that when everything is known as the Self, i.e. when all essence is known to be exactly identical, then speech as illustration has fulfilled its communication and is left behind. Yet another example of illustration can be seen in the conception of the upside down world tree in the Bhagavadgita XV.1-3:

They say (that there is) an indestructible aśvatta tree with roots above and branches below, whose leaves are the Vedic hymns: who knows it is a knower of the Veda. Its branches spread below and above, being nourished by the gunas (i.e., the strands that constitute prakṛti or Nature), objects of perception being its twigs. Its

²PU, p. 200, (sa yathā saṁdhāve – khilya udake prāṣṭa udakam evānuvi – liyeta, na hāṣya udgrahanāyeva svāt, yato yatas tv ādādīta lāvagam eva, evām vā ara idam mahād būtaṁ anāntam apārrām vijñānah ganava eva; ete bhūtebhīyāh samutthāya, tāy evānuvināsyatī; na pretya saṁdhāti, iti are bravim, iti hovāca yajnavalkyaḥ).
(adventitious) roots are produced below, in the world of man, bound to Karma. Its form is not obtained here as thus (or thus), nor its end, nor its beginning not the ground (on which it is planted), once this āsvattha tree so well nourished (though it is), has been cut down with the mighty sword of non-attachment.\(^3\)

In this illustration the āsvatta tree is the tree of life, the world and man. Each having their unseen roots in Brahman. Sāṃsāra is seen to have its basis in that which is above it. This formulation has been aptly demonstrated by the analysis of Dr. Arapura:

The reason why the āsvattha appears to be important enough for a close scrutiny is that it stands as a symbol for the human cosmos (not so much the physical cosmos), the world of man, the sāṃsāra, representing the endless round of birth, death and rebirth as well as old age, sorrow and bondage. The ancient thinkers were intensely aware of Ultimate Reality as such, that is, Brahman. And they were aware also of the world of becoming. The two cannot co-exist as two separate and equally true parts of reality. Nor can the two be treated as if there is no meeting at all. On an empirical basis what we know as life along with birth, death, rebirth, old age and all other things which go with them—belongs to becoming. Yet the ancient thinkers found becoming to be not self-explanatory. The principle whereby it can be understood is the transcendent Brahman, para-brāhman. But as the principle of explanation para-brāhman has been already taken one step down from its pure transcendence to the status of a structure: hence aparā brāhman. ... Brahman simply does not become. But insofar as the empirical basis of our understanding is the world of becoming Brahman must serve as the principle underlying it. The employment of Brahman as the principle in this manner is what gives rise to the concept of being. As a concept it is always answer to a question, whereas the Ultimate Reality per se is not answer to any question, much less a question. It simply is that and never a what. Insofar as becoming is the question, being (sat) is the

answer. Samsāra is the name for the total framework of becoming, constantly under the existential pressure to be put as a question. Brahman, the ground, is provided as the answer. This way we have an ontology not by virtue of any pressure that being puts upon becoming—there is no such pressure and indeed apart from becoming taken problematically there would be no need for the concept of being at all. There is, on the contrary, a pressure that comes from within the realm of samsāra, of becoming, and that is an existential pressure calling for an answer. Hence Brahman is to be understood as the ground of the tree of samsāra, and the tree inevitably grows downward. That tree is the avattha of the Bhagavadgītā.4

Analogue is a kind of verbal description or illustration of a visual image. But it is not merely description, but it is description followed by reflexion. Description, if it is only that, would not constitute the proper positive function of language in the Vedānta. In fact the task of analogue is to bring about an inquiry beyond the analogue. This is why analogue is used to speak about that which is of its very nature unspeakable as in the Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad III.4.2:

Ugasta Cākrāyaṇa said: "This has been explained by you as one might say "this is a cow," "this is a horse." Explain to me the Brahman that is immediately present and directly perceived, that is the self in all things! "This is your self that is within all things. 'Which is within all things, Yājñavalkya? 'You cannot see the seer of seeing, you cannot hear the hearer of hearing, you cannot think the thinker of thinking, you cannot understand the understander of understanding. He is your self which is in all things. Everything else is of evil.' Thereupon Ugasta Cākrāyaṇa kept silent.5


5 PU, p. 229, (sa hovāca usastas cākrāyanaḥ: yatha vibhrūyād, asau rauḥ, asāv aśva iti, evam evaitad vavapadiṣṭam bhavati, yad eva sāksād aparokṣād brahma va ātmā sarvāntaraḥ tam me vyācākṣya iti: ega ta ātmā sarvāntaraḥ. kātamaḥ Yājñavalkya, sarvāntaraḥ. na dr̥gter dr̥ṣṭāram paśyeḥ, na śruter śrotāram śṛṇuyāḥ, na mater mantāram manvīthāḥ, na
Thus Brahman is seen as essentially beyond the categories and structures of experience. One cannot think of Brahman as other than the "within" or essence of all things being not open to language and thought, approachable only through language and thought. Language and thought must be seen as a kind of analogue.

Analogue or illustration should be seen in a specific way. It is not to be taken as something more nor less than it is. When I point out the moon by fixing your gaze upon the highest tree in a specific group and tell you that the moon is just to the right of its top, just so the analogue is used to fix our gaze to that thing which is just beyond the fact which has been brought to our immediate attention. The illustration acts as a pointer, an indicator to that beyond which we are trying to perceive. But it must be seen as something that is necessary. The tree is used to direct our attention to the moon and it is a part of our perception and understanding of the moon. The analogue is part of the understanding of that to which it acts as a pointer. It participates in the object to which it points and draws our attention towards it. Once our attention is on the moon we can see that the tree was merely an indicator, but even as merely an indicator it always remains a pointer to the moon in that specific instance of analogue.

Speaking about that which is in itself unspeakable is speaking in illustration or analogue. One uses speech to point beyond; speech

viṣṇāter viṣṇātāram viṣṇīyāh, esa ta ātma sarvāntaraḥ, ato'nyad ārtam. tato ha uṣastas cākrāyapā uparāma).
is always in reference and grounded upon that to which it points, namely Brahman. Speech is grounded in and arises out of Brahman so that it may lead back to Brahman. True speech is always spoken in reference to Brahman. If not it is not true speech but idle chatter and nonsense. When one understands that this is the nature of speech, i.e. that all speaking is in some way a reference or pointer beyond itself, then one can begin to see the transcendental origin of "śruti" in the Advaita. Śruti, like conventional speech, acts as a pointer. Śruti is the grasping of that which is "beyond" and "within" because it is given directly by that "beyond" and "within". Man's conventional speech also participates in this but not to the same degree or depth. None the less speech when it is in the movement of actually participating and pointing is at its maximum height and depth. It is this height that must be understood when we conceptualize the utilization of analogue or illustration in the Brahma Sūtra and the commentary of Śaṅkara.

By a correct analysis of the method of analogue in terms of what we have briefly seen in the Upanisads we can see the instructional communication. It is only with the proper introduction and guidance that the student can obtain that knowledge which is the highest intuitive wisdom which is liberation. The use of analogue is necessary for this enterprise and can be seen as one of the central thrusts of teaching within Indian thought.

The method of analogue has within its structure an illusive nature. It utilizes a teaching method which has the capacity for a variety of interpretations. These interpretations differ because the
analogue exists between the literal and that which cannot be reached by language. Yet it must always be graspable in terms of understanding, and while being graspable must, in the end, render itself transparent. This is to say that the analogue must not be taken literally and it must act as a pointer to that which is beyond language but is expressed in language. That which is beyond language and in which language is grounded is Brahman. Thus:

The real problem is not what is said about Brahman but the saying. Everything that is truly said, on account of the saying of it, is a negation of the intent in the saying, for such is the coherent definition of Brahman the non-dual, the One without a second. Brahman is throughout spoken of as attributeless (nirguna), as devoid of all differences of space, place and time (diseasekālāṇi bhedaśūnya). The words sūnya (devoid of) and vivarjita (free from), like many other similar words, added to other predicative terms form compounds signifying negative attributes of Brahman, and there is a prolific use of these in all Advaita Vedānta works. Thus Brahman is said to be free from the entire universe (sarvapra pāṇca-vivarjita), free from all objects (sarvaviṣayavivarjita) . . . If these and hundreds of other expressions like them are literally true then they are also literally false, for the very fact that they can be formulated militates against their content as well as intent.6

Language in analogue is a grasping of its own ground which is Brahman. In the analogue language acts as a path which brings one back to the transparency of language so that an opening beyond language can be conceptualized. Thus when we consider various accounts of analogue within the Advaita the consideration must always be under the method which allows language itself to become transparent. Analogues are not to be taken as a logical syllogism for to do so would be to misunder-

stand the nature of the meaning of language of analogue.

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6 MDAB, p. 114.
BRAHMAN LANGUAGE AND ANALOGUE

The speaking of an analogue participates in the very center of Brahman language because in the Advaita all that is, is a manifestation of Brahman. Thus all phenomena, world or symbol, must always find its home in that abode which is beyond the division of subject and object. To go beyond this dichotomy one can utilise the model of analogue. Śaṅkara writes concerning illustration:

The word Ajā used here ([1.4.10] is not meant to indicate creatures having the form of a sheep, nor is it used in its etymological sense (meaning something which is not born). How then is it (used)? It is a kind of instruction given by way of metaphor. Instruction is here given about the root-cause or source from which all-sentient and insentient things are born, and which is characterized by Tejabanna, by the use of the metaphor of an Ajā (ewe). . . . the intention is to propound the arrangement of the conditions of bondage and Final Release. . . .

Thus the world that confronts one in everyday experience is a kind of symbol or pointer to its ground in Brahman. This was communicated to me in a discussion with Dr. T. R. V. Murti in Banaras:

The method for reaching Brahman is not an ontological argument implying a necessary idea. No squeezing existence out of a concept. For this is knowledge through a concept—a second place knowledge. Rather you must know the thing by being it, not feeling, standing outside like the blind men and the elephant—this is spacial and constituent—being different from you. Being-in-it, i.e. object and knowledge must be coincident—"Tat tvam asī"—the object has become radiant and the atman has reality. Knowledge through being the thing. By other ways you cannot get to truth or knowledge—it is always a perspective. To rephrase the Taṇṭārīya Upanishad which says, "Only by knowing Brahman do you become Brahman", I would add "Only by becoming Brahman do you know Brahman."

8Interview with Dr. T. R. V. Murti in Banaras, Feb. 6, 1974.
Under this conception language must be seen as one of the primary ways by which the division between subject and object is removed. This is because Brahman is the ground within which language has itself imbedded. By way of analogue this imbeddedness of language brings about an inquiry into Brahman. Analogue participates in the removal of subject and object when language as discourse about Brahman is made explicit. This participation of language in the removal of ignorance by analogue is central to the understanding of instruction concerning knowledge of Brahman.

ANALOGUE AND DIALECTIC

In Chapter Two of this study the dialectic method of the Mādhyamika Buddhism of Nāgārjuna was briefly discussed. There we discussed the use of dialectic as a negative tool for rendering any view null and also the relation of language to the Buddhist conception of the absolute.

The Absolute of the Mādhyamika is of the nature of a negation, immanent in all positions. Yet, because such a negation is indescribable in any manner, in which any position is describable, it transcends all descriptions. For this reason, it could not be identified with the Absolute of the Advaitin, which is All (Sarvam Khalvidam) and yet nothing, which could be conceived of, as existing in abstraction from this concrete totality of integral existence, the Advaitic Absolute is more comprehensive and more communicable than the Sagata Absolute. ... As against the Mādhyamika Absolute, which is unmitigatedly trans-rational, the Advaitic Brahman stands in the office of the absolute criterion, necessarily indicated by the self-contradictory nature of objectivity as contemplated by the pramana-riddled intelligence as also by the dialectic of reason, whose lever must lie in the intuitive simplicity of the Real. 9

9Heritage, pp. 72-3.
The Mādhyamika position considers the use of anāloga as invalid, as S. S. Roy comments, "The Mādhyamika is all to hostile to the employment of the analogical method, which might facilitate an understanding of the real in the case of discursive apprehension." This view of the Mādhyamika is also expressed implicitly by F. J. Streng in his study of the Mādhyamika in Emptiness--A Study in Religious Meaning. In his book he makes the distinction in Part III of what he terms the "intuitive structure" as distinct from "Nāgārjuna's dialectical structure." This can be demonstrated by the fact that the dialectic is a reductio ad absurdum which does not establish any thesis, "It accepts a particular thesis hypothetically, and by eliciting its implications shows up the inner contradictions which has escaped the notice of the opponent." When one approaches the usage of the dialectic and the analogue in the Brahma Sūtra commentary of Śaṅkara we find a problem. There does not seem to be an example of Śaṅkara's use of the Buddhist dialectics. In fact there seems to be only two scholars who maintain that Śaṅkara uses a Buddhist dialectic, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan and Professor Das Gupta. Concerning this analysis of these two scholars Dr. Devaraja in his An Introduction to Śaṅkara's Theory of Knowledge remarks:

The remarkable fact to be borne in mind in this connection is that in his commentaries on the Prasthanatrayi

10 Ibid., p. 94.
11 CPB, p. 132.
extending over two thousand pages Śaṅkara nowhere allows himself to indulge in the negative dialectic of Nāgārjuna --Śrīharṣa-- type. No modern scholar, not excluding Dr. Radhakrishnan and Prof. Das Gupta, has been able to quote a single instance of Śaṅkara's fondness for the dialectical method. It is difficult to agree with the former in the opinion that Śaṅkara's criticism of the asatkaryavādā is part of the "penetrating criticism" of the causal category intended to show the thoroughly unsatisfactory nature of the concept. The only place where Śaṅkara submits causation to dialectical treatment is in his commentary on the Ānanda; but this affords no justification for the conclusion that "Gauḍapāda's arguments are approved by Śaṅkara".

The 'logical dialectic' used by Śaṅkara in the criticism of the atomic theory and other Vaiśeṣika tenets has no kinship whatever, as Dr. Das Gupta seems to think it has, with the sceptical dialectic of Nāgārjuna and Śrīharṣa. As the learned Doctor is himself constrained to observe, Śaṅkara does not so much 'criticise the definitions of the Vaiśeṣika as point out the general logical and metaphysical', or, as we should like to put it, metaphysical rather than logical, 'confusions that result from some of the Vaiśeṣika theories'.

Further commenting on the existence of the least of the Buddhist dialectic Devaraja states that:

The only place, so far as we are aware, where Śaṅkara tries to silence his opponent by a sort of "logical violence" is in the Brhadāraṇyaka Bhāṣya (2.1.20) where he meets the objection that "difference can be established by inference" by putting the counter-question, who is it that infers? How can he who does not know even himself (ātmanāṁ), ascertain whether there are differences in the Ātman or not? This is no doubt a sort of verbal jugglery, but even here Śaṅkara's critique of bheda is very different that by Maṇḍana in the Brahmaśīddhi or by Śrīharṣa in the Khaṇḍana. What Śaṅkara is concerned here to deny are the differences among the souls, and not the plausibility of the concept of difference.

The truth is that Śaṅkara does not belong to the category of dialectician-philosophers. He is a believer in the use and value of the pramanās, and has distrust of abstract and dialectical reasoning.

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12 STK, p. 156. See also Heritage, pp. 99-102.

13 Ibid., pp. 156-7.
The dialectic argumentation then must be classed as tarkā, and tarka, as we have previously observed is rejected by Śaṅkara.14

We have commented at length about the use of the analogue within the Advaita of Śaṅkara. In a recent work E. Deutsch makes the case very clear when he writes about analogue and the role of reason in the Advaita:

Reason may be used to support truths of spiritual experience in the form of "analogical reasoning" (samanyatodrstanumana); that is, reasoning that is based upon analogies between the transcendental and the empirical orders of being. Analogies do not demonstrate anything; they may, however, provide the mind with some understanding, drawn from its own experience, of the nature of that which transcends empirical experience. Advaitic literature is replete with analogies and with elaborate analyses of them. They function not so much as a means of convincing one in any shallow rationalistic sense but as a means of awakening one to new possibilities of experience.15

Thus for Śaṅkara accurate reasoning, which is ultimately concerned with knowledge of Brahman, proceeds not by engaging in tarka but by the correct understanding of scripture coupled by illustrations or analogues from the world of experience.

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14 The dialectic of the Buddhists must not be confused with the more general definition of dialectics as given for example by R. D. Ranade in his Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy on p. 26 when he speaks of "method of dialogue". Also a further study of Gaudapāda's Karikās with Śaṅkara's commentary will not show sufficient evidence to warrant any refutation of the above position.

USE AND OCCURRENCES OF ANALOGUE

An analysis of the occurrences of analogue or illustrative argumentation within the Advaita darsana of Saṅkara is contained in two articles by M. D. Paradkar entitled "Nyāyas in Saṅkara-Bhāṣya on the Brahma-sūtras" and "Field of Observation of Saṅkaracarya Similies from the Nature World." In both of these articles Paradkar has given us over four hundred fifty citations illustrating the variety of different subjects covered and utilized within Saṅkara to contend with the doctrines of other dārṣṭāna or to instruct one within the frame of the Advaita itself. However, there does seem to be a rather distinct lack of organization on the part of the author for there is no apparent order to his numbering classification. But, as the author implies, this is not his intent in writing these articles. Rather he is concerned to show the occurrences of this kind of phenomena within the Advaita work. Other than this limited approach there was nothing else attempted. In this he has succeeded, for with his study he has shown the vastness and complexity of the various kinds of references to the phenomenal world within the Advaita of Saṅkara. In fact these occurrences do not fit into any type of hierarchy within the Advaita. They all stand as a basis for future investigation into "an inquiry into Brahman" and as such do not, of and by themselves, mean anything. They are pointers that act as a means to instruction into the meaning of the Advaita, namely discourse about Brahman.

16 Cited fully in Appendix A and B pp. 239, 241.
Another instance of the occurrences of illustration, classified according to type, is that given by R. H. Brooks in his Ph.D. entitled "The Rope and the Snake". In his study Dr. Brooks defines analogue or adhyāsa as an explanatory model and gives a preliminary classification of all of Advaita's analogues according to their structure. He gives it as:

Class:
I. Non-superimposition analogy (sympathy, magnet,)

II. Superimposition analogy
A. without adjunct (nirupādhika)
   1. with similarity (sāḍrśya)
      rope/snake
      shell/silver
      post/man, etc.
   2. without similarity (sāḍrśyābhāva)
      hypnotist:
      dream
      nāmarūpa analogies
      sea/waves
      clay/pot
      actor/etc. sic

B. with adjuncts (sopādhika)
   1. organ defect
      double moon
      yellow conch, etc.
   2. action defect
      tenth man
      lost necklace, etc.
   3. Natural law
      sky/surface
      crystal/color
      mirage
      motion illusions (firebrand, etc.)
      Reflection illusions
      sun/image in water
      face/image in mirror, etc.
      Appearance illusions
      light/object illumined
   4. limitation illusions
      space/pot-space

The above classification of Brooks is a more generalized rendering, of one contained in Chapter Five of his work. Here he makes the division of analogues into general types under (1) Persuasive and (2) Explanatory. He further divides (1) into (a) popular, (b) Upanisadic and (2) into (a) causal and (b) structural:

I. "Persuasive" Analogies
   a. "Popular" or bad analogies
      worm and wasp
      beat and shore
      female crane—II.1.25, III.1.19.
      lotus—II.1.25.
      sympathy—I.1.1, II.3.46.
      carpenter
      eclipse
   b. "Upanisadic" analogies
      spider—II.1.25.
      clay, pot, milk/curd, water/ice, gold/ornament
      II.1.14, II.1.18, IV.3.14, II.1.18, II.1.24.
      fire/sparks—I.3.43.

II. Explanatory Analogies
   a. Causal
      1. creation analogies—I.1.4.
         lodestone
         hypnotist, gods, king—I.1.7, I.3.19, II.1.1, II.1.9,
         II.2.29.
         dream—I.2.12, I.3.19, II.1.14, II.1.23, II.1.28,
         II.2.29, III.2.21.
      2. transformation analogy
         actor—II.1.18
         thread/cloth—II.1.15.
         earth/modifications—II.1.24.
         ocean/waves, etc.—II.1.13. (cf. also clay/pot, etc.)
      3. realization analogies
         tenth man
         lost necklace
         loss of direction—III.3.9.
         soap-nut
   b. structural
      1. Brahman/world analogies
         mirage—II.1.14.
         sky/surface, etc.—I.1.1, I.2.8, I.3.19
         firebrand
         rope/snake—I.1.4, I.3.19, I.4.6, II.1.9, II.1.14,
         III.2.21, III.2.22.
         shell/silver
2. Self/soul analogies
double moon—III.2.21, IV.1.15, IV.1.19.
crystal/color—III.3.19, III.2.11.
light/object—II.3.46, III.2.15, III.2.25, III.2.34.
object (mirror image)—II.3.46, II.3.50, III.2.18-20, III.2.25.

Dr. Brooks makes even a further breakdown of II. b and arrives at the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nirupādhika</th>
<th>Sopādhika</th>
<th>Adjunct (Upadhi)</th>
<th>Natural law Involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B r 1. rope/snake</td>
<td>a h 2.a. space/surface</td>
<td>m a 2.b. sky/blueness</td>
<td>earth's atmosphere light diffraction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w o r d l 4. firebrand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>retinal afterimage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. double moon</td>
<td></td>
<td>diplopia</td>
<td>retinal displacement of light refract.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. crystal</td>
<td>colored obj. in proximity</td>
<td>light refract.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. light/object</td>
<td>object</td>
<td>reflection &amp; absorption.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. object/mirror image</td>
<td>mirror</td>
<td>light reflect.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. space/pot-space</td>
<td></td>
<td>pot</td>
<td>(none) 19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18 This chart is adapted from p. 186 of the thesis. I have omitted those analogue examples which occur in works other than the Brahma Sūtra; all that is indicative of them is his specific title.

19 Ibid., p. 272.
By his breakdown of what he sees as analogues in Śaṅkara Dr. Brooks has rendered us a unique service for this classification was completed with great acumen. In fact we have not argument with this classification as such. But we would take issue with him on two other points. The first is a basic assumption with which he begins his study. He makes the statement about Advaita that, "The whole point of approaching Advaita in this way . . . is to analyze Advaita's most basic claim—that the world as we ordinarily perceive it is an illusion." 20

But as we have already seen, the claim that the world as we ordinarily perceive it is an illusion is not the most basic claim of Advaita. This claim is rather a logical postulate of another more important claim:

. . . the central objective of the Vedānta in the advaitic form, which is to explain how speaking about Brahman, the Reality, is made possible. The Vedānta knows that philosophy is about Brahman, not about the world or experience. Knowledge about these latter things arises as modes of the knowledge of Brahman. 21

Thus Dr. Brooks begins from the wrong end, as it were, in his understanding of the Advaita of Śaṅkara.

The second point of contention is in regard to the method that Dr. Brooks utilizes in his thesis. This is more specifically a concern when he utilizes this method in an attack upon Advaita. He observes that, "I do not believe this approach to Advaita does it any violence, although the negative outcome of my analysis will surely

20 Ibid., p. 1.
21 MDAB, p. 112.
lead Advaitins to feel that it does. But that’s Advaita’s fault, not mine."\textsuperscript{22} This statement is indeed a kind of apology for his study which is based upon an interpretation of Advaita from the point of illusion rather than Brahman. To return to his method—what Dr. Brook’s tries to do, and succeeds if you grant him his presuppositions, is give a critique of the Advaita darsana from a "scientific" analysis. By this analysis he utilizes the modern Western scientific theories of such works as Max Black’s Models and Metaphors and M. Hesse’s Models and Analogies in Science to present an attack against the Advaita. This usage of "scientific" models plus his employment of Western canons of logical structures place his method well within a Western philosophical investigation and does not, as he holds, refute the Advaita propositions which are at heart based in a completely different "sphere of the spirit".\textsuperscript{23} Thus as a Western philosophical study it is perhaps a worthy one but as a study of Indian thinking in terms of Advaita there remain great questions. For in fact Dr. Brooks wishes that Śaṅkara be either a philosopher or a theologian, in conformity with a specific kind of Western view on the two subjects.

The occurrences of analogue or illustration that we have previously cited by M. D. Paradkar is also a praiseworthy accomplishment and as it stands does not contain any information with which we could disagree. Both of his articles show, for our purpose, the great number of these occurrences and their different usage in the Advaita.

\textsuperscript{22} Brooks, p. 191.

\textsuperscript{23} Refer to Introduction p. 3 ff.
in a most positive light. It is not, of course, a systematic presentation of the illustrations as compared to Dr. Brooks' but is useful to show the great kinds of usage of this kind of approach. This approach would maintain that analogue in the making transparent of language is the movement by which it can be seen as first and foremost a teaching method.

ANALOGUE AS TEACHING METHOD

The illustration argument or analogue is one which is utilized after the questioner has given consent to a specific way of viewing the world and the reality of the actuality of liberation within it. Without an understanding of this kind when we approach the Advaita then any criticism must be seen as not entering into the heart of the Advaita-darsana. When the serious questioner approaches the utilization of the analogues of the Advaita they must be seen as a kind of instruction. This is because, as has already been mentioned, the Advaita above all else is concerned with an "inquiry into Brahman". The analogue is thus used conceptually in order to overcome another view or to propose a specific perspective. An example of analogue used to overcome another view is seen in the discussion of the view of the relation of the Purusa to Prakriti in the Sāṁkhya darsana:

May be, it may be this way (says the Sāṁkhya), by ranging himself in opposition (to the Vedāntin) and trying to justify his position by illustrations, thus—Just as one lame person possessing the power of sight but not the power of movement, riding pick-a-back on another who is sightless but possesses the power of movement, makes the latter move, or just as a magnet which while it itself does not move, makes iron move (i.e., attracts it), even so, would the Purusha cause the Pradhāna to act. To this we reply—Even so, there is no escaping the fault. In the first place, the fault viz. the discarding of the position
assumed as hypothesis (by the Śāṅkhya) would arise, because you (the Śāṅkhya opponent) hold that the Pradhāna possesses such tendency, and you do not hold that the Purusha (Self) can cause activity (in Pradhāna). How can the apathetic Purusha ever stimulate the Pradhāna to act? The same may also direct the blind one to move by words etc., but no such influence for causing movement is possible in the case of the Purusha who is apathetic i.e., inactive, nor can it, like a magnet, cause movement by mere proximity, because (were we to suppose so) there would thus be the predicament of perpetual activity induced by the constant proximity (between the Pradhāna and the Purusha).24

Thus the Śāṅkhya stands refuted on a specific point according to the Vedānta interpretation and analysis of analogue. Another example of this type of analogue concerns Śāṅkara's counter to the Bhāgavata doctrine of creation:

This is again why the Bhāgavata doctrine is incongruous. Because, it is never observed in the ordinary world that an implement such as a hatchet etc., is ever produced out of an agent such as Devadatta etc. The Bhāgavatīs describe that from the Aiva-Self called Samkarshaṇa, the mind that is called Pradyumna is produced, and from this effect Pradyumna, the Ego (Ahamkara) that is called Aniruddha is produced. In the absence of any parallel instance (in illustration of it) we are not able to understand it to be so, nor is any scriptural passage of such import available.25

Analogue or illustration is also used to explicate the position of the Advaita itself. One analogue concerning the proposition of the Vedānta that the effect is non-different from the cause is contained in Śāṅkara's commentary on Brahma Sūtra II.1.19:

Just as when a piece of cloth happens to be folded, it is not definitely understood whether it is a piece of cloth or some other material, but when it is unfolded it becomes clearly understood to be a piece of cloth, or,

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24 BS, II.2.7, Apte, p. 354.
it is understood to be a piece of cloth even when it is yet folded, but it is not understood as to how long and broad it is, but when it is unfolded it is known to be of a particular dimension in length and breadth and that it is not a piece of cloth different from the one which happened to be in a folded condition, similarly, an effect such as a piece of cloth etc., unrecognizable as it is, while it is in the condition of its cause viz. as threads etc. becomes clearly recognizable when it is made manifest by the operations of the causal agents, such as the shuttle, the loom and the weaver. Hence the meaning is, that it is precisely in accordance with "the maxim of the folded and unfolded pieces of cloth" that an effect is non-different from its cause.26

Now this analogue, standing in isolation, does not convince us of the effect necessarily being non-different from its cause. But it does employ the use of analogue as a means by which an argument can be constructed. Thus to take this as an isolated argument is to misconstrue its intent which is to build a cogent religio-philosophical premise out of a number of conventional analogues. This is also the case in the analogue given by Śaṅkara in reply to an opponent's objection:

... even though the sea is not different from water which constitutes its self, the foam, waves, and bubbles (of the sea) etc., which are modifications of the sea, and are not different from it, are sometimes seen to display a behavior characterized by being distinctly different from each other, and at another time being in conjunction with each other. These modifications of the sea, viz. the foam, waves etc. even though they are non-different from their cause, i.e. the sea, which has water as its self, still they (i.e. the modifications) do not attain each others condition ... Hence, it is said ... (by the Śūtrakāra) that distinctive difference between the experriencer and the thing to be experienced—non-different though they are from their cause viz. the Highest Self i.e. Brahma—is reasonably sustainable on the analogy of the maxim of the sea and the waves etc.27

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26 _Ibid._, II.1.19, pp. 322-3.  
Thus we can understand the implications of the analogue as one of the primary methods by which the Advaita maintained itself in dialogue with other views so that the correct understanding of the Advaita is communicated. Analogue then is a teaching method by which other views are overcome and by which its own views are propounded.

ANALOGUE AS BRAHMAN SPEAKING

The intent of the teaching method of analogue is to remove ignorance or avidyā. By this removal knowledge or vidyā dawns. This is the intent of an inquiry into Brahman which, as we have already seen, is the object of the Sūtra commentary. Thus when the Advaita utilizes the analogue for purposes of refutation or presentation it is done with reference to Brahman. The inquiry into Brahman then is the ultimate concern of the Advaita darsānā and by extension all is derived from this imperative. The analogue is a way by which this inquiry proceeds. By way of analogue understanding arises and this understanding leads to liberation. Liberation itself is not open to question, it is given. As Śaṅkara states:

So far as the Upanishadic teaching goes, however, as it understands the Self to be but one only, and that inasmuch as one entity can at once be both subject and object (of the torment) is not reasonably sustainable, and as the Scriptural instruction is, that all different effects are merely made current by speech (while in fact in the strictest sense they do not exist), no doubt about non-release can ever arise, even in a dream (in the mind of a Vedāntin). So far as the phenomenal world of experience is concerned, however, the well-known condition of one being the tormentor and the other the tormented, is as valid as it is seen to be for the time being, and so it does not become necessary (in such a case) either to raise an objection or to have to refute it.28

28Ibid., II.2.10, p. 360.
Thus analogue speaks about that which in itself is beyond language. It is analogues based upon the world that point beyond the world and to man's fulfillment in liberation (release). This is the reason Śaṅkara utilizes analogues from the world, as shown in Appendix A and B. Analogues measure out phenomena so that their nature can be grasped. This measuring out is centered in the conception of māyā.

**Occurrences of Māyā in the Commentary of Śaṅkara**

The concept of māyā is an important part of the understanding of the Advaita darśana. It occurs in a number of places within the commentary on the Brahma Sūtra. It is also implied throughout other parts of the commentary. Let us now look at these occurrences.

- māyā—I.1.20, I.2.6, I.3.19, I.4.3, I.4.9, II.1.1, II.1.9, II.1.14, II.1.21, II.2.29, III.2.3, III.2.17.
- māyāmātra—I.1.9, III.2.3.
- māyāmātratva—I.2.4, III.2.6.
- māyālīkavañcana—II.3.6.
- māyāvin—I.1.17, I.3.19, II.1.1, II.1.9, II.1.21, II.1.28.
- māyāvyapāśraya—I.2.7.
- māvin—I.4.3.29.

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Let us now look at the above as they occur in text. In 1.1.20 we find the word "māyā" and "māyānaya" occurring in Śaṅkara's answer to the opponent concerning the assumption of shape by the highest Lord:

With a beard bright as gold, etc., cannot refer to the highest Lord, we reply that the highest Lord also may, when he pleases, assume a bodily shape formed of māyā (mayam), in order to gratify thereby his devout worshippers. Thus Smriti also says, "That thou seest me, O Nārada, is the Māyā (māyāhyeṣas) emitted by me; do not then look on me as endowed with the qualities of all beings."

30 We will follow the procedure of giving the English translation of the quote and in the footnote cite the Sanskrit and other translations. The order of footnotes will be the Sanskrit given by Sastri in his Nīrnaya Sagar press edition cited as Sastri followed by page, then Apte's translation cited BSB and page, Thibaut's translation cited VS and page, and lastly Gambhirananda cited BS and page. For full acknowledgement of above authors, consult Bibliography.

31 Sastri, p. 196, (svātparaśevyā—pūchhayavanmāyāmayaṃ rūpaṃ sādhuḥkānugrahārtham, 'māyā hyeṣaḥ māyā srṣṭa yanmāṃ paśvaśi Nārada. sarvabhūtaguṇair yuktaṃ maivaṃ mām jñātunjharasi 'iti śmarān&at). BSB, pp. 67–8: With regard to the objection (raised by the opponent), that the mention in the Scriptures, of form such as having an auroate beard etc., is not reasonably sustainable in the case of the Highest Lord, we reply—It may well be the illusory māyānaya form assumed by the Lord, at will, with a desire to extend his grace to the devout worshipper, because the Smriti says, "What you see before you, Oh Nārada, is the Māyā generated by me. It is not correct to understand me as one endowed with all the attributes of beings."

VS, p. 80: With a beard bright as gold, etc., cannot refer to the highest Lord, we reply that the highest Lord also may, when he pleases, assume a bodily shape formed of māyā, in order to gratify thereby his devout worshippers. Thus Smriti also says, "That thou seest me, O Nārada, is the Māyā emitted by me; do not then look on me as endowed with the qualities of all beings.

BS, pp. 80–1: In answer to the objection that the reference in the Upaniṣad to such forms as the possession of golden beard etc. does not befit God, we say: Even for God there may be forms created at His will out of Māyā for the sake of favouring the aspirants, as is declared in the Smriti, "O Nārada, it is a Māyā, created by Me, that you see Me in this form possessed of all the substances and qualities. You must not understand Me thus." See also BSB III.2.17.
I.2.6 is a quotation from the Bhagavad Gītā 18:61: This quotation is exactly the same as that found in BSB II.1.14.

Oh Arjuna The Lord present in the hearts of all beings by His power of māyā makes them go round and round as on a whirling machine.32

I.3.19 equates māyā with avidyā:

Only one is the Great Lord who is eternally immutable and is of the very essence of knowledge, who, because of avidyā, that is māyā, is as by a māyāvin made to appear in diverse ways, but that there is nothing other (than the Great Lord) which is of the very essence of knowledge.33

32 Sastri, p. 234, (Iśvarah sarvabhūtānam hṛdaye arjuna tiṣṭhati bhrāmayan sarvabhūtānān yantrarūḍāni māyāyā).

BSB 1.2.6, p. 99 reads: "Oh Arjuna, the Lord is immanent in the region of all beings, making them go round and round by his power of illusion (Māyā) as if they are riding on a machine". At BSB II.1.14 it reads: "Oh Arjuna, the Lord is immanent in the region of the heart of all beings and by this power of Māyā makes them go round and round as in a whirligig". p. 312.

VS, I, p. 113: The Lord, O Arguna, is seated in the heart of all beings, driving round by his magical power all beings (as if they were) mounted on a machine. II.1.14 I, p. 330: The Lord, O Arguna, is seated in the region of the heart of all beings, turning round all beings (as though) mounted on a machine, by his delusion.

BS, p. 114: The Lord, O Arjuna, dwells in the hearts of all beings, causing all beings by His Māyā to revolve, (as if) mounted on a machine. II.1.14 p. same.

33 Sastri, p. 307, (eka eva parematārāh kūṭastha nityo viṇānaḥ āhu tavā yudhā māyāyā māyāvivad anekadā vibhāvyate nāṃyo viṇānādhātur asti iti).

BSB, p. 176: ... there is but one and only one, the Highest Lord, who is eternally immovable and has the essence of knowledge as his structure, who under the influence of ignorance i.e. illusion (Māyā) is, as by an illusionist, made to appear in different ways, and that there is nothing else which has this essence of knowledge as its structure.

VSi, p. 190: ... only one highest Lord ever unchanging, whose substance is cognition, and who, by means of Nescience manifests himself in various ways, just as a thaumaturg appears in different shapes by means of his magical power. Besides that Lord there is no other substance of cognition.
I.4.3 concerns the reply of Advaita to an objection of the Sāṁkhya:

The seedal power is of the nature of avidyā, imparted by the word avyakta having the highest Lord as its locus or ground, and of the nature of māyā and is verily, the Great Sleep wherein the transmigrating individual self slumbers on without awareness of its own nature. . . . This same avyakta is indicated or enjoined by the word māyā as in the description of the mantra. Know māyā to be . . . . It is this māyā that is the avyakta because it is not possible to determine its nature as ens or otherwise. 34

BS, p. 195: The supreme Lord is but one—unchanging, eternal, absolute Consciousness; but like the magician He appears diversely through Māyā, otherwise known as Avidyā (ignorance). Apart from this there is no other Consciousness as such.

Sastri, p. 378, (avyaktaṁ hi hṛtyaaktir avyakta sābda nirdeśya paramesvārasyā māyāmayi mahāsvātpīhi yasyam svarupa pratibodha rahita sarate samsārino jīvaḥ . . . . . tad etad avyaktaḥ . . . . guacit māyeti sūcitam, māyām tu prakritim vidyān māyaṁnaṁtu maheśvaram iti . . . . . mantra-varnāḥ avyakta hi sa māyā tattva anyatva nirūpasya sākṣati)

BSB, pp. 227-8: This potential power of the seed is of the nature of Nescience, and it is indicated by the word "undeveloped" (Avyakta), and has the Highest Lord as its basis, and is of the nature of an illusion (Māyā), and is the great sleep in which the transmigratory Jīva-Selfs unaware of their own true nature (Rūpa) continue to slumber on. . . . Occasionally it is expressed by the word "Akshara" as in the Scriptural passage "Higher than the high Imperishable" (Mund. 2.1.2) and occasionally it is suggested to be the illusory power (Māyā) thus—"You should know the Prakṛti (the cause) to be but the illusory power—Māyā (and not the Pradhana of the Sāṁkhya), and the Highest Lord as the master-illusionist (Shvet. 4.10). It is this Māyā that is this "undeveloped" (Avyakta), because, it is not possible to predicate about it, that it either is different from it (i.e. Brahma) or not different from it.

VS, I, p. 243: For that causal potentiality is of the nature of Nescience; it is rightly denoted by the term "undeveloped;" it has the highest Lord for its substratum; it is of the nature of an illusion; it is a universal sleep in which are lying the transmigrating souls destitute for the time of the consciousness of their individual character. . . . For Māyā is properly called undeveloped or non-manifested since it cannot be defined either as that which is or that which is not.

BS, p. 249: That potential power, constituted by nescience, is mentioned by the word unmanifest. It rests on God, and is comparable to magic. It is a kind of deep slumber in which the transmigrating souls sleep without any consciousness of their real nature: . . .
I 4.9 is a quote from Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad IV-10.11.

Know then that prakṛti is māyā and the wielder of māyā is the Great Lord. . . . That one who is the controller of every root-cause (such as māyā). 35

II.1.1 deals with the creation of the world by Īśvara:

It has been shown in the first adhyāya that the omniscient Lord of all is the cause of the origin of this world in the same way as clay is the material cause of jars and gold of golden ornaments; that by his rulership he is the cause of the subsistence of this world, just as the māyāyī is the cause of the subsistence of the māyā. 36

sometimes it is called Māyā as in, "Know Māyā to be Nature and the master of Māyā to be the great God" (Vs. IV.10). That Māyā is surely unmanifest, for it can neither be ascertained as real nor as unreal.

35. Sastrī, p. 388, (māyām tu prakṛtim viddhi, māvinam tu mahaśvaram; . . . yo yonim yonim adhitisthaty eko ha iti ca tasmaṇ eva vagamān na svatantrā kacit prakṛti hi . . .).

BSB, p. 240: "Know the Māyā (illusive power) as the primal cause and the Highest Lord as the Māyin [the master illusionist]" and "That one (the Highest Lord) who is the controller of every root-cause (such as Māyā)" (Shvet. 4.10.11).

VS, I, p. 255: 'Know then, Prakriti is Māyā, and the great Lord he who is affected with Māyā; 'who being one only rules over every germ' IV,10,11;

BS, p. 261: Know Māyā to be Nature (material cause), and the master of Māyā to be the great Lord" (Vs. IV.10)

36. Sastrī, p. 432, (kim prabodha iva svapne'pi paremīrthikī śrṣṭieahosvin māyā māyi iti).

BSB, p. 275: In the first Adhyāya, it has been propounded by coordinating the statements in Vedānta, that the Omniscient Lord of all, is the cause of the origination of the world, even as clay and gold etc. are (the cause of the origination) of a pot and an ornament respectively, that he is the cause of the preservation of the created world, even as the illusionist is (the cause) of the illusion,

VS, I, p. 290: It has been shown in the first adhyāya that the omniscient Lord of all is the cause of the origin of this world in the same way as clay is the material cause of jars and gold of golden ornaments; that by his rulership he is the cause of the subsistence of this world once originated, just as the magician is the cause of the subsistence of the magical illusion;

BS, p. 299: In the course of showing how all the Upaniṣadic texts are in agreement in presenting Brahman (as the cause of the universe), it was proved in the First Chapter that the omniscient Lord of all is the source of the origin of the universe, just as clay, gold,
II.1.9. speaks of the Highest Self:

This manifestation of the Highest Self, by its existing as the Self of the three conditions, is—like the appearance of a snake etc. in a rope—but a (māyāmātram) mere illusion. 37


II.1.21. constitutes the beginning of a comparison:

Just as the māyāvi by his free will effortlessly retracts or withdraws the māyā spread by himself

etc. are of pots, necklaces, etc.; that by virtue of His being the ordainer of the created universe, like the magician of his magic.

37 Sastri, p. 447, (yathā svayam prāśaritayā māyavā māyāvi trsvapi kalīṣa nā saṃprṣyate it yathā ca svapna dvrgrekaḥ svapna darśana māyavā nā saṃprṣyatha it). BSB, p. 294: This manifestation of the Highest Self, by its existing as the Self of these three conditions, is—like the appearance of a snake etc. in a rope—but a mere illusion. VS, I, p. 312: For that the highest Self appears in those three states, is a mere illusion, not more substantial than the snake for which the rope is mistaken in the twilight. BS, p. 318: This appearance of the supreme Self in identity with the three states is a mere superimposition, as in the case of the rope appearing as a snake etc.

38 Sastri, p. 462, (yathā ca māyāvi svayam prāśaritam māyam icchayā 'nayasaṇaiva upa saṃkaratā it). BSB, p. 324: Just as an illusionist, at will and without any effort withdraws an illusion spread by him. VS, I, p. 344: And as the magician easily retracts, whenever he likes, the magical illusion which he had emitted. BS, p. 347: As a juggler withdraws at will and without effort the magic spread out by himself.
II.2.29. discusses cancellation of dream and māyā:

A thing perceived in a dream by one is contradicted (on his waking) . . . there is a similar contradiction or cancellation in the case of māyā also. A thing perceived in a waking state—a pillar for instance—is never in the slightest cancelled or contradicted in that state.  

3.2.3. dreams as māyā:

But it (viz. the dream world) is mere māyā, on account of its nature not manifesting itself with the totality (of the attributes of reality).

39 Sastrī, p. 555, (bādhyaṁ hi svapnapalabdham vastu . . . evam māyādīsvapi bhavati vācāyathām bādhah, naivam jñāritobalabdham vastustambaḥdiḥkam kṛṣyaḥcidapayavasthayam badhyate).  
BSB, p. 402: Things perceived in a dream by a person are contradicted on his awaking (from a dream), . . . There is a similar contradiction in the case of Māyā (illusion) etc. But a thing perceived in a waking condition—a pillar for instance—is never contradicted under any circumstances.

VS, I, pp. 424-5: The things of which we are conscious in a dream are negated by our waking consciousness. . . . In an analogue manner the things of which we are conscious when under the influence of a magic illusion, and the like, are negated by our ordinary consciousness. Those things, on the other hand, of which we are conscious in our waking state, such as posts and the like, are never negated in any state.

BS, p. 423: To a man, arisen from sleep, the object perceived in a dream becomes sublated, . . . So also in the case of magic etc., adequate sublation takes place. But a thing seen in the waking state, a pillar for instance, is not thus sublated under any condition.

40 Sastrī, p. 689, (māyāmātram tu kartavyenanaḥbhivyakta-svarupatvāt).  
BSB, pp. 562-3: The dream creation is bhut mere appearance i.e. illusion, and there is not even an iota (lit., whiff) of reality (about it).

VS, II, p. 134: It is not true that the world of dreams is real; it is mere illusion and there is not a particle of reality in it.

BS, p. 590: . . . for the creation in the intervening state is a mere product of Māyā, there being not the slightest touch of reality in it.
3.2.17. is a *sūtra* quote:

Oh Nārada, when you see me as endowed with the attributes of all beings it is only māyā of by own creation, but you should not understand me as being such (in reality).\(^{41}\)

3.2.1. is a statement of a doubt:

Here a doubt arises whether in the dream condition creation is real as in the waking state or whether it is māyā.

\(^{41}\) Sastri, p. 710, (māyā hvesā māyā srṣṭa yan mām paśyasi nārada / sarva bhūta gunoir yuktam naiyam mām jñātmarhasi).

BSB, p. 587: "Oh, Nārada, when you see me as one endowed with the attributes of all beings, it is only an illusion of my own creation, but you should not understand me to be really so".

VS, II, p. 157: 'The cause, O Nārada, of your seeing me endowed with the qualities of all beings is the Māyā emitted by me; do not cognize me 'as being such (in reality).'"  

BS, p. 614: "O Nārada, that you see me as possessed of all the (five divine) qualities of all elements, is only because of My Māyā, called up by Myself. For else you should not understand Me thus."

\(^{42}\) Sastri, p. 687, (kim prabodha śāvapnē praśāparamārthikī srṣṭirahosvin māyāmayīti? tatra tāvat pratipadyate--).

BSB, p. 561: With regard to this, a doubt (arises)—whether in the dream condition creation is as real, as it is in the waking condition, or whether it is merely an appearance i.e. it is illusory (Māyāmayī).

VS, II, p. 133: Here a doubt arises whether the creation thus taking place in dreams is a real one (paramarthikā) like the creation seen in the waking state, or whether it consists of illusion (māyā).

BS, p. 588: The doubt arises with regard to this, whether the creation in dream is as real as in the waking state, or it is only illusory.
3.2.4. māyā and dream—a special character:

Being merely māyā there is not even a whiff of ultimacy or truth about a dream, if it be said, (we reply) that it is not the case.

As it is explained in "the non-difference of them results from the words like beginning etc." (BS: 11,1,14) the entire world of phenomena is mere māyā. The mere māyā character stated or ascribed to this creation (of dream) is therefore of a special kind or simply special.43

3.2.6. is the conclusion of the sūtra:

Therefore it is sustainable that the dream is of the nature of mere māyā.44

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43Sastrī, pp. 692, 3, (māyā mātratvāt na kaścit svapne para-
māraśvaṁ dharmaṁ tari stiti—niyucyate, pratipādaṁ hi tadam yatvam
āramaṁ āsādāṁsāyā ityacra sahaśāsya prapancaśaśā māyāmātratvam,
atā vaiśesakam idam sandhyāsya māyāmātratvam udinam).

BSB, pp. 563, 567: (Says the opponent of Vedānta)—A dream, then, being an illusion, is it not, that there could not be even an iota of reality about it? (We reply)—It is not so... as has been explained (in Bra. Sū. II.1.14), and it has been elaborately established by us already that the whole phenomenal world is wholly illusory. ... The illusory character of dream creations, therefore, comes to be so stated separately in a special sense (of being totally illusory).

VS, II, pp. 136, 138: Well then, as dreams are mere illusion, they do not contain a particle of reality?—Not so, we reply; ... On the other hand we must remember that also the so-called real creation with its ether, air, &c., is not absolutely real; for as we have proved before (II,1,14) the entire expanse of things is mere illusion, ... That the latter is mere illusion has, therefore, to be understood with a distinction.

BS, pp. 592, 594: In that case, since it is all mere Māyā, there is no touch of reality in dream. ... We say no, ... for under the aphorism, "The effect is non-different from the cause since terms like 'origin' etc. are met with" (II,1.14), we showed that the whole creation is but Māyā. Hence the statement that dream is merely Maya has a special significance.

44Sastrī, p. 694, (tasmād upapannam svapnasya māyāmātratvam).

BSB, p. 569: It is, therefore, reasonably sustainable that dreams are but a mere appearance i.e. an illusion (Māyā).

VS, II, p. 141: From all this it follows that dreams are mere illusion.

BS, p. 594: Hence it is reasonable to say that dream is mere Māyā.
In 2.3.6. māyālikā is deception:

It is not intelligible that scripture, like any man shall determine a thing by statements which are delusively false or deceitful.\(^{45}\)

1.1.17. distinguishes māyāvinas:

The māyāvin par excellence is one that stands on the ground different from the other māyāvin that appears to climb into the sky on a rope with a sword and leather in his hand.\(^{46}\)

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\(^{45}\) Sastrī, p. 584, (na ca vēdasya puruṣānāmiva māyālikā vanjanādibhiḥ arthavādāraṇam upapadyate).

BSB, p. 432: It is not reasonably sustainable that the Scriptures--like ordinary men--ascertain a thing to be such and such, by illusorily deceptive or untrue statements.

VS, II, p. 13: Nor can Vedic affirmations about things be viewed, like ordinary human statements, as mixed up with error, untruth, and deceit.

BS, p. 453: And it cannot be argued that like men, the Vedās also ascertain a thing through delusive, equivocal, or deceptive statements etc.

\(^{46}\) Sastrī, p. 184, (yathā māyāvināścarma khaṅga dhārāt sūtreṇa ākāsamadhirohataḥ sa eva māyāvi paramārtha rupo bhumiṣto 'nyah).

BSB, p. 58: Just as the real illusionist par excellence who stands on the ground, is different from the other illusory person, who appears to ascend into the sky by a rope with a sword and a leather shield in his hand.

VS, I, p. 70: ... the Lord differs from the soul (vignanatman) which is embodied, acts and enjoys, and is the product of Nescience, in the same way as the real juggler who stands on the ground differs from the illusive juggler, who, holding in his hand a shield and a sword, climbs up to the sky by means of a rope; ...

BS, p. 70: ... the difference being made in the same sense that the magician standing on the ground is fancied to be different from the magician holding sword and shield in hands and climbing up by a rope to the sky, though in reality the first is the very essence of the latter; ...
2.1.28 discusses creation as not touching the creators:

It is seen in the world also that gods, māyāvīn and others create without destruction of their own forms the diverse elephants, horses, etc.⁴⁷

2.2.7. māyā as the power of creation:

In the case of the Highest Self, however there is a distinction because of apathy or detachment (in respect of things) and its own native and creative tendency being contingent through māyā.⁴⁸

⁴⁷Sastrī, p. 477, (loke 'ni devādisu māyāvyādīgu ca svarūpā anūdha mardenaiva vicitra hāstvas vadi ṛṣṭavo).
BSB, p. 334: It is seen in the ordinary world also, that Gods, illusionists etc. cause such creations as elephants and horses, without their own forms undergoing destruction, . . .
VS, I, p. 353: In ordinary life too multiform creations, elephants, horses, and the like are seen to exist in gods, etc., and magicians without interfering with the unity of their being.
BS, p. 357: In the world also it is seen in the case of gods, as also jugglers and others that various kinds of creation of elephants and so on take place without any destruction of their nature.

⁴⁸Sastrī, p. 498, (paramātmanasta svarūpavāpyapāsāyam auḍāśīnyam māyāvyapāśrayam ca pravartakātvaṁ ityastvatātisāvaḥ).
BSB, p. 355: In the case of the Highest Self, however, its tendency towards creation depends upon its association with its power of Māyā, and apathy of its own nature (as realized by the Jīva-Self on the attainment of knowledge), and that is where there is this peculiarity (Atishaya) in the case of the Highest Self.
VS, I, p. 374: The highest Self, on the other hand (which is the cause of the world, according to the Vedāntins), is characterised by non-activity inherent in its own nature, and; at the same time, by moving power inherent in Māyā and is thus superior (to the soul of the Saṁkhya).
BS, p. 378: But in the case of the supreme Self there is the greater advantage that It has inactivity from its own point of view, but a driving urge (for creation) from the standpoint of Māyā.
ANALOGUE AND MAYA

We have just observed that illustration or analogue is that means, within the Advaita, which is used to measure out language so that the inquiry into Brahman is seen as a continuity. In other words the inquiry uses language to show that true language performs its ultimate function in making itself transparent. In this way we can understand the citation from the Brahma Sutra concerning language:

Scriptures also tell us, how, questioned by Bādhva explained Brahman to him (i.e. Bādhvakā) merely by his silence, thus—"He (i.e. Bādhvakā) said, Oh Bādhva, teach me (what Brahman is), but he (Bādhva) remained silent and when he was thus questioned a second and a third time, replied—"Indeed, have I told you (my my silence), but of course you do not understand [it understand]. This Self (ātman) is one from which duality has been swept away (upashānta)."

Another illustration of this is that transparency is assumed when we say that Brahman shines through language, for Brahman is seen as self-luminous as in B.S. 1.3.22:

Whatever becomes manifest becomes so manifest because of the lustre called Brahman, and Brahman is not made manifest by any other light, because it has the nature of being self-luminous.

Thus through the activity of language made transparent Brahman, defined as self-luminous, shines forth. Language measures itself out so that the immeasurable is shown.

49 BSB, 3.2.17, Apte, p. 587. In Apte's citation Vāshkali read as Bādhvakā. We will use Vāshkali in our text.

The measuring activity of language is implicit within the definition of māyā in the Advaita of Śaṅkara. This was observed in the etymological definition cited in Chapter Two. Māyā can be seen as a measuring out of the immeasurable. The immeasurable for the Advaita is Brahman. Thus māyā as measuring is promulgated by the activity of illustration or analogue which measures out name-form complex and language. This is accomplished by defining the former as "indefinable as either Brahman or non-Brahman". Concerning the latter language is made transparent so that the self-luminous Brahman shines through.

Analogue in the Advaita is primarily instructional communication that leads us down the pathway in the inquiry into Brahman. This can also be understood if we refer back to the Advaita understanding of māyā as the matrix of the universe. The point of this is that to quest after māyā itself will lead one nowhere. The analogue recognizes this because it is constructed on the framework of knowledge of Brahman. This is also true regarding the status of māyā. It is also constructed on the frame of knowledge of Brahman. This is not to say, however, that they are identical because in the Advaita analogue, because of its construction within the name-form complex and along with language, must reside within the canopy of māyā.

The two function in the same manner because māyā must be passed through like the veil over the doorway and analogue must make

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itself transparent to the self-luminous; the point of arrival is the same; it is Brahman. Thus when we talk of māya we must utilize analogue. Everything that is said is said with the suffix "as it were".\textsuperscript{52}

**ANALOGUE AND BRAHMAN**

Because of the nature of analogue the inquiry is brought to completion. There is the consideration also that by its very nature analogue can be seen as the departure into an inquiry and at the same moment its completion. What this means is that the analogue is not necessary to knowledge of Brahman in the Advaita. If it were necessary, it would have to be understood as a kind of injunction (vidhi) (like "works" in the Pūrva-Māmāsā) and this is rejected by the Advaita. Rather analogue is only instruction and does not enjoin something. "The science of Brahma however merely instructs a person about Brahma, but it does not enjoin to any act of acquiring knowledge."\textsuperscript{53} The analogue is at once the process of the inquiry and its completion. It is its completion in that, because knowledge of Brahman is knowledge that is intuitive, there is the possible recovery immediately of identity. This is shown in the illustration of the tenth man.\textsuperscript{54} Ten men were crossing a river and when they reached the other side they proceeded to count each other. The first man counter the nine others and took this to be the total. He was sad that there was one missing. Thereupon

\textsuperscript{52}See Paul Deussen's comment in Chapter Six, quote #22.

\textsuperscript{53}BSB, 1.1.1, Apte, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{54}PBV, p. 98 ff.
the others counted and each did as the first and counted only nine. All were then greatly saddened. At this time another man came upon them and seeing how sad they were inquired about it. They told him how they began with ten and after crossing the river, there were only nine. The stranger then looked at them and told them to count again, which they did, arriving again at nine. Then the stranger told them, "Indeed you have counted all but yourself. You yourself are the tenth."

This story illustrates that knowledge of Brahman is precisely the knowledge that one already is Brahman. Thus it is by working through the analogue that the possibility of knowledge of Brahman is put forward. True release is beyond analogue for in it analogue has fulfilled its meaning—the inquiry into Brahman.

Another example is the analogue of a dramatic stage:

... The agent, the act, and the objects are at the same time illumined by the witness—intelligence which is like a lamp set on a dramatic stage. The lamp gives light to the manager of the drama, to the actors and to the audience without any distinction; and it shines even if the theater be empty of all persons. ... The sense of egoity may be compared to the proprietor of the drama, the objects to the audience and the intellect to the danseuse; and the various sense-organs are auxiliaries or accompaniments which aid the actors. All these are without distinction illumined by the witness. Just as the lamp on the dramatic stage illumines without moving and without being affected by the movements of the actors and the audience, even so the witness which is permanent and immutable manifests all things both within and without.55

This illustrates that through Brahman, the self-luminous, all that exists is illumined; when all is known by the light of Brahman the inquiry is fulfilled and illustration is rendered transparent.

55Ibid., p. 173.
CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

NĀMA-RŪPA, LANGUAGE, MĀYĀ, AND ANALOGUE: THEIR CONNECTION IN ŚĀṆKARA

The name-form complex, consisting of either the world of manifold phenomena or as existing in seed form within the mind of Jñāna, is defined by Śāṅkara as anirvacanīya. Language is contained within name and it constitutes one of the central ideas in the Advaita inquiry into Brahman. Language is that which through its usage misunderstanding is corrected and which points beyond itself to knowledge. It accomplishes both of these movements through analogue. Analogue is the action of the inquiry into Brahman and the completion of the inquiry itself simultaneously. It allows Brahman to show through. Māyā is the matrix of the cosmos because it places itself at all times within the frame of an inquiry into Brahman and in this placement measures itself out so that the inquiry is furthered. The activity of measuring is accomplished by analogues which utilize the name-form complex in its proper perspective. In this service every construct is defined as being a pointing mechanism. Any illustration, ideally, could thus be applied and used in this way. One example of this within the tradition, but not used by Śāṅkara, can be seen in the Srimad-bhagavata account of the fifth incarnation of Viṣṇu as Vāmana the dwarf.
In Chapter Fifteen of the *Srimad-bhagavata* the story of how King Bali\(^1\) gained control over the world is related. Because of this there arose a great consternation within heaven and after some time it was agreed that Viṣṇu should incarnate himself so that order could be restored to the cosmos. Viṣṇu did incarnate as the dwarf Vāmana and after performing austerities, went to King Bali and asked for a boon:

Thereupon the Lord in the form of dwarf said, "O King! All the lovely objects of the world are not capable of satisfying him who has not controlled his senses; one dissatisfied with a piece of land measuring three footsteps is not satisfied even with an island . . . It is, therefore, O thou bestower of boons, that I do beg of thee just a piece of land measuring three footsteps.\(^2\)

King Bali did not consider that Vāmana, being a dwarf, could cover much land in three footsteps and thus granted him this\(^3\) boon. As Vāmana began to step off three times, a wonderful thing occurred: he began to expand. He grew as he raised his foot and when he had completed his first and second footsteps all the world was covered:

Thereupon, with His one foot he occupied the entire land of Vali, with His body the sky, and with His two arms the quarters, His second foot was accommodated by Heaven but no room was left for the third. Thereupon the second foot of His extending above heaven through Maharloka, Tapoloka, and Janaloka reached Satyaloka.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) The text that we cite has translated Bali which means "to increase" as Vali. We utilize Bali as this is the more correct.


After a brief time King Bali offered to Vāmana, who in reality was Viṣṇu, a place for the third footstep. He said to the dwarf, "Do thou place thy third foot on my head."\(^4\)

Referring back then to what was stated about the possibility of the utilization of illustration, the account cited above could be understood thusly: the three footsteps of Vāmana represent the idea of measuring, in fact we can say that the whole account is the measuring out of existence that which was covering the real. Vāmana measured off the world so that the power of King Bali was eradicated and in doing so regained or reinstituted order to the cosmos. If we now view māyā as measure we can say that in the same manner māyā measures out of existence that which covers the real. It does this by placing the cosmos in its rightful place by establishing the primacy of Brahman in the Advaita. It accomplishes this so that release or liberation can be realized. Thus through analogue the name-form complex, language, and māyā are postulated on, and exist for, instruction about Brahman.

NECESSITY OF CONNECTION

In the Advaita of Śaṅkara these four (analogue, name-form complex, language, and māyā) are necessarily connected. If this is true the question that arises is, why is such the case? The Advaita of Śaṅkara sees this implicit connection in the above mentioned citations (Chapter Seven) of the occurrences of māyā in the Bhāṣya.

Māyā there is used in reference to the name-form complex and this is expressed in language which is structured so that inquiry into

\(^4\)Ibid., p. 161.
Brahma is furthered by analogue or illustration. The connecting link in these factors shows itself as centered in and for the acquisition of Brahman knowledge. Name and form explain the makeup of the phenomenal world so that it becomes an ordered cosmos—not to define it but rather to place it within the Advaita ontology. Maya is the matrix or frame in which the name-form complex finds its base; it is the power (Sakti) of Isvara in creation and at the same time the localized structure of the individual who exists in a state of unrecovered knowledge. Language provides us with the tool for the recovery of knowledge by measuring out ignorance as well as itself.

The necessity of the connection of these factors centers in that which is common between them. This is the "instruction" aspect or element of their definition. Thus they can only be defined in reference to that of which they essentially are and direct one toward. This essence and direction in the Brahma Sutra begins and ends at the inquiry itself. The point of departure and arrival is self-evident. This is why the statement "tat tvam asi" attains its high status in Advaita. It is the tautological frame:

If we were to understand the knowledge of the unity of the Self with Brahman, to be of the nature of attributing greatness to a comparatively small thing, then the coordinated meaning of the sentences such as "that-thou art" (Chhân. 6.8.7) and "I am Brahman" (Brih. 1.4.10) and "This Self is Brahman" (Brih. 2.4.19) which have the purport of propounding the unity of the Self and Brahman, would be done violence to, and would contradict Scriptural passages about the fruit in the form of the removal of Nescience such as "The knots of the Hridaya are cut asunder and all doubts are resolved" (Mûnd. 2.2.8), and passages like "knowing Brahma, he became Brahman" (Mûnd. 3.2.9) which speak about the Self attaining the condition of Brahma, cannot be properly understood. Therefore the knowledge
of the unity of the Self and Brahma is not of the nature of attributing greatness to a small thing etc.; hence also, the science of the knowledge of Brahma does not depend upon some sort of operation by man.\textsuperscript{5}

Thus the connection exists only for the inquiry into Brahman. This inquiry is the purport and purpose of all conceivable discourse in the Advaita of Śaṅkara.

**IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONNECTION**

The implications from the connection of the name-form complex, language, and māyā arise because of discourse in the Advaita.\textsuperscript{5} This entails however a special understanding regarding the conception of discourse itself. This was pointed out in Chapter Six to be understood as true discourse which is the same as true language or Veda. Veda itself derives from the root vid which means "to know". Discourse is then concerned with knowledge which is true. That which is true is Real (sat) as Śaṅkara observes:

\[\ldots\text{ the word } \text{"truth"}\text{ means the Highest Brahma, because of its nature (rūpa) of being the transcendent entity also because of another Scriptural passage---"Brahma is Truth, knowledge, and infinite" (Tait. 2.1). It is then, that Śaṅkumāra gives instruction about "Brahma" to Nārada, to whom all this is explained and who asks, "Oh Bhagawan, can I be such Ativādi" on the strength of truth?---by means of a series of devices such as contemplation (Vijnāna) etc. So we think that, that truth which has been promised to be spoken of after Prāṇa is here referred to as "Bhūmā". Therefore, as instruction about Bhūmā comes after the instruction about prāṇa, it is the Highest Self, which is different from Prāṇa, that deserves to be Bhūmā. It is only in this way that the beginning of the chapter which expresses a desire to understand the Self, becomes reasonably sustainable.}\textsuperscript{6}

\textsuperscript{5} BSB, 1.1.4, Apte, pp. 22-3.

\textsuperscript{6} Ibid., I.3.8, pp. 154-5.
The Real (sat) is only Brahman:

This again why the effect is non-different from the cause, viz. because the scriptures [sic] say, that the Avara i.e. the one which comes into existence later on as the effect, is, before its creation, already in existence in the cause, as the cause itself, because in the Scriptural passages "Oh mild one, this was mere existence 'Sat' only, in the beginning" (Chhān. 6.2.1). "This in the beginning was only the Self (Ātmā)" (Ait. Āra. 2.4.1.1), the word "this" (Idam) by which the effect (i.e. this world) is understood, and the cause the Ātma (the Self), have the same case endings (showing their oneness). That (viz. the effect) which does not exist in the form of the sand as the cause of itself, can never be produced) from sand. Therefore being in fact non-different (from the cause) before creation, it is understood, that the effect even when it is created, is non-different from its cause. Just as Brahma during all the three times (i.e. past, present and future) never deviates from existence (satt va), even so, the effect viz. this world also during all the three times never deviates from existence (Sattva).

And again as existence itself as such (i.e. Sat) is but one only, it follows that the effect is non-different from the cause.7

Thus discourse is discourse at all times about Brahman. This discourse constructs a coherent frame that, being derived from Brahman and mahāvākyas such as "tat tvam asī", presents itself as a tautological ontology. This tautological ontology is commented on by Dr. Arapura:

The basic metaphysical concept of that One (Tad Īkam) has been reached in the Rgveda by mantras . . . . But what I call the sacred tautology is distinctly Upanisadic and hence Vedāntic. It is to Śaṅkara's credit that he grasped this sacred tautology with unparalleled power of penetration and expressed it with unmatched consistency. Only a few elements are essential for the articulation of this, viz., the principle of māyā-avidyā, the principle of the identity of jīva and Ātman as expressed in the Advaita formula:

7Ibid., II.1.16, pp. 313-4.
Mâyā then is discourse about Brahman which is expressed in an ontology, expressed tautologically. Analogue is the heuristic device by which inquiry of and arrival at knowledge is accomplished. Brahman in Itself as Satcidānanda becomes the horizon toward and around which the Advaita of Saṅkara moves. As long as language and the name-form complex remain separate from oneself analogue continues. This is so as long as mâyā or discourse about Brahman is necessary. Mâyā however, is not eternal though it is beginningless because liberation is an irrefutable fact for Advaita and there can be no questioning of it: thus the need for the inquiry into Brahman. The inquiry is conducted through mâyā as discourse about Brahman. Mâyā-talk is Brahman-talk for Saṅkara:

Mâyā is to be understood as the utmost universalization of mythic being, as the unbounded frame and structure of all individual myths, unified into a single interpretive system. If rhetoric is permitted, it can be described as the fathomless, boundless ocean from which all things come and into which all things disappear. It may be objected that this is the kind of talk that one makes


9In the present study we are not dealing with the concept of Moksha as such. For the Advaita understanding of this the reader is asked to refer to A. G. Krishna Warrier, The Concept of Mukti in Advaita Vedānta, (Madras: University of Madras, 1961).
about Brahman. Yes, that is precisely the point. Brahman talk also turns out to be mâyâ talk. Clearly the subject of discourse, that is mâyâ, is not itself but Brahman, and as such the paradox of self-invalidation implied in the statement "the world is illusory", it being part of that illusory world, resolves itself. If mâyâ is the logical structure of the discourse about Brahman then discourse about mâyâ is simply its obverse side, existing only tenuously. It is in that sense that one must speak of it, as has been spoken of by Advaitins, as neither real nor unreal but indefinable (anirvacanîya). ¹⁰

But even as it is expressible as indefinable this indefinability must be understood correctly along with the conception of mâyâ.

NEED FOR A REDEFINITION OF ŚAṈKARA'S MÂYÂ--MÂYÂVÂDA OR NOT?

As was mentioned previously in this work the attacks levelled against the Advaita of Śaṅkara have been against the concept of mâyâ or mâyâvâda. This does of course imply that Śaṅkara developed and utilized a concept of mâyâvâda which the opponent interpreted as a dualism, that mâyâ was other to Brahman. But we have observed that this cannot be a correct understanding. It is true that mâyâ holds an important place within the epistemological and metaphysical frame of the Advaita but we must not turn the term mâyâ into an ontological one except in a very special sense. This is because one must recall that mâyâ is merely a logical postulate arising out of the doctrine of Brahman. So what then can we say about mâyâvâda? If it is used with the proviso that it derives from a doctrine of Brahman then the usage is acceptable to Advaita. However, most often it is not used in this sense and mâyâvâda then constitutes a gross injustice to

¹⁰MDAB, pp. 117-8.
Advaita. Perhaps then it would be best to refrain from the description of Śaṅkara's Advaita as māyāvāda and say rather that Advaita can be termed Advaitavāda or Brahmavāda. The movement from Brahmavāda into māyāvāda occurred historically within the post-Śaṅkara Advaitins.

MĀYĀVĀDA IN THE POST-ŚAṄKARA ADVAITA

As was pointed out in Chapter Five of our study the history of the Advaita darsana after Śaṅkara developed because of an inner momentum which added to and interpreted Śaṅkara to answer the new religio-philosophical positions that arose. This was especially the case with the conception of māyā. Śaṅkara said that the world was māyā and was due to māyā; the post-Śaṅkara Advaitins worked out from this a method of māyā which defined the world. This attempted construct brought about the shift from māyā to māyāvāda. Concomitant with this was the apparent shift from Śaṅkara's concept of anirvacanīya to anirvacanīyakhyati-vāda. Both of these conceptual changes we will briefly turn our attention to. 11 In this we will only concern ourselves with several examples because to give a fuller treatment is beyond our present work. There are three views concerning māyā that were brought out in the conclusion of Chapter Five. These views are: (1) abhāsavāda, (2) pratibimba-vāda, and (3) avaccheda-vāda. They belong respectively to Suresvara, Sarvajñatma Muni and

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11 These points constitute a very important development within the Advaita Vedānta. This shift is merely pointed out in this dissertation and a full study could constitute a major contribution to the study of Indian philosophy. This can be one direction for further research which would be most valuable. We have merely pointed out the overall view of the shift, not the "why" or the "how".
Anubhūtisvarūpā,¹² and Vācaspati. Thus Śuresvara maintains the Abhāsavāda or appearance theory. Sarvajñatma Muni and Anubhūtisvarūpā the pratibimba-vāda or reflection theory and Vācaspati Miśra the avaccheda-vāda or determination theory. Each of these theories concern the problem of the relation between Brahma and māyā. This formulation itself shows us that the later Advaita has moved out of the inquiry into Brahma and begun to concentrate upon the status of māyā and the status of Brahma with respect to each other. We can recall from Chapter Five that for Śuresvara Brahma is screened by ignorance and appears as witnessing consciousness or Īśvara. Brahma is also screened by intellect and appears as the individual self or Īśva. Thus ignorance and intellect become appearances derived from Brahma.

Anubhūtisvarūpācarya in his commentary on Śaṅkara's Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya called Prakāśā-vivaraṇa maintains that ignorance is part of māyā and the individual self is the reflection in ignorance whereas Īśvara is the reflection of Brahma in māyā. So the relation here of Īśvara to the individual self is established by reflection.

Vācaspati maintains the third view of determination which states that:

Māyā, though not real, can limit the nature of infinite Brahma, and Īśva is thereby obtained. What is not so limited is Īśvara. The same Brahma as the object (viśaya) of avidyā is Īśvara; but the viśaya (locus) of avidyā

Thus the post-Śaṅkara Advaita, in answering questions concerning the controversy about the problem of the relation between Brahman and māyā, were guided and drawn, even though this may be denied by modern Advaitins, into discourse about māyā rather than discourse about Brahman. The difference in the various answers to the three theories cited leads into the great discussions among the Advaitins themselves as well as the other Vedāntic viewpoints.

Concurrent with the shift of māyā in the post-Śaṅkara Advaita was the change in the conception of anirvacanīya to anirvacanīya-khyāti. This was pointed out immediately following our brief discussion of Śureśvara's understanding that māyā is only an instrument through which the one Brahman appears as many. Śureśvara used anirvacanīya-khyāti as a theory of error and developed his philosophical views within this context. This conception proceeds from the conception of adhyāsa or super-imposition in Śaṅkara's Advaita. This fact has been pointed out by Dr. Arapura:

Both Vācaspati Miśra (Bhāmatī) and the Vīvarana School interpret adhyāsa so as to mean an anirvacanīya appearance, totally changing Śaṅkara's meaning of the word... In the thought of Śaṅkara all interpretations

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14 The word khyāti is used by Śaṅkara in his Bhāṣya in only one place (I.4.1) where it is used in the ordinary sense of opinion or view. See Mahadevan, Word Index to Brahma-Sūtra, Part One, (Madras: Madras University, 1971), p. 356.
of adhyasa boiled down to one thing: the appearance of the mother-of-pearl as if it is silver or the appearance of the moon as two. The later advaitins interpreted the appearance of silver as the actual manifestation of the anirvacaniya silver in the substratum of the appearance, caused by the mysterious principle of avidya. They thus enunciated anirvacaniti-khyeti as a doctrine of falsity or error. It is in Bhāmati that avidya itself was first called anirvacaya (anirvacya avidya, Bhāmati, verse 15) anirvacaniti-khyeti as a doctrine of falsity or error.

This then is the indication of the alterations in Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta that have taken place with regard to the concepts of māyā and anirvacaniti. We do not intend to go into this matter any further. Our only intention was to point out the change rather than to analyze it fully. This is because this subject would take us well beyond our present topic. So at this point let us turn our attention, briefly, to a modern critique of Śaṅkara's māyā which is contained in the views of Sri Aurobindo.

AUROBINDO'S VIEW OF ŚAṅKARA'S MĀYĀ

Sri Aurobindo is one thinker who is having a great impact upon modern India as well as the West. His theory of life is a type of dynamic evolutionism. This however is not our present concern. We are concerned with specifically his understanding of Śaṅkara's


16. For a full account of Sri Aurobindo's system the reader is asked to refer to the author's M.A. Thesis: "The Eschatology of Sri Aurobindo's Evolutionary Doctrine", Religion Department, McMaster University (1971). Cited hereafter as Eschatology.
Aurobindo levels his attack against Śaṅkara from within the camp of the Advaita, he observes of himself that:

The real Monism, the true Advaita, is that which admits all things as the one Brahman and does not seek to bisect its existence into two incompatible entities, and eternal Truth and an eternal Falsehood, Brahman and not Brahman, Self and non-Self, a real Seal and an unreal, yet perpetual Maya. If it be true that the Self alone exists, it must be also true that all is the Self.\[17\]

The fundamental departure point of Aurobindo's understanding of Śaṅkara is that he calls him a qualified illusionist.\[18\] He further maintains that Śaṅkara's philosophy affirms a qualified reality of māyā. That is, it has two orders of reality: one of pure being of Brahman which is absolute and eternal and a second of Brahman in māyā which is phenomenal and temporal. He continues:

Here we get a reality for ourselves and the universe: for the individual self is really Brahman; it is Brahman who within the field of Maya seems phenomenally to be subjected to her as the individual and in the end releases the relative and phenomenal individual into his eternal and true being. In the temporal field of relativities our experience of the Brahman who has become all beings, the Eternal who has become universal and individual is also valid; it is indeed a middle step of the movement in Maya towards liberation from Maya. The universe too and its experiences are real for the consciousness in Time and that consciousness is real.\[19\]

According to Aurobindo's interpretation, the universe for Śaṅkara is "unreal reality". Aurobindo argues against Śaṅkara's māyā-vāda

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\[18\] Ibid., p. 407.

\[19\] Ibid., p. 408.
utilizing the classic examples of the rope and snake and pot and earth, etc. Aurobindo understands the world, which consists of matter, life, psyche, and mind, as a progressive reality which will ultimately be raised to divinity. Mâyā exists in degree in every stage of evolution according to the extent to which that stage is able to reveal the divine nature. The less it is able to do so, the more it participates in mâyā. In fact this participation is distinguished by Aurobindo into "Lower and Higher Mâyā".

Lower and Higher Mâyā in Aurobindo

The lower mâyā is that mâyā which man experiences in his everyday world. It is that which gives rise to disharmony, suffering and ignorance. But just because it is that, it has to be taken in and overcome:

The lower, present and deluding mental Maya has first to be embraced, then to be overcome; for it is God's play with division and darkness and limitation, desire and strife and suffering in which He subjects Himself to the Force that has come out of Himself and by her obscure suffers Himself to be obscured.

Thus in the embracing one begins to understand that this lower mâyā is a veil over the true meaning of what man is. Lower mâyā must be seen as "lower" and in relation to something which is higher, for even within lower mâyā the potential perfection of man exists. Aurobindo observes that, "The principle and power of perfection are there in the subconscious but wrapped up in the tegument or veil of the lower maya, a mute premonition emerging as an unrealized ideal;


\[21\] Life Divine, p. 108.
in the superconscient they await, open, eternally realized, but still separated from us by the veil of our self-ignorance.\textsuperscript{22} The way to understand lower māyā is to embrace it and in the process of this embrace, knowledge will begin to dawn. But as ignorance is the lower māyā so also knowledge is the higher māyā for knowledge also is only a stage in the evolutionary ascent. Aurobindo states:

For there in the higher and divine Maya is the conscious knowledge, in its law and truth, of that which works in the subconscious by the lower Maya under the conditions of the Denial which seeks to become the Affirmation. For this lower Nature works out what is willed and known in that higher Nature. The Illusion-Power of the divine knowledge in the world which creates appearances is governed by the Truth-Power of the same knowledge which knows the truth behind the appearances and keeps ready for us the Affirmation towards which they are working. The partial and apparent Man here will find there the perfect and real Man capable of an entirely self-aware being by his full unity with that Self-existent who is the omniscient lord of His own cosmic evolution and procession.\textsuperscript{23}

The difference between lower and higher māyā is not a difference in fact but in degree. The lower māyā shows itself as negation, disruption and difference. The higher māyā shows itself as affirmation, reunion and unity. But as the higher māyā shows itself it also is only partial, for conscious knowledge, thought and mind, are transitional stages of the evolutionary ascent. Aurobindo states:

This distinction between the lower and the higher Maya is the link in thought and in cosmic Fact which the pessimistic and illusionist philosophies miss or neglect. To them the mental Maya, or perhaps an Overmind, is the creatrix of the world, and a world created by mental Maya

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., p. 199.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., p. 196.
would indeed be an inexplicable paradox and a fixed yet floating nightmare of consciousness which could neither be classed as an illusion nor as a reality. Mind is only one of His instruments in the descent and the ascent. It is an instrument of the descending creation, not the secret creatrix—a transitional stage in the ascent, not our high original source and the consummate term of cosmic existence.24

Advaita Vedānta: Aurobindo and Śaṅkara

Aurobindo places himself in the Advaita Vedānta conception of philosophy, but he disagrees with Śaṅkara specifically on the conception of māyā and consequently with the rest of his philosophy. This is evident from his many references to Śaṅkara and the internal refutations contained in many quotes. He remarks:

World is Maya. World is not unreal in the sense that it has no sort of existence; for even if it were only a dream of the Self, still it would exist in it as a dream, real to It in the present even while ultimately unreal. Nor ought we to say that the world is unreal in the sense that it has no kind of eternal existence, for although particular worlds and particular forms may or do dissolve physically and return mentally from the consciousness of manifestation into the non-manifestation, yet Form in itself, World in itself are eternal.25

The reply of Advaitism to Aurobindo's contention that Śaṅkara is a qualified illusionist is that Aurobindo misunderstood Śaṅkara's māyāvāda. Śaṅkara's māyāvāda maintains that Brahman is the only reality. A follower of Śaṅkara's Advaita is C. R. Malkani, who in an article on Aurobindo's attack on Śaṅkara, maintains that for

24 Ibid., p. 109.
25 Ibid., p. 95.
Advaitism the world does not exist in time but just appears. In the beginning and end of time the world does not exist, but in middle it does appear to exist. It does not appear by itself but in relation of identity or tādātmya with its real ground or satva which is Brahman.

Malkani continues:

Brahman exists in all the three times—past, present, and future,—and the world only in the middle. Brahman is therefore its essence, or tatva. The world on the other hand, since it comes out of Brahman and disappears into Him, and since it has no independent being is only an illusory appearance and so unreal. Thus for Advaitism, Brahman is the only reality, and Brahman does not contain the world in any form or at any time. Even when the world appears, it appears falsely and illusorily, and it is not therefore really contained. Brahman is always pure and unmixed with the world. The world does not really exist in Him even in subtle form.

Thus it is for this reason and others that Malkani disagrees with Aurobindo. He states, "In our opinion, Srī Aurobindo misses the entire sense of maya-vāda as it is understood in Advaitism." Aurobindo, if he replied to this attack by Malkani, would maintain that he understands better than Malkani the Advaitism of Śaṅkara and for this reason has gone beyond it. Brahman for Śaṅkara is static Being; therefore he holds the world to be illusion or māyā. Aurobindo observes that this illusion is true but only tentatively. He states:

Therefore we accept the truth on which the philosophies of the supracosmic Absolute take their stand: Illusionism

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27 Ibid., p. 29.
itself, even if we contest its ultimate conclusions, can still be accepted as the way in which the soul in mind, the mental being, has to see things in a spiritual-pragmatic experience when it cuts itself off from becoming in order to approach and enter into the Absolute. But also, since the becoming is real and is inevitable in the very self-power of the Infinite and Eternal, this too is not a complete philosophy of existence.  

Saṅkara then is correct in his observation but only to a point, that of seeing only a partial truth. Aurobindo states, "A theory of Maya in the sense of illusion or the unreality of cosmic existence creates more difficulties than it solves; it does not really solve the problem of existence, but rather renders it forever insoluble. For, whether Maya be an unreality or a non-real reality, the ultimate effects of the theory carry in them a devastating simplicity of nullification. Ourselves and the universe fade away into nothingness or else keep for a time only a truth which is little better than a fiction."  

Thus Aurobindo maintains that Saṅkara's māyāvāda is correct in the first parts of evolution but in the evolution beyond "finite mind" it is an incorrect analysis of the Absolute. This is brought out by Aurobindo's analysis of the characteristics of māyā.

Aurobindo's Understanding of Māyā

Whether Aurobindo really is an advaitin is still a point of discussion as P. T. Raju states, "But Sri Aurobindo Ghosh and Tagore treat the world as being and real. The position of Aurobindo is more allied to Saktism and Kasmira Saivism ...". On another

28 Life Divine, p. 588.
29 Ibid., p. 418.
30 HPEW, p. 303.
approach Śaṅkara's Advaita could attack Aurobindo from the point of seeing Aurobindo's evolution in the same light as the Śaṅkhya evolutionary theory. The main question then directed to Aurobindo would be how can Satcidānanda be dynamic? Also, as we have already shown, to term the Advaitavāda of Śaṅkara as māyāvāda is to misunderstand his system. The Advaita would say to Aurobindo that the world is real as long as one wishes to consider it but this doesn't lead one to inquire into Brahman. Aurobindo's system develops out of a uniting of Eastern and Western thought which falls short of its goal. As Arapura observes:

Indians today use both the traditional language of religion and the new language of Western science, politics and even philosophy. But there has been no real meeting of the two languages and whenever people like Aurobindo have attempted an integration they have come out with pseudo-synthesis. 31

Thus we can say that Aurobindo doesn't understand Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta because of the points cited above and also because of his failure to grasp māyā in Advaita as something more than illusion.

MĀYĀ DEFINED AS MEASURE

Mānir-Williams etymologically defines māyā as deriving from the root mā or "measuring". When one adds the suffix ya to the root mā it can be defined as "relating to measuring". 32 This was also the

31 LP, p. 29.

meaning understood in the earliest etmological references to māyā aside from the Rgveda contained in the Nighantu and the Nirukta as we saw in Chapter Two. We have seen above that māyā can also be understood in this manner in Śaṅkara’s Advaita Vedānta. This is so because māyā acts as the measuring out of phenomena so that Brahman remains. This “measuring out of phenomena” is the inquiry into Brahman itself. Even when māyā is translated by the word “illusion”, this inquiry is fostered because māyā can only be an “illusion” strictly within an ontological discussion of Brahman. Within the structures of epistemology and metaphysics māyā can never be “illusion” because it maintains its reality as a kind of “measure” as long as one is still within the name-form complex. However, even speaking within ontology māyā is not just “illusion” because as we have observed māyā-talk is Brahman-talk and conversely Brahman-talk is māyā-talk and this is so as long as talk exists. Māyā can be understood by Śaṅkara’s Advaita as measure because it is an aspect of māyā that it measures itself out. That is, māyā acts in that it uses the errors of the phenomenal world to eliminate error in knowledge. And it is in this way that the inquiry progresses. As such māyā is provisional forever but not eternal. It is the measure of distinction between Brahman with and Brahman without distinction.

AS DISCOURSE ABOUT BRAHMAN

In Chapter Six and Chapter Seven māyā as discourse about Brahman was discussed. There we saw that because language allows the inquiry into Brahman to proceed and because by definition any process occurring within the frame of māyā language construct
becomes discourse about the structure of mâyā. The structure of mâyā cannot be determined as anything separate from the inquiry into Brahman. The inquiry proceeds by understanding that any and all discussion, if it be accurately termed such, centers upon discourse about Brahman. Mâyā as discourse about Brahman relates to mâyā as "measuring out" in that it is through discourse about Brahman that mâyā measures out the name-form complex, language, and mâyā itself so that the reason for the discourse, namely knowledge of Brahman, can be actualized. The procedure of the activity of measuring is the discourse itself. In this procedure the result of the discourse is proposed at the start of the endeavor thus—"Now therefore an inquiry into Brahman". The discourse about Brahman points beyond the discourse when knowledge of Brahman is discussed. It is this discussion which points beyond mâyā as "measure" and "discourse about Brahman" and this pointing shows another aspect of mâyā. This aspect is seen when measure and discourse are understood as primary pointers and are analogues that always participate in aiming one at Brahman.

IN ANALOGUE

The definitions of mâyā pointed out above are constructed on the basis of the name-form complex. Analogue is the frame upon which mâyā builds itself in terms of its usage as measure and discourse. It is through an understanding of analogue that language exhibits the ability to overcome its horizon by participating in discourse about

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33 This horizon is the limitation of the Sphotavadins.
Brahman. Hence there is the example of the pregnant silence of Bāhva's answer to the question of Vāshkalin on teaching him the Self (Atman). Dr Arapura remarks:

... the irony of having to make implicit truth explicit may sometimes be dramatically expressed in silence. Such dramatic expression is what is witnessed in the rather rhetorical silence observed by Bāhva before Vāskali, in answer to the question about Brahman, followed by the words "silence is this Atman" (upasānto 'yan ātma). From the context where this episode is narrated it is clear that what Śāṅkara has in mind is the irony of having to say what cannot be said, fully knowing that silence itself is excluded from speech only so that the actuality of Brahman may be indicated by such dramatic enactment.

The difference between speech and silence is the analogical measure of the difference between Brahman with distinction and Brahman without distinction. The difference measured thus is māyā; here is the significance of the etymology of the word, from mā, to measure. 34

The understanding of the analogue then is central if we wish to grasp the significance of māyā as measure and as discourse about Brahman. In both activities, even though they are not actually separate actions, analogues perform the service of allowing them to define their boundaries and push them beyond, to the horizon of Brahman. This push is the point at which the screen of apparent duality becomes crystalline rather than existing in a state of opaqueness. This allows the self-luminous Brahman to shine through. Analogues then allow māyā to fulfill its necessary function in Advaita, that is to make itself transparent to Brahman.

34 MDAB, p. 115. Italics are my addition.
Concerning Brahman as shining through all Śaṅkara comments:

"In its presence (tatra = tasmin Svātmabhūte Brahman) the Sun, does not shine, nor the moon and the stars, nor lightning, and much less fire. All this shines in the wake of its shining. By its (borrowed) lustre, all this shines" (Muṇḍ. 2.2.10). . . . It is only if we understand the Highest Self as meant by "All this shines in the wake of that which shines" that it becomes reasonably sustainable because the Highest Self is mentioned as being "one whose nature is lustre". . . . Whatever becomes manifest becomes so manifest because of the lustre called Brahma, and Brahma is not made manifest by any other light, because it has the nature of being self-luminant. . . . 35

Utilizing Brahman as the self-luminous māyā, under the presented forms of interpretation, can be understood as the principle of transparency. As such there is no necessity that māyā become transparent because this can only happen when the individual moves into the inquiry into Brahman. If however one makes such a move then the conception of māyā is seen to point to the transparent aspect of its nature. All structures and frames of experience contained under the canopy of māyā admit of their crystalline or transparent being in terms of the horizon of Brahman as self-illumination. Thus "tāt tvam asī" allows us an example of the highest transparency which, through the analogue of the measuring of the nyagrodha tree coupled with discourse about Brahman, explodes upon the listener as the expression of the inexpressible, namely Brahman. This is also the case with the syllable aum which is commented on thus:

35 BSB, I:3.22, Apte, pp. 179-80.
And thus it has been said elsewhere: "there are, verily, two Brahmans to be meditated upon, sound and non-

sound. By sound alone is the non-sound 'revealed. Nowhere

the sound is sum. Moving upward by it one comes to ascend

in the non-sound. So (one says) this is the way, this

is immortality, this is complete union and also tranqui-

lity. And now as the spider moves upward by the thread, obtains free space, thus assuredly, indeed the meditator

moving upward by the syllable aum obtains independence."

Other expounders of the sound (as Brahman) think otherwise.

By closing the ears with the thumbs they hear the sound

of the space within the heart. There is the sevenfold

comparison of it, like rivers, a bell, a brass vessel,

a wheel, the croaking of frogs, rain, as when one speaks

in a still place. Having passed beyond this variously

characterised (wound), they disappear (become merged)

in the supreme, the non-sound, the unmanifest Brahman.

There they are uncharacterised and indistinguishable like

the various juices that have reached the condition of

honey. For thus has it been said, "There are two Brahm-

mans to be known, the sound Brahman and what is higher.

Those who know the sound Brahman get to the higher

Brahman."

Sound as śabda is the thread upward to knowledge of Brahman. The

Brahma Sūtra is itself this thread, "for the Sūtras are meant only

for the purpose of stringing together the flower-like Vedānta passages.

The Sūtras refer to the Vedānta passages which are considered therein.

36 PU, Maitrī-Upaniṣad IV.22, p. 833, (athānyatra śṛṣṭvā uktam:  

dve va-vā brahmapi abhidhyeye śabdas cāsābdaśa, aha śabdenaśvāśabdam

āviśkritvate, aha tatra aum iti śabdo'nenordham utkrānto'śabde

nidhanam eti, athāhiśa gatir etad aṃrtam, etat sāyujuvatvam; nirvā-

tatvam tatha ceti; aha yathorganābhis tantunordham utkrānto' va

vākāśam labhatity evah vā va khāly asāv abhidhyati aum ity anenordham

utkrāntah svātantryaṃ labhate, anyathā pare śabdavādinaḥ: śravag-

āṅguṣṭhayogenāntarhdayadāśa-sabdam ākāṇayanti, saptavidheyaṃ
tasyopamā, yathā nadyaḥ kīṇkīṇī kāmasya-cakrake-bheka viśkṛtikā
vṛṣṭir, nivāte vadatīti, tatha prthag lakṣāṇam atitya pare śabde-

vyakte brahmapi astaṃ gatāḥ, tatra te'prthag-dharmop'prthag-vivekyā
yathā sampatnā madhutvaṃ nānārasa ity evah hy āha; dve brahmapi

veditavye, śabda-brahma param ca var, śabda-brahmapi nisptah param

brahmādṛśgacchati).
For the knowledge of Brahman is effected by the determination (brought about) by the consideration of the meaning of the Vedānta passages. The Advaita of Śāṅkara revolves, then, around the inquiry into Brahman and it is only by seeing the frame of phenomena (mūyā) as transparent that the inquiry is initiated.

"sarvam khalvidam Brahma"

37 BSB, I.1.2, Apte, p. 11.
APPENDIX A


1. Blind man and cow's tail compared with incorrect teaching (I.1.7) Andha-goliṅgūla-nyāya.

2. Blind man and lame man riding on his back with a view to refute the Sāmkhya. (II.2.7) Andha-pāṅgu-nyāya.


5. Utilization of the simplest method and not the more difficult (II.4.3, I.2.4, II.4.3) Arke cet madhu vindeta kimartham parvatam vrajet.


7. The slaying of half of the body whilst the other half is kept alive (III.3.18) Ardhavaisasa-nyāya.

8. Identity between a thing and its different forms (III.2.27) Ahi-kundala-nyāya.

9. The arrow-maker (I.2.10) Iṣu-kāra-nyāya.

10. Establishes that two mutually interdependent and unknown things cannot independently lead to any definite conclusion (II.2.17) Kunda-badara-nyāya.

11. Milk and water used to illustrate close union without complete identification (II.3.5) Kṣiradaka-nyāya.


13. Threads and the piece of cloth (II.2.12) Tantu-pāta-nyāya.


15. Movement of the bird cage (II.4.9) Pañjara-cālana-nyāya.
16. Prakṛti as material cause (II.3.6) Prakṛti-vikara-nyāya.

17. Prevention is better than cure (Brīh. II 3-1) (III.3.22) Prakṣaḷanāt hi pāṅkasya surāt asparśānam.


19. Eternal series of the seed and the sprout (II.1.35, II.2.28; III.2.9) Bhāṅkva-nyāya.

20. Specifying a thing out of a number of similar things for specific purpose (III.1.11) Brāhmaṇa-parivṛtti-nyāya.

21. Non-difference of a thing even though different forms such as a folded and unfolded cloth (II.1.19) Saṁvestita-prasārita-pata-nyāya.

22. Driving in of a post (II.1.34, III.3.53, III.4.2) Sthūpa-nikanana-nyāya.


APPENDIX B


3. Live charcoal II.3.12; III.2.25, II.3.46, III.2.15, II.2.13, III.2.11.

4. Following a person I.3.22, II.3.5, II.2.3.

5. Magnet and Iron II.2.2, II.2.7.


7. Spokes of a wheel I.1.31.

8. Slaying half of the body III.3.18.

9. Šrīdharma smeared with clay II.2.35.


11. Threshing corn IV.1.1.


15. Solid Rocks II.1.23; Earth surface III.2.31.


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18. Conduct III.3.20; Mirror I.1.4; Food II.3.5; Devadatta and seat I.3.1

19. Exchange of Selfs III.3.37, III.3.15; Sun and arrow II.3.7; Lotus II.2.26, II.5.4.

20. Water II.2.29, IV.2.1, II.3.5, III.2.9.

21. Milk II.2.5, II.2.9, II.3.9, II.2.10.


24. Created, rope II.3.7; fuel I.2.11; rice II.1.13; satisfaction with food III.3.32; meat, broth, rice II.1.4, II.3.2; herbs II.1.27.

25. Bracelet II.3.7; thorn II.3.29; Soul over senses II.2.40; Acts III.3.1, plurality of works II.3.1; coin II.2.31, III.2.3.

26. Varnish II.2.17; pot II.2.17; ear-ring II.3.7, I.1.4; snake III.2.20; well II.2.32; bank of river I.1.6; armlet II.3.7.

27. Milk II.3.12, II.3.5, II.2.5, III.2.9, II.2.28.

28. Effect not existing in cause II.1.18; milk and curds II.1.24, II.2.17, II.3.7, II.2.3, II.1.18.

29. Ganges III.2.7; going II.1.18, II.3.26; city of Gandharvas II.2.28.

30. Mountain IV.3.4, III.4.3; useful house items II.2.1; cowness II.1.18; rope II.3.7; ruler cessation III.3.20.

31. Jar I.1.4, II.2.34, II.3.7, II.3.18, II.3.48, I.2.6, II.1.14, I.1.5.

32. Jar and potter II.1.24, II.1.18, III.2.21, III.1.8, II.1.14.

33. Jar and clay II.1, II.1.15, II.3.9, IV.3.14.


35. Space in jar I.2.20, II.3.7, II.1.14; water wheel II.2.19; ghee II.2.15, II.2.17, III.2.21, III.1.8, II.2.17.

36. Potters wheel IV.1.15; eye II.4.10; form II.2.2; sandle paste II.3.24, II.3.23.

37. Moon II.1.27, I.1, IV.1.15, IV.1.19, III.2.18, III.2.21, III.2.34, II.3.46, III.2.15.
38. Skin II.2.35; image in water II.3.50, II.2.18; waking state IV.4.14, fire II.3.48.

39. Threads II.3.7, II.2.15; spider II.1.25; piece of cloth II.1.15.

40. White threads II.2.11, II.2.12, II.2.26.

41. Penance II.3.5, III.2.21; darkness and light I.1, ripples II.1.14, II.2.10, II.1.13.

42. Eyesight III.2.5.

43. Grass II.1.5, person eating II.2.28, III.3.32; curds and poison IV.1.6; sands/oil II.1.16; sense of touch II.3.24.

44. Imaginary venom II.1.14; curds I.1.4; wooden machines IV.4.15; earth IV.3.4; body and self IV.2; heaven I.4.10; binary II.2.13, II.2.11, darkness II.3.40.

45. Stars I.3.19; mountain IV.3.4; men and city III.2.3; arrow II.3.7; mud III.3.22.

46. Folded and unfolded cloth II.1.19; threads II.3.25/26; weaver II.1.24; path III.3.30; lotus II.1.25; milk as white II.3.12; calf II.2.3; binary III.2.11, II.3.7.

47. Rain II.3.42, II.1.34, III.2.7; running and crawling III.1.10, hare UU.2.17.

48. City II.1.18; stones and clods II.2.1.

49. Stones II.1.3; virile power II.3.31; rampart wall III.2.7; king I.3.14; dung and urine II.3.48; poison IV.1.6; seeds II.1.23, climbing a tree III.1.13.

50. Earth II.2.17, IV.3.14, II.1, II.1:9, I.3.22, I.1.4.


52. Fire power of illumination and burning III.2.6, III.2.5, III.2.20, sun II.3.46, I.1.12, IV.1.5.

53. Bright lamp I.3.3, II.2.28, III.3.54.

54. Bright lamp II.2.10, III.1.8, II.3.40, II.2.10.


56. Things made of earth II.3.48, condition of deep sleep IV.2.8, measure I+2.30; vital airs II.2.20.
57. Palaces II.1.25, II.2.1, III.2.7; fruit II.1.23, III.1.13; sea II.1.14.
58. Bija (seed) II.3.7, II.1.23, II.1.18.
59. Brahma shabda II.3.7, II.3.5; fire burning oil III.1.8; various things II.1.14.
60. Aggregate of five elements III.3.35; four fold creatures I.1, II.1.9; archet. II.2.1.
61. Charm beads II.1.27; stones II.1.23; jewel II.3.25; she-goat T.4.10; honey III.4.3.
62. Mind II.4.12, II.3.7; magic spells II.1.27; mahat I.4.7; magical illusion II.2.28.
63. Water in a mirage II.2.28; imaginary fire III.3.51.
65. Clay and jar I.3.11.
66. Curds II.1.18; gold and clay II.1.4; clay dishes III.1.9, IV.1.5, IV.2.1.
67. Sweet balls III.1.7, orders of sage and householder II.4.49; barley I.2.20.
69. Golden ornaments II.1, II.1.9, II.2.28, IV.1.4.
70. Colour (rūpa) II.3.26, II.2.17.
71. Lump of salt III.2.16; plough III.2.4; horse and plough III.2.4.
73. Clod of earth II.2.8; common use of Atman III.3.15; ordinary phrases II.3.3, Oneness of a forest I.3.28; creeper II.1.25; sentence in ordinary life III.2.21; darsana sacrifice III.2.21; vac IV.2.2; poison IV.1.6, II.1.14.
74. Right and left horns of a cow II.2.17.
75. Spark
76. Tree II.1.25, II.1.14, III.1.1, III.1.13; falcon I.2.27.
77. Science of grammar III.2.22, I.1.3, III.2.21, venom II.1.14; offering one hundred coins II.4.11; dishes II.1.2, II.1.4.

78. Bodies IV.4.15; bodies and stone statue II.1.25; horn of a hare II.2.26.


80. Sun II.3.7, III.2.25, I.1.5, II.3.46, II.1.1, III.2.28.

81. Sun III.1.8, III.2.24, II.3.46, III.2.15, II.3.48, III.2.20.

82. Gold (stars) I.3.19, IV.1.4, II.1.4, II.2.17.

83. Condition of deep sleep IV.2.8; needle II.3.7, I.2.7; threads II.1.24; shawl II.3.7; Atman in common speech III.3.15.

84. Bridge I.3.1, III.2.31, I.3.16; oneness of army I.3.28; general of army I.3.28; salt III.3.1, III.2.15; descending stairs II.3.14.

85. Post II.1.35, III.4.2.

86. Bath II.1.14; oil III.1.18; sands II.1.16; crystal I.3.19, III.1.6.

87. Cities II.1.18, IV.2.5; stream of a river II.2.35.

88. Cognition in a dream II.2.28, II.2.29; experience in a dream II.1.14; illusion in a dream II.1-9, nāma-rūpa and a dream III.2.21.

89. Snow (hima) II.2.17, II.3.14, III.1.8.
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