MĀYĀ IN ŚAṄKARA

WITH REFERENCE TO ŚAṄKARA'S BHĀSYA

ON THE <u>BRAHMA SŪTRA</u> FROM

A PHENOMENOLOGICAL VIEWPOINT

By

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SCOPE AND CONTENTS:

The conception "māyā" has been translated as "illusion" by
many who interpret the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara. What we intend to
accomplish in this dissertation is to determine if this translation is
the correct one. This will be accomplished in two parts. The first
will entail an historical survey of māyā in the early tradition and
samvṛti in Mādhyamika Buddhism and pre-Śaṅkara Advaita. Then we will
review Śaṅkara and the post-Śaṅkara Advaita on māyā. Part Two is a
phenomenological inquiry into māyā in the Brahma Sūtra bhāṣya of
Śaṅkara. Here we will be concerned with the structures of the name-
form complex, language, and analogue, and their relation to māyā. We
will also point out other possible interpretations of the concept
"māyā" in Śaṅkara's thought.

PREFACE

This dissertation will focus on a concept that later came to be designated as māyāvada in Śaṅkara's thought. I am proposing to do this strictly within the scope of his major work, namely his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra. This study is to be understood as a phenomenological study of māyāvada in the sense that I am proposing a specific slant in the method employed in approaching the problem.

The source material for this study will be the philosophical commentary of Śaṅkara. This study will be concerned with the concept of māyā in its specific occurrences and also related portions which illustrate and define māyā. Particular stress will be laid upon the use of analogue in the Brahma Sūtra as it is this method which lends the full import of māyā in Advaita Vedānta.

To understand māyā by the use of phenomenology means to see the world as containing structures of experience. These structures can be seen as the limits within which an investigation must take place. One of these structures is the nature of language and its strict relation to māyā. But this is not to ask the question of the meaning of language, i.e. vāk. Rather what is being investigated is the structures of experience and not the metaphysical implications. Another structure is the existence of māyā as an interpretation of the world as it confronts us as name and form. We see the world through both of these structures and it is by an examination and interpretation through the use of models of analogue that we

experience a change in the meaning of experience. Māyā can be seen as

relating to each of these structures directly. It is related to

language because māyā-language is essentially based on the need

for discourse about Brahman and it is related to name and form because

māyā is said to be coterminous with the world: it is beginningless

but not eternal. Thus what I shall consider is the way in which māyā,

through the use of argument from analogue, is dependent upon and/or

essential for the ground of the structures of experience. It is my

task then to view māyā (strictly within Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya on the

Brahma Sūtra), through a phenomenological method, as a way by which

it can be seen as an interpretation of the world.

In memory of my teacher

and my friend

Dr. A. D. Mattson, Jr.

1925-1971

Also to J.R., J.T., and A.J.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

THE PRESENT STUDY

The concept of māyā[1] in the Indian religio-philosophical school of Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta has been translated primarily as "illusion". This factor has lead critics to describe classical Indian thinking as world-negating, pessimistic, and unproductive. These critics of the Advaita Vedānta include modern Indian and Western thinkers, i.e. Aurobindo and A. Schweitzer to name but two. Albert Schweitzer's book Indian Thought and Its Development[2] interpreted Indian thinking as "world-denying" and "life-denying". There is also Teilhard de Chardin who writes concerning the Grand Option:

> On the one hand there are those who see our true progress only in terms of a break, as speedy as possible, with the world: as though the spirit could not exist, or at least could not fulfil itself, except, in separation from matter. And there are those on the other side, the believers in some ultimate value in the tangible evolution of things.[3]

Teilhard places Indian thinking in the former and his own system in

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[1] Throughout this dissertation the Sanskrit "māyā" and "Brahman" will not be underlined.

[2] A. Schweitzer, Indian Thought and Its Development, trans. Mrs. Charles E. B. Russell, (London: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd., 1936), p. 1 ff.

[3] Teilhard de Chardin, The Future of Man, trans. Norman Denny, (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 44.

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the latter which he sees as the only real option. Friedrich Nietzsche states of the Vedānta that:-

> . . . the metaphysical pessimism of the Vedanta philosophy?
> . . . Are all these not likewise phenomena of decay and
> sickness? To give excess weight to moral value or to
> fictions of the "beyond" or to social distress or to
> suffering in general: every such exaggeration of a narrow
> viewpoint is in itself already a sign of sickness. ... .[4]

This pre-conceived notion about the attitude and thinking of India must be reassessed in order to understand it. To translate "māyā" as "illusion" in the Advaita of Śaṅkara is to gloss over the primary criteria and self-understanding that the term conveys. We must then look for a new way to translate "māyā" in the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara.

Thus this study concerns itself with the explication and under-standing of māyā in Śaṅkara's commentary on the Brāhma Sūtra. This topic arose out of a broader interest in the discipline of comparative religion and is written so as to make a contribution to it. Our orientation will be two-fold, historical and philosophical. The historical section forms the general background from which the philo-sophical inquiry proceeds.

The Introduction presents the general criteria from which our study will develop. We will consider the different positions of what we term the "Jewish-Christian view" as compared with the view of "Indian thinking".[5] We will then begin our historical section with

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[4] F. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. W. Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), Aphorism #1020, p. 528.

[5] By these criteria I am assuming the traditional or orthodox position of each type of thinking: This is not to imply that these

Chapter II which will look at maya in the early tradition.[6] Chapter
III will briefly investigate the corresponding term for maya in the
Buddhist tradition within the major work of Nāgārjuna so as to
understand how within this one specific instance it was utilized. Along
with this we will review the maya concept in Gaudapāda[7] who is said to
have been Śankara's teacher's teacher. Chapter IV will look at the
Advaita school of Śankara and the over-all schema of his system. Con-
cluding our historical survey, Chapter V will follow briefly the
concept of maya through the developments of the post-Śankara Advaita
until approximatly the 17th century. This will complete our historical
survey.

Part Two of the dissertation will be a philosophical inquiry.
Here we will investigate the use of the term "maya" in Śankara's
bhāṣya or commentary on the Brahma Sūtra. In Chapter VI we will
concentrate on the relation between language and the name-form com-
plex (nāma-rūpa) so as to see within Śankara's thought how these are
utilized within the over-all conception of the definition of language

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are the only possible positions within each tradition but are pre-
sented so that confusion between them is lessened.

[6]The use of the word "tradition" in this dissertation is used
to indicate the "orthodox" or Vedic schools and their general lines
of heritage given by themselves. We are concerned more specifically
with the Advaita Vedānta tradition in our inquiry.

[7]Our purpose is not to determine once and for all the under-
standing of Nāgārjuna and Gaudapāda but merely to give a general
over-all view of their concept as understood by various scholars.
This chapter exists only to give a general background within the
tradition.

and the name-form complex as māyā.' Chapter VII will concentrate upon
the way in which māyā is related in terms of instruction by the use
of analogue[8] within the Brahma Sūtra and by extension the experiential
grounding of māyā within the conception of Brahman and how this is
communicated. Chapter VIII, which will conclude our study, will
concentrate upon the centrality of māyā for an understanding of the
name-form complex and language within the contextual frame of ana-
logue as a means of comprehension. Here we will also examine an
apparent shift in the māyā conception of Śankara in the post-Śankara
Advaita and a modern criticism of Śankara's māyā which does not
recognize its full import. In this concluding Chapter we will at
last take up for consideration other terms related to māyā in Śankara's
Advaita Vedānta.

METHOD

As was mentioned above we have utilized two approaches,
historical survey and philosophical inquiry, in this study. The
historical part is a survey of the philosophical conception of māyā,
and its affiliate term in Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamika Buddhism viz., samvrti.
The second part is philosophical or more precisely a phenomenological
investigation of the concept māyā.

In our approach to phenomenology we are not concerned with a
specific development of that method in Western philosophy as such.

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[8]The term "analogue" in this dissertation is used as a des-
cription of a teaching method and must not be confused with the Western
Scholastic "analogy" which is utilized to discuss theological questions.

Rather we are utilizing this method in its general definition. We can say with Pierre Thévenaz in his book <u>What is Phenomenology?</u>:

> It is above all method--a method for changing our
> relation to the world, for becoming more acutely aware
> of it. But at the same time and by that very fact, it
> is already a certain attitude vis-a-vis the world, or
> more exactly a certain attitude vis-a-vis our relation
> to the world. Phenomenology combines the most radical
> break with our ordinary and natural attitude vis-a-vis
> the world (in this sense, it is an ascesis of the

The concept of analogy is one which contains great philosophical and theological implications in Western thinking. This can be traced back to Aristotle within the Greek world and, for Christianity, in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas. One great interpretation of St. Thomas is that contained in the work of Cardinal Cajetan, <u>The Analogy of Names and the Concept of Being</u>, (trans. E. A. Bushinski with H. J. Koren, 2nd edition Duquesne University, Ad Press Ltd. 1959). In this work he centers on the relation of God to his creation and how man can know God (which in Western theological circles is the dominant way of understanding analogy). He states that there are three general concepts of analogy which have seven variations: (1) Analogy of inequality, (2) Analogy of attribution, (3) Analogy of proportionality; the variations: (1) substance and accidents, (2) cause and effect, (3) God and creatures, (4) created beings as analogues, (5) being in act and potency, (6) being in reason, (7) analogy other than being. In addition to this work the theological and philosophical analysis of analogy is so vast that it is implicit and explicit throughout much of Western thinking to the present.

In this study we take note of the above understanding of analogy but are not concerned with it or with a comparative study of this concept as such. Rather than "analogy", analogue has been used in its much more general usage as a teaching method within the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara, with reference to such Sanskrit terms as māyā, <u>avidyā</u>, <u>adhyasa</u>, <u>ajnana</u>, <u>mithya</u> etc. (with the added provision that each and every term for the Advaita must be meant only for discourse about Brahman). We recognize that the words which express "analogue" in one language and religious context have perhaps correlate terms in another language but the religious context is so different that an identical translation of each terms would be inaccurate. Thus we are not concerned with "analogy" in the West but with "analogue" in the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara.

mind) with the deepening or the consecration of this
original attitude (in this sense, it is respect for the
real and engagement in the world). Consciousness
takes its distance with regard to things: it
gives itself complete freedom in respect to
them, but one realizes at once that this is in
order to be more faithful to our essential inser-
tion in the world. . . . The phenomenological method
thus permits pushing on simultaneously and with one
movement towards the roots of subjectivity and the
foundation of the objective world.[9]

The phenomenological method then brings about a new understanding of

the world by an analysis of consciousness. This analysis delineates

and analyzes the constructs by which one understands reality. It is a

consideration of these basic constructs, those concepts and inter-

pretations of the world, fundamental within any given view, that form

the ground upon which one can approach a religion or philosophy. It

calls for a moment in which the symbols of consciousness are gathered

and interpreted. This is brought out by Professor J. G. Arapura: "By

the phenomenological moment, I mean the most efficient gathering of

all that there is, the interpretation of all symbols, with the proper

use of subjectivity and culture subjectivity."[10] In this study we are

using the phenomenological method so as to understand the conception

of māyā in Sankara's bhāṣya on the Brahma Sūtra. We are centering on

this concept within the Advaita because it is a primary one in any

understanding of the Advaita. We are not in any way attempting to

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[9] Pierre Thévenaz, What is Phenomenology?, trans. Courtney, ed.
Brockelman and J. Edie (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1962), p. 91.

[10] J. G. Arapura, "Comparative Religion, Myth and the Renewal
of Philosophy", in Dr. Bhagavan Das Centenary Vol., (Banaras: Kashi
Vidyapith, 1969), p. 215.

criticize the Advaita but rather to understand it. It is in this manner, and only this manner, that we may begin to comprehend the various ways in which different people understand reality. By phenomenology we mean the ". . . singling out and uncovering of a certain ultimate, self-constitutive and existential element of consciousness, by means of which a particular dynamic in the original manifestation (though not the origin as such) of religion will be made to reveal itself."[11]

This specific investigation arose out of a context of a particular study of comparative religion, that is J. G. Arapura's work Religion as Anxiety and Tranquillity--an Essay in Comparative Phenomenology of the Spirit.[12] Within his work Dr. Arapura begins by linking, following Husserl, consciousness and reflection. He observes:

> Phenomenology's justification for starting with consciousness rather than with the phenomena outside it is that it is itself a unique phenomena, one that is always in the process of apprehending itself along with its own states (or moods), and by that means, of apprehending the world (or being of be-ings).[13]

He begins then with the reflection of consciousness upon itself which gives rise to what he terms the sense of wrongness of existence:

> The self-confrontation of existence takes place in consciousness' reflection upon itself. This sense of wrongness cannot be truly explained as a matter of constitution since in actual life there never is encountered

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[11]J. G. Arapura, Religion as Anxiety and Tranquillity--An Essay in Comparative Phenomenology of the Spirit, (The Hague: Mouton, 1972), p. 3. Cited hereafter as AT.

[12]Ibid. Note p. 58 ff.

[13]Ibid., pp. 60-1.

>an alternative way of constituting the self or projecting
>existence. The only alternatives that are possible
>come in the form of myth which in turn are grounded on
>the sense of wrongness itself as an answer, remedy, solution,
>offering a structure of rectification. The sense of wrong-
>ness of existence is not to be understood as an ordinary
>discontent that can be removed by some special argument
>or analysis or knowledge, although quests in that direction
>are automatically launched from this ground. It should be*
>assumed that it is as fundamental as wonder and curiosity
>which are regarded respectively as the sources of philosophy
>and science.[14]

This sense of wrongness of existence is then looked at in terms of

consciousness and this gives rise to the "spheres of the spirit"

which variously interpret this reflection. Dr. Arapura sees this

development as producing the "anxiety sphere" of the West and the

"tranquillity sphere" of Indian thinking. This present topic grew

out of the analysis of Dr. Arapura's interpretation of the Indian

"sense of wrongness of existence". We are centering on one unique

example within the Indian "sphere" for our investigation, and even

more specifically one topic within one specific understanding, namely

māyā in Sankara's commentary on the Brahma Sūtra. But before we

proceed with the historical survey let us point out some general

differences between these "spheres".

INDIAN AND WESTERN THOUGHT

Making some distinctions between the Indian and Western

"spheres of the spirit" will allow our study to proceed by removing the

confusion between them that has been one of the difficulties of com

parative religion, i.e. interpreting Indian thinking within the

structures of Western thought. In this section we will consider the

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[14]Ibid., p. 62.

Indian and Western: (1) view of history, (2) view of language, (3) view of man, (4) end of man, and (5) concept of philosophy. Our criteria for Indian thinking is the understanding of Advaita Vedānta and for the West it is the Jewish-Christian view of religion and the Greek view of philosophy.

(1) Meaning of History

We encounter in the Indian understanding of history a "cyclic" description of the cosmos within which man is subject to transmigration or rebirth. H. Zimmer remarks that:

> The wheel of birth and death, the round of emanation, fruition, dissolution, and re-emanation, is a commonplace of popular speech as well as a fundamental theme of philosophy, myth and symbol, religion, politics and art. It is understood as applying not only to the life of the individual, but to the history of society and the course of the cosmos. Every moment of existence is measured and judged against the backdrop of this pleroma.[15]

The cosmos has world cycles which are subdivided into four world ages or yugas. These ages take their names from the four throws of the Indian dice game and are called Krita (four), Treta (three), Dvapara (two), and Kali (one).[16] In the world of the present we are in the Kali yuga which is said to have begun on Friday, February 18, 3102 B.C. At the end of the Kali yuga, which is the last before dissolution, the cosmos will terminate and return to its ground in the Absolute. After a period of 4,320,000,000 years the cosmos will emerge again out of the Absolute and begin again with the Krita yuga.[17] Examples of this cyclic view are contained throughout the Scripture of India.

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[15] H. Zimmer, Myths and Symbols in Indian Art and Civilization, ed. Joseph Campbell, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 13. Cited hereafter as M&S.

[16] Ibid., p. 13.

[17] Ibid., p. 16.

One example can be seen in the Puranic account of the sage Markandeya:

> I shall tell you the wonderful scene beheld by
> the sage Mārkandeya at the time of Lord Viṣṇu's repose
> in the vast speck of water all by Himself. Swallowed
> up by Lord Viṣṇu, the sage Mārkandeya remained within
> His belly by His glory for many thousands of years and
> began to wander about there. . . . Then the sage devoted
> himself to meditation, to the performance of sacrifices,
> Japams and Homas, and asceticism by virtue of which he
> slowly came out of Viṣṇu's mouth. He did not know at all
> when he entered in His belly or when he came out of
> His mouth. This was due to Lord's Māyā. He saw the whole
> universe under the cover of Tamoguṇa and that vast expanse
> of water. He was afraid. The sage was then bewildered and
> lost all hopes of life. On seeing Viṣṇu he seemed to
> have remembered Nārāyaṇa and became glad. He became
> astonished and standing in that vast expanse of water
> did not know whether he was dreaming or deluded.--13-20.
> . . . he immediately went again into His belly.--21-25.
>   Then after sometime coming out of Viṣṇu's mouth,
> the sage saw a boy sleeping on the branch of a banyan tree.
> He was seen playing all by himself without any anxiety
> in the universe bereft of creation. . . . The sage was
> much surprised and tried, . . . Then he thought to him-
> self while floating on the water, I undoubtedly saw him
> before, but am doubtful as I might be deluded by Deva
> Māyā. . . . the Lord, in the form of that young boy,
> thundered to Mārkandeya "Son, Mārkandeya! do not be afraid.
> Come near me." . . . the longlived sage Mārkandeya with
> folded hands and with eyes struck with wonder most devout-
> fully saluted Lord Viṣṇu after reciting his name and Gotra.
> . . . Srî-Bhagavāna said: . . . I am the Creator of the
> past, future and the present. Brāhmana! whatever you
> see or hear about or think about, I am all those. I
> created this universe before and I am creating it now.
> Mārkandeya! I create this whole universe at the end
> of each yuga and then support it. Hear about my dharmas
> by joyfully entering within My belly. Brahmā along with
> the Riṣis and the Devas rests in My body. I am the avyakta
> Yoga, again I am Vyakta, the enemy of the demons. You
> attain to me. I am the one-lettered mantra and again the
> three-lettered mantra. I give dharma, artha, kāma; and again
> I am the giver of Mukti. I am the giver of salvation.
> I am "Om" the symbol of the sacred Trinity."--51-65.[18]

Also we find in the _Bhagavad Gītā_ the god Kṛṣṇa remarking that:

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[18]_The Matsya Purānam_, ed. J. D. Akhtar, _The Sacred Books of the Aryans_, Vol. I, ed. S. Shastri, (New Delhi: Oriental Pub., 1972), pp.130-2.

12--Never was there a time when I was not, nor you, nor
yet these princes, nor will there be a time when we shall
cease to be,--all of us hereafter.
13--Just as in this-body the embodied self must pass
through childhood, youth, and old age, so too at death
will it assume another body: in this the thoughtful man
is not perplexed.[19]

Sankara observes in his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra I.3.30:

With regard to this it is said--"Because of the same
names and forms (recurring)"--and even if such absorption
and regeneration is accepted, we do have to accept the
transmigratory existence as having no beginning. The
Āchārya will hereafter expound, as to how transmigratory
existence is without beginning, in the Sūtra 'It is
reasonably sustainable and is also perceived to be so'
(Bra. Su. II.1.36).[20]

The Western concept of history is linear. This is evident, for

example, in Koheleth 3:11 when we hear about the beginning and the end

of God's work:

What profit does one who works get from all his labour?
I have seen the business that God has given men to keep
them busy. He has made everything to suit its time: more-
over he has given men a sense of time past and future,
but no comprehension of God's work from beginning to end.[21]

A Jewish account of this linear view is expressed by the thinker

Philo in his De Opificio Mundi when he writes:

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[19]The Bhagavad Gītā, R. C. Zaehner, (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1969), p. 125. 2:12-13 (12--na tv ev'āhaṁ jātu n'āsaṁ, na tvaṁ, n'eme
jan'ādhipāḥ; na c'aiva na bhaviṣyāmaḥ sarve vayam ataḥ param. 13--
dehino 'smin yathā dehe kaumāraṁ yauvanaṁ jarā tathā deh'āntara-
prāptir: dhiras tatra na muhyati.)

[20]Brahma-Sūtra Shānkara-Bhāsya, trans. V. M. Apte, (Bombay:
Popular Book Depot, 1960), p. 196-7. Cited hereafter as BSB.

[21]Biblia Hebraica, ed. Rudolf Kittel, (Stuttgart: Wurttem-
bergische Bibelanstalt, 1937), p. 1215.

אֶת־הַכֹּל עָשָׂה יָפֶה בְעִתּוֹ גַּם אֶת־הָעֹלָם נָתַן בְּלִבָּם
מִבְּלִי אֲשֶׁר לֹא־יִמְצָא הָאָדָם אֶת־הַמַּעֲשֶׂה אֲשֶׁר־עָשָׂה הָאֱלֹהִים
מֵרֹאשׁ וְעַד־סוֹף׃

Then he says that "in the beginning God made the heaven
and the earth", taking "Beginning" not, as some think,
in a chronological sense, for time there was not before
there was a world. Time began either simultaneously with
the world or after it. For since time is a measured
space determined by the world's movement, and since
movement could not be prior to the object moving, but
must of necessity arise either after it or simultaneously
with it, it follows of necessity that time also is either
coequal with or later born than the world.[22]

The most exact account of this within the Christian community is that

found in the Roman Catholic tradition of creatio ex nihilo. In a

letter by Leo I in the fifth century he states:

Beside this unique consubstantial, eternal, and unchange-
able deity (divinity) of the supreme Trinity there is
absolutely no creature that is not in its origin created
from nothing. (#285)[23]

A latter account in the thirteenth century by Innocent III states:

We believe that the one and the same God creator of the
New and the Old Testament (that is the law of Moses and of
the Prophets and of the Apostles), created everything from
nothing, without changing in his Trinity. (#790)[24]

He again asserts the doctrine in a latter place:

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[22]Philo, De Opificio Mundi, trans. F. H. Colson, (Loeb Classi-
cal Library, 1926), pp. 20-3.

26 VII. Φησὶ δ' ὡς " ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν
οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν," τὴν ἀρχὴν παραλαμβάνων,
[6] | οὐχ ὡς οἴονταί τινες, τὴν κατὰ χρόνον· χρόνος
γὰρ οὐκ ἦν πρὸ κόσμου, ἀλλ' ἢ σὺν αὐτῷ γέγονεν
ἢ μετ' αὐτόν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ διάστημα τῆς τοῦ κόσμου
κινήσεώς ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος, προτέρα δὲ τοῦ κινου-
μένου κίνησις οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον
αὐτὴν ἢ ὕστερον ἢ ἅμα συνίστασθαι, ἀναγκαῖον
ἄρα καὶ τὸν χρόνον ἢ ἰσήλικα κόσμου γεγονέναι
ἢ νεώτερον ἐκείνου·

[23]Echiridion Symbolorum, ed. Henricus Denzinger, retractavit
A. Schonmetzer S.J., Ed. XXXII, (Barcelona: Herder, 1963), p. 101.
(Praeter hanc autem summae Trinitatis unam consubstantialem et sempi-
ternam atque incommutabilem deitatem nihil omnino creaturarum est,
quod non in exordio sui ex nihilo creatum sit.)

[24]Ibid., p. 255. (Novi et Veteris Testamenti (, id est Legis
Moysi et Prophetarum et Apostolorum) unum eundemque (et Deum) auctorem
credimus esse Deum (-!), qui in Trinitate, ut dictum est, permanens,
de nihilo (-!), cuncta (omnia) creavit! . . .)

> God . . . through his omnipotent power established, out of
> nothing, from the beginning of time both creatures, spiritual
> and corporal, that is angelic and worldly. (#3800)[25]

At the council of Florence in 1442 it was stated:

> (The council) believes most firmly and confesses and pro-
> claims that one true God, Father, Son and Hold Spirit,
> is the creator of all visible and invisible things: when
> he willed, by his goodness, he established all crea-
> tures, both spiritual and corporal; good because they
> were made by the highest good, but also changeable
> because they were made from nothing. . . . (#1333).[26]

(2) View of Language

Just as the Indian and Western views of history are different,
so too are the two views of language. In terms of Indian thinking
revelation as the origination of language means that revelation reveals
itself. That is to say there is no giver of revelation as such; rather
the Veda is that body of truth which has been seen by the Rṣi and this
body exists through all cycles of world emanations. Its character is
that it is apauruseya or non-personal which means that it is not given
in a personal or historical event; it has always existed. This language
accompanies a cyclic view of history.

> The cyclic view aims at being direct, essentially intui-
> tive, with respect to knowledge. It tolerates no obstacles
> or obstructions except those that can be readily conditioned

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[25]Ibid., p. 259. (. . . qui sua omnipotenti virtute simul ab
initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam, spiritualem et
corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam: . . .)

[26]Ibid., p. 338. (Firmissime credit, profitetur et praedicat,
unum verum Deum. Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, esse omnium
visibilium et invisibilium creatorem: qui quando voluit, bonitate sua
universas, tam spiritales quam corporales, concicit creaturas: bonas
quidem, quia a summo bono factae sunt, sed mutabiles, quia de nihilo
factae sunt, . . .) For a more detailed account of this difference in
the meaning of history the reader is asked to refer to: Cosmos and His-
tory, Creation Legends of the Ancient Near East, and Philosophies of
History (see Bibliography).

and rendered transparent and thus overcome. Hence language by definition is both unicentric and transcendentally originated. It is by definition also self-luminous and its purpose is revelation through vidyā (jñana, gnosis).[27]

This can be seen in Śankara's comments in the Brahma Sūtra bhāṣya.

He remarks at I.3.28 that:

> . . . (the world i.e. everything) is created out of this (i.e. the word). It is out of the scriptural word, indeed, that this world i.e. everything including the Gods etc. is created. . . . Similarly we understand that before creation, Vedic words occurred to Prajāpati the creator and thereafter he created the objects according to those words. That the Scriptures also say similarly viz. that he uttered the word "Bhūh" and created the Earth--which shows that words such as "Bhūh" etc. first occurred to the mind as words, and from them the worlds "Bhūh" etc. were afterwards created.[28]

He continues at I.3.29:

> "Hence it is that (the Vedās) are eternal." Thus-- it is also because this transitory world which consists of definite forms such as the Gods etc. is born from the Vedic words, that the eternity of the Vedic word should be understood.[29]

In contrast to this conception of language is the Western Biblical view which sees language as given by a personal God and constituting an historical event. Language proceeds as an utterance of God for the Jewish world and this language is Hebrew.

> When God was about to create the world by His word, the twenty-two letters of the alphabet descended from the terrible and august crown of God whereon they were engraved with a pen of flaming fire.[30]

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[27] J. G. Arapura, "Language and Phenomena", Canadian Journal of Theology, XVI 1 and 2, (1970), p. 47. Cited hereafter as LP.

[28] BSB, I.3.28, Apte, p. 187.   [29] BSB, I.3.29, Apte, pp. 195-6.

[30] L. Ginzberg, The Legends of the Jews, Vol. I, (Philadelphia: The Jewish Pub. Society of America, 1909), p. 5. Also refer to footnote in Vol. 7 #10 on pages 5-6.

> Then the Lord came down to see the city and tower
> which mortal men had built; and he said, "Here they
> are, one people with a single language, and now they
> have started to do this (build the tower to reach
> heaven); henceforward nothing they have a mind to
> do will be beyond their reach. Come, let us go down
> there and confuse their speech, so that they will not
> understand what they say to one another.[31]

Turning to the Christian conception of language we find that language

(Logos) is a very important theme. This is probably seen most fully

in the Gospel of John:

> When all things began, the Word already was. The Word
> dwelt with God, and what God was, the Word was. The
> Word, then, was with God at the beginning, and through
> him all things came to be; no single thing was created
> without him.[32]

Thus we see that the conception of the meaning of language differs

between Indian thinking and Western thinking. This has rightly been

observed by Professor Arapura:

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[31] Biblia Hebraica, p. 8 . Genesis 11: 5-7

וַיֵּרֶד יְהוָה לִרְאֹת אֶת־הָעִיר וְאֶת־הַמִּגְדָּל אֲשֶׁר בָּנוּ בְּנֵי הָאָדָם
וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה הֵן עַם אֶחָד וְשָׂפָה אַחַת לְכֻלָּם וְזֶה הַחִלָּם לַעֲשׂוֹת
וְעַתָּה לֹא־יִבָּצֵר מֵהֶם כֹּל אֲשֶׁר יָזְמוּ לַעֲשׂוֹת׃ הָבָה נֵרְדָה וְנָבְלָה
שָׁם שְׂפָתָם אֲשֶׁר לֹא יִשְׁמְעוּ אִישׁ שְׂפַת רֵעֵהוּ

[32] John 1: 1-4, The New English Bible,)Oxford University Press,
Cambridge University Press, 1961), p. 150.

1 Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν,
καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος. 2 οὗτος ἦν ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς τὸν θεόν.
3 πάντα δι᾽ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ
ἕν. ὃ γέγονεν. 4 ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν, καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἦν τὸ
φῶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων·

... I may say that in the case of the one, language
indicates, and is employed for, disengagement from
phenomena and retreat into the one only centre of
Reality, while in the case of the other, what language
indicates and is employed for is engagement with
phenomena. In the case of the one, phenomena are
absorbed into that centre of Reality revealed in
gnosis through the use of language. This means that
every time it happens it is not a speaker who speaks
but the self-same centre; hence speech is attached to no
person; speech speaks by itself. Speech is _apauruseya_
(non-personal) . . . In the case of the other, phenomena
are not absorbed _into_ a centre but _proceed_ from a centre.
Thus phenomena are put forth or brought into being.
Every new point that emerges (in terms of linear pro-
cession) equally become an authentic centre from which
language and phenomena can again proceed.[33]

(3) View of Man

The view of man in Indian thinking is summarized quite will

in the Krishna-janma khānda of the _Brahmavaivarta Purāna_ which states:

Life in the cycle of the countless rebirths is like a
vision in a dream. The gods on high, the mute trees and
the stones, are alike apparitions in this phantasy.
But Death administers the law of time. Ordained by time,
Death is the master of all. Perishable unending cycles
the good and evil alternate. Hence, the wise are attached
to neither, neither the evil nor the good. The wise are
not attached to anything at all.[34]

Another example is the statement of the _Bhagavad Gītā_ that:

27--For sure is the death of all that is born, sure is
the birth of all that dies: so in a matter that no one
can prevent you have no cause to grieve.
28--Unmanifest are the beginnings of contingent beings,
manifest then middle course, unmanifest again their ends:
what cause for mourning here?
29--By a rare privilege may someone behold it, and by
a rare privilege indeed may another tell of it, and by
a rare privilege may such another hear it; yet even having
heard there is none that knows it.

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[33]LP, p. 19.

[34]M&S, p. 8.

30--Never can this embodied [self] be slain in the body
of anyone [at all] : and so you have no need to grieve
for any contingent being.[35]

The Chāndogya Upaniṣad observes:

1--Verily, this whole world is Brahman, from which he comes
forth, without which he will be dissolved and in which
he breathes. Tranquil, one should meditate on it. Now
verily, a person consists of purpose. According to the
purpose a person has in this world, so does he become
on departing hence. So let him frame for himself a
purpose.
2--He who consists of mind, whose body is life, whose form
is light, whose conception is truth, whose soul is space,
containing all works, containing all desires, containing
all odours, containing all tastes, encompassing this whole
world, being without speech and without concern.
3--This is my self within the heart, smaller than a grain
of rice, than a barley corn, than a mustard seed, than a
grain of millet or than the kernel of a grain of millet.
This is myself within the heart, greater than the earth,
greater than the atmosphere, greater than the sky,
greater than these worlds.
4--Containing all works, containing all desire, containing
all odours, containing all tastes, encompassing this
whole world, without speech, without concern, this is the
self of mine within the heart; this is Brahman. Into
him, I shall enter, on departing hence. Verily, he who
believes this, will have no more doubts. Thus used to say
Sāṇḍilya, yea Sāṇḍilya.[36]

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[35]Bhagavad Gītā, Zaehner, pp. 135-6. (27--jātasya hi dhruvo
mṛtyur, dhruvaṁ janma mṛtasya ca: tasmād aparihārye 'rthe na tvaṁ
śocitum arhasi. 28--avyakt'ādīni bhūtāni vyakta-madhyāni, Bhārata,
avyakta-nidhanāny eva: tatra kā paridevanā? 29--āścaryavat paśyati
kaścit enam, āścaryavad vadati tath'aiva c'ānyah: āścaryavac c'ainam
anyah śṛṇoti, śrutvā py enaṁ veda na c'aiva kaścit. 30--dehī nityam
avadhyo 'yaṁ dehe sarvasya, bhārata, tasmāt sarvāṇi bhūtāni na tvaṁ
śocitum arhasi.

[36]The Principal Upaniṣads, ed., trans. Radhakrishnan, (London:
George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1969), pp. 391-2. Cited hereafter as PU.
(1--sarvaṁ khalvidam brahma, tajjalān iti, śānta upāsīta; atha khalu
kratumayah purusah, yathā-kratur asminl loke puruso bhavati tathetah
pretya bhavati, sa kratuṁ kurvīta. 2--mano-mayah prāṇa-śarīro bhā-
rūpah śatya-saṁkalpa ākaśātmā sarva-karmā sarva-kāmah sarva-gandhah
sarva-rasah śarvam idam abhyātto 'vāky anādarah. 3--eṣa ma ātmāntar

Man then is subject to countless rounds of rebirth which are contained within the cyclic historical process of the cosmos. Man himself is subjected to this cycle because of his attachments and this is his predicament. He finds himself in a state of ignorance (avidyā) because he thinks that attachments will help him out of the rounds of rebirth. In order for man to obtain freedom from this bondage in ignorance he must gain knowledge (vidyā), as is seen in the above quotes, which will remove ignorance.

In Western thinking man is seen as a creature who is created by God:

> So God created man in his own image, in the image of
> God created he him; male and female created he them. (28)
> And God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful,
> and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it;
> and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the
> fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth
> upon the earth.[37]

Man, however, rebelled against God and was cast out of the garden of paradise:

> (21) Unto Adam also and to his wife did the Lord God make
> coats of skins, and clothed them. (22) And the Lord God
> said, Behold, the man is become as one of us, to know

hṛdaye' ṇīyān vrīher vā, yavād vā, sarṣapād vā, śyāmākad va, śyāmāka-
taṇḍulād vā; eṣa ma ātmāntar hṛdaye jyāyān pṛthivyāḥ, jyāyān antarikṣāj
jānān divaḥ, jyāyān ebhyo lokebhyaḥ. 4--sarva-karmā sarva-kāmaḥ sarva-
gandhaḥ sarva-rasaḥ, sarvam idam abhyātto'vāky anādaraḥ, eṣa ma
ātmāntar hṛdaye etad brahma, etam itaḥ pretyābhisambhavitāsmīti,
yasya syāt addhā na vicikitsāstīti ha smāha śāṇḍilyaḥ, śāṇḍilyaḥ.)

[37] Biblica Hebraica, Genesis I: 27-8,

27 וַיִּבְרָ֨א אֱלֹהִ֤ים ׀ אֶת־הָֽאָדָם֙ בְּצַלְמ֔וֹ בְּצֶ֥לֶם אֱלֹהִ֖ים בָּרָ֣א אֹת֑וֹ
זָכָ֥ר וּנְקֵבָ֖ה בָּרָ֥א אֹתָֽם׃
28 וַיְבָ֣רֶךְ אֹתָם֮ אֱלֹהִים֒ וַיֹּ֨אמֶר לָהֶ֜ם אֱלֹהִ֗ים
פְּר֥וּ וּרְב֛וּ וּמִלְא֥וּ אֶת־הָאָ֖רֶץ וְכִבְשֻׁ֑הָ וּרְד֞וּ בִּדְגַ֤ת הַיָּם֙
וּבְע֣וֹף הַשָּׁמַ֔יִם וּבְכָל־חַיָּ֖ה הָֽרֹמֶ֥שֶׂת עַל־הָאָֽרֶץ׃

good and evil: and now lest he put forth his hand, and
take also of the tree of life, and eat and live for ever:
(23) Therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the garden
of Eden, to till the ground from whence he was taken.[38]

In terms of Christian understanding, man, as a creature of God, is a
being who is sinful. This is to say that in man's rebellion against
God he placed himself outside of the garden. Thus the state of man's
nature is that he is a fallen being who finds salvation through the
grace of God. In India man is not sinful; he is in ignorance and it
is only through knowledge that he may liberate himself from the wheel
of rebirth.[39]

(4) End of Man

India considers the end of man as the attainment of liberation.
It is liberation from the world of action, duty and transmigration.
It is in some sense a transcendent state beyond the tri-level cosmos
of the earth, heavens, and hells. This idea is expressed in various
ways within the tradition, according to the specific school or cult,
but conceptually it is the same in terms of its structure. In fact

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[38]Ibid., _Genesis_ 3:21-23, p. 3.

וַיַּעַשׂ

כ יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים לְאָדָם וּלְאִשְׁתּוֹ כָּתְנוֹת עוֹר וַיַּלְבִּשֵׁם: פ בּוַיֹּאמֶר ׀
יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים הֵן הָאָדָם הָיָה כְּאַחַד מִמֶּנּוּ לָדַעַת טוֹב וָרָע וְעַתָּה ׀
פֶּן־יִשְׁלַח יָדוֹ וְלָקַח גַּם מֵעֵץ הַחַיִּים וְאָכַל וָחַי לְעֹלָם: בּוַיְשַׁלְּחֵהוּ
יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים מִגַּן־עֵדֶן לַעֲבֹד אֶת־הָאֲדָמָה אֲשֶׁר לֻקַּח מִשָּׁם:

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[39]See A T, p. 76 ff.

the end of man, specifically within the Advaita Vedānta, is the concern

of the study at hand. The Bhagavad Gītā, a basic text for the Advaita,

remarks about it that:

> 19--When the watching [self] sees there is no agent other
> than [these] constituents and knows what is beyond them,
> then will he come to share in that mode of being which
> is mine.
> 20--Transcending these three constituents which give the body
> its existence, from the sufferings of birth, death, and old
> age delivered, the embodied [self] wins immortality.[40]

The Western view of the end of man is that man and history

become in some way perfected. An example of one specific view within

the Jewish tradition is contained in the commentary on the crime of Cain:

> The crime committed by Cain had baneful consequences,
> not for himself alone, but for the whole of nature also
> . . . While, before, the vine had borne nine hundred and
> twenty-six different varieties of fruit, it now brought
> forth but one kind. And so it was with all other species.
> They will regain their pristine powers only in the world
> to come.[41]

In Christianity the end of man is concerned with the second coming of

the Christ. This will mark the perfection, the end and fulfilment of

time:

> Behold, he is coming with the clouds! Every eye shall
> see him, and among them those who pierced him; and all
> the peoples of the world shall lament in remorse. So

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[40]Bhagavad Gītā, Zaehner, p. 355. (n'ānyaṁ guṇebhyaḥ kartāraṁ
yada draṣṭā 'nupaśyati guṇebhyaś ca paraṁ vetti, mad-bhāvaṁ so 'dhigac-
chati. 20--guṇān etam atitya trin dehi deha-samudhavān janma-mṛtyu-
jarā-duḥkhaiṛ vimukto 'mṛtam aśnute.

[41]Legends of the Jews Vol. I, p. 112, also see note on pp. 141-
2, #30 Vol. 7.

it shall be. Amen. "I am the Alpha and the Omega", says the Lord God, who is and who was and who is to come, the sovereign Lord of all.[42]

A new heaven and a new earth will be established:

Then I saw a new heaven and a new earth, for the first heaven and the first earth had vanished, and there was no longer any sea. I saw the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God, make ready like a bride adorned for her husband. I heard a loud voice proclaiming from the throne: "Now at last God has his dwelling among Men! He will dwell among them and they shall be his people, and God himself will be with them. He will wipe every tear from their eyes; there shall be an end to death, and to mourning and crying and pain; for the old order has passed away!"[43]

Thus the Indian view of cyclic occurrence of man within the cyclic cosmos sees the end of man as outside the cosmos whereas the Western view finds its end in the fulfillment and completion of the will of God in history.

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[42]Revelation 1:7-8

7 Ἰδοὺ ἔρχεται μετὰ τῶν νεφελῶν,
    καὶ ὄψεται αὐτὸν πᾶς ὀφθαλμὸς
καὶ οἵτινες αὐτὸν ἐξεκέντησαν,
    καὶ κόψονται ἐπ' αὐτὸν πᾶσαι αἱ φυλαὶ τῆς γῆς.
ναί, ἀμήν.
    8 Ἐγώ εἰμι τὸ Ἄλφα καὶ τὸ Ὦ, λέγει κύριος ὁ θεός, ὁ ὢν καὶ ὁ ἦν καὶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος, ὁ παντοκράτωρ.

[43]Revelation 21:1-4

21 Καὶ εἶδον οὐρανὸν καινὸν καὶ γῆν καινήν· ὁ γὰρ πρῶτος οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ πρώτη γῆ ἀπῆλθαν, καὶ ἡ θάλασσα οὐκ ἔστιν ἔτι. 2 καὶ τὴν πόλιν τὴν ἁγίαν Ἰερουσαλὴμ καινὴν εἶδον καταβαίνουσαν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἡτοιμασμένην ὡς νύμφην κεκοσμημένην τῷ ἀνδρὶ αὐτῆς. 3 καὶ ἤκουσα φωνῆς μεγάλης ἐκ τοῦ θρόνου λεγούσης, Ἰδοὺ ἡ σκηνὴ τοῦ θεοῦ μετὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ σκηνώσει μετ' αὐτῶν, καὶ αὐτοὶ λαοὶ αὐτοῦ ἔσονται, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς μετ' αὐτῶν ἔσται, [αὐτῶν θεός,] 4 καὶ ἐξαλείψει πᾶν δάκρυον ἐκ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ ὁ θάνατος οὐκ ἔσται ἔτι, οὔτε πένθος οὔτε κραυγὴ οὔτε πόνος οὐκ ἔσται ἔτι· [ὅτι] τὰ πρῶτα ἀπῆλθαν.

(5) Concept of Philosophy

In India the concept of philosophy can never be separated from a view of liberation, because philosophy is always concerned with the analysis of existence so that knowledge (vidyā), which is of its very nature liberation for the Advaita Vedānta, can be attained. Western philosophy developed originally out of the Greek mind and was later brought into the Christian world i.e. Augustine and Aquinas. The fundamental difference between these two understandings is commented on by Betty Heinmann in her work Indian and Western Philosophy:

> Let us examine then, the Western term "Philosophy" and
> its Eastern equivalent in the classical language of India,
> Sanskrit; and even at the outset we meet with fundamental
> contrasts. For the Greek term philo-sophia means literally
> "love of sophia", of human reason, measure, of judgment
> and discrimination. On the other hand, the Sanskrit term
> for philosophy is anu-iksiki, the "survey of, literally
> the look along (anu), all things," which means "along
> all existent facts." Thus contemplation of reality, not
> discrimination in a rational order, is the cardinal aim
> of Indian Philosophy, the Sanskrit name of which means
> no more than synopsis, comprehensive view and receptive
> contemplation. Further evidence of the profound gulf be-
> tween East and West is provided by another fundamental
> philosophical term. Our word "system" (systema) is
> literally "putting-together," "com-position," in a rational
> order. It was Aristotle, the founder and organizer of
> Western exact science, a post-Sophistic scholar and the
> first great genuinely Western Philosopher, who invented
> the term sy-stema or sy-stasis, while his school, the
> Peripatetics, developed it to its full meaning. The
> human mind, then, thinks "systematically," prescribes the
> order of research, the selection, disposition and com-
> position of ideas. Conversely Plato, the ontological and,
> indeed, the last great cosmic thinker of the West, con-
> tinues under the influence of pre-Sophistic cosmic concep-
> tions to apply to his own principles the pregnant term
> theoria, meaning literally "Intuitive-view," or contempla-
> tion. This use of Theoria, instead of the later sy-stema,
> reveals Plato's general attitude, his humble openness to-
> wards the phenomena as objects of contemplation, but,

not of selective research.

Now precisely the same concept of "system" as
Plato's was conceived by Indian Philosophy and has been
preserved to the present day, the Sanskrit term for system
being either _darsana_ or _drsti_, both derived from the root
drs (Greek _derkomai_)--to look, to contemplate, to be
receptive--but in no degree implying any idea of regu-
lating the facts of Nature.[44]

We must comment however that Betty Heinmann's observations are not

necessarily truly representative of the West but do clarify our point

in the present context.

Thus what we term "philosophy" in India is something other than

what is termed "philosophy" in the Greek (Aristotelian and post-

Aristotelian) sense of the word. Philosophy in India is the quest for

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[44]Betty Heinmann, _Indian and Western Philosophy_, (London: George
Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1939), pp. 27-8. F. E. Peters observes: "Philoso-
phia: love of wisdom, philosophy 1. By the traditional Greek account
Pythagoras was the first to use the term _philosophia_ (See D.L.1.12;
Cicero, _Tusc_. V.3.8), and endowed the word with a strongly religious
and ethical sense . . . .which can best be seen in the view of the
philosopher put forth by Socrates in _Phaedo_ 62c-69e. In Aristotle
is has lost these Pythagorean overtones (the same process is visible
in Plato . . .): _philosophia_ has now become a synonym for _episteme_
(q.v.) in the sense of an intellectual discipline seeking out causes
(_Meta_. 1026a). In the same passage Aristotle mentions 'first
philosophy' (_prote philosophia_) or "theology" (see theologia; "meta-
physics" is a latter word) that has as its object not mutable things
as does physics (also called "second philosophy," _ibid_. 1037a) or
those connected with matter, as does mathematics, but being (_on_)
that is eternal, immutable, and separated from matter." from F. E.
Peters, _Greek Philosophical Terms: A Historical Lexicon_, (New York:
New York University Press, 1967), p. 156.

knowledge that will remove ignorance and in turn bring freedom in liberation. This is true for almost all[45] the Indian schools or systems of thought. The most important for our investigation is the Advaita Vedānta darśana.

THE RISE OF THE ADVAITA DARŚANA

The Advaita Vedānta darśana, as with most Indian religio-philosophical thought, grew out of the conceptions which were set in the Veda and the subsequent tradition and commentaries that arose from it. This darśana or "system" of thought is one which developed out of the Sūtras of the Uttara Mīmāṁsā darśana, viz. the Vedānta sūtras of Bādarāyana, and is seen in the present as having had a very profound imprint on the thinking of India. The Vedānta is perhaps the most well-known darśana of the six classic darśanās:

> Of the systems of thought or darśanas, six became more
> famous than others, viz., Gautama's Nyāya, Kaṇāda's Vaiśe-
> ṣika, Kapila's Sāṁkhya, Patañjali's Yoga, Jaimini's Pūrva
> Mīmāṁsā and Bādarāyaṇa's Uttara Mīmāṁsā or the Vedānta.
> They are the Brahmanical systems, since they all accept
> the authority of the Vedas. The systems of thought which
> admit the validity of the Vedas are called āstika, and those
> which repudiate it nāstika. The āstika, or nāstika char-
> acter of a system does not depend on its positive or nega-
> tive conclusions regarding the nature of the supreme
> spirit, but on the acceptance or non-acceptance of the
> authority of the Vedas. . . .[46]

Thus we have in the Advaita darśana a restatement of the tradition so that the correct understanding, as far as the Advaita was concerned, of the Veda was given. Historically this was necessary because of the

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[45]The notable exception being the Cārvāka school.

[46]S. Radhakrishnan and C. A. Moore, A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy, (New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1967), p. 350.

rise of the nāstika systems, which repudiated the Veda, from the fifth

century B.C. Most notably these were the Jaina and Buddhist systems

of thought.

The Advaita Vedānta darśana is that ninth century system which

is the product of the genius of Śaṅkara. Śaṅkara formulated what he

saw as the implicit doctrine of Brahman within the Upaniṣadic scrip-

tures. This formulation arose from the encounter of the Vedānta with

the other systems of thought present at that time. It attempted to

correct various interpretations, which the Advaita saw as wrong, within

the other āstika systems and along with this challenge the nāstika

systems, most notably the Mādhyamika school of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

Thus the Advaita darśana grew out of a complex cultural heritage that

contained great varieties of religious, philosophical and cultic

phenomena. But the Advaita did not see itself as original in its

conception of Brahman. It is especially important to recognize that

generally within the development of Indian philosophy the need was

not to be "original" at all but rather to thread together the coherent

ideas already in existence. Thus for example Śaṅkara is not one

who thinks of himself as original for he relies upon and always refers

to scripture as well as to a number of authors who preceeded him in

his Sūtra-Bhāṣya.

The philosophic position of the Advaita darśana is one of

absolute non-dualism. Advaita itself means non-dual. It conceives

reality as being ultimately one, namely Brahman. Man is connected to

Brahman by the fact that there is within him an inner core or soul

which is Ātman. This inner core is identical with Brahman. This

will be explained more fully at a later place in our study. Another

position in Indian philosophy, one which holds that there is no core

nor any such absolute as Brahman, is the Mādhyamika position of the

Buddhists. These two taken together are what is called the "two

traditions" of Indian philosophy by Dr. T. R. V. Murti. The former

has its ground in the ātman doctrine of the Upaniṣads while the

latter is based upon the anātman doctrine of the Buddha. Speaking

of the "two traditions" Dr. Murti observes:

> The Upaniṣads and the systems following the Brāhmanical
> tradition conceive reality on the pattern of an inner
> core or soul (ātman), immutable and identical amidst
> an outer region of impermanence and change, to which it
> is unrelated or but loosely related. This may be termed
> the Substance-view of reality (ātma-vāda). . . .
> The other tradition is represented by the Buddhist denial
> of substance (ātman) and all that it implies. There is
> no inner and immutable core in things; everything is in
> flux. Existence for the Buddhists is momentary (kṣaṇika),
> unique (svalakṣaṇa) and unitary (dharmamātra). It is
> discontinuous, discrete and devoid of complexity. The
> substance (the universal and the identical) was rejected
> as illusory; it was but a thought-construction made
> under the influence of wrong belief (avidyā). This may
> be taken as the Modal view of reality.[47]

Thus there is the Advaita darśana which maintains the "substance"

view of reality as distinct from the Buddhist or "modal" view. This

distinction is quite basic and because of it other distinctions

follow. Another distinction which we will note now is the different

interpretations that each places upon language. The Advaita views

language as originating extraneous to karma-saṁsāra whereas the

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[47]T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1960), p. 10. Cited hereafter as CPB.

Buddhist maintain that language is grounded and referent to <u>karma-samsāra</u> . What this means is that the Advaita views, along with the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā, language as given transcendentally (<u>śruti</u>) and the Buddhist maintains that it is, along with other things, a momentary becoming and hence conventional although in a different sense than in the Nyāya. Professor Arapura expresses this idea of language in the Vedānta:

> All the human faculties are the means by which
> Brahman manifests itself, <u>etad va dīpyate yad vācā</u>
> <u>vadati</u>. (This Brahman indeed shines forth, when one
> speaks with speech):-so we read in the Kauṣītaki
> Upaniṣad. . . . However, among the faculties through
> which Brahman (Ātman) shines forth, speech still remains
> the first.[48]

Language in the Vedānta must be seen as an aspect of Brahman for:

> Thus we are told that speech is Brahman (<u>vāgvai brah-</u>
> <u>meti</u>). Speech is <u>virāt</u>. Speech is also everything.
> It is the world (<u>vāgeva ayam lokah</u>), it is the gods
> (<u>devāh</u>), it is agni, and so on. It is the <u>Rgveda</u>, it
> is the one source of all the Vedas.[49]

In fact along with the <u>āstika</u> systems, the Advaita maintains its own view against others. One example of this is the relation of the Advaita to the Grammarian conception of <u>sphota-vāda</u>:

> . . . Bhartṛhari begins his <u>Vākyapadīya</u> by identifying
> language and Brahman (<u>anādi nidānam brahmā śabda-tattvam</u>
> <u>yadakṣaram</u>). Śankara while not accepting this identity,
> (and thus rejecting the <u>sphota-vada</u>) still held that
> "from the <u>Svayambū</u> self-born proceeded the <u>vāk</u> without
> beginning and end" (<u>Vedānta-Sūtra bhāsya</u> 1.3.28)

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[48]J. G. Arapura, "Some Perspectives on Indian Philosophy of Language", lecture University of Rajasthan, April 1972, p. 17.

[49]<u>Ibid</u>., p. 17.

The "supernaturalists" also accepted the vedic view of cosmogony that the world evolved from the word. Bhartṛhari held that the world arose as a vivarta of veda (Chandoghya eva prathamam etad visyam vyavartatā. Vākyapadīya 1.1.20). Śaṅkara holds the same view (Vedānta sūtra bhāsya 1.3.28).[50]

In contrast to the Advaita position there is the Mādhyamika Buddhist conception of language as based in everyday speaking. Buddhist language as such is not grounded in any truth principle. It has a negative function in that it is useful for removing views, but it cannot be used for comprehending truths or universals. Ratnakīrti writes in his Apohasiddhih:

> (16.5.6) And what we perceive in clear perception is only the particular and this fact precludes admission of the (vicious) circle of (realistic pluralism) engendered by such imposed realities as, universals, attributes, actions, etc.[51]

This conception sees language as "designation" rather than as participating in reality or "naming". Stcherbatsky writes that for the Buddhist reality is unutterable:

> Ideality or thought-construction, being by its very definition something that can be expressed in a name, it is clear that reality, as pure reality, the contradictorily

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[50] J. G. Arapura, "Indian Philosophy of Language--Introduction", unpublished, privately circulated, (1974), p. 9.

[51] D. Sharma, The Differentiation Theory of Meaning in Indian Logic, (The Hague: Mouton, 1969), p. 89. p. 88 (vādhakam ca sāmānya-guṇakarmmādy upādhicakrasya, kevalavyaktigrāhakam paṭupratyākṣam.) Sharma observes on p. 47 that, "According to the apohist view meaning in its logical aspect can only be a mental phenomena, for it arises in the intellect and is based on our propositional attitude. It is in fact the instrument of the act of reference, rather than the object of reference. And thus there is only a creative mental function contained in the law of differentiation (apoha).

opposed thing to ideality, must be something that cannot
be expressed in speech. A reality which is stripped off
from every relation and every construction, which has
neither any position in time and space nor any charac-
terizing quality, cannot be expressed, because there is
in it nothing to be expressed, except the fact that it has
produced a quite indefinite sensation.[52]

The Buddhist idea of language is termed _apoha-vāda_:

. . . According to _Apoha_ a word denotes the negation of
contraries; the word "cow" denotes the negation of
"non-cow". _Apoha_ then is neither internal nor external,
and different from cognition and object. Therefore the
relation between word and object is unreal but a mere
designation which colours a determinate cognition.
Etymologically it means either the exclusion of this indi-
vidual from another contradictory individual or the
contradictory individual _from_ as well as _in_ this indi-
vidual. The Buddhist Ratnakirtis _Apohasiddhi_ is a
definitive work for this theory. All _āstika_ systems
refuted _apoha_ like one man.[53]

Thus language can be classed for the Advaita under the rubric "name"

and for the Buddhist under "designation". This point will be brought

out more fully in Chapter III. Let us turn now to a general under-

standing of the fundamental conception of the Advaita Vedānta of

Sankara.

The religio-philosophical thought of the Advaita darśana can

be summed up in the brief phrase: _brahma satyam jagan mithya jivo_

brahmaiva na'parah (Brahman is Being, the world is non-real, the

individual is non-different from Brahman). This is to say that one's

individual being is identical with Being (Brahman) and this is true

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[52]T. Stcherbatsky, _Buddhist Logic_ Vol. I, (The Hague: Mouton
and Co., 1958), pp. 185-6.

[53]Arapura, "Indian Philosophy of Language--Introduction", p. 13.

for all individual beings. It is from this view that the complex

epistemological, metaphysical and ontological system that is called

the Advaita darśana emerges. The Advaita Vedānta understands itself

to be in direct line with the Vedic texts. Thus let us turn our

attention to the earliest tradition and briefly consider the term

"māyā".

PART ONE

HISTORICAL SURVEY

CHAPTER II.

MĀYĀ IN THE EARLY TRADITION

The conception of māyā within the Indian tradition begins with the earliest writing of the tradition, the Ṛgveda. Within this collection of books the number of times the word māyā and its derivatives occurs is numbered by Gonda as over one hundred times.[1] Another numbering of māyā and its derivatives is that given by P. D. Shastri in his Doctrine of Māyā where he gives the following list of one hundred one occurrences:

> (1) māyāh (nominative and accusitive plural twenty-four times)
> I.32.4 I.117.3 II.11.10 II.27.26 III.20.3 III.53.8
> V.2.9 V.31.7 V.40.8 VI.18.9 VI.20.4 VI.22.9 VI.44.22
> VI.45.9 VI.58.1 VII.1.10 VII.98.5 VII.99.4 VIII.41.8
> X.53.9 X.73.5 X.99.2 X.111.6
> (2) māyayā (instrumental singular nineteen times)
> I.80.7 I.144.1 I.160.3 II.17.5 III.27.7 IV.30.12
> IV.30.21 V.63.3 V.63.7 VI.22.6 VII.104.24 VII.23.15
> VII.41.3 IX.73.5 IX.73.9 IX.83.3 X.71.5 X.85.18 X.177.1
> (3) māyinah (accusitive plural and genative singular of
>   mayin fifteen times)
> I.39.2 I.51.5 I.54.4 I.64.7 I.159.4 II.11.10 III.38.7
> III.38.9 III.56.1 V.44.11 VI.61.3 VII.82.3 VIII.3.19
> VIII.23.14 X.138.3
> (4) māyābhih (instrumental plural thirteen times)
> I.11.7 I.33.10 I.51.5 I.151.9 III.34.6 III.60.1
> V.30.6 V.44.2 V.78.6 VI.47.18 VI.63.5 VII.14.14
> X.147.2

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[1] J. Gonda, "The 'Original' Sense and the Etymology of the Sanskrit Māyā", Four Studies in the Language of the Veda, (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1959), p. 127. Cited hereafter as Studies.

(5) māyinam (accusitive singular of mayin ten times)
I.11.7 I.53.7 I.56.3 I.80.7 II.11.5 V.30.6 V.58.2
VI.48.14 VIII.76.1 X.147.2
(6) māyā (three times)
III.61.7 V.63.4 X.54.2
(7) māyām (accusitive singular three times)
V.85.5 V.85.6 X.88.6
(8) māyī (nomative singular of mayin three times)
VII.28.4 X.99.10 X.147.5
(9) māyinam (three times)
I.32.4 III.20.3 III.34.3.
(10) māyinī (two times)
V.48.1 X.5.3
(11) māyinā (instrumental singular of mayin)
VI.63.5
(12) māyini
V.48.3
(13) māyāvinā
X.24.4
(14) māyāvān
IV.16.9
(15) māyāvinam
II.11.9
(16) māyāvinah[2]
X.83.3

With these citations, we can say beyond any doubt that the word "māyā"

occurs numerous times in the Ṛgveda. As to the specific meanings of

the individual occurrences one should consult each of them separately.

Let us now look briefly at the three occurrences of māyā cited by

Shastri. These are given as III.61.7, V.63.4, and X.54.2. III.61.7

is to Ushas (morning):

> 7--On Law's firm base the speeder of the Morning, ths
> [sic] Bull, hath entered mighty earth and heaven.
>   Great is the power of Varuṇa and Mitra, which
> bright hath spread in every place its splendour.[3]

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[2]P. D. Shastri, The Doctrine of Māyā, (London: Luzac and Co., 1911), pp. 6-7. Cited hereafter as Doctrine.

[3]R. T. H. Griffith, The Hymns of the Ṛgveda Vol. I, (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1963), p. 388. Cited hereafter as Hymns. Theodor Aufrecht in his Die Hymnen des Rigveda, (Wiesbaden:

Gonda, commenting on this hymn, points out its resemblance to
Rv III.53.8 and VI.53.8: ". . . the important event of the sun's
appearance into the world is attributed to the great _māyā_ of Mitra and
Varuṇa, that is to say to their 'power of creating or constructing
objects characterized by forms and dimensions.'"[4] His previous comment
on hymns III 53.8 and VI.53.8 brings this out more fully:

> It seems hardly possible to escape the conclu-
> sion that _māyā_ here refers to a special ability to
> create forms, or rather to the inexplicable power of a
> High Being to assume forms, to project itself into exter-
> nality, to assume an outward appearance, to appear in,
> or as, the phenomenal world. It is perfectly intelligi-
> ble that this text could be quoted in order to demonstrate
> that the universe is identity gone into difference . . .[5]

V.63.4 is addressed to Mitra-Varuṇa.

> 4--Your magic, Mitra-Varuṇa, resteth in the heaven.
> The Sun, the wondrous weapon, cometh forth as light.
>   Ye hide him in the sky with cloud and flood
> of rain, and waterdrops, Parjanya! full of sweetness
> flow.[6]

Otto Harrassowitz, 1963) gives the Vedic Sanskrit as: (ṛtásya
budhná vsām iṣaṇyán vṛ́ṣā mahí rodasí ā viveśa/. mahí mitrásya varu
ṇasya māyā candrā bhānúm vídadhe purutrā//). A different translation
is given by H. D. Velankaʳ, Ṛgveda Maṇḍala III, (Bombay: University of
Bombay, 1968), p. 146: The bull of the dawns, urging her on, has
entered the two great worlds at the bottom of ṛta. He, the great māyā
of mitra and varuṇa, has distributed his light like a beautiful lady.

[4]Studies, p. 129.

[5]Ibid., p. 128.

[6]Hymns Vol. I, p. 534. Aufrecht: (māyā vām mitrā varuṇā divi
śritā sūryo jyotiścarati citrám āyudham/ tam abhréṇa vṛṣṭyā gūhatho
divi parjanya drapsā mádhumanta īrate //).

Gonda remarks that, "By máyā Mitra and Varuṇa make the sun to cross the sky and obscure it with cloud and rain . . ."[7] Commenting on the previous verse:

> In addressing Mitra and Varuṇa the poet of Rv.
> 5,63,3 states that they cause the sky to rain, not so
> much "durch die Zaubermacht des Asura" as Geldner under-
> stands the phrase asurasya māyayā--which may, according
> to the same scholar also mean: "mit der Zaubermacht, wie
> sie ein Asura besitzt"--, nor something like "divine
> dominion", a term used in this connection by Macdonell,
> but rather, with Sāyaṇa: māyayā is to be understood as
> prajñayā Sāmarthyena.[8]

Also:

> . . . thus 5,63,3 where Mitra and Varuṇa are said to
> cause the sky to rain by their māyā "incomprehensible
> ability (to contrive important processes of this charac-
> ter)." See also 5,85,5 and 6 where Varuṇa measures and
> fixes the earth and makes the rivers debouch into the
> ocean. Thus the term is often employed in connection with
> the marvels of nature (see e.g. also 5,63,4), for instance
> also with the appearance of daylight and the foundation
> of the world. Those possessed of māyā, e.g. gods, could
> moreover attain results which are beyond the power of
> ordinary men. Although then māyā may from the human
> point of view by 'Zaubermacht', it is in fact always the
> same incomprehensible ability. However, the surprising
> and incredible may easily be taken to be unreal or im-
> possible, that is to say: not in accordance with what is
> from a certain point of view called or regarded as reality.[9]

The God Indra is addressed in verse X.54.2:

> 2--When thou wast roaming, waxen strong in body,
> telling thy might, Indra, among the people,
>   All that men called thy battles was illusion:
> no foe hast thou to-day, nor erst hast found one.[10]

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[7]Studies, p. 132.   [8]Ibid., p. 130.

[9]J. Gonda, Change and Continuity in Indian Religion, (The Hague:
Mouton & Co., 1965), pp. 167-8.

[10]Hymns Vol. II, p. 457. Aufrecht: (yád ácaras tanrá
vavrdhānóbálānĪndra prabrurānó jáneṣu/ māyét sá te yáni yuddhāny āhúr

Concerning this verse Gonda makes the following observation:

> Rv. 10,54,2 is an interesting passage. If in-
> terpreted in the line of the above explications and
> without considering the context in which it is quoted
> in the Śat Br. 11,1,6,9 f., there is no coercive reason
> to render māyā by "illusion" or the German "trug" or
> "Blendwerk" . . . The meaning of the above words seems
> to be: "it was, indeed, māyā what they say to be your
> fights," that is to say: "they are no ordinary combats,
> but achievements of marvellous ability." It follows:
> "in fact, thou hast never met a mightier rival." This
> interpretation is very well adapted to the context, which
> praises the god's exploits, expressing astonishment with
> regard to their greatness and importance. However, the
> surprising and incredible may easily be taken to be impos-
> sible or unreal, that is to say: not in accordance with
> what is from a certain point of view called reality. When
> viewed in the light of those contexts where māyā denotes
> the power and ability to produce marvellous phenomena
> which lack a certain degree of reality, the above passage
> admitted of the interpretation given in the Śatapathabrāh-
> mana. . . .[11]

Thus māyā, according to Gonda, must not be seen as "illusion" in these

three verses, but as a marvellous power of creation. To continue our

study then we may be content with a general meaning of the conception

of māyā in the Ṛgveda. Shastri has provided us with one in his

work, he states:

> The two chief meanings, therefore, which the word is
> assigned in R.V. are "power" (Prajñā, lit."knowledge")
> and "deception" ("Kapaṭa", Vañcanā). The above examin-
> ation of the various passages in which the word occurs
> has shown us that wherever it means "power" the idea of
> "mystery" necessarily goes with it; i.e., it does not
> mean any "physical" power, but "a mysterious power of
> the will" which we would translate into such Sanskrit
> expressions as sankalpa-śakti or icchā-śakti.[12]

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nādya śátruṃ nanú purá vivitse //).

[11]Studies, pp. 135-6.

[12]Doctrine, p. 10.

Gonda is reluctant to follow Shastri in defining māyā in any primary

sense as "deceptive" but would agree when māyā is seen as connoting

"power". He observes:

> Too often they appear to have lost sight of two facts:
> first, that this term is frequently used, in a variety
> of contexts, without any bearing upon the great problem
> of the "reality" of the phenomenal world as compared
> with Brahman, and in the second place, that it does not
> always refer to illusions, fascination, delusions,
> that it is far from denoting always pseudo-realities,
> or realities or activities of an artificial or mis-
> leading character. It is true that the word is some-
> times used in connection with jugglers and deceptive
> activities, but that is no reason for concluding that
> "illusion or delusion" are its main, or even its original
> meaning."[13]

In fact, according to Shastri, the first time that the Sanskrit word

māyā was translated by the word "illusion" is found in the English

translation of the German translation of Sanskrit in W. D. Whitney's

work on the Atharva-veda Saṁhita. These are the verses:

> Brhatī the measure (mātrā) was fashioned forth out of
> measure [as] a mother; illusion (māyá) was born from
> illusion, Mātalī out of illusion. (9.5)

> Note: The desire to play upon the root mā "measure,
> fashion," is the leading motive in the making of this
> verse. The pada-text gives the absurd reading māyáḥ
> at beginning of c; Ppp reads after it hi instead of ha.

> She ascended; she came to the Asuras; the Asuras called
> to her: O illusion (māyá), come! of her Virochana son of
> Prahrāda was young (vatsá), the metal-(áyas-) vessel
> was vessel; her Dvimūrdhas son of Ṛitu milked; from her
> he milked illusion; that illusion the Asuras subsist
> upon; one to be subsisted on becometh he who knoweth
> thus. (10.22 Viraj)[14]

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[13]Studies, p. 126.

[14]W. D. Whitney, Atharva-Veda Saṁhita Vol. II, (Varanasi:
Motilal Banarsidass, 1905), p. 507, p. 514.

Commenting on the relation of the concept of māyā to the Vedic gods

Betty Heineman states:

> The main gods, like Indra and Agni, are called puru-
> rūpavat, "having many forms", all of equal importance.
> Because of this, their capacity of assuming many forms
> simultaneously and successively, they are also called
> māyā-vat or māyin--a term generally translated as
> "sorcerer" or "fraudulent illusionist" (though māyā, a
> derivative of the root mā, "to measure", indicates
> only that many measurable, visible forms, māyās,
> all transitory in their existence, are ascribed to
> them). The measurability, visibility and manifold-
> ness are a reflection or manifestation of the
> Ultimate, but never the Ultimate itself. This lies
> before, and after, all its emanations. The Summum
> Bonum is hidden while manifested in apparent
> multiformity.[15]

Following the most ancient commentaries the conception of

māyā is related to the idea of knowledge and measure:

> Our earliest and most dependable guide to the original
> meaning of the word is obviously the Nighaṇtu. According
> to it, māyā was one of the words for praja, praja-namani.
> Prajñā, as commonly understood, means wisdom, knowledge.
> However, the suggestion of the Nighaṇtu takes us a step
> further. According to it, another synonym for prajñā was
> dhi. And the word dhi was also one of the words meaning
> action or karma - karma-namani. Evidently, to the early
> Vedic poets there was no wisdom that was not also action;
> or, the only wisdom they knew was the wisdom of practical
> activity. This action was kratu. The same word also meant
> prajñā or wisdom. Further, the word saci, too, was a synonym
> for both karma and prajñā. The implication is clear. The
> concept of wisdom was originally inconceivable without
> the concept of activity. Therefore, if māyā originally
> meant prajñā or wisdom, it could not have been wisdom in
> our sense of the word, i.e. wisdom as dissociated from
> action.[16]

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[15]Betty Heineman, Facets of Indian Thought, (New York: Schocken Books, 1964), p. 90. Cited hereafter as Facets.

[16]Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, Lokāyata: A Study in Ancient Indian Materialism, (New Delhi: Peoples Pub. House, 1959), p. 648.

In the Nirukta commenting upon the Nighantu we find that the word māyā,
" . . . is derived from the root mā, to measure, with the suffix ya,
meaning 'by which the objects are given specific shape.' miyante
paricchidyante anaya padarthah."[17] Measure seen as māyā in the Vedānta

of Advaita is the opinion of Shastri:

> The word "Maya" is derived from√mā, to measure--"mīyate
> anayā its", i.e., by which is measured, meaning thereby,
> as tradition has it, that illusive projection of the world
> by which the immeasurable Brahman appears as if measured.
> The same root gives further the sense of "to build",
> leading to the idea of "appearance" or illusion.
> Sāyana, in his commentary on R.V. I.11.7. too derives
> the word from "mād mane" (i.e. √mā, to measure).
> Further on, while explaining the form "māyayā" in R.V.
> III.27.7 he derives it from√mā, to know, or to
> measure, and adds--"mimīte jānīte karma mīyate anayeti
> vā māyā karmaviṣayābhijñānam", i.e., (1)√Mā, to know--
> by which the ritual, etc. are known, (2)√Mā, to measure
> --by which the ritual, etc., are measured (i.e., understood,
> or performed); hence māyā = the knowledge of the object
> of the ritual, etc.[18]

With this understanding of the concept of māyā as a basis various

other extended meanings arose as the concept was interpreted. This

extended meaning is commented on by Betty Heineman:

> For instance, in Rgveda IX.89.9 and V.85.5 the diffi-
> cult term māyā is taken up three times also by other
> derivations from its root, mā, "to measure" (manan, mamire).
> As such the noun in question is illumined by linguistic
> forms of kindred descent. This eminently useful device
> is subsequently borrowed from the early texts by later
> commentators in their bhāsyas to the Scripture. Again
> and again they introduce other derivations of the term
> under discussion. In order to revive its root-meaning,
> they supply also its full verb or its related past parti-
> ciples or adjectives, as these, more than the noun it-
> self, retain the living import of its root. At other

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[17]Ibid., p. 649.

[18]Doctrine, pp. 29-30.

times, synonyms are used which throw light on the term
by their coextensive meaning and equivalence.[19]

This extended meaning of the term māyā gives rise to a more popular

conception. Heinrich Zimmer points to this in his work on Indian

concepts.

> The Hindu mind associates such ideas as "transitory,
> everchanging, elusive, ever-returning," with "unreality",
> and conversely, "imperishable, changeless, steadfast,
> and eternal," with "the real". As long as the experiences
> and sensations that stream through the consciousness of
> an individual remain untouched by any widening, devalua-
> ting vision, the perishable creatures that appear and
> vanish in the unending cycle of life (saṁsāra, the round
> of rebirth) are regarded by him as utterly real. But the
> moment their fleeting character is discerned, they come
> to seem almost unreal--an illusion or mirage, a decep-
> tion of the senses, the dubious figment of a too restric-
> ted, ego-centered consciousness. When understood and
> experienced in this manner the world is Māyā-maya, "of the
> stuff of Māyā." Māyā is "art": that by which an artifact,
> an appearance, is produced.[20]

An example of this is given by Zimmer from the Matsya Purāṇa which was

set down in about the fourth century A.D. Here we find māyā attached

to the god Vishnu. The sage Vyāsa tells of Vishnu's māyā in the form

of a tale:

> . . . "No one can comprehend my Māyā. No one has ever
> comprehended it. There will never be anyone capable of
> penetration to its secret. Long, long ago, there lived
> a godlike holy seer, Nārada by name, and he was a direct
> son of the god Brahma himself, full of fervent devotion
> to me. Like you, he merited my grace, and I appeared
> before him, just as I am appearing now to you. I granted
> him a boon, and he uttered the wish that you have
> uttered. Then, though I warned him not to inquire further
> into the secret of my Māyā, he insisted, just like you.
> And I said to him: 'Plunge into yonder water, and you
> shall experience the secret of my Māyā.' Nārada dived

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[19]Facets, p. 70.

[20]M&S, p. 24.

into the pond. He emerged again--in the shape of a girl.

"Nārada stepped out of the water as Sushilā, 'The Virtuous One,' the daughter of the king of Benares. And presently, when she was in the prime of her youth, her father bestowed her in marriage on the son of neighboring king of Vidarbha. The holy seer and ascetic, in the form of a girl, fully experienced the delights of love. In due time, then, the old king of Vidarbha died, and Sushilā's husband succeeded to the throne. The beautiful queen had many sons and grandsons, and was incomparably happy.

"However, in the long course of time, a feud broke out between Sushilā's husband and her father, and this developed presently into a furious war. In a single mighty battle many of her sons and grandsons, her father, and her husband all were slain. And when she learned of the holocause she proceeded in sorrow from the capital to the battlefield, there to lift a solemn lament. And she ordered a gigantic funeral pyre and placed upon it the dead bodies of her relatives, her brothers, sons, nephews, and grandsons, and then, side by side, the bodies of her husband and her father. With her own hand she laid torch to the pyre, and when the flames were mounting cried aloud, "My son, my son!" and when the flames were roaring, threw herself into the conflagration. The blaze became immediately cool and clear; the pyre became a pond. And amidst the waters Sushilā found herself--but again as the holy Nārada. And the god Vishnu, holding the saint by the hand, was leading him out of the crystal pool.

"After the god and the saint had come to the shore, Vishnu asked with an equivocal smile: 'Who is this son whose death you are bewailing?' Nārada stood confounded and ashamed. The god continued: "This is the semblance of my Māyā, woeful, somber, accursed. Not the lotus-born Brahmā, not any other of the gods, Indra, nor even Shiva, can fathom its depthless depth. Why or how should you know this inscrutable?'

"Nārada prayed that he should be granted perfect faith and devotion, and the grace to remember this experience for all time to come. Furthermore, he asked that the pond into which he had entered, as into a source of initiation, should become a holy place of pilgrimage, its water--thanks to the everlasting secret presence therein of the god who had entered to lead forth the saint from the magic depth--endowed with the power to wash away all sin. Vishnu granted the pious wishes and forthwith, on the instant, disappeared, withdrawing to his cosmic abode in the Milky Ocean."

"I have told you this tale," concluded Vishnu, before he withdrew likewise from the ascetic, Sutapas, 'in order to teach you that the secret of my Māyā is

> inscrutable and not to be known. If you so desire,
> you too may plunge into the water, and you will know why
> this is so.'
> Whereupon Sutapas did."[21]

Thus the concept of māyā in the early tradition developed within the

frame or construction of such understandings as "wonderous power of

the gods" which accounted for and included māyā as "measure" and

"wisdom". But to determine a more exact meaning of māyā in the early

tradition is not our primary objective and this would be beyond the

subject matter of our inquiry. What has been presented merely points

to the fact that this term is found in the earliest tradition and was

used in a variety of senses, including "measure". In this chapter we

have briefly reviewed the idea of māyā in the early tradition. It

was necessary to accomplish this so that the framework of this present

study could be made explicit, thus making the study more understandable

in terms of a larger scope. This larger scope is needed so that we

may later see how the classical conception of māyā is related to the

māyā concept of the earlier tradition. Whether or not Śankara's

conception of māyā is seen as a "correct interpretation" of the early

tradition is not a point of contention. Rather the point is that it is

necessary to understand any concept within its own context, as much

as this is possible. Let us now turn and consider briefly the time just

before Śankara, concerning ourselves with the Mādhyamika Buddhism of

Nāgārjuna and Śankara's teacher's teacher Gauḍapāda.

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[21]Ibid., pp. 30-1.

CHAPTER III

SAMVRTI DOCTRINE FROM NĀGĀRJUNA THROUGH GAUDAPĀDA

LIFE OF NĀGĀRJUNA

The third century[1] Buddhist thinker Nāgārjuna[2], who first
systematically expounded the _śūnyatā_ view, has a life story which is
hidden in time and myth. In fact there exist various accounts of
Nāgārjuna ranging from a skeptical attitude of whether or not he
did exist to the positing of a number of "Nāgārjuna's", i.e. a

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[1]Jan Yun-Hua, "Nāgārjuna, One or More? A New Interpretation
of Buddhist Hagiography", History of Religions, X #2 (1970), Dr. Jan
remarks concerning the Buddhist view of Nāgārjuna from Chinese records
that: "To place the dates of the Buddha and eminent Buddhist leaders
as early as possible was a fashion among Buddhists in medieval China.
It was a result of the complex Buddhist-Taoist conflict and the
traditional reverence for aged persons in Chinese society. Thus, the
date of 700 years after the Nirvāṇa of the Buddha as the birth date
of Nāgārjuna seems more plausible than the suggestion of 300 years
after the great Nirvāṇa. If the date of Nirvāṇa of the Buddha be
accepted as circa 480 B. C., the time of Nāgārjuna would be placed
in the third century A. D. This tallies with the conclusion made by
Lamotte and Robinson." (p. 149).

[2]The name of Nāgārjuna is said to have come from the fact
that "his mother had given birth to him under a tree. As the tree
was called 'Arjuna' (he received) the name 'Arjuna'. As he obtained
from the serpents guidance (lit: the way) he was called on account
of the sign connected with Nāga (dragon) Nāgārjuna." M. Walleser,
"The Life of Nāgārjuna from Tibetan and Chinese Sources", Asia Major,
Hirth Anniversary Volume (1923), p. 448.

"Tantric" Nāgārjuna, a "Medical" Nāgārjuna, etc.[3] Generally, however,

we can say that:

> According to early Buddhist sources, the main elements
> of the life of Nagarjuna, though complicated by
> legendary accounts, remain clear: all the sources
> agree that he came from a Brahminical family, was
> well versed in magic power, and had a romantic life
> when he was young. After renouncing his worldly
> life and being initiated into the Buddhist Sangha,
> he studied Mahayana texts on the Snow Mountain,
> went to and obtained more important Mahayana
> scriptures from the palace of the Nagas under the
> sea, and won the mind and support of the king of
> Satavahana dynasty. These sources also say that
> he settled in South India until the last days of his life.
> He had a long life, lasting several hundred years.[4]

BASIS OF THE MĀDHYAMIKA

A systematic development of the Mādhyamika view can be said

to be found in Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.[5] In this work Nāgārjuna

presents what he considers the correct interpretation of the teaching

of the Buddha:

> I reverently bow to Gautama (the Buddha) who out
> of compassion has taught the truth of being (saddharma)
> in order to destroy all views.   XXVII   30[6]

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[3] See Jan, "Nāgārjuna, One or More?" for a summary and review of these various opinions.

[4] Ibid., pp. 140-1.

[5] We will center on this text for our study as it is sufficient for our study of saṃvṛti and paramārtha. The English translations with which we will work are: Inada, K.K., Nāgārjuna: A Translation of His Mūlamadhyamakakārikā with an Introductory Essay, (Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1970); F. J. Streng, "Fundamentals of the Middle Way", Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning, (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1967), pp. 183 ff. Latter cited hereafter as Emptiness.

[6] K. K. Inada, Nāgārjuna, p. 171. (sarvadṛṣṭiprahāṇāya yaḥ saddharmamādeśayat/ anukampāmupādāya taṃ namasyāmi gautamaṃ//)

Nāgārjuna, following the Buddha, developes his thought within the "modal view" of reality,[7] but he takes the modal view further than did earlier Buddhist thought, i.e. the Abhidharmika system. The Abhidharmika system held to a more dogmatic understanding of the message of the Buddha; they assert that the doctrine of anātma is another view over and against the ātma view of the Upanisads. Nāgārjuna, however, takes the message of the Buddha further and systematically developes the Mādhyamika system into the central or pivotal system of Buddhism.[8] This development was accomplished by a radical understanding of the "Silence" of the Buddha. This "Silence" refers to the Buddha's refusal to entertain certain types of questions, the inexpressibles. These inexpressibles are said in Buddhist Sanskrit literature to be fourteen[9] in number. The inexpressibles are given by Murti as:

(1) Whether the world is eternal, or not, or both, or neither;
(2) Whether the world is finite (in space), or infinite, or both, or neither;
(3) Whether the Tathagata exists after death, or does not, or both, or neither;
(4) Is the soul identical with the body or different from it?[10]

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[7] See Introduction, p. 26 ff.

[8] T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1960), p. 5. Cited hereafter as CPB.

[9] K. N. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1963), p. 471. Cited hereafter as EBTK.

[10] CPB, p. 38.

The Abdhidharma school understood these inexpressibles within their own system of speculative metaphysics based on a theory of Elements (dharmas).[11] This system reduces the inexpressibles to a difficulty of verbal formulation.[12] One example of this kind of approach can be seen in the discussions about the existence of the ego between King Milinda and the Buddhist thinker Nāgasena. This discussion concludes as follows:

> Then Milinda the king spoke to the venerable
> Nāgasena as follows:
> "Bhante Nāgasena, I speak no lie: the word 'chariot'
> is but a way of counting, term, appellation, convenient
> designation, and name for pole, axle, wheels, chariot-
> body, and banner-stall."
> "Thoroughly well, your majesty, do you understand a
> chariot. In exactly the same way, your majesty, in respect
> of me, Nāgasena is but a way of counting, term,
> appellation, convenient designation, mere name
> for the hair of my head, hair of my body . . .
> brain of the head, form, sensation, perception, the
> predispositions, and consciousness. But in the
> absolute sense there is no Ego to be found."[13]

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[11] The conception of dharmas as the central point of early Buddhist thought has been pointed out by Stcherbatsky in his The Central Conception of Buddhism, 4 ed., (Varanasi: Indological Book House, 1970), p. 62. He states: "In the light of this conception Dharma Buddhism discloses itself as a metaphysical theory developed out of one fundamental principle, viz. the idea that existence is an interplay of a plurality of subtle, ultimate, not further analysable elements of Matter, Mind, and Forces. These elements are technically called dharmas, a meaning which this word has in this system alone. Buddhism, accordingly, can be characterized as a system of Radical Pluralism (sanghata-vāda): the elements alone are realities, every combination of them is a mere name covering a plurality of separate elements."

[12] See CPB, pp. 41-4, 184-95.

[13] H. C. Warren, Buddhism in Translations, 4th printing, (New York: Atheneum Press, 1970), pp. 132-33.

On the other hand the Mādhyamika sees the inexpressibles not as a difficulty of verbal formulation but as "conflict in Reason".[14] In fact Nāgārjuna comments that the Buddha has nowhere taught the theory of Elements, i.e. concepts. "All acquisitions (i.e., grasping) as well as play of concepts (i.e., symbolic representation) are basically in the nature of cessation and quiescence. Any factor of experience with regards to any one at any place was never taught by the Buddha."[15] As a "conflict in Reason" the Mādhyamika saw in the inexpressibles of the Buddha a rejection of all theories:

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[14] This "conflict in Reason" is seen as the conflict inherent within the given metaphysical systems of that time. By this any view or philosophical position was shown by the dialectic as leading to absurd concepts. This "conflict in Reason" seems to be understood by Murti in a Kantian way. We however wish to use it in a more limited manner. This manner is in reference to the kind of method the mādhyamika utilizes in rendering views "void". We are not taking-issue with Murti in our analysis because it would lead us away from our primary concern. But we recognize the inherent difficulty in the use of Kant by Dr. Murti. At this point the reader may wish to refer to the following: Jacques May, "Kant et les Mādhyamika", Indo-Iranian Journal, III (1959), 102-111. Here he refers to the relation of Kant to the Mādhyamika as "perfide" (treacherous). E. Conze has commented upon Murti's use of Kant in his "Spurious Parallels to Buddhist Philosophy", Philosophy East and West XIII (1963), 105-115. In review of this article Alex Wayman wrote "Conze on Buddhism and European Parallels" pages 361-64 of the same volume. Wayman also wrote a review of Streng: "Contributions to the Mādhyamika School of Buddhism", Journal of the American Oriental Society, 89 (1969), 141-52. Another attack upon Murti is that of R. C. Pandeya entitled "The Madhyamika Philosophy: A New Approach", Philosophy East and West, 14 (1964), 3-24. In regard to this controversy see also R. H. Robinson, Early Mādhyamika in India and China, (Madison: U. of Wisconsin Press, 1967), p. 4 ff.

[15] Inada, Nāgārjuna, p. 159, (sarvopalambhapaśamaḥ prapañco-paśamaḥ śivaḥ/ na kvacit kasya citkaściddharmo buddhena deśitaḥ//).

> He (Buddha) starts with the total and interminable
> conflict in Reason as exemplified in the several
> speculative systems of his time. The untenability of
> each view, of all views, condemns them as mere subjective
> devices. The rejection of theories (<u>ditthi</u>) is itself the
> <u>means</u> by which Buddha is led to the non-conceptual
> knowledge of the absolute, and not vice versa. It is no
> accident then that Buddha concerns himself with an
> analysis of the various theories of reality and rejects
> them all. Buddha ascends from the conflict of Reason to
> the inexpressibility of the absolute. The consciousness
> of the conflict in Reason and the attempt to resolve it
> by rising to a plane higher than Reason is dialectic.[16]

The Buddha then does not answer the inexpressibles because he is

aware of the implications of each with regard to the theories they

propound. This awareness is not just an awareness of verbal formula-

tion but is much deeper in that it recognizes that the Absolute (<u>Nirvāṇa</u>)

cannot be clothed in theories. This is where Nāgārjuna and his

followers, i.e. Chandrakṛti, begin their understanding of the dialectic;

it is implicit in the "Silence" of the Buddha.

MĀDHYAMIKA DIALECTIC

The dialectic method, based on the inexpressibles, is the

basis of the Mādhyamika. With it the Mādhyamika dialectic tries to

remove the "conflict inherent in Reason" by rejecting both the opposites,

taken singly or in combination.

> The Mādhyamika is convinced that the conjunctive or
> disjunctive synthesis of the opposites is but another
> view; it labours under the same difficulties. Rejecting
> of all views is the rejection of the competence of Reason
> to comprehend reality. The real is transcendent to thought.
> Rejection of views is not based on any positive grounds
> or the acceptance of another view; it is solely based
> on the inner contradiction implicit in each view. The
> function of the Mādhyamika dialectic, on the logical level,
> is purely negative, analytic.[17]

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[16]CPB, pp. 48-9.   [17]Ibid., p. 128.

When the Mādhyamika dialectic rejects the opposites it rejects the four alternative views possible on any subject. This can be formularized with regard to the question of a next world as:

(1) S is P, e.g. _atthi paro loko_ (there is a next world)

(2) S. is not P. e.g. _natthi paro loko_ (there is no next world)

(3) S. is and is not P, e.g. _atthi ca natthi ca paro loko_ (there is and is no next world)

(4) S neither is nor is not P, e.g. _N'ev'atthi na natthi paro loko_ (there neither is nor is there no next world)[18]

Murti expresses it as:

> The basic alternatives are two: Being and Non-Being, Affirmation and Negation. From these two others are derived by affirming or denying both at once: both Being and Non-Being (_ubhayasamkirnā-tma_), and neither Being nor Non-Being (_ubhayapratisedhasvab hāvatā_).[19]

This method uses epistemology as dialectic to render inefficient any ground from which to develop a view of reality, i.e. it uses dialectic to destroy any philosophic view.

When the dialectic destroys views it does not posit any new view or position:

> How does the Mādhyamika reject any and all views? He uses only one weapon: By drawing out the implications of any view he shows its self-contradictory character. The dialectic is a series of _reductio ad absurdum_ arguments (_prasangāpādanam_). Every thesis is turned against itself. The Mādhyamika is a _prāsangika_ or _vaitandika_, a dialectician or free-lance debater. The Mādhyamika disproves the opponents thesis and does not prove any thesis of his own.[20]

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[18] EBTK, p. 335.

[19] CPB, p. 129.

[20] _Ibid._, p. 131.

Thus the center of the Mādhyamika system of Nāgārjuna is the dialectical method. This method is brought against all views, in fact the Mādhyamika begins with:

> . . . The world illusion itself in all its directness
> and universality. He thus avoids the dogmatic
> procedure of analogical extention employed by the
> Vedānta and the Vijñānavadā. The world illusion
> is presented to the Mādhyamika as the total and
> persistent conflict of Reason—the interminable
> opposition of philosophical viewpoints. He is
> solely concerned with opposition of philosophical
> viewpoints. He is solely concerned with the
> transcendental illusion, as the several philosophical
> views are views of reality, the Mādhyamika, in
> being aware of the illusoriness of the views, is
> aware of the illusoriness of the world which is
> characterised by these views.[21]

VIEW OF TRUTH

Nāgārjuna declares that they do not understand the teaching of the Buddha who do not understand the distinction between relative truth (samvrti-satya) and absolute truth (paramārtha-satya). He states:

> The teaching of the Dharma by the various Buddhas
> is based on the two truths; namely, the relative
> (worldly) truth and the absolute (supreme) truth.
> Those who do not know the distinction between
> the two truths cannot understand the profound
> nature of the Buddha's teaching.[22]

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[21]Ibid., p. 216.

[22]Inada, Nāgārjuna, p. 146.
8—dve satye samupāśritya buddhānāṃ dharmādeśanā/ loka-saṃvṛtisatyaṃ ca satyaṃ ca paramārthataḥ//
9—ye 'nayorna vijānanti vibhagaṃ satyayordvayoḥ/ te tattvaṃ na vijānanti gambhīraṃ buddhaśāsane//

What then is the nature of these two truths, samvrti-satya and paramārtha-satya? In answer to this question we can say that samvrti-satya is truth so called. Chandrakīrti gives three definitions of samvrti which in abridged form are:

> (1) Etymologically samvrti means that which covers up entirely the real nature of things and makes them appear otherwise.
> (2) It may also mean the relative nature of things i.e. their dependence upon something.
> (3) It is that which is of a conventional nature and is usually accepted by common folk.[23]

Whatever is of a covering nature, be it expressed by the use of form or language, can be said to be samvrti. Everything is of the nature of samvrti which can be thought, spoken or experienced by man. All man's expressions whether in philosophic views or common everydayness are empirical or relative. Thus that which has a world is, by its very nature samvrti-satya.

Paramārtha-satya is absolute truth and it is the knowledge of the real which is not signified by language and belongs to the realm of the unutterable. It is:

> . . . Knowledge of the real as it is without any distortion (akrtrimam vastu-rūpam). Categories of thought and points of view distort the real. They unconsciously coerce the mind to view things in a cramped, biassed way; and are thus inherently incapable of giving us the truth. The paramārtha is the utter absence of the function of Reason (buddhi) which is therefore equated with samvrti. The Absolute truth is beyond the scope of discursive thought, language and empirical activity; and conversely, the object of these is samvrti-satya. It is said: "The paramārtha is in fact the unutterable (anabhilāpya), the unthinkable, . . . unteachable etc."[24]

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[23]CPB, pp. 244-5.   [24]Ibid., p. 244.

Thus samvrti-satya and paramārtha-satya constitute different perspectives of the real. Of course, the Mādhyamika would not call these perspectives but rather the correct approach to nirvāna. These different perspectives however are merely perspectives and do not set up a doctrine of one reality as against another. For:

> The Absolute is not one reality set against another, the empirical. The Absolute looked at through thought-forms (vikalpa) is phenomena (saṁsāra or samvṛti, literally covered). The latter, freed of the superimposed thought-forms (nirvikalpa, nispranpañca), is the Absolute. The difference is epistemic (subjective), and not ontological. Nāgārjuna therefore declares that there is not the least difference between the world and the absolutely real.[25]

Thus saṁsāra and nirvāṇa are not "different", as Nāgārjuna observes: "The limits (i.e. realm) of nirvāṇa are the limits of saṁsāra. Between the two, also, there is not the slightest difference whatsoever."[26] In fact there is no ontological-epistemic difference between the empirical and the Absolute. It is purely within the epistemic as is implied by Nāgārjuna when he states that: "The status of the birth cycle is due to existential grasping (of the skandas) and relational condition (of the being). That which is non-grasping and non-relational is taught as nirvāṇa."[27]

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[25]CPB, p. 141. See also R. C. Pandeya "The Mādhyamika Philosophy: A New Approach" cited above for a different analysis of this topic and M. Sprung's articles in Two Truths.

[26]Inada, Nāgārjuna, p. 158, XXV 20 (nirvāṇasya ca yā koṭiḥ saṁsārasya ca/ na tayorantaraṁ kiṁ citsusūkṣmamapi vidyate//).

[27]Ibid., p. 156, XXV 9 (ya ājavamjavībhāva upādāya pratītya vā/ so 'pnatītyānupādāya nirvāṇamapadiśyate//)

J. G. Arapura states that this "identity" of nirvāṇa and saṁsāra

must be seen as a counter-reality to the Vedānta:

> . . . in Buddhism, as the counter-reality [to the Vedānta
> analysis of becoming] has no admitted ground other than
> itself, and hence it is what one must start with, it is
> only by countering it from within with the skill of dia-
> lectics that Reality (paramārtha-satya) can be attained.
> Nirvāṇa is that Reality . . . from which all considera-
> tions must be expelled. Hence nirvāṇa and saṁsāra (the
> stream of becoming) are considered identical . . . Therefore,
> the correct knowledge of saṁsāra is indispensable for
> the attainment of nirvāṇa.[28]

F. J. Streng also points this out when he states that:

> The difference between nirvāṇa and saṁsāra applies only
> to the convential norms of truth, for ultimately both of
> them are empty (śūnya). The "negative tendency" in
> dealing with nirvāṇa and saṁsāra as "undifferentiated"
> rather than as "the same" is important to prevent the
> misunderstanding that emptiness is an Absolute in the sense
> of Brahman in Advaita-vedanta thought. Nirvāṇa and saṁsāra
> have a "negative identity" whereby the nature of reality in
> nirvāṇa consists in the lack of self-sufficient reality
> in the factors that constitute saṁsāra. The emptiness of
> the phenomenal world is also the emptiness of any "non-
> phenomenal reality" that is conceived as self-existent.
> Saṁsāra is no more "empty than nirvāṇa; nor is nirvāṇa
> more "empty" than saṁsāra from the highest point of view--
> though nirvāṇa is more "empty" than saṁsāra from the con-
> ventional, practical perspective.[29]

The "identity" of saṁsāra and nirvāṇa does not constitute an

identification on the worldly (samvṛti) level. Samvṛti admits of

differences and degrees whereas "truth" from the standpoint of

paramārtha-satya is one:

> Samvṛti cannot be taken as a lesser, partial or incomplete
> form of truth and that it needs the addition of some other
> features to make it the whole truth. The Absolute in the
> Mādhyamika system is not made up of particular things; it

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[28] A&T, p. 105.

[29] Emptiness, p. 75.

is not a synthesis or summation of different aspects and
piecemeal views. The absolute and phenomena differ quali-
tatively, not in quantity. The concept of degrees is appli-
cable only when the thing to which it applies is capable of
quantitative measurement and when it increases or decreases
with the accretion or subtraction of entities. To accept
the degrees of truth is really to reduce the distinction
between truth and falsity to one of size--the real is the
bigger, the fuller, while the "false" is the smaller, the
incomplete; the real is so much more of the false. This
is to give up the qualitative distinction of the true and
the false. Samvrti is totally false; and nothing of it is
taken up in forming the paramartha.[30]

PARAMĀRTHA AND THE ABSOLUTE

Even though the Mādhyamika is ultimately concerned with

paramārtha-satya it is necessary to go through samvrti-satya, because

the paramārtha can only be realized negatively by the removal of

samvrti. This negative movement proceeds by negation of views. But

this negation is not for naught for it is the heart of the dialectic

which gives rise to śūnyata.

> Negation is the threshold of intellectual intuition.
> Śūnyata is not only the negation of dṛṣṭi (view judgment),
> but is Prajñā. As spiritual life is born of the abandon-
> ment of the secular, intuition is made possible by universal
> negation. Śūnyata is negative only for thought; but in
> itself it is the non-relational knowledge of the absolute.
> It may even be taken as more universal and positive than
> affirmation. . . . It is the freeing of reality of the
> artificial and accidental restrictions, and not the denial
> of reality. Śūnyata is negation of negations; it is thus
> a reaffirmation of the infinite and inexpressibly positive
> character of the real.[31]

Śūnyata being prajñā is the means to nirvāṇa.[32] Nirvāṇa as we have

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[30]CPB, p. 252.

[31]Ibid., p. 160.

[32]Ibid., p. 269.

already seen is the same as <u>saṁsāra</u>, MMK XXV 20, thus what the Mādhyamika means when it states that "Saṁsāra (i.e. the empirical life-death cycle) is nothing essentially different from <u>Nirvāṇa</u>. <u>Nirvāṇa</u> is nothing essentially different from <u>saṁsāra</u>."[33] is that the difference between them is in "<u>our way of looking at them</u>; it is epistemic, not metaphysical," i.e. ontological.[34] Mādhyamika then has no ontology; it is a pure epistemic analysis of all views so that <u>prajña</u> of <u>śunyata</u> can take place. When <u>prajña</u> of <u>śunyata</u> takes place in the Mādhyamika the truth of <u>nirvāṇa</u> is reached. As Nāgārjuna states, "The teacher (Buddha) has taught the abandonment of the concepts of being and non-being. Therefore, <u>nirvāṇa</u> is properly neither (in the realm of) existence nor non-existence."[35]

TRANSITION FROM NĀGĀRJUNA TO GAUDAPĀDA

There is general agreement that Gaudapāda can be seen as the one figure, standing historically between Nāgārjuna and Śaṅkara, who may have been influenced by Buddhist thought.[36] In fact it has been held by some that Gaudapāda was a Buddhist. This opinion was

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[33]Inada, <u>Nāgārjuna</u>, p. 158, XXV 19, (na saṁsārasya nirvāṇātkiṁ cidasti viśeṣaṇaṁ/ na nirvāṇasya saṁsārātkiṁ cidasti viśeṣaṇaṁ//)

[34]CPB, p. 163.

[35]Inada, <u>Nāgārjuna</u>, p. 156, XXV 10 (prahāṇaṁ cābravicchāstā bhāvasya vibhāvasya ca/ tasmānna bhāvo nābhāvo nirvāṇamiti yujyate//)

[36]T. R. V. Murti briefly reviews the position of pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta and sees Gaudapāda as probably being influenced by Buddhist thinkers. See CPB, pp. 109-117. See also M. T. Sahasrabudhe, <u>A Survey of Pre-Śaṅkara Advaita Vedānta</u>, (Poona: University of Poona, 1968).

held by the historian of Indian philosophy, S. Dasgupta, who states:

> Gaudapāda thus flourished after all the great
> Buddhist teachers Aśvaghoṣa, Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga,
> and Vasubandhu; and I believe that there is
> sufficient evidence in his kārikās for thinking
> that he was possibly himself a Buddhist, and
> considered that the teachings of the Upaniṣads
> tallied with those of Buddha.[37]

He then goes on to briefly review the Māṇḍūkyakārikā by Gaudapāda

and ends his survey by observing that:

> It is so obvious that these doctrines are borrowed
> from the Mādhyamika doctrines, as found in Nāgār-
> juna's kārikās and the Vijñānavāda doctrines, as
> found in Laṅkāvatāra, that it is needless to attempt
> to prove it. Gaudapāda assimilated all the Buddhist
> Śūnyavāda and Vijñānavāda teachings, and thought
> that these held good of the ultimate truth preached
> by the Upaniṣads.[38]

Another view which sees in Gaudapāda an attempt to utilize the logic of

the Mādhyamika is that given by S. Radhakrishnan. He observes that:

> Gaudapāda's work bears traces of Buddhist influence,
> especially of the Vijñānavāda and the Mādhyamika
> schools. Gaudapāda uses the very same arguments
> as the Vijñānavāda do to prove the unreality of
> the external objects of perception. . . . In common
> with Nāgārjuna, he denies the validity of causation
> and the possibility of change. . . The empirical world is
> traced to avidyā, or, in Nāgārjuna's phrase,
> samvṛti. . . The highest state beyond the distinctions of
> knowledge cannot be characterised by the predicates
> of existence, non-existence, both or neither.
> Gaudapāda and Nāgārjuna regard it as something
> which transcends the phenomenal. . . .[39]

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[37] S. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I
(Cambridge: University Press, 1969), p. 423.

[38] Ibid., p. 429.

[39] S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, (London: George
Allen & Unwin, 1965), p. 464

Thus we can see that there is probably a relation between the views formulated by Gauḍapāda in his Māṇḍūkyakārikā and the Buddhist thinkers.

LIFE OF GAUḌAPĀDA

As with Nāgārjuna and even more so with Gauḍapāda, the thinker that is presented is one shrouded in myth and legend. All that one can say for sure is that there is a philosophy which presents itself to us under the name Gauḍapāda. Following T. M. P. Mahadevan we can say that the tradition:

> . . . regards Gauḍapāda as Śaṅkara's paramaguru
> (preceptor's preceptor). A verse which contains
> the succession list of the early teachers of
> Advaita gives the names of those teachers in the
> following order: Nārāyaṇa, the lotus-born Brahmā,
> Vasiṣtha, Śakti, his son Parāśara, Vyāsa, Śuka,
> the great Gauḍapāda, Govinda-yogīndra, his disciple
> Śaṅkarācārya, and then his four pupils Padmapāda,
> Hastarmalaka, Troṭka, and the Vārtikakāra (i.e.,
> Sureśvara).[40]

Thus we are given a succession list but have scant reference to Gauḍapāda outside of this. There are, however, at least two references given us:

> Ānandagiri, in his gloss (ṭīkā) on the Māṇḍūkya-
> kārikā-bhāṣya, says that the teacher Gauḍapāda in
> those old days spent his time in Badarikāśrama, the
> holy residence of Nara-Nārāyaṇa, in deep meditation
> on the Lord, and that the Lord, Nārāyaṇa, greatly
> pleased, revealed to him the Upaniṣadic wisdom.
> Bālakṛṣṇānanda Sarasvatī (17th century A.D.) writes
> in his Śārīrakamīmāṁsābhāṣyavārtika that there was
> in the country of Kurukṣetra a river called Hiraṇ-
> āvatī, on whose banks there were some Gauḍa people;

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[40]T. M. P. Mahadevan, Gauḍapāda: A Study in Early Advaita, (Madras: University of Madras, 1960), p. 2.

that the pre-eminent of them, Gauḍapāda, was absorbed
in deep meditation beginning from the Dvāpara age;
and so, as his proper name is not known to the
moderns, he is celebrated by the class name of the
Gauḍas.[41]

GAUḌAPĀDA AND BUDDHISM

The major work attributed to the thinker Gauḍapāda in his

Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā.[42] This work has been pointed out to be of central

import to the problem of the relation of Gauḍapāda to Buddhist

thought. Just as Dasgupta felt it was "obvious" that Gauḍapāda was a

Buddhist, Radhakrishnan also asserts a definite relationship between

Buddhism and the thought of Gauḍapāda. Each of these opinions is

based upon a resumé of his Māṇḍūkyakārikā. Thus for purposes of

understanding the thought of Gauḍapāda let us turn to a brief

account of some scholars' opinions on the association of Gauḍapāda

and Buddhism.[43]

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[41]Ibid., p. 3. Also see Bhattacharya, The Āgamaśāstra of
Gauḍapāda, (Calcutta: University Press, 1943), pp. lxiii-lxxix.

[42]We will center on this text for our study as it is suffi-
cient for our study of samvṛti and māyā. The English translations
consulted are: V. Bhattacharya, The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda, (Cal-
cutta: Calcutta University Press, 1943); S. Nikhilananda, The Māṇ-
dūkopaniṣad with Gauḍapāda's Kārikā and Śaṅkara's Commentary,5th ed.,
(Mysore: Sri Ramakrishna Ashrama, 1968). The Kārikā of Gauḍapāda is
divided into four chapters (prakaraṇas): (1) The scripture (āgama)
portion. (2) The analysis of illusoriness of self-experiences
(vaitathya). (3) The portion on non-duality (advaita). (4) The
quenching of the fire-brand (alātaśānti).

[43]The point of this study is not to determine the questions
about Gauḍapāda and Buddhism once and for all, for this is beyond the
scope of our study; rather it is presented to indicate the groundwork
for the development of the later part of this study.

V. BHATTACHARYA

Perhaps the greatest statement of the association of Gauḍapāda and Buddhism is contained in the work by Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya entitled The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda. In this great work Bhattacharya analyzes the sources, internal structure, and the inter-relation of the four chapters. He makes some very thoughtful conclusions in his analysis which we will now review. Bhattacharya first reviews the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and its relation to the Kārikās. He deduces that: (1) The Kārikās in Book I are not the exposition (vyākhyāna) of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad. (2) The Upaniṣad is based mainly on the Kārikās and not vice versa. (3) Because of (1) and (2) it is the case that the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad is later than the Kārikās.[44] He next looks at the inter-relation of the four chapters and arrives "at the conclusion that these four Books are four independent treatises and are put together in a volume under the title of the Āgamaśāstra."[45]

Uniting Gauḍapāda and Buddhism Bhattacharya sees Buddhist influences in the specific kārikās in; Chapter II: Chapter II: 31-32, 35, (cf. 38), 44, 46, and in most of the kārikās in Chapter IV.[46] He does note that Gauḍapāda is a Vedāntist. He states that, "It is, however, to be noted that Gauḍapāda, though much influenced by the

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[44] V. Bhattacharya, The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda, p. xlvi. Cited hereafter as AS. Later on he concludes that the main source is the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, see p. ciii.

[45] Ibid., p. lvii.

[46] Ibid., p. lxxxiii.

Buddhist thoughts, maintains his position as a Vedantist."[47] What he

gives with one hand he takes away with the other for he immediately

goes on to say that, "It is true that he advocates the Vijñānavāda,

but certainly it is originally adopted by him from the Upaniṣadic

source, i.e., BU, IV. 3.14 . . . ."[48] In fact he ends his "Introduction"

by stating that:

> It may therefore be safely concluded that Gauḍapāda's Brahman
> and the citta in Vijñaptimātratā of the Yogācāras are in
> fact the same thing with the only one difference that while
> the former is nitya the latter is dhruva.[49]

T. M. P. MAHADEVAN

A different approach to Gauḍapāda and Buddhism is contained

in the study of T. M. P. Mahadevan entitled Gauḍapāda--A Study in

Early Advaita. Mahadevan deals with the same questions Bhattacharya

entertained but his conclusions are quite different. With regard to

the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad being later than the Kārikās, Mahadevan proceeds

by an analysis of the contentions of Bhattacharya that the Kārikās

in Book I are not the exposition of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and that the

Upaniṣad is based on the Kārikās. Mahadevan points out that the two

objections[50] raised by Bhattacharya do not hold and because of this,

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[47]Ibid., p. cxxxii.

[48]Ibid., p. cxxxii.

[49]Ibid., p. cxlii.

[50]Mahadevan's arguments are centered on the idea that the
Kārikās in Book I is definitely the exposition of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad
and also that the Kārikās is based upon the Upaniṣad and not vice
versa. See Mahadevan, p. 65 ff.

his conclusion is invalid. Mahadevan observes:

> The language of the Mandukya Upanisad is admittedly of
> a piece with that of the other prose Upanisads. Some
> of the terms used there, e.g. Vaisvanara and Turiya, are
> older than their corresponding expressions, Visya and Tur-
> ya, in the verses of the Karika. And so, there seems to
> be no cause for discarding the traditional view that the
> twelve prose passages constitute the Mandukya Upanisad
> which was made the basic text by Gaudapada for his work.[51]

Mahadevan next proceeds to the inter-relations of the four

chapters. He reviews the position of Bhattacharya with regard

to each chapter and propounds his own view against each of them. He

concludes that, "From the analysis of the four prakaranas given

above, the scope of the Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā would have become clear by

now. In this manual of Advaita Gaudapāda sets forth the essentials

of non-dualism."[52]

The next task of Mahadevan is to recapitulate the stand

Bhattacharya takes on the various verses which contain Buddhist words

and philosophic concepts.[53] After an analysis of this recapitulation

he arrives at the judgement that:

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[51]T. M. P. Mahadevan, Gauḍapāda--A Study in Early Advaita,
(Madras: University Press, 1960), p. 55 Cited hereafter as G.

[52]Ibid., p. 64.

[53]For a line by line analysis the reader may wish to refer to
the specific quotes. The verse is given followed by Bhattacharya's
pagination and Mahadevan's pagination.
II 4 / AŚ p. 17 / G p. 125, 192 ff.--Contents of a dream.
II 6-7 / AŚ p. 19-20 / G p. 123--Contents of a dream.
II 16 / AŚ p. 26-8 / G p. 193-4--Concerning the jiva.
III 36-7 / AŚ p. 94-5 / G p. 197, 218--Concerning samadhi.
III 38 / AŚ p. 72-3 / G p. 194--Ātmasaṃstha jñāna as vijñaptimātra.
III 39 / AŚ p. 97 G p. 198--Concerning asukhayoga.
IV 2 / AŚ p. 97-100 / G p. 199, 217-8--Asparśayoga as asukhayoga.
IV 5 / AŚ p. 107 / G p. 140--Doctrine of non-origination of the
  Advayavādins

Our object in criticizing the view of those who hold
Gaudapāda to be an advocate of Bauddha doctrines in his
Kārikā is to show that the main aim of the teacher is to
expound the philosophy of the Upaniṣads, and that he does
not deviate from his purpose even·when he adopts the argu-
ments of the Bauddha Idealists and dresses his thought in
Buddhist terminology. This is recognized by those teachers
of Buddhism who came after Gaudapāda and·who, while refer-
ring to his Kārikā do not regard him as a Bauddha or as
having been influenced by Buddhism.. Śantirakṣita quotes
in his Madhyamakālankarakārikā verses from Gaudapāda's work,
while discussing the views of the Aupaniṣadas. Kamalaśīla
refers to the Kārikā in the Pañjika as an Upaniṣat-sastra.
So, it is clear that the Bauddhas themselves considered
the Kārikā to be a work on Vedanta. Gaudapāda is faithful
throughout to the Upaniṣads. Even in the Alātaśāntipra-
karaṇa where he employs Bauddha terminology to a great
extent, he does not cut himself away (as we have seen)
from the Upaniṣadic moorings.[54]

Mahadevan answers the last criticism of Bhattacharya by saying

that Bhattacharya himself admits to the fact that Gaudapāda is an

Advaitan. Bhattacharya, however, goes on to say that Gaudapāda advo-

cates the Vijñānavāda position of Buddhism. In fact Bhattacharya

states that he sees no difference between Gaudapāda's Brahman and the

citta of the Yogācāra except that the former is nitya and the latter

dhruva. Mahadevan states that this is exactly the point, for:

Tha Ātman or Brahman of the Upaniṣads is nitya or
śāśvata (eternal), while the vijñāna of the Bauddhas is
momentary (kṣaṇika), and it changes every moment. The vij-
ñāna does not, therefore, move forward as one and the same
(ekam abhinnam), but continues in an uninterrupted stream
(santati) as the flood with its currents (srotasā aghavat).
This continuity has no beginning, nor has it an end

IV 21 / AŚ p. 126 / G p. 144--Statement of an objection raised by
      opponent.
IV 40 / AŚ p. 147 / G p. 195 ff.--Origination and catuṣkoṭi.
IV 57 / AŚ p. 162 / G p. 195--Śāśvatavada and ucchedavāda.
IV 87-8 / AŚ p. 197-8 / G p. 197--Concerning different types of jñānas.
IV 90 / AŚ p. 199-201 / G p. 200-1--Concerning agrayāna.
Refer also to "Criticisms Answered", p. 202-28 in G.

[54]Ibid., p. 227.

(anādi-nidhana) till nirvāṇa. Now as through all the moments the Ālayavijñāna continues it is dhruva and not nitya. While the self is eternal and ever the same, in the view of the Advaitin, the citta or vijñāna of the Bauddha idealist is a series of momentary cognitions.[55]

S. S. ROY

As Mahadevan has proposed an alternative interpretation of Gauḍapāda to Bhattacharya so S. S. Roy has proposed an alternative interpretation in his The Heritage of Śaṅkara. Roy feels that all arguments and evidence relating Gauḍapāda to Buddhism can be reduced to three points. He comments: "The evidence that possibly can be manipulated by such a critic of Gauḍapāda is of a three-fold nature (a) doctrinal, (b) methodological and (c) textual and terminological."[56] The doctrinal evidence used by the critic centers in the doctrines of (i) aparśayoga (contactless concentration) and (ii) ajātivāda (non-origination). Both of these criticisms are leveled at Gauḍapāda by Bhattacharya.[57] Roy, in opposition to Bhattacharya, proceeds by showing that "To maintain that Gauḍapāda subscribed to the doctrine of Aparśayoga and also argued in favor of Ajātivāda amounts to ascribing two different types of philosophical positions to him."[58] He then goes on to indicate the relation of Aparśayoga to Vijñānavāda and Ajātivāda to Mādhyamika and concludes that:

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[55] Ibid., p. 207. Mahadevan includes a footnote comment that: "In view of this vital difference admitted by Prof. Bhattacharya himself, it seems to us that he is not justified in concluding as he has . . ."

[56] S. S. Roy, The Heritage of Śaṅkara, (Allahabad: Udayana Publications, 1965), p. 9. Cited hereafter as Heritage.

[57] (i) AS p. 95-7.   (ii) AS p. 102-5.

[58] Heritage, p. 45.

The Ātman of the Advaitin is necessarily implied
in the Ajātivāda of the Mādhyamika and the
Asparśayoga of the Vijñānavāda, but neither the
Mādhyamika nor the Vijñānavāda realized that the
Ātman of the Advaitin, which is a self-comprehending
(Svaprakāśa) existence (Sattā), alone contem-
plates in entirety, the truth only realized in a
half-hearted manner by the Buddhist Absolutists.
The Mādhyamika errs by not realizing the necessity
of an absolute criterion for showing the self-
contradictory nature of the categories. The
Vijñānavāda is mistaken in lifting subjectivity
to a transcendental pedestal, without ever taking
transcendental subjectivity as the prius
of all existence.[59]

Thus it is apparent to Roy that Gauḍapāda is an Advaitin and utilizes

the doctrines of Asparśayoga and Ajātivāda in such a manner.

The methodological evidence is the next approach used by the

critic of Gauḍapāda. According to Roy the summation of this view

maintains that Gauḍapāda utilizes dialectic and reason as more impor-

tant than śruti.[60] The conclusion drawn from this is that:

The arguments given by Gauḍapāda were never
given by any Vedāntin of the Brāhmaṇical
tradition. They are reminiscent of the
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and the Vigrahavyāvartani
of Nāgārjuna and of the Mādhyamakāvatāra and
Prasannapadā of Chandrakīrti. Nāgārjuna and
Chandrakīrti, it appears, found an inlet
into the Vedānta through Gauḍapāda.[61]

In respect to this kind of approach to Gauḍapāda Roy asserts that,

"Our submission in this respect is that the dialectic in Gauḍapāda is

not independent of revelation. Everywhere the dialectic has one clear

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[59]Ibid., p. 50.

[60]Ibid., p. 19.

[61]Ibid., p. 19.

aim,--of supporting the scriptural texts."[62]   In fact:

> Even the dialectic is not to be taken literally
> in the manner of the Mādhyamikas. In respect of
> Methodology, it would be a mistake in principle
> to say that Gauḍapāda follows either Pure Reason
> or Pure Revelation exclusively. His is a brief
> for Madhuvidyā, of which the whole world of
> experience, including Reason and Revelation, is
> only a symbol, a cypher to be read. Everything,
> including words (Śruti) and reason (Prasaṅga),
> points to an Ens that transcends the Cypher and
> Symbol and yet communicates itself through
> them.[63]

The next evidence that Roy reviews is that of the assertion
of the critic on textual and terminological grounds that Gauḍapāda
has an association with the Buddhists. The textual evidence he cites
is that from the article of La Vallee Poussin entitled "Buddhists
Notes' on Vedānta and Buddhism",[64] and the terminological evidence is
taken from Bhattacharya.[65]   Roy's reply to this kind of criticism is
that:

> The use of a word, which has its origins in this
> or that school of thought, should not be restricted
> to those only who coined it and gave it currency.
> . . . so the presence of the Buddhist philosophical
> terms in the Āgamaśastra does not necessarily point
> to the conclusion that Gauḍapāda was a Buddhist.
> One has to make a deeper analysis of Gauḍapāda in
> order to consider the nature of the charge; and a
> deeper analysis of his philosophical doctrine only
> that Gauḍapāda was a Vedāntin, who was making an
> extensive use of Buddhist terms and the Buddhist
> art of disputation.[66]

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[62]Ibid., pp. 57-8.

[63]Ibid., p. 59.

[64]Ibid., pp. 20-2, 189.

[65]Ibid., pp. 22-4.

[66]Ibid., p. 60. See also quote
#23 in this chapter.

In fact the use of similar words is not as important as the more basic philosophy of language upon which they are founded. This has already been pointed out in terms of the Buddhist _apoha-vāda_ and the Vedānta conceptualization of language as having a ground in Brahman. The Buddhist interpretation of words is commented on by K. K. Raja:

> Moreover, according to the Buddhist logicians there is no primary referent for a word; for the essential nature of an object transcends the pale of all forms of knowledge and expression. Each word is applied to its object only indirectly by a sort of transfer, or upacara. The think-in-itself (_avalakṣana_) cannot be directly denoted by a word. It is only the mental image, or _vikalpa_, that is denoted by words, and this image is not an objective reality, being the negation of its counter-correlate (anyāpoha), the exclusion of all things other than itself.[67]

GAUDAPĀDA AND BUDDHISM--A CONSIDERATION

What then can be the conclusion in respect to Gauḍapāda and his relation to Buddhism? Any definitive answer to this question takes us well beyond the scope of this study. However, perhaps it is not premature to say that we would tend to agree with T. R. V. Murti's appraisal of the situation when he states:

> Gauḍapāda appears to us as the Brahmanical thinker boldly reformulating the 'Upaniṣadic idea in the light of the Mādhyamika and Vijñānavāda dialectic. But there was more borrowing of technique than of tenents. The Vedānta philosophers did not and could not accept the Buddhist metaphysics--its denial of the self, momentariness, etc.; but they did press into service the Mādhyamika dialectic and the Vijñānavāda analysis of illusion. No absolutism could be established without the dialectic and a theory of illusion.[68]

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[67]K. K. Raja, _Indian Theories of Meaning_, (Madras: The Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1963), p. 247.

[68]CPB, p. 13.

Gaudapāda comes to us then as one of the first Vedānta thinkers to
seriously take account of the implications of Buddhist thought. He
reformulates the Upaniṣadic philosophy and in this reformulation
arrives at a more thorough-going critique of the thought of his time.
But even this reformulation must be seen not as a break with the
āstika tradition for Gaudapāda considers himself an Advaitin. He
observes, "The dualists obstinately cling to the conclusions arrived
at by their own inquiries (as being the truth). So they contradict
one another; whereas the Advaitin finds no conflict with them."[69]
A further observation of Gaudapāda is given by Professor Arapura.
He states:

> It is a well-known fact that as a dialectical device
> māyā is a variant of the more general theory of saṁvṛti,
> explicitly fashioned by the Mādhyamika dialecticians,
> chiefly Nāgārjuna. It is Gaudapāda who introduced the
> Buddhist epistemological method into the Vedānta: this too
> is well-known. The schema adopted by Nāgārjuna necessi-
> tated the positing of an absolute reality (paramārthasatya)
> conceived as śūnya as against a phenomenal reality
> (saṁvṛtisatya). This division has a parallel in Vijñān-
> avāda. However, what appears to be no more than a purely
> schematic division for the Buddhists was something quite
> different for Gaudapāda. The problem at issue is not
> whether paramārthasatya(śūnya) is the Mādhyamika language,
> or pariniṣpanna in the Vijñānavāda language, is ontological
> reality rather than a mere speculative supposition, that
> whole matter being still controversial, but on what grounds
> it can be said to be so if it might be. We note a very
> deep divergence here between Gaudapāda and the Buddhists.
> Gaudapāda clearly attests to the fact that the doctrine
> of Brahman and the consequent doctrine of māyā--along with
> that of the identity of the jīvas with Brahman--is strictly
> derived from the Upaniṣads and were not taught by the

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[69]Mandukyopaniṣad with Gaudapāda's Kārikā & Śaṅkara's Commentary,
tr. S. Nikhilananda, (Mysore: Sri Ramakrishna Ashram, 1968), p. 163.

Buddha. Even his celebrated insistence on the primary
use of reason as attested, for instance, by his declara-
tion that śruti (scripture), while it speaks of creation
either from the existent or the non-existence, had to be
given up in favour of that which is ascertained by reason,
must not lead us to suppose that he used dialectic in the
free and uninhibited manner of the Buddhists. His essen-
tial concern is Brahman, but it is only that he goes about
demonstrating Brahman with the tools that the Buddhists
had forged.[70]

GAUḌAPĀDA'S THOUGHT

Gauḍapāda, like all other philosophic thinkers, developed his

thought out of a complex philosophical tradition. His thinking

includes various references, both implicit and explicit, to the

orthodox and heterodox views in vogue at his time. Thus let us

scrutinize a few basic ideas of his without going into this relational

digression in his thought. One of the important aspects of Gauḍapāda

is the idea concerning non-origination. Regarding the view of such

things as the interpretation of the gods Gauḍapāda observes that:

> From the sacred texts "there is no plurality here" and
> also from "Indra through māyās, etc.," (it is to be known
> that) it is through illusion that he is variously born,
> though (in fact) he does not take birth.[71]

We can see, then, that "being born is a fact but only insofar as it is

through māyā (illusion). This idea of non-origination means, then, that

if there is no plurality then there can be no origination in fact.

This is indeed so for, 'No individual soul is born, nor is

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[70] J. G. Arapura, "Māyā and the Discourse about Brahman", in
Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedānta, M. Sprung, ed., (Holland: D. Reidel
Pub. Co., 1973), pp. 112-13. Cited hereafter as MDAB.

[71] AS, III 24, pp. 62-3; (neha nāneti cāmnāyād indro māyābhir
ity api/ ajāyamāno bahudhā māyayā jāyate tu saḥ //).

there any possibility of it. This is that highest reality where
nothing is born.'"[72] The implication of this is that there is
definitely a highest reality and that it is by recognition of non-
origination that one can go beyond the common view that there is such
a thing as origination. Gaudapāda comments that this common view is
a mistake just like the view of the rope as snake:

> As in the dark a rope which is not determinately
> known is imagined to be a snake or a continuous
> line of water; etc., so is imagined the soul
> (ātman= jīva).

> As the rope being determinately known the thing
> imagined vanishes and there is non-duality--it
> is nothing but the rope, so is the ascertainment
> of ātman.[73]

Origination then is like the rope, imagined as snake, for when there
is non-duality it is seen that there is the Soul (ātman). The Soul
is imagined to originate but in truth there is no origination. But
what of the Soul, does it not need emancipating knowledge of the
ātman which is its real nature? No, it does not, for:

> There is no disappearance, no origination; no one
> in bondage, no one who works for success; no one
> who is desirous of emancipation, no one who is
> emancipated.--This is the highest truth.

> It is (ātman) imagined in the form of things which
> are really non-existent through that which is non-

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[72]Ibid., III 48, p. 82, (na kaścij jāyate jīvah sambhavo
'sya na vidyate/ etat tad uttamaṃ satyaṃ yatra kiñcin na jāyate //).

[73]Ibid., II 17-18, pp. 28-9, (17--aniścitā yathā rajjur
andhakāre vikalpitā/ asrpadharādibhir bhāvais tadvad ātmā vikalpitaḥ //.
18--niścitāyāṃ yathā rajjvāṃ vikalpo vinivartate/ rajjur eveti
cādvaitaṃ tadvad ātmaviniścayaḥ //).

> dual, and the things (themselves), too, are
> imagined through what is non-dual. Therefore non-
> duality is blissful.[74]

Therefore we have two views of truth. The first is of the nature of common experience (form of things) and the second is the highest truth which is of the nature of bliss and is _ātman_. How does one arrive at this second truth? Should one use logic?

> It is the adherence to (an idea of) a thing--
> whatsoever it may be, by which bliss is constantly
> covered and misery is unfolded. The glorious one
> (dharmadhātu)--(i) is, (ii) is not, (iii) is and
> is not, (i.e., both), or (iv) neither is nor is not
> (i.e., not both)--with these (notions) the childish
> obscure it (respectively in accordance with their
> own ideas of its being) (i) steady, (ii) unsteady, (iii)
> both, and (iv) the absence (of both).[75]

It seems that one should use logic in order to get rid of an idea of a thing. But when one arrives at this logical conclusion does this logic also establish or uncover the highest truth or knowledge of that truth? This logic does not suffice, for:

> It is accepted that knowledge which is unborn
> does not go (i.e., relate itself) to the elements
> of existence, which are (also) unborn. As the

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[74]Ibid., II 32-3, p. 39, 41, (32--na nirodho na cotpattir na baddho na ca sādhakaḥ/ na mumukṣur na vai mukta ity eṣā para-mārthatā//. 33--bhāvair asadbhir evāyam advayena ca kalpitaḥ/ bhāvā apy advayenaiva tasmād advayatā śivā//).

[75]Ibid., IV 82, 83, 84, (82--sukham āvriyate nityaṃ duḥkhaṃ vivriyate sadā/ yasya kasya ca dharmasya graheṇa bhagavān asau//. 83--asti nāsty asti nāstīti nāsti nāstīti vā punaḥ/ calasthiro-bhayābhāvair āvṛṇoty eva bāliśaḥ //. 84--koṭyaś catasra etas tu grahair yāsāṃ sadāvṛtaḥ/ bhagavān ābhir aspṛṣṭo yena dṛṣṭaḥ sā sarvadṛk//).

> knowledge does not go (to the elements of existence)
> it is declared to be free from attachment (asanga,
> i.e., free from any relation to its object).[76]

Thus knowledge does not relate itself to logic. It is beyond the

grasp of logic and epistemological method. It is knowledge which is

given because it is unborn and the basis of these (unborn) methods.

But this knowledge is knowable, Gaudapāda states:

> The jñāna that does not imagine (i.e., indeterminate)
> and is (consequently) unborn is, they say, not different.
> from the knowable. The knowable is Brahman, the
> unborn and eternal one. So the unborn (Brahman)
> becomes manifest through the unborn (jñāna).[77]

Therefore we see that Gaudapāda's thought derives from Brahman and

this pervades his entire Māṇḍūkya Kārikā.

We have briefly shown that Gaudapāda begins with non-

origination and an analysis of common experience and moves into logic

and beyond these to the knowability of Brahman which is the absolute

truth of non-duality. The status of this world as real is accepted

or rejected under the canopy of Brahman. But the case is that if

Brahman is non-dual then that which posits another, i.e., the world,

must be rejected. This also includes any statements about a creator

of the world. Why then do the scriptures speak of creation, and gods,

and the universe?

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[76]Ibid., IV 96, p. 209, (ajeṣv ajam asaṃkrāntaṃ dharmeṣu
jñānam iṣyate/ yato na kramati jñānam asaṅgaṃ tena kīrtitam//).

[77]Ibid., III 33, p. 68, (akalpakam ajaṃ jñānam jñeyabhinnaṃ
pracakṣate/ brahma jñeyam ajaṃ nityam ajenājaṃ vibudhyate//).

If the expansion of the (visible) universe (prapañca)
were (really) existing it would have to cease
to exist, no doubt, (if non-duality of Reality is
to be realized), but this duality is mere illusion,
in absolute truth there is non-duality.

False creation (vikalpa) would cease if it were
created by some one. This statement (of vikalpa)
is for the sake of instruction. When (the Reality)
is known there is no duality.[78]

VIEW OF TRUTH--SAMVRTI AND MĀYĀ

We have seen two perspectives with regard to truth in

Gauḍapāda. We have seen that he places everything under the absolute

truth of non-duality or Brahman. He has also spoken of the various

perspectives of false creation, the existence of the world, and

illusive duality. Thus let us look at these various views to see

where Gauḍapāda stands.

Gauḍapāda centers the fact of the appearance of duality in

māyā. He states, "As owing to māyā the mind in dream moves with

appearance (or image) of the two (viz., the percipient and the percep-

tible, or in other words, the subject and object), so owing to māyā

the mind in the waking state moves with the appearance of the two."[79]

Māyā is an expression of duality. But does this not mean that māyā

is something other than the absolute even though we have seen that

there is only non-duality? In other words, where is the dwelling

place of māyā?

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[78]Ibid., I 17-18, pp. 7, 8, (17--prapañco yadi vidyeta
nirvarteta na saṃsayaḥ/ māyāmātram idaṃ dvaitam advaitaṃ paramārthataḥ//.
18--vikalpo vinivarteta kalpito yadi kenacit/ upadeśād ayaṃ vādo
jñāte dvaitaṃ na vidyate//).

[79]Ibid., III 29, p. 66, (yathā svapne dvayābhāsaṃ spandate
māyayā manaḥ/ tathā jāgrad dvayābhāsaṃ spandate māyayā manaḥ//)

> It is the self, the shining one, that imagines the
> self by the self through its own illusion (māyā),
> and verily it is that (self) which cognizes the
> things. This is the conclusion of the Vedānta.[80]

Thus the dwelling place of māyā is in the self when it imagines itself

as another self. This imagined self is an illusion, "It (Ātman) is

imagined as Prāṇa 'breath' or 'life' and other innumerable things.

This is an illusion of it, the shining one, by which it itself is

deluded."[81]

Just as the ātman is imagined as innumerable things so other

things are imagined by maya to exist, "As an elephant called up by

illusion is said to exist owing to perception and common practice, so

on the same ground it is said of a thing that it exists."[82] That

which exists, owing to perception and common practice, is of the

nature of an illusion of the ātman. But what is the nature of illusion,

does it exist separately from the objects of perception and common

practice? Gauḍapāda answers that it does not, for it is of the same

nature as the objects of perception and common practice.

> In the practical truth (samvṛti) everything comes
> into being; hence there is nothing eternal. (On
> the other hand), every thing is naturally with-
> out origination; hence there is no annihilation.

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[80] Ibid.; II 12, p. 22, (kalpayaty ātmanātmānam ātma devaḥ
svamāyayā/ sa eva budhyate bhedān iti vedāntaniścayaḥ).

[81] Ibid.; II 19, p. 29, (prāṇādibhir anantais tu bhāvair etair
vikalpitaḥ/ māyaiṣā tasya devasya yayāyaṃ mohitaḥ svayam//).

[82] Ibid., IV 44, p. 152, (upalambhāt samācārān māyāhastī
yathocyate/ upalambhāt samācārād asti vastu tathocyate//).

> The things which are said as generated are so
> in the empirical truth and not in fact. This
> generation is like illusion, and that illusion,
> too, does not exist.[83]

What is the relation of practical truth to absolute truth

in Gaudapāda? It seems from what we have already seen that it is

useful for instruction and for the start of the uncovering of the Self

(ātman). Practical or empirical truth may therefore be used as a

tool, but as with logic, a tool which is grounded upon absolute truth.

As we have seen, absolute truth precludes discussion of origination,

dependence, and existence.

> Whatever exists in empirical truth (samvṛti)
> which is imagined (kalpita) does not exist
> in absolute truth (paramārtha), for one that
> is dependent (paratantra, for its existence
> or origination) may exist (only) in empirical
> truth which is the cause (of existence or origination),
> and not in absolute truth.[84]

Thus epistemic truth leads to ontological truth because it is depen-

dent on the absolute and it is an illusion of the absolute. What is

the nature of one's recognition of this ontological reality? Gaudapāda

describes it in the words, "It is intense abstract concentration

(samādhi) which is beyond all expression, and above all thoughts,

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[83]Ibid., IV 57-8, pp. 161-3, (57--samvṛtyā jāyate sarvaṃ
śāśvataṃ tena nāsti vai/ savbhāvena hy ajaṃ sarvam ucchedas tena nāsti
vai//. 58--dharmā ya iti jāyante samvṛtya te na tattvatah/ janma
māyopamaṃ teṣāṃ sā ca māyā na vidyate//).

[84]Ibid., IV 73, p. 174, (yo 'sti kalpitasamvṛtyā paramarthenya
nāsty asau/ paratantro 'bhisamvṛtyā syān nāsti paramārthatah//).

very calm and full of light, burning once for all, unwavering and without fear."[85]

Not only is the above a description of the ultimately Real but it is also a description of the Real Self (ātman). What is necessary is that one recognize that the ultimately Real and the Real Self are the same. There is no duality only Brahman. One must become what one already is, i.e., Brahman:

> Having realized the truth inward, having also
> realized the truth outward, one becomes the
> truth (itself), delighting therein and being
> such one should be unmoved from it.[86]

TRANSITION FROM GAUDAPĀDA TO ŚANKARA

In fine we can make some general statements about Gaudapāda's thought. We have seen that Gaudapāda views everything from the point of the absolute and that that which is not absolute has some reason for being, i.e., for the purpose of instruction. The use of logic has also been shown to be a dependent method and not something which is its own base. All reality points beyond duality (samvṛti) to the non-dual, and hence duality can be overcome by becoming that which one already is. Meaning is obtained through the recovery of the non-dual. This is knowledge which, grounded in the non-dual, is completed by language, and emerges through the removal of duality.

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[85] Ibid., III 37, p. 72 (sarvābhilāpavigataḥ sarvacintāsamutthitaḥ/ suprasānatah sakrjjyotiḥ samādhir acalo 'bhayaḥ//).

[86] Ibid., II 38, p. 47, (tattvam ādhyātmikam dṛṣṭva tattvaṃ dṛṣṭva tu hāhyataḥ/ tattvībhūtas tadārāmas tattvād apracyuto bhavet//).

We have here a very basic difference between the thought of Nāgārjuna and Gaudapāda. In Nāgārjuna, as we have shown, samvṛti is totally false and language finds its ground in samvṛti.[87] Samvṛti is false because all positions disappear under the scrutiny of the Mādhyamika dialectic. The dialectic removes all positions so that one can see that "samsāra is nirvāṇa". In Gaudapāda samvṛti, used correctly, has a positive purpose; in Nāgārjuna it is seen as having a purpose only in a negative way.

> The paramārtha, however, can be understood and realized
> only negatively, only as we remove the samvṛti, the
> forms which thought has already, unconsciously and begin-
> ninglessly, ascribed to the real. The Real is to be un-
> covered, discovered, and realised as the reality of
> appearances (dharmānām dharmatā). In the order of our
> discovery, the removal of samvṛti must precede our know-
> ledge of the paramārtha. Paramārtha is the end or
> goal that we seek to attain, and samvṛti is the means;
> it is the latter or jumping board which enables us to
> reach that objective. It is therefore stated that
> samvṛti is the means (upāyabhūta) and Paramārtha is the
> end (upeyabhūta). Basing ourselves on vyavahāra do we
> advance to the paramārtha.[88]

The absolute is completely beyond speaking (apoha-vāda) and conception (dṛṣti-vāda). However, Gaudapāda uses speaking and conception as a means of uncovering the absolute, as a means to the absolute, it is positive because speaking and conception are grounded upon the absolute. Thus Gaudapāda conceives of the absolute in terms of the Upaniṣadic tradition. This tradition of the Vedānta becomes the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara. Gaudapāda's thought forms the basis for the latter development of Gaudapādas pupil's pupil Śaṅkara.

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[87] Refer to Introduction.   [88] CPB, p. 253.

CHAPTER IV

SAMVṚTI (MĀYĀ) IN ŚAṄKARA

ADVAITA AND THE UTTARA MĪMĀṂSĀ

The Advaita darśana, as we indicated in our first chapter, grew out of the Sūtras of Uttara Mīmāṃsā of Bādarāyaṇa and is synonymous with it. The Vedānta tradition beginning with Śaṅkara attributed the central text of the Uttara Mīmāṃsā, namely the Brahma or Vedānta Sūtra, to Bādarāyaṇa:

> Tradition from Śaṅkara downwards attributes the Sūtra
> to Bādarāyaṇa. The fact that the name of the latter is
> mentioned in several places in the third person inclines
> one to think that Bādarāyaṇa is not its author. Such a
> use of the third person is not, however, an uncommon prac-
> tice in ancient India, and it need not imply a different
> authorship. Indian tradition identifies Bādarāyaṇa, the
> author of the Sūtra, with Vyāsa. Śaṅkara's followers,
> Govindānanda, Vācaspati and Ānadāgiri identify Vyāsa with
> Bādarāyaṇa; Rāmānuja, Madhva, Vallabha and Baladeva ascribe
> the Sūtra to Vyāsa. . . . It is not, however, clear
> what opinion Śaṅkara himself held.[1]

The sūtra itself, and Bādarāyaṇa, are dated within the tradition between 500 to 200 B.C. A.B. Keith is of the opinion that Bādarāyaṇa cannot be dated later than 200 A.D.[2] We may side with a date then between 200 B.C. and 200 A.D. For our purpose assigning an exact date is of little value, as we have no argument with either of the

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[1] S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1931), pp. 432-3.

[2] Ibid., p. 433.

above. Rather our intent is merely to gain a perspective in approaching the Advaita darśana. Either of the above dates places it well within the tradition and this is sufficient for our purposes. For a more developed analysis of the time between Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkara we would refer the reader to the more traditional account given in the book Preceptors of Advaita edited by Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan. Much more important for our present study is the general content of the Sūtra itself.

> The Brahma Sūtra is the exposition of the philosophy of the Upaniṣads. It is an attempt to systematise the various strands of the Upaniṣads which form the background to the orthodox systems of thought. It is also called uttaramīmāṁsā or the mīmāṁsā or the investigation of the later part of the Vedas, as distinguished from the mīmāṁsā of the earlier part of the Vedas and the Brahmanas which deal with ritual or karmakanda. All the commentators on the Brahma Sūtra agree that the Brahma Sūtra was intended to be a summary of the teachings of the Upaniṣads. The Brahma Sūtra is also called the Vedānta Sūtra or Sariraka Sūtra. It takes into account the systems of thought known at that time.[3]

As an exposition of the thought of the Upaniṣads the Brahma Sūtra, like all sūtras, is aphoristic. That is, as it exists by itself, it accommodates a wide variety of meanings which can be understood only by reference to a commentary or Bhāsya. This commentary brings out the implicit meaning of the Brahma Sūtr and develops it into a cogent system.

The Brahma Sūtra contains four chapters of adhyāyas which are again divided into four parts or pādas. Each part in turn is subdivided into sections or adhikaraṇas which are made up of sūtras.

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[3]Radhakrishnan, The Brahma Sūtra, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1960) pp. 21-2.

The sūtras themselves vary in number according to the topic considered. The Uttara Mīmāmsā follows the Pūrva Mīmāmsā in its analysis of each section or adhikarṇa. Each section has five factors:

(1) Viṣaya = subject matter,
(2) Saṁśaya = doubt or uncertainty,
(3) Pūrva-pakṣa = statement of an object,
(4) Siddhānta = established conclusion, [4]
(5) Saṁgati - connection between sections.

Concerning the contents of the Brahma Sūtra Dr. Radhakrishnan remarks:

> The first chapter deals with samanvaya. It attempts to offer a coherent interpretation of the different texts of the Upaniṣads. . . . The second chapter deals with avirodha and shows that the interpretation offered in the first chapter is not inconsistent with the writings of other sages and views of other systems. Even when the sūtras were formulated, they reckoned with other views and objections from rival schools. Truth would not be sought so industriously if it had no rivals to contend against. The third chapter deals with sādhanā and is devoted to an exposition of the means for the realisation of Brahman. The fourth deals with phala or the fruit of knowledge.[5]

LIFE OF ŚAṄKARA   (788-820 A.D.)

According to Radhakrishnan in his Indian Philosophy there is some debate about the specific dates of Śaṅkara.[6] But there does exist a definite tradition, containing both facts and myth, about the life and death of the great man:

> Śaṅkara belonged to the simple, learned and hardworking Nambūdri sect of Brahmins of Malabar, and is generally supposed to have been born a Kāladi, on the west coast of

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[4]Ibid., p. 24.

[5]Ibid., p. 24. See also Deussen, The System of Vedānta.

[6]I P , p. 447.

the peninsula. Though there is a tradition that Siva was
the family deity of Śaṁkara, it is also held that he was
by birth a Sakta. Early in his youth he went to a Vedic
school, presided over by Govinda, the pupil of Gauḍapāda.
In all his works, Śaṁkara subscribes himself as the pupil
of Govinda, who evidently taught him the main principles
of the Advaita system. Even while a young boy of eight
he is said to have·devoured with avidity and delight all
the Vedas. Apparently he was a youthful prodigy of Vedic
learning and free intelligence. He was impressed with
the mystery and importance of life, and had an early vision
of the beauty of holiness. Before he learned the ways of
the world, he rejected them and became a saṁnyāsin. But
he was no passionless recluse. The pure flame of truth
burned within him. He wandered as a teacher from place
to place, engaging in discussions with the leaders of other
schools·of thought. According to the traditional accounts,
he met, in the course of these tours, Kumārila and Maṇḍana
Miśra, . . . The story of his entering the dead body of
Amaruka shows that Śaṁkara was an adept in yogic practices.
He established four mutts or monasteries, of which the
chief is the one at Śṛingeri in the Mysore Province, . . .
A touching incident, about which tradition is unanimous,
shows how full of the milk of human kindness and filial
affection Śaṁkara was. In open defiance of the rules
which·govern the order of Saṁnyāsins, Śaṁkara performed the
funeral rites of his mother, and thus incurred the serious
opposition of his community. He died at Kedārnāth in the
Himalayas at the age of thirty-two . . ..[7]

A modern scholar who is presently engaged in historical
questions concerning Śaṅkara is Dr. Paul Hacker of Münster, West
Germany. In his article entitled "Saṅkara der Yogin und Sankara der
Advaitin--Einige Beobachtungen",[8] he tries to determine whether
Śaṅkara wrote a commentary on Vedavyāsa's Yogabhāsya entitled Yoga-
bhasyavivarana. Hacker maintains that such is

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[7]Ibid., pp. 447-8. See also S. S. Sastri, Śaṅkarācāryā,
(Madras: Natesan and Co.).

[8]Paul Hacker, "Saṅkara der Yogin und Śaṅkara der Advaitin--
Einige Beobachtungen", Weiner Zeitschrift für die Kunde Sud--und
Ostasiens und Archiv fur Indische Philosophie, XIII (1968), pp. 119-48.
Other articles listed in the Bibliography.

.the case and this in turn points out that Śaṅkara was first an

adherent of Patanjali's Yoga and later became an Advaitin. The criteria

for such a conclusion are found throughout Hacker's articles on

Śaṅkara. Whether or not such is the case has no bearing upon the

present study as we are not concerned at present with any contested

works of Śaṅkara.

For the tradition then, Śaṅkara, student of Govinda, lived a

brief life of thirty-two years but in this time he synthesized one of

the most important schools of philosophy in India. By reflectively

thinking about <u>Śruti</u> he formulated the non-dualistic (Advaita)

school of Vedānta. This school and Śaṅkara can be seen as one of

the highest peaks of Indian spirituality because it is a point at

which previous Vedic philosophy culminates and also a referent of

most later thought.

In modern scholarship there is some disagreement about the

exact relation of Śaṅkara to Gauḍapāda. For our purpose we need not

enter into this discussion any more than we have already in the

previous chapter. It is not essential for our study that Śaṅkara

be in a direct line methodologically with Gauḍapāda. In this regard

we would follow the traditional account without entering into critical

exegesis. [6] Traditionally it is accepted that there was strong influence

from Gauḍapāda, but that this influence did not in any way hinder

the creative thinking of Śaṅkara. Thus the thought of Śaṅkara can

be approached as a self-sufficient whole.

WORKS OF ŚANKARA

The major works of Śankara, aside from many minor works attributed to him, are his commentaries or <u>bhāṣya</u> on the triple foundation (<u>prasthanatraya</u>) of the Vedānta, namely the <u>Upaniṣads</u>,[9] the <u>Bhagavad Gītā</u>, and the <u>Brahma Sūtra</u>. Each of these commentaries are concerned with presenting one coherent system, which, Śankara maintains, is the import of each of the texts.

In this study we will concern ourselves primarily with the <u>Brahma Sūtra</u> and Śankara's commentary on it. The <u>Brahma Sūtra</u>, as Śankara saw it deals chiefly with one topic and by extention two others, namely the nature of realization of Brahman and by implication the status of the world and the individual self. His commentary on the <u>Sūtra</u> brings out what he sees as the import of the <u>Sūtra</u> itself. This import is the coherent system of non-duality or Advaita. The Advaita maintains that there is only one Reality, Brahman. The world as name and form (<u>nāma-rūpa</u>) has as its foundation the only "Real" that is. This "Real" is the same for all things which participate in existence (<u>sat</u>). The world is real only in relation to its true ground or essence. Man must therefore embark on an inquiry into this "Real". Thus we find the opening sloka in the <u>Brahma Sūtra</u>: "Now therefore the desire to know Brahman".[10]

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[9]Namely, the <u>Chāndogya</u>, the <u>Bṛhadāraṇyaka</u>, the <u>Taittirīya</u>, the <u>Aitareya</u>, the <u>Śvetāśvatara</u>, the <u>Kena</u>, the <u>Katha</u>, the <u>Īśa</u>, the <u>Praśna</u>, the <u>Muṇḍaka</u>, and the <u>Māṇḍūkya</u>. See Radhakrishnan, IP, Vol. II, p.450 ff.

[10]Radhakrishnan, <u>The Brahma Sūtra</u>, p. 227, (<u>athāto brahma-jijñāsā</u>).

KNOWLEDGE--PRAMĀ AND PRAMĀNA

Pramā is the word used to describe true or valid knowledge. This

definition and its relation to the pramāna is brought out by D. M.

Datta in his The Six Ways of Knowing:

> A prama or knowledge, therefore, can be accurately regarded
> as a cognition the object of which is neither contradicted
> nor already known as an object (anadhi-gata-badhita-rtha-
> visayam jnanam).
> The special source of a particular prama or knowledge is
> called pramana. Pramana is defined as the karana of a prama.
> A karana is conceived as the unique or special cause through
> the action of which a particular effect is produced. In
> the case of perceptual knowledge or pratyaksa prama, for
> example, a sense-organ (in the case of an external percep-
> tion) or the mind (in the case of an internal perception)
> is said to be the karana or instrumental cause . . .[11]

Sankara in his works actually refers to only three pramānas but

generally the Advaita system is said to utilize six.[12] For our

purpose it is not necessary to arrive at any conclusion on the specific

uses of the various pramānas by Sankara. This would take us well

beyond our present study. We can say, however, that even though

Sankara may not have actually spoken of some pramānas, this doesn't

imply that he didn't utilize them in his works.

For Sankara the primary pramāna is testimony or śruti. Śruti

is the scripture of the Vedānta. It is "transpersonal" in that it has

always existed and was heard and set down by the ancient seers of

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[11]D. M. Datta, The Six Ways of Knowing, (Calcutta: University
of Calcutta, 1960), p. 27 ff. Cite hereafter as SWK.

[12]An analysis of the pramānas utilized by the Advaita is
contained in Datta's SWK. The pramānas are: perception, inference,
scriptural testimony, comparison, implication, and negation. See also
Radhakrishnan, IP, Vol. II, p. 488 ff., and Deussen System of Vedānta,
pp. 89-90.

the Indian tradition. For the Advaita śruti is contained in the

Upaniṣads and they are concerned with Brahman:

> Need it be mentioned, therefore, that it is not possible
> to explain the inscrutable nature of Brahma, without (the
> help of) the Scriptures? The Puranikas also say, similarly
> --"Do not employ reasoning to entities which are unthinkable.
> To be beyond the material effects (Prakriti) is the
> criterion of that which is unfathomable". Therefore, the
> realization of the supersensuous Brahmā, as it is in fact,
> depends upon the Scriptures as it source.[13]

In the Advaita there is a distinction between two types of scripture,

one connoting absolute truth or parā vidyā and relative truth or

aparā vidyā. The parā vidyā scriptures are contained in the great

statements of the mahāvākyas. The difference between the two types

is based upon the knowledge that they give:

> According to Sankara the authority of a scriptural
> passage is established if it is able to generate certain
> and fruitful knowledge. The Upaniṣadic texts are able to
> give such knowledge, which, Sankara says, is seen to
> result in the removal of evils such as ignorance, grief,
> delusion and fear which are at the root of transmigration.
> Further, the Upaniṣads themselves say that "for him, who
> sees unity there can be no delusion and grief." Some
> passages in the Veda such as "He (the god Fire) cried; so he
> was called Rudra (the crier)" may not give any certain
> and fruitful knowledge; and they have consequently no
> authority. Also texts like "the sun is the sacrificial
> post" have to be understood figuratively, because their
> literal meaning is contradicted by perception; and their
> purport does not lie in their literal meaning. But there
> are certain texts in the Upaniṣads, which by the appli-
> cation of the six-fold criteria mentioned in the previous
> chapter, are found to be their central theme. Since these
> texts give us fruitful knowledge not obtained by any other
> source and since they are found to be "important" as they

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[13]V. M. Apte, Brahma-Sūtra Shānkara-Bhāshya, (Bombay: Popular
Book Depot, 1960) II.1.27, p. 332. Cited hereafter as BSB Apte.

have an independent meaning on their own, the Advaita
school maintains that their purport must be accepted at all
costs.[14]

There are four mahāvākyas: (1) "That thou art" (tat tvam asi/ Chhan.

6.8.7). (2) "I am Brahman" (aham brahmā 'smi/ Brih. 1.4.10).

(3) "This Self is Brahman" (ayamatmā brahma / Brih. 2.5.19). (4) "All

this is Brahman" (sarvam khalv-idam brahman/ Chhan. 3.14.1). Let

us select the first mahāvākya above and consider it for a moment.

"That thou Art" is found in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad from 6.8.7 on in

the dialogue of a son with his father:

> 1. "Bring hither a fruit of that nyagrodha tree."
> "Here it is, Venerable Sir" "What do you see there?"
> "These extremely fine seeds, Venerable Sir." "Of these,
> please break one." "It is broken, Venerable Sir." "What
> do you see in these" "Nothing at all, Venerable Sir."
> 2. Then he said to him, "My dear, that subtle essence
> (which you do not perceive, verily, my dear, from that
> very essence this great nyagrodha tree exists. Believe
> me, my dear.
> 3. That which is the subtle essence, this whole world
> has for its self. That is the true. That is the self.
> That art thou Svetaketu." "Please, Venerable Sir, instruct
> me still further." "So be it, my dear," said he.[15]

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[14]K. S. Murty, Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedanta,
(Waltair: Andhra University, 1959), p. 88. Cited hereafter as RRAV.
See also IP Vol. II, p. 518-20.

[15]Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upanisads, (London: George Allen
& Unwin, Ltd., 1969), p. 462, (1. nyagrodha--phalam ata āharet; idam,
bhagavaḥ, iti; bhinddhīti; bhinnam, bhagavaḥ, iti; kim atra praśyasīti;
aṇvya ivemā dhānāḥ, bhagavaḥ, iti; āsām aṅgaikām bhinddhīti; bhinnā,
bhagavaḥ, iti; kini atra paśyasīti; na kiṁ cana, bhagavaḥ, iti. 2. taṁ
hovāca yaṁ vai, saumya, etam aṇimānam na nibhālayase, etasya vai,
saumya, eṣo'ṇimna evam mahān nyagrodhas tiṣṭhati śrddhatsva, saumya,
3. sa ya eṣo'ṇimā, aitad ātmyam idaṁ sarvan, tat satvam, sa ātmā,
tat tvam asi, śvetaketo, iti; bhūya eva mā, bhagavān, vijñāpaytv iti;
tathā, saumya, iti; hovāca.). Cited hereafter as P U.

This declaration "That thou Art" indicates that the essence of the world and the self is Brahman. For Śankara this statement contains the essence of _śruti_ and opens the way to inquiry about Brahman.

Another aspect of Indian epistemology is the development of hypothetical reasoning or _tarka_. Tarka is not a _pramāṇa_ because it produces no new knowledge or absolute certainty. It is based on speculation and is seen by Śankara as unfounded (_apratiṣṭhita_). N. K. Devaraja gives an analysis of Śankara's position with regard to _tarka_ by responding to Śankara's statement that:

> Hence, in this case, how can an entity which is
> actually perceived as substantially existing according
> to its own nature by all the various means-of-proof, be
> said to be either possible or not possible (of existence),
> by raising such alternatives as that such external objec-
> tive entities are either different or non-different
> (from Paramanus), when as a matter of fact they are
> actually perceived? It is not that because cognitions
> have the form of the objects of such cognitions, that
> destruction of such objects results, for cognition cannot
> have the form of external objects if such external objects
> themselves did not exist, and also because, such
> objects are as a matter of fact perceived to be external.
> Hence it is that, that an object and its perception are
> as a rule apprehended simultaneously, is to be under-
> stood to mean, that they have a relation of cause and
> effect between them, and not that they are one and the
> same, and have no distinction between them.[16]

Devaraja adds this analysis:

> This passage conclusively proves that Śankara attaches
> far greater value to _pramāṇas_ than to abstract reasoning.
> Reasoning cannot establish possibilities and impossibilities
> against the _pramāṇas_. The possible according to him is
> what can be apprehended through perception, inference,
> etc. Śankara, in fact, has no patience with those idle
> speculators who, having renounced all dependence on
> Śruti, constantly argue "it is, it is not; he is the agent,
> he is not the agent" etc., thus throwing the whole import

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[16] BSB, II.2.28, Apte, p. 398.

of the scriptures into confusion. He is even more
furious with those who argue in opposition to the common
experience of mankind. Śankara reprimands the mentalist
for disregard of common sense as no idealist of any
brand has even done. His conclusion is that "only that
reasoning which has the backing of the Scripture and is
therefore auxiliary of experience can be acceptable."
Śankara feels there can be no real opposition between
Śruti on the one hand and experience on the other.[17]

Thus tarka or speculative reasoning does not help one to attain

knowledge of Brahman. Real experience and śruti then are the

ground from which one may inquire into Brahman. Tarka does not gain

one anything and must be seen as indulgence in idle speculation.

In fine we can say Śankara maintains that the pramāṇas give us

correct knowledge insofar as that is possible. Scriptural testimony

is the most efficacious pramāṇa and gives us truth of the non-

duality of Brahman. This non-dual conception is contained most expli-

citly in the Upaniṣadic passages known as the mahāvākyas. These are

the core of the Veda and are seen as connoting absolute truth. Specu-

lative reason is seen as idle speculation for it gives no new knowledge

and leads one astray from the path of the attainment of the knowledge

of Brahman. This path to the knowledge of Brahman is one which

journeys through the labyrinth of ignorance (avidyā) to self-understan-

ding (vidyā).

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[17]N. K. Devaraja, An Introduction to Śankara's Theory of
Knowledge, (Varanasi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1962), p. 67. Cited here-
after as STK. See also RRAV, pp. 164-5.

SELF (ĀTMAN)

The journey to reach knowledge of Brahman is undertaken in

ignorance or avidyā. This journey brings one to a correct understanding

of the Self by working through the things which falsely maintain that

they are the Self. This methodology can be seen in the illustration

of the argumentation of the vital breaths in Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad

VI.1.7-13:

> 7. These vital breaths, disputing among themselves about
> their self-superiority went to Brahma and said, "Which
> of us is the most excellent?" He then said, that one of
> you is most excellent after whose departure this body is
> thought to be worse off.
> 8. (The organ of) speech departed and having remained
> absent for a year came back and said, "How have you been
> able to live without me?" They said, "As the dumb, not
> speaking with speech but breathing with the breath, seeing
> with the eye, hearing with the ear, knowing with the mind,
> procreating with the semen. Thus have we lived." Then
> speech entered in.
> 9. The eye departed and having remained absent for a
> year came back and said, "How have you been able to live
> without me?" They said: "As the blind not seeing with
> the eye, but breathing with the breath, speaking with
> the speech, hearing with the ear, knowing with the mind,
> procreating with the semen. Thus have we lived." Then
> the eye entered in.
> 10. The ear departed and having remained absent for a
> year came back and said, "How have you been able to live
> without me?" They said, "As the deaf not hearing with the
> ear, but breathing with the breath, speaking with the speech
> seeing with the eye, knowing with the mind, procreating
> with semen. Thus have we lived." Then the ear entered in.
> 11. The mind departed and having remained absent for a
> year came back and said: "How have you been able to live
> without me?" They said, "As the stupid not knowing with
> the mind, but breathing with the breath, speaking with
> the speech, seeing with the eye, hearing with the ear,
> procreating with the semen. Thus have we lived." Then
> the mind entered in.
> 12. Then semen (the organ of generation) departed and
> having remained absent for a year came back and said:
> "How have you been able to live without me?" They said,
> "As the impotent not procreating with semen, but breathing
> with the breath, speaking with the speech, seeing with

the eye, hearing with the ear, knowing with the mind.
Thus have we lived. Then the semen entered in.
13. Then as the life breath was about to depart, even as
a large fine horse of the Sindhu land might pull up the
pegs to which his feet are tied, even so did it pull up
those vital breaths together. They said: "Venerable Sir,
do not go out, verily, we shall not be able to live without
you." "If I am such make me an offering." "So be it."[18]

This illustrates, in one instance, the method employed in the

uncovering of the true self, a journey in ignorance or avidyā. It

is because one finds himself in ignorance that an inquiry into Brahman

is embarked upon, as explained in Chapter One.

Man within Indian thought understands himself as existing in a

state of ignorance. This ignorance has no historical origin as such

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[18]P U , pp. 306-8, (1. to heme prāṇāḥ, aham śreyase vivadam--
ānāḥ brahma jagmuḥ; tadd hocuḥ; ko no vasiṣṭha iti. tadd hovāca,
yasmin va utkrānta idam śarīram pāpīyo manyate, sa vo vasiṣṭha iti.
8. vāg ghoccakrāma: sā samvatsaram proṣya, āgatya, uvāca. katham
aśakata mad ṛte jīvitum iti; te hocuḥ; yathā kalāḥ avadanto vācā,
prāṇantaḥ prāṇena, paśyantas cakṣuṣā, śṛṇvantaḥ śrotreṇa, vidvāmso
manasā, prajāyamānā retasā, evam ajīviṣmeti. pravineśa ha vāk. 9.
cakṣur hoccakrāma, tat samvatsaram proṣya, āgatya, uvāca katham aśakata
mad ṛte jīvitum ktk. te hocuḥ yathāndhāḥ, apaśyantaś cakṣuṣā,
prāṇantaḥ prāṇena, vadanto vācā, śṛṇvantaḥ śrotreṇa, vidvāmso manasā,
prajāyamānā retasā, evam ajīviṣmeti. praviveśa ha cakṣuḥ. 10. śrotram
hoccakrāma, tat samvatsaram proṣya, āgatya, uvāca, katham aśakata
mad ṛte jīvitum iti. te hocuḥ; yathā badhirāḥ aśṛṇvantaḥ śrotreṇa,
prāṇantaḥ prāṇena, vadanto vācā, paśyantaś; cakṣuṣā, vidvāmso manasā,
prajāyamānā retasā, evam ajīviṣmeti. pravineśa ha śrotram. 11. mano
hoccakrāma. tat samvatsaram proṣya, āgatya, uvāca, katham aśakata mad
ṛte jīvitum iti. te hocuḥ. yathā mugdhāḥ avidvāmso manasā, prāṇantaḥ
prāṇena, vadanto vācā, paśyantaḥ cakṣuṣā, śṛṇvantaḥ śrotreṇa, prajāya-
mānā retasā, evam ajīviṣmeti. praviveśa ha manaḥ. 12. reto
hoccakrāma. tat samvatsaram proṣya, āgatya, uvāca: katham aśakata mad
ṛte jīvitum iti. te hocuh, yathā klībāḥ, aprajāyamānā retasā,
prāṇantaḥ prāṇena, vadanto vācā, paśyantaś cakṣuṣā, śṛṇvantaḥ śro-
treṇa, vidvāmso manasā, evam ajīviṣmeti praviveśa ha retaḥ. 13. atha
ha prāṇa utkramiṣyan, yathā mahāsu-hayaḥ saindhavaḥ paḍviśa-saṅkhūn
samvṛhet, evam haiveman prāṇān samvavarha. te hocuḥ: mā bhagavaḥ
utkramīḥ, na vai śakṣyāmas tvad ṛte jīvitum iti, tasyo me balim
kuruteti, tatheti.)

so man cannot ask when this ignorance began. It is seen as beginning-less but not as eternal. Ignorance can be overcome by knowledge which will terminate ignorance, a path which seeks the true Self or atman. The statement "That art thou" means "Brahman is atman". Thus, the atman is seen as identical with Brahman. This identity is the knowledge with which ignorance is erased. Knowledge of atman is not a new acquisition but merely the recognition of the truth that has always been but which was obscurred by ignorance. Thus no new knowledge dawns rather correct knowledge dawns.

An inquiry into Brahman is an inquiry into Atman and it is undertaken through ignorance. Ignorance is the forgetfulness of Self. This Self is the atman which is identical with Brahman. This logic is simple and is not to be had by works but through knowledge.

As Dr. Arapura observes:

> Sankara's logic is rigorously simple. Eternity cannot be attained. For it is either already here or not here. He seeks to demonstrate that it is already here. If it is not here no action or change or revolution or progress can lead to it. Hence the 'quest' would be meaningless. But the fact that eternity is already here--Nitya-buddha-mukta-suddha--constitutes the problem. . . .[19]

Thus acceptance of this identity is what is necessary. This is what is given in sruti and it is by sruti that this identity is affirmed.

As Radhakrishnan remarks:

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[19] J. G. Arapura, "Language in Advaita Vedanta", Seminar paper, lecture VII, 1974, p. 2, privately circulated.

Śaṁkara argues that it is impossible for us to know the self (ātman) by means of thought, since thought itself is a part of the flux belonging to the region of the non-self. If we grasp it by inducing a sort of sleep on all our critical and interpretative powers, then we do fail to have knowledge of the type we desire.. Yet we cannot think away the self, for there is no consciousness or experience possible apart from it. Though it escapes our knowledge, it does not entirely escape us. It is the object of the notion of self, and is known to exist on account of its immediate presentation. It cannot be proved, since it is the basis of all proof and is established prior to all proof. Logically it is a postulate. We have to take it for granted.[20]

This must be seen as the "dialectics of the sacred" as Dr. Arapura states:

. . . The problem is created by the extra-ordinary nature of its presence--here lies, parenthetically speaking--the real dialectics of the sacred. It is present and we do not know it. The whole matter is reduced to a question of knowing or not knowing. The fact is to be accounted for by avidyā, which is the dynamics of our becoming--existence. Words, even words pertaining to Brahman are part of avidyā, yet are avidyā destroying; here lies the dialectics. The words, therefore, break loose from avidyā on account of their altogether unique origin. Moksa is eternity. It is not accomplished by any new action (here lies a tremendous difference with Pūrva Mīmāṁsā). The purpose of Vedānta language is to make us aware of this already established fact. Hence Vedānta is vastu-tantra. The sentences of the Vedānta are not artha-vāda.[21]

So the ātman is known by means of testimony or śruti, It is declared that "The ātman is verily the Brahman" and as we have observed this declaration does not render a man to engage in some activity but instructs him straightaway regarding the nature of ātman. The ātman is known, then, because it is self-evident, self-luminous. This fact

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[20] IP Vol. II, pp. 476-7.

[21] Arapura, "Language in Advaita Vedānta", p. 2.

is illustrated by a discussion between Yājñavalkya and King Janaka
in Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad IV.3.6 concerning the origin of light. After
a brief analysis of the origin of light as being localized in such
as the sun, moon and speech the King asks:

> 6. "When the sun has set, Yājñavalkya, and the moon has
> set, and the fire has gone out and speech has stopped,
> what light does a person here have?" "The Self, indeed,
> is his light," said he, "for with the self, indeed, as the
> light, one sits, moves about, does one's work and returns.[22]

Thus ātman is that upon which all is constructed and because of this
knowledge of ātman does not follow from anything. It is the essential,
that from which all arises and to which all must eventually return.
It is the same as Brahman for the philosophy of the Self is, when
analyzed, itself the inquiry into Brahman.

BRAHMAN

The Real, Brahman, best described as "neti-neti"[23] (not this--
not that) means that Brahman can only be described actually via negi-
tiva as being not this or not that when compared to anything. But
it is also the case that even though Brahman can best be described
via negitiva, the via positiva is also utilized. Brahman is spoken
of as being the pure reality of existence (sat), consciousness (cit),
and bliss (ānanda). Brahman is, of course, beyond conception and when

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[22]PU, pp. 255-6, (6. astam ita āditye, yājñavalkya, candramasy
astam ite, śānte agnau, śāntāyāṁ vāci, kiṁ-jyotir evāyam pruuṣa iti.
ātmaivāsya jyotir bhavati, ātmanaivāyam jyotiṣāste, palyayate, karma
kurute, vipalyeti iti.).

[23]Ibid., p. 286.

any conception is used in a descriptive say it is always seen as

falling short of the truth. Truth is brought about when one attains

knowledge of Brahman which means identification with Brahman. Know-

ledge of Brahman occurs when there is an intuitive realization of the

truths that one is in fact ātman and ātman is none other than Brahman,

an identity which has always existed. Thus to know Brahman is to

be Brahman or to have this gnosis is to return to that which you

already were and have always been.

    We have said that the via negitiva is the most accurate

description of Brahman. This idea can be seen clearly in the

Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad IV.4.22 which describes Brahman as the Self.

> 22. Verily, he is the great unborn Self who is this
> (person) consisting of knowledge among the senses. In
> the space within the heart lies the controller of all,
> the lord of all, the ruler of all. He does not become
> greater by good works nor smaller by evil works. He is
> the bridge that serves as the boundary to keep the differ-
> ent worlds apart. Him the Brāhmanas seek to know by the
> study of the Veda, by sacrifices, by gifts, by penance, by
> fasting. On knowing Him, in truth, one becomes an ascetic.
> Desiring Him only as their worlds, monks wander forth.
> Verily, because they know this, the ancient (sages) did
> not wish for offspring. What shall we do with offspring
> (they said), we who have attained this self, this world.
> They, having risen above the desire for sons, the desire
> for wealth, the desire for worlds, led the life of a medi-
> cant. For the desire for sons is the desire for wealth
> and the desire for wealth is the desire for worlds; both
> these are, indeed, desires only. This Self is (that which
> has been described as) not this, not this. He is incom-
> prehensible for He is never comprehended. He is indestruc-
> tible for He cannot be destroyed. He is unattached for He
> does not attach himself. He is unfettered, He does not
> suffer, He is not injured. Him (who knows this) these
> two (thoughts) do not overcome, for some reason he has

done evil or for some reason he has done good. He over-
comes both. What he has done or what he has not done does
not burn (affect) him.[24]

To describe Brahman as a thing or as having attributes then is to

misunderstand the nature of Brahman and knowledge of Brahman. He who

does so sees Brahman as just another thing among things even though

perhaps higher in a kind of structure of existence. But Brahman is

not a thing, as such; if one uses this type of description Brahman is

the only thing and there is no other thing, including no-thing,

besides it. Brahman is best understood, then, in terms of the

description which uses the via negitiva. Man however has difficulty

understanding this kind of description so Brahman is also described

via positiva. It is the fullness of pure existence (sat), conscious-

ness (cit), and bliss (ānanda); Brahman is Satcidānanda. In terms of

sat Brahman "is ever existent and the unreal is never existent--

regarding the two, the Self and the non-Self, the real and the unreal,

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[24]PU, pp. 278-9, (22. sa vā eṣa mahān aja ātmā yo'yaṁ vijñān-
amayaḥ prāṇeṣu; ya eṣo'ntar-hṛdaya ākāśaḥ tasmin śete, sarvasya vaśī,
sarvaśyasanaḥ, sarvasyādhipatiḥ; sa na sādhunā karmaṇā bhūyān no evāsā-
dhunā kanīyān. eṣa sarveśvaraḥ, eṣa bhūtādhipatiḥ, eṣa bhūtapālaḥ.
eṣa setur vidharaṇa eṣāṁ lokānām asambhedāya. tam etaṁ vedānuvacanenā
brāhmaṇā vividiṣanti, yajñena, dānena, tapasānāśakena: etam eva
viditvā munir bhavati, etam eva pravrājina lokam icchantaḥ pravrajanti.
etadd ha sma vai tat pūrve vidvāṁsaḥ prajāṁ na kāmayanti: kiṁ
prajayā kariṣyāmaḥ; yeṣāṁ no'yam ātmāyaṁ loka iti. te ha sma putra-
iṣaṇāyāś ca vittaiṣaṇāyāś ca lokaiṣaṇāyaś ca vyutthāya, atha bhikṣā-
caryaṁ caranti; yā hy eva putraiṣaṇā sā vittaiṣaṇā, yā vittaiṣaṇā sa
lokaiṣaṇā; ubhe hy eti eṣaṇe eva bhavataḥ sa eṣa neti nety ātmā;
agṛhyaḥ, na hi gṛhyate; aśīryaḥ, na hi śīryate; asaṅgaḥ, na hi sajyate;
asito na vyathate, na riṣyati; etam u haivaite na tarata iti, ataḥ
pāpam akaravam iti, ataḥ kalyāṇam akaravam iti; ubhe u haivaiṣa ete
tarati, nainaṁ kṛtākṛte tapataḥ.).

is always present before the minds of those who attend only to truth, to the real nature of the Brahman, the Absolute, the All . . . ."[25] As cit Brahman in "All this (three fold world) is guided by intelligence, is established by intelligence. The support is intelligence, Brahma is intelligence."[26] In Śaṅkara's commentary on the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad. III.47. ānanda is discussed:

> The above mentioned bliss which is the highest Reality
> and which is characterised by the knowledge of the Atman
> is centered in the Self. It is all peace, characterised
> by the cessation of all evils. It is the same as liberation.
> It is indescribable as nobody is able to describe it; for,
> it is totally different from all objects. This ultimate
> bliss is directly realized by the Yogis. It is unborn
> because it is not produced like anything resulting from
> empirical perceptions. It is identical with the Unborn
> which is the object sought by knowledge. The knowers of
> Brahman describe this bliss verily as the omniscient Brah-
> man, as it is identical with that Reality which is omnis-
> cient.[27]

So the description of Brahman as Satcidānanda imparts the idea that Brahman is the essence of existence, consciousness, and bliss.[28] But

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[25]A. Mahadeva Sastri, The Bhagavad-Gītā with the Commentary of Sri Śaṅkarācharyā, second edition, English (Mysore, 1901), p. 30, II.16.

[26]PU, Aitareya Upaniṣad III.1.3, p. 523 (sarvaṁ tat prajñā-natram prajñāne pratiṣṭhitam, prajñā-netro lokaḥ prajñā pratiṣṭhā, prajñānam brahma).

[27]Swami Nikhilananda, The Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad with Gauḍapāda's Kārikā and Śaṅkara's Commentary (Mysore: Sri Ramakrishna Ashram, 1968) P. 206, III.47.

[28]In Ontology of Advaita R. Rao observes that, "Though Sat, Cit, and Ānanda as applied to Brahman are not found in this form in the early Upaniṣads, yet the bases of them can easily be recognised therein in the following ways: 'vijñānam ānandam brahma'--Brih. Up. 3.9.28; 'satyam prajñā ānanda'--Brhi. Up. 4.1; 'satyam jñānam anantam brahma'-- Taitt. Up. 2.1. It is only in the very late Upaniṣads that we come across Brahman described as 'sat-cit-ānanda'; Rāmapūrvatāpanīya Upaniṣad 92; Rāmottaratāpanīya Upaniṣad 2.4.5. p. 28."

We must not think of each of these terms as connoting a part of

Brahman 'for they do not connote but denote. As T. R. V. Murti

rightly observes when he writes:

> The three terms of the definition, Sat, Cit and Ānanda,
> are not synonymous (aparyāya). Although they all <u>denote</u>,
> not <u>connote</u>, one and the same entity, Brahman; the differ-
> ence between them is not verbal; each denotes Brahman differ-
> ently. The thing excluded, or the mode of approach (the
> vyāvartya), is different in each case; Sat excludes asat
> (non-being); Cit (will or intelligence) excludes matter
> (jada); Ānanda (bliss) excludes Duḥkha (pain). These terms
> are not concepts or predicates. It would be less of a mis-
> take to take them denotatively as things or substances.
> Each is <u>sui generis</u>, a Self. Each is identical with Brah-
> man, substantially, not conceptually.[29]

Thus whenever one refers to Brahman as either <u>sat</u>, <u>cit</u> or <u>ānanda</u>

it must be recognized that the other terms are necessarily included.

<u>TAṬASTHA-LAKṢAṆA</u> AND <u>SVARŪPA-LAKṢAṆA</u>

The definition of Brahman as <u>satcidānanda</u> is an essential or

substantial one (<u>svarūpa-lakṣaṇa</u>). It can be termed a "naming" rather

than a "designation". When Brahman is seen as the basis for the cause

of the origin, sustenance and cessation of the world, it is referred

to by an accidental or modal definition (<u>taṭastha-lakṣaṇa</u>). Which-

ever definition is utilized it is still the non-dual Brahman that is

being spoken of. In the order of phenomenal experience or discovery

the <u>taṭastha-lakṣaṇa</u> is first and Brahman is realized only when we

understand that the essence of the <u>taṭastha-lakṣaṇa</u> is the <u>svarūpa-</u>

<u>lakṣaṇa</u>. Thus by its very nature the <u>taṭastha-lakṣaṇa</u> view is

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[29]T. R. V. Murti, "The Two Definitions of Brahman in the
Advaita", Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya Memorial Volume, (Amalner:
Institute of Philosophy, 1958), pp. 146-7.

grounded in a view beyond itself. The experiential movement is from the basis of the world into that basis so that it is no longer seen in terms of other but as Self. The progression takes place from experience of other (world) to discovery of identity. This is a movement from the non-real to the real for:

> Our natural attitude is to take anything that appears
> as real. For instance, we mistake the body for the self.
> This is an unconscious process of identification: for none
> can consciously fall into illusion. Then occurs the shock
> of disillusionment. Consequent on this, we become reflec-
> tive. Disillusionment, or the cancelling consciousness,
> reveals the soul of the appearance by tearing off its
> superficial vestures as it were. Only this experience pro-
> vides us with the criterion of the real as abādhya (the
> uncontradicted) and the illusory as bādhay; and not any
> a priori formal concept.[30]

So the movement from the unreal to the real is a movement from the contradictable to the uncontradictable. Brahman as satcidānanda is uncontradictable. Brahman as the basis of the world is uncontradictable also, but it has, as it were, derivatives which are contradictable i.e. the experience of the world.

STATUS OF THE WORLD

The inner structure of the world is seen as both contradictable and uncontradictable. It is contradictable in that it somehow participates in non-being (asat) but it is uncontradictable because its essence is being (sat). Thus we have the idea that existence, which means "to be", is identical with essence.[31] Thus when we think

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[30] Ibid., pp. 136-7.

[31] This is distinct from the West which has many times seen a distinction between essence and existence. For a further discussion of this we would refer the reader to J.G. Arapura's Religion as Tran-quility and Anxiety and A. G. Javadekar Axionoetics. An interesting

of the status of the world for Śaṅkara we should see it as having

Brahman for its ground while participating in that which is "other" than

Brahman. However, it must always be remembered that there is none

"other" than Brahman and thus whatever is referred to as "other"

ultimately has its ground in Brahman.

The world is seen as an appearance of Brahman, an appearance

which is at heart identical with Brahman. When the status of the

world is questioned this consideration is not within the framework

of a cosmogonical inquiry, as such, because this does not lead to

knowledge of Brahman. Rather the world should be considered in terms

of a cosmological frame. This is accomplished by Śaṅkara by the

concept of māyā which is seen as the matrix of the universe:

> Māyā theory has implications for several things, mainly
> experience, the world and language. The original motivation
> in articulating the theory was to rationalize these impli-
> cations by making them cohere with the fundamental meta-
> physical position of Advaita Vedānta. In this sense it
> is clear that māyāvada is simply a rational postscript
> of advaita vāda and is in no way prescriptive of it.[32]

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example of this kind of thought in the West can be seen in Jean-Paul
Sartre's Being and Nothingness when he states, "This self with its a
priori and historical content is the essence of man. Anguish as the
manifestation of freedom in the face of self means that man is always
separated by a nothingness from his essence . . . Man continually
carries with him a pre-judicative comprehension of his essence, but
due to this very fact he is separated from it by a nothingness.
Essence is all that human reality apprehends in itself as having been."

[32]MDAB, p. 110.

The exemplification of this conception will concern us throughout the second part of this study. In fact it will be just these things, namely, experience, world (nāma-rūpa), and language, and their relation to māyā that our investigation will center upon.

For Śaṅkara, then, the world of experience is a fact as is implied when he suggests that we should no more pay attention to a man who while perceiving external things with his senses denies their existence, than believe the report of a man who while eating and experiencing the feeling of satisfaction states that he does not do so.[33] The fact of the experience of the world is not questioned, rather what must always be the guiding premise is "an inquiry into Brahman".

COSMOGONICAL AND COSMOLOGICAL

The cosmological inquiry of Śaṅkara into the nature of the world is two-fold: the consequence of the given nature of Brahman and the experience of the world. This structure of conception in Śaṅkara is best seen in the dependency and difference of the "acosmic" and "cosmic"[34] understanding of the nature of the world. The "acosmic" concept is understood in terms of the construction of the world given by Yājñavalkya when he answers the questions of Gārgi in Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad III.8.7-11:

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[33]BSB, II.2.28, Apte, p. 397.

[34]M. Hiriyanna, Outline of Indian Philosophy, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1964), p. 60 ff.

7. He said: "That which is above the sky, that which is beneath the earth, that which is between these two, sky and earth, that which the people call the past, the present and the future, across space is that woven like warp and woof. Across what is space woven like warp and woof?"

8. He said: "That, O Gārgi, the knowers of Brahman, call the Imperishable. It is neither gross nor fine, neither short nor long, neither glowing red (like fire) nor adhesive (like water). (It is) neither shadow nor darkness, neither air nor space, unattached, without taste, without smell, without eyes, without ears, without voice, without mind, without radiance, without breath, without a mouth, without measure, having no within and no without. It eats nothing and no one eats it."

9. "Verily, at the command of that Imperishable, O Gārgi, the sun and the moon stand in their respective positions. At the command of that Imperishable, O Gārgi, heaven and earth stand in their respective positions. At the command of that Imperishable, O Gārgi, what are called moments, hours days and nights, half-months, seasons, years stand in their respective positions. At the command of that Imperishable, O Gārgi, some rivers flow to the east from the white (snowy) mountains, others to the west in whatever direction each flows. By the command of that Imperishable, O Gārgi, men praise those who give, the gods (are desirous of) the sacrificer and the fathers are desirous of the darvi offering."

10. "Whosoever, O Gārgi, in this world, without knowing this Imperishable performs sacrifices, worships, performs austerities for a thousand years, his work will have an end; whosoever, O Gārgi, without knowing this Imperishable departs from this world, is pitiable. But O Gārgi, he who knowing the Imperishable departs from this world is a Brahmana (a knower of Brahman)."

11. "Verily, that Imperishable, O Gārgi, is unseen but is the seer, is unheard but is the hearer, unthought but is the thinker, unknown but is the knower. There is no other seer but this, there is no other hearer but this, there is no other knower but this. By this Imperishable, O Gārgi, is space woven like warp and woof."[35]

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[35]PU, pp. 231-3, (7. sa hovāca, yad ūrdhvam, gārgi, divaḥ, yad avāk pṛthivyāḥ, yad antarā dyāvāpṛthivī ime, yad bhūtaṁ ca bhavac ca bhaviṣyac cety ācakṣate ākāśa eva tad otaṁ ca protaṁ ceti; kasmin nu khalv ākāśa otaś ca protaś ceti. 8. sa hovāca, etad vai tad akṣaram, gārgi, brāhmaṇā adhivadanti, asthūlam, anaṇu, ahrasvam, adīrgham, alohitam, asneham, acchāyam, atamaḥ, avāyv anākāśam, asaṅgam, arasam, agandham, acakṣuṣkam. aśrotram, avāk, amanaḥ, atejaskam, aprāṇam, amukham, amātram, anantaram, abāhyam; na tad aśnāti kiṁ cana, na tad

This understanding of Brahman or the Imperishable points beyond the apparent world to its logos. The "cosmic" participates at all times in this "acosmic". The "cosmic" itself has a fundamental place within this inquiry because it is only when one correctly views this two-fold structure that the "cosmic" can maintain its position as having a positive place for an inquiry into meaning (Brahman). If it is taken as having a meaning in and for itself it must be seen as not leading to knowledge of Brahman. The "cosmic" understanding is the conception that the world is attributed to Brahman in a form that man can understand, namely Īśvara or God. The world is seen as produced by Īśvara's power (śakti) and exists for the sake of Īśvara. Śaṅkara points this out when he states:

> The word "this" in the following passage refers to this world of names and forms as caused by the intelligent Brahman alone. "This was, in the beginning, the one, non-dual Being; it saw within it the desire, "to become many and produce much", and so created the fire" (Cha. 6. 2 and 3); "This was in the beginning one Atman alone, and nothing else had the capacity to move. He saw within him the desire to produce the worlds, and produced them" (Ait. Ar. 1.1.1). . . . All this clearly shows, that the

aśnāti kaś cana. 9. etasya vā akṣarasya praśāsane, gārgi, sūryācandramasau vidhṛtau tiṣṭhataḥ; etasya vā akṣarasya praśāsane, gārgi, dyāvāpṛthivyau vidhṛte tiṣṭhataḥ; etasya vā akṣarasya praśāsane, gārgi, nimeṣā, muhūrtā, ahorātraṇy ardamāsā, māsā, ṛtavaḥ, saṁvatsara iti. vidhṛtās tiṣṭhanti; etasya vā akṣarasya praśāsane, gārgi, prācyo' nyā nadyaḥ syandante śvetebhyaḥ parvatbhyaḥ, pratīcyo' nyāḥ, yām yām cā diśam anu; etasya vā akṣarasya praśāsane, gārgi, dadato manuṣyāḥ praśaṁsanti; yajamānaṁ devāḥ, darvim-pitaro 'nvāyattāḥ. 10. yo vā etad akṣaram, gārgi, aviditvāsmiml loke juhoti, yajate, tapas tapyate, bahūni varṣa-sahasrāṇy antavad evāsya tad bhavati; yo vā etad akṣaram, gārgi aviditvāsmāl lokāt praiti, sa brāhmaṇaḥ. 11. tad vā etad akṣaram, gārgi, adṛṣṭaṁ draṣṭṛ, aśrutam, śrotṛ, amatam mantṛ, avijñātam vijñātṛ, nānyad ato'sti draṣṭṛ, nānyad ato' sti śrotṛ, nānyad ato' ati mantṛ, nānyad ato' sti vijñātṛ; etasmin nu khalv akṣare, gārgi, ākāśa otaś ca protaś ca.)

cause of the world is the "seeing" of the intelligent
Brahman and not that of the non-intelligent pradhana.[36]

Again we can see this conception in the analysis given in Chāndogya

Upaniṣad III.14.1:

> Verily, this whole world is Brahman, from which he comes
> forth, without which he will be dissolved and in which
> he breathes. Tranquil, one should meditate on it. Now
> verily, a person consists of purpose. According to the
> purpose a person has in this world, so does he become on
> departing hence. So let him frame for himself a purpose.[37]

In Śaṅkara's commentary on the Brahma Sūtra I.4.23 he counters the

objection that Brahman can not be the material cause of the world;

> Brahma should be understood to be both the material cause
> and the accidental cause, and not only an accidental cause,
> because (understood that way alone) there is no conflict
> between the Scriptural solem statement and the illustration.
> It is in this way that a conflict between the Scriptural
> solemn statement and the illustration does not take place.[38]

Thus Brahman, as Īśvara, is both the material and accidental cause of

the world. But this creation by Īśvara must not be understood as a

creation from a need or desire of purpose. Rather it is a creation by

sport as is shown in Brahma Sūtra II.1.33: "But (the act of creation)

is a mere sport (of the Lord) even as it is seen in the ordinary

world." To which Śaṅkara adds the explanation:

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[36]V. H. Date, Vedānta Explained Vol. I, (Bombay: Popular Book
Depot, 1954), pp. 33-34.

[37]PU, p. 391, (sarvam khalv idam brāhma, tajjalān iti, śānta
upāsīta; atha kratumayah purusah, yathā-kratur asminl loke puruṣo
bhavati tathetah pretya bhavati, sa kratum kurvīta.

[38]BSB, VI.4.23, Apte, p. 270.

Just as in the ordinary world, in the case of a king who
has attained all his desires or of his minister, their
activities in sports and pastimes are merely of the nature
of a sport and are indulged in without any particular aim
in mind, or just as the inspiration or expiration etc.
(or a man) takes place naturally, without any extraneous
purpose, even so may the Lord also engage in such sportful
activity without any purpose, and merely as the result of
his nature. It is not possible to explain on the ground
of reasoning or the Scriptures that there is any other
purpose on the part of the Lord. It is not possible to
question the nature (of the Lord). Though the creation
of this world-sphere appears to _us_ as a stupendous under-
taking, yet to the Lord, it is but a mere pastime, because
of his measureless power. . . .[39]

Many examples of creation are given in _śruti_,[40] but in fact
one must always recognize that these accounts must be seen as a more

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[39]_Ibid._, II.1.33, p. 338.

[40]One may refer to various accounts of creation contained within
the _Rgveda_ and other _śruti_. Griffith translates them as follows:
Rgveda X.82 (p. 498)--Viśvakarman, 1. The Father of the eye, the Wise
in spirit, created both these worlds submerged in fatness. Then when
the eastern ends were firmly fastened, the heavens and the earth were
far extended. 2. Mighty in mind and power is Visvakarman, Maker,
Disposer, and most lofty Presence. Their offerings joy in rich juice
where they value One, only One, beyond the Seven Rishis. 3. Father
who made us, he who, as Disposer, knoweth all races and all things
existing, Even He alone, the Deities' name-giver, --him other beings
seek for information. In _Rgveda_ X.90 (p. 517) we find the great hymn
to Purusha: 1. A thousand heads hath Purusha, a thousand eyes, a
thousand feet. On every side pervading earth he fills a space ten
fingers wide. 2. This Purusha is all that yet hath been and all that
is to be; The Lord of Immortality which waxes greater by food. 3. So
mighty is his greatness; yea, greater than this is Purusha. All
creatures are one-fourth of him, three-fourths eternal life in heaven.
4. With three-fourths Purusha went up: one-fourth of him again was
here. Thence he strode out to every side over what eats not and what
eats. . . . Also in _Rgveda_ X.121 (p. 566) there is the hymn to Praja-
pati--1. In the beginning rose Hiraṇyagarbha, born Only Lord of all
created beings. He fixed and holdeth up this earth and heaven. What
God shall we adore with our oblation? . . .5. By him the heavens are
strong and earth is steadfast, by him light's realm and sky-vault are
supported; By him the regions in mid-air were measured, what God shall
we adore with our oblation? . . . 10. Prajāpati! thou only comprehen-
dest all these created things, and none beside thee. Grant us our
hearts' desire when we invoke thee: may we have store of riches in

symbolic or illustrative account rather than as literal. This is
implied in the analysis of language in Advaita Vedānta (as well as in
the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā) as being non-personal (apuruseya) and by implica-
tion beyond (transcendent) but at the same time moving into the heart
of everything (immanent).

> In Hindu thought language has to be impersonal . . .
> Brahman cannot speak and there is none else to speak the
> ultimate word; so speech is attached tenuously to Brahman
> and the whole of the phenomenal world as pervaded by name
> and form is hung from speech.[41]

Thus even though the conception of creation, with concepts such as
material and accidential cause, is of some importance within Śaṅkara's
work we must recognize that it is a symbolic and not a literal meaning
that must be understood. As Śaṅkara states:

> Nor should it ever be forgotten, that even this
> Scriptural statement about creation (by the Lord) is not
> so in the truest sense, but with reference to the per-
> ception of the transactions of names and forms being merely
> imagined through Nescience, and also because it purports
> to propound how Brahma is the Self (of everything).[42]

Accounts of creation, and an account of the cosmos, then,
fulfill a necessary requirement in Śaṅkara because they make the world

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possession. Each of these hymns are from R. T. H. Griffith, The
Hymns of the Ṛgveda Vol. II, (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies,
1963). In addition one may consult R. D. Ranade, A Constructive Survey
of Upaniṣadic Philosophy, and Deussen, The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads.

[41]LP, p. 24.

[42]BSB, II.1.33, Apte, pp. 338-9.

of experience an ordered cosmos, but they do not answer the questions

of origins in relation to the experience. In order to discover

experience a question other than origins must be asked, and this is

one of meaning in experience rather than the origin of experience it-

self. The meaning question is inherent in the question already put

forward as central for a understanding of Śankara, namely, "Now

therefore the desire to know Brahman."

MĀYĀ

The conception of the doctrine of māyā in the thought and

system developed by Śankara is seen by some as the central issue of

the Advaita Vedānta. Much of modern scholarship has utilized the word

māyā to mean only illusion. But we must remember that the word

māyā is etmologically a word which means "to measure". Māyā, in

Śankara, is the canopy under which reside the phenomenal world of

name and form, language and experience. Historically māyā has been

seen as a point of attack of many later thinkers within the Vedānta.

Rāmānuja and Madhva[43] attack the Advaita on exactly this concept. The

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[43]Rāmānuja's objections to the concept of māyā are seven in
number: 1. Aśrayānupapatti--locus of avidyā. 2. Tirodhananupapatti--
obscuration of Brahman. 3. Svrūpānupapatti--nature of avidyā. 4. Anir-
vacanīyānupapatti--indefinability of avidyā. 5. Pramānānupapatti--
avidyā is not provable by the pramāṇas. 6. Nivartakānupapatti--no
remover of avidyā. 7. Nivrttyānupapatti--no removal of avidyā. Refer:
G. Thibaut, The Vedānta-Sūtras with the Commentary by Rāmānuja, S.B.E,
Vol. 48, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1962), p. 124 ff.
    Madhva's refutation of māyā is dependent upon interpretations
of the meanings of various "religio-philosophical" words and is not
set down in a given place, as Rāmānuja's. Thus the reader is asked
to refer to: K. Narain, A Critique of Madhva Refutation of the Samkara
School of Vedanta, (Allahabad: Udayaya Pub., 1964), p. 211 ff. and
H. N. Raghavendrachars, "Madhva's Brahma-Mīmāṃsā", The Cultural Heritage
of India Vol. III The Philosophies, H. Bhattacharyya editor, (Calcutta:
Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, 1937), p. 313 ff. See also
S. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy Vol. IV, (Cambridge, 1966),
pp. 101-319 inclusive.

great traditional arguments of the on-going discussion have been

covered in great detail within the philosophical literature of India

and a full analysis of it would be beyond this present study. To

cover this well-trodden soil would take us far afield from Śaṅkara.

Some interpretations of māyā in the Advaita see māyā as a

completely new development within the thought of Śaṅkara. We have

already seen in the second chapter that māyā is found in the oldest

text of the tradition, namely the Ṛgveda. Thus māyā must not be

understood as a completely new development within Śaṅkara's thought or

system. With regard to the idea of "illusion" this translation of

the Sanskrit māyā by the English word "illusion" was pointed out as

starting with W. D. Whitney in his work on the Atharva-Veda Saṁhita.

This translation is correct but to use it in reference to the Ad-

vaita, in only this sense, is to do so without any reflective awareness

of the meaning within the traditional account from the Veda up to the

Upaniṣads. Thus we must begin to see māyā within Śaṅkara not only as

it has been seen by his opponents or later critics but within the

context of "an inquiry into Brahman". We must always recall that:

> Śaṅkara was primarily what we could call today a philo-
> sophical theologian, whose urgent interest was to explain
> in the most cogent rational terms the central message of
> the Vedānta. This led him to the theory of non-dualism
> (advaitavāda), out of which by sheer force of logical im-
> plication arose the subsidiary theory of illusion (māyā-
> vāda, avidyāvāda). Śaṅkara realized that if duality (in
> all such ubiquitous forms as subject-object, thinker-thought,
> thinker-thing, etc.,) is to be avoided while explaining
> (not explaining away) the world by māyā, the principal of
> avidyā needs to be recognized as a concomitant condition,
> for both mean illusion.[44]

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[44]MDAB, p. 109.

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Thus while it is true that Śaṅkara did utilize māyā as "illusion" in certain instances it was not used to explain away the world but rather to explain the world. Māyāvada must be seen as a rational postscript to Advaitavāda and is in no way prescriptive of it.[45] To mistake it for other is not to do justice to the Advaita of Śaṅkara.

Concerning the word samvṛti we do not find it within Śaṅkara's commentary on the Brahma Sūtra, rather we find the word samvṛta. This occurs at III.2.3, and is about the existence of dream objects in the waking world. Śaṅkara observes that, "There cannot possibly be suffi-cient space for a chariot in the limited space of a body."[46] Thus samvṛta means in this instance "limited space", in fact within the Nirnaya Sagar edition there is an editorial comment that, "samvṛte means contracted".[47] The use of the word by Śaṅkara has no reference to the technical usage that the Buddhists put it to. The Mādhyamika samvṛti and Advaita māyā have different origins; this has been brought out by Dr. Arapura when he comments:

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[45]Ibid., p. 110.

[46]BSB, III.2.3, Apte, p. 563, (nahi saṁvṛte dehādesa rathā-dayo'vakāsam labheran). Gambhirananda (Brahma-Sūtra-Bhasya of Sri San-karācarya, Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1965) gives the following: "For instance, the space needed for a chariot etc. is not possible in dream; for within the narrow limits of the body, the chariot etc. cannot get sufficient room." (p. 590), and Thibaut (Vedānta Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa with Śaṅkara's Commentary Part 1 and 2, Dover Pub., 1962): ". . . for those cannot find room in the limited confines of the body (vol. II, p. 134-5).

[47]B. Sastri, Brahma Sūtra bhāṣya of Śaṅkara, (Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar Press, 1938), p. 689.

It is possible to see that the _māyā_ doctrine of the
Vedānta has its origin in logical thinking while the
saṁvṛti doctrine as set forth by all the relevant
schools of Buddhism, particularly the Mādhyamika, has
its origin in dialectical thinking. "Logical" here means
making it possible for something to be said about
Reality (_Brahman_ in this context), taking, of course,
the original meaning of "logos"; "dialectical" likewise
means the discovery, through talking, of that about which
something may be said. The gist of this may be expressed
this way: in the case of the one, there is Reality but
it cannot be talked about without some sort of contradic-
tion, and in the case of the other, the possibility of
talk is accepted without inquiring, however, into the
origin of talk--but there is no knowing what reality or
reality-substitute, if any, it will lead to, and what
significance it will bear.[48]

Thus what we have then, in the case of Śaṅkara, with regard to māyā

is its logical development out of _Advaitavāda_. This development will

be further investigated within the context of the remainder of our

study so that we may see the implications of it and the effects

of these implications on the understanding of māyā in the Advaita

darśana of Śaṅkara.

CONCLUSION

The Advaita darśana of Śaṅkara grew out of a response to the

religio-philosophical milieu of its age. On the one hand, it formu-

lated a cogent expression of the vedic tradition which responded to

and went beyond the previous existing darśanas (Saṁkhya, Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā,

Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Yoga). On the other hand it brought to task

the views of those systems of thought which were outside the vedic

pale. It answered the questions of its age with insight and presented

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[48]MDAB, p. 113.

a view that has always been a powerful force up to the modern time.
Various historical occurrences have shaped the system of Śaṅkara, and
in fact the history of much of Indian philosophy is a history of the
debates and discussions of the schools. After the passing of Śaṅkara,
the Advaita darśana grew into a great tree which saw the branches
of various interpretations of what Śaṅkara held develop. This
complex history is vast and much work is necessary for us to glean a
completely accurate picture of it. For an understanding of Śaṅkara,
however, a brief inquiry into it is most important. Thus let us now
turn our attention, however briefly, to the great tree of Advaita
Vedānta which reaches into the heart of modern India.

9th Cen. Maṇḍana Miśra
Brahmasiddhi

SAŃKARA— *Brahma Sūtra, Bhagavad Gītā, Upaniṣad Bhāṣya*

Sureśvara
Naiṣkarmyasiddhi
Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Vārtikka

Padmapāda
Pañca-Pādika

Vācaspati Miśra
Bhāmatī
Pañcapadika
Tattva-Saṃīkṣa

10th.

Vimuktātman
Iṣṭasiddhi

Sarvajñātma Muni
Saṃkṣepa-Śārīraka
Jñānottama Miśra
Candrikā

11th.

Gangāpuri
Bhaṭṭāraka
Padārtha-tattva-Nirṇaya

Śārīraka-Bhāṣya-Prakaṭārtha

Ānandabodha
12th. Bhaṭṭārakācārya
Nyāya-Makaranda
Pramāṇa-Mālā
Nyāya-Dīpāvalī

13th.

Śri Harṣa
Khaṇḍana-Khaṇḍa-Khādya

Citsukha
Bhāva-Tattva-Prakāśikā
Tattva-Pradīpika, Abhiprāya-Prakāśikā
Ānandajñāna (Ānandagiri)
Tattvāloka
Tarka-saṃgraha
Śaṅkara Miśra

Prakāśatman
Pañca-Padika-Vivaraṇa

Amalānanda
Kalpa-taru
Śāstra-darpaṇa

14th.

Vidyāraṇya Mādhava
(Bhāratītīrtha)
Vivaraṇa-pramaya-saṃgraha

Akhaṇḍānanda
Tattva-Dīpana

15th. Jagannāthāśrama
Bhāṣya-Dīpikā

16th. Nṛsiṃhāśrama Muni
Bodha-Dhikkāra
(1) Ātmasvarūpa
(2) Dharmarājādhvarindra
Tarka-Cūḍāmaṇi
Vedānta-Paribhāṣā

Madhusūdana Sarasvati
Advaitasiddhi

(3) Narāyanāśrama
Bodha-Dhikkāra-Satkriyojjvalā

Ānandapūrna
Brahma-siddhi-vyākhya-ratna,
Vidyā-sāgārī

Appaya Dīkṣita
Siddhanta-Leśa

(1) Purusottama
(2) Bālabhadra
(3) Śeṣagovinda
Nṛsimha
Jagannāthāśrama

Prakāśānanda
Vedānta-Sidhanta-Muktāvali

Rāmakṛṣṇa Dīkṣita
Vedānta-Sikhāman

Nānā Dīkṣita

17th.

Rāma-Tīrtha

Lakṣmīnṛsimha

CHART OF POST SAŃKARA ADVAITA VEDĀNTA (Partial)

CHAPTER V

MĀYĀ IN THE POST-ŚAŃKARA ADVAITA

The development of Vedāntic philosophical thought which grew
out of the Advaita Vedānta formulated by Śańkara has a history which
is complex and great. It is great because it encompasses a vast number
of philosophical positions stemming from those which were prominent
during the writing of Śańkara through the dialectical argumentation
which brings us up to the present. What we will concentrate on
within the next few pages will be the time immediately following
Śańkara, centering on the followers who developed his thought. These
can be placed into two groups: first those who wrote as his contem-
poraries or immediate followers and second those who came to be known
as the dialecticians. This history is complex because the philosophi-
cal dialogue occurred in the form of commentary. Thus when we consider
this dialogue we are confronted with various commentaries written upon
other commentaries. What we have then is a long line of works which
can be traced back to Śańkara. This history is commented on by N. B.
Chakraborty in The Advaita Concept of Falsity--A Critical Study. He
observes, "The commentary of Śaṁkara on Brahmasūtra is known as
Śārīraka bhāṣya. The post-Śaṁkara advaita philosophy originates out
of the different interpretations and commentaries of Śārīraka Bhāṣya.
The commentators of Śārīraka bhāṣya are fully manifest in their anno-
tations. These annotations are mainly based on independent reasoning

and sometimes insurmountable dialectic also is resorted to."[1]

What we intend here is to give a brief account of some of the post-Śaṅkara thinkers on the problem of the meaning of māyāvāda and what this entails. This limits us in that we will not be able to develop the minute philosophical intricacies of these positions nor reconstruct the full dialectical argumentation. Positively however it means that we will see in what ways these thinkers, correctly or incorrectly, interpreted Śaṅkara on a specific theory.

VIVARAṆA AND BHĀMATĪ SCHOOLS

We have seen in the previous chapter that the thought of Śaṅkara contained the seeds for further growth. This growth was nurtured by the critical comments of various philosophical positions, the most important for our present study being that of the Viśiṣ-tādvaita of Rāmānuja and the Dwaita of Madhava. As the thought of Śaṅkara took root and began to sprout, various adaptations emerged. Two important adaptations were the schools that grew out of the concep-tualization of study, reflection and meditation, and their value for knowledge of Brahman. These schools are known as the Vivaraṇa school and the Bhāmatī school.

The Vivaraṇa school held that the activities of study or reflection and meditation are not the direct means to knowledge of Brahman:

> The Advaitins differ with regard to the fixing of the
> relative values of study, reflection, and meditation. The

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[1] N. B. Chakraborty, The Advaita Concept of Falsity--A Critical Study, (Calcutta: Sanskrit College, 1969), p. 41. Cited hereafter as ACF.

Vivaraṇa school maintains that all the three are not the
direct means to Brahman-knowledge. The ascertainment of
the purport of the Vedāntas through reasoning is "hearing"
(śravaṇa); reflecting on the non-dual Brahman through
reasonings which establish non-difference and condemn
difference is manana; and the constancy of the mental flow
of the form of Brahman without being clouded by the mode
of the form of the not-self is meditation (nididhyāsana).
These three are aids to remove the notions that the non-
dual Brahman is impossible and that the contrary of that is
true. Doubts and delusions are destroyed by this triple
means. But the direct means to knowledge are the Vedānta
texts which come into contact with the sense of hearing.
The avāntaravākyas which reveal either the nature of the
supreme self or that of the jīva give us mediate knowledge.
The mahāvākyas or major texts which assert the identity
of the Supreme Intelligence and the jīva give us immediate
intuitive knowledge. The contention that verbal testimony
can yield only mediate knowledge is met in this manner. The
knowledge through verbal testimony of an object which is
remote is always mediate. But of an object which is proxi-
mate, verbal testimony gives both mediate and immediate
knowledge. This point may be explained by citing the
episode of the tenth man. Through the words of a trust-
worthy person the tenth man at first learns mediately that
the tenth man is not lost, and then he realizes that he is
himself the tenth man. Brahman is not remote; it is
identical with the jīva; hence of it, immediate intuitive
knowledge is possible through verbal testimony.

For Vācaspati (founder of the Bhāmatī school) who
follows the tradition of Maṇḍana, verbal testimony of itself
is not the cause of immediate knowledge. Uninterrupted
contemplation of the cognition which results from verbal
testimony ultimately causes the final intuition. The process
of prasaṅkhyāna is indispensable for Brahman-intuition.
This view which is urged by Vācaspati differs from the
Vivaraṇa view. Unintermittent meditation, and not mere
hearing of the Vedāntas, takes the prominent and primary
place as the means to intuition. The tendency to place
more and more importance on meditation reached its climax
in Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. His strong leaning to the path
of devotion led Madhusūdana to maintain that bhakti is as
good a means as jñāna for the realization of the attribute-
less Brahman.[2]

These are aids to show the truth of the non-dual Brahman for doubts

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[2]T. M. P. Mahadevan, The Pañcadasī of Bhārtītīrtha-Vidyāraṇya,
(Madras: University Press, 1969), p. 171. Cited hereafter as PBV.

and delusions are destroyed by this means for the Vivaraṇa. Thus
the emphasis is on Śruti which is the only means by which knowledge
of Brahman can be had. This school is considered to be the most
representative school of those coming out of the teachings of Śaṅkara.
The thesis of this school is based on the Pañcapadika Vivaraṇa which
is an annotation on the Pañcapadika of Padmapāda, who was a disciple
of Śaṅkara. Because of his being a disciple of Śaṅkara it is held
that he could most definitely and correctly know the implications of
the Advaita better than any other. Therefore, the Vivaraṇa school,
which is based on the Pañcapadika, is to be taken as the represen-
tative school of Advaita Vedānta.[3]

Just as the origin of the Vivaraṇa school is based on a text
so too is the Bhāmatī school. The basic text of this school is the
Bhāmatī of Vācaspati Miśra. For Vācaspati Miśra, who follows the
tradition of Mandana Miśra and Śaṅkara as pointed out above, verbal
testimony of itself is not the cause of immediate knowledge. It is
rather uninterrupted contemplation of the cognition which results from
verbal testimony. This contemplation ultimately causes the final
intuition. The process of prasankhyāna is indispensable for intuition
of Brahman. This is to say that unintermittent meditation, and not
mere hearing of the Vedāntas, takes the prominent and primary place
as the means of intuition.

The school of Bhāmatī initiated by Vācaspati Miśra (9th Cent.
A. D.) who wrote the ṭīkā, viz., Bhāmatī on the

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[3]ACF, p. 42. See also Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy
Vol. II, (Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1968), p. 105.

Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, however, traces Vedantic studies on the
logical and dialectical place to the adhyayanavidhi as the
studies of Mīmāṁsā have also the same injunction at their
origin. Śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana are not the
fountain-heads of the Vedantic dialectical studies by way
of injunctions. Nor even is śravaṇa the principal means
toward Ātmadarśana. These pertain to the ken of jñāna or
knowledge, pure and simple, where no injunctive force can
exist. Knowledge arises as soon as the conditions of it
are fulfilled. Hence what these three stages can do is only
to show the way towards the Realization of the Self only
indirectly by focusing our attention on several indirect
methods. Śravaṇa is responsible, according to the Bhāmati
School, for an indirect (parokṣa) knowledge of Self, as the
means of knowledge, is mediate; manana is also responsible
for such knowledge that is indirect; but by nididhyāsana
which engenders constant concentration upon the indirectly
realized Self, there arises an immediate (pratyakṣa)
knowledge of it. Hence nididhyāsana is the principal organ
of the knowledge of the Self where śravaṇa and manana are
secondary. But all these three are never the object of any
injunction, but are only objects of factual statement
(vihitānuvādaka).[4]

This tendency to place more and more importance on meditation reached

its height in Madhusūdana Sarasvati. His strong leaning to devotion

led him to maintain that bhakti is as good a means as jñāna for

realization of Brahman.[5] Thus the Bhāmatī school of Vācaspati gives

a place in Advaita for the primacy of meditation in the realization of

Brahman. A chart which presents the two interpretations drawn up

by Mahamahopadhyaya A. Sastri compares them as follows:

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[4]B. K. Sen Gupta, A Critique on the Vivaraṇa School, (Calcutta:
Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1959), p. 4.

[5]PBV, p. 171. See also ACF, p. 42 ff.

BHAMATI	VIVARANA
(1) <u>Jīva</u> (individual self)--locus of both cosmic and individual <u>Avidyās</u> (nescience).	(1) a. Cosmic <u>Avidya</u> (<u>maya</u>) located in <u>Brahman</u>. b. Individual nescience (<u>avidya</u>) has for its basis <u>jiva</u>
(2) <u>Avidyā</u> is different in different <u>jivas</u>. <u>Avidyās</u> are therefore many and not one.	(2) a. Cosmic <u>Avidya</u> is one. b. Individual <u>Avidyas</u> are manifold.
(3) <u>Avidyā</u> has for its object <u>Brahman</u>.	(3) The same
(4) <u>Avidyā</u> is only the efficient cause (<u>nimitta-sahakāri</u>) in the capacity of being a fault.	(4) <u>Avidya</u> is the efficient cause in the capacity of a fault and is also the material cause (<u>upādāna</u>).
(5) <u>Avidyā</u> possesses the power of veiling (<u>āvaraṇa-śakti</u>) alone.	(5) It possesses a twofold function a. veiling (<u>āvaraṇa</u>), b. projection (<u>vikṣepa</u>).
(6) <u>Brahman</u> alone is the appearing or illusory cause (<u>vivartop-ādāna</u>).	(6) <u>Brahman</u> and <u>māyā</u> both are material causes: (i) <u>Brahman</u> is the illusory or apparent Cause, (ii) <u>Māyā</u> is the really transforming material cause.
(7) Perception is only mental (<u>mānasa</u>) and <u>not</u> verbal (<u>śabda</u>).	(7) Perception is both mental and verbal.
(8) Mind is also an organ of sense (<u>indriya</u>).	(8) Mind is not an organ.
(9) Deep meditation (<u>nididhyāsana</u>) is the main factor in Spiritual Realization while study (<u>śravaṇa</u>) and deliberation (<u>manana</u>) are subsidiaries.	(9) <u>Śravaṇa</u> (study) is the main factor in Realization, <u>manana</u> and nididhyāsana are auxiliaries <u>sic</u>.
(10) Only the associated Absolute (<u>upahita Brahman</u>) is the object of Vedantic knowledge and <u>not</u> Pure Consciousness.	(10) Pure Consciousness (<u>śuddha Brahman</u>) also comes within the scope Vedāntic knowledge.
(11) Pure Consciousness is neither the object of mental mode (<u>vṛtti</u>) nor of the reflected consciousness (<u>phalacaitanya</u>).	(11) Pure Consciousness is the object of mental modification (<u>akhaṇḍākārā vṛtti</u>).
(12) Knowledge is a form of mental action, but does <u>not</u> come under the scope of injunction.	(12) Knowledge is <u>not</u> a mental action and does <u>not</u> come under the jurisdiction of Vedic injunctions.
(13) There is no injunction in the act of study (<u>śravaṇa</u>)in the Upaniṣadic text--śrotavya, etc.	(13) There is restricting injunction (<u>niyama vidhi</u>) in the śrotavya text.
(14) Even the sense-organs, superimposed as they are on the witnessing self (<u>sākṣin</u>), are perceptible.	(14) Only the characteristics (<u>dharma</u>) of the sense-organs are imposed on the witnessing self and as such are perceptible.

(15) No mental modification is admitted in things directly illumined by the sākṣin.

(15) Mental modification exists in such cases also; but such mind-modifications are not generated by any means of correct know-ledge (pramāṇa).

(16) Iśvara is the consciousness limited by a totality (samaṣṭi) of limitations; while jiva is consciousness with individual limitations (vyaṣṭi).

(16) Iśvara is the prototypal consciousness (bimbacaitanya) while jiva is reflected consciousness (pratibimba) and not limited (avacchinna). . . . [6]

CONTEMPORARIES AND FOLLOWERS

The first great thinker with whom we will deal is the ninth century Advaitin Maṇḍana Miśra.[7] His greatest work is called Brahmasiddhi, which is an independent interpretation of Advaita Vedānta. It is supposed that Maṇḍana lived at the same time as Śaṅkara and wrote his work to promote his own view of Advaita. This work is divided into four chapters, the first of which is Brahmakāṇḍa, which deals with the nature of Brahman as one and immutable, as pure consciousness and positive bliss.[8] The method which Maṇḍana follows is to abolish the difference between subject (draṣṭṛ) and object (dṛśya) because there is something more essential, namely Brahman.

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[6]From The Brahmasūtra-Śaṅkara-Bhāshyam with Five Commentaries, ed. by Mahananopadhyaya Anantakrishna Sastri, (Calcutta: Metropolitan Print. and Pub. House, 1941), pp. 9-10.

[7]For the controversy about who Mandana Misra is see HIP Vol. II, pp. 82-87.

[8]D. C. Bhattacharya, "Post-Śaṅkara Advaita", The Cultural Heritage of India, Vol. III, ed. by H. Bhattacharyya, (Calcutta: Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, 1969), p. 225. Cited hereafter as CHI.

This rejection of subject and object is centered on the concept of the self. The self does not undergo any change but only appears to transform itself. In reality it is through the self's reflection in the anthkarana that we have the false appearance of transformation.

This false appearance is avidyā or māyā for Mandana. This avidyā is not a characteristic (sva-bhāva) of Brahman nor is it different from Brahman which is sat. In fact avidyā is neither existent nor non-existent. It is indescribable or unspeakable (anirvacanīya); it belongs to the individual souls (jīva). But if it belongs to the jīva and is neither existent nor non-existent, there arises an inconstancy. Mandana points out that these inconsistancies are of the nature of avidyā. They can be stated in formulation as: (1) the jīvas are essentially identical with Brahman, (2) the diversities of jīvas are due to imagination (kalpanā), (3) Brahman is devoid of imagination, (4) the jīvas are products of imagination. The question arrived at is to whom does the imagination which produces the jīvas belong? The answer is twofold, in the sense that the imagination belongs to māyā, on the one hand, and, on the other, in the sense that avidyā is produced from the jīva and the jīva in turn is produced from avidyā.[9]

The second chapter of Brahmasiddhi is called Tarkakāṇḍa. In this chapter Mandana refutes the philosophical concept of the perception of difference (bheda). He begins by stating that bheda

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[9] S. N. Dasgupta, History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, (Cambridge: University Press, 1968), pp. 87-90. Cited hereafter as HIP.

is wrongly thought to be revealed in perception. Thus he attempts to prove that bheda is never experienced by perception (pratyaksa). This he does by an analysis of perception which he says yields three possible alternatives: (1) that perception manifests a positive object; (2) that perception presents differences from other objects; (3) that perception manifests a positive object and distinguishes it from other objects. This third alternative in turn yields another three alternatives: (a) the simultaneous presentation of the positive object and its distinction from other object; (b) there is given first the presentation of the positive object and then the presentation of the difference; (c) there is given first the presentation of the difference and then the presentation of the positive object. Thus Mandana proceeds by a dialectical argument against all who hold that bheda is revealed in perception. This dialectic is especially directed against the Buddhists and those who hold that things are by their very nature different from one another (prakrtyaiva-bhinnā-bhāvaḥ). All in all we can say with Dasgupta that:

> The main point in his refutation of the category of differ-
> ence consists in this, that he shows that it is incon-
> ceivable and dialectically monstrous to suppose that the
> category of difference can be experienced through perception
> and that it is philosophically more convenient to suppose
> that there is but one thing which through ignorance yields
> the various notions of difference that to suppose that
> there are in reality the infinite agreements of unity and
> difference just as they are experienced in perception.[10]

The third chapter of Brahmasiddhi is called Niyogakaṇḍa. In this chapter Mandana refutes the Mīmāṁsā view that Vedāntic texts are

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[10]Ibid., p. 98.

to be interpreted in accordance with the Mīmāṃsā canon of interpretation which states that Vedic texts imply either a command or a prohibition. In the fourth chapter called Siddhikāṇḍa, Maṇḍana again puts forth the view that the import of the Upaniṣads is to show that the manifold world is illusion which is due to ignorance of the individual souls.[11]

Maṇḍana has already been shown to have been the one who gave the necessary basis for the development of the Bhāmatī school of Vedānta by Vācaspati Miśra. This school utilizes meditation as over against the Vivaraṇa school which stresses the Vedāntic texts. For Maṇḍana meditation is indispensably necessary to uproot the saṃskāras (residual impressions) produced by anyathā-grahaṇa-avidyā (misapprehension avidyā). This avidyā is one kind of two, the second being agrahaṇa-avidyā or non-apprehension avidyā. This meditation is necessary as opposed to verbal knowledge of the contents of the Vedāntic texts, which is mediate (parokṣa) which can never produce perception of the reality (Brahma-sākṣātkāra) and liberation, unless the proper vṛtti (mental image or modification) is formed through constant meditation.[12]

An immediate follower of Śaṅkara is Sureśvara whose most famous works are Naiṣkarmyasiddhi, Bṛhadāraṇyaka-bhāṣya-vārttika, and

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[11] Ibid., p. 98.

[12] Another interesting fact about Maṇḍana is that he accepted the theory of sphoṭa advocated by Bhartṛhari and others and he tried to harmonize the doctrine of the Śabdadvaita with the Brahmadvaita of the Advaita. For Maṇḍana the word is Brahman, the word is all. See CHI, pp. 256-7.

Taittiriya-bhāsya-vārttika. The best known, the Naiskarmyasiddhi,

will be looked at briefly after a few comments on Brahman as sat.

For Suresvara Brahman is sat, the material cause of the world.

Brahman is also unchanging and it is through māyā that the world

appears. Māyā is the secondary or mediate cause of the world which it

also pervades. From the standpoint of experience, the world and māyā

exist; from the standpoint of Brahman there is no world or māyā but

only pure sat, cit, and ānanda. Māyā is the same as avidyā and it

veils the true nature of Brahman and makes It appear as the world.

It is only through the Vedic texts that avidyā disappears and the

knowledge of Brahman dawns. Thus Suresvara holds more to the

Vivarana school of Vedānta which disagrees with Mandana. This disa-

greement is discussed by D. C. Bhattacharyya in his article "Post-

Sankara Advaita":

> Unlike Mandana, Suresvara maintains that the Vedic texts
> are capable of producing immediate cognition of the self
> as Brahman. Suresvara repudiates the necessity of medi-
> tation (dhyānābhyāsa) or repetition (prasankhyāna) as a
> means of producing immediacy (aparoksatva). This view of
> Suresvara and others is called Sabdāparoksavāda. He has also
> refuted the theory (maintained by Mandana) that avidyā
> is of two kinds, stating that avidyā must be one, because it
> has only one supreme Self for its object and support. In the
> Brhadāranyaka-bhāsya-vārttika he has also rejected the
> anyathākhyāti theory regarding the nature of error, and has
> established the theory of anirvacanīya-khyāti, which was
> accepted by all the later Advaitins.[13]

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[13]Different systems hold to different conceptions of error.
Some of these are: (a) sat-khyāti of the Rāmānujites, (b) atma-khyāti
and the asat-khyāti of the Buddhists, (c) Anyatha of the Nyāya and the
Vaisesika systems and (d) anirvacanīya-khyāti of the Advaitins. See
CHI, p. 259-60.

In his Naiṣkarmya-siddhi Sureśvara deals first with the relation of Vedic duties to the attainment of knowledge of Brahman. He argues against the Mīmāṁsā view which maintains that emancipation takes place through Vedic duties. He holds that emancipation has nothing to do with the performance of action. Emancipation is not acquired by a combination of knowledge and performance of duties (jñāna-karma-samuccaya) as is held by Brahmadatta nor is it even necessary for karma to be performed as is maintained by the modified dualists like Bhartṛprapañca. Two considerations refute the latter view: that the conception of reality as both unity and difference is self-contra-dictory, and when oneness is realized through true knowledge and the sense of otherness and difference is removed, it is not possible for duties to be performed. The performance of duties always implies the experience of duality and difference. Knowledge of Brahman always implies unity and sameness.[14]

The second chapter of Naiṣkarmya-siddhi deals with the relation of self-realization to the proper interpretation of the Upaniṣads. When self-knowledge dawns, the experience of ego and what is included in the makeup of the ego vanishes. Duality is caused by the effects of antaḥkaraṇa; knowledge breaks the bond of objectivity and illusory appearances. The world appearance is seen as a product of nescience (ajñāna). Thus all vanishes like the illusory silver in the conch shell.[15]

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[14]HIP Vol. II, p. 100.

[15]Ibid., p. 101.

The nature of ajñāna is the subject of the third chapter.
Ajñāna produces the non-self which gives rise to apparent objective
things. Ajñāna has its support in the self which is the same as
Brahman:

> It is the ignorance of the real nature of the self that
> transforms itself into all that is subjective and objective,
> the intellect and its objects. It is thus clear that accor-
> ding to Sureśvara, unlike Vācaspati Miśra and Mandana, the
> avidyā is based not upon individual persons (jiva), but
> upon the pure intelligence itself. It is this ignorance
> which, being connected and based upon the pure self, pro-
> duces the appearances of individual persons and their sub-
> jective and objective experiences.[16]

Thus Sureśvara deals with the concept of avidyā in his third chapter.
In the fourth and final chapter he summarizes the first three.

Māyā for Sureśvara is only an instrument (dvāra) through
which the one Brahman appears as many. It is positive but is not
substance. It is like a veil which hangs on Brahman and covers up
the One and draws attention away from It. Thus Sureśvara's māyāvada
itself has no new element. Sureśvara introduces a new concept when
this theory is transposed into a theory of error, namely anivivacanīya-
khyāti. This contributes to the future development of Advaita in
Indian philosophy.

The third Advaita thinker whom we will consider is Padmapāda
(820 A. D.), the founder of the Vivaraṇa school of Vedānta. Two works
are attributed to him: the first and most important is the Pañca-pādikā,
which is a commentary on Śaṅkara's commentary on the first four sūtras

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[16]Ibid., p. 101.

of the Brahma-sūtra. For Padmapāda the terms māyā, avyākrta, prakrti, agrahaṇa, avyakta, tamaḥ, kāraṇa, laya, śakti, mahāsupti, nidrā, kṣara, and ākāśa are synonymous with avidyā.[17] Avidyā is that which obstructs the pure and independently self-revealing nature of Brahman. Avidyā stands as if it were a pointed canvas (citra-bhitti) of ignorance (avidyā), deeds (karma), and past impressions of knowledge (pūrva-prajñā-saṃskāra). All of these produce the individual persons (jīvatvāpādikā). Avidyā thus maintains itself in the jīvā. The support and object of this avidyā is Brahman. This conception is against that of Vācaspati Miśra who maintains that avidyā has Brahman as its object and the jīvā as its support. This also is one of the points of difference between the Vivaraṇa and the Bhāmati schools.[18]

Padmapāda has given two meanings to falsehood: (1) Falsehood is a simple negation (apahnava-vacana). (2) Falsehood is the unspeakable and indescribable (anirvacanīyata-vacana). Dasgupta adds that, "It is probably he who of all the interpreters first described ajñāna or avidyā as being of a material nature (jaḍātmikā) and of the nature of a power (jaḍātmikā-avidyā-śakti), and interpreted Śaṅkara's phrase 'mithyā-jñāna-nimittaḥ' as meaning that it is the material power of ajñāna that is constitutive or the material cause of the world-appearance."[19] This conception gives more substantiality to avidyā than existed in Śaṅkara.[20]

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[17]Ibid., p. 104.

[18]Ibid., pp. 104-5.

[19]Ibid., p. 105.

[20]CHI, p. 263.

With this conception of material power Padmapāda distinguishes between avidyā and māyā. When the power of concealing (āvaraṇa) is predominantly ignorance, it is called avidyā, and when the power of projection or transformation (vikṣepa) is predominant, it is called māyā.[21] With regard to this transformation or creation he maintains that irrational and indefinable ignorance (anirvacanīya-avidyā) is the material cause of superimposition and the world appearance. This indefinableness is carried over into discussion about the falsehood of the world. According to Padmapāda the world is false in the sense that it is different from both what is sat (existent) and what is asat (non-existent). Anything that is neither existent nor non-existent is false. Thus the world is false and the only thing that is sat is Brahman.

Padmapāda's thought has a dominating, pervasive influence over the development of later advaitic thought. His system is less revolutionary and speculative than Maṇḍana's and thus draws a greater number of thinkers. It offers a more orthodox, comprehensible explanation of the riddle of existence. The sole distinguishing characteristic of Padmapāda is that it was the elaborate systematization of the metaphysical subtleties, often ignored by early thinkers, as bereft of any pragmatic value.[22]

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[21] Ibid., p. 263.

[22] S. S. Hasurkar, Vācaspati Miśra on Advaita Vedānta, (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1958), p. 206. Cited hereafter as VMAV.

The fourth Advaita thinker who followed both Śaṅkara and Maṇḍana Miśra is Vācaspati Miśra (840 A. D.). Vācaspati wrote commentaries on all the systems of philosophy, the most important of which is probably the Bhāmati which is a commentary on Śaṅkara's Bhāsya. In his view truth and reality are given as immediate self-revelation. He holds to two different kinds of ajñāna:

> . . . as psychological and as forming the material cause of the mind and the inner psychical nature of man or as the material world outside. Thus he says in his commentary on the Śaṅkara-bhāsya, I.iii.30, that at the time of the great dissolution (mahā-pralaya) all products of avidyā, such as the psychical frame (antaḥkaraṇa), cease to have any function of their own, but are not on account of that destroyed; they are at that time merged in the indescribable avidya, their root cause, and abide there as potential capacities (sūkṣmena-śakti-rūpeṇa) together with the wrong impressions and psychological tendencies of illusion.[23]

Thus we see that for Vācaspati avidyā or māyā is coexistent with Brahman, an accessory through which the creation of the world takes place. It hides Brahman and rests on individual persons who are themselves dependent upon māyā and māyā on them. The world appearance is not a mere subjective idea or sensation but has an objective existence, even though its nature is inexplicable and indescribable (anirvacanīya-avidyā). At the time of dissolution the constitutive material, both psychical and physical, will remain hidden in avidyā until the next creation.[24]

Vācaspati's contribution to the Advaita differs from Maṇḍana in that :

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[23]HIP Vol. II, pp. 108-9.

[24]Ibid., p. 48.

. . . his predecessor [Maṇḍana] points to the ultimate
undefinability of avidyā as the only explanation of mutually
inter-dependent position of avidyā and its locus, the indi-
vidual soul, Vācaspati, more logical and rational in his
attitude, lays emphasis on the beginninglessness of the
two entities interdependently involved, and thus refutes
the charge of his rivals. . . .he is the first advaitin,
known to us who, improving upon the original stand of Maṇ-
dana, states in clear-cut terms that the avidyā, the locus
of which cannot be logically maintained to be Brahman, is
not one, common to all individual souls, its seats; but
is many, differing with each and every one of them.[25]

Avidyā or ajñāna then abides in the many jīvas and not in Brahman,
which is of the nature of knowledge.

As we have already noted, for Vācaspati there are two kinds
of avidyā. The positive one, which produces the world, gives rise
to the psychological avidya. The former, mūlāvidyā or kāraṇāvidyā
(primal nescience), produces the latter, tūlāvidyā or kāryāvidyā
(derivative nescience).[26] Brahman as Īśvara is both the material
(upādana) and the efficient cause (nimitta) of the world and is māyā.
Māyā is coexistent with Brahman, an accessory in the creation of the
world. Māyā hides Brahman and is dependent upon souls; the souls are
in turn dependent upon māyā. But for Vācaspati the world appearance
is not mere subjective idea or sensation; it has objective existence,
even though its nature is inexplicable and indescribable.[27]

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[25] VMAV, p. 198-9.

[26] CHI, p. 267.

[27] HIP Vol. II, p. 48.

DIALECTICIANS

By observing the chart of post-Śaṅkara Advaita we can see there are many omitted in our survey. This can be defended from two points of view, namely, a complete survey of every thinker would be beyond the possibilities and scope of this study, and those whom we have looked at represent major figures having the most impact on the tradition. We will now turn our attention to those thinkers who best represent the dialectical aspect of post-Śaṅkara thought.

The beginnings of the fully developed dialectic can be found in the work of Śrīharṣa (1150 A. D.). Śrīharṣa wrote many works which are not available, but the most important study philosophically is his Khandana-khaṇḍa-khādya in which he attempts to refute all definitions of the Nyāya system, intended to justify the reality of experience, by proving that experiences are phenomenal and that all that is known is indefinable and unreal. This is because, ". . . indefinableness is in the nature of all things in the world and all experience (māyā-svabhāvānugāminyām anirvacanīyatvāt)and no amount of ingenuity or scholarship can succeed in defining the nature of that which has no definable nature of existence."[28] Thus the arguments put forward by the Naiyayikas and the Vaiśeṣikas to support the reality of the pramāṇas (the means of valid cognition) and the prameyas (the objects of valid experience) are shown by the dialectic to be relative truths which are ultimately not valid.

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[28]Ibid., p. 127.

This negative method of destructive criticism (khaṇḍana) was originally started by the Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna. It was taken up by Śrīharṣa, Citsukha, Ānandagiri and a host of others. Commenting on the dialectics' ties with Buddhism Śrīharṣa:

> . . . admits the similarity of his philosophy to that of the nihilists (Śunyavādins); but he promptly points out the difference too, saying that while the Buddhists hold everything to be indeterminable and false, the Brahmavādins (Vedāntins) hold knowledge (vijñāna) to be self-evident and real; that while the former hold that the world does not exist outside cognition, the latter assert that the world, though indeterminable as sat or asat, is different from cognition.[29]

Thus Śrīharṣa proceeds purely dialectically and tends to concentrate upon the destruction of other systems rather than developing his own. But he accepts Brahman and in fact says that the proof that may be demanded of ultimate oneness is seen in the fact that that very demand proves that the idea of ultimate oneness exists. This is to say that if the idea of ultimate oneness were not at all realized then no one could think of asking for a proof of it.[30]

Using the dialectic method Śrīharṣa shows that to try to define a concept of "difference" is impossible because the nature of the structure in which we use such a concept is indescribable. As Dasgupta points out:

> The chief method of Śrīharṣa's dialectic depends upon the assumption that the reality of the things that one defines depends upon the unimpeachable character of the definitions;

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[29]CHI, p. 271.

[30]HIP Vol. II, p. 128.

but all definitions are faulty, as they involve the fallacy
of argument in a circle (cakraka), and hence there is no
way in which the real nature of things can be demonstrated
or defined. Our world of experience consists of knower,
known and knowledge; if a knower is defined as the possessor
of knowledge, knowledge can only be understood by a refer-
ence to the knower; the known, again, can be understood
only by a reference to knowledge and the knower, and so
there is a circle of relativity which defies all attempts
at giving an independent definition of any of these things.
It is mainly this relativity that in specific forms baffles
all attempts at definition of all categories.[31]

Following directly in Srīharṣa's footsteps we have Citsukha,
who not only used dialectical reasoning but also gave astute inter-
pretations of some important concepts of Advaita.[32]   In his most
important work, the Tattva-pradīpika or Citsukhī, he refutes the Nyāya
and Vaiśeṣika categories and also develops and interprets Advaita
theories. He begins his interpretation of Vedānta by giving a formal
definition to the concept self-revelation or self-illumination.
Citsukha is probably the first thinker to give such a definition in the
thought of Advaita.[33]   He defines it as ". . . that which is entitled
to be called immediate (aparokṣa-vyavahāra-yogya), though it is not
an object of any cognition or any cognizing activity (avedyatve'pi)."[34]
In other words self-luminosity is that which, without being an object
of cognition, can be experienced or intuited immediately. This
definition applies only to the self because the self is not an object
of cognition. It is defined as consciousness--pure self-revealing
consciousness (atmanaḥ saṃvid-rūpatva).

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[31] Ibid., p. 133.

[32] Ibid., p. 147 ff.

[33] Ibid., p. 149.

[34] Ibid., p. 149.

Falsity is defined as the non-existence of things in that which is supposed to be their abode or locus. This is commented on by Dasgupta:

> Citsukha defines falsity (mithyatva) as the non-existence of a thing in that which is considered to be its cause. He shows this by pointing out that a whole, if it is to exist anywhere, must exist in the parts of which it is made, and, if it does not exist even there, it does not exist anywhere and is false. It is, however, evident that a whole cannot exist in the parts, since, being a whole, it cannot be in the parts. Another argument adduced by Citsukha for the falsity of the world appearance is that it is impossible that there should be any relation between the self-revealing consciousness, the knower (dṛk), and the objects which are cognized (dṛśya)[35]

Thus he uses the dialectic method to determine the implications of falsity in Advaita. This follows Śrīharṣa but uses new and different arguments:

> . . . though the arguments of Citsukha are in many cases new and different from those given by Śrīharṣa. Citsukha's general approach to such refutations is also slightly different from that of Śrīharṣa. For, unlike Śrīharṣa, Citsukha dealt with the principal propositions of the Vedānta, and his refutations of the Nyāya categories were not intended so much to show that they were inexplicable or indefinable as to show that they were false appearances, and that the pure self-revealing Brahman was the only reality and truth.[36]

But because he did not deal with the Nyāya categories as strongly as did Śrīharṣa, this does not mean that he holds a different view about false presentations.

Citsukha maintained the fundamental viewpoints on the nature of avidyā, how it ceases, and where it has its support, that were

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[35]Ibid., p. 152.

[36]Ibid., p. 156.

set down in the views of Sureśvara and others.[37]

> Avidyā or ajñāna is a beginningless positive entity. It
> is called positive only in the sense that it is not nega-
> tive. It is not the negation or absence of knowledge..
> Ignorance is not perceived by any sense process but is dir-
> ectly perceived by the self-shining consciousness (sakṣin).
> Just before the cognition of an object there is ignorance
> covering the object which is then experienced by the saksin
> as having been unknown (ajñātatayā). Thus all things are
> objects of the witnessing consciousness (sakṣin) either
> as known or as unknown. The sakṣin, according to Citsukha,
> is none other than the pure Brahman which is in the Jiva
> as its unchanging background. Citsukha explains error
> as the experience of a false presentation of an indetermin-
> able nature (anirvacanīya-khyāti).[38]

False presentations, then, though they serve all the purposes of a

perceptual object, cannot be described as either sat or asat. They

are unspeakable or indefinable and are illusion.

Following the dialectical movement of Citsukha we can see the

breadth of his philosophical thinking. Generally his refutations of

categories follow the same line of development found in Śrīharṣa's

work Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya. Briefly then, he covers the following

categories. In his refutation of time (kāla), he maintains that it

can neither be seen as a thing nor can it be apprehended by the mind

(manas). The same is also true of space (dik). He refutes the

Vaisesika theory of atoms by reference to the relation of part to the

whole, as we have seen above. Contact (saṃyoga) and separation

(vibhāga) cannot be understood. The same holds for the theory of

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[37]Ibid., p. 153.

[38]CHI, p. 273.

numbers, class-concept (jati), cause (karana) and effect (karya),
substance (dravya) and qualities (guna). All fall under the dialectic
and are seen, in the last analysis, to be inexplicable.[39]

We have mentioned above the relation of Srīharṣa, and by
implication Citsukha, to the Buddhist thinker Nāgārjuna. Another
obvious relation has been pointed out by Dasgupta, who states:

> . . . though Srīharṣa and Citsukha carried out an elaborate
> scheme of a critique of the different categories in order
> to show that the definitions of these categories, as given
> by the Nyāya, are impossible, yet neither of them can be
> regarded as the originator of the application of the dia-
> lectic method in the Vedānta. Sankara himself had started
> it in his refutation of the Nyāya and other systems in his
> commentary on the Vedānta-sūtras, II.ii.[40]

This is a correct analysis but if carried too far it leads to a
misunderstanding; tradition maintains that the post-Sankara Advaita
brought out many of the ambiguities in Sankara and formulated them
into a more coherent system. Sankara did not develop a distinct
dialectical method. This opinion is also expressed by Dasgupta a few
pages later when he states that:

> Sankara, however, seldom indulges in logical dialectic like
> the above, and there are only a few rare instances in which
> he attacks his opponents from a purely logical point of
> view. But even here he does not so much criticize the
> definitions of the Vaiśeṣikas as point out the general
> logical and metaphysical confusion that result from some
> of the important Vaiśeṣika theories. It is easy to note
> the difference of a criticism like this from the criticisms
> of Srīharṣa in his Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya, where he uses
> all the power of his dialectical subtleties to demolish
> the cherished principles of pure logic as formulated by
> the Nyāya logicians.[41]

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[39] HIP Vol. II, pp. 156-63.

[40] Ibid., p. 163.

[41] Ibid., pp. 191-2.

The next major figure we will consider is Vidyāraṇya Mādhava (1350 A. C.) who wrote the Pañcadasī, Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha, and the Jīvan-mukti-viveka.[42] The most important for our study are the Pañcadasī and the Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha. In his Pañcadasī Vidyāraṇya repeats the Vivaraṇa view of Advaita. Speaking about the relation of Brahman and māyā he states that because the scripture declares Brahman to be "relationless" there can exist no real relation between Brahman and māyā. But just as there is an unreal relation between the sky and the color blue there is an unreal relation between Brahman and māyā. This relation is a superimposed one of identity, called anirvacanīya-tādatmya-sambandha (or indefinable relation of

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[42]There exists controversy over exactly who this thinker really is and what his name is. Dasgupta states that, "Vidyāraṇya is reputed to be the same as Mādhava, brother of Sāyana, the great Vedic commentator." HIP Vol. II, p. 215. See also CHI p. 274. Another suggestion is that given by T. M. P. Mahadevan in his The Pañcadasī of Bhāratītīrtha-Vidyāraṇya, he states, "In an earlier work, The Philosophy of Advaita, with Special Reference of Bhāratītīrtha-Vidyāraṇya, I suggested that probably Bhāratītīrtha worte the Pañcadasī and the Vivaraṇaprameya-saṅgraha, and not Mādhavācārya, the reputed author of such works as the Parāsara-mādhavīya, etc. The main authority far [sic] making this suggestion is Appayya Dīkṣita's Siddhān-taleśa-saṅgraha where the Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha is ascribed to Bhāratītīrtha, as also the Pañcadasī from which passages are cited, attributing them to Bhāratītīrtha. The passages cited by Appayya Dīkṣita are from the Citradīpa (Ch. V), the Chyānadīpa (Ch. XI), and the Brahmānanda-Yogānanda (Ch. XI). I gave also other evidence in support of my view that Bhāratītīrtha might be considered the author of the Pañcadasī, the Vivaraṇaprameya-saṅgraha, and possibly of the Dṛg-dṛsya-viveka also." See PBV, p.xiv-xv. See also Mahadevan, The Philosophy of Advaita, pp. 1-8.

identity).[43] Māyā then acts as an obscurer of Brahman. It can be described as that power which produces the world appearance, power neither absolutely real nor unreal. Brahman is the absolute real. Māyā then is associated with Brahman. It is associated with that part of Brahman which transforms itself into elements and their modifications. Thus all objects of the world are a complex of Brahman and māyā.[44]

The power which produces the world appearance is Īśvara plus the jīvas--joint creators of the world. Īśvara is the principal parent, the jīva is a subsidiary one. In respect to the world existence, Īśvara is the ground, whereas in respect to enjoyment, the jīva is the locus. The nature of creation for Īśvara is physical, for jīva it is psychical.[45] Before this illustration is carried too far Vidyaranya reminds us that:

> The universal and unitary Self appears to be split up as Īśvara and the jīvas. But in reality the Īśvaratva and the jīvatva are unreal superimpositions of the adjuncts, viz., māyā and the five sheaths. The sheaths were shown to be modifications of māyā. The māyāśakti belongs to Īśvara. It produces the world, regulates and governs it. Because of the reflection of Intelligence in it, it seems to possess consciousness. It appears to be alive and animating. Brahman seems to attain Īśvaratva, because of its apparent association with this śakti. When the five sheaths are superimposed on the Self, it becomes the jīva, the empirical self. But the principle, which appears as Īśvara when it is in association with māyā and as the jīva due to the superimposition of the sheaths, is the same Brahman. This is

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[43]PBV, p. 19.

[44]HIP Vol. II, p. 215.

[45]PBV, pp. 44-5.

comparable to a person becoming father to one and grandfather to another. Apart from the son and the grandson, that person is neither the father nor the grandsire. When we discard māyā and its effects and perceive their non-reality, Brahman is realized to be pure and infinite.[46]

Discussing further the nature of māyā experientially and logically Vidyāraṇya remarks that:

> Māyā which is the material cause of the universe is of the nature of nescience. The evidence for this statement is experience itself. The products of prakṛti are experienced to be inert and delusive by all people from the wise to the ignorant. Inertness, indeed, is that which constitutes the nature of pot, etc; and where the intellect is made blunt, that is called delusion. Sub-specie temporis all persons experience delusion and ignorance. Though immediately and universally experienced, māyā is indeterminable. Logic cannot determine the nature of māyā, which is neither real nor unreal. Māyā is not unreal, because it is manifest; it is not real, because it is sublated. Thus to logic māyā is a riddle. But sub-specie aeternitatis it is unreal. From the point of view of knowledge, māyā is that which is not. To those who have realized the purport of scripture it is not real at any time. For them there is no māyā at all. To the logicians it is like the Sphinx, indeterminable. It can be described neither as real nor as unreal. To the lay men of the world māyā appears to be real. Thus māyā is of three forms, unreal, indeterminable, and real.[47]

The Pañcadaśī of Vidyāraṇya, compared to the Vivaraṇaprameya-saṅgraha, is much easier to understand. The Vivaraṇaprameya-saṅgraha presents itself as a much more closely argued work, centering in great detail on those subjects covered in the Pañcadaśī. Instead of going into these arguments in detail we will give a brief outline of the work by following the comments of the author. The work is

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[46] Ibid., p. 38.

[47] Ibid., p. 71.

divided into four aphorisms made up of nine varnakas. Aphorism one

varnaka one concerns itself with, "The unity with Brahman is the content

of the prescription, through the mediation of the Vedānta; that

together with its fruit was expounded in the previous section."[48] The

second varnaka begins with the statement, "For the prescription 'The

self is to be heard', the direct content is the inquiry concerned with

the Vedānta texts; that [content] is to be expounded in the present

section."[49] Following this, "Here, in the third varnaka, in order

to strengthen [the conclusion about] the commencement of the śastra,

through commenting on the words of the aphorism, the senses of the

words are inquired into."[50] Fourth varnaka: "But the three, however,

viz., the connection, the content and the fruit, were [only] briefly

indicated; in the fourth varnaka all these [three] are objected to

[discussed] and demonstrated."[51] Second Aphorism fifth varnaka and

third aphorism sixth varnaka: "In the second aphorism was stated the

two-fold definition of Brahman. Here is stated by the aphorist the

probans in respect of Brahman's omniscience, in the words 'Because of

being sastra-source.'"[52] The seventh varnaka is a continuation of the

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[48] S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri and Saileswar Sen, trans., _The Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha of Bhāratītīrtha_, (Kumbakonam: Sri Vidya Press, 1941), p. 223. Cited hereafter as VPS.

[49] Ibid., p. 233.

[50] Ibid., p. 277.

[51] Ibid., p. 365.

[52] Ibid., p. 446.

sixth. The fourth aphorism eighth varnaka discusses the validity

of the Vedāntas as a means of valid knowledge in respect of Brahman.[53]

In the ninth varnaka the author refutes the view of those who think

that there is significance in words only when associated with duties.[54].

Thus we have given a brief review of Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha of

Bhāratītīrtha-Vidyāraṇya.

     The last figure with whom we will concern ourselves is the

most important figure among the later post-Śaṅkara Advaitins. He is

Madhusūdana Sarasvati (1500 A. D.)[55] whose major work is his

Advaitasiddhi. In this work he tries to refute the objections raised

by Vyāsatīrtha (in his Nyayāmrta) who is connected with the Madhva

school of Vedānta:

> It seems, however, that the Visiṣṭā-dvaita philosophy
> was not a source of perennial inspiration for the develop-
> ment of ever newer shades of thought, and that the logical
> and dialectical thinkers of this school were decidedly
> inferior to the prominent thinkers of the Śaṅkara and
> Madhva schools. There is hardly anyone in the whole history
> of the development of the school of Rāmānuja whose logical
> acuteness can be compared with that of Jayatīrtha or
> Vyāsatīrtha.[56]

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[53] Ibid., p. 461.   [54] Ibid., p. 483.

[55] Madhusūdana Sarasvati belonged to the family of Sri Rama
Misra of Kotalipada (Dist. Faridpur, Bengal). His father's name was
Pramodana Purandaracarya. Madhusūdana was a Bengali Brahmana of the
Pascatya Vaidika Srini and wrote numerous works in addition to Advaita-
siddhi. He wrote: (1) Gūdhārthadīpika (a commentary of the Gītā), (2)
Advaitaratnarakṣaṇa, (3) Prasthānabhēda, (4) Bhaktirasāyana, (5) Vedānta-
kalpalatika, plus commentaries on: (6) Samkṣepasārīraka, (7) Mahimnās-
totra, (8) Bhāgavata, (9) Dasaśloka or Siddhantabindu. See Introduction
to Advaitasiddhi, Sastri, trans., 1934, cited hereafter as IAS.

[56] HIP Vol. III, p. 111.

Madhusūdana's greatest work *Advaitasiddhi* is divided into four chapters. In the first chapter he proposes the theory that Brahman is given as the central unity around which all revolves. In the second chapter he meets all objections brought against the first chapter and criticizes all rival theories. In chapter three he discusses and delineates the ways and means to attain *Brahmavidyā*. In the fourth and final chapter he recounts the fruits of *Brahmavidyā*.

The relation of Brahman to the world appearance is discussed by Madhusūdana under three points: (1) Brahman: is not subject to negation or sublation at any time, and is existent. (2) Non-entities: subject to eternal negation, and non-existent. (3) The characteristic common to both Brahman and the world-appearance is existence. The characteristic common to both *alika* and the world-appearance is liability to negation. Hence, the world-appearance may be inferred to be both existent and subject to negation or sublation.[57] Thus world-appearance is established as existent and subject to negation or non-existence. This point is brought out more fully in the comparison between the Dvaita and the Advaita on the truth or falsity of the world. Sastri points this out in a chart, the first point of comparison being given as: "Dvaita, (1) In cases of error, *asatkhyati* is recognized, so that the illustration of the shell-silver may not be put forward to establish the falsity of the world; Advaita, (1) In

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[57] IAS, p. 15.

such cases, _anirvacanīyakhyāti_ is admitted, so that the empirical
world may be established as false in an analogy of the instances of
illusion."[58]

> For Madhusūdana:
>
> Brahman which is absolute existence expresses itself in
> and through the concrete manifolds, which, therefore,
> partially share in the quality of existence. The "isness"
> reflected in the world order is to be referred to Brahman
> which forms its ultimate substratum. It is due to the appar-
> ent identity with the permanent substratum Brahman that
> the worldly appearances are cognized as true.[59]

Thus Brahman is seen as the ground upon which the world-appearance
rests. Because this is so and because the world-appearance is
indescribable, Madhusūdana utilizes all five of the various definitions
of falsity given in Advaita. These can be summarized as: (1) Vācaspati
Miśra's--falsity is something quite distinct from both existence and
non-existence. (2) Vivarṇa school--falsity is the absolute non-
existence of a thing in a locus where it appears. (3) Vivaraṇa school--
the falsity is the capability of being sublated by knowledge. (4)
Citsukha--falsity is the appearance of a thing in a locus where it
never existed in the _pāramārthika_ or in its own form. (5) Ānanda-
bodha--falsity is something other than the object of valid knowledge.[60]

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58 _Ibid._, p. 78.

59 A. B. Shastri, _Studies in Post-Śaṁkara Dialectics_, (Calcutta:
University Press, 1936), p. 199. Cited hereafter as _Studies PS._

60 IAS, p. 37.

Madhusūdana then works with all the tools at his disposal to refute the arguments of his opponents. He begins by accepting anirvacanīya-khyāti:

> The world is neither sat or asat. It stands midway between
> the two extremes, sat and asat. It is sat because it
> partially shares in the quality of existence and asat
> because it partially partakes of the character of non-
> existence, for though without a beginning, it has an end
> and will die out. The world is, because it appears to us,
> and also is not, because it will cease to exist ultimately.
> It follows also that avidyā, the cause materia of this
> world exists because it appears to us, and at the same time
> it does not exist because it ultimately dies out of exis-
> tence. So we find that both the world and its cause materia,
> avidyā, are neither being nor non-being but inexperiencable
> in their nature. Madhusudana Sarasvati thus maintains
> that the inexplicable character of nescience is neither
> sat nor asat nor both.[61]

In sum we can say of Madhusūdana that he:

> . . . supports many of the conflicting theories separately
> and independently, implying thereby that any of the theories
> may be resorted to in explaining the indeterminable false
> world, the main interest of the Advaitins being in the
> one absolute Brahman. Thus he analyzes and accepts the
> unity as well as the plurality of the Jīvas, the unity as
> well as the plurality of nesciences, Brahman as well as the
> Jīva as the locus of nescience, the objectivity of the world
> as well as the Vedāntic solipsism (Dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda), and
> so on. He prescribes the different theories for different
> Vedānta students according to their fitness (adhikāra).
> Himself a bhakta, he could easily harmonize bhakti with
> the Advaita doctrine of attributeless Brahman. Thus, just
> after the chapter where he strongly affirms the formless-
> ness of Brahman, he indulges in a highly emotional descrip-
> tion of his deity Kṛṣṇa who, he says, is the "highest"
> known to him.[62]

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[61]Studies PS, p. 287.

[62]CHI, pp. 278-9.

CONCLUSION

Though Śaṅkara said that the world was māyā and was due to
māyā the followers of Śaṅkara could not resist the urge to concep-
tualize the world on this basic concept of māyā. "The latter
treated māyā, not as a concept of value, but as a principle of
explanation and creation. However mysterious it may be, its workings
must have a method, which they wanted to grasp rationally."[63] The
post-Śaṅkara Advaitins turned from a concern about knowledge of
Brahman to the question of the relation between Brahman and māyā.
Three views developed out of the controversy surrounding this problem:
(1) the ābhāsa-vāda or appearance theory, (2) the pratibimba-vāda or
reflection theory, and (3) the avaccheda-vāda or determination theory.
In the first theory, according to Suresvara, Brahman is screened by
avidyā and appears as sakṣin or witness which is the same as Īśvara.
Brahman is also screened by buddhi or intellect and appears as jīva.
In the reflection theory, "Īśvara is a reflection of the Brahman in
māyā and jīva the reflection in avidyā, which is a part of māyā."[64].
In the determination theory, given by Vācaspati,

> Māyā, though not real, can limit the nature of infinite
> Brahman, and jīva is thereby obtained. What is not so
> limited is Īśvara. The same Brahman as the object (viṣaya)
> of avidyā is Īśvara; but the āsraya (locus) of avidyā is

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[63] P. T. Raju, "Post-Śaṅkara", History of Philosophy Eastern
and Western Vol. I, ed. Radhakrishnan, (London: George Allen & Unwin,
1957), p. 292. Cited hereafter as HPEW.

[64] Ibid., p. 295.

jīva. Thus avidyā becomes a determination of jīva and overwhelms him; but it is not a determination of Īśvara, and so He is not overwhelmed by it.[65]

From the epistemological standpoint it is difficult to pass from knowledge of the abstract to knowledge of the concrete:

> In fact, it is somewhat difficult to establish the objective reference of knowledge by starting from knowledge. How knowledge passes from abstract to concrete is what logical intellect cannot fully apprehend. This is an epistemological implication of the māyā doctrine of Śaṁkara . . . . This aspect has been more fully developed in Śaṁkarites than in Śaṁkara.[66]

It has developed because of the need of the Advaita to criticize and refute divergent theories. In this criticism new possibilities opened up for the development of his own theory. This has been seen in this study in terms of dialogue, "Maṇḍana, Sureśvara, Padmapāda and Vācaspati are the creators of four distinct lines of Advaita thought. Each has many followers. But it will not be right to say that these lines developed independently. The lines cross and recross each other; and as fresh problems were created by further controversies, their followers gave independent solution."[67]

We have seen in the course of this study that one of the primary concepts to emerge out of the post-Śaṅkara Advaita is the inexplicable nature of the world-appearance. This development is commented on by A. B. Shastri in his Studies in Post-Śaṁkara Dialectics:

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[65]Ibid., p. 295.

[66]Studies PS, pp. 9-10.

[67]HPEW, p. 290.

According to Samkhya, the cause and effect are identical, because it is the potentiality that comes into actuality. But Advaitism denies this truth and holds that the relation is inexplicable, anirvacanīya. So far as our experience is concerned we can say this much, that the effect cannot be understood independent of its material cause, i.e., pot cannot exist independent of clay. Thus it stands in opposition to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems that hold that the effect is a separate and independent entity. The relation is not identical; because the activity of the agent fails in this affirmation and the expression "the agent makes a think" is emptied of all meaning. Neither can it be considered as bhedabheda as these are two contradictory terms which cannot inhere in the same object at the same time. Hence the nature of the effect is unspeakable or anirvacanīya. This is the view of the Śaṁkarites.[68]

In the Advaita any world-appearance should not be regarded as having independent reality like Brahman. Things appear to us as real because they are kindled with Brahman. They are seeming expressions of reality and not real existence. As Sureśvara remarks, ". . . the world has come out of sat, loses itself in sat, so the entire world is real, but viewed apart from sat is false."[69]

In conclusion then we can say that māyāvāda or avidyāvāda has a threefold implication brought out by the dialectic: (1) The dialectic demonstrates the self-contradictions involved in the nature of thought. (2) The dialectic demonstrates the futility of thinking to know the ultimate truth. (3) The dialectic indirectly stresses the value of the other methods of approach.[70] These implications plus the development of the Advaita on other lines make the Advaita

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[68]Studies PS, pp. 172-3.

[69]Ibid., p. 14.

[70]Ibid., pp. 242-3.

the philosophical system that it is. What we have concentrated on is but one aspect in this system, namely māyāvāda. Māyā is the inexplicable, the mysterious, as A. B. Shastri observes:

> To sum up, the real essence of the Anirvacanīya theory of the Advaita Vedānta as propounded by Samkara in his exposition of Adhyasa, and developed by other advocates of the monistic school, is that appearances are inexplicable and mysterious, as their causi materia avidyā is inexplicable and mysterious in its character. Avidyā as becoming principle creates new appearances in erroneous conception. Objects of normal perception as well come under this category; as the time-space-cause world also owes its origin to the mysterious power of Māyā and is superimposed on the Absolute Being. The principle therefore is the same in the normal and abnormal perception. But the Advaita Vedānta draws a distinction between the false percept and normal percept, the normal percept though superimposed persists to the last while the abnormal one is denied in our pragmatic life.[71]

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[71]Ibid., pp. 242-3.

PART TWO

PHENOMENOLOGICAL INQUIRY

CHAPTER VI

LANGUAGE AND REALITY (NĀMA-RŪPA) IN ADVAITA

LANGUAGE IN ADVAITA

The structure of language in Śaṅkara's thought is grounded in the premise of Vedāntic thinking that the nature of language is apauruṣeya[1] which means non- or trans-personal. This is to say that language originates from Brahman and is one of the primary modes by which realization is gained. Language in its highest participation in Brahman is śruti and at its lowest is idle chatter. In fact not only language but reasoning itself is founded upon śruti for the Advaita:

> Reasoning independent of scripture, says the Vedānta, depends upon the theoretical speculations of individuals, and speculations are unrestricted and devoid of proper foundation. The Vedānta feels called upon to give an epistemological account of this archimedian point. It sees the Veda or Śruti as the foremost pramāṇa (knowledge by the very act of assumption which governs the character of reason). The only role of pramāṇa is to argue itself out of the context of knowledge and let truth remain.[2]

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[1] For a comparative analysis of this concept refer to J. G. Arapura, "Language and Phenomena", Annual Proceedings of the Canadian Society for the Study of Religion, and also J. G. Arapura, "Language and Knowledge: A Vedāntic Examination of a Barthian Issue", Union Seminary Quarterly Review, XXV (Winter 1970), 151-68. Cited hereafter as LP and LK respectively.

[2] LK, p. 162.

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Language then, has a structure which is ultimately dependent and given by Brahman. This language constructs and delineates the Weltanschaung of the Advaita. Language acts always as a participant and pointer to the Real. This is because in the Advaita the concern is about Brahman as such and not about the world or experience. All accurate language is language which is concerned with the acquiring of knowledge of Brahman. Language acts as a pointer to Brahman because it is through language that that which is unspeakable is provisionally spoken. The nature of Brahman is inscrutable:

> Need it be mentioned, therefore, that it is not possible to explain the inscrutable nature of Brahma, without (the help of) the Scriptures? The Puraṇikās also say, similarly —"Do not employ reasoning to entities which are unthinkable. To be beyond the material effects (Prakriti) is the criterion of that which is unfathomable." Therefore, the realization of the supersensuous Brahma, as it is in fact, depends upon the Scriptures as its source.[3]

The Advaita understanding of language grew out of a great heritage of the philosophy and meaning of language. It grew out of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā darśana in its formulation of a cannon of interpretation, especially within the view of Kumārila within that darśana. The vast and complex work of the Grammarian thinkers such as Bhartrhari influenced the thought of the Advaita position.[4] The Buddhists,

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[3]BSB, II.1.27, Apte, p. 332.

[4]For a further study of the whole approach to language in Indian philosophy refer to: Sastri, The Philosophy of Word and Meaning; Iyer, Bhartrhari; Pillai, Vākyapadīya; and Iyer, Sphoṭasiddhi listed in the Bibliography.

with language philosophy as _apohavāda_, provided the antithesis to the
Advaita conception. However, each of these constitutes a system unto
itself, containing an involved analysis of their own roots which is
beyond the present inquiry. Our concentration must center on a less
ambitious task, namely the Advaita view of language and its relation to
nāma-rūpa and māyā.

LANGUAGE AND NĀMA-RŪPA (GENERAL)

The basis of the complex which is called the universe is
found in the construct termed names and forms (nāma-rūpa). These
names and forms are constructs of language, as Śaṅkara observes:

> Brahma appears to become susceptible of (i.e. appears
> to be the basis of) all phenomenal behaviour by way of
> modifications etc. by reason of the distinctions of aspects
> or forms characterized by names and forms imagined through
> Nescience, which are at once both evolved and unevolved, and
> about whom it is not possible to predicate that they either
> are or are not Brahma, while in its truest nature Brahma
> subsists only in its unmodified aspect, and is beyond
> all phenomenal behaviour, and, as names and forms imagined
> through Nescience are but merely made current by speech,
> the fact that Brahma has no parts is not thereby vitiated.
> Besides, on the one hand this Scriptural statement about
> the modification (of Brahma) is not meant to propound the
> fact of modification itself, as such realization is not
> understood to have any fruits as such, while on the other
> hand it _is_ intended to establish how Brahma which is the
> Self of all is devoid of any _real_ phenomenal behaviour, as
> it is understood that a fruit results by such realization.[5]

and further:

> Because (the world i.e. everything) is created out of
> this (i.e. the word). It is out of this Scriptural word,
> indeed, that this world i.e. everything including the

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[5]BSB, II.1.27, Apte, p. 333.

Gods etc. is creator. . . . Similarly we understand that
before creation, Vedic words occurred to Prajāpati the
creator and thereafter he created the objects according
to those words. That the Scriptures also say similarly
viz. that he uttered the word "Bhūh" and created the Earth--
which shows that words such as "Bhūh" etc. first occurred
to the mind as words, and from them the words "Bhūh" etc.
were afterwards created.[6]

But this abiding of name and form in language does not constitute
either the essence or origin of nāma-rūpa. We have just observed
that their essence is Brahman. Concerning the location or residence
of name and form Śaṅkara asserts that:

. . . The Sūtrakāra replies--"But the apt arrangement
of names and forms". The word "But" refutes the opponent's
view. The evolving of names and forms by one who makes
the triple agglomeration, indicates the Lord, because the
Scriptures indicate that the agency which makes the
triple agglomeration can indubitably belong to Him only.
This evolving of names and forms such as the fire, the Sun
the Moon, and the lightning, or of Kusha-grass, Kāsha-
grass, Palāsha tree or beasts or deer or man, is of various
sorts, in so far as every species and every individual
is considered in it, and it deserves to be the handiwork
of the Lord alone, who is the creator of Teja, Water and
the Earth. Whence is it so? Because of such instructions
in the Scriptures. After the opening sentence "That this
deity thought", and by the use of the first person singular,
viz. "I shall evolve", the instruction given is that this
evolving is the handiwork of the Highest Brahma alone.[7]

Name and form are evolved from the Lord or Īśvara. They reside in
him because of nescience and the world is created, preserved and
reabsorbed into him. In answer to an objection Śaṅkara remarks that:

. . . the omniscience (of Brahma as the Lord) depends
upon the evolving of the seed of the nature of names and
forms which are the result of Nescience, and on the

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[6] Ibid., I.3.28, pp. 187-90.

[7] Ibid., II.4.20, pp. 524-5.

Scriptural passage--"The Ākāsha was born of this very
Self" (T aiū. 2.1), and that the origin, preservation
and resorption of the world proceed·from the Lord who
is of an eternally pure, wise, and free nature, and neither
from the non-sentient Pradhāna nor from any other things,
is what is declared (by the Sūtrakāra) by the Sūtra--
"From whom is the origin etc. of this world" (Bra. Sū.
I.i.4).[8]

But we must not confuse the issue, for just as the Lord, as it were,

evolves the name and form from out of his mind, it is not an actual

modification (pariṇāma) of Brahman. The Advaita darśana disagrees

with this view and speaks rather of a seeming modification, an

apparent one, but not an actual modification of Brahman. The Advaita

maintains a seeming modification (vivarta) of Brahman because the

basis of the construct of name and form is found in nescience. In

fact it is made current by speech:

Brahma appears to become susceptible of (i.e. appears to
be the basis of) all phenomenal behaviour by way of
modifications etc., by reason of the distinctions of aspects
or forms characterized by names and forms imagined through
Nescience, which are at once both evolved and unevolved,
and about whom it is not possible to predicate that they
either are or are not Brahma, while in its truest nature
Brahma subsists only in its unmodified aspect; and is
beyond all phenomenal behaviour, and, as names and forms
imagined through Nescience are but merely made current by
speech, the fact that Brahma has no parts is not thereby
vitiated. Besides, on the one hand this Scriptural state-
ment about the modification (of Brahma) is not meant to
propound the fact of modification itself, as such
realization is not understood to have any fruit as such,

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[8]Ibid., II.1.14, p. 310.

while on the other hand it is intended to establish how
Brahma which is the Self of all is devoid of any real
phenomenal behaviour, as it is understood that a fruit
results by such realization.[9]

However in fact Brahman is absolutely changeless and does not contain

any conception of "becoming":

. . . because it has been particularized as being abso-
lutely unchangeable. It is not possible, that one and
the same unchangeable Brahma can at one and the same time
be the substratum of many (opposite) qualities, such as
being fixed and yet capable of movement. We have already
said that Brahma is unchangeable and eternal because of
the denial (by the Scriptures) of its undergoing any modi-
fication. Nor is it, that just as the realization of the
doctrine of Brahma being the only one Self leads to the
fruit of Final Release, the knowledge that it is capable
of modification in the form of this world also leads to
some other independent fruit, because there is no authority
for it.[10]

Brahman is, however, the ground of the manifestation of names

and forms for, as we know, there is nothing else but Brahman. This is

the conjecture of scripture as we see in Brahma Sūtra I.3.41:

The Ākāsha (is Brahma) because of the mention of its
being different (from names and forms).--41.

To which Saṅkara comments:

A Scriptural passage mentions--"Ākāsha, verily, is the
revealer of names and forms. That within which these
(names and forms) are (contained) is Brahma, that is
immortal, that is the Self" (Chhan. 8.14.1).
. . . It is the Highest Brahma alone that deserves to
be expressed by the term Ākāsha. Why so? Because of the
mention of its being a different entity (from names and
forms) etc. The passage "That within which these (names
and forms) are contained" indicates the Ākāsha as being
something different from names and forms, because the

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[9]Ibid., II.1.28, p. 333.

[10]Ibid., II.1.14, p. 309.

creation as such is precisely evolved by names and forms.
Besides, the unfettered and free revelation of names and
forms is not possible in the case of anything other than
Brahma, because the Scriptures have mentioned the crea-
tive agency (Kartritva) of Brahma thus--"I will now
enter (the creations) by the Jīva-Self and evolve names
and forms" (Chhān. 6.3.2).[11]

By the use of illustration Sankara points out that just as one can

know a jar by its derivation out of a clod of earth, just so, when one

knows Brahman one understands the concept of creation:

> As for this word "Ārambhaṇa", the Scriptures, after de-
> claring that by knowing the one (i.e. Brahma) everything
> else becomes known, and with a desire to cite an illus-
> tration, says--"Oh mild one, just as by knowing one clod
> of earth, everything that is made of earth becomes known.
> The effect (viz. a pot etc.) is merely a name made current
> by speech, while that it is earth merely, is the truth"
> (Chhān. 6.1.1). By this is meant that when a clod of
> earth is understood to be in essence but mere earth only,
> all things made of earth such as a jar, a trough and a
> water-pot, automatically become known, because, having
> the earth as their Self is common (to them all), and
> hence it is (that it is said) than an effect is merely a
> name made current by speech, and its existence as an effect
> is because of speech only. The effect viz. a jar or a
> trough or a water-pot is not in existence substantially
> as an effect as such; but is merely a name, and is false or
> untrue, and that it merely is but earth only, is the truth.
> This is stated as an illustration of Brahma. Therefore,
> because of the word "Ārambhaṇa" occuring in the Scriptures,
> it is understood that, in the case of the thing illustra-
> ted also, all creation as a class as such, has no exis-
> tence as apart from Brahma.[12]

The cause of the material world is understood to be the lower

Brahman, or Īśvara:

> Scriptural passages such as--"He who is omniscient in
> the comprehensive sense and who perceives everything in

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[11] Ibid., I.3.41, p. 216.

[12] Ibid., II.1.14, p. 303.

detail and whose penance is knowledge and from whom the
Brahma, names and forms and food were created" (Mund.
1.1.9.)--which have the purport of conveying that the
omniscient Lord is the cause (of the transient world),
should be adduced as instances.[13]

In addition when absorption (prayala) occurs at the end of the cycle
the names and forms return to their prior condition residing in
Īśvara's mind as seeds (bija):

> . . .this very transitory world divided into various
> entities by names and forms, was fit to be indicated by
> the word "Avyakta", when after having given up all its
> names and forms (which made it manifest) it relapses
> into its antecedent condition of a potential seed.[14]

This seed is seen as consisting of the nature of nescience which is
the same as māyā:

> . . . This potential power of the seed is of the nature
> of nescience, and it is indicated by the word "undeveloped"
> (Avyakta), and has the Highest Lord as its basis, and is
> of the nature of an illusion (Māyā). . .[15]

Thus the aspect of the complex of name and form is based in māyā. As
such they are manifestations of the Real, i.e. Brahman, and are not
something arising out of nothing. As is commented on by Dr.
Radhakrishnan:

> The forms are manifestations of the Real, not arbi-
> trary inventions out of nothing. Form, rūpa, is the
> revelation of the formless a-rūpa. Nāma, name, is not
> the word by which we describe the object, but is the
> power or the character of reality which the form of a
> think embodies. The infinite is nameless for it in-
> cludes all names. . . .16

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[13]Ibid., I.1.5, p. 38.

[14]Ibid., I.4.2, p. 226.

[15]Ibid., I.4.3, p. 227.

[16]PU, p. 87.

The name-form complex then is taught in the Vedānta (Upaniṣads)

as abiding in the Lord:

> This is the conclusion derived from all the Upaniṣads,
> viz., that the evolving of names and forms is the Lord's
> handiwork, because of such passages as "The Ākāsha verily
> is the revealer of names and forms" (Chhān. 6.14.1).
> Therefore, this evolving of names and forms is the handi-
> work of the Highest Lord who makes the triple agglomera-
> tion. . .[17]

We have observed that true language or Veda is primary in

relation to names and forms.[18] By definition the nature and meaning

of language within the Advaita darśana has its roots in forms, Dr.

Arapura explains:

> Language is the expression of the forms, and hence the
> Veda is composed in language. But inso far as language
> is rooted in the forms, it is not defined as human or other.
> Language is not an attribute of man or vice-versa; it
> is simply the case that they coalesce dynamically in the
> forms. Hence there is no problem of relating divine reve-
> lation to human language through the interrelation of
> two kinds of will and two kinds of act. Only the Veda is
> true language. For incorporeal beings like the gods,
> revelation is manifest of itself, but for man it is knowable
> only through human language.[19]

It is not possible to say that the name-form complex is one

with Brahman or that it is different from Brahman:

> It is declared by both the Scriptures and the Smritis,
> that names and forms which are imagined through Nescience
> and which are as it were the Self of the Omniscient Lord,
> and about which it is impossible to say, either that they
> are one with Brahma or that they are different from it,

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[17]BSB, II.4.20, Apte, p. 525.

[18]This is not to imply an identity between language and Brahman
as we have in the Grammarian schools or language philosophies. This is
absolutely rejected by the Advaita.

[19]LK, p. 161.

and which are the seeds of this entire expanse of trans-
migratory existence, are the illusion-causing power and
nature (Prakriti) of the Lord.[20]

Neither can it be maintained that names and forms exist in any

absolute sense:

> Hence that (the conventional) distinction between the
> cognitional Jīva-Self and the Highest Self is due to the
> limiting adjuncts such as the body etc., which are produced
> by names and forms, which are projected by Nescience, and
> which do not exist in the absolutely real sense, is what
> should be understood by those who are the adherents of
> the Vedānta view, on the strength of the following Scrip-
> tural passages--"'Sat' alone was in the beginning, the only
> one without a second" (Chhān. 6.2.1), "All this is the Ātmā
> (Self)", (Chhān. 7.25.2), "All this is Brahma" (Muṇḍ.
> 2.2.11), "All this is that which is the Self" (Brih. 2.4.6),
> "There is no seer other than this" (Brih. 3.7.23), "There
> is no other seer, but this (Self)" (Brih. 3.8.11).[21]

Brahman alone exists in the absolute sense. All else exists, as it

were, because of Brahman. In fact within the above quote the "as it'

were" is an interesting conception. This is noted by Paul Deussen in

his Philosophy of the Upaniṣads where he notes that, "Strictly

speaking, such an 'as it were' or iva should be supplied to every

page and every line in which the Upanisads are concerned with some-

thing other than atman."[22] This statement also holds true for the

Brahma Sūtra commentary for the Brahma Sūtra is not an inquiry into

name and form but an "inquiry into Brahman".

> It is not here intended to speak at length about the
> creation. We neither see nor find it mentioned by the
> Scriptures that any particular consummation devoutly to
> be wished for by man (Purushārtha) is bound up with it.

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[20] Ibid., II.1.14, p. 310.   [21] Ibid., I.4.22, p. 267.

[22] P. Deussen, Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, trans. A. S. Geden,
(New York: Dover Publications, 1966), p. 158.

> nor is it possible to imagine so, because it is under-
> stood from the introductory and concluding portions, that
> the details about creation are in complete conformity with
> passages in various places dealing with Brahma. The
> Scriptures further do indicate how the account of the
> creation in extenso has the purpose of making one under-
> stand Brahma from it. . .[23]

LANGUAGE AND BRAHMAN

In the uniqueness of the nature of language in the Advaita darśana, the complex of name and form emerges as an expression of Iśvara. Iśvara is the phenomenalization of Brahman from the perspec-tive of the name-form complex. This is to say that the ideas or seeds present in the mind of Iśvara must be amplified to be understood. This activity is performed by language. Language itself is grounded in name and form because of the eternality of the Veda. But it is at the same moment the continuation of name and form. In fact name and form and language exist as long as one wishes it so. Language, then, is not the essence of Brahman even though language may be sacred (śruti). So the function of sacred language is referential, it refers to Brahman; it always acts as a pointer beyond itself to Brahman. Language makes possible the transcendence of itself by making itself fulfill its function of transparency. Thus we move through language to knowledge of Brahman which understands language pri-marily as "an inquiry into Brahman".

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[23]BSB, I.4014, Apte, p. 251.

LANGUAGE AND MĀYĀ

We noted earlier in this study the idea that the central question within the Advaita centered on how one speaks about that which is beyond language. Two possible means to answering this question were briefly discussed, the via positiva and the via negitiva. Another approach, which is more basic, is the utilization of language as discourse. This aspect of language follows from the view that true language is Veda and true speaking is by extention speaking so that the ground of speech is made the referent. This is using language as discourse about Brahman. As Dr. Arapura remarks:

> . . . the central objective of the Vedānta in the advaitic form, which is to explain how speaking about Brahman, the Ultimate Reality, is made possible. The Vedanta knows that philosophy is about Brahman, not about the world or experience. Knowledge about these latter things arises as modes of the knowledge of Brahman. The inalienable connecting link is discourse itself.[24]

This discourse takes place at all times Within the predicament of ignorance or avidyā for it is through ignorance that one moves toward knowledge of Brahman. Avidyā is, for Advaita, the "sense of the wrongness of existence" and when it is:

> Rendered into the language of phenomenology, avidyā may be described as the existential fact of consciousness as it confronts itself. Tat tvam asi means then that the transcendent essence of consciousness is ātman but whenever this truth is verbally expressed there will be a logical contravention of the existential fact of consciousness confronting itself, although the facticity of the fact cannot be

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[24]MDAB, p. 112.

intentionally purported. Distinction will not have to
by presupposed if the truth remains strictly implicit.
Undoubtedly, implicit truth is what is intended in śruti
statements, but stated truth presupposes extension and
therefore distinction. But is there a way in which implicit
truth can remain implicit? There seems to be no direct way
whatsoever. Nevertheless the irony of having to make
implicit truth explicit may sometimes by dramatically
expressed in silence.[25]

Dr. Arapura continues:

> The difference between speech and silence is the
> analogical measure of the difference between Brahman
> with distinction and Brahman without distinction. The
> difference measured thus is māyā: here is the signifi-
> cance of the etymology of the word, from mā, to measure.
> It thus becomes very instructive to note that Śankara
> himself concludes his narration of the episode with an
> explanatory quotation from smrti. "The cause, O Nārada,
> of perceiving me as possessing the qualities of all beings
> is tha māyā produced by me; (but) thou shouldst not know
> (think of) me as such".[26]

Thus the idea of māyā, along with avidyā, must be reconsidered when

we approach the Advaita understanding of Śankara. The Advaita of

Śankara has always understood the definite relation between māyā and

avidyā and in fact within Śankara there is no differentiation between

them except:

> Śankara himself, who, it seems, on the one hand, thought
> of māyā as the structure of discourse about Brahman,
> keeping in view the character of Brahman, revealed in
> śruti, and therefore as the logos of the world, and, on
> the other, thought of avidyā as that which informs māyā.
> The idea of distinguishing the two even in a methodological
> manner clearly found no place in his thinking.[27]

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[25]Ibid., p. 115.

[26]Ibid., p. 115.

[27]Ibid., p. 116.

Thus language must be seen primarily as discourse about Brahman and the implicit concern then is not the removal of the world but rather with the speaking of that which cannot be reached by speech. There is no denial of the world:

> Simply in the interest of accurate exposition, not partisan defense, a very wide-spread misunderstanding needs to be dispelled. Māyā does not mean denial of the world. The ultimate non-being of the world does not have to be stated as a theory, as it is strictly implied in the very definition of Brahman itself. As a theory it only seeks to translate the implicit into the explicit, thereby necessitating the complete phenomenological tracing, or retracing, of the paths through which the world-appearance has come into being. Māyā, therefore, is a provisional recovery of the world so that its ultimate non-being, along with Brahman 's being, may be spoken.[28]

This is implied by Śaṅkara when he writes:

> It would be reasonably sustainable to understand that prior to the realization of Brahma as the Self of all, all transactions (of the phenomenal world) for the time being are real enough, even as the transactions in dreams are real enough (for the time being) until waking consciousness returns. As long as the truth of the one-ness of the Self is not realized, the knowledge, that all these effects, i.e. modifications, as characterized by the means-of-proof, the thing to be known, and the fruit, are unreal, does not arise in any one, and on the other hand, people in general under the influence of Nescience, consider these effects or modifications as being their own Selfs, viz., that this body is myself, or that this

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[28] Ibid., p. 119. Also in "Realistic Idealism", Contemporary Indian Philosophy, p. 318, Hiralal Haldar states; "Epistemologically, Śaṅkara is a thorough-going realist . . . All that he maintains is that ultimately, from the highest point of view it (empirical world) has no independent existence apart from Brahman. Both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja maintain that even illusions are not unreal and merely subjective. They are as objective as the things of ordinary perception, the only difference being that they are not common to all, but individual and last only as long as they are experienced . . . ."

is mine, by ignoring their own Brahmic nature. There-
fore, prior to the realization of Brahman as the Self of
all, all worldly and religious transactions based on the
Scriptures, are reasonably sustainable i.e. valid, even
as an ordinary man, while he is asleep and dreaming, sees
all the high and low entities, and definitely considers
his experiences quite as real as they are when they are
directly perceived, and has no notion, then, of their
having only an un-real appearance (of direct perception).[29]

The world arises and maintains itself because of avidyā and māyā for

if one were to gain knowledge of Brahman this predicament would no

longer exist.   Another way of stating this is to say that by know-

ledge of Brahman all things are known in their true perspective.   In

fact when one knows Brahman one understands that there is nothing else

to be concerned with.

Just as in the ordinary world, when an injunction to
perform a sacrifice is given, it is necessary to know with
what (material) and how one should perform the sacrifice,
but when it is said "That thou art" or "I am Brahma" and one
understands how the Atma i.e. Brahma is the Self of all,
there is nothing which need be known beyond that, for
it is only when there still remains something which ought
to be known, that there can be any further desire to know,
and as apart from one's unity with the Self nothing still
remains which one would further want to know.[30]

Thus we have the requisite of "an inquiry into Brahman".

MĀYĀ AS DISCOURSE ABOUT BRAHMAN

As we have observed above "true language" is considered to be

śruti and "true speaking" is discourse about Brahman.   We also noted

that this discourse takes place within the name-form complex which in

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[29]BSB,II.1.14, Apte, pp. 306-7.

[30]Ibid., II.1.14, p. 308.

turn is spoken of as the framework of māyā. Māyā can be seen as the frame of the condition of the cosmos. It is that aspect of reality which contains a two-fold function. On the one hand māyā has its foundation in Brahman because of its potential to render itself transparent to knowledge of Brahman; on the other hand māyā has an attraction element that draws the viewer deeper into its structure as the frame of the cosmos. There is always the aspect which can provide for the continuation of samsāra.

As discourse about Brahman, māyā is an inquiry. In this inquiry we do not inquire into the nature of māyā itself because to do so is to engage in the continuation of samsāra which is not the proper perspective for the Advaita. This has exactly been the problem in certain interpretations of the Advaita conception of māyā. They understand māyā as something outside of Brahman.

Brahman is the referent of māyā and as such can never be omitted as the necessary element within which language and the name-form complex are substantiated. Māyā can be said to be the cosmic myth:

> . . . Māyā is myth, the most generalized myth possible,
> the unbounded frame, the structure of all myths, unified
> into a single interpretative system. To permit myself a
> little rhetoric, it is the fathomless, boundless ocean,
> from which all things come and into which all things go.
> One may object that this last is the kind of talk that one
> makes about Brahman. Yes, precisely that is the point.
> . . . meaning that whatever is said about Brahman is said
> in causal, ontological and teleological (or rather escha-
> tological) terms of the world, is that under conditions of
> avidyā=existence Brahman talk also turns out to be māyā talk.[31]

[31] J. G. Arapura, "Māyā and the Discourse about Brahman",
privately circulated seminar paper, pp. 2-3.

NATURE OF REALITY IN ŚAŃKARA

When we approach the nature of the Real in the Advaita we have, as it were, answered the question before it is asked. But this comment leads into problems for we find two distinguishable sets of elements contributing to this confusion. These are Brahman, as seen as creator and Lord over the world within whom māyā as power (śakti) resides, and Brahman, who can be discussed by the negative description neti, neti. The first form of Brahman is termed saguṇa Brahman or also aparā Brahman. The second form is termed nirguṇa Brahman or parā Brahman and is beyond the name-form complex. But the differentiation between is merely one which is made current by speech for, "This same identical Brahman is understood to be propounded everywhere."[32]. Thus when the Sūtra speaks of Brahman as cause or through whom the language of the Veda and the manifestation of the cosmos appears they are strictly speaking through myth and actually intending discourse about Brahman. If one speaks of the function of the world without recourse to any substantial conception, namely Brahman, then one is involved in speculation which does not lead one into an inquiry into Brahman but takes them deeper into the frame and structure of name and form.

> When a person entertains a notion that his body etc.--
> which are not the Self--are the Self, it is Nescience
> (Avidyā). This leads to attachment (Rāja) for the wor-
> ship etc. of the body, and to hatred towards things which
> cause injury etc., to fear and delusion of mind at the

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[32]BSB,III.3.33, Apte, p. 678. See also Deussen, The System of Vedanta.

prospect of its destruction, and this continuous stream
of manifold evils of countless different sorts, is directly
known to us all. Conversely, this abode of the Heaven
and the Earth, which is referred to as relevant to the
present context, is indicated as that which is to be
attained by those who have attained Final Release from such
faults as Nescience, attachment and hatred, etc. How
(is it so indicated)? Because, after mentioning, "The
knots of the Hridaya are cut asunder and all doubts are
resolved, and the Karma (aggregate of actions) of a person
is exhausted when this (Brahma) which itself is both the
cause (Para) and the effect (Avara) is realized (by a
person)" (Muṇḍ. 2.2.8), the Scriptures say--"So the person
who has realized (Brahma) and who is released from (the
bondage of) names and forms, reaches the celestial Purusha
(i.e. the Highest Self) which is greater than the great
unmanifested" (Avyakta . . .[33]

Within the Advaita then we find a kind of freedom, for those
who wish to bear its consequences, to engage in speculation or tarka.
The outcome of this speculation is the bondage of the wheel of
saṁsāra. This bondage can be overcome not by works, as is the case
in the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā, but only through knowledge. This knowledge is
one which can begin with the correct inquiry:

> . . . because there is but one and only one Brahma and it
> is of one uniform nature. That there could be a variety
> in the nature of Vidyās in the case of Brahma which is
> of one uniform nature, is not possible. If an entity
> is of one nature, and the knowledge of such entity is of
> a different nature, such knowledge can only be of an illusory
> nature. Now, again Brahma being but one and one only,
> if different Vijnānas (i.e. Vidyās or Upāsanās or Cognitions)
> of it are intended to be expounded by the Vedānta texts,
> then only one of them could be free from doubt, and the rest
> would necessarily be doubtful, and thus the predicament
> of a distrust of the Vedānta texts would result. Therefore
> it cannot be possible to entertain a doubt as to whether
> there are differences in the Vidyās relating to Brahma
> in the Vedānta texts, nor can it be maintained (even if
> it be so doubted) that because of the uniformity of

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[33]Ibid., I.3.2., p. 145.

injunctions, there is non-difference between them, because
the knowledge of Brahma is characterized by the absence
of any such injunction about it (unlike the case of Dharma
in Pūrva-Mīmāṅsā). It has already been said by the Āchārya
(i.e. the Sūtrakāra)--in the Sūtra "But that (Brahma is
to be known from the Scriptures) is established, because
(all Vedānta texts) have that connected sequence" (Bra. Su.
I.1.4.)--that the knowledge of Brahma supervenes, not
through passages which purport to give injunctions (to
act), but through passages about Brahma which culminate
in the realization of Brahma as an entity. So how can
any such discussion either about the difference or non-
difference (between the Vidyās) be at all started?[34]

Language leads us to an understanding of reality, which is language

as śruti:

> If parā Brahman is neti, neti there can be no vidyā
> (instructional technique) or language adequate to it: that
> it is so is evident from Śankara's writings. But this
> truth too has to be brought under some devices of
> instruction and even of expression. Then the distinction
> between the parā vidyā and aparā vidyā must be seen merely
> as a convention necessary for such devices, and not in
> any way suggesting a one-to-one correspondence with parā
> Brahman and aparā Brahman respectively. Śankara makes
> it clear that the purport of all statements are the
> parā Brahman or paramātman, . . . Then the question arises
> why there should be negative statements in some places and
> positive statements in other places. Answer: In some
> places characteristics of a positive injunctional nature
> are mentioned (as in BSS III.iii.11) and in others negative
> conceptions are mentioned (as in BSS.III.iii.32) for the
> reason that such different considerations (cintābhedaḥ)
> will facilitate a full and detailed treatment of the subject
> of Brahman (parā, that is).[35]

The injunctional elements and the negative elements should be taken

as discourse about Brahman so that the subject can be treated fully.

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[34] Ibid., III.3.1, p. 618-19.

[35] J. G. Arapura, "Two Distinguishable Sets of Elements
Contributing to the Building of Śankara's 'System'", seminar paper,
27 Nov. 72, privately circulated, p. 1.

Thus language as śruti is the highest discourse form. Also we have previously observed that the distillation of śruti has taken place in the Advaita so that the essence of scripture about Brahman can be encapsulated. These encapsulations of śruti are the mahāvāṅkyā statements, most notable of which is "That art thou" or Tat ṭvam asi, which is rendered into the formula Brahman=Ātman. These statements are not to be confused as signifying any injunction for this they do not demand. They state something else, namely that we have forgotten what we are and instead have become infatuated with the frame of maya. Thus "true language" opens the way to the understanding of the ultimate mystery. As Dr. Arapura observes:

> Śankara knows that parā Brahman is the ultimate mystery
> to be taught by the Vedānta, and he brings about a
> continuation of the vidyās into new methodological expres-
> sions. The purpose of the method is precisely to do what
> the word . . . indicates. Recall Ch. Up. 6.14. "As a man
> who has been brought blindfolded from the country of the
> Gandhavas and then set free in the wilderness, goes astray
> to the east or north or south, . . . but after someone
> has removed the blindfold and told him, 'in this direction
> lies the country of the Gandhavas, go in this direction',
> instructed and prudent, asking the road from village to
> village he finds the way home, even so the man who in this
> world has met with a teacher, becomes aware 'to this
> (world) shall I belong only till I am released, whereupon
> I shall go home'." The Vedānta (or the Vedāntas in the
> older sense) takes the place of the teacher, but is no more
> a resident of the "home country" than the kindhearted man,
> who removes the blindfolded person's blindfold and points
> to him the right direction is a resident of Gandhava.
> The Vedānta has two essential functions to perform, (1)
> to logically elaborate (or even describe) the home-country,
> its essential character--pointing to the right direction,
> and (2) to be a guide to the wayfarer and to keep him on
> the right road and therefore to be present at every village
> . . . to guide him along.[36]

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[36]Ibid., p. 2.

REALITY AND THE WORLD

To ask a question about the origins of the world in the
Advaita is to sort out, as it were, the logical element of the
cosmogonical and cosmological so that the question opens itself to
inquiry into Brahman. The cosmogonical and cosmological elements
are analogues to true language in that they open up the possibility
for the removal of ignorance.

> Strange as it may sound, māyāvāda implies a very strong
> affirmation of the reality of the world. In this respect
> it goes exactly as far as empiricism would want to go.
> No empiricist ever ascribes absolute reality to the world
> in any case. Analogical reasoning itself, which is so
> important in Vedānta philosophy, is based on the reality
> of the perceived world as it is on the reliability of
> experience. This is how one prefers the report of
> perceptions of the waking state to those of the dreaming
> state as clues to Reality. Likewise the real rope seen
> as rope rather than as snake, is truer to fact. The
> genuine philosopher must respect fact as against the
> would-be philosopher who denies what he sees.[37]

The world is the experiential grasping in everyday life of
the name-form complex. It is the presentation of a kind of snare by
which one becomes entangled in bondage. So questions about the
world and its creation are secondary, as modes of discourse about
Brahman. As such they contain the tendency to lead one deeper into
the structure of the world itself. But it is exactly by travelling
through the activity of this world that there arises the possibility
of liberation. This is so because language and the world act as
pointers to their respective grounding in Brahman. Thus the world,
as it is actually or ideally perceived, is the common myth which

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[37]MDAB, p. 111.

is experienced and it is through this myth that we see that:

> To treat māyā as illusion is to misunderstand it. Truly
> speaking, it is the cosmic condition of which illusion
> is the model. All descriptions of māyā are given through
> analogy with human illusory experiences but to identify
> the terms of analogy is to mistake its purpose. Śankara
> is very emphatic about the factual reality of the things
> that are mistaken for something else. The rope that is
> seen as snake is the objective foundation of the illusion.
> Likewise, to reverse it, the water that we see in a mirage
> is unreal but the water that we use is real.[38]

MĀYĀ AND REALITY

Some have understood māyā as the "other" which is opposed to

Brahman and have read the Advaita as maintaining the existence of

two as Real as opposed to the non-dual. This is possible when one

does not understand māyā as ignorance of knowledge of Brahman and

instills it with a reality apart from Brahman. This confusion

probably arises out of a confusion in the reading of the nature of

language and name and form. It could be that this is where much

criticism of the Advaita originates. In this one can see that the

conception of māyā as illusion would have a place. But if we under-

stand māyā as myth and the cosmic condition of which illusion is the

model and relate both of these to the world by way of analogues, the

confusion would cease to exist.

We may say for purposes of illustration that māyā exists, as

it were, like a veil which is draped over a doorway. One has the

option of remaining in the room from which one is observer or one may

pass through to the outside. But there is more to the illustration,

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[38]Ibid., p. 120.

for this veil is a beautiful panorama of changing exotic visions of
bright hue and psychedelic colours. As such it is fascinating to
observe and tends to shift its picture from one subject to another,
or so it seems. It has a hypnotic effect and assails our senses
with its power. But it is just a veil over a doorway and the
correction is the Advaita approach to the understanding of māyā as
the veil over the door.[39] Māyā measures out the illustration by
recalling our attention to the fact that this is a passageway. In
this recalling the correct inquiry takes place. Māyā acts as the
veil and the passageway. As the veil it is the conceptualization of
language and the name-form complex. As the passageway it is inquiry
into Brahman. In this latter aspect māyā is the measure of the
immeasurable.[40] Māyā acts as a pointer to Brahman through analogues
of world experience in reference to knowledge of Brahman.

MĀYĀ AND NAME AND FORM

Māyā is the base from which the name and form complex (the
world) arises. In defining the reality of the name-form complex[41] the
Advaita states that the name-form cannot be said to be Brahman nor

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[39] Interview with T. R. V. Murti in Banaras, February 1974.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Name-form (nāma-rūpa) occurs together in the Brahma Sūtra
Bhāṣya twenty-six times: I.1.2, I.1.5, I.1.6, I.1.22, I.2.14, I.3.2,
I.3.17, I.3.18, I.3.41, I.3.42, I.4.9, I.4.14, I.4.15, I.4.21, I.4.22,
II.1.14, II.1.21, II.1.27, II.2.19, II.3.17, II.4.20, III.2.14,
III.3.1, III.3.26, IV.2.16, IV.3.14. See T. M. P. Mahadevan, Word
Index to the Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya of Śaṅkara Part Two, (Madras: Centre
of Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, 1973), pp. 509-
510.

can it be said that it is non-different from Brahman.[42]   In the Advaita

the name-form complex is defined by the technical term anirvacanīya

which can be translated as "undefinable with regard to Brahman".

Within the Sūtra bhāsya Śankara uses the word anirvacanīya three

times:

> (1) I.1.5 Those names and forms--we reply--which are
> yet unevolved (avyākrita), but which are intended to
> be evolved, and with regard to whom it is not possible
> to say whether they are the same or different from Īśvara--
> are such objects.[43]

The above quote of Śankara is against the opponents (in this instance

the Samkhya) question concerning the Lord's object of knowledge before

creation of the world.

> (2) II.1.14 It is declared by both the Scriptures and
> the Smritis, that names and forms which are imagined through
> Nescience and are as it were the Self of the Omniscient
> Lord, about which it is impossible to say, either that
> they are one with Brahma or that they are different from it,
> and which are the seeds of this entire expanse of trans-
> migratory existence, are the illusion-causing power of the
> nature (prakriti) of the Lord.[44]

This response is one which is directed to the Samkhya opponents'

question about the contradiction of scriptures when it is asserted

that there is non-duality and oneness.

> (3) II.1.28 Brahma appears to become susceptible of
> (i.e. appears to be the basis of) all phenomenal behavior
> by way of modifications etc., by reason of the distinctions
> of aspects or forms characterized by names and forms

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[42]See Chapter Five pp.

[43]BSB, I.1.5, Apte, pp. 39-40.

[44]Ibid., II.1.14, p. 310.

⎰ imagined through Nescience, which are at once both
⎱ evolved and unevolved, and about whom it is not possible
⎰ to predicate that they either are or are not Brahma, while
⎱ in its truest nature Brahma subsists only in its unmodi-
fied aspect, and is beyond all phenomenal behaviour, and,
as names and forms imagined through Nescience are but merely
made current by speech, the fact that Brahma has no parts
is not thereby vitiated. . . .[45]

This denies the conception of parts of Brahman to which the opponent

raises objection.

The conception of anirvacanīya in the Advaita of Śankara has

been discussed by N. K. Devaraja in his Introduction to Śankara's

Theory of Knowledge.[46] In this book Dr. Devaraja discusses the term

anirvacanīya and following the popular interpretation of the word he

understands it as an adjective modifying the world. He concludes

that Śankara does not deny the possibility of the knowledge of the

world but rather its desirability.[47] But this is not exactly the

point for Śankara, as has been observed by Sengaku Mayeda in a review

of Dr. Devaraja's book.[48] Mayeda disagrees with Devaraja on the

popular interpretation of anirvacanīya. He comments:

When we rely only upon Śankara's works and disregard his
commentators' interpretations, we find the term anirva-
canīya occuring only as an adjective modifying the unevolved
name and form (avyākṛte   nāmarūpa) which are used
in the sense of the primary material of the world . . .[49]

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[45] Ibid., II.1.28, p. 333.

[46] Refer to Chapter Four and STK, pp. 158-63 ff.

[47] STK, p.

[48] S. Meyeda, Journal of the American Oriental Society, 86.4,
(1966), pp. 431-33.

[49] Ibid., p. 432.

In regard to the conclusion of Dr. Devaraja regarding knowledge of

the world, Mayeda remarks:

> This conclusion is not acceptable. In Śaṅkara's works
> the term is associated with the compound "tattvānyatvābhyam"
> and never with the compound "sadasadbhyām" or "sat tāsat-
> tābhyām". This constitutes a significant difference between
> Śaṅkara and his followers, which Dr. Devaraja has failed
> to notice.[50]

Let us now return to the examples just cited and view them

after a brief discussion. We can agree with Mayeda that the word

anirvacanīya is qualified by tattvānyatvābhyam which leads us to

define it as "indefinable as Brahman or different". This is further

discussed by Dr. J. G. Arapura when he remarks:

> Definition (nirvacanam) is simply a matter of being able
> to assert identity or difference. If we take anirvacanīyatā
> distributively or negative-alternative it can be said
> to apply both to identity and difference. However,
> difference has been denied concomitantly but separately.
> But anirvacanīya is not here employed to eliminate difference,
> which has already been accomplished by placing the world
> through nāma-rūpa and avidyā kalpana in Brahman (or Īśvara).
> . . . The role of nāma-rūpa has to be noticed, and its
> role is to deny difference. We may hark back to the
> Upaniṣads themselves. The Chāndogya asserts that the
> modification that occurs in the conversion of clay into
> vessels of clay is "mere names, dependent on words"--
> vacārambha ṇam vikāro nāmadheyam, Chāndogya 6.1.4. . . .
> The bhāṣya goes even further and suggests, as it does,
> that the whole universe, both the res extensa and the
> res cogitans included, is name and form (nāma-rūpa-
> prapanca). This modification of form (rūpa-bheda) is a
> burden laid on the conscious individual, the soul, by some
> primeval nescience. . . . Avidyā is the same as mithyājnanam
> (false knowledge), abhimānam (illusory, self-pretension).
> It is an existential fact encountered in consciousness,
> over against which must be set samyagdarśanam (perfect
> knowledge). To look for the origin of avidyā is futile.

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[50]Ibid., p. 432.

It is to be apprehended only in reflection. We can only
penetrate deeply into this fundamental existential problem
perhaps by turning from logic to myths and similies.
Sankara thus turns to similies often as when he argues
that the fact that a person suffering from the eye disease
called timira (diplopia) sees two moons does not prove
that there are two moons, (II.1.28).[51]

Thus anirvacanīya within the Advaita must be seen as directly related

to name and form and in fact constitutes the definition of name and

form as the explanatory principle of the origin of the world contained

with the avidyā structure. The world then as anirvacanīya cannot be

defined as existent or non-existent, as either one with Brahman or

different from Brahman. This consideration follows after the given

point of departure, which is an inquiry into Brahman, and not an

inquiry into the world. Thus when Meyeda adds at the conclusion of

his review of Devaraja that:

In the case of Sankara the expression has not deep
philosophical or ontological connotation as it does
with the later Advaitins and is never used to des-
cribe the character of the world which is an effect
of evolution.[52]

Here Meyeda missed the point because indeed there is deep philoso-

phical and ontological meaning if we place it into the inquiry into

Brahman. We grant that the later Advaitins did do as he suggests but

just because of this one may not assume that Sankara did not under-

stand anirvacanīya ontologically, because anirvacanīya is always

spoken of in terms of Brahman knowledge.

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[51] J. G. Arapura, "Anirvacanīyakhyati-vāda: Its Origin, Develop-
ment and Implications". Privately circulated seminar paper, March 1974,
pp. 1-2.

[52] Meyeda, Journal, p. 433.

BRAHMAN AND NAME AND FORM

The nature of name and form in relation to Brahman is defined
as "indescribable as either one with Brahman or as different from
Brahman." Thus in order to understand name and form we must conceive
of it as arising out of the avidyā of the individual on the one hand
and also, at the same time, arising out of the creative power of
Īśvara. But this understanding does not bring us to any real result
for the Advaita. It is already assumed that the search after the
world, whether of concrete forms and names or "seed" forms and names,
in exclusion of an inquiry into Brahman will not lead to liberation
or release from samsāra. Thus a simultaneity must be maintained. On
the one hand, we must abide and consider the name-form complex
within the world of change and chance and on the other recognize that
if the former is pursued uncritically, it will lead to ignorance
rather than knowledge. As is seen by Śankara:

> . . . to superimpose the non-self on the Universal Self
> is not inconsistent. Learned men consider superimposition
> of this nature as Nescience (avidyā) and they further
> say that knowledge (vidyā) is the determination of the
> real nature of a thing by discrimination. This being so,
> that on which some other thing is superimposed is not in
> the least affected by the faults and merits of the thing
> superimposed, and it is by entertaining i.e. adopting the
> reciprocal superimposition of the Self and the non-self,
> that all worldly conduct and Vedic actions depending on
> the means of proof (pramāṇa) and the objects of knowledge,
> and all scriptural injunctions and prohibitions, known
> as Nescience, are promoted.[53]

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[53]Śankara's Forward, BSB. Apte, p. 2.

It is precisely this superimposition that is to be removed by the
inquiry into Brahman. The inquiry into Brahman is not an injunction
and is not acquired by the performance of any act:

> The knowledge of Brahma, on the other hand, has
> for its result eternal bliss (nihshreyasa) and it does
> not expect the performance of any act. . . . it is Brahma
> which is actually eternally in existence, that is desired
> to be known, and being thus eternal does not depend upon any
> action on the part of man. . . . Injunction which is a
> characteristic of religious duty instructs a person and
> at the same time enjoins him to the performance of the same.
> The science of Brahma however merely instructs a person
> about Brahma, but it does not enjoin a man to any act
> of acquiring knowledge.[54]

The science of Brahman instructs a person about Brahman. This
instruction is conducted through an inquiry into Brahman which by
inherent necessity must conceive knowledge of anything other than
Brahman as not leading to final Beatitude.[55] Under the criterion of
right knowledge name and form must reside. This right knowledge is
brought about, for those who search after it, through instruction by
the Vedic passages. This, as has been pointed out by Dr. Arapura, is
accomplished by "turning from logic to myths and similies" or what
we would like to rephrase as a turning from logic to analogue or
illustrative argumentation.

This kind of reasoning concerning name and form can be seen
in the Advaita analysis of the Brahman's modification:

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[54]Ibid., 1.1.1., p. 6.

[55]Ibid., 1.1.1., p. 9.

Just as in the ordinary world, milk and water,
by themselves undergo modifications into curds and snow
respectively without expecting any extraneous means, even
so, it might be the case here (i.e. in the case of Brahma)
. . . whatever modification milk undergoes in turning into
curds is by itself only, and whatever potentiality or
the limit of potentiality which milk has in itself for
the modificatory process of conversion into curds is but
merely accelerated by heat etc., that is all. Because
were milk not to possess in itself this potentiality of
modifying itself into curds, it would never undergo such
modification per force alone, by means of heat etc. Ākāsha
and vāyu, for instance do not modify themselves per
force into curds, by heat etc., and (in the case of milk)
its capacity (for modification) is merely perfected by the
assemblage of means. Brahma on the other hand is fully
powerful by itself, and nothing else is necessary to make
its capacity perfect. . . . . Therefore, only one, as Brahma
is, that it has diverse powers inherent in itself, and that
it can, like milk, modify itself in diverse ways, is
reasonably sustainable.[56]

ANALOGUE AND NAME-FORM

In the inquiry into Brahman we begin from the name-form com-

plex defined as indescribable, being different or not different from

Brahman. This concept points to the understanding of and discussion

concerning name-form as one taking place after the beginning of inquiry

itself. The inquiry by the utilization of concepts within the name-form

complex uses these concepts as illustrations which have the necessary

built-in factor that they stand within the inquiry into Brahman. Thus

when we define the name-form complex or draw out conclusions within

the complex, both of these activities are furthered so that instruction

into Brahman can be accomplished. In fact illustration or analogue

can be seen as a primary method in the Brahma Sūtra. Thus we will

now turn to a consideration of illustration or analogue within the

context of an inquiry into Brahman.

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[56] Ibid., II.1.24, pp. 327-8.

CHAPTER VII

THE USE OF ANALOGUE IN THE BRAHMA SŪTRA

LANGUAGE AND ANALOGUE

We have seen in the previous chapter that māyā language must
be seen always and primarily as discourse about Brahman. True speaking
about māyā recognizes that māyā language originates and terminates
on that truth that is given by hearing, which is <u>śruti</u>. The world
as itself contains no ground for speaking of itself:

> The Vedānta philosopher is also clear in his mind that
> the world offers no standpoint from which to speak about
> the world or to gain knowledge about it. Hence his
> insistence on Śruti (revelation). What the world contri-
> butes to the knowledge of itself is analogies based on
> the distinction between fact and nonfact present in its
> very structure. When that transcendentally originated
> (by definition) knowledge bodies forth with the aid of
> analogies provided by the phenomenal world we have a
> well-ordered and coherent knowledge of the world giving
> rise to a system of meaning and a framework for the aspir-
> ation towards liberation.[1]

It is through these analogues that knowledge about the structure and
meaning of the world is gained but this gain is always seen as a
method by which one acquires a true perspective of meaning and not
as an end in itself. Analogue must be seen always as an illustra-
tion of the truth which is contained in a deeper structure of
language.

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[1]MDAB, p. 6.

The use of analogue or illustrative language in Indian thought holds an important place. We can see that this type of language is used in teaching as one of the primary modes by which instruction is communicated. It is utilized when one speaks of the non-dual Brahman as is done in the Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad II.4.12 when Yājñavalkya and Maitreyī discuss the Self:

> As a lump of salt thrown in water becomes dissolved in
> water and there would not be any of it to size forth,
> as it were, but wherever one may take it is salty indeed,
> So, verily, this great being, infinite, limitless, consists
> of nothing but knowledge. Arising from out of these ele-
> ments one vanishes away into them. When he has departed
> there is no more knowledge. This is what I say, my dear!
> so said Yājñavalkya.[2]

For purposes of illustration in this discussion Yājñavalkya wishes to convey the idea that when everything is known as the Self, i.e. when all essence is known to be exactly identical, then speech as illustration has fulfilled its communication and is left behind. Yet another example of illustration can be seen in the conception of the upside down world tree in the Bhagavadgītā XV.1-3:

> They say (that there is) an indestructible aśvatta tree
> with roots above and branches below, whose leaves are
> the Vedic hymns: who knows it is a knower of the Veda.
> Its branches spread below and above, being nourished
> by the guṇas (i.e., the strands that constitute prakṛti
> or Nature), objects of perception being its twigs. Its

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[2]PU, p. 200, (sa yathā saindhave - khilya udake prāsta udakam evānuvi - līyeta, na hāsya udgrahanāyeva syāt, yato yatas tv ādadīta lavaṇam eva, evaṁ vā ara idam mahad būtam anantam apāraṁ vijñānaghana eva; etebhyo bhūtebhyaḥ samutthāya, tāny evānuvinaśyati; na pretya samjñāsti, iti are bravīmi, iti hovāca yājñavalkyaḥ).

(adventitious) roots are produced below, in the world
of man, bound to Karma. Its form is not obtained here
as thus (or thus), nor its end, nor its beginning not the
ground (on which it is planted), once this aśvattha tree
so well nourished (though it is), has been cut down with
the mighty sword of non-attachment.[3]

In this illustration the aśvatta tree is the tree of life, the world

and man. Each having their unseen roots in Brahman. Saṁsāra is seen

to have its basis in that which is above it. This formulation has

been aptly demonstrated by the analysis of Dr. Arapura:

> The reason why the aśvattha appears to be important enough
> for a close scrutiny is that it stands as a symbol for the
> human cosmos (not so much the physical cosmos), the world
> of man, the saṁsāra, representing the endless round of birth,
> death and rebirth as well as old age, sorrow and bondage.
> The ancient thinkers were intensely aware of Ultimate
> Reality as such, that is, Brahman. And they were aware
> also of the world of becoming. The two cannot co-exist
> as two separate and equally true parts of reality. Nor
> can the two be treated as if there is no meeting at all.
> On an empirical basis what we know as life along with
> birth, death, rebirth, old age and all other things which
> go with them--belongs to becoming. Yet the ancient thinkers
> found becoming to be not self-explanatory. The principle
> whereby it can be understood is the transcendent Brah-
> man, parā brahman. But as the principle of explanation
> parā brahman has been already taken one step down from its
> pure transcendence to the status of a structure: hence
> aparā brahman. . . . Brahman simply does not become. But
> insofar as the empirical basis of our understanding is the
> world of becoming Brahman must serve as the principle
> underlying it. The employment of Brahman as the principle
> in this manner is what gives rise to the concept of being.
> As a concept it is always answer to a question, whereas
> the Ultimate Reality per se is not answer to any question,
> much less a question. It simply is that and never a what.
> Insofar as becoming is the question, being (sat) is the

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[3] The Bhagavadgītā, trans. R. C. Zaehner, (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1969), XV 1-3, pp. 359-60, (ūrdhvamūlam adhahśākham aśvattham
prāhur avyayam, chandāṁsi yasya parṇāni, yastam veda sa vedavit, adhas
co'rdhvam prasṛtās tasya śākhā, guṇapravṛddhā viṣayapravālāḥ, adhaś ca
mūlāny anusaṁtatāni, karmānubandhīni manuṣyaloke, an rūpam asye'ha
tatho 'palabhyate, nā 'nto na cā 'dir na ca sampratiṣṭhā aśvattham enam
suvirūdhamūlam, asangaśastreṇa dṛdhena chittvā). See also Katha
Upaniṣad II.3.1.

answer. Samsāra is the name for the total framework
of becoming, constantly under the existential pressure
to be put as a question. Brahman, the ground, is provided
as the answer. This way we have an ontology not by
virtue of any pressure that being puts upon becoming--there
is no such pressure and indeed apart from becoming taken
problematically there would be no need for the concept
of being at all. There is, on the contrary, a pressure
that comes from within the realm of samsāra, of becoming,
and that is an existential pressure calling for an answer.
Hence Brahman is to be understood as the ground of the
tree of samsāra, and the tree inevitably grows downward.
That tree is the aśvattha of the Bhagavadgītā.[4]

Analogue is a kind of verbal description or illustration of
a visual image. But it is not merely description, but it is des-
cription followed by reflexion. Description, if it is only that, would
not constitute the proper positive function of language in the
Vedānta. In fact the task of analogue is to bring about an inquiry
beyond the analogue. This is why analogue is used to speak about that
which is of its very nature unspeakable as in the Bṛhadāranyaka
Upaniṣad III.4.2:

> Uṣasta Cākrāyaṇa said: "This has been explained by you
> as one might say "this is a cow," "this is a horse."
> Explain to me the Brahman that is immediately present
> and directly perceived, that is the self in all things!
> "This is your self that is within all things.'
> 'Which is within all things, Yājñavalkya?' 'You cannot
> see the seer of seeing, you cannot hear the hearer of
> hearing, you cannot think the thinker of thinking, you
> cannot understand the understander of understanding. He
> is your self which is in all things. Everything else is
> of evil.' Thereupon Uṣasta Cākrāyana kept silent.[5]

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[4] J. G. Arapura, "The Upside Down Tree of the Bhagavadgītā Ch.
XV--An Exegesis", Numen, Vol. 26, Fasc. #3, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 31
Mei, 1974), pp. 8-9.

[5] PU, p. 220, (sa hovāca uṣastas cākrāyaṇaḥ: yatha vibrūyād,
asau gauḥ, asāv aśva iti, evam evaitad vyapadiṣṭam bhavati, yad eva
sākṣād aparokṣād brahma ya ātmā sarvāntaraḥ tam me vyācakṣva iti: eṣa ta
ātmā sarvāntaraḥ. katamaḥ Yājñavalkya, sarvāntaraḥ. na dṛṣṭer draṣṭāram
paśyeḥ, na śruter śrotāram śṛṇuyāḥ, na mater mantāram manvīthāḥ, na

Thus Brahman is seen as essentially beyond the categories and
structures of experience. One cannot think of Brahman as other than
the "within" or essence of all things being not open to language and
thought, approachable only through language and thought. Language
and thought must be seen as a kind of analogue.

Analogue or illustration should be seen in a specific way.
It is not to be taken as something more nor less than it is. 'When
I point out the moon by fixing your gaze upon the highest tree in a
specific group and tell you that the moon is just to the right of
its top, just so the analogue is used to fix our gaze to that thing
which is just beyond the fact which has been brought to our immediate
attention. The illustration acts as a pointer, an indicator to that
beyond which we are trying to perceive. But it must be seen as some-
thing that is necessary. The tree is used to direct our attention to
the moon and it is a part of our perception and understanding of the
moon. The analogue is part of the understanding of that to which it
acts as a pointer. It participates in the object to which it points
and draws our attention towards it. Once our attention is on the
moon we can see that the tree was merely an indicator, but even as
merely an indicator it always remains a pointer to the moon in that
specific instance of analogue.

Speaking about that which is in itself unspeakable is speaking
in illustration or analogue. One uses speech to point beyond; speech

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vijñāter vijñātāram vijānīyāḥ, eṣa ta ātmā sarvāntaraḥ, ato'nyad ārtam.
tato ha uṣastas cākrāyaṇa upararāma).

is always in reference and grounded upon that to which it points, namely Brahman. Speech is grounded in and arises out of Brahman so that it may lead back to Brahman. True speech is always spoken in reference to Brahman. If not it is not true speech but idle chatter and nonsense. When one understands that this is the nature of speech, i.e. that all speaking is in some way a reference or pointer beyond itself, then one can begin to see the transcendental origin of "śruti" in the Advaita. Śruti, like conventional speech, acts as a pointer. Śruti is the grasping of that which is "beyond" and "within" because it is given directly by that "beyond" and "within". Man's conventional speech also participates in this but not to the same degree or depth. None the less speech when it is in the movement of actually participating and pointing is at its maximum height and depth. It is this height that must be understood when we conceptualize the utilization of analogue or illustration in the Brahma Sūtra and the commentary of Śaṅkara.

By a correct analysis of the method of analogue in terms of what we have briefly seen in the Upaniṣads we can see the instructional communication. It is only with the proper introduction and guidance that the student can obtain that knowledge which is the highest intuitive wisdom which is liberation. The use of analogue is necessary for this enterprise and can be seen as one of the central thrusts of teaching within Indian thought.

The method of analogue has within its structure an illusive nature. It utilizes a teaching method which has the capacity for a variety of interpretations. These interpretations differ because the

analogue exists between the literal and that which cannot be reached
by language. Yet it must always be graspable in terms of understanding,
and while being graspable must, in the end, render itself transparent.
This is to say that the analogue must not be taken literally and it
must act as a pointer to that which is beyond language but is expressed
in language. That which is beyond language and in which language is
grounded is Brahman. Thus:

> The real problem is not what is said about Brahman but
> the saying. Everything that is truly said, on account
> of the saying of it; is a negation of the intent in the
> saying, for such is the coherent definition of Brahman
> the non-dual, the One without a second. Brahman is
> throughout spoken of as attributeless (nirguṇa), as devoid
> of all differences of space, place and time (digdeśakālā ḍi
> bhedaśūnya). The words śūnya (devoid of) and vivarjita
> (free from), like many other similar words, added to other
> predicative terms form compounds signifying negative
> attributes of Brahman, and there is a prolific use of
> these in all Advaita Vedānta works. Thus Brahman is
> said to be free from the entire universe (sarvapra pañca-
> vivarjita), free from all objects (sarvaviṣayavivarjita)
> . . . If these and hundreds of other expressions like them
> are literally true then they are also literally false,
> for the very fact that they can be formulated militates
> against their content as well as intent.[6]

Language in analogue is a grasping of its own ground which is Brahman.
In the analogue language acts as a path which brings one back to the
transparency of language so that an opening beyond language can be
conceptualized. Thus when we consider various accounts of analogue
within the Advaita the consideration must always be under the method
which allows language itself to become transparent. Analogues are not
to be taken as a logical syllogism for to do so would be to misunder-
stand the nature of the meaning of language of analogue.

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[6]MDAB, p. 114.

BRAHMAN LANGUAGE AND ANALOGUE

The speaking of an analogue participates in the very center of Brahman language because in the Advaita all that is, is a manifestation of Brahman. Thus all phenomena, world or symbol, must always find its home in that abode which is beyond the division of subject and object. To go beyond this dichotomy one can utilize the model of analogue. Sankara writes concerning illustration:

> The word Ajā used here [I.4.10] is not meant to indi-
> cate creatures having the form of a sheep, nor is it used
> in its etymological sense (meaning something which is not
> born). How then is it (used)? It is a kind of instruc-
> tion given by way of metaphor. Instruction is here given
> about the root-cause or source from which all sentient
> and insentient things are born, and which is character-
> ized by Tejobanna, by the use of the metaphor of an Ajā
> (ewe). . . . the intention is to propound the arrange-
> ment of the conditions of bondage and Final Release. . ..[7]

Thus the world that confronts one in everyday experience is a kind of symbol or pointer to its ground in Brahman. This was communicated to me in a discussion with Dr. T. R. V. Murti in Banaras:

> The method for reaching Brahman is not an ontological
> argument implying a necessary idea. No squeezing exis-
> tence out of a concept. For this is knowledge through
> a concept--a second place knowledge. Rather you must
> know the thing by being it, not feeling, standing outside
> like the blind men and the elephant--this is spacial and
> constituent--being different from you. Being-in-it, i.e.
> object and knowledge must be coincident--"Tat Tvam Asi"
> --the object has become radiant and the atman has reality.
> Knowledge through being the thing. By other ways you
> cannot get to truth or knowledge--it is always a perspec-
> tive. To rephrase the Taittiriya Upaniṣad which says,
> "Only by knowing Brahman do you become Brahman", I
> would add "Only by becoming Brahman do you know Brahman."[8]

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[7]BSB, I.4.10, Apte, pp. 241-2.

[8]Interview with Dr. T. R. V. Murti in Banaras, Feb. 6, 1974.

Under this conception language must be seen as one of the primary
ways by which the division between subject and object is removed. This
is because Brahman is the ground within which language has itself
imbedded. By way of analogue this imbeddedness of language brings
about an inquiry into Brahman. Analogue participates in the removal
of subject and object when language as discourse about Brahman is made
explicit. This participation of language in the removal of ignorance
by analogue is central to the understanding of instruction concerning
knowledge of Brahman.

ANALOGUE AND DIALECTIC

In Chapter Two of this study the dialectic method of the
Mādhyamika Buddhism of Nāgārjuna was briefly discussed. There we
discussed the use of dialectic as a negative tool for rendering any
view null and also the relation of language to the Buddhist concep-
tion of the absolute.

> The Absolute of the Mādhyamika is of the nature of a
> negation, immanent in all positions. Yet, because such
> a negation is indescribable in any manner, in which any
> position is describable, it transcends all descriptions.
> For this reason, it could not be identified with the
> Absolute of the Advaitin, which is All (Sarvam Khalvidam)
> and yet nothing, which could be conceived of, as existing
> in abstraction from this concrete totality of integral
> existence, the Advaitic Absolute is more comprehensive and
> more communicable than the Sagata Absolute. . . . As
> against the Mādhyamika Absolute, which is unmitigatedly
> trans-rational, the Advaitic Brahman stands in the office
> of the absolute criterion, necessarily indicated by the
> self-contradictory nature of objectivity as contemplated
> by the pramana-riddled intelligence as also by the dialec-
> tic of reason, whose lever must lie in the intuitive
> simplicity of the Real.[9]

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[9]Heritage, pp. 72-3.

The Mādhyamika position considers the use of analogue as invalid, as
S. S. Roy comments, "The Mādhyamika is all too hostile to the employ-
ment of the analogical method, which might facilitate an understan-
ding of the real in the cast of discursive apprehension."[10] This view
of the Mādhyamika is also expressed implicitly by F. J. Streng in
his study of the Mādhyamika in Emptiness--A Study in Religious
Meaning. In his book he makes the distinction in Part III of what
he terms the "intuitive structure" as distinct from "Nāgārjuna's
dialectical structure". This can be demonstrated by the fact that
the dialectic is a reductio ad absurdum which does not establish any
thesis, "It accepts a particular thesis hypothetically, and by
eliciting its implications shows up the inner contradictions which
has escaped the notice of the opponent."[11]

When one approaches the usage of the dialectic and the
analogue in the Brahma Sūtra commentary of Śankara we find a problem.
There does not seem to be an example of Śankara's use of the Buddhist
dialectics. In fact there seems to be only two scholars who maintain
that Śankara uses a Buddhist dialectic, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan and
Professor Das Gupta. Concerning this analysis of these two scholars
Dr. Devaraja in his An Introduction to Śankara's Theory of Knowledge
remarks:

> The remarkable fact to be borne in mind in this connec-
> tion is that in his commentaries on the Prasthanatrayi

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[10] Ibid., p. 94.

[11] CPB, p. 132.

extending over two thousand pages Śaṅkara nowhere allows
himself to indulge in the negative dialectic of Nāgārjuna
--Śrīharṣa-. . . . type. No modern scholar, not excluding
Dr. Radhakrishnan and Prof. Das Gupta, has been able to
quote a single instance of Śaṅkara's fondness for the
dialectical method. It is difficult to agree with the
former in the opinion that Śaṅkara's criticism of the
asatkaryavāda is part of the "penetrating criticism"
of the causal category intended to show the thoroughly
unsatisfactory nature of the concept.. The only place
where Śaṅkara submits causation to dialectical treatment
is in his commentary on the GK; but this affords no
justification for the conclusion that "Gauḍapāda's
arguments are approved by Śaṅkara".

  The 'logical dialectic" used by Śaṅkara in the
criticism of the atomic theory and other Vaiśeṣika tenents
has no kinship whatever, as Dr. Das Gupta seems to think
it has, with the sceptical dialectic of Nāgārjuna and
Śrīharṣa. As the learned Doctor is himself constrained
to observe, Śaṅkara does not so much "criticise the defi-
nitions of the Vaiśeṣika as point out the general logical
and metaphysical", or, as we should like to put it, meta-
physical rather than logical, "confusions that result
from some of the Vaiśeṣika theories".[12]

Further commenting on the existence of the least of the Buddhist

dialectic Devaraja states that:

> The only place, so far as we are aware, where Śaṅkara
> tries to silence his opponent by a sort of "logical vio-
> lence" is in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Bhāṣya (2.1.20) where he
> meets the objection that "difference can be established
> by inference" by putting the counter-question, who is it
> that infers? How can he who does not know even himself
> (ātmanam), ascertain whether there are differences in
> the Ātman or not? This is no doubt a sort of verbal
> jugglery, but even here Śaṅkara's critique of bheda is
> very different that by Maṇḍana in the Brahmasiddhi or
> by Śrīharṣa in the Khaṇḍana. What Śaṅkara is concerned
> here to deny are the differences among the souls, and
> not the plausibility of the concept of difference..
>   The truth is that Śaṅkara does not belong to
> the category of dialectician-philosophers.. He is a
> believer in the use and value of the pramāṇas, and has
> distrust of abstract and dialectical reasoning.[13]

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[12]STK, p. 156. See also Heritage, pp. 99-102.

[13]Ibid., pp. 156-7.

The dialectic argumentation then must be classed as _tarka_, and _tarka_, as we have previously observed is rejected by Śaṅkara.[14]

We have commented at length about the use of the analogue within the Advaita of Śaṅkara. In a recent work E. Deutsch makes the case very clear when he writes about analogue and the role of reason in the Advaita:

> Reason may be used to support truths of spiritual exper-
> ience in the form of "analogical reasoning" (_samanyatodrs-_
> _tanumana_); that is, reasoning that is based upon analogies
> between the transcendental and the empirical orders of
> being. Analogies do not demonstrate anything; they may,
> however, provide the mind with some understanding, drawn
> from its own experience, of the nature of that which trans-
> cends empirical experience. Advaitic literature is
> replete with analogies and with elaborate analyses of
> them. They function not so much as a means of _convincing_
> one in any shallow rationalistic sense but as a means of
> _awakening_ one to new possibilities of experience.[15]

Thus for Śaṅkara accurate reasoning, which is ultimately concerned with knowledge of Brahman, proceeds not by engaging in _tarka_ but by the correct understanding of scripture coupled by illustrations or analogues from the world of experience.

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[14]The dialectic of the Buddhists must not be confused with the more general definition of dialectics as given for example by R. D. Ranade in his _Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy_ on p. 26 when he speaks of "method of dialogue". Also a further study of Gauḍapāda's Karikas with Śaṅkara's commentary will not show sufficient evidence to warrant any refutation of the above position.

[15]E. Deutsch, _Advaita Vedānta--A Philosophical Reconstruction_, (Hawaii: East West Center Press, 1969), p. 93.

USE AND OCCURRENCES OF ANALOGUE

An analysis of the occurrences of analogue or illustrative argumentation within the Advaita darśana of Śankara is contained in two articles by M. D. Paradkar entitled "Nyāyas in Śankara-Bhāṣya on the Brahmasūtras" and "Field of Observation of Śankaracarya Similies from the Nature World."[16] In both of these articles Paradkar has given us over four hundred fifty citations illustrating the variety of different subjects covered and utilized within Śankara to contend with the doctrines of other darśanas or to instruct one within the frame of the Advaita itself. However, there does seem to be a rather distinct lack of organization on the part of the author for there is no apparent order to his numbering classification. But, as the author implies, this is not his intent in writing these articles. Rather he is concerned to show the occurrences of this kind of phenomena within the Advaita work. Other than this limited approach there was nothing else attempted. In this he has succeeded, for with his study he has shown the vastness and complexity of the various kinds of references to the phenomenal world within the Advaita of Śankara. In fact these occurrences do not fit into any type of hiarchy within the Advaita. They all stand as a basis for future investigation into "an inquiry into Brahman" and as such do not, of and by themselves, mean anything. They are pointers that act as a means to instruction into the meaning of the Advaita, namely discourse about Brahman.

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[16]Cited fully in Appendix A and B pp. 239, 241.

Another instance of the occurrences of illustration, classi-
fied according to type, is that given by R. H. Brooks in his Ph.D.
entitled "The Rope and the Snake". In his study Dr. Brooks defines
analogue or <u>adhyāsa</u> as an explanatory model and gives a preliminary
classification of all of Advaita's analogues according to their
structure. He gives it as:

Class:

I. Non-superimposition analogy (sympathy, magnet,)

II. Superimposition analogy
    A. without adjunct (<u>nirupādhika</u>)
        1. with similarity (<u>sādṛśya</u>)
           rope/snake
           shell/silver
           post/man, etc.
        2. without similarity (<u>sādṛśyābhāva</u>)
           hypnotist
           dream
           <u>nāmarūpa analogies</u>
                sea/waves
                clay/pot
                actor/act. sic
    B. with adjuncts (<u>sopādhika</u>)
        1. organ defect
           double moon
           yellow conch, etc.
        2. action defect
           tenth man
           lost necklace, etc.
        3. Natural law
           sky/surface
           crystal/color
           mirage
           motion illusions (firebrand, etc.)
           Reflection illusions
                sun/image in water
                face/image in mirror, etc.
           Appearance illusions
                light/object illumed
        4. limitation illusions
           space/pot-space[17]

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[17]R. H. Brooks,"The Rope and the Snake", Ph. D. Dissertation,
unpublished, University of Minnesota (1968), p. 240.

The above classification of Brooks' is a more generalized rendering, of one contained in Chapter Five of his work. Here he makes the division of analogues into general types under (1) Persuasive and (2) Explanatory. He further divides (1) into (a) popular, (b) Upaniṣadic and (2) into (a) causal and (b) structural:

    I.   "Persuasive" Analogies
         a. "Popular" or bad analogies
             worm and wasp
             boat and shore
             female crane--II.1.25, III.1.19.
             lotus--II.1.25.
             sympathy--I.1.1, II.3.46.
             carpenter
             eclipse
         b. "Upaniṣadic" analogies
             spider--II.1.25.
             lump of salt--I.3.13, III.2.16, III.3.1.
             clay, pot, milk/curd, water/ice, gold/ornament
                 II.1.14, II.1.18, IV.3.14, II.1.18, II.1.24.
             fire/sparks--II.3.43.
    II. Explanatory Analogies
         a. Causal
             1. creation analogies--I.1.4.
                 lodestone
                 hypnotist, gods, king--I.1.7, I.3.19, II.1.1, II.1.9,
                     II.2.29.
                 dream--I.2.12, I.3.19, II.1.14, II.1.23, II.1.28,
                     II.2.29, III.2.21.
             2. transformation analogy
                 actor--II.1.18
                 thread/cloth--II.1.15.
                 earth/modifications--II.1.24.
                 ocean/waves, etc.--II.1.13. (cf. also clay/pot, etc.)
             3. realization analogies
                 tenth man
                 lost necklace
                 loss of direction--III.3.9.
                 soap-nut
         b. structural
             1. Brahman/world analogies
                 mirage--II.1.14.
                 sky/surface, etc.--I.1.1, I.2.8, I.3.19
                 firebrand
                 rope/snake--I.1.4, I.3.19, I.4.6, II.1.9, II.1.14,
                     III.2.21, III.2.22.
                 post/man--I.1.4, I.3.19, II.1.14.
                 shell/silver

2. Self/soul analogies
   double moon--III.2.21, IV.1.15, IV.1.19.
   crystal/color--I.3.19, III.2.11.
   light/object--II.3.46, III.2.15, III.2.25, III.2.34.
   object (mirror image)--II.3.46, II.3.50, III.2.18-20,
       III.2.25.
   space/pot-space--I.1.5, I.1.17, I.2.6, I.2.7,
       I.2.20, I.3.7, I.3.25, II.1.13, II.1.14, II.1.22,
       II.3.3, II.3.17, II.3.46, II.3.48, III.2.25,
       III.2.34, III.2.35, IV.3.14.[18]

Dr. Brooks makes even a further breakdown of II. b and arrives at the
following:

	Nirupādhika	Sopadhika	Adjunct (Upadhi)	Natural law Involved
B r a h m a n / w o r l d	1. rope/snake			
	2.a. space/surface			
	2.b.	sky/blueness	earth's atmosphere	light diffraction
	3.	mirage	heat	light diffraction
	4.	firebrand	motion	retinal afterimage
	5.	double moon	diplopia	retinal displacement of light refract.
	6.	crystal	colored obj. in proximity	light refract.
	7.	light/object	object	reflection & absorption.
	8.	object/mirror image	mirror	light reflect.
	9.	space/pot-space	pot	(none)[19]

[18]This chart is adapted from p. 186 of the thesis. I have
omitted those analogue examples which occur in works other than the
Brahma Sūtra; all that is indicative of them is his specific title.

[19]Ibid., p. 272.

By his breakdown of what he sees as analogues in Śaṅkara Dr. Brooks has rendered us a unique service for this classification was completed with great acumen. In fact we have not argument with this classification as such. But we would take issue with him on two other points. The first is a basic assumption with which he begins his study. He makes the statement about Advaita that, "The whole point of approaching Advaita in this way . . . is to analyze Advaita's most basic claim--that the world as we ordinarily perceive it is an illusion."[20] But as we have already seen, the claim that the world as we ordinarily perceive it is an illusion is not the most basic claim of Advaita. This claim is rather a logical postulate of another more important claim:

> . . . the central objective of the Vedānta in the advaitic
> form, which is to explain how speaking about Brahman,
> the Reality, is made possible. The Vedānta knows that
> philosophy is about Brahman, not about the world or exper-
> ience. Knowledge about these latter things arises as modes
> of the knowledge of Brahman.[21]

Thus Dr. Brooks begins from the wrong end, as it were, in his understanding of the Advaita of Śaṅkara.

The second point of contention is in regard to the method that Dr. Brooks utilizes in his thesis. This is more specifically a concern when he utilizes this method in an attack upon Advaita. He observes that, "I do not believe this approach to Advaita does it any violence, although the negative outcome of my analysis will surely

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[20]Ibid., p. 1.

[21]MDAB, p. 112.

lead Advaitins to _feel_ that it does. But that's Advaita's fault, not mine."[22] This statement is indeed a kind of apology for his study which is based upon an interpretation of Advaita from the point of illusion rather than Brahman. To return to his method--what Dr. Brook's tries to do, and succeeds if you grant him his presuppositions, is give a critique of the Advaita darśana from a "scientific" analysis. By this analysis he utilizes the modern Western scientific theories of such works as Max Black's _Models and Metaphors_ and M. Hesse's _Models and Analogies_ in Science to present an attack against the Advaita. This usage of "scientific" models plus his employment of Western canons of logical structures place his method well within a Western philosophical investigation and does not, as he holds, refute the Advaita propositions which are at heart based in a completely different "sphere of the spirit".[23] Thus as a Western philosophical study it is perhaps a worthy one but as a study of Indian thinking in terms of Advaita there remain great questions. For in fact Dr. Brooks wishes that Sankara be either a philosopher or a theologian, in conformity with a specific kind of Western view on the two subjects.

The occurrences of analogue or illustration that we have previously cited by M. D. Paradkar is also a praiseworthy accomplishment and as it stands does not contain any information with which we could disagree. Both of his articles show, for our purpose, the great number of these occurrences and their different usage in the Advaita

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[22]Brooks, p. 191.

[23]Refer to Introduction p. 3 ff.

in a most positive light. It is not, of course, a systematic presentation of the illustrations as compared to Dr. Brooks' but is useful to show the great kinds of usage of this kind of approach. This approach would maintain that analogue in the making transparent of language is the movement by which it can be seen as first and foremost a teaching method.

ANALOGUE AS TEACHING METHOD

The illustration argument or analogue is one which is utilized after the questioner has given consent to a specific way of viewing the world and the reality of the actuality of liberation within it. Without an understanding of this kind when we approach the Advaita then any criticism must be seen as not entering into the heart of the Advaita-darsana. When the serious questioner approaches the utilization of the analogues of the Advaita they must be seen as a kind of instruction. This is because, as has already been mentioned, the Advaita above all else is concerned with an "inquiry into Brahman". The analogue is thus used conceptually in order to overcome another view or to propose a specific perspective. An example of analogue used to overcome another view is seen in the discussion of the view of the relation of the Puruṣa to Prakṛti in the Saṅkhya darsana:

> May be, it may be this way (says the Sāmkhya), by ranging himself in opposition (to the Vedāntin) and trying to justify his position by illustrations, thus--Just as some lame person possessing the power of sight but not the power of movement, riding pick-a-back on another who is sightless but possesses the power of movement, makes the latter move, or just as a magnet which while it itself does not move, makes iron move (i.e. attracts it), even so, would the Purusha cause the Pradhāna to act. To this we reply --Even so, there is no escaping the fault. In the first place, the fault viz. the discarding of the position

assumed as hypothesis (by the Sāmkhya) would arise, because you (the Sāmkhya opponent) hold that the Pradhāna possesses such tendency, and you do not hold that the Purusha (Self) can cause activity (in Pradhāna). How can the apathetic Purusha ever stimulate the Pradhāna to act? The lame man also, directs the blind one to move by words etc., but no such influence for causing movement is possible in the case of the Purusha who is apathetic i.e. inactive, nor can it, like a magnet, cause movement by mere proximity, because (were we to suppose so) there would thus be the predicament of perpetual activity induced by the constant proximity (between the Pradhāna and the Purusha).[24]

Thus the Sāmkhya stands refuted on a specific point according to the Vedānta interpretation and analysis of analogue. Another example of this type of analogue concerns Śaṅkara's counter to the Bhāgavatā doctrine of creation:

> This is again why the Bhāgavatā doctrine is incongruous. Because, it is never observed in the ordinary world that an implement such as a hatchet etc. is ever produced out of an agent such as Devadatta etc. The Bhāgavatās describe that from the Jīva-Self called Samkarshana, the mind that is called Pradyumna is produced, and from this effect Pradyumna, the Ego (Ahamkara) that is called Aniruddha is produced. In the absence of any parallel instance (in illustration of it) we are not able, to understand it to be so, nor is any Scriptural passage of such import available.[25]

Analogue or illustration is also used to explicate the position of the Advaita itself. One analogue concerning the proposition of the Vedānta that the effect is non-different from the cause is contained in Śaṅkara's commentary on Brahma Sūtra II.1.19:

> Just as when a piece of cloth happens to be folded, it is not definitely understood whether it is a piece of cloth or some other material, but when it is unfolded it becomes clearly understood to be a piece of cloth, or,

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[24] BSB, II.2.7, Apte, p. 354.

[25] Ibid., I.2.43, pp. 419-20.

it is understood to be a piece of cloth even when it is
yet folded, but it is not understood as to how long and
broad it is, but when it is unfolded it is known to be
of a particular dimension in length and breadth and that
it is not a piece of cloth different from the one which
happened to be in a folded condition, similarly, an effect
such a piece of cloth etc., unrecognizable as it is, while
it is in the condition of its cause viz. as threads etc.
becomes clearly recognizable when it is made manifest
by the operations of the causal agents, such as the shut-
tle, the loom and the weaver. Hence the meaning is, that
it is precisely in accordance with "the maxim of the
folded and unfolded pieces of cloth" that an effect is non-
different from its cause.[26]

Now this analogue, standing in isolation, does not convince us of

the effect necessarily being non-different from its cause. But it

does employ the use of analogue as a means by which an argument can

be constructed. Thus to take this as an isolated argument is to

misconstrue its intent which is to build a cogent religio-philoso-

phical premise out of a number of conventional analogues. This is

also the case in the analogue given by Sankara in reply to an oppo-

nent's objection:

. . . even though the sea is not different from water
which constitutes its self, the foam, waves, and bubbles
(of the sea) etc., which are modifications of the sea,
and are not different from it, are cometimes seen to dis-
play a behavior characterized by being distinctively
different from each other, and at another time being in
conjunction with each other. These modifications of the
sea, viz, the foam, waves etc. even though they are non-
different from their cause, i.e. the sea, which has water
as its self, still they (i.e. the modifications) do not
attain each others condition . . . Hence, it is said,.
(by the Sutrakara) that distinctive difference between
the experiencer and the thing to be experienced—non-
different though they are from their cause viz. the Highest
Self i.e. Brahma—is reasonably sustainable on the analogy
of the maxim of the sea and the waves etc.[27]

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[26] Ibid., II.1.19, pp. 322-3.   [27] Ibid., II.1.13, pp. 301-2.

Thus we can understand the implications of the analogue as one of the primary methods by which the Advaita maintained itself in dialogue with other views so that the correct understanding of the Advaita is communicated. Analogue then is a teaching method by which other views are overcome and by which its own views are propounded.

ANALOGUE AS BRAHMAN SPEAKING

The intent of the teaching method of analogue is to remove ignorance or avidyā. By this removal knowledge or vidyā dawns. This is the intent of an inquiry into Brahman which, as we have already seen, is the object of the Sūtra commentary. Thus when the Advaita utilizes the analogue for purposes of refutation or presentation it is done with reference to Brahman. The inquiry into Brahman then is the ultimate concern of the Advaita darśana and by extention all is derived from this imperative. The analogue is a way by which this inquiry proceeds. By way of analogue understanding arises and this understanding leads to liberation. Liberation itself is not open to question, it is given. As Śankara states:

> So far as the Upaniṣhadic teaching goes, however, as it understands the Self to be but one only, and that inasmuch as one entity can at once be both subject and object (of the torment) is not reasonably sustainable, and as the Scriptural instruction is, that all different effects are merely made current by speech (while in fact in the truest sense they do not exist), no doubt about non-release can ever arise, even in a dream (in the mind of a Vedāntin). So far as the phenomenal world of experience is concerned, however, the well-known condition of one being the tormentor and the other being the tormented, is as valid as it is seen to be for the time being, and so it does not become necessary (in such a case) either to raise an objection or to have to refute it.[28]

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[28]Ibid., II.2.10., p. 360.

Thus analogue speaks about that which in itself is beyond language. It is analogues based upon the world that point beyond the world and to man's fulfillment in liberation (release). This is the reason Sankara utilizes analogues from the world, as shown in Appendix A and B. Analogues measure out phenomena so that their nature can be grasped. This measuring out is centered in the conception of māyā.

OCCURRENCES OF MAYA IN THE COMMENTARY OF SANKARA

The concept of māyā is an important part of the understanding of the Advaita darsana. It occurs in a number of places within the commentary on the Brahma Sūtra. It is also implied throughout other parts of the commentary. Let us now look at these occurrences.

> māyā—I.1.20, I.2.6, I.3.19, I.4.3, I.4.9, II.1.1, II.1.9,
>   II.1.14, II.1.21, II.2.29, III.2.3, III.2.17.
>
> māyāmaya—I.1.20, I.4.3, III.2.1.
>
> māyāmātra—II.1.9, III.2.3.
>
> māyāmātratva—III.2.4, III.2.6.
>
> māyālikavañcana—II.3.6.
>
> māyāvin—I.1.17, I.3.19, II.1.1, II.1.9, II.1.21, II.1.28.
>
> māyāvyapāsraya—II.2.7.
>
> māyāsakti—II.1.14.
>
> māyin—I.4.3.[29]

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[29]T. M. P. Mahadevan, Word Index to the Brahma-sūtra-bhāsya of Sankara, Part II, (Madras: Centre of Advanced Study in Phil., Univ. of Madras, 1973), pp. 754-5. The following list is given by Jacob's in his A Concordance to the Principal Upanishads and Bhagavadgitā: Māyā—Brih. 2.5.19, Swet. 1.10, 4.9, 4.10, Gaudapāda K. 2.19, 2.31, 3.19, 3.24, 3.27, 3.28, 3.29, 4.58, 4.61, Gītā 7.14, 7.15, 18.61, Māyāmaya—Gaudapāda K 4.59, 4.69. Māyāmātra—Gaudapāda K. 1.17. Māyāhistan Gaudapāda K. 4.44.

Let us now look at the above as they occur in text.[30]   In I.1.20
we find the word "māyā" and "māyāmaya" occurring in Śaṅkara's answer
to the opponent concerning the assumption of shape by the highest
Lord:

> With a beard bright as gold, etc., cannot refer to
> the highest Lord, we reply that the highest Lord
> also may, when he pleases, assume a bodily shape
> formed of māyā (mayam), in order to gratify thereby
> his devout worshippers. Thus Smriti also says, "That
> thou seest me, O Nārada, is the Māyā (māyāhyeṣas)
> emitted by me; do not then look on me as endowed
> with the qualities of all beings.[31]

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[30]We will follow the procedure of giving the English trans-
lation of the quote and in the footnote cite the Sanskrit and other
translations. The order of footnotes will be the Sanskrit given by
Sastri in his Nirnaya Sagar press edition cited as Sastri followed
by page, then Apte's translation cited BSB and page, Thibaut's
translation cited VS and page, and lastly Gambhirananda cited BS and
page. For full acknowledgement of above authors, consult Bibliography.

[31]Sastri, p. 196, (syātparameśvarasyā-picchavasanmāyāmayam
rūpam sādhakānugrahārtham, 'māyā hyeṣā māyā sṛṣta yanmām paśyaṣi Nārada.
sarvabhūtaguṇair   yuktam maivam mām jñātumarhasi 'iti smaraṇat).
      BSB, pp. 67-8: With regard to the objection (raised by the
opponent), that the mention in the Scriptures, of form such as having
an aureate beard etc., is not reasonably sustainable in the case of
the Highest Lord, we reply--It may well be the illusory māyāmaya form
assumed by the Lord, at will, with a desire to extend his grace to
the devout worshipper, because the Smriti says, "What you see before
you, Oh Nārada, is the Māyā generated by me. It is not correct to
understand me as one endowed with all the attributes of beings."
      VS, p. 80: With a beard bright as gold, etc., cannot refer to
the highest Lord, we reply that the highest Lord also may, when he
pleases, assume a bodily shape formed of māyā, in order to gratify
thereby his devout worshippers. Thus Smriti also says, "That thou
seest me, O Nārada, is the Māyā emitted by me; do not then look on me
as endowed with the qualities of all beings.
      BS, pp. 80-1: In answer to the objection that the reference in
the Upaniṣad to such forms as the possession of golden beard etc. does
not befit God, we say: Even for God there may be forms created at His
will out of Māyā for the sake of favouring the aspirants, as is
declared in the Smṛti, "O Nārada, it is a Māyā, created by Me, that you
see Me in this form possessed of all the substances and qualities.
You must not understand Me thus." See also BSB III.2.17.

I.2.6 is a quotation from the <u>Bhagavad Gītā</u> 18:61: This quotation is exactly the same as that found in BSB II.1.14.

> Oh Arjuna The Lord present in the hearts of all beings by His power of māyā makes them go round and round as on a whirling machine.[32]

I.3.19 equates māyā with <u>avidyā</u>:

> Only one is the Great Lord who is eternally immutable and is of the very essence of knowledge, who, because of avidyā, that is māyā, is as by a māyāvin made to appear in diverse ways, but that there is nothing other (than the Great Lord) which is of the very essence of knowledge.[33]

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[32]Sastri, p. 234, (<u>iśvarah sarvabhūtanām hrddeśe arjuna tiṣṭhati bhramayan sarvabhutāni yantrārūdāni māyaya</u>).
   BSB 1.2.6, p. 99 reads: "Oh Arjuna, the Lord is immanent in the region of the Hridaya of all beings, making them go round and round by his power of illusion (Māyā) as if they are riding on a machine". At BSB II.1.14 it reads: "Oh Arjuna, the Lord is immanent in the region of the heart of all beings, and by this power of Māyā makes them go round and round as in a whirligig". p. 312.
   VS, I, p. 113: The Lord, O Arguna, is seated in the heart of all beings, driving round by his magical power all beings (as if they were) mounted on a machine. II.1.14 I, p. 330: The Lord, O Arguna, is seated in the region of the heart of all beings, turning round all beings (as though) mounted on a machine, by his delusion.
   BS, p. 114: The Lord, O Arjuna, dwells in the hearts of all beings, causing all beings by His Māyā to revolve, (as if) mounted on a machine. II.1.14 p. same.

[33]Sastri, p. 307, (<u>eka eva paremeśvarah kūṭastha nityo vijñānadhātuna avidyayā māyayā māyāvivad anekadhā vibhāvyate nānyo vijñānadhātur asti iti</u>).
   BSB, p. 176: . . . there is but one and only one, the Highest Lord, who is eternally immoveable and has the essence of knowledge as his structure, who under the influence of 'ignorance i.e. illusion (Māyā) is, as by an illusionist, made to appear in different ways, and that there is nothing else which has this essence of knowledge as its structure.
   VSI, p. 190: . . . only one highest Lord ever unchanging, whose substance is cognition, and who, by means of Nescience manifests himself in various ways, just as a thaumaturg appears in different shapes by means of his magical power. Besides that Lord there is no other substance of cognition.

I.4.3 concerns the reply of Advaita to an objection of the Samkhya:

> The seedal power is of the nature of avidyā,
> imparted by the word avyakta having the highest Lord
> as its locus or ground, and of the nature of māyā and
> is verily, the Great Sleep wherein the transmigrating
> individual self slumbers on without awareness of its
> own nature. . . . This same avyakta is indicated or
> enjoined by the word māyā as in the description of the
> mantra. Know māyā to be . . . . It is this māyā that is
> the avyakta because it is not possible to determine its
> nature as ens or otherwise.[34]

BS, p. 195: The supreme Lord is but one--unchanging, eternal, absolute Consciousness; but like the magician He appears diversely through Māyā, otherwise known as Avidyā (ignorance). Apart from this there is no other Consciousness as such.

[34] Sastri, p. 378, (avidyātmikā hi bījaśaktir avyakta śabda nirdeśya parameśvarāśrayā māyāmayī mahasvptīhi yasyam svarupa pratibodha rahita sarate samsārino jīvah . . . tad etad avyaktam . . . quacit māyeti sūcitam, mayam tu prakritim vidyān māyinamtu maheśvaram iti . . °. mantravarnāt avyakta hi sa māyā tattva anyatva nirūpanasya śakyatvāt)

BSB, pp. 227-8: This potential power of the seed is of the nature of Nescience, and it is indicated by the word "undeveloped" (Avyakta), and has the Highest Lord as its basis, and is of the nature of an illusion (Māyā), and is the great sleep in which the transmigratory Jiva-Selfs unaware of their own true nature (Rūpa) continue to slumber on. . . . Occasionally it is expressed by the word "Akshara" as in the Scriptural passage "Higher than the high Imperishable" (Mund. 2.1.2) and occasionally it is suggested to be the illusory power (Māyā) thus-- "You should know the Prakriti (the cause) to be but the illusory power--Māyā (and not the Pradhana of the Samkhyas), and the Highest Lord as the master-illusionist (Shvet. 4.10). It is this Māyā that is this "undeveloped" (Avyakta), because, it is not possible to predicate about it, that it either is different from it (i.e. Brahma) or not different from it.

VS, I, p. 243: For that causal potentiality is of the nature of Nescience; it is rightly denoted by the term "undeveloped;" it has the highest Lord for its substratum; it is of the nature of an illusion; it is a universal sleep in which are lying the transmigrating sould destitute for the time of the consciousness of their individual character. . . . For Māyā is properly called undeveloped or non-manifested since it cannot be defined either as that which is or that which is not.

BS, p. 249: That potential power, constituted by nescience, is mentioned by the word unmanifest. It rests on God, and is comparable to magic. It is a kind of deep slumber in which the transmigrating souls sleep without any consciousness of their real nature. . . . .

I.4.9 is a quote from Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad IV-10.11.

> Know then that prakṛti is māyā and the wielder of māyā
> is the Great Lord. . . . That one who is the controller
> of every root-cause (such as māyā).35

II.1.1 deals with the creation of the world by Īśvara:

> It has been shown in the first adhyaya that the omnis-
> cient Lord of all is the cause of the origin of this
> world in the same way as clay is the material cause
> of jars and gold of golden ornaments; that by his ru-
> lership he is the cause of the subsistence of this world,
> just as the māyāyi is the cause of the subsistence of the
> māyā.36

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sometimes it is called Māyā as in, "Know Māyā to be Nature and the
master of Māyā to be the great God" (Vs. IV.10). That Māyā is surely
unmanifest, for it can neither be ascertained as real nor as unreal.

35Sastri, p. 388, (māyām tu prakrtim viddhi, māyinam tu
maheśvaram; . . . yo yonim yonim adhitisthaty ekoha iti ca tasyāt evā
vagamān na swatantrā kacit prakriti hi . . .).
    BSB, p. 240:"Know the Māyā (illusive power) as the primal
cause and the Highest Lord as the Māyin (the master illusionist)" and
"That one (the Highest Lord) who is the controller of every root-
cause (such as Māyā)" (Shvet. 4.10.11).
    VS, I, p. 255:'Know then, Prakriti is Māyā, and the great Lord
he who is affected with Māyā;''who being one only rules over every
germ;' IV,10,11;
    BS, p. 261: Know Māyā to be Nature (material cause), and the
master of Māyā to be the great Lord" (Vs. IV.10)

36Sastri, p. 432, (kim prabodha iva svapne'pi paremirthiki
srstieahosvin māyā mayi iti).
    BSB, p. 275: In the first Adhyaya, it has been propounded
by coordinating the statements in Vedānta, that the Omniscient Lord
of all, is the cause of the origination of the world, even as clay and
gold etc. are (the cause of the origination) of a pot and an ornament
respectively, that he is the cause of the preservation of the created
world, even as the illusionist is (the cause) of the illusion, . . .
    VS, I, p. 290: It has been shown in the first adhyaya that the
omniscient Lord of all is the cause of the origin of this world in the
same way as clay is the material cause of jars and gold of golden
ornaments; that by his rulership he is the cause of the subsistence of
this world once originated, just as the magician is the cause of the
subsistence of the magical illusion;
    BS, p. 299: In the course of showing how all the Upaniṣadic
texts are in agreement in presenting Brahman (as the cause of the
universe), it was proved in the First Chapter that the omniscient Lord
of all is the source of the origin of the universe, just as clay, gold,

II.1.9. speaks of the Highest Self:

> This manifestation of the Highest Self, by its
> existing as the Self of the three conditions, is—like
> the appearance of a snake etc. in a rope—but a
> (māyāmātrm) mere illusion.[37]

II.1.14. is the Bhagavad Gītā citation 18.61 already cited above at

I.2.6.

II.1.21. constitutes the beginning of a comparison:

> Just as the māyāvi by his free will effort-
> lessly retracts or withdraws the māyā spread by himself
> . . . [38]

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etc. are of pots, necklaces, etc.; that by virtue of His being the
ordainer of the created universe, like the magician of his magic.

[37]Sastri, p. 447, (yathā svayam prasāritayā māyayā māyāvi
trsvapi kaliśa na samprsyate it yathā ca svapnadrgekah svapna darśana
māyayā na samsprsyatha it).

    BSB, p. 294: This manifestation of the Highest Self, by its
existing as the Self of these three conditions, is—like the appear-
ance of a snake etc. in a rope—but a mere illusion.

    VS, I, p. 312: For that the highest Self appears in those
three states, is a mere illusion, not more substantial than the snake
for which the rope is mistaken in the twilight.

    BS, p. 318: This appearance of the supreme Self in identity
with the three states is a mere superimposition, as in the case of
the rope appearing as a snake etc.

[38]Sastri, p. 462, (yathā ca māyāvi svayam prasāritam māyam
icchayā 'nayasanaiva upa samharati et).

    BSB, p. 324: Just as an illusionist, at will and without any
effort withdraws an illusion spread by him, ...

    VS, I, p. 344: And as the magician easily retracts, whenever
he likes, the magical illusion which he had emitted, ...

    BS, p. 347: As a juggler withdraws at will and without
effort the magic spread out by himself, . . .

II.2.29. discusses cancellation of dream and māyā:

> A thing perceived in a dream by one is contra-
> dicted (on his waking) . . . there is a similar contra-
> diction or cancellation in the case of māyā also. A thing
> perceived in a waking state--a pillar for instance--is
> never in the slightest cancelled or contradicted in
> that state.[39]

3.2.3. dreams as māyā:

> But it (viz. the dream world) is mere māyā, on account
> of its nature not manifesting itself with the totality
> (of the attributes of reality).[40]

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[39]Sastri, p. 555, (bādhyate hi svapnopalabdham vastu . . .
evam māyādisvapi bhavati yathāyatham bādhah. naivam jāgritobalabdham
vastustambhādikam krsyañcidapyavasthayam badhyate).

BSB, p. 402: Things perceived in a dream by a person are
contradicted on his awakening (from a dream), ... There is a
similar contradiction in the case of Māyā (illusion) etc. But a thing
perceived in a waking condition--a pillar for instance--is never
contradicted under any circumstances.

VS, I, pp. 424-5: The things of which we are conscious in a
dream are negated by our waking consciousness. . . . In an analogue
manner the things of which we are conscious when under the influence
of a magic illusion, and the like, are negated by our ordinary
consciousness. Those things, on the other hand, of which we are conscious
in our waking state, such as posts and the like, are never negated
in any state.

BS, p. 423: To a man, arisen from sleep, the object perceived
in a dream becomes sublated, . . . So also in the case of magic etc.,
adequate sublation takes place. But a thing seen in the waking state,
a pillar for instance, is not thus sublated under any condition.

[40]Sastri, p. 689, (māyāmātram tu kartsnyenanabhivyakta -
svarupatvāt).

BSB, pp. 562-3: The dream creation is but mere appearance i.e.
illusion, and there is not even an iota (lit., whiff) of reality (about
it).

VS, II, p. 134: It is not true that the world of dreams is
real; it is mere illusion and there is not a particle of reality in it.

BS, p. 590: . . . . for the creation in the intervening state
is a mere product of Māyā, there being not the slightest touch of
reality in it.

3.2.17. is a smrti quote:

> Oh Nārada, when you see me as endowed with the
> attributes of all beings it is only māyā of by own crea-
> tion, but you should not understand me as being such (in
> reality).[41]

3.2.1. is a statement of a doubt:

> Here a doubt arises whether in the dream condition cre-
> ation is real as in the waking state, or whether it is māyā.[42]

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[41]Sastri, p. 710, (māyā hyeṣā māyā sṛṣṭa yan mām paśyasi nārada / sarva bhūta gunair yuktam naivam mām jnātymarhasi).

BSB, p. 587: "Oh, Nārada, when you see me as one endowed with the attributes of all beings, it is only an illusion of my own creation, but you should not understand me to be really so".

VS, II, p. 157: 'The cause, Q Nārada, of your seeing me endowed with the qualities of all beings is the Māyā emitted by me; do not cognize me as being such (in reality).'

BS, p. 614: "O Nārada, that you see me as possessed of all the (five divine) qualities of all elements, is only because of My Māyā, called up by Myself. For else you should not understand Me thus."

[42]Sastri, p. 687, (kim prabodha iva svapne 'pi paramārthiki sṛṣṭirahosvin māyāmayīti? tatra tāvat pratipadyate--).

BSB, p. 561: With regard to this, a doubt (arises)--whether in the dream condition creation is as real, as it is in the waking condition, or whether it is merely an appearance i.e. it is illusory (Māyāmayi).

VS, II, p. 133: Here a doubt arises whether the creation thus taking place in dreams is a real one (paramarthika) like the creation seen in the waking state, or whether it consists of illusion (māyā).

BS, p. 588: The doubt arises with regard to this, whether the creation in dream is as real as in the waking state, or it is only illusory.

3.2.4. māyā and dream—a special character:

Being merely māyā there is not even a whiff of ultimacy or truth about a dream, if it be said, (we reply) that it is not the case.

As it is explained in "the non-difference of them results from the words like beginning etc." (BS.11,1,14) the entire world of phenomena is mere māyā. The mere māyā character stated or ascribed to this creation (of dream) is therefore of a special kind or simply special.[43]

3.2.6. is the conclusion of the sūtra:

Therefore it is sustainable that the dream is of the nature of mere māyā.[44]

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[43]Sastri, pp. 692,3, (māyā mātratvāt na kaścit svapne para-mārthagandho tarhi stiti - nityucyate, pratipādita hi tadan yatvam ārambhana śabdādibhyay ityatra samasthasya prapancasya māyamatratvam, ata vaiśesikam idam sandhyasya māyāmātratvam udinam).

BSB, pp. 565, 567: (Says the opponent of Vedānta)—A dream, then, being an illusion, is it not, that there could not be even an iota of reality about it? (We reply)—It is not so . . . as has been explained (in Bra. Sū. II.i.14), and it has been elaborately established by us already that the whole phenomenal world is wholly illusory. . . . The illusory character of dream creations, therefore, comes to be so stated separately in a special sense (of being totally illusory).

VS, II, pp. 136, 138: Well then, as dreams are mere illusion, they do not contain a particle of reality?—Not so, we reply; . . . On the other hand we must remember that also the so-called real crea-tion with its ether, air, &c., is not absolutely real; for as we have proved before (II,1,14) the entire expanse of things is mere illusion. . . . That the latter is mere illusion has, therefore, to be understood with a distinction.

BS, pp. 592, 594: In that case, since it is all mere Māyā, there is no touch of reality in dream. . . . We say no, . . . for under the aphorism, "The effect is non-different from the cause since terms like 'origin' etc. are met with" (II.i.14), we showed that the whole creation is but Māyā. Hence the statement that dream is merely Maya has a special significance.

[44]Sastri, p. 694, (tasmād upapannam svapnasya māyāmātratvam).

BSB, p. 569: It is, therefore, reasonably sustainable that dreams are but a mere appearance i.e. an illusion (Māyā).

VS, II, p. 141: From all this it follows that dreams are mere illusion.

BS, p. 594: Hence it is reasonable to say that dream is mere Māyā.

In 2.3.6. māyālikā is deception:

> It is not intelligible that scripture, like any
> man shall determine a thing by statements which are
> <u>delusively</u> false or deceitful.[45]

°1.1.17. distinguishes māyāvins:

> The māyāvin <u>par excellence</u> is one that stands
> on the ground different from the other māyāvin that
> appears to climb into the sky on a rope with a sword and
> leather in his hand.[46]

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[45]Sastri, p. 584, (<u>na ca vēdasya puruṣānāmiva māyālikā</u>
<u>vanjanādibhih arthavadhāranam upapadyate</u>).

    BSB, p. 432: It is not reasonably sustainable that the
Scriptures--like ordinary men--ascertain a thing to be such and such,
by illusorily deceptive or untrue statements.

    VS, 'II, p. 13: Nor can Vedic affirmations about things be
viewed, like ordinary human statements, as mixed up with error, un-
truth, and deceit.

    BS, p. 453: And it cannot be argued that like men, the Vedas
also ascertain a thing through delusive, equivocal, or deceptive
statements etc.

[46]Sastri, p. 184, (<u>yathā māyāvinascarma khanga dharāt</u>
<u>sūtreṇa ākāsamadhirohatah sa eva māyāvi paramārtha rupo bhumiṣto 'nyah</u>).

    BSB, p. 58: Just as the real illusionist <u>par excellence</u>
who stands on the ground, is different from the other illusory
person, who appears to ascend into the sky by a rope with a sword
and a leather shield in his hand.

    VS, I, p. 70: . . . the Lord differs from the soul (vigna
natman) which is embodied, acts and enjoys, and is the product of
Nescience, in the same way as the real juggler who stands on the
ground differs from the illusive juggler, who, holding in his hand a
shield and a sword, climbs up to the sky by means of a rope; . . .

    BS, p. 70: . . . the difference being made in the same sense
that the magician standing on the ground is fancied to be different
from the magician holding sword and shield in hands and climbing up
by a rope to the sky, though in reality the first is the very essence
of the latter; . . .

2.1.28 discusses creation as not touching the creators:

It is seen in the world also that gods, māyāvin and others create without destruction of their own forms the diverse elephants, horses, etc.[47]

2.2.7. māyā as the power of creation:

In the case of the Highest Self however there is a distinction because of apathy or detachment (in respect of things) and its own native and creative tendency being contingent through māyā.[48]

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[47]Sastri, p. 477, (loke 'pi devādisu māyāvyādisu ca svarūpā anuba mardenaiva vicitra hastyas vadi srstayo).

BSB, p. 334: It is seen in the ordinary world also, that Gods, illusionists etc. cause such creations as elephants and horses, without their own forms undergoing destruction, . . .

VS, I, p. 353: In ordinary life too multiform creations, elephants, horses, and the like are seen to exist in gods, etc., and magicians without interfering with the unity of their being.

BS, p. 357: In the world also it is seen in the case of gods, as also jugglers and others that various kinds of creation of elephants and so on take place without any destruction of their nature.

[48]Sastri, p. 498, (paramātmanasta svarūpavyapasvāyam audāsīnyam māyāvyapāsrayam ca pravartakatvam ityastyatiśayaḥ).

BSB, p. 355: In the case of the Highest Self, however, its tendency towards creation depends upon its association with its power of Māyā, and apathy of its own nature (as realized by the Jīva-Self on the attainment of knowledge), and that is where there is this peculiarity (Atishaya) in the case of the Highest Self.

VS, I, p. 374: The highest Self, on the other hand (which is the cause of the world, according to the Vedāntins), is characterised by non-activity inherent in its own nature, and; at the same time, by moving power inherent in Māyā and is thus superior (to the soul of the Sankhyas).

BS, p. 378: But in the case of the supreme Self there is the greater advantage that It has inactivity from Its own point of view, but a driving urge (for creation) from the standpoint of Māyā.

ANALOGUE AND MĀYĀ

We have just observed that illustration or analogue is that means, within the Advaita, which is used to measure out language so that the inquiry into Brahman is seen as a continuity. In other words the inquiry uses language to show that true language performs its ultimate function in making itself transparent. In this way we can understand the citation from the Brahma Sūtra concerning language:

> Scriptures also tell us, how, questioned by Bāshkali, Bādhva explained Brahma to him (i.e. Bāshkali) merely by his silence, thus--"He (i.e. Bāshkali) said, Oh Bādhva, teach me (what Brahma is), but he (Bādhva) remained silent and when he was thus questioned a second and a third time, replied--"Indeed, have I told you (my my silence), but of course you do not understood [cit: understand]. This Self (ātmā) is one from which duality has been swept away (upashānta)."49

Another illustration of this is that transparency is assumed when we say that Brahman shines through language, for Brahman is seen as self-luminous as in B.S. 1.3.22:

> Whatever becomes manifest becomes so manifest because of the lustre called Brahma, and Brahma is not made manifest by any other light, because it has the nature of being self-luminant ./. .50

Thus through the activity of language made transparent Brahman, defined as self-luminous, shines forth. Language measures itself out so that the immeasurable is shown.

49BSB, 3.2.17, Apte, p. 587. In Apte's citation Vāshkali read as Bāshkali. We will use Vāshkali in our text.

50Ibid., I.3.22, p. 180.

The measuring activity of language is implicit within the definition of māyā in the Advaita of Śankara. This was observed in the etymological definition cited in Chapter Two. Māyā can be seen as a measuring out of the immeasurable.[51] The immeasurable for the Advaita is Brahman. Thus māyā as measuring is promulgated by the activity of illustration or analogue which measures out name-form complex and language. This is accomplished by defining the former as "indefinable as either Brahman or non-Brahman". Concerning the latter language is made transparent so that the self-luminous Brahman shines through.

Analogue in the Advaita is primarily instructional communication that leads us down the pathway in the inquiry into Brahman. This can also be understood if we refer back to the Advaita understanding of māyā as the matrix of the universe. The point of this is that to quest after māyā itself will lead one nowhere. The analogue recognizes this because it is constructed on the framework of knowledge of Brahman. This is also true regarding the status of māyā. It is also constructed on the frame of knowledge of Brahman. This is not to say, however, that they are identical because in the Advaita analogue, because of its construction within the name-form complex and along with language, must reside within the canopy of māyā.

The two function in the same manner because māyā must be passed through like the veil over the doorway and analogue must make

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[51]Discussion with T. R. V. Murti in Banaras, Feb. 1974.

itself transparent to the self-luminous. The point of arrival is the
same; it is Brahman. Thus when we talk of māyā we must utilize
analogue. Everything that is said is said with the suffix "as it
were".[52]

ANALOGUE AND BRAHMAN

Because of the nature of analogue the inquiry is brought to
completion. There is the consideration also that by its very nature
analogue can be seen as the departure into an inquiry and at the
same moment its completion. What this means is that the analogue is
not necessary to knowledge of Brahman in the Advaita. If it were neces-
sary, it would have to be understood as a kind of injunction (vidhi)
(like "works" in the Pūrva-Mīmāmsā) and this is rejected by the Advaita.
Rather analogue is only instruction and does not enjoin something. "The
science of Brahma however merely instructs a person about Brahma, but
it does not enjoin to any act of acquiring knowledge."[53] The analogue
is at once the process of the inquiry and its completion. It is
its completion in that, because knowledge of Brahman is knowledge that
is intuitive, there is the possible recovery immediately of identity.
This is shown in the illustration of the tenth man.[54] Ten men were
crossing a river and when they reached the other side they proceeded to
count each other. The first man counter the nine others and took
this to be the total. He was sad that there was one missing. Thereupon

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[52] See Paul Deussen's comment in Chapter Six, quote #22.

[53] BSB, 1.1.1, Apte, p. 6.

[54] PBV, p. 98 ff.

the others counted and each did as the first and counted only nine.
All were then greatly saddened. At this time another man came upon
them and seeing how sad they were inquired about it. They told him
how they began with ten and after crossing the river, there were only
nine. The stranger then looked at them and told them to count again,
which they did, arriving again at nine. Then the stranger told them,
"Indeed you have counted all but yourself. You yourself are the tenth."
This story illustrates that knowledge of Brahman is precisely the
knowledge that one already is Brahman. Thus it is by working through
the analogue that the possibility of knowledge of Brahman is put for-
ward. True release is beyond analogue for in it analogue has
fulfilled its meaning--the inquiry into Brahman.

Another example is the analogue of a dramatic stage:

> . . . The agent, the act, and the objects are at the same
> time illumined by the witness-intelligence which is like
> a lamp set on a dramatic stage. The lamp gives light
> to the manager of the drama, to the actors and to the
> audience without any distinction; and it shines even if
> the theater be empty of all persons. . . . The sense of
> egoity may be compared to the proprietor of the drama,
> the objects to the audience and the intellect to the
> danseuse; and the various sense-organs are auxiliaries
> or accompaniments which aid the actors. All these are
> without distinction illumined by the witness. Just as
> the lamp on the dramatic stage illumines without moving
> and without being affected by the movements of the
> actors and the audience, even so the witness which is per-
> manent and immutable manifests all things both within and
> without.[55]

This illustrates that through Brahman, the self-luminous, all that exists
is illumined; when all is known by the light of Brahman the inquiry is
fulfilled and illustration is rendered transparent.

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[55]Ibid., p. 173.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

NĀMA-RŪPA, LANGUAGE, MĀYĀ, AND ANALOGUE: THEIR CONNECTION IN ŚAŃKARA

The name-form complex, consisting of either the world of manifold phenomena or as existing in seed form within the mind of Īśvara, is defined by Śaṅkara as <u>anirvacanīya</u>. Language is contained within name and it constitutes one of the central ideas in the Advaita inquiry into Brahman. Language is that which through its usage misunderstanding is corrected and which points beyond itself to knowledge. It accomplishes both of these movements through analogue. Analogue is the action of the inquiry into Brahman and the completion of the inquiry itself simultaneously. It allows Brahman to show through. Māyā is the matrix of the cosmos because it places itself at all times within the frame of an inquiry into Brahman and in this place-ment measures itself out so that the inquiry is furthered. The activity of measuring is accomplished by analogues which utilize the name-form complex in its proper perspective. In this service every construct is defined as being a pointing mechanism. Any illustration, ideally, could thus be applied and used in this way. One example of this within the tradition, but not used by Śaṅkara, can be seen in the <u>Srimad-bhagavata</u> account of the fifth incarnation of Viṣṇu as Vāmana the dwarf.

In Chapter Fifteen of the <u>Srimad-bhagavata</u> the story of how
King Bali[1] gained control over the world is related. Because of this
there arose a great consternation within heaven and after some time it
was agreed that Visṇu should incarnate himself so that order could be
restored to the cosmos. Visṇu did incarnate as the dwarf Vāmana and
after performing austerities, went to King Bali and asked for a boon:

> Thereupon the Lord in the form of dwarf said, "O King!
> All the lovely objects of the world are not capable of
> satisfying him who has not controlled his senses; one
> dissatisfied with a piece of land measuring three foot-
> steps is not satisfied even with an island . . . It is,
> therefore, O thou bestower of boons, that I do beg of
> thee just a piece of land measuring three footsteps.[2]

King Bali did not consider that Vāmana, being a dwarf, could cover
much land in three footsteps and thus granted him this boon. As
Vāmana began to step off three times, a wonderful thing occurred:
he began to expand. He grew as he raised his foot and when he had
completed his first and second footstep all the world was covered:

> Thereupon, with His one foot he occupied the entire land
> of Vali, with His body the sky, and with His two arms the
> quarters, His second foot was accommodated by Heaven but
> no room was left for the third. Thereupon the second foot
> of His extending above heaven through Maharloka, Tapoloka,
> and Janaloka reached Satyaloka.[3]

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[1] The text that we cite has translated Bali which means "to
increase" as Vali. We utilize Bali as this is the more correct.

[2] J. B. Sanyal, <u>The Srimad-Bhagavatam of Krishna-Dwaipayana
Vyāsa</u> Vol. III, 3rd edition, (Calcutta: Oriental Publishing Co.,
1965), p. 153.

[3] <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 158.

After a brief time King Bali offered to Vāmana, who in reality was

Viṣṇu, a place for the third footstep. He said to the dwarf, "Do

thou place thy third foot on my head."[4]

Referring back then to what was stated about the possibility

of the utilization of illustration, the account cited above could be

understood thusly: the three footsteps of Vāmana represent the idea of

measuring, in fact we can say that the whole account is the measuring

out of existence that which was covering the real. . Vāmana measured

off the world so that the power of King Bali was eradicated and in

doing so regained or reinstituted order to the cosmos. If we now view

māyā as measure we can say that in the same manner māyā measures out

of existence that which covers the real. It does this by placing the

cosmos in its rightful place by establishing the primacy of Brahman

in the Advaita. It accomplishes this so that release or liberation

can be realized. Thus through analogue the name-form complex, language,

and māyā are postulated on, and exist for, instruction about Brahman.

NECESSITY OF CONNECTION

In the Advaita of Śaṅkara these four (analogue, name-form

complex, language, and māyā) are necessarily connected. If this is

true the question that arises is, why is such the case? The Advaita

of Śaṅkara sees this implicit connection in the above mentioned

citations (Chapter Seven) of the occurences of māyā in the Bhāṣya.

Māyā there is used in reference to the name-form complex and this

is expressed in language which is structured so that inquiry into

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[4]Ibid., p. 161.

Brahmān is furthered by analogue or illustration. The connecting
link in these factors shows itself as centered in and for the acqui-
sition of Brahman knowledge. Name and form explain the makeup of the
phenomenal world so that it becomes an ordered cosmos—not to define
it but rather to place it within the Advaita ontology. Māyā is the
matrix or frame in which the name-form complex finds its base; it is
the power (śakti) of Īśvara in creation and at the same time the
localized structure of the individual who exists in a state of
unrecovered knowledge. Language provides us with the tool for the
recovery of knowledge by measuring out ignorance as well as itself.

The necessity of the connection of these factors centers in
that which is common between them. This is the "instruction" aspect
or element of their definition. Thus they can only be defined in
reference to that of which they essentially are and direct one toward.
This essence and direction in the Brahma Sūtra begins and ends at the
inquiry itself. The point of departure and arrival is self-evident.
This is why the statement "tat tvam asi" attains its high status in
Advaita. It is the tautological frame:

> If we were to understand the knowledge of the unity of
> the Self with Brahma, to be of the nature of attributing
> greatness to a comparatively small thing, then the coor-
> dinated meaning of the sentences such as "that thou art"
> (Chhān. 6.8.7) and "I am Brahma" (Brih. 1.4.10) and
> "This Self is Brahma" (Brih. 2.4.19) which have the purport
> of propounding the unity of the Self and Brahma, would be
> done violence to, and would contradict Scriptural pas-
> sages about the fruit in the form of the removal of Nescience
> such as "The knots of the Hridaya are cut asunder and
> all doubts are resolved" (Muṇḍ. 2.2.8), and passages like
> "knowing Brahma, he became Brahma" (Muṇḍ. 3.2.9) which
> speak about the Self attaining the condition of Brahma,
> cannot be properly understood. Therefore the knowledge

of the unity of the Self and Brahma is not of the nature
of attributing greatness to a small thing etc.; hence
also, the science of the knowledge of Brahma does not
depend upon some sort of operation by man.[5]

Thus the connection exists only for the inquiry into Brahman. This
inquiry is the purport and purpose of all conceivable discourse in
the Advaita of Śaṅkara.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONNECTION

The implications from the connection of the name-form complex,
language, and māyā arise because of discourse in the Advaita. This
entails however a special understanding regarding the conception of
discourse itself. This was pointed out in Chapter Six to be under-
stood as true discourse which is the same as true language or Veda.
Veda itself derives from the root vid which means "to know". Dis-
course is then concerned with knowledge which is true. That which is
true is Real (sat) as Śaṅkara observes:

> . . . the word "truth" means the Highest Brahma, because
> of its nature (rūpa) of being the transcendent entity
> also because of another Scriptural passage--"Brahma is
> Truth, knowledge, and infinite" (Tait. 2.1). It is then,
> that Sanatkumāra gives instruction about "Brahma" to
> Nārada, to whom all this is explained and who asks, "Oh
> Bhagawan, can I be such Ativādi" on the strength of
> truth?--by means of a series of devices such as contem-
> plation (Vijnāna) etc. So we think that, that truth which
> has been promised to be spoken of after Prāṇa is here
> referred to as "Bhūmā". Therefore, as instruction about
> Bhūmā comes after the instruction about prāṇa, it is the
> Highest Self, which is different from Prāṇa, that deserves
> to be Bhūmā. It is only in this way that the beginning
> of the chapter which expresses a desire to understand the
> Self, becomes reasonably sustainable.[6]

[5]BSB, 1.1.4, Apte, pp. 22-3.

[6]Ibid., I.3.8, pp. 154-5.

The Real (sat) is only Brahman:

> This again why the effect is non-different from the cause,
> viz. because the scritpures [sic] say, that the Avara i.e.
> the one which comes into existence later on as the effect,
> is, before its creation, already in existence in the
> cause, as the cause itself, because in the Scriptural
> passages "Oh mild one, this was mere existence 'Sat' only,
> in the beginning" (Chhān. 6.2.1). "This in the begin-
> ning was only the Self (ātmā)" (Ait. Āra. 2.4.1.1), the
> word "this" (Idam) by which the effect (i.e. this world)
> is understood, and the cause the Ātma (the Self), have
> the same case endings (showing their oneness). That (viz.
> the effect) which does not exist in the form of the sand
> as the cause of itself, can never be produced) from sand.
> Therefore being in fact non-different (from the cause)
> before creation, it is understood, that the effect even
> when it is created, is non-different from its cause.
> Just as Brahma during all the three times (i.e. past,
> present and future) never deviates from existence (satt va),
> even so, the effect viz. this world also during all the
> three times never deviates from existence (Sattvą).
> And again as existence itself as such (i.e. Sat) is but
> one only, it follows that the effect is non-different
> from the cause.[7]

Thus discourse is discourse at all times about Brahman. This dis-

course constructs a coherent frame that, being derived from Brahman

and mahāvākyas such as "tat tvam asi", presents itself as a tautologi-

cal ontology. This tautological ontology is commented on by Dr.

Arapura:

> The basic metaphysical concept of that One (Tad Ekam)
> has been reached in the Rgveda by mantras . . .. But what
> I call the sacred tautology is distinctly Upaniṣadic
> and hence Vedāntic. It is to Śankara's credit that he
> grasped this sacred tautology with unparalleled power
> of penetration and expressed it with unmatched consis-
> tency. Only a few elements are essential for the arti-
> culation of this, viz., the principle of māyā-avidyā,
> the principle of the identity of jīva and ātman as
> expressed in the Advaita formula:

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[7]Ibid., II.1.16, pp. 313-4.

> Brahma Satyam
> Jaganmithyā
> Jivo'brahmaiva nāparā . . . [8]

Māyā then is discourse about Brahman which is expressed in an onto-

logy, expressed tautologically. Analogue is the heueristic device

by which inquiry of and arrival at knowledge is accomplished. Brahman

in Itself as <u>Satcidānanda</u> becomes the horizon toward and around

which the Advaita of Śaṅkara moves.[9] As long as language and the

name-form complex remain separate from oneself analogue continues.

This is so as long as māyā or discourse about Brahman is necessary.

Māyā however, is not eternal though it is beginningless because liber-

ation is an irrefutable fact for Advaita and there can be no questioning

of it: thus the need for the inquiry into Brahman. The inquiry is

conducted through māyā as discourse about Brahman. Māyā-talk is

Brahman-talk for Śaṅkara:

> <u>Māyā</u> is to be understood as the utmost universalization
> of mythic being, as the unbounded frame and structure of
> all individual myths, unified into a single interpretive
> system. If rhetoric is permitted, it can be described
> as the fathomless, boundless ocean from which all things
> come and into which all things disappear. It may be
> objected that this is the kind of talk that one makes

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[8]J. G. Arapura, "Two Distinguishable Sets of Elements Contri-
buting to the Building of Śaṅkara's 'System'", Seminar paper, unpub-
lished, (November 1972); p. 2.

[9]In the present study we are not dealing with the concept of
<u>Moksha</u> as such. For the Advaita understanding of this the reader is
asked to refer to A. G. Krishna Warrier, <u>The Concept of Mukti in
Advaita Vedānta</u>, (Madras: University of Madras, 1961).

> about Brahman. Yes, that is precisely the point. Brahman
> talk also turns out to be māyā talk. Clearly the subject
> of discourse that is māyā, is not itself but Brahman,
> and as such the paradox of self-invalidation implied in
> the statement "the world is illusory", it being part of
> that illusory world, resolves itself. If māyā is the
> logical structure of the discourse about Brahman then dis-
> course about māyā is simply its obverse side, existing
> only tenuously. It is in that sense that one must speak
> of it, as has been spoken of by Advaitins, as neither real
> nor unreal but indefinable (anirvacanīya).[10]

But even as it is expressible as indefinable this indefinability must

be understood correctly along with the conception of māyā.

NEED FOR A REDEFINITION OF ŚANKARA'S MĀYĀ--MĀYĀVĀDA OR NOT?

As was mentioned previously in this work the attacks levelled

against the Advaita of Śankara have been against the concept of māyā

or māyāvāda. This does of course imply that Śankara developed and

utilized a concept of māyāvāda which the opponent interpreted as a

dualism, that māyā was other to Brahman. But we have observed that

this cannot be a correct understanding. It is true that māyā holds

an important place within the epistemological and metaphysical frame

of the Advaita but we must not turn the term māyā into an ontological

one except in a very special sense. This is because one must recall

that māyā is merely a logical postulate arising out of the doctrine

of Brahman. So what then can we say about māyāvāda? If it is used

with the priviso that it derives from a doctrine of Brahman then the

usage is acceptable to Advaita. However, most often it is not used

in this sense and māyāvāda then constitutes a gross injustice to

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[10] MDAB, pp. 117-8.

Advaita. Perhaps then it would be best to refrain from the descrip-
tion of Śaṅkara's Advaita as māyāvāda and say rather that Advaita can
be termed Advaitāvāda or Brahmavāda. The movement from Brahmavāda into
māyāvāda occurred historically within the post-Śaṅkara Advaitins.

MĀYĀVĀDA IN THE POST-ŚAṄKARA ADVAITA

As was pointed out in Chapter Five of our study the history
of the Advaita darśana after Śaṅkara developed because of an inner
momentum which added to and interpreted Śaṅkara to answer the new
religio-philosophical positions that arose. This was especially the
case with the conception of māyā. Śaṅkara said that the world was
māyā and was due to māyā; the post-Śaṅkara Advaitins worked out from
this a method of māyā which defined the world. This attempted
construct brought about the shift from māyā to māyāvāda. Concomitant
with this was the apparent shift from Śaṅkara's concept of anirva-
canīya to anirvacanīyakhyati-vāda. Both of these conceptual changes
we will briefly turn our attention to.[11] In this we will only
concern ourselves with several examples because to give a fuller
treatment is beyond our present work. There are three views concerning
māyā that were brought out in the conclusion of Chapter Five. These
views are: (1) ābhāsavāda, (2) pratibimba-vāda, and (3) avaccheda-
vāda. They belong respectively to Sureśvara, Sarvajnatma Muni and

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[11]These points constitute a very important development within
the Advaita Vedānta. This shift is merely pointed out in this dis-
sertation and a full study could constitute a major contribution to
the study of Indian philosophy. This can be one direction for further
research which would be most valuable. We have merely pointed out
the overall view of the shift, not the "why" or the "how".

Anubhūtisvarūpā,[12] and Vācaspati. Thus Sureśvara maintains the ābhāsavāda or appearance theory. Sarvajñātma Muni and Anubhūtisvarūpā the _pratibimba-vāda_ or reflection theory and Vācaspati Miśra the _avaccheda-vāda_ or determination theory. Each of these theories concern the problem of the relation between Brahman and māyā. This formulation itself shows us that the later Advaita has moved out of the inquiry into Brahman and begun to concentrate upon the status of māyā and the status of Brahman with respect to each other. We can recall from Chapter Five that for Sureśvara Brahman is screened by ignorance and appears as witnessing consciousness or Īśvara. Brahman is also screened by intellect and appears as the individual self or jīva. Thus ignorance and intellect become appearances derived from Brahman.

Anubhūtisvairūpācarya in his commentary on Śaṅkara's _Brahma Sūtra Bhāsya_ called _Prakaṭārtha-vivaraṇa_ maintains that ignorance is part of māyā and the individual self is the reflection in ignorance whereas Īśvara is the reflection of Brahman in māyā. So the relation here of Īśvara to the individual self is established by reflection.

Vācaspati maintains the third view of determination which states that:

> Māyā, though not real, can limit the nature of infinite Brahman, and jīva is thereby obtained. What is not so limited is Īśvara. The same Brahman as the object (_viṣaya_) of _avidyā_ is Īśvara; but the _āśraya_ (locas) of _avidyā_

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[12]Anubhūtisvarūpācarya (12th-13th Cent. A.D.) wrote the _Prakaṭārtha-Vivaraṇa_, trans. T. R. Chintamani, (Madras: Madras University, 1935-39), Sanskrit Series No. 9, Vol. II.

is jīva. Thus avidyā becomes a determination of jīva
and overwhelms him; but it is not a determination of
Īśvara, and so He is not overwhelmed by it.[13]

Thus the post-Śankara Advaita, in answering questions concerning the

controversy about the problem of the relation between Brahman and māyā,

were guided and drawn, even though this may be denied by modern

Advaitins, into discourse about māyā rather than discourse about

Brahman. The difference in the various answers to the three theories

cited leads into the great discussions among the Advaitins themselves

as well as the other Vedāntic viewpoints.

Concurrent with the shift of māyā in the post-Śankara

Advaita was the change in the conception of anirvacanīya to anirva-

canīya-khyāti.[14] This was pointed out immediately following our

brief discussion of Sureśvara's understanding that māyā is only

an instrument through which the one Brahman appears as many.

Sureśvara used anirvacanīya-khyāti as a theory of error and developed

his philosophical views within this context. This conception proceeds

from the conception of adhyasa or super-imposition in Śankara's

Advaita. This fact has been pointed out by Dr. Arapura:

> Both Vācaspati Miśra (Bhāmatī) and the Vivaraṇa School
> interpret adhyasa so as to mean an anirvacanīya
> appearance, totally changing Śankara's meaning of the
> word . . . In the thought of Śankara all interpretations

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[13]"Post-Śankara", p. 295.

[14]The word Khyāti is used by Śankara in his Bhāṣya in only
one place (I.4.1) where it is used in the ordinary sense of opinion
or view. See Mahadevan, Word Index to Brahma-Sūtra, Part One,
(Madras: Madras University, 1971), p. 356.

of <u>adhyasa</u> boiled down to one thing: the appearance
of the mother-of-pearl as if it is silver or the appear-
ance of the moon as two. The later advaitins interpreted
the appearance of silver as the actual manifestation
of the <u>anirvacanīya</u> silver in the substratum of the
appearance, caused by the mysterious principle of <u>avidyā</u>.
They thus enunciated <u>anirvacanīty-khyāti</u> as a doctrine
of falsity or error. It is in Bhāmatī that <u>avidyā</u> itself
was first called <u>anirvacya</u> (anirvacya avidyā, Bhāmatī,
verse 1) <u>anirvacanīty-khyāti</u> as a doctrine of falsity or
error.[15]

This then is the indication of the alterations in Śaṅkara's Advaita

Vedānta that have taken place with regard to the concepts of māyā and

anirvacanīya. We do not intend to go into this matter any further.

Our only intention was to point out the change rather than to

analyze it fully. This is because this subject would take us well

beyond our present topic. So at this point let us turn our attention,

briefly, to a modern critique of Śaṅkara's māyā which is contained in

the views of Sri Aurobindo.

AUROBINDO'S VIEW OF ŚAṄKARA'S MĀYĀ

Sri Aurobindo is one thinker who is having a great impact

upon modern India as well as the West. His theory of life is a type

of dynamic evolutionism.[16] This however is not our present concern.

We are concerned with specifically his understanding of Śaṅkara's

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[15]J. G. Arapura, "Anirvacīyakhyāti-vāda: Its Origin, Develop-
ment and Implications", Seminar paper, unpublished (1974), p. 3.

[16]For a full account of Sri Aurobindo's system the reader
is asked to refer to the author's M.A. Thesis: "The Eschatology of
Sri Aurobindo's Evolutionary Doctrine", Religion Department,
McMaster University (1971). Cited hereafter as Eschatology.

maya. Aurobindo levels his attack against Śankara from within the

camp of the Advaita, he observes of himself that:

> The real Monism, the true Adwaita, is that which admits
> all things as the one Brahman and does not seek to
> bisect Its existence into two incompatible entities, and
> eternal Truth and an eternal Falsehood, Brahman and
> not Brahman, Self and non-Self, a real Seal a nd an
> unreal, yet perpetual Maya. If it be true that the Self
> alone exists, it must be also true that all is the Self.[17]

The fundamental departure point of Aurobindo's understanding

of Śankara is that he calls him a qualified illusionist.[18] He further

maintains that Śankara's philosophy affirms a qualified reality of

mayā. That is, it has two orders of reality: one of pure being of

Brahman which is absolute and eternal and a second of Brahman in mayā

which is phenomenal and temporal. He continues:

> Here we get a reality for ourselves and the universe:
> for the individual self is really Brahman; it is Brah-
> man who within the field of Maya seems phenomenally
> to be subjected to her as the individual and in the
> end releases the relative and phenomenal individual
> into his eternal and true being. In the temporal
> field of relativities our experience of the Brahman
> who has become all beings, the Eternal who has become
> universal and individual is also valid; it is indeed
> a middle step of the movement in Maya towards liber-
> ation from Maya. The universe too and its experiences
> are real for the consciousness in Time and that con-
> sciousness is real.[19]

According to Aurobindo's interpretation, the universe for Śankara is

"unreal reality". Aurobindo argues against Śankara's mayā-vāda

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[17] Sri Aurobindo, _The Life Divine_, (New York: Indian Library
Society, 1949), p. 31. Cited hereafter as _Life Divine_.

[18] Ibid., p. 407.

[19] Ibid., p. 408.

utilizing the classic examples of the rope and snake and pot and earth,
etc. Aurobindo understands the world, which consists of matter,
life, psyche, and mind, as a progressive reality which will ultimately
be raised to divinity. Māyā exists in degree in every stage of
evolution according to the extent to which that stage is able to
reveal the divine nature. The less it is able to do so, the more it
participates in māyā.[20] In fact this participation is distinguished
by Aurobindo into "Lower and Higher Māyā".

Lower and Higher Māyā in Aurobindo

The lower māyā is that māyā which man experiences in his
everyday world. It is that which gives rise to disharmony, suffering
and ignorance. But just because it is that, it has to be taken in
and overcome:

> The lower, present and deluding mental Maya has first
> to be embraced, then to be overcome; for it is God's
> play with division and darkness and limitation, desire
> and strife and suffering in which He subjects Himself to
> the Force that has come out of Himself and by her obscure
> suffers Himself to be obscured.[21]

Thus in the embracing one begins to understand that this lower māyā
is a veil over the true meaning of what man is. Lower māyā must be
seen as "lower" and in relation to something which is higher, for
even within lower māyā the potential perfection of man exists.
Aurobindo observes that, "The principle and power of perfection are
there in the subconscient but wrapped up in the tegument or veil of
the lower maya, a mute premonition emerging as an unrealized ideal;

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[20] S. K. Maitra, _The Meeting of East and West in Sri Aurobindo's Philosophy_, (Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1968), p. 320.

[21] _Life Divine_, p. 108.

in the superconscient they await, open, eternally realized, but still separated from us by the veil of our self-ignorance."[22] The way to understand lower māyā is to embrace it and in the process of this embrace, knowledge will begin to dawn. But as ignorance is the lower māyā so also knowledge is the higher māyā for knowledge also is only a stage in the evolutionary ascent. Aurobindo states:

> For there in the higher and divine Maya is the conscious knowledge, in its law and truth, of that which works in the subconscient by the lower Maya under the conditions of the Denial which seeks to become the Affirmation. For this lower Nature works out what is willed and known in that higher Nature. The Illusion-Power of the divine knowledge in the world which creates appearances is governed by the Truth-Power of the same knowledge which knows the truth behind the appearances and keeps ready for us the Affirmation towards which they are working. The partial and apparent Man here will find there the perfect and real Man capable of an entirely self-aware being by his full unity with that Self-existent who is the omniscient lord of His own cosmic evolution and procession.[23]

The difference between lower and higher māyā is not a difference in fact but in degree. The lower māyā shows itself as negation, disruption and difference. The higher māyā shows itself as affirmation, reunion and unity. But as the higher māyā shows itself it also is only partial, for conscious knowledge, thought and mind, are transitional stages of the evolutionary ascent. Aurobindo states:

> This distinction between the lower and the higher Maya is the link in thought and in cosmic Fact which the pessimistic and Illusionist philosophies miss or neglect. To them the mental Maya, or perhaps an Overmind, is the creatrix of the world, and a world created by mental Maya

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[22] Ibid., p. 199.

[23] Ibid., p. 196.

would indeed be an inexplicable paradox and a fixed yet
floating nightmare of conscious existence which could
neither be classed as an illusion nor as a reality . . .
Mind is only one of His instruments in the descent and the
ascent. It is an instrument of the descending creation,
not the secret creatrix.--a transitional stage in the
ascent, not our high original source and the consummate
term of cosmic existence.[24]

Advaita Vedānta: Aurobindo and Śankara

Aurobindo places himself in the Advaita Vedānta conception of

philosophy, but he disagrees with Śankara specifically on the concep-

tion of māyā and consequently with the rest of his philosophy. This

is evident from his many references to Śankara and the internal

refutations contained in many quotes. He remarks:

> World is Maya. World is not unreal in the sense that
> it has no sort of existence; for even if it were only a
> dream of the Self, still it would exist in it as a dream,
> real to It in the present even while ultimately unreal..
> Nor ought we to say that the world is unreal in the sense
> that it has no kind of eternal existence, for although
> particular worlds and particular forms may or do dissolve
> physically and return mentally from the consciousness
> of manifestation into the non-manifestation, yet Form in
> itself, World in itself are eternal.[25]

The reply of Advaitism to Aurobindo's contention that Śankara

is a qualified illusionist is that Aurobindo misunderstood Śankara's

māyāvāda. Śankara's māyāvāda maintains that Brahman is the only

reality. A follower of Śankara's Advaita is G. R. Malkani, who in

an article on Aurobindo's attack on Śankara, maintains that for

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[24] Ibid., p. 109.

[25] Ibid., p. 95.

Advaitism the world does not exist in time but just appears. In the
beginning and end of time the world does not exist, but in middle
it does appear to exist. It does not appear by itself but in relation
of identity or tādātmya with its real ground or satva which is Brahman.
Malkani continues:

> Brahman exists in all the three times--past, present, and
> future,--and the world only in the middle. Brahman is
> therefore its essence, or tatva. The world on the other
> hand, since it comes out of Brahman and disappears into
> Him, and since it has no independent being is only an
> illusory appearance and so unreal. Thus for Advaitism,
> Brahman is the only reality, and Brahman does not contain
> the world in any form or at any time. Even when the
> world appears, it appears falsely and illusorily, and it
> is not therefore really contained. Brahman is always pure
> and unmixed with the world. The world does not really
> exist in Him even in subtle form.[26]

Thus it is for this reason and others that Malkani disagrees with
Aurobindo. He states, "In our opinion, Sri Aurobindo misses the
entire sense of maya-vada as it is understood in Advaitism."[27]

Aurobindo, if he replied to this attack by Malkani, would
maintain that he understands better than Malkani the Advaitism of
Śaṅkara and for this reason has gone beyond it. Brahman for Śaṅkara
is static Being; therefore he holds the world to be illusion or māyā.
Aurobindo observes that this illusion is true but only tenatively.
He states:

> Therefore we accept the truth on which the philosophies
> of the supracosmic Absolute take their stand; Illusionism

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[26]G. R. Malkani, "A Justification of Maya-vada and Sri Auro-
bindo's Theory of Creation", Reprint from The Philosophical Quarterly,
(January 1943), p. 109.

[27]Ibid., p. 29.

> itself, even if we contest its ultimate conclusions, can
> still be accepted as the way in which the soul in mind,
> the mental being, has to see things in a spiritual-
> pragmatic experience when it cuts itself off from becoming
> in order to approach and enter into the Absolute. But also,
> since the becoming is real and is inevitable in the very
> self-power of the Infinite and Eternal, this too is not
> a complete philosophy of existence.[28]

Śaṅkara then is correct in his observation but only to a point, that

of seeing only a partial truth. Aurobindo states, "A theory of Maya

in the sense of illusion or the unreality of cosmic existence creates

more difficulties than it solves; it does not really solve the problem

of existence, but rather renders it forever insoluble. For, whether

Maya be an unreality or a non-real reality, the ultimate effects of

the theory carry in them a devastating simplicity of nullification.

Ourselves and the universe fade away into nothingness or else keep

for a time only a truth which is little better than a fiction."[29]

Thus Aurobindo maintains that Śaṅkara's māyāvāda is correct in the

first parts of evolution but in the evolution beyond "finite mind" it

is an incorrect analysis of the Absolute. This is brought out by

Aurobindo's analysis of the characteristics of māyā.

Aurobindo's Understanding of Māyā

Whether Aurobindo really is an advaitin is still a point of

discussion as P. T. Raju states, "But Sri Aurobindo Ghosh and Tagore

treat the world as being and real. The position of Aurobindo is more

allied to Saktaism and Kasmira Saivaism . . .".[30] On another

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[28]Life Divine, p. 588.

[29]Ibid., p. 418.

[30]HPEW, p. 303.

approach Śaṅkara's Advaita could attack Aurobindo from the point of

seeing Aurobindo's evolution in the same light as the Saṅkhya evolu-

tionary theory. The main question then directed to Aurobindo would

be how can Satcidānanda be dynamic? Also, as we have already shown,

to term the Advaitavāda of Śaṅkara as māyāvāda is to misunderstand his

system. The Advaita would say to Aurobindo that the world is real

as long as one wishes to consider it but this doesn't lead one to

inquire into Brahman. Aurobindo's system developes out of a uniting

of Eastern and Western thought which falls short of its goal. As

Arapura observes:

> Indians today use both the traditional language of
> religion and the new language of Western science,
> politics and even philosophy. But there has been no real
> meeting of the two languages and whenever people like
> Aurobindo have attempted an integration they have
> come out with pseudo-synthesis.[31]

Thus we can say that Aurobindo doesn't understand Śaṅkara's Advaita

Vedānta because of the points cited above and also because of his

failure to grasp māyā in Advaita as something more than illusion.

MĀYĀ DEFINED AS MEASURE

Monier-Williams etmologically defines māyā as deriving from

the root mā or "measuring". When one adds the suffix ya to the root

mā it can be defined as "relating to measuring".[32] This was also the

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[31]LP, p. 29.

[32]Sir Monier Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary,
(London: Oxford Univ. Press, First Ed. 1899, present 1964), p. 811.
For the suffix ya the reader is asked to refer to A. A. MacDonell,
A Sanskrit Grammar for Students, (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1968),
p. 165. See also W. D. Whitney, The Roots, Verb-forms and Primary
Derivatives of the Sanskrit Language, American Oriental Series Vol.
XXX, (American Oriental Society, 1945), p. 119.

meaning understood in the earliest etmological references to māyā

aside from the Rgveda, contained, in the Nighantu and the Nirukta as we

saw in Chapter Two. We have seen above that māyā can also be under-

stood in this manner in Śankara's Advaita Vedānta. This is so because

māyā acts as the measuring out of phenomena so that Brahman remains.

This "measuring out of phenomena" is the inquiry into Brahman itself.

Even when māyā is translated by the word "illusion", this inquiry is

fostered because māyā can only be an "illusion" strictly within an

ontological discussion of Brahman. Within the structures of episte-

mology and metaphysics māyā can never be "illusion" because it maintains

its reality as a kind of "measure" as long as one is still within the

name-form complex. However, even speaking within ontology māyā is

not just "illusion" because as we have observed māyā-talk is Brahman-

talk and conversely Brahman-talk is māyā-talk and this is so as long

as talk exists. Māyā can be understood by Śankara's Advaita as measure

because it is an aspect of māyā that it measures itself out. That is,

māyā acts in that it uses the errors of the phenomenal world to

eliminate error in knowledge. And it is in this way that the inquiry

progresses. As such māyā is provisional forever but not eternal. It

is the measure of distinction between Brahman with and Brahman without

distinction.

AS DISCOURSE ABOUT BRAHMAN

In Chapter Six and Chapter Seven māyā as discourse about

Brahman was discussed. There we saw that because language allows

the inquiry into Brahman to proceed and because by definition any

process occurring within the frame of māyā language construct

becomes discourse about the structure of māyā. The structure of
māyā cannot be determined as anything separate from the inquiry into
Brahman. The inquiry proceeds by understanding that any and all
discussion, if it be accurately termed such, centers upon discourse
about Brahman. Māyā as discourse about Brahman relates to māyā as
"measuring out" in that it is through discourse about Brahman that
māyā measures out the name-form complex, language, and māyā itself so
that the reason for the discourse, namely knowledge of Brahman, can be
actualized. The procedure of the activity of measuring is the dis-
course itself. In this procedure the result of the discourse is
proposed at the start of the endeavour thus--"Now therefore an inquiry
into Brahman". The discourse about Brahman points beyond the dis-
course when knowledge of Brahman is discussed. It is this discussion
which points beyond māyā as "measure" and "discourse about Brahman"
and this pointing shows another aspect of māyā. This aspect is seen
when measure and discourse are understood as primary pointers and are
analogues that always participate in aiming one at Brahman.

IN ANALOGUE

The definitions of māyā pointed out above are constructed on
the basis of the name-form complex. Analogue is the frame upon which
māyā builds itself in terms of its usage as measure and discourse. It
is through an understanding of analogue that language exhibits the
ability to overcome its horizon[33] by participating in discourse about

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[33]This horizon is the limitation of the Sphotavadins.

Brahman. Hence there is the example of the pregnant silence of
Bāhva's answer to the question of Vāshkalin on teaching him the Self
(Ātman). Dr Arapura remarks:

> . . . the irony of having to make implicit truth explicit
> may sometimes be dramatically expressed in silence. Such
> dramatic expression is what is witnessed in the rather
> rhetorical silence observed by Bāhva before Vāskali, in
> answer to the question about Brahman, followed by the
> words "silence is this Ātman" (upaśānto 'yam ātma). From
> the context where this episode is narrated it is clear that
> what Śaṅkara has in mind is the irony of having to say
> what cannot be said, fully knowing that silence itself is
> excluded from speech only so that the actuality of Brah-
> man may be indicated by such dramatic enactment. . . .
> *The difference between speech and silence is the analogical*
> *measure of the difference between Brahman with distinc-*
> *tion and Brahman without distinction. The difference mea-*
> *sured thus is māyā: here is the significance of the etmo-*
> *logy of the word, from mā, to measure.* [34]

The understanding of the analogue then is central if we wish to grasp
the significance of māyā as measure and as discourse about Brahman.
In both activities, even though they are not actually separate
actions, analogues perform the service of allowing them to define
their boundaries and push them beyond, to the horizon of Brahman. This
push is the point at which the screen of apparent duality becomes
crystalline rather than existing in a state of opaqueness. This allows
the self-luminous Brahman to shine through. Analogues then allow
māyā to fulfill its necessary function in Advaita, that is to make
itself transparent to Brahman.

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[34]MDAB, p. 115. Italics are my addition.

TRANSPARENCY

>Concerning Brahman as shining through all Śaṅkara comments:

> 'In its presence (tatra = tasmin Svātmabhūte
> Brahmaṇi) the Sun does not shine, nor the moon and the
> stars, nor lightning, and much less fire. All this shines
> in the wake of its shining. By its (borrowed) lustre
> all this shines" (Muṇd. 2.2.10). . . . It is only if we
> understand the Highest Self as meant by "All this shines
> in the wake of that which shines" that it becomes
> reasonably sustainable because the Highest Self is mentioned
> as being "one whose nature is lustre" . . . Whatever
> becomes manifest becomes so manifest because of the
> lustre called Brahma, and Brahma is not made manifest
> by any other light, because it has the nature of being
> self-luminant . . .[35]

Utilizing Brahman as the self-luminous māyā, under the presented forms

of interpretation, can be understood as the principle of transparency.

As such there is no necessity that māyā become transparent because

this can only happen when the individual moves into the inquiry into

Brahman. If however one makes such a move then the conception of

māyā is seen to point to the transparent aspect of its nature. All

structures and frames of experience contained under the canopy of

māyā admit of their crystalline or transparent being in terms of

the horizon of Brahman as self-illumination. Thus "tat tvam asi"

allows us an example of the highest transparency which, through the

analogue of the measuring of the nyagrodha tree coupled with discourse

about Brahman, explodes upon the listener as the expression of the

inexpressible, namely Brahman. This is also the case with the syl-

lable aum which is commented on thus:

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[35]BSB, I.3.22, Apte, pp. 179-80.

And thus it has been said elsewhere: "there are, verily, two Brahmans to be meditated upon, sound and non-sound. By sound alone is the non-sound revealed. Nowhere the sound is aum. Moving upward by it one comes to ascend in the non-sound. So (one says) this is the way, this is immortality, this is complete union and also tranquillity. And now as the spider moves upward by the thread, obtains free space, thus assuredly, indeed the meditator moving upward by the syllable aum obtains independence." Other expounders of the sound (as Brahman) think otherwise. By closing the ears with the thumbs they hear the sound of the space within the heart. There is the sevenfold comparison of it, like rivers, a bell, a brass vessel, a wheel, the croaking of frogs, rain, as when one speaks in a still place. Having passed beyond this variously characterised (wound), they disappear (become merged) in the supreme, the non-sound, the unmanifest Brahman. There they are uncharacterised and indistinguishable like the various juices that have reached the condition of honey.. For thus has it been said, "There are two Brahmans to be known, the sound Brahman and what is higher. Those who know the sound Brahman get to the higher Brahman.[36]

Sound as _śabda_ is the thread upward to knowledge of Brahman. The _Brahma Sūtra_ is itself this thread, "for the Sūtras are meant only for the purpose of stringing together the flower-like Vedānta passages. The Sūtras refer to the Vedānta passages which are considered therein.

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[36]PU, _Maitrī Upaniṣad_ IV.22, p. 833, (athānyatrāpy uktam: dve vā va brahmaṇi abhidhyeye śabdaś cāśabdaśca, atha śabdenaivāśabdam āviṣkriyate, atha tatra aum iti śabdo'nenordhvam utkrānto'śabde nidhanam eti, athāhaiṣā gatir etad amṛtam, etat sāyujyatvam, nirvṛtatvam tathā ceti; atha yathorṇanābhis tantunordhvam utkrānto' va vakāśam labhatīty evaṁ vā va khalv asāv abhidhyātā aum ity anenordhvam utkrāntaḥ svātantryam labhate, anyathā pare śabdavādinaḥ: śravaṇāṅguṣṭhayogenāntarhṛdayākāśa-sabdam ākarṇayanti, saptavidheyaṁ tasyopamā, yathā nadyaḥ kiṅkiṇī kāṁsya-cakraka-bheka viḥkṛndhikā vṛṣṭir, nivāte vadatīti, taṁ pṛthag lakṣaṇam atītya pare śabde-vyakte brahmaṇy astaṁ gatāḥ, tatra te'pṛthag-dharmiṇo'pṛthag-vivekyā yathā sampannā madhutvaṁ nānārasā ity evaṁ hy āha: dve brahmaṇī veditavye, śabda-brahma paraṁ ca vat, śabda-brahmaṇī niṣṇātaḥ param brahmādhigacchati).

For the knowledge of Brahman is effected by the determination

(brought about) by the consideration of the meaning of the Vedānta

passages . . . ."[37] The Advaita of Śaṅkara revolves, then, around the

inquiry into Brahman and it is only by seeing the frame of phenomena

(māyā) as transparent that the inquiry is initiated.

"sarvam khalvidam Brahma"

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[37]BSB, I.1.2, Apte, p. 11.

APPENDIX A

1. Blind man and cows tail compared with incorrect teaching (I.1.7)
    Andha-golāṅgūla-nyāya.

2. Blind man and lame man riding on his back with a view to refute the
    Samkhya. (II.2.7) Andha-pangu-nyāya.

3. Series of blind men with a view to refute the Purva-Paksin
    (I.1.4, II.2.37, II.2.30) Andha-parampara-nyāya.

4. Star of the Arundhāti (I.1.8, I.1.12) Arundhāti-nidarśana-nyāya.

5. Utilization of the simplest method and not the more difficult
    (II.4.3, I.2.4, II.4.3) Arke cet madhu vindeta kimartham parvatam
    vrajet.

6. Various interpretations in answer to the Purva (I.1.19, I.2.28)
    Ardhajaratiya-nyāya

7. The slaying of half of the body while the other half is kept
    alive (III.3.18) Ardhavaiśasa-nyāya.

8. Identity between a thing and its different forms (III.2.27)
    Ahi-kundala-nyāya.

9. The arrow maker (III.2.10) Iṣukāra-nyāya.

10. Establishes that two mutually interdependent and unknown things
    cannot independently lead to any definite conclusion (II.2.17)
    Kunda-badara-nyāya.

11. Milk and water used to illustrate close union without complete
    identification (II.3.5) Kṣīrodaka-nyāya.

12. Men with umbrellas (I.2.11, III.3.34) Chātri-nyāya.

13. Threads and the piece of cloth (II.2.12) Tantu-pata-nyāya.

14. Double moon (IV.1.19) Dvi-candra-darśana-nyāya.

15. Movement of the bird cage (II.4.9) Pañjara-cālana-nyāya.

16. Prakṛti as material cause (II.3.6) <u>Prakṛti-vikara-nyāya</u>.

17. Prevention is better than cure (Briḥ. II 3-1) (III.3.22)
    <u>Prakṣālanāt hi paṅkasya sūrāt asparśanam</u>.

18. Overthrowing the chief antagonist overthrows lesser ones (I.4.28)
    <u>Pradhāna-malla-nibarhaṇa-nyāya</u>.

19. Eternal series of the seed and the sprout (II.1.35, II.2.28,
    III.2.9) <u>Bījaṅkvra-nyāya</u>.

20. Specifying a thing out of a number of similar things for specific
    purpose (III.1.11) <u>Brāhmana-parivrājaka-nyāya</u>.

21. Non-difference of a thing even though different forms such as a
    folded and unfolded cloth (II.1.19) <u>Saṃvestita-prasārita-pata-nyāya</u>.

22. Driving in of a post (II.1.34, III.3.53, III.4.2) <u>Sthūṇā-nikanana-
    nyāya</u>.

23. Kind of eternity (II.3.35) <u>Ssotaḥ-santāna-nityatā-nyāya</u>.

24. Relation of master and servant (II.1.4, II.3.43) <u>Svāmi-bhṛtya-nyāya</u>.

APPENDIX B

From M.D. Paradkar, "Field of Observation of Śaṅkarācārya--Similies from the Nature World", <u>Journal of the University of Bombay</u> (arts) xxviii (1959), pp. 78-131.

1. Fire (<u>agnie</u>) I.1.4, I.1.5, I.3.22, II.2.28, III.3.54, II.2.10, III.3.51; Fire of the nature of heat IV.2.1, II.2.29, II.2.15, II.3.7, II.3.40, I.3.40, IV.3.14; Fire having heat and light as its nature II.3.29, II.3.43, II.3.18, II.2.2, II.3.48, II.3.40, III.2.6, III.2.5, II.1.15, II.2.17, III.3.51, II.3.40, III.2.32, III.1.8., III.2.21, V.1.15.

2. Seed and sprout II.1.35, II.2.28, II.2.9, II.3.7, III.2.26.

3. Live charcoal II.3.12; III.2.25, II.3.46, III.2.15, II.2.13, III.2.11.

4. Following a person I.3.22, II.3.5, II.2.3.

5. Magnet and Iron II.2.2, II.2.7.

6. Star I.1.8, I.1.12. Flames of fire III.1.8.

7. Spokes of a wheel I.1.31.

8. Slaying half of the body III.3.18.

9. Gourd smeared with clay II.2.35.

10. Experience of falsity II.1.14.

11. Threshing corn IV.1.1.

12. Earth and Lord II.1.1.

13. Difference of condition of time IV.4.42.

14. Eating forbidden food III.4.42.

15. Solid Rocks II.1.23; Earth surface III.2.31.

16. Sky (most frequent) as Brahman I.1.4, I.3.19, I.1.4, II.1.13; light I.3.19; Atman II.3.24; Milk II.1.24; Space III.2.34, I.2.6, II.1.14, I.1.5, Sky, light, sun III.2.25; Sky and jar IV.3.14, II.3.48, I.1.17, I.2.20, II.3.46, II.1.14.

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17. Sky I.3.19, I.2.8, I.1.1, II.3.3, I.2.7, II.1.18.

18. Conduct III.3.20; Mirror I.1.4; Food II.3.5; Devadatta and seat I.3.1

19. Exchange of Selfs III.3.37, III.3.15; Sun and arrow II.3.7; Lotus II.2.26, II.5.4.

20. Water II.2.29, IV.2.1, II.3.5, III.2.9.

21. Milk II.2.5, II.2.9, II.3.9, II.2.10.

22. Water, fuel, cook II.3.37, II.1.24, II.3.14, II.2.17.

23. Jar, dish, pail II.3.7, II.1.14, III.3.36, II.1.14; perception II.3.37.

24. Created, rope II.3.7; fuel I.2.11; rice II.1.13; satisfaction with food III.3.32; meat, broth, rice II.1.4, II.3.2; herbs II.1.27.

25. Bracelet II.3.7; thorn II.3.29; Soul over senses II.2.40; Acts III.3.1, plurality of works II.3.1; coin II.2.31, III.2.3.

26. Varnish II.2.17; pot II.2.17; ear-ring II.3.7, I.1.4; snake III.2.27; well II.2.32; bank of river I.1.6; armlet II.3.7.

27. Milk II.3.12, II.3.5, II.2.5, III.2.9, II.2.28.

28. Effect not existing in cause II.1.18; milk and curds II.1.24, II.2.17, II.3.7, II.2.3, II.1.18.

29. Ganges III.2.7; going II.1.18, II.3.26; city of Gandharvas II.2.28.

30. Mountain IV.3.4, III.4.3; useful house items II.2.1; cowness II.1.18; rope II.3.7; ruler cessation III.3.20.

31. Jar I.1.4, II.2.34, II.3.7, II.3.18, II.3.48, I.2.6, II.1.14, I.1.5.

32. Jar and potter II.1.24, II.1.18, III.2.21, III.1.8, II.1.14.

33. Jar and clay II.1, II.1.15, II.3.9, IV.3.14.

34. Jar and dishes II.1.14, II.3.14, II.2.1.

35. Space in jar I.2.20, II.3.7, II.1.14; water wheel II.2.19; ghee II.2.15, II.2.17, III.2.21, III.1.8, II.2.17.

36. Potters wheel IV.1.15; eye II.4.10; form II.2.2; sandle paste II.3.24, II.3.23.

37. Moon II.1.27, I.1, IV.1.15, IV.1.19, III.2.18, III.2.21, III.2.34, II.3.46, III.2.15.

38. Skin II.2.35; image in water II.3.50, II.2.18; waking state IV.4.14, fire II.3.48.

39. Threads II.3.7, II.2.15; spider II.1.25; piece of cloth II.1.15.

40. White threads II.2.11, II.2.12, II.2.26.

41. Penance II.3.5, III.2.21; darkness and light I.1, ripples II.1.14, II.2.10, II.1.13.

42. Eyesight III.2.5.

43. Grass II.1.5, person eating II.2.28, III.3.32; curds and poison IV.1.6; sands/oil II.1.16; sense of touch II.3.24.

44. Imaginary venom II.1.14; curds I.1.4; wooden machines IV.4.15; earth IV.3.4; body and self IV.1.2; heaven I.4.10; binary II.2.13, II.2.11, darkness II.3.40.

45. Stars I.3.19; mountain IV.3.4; men and city III.2.3; arrow II.3.7; mud III.3.22.

46. Folded and unfolded cloth II.1.19; threads II.3.25/26; weaver II.1.24; path III.3.30; lotus II.1.25; milk as white II.3.12; calf II.2.3; binary III.2.11, II.3.7.

47. Rain II.3.42, II.1.34, III.2.7; running and crawling III.1.10, hare UU.2.17.

48. City II.1.18; stones and clods II.2.1.

49. Stones II.1.3; virile power II.3.31; rampart wall III.2.7; king I.3.14; dung and urine II.3.48; poison IV.1.6; seeds II.1.23, climbing a tree III.1.13.

50. Earth II.2.17, IV.3.14, II.1, II.1.9, I.3.22, I.1.4.

51. Light III.2.24, II.2.35, III.2.25, II.3.46, III.2.15, I.1, III.2.28, II.3.25, II.3.25/26.

52. Fire power of illumination and burning III.2.6, III.2.5, III.2.20, sun II.3.46, I.1.12, IV.1.5.

53. Bright lamp I.3.3, II.2.28, III.3.54.

54. Bright lamp II.2.10, III.1.8, II.3.40, II.2.10.

55. Bright lamp I.3.22, IV.4.15, II.3.25, III.1.8.

56. Things made of earth II.3.48, condition of deep sleep IV.2.8. measure I.2.30; vital airs II.2.20.

57. Palaces II.1.25, II.2.1, III.2.7; fruit II.1.23, III.1.13; sea II.1.14.

58. Bija (seed) II.3.7, II.1.23, II.1.18.

59. Brahma shabda II.3.7, II.3.5; fire burning oil III.1.8; various things II.1.14.

60. Aggregate of five elements III.3.35; four fold creatures I.1, II.1.9; archet. II.2.1.

61. Charm beads II.1.27; stones II.1.23; jewel II.3.25; she-goat T.4.10; honey III.4.3.

62. Mind II.4.12, II.3.7; magic spells II.1.27; mahat I.4.7; magical illusion II.2.28.

63. Water in a mirage II.2.28; imaginary fire III.3.51.

64. Clay II.2.2, II.3.14, II.3.5, II.2.1, II.2.39, II.1.24.

65. Clay and jar I.3.11.

66. Curds II.1.18; gold and clay II.1.4; clay dishes III.1.9, IV.1.5, IV.2.1.

67. Sweet balls III.1.7, orders of sage and householder II.4.49; barley I.2.20.

68. Silver I.1, I.1.4, IV.1.5, chariots II.2.2, II.1.25; horse III.4.26.

69. Golden ornaments II.1, II.1.9, II.2.28, IV.1.4.

70. Colour (rūpa) II.3.26, II.2.17.

71. Lump of salt III.2.16; plough III.2.4; horse and plough III.2.4.

72. Well known illustration II.1.13, II.3.7, II.3.25, III.3.30, III.3.51.

73. Clod of earth II.2.8; common use of Atman III.3.15; ordinary phrases II.3.3, Oneness of a forest I.3.28; creeper II.1.25; sentence in ordinary life III.2.21; darsana sacrifice III.2.21; vac IV.2.2; poison IV.1.6, II.1.14.

74. Right and left horns of a cow II.2.17.

75. Spark

76. Tree II.1.25, II.1.14, III.1.1, III.1.13; falcon I.2.27.

77. Science of grammar III.2.22, I.1.3, III.2.21, venom II.1.14; offering one hundred coins II.4.11; dishes II.1.2, II.1.4.

78. Bodies IV.4.15; bodies and stone statue II.1.25; horn of a hare II.2.26.

79. State of dream IV.4.15; world III.3.51; sea/ocean II.2.35, II.1.14.

80. Sun II.3.7, III.2.25, I.1.5, II.3.46, II.1.1, III.2.28.

81. Sun III.1.8, III.2.24, II.3.46, III.2.15, II.3.48, III.2.20.

82. Gold (stars) I.3.19, IV.1.4, II.1.4, II.2.17.

83. Condition of deep sleep IV.2.8; needle II.3.7, I.2.7; threads II.1.24; shawl II.3.7; Atman in common speech III.3.15.

84. Bridge I.3.1, III.2.31, I.3.16; oneness of army I.3.28; general of army I.3.28; salt III.3.1, III.2.16; descending stairs II.3.14.

85. Post II.1.35, III.4.2.

86. Bath II.1.14; oil III.1.18; sands II.1.16; crystal I.3.19, III.1.6.

87. Cities II.1.18, IV.2.5; stream of a river II.2.35.

88. Cognition in a dream II.2.28, II.2.29; experience in a dream II.1.14; illusion in a dream II.1-9, nāma rūpa and a dream III.2.21.

89. Snow (hima) II.2.17, II.3.14, III.1.8.

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