THE CONCEPT OF CRAVING IN EARLY BUDDHISM
THE CONCEPT OF CRAVING IN EARLY BUDDHISM

by

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The aim of this thesis is to show the soteriological significance of the concept of craving in early Buddhism. It is argued that more than any other single factor, craving is the central problem in early Buddhism, and that when properly understood, it can be seen as the crucial link holding the entire soteriological system of the Four Noble Truths together. Craving thus stands at the heart of the Buddha's gospel, and a correct interpretation of its complex and unique structure is essential for an adequate understanding of the Buddhist religion as a whole.

The concept of craving in early Buddhism is a theme that has not been adequately subjected to systematic analysis by Buddhist scholarship in the past. This study is undertaken in response to this deficiency.

Methodologically, this thesis investigates the concept of craving from both the phenomenological and the theological perspectives. It is not a semantic analysis of the word tānha as such, but an attempt to get behind the general disposition indicated by that word, to see exactly what the Buddha meant when he said that to experience was 'to burn with thirst'. In one way, then, we must furnish a detailed phenomenological description of the origin,
development and manifestation of craving as set down in the Pāli Nikāyas. In another way, however, we have an even more pressing responsibility as we attempt to interpret this data and give it meaning.

In order to best accommodate these aims, the thesis is divided into four parts. First we have to ascertain what primary textual sources we should use as the foundation of this study, and what the possible historical and theological problems are that we might encounter in understanding these sources. At the same time we review what scholarship has already been offered in this area, and establish our own approach and method.

Secondly, in order to see how craving is part of a much larger general theological structure, it is important to understand how it is related to the central Buddhist concept of painfulness (dukkha). Here the primary object is to see the psychological nature of this painfulness, and to examine how the early Buddhists described the psycho-physical structure of man.

Thirdly, we turn our attention specifically to how painfulness is provoked by grosser forms of craving. At this point our concern centres in upon the various mental factors which make up consciousness and unconsciousness. This is a strategic part of the thesis, for not only does it provide an in-depth study of the psychological structure
of man, but it also demonstrates that the individual has the potential to control craving, and even use it as a positive force.

This lays the groundwork for part four, where we argue that in an important sense, craving has a definite soteriological value in early Buddhism. Here we investigate those passages which indicate the significance of conation in the Buddhist way (Marga), and show that even tanhā can be used as the instrument for its own purification, that it can be 'redirected' from deleterious aims to a more 'skilful' (kusala) form of intention. Only when this positive conative discipline has been undertaken can the individual fruitfully undertake the mindfulness (sati) and meditation (samādhi) necessary for insight (pañña) and thus enlightenment (nibbāna). In this final transcendent experience, craving of any kind is at last eradicated, its unconscious roots determined, and its relationship with painfulness at last fully understood.

It can be seen, then, that the central thesis concerning craving is woven into an entire framework of Buddhist soteriology, and that it cannot be properly understood as only a psychological phenomenon. For the early Buddhists, craving is of course partly a psychological dilemma. But unchecked and uncontrolled, it is
also a serious obstacle in a spiritual sense, keeping the individual bound to ignorance and thus preventing the wholesome development of the mind and the transcending experience of enlightenment. In this sense, craving clearly is the ultimate soteriological problem in early Buddhism, yet it has often been taken out of its theological context and been inadequately understood.

The purpose of this thesis is to make a study of this central concept within the context of the religious system of Buddhism.
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helped me over the difficult periods, and, along with the cheerful presence of my two children, has provided me with a stable background to work in.

In conclusion, let me make two remarks about the use of Pāli terms in this thesis. As a rule, all such terms are underlined in the text that I have written, but not in the translations of actual quotes from the Buddhist scriptures. I felt that to underline the Pāli terms that appear in the translations would make these translations cluttered and difficult to read, especially since they are set down in single-space typing. On the odd occasion where these terms are underlined in a translation, it is only for emphasis. Secondly, all diacritical marks on the Pāli words have been done with pen rather than type, again because of the difficulty of accurately fitting them in on single-spaced quotes.
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INTRODUCTION

As part of the complex tapestry of the Indian religious tradition, Buddhism may appear to the Westerner as a less amorphous and more accessible religion than its Hindu and Jaina counterparts. It is generally thought that with Buddhism, for instance, one is dealing with a cohesive body of doctrine, and that a comprehensive view can be readily presented. But an adequate presentation of Buddhism to the West is not as easy as it may appear. It is the conviction that Buddhism has often been misinterpreted to the West in an unbalanced and even distorted way that has led me to begin this study.

This imbalance stems in large part from a lack of understanding where the real emphasis lies in Buddhist soteriology.¹ The Buddhist soteriological system is in many ways as complicated as that found in any other Indian religion, and it is easy to become diverted in pursuit of its heart. As a soteriological system rooted in the Indian tradition, Buddhism contains all sorts of features which are not crucial to the

¹Soteriology means a doctrine of salvation. Although frequently found in a specifically Christian context, it is not a term confined only to that religion. G. Kittel (Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, Vol. 7, trans. G. W. Bromiley, Grand Rapids: W. B. Eerdmans, 1971, p. 965f.) points out that σωτήρ and σωτηρία were common words in the Attic Greek (pre-Christian) world. They had five connotations:
saving message, yet which are part of the system nonetheless. Some of these features, such as the Brahmanic pantheon of gods, have clearly limited soteriological value in Buddhism. These aspects of Buddhism are relatively easy to assess and put aside. The real problem comes, however, in trying to penetrate the central issue of Buddhism as it is laid down in the Noble Truths about painfulness, its cause and the way to its dissolution. Here is a theological assertion about painfulness which is in part anchored in the rich background of Brahmanic Hinduism, but which is for the first time articulated in a creative and novel way by Ācārya Buddha in

1. saving, 2. keeping, 3. benefiting, 4. preserving the inner being, 5. salvation from all the perils of life. H.Liddell and K. Scott (Greek-English Lexicon. New York: Harper Co. 1855. p. 1452) also demonstrate many non-Christian applications of the term σωτηρία. Soteriology has a definite religious focus then, and can be legitimately used to describe questions related to salvation in any religious tradition. It is in this sense that we apply the word to Buddhism in this thesis.

2 By the word "theological", I mean more than just the theistic aspect, if there is any, of a given religion, but also the whole doctrinal structure of that religion. This broad interpretation of the word theology is perhaps best reflected in Paul Tillich, who defines theological problems as those that lie at the heart of any religion. Thus he writes that theology deals primarily with questions of "ultimate concern", that it "presupposes in every sentence the structure of being, its categories, laws and concepts", and that further "the 'situation' to which theology must respond is the totality of man's creative self-interpretation in a special period". (cf. Tillich, "P. Systematic Theology, Vol. 1. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1951. pp. 4, 21f.). We will return to Tillich's understanding of theology later in Chapter One.

the 6th century B.C. How to interpret these truths has therefore not unexpectedly become a controversial matter among western scholars ever since they became interested in Buddhism in the early part of the last century. This in turn has led to a wide variety of approaches assumed by researchers as they are continually confronted with the problem of making meaningful expositions of what the Buddha taught about painfulness and its cause.

Some approaches, such as those concerned only with the search for the 'historical' Buddha, or those presented more as heroic sagas of the Buddha's life and ministry, are understandably not greatly concerned with the central soteriological issues of the Noble Truths. Others, however, have tried to map out a categorical philosophy to explain Buddhist soteriology. In doing so, some have ruthlessly purged Buddhism of all emotion and feeling in their attempt to present an epistemological, pragmatic and religiously antiseptic philosophy. Others again have sensed the opposite.

"Two good examples of this kind of approach are Sir Edwin Arnold's The Light of Asia (first published in 1879) and Herman Hesse's popular novel Siddhartha (trans. H. Hosner, New York: New Dimensions. 1970), which even today gains an enthusiastic response.


Jayatilleke, K. N. Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge (London: Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1963)."
and claim that the Buddhist gospel is not just a discipline of reason, but is more meditative and transcendental, often focusing on the central experience of nirvāṇa. We will argue, however, that both these approaches are too extreme. On the one hand, the 'epistemological' or 'pragmatic' approach clearly fails to be sensitive to the spiritual dimension of Buddhism, and on the other hand, the 'transcendental' approach has made Buddhism appear unduly otherworldly when in fact one of its major goals was to avoid that kind of emphasis.

By contrast to both these approaches, it is the argument of this thesis that the major soteriological focus of early Buddhism has been given inadequate attention. The early message of the Buddha centered on what we in the West would call the psychological dimensions of life, based on the ordinary experiences of existence. It answers

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7Grimm, G. The Doctrine of the Buddha (Berlin: Akademie Verlag Berlin, 1958).

8Later Mahāyāna Buddhism, for example, assumes that a philosophical rather than a psychological interpretation more accurately expresses the Buddha's understanding of the state of dukkha. They sought to explain painfulness more from the perspective of the Third Noble Truth (there is a state of non-painfulness or nibbāna) than from the Second (the psychological causes of pain): cf. T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, op cit. p. 260f., and Younger, P. The Indian Religious Tradition (Varanasi:
primarily to questions of human nature? What is the nature of man? Why is he continually subjected to craving? Is there any escape from his awareness of pain and the bonds of an unending cycle of life?

The Buddha teaches us that these are the kinds of questions which form the basis of his soteriology. For this reason we are urged to look beyond the deceptive simplicity of our psychological make-up, and search out the genesis of painfulness deep within the psyche. In so doing, the enlightened individual becomes increasingly aware of the roots of craving which stand behind so much of his sense of painfulness. Somehow the everyday examples of craving are no longer treated as mere coincidences, but as strategic and significant events holding man securely within the grip of samsāra. Craving comes to represent more than just a series of isolated and unrelated experiences. Rather it is seen as a whole way of life which prevents the development of the individual, thwarting the cultivation of good or 'skilful' (kusala) intention, and leading towards an ever increasing preoccupation with satiating the thirsts of the self.

In this thesis, then, we will argue that craving, more than any other single item, is the link that holds the

BharatiyaVidya Prakashan Press. 1970. Younger points out that "the Mahāyāna interpret duhkha in philosophical terms as a way of speaking about a world which is essentially an unreal distortion of the Ideal or nirvāṇa". Ibid. p. 39.

Because this thesis is based on the Pāli Nikāyas, the normal spelling for technical words will be in Pāli
Buddha's four truths, and consequently his whole soteriology, together. The object of the Buddha's doctrine is of course release from painfulness. But the central soteriological problem remains the major obstacle to that release, the experience of craving. This is seen in the Buddha's teaching that while mind and reason are the most precious powers of man, they are fully subject to the distorting effect of craving, and that only an understanding of man's craving can free his reason to function without hindrance, and thus release him from the chaos of a selfish, grasping life.

This message, uttered more than two thousand years ago in northern India, seems intuitively to be contemporary and relevant. But we must not ignore the historical and theological problems involved in determining just what that message was: These problems are formidable and our first task will be to determine what they are and how they might be tackled.

The historical problems are mainly centred on determining which strata of Buddhist literature we should concentrate on, and the responsibilities we have in accurately interpreting this body of literature. Once we have established the textual foundation upon which this thesis is based, we should then turn to the theological problems of understanding a religious tradition remote in ways of thinking and time from our own contemporary age. Here we can profit from examining the

unless otherwise indicated. It should also be pointed out that all of the translations offered in this thesis are my own.
approaches of certain other scholars who have faced the same difficulty of penetrating the heart of ancient religious traditions other than their own. This will also enable us to determine the approach this thesis should take, and the methodology it should follow in pursuing its aim.

Having come to grips with these initial historical and theological problems in the first chapter, we can then turn to the central argument of the thesis concerning the significance of craving in early Buddhist soteriology.

Here we will first aim to place craving in the context of the problem of painfulness in order to see how it is related to the whole early Buddhist theological structure. An analysis of the nature of painfulness will lead us into an examination of the various psycho-physical descriptions of man, and further demonstrate how the origins of pain are closely tied to the craving disposition. In the following chapter we search out the relationship between the various concepts of mind and craving in order to build a detailed psychological portrait of man. Having established how craving arises and how it affects the mind, we can then turn to the spiritual implications of craving in the final chapter. Here we centre in upon the theme of emancipation, and argue that a crucial part of the way to enlightenment is conative in scope, involving the redirection rather than suffocation of craving. This discussion will round out our study and allow us to see the full range and implications of craving as the central soteriological issue in early Buddhism.
CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL PROBLEMS IN UNDERSTANDING

Any study of early Buddhism should be established at least in part on the evidence of the Buddhist canonical sources, and this investigation of the concept of craving in early Buddhism begins from that point. The obvious question that immediately arises, however, is how one should approach and use these sources. In other words, in trying to understand canonical evidence and enter into an encounter with it, we must first develop a method for systematically analyzing this material. Problems of an historical and literary nature are certain to arise, but they must be examined in such a way and from such a perspective that they will become a meaningful part of the study as a whole. A balance must be found between the limited historical approach which would leave us with only the few facts we know of the history behind the canon, and the apologetic - theological approach which has the potential of being overly subjective in its rush to interpretation. One possible way of approaching the historical problems in understanding the Buddhist canon is to start with what facts we have, and build our analysis as carefully as possible on this objective data. To some extent there will have to be judgments on our part as we develop an empathy towards the meaning of
ideas found in the canon, and we should welcome these judgments as long as they do not reflect bad logic or unfounded generalizations. This is necessary if the method is to be more than just a rehearsal of dusty facts and if it is to truly contribute to our contemporary understanding of an ancient collection of documents.

It is prudent to start, then, with an idea of what the Buddhist canon is, what it consists of, and why this study is based primarily on one section of the canon. Secondly, we should consider the transmission of the canon, its various languages and recensions, and whether there is any way we can determine how true the written recensions are to an oral tradition. Thirdly, an attempt should be made to ascertain the dates of both the oral and the written canons. Fourthly, the question of how we should use the recensions of the canon available to us must be carefully reviewed. Here we engage problems of interpretation, exegesis and translation, problems of understanding how the canon delivered its message, and how we in a 20th century Western environment can investigate not only what the canon says but why it says what it does.

The first concern, then, is to know what the Buddhist canon is, and what parts of it are most useful to us for the purposes of this paper. The canon, commonly known as the Tipitaka (Three Baskets), consists of those books which the brotherhood (sangha) eventually came to regard as definitive expressions of its life and faith. It is a large collection of
texts (consisting of fifty volumes in an average printing), and is at first difficult to arrange in one's mind. For the most part, the traditional threefold division into ritual and discipline (Vinaya), doctrine (Sutta) and later esoteric additions (Abhidhamma) can be taken seriously, with each pitaka answering to a particular theological need. We can begin our investigation of the structure and purpose of these works by first examining the Sutta, because in many ways it is theologically the most strategic of the pitakas.

The Sutta Pitaka represents the central literary work of early Buddhism, and the tradition acknowledged this fact by building a huge commentorial and exegetical tradition around this collection of teachings. The Sutta is really five separate collections or Nikāyas, with the first four (Dīgha, Majjhima, Samyutta and Āṅguttara) being very similar in content, with only a variation of literary style, while the fifth (Khuddaka) is a more eclectic collection which was probably added to the Sutta somewhat later and more gradually. The contents of the Sutta are concerned with the problems of man, especially with his experience of pain, and with his search for an understanding of how this pain arises and how it can be destroyed. These

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1These collections of sermons were put together by the early sangha in a manner which reflects the length rather than content of the teachings themselves. Thus the names of the Nikāyas appear as the collection of long sermons (Dīghanikāya), medium sized sermons (Majjhima), 'grouped' sermons (Samyutta), sermons arranged in ascending numerical order (Āṅguttara), and miscellaneous sermons (Khuddaka).
problems are enucleated in the Four Noble Truths, which is the central teaching of the Sutta, and which forms the basis of what the early Buddhists call the dhamma, or doctrine. In this study of craving in early Buddhism, these teachings will provide the foundation of our investigation, and because they are chiefly found in the Sutta, that piṭaka in particular will be of interest to us.

The Vinaya Piṭaka is made up mostly of instructions for the daily life of the sangha, and is only incidentally concerned with doctrine. However, as it does contain a few passages which reinforce the doctrinal teachings of the Sutta, and as its text is historically reliable, selected portions of this piṭaka will be useful for us.

With the Abhidhamma Piṭaka there is much more of a problem. For many years now, Buddhist scholarship has regarded this piṭaka as late and obscure, and both these charges still stand. We would be obliged to challenge this opinion if it could be demonstrated that the Abhidhamma was as old as the Vinaya and Sutta. But although several attempts have been made to prove this assumption, it is unlikely that the vast bulk of the Abhidhamma is of the same age as the other two piṭakas.

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2 For example, the discourse on Non-Selfhood and the Fire Sermon, both in the Mahāvagga of the Vinaya.

3 From a traditional point of view, some Buddhists regard the Abhidhamma as coming from the lips of the Buddha.
It should, however, be noted that an outline of theological themes in the Abhidhamma may well be as old as the oldest portions of the Sutta and the Vinaya. This outline was a set of headings which served as notes on the dhamma, or doctrine, and was called a mātrkā, about which Warder writes "...it seems very probable that in the earliest period this third section of the Tripiṭaka (the Abhidhamma) consisted simply of some set of Mātrkā headings, possibly propounded by Buddha himself when giving systematic instructions to his followers, and that this was only later fully elaborated into Abhidhamma expositions". What the Abhidhamma Piṭaka does is develop the Mātrkā by systematizing and expanding the doctrine. A crucial question that must be asked, however, is whether apart from the Mātrkā the Abhidhamma contains doctrine originally taught by the Buddha during his lifetime. Could it be that some of the Buddha's teachings were ambiguously expressed and therefore interpreted in divergent ways, so that one might ask whether the Nikāyas write from one standpoint of what the Buddha said and the

himself. The historical support for this claim is reflected in such a sentence as found in the introduction to Buddhaghosa's commentary on the Dīgha Nikāya (the Sumangalavilāsini) concerning the Abhidhamma, which is referred to as "that which the Buddha taught to the devas in heaven and subsequently to Sāriputta who gave it to Ananda". This traditional kind of reply is, however, no real evidence of the Abhidhamma's age, and is unsatisfactory from an historical point of view.

Abhidhamma another? It is unlikely that this was the case because generally speaking the Abhidhamma has not radically changed the initial direction or emphasis of the Sutta teachings. Only in a few points of understanding, as in its contribution to the study of causality, does the Abhidhamma present a doctrinal position not found at least in part in the Sutta. To a large extent, the expanded doctrine of the Abhidhamma simply represents later fine doctrinal distinctions which have a limited appeal to the student whose objective is to research only the earliest doctrinal teachings. If it is asked, therefore, whether either account, the Nikāyas or the Abhidhamma, deserves absolute confidence to the exclusion of the other, it can be readily argued that the Nikāyas have this confidence because of their traditional antiquity and unique place in Buddhist literature. On the other hand, the catechetical style, the scholastic presentation of doctrine, and the fact that the Abhidhamma quotes openly from the Sutta

5The Abhidhamma has significantly changed the focus of the doctrine of causality as taught by the Buddha. Warder puts it this way: "the pratityasamutpāda (doctrine of dependent origination or causality) discussed by the Buddha was concerned almost exclusively with the particular case of transmigration, the origination of unhappiness. It was also empirical, not theoretical, in the sense that the problem set was to determine by observation what was the condition through which each member of the sequence occurs, not to investigate the nature of the causal relation itself. Here in the Abhidhamma, however, the interest is shifted to this relation and at the same time, it becomes more general, taking into consideration all mental processes and also the process of the physical world." Ibid. p. 224.
make the Abhidhamma controversial, and open to the charge that it represents a later interpretation of Buddhist doctrine.

A second historical problem to be investigated is that of the recensions and languages of the canon. Initially, the teachings of the Buddha were in all likelihood set down in a Prakrit (Māgadhī) recension of the Tipitaka, of which nothing now survives. But there is no real proof that such a recension ever became recognized as a kind of ultimate or Ur-Tipitaka. Indeed, taking into consideration the Buddhist principle of not having one sacred language for its canon, combined with the many languages and dialects prevalent in the 5th-4th century B.C. India, and the rise of the various schools, any number of canonical recensions probably proliferated in the early centuries of Buddhism. At one time it is presumed that all eighteen traditional schools of Indian Buddhism had their own recensions of the Tipitaka. Of these, only the Sthaviravādin Tipitaka remains as a complete unit preserved in the Pāli tradition. This Sthaviravāda Pāli Tipitaka has been described by Warder "as one of the most authentic, in the sense of preserving the discourses of the Buddha in their wording as recognized before the schisms", and it is this canon that Pāli scholars use today.  

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6Ibid. p. 225

7It should be noted that not all scholars accept the
Fragments of other Indian Tipitakas do, however, exist, most important of which is a collection of Sanskrit texts from the Sarvastivāda Canon. These tend to support the conclusion that basically the recensions differed little from each other, especially as far as the Sutta Piṭaka is.

Pāli Canon as either the best or most trustworthy early Buddhist literary source, however. The most notable critic is Conze, who questions the alleged pre-eminence of the Pāli Canon from four points of view. For one, the Buddha spoke Magadhi, not Pāli. Two, the Pāli Canon is no older than that of other schools, i.e. Sarvastivāda. Furthermore, "the Pāli Canon's prestige among Europeans owed something to the fact that it fitted in with their own mood, in being more rationalistic and moralistic than some other traditions, and much less given to religious devotion, mythology and magic. The Pāli Canon stresses the ethical side of Buddhism, to which Protestants would readily respond". This is consistent with the intent of the older Anglo-German school of Buddhist studies (i.e. H. Oldenberg, T. W. Rhys Davids, E. J. Thomas) who set out "to make the Buddha appear as a moralist". Three, history has favoured the Pāli Canon on two counts. On the one hand, the Muslims never reached Ceylon to destroy the Pāli Canon as they did many other canons, and on the other hand, the British raj took immediate interest in the Pāli Canon, as exemplified in the "devoted zeal" of the Pāli Text Society. Thus, argues Conze, "in the perspective of those who only read English, the Theravādins have therefore come to occupy a quite disproportionate importance". Fourthly, Conze notes that because the works of the Sarvastivādins and Mahasanghikas are now "more available", the Pāli Canon will have to relinquish its long-cherished status. "It is quite obvious", writes Conze, "that in the future this rich Sarvastivādin material must be consulted by all students with as much care as the Pāli sources". With Conze's customary eagerness, he goes on to emphasize certain Mahāyāna works (i.e. The Mahāvastu) as being just as crucial as the canon for adequate understanding of early Buddhism (cf: Conze, E. Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies. Columbia: S.C. University of South Carolina Press. 1968. p. 3f). Although Conze's criticism of the European attitude towards the Pāli Canon is not without value, it can still be argued that the canon is nonetheless the most strategic early Buddhist literary source if only because of its wholeness as an historical unit, and its completeness as a body of literary material. Younger recognizes this when
concerned. It is Warder's opinion that the 'central body of sutras' (all the Nikāyas but the Khuddaka) are "so similar in all known versions that we must accept these as so many recensions of the same original texts, ... whatever textual discrepancies are found hardly affect the doctrine..."8

Other complete Tipiṭakas in languages outside the Indian tradition are found in Chinese and Tibetan. Of these, the Chinese versions are of special interest for comparison with the Pāli text, but although they seem to reflect recensions of the Sarvāstivāda, Dharmagupta and Kāśyapiya schools of Indian Buddhism, they do not provide us with any real idea of the language of the original.9

It is possible to conclude then, that behind the canonical recensions we now have there may have been other written sources, although there is no indication in the Pāli Tipiṭaka that this was in fact the case. Certainly, however,

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8Warder, A. K. Indian Buddhism, op cit. p. 7.

there was an oral tradition which had gone on from the time of the First Rehearsal at Rajagaha (486 B.C.). But whether there is a means by which we can trace the way in which the tradition of the sayings of the Buddha were handed down before being crystallized into written sources is a question that still remains unresolved.

It is useful to note that in the New Testament a similar problem arises concerning the tradition of the words and works of Jesus. Although there have been many different approaches to this New Testament problem, one of the most interesting and creative methods has been that of the Formgeschichte school, a method which has contributed greatly to our understanding of what Jesus said and taught by increasing our understanding of the forms which the oral tradition behind the gospel assumed. The main question asked by the form critics is how the oral tradition took the literary form it did.

By using similar critical methods on the Pāli Canon, could we come close to what Warder calls "the most original parts of Buddhism"? The success of the method would depend largely on the assumption that the teachings of the Buddha could be analyzed into separate units, each of which might be considered as a form gradually fixed in the process of transmission, and that we could recover the earlier history of these.

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10 Warder, A. K. *Indian Buddhism.* op cit. p. 279
forms and finally ascertain the historical setting which determined these forms. Again, as in the New Testament, it should initially be asked if through form criticism we can reliably ascertain the influence of an early church (i.e. the sangha) on the canon we have? Were stories of the Buddha needed in spreading the teaching (dhamma)? In other words, was there a tradition that had its point of departure from Buddha, but that was freely modified for the use of the early sangha? The pitakas do not reflect anything similar to the intense struggle in the life and faith of the early church that one finds in the Gospels, so that it is unlikely that the dhamma suffered as much sangha-orientated interpolation. There was no eschatological urgency in early Buddhism, and no bewilderment about what the teachings of the Buddha might mean to future generations far removed from the original historical sitz im leben of those teachings: The teachings of Jesus, on the other hand, went through a process of reinterpretation to meet the circumstances of an early church which was uncertain when its eschatological fullness in time would come. In addition, the lack of historical knowledge about the situation of the sangha during the first century of its life make it difficult to reconstruct the early oral tradition in which the Buddhist message was transmitted.

But can we say how much of the teaching found in the Sutta originated with Gotama the Buddha? One way of getting
at this question, if we cannot trace the oral tradition very far, would be to examine the theological themes in the Sutta's teaching and ask if they are likely to be the work of one man. There are, for example, the different teachings concerning the omniscient and transcendental character of the Buddha, and the many different instructions on forms and methods of meditation. Yet despite this variety of emphasis, the Nikāyas also so emphatically present the significant doctrines of anicca, anattā and dukkha (non-being, impermanency and painfulness), that the mind of one teacher can clearly be perceived behind these central themes. There can be no doubt that the Buddha's dhāmma rests on his profound insight into painfulness, its cause and the possibility of its cessation. This element of personal teaching is everywhere apparent in the Nikāyas:

Pubbe cāham Anuruddha etarahi ca dukkhāneva paññāpemi dukkhaṃ ca nirodhanti.

Formerly, and now also, Anurādhā, it is just painfulness and the cessation of painfulness that I proclaim. S.4.2.

In addition to the personalized character of the central teaching on pain is the fact that the climate of philosophical dialogue in which the teachings are set could well reflect the actual situation at the time of the Buddha. All the prominent philosophical schools of the Sixth Century B.C. are cited (i.e. Brahmanism, Lokāyata, Ājīvakism and Jainism), and are often found as sparks for debates and foils for the Buddha's own teachings. 11

11 Jayatillekē, K. N. Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge;
It is clear, therefore, that many doctrines attributed to the Buddha are compatible with his great theme of dukkha, that they reflect the integrity and genius of one man, and that they are concerned with the philosophical issues current to the Sixth Century B.C. India.

We can safely conclude that while the Sutta as we have it is the work of centuries of collection within the sangha, they were working with a solid body of teaching from the Buddha (who taught for about thirty to forty years before his death), and that they generally tried to remain faithful to that which they had received from their teacher.

Closely related to the controversial issue of which parts of the canon may reflect the earliest Buddhist teachings is the problem of dating the canon (the question of adjudication of the Chinese and Tibetan Canons on this matter goes beyond both the qualifications of the writer and the scope of this chapter, so that our remarks are confined only to the Pāli texts). The usual form in which this question is asked is whether the canon and its component parts can be reliably dated at all. We have already indicated that some portions of the canon are older than others, so that the problem of dating the canon as a whole, and the problem of dating the individual

pitakas, can really be thought of as two separate inquiries.

One way of approaching this problem of dates is to start with the facts that are generally accepted, and then attempt to sort out some of the more contentious possibilities that are still unresolved. First, we can be much more certain about a terminus ad quem for the canon as a whole than we can be of its terminus ad quo. A terminus ad quem can be established as early as the 2nd century B.C., if we are to believe the evidence of the contemporary sanghā in Ceylon. They claim that the earliest extant copy of the Pāli Tipiṭaka was set down in writing during the reign of King Vaṭṭhagamani Abhaya (c. 101 - 77 B.C.) at Alu-vihāra, Matale, about fifteen miles from the present day city of Kandy.¹² If we are sceptical of this claim, the next terminus ad quem would have to be c. 1st century A.D. just before the writing of the Milinda Pañha (c. 2nd century A.D.) in which the pitakas are mentioned.¹³

The question of a terminus ad quo for the canon is a much more complicated issue to resolve because to some extent we are obliged to speculate on the nature of oral composition which preceded the written compilation. This can lead to certain highly complex and methodologically contentious

hypotheses. The question should probably be asked in its most general form by asking if the written Tipiṭaka can tell us anything about its own history?

First of all, the canon does provide us with an historical picture of how it came to be established, at least in the case of the vinaya and dhamma. As Lamotte has pointed out, the Vinaya Piṭaka in each of its recensions has an appendix in which the events of the First Rehearsal after the death of the Buddha are carefully recorded. These narrations claim that an assembly of five hundred bhikkhus, headed by one Kāśyapa, reviewed all the remembered sayings of the Buddha and produced an 'authorized' canon. The accounts (as well as one of a second rehearsal a century later) are obviously not part of what was recited at the First Rehearsal they were designed to describe, but there is no reason to doubt that such a Rehearsal did take place, and under circumstances similar to those outlined in the Vinaya.

It appears that nothing at that time was written down, probably because writing was not a customary medium for teaching in this period of Indian pedagogy. Instead, everything that was considered 'canonical' would have been memorized by the bhikkhus, and in all likelihood this method of recording went on for years, even centuries, after the First Rehearsal. To this oral recension additions were undoubtedly added, but

initially at least, these additions had to correspond doctrinally with the already established oral tradition. Warder notes that the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta makes the Buddha himself "lay down a rule to coter just this situation: if someone claims to be in possession of an authentic text not in the Sutra or in the Vinaya - again two pitakas only - it should be checked against the Sutra and Vinaya and accepted only if it agrees with them. Such agreement or disagreement may have seemed obvious enough at first. Later it was far from obvious and depended on subtle interpretations; thus the schools came to accept new texts, some of which contained new doctrines". 15

These schools came into being sometime after the Great Schism at Vaiśāli, c. 349 B.C. This split was prompted over the issue of whether or not an arhat was by nature beyond the reach of seduction. The majority of bhikkhus assembled at Vaiśāli (the so called Mahāsangha, or "great body of bhikkhus") claimed that an arhat could be seduced, thus breaking away from an opposite opinion held by the Sthavira, or elders. The doctrinal outcome of the schism was that the Mahāsangha felt it necessary to make a pronounced distinction between the arhat and the Buddha. They reasoned that the latter, even in an arhat stage, could not have been seduced under any circumstances, and

15Warder, A. K. Indian Buddhism. op cit. p. 205.
was thus more than human. This was the beginning of a whole new emphasis in Buddhology, a shift from the humanism of the early canon to the supernaturalism of an emerging Mahāyāna. Conceivably this could well have been the issue that provoked the Sthāviraśāda to begin the transmission of the oral canon to a written text in order to protect what they felt was the original dhamma. At any rate, various canonical recensions now began to make an appearance as the schools multiplied to eighteen in number by circa 50 B.C.

Certainly we know from archaeological evidence that by the time of Aśoka's Bhābra edict to the Buddhist sangha (in Jaipur), c. 257 B.C., there was in common circulation a series of Buddhist canonical 'texts', perhaps in writing, known as the 'suddharma', or 'true doctrine'. This Aśokan rock edict also lists seven 'discourses on the doctrine' in Māgadhī, none of which can be positively identified with the Pāli Tipiṭaka texts, although many attempts have been made to decipher the true meaning of this curious Māgadhān list. Some of the attempts are just wild guesses. Thus Keith\(^{16}\) thought that because there were seven appointed discourses, they must refer to 'seven passages of the law' very similar to ones found in the Sutta Pitaka, perhaps referring to the mātrkā-type headings that form the seven basic doctrines.

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leading to enlightenment as recorded in the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta. But Keith makes no attempt to substantiate this conclusion. A much more careful analysis of these seven Māgadhī words is made by Warder, who argues convincingly that some refer to instructions laid down by the Buddha, and others to actual canonical texts, and further concludes that 'there is at least no question of having to look outside the Tripitaka as we now know it for Asoka's selection, although he was using a version inaccessible to us'.

Vague as the Bhābra inscription may be, it does at least tell us that the teachings of the Buddha were collected in some form or other by the 3rd century B.C. We can further surmise that as the great popularization of Buddhism spread beyond the bounds of India at this time, it might well have taken with it written canonical texts. We know that in all likelihood these missions abroad, even the celebrated visit of Mahinda to King Devanapiyatissa in Ceylon (c. 240 B.C.) consisted only of small groups of bhikkhus, sometimes as few as five in number, and it is questionable whether such a modest band could be expected to have memorized the whole oral canon. With this in mind, it may be that a written canon did exist by the time of the Ceylon mission, but there is no proof for this suggestion.

Such a written Tripitaka, if it existed at all, was a

17Warder, A. K. Indian Buddhism. op cit. p. 256.
probably in Māgadhī or some other Prakṛt language, and it is no longer available to us. The Pāli recension of the Sthaviravāda school, the Ceylon tradition informs us, was not set down in writing until the 1st century B.C.

The important question that should now be asked is if the Pāli text itself is able to give us any indication of the age of its component parts. In other words, despite the fact that the Pāli written recension is as late as the 1st century B.C., does it reflect various developments of style and doctrine which took place in a much older oral or written canon? This is a different question than the one asked above as to whether the canon actually reports the initial teachings of the Buddha. Here we are concerned only with the possibilities of dating the tradition that stands behind the Pāli text itself. Are there, for example, certain archaisms in the Pāli language which may date a passage as being from an older layer of tradition? Or should we attempt to date the canon only from a doctrinal point of view? The latter suggestion is made by T. R. V. Murti, who looks for philosophical stratifications in the canon as indicative of age. He writes, 'the chronological division of texts into primitive and later accretions is highly conjectural. Two or several parts of the Buddhist scriptures may be at variance with each other; but in the absence of incontestable historical evidence, it is difficult to decide which text is prior to which other. We have to fall back upon the philosophical appraisal of the doctrine for deciding
the priority of some texts to that of others. 18

The problem with this method is that it forces us
to assume a certain stance to begin with as to what is the
oldest philosophical position in the canon. Only once we
have made such a judgment can we adjudicate the other
philosophical and doctrinal positions represented in the
canon. In the absence of any independent evidence as to
which philosophical position is early, this approach is
in grave danger of arguing for historical precedence on
the basis of subjective philosophical predilection.

Another approach is that conducted by Warder on
dating the Pāli metre in the poetic literature of the canon.
This has the advantage of being a more objective method, and
in the long run may produce some interesting conclusions.
Warder's method has been applied mostly to the various works
that make up the Khuddaka Nikāya, and he is able to demonstrate
how later additions have been made in some cases to what is a
very old core of poetry. For instance, in his study of the
metre of the Theragāthā, he is able to isolate some passages
which he thinks reflect c. 500 B.C., others a century later,
and the majority of the text the Aśokan era. Whether this
means an oral Pāli recension existed as early as the First
Rehearsal, or whether the Pāli metre reflects the metre of
an older Prakṛt-Māgadhi tradition, he does not indicate.

18Murti, T. R. V. The Central Philosophy of Buddhism
But the significance of his findings are very revealing nonetheless. He points out that about the time of the Buddha a new trend in poetry originated in Māgadha, "and during the next three centuries or so created many new techniques of metrics and poetry". These techniques can be traced in the additions that were finding their way into the dhamma, but it is important to point out that such additions were confined to the fifth, or Khuddaka Nikāya alone. This expansion, Warder points out, "was in order to satisfy the popular demand for stories, legends, and what is sometimes known as 'edification' (narratives)". 19 What this further suggests, however, is that the first four Nikāyas were not being added to, and it is thus probable that from a very early stage they were considered to be a fixed body of doctrine.

To establish a date for these early portions of the dhamma and vinaya still seems beyond present scholarship. It may be metrically and doctrinally possible to identify later passages from the Aśokan era to the 1st century A.D., but even here the subjective element is never very far away. A reasonable adjudication of the date for most of the canon must, therefore, still lie somewhere in the 2nd - 1st century B.C. But as we have indicated, much of the basic content of the Vinaya Pitaka, the first four Nikāyas of the Sutta Pitaka

19 Warder, A. K. Indian Buddhism. op cit. p. 228.
and the Mātrkā headings of the Abhidhamma are established in a tradition that in all likelihood not only pre-dates the first schism, but may well reflect the First Heharsal after the death of the Buddha, c. 486 B.C.

We now have a rough chronological periodization of how canonical material developed in the lifetime of the Buddha, in the era of the three councils and in post-Asokan times, but now we must ask the question of how we should use the recensions available to us. We have to remember that Buddhist canonical literature was produced in the sangha, by members of the sangha, for use by the sangha. They had a purpose or purposes in recording the Vinaya and the Sutta Pitakas. How, therefore, are we in a 20th century western environment to interpret this literature and its purpose so that it is meaningful for us?

This interpretive issue can be defined in two ways. For one, do the later Buddhist schools and commentaries provide us with interpretations of the canon that reveal hidden meanings in the dhamma crucial for our understanding? Two, as we all use translations of the canon, whether prepared by others or by ourselves, we need to have in mind some clear principles for translating. What problems can we expect to encounter here? How, for example, should we translate ancient Pali words into contemporary English? Closely related to the question of translation is a third problem, which we will consider as a theological one and postpone until the next
section, and that is that since understanding a text involves more than a word by word translation, how can we translate the meanings of texts?

What then first of the schools and commentaries? The question of interpreting the canonical texts linguistically and exegetically was a problem right from the very beginning, for although the traditional eighteen schools of Indian Buddhism disagreed little on the text of the Sutta in particular, they each held a different doctrinal interpretation of the texts.20 As Murti has pointed out, a philosophical assessment of the teachings as a whole led to the formulation of later doctrine. With this in mind, he writes, "passages must not be counted, but weighed. We must consider the entire body of texts together and evolve a synthesis, weighing all considerations. We require a synoptic interpretation of the Buddhist scriptures. It is necessary to make a doctrinal analysis of the contents and assess philosophically their value. Such a syntheses of doctrines and texts have been

20 Warder has offered an interesting list of ten points over which the schools disagreed, and shows how they were all based on textual exegesis. It is his further assessment that despite the disagreements, 'there is little here to effect the main doctrines, or even the great mass of detailed working out in the dialogues. The schools seem to have agreed on the wording of what the Buddha said. The disputes concern subsidiary matters on which the texts were not explicit or where there was a possibility of varying interpretations'. Ibid. p. 12.
made from time to time by the Buddhist schools themselves".\textsuperscript{21} Does this mean that if we want to have an accurate understanding of what the Buddha taught we have to investigate the exegesis of the Buddhist schools? Does it further imply that any contemporary study of Buddhist canonical doctrine must either be based on or take into serious consideration that vast commentorial literature of Buddhaghosa and Dhammapala?

There are obvious problems with the use of the commentaries of the schools. In the first place, no school can be said to represent what appears to have been the original doctrine of the Buddha. Secondly, the commentaries were written at a time far removed from the canonical era, and it is likely that many of the concepts had by then lost their initial meaning. Thirdly, they disagree for reasons that are often historically conditioned and are no longer clear to us.

We know that the schools were not a "protestant" reaction against the canonical tradition of early Buddhism, as the wording of the canon itself is never tampered with. In this regard the schools were very traditionalist and protective of the canon. But there is no reason why any one particular school should be judged as the guardian of an authentic interpretation of what the canon means. Slavery on our part to the tradition which maintains that the schools

and commentaries must be used (an opinion held, for example, by many contemporary Sinhalese translators of the Pāli Canon; who regard the commentator Buddhaghosa with a particular veneration) is unnecessary for two reasons. On the one hand, the tradition that stretches back to the life of the Buddha is broken for us anyway, and the schools are theologically not much closer to the heart of the Buddhist dhamma than we are. On the other hand, as we have already observed, the 'original' canon is generally preserved in all of its various recensions with little indication of scholastic interpolation. We can refer to the canon directly, therefore, without having to support our conclusions with evidence from the schools of commentaries.

What now of the importance of having accurate and yet expressive translations of the canon? Whether we prepare our own translations or use those of others, we need some guidelines on what the principles of translation are, for even the best translation is open to the criticism that it may not be adequate.

It is easy to launch a broad critique of the translation of languages very different in time and type. One example of this is cited by Jayatilleke, who discusses three serious objections that can be raised against the possibility of rendering any 'accurate' or 'meaningful' translation.22

First, he notes, there is the problem of a translation expressing the 'spirit' of the original. Secondly, there is the objection that any two given languages 'historically' far removed from one another (i.e. French and Chinese, English and Pāli) will have such differing 'concepts' that any meaningful translation is next to impossible. Thirdly, partly as a development of the second point, there is the suggestion that if the original is an 'ancient' language (i.e. Vedic Sanskrit), its ideas or modes of thought are most likely "so different from ours that a translation is of little significance, as the assigning of meanings to its symbols involves a series of inductive arguments of dubious value". But Jayatilleke is not so pessimistic as to accept any of these criticisms at face value. He further appeals to the view that so pronounced is 'the degree of correspondence in human ideas in spite of divergence in language', that some attempts at translation and interpretation are worthwhile.

Actually the problems of the translator very nicely bring out the two levels of difficulty faced by those who would interpret man to his fellow man. On the one level is the need for technical competence. One of the first clues in understanding the ways of thinking of another people is in their language, and unless we have some skill in handling the syntactical and morphological basis of their language, we cannot adequately interpret the ways of thinking which are so often unconsciously embodied in the structure of a language.
H. Nakamura puts the problem this way: "forms of linguistic expression become, in the inner consciousness of people, norms for psychologically ordering in a fixed pattern and carrying to conclusion the operation of thought. Therefore the special forms for developing the effectiveness of a given language, especially the grammar of that language and more especially its syntax, express the more conscious ways of thinking of the people using the language, and what is more, may be said to explicate such ways of thinking." 23

Grammar and syntax is the point to begin with in translating, as frequently the sentence and its structure is more immediately comprehensible than are the meanings of individual words. But there are always grammatical idiosyncrasies in any language which express a dimension of meaning peculiar to that language, and the translator has to be aware of these idiosyncrasies if he is to present a meaningful translation. Thus, for example, in French we find a complex subjunctive mood that is not nearly so pronounced in other Indo-European languages. In Semitic languages, a frequently baffling feature is the tremendous variation of meanings derivable from one consonantal root. 24


24 By simply changing the voweiling of a root, and by the addition of prefixes and suffixes, one root can take on many meanings. Thus, for example, from the Arabic root 'sllm, aslama, 'to be safe'; sallama, 'to deliver'; aslama, 'to submit' (in the 4th Masdar, 'Islam');
In Pāli and Sanskrit, there is the critical syntactical problem of an intricate compound structure, and the great number of abstract nouns expressed by the addition of -ta or -tvā to the root.

Sometimes, however, even a sound grammatical knowledge combined with a simple word for word translation does not really provide the meaning of a text. This may be for several morphological reasons. The most obvious examples of this are when an idiom is found in what may initially appear to be a straightforward sentence, and when a critical word has a disguised or controversial meaning.

Certainly one of the major difficulties facing the inexperienced translator is achieving an understanding of what an idiom may mean to its original audience. Thus, for example, the Pāli sentence 'rāja cakkam vatteti' can be seen to have a literal meaning in 'the king turns the wheel' as well as the idiomatic meaning 'he exercises his authority'. Word for word translations do not, therefore, always give us a realistic understanding of a sentence. This morphological issue is a familiar one to all translators. How, for instance, should a New Testament scholar translate such a word as λόγος, or such a contentious passage as Lk. 17. 21 (ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐν τούτῳ ὑποταμών) and how should a Pāli scholar translate such a word as dukkha, or such a passage as D. 2. 101 (Tasmat ihānanda

istalama, 'to receive'; istāaslama, 'to surrender'; salāmum, 'peace'; salāmatun, 'safety'; and Muslimun, a Muslim.
atta-dīpā viharatha atta-saranā anaṁha-saranā, dhamma-dīpā dhamma-saranā anaṁha-saranā)? In both the textual passages cited here, the translator must first come to understand the syntax and the context of the sentence in which the disputed word occurs (εὐτο in the Lukan example and atta in the Dīgha example), but even more important, he must have a knowledge of the ambiguities and variety of meanings the controversial word might have. It may be that an author or chronicler might mean several different things by the same word, just as he may use different words to signify the same, or essentially the same things (i.e. the Pāli example of tāṁhā with its several synonyms - chanda, rago, lobha, etc.).

A final technical problem is that of selecting an appropriate English word as a translation, a word that in English has a suitably delimited range of meaning and also fits a similar situation as the translated word does in the original context.

Apart from the need for technical competence, there is also another level of difficulty facing the translator, and that is the need for empathy. As the New Testament scholar R. M. Grant has observed, absolutely rigid rules for translating, as for interpreting, cannot be laid down. "In every case", he writes, "we are dealing with a living author who used grammar and syntax as a means, not as an end in itself." The function of translation in providing one with an understanding of a given Pāli text has limited possibilities,

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therefore, if we do not have some feeling for the structure within which the Pāli writers' thought moved. The translator has to make an analysis of the intentions and purposes of an author or text. Only by having an empathy with this purpose can he come closer to gaining a more profound theological understanding of the Pāli texts he translates. He must consider the Pāli Canon as more than just a body of literature, and seek out some idea of why it was memorized and ultimately written down in the first place. In striving to discover the conviction which stands behind the canon, the translator thus can hope to present a realistic and expressive picture of what Buddhism meant to its early adherents, and ultimately what it can mean to us.

Historical problems must also be understood as historical responsibility. The sceptic can see there are these problems, and maintain that we should limit ourselves only to an objective study of what few facts we have of early Buddhism. But the historian's eyes are always determined by his own views, and he cannot avoid interpretation altogether. Nor should he remain chained to an objective historical study alone, for each generation needs to look afresh at what a text might say. He has a responsibility in his analysis of what facts are before him, and that is to make historical judgments which, although initially based on these few facts, may go beyond these facts. A good example of this is Warder's method of dating canonical poetry by a study of metre. He has the basis of a good argument in the evidence of certain archaisms he finds
in certain passages. But he also has read into the developing metrical patterns an historical meaning, which is his responsibility as an historian. We need this kind of imagination if we are to make our historical study of the Buddhist canon a fruitful one. 26

We cannot hide behind our ignorance of the historical background of early Buddhism. And yet we can hope to learn from an historical study that we do have these limitations, and that if we can further free ourselves from careless generalizations and unsatisfactory methods of interpretations, then our contribution to Buddhist studies may after all be meaningful from a theological as well as a historical point of

26 The same principle of imagination and responsibility applies to all our endeavours in translating the Pāli text. The good historian should realize that sometimes a word for word translation alone is not adequate, as it is not always possible to translate directly from Pāli into English. For example, one only has to look at the available translations of the popular Dhammapada to see how various translators face this problem of making reliable translations out of contentious passages. How, for instance, should one translate Pāli expressions which have cognate objects, such as 'kāmakāma' in Dhm. 83? Should it be translated simply word for word as 'desiring desire', or does Radhakrishnan's translation of 'yearning for pleasures' or A. W. Schlegel's translation of 'amori dediti' (given to love) come closer to giving us a clearer idea of what this expression means? Again, consider the first line of the Dhm: 'manopubbaṅgagā dhammā manoṣetāhā manomaya', translated by Bhikkhu Kassapa as "mind precedes things (dhammā), dominates them, creates them". But Radhakrishnan has interpreted the noun 'dhammā' in a different sense altogether when he translates "the mental natures (dhammā) are the results of what we have thought, are chieftained by our thoughts, are made up of our thoughts". Clearly the translator has to rely on his own judgment and imagination in approaching these and other passages, and this is his responsibility as an historian.
view. We feel, therefore, that the historian inevitably has the theological problem to face as well. He must use skill and discipline to get a basis for his interpretation, but interpret he will in some sense, and he may as well look at his problems as an interpreter as well as an objective analyst. It is with this perspective in mind that we approach the many Pāli texts which form the foundation of this study of the early Buddhist concept of craving.
THEOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN UNDERSTANDING

In the last section, we saw that there are several historical problems involved in approaching early Buddhist literary sources, and for a variety of reasons we argued that this thesis should be based chiefly on the Sutta Piṭaka of the Pāli Canon. Apart from these historical issues, however, there are also certain crucial theological problems that need to be reviewed before we centre specifically on the doctrine of craving in early Buddhism. This is because one of the most pressing questions that can be initially asked of any study such as this one, which has as its aim an analysis of certain experiential and existential aspects of another religious tradition, is whether such a study can truly penetrate another tradition to the extent that it becomes sensitive to the deeper spiritual dimension of that tradition.

In recent years, considerable attention has been paid to this problem in comparative religious studies. It is now recognized that the meaning and truth of any religion lies beyond the simple historical and phenomenological level, and that something like Otto's "idea of the holy" or the "mysterium tremendum" is the kind of ultimate religious dimension which must eventually be investigated.
The difficulties involved in approaching this inner heart of another religious tradition have been expressed by a variety of scholars in a variety of ways, but the basic problem remains something each student of comparative religion has to resolve in his own right: how can we penetrate the theological circle of another religious community, especially when that community belongs to a different culture and has a different world view?\footnote{As expressed, for example, in the difference between the Indian concept of time, which is thought of as having a cyclical dimension, and the traditional western linear view of time. Cf. Brandon S. G. F. History, Time and Deity (New York: Manchester U.P., 1965).} How are we in the West, for example, to isolate where the central religious question is located in Eastern experience?

We propose to examine this problem by investigating it from three perspectives. First, we should have a clear idea of how some leading scholars have defined the dimensions of the problem by using such definitions as 'theological circle', 'spheres of the spirit', 'the vertical and horizontal', 'cumulative tradition and faith'. To begin with, we will examine the positions taken by two contemporary scholars, Paul Tillich and W. C. Smith, on the question of the immanent and transcendent aspects of other religions.

Secondly, as we are especially interested in the possibilities of penetrating the transcendent or vertical dimension of other religions, we can use the approaches of
Tillich and Smith as a foundation upon which to investigate in particular ways which show an openness to this dimension. Here we should also review the critical theological problem of how the transcendent dimension of a religion can be expressed in its sacred literature.

Thirdly, although the vertical dimension of other 'theological circles' may be closed in their periphery, the question must ultimately be asked if they are open in their depths? In other words, are what seem to be 'theological circles' or 'spheres of the spirit' actually hemispheres, needing only to be brought together as one sphere?

And finally, we must see how in particular this discussion applies to our study of the early Buddhist concept of craving. In order to adequately investigate the religious significance of craving, we will have to settle on a method which can adequately penetrate the early Buddhist theological circle. This review of certain theological problems in understanding other faiths will help prepare us as we come to establishing this method in the next section.

The first concern, then, is to have an understanding of what the central problem is. As we study another religion, is there a point in the theology of that religion past which the outside observer cannot penetrate? Is St. Anselm's statement "I believe in order that I may understand" a prerequisite for any hope of reaching the truth of another faith? In other words, can we only expect to understand what has been called the horizontal aspect of a religion other than our own,
its observable deposit of history, community and ritual,
and not its vertical dimension, its language of revelation,
myth and faith? This question has surely been asked many
times, and there may be no one answer to it, or any answer
at all. But two scholars in particular, Paul Tillich and
W. C. Smith, have touched the issue deeply in their writings,
and because they arrived at significantly different con-
cclusions, it is worthwhile examining their approaches with
some care.

On the one hand, it is Paul Tillich who emphasizes
the expression 'theological circle' and shows how it design-
nates both the kerygmatic basis of a religion, and the
personal faith of an individual. He urges, therefore, that
one has to be careful to distinguish between a circle that
may refer to a specific kerygma, community or religious
tradition as a whole, and a circle that is representative
of an individual's personal theological conviction.

The importance of discriminating between these two
aspects of the theological circle becomes evident when one
is tempted to make broad statements concerning the spiritual
dimension of a religion, because it is never possible for one
theological circle to fully assimilate and express the depth
and complexity of the many individual circles that together
constitute the living continuity of a particular religion.
Tillich ultimately concludes that both the horizontal and
vertical features of the theological circle of a religion
are penetrable under certain conditions, but he never loses
sight of the fact that the individual circle is not open
to any kind of generalization, and therefore remains
virtually closed to the outsider. He points out that the
individual circle is rooted for everyone in a "mystical
a priori, an awareness of something that transcends the
cleavage between subject and object."26 But it is an
awareness that can often be jealously guarded. For example,
the 'theologian' works within a circle which is much narrower
than that of the 'religious philosopher', because, notes
Tillich, the former adds to the 'mystical a priori' the
'criterion' of a religious message. Thus, "while the
philosopher of religion tries to remain general and abstract
in his concepts... the theologian is consciously and by
intention specific and concrete: he enters a theological
circle with a concrete commitment".29 That 'commitment'
may express itself in a tendency to approach theology only
from a rigid apologetic angle, for the particular difficulty
facing the 'theologian' is that unlike the 'religious
philosopher', he cannot become sufficiently detached from
his theology to look at it dispassionately. Rather, notes
Tillich, "he looks at his object (which transcends the
character of being an object) with passion, fear and love.

26Tillich, P. Systematic Theology, Vol. 1 (Chicago:
29Ibid. p. 10.
He is determined by his faith, in a theological circle. Furthermore, "...his attitude is existential because he is involved with the whole of his existence, with his finitude and anxiety, with his self-contradictions and his despair, his healing forces in him and his social situation". This kind of personal subjective religious response may well be impossible to explain or expose to others. It should not be felt necessary to look to the individual theological circles in order to penetrate the spiritual dimension of the kerygma those circles are based on, when the place to start is more obviously the theological circle of the kerygma itself.

In this regard, Tillich stresses that the theological circle of a religious tradition as a whole - its 'experience of the holy with the finite', and its 'spiritual power' - is penetrable to the thoughtful investigator. In other words, both the horizontal and vertical dimensions of the religion can be meaningfully understood by the outsider.

The central thrust of Tillich's approach to the "experience of the holy with the finite", is formulated in his last essay, The Future of Religions, in which he proposes that this experience of the holy was somehow expressed in 'religious symbols', symbols best reflected in cultural history and points of doctrine. As an example of religious symbolism in culture, he emphasizes that even as the history of religions in its essential nature does not exist alongside
the history of culture, but is embedded in that culture, so too does the sacred not lie beside the secular, but in its depths. These "finite religious symbols", he wrote, "are not stones falling from heaven. They have their roots in the totality of human experience including local surroundings, in all their ramifications...". Such religious symbols are tools whereby the student of religions can investigate the 'Geschichte' or existential meaning of religion in history.

But Tillich also shows how doctrinal positions in any religion can likewise demonstrate for the outsider the central issues of that religion. In his *Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions* he compares, for example, the soteriological concepts of the Kingdom of God in Christianity and Nirvāṇa in Buddhism, observing how each definition is designed to answer to a similar "ultimate concern". He writes, "in the dialogue between Christianity and Buddhism two telos formulas can be used: in Christianity the telos of everyone and everything united in the Kingdom of God; in Buddhism, the telos of everything and everyone fulfilled in the Nirvāṇa... both terms are symbols... expressing the nature of the holy and holiness as it "ought to be" over the holiness of the "is"." In this approach, Tillich

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evidently sees a common ground which makes dialogue between Christianity and Buddhism possible. He frequently alludes to the fact that all religions face such problems as chaos and order, evil and good, and that in these "ultimate concerns", meaningful comparisons, and therefore meaningful penetrations, can be made. Only when a theological circle is "foolishly defended" by apologists who fear any admission of a "common ground" with other religions will this understanding between two religions not be possible.

A final question to be asked of Tillich, however, is how he makes the leap from the understanding of the horizontal to the vertical dimension of religion. The key concept here is participation. His aim is to participate in the "spiritual powers" of a religion, in its intrinsic aim of existence, in its event as Geschichte and in its mysticism. "Participation", he writes, "in an event of the past is only possible if one is grasped by the spiritual power of this event, and through it enabled to evaluate the witnesses, the traditions and the authorities in which the same spiritual power was and is effective."\(^{32}\) The ultimate goal is to achieve "immediate participation in the divine ground by elevation into unity with it, transcending all finite realities and all finite symbols of the divine, leaving the sacramental activities far below and sinking cult and myth into the experienced

\(^{32}\)Ibid. p. 80
abyss of the ultimate.\textsuperscript{33} The actual method of this participation appears to be largely experiential. Tillich is telling us to use the experience of our own religious tradition to penetrate that of another. By "devotion, thought and action" we must first see the depth of our own religion, and in doing so we shall come to see that "in the depth of every living religion there is a point at which the religion itself loses its importance, and that to which it points breaks through its particularity, elevating it to spiritual freedom, and with it to a vision of the spiritual presence in other expressions of the ultimate meaning of man's existence."\textsuperscript{34}

A second approach to this critical central issue is that put forward by W. C. Smith, whose analysis of the theological problems involved in penetrating the spiritual dimension of other religions makes his work \textit{The Meaning and End of Religion} one of the most important contributions to contemporary studies in this area. Like Tillich, Smith recognizes the danger of not differentiating between the individual religious response and the corporate response of a religious tradition. But Smith's method of developing the implications of this problem is in many ways more radical and more sharply stated than Tillich's. Smith first attacks the whole concept of religion which has been the basis for

\textsuperscript{33}Ibid. p. 92.

\textsuperscript{34}Ibid. p. 97.
past studies of man's religious life. This concept, he rightly claims, "has neglected either the mundane or the transcendent element in what it has studied, and has been confused in so far as its concept has attempted to embrace both".\textsuperscript{35} Arguing that the term 'religion' has greatly contributed to this confusion because it is itself an inadequate and highly misleading term, Smith puts it aside in favour of two separate concepts, 'cumulative tradition' and 'faith', with the link between the two being the living person.\textsuperscript{36} The 'cumulative tradition', approximating what Tillich refers to as 'religious symbols', is described by Smith as "the entire mass of overt objective data...of the past religious life of the community in question...temples, scriptures, theological systems...anything that can be transmitted from one person, one generation, to another, and that the historian can observe".\textsuperscript{37} On the other hand, faith, as the personal 'inner religious experience', the 'dynamic inner life', beyond the traditional empirical historical facts, is not a spiritual quality that is open to the observer, be he an anthropologist, historian, philosopher, theologian or whatever. Faith, Smith suggests, is like love,

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid. p. 141.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid. p. 141.
"an inadequate but not absurd analogy". It is simply indescribable, so personal that a definition of it is not possible to give. "I myself have been at pains to stress", he writes, "that men's faith lies beyond that sector of their religious life that can be imparted to an outsider for his inspection. My concern is rather to devise an analysis to do justice to the unfathomability of that personal faith...to contrive a method that will not have prejudged, by the very shape of its concept, the aspect of man's life that it is proffered to handle". 38

Although in Smith's final judgment, there is no 'generic' or fixed faith, just 'your faith and mine', none-theless he builds a methodology whereby men at least can become aware of each others faiths. Like Tillich, Smith would first investigate the role that personal faith has played in the religious history of mankind. He looks for indications of this faith in art 39 (i.e. the Buddha image), in community (i.e. the sangha) 40 and in the traditional forms of the expression of faith in ritual and morality (i.e. the vinaya and dhamma), in other words for both intellec-tual and practical expressions of faith as they exist in the objective data of the cumulative tradition. By

38 Ibid. p. 154.
39 Ibid. p. 156.
40 Ibid. p. 158.
observing and understanding these items in an empirical manner, we can pick up clues as to the "personal and living quality of the men whose faith they have expressed". The question to be put to the 'faith' of another religious tradition is not, therefore, what it represents as a 'belief', as if the two terms of faith and belief were identical, but how the adherents of that tradition exhibit their faith in what they feel, in what they hope for, and in what they fear.

We can profit by observing the way Tillich and Smith have thought out the dimensions of this central theological dilemma, and from the instructive nature of their approaches. Assuming that they have sufficiently exposed the kinds of problems every student of comparative religion must wrestle with at one time or another, we can accept the soundness of their arguments and draw a conclusion to our first question. As we obviously cannot examine the faiths of each of the peoples of another religious tradition individually, therefore we have to look for an expression which will embrace something of the totality of their experience with at least partial adequacy. We could call this a cumulative tradition, a kerygmatic circle, a theological circle or a community theological circle. Or again, we could borrow from J. G. Arapura his expression 'sphere of the spirit' a term he in turn formulated from Hegel's phrase 'phenomenology of the spirit (geist)'.

In any case, whatever expression is used, it seems

41 Arapura, J. G. Religion as Anxiety and Tranquillity
evident that by itself it cannot greatly surpass the limits of phenomenology, in the sense that it can only incorporate cult, feelings, ideas, but not the ultimate religious truth or the vertical dimension of individual faith.

Both Tillich and Smith agree that we can observe and understand other religions from this horizontal level, and they have both looked to the phenomenological evidence of tradition and symbolism, of culture and history, as expressions of the experience of the holy. They recognize, as we must, that this is an important methodology, because too often the student of comparative religion is swamped with superficial philosophical generalities which have not been placed in an adequate cultural sitz im leben. They would concur with Alan Watts when he pointedly remarks "...almost all the modern literature on Buddhism (and other Eastern religions) treats of these subjects in a void with the barest minimum of reference to the larger background of Indian and Chinese culture. One gathers, therefore, that these disciplines are exportable units, like bales of rice and tea, and that Buddhism can be 'taken up' anywhere at anytime like baseball."42 This is clearly a fault that must be avoided, and one that Tillich and Smith have both carefully refrained

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They both further argue that we can progress beyond the point of delating particular theological issues and exegetical subtleties. But at this juncture they part company, for they differ substantially in their approaches to the possibility of penetrating the vertical dimension of other religions. Tillich, as we have seen, takes the more generous position that 'participation' through empathy with the 'spiritual power' of another religion is possible. Smith, on the other hand, argues that questions and answers of an ultimate nature are so embraced by the individual's faith, that the most we can hope to understand of the vertical aspect of another religion is how this individualistic faith is expressed in its impact on the cumulative tradition of a particular religion.

We have, then, two distinct judgments on the possibilities of penetrating the spiritual and mystical aspects of other theological circles or kerygmas. But we are not yet in a position whereby we can adjudicate whether we should be content to accept the limitations Smith has placed on our theological aspirations to touch the very heart of another religion, or whether we can accept without challenge Tillich's more optimistic approach. We realize that there is an obvious tension between these two conclusions that must eventually be resolved, but before we can do this, we need to proceed to our second point — to have a better understanding of what other ways are open to us as we seek to penetrate the maze of theological problems that prevent us from approaching the vertical dimension of other religions.
First, it is safe to say that theological problems in understanding will always arise to confuse and even prevent the pursuit of the truth of another religion by throwing up a smokescreen of complications which hides what is often the quite straight-forward simplicity of that searched-for truth. We must not allow ourselves, then, to become lost in this smokescreen, to become excessively engaged in the superficialities of another religion's theological doctrine and apologetics.

Nor should we be governed by our own tradition's apologetics (John 14:6 - "I am the way, the truth and the light; no one can come to the Father but by me"), or by the opposite reaction of naïve eclecticism. The smugness of the fundamentalist or haphazard approach of the syncretist too often denies any possibility of understanding another religion. Ninian Smart highlights the hollowness of these approaches when he writes: "to my mind, a trouble with apologetics is that it tends furiously to leap into the fray, without wondering what the rules of combat are. Conversely, the trouble with 'peaceable 'we-all-say-the-same-thing-at-the-bottom' approach is that it sleepily and too good-naturedly evades the question of what the rules of agreement are. No wonder that students of religions have hastily retreated into categories of facts; "Hinduism is thus and thus, and as for questions at the end about truth, well, gentlemen, they're
not my province".  

One approach that can be of considerable assistance to us in overcoming these problems is that proposed by J. G. Arapura. He argues for a definition of the phenomenological method which goes beyond the simple examination of straightforward, objective phenomena. His is, in fact, a phenomenological approach balanced by a philosophical understanding of the role of 'consciousness' in religion. Thus for him, the phenomenological method means two things. First, it is "the seeking and the finding of some element in human consciousness where religion may be demonstrated to repose terminally and finally as far as we can see", 44 and secondly, "it establishes the relations between religion thus located and its appearing to man and in civilization as a phenomenon". 45 It is 'consciousness', then, that has to be 'examined as a phenomenon', and it is 'consciousness' that is 'the primary focal point in the quest for religion's essence'. 46

Arapura commends Edmund Husserl for helping to bring consciousness to the forefront of phenomenological and philosophical investigation, and to some degree bases his thesis on two aspects of consciousness evident in Husserl's

44 Arapura, J. G. Religion as Anxiety and Tranquillity op cit. p. 42.
46 Ibid. p. 58.
phenomenology. This centres on the complex relationship that exists between consciousness and the act of 'reflection'. Husserl himself outlined the relationship by observing "it (reflection) is as we may also express it, the name we give to consciousness' own method for the knowledge of consciousness generally. But...in this very method (reflection) itself becomes the object of possible studies". Elaborating on this, Arapura writes:

Thus, two very important truths present themselves to us: (i) there is a first-order reflection, a spontaneous activity of consciousness directed towards itself as well as a second-order reflection, a methodological activity of consciousness initiated by the thinker. (ii) These two orders are connected, which is a fact that the methodological thinker must always bring to greater clarity. In the light of these truths it may be concluded that while it is quite legitimate for phenomenology to make consciousness as it apprehends everything in the world – all phenomena – as a prerequisite for the study of everything, it is obligated to itself to

47 Ibid. p. 59. Q. Lauer further identifies what phenomenologists mean by consciousness when he writes: "The consciousness with which the phenomenologist is here concerned, is not consciousness as a psychic function, in the way it is, for example, to the experimental psychologist. He is concerned with consciousness as a kind of being which things exercise, the only kind of being directly available to the investigator. Thus, for him, consciousness is best expressed by the German word "Bewusstsein", which means the kind of being an object has in being known." Phenomenology: Its Genesis and Prospect (New York: Harper Torchbook. 1955), p. 7.
reflect also on consciousness as it reflects upon itself...our hope is that by elucidating the concept of the first-order reflection of consciousness, upon itself by subjecting it to the second-order (methodological) reflection a rather novel possibility for the study of religion will be unfolded, which will be different from what phenomenologists of religion have hitherto developed. Accordingly, we seek to locate religion in the particular self-activity of consciousness...it is necessary that consciousness be made transparent to itself by removing all opacities that obstruct its self-disclosure...consciousness being subjected to this kind of study would reveal an intrinsic and inalienable character of it, which can be interpreted only by the key of religion.⁴⁸

Arapura further argues that one result of 'first-order reflection', of consciousness 'reflecting upon itself', is the arising of what he calls 'the sense of the wrongness of existence'. Such a sense of wrongness is not just 'ordinary discontent', but an interiorization of the forms of wrongness which are expressed by such notions as 'the absurd, nausea, alienation and angst'. "The sense of the wrongness of existence upon which a view of religion has to be based", he writes; "by the very nature of the case, cannot afford to be as specific as any of them but must be vague and general enough to comprehend all of them as it also receives confirmation of itself through their instrumentality".⁴⁹ In addition to a

⁴⁸Arapura, J. C. Religion as Anxiety and Tranquillity cit. p. 61.
⁴⁹Ibid. p. 64.
sense of wrongness, consciousness also reflects on an accompanying 'sense of the Absent'. Together, the sense of the wrongness of existence and the sense of the Absent lie at the heart of every religion. Consequently, Arapura argues, "they must be treated as the most general presentations of what in the course of the historical development of religion and thought based on it have become specific and have been bodied forth in specific types of existential awareness and specific formulations of Reality". 50

This understanding is an interesting and valuable one, for in seeking to go beyond a purely "methodological" phenomenology, it yet does not try to force an analysis of the transcendent, vertical aspect of religion. Rather, it looks for the forms in which this vertical dimension is expressed in terms of the consciousness a religious tradition or 'sphere of the spirit' manifests towards certain underlying human existential problems. The need is to find what forms these problems assume in such aspects of a religious tradition as its myth, doctrine or psychology. If the aim of the investigator is to make a comparative study of a particular existential problem faced by two different spheres of the spirit, he can perhaps best accomplish this aim by analyzing and comparing the 'consciousness' of the problem in one sphere with the expression of 'consciousness' in another religion and then the same problem.

50 Ibid. p. 67.
In my judgment, this kind of approach offers a sound potential for penetrating beyond the simple phenomenological level of other religions. By seeking to understand the 'consciousness' of another 'sphere of the spirit', we can seek to translate its philosophical, existential, mystical and spiritual experience of the transcendent into a context which is meaningful for our own (Western) consciousness. There is no hint of eclecticism in this procedure. We recognize the separateness and distinctiveness of the two circles or spheres of consciousness. But dialogue between these circles can be fruitful in that it forces the student to be much more subjective in his understanding of another circle.

Up to this point, we have had occasion to briefly review and analyze how Tillich and W. C. Smith have outlined for us what some of the major theological problems in understanding are, and how their analysis of these problems are useful for us as we come to grips with these same difficulties. We have further seen the insufficiency of the strictly historical, the phenomenological, the apologetic and eclectic approaches to these theological problems, and have settled on Arapura's combination of both a phenomenological and philosophical approach as being a method which is not open to the charge of being concerned only with the horizontal, nor to the claim that it guarantees an absolute penetration of the vertical.

But if there is any single theological problem which all of these methods have great difficulty in replying to, it
is how the vertical response of another tradition or sphere can be elicited from the literature of that sphere. This problem was raised when we considered historical problems in understanding, and it is one that we must now return to.

It is of course obvious that each religious tradition is enclosed in a system of language, and that our idea of what belongs to the realm of reality, and our whole perspective on the meaning of mystical experience, is to a large extent locked into language. When Tillich urges us, therefore, to 'participate in the spiritual power' of another religion, or when Smith asks that we discover the exhibition of faith in terms of 'feeling', 'hope' and 'fear', can we realistically expect to gain this understanding from the sacred texts of these other religions? How do we penetrate revelation as it is expressed in scripture? Or, in the context of this thesis, how can we expect to get behind the experience of painfulness and craving as it is set down in the Pāli Nikāyas?

This is an especially critical problem for the Western student as he tries to interpret the so-called paramattha (ultimate) or dhamma - language of the Pāli texts, and it is vital for us to familiarize ourselves with what Buddhist scholarship means by dhamma language. By this they refer to

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51 The concept of paramattha as 'truth in the ultimate sense' as distinguished from ordinary or conventional (sammuti) truth is strictly speaking developed in the commentaries, but it has roots in the distinction drawn in the Nikāyas between two types of Suttas - those that are nītattha ('of direct
the vertical theological meaning which lies behind ordinary (sammuti) Pali language. Many words which may appear to have a simple and straightforward meaning can be seen, therefore, to have a more subtle and abstract theological connotation when interpreted by the knowing reader. Thus, for example, such a noun as 'jāti' (birth) should be understood as not just the physical birth of the individual, but as his continuous involvement with his ego, an involvement which constantly gives birth to a sense of 'I'. Similarly, the noun 'punabhava' (rebirth) can be interpreted from the paramattha perspective.

Writs Buddhadasa concerning this word:

In everyday language birth in the beastly realm means an actual, physical birth as a pig, dog or some other animal. Rebirth after death as some kind of lower animal is the ordinary meaning of rebirth into the realm of beasts. In Dhamma language it has a different meaning, however. At any moment that one acts with animal stupidity, or bestiality, one is born into the realm of beasts. It happens here and now. One may be born as a beast many times over in a single day. In Dhamma language, therefore, birth as a beast means stupidity or bestiality.

How are we to recognize this dhamma - language which lies behind the teaching of the Buddha? Two attitudes in meaning') and those that are neyyatha ('of indirect meaning') (cf. A.1.60f.). cf. also Jayatilleke, K. N. Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge. op cit. p. 361f.; Murti, T. R. V. The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. op cit. p. 250f., and the article on paramattha in the Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary (London: Luzac Co. Ltd. 1966), p. 420.

particular seem necessary. For one, we have first to have some idea of what the bondage to the wheel of life means to the Buddhist, how and why he is determined in this wheel by a ceaseless process of craving, and what the possibilities for his escape from endless rebirth into freedom are. This we can gain to a certain extent from a knowledge of what the Pāli texts say to us about these conditions. Here we see how the texts speak in the theological language of its time and historical setting. But when we look at the texts with an hermeneutical eye, we can see that interpretation of this language demands something more than just being able to say 'the Buddhist world view is thus-and-so, and its soteriology, such-and-such'. Clearly, a second, more profound attitude is needed. We have seen that Paul Tillich calls for a sense of participation in relation to the subject matter of a text. A contemporary of his, Rudolf Bultmann, says somewhat the same thing when he urges that we approach exegesis with a certain 'life-relation' to the text. Such an approach, it may be countered, has a measure of presupposition to it that could misinterpret the authentic 'inside' view of, for example, the Buddhist dhamma, by forcing upon it an external 'outside' view that is not of the same 'sphere of the spirit', that has concepts which are quite different from the internal dhamma itself. But although Bultmann agrees that there is no exegesis without presuppositions, he prefers to speak of this kind of exegetical understanding as 'preunderstanding'. 'It as little involves prejudices', he writes:
as does the choice of a perspective. For the historical picture is falsified only when the exegete takes his pre-understanding as a definitive understanding. The "life-relation" is a genuine one, however, only when it is vital, i.e. when the subject matter with which the text is concerned also concerns us and is a problem for us. If we approach history alive with our own problems, then it really begins to speak to us.\textsuperscript{53}

What Bultmann says about history can surely also be applied to the approach we take to the literature of other theological circles. The \textit{dhamma} language of the Buddhists is not some mysterious hocus pocus of a superhuman mahatma. In it is isolated the central theological experience of Gotama, and the challenge of touching upon this truth is open to us, if we are prepared to become experientially involved with the \textit{dhamma} language, to 'participate', to have a 'life-relation' with it.

Even apart from the question of how we should interpret the transcendent dimension of the \textit{dhamma} language, I feel that this experiential aspect is where our own theological tradition can prepare us to understand the early Buddhist theological circle. We have to see that the way problems of ultimate theological concern are expressed will be different in each religion; but if we are at least sensitive to this experience of concern in our own religious traditions, then we might be better able to perceive it in other traditions. As

we shall see, this is especially important as one comes to encounter the vertical dimension of that Buddhist expression which embraces the totality of its creed - The Four Noble Truths. Unless one attempts to become experientially sympathetic to these truths, they become just another formula with no particular existential depth or profundity. The spiritual dimension of Buddhism to a large extent can only be revealed by the exacting experiential demands of these truths.\(^{54}\)

We know that words cannot describe the meaning and truth revealed by this experiential encounter. But as we can only strive to communicate with each other through this frequently unsatisfactory medium of language, we have therefore to be satisfied with the cogency and feelings we can hope to express in our analysis of Buddhist theological problems and our interpretation of the dhamma language. As Arapura has remarked, "whether such a thing as pure thought exists, and whether it can be used to transcend language and logic only raises interesting but irresolvable questions".\(^{55}\)

The fact is that to be practical about the problem, the paramattha or vertical dimension of Buddhist experience and

\(^{54}\)cf. also Swearer, D. K. Secrets of the Lotus (New York: Macmillan Co. Ltd. 1971), p. 10, who writes concerning one of his students in a meditation class at Oberlin in 1969: "although her academic study of Buddhism was important to the conclusions she reached, their authority rested largely on her experience".

\(^{55}\)Arapura, J. G. 'Spirituality Eastern and Western'. op cit. Lecture X.
revelation still has to be largely expressed in sammuti, or everyday ordinary language.

But Arapura has raised an important philosophical issue when he asks whether such a thing as 'pure thought' transcends the barriers of each kerygma. This is a third question for us to struggle with. It is also an important theological problem, because the answer we give to it will undoubtedly reflect whether we think the vertical dimension of another religion is penetrable or not.

There are many ways this question can be asked: are what seem to be 'spheres of the spirit' really hemispheres, needing only to be brought together to form one sphere? Although 'theological circles' may be closed in their periphery, are they open in their depths? Is there a spiritual nucleus behind the vertical dimension of each religion which is essentially the same?

One does not have to be a mystic to think that other theological circles are open in their depths. We have already seen how Tillich, for example, looks for the point in a religion where it 'breaks through' its particularity, and assumes 'a spiritual freedom', and a 'vision' of what other expressions of ultimate concern and meaning are besides those of our own theological circle. Yet Tillich is not presupposing anything but the fact that there is common ground between religions. He is saying that the circles are open in their depths, but their depths are not necessarily the same. Thus he writes:
None of the various elements which constitute the meaning of the holy are ever completely lacking in any genuine experience of the holy, and, therefore, in any religion. But this does not mean that a fusion of the Christian and the Buddhist idea of God is possible, nor does it mean that one can produce a common denominator by depriving the conflicting symbols of their concreteness. 56

There are scholars, however, who are more syncretistic in their search for this common ground. Rudolf Otto is perhaps the most celebrated example, for it is his conviction that the mystical dimension of each religion displays the single phenomenon of the mysterium tremendum, the 'numinous' experience. This feature, he admits, is not easy to describe, in that it is "wholly other...that which is quite beyond the sphere of the usual, the intelligible, and the familiar...and is contrasted with it, filling the mind with blank wonder and amazement". It is furthermore not something that can be taught, but must be 'awakened from the spirit'. 57 Otto is convinced, however, that despite the inexpressible nature of the numinous, it is a similar phenomenon for whoever experiences it, be he Sankara or Eckhart. What is true of the spirit in one sphere must also be true in all spheres, and such obstacles as different ways of thinking, and forms of language and logic, are really quite incidental. So he writes, "whether the flower

56 Tillich, P. Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions. op cit. p. 67.

of mysticism blooms in India or China, in Persia or on the Rhine... its fruit is one." 58

It is easy to be critical of Otto, for he often carelessly uses such ambiguous and thoroughly western theological terms such as 'soul', 'grace', and 'salvation' when he approaches the eastern religious traditions. By further trying to purge the experience of the mysterium of cultural and conceptual context, he ignores the fact that all philosophers and sages are conditioned by events in a certain era of space and time, and that the thinking of the individual philosopher or sage cannot avoid a continuity with that of his particular religious heritage or even his society. But whatever our objections might be of Otto's syncretistic proposal, we must realize the importance of his contribution to the study of this problem in comparative religion, especially in regard to his understanding of the broad dimension of the idea of the holy, and to his descriptive theological terminology.

In many ways, the Buddhist scholar Buddhadasa approaches other theological circles from Otto's perspective, as is suggested when he argues that "if a person has penetrated to the fundamental nature of religion, he will regard all religions as essentially similar". 59 This may appear to be as extreme a view as Otto's, but Buddhadasa does not, I think, mean it to be either extreme or eclectic. He seems,

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59 Buddhadasa, Towards the Truth. op cit. p. 88.
rather, to share more with Tillich the sense that although the heart of each theological circle may appear to be the same, in fact the 'sameness' is only in the nature of the problems they strive to resolve. He urges us, therefore, to recognize that all religions share two characteristic features: on the one hand, an understanding of the 'human condition' and the necessity of 'overcoming evil', and on the other hand, the 'nature of ultimate reality' which transcends any attempt to dichotomize or conceptualize. By recognizing that each theological circle has a basic common denominator in the problem of evil, however it may express this problem, and that its soteriological *sumnum bonum*, be it *nirvana* or the Godhead in Trinity, is in the final sense inexpressible, Buddhadasa violates none of the integrity which surrounds a given religion. He simply points out that penetration of another theological circle, even to its very heart, is possible for one who has first penetrated his own theological circle.

Other scholars have approached this critical problem with a much more pronounced sensitivity to the separateness of the eastern and western vertical responses to questions of ultimate religious truth. Arapura, for example, emphasizes the absolute distinctiveness and uniqueness of the eastern and western spheres of the spirit, arguing that a single phenomenology of the spirit is not a valid philosophical enterprise. But Arapura has a purpose behind this conviction that seemingly similar phenomena and concepts must be situated
in their 'total phenomenological contexts'. He realizes that this attitude may suggest that dialogue between two spheres 'is impossible beyond the mere act of demonstrating differences'. And yet this is precisely the point he wishes to bring the problem to, for, as he argues, this is the point where all easy-going presuppositions have been demolished. Using Nietzsche's proclamation that 'God is dead' as an analogy, which as Buber says is 'only a starting point, not an end point' in a new quest for God, what seems like a terminal point must be the beginning. This beginning, then, must be an assertion of freedom.\(^{60}\) And, as we have seen, Arapura strives to meet this problem by advocating that the 'consciousness' these spheres have for certain common existential problems is the place to begin dialogue. 'Consciousness', then, becomes for Arapura the philosophical point of departure, and the moment when penetration of the vertical dimension of each sphere becomes a possibility.

Any conclusions to this third question of whether theological circles are open in their depths are obviously open to a wide range of interpretation. My own judgment is that this transcendent aspect of other religions is at least partially open to the thoughtful outsider, provided that to some extent he is willing to involve himself experientially with the soteriological aims of another religion. As long as one is not totally rigid in the defence of the uniqueness of his own theological circle, the fact that through his...

\(^{60}\)Arapura, J. G. 'Spirituality Eastern and Western. op cit. Lecture X;
understanding of his own circle, he has some established idea of why men need religious hope and guidance is of great assistance to him when he comes to compare the source for this need as it is demonstrated in the various religions of man. This person may well come to the conclusion that theological circles do interconnect, and that one ultimate truth of the meaning of existence is not confined to any one circle.

Having now considered three aspects of the central issue of whether we can penetrate the theological circle of other religious traditions, we can summarize our findings, and draw these conclusions:

1. For one, as W. C. Smith has so carefully argued, we have to be aware that the transcendent dimension of an individual's 'faith' is not open to the outside investigator, but that the expression of this transcendent experience may be examined in the cultural, historical and theological deposit of a particular religion.

2. Secondly, we have always to keep in mind the limitations of language, logic and ways of thinking as we approach circles outside of our own.

3. Thirdly, our 'outside' view of the vertical dimension of another religion must be recognized as such, and must not be allowed to superimpose itself on the inside view, which however foreign or remote, is still the authentic one.

4. Fourthly, then, every religion or theological circle must acknowledge the distinctiveness and separateness of its own religious convictions, and those of other circles. This
does not mean, however, that dialogue is impossible between the different circles. Thus we can admit, fifthly, that the experiential encounter we have had with our own religious tradition can be meaningful in helping us seek out a common humanness, what Tillich has called the 'ultimate concern' of other religions, and Arapura the consciousness of a sense of 'the wrongness of existence'.

Finally, then, it can be argued that although theological circles are not hemispheres needing only to be brought together as one circle, neither are they circles which do not interconnect in some places. The vertical dimension of another religion is at least partially open to the sympathetic outsider who cares to 'participate' in the existential experience of that religion.

Up to this point, we have reviewed a number of theological problems in understanding religious traditions outside of our own. Apart from opening our minds to the general question of how to approach the transcendent aspect of other faiths, this discussion is also useful for two other reasons. On the one hand, as we come to discuss the specific issue of how to penetrate the central Buddhist conative experience of craving and its relationship to painfulness, we will have a better idea of possible avenues of approach and methods of understanding this experience. On the other hand, this knowledge also helps prepare us to judge the sufficiency of those studies in early Buddhism which have aimed in one way
or another to elucidate the central problem of craving.

We want now to look at these two questions in particular. First we should have some idea of the kind of research already done in this field of Buddhist conation, and see where the strengths and weaknesses of other approaches lie. Then secondly, we must set down our own outline and method of dealing with the phenomenon and experience of craving in this thesis.
PREVIOUS STUDIES THAT HAVE CENTRED ON THE PROBLEM OF CRAVING IN EARLY BUDDHISM

Western studies in the Buddhist concept of craving and related conative issues actually began as early as 1819, when Buddhism made its first noticeable impact on European thought in the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer, whose psychology of 'will' is remarkably like that of the Buddhist concept of \textit{tanḥā} (craving). Although it is easy to be critical of Schopenhauer's modest knowledge of Buddhist teachings (he never had recourse to much canonical material),

\footnote{Schopenhauer proposed that the ultimate reality was \textit{Ωλγα} (will, impulse, striving) rather than \textit{βουλής} (the capacity to determine).}

\footnote{Schopenhauer identifies 23 books on Buddhism he was familiar with by 1854 (cf. 2nd. German edition of \textit{Ueber den Willen in der Natur} (p. 119-120)(409-410). It is interesting that in this list, only one work (The Kangyur, a Tibetan book almost identical in subject and text to the Kevaddha Sutta of the \textit{Dīgha Nikāya}) was textually based on the Buddhist Canon. The rest of the actual Buddhist texts cited are two unidentified books with Latin translation by Spiegel, Foucaux's translation of the \textit{Lalitavistara}, and \textit{The Mahāvamsa}. All other works listed in this reference were contemporary interpretations of Buddhism, including Burnouf's famous \textit{Introduction a L'Histoire du Bouddhisme} (1844) and Upham's \textit{Doctrine of Buddhism} (1829). But the two studies which appealed to Schopenhauer most were Spence Hardy's \textit{Eastern Monachism} (1850) and his \textit{Manual of Buddhism} (1853). Of these works, he writes 'these two excellent books, written after a stay of twenty years in Ceylon and from oral instruction of the priests there, have given me more insight into the true nature of the Buddhist dogma than have any others'.}
he nonetheless had for his era a remarkably good grounding in Indian philosophy, which he initially built on a careful digestion of the Upaniṣads.\textsuperscript{63} He was especially fascinated with the Indian concept of mayā (which he defined as "the inward moving force of the corporeal world"), and later by the more explicitly Buddhist connotations of the words samsāra and tanhā. His single most important thought came to be very Buddhistic, that "the will-to-live" is "the being-in-itself" of the world.\textsuperscript{64} Its nature is thirst or craving.

\textsuperscript{63}In 1813, Schopenhauer obtained a copy of Anguetil-Duperon's excellent Latin translation of a carefully edited Persian version of the Upaniṣads, The Oupnek'hat.

\textsuperscript{64}Schopenhauer shared with the Buddha a similar approach to the question of what the world is "in-itself". Both agreed that any "thing-in-itself" is not part of a "back-stage" structure of the world, as is proposed by, for example, both the Advaita Vedānta of Sankara and E. Kant. Schopenhauer would have acknowledged with the Buddha that phenomena are only khandā, or aggregates, the immediate appearance of things "in themselves and by themselves". They are only momentary, subject to continuous interdependent arising (paticcassamuppāda) without any first cause. Schopenhauer frequently speaks of the "existentia fluxa" of phenomena (i.e. Parerga and Paralipomena II, p. 315. #147), of a chain of cause and effects (i.e. The World as Will and Representation. I. pp. 177, 178; P. P. II., pp. 265, 315; #147 or #144): "In such a world where there is not stability of any kind, no lasting state is possible but everything is involved in a restless rotation and change, where everyone hurries along and keeps erect on a tight rope by always advancing and moving, happiness is not even conceivable". For Schopenhauer, it is the will that becomes the "thing-in-itself" and "the kernel of all phenomena". All quotations from Schopenhauer above are from the translations of E. F. J. Payne, W.W.K., I and II (New York: Dover Publications, 1966).
and therefore painfulness. Consequently, the essential thrust of his philosophy is liberation from suffering by "the denial of the will-to-live". This alone is "the road to salvation".65 Because Schopenhauer came so close to perceiving the very nucleus of the Buddhist dhamma in his interpretation of Buddhist conative psychology, it is prudent if we outline his concept of 'will' with some care. In several of his works, he gives the impression that the logic of his philosophy is based on the Buddhist formulation of the Four Noble Truths (whether this was intentional or not is a question which is beyond the scope of this paper). A number of passages are structured on his interpretation of pain, the cause of this pain, the possibility of its cessation and the 'road to salvation'. Thus, for example, we read this about the nature of pain:

The life of every individual, viewed as a whole and in general, and when only its most significant features are emphasized, is really a tragedy; but gone through in detail it has the character of a comedy. For the doings and worries of the day, the restless mockeries of the moment, the desires and fears of the week, the mishaps of every hour, are all brought about by chance that is always bent on some mischievous trick; they are nothing but scenes from a comedy. The never-fulfilled wishes, the frustrated efforts, the hopes mercilessly blighted by fate, the unfortunate mistakes of the whole life, with increasing suffering and death at the end, always gives us a tragedy. Thus, as if fate wished to add mockery to the misery of our

65 'The road to salvation' is also the title of Chap. 49 in The World as will and Representation, II. op cit.
existence, our life must contain all the woes of tragedy, and yet we cannot even assert the dignity of tragic characters, but, in the broad detail of life, are inevitably the foolish characters of a comedy. Now, however much great and small worries fill up human life, and keep it in constant agitation and restlessness, they are unable to mask life's inadequacy to satisfy the spirit; they cannot conceal the emptiness and superficiality of existence, or exclude boredom which is always ready to fill up every pause granted by care. The result of this is that the human mind, still not content with the cares, anxieties and preoccupations laid upon it by the actual world, creates for itself an imaginary world in the face of a thousand and different superstitions. Then it sets itself to work with this in all kinds of ways, and wastes time and strength on it, as soon as the real world is willing to grant it the peace and quiet to which it is not in the least responsive.

Schopenhauer then develops his celebrated philosophy of "will" as the cause of this pain. Two passages in particular can give us an idea of how significant this concept was in his philosophy:

We have already seen in nature without knowledge her inner being as a constant striving without aim and without rest, and this stands out much more distinctly when we consider the animal or man. Willing and striving are its whole essence, and can be fully compared to an unquenchable thirst. The basis of all willing, however, is need, lack and hence pain, and by its very nature and origin it is therefore destined to pain.

66 Ibid. p. 322f. (#58).
67 Ibid. p. 311f. (#57).
Again, in *World as Will and Representation* he writes:

This great intensity of willing is in and by itself and directly a constant source of suffering, firstly because all willing as such springs from want, and hence from suffering. Secondly, because, through the causal connection of things, most desires remain unfulfilled, and the will is much more often crossed than satisfied. Consequently, much intense willing always entails much intense suffering. For all suffering is simply nothing but unfulfilled and thwarted willing. Now a person filled with an extremely intense pressure of will wants with burning eagerness to accumulate everything, in order to slake the thirst of egoism.\(^68\)

The possibility of cessation from pain is clearly evident to Schopenhauer if only the 'will-to-live' can be neutralized:

It follows from all that has been said, that the denial of the will-to-live, which is the same as what is called complete resignation or holiness, always proceeds from that quieter of the will; and this is the knowledge of its inner conflict and its essential vanity, expressing themselves in the suffering of all that lives.\(^69\)

This is indeed "the road to salvation":

And we know that these moments, when delivered from the fierce pressure of the will, we emerge, as it were, from the heavy atmosphere of the earth, are the most blissful that we experience. From this we can infer how blessed must be the life of a man whose will is silenced not for a few moments... but for ever, indeed completely extinguished, except for the last glimmering spark that maintains the body.


and is extinguished with it. Such a man who, after many bitter struggles with his own nature has at last completely conquered, is then left only as a pure knowing being, as the undimmed mirror of the world. Nothing can distress or alarm him anymore; nothing can any longer move him; for he has cut all the thousand threads of willing which hold us bound to the world, and which, as craving, fear, envy, and anger, drag us here and there in constant pain. He now looks back calmly and with a smile on the phantasmagoria of this world which was once able to move him and to agonize even his mind, but now stands before him as indifferently as chess-men at the end of a game.\footnote{Ibid. p. 390 (\#68).}

From the evidence of these passages, we can determine that it is with some considerable justification that Schopenhauer's philosophy of 'will' can be compared with the Buddhist concept of \textit{tanha}. But although Schopenhauer often referred to the wisdom of the Buddha and his noble truths, it was not his intention to engage in any specific comparative religious studies. Schopenhauer evidently interpreted the central problem of the Buddhist \textit{dhamma} as an issue of conative \textit{psychology}, but his contribution to western Buddhist scholarship ends here. It was still, of course, a monumental service to Buddhist studies in the West, and was doubtless responsible for introducing at least some idea of what the nature of Buddhist psychology was to Europe still very much in the dark about the mysteries of eastern thought.

However, because these reflections of Buddhist doctrine
were so carefully embedded in Schopenhauer's own philosophy, in many ways his representation of Buddhist thought provoked an inadequate understanding of what the Buddha taught about dukkha and tanhā. Very quickly, Schopenhauer's metaphysics and psychology, and therefore the Buddha's, came to be identified with pessimism. There is no question that an element of pessimism did feature significantly in Schopenhauer's thought, and that it is possible to read a similar philosophy of life into the teachings of the Buddha, as Schopenhauer did when he wrote:

At bottom, optimism is the unwarranted self-praise of the real author of the world, namely of the will-to-live which complacently mirrors itself in its work. Accordingly optimism is not only a false but pernicious doctrine, for it presents life as a desirable state of man's happiness as its aim and object. Starting from this, everyone then believes he has the most legitimate claim to happiness and enjoyment. If, as usually happens, these do not fall to his lot, he believes that he suffers an injustice, in fact, that he misses the whole point of his existence; whereas it is far more correct to regard work, privation, misery, and suffering, crowned by death, as the aim and object of our life (as is done by Brahmanism and Buddhism, and also by genuine Christianity), since it is these that lead to the denial of the will-to-live.71

But many have misunderstood what Schopenhauer meant by 'pessimism', and failed to grasp that his use of the word does not condemn either his philosophy, or the Buddha's, to an

71Ibid. II. p. 584.
eternal gloominess. On the contrary, Schopenhauer fully accepted the possibilities of liberation and complete freedom for he who saw the limitations of the world and the will. The vehicle for this enlightenment, he claimed, was a pessimistic attitude towards the possibility of expecting salvation from this world. Commenting on this aspect of Schopenhauer's philosophy, one scholar remarks:

His standpoint on pessimism is deduced from the immanent structure of the world, and how it refers to the 'worldliness of the world' exclusively, or to the nature of samsara. This Buddhist term was adopted by Schopenhauer explicitly in his deduction of the basic idea that pessimism in this connection is the indispensable motive for urging the human mind on the path of liberation... in the literal meaning of the term nibbānam - as extinction, and not as a 'realm' of 'divine' happiness for the hedonist wretch, for whose sake the opposite theory of 'optimism' was invented, and introduced previously by the European court philosopher, Leibniz.72

After the initial exploratory work by Schopenhauer, the subject of Buddhist conative psychology lay virtually untouched until 1897, when Mrs. C. A. F. Rhys Davids wrote one of her best essays, "On the Will in Buddhism".73 This time, the subject of Buddhist conative and motivational psychology was in the hands of a scholar who had at her fingertips

72 Nanajivako, Bhikkhu. "Selected passages from Parerga and Paralipomena". Schopenhauer and Buddhism (Kandy: B.P.S. 1970)

the complete Pāli Canon. The main emphasis of her paper is that the languages which have grown up with the traditions of western philosophy "do not afford equivalents for Oriental standpoints", and that this is especially serious when one approaches "the Buddhist attitude in relation to the volitional side of the human mind". Furthermore, even for those who are familiar with the Indian languages, not enough care, she insists, is being exercised in distinguishing between psychological words which have closely parallel but not exactly synonymous meanings. She then proposes that scholars make one fundamental discrimination to overcome these obstacles. They should differentiate between terms that connote volition "from a psychological import only" (i.e. *viriyām* - striving), and those that have "an ethical or moral implication" (i.e. *tanha* - craving), and be further careful not to use a term of 'psychological import' which does not denote ethical values, for those Pāli words "which in themselves convey, or are explicitly qualified as conveying, a meaning that is morally blameworthy". "For instance", she continues, "a comparison of the translations made by such scholars as Burnouf, Foucaux, Max Müller, Fausböll, Oldenberg and Warren with the originals, discloses the striking fact that the one English word "desire" is made to do duty for no less than seventeen Pāli words, not one of which means desire in its ordinary sense, but rather that of perverted, morbid, excessive desire".

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Mrs. Rhys Davids then points out that when the Pāli Canon wishes to convey ethical values in terms of volition, either distinct and special words are used, or else the term volition is explicitly qualified as referring to an object of perverted desire or to "a morbid state of will". Thus want or wish (ākankhā) becomes craving (tanha), want or desire (chanda) becomes lust (chandarāgo), love (kāma) becomes lust (kāmarāgo) or sensual delight (nandirāgo).

By pointing out how complicated an issue "will" was in the Nikāyas, and how inconsistent most western interpreters of the Buddhist texts are when it comes to translating Pāli words related to the general concept of 'willing' (cetanā, viriyām, tanha, etc.), Mrs. Rhys Davids has made an important cautionary statement. But from our point of view, the real contribution of her essay is in her argument that will as such, desire as such, are not to be repressed, but that the culture and development of them are "absolutely indispensable to any advance towards the attainment of Buddhist ideals". Here she lashes out against Schopenhauer and all other critics whom she suspects of imprinting Buddhism with the distasteful and misleading stamp of pessimism.

The stony, stultified, self-centred apathy we often hear ascribed to the Buddhist ideal is supposed to be the result of a Schopenhauerian pessimism as to the worth and promise of life and the springs of life. If, however,
the critic would dwell more on the positive tendencies in Buddhist ethics, he might discern under the outward calm or mien of the Buddhist sage in literature and art, a passion of emotion and will not paralyzed or expurgated, but rendered subservient to and diffused around deep faith and high hope. 77

by arguing that neither will, nor aspiration, nor 'the preciousness of life' can be said to be repressed in Buddhism, Mrs. Rhys Davids shows that as a psychology, Buddhism seeks "to foster and strengthen aspiration and resolve in the effort to persevere towards complete attainment of what it held to be the noblest kind of life". 78 These are significant conclusions, and ones we will want to elaborate on more fully in chapter four of this thesis.

It need be said for now that, although we owe much to the comprehensive research of Mrs. Rhys Davids on the subject of Buddhist conative psychology, her subsequent work in this field, notably in The Birth of Indian Psychology and Its Development in Buddhism is not very useful for us. This is chiefly because it tends to become focussed on the more advanced psychology of the Abhidhamma Pitaka, and not the earlier expression of this conative psychology as found in the Sutta Pitaka.


78 Mrs. Rhys Davids supports this claim with references to M.1.480, where 'conversion' is noted to consist of a sequence of trust, desire (chando), zeal (ussāho), pondering (tulana), struggle (padhānam), endurance (thāma), effort (viriya) and
Apart from the fruitful work of both C. A. F. Rhys Davids and her husband, early Buddhist conative psychology was not comprehensively researched in the early part of this century. Many of the standard texts of this time, such as Oldenberg's *Buddha: His life, His doctrine, His order* (1882), were of course aware of the psychological message contained in the *dhamma*, but did not pursue the psychology of Buddhist soteriology to any pronounced depth. The same can be said even of such a classic psychological study of religion as William James' *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902). James had little introduction to the wisdom of the East, as his scanty references to both Hinduism and Buddhism testify. But he did have some idea of the psychology of the Buddhist *dhamma*, and argued that its "pessimistic element" marks it as a well 'developed' religion of deliverance, in that, like Christianity, it taught that "man must die to an unreal life before he can be born into the real life (i.e. the 'second birth')". But other than a few isolated remarks of this

energy (*parakkama*). Many other references can also be given to substantiate this judgment. cf. Chapter 4 below.

79 T. W. Rhys Davids' research on Pāli psychological terminology is an especially valuable contribution to this subject, cf. relevent definitions in the *P.T.S. Dictionary* or *cit.*


81 ibid. p. 308.
nature, and one interesting paragraph on Buddhist meditative practices, James' treatment of Buddhist psychology is uneventful.

Aside from the odd article, it was not until the First World War that any real contribution outside of Mrs. Rhys Davids' research was made to the study of Buddhist conative psychology. In 1915, however, George Grimm began to publish a series of books on the subject, the best of which is his truly profound *The Doctrine of the Buddha*. In this work, Grimm takes up again the Schopenhauerian concept of the will as being the central issue of Buddhist soteriology. Unlike Mrs. Rhys Davids, Grimm has a far deeper and more positive understanding of Schopenhauer's philosophy, and with consummate skill he supplies the Nikāya texts to support much of Schopenhauer's thesis. Somewhat as Mrs. Rhys Davids does when she makes a division between volition as 'psychological' or 'ethical', Grimm develops the doctrine of the will in Buddhism by observing it from two levels. On the one hand, will acts as if it were determined by consideration and reflection. On the other hand, it acts as inclination, making itself felt in spite of consideration and reflection. This kind of will, Grimm argues, is thirst

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84 Grimm, G. *Buddhist Wisdom. The Mystery of the Self* (Santa Barbara: The Buddhist Press. 1930).
(tanḥā), and an understanding of this reveals the very heart of the Buddhist soteriological message. So he writes:

Just as physiological thirst is not dependent on our arbitrary choice, in the same way we see the thirst for existence and well-being that animates us, ever and again, well up out of us with irresistible might, so much so, that instead of its being subject to the domination of our reason, that is, of our cognition, without ceremony it forces this latter into its own service... The word tanḥā, thirst, is identical with what Schopenhauer designates as will, thus consciously amplifying the normal content of this conception, where only "will led by cognition, and expressing itself under the guidance of reason" is understood. Thus the Buddha already had penetrated the identity of the essence of every striving and operating force in nature whatever with will. Therefore he created a special word (tanḥā) to designate the conception of this genus, in contrast to the species of volition in its narrower sense.84

This kind of will leads directly to frustration and painfulness, so that the relationship between tanḥā and dukkha is one of a cyclical embrace of cause and effect leading ever on to more pain:

Everything occurring to us and in us is willing. We will to see, to hear, to smell, to touch, to think - of course, pleasant things only - or what is the same thing, we wish to generate within

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us a pleasant consciousness in the form of the sensation of pleasant objects, which consciousness is the sole object of the activities of the senses. But consciousness aroused in the end always disappoints expectations; suffering ultimately predominates every time; the painful impressions of consciousness are far more numerous and also more intense than the pleasant ones. Thereby new willing is excited within us, namely, the desire to or will to know the causes of those unpleasant impressions of consciousness and how to eliminate them, so that only the pleasant ones may remain. This willing also always remains unsatisfied; we never succeed in finding out beyond question the cause of suffering.\footnote{Ibid. p. 262.}

The soteriological emphasis of Buddhism is, however, to recognize the limitations of our conative volition, to see that \textit{tanha} is not only a conscious but an unconscious volitional force. Once one realizes the perpetually unsatisfied character of willing, then a new kind of willing arises: "to seek for the deepest and last cause of all suffering no longer outside but inside ourselves; that means, to ascertain whether this last cause may not be contained in our former willing itself, which in its totality exhibits itself as the thirst for the world that fills us".\footnote{Ibid. p. 267.} This is the 'pure will' or 'the will for pure insight' that Grimm argues is 'the aim of the holy way' in Buddhist meditation.

The significance of Grimm's study lies in the fact that he has raised the study of the \textit{dhamma} beyond that of a
strictly clinical psychological approach in that, like
Schopenhauer, he also wrestles with the philosophical and
existential dimension of painfulness and above all, craving.
His work is, therefore, an important contribution not only to
studies in Buddhist conative psychology, but also to Buddhist
soteriology. The fact that almost all of his textual refer-
ences are situated in the Sutta Pitaka, and that they are
both intelligently translated and interpreted, makes this
work a valuable one for our study of the early Buddhist con-
cept of craving.

More recent examinations of early Buddhist psychology
tend to be Abhidhamma orientated, but there are some excep-
tions. K. N. Jayatilleke's Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge
(1963) offers some insights into Nikaya psychology, though
predominantly from a cognitive and empirical viewpoint. Else-
where (Buddhism and Peace, 1969; Buddhism and Science, 1958;
Facets of Buddhist Thought, 1971) he ventures into short dis-
cussions of motivation and behaviour in Buddhist psychology,
but the modest size of these works prevents him from offering
much more than a peripheral examination of the subject.

The same can be said of E. R. Sarathchandra's The
Buddhist Psychology of Perception (1958). He develops in
detail the physiology of sense perception in early Buddhism,
and then only towards the end of his work offers a brief
philosophical basis for the Buddhist theory of perception.
But Sarathchandra does at least develop and argue with some
care the fact that the Buddha's soteriology was practical and personal. He notes that the origin of painfulness from sense-cognition is everywhere apparent in the Nikāyas. Yet the individual should also perceive that above all else his consciousness is just one of those causal relations obtaining in the physical world. He argues that the reduction of consciousness to mere phenomena, and the elimination of the self in the sense in which it is generally understood is the whole aim of the Buddhist psychology of perception.\(^87\) This is 'insight', which, Sarathchandra writes, "is different from normal sense-consciousness, by the help of which (insight) one is able to intuitively grasp the nature of reality."\(^88\)

Another recent study which also deals in part with Buddhist conative psychology is bhikkhu Ānānanda's Concept and Reality (1971).\(^89\) In this useful piece of research on the concept of pāpañca (illusion, or the process of conceptual proliferation), Ānānanda is able to demonstrate from the Pāli texts the close relationship between the experience of tanhā and the psychological state of pāpañca (illusion, or the process of conceptual proliferation). He argues that craving is largely provoked through failure to see the truth about flux.


\(^{88}\)Ibid. p. 100.

\(^{89}\)Ānānanda, Bhikkhu. Concept and Reality in Early Buddhism (Kandy: B.P.S. 1971).
In itself, this is not a novel argument, but where Nanananda is of particular interest is in his observation that in later Buddhist literature, tanhā and papaṇca come to have a virtually synonymous meaning.\(^{90}\)

Despite the merit of these several works, there is little question that the most reliable contemporary work to date on early Buddhist conative psychology is Rune Johansson's article on "Citta, Mano and Viññāna"\(^{91}\) and his subsequent book The Psychology of Nirvāṇa. Johansson uses the tools and terminology of modern western psychology only in as much as it is necessary to define the structure of personality, but his research on the function of the 'personality factors' which make up the individual is thorough. The unique contribution of his work is his theory of 'consciousness' in the formula of patiñcasamuppāda. He sees 'consciousness' as more than just viññāna. Consciousness consists, rather, of a 'process' of factors including internal and external material (nāmarūpā), the six sense modalities (salayātana), stimulation (phassa), feeling (vedanā) and desire (his preferred translation of tanhā).

Of crucial soteriological importance is his argument that tanhā as conation be included in a process of consciousness which is otherwise 'cognitive' in structure. In other words, because of the inclusion of tanhā, the process of consciousness

\(^{90}\)Ibid. p. 108.

has contained within it a deeper role of intention.

The Nikāyas see tanhā as a complex issue, however. On the one hand, it is seen as part of the process of consciousness. On the other hand, it can be argued that it has certain roots (the āsavā, arūṣaya, akusālamūla) deep in the unconscious. An understanding of the dynamics of tanhā demands a knowledge of where tanhā receives its energy, where and how it arises, and the various courses it takes.

If there are any limitations in Johannson's work, it would be in his incomplete investigation into the nature of the unconscious in the Nikāyas. Very little work has been done on this subject, perhaps because the evidence is at times vague and contestable. Attempts to explain the unconscious by such terms as bhavanga and ālayavijñāna are of little use to us, as these terms are not found in the Nikāyas. Consequently, there is a real need for more research to be conducted in this area of early Buddhist psychology. Research would also be helpful in determining the arising of craving, and the psychological dimension of early Buddhist soteriology.
THE APPROACH AND METHOD OF THIS THESIS

We have seen from our review that the study of craving and its place in early Buddhist soteriology has received some attention in modern scholarship, but that it is also an incomplete study. What kind of strategy or approach should we take, then, and what method would be the most useful, as we attempt to give a comprehensive picture of craving, especially contributing to those portions of early Buddhist psychology which we have indicated are inadequately investigated?

Three stages of approach are necessary. First, in order to see how craving fits into the general theological picture of Buddhism, it is necessary to understand how it is part of the central problem of painfulness (dukkha). This is a complex task, because painfulness by itself is a state of many nuances arising through a variety of causes. We must see, then, how painfulness is expressed not only as physical suffering, but also how it is interpreted from a psychological and existential point of view.

We will argue that these latter aspects of painfulness are closely related to the early Buddhist world-view of samsāra, and to the associated concepts of impermanency (anicca) and non-self (anattā). Buddhism teaches that whatever is impermanent is painful (‘yad annicam tām dukkham’ S.1.28), and this above all refers to the psycho-physical structure
which is man. Failure to understand how transient man is an integral part of *samsāra* leads inevitably to painfulness. Here is one of the most crucial points in the Buddha's teaching. We must see that the cause of the arising of painfulness is within painfulness itself. No external agency provokes this pain. It is caused because in his ignorance and by his ceaseless craving man does not recognize that the very inherent nature of his 'person' is transient and therefore painful ('in brief, the five grasping aggregates are painful' - *saṅkhittena pañc'upādānakhandha dukkhā*. M.1.165). One of our first responsibilities must be, therefore, to come to some understanding of what this 'person' is, what this false idea of 'self' is that lies behind man's craving disposition, thus contributing so profoundly to his sense of painfulness.

The world by itself cannot be regarded as either painful or not painful. What makes it one way or the other is our craving relationship to it, our false sense of identity and our clinging to those values we feel have permanency and meaning when in fact they are momentary and hollow. In the second stage of our investigation, then, we need to have a better understanding of how this craving arises to give these delusionary and consequently painful concepts of self and permanency. Here we will be particularly concerned with the various mental factors which make up consciousness and unconsciousness (*viññāṇa, mano, citta* and *saṅkhāra*).

This is a strategic part of the thesis because it provides us with an in-depth study of the psychological
make-up of man. It will also show us the potential the individual has to train this apparatus in order to achieve the goal of freedom from painfulness.

Thirdly, having demonstrated how craving arises and the various courses it takes, we will turn to the important issue of how *tānha* in one sense is used as the instrument for its own purification. Here we will argue that far from curbing or eroding all craving and intention, Buddhism asks that we re-direct the 'current of craving' from deleterious aims in order to arrive at a higher, more qualitative intention which contributes to the realization of freedom from gross craving. Only when craving has been so re-directed, only when intention has become positive and 'skilful' (*kusala*), can the individual embark successfully on a meditative process of mindfulness (*sati*) and concentration (*samādhi*) that leads to insight (*panna*) or *nibbāna*. Here craving is at last eradicated, its unconscious roots (*āsavā*) exposed, and its relationship with ignorance and painfulness fully understood.

Having outlined the approach taken in this thesis, what now of its method? The method engaged is partly phenomenological, in that it seeks out the aetiological and pathological phenomena of craving. As we have seen, some phenomenologists also cultivate empathy for what another religious tradition is trying to say, and to some extent strive to understand the heart of that other religion. But at the same time, following

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92i.e. the aetiology of craving in the *paticcasamuppāda* (*M.1.49*), and the pathology of craving expressed as *kāmatanha, bhavatanha* and *vibhavatanha*, *D.2.308, M.1.48, S.5.420*. 

the lead of J. G. Arapura, this thesis goes beyond a strictly classical phenomenological methodology, in that unlike this particular aspect of phenomenology, we do not always suspend judgement about crucial theological questions, and in that we do make arbitrary adjudications about the meaning and value of certain Buddhist issues.

Our aim is not only to present the phenomenological facts about craving, but also to interpret why the Buddha taught that craving is a crucial religious problem. Here the methodological goal is clear. How is it possible to gain a full understanding of what the Buddha meant by the word "tānha"? As we pointed out early in this chapter, Western scholars have not found it easy to gain such understanding. The historical problems associated with an accurate reading of the texts can with care be minimized. What is more difficult is penetrating the theological circle on the other side, knowing exactly what the Buddha meant when he said that to experience was to "burn with thirst". What the Buddha meant when he talked about craving was at least in part based on special knowledge derived from his enlightenment. The men around him only partially understood, even though the Buddha explained the truth he had in mind in the current cosmological and psychological language of the day.

while his meaning was on the surface reasonably clear

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94 Mahavagga 1.21.1, Vinaya Pitaka
to his followers, the higher truth to which he called them involved their following the Path and reaching out to a higher level of understanding. The same problem faces us today. Our task must be, then, to not only investigate the phenomenon of craving, but also to open our minds to the inner journey of the Buddha's enlightenment, to pass over into his enlightened insight into the darkest corners of the mind. In the long run, this understanding is a private journey of discovery for the one who cares to think about it deeply. The Buddha helps us on this journey by providing us with a comprehensive psychology and philosophy. He furnishes us with a method (the Eight-Fold Path) to use these tools to further our own insight. But he also recognizes that one can only discover the way to enlightenment by ultimately travelling and experiencing it alone.95

This has to be kept in mind as one studies the Buddhist psychology of craving, because in many ways the straightforward, empirical nature of this psychology can lead the student to forget the relationship this psychology has with the soteriological aims of the dhamma. As we come to investigate the mechanics of craving, we will have to remember that there is always a theological significance and meaning behind what often seems to be a purely straightforward phenomenological description. That meaning is exposed to some extent in those texts which point out how craving gives rise to psychological

95This is clearly brought out in the well-known parable of the Raññ, M.1.134-135, where the Buddha encourages
conditions which are in essence painful, and in the role of meditation plays to combat this condition, not only as a therapy for mental health, but also as an instrument of those who use his dhamma as a raft (kullo) to ultimately abandon it when its usefulness is no longer apparent. The individual on the way to enlightenment must recognize that in the long run he alone, and not the dhamma, is the instrument of his own salvation:


What should that man do, bhikkhus, in order to do what should be done with the raft (of dhamma)? Bhikkhus, it might occur to him after he has crossed over and gone beyond: 'Now, this raft has been very useful to me. Depending on it and striving with my hands and feet, I have crossed over safely to the beyond. Suppose now, having beached this raft on the dry ground or having submerged it in the water, I should proceed as I desire?' In doing this, bhikkhus, that man would be doing what should be done with that raft. Even so is the parable of the raft dhamma taught by me for crossing over (i.e. over tanhā and avijjā), not for retaining. M.1.134.
salvation. Yet even in these more obvious theological examples, if one is to penetrate the full meaning of the nature of craving, one does it best by putting one's own experience beside that of the Buddha's.

With this partly phenomenological and partly philosophical method as our basis, let us now 'enter the stream' and focus our attention on painfulness and its relationship to craving.
CHAPTER II

DUKKHA AND TANHĀ

Craving must initially be seen in the context of the First Noble Truth (all of life is painnessness, dukkha), in order to determine its central position in Buddhist soteriology. It should be understood as an essential part of a much larger theological system, a system roughly incorporated by the Four Noble Truths (ariyasaccāni). Each of these truths tells us something about the nature of the first truth, about its phenomenological, psychological and existential constitution, about how it arises and how it has the potential for cessation.

In this chapter, then, our aim will be to come to some understanding of the central focus of this truth, that life is painfulness. The Pāli texts make it clear that painfulness is the key-stone of Buddhist theological thought. In the first sermon of the Buddha (S.5.420, Vin. 1.10), 'this noble truth of painfulness' (idam dukkham ariyasaccan) is set down as the basis upon which all the other truths are established, and they are consequently referred to as the noble truth of the arising of painfulness (dukkhasamudayaṃ ariyasaccan), the noble truth of the extinction of painfulness (dukkhanirodham ariyasaccan) and the noble truth of the path leading to the
extinction of painfulness (dukkhānirodhagāmini paṭipadā ariyagacchan). The Nikāyas frequently urge us to see dukkha as the key to the other truths:

Yo bhikkhave dukkham passati dukkhasamudayam pi so passati dukkhanirodham pi passati dukkhanirodha gaminipatipadam pi passati.

He who sees painfulness, bhikkhus, sees also the arising of painfulness, the cessation of painfulness, and the path leading to the cessation of painfulness. S.5.437.

In order to adequately penetrate what the early Buddhists mean by dukkha, two distinct but nonetheless related issues will be examined in this chapter. First, assuming that painfulness is best understood from the perspective of the other truths, we will argue that its psychological and experiential meaning can be best seen from the point of view of the second truth (dukkha samudayo). Secondly, in looking to what the Pāli texts tell us of dukkha, we want to transcend the strictly phenomenological descriptions of painfulness and seek out the principle theological dilemma as it is expressed in the crucial concept of samsāra with its attendant features of momentariness (anicca) and non-being (anattā).

Because of craving and ignorance, anicca and anattā are two aspects of reality which are commonly misunderstood, a failure which provokes a special kind of painfulness. Here we will show how this evasive and disturbing aspect of dukkha is built upon ignorance of what the person (sakkāya) is, and further how the Buddha developed two psycho-physical
descriptions of man (the Ānāgākkhandha and Patīcchasamuppāda) to explain this fluctuating and therefore painful identity we call "self".

This will provide us with the necessary background to trace in the next chapter the origin of painfulness as it arises in particular through the agency of craving, and finally in chapter four to trace the methods for the redirection of craving and the ultimate extinction of painfulness.

**DUKKHA AND THE OTHER NOBLE TRUTHS: A QUESTION OF INTERPRETATION**

This thesis looks at the problem of painfulness chiefly from the perspective of the second noble truth, the cause or the arising of dukkha (dukkha samudayo). Controversy arises, however, as to whether the second truth adequately expresses the full dimension of dukkha. Younger points this out clearly when he writes:

The most important question in Buddhism and hence in the whole of the Indian Religious Tradition is "what did the Buddha mean by duḥkha or suffering?" Traditionally there have been two somewhat different lines of interpretation, depending on whether one saw the second or the third truth as the key to the interpretation of the first. Those who saw the second truth as the key to this theological system tended to interpret duḥkha primarily in psychological terms, as a description of the experienced reality of the world. On the other hand, those who saw the third truth as the key tended to interpret duḥkha in
philosophical terms as the way of speaking about a world which is essentially an unreal distortion of the Ideal or Nirvāṇa.\(^1\)

A good example of a recent scholar who judges dukkha largely on the basis of its relationship with the second noble truth is Walpola Rahula.\(^2\) Rahula stresses that the Buddha was above all realistic, that he looked at things objectively, "as they are" (yathābhūtām). He appeals to such texts as M.1.90, where three things are said to govern life: assāḍa, attraction; ādīnava, a sense of unsatisfactoriness; and nissaraṇa, liberation. The essence of the Buddha's soteriological teaching is that attraction produces unsatisfactoriness or pain, non-attachment produces liberation. Painfulness is therefore a psychologically induced and expressed quality. This kind of observation provokes Younger to write that along with certain others like Mrs. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, for Rahula "dukkha is a psychological category in a moralistic theology based on a Realist philosophy".\(^3\)

It is questionable whether Rahula in particular would accept this assessment, as he writes at some length about what he calls the "philosophical" meaning of dukkha which

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\(^1\)Younger, P. The Indian Religious Tradition. op cit. p. 39.


connotes "enormously wider senses" about the Buddha's "view of life and the world", what is ideas of 'imperfection', 'impermanence', 'emptiness' and 'unsubstantiality'.

Nevertheless, in the long run, Younger's judgment of Rahula's approach is justified, because Rahula's "philosophical" appraisal is really an analytical but psychological explanation of what is a "being" or an "individual" or an "I". It is still a definition of dukkha that is descriptive of the reality of life, and is not based on a comparison of an 'ideal' state that transcends the life of here and now, such as nibbāna.

Rahula is not alone in defending what is basically the Theravāda interpretation of dukkha as a psychological state of disequilibrium and ignorance. Others, such as G. P. Malalasekera and R. Johansson express a similar approach. Thus the latter writes "the present circumstances of a human life - birth, illness, sorrow, old age, death - were summed up into the word dukkha and were found to depend on the ceaselessly evolving processes that make up the rest of the (paticcasamuppāda) series, all of them personal..."

factors. Through a 'stopping' of these factors, release can be attained. This is the core of Buddhism. For Johansson, even nibbāna itself "is mainly a psychological fact", so too must the antithetical state of dukkha be interpreted solely from a psychological point of view.

The other side of the issue is represented by those who define dukkha from the perspective of the third noble truth (dukkha nirodho). T. R. V. Murti exemplifies this school of thought when he observes that every Indian system begins with the problem of suffering. The parallel on the intellectual side is the consciousness of illusion. That makes us critical, reflective. Consciousness of suffering leads us to discard secular values and to go in search of the abiding nirvāna in any school of Buddhism is not nothing, but an asāmskṛta dharma, some sort of noumenal unconditioned reality behind the play of phenomena.

Murti's viewpoint is also expressed by Charles Moore and other Mahāyāna scholars, but it is in Paul Younger that this approach to the meaning of dukkha is most clearly articulated. Younger's position has to be seen in the

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7 Ibid. p. 107.
8 Ibid. p. 135.
light of the wide range of research that he has applied to the question of dukkha; for his analysis of this concept is more comprehensive than any other study to date. He argues that the concept of dukkha in the Indian religious tradition has undergone changes in its development, and that these changes can be seen in the Tipitaka:

The earliest uses [of dukkha in the Nikayas] seem to be those which are similar to the earlier non-Vedic use. These are followed by usage in philosophical passages which, while reflecting a technical philosophical background, have a relatively crude literary form. Next would be the well-known theological formulations, and fourth, and last, the devotional and ethical passages which presuppose the acceptance of the theological formulation. 12

Younger points out that dukkha in the 'earlier non-vedic tradition' refers to both a state of radical pluralism and the experience of such pluralism, an experience of momentariness. The Pali Nikayas certainly reflect this attitude (cf. M.1.22, 516; 2.222. D.3.51). But gradually, Younger argues, dukkha comes to be recognized as one of three characteristic modes of feeling (vedana), along with sukha (pleasant feeling) and sukhadukkha. The significance of this development is crucial, because here dukkha "represents an interiorization of the earlier (non-vedic) conception", so that it "no longer refer(s) as much to the objective aspect of the

12 Ibid. p. 145.
experience, as to the reflection upon that experience.\textsuperscript{13} Eventually all experience becomes equated with impermanence (ānicca) and therefore dukkha. Younger observes that "In making this point the meaning of dukkha is changed quite radically for it is no longer one type of experience beside others, but an analysis of experiencing as such".\textsuperscript{14} This "experiential tone" becomes the hallmark of the Buddhist interpretation of painfulness. It is an experience, however, that goes beyond the experiences of pain to indicate that dukkha is also the subjective existential concern with the inevitability of pain and death. This is the strongest and most creative point made by the ariyasaccāni, for the reality of pain and death is seldom denied, but the fact that man is existentially confronted by its inevitable finality is seldom set forth in theological language.\textsuperscript{15} Up to this point, Younger's argument seems quite in line with Theravāda sentiments on the meaning of dukkha. But Younger goes on to argue that ultimately dukkha cannot be really fathomed without a "mystical experience" of its opposite condition, that of nirvāṇa, "for it is the vision that there can be a cessation of dukkha which determines what one means by dukkha".\textsuperscript{16} Younger continues:

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid. p. 146.
\textsuperscript{14}Ibid. p. 146.
\textsuperscript{15}Younger, P. The Birth of the Indian Religious Tradition. op cit. p. 104.
\textsuperscript{16}Ibid. p. 105
It is only in the light of the mystical vision (dhi) of Nirvana that the true nature of dukkha is recognized, but the only proper theological statement that can be made about the goal of the spiritual path is that it is a transcendence of dukkha. In establishing this relationship between the ideas of Nirvana and dukkha within the theological system, Buddhism affirmed the relatedness of the 'mystical' and the 'ordinary' in human experience.17

Here the central issue is that dukkha has to be seen from the perspective of what it is not, of nibbana. At the same time, however, this passage also emphasizes an apparent ambivalent attitude towards interpreting 'human experience' from either a 'mystical' or an 'ordinary' point of view. Younger brings this clearly into focus elsewhere when he writes:

The theology of early Buddhism is a combination of a very experiential and this-worldly Realism, and a mystical and somewhat escapist philosophical Idealism. The link between these seemingly contradictory tendencies is the term dukkha, which is at once a description of simple experience and the theological category which describes this world as totally other than Nirvana...[this view] welds together divergent human tendencies - the tendency to live primarily within the realm of the experienced and the tendency to disdain what is experienced and model a new world. The Buddhists attempted to do both.18


This is a good argument solidly based on textual analysis, and in chapter four of this thesis we will want to return to some of the questions Younger and others have raised about the 'mystical' aspect of the Buddhist liberation experience. But for the purpose of our interpretation of dukkha in this chapter, the 'philosophical' approach based primarily on an analysis of what dukkha is not, of nibbāna, is not as useful as seeing dukkha as what it is here and now, as a state of psychological painfulness. Much of what Younger has written about the 'interiorization' of the philosophy of impermanence (anicca) is consistent with the psychology contained within the second noble truth, and in this chapter we will see that the texts speak to us primarily in these psychological and existential terms.

THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND EXISTENTIAL DIMENSIONS OF DUKKHA

Dukkha (du, bad, low + kha, to be empty or hollow) cannot be adequately translated into one English word. Thus T. W. Rhys Davids cautions:

There is no word in English covering the same ground as dukkha does in Pāli. Our modern words are too specialized, too limited, and usually too strong. Sukha and dukkha are ease and dis-ease (but we use disease in another sense)... or well-being and illness (but illness means something else in English). We are forced, therefore, in translation to use half synonyms, no one of which is exact. Dukkha is equally mental and physical. Pain is too predominantly
physical, sorrow too exclusively mental, but in some connections they have to be used in default of any more exact rendering. 19

In popular convention one usually finds 'suffering' as a common translation, but, as Gunaratne points out, "even it is not quite satisfactory since the word 'suffering' is likely to convey the idea of pain only and does not introduce the idea of unsubstantiability or illusoriness". 20 Like Rhys Davids, Gunaratne further emphasizes this wide range of nuances accommodated in the term dukkha:

The word 'dukkha' must awaken in our minds not only thoughts of pain and distress, but also all those thoughts about the unsatisfactory and illusory nature of the things of this world, their unsubstantiability, their failure to satisfy completely, and their inevitable ending in disappointment, sorrow and disharmony. Dukkha consists of that state of unbalance, that continued agitation and disturbance to which all beings are subject by reason of the absence of stability and permanence in this world, by reason of the never ending rise and fall of things leading to a universal 'unsatisfactoriness' or disharmony. Perhaps the word 'disharmony' can be regarded as the closest equivalent of dukkha. 21

Whether we translate dukkha as suffering, disharmony, a sense of the wrongness of existence, painfulness, angst, or


21Ibid. p. 8.
whatever, the important point is to make our understanding of that translation sufficiently broad to cover all the implications of the term.

The Pali texts are clearly conscious of the diverse meanings of dukkha, and this may well be why a traditional classification of three kinds of dukkha is sometimes found in the Nikāyas (cf. S.4.259; D.3.216; M.3.249; M.2.106. Rahula is wrong when he suggests this three-fold conception is found only in the later-Visuddhimagga). This list, which may initially appear as somewhat artificial or at least arbitrary, in the long run turns out to be quite comprehensive and reflective of the phenomenological, psychological and existential responses to the problem of painfulness found in the Nikāyas:

Dukkhām dukkhanti avuso Sāriputta
vuccati, kataman' me kho āvuso dukkhanti. Tisso imāvuso dukkhātā, dukkhadukkhātā, saṁkhāradukkhātā (variant reading: samsāradukkhatā), viparināmādukkhātā, ima kho tisso dukkhatā ti.

Painfulness, painfulness! is the saying, friend Sāriputta. But what, friend, is painfulness? There are these three forms of painfulness, friend: the sort of painfulness caused by bodily (physical) pain, the sort caused by psychological change, the sort caused by the changeable nature of things. These are the three sorts of painfulness. S.4.259.

22Rahula, W. What the Buddha Taught. op cit. p. 19
In many ways, dukkha dukkhata, saṅkhāra dukkhata and viparītānāma dukkhata correspond to the three characteristic marks of existence (tī lakkhana). These 'marks' or 'signs' of existence also point to momentariness and non-self as being the basis of what the Dhm. 277f. calls the world of painfulness:

sabbo saṅkhāra aniccā' ti yadā paññāya passati atha nibbindati dukkke, esa maggo visuddhiyā
sabbo saṅkhāra dukkha' ti yadā paññāya passati atha nibbindati dukkke, esa maggo visuddhiyā
sabbo dhammā anattā' ti yadā paññāya passati atha nibbindati dukkke, esa maggo visuddhiyā

All created things are impermanent when one realizes this through insight, he turns away from painfulness; this is the path to purity.

All created things are prone to painfulness. When one realizes this through insight, he turns away from painfulness; this is the path to purity.

All the elements of being are non-self. When one realizes this through insight, he turns away from painfulness; this is the path to purity.

Here, ignorance of the inevitability of anicca (impermanency) corresponds to the painfulness of reflecting on a transient objective world (viparītānāma dukkhata), and ignorance of anattā to that painfulness generated by seeing that even the subjective psychological component we call the
"Self" is subject to decay (sānkhaṭa dukkhata).²³ With these two lists, then, we have a good idea of the central kinds of painfulness the Buddha was intent on eradicating.

Our aim now is first to see how dukkha dukkhata reflects ordinary empirical pain. But then it is necessary to go beyond this phenomenological definition, and see how viparītā and sānkhaṭa dukkhata express the psychological and existential dimensions of painfulness. These experiences of pain are based on a complex theory of flux (khaṇika, samsāra). The transient nature of the phenomenal world (anicca) and the momentary state of 'personality' (anatta) are hidden through ignorance from the eyes of most individuals. Until this crucial theory of flux is understood, anicca and anatta will not be understood, and viparītā and sānkhaṭa dukkhata will persist.

²³Some scholars prefer to interpret sānkhaṭa dukkhata as the painlessness that haunts man as he senses the instability of all "conditioned states" that make up the individual (i.e. Rahula, W. What the Buddha Taught, op cit. p. 19; and the translation by Mrs. C. A. F. Rhys Davids of S.3.86f.). But as Jayatilleke convincingly argues, if sānkhaṭa here refers only to 'component things', then it would really be identical to viparītā dukkha. Rather, he points out, sānkhaṭa should mean 'purposive psychological activities' to indicate subjective as well as objective flux (Jayatilleke, K. N. "Some Problems of Translation and Interpretation". U.C.R. Vol. 7. 1949, p. 218). cf. also Chapter Three, p. 222 below.
Dukkha dukkhata refers to relatively straightforward kinds of painfulness. This includes physical pain, as this passage from the Udāna (Naṁdavaggo I) implies:

Tena kho panā samayena ānātaro bhikkhu bhagavato avidūre nissiṁno hoti pallāṅkaṁ ābhujitvā ujam kāyaṁ panidhāya purāṇa-kammavedikajam dukkham tippam kharāṁ katukām...

Now on that occasion a certain bhikkhu was seated not far from the Blessed One in a cross-legged posture, holding his body upright, enduring pain that was the fruit of former kamma, pain-racking, sharp and bitter...

Other forms of dukkha dukkhata accommodate the whole range of daily anxieties and apprehensions of living in a complicated and disturbed world. Many are forced to live in conditions of economic and social insecurity, and everyone knows times of family and domestic crisis. Perhaps one of the most obvious kinds of dukkha is experienced in seeing the attachments we accumulate for loved ones undone through misunderstanding, inability to communicate and lastly through death. In M.2.106, we read the sad story of the death of a father's only son. The death leaves the father heartbroken, and we are warned that this is what to expect from filial love.
This passage tells us that when conditions change, as change they inevitably must, what was once joy or satisfaction becomes painfulness. To some individuals, the cause for the arising of this kind of pain is obvious. They can accept it, and can even learn to be unaffected by it. But most persons are not aware of this potential for painfulness that lurks behind every disposition and thought. Only the obvious physical and mental aspects of pain strike them and the causal genesis; as well as the way to release from that pain, is lost to them because of ignorance (avijja). In the Nikayas, ignorance is often defined as not knowing all the facts about dukkha:

"Yam kho āvuso dukkhe aññānam dukkha-śamudaye aññānam dukkhanirodhe aññānam dukkhanirodha gāmini patipadāya aññānam, ayam vuccat" āvuso avijja.

Whatever is not knowing in regard to painfulness, not knowing in regard to the uprising of painfulness, not knowing in regard to the stopping of painfulness, not knowing in regard to the course leading to the stopping of painfulness, this, your reverence, is called ignorance. M.1.54.

Younger, P. The Indian Religious Tradition, op cit.
theory about "the nature of the cosmos". Without knowing something of this theory, and how it explains the causal origin of all dukkha, man will continue to regard dukkha as a "simple fact" and thus ever continue under its bondage. The next step is to see how viparināma and sankhāra dukkha reflect this deeper sense of painfulness and its complex causal background in the doctrine of samsāra.

SAMSĀRA, VIPARINĀMA AND SANKHĀRA DUKKHATA

Viparināma (vi + parināma - change, for the worse) dukkhata (the painfulness associated with the transient nature of the objective world) and sankhāra (sa + kr., aggregate, mental or psychological factors) dukkhata (the subjective painfulness of seeing impermanency of the self), as well as the early Buddhist concepts of anicca and anattā, are based on the Indian concept of samsāra. Thus before we see how dukkha is experienced as momentariness and instability, it is vital that it be seen in the perspective of this central doctrine of flux.

Samsāra, from the Sanskrit 'samsārāti', literally means 'faring on'. It is the word used to describe the concept of the cycle of life and of rebirth not only in Buddhism, but in the whole Indian religious tradition.

Questions as to the origin of this concept are not

26 cf. p. 222 below.
properly within the scope of this thesis, but some idea of its development up to the time of the Buddha is necessary if one is to see how the Buddhist position came to differ from contemporary Upaniṣadic thought in regards to this issue.

In Indian philosophy, it is not until the Upaniṣadic era (c. 800-500 B.C.) that the cosmological doctrine of life as a cycle of creation, destruction and recreation becomes prevalent. At the same time, a developed sense of karma as a doctrine of moral justice allowed the individual to see his place in the wider scope of samsāra, thus giving rise to the idea of rebirth. Even in the earliest Upaniṣadic references to rebirth (Ghan. U. 5. 3; Brhd. U. 6. 2) there is the conviction that all happiness and painfulness is merited by previous action in this and former existences.

In many ways, the Upaniṣadic concept of samsāra expresses the same existential concerns as those found in the Nikāyas. Certainly the inevitable wasting and decay of the human body and the valuelessness of desires and sense pleasures is clearly expressed in the Upaniṣads, as this passage from the Maitri Upaniṣad shows:

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Bhagavann asthi-carma-snāyu-majjā-
māmsa-sukra-śonita śleṣmā-śru-
dūṣikā-vin-mutra-vāta-pitta-kapha-
samghate durgandhe niṁsāre'smin
sarire kiṁ kāmopabhogaḥ? kāma-
krodha-lotha-moha bhaya-visādersyesta-
vīyogānīṣṭa-samprayoga-kṣut-pipāśā-
jarā mṛtyu-roga-śokādyair abhihaṅ
sarire kiṁ kāmopabhogaḥ?
sarvam cedam kṣāyiśu paśyāmo
yathēme damśa-maśakādayas-trna-
vanaspatabodhūta-pradhvasmīnaḥ...

Blessed One, in this foul-smelling,
unsubstantial body, an aggregate of
bone, skin, muscle, marrow, flesh,
semen, blood, mucus, tears, dis-
charge, faeces, urine, wind, bile
and phlegm, what is the good of the
enjoyment of desires? In this body
which is afflicted with desire,
anger, covetousness, delusion, fear,
despondency, envy, separation from
what is desired, union with the un-
desired, hunger, thirst, old age,
death, disease, sorrow and things
like this, what is the good of the
enjoyment of desires? And we see
that all this is perishing, as the
gnats, mosquitoes and the like, the
grass and the trees that grow and
decay...(1.3,4).

We have only to compare this Upaniṣadic passage with
any number of Buddhist texts to see how similar the two
attitudes towards this transient life and its pleasures are:

Passa cittakatam bimśam arukāyaṁ
samussitaṁ, ātum abhusamkappam
yassa n'atthi dhuvam thiti pari-
jjīnnaṁ idam rūpam, roganiddhaṁ
pabhanguram bhijjati pūtisandeho
maranantam hi jīvatam.

Behold this painted image, a body
full of wounds, put together,
diseased, and full of many inten-
tions (samkappam - 'thoughts',
Radhakrishnan) in which there is
neither permanence nor stability.
This body is worn out, a nest of diseases and very frail. This heap of corruption disintegrates, life verily ends in death. Dhm. 147f.

And from M.1.130:

Appasadda kama yuttatmayamahuruddhah bahupayasa, adinavo ettha bhivyayo.
Atthakankampama kama yuttamayam...
mamsapesupama... tinkukkupama,
angarakasupama, supinakupama, yacitakupama, rukkhaphalupama, asisunupama,
sattisulupama, sappasirupama kama yuttamayamahuruddha bahupayasa,
adinavo ettha bhivyayo. Atha ca pana

tvam moghapurisa attanaduggahitena amhe c'eva abhacikhsahi attana-ca
khanasa bahu-ca appuham pusavasi.
Tam hi te moghapurisa bhavissati
digha-rattam ahitaya dukkhayati.

Sense pleasures are said by me to be of little satisfaction, of much painfulness, of much tribulation, wherein there is much disadvantage. Sense pleasures are said by me to be like a skeleton, a lump of flesh, a piece of dry grass, a pit of glowing coals, a dream, as something borrowed, the fruit of a tree, a slaughter house, an impaling stake. Sense pleasures are said by me to be like a snake's head, of much painfulness, of much trial, wherein there is much disadvantage. And yet you, foolish man, not only misrepresent me because of your wrong grasp, but also injure yourself and give rise to much demerit which will be for a long time, unwise man, for your woe and painfulness. M.1.130.

From these passages, it is clear that the Buddha incorporates the principle-focus of the Upanishadic samsara as flux and impermanency into his theology. Although unlike the Upanishads, the Buddha teaches that there is neither a soul nor its transmigration that provokes rebirth, but rather
"causal energy" of "evolving consciousness" (saṃvattanikām viññāṇam, M.2.262; a question we will return to in the next chapter), nevertheless he does accept two further key Upaniṣadic concepts which are important corollaries of saṃsāra, notably the law of karma and the cosmic dimensions of saṃsāra.

Thus as in the Upaniṣads, so in the Nikāyas the stream of 'existences' in saṃsāra are thought to be products of a law of karma which determines the quality of each life. Karma takes on the general meaning of 'acts' in Indian philosophy, and the Buddhists inherited this connotation, although for them it had no liturgical or penitential value. They interpreted an act of karma only as one that can be morally qualified. But of crucial importance is the additional emphasis the Buddha placed on the intention that stands behind the act. It is this intention that is the essence of karma, with the act assuming only secondary significance:

Cetanā 'ham bhikkhave kammaṃ vadāmi. Cetayitvā kammaṃ karoti kayena, vācā, manasā.

It is mental volition, bhikkhus, that I call karma. Having willed, one acts through body, speech or mind. M.3.415.

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29 This argument is emphasized by many Buddhist scholars, such as W. J. Thomas ("Buddhism, by making the ethical character of an action depend upon motive and not upon external performance, transformed the doctrine of karma..." History of Buddhist Thought (London: Routledge and Paul. 1969), 1951 2 ed., p. 117 and R. H. Robinson ("One novel feature of early Buddhist ethics is that it gives primacy to intention.") The Buddhist Religion (Belmont: Dickenson Co. 1970), p. 20.
The Buddha also acknowledged the eternal and cosmic magnitude of *samsāra*. *Samsāra* should never be conceived of as a single circle, a snake swallowing its tail. Rather it should be thought of as a series of circles, a coil developing from one central circle, with no beginning, and with its end not yet in sight, not yet determined. The Nikāyas often stress the fact that the cycle of life has no beginning:


Thus have I heard...The Blessed One said this - incalculable is the beginning, bhikkhus, of this faring on. The earliest point is not revealed of the running on, the faring on, of beings cloaked in ignorance; tied to craving. If a man, bhikkhus, were to prune out the grasses, sticks and boughs and twigs in this India and collecting them together, should make a pile laying them in a stack of squares saying for each: 'this is my mother; this is my mother's mother. Bhikkhus, the grasses, sticks, boughs, twigs in this India would be used up,
ended up or ever the mothers of that man's mother were come to an end. Why is that? Incalculable is the beginning, bhikkhus, of this faring on. S.2.178.

As samsāra has no beginning, so too there is no end for those still 'fettered by craving', who in their ignorance regard the body or any of its attributes as a permanent 'self':

Hoti so bhikkhave samayo yam mahāsamuddo uussussati vissussati na bhavati, natvāham bhikkhave avijjāniyavanānam sattānam tanhaṁ samyojanaṁ sandhāvatām samsarataṁ dukkhasa antakiriyaṁ vadāmi. Hoti so bhikkhave samayo yam Sineru pabbatārājā dayhati vinassati na bhavati, na tvevāham bhikkhave avijjāniyavanānam sattānam tanhaṁ samyojanaṁ sandhāvatām samsarataṁ dukkhasa antakiriyaṁ vadāmi. Hoti so bhikkhave samayo yam mahāpathavi dayhati vinassati na bhavati, na tvevāham bhikkhave avijjāniyavanānam sattānam samyojanaṁ sandhāvatām samsarataṁ dukkhasa antakiriyaṁ vadāmi. Sāyathāpi bhikkhave sa gaddulābaddho dalhe_khile vá thambē yā upanibaddho tam eva khilām vā thambēm vā anuparidhāvati anuparivattati. Ėvam eva kho bhikkhave assutavā puthujjano ariyānam adassavi, la, sappurisadhamme avinito rūpaṁ attato samanupassati, viṁnānavatām vā attānam attani vā viṁnānam viṁnānasmin vā attānam. So rupāneva anuparidhāvati anuparivattati, vedanaṁ neva, la, saññāneva, sañkhāre yeva viṁnānāneva anuparidhāvati anuparivattati. So rupām anuparidhāvam anuparivattam, vedanaṁ, la, saññham, sañkhāre, viṁnānam anuparidhāvam anuparivattam na parimuṇcati rūpmā, na parimuṇcati vedāna, na parimuṇcati viṁnānamā, na parimuṇcati jātiyā jāra-maraṇena sokehi pāridevhi dukkhehi domanassahi upāyasehi na parimuṇcati dukkhasmā ti vadāmi. S.3.149.

There comes a time, bhikkhus, when the mighty ocean dries up, is utterly drained, comes no more to be. But of beings hindered by ignorance, fettered by craving,
who run on, who fare on the round of rebirth, I declare no end. There comes a time, bhikkhus, when Sineru, monarch of mountains, is consumed, is destroyed, comes no more to be. But of beings hindered by ignorance, lettered by craving, who run for ever the round of rebirth, I declare no end. There comes a time, bhikkhus, when the mighty earth is destroyed, comes to be no more. But of beings hindered by ignorance...I declare no end. Bhikkhus, just as a dog tied up by a leash to a strong stake or pillar, keeps running and revolving round and round that stake or pillar, even so, bhikkhus, the untaught persons who do not discern the Aryans...who are untrained in the noble doctrine, regard body as the self, regard feeling, perception, activity, regard consciousness as having self, regard consciousness as being in the self or the self as being in consciousness...run and revolve round and round from body to body, feeling to feeling, from perception to perception, from volition to volition, from consciousness to consciousness...they are not released from this, they are not released from rebirth, from old age and decay, from sorrow and grief, from woe, lament and despair...they are not released from painfulness, I declare. S.1.149.

In this passage, the unenlightened person fails to see the true nature of samsāra. It is as if he does not understand the three characteristics of painfulness, impermanency and non-self. Reality to him seems to be something tangible and physical. Such a person fails to see that samsāra even as an expression of linear time - past, present and future - is unreal in the sense that temporality is unreal. The only reality time has is the same as that of the properties that make up the sentient world, that is, they are both momentary ('n'atthi so khāna vā layo vā mūhutto vā yan nadi āramati' -
'there is no moment, no inkling, no particle of time that the river stops flowing'. a.4.137). Thus the entire objective world is held in the macrocosmic embrace of samsāra. Everything is momentary: Ignorance of this truth leads to viparītāmā dukkhata, the existential painfulness that comes from placing value and emphasis on a transient material world. Such an attitude towards the objective world is certain to increase craving and consequently painfulness:

Santi kho, Puṇṇa, cakkhuvināyeyā rūpā īṭhā kantā maṇāpā piyārūpā kāmūpasamhita rajaniyā. Taṁ ce bhikkhu abhinandati abhivadati ajjhosaṁya titthati, tassa taṁ abhinandato abhivadato ajjhosaṁya titthati, tassa taṁ abhinandato abhivadato ajjhosaṁya titthato uppaįjati nandi; nandi samudaya dukkhasamudayo puṇṇati vadāmi... nandinīrodhā dukkhanīrodho Puṇṇah vadāmi.

There are, Puṇṇa, material shapes cognizable by the eye, agreeable, pleasant, liked, enticing, connected with sensual pleasures, alluring. If a bhikkhu delights in these (both eye and material shapes), welcomes them and persists in cleaving to them, delight arises in-him. I say, Puṇṇa, that from the arising of delight is the arising of painfulness, and from the stopping of delight is the stopping of painfulness. M.3.267.

Yet of even more crucial significance is the Buddhist teaching that not only is the material world in flux (anicca), but so also is the individual 'personality' who lives within samsāra. This is anattā, and the failure to understand this
principle leads to what is perhaps the most persistent and baffling kind of psychological painfulness (saṅkhāra dukkhata), a painfulness which has its answer concealed within the second noble truth (dukkha samudayo). Here, the Buddha teaches that the cause of this painfulness is to be found in the incessant and successive reproduction of 'personalities', by which man 'objectifies' and 'centralizes' himself, leading to the construction of "I" consciousness (ahāmkāra) as an unchangeable entity. This ego-centric state is one of delusion (avijñā) about the real, fluctuating, non-permanent world. In such a condition of ignorance, everything is judged and valued from the ego-centric perspective of craving. Because of the preconceived notion of a permanent ego, there arises a craving for a permanent world with permanent pleasures and gratification. As such a world cannot be discovered, there is frustration, disappointment and pain.

The second noble truth is at once both a description of man in this state of painfulness and an answer to the question of how this kind of pain arises in the first place. It is true that frequently the Buddha refers to the second truth as simply 'that craving which leads to rebirth' ('vāyam tanhā ponobbhavikā', S.5.420). But the second truth points

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30 Mahula also points this out when he writes "so tanhā, thirst, is not the first or the only cause of the arising of dukkha. But it is the most palpable and immediate cause, the 'principle thing' and the 'all-pervading' thing. Hence in certain places of the original Pāli text themselves the definition of samudaya or the origin of
to a cause of painfulness which is far more complex than the phenomenon of craving itself. In accordance with his pedagogical method of teaching for all levels of intellectual comprehension, the Buddha carries the noble truth of craving beyond the plain statement of fact, and demonstrates for those capable of understanding, how craving fits in to an intricate description of man. The whole point of this description is to explain the painful state of "becoming" - the conditioned genesis, the growth, development and decay - of the individual. Failure to understand this 'process' that makes up the individual is the central provocation of the experience of sankhāra dukkha. What we need to see now are the various ways in which this state of 'becoming', this conditioned 'personality', are described in the Nikāyas.

'PERSONALITY' AND DUKKHA: THE CENTRAL ISSUE IN THE BUDDHIST THEOLOGY OF PAINFULNESS

sakkāyo sakkāyo ti ayye vuccati.
Katamo me kho ayye sakkāyo netto
Bhagavatā ti.

Person! Person! it is said, O venerable one. But what is it that the Blessed One has called the 'person'? M.1.299.

dukkha includes other defilements and impurities (kilesa, sasava dhamma), in addition to tanhā 'thirst' which is always given the first place...it will be sufficient if we remember that this 'thirst' has as its centre the false idea of self arising out of ignorance". cf. What The Buddha Taught. op cit. p. 30.
One of the most salient features of Buddhism is that it is built upon a careful analysis of the 'person', both in terms of the bodily processes and the conscious and unconscious phenomena. Painfulness has its origins within this psychophysical framework of 'personality'. The Buddha teaches that despite the lack of a permanent entity called 'the person', there is a 'continuity of processes' (santati) which constitutes becoming (bhava), conditioning birth (jāti), ageing, death (jāramaranam) and re-becoming (punabhava).

The early Buddhists had a variety of methods which they used to explain the physical and mental phenomena which make up the 'process' or the 'person'. In the Nikāyas, four approaches are developed, two from a psychophysical standpoint (the pañcakkhandha and the patīccasamuppāda) and two from a purely mental focus (citta and mano).31 In this chapter, with our aim concerned with the theological question of what the 'self' is, and how painfulness arises within this structure, the two psychophysical descriptions, as synthetic explanations showing the co-relative interdependence of mental and physical factors, are the most useful. In the next chapter,

31 Several theological reasons probably lie behind the various definitions of 'personality' in Buddhism. Thus the khandhas are an answer to those who questioned what the 'self' or attā is, the patīccasamuppāda is a theological explanation of 'dukkha samudayo', and mano explains that the mind as "thought" is more than just a material mass of grey matter. Perhaps citta has the most subtle theological function, as Johansson suggests when he writes that it is the 'enfant terrible' of the monk, "from the beginning endowed with all moral depravities, and bound to the world by means of desires and passions, but capable of the highest development". Johansson, R. Psychology of Nirvāṇa, op cit. p. 68.
where our aim will be to trace the aetiology of craving within the 'personality', we will concentrate in particular on the process of consciousness (viññāna) in the paticcasamuppāda, and the two mental factors of citta and mano.

THE PĀNCAKKHANDHA

Tathāgatena, āvuso, arahatā sammā sambuddhena Bārāṇasīyaṁ Isipatane migadāye anuttaram dhammacakkam pavattitam...dukkhanirodhaṁ niyāna paṭipadāya ariyasaccassa ācikkhanā desāna paññapaṇā paṭṭhapaṇa vibhavājanā uttānikamman. Kātamaṁ c'āvuso, dukkham ariyasaccam? Jāti pi dukkha, jarā pi dukkha, māraṇam pi dukkham, sokaparideva dukkha domanassupāyāsa pi dukkha. Yam pi icchāṁ na labhati, tam pi dukkham; samkhittena pañcupādanakkhandhā dukkha.

Your reverences, the matchless wheel of dhamma set rolling by the Tathāgata, perfected one, fully self-awakened one in the deer park at Isipatana near Benares cannot be rolled back...it was a proclamation, a teaching, a laying down, establishing, opening up, analyzing and making plain of the noble truth of painfulness...and what, your reverences, is the noble truth of painfulness? Birth is pain, ageing is pain, dying is pain, grief, sorrow, suffering, misery and despair are painfulness. And not getting what one desires, that too is painfulness. In brief, the five groups of grasping are painfulness. M.J.249.

In this text, painfulness is summed up by directly associating it with 'the five groups of grasping'. The close
relationship between these 'groups' or 'aggregates' (khandhas) and painfulness is indicated by the adjective 'upādāna'. When the Buddha refers to these aggregates as 'grasping', he stresses how man clings to his person (sakkāya) as if it were a substantial entity, when in reality it is nothing but a conditioned process fully subject to the law of flux (khanika) and potentially open to painfulness.

The five khandhas are, firstly, the physical factor of rūpa, form or body. In the Nikāyas, rūpa is described as being made up of the four primary modes (cattāri mahābhūtāni) of solidity, fluidity, heat and motion (pathavi, āpo, tejo, vāyo: M.1.28). The other four khandhas are mental factors. These are vedanā, saññā, saṅkhāra and viññāna.

Vedanā (śīd - to know), commonly refers to any kind of feeling or sensation (sukhā vedanā, dukkha vedanā, adukkhama sukha vedanā. S.4.232), although, as Younger correctly cautions, 'the term vedanā has a less emotional and broader epistemological meaning than the English "feeling"'.

Saññā, the 'perceptions', refers to all the senses, and not just vision, as A.3.413 makes clear ('chayima...saññā: rupasaññā, saddasaññā, gandhasaññā, rasasaññā, photthabba saññā, dhammasaññā' - 'perceptions are these six: perception of form, sound, smell, taste, touch and ideas').

The khandha sañkhaṇa will be carefully reviewed in the next chapter, but it is important to have some idea of its meaning now. It usually denotes will or volition, although there is some controversy over this translation. This is because the root structure of sañkhāra (saṁ - together + ṭkr̥ - to make, to do) suggests that the word could mean "conditioned states" rather than will. But as Jayatilleke points out:

It is of great significance that apart from the traditional exegesis on sañkhāra in 'anicca vata sañkhāra', as 'all compounded constituents' there isn't a single instance in the Canon of the word being used of a material object or objects compounded of elements... yet it is evident that some translators seemed to have been guided largely by the etymology of the term than by the meaning elicited in its several contexts, and this explains the choice of such terms as 'component things, confections, combinations, conformations, compositions, aggregates, compounds, syntheses, etc'...(these) seem to stray unnecessarily from the central notion of the concept as denoting 'will'.

This argument is further reinforced by such texts as S.3.60, where sañkhāra is used synonymously with the conative term cetanā (will, volition, purposeful striving).

Katamā ca sañkhāra? Chayime...cetanākāya: rūpasañcetanā saddasañcetanā gandhasañcetanā raḥasañcetanā phoṭṭhabassañcetanā dhamma-sañcetanā.

What are the sāṅkhāras? They are these six forms of purposeful striving: striving for form, for sound, for smell, for taste, for touch, for mental images.

Vībhāṇa, the fifth and final khandha, is a complicated term in its own right, and like sāṅkhāra will be examined in detail in the next chapter. As 'consciousness', it plays an obvious and crucial role in the psychophysical structure of the five aggregates.

It is important to emphasize that all of these aggregates are impermanent and in a constant state of flux. This means that they are subject to a law of causation (asaṅkāryavada) which states that for everything that is caused there must be a previous and different effect ('katamo eko dhamma? sabbe sattā āhāratṭhitikā, sabbe sattā sāṁkhāra-tṭhitikā' - 'What is the single doctrine? All beings persist through causes. All beings persist through condition.' D.3.211). Because the khandhas arise out of a cause, they therefore cannot be self-existing. Physiologically, this is demonstrated in the continuous breakdown and restructuring of the cells, in the fact that nothing in the body, not even nails, teeth or bones, have a permanency in their present state of longer than seven years. And again, from a mental point of view, what one may think to be a permanent entity, such as the mind, is in reality a continual flux of sensations, perceptions, volitions and states of consciousness and unconsciousness. Thus we can concede that the pañcakkhandha is a conditioned process ('hetu paticca sambhotam, hetu bhanga nirujjhati' -
by reason of a cause they came to be, by rupture of a cause they die away' S.1.134). None of the constituents of the pañcakkhandha can exist apart from the others. Even consciousness (viññāna) is seen to be ultimately dependent on the physical body:

Ayam kho me kāyo rūpi cātum maha bhūtiko mātā-pettika sambhavo odanakumās upacayo anicc'ucchādana parimaddena bhedana viddhamśana dhammo, idaṁ ca pana me viññānam ettha sitam ettha patibaddhan ti.

This body of mine has form, it is built up of the four elements, it springs from father and mother, it is continually renewed by so much boiled rice and juicy foods, its nature is impermanence, decay, abrasion, dissolution and disintegration; and therein is this consciousness of mine, too, resting, for on that does it depend. D.1.76.

As a description of what the 'self' is, the pañcakkhandha seems quite complete. Because the pañcakkhandha is a process, it is something that has no permanency, and for this reason it is painfulness. For the average individual, however, the origins of painfulness may not be immediately apparent in the pañcakkhandha. In order to come to grips with this problem, the Buddha gave an even more intricate description of man and his involvement with painfulness in the well-known formula of the paticcasamuppāda.
THE PATICCASAMUPPĀDA

At the heart of the Buddhist enlightenment stands the paticcasamuppāda (paticca - grounded on, samuppāda - origin, genesis: "arising on the grounds of a preceding cause", "causal genesis", "dependent origination"). This is clearly brought out in S.2.10:

Pubbe va me bhikkhave sambodhā anabhisambuddhassa bodhisattaseva sato etad ahosi. Kiccham vatāyam loko āpanno jāyati ca jāyati ca miyati ca cavati ca upapajjati ca. Atha ca pan 'imassa dukkhassa nissaraṇam nappa jānāti jarāmaraṇassa. Kudassu nāma imassa dukkhassa nissaraṇam paññāyissati jarāmaraṇassāti.

And to me, bhikkhus, before I was enlightened, while I was yet unenlightened and bodhisat, there came this thought: alas, the world has fallen upon trouble. There is getting born and growing old, and dying and falling and being reborn. And yet from this painlessness an escape is not known, even from decay and death. O when shall escape from this painlessness, even from decay and death, be revealed?

Having given this simple outline of painlessness, the buddhā goes on to develop how in his enlightenment he comes to understand painlessness as becoming (samudayo), and becoming as a process of cause and effect (paticcasamuppāda):
Then to me, bhikkhus, came this thought: What now being present, does decay and death come to be? What conditions decay and death? Then to me, thinking about this right to its foundation (yoniso - thinking with great penetration) came to pass understanding of insight: let there be birth, then there is decay and death. Decay and death is conditioned by birth. Then to me, bhikkhus, came this thought: what now being present, does birth come to be? What conditions birth? Then to me, thinking with great penetration, came to pass comprehension of insight: let there be becoming, then birth comes to be...let there be grasping, then becoming comes to be...let there be craving, then grasping comes to be...let there be feeling, then craving comes to be...let there be contact, then feeling comes to be...let there be sense impression, then contact comes to be...let there be name and form, then
sense functions come to be...let there be consciousness, then name and form come to be...let there be ignorance, then volition comes to be; volition is in turn conditioned by ignorance. Such is this willing conditioned by ignorance and the rest. Even so is the coming to be of this entire aggregate of painfulness.

Coming to be! Coming to be! At that thought, bhikkhus, there arose in me, in things not learned before vision, there arose in me knowledge, insight arose, wisdom arose, light arose.

At the outset, it should be emphasized that the paticcasaṣampada has a versatile role in Buddhist thought. This fact has confused some Western scholars who have tried to defend a limited meaning for the formula. Thus A. B. Keith argued that the paticcasaṣampada was only "an explanation of misery; it tells us nothing regarding the physical causes".\(^{34}\) This opinion was endorsed by E. J. Thomas\(^ {35}\) and R. E. Hume.\(^ {36}\) On the other hand, there are scholars who emphasize that the paticcasaṣampada has a causal focus. Thus Grimm sees the paticcasaṣampada as an explanation of how the "incredible essence" of man "comes to the world, to the realm of anatta, of not-self", how he has got into this "world of becoming".\(^ {37}\)

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\(^{34}\) Keith, A. B. Buddhist Philosophy. op cit. p. 113.


\(^{37}\) Grimm, G. The Doctrine of the Buddha. op cit. p. 175.
T. W. Rhys Davids also stresses the causal theme of the *paticcasamuppāda*, but points out that it is likewise an answer to the arising of *dukkha*, an argument he defends by appealing to many textual sources. He is supported by K. N. Jayatilleke, who argues that the formula gives "a causal account of the factors operating in maintaining the process of the individual and thereby of suffering" as well as being employed "to substitute an empirical causal explanation of the (relative) origin and development of the individual in place of an explanation in terms of metaphysical first causes or final causes".

It is evident, therefore, that in the Nikāyas the *paticcasamuppāda* answers to the problem of the origin of painfulness, and as well is a description of psycho-physical and causal structure of man. In this way, it is a micro-cosmic picture of *samsāra*, of each 'wheel of life' (*bhavacakka*) that arises and passes away. It can also be argued that part of the *paticcasamuppāda* is the most detailed structural concept of mind that we have in the Nikāyas. The term has, then, a variety of theological and psychological functions in Buddhist thought.

It is further significant to point out that the *paticcasamuppāda* was not a fixed formula in early Buddhism. This is demonstrated in the wide variation of causal formulas

\[38\] Cf. Introduction to the Mahanidanasutta (D.15).

found in the Nikāyas. Traditionally, the formula begins with ignorance (avijjā) and ends with old age and death (jaramaranam). In between these factors are ten other "nidānas" (spokes or causal factors). Thus ignorance is said to 'condition' (paccaya) our volitional tendencies and activities (saṅkhāras). The saṅkhāra, conditioned by the illusion of self-hood ("ego"-ism), produce a consciousness

Centuries after the Nikāyas were set down, Buddhaghosa commented on these varied causal descriptions, and gave this not unpleasing opinion: "The Blessed One's teaching of pāṭiccasamuppāda is fourfold, namely: from the beginning, or from the middle up to the end, or from the end, or from the middle, down to the beginning. It is like four creeper-gatherers' ways of seizing a creeper". Vsm. 27. 28.

Paccaya (pati + jī, compounded also as paticca) literally means "resting on", "cause", "requisite". It is a concept which must have caused difficulties for the early Buddhists, because in the Paṭṭhāna of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka we have a complex enlargement of the basic meaning of paccaya as "cause". The Paṭṭhāna gives twenty-four aspects of conditionality to define what can happen in any one particular cause-effect relationship. In summary, it shows how every mental state is related to the succeeding one in at least four different ways: by proximity (anantara) in time and place, by 'contiguity' (samanantara) as in touching, by absence (n'atthi), and by 'abeyance' (avigata), a state of waiting or expectation. Simply stated, this means that each expired thought process 'renders service' (upakara) to the next mental state, passing on the totality of its energy (passaya satti) to the next thought. Although the twenty-four paccaya of the Abhidhamma Paṭṭhāna is a later elaboration of the causal action in the pāṭiccasamuppāda (and is therefore properly outside of the scope of this thesis), one feature of this Abhidhamma development is of particular interest to us, and that is the first so-called 'hetu paccaya', or 'root condition'. The significance of the Abhidhamma recognition of a 'root condition' will become clearer as this thesis develops a concept of the unconscious in the Nikāyas, but for now we should note that the 'root condition' of the twenty-four paccaya is made up of the kusala and akusala mūla (moral and immoral roots, i.e. lobha - alobha, greed and greedlessness; dosa - adosa, hate and hatelessness; moha - amoha, delusion or undeludedness).
(viññāna) which in turn conditions a psychophysical organism or 'personality' (nāmarūpa). 42 The psychophysical organism conditions its six bases of sense cognition (salāyatana), and the senses condition the quality of our impressions (phasso). The impressions condition the pleasant, unpleasant and neutral feelings that we have (vedanā), and these feelings, along with all the previous conditioning factors, both condition craving and are used as instruments of craving (tanhā). Craving thence conditions a state of entanglement or clinging (upadana), and this state in turn conditions a process of

Although the Paṭṭhāna is careful not to interpret the mūla as a primal cause of the other paccaya, it does describe them as "a condition by way of root (mūla) for the mental phenomena". At the outset, the Abhidhamma may seem to emphasize the crucial importance of the mūla more than the Sutta does, but what is often overlooked is the fact that the Nikāyas themselves contain many telling references to the moral and immoral roots, and it will be our responsibility to carefully investigate this evidence, to see what its implications are and especially to seek out the relationship which the immoral roots may have with tanhā.

42 In our examination of the pañcakkhandha, we pointed out that rūpa consists of the four primary modes. Nāma corresponds to the four mental khandhas, although sometimes the Nikāyas refer to the sankhāra and viññāna khandhas as cetanā (volition) and manasikāro, as in S.2.3:

Katamañca bhikkhave nāmarūpam?
Vedanā saññā cetanā phasso
manasikāro: idam vuccati
nāmam. Cattāro ca mahābhūtā
catunnañca mahābhūtānām
upādāyā rūpam. Idam vuccati
rūpam.

What, bhikkhus, is name and form? Feeling, perception, willing, stimulation, mental attention: this is called name. The four elements and the form derived from them: this is called form.
becoming (bhava) in conformity with the individual's pattern of conditioned background. From 'becoming' results birth (jāti) with its inevitable sequence of decay and death (jāti paccayā jaramaranam).

This format is not always followed, however. Sometimes the causal process is described as beginning, rather than ending, with old age and death (M.1.49). In other texts, the sequence is frequently shortened, listing only a few of the nidānas. Thus M.1.38 omits the traditional first six factors; and starts with vedāna (feelings), and in M.1.256, tanhā is the first factor listed. Again, at times one particular factor may receive more attention than others. For example, craving may be further outlined as kāmutschā (sensuous craving), bhavatāna (craving for life and egoistic pursuits) and vibhavatāna (craving for destruction); or grasping may be described as kāmaupādāna (grasping for sensual pleasure), ditthupādāna (grasping for theories), silābbatupādāna (grasping for customs and rituals) and attavādupādāna (grasping in a belief of the soul and substance). Occasionally, the sequence of causes is so arranged to give special emphasis to one factor as the key to the ceasing of becoming and painfulness (cf. tanhā in S.4.86, M.1.256), and it is not uncommon to find only one of the factors mentioned as the cause of painfulness (i.e. avijjā, Sn.3.12.6, M.1.54; viññāna, S.2.13; tanhā, S.5.420).

The important point here is that the patiācasamuppāda
had no one first cause. What it describes is a cyclical wheel of life that is based on a series of causes and effects, with no beginning and no end in sight. Wherever and whenever this wheel turns, there will be painfulness.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONCEPT OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE PATICCASAMUPPADA

The paticcasamuppada is not only a description of man in a state of painfulness, but it also contains within it the answer to the problem of pain. It does this in particular by showing how consciousness directly contributes to states of painfulness. Although like the pañcakkhandha, the formula of 'conditioned genesis' shows how the mind and physiological functions of the body coexist in one psychophysical framework, it can be argued that unlike the pañcakkhandha, the central emphasis of the paticcasamuppada is seen in its sophisticated theory of consciousness. Rune Johansson brings this point into relief for us when he writes:

- In spite of this dependence (between mind and body), the bodily processes are not further analysed, and the conscious phenomena are always treated as the most important. This may be one of the reasons why the series of dependencies (paticcasamuppada) often seems to mention things in the wrong order. We are, for instance, used to consider needs as more basic than consciousness, and to interpret consciousness as depending on perception and perception as depending on the sense organs. Buddhist thinking seems to have started from what
is immediately given and most important to the person, namely activity and consciousness. The relations of the rest is to a great extent implication and activation. 43

If Johansson is correct, and we will argue more fully in the next chapter that he is, then consciousness in the patīccasamuppāda should be regarded as more than just an accumulation of mental phenomena. It is a 'process' involving sensory perception, impressions, feelings and craving. Apart from the psychological importance of this theory, its soteriological significance cannot be underestimated. The world in itself cannot be regarded as either painful or not painful. It is only our relationship to it through our consciousness that makes it one way or the other. Therein lies the clue to the Buddha's teaching of deliverance. The average man (puthujjana) accepts as valid what his senses have to tell him about the world. In his ignorance (avijjā), he is unaware of the momentariness (khanika) and impermanency not only of the objective world (anicca), but of his own 'self' (anattā). Although his senses may accurately tell him that ice is cold or the clouds are white, they are ultimately unreliable because they present information which is relevant only to the illusory "ego". Our selfish attitude towards the ego is the basis for craving and attachment. Consequently, we do not perceive the objective world without attaching

ego-centric values to what we are conscious of. To be attached to anything, whether it is a car, a woman, a nation, or even a doctrine, is to approach that entity as something that is mine, or yours, or ours. Such attachment can only bring painfulness, because, as we have previously emphasized, it is impossible to satisfy an attachment to momentary events.

The focus of Buddhist soteriology is principally aimed at eradicating this attachment and false sense of 'self' by mastering this consciousness and the thirsting forces that lie within and behind it. An understanding of the patíccasamuppáda makes this liberation possible, for knowledge of the patíccasamuppáda is the key to enlightenment ('yo patíccasamuppádam passati so dhammam passati, yo dhammam passati so patíccasamuppádam passatiti'. 'He who sees the nature of dependent origination sees the dhamma, and he who sees the dhamma sees dependent origination'. M.I.191), an enlightenment which leads above all to the dissolution of egocentricity, craving and consequent painfulness:

Yato ca kho, Sáripputta bhikkhuno-imasmim ca sayinña-káye-ahankára-mamankára-mánánusaya na honti, bhikkhu ca sabbannimitteu ahankára-mamankára-mánánusaya na honti, yaṃ ca cetovimuttim paññavimuttim upasampajja viharato ahankára-mamankára-mánánusaya na honti, tam ca cetovimuttim paññavimuttim upasampajja viharati.
Ayam vuccati Sáripputta bhikkhu acchechchi tanhám, vavattayi.
samyojanam, samma mānabhissmayā antamakāsi dukkhassa.

In so far as a bhikkhu, Sāriputta, has in this body together with consciousness no tendency (anusaya) to the conceit "I" or "mine", abides in the attainment of that mind's release, of that release through insight, there is no tendency to the conceit "I" and "mine" - such a bhikkhu, Sāriputta, has cut off craving, has broken the bonds, has by perfect comprehension of conceit made an end of painfulness. A.I.133.

To sum up, in this chapter we have investigated the central Buddhist theological issue of painfulness. First, we pointed out that our tools for this investigation are contained within the second noble truth, the cause for the arising of painfulness. Thus secondly, given various expressions of phenomenological, psychological and existential painfulness in the Nikāyas, it was demonstrated that they are best understood by seeing them in the perspective of the Buddhist concept of flux (khaṇika, saṃsāra) and thence by tracing out their causal backgrounds. This is especially crucial for coming to grips with that kind of painfulness associated with false ideas of personality or 'self'. In order to explain the 'self' and how it provokes painfulness, we looked at two early Buddhist psychophysical descriptions of man, the pañcakkhandha and the paticcasamuppāda. Of these two, the paticcasamuppāda gave us the most detailed causal picture answering to both the question of self and the arising of painfulness. In particular, this formula also provided us with a theory of consciousness, a theory we
argued was the heart of the paticcasamuppāda and the key to the problem of dukkha. In early Buddhist psychology, consciousness reflects a whole attitude towards the 'self' and the world, and for the average individual, it is a consciousness warped and controlled by craving. Of strategic soteriological importance, therefore, is to see how craving is involved in the process of consciousness.

This leads us directly into the issues raised in the next chapter. At this point, we have a picture of man open to various aspects of painfulness. These aspects are basically psychological and have their genesis in craving. What we need to do now is to see in greater detail the etiology and mechanics of craving as it operates not only in the paticcasamuppāda, but in other descriptions of the mind, notably mano, citta and sankhāra. Once this is done, the full significance of craving as the principle cause of painfulness will be clearly evident.
CHAPTER III

MIND AND TANHĀ

In this chapter we are concerned with the early Buddhist description of how craving arises within the mind and how it can affect the individual. Our aim is to examine the major Pāli terms related to the mind with a view to determining as comprehensively as possible the aetiological background and scope of craving.

First we will consider the concept of consciousness in the dhamma. Here our study will concentrate particularly on the term viññāna and the other factors, including tanhā, which are closely related to it. Secondly, the term mano, often interpreted as an inner sense with an active instrumental function, will be reviewed. Thirdly, we will investigate the term citta, which has an experiential function all of its own in many ways suggesting it is the core of 'personality'. Fourthly, we will turn our attention to the question of the unconscious in the Nikayas. Here we will argue that behind conscious craving are unconscious roots and inclinations which must be penetrated and controlled if craving itself is to be mastered. These four areas of examination will provide us with an inclusive picture of the
early Buddhist concept of mind, and an understanding of how craving arises and operates within it.

**VINÑĀNA AND TAMHĀ**

In the *paticcasamuppāda*, the term used for consciousness is *vinñāna*, and in this section we want to show how closely craving is related to *vinñāna*. There is a basic problem here, however, in interpreting what the early Buddhists mean by *vinñāna* both as 'consciousness' and as the term occurs in uses outside the *paticcasamuppāda*. For apart from its role in the *paticcasamuppāda*, *vinñāna* is also used in two other quite different contexts - as a factor in meditation and as the survival factor in rebirth. Although it should be emphasized that the *vinñāna* of the *paticcasamuppāda* and the *vinñāna* of meditation and rebirth refer to the various functions of the one factor, the reader must be aware of the versatile nature of this factor if he is to capture the complexity of the Buddhist concept of consciousness.

Our approach to this problem of interpretation will be threefold. First, the function of *vinñāna* and its relationship to craving in the *paticcasamuppāda* will be established. Secondly, we will show how *vinñāna* and *tanha* are involved together as the determining factor of rebirth. Thirdly, and lastly, consideration will be given as to why the Buddhists place such great emphasis on the correct development of consciousness as a factor in meditation useful in curbing
and redirecting the energy of craving.

Our first objective then, is to set down the central texts which explain what viññāna is, and how it involves craving. These texts will show that tanhā is in fact part of a whole process of consciousness, and not a separate and isolated phenomenon.

The root of viññāna is vi + jna, from which is developed both the noun viññāna and the verb vijānati (to become aware). The major function of viññāna is stressed in MA.292:

Viññānam viññānan-ti āvuso vuccati,
Kittāvatā nu kho āvuso viññānan-ti vuccatīti. Vijānāti vijānatīti kho āvuso, tasmā viññānan-ti vuccatī,
kiñ-ca vijānāti: sukhān-ti pi vijānāti, dukkhānti pi vijānāti,
adukkhāmasukhān-ti pi vijānāti.
Vijānāti vijānatīti kho āvuso, tasmā viññānan-ti vuccatīti.

Your reverence, it is called viññāna, viññāna. Now in what respects, your reverence, is it called viññāna?
Your reverence, it is called viññāna because it notices (vijānati—becomes aware, discriminates). And what does it notice? It notices pleasure, pain and neutral feelings. If it is said "it notices, it notices", your reverence, there it is called viññāna.

At MA.53, a further listing of six kinds of 'noticing' or 'awareness' ('cha...viññāna kaya') is developed, "becoming aware" through the visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactial and mental processes, emphasizing the close relationship between viññāna and the senses.

The question of how closely viññāna is dependent
upon and related to other mental phenomena, however, can only be determined by interpreting the role it plays in the *patiṭcassamuppāda*. Here, a controversy has arisen over the question of the relationship *viṭṭhāna* has with the factors following it in the formula. In modern Buddhist psychological studies, this controversy has provoked two different answers. On the one hand, there are those who argue that *viṭṭhāna* should be understood apart from the other factors of the *patiṭcassamuppāda*, and rigidly interpreted as only "awareness" or "sensation". On the other hand, there are scholars who argue that the function of *viṭṭhāna* in the *patiṭcassamuppāda* cannot be adequately explained apart from these other factors. A good way this issue can be exemplified is to take a particular Sutta text, and see what these two schools of thought have to say about it. One such text is found in *M.l.l.l.*:

Yam kho no āvuso Bhagavā saṅkhittena uddesām uddisitvā... viṭṭhām paviṭṭho: Yatoniḍāṇam bhikkhu pūrisam-pe-aparisesā nirujjhantīti, imassa kho aham āvuso Bhagavatā saṅkhittena uddesassā uddiṭṭhassa viṭṭhārena atthām avi- bhattassa evaṃ viṭṭhārena atthām ājānāmi: Cakkhuḥ - c'āvuso paticca rūpe ca uppa- jjati cakkhuviṭṭhānam, tiṇṇam saṅgati phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā, yam vedeti tam saṅjānāti, yam saṅjānāti ṭam vita-kketi, yam vitakketi tam papañceti...

Your reverences, in regard to that sermon which the Blessed One recited in brief... 'Whatever is the origin', bhikkhu, of the number of obsessions and perceptions which assail a man...are stopped without remainder', of that sermon recited by the Blessed One in brief but whose meaning
was not explained in full, I understand the meaning in full thus: Dependent on the eye and material forms arises visual consciousness, the meeting of the three is sensory contact, dependent on contact is feeling, what one feels, one recognizes, what one recognizes one thinks about (vitakketi), and what one thinks about obsesses (or deludes - papañceti) one...

How are we to understand the noun viññāna in this paragraph? One argument put forward by E. R. Sarathchandra\(^1\) claims that because viññāna comes before vedanā and sañña\(^2\) in the causal process, therefore viññāna can mean no more than 'sensation'. He finds the interpretation of viññāna as a general term for sense consciousness to be too broad and misleading. Thus he writes, "when it (viññāna) came to be applied to the psychology of perception, it meant not full cognition, but bare sensation, a sort of anaetic sentence that occurs before the object is completely comprehended".\(^3\)

Other contemporary Buddhist scholars, notably K. N. Jayatilleke and Rune Johansson, argue that viññāna has a much wider meaning when seen, as it must be, in conjunction with other factors of the paticcasaṃuppāda. Thus

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\(^2\)Although sañña (perception) is strictly speaking not listed as one of the spokes of the paticcasaṃuppāda, its function is presumed in the factor salayatana, or six sense bases.

Jayatilleke suggests that in the selected passage above (M.1.111), viññāna is best translated as 'perception', but it should be understood that vedanā, sañña and viññāna arise simultaneously to give this meaning of "perception". Vedanā and sañña are therefore directly involved in the function of viññāna. Here, Jayatilleke has taken "tinnaṃ...vitakketi" to be an appositional expansion of 'cakkhuviññānam'.

Johansson supports Jayatilleke to the extent that he also sees a close relationship between viññāna and several of the following factors in the paticcasamuppāda. But Johansson goes even further, and develops a unique and highly plausible argument in his theory of a "viññāna process". In this theory, he postulates that there is a process of consciousness in the paticcasamuppāda that includes viññāna, nāmarūpa, salāyatana, phassa, vedanā and tanhā. "All these factors in the centre of the series", he writes, "are certainly not causal; they are rather a further analysis of the viññāna-process, and the arrangement is one of implication and correlation rather than causality". For Johansson, then, the "becoming aware" function of viññāna is described in terms of process rather than entity ("saṅkhārasamudaya viññānasamudayo,


sānkhaśanirodha viññānanirodha' - 'from the arising of sānkhaśa, viññāna arises; from the stopping of sānkhaśa, viññāna stops'. M.1.53). This is further reinforced in M.1.256, where viññāna is described as "named according to whatever condition it arises through" (i.e. 'cakkhuṇa paticca rūpe ca uppajati viññānam, cakkhuviññānam t'eva saṅkham gacchati' - 'if viññāna arises dependent on eye and forms, it is called eye - viññāna'), and in the frequent occurrence of the expression 'viññānasotam' (the stream or flow of viññāna, i.e. D.3.105).

The position argued in this thesis is that Jayatilleke and Johansson are justified in their observations about the relationship viññāna has with subsequent factors in the paticcasamuppāda. Sarathchandra's notion that the traditional cause and effect sequence of factors in the paticcasamuppāda prevents viññāna from bearing a developed sense of consciousness seems to reflect an excessively mechanical view of the sequence. His argument that viññāna comes before saññā and vedanā is weak because that sequence is not followed in all the texts. As has already been pointed out, the paticcasamuppāda was not a fixed device in early Buddhism, and the formula has several different sequences of factors. In some Nikāya passages, saññā and vedanā come before viññāna, as for example in M.1.293 ('yam vedeti tam sañjānati, yam sañjānati

7cf. p. 135 above.
tām viʒāṇāti’ - 'whatever one feels, that one perceives; whatever one perceives, that one is conscious of'). Other texts point to a relationship between viññāṇa and other factors of the patiṣcaṣaṃuppāda which make them virtually interchangeable. Thus in M.1.293 we find:

Ya c'āvuso vedanā yā ca saṃā na yañ-ca viññāṇam ime dhamma samsaṭṭhā udāhu visamsatthā, labhā ca paṇṭ imesam dhammanām vinibbhujitvā vinibbhujitvā nānākaraṇāṃ paññāpetun-ti.

Ya c'āvuso vedanā yā ca saṃā na yañ-ca viññāṇam ime dhamma samsattā no visamsattā, na ca labhā imesam dhammanām vinibbhujitvā vinibbhujitvā nānā karaṇām paññāpetum. Yām h'āvuso vedetī tam saṃjāṇati, yam saṃjāṇati tam viṣjāṇati, tasmā ime dhamma sam-saṭṭhā no visamsaṭṭhā, na ca labbhā imesam dhammanams vinibbhujitvā vinibbhujitvā nānākaraṇām paññāpetun-ti.

Your reverence, that which is feeling, and that which is perception and that which is consciousness - are these states related or unrelated? And is it possible to lay down a difference between these states, having analysed them repeatedly?

That which is feeling, your reverence, and that which is perception and that which is consciousness - these states are related, not unrelated, and it is not possible to lay down a difference between these states, having analysed them repeatedly. Your reverence, whatever one feels, that one perceives; whatever one perceives that one discriminates; therefore these states are related, not unrelated, and it is not possible to lay down a difference between these states, having analysed them repeatedly.

And again, other examples emphasize the support
various factors lend to consciousness. D.3.228 illustrates this kind of relationship between viññāna and saññā:

Saññūpāyam vā...viññānam titthamānam
titthati saññārammaṇam saññāpatiṇītham
nandūpavesanam vuddhiṁ virūhiṁ
veṣullam āpajjati...

Viññāna is firmly supported by means of saññā, with saññā as object, with saññā as support, it attains to happiness, growth, increase and full development.

In S.2.114, the relationship between viññāna and nāmarūpa is compared to two bales of reeds both supporting each other:

Seyyathāpi āvuso dve nalakalāpiyo
aṅhamāṇam nissaya tittheyyum
evameva kho nāmarūpapaccaya viññānam
viññāna paccayā nāmarūpam...
Evam etassa kevalassa dukkhhakhandhassa samudayo hoti. Tesane...
nalakalāpiṇam ekam ākādheyya ekā
apateyye, aparame ākādheyya
apara pateyya. Evam eva kho
āvuso nāmarūpanirodha viññānanir-
rodho viññānanirodha nāmarūpa-
nirodho...evam etassa kevalassa
dukkhhakhandhassa nirodho hoti.

Your reverence, just as two bundles of reeds were to stand one supporting the other, even-so consciousness is dependent on name-and-form, and name-and-form is dependent on consciousness... thus is the arising of the entire mass of painfulness. But, your reverence, if one of those two bundles of reeds is drawn out, the other one would fall down, and if the latter is drawn, the former one will fall down. Even so, your reverence, with the cessation of name-and-form, consciousness ceases, with the cessation of consciousness, name and form ceases...thus comes to be the cessation of this entire mass of painfulness.
We have seen how vinñana and the factors of name-and-form, sensory impressions and feelings can all be interpreted as arising simultaneously in support of each other, making consciousness part of a process involving several factors at once. The key question now is if there is any evidence that tanha, too, is part of this process.

Johansson has argued that tanha is part of a vinñana "process". The principal text in support of this argument is S.4.86. In this description of a series of dependencies, vinñana and tanha are described as the beginning and end of a sequence that Johansson argues should be understood not so much in terms of 'causality', but in terms of 'implication', because the factors are 'correlative' to each other (i.e. so related that each implies or complements the other).

Cakkhum ca paticca rūpe ca upppardati cakkhunvinñanam; tīṇṇam sangati phasso; phassupaccayā vedahā; vedanāpaccayā tanha; tassāyeva tanhāya aśesāvirāganirodhā bhavanirōdho; bhavanirōdha jātinirōdho; jātinirōdha jàramarānāma sokaparideva-dukkha-domanassupāyāsā nīrijñhanti.

Depending on eye and forms arises eye-consciousness (the text repeats the same about the other senses and their objects). The coming together of the three is stimulation. Depending on stimulation is feeling. Depending on feeling is craving. But by utter passionless ceasing of craving comes ceasing of becoming. By ceasing of becoming comes ceasing of birth. By the ceasing of birth comes the ceasing of old age and death, of sorrow and grief, of woe, of lamentation and despair.
Commenting on the viññāna "process" he sees in this text, Johansson writes:

From the modern point of view it seems very logical to start with the sense processes; the objects, the sense-organs and the processes of stimulation. That these stimulations are received and evaluated in terms of feelings, is also good psychology. The needs and desires are nowadays considered to be as basic facts as the sense-processes; and they would not be placed in a dependent position by modern psychology, but the Buddhist way of thinking can also be accepted. From the Buddhist point of view it is very significant, that the formulation changes on this point, because the desires are the great problem, and the series goes on to explain that rebirth is stopped if desire is stopped.

In Johansson's judgment, therefore, craving is the terminal factor in a process of consciousness which begins with viññāna. This is a sound argument, but it does not by itself give us enough of an indication of the strategic role tanhā plays in this 'process'.

The texts on the 'four foods' (cattāro āhārā, cf. D.3.211; S.2.11, 99, 101; M.1.256) illustrate the dynamic role craving has in its relationship with consciousness. These texts further point out that from another perspective tanhā stands behind the operation of consciousness and to a large extent regulates and manages it. Unlike its role in

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Johansson, H. The Psychology of Nirvāṇa. op cit. p. 82.
...86, then, where tanhā is the terminal factor of a process of consciousness, here tanhā is described as the genesis of consciousness. These two theories may appear to be inconsistent, but as was pointed out above, the sequence of factors in the early Buddhist theory of causality is a flexible one. Whether craving is seen as the end of the process of consciousness in one case and the origin in another, it is significant that in both examples it is craving which is responsible for "becoming" (bhava), using consciousness as the instrument to further this becoming.

In turning to the analogy of the 'foods', M.1.256 points out that they are ordinary food, sensory stimulation, volition and consciousness, and each has craving as its source:

Cattāro me bhikkhaye āhāra bhūtānam vā sattānam ṭhitiyā sambhayesīnām vā anuggahāya, katame cattāro; kālim kāro āhāro oḷariko vā sukhumo vā, phassa dūtiyo, mano-sūncetana-tatiyā, viññānaṃ catuttham. Ime ca bhikkhave cattāro āhāra kimnidāna kim-

samudaya kimjātikā kimpabhavā: ime cattāro āhāra tanhānidāna tanhāsamudayā, tanhājatika tanhāpabhavā...

Ābhikkhus, these four forms of food are for the maintenance of creatures that have come to be or for the assistance of those seeking birth. What are the four? Ordinary food, whether gross or fine, is the second. The second is contact (sensory stimulation), the third is mental striving, and consciousness is the fourth. And of these four forms of food, bhikkhus, what is the occasion (nidāna), what is the source,
what is the birth, what is the origin? These four forms of food, bhikkhus, have craving as the occasion, craving as the source, craving as the birth, craving as the origin...M.I.256.

In another text which describes the four foods (3.2.97ff.), the arising of painfulness is traced to craving for any of the foods. But craving alone cannot instigate painfulness. It needs the vehicle of consciousness to initiate the sorrowful wheel of becoming and rebirth. If there is craving for any of the foods, then consciousness is "firmly placed" (patithitam) and "becomes fruitful" (or grows - virulham):

Kabalimkāre (phasse, manosāncetanāya, viññāne...pe) ce bhikkhave āhāre atthi rāgo atthi nandi atthi tanhā patiṭṭhitam tattha viññānam virūham. Yattha patiṭṭhitam viññānam virūham, atthi tattha nāmarūpassa avakkanti. Yattha atthi nāmarūpassa avakkanti atthi tattha sankhārānam vuddhi. Yattha atthi sankhārānam vuddhi atthi tattha ayatim punabhavābhīnibbatti. Yattha atthi ayatim punabhavābhīnibbatti atthi tattha ayatim jātijarāmaranam. Yattha atthi ayatim jātijarāmaranam sasokantam bhikkhave, sadaram saupāyasanti vadāmi...pe.

Seyyathāpi bhikkhave rajako va cittakāro va sati-rajanāya va lākhāya va haliddiyā va niliyā va mahetthāya va suparimaṭṭhe va phalake bhittiyā va dusspaṭhe va itthirūpam va purisarūpam va abhinimineyya sabbangapaccangam. Evam eva kho kabalimkāre (phasse, manosāncetanāya, viññāne...pe) ce āhāre atthi rāgo atthi nandi atthi tanhā patiṭṭhitam tattha viññānam virūham. Yattha patiṭṭhitam viññānam virūham atthi-tattha nāmarūpassa avakkanti. Yattha atthi nāmarūpassa avakkanti atthi tattha sankhārānam vuddhi...yattha atthi ayatim punabhavābhīnibbatti atthi tattha ayatim jātijarāmaranam...sasokantam sadaram saupāyasan. Kabalimkāre (phasse, manosāncetanāya, viññāne...pe) ce āhāre naththi rāgo naththi nandi naththi tanhā appatiṭṭhitam tattha viññānam avirūham. Yattha appatiṭṭhitam viññānam avirūham naththi tattha nāmarūpassa avakkanti...naththi tattha sankhārānam vuddhi...yattha naththi ayatim punabhavābhīnibbatti naththi tattha ayatim jātijarāmaranam...asokantam adaram anupāyasanti.

natthi rago natthi nandi natthi tanhā appatitthitam tattha viññānam avirūlham. Yattha appatitthitam viññānam avirūlham natthi tattha nāmarūpasaṅga avakānti...
natthi tattha saṅkhārānaṁ vuddhi. Yattha natthi āyatim punabhavābhiniṁbatti natthi tattha āyatim jāti jāmarāmanāṁ...
asokantaṁ adaraṁ anupāyāsanti.

Bhikkhus, there are these four foods for the maintenance of beings that have been born, or for the conditioning of those seeking to come to be. What are the four? Ordinary food, gross or fine; the second is contact, volition is the third, consciousness is the fourth. And how is ordinary food to be understood? When ordinary food is well understood, the passions of the five senses are well understood. When the passions of the five senses are well understood, the letters by which the Aryan disciple (sāvaka-hearer) could again come into this world do not exist. And how is the food of contact to be understood? When such food is well understood, the three feelings (i.e. pleasant, painful and neutral) are well understood. When the three feelings are well understood, I say that there is nothing further which the Aryan disciple has to do. And how is the food that is volition to be understood? When the food of volition is well understood, the three cravings (sensual craving, craving for life, and craving for death) are well understood. When these are well understood, I say that there is nothing further the Aryan disciple has to do. And how is the food of consciousness to be understood? When consciousness is well understood, name and form is well understood. When name and form is well understood, I say there is nothing further an Aryan disciple has to do...(and further), bhikkhus, if there be passion, if there be delight, if there be craving as to ordinary food (and as to the other three foods), it is there that consciousness is firmly placed and becomes fruitful. Where consciousness is firmly placed and becomes fruitful, there is descent of name and form. Where there
is descent of name and form, there is growth of volition. Where there is growth of volition, in the future there is becoming and rebirth. Where in the future there is becoming and rebirth, there in the future is decay and death. Where there is in the future decay and death, I say too, bhikkhus, that with it is grief, despair and trouble.

Bhikkhus, it is just as if a dyer or a painter, if there be dye, or lac, or turmeric, or indigo or crimson (paint), or a finely polished plank or wall or strip of cloth, can make a woman's or a man's shape complete in all its parts, even so, if there be passion, delight or craving as to ordinary food (or any of the other three), there is consciousness, being firmly placed and fruitful, and name and form descends, volitions grow, and in the future is becoming and rebirth, grief, despair and trouble.

Bhikkhus, it is (further) just as if there were a house or hall having windows on the north, or the south or the east. When at sunrise a stream of light enters the window, where does it fall upon? "On the west wall, lord." If there be no west wall, bhikkhus, where does it fall? "On the ground, lord." If there be no ground, bhikkhus, where does it fall? "On water, lord." If there be no water; bhikkhus, where does it fall? "It falls nowhere, lord." Bhikkhus, even so if there be no passion, no delight, no craving as to (any of the four foods), there consciousness is not placed or fruitful, there volition does not grow, there in the future is no becoming and rebirth, nor decay and death, grief, despair and trouble.

S.2.97ff.

Here, craving is seen as that which provokes consciousness to establish, fix or 'firmly place' itself upon any of the four foods. If there is craving for these foods, there consciousness finds a resting place and grows, resulting
in the descent of the sentient body, increase in volition, and future becoming and rebirth.

Up to this point we have reviewed evidence pertinent to the etiology and function of craving, and how it is related to viññāna in a 'process of consciousness'. It was argued that craving is an integral part of this process, and that however the place of craving is described in this process, either as at the beginning or the end, because it determines 'becoming', it is the most critical soteriological factor in this process.

Now we need to examine the two other aspects of viññāna specified at the beginning of this section. On the one hand, we need a clearer understanding of how viññāna and taṇhā are involved with the rebirth factor of bhava or "becoming", and on the other hand, we need to see why the Buddhists place such great emphasis on the correct development of consciousness (and therefore with all the dynamic factors involved in the arising of consciousness) in their pursuit of freedom (nibbāna). Although the soteriological significance of this latter function of viññāna will be set forth primarily in the next chapter, there is a need now to see; at least in outline, this perspective in order to give us an indication of the full range of the meaning of consciousness.
VINNANA, TANHA AND BHAVA

The Buddhist theory of *patipecasadupada* affirms that a process of consciousness contributes to the creation of a state of *bhava*, or "becoming", in the next life. This is clearly demonstrated in *S.4.86* and *S.2.97*, two texts we have just reviewed. This does not mean that a 'self' or 'soul' actually transmigrates in the form of *vinna*, nor that *vinna* goes from life to life without change of identity (*anana*). The question now to be asked then, is if *vinna* is not the equivalent of a "soul", then how does it act as a vehicle or agency that transmits an accumulation of its own "energy" and the deeds of previous lives (*kamma*).

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9. Sati apparently thought the *vinna* transmigrates without change of identity: "Evaṃ bya kho aham āvuso Bhagavata dhammam desitam ājanāmi yathā tad ev’idam vinnanam sandhāvati saṃsāra tī, anaana tī". "Your reverences, even so do I understand the dhamma taught by the Blessed One, that it is this consciousness itself that runs on, fares on, not another". *M.1.256*.

10. By the phrase "accumulation of its own energy", we refer to the Buddhist theory that consciousness of the present moment relies not only on immediate sensory data, but on previous experience and memory, for we all use past experience to interpret present perceptual experience. Malalasekera notes the significance of the past as a "flow of energies" in conscious when he writes:

Buddhism greatly stresses the importance of the present moment. The present is not regarded as an insignificant point of intersection between past and future, having an elusive,
into new life (bhava)?

There are some scholars who think that the idea of viññāna as a transmigrating agency is a later one, that it is not compatible with the 'empirical' emphasis of the function of consciousness in the paticcasamuppāda. 11 Sarathchandra, 12 for example, feels that viññāna as a 'transmigrating factor' is a later 'metaphysical' view which

even an illusory nature, but is charged with "energies" coming from the past and with a significance extending to the future. The past course of a movement and the direction to which the process moves doubtless belong to the co-determining factors of a present situation. Parts of the past and the future, also, though not "real", are yet actual, in the sense of being presently active. This fact is illustrated by the powerful influence of traditions and ideals, the one being the surviving past and the other the anticipated future. But there is another "unreal" factor acting upon the present: the "subterranean" flow of energies, originating in past actions and emerging to the surface unexpectedly, at a time determined by their inherent life-rhythm and by the influence of favouring or disturbing circumstances. These factors invest the present moment with great significance and a decisive importance.


11 See above S.2.114, V.1.76.

rose because of 'a gap in the original teaching' and because of 'the influence of the brahmanical factor' under which this new idea was fostered. He further suggests that the Buddha left no statement about this:

It was for him not a topic of prime importance. What was important was to realize that our normal empirical consciousness was not a stable entity as the philosophers of the time were trying to make out...the question as to what part of the individual actually survived through his various births would naturally arise in the popular mind, since the Buddha had not refuted the prevalent belief in reincarnation.\(^\text{13}\)

There are a number of obvious problems with Sarathchandra's argument. Jayatilleke has demonstrated that one cannot assume that there was a 'prevailing belief' in reincarnation during the Buddha's lifetime.\(^\text{14}\) Furthermore, Sarathchandra's contention that the Buddha left no statement about viññāna and rebirth is not consistent with the usual reading of the Nikāyas. Where we can agree with Sarathchandra, however, is in his concern lest viññāna be wrongly assumed to have 'attā' or 'soul' properties, that it might be interpreted as a kind of spiritual entity that continues unchanged from life to life. Viññāna is clearly not a 'soul' in the attā sense. All Buddhists concur with Sarathchandra on this point. But this does not necessarily

\(^{13}\)Ibid. p. 21.

imply that viññāna is not involved with rebirth.

There are many texts which indicate a relationship between viññāna and bhava ('Becoming' or birth). In Sn. 1055, one is urged not to set his viññāna on bhava (‘viññāṇam bhava na tīṭṭhe’). In S.2.13, viññāna is cited as the direct cause of rebirth (‘viññāṇāhāro punabbāvabhinitbattiya pācoayo’ - 'the type of food called viññāna is the cause of renewed becoming, of birth in the future'). In M.2.262, we are introduced to the unusual term 'saṁvattanika (from saṁvattati - 'conducive to, involving') viññāna', which Horner translates as 'evolving consciousness', and Wijesekera as 'the survival factor'.

\[
\text{Tassa evaṁ paṭipanassa tabbahula-vihārino ayatane cittampasīdāti sappāsāde sati etarahi vā ānaṁjam samāpajjati, paññāya va ādhipuccati. Kayassa bheda param marañā thānam etam vijjati yam ūm samvattanikam viññāṇam assa ānaṁjūpago...}
\]

While he is faring along thus, abiding given over to this, his thought is peaceful in its sphere; if he is serene either he comes to imperturbability now or he is intent on wisdom. At the breaking up of the body after dying this.

\[15\] In the paragraph preceding S.2.13, the question is raised as to "who" feeds on consciousness. The Buddha replies that this is not a proper question. Rather, the question should be, "of what, lord, is consciousness a food?" The answer is that consciousness is the cause of becoming and rebirth. This indicates that consciousness is not a 'soul', but that it does have something to do with rebirth.

situation exists, that the evolving consciousness may accordingly reach imperturbability... (Horner's translation).

From this passage alone, it can be argued that consciousness "evolves" after dying, that its causal energy is not destroyed except in nibbana.

Another way of looking at the process of rebirth is to see it in terms of the transmitting function of viññana. Karma (volitional acts, deeds)\(^\text{17}\) is generally associated with

\(\text{17}\) Few other concepts in Buddhism are more complex than that of karma, a fact stressed even in the Nikayas themselves, where the operations of karma are said to be not fully comprehensible (acinteyya, A.2.80) except "to the vision and understanding of a Buddha". At the same time, the Nikayas make constant reference to this doctrine, with the result that the general reader can find himself confused as to its meaning. The doctrine further carries with it a number of popular misconceptions, so that any serious study must sooner or later establish some salient features about karma which are based on textual evidence.

In the Nikayas, two suttas in particular (the Cūḷakammavibhaṅgasutta, M.3.203; and the Mahākammavibhaṅgasutta, M.3.207) provide us with a reliable explanation of what karma is to the Buddhists, and how it operates. Here the function of karma is defined in terms of volitional actions, actions 'morally good' (kusala - sometimes translated as "skillful", i.e. I. B. Horner, "Lesser Analysis of Deeds", Middle Length Sayings III. op cit. p. 252), morally bad or evil (akusala) or morally neutral (avyākata). As "actions", they may refer to bodily behaviour (kāyakamma), verbal behaviour (vācikamma) and psychological behaviour (manokamma). But central to the doctrine of karma is the intentional, conscious volition (cetanā) that stands behind behaviour or deeds. The volitional dimension of karma is what gives it its theological significance in Buddhism:

Saṅcetanikāṁ, āvuso Samiddhi, kammaṁ katvā kāyena vācāya manasā, kiṁ so vediyatiti? Saṅcetanikāṁ, āvuso Potaliṣṭutta, kammaṁ katvā kāyena vācāya manasā, dukkhaṁ so vediyatiti.
samkhāra (volition - i.e. "samkhāra, bhikkhus, I say is kamma" - D.2.63, A.3.9), and for this reason the Nikāyas do not have that much to say about vinñāṇa as the agency of karma. But in one key text (A.1.233), vinñāṇa, kamma and tanhā are all seen to function together in the process of rebirth:

Kammaṁ khettaṁ vinñāṇam bijam tanhā sineho avijjāni - varanam sattanām tanhāsamyojanānam hinaya dhātuya vinñāṇam patitthitam.

Kamma is the field, vinñāṇa the seed, tanhā the moisture. Of beings that are hindered by ignorance, fettered by craving, consciousness gets support in low (hīna - inferior, poor) conditions.

Venerable Samiddhi, when one has intentionally done a deed by body, speech or thought, what does one experience? When one has intentionally done a deed by body, speech or thought, Friend Potzal's son, one experiences painfulness. M.3.207.

This volitional aspect of karma further prevents it from being the deterministic doctrine many think it is. Unlike the Ājīvika theory of karma (which claims that all present experience and action is rigidly determined by past karma), Buddhism asserts that karma states tendencies, and not inevitable consequences. Thus morally good acts tend to be followed by kusala, or 'pleasant' consequences, and morally bad acts by dukusala, or 'unpleasant' consequences. What is crucial in the Buddhist doctrine of karma, then, is the intention behind the act. The value of a moral act lies strictly in its volitional genesis, and not on its physical expression, as it does, for instance, in Jainism. Accordingly, man has an element of free will (attakāra) in the form of personal endeavour (pūrṇa-kāra) by which he can condition and direct his volitions, and thereby control the value of his acts. Soteriologically, this is of great importance in Buddhism, for the aim of destroying the evil effects of karma (kammakkhaya) is realized by converting
In this passage, *kamma*, *vinñāna* and *tanha* are mentioned as the factors essential for rebirth. *Tanha* has a clear dynamic role as the ingredient of 'moisture' which nourishes the 'seed' of consciousness. Under certain conditions, it is presumed that the seed will flower and produce more seed in a continual process of regeneration.

And how does *karma* fit into this picture? As the 'field' in which the 'seed' of *vinñāna* grows, the analogy suggests that *karma* is the soil necessary for *vinñāna* to evolve from. In psychological terms, the soil represents past lives, intentions, deeds and actions which provide the background for the arising of consciousness.

In another passage (e. 2.142), consciousness is said to be conditioned by the merit and demerit of acts:

Avijjā - gato...yam...purisapuggalo
puññam ce sākhāram abhisankharoti,
puññupagam hoti vinñānam. Apuññam
ce sākhāram abhisankharoti, apuññu-
pagam hoti vinñānam.

If an ignorant man performs an act of merit, consciousness becomes pure. If he performs an act of demerit, consciousness becomes impure.

Such actions of merit and demerit, whether as speech, thought or behaviour, are also said to make up *karma*, and

the basis for motivation from that of greed, hatred and delusion (*lobha, dosa* and *moha*, the so-called akusala mūla, or roots of immoral bases, cf. D.1.37, 103; M.1.297) to selflessness, compassion and insight (*cāya, mettā, panna*). At the same time, it must be emphasized that the soteriological object of Buddhism is not so much to perfect *karma* so that a better life may be obtained in *samsāra*, but to eradicate *karma* altogether, thereby preventing rebirth.
this *karma in turn affects rebirth.* 'Kamma ḍayāda satta ti vadāmi' - 'I say, beings are heirs to action' M.1.390. it can be argued, therefore; that consciousness carries or transmits its own 'energy' (cf. S.2.97; 4.86) and the merits and demerits of acts (S.2.82) from one phenomenal existence to another.

There are still some difficult questions that need to be asked about the process of rebirth. For one, how does consciousness act as an agency in rebirth between one life and another while still keeping within the empirical framework of the patiṣcassamuppāda? And two, how does it do so without violating the fundamental anatta doctrine of Buddhism? The answer to both of these questions is found in the factor of upādāna.

**THE LINK OF UPĀDĀNA**

Upādāna ('grasping, clinging, attachment') is traditionally the ninth spoke in the twelve-fold sequence of the patiṣcassamuppāda. It follows craving, which, as we have seen, is the last factor of the viññāna 'process'. Coming as it does just before bhava, upādāna must play a crucial role in the process of rebirth. But in this capacity, upādāna is seldom understood. One reason why this is so is because to the Western reader at first glance there does not appear to be any real difference between 'craving' and 'grasping'. It could be maintained, for instance, that
grasping as expressed in its conventional four-fold typology ("kamupādānaṁ, diṭṭhiupādānaṁ, sīlabbutupādānaṁ attavādupādānaṁ"..."grasping after sense pleasures, speculative views, customs and the self" M.1.51) is only a somewhat stronger form of greed than tanhā, and therefore just as much a part of the process of consciousness as craving. But in the pāṭiccasāmuppāda, upādāna has a more subtle role than is indicated by its translation into English as "grasping". Here it is traditionally listed as the link between the viññāna 'process' and becoming (bhava). As this link, and based on its place in the list alone, Johansson points out that it is possible to interpret upādāna as being a kind of "emotional investment" in an object which determines the nature of rebirth.\(^\text{18}\)

This is a credible theory, but it fails to emphasize the most significant feature of the word upādāna. This

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\(^{18}\) Johansson writes that the function of upādāna is "to build a bridge between 'desire' and bhava, 'becoming', the latter probably meaning 'preliminary selection of one of the three rebirth-worlds': the world of kāma, 'sense-pleasure', rūpa, 'form', and arūpa, 'formlessness' (this according to S.11.4). This could be explained as a process of wish fulfillment. It is an established psychological fact that desire produces an emotional investment into its object and strong conscious images relating to the same object. If we, for instance, strongly desire a continuation of life, this desire will strengthen the conscious stream by adding more emotions and ideations, and this will be felt to be a causal factor towards new life". Psychology of Nirvāna. op cit. p. 81.
Feature is observed in the root structure of the noun as upa + a + da, or 'substratum by which an active process is kept alive or going'. In D.1.45, and even more significantly, S.4.399, bhava is compared to a fire which needs fuel (upādāna) to keep up the process of combustion. At the end of the passage the 'fuel' is identified as none other than craving (tanhupādānam), the basis of becoming:

Seyyatāpi...aggi sa-upādāno jalati no anupādāno, evam eva khvāham... sa-upādānassa upapattiṃ paññapemī no anupādānassa ti...samaye imaṃ ca kāyam nikkhipati satto ca aṅnatalam kāyam anupanno hoti, tam aham tanhupādānam vadami; tanhā hissa tasnim samaye upādānam hoti ti...

Just as a fire with fuel blazes up, but not without fuel, even so do I declare rebirth to be for him who has fuel, not for him who is without fuel... at a time when a being lays aside this body and rises up again in another body, for that I declare craving to be the fuel. Indeed, craving is at that time the fuel.

Here, as the link of 'fuel' conditioning rebirth, in one sense upādāna belongs more to the new life (bhava) than to the old life which generated rebirth. On the other hand, because upādāna is the fuel of craving, it must be presumed that this craving is none other than the tanhā of the old

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vinnāna process. It is the 'fuel' of craving, then, that is the bridge between vinnāna and rebirth, the bridge by which karma and the energy of vinnāna pass over into new becoming. Without craving there is no fuel, no basis upon which another life can evolve. Moreover, the early Buddhists argue that there is essentially nothing metaphysical about the role of vinnāna as the agency of rebirth, for it performs this task through the empirical factors of tanha and upādāna. 20 What passes over in 'becoming' is not

20 I think it is fair to say that to many Western observers, the concept of rebirth is not empirical, but entirely metaphysical, and acceptance of it demands just as much of a 'leap of faith' as belief in the resurrection or life after death. To the Buddhist, however, rebirth has nothing to do with a blind faith in a conjectural theory of after-life. It is, rather, a doctrine accepted as true to reason and experience.

As several scholars have pointed out (especially C. A. Moore, 'Buddhism and Science', Buddhism and Culture, op cit. pp. 100, 118), the question of whether rebirth is compatible with empiricism is only part of a much larger problem, and that is the relationship between the whole of the Buddhist dhamma and the scientific method. We will want to return to this general theme more expansively in the next chapter, but we can anticipate some of our observations by pointing out that there is a strong argument in support of an empirical Buddhist theory of knowledge and therefore soteriology. Whether the Buddhist experience of enlightenment has some kind of spiritual response which in some way transcends the empirical nature of its epistemology is also a question we must put aside until later. But for now it is important for us to recognize that the complex superstructure of 'knowing' and 'enlightenment' is firmly established in an empirical theory of knowledge.

It is clear that we cannot make any significant statements about the empirical function of vinnāna or the vinnāna 'process' which contributes to rebirth, unless there is a more adequate demonstration of the empirical foundation of Buddhist epistemology (ñāna), and therefore our immediate task should be to substantiate this argument by appealing to the evidence of the Nikāyas.
a soul (attā), but a force, a dynamic energy expressed in terms of craving, and karmic volition.

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the rebirth process is the crucial role craving has both in necessitating

First of all, to guide us in our interpretation of the relevant texts (and following the lead of K. N. Jayatilleke in his acclaimed study of this subject, The Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, or cit. p. 464), we need a definition of empiricism. A conventional dictionary (Random House Unabridged Dictionary 1966) offers this traditional description: "derived from or guided by experience or experiment". Runes elaborates by writing: "a proposition about the sources of knowledge: that the sole source of knowledge is experience; or that either no knowledge at all or no knowledge with existential reference is possible independently of experience. Experience may be understood as either all conscious content, data of the senses only, or other designated content. Such empiricism may take the form of denial that any knowledge...can be obtained a priori", (D. Runes, Dictionary of Philosophy, N.J. Littlefield, Adams. 1962, p. 89).

These definitions in turn must be applied to those Pāli texts which seem to indicate the empirical method. Although there are many such texts, the most important and celebrated one is the Kālāma Sutta (A.2.191), and to a more modest degree the Discourse to Bhaddiya Licchavi (A.2.191-3), and the Sabbasutta (Discourse on Everything) (S.4.15). In these sermons, the Buddha refutes "six ways of knowing based on authority" (sabda; as held, for instance, by the Brahmins who believed in the sacred authority of the Vedas) and "four ways of knowing based on reason" (tarka or takka, including the rationalists of the early Upaniṣads (cf. nididhyāsītavyah, Brh. U.4.5.6, 2.4.5) and the methods of the sceptics and materialists). In his address to Kālāma, the Buddha ends by emphasizing that one should reject (pāññeyātha) opinions as false only after testing them "in the light of one's own experience" (attāna vā janeyātha), as he does in this passage from the Sabbasutta:

Evam me sutam. Ekam samayam Bhagavā
Sāvattthiyam viharati Jetavane Anātha-
pindikassa ārāme. Tatra kho bhagava
bhikkhū āmantesi bhikkhave 'ti.
Bhandante 'ti te bhikkhū Bhagavato
puccassosam. Bhagavā etad avoca.
Sabbam vo bhikkhave desissāmi, tam
or provoking rebirth, and in actually carrying out the transmission of energy that characterizes rebirth. In this way, we begin to see that craving has an importance not just in this life as an isolated phenomenon, but in the whole

sunātha. Kiṁ ca bhikkhave sabbam. Čakkhun' c'eva rūpa ca, sotaṁ ca saddā ca, ghanān ca gandhā ca, jīvā ca rasā ca, kāyo ca phoṭṭhabbā ca, mano ca dhammā ca. Idam vuccati bhikkhave sabbam. Yo bhikkhave evaṁ vadeyya, āham etam sabbam paccakkhyā anāham sabbam pannaṁ pessamiti, tassa vācavatthur eva'ssa, puṭṭho ca na sampāpeyya, uttarāṁ ca vighātām āpajjeyya. Tam kissa hetu. Yathā tam bhikkhave avisayasmin (lit: "not forming an object", "indefinable").

Thus have I heard. Once the Exalted One was living at Sūvatthi, in the monastery of Anāthapindika (situated) in Jetā's Grove. Then the Exalted One addressed the monks: "O bhikkhus!" They responded: "Yes, O Lord!" and the Exalted One spoke thus: "Bhikkhus, I will preach to you 'everything'. Listen to it. What, bhikkhus, is 'everything'? Eye and material form, ear and sound, nose and odour, tongue and taste, body and tangibles, mind and concepts. These are called 'everything'. Bhikkhus, he who would say, 'I will reject this everything and proclaim another everything', he may certainly have a theory (of his own). But when questioned, he would not be able to answer and would, moreover, be subject to vexation. Why? Because it would not be within the range of experience.
structure of samsāra. We can say with confidence, then, that more than any other factor, craving "turns the wheel".

This lays the basis, then, for the "means and limits" of knowledge in early Buddhism. If the Buddha rejects the traditional pramāṇa (valid means of knowledge) of śabda (testimony), and is suspicious of the intellectual and deductive rationalism that often qualifies tarka, what then does he accept as a valid source of knowledge? Two sources only are recognized in the Nikāyas. These are saññā (perception, i.e. discernment of the five senses, A.4.103, M.1.300, S.3.3; and extra-sensory perception, It.58, Nd.1.323, A.3.325, M.1.7, 170) and anyaye mānam (inductive knowledge, S.2.58, D.1.226). Let us look at these sources more closely. First of all, some elaboration of saññā is needed. Saññā is the basis of the Buddhist theory of truth (to know "things as they are" - yathabhūtam, D.1.83, M.2.170), as is emphasized in this well-known passage from A.4.103: 'ko saddhāta ayaṁ ca paṭṭhavi Sineru ca pabbata-rāja dayhissanti ti...aṭṭhāna diṭṭhāpadehi' - 'who would believe that this earth and the stately mountain Sineru would be consumed by fire except on the evidence of sight (diṭṭha - what is actually observed)?' But 'seeing' (passam) in the Nikāyas can also include paranormal or extrasensory perception (i.e. D.1.82 - 'atikkanta mānusaka', 'going beyond the human'). 'Seeing' in the paranormal sense refers to a clairvoyant faculty which may be expressed in several ways, as for instance, in the chalabhinna or 'six kinds of higher knowledge': iddhi-vidhāna (psycho-kinetic activity, D.1.77), dibbāya sotadhātuva (clair-audience, D.1.79), cetopariyānāna (telepathic knowledge, D.1.79), pubbenivasanussatićchāna (retroactive knowledge of past existences, D.1.81), suttanān cutuppapāta-ćchāna (knowledge of the decease and survival of beings), and asavakkhayaćchāna (knowledge of the destruction of defiling impulses, D.1.83).

Of all features of the Buddhist theory of knowledge, paranormal experience provokes the most controversy, partly because of Western reluctance to accept extrasensory perception as an empirical source of knowledge. Some may hesitate to take the Buddha seriously on this question of paranormal knowledge. Could he have actually supported such a conjectural method in the light of the empirical emphasis of his doctrine of 'knowing and seeing' (jānam passam)? Commenting on this, Jayatilleke writes:

It may be asked whether the claims to extrasensory perception belong to the mythical and miraculous element in the Canon and whether these claims were actually made by the Buddha and his disciples. There is reason to believe
VINNAWA, TANHA AND MEDITATION

We have already indicated that the subject of consciousness and meditation will be comprehensively examined in the next chapter, but that we need now to anticipate some of those observations in order to obtain an understanding of

that these claims were actually made. There is no doubt that yoga-practises prevailed among the thinkers of the Middle and late Upaniṣads, the Jains, some of the Ājīvikas and the Buddhists. Claims of this kind were common to all these schools. They are not considered miraculous but the result of the natural development of the mind in the Buddhist texts, and have a close connection with the central doctrines of Buddhism. (ibid. p. 459).

For the early Buddhists, then, extrasensory perception is accepted as empirical evidence. It seems to have been largely reserved for the disciplined arhat, and was regarded as a product of his concentration, as is reflected in this passage which describes one aspect of extrasensory power known as pubbenivāsānussatinānāya (knowledge of previous existence):

'So evam samāhite citte parisuddhe
pariyodāte anangane vigatupakkilese
mudubhūte kammanīye ṭhīte ānejjappatte
pubbe-nivāsānussati-ḥañāya
cittam abhinnharati abhinnāṃmeti.
So aṅka-vihitam pubbe-nivāsam
auussarati seyyathidum...amutiśīṃ
evam nāmo evam gotto evam vānno
evumāharo evam sukha-dukkha-puṭi-
samvedi evam-āyu-pariyanto. So
tato cuto amutra upapadim. Tatra-
parisim evam nāmo evam totto...so
tato cuto idhupapanno' ti iti
sākaram sa - uddesam aṅkavihitam
pubbe nivāsam anussavati.'
the total structure and significance of the viññāna factor.
In the last few pages, we saw how viññāna ordinarily acts as the carrier of those 'energies' which 'flow over' into the new life. The Nikāyas also tell us that if viññāna is

With his mind thus composed, clear and cleansed without blemish, free from delilments, pliant and flexible, steadfast and unperturbed, he turns and directs his mind to the recollection of former lives... (recalling) 'in such a place was my name, such my family, such my caste, such my food, such my experience of comfort and painfulness, and such the limits of my life. When I passed away from that state, I took again form in such and such a place. There I had such a name and family, etc. When I passed away from that state I took form again here'. Thus does he call to mind his former lives in days past in all their detail and in all their aspects. D.1.81.

Perception, then, both normal and paranormal, is regarded as the empirical basis of a whole system of epistemology.

The second recognized early Buddhist source of knowledge is inferential or 'inductive' knowledge (anvayeva pāram) based on the data of perception and on an understanding of the principle of causality ('imasmīm sati idam hoti: 'issam' 'upādā, idam upapajjati' - 'if this is, that comes to be; from the arising of this, that arises' Ud.2, M.1.204). Thus, for example, from normal perception of the growth and decay of the body we are able to infer that all beings are subject to a causal process. Likewise the knowledge that craving and attachment precipitate painfulness is seen to be an inductive inference based on observable causal items (M.2.108). On the other hand, apart from normal perception, extrasensory perception provides the data for inductive inference concerning rebirth and karma.

In all of these examples, inductive knowledge is seen to be based on a theory of causation. Causation lies behind "the nature of things" (dhamma-dhātu, S.2.25) both in the psychological processes (i.e. dhammatā esa...yam
'calm', if it is 'stopped' (Sn.734, D.1.223), it no longer can 'flow over', but in its stabilized conditioned the viññāna processes 'go home' (U.93), just as the arhat 'goes home' to the 'unconditioned' when the fuel of the

silavato...avippatisūro uppanjati dhammatā esa...yam avippatisūrissa pāmujjam uppanjati' - 'it is in the nature of things that the absence of remorse is present in a virtuous person...it is in the nature of things that joy arises in a person who lacks remorse'. A.5.21), and in the organic processes (S.3.54), and is the keystone behind all inductive inference:

Idamassa dhamme nānām; so iminā dhammena diṭṭhena viditena akālikena pattena pariyogāhena atītānāgata nayam neti: ye kho keci atitam addhānām samāna vā brāhmaṇa vā jārāmaranaṃ abhānāmsu, jārāmaranaṃsamudayam...jārāmarananirodham... jārāmarananirodha gaminim paṭipadam... seyyathāpāham etarahi...yo hi keci anāgatam addhānām samāna vā brāhmaṇa vā jārāmaranaṃ abhijānissanti...seyyathāpāham etarahi ti, idam assa anvaye nānām.

This constitutes the knowledge of things (dhamme - 'phenomena'); by seeing, experiencing, acquiring knowledge before long and delving into these phenomena, he draws an inference (nayāṃ neti - Jayatilleke's translation, Iti, p. 443) with regard to the past and the future as follows: "all those recluses and brahmins who thoroughly understood the nature of decay and death, its cause, its cessation and the path leading to the cessation of decay and death did so in the same way as I do at present; all those recluses and brahmins who in the future will thoroughly understand the nature of decay and death...will do so in the same way as I do at present - this constitutes his inductive knowledge." S.2.58.
five khandhas is consumed.

This points to one of the central features of Buddhist soteriology - that salvation from the wheel of the viññāna process is found in the process itself. By judicious use of viññāna, one overcomes ignorance and

Perhaps the single most striking feature of the early Buddhist theory of knowledge is that through the causal explanation of the genesis and development of phenomena it prevents the introduction of metaphysical first or last causes. The Buddhist theory of causation itself reflects a defense against any suspicion of the unexplainable. In this theory (identified as 'asatkaryavāda', that the effect is not contained in the cause and is something new), the Buddhist empirical approach is reinforced. This is demonstrated in D.1.201, where, in the parable of the milk and the curds, the Buddha first outlines the products of the cow in causal sequence ('Seyyathā pi Citta gavā khīram, khīramhā dadhi, dadimhā navaññam, navaññamhā sappi, sappimhā sappimando' - 'Just as, Citta, from a cow comes milk, and from the milk comes (khīramhā) curds; and from the curds comes butter, and from the butter comes ghee, and from ghee comes the best of clarified butter...'), and then emphasizes that it is wrong to think of the milk remaining in the curds or the curds existing in the milk. The latter position would be as the satkaryavāda (the theory that the effect is contained in the cause, as in Sāṃkhya) teach, for, according to this school, "the oil exists in the sesame, the statue in the stone, the curd in the milk" (cf. Das Gupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 257, as quoted from Jayatilleke, K. N., E.B.T.K. op cit. p. 453). To the early Buddhists, the satkaryavāda still has an element of mystery in the relationship between the curd and the milk, or any other causal sequence; and thus violates the strictly empirical nature of the causal formula 'imasmīṃ sati idāṃ hoti'.

From this brief review of the epistemological method of the Nikāyas, it can be concluded that one of the central aims of the method is the elimination of metaphysics. As a theory of knowledge, it is established on an empirical and causal explanation for the origin of sense cognition, extrasensory perception and inductive inference. Likewise in its approach to all data and phenomena, Buddhist epistemology reflects an empirical basis. For these reasons, it can be argued that the initial premise which provoked this discussion (that rebirth is an empirical phenomenon in the Nikāyas) is justified.
craving, and gains release from samsāra. Viññāna is, therefore, the instrument of its own purification. The discipline of training viññāna to be even and orderly, and eventually to extinguish it altogether, is the basis of meditation (sati, 'mindfulness'; and samādhi, 'concentration'). Such a method forces viññāna to assume a greater orderliness by relying less and less on its cognitive and conceptual functions, as M.1.93 and 3.223 point out:

Tathā tathā...bhikkhu upaparikkheyya, yathā yathā upaparikkhato bahiddhā cassa viññānaṃ avikkhittam hoti avisatam ajjhattam asanthitam anupādaya aparitassato ayatim jātijāmarāna-dukkhasamudaya sambhavo na hoti.

A bhikkhu should investigate (things) in such a way that his viññāna, as he investigates, is not scattered and rambling externally and also not unconcentrated internally. And without fuel, as he is without longing, there shall be no arising in the future of painfulness resulting from birth, old age and death.

Bahiddha...viññāne avikkhitte avisate sati ajjhattam asanthite, anupadaya aparitassato ayatim jātijāmarāna-dukkhasamudaya - sambhavo na hoti.

If viññāna is undistracted and unbound externally (referring to perceptual consciousness) and free internally (i.e. intellectual consciousness), then for him who is without fuel, without longing, there will be no future arising of painfulness resulting from birth, old age and death.

These texts tell us two important things about viññāna. First, it is tied up with craving, with the 'fuel' that leads
to rebirth. Secondly, however, in spite of this fact, control of viññāṇa results in exhaustion of this fuel. Elsewhere (M.1.293, 398) we are told that this control is best understood as a series of mental exercises (sāmāpatti) at various levels of meditation (jhānas), levels that for the most part "reside in places of viññāṇa" (viññāṇaāṭṭhiti). This is important, because it shows that viññāṇa is present in all but the last of nine meditational states. Thus it is possible to argue that in the first stage, viññāṇa assumes the function of vitakka (reasoning) and vicāra (investigation). As the jhānic stages progress, the vitakka-vicāra function of viññāṇa becomes more and more tranquillized by the development of samādhi (concentration). As the fifth stage is entered, experiences based on perception and cognitive ideas are neutralized, and oneness of mind with the infinite is developed:

Bhikkhu sabbaso rūpasāññānaṃ samati-kkamā patīgha saññānaṃ atthagamā nānattasaññānaṃ āmanasi-kāra 'ananto ākāsoti' ākāsanañcāyatanam upasampajja viharati.

The bhikkhu, by passing beyond the perception of form, by putting an end to sense reaction, by paying no attention to perceptions of diversity thinks: 'the space is infinite', and reaches up to and remains in the mental state of infinite space. D.1.18).

Then the meditating individual passes beyond "infinite" consciousness (viññāṇaāñcāyatanas) into a state of ākīṇcaññāyatanas, or mental state of nothingness, where the usual function of viññāṇa as conscious activity
dependent on the senses ceases. This plane of knowing 'there is nothing at all' is realized only by a purified viññāna without the five senses, as is noted in M.1.293:


Friend, what is knowable by purified viññāna of the 'inner sense' (mano) without use of the five sense organs? Thinking, 'space is unlimited', the plane of unlimited space is knowable by the clear viññāna of the inner sense without use of the five-sense organs; thinking 'viññāna is unlimited', the plane of unlimited viññāna is knowable; thinking 'there is nothing at all', the plane of emptiness is knowable.

In the eighth stage (nevasaṃñānasamāyatanam - neither perception nor non-perception), the meditator experiences or feels (vedana) that the consciousness of nothingness has ceased (ākiñcaññayatanasamāna niruddhā hoti). Only in the ninth and final jhāna (saññāvedayitanirodha - consciousness of perception and experience extinguished) does viññāna not function, and the concept of wisdom (pañña, about which we will have much to say in the next chapter) is introduced to supercede it:

So kho aham ānanda aparāpa samayena sabbassā nevasaṃñānaañca saññāyatanam samatikkamma sañña-vedayitañca-nirodham upasampajjā viharāmi, paññaya ca me disvā āsava parikkhayam agamamsu.
And presently, Ananda, passing wholly beyond the mental state of neither perception nor non-perception, I entered and abode in the cessation of perception and feeling, and I saw by wisdom that the āsavā were completely destroyed. A.4.448.

We want now to draw to a close these preliminary remarks concerning viṁñāṇa and the relationship it has with tanhā. A systematic summary of our argument points to two prominent conclusions. On the one hand, viṁñāṇa must be seen to have a versatile role in Buddhist psychology. As a 'process of consciousness', it is involved with other dynamic agencies (i.e. saṁśā, vedanā, tanhā), a combination of different factors which produces the force we call 'consciousness'. This 'consciousness' is evident in our every perception, awareness and feeling (i.e. vijñāna, M.1.292). We pointed out that it can also be regarded as the medium of the law of rebirth, and as the instrument of its own salvation.

Secondly, the fundamental role of craving in all of these aspects of viṁñāṇa has to be emphasized. That craving is a constant stimulation for consciousness, that it is "food" for consciousness and "fuel" for 'rebirth' is clearly demonstrated in the Nikāyas, as is the fact that when consciousness is stopped at the zenith of meditation, the cravings that work through it, and the experience of painfulness, must also cease.

The psychological picture that is beginning to emerge, then, is that of a process of consciousness closely related
to the world of the senses, yet which is nonetheless governed by intention in the form of craving (or lack of it), intention which directly affects the quality of that consciousness. This is an important conclusion in its own right, validated by the arguments we have proposed in this chapter.

But the picture is not yet complete. There are two other psychological terms related to viññāna (citta and mano) which in particular need investigation. Perhaps this is best illustrated by such a passage S.2.95:

Yam ca kho etam bhikkhave vuccati cittaṃ iti pi mano iti-pi viññānam iti pi, tatrassutava puthujjano nālam nibbinditum nālam virajjitum nālam vimuccitum. Tam kissa hetu? Digharattam hetam bhikkhave assuta-vato puthujjanassa ajjhositam mamā-yitam pāramattham: Etam mama eso ham asmi eso me attāti.

Yet this, bhikkhus, that we call citta, that we call mano, that we call viññāna; by this the un instructed people are not able to feel repelled, they are not able to show lack of passion for it or to be free from it. And why is this? For a long time, bhikkhus, it has been for the un instructed that to which they cling, that which they call 'mine', that which they wrongly conceive thinking: that is mine; this I am; this is my spirit.

This text ostensibly highlights the nescient tendency (avijjā) of the average man to place ego-centric values on the mental faculties, but it also points to an interesting side-by-side use of the three psychological terms citta, mano
and viññāna. By listing each term separately, the text indicates that these terms were evidently regarded as having individual functions. Having gained some idea of what viññāna is and how craving is related to it, let us now look to mano and citta with a view to setting down a definition of their psychological roles, and establishing as carefully as possible what links they may have with tanhā.

MĀNO

A second psychological term frequently used to describe the conscious state is mano. Although it is not as difficult a term to grasp as viññāna and citta, it is still open to misunderstanding. There are two main reasons why this is so. Firstly, because the term is very old (Sanskrt \textit{manā}, to think; Vedic noun \textit{manah}); with a long background in Indian psychology, it is more open to preconceived interpretation on the part of individual interpreters than viññāna and citta are.\footnote{It is true that viññāna and citta also have Sanskrit roots (\textit{vi} + \textit{sājha} and \textit{scit}), but they have become distinctly Pāli Buddhist terms, and seem to be less open to historical controversy than mano. Viññāna, for example, is certainly not the Sanskrit viññāna, especially the concept of the unchanging viññāna (nirāśraya viññāna). Viññāna is as much 'mind' as mano and citta, clearly subject to the law of flux. (S.2.94).} That mano has pre-Buddhist uses and connotations is certain, for the term was freely used both in the Upaniṣads and by the early Saṁkhya philosophers. A question
that immediately arises, therefore, is whether we can assume that Buddha uses mano in a manner consistent with one or more of the contemporary rival schools of his era. Although, as Jayatilleke has shown, there is evidence throughout the Nikayas that points to a close relationship between early Buddhism and other schools of thought, it is hard to prove whether a Buddhist psychological concept such as mano is a notion founded on a pre-Buddhist psychology or not. It is apparent, however, that the early Buddhist interpretation of mano bears some resemblance to the manas of the Upanisads and Sankshya, although it is also theologically different from both these uses.

In the Upanisads, manas is conceived not only as one of the sense organs (i.e. Ch.6.6.1, Uddalaka’s materialist concept of manas; cf. also Brh.1.3.1-7; 1.7-13), but the person consisting of manas is said to be the supreme reality (‘manomayo’ yam purusah...sa ‘eva sarvasyasvarah’ - ‘this person consisting of mind...is lord of all’. Brh.5.6.1).

It is possible that the Upanisads regarded the sense organs as being material and therefore subject to decay, while mind was more than just a sense organ in that it was immaterial, indestructible and thus immortal. In Sankshya, with its carefully defined dualism between eternal purusa and impermanent

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22Jayatilleke, K. N. Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge. op cit. chaps. 1-4.
prakūti, manas stands only in the latter category. Thomas points out that for Sāṅkhya "not only the five senses but also the group to which mind belongs, stands on the material (prakūti) side of nature."²³

The early Buddhist use of mano stands somewhere between these two interpretations. On the one hand, the mano of the Nikāyas, like the manas of the Sāṅkhya, is not considered to be eternal. On the other hand, like the manas of the Upaniṣads, the Buddhist mano is not just a material sense. It is more than this, with intellectual and conative properties which give it an ideational function all of its own. The question is certainly a complex one, and this is not the place to treat it exhaustively. Nor is this necessary, for us it is enough to realize that the Buddhist connotation of mano, although having roots in a psychological terminology common to ancient India, is still unique in its own right. In order to avoid misunderstanding, therefore, we do well to look beyond the history and use of the term in rival schools, and look foremost to the evidence of the Nikāyas in order to see the particular contribution of this concept in the Buddhist psychology of consciousness.

A second source of misunderstanding arises from an inaccurate appreciation of the role of mano as the 'sixth sense' in Buddhism. Not infrequently mano is referred to as 'the grey matter of the brain' without any further elaboration.²⁴

²³ Thomas, E. J. The History of Buddhist Thought. op cit. p. 77.
This gives a completely distorted picture of what mano does in fact represent. Our present aim must be twofold, therefore. As in our investigation of vinñāna and citta, we have first to clear aside erroneous interpretations, and then secure a textually sound definition of what the early Buddhists mean by mano. Secondly, we want to do this keeping as the focus of our study the relationship mano has with tanhā and its related synonyms.

The mano of the Nikāyas should initially be understood as one of the physical senses. Furthermore, because the early Buddhists did not make a clear discernment between the external and internal world, the ideations (dhamma) of mano were considered as 'real' as the physical stimuli of the other senses (rūpa, form, was the stimulus of cakkhu (eye); sadda, sound, the stimulus of sota (ear); gandha, smell, that of ghāna (nose); rasa, taste, that of jivha (tongue); phoṭṭhabba, touch or tangibility, that of kāya or body). Thus mano is an internal sense which can 'perceive' ideas, and in this way it is sometimes referred to as the sixth 'perception' ('cha yimā...saññā: rūpasaññā, saddasaññā, gandhasaññā, rasasaññā, phoṭṭhabbasaññā, dhammasaññā'... 'there are these six perceptions: perception of form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and ideas'. A.3.413).

But although mano is one of the senses, it must be emphasized that it is also more than this. For one, mano is
the integrator of the other senses:

Imesaṁ kho...pañcannāṁ indriyānāṁ
nāṇāvisāyanāṁ nāṇāgocarāṇāṁ na
aññamaññassa gocaravisayam paccanubhotānam mano paṭisaraṇāṁ, mano ca nesaṁ gocaravisayam paccanubhotiti.

Of the five senses, different in range, different in field, not reacting to the field and range of each other, mano is the refuge, and mano reacts to their field and range. M.1.195.

A second function of mano concerns the nature of this 'reaction' attributed to mano. M.3.216 outlines how mano experiences 'feeling' or 'discriminates' (upavicarati) the 'quality' of each sensory perception that originates in any of the senses:

Atthādasā mañopavicarā veditabbā
ti iti kho pan'tetam yuttam, kin
c'etam paticca vuttam? Cakkhuṇā
rūpam disvā somanassatthāniyam
rūpam upavicarati domainassatthānī-
yam rūpam upavicarati upekhātthani-
yam rūpam upavicarati; sotena saddam

25 It is interesting to compare the function of mano in the Nikāyas with that of the antahkarana in Advaita Vedānta, for in one way, the early Buddhist concept of mano shares with the antahkarana the role of being the 'seat' of the senses, marshalling and classifying all sense impressions. However, there is one strategic difference in that unlike mano, the antahkarana is not regarded as a sense, for, as Radhakrishnan writes, "if it were a sense, it could not have a direct perception of itself or its modifications". (Indian Philosophy, Vol. 2 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966), p. 486). In this way, citta seems to come closer to the antahkarana, for citta, as we shall see, is able to 'look' back at the viññāna process of consciousness and presumably on the function of mano as well. But the comparison breaks down here, because citta in turn is not regarded as that which initially receives the sense impressions, a task, we have seen, reserved for mano.
A third function of mano is its role in the perceptual process as a bridge between the senses and viññāna:

Ajjhatti kaṁce āvuso sotāṁ aparibhinnām hoti → pe āhanam aparibhinnam hoti → jivhā aparibhinnā hoti → kāya aparibhinnā hoti → mano aparibhinnā hoti bāhirā ca dhammā na āpāthām āgacchanti no ca tajjo samānāhāro hoti, n'eva tava tajjassa viññānabhāgassa pāṭubhāvo hoti. Ajjhatti ko ce avuso mano aparibhinnā hoti bāhirā ca dhammā āpāthām āgacchanti no ca tajjo
sāmānāharo hoti, n'eva tāva tajjassa vinnañabhiṣagassa pātubhāvo hoti.

Your reverence, if the ear that is internal is intact... the nose that is internal is intact... the tongue that is internal is intact... the body that is internal is intact... the mind that is internal is intact, but external mental objects do not come within its range and there is no appropriate impact, then there is no appearance of the appropriate section of consciousness. But when, your reverence, the mind that is internal is intact and external mental objects come within its range and there is appropriate impact, then there is thus an appearance of the appropriate section of consciousness. M.1.191.

So far, our description of mano appears to be partly physiological (as one of the sense organs) and partly ideational (it integrates the perceptual process and experiences impressions). But it is in the latter capacity that mano assumes its real significance in Buddhist psychology. Not only does it have the attribute of feeling and emotion; the Nikāyas also indicate that mano 'thinks' (manovitakka - 'thoughts of mano'. S.1.207), has 'imagination' ('vanām pavīththo, atha(me) mano niccharati bahiddhā' - 'I have gone into the forest, but my mano goes astray outside'. S.1.197), and 'memory' ('Jinnassa me dubbalathāmakassa ten'eva kāyo na.paloti tattha, sāmkappayattāya vajāmi niccaṁ, mano hi me...tena yutto' - 'Because I am old and feeble, my body does not go there, but in my intentions (sāmkappa) I always go there, for my mano is joined to him'. Sn. 1144).  

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26 cf. Johansson, R. "A Psychosemantic Investigation",
The picture of mano that we now have is an increasingly active one. It does far more than merely assemble and pass on sense impressions. But this active, dynamic role is nowhere more evident than in mano's association with 'intention' and 'action', both good and bad, and it is in this capacity that we see most clearly mano's relationship with craving and its related forces.

**MANO AND TANHĀ**

In S.2.97, M.1.256 and D.3.228 (cf. p. 154), we saw that a close relationship is outlined between tanhā and the 'four foods'. One of those 'foods' was manosāṃcetanā, a compound best translated as 'mental volition', 'will' or 'purposiveness'. This strategic text indicates that mano can be affected by tanhā, and that the results of this exposure to tanhā are realized in 'willing' and 'purposiveness'.

Mano, then, plays an important role in the Buddhist theology of intention. This is clearly brought out in not only the above references, but in many other texts as well, such as Dhm.233:

*op. cit.* p. 186. I am indebted to him for pointing this text out. He further remarks, "samkappa is here used for the planning and longing thought activity; mano could refer to a day-dreaming function or to emotional attachment".
Manopakopam rakkheyya, manasā samvuto siyā manoduuccaritam hiṁvā, manasā sucaritam care.

Let one be mindful (watchful) of mano irritation. Let him practise restraint of mano. Having abandoned the 'sins' of mano (manoduuccarita), let him practise virtue with his mind.

These passages introduce us to one of the most crucial theological problems of early Buddhism. It is the intention, the purposiveness lying behind mano that is so strategic to Buddhist soteriology. A further corollary of this theology is that acts of body and speech are of less significance than the thought which lies behind them, a teaching which is in many ways the backbone of the Vinaya Piṭaka, but which is also carefully developed in the Nikāyas, as for instance in M.1.373:


Dīghatapassin the Jain spoke thus to the Blessed One: "But, friend Gotama, how many kinds of wrong (danda) do you lay down for the effecting (performance; action - kiriyā) of an evil deed, for the going on (rolling on - pavattiyā) of an evil deed"?

"Tapassin, it is not the custom of a Tathāgata to lay down 'wrong, wrong'. Rather, Tapassin, it is the custom for a Tathāgata to lay down 'deed deed'" (kamma).

"But how many kinds of deeds do you lay down, friend Gotama, for the effecting of an evil deed, for the rolling on of an evil deed?"

"Tapassin, I lay down three kinds of deeds for the effecting of an evil deed, the deeds of body, speech and mano."

"But, friend Gotama, is deed of body one thing, deed of speech another, deed of mano another?"

"Tapassin, deed of body is one thing, deed of speech another, deed of mano another."

"But, friend Gotama, of these three deeds thus separated, thus particularized, which deed do you lay down as the more blamable in the effecting of an evil deed, the rolling on of an evil deed? Is it the deed of the body, the deed of the speech or the deed of mano?"

"Tapassin, of these three deeds thus separated, thus particularized, I lay down that deed of mano is the more blamable in the effecting of an evil deed, in the rolling on of an evil deed; deed of body is not like it, deed of speech is not like it."

"Did you say 'deed of mano', friend Gotama?"

"I say 'deed of mano', Tapassin."
Mano’s relationship with bad traits, craving and unskilled states of mind (akusala dhamma. M.3.49), indicate its moral vulnerability. At the same time, the texts point out that like citta and viññāna, mano can be cultivated and developed in thoughtfulness (Dhm.233) and meditation. Elsewhere (Dhm.96) mano is referred to as ‘calmed’ (santa), as if released from the stirrings of craving. By the calming of mano, speech and deeds likewise become less agitated, tranquility is achieved, and with it, freedom (vimutti) from mental irritants:

Santam tassa mano hoti, santā vaca ca kamma ca sammadañña vimuttassa upaśantasa tādino.

His mano is calm, calm his word as well as deed, when he has obtained freedom through true knowledge and has become tranquil.

This does not mean, however, that mano can attain nibbāna, as citta does, or ‘evolve’ into another life, as viññāna does. The changing, transitory state of mano is never lost sight of, and at death it meets the same fate as the other senses:

Manañca paticcā dhamme ca uppajjati manovinñānaṁ; mano anīcco viparināmī aññathābhāvi; dhammā anicca viparināmino aññathābhāvino.

Dependent upon mano and mental states, manovinñāna arises. Mano is impermanent, changing, becoming something different. The mental states are impermanent, changing, becoming something different. S.4.69.

We can sum up by observing that the basic psychological operations of mano are seen in its co-ordinating
role as it receives impressions from the other senses, and thus becomes instrumental in the perceptive, feeling and thinking (manovitakka, manosankhāra) processes. It's central theological significance, however, lies in the fact that it is an active agency of will (manosuñcetañā), and is thus able to govern the quality and disposition of moral (or immoral) acts. It is in this capacity that its critical relationship to tanhā is best observed.

CITTA AND TANHĀ

Citta is one of the most complex psychological terms in Buddhism, perhaps made all the more so because of the great interest shown it in the Abhidhamma Pītaka. Even in the Nikāyas, however, citta is difficult to come to grips with, and it is easy for the student to get lost in the tangle of definitions that he accumulates. It is appropriate, therefore, to approach citta in terms of crucial questions. For us, these questions must be relevant to the central problem of the craving individual.

One place to begin is by selecting a text which carefully defines citta. One of the clearest is M.3.32:

27 A common feature of the Abhidhamma was to hold the position that citta was almost a kind of 'self' around which everything else is arranged. This concept is frequently found in diagrams designed to explain the Abhidhamma construction of mind (a good example is H. V. Guenther, Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidhamma (Lucknow: Pioneer Press, 1957), p. 22).
Cha kho pan’imani, āvuso, ajjhatti-kāni bāhirāni āyatānānī tena bhagavatā jānatā passatā arahatā sammussambuddhena sammad akkhātāni. Katamāni cha? Cakkhu c’eva rūpa ca, sotām ca sadda ca, ghanam ca gandhā ca, jivhā ca rasā ca, kayo ca phoṭṭhabba ca, mano ca dhammā ca, - imāni kho, āvuso, cha ajjhattikāni bāhivani āyatānānī tena Bhagavatā jānatā passatā arahatā sammussambuddhena sammad akkhātāni. Kathām jānato pan’ āyasmatā kathām passato imesu chausu ajjhattikābā - hi resu āyatanesu anupādāya āsāvehi cittam vimuttan ti? Khināsavassa, bhikkhave, thikkhuno vusitāvato katakaraniyassa ohitabharassā anuppattasadattthassa pari-khina-bhavasamyojanassa sammadānāvī-muttassā ayam anudhammo hoti veyyākaranāya: Cakkhusmi māvuso, rūpe cakkhuviṇṇāne cakkhu-viṇṇāna-viṇṇatabbesu dhammesu yo chando yo’rāgo ya nandi ya tanha, ye upayupādāna cetaso adhiṭṭhānābhiniyēsānusayi, tesam khaya virāgā nirodhā cāga patissaggā vimuttam me cittān ti pajānāmi. Sotasmim, āvuso, sadde sotaviṇṇāne; ghanasmim...gandhe ghanaviṇṇāne; jivhāya...rāse jivhāviṇṇāne; kāyasmi...phoṭṭhabbe kāya-viṇṇāne; manasmim...dhamme manoviṇṇāne manoviṇṇānaviṇṇatabbesu...Evam kho me, āvuso, jānato evam passato imesu chausu ajjhattikābā hi resu āyatanesu anupādāya āsāvehi cittam vimuttan ti.

Your reverence, these six internal and external (sense) fields have been rightly pointed out by the Blessed One who knows and sees, perfected one, fully self-awakened one. What six? The eye as well as material shapes, the ear as well as sounds, the nose as well as smells, the tongue as well as tastes, the body as well as tactile objects, the mind as well as mental states. Your reverence, the six
internal and external (sense) fields have been rightly pointed out by the blessed One who knows, sees. But knowing what, seeing what in respect of these six internal and external (sense) fields can your reverence say that his mind is freed from the cankers with no grasping (remaining)? Bhikkhus, the explanation of that bhikkhu in whom the cankers are destroyed, who has lived the life and done what has to be done, laid down the burden, attained his own welfare, in whom the fetters of becoming are utterly destroyed and who is freed by right profound knowledge, would be in accordance with dhamma were he to say:

Your reverences, whatever is desire, whatever is attachment, whatever is delight, whatever is craving for eye, material shape, visual consciousness (viññāna) and for things cognizable through visual consciousness, by the destruction, fading away, stopping, giving up and casting out of grasping after and hankering after these things which are mental dogmas, biases and tendencies, I comprehend that my mind (citta) is freed. Your reverences, so it is with the ear, sounds, auditory consciousness... the nose, smells, olfactory consciousness... the tongue, tastes, gustatory consciousness... the body, tactile objects, bodily consciousness... the mind, mental states, mental consciousness, with mental states cognizable through mental consciousness (manoviññāna). So, your reverences, as I know thus, (and) see thus in respect of these six internal (sense) fields, I can say that my mind (citta) is freed from the āsavā with no grasping (remaining). M.3.32.

This passage takes us a long way in our understanding of citta. This is so for two reasons. On the one hand, the text makes a fundamental distinction between viññāna and citta.
Vinnana is here described in terms of the rapidly changing surface consciousness represented by the six senses (salāyatana). Citta, on the other hand, does not have this fractured appearance. It is involved with the senses only if it is under the sway of tanhā, and seems to have a deeper background than vinnana, as if it is an experiential core of 'personality'.

This initial definition of citta does not mean that the early Buddhists regarded it as the 'self'. The text does point out, however, that through tanhā and the related synonyms of chanda, rāga, upadāna and anusaya, citta is bound to the senses, and that in this way it is a kind of center for what Johansson calls 'emotions, desires and moral defilements'.

As we shall presently see, there is a great deal of evidence in support of this definition of citta as a mental factor burdened with all the morally objectionable emotions and selfish needs; but there is equal evidence that demonstrates how citta can be developed, how it can be trained, how it alone of all the psychological factors can attain nibbana.

What we need to do now, then, is look carefully at these two aspects of citta, the natural or 'untrained' citta of the average individual, and the 'trained' citta of the arhat. Both will tell us something about how craving arises.

28 This expression is used by Johansson to describe citta; cf. Psychology of Nirvāna, op cit. p. 61.
how it operates in this crucial 'centre of emotions', and how it can be neutralized.

THE UNTRAINED OR 'NATURAL' CITTA

The untrained citta has many attributes. We know first of all that it is incorporeal (asariya - Dham.37), and although it is sometimes said to depend on physical stimulation (phassati - S.4.125), it is even more closely involved with perception (sāññā, S.4.293) and 'feelings' (vedanā; i.e. "sāññā ca vedanā ca cetasikā ete dharmā cittapatibaddhā, tasmā sāññā ca vedanā ca cittasankhāre ti"..."perception and 'feeling' are mental processes dependent on citta. Thus perception and 'feeling' are called the activity of the citta"). This does not mean citta is the 'center' of perception, a role more in keeping with the function of mano. Citta remains, however, receptive and susceptible to the influences of perception. Aside from its sensitivity to perception, the natural citta also has memory (M.1.22, D.1.81, cf. footnote 20) and intellectual (A.1.9, 'cittena...nassati' - 'understand with citta') faculties.

But these aspects receive relatively little comment in the Nikāyas when compared to the emotional nature of the untrained citta. Here it is necessary to distinguish, as Younger and Johansson do, between feelings (vedanā -

30 I am indebted to Johansson for pointing out the
be they pleasant or unpleasant) and that state of affectivity or 'lack of balance' which we can properly call emotion, represented by such attributes as trembling and nervousness (paritassana; S.3.16), obsession to sensuality (kāmāsava, D.1.84), anger (padosa, D.1.71, savera, D.1.247) apathy (liña, S.5.112) and mental disturbance or imbalance (uddhata, S.5.112). In the last chapter we pointed out how 'emotion' does not accurately describe the more epistemological nature of the term vedanā.\(^{31}\) Emotion is deeper than vedanā. In the case of the untrained citta, it is associated with gross desires and bad moral traits, sometimes with tanhā (Dhm.154), though more often with rāga (passion or desire, S.1.185),

\(^{31}\)References to S.3.16 and 5.112. Johansson has compiled an exhaustive list of 120 references in the Nikāyas to citta, mano and vinnana on a semantic differential basis. This pioneering endeavour has been helpful to me on several occasions while researching the evidence of the Nikāyas, and I am especially grateful for his thorough work on the Saṃyutta Nikāya in this field. (cf. "A Psychosemantic Investigation", op cit. p. 210f.)

It is worth noting that there has been remarkably little work done in this area of Buddhist psychology. Even K. N. Jayatilleke's reliable Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, which is firmly established on the evidence of the Nikāyas, has surprisingly little to offer on the technicalities inherent in many common psychological terms. The works of Mrs. Rhys Davids on Buddhist psychology (op cit.) are now largely suspect for reasons already outlined in Chapter I of this thesis, and most other standard works on Buddhist psychology (i.e. Govinda; Jayasuriya; Guenther et al., op cit.) tend to gravitate to the Abhidhamma, often ignoring the Nikāyas altogether. This is all the more remarkable considering the relative wealth of psychological data that is available from the Nikāyas, a fact that in my judgment exposes the fallacy of that opinion which seems to automatically equate Buddhist psychology only with the later Abhidhamma.

\(^{31}\)cf. 126 above.
the úsavā (cankers, D.1.84), lobha (greed, M.1.36) and the
unakkilesā (general depravity, the so-called 'moral defile-
ments'), as M.1.36 points out:

Katame ca bhikkhave cittassa upakkilesā: Abhijjhāvisumalobho cittassa
upakkileso, byāpādo cittassa upakkileso, kodho c.ū.; upanāho c.ū., makkho
c.ū., palāso c.ū., issā c.ū., mačchariyam c.ū., māyā c.ū., sattheyyam c.ū.,
thambho c.ū., sārambhī c.ū., māno c.ū.; atimāno c.ū., mado c.ū., pāmañdo cittassa
upakkileso...

And what, bhikkhus, are the moral defile-
ments of citta? Greed and covetousness
is a defilement of citta, malevolence...
anger...malice...hypocrisy...spite...
envy...stinginess...deceit...treachery...
obstinacy...impetuosity...arrogance...
pride...conceit...indolence is a defile-
ment of citta.

At the same time as having these unattractive features,
the untrained citta is said to be difficult to manage
(dūrakkha, Dhm.33) and to be instrumental in allowing 'un-
guarded' (arakkhitam) bodily (kāyakammam) and mental (mano-
kammam) actions (A.1.261).

What does this tell us about citta's involvement
with tanhā? We cannot help but notice how open the untrained
citta is to the assault of the senses and their craving for
satisfaction. Even when the actual noun 'tanhā' is not used
directly in conjunction with citta, it is enough to point out
as in M.3.32 above, the many other synonyms for craving
(i.e. chando, rāga, tanhā, upādāna, anusaya) that are used
with citta. Johansson calls such synonyms the "adhesive tape
of tanhā"32 by which citta is bound to the vinītana of the

five senses (i.e. cakkhu-viññāna, sota-viññāna, ghāna-viññāna, jivhā-viññāna, kāya-viññāna) and thence to their objects and physical stimuli. The untrained citta is, therefore, very much under the influence of craving, and its liberation will depend first and foremost on ridding itself of this 'tape' which secures it to the world of viññāna and thence samsāra.

The untrained citta, then, does not escape rebirth. The texts are basically consistent about this fact and point out that as is the case with viññāna, desire for rebirth seems to affect citta:


Bhikkhus, I will teach you 'uprising' by means of aspiration. Herein, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu is endowed with faith, endowed with moral habit, endowed with learning, endowed with renunciation, endowed with wisdom. It occurs to him: 'O that at the breaking up of the body after dying I might arise in companionship with the nobles. He fixes his citta on this, he resolves his citta on this, he develops his citta for this.
These aspirations and 'abidings' (viharo-lit: 'dwelling' in this) of his he holds fixed, and developed thus, eagerly practised, contribute to rebirth there. This, bhikkhus, is the way, this the course, that contributes to uprising there. M.3.99.

Both vihāna and citta are subject to this rebirth cycle, a fact that not surprisingly leads us to ask if in rebirth there is any real difference between the two factors. Johansson points out that in the case of ordinary rebirth, when both vihāna and citta are said to undergo the same process, 'we may assume a simple identification' between the two.\(^{34}\) In the case of the trained citta, however, this is not so. Here citta assumes a definite role set apart from the grosser elements, a role that is soteriologically very important.

**THE TRAINED CITTA**

A trained citta is a controlled citta, not one that would "wander formerly as it liked, as it desired, as it pleased" ('acāri cāritam yenicchakam yatthakāmam yathāsukham'. Dhūm.326). When free from deleterious desires, it is not open to emotion, as D.2.81 points out: 'Pañña paribhāvitam cittam sammad eva āsavehi vimuccati seyathīdam kāmāsava ditthāsava avijjasavā ti...citta, when thoroughly developed through wisdom, is set free from the cankers, that is to say the

\(^{34}\) Johansson, H. *Psychology of Nirvāṇa*. *op cit.* p. 83.
cankers of sensuality, wrong views and ignorance'. It is further described in this state as serene (saṁhita, D.1.76), restrained (saṁvuta, A.1.7) and calm (vāpasanta, D.1.71), able to purge itself from 'unskilled' (akusala) moral habits, to change its nature from bad dynamic traits to good ones: 'yaṁ cittaṁ viṭarāgam viṭadosām viramohām, itosamutthāna kusalasilā'... that citta which is free from desire, free from hate and free from illusion... originating from this are the 'skilled moral habits'. This is an interesting passage because it shows that citta has a number of 'akusala' traits which it is able to bring under control.

The question of the control and training of citta is strategic to Buddhist meditational practises. As one of the four applications of mindfulness (cattāro satipatthana - contemplation of body, feeling, dhamma or mind objects, and citta), the arhat strives to understand any condition of citta, whether or not it is full of hate or greed, whether or not it is developed, concentrated or liberated. The central aim of citta contemplation is to gain control over the experiential, as A.3.377 stresses: 'evam sammāvimutta-cittassa... bhikkhuno bhusā ce pi cakkhuvinneyyā rūpā cakkhusā āpatham agacchanti, nev'assa cittam pariyādiyanti, amissikatam ev'assa cittam hoti, thitaṁ anejjappattam, vayaṁ c'assānu-passati'... 'if objects cognizable by the eye come very strongly into the range of vision of a bhikkhu with wholly freed citta, they do not obsess his citta, and his citta is untroubled, firm, having won to composure; and he watches it depart'.
Like viññāna, citta also experiences the jhānic stages of meditation. The same can be said of ceto, which, like citta, is a derivative of the root \( \sqrt{\text{cit}} \). (This latter point is important, because in instances where the noun ‘ceto’ appears, it should be interpreted as being synonymous with citta). \(^{35}\) But unlike viññāna at the ninth jhāna, citta

\(^{35}\) Aside from sharing the same root, citta and ceto share many similar aspects. Some of these directly involve descriptions of the ‘impure mind’ (cetaso upakkilese, D.3.49; cittassa upakileśā, S.5.92, 108, 115) and of efforts to purify it (parisuddhena cetasā, M.3.94; citte parisuddhe, D.1.76) through meditation (cetosamadhi, M.3.108; cittasamādhi, S.4.350). As a synonym for citta, ceto is also found as the mental factor which attains freedom (vimutti) at different jhānic stages, an important feature pointed out in M.1.297:

Kati pan‘avuso paccayā adukkhamasukhāya cetovimuttiyā samapatiyyā ti.
Cattāro Kho ‘avuso paccayā adukkhamasukhāya cetovimuttiyā samapatiyyā:
Idh‘avuso bhikkhu sukhassā ca pahāna dukkhaṃ ca pahāna pubbe va soma-
nassadomanassanām atthagamā adukkham asukham upakhāsatiparīsuddhiṃ catut-
thām jhānam upasampajja viharati.
Ime kho ‘avuso cattāro paccayā adukkhamasukhāya cetovimuttiyā samapatiyyā ti.
Kati pan‘avuso paccayā animittaṃ cetovimuttiyā samapatiyyā ti. Dvē kho ‘avuso paccayā animittaṃ cetovimuttiyā samapatiyyā:
Sabbanimitṭānaṃ ca amanassikāro, animittaṃ ca dhātuyā manasikāro.
Ime kho ‘avuso dve paccayā animittaṃ cetovimuttiyā samapatiyyā ti...
yā ca yāmaṃ ‘avuso ārambhana cetovimutti yā ca ākiñcānaṃ cetovimutti yā ca sunnahā cetovimutti yā ca animittaṃ cetovimutti...
idh‘avuso bhikkhu mettāsahagatena cetassā ekam disam pharitvā viharati...
karanassa-
hagatena cetassā - pe - muditāsahagatena cetassā - upakhāsahagatena cetassā ekam disam pharitvā viharati,
tathā dutiyam tathā tatiyam tathā catutthim, iti uddham - adho tiriyam
alone can realize the ultimate experience of freedom from the cankers (āsavā). It is citta that experiences the calming of the khandhas, the stilling of viññāna. It is citta that enters nibbāna;

And how many conditions are there, your reverence, for the attainment of the freedom of mind which has neither suffering nor joy? There are four conditions, your reverence, for the attainment of the freedom of mind which has neither suffering nor joy. In this case, your reverence, a bhikkhu by getting rid of joy, by getting rid of suffering, by the subsiding of his former pleasures and sorrows, enters on and abides in the fourth meditation (jhāna) which has neither suffering nor joy, and which is entirely purified by equanimity and mindfulness. These, your reverence, are the four conditions for the attainment of freedom of mind which has neither suffering nor joy. How many conditions are there, your reverence, for the attainment of the freedom of mind that is signless? There are two conditions, your reverence...paying no attention to any signs, and paying attention to the signless 'realm'. These, your reverence, are the two conditions for the attainment of the freedom of mind that is signless...your reverence, whatever is immeasurable freedom of mind (that is boundless-appamānā) and whatever is freedom of mind that is nothingness (ākīñcānna cetovimutti) and whatever is freedom of mind that is void (suññatā cetovimutti) and whatever is freedom of mind that is signless (animittā cetovimutti)...
kūpadhātuyā (vedānādḥātuyā, saṁnā- 
sañkkhāra-, viññāna-) ce bhikkhave 
bhikkhuno cittam virattim vimuttim 
hoti anupādāya āsavā vimuttatā 
ṭhitam, ṭhitattā santussitam, 
santussitattā na paritassati, a 
paritassam paccataṁneva pari- 
nibbatati.

bhikkhus, if a bhikkhu's citta is 
not attached to the element of 
form (feeling, perception 
activities, consciousness), and 
is released from the āsavā without 
basis, then by its release it is 
steadfast; by its steadfastness 
it is content; being content it 
does not become excited; free 
from excitement it attains 
nibbāna by itself. S.3.45.30

One feature in particular must strike us about citta, 
and that is the diversity of the emotional, moral and dis- 
 positional aspects of this term. Like viññāna, it is 
dynamic and changing, open to sensory impression, capable 
of being manipulated by craving and thus involved in the

as to this, your reverence, a 
bhikkhu abides 'having suffused the 
first quarter (of the world)' with 
a mind of friendliness...he dwells 
having suffused the first quarter 
with a mind of compassion...with a 
mind of sympathetic joy...with a 
mind of equanimity, likewise the 
second, likewise the third, likewise 
the fourth; just as above, below, 
across; he dwells having suffused 
the whole world, everywhere, in 
every way with a mind of equanimity 
that is far-reaching, wide-spread, 
immeasurable, without enmity, with- 
out ill will. This, your reverence, 
is called immeasurable freedom of 

36. This text is pointed out by Johansson, Psychology 
of Nirvāna, op cit. p. 62.
rebirth process. And yet in its trained state, citta is clearly apart from the khandhas (which include, of course, vininna), or from any of the factors of the paticcasamuppada for that matter.

There is no single English word which adequately suffices as a translation of citta. Attempts to make one such word as 'personality' or 'ego' serve as a translation are open to controversy, as Johansson points out when he writes:

"by personality is meant an individual organization of traits: 'there is a guiding purposiveness, a hierarchy of motives, a more or less consistent 'style of living'. Personality may change and can be 'developed' and 'deranged', but there is continuity and unity. It is both psychological and physical, both structural and functional. Like personality, citta is an organizing factor and it has an individual structure... (it) can be recognized and interpreted by others (i.e. S.1.178, A.5.92)... But there are differences also. We may speak about 'our' personality as about something outside us, but in reality, we always identify ourselves with our personality, and the psychological ego contained in it. Citta is much more frequently placed as an object of activities and conceived as 'outside' the speaker (it should, e.g., be 'restrained'). Citta is a more limited concept, as it mainly covers only conscious phenomena."... we may conclude that

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As we shall presently see, it can be argued that the asava and anusaya are involved in an unconscious process. Consequently, mention of them in relationship with citta could imply that citta also has an unconscious role:
citta rather may be called a center within personality, a conscious center for activity, purposiveness, continuity and emotionality. The vague term 'mind' may, after all, be the best translation, although it does not cover the emotional and moral aspects.

We have to recognize, as Johansson does, the obvious hazards of comparing an ancient Buddhist psychological term like citta with modern psychological concepts such as 'ego' or 'personality'. Yet despite the obstacles of time and culture, citta does have some identification with what contemporary psychologists call the personality or ego, in that citta is a central function fundamental to the individual, expressing the constitution, quality and character of the personality. It has no permanent 'value', of course, being subject to the doctrine of anatta like all other Buddhist psychological concepts. But it is fair to say that of all these concepts, citta represents more of an entity (as apart

Rūpadhātuyā...yo chando yo rāgo yā nandī yā tāñhā ye upāyupādāna cetaso adhīttānaṃbhinives - ānusaṭṭā tesām khaya virāga nirodhā cāgā pati-nissaggā cittaṃ suvimuttaṃ.

By the destruction of, the indifference to, the cessation, the giving up, the utter surrender of that wish, that desire, that pleasure, that craving, that approach and grasping, that decision, indulgence and disposition (inclination) in ceto directed to the form element, the citta is completely freed. S.3.13. 38

Johansson, R. "A Psychosemantic Investigation".

38 See cit. p. 178.
from process) of mind and personality than the others. This is doubtless one of the major reasons why it receives careful attention in both the Nikāyas and the Abhidhamma. at the same time, because of its close involvement with tanhā, and because it is regarded as the fundamental 'problem-child' of the bhikkhu, citta not unexpectedly comes under thorough examination in the Nikāyas as a crucial part of the central soteriological problem of craving.

CONCLUSION

So far we have described the principle components of the Buddhist psychology of consciousness, and in doing so have also mapped out the main conceptual models of the mind. Its wider applicability will become apparent in the pages to come. Our next major task will be to review the evidence for a Buddhist psychology of the unconscious. But it first remains for us to make certain concluding remarks to bring this present section together, because it is important that we see viññāna, citta and mano as a whole, as descriptive of a unit of consciousness, rather than as a fractured series of unrelated mental phenomena.

Summaries of the Buddhist psychological structure are difficult to present in simplified form, if only because of the complexity of the apparatus we are dealing with. Diagrams showing the various psychological factors

in relationship to each other are popular answers to this
problem, but they are not always reliable because they
tend to make rigid boundaries between mental phenomena
when all too often such lines of distinction are meaning-
less or merely serve to confuse. If we try to visualize
the three concepts of viññāna, citta and mano, then, we
have to remember that often their functions overlap, and
that the picture we put together should be a fairly flex-
ible one.

One such picture could start with the objective
physical stimulations of form, sound, smell, taste and
touch. We can visualize the presence of these factors
on our mental canvas, so to speak, and see that they are
related to both viññāna and mano. As 'impressions' on
viññāna, the physical stimuli provoke what we call the
'viññāna process', a rapidly fluctuating surface con-
sciousness which continues throughout the waking hours.
As 'impressions' on mano, the physical stimuli initiate
first the three basic feelings of ease, pain and indiffer-
ence (somanassa, domanassa, upekha), and then affect a
whole state of willing or intention (sañcetanā). Mano
appears as a deeper form of consciousness than viññāna,
indicative of an inner sense that is more of an 'entity'
than a 'process'. The whole aggregate of this structure
is then bound to citta through craving and its related
synonyms (chando, rāga, upādāna, anusaya, M.3.32; the
upakkilesa, M.1.36; and the āsavā, D.1.84), for these
forces are the bridge by which the cognitive and ideational world of viññāna and mano cross over into citta.

Citta itself is also affected by perception, but in our picture much of the function of citta is set apart from the perceptual processes, for citta has personality factors not present in viññāna and mano. These factors point to its potential for moral energy and purpose, as illustrated in the role citta plays in meditation, where alone of all the concepts of consciousness, citta can eradicate the āsavā (kāmāsavā, bhavāsavā, avijjāsavā, ditthāsavā - the 'cankers' of sensual desire, desire for life, ignorance and opinions) in the ninth and final jhāna. So we see that our picture of citta in many ways embraces the functions of viññāna and mano, in that both surface consciousness and ideation are included in the citta factor too. Yet because of its more profound response to conscious stimuli, citta is regarded as the centre of personality, the deep background of purposiveness and emotion. And this is not all, for the evidence shows that citta includes more than one layer of consciousness, not just the surface consciousness of viññāna, or the integrating, emotive consciousness of mano. In states of trance or sleep, viññāna and mano are largely not completely neutralized, but citta can still 'know' (jānāti - M.1.523), can still reflect and contemplate

40M.1.523 points out how the trained citta is always conscious:

Evan eva kho Sandaka yo so bhikkhu araham khināsavav vusitavā katakaruniyo
Our picture would not be complete if we fail to see how the thread of *tānha* weaves its complicated web throughout this mental structure, and how it is the major seam that brings this picture together. *Tānha* infects each of the components we have looked at. Starting with its genesis in the primitive cravings incited by perception, *tānha* becomes increasingly complicated, affecting the direction of the *viññāna* 'process' of consciousness and the ideational response of *mano* to sense impressions, thus dictating not only mental attitude, but also the physical response of action and deed. Its most potent and damaging action, however, is its effect on the will of the individual. To some extent, *viññāna*, *citta* and *mano* are all agencies of willing, in that they all contribute to conditions of purposiveness, of direction, of intention. *Tānha* enslaves:

> ohitabharo anupattasadattho pari-kkhinabhavasamyojano same d'anna vimutto, tassa carato c'eva titthato ca suttassa ca jāgarassa ca 'sata tam samitam khina va āsava, api ca kho nam paccavakkhamano jānati: khina me āsava ti.

Even so, Sandaka, whatever bhikkhu is a perfected one, with cankers destroyed, who has lived the life, done what has to be done, laid down the burden, attained his own goal, the fetters of becoming utterly destroyed, freed by perfect profound knowledge, for him whether he is walking or standing still or asleep or awake, the cankers are as though destroyed; and moreover, while he reflects on it, he knows, 'my cankers are destroyed'.
that will at all stages of consciousness, and is even
able to cripple the one faculty (citta) that alone has
the potential to neutralize it.

The psychological significance of our picture
cannot be underestimated, but of crucial importance is
the theological projection which is emerging. The aeti-
ology of craving as part of the conscious process has now
been demonstrated, and the psychological basis for the
Buddhist theology of intention established. It is this
theology of intention that clearly underlies tanhā's
crucial place as the central factor in Buddhist soteri-
ology, a feature that will become increasingly evident
when we come to discuss tanhā and meditation in the next
chapter. Before we can do this, however, we have first to
complete our psychological picture. There remains one
more major responsibility in this task, and that is to
investigate evidence which points to an early Buddhist
psychology of the unconscious.

THE UNCONSCIOUS AND TANHĀ

In an article on early Buddhist psychology written
in 1924, J. T. Sun observed, "The Buddhist knows that by
living a life governed by conscious wisdom and not by un-
conscious craving there will result a personality but little
affected by sorrow". 41 Unwittingly or not, Sun was the first

modern scholar to touch upon an issue of great importance, and that is the question of the unconscious in the Nikāyas. In order to come at this topic in a methodical way, we need first to review what scholarship has been offered on this subject, define the limitations of these works, and then set about to examine the evidence of the Nikāyas for ourselves. This inquiry will be concerned chiefly with the concept of saṅkhāra, one of the most complex and vital terms in Buddhist psychology. Other concepts such as the anusaya, ukusala mūlā and the āsavā also indicate an unconscious state, and these too will have to be examined. As in our study of the Buddhist understanding of consciousness, we aim for a total psychological picture. Once this has been worked out, a clearer idea about the relationship between the unconscious, consciousness and tanhā should be evident.

PREVIOUS SCHOLARSHIP

The concept of the unconscious in the Nikāyas is not a well researched notion. In fact, it has received surprisingly little attention in modern scholarship, and no definitive work has yet been published on this subject.42

42 It is important to emphasize that we are concerned here only with the concept of the unconscious as it appears in the earliest strata of Buddhist literature, the Nikāyas. In later Buddhist literature, both in Abhidhamma and in the commentaries, the notion of the unconscious becomes increasingly significant and sophisticated, and contemporary works that do investigate the Buddhist concept of the unconscious almost invariably rely on this post-
Apart from J. T. Sun (whose essay provides us with general observations, but no direct textual references),


Post-Nikāya development of the concept of the unconscious revolves chiefly around the term bhavanga. Comprised of bhava (existence) + ānāga (factor), bhavanga came to assume two closely related meanings in Theravāda scholarship. On the one hand, as Nyanatilokā points out (Buddhist Dictionary. Op cit. p. 29), it can refer to a "life-stream" of which we are not fully conscious. "Herein", he writes, "since time immemorial, all impressions and experiences are, as it were, stored up, or better said, are functioning, but concealed as such. to full consciousness, from where however they occasionally emerge as subconscious phenomena and approach the threshold of full consciousness...this so called 'subconscious life-stream' or undercurrent of life is that by which might be explained the faculty of memory, paranormal psychic phenomena, mental and physical growth, karma and rebirth". On the other hand, bhavanga can be regarded only as a "life-continuum" factor, as Shwe Aung notes in his introduction to the Abhidhammattha-Saṅgha, where he refers to bhavanga as "the indispensable stream of being" which is the "sine qua non of present conscious existence...but it must not be supposed that the stream of being is a subplane from which thoughts rise to the surface". The fact is, however, that contemporary Theravāda teachers almost always emphasize the "subconscious" functional state of bhavanga. They are not always careful to define what they mean by "subconscious", but as a state of mind which is "below the threshold of consciousness" (Itid. p. 266), they give us some indication of how they regard this mental state.

Given the significance of this concept in Buddhist psychology, it is important to ask where it first gains currency in Buddhist literature. With this in mind, we have first to inquire if there is any evidence for the term appearing in the Nikāyas. The one contested passage is A.2.79. The P.T.S. manuscript edited by Morris (1955) reads "bhavagga" ('the best state of existence') for bhavanga. The manuscript (unidentified) used by Jayatilleke ("Some Problems of Translation and Interpretation". U.C.R. 1949. Vol. 7, p. 216) and Sarathchandra (op cit. p. li.) does not make this change, and includes bhavanga in the text:

Cattāri 'imāni bhikkhave angāni (Morris: aggāni). Katamāni ca" ca (Morris: kuppagām vedanāgām,
only two other scholars (K. N. Jayatilleke and M. W. P. de Silva) have made serious attempts to investigate the

sunāggam, bhavaṅgam. Imāni kho bhikkhaye cattāri anganīti (Morris: aggani).

There are these four limbs (angāni; the Morris reading ‘aggani’ means 'perfections'). What four?
"Perfection" of bodily forms, of feeling, of perception and of bhavanga, etc.

It is interesting that Buddhaghosa's fifth century A. D. Commentary on the A. N. rejects the reading 'bhavanga' as misleading, and insists on 'bhavagga' as the correct noun in this text:

Pañcama rūpaggan ti yaṁ rūpam sammasitvā arahattam pāpunati, idam rūpaggam nāma. Sesu su pi es'eva nayo...Bhavaggan ti ettha pana yasmim attabhāve thito arahattam pāpunati, etam bhavaggam nāma ti...

One contemplates on the material form of the body and attains arahatship, that is rūpaggan (perfection attained by contemplating on rūpa). With the rest also it is the same...the lifetime during which one attains arahatship, that is the highest point of existence (bhavaggan).

It is appropriate to conclude that the A. N. reading of bhavanga is too contentious to trust, and that bhavanga is not a term common to the Nikāyas. Bhavanga does appear in the Paṭṭhāna of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, but it is not until Buddhaghosa and the Commentaries that it receives much attention (cf. P. T. S. Dictionary, op cit. p. 499).
concept of the unconscious in the Nikāyas. Jayatilleke makes no mention of such a concept in his principal work, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, but in several other essays, he refers to the likelihood of such a theory in the Nikāyas. Thus in "Buddhism and the Scientific Revolution", he writes:

In psychology we find early Buddhism regarding man as a psycho-physical unit whose 'psyche' is not a changeless soul but a dynamic continuum composed of a conscious mind as well as an unconscious in which is stored the residua of emotionally charged memories going back to childhood as well as into past lives.\(^4^3\)

In another essay ("Some Problems of Translation and Interpretation"),\(^4^4\) Jayatilleke investigates the exegesis of the noun saṅkhāra, and points out how it must have a conative meaning, with an unconscious as well as conscious dimension to it. The only drawback with Jayatilleke's study is that it does not go far enough. There is no mention, for instance, of the role of the anusayā or mūlā in the unconscious. To some extent this is remedied by his pupil, M. W. P. de Silva,\(^4^5\)


\(^4^4\)Ibid. p. 216ff.

who gives a few references and tries to set them in perspective by comparing them with the topographical and structural concepts of mind proposed by Freud. Where de Silva is helpful is in making sure that we use such words as ‘unconscious’ with consistency. Thus we are rightly cautioned, for instance, to avoid the use of the term ‘subconscious’ to describe certain aspects of mental phenomena of which we are not fully conscious, for this term is largely undefined and therefore open to all kinds of misleading interpretation. But de Silva’s examination of the Buddhist concept of the unconscious is inadequate for several reasons. Firstly, although he states that his aim is to investigate only the evidence of the Nikāyas, in fact his references to Nikāya texts are relatively few and insufficient. He frequently draws on late or post-canonical material to support his thesis and thus loses

46 de Silva, M. W. P. A Study of Motivational Theory in Early Buddhism with reference to the Psychology of Freud. op cit. p. 95. Not infrequently one finds careless use of the terms unconscious, preconscious and subconscious in Buddhist books. For example, in one instance Gunaratne writes concerning the bhavanga: "this so-called subconscious life-stream...which certain modern psychologists call the unconscious or the Soul" (Rebirth Explained. op cit. p. 25). Again, Sarathchandra uses subconscious and unconscious indiscriminately, leading the reader to wonder what his precise meaning really is (The Buddhist Psychology of Perception. op cit. p. 91).

47 i.e. in A Study of Motivational Theory in Early Buddhism. op cit. p. 30 (The Dhammasāṅgani) p. 34 (hettippakaranā) p. 48 (Visuddhimagga) p. 100 (Paṭṭhāna) p. 104 (the theravāda theory) p. 113 (Yamaka) p. 121 (Atthasālisti) p. 125 (the aśrama theory) p. 127 (Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra) p. 134 (Milinda Pañha).
the confidence of the reader who is often not sure if the point he is making is drawn from the Nikāyas or some later work. He is of course free to base his arguments either on the Nikāyas or on a more extensive tradition. But if the argument is about an early Buddhist view, it is important to know exactly what base is being used. Secondly, de Silva's use of Freud is ponderous and methodologically not well defined. There is a case for using Freud as an instrument to penetrate Buddhist psychology, as has already been demonstrated by J. T. Sun and Erich Fromm. But it should be initially set out whether one looks to Freud to find possible jumping off points into Buddhist teaching (as Sun does by asking what in Freud is also in Buddhism) or whether one approaches Freud with a view to explicating certain Buddhist teachings (the method used by Fromm). De Silva does not see this distinction clearly, and indiscriminately applies both approaches, with the result that his reasons for using Freud are not always clear. In general, de Silva is so eager to point out similarities between the Freudian and Buddhist systems, that he takes Freudian connotations and forces them onto the suspected Buddhist parallels. He does this, for instance, with *tanha* and its relationship to the unconscious. Here, following the lead of

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48 Sun, J. T. "Psychology in Primitive Buddhism". *op cit.*


Jayatilleke, he identifies the three traditional aspects of tanhā (kāma, bhava and vibhava) with the Freudian instincts of eros (ego), libido and the death instinct. This is an interesting observation, but does it mean, as de Silva seems to hold, that tanhā is equivalent with the unconscious? It is true that the Freudian instincts, residing as they do for the most part in the id, cannot be said to be wholly conscious. On the contrary, they are largely, although not always, unconscious. If the comparison between tanhā and the Freudian instincts is as close as de Silva maintains it is, then tanhā too would seem to be a chiefly unconscious phenomenon. We have seen that such a contention is inconsistent with the evidence of the paticcasamuppāda. Tanhā’s place in this formula gives it an unquestionable conscious role. What we can say is that lurking behind tanhā are certain dynamic forces, the roots (mūla), latent tendencies (anusayā) and 'cankers' (āsayā) that may well be unconscious in the Freudian sense. We must, however, make a careful distinction between these forces and tanhā, for although they

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50 Writes Jayatilleke, "The unconscious mind is said to be impelled to act under the influence of three types of desire – the desire for sense gratification (kāma-tanhā), the desire for self-preservation (bhava-tanhā) and the desire for destruction (vibhava-tanhā)...this conception of mind sounds very modern, and one cannot also fail to observe the parallel between the threefold desire in Buddhism and the Freudian conceptions of eros, libido and thanatos". "Buddhism and the Scientific Revolution". op cit. p. 4.

50a It should be noted that our use of the term 'unconscious' is used in the sense that Freud originated. Whereas in his early work he identified the unconscious with the id, his mature position on the unconscious was that all mental activity, excluding of course consciousness in the narrow sense of consciousness of consciousness, may be unconscious.
are related, they are clearly not one and the same thing.

It is important to point out that in this context de Silva has not discussed the delicate balance in which tanhā is situated as it exists in both a conscious and unconscious state, and that in his zeal to show Freud's relevance in Buddhist studies, he has overstated his case. Apart from these references we have just reviewed, modern scholarship in Buddhist psychology has not been fruitful in developing a case for a concept of the unconscious in the Nikāyas.

Even Johansson, whose otherwise informative study on the mind cannot be surpassed for comprehensiveness, does not venture into this subject, except for two single references to Jayatileke's efforts in this field.51

It is now our responsibility to look to the evidence of the Nikāyas and develop our own argument in defense of an early Buddhist concept of the unconscious. A good place to start is with the crucial term sankhāra.

SANKHĀRA

Although in this section our central aim is to develop the concept of the unconscious as it is expressed in the term sankhāra, this unconscious dimension would not be very meaningful to us if we failed to see it in its relationship to the larger conative background of sankhāra. The method of this

section requires, therefore, that we first demonstrate why *sankhāra* should be principally regarded as a conative term, and secondly how in this capacity, one of its unique aspects is expressive of certain conative dispositions which are unconscious.

In its opening comments on the word *sankhāra*, the *P. T. S. Dictionary* sums up the predicament Western translators face in coming to grips with this term when it remarks: "*sankhāra* is one of the most difficult terms in Buddhist metaphysics, in which the blending of the subjective-objective view of the world and of happening, peculiar to the East, is so complete that it is almost impossible for Occidental terminology to get at the root of its meaning in a translation. We can only convey an idea of its import by representing several sides of its application without attempting to give a 'word' as a definite translation."

One reaction to this dilemma is for translators to turn to the etymology of the word in the hopes of seeking out a basic meaning. The breakdown is *sam* (together with) + \( \sqrt{kr} \) (to do) + a (agency), but this affords us no immediate insight into the word. The Sanskrit verb \( \sqrt{kr} \) is itself very complex. As we pointed out briefly in chapter two, it can be demonstrated that the root \( \sqrt{kr} \) refers, on the one hand to something that is put together, as a compound (*saṅkhata*), or aggregate ('*sabbe sankhāra anicca' - 'all component things

\[52\] cf. 127f.
are impermanent". S.1.200). On the other hand, the root kr can also be shown to lie behind the Sanskrit noun kratu, which has a distinctly conative meaning (cf. Brhad. U. 4.4.5: "sa yathākāmo bhavati, tat kratur bhavati, yat kratur bhavati, tat karma kurute" - 'as is his desire (kāma), such is his resolve (kratu); as is his resolve, such is the action (karma) he performs').

The root structure of saṅkhāra indicates, therefore, two possible meanings for the word. In the Nikāyas, there is evidence that occasionally saṅkhāra is used to specify 'aggregate', 'component things', 'syntheses' or 'composition' (S.1.200, 3.86; Thera. 5.10). That saṅkhāra can refer to phenomenal existence is true enough then, and it is often round translated as such. But in the majority of references to saṅkhāra in the Nikāyas, a more likely interpretation is psychological and conative. What kind of evidence strengthens this conclusion?

SAṅKHĀRA AS VOLITION

Not infrequently saṅkhāra is used synonymously with other conative Pāli terms. Thus in S.3.60 we read:

Kātāmā ca saṅkhārā? Chayime... 
cetanākāyā...rūpasāṇcetanā sadda-saṅcetanā gandhasaṅcetanā rasa-saṅcetanā phoṭthabbasaṅcetanā 
dhammasaṅcetanā.

And what are the saṅkhārā? They are the six forms of purposeful strivings: striving for form, for sound, for smell, for taste, for touch, for mental image.

In A.1.32, saṅkhāra is included in a whole list of volitional terms:

Micchādiṭṭhi kassa bhikkhave purisa-puggalassa yañ c'eva kāya kammaṁ yathādiṭṭhisamattam samādinnam yañ ca vacikammaṁ...pe...yañ ca mano kammaṁ yathādiṭṭhisamattam samādinnam yañ ca cetanā...yañ ca paṭṭhanā yo ca paṇidhi ye ca saṅkhāra sābbe te dhammad anīṭhāya akantāya amanāpāya ahitāya dukkhāya samvattanti.

Bhikkhus, in a man of wrong view (micchā: perverted, leading a wrong course) all deeds of body done according to that view, all deeds of speech...of thought... of volition -(cetanā), aspiration -(paṭṭhana) mental resolve (paṇidhi) and willing (saṅkhāra); all such things contribute to the unpleasant, the distasteful, the repulsive, the unprofitable, in short, to painfulness.

In both these texts, the central notion of willing is identified with saṅkhāra. In A.1.32, saṅkhāra is used in the sense of effecting a course of action leading to "dark results" now and to rebirth at death, a connotation found in other passages as well, notably in A.1.122 and M.1.389:

54A.1.122:
Idha bhikkhave ekacco puggalo
davyāpajjham kāyasankhāram...
vacisankhāram...manosankhāram
abhisaṅkhāroti. So davyāpajjham
cikāyasankhāram abhisaṅkhāritvā...
davyāpajjham lokam upekkhajati.


Katamañ - ca Punna kammam kanham kaghavipākam: īdhā Punna ekacco sabyābajjham kāyasāṅkhařām abhisāṅkhāroti sabyābajjham vacisāṅkhāram abhisāṅkhāroti sabyābajjham mano-sāṅkhāram abhisāṅkhāroti. So sabyābajjham kāyasāṅkhāram abhisāṅkhāritvā...pe...sabyābajjham lokam upapajjati.

And what, Punna, is the deed that is dark with dark results? Here, Punna, someone effects a harmful (byābajjha - malevolent) activity of the body, of speech, of the mind. He, having effected an activity of the body that is harmful, etc., arises in a world that is harmful.

"Elsewhere saṅkhāra assumes the sense of making a calculated choice between courses of action, as in D.3.217 ("taya saṅkhāra: punṇabhisāṅkhāro, apunṇabhisāṅkhāro anenjābhisāṅkhāro" - "three saṅkhāras: those effecting meritorious, demeritorious and neutral actions"), M.1.391 and 4.2.230f:

Cattār 'imāni bhikkhave kammāni mayā... paveditāni. Kaṭamani cattari? Attī bhikkhave kammam kanham kaghavipākam... kammam sukkam sukkavipākam...kanhasukkam kaṇhasukkavipākam...kammām ākanhamasukkam akenha-asukka-vipākam kammām kaṁmakkhayāya samvattati. Kaṭamañ... kammam kanham kaghavipākam? Idha... ekacco savyāpajjham kāyasāṅkhāram abhisāṅkhāroti...Kaṭamañ...Kammam sukkam sukkavipākam? Idha...ekacco avyāpajjham kāyasāṅkhāram abhisāṅkhāroti. Kaṭamañ...kammam kanha-sukkam kaṇhasukkavipākam? Idha... ekacco savyāpajjham pi avyāpajjham pi kāyasāṅkhāram abhisāṅkhāroti... Kaṭamañ...kammam ākanhamasukkam

Herein, bhikkhus, a certain person effects acts of body...speech and thought that are injurious (vyāpajjhī). As a result of so doing, he is reborn into an injurious world.
bhikkhus, I have come to understand, realize and know these four deeds. What four? There is the dark deed with a dark result, a bright (sukka-good, pure) deed with a bright result, a deed that is both dark and bright with a dark and bright result; and the deed that is neither dark nor bright, with a result neither dark nor white, which being itself a deed contributes to the dissolution (samvattati) of deeds. And of what sort is the deed that is dark with a dark result? In this case... a certain one effects willed bodily action (likewise action of thought and speech) that is harmful, (savyapajjham kayasankharam abhisankharoti)... and what sort is the bright deed with the bright result? In this case... one effects willed bodily action that is not harmful. And what sort is the deed that is both dark and bright, with a result that is both dark and bright? In this case one effects willed bodily action that is joined with both harm and harmlessness. And of what sort is the deed that is neither dark nor bright with a result that is similar, which, being itself a deed, contributes to the dissolution of deeds? In this case, bhikkhus, it is cetanā (volition, intention) that abandons this dark deed with the dark result... bright deed with the bright result, deeds both dark and bright.

This passage points out how sankhāra describes consciously performed acts initiated by the conative attitude of the individual. But the text is also important for another different yet crucial reason. As in M.1.391, sankhāra is
here used in conjunction with cetanā, only with this
distinction - in these passages, cetanā is the volitional
word used for that act of deliberation which does away
with rebirth - prone acts. Does this mean that saṅkhāra
reflects only gross and detrimental willing, while cetanā
refers to pure and refined willing? Although this some-
times appears to be the case, it must be emphasized that
it is not always so. For instance, as in S.3.60 above,
in certain contexts saṅkhāra and cetanā are used synonyn-
ously. Even more telling is the relationship between
cetanā and 'dark' deeds (kammaṁ kahāṁ), for, as in A.3.415,
cetanā is equated with kamma ('cetanāham bhikkhave kammaṁ
vadāmi'), kamma is often 'dark' and cetanā is not therefore
always a "pure" kind of willing. As for saṅkhāra, there
are circumstances when it is used positively, as in M.1.297,
where the compound abhisāṅkhāra is used to describe the
preliminary act of volition needed to achieve certain stages
of trance. Saṅkhāra is not always, then, a disadvantageous
conative force.

The use of the compound abhisāṅkhāra in the last
paragraph raises another important question altogether, and
that is how this term complements and further elucidates the
conative role of saṅkhāra. A complicated term in its own
right, abhisāṅkhāra is best looked at in the context of one
or two critical Pāli passages, in order to clearly see its
psychological function.

\[55\] As cetanā is equated with kamma, so also is saṅkhāra (D.2.63, A.3.9).
As in the case of sankhāra, the structural breakdown of abhisankhāra (athi, "towards" - sankhāra) does little to help us isolate the term's meaning. It has been variously translated as 'karma', 'accumulation', 'substratum', 50 'complexes', 57 'planning', 58 and 'impulse'. 59

Jayatilleke has made a bold interpretation of the term by translating it as 'motive force'. 60 This may be a controversial translation for some critics, if only because 'motive' is a widely misused and misunderstood word. 61 But Jayatilleke's understanding of the word 'motive' is consistent with some of the common contemporary psychological usages of the term. For instance, in one recent attempt to clarify the meaning of motive, J. W. Atkinson summarizes what he thinks are several different 'languages'

57 Dialogues of the Buddha III. op cit., translation of D.3.217.
58 Kindred Sayings II. op cit., translation of S.2.82.
59 Gradual Sayings I. op cit., translation of A.1.111.
61 writes Dr. T. Chaplin concerning this confusion:
of motivation, each designed to express a particular nuance of the concept. If we accept his argument, one way motivation can be described is in 'experiential' language, referring to the experience of desire, determination and inclination to act. This is very much the way Jayatilleke uses the term abhisāṅkhāra, and from this perspective, his translation of the word as 'motive force' is justified.

There is an important Pāli text which indicates this sense of 'motive'. It is set in an elaborate analogy known as the Parable of the Wheelwright (A.1.111), and is worth looking at in some detail. Here an analogy is drawn between a chariot wheel and the wheel of life.

A certain king (rañāh) asks his wheelwright to make a pair of chariot wheels, to be ready for a battle six months hence. After six months less six days has passed, the wheelwright has finished only one wheel. The king inquires whether

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Of the many intervening variables that psychologists use, the concept of motive (or motivation) is among the most controversial and least satisfactory. There seem to be as many different major definitions as there are major theories of motivation. The concept is also freighted with a number of subtle connotations from general English usage and with specialized denotations from the literature of psychology.


the second wheel can be made in the short time that remains, and is answered affirmatively. Upon delivery of the wheels on the appointed day, the king exclaims that despite the variation in time it took to make each wheel, they both appear to look alike and have no structural differences. "But your honour", replies the wheelwright, "there is a difference. Let your honour look". The parable continues:

atha kho bhikkhave rathakāro yam tam cakkam chahi divasehi niṭṭhi-tam tam pavatteesi. Tam pavattitam samānaṃ yāvatikā abhisaṅkhārassa gati tāvatikām gantvā cingulāyitvā bhūmiyam papati. Yaṃ pana tam cakkam chahi māsehi niṭṭhi tam charattunehi tam pavattesi. Tam pavattitam samānaṃ yāvatikā abhisāṅkhārassa gati tāvatikām gantvā akkhāhatam manne aṭṭhasi.

This (said), bhikkhus, the wheelwright set rolling the wheel he had finished in six days. The wheel kept rolling so long as the impulse force (abhisaṅkhārassa gati) that set it moving lasted, Then it circled around and around and fell to the ground. Then he set rolling the wheel which he had finished in six months less six days. It kept rolling so long as the impulse force that set it going lasted, and then stood still as if, you might think, it was stuck to the axle.

The reasons for the discrepancy in the performance of each wheel is then revealed. The wheel made in six days had a crooked rim (sayaṅkā), and along with the spokes and hub was defective and full of flaws (sadosā sakasāvā). The wheel made in six months less six days had none of these flaws. "Owing to the even, faultless, flawless nature of the rim, spokes and hub", continued the wheelwright, "this wheel set
rolling rolled on so long as the impulse force that set it moving lasted, then it stood still."

At this point, the chariot wheels are compared to the individual in samsāra. The analogy between the physical impulse that moves the chariot wheels and the psychological attitude that motivates the individual in the "wheel of life" is striking. The Buddha instructs his listeners that he himself was the wheelwright in the parable, and just as he was expert (kusalo) in wood that was crooked and full of faults and flaws (dāruvaṅkānam dārudosānam dārukasāvānam), so also is he now an expert in the crooked ways, faults and flaws of body, speech and mind (kayaṃvacā manovaṅkānam manodosānam manokasāvānam). The one who remains crooked in motivation will fall away from the dhamma, just like the wheel that was made in six days, and the one who is not crooked in motivation will stand firm in the dhamma like the wheel made in six months less six days.

So far we have argued that saṅkhāra and its related compounds (abhisāṅkhāra and athisāṅkhāroti) are volitional terms in both scope and purpose. We have seen how abhisāṅkhāra indicates a momentum, a dynamic force that 'keeps the wheel rolling', and how this definition complements the dispositional nature of saṅkhāra. Contributing as it does to meritorious, demeritorious and imperturbable action, saṅkhāra is the effector of deeds (kamma) and therefore the principal factor of responsibility in the patīcchasamuppāda. But is it a conscious or unconscious responsibility, a conscious or
unconscious volition? Now we must turn to this central question, in which we will argue that saṅkhāra reflects both conscious and unconscious conation.

SANKHĀRA AS CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS VOLITION

Saṅkhāra certainly has a conscious conative dimension. This is seen in its relationship to avijjā, traditionally the first link of the paticcasamuppāda. In the formula 'avijjā paccayā saṅkhāra', the nature of one's volition and subsequent volitional activities (kamma) is shown to be causally linked with the nature of one's beliefs. Because avijjā is usually associated with ignorance of the Four Noble Truths, volition can therefore have its genesis in the conscious attitude one assumes towards the Four Noble Truths. Thus ignorance provokes conscious volitional activities that can be morally unfavourable (apuññasāṅkhāra, S.2.4), and a more enlightened response to the Truths initiates morally superior volitional activities.

Again, as we saw above in M.1.389 and a.2.230, saṅkhāra as 'seeking after ends' and as 'making a choice' denotes a deliberate act of will consciously carried out. Even in the sense of 'motivation', saṅkhāra can be understood as a conscious conative term.

The evidence that saṅkhāra also has an unconscious volitional dimension is harder to find, but nonetheless apparent in several key texts. The first of these, A.1.170,
cannot be considered an unusual or exceptional passage because it is the same as a similar text in D.3.104:

Katamañ ca brāhmaṇā ādesanāpāṭipāṭihāriyam? Idha brāhmaṇa ekacco nimittena ādisati: evāṁ pi te mano īttham pi te mano iti pe te cittan ti. Idha pana brāhmaṇa...api ca kho manussānaṁ vā amanussānaṁ vā devatānaṁ vā saddam sutvā...api ca kho vitakkayato vicārayato vitakka-vipphārasaddam sutvā...Idha pana brāhmaṇa ekacco na h'eva kho nimittena ādisati...api ca kho avitakkam avicāram samādhiṁ samāpannassa citasā ceto paricca pajānati, yathā imassa bhoto manosaṅkhāre paṇihitā imassa cittassa anantarā amun nāma vitakkham vitakkissati ti.

Brahmin, what is the marvellous ability of mind reading (ādesanā-pāṭipāṭihāriyam; P. T. S. Dictionary - 'guessing other people's character')? In this case, a certain one can announce by means of a sign. Thus is your mano. Such and such is your mano, such and such your citta. And again, Brahmin, perhaps...he does so after hearing a voice from men or non-humans or devas...or on (judging) some sound he has heard, an utterance intelligently made by one who is reasoning intelligently.

Then again, Brahmin, in this case suppose a certain one does not announce by any of the signs (ways)...yet maybe, when he has attained a state of concentration which is free from cogitative and reflective thought (avitakkam avicāram samādhi) can comprehend (paricca) with his mind (ceto) the thoughts (citasā) of another and knows (pajānāti) thus: According to how the mental sankhāra (manosaṅkhāre), are disposed in the mind of this venerable one, he will think such a thought (amum nāma vitakkam) now.
Commenting on this strategic passage, Jayatilleke writes: "As the subject is apparently not conscious of the presence of these saṅkhārā which subsequently determine or influence his processes of thought they are presumably not present in his consciousness when they are perceived by the exercise of the telepathic powers of the other...in this passage we therefore find perhaps the earliest historical mention of unconscious mental processes". Two other passages lend support to this proposed concept of the unconscious. One of these is D.3.104f, where the Buddha teaches the four degrees of discernment (dassanasamāpatti). The third and fourth degrees are described in terms of a divided 'stream of consciousness' (viññāna-sotām):

Puna ca param bhante...ca viññāna-sotām pajānāti ubhayato abbcchinnam idha - loke patiṭṭhitam ca para - loke patiṭṭhitam ca, Ayam tatiyā dassana - samāpatti. Puna ca param bhante...ca viññāna - sotām pajānāti ubhayato abbcchinnam idha - loke appatiṭṭhitam ca para - loke appatiṭṭhitam ca. Ayam catutthā dassana - samāpatti.

Again, lord, he goes on after that to discern the unbroken flux of (human) consciousness, established both in this world and in another world without a sharp distinction into two parts (ubhayato abbcchinnam). This is the third degree of discernment. Again, lord, he goes on to discern the unbroken flux of (human) consciousness as not established either in this world or in another world.

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This crucial passage indicates that viññana (which we have so far discussed only as a 'process of consciousness') also has a dimension which is 'in a world beyond' (para-loke patitthitam), a dimension that can be identified with the unconscious, as Jayatilleke argues when he observes:

As this is said to be so when the person is alive in this world it implies the presence of a part of the stream of consciousness of which the person is not aware though it nevertheless exists in a state of flux. And though there is no text to confirm this the probability is that this part of the stream of consciousness consisted of these dynamic sāṅkhāras which persisted in a state of flux in the unconscious influencing his subsequent behaviour.64

by its description as 'para-loke' ("in a world beyond"), the dispositional nature of this concept of the unconscious may not be immediately apparent, but the probability that it consists of the sāṅkhāra, and the fact that it is in flux tends to reinforce the argument that we are still dealing with a dispositional definition of the unconscious. Furthermore, the relationship evident here between sāṅkhāra and viññana is justified in light of the paticcasa-muppāda, where the formula "sāṅkhāra paccaya viññanaṁ" points out how the conative force of the sāṅkhāra causally conditions the arising of consciousness, and that if some of these sāṅkhāra are hidden from consciousness, they nonetheless still

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64 Ibid. p. 216.
lie behind that consciousness and affect its quality and attitude.

The fact that many of our bodily and mental functions have both a conscious and unconscious volitional aspect is also brought out in the terms kāya, vacī, and cittasaṅkhāra (M.1.301). As in our quote from A.2.230 above, for instance, kāyasāṅkhāra can be identified with conscious volitional acts executed through the agency of the body. But in M.1.301, it is also identified with breathing (assāsapassāsā), an action descriptive of a reflex or habit more often than not unconsciously performed. Likewise vacisaṅkhāra, cittasaṅkhāra, and manosāṅkhāra (A.2.158) have both conscious and unconscious volitional roles, as Jayatilleke notes in commenting on this passage in the Sāncetanikavagga:

All these saṅkhāras are further classified in another context where the use of the term saṅkhāra for 'reflex actions' or unconscious habits of body, speech and mind is shown by the fact that we can operate a saṅkhāra (saṅkhāram abhisāṅkhāroti) without being aware of it (asampajana) A.2.158.65

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65 Ibid. p. 217, U.C.R. Vol. 8, 1949, p. 45. cf. A.2.158:

Sampajāno vā tam bhikkhave kāyasāṅkhāram (vacī, mano) abhisāṅkhāroti yam paccaya, ssa tam uppañjati ajjhatam sukhadukkhham, asampajāno vā tam bhikkhave kāyasāṅkhāram abhisāṅkhāroti yam paccaya:ssa tam uppa- jjati ajjhattam sukhadukkhham.

Either of set purpose (Woodward's translation), bhikkhus, one wills willed bodily action following on which to him arises pleasure or pain, or not of set purpose does he will such bodily action which causes the arising of pleasure and pain.
It is important to point out, however, that all of these saṁkhāra, even if unconscious, can be brought to the attention of consciousness (cf. D.2.106 below). This is not something the average individual (nathujjana) can do. For him, many of these "motives" are not correctly understood, or go completely unrecognized, are compulsive and therefore lack any agent control. But for the arhat, the discipline of meditation can enable him to make the unconscious conscious. He can, for example, will his breathing to stop, and even will to "let go" (ossajī) of those "motive forces which sustain life" (Jayatilleke's translation of ayusaṁkhāra), as the Buddha was said to have done in D.2.106. We will have more to say about this in the next chapter.

To sum up, so far we have reviewed the evidence which points to a concept of the unconscious in the term saṁkhāra. We started out by arguing that saṁkhāra is a volitional term denoting conscious willing (striving after ends and making a choice) as well as willed actions (kamma). This central volitional meaning of saṁkhāra is also seen to apply to an unconscious dimension of the term. There, saṁkhāra reflects a dispositional rather than spatial concept of the unconscious, and consists of both conative forces (what Jayatilleke also calls "motive forces") which go largely unrecognized by the individual, and undeliberate, reflex actions, such as breathing. We have also seen how the unconscious saṁkhāra are related to the arising of the viññāna.
process (D.3.105), and how both mano (A.1.170, 2.158) and citta (M.1.301) are affected by these forces.

The picture of the unconscious is not yet complete, however, for the Nikāyas also make reference to certain latent tendencies (anusayā) and dispositional roots (mūlā), which are largely unconscious in operation. What do these forces tell us about the nature of the unconscious and about the aetiology of craving?

THE ANUSAYĀ, AKUSALĀ - MŪLĀ AND ĀSAVĀ AS FACTORS OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

Of the many lists of detrimental psychological features found in the Nikāyas, three lists in particular are

A compilation of these lists is as follows:

1. Tanhā - cravings
   Kāmatanā (sensual craving), bhavataṇhā (craving for life), vibhavataṇhā (craving for annihilation, or craving for power). M.1.299, Itv.3.1.9.

2. Upādānas - grasplings
   Kamupādāna (sense grasping), attavādupādāna (self-grasping), silabbatupādāna (rites grasping), diṭṭhupādāna (views grasping). M.1.65, D.2.57.

3. Āsavā - cankers
   Kamāsavā (sensuality), bhavāsavā (life desire), avijjāsavā (ignorance). M.1.279, 464. Itv.3.1.7.

4. Nīvaranāṇi - hindrances
   Kāmacchanda (sensuality, lust), abhijjhā-vyāpāda (ill-will), thīna-middhā (dullness), uddhacca-kukkucca (worry), vicikicchā (waverer). M.1.432, 2.52.
so described as to suggest an unconscious background. These
are the anusayā, the akusala mūlā and the āsava. What kind
of evidence supports this claim? Let us begin with the

5. Anusayā - inclinations
Kāmaraga (sensuality, lust), patigha (anger),
ditthi (views), vicikiccha (doubt), māna
(conceit), bhavarūga (life desire); avijjhā

6. Akusala - mūlā - unskillful roots
rāga (luster), dosa (hatred), moha (delusion).
D.1.37, M.1.297. Sometimes lobha (greed) is
used in place of rāga (i.e. A.1.263).

7. Samyojanas - fetters
Sakkāyaditthi (personality belief), vicikiccha
(skepticism), silabhataparamāśo (belief in
purification through rules and rites),
kamacchando (sensuality, lust), vyāpādo (hatred),
rūparāgo (craving for birth with form),
arūparāgo (craving for birth without form, as in
immaterial existence), māno (self will),
uddhaccāna (restlessness), avijjhā (ignorance).
S.1.23, S.241; A.1.264; M.1.463; Dhm.370.
Various groupings of the samyojanas are also
found. Thus the tīni samyojanāni (M.1.9;
A.1.231; D.2.92; S.5.357) are the first three
fetters in the above list of samyojanas. The
orambhāgiyāni (belonging to the lower part)
refer to the first five fetters (M.1.432;
D.1.156; A.1.232; S.5.61) and the uddambhāgiyāni
(belonging to the upper part) refer to the
last five fetters (A.5.17; S.5.61).

8. Gatā - alternatives (lit: "gone in a certain way")
Tanhañgametam (ways of cravings), saññagametam
(ways of perception), maññitametam (ways of
imagining), panaññametam (ways of conceptual
proliferation), upadāñgametam (ways of grasping). A.4.68.

9. Thānas - the four 'behaviours' (translated as
'motives' in Dialogues of the Buddha. Vol. 3.
op cit. D.3.162) leading to evil karma (papakaṃmā).
Chanda (desire, deleterious in this list), dosa
(hatred), bhaya (fear), moha (delusion).
anusaya, where a case for unconscious dispositional factors is clearly indicated in the texts. Anusaya has been variously translated as latent bias, 
latent tendency, latent disposition, bent, proclivity, persistence in dormant disposition, and predisposition. 'Latent tendencies' or 'inclinations' are adequate translations of the word, and it is worth noting that it is always used in a bad sense. Traditionally there are seven anusaya:

10. Pāca cetato vinibhandhā - five bondages of the mind.
Kāmesu rago (attachment to sensuality), kāye rāgo (attachment to tody), rūpe rāgo (attachment to material shape), yāvattham udarāvadehakaram bhūjītvā seyya sukham anuyoga (eating as much as one can and living in eusiness), ānātaram deva - nikāyam panidhāya trahmacariyām (thinking that by the custom of Brahma-faring I will become as the devas). M.1.103, D.33.2.20.

11. Tinnam patisevanāni - three indulgences.
Soppa (sleep), surāmerayapana (drinking of spirits), methunadhammasamapattiya (pursuing sex, in which there can be no satiation - 'n'atthi titti') A.1.258 (Sambodhi, Vagga).

68Jayatilleke, K. N. Facets of Buddhist Thought. op cit. p. 87.
69These latter five translations occur in the F. T. S. Dictionary. op cit. p. 44. Jayasuriya writes that the anusaya "may be regarded as the level of the unconscious mind of the psychologists". The Psychology and Philosophy of Buddhism (Colombo: Y.M.H.A. 1963), p. 108.
Satta anusaya, kāmarāgānusayo, paṭighūnusayo, ditthānusayo, vicikicchānusayo, mānānusayo, bhavarāgānusayo, avijjānusayo.

Freely translated, this passage from D.3.254 reads:
seven latent tendencies: the desire to satisfy our senses and sex (kāmarāga), aggression (paṭigha), the beliefs we cling to (dittha), doubt (vicikiccha), personal pride and conceit (māna), egoistic impulses (bhavarāga) and ignorance (avijjā). There are two central aspects of the anusaya, then. On the one hand they are latent and therefore unconscious, and on the other hand they are dispositional.

Frequently the anusaya are used in conjunction with the verb anuseti (anu. seti - to lie down, lie dormant), a verb which in turn reflects an unconscious state:

Yañca...ceteti yan ca paṇappeti
yanca anuseti, ōrammaṇam etam
hoti viññānassa thitiyā, ārammaṇe
sati patiṭṭhā viññānassā hoti...
no ce...ceteti no ce paṇappeti
atha ce anuseti, ōrammaṇam etam
hoti viññānassā thitiyā, ārammaṇe
sati patiṭṭhā viññānassā hoti.

That which we will and that which we intend and that which lies as dormant tendencies - this becomes a basis for a state (prevalence, duration) of viññāna. If the basis is there, there will be a state of viññāna...even if we do not will or intend, but there is still a dormant tendency, this becomes a basis for viññāna.

S.2.65.

A key text which demonstrates the close relationship between the anusaya and anuseti also points out how the anusaya are present even in infancy, the source for potential
painfulness in child and adult alike:

Daharassa hi Māluṇkyāputta kumarassa mandassa uttānaseyyakassa sakkāyo ti pi na hoti, kuto pan'assa uppajjissati sakkayadiṭthi; anuseti tv'ev'assa sakkayadiṭṭhanusayo. Daharassa hi Māluṇkyāputta kumarassa mandassa uttānaseyyakassa dhammad ti pi na hoti, kuto pan'assa uppajjissati dharmassu vicikicchā; anuseti tv'ev'assa vicikicchhanusayo. Daharassa hi Māluṇkyāputta kumarassa mandassa uttānaseyyakassa sīla ti pi na hoti, kuto pan'assa uppajjissati sīlesu sīlabbataparāmaṣo; anuseti tv'ev'assa sīlabbataparāmaṣanusayo. Daharassa hi Māluṇkyāputta kumarassa mandassa uttānaseyyakassa kāma ti pi na hoti, kuto pan'assa uppajjissati kāmesu kāmacchando; anuseti tv'ev'assa kamarāgaṇanusayo. Daharassa hi Māluṇkyāputta kumarassa mandassa uttānaseyyakassa sattā ti pi na hoti, kuto pan'assa uppajjissati sattasu byāpādo; anuseti tv'ev'assa byāpād anusayo.

Māluṇkyāputta, if there were not 'own body' for an innocent baby boy (daharassa) lying on his back, how could there arise for him the view of 'own body'? A latent tendency to the view of 'own body' indeed lies latent within him. Māluṇkyāputta, if there were not things (dhamma) for an innocent baby boy lying on his back, how could there arise for him perplexity about things? A latent tendency of perplexity indeed lies latent in him. Māluṇkyāputta, if there were not habits (sīla) for an innocent baby boy lying on his back, how could there arise for him clinging to rites and customs? A latent tendency to cling to rites and customs indeed lies latent in him. Māluṇkyāputta, if there were not sense-pleasures for an innocent baby boy lying on his back, how could there arise for him desire for sense-pleasures among the sense-pleasures? A latent tendency towards
attachment to sense-pleasures indeed lies latent in him. Mūlunkyāputta, if there were not 'beings' for an innocent baby boy lying on his back, whence could there arise for him malevolence towards beings? A latent tendency to malevolence indeed lies latent in him. M.1,432.

This passage shows how unconscious harmful inclinations are passed on from life to life, doubtless through the process of kamma. They appear to be deeper, almost instinctual forces, ready to excite and stimulate craving. Behind all our conscious feelings lie the anusayā, as M.1,303 illustrates:


But lady, how is pleasant feeling pleasant, how painful? How is painful feeling painful, how pleasant? How is neutral feeling pleasant, how painful? Friend Visākha, pleasant feeling is that where pleasantness is lasting, pain variable; painful feeling is that where pain is
lasting, pleasantness variable; neutral feeling is pleasant as to knowing, painful as to not knowing. But lady, what tendency lies latent in pleasant feeling, what tendency lies latent in painful feeling, what tendency lies latent in neutral feeling? Friend Visākhā, a tendency to attachment lies latent in pleasant feeling, a tendency to anger or repugnance (patigha) lies latent in painful feeling, a tendency to ignorance lies latent in neutral feeling.

In another important text (M.3.285), the anusaya are shown to be apart from the process of consciousness, yet still affecting the experiences that are generated by that process:

Cakkhuṁ ca bhikkhave, paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviṁnañā, tinṇam samgati phasso; phassapaccaya uppa-jjati vedayitaṁ sukhāṁ vā dukkhāṁ vā adukkhamasukkhāṁ vā... So sukhānam vedanāya phuttho samāno abhinandati abhivadati ajjhosāya tiṭṭhati, tassa rāgānusayo anuseti. Dukkhāya vedanāya phuttho samāno socati kilamati pari-devati urattālim kandati sammohām āpajjati; tassa patighānusayo anuseti. Adukkhāmasukkhāya vedanāya phuttho samāno tassā vedanāya samudayaṁ ca atthangamaṁ ca aśsādaṁ ca ādinavan ca nissaranāṁ ca yathā bhūtām nappajanati; tassa avijjānusayo anuseti.

Bhikkhus, visual consciousness arises because of eye and material shapes, the meeting of the three is sensory stimulus; an experience arises conditioned by sensory stimulation that is pleasant or painful or neither painful nor pleasant. He, being stimulated by a pleasant feeling, delights, is happy, and persists in clinging to it; a latent tendency to attachment is latent within him. Being stimulated by a painful feeling, he grieves, is troubled, sad, beats his chest and
becomes disillusioned; a tendency to anger or repugnance is latent within him. Experiencing a feeling that is neither painful nor pleasant, he does not understand the origin nor the going away nor the satisfac-
tion nor the peril of that feeling, nor the escape from it as it really is; a tendency to ignorance is latent within him.

Having demonstrated the unconscious dispositional
nature of the anusaya, we now need to ask what their re-
lationship is to tanhā. One could establish a scheme of
correspondence between the anusaya and tanhā, perceiving
the latter as a deeper background, an undercurrent that
sustains conscious craving. Thus it could be argued that
the anusaya of sensual lust (kāmarāga) forms the basis of
kāmatanha (sensual craving), the latent tendency to cling to
life (bhavarāga) is the basis for bhavatānha (craving for
life), and the latent tendency of anger (patigha) is the
basis for those aggressive tendencies which make up
vibhavatānha. 70 As was evident in M.3.285 above, the anusaya
lie behind the vinnaṇa process of which tanhā is a part.
But it can be argued that they also affect the aetiology
of conscious craving because they represent the unconscious
dispositional basis of each individual. Furthermore, as
tanhā is expressive of the central Buddhist theological

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70 Vibhavatānha is normally associated with the
ucceda-dīttī (view of annihilation), as in M.102:
problem of egocentric involvement, so too do the anusaya
concentrate heavily on this feature at an unconscious level.
Thus the baby in M.1.432 is said to have sakkayaditthi, or
a feeling (literally 'opinion') of selfhood, that he is the
centre of the world, so to speak, and that for anything to
have meaning, it must revolve around his self. Again, with

Ye kho te bhonte samanabrahmana
sato sattassu ucchedam vinasa
vibhavam pathahe penti, te sakkaya
yabhaya sakkayaparijegucch, sakkaya na neva anuparidhavanti
anuparivattanti. Seyathapi
nema sangaddubaddho dalhe
thambe va khile va upanibaddho
tam eva thambam va khila vah
anuparidhavati anuparivattati...
evam ev'te bhonto samanabrahmanah
sakkayabhaya sakkayaparijegucch, sakkaya na neva anuparidhavanti
anuparivattanti.

Those worthy recluses and brahmins
who lay down for beings the cutting
off, the destruction, the denial of
bhava, these, afraid of the 'person'
sakkaya), hating the 'person',
simply keep running and circling
around the 'person'. Just as a
dog that is tied by a leash to a
strong post, so do these worthy
recluses, and brahmins, afraid of
the person, hating the person,
simply keep running and circling
around the person.

Here the words uccheda, vinasa and vibhava are clearly
used as synonyms for vibhava, emphasizing the sense of ' anni-
hilation'. But the prefix 'vi' can also be used as an inten-
sive rather than negative particle, thus giving the meaning
of power, with the aggression and ambition that accompany
craving for power (cf. The Dhammapada, trans. S. Radhakrishnan.
op cit. p. 165).
the *anusaya* of conceit (*māna*) and life desire (*bhavarāga*),
the stress falls upon the same egocentric predicament. The
former latent tendency is the basis of the experience of
pride, and the feeling of one's distinctiveness; the latter
reminds us of the *āyusaṅkhāra* or life force, and can be
equated with the will to live to which most individuals cling.

Aside from the *anusaya*, there are two other lists
of detrimental traits which have an unconscious dimension.
One of these is the *akusala mūlā*, or roots of immoral action.

THE AKUSULA MŪLĀ

Traditionally, the three 'roots' (*mūla*) of immoral
action ('unskilled states' - a + kusala) are *rāga* (greed),
dosā (corruption or hatred) and *moha* (delusion), although
frequently *lobha* is used synonymously with *rāga* (i.e. 'tīna
*akusala - mūlānī: lotho akusala - mūlam, doso akusala -
mūlam, moho akusala - mūlam'). 71

The word 'root' (*mūla*) is very graphic, and by itself
indicates a source for immoral actions. Some scholars identify
the *akusala mūlā* with 'fundamental evil motives', as Jayasuriya
does when he writes "since the motives of attachment, ill will
and delusion are the unrecognized but profound causes of the
thoughts in these divisions, the Buddha's teaching emphasizes

71 It should be pointed out that there are also three
moral (*kusala*) roots as a balance, to the *akusala mūlā*. These
are *arāgā* (or cāga, generosity), *adōsa* (or mettā, love), and
āmohā (or vijjā, knowledge).
the need for getting rid of evil motives as an important
means to refrain from evil actions and to cleanse the mind
of its many impurities and defilements." 72 Jayasuriya
significantly points out here that the mūla are 'unrecog-
nized', and that they are the cause for 'evil actions' and
mental 'impurities'. This is consistent with the evidence
of the texts, where the akusala mūla are used to describe
the arising of kamma ('kammaṇam samudayāya', A.1.264), and
because kamma is passed on from birth to birth, it can be
argued that the akusala mūla are inherited unconscious
dispositional forces that stand behind willed action, as
is suggested in A.1.263:

Yaṁ bhikkhave lobhapakataṁ kammaṁ
lobhajāṁ lobhanidānam lobhasamudayaṁ
tāṁ kammaṁ akusalaṁ tāṁ kammaṁ
sāvajjāṁ tāṁ kammaṁ dukkhavipākaṁ
tāṁ kammaṁ kammaṇam samudayaṁ saṁvattati
na tāṁ kammaṁ kammanirodhaṁ saṁvattati.
Yaṁ bhikkhave dosapakataṁ kammaṁ... nā
pe...yaṁ bhikkhave mohapakatām kammaṁ...

Bhikkhus, were there kamma performed
by greed, born of greed, conditioned
by greed, arising from greed - that
kamma is akusala (immoral), that
kamma is blame-worthy (sāvajja), that
kamma has painfulness as its fruit,
that kamma leads to the further
arising of kamma, that kamma does
not lead to the cessation of kamma.
Bhikkhus, were there kamma performed
in hatred... in delusion...(that kamma
is akusala, etc.).

This passage continues by emphasizing that kamma is

72 Jayasuriya, W. F. The Psychology and Philosophy
of Buddhism. op cit. p. 57; cf. also p. 40f, 72f.
based on (thāniyā) desire (rāga), whether of the past, present, or in the future. As one of the akusala mūla, rāga is the source of that attachment to which the infatuated mind (sāraṇa) is fettered (saṁyutto) for the production of more desire and thus more kamma:

Tīṇ'īmāni bhikkhave nidānāni kammapāramā samudayaīya. Katamāni tīnī? Atite bhikkhave chandarāgatthāniye dhamme ārabba chando jāyati, anāgata bhikkhave chandarāgatthāniye dhamme ārabba chando jāyati, paccuppanne bhikkhave chandarāgatthāniye dhamme ārabba chando jāyati. Kathan ca bhikkhave atite...anāgata...paccuppanne chandarāgatthāniye dhamme ārabba chando jāyati? Atite...anagate...paccuppanne bhikkhave chandarāgatthāniye dhamme ārabba cetasā anuvitakketi avu-vicāreti. Tassa atite...anagate...paccuppane, chandaragatthāniye dhamme ārabba cetasā anuvitakkayato anuvicārayato chando jāyati, chandajāto tehi dhammehi saṁhutto hoti. Bhikkhave saṁnājanām vadami, yo cetaso sāraṇa. Evan kho bhikkhave atite chandaragatthāniye dhamme ārabba chando jāyati...

Bhikkhus, there are these three conditions for the arising of kamma. What three? Bhikkhus, for things which in the past were based on desire and excitement or wishing (chanda - here used in a non-virtuous sense)...in the future will be based on desire and excitement...in the present are based on desire and excitement. How, bhikkhus, is desire born for things which in the past...future...present are based on desire and excitement? Bhikkhus, things which in the past, future or present are based on desire, one turns over in his mind (pōnders - anuvitakketi anuvicāreti). Thus turning things
over in his mind, desire is born. Desire being born, he is fettered by those things. I call it a 'fetter,' bhikkhus, that mind full of infatuation. Thus, bhikkhus, is desire born for things which in the present are based on desire and attachment.

What now of the relationship between the akusala mūlā and tanhā? It is significant to point out that the mūlā are synonymous with some of the anusaya. Thus rāgamūla (roots of greed) overlaps with kāmarūgānusayo (inclination for sensual satisfaction), dosamūla (roots of hatred) with latijānusayo (inclination for aggression) and mahāmūla (roots of delusion) with avijjānusayo (inclination to ignorance).

Furthermore, as we demonstrated in the last section how the anusaya lie behind tanhā, for the same reasons it can be argued that the mūlā stand behind and affect tanhā. Thus, for example, a correspondence is evident between rāgamūla and both kāma and bhava tanhā. The mūlā as 'roots', then, are more than just metaphorically symbolic. They play a crucial role in the aetiology of tanhā.

THE ĀSĀVĀ

The last group of harmful dispositions which lie largely below the threshold of consciousness are the āsāvā. Coming from the root śru (to ooze, discharge), āsāvā has a specific function in psychological terminology as that which "intoxicates the mind so that it cannot rise to higher
It is difficult to find an English equivalent for this word, but Horner’s translation of ‘canker’ adequately conveys the sense of a psychological ‘sore’ that festers and corrodes. In what are regarded as some of the older passages of the Nikāyas (M.1.55, A.1.165, S.4.256, It.49), only three āsavā are referred to (kāmāsavā, bhavāsavā, avijjāsavā: the cankers of sensuality, of ‘becoming’, of ignorance), but elsewhere, dīṭṭhi (the canker of ‘views’ or speculation) is added, as in D.2.81:

Paññā – paribbāvatām cittaṃ sammad eva āsāvehi vimuccati, seyyathidham kāmāsavā bhavāsavā avijjāsavā ti.

The citta set round with wisdom is set free from the āsavā, that is to say from the cankers of sensuality, lust for life, speculation and ignorance.

A significant feature of this passage is its reference to citta. The āsavā frequently appear in the context of this term, and the very fact that the āsavā seriously affect citta and are the last detrimental dispositions to be removed before enlightenment points to their entrenched position deep within the psyche. Only in the final jhāna does the arhat finally rid himself of these cankers:

So kho āham ānanda aparena samayena sabbaso nevasaṅghaṅga saṅghayatanam samatikkamma saṅghavedayitanirodham upasampajja viharāmi, paññaya ca me disvā āsavā parikkhayaṃ aham su.

74 Horner, I. B., Middle Length Sayings. op cit. p. 8; "Discourse on all the Cankers" (Sabbasarasutta).
And presently, Ananda, passing wholly beyond the mental state of neither perception nor non-perception, I entered and abode in the cessation of perception and feeling, and I saw by wisdom that the cankers were destroyed. A.4.448.

The āsava are evidently so deep-rooted (and yet at the same time so common), that as this passage and other texts point out, it takes a special kind of knowledge (pañña) to root them out ('pañña paribhāvitam cittam sammad eva āsavehi vimuccati seyyathidam kāmasava...pe'. 'Citta when thoroughly developed through pañña, is set free from the cankers.' D.2.81). The average man is unaware of this deep background, and even those engaged in the first three levels of meditation are not able to penetrate the depths of their dispositional nature sufficiently to discover the source of craving and eradicate it.

It can be argued, then, that the chief feature of the āsava is their ability to thwart insight particularly into the cause of painfulness: At least it is clear that the third āsava of avijjā is in many ways the most fundamental of the cankers ('āsavasamudyā avijjāsamudayo āsavanirodhā avijjānirodho' - 'with the arising of cankers there is the arising of ignorance, with the cessation of cankers there is cessation of ignorance'. M.1.54), and the basis of all harmful states of mind. No other factor is as 'impure' (malā):
Tato maṇḍa maṇḍataram avijjā paramam
maṇḍam etam maṇḍam pahatvāna nimmala
hotta bhikkhave.

But the superlative impurity, greater than all the others, is ignorance; having struck down that impurity, bhikkhus, be pure. Dhm. 243.

It is important to point out that the ignorance specifically indicated by avijjāsava is lack of the higher knowledge of the Four Noble Truths. Many Buddhist texts stress the destruction of the āsavā as coinciding with the realization of the Four Truths. This is most forcefully affirmed in D.2.97:

So evam samāhiṭe citte parisuddhe
pariyodāte aññagaṇe vigatūpakkilesa
muḍu-bhūte kammaniyē tīṭhe ānejjappatte
āsavānaṁ khāya - Ṋañāya cittam abhi-
niharati abhinnāmaṃti. So 'idam
dukkham 'ti yathā - bhūtam pājānāti
'ayam dukkha samudayo 'ti yathā -
bhūtam pājānāti, ayam dukkha nirodho,
ti yathā bhūtam pājānāti, 'ayam dukkha
nīroDA - gāmini paṭipoda 'ti yathā -
bhūtam pājānāti, 'ime āsavā'...tassa
evam jānaṭo evam passato kāmāsavā pi
cittam vimuccati bhavāsavā pi cittam
vimuccati, avijjāsavā pi cittam
vimuccati.

With his citta thus serene, pure, translucent, cultured, rid of evil, supple, ready to act, firm and imperturbable, he directs and bends down his citta to the knowledge of the destruction of the āsavā. He knows as it really is: 'this is painfulness'. He knows as it really is: 'this is the origin of painfulness'. He knows as it really is: 'this is the cessation of painfulness'. He knows as it really is: 'this is the path that leads to the cessation of painfulness'. He knows as they really are: 'these are the āsavā'. To him, thus knowing, thus seeing,
the citta is set free from the
canker of sensuality, is set free
from the canker of lust for life;
is set free from the canker of
ignorance.

As this and other passages indicate, the destruction
of the āsavā is a central soteriological focus of Buddhism.
One does not find the anusayā or akusala – mūlā directly
mentioned in such a context as this.76 It is also notable
that the āsavā are referred to many more times in the
Nikāyas than the anusayā or akusala – mūlā, emphasizing
their critical importance in Buddhist psychology. Their
intransigence and powerful grip on the average individual,
demonstrated in their presence right up to the most profound
level of meditation, indicates the depth of their influence
on the personality (citta). Like the anusayā and the mūlā,

76 Sometimes in the Saṃyutta Nikāya the eradication
of the akusala mūlā is compared to nibbāna (S.4.251), but
only in the context that the mūlā automatically disappear
if the āsavā are destroyed:

Ekam antaṁ nisinno kho so bhikkhu
Bhagavantam etad avoca. Nāgavinayo
dosavinayo mohavinayo ti bhante
vuccati; kīsā nu kho etam bhante
adhivacanam rāgavinayo dosaṁ mohaṁ
ti. Nibbānadhātuyā kho etam bhikkhu
adhivacanam rāgavinayo...pe...āsavānām
khayo tena vuccati ti.

Then a certain bhikkhu, sitting down,
said this to the Blessed One. "Lord,
the saying 'restraint of lust, re-
straint of hatred, restraint of
illusion' is the saying. What, Lord,
does this restraint, (etc.) imply?"
"It implies, bhikkhu, the realm of
nibbāna. By this restraint (etc.)
is meant the destruction of the
āsavā."
the asavā are clearly below the threshold of consciousness, and remain a constant source of craving until they are finally eradicated only at the supreme moment of enlightenment. In this way, it is possible to argue that the asavā are even less readily brought to the realization and understanding of an enlightened consciousness than the anusayā and the mūlā, and that therefore they represent the deepest unconscious dispositional forces of the human psyche.

In summing up, we can say that the anusayā, akusala mūlā and asavā are all represented in the Nikāyas as having special significance as groups of harmful dispositions or traits which are unconscious. Although several of the individual traits overlap and are represented in all three lists, each group still has a distinct function which sets it apart. Thus only the anusayā are referred to directly as being ‘anusetī’ or ‘latent’ dispositions. The akusala mūlā—we have seen to be the direct cause for the arising of karma (A.1.264), and they have a distinctly ethical function, as they infatuate the mind (cetaso sārāgo) with things (dhamma) that in the past, present and future are based on evil desire and excitement (chandarāgatthānīye).

But of all the groups of traits, the asavā are the most significant because they are the most trenchant and the last group of harmful dispositions to be destroyed in the process of enlightenment (A.1.446). They have a pronounced theological focus. Frequently mentioned as the root of
ignorance, they are thus seen to be the major obstacle in understanding the soteriological significance of the Four Truths.

Yet although the anussayä, akusala mūla and āsavā are emphasized for varying and different reasons as psychological, ethical and theological expressions, it is still important to recognize that they share a unity of purpose in that they are all expressions of unconscious dispositional forces that contribute to the aetiolo-ogy of craving.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, our primary aim has been to trace the aetiology of craving. We have sought out the faculty and activity of human consciousness which stands behind the problem of craving, and have mapped out where and how craving arises in the vihāna ‘process’, and how it is related to other psychological concepts of mind, notably mano and citta.

We have also argued that not only does craving arise because of stimulation of the senses, but that it is further excited and provoked by unconscious dispositional forces; the so-called latent tendencies, roots and cankers. This theory that there are such unconscious inclinations standing behind the conscious tanhā is soteriologically of great importance, for these unconscious forces become barriers to enlightenment if only because they are so deep.
within the psyche of the average individual that for the
large part they go unrecognized, and hence untreated. 7
In explicating the etiology of craving, a
psychological picture has emerged that has a twofold
emphasis. On the one hand, just as the Buddha rejects
'substance' theories of the body (skhandha), so does he
reject a 'substance' concept of the mind. The mind is
discussed in psychological and dispositional terms only.
On the other hand, as we have argued throughout this
chapter, the principal psychological problem affecting
this dispositional concept of mind is seen to be craving
and its related roots.

As a purely psychological phenomenon, craving might
well be discussed by the psychologist only as a question
of motivation. But for the Buddhist, craving as a conative
force also has a strategic theological significance, because
to a large extent, it directs the focus of intention in the
individual.

As we will continue to argue in the next chapter,
Buddhist soteriology depends on developing right intention,
and craving plays a major role in this aim. Here we will:
argue that far from curtailing or eroding willing, Buddhism

7 It could well be argued that the debates between
the 'empirical' and 'mystical' interpretations of Buddhist
soteriology, which we take up in the next chapter, would
not have occurred if this perspective had been better
understood.
asks that we purify our volition, including tanhā, in order to arrive at a higher, more qualitative willing which contributes to the realization of freedom from gross tanhā and the roots that feed it.

By keeping this crucial issue in mind, the psychology of craving takes on the added dimension of being more than just a psychological topic, and its real place in Buddhism as a religious problem is not lost sight of.
CHAPTER IV

TANHĀ AND EMANCIPATION

In the last chapter, we mapped out the infrastructure of tanhā, and showed how the mind becomes entangled, to use the graphic imagery of M.1.383, in the 'great net of craving' (mahātanhājāla). Having demonstrated how craving arises and what effects it has on the individual in samsāra, our next task is to investigate the way of release from this net, the way to emancipation.

In pursuing this aim, we want to come to grips with two different but nonetheless related problems. Firstly it is necessary to see how Buddhism seeks to divert "the current of craving" from deleterious thirsts to ethical and intellectual objectives. In developing this argument, we will stress that far from being a pessimistic soteriology, which asks us to atrophy our senses and erode our will, Buddhism in fact urges us to develop our senses and apply energy and 'skilful' (kusala) intention in pursuit of a freedom from craving and the grosser forms of volition.

Secondly, we must see that the principle character of this purified volition is the achievement of proper meditation.
The central argument of this chapter is, then, that both the will and mind are soteriologically important, and that mindfulness and meditation must be seen as dependent upon a theology of intention which forms the most general basis of Buddhist emancipation.

This is not a universally accepted position in Buddhist studies. Many scholars underestimate the crucial place of conation in Buddhist soteriology, and this misunderstanding has often led to a negative emphasis. For example, in the first chapter we saw how one of the earliest western interpreters of Buddhism, Arthur Schopenhauer, concluded that the early Buddhist concept of volition closely reflected his own pessimistic doctrine of will (Bejahung, Verneinung).

This impression that desire and willing in Buddhism is always deleterious was also reinforced by the early translations of the Pāli texts into European languages. It was Mrs. Rhys Davids who in her essay "On the Will in Buddhism", ¹ pointed out in a comparison of various English translations with the originals "that the one English word "desire" is made to do duty for no less than seventeen Pāli words (for example, tanhā (craving), ākāsaṃ (space, "puffed-up state"), visattikām (dart of lust), chātata (hunger), sitā (clinging), not one of which means desire taken in its ordinary general sense, but rather in that of

¹ Rhys Davids, C. A. F. "On the Will in Buddhism". op cit. p. 54, 57.
perverted, morbid, excessive desire". She also found that much was the same case with the French and German translations of Burnouf, Foucaux, Oldenberg, Max Müller, Fausböll and Neumann. For these translators, 'desire' in the context of the Pāli Nikāyas was always bad, though in the West it had not lost its neutral moral connotation.2

2French and German translations and interpretations of the Pāli word 'tānha' and its related synonyms are usually negative, though there are some interesting ways of expressing this negativity. E. Burnouf, one of the first modern Europeans to study Buddhism, writes of both ānāhā and upadāna as 'la soif ou le désir' (Introduction à l'histoire du Bouddhisme Indien (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1844), p. 497f), a translation which becomes standard in most French studies thereafter. But he also refers to two other interpretations of tānha offered by M. Hodgson and M. Goldstuecker which are more expressive. Hodgson describes tānha partly as "worldly love": "ensuite naît dans le corps archétype, le désir ou l'amour mondain... la soif est le désir de renouveler les sensations agréables, et celui d'éviter ce qui est désagréable". And Goldstuecker gives a unique interpretation of tānha as the "appetite" and the "power" (dvānapasā) behind the individual: "je crois que Trichna exprime l'appétitus, le désir d'être actif, ou la fermentation intérieure qu'éprouvent les éléments invisibles pour procéder à leur création de Bhava ou des éléments visibles. Alors on peut dire que l'impulsion, comme essence de ces éléments invisibles, est leur cause, est ce qui les précède virtuellement. Comme Bhava est la dvānapasā de Djati, de même on peut supposer que Trichna est la dvānapasā des Upādāna skandhas". (Ibid).

B. Saint-Hilaire, writing twenty to thirty years after Burnouf (Le Bouddha et sa Religion (Paris: Didier et Cie. 1862) describes tānha as "finding what pleases" and "fleeing that which is disagreeable": "l'attachement, cause de l'existence, n'est lui-même qu'un effet; ce que le cause, c'est le désir (trishna, mot-à-mot, la soif). Le désir est cet insatiable besoin de rechercher ce qui plait, et de fuir ce qui est désagréable" (Ibid. p. 128). It is further the cause of painfulness because it provokes passion, desire (désir - always, as Mrs. Rhys Davids emphasizes, interpreted by early Western scholars as bad or gross when used in Buddhism) and, interestingly enough, failure: "c'est la cause de la douleur, que le Bouddhisme n'attribue qu'aux passions, au désir, à la faute". (Ibid p. 81).
The same negative attitude towards Buddhist conation is also exhibited in more recent studies. Thus

With de la Vallee Poussin (Bouddhisme Paris: G. Beauchesne' 1925), tanhā is still translated as 'la soif' but with the 'additional interpretation of being a thirst of greed or covetousness (convoitise).

A. Bareau, in his more recent Recherches sur la Biographie du Buddha dans les Śūtrapitāka et les Vinayapitāka Anciens (Paris: Ecole Française d'Extreme Orient. 1963) shows how 'desir' is arbitrarily used both as a translation for ṭhāṇā (tanhā), but also for kāma (cf. his translation of M.1.114f). It is noteworthy, however, that unlike Burnouf and others, Bareau does not translate upādāna as désir, but as 'l'appropriation' (Ibid. p. 87).

Although Mrs. Rhys Davids is especially critical of the cavalier way in which Max Müller and Faustboll apply the word 'desir' without qualification to many Pāli words ("On the Will in Buddhism". op cit. p. 58), thereby implicating German scholarship on this matter in general, I found this was not the case with H. Oldenberg. In his Buddha, Sein Leben, Seine Lehre, Seine Gemeinde (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta 'sche. 1923), and in his translation of the Mahavagga of the Vinaya, he is careful to distinguish between tanhā (Durst), rāgā (Begierde) and other forms of greed (freudē and Begehrens). Translating the Mahavagga 1.6.19ff, the idea of tanhā as Durst, "thirst" , which so appealed to French trans- lators (la soif), is offered in this critical passage: "dies, ihr Mönche, ist die heilige Wahrheit von der Entstehung des Leidens: es ist der Durst, der von Wiedergeburt (rebirth) zu Wiedergeburt zu Wiedergeburt führt, samt Freude (delight) und Begier (lust) und dort seine Freude findet: der Lüstendurst (kāmatanā) Weredurst (bhavatanā) der Vergänglichkeitdur (vīśhavatanā)." And, in his translation of Mahavagga 1.21, he is careful not to translate rāgā as Durst: "Alles, ihr Jünger, steht in Flammen. Und was alles, ihr Jünger, steht in Flammen? Dau-Auge steht in Flammen usw. (etc.)...Durch welches Feuer ist es entflammmt? Durch der Begierde Feuer, durch des Hasses Feuer, durch des Verblendung Feuer ist es entflamm..." (Pāli: 'Saṃbhāh bhikkhave ādittam. Kiṃ ca, bhikkhave sabbāṃ ādittam. Cakkhum bhikkhave ādittam...kena ādittam, rāgaggīna dosaggīna mohaggīna ādittam...').

In an unidentified passage on dukkhaniruddha (Buddha, Sein Leben etc. op cit. p. 251), Oldenberg uses 'Begehrens' as a possible translation of upādāna, setting it apart from Durst: "Dies, ihr Mönche, ist die heilige Wahrheit von der Aufhebung des Leidens: die Aufhebung dieses Durstes durch gänzliche Vernichtung des Begehrens, ihn fahren lassen, sich seiner entäußern, sich von ihm lösen, ihm keine Stätte gewähren".
J. B. Crozier writes "the object of Buddhism is the suppression of all desire," and Arnold Toynbee unequivocably asserts that "inward peace" in Buddhism looks "unattainable" since desires cannot be given up without cultivating the desire to give them up. Even in some of the most contemporary Buddhist scholarship, the position that the will has no significant place in the Buddhist soteriological system persists. Thus Dhammassuddhi observes "so long as there is will, freedom cannot exist. Will, itself, is conditioned by selfish desire, attachment, ignorance of truth and so on... freedom... means freedom from the will." Likewise, when D. K. Swearer writes "where the

A more recent series of Tipitaka translations are offered by K. E. Neumann (Die Reden Gotamo Buddhos (Zurich: Artemis Verlag. Vols. I - III. 1957), who, as Oldenberg, also accepts Dursten as an accurate interpretation of tanhā: "Wer jenen Jammer wohe gemerkt, dass Dürsten heid entwickeln muss: Wer"dursten genesen nichts mehr nimmt, Gewartig zieh' er hin, der Mönch." (Pāli, from Sn.142: "etam ādīnavamātava: tanhā dukkhassa sambhavam, vitataghe anādāno sato bhikkhu paribbaje ti"). But notably Neumann's translation of tanhā in Sn.875 is lüstern (lasciviousness).

Not all European translations of tanhā and its related synonyms are careless then, but Mrs. Rhys Davids central point still remains unchallengable: when 'desire', of any kind appears in the Buddhist texts, western translators always construe it to be deleterious, when in fact there are many cases where 'desire' is used positively and 'skillfully' (kusala), as will be clearly demonstrated in this chapter.


biblical tradition focuses on man's will in its interpretation of the human situation, Buddhism focuses on man's mind, he appears to emphasize only one aspect of the soteriological problem, and consequently of the soteriological solution.

The interpretations which minimize the role of volition in Buddhist soteriology seem to have drawn a legitimate contrast with Christianity and then exaggerated it. From the Buddhist scriptures, however, it can be readily demonstrated that the will does enter into the buddhist soteriological path, and that will can be and is regarded as a positive instrument on that path.

THE POSITIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF BUDDHIST CONATIVE PSYCHOLOGY

There are two ways in which this theme is especially indicated in the Nikāyas. In the first place, the whole perspective of the Buddhist path is based to a considerable degree on positive willing.. In the Noble Eightfold Path (ariyo atthangiko maggo) the first factor in the meditation section is "right effort" (samma-vayama), indicating that


8The Eightfold Path is traditionally organized into
the mental energy of proper intention and desire undergird samādhi or meditation:

"Katamoc' avuso sammāvāyamo. Idha...bhikkhu anuppannaṁ paṭkānam akusalānam dhammānam anuppādāya chandam janeti vāyameti viriyam ārabhati cittam pagganhoti padahoti."

"And what, your reverences, is right endeavour? As to this... a bhikkhu generates desire; endeavours, stirs up energy, exerts his citta and strives for the non-arising of evil unskilled states." M.3.251.

Other factors of the Eightfold Path also point to actions that demand resolve and positive intention (i.e., right speech, action and livelihood - sammāvācā, kammanta, ajīvā). Nor is the Eightfold Path alone in stressing the importance of the will in the search for freedom. For example, in another list known as the thirty-seven "qualities belonging to awakening" (bodhipakkhiyā dhammā) set forth by the Buddha at Vesālī just before he died (D.2.119f), the three parts: (i) pañña (insight), consisting of sammāditthi (right view) and sammāsankappo (right purpose). (ii) sīla (morality), consisting of sammāvācā (right speech), sammā-kammanto (right action), sammājīvo (right livelihood). (iii) samādhi (meditation), consisting of sammāvāyamo (right effort), sammasati (right mindfulness), sammāsamādhi (right concentration). There is no evidence of a causal pattern in the outline of these three parts. In fact, their sequence seems quite arbitrary. Pañña may have been placed first to emphasize its crucial significance as the central focus of the Path, but conjecture only can support that argument. cf. also Footnote 25 below.
emphasize is evenly divided between the will to acquire enlightenment, and the method of meditation. Secondly, another way the Nikāyas emphasize the significance of positive conation is seen in the fact that they make a clear distinction between bad (akusala - unskilful, evil) and good (kusala) desire and volition.

This is especially the case with the many synonyms for tanhā. In the last chapter, we referred to the 'adhesive strip' of tanhā, descriptive of a number of synonymous volitional factors which, like tanhā, bind consciousness (viññāna), mind (mano) and personality (citta) to ignorance and samsāra. Thus, in M.3.32, we find chando

Katame ca te bhikkhave dhammā mayā abhiññāya desita, ye vo.sādhakam uggahetvā asevitabbā bhāvetabbā bahuli - kātabbā yathayidam brahmācariyam addhāniyam assa ciraṭṭhitikām, tad assa bahujana - hitaya bahujana - sukhaya lokānukampāya atthaya hitāya sukhaya devamanussānam? Seyyath-īdam cattāro satipaṭṭhāna, cattāro sammappadhāna, cattāro iddhipāda, pañc'indriyāni, pañca balāni, satta bojjhangā, ariyo atthangiko maggo.

Which then, bhikkhus, are the teachings which, when I had perceived them I made known to you, which when you have mastered it, it is your duty to practise, meditate on, and spread abroad, in order that the brahmācariya may last a long time and continue, in order that it may continue to be for the good and the happiness of the mass of people,
(lust, striving), rāga (passion), upādāna (grasping) and
anuṣaya (inclination) all used synonymously with tanhā.

out of pity for the world, to the
good and the gain and the happiness
of gods and men? They are these:
the four applications of mindfulness,
the four right efforts, the four
bases of psychic power (iddhi), the
five moral virtues, the five powers,
the seven limbs of awakening, the
Noble Eightfold Path. D.2.119f.

Commenting on some of these categories, T. W. Rhys
Davids further outlines the four right efforts as:

1. The struggle to prevent evil arising.
2. The struggle to put away evil states
   which have arisen.
3. The struggle to produce goodness not
   previously existing.
4. The struggle to increase goodness
   when it does not exist.

The four bases of psychic power (iddhi - translated
by Rhys Davids as "saintship") are:

1. The will to acquire iddhi united to
   earnest meditation and the struggle
   against evil.
2. The necessary exertion united to
   earnest meditation and the struggle
   against evil.
3. The necessary preparation of the
   heart united to earnest meditation
   and the struggle against evil.
4. Investigation united to earnest
   meditation and the struggle against
   evil.

The five moral virtues are:

1. Faith.
2. Energy.
3. Mindfulness.
4. Concentration.
5. Even-mindedness.
There are other lists, too, such as D.3.238, where pipāsā (thirst) and parilāha (fever of passion) are used synonymously with tanhā, and M.1.270, where nandi (feeling of delight), like tanhā, is said to come just before upādāna.

Some of these synonyms, notably rāga and parilāha, are never used in a positive conative sense. There are examples, however, where both tanhā and the other synonyms are used positively to express the reformation and cultivation of will and desire.

CHANGING THE CURRENT OF DESIRE:
TANHĀ AS 'WHOLESOME' (KUSALA) CRAVING

Tanhā itself is not often used in this kind of positive context, but there are one or two interesting uses of the word which indicate that it was not always used in an unwholesome way. An important example is found in D.3.216, where the three kinds of tanhā normally discussed in the Nikāyas (kāma-tanhā, bhava-tanhā, vibhava-tanhā. S.5.420) are further added to:

The five powers (balāni) are the same as the five moral virtues.

The seven limbs of awakening (bojjhanga) are:

1. Energy.
2. Mindfulness.
3. Investigation of the dhamma, things, mental states.
4. Rapture of mind.
5. Impassibility of body.
6. Concentration.
7. Evenmindedness.

Three other directions of craving are craving for sensuality, for life in the brahma (rūpa) world, for life in the higher worlds. (Again) three other directions of craving are craving for life in the brahma world, for life in the higher worlds, (and) craving for cessation.

Controversy surrounds the meaning of nirodha-tanhā.

T. W. Rhys Davids maintains that it should "be taken in the sense of (craving) 'for life to end', the Uccheda or Annihilationist view". Others maintain that it refers to a more noble, albeit paradoxical, craving for nibbāna.

This view is supported by a later critical text (Netti-pakaranā 87) which makes this observation:

Tattha tanhā duvidhā: kusala pi akusala pi. Akusala sāmaparagāminī, kusala apaceyagāminī pahānatanhā... tattha yam nekkhamamasitam doma-nassam "kudassu nāmāham tam āyatanam sacchikatvā upasampajja viharissam, yam ariyā santam āyatanam sacchikatvā upasampajja viharanti" ti, tassa uppajjati pihā phāpaccayā doma-nassam, ayaṁ tanhā kusala. Rāga-virāga cetovimuttī, tadā-rammaṇa kusala.

Here, craving is of two kinds: skilful and unskilful (profitable or unprofitable). While the unprofitable kind goes with samsāra, the profitable kind is (leads to) the giving up of craving. Here, (as an example) in the case of the

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grief that has for its support the renunciation (nekkhamma - giving up of craving) (it is described thusly):
"When shall I enter upon by verification and abide in that base, which peaceful base the Noble Ones enter upon by verification and abide in?"
And longing arises in him, and grief with the longing as its condition: such craving is profitable; for there (there is) the freedom of citta due to the fading of lust. (Such craving)
is profitable in having that for its object.

This passage from the Netti-pakaraṇa lends definite support to the argument that craving for nibbāna was at least partially beneficial from a soteriological point-of-view. Another text which is of unusual interest is A.2.144, the so-called Nun's Sutta. Here, Ānanda instructs a nun about the ultimate goal of release from craving in this interesting way:

Tañhāsambhūto ayaṁ bhagini kāyo tanhāṁ nissāya tanhā pahāṭabbā ti - iti kho pan'etam vuttaṁ kīnc'etaṁ paticca vuttam. Idha bhagini bhikkhu sunāti: itthannāmo kira bhikkhu āsavānaṁ khayaṁ anāsavāṁ cetovimuttim paññāvimuttim ditṭh'eva dhamme sayaṁ abhiṁnaṁ sacchikatvā upasampajja viharatīti. Tass'evam hoti: kudassu nāma aham pi āsavānaṁ khayaṁ...pe...sacchikatvā upasampajjā virarissāmiti. So aparena samayena tanhāṁ nissāya tanhāṁ pajaḥati.

Sister, as to the saying "this body has come into being through craving, is dependent on craving; craving must be abandoned" - it was said in this connection. Herein, sister, a bhikkhu hears it said: "They say that such and such a bhikkhu, by destroying the āsavā, himself in this very life thoroughly comprehending it, realizes the citta's release, the release by
wisdom, that is free from the āsavā, and having attained it abides therein."
To him it occurs: "surely I too, by destroying the āsavā...having attained it shall abide therein." Then sometime later, though dependent on craving, he abandons craving.

Although this text leaves no doubt in the reader's mind that ultimately craving has to be abandoned, it can be argued that the word 'nissāya' (ni + sri - that on which one depends, support, help, protection, endowment, resource) indicates that release from craving initially depends on craving for its release.

This position was first proposed by Jayatilleke, and has latterly received support from Brian Cooke of the University of Ceylon. What needs to be emphasized, however, is that the texts nowhere claim tanhā to be an end in itself as a path to the realization of nibbāna. The fact is that in all these passages we have just examined (D.3.216; Nett.87, A.2.144) positive (kusala, nissāya) craving can at best be

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11 Writes Jayatilleke "The self-centred desires are to be eliminated by depending on desire (tanham nissāya- tanham pahātabbam A.2.146) - namely the desire for Nirvāṇa. But this latter master-desire, it is pointed out, is not on the same footing as the first-order desires, for unlike the self-centred desires, which continually seek gratification from time to time without being permanently satisfied, the master-desire would achieve final satisfaction and be extinguished with the eradication of the self-centred desires and the attainment of Nirvāṇa, which coincides with it". Buddhism and Peace, op cit. p. 12. Cooke, an advisor to R. Johansson (cf. Psychology of Nirvāṇa. p. 10), maintains that A.2.144f, is one of the most overlooked passages on tanhā in the Nikāyas, and strongly argues that the passage is firm evidence for a positive interpretation of tanhā.
seen as a stepping-stone to getting rid of craving altogether.

Other texts which actually use the word 'tānha' as descriptive of the zeal to pursue nibbāna are not common, and our discussion of tānha used in this context is now finished. It is significant to point out, however, that upādāna (grasping), a close synonym of tānha, is often referred to as the positive though somewhat misdirected zeal that urges one to progress in meditation:


Ānhaḍa, a bhikkhu who has grasping does not attain to parinibbāna.

But where, revered sir, does a bhikkhu grasp who is grasping?

"The plane of neither perception nor non-perception, Ānanda."

"Indeed, sir, the bhikkhu who is grasping grasps after the best of grasping." "That bhikkhu who is grasping grasps after the best of grasping, Ānanda. For this is the best of grasping, Ānanda, that is to say the plane of neither perception nor non-perception.

M.2,265.

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12The P. T. S. Dictionary op cit. p. 294 makes reference to "Tālaputa's good tānha" in the Theragathā 1. 1091f. After careful inspection of this text in Pāli, we have found no evidence to support the Dictionary's claim. The only references to tānha in that chapter are all of a deleterious nature (i.e. "dukkhavaham tānhalatam" - "(this) creeper of craving, the cause of painfulness" Ther. 1094).
The "best of graspings" (upādānasattham) occurs in the advanced state of meditation called the eighth jhāna (nevasaṅgaṇāsaṅgaṇāyatanam). Only in the ninth and final jhāna are the asavā at last eradicated (i.e. D.2.97). Craving and grasping after nibbāna are a part of the early stages of meditation and are left aside only in the most exalted stage of meditation. This kind of craving is "good" in the sense that it is not perverted or morbid, but it is of course part of man's inadequately developed insight into the finally transcendent state of nibbāna. 13

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13 Conze, E. Buddhist Thought in India (Ann Arbor: Ann Arbor Paperbacks. 1967), p. 67. Conze clearly expresses this enigma of craving for nibbāna when he writes:

If Nirvāṇa is defined as extinction, or stopping, of craving, how is it that the sage is called "prone and inclined to Nirvāṇa", and yet does not desire it? While someone is still at a distance from Nirvāṇa, he may desire it, strive and live for it. As long as he desires Nirvāṇa he has not got it, is still distinct from it. Once it is attained, all wishing, even for Nirvāṇa, will cease. While he still desires Nirvāṇa, the nature of his 'desire' will depend largely on the adequacy of the notion he has formed of it. While that is still very inadequate the desire will differ little from the kind of 'craving' normally felt for worldly things. As his eyes are gradually opened to the true features of Nirvāṇa the yogin's desire will no longer be a manifestation of craving, and rather become its negation.
THE DYNAMICS OF CHANDO

So far we have reviewed certain texts which show now *tanha* or unwholesome thirst can be changed into a thirst to overcome that unwholesomeness. Although this purified kind of craving is not part of the condition of *nibbana*, the important point is that *tanha* can nonetheless be used positively in the pursuit of *nibbana*. The 'current' of craving can be diverted, and desire as such is not to be repressed, but cultured and developed and eventually used for a positive good.

This argument is supported by the way the Nikayas use the noun *chando*. *Chando* (*skandh*: 'to jump' — impulse, excitement, intention, resolution, will, desire, cf.: P.-T. S. Dictionary) is one of the most versatile conative words in Pali. Although *chando* is frequently used as a synonym for unwholesome *tanha* (i.e. S.5.272), it is also often used as part of the path leading to *nibbana* (M.2.173). This ambivalence is everywhere apparent in the texts, a good example of which is A.5.272, where *chando* is first censured as gross craving, and then encouraged as that kind of desire that leads to arhatship:

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14 The dual connotation of *chanda* is clearly brought out, for example, in the indexes for the Samyutta Nikaya, Vol. VI., p. 38, where the many references to *chanda* are listed under the two broad headings 'the Exercise of chanda as essential to salvation' and 'the Extirpation of chanda as essential to salvation'.

Ekaṁ antaṁ nisinno kho Unnaṁbho brāhmaṇo āyasantaṁ Anandaṁ etad avoça. Kim atthī yāṁ nu kho bho Ananda saṁaṇe Gotame brahmacariyam vussati ti. Chandapahāṇattathāṁ kho brāhmaṇa Bhagavati brahmacariyam vussati ti. Atthī paṇa bho Ananda maggo atthī paṭipadā etassa chandassa pahānāyā ti. Atthī kho brāhmaṇa maggo atthī paṭipadā etassa chandassa pahānāyā ti...Idha brāhmaṇa bhikkhu chandasamādhīpadhānasankhārasamannāgatam iddhipādam bhāveti viriyasamādhī cittasamādhī vimamsasamādhīpadhānasankhārasamannāgatam iddhipādam bhāveti ayam kho brāhmaṇa maggo ayam paṭipadā etassa chandassa pahānāyā ti. Evam sante kho Ananda saṁtakam hoti no asantakam chandena ca chandam pajahissati ti netam thānaṁ vijjatīti. Tena hi brāhmaṇa taṁnēvettha paṭipucchiṁsāmi yathā te khameyya tathaṁ taṁ vyākareyyasi. 'Tam kim maṁnasi brāhmaṇa ahosi te pubbe chando Arāmaṁ gaminvāmiti tassa te āraṁgatassa yo tajjo chando so paṭipassadho ti.' 'Evaṁ bhō.'...pe...Evaṁ eva kho brāhmaṇa yo so bhikkhu arahamsaṁkhiṇāsavo vusītavā katakaraniyo obhitabhāro anuppattasadatto parikkhiṇabhavasamyojano sammadānā vimutto tassa yo pubbe chando ahosi arahattaṁpaṭṭiyā arahatte patte yo tajjo chando so paṭipassadho.

So seated the brahmin Unnaṁbha said to the venerable Ananda: 'What is it, master Ananda, for which the holy life is lived under Gotama the recluse?' 'For the sake of abandoning desire (chando), brahmin, the holy life is lived under the Blessed One.' 'But is there any way, is there any practice, master Ananda, for abandoning this desire?' 'There is a way, brahmin, there is a practice for abandoning this desire...herein,
brahmin, a bhikkhu cultivates (the four bases) of iddhi (psychic power)\textsuperscript{15} of which the features are desire (chando), together with the factors of meditation (samādhi) and struggle (pāthāna), also that of energy (vīrīya) and 'thought' (citta) in meditation, and that of investigation, together with the factors of meditation and struggle. This, brahmin, is the way, this is the practice for the abandoning of this sensual desire.' 'If that be so, master Ṭānanda, it were a task without end (santakām), not one with an end. That he should get rid of one desire by means of another desire (seems) an impossible thing.' 'Then, brahmin, I will just question you in this matter. Answer as you think right.' 'Now, brahmin, what do you think? Previously, was there not a desire in you (urging) you thus: 'I will go to the Park?' When you get to the Park, was not that appropriate desire calmed?' 'Yes, master'...(then follow several other examples of desire leading to a fruitful result and thus being satiated).' 'Very well then, brahmin. That bhikkhu who is arhat, one in whom the āsavā are destroyed, who has lived the life, done the task, lifted the burden, who is a winner of his own welfare, who has outworn the fetters of rebirth, one who is released by perfect insight - that desire which he had previously to attain arhatship, now that arhatship is won, that appropriate (tajjo) desire is calmed (patipassadho).

The most striking feature of this passage is that gross desire has been channelled to a more acceptable kind of desire, a desire which in the end is not described in

\textsuperscript{15}The four bases of iddhi are "the making (of) determination in respect of concentration on purpose, on will, on thoughts and on investigation". P. T. S. Dictionary. op cit. p. 120. cf. also D.2.213, M.1.103.
terms of liquidation and expurgation, but as that which can be allayed, quieted and satisfied (patipassadho).
The fact is that the emotional and volitional features of chando are not paralyzed. They are developed and refined until at last they are incorporated into the soteriological path.

The place of chando in this path varies from text to text, however. In the above passage and in certain other contexts, chandó is closely involved with meditation itself (i.e. S.5.268: 'chandam ce bhikkhave bhikkhu nissāya labhati samādhim labhati cittassa ekaggatam ayam vuccati chandasamādhi. So anuppānaṁ pāpakānaṁ akusalānaṁ dhammānaṁ anuppādāya chandam janeti vāyamati viriyam ārabhāti cittam pagganhāti padahati! - 'Bhikkhus, if, emphasizing desire, a bhikkhu lays hold of meditation (or concentration: samādhi), lays hold of one-pointedness of mind, this act is called 'desire - concentration'. He generates desire for the non-arising of unwholesome, unprofitable states that have not yet arisen, he lays hold of and exerts his citta (to this end).') Elsewhere (M.1.480, 2.173), chando is part of a process leading to enlightenment which places far more stress on striving and energy than on meditation:

Saddhājate upasamkamanto parirupā- sati, payirupāsanto sotam odahati, ohitasoto dhammam sunāti, sutvā dhammam dhāreti, dhāritānaṁ dhammānaṁ attham upaparikkhati, attham upaparikkhato dhammā nijjhaham khamanti, dhammanjñhāna- kkhantiyā sati chando jāyati,
chanda jāto uṣsahatī uṣsahitvā
tuleti, tulyayitvā padahati,
pahitatto samāno kāyena c'eva
paraṃsaсcaccam sacchikarto,
pahāya: ca tam ativijjha
passati.

When trust (faith) is born, he,
having approached and sitting
(with the teacher), thus sitting
he turns his ear, and after
listening to the dhamma, and
having heard the dhamma he holds
it (in mind); he (then) examines
the meaning of the dhamma which
he has held (in mind), having
examined the meaning of the
dhamma and understanding it, he
is able to approve (khamanti
-lit: endure) of it. (Then)
desire is born when there arises
patience of understanding the
law. Desire being born (such a
man) makes an effort (usahati),
having made an effort, he con-
siders (tuleti); having consid-
ere...e he strives, having striven,
indeed with his own body he
experiences the highest truth,
and sees it having pierced it
(ativijjha) with his wisdom.
M.2.173.

There is nothing negative about the function and
purpose of desire in this process of conversion. In this
regard, chando evidently plays a crucial role in Buddhist
soteriology, and the fact that many early critics failed to
recognize this understandably provoked Mrs. Rhys Davids to
remark: "now we cannot afford to impoverish our ethical
(and aesthetical) concepts by squandering this term (chando)
outright on (gross) tanha, and thereby, so to speak, make
the devil a present of all desire - even of that dhammachanda...
that drove the Buddha from home to Bo-tree. Much harm has
been wrought by translators, whose cheapening of the word 'desire' has justified the superficial criticism which perennially speaks of Buddhist ethics as the 'negation' or 'extinction' of all desire.\textsuperscript{16}

So far the theology of intention that we have been developing agrees substantially with this judgment of Mrs. Rhys Davids. Nor is this argument without support in contemporary Buddhist scholarship. Thus Malalasekera observes "it is not (a) freedom from desire as such, but freedom from enslavement to blind and shifting desires."\textsuperscript{17}

In a similar vein, Jayatilleke remarks that it is a freedom "which consists in changing the basis of our motivation from greed, hatred and ignorance to selfless service, compassion and understanding."\textsuperscript{18} A careful reading of the Nikāyas justifies these opinions, and indicates that the Buddha did not hold up as an example of emancipation an arhat totally devoid of all volitional response.\textsuperscript{19}


\textsuperscript{17}Malalasekera, G. P. "Some Aspects of Buddhism". \textit{Buddhism and Culture. op cit.} p. 62.

\textsuperscript{18}Jayatilleke, K. N. \textit{Buddhism and Peace. op cit.} p. 12.

\textsuperscript{19}Johansson brings out an important observation about the 'motivational needs' of the arhat when he writes: "No human being can live without the motivating factors which psychologists call needs. The texts also silently assume that the arahants had these personal needs, of air, food, clothes, shelter, etc., and that a reasonable satisfaction of them was permitted. There are no definitions of nibbāna.
the way to enlightenment a way of repression and sublimation. Unwholesome desires were to be understood and then ex-\emph{dicated}, but the energy of desire was not to be ex-\emph{purged}. It was rather to be directed towards higher and more positive ethical and intellectual objectives, thus directly contributing to the attainment of enlightenment.

\textbf{DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENSES}

At the same time as volition is purged of its moral impurities and redirected to higher purposes, the Nikāyas also urge that the senses should not be atrophied, but brought under control and developed. The teaching of the Nikāyas urges the cultivation of a new attitude towards the senses, a recognition of how they contribute to the nature of volitional response. Once the operation of the senses have been understood, one undertakes an attempt to master one's reaction to the stimulation of the senses and thus regulate the quality of volition.

Initially, then, the individual must understand how the senses provoke unwholesome craving. The Nikāyas are very explicit about the close relationship that exists between the senses and \textit{tanha}. A good example is A.1.1.,

\begin{quote}
in terms of mortification. It is, however, frequently mentioned that an arahant was appiccho, 'wanting little' (e.g. S.1.63, 2.202). By this expression the existence of needs is admitted, and we should carefully distinguish these legitimate and unavoidable needs from \textit{tanha} and \textit{raga}...". Psychology of Nirvana, \textit{op cit.} p. 28.
\end{quote}
where lust (kāmatanha), built upon excitation of all the senses, is said to affect the whole personality (citta):

Bhagavā etad avoca: nāham bhikkhave aṇṇām ēkarūpam pi samanupassāmi yam evam purissa cittām pariyādāya titṭhati yathāyidām bhikkhave itthisaddo nāham bhikkhave aṇṇām ekaandham pi samanupassāmi yam evam purisassa cittām pariyādāya titṭhati yathāyidām bhikkhave itthisaddo...

The Blessed One said: Bhikkhus, I know not of any other single body by which a man's citta is attracted as it is by that of a woman. Bhikkhus, I know not of any other single sound by which a man's citta is so attracted as it is by the voice of a woman. Bhikkhus, I know of no other single smell, flavour, touch by which a man's citta is attracted as it is by the smell, flavour and touch of a woman.

Many other passages from the Nikāyas also point out the grip that the senses can have over the mind (D.1.26, S.4.15, M.1.85, 2.253), as this one from M.1.15:

Yān-ān-deva bhikkhave bhikkhu bahulam anuvitakketi anuvicāreti tathā tathā nati hōti cetaso. Kāma vitakkam ce bhikkhave bhikkhu bahulam anuvitakketi anuvicāreti; pahāsi nekkhammvitakkam, kānavitakkam bahulakasi; tassa tam-kānavitakkaya cittam namati.

Bhikkhus, according to whatever a bhikkhu ponders and reflects on much his mind (ceto) gets a bias that way. Bhikkhus, if a bhikkhu ponder and reflect much on sense pleasures he puts aside thought of denunciation; if he makes much of the thought of sense pleasures, his mind inclines to the thought of sense pleasures.

Once the senses have been analyzed and their dangers
marked out (Dhm.162ff), the next responsibility is to recognize the need to struggle against the forceful but ill-directed current of craving which is excited by the senses. The bond that exists between the senses and craving, and the urgent necessity of overcoming their control over the individual is clearly set forth in the Parable of the Man in the River (Itv.4.10):

Seyyathā pi bhikkhave puriso nadiyā sotena ovuḥheyya piyarūpasātarūpena, tam-anāṃ cakkhumā puriso tire ṭhito disvā evaṃ vadeyya: kiṁca pi kho tvam ambho puriso nadiyā sotena ovuḥhāsi piyarūpasātarūpena. Athi cettha hetṭha rahado saummi savatto sagaho sarakkhasa yaṃ tvam ambho purisa pāpuniṭvā maranam vā nigacchasi maranamattam vā dukkhanti. Atha kho so bhikkhave puriso tassa purisassā saddāṃ sutiya hatthehi ca padehi ca pāṭisotam vāyameyya. Upanā kho me ayām bhikkhave kata atthassa vinñāpanāya. Ayam cettha atṭha: Nadiyā soto ti kho bhikkhave taṭṭha yetam adhi vacanam; piyarūpasātarūpaṃ ti kho bhikkhave channetam ajjhattikānaṃ āyatanānam adhi vacanam; hetṭhā rahado ti kho bhikkhave pāṇcannaṃ orambhāgiyānaṃ sāmyo jānaṃ adhi vacanam; saumuttī ti kho bhikkhave kodhūpāyasassetam adhi vacanam; savatto ti kho bhikkhave pāṇcannetam kāmagunanām adhi vacanam; sagaho sarakkhasa ti kho bhikkhave mahāgāmassetam adhi vacanam; pāṭisoto ti kho bhikkhave nekkhammassetam adhi vacanam; hatthehi ca padehi ca vāyāmo ti kho bhikkhave viriyārambhasetaṃ adhi vacanam; cakkhumā puriso tire ṭhito ti kho bhikkhave Tathāgatasassetam adhi vacanam arohato sammāsambuddhassa ti.

20 A. K. Warder considers this compound to be a possible misprint of the Pāli text. A better reading
Bhikkhus, suppose a man is carried along in a river by a current which looks delightful and charming. Then a sharp-sighted man standing on the bank seeing him calls out: good man, though you are carried along in the river by a current which looks delightful and charming, yet further down here is a pool with waves and whirlpools, with monsters and demons. Good man, when you get there you will come to your death or painfulness. Then, bhikkhus; that man, hearing the other's call, struggles against the stream with hands and feet. This figure, bhikkhus, I use to explain my meaning. And in this case the meaning is: "A river current" is a name for craving; "looking delightful and charming", bhikkhus, is a name for one's own sphere of perception; "the pool lower down", bhikkhus, is a name for the five fetters (saṃyojāna) belonging to this lower world. "With waves", bhikkhus, is a name for the five pleasures of sense. "With monsters and demons", bhikkhus, is a name for women (mātugāma). Bhikkhus, "against the stream" is a name for freedom from craving. "Struggle with hands and feet", bhikkhus, is a name for the exercise of energy. Bhikkhus, "the sharp-sighted man standing on the bank" is a name for the Tathāgata, the arhat, the perfectly Enlightened One.

In this strategic analogy, the emphasis is upon the 'struggle of energy' (viriya) needed to overcome craving.

would be viriyārambhassa (viriya, energy + arambha, initiating, gen. sing. + tam (particle). (Private conversation with Prof. Warder, March, 1974).

21 cf. A.2.115 (The Parable of the Goad). Commenting on this passage, Guenther writes "only by energy (viriya)
and its reliance on the senses. What this terminology seems to indicate is the need for a right volitional attitude in coming to grips with the senses. It is important to point out that in this text there is no suggestion that the aim of the struggle is to deaden the senses. On the contrary, the very analogy of a 'struggle' presupposes cultivation and development rather than neutralization.

The bhikkhu above all learns to separate cognition from thirst, to liberate all his senses from service to craving. He does not let his senses shrivel up, but perceives that when the senses stimulate egocentric craving, they present a counterfeit world which pays no attention to the three characteristics of reality (anicca, dukkha, anatta). Thus the way of salvation is also the way of right cognition, a cognition that sees not only transiency and painfulness, but likewise how the 'senses' contribute to all notions of egocentric volition, and how this kind of volition is a potential spiritual hazard.

The bhikkhu who is aware of this has a constant responsibility in keeping a watch on his senses, but his reward is freedom from craving:

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can we obtain the goal. Viriyam is the behaviour and activity of the energetic man...energy is not just physical output, but that which permeates the whole attitude or mental outlook of man dealing with the problems to attain spiritual maturity...it is will-power". Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidhamma, op cit. p. 200f.
Eye, ear, nose, tongue and body and also the mind, if a bhikkhu keeps these gates guarded well, in eating with restraint and control, in the sense faculties he meets with ease, with ease of body and with ease of mind (ceto). With a body that does not burn (i.e. with thirst), with a mind that does not burn, he lives at ease by day and night. Itv.24.

This passage warrants a detailed exegesis of the phrase dvarāni suguttāni (guarding the 'doors', viz. the senses) in order to bring out its significance. Here, dvara refers to the sense organs, what the P. T. S. Dictionary describes as the "in- and outlets of the mind". Suguttāni (su + gutta, pp. √gup) means literally "well-guarded", "watchful", "constrained". The P. T. S. Dictionary gives other references to texts where gutta is used specifically with dvārata (i.e. D.3:213), always in the sense of "control over the doors of one's senses".

Certainly this passage should not be interpreted to mean that the bhikkhus' life must be devoid of all sense pleasure. There are texts which clearly point out that not all sense pleasures are considered dangerous, but only those

\[ ^{22}\text{P. T. S. Dictionary, op cit. p. 332.} \]
other sense pleasures not necessarily associated with unwholesome states of mind are considered to be acceptable, as M.3.231 indicates:

Yo kāmapatisandhisukhino somanassānuyogogo hino gammo pethu-jjaniko anariyo anatthaśāmhitō, sadukkho eso dhammo sa-upaghāto sa-upāyāso aparilāho micchā-patipada. Yo kāmapatisandhisukhino somanassānuyogam ananuyogo hinaṁ gammām pethu-jjanikāṁ anariyāṁ anatthaśāmhitāṁ, adukkho eso dhammo anupaghāto anupāyāso aparilāho sammāpatipāda.

Whatever is happiness in association with sense pleasures and intentness on a joy that is low, of the villager (gammo), of the average man, not ariyan, not connected with the goal, this is something which has misery, painfulness, trouble and anguish, and it is a wrong course. But whatever is happiness in association with sense pleasures but with no intent on a joy that is low, of the villager and average man, not ariyan, not connected with the goal, this is something without misery, painfulness, trouble or anguish; it is the right path to walk on (sammā-patipādā).

What we find in the arhat, then, is a new attitude towards the use of the senses and the kinds of satisfaction they give. The arhat never deliberately destroys or represses his sense functions, but refines them and uses them as instruments to see behind the world of ignorance. There are doubtless some critics who do not accept this interpretation, and who appeal to certain texts in the Nikāyas which...
seem to indicate a sense of crushing the senses rather than developing them. An example might well be Dhm. 1601:

Cakkhunā saṁvāro sādhu, sādhu
sotena saṁvāro ghānena saṁvāro
sādhu, sādhu jivhāya saṁvāro...
sabbathā saṁvuto bhikkhu sabbadukkhā pamuccati.

Restraint in the eye is good;
restraint in the ear is good;
in the nose restraint is good,
good is restraint in the tongue.
A bhikkhu who is restrained in
all things is freed from
painfulness.

It would be a misinterpretation of one of the major focuses of Buddhist soteriology, however, to read into such a text any concept of 'cutting off' of the senses. As will become clear when we come to discuss the satipatthāna (application of mindfulness), Buddhism argues that even in enlightenment the arhat still uses his senses, and still experiences physical pain and pleasure. But at this stage, being freed from egocentric craving, sensory stimulation of any kind has no real effect on his spiritual equilibrium, and he is neither troubled or excited by his senses because he is in complete control of their action and the volitional responses which stem from them. In other words, he uses his senses but remains detached from them. At this point the senses are truly divorced from unwholesome volition, and the arhat enters into a state of nibbāna:
Idha bhikkhave bhikkhu araham hoti
khinasa yo vusitavā katakaranīyo
ohitabhāro anupattasadatho
parikkhinbhavasanyojano sammad-
an̄navimutto. Tassa titthanteva
pañcindriyāni yesam avighatattā
manapāmanāpaṁ paccanubhoti,
sukhadukkhām paṭisamvediyati.
Tassa yo rāgakkhayo dosakkhayo
mohakkhayo, ayaṁ vuca ti bhikkhave
saupādisesā nibbānadhātu.

Here, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu is
arahat, one who has destroyed the
āsava, who has lived the life
done what was to be done, laid
down the burden, won the goal,
worn out the fetter of becoming,
one released by perfect knowledge.
In him the five sense faculties
still remain, through which, as
they have not yet departed, he
experiences sensations both
pleasant and unpleasant, experi-
ences pleasure and painfulness.
In him the end of lust, hatred
and delusion, bhikkhus, is called
(the condition of) nibbāna with
the basis (i.e. the senses) still
remaining. Itv.38 (2.2.6).

Up to this point we have looked at how Buddhism teaches
the overcoming of pathological responses to evil intentions by
the cultivation of wholesome volition and a proper development
of the senses. We have seen how the arhat still acts from
positive motivation (i.e. mettā and karuṇā), how he is still
active (ātāpi, Ta.1), but, because he is without tanhā, how
he is emotionally 'cool' (sītabhūta, Sn.642) and how, there-
fore, his cognitive processes also become more objective and
realistic (A.3.378). We have argued that one of the principle
soteriological aims in Buddhism is the re-direction, and not
the suffocation, of the energy of volition and of the operation
of the sense faculties.
Now we must look at the other side of the soteriological coin and see how this theology of intention is related to meditation in pursuit of freedom.

TANHĀ AND MEDITATION

There can be no question that Buddhism is a religion securely based on a great tradition of meditation. It is within this discipline that the heart of the Buddha's saving message is revealed, and the significance of meditation as part of the soteriological path in Buddhism cannot be overestimated.

As we approach the complexities of Buddhist meditation, we do so with the understanding that only when the arhat has disciplined himself to work with right intention towards emancipation can he begin to meditate fruitfully and meaningfully. Thus much of what we have said about the development of proper volition and the controlled senses is also incorporated in the path of Buddhist meditation. 23

In this section, however, we want to demonstrate that although meditation partly depends on the will to "tame the monkey of the mind" (S.2.95) and thereby change the direction of conduct, the final aim of Buddhist soteriology is to develop from a being which acts from gross willing into a being which acts from wisdom (pañña).

The argument of this section will be developed in two stages. First we must see how the Nikāyas gradually shift the soteriological emphasis from the conative to the noetic. We will have to examine the ethical discipline and the processes of meditation as set forth in the Nikāyas, and attempt to understand those angas or "limbs" of the Eightfold Path that deal with moral qualification (sīla) and meditation (sāti and samādhi).

Nyanaponika argues that in the four objects of mindfulness (cātārā satipatthāna) there is a crucial element of wish, effort and endeavour to keep the mind at an even level, to not only "know" the mind, but to "shape" it. *Ibid.* p. 39.

Up to about 1960, not much was written in the West on Theravāda meditation. The principle texts were George Grimm's *Doctrine of the Buddha - The Religion of Reason and Meditation* (op cit.), F. Heiler's *Die Buddhistische Versenkung* (1922), and G. Constant Lounsbury's *Buddhist Meditation in the Southern School* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench. 1950) and E. Conze's *Buddhist Meditation* (London: Allen and Unwin. 1959). This latter book is only an anthology of Theravāda and Mahāyāna texts on meditation, with an emphasis on Buddhaghosa. Conze does not attempt to argue any one position, and offers few of his own observations on the religious meaning of meditation. It is useful only as a reference for texts. Recently, however, this topic has been the subject of several scholarly books, the most important of which are:

Nyanaponika, Thera. *The Heart of Buddhist Meditation.* op cit. Nyanaponika builds his study around the Mahā Satipatthānasutta of D.2.290. His concern is chiefly to explain the method of sati, or mindfulness, and he succeeds in presenting a good practical guide and physical description of his subject. The book is restricted in its aim, however, and offers little as to the nature and practise of samādhi (the jhānas).

Swearer, D. K. *Secrets of the Lotus.* op cit. This book is made up of contributions on meditation in the Theravāda by Dhammasudhi, on Zen meditation by Mishimura, and two chapters of an introductory and explanatory nature by Swearer. It aims to be comprehensive, and in this it largely succeeds. The prologue by Swearer and his chapter on 'The Foundation of Mindfulness' are especially valuable because he is not timid in frankly pursuing the most difficult aspect of
Secondly, we will seek to know more about the nature of panna in the soteriological process. In what way does panna as wisdom or 'insight' refer to an understanding of the place of conation, and how is it that in meditation, and that is its experiential dimension. This is chiefly based not only on his own experiences with the nature of enlightenment, but on 'a Buddhist meditation experiment' (p. xii) he undertook to encourage among students at Oberlin College in 1969. Recognizing that "there seems to come a point where the usual logical procedures of rational discourse fail to convey the reality connoted by the terms" (i.e. nibbāna) (p. 3), evidently he reasoned that the only way he could come close to exposing his students to "the ineffable nature of the enlightenment experience" was to confront them with the actual practice of meditation in conjunction with the professional assistance of Dhammacārī and Nishimura. It is the best text of its kind yet to be offered.

Three other books which to some degree or another comment on meditation from the Theravāda point of view are Piyadassi Thera's The Buddha's Ancient Path (op cit), Buddhadasa's Toward the Truth (op cit) and R. Johansson's Psychology of Nirvāṇa (op cit). Piyadassi Thera ostensibly reviews all of the Four Noble Truths, but the better part of his text deals only with the Magga, or Fourth Truth. The work is of interest because it is one of the few to be written by a bhikkhu from the tradition itself, but it aims to be and is nothing more than a standard textbook on the demonstrable principles of Buddhism.

Buddhadasa is also a Theravāda bhikkhu, but his references to meditation (p. 24, 41f., 51, 139) are somehow more interesting and personal than Piyadassi's. He is especially useful in developing the nature of pannāvīmutta as a way to nibbāna through insight, and his work is thus a good balance for Nyanaponika's study of the discipline of sati. As can be expected, Johansson pursues his argument that nirvāṇa is a psychological state of mind by appealing to the psychological basis of meditation as a system of mental health. He rejects later Abhidhamma and Mahāyāna tendencies to make the goal of enlightenment an "ultimate metaphysical truth" (p. 111), and, like his teacher Jayatilleke (cf. Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, op cit., p. 467f.), argues that the path and the goal are not abstract or superhuman concepts, a subject which is examined in greater detail elsewhere in this study. Apart from presenting a very convincing argument,
pañña craving and all forms of volition are eventually brought to an end. This discussion will go beyond the initial stages of spiritual life (sīla and samādhi), and will be concerned with the existential purpose and theological aim of the path as it is expressed in the "limbs" of panna (sammaditthi, sammāsankappo, right understanding and thought). This stage of the path describes the special experiential adventure of the arhat and is much harder to comment on than the ethical and meditational background, but as it finally gets us to the heart of the Buddhist experience, it certainly reflects back on the Buddhist understanding of tanhā.

In coming to grips with the first question, it is crucial for us to understand that in the Nikāyas the steps recommended to obtain enlightenment develop in a causal sequence. There are many references in the texts (i.e. D.1.62f, M.1.200, 346) to a method which leads to arhatship, usually

Johansson also eminently succeeds in writing clearly and concisely about the different aspects of meditation as developed in the Nikāyas. Lastly, mention should be made of a variety of recent essays and books written by Burmese and Sinhalese scholars on the Theravāda meditative practices, most notably Mahasi Sayadaw's Buddhist Meditation and Its Forty Subjects (Rangoon: Buddha Sasana Council Press. 1958), his Practical Basic Exercises in Satipatthana Vipassana Meditation (1956), and his Requisites of Enlightenment (Kandy: B.P.S. 1969). Mohnyin Sayadaw's Dīthā Vipassanā Cognitive Insight-Exercises (Rangoon: Rangoon Gazette Ltd. 1955) is also popular for lay people, and, like Rhantipalo's Practical Advice for Meditators, offers a good, simple review of the basic elements of Theravada meditational practice. These studies are practical and useful, but should not as a rule be taken as valuable contributions to the subject of meditation.
based on the three stages (sīla, samādhi, pānā) of the Eightfold Path. Whether this numerical system was artificial or not, its practical object was to remove in a systematic fashion those impediments of craving which obstruct the development of meditation and concentration. It is not surprising, therefore, that the initial emphasis should be on morality or virtue (sīla), considered to be essential for success in meditation and for any pursuit of the final fruit of wisdom (sīlaparidhota hi pānā pānā paridhota hi sīlam; 'morality is washed around with wisdom and wisdom with morality'. D.1.124).

The Nikāyas are explicit about what makes up sīla. Usually it is associated with the pānca sīla or five precepts for the layman, and the dasa (ten) sīla, reserved for the sāmanerās and, as Saddhatissa puts it "for the more

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25 H. V. Guenther for one thinks that the Eightfold Path was 'artificial', as he concludes when he writes "as long as it was meant as a suggestion, no objections could be raised against such a numerical presentation, but when the import of the various "members of the path" (anga) were analyzed (i.e. by the Abhidhamma), it became apparent that the number eight could not be kept up, though this number had been hallowed by its association with the Buddha's word". Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidhamma. op cit. p. 304.

There are other lists aside from the eight-fold path detailing factors leading to emancipation (i.e. S.5.200 - "Pāncimāni (bhikkhave) indriyāni. Katamāni pānca? Saddhindriyam viriyindryam satindriyam sāmadhindriyam pānindriyam. Imesaṁ kho (bhikkhave) pāncindriyānan samattā pariñjattā arahāṁ hoti: "These are the five functions. What five? The function of faith, of energy, of mindfulness, of concentration and of understanding. By the completion and fulfillment of these five functions one becomes an arhat". Cf: K. N. Jayatilleke. Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge. op cit., p. 396f for a comprehensive review of these lists), but the tradition of the Nikāyas lends the greatest weight to the eight limbs of the ariya atthangika magga. cf. also Footnote 8.
pious of the laity who could remain unattached to their families". These are comprehensive lists guarding against killing (paññātipāta), stealing (adinnādāna), sexual misconduct (kāmesu micchācāra), lying (musāvāda), intemperance (sūra-meraya-majja-pamadatthana) (the pannāsilā) and against speech that is slanderous (pisuna-vācaya), impolite (pharaṣa-vācaya) or frivolous (samphappalāpa), covetousness (abhijjhaya), malice (byāpada) and heretical views (micchāditthiyā). In M.1.345 these virtues are placed in the context of a positive exposition of the good life:


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27 Sometimes not all of these unwholesome tendencies are listed (i.e. A.1.269).
Thus gone forth, he having the way of life and the training of the bhikkhu, abandoning attack on creatures, is one that abstains from attack on creatures; stick and knife put aside, he lives carefully, kindly, friendly—and compassionate towards all living things and creatures. Abandoning the taking of what has not been given, he is one that abstains from taking; what has not been given, waiting for what is given, without stealing he lives with self-purified. Abandoning the non-brahmin life, he is brahma-carīya, keeping aside he is one that refrains from sexual dealings with women. Abandoning lying...slanderous...harsh and frivolous talk...he is a speaker at the right time, a speaker of fact, a speaker on the goal, a speaker on dhamma, a speaker on discipline, he speaks worthy words, with an argument (sāpadesa), discriminating, connected with
the goal. He is one that abstains from any destruction of seed and vegetable growth. He is one that eats one meal a day, foregoing evening supper, refraining from eating at the wrong time. He is one that abstains from watching shows of dancing, singing, music. He is one that abstains from using garlands, perfume, oils, adornments, fine clothes. He is one that abstains from using high or large beds... who abstains from accepting gold and silver... or (gifts of) raw grain... raw meat... women and girls... male and female slaves... goats and sheep... fowl and swine... elephants, cows, horses, mares... fields and land... he is one that abstains from the practice of sending or going on messages. He is one that abstains from buying and selling, from cheating with weights, bronzes and measures. He is one who abstains from the devious ways of bribery, fraud and deceit. He is one who abstains from maiming, murdering, tying up, highway robbery and banditry. He is contented with a garment to protect his body, with alms to sustain his appetite. Wherever he goes he takes these things with him. As a bird on the wing wherever it flies it takes its wings with it as it flies, so a bhikkhu, contented with a garment... and alms... takes these things with him wherever he goes. Having this aryan body of virtuousness, he inwardly experiences the bliss of blamelessness.

Certainly sīla as described here refers to a wholesome conative approach to the ordering of one's life. It suggests that one doesn't start with good ethical conduct automatically, but must work at it with discipline and energy. By itself, however, sīla cannot produce panna; alone it can only provide
merit (puñṇa), even although it beomes part of a causal chain and thus contributes to a whole process culminating in panna. It may be that in some lay circles punnā became an end in itself, but in the Nikāyas there is no basis for this.

For the Buddha, what was of much greater significance than the actual behaviour of sīla was the intention and processes of mind that lay behind sīla. Thus in the continuation of M.1.345 above (and in other texts as well, i.e. M.1.145, 3.129f) we are told that the virtuous life (ariyena sīlakkhandena) leads to restraint of the senses (indriyasāmvara), which causally conditions the development of mindfulness (satisampajjāna) and thence the arising of pannā.

Although the Buddha (and latterly his disciples) urged self-control and the exercise of will-power in the pursuit of a wholesome ethical life, it should be emphasized that this was not for any puritanical motive. Rather it was always related to the need for the training of the mind through the discipline of meditation. This theology of intention is always worked into the development of the profound noetic insight of the arhat. Here the senses are controlled, resentment and other volitional hindrances removed, the unconscious roots of evil notions understood and thus destroyed, and craving of any kind dissolved. All of this has meaning, however, only as success is attained in the intellectual contemplation of reality, in cutting
through ignorance and in experiencing for oneself the
great Buddhist principles of anicca, dukkha, anatta and
imitticasamupâda. Without the final accomplishment of
wisdom or insight (pannâ), meditation even at its highest
level cannot yield enlightenment, the asava cannot be
completely eradicated, and thus the craving disposition
will sooner or later inevitably resurface.

THE CASE OF PANNA ACHIEVED WITHOUT MEDITATION

As we turn now to investigate the principles of
Buddhist meditation, we have first of all to see that medi-
tation (samâdhi) needs insight (pannâ) to be fully meaningful,
but that pannâ is not necessarily generated by meditation.
The significance of this point is that whereas most
individuals need to follow a path of meditation to achieve
pannâ, some do not need to do so, but attain insight through
an act of faith (saddhâ), or through a sudden flash of
understanding. Before we look at the process of meditation
in detail, therefore, it is important that we see this
distinction clearly.

The Nikayas distinguish between these two ways of
attaining insight by differentiating between the cetovimutto
(one who is freed by the way of mindfulness and meditation)
and the pannâvimutto (one freed only by insight). Both
paths ultimately involve pannâ, but the one who is said to
be pannâvimutto achieves this insight without meditating.
Such insight could come to a person who is pannāvimutto with great swiftness, provoked perhaps by hearing a discourse on a particular teaching elucidated:

Idāṁ aṁyoca Bhagavā. Attamanā te bhikkhu Bhagayato bhāsitaṁ abhi-nandum ti. Īmasmiṁ kho pana veyyākarānasmīṁ bhanṇāmāne satthimattānaṁ bhikkhunām anupā-daya āsavehi cittani vimuccimsuti.

Thus spoke the Blessed One. Delighted, the bhikkhus rejoiced in what the Blessed One has said. And while this exposition was being spoken, the minds of as many as sixty bhikkhus were freed from the āsava with no grasping left. M.3.20

This phenomenon is demonstrated in several other texts as well (i.e. M.1.437, 3.20; S.1.191, 2.119; D.3.105). Thus in M.1.437, when the Buddha is asked "atha kīncarahi idh'e kacce bhikkhu cetovimuttino ekacce pannāvimuttino ti" ('why is it that some bhikkhus gain the freedom of mind, while others have only freedom through knowledge?'), he replies that there is a 'difference of faculties' ('tesaṁ... indriyavemattakam'). Or, again in S.1.191, reference is made to sixty bhikkhus freed by both ways ('satthī bhikkhū ubhato - bhāga - vimuttā'), while others are freed only by insight ('itare pannāvimuttā ti'). And in S.2.119f, one Susīma, recently admitted to the order, after questioning some of the bhikkhus who had declared knowledge as to how they had achieved this knowledge, is told 'pannāvimutto kho mayam āvuso Susimati' ('we have been freed by insight,
Whereas the kind of freedom obtained by the pañña-vimutto is as fully authentic as the freedom attained by the cetovimutto, it has an element of faith (saddhā) in it which sets it apart from the way of the cetovimutto, as Jayatilleke observes when he writes:

The mention of this kind of emancipation raises a number of questions. It meant that the doctrine was not fully verified by the disciple but was accepted on trust, even if the conviction of emancipation was real and directly experienced. The doctrine of rebirth and karma and the greater part of the theory of Buddhism would have had to be accepted on faith by such a person since he did not have within him the power to develop or verify them. This explains the conception of the saint with faith (saddhā) in the Pāli Canon.

Here faith should be seen not as a substitute for pañña, but, in Robinson's words, "as the seed which grows into confirmatory realization... a willingness to take statements provisionally on trust, confidence in the integrity of a witness, and determination to practise according to instructions".

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28 cf. Kindred Sayings, Vol. 2, op cit. on S.2.119, C. A. F. Rhys Davids remarks that is, emancipated without the aid of the eight grades of deliverance, referring to the jhānas of samādhi. cf. also the Sumangalavilāsini on the Mahānidāna Sutta (D.2.68), where the same point is made.


Another text which brings out the difference between the two ways is A.1.61:


Bhikkhus, these two conditions have part in wisdom (vijjā). What two? Calm and introspection. If calm is cultivated, what profit will it lead to? The mind is cultivated. If the mind is cultivated, what profit will it lead to? All desire (rāgo - lust) is abandoned. Bhikkhus, if introspection is cultivated, what profit will it lead to? Understanding (insight) is cultivated. If understanding is cultivated, what profit will it lead to? All ignorance is abandoned. A mind defiled by lust is not set free, nor is understanding, cultivated if defiled by ignorance. Indeed, bhikkhus, this ceasing of lust is the freedom of mind (ceto-vimutta), and this ceasing of ignorance is the freedom by understanding (paññāvimutta ti).

In this passage, cetovimutta is clearly equated with freedom from lust or desire, whereas paññāvimutta is more concerned with freedom from ignorance. But it is also significant that in this passage (and in other texts, i.e. D.3.78, Dhm.372), the two methods are not seen to be in conflict, but are rather complementary to each other.
The point of this discussion is only to demonstrate that not every individual follows a path of meditation in order to obtain insight. It can be said in summary, however, that pannaavimutto seems to be reserved only for a very few, and that in the great majority of cases, the traditional path to insight is through the discipline of meditation. It is to this discipline in particular that we now turn.

MEDITATION AND PANNĀ

What we first of all need to have is a better understanding of the meditational procedures developed in the Nikāyas. Traditionally, the texts distinguish between two forms of meditation, sati (mindfulness) and samādhi (concentration, meditation). Sati is customarily said to precede samādhi, although both can be practised simultaneously (M.1.270), and either one can contribute directly to pannā.31 As a rule, however, the relationship between the two groups of meditational practice is described as a process of gradual training. Thus in M.3.135f, the stages of meditational development are outlined first as equipping oneself with the resolve to practise mindfulness. This in turn permits one to abandon the deleterious bonds known as the five hindrances (pañca nīvaraṇāni); and to undertake the discipline of the

31 Writes Nyanaponika Thera about sati and its relationship to pannā: "clear comprehension (sampajānā) is right knowledge (paññā) or wisdom (paññā) based on right attentiveness (sati)". The Heart of Buddhist Meditation. op cit. p. 46.
sati-exercises, exercises which lead directly to the states of religious experience (jhānas) which make up samādhi:

Yato kho, aggivessana, ariyasāvako jāgariyam anuyutto hoti, tam enam Tathāgato uttarim viṇeti: Ehi tvām, bhikkhu, satissampajāññena samannāgato hoti, abhikkante paṭikkante sampa-
\[\text{...}\]

Yato kho, ariyasāvako satisamappajāññena samannāgato hoti, tam enam Tathāgato uttarim viṇeti: ehi tvām, bhikkhu, vivittam senāsanam bhaja 'araññham rukkhamulam pabbatam kandaram girigaham susānam vaṇapaththam abbhokāsa palālapunjan ti. So vivittam senāsanam...so paccā-
\[\text{...}\]

uddhaccakukkuccam pahāya anuddhato viharati ajjhattam vupassaṅcatitto uddhaccakukkuccā cittaṃ parissodheti, vicikichchham pahāya tiñnavicikiccho viharati akathāṅkhathi kusesu dhhammesu vicikidhāya cittaṃ parisodheti. So ime pāncā nivarane pahāya cetaso upakkilese pānāyah dubbali-karaṇa kāye kāyānupassi viharati atāpi sampañño, satima, vineyya loke abhijjhādomaṃnasam; vedaniyasu-pe.; citta dhhammesu. Seyathāpi...hatthidamako mahantaṃ thambham pathavijam nikhanitva āraññakassa nāgassa givaya
When, Aggivessana, the aryan disciple has cultivated wakefulness, the Tathāgata gives him further guidance (saying) "come, bhikkhu, be possessed of mindfulness and clear comprehension. Be one who acts with clear comprehension whether you are setting out or returning...in looking down or around...in bending or stretching your limbs...in wearing the robe and carrying the bowl...in eating, drinking, chewing and savouring... in defecating and urinating...in walking, standing, sitting, falling asleep, waking, talking and keeping silent." When the aryan disciple is possessed of mindfulness and clear comprehension, the Tathāgata gives him further guidance, saying:
"Come, bhikkhu, live in a secluded place, in a forest, under a tree, on a hill, in a wilderness, a mountain cave, a cemetery, a jungle grove, in the grass fields. The bhikkhu then chooses a secluded place...returning after the alms meal (pacchābhattam), he sits down with legs crossed, keeping the body erect and his mindfulness alert. Having abandoned greed for the world, he dwells with a mind (citta) devoid of greed, he purifies (parisodhethi) the mind of greed. Having abandoned the blemish of hatred he dwells with a mind free from hatred, friendly and compassionate towards all living creatures, he purifies the mind from the blemish of hatred. Having abandoned sloth and torpor, he dwells with a mind free from sloth and torpor, perceiving the light, mindful, clearly comprehending; he purifies the mind from sloth and torpor. Having abandoned restlessness and worry, he dwells with a mind that is quieted, he purifies the mind from restlessness and worry. Having abandoned doubt, he has left uncertainty, unperplexed as to the states that are skilled (kusalesu), he purifies the mind of doubt. Having given up these five hindrances (nivarane) that defile the mind and weaken understanding, he practises body-contemplation on the body, ardent (ātāpi), clearly aware and mindful (of it) so as to control the covetousness and discontent of the world; (likewise the three other sati exercises) feeling - contemplation on feeling; mind contemplation on the mind; mind-object contemplation on mind objects...It is as if an elephant trainer, driving a strong stake into the ground, ties a jungle elephant to it by his neck to subdue his jungle behaviour and
the longing, fretting and fever for the jungle, to make him amenable to village life, for training him in a behaviour agreeable to men. Similarly the four foundations of mindfulness are for the noble disciple a fastening of the mind, for subduing worldly behaviour, for subduing worldly longings, worldly anxieties, fretting and fever; they are for leading to the right path, for realizing nibbāna. Then the Tathāgata, gives him further instruction, (saying) "Come, bhikkhu. Practise body contemplation on the body, and do not think thoughts concerned with the body (i.e. lust). Practise feeling contemplation of feelings, and do not think thoughts concerned with feeling (i.e. desires). Practise mind contemplation on the mind, and do not think thoughts concerned with mind (desires). Practise mind-object contemplation on mind objects, and do not think thoughts concerned with mind object (desires). Then he, by stilling of initial and discursive thought, with the mind calmed and fixed on one point, enters on and abides in the second samādhi (i.e. jhāna) devoid of initial and discursive thought, is born of concentration and filled with rapture and joy; he enters and dwells in the third samādhi, etc. M.3.135.

As this passage indicates, meditation is not without a causal pattern. In looking at the sequence involved here and its principle components more carefully, we see a path which seems to start with the physical and volitional discipline of the bhikkhu as he first pays attention to his every waking action. This kind of attention is both mindful and discriminatory (satisampāṇṇa), and has as its object the development not only of sense and self-control (patipajjati, S.4.112) through gradual purification (parīsotheti) of the
mind (citta), but also the development of insight into the causal genesis of the self and the origins of the five hindrances. Already with mindfulness, then, the pattern is seen to shift from the initial volitional resolve to obtain the goal to the more noetic emphasis of understanding the nature of that goal.

The psychological aim of mindfulness can be seen in the four objects that it takes for the bhikkhu to meditate upon (the body and its functions, feelings, perception and thought), objects that constitute the whole man, accommodating his total physical and mental structure and range of experience. By meditating on these properties, the individual comes first to see transiency:


And as to the body, so does he continue to consider the body, either internally or externally, or both internally and externally. He keeps on considering how the body is something that comes to be, or again he keeps on considering how the body is something that passes away; or again he keeps on considering that coming to be with the passing away; or again, conscious that 'there
is the body, mindfulness thus here becomes established, deep enough for the purposes of knowledge and of mindfulness (patissati - 'self-collected-ness'), and he dwells independent, grasping after nothing whatsoever in the world. D.2.291.

The bhikkhu achieves this state of mindfulness by contemplating, for example, on the breathing function (ṭānāpana sati) of his body, which unlike the prānāyama breathing exercises of Hatha Yoga does not aim to interfere with the breathing process, but to let it continue naturally and effortlessly. Apart from the purely psychological benefit of calming the agitated mind, meditation on breathing offers an insight into anicca, as Nyanaponika Thera, basing his observations on D.2.290f, points out when he writes: "just as, in ancient mystical thought, breath was identified with the life force itself, so does Buddhist tradition regard breathing as representative of the bodily functions (kaya-sahkhara). In the obvious evanescence of breath we perceive the impermanence of the body; in heavy, short or strained breath, or in the ailments of the respiratory organs, we become aware of the suffering associated with the body." \(^{32}\) The same purpose of perceiving transiency lies behind mindfulness of the bodily postures and its organic parts, of its composition from the four primary elements, and in the contemplation of corpses in various states of decomposition:

\(^{32}\) Ibid. p. 63.
Seyyathāpi bhikkhave dakkho go-
ghātako va goghātakantevāsi va
gavim vādhitvā cātummahāpathe
bilaso paṭivibbajītvā nāsino
assa, evam eva kho bhikkhave
bhikkhu imam eva kāyam...
paccavekkhāti.

Just as a cattle butcher or his
apprentice, when he has slain
an ox, displays the pieces of
the carcase at the crossways
as he sits, even so, bhikkhus,
does a bhikkhu reflect upon
this very body. D.2.294

As with kāyānupassana, so too are the exercises of
contemplating feelings (vedanānupassana), states of mind
(cittānupassana) and mental contents (dhammānupassana)
aimed at intellectually perceiving the impermanent nature
of the self.

At the same time, all of these exercises also serve
to alienate consciousness from craving after meaningless
satisfaction for a body which has no permanent value (Dhm.279,
S.3.141, 4.49; A.2.52). Likewise they penetrate the un-
conscious roots of behaviour, delving, as M.3.125 suggests,

33cf. p. 204, Chapter III above.
34The argument that mindfulness is more than just
collection on conscious phenomena, but is also an under-
standing of the unconscious depths of the mind, receives
support from Dhammasuddhi when he writes: "the only way to
deal with the mind and mental states is through development
of true awareness. The practice of meditation is to make
us aware, from moment to moment, "seeing" everything which
arises or goes on within us. Only in this manner can we
come into contact with the unconscious contents of the mind.
These, as we know, cause many problems in life. People
appear to be able to carry on life smoothly on a superficial
level, but within the mind there may be psychic disturbances...
full awareness of unconscious disturbance enables one to
erase them". Secrets of the Lotus. op cit. p. 51.
into the causes for the arising of greed (abhiṣijha; usually this factor of the five hindrances is referred to as kāmacchanda, sensual lust),

35 hatred (byāpāda, dosa) and worry (vicikīkīcchā). Similarly in another text (S.4.112), we are told that mindfulness is perceiving the 'evil and unskilled processes' (pāpakā akusala dhamma) that lie behind greed and discontent.

Aside from the insight sati affords into transiency, therefore, a second conclusion we can draw is that sati is the instrument by which both conscious and unconscious craving are understood and dissolved. In the end, then, correct application of mindfulness can lead to a state of volitional purification and intellectual awareness, where craving and emotion of any kind are eliminated and their causal effect neutralized, a state which if profound enough can lead even to the destruction of the āsavā (S.2.54) and thence directly to nibbāna.

So too does Nyanaponika Thera suggest that mindfulness searches out the unconscious: 'sati operates at several levels in the evolution of mental processes as mirrored by the actual stages and qualitative differences of perception: from the unconscious to the conscious: from the first faint awareness of the object to a more distinct perception and a more detailed knowledge of it; from the perception of isolated facts to the discovery of their causal, and other, connections; from a still defective, inaccurate or prejudiced cognition to the clear undistorted presentation by Right Mindfulness'. *The Heart of Buddhist Meditation.* op cit. p. 27.

But although sati can lead by itself to nibbāna, it is more usual to find it practised either before or along side of samādhi (sam + a + dha – concentration). This is indicated in the text we used to demonstrate the causal sequence of the soteriological path (M.3,135f). As we have already had occasion in the last chapter to deal with what happens to the psychological factors of viññāna and citta in samādhi, there is no need to rehearse again the nine (nava – A.4.448) stages of samādhi (the jhānas). What is necessary, however, is that we distinguish how samādhi differs from sati.

The single most important difference lies in the fact that the jhānas which make up samādhi are all unique non-natural states of mind. This is consistent with what the P. T. S. Dictionary observes about jhāna when it comments that although the word literally means meditation, "it never means vaguely meditation, (but) is the technical term for a special religious experience, reached in a certain order of mental states."

Already even before the first jhāna is entered, the five hindrances have been overcome by sati, and all sense desires, cravings and emotions neutralized. As the stages develop, even various kusala (skilful) characteristics are discarded, as for example 'joy and happiness arising from detachment' (vivekaja pitisukha) in the second jhāna and the

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'happiness of neutrality' (upekṣā - sukhā) in the fourth. The 'religious experience' referred to above suggests, then, a growing state of intellectual awareness as to the unsubstantiality and meaninglessness of those attributes of attachment possessed by consciousness and unconsciousness. The mind, initially cluttered with all kinds of cravings, emotional illusions and intellectual obsessions (papañcā), becomes increasingly emptied, and yet at the same time, more aware ('ākīñcapaññāyatana - sukhuma - sacca - saññī yeva tasmā samaya hoti' - 'he becomes at that time conscious, subtly but genuinely, of the level of nothingness'. D.1.184), until finally, in the ninth jhāna, (saññāvedayitanirodha - cessation of ideation and feeling), everything, including the idea of nothingness, disappears. At this state, viññāna has disappeared, and citta alone experiences freedom from emotion (D.2.81), serenity (D.1.76), calm (D.1.71) and destruction of the deep-rooted āsavā (S.3.45). Although this jhāna is often referred to as the 'final' or 'nirodha' level, it must not be confused with panna or nibbāna, for the ninth jhāna is still largely an intellectual state, as Johansson points out when he writes:

It is, therefore, an act of knowledge or conviction, an impression of ultimate integration and holistic comprehension that in some way can co-exist with an otherwise totally undifferentiated consciousness. It may therefore also not be correct to call it a state of trance, 37

37 Conze for one suggests that trance might have been the object of samādhi, but he admits that neither he nor
as trances are usually said to be accompanied by concrete visions and strong emotional experiences. The nirodha state is certainly pleasant but in a very vague way. It is mainly emptiness but is accompanied by intellectual clarity. 38

It is important to clarify, then, that samādhi is not to be equated with nibbāna. The former is a whole series of stages indicative of increasingly advanced detachment from the world around us. Nibbāna, on the other hand, is a total experience of enlightenment that can be realized at any stage in the samādhi process. Thus pānā or nibbāna is not reserved only for those who have achieved the ninth jhāna. Not only is there the example of the pannavimutto referred to above, but other texts also point out that the ceasing of the āsava and the realizing of nibbāna can be experienced at any of the samādhi levels:

Idh'ānanda bhikkhu upadhiviveka
akusalanam dhammānam pānā
sabbaso kayadutthullānam pati-
ppassaddhiya vivic'eva kāmēhi
vivicca akusalehi dhammehi
savitakkam savicāram vivekajam

anyone else has dealt with the subject adequately, citing as an excuse the lack of real evidence: “but about the psychological mechanism of trance itself, a detailed analysis of the changes which take place step by step in the mind, and concrete advice on how it should be done - the sources seemed to contain little information. If the subject fails to come to life, it is perhaps because the secret, known two thousand years ago, has, with so much else, been lost in the meantime. It may also be because the ancient authorities believed in not being very explicit about mental states which only experience, and no description can reveal”. Buddhist Meditation. op cit. p. 32.

pītisukhāṁ pathamaṁ jhānāṁ upasam-pajja viharati. So yad eva tathā hoti rūpagatāṁ vedanāgatāṁ suṅgagatāṁ saṅkhāragatāṁ viṁśanagatāṁ te dharmme aniccato dukkhatu rogato gandato sallato aghato ābhādhatu parato palokato suṁhata anattato samanupassati. So tehi dharmmehi cittaṁ paṭivāpeti, so tehi dharmmehi cittam paṭivāpetvā amatāya dhātuyā cittaṁ upasamharatī. etam santām etam paṁtām yadidam sabbasaṅkhārasamathā sabbupadhīpaṭinissaggā thanakkhayo virāgo nirodho nibbāna ti.

Here, Ānanda, a bhikkhu, by detachment (viveka) from the basis of rebirth (upadhi), by getting rid of unskilled states of mind, by abandoning every corruption of the body; detached from sense pleasures, detached from unskilled states of mind, enters and abides in the first jhāna which is accompanied by initial and discursive thought, is born of detachment, and is joyful. Whatever is there of form, feeling, ideation, activity, he looks on these as impermanent, painful, a disease, a boil, a dart, a misfortune, an affliction, as something apart, as decay, empty, not-self. He turns his mind from these things and when he has done so he focusses his mind on the deathless element, thinking: this is the real (santa), this is the excellent, that is to say the tranquillizing of all activities, the removal of all clinging, the destruction of craving; (it is) dispassion, stopping, nibbāna. M.1.435.39

From the context of this passage and those other texts we have reviewed concerning the āsavā, it might be

39I am indebted to Johansson for pointing this text out. Ibid. p. 102.
argued that with the ceasing of these deep roots of craving, in samādhi our story concerning tanhā is over. But this is not the case, for tanhā plays a crucial part in the ultimate experience of panna, and thus as the main soteriological problem in Buddhism, it is only on this final experience of enlightenment that it is fully understood.

TANHĀ AND PANNA

It is panna and not samādhi which is the real crisis of religious experience in Buddhism. This is clearly demonstrated in the Nikāyas, where nibbāna is never described as an intellectually perceived state or as a freedom secured only by concentration. The way of sīla and samādhi must always be accompanied by the insight of panna if it is to realize the freedom of nibbāna.

The central question here, however, is the nature of this insight. What final truth is panna trying to tell us? Panna is evidently an understanding that goes beyond the range of ordinary empirical knowledge (nāna). One of the soteriological limitations of the latter is that although it contributes to salvation, it still does not free one from 'upadhika' (literally 'having a substratum', 'showing attachment to rebirth'), as Sn.789 points out:
Ditthena ce suddhi narassa hoti
nāṇeṇa vā so pajahāti dukkhām
aññena so sujjhati soppahiko.

If one's salvation is by seeing
(dittha), and he gives up pain-
fulness by ordinary knowledge
(nāna), he is saved in a
different way (i.e. from the way
of pāññā), being still 'attached
to rebirth'.

At this point, however, controversy arises. Granted
that pāññā is more than nāna, the question is how much does
it differ from the method of deduction and analysis found
in nāna? In other words, in the Nikāyas is pāññā an ex-
perience which has little or no relationship with nāna,
that is wholly metaphysical in nature, assuming a mystical
and unfathomable spiritual meaning? Or is it part of a
logical progression to insight, part of a causal pattern
that begins with intellectual understanding and ends with
an experience at least partially based on that understanding?

There is much scholastic support for both sides of
the issue, and how one approaches it cannot but affect the
definition one offers of the nature of the experience of
enlightenment. It is important, therefore, to make clear
what our understanding of pāññā is in relationship to the
two different schools of thought. First, then, we want to
look at each argument individually in order to see what the
problems are.

The metaphysical definition of pāññā is favoured
chiefly by A. E. Keith, C. A. Moore, E. Conze and H. D. Lewis. Keith made the first radical defence of an enlightenment based totally on a non-empirical knowledge when he wrote:

The place available for reasoning is limited, in that, although the Buddha in the Suttas reasoned and instructed by analogy and parable and simple deductive argument, it is not claimed that he attained his saving insight by this means and still less that the insight itself consists of any such reasoning: the Buddha attained his enlightenment in complete intuition, the fruit of a long process in which he overcame all forms of empirical knowledge.

Elsewhere he further elaborated by observing that:

The Buddha, like the Sage of the Upaniṣad, sees things as they truly are (yathābhūtam) by a mystic potency, which is quite other than reasoning of the discursive type. The truth of his insight is assured by it alone, for it is obviously incapable of verification in any empirical manner.

40 Keith, A. B. Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon. op cit. p. 33.
41 Moore, C. A. "Buddhism and Science: Both Sides". op cit. p. 103f.
44 Keith, A. B. Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon. op cit. p. 33.
Keith's argument is largely supported by C. A. Moore, who treats the question of the nature of enlightenment as only part of a much larger problem of the relationship Buddhism has with the scientific method. Thus he writes:

When the Buddha reached his knowledge concerning the nature of reality and of the self he did not reach that knowledge or truth by scientific or empirical means or by reason or by logical demonstration but after many lives of effort and extended meditation and by intuitive insight which was purely an inner experience... having rejected the false, the Buddha then set about in his meditation to seek the truth directly and in this process abandoned logic, reason, empirical experience and all that may go by the name reason.

As we noted, Moore's case is further established on an extensive attack directed against those who argue for an intimate affinity or even a compatibility between Buddhism and methods of science. It is also along these lines that Conze writes about 'the mystery of enlightenment', for he too rejects models of comparison that attempt to tie the goal and methods of meditation with, for example, the scientific aims and procedure of psychotherapy.

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47 Conze, E. Buddhist Meditation. op cit. p. 32.
48 There is much that is correct about Conze's criticism of attempts to make Buddhist meditation merely a system of mental health. But his remarks about pāñña are in the long run not very useful to us for another.
Other scholars who object to a concept of enlightenment based on anything but a mysterious insight do so because they feel the experience of that enlightenment is totally ineffable. A good example is H. D. Lewis, who writes:

It needs no detailed or vivid picture to make it altogether plain that the illumination which Buddha claimed, although its substance can be partly set out and taught as a system, falls into an entirely different class from the normal discovery of truth at the scientific or philosophic level. It has more in common with the raptures of the artist. 49

The most serious criticism of this approach is that it completely prohibits any discussion on the nature of enlightenment. And yet, as Radhakrishnan observes, even although it is difficult to express the truths of the experience of enlightenment, we cannot be content with saying that the experience is ineffable, 50 no matter what the obstacles of communicating are, if any religious sense is to be made of that experience at all.

The other side of the issue is argued most forcefully different yet important reason, and that is because, as he admits, he comments on pañña from the perspective of the later commentaries and not from the Nikayas (Ibid. p. 24). cf. Johansson's criticism of this later concept of pañña in Footnote 59 below.

49 Lewis, H. D. World Religions. op cit. p. 164.
50 Radhakrishnan, S. The Brahma Sutra. op cit. p. 117.
by G. P. Malalasekera, C. Humphreys, A. K. Warder, R. Johansson and above all K. N. Jayatilleke. We have already expressed our fundamental acceptance of Jayatilleke's theory of knowledge and developed its essential points in the last chapter, but it remains for us now to show how the argument of a causal sequence that stands behind all processes of knowledge refers also to the knowledge of panna.

51 Malalasekera, G. P. "Buddhism and the Race Question" (Paris: UNESCO, 1958). ("Early Buddhism can be stated in the form of a scientific theory which each individual who wishes to test it out is to verify for himself." Ibid. p. 11).

52 Humphreys, C. Buddhism (London: Penquin Books, 1951). ("Buddhism has nothing to fear from two activities of the modern western mind, namely, the "higher criticism" of previous ideas and alleged authorities, and science, using the term in its widest scope." Ibid. p. 222).

53 Warder, A. K. "Early Buddhism and Other Contemporary Systems". BSQAS. Vol. 18, 1956. ("The Buddha legend synthesizes the quest for truth on scientific principles regardless of past traditions: observation of life, experiments in asceticism (under various teachers and independently), final deduction of a way to end suffering." Ibid. p. 57).


55 Jayatilleke, K. N. Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge. op cit. p. 466. It is significant that Keith and Moore, writing before the publication of Jayatilleke's Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge (1963) did not, therefore, have to face the challenge of the latter's masterly argument and demonstration of facts.

56 cf. Footnote 20, Chapter III above.
We can best demonstrate this by first pointing out that Jayatilleke would have been critical about the haphazard way Keith and Moore use the word 'intuition'. Moore especially, whose whole argument contains only a few largely undocumented references to the Nikāyas and not a single word of Pāli, is confusing when he talks loosely of "intuitive" insight. The reader can only ask what does he mean by intuition, and how is it different from other forms of knowledge? As Jayatilleke has shown, 'intuition' in Pāli is variously translated as jānāti, pāṇṇa and nānam, all of which have different connotations, and it is important to be precise when using any of these words.

Keith is more careful, and refers to pāṇṇa as intuition. But his argument that 'like the Šage in the Upanisads' the Buddha's insight is also an intuition of 'mystical potency' is wide open to Jayatilleke's refutation by a better use of the Pāli texts. Thus Jayatilleke writes:

In the Upanisads one's knowledge and vision is not, in the final analysis, due to one's efforts but to the grace or intervention of Atman or God. The emergence of this knowledge is conceived as something inexplicable and mysterious. This character warrants it being called a kind of mystical knowledge. But in the Buddhist account the mental concentration (samādhi) which is a product of training and effort, is a causal factor (upanisā)

in the production of this knowledge (A.3.200, 313)... here 'knowledge and insight' (nānadassana) which is a means to an end, and is often called pāñhā as well as the final 'knowledge and insight of emancipation' (vimuttinānadassana) which is the end itself, are considered to be natural occurrences... his enlightenment (therefore) is not considered to be a mysterious single act of intuition, but the discovery by means of the developed natural faculties of the mind of the cause and cessation of suffering. 58

From the context of Jayatilleke's criticisms, it is clear that one of his central aims is to refute any suggestion that pāñhā is an experience of some kind of other-worldly 'truth'. He does not say that pāñhā is only an intellectual insight into 'the knowledge and insight of things as they are' (yathābhūtānādassana).

It may be this in part (S.2.30, 5.432), but it is also the 'knowledge and vision of salvation' (vimutti - nānadassana, M.1.145, A.3.81, S.5.162). 'Salvation', however, is not an abstract metaphysical truth. It may have become just this to the later Abhidhamma and Mahāyāna, but it was not so in the Nikāyas. 59

58 Ibid. p. 420, 466.

59 This at least is Johansson's criticism of later Buddhist interpretations of the experience of enlightenment. Challenging Jayasuriya's observation that it was an experience of paramattha dhamma (an uncompounded state, an element, a Real), Johansson argues that this Abhidhamma view "misses the whole point of Buddhism". It was an 'experience of freedom from birth and death... on the other hand it can be understood that an important experience was
How, then, do the texts describe pāṭaṁ? For one, they refer to it as an experience of understanding based on thinking, learning and development (cintā - mayā pāṭaṁ, suta - mayā pāṭaṁ, bhāvanā - mayā pāṭaṁ, D.3.219). Secondly, however, as we have seen they recognize the crucial place of introspection (vipāsāna) into the meaning and validity of the great truths taught by the Buddha. But this insight is not built on any metaphysical revelation. It is an experiential encounter with reality that is perhaps best described in terms of 'seeing' through a veil of ignorance and craving, or of 'seeing' the Four Noble Truths, just as, M.1.280 tells us, one 'sees' through the surface of a pool of water:

So evaṁ samābhite citte parissuddhe pariyoḍate anāṅgane vigatūpakkilese mudubbute kammatiye ṣhte ānejj-appatte āsavānāṁ khayaḷāṇāya cittaṁ ābhinnānāmeti. So: idāṁ dukkhan-ti yathābhūtāṁ pajānāti, ayām dukkhasamudayo ti yathābhūtām pajaṁāti, ayām dukkhanirūdo ti yathābhūtām pajaṁāti; ime āsava ti yathābhūtām pajaṁāti, āyām āsavasa-
mudayo...ayām āsavanirodho...ayām

Projected and reified like this, because it would seem more 'real', more universal, more superhuman. Any produced state was difficult to make enough permanent, enough clear, enough perfect to meet the ideal. By projecting it, the monk became free from something of the individual responsibility. The task was no longer entirely his. He could be excused if he was able to see only brief glimpses of his great vision. This was then, the beginning of the transformation of Buddhism. In the Nikāyas we can still see the doctrine in its overwhelming freshness and intensity. But the metaphysicians took over and it was changed from a living concern into just another theory. *Psychology of Nirvāṇa*, p. 112.
asavanirodhagāminī paṭipadā. Tassa evaṁ jānato evaṁ passato kāmāsava pi cittaṁ vimuccati, bhavāsavā pi
cittaṁ vimuccati, avijjāsavā pi
cittaṁ vimuccati, vimuttaṁ
vimmattā - ito ńanam hoti; khina
jāti, vusitaṁ brahmacariyaṁ, kataṁ
karaniyaṁ nāparam itthattayaṁ
paṭāṭī. Seyyatā pa bhikkhave
pabbatasaṅkkehe upadārahado accho
vippasanno anāvilo, tattha cakkhumā
puriso tīre thito passeyya sippis
sambukam - pi sakkharakaṭṭham - pi
macchagumbam - pi carantām - pi
titthantām - pi; tassa evaṁ - assa:
Ayām kho udakārahado accho vippasanno
anāvilo, tat'time sippisambukā pi
sakkharakaṭṭhale pi macchagumbā pi
carantā pi titthantā pītī; evaṁ
eva kho bhikkhāve bhikkhu: idam
dukkhaṁ - ti yathābhūtām paṭāṭī...
ayaṁ āsavanirodhaṁ gāminī paṭipadā
ti yathābhūtām paṭāṭī. Tassa
evaṁ jānato evaṁ passato kāmāsava pi

cittaṁ vimuccati, bhavāsavā pi
cittaṁ vimuccati, avijjāsavā pi
cittaṁ vimuccati, vimuttaṁ
vimmattā - iti ńanam hoti; khina
jāti...paṭāṭī...pe.

He, with mind (citta) composed,
purified, clear, without blemish
or defilement, grown supple and
dexterous, directs his mind to
the knowledge of the destruction
of the āsavā: Thus, "this is
painfulness, this is the
stopping of painfulness, this is
the way leading to the stopping
of painfulness. I understand as
it really is: these are the
āsavā, this is the arising of the
āsavā, this is the stopping of the
āsavā, this is the way leading to
the stopping of the āsavā.
When he knows thus, sees thus,
his mind is freed from the āsavā
of lust, his mind is freed of the
āsavā of becoming, his mind is
freed from the āsavā of ignorance.
In freedom the knowledge comes to
be that he is freed, and he
understands: destroyed is birth,
brought to a close is the brahma-cariya, done is what was to be done, there is no more of being such and such. Bhikkhus, it is like a pure, limpid, serene pool of water in which a man with vision standing on the bank might see oysters and shells, also gravel and pebbles, and shoals of fish moving about and keeping still. It might occur to him: this pool of water is pure, limpid, serene, here are oysters and shells, gravel and pebbles, and shoals of fish moving about and keeping still. Even so, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu understands as it really is: this is painfulness...he understands as it really is: this is the way leading to the stopping of the āsavā. When he knows thus, sees thus, his mind is freed from the āsavā of lust, from the āsavā of becoming and from the āsavā of ignorance. In freedom the knowledge comes to be that he is freed, and he understands: destroyed is birth, etc. M.1.280.

Johansson, who also makes reference to this text, considers it to be of strategic significance in defining how panna operates. Thus he observes:

This is a very concrete description of the process involved: a man sees a scene and then makes a conscious reflection by means of which he understands the meaning of everything he sees; this is an act of panna. In the same way, he can by introspection see himself, how he is caught in a vicious circle of causality, how everything in his life is caused and only leads to suffering, further exactly what those causes are and how the law can be used to counteract the effects - and we can understand how this vision and understanding can lead to an experience
of liberation. Even dynamic factors (desires, emotions) may be influenced, diverted or dissolved, by a causal analysis of their origin and their effects. 60

To sum up, then, pāṇḍita 'sees' the true nature of reality in and through an experience that is far more profound than 'seeing' painfulness, or ignorance, or craving, through ordinary knowledge (nāna), even although it is causally related to that knowledge. As an 'in-depth' understanding, it carries on beyond the surface of phenomena, penetrating the causal genesis of all things, providing the individual with more than just a general understanding of how ignorance and craving prevent insight into the three signs of the phenomenal world (anicca, dukkha, anatta), but with a whole experience of how these fetters bind the individual to perpetual samsāra.

At the same time, the arhat attains insight into the way of emancipation through the path of intention and concentration. Through these vehicles, he knows how to 'change the current of desire' and how at last to dissolve that current altogether.

Thus at last he is awake to the full implications of unwholesome and misguided craving. He sees it as not just one specific kind of desire, but as a whole mental state, both conscious and unconscious, which obstructs the development of selflessness, the 'ego oozing like a secret sore'. This is more than a psychological interest in

60Ibid. p. 91.
craving as a state of mental disequilibrium, for here the arhat looks far beyond this approach, and interprets what the experience of craving means as a religious problem, and how, in the light of this understanding, craving can be seen to be the central soteriological problem in Buddhism:

Evāṃ etam yathābhutāṃ sammapaṭṭhāya passato thavataṅhā pahiyaṃ...sabbato tanhānam khayaṃ asesavirāganirodho nībbaṇaṃ.

Whoever sees this as it really is by perfect understanding, his craving for becoming disappears...by the complete extinction of craving there is dispassion, cessation without remainder, nībbaṇa. Ud.33.
CONCLUSION

In this thesis, we have argued that a study of the concept of craving is crucial to an understanding of early Buddhist soteriology. A psychological picture has emerged which clearly indicates why and how craving is the central obstacle that prevents the achievement of a state of mental equilibrium unsoiled by egoistic and grasping aims, and therefore free from pain. In many ways, this picture may appear to be quite straightforward. But as we have demonstrated, behind this outward simplicity is an intricate soteriological system in which craving is firmly embedded. One of the first conclusions we can draw, therefore, is that it is not possible to understand a problem such as craving without initially seeing it as an integral part of a whole system. Craving is not just an isolated phenomenon that can be removed from the greater context of Buddhism and clinically examined on its own. Neither can it be quickly associated with any of the other factors that make up the soteriological system, such as painfulness or meditation. Clearly the Buddhist teaching about craving has first to be seen in relationship to a whole range of theological issues.

Once craving is examined from this general perspective, however, it is possible for us to recognize where the
key emphases of the doctrine lie. For one, we discover that craving is an omnipresent aspect of all experience and that it is rooted in a complex state within the experiencing being who comes to see all of life as painfulness. In this way it is from the beginning rather different from most other soteriological systems. The problem here is not a cosmic crisis nor a spiritual condition which is in the hands of external forces. Neither is the condition of man isolated in a single part of his nature such as an enslaved will, a confused intellect, or a disorientated emotion. The problem is a stain, psychologically deep and intricate, which permeates the entire individual.

A second emphasis that emerges is the close relationship which craving has with the Buddhist concept of mind. The Buddha teaches us that the mind is tangled in a web of conditioning factors, the most strategic of which is craving, and that all men everywhere are born into this state. A definition of the mind and the various factors which affect it is therefore essential if one is to move into the way to salvation. The Buddha traces out the problem of craving through the various rooms of the mind. In this way he clearly shows how the mind (both in its conscious and unconscious operations) is strategic to the arising and expression of craving. Here, too, there is an exposition of the complex mental life of the individual to a degree that marks Buddhism off from other religious systems.
A third emphasis enters into focus as we come to realize that the mind is not only the receptacle of craving, but is also the vehicle for liberation from craving. The fact that the mind is the context in which this whole drama of life and salvation is worked out is central to the teachings of Buddhism. The mind is regarded as both corruptible and corrective. The Buddha teaches that the mind is like a lotus, born in mud and slime, often submerged beneath the defiling (upādāna) waters of ignorance and craving, and yet at the same time capable of growing and rising above these waters as a symbol of purity and enlightenment:

Seyyathāpi nāma uppaliniyām vā paduminyām vā pundarikiniyām vā appekkaccāñi uppalāni vā padumānī vā pūndarikānī vā udake jātānī udake sāmvaddhāni udakānuṅgatānī anto-nimugga-posiṇī, appekkaccānī uppalānī vā padumānī vā pūndarikānī vā udake jātānī udake sāmvaddhānī samodakam thitānī, appekkaccānī uppalānī vā padumānī vā pūndarikānī vā udake jātānī udake sāmvaddhānī udakā accu-ggama thanti (titthanti M.1.169) anupalittāni udakena.

As in a pond of blue lotuses or in a pond of red lotuses or in a pond of white lotuses, some blue and red and white lotuses are born in the water, grow up in the water, do not rise above the water, but thrive sunken beneath; and other blue or red or white lotuses are born in the water, grow up in the water, reach the surface of the water; while other blue, red and white lotuses are born in the water,
grow up in the water, and stand
rising out of the water, undefiled
by the water. D.2.38 (cf. also

The Buddha finally emphasizes a doctrine of con-
idence (visārada, samanera) which recognizes the need for
self-effort, which has no reliance on any external agency
or power. The positive nature of this teaching is clearly
emphasized even in his first sermon (S.5.421, Mahāvagga
1.21.1); in his laying down of the path between asceticism
and indulgence. Here he demonstrates the psychological
truth that gross desires are only aggravated by a negative
effort to eradicate them. The evident need is not to
repress or sublimate the cravings that haunt the individual,
but to root out their genesis, to understand their aetiology,
and finally to redirect this 'unskillful' craving to more
purified objectives, until at last craving of any kind is
eradicated. In doing so, man comes to the understanding
that he no longer need be tied by the leash of craving
(tanha-gadulla, bhavanetti) 61 to a selfish and chaotic
emotional life.

61 Commenting on the compound 'bhavanetti', Harvey
notes: 'the word netti mostly occurs in tappurisa
compounds, e.g. in bhavanetti, ahāranetti, etc. In one
instance, netti is used in a bahubhini, viz. netticchinnassa
bbikkhuno' (Ud. 46, Itv. 94), and here the word has the
secondary meaning of 'rope, cord'...that is to say, it means
the instrument, visible or invisible, by which a being is led.
In its original meaning netti signifies the action of leading.
Both meanings concur in bhavanetti and aharanetti, which
ultimately assumed the meaning of 'desire' or 'lust'.
Bhavanetti is the leading to existence as well as that by
which this leading is effected, to wit tanha. For tanha
This understanding is normally strengthened through the discipline of meditation. At this point the soteriological path shifts from a conative to a noetic focus, and insight into the complex nature of craving is more readily realized. It should be pointed out, however, that although even in meditation the mind is never looked upon as something mystical and otherworldly, it would be wrong to interpret Buddhism only as a common-sense psychology. Clearly there is a transcendent element in the experience of enlightenment, an awareness not only of the sheer scope and depth of craving, but of how in its deleterious form it above all contributes to that sense of 'wrongness' which Buddhism aims to escape from.

Buddhism has sometimes been interpreted as pure mystery and sometimes as pure common sense. A study of tanhā demonstrates that both views are wrong. Clearly craving is a spiritual sickness which is only finally overcome when experience and dukkha have been finally overcome in nirvāṇa. On the other hand, craving is a part

leads men to existence, and by tanhā they are led to it as cows are led by a cord bound about their necks wherever they are wanted (Asl.364)". Netti Pakarāna. Ed. E. Harvey. Luzac. P. T. S. 1961, p. VII from the Netti-gandha, or 'Treatise on Leading').

62 cf. Johansson, K. "The ideal state, according to modern psychological thinking, is called mental health. It is legitimate to compare this concept to nibbāṇa, as the Buddha himself frequently described nibbāṇa as health." Psychology of Nirvāṇa. Op cit. p. 135.
of man's experience and is only tackled properly by the will and intellect of man himself. Thus understood, craving becomes part of a soteriological system which is practical and realistic, and yet points to a final mystical goal.
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