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PAÑČAPRAKRIYA OF SARVAJÑĀTMAN: A STUDY,
WITH
TRANSLATION, NOTES, AND A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION

by

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Dr. Phyllis Granoff

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is comprised of a translation, for the first time, of the Sanskrit philosophical work entitled Pañcarakriya which belongs to the relatively early Advaita Vedānta thinker Sarvajñātman (first half of the tenth century) and a thematic analysis of the contents of that work. The Pañcarakriya is a manual of Advaita Vedānta philosophy of language which, for Sarvajñātman, can eventually be reduced to the discernment of the proper meaning of certain great Upaniṣadic statements or māhā-vākyas such as "I am Brahman", and "That thou art."

It has been demonstrated in the analytic portion of the thesis that the Sarvajñātman who is the author of Saṁkṣepaśārīraka and the Sarvajñātman who is the author of Pañcarakriya are one and the same. In addition to this, the thesis has brought to the fore the close philosophical indebtedness of Sarvajñātman to Saṅkara and Sureśvara before him, in terms of the Advaita Vedānta philosophy of language and the problem of the locus of ignorance (ajñānārāya), though the traditional connection between Sarvajñātman and Sureśvara, as direct pupil and teacher respectively, has been denied.
From our analysis, Sarvajñātman appears to be the first of the relatively early Advaita Vedānta thinkers to make use of two of perhaps the most central notions in the Advaita Vedānta philosophy of language. The first of these is the classification of Upaniṣadic statements about Brahman into 'great statements' (mahāvākyā-s) and into 'subsidiary statements' (avāntaravākyā-s) allowing the latter to contribute to the understanding of the former. The second is the formulation of the three-fold division of the secondary usage of language into non-inclusive secondary usage (jahallaksanā), inclusive secondary usage (ajahallaṁśanā), and both inclusive and non-inclusive secondary usage (jahadaḥjahlaksanā), along with the determination that it is only the last of these which is suitable for obtaining the proper import of a mahāvākyā.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I must thank all the people of my supervisory committee who have seen me through this, namely, Dr. J. G. Arapura, Dr. K. Sivaraman, Dr. Phyllis Granoff and Dr. W. K. Whillier. I am especially compelled to thank Dr. Granoff for her remarkable patience and stamina in correcting my translation, and in working with me regularly even through a period of unfortunate ill-health. My philosophical indebtedness to Dr. Arapura is immense. I must also thank K. Venugopalan of Deccan College, Poona under whose warm and kind guidance I first had the pleasure of reading the text.

The good things in this thesis belong to my teachers. The faults are all mine.
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<tr>
<td>AIU</td>
<td>Aitareyopanisad in Isādi-Daśopanisadah Śāṅkara-bhāṣyayutah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>Anvāyārthapraṇāśikatīkā of Rāmatīrhtha in SS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BHG</td>
<td>Bhāgavatātā in BHGBH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BHGBH</td>
<td>Śāṅkarabhāṣya on BHG in Śrīmadbharavatītā (Anandagīrīktātīkāśaṃvalītasa Śāṅkarabhāṣyasametā)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS</td>
<td>Brahmasūtras of Bādārayaṇa in BSBH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSBH</td>
<td>Śāṅkarabhāṣya on BS in Brahmasūtras Śāṅkarabhāṣya</td>
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<td>Brhadāraṇyakopanisad in Isādi-Daśopanisadah Śāṅkarbhāṣyayutah</td>
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<td>BUBH</td>
<td>Śāṅkarabhāṣya on BU in Isādi-Daśopanisadah....</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHU</td>
<td>Chāndogypanisad in Isādi-Daśopanisadah....</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHUBH</td>
<td>Śāṅkarabhāṣya on CHU in Isādi-Daśopanisadah....</td>
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<td>KEU</td>
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<tr>
<td>KEUBH</td>
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<td>KU</td>
<td>Kathopanisad in Isādi-Daśopanisadah....</td>
</tr>
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</table>

* See Bibliography below pp. 235-237 for further information on the titles mentioned in this list.
Sāṅkarabhāṣya on KU in Tādī-Daśopanisadah....

MĀU
Māndūkyopanisad in Tādī-Daśopanisadah....

MĀUBH
Sāṅkarabhāṣya on MU

MS
Mīmāṁsāṣūtras of Jaimini in Śrīmajjaṁminipraṇītām Mīmāṁsādarśanam

MU
Mundakopanisad in Tādī-Daśopanisadah....

MĀUBH
Sāṅkarabhāṣya on MU in Tādī-Daśopanisadah....

NAIS
Naiskarmyasadhi of Sureśvara in Naishkarmya-Siddhi of Śrī Sureśvarācārya

NS
Nyāyasūtras of Gautama in Nyāvadarśanam

P
Aṣṭādhīyāyi of Pāṇini in The Aṣṭādhīyāyi of Pāṇini

PP
Pañcaprakriyā of Sarvajñātman in Pañcacrakriyā of Sarvajñātman with the Commentaries of Anandajñāna and Pūrṇavidyāmuni

PR
Pramāṇalakṣana of Sarvajñātman in Pramāṇalakṣana of Sarvajñātman

ŚŚ
Sāṅkṣepaśārtrakā of Sarvajñātman in Sāṅkṣepaśārtrakā (Agnicitpurusottamamśrakrtasūdodhiniḥkāryā....

ŚT
Subodhinītikā of Agnicitrputussottamamśrā on ŚŚ in ŚŚ

ŚV
Ślokavārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa....

SV
Sambandhavārttika of Sureśvar in Bṛhadāraṇyako-panisadbhaṣyavārtikām (Anandaśīrīkṛtaśātrapra-kāśikākhyatikāsamvallam)

TD
Tarkasaṃgrahadīpikā of Annambhaṭṭa in TS

TS
Tarkasaṃgraha of Annambhaṭṭa in Tarka-Saṃgraha of Annambhaṭṭa....

TV
Taittirītyopanisad in Tādī-Daśopanisadah....
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TUBH</td>
<td>Śaṅkarabhāṣya on Tū in Isādi-Daśopanisadah...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUBHV</td>
<td>TaṅttirTyaśopanisadbhaṭṭika of Śurēṣvara in TaṅttirTyaśopanisadbhaṭṭikāya (Anandaśīrīkṛsaṇa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Upadeśasāhasrī of Śaṅkara in Śaṅkara's Upadeśasāhasrī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vedaṃta-ṣāra (vg)</td>
<td>Vedāntasāra of Sadānanda in Vedānta-Sāra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VEDP</td>
<td>Vedāntaparībhaṣā of Dharmarāja in Vedāntaparībhaṣā</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

I. The Nature and Content of the Text

The Pañcaprakriyā is a small manual (prakarana) which endeavours to impart knowledge concerning the fundamental tenets of Advaita Vedānta philosophy. In accordance with the four traditional preliminary considerations (anubandha-s) to the composition of a work, we find¹ that its thematic concern (visaya) is the unknown ātman (ajñātātman); its aim (prayojana) is to produce final release (niḥśreyasa); the relation between the text and its object (sambandha) is that between the means of knowledge and object of knowledge (visayavisayibhāva); the qualified person for whom the work is written (adhikārīn) is one who desires final release (niḥśreyasakāma). In keeping with the fact that it is a prakarana or simple manual, the text is written in, what is for the most part, simple and uncumbersome Sanskrit prose.

¹According to Ānandagiri's Commentary, since Sarvajñātman himself does not provide them in any explicit manner (also see note 3 to the translation).
As its title suggests, the work is composed of five chapters or sections. The first of these examines the accepted usages or powers of words (śabdavṛtti-s) such as the primary usage (mukhyavṛtti), that based on similarity of qualities (gunavṛtti), and secondary usage (laksanavṛtti), and concludes that of these only the last two should be applied to the great Upaniṣadic statements (mahāvākya-s) in order to reveal their true purport. The second chapter provides an example of partially non-inclusive and partially inclusive secondary usage (jñādajahallaksana) in its application to the mahāvākya: "I am Brahman" ("Aham brahmaśmi." BU I. iv. 10), as well as a somewhat detailed description of the person who is qualified to receive the knowledge conveyed by these statements and which terminates in final realization (anubhava). Sarvājjñātman also here includes a defense of the doctrine of liberation while living (jivan-mukti). The third chapter, in the overall context of explaining the meanings of the words "That" ("tat") and "Thou" ("tvam") taken from the mahāvākya: "That Thou art" ("Tat-tvamasi."—CHU VI. viii. 7), supplies a brief account of

---

2Sarvājjñātman's ultimate position seems to be that jahadajahallaksana alone can reveal Brahman, but he concedes that given certain suppositions one may, as Sureśvarā does, state that gunavṛtti and jahallaksana can also apply to Brahman (see below p. 44).
the progressive unfolding of the universe from Brahman as associated with ignorance (avidyāśabalabrahman) and the reciprocal or inversely related merging (laya) of this cosmos back into the pure Brahman (suddhabrahman) by the aspirant for release (sādhaka). The fourth chapter examines the nature of subsidiary statements (avāntaravākyā-s) in the Upanisads, such as the statement "Brahman is truth, knowledge, the infinite." ("Satyan jñānamanantam brahma."--TU II. i. 1), which contribute to the determination of the meanings of the words "tat" and "tvam" in the māhāvākyā: "Tattvamasi"--CHU VI. viii. 7). The fifth and final chapter, which in itself comprises one third of the work, is the most philosophically intricate of the five chapters. In this chapter Sarvajñātman puts forward one of his central theses, namely, that ignorance (ajñāna) and knowledge (jñāna) both have Brahman in its inward form (pratyagrupa) as their locus (āsraya)³ so that

³"And Brahman in its inward form alone is the locus of knowledge and ignorance." (see translation below p. 112 and p. 228 of the Appendix: "Brahmanaśca pratyagrupenaiva jñānajñānaśrayatvamucyate."). Though Sarvajñātman also accepts the necessity of the fact that Brahman alone is also the object (visaya) of ignorance (see Sāmksepaśārīraka I. 20; II. 27, 189, etc.), this does not appear to have much to do with the central theme of this chapter, namely, that it is Brahman alone which is bound (i.e., serves as the locus of ignorance) and freed (i.e., is subsequently the locus of that knowledge which destroys ignorance), and so Sarvajñātman mentions it only in passing: "Nor should the thought that, 'Ignorance must have a distinction between its content and locus.'
it is Brahman alone which undergoes bondage (bandha) and which experiences release (moksa).

be urged, because that [distinction] is indeed absent in the state of deep sleep" (trans. p. 114).
II. Authorship

The author called Sarvajñātman has two other extant works besides the Pañcaprakriyā⁴ attributed to him. The smaller and less important of them is the Pramāṇalaksana⁵ which examines and defends the various means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa-s) that are accepted by the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsākās. The remaining work called the Saṁkṣepaśārīraka⁶ is Sarvajñāt-

⁴Henceforth abbreviated as PP with PP trans. referring to my own translation of it which comprises the second part of this thesis.

⁵There are two editions of this work available. The older of the two: "Pramāṇalaksanaam", ed. T. R. V. Dikshitar and T. R. Chintamani, Journal of Oriental Research, 10 (1936), 1-8 continued in vol. 15 (1945-46), 9-16 of the same journal, contains only the sections dealing with perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāṇa), while the most recent edition: The Pramāṇalaksanam of Sarvajñātmacumuni, ed. E. Easwaran Nampothiry, Kerala University Sanskrit Department Publication, No. 8 (Trivandrum: Department of Sanskrit University of Kerala, 1973), has brought to light sections on all of the Bhāṭṭa pramāṇa-s except for presumption (arthāpatti).

⁶T. Vetter on p. 159 of his Sarvajñātman’s Saṁkṣepaśārīrakam, I Kapitel: Einführung, Übersetzung, und Anmerkungen (Wien: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1972), lists four separate editions of the work. Of these I have used the earliest: Saṁkṣepaśārīrakam (Agniṣṭūrṇasottamamiśrakṛtasubodhinītikāya rāmatrthaviracitānvyārthaprakṛṣṭikāya tikāya ca sametām), Anandārāmasamāskṛta-granthāvalīḥ 83 (Poona: Anandārāma, 1918); it is with reference to this edition that the abbreviation SS is henceforward employed. In addition to
man's magnum opus, which is described by Sarvajñātman himself as a work that abounds in the skill of making clear the purport of Śaṅkara's Brahmaśūtrabhāṣya (srimacchārīrakārthaprapakṣaṇapatutasālī) and does so concisely (saṅkṣeptas). It is, as associated with this last treatise that the name Sarvajñātman finds prominence in the history of Indian philosophy.

What evidence do we encounter in PP that could be said to further an identification of its author with that of SS?

Stylistically, there can be little comparison between the two works, since PP, as a basic manual of Advaita Vedānta, has a far more limited doctrinal horizon than SS. PP does what it is intended to do fundamentally and briefly, avoiding elaboration and entirely, with the natural exception of benedictory verses, colophons, and quotations, employing prose as its medium.

SS, on the other hand, is a large work comprised of 1240 verses in varying meters and which has grown to

this, the work has been edited and translated by N. Veezhinathan and is entitled, The Saṅkṣepaśārīraka of Sarvajñātman (Madras: Centre For Advanced Study In Philosophy, University of Madras, 1972).

7See SS I. 10 and I. 57.

8T. Vetter (1972) pp. 175-6 lists twenty different
its great size by virtue of its author's frequent indulgence in thorough-going polemics as well as by means of the careful and detailed explanations that have earned the text an important place in Advaita Vedānta literature. Composed in meter, ŚŚ is subject to its contingencies, such as the frequent variation from verse to verse of synonyms that refer to the same entity and the exceedingly frequent use of pronouns. These tend to provide a healthy medium for an obscurity which is not encountered, to any real types of meter that appear in the first chapter of ŚŚ.

9 The main opponents encountered in ŚŚ seem to be other Advaitins (Maṇḍana Miśra being chiefly identifiable, e.g., ŚŚ II. 138, 174, etc.) and the two main Mīmāṃsākās (e.g., ŚŚ I. 343 ff.), though we do meet up with arguments against the causal theories of the Baudhāṇas, Sāṅkhyaṇas, and Vaiśeṣikas (ŚŚ II. 56-80).

10 This does not go unnoticed by T. Vetter (1972, p. 6) when he states the following:


Vetter (1972, p. 173) also supplies a list of various synonyms that occur in ŚŚ I for the following notions: 'ignorance', 'revelation', 'the concluding portion of revelation', 'the intellect', 'knowledge', and the verb 'to know'. 
degree, in PP.

Thematically, the two works are quite similar, so much so that PP may quite readily be said to be a precis of SS. Both works are predominantly preoccupied with the interpretation of scriptural passages that bear upon and include mahāvākyā-s, with the second chapter in SS and the last chapter in PP being the only ones that can be said to emphasize definitely an analytic metaphysics in its own right. In order to illustrate this thematic similarity we can select some key issues which are dealt with identically in both SS and PP:

1) There is support of Suresvara in his acceptance of jahallaksana and gunavr̤tti as applying to the interpretation of mahāvākyā-s (SS I. 169-70, 233 and PP trans. pp. 85-87).

2) There is the explanation and interpretation of the subsidiary statements (avāntaravākyā-s) involving the notion of a gathering of unrepeated

Sarvajñātman himself gives twenty synonyms for 'ignorance' at SS I. 318 and II. 127.

11 The cosmology and psychology of the three states of waking, dreaming, and deep sleep which dominate the third chapter of PP have their foundation in the Upaniṣads and are meant only to clarify the meanings of the words "tat" and "tvam".
words (apunaruktaśabdopasaṃhāra) (ŚŚ III. 312-25 and PP trans. pp. 94-95).

3) The acceptance of lakṣaṇāvṛtti to be of three kinds with only that secondary usage which is partially non-inclusive and partially inclusive (ja-hadajahallaksanā) being ultimately applicable to the interpretation of mahāvākyā-s (ŚŚ I. 154-57 and PP trans. pp. 84 and 86).

4) There is a heuristic acceptance of two aspects of Brahman: the non-dual (advaya) and the inward (praty蘸c), and of the fact that it is the latter alone which is the locus of ignorance (ŚŚ III. 13-14 and PP trans. p. 113).

5) There is the acceptance of the fact that the relation of jñāna to Brahman is by means of Brahman taking on the outer-coat of the internal organ (kaṭucadvāra) (ŚŚ III. 132 and PP trans. p. 115).

6) There is the acceptance of the fact that the relation of ajñāna to Brahman is through ajñāna alone, i.e., that it is an admissible self-dependence (ātmāsraya) as in the case of difference (bheda) (ŚŚ I. 51-7 and PP trans. pp. 115-6).
7) There exists the re-interpretation of statements made by Śaṅkara and Sureśvara which indicate that the jīva serves as the locus of ignorance, so that they are not contrary to Sarvajñātman’s position that Brahman alone is the locus of ignorance (SS II. 174-5, 188, 192-4 and PP trans. pp. 119-122).

Therefore in terms of these key issues, the case for the identity of the author of SS with that of the author of PP appears to be a strong one; at the very least we should say that if they are not identical, the author of PP certainly exhibits an unusual familiarity with many of the central themes of SS.

Supporting this identification, we find that there are two colophons, one each at the end of the first and second chapters of PP, which pay homage to the same guru, namely Deveśvara, who is also given at SS I. 8 and IV. 62 as the guru of the author of that work. In addition to this we must take notice of the fact that the author of PP has, on three occasions, employed verses directly from SS without crediting them to that work or to its author in the usual manner, e.g., iti saṅksepaśatTrakakaraḥ.²

²The verses taken from SS are SS I. 2, I. 169 and
On the other hand, the assertion of the identity of the two authors is not completely free of blemishes, even though they may be relatively minor ones, and there are two. The first is that there appears to be some inconsistency in attaching rather elaborate colophons to the first two chapters of PP, a minimal colophon which simply supplies the name of the author of PP to the work as a whole, and no colophon whatsoever to the last three chapters of the work. This fact may give rise to the suspicion that the first two chapters alone are the true work of Sarvajñātman and that the remaining chapters were composed by someone else, perhaps one of Sarvajñātman's pupils who was well-versed in the teachings of SS.¹³ However, though this possibility would not be forgotten, the conceptual similarity between PP and SS renders it less significant.

The second fact which may be taken to work against our acceptance of the identification of the author of PP with that of SS is the pejorative dismissal by the author

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III. 16, which respectively occur on pages 225, 211-2, and 231 of the Appendix below and on pages 111, 87, and 123-124 of my translation.

¹³ Of course there are the possibilities that Sarvajñātman had some preference for the content of these two chapters and thus concluded them alone with colophons, or that the corresponding colophons for the remaining chapters were simply lost.
of PP, at the close of the second chapter, of the
doctrine of instant liberation (sadyomukti) and death (de-
hapāta) in favour of the assertion of the doctrine of li-
beration while living (jīvanmukti) with the body falling
away on the exhaustion of karma-s already set in motion
(i.e., prārabdhakarma-s).  
This is so because we find
that at ŚŚ IV. 37-39 Sarvajñātman clearly propounds the op-
posite and accepts sadyomukti and dehapāta, stating that
the notion of jīvanmukti encountered in scripture can only
be properly understood as referring to a person who is ima-
gined to be freed while living and not one who is really
so.  
However, this may be resolved by the postulation
that PP might have been one of Sarvajñātman's earlier works
and that by the time of the composition of his magnum opus
he had refined his views on this point.  
Such an expla-
nation may be looked upon as having further credence by
virtue of the fact that in ŚŚ IV. 40-45 Sarvajñātman seems

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14 See Appendix below pp. 215-16 and my translation
pp. 95-96.

15 jīvanmuktipratyayam śāstrajātām jīvanmukte kal-
pate yojanīyam/—ŚŚ IV. 39a-8.

16 If this was in fact the case with Sarvajñātman,
then it is interesting to note that the three verses made
mention of in note 14 above would not actually be quotations
from Sarvajñātman's major work, but rather the original sour-
ces for those verses as they appear in ŚŚ—that is if they
are not, to begin with, mere interpolations into PP.
to undergo a minor, but abrupt, turnabout in refusing to do away with the doctrine of jivanmukti completely and takes pains to explain how thinkers such as Sāṅkara (BSbh IV. i. 15) could propound such a belief.

Therefore, based upon the above evidence, the identification of the author of PP with that of ŚŚ does not seem at all unreasonable.
III. The Date of Sarvajñātman

As is the general case with the relatively early history of Indian philosophy, the controversy over the assignment of a date to Sarvajñātman is one which exhibits an understandable polarity between the acceptance and defense of traditional views on what that date should be, and the submission of scholarly approximations of the same which attempt to avoid any traditional bias.\(^{17}\) Scholars such as S. V. Venkiteswara Iyer,\(^ {18}\) K. Sitaramayya,\(^ {19}\) M. Hi-

\(^{17}\) The most informative discussion of this debate, as it concerns Sarvajñātman, is presented by E. Easwaran Nampoothiry in the "Introduction" to his edition of The Pramāṇalaksanam of Sarvajñātmanamuni (Trivandrum: Department of Sānśkrit University of Kerala, 1973). I agree with his conclusion that Sarvajñātman must have flourished in the last half of the tenth century and perhaps up to the early decades of the eleventh century, so that the fact of his being the direct pupil of Sureśvara (first half of the eighth century in keeping with the accepted date of Śaṅkara—see note 31 above) is necessarily precluded. There is nothing from my study of PP that I could bring to Nampoothiry's commendable research on this subject, therefore I merely summarize, for the most part in what follows, the essential reasons for situating Sarvajñātman in the tenth/eleventh century as he has brought them to our attention.


\(^{19}\) "A Note on the Date of Sarvajñātman", Proceedings of the All-India Oriental Conference, 13, No. 2 (1946) 206-11.
riyanna, and N. Veezinathan, uphold the traditional view that Sarvajñātman was a direct disciple of Sureśvara and lived in the later half of the ninth to the earliest parts of the tenth century. Standing against this we have, the position of scholars such as T. A. Gopinatha Rao, T. R. Chintamani, and T. Vetter, who hold that Sarvajñātman is not the direct pupil of Sureśvara.

The former of these two viewpoints appears to be founded mainly upon the identification of Devesvara, who is cited in all of Sarvajñātman's known works as his guru.

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21 The Saṁksepaśārātraka of Sarvajñātman (Critically Edited with Introduction, English Translation, Notes and Indexes) (Madras: Centre for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, 1972).


23 "Introduction" to his Pañcaprakriyā of Sarvajñātman with the Commentaries of Ānandajñāna and Pūrṇavidyāmuni, Bulletins of the Sanskrit Department University of Madras No. 4 (Madras: University of Madras, 1946).


25 Namely: a) in the colophons at the end of the first and second chapters of PP; b) §§ I. 8 and IV. 62; c) in the colophon found at the close of Pramāṇalakṣaṇa.
with Sureśvara the direct pupil of Śaṅkara, by force of the fact that the words "sura" and "deva" are synonymous. Traditional accounts of lineage that have been preserved in the various Advaita Vedānta centres of learning (matha-s) are also brought forward to support this identification. Thus, those who assert this position tend to employ textual and epigraphic evidence with the aim of bringing the dates of Śaṅkara, Sureśvara, and Sarvajñātman as close together as possible.

As a contradiction of this viewpoint, we can briefly summarize the reasons called to our attention by the supporters of the theory that Sarvajñātman could not have been

26 We encounter this in Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's Sārasamgraha on SS I. 8 where he states the following concerning the occurrence of the name Devesvara in that verse: "Surapadaasthāne devapadaprayogah sāksādgurunāmāgrahanāya, guornāma na grhanīyāditī smṛteh." ("The use of the word 'deva' instead of the word 'sura' is in order not to mention directly the name of the teacher, because of the smṛti-passage: 'One ought not to take the name of the teacher.'"). Thus Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (last half of the seventeenth century) asserts the identification on the basis of a popular citation from what appears to be a Dharmaśāstra. Rama-tīrtha (mid-sixteenth century) in his Anvayārthaprakāśika on SS I. 8 also makes this identification: "Idānīṃ sāksāt-svagurum sureśvarācāryamathipūjayaṭi."

27 K. Sitaramayya (1946 pp. 207-208) employs the relevant portion of a chronology from the matha at Kāñci to testify to the direct connection between Sarvajñātman and Sureśvara.
the direct pupil of Sureśvara:

1) The lineage of teachers and pupils given in the colophon to Pramānalaksana supplies the following succession: Devānanda is the pupil of Śreṣṭhānanda, Deveśvara is the pupil of Devānanda, and Sarvajñātman is the pupil of Deveśvara. This contradicts the direct lineage from Śaṅkara to Sureśvara to Sarvajñātman propounded by the matha-chronologies.

2) The ruler Manukulāditya mentioned at SS IV. 62 seems, in fact, to be Bhāskararavivarman who ruled in Kerala from 962-1018, so that Sarvajñātman cannot be pushed back into the ninth century in order to be temporally proximate enough to Sureśvara that he might be regarded as having received tutelage from him. Thus it seems that we cannot place Sarvajñātman much lower than the middle of the tenth century.²⁸

²⁸ Both points one and two were first brought to the attention of scholarship by T. A. Gopinatha Rao, while he edited the Huzur Office Plates (see Travancore Archaeological Series 2, part III, pp. 131-207—the relevant pages being pp. 143-46). He was the first to associate Manuku-
3) All of the extant colophons give the name Deveśvara as Sarvajñatman's guru and never Sureśvara. In all three of Sarvajñatman's works Sureśvara is always called Vārtikakāra and never Sureśvara; in fact in the Pramānalaksana the Vārtikakāra is indeed once called Sureśvara29 and not Deveśvara, which seems to add credence to the fact that they

lāditya with the reign of Bhāskararavivarman, whose ascension he concluded took place in 978. Since then, the ascension date of Bhāskararavivarman seems to have been fixed more accurately at 962 (see p. 702 of S. Sanku Ayyar's "King Manukulāditya," Journal of Indian History 44 (Dec. 1966) part III, pp. 699-705; however, in this paper the author, basing his argument on a kāvyā source called the Sitāharana, comes to identify Manukulāditya with Kodaravivarman Kūlaśekhara who reigned in Kerala between 917 and 949). More recently, evidence such as the inscription discovered in the Pullūr Kōṭavalam Viṣṇu temple, Hosdurg Talik, Cannanore District, Kerala (see Annual Report of Indian Epigraphy (1963-64) No. 125) in which the name Manukulāditya is directly related to Bhāskararavivarman, seems to have made the identification of Manukulāditya with Bhāskararavivarman (ruled: 962-1018) an accepted and settled fact (e.g., see M. G. S. Narayan, "The Ceraman Perumals of Kerala," Historical Studies in Kerala (XXXVII Indian History Congress, 1976, Souvenir Volume), edited by M. G. S. Narayan and K. K. N. Kurup, Department of History University of Calicut, pp. 28-34, especially p. 30, and K. Veluthat, Brahman Settlements in Kerala (Calicut University: 1978) pp. 40-41 and 69, where the name Manukulāditya seems to be preferred over that of Bhāskararavivarman.).

29See E. Easwaran Nampoothiry's The Pramānalaksanam of Sarvajñatmanumuni (Trivandrum: 1973) p. 30: "Trirūpatve liṅgasyā jyotirbrāhmaṇagatam sureśvarasya vārtikam gamakaṁ-āhuh..."
are two separate people. 30

4) One of the central arguments that is taken to contribute to collapsing the chronological distance between Śaṅkara, Suresvara, and Sarvājaññatman is the acceptance of Śaṅkara's date to be 788-820, however it seems more appropriate that he should be placed a century earlier. 31

30 As a whole, this point was first made by T. R. Chintamani in the "Introduction" to his edition of Pañcarākṣa-kriyā (Chintamani 1946 p. v) where he also calls our attention to the fact that it would be an anomaly in the Indian philosophical tradition that a pupil should never refer to his teacher in his own name, as well as to the fact that the use of the synonym "deva" for "sura" in the light of Dharmasāstric principle (see note 26 above) is an extremely weak argument for the identification of Devesvara with Suresvara.

31 The problem of the date of Śaṅkara has by no means been settled in any final way. However, we may divide modern scholarship onto two main schools on the issue, namely, those who place Śaṅkara at the beginning of the ninth century (specifically 788-820, e.g., see K. G. Pathak, "The Date of Śaṅkarācarya," Indian Antiquary (June 1882) pp. 174-5; Nilkantha Sastrī, "A note on the Date of Śaṅkara," Journal of Oriental Research, 11 (1937) p. 285), and those scholars wanting to place Śaṅkara in the seventh century and no later than the earliest part of the eighth century (e.g., see S. Kuppaswami Sastrī's "Introduction" to his edition of Brahmasiddhi, Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Series No. 4, (Madras: 1937) p. lviii; T. R. Chintamani, "Date of Śrī Śaṅkaracarya and Some of his Predecessors," Journal of Oriental Research, 3 (1929) pp. 39-56; S. L. Pandey, Pre-Śaṅkara Advaita Philosophy, (Allahabad: Darshan Peeth, 1974, chapter VII). While the former view seems to be founded upon a manuscript which cites the date of Śaṅkara (Pathak 1882) and a Cilorinese inscription which seems to bear it out (N. Sastrī 1937), the latter one seems to rely mainly upon ideological
5) There is a direct reference to Vimuktatman at Sê IV. 14 and a direct quotation from Ista-siddhi in the last chapter of PP (see note 235 to my translation below) so that, given the fact that Vimuktatman cannot be placed earlier than 650, we should have to strain the life span of Sureśvara considerably from his being a contemporary of Śaṅkara (700 or just prior to this) to meet even this lowest possible date for Sarvajñātman. 33

and textual crossreferences between the content of the writings of Śaṅkara and the content of the available writings of pre-Śaṅkara thinkers.

The forefront of the most recent scholarship on Advaita Vedānta seems to lean towards the latter view in placing Śaṅkara prior to, or around, 700 (e.g., see Paul Hacker, Orientalistische Literaturzeitung, 59 (1964) pp. 235-36; S. Mayeda, Sankara’s Upadesasahasri (Critically Edited with Introduction and Indices), (Tokyo: Hokusaido Press, 1973) p. xi, where he cites H. Nakamura’s Shoki no Vedanta Tetsugata, (Tokyo; 1950) pp. 64-121 as his basis; Allen Wright Thrasher, "The Dates of Mandana Miśra and Śaṅkara," Wiener Zeitschrift für Die Kunde Süd- Und Ostasiens, 23 (1979), pp. 117-139.

We go along with this latter view and accept the fact that Śaṅkara must have lived around or before 700.

32 As established by M. Hiriyanna in the "Introduction" to his edition of Istaśiddhi, Gaekwad’s Oriental Series Vol. LXV (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1933), pp.xii-xiii.

33 Attention was first drawn to these references to Vimuktatman in the writings of Sarvajñātman by T. R. Chintamanī in the "Introduction" to his edition of Pañcaprakṛtyā (Chintamanī 1946 p. vi).
6) According to E. Easwaran Nampoothiry (1973 p. 56) Sarvajñātman seems to be following Bhāsarvajña (860-920), author of the Nyāyasāra, quite closely in his discussion of the fallacies concerning the example (udhāharāṇabhāsa-s) of a syllogism in his analysis of inference (anumāna) in his Pramāṇalaksana (see Nampoothiry 1973 pp. 22-3). If this is the case then Sureśvara cannot be the direct teacher of Sarvajñātman on the same grounds as given in the previous point.

It is on the basis of these reasons that we must assign Sarvajñātman to the later half of the tenth century, or at the latest, to the first half of the eleventh century, which makes his traditional association with Sureśvara, namely, as his direct pupil, an extremely improbable one.

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IV. Hermeneutics and Metaphysics in Advaita Vedānta

At the close of the last chapter of PP Sarvajñātman states that in it he has discussed the function or workings of ignorance (avidyāvṛtti) and implies that in the preceding four chapters, which deal with the interpretation of mahāvākyas, he has done the same for knowledge (vidyā). Knowledge (vidyā, jñāna) in this sense is knowledge of the unity of the Self (ātmaikatvajñāna), which is identical with Brahman in its pure state (śuddhabrahman) and which is the final soteriological aim of Advaita Vedānta. It is attainable only through the correct understanding of the mahāvākyas. Everything other than this knowledge is ul-

35 See p. 124 and note 241 of PP trans...

36 What I mean to say here is that, for the Advaitin, jñāna as liberal rational knowledge of the Absolute can only be derived from the Upaniṣads, so that all knowledge derived through any other means is necessarily subordinate to it. For example see PP trans. p. 9: "For the person desirous of final release, final release (moksa) comes about only from the knowledge of the great sentences such as 'I am Brahman.' " Compare this with ŚŚ II. 53:

Vedāntavākyajanitām paramātma-buddhivṛttim
vyapekyo punaratrā na kācidasti/
timately ignorance (avidyā, ajñāna) or its effect (ajñāna-kārya).

In this way, when the Advaitin pursues jñāna (i.e., knowledge of the Absolute which is identical with the Absolute) the medium that predominates is the interpretation of scripture, or in other words, hermeneutics. When he is directly concerned with the Absolute, the Advaitin is pre-occupied with hermeneutics since only the revealed statements offer a direct access to the Absolute. On the other hand, when the Advaitin is indirectly concerned with the Absolute, that is, when his main concern is not a soteriological one but, for example, a polemical one, then the interpretation of things predominates. That is to say that he is then more pre-occupied with the analysis of phenomenal existence (lokavyavahāra) itself in an attempt to expose, in a rational manner, its ultimately illusory nature and to esta-

Satsamprayogajanitā bhuvanatraye 'pi buddhis-
tamoviracitam hi jagataamastam/

(When compared with that mode of knowledge [which has the form] of the Supreme Self and which is produced by Upaniṣadic statements, there exists no other knowledge whatsoever which is produced through connection with [empirically] existent objects, for the universe in its totality is fashioned out of ignorance.)

Also see ŚŚ III. 294 and 303.
blish the possible relationship it might have with ultimate reality. There he is more directly concerned with the workings of ignorance and its effects, that is, an interpretation of things or what might be called metaphysics. 37

In proposing this division I should not want to imply that there is a strict dichotomy in the philosophic endeavour of the Advaitin and that when he deals with Brahman he is a dogmatist, or that when he deals with phenomenal existence he is an empiricist. On the contrary, hermeneutics and metaphysics often overlap, presuppose, and draw support from one another for the Advaitin. Though he might in one sense be called an illusionist (māyāvādin), the Advaitin still holds to the principle that the unseen must be determined from the seen ("...drstācādrstasiddhiḥ."—Śaṅkara BSBH II. ii. 2) and this shows that there existed within his ideology a margin for the valid extension of thinking in itself, and that the conjectures which resulted from such an extension were unacceptable if they were opposed to that which was simply seen to be the case—of course what this implies is the central empiricist axiom that facts essentially cannot be irrational. Thus he should not be thought

37 I use this term in its widest sense to mean speculation on truth, being and knowledge, but as apart from connection with revelation. In the Advaita Vedanta system this would include its epistemology, psychology, cosmology, and ontology as they are products of human speculation.
of excluding all valid sources of knowledge other than scripture from bearing upon the final knowledge (jñāna) of Brahman, since they also add something towards the correct understanding of the mahāvākyas. Similarly, scripture will often be called upon to lend its support to certain points an Advaitin may make while debating with an opponent. However, the point that must be remembered if one is to see the difference between hermeneutics and metaphysics which exists for the Advaitin, is that metaphysical thinking on its own is ultimately ineffectual in a soteriological sense, since it cannot actually tap the visionary force that is capable of altering the being and becoming of the inquirer in the way in which that force is made accessible through revealed scripture.

The main reason for pointing out such a division between hermeneutics and metaphysics is that PP affords an obvious perception of it in the ordering of its chapters and because positing such a division enables us to call attention to the two respective points of departure and the different end-products involved in them within the context of Advaita Vedānta philosophy. For example, in hermeneutics the starting point is scripture (śāstra) which purports to present a direct access to the experience (anubhava) of ultimate reality (Brahman), and it is the realization of one's
unity (ekatva) with this ultimate reality which is its final product. For metaphysics the starting point is given phenomenal existence along with an accepted number of valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa-s) which are applied to that given phenomenal existence. The end product here is the baring, and logical reinforcement, of the fact that this given phenomenal existence is ultimately illusory.

However, from a higher viewpoint, both the hermeneutics and metaphysics of Advaita Vedānta must be seen to begin from within ajñāna, which is only to say that given phenomenal existence and the pramāṇa-s (which include scripture) are, in their totality, effects or products of ignorance (ajñanakārya). Yet hermeneutics must be seen to hold a privileged position since its starting point is revelation (śruti) itself and therefore it has conceded to it

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38 In his Pramānalaksana, Sarvajñātman accepts the usual six pramāṇa-s held by the Bhaṭṭas and Advaitins: perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), scripture (śāstra), comparison (upamāna), non-cognition (anupalabdhi), and postulation (arthāpatti)—see D. M. Datta's *The Six Ways of Knowing*, (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1972).

39 This is the reason why, at the close of BSBH I. 1. iv (p. 78), Śaṅkara states: "Nahyāheyaṇupādeyādvaitātmāvagatau nirvisayāṇyapramāṭrākāni ca pramāṇāni bhavitum-arthānti." ("Once within the realization of the non-dual ātman, which is neither to be discarded nor appropriated, being devoid of objects and knowers, there cannot be any valid means of knowledge.")
a certain proximity to Brahman. Without examining and understanding the meaning of the Vedāntic statements one cannot realize the ultimate unity between the Īśva and Brahman; it is only through these Vedāntic statements that one can gain access to Brahman.

Thus, we will employ the above division, which I do not take to be an artificial one, but on the contrary, an inherent one in the writings of Śaṅkara, Sureśvara, and Sarvajñātman, in our investigation of the philosophical content of the Pañcaprakriyā.

40 Compare this with BSBH II. i. 4 p. 344: "Drstāsāmyena cādrstamartham samarthayānti yuktir añubhavasyā sam- nikrsyate, Viprakrsyate tu śrutiraitihyamātrena svārthābhi- dhanāt." ("Reasoning, which determines unknown things because of their similarity to known things, is near to mundane experience, while śrutī is more remote since the expression of its meaning is by mere tradition."); and CHUBH VIII. xii. 1 p. 598: "Tato guruṭarasya pramāṇāntarasyānu- papathe." ("Another pramāṇa higher than that [i.e., śrutī] is not possible.")

41 As at US XVIII. 188: "Nityamuktatvavijnānam vāk- yād bhavati nānyatah" ("The knowledge of being eternally free comes from Vedāntic statements, not from anything else"); and BSBH II. i. 6 p. 349: "Āgamamātrasamadhiyamya eva tva- yamartho dharmavat..." ("However, this [Brahman], just as is the case with dharma, is to be known through scripture alone.")
V. Hermeneutics in Śaṅkara, Suresvara, and Sarvajñātman

Sarvajñātman begins his work with an examination of the different usages of words (śabdavṛtti-s) that are accepted by the Advaita Vedānta school, namely, mukhyavṛtti (primary usage, also variously termed, abhidhā, prasiddhi, vācyā, or agaunā), gunavṛtti (that usage based on a similarity of qualities), and laksanavṛtti (the secondary, or implied usage). 42 It is the last two of these, and especially laksanā, which are crucial to Sarvajñātman's hermeneutics, in the sense that it is only through them that one can interpret or fathom the true extent of certain Upaniṣadic statements (vedāntavākyā-s) which purport to refer to Brahman which is beyond any of the accepted relations that may permit the common or primary use of language. 43

42 For an informative explanation of these three usages and the attitudes of the various schools towards them, see Chapters II and VI of K. Kunjumoni Raja's Indian Theories of Meaning, (Madras: Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1963).

43 See note 15 to PP trans. and similar statements by Śaṅkara at BUBH II. 111. 6 p. 755; MAUBH 7; BHGBH XIII. 12 p. 385; US XVIII. 28; and by Suresvara at NAIS III. 103.
Śaṅkara and Sureśvara also accept this same general distinction, however in Śaṅkara the distinction between gunavrṣṭī and lakṣāṇā does not seem to be as developed as it is in both Sureśvara and Sarvajñaṭman.\footnote{A distinction between the two had already been definitely formulated by Kumārila in the Tantravārtika p. 313 under MS I. iv. 22:}

\begin{quote}
Abhidheyaṁ abhute pravrṣṭīlakṣāṇasyate.
Lakṣāṇāṁ agunayogādvrṣṭīṁ tu gaunātā.
\end{quote}

(That usage which exists when there is a connection with the primary usage is admitted to be lakṣāṇā, That usage which is due to a similarity with the qualities being implied is admitted to be gaunā.)

Sarvajñaṭman is well aware of the distinction and seems to be making a reference to this exact verse at SS I. 172.

\footnote{That is the Upanisadbhāsyas, BHGBH, BSBH, US, and MKBH. The word lakṣāṇā does occur at MKBH IV. 67 but with a completely different sense and because Gauḍapāda has made use of it.}
BSBH I. 1. 5 pp. 88-89, I. 1. 7 p. 93) to point to a broad
distinction between the primary and secondary usages of
words. 46 Even when he comes actually to employ words such
as laksanā (e.g., BSBH I. iv. 11 p. 303, III. 1. 22 p.
590, 11. 21 p. 624, 111. 7 p. 657, 111. 9 p. 661, IV. 11. 1
p. 824), laksanīka (BSBH II. iv. 17 p. 558, III. 1. 10),
or laksanikī vṛtti (BSBH II. iv. 19 p. 560) they seem no-
thing more than alternative appellations for the general
concept of non-primary designation. However, at two places
in BSBH Śaṅkara does seem to accord laksanā a peculiar qua-
lication which perhaps implies that he was to some extent
aware of laksanā in the sense used by Suresvara and Sarva-
ājñātman, when he states that there are two types of laksanā,
namely, a proximate one (samnikrśta laksanā) and a remote
or detached one (viprakṛṣṭa laksanā). 47 What must be no-

46 This distinction already appears in Gaudapāda at
MK III. 14 and seems to appear even in Bādarāyaṇa at BS I.
1. 6.

47 The passages propounding such qualification of
laksanā are BSBH III. 111. 9 pp. 661-62 and IV. 1. 6 p. 807
1. 3-4. Of these the former is the more informative one
and it occurs in the context of a discussion of the possible
relationships between the two words "om" and "udgītha" in
the phrase: "Oṃityetadaksāramudgīthāṃūpāśita." ("One should
meditate on the syllable 'om' as the udgīthā."--CHU I. 1. 1)
Śaṅkara denies that the relationship could be one of super-
imposition (adyāśa) since that would require the use of la-
sanā for the word referring to the superimposed cognition
and that no proper result could be determined for the medit-
tation. Sublation (āpavāda) is denied because no proper re-
ticed here is that this observation about two 'strengths' of laksana may very well be one of the sources\(^{48}\) that contributed to Sarva-jn\text{\u092f}\text{\u093e}\text{\u0939}\text{\u093f}tman's notion of dividing laksana into three kinds, with viprakrsta laksana, which is so termed because it is quite detached from its primary sense, perhaps contributing to Sarva-jn\text{\u092f}tman's idea of jahallaksa\text{\u0939}\text{\u093e} and samnikrsta laksana, being the less removed from its pri-

sult could be attained and, lastly, unity (ekatva) is denied because, if that were so, then there would be no need to use two separate terms. Sa\text{\u092f}\text{\u093e}kara holds that the relation must be one of qualification (vi\text{\u0935}esana) where the udg\text{\u0939}tha qualifies 'om' whose primary sense is all the Vedas, making it mean only that syllable 'om' contained in the udg\text{\u0939}tha portion of the Veda (i.e., the second part of the Sa\text{\u092f}maveda). Here, the p\text{\u0935}r\text{\u093f}vat\text{\u0939}ks\text{\u0917} intercedes saying that this would also entail the use of laksana, as was the case with adhy\text{\u0935}sa, since the word udg\text{\u0939}tha taken as referring to 'om', would be referring only to a portion of what its primary sense means. Sa\text{\u092f}kara replies that in the case of the adhy\text{\u0935}sa relation the laksana was detached (viprakrsta) and clearly improper, while here, where the word for the whole (i.e., udg\text{\u0939}tha) is used to denote part of itself (i.e., the omkara), the laksana is more proximate (samnikrsta) to the direct meaning; as with the phrase, "The cloth is burnt," is used when perhaps only a portion of the cloth has actually been burnt. This example of the cloth would be considered to be an example of jahada jahallaksana according to Sarva-jn\text{\u092f}tman since it is only a portion of its original sense that is finally meant by the word "cloth". One cannot help but notice that the acceptance of laksana in the one case and the rejection of it in the other seems to be somewhat contrived on Sa\text{\u092f}kara's part.

\(^{48}\)Another possible source being Pata\text{\u0915}jali's comments on P\text{\u0917}minis\text{\u0935}tras II. 1. 1 (see note 29 to my translation of PP).
mary sense, could similarly have contributed to the distinction of *ajahallaksana* and *jahadajahallaksana* from *jahallaksana*.

With Sureśvara we find that his ideas of *mukhyavrtti* and *gunavrtti* do not really differ from those of Śaṅkara, but he can claim an innovation in his application of *gunavrtti* to the Upaniṣadic statement, "I am Brahma" ("*Aham brahmāsmi*"—BU I. 1v. 10) at NAIS II. 55 and Sarvājñātman clearly seems to accept and acknowledge this in PP.⁴⁹ Concerning *laksana*, Sureśvara, just as with *gunavrtti*, again goes one step further than Śaṅkara in applying it to the phrase, "I am Brahma" at NAIS II. 54; however, this verse has sparked some controversy⁵⁰ because of the fact that Su-

⁴⁹See note 19 to my translation as well as NAIS III. 97-104 and Paul Hacker, Untersuchungen über Texte des frühen Advaitavādā I. Die Schüler Śaṅkaras, (Wiesbaden: 1950) pp. 55-56—especially the remarks by Hacker (p. 55 note 2) on the term *gunaleśa* which occurs at NAIS III. 97, 98 and 102. Sureśvara sometimes employs the words *gauna* and *mukhyārtha* in an epistemological sense to refer to actual experiences rather than word usages (*śabdavrtti*-s) as at NAIS III. 96 (see Hacker, Untersuchungen..., p. 82).

⁵⁰That is, as to whether Sureśvara does in fact apply *laksana* to phrases like "I am Brahma" and "That thou art." J. M. van Boetzelaer, Sureśvara's *Taittirīyopanisadvārtikā* (Translated into English with an Introduction and Notes) (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971), p. 54, seems to be of the opinion that he does not (we must note some confusion on his part because when he does refer to NAIS II. 54: "As a matter of fact it may be noted that the term *laksana* does not occur in the NaiŚī where the proposition *tat tvam asi* is
resvara has used the neuter form: \textit{laksanam} \textsuperscript{51} rather than the expected feminine form: \textit{laksanā}, to mean the secondary usage of words (\textit{laksanā vṛtti}). Yet two things seem to discussed (\textit{NaI\textsc{Si} II, 54}).", he does not correctly note that it is the proposition, "\textit{Ahām brahmāsmi}" that is under discussion at \textit{NAIS II}. \textsuperscript{54}, nor that the word \textit{laksanā} does indeed occur in the prose preamble to \textit{NAIS II}. \textsuperscript{54}. Van Boetjeelaer also cites M. Biardeau, "\textit{La Définition dans la Pensée Indienne}," \textit{Journal Asiatique} (1957) p. 383, in support of his position. Standing clearly against this view we have Hacker in his \textit{Untersuchungen...}, and A. J. Alston in his translation of \textit{NAIS} entitled, \textit{The Realization of the Absolute} (London: Shin\textsc{fi} Sadan, 1971).

\textsuperscript{51} \textit{NAIS II. 54} runs: "\textit{Nājñaśisamiti pṛaha susuptād-\textit{utthito}} 'pi hi/ \textit{Ayodhādivattena laksanam paramātmanah}''" ("Indeed, even the person risen from deep sleep says 'I knew not.'/ In that statement there is the secondary indication of the highest ātman, just as in the statement, 'The metal burns.'"\textsuperscript{'}") The word \textit{laksanā} is most commonly used in the Advaita Vedānta school to mean \textit{definition} as, for example, the words in the phrase, "\textit{Satyam jñānānāntamabrahma}" ("Brahman which is truth, knowledge, the infinite."\textsuperscript{52} \textit{TU I}. i. 1) are \textit{laksanā}'s (definitions) of Brahman (see \textit{TUBH II}. i. 1 and \textit{TUBHV II}. 50–54, 74–76) and they do not have recourse to \textit{laksanā} (secondary usage) to fulfill their function (see van Boetjeelaer, 1971, pp. 53–54 for the views of certain scholars on this point), nor do they ever leave off their primary senses (see \textit{TUBHV II}. 76–79). Secondly, the word \textit{laksanā} is also used by Śrīsvara to mean: the process of indirect (secondary) indication as at \textit{NAIS III}. 27a: "\textit{Laksanam sarpavadrajvāh pratīcāh śvādaham tathaḥ}" ("Just as the snake indirectly indicates the rope, so does the 'I' indirectly indicate the inward supreme Self") This same usage is also found at \textit{NAIS III}. 97, SV 704, and \textit{TUBHV I}. 20. It is this \textit{laksanā} (secondary indication) which is often employed to explain the actual relation between the major components of a sentence in order to render, what seems otherwise an incongruous sentence, understandable and that relation is referred to as \textit{laksyalaksanabhāva} (or ...\textit{sambandha}) as at \textit{NAIS III}. 3, 11, 26 (also see Hacker, \textit{Untersuchungen...}, p. 77 and note 62 to my translation of PP).
make it certain that Sureśvara does mean \textit{lakṣanā vr̥tti} here: a) the last sentence of the prose introduction to \textit{NAIŚ II.}\textsuperscript{54} directly states that the three usages of words are going to be presented ("Soc̆ate \textit{prasiddhalakṣanāgunavr̥ttiḥibḥih}"). b) the phrase "The metal burns.", which is given as an example in the verse, clearly illustrates a case of \textit{lakṣanā vr̥tti} (i.e., burning, which in its primary sense is applicable to fire, is made to apply to the metal itself) and in fact, Sarvajñātman uses this very same example in \textit{PP} (see my translation pp. 5-6 which is equivalent to \textit{ŚŚ I. 169}) and calls it an instance of \textit{jahallakṣanā}. In any event, \textit{NAIŚ II. 54} appears to be another source for Sarvajñātman's three-fold division of \textit{lakṣanā}.

It is with Sarvajñātman, from among the relatively early Advaitins, that we first encounter a clear-cut distinction between the three usages of words and, more significantly, the formulation of the distinction between the three types of \textit{lakṣanā} which comes to play such an important role in the exegesis of the key Upaniṣadic statements (\textit{mahāvākyā-s}) in the texts of the Advaita Vedānta thinkers that follow Sarvajñātman. After Sarvajñātman, \textit{jahadajahal-lakṣanā} (i.e., partially inclusive and partially non-inclusive secondary signification) seems to become the standard way of properly interpreting statements like "That thou
Having elaborated the three usages of words, including the three-fold division of laksana, Sarvajñatman goes on, in the next three chapters, to deal with Upaniṣadic statements which profess to say something about final reality (Brahman). These he divides into two categories: a) the great Upaniṣadic statements (mahāvākyas) such as "I am Brahman" (BU I. iv. 10) and "That thou art" (CHU VI. viii. 7), the correct understanding of which is the ultimate means of bringing about final release (mokṣa); b) statements which are subsidiary (avāntaravākyas) to the great Upaniṣadic statements, but which contribute to the understanding of the meaning of the components of the great statements—these subsidiary statements are of two kinds, positive or affirmative ones (vidhimukha) such as, "Brahman is truth, knowledge, the infinite" ("Satyam jñānam anantam brahma."—TU II. i. 1), and negative ones (nisedha-

52 For example see Vedāntasāra p. 11, where the term bhāgalaksana (this seems to be a later term for jahādajahal-laksana, cf., SS I. 164) is used, but compare this with the untraditional denial of laksana altogether for statements such as "That thou art." at VEDP IV. 27.

53 See p. 90 of my translation of PP below and also the prose introduction to the initial chapter of Sureśvara's NAIS.
mukha) such as "Not this, not this." ("Neti neti."—BU II. iii. 6, ix. 26, IV. ii. 4). All of the effort of what I call Advaita Vedānta hermeneutics is directed towards the proper understanding of these revealed mahāvākyā-s with a purely soteriological motive. Finding out what they mean, which is equivalent to directly experiencing their meaning, produces liberation.

There seems to be evidence for the separation of statements such as "That thou art." from other statements about Brahman even among the pre-Śaṅkara Advaitins, but Śaṅkara himself is not always clear on this point. To begin with, the term mahāvākyya is not employed by him, in—

54 See chapter four of my translation of PP and SS III. 310-25 which gives the purpose and different extent (parimāna) of both the positive and negative avāntara-vākyā-s (also compare Sarvajñātman's distinction between avāntara-vākyā-s and mahāvākyā-s with the relation that he feels holds between statements conveying the qualified Brahman (sagunavākyā-s) and those conveying the unqualified Brahman (nirgūṇavākyā-s) made at SS I. 463-65).

55 S. L. Pandey offers a quotation from Ānandagīrī on BUBH II. 1. 9 which describes the view of Dravidācārya on this point at note 11 on p. 206 of his Pre-Śaṅkara Advaita Philosophy (Allahabad: Darshan Peeth, 1974): "Tat-tvamasyādīvākyam aikyaparam tačchatāh srstādīvākyamityukte 'rthe dravidācāryasammatimāhā," ("He gives the concurrence of Dravidācārya for the rule: 'Statements like "That thou art." etc., have unity as their aim; statements concerned with creation etc., are subordinate to them.'"

56 In fact, the word mahāvākyya does occur at BSBH
stead he calls statements such as "That thou art" simply Upaniṣadic statements (i.e., vedāntavākya-s, vākya-s, vaca-s, etc.). Generally, we can perceive two strata in Śaṅkara concerning those statements which in the later Advaita tradition are termed mahāvākya-s. In the first stratum we find that the statements "That thou art" and "I am Brahman" are grouped together with, and regarded as similar to, statements such as "Not this, not this" which are clearly avāntaravākya-s according to Sarvajñātman.⁵⁷ In the second stratum texts such as "That thou art" begin to be accorded more of an individual status and in places even merit analysis of their component parts.⁵⁸ Though there

I. iii. 33 p. 264 l. 4 in connection with the word avāntaravākya but there they occur in a pūrvapakṣa and mean only greater and lesser portions of a sentence in general.

Lists of such Upaniṣadic statements appear, for example, at BGBH I. iv. 7 pp. 662 and 663, I. iv. 10 pp. 670 and 671; AIUBH preamble to the second adhyāya p. 342; BSBH II. iii. 18, 30, 47; III. ii. 27; IV. i. 3; iv. 4. The statements "That thou art" and "I am Brahman" are not at all distinguished in these lists.

We encounter more restricted grouping of "That thou art" and "I am Brahman" at BSBH I. i. 4 p. 62; I. i. 31 p. 145 l. 4; I. i. 8 p. 158 ii. 1-2; and singular presentation of "That thou art" at BSBH I. ii. 6 p. 155 l. 6; I. ii. 13 p. 168 l. 3; I. iv. 6 p. 294 l. 2 and p. 295 l. 9; etc. This does seem to indicate that these two sentences, and especially the sentence "That thou art", were to some extent beginning to be distinguished, perhaps paradigmatically, from all other Vedāntic statements about ultimate truth or Brahman. Though Śaṅkara does not
may appear, in Śaṅkara, some movement towards the recogni-
tion that texts such as "That thou art" and "I am Brahman"
are superior to all other Vedantic statements, ultimately,
he cannot be said to have regarded them as being fundamen-
tally different from texts such as "Not this, not this"
in the sense that their function is also the negation of
what is not-Brahman. 59

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exegetically analyse the sentence "I am Brahman" in terms
of its component parts (he does concern himself with the
meaning of the word "Brahman" in it at BUBH I. iv. 10) in
the same way that Sureśvara (NAIS II. 54 ff.), he does at-
tempt such analysis of the sentence "That thou art" at
CHU VI. xvi. 3; BSBH IV. 1. 2; and US XVIII; with the last
being perhaps the most significant. It is curious to note
that there appears to be no mention of either the state-
ments "That thou art" or "I am Brahman" in Śaṅkara's BHGBH.

59 That is to contrast it with the clearly positive,
but not objectifiable, knowledge that such statements are
given to convey in Sarvajñātman's writings (see SS II. 15,
101-2 and 238) and in the writings of later Advaitins. Thus
Śaṅkara states the following at US XVIII. 4: "Siddhādevaham-
ityasmādyuṣaddharmo nisidhyate/ Rajyāvantvāhidhatriyuktyā tat-
tvamityādīśāsanāth/" ("Teachings such as 'That thou art,'
etc., along with reasoning, negate the not-Self element
from the Self which is established as the 'I,' just as the
notion of snake is negated in relation to the rope."). Si-
milar statements occur at MĀUBH 7; BUBH I. iv. 7 p. 662 ll.
10-11 ("...abrahmānātmavijñānātmavijñāntakatvācca 'ekamevaśvi-
tiyam', 'tattvamasi; ityevamādivākyānām.'); at the close of
CHU VI. xvi. 3 ("Tasmāt vikārāṇrtadhiṣṭhātivātma-śānāvat-
vartakamevedam vāyam tattvamāsiti siddhāmīti."); BSBH III.
II. 21 p. 625"1. 9-11; III. iii. 9 p. 660 1. 7-8 ("Yathā
dehendriyasamāghate ātmabuddhirātmanyevātmabuddhā pavacād-
bhāvinyā 'tattvamasi; ityanayā yathārthabuddhā nibavāya-
te."). Thus Śaṅkara seems, in this sense, to have regarded
statements such as "That thou art" as mainly having the
purpose of negating what is other than Brahman.
If we consider the manner in which Śaṅkara analyzes the statement "That thou art" in the three central places that he does this, we find the following. At CHU VI. xvi. 3 Śaṅkara determines that the statement "That thou art" is not: a) a statement of meditative attribution (upāsanā, which is obviously what is meant here, although the word does not actually occur in the passage) as when the idea of a god is imposed on its image, because there is only attribution, and not identity, between the two entities concerned, and also because this would involve the erroneous superimposition of qualities on Brahman; b) a metaphor (upacāra) as in the case of the statement "You are a lion" because the knowledge produced from a metaphor is false ("Mrsātvādupacāravijñānasya."—p. 540 l. 6); c) a statement of praise (stuti) since Śvetaketu, the "thou" of the statement is not to be praised and because there is no praise involved in referring to Brahman as Śvetaketu. What the statement "That thou art" does do is that, after having shown that the Existent enters the world, it points

60 This is none other than the common example given for gunavṛtti; with this statement Śaṅkara seems to deny the application of gunavṛtti to the statement "That thou art."

61 In Sarvajñātman this is the function of one of
to the unbridled unity between the Existent and the ātman and thus it excludes or negates everything which is other than that.

At BSBH IV. 1. 2, in the context of discussing the significance of the repetition of the statement "That thou art." in CHU VI., Śaṅkara states that the sentence expresses an identity between the sense or content of the word "thou" (tvam) and the sense or content of the word "that" (tat). Further, the sense of the word tat is given as that Brahman which is the cause of the origin of the universe and Śaṅkara supplies a string of what Sarvajñātman would call avāntaravākyas for additional clarification of this sense, while the sense of the word tvam is the inward

the five kinds of arthavāda-s (elaborating statements) which are grouped in the avāntaravākyas (see PP trans. pp. 104u-5).

62 CHU VI. xvi. 3 p. 540 1. 2-3: "...praveśam darjayitvā tattvamasīti nirohaṣam sadātmabhāvamupadīśati."

63 Ibid., 1. 25-6: "Tasmāt vikārānrtādhikrtajīvātmavijñānavivartakamevedam vākyam tattvamasīti siddhamiti." ("Therefore it has been established that this Upanisadic statement 'That thou art.' only excludes the knowledge of the living self which is a modification, which is unreal, and which is qualified [for religious duty].")

64 BSBH IV. 1. 2 p. 795: "Api ca tattvamasītyetadvākyam tvamadārthasya tatpadārthabhāvamācaste."
Self (pratyagātman). 65 Śaṅkara goes on to say that, for those persons for whom the proper meaning of these two words is somehow obstructed, the repetition of the statement assisted by reasoning (yukti) will lead to a proper discarding (avadhāna or apoha) of the false meanings of the words tat and tvam. 66

Finally, in the eighteenth chapter of US, Śaṅkara draws an analogy between the statement "That thou art" and statements like "The horse is dark" in which there is a mutual restriction existing between each of the sentence portions, namely, the word "horse" excluding everything that is non-horse from the sense of the word "dark", and the word "dark" excluding everything that is non-black from

65 Ibid.: "Tatpadena ca prakṛtam sadbrahmeksitr jagato jānātikāraṇamabhidhiyate satyam jhānam anāntam brahma... ityādīśāstraaprasiddham." ("That Witness which is the existent Brahman, which has been mentioned and which is the cause of the origination of the universe, is what is denoted by the word 'that', 'That Brahman which is truth, knowledge, the infinite,'... such scriptural passages make this well known.") On p. 796 of the same passage, Śaṅkara explains the sense of the word tvam: "...tathā tvāmpadārtho 'pi pratyagātmatayā sambhayamanascaitanyaparyantatvenavadharitah." ("...in the same way the sense of the word 'thou' is the inward self, the hearer, which beginning with the body is thought of as the inward self and which is determined as finally ending up in pure consciousness.")

66 See BSBH IV, 1, 2 p. 796 11. 2-6 for the passage which this paraphrases.
the sense of the word "horse" (US XVIII. 169). Thus the word tvam by being brought into conjunction with the word tat, which expresses the sense of being free from suffering (nirduhkha), has the sense of being the sufferer (duhkhin) excluded from it, and similarly the word tat by coming into conjunction with the expressed sense of the word tvam, which is the inward self (pratyagatman) in its immediateness, has the sense of what is not the inward self (apratyagatman) or non-immediacy (paroksatva) excluded from it; in the end Saṅkara does not seem to look upon statements such as "That thou art" and "Not this, not this" as operating on different levels, for both are taken by him to demonstrate the fact that in order to understand Brahman one has to negate what is not-Brahman.

67 For a further explanation of this relation which is called bheda, see K. Kunjunni Raja, Indian Theories of Meaning (Madras: Adyar Library, 1963) pp. 192-3.

68 US XVIII. 194-5:

TattvamostulyanIdarthamasItyetatpadambhavet
Tacchabdah pratyagatmārthastacchabdārthastvamās tathā.

Duhkhitvapratyagatmatvam vārayetāmubhāvapi
Esvām ca netinetyartham gamayētām parasparam.

(The purpose of the word 'art' is to show that the words 'that' and 'thou' refer to the same thing, The word 'that' comes to have the sense inward
However, it is also important for Śaṅkara that before one can properly execute such an analysis of the sentence "That thou art" one must first of all, as with the analysis of any sentence, call to mind the correct meanings of the individual terms. This process of recollection involves the application of the method of retaining what is constant and abandoning what is not constant (anyavyā-

self and similarly the word 'thou' comes to have the sense of the word 'that'.

Both words exclude being the sufferer and not being the inward self [from one another], And thus they mutually express the meaning of the statement "Not this, not this."

Similar lines occur at US XVIII. 169b-170a: "Nirdhukhavācīna yogāttvamāsbadsya tadarthatā// Pratyagātmābhidhānena tacchabdasya yustestathā/". This bears a structural similarity to what Sarvājñātman came to call partially non-inclusive and partially inclusive secondary usage (jahadajahallaksanā—see PP trans. pp. 84-5), but Śaṅkara nowhere mentions the secondary usage of language (laksanā) in his analysis of statements like "That thou art."; compare US XVIII. 171a: "Śvārthasya hyaprahānena viśistārthasamar-pakau/" ("The two words tat and tvam express a peculiar sense without giving up their own senses/"); but whether we can get jahadajahallaksanā out of this certainly debatable.

69US XVIII. 188b: "Vākyārthasyapi vyākānampadār-thasmrtipūrvakam//" ("The knowledge of the sentence sense is preceded by the recollection of the word senses."). Similar statements are made by Śaṅkara at US XVIII. 176-79 and especially verse 178.
vyatireka)\textsuperscript{70} in order to determine the proper sense of the word \textit{tvam} which, once accomplished, automatically makes the proper sense of the word \textit{tat} clear and, in turn, leads to the possibility of understanding the meaning of the sentence "That thou art." in the correct manner.\textsuperscript{71} It is in

\textsuperscript{70}For example the \textit{ātman} is always present whenever we encounter the three states of waking, dreaming, and deep sleep—this is the positive concomittance (\textit{anvaya}) between them. However, the three states are not always present whenever the \textit{ātman} is present, as in the state of liberation (\textit{moksa}); this is the negative concomittance (\textit{vyatireka}) between the two. From this, the \textit{ātman} is deduced to be the more essential element (cf., US XVIII. 168).

\textsuperscript{71}Following US XVIII. 179-181:

\begin{verbatim}
Tattvamasyādivākyesu tvampārthāvivekatah
Vyajyate naiva vākyārtho nityamukto 'hamītyatah.

Anvayavyatirekakōktistadvivekāya nānyathā
tvampārthāviveke hi pānāvarpitavilvavat.

Vākyārtho vyajyate caivaṃ kevalo 'hampārthatah
duhkhītyetadapohena pratīyagātmaviniścayat.
\end{verbatim}

(In statements such as "That thou art." etc., one cannot indeed get the sentence sense, which is eternally freed 'I am', without the discrimination of the word "thou".

We have mentioned the process of positive and negative concomittance for the sake of the discrimination of that; for, once the discrimination of the sense of the word "thou" occurs, it is as if it were a \textit{bilva} fruit placed in one's palm,

Then the sentence meaning is clear from the determination of the inward self through the exclusion of suffering to the ego [Which is the sense of the word "thou"].)
this way that one moves from an understanding of the individual word senses (padārtha-s) to an understanding of the sentence sense (vākyārtha) as a whole as it has been described in the previous paragraph.

In summarizing Śaṅkara's ideas on the exegesis of statements such as "That thou art" we may say that, first of all, he clearly distinguishes them as being statements of unity. The fact that their true purport is the unqualified unity of the constituents elements is what separates them from all other Upaniṣadic statements dealing with Brahman. Secondly, this unity comes to be realized through the determination of the correct meanings of the individual words of the sentences through the process of anvayavyatireka which seems to lay the groundwork for the sentence analysis by the discarding of the contradictory portions (e.g., the duhkhitva in terms of "thou" and the paroksatva in terms of "that") of the ordinary sense of the individual words. It is important to take note of the fact that Śaṅkara nowhere mentions the term laksanā (secondary usage of language) in his exegesis of statements like "That thou art."

Turning to Śuresvara, we find that, as with Śaṅkara, he does not employ the word mahāvākya in his writings. In addition to this, the lists of Upaniṣadic sentences in which
the statements "That thou art" and "I am Brahman" were often found in Śaṅkara are absent in Sureśvara, but perhaps this is simply due to the fact that almost all of his writing is in verse form. Aside from this, the two statements do seem to possess a more prominent profile in Sureśvara's work than they did in the work of Śaṅkara (e.g., see NAIS II. 54-58 and the whole of the third chapter of that work as well).

Sureśvara is distinguished by Sarvajñātman as applying gunavrtti and what Sarvajñātman calls jahallaksana (non-inclusive secondary usage—see PP trans. p. 86) in the analysis of the statement "I am Brahman",72 and in doing so Sureśvara seems to be the first Advaitin to apply sabdavrtti-s to mahāvākya-s in an outright fashion. This is Sureśvara's innovation to the exegesis of mahāvākya-s.

Just as with Śaṅkara, Sureśvara holds that one can obtain knowledge of Brahman only through sentences like "That thou art." ("...vedāntāgamavākyādeva samyagjñānam." --NAIS I. i. prose) and that one can correctly understand these sentences only by first recalling the proper meanings of their individual word-components through the process of

72 See PP trans. p. 85 where Sarvajñātman quotes NAIS II. 55 and also the paragraph pp. 86-7 (notes 26-8) which seems to directly presuppose NAIS II. 54.
anvayavyatireka. Also just as with Śaṅkara (see above p. 44) it is the subject element (the "I" and the "thou") rather than the predicate ("Brahman" and the "that") in these sentences which is the crucial point of entry into their proper exegesis. Thus we find that the aim of the whole second chapter of NAIS is to establish the correct meaning of the term "thou" and it does so through the process of separating the eternal or constant element in the notion of subject from those elements which are not constant but eventually fall away (e.g., the body, sense organs, etc.). Without the employment of such a process of anvayavyatireka to understand the underlying sense of tat and tvam one could not properly understand a statement such as "That thou art." 73 Once one comprehends the true senses of the words tat-tvam one can begin to deal with propositions such as "That thou art." without falling prey to their surface contradictions.

Dealing with the sentence "That thou art " as a

73 Following NAIS II. 9: "Anvayavyatirekābhīyām vinā vākyārthabodhanam/ Na śyāt tena vinājñānapraḥānaṃ no pāpaḍyate/" ("There would be no understanding of the meaning of the great Upaniṣadic sentences without the process of positive and negative concommittance, and without that there is no possibility of ignorance being destroyed."). The process is further mentioned at NAIS III. 4; 22; 28; 36; 38; 46 prose; 53; TUBHV III. 19.
whole, Suresvara posits three relations to occur between the two components *tat* and *tvam*. The first is one of grammatical co-ordination or identity of case (*sāmānādhikaranya*) between the words themselves; the second is the relation of qualification and qualified thing (*viṣesana višesayatā*) between the two word senses (*pāḍārtha*-s); the third is the relation between indirect indication and the indirectly indicated thing (*lakṣya-lakṣyanasaṃbandha*), and obtains between the individual word senses (*pāḍārtha*-s) and the sentence sense (*vākyārtha*) as a whole.\(^\text{74}\) This, in fact, seems to be the source for Sarvajñātman's similar analysis of *mahā-vākyas* at SS I. 169-70 and PP trans. p. 91. Both thinkers seem to agree that the relation of indirect indication and indirectly indicated thing is the only manner of interpret-

\(^{74}\) **NAIS III. 3:** "*Sāmānādhikaranyam ca viṣesana viśesayatā/ Laksyalaksanasambandha pāḍārthapratyagatmānām/* ("There is grammatical co-ordination and the relation between qualification and qualified thing, the relation of indirect indication to indirectly indicated thing is between the word senses and the inward self [which is the sentence sense].") Our paraphrase of this passage follows Hacker's (Untersuchungen..., p. 78) translation of Jñānottama's commentary on the verse since Suresvara himself is not precise here and because Jñānottama's remarks do seem to correctly describe what Suresvara does when he treats of these relations (NAIS III. 3; 9-11; 25-26). In fact, Hacker's exegesis of Suresvara's exegesis of statements such as "That thou art" and "I am Brahman" is the most valuable secondary source on this topic (see Untersuchungen..., pp. 73-79 and 101-102) if one does take into account the consideration that he does depend on Jñānottama excessively.
ing the sentence "That thou art " which is actually free from contradiction (virodha).

The process of perceiving these three relations in the statement "That thou art " involves two movements. First of all there is the movement towards lakṣyālaksana-sambandha, which involves the perception of a contradiction concerning the identity between the two entities described by the words "that" and "thou" present on the level of grammatical apposition (sāmānyādhi karana), that is, though the case terminations say that the two are one, we still find two words which must refer to separate entities. In order to avoid this contradiction one confronts the statement on the level of viśeṣanaviśeṣyata so that the entity referred to by the word "thou" becomes qualified by the qualification 'being free from suffering' which is an essential qualification of the entity referred to by the word "that", and conversely "that" becomes qualified by 'being inward', or in other words 'being immediate', which is characteristic of the entity referred to by the word "thou". However, this leads to the problem that we would

\[\text{NAIS III. 10: } \text{Nirdūhkhitvam tvam arthasya tad-} \]
\[\text{arthena viśeṣaṁat/ Pratyaktā cā tvam padenaśya samnīdhēḥ/} \]
\[\text{("The sense of the word 'thou' is one who is free from suffering because there is qualification of it by the sense of the word 'that', and the sense of the word} \]
have to admit two contradictory qualities existing in the
same locus for each of the entities called "that" and cal-
led "thou".76 These contradictions, which arise from con-
sidering the purport of these sentences on the level of
the primary meanings of its words, lead us to the abandon-
ment of those primary meanings and the employment of la-
ksyalaksanasambandha, which in itself resolves these con-
tradictions through the exclusion (vyāvrtti or hāna) of
their mutually contradictory primary senses (i.e., sadvi-
tiya for tvam and pāroksya for tat--see note 75 above) and
the retainment (upadāna) of that sense which is the under-
lying substratum (nisthātman--NAIS III. 76) of those con-
tradictory senses.77

Once this first movement has been completed there

76 As stated at NAIS II. 38: "Dharminśca viruddha-
tvānna drṣyaugunesangatīḥ/ "Mārutāndolitajvalām śaityam nāg-
nim.sisrpsati/" ("Just as coolness cannot creep into a ra-
ging wind-fanned fire, objectifiable qualities are not asso-
ciated [with the Self] because that would mean that the sub-
stratum [of those qualities, namely, the Self] would be con-
tradicted."). Also see NAIS III. 25 and SV 121; in the lat-
ter viśesanaviśesyatā is said not to exist without ignorance
("Nāvidyāmāntarenaṁsaṁ viśesanaviśesyatā/").

77 For this see NAIS III. 76–80 and also the prose
portion of NAIS III. 26. There is a structural similarity
here with Sarvājñātman's notion of jahadajahallaksanā (both
non-inclusive and inclusive secondary usage of language--
see PP trans. pp. 84 and 86) and is probably a source for it.
is, through the admission of lakṣyālaksanasambandha, a possibility of rectifying the surface contradictions which were apparent in terms of sāmāṇādhikaranya and viśeṣanaviśeṣyata in the sentence on the primary level of language by employing an exclusion (vyāvṛtti) of those portions of the primary senses of tat and tvam which are contradictory from taking part in the grammatical or qualifier-qualified relation that occurs among the sentence components. 78 This second or downward movement shows how, once properly understood, the true purport of the sentence, which is the unity of tat and tvam, can be apprehended on all levels.

Another feature which distinguishes Sureśvara's

78 Thus we find NAIS III. 9: "Sāmāṇādhikaranyāderghatetarakhayoriva/ Vyāvṛtteh syādavākyārthah saksāṇastattvamarthayoh/" ("That which cannot be the sense of any sentence but which belongs to the senses of 'thou' occurs to us directly due to the exclusion from the relation of grammatical co-ordination etc., [of the contradictory portions of the sense of those two words], just as in the case of the ether in a pot and the other [all-pervasive] ether."). See Hacker, Untersuchungen..., p. 78 for an explanation of the ether simile; briefly, in the statement "The pot-ether is the great ether.", the surface contradictions are resolved by excluding the notion of limitation in the case of the pot-ether and the notion of greatness, which distinguishes the all-pervasive ether from all other limited ethers, from the great ether, thus revealing that one and the same ether is the true sense of the statement. This verse recurs at TUBHV II. 658. Of the different translations of this verse available (A. J. Alston 1971; R. Balasubramanian 1974; P. Hacker Untersuchungen..., p. 79; S. S. raghavachar 1965; J. M. van Boetzelaer 1971) Hacker seems to place it in its most proper context, while van Boetzelaer's seems to be the most mistaken. Compare the similar use of varāna (exclusion) in NAIS III. 2.
exegesis of statements such as "That thou art" is that he paradoxically explains their meaning (vākyārtha) as that which cannot be the meaning or sense of any sentence (avākyārtha). Among the earliest and most general ways of explaining the nature of the relation that subsists between the component parts of a sentence and that work towards producing the sentence sense (vākyārtha) were those of either a combinative interrelation (samsarga) or an exclusive interrelation (bhedā), but according to Sureśvara the sense of statements such as "I am Brahman" or "That thou art" can be neither of these, instead it is inca-

79 A. J. Alston in his translation of NAIS (Realization of the Absolute, London: Shanti Sadan, 1971) notes, under NAIS I. 67 prose portion, that this idea that knowledge of Brahman is non-verbal and non-relational may stem from Maṇḍana Miśra.

80 See K. Kunjunni Raja, Indian Theories of Meaning, 2nd ed. (1977; rpt. Madras: Adyar Library and Research Centre) pp. 191-93 for an explanation of these two terms.

81 As at SV 902: "Anyatreva na ca āryatra vākyārtho bhedalaksanah/ Samsargalaksano vāpi brahmātmābhedato bhavet/" ("Elsewhere, but not here [i.e., in the sentence 'That thou art.'] the sentence sense is characterized by either exclusive interrelation [of the components] or combinative interrelation [of the components] for Brahman and ātman are not different."). Also see SV 903-7 and NAIS III. 26 prose (in the latter, avākyārthā is described as being free from both combinative and exclusive interrelation, i.e., bhedasamsargarahita). Sarvajñātman too denies samsarga for "That thou art" at SS I. 145 and 195 which may be compared with Sureśvara's rebuke of it at NAIS III. 76-78.
pable of being reduced to the sense of any sentence.\(^{82}\)

It is this *avākyārtha* which one finally attains in sentences such as "That thou art." through the application of *anyavayatireka* to the components involved\(^{83}\) and the resolution of the contradictions apparent in terms of śāmān-
ādhikaranya and *vīsesanavīsesyata* in the sentence by the

\(^{82}\)For example at TUBHV II 6.42, Brahman's being *avākyārtha* is explained as follows:

\[\text{Nāṇāpadārthasamsargalaksano 'yam yatah smrtah}
\*Vākyarthe vākyavidbhirhi bramāvākyam ca no mātam}
\*Tasya cāvisayatvattu brahmāvākyārthārūpabhrt.\]

(Since this thing which is sentence sense is described by those who know about sentences as characterized by being a combinative interrelation of various words, and since our opinion is that an Upāniṣadic sentence is a valid means of knowledge [concerning Brahman], then, because it is not an object, Brahman possesses a nature which is not capable of becoming the content of any sentence.)

The term is used repeatedly in TUBHV, occurring at II. 99; 392; 534; 618; 641-2; 647; 658-9; 664; III. 35; and it also occurs at NAIS III. 2 prose; 3 prose; 9; 39 prose (also compare the phrase "Na padārtho na vākyārtha ātmāyam..." at SV 462).

\(^{83}\)As at NAIS III. 28 prose: "Iyam cāvākyārthapratipattiranvayavatirekābhijāmsaiva." ("And this understanding of what cannot be the content of any sentence belongs only to him that knows positive and negative concomittance."). Also compare a similar statement at NAIS III. 39 prose: "Anvyavavatirekapurassaram vākyamevavākyārtharūpamātmanam pratidādayatiit...." ("The Upaniṣadic sentence alone, as preceded by the process of positive and negative concomittance, teaches that ātman which cannot become the content of any sentence."); and TUBHV II. 656-7.
adoption of laksyalaksanasambandha.

In summarizing Sureśvara's approach to the analysis of statements such as "That thou art." we may say that a) he does accept the application of gunavṛtti and laksana (see pp. 32-34 above) to them; b) just as with Śaṅkara, anvāvyatireka plays a crucial role in the analysis of these sentences by serving as the means of determining the correct senses of the individual terms aham ("I") and tvam ("thou") and that it is this subject-element in the sentences which serves as the important point of entry to their exegesis; c) once the true sense of the individual terms has been determined, one can move through the contradictions apparent on the levels of sāmānādhikaranya and vi-śesanaviśesyata to the adoption of laksyalaksanasambandha in order to obtain the proper sentence sense; d) this final sentence sense is paradoxically that which cannot be the sense of any sentence (avākyārtha).

It is on this foundation, as created by Śaṅkara and Sureśvara, that Sarvajñātman directly builds his hermeneutics, and more often than making innovations on their ideas, Sarvajñātman simply clarifies or elaborates what seems to have stood as implicit in them. In moving from Śaṅkara through Sureśvara to Sarvajñātman, we can discern an increasing emphasis on the crucial role that the under-
standing of the proper sense of statements such as "That thou art " and "I am Brahman " plays in the system. With Sarvajñātman the use of the term mahāvākya becomes a necessity, since it is made clear in his writings that the understanding of all else (e.g., inter-scholastic polemics) in the Advaita Vedānta system is incidental to the proper understanding of such statements which encapsulate within them the whole truth of the system itself.

In his hermeneutics Sarvajñātman first of all makes a clear and central distinction between mahāvākyas and avāntaravākyas (see pp. 35-36 above) and in doing so he makes a shift from Śrīvāsa's emphasis on entering upon the examination of the mahāvākyas from the inward or subjective perspective (i.e., through examining the sense of the words aham and tvam—see p. 47 above) and the application of anvayavyatireka to properly determine the content of that subjective element which accompanies it, to an emphasis on the remaining element (i.e., that denoted by the terms Brahman and tat) with the role of anvayavyatireka there being taken care of by the function of the avāntaravākyas. Sarvajñātman seems to try to make of the exegesis of mahāvākyas a more closed system in the sense that, by entering into the mahāvākyas through the Brahman-element (Brahman being the import of śruti or revelation as estab-
lished, at length, by Śaṅkara at BSBH I. i. 4), the inves-
tigator (mumukṣu or brahmajijñāsu) need never go outside
of śruti to find the necessary information about it.

Sarvajñātman discusses the extent (parimāṇa) of
both the positive (vidhi) and negative (nisedha or prati-
śedha) avāntaravākyā-s at SŚ III. 312-26 and there we find
that in both cases one determines the extent by a gather-
ing together (upasamḥāra, see PP trans. note 66) of unre-
peated Upaniṣadic words that refer to the supreme Self
(parātman—see SŚ III. 314-15 and 317-18). Thus, in terms
of the positive avāntaravākyā-s we obtain ten different
predicates (śuddha, buddha, mukta, etc., see PP trans. note
58); however, Sarvajñātman seems less specific about the
number of negative predicates (the example of śruti which
seems most often quoted by Sarvajñātman in this respect is
BU III. viii. 8, as at SŚ I. 254 and 256). Since the ne-
gative avāntaravākyā-s merely negate what has sprung up
out of ignorance, while the positive avāntaravākyā-s also
aim at affirming the essential qualities of Brahman,

84 SŚ III. 320a: "Yadiha kimcīdabodhasamudbhavam
tadakhilam pratisedhāti kevalam/" ("Whatever has arisen
out of ignorance in this world, that [the negative subsi-
diary statements] negate entirely.").

85 SŚ III. 319a: "Vidhivacasyubhayam tu pade pade
bhavati samgrahavaran janarūpakam/" ("But each word in the
jñātman takes the purpose of the negative statements to be only the clarification of the sense of the words *tat* and *tvam*, and the confirmation of the possibility (*sam-bhāvanā*) that such an entity as described by the positive *avāntaravākya*-s could exist. They do not, as the positive *avāntaravākya*-s do, give rise to a positive transformation of knowledge (*buddhivṛtti* or *dharma*) that will des-

positive subsidiary statements has both the nature of conveying and negating [something about Brahman].

86 SS I. 256b: "Evam tattvamāśūnāvākyakatayostat-
tvampadoktārthaḥ samuṣṭhāyā tu neti neti vacanam mo-
ksāya sūksāna tu/" ("Thus, the phrase 'Not this, not this.' is meant only for the clarification of the mentioned senses of the words 'that' and 'thou' as they are found in sentences such as 'That thou art/'; it is not directly for the sake of final release.").

87 SS I. 263a: "Satyam jñānām manantamityaḥ bhūte
samabhāvanā nityāte nāstuladivyacāh samuṣṭhāva
dhāṣāyā dvaitopamadaysaṁvīnā/" ("Without the knowledge which is produced from statements such as 'Not gross....' etc. and which destroys duality, when it is stated that [Brahman] is truth, knowledge, the infinite, the possibility [of it] is not realized/". Also see note 146 to PP trans..

88 As described at SS II, 125a: "Brahmājñāñasam-
udbhavam grahaṇam sātigrahaṁ brahmaṇah svākāragrahanena
vedādirasā jātā matirbādhate/" ("That mental state born out of the Upanisads sublates the senses and their objects which are produced from ignorance, because it apprehends the reflection of Brahman in itself/". Of course the transformation of knowledge that finally liberates can only come from the mahāvākyo-s, but the point is that the positive *avāntaravākyo*-s, as opposed to the negative ones, do make a positive contribution to the attainment of this final knowledge. Also see SS I. 341-2; II. 53; III 306-7.
troy ignorance and lead directly to liberation (see §§ I. 253-4) and are thus regarded as mere restatements (anuvākyā-s) of the destruction of duality made known by the positive subsidiary statements. It is in this way that the avāntaravākyā-s are taken by Sarvajñātman as clarifying the sense of the term "that" in the mahāvākyā "That thou art."

Using the avāntaravākyā-s in the above manner to determine the sense of the word tat as the qualified Brahman, and putting this together with the given immediacy of our own subjective perspective as the sense of the word tvam, one gains entry into the mahāvākyā on the surface level, that is, on the level of the primary sense of its components and a level on which contradictions still abound. Then one proceeds to discover that the only manner in which one can resolve these apparent contradictions is by dealing with the relationship of the components involved on a secondary level. In this respect Sarvajñātman differen-

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89 Sarvajñātman cites the opposing view which places both negative and positive statements about Brahman on an equal footing at §§ I. 250ff. and ST on this verse attributes it to Maṇḍanamiśra, however, T. Vetter (Sarvajñātman's Saṃkṣepaśārīrakam I. Kapitel, 1972) takes this as an injustice to Maṇḍanamiśra's position (note to §§ I. 250).

90 This refers to the sāmānādhikāranya, viśesanaviśesata, lakṣyavāksanasaṃbandha progression which Sarvajñātman adopts from Sureśvara (see above pp. 46-50; §§ I. 196-7).
tiates three separate types of secondary usage of words: non-inclusive (jāhālaksanā), inclusive (a[jahallaksanā), and both inclusive and non-inclusive (jahadajahallaksanā) —each being thus termed as to whether or not they include, that is retain, their primary sense (mukhyavrūtti). ⁹¹ Of these, he principally accepts only jahadajahallaksanā as being able to reveal the true import of the mahāvākya-s although he concedes, perhaps simply out of deference, Su-
reśvara's position that gunavrūtti and jahallaksanā might also yield the proper sense of the mahāvākya "I am Brah-
man." ⁹²

In order to accommodate this adoption of jahadaja-
hallaksana, in which a portion of the primary sense of the word involved is given up and a portion of it retained,

⁹¹ The use of this three-fold distinction seems to be an innovation on the part of Sarvajñātman, for an explanation of them, along with the appropriate examples, see PP trans. pp. 3-4. The three are also treated of at SS I. 154 with the corresponding examples found in everyday language (laukikavākya-s) given at SS I. 155-6 and those from Veda at SS I. 157.

⁹² Sarvajñātman clearly establishes the fact that jahadajahallaksanā is the only way of revealing the pratyagātman which is the true sense of the mahāvākya-s at PP trans. p. 5, but on pp. 4-5 of the same work he also states that gunavrūtti is applicable to them, and on pp. 5-6 concedes that in a certain sense jahallaksanā may also be applicable (also see SS I. 233).
Sarvaññātman takes the primary senses of the words tat and tvam to be neither their ultimate connotation, which would be what is indicated by their secondary sense (i.e., the supreme Self or parātman), nor their given or daily usages, being that which is the source of the universe and the ego respectively, but rather, a blend of both of these portions in each case is meant, so that the primary sense of tat is a mixed Brahman (śabolabrahman), that is, a transcendent Brahman which is mixed or associated with all the qualifications ascribed to it by the positive avāntaravākya-s, and the primary sense of the word tvam is the inward from as mixed with the qualities of being possessed of duality and all the qualifications we normally associate with the given subject. This same structure, in which the primary sense of a word is a mixture (śabala or samparka) of its secondary sense and its given sense, is further employed by Sarvaññātman to construct primary senses for the words satya (the true), jñāna (knowledge), ananda (bliss), nitya (eternal), suddha (pure), mukta (freed), and sat (the existent), at SS I. 178-184. These are the key components of the avāntaravākya-s, but Sarvaññātman also does this

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93See PP trans. pp. 90-1, where this is made clear with respect to the terms "I" and "Brahman", and pp. 108-9, for the process as it relates to the words "that" and "thou".
for the words "Brahman" and ātman at ś Ś I. 158-9. The rea-
son for this seems to be that these words might easily avail
themselves of āhādajahallaksanā and indicate an impartite
sense (akhandārtha) without contradiction.94

In this way, since the primary senses of both the
words tat and tvam already conceal within themselves their
true or secondary sense, this process of āhādajahallaksanā
is merely a logical way of liberating that portion of their
primary senses which do not fall short of the true import
of the mahāvākyā-s. Thus, in respect to the word tat, the
qualified or limited (upahita) portion signified by the
word pāroksya (the non-immediate) is given up and the un-
limited portion signified by the word advaya (the non-dual)
is retained; similarly for the word tvam, the limited por-
tion signified by the word sadvitīya (possessing duality)
is abandoned and the unlimited portion signified by the
word pratyak (that which is inward) is retained.95 The re-

94 These words cannot yield liberationāl knowledge
in themselves and thus must be seen as different from ma-
hāvākyā-s. Cf., Ś Ś I. 191, where Sarvajñātman makes the
concession (praudhivāda) that guṇavṛtti and jahallaksanā
should be used to interpret the sense of these words.

95 This operation is described in relation to the
terms "I" and "Brahman" at PP trans. pp. 91-92 and also
compare this with pp. 108-9 of that text on tat and tvam.
We also find the following statement at Ś Ś I. 160:
tained portions are what each word signifies secondarily and it is the complete and utter identity of these two secondary senses (laksyārtha-s) which is the result of this whole operation and the true import of a sentence like "That thou art."

While Śaṅkara did not really have a term to denote this final import or sentence sense (vakyārtha) of statements such as "That thou art." and while Śuresvara seemed to favour the paradoxical term avākyārtha (that which cannot be the sense of any sentence—see above p. 52), Sarvajñātman prefers to use the term akhand (partless) or akhandārtha (impartite sense).96 Essentially there seems to be

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Tat} & \text{chabāyagata} \text{madvayabhāgamekam} \\
\text{pratyaktvamātramavirodhamapeksamānāḥ;} \\
\text{Tvamšabdavācyasabalamupādādāno} \\
\text{vākyādakhandamathā tat} \text{tvamāsimāti vi} \text{dāyāt.}
\end{align*}
\]

(Who aspires to non-contradiction [in the sense of the mahāvākya], must make use of that one portion of the non-dual contained in the expressed sense of the word tat [and] that bare inwardness found in that mixed entity which is the expressed sense of the word tvam, it is then that from the great Upaniṣadic statement "That thou art" one might know that thing which is partless.)

Though we still have the secondary senses of tat and tvam described by two separate words (i.e., the non-dual and inwardness), their apposition in the sentence "Tattvamasi," allows for the final enlightening leap to a direct awareness of absolute unity (ekatva) which crowns the Advaita Vedānta system.

96 See SS I. 145-51; 160; and 195-6.
no difference between what Suresvara means by his use of avākyārtha and Sarvajñatman's use of akhandārtha; both of them use it to show that the sense of a sentence such as "That thou art." cannot be the result of any relation (sam-sarga or bheda, see above p. 52),\(^7\) rather it is a partless whole which secondarily conveys the total identity of the entities signified by the terms tat and tvm.

In summarizing Sarvajñatman's contribution to Advaita Vedānta hermeneutics, we may say that it is basically two-fold. First of all, he introduces the notion of mahāvākya to describe the two statements "That thou art" and "I am Brahman" whose purport is the complete identity of the living subject (jīvātman) with the Absolute (Brahman) as conveyed through an impartite sentence sense (akkhandārtha) as opposed to all other Upaniṣadic statements about the Absolute which are subsidiary (avāntaravākya-s) and which are meant to qualify it either positively (vidhivākya) or negatively (nisedhavākya). In doing this he gives the dominant role to the positive subsidiary statements over the negative ones in their ability to contribute to the understanding of the final sense of the mahāvākya and thus

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\(^7\) For Sarvajñatman's viewpoint on this see SS I. 145-6 and SS I. 195 (cf., SS I. 218-21 where akhanda is termed a principal (mukhya) syntactical relation and samsarga a secondary (gauna) one.
he falls more closely in line with later Advaitins rather than with thinkers such as Śaṅkara, Maṇḍanamiśra, and Suresvara, who seem to place the positive and negative statements about Brahman on much the same level when it comes to contributing to knowledge about Brahman. Secondly, Sarvajñātman introduces the three-fold division of laksanā and most importantly the notion of jahadajahallaksanā which was to become the staple explanation of the later Advaitins in their discussions of the manner in which the mahāvākyās convey an impartite sense (akhandārtha). Though the basic structural operation of jahadajahallaksanā can already be found in Śaṅkara and Suresvara (see above pp. 41-42 and 50), Sarvajñātman codifies it and clearly adds to it with his introduction of the idea that the primary sense of the words involved in the mahāvākya is an associated entity (śabalavastu) which already contains, as a portion of itself, that which eventually becomes its secondary sense (laksyārtha). Broadly speaking, these are Sarvajñātman's main contributions to the Advaita Vedānta hermeneutics.
VI. Metaphysics and the Problem of the Locus of Ignorance in Śaṅkara, Sureśvara, and Sarva-jñātman

To whom does ignorance belong? Where does it claim its foothold in order to gain whatever measure of ontological reality it may merit in the Advaita Vedānta system? Basically, there are two possibilities which together form an apparently irreducible dilemma. Either ajñāna (ignorance) has its locus (āśraya) in Brahman, in which case, Brahman could no longer be held to be the partless and pure entity serving as the irreducible base of Advaitism, or, ajñāna has its locus in the jīva (the living subject), in which case, one is faced with the contradiction that, since the jīva is an effect or product of ignorance (ajñānakārya), there would be a point, prior to the arisal of that product, when ignorance would be without a locus.

This problem gains more and more philosophic attention in the Advaita Vedānta school as we move ahead from the time of Śaṅkara. On the whole, one must say that Śaṅ-

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99 For a brief but informative survey of this, see E. A. Solomon's Avidyā—A Problem of Truth and Reality, (Ahmedabad: Gujarat University, 1969), pp. 254-299.
kara and Suresvara are vague on the topic; however, tradition seems to accept them as being united in holding that Brahman is both the locus (āśraya) and object (visaya) of ajñāna. The archtypical exponent of the contrary position, namely, that the jīva is really the locus of ajñāna, is Mañdanamisra and it is at him that Sarvajñātman directs his main polemic.

Śaṅkara himself provides scant detail on this problem, but there seem to be at least four definite places where he touches upon the subject. The chief of these occurs at BHGBH XIII. 2 pp. 371-73. There, in response to the question "Whose is ignorance?" ("Atrāha sāvidyā kasyeti?"—p. 371) from the opponent, Śaṅkara replies, "It belongs to the one it is perceived to belong to." ("Yasya drśyate tasyaiva."—p. 372). From this we get the immediate impression that Śaṅkara holds that the jīva must be the locus of ignorance; however, if we go on a bit further

100 See PP trans. note 180.

into the passage we can see that Śaṅkara's aim here is more didactic than one of philosophical exactitude. The opponent carries on the inquiry with the question: "Of whom is it perceived?" ("Kasya drṣyate?"); but Śaṅkara quickly cuts him off: "The question 'Of whom is ignorance perceived?' is pointless. How? If ignorance is perceived, then that to which it belongs must also be perceived." ("At-rocya prájña kasya drṣyate iti praśno nīrarthakah. Katham, drṣyate cedavidyā tadvantamapi paśyasi."). This same didactic tenor is echoed in a thematically similar passage at BSBH IV. i. 3 p. 800: "Kasya punarayamaprabodha iti cet --yastvam prrochasi tasya ta iti vaddmāḥ. Nanvahamīśvara evoktaḥ śrutya, vadyeva pratibuddho 'si, nāsti kasyacid-aprabodhaḥ." ("If it is asked: 'Whose is this ignorance?' --we say: 'You who ask are the one to whom it belongs.'

But [you may object]: 'It has been stated in scripture that I am the Lord.'; [we say:] 'If you are so knowledgeable, then ignorance belongs to nobody at all.'

The fact that Śaṅkara's aim in these passages is to show that ignorance should in no way be ultimately connected with Brahman is made clear further on in BHGBH XIII. 2 p. 373 in the following summary statement: "Yadā caiva māvidyāduḥkhitvād-vairna jñātuh ksetrajñasya kīmciuddusyati." ("And when this is so, the knower, i.e., the field-knower, cannot be de-
filed in any way by ignorance, being the sufferer, and similar things.")

However, in two other places we encounter a slightly different view on this topic. At BSBH IV. 3 pp. 287-288, in refuting the Sāṅkhya theory of causality, Śaṅkara makes the following statement about ignorance in its causal aspect (i.e., as the seed-potency or bijaśakti of the universe): "Avidyātmakā hi bijaśaktiravyaktaśabdanirdeśyā paramesvarāgraya...." ("For the seed-potency, which consists of ignorance and which is denoted by the word 'unmanifested', has its locus in the supreme Ṛṣeva..."), Śaṅkara clearly recognizes that, as the causal principle of the universe, avidyā cannot claim to have its locus in any one of its products (i.e., in the jīva), and so he takes Brahman (Paramesvara) as being its locus. The other statement occurs at BUBH IV. 10 p. 670 ll. 4-6: "...nāvidyā-kartri bhrāntam ca brahma. Kintu naivābrahma avidyākartā cetano bhrānto 'nya isyate." ("...Brahman is neither the author of ignorance nor is it subject to error. Nevertheless, it is indeed not admitted that there is another conscious entity which is different from Brahman that is the author of ignorance and is subject to error."). Here, though there is no specific mention of the locus of ignorance, we can get a clear idea that, although Śaṅkara wants
to avoid any association of ignorance with Brahman at all costs, ultimately he cannot place it anywhere else. This is the true dilemma for Śaṅkara concerning the locus of ignorance, and it is in the light of these last two statements that I think one must view passages such as the ones cited in the previous paragraph which seem to place the ontological accountability for ignorance (ajñāna or avidyā) on the shoulders of the jīva.

Suresvara is also aware of the problem of locating ignorance in its proper place. Without doing so one cannot fit any ontological status to it, and so at NAIS III. 1 prose p. 226 ll. 6-8 he states the following: "Tacca ajñānam svātmātraniṁuttam na sambhavatīti kasyacit kasmimścid visaye bhavati-ityabhupagantavyam." ("And therefore one has to admit that the fact that ignorance is caused simply out of itself is impossible; it [must always] belong to a certain thing [i.e., have its locus in something] and be in relation to some sort of object [of which there is ignorance]."). As with Śaṅkara, Suresvara on the one hand wants no relation to subsist between Brahman and ignorance that would affect the purity of Brahman. For example, at NAIS II. 53 prose, Suresvara states: "Na tu paramārthata ātmano 'vidyāyā tatkāryena va sambandho 'bhūt, asti, bhavisyati va. Tasyāpariluptadratīsvābhāvyat." ("But in reality the ātman
neither has had, now has, nor will have any relation with ignorance or its products, because the ātman possesses a nature which is undefiled consciousness."'). On the other hand, in terms of causality, he cannot escape admitting ignorance to be the source for the relation which the ātman has with what is ultimately unreal and superimposed upon it (i.e., adhyāsa), as at NAIS III. 20 prose: "Tayoh kūtasthaparināminoh ātmananavabodha eva sambandhahetuh, na punarvāstavah kaścidapi sambandha upapadyate....". ("Non-knowledge of the ātman alone is the reason for the relation between the changeless entity and the modified entity, but in reality, no relation whatsoever is possible....")

In terms of his final conclusions on the topic, Sureśvara is far clearer than Śaṅkara. At NAIS III. 1 prose, having admitted that there are two categories (pa-dārtha-s) of things in the world, the ātman and what is not the ātman, Sureśvara presents a string of reasons as to why the latter cannot serve as the locus of ignorance:

(For the very nature of it [i.e., the anātman] is ignorance, indeed it is not possible that ignorance belong [i.e., have its locus in] to ignorance itself [which would be the admission of the fault of self-dependence or ātmāsraya]. Even if this were possible, what special change would ignorance give rise to in something whose nature was [already] ignorance? And the attainment of knowledge does not exist in it [i.e., the anātman as the locus of ignorance], whereby ignorance could have the nature of negating that [knowledge--and thus ignorance would exist without a purpose (nispravojana) in the anātman]. And there is the further reason that the anātman has been produced form ignorance. For it is impossible that what has been established as existing earlier [namely, ignorance] be the thing that rests on a locus which is yet to be established and which is obtained from that [ignorance]. And for the reason that it [the anātman] which is completely dependent on ignorance, has no nature of its own [apart from it].)

It is these reasons, and predominantly the causal one (i.e., since the jīva is an effect of ajñāna it cannot serve as its locus), which force Sureśvara to the following conclusion later on in the same passage: "Evaṃ tāvannanatmano ajñānitvam, nāpi tadvisayamajñānam. Parisesvādātmana evāsv-tvajñānam." ("Thus the anātman is not the locus of ignorance, ignorance is not even its content. Let ignorance belong to the ātman alone since that is the remaining alternative.").

Both Śaṅkara and Sureśvara exemplify the earliest phase of dealing with this problem, but in general it does not seem to have been a preoccupation with them. Sarvajñātman, however, does mean to set aside some space stric-
tly for resolving this issue and thus he seems to consider it a relevant problem. In doing this he is more representative of the analytic concerns of later Advaitins, or at least, he represents a transition between these two periods.

For Sarvajñātman there are two entities which can be held accountable for ignorance, namely, Brahman and what is not-Brahman or ajñāna. The former is ultimately real, while the latter is ultimately illusory and gains whatever claim to provisional reality it has through its association with Brahman. Sarvajñātman also clearly recognizes the fact that the locus of ignorance cannot be ignorance itself (see §§ II. 218-19) or its effects (i.e., ajñānakārya and specifically the jīva, see §§ III. 15) but must be the pure Brahman. However, the logical difficulty is at exactly this point, since Sarvajñātman also accepts the fact that pure Brahman cannot be associated with anything that has to do with ignorance. Therefore, the whole problem for Sarva-

102 Among the terms that Sarvajñātman employs to refer to that entity which serves as the locus of ignorance are the following: "the bare Self" (ātmavāmātra §§ I. 20); "consciousness" (citavāstu, cit, §§ I. 318); "partless consciousness" (nirvibhāgacāti §§ I. 319); "the inward entity" (pratyagvāstu §§ II. 127; pratyakṣavāmātra §§ II. 212).

103 As at §§ III. 24: "Na hi kalpanāviracitam viracitam vitatham paramātmavastvavitatham sprātī/ Pāramātmavāstu ca tathā tamāsā parikalpitam na kimapī sprātī/" ("For a thing which is unreal and which is constructed out
jñātman, in his claiming that pure Brahman is the locus of ignorance, is how can Brahman, the sole reality and completely free from any association, enter into a relation with ignorance which is ultimately unreal? What is the cement that could account for such a paradoxical bond as that involved in saying that Brahman is the locus of ignorance?

Sarvajñātman at least names this 'cement', in what for him is the correct formula describing Brahman's relationship to that state of affairs which is phenomenal existence, when he states: "...Brahman in its inward form is the locus of knowledge and ignorance." (PP trans. p. 113 — "Brahmanasca pratyagrupena jñānajñānāsrayatvam....").

Now by this term "inward form" or pratyagrupa, Sarvajñātman clearly does not intend the jīva (the living subject) since he explains that there is a non-correspondence (vy- abhicāra) between ignorance (which is present) and the jīva (which is absent) in the state of deep sleep (susupti). 104

of imagination [i.e., ignorance] does not come into association with that real entity which is the supreme ātman/ And similarly, that entity which is the supreme ātman does not come into association with anything whatsoever that is imagined out of ignorance/"); the example is given at SS III. 25.

104 Sarvajñātman provides this argument at PP trans. pp. 113-4 and for further references to susupti as the state.
He also does not intend pure Brahman here, since that would render the key portion of the statement tautological and log-ically uninformative, and it is obvious that Sarvajñātman means a definite aspect of Brahman in his choice of the term pratyāgrūpa. But if Sarvajñātman intends a specific aspect of Brahman as the thing which allows absolute Brah-man to be the locus of ignorance, then one could argue that a differentiation would have to be admitted in a supposedly undifferentiated Brahman, and to the Advaitins differen-tiation is the signal that one is dealing with an entity other than Brahman, an entity which is a product of ignorance, and an entity which is, in fact, ignorance itself. One may also ask the question, "Why is this absolute Brahman brought in by Sarvajñātman as the locus of ignorance, when this pratyāgrūpa could very well serve as the locus in itself?"

The logical impasse is obvious and unrelenting. If the pratyāgrūpa is still pure Brahman, then, in order for Brahman to become the locus of ignorance, one will have

in which everything is completely merged in ignorance, see SS III. 120-23. In emphasizing the fact that susupti is a state dominated by bare ignorance, Sarvajñātman seems to make a departure from Śaṅkara who, though he also agrees that no jīva exists there (CHUBH VI. vii. 1 p. 522), never seems to use ignorance in connection with it (see BUBH IV. iiii. 30 p. 899; MĀUBH 5; CHUBH VI. ii i p. 506).
to admit the intervention of yet another entity between the pratyagṛūpa and ignorance, and so on, due to the fact that pure Brahman cannot be associated directly with ignorance. If the pratyagṛūpa is no longer pure Brahman, then one will have to admit the intervention of another entity between the pratyagṛūpa and Brahman, and so on, since the pratyagṛūpa, being different from Brahman, would fall on the side of ignorance and need something else to connect it to Brahman. Thus we can see that Sarvajñātman's introduction of this inward entity as the means of Brahman becoming the locus of ignorance logically solves nothing.

In order to see any value in Sarvajñātman's statement on the locus of ignorance, one is forced into an illogical leap, or in other words, a leap out of logic. This, of course, is the final fate of any non-dualistic absolutism which means to assert its position with any integrity, and I do not try to disparage it.

In this way, we are forced to take Sarvajñātman's use of the term pratyagṛūpa as a heuristic one in which

105 The term pratyagṛūpa, as well as similar terms such as pratyagātman, pratyagvastu, and pratyagmātra are all used by Sarvajñātman to refer to pure Brahman and therefore must necessarily be interpreted in a heuristic fashion from the start (see PP trans. note 177 for further details on this).
the overall force of the introduction of this inward entity into the formula about the locus of ignorance intends to call our attention to the paradoxical fact that, though pure Brahman can in no way be associated with anything, let alone ignorance itself, there is no reasonable alternative but to assume that pure Brahman is the locus of ignorance. Though our automatic inclination is not to associate ignorance with Brahman, but with some subjective or inward aspect of consciousness, \(^{106}\) we have to realize that this option comes from within the sphere of ignorance itself. The final truth of non-dualistic absolutism does not allow for such an option, and we are heuristically led to the necessary leap that undercuts given perspectives altogether whether logical, or psychological. It seems that it is in this way that Sarvajñātman wishes to interpret the statements of Śaṅkara which appear to state that the \(\text{jīva}\) must be the entity which serves as the locus of ignorance (see PP trans. p. 121).

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\(^{106}\) Sarvajñātman seems to account for this in his discussion of the \(\text{jīva}\) as the manifesting factor (\(\text{vyākhyāka}\)) for ignorance (see PP trans. pp. 119-20). The nature of a \(\text{vyākhyāka}\) is to manifest an object (\(\text{vyākhyā}\)) as if it were contained on the \(\text{vyākhyā}\). Thus the \(\text{jīva}\), being the \(\text{vyākhyā}\) for ignorance, manifests it as if it were contained in the \(\text{jīva}\), so that even though the \(\text{jīva}\) is not the locus of ignorance, there is the experience of ignorance as contained in the \(\text{jīva}\).
While Brahman serves as the locus of ignorance, a condition which one experiences completely in the state of deep sleep (susupti), in the states of waking (jägarita) and dreaming (svapna) we clearly experience some varied types of cognition. Where does Sarvajñätman think that such knowledge secures its locus? Such knowledge is a transformation (parinäma) of the internal organ (antahkarana) which is an effect of ignorance and thus is different from Brahman which is eternal, for such a transformation is limited and perishable. As such, ordinary knowledge may ultimately be seen to be no different from ignorance itself. In this ultimate sense, the explanation of the locus of ignorance also accounts for the locus of objectifiable knowledge. However, though this bare 'relation' between Brahman and ignorance is evident in the state of deep sleep, the objectifiable knowledge that makes up the states of waking and dreaming is once-removed by comparison and needs a different accountability of its locus.

Sarvajñätman provides this by saying that, in order to be the locus of such objectifiable knowledge, Brahman needs an intermediary (dvära), since by itself it could not be directly associated with such a transformation. This presents us with essentially the same logical problem we have already encountered in Sarvajñätman's assertion.
that Brahman serves as the locus of ignorance through its inward form. However, here Sarvajñātman attempts to bridge the existing gap through the employment of a metaphorical phrase, so that the descriptive formula takes the following shape (see PP trans. p. 34): "Knowledge is a transformation, and for this reason, pure consciousness, having taken on the outer coat of the internal organ, is its locus...." ("...jñānasya tu parimānyādāntahkaranakaścukama
aparidhāyaiva caityamāśrayo bhavati."). Thus pure Brahman (śuddhabrahman) serves as the locus of knowledge only in the capacity that it has already somehow become its associated aspect (śabalahrahman or viśīṣṭabrahman). The intervening entity appears to be more tangible in this case as opposed to the case of the locus of ignorance, but again the logical contradiction is not really overcome by its intervention unless one interprets it heuristically, and its tangibility seems to be meant primarily to account for the manner in which pure Brahman can be both the locus of knowledge and ignorance (jñānajñānāśraya) at the same time.

By so demonstrating that pure Brahman is the locus of knowledge and ignorance, Sarvajñātman is able to make

107It might be appropriate to mention here that the distinction concerning the nature of a locus, which Sarvajñātman draws between the base (adhisthāna) and the
the crucial extrapolation which seems to be the central point of the last chapter of PP, namely, that pure Brahman alone is subject to transmigration and pure Brahman alone is the entity which is liberated from it. As the locus of ignorance, pure Brahman is the only entity which can finally be termed directly subject to ignorance, and as the locus of knowledge pure Brahman is the only entity which can finally be termed capable of appropriating the varied cognitive experiences available in the phenomenal world.

support (ādhāra) of an illusion at SS I. 31-33 is not expressed in PP. That distinction comes about in response to an objection against the Advaita Vedānta theory of mutual superimposition (anyonyādhyāsa) which states that the false relationship between Brahman and the world is one of mutual superimposition. The objection is that since superimposition always implies that the superimposed object will eventually be sublated, the mutual superimposition between Brahman and the world also implies their eventual mutual sublation and a necessary nihilism. That is to say that if Brahman is superimposed upon the world as its final locus, then when the world is eventually sublated Brahman would have to be sublated as well and nihilism would result. But Sarvajñātman holds that Brahman is superimposed upon the world not as its final base (adhisthāna), but as its apparent support or temporary prop (ādhāra), and that it is this temporary prop which is what is sublated once the illusory world is sublated and not Brahman as the final base or locus (adhisthāna) of phenomenal existence.

As stated at PP trans. p. 115: "Therefore Brahman alone undergoes transmigration and Brahman alone is liberated...." ("Tasmādbrähmaiva samsarati brahmaiva mucyāte...."—see Appendix below p. 229).
in order to escape eventually from it.\textsuperscript{109} 

The distinction between pure Brahman (śuddhabrahman) and qualified Brahman (vīśistabrahman), which must be taken heuristically from the beginning, is what allows Sarvajñātman to resolve the various contradictions and paradoxes that are encountered in the association of pure Brahman with anything else whatsoever. The epistemological counterpart of this distinction is the well known Advaita Vedānta distinction between the ultimate (paramārthika) and the given (vyavahārika) levels of truth.\textsuperscript{110} Ultimately pure Brahman is the ground of everything, but everything other than pure Brahman is regarded by the Advaitin as a false reality, and pure Brahman's association with it as a false problem.

\textsuperscript{109} The arguments against the jīva being the entity which undergoes bondage are presented at PP trans. pp. 116-7. Basically, the central argument is that the entity which strives after liberation (sādhaka) and the entity which finally attains it (phalīn) must be identical otherwise there would be a general disorder in the arrangement of persons properly reaping the results of the actions (karma-s) that they have performed, and thus, in order not to disrupt this arrangement, if we hold that the jīva is the sādhaka, we should also have to admit that the jīva alone is the entity which is released and such a final admission would go against all accepted Advaita Vedānta tenets.

\textsuperscript{110} For an informative group of essays on this topic see The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedānta, ed. M. Sprung (Dordecht: Reidel, 1973).
In summation, Sarvajñaṭātman has, through his introduction of this heuristically interpreted intervening entity (i.e., the pratyagṛūpa) into the problem of the locus of ignorance, improved, in terms of clarification, on the position of Sureśvara and especially on the somewhat unclear position of Śaṅkara on this same topic without deviating from their original expressed stances. Whereas the problem was not of consummate concern to the two earlier thinkers, Sarvajñaṭātman accords it a central place in his writings in the form of a rather exhaustive argument. However, though this trend is evidence that he should be grouped along with progressively later Advaitins in the tradition, his continuity with Śaṅkara and Sureśvara appears to be quite evident and the traditionally accepted bond between these three philosophers is a more than justified one.
TRANSLATION

The Five Chapters

I. [An Examination of the Uses\(^1\) of Words]\(^2\)

I\(^2\) praise the Veda which, like a lamp, is the cause of the origination of the knowledge of all knowable things, Which is an illusory evolute\(^3\) of pure consciousness, which is eternal, and which is the Bestower\(^4\).

Now\(^5\) we will examine the different functions of words, for the sake of the faultless establishment of the knowledge of the meaning of the Veda. There are three uses of words that are well established in the world: the common (prasiddha) one, the secondary (laksana\(^6\)), and that based on similar qualities (guna). What is meant by the word "common" is the primary (mukhya) use. Whenever there is a word which is possessed of a known denotative capacity\(^6\) revealed in the exchanges of those who are experienced\(^7\) in the manner of expressing its meaning, then its use with respect to its own object through that very cause (prayojaka)
is its primary use. For example, the use of the word "cow", which has a known denotative capacity concerning a shape which is possessed of things such as dewlap, only when it is used in respect to that object, as in such general usages as "Bring the cow." On the other hand, the secondary usage is that usage with respect to a different sense on the basis of a connection with the primary sense, when the understanding of the primary sense is contradicted by other valid means of knowledge.  For example, in the statement "The hamlet is situated on the Ganges", the use of the word "Ganges" intends the banks of the Ganges through its connection with the Ganges river, which is the primary sense of the word. And the usage based on similar qualities is that usage which occurs when the accepted primary sense is contradicted by other means of valid knowledge, and which indicates a sense different from the primary sense on account of a connection with qualities found in the primary sense. For example, in the phrase, "Devadatta is a lion", the use of the word "lion" is due to the association with the qualities of a lion such as fierceness and courage. Even if the basic form 'usages of a particular word to mean an object different from its primary sense' is the same for both the secondary usage and the usage based on similar qualities, still there is a difference between
them because their specific definitions are different. Thus the three usages of words have been explained.

Of these three, mukhyavrtti and gunavrtti have only one form. On the other hand, laksanā is threefold, namely, non-inclusive secondary usage (jahallaksanā), inclusive secondary usage (ajahallaksanā), and partially non-inclusive and partially inclusive secondary usage (jahadayahallaksanā). In respect to this, the one called jahallaksanā is the usage of a word in a different sense by completely abandoning its primary sense (mukhyārtha); just as the word "Ganges" (in the sentence, "The hamlet is situated on the Ganges") is used to mean only the banks of the river by abandoning its primary sense entirely. Ajahallaksanā, on the other hand, is the use of a word to mean a different sense while not abandoning its primary sense, and retaining its entire primary sense; just as when there is the secondary indication of a horse in the phrase, "The red stands there", the word "red" is used to mean the individual object--horse, while retaining its original sense of "redness". And jahadayahallaksanā is the use of a word, while retaining its primary sense and abandoning one portion of it, to mean the other portion of its primary sense, just as in the statement, "This is that Devadatta", the two words "this" and "that", which express different
times and places, are used to mean an individual called Devadatta by abandoning that portion consisting of those times and places. These are the three types of laksanā that are well known in the world.

If the question, "Which among these usages, namely, mukhyavṛttī, gunavṛttī, and laksanavṛttī, is the one that applies to the Supreme Self within us all?", should arise, we reply to it that, if one excludes mukhyavṛttī, there is no prohibition for using gunavṛttī or laksanavṛttī in reference to it. Mukhyavṛttī is indeed prohibited in respect to the pratyagātman (the Supreme Self within us all) on account of the fact that in the case of the pratyagātman mundane things such as relation (sastī), quality (guna), activity (kriyā), universal (jāti), or convention (rūdhī), which are the basis for mukhyavṛttī, do not exist. Indeed, there is no possibility of relation and the rest existing in the pratyagātman, of which all qualifications have been prohibited, according to the śruti passage, "Not this, not this", and which is beyond the range of speech and mind, whereby mukhyavṛttī would be applicable. Therefore gunavṛttī and laksanā are the usages applicable to the pratyagātman.

Due to the fact that there is a connection with qualities, as demonstrated in the following statement:
Because it is inward, because it is exceedingly subtle, because it is similar in form to the Ātman, the usage of words such as "I", based on similar qualities, is accepted with respect to the pratyagātman.

Also, in reference to lakṣāṇa, jahallakṣāṇa and ajahallakṣāṇa are not accepted [as applicable to the pratyagātman], but jahadajahallakṣāṇa is, because there is the possibility of using the words "that" (tat) and "thou" (tvam), which, in terms of primary signification, [respectively mean] something associated with non-immediacy (pāraksya) and something associated with possessing duality (sadvitīya), to mean one portion [of that primary sense] by abandoning another portion of it, just like the words found in statements such as "That is this." Therefore, the pratyagātman is known through jahadajahallakṣāṇa, not through ajahallakṣāṇa which consists of not abandoning the original meaning as in the case of words like "Gāyatrī", "Vaisvānara", etc., nor through jahallakṣāṇa which involves abandoning the original meaning, as is the case in sentences such as "The sacrificer is the clump of darbhagrass", "The sacrificer is the unsegmented dish."
it has been established.

If the word "Brahman", in its primary sense, means ignorance together with the illusory reflection of consciousness, and likewise the word "I", in its primary sense, means the I-faculty (ahamkāra) [together with the illusory reflection of consciousness], then, given this position, the jahallakṣanā [of those words] is also [suitable in the mahāvākya, "I am Brahman"
27] so that they mean the Supreme Self (ātmavāstu). In the same way jahallakṣanā is used in phrases such as: "The boat roars"; "The metal burns"; "The snake is a rope"; and there is no fault in this whatsoever.28

Having accepted these three types of [secondary] usage, those people who are well-versed in the three Vedas have made the distinction [between the different types] of laksanā through their use of the technical terms: 'abandoning the original sense [of the components]' (jahatsvārtha); 'retaining the original sense [of the components]' (ājahatsvārtha); and 'abandoning part and retaining part of the original sense [of the components]' (jahadajahatsvārtha)29 in reference to the sūtra: "[Whenever] an operation concerning a finished word [is prescribed, the word] samarthah: 'semantically connected' [is to be supplied]." 30

Nor should one think thus—that even if laksanā makes the
ātman known, there is the unwarranted conclusion that the ātman is an object\textsuperscript{31}--because scripture functions to repudiate those qualities which do not belong to [the pratyag-ātman], but which are superimposed on it by ignorance. For scripture only removes a quality which does not belong to the Self but which is superimposed on it out of ignorance, it does nothing more,\textsuperscript{32} it does not make that [pratyagātman] an object; thus there is indeed no contradiction concerning statements such as, "That from whence words turn back." \textsuperscript{33} Also, the qualification of 'being that thing which is taught in the Upaniṣads,'\textsuperscript{34} is indeed appropriate even if [the ātman] lacks objectivity, because scripture repudiates that ignorance which refers to the pratyagātman without making it into an object. Therefore, by discarding mukhyavṛtti and [employing] either laksanā or gunavrṛtti as it suits one, there will be no contradiction concerning the pratyagātman which is being instructed--thus a person striving after release should [examine statements like "tattvamasi"] by using positive and negative concomitances that resort to laksanā and gunavrṛtti.\textsuperscript{35}

I praise\textsuperscript{36} that consciousness which is great, which is eternally unchanging, and by whose power [all] internal and external things shine forth.
Sarvajñātman, who has been purified through contact with the falling of the pollen-dust from the full-blown lotus feet of the glorious Devesvara, who is expert in the ways of the Veda in its entirety,

has explained the different usages of words, in this way, for the sake of the establishment of clarity of knowledge in the minds of those who are holy men. For the knowledge of words is the prime cause of final release and the joys of heaven for a person in the world.

Thus the Examination of the Uses of Words [is Concluded.]
II. [Explanation of the Great Sentences]

I praise that Bowman [Viṣṇu] who is pure, whose essential nature is knowledge, due to the ignorance of whom this whole world appears, and due to the knowledge of whom it vanishes.

Now we shall examine the meaning of the great sentences found in the Upaniṣads. For the person desirous of final release, final release (mokṣa) comes about only from the knowledge of the great sentences such as, "I am Brāhmaṇ." And the knowledge of the meaning of the great sentences comes about through a complete knowledge of the two words "I" and "Brahman." And the meanings of those two words are two-fold, the expressed (vācyā) and the implied (lakṣya). Of these, the expressed sense is the associated entity and the implied sense is the pure entity. That very inward consciousness associated with the effects consisting of the vital breath and the body, and which exists [in all beings] up to the gods, is the expressed
sense of the word "I". That non-dual, blissful consciousness associated with that ignorance which is the cause of the vital breath and the body, is the expressed sense of the word "Brahman". This is the idea—that inward form which is possessed of duality is the expressed sense of the word "I"; that blissful consciousness accompanied by non-immediacy is the expressed sense of the word "Brahman"; now there is the occurrence of a contradiction in these two expressed senses of the words "Brahman" and "I" [involving the fact that] the entity associated with the cause and that associated with the effect share the same grammatical cases and are related to each other as qualifier and thing qualified. Thus one must abandon the adventitious limitation in both instances [and in this way] two pure entities are made known through secondary implication.

Concerning this, the word "I" secondarily signifies that portion of its meaning which is the inward consciousness by abandoning that portion [of its meaning which refers to] that thing possessed of duality in the form of the effect consisting of vital breath and body. And the word "Brahman" secondarily indicates that portion which is the non-dual, blissful, consciousness by abandoning that portion [of its meaning which refers to] that non-immediate thing in the form of ignorance which is the cause of vital
breath and body:

Thus, for the qualified person who a) knows the inward consciousness through the secondary usage of the word "I", and the non-dual, blissful, consciousness through the secondary usage of the word "Brahman"; b) who has destroyed his sins through [the performance of] sacrifices; c) who has attained the ultimate fruit of the whole of the ritual portion of the Veda; d) who has renounced all ritual activity; e) who has approached a teacher who [himself] has 1) directly experienced Brahman, 2) become a person who though living has gained final release, 3) has destroyed the cause of all sorrows by the fire of correct knowledge, 4) who has perfected all the characteristics [of such a person who is freed while living], 5) who is, as it were, a teacher granted the rank [out of the student's own ignorance], just as in the case of things imagined [to be real] in dreams, 6) who is imagined to be surrounded by a thousand pupils of the same character as the student [himself]; f) who has errors, doubts, the knowledge of what is not the purport, confused ideas and impossibility, destroyed through repeated hearing, thinking, and meditating which are all obtained through the grace of the teacher; g) who has been granted the grace of Isvara---[for such a quali-
fied person the knowledge of the unity of the meanings of the two words "I" and "Brahman" as in such statements as "I and nothing other am Brahman" [terminates] in final realization, having arisen from the mahāvākyā "I am Brahman." [All this is] according to the maxim "The Veda produces correct knowledge in the qualified person." 51

Therefore, 52 when there is the cessation of ignorance and its effects due to the arisal of knowledge, one persists for some time because that which has been sublated 53 still continues and because there is nothing contradictory in one simultaneously experiencing the highest Brahman and liberation while living as a jīvanmukta; [for such a person,] on account of the fact that he has exhausted, through their enjoyment, the merit and demerit that might cause the arisal of a body, and because his accumulated karma is completely consumed by the fire of correct knowledge, and because he does not produce future merit and demerit, or if producing them he is not sullied by them due to his knowledge, when his existing body falls away--since in the absence of its cause no product arises 54--no further body is produced. 55 And even if, for that reason, you say that when there is an absence of ignorance [in that state of being a jīvanmukta], there exists there an absence of those things constructed out of ignorance such
as omnipresence, omniscience, being the lord of all things, being the Ātman of all things, having an irresistible will, etc., just as [there would be the absence] of the whole manifest cosmos including the teacher and the ether, even so there does indeed occur an absolute release for that wise person, [which is not a negative state but] which possesses those characteristics which are found in the essence of that inward Brahman that is eternal, pure, sentient, freed, true, supremely blissful, non-dual, consciousness, which is left over after the universe, along with its root case, has been consumed by the fire of the knowledge of the meaning of the scriptural statements which arise from the knowledge of the meanings of the individual words [in those statements]. [The meaning of those statements] is made possible through the maxim of retaining that portion [of the word meanings which should be retained and giving up that portion [of the word meanings] which should be given up by means of the process of secondary signification which arises when there is a contradiction in terms of the grammatical apposition and the accompanying relation between qualifier and thing qualified [in the statements]. [The possibility of employing such a maxim exists] on account of the admission that there can be a complete understanding of the scope of those subsidiary sentences.
which are ancillary to the mahāvākyas already mentioned, and which are in the form of positive statements about Brahman, by collecting together all those words which relate to brahman without qualities (nirguna brahman) and which are not repeated in the Upaniṣads of all the Vedic recensions. All of this is according to śrutis passages such as: "He who possesses a teacher knows that so long will he remain, just until there is final release for him, and then he will attain perfection," and "The gods have no power to obstruct that person who has attained realization of Brahman."

There are some people who say, that because there is no cause for the comings and goings of the worldly cycle, and because there are śrutis passages which negate that cycle, and because the śrutis and smṛtis passages which deal with the state of liberation while living can be seen to refer to an imagined teacher who has been liberated while living, there exists only instant liberation upon achieving the realization of Brahman. Moreover, if you admit that the state of being liberated while living exists for that perfected person, then, due to the fact that he could not be a teacher for a pupil who to him would represent nothing more than the charred remains of an illusion consumed by the fire of knowledge, there would be no use
for the perfected person who was liberated while living; and the reason for the existence of the *cira-gruti* (CHU VI. xiv. 2) is the intention of conveying an absolute release in which there is a delay for the removal of that covering which is the sleep of ignorance—that is its more appropriate interpretation.

Ah! Praise be to the sage of the highest order, he is established in the Infinite, he prostrates himself before Vasudeva, he destroys attachments, He broods over that which is real, he renounces actions, he worships the Knower, he is virtuous.

This examination has been made by the sage called Sarvajñātman who has been purified by coming into contact with the pollen-dust from the lotus feet of Deveśvara, Thus, this explanation of the Upaniṣads, whose supreme concern is the unity of Brahman and the ātman, has been written for the sake of the final beatitude of those people who have renounced
the world; it is to be revered by those who hold the maintenance of their own duty supreme.

Thus [the Chapter] on the Meaning of the Mahāvākyas is Concluded.
III. [Explanation of the Meaning of the Words "Tat" and "Tvam"]

I praise that from which the universe beginning with Mahat has originated, just as a snake appears from a rope, That forever-blissful witness of the dancing of the inward intellect.

The expressed sense of the word "tat" is Brahman as associated with ignorance. From that are born in succession the five primordial elements: the ether, air, fire, water, and food. What is meant by the word "food" is earth. From that comes the ether; from the ether comes air; from air, fire; from fire, water; from water, food. The expressed sense of the word "food" is earth. Thus, these are the unquintupled primordial elements. From them arises the subtle body containing the seventeen. This subtle body containing the seventeen [can be broken down as follows:] speech, the feet, the hands, the anus, and the organ of generation are the five motor organs; hear-
ing, touch, seeing, taste, and smell, are the five cognitive organs; life-air, the downward going air, the diffused air, the upward going air, the circulating air, are the five vital airs; mind and intellect are the two functions of the internal organ, the one having the nature of doubt is the mind, the one having the nature of certainty is the intellect—thus although the internal organ is one, it can be designated in both ways depending on its activity, just as one and the same person can be called a cook when he is cooking and a cutter when he cuts grass. The five unquintupled primordial elements and their product, the subtle body containing the seventeen, are Hiranyakarbha, and this is the subtle body of the \textit{atman}.

The quintupled primordial elements are established in \textit{sruti} passages that refer to a triplication process. From them are produced the divine Cosmic Egg, the human sphere, and that world of things which serve as objects of human perception; \textit{the last two worlds} consist of beings that possess the type of gross body that is commonly known to us as equipped with things such as hands, head, and feet. These five quintupled primordial elements and their product, the Cosmic Egg, and all the various gross bodies belonging to \textit{different} creatures—all this is cal-
led Virāj. This is the gross body of the Ātman.

There is only one gross body called Virāj; there is only one subtle body called Hiranya-svabhāva; there is only one Jīva which is under the delusion that these two bodies belong to it, and which is the primary meaning of the word "tvam"; the primary sense of the word ["tat"], that very Brahman which has entered into those two bodies just like the reflection of the sun in the water or the space within a jar, is termed the Jīva by reason of its activity of sustaining the vital airs. And this Jīva is indeed that Supreme Self (paramātman) which is the witness of [the three states of] waking, dreaming and deep sleep, which is a qualitiless entity different from [the three states of] waking, dreaming and deep sleep, which is partless, which is free from association [with anything else], whose essence is eternal, pure, sentient, freed, true, supremely blissful, and non-dual, who exists even in the three times. That unmodified one, on account of its proximity to the internal organ, perceives waking, dreaming and deep sleep, which are states of the internal organ, and the actions, agents and results of actions [in those states].

The waking state, which is the perception of objects through the sense organs, is caused by the actions of the
gross, body; when the sense organs are withdrawn there is
the dreaming state which has for its content objects such
as elephants whose nature are mental impressions. This
state is caused by the actions of the subtle body and is
born from the mental traces of the waking state. When
there is a cessation of the actions of the gross and subtle
bodies, there is a cessation of the two states of waking and
dreaming which are fashioned out of them; for this reason
the internal organ resides in its causal form within that
Brahman which is the Wielder of Maya\(^{110}\) and which is the
expressed sense of the word "tat"\(^{111}\) just as a fig tree
exists in its seed\(^{112}\) and this is the state of deep sleep.
Thus the \(jiva\) perceives these states such as waking and
the rest in order and sometimes not in order\(^{113}\).

First, when he undertakes his meditation\(^{114}\) the as-
pirant for final release should understand things in the
above way, and after making his internal organ immobile\(^{115}\),
he should merge all the many types of objective realities\(^{116}\)
in succession, and the knower of those objective realities\(^{117}\)
should be made to remain [since it cannot be merged]. That
which has originated from the five quintupled primordial
elements, such as the Cosmic Egg etc., all that does not
exist apart from those five quintupled primordial elements,
just as a pot which is produced from clay does not exist
apart from the clay, due to the fact that the latter is an effect of the former. In the same way, the five quintupled primordial elements do not exist apart from the five quintupled primordial elements. At this point only Hiran-yagarbha, which is the subtle body [of the ātman], remains. Concerning this, the seventeenfold subtle body does not exist apart from the five unquintupled primordial elements, just as a pot which is produced from clay does not exist apart from the clay, due to the fact that the latter is an effect of the former. At this point, the five unquintupled primordial elements are what remain. Of these, earth, which is expressly indicated by the word "food", does not exist apart from water, water does not exist apart from fire, fire from wind, wind from the ether, the ether apart from that Brahman in the form of the Wielder of Māyā, which is the expressed sense of the word "tat"; the Wielder of Māyā, as well, does not exist apart from the pure Brahman. At this point, when there is an absence of the three states of waking, dreaming, and deep sleep because of the absence of the internal organ, then that pratyagātman whose essence is consciousness and which is free from the quality of being the Jīva, remains, [as well as,] that Brahman whose essence is eternal, pure, sentient, freed, true, supremely blissful, and non-dual--these two entities, which
are the [secondary] senses of the words "tat" and "tvam", remain. Concerning this, he who has achieved absolute conviction up to the point of [that exemplified in] the holding the burning axe\textsuperscript{121}--the conviction being in the form:

"Brahman alone is I", "I alone am Brahman"--he knows the meaning of the sentence, "Tattvamasi" ("That thou art")\textsuperscript{122} through a knowledge which is nothing short of direct experience,\textsuperscript{123} just as with the perception of the āmalaka fruit in the hand,\textsuperscript{124} such a one is indeed liberated as according to the śruti passage, "He who possesses a teacher knows that, so long will he remain...." \textsuperscript{125}

Thus the Examination of the Meanings of the Words "Tat" and "Tvam" has been Concluded.
IV. [Explanations of the Subsidiary Sentences]

I praise the teacher, whose nature is truth and bliss etc., who is the one witness of all the worlds, Who is to be known from the Upaniṣads, and who destroys [all] differences.

Now we will explain the meaning of the subsidiary sentences to that supremely qualified person, who is an ascetic, who is prompted by the injunction for hearing, thinking, sustained meditation etc., who is a brahmana, who has attained, in full, the four means such as the discrimination between eternal and non-eternal things etc., who approaches [a teacher] as according to the injunction; [we will teach only such a person] because others are only secondarily qualified through an absence of prohibition without any impelling from the injunction for hearing, and the rest.

Now, the meaning of the subsidiary statements is only the sense of the two words "tāt" and "tvam" as they
participate in the meaning of the mahāvākyā whose characteristic feature is [expressing] the unity of Brahman and the Ātman. Of them, subsidiary statements such as "Brahman is truth knowledge, the infinite,"\textsuperscript{134} "One knows that Brahman is bliss,"\textsuperscript{135} etc., clearly set down the meaning of the word "Brahman". That real entity which is contradictory to insentience, differentiation, and suffering, is made known by words such as "truth", "knowledge", "the infinite", as the meaning of the word "Brahman" in the statements "Brahman is truth, knowledge, the infinite." and "One knows that Brahman is bliss."\textsuperscript{136} For in this way, because Brahman is truth it is not false; because it is knowledge it is not insentient; because it is infinite it is not broken up by limits; the three differences\textsuperscript{137} and the three absences\textsuperscript{138} do not hinder it—this is what is meant. And in the same way it is declared that because it is bliss it is free from suffering.

The fivefold elaborating statements\textsuperscript{139} which have reasoning as their nature\textsuperscript{140} and which convey creation, continuance, dissolution, entrance, and control, are like those elaborating statements of praise and disgrace\textsuperscript{141} which are subsidiary to the sense of statements which are positive or negative injunctions;\textsuperscript{142} they exist for the sake of explaining the eternity of that very Brahman which is
being taught in this manner. Of these, "That from which, these creatures are born, that by which creatures live, that which those who die enter, that Brahman is what you must seek to know", \(143\) are statements of creation, continuance, and dissolution. "Having created it, it then entered into that [creation].", \(144\) is an entrance statement. "Out of fear of it, the wind blows; out of fear of it the sun shines", \(145\) is a statement of control. When the eternity etc., of Brahman is taught by these fivefold artha-āvāda-s, which convey an idea \(146\) of Brahman and which are supported by reasoning such as, 'The universe consists only of that [Brahman] because it is born from that [Brahman], because it is dissolved into it, because it is maintained on it, \(147\) because it has been entered by it, and because it is restricted by it.', then the meaning of the word "Brahman" is determined. The errors of knowledge concerning the meaning of the word "Brahman" are destroyed—thus the explanation of the meaning of those subsidiary statements which have as their aim the determination of the meaning of the word "Brahman".

Now we will also explain the meaning of those subsidiary statements which have as their aim the determination of the meaning of the word "tvam". The setting forth of the fivefold sheaths which define the ātman possessed
of adventitious limitations and which are termed the food sheath, the vital-air sheath, the mind sheath, the knowledge sheath, and the bliss sheath,¹⁴⁸ has for its aim the determination of the essence of that ātman which is free from adventitious limitations, on account of the fact that what is illustrated here is that [each] inner ātman is similar to the previous ātman just as an image made by pouring molten copper into a mould, is similar to the mould;¹⁴⁹ otherwise that teaching of the sheaths would be useless, while [interpreting it] in this way¹⁵⁰ does render it useful. Indeed, the teaching of the principal object is not easily done without the mention of the incidental object, just as the description of Arundhatī—for one cannot easily point out the faint star Arundhatī, which is the principal concern and which is next to [a bright star], without [first] saying that the bright star which is the lesser concern is Arundhatī.¹⁵¹ In the same way, one is not able to describe the principal ātman without having [first] dealt with the five sheaths. Thus there is the description of the sheaths themselves, which are possessed of adventitious limitations, on account of the possibility of drawing out the ātman from the five sheaths like an arrow from its sheath. And in this way, there is another ā śruti passage:¹⁵²
Being only the size of a thumb, that person which is the inward self abides within the hearts of men, That may be drawn out of one's own body with care, as an arrow is from its sheath.

Therefore, the purport of the teaching of the five sheaths in the Āraṇi passage is that pratyagātman which is different from those five sheaths, which is one in all bodies, and which is the meaning of the word "tvam" as it accords with the sense of the mahāvākyā.

In the same way, this one entity which is different from the states of waking, dreaming, and deep sleep, which is free from any relation with the states of waking, dreaming, and deep sleep, and which exists in the bodies of men, animals and gods, is the meaning of the word "tvam". This is because of the fact that the three states do not always exist while the Ātman, which experiences them, does always exist. Things which are found to lack constancy are unreal; for example, the snake, stick, line, crack in the ground, or the line made by cow urine on the ground [which are illusory perceptions of a rope]. The Ātman [which never wanders from the three states], is the true thing,
just like the 'this'-portion which refers to the rope. This is the purport of the teaching of the three states as encountered in śruti passages such as, "The three abodes are the three sleeps.", because if we take them in their own right they would lack human purpose, and because we perceive human purpose in the knowledge of the unity of Brahman and the ātman in statements like, "The knower of Brahman attains to the Supreme" and thus we employ the maxim—"That which has no result is subordinate in relation to that which does." 

Now, that which is characterized as the true, knowledge, the infinite, and bliss, and which is contrary to what is non-existent, false, insentient, limited, and sorrowful, that is Brahman and should be secondarily indicated by the word "tatt" in the mahāvākyā, "Tattvamasi", through the abandonment of that portion of the associated Brahman which is non-immediate, the associated Brahman being the expressed sense of the word "Brahman". The aforementioned pratyagātman is be secondarily indicated by the word "tvam" through jahadajahallaksana by means of denoting its own expressed sense: "tvam", as a thing which is associated and possessed of duality: [and] by means of abandoning that portion which is the 'possession of duality' contained in that associated [pratyagātman] which is the expres-
sed sense of the word "tvam", because otherwise there would be the unwarranted conclusion that there would be a contradiction in the understanding of the sense of the words of the mahāvākya, "Tattvamāsi ", for the dual would be the non-dual, and the perceivable would be the non-immediate, etc.

Thus, having clarified the meanings of the two words, the teacher causes that very thing which is unchanging to be understood by saying the words "Tattvamāsi." And through a mahāvākya such as "Tattvamāsi ", that person who is desirous of final release is taught with certainty that Brahman and ātman are one by [employing] the interchange: 'That aforementioned Brahman and nothing more is I '; 'That pratyagātman is I and nothing more '; 'And I and nothing more am the aforementioned pratyagātman '; ' [I and nothing more] am that aforementioned Supreme Brahman,' 161 And on account of that, he is immediately released from the cycle of transmigration, as according to śruti passages such as, "...so long will he remain...." 162

Thus Ends the Examination of the Meaning of the Subsidiary Statements.
V. The Examination of Bondage and Release

That inward consciousness whose plenitude is obscured by the differences of universe, of being Īśvara, and of being a Īva differences artificially constructed out of its own ignorance, Which exists in its own essential greatness, which is free from all delusion, stands supreme, the single source of everything in the world.

When ignorance has arisen, the fact is that the pure Brahman alone is a) the material and instrumental cause, b) the Lord, c) the Witness, with respect to a) the whole cosmic expanse of effects, b) the different Īva-s which are to be lorded over, c) the objective world, by means of ignorance which is accompanied by a reflection of consciousness; just as the pure pratyāgatman alone becomes associated with the qualities of being the impelled one, the agent, the enjoyer, and the knower, by means of its relation to [that collection of] effects and senses.
which has a reflection of consciousness in it. However, this is not so of that thing qualified by entities such as the collection of effects and senses. This has been said:

The atman is possessed of lordship, and is the cause, as well as being the Witness, because it is always connected with objects that are to be lorded over, to be effected, and to be witnessed.

Therefore, Brahman alone undergoes transmigration due to its own reflection-infused ignorance, and Brahman alone is liberated by its own knowledge. And transmigration is the fact that this Brahman is the locus of the differences such as being a jiva, being Isvara, and the universe; when these are destroyed, liberation occurs which is [Brahman's] remaining in its [true] essence, as according to the śruti passage: "Indeed the plenitude is immortal, that which is meagre dies." And Brahman in its inward form alone is the locus of knowledge and ignorance. 'Until this moment I knew not the atman, now I know it'--due to such an
experience of knowledge and ignorance which has the prat-yagātmā as locus, [we] cannot [say that] Brahman in its non-dual blissful nature is [also] the locus of knowledge and ignorance, [and further, this is also true] because we do not experience such things as,'That Brahman whose essence is non-dual and blissful is ignorant.' Nor can Iśvara, who is the reflection [of pure consciousness], be the locus of knowledge and ignorance, since we never experience cognitions such as, 'Iśvara is ignorant.', and because this would contradict the śrutī and smṛti passages dealing with the fact that Iśvara is omniscient, as well as what is common knowledge.  

Nor can the universe serve as the locus of knowledge and ignorance, because it is a well known fact that it is insentient. Nor can that reflection called the jīva be the locus of knowledge and ignorance; the fact that 'When there is the merging of all adventitious limitations at the time of deep sleep, the jīva-condition exists as potential and rests on ignorance.' is inferable through the inferential mark of its rising up again, and at the time of deep sleep there is no experience of the jīva-condition either directly or indirectly. And if the jīva-condition is not perceivable [i.e., that it must be inferred], then the jīva cannot be directly perceptible. If you say that this jīva [which is inferred]
is the locus of ignorance at that time, then ignorance as well would be only inferred — but we do not perceive this to be the case. Therefore it should be accepted that the pratyagbrahman alone is that in which ignorance resides, because at the time of deep sleep we experience ignorance as having its locus only in the inward consciousness. Nor should the thought that, 'Ignorance must have a distinction between its content and locus' — be urged, because that distinction is indeed absent in the state of deep sleep; this has been stated by Sureśvara.

Prior to the rise of the knower of correct knowledge and the rest, there is no relation with anything other than pure consciousness, For this reason, [there is at that time], pure consciousness alone, which is one, which possesses ignorance as a qualification, and which is known only through its self-experience.

In respect to this, pure consciousness is the locus [of ignorance] without indeed taking on the outer coat of the internal organ, because ignorance is beginningless; but
knowledge is a transformation,\textsuperscript{190} and for this reason, pure consciousness, having taken on the outer coat of the internal organ, is its locus, since it is contradictory that the Unchanging One\textsuperscript{191} should have a relation with a transformation without the intervention of something which can be subject to the transformation.\textsuperscript{192}

Hence, stating that the associated \textit{Atman} is what is to receive instruction in the words, 'That which receives instruction is the associated \textit{Atman}, not the Supreme Brahman, nor that which is insentient.,' does not help to prove the position that the \textit{jiva} is [the locus] of ignorance,\textsuperscript{193} because even if we adopt the position that Brahman is the locus of ignorance, the fact that Brahman is the locus of knowledge is possible through an association with the internal organ.\textsuperscript{194} Brahman also has a relation with beginningless ignorance only through a relation with ignorance;\textsuperscript{195} it is not by means of Brahman alone.\textsuperscript{196} Nor is it through a relation with another ignorance, because just as difference is independent of another difference,\textsuperscript{198} so also is ignorance independent of a relationship with another ignorance. Therefore ignorance has the \textit{pratyag\=atman} alone as its locus, and its being the locus of ignorance is due to that very ignorance alone.\textsuperscript{198} Therefore Brahman alone undergoes transmigration and Brahman alone is liberated, as
according to śruti passages such as: "Indeed in the begin-
ning this was Brahman, it knew only itself, saying 'I am
Brahman,' then it became all." 199

On the other hand, if that jīva-reflection alone,
which is qualified by what is not ātman, 200 is taken as en-
titled to knowledge and action, but not the inward Brahman
by means of taking on the outer coat of the internal organ,
then one should say that it the jīva as that very quali-
fied entity has a relation to heaven and liberation, on
account of the fact that the striver alone is the reaper. 201
Or else, if you admit the fact that one is the striver and
the other is the reaper, 202 then there would be the unwar-
ranted conclusion that there would occur the acceptance of
what has not been done and the destruction of that which
has been done. 203

And because that qualification which is destroyed
at times such as that of the Great Dissolution 204 cannot rise
up again, 205 it being contrary to common occurrence to have
something which has been [totally] destroyed rise up again, 206
one cannot say that that very qualification 207 which exis-
ted previously is the one that exists now, by basing it on
the recognition of the same names and forms [which existed
prior to the Great Dissolution]. 208 For, if you say that
it is the essence (svarūpa) which is the recognizer on ac-
count of the fact that because of the destruction of the qualification \[at these times\] the qualified thing cannot be the recognizer of the \[new\] qualification, then it turns out that the essence alone would be the ignorant one, due to the fact that the error of seeing duality has its locus in ignorance. When the essence alone through its being qualified by the adventitious limitation \[which is the internal organ\] is taken as the striver, it may also be taken as the reaper. For that reason, the above mentioned fault \[cannot be applied to us\]. In that way, one cannot raise the objection that, 'If the Ātman, through its being qualified by bodies such as that of a brāhmaṇa, is the one that is entitled to perform proper religious actions, then it is the Ātman in that very form \[i.e., as the qualified thing or Īva\] which must be the enjoyer', because the qualified entity is not the striver, only the essence is the striver. Therefore, Brahman alone is subject to transmigration due to its own ignorance, and is freed due to its own knowledge.

And if Brahman is the striver, the fact that there is no experience having the form, 'The non-dual, blissful Brahman is ignorant ', is not a fault, because it is Brahman in its inward form which is admitted to be ignorant, the striver, and so on--this is what has been
stated.  It has been said by Śaṅkara that, "By intending to do something favourable for Brahman, one should not abandon the true sense [of the scriptures] by construing something that is contrary to the meaning of the scriptures." Sureshvara has also said the following:

Why are you intolerant about this idea of agentship [being applied to Brahman]? Don't you see that the cycle of transmigration, which is imagined out of ignorance, exists only in me?

Therefore, Brahman alone is subject to transmigration and Brahman alone is released; Jiva-s do not have a relation with knowledge and ignorance, or with bondage and release. For, the position that ignorance concerning Brahman, which occupies the position of being the source of reflection, belongs either to those entities which are imagined out of ignorance and possess differences which are imagined out of ignorance, or to those things which are like reflections, has been destroyed.

There is [the statement by Sureshvara]:
It is by means of perception which tends outwards, and not by itself, that the knower which resides in the intellect assumes ignorance to exist in itself, just as one imagines blueness to exist in the sky.

Here it has been stated that ignorance belongs to that thing which resides in the intellect. [The passage] is meant to indicate that the \textit{jīva}, which is subject to the adventitious limitation of the internal organ, is the manifesting factor\textsuperscript{222} of the recognition\textsuperscript{223} of ignorance which is its own cause, and not that the \textit{jīva} is the locus of ignorance. For the \textit{jīva} manifests ignorance, which has its sole locus in the inward consciousness, as contained in itself, due to the fact that the many manifesting factors \textit{that exist in the world} have such a nature.\textsuperscript{224} For instance, the physical forms such as 'the dappled one', etc., manifest the universal 'cowness', which itself is all-pervasive, only as contained within themselves, as shown in the notions:

'The cow is dappled '; 'The cow is muti-coloured '; 'The cow is hornless '; etc.\textsuperscript{225} Likewise, different vocal durations such as the short, the long, and the prolonged,\textsuperscript{226} which manifest a meaningful sound through the manifestation of the
[specific] instrument of articulation^[used for the vocalization], manifest that meaningful sound only as contained in themselves, as in such notions as: 'The letter "a" is a long sound ', etc.. Similarly, the manifesting factors of the face, such as a jewel, a sword blade, or a mirror, manifest the face only as contained in themselves. Therefore, the nature of the many manifesting factors in the world is that they manifest the thing which is to be manifested as if it were contained in themselves. Therefore, even though the internal organ, or the Jīva which has taken it on as an adventitious limitation, is not the locus of ignorance, due to the fact that they [--the internal organ and the Jīva--] are the manifesting factors of that ignorance which [in reality] rests on the pratyagātman, it is but proper that there be an experience of ignorance as contained in them of the form: 'I do not know this.' And the fact that is that the internal organ, or the Jīva which has taken it on as an adventitious limitation, is the manifesting factor of ignorance, because when they [--the internal organ and the Jīva--] are absent at the time of deep sleep, even though there is an indeterminate knowledge of it at that time, there is no determinate knowledge of that ignorance which rests on the pratyagātman, and because when they are present, as in the waking state, there is a deter-
minate knowledge of it; and Suresvara has said that things such as the internal organ are the manifesting factors of ignorance.

Just as when there is no production of an outward [mental] modification there is no manifestation of "I", just so, without the internal organ, there is no clear manifestation of ignorance.

Even though Sankara has stated that the internal organ is the locus of ignorance in his commentary on the chapter concerned with the 'Knower of the Field' in the Bhagavadgita, even so, he has stated that in order to negate the notion that the pratyagatman's being the locus of ignorance is ultimately true, not in order to justify the notion that the internal organ is the locus of ignorance. For, given the suspicion that the notion of the pratyagatman's being the locus of ignorance is ultimately true, the statement, 'Ignorance belongs to the [internal] organ which serves as the manifesting factor' is indeed meant to assign that [ignorance] to that [internal organ].
with the intention 'May the pratyațtman not have any connection with ignorance.' The statement does not intend to say that the internal organ has a connection with ignorance because this would be the Sāńkhya doctrine and because [Sāńkara's] other commentorial passages contradict such a viewpoint. Thus in Sāńkara's doctrine, the pratyațtman alone is the locus of knowledge and ignorance. 

Vimuktatman has stated the following:

That self-luminous entity shines, and it is in reference to it that there exists the notion of the distinction between knowledge and ignorance. Thus, that to which ignorance belongs, that is the object of ignorance.

Therefore, that inward ignorance, which is accompanied by an illusory reflection of consciousness (sābhāsa), alone is the means for the paramatman's being the cause of the universe which consists of the field and the field-knower. In respect to this, when the illusory reflection of consciousness existing in ignorance predominates it is the cause of the field knower, and taking that recourse in
which ignorance predominates, it is the cause of the field. This has been stated.\textsuperscript{236}

Darkness [i.e., ignorance] is the predominance belonging to the fields, consciousness is the predominance belonging to the conscious selves, Supreme Brahman becomes their cause through meditations, previous mental impressions, and actions.

Of these, the field-knower is the illusory reflection of consciousness which has taken upon it the Citadel of Eight as an adventitious limitation. The five motor organs, the five cognitive organs, the four-fold internal organ,\textsuperscript{237} the five vital airs, the five elements, ignorance, desire, and action—these are the Citadel of Eight.\textsuperscript{238}

The five motor organs, the five others which are the cognitive organs, and the four-fold entity beginning with the mind, The five vital airs, [the elements] consisting
of ether etc., and desire, and action, and darkness, are the Citadel of Eight.²³⁹

By the word "ignorance" [is meant] mistaken knowledge, because the topic under discussion here is the effects of ignorance.²⁴⁰ Concerning the verse, one should understand the word "darkness" as a function of ignorance; this function of ignorance belongs to the Supreme Self. On the other hand, the function of knowledge has already been explained.²⁴¹

Thus, the manual called Pañcaprakriyā written by the revered supreme ascetic, mendicant, and teacher, Sarvajñātman, has been concluded.
Notes to the Translation

1 The word employed here is vṛtti, which can alternately be rendered into English by the words: "function", "power", "employment", etc. It is used in this way by Sarvajñātman, along with specific modifiers, namely, mukhya-, guna-, and lakṣanā-, to mean the level upon which a word operates in order to convey its intended sense. Saṅkara too, though rather infrequently, uses the word in the same manner: mukhyā vṛtti at BSBH I. ii. 1 p. 75 1. 11, IV. i. 5 p. 467 1. 6 (cf., svārthavṛtti in the same sentence); gunavṛtti at BSBH I. i. 6 p. 29 1. 9; the phrase "lakṣanikīm vṛttim" occurs at BSBH II. iv. 19 p. 321 1. 1. Anandaśīri freely uses the word pravṛtti in the same sense though this word does not appear in Sarvajñātman's text. Of course the most common use of the word vṛtti in Advaita Vedānta is in the sense of manovṛtti (mental modification) as in the phrase "Śrūtaṁ śīlāṁ śrāvakāṁ śrāvyāṁ śāstrasāṁ naḥca vṛttayaḥ prasiddhāḥ..."—SBH II. iv. 12 p. 316 11. 12-11.

2 This is the maṅgalācarana or salutary verse/verses taken as mandatory at the commencement of any Sanskrit treatise to insure successful and faultless completion. Its usual form seems to include a praise of an īstadevātā (attendant deity) in the first verse and a salutation to the author's preceptor in the second, as is exemplified in both commentaries to our text. Here, as in PR, Sarvajñātman mentions only the īstadevātā (the Veda here and Viṣṇu in PR) though in the eighth verse of the ten maṅga verses to ŚŚ he does give the name of his guru, Devesvara; otherwise this teacher is named only at the close of PR and ŚŚ IV. 62, as well as at the end of each of the first two chapters in the present work. The significance of Sarvajñātman's mentioning his guru only at the close of these two chapters but not at the end of the work as a whole is not clear. On his part, Saṅkara generally refrains from employing maṅgalācarana-s except in half a dozen specific instances: three times in US, namely, in introducing the metrical portion as well as at the beginning of US XVII and XVIII; at the be-
ginning of TURH; at the beginning of MAUBH; at the begin-
ing of BHORH (actually a quotation of a Purānic verse).
See pp. 152-3 of Paul Hacker's "Relations of Early Advai-
tins to Vaishnavism", Weiner Zeitschrift Für Die Kunde Süd-
und Ostasiens, 9 (1965), 147-154 on this point. There
Hacker draws our attention to a statement by Śaṅkara oc-
curing at KEUBH p. 97 l. 17-18, which runs: "Na hi svā-
rājye 'bhisikto brahmatvam gaminah kamcana namitum icchati."
("He who is resigned to Brahman, who is enthroned in self-
effulgence, does not need to make obesience to anything
whatsoever.").

The maṅgalācarana, as Ānandagiri reveals in his
commentary, has for its authority (pramāṇa) the practise
of learned men (sīstācāra) who precede their works with a
verse or verses of praise (e.g., Śuresvara). From the
conduct of such men and from MS I. 33 ("Asti hyanumānam")
which states that when a śruti passage is not expressly
evident (as in our case with the maṅgalācarana), one should
infer its existence (see Śabarabhāṣya on the āutra— an in-
ference is made for a śruti passage that would support such
conduct even though it cannot be pinpointed in the Veda).
These two proofs can be challenged by a pūrvapakṣin on the
grounds that a) people like Śaṅkara have, in many instan-
ces, successfully completed works without employing a maṅ-
galācarana, and even nāstika-s such as certain Buddhists
have completed their treatises without the aid of benedici-
tory verses; b) many works never reach fruition even though
they do begin with a maṅgalācarana (essentially demonstra-
ting the breakdown of the positive and negative concomit-
tance or anvayaavyatireka between maṅgalācarana and a suc-
cessful completion of a work). The reply of the siddhān-
tin to the first part of the objection would be that pre-
ceptors like Śaṅkara have mentally performed the maṅgalā-
carana before commencing their works even though it may
not be present in so many words, and that the works of
nāstika-s who do not perform maṅgalācarana-s are propor-
tionately fraught with errors. The reply to the second
portion of the objection would have to suppose that the
maṅgalācarana-s set forth by those people were not equal
to the tasks they set out to perform in their writings and
therefore could not remove all the obstacles that lay in
the way of their completion of the works. See Annambhaṭṭa's
Dīpikā on his own maṅgalācarana to his Tarkasaṃgraha, where
such a polemic takes place.

A maṅgalācarana should also indicate all the anu-
bhandha-s or preliminary considerations for the work in ques-
tion, namely: 1) the adhikārin or qualified person for whom
the treatise is written; 2) the visaya or thematic concern, i.e., the subject matter of the work; 3) the sambandha or mutual connection between what is to be made known and the means of making it known (bodhyabodhakabhāva or pratipādyapratipādikabhāva); 4) prayojana or aim of the work. See VS pp. 1-2 on the anubandha-s.

Since it is necessary that an author be well aware of the anubandha-s for his particular work before he begins it, and since Sarvajñātman has not explicitly made mention of them, Anandagiri assumes them to be latent in the maṅgalācarana. He states the following on p. 3 of our edition:

Cidvivartāyatē kāraṇatvena cidātmano nīrdeśāt
ajātasya tasya visāyatvam visayavisayabhāvasambandhaścoktaḥ. Vedhāsa iti ca nihṛtyasahetutva
nīrdeśāt tasya prayojanatvam tatkāmasādhiśārīṛtvam ca vāgamitam.

(On account of the fact that there is the mention of that ātman which is pure consciousness as the cause [of the illusory evolute] in the words, '...which is an illusory evolute of pure consciousness....', that unknown thing [i.e., which will be realized through study of the Vedānta] is the subject matter, and the mutual relation between what is to be made known and the means of making it known which exists between the cidātman and the Veda is also expressed there: Since the author indicates that it [the Veda] is the cause of final beatitude through the words, '...which is Brahma the Bestower.', it is admitted that such final beatitude is the aim of the work and he who desires it is the qualified person for whom the work is written.)

Vivarta—an evolute of cit to which only pragmatic and not ultimate reality is conceded. It stands in opposition to the notion of parināma or actual transformation that is held by the Sāṅkhya. See Paul Hacker’s Vivarta (Weisbaden: Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur Geistes und Sozialwissenschaften Klassen, 1953). The cid-ātman is both the kāraṇa (cause) and adhīsthāna (locus or support) of each and every vivarta.

On p. 2 of our edition, Anandagiri calls attention to the possible objection that since the Veda is such a vi-
varta, consisting of verses and strophes, it is an effect like the ether ākāśa) nad onw should wish to set it aside, as one does with all insentient effects om prder to attain a realization of Brahman and one should not praise it as Sarvajñātman does in the mahāgalācarana. The siddhāntin replies that it should indeed be praised because it is a supremely special effect of ignorance, on two counts: a) it is not a human product (i.e. it is apauruseya—this concept is taken over by the Advaitins from the Mīmāṃsā school and their position is summarized by Śaṅkara at BSBH I. iii. 29 and also see MS I. viii. 27); b) its subject matter is of such an eminent nature (viśistavīśaya).

4 Vedhas—here we follow Ṣanandakīrī who gives the following explanation of this term:

Tasyaiva karmāvabodhamutpādyānuṣṭhānadvārā abhyudayahetutvam brahmājñānamutpādyā ca brahmānīṃsthādvāreno nīḥśreyasapravojakatvamabhyudayam niḥśreyasam ca ubhayamuktavidhāvā vidhātītī vy utpāteriti vaiśistvyāntaramābra—vedhasa iti.

(Having given rise to the knowledge of karma, the Veda is the cause of prosperity through the performance [of those proper actions], and having given rise to the knowledge of Brahman, the Veda is the cause of final beatitude through a firm conviction in Brahman, thus according to the etymology: 'It bestows both kinds of things, namely, prosperity and final beatitude.', he gives another eminent qualification by stating that it is the Bestower.)

5 Athatas—Vidyāpurṇa in his Vyākhya on this, explains the word ātha (now) as 'immediately following upon the adhikārin's desire to know Brahman (brahmaṇijñāsa) and the word atas (hence) as referring to the cause (hetu) of the origination of all knowable things, and therefore that which is the cause of the origination of the knowledge that will be imparted by the text, namely, the Veda. This follows Śaṅkara at BSBH I. 1. 1, concerning the same two words. The word athatas (now) carries in its sense the response to both the questions "When?" and "Whence?" the work which ensues comes about.
Grhītaśaktika—Anandagiri glosses this with the word "jñānasamārthya". The idea here is that one comes to know what a word stands for through witnessing the exchanges of experienced people.

Vṛddha—here meaning the uttamavṛddha or the most experienced in the śabdārtha sambandha (the connection between a word and its sense), that is, the one making the statements such as "Bring the cow.", and the madhyamavṛddha or the one who is not so well experienced, that is, the one hearing (srotr) and acting on the first's statements. These two are observed by the least experienced one, that is, the child (bāla) or learner (vyutpattṛ) who perceives what is taking place between them and thus gains a knowledge of the relation between a specific word and its sense. Anandagiri supplies more detail of the actual process once the child has finished his observation of the exchange of these experienced people, when he states the following on pp. 5–6 of our edition:

Tamālakasya bālasya parisaragatasayaivam manīsā sam-unmīsati—vimata pravrattīḥ viśiṣṭāvijānānāṁvīrīkā, viśiṣṭapravratti vā, madhyapravratti vā iti. Tac-cedām vijānāmah kuto jātām—iti āgeśanāyām anvaya-vyatiśekābhyaḥ prakrtavacana janitāmetādyayadhā-rayati. Tadevaṃ viśiṣṭaviḥānavaisvatvā padasamudāyasyaiva dhārita kriyāpadasya pravrattaka-vīsyatvā, itarasya ca padakadambakasya kārakāro-caratvamityadhygate satyāvāpoddharāthyām padavi-seṣasya arthavisvānavaisvatvādhyavasaśyāt rośabda-syāpi tattatpravogabheda sgotvāvacchinnasāmādī-madarthāvāvabhiīcārām tadārthe tasyāvipratipattṛ pravrattīḥ mukhyavrattīya padesābhāgīnītyarthāh.

(Having beheld that exchange), an idea occurs to the child who is nearby: "This activity is preceded by a specific knowledge because it is a specific activity, just as my own activity." And [he asks himself]: "Whence does this knowledge arise?": then through positive and negative concomittance he comes to the realization that it is born from those words in question. Thus he has a general knowledge that the collection of words has as its object a specific knowledge, and then [he realizes that] the verb has 'acting' as its aim and the rest of the words fall within the category of declined words.
relating to the verb; when that fact is learnt one then apprehends, through the process of grouping together and grouping apart, that specific words refer to specific objects; similarly, the word "cow" never fails, in its various occurrences, [to refer to] that object which is possessed of things such as dewlap and which is distinguished [from other things by a connection with] the universal: "cow-ness". Thus, the invariable use of that word [i.e., "cow"] in respect to that object [i.e., cow] is entitled to the designation: "primary usage".)

Ānandagiri's elaboration can probably be aligned with Kumaṇḍila's explanation for the acquiring of sādbārthasambandha-jāmaṇa which occurs in the closing verses (i.e., verses 140-141) of the sambandhakseparatiḥāra of ŚV (p. 46). There the steps of the learning process are brought into line with the following three pramāṇa-s: a) pratyakṣa—where the vyutpattā perceives the interaction between the uttamavṛddha and the śrotr; b) anumāṇa—where having perceived that interaction, the vyutpattā infers that there must exist some knowledge of the connection between words and objects in the minds of the two people being observed; c) arthaśārthā—where following that, there is the postulation that a relation between the word used (e.g., "cow") and the object brought by the śrotr actually exists. The process of āvāpoddhāra (grouping together and grouping apart the occurrences of the same words as they appear in different sentences—see SS I. 135; 141; 367; NAIS III. 131) mentioned in the last half of Ānandagiri's elaboration, is a form of mutual anavyayvayatireka between the two words occurring in the statement, "gāmāṇaya", so that one learns the meaning of the word "cow" by grouping together the occurrences of the word "cow" and its corresponding object in sentences in which it is constant, but the verb varies (e.g., "Bring the cow", "Bind the cow", "Milk the cow") and by grouping apart the varying verbs form the word "cow" (e.g., for the verb "bring" we get the following sentences: "Bring the horse", "Bring the pot", "Bring the cloth")—here the verb is constant and the object varies. The method separately determines the meaning of each of the two portions of the sentence. The word āvāpoddévā sometimes occurs in an identical context in later texts such as the Kāvya text called Sāhityadharpaṇa (II. 44) and Annambhatta's TD on TS LIX (p. 50 of the Bombay edition).
Akrti—in the Nyāya sense of shap or collocation of parts (see NS II. ii. 55-62) rather than in the Mīmāṃsā sense of jāti (see MS I. iii. 30 and Śabara on this, as well as ŚV XIII. 18).

The purpose of this specification is in order to avoid the ativyāpti (over extension) of the definition of laksanā to the other two usages. TD on TS III p. 4 states the three faults of a definition:


(The exclusion of part of the things which are being defined is non-pervasion (avyāpti), just as in saying acow is a tawny animal [and thereby excluding those cows which are white, spotted, etc.]. The application of the definition to what is not being defined is over-extension (ati-ivyāpti), just as in saying a cow is an animal that has horns, [ which would also apply to animals such as goats, buffaloes, etc.]. The non-application [of the definition] to any of the things being defined is impossibility (asambhava) [of the definition] just as in saying that a cow is an animal with uncloven hooves. That thing which is free from these three faults is a [true] definition.)

Ānandagiri points out how the specification avoids ativyāpti on two counts when he states (p. 6 of our edition):

Yatkiśćidārthamāpleksyā vācyārthasyāpi bhavatvarthāntaravartvamāntare vṛttiśabdasya laksanātyukte mukhyā laksanā syāditi viśānti—mukhyārthaambhandhāditi. Ātha vārthāntare vṛttirityukte guṇavṛttau vyabhicāre tannivārpaṁarthamīdam viśesānam.

(If he had just said "Secondary usage is usage with respect to a different sense....", then since every word-sense is different compared to other word-senses, even a primary sense would be secondary; thus
he specifies that it is "...on the basis of a connection with the primary sense....". Or if he had said that [laksana is simply] usage with respect to a different sense, then this [definition] would fail because it would also apply to that usage which is based on similar qualities--this specification is made in order to avoid that.

The idea of the first point seems to be that though the primary sense of the word "cow" is that thing qualified by the universal: "cowness"; that sense is a different sense from the primary sense of the word "pot" which means that thing which is qualified by the universal: "potness". Thus, given the definition: 'Secondary usage is usage with respect to a different sense.'; the primary sense of the word "cow" which refers to that thing qualified by the universal: "cowness" (which is in itself a sense different from that thing which is qualified by the universal: "potness") would have to be taken as a secondary usage.
The specification 'on the basis of a connection with the primary sense' avoids this difficulty by stating that the different sense referred to must be connected with the primary sense of the word in question; that is to say, it is not enough to say that the senses concerned simply be different, as in the case of the words "cow" and "pot", in order for secondary signification to take place, but it is important that the different sense (artha) indicated by the secondary usage be firmly connected with the primary usage of the original word. The second ativāpti mentioned above concerning gunavṛtti is clear (see SS I. 172 for the difference between gunavṛtti and laksana-vṛtti).

10 This specification is meant to avoid the possible objection that the given definition of laksana is asambhavin (i.e., can never apply to anything at all). The sense of the objection is that if mukhyavṛtti is admitted, then one should stop at, or be content with, that and not resort to laksana. If mukhyavṛtti is present, then that in itself accounts for the function of the word and the question of laksana will never arise, so that your definition will be asambhavin. Sarvaśāṃsata's qualification, "...mukhyārthaparigrahe pramāṇatāravirodhe sati...." ("...when the understanding of the primary sense is contradicted by other pramāna-s....") is stated to account for such an objection.
11 Which is the river proper itself, i.e., the current.

12 There is a misprint in the edition here, aparārthya should be aparītyajya.

13 That is, the pratyaśātman. Śaṅkara consistently uses the term to refer to the Absolute Self in his writings and Sarvajñātman follows him on this point (see SS I. 25, 50, 242; II. 8, 12-15; IV. 16). Compare with this, the three different aspects of the term pratyaśaḥ as given by Sarvajñātman at SS I. 159:

Pratyagbhāvastāvadeko 'sti buddha
pratyagbhāavah kaścidanyah pratīcī,
Pratyagbhāvastātkaścātātra cāno
vyutpanno 'yam tatra cātmeti śabdāḥ.

(Indeed, one aspect of inwardness is in the intellect,
A certain other one is in the inward self,
And another aspect of inwardness which is made out of them exists in [the mixture],
this [last one] is the primary sense of the word "ātman".)

This final aspect of inwardness is a result of the mutual superimposition tāking place between the intellect and the Absolute Self (pratyaghaḥ) and exists in the associated (śabala) entity, namely, the jīva.

14 With this question, Sarvajñātman has in mind the possible objection that the three usages of words are all inapplicable with respect to the pratyaśātman since it is not an object (avisaya).

15 Sarvajñātman states the same thing at SS I. 239:

Sastijñātigunakrīdirahite sarvasva vijñātari
pratyakṣe parivarjītākhilajagaddvaitaprapaṇe drśau;
Samtyaktavyavahānake paramake viśnoḥ pade sāsvate
tvayajñātmanavijṛmbhitā na hi gīro mukhyapravrttīksamāḥ.
(Indeed, language which is arisen out of ignorance cannot cope, in its primary usage, with You who are free from things such as relation, universal, quality, activity, etc., who know all things, who are directly perceivable, who are completely devoid of this cosmos of duality which is the universe, who lack all concealments, who are the highest abode of Viṣṇu, and who are eternal.)

16 BU II. iii. 6.

17 Vāmanasagocarātita—as in TU II. 4 and 9: "Yato vācā nivartante aprāpya manasā sāha/ Ānandam brahmaṇa vidvān na nibhēti kadācana/" ("That from which words together with the mind, not being able to reach, turn back/ The one who knows that Brahman's bliss never fears at all/"); and KU VI. 12: "Naiva vācā na manasā prāptum sākyo na ca- kṣūrā/ Astīti bruvāto 'nyatra katham tadupalabhate/" ("It can neither be obtained by words, nor by the mind, nor by the eye/ How then can it be apprehended other than by saying, 'It exists.'?/").

18 The idea seems to be this, that even though it is correct to say that the two usages are ultimately inapplicable to the pratyagātman, since they still belong to the realm of language, even so they can be taken as provisionally applicable because the pratyagātman is not directly perceivable and it has to be somehow indicated in order to be taught, as well as in order to account for śrutī passages that contain words that stand for the Absolute Brahman. Since the primary usage of words is clearly inapplicable to the pratyagātman, due to the absence of the śabdapravṛttinimitta-s already mentioned (note 15 above), one must resort to the remaining types of word-usages.

19 "Pratyaktvādatisukṣmatvādātmadrṣtyanuśīlanāt/" -- NA Ś II. 55a; the second half runs: "Ato vṛttIrvihaṇyā hyahamvṛttypalaksyate/" ("For these reasons having discarded other modes, the I-mode figuratively indicates [the inward Self]/"). Sarva jñātman similarly admits the applicability of gunavṛtti to the Absolute at ŚŚ I. 170:
Pratyakṣvādiṅguṇānvyayena yadi vā gaṇyastu vṛtti- 
tayor brahmāhampādayon paretaraṇṇormukhye virodho 
yatah,
Mukhyāarthānupapattiḥetukatayā gaṇyasti vṛtti-yato 
loke mānavako vibhāvasurasau simhah pumānityapi.

(Or, since there is a contradiction concerning the 
primary senses of the two words, "Brahman" and "I". 
which are the Supreme [Self] and the other [self 
(i.e., the Jīva)], those two words are said to have 
a secondary usage based on similar qualities because 
of the fact that [the two entities] are linked by 
qualities such as inwardness, etc., just as in the 
everyday world secondary usage based on a similarity 
of qualities is found in statements like, "The young 
pupil is a fire.", "This person is a lion.", due to 
the impossibility of their primary senses.)

It is clear therefore that both of the authors ac-
cept the applicability of gūṇavṛtti with respect to the 
pratyagātman. However, due to the recognition of the prob-
lem that such an admission presupposes the existence of two 
entities that can be compared in terms of their qualities, 
as well as of the problem that Brahmā is ultimately qua-
litless (nirupādhika), later Advaitins shy away from it 
and explain away statements such as the above in earlier 
wrtings as an argumentative indulgence (praudhivāda), and 
not ture admissions (see for example, Madhusūdana Sarasvati's 
statement on p. 94 of his Vedāntakalpatīka: "Siddhānte ni 
prabhavādiguṇavayogena gaṇyāh svākārah sāmksepaśāfrakakārārām 
praudhivādamātram, iti sampradāyavah.").

Returning to the quotation from Sureśvara which ap-
ppears in our text, we may add that the comparison in terms 
of inwardness is made because the "I" (aṅkāra) is the most 
inward thing apart from the ātman, and the comparison in 
terms of subtlety is grounded in the fact that both are be-
yond the range of the two types of sense organs (i.e., the 
five sensory organs or buddhīndriya-s and the five motor or-
gans or karmendriya-s, which are listed for example at Manu-
smṛti II. 90). The last reason, namely, the similarity of 
form, is based on the notion that both the "I" (aṅkāra) 
and the ātman have the form of consciousness (cāltanaya); the 
ātman being purely and naturally so, and the "I" because it 
takes on the reflection of that consciousness which is es-
sential to the ātman. Jñānottama, commenting on NAIŚ II. 54 
gives an additional interpretation for the phrase, "...ātma-
drṣṭyānuṣṭhānāt...", glossing it as: "...ānāmbāṣāra-
ḥyātmadrṣṭyānuṣṭhānāt..." (...because it is similar in
form to that self which begins with the sheath of food....").
Such an interpretation alludes to the microcosmic/macro-
cosmic comparison between the higher and lower self as it
occurs at BU II. 2-5, where both the cosmic and individual
selves are described as comprised of five progressively sub-
tle sheaths or bodies, beginning with the gross material
body which is designated the body of food and ending with
the most subtle body which is called the body of bliss
(ānandamaya-kosa).

Thus, keeping in mind that notion of "I", namely
the ahaṅkaara, which can be connected with the pratyakṣa-
man through the similar qualities mentioned, and not taking
into account other mental modes, such as the intellect
(buddhi) or the mind (manas), one can employ guna-vrtti in
statements such as "I am Brahman " ("Aham brahma
smiti."--
BU I. iv. 10) in order to apprehend the unity of the in-
dividual self with the Absolute Self (jñātmaikatva) which
is the final truth of Advaita Vedānta.

Lastly, Ānanda-giri points out a possible objection
that might arise to Sarva-jñātman's use of the quotation
from Suresvara when he states: "Nanudāṛtavārtikasya laks-
āṇavṛttivisyayatvena caritārthatvānna gunavṛttau paryava-
sānamitā..." ("Due to the fact that the line extracted by
you could also be meaningful in terms of laksanāvṛtti, you
should not take it to refer to gunavṛtti..."). The ob-
jection is simply that the line from Suresvara has been
taken out of context in terms of what the second half of
the verse states. There the word "upalakṣyate" clearly
occurs, but gunavṛtti is not mentioned at all. Perhaps
this is the reason for Sarva-jñātman's quoting of only the
first half of the verse. In any event, the quotation does
comply with Sarva-jñātman's definition of gunavṛtti, and
his interpretation of the verse is borne out by Jñānottama's
commentary on it as well.

20 The reference here is to the mahāvākyas: "Tat-
tvamasi" ("That thou art."--CHU VI. viii. 7).

21 Compare this with NAIS III. 23-24 which is
quite similar.

22 That is, by abandoning the 'non-immediacy' and
the 'possessing duality' portions, and intending the por-
tion left over, namely, the eternally existent inward con-
sciousness.
23 Here the word "that" refers, in its primary sense, to a thing associated with a past time and place, and the word "this" refers, in its primary sense, to a thing associated with a present time and place, but by abandoning their references to these various times and places, the two words refer to the entity which persists through them. Ānandagīrī introduces two possible objections here. First of all, one might say that the entity which is qualified by previous times and places (i.e., the "that", say a person as a young child) simply becomes further qualified (viśistavāśistya) by the present times and places (i.e., the "this", say the same person as an adult) so that resorting to lakṣanā becomes unnecessary in order to explain the purport of the statement. The retort to such an objection would be that it is impossible to be possessed of two contradictory qualifications simultaneously (i.e., it is contradictory to be simultaneously a child and an adult); therefore, one must admit lakṣanā in this case in order to get to the purport of the statement. This leads to the second possible objection: Alright then, let one (e.g., the "that") be a qualified entity (viśista) and one (e.g., the "this") be a secondarily signified entity (laksita), and in that way, the two could exist at one and the same time and place. The answer that Ānandagīrī gives to this is that the objector completely misunderstands the purport of the sentence, and this purport is the underlying entity as an indivisible unity, and not the identity of that which is qualified and that which is secondarily signified (e.g., that the adult which one previously encountered as a child is in fact the same person as that child). However, this last response given by Ānandagīrī does not really seem to bring out the difference between regarding one of the components to be viśista and one to be laksita, and regarding them both to be laksita; instead with his response he appears to side step the issue.

24 As an illustration, Ānandagīrī supplies the following sentence: "Gāyatrī vā idam sarvam bhūtam." ("Indeed the Gāyatrī is all this that has arisen."--CHU III. xii. 1). Here, though the word "Gāyatrī" means a certain type of meter in its primary sense, it is taken to refer to Brahman in its causal form (see BS Bh I. 1. 2, which deals with Brahman as the origin of the world, this is called the kāraṇātman and is commonly identified with Īśvara). For a schema of the meditational symbolism of the Gāyatrī
meter, see BU V. xiv and Šaṅkara on it. As for the word "vaśvānara", Anandaśīri supplies the sentence: "Vaiśvānaramātmanam sampratyaḥdyesi" ("Now know that ātman, Vaiśvānara."—this is similar to CHU V. xi. 5). Šaṅkara explains the meditation upon Vaiśvānara in his commentary to BU V. ix. 1 (compare this with BHG XV. 14). In this latter sentence the primary reference of the word "vaśvānara" is to the digestive fire (jatharāgni), but it is taken as meaning Brahman. The word "etc." ("ādi") as used by Sarvaṅkātman intends things such as the vital breath (prāṇa) and ether (ākāśa). Such ajahallaksana can never account for the qualitiless (nirupādhika) side of Brahman.

25 The two sentences are, "Yajamānaḥ prastarah" from Taittiriya Sāṃhitā II. vi. 5, and "Yajamāna ekakapālaḥ" from Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa I. vi. 3. 4. In the former sentence, the word "sacrificer", whose primary sense is a specific type of man, is used to refer to the specific fist full of darbha-grass which is the place on which the sacrificial ladle rests, by abandoning its primary sense entirely. Similarly in the latter sentence, the word "sacrificer" refers to the sacrificial cake which is baked in the unsegmented dish.

26 This verse in the text, which becomes the whole of the paragraph that follows in the translation, is identical to SS I. 169, except for the fact that in our text it concludes with the words "...na khalu tadā kaścidacyasti dosah", while in SS I. 169 it ends with the words, "...bhāvatu jahallaksana ko virodhah." Whether this can be taken as an indication of the chronological sequence between PP and SS is completely open to debate. If SS was written prior to PP, why would an author of Sarvaṅkātman's eminence misquote a passage from his own magnum opus? On the other hand, and more likely, the variation can be attributed to the contingencies of oral transmission. In any event, both ST and AT on SS I. 169 start off their commentators with the statement that the verse is a prauchiyāda (an argumentative indulgence in a position not ultimately acceptable to the author—see note 19 above) on behalf of Sarvaṅkātman. It is also termed abhyuparamāvāda (cf., NS I. i. 31) as in AT on SS I. 169: "Atra yadiśab-daprayogādabhyupagamavādatāsya paksasya dyotitā vastutastu vedāntesu brahmādīśabānām pratyagbrahmaṇyeva prayogadādānāt...". What the verse in our text is ultimately trying to say may be paraphrased in the following manner:
If, given a certain context, we admit that jahalaksanā can lead to the purport (i.e., ekatva) of a mahāvākyā, this does no injury to our ultimate position that only jahadajahalaksanā can lead to it.

27 BU I. iv. 10.

28 ST on SS I. 160 supplies a helpful paraphrase of the verse:

Vyavahārātīte brahmanī vyutpattiyasambhavāna śa-balām brahmāhampadayoh śakyam kim tu sābhāsājīrvanam sābhāsāḥamkāraścetī pākeṣe rauti naureka daahati sar-po rajjurityatra kṛtsnāsvarthaparityākena tatsambandhiśanasmāsahāraśarādhisāhānalahakṣarāvadihāpi tadadhisthānavabhramalaksanā syādityavirodha ityarthā.

(On account of the fact that primary usage is impossible in respect to Brahman which transcends the ordinary world, it is not possible that [Brahman as] an associated entity [serve as the primary sense] of the two words, "Brahman" and "I"; moreover, [their primary senses must respectively be] ignorance together with an illusory reflection of consciousness and the I-faculty together with an illusory reflection of consciousness: with regard to this position there may be [through the complete abandonment of the primary sense] the secondary indication of Brahman which is their locus, just as by the abandoning of the primary sense entirely in statements such as "The boat roars "; "It is burning "; "The snake is the rope "; there is the secondary indication of people [on the boat], the fire, and the locus of the snake, which have a connection with the respective primary senses. There is no contradiction in this--this is the sense intended.)

Thus, in the mahāvākyā: "I am Brahman ", the primary sense of the two words, which is the associated (śabala) entity, is abandoned in each case, leaving pure consciousness which is the locus (adhisthāna) of each associated entity. In this way one comes to understand the true purport (tātparya)
of the mahāvākyā, which is the unity (ekatva) of the locus which underlies each of the entities indicated by the primary senses of the words "I" and "Brahman".

29 The sūtra being referred to is P II. 1. 1. However, though Patañjali introduces the notions of jahatsvārtha and ajahatsvārtha in his MBH at Bhāsya No. 75 on P II. 1 as two types of vṛtti, the word "vṛtti" as employed in MBH always means either: a) the transformation or integration of word components to form finished products of a structurally higher order, for example, √ram + suffix -ana = gamana, or compounding rājjas puruṣaḥ to form rājav- puruṣaḥ; or b) the finished form which results from that process (see S. D. Joshi's Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya--Samarthāṁnika P. 2. 1. 1., Poona: University of Poona, 1968, p. 9 note 19 and also pp. x-xi), and not śabdavṛtti as is intended in Sarvajñātman’s text. Coupled with this problem is the fact that neither Patañjali, nor the major commentators Kaiyata and Nagesa, who both postdate Sarvajñātman, mentions the third type of vṛtti called jahadajasvārtha, but only jahatsvārtha and ajahatsvārtha.

It is puzzling to see why Sarvajñātman should call our attention to this sūtra which really has little affinity with the discussion of laksanā that is underway except for a seemingly co-incidental parallel in the terminology used. Sarvajñātman does seem to be the first Advaitin to use this three-fold division of laksanā, perhaps the original inspiration for his notion of jahadajasvārtha lies in Patañjali's Bhāsya on P II. 1. 1 (compare Bhāsya No. 80 on this same sūtra which reads: "Jahadayasau svārtham nātyantaya jahāti. Yah parārthavirodhī svārthastam jahāti"—"Although it abandons its own sense, it does not do so completely. It abandons that part of its own sense which contradicts the other sense."). In any event, the problem of this sentence is: To whom is Sarvajñātman specifically referring when he uses the term "traividyāvṛddhaḥ"? Perhaps Sarvajñātman is seeking some sort of contrived basis for his three-fold division of laksanā in the writings of the Grammarians.

31 Karmatvaprasya—karma here means object both in the physical sense (visaya) and in the sense of the accusative in terms of grammatical relation (karmakāraka—see P I. iv. 49). Therefore, one should not think that if laksāṇa makes the ātman known, it means that the ātman is then necessarily an object, in both the above senses, of such statements and the knowledge they generate.

32 The phrase that occurs in the text is: "...eva kevalam...". Restrictive particles are of three kinds: a) avogyavāvṛtti, in which that which is excluded is a non-connection with a specific thing, e.g., "Arjuna indeed (eva) is the wielder of the bow" ("Pārtha dhanur-dhara eva"), where the non-connection with the quality of wielding the bow is denied of Arjuna; b) anyavogyavāvṛtti which involves the exclusion of a connection with some other thing, e.g., "Arjuna alone (eva) is the wielder of the bow", ("Pārtha eva dhanur-dharaḥ"), where Arjuna alone and no other person is meant; c) atyantāvyavāvṛtti, in which the particle negates the suspicion that the statement is a fiction, e.g., "Indeed (eva) the lotus is blue" ("Malamutpalambhavatya eva"), where the suspicion that the falsity of the lotus being blue is excluded. The first is an affirmative exclusion, the second a disjunctive exclusion, and the last is an absolute exclusion. In terms of the phrase from our text, as the commentary points out, the particle eva is of the first type and it points to the exclusion of the non-connection of the Veda with the removal of avidyā, meaning that the removal of avidyā certainly exists in the Veda; while the particle kevalam is of the second kind, meaning that this removal and nothing else, such as presentation of the ātman as an object of knowledge, is what is asserted of the Veda.

33 "Yato vaco nivartante"—TU II. iv. 1 and II. ix. 1.

34 This is an allusion to BU III. ix. 26: "... tam tvāupanisadad purusam prcohāmi..." ("...I ask you about that person who is taught in the Upāniṣads..."). The issue of the appropriateness of the qualification, "au-paniṣada", could be called into question in the following way: If the ātman is not an object, then how does it come about that there exists this śruti passage that states that it is taught in the Upāniṣads?
What is meant here is that the mumukṣu deals with such statements by observing that the essence secondarily signified by the words "tāt" and "tvam", namely pure consciousness (cāitanya), is what persists in all cases, and also by observing that what is primarily signified by the words "tāt" and "tvam", namely that entity associated with non-immediacy (parokṣatvāśabala) and that entity associated with possessing duality (sadvitiyaśabala) respectively, does not concomitantly persist with that pure consciousness. The former observation is one of positive concomitance (anyava) and the latter observation one of negative concomitance (vyatireka).

The Vyākhyā calls our attention to the fact that while the māngalācarana at the beginning of the chapter has as its object of praise the Veda, here the praise is being more clearly directed at Brahman in the form of abstract consciousness: "Prakaraṇārambhe abhiṣicḍhānāpṛādānyena prañāmya antē punarabhidheya-prādānāyena prañāmaṁ karoti." ("Having offered praise at the beginning of the work with that thing which is speaking about [Brahman] predominating, he praises again at the end of the work with that thing which is spoken about predominating."). It must be noted that the only chapters in the whole of the work to have closing benedictory verses are the first and the second, and that there is no such verse at the close of the work as a whole. This could point to the fact that these two chapters alone belong to SarvaジャNatman, but there does not seem to be any significant evidence in the last three chapters that might indicate their attribution to a separate author. SarvaジャNatman's two other known works both conclude with verses of praise and both mention Devasvara in those verses.

Anandagiri explains SarvaジャNatman's use of the third person here, instead of the expected first person: "Vyākhyāviti parokṣavacanamācaryasya ahaṁkārārāhityapra-kaṭīkaraṇārtham." ("The Teacher's use of the third person with the words, 'he has explained' is in order to convey his freedom from egotism.").

Rajas—the comparison (upamiti) between Devasvara's feed and two lotuses allows for a play on the word rajas to mean both pollen from flowers and dust from the feet.
39 Śreyas and preyas respectively—the significance of mentioning preyas here is that even in attaining or desiring heaven, one must know the meanings of the words correctly in terms of their various usages, so that sacrifices may be performed properly and thus be efficacious. What we might also take note of here is the fact that, for the Advaitins, verbal testimony (comprised of scripture and the statements of trustworthy persons such as one's teacher) alone allows proper access to the realization of Brahman (e.g., Saṅkara at BSBH I. 1. 2 p. 7: "Vākyārthavicārayaḥ.yavasānanirvṛttaḥ hi brahmāvagatiḥ, nānumāndi pramāṇānta-ranirvṛtta."—"The realization of Brahman is accomplished by the firm understanding [that results] from deliberation on the meaning of [Vedic] sentences, not by other valid means of knowledge such as inference, etc."). For the contrasting Buddhist standpoint on this we have Dharmakirti's statements at Nyāyabindu I. 2-3: "2. Dvividham sam-yagājānam. 3. Pratyaksamanumānam ca." ("2. Correct knowledge is two-fold. 3. Perception and inference.").

40 Athatas here means, as Ānandagiri points out, that after investigating the usages of words one should explain the great sentences ("Sabdavṛttivivekānāntaram ma-hāvākyavyākhyānam kartavyamityarthah.").

41 Ānandagiri illustrates the sense of Sarvajñātman's emphasis on the fact that mokṣa arises only from great sentences such as these, when he supplies a probable Mīmāṃsāka objection at this point, as the Advaitin retort to it:


(But the knowledge of the meaning of sentences such as "I am Brahman." is useless, because freedom is established through proper ritual action, and in this way the explanation of the great sentences does not do anything useful. Sarvajñātman says in reply to that the words: "I am Brahman."

etc... For mokṣa is not established by proper ri-
tual action, because that would lead to the unwarranted conclusion that it would be non-eternal since it would be produced by human effort; and because this is contradicted by such prohibitions as, "Not through proper ritual action."—Mahānārāyaṇa Upanisad X. 5).

42 The idea is that a clarification of the meaning of these two words (padarthaparisodhana), i.e., the discrimination between what is directly and indirectly expressed by them, will lead to a correct understanding of the mahāvākyā.

43 The words used here are sabala to mean the associated entity, and suddha to mean the pure entity. Sabala means something that is mixed with, or qualified by, something else, while suddha here means a thing which is pure in a sense opposite to what is conveyed by the word sabala and it is meant to point to that pure consciousness, which is dissociated from everything else.

44 Adhidaivaparyanta—Advaitins accept a three-fold division of the manifest Brahman: the Divine (adhibhūta), the Human (adhyātma), and the Elemental (adhibhūta). Suresvara, in his Pañcarānakavārtika, verses 12-28, gives the following itemization:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adhyātma</th>
<th>Adhibhūta</th>
<th>Adhidaiva</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The five sensory organs:</td>
<td>Their corresponding objects:</td>
<td>The corresponding divinity:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) auditory</td>
<td>a) sound</td>
<td>a) Dīś (Space)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) tactile</td>
<td>b) object of touch</td>
<td>b) Vāyu (Wind)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) visual</td>
<td>c) colour or form</td>
<td>c) Āditya (Sun)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) taste</td>
<td>d) flavour</td>
<td>d) Varuṇa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) olfactory</td>
<td>e) odour</td>
<td>e) the Ādviṣas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The five motor organs:</th>
<th>Their corresponding functions:</th>
<th>The corresponding divinity:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) tongue</td>
<td>a) speech</td>
<td>a) Agni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) hands</td>
<td>b) taking hold</td>
<td>b) Īndra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) feet</td>
<td>c) walking</td>
<td>c) Viṣṇu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) anus</td>
<td>d) excreting</td>
<td>d) Mṛtyu (Death)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) sexual organ</td>
<td>e) sexual joy</td>
<td>e) Frajjāpati</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The three-fold internal organ: The corresponding objects: The corresponding divinity:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a) mind</th>
<th>a) mental objects</th>
<th>a) Candra (Moon)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b) intellect</td>
<td>b) knowable objects</td>
<td>b) Brahmaśpati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) I-faculty</td>
<td>c) ego-objects</td>
<td>c) Rudra</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thought (citāta) Objects of thought Kṣetrajña

Ignorance Objective modes of ignorance (vikāra)

Ānandagīrī makes the sense of the phrase clear when he states the following in the commentary: "Adhyātmikādhī-bhautikopādhidvārakam paricchinnatvam parīhartum 'Hiranyagarbhatām nītā taṃśaṃ bruṇāt' iti nāyāmanusṛtya viśināsti--adhidaiva-parāntamiti." ("Having resorted to the maxim, 'Taking him up to the limit of Hiranyagarbha, one should say [the mahāvākyā] to him.' [—BUBHV I. iv. 1138], in order to put aside the restrictions caused by the human and elemental spheres, Sarvajñātman specifies [the qualification] 'up to the gods'.").

In terms of the above chart, the Hiranyagarbha of the BUBHV quotation would be equated with Īśvara who is the cumulative totality (samaṣṭi—see Vedāntasāra p. 3 ff.) of all pratyakṣaṇa-s, as opposed to the distributed instances (vyāstī-s) of consciousness internal to sentient entities. In this same sense Hiranyagarbha is subject to the cumulative totality of ignorance, so that the sense of the BUBHV passage quoted above by Ānandagīrī would be: "having brought the person who seeks release up to the stage of Hiranyagarbha, who contains all pratyakṣaṇa-s and all individual ignorance, that is having made the seeker aware of this macrocosmic perspective, the teacher should remove the ignorance that exists there by uttering the mahāvākyā'.

We may note an occurrence of the word adhīḍīva and its counterparts at SŚ III. 67a, where Sarvajñātman states the following: "Adhyātmamevaṃ adhīḍhīvam adhīḍhīvam sū-
Thus having the nature of a witness you see the Human, the Elemental, the Divine, Sūtra, and Virāj/""). This is interpreted by ST as follows: "Evaṁ ca satī samastīvyāstisarvāsārītrasyāksitaṁ sarvātmekatvam śiśdham...." ("When this is so there is the establishment of all selves in the form of all bodies both in cumulative totality and distributed instances...."); and ST glosses the terms in this way: "Tatrādhyyātmanam dehādi. Adhibhūtāmāśāsādi. Adhi-
daiṣvam karādhaisthātraśūryādi. Sesam spaṣṭam." ("Of these the Human is that which consists of body etc.; the Elemental is the ether etc.; the Divine consists of Śūrya and the rest who preside over the organs; the remainder is clear.").

In summation, it seems that Sarvajñātman's use of the phrase "up to the gods...." intends the inclusion of all pratyacakātya-s up to and including those of the gods, namely those on the Elemental level (adhibhūta) --probably meaning those found in plants and animals--on the human level (adhyatma), and those found in the gods (adhidaiva).

45 Ignorance, in its collective totality, is the causal body of Īśvara who is the first differentiation of Brahman. As at Vedāntasāra p. 3, 1. 9: "Īśvarasyeyam sa-
avastirakāḥlakāraṇatvātārāṇaṁśarītram...." ("This collective totality of ignorance belonging to Īśvara is the causal body of Īśvara, because it causes everything....").

46 The Vyākhyā states that Sarvajñātman is trying to connect the primary meanings of the two words given here, with the primary meanings of those same words given in the first chapter;

(But in the previous chapter the caitanya as qualified by sadvitīva and pāroksya was the primary sense of the two words contained in the mahāvākyā; here he says otherwise. Thus there seems to be a contradiction between what was said earlier and what is said later. Having this doubt in mind, he gives what is meant through the words, 'This is the idea etc...').
Sāmāṇādhikāraṇavyāśeṇaśeṣyaḥbhāva—sāmāṇādhi-
karanyā literally means 'having the same substratum' and
here it refers to the appositional relation that is set off
by the agreeing grammatical terminations of words in a sen-
tence, and which indicates the fact that the words con-
cerned refer to one and the same object. The logical con-
tradiction that results from placing the words "I" and "Brah-
man" in grammatical apposition, and thereby asserting their
identity, is obvious (see SS I. 166). The problem with rela-
tion between qualifier and qualified (viśeṇaśeṣyaḥbhāva)
which is implied by the failure of the grammatical relation
is given by Sarvajñātman at SS I. 167: "Aviruddhaśeṣeṇa-
dvaya-prabhavatve 'pi viśeṣayordvayoh/ Ghatate na yadaikatā
tadā nitarām tadviparītanupayoh/" ("Even when two qualified
entities which arise due to two non-contradictory qualifica-
tions cannot possibly be identical, then it is completely
impossible for two entities whose qualifications are of
an opposite nature."). At on this gives the example of a
person qualified by possessing a stick and wearing ear-
rings for the case of two different attributes connected
with one qualified entity, and the example of Devadatta as
qualified by different times and places (i.e., in the state-
ment "This is that Devadatta") as an instance of contradic-
tory qualifications.

"...suddhau padārthau ca lakṣyate."—what is
meant is that the pure portion of each of the two word mean-
ings is what each of the two words secondarily indicates.

These are the seven qualifications mentioned for
the adhikārin:

a) laksayitvāvatisthamāna—reaching the stage of
being able to apply secondary signification to
the mahāvākyā.

b) yajñādikṣapitakalmahā—this and the next qua-
lification are evidence of a practical acceptance
of the karmakānda.

c) sarvakarmakāndaphalabhūta—compare this with the
description of the great-souled person (mahātman)
who is described at SS I. 69 as karmakāndakṛta-
buddhisuddhita (who has purified the intellect by
the performance of the karmākānda). Ānandagiri
in his commentary to PP interprets the qualification in two ways: i) as a purification of the intellect in the form of a cleansing of the person ("Buddhiṣuddhिः puruṣasamkāra-rūpa...") which is close to the sense of SS I. 69; ii) attaining the state of Hiranyagarbha (see note 97 below), which he explains in the following way:

Darvihomanārabhyasahasrasamvatsatrarparyanta-tasya kramaṁ karmāṇo 'nusthāna-daśeṣajagad-ātmatvam hiranyagarbhabhāvam prāptasya prāpt-
tavyāntāramātratipadyamānasya gārgyavadavasa-thitasyetartha.

(The sense is this: he has reached the state of Hiranyagarbha, which means that one becomes the whole universe through the performance of ritual actions beginning with the oblation made with the ladle [which is the simplest] and ending with the thousand-year session [which is the most complex]—for such a person who has attained this state there is no perceiving of anything else which should be attained, just like the descendant of Garga.)

The reference to a Gārgya is probably an ironic allusion to Dvptabāḷāki, who in BU II. i. 1-14 divulges to Ajātāśatrū the various things that he is content with considering as the Absolute (Śaṅkara, in fact, calls the last thing that Dvptabāḷāki names, i.e., the purusa in the self, which is the limit of his metaphysical penetration, Hiranyagarbha—see BUBH II. i. 14)

d) sarvakarmasamnyāsītvā—this, and the two prior qualifications demonstrate a clear progression (krama) through karmakāṇḍa to jñānakāṇḍa.

e) guropasannā—the teacher is of paramount importance in the Vedanta tradition. See MU I. ii. 12; Śaṅkara in his commentary on this passage makes this statement: "Śāstra-jñāno 'pi śvātantranyena brahmajñānāvaseṣam na kuryāditi..." ("Even though one is versed in the scriptures, he should not pursue the knowledge of Brahman on his own...".). Also see note 50 below for the various qualifications of a teacher.
f) tatraprasādalabdhaśravanamanamanidhiyāsanā- 
  bhyasananirastāsambhāvanāviparītabhāvanātātparya-
  jñānasamārayavipārya--Ānandagiri glosses the ob-
  stacles which must be destroyed in the qualified
  person, as follows:

1) asambhāvanā (impossibility) is the lack
   (vaiḍhurya) of any internal percepts
   (vāsanā-ś) corresponding to the cognition:
   'I am Brahma and nothing else.'

ii) viparītabhāvanā (confused idea) is pos-
     sessing the imagined idea (vāsanā) that
     the body and like things are the Self.

iii) atātparyajñāna (knowledge of what is not
      the purport) is both ignorance of what is
      the purport (namely, the unity of Brahman
      and the Self) and knowledge of what is not
      the purport (namely, duality).

iv) samāgāya (doubt) is as to whether I am dif-
     ferent from Brahma or not different from it.

v) viparyāgāya (error) is the deep rooted notion
     (abhimāna) that the ātman is the body.

g) paramēśvarānugṛhitā--Ānandagiri cites MU III.
   11. 3: "Yameva śiśā vrūnāt tena labhyah." ("He is
   to be reached only by the one whom he chooses.").
   Śaṅkara's interpretations of this line at MUBH
   III. 11. 3 and KUBH I. 11. 23, where it recurs,
   take the pronouns quite differently and do not
   take Īśvara into account at all.

50 These are the six qualifications mentioned for
     the teacher:

1) sāksātkṛtabrahma--the opposite to this is paro-
     kṣajñāna (theoretical or academic knowledge), and
     as Ānandagiri points out, a person who has this
     latter kind of knowledge is not necessarily a guru
     because we see that perceiving final reality (tat-
     tvadarśitva = sāksātkṛtabrahmatva) exists apart
from paroksajñānatva. In other words, Ānandagiri is saying that paroksajñānatva is of a lesser extension than sāksātkṛtābhramatva.

2) Jīvanmukta—as at SS IV. 45: "Tasmā dhvānārabdhāṁ karmāṇāṁ bhogasiddhāṁ/ Sthitvā bhogam dhvāntagandhparsūtam bhuktvātvyan- tam yāti kaivalyamante/" ("Therefore the realised person goes on existing in the form of one who though living has gained final release. In order to fulfill the experiencing of those actions already set in motion; having remained in that state and having experienced it as resulting from a remaining trace of ignorance, he completely attains final release."). However, Sarvajñātman seems to accept the state of Jīvanmukta only pragmatically in SS IV. 38-40 in order to account for the ability of a realised teacher to teach, since if a teacher were completely liberated at the moment of realization (i.e., a sadyomukti) he could bear no relation whatsoever to bodily parts, such as the organs of speech, which are necessary for imparting instruction.

3) samyagjñānāgnidagdhasamastaduhkhanidāna—as at BHŪ IV. 37: "Yathailaṁsi namdhō 'gnirbhasasāt- kurate 'jrūna/ Jñānānīn ṣarvakarmāḥ bhasasātku- rute tathā/" ("O Arjuna, just as a blazing fire reduces fuel to ashes, just so does the fire of knowledge reduce all actions to ashes."). But in his commentary on this passage, as well as at BūBh IV. 1. 15, Śaṅkara is quick to state that this fire of knowledge can destroy only those actions that have not yet borne fruit (anārabdhakarma-s) and not prārabdhakarma-s.

4) sarvalakṣanasampanna— Ānandagiri gives the following qualities as examples: being proficient in the Veda (śrutiśayā), being intent on Brahman (brahmanisthatva), being tranquil (sāntatva)—these are probably all among the characteristics of a Jīvanmukti as well.

5) svājñānākalpitasavapnadrśyakalpitagurumiva—Because in reality there is no duality, one is granted this rank of teacher only due to the fact that the students still perceive duality. This, however,
should not hamper his effectiveness as a teacher, and this is the intention of the example of the dream-object, since even a dream-object, though it lacks reality, can instill fear in the dreamer (even to the point of waking him up) as can the rope snake. Also see ŚŚ I. 338.

6) kalpitasabrahmacārīsahasraparivestita—popularity, probably as a result of vanquishing opponents in philosophical debates.

51 "Adhikārīnāḥ pramitiṣya nako vedaḥ."—Source undetermined.

52 The Vākyā on p. 22 of our edition sums up the basic purport of this long sentence in these words: "... tasmājīfānādārānataktāryanivṛttau kīñcitkālārayavasthitasya vidhvasah sarīrāntarānutpatteḥ atyāntikam kaivalyam bhava-vyeveti." ("... when ignorance and its effects have been destroyed by knowledge, and after one has stayed in the world for a while, there is absolute freedom, because there is no possibility of another body for that pure person."). Due to the length of the sentence in the text, I have divided it into several sentences for the purpose of translation. The first half of the sentence in the Sanskrit text deals with the negative side of final release, namely, with the fact that no new body can arise for the Jīvanmukti (this runs up to "...sarīrāntarānutpatteḥ...", see Appendix p. 217 11. 1-2) and this is one sentence in my translation. The second half of the Sanskrit sentence emphasizes the positive side of this final release, in an effort to show that it is not completely negative, as might be supposed from the first half of the sentence; it is comprised of three sentences in my translation, ending on p. 95 1. 6 of the translation.

53 Bādhita—meaning the illusion of the external world. The idea seems to be this, that though for all intents and purposes the illusory world of duality has been sublated due to the arising of knowledge, one is still subject to the inertia of one's karmas that have already been set in motion (prārabdha), and thus though one is no longer affected by it, the illusion of the world continues until the prārabdhakarma-s have run their course.

54 As stated in the same sentence, merit and demerit (punyapāpa), which are simply actions whose nature
it is to bind ("...punyatāpe bandhanabhūte karmanī..."
MUBH III. 1. 3), cause the production of a body. These ac-
tions can be of three kinds, namely, those which have been set
in motion (prārabdha) and are bearing fruit for the
present body; those which have been accumulated (sāncita)
in previous existences but which have not yet fructified;
those future (āgāmin) actions which are yet to be per-
formed by the jīvanmukta while in his final body. The first
type cannot be the cause of further bodies for the jīvan-
mukta since he is exhausting their consequences by means
of his present body; the second type cannot be such a cause
because it is completely burnt up by his correct knowledge;
the remaining type cannot be such a cause because his cor-
correct knowledge has destroyed all ignorance which could be
the cause of such actions clinging to him (see the closing
portion of BSBH IV. 1. 19).

Up to this point we are given the negative side
of the jīvanmukta's state of release, that is, no actions
cling to him (other than the ones that are already set in
motion), and no further bodies are produced for him. He
is in a state of isolation from transmigratory existence.

Satyasamkalpa—Śaṅkara explains this term at
CHUBH III. xiv. 7:

Satyasamkalpāḥ satvā avitathāḥ saṃkalpāḥ yasya
so 'yaṁ satyasamkalpāḥ. Na vathā samsāriṇā Īva-
nakāntikalpāḥ saṃkalpa Īśvarasyetārthāḥ. Saṃ-
sarīno 'nṛtenā mithyāphalatvahetunā pratyūdhatvāt-
saṃkalpasya mithyāphalatvam...

(He who has irresistible will [lit., true will]
is one whose volitions are true and infallible.
Īśvara's will is not like the ordinary person's
will which is variable [i.e., sometimes it is ful-
filled and sometimes it is not]. The will of the
ordinary person, because it is under the reins of
untruth which serves as the cause of its bearing
false results, bears false results.)

That is, since all manifest things such as the
teacher, or the ether, have ignorance as the cause for their
manifestation.
58 This varies slightly with a similar list given by Sarvajñātman at SŚ I. 173: "Nityah śuddho buddhamsukta- svabhāvah satyah sūkṣmah sanvibhuṣcādviṭīyah/ Tnandādhīr- yah parah so 'hamasmi pratyaṣdāturnātra samātīrasti//" ("That supreme thing is eternal, pure, its essence is sen- tient and freed, it is true, subtle existent, omnipresent, non-dual, endless bliss/ I am that internal basic element, there can be no doubt about this//"). The additional pre- dicates given in this quotation are: subtle (sūkṣma), ex- istent (sat), omnipresent (vibhu)--making ten in all.

In SŚ I. 178-174 Sarvajñātman devotes a verse each to the following from among those predicates: satyā, jñāna (= buddha), ānanda, nitya, śuddha, mukta, asti (= sat).

The corresponding verse dealing with advidyā seems to ap- pear at SŚ I. 158, while sūkṣma and vibhu do not seem to be allotted separate verses by Sarvajñātman. In his notes to his translation of SŚ I. 173 T. Vetter (Sarvajñātman’s Sāṅkṣepaśārāraśaka—1. Kapit 1. Einführung, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen, Wein, 1972) puts forward the likely observa- tion that, through such a list of predicates, Sarvajñāt- man exhibits a combination, perhaps as an intermediate stage, of what was a preference among earlier Advaitins such as Sāṅkara for the phrase 'śuddhabuddhamukta' to refer to Brah- man, with what later became a preference of later Advaitins for the phrase 'saccidānanda' to refer to Brahman.

59 The reference here is to ignorance (avidyā).

60 Specifically those statements whose purport is the unity of the jīva and Brahman (brahma-jīvaikātva), in other words of the mahāvākyā-s, which are traditionally accep- ted to be four: "Tattvamāsi " ("That thou art."—CHU VI. viii. 7); "Aham brahmāsmi " ("I am Brahman."—BU I. Iv. 10); "Prajñānām brahma " ("Knowledge is Brahman."—AU V. 3); "Ayamātmanā brahma " ("This Ātman is Brahman."—MA 2). These are listed by Sāṅkara at the close of his minor and not de- finitely authentic work, Pañcarāṇa, but the term mahāvākyā itself does not occur in Sāṅkara or Suresvara with this spe- cific sense (though the term does crop up with a different sense at BSBH I. iii. 33). What should be noted here is that for Sāṅkara, Suresvara, and Sarvajñātman, those of the above sentences taken from the two oldest Upaniṣads, namely, "Aham brahmāsmi " and "Tattvamāsi " are of chief importance; they do not accord the same depth of concern and scrutiny to any other separate vedāntavākyā-s.
The term employed here is lakṣyālaksanabrāhva, which literally means the relation between secondary signification and the thing secondarily signified.

See note 47 above.

Parimāna—literally the word means 'size' or 'measure'; in our context the word refers to the fact that the subsidiary sentences (avāntaravākya-s, see following note) circumscribe the essential nature (svaṁa) of Brahman. Sarvajñātman uses the word parimāna and the word pa- rimiti in the same context at SS III. 311-313, 317-319, and 326. From SS III. 311 it seems that knowledge of the scope or extent of these subsidiary statements is an invaluable supplement to the understanding of the meanings of the words "tat" and "tvam", and hence the sense of the mahāvākya-s themselves:

Adyāpyavāntaravacah parimānabodhavai kalyamasti
mama' tena mahāvacca 'pi
vākyārthabhuddhimanubhūtiphalāvasānām notpādayat-
yahāraṁ śrutamapyaśakteḥ.

(Even now I lack an understanding of the scope of the subsidiary sentences; because of this even though I hear the great statements daily, they are unable to bring about that final result which ends up in the direct experience of the knowledge of the meaning of those statements.)

The word parimāna therefore seems to be drawing our attention to the fact that these avāntaravākya-s also cover a very valuable amount of ground when it comes to tracing out the extent of that Brahman who is to be realized through an understanding of the meanings of the mahāvākya-s. This parimāna is obtained through the process of upasamāra or gathering together described in note 56 below and it is comprised of the predicates nitya, suddha, buddha, mukta, etc., mentioned in note 58 above. It is interesting to note that the essential definition (svaṁa) of Brahman, namely, "satyam jñānamanantam" (TT II. 1. 1) would, for Sarvajñātman, probably fall within this parimāna of the avāntaravākya-s.
Avântaravâkya—Sarvajñâtman gives a brief definition of this at SS III. 312:

Vidhimukhena parasya nivedakap vacanajâtamaavântarasmātman,
Yadapi bhedaniśedhamukhena tatparim titi prati-
pādaya me 'dya bhoh.

(That group of statements which makes Brahman known in a positive manner is termed subsidiary, as well as that group which negates difference, Revered Sir, teach me today their extent.)

Thus avântaravâkya-s are essentially those statements in the Upaniṣads which deal with the highest Brahman (para) either in a positive (vidhi) or a negative (niśedha) manner and, one might add, which are not mahâvâkya-s. The basic difference between the two (see SS III. 319-320) is that while the purpose of the negative statements is only to negate what has arisen from ignorance (abodhavratisedha), the purpose of each word in the positive statements about Brahman is both to exclude what is imagined (parikalpita-
varjana) about Brahman and to grasp hold of its real nature (svakavapuṣṭamgraha).

65 Vidhimukhena—it is important to note here that though the definition of avântaravâkya-s includes both positive and negative statements about Brahman, Sarvajñâtman does not mention the latter here. The reason for this is that the niśedhavâkya-s are not meant solely to convey that thing which they intend to negate (niśedha = arâtmârûpa), more importantly they are indirect indicators (or indirect definitions = upalaksana-s) of that thing which is left over (avaśista = parabrahmān) from the process of negation. On the other hand, the vidhivâkya-s do not convey any additional form (abhyadhikarûpa) apart from the partless essence (âkhanda-svarûpa) which their words, once gathered together (upasamhâra), define (see SS III. 322-323 and AT on SS III. 322) Brahman. Thus it is the positive avântaravâkya-s which make the more critical contribution to the understanding of the purport of mahâvâkya-s such as "Tattvamasi."

66 The reference here is to the process of upasam-
hārā, which is also referred to by Sarvājñātman at Sū III. 313-321; of these, verses 314-15 explain both the necessity of the process and the process itself:

Apunaruktapadāni vinā yato na pariṣkalabadhī-
samudbhavah,
Apunaruktapadāni tatātastavamupasamhara tat-
tvabubhutsayā.

Kuru pariṣparavākyavivecanam tadanuśabdasamāha-
raṇam kuru,
Priyādrabprabhṛtīni ca yatnavānapacitāpacitāni
parityaja.

(Since there is no arisal of the knowledge of that fully complete entity [i.e., the highest Brahman] without the unrepeated words, therefore collect together those unrepeated words with a desire for [the knowledge] of reality.)

(Distinguish between Upaniṣadic statements concerned with the higher and lower forms of Brahman, then collect together the [unrepeated] words, then carefully discard [from the former type of statement] such phrases as 'having joy as its head' [-TU II. v. 1], which are quantifiable [lit., possess distinctions as to being greater or lesser].)

Such a process of upasamhāra is also discussed by Śaṅkara at BSBH III. iii. 10-13. There the concern is whether the qualities (guna, dharma) attributed to a given object of an esoteric meditational knowledge (vidyā) in one Upaniṣadic recension (sākhā) should be inserted or understood wherever that same object (e.g., prāṇa in relation to the prāṇa-vidyā) appears in any Upaniṣadic recension. Śaṅkara’s conclusion concerning this appears at the close of BSBH III. iii. 10: "Evamabhiyogavīsesācchākhāntare 'pyupāsyā gunah sākhāntare pāsyeyan. Tasmādekapradhānasambaddhā dharmā ekatāpyucyamānāḥ sarvatraivopasamhārtavyā iti." ("Thus, the qualities set down in one recension may be, out of special application, inserted in another recension. Therefore the qualities connected with the one chief object, although they are being stated in the one place [and not the other places] should be gathered together in all the places [that the chief object is mentioned].") Thus what we have here
is a gunopasamhāra or a gathering together of qualities.

In his bhāṣya to the next sūtra (11) Saṅkara goes on to say that the same process applies to those texts which aim at teaching the essential nature of Brahman (brahma-svārūpapratipādanapara), so that all the essential qualities, such as bliss and the rest, should be understood and brought together wherever one of them is mentioned. The next sūtra (12) and the bhāṣya thereon are clearly the basis for the second of the two verses quoted above from Sarvajñātman, since they too point out that quantifiable (upacitāpacita --see also BSBH III. ii. 2 where this term also occurs) qualities are to be discarded in reference to the higher (para or nirguṇa) Brahman. Finally, the last sūtra (13) reiterates the fact that those qualities which teach the essential nature of Brahman, such as bliss and the rest, are valid for all passages dealing with Brahman.

One might also consult Saṅkara's BSBH IV. ii. 18, where the following phrase occurs: "Ekavākyataya tūpasamhriyamānam phalam nityamuktabuddhasvabhavatātāsya..." ("The result which is being collected together as a single topic is that it [i.e., Brahman] is eternal, freed, awakened, pure in essence....").

What we should notice is that, when Saṅkara uses this notion of upasamhāra, though it is clearly the fore-runner of Sarvajñātman's same idea, it is not as sophisticated as Sarvajñātman's usage, since Saṅkara does not seem to be aware of the concept of avāntaravākya, nor does he seem aquainted with the idea that what should be gathered together are words that are unrepeatable (apunarukta) in the various recensions of the Upaniṣads.

Lastly, and by way of an aside, there seems to be a small problem with the final list of predicates that according to Sarvajñātman, results from this process of gathering together. If these predicates are supposedly a result of the process as applied to the positive statements (vidhvākyā-s), then how does Sarvajñātman obtain the predicate 'non-dual' (advaya or advitiya) which is one of the final ten (see note 58 above). Sarvajñātman does not seem to take notice of this.

67 "Aśārvadhayaḥ puruso veda tasya tāvadeva ciraṁ yāvanna vimokṣye atha sampatsye."—CHU VI. xiv. 2.

68 "Tasya ha na devaścañābhūtvā Itāte."—BU I. iv. 10.

69 "...iti kecit."—it is strange to find Sarvajñātman using such a pejorative phrase to name the adherents to
the view of sadyomukti, since he himself staunchly pro-
pounds that view at SŚ IV. 38:

Samyagijñānavibhāvasah sukaleśvājanatatsambhāvan
sadyo vastubalapraavartanamarudvāpārasamādāpyatah,
Nirlepeha hi dandahtī na manārapayasya rūpānta-
ram samsārasya dīnaśṭi tena vicuṣāḥ sadyo vimukt-
tirdhruvā.

(The fire of correct knowledge, which has been set ablaze by the action of the wind which is swirling with the force of Absolute Reality, immediately consumes the whole of ignorance and its products without remainder; no minute portion of worldly existence, no other form of it remains whatsoever; because so this the realized person is liberated immediately.)

What this perhaps signifies is that PP was written earlier than SŚ, so that Sarvajñātman had not yet developed his final conviction concerning this point. It would also seem more probable that Sarvajñātman should try his hand at a small manual such as PP prior to embarking on his magnum opus (though I am not aware that this should be the precedent for classical Indian philosophical authorship). On the other hand, this may be evidence to the fact that Sarvajñātman did not compose the text; however, due to the text’s wider conceptual affinity with SŚ I think that this is unlikely. Finally, this small statement concerning sad-
yomukti could even be an interpolation.

70 Utkṛṣṭaṁatgaṭa-ṭagati—lit., death, living, and returning. The cause for all of them, which is being described as absent, is ignorance.

71 Anandagiri gives the following as an example: "Na tasya prāṇāḥ utkṛṣṭaṁantō, atraiva samavaṁīyante." ("His breaths do not depart, they are indeed lead away together.

--this quotation is similar to BU IV. iv. 6 which reads: "Na tasya prāṇāḥ utkṛṣṭaṁantō, brahmaiva saṃbrahmapyeta.

The statement refers to the perfected person, and the idea seems to be that, as such a person, he is devoid of karma-s that would normally, on death, cause a person to proceed to the next world in preparation for rebirth, and therefore
the usual cycle of death, life, and rebirth ceases for him. His breaths do not depart in this usual way, instead they are lead away together, i.e., merged back into their cause which is Brahman (cf., Śaṅkara on BU IV. iv. 7: "Tasmādvidesu notkramantī prānāh yathāvasthitā eva svakārane puruṣe samavatīvantē."

72 Ānandagiri again supplies examples: "Tadyathā-hinirvlayani vaṃśike mrtau pratyastā sāyaṁ..." ("Therefore just as the slough of the snake lies on the anthill, dead, cast off...")--BU IV. iv. 7; "Sacaśurasacakṣurīva." ("Having eyes he is as if he were without them.")--source unknown; "Sthitaprajñāsya kā bhāṣā?" ("What is the definition of the man whose wisdom is stabilised?")--BHG II. 54: "Prājñātī yādā kāman..." ("When he abandons desires...")--BHG II. 55. The first two quotations refer to the fact that the perfected person is no longer affected by his body, even though it may linger on, due to various karma-s after his attainment.

73 See note 51 (5) above. We might also allude here to the story of Ekalavya in the "Sambhavaparvan" of the Mahābhārata (I. 123 in the Critical Edition, Bhandarkar Oriental Institute, Poona). He attained proficiency in archery to rival even Arjuna by erecting a clay statue of Drona, weapons master and teacher of the Pandavas, who would not instruct him on account of Ekalavya's family origins. By worshipping this image of Drona in the forest, Ekalavya was able to perfect his skill in archery to the point that, upon encountering his prowess, the real Drona has, our of fear for someone's surpassing Arjuna's skill, to ask for Ekalavya's right thumb as tribute for the instruction he had received from the image. Ekalavya, of course, consented and thus Arjuna's unrivalled excellence in archery was preserved. In this way, even a teacher who is only construed to be so may impart instruction to the pupil who exhibits proper reverence for him.

74 Sadyomukti--see note 69 above.

75 See note 69 above.

76 Jhānoddagdhaḥbhāsamātrarūpa--lit., possessing a form that is merely an illusion which has been burnt by knowledge. Ānandagiri makes the sense clearer when he says the following: "Kiṃca na viduṣāḥ śiṃgāṃ pratyupadeṣo yud-
yate, śīyasamghātasya dagdhopatavat jñānadagdhasyābhāsa-
mātrasyopakṣanīyatvena upadeśayogyatvāt..." ("Moreover,
the fact that this perfected person should instruct a pu-
pil is implausible, due to the fact that that aggregate
which comprises the pupil is not fit for instruction since
[to such a teacher] he, being merely an illusion that has
been consumed by knowledge, is useless, just like a cloth
that has been burnt [is useless]... "). The point of
the example of the burnt cloth is that though the charred re-
mains of a cloth might still have the shape of a cloth,
it can no longer be used as one. In the same way, for a
jīvanmukta, a pupil is merely the semblence of a pupil,
since the jīvanmukta realizes that there is no second, ex-
ternal thing which can be taught by him.

77 Ānandagiri explains that the use of the exclama-
tion here is on account of the fact that: "Because of
the greatness of the knowledge, the person who is qualified
for it is a rarity..." ("Vidyāmāhātyāt tadadhākārino daur-
labhyam..."). In connection with this, in the sentence
preceding the one to which we have just referred, Ānanda-
giri supplies a reading of BHG VII. 3: "Manusyānām saha-
sresu kāścideva." ("There is only a certain one in a thou-
sand people.").

78 Ekadandī—lit., bearing one staff. It is an
epithet signifying the highest order of sage (muni), and
in so doing, it is on par with such terms as parīvrājaka
and paramahamsa.

79 Bhūman—as at CHU VII. xxiii. 1: "Yo vai bhūmā
tatsukhan." ("That which is the Infinite is bliss."); and
CHU VII. xxiv. 1: "Yatra nānyat paśyati nānyacchṛṇoti nān-
yadvijānāti sa bhūma." ("That in which nothing else is seen,
nothing else is heard, nothing else is known, that is the
Infinite."). Bhūman is a synonym for Brahman.

80 In his commentary to BHG VII. 19, Śāṅkara equa-
tes Vāsudeva with the pratyagātman.

81 Attachment to objects of the senses, as Ānanda-
giri states: "Sābhādisu visayesu āsahābhāvo 'pi..." ("He
also lacks attachment to objects such as sound, etc., ... ").
82 Anandagiri explains this as follows: "Tattvam-padārthaparipūsodhanārthamanvayavyatirekarpāmālocanaśālacara..." ("He also employs thought processes, which take the shape of positive and negative concomitances, in order to clarify the meanings of the words 'tat' and 'tvaṃ'.") Thus he seems to allow for a play in the word "tattvamārthaṃ" (the real) in the phrase "...tapasyati tattvamārthaṃ." ("He broods over that which is real.") to mean "tattvamārthaṃ" ("the meanings of the words 'tat' and 'tvaṃ'").

83 The knower of the unity between the pratyagātman and Brahman.

84 See note 38 above.

85 Samnyāasin-s—the last of the dutiful stages of life (āśramadharmā-s), see Manusmṛti VI. 33 ff..

86 Nijadharma—this is the equivalent of svadharma which is the dutiful mode of life appropriate to each of the four castes and the four stages of life (varṇāśrama-dharma-s). Cf., BHG III. 35: "Śreyānvadharmo vīgūnā pa-radharmātsvanuṣṭhitat/ Svadharme nidhanam śrevah paradhar- mo bhayāvahah/" ("Better that one's own duty should be without merit than someone else's duty be performed/ Better that one should die doing one's own duty, another's duty is fraught with danger/"). By nijadharna here, Sar-vajñatman probably means samnyāsadharma since it is the sam- nyāsin for whom the work is written.

87 This term is integrated into Advaita Vedānta from the Sāṅkhya and stands for the first primordial evolve of Brahman. Sureśvara gives the Sāṅkhya position at Mānasollāsa II. 32: "Māyāyam brahmcaitaṁanyagratibimbānusāngataḥ/ Mahatkālampūṁsassyuh mahattattvādahāhākṛtiḥ/" ("Due to the adherence of that reflection of consciousness which is Brahman in māyā/ There is Mahat, Time, and Spirit; form that element which is Mahat arises the I-faculty/").

88 The implication is that the whole manifest universe is an illusion (abhisāsa) superimposed upon Brahman as its ground (adhikāsthāna), in the same way that one might superimpose the false notion of a snake upon a coil of rope perceived in a dim light.
Anandagiri gives two alternate readings concerning the specific phrase "...saddhãnasam..." in the verse: 
a) saddhã-samādhi, where saddhã is taken with the verb with the sense being, "That praising is fruitful which is done with an excessive degree of faith and devotion...." ("Bhakti-draddhahoratirekennā kriyamānā namaskriyā phalavatī..."), the thing intended being that Sarvajñātman is not praising just one, but is continually praising; b) sat-samādhi, this being taken as a single qualification of "...sākṣinam....", with the meaning, "...that witness which is both the Existent and blissful...." (here, the word sat would refute the notion that the sākṣin could be an effect--"Tatra sattvena kāraṇanirapeksatayā kāryatvam nirākṛtiva kāraṇatvam samar-thyate," i.e., "Concerning that [single qualification] he, having refuted the fact that it could be an effect, since it is the Existent and thus does not require a cause, he emphasizes the fact that it is a cause."). I have chosen to take it as a bahuvrhi with saddhã as its first member, meaning that which is possessed of perpetual blissfulness. There does not seem to be any ground for preferring one of these senses over the others.

Antardhînrttasākṣin--here the inward intellect (antardhi) refers to the antahkaraṇa (internal organ) as it is composed of buddhi (Intelect), ahaṅkāra (I-faculty) and manas (mind), and the witness (sākṣin) of the activity of these is the ātman. The same imagery is used by Sureshvara at NaS II. 58a: "Esa sarvadhivyām nṛttamaviluptaikadarsanah/" ("This [atman] is the one unimpaired entity that views the dance of every intellect/"); it is more fully developed at Pañcadasī X. 10 ff.

The editor suggests the reading "sat" in place of "tat" in accordance with the readings of Anandagiri's pratikās. However, in view of the specific concern of the chapter, which is the explanation of the words "tat" and "tvam", I have taken "tat" to be the more appropriate reading.

This account of the production of the five primordial elements is based on Tu II. 1. 1., where instead of sat, the ātman is named as the prime source; āgni appears for tejas, and prthivyā for anna. As Anandagiri points out, the equation of earth with food which which is made here by Sarvajñātman, is based on CHU VI. 11. 4 which runs:
"Tā āpa aiksanta—bhavyah syāma prajāyemahīti. Tā annam-asrjanta." ("Water wishes—'May I be many. Let me issue forth.' It created food."). All in all, the account given here blends together the version presented at ṬU II. 1., with that presented at CHU VI. II..

93 Apancaikṛta—this serves as a description of the five primordial elements because they are pure and unmixed in terms of each other. The gross (sthūla) elements are termed pāṇcikaikṛta (quintupled), and they are a result of a process (i.e., pāṇcikaraṇa) which is explained by Suresvara in his Pāṇcikaraṇavārttīka verses 8-10:

8. Prthivyādīni bhūtāni pratyekam vibhajedvidhā, 
   ēkaikam bhāgamādāya caturdā vibhajedpunāh.

   (The elements such as earth and the rest, are each one divided in two, 
   Taking, one by one, a half [from each element, 
   that half] is again divided four-fold.)

9. Ēkaikam bhāgamekasmin bhūte samveśayetkramāt, 
   Tataśca kāśābhūtasya bhāgah pāncā bhavanti hi.

   (Each of these parts combines with [the untouched 
   halves of those] elements [different from it], 
   And thus ether, [for example] has five parts.)

10. Vāyūbhāgaścātvāro vāyūdīśvevanādiṣet, 
    Pāṇcikaraṇametatsyādityahustattvavedināh.

   (Four of these parts are air and the rest, one 
   should teach the same concerning air and the 
   other [elements], 
   The knowers of reality declare that such is 
   the process of quintupling.)

In other words, ether consists of half pure ether, and a half made up of one-eighth of each of the other four elements. Each of the other gross elements is made up in the same manner.

94 Saptadaśakalīṇga—this is also termed the sūtrātman and Hiranyagarbha (see note 97 below), and is sometimes described under the imagery of the eight-fold citadel (purvyāstaka—see note 238 below).
The five vital airs are explained according to their functions at BSBH II. iv. 14:

Prāṇah prākvṛttirucchvāsādikarma. Apāno 'rvāg
vrūtiṁiśvāsādikarma. Vyānastayoh sandhau var-
tāmāno vyāvatkarmahetuh. Udāna Ěrdhvavrtti-
utkrāntyādihetuh. Samānah samam sarvesvahresu
yo 'nnarasānnayatiti evam pāncavṛttih prāṇah.

(Prāṇa is the function which is directed forwards involving actions such as exhaling. Apāna is the function directed backwards involving such actions as inhaling. Vyāna exists at the juncture of those two and it is the cause of actions involving strength. Udāna is the function directed upwards and it is the cause for things such as the departing of the breaths at death. Samāna conveys the essential nutrition of food throughout all the limbs.)

Ānandaśīri takes note of the possible objection that if the internal organ (antahkaraṇa) entails two functions, then it must be made up of two different substances since otherwise the idea of a subtle body comprised of seventeen things would break down—thus the internal organ cannot be one simple thing (advaya). His reply to this is that the idea of having two separate substances for these two functions is unnecessarily complicated when they can be accounted for as simply two separate functions of the one antahkaraṇa.

Hiracyagarbha is also known as sūtrātman (see BSBH V. v. 1: "Tadettadhīranyagarbhasya sūtrātmāno janma,
yadavyākrtasya jagato vyākaranam."). It is the highest form of Brahman as effect (kāryabrahman) and is called the first-born (prathanaṁja—see MUH I. II. 11). I present a schematic representation of the Advaita cosmology below as it is given by Śureśvara in his Pañcarāṇavārttika (the numbers appearing in parenthesis refer to specific verses in which occur the names beside which they stand):
turīya = śuddhabrahman

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Microcosm</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Letter</th>
<th>Macrocosm</th>
<th>Atman-body</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(vyāṣṭi)</td>
<td>(avasthiti)</td>
<td>(kāra)</td>
<td>(samaṣṭi)</td>
<td>(ātmaśārīra)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

prājñā (43)  | susupti (deep sleep) | "M" | Aksara (44) | causal (kāraṇa) |

taijasa (38) | dream (svapna) | "U" | Hiraṇyagarbha (38) | subtle (liṅga) |

viśva (30) | waking (jārārīta) | "A" | Virāj (11) | gross (sthūla) |

* Aksara is also called 'the Seed' (bīja) at verse 2, and "Cause of the Universe" (jārātkaṇaṇa) at verse 43; Hiraṇyagarbha is also called "the Thread" (sūtra) at verse 6 and liṅga at verse 36.

One must notice that movement downward on the chart represents the unfolding of the cosmos, and that upward movement on the chart represents the reverse of that process or the re-integration of existence through each level of the various ātmaśārīra-s. Such a process of re-integration is described at verses 49-50 of Pañcikaraṇavārttika:

Akāram purusam viśvamukāre pravilāpayet,  
Ūkāram taijasaṃ sūkṣmam makāre pravilāpayet.

(That person which is viśva and which is the letter "A", should be merged into the letter "U", That subtle thing which is taijasa and which is the letter "U" should be merged into the letter "M".)

Makāram kāraṇam prājñām cidātmani vilāpayet,  
Cidātmānam nityasuddhabuddhamuktasadadvayah.

(That causal thing which is prājñā and which is the letter "M" should be merged into that ātman which is pure consciousness,  
I am that ātman which is pure consciousness and which is eternal, pure, sentient, freed, existent, and non-dual.)
Thus, as our own text states, Hiraṇyagarbha consists of the five unquintupled elements and their effects and in terms of comprehensive knowledge about the highest Brahman (parabrahman or sūddhabrahman) it represents a knowledge of the subtle basis which underlies the cosmos. Yet it is a level of understanding which must be surpassed as exemplified by Yama's commendation of Naciketas at Ku II. 11 and Śaṅkara's commentary on it which glosses the state reached by Naciketas, and yet abandoned by him, as the "...abode of Hiraṇyagarbha." ("...krtob upāsanāyaḥ phalam hairanyagarbhapadām."). For further information on the Advaita Vedānta conception of Hiraṇyagarbha consult A. C. Swain's "Concept of Hiraṇyagarbha in the Philosophy of Śaṅkara", Rākalpānyāsah (Felicitation Volume for Śrī Dravid Shastri), Bhartī Parishad Prayag, 1970, pp. 126-133.

98 A danda seems necessary after "...ātmanah".

99 Anandagiri clarifies this:

Yathā hī bhūtatrayotpattisrutiḥ bhūtapañcaakotpatpattiparāpariṣṭipta, tathā triyuktaraṇaṃsrutirapi pañcikrtabhūtapañcakavipāsyeṣvate, anyathā sarirādau bhūtāvahārāvadbūtādvāvāvahārāvahārāvahārāvahārāsāṅgāt, atah "Tāsām triyuktam triyuktamekākam karavāni. ityādi srutisiddhāni yathāktaṇi bhūtānityarthāt.

(Indeed, just as it is accepted that those śruti passages concerning the origination from three elements have as their real concern the origination from five elements, just so is it admitted that those śruti passages which deal with triplication have as their aim the five quintupled elements, and this is so for the reason that otherwise there would be the unwarranted conclusion that the two elements [not mentioned in the triplicated account, namely, ākāśa and vāyu] would not be applicable to the body in the way that the elements are used in reference to the body [i.e., in the sense that they are the grounds of the various organs ākāśa being the ground of śrotra (hearing) and vāyu the ground of prāṇa (vital breath)], hence those elements just mentioned are established in śruti passages such as "Let me make each one of those three-fold, three fold."—CHU VI. III. 3.)
The term triyuktaranārūti seems to be applicable to any one of the passages CHU VI. ii. 1 through to about CHU VI. vi. 5 since they all fall within the topic of the triplication of elements, and this seems to be the only place in the Upaniṣads where such an analysis occurs. No mention of the quintuplication of elements seems to be made in Vedic literature (i.e., no scriptural authority seems to be present for it—see S. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy* II, London: Cambridge University Press, 1926, p. 74 note 1). The main characteristic of this triplication-ārūti is that it considers the world to arise from only three elements, namely, fire, water, and earth, and that these three elements triplicate in a manner analogous to the quintuplication process described in note 93 above, where the major element concerned, e.g., fire in the case of fire, predominates in the final triplicated form. In explaining this Śaṅkara (see CHUH VI. iii. 3) does not seem to be aware of any specific reckoning of the division of the elements (e.g., half of the original element remaining as the predominant element, and the remaining half being divided into equal parts of the other elements) as seems to be the case with the later concept of pāñcikaraṇa—perhaps Śureśvara is the first to do this in his Pāñcikaranavārttika, Śaṅkara does not describe this process of pāñcikaraṇa even in the small work entitled Pāñcikaraṇa) but merely states that there is a predominating element in each of the three cases (e.g., he uses the word prādhānya or predominating thing) at CHUH VI. iii. 3, and he refers to a preponderance or bhūyastva at BSBEH II. iv. 22).

From the historical perspective, the doctrine of triyuktaraṇa is the original account of the arisal of the phenomenal elements. However, due to the apparent contradiction between Upaniṣadic accounts which, on the one hand, accept the existence of five elements (earth, water, fire, air, and ether) as at TU II. 1. 1, and those passages which assume the existence of three elements (fire, water, and food = earth) as at CHU VI. iii. 2 f., Advaita Vedaṇta thinkers have been compelled to favour one over the other, and most of them seem to favour the more comprehensive CHU account. In this way, that is, by accepting the idea of five elements and in addition and modifying the process of replication offered in the TU account so that it would accommodate of this idea of five elements, the doctrine of quintuplication (pāñcikaraṇa) seems to have been evolved.

Śaṅkara, for the most part, accepts the existence of five gross elements and he seems to refer to the doctrine of triplication only when the text (e.g., CHU VI) forces him
to discuss it (see section IV of S. "Mayeda's "On the Cos-
mological View of Śāṅkara", The Adyar Library Bulletin 39
(1975) 196-204). This can be seen at CHUPH 71. iv. 4 when
he encounters the objection that the process of tripli-
cation cannot account for air (vāyu) and ether (antarikṣa
or ākāśa) and their qualities (touch and sound respectively)
since they do not enter into this process of tripli-
cation at all, and this being the case the premise of this whole
portion (adhyāya) of CHU, namely, that knowledge of sat
will make all things known, will be a faulty one (since the
evolution of the world from sat through the process of tri-
plication will not account for the existence of air and
ether, and their qualities, and thus these things, though
they exist, will not be known from sat). What Śāṅkara of-
fers in reply is a veiled pāṇci karana in which the two mis-
sing elements are inferred to exist in the finally tripli-
cated elements from the perception of their qualities there-
in:

Tejasī tvadṛūpavati Šabdāsparaśayorapyupalamb-
bhādavāvantarikṣayostatra sparśāsabdāagunavā-
toh sadbhāvo 'numīyate.... Yathā tu trīvṛtrke
trīni rūpāntyeva satyam, tathā pāṇci karane pi
samāno nyāyah....

(Just as much as sound and touch are perceived
in fire which is a thing possessing colour,
just so can the existence of air and the ether,
which possess sound and touch as qualities, be
inferred in that [fire].... Just as in the pro-
cess of triplication only the three forms are
real, so also in the process of quintuplication
the same reasoning follows.)

100 Brahmānḍa—This seems to be the first of the
effects of the five gross (quintupled) elements. In refe-
rence to the chart provided in note 97 above, we find that
this brahmānḍa belongs as part of Virāj; since the latter
is defined at Pāṇci karana vārttika 11 as: "Pāṇci krtānī bhū-
tānī tatākṣaraṇa virāddhavat/" ("The quintupled elements
and their effects are Virāj/"). The brahmānḍa is the gross
creation on the macrocosmic order, which is the reason for
its being called "divine" (adhidaiva). In explaining the
term, Anandagiri states the following: "Anavacchinasamast-
vātmakamagnyādityadyayavavyavamityarthah." ("The sense is that
it has parts such as Agni[-loka] and Aditya[-loka] which themselves are undivided cumulative totalities.

Thus it seems that each devaloka is a samastī (see note 44, the brahmāṇḍa corresponds to the adhidaiva portion of the chart there) and that all the devaloka-s collectively make up the body of Virāj.

101 These are the other two pañcikṛtabhūtakārva-s and represent the gross creation on the microcosmic (pinda) order. Again the terms used here are adhyātma and adhibhūta respectively (see note 44 above).

102 The structure of the sentence seems to imply that only the latter two loka-s consist of beings who have gross bodies equipped with hands, head, etc. However, it is not clear where the bodies of the deva-s who comprise the brahmāṇḍa, and must also have hands, head, and feet, should go. Perhaps this final qualification can be taken as referring to all the three spheres.

103 Anandagiri calls the following possible objection to our attention here: "Hiranyagarbhe cāparah Sar trabhade jīvabheda prasiddheranyathā vyavasthānu napatteḥ..." ("But, Virāj has one jīva, and Hiranyagarbha another, because it is commonly known that when bodies are different the jīva is different, otherwise, there would be the impossibility of the distinctive arrangement [of individuals and their deeds]... "). That is to say, we see in the everyday world that each different body has a separate jīva, so that the karma-s that result from the activity of any specific body accrue to their own jīva and not to the jīva of a different body which has not performed those karma-s, and conversely any given jīva receives only those karma-s performed by its own body and not those performed by a body associated with another jīva; otherwise if this distinctive arrangement (vyavasthā) of things were not the case, the liberation (mukti) of a given jīva could not be worked out, and this would be so because one could never be sure that a jīva would receive the karma-s worked out by its own specific body.

Anandagiri responds to the objection in this way: "Ekasyāpi jīvasya atītālākarasa trabhadasambhavat na tad-bheda jīvabhedamāksipati; vyavasthāpi dehabhedadhaviruddhā..." ("On account of the fact that it is quite possible
to have one jīva for the different past and future bodies, a difference in the body does not indicate a difference in respect to the jīva; the distinctive arrangement is also not contradicted because it is based on the difference concerning jīva-s,"). So, though in a life one might have various bodies such as that of a child, an adult, or an old man, one experiences the sameness of the jīva throughout because of things such as childhood memory, and thus the idea that a jīva may have more than one body is not unsound.

104 Again (see note 91 above) the word "sat" actually occurs in the text, but in keeping with the aim of the chapter I have chosen to place the word "tat" here. Since this part of the chapter has evolved out of cosmogony presented at CHU VI. ii. 1 where "sat" is given as the original source, that sense should not be totally excluded here.

105 The first of these examples represents the prātibimbavāda (reflection theory, see Sūtra II. 176-77; III. 277-78) adhered to by the Vīvāraṇa school of Advaita Vedānta (e.g., Padmapāda and Prakāśātman) wherein the jīva is seen to be a reflected image of the original Brahman (bimba) and is real with respect to its identity with Brahman (i.e., its vidrupalta) but unreal in terms of the form the reflection takes (i.e., its ajñānarupatva)—see Pañcarāja Pādīkā I. 103 on this. The second example represents the avacchedavāda (limitation theory) adhered to by the Bhāmatī school of Advaita Vedānta (e.g., Vācaspati Miśra) wherein the jīva-s are false delimitations of Brahman produced by the adventitious limitations (upādhi-s) of ignorance (ajñāna)—see Bhāmatī on BSBH II. i. 4:

106 Prāṇadhāranakriya—this is the same as Saṅkara's definition given at BSBH II. i. 36: "...śarīramātman jīvasabdene prāṇadhārananimmittenābhilapan..." ("...the embodied Ātman is expressed by the word jīva which has as its reason [for applicability], the fact that it sustains the vital airs....").

107 See the chart presented in note 97 above as well as Mānu 3-5, and Saṅkara's Bhāṣya thereon.

108 See note 58 above. The phrase occurs in Saṅkara's Pañcākaraṇa towards the end of it and runs as fol-
lows: "...nāṁṆāṇam nāpi tatkāryam kintu nityaśuddhabuddha-
muktasatyasvabhāvam paramānandadvayam pratyagbhūtacaitan-
yam brahmañvāhāmanasmi..." ("...neither ignorance nor its
effects am I, moreover I am that Brahman alone which is the
inward consciousness, which is eternal, pure, sentient,
freed, true, supremely blissful, and non-dual...."). For
a list of points that argue against the authenticity of the
Pāṇṭikaraṇa see S. Mayeda's "On the Cosmological View of
2. Also see Suresvara's Pāṇṭikaraṇavārttika verses 50-51
on this point.

109 Antahkaranasannidhāna—what is being referred
to here is that, except for the pratyākatman, the antah-
karaṇa is the most inward thing to a person, and thus in
this sense the two do hold somewhat of a proximity.

110 Māyāvin—this is Śvara the Cosmic Conjurer or
Juggler. See TUBHV II. 374 and 378.

111 See note 104 above.

112 The point of the example, as Ānandagiri makes
clear, is to serve as a refute instance for the following
possible objection: "Yadi hi kāraṇatmanā tasyāvästāṇam,
kīmīti tarhī nopalabhyate?" ("Indeed, if the state of it
[the antahkaraṇa] is the causal form, why then is it that
it is not perceived in deep sleep?"). This objection is
based on the idea that; in deep sleep, one does not perceive
any object whatsoever (BUBHV IV. iii. 23, p. 897). The
answer to the objection runs as follows: "Vatavṛkṣasya prāg-
api janmano vātabīje 'vāstānāmāṣṭhitam, āsato nāraviśāna-
syeva jāmāyogat; tathāpi tasya upalambho nāsti; tathā prā-
kṛte 'pi..."). (It is accepted that the fig tree exists in
the seed of the fig tree even before the production of the
fig tree, because [things like] the horns of man, which are
non-existent entities cannot possibly be produced; similarly,
the tree is not perceived in the seed and this is what oc-
curs in respect to what is under discussion [i.e., the an-
tahkaraṇa]...."). The idea of the response involves the
inference of the pre-existence of the effect in the cause
(satkāryavāda), a theory of causality shared by the Advait-
ts and Śāṅkhyas (see Śāṅkhyā Kārikā 9) but held in a some-
what modified form by the Advaitins. This theory of causa-
ion is in direct opposition to the theory which accepts
the fact that the effect is not pre-existent in the cause (asatkāryavāda) upheld by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas (see Praṣṭāpādā's Padrthadharmasamgraha 68 and Śrīdhāra's Nyāya-kandali on it). The point of the answer is that the antahkaraṇa is not perceived when it is in its causal form because it is only present as a subtle potentiality, but it is, in any case, certainly there. The example of man's horns is meant to refute the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causality.

113 That is, one sometimes experiences the three states in the normal order of waking, dreaming, and deep-sleep, and sometimes, such as when one faints (i.e., proceeding from the waking state directly to the state of deep-sleep) not in the normal order.

114 Samādhi—lit., a collecting together, and it is intended to refer to a fixing or concentration of the mental faculties that stands as the culmination of the ascetic's spiritual discipline. It is the eighth and last limb of yoga (see Yogasūtra II. 29). Ānandagiri explains its purpose as: "...yathoktaikatvajānadrīdhikaranārthāṃ...

115 Niścalā—Ānandagiri explains the steps to this: 
"...antahkaraṇam visayehbyo 'pacchidyā pratvakpraṇamaṃsādyā
tanmīsthātvena tasmā niścalā jāte prasaṃkhyāṃ kurvāt...
("...when the antahkaraṇa is cut off from worldly objects, when an inward inclination is brought about, then that [antahkaraṇa] is immobile due to its being firmly established in that [inward state], when that is the case one may perform meditation...")

116 Kṣetra-s—these are briefly enumerated at BHG XIII. 5-6:

Mahābhūtānēsāmpāravajjāno buddhiravyaktamevaca
Indriyāni dasāikam ca pañca cendriyagocarāh.

(The primordial elements, the I-faculty, the intellect, and also the Unmanifested, The ten-senses and the one [manas], and the five objects of the senses.)
Ichā dveṣah sukham duḥkhām saṃghātaścetanaṁ dhṛtiṁ
eñatākṣetram samāsena savikāramudhāṁrtam.

(Desire, aversion, pleasure, pain, the aggregate
of the body and the senses, sentience, determina-
tion,
This is the kṣetra described in brief, together
with its modifications.)

117 Kṣetrajña --this is Brahman, the conscious
principle residing in all kṣetra-s and which is described at
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad XIII. 12-17. Since it is the end point of the retrac-
ing process, it cannot be merged as can the kṣetra-s.

118 The idea is that an effect cannot exist as so-
mething apart from its cause, since according to the theory
of causation accepted by the Advaitins (see note 112 above)
an effect is not a new entity separate from the cause but
already exists in a potential state within the cause. Thus
the cause (kāraṇa) is the more fundamental of the two en-
tites, since there is the possibility that it might exist
without having to account for its effect (kārya) while the
opposite is not the case.

119 Again it must be noted (cf., note 97 above)
that this process of merging is the reverse of the actual
unfolding of the macrocosmic and microcosmic universe. Ān-
andagiri draws our attention to this when he states: "Apaṃ-
cikrtānāṁ bhūtānāṁ 'Viparyāyena tu kramaḥ' iti nyāyenot-
pattīviparītākramena pravilāpanakramām...." ("The sequence
of merging is in reverse order to that of the production of
the unquintupled primordial elements; as according to the
maxim, 'The sequence is in reverse order.' [Bṛhad Āraṇyan
14]....").

120 There is a misprint in the text here, since
"...antahkaranabhāvāt...." should clearly read "...antah-
karanabhāvāt...." (see Appendix p. 220, line 16).

121 This is a reference to a trial by ordeal in-
volving the grasping of a burning hot axe in the bare hands
--a person who is committed to untruth (abṛtbhīṣandha) in
respect to the alleged offence is burned when having to
grasp the axe, while a person committed to truth (satyabhī-
sandha) remains unscathed through the same procedure—which is described in CHU VI. xvi. 1-3 (see also pp. 245-6 of Franklin Edgerton's "Studies in the Veda", Journal of the American Oriental Society 35 (Dec. 1915) 240-246, for a discussion of the translation of the word abhisandha in this specific passage). In his commentary on CHU VI xvi. 3 p. 537, Saṅkara treats the trial by ordeal described above, as a metaphor of the two states, i.e., bondage and release, that are possible for man. The person committed to untruth represents the bound person who is committed to the untruth of the modifications of Brahma (vikārānrtābhisandha), while the person committed to truth represents the liberated person who is committed to the ātman (ātmābhisandha):

Yadātmābhisandhyanabhisandhikrte moksabandhane, yacca mūlam jagato, yadāyatanā yatpratisthāsca sarvāḥ prajā, yadātmakam ca sarvam yaccajamamrtam-abhayam śivamadvityam, tatsatyam sa ātma tava, atastattvamasi he śvetaketo....

(Liberation and bondage are respectively fashioned out of a commitment to the ātman and a non-commitment to the ātman, and that which is the root of the universe, that in which all creatures have their abode and on which they are established, and that of which all things consist, and that which is not born, does not die, is without fear, which is bliss, which is non-dual, that is the true, that is your ātman, hence that thou art O Śvetaketu....)

Thus, the satyābhisandha of CHU VI. xvi, has become the ātmābhisandha of Saṅkara's commentary.

122 "...tattvamasivākyārthaḥ..." should be in the accusative in order to agree with the verb "...jānāti ...."—see Appendix p. 220 lines 21-22.

123 Anubhava—This is even referred to as a pramāṇa (means of valid knowledge) by Saṅkara at BSBH I. i. 2 p. 8:

Na dharmaḥ pāsāyāmiva śrutiādaya eva pramāṇam
brahmajiṣṭhāṣayām, kimtu śrutiayadayo 'nubhavādayasya
yathāsambhavamiha pramāṇam; anubhavāvasanatvad-
bhūtvastuviṣayatvāc ca brahmajiṣṭhānasya.

(Śruti and the rest are not the only valid means
of knowledge in the case of the enquiry into Brah-
man as they are in the case of the enquiry into
dharma, but Śruti and the rest and direct experi-
ence etc., are valid means of knowledge as the case
may be, because the knowledge of Brahman has as its
goal direct experience and because it has as its
object an existent thing.)

124 "...karatalanyastāmalavavat...." should read
"...āmalakavat....", see Appendix page 222 line 21.

125 "Acāryavān puruso veda tasya tāvadeva cīram...." --CHU VI, xiv. 2. That is, one is liberated as a jīvanmukta
(see PP trans. p. 96 above).

126 See note 64 above.

127 Here the praising of the teacher and the ista-
devatā overlap so that the equation, īśtadevatā = paramāt-
man = guru, can be made and since we may carry over the
idea of the guru as jīvanmukta from the previous chapter,
the jīvanmukta can also be added to this equation. As Ān-
andagiri takes it, the first three quarters of the verse
praise the supreme deity intended, and the fourth quarter,
i.e., "...guruve bhedabhedine." ("...to the teacher who de-
stroys [all] differences."), mentions the distinction be-
tween the actual teacher and the devatā ("Tatra pādatrayena
paradevatā namaskriyate; caturthena tu pādena gurorvaiśīṣṭi-
pūrvam namaskriyeti vivektavam."), but it must also be re-
membered that this is ultimately only an imagined (kalpita)
distinction.

128 As at SU VI. 23:

Yasya deve paraḥ bhaktiryathā deve tathā gurau,
Tasyaite kathitaḥ hyarthah prakāśante mahātmanah
prakāśante mahātmanā iti.
(For someone who has the highest devotion to a
deity, who has [the same devotion] for his tea-
cher as for the deity, do these things which
have been related shine forth, for that great soul
the shine forth.)

129 That is BU II. iv. 5: "Atmā vā are drastavyah
śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyo maśtreyi...." ("The Āt-
man, my dear Maitreyī, should be directly perceived, heard,
thought about, and repeatedly meditated upon...."). Saṅ-
kara, in his Bhāṣya on this, explains the terms as follows:

Tasmādātmā vai are drāṣṭavyo darśanārha, darśana-
vigayamāpaḍayitavyah. Śrotavyah pūrvaṁcāryata
āgamataśc. Faścānmantavyaṁstarkataḥ. Tato nidi-
dhyāsitavyo niścayena dhyātavyah evam hyasau drsto
bhavati śravānāmānannididhyāsanasādhanaṁ nirvair-
titaḥ.

(Therefore the Ātman, my dear, should be directly
perceived, i.e., it deserves to be perceived di-
rectly which means that it should be made to be-
come an object of direct perception. It should
be heard firstly, from teacher and scripture. Af-
ter it should be thought about through reasoning.
Then it should be repeatedly meditated upon, i.e.,
the mind should be fixed on it with resolve, for
thus is it directly perceived by going through
these methods of hearing, thinking, and sustained
meditation.)

130 The highest of the four castes, see Rig Veda
X. xc and Manuṃtriti I. 87-88.

131 Śādhanacatustaya—see BSBH I. i. 1 p.5. They
are: a) nityānityavastuviveka (discrimination between et-
ernal and transient realities); b) iḥāmutrārthabhogavirāga
(renunciation of the enjoyment of objects in this world
and the next); c) śāmadādhisādhanaṃpat (perfection of
the means of tranquility, giving, etc.); d) mumukṣutva
(desire for release).

132 As, for example, at MU I. ii, 12: "Tatvijñā-
nārtham sa sūryevābhigacchetsamitpānīḥ ārotriyam brahma-
niṣṭham." ("For the sake of that knowledge may he approach, carrying sticks for the fire in his hand, a teacher who is versed in the Vedas and who is established in Brahman.")

133 These others are, for example, the three remaining castes, the gods, and women, according to Ānandagiri.

134 "Satyam jñānamanantam brahma."--TU II. 1. 1.

135 "Ānanda brahmeti vyājanat."--TU III. vi. 1.

136 See previous two notes.

137 The three bheda-s are explained at Pañcadaśī II. 20:

Vṛksasāya svagato bhedaḥ patrapuspapahalādibhiḥ;
Vṛksāntarātsajātiyo vijātiyaśsilāditaḥ.

(The self-contained difference in a tree exists with respect to its leaves, flowers, fruit, etc., because there is a difference between different kinds of trees, a tree possesses difference within its own class; because it is different from things such as a stone, etc., a tree possesses a difference from things external to its own class.)

Thus, Brahman cannot possess the first kind of difference (svagatabheda) because it is not subject to internal limits; that is, it is not differentiated. It cannot possess the second kind of difference (cājātiyabheda) because there is no second entity with which it could be subsumed under a universal. It cannot possess the third kind (viṣṭytabheda) since there is nothing except it (cf., Pañcadaśī II. 21). Ānandagiri however, takes the reference to three differences to apply to those concerning time (kālā), space (deśa), and object (vastu), which would also fit the present context since Brahman is beyond both the limits of space and time, in addition to not being objectifiable.

138 The three absences as supplied by Ānandagiri are: a) prior absence (prāgabhāva) which is the absence
of something prior to its coming into being; b) subsequent absence (pradhyāvaḥbhāva), which is the absence of something subsequent to its destruction; c) mutual absence (anyonyabhāva), which mutually denies the identity between two given things. All of these are explained, along with a fourth type of abhāva called absolute absence (atyantabhāva) which is the absolute absence of something on a given locus (adhiṣṭhita), at VEDP. VI. 21 ff. Such a four-fold division is accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, as at TS 80 and TD on this; however the earliest instance of this four-fold analysis comes from the Kumārila Bhāṭṭas, e.g., verses 2-4 of the 'Abhāvaprāmāṇyavāda' section of SV.

The fourth type of abhāva is not mentioned here by Sarvajñatman is that since something is being predicated of Brahman in the sentence, the possibility that Brahman is absolutely non-existent simply does not arise. In any event, since Brahman is completely beyond temporal boundaries, that is, since Brahman is never either created or destroyed, it can never suffer prior or posterior absence. In addition to this, because Brahman is non-dual, no other entity exists through which mutual absence, which in itself is nothing more than difference, can come into play.

139 Arthavāda--an arthavāda is taken by the Mīmāṁsākās as a statement that is conjoined with and subsidiary to an injunction; its purpose is the praising of what is enjoined in the injunction (vidhiṣṭuti). This is explained at MS II. 1. 7 and in the commentaries upon it. In general, this is the way in which it seems to be used in early Advaita writings, such as at BS Bh I. iii. 33 for example. Sarvajñatman however, appears to want to put forward a parallel between the relationship that exists between arthavāda-s and that thing enjoined by injunctions, namely, dharma as propounded by the Mīmāṁsākās on the one hand, and the relationship that exists between the five-fold statements dealing with creation etc. (i.e., with qualified Brahman) and that thing which is the meaning of the mahāvākyā-s, namely, nirguṇabhāman as propounded by the Advaitins, on the other. Thus, these five-fold statements dealing with creation etc., are meant to contribute a type of elaboration, upon the meaning of the mahāvākyā-s.

140 Yuktyarthavādavākyānī--Anandagiri glosses this as "Yuktirupānvarthavādavākyānī..." by which he probably means something to the effect of 'being supported by reason' since Sarvajñatman uses such a phrase, namely, yuktyupārmbhita, on the next page of the text.
These are *arthava-da-s* in the strict *śīmārśāka* sense and Ṛanandagiri supplies the phrase "*vāyuryai kṣepa-sthā.*" ("The Wind is the swiftest."--Taittiriya Samhitā II. i. 1. 1) as an example of a statement of praise, and the phrase "*So 'rodit.*" ("He wept."--Taittiriya Samhitā I. v. 1. 1) as an example of a statement of disgrace. These are the *arthava-da-s* that correspond to the two injunctions given in the following note.

Vidhipratisedha—as an example of the former (vidhi), Ṛanandagiri supplies the phrase. "*vāyavyam śvetamā-labheta bhūti kāmāh.*" ("A person who desires prosperity should sacrifice the white animal assigned to the Wind."--Taittiriya Samhitā II. i. 1. 1). The *arthava-da* from the previous note which corresponds to this injunction, namely, "The Wind is the swiftest," does not indicate any action to be done, but merely shows that the Wind, as the swiftest deity, will be the quickest to lead to prosperity (see Śabarabhāṣya on MS I. ii. 7). Ṛanandagiri's example of the latter (pratisedha) is "*Bahirīśi raja tama na deyaṁ.*" ("One should not put silver on the sacrificial grass."--Taittiriya Samhitā I. v. 1. 2). This is paired with the *arthava-da* "He wept," which, as we learn from the rest of Taittiriya Samhitā I. v. 1. 1, refers to Rudra and to the fact that, when he wept, his tears became silver. This conveys the idea that silver should not be given at a sacrifice since it is produced from tears and can only lead to subsequent sorrow for the giver (see Śabarabhāṣya on MS I. ii. 10).

"Yato vā imāhi bhūtāni jāyante; yena jātāni jīvantā; yatprasyantyabhīsanviśanti; tadviṣijhāsasya, tadbrahmeti."--TU III. i. 1.

"Tatśrītvā, tadevānu prāviśat."--TU II. vi. 1.

"Bhīṣaṃśādvātah pavate, bhīṣodeti sūryah."--TU II. viii. 1. Śaṅkara, in his commentary on this passage, throws some light on the reason for terming this a restrictive statement:

Vātādayo hi mahārāh svayamĪśvarah satah pavanādi-kāryesvāyasabahulesu niyatah pravartante. Tadyuktaṁ praśāstari sati, yasmāt niyamena teśaṁ pravar-
tānam, tasmadasti bhavāranam teṣām pradhāstra
brahma. Yataste bhūtvā iva rajhoh 'smāt brahma
bhayena pravartante taccā bhavāraṇa-namandam
brahma.

(Indeed, the Wind and the rest, who are worthy
of great praise and are lords in themselves,
go about as restricted to activities such as
blowing breezes, and so on, which involve much
effort. This would be proper if a master exis-
ted over them. Thus ther is something on ac-
count of which they go about in their restricted
manner, and their master is Brahman. They go
about in fear of that Brahman as if it were the
fear [of servants] from their king, and so that
Brahman which is bliss is the cause of their
fear.)

Thus the aspect of Brahman that seems to be stressed by
the controlling type of arthavāda is Brahman as the Lord
(Isā, Iśvara) over the universe.

146 Sambhāvanā—the meaning of the word is not al-
together clear here. It occurs in a similar fashion at SS
1. 26?) where the sense is that sambhāvanā is not attained
unless knowledge which arises from statements such as "Not
gross, etc."("...asthūlādivacah...") confirms the know-
ledge of the secondary meanings of the avāntaravāya-s.

147 These first three reasons give, namely, "...
tajjatvat tallatvat tadanatvat...." are based on Saṅkara's
analysis of the obviously artificial construction "tajja-
lan" which occurs at CHU III. xiv. 1:

Tasmādbrahmano jatam tejobannādikrameṇa sarvam.
Atastajjam. Tathā tenaiva jananakramena prati-
lomatayā tasminneva brahmani liyate tadatmataya
ślisate iti talam. Tathā tasminneva sthitikāle
'niti prāntitī cestata iti.

(All the world has been born from that Brahman in
a succession of things such as fire, water, food,
etc.. Hence it is termed 'born from that' [tajja].
Similarly, as it sprouts out in that very succes-
sion of generation, so it dissolves into that very Brahman and is united as identical with it. Thus it is termed 'dissolved into that' [talla]. Similarly, because it breathes and moves on top of that very Brahman during the duration of its existence, it is termed 'living on it' [tasmin...

There five sheaths arrange themselves concentrically around the Ātman, with the Food sheath being the outermost sheath, and the one consisting of bliss the innermost--see Tu II. ii.-v. and Saṅkara on this.

The idea here is that each subsequent Ātman, meaning each progressively inner Ātman in the series of concentric sheath-selves, is similar in form to the one before it. For example, the prāṇamāyātman is similar in form to the annamāyātman, and the manomāyātman is similar in form to the prāṇamāyātman. The same simile occurs in the same context at BS Bh I. 1. 12, i.e., in reference to the concentric symmetry of the various sheath-selves. However, as used at US XIV. 3 and Pañcadasī IV. 20, this simile can also refer to the manner in which, according to the Advaita Vedānta theory of perception, the mind (manas) extends itself outwards to assume the form of the object it perceives. In his commentary to Tu II. ii. 1 (pp. 289-90) Saṅkara employs this simile with reference to the five kosa-s as follows:

Sa vā esa prāṇamaya-ātma puṣuṣavidha eva puṣuṣākāra eva śīraḥpaksādibhiḥ. Kim svata eva netyāha. Pra-

siddham tāvadannarasamayasyātmanah puṣuṣavidhatvām.
Tasyānārasamayasya puṣuṣavidhatām puṣuṣākāratām.
Anvayam prāṇamayaḥ puṣuṣavidho muṣāniṣktapatimā-
vanna svata eva. Evam puṃsasya puṃsasya puṣuṣavi-
dhatā, tāmanūttarotarāḥ puṣuṣavidho bhavati, puṃvah
puṃsācchartarottareṇa pūrṇah.

(Indeed this Ātman consisting of vital air is also of a human kind, i.e., it also has a human shape replete with head, flanks, etc. Is this intrinsic to it? The answer is no. Indeed it is well known that the Ātman which consists of food-essence is of a human kind. To say that that one which consists of food-essence is of a human kind is to say that
it has a human shape. Following in line with that, this one consisting of vital air is of human kind, just as an image which has been cast in a mold--it is not intrinsic to it. Thus each prior [self] is of a human kind, following in line with them, each subsequent [self] comes to be of a human kind, and each prior one is completely filled up by each subsequent one.)

From this it is clear that the concentric symmetry indicated by the simile given in our text is one of shape, and one in which each progressively inward ātman completely fills up the shape of the ātman that immediately preceded it.

150 That is, by interpreting the teaching of the five sheaths as having as its principal concern the pratyag-ātman and not the sheaths themselves, which are incidental.

151 This same illustrative simile accrues at BS Bh I. 1. 8 and I. 1. 12.

152 This is KAU VI. 17:

Aṇugusthamātrah puruṣo 'ntatātmā sadā janānām
hṛdaye samnivistah,
Tām svāccharīrātāpravṛḥḥrenmukhādeviśkām chaśaṁ
dhāyunā.

As Ānandagiri states, the means for drawing out the ātman from the body is discrimination ("Dehāderatmano nīṣkarṣopāyam vivekam...." between what is ātman and what is an-ātman.

153 The idea is that, though the three states are different from the ātman, it could still enter into some sort of relation with them, such as possessing them--but Sarvajñātman denies this.

154 That is to say that the ātman is ayyabhicārin in terms of the three states, since they are never found apart from it.
155 Sarpadandadharābhūchidrabalīvardamūtrita—
the idea is that whatever is vyabhicārin (i.e., does not persist as long as some other thing does) in terms of some other thing, is false (mithyā) in terms of that other thing. The example supplies five things which may, under certain circumstances be superimposed upon what is in reality a rope. Thus, since they all disappear when one comes to realize the rope for what it is, they are said to be vyabhicārin in terms of the rope, and therefore they are also mithyā in terms of the rope.

The author seems to have chosen five examples of possible superimposition on the rope in order to coincide with the five kosa-s which are superimposed on the Ātman. The five examples are all epistemological, that is, they illustrate errors in cognition, and it will profit us to take a closer look at the most famous of them, namely, the rope-snake. This example refers to the erroneous cognition 'This is a snake' upon, for instance, encountering a coil of rope in a dimly lit room. The 'this'-portion of the cognition refers, according to the Advaitin, to the substratum (adhishthāna) of the erroneous superimposition, and this substratum is the rope, which therefore is also the true thing since it is that which is eventually unsublated (abādhita) in terms of the cognition. The error in the cognition arises from the mutual superimposition (iteratarādhyāsana) between the 'this'-element in the cognition and the snake-element, and it is sublated upon the discrimination of the fact that what has been encountered is indeed a coil of rope and not a snake. See SS I. 34-37, and I. 465, where the same ideas are touched upon in terms of the cognition 'This is silver' in reference to a piece of nacre.

156 "Traya āvasthāstrayah svapnāḥ."—AIU I. iii. 12.
Here "svapnāḥ" is meant to stand for all the three states.

157 Purusārtha—the goal towards which man should strive. For the Advaitin this would be moksa (final release) in the form of brahma-jñāna (Brahman-realization). In Epic and Purānic literature, as well as in Dharmāstras, four purusārtha-s are accepted, namely, dharma (duty), artha (material well-being), kāma (pleasure), and moksa (final release).

158 "Brahmavidāpnoti param."—TU II. i. 1.
"Phalavatsannidhāvaphalam tadaṅgam."—This identical phrase occurs at BS Bh. II. 1. 14 p. 200 l. 19. Ānandagiri refers to this as a Mīmāṃsā principle (mīmāṃsāsāparatva), and as such, it would probably refer to the difference between primary (pradhāna) and subsidiary (guna) actions, since the former are those acts which produce a specific imperceptible potency (spūrva) that eventually leads to the production of results (phala) in the Ātman, and which receive their impetus from the optative verb in an injunction, while the latter do not produce such a potency and are merely preparatory to the primary act (see MS II. 1. 6-8 and Sābara on this). Sarvajñātman uses the principle to show that the avāntaravākyas which mention the three states must point to the pratyātman.

Śvavācyā—Ānandagiri glosses this as "Tacchandasya vācyam....", in other words, simply as 'the expressed sense of the word 'tat''.

Vyatihāra—this is a reciprocal form of meditation having the form 'X is I', 'I am X', and in our case we have two vyatihāra-s involving Brahman and the pratyātman respectively as the variables. This form of meditation is referred to by Śaṅkara at BS Bh. III. iii. 37.

As in the previous chapter, Sarvajñātman closes with the ciraśrutī: "...tasya tāvadeva cīram...."—CHU VI. xiv. 2).

Bhumabhāva—Ānandagiri glosses this as "...limitless greatness...." ("...bhumabhāvo mahattvamāvacchini natvam yasyāḥ....."). The verse is identical to SS I. 2, and Sī on it glosses the same phrase as "...essence permeated by bliss...." ("...bhumabhāvah pūrṇānandaśvarupatā yasyā iti...."), while AT glosses the phrase simply as "...Brahman...." ("...bhumabhāvo brahmabhāvah pūrvoktalaksano yasyāḥ...."). All three of these interpretations seem to coincide with the manner in which the word "bhūman" occurs at CHU VII. xxii. 1 and xxiv. 1, as well as with the manner in which Śaṅkara takes it in his BS Bh. I. iii. 8 (i.e., taking it to refer to an infinite Brahman identical with bliss.

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, however, in his Sārasaṅgraha on SS I. 2, goes against this interpretation on the basis of the fact that Brahman itself can never be obscured:
So it is clear that Madhusūdana does not take Brahman and bhūman to be identical as do the other interpretations; instead he takes bhūman to be an attribute or characteristic of Brahman. This is further borne out when he goes on to say: "Bhūman bhāva iti vyākhyānam anupādekam, bahorbhāvasya bhūmaśabdavyācyatvena bhāvaśabdadvaityarthānmapateḥ." ("The interpretation: 'the state of being infinity' should not be adopted, because there would be the unwarranted conclusion that, since the state of being great is [already] expressed by the word 'infiniteness' [itself], the words 'the state of being' would serve no purpose.").

We would side with the former type of interpretation because of the effort that it makes to base its explanation on śruti (cf., Vetter's translation of the verse in his Sarvajñātman's Sankṣepāśārīrakam I. Kapitel, Wien, 1972, which sides with Madhusūdana).

164 Jagatparamēśvaratvaṁyatva—Madhusūdana, in his Sāraśāmgraha, breaks this down further into the following five-fold differences: a) between the jīva and the universe; b) between the jīva and Īśvara; c) between each separate jīva; d) between the different universes (perhaps referring to the adhyātma, adhidaiva, adhibhūta distinction—see note 44 above); and e) between the universe and Īśvara. Basically Sarvajñātman's statement of these three artificially constructed (kalpita) differences points to the distinction in the manifested world between the object to be enjoyed (bhoga) which is the sentient universe, the enjoyer (bhoktr) which is the jīva, and the controller (niyantṛ) these things, which is Īśvara. A similar phrase occurs at 85 I. 20.
165 Svājñāna--Anandagiri glosses this as: "Svasya pratyagātmanah svātmānyevavājñānan..." ("Ignorance of the inward self, resting on the self..."). This attempts to take notice of the fact that Sarvajñātman regarded Brahman to be both the object (viśaya) and locus (āśraya) of ignorance--see ŚŚ I. 20.

166 Svāmahimāna--as at CHU VII. xxiv. 1: "Sa bha-
gavah kasminpratiṣṭhitā iti. Sve mahimni yadi vā na mahim-
niti." ("Sir, in what is that [bhūman] established? In its own greatness, or not on greatness.").

167 Astamoha--while Anandagiri and AT take this in the sense of having delusion destroyed (apakṛtamoha and nir-
astamoha respectively) and ST does not gloss it, Madhusūdana in his Sārasaṅgraha takes it as 'having delusion superim-
posed on it ("Astoṣṭayaṣṭo 'paramārthaṁsamoḥah..."'). In any case, one can see that the first half of the verse presents the Ātman as it exists in its bound state, while the second half presents the Ātman as it exists in its freed state.

168 Prakṛtinimittakāraṇa--cf., ŚŚ I. 540.

169 Dr̥ya--lit., visible thing, thing which is to be seen.

170 Niyoja--Anandagiri explains this as "...yāge niyoga mametyevam svakhyayatvena kāryaboddhṛtyātmano niyo-
yatvam..." ("...the impelled one is the knower of what should be done as belonging to him in the form of the cog-
nition 'This is my order to sacrifice' ...."). This, of course, is predicated of the pratyagātman only after it has acquired a body.

171 Anandagiri notes that the relation of the pratyagātman to these four states is due to a relation of the pratyagātman with the body as infused with the reflection of cit (sābhāsakāryakaranāsambandha).

172 The body or the sense organs are meant here.

173 What is meant by the thing qualified (viṣiṣṭa) here, is the jīva. This statement is intended to stand a-
against the avacchēdavāda which holds that the jīva, since it is the pure Brahman in its limited form, is the thing which is impelled etc.. Anandagiri summarizes the reasons standing against this avacchēdavāda when he states: "Viśis-
tasya viśesanabhede bhedākrtvabhoktrtvādiṣu vaiyādhi-
karanādakrtābhhyāgamakrtaviprasaṅgāt...." ("Because there would be the unwarranted conclusion that there would occur the destruction of what was done and the admission of what was not done, due to the fact that the substrata would be different for the agent, the enjoyer, etc.; why? because the thing qualified [viśista = jīva] is different when the qualifying thing [viśesana = antahkarana] is different...."). The unwarranted conclusion given is that what has been done (krta), namely, those kārma-s performed by a jīva, would be destroyed, that is, they would not impart their results (phala) to the jīva that originally performed them. In other words, the kārtṛ and the bhokṭṛ of one and the same action would then be separate jīva-s. Further, that which has not been done (akṛta), namely, those actions not performed by one's self but by a different jīva, would be admitted also resulting from the fact that the kārtṛ and the bhokṭṛ of one and the same action would have to be separate jīva-s.

This is not an admission that the avacchēdavādin wishes to make since it would be impossible for mokṣa to come about in such a chaotic state of affairs concerning the performance of actions and the reaping of their fruit. But the avacchēdavādin is forced into such an admission if he accepts the fact that it is the jīva, i.e., the viśista, instead of the pure pratyagātman, which is kārtṛ, bhokṭṛ, etc., because there would have to be different viśesana-s for each of the four states, namely, kārtṛ, bhokṭṛ, etc., in order to explain the fact that kārtṛ, bhokṭṛ, etc., are different at all. Now, if we have different viśesana-s for each different state, we must also conclude that the viśis-
ta-s are different in each state, since what makes a vi-
śista different from any other is the viśesana-s which are peculiar to it. Thus the avacchēdavādin is forced to ac-
cept the conclusion that the viśista (i.e., jīva) that is regarded as the kārtṛ is separate from that viśista (i.e., jīva) that is the bhokṭṛ, which in fact admits the above mentioned unwarranted conclusion concerning the performance and consequences of kārma-s.

174 This is BUDHV IV. iii. 354: "Aiśvaryam kārana-
tvam ca sākṣītyamapi cātmanah/ Sadeśitavyākāryārthaśākṣyār-
thenāsyā samgateh/"
175 Sābhāsasvāvidyā—see note 165 above for the sense of svāvidyā (=svājñāna). Sarvajñātman echoes the same view expressed in this sentence at SS III. 7.

176 "Yo vai bhūma tadamṛtam, atha yadalpaṁ taṁmar-
tyam."—VII. xxiii. 1.

177 Pratyagrūpaṇa—that is, as the pratyagātman (see p. 214 I. 11 of the Appendix and PP trāns. p. 91 I. h, for the same use of the word pratyagṛupa). Sarvajñātman explains the three ways in which the word pratyāñca is used at SS I. 159:

Pratyagbhāvastāvadēko 'sti buddho pratyagbhāvah kaścidanyah pratiti,
Pratyagbhāvastākrtastatra cānyo vyutpanno 'yam
tatra cātmeti śabdah.

(Indeed, there is one inwardness in the intellect, there is a certain other one in the inward entity, And there is another inwardness which is a mixture of them and this is the primary sense of the word "ātman".)

The first of these is the mundane (apāramārtikaka) use, the second is the use on the level of an absolute truth (tattvika), and the third is the mixed (śabala) use which has a heuristic function when it is used as the primary sense of words that refer to the self in mahāvākyas-s. The use of the term 'pratyāñca' in the context of discussing the locus of ignorance presents one of the most difficult problems in understanding Sarvajñātman's metaphysics, because of his adamance about the fact that the sūddhabrahman alone, as opposed to any product of ignorance (ajñānakāravā), must be the locus of ignorance (e.g., SS II. 208: "Brahmaivā-
ajñāna tasmādiha bhavitumalam nāparam vastra kṣicittasyājñā-
naṁmakatvāt...")—"Therefore Brahman alone is capable of being the locus of ignorance, this is not so of any other entities whatsoever because they themselves consist of ignorance [i.e., the purpose of ajñāna is to obscure jñāna...
so that if something were already ajñāna there would be no purpose to its having even more ajñāna and it would thus be purposeless . . . ."

Therefore, as the locus of ignorance, the pratyaśātman cannot be an ajñānakārya, yet in the next few lines of our text Sarvajñātman goes on to state that that Brahman which is non-dual and blissful (advayānandabrahman) is clearly not the locus of ignorance because we never experience the fact that such a Brahman is ignorant, which in turn leads us to the conclusion that the pratyaśātman and advayānandabrahman are somehow different aspects of the same absolute entity—the former aspect being the one Sarvajñātman puts forward as the locus of ignorance. Clearly, there is a logical lacuna here in respect to Sarvajñātman's staunch non-dualism and the manner in which he proposes that ignorance comes to rest on the suddhabrahman; however, there is evidence in SS as well for both an inward (pratyakṣa) and an infinite or absolute (anantarūpa or adva-yarūpa) aspect of the suddhabrahman. For example, see SS I. 269, 561; III. 305.

One cannot fully understand the notion of inwardness without also appreciating the corollary idea of absolute non-duality, and vice versa, in order to completely apprehend the partless (akhanda) unity conveyed by the syntactical compatibility of the two words, 'tat' and 'tvam'. In the end if we are to explain Sarvajñātman's employment of this term 'pratyakṣa' as it refers to suddhabrahman, we are forced to explain it as a heuristic one, and a heuristic one with an effort to convey two specific truths about suddhabrahman: a) the notion of inwardness is used by Sarvajñātman to distinguish suddhabrahman from everything that is external (parānca) and thereby, objectifiable (see SS I. 241)—this heuristic purpose may thus be called 'epistemological' since its implication is that there can be no objectifiable knowledge of suddhabrahman; b) it is also used to point to the fact that suddhabrahman is the inward or underlying essence (svabhāva) of all things—thus we may call this heuristic purpose 'ontological'. It is in the light of such heuristic purpose that Sarvajñātman seems to use the phrase, "...Brahman in its inward form alone is the locus of knowledge and ignorance" in contradistinction to the phrase, "...Brahman in its non-dual blissful nature cannot be the locus of knowledge and ignorance...."

178 Anandagiri gives MU I. 1. 9, "Yassarvajñānaḥ sarvavit" ("He who is omniscient, all-knowing."); as an example of śruti, and BHG VII. 10, "Buddhimatāmasmi " ("I am the
intellect of those possessed of intellect." as an example of smrti.

179 For example, in the case of the rope-snake, the rope does not mistake itself for the snake, nor does it know itself to be the rope—only a conscious entity (caitanya) indulges itself in ignorance. If, in fact, an insentient entity were taken as the locus of knowledge, it then could no longer be regarded as being insentient.

180 With this statement the last of the four improper alternatives for the jñānajñānaśraya (locus of knowledge and ignorance) is ruled out. We may briefly summarize the four by stating that the jñānajñānaśraya cannot be:

1) advayānandabrahman, because we never have the experience that it is ignorant (mudha).

2) Īśvāra, because it is omniscient.

3) jagat, because it is insentient (jāda).

4) jīva, because no jīva exists in the state of deep sleep when ignorance does indeed exist (i.e., the jīva is vyabhicārin with respect to ignorance during the state of deep sleep), though jīvatva is inferred to exist in a potential form at that time.

Though the first three alternatives seem to be quickly dismissed as obviously untenable, the last, which is advocated by Maṇḍana Miśra (see S. Kuppaswami Sastri’s edition of Brahmasūdhi, Madras Government Oriental Series No. 4, Madras: 1937, pp. 10-12, as well as TŚ II. 138, 174) and later on seems to find support in the thought of Vācaspati Miśra and the Bhāmati school, is thoroughly examined by Sarvajñātman in the following pages of PP.

181 Jīvatva—if one were to take this as the universal (jāti): "The state of being a jīva", then Sarvajñātman would be open to the objection of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika who holds that the relationship between an individual (vyakti) and a universal (jāti) is an eternal one called inherence (samavāya, see TŚ 79), namely, that if the universal called jīvatva exists in the state of deep sleep, then
a corresponding individual jīva must exist there also, and thus opening the way for the possibility of the jīva serving as the locus of ignorance. However, it is clear that by his use of the word, "jīvatva", Sarvajñātman does not intend the universal, but simply the basic adventitious limitation (upādhi) that covers all the active characteristics, such as being the agent (kartrtvā), the enjoyer (bhoktrtvā), and so on, that are associated with the jīva as that which wanders through the world of mundane existence (i.e., as a samsārin).

Sarvajñātman does not admit the presence of such characteristics in the state of deep sleep because a) the sense organs which connect the jīva with external objects in the waking state, and thus perpetuate the illusion of such characteristics, are completely merged into the ātman, and b) the mental impressions (vāsanās) derived from the waking state which perpetuate the illusion of such characteristics in the dream state, are completely absent in the state of deep sleep. Thus, this active jīva-condition (jīvatva = samsāritva) cannot be present, in any full sense, in that state of deep sleep; it exists there only potentially (saktinat—see n. 183 below for the macrocosmic statement of this potentiality) and in order to account for the subsequent reappearance of the same jīva.

182 The process of the jīva's return from the state of deep sleep, and the logic of its being the same jīva that entered into the state of deep sleep, are discussed by Śaṅkara at BSžh III. ii. 9, and BUBH II. i. 19.

183 The inference would run: 'At the time of deep sleep, jīvatva is potential because the jīva re-awakens afterwards.' The macrocosmic application of this inference is made by Śaṅkara at BSžh I. iii. 30: "Prajñamānāmapi cedam jaracchaktyavaśeṣameva pratiyate. Saktimūlameva ca prabhavati; itarathākasmikatvaprasangat." ("Moreover this universe, when it is being merged, is merged so that only what is potential remains. And that root of potentiality alone is what unfolds [as the universe at the time of creation]; otherwise there would be the unwarranted conclusion that [the universe] would be without a cause.")

184 What is meant by direct (aparokṣa) experience is perception (pratyakṣa), and what is meant by indirect (parokṣa) experience is inference (anumāna). The idea of the statement is that ajñāna, which is directly experienced
at the time of deep sleep, cannot have an indirectly experienced ātma as its locus. Cf., Ānandaśīrya: 
... Jīvatvasya sausūptikasyā saktiśesasya anumitasyāpi tatkāle kayāpi vidhayā sphuranābhavat na tādā sphurato jñānasya tadhāsa-
vatvasiddhirityarthah...; which seems to be based on the acceptance of the principle that a thing which is directly experienced should not have something which is inferred as its locus.

185 This, according to Ānandaśīrya, is a response to the following objection: "Naḥūṭhitena sausūptajīva-
tvam saktiśesamanumeyam paroksātā pariṣchorati; tenā tadhā
śrayatayah jīvasvāpi sphuranāt yuktamaḥ jñānāśrayatvam....
("That jīvatva existing at the time of deep sleep, which
is inferable as potential by the person who has re-awakened,
is experienced as non-immediate; through this, the jīva too is experienced as the locus of that jīvatva; for this reason it is proper to say that the jīva is the locus of aśāna....")

In other words what is being stated is that, if one can, upon waking, infer that jīvatva had existed at the time of deep sleep, so that a type of jīva is, in retrospect, experienced as existing at that time, why then not let aśāna have its locus in this jīva which is inferred to exist then? As stated in the previous note, SarvaśīPan's response to this is that in considering the locus of aśāna to be an inferred thing, one cannot escape the conclusion that aśāna must then itself be an inferred thing, which goes against the fact that aśāna is directly experienced at the time in question.

186 In addition to SarvaśīPan's response, as explained in the previous two notes, Ānandaśīrya supplies the argument that to regard the jīva as something inferred goes against the Advaita Vedānta notion that it is a thing which is directly experienced: "Na hi jīvasya paroksātvam kena-
ciddrastamītaṃ va 'aham' ityaparoksātvā, ākāśasya ca sāk-
śri-pratyakṣaṃtvena paroksātvānabhupagamāt...." ("No, for one perceives or accepts the fact that the jīva is non-immediate on account of the fact that we all have the direct perception 'I', and because the ākāśa is directly experienced by the perception of the Witness.").

187 This is the exact opposite of SarvaśīPan's position as stated, for example, at Sā Sūtra, 3:19: "Aśrayatva-
viṣayatvabhāgini nirvikāśagacitireva kevala." ("Undivided Absolute Consciousness serves as the locus and object of ignorance.").
188 \textbf{BUBHV I. iv. 290:}

Pramātṛdyutthiteh pūrvam cidanyānanvayāttamoe-
Videṣāṇa cidevaikā svānubhūtyaiva gamyate.

We follow the editor’s suggestion of "...cidanyānanvayāta-
mah..." for "...cidanyānacottamah...", and Ānandagiri’s
explanation: "...susūpyavasthāyām cidātmano 'nyena viṣa-
yayavitvena, ēṣrayāvayavitvena ca tanaso 'sambandha cid-
ātmaiva..." ("...because in the state of deep sleep, ign-
orance has no relation in the form of content and contain-
er, or locus and thing resting on the locus, with anything
other than the cidātman, there is only the cidātman [at that
time]...").

189 The idea is that since ignorance is begin-
ningless, it cannot have anything that is an effect (kārya)
and thus possessed of a beginning as its locus, otherwise,
an impossibility would result, since ignorance could be
present before the coming into existence of the effect,
therby being without any locus.

190 "...parināmitvāt..." should be changed to "...
parināmatvāt...". As borrowed from Sākhya-Yoga, this
term finds a similar use in Advaita Vedānta, namely, sig-
nifying an actual transformation of some material base as
opposed to an illusory transformation (vivarta) of a given
base. Here it seems to refer to the Advaita Vedānta no-
tion that perceptual cognitions are a result of an actual
transformation of the internal organ into the form of the
object being cognized. \textit{VEDP I. 18} describes such a pro-
cess:

\begin{quote}
Tatra yathā tatākodakaṁ chidrānirgratva kulyāt-
manā kedārān praviśya tadvaive catuṣkoṇādyākāraṁ
bhavati tathā tajjasamanṭhakaranaṁapi caksurādi-
ṛā nirgratva ghatādivayadeṣam gatyā ghatādivi-
ṣayākāreṇa parināmate. Sa eva parināmō vṛttir-
ītyucyate.
\end{quote}

(Concerning this, just as the water of a tank;
having gone out of an opening and having entered
the fields through channels, becomes just like them, that is, becomes a form having four sides etc., so also does the internal organ, whose nature is light, go out through the sense of sight etc., and having gone to the place where there is an object such as a pot etc., it transforms into the form of the object such as pot etc. That very transformation is called a modification.)

191 Kūṭastha—namely, the Ātman.

192 Paścāmin—namely, the antahkarana.

193 As Ānandagiri explains it: "Cidātmano buddhivyavadhānena jñānāsrayatve buddhivāśīṣṭasyaiva bodhyatvam phalam..." ("If the cidadtman were the locus of knowledge through the intervention of the intellect, then the result is that only that thing qualified by the intellect [i.e., the jīva] is the one that is to be instructed..."). The qualification bodhya (that which is to be instructed) is meant to refer to that entity which is to be instructed in the manner of attaining the final realization of the unity of Ātman and Brahman. The parabrahman or jada (insentient matter) cannot be instructed because the former is above all desires such as the desire for instruction and because it consists, in essence, of pure knowledge itself, while the latter is simply insentient and therefore has no capacity for instruction at all.

This assumption that the jīva is the only entity that is fit for instruction leads to the following set of assertions: a) if the thing qualified by the intellect is that which is suitable for instruction, then it alone can be ignorant (i.e., the locus of ignorance); b) the thing qualified by the intellect is the jīva; c) therefore the jīva is the locus of ignorance (Ānandagiri: "Nānu visiṣṭasya bodhyaṃ tasyaiva jñānāsrayam phalam āthavā jātivābhivyupagamādhiṣṭasya ca jātivyāpajiveser aprājñāsrayatvam bālādyadhyetetyāśākya...".) Again this is the position of "Anāna Miśra and the Bhāmatī school", and it directly opposes Sarvajñātman's own position.

194 There should be a danda after "...antahkarana-śabalatvād..."—see Appendix p. 227 line 11
The idea is that there is no intervening thing between Brahman and its relation with ignorance that could be taken as accounting for that relationship.

What is meant by this is that the relation with ignorance is not natural (svabhāviśa) to Brahman but that it is adventitious and occasioned by ignorance itself. Ānandagiri also quotes Sureśvara (SV. 176) on this:

Nāsyāvidyāvāidyāmānevasitā prakalpyate,
Brahmadvārā tvāvidyeta na kathāñcana yujyate.

(No: only when ignorance exists is it possible to say that ignorance belongs to it [Brahman], but ignorance is not possible by means of Brahman.)

The verse has been slightly altered by Ānandagiri to suit his own purpose since "Brahmadvarī..." appears in the Ānanda Āshrama edition (1937) of SV for "Brahmadvārā..." hers. The importance of making the point that Brahman has nothing to do with the bringing about of the relationship with ignorance is that it avoids the unwarranted conclusion that if Brahman were responsible for such a relationship, Brahman being eternal and omnipresent, that relationship could never cease and the attainment of knowledge and liberation would become impossible.

As has been shown in the previous note, the Advaitin cannot afford to make Brahman the occasioning factor in the relationship with ignorance, and thereby he is forced to assume the ignorance itself is this occasioning factor. Such an admission involves the fault (doṣa) of being based on itself (ātmāśraya), i.e., an explanation of a thing as depending on itself. However, in the case of the relationship with ignorance, the Advaitin does not treat the ātmāśraya which is concluded about it as a vicious one. Instead, being the only acceptable alternative, he regards it as admissible and alludes to the case with difference (bheṣa-dā) as a similar example.

The point of the allusion is that with difference, we encounter the same problems, as are the case with ignorance, in trying to explain the relationship of difference to the things which it differentiates. That is to say, a
given difference will involve two entities a and b, but it
must not reside in a unity which is composed of the iden-
tity of these two entities a and b and thereby cause their
difference, otherwise the very concept of oneness upon which
difference depends for its counter-positive (pratiyogin)
would vanish. A and b therefore, must already be different
before a difference "x" could differentiate them, and this
difference "x" by which a and b will differ enters by means
of a difference which already must exist and thus it is de-
pendent on difference. In this way difference can be re-
garded as being based on itself (ātmādṛaya). Sarvajñātman
makes this same allusion to difference in explaining the
origin of ignorance at ŚŚ I. 55.

198 "Tasmādaviduskṛta evāvidyā, avidyayāvita cāvidyā-
vattvam." -lit.: "Therefore ignorance exists only in the
Faultless One, and its possession of ignorance is due to
that very ignorance alone."

199 "Bṛhmaḥ vā idamgraśīt. Tadātmānamevāvet.
Aham brahmāsmīti. Tasmāt tat sarvamabhavat."--BU I. iv. 10.

200 Anātman--namely, the antahkarana, etc..

201 With this paragraph, Sarvajñātman is entertai-
ning a possible objection (pūrvapaksa). Sarvajñātman's own
position (siddhānta) is that Brahmān has a relation with
transformations (parināma-s) such as knowledge, through the
outer cloak of the antahkarana (see PP trans. p. 115 above).
The pūrvapaksa proposes that the jīva (i.e., the viśista
which has the antahkarana as its viśesā) is that which is
connected with knowledge and action (jñānakarmanāhika-
ātvā), which is simply to say that the jīva is the one who strives
(sādhaka) for the fulfilment of the jñānakānda and karmakā-
da portions of the Veda. However, Sarvajñātman goes on
to say that if this were the case, then the pūrvapaksa is
forced to admit the unwarranted conclusion that the jīva
must also be the one that reaps the rewards (phalin) of the
striving for the fulfilment of those two portions of the
Veda (the rewards are apavarga or release = moksa, and svarga
or heaven), because it is only logical that the person
who strives (sādhaka) for anything be identical to the person
who reaps the Fruit (phalin) of that striving.

202 For example, that the jīva is the sādhaka and
that Brahma is the phalin.
Akṛtābhya gamakrtavipranāśaprzasaha—see note 173 above and SS III. 30.

Mahāpralayādi—as Anandagiri explains, the "ādi" stands for deep sleep (supti) and swoon or coma (mūrocha).

Thus the point being made is that in order for the jīva, which is the viśīta (qualified entity), to be the one which is liberated and not the pratyaśatman, and due to the fact that the attainment of mokṣa (liberation) requires enormous amounts of time, amounts of time that span even the periods of cosmic dissolution, the jīva as viśīta must also persist through all these times or it could not be the one that strives for, and reaps, the rewards of liberation. However, the thing that qualifies (viśesana = antahkarana) the jīva as the qualified entity (viśīta) is destroyed at times such as mahāpralaya, so that jīva cannot persist through them and therefore cannot be the entity that undergoes liberation.

As, for example, a pot—once it has been smashed it does not reform itself after some time.

Viśesana—namely, the antahkarana.

Name and form (nāmarūpa) is a term used in Advaita Vedānta to indicate everything other than Brahman ("...na ca brahmaṇo 'nyānāmarūpābhyaḥ 'marthāntaram."—"... nothing except Brahma is different from name and form."—BSBH I. iii. 41). It has both a manifest (vyākṛta) and an unmanifest (avyākṛta) form (as at BSBH II. 1. 17: "Vy- ākrtanāmārūpātavādhamāyāvyākṛtanāmārūpātvaran dharmānta- ram.").

Nāmarūpa is a descriptive two-element formula that reduces phenomenal existence down to its basic conceptual components: name, and the objectifiable content of name (one essentially inseparable from the other). Its double nature (manifest and unmanifest) is used by Śaṅkara to account causally for the multiplicity of phenomenal existence and its intrinsic structure. For an analysis of Śaṅkara's use of the term consult Paul Hacker's "Eigentümlichkeiten der Lehre und Terminologie Śaṅkaras", Zeitschrift Der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 100 (1951) pp. 246-248.
The fact of the sameness of name and form rising up after each cycle of dissolution is specifically dealt with by Śaṅkara at BSBH I. iii. 30 where, for example, he states the following:

Drṣṭānuśravikasukhadhukhāvyayau ca rāgadvēṣau
bhavačaḥ, na vilakāṇavāvyāvityato dharmādharmā-
phalabhūtottarā srṣṭirnispadyamānā pūrvasrṣṭisa-
drasyevanispadyate.

(Desire and aversion have as their concern the pleasure and sorrow for those things which have been see or previously heard about, they are not concerned with anything else, hence a new creation is the result of merit and demerit [of the creatures that existed in the previous creation] and it is set down as similar to the previous creation.

209 In searching for some entity that does in fact persist through the times such as the cosmic dissolution, the pūrvaapākṣin proposes that it is the essence (svārūpa) underlying the viśīṣṭa, and that because it persists in this fashion it can serve to recognize the possible continuity between the viśīṣṭa which existed prior to dissolution and the viśīṣṭa which exists after it. In this way, some scope might remain for his position that the jīva and not Brahman is both the bound and liberated entity. However, this is exactly what Sarva-jñātman has been saying all along, namely, that it is the essence (svārūpa = viśīṣṭa = pratyagbrahman) which truly undergoes bondage and release, and which is the real locus of ignorance and knowledge. Thus the pūrvaapākṣin is in fact admitting the position of the siddhāntin here.

210 The text seems to be punctuated wrongly here. "...āpadyate. Dvaitadarṣaṇanāvibhrasāya jñānāśrayatvād upe- dhī..." should be "...āpadyate dvaitadarṣaṇanāvibhrasāya jñānāśrayatvāt. Upūdhī..." (see Appendix p. 228 ll. 6-9).

The reason dvaitadarṣaṇanāvibhrasāya jñānāśrayatvāt is why the essence (svārūpa) as recognizer (pratyabhijñāt) is the locus of ignorance. That is to say, the recognition of the qualification (viśīṣṭa) is an error of perceiving duality (dvaitadarsaṇanāvibhrama) since it implies seeing the
visesana as different from the atman, and such a perception is rooted in ignorance making the person who has it possessed of ignorance.

211 The fault referred to is akrtabhyagamakrtavipranasaprasya (the admission of what is not done and the destruction of what has been done—see note 203 above). A clearer paraphrase of the intention of the sentence would run as follows: Due to the fact that the jiva is an effect of ignorance and therefore cannot serve as the locus of ignorance, the essence alone must be the locus of ignorance and the locus of all its effects, and thus the essence is both the striver (sadhaka) and the reaper (phalin)—for this reason (that the striver and the reaper are the same) we cannot be taken to task for admitting that the same jiva which performs certain karmas will not reap their results, and thus that moksa would be impossible.

212 That is to say, because of the preceding reasons one cannot say that the jiva is bound and released, even though we hold that it is the essence (svarupa = atman) by taking on the outer coat of the antahkaraana (antahkaranaakauchukadvarena or visesadvarena, compare a similar use of kauchaka at SS III. 132) which is entitled to perform karma, we do not mean to say that the essence becomes the jiva and is entitled to perform karma in that qualified (visista) form alone. What we mean to say is that the intervention of the antahkaraana in the case of accounting for the locus of knowledge (i.e., is entitled to knowledge and action—jahanakarmadhikarin) is a logical necessity (see top half of PP trans. p. 115) and we never mean to say that the atman transforms itself into the jiva and in that way is the locus of ignorance. However, one must notice that it is a drawback of Sarvajnaatman’s metaphysics that he does not further explain the nature of this relation that the atman has with the antahkaraana when it takes it on as an outer coat, but simply implies that it produces no change in the atman.

213 Sarvajnaatman makes a similar statement at SS III. 7:

Brahmaiva samsarati mucyata etadeva
dauvarikam bhavati samsaranam tu tasya
Muktih punarbhavati cidvapusaiva tasya
svajhatah svamahimapratibodhatastca.

(Brahman alone undergoes transmigration
and it alone is freed; its transmigration
comes about by means of an intervening
factor, while it is released in its pure
consciousness alone; [the former] comes
about due to its own ignorance and [the
latter] due to the knowledge of its own
greatness.)

The commentaries explain that the intervening factor referred to in the second line of the verse is the subtle body
(linga).

214 And thus also the locus of ignorance.

215 See p. 31 lines 18-19.

216 "Na ca brahma ca istam ciktaunah sastrarthavi-
paritakalpanayah svarthaparityagah karyah." —BUSH I. iv. 10
p. 61. This phrase occurs in the context of a polemic be-
tween Saṅkara and (according to the commentaries) Bhartṛ-
prapañcaka as to whether the word "brahman" in the opening
phrase of BU I. iv. 10 (i.e., "Brahma va idam etra
Tadātmānāme svavet. Aham brahmāsmi iti. "Asmā tāt tāt sarvam-
havati."—"Indeed Brahman was all this in the beginning.
It knew only itself in the form of the cognition, 'I am
Brahman.' Therefore it became All.")) means the pure Brah-
man (para), which is what Saṅkara asserts, or whether it
means the conditioned Brahman (apara) or a brāhmaṇa as stri-
ver (sādhaka) for liberation, which is Bhartṛprapañcaka's view.
Both of them seem to assume that this opening phrase of BU
I. iv. 10 describes the fact that the entity which is re-
ferred to by the word "brahman" is first of all described
as bound, then becomes aware of the cognition 'I am Brahma-
man' and through that attains liberation (i.e., 'becomes
All). The objection which immediately precedes those words
of Saṅkara that are quoted in our text runs as follows:
"Brahmanā sādhakatyakalpanā asmadādīsviva apeṣa
tadātmānāme svavetasmāttatsarvamabhavat. iti, iti cet." ("It is sil-
ly to imagine that Brahman is a striver just like us and
thus say that 'It knew only itself, therefore it became All."—
Saṅkara's response carries in it the intention that one
should not feel that one is doing anything demeaning to the absolute and pure nature of Brahman by allowing it to serve as the locus of ignorance, or to be such things as the striver and reaper, because the superimposition of these things upon Brahman does not in any way affect its true nature. In addition to this, the words that immediately follow the quotation taken from Śaṅkara are: "Na caitāvatye-vāksamā yuktā bhavataḥ." ("Nor is it proper that you should be intolerant about just that much."); and it is these words which seem to serve as the basis for the quotation from Su- reśvara which immediately follows in our text.

217 The verse is BUBHV I. iv. 1279:

Aksamā bhavataḥ keyam sādhakatvaprakalpane
Kim na paśyati samsārar mayyevājñānakalpitam.

That is, only on me as the pratyagātman.

218 That is to say that a jīva is not the locus of knowledge and ignorance.

219 "...ajñānakalpitāmajñānakalpitabhedānām...." --that is, to the jīva-s which is Maṇḍana Miśra’s position.

220 Pratibimbakalpa--that is, the jīva taken as possessing a consciousness which is a real reflection of that pure caitanya which is Brahman. This is the position of the Vivaraṇas.

220 This verse is BUBHV I. iv. 298:

Parākpravanayā drṣṭyā dhīstho jīmo jñānamātmanā, Vyojakārsnyādivattājam sambhāvayati na svataḥ.

Again here we have a reference to the Advaita Vedānta theory of perception, in which a mode of the internal organ (antahkaranavṛtti) goes outward through the channels of the sense organs and takes on the form of the object to be perceived. The verse states that the knower within the intellect (dhī = buddhi), that is, that knower associated with
the intellect or the \text{jiva}\text{ (as antahkarana}\text{vishista}) assumes itself to be the locus of ignorance. The point of the simile of the ether is that, though it is not an object of senuous perception, ignorance causes us to imagine that the blueness which we do perceive resides on it.

222 \text{Vyanjaka}--usually employed to indicate the factor that renders something that is immaterial and eternal, material and non-eternal, e.g., the individual (\text{vyakti}) is the manifesting factor (\text{vyanjaka}) of a universal (jati) which is the thing to be manifested (\text{vyanjya}).

223 \text{Pratyabhijna}--\text{Anandagiri} does not gloss this word, and its use here does seem peculiar; perhaps \text{Sarvajnaticman} merely means experience (anubhuti) by it.

224 That is, the nature of manifesting the thing which is to be manifested (\text{vyanjya}) as contained within themselves (i.e., the \text{vyanjaka}--s).

225 \text{Anandagiri} notes that this example is intended for those who accept the view that universals exist everywhere (sarvagata) including in their particulars, a view accepted by the \text{Nyaya}, \text{Vaishvikas} and the \text{Mimamsakas}. The examples that follow this one are intended for those people who hold that a universal pervades only its particulars.

226 \text{HrasvadIrghaputri}--see P. I. ii. 27 and commentaries on this. The three terms refer only to the length of vowels in words. For example, the short (\text{hrasva}) vowel is that which has one measure (matra) and takes one unit of time (kala) to pronounce, as the vowels "a" and "u" in the word "madhu" (honey). The long (\text{dhirgha}) vowel has two matra-s and takes two kala-s to pronounce, as the vowel "i" in the word "gauri" (female buffalo). The prolonged (pluta) vowel has three matra-s and takes three kala-s to pronounce, and it is marked by the figure "3" in writing, as in the phrase, "Devadatta\text{3 anvasa}" ("Be seated Devadatta."). Where the vowel "A" is prolonged.

227 \text{Karanabhivyaktidvarena}--\text{Abhayankar} in his \text{A Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar, (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1961)}, in the entry for "\text{Karana}" cites \text{Tattiriya Pratisakhya XXIII. 2} as enumerating its five forms: "\text{Anupradhanatsamsargatsathnatkaranavinyayat/ Jyate varnavaisegvam pari-}
nāmātca pañcamāt." ("From the five: augmenting, blending, the location, the position of articulation, and transformation, the distinctiveness of letters is produced."). He also provides a commentary for this passage which runs:

Akārasya tāvat—anupradānam nādaḥ. samsargasān kanthe, sthānam hanū, karanavivayah osthau, parimāṇam mātrakālāḥ. Anupradānādibhiḥ pāṃ- cabhīḥ karanairvānānāṃ vaiśeṣyām jāyate.

(There is this much concerning the letter "a"—augmenting means resonance; blending is in the throat, the location is the jaw, the position of articulation is the lips; [and] the extent is the duration of the measure. Through these five instruments of articulation beginning with augmenting, there is produced the distinctiveness of letters.).

It seems that the last of these, namely, parimāṇa as mātrakaḷā is the one which is meant in our example.

Thus, the basic proposition illustrated by all of these examples is: "Vyaṅjaka vyāṅgyam svagatatvena vyāṅ- jayati." (The manifesting factor manifests that which is to be manifested as if that thing to be manifested were contained within it). The examples therefore fall into the following pattern:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vyaṅjaka</th>
<th>Vyaṅgya</th>
<th>Svagatatvena</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) gopinda</td>
<td>gotva</td>
<td>gopindaṣvagatatvena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) hrasvādi</td>
<td>ūśabda</td>
<td>hrasvādīṣvagatatvena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) manyaḍyarthaka</td>
<td>dehasagatamukha</td>
<td>manyaḍyarthagatatvena</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of the explanation of the manner in which the ji-va seems to appear as the locus of ignorance, which all the above examples are meant to clarify, we obtain the following corresponding pattern:
This same type of statement is made by Sārvajñatman at Sa-II. 192.

229 The two correlating terms used here are pratyakṣa and sākṣat. Ṣanandagiri helps us with these two odd terms when he says that they respectively refer to nīr-vikalpaka (indeterminate) and savikalpaka (determinate) cognitions: "Atra pratītēḥ sākṣataratvam savikalpatvam prayatnamatvam nīr-vikalpakaḥ prayatītiṃśayatvamītī vivekaḥ." What Sārvajñatman seems to intend here is that in the state of deep sleep bare ignorance is apprehended, while in the waking or dreaming states ignorance is perceived as differentiated into and mixed up with its effects. The inference in the sentence runs as follows: The antahkaraṇa or the jīva are the manifesting factors of ignorance because whatever is the manifesting factor must be positively and negatively concomitant with the thing to be manifested and the antahkaraṇa and the jīva as qualified by it exhibit such a concomitance.

230 This verse is from NAIŚ III. 58:

Bṛihyāṃ vr̥ttimanutpādyā vyaktīṁ svāṃhāmo yathā
Narte 'ntahkaraṇam tadadhyāntasya vyaktirājjasī.

231 This seems to refer to the phrase: "...karane
caksusmi viparītārāhakādidosasya darśanāt." "...because
we see that faults such as those which occasion perceptions
contradictory to reality exist in that organ which is the
eye."); occurring at BHGBH XIII. 2.

232 Since ignorance is ultimately an unreal entity,
it ultimately does not even have its locus in Brahman. Sār-
vajñatman construes Śāṅkara's statement that ignorance re-
sides in the organ as an heuristic assertion, which by fir-
mly assigning ignorance to the antahkaraṇa, calls attention
to the fact that though Advaitins talk about ignorance as
resting on Brahman it, being an ultimately unreal entity, cannot even have its locus there, and to the fact that Brahman ultimately has no relation with ignorance whatsoever.

Sarvajñātman cannot disregard this statement made by Śaṅkara since its apparent implication, namely, that the antahkarana is the locus of ignorance, puts a direct strain on Sarvajñātman's consistory regarding his position that the pratyagātman alone is the locus of ignorance. He is also compelled to appropriate the statement, in one manner or another, into his own viewpoint, due to the obviously authoritative position that Śaṅkara's words command in the Advaita Vedānta tradition; a position which he himself often calls upon throughout his work. This is a recurring problem in all the Indian commetorial traditions; whenever an author who is relatively later on in a tradition seeks to 'fill out' the words of his predecessors, and especially the often skeletal statements of the founders of those traditions, his attempts at establishing an overall consistency for the statements which he is 'filling out', as well as at setting those statements in the light of his own contemporary polemical concerns, should not necessarily be construed as compromising the statements of those earlier writers, though this does not preclude the fact that distortions are quite a real possibility. In our case, Sarvajñātman does not seem to have compromised the words and philosophical position of Śaṅkara.

233 "...tasya māsake taddhi kṣipati..."—lit., "...throws it on the head of that [internal organ]..."

234 Cf., Śaṅkhya-kārikā 62:

Tasmānna badhyate nāpi mucyate nāpi samsarati kāścit, Samsarati badhyate mucyate ca nānāśraya prakṛti.

(Therefore no [soul (puruṣa)] whatsoever is bound, nor release, nor is subject to transmigration, it is nature which resides in the infinite existing entities, which is subject to transmigration, is bound, and is released.)

Being bound, etc., prakṛti has to be the locus of ignorance, and the antahkarana, according to the Śaṅkhya-s, is an evo-
lute of prakṛti. Thus the implication of the above kārikā is that the āntānkaraṇa, rather than pure consciousness, is the locus of ignorance.

The reference is to Īstasiddhi VI. 8:

Svaruk ca bhāti yattatra jñānājñānavibhāgadhīṁ
Ato 'vidyā bhavedyasya bhavettadvayāiva sā.

The first line of this differs slightly with Hiriyanna's edition (Īstasiddhi of Vīmuktaṭāman with Extracts from the Vivaraṇa of Jñānottama, Gaekward's Oriental Series No. 65, Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1933) which reads: "Svaruk ca bhāti yattatra nājñātajñānavibhāgadhīṁ" and clearly deals with the fact that the distinction between object of ignorance (ajñāta) and locus of ignorance (ajñā) does not occur with reference to the self-luminous consciousness. What the first line of this verse, as it stands in our text, is attempting to convey is that both knowledge and ignorance must be assigned to the self-luminous Brahman, or in other words, that both knowledge and ignorance have their locus in the self-luminous Brahman.

The verse is from BUBHV I. iv. 342:

Tamāḥ pradhānām kṣetraṇām citpradhānaścidātmanāṁ
Praha kāraṇatāmeti bhāvanājñānakarmabhīṁ.

The last line refers to the three auxiliary causes (sahā-kārin) which aid Brahman in the creation of the universe. An auxiliary cause is something that aids in the production of a specific effect and yet is neither its material cause (upādanakāraṇa) or instrumental cause (nimittakāraṇa), as a potter's stick is the auxiliary cause in the case of the production of a pot from clay, which is its material cause, by the potter, which is its instrumental cause.

The first of these, namely, bhāvanā is glossed as upāsana or meditation by Ānandagiri in his commentary to BUBHV I. iv. 1145 and 1140. Here it seems to be taken as 'those things known though meditation' ("bhāvanājñātāhini ....") by Ānandagiri. The second auxiliary cause, namely, jñāna is meant to refer to the knowledge of past experien-
ces in the form of mental impressions (vāsanās or samskāras) which have derived from the experiences concerning the results of past actions. The last auxiliary cause, namely, karma is meant to refer to meritorious and demeritorious actions (dharma-dharma-upakarma-s). Thus there are three auxiliary causes which aid Brahma in the creation of the universe. It is in this way that we can set Sureśvara's text in line with Śaṅkara's explanation of the phrase: "Tam vidyākarmāṇī samanvārabhete pūrvaprajāpa ca." ("Knowledge and actions and prior experience take hold of it i.e., the departing soul."—BU IV. iv. 2). It is from these that the Jīva is able to cultivate a new body upon the death of the old one.

237 That is, the antahkarana as consisting of mind (manas), intellect (buddhi), the I-faculty (āhāmkāra), and thought (citta).

238 This metaphor of the body as the citadel of the soul occurs again at CHU VIII. i. 1; MU II. ii. 7; BS I. iii. 14 (see Śaṅkara on these passages).

239 This verse is ŚŚ III. 16:

Karrendriyāṇi khalu pañca tathāparāṇi
Puddhāndriyāṇi mana adicaturṣṭavam ca,
Prāṇaṇaṁ ca kraṇaṁ ca viyadādikam ca
Kāmaśca kraṇaṁ ca tamah punāraṣṭātī pūḥ.

240 The point of this is that neither the word "ignorance" (avidyā) in the sentence that immediately precedes the verse quoted from ŚŚ III. 16, nor the word "darkness" (tamas) in the verse itself, may refer to primordial ignorance which is the cause of the universe and thus the cause of the body itself (see ŚŚ III. 9). This is so because the body is an effect of ignorance, meaning that if that same ignorance is again regarded as one of the components of that effect, then the contradiction that the cause produces itself as one of its effects would arise, leading to a breakdown of the distinction between cause and effect. Thus, the two words mentioned here refer to an effect of ignorance that occurs within the boundaries of bodily existence, an effect such as an error in perception.
This last statement is, according to Anandagiri, to be viewed as a response to the possible objection that Sarvajñatman has dealt only with the concepts of ignorance (avidya) and bondage (bandha) in a one-sided fashion, leaving out an explanation of the meaning of knowledge (vidya) and liberation (moksa). He states: "Kim tarhi vidya-vrttamityasaanka nirupadhitam pratyagbrahmanugam parakrti-seesanarthakam paramanandatmakam prageva darsitam ...." ("Having in mind the doubt, 'What then is the function of knowledge?', he says that it is that very thing which has been explained earlier i.e., in the four previous chapters as having the form of the pratyagbrahman which is without adventitious limitations, which has all suffering destroyed, and which consists of supreme bliss....")
APPENDIX

Pañcaprakriyā *

[1. Sabda-vṛtttiviveka ]

Dīpavatsarvaviṣayaviṣayānotpattihetave
Cidvivartāya nityāya namo vedāya vadhase.

Athataḥ sabdavṛtttiprakāśarhideṇa vyākhyāśyāmō vedārthajñanairnaiṁśydhiyaye. Tisraḥ sabdasya vṛttayaḥ praśiddhilakṣaṇāvunāvṛttaya iti loke praśiddhaḥ. Praśiddhi-sabdena mukhyā vṛttirabhidyate. Yasyārthasya vācakatvena vṛddhayavahāre yaḥ sabdo gṛhyāsaktikō bhavati tasya tenaiva prayojakena tatraivārthe vṛttih mukhyā vṛttitirtiṣṭhyuṣyate. Yathā sāśnādīmadākṛtaḥ gṛhyāsaktikasya gosabdasya "Gaṁnaya." ityādiprayoge tatraivārthe vṛttih. Laksanā tu punaḥ mukhyārthaparigrane pramanāntaravirodhe sati mukhyārthasambhandhādarthāntare vṛttih. Yathā "Gaṁ-

*This is a rendering into Roman script of Sarvajñātman’s Pañcaprakriyā which is found in Devanāgarī script in R. Chintamani’s Pañcaprakriyā of Sarvajñātman with the Commentaries of Anandajñāna and Purnavidyāmuni, University of Madras, Bulletins of the Sanskrit Dept. No. 4, 1946, which has served as the basis for my translation.
गायम् ग्होशन प्रतिवसति। इति प्रयोगे गाँगासंबंध्यताः
गांगातिरे गांगाः सब्दस्य वृत्तिः। गुणवृत्तितः मुख्यार्थपरिग्रहे प्रमाणं
तारविरोधे सति मुख्यार्थहुगुणयोगाद्
अर्थंतंत्रे वृत्तिः इति; यथा "सिम्हो देवदत्ताः।" इति
क्रांरायासिदिष्ठाकुण्योगति सिम्हासंबद्याः देवदत्ते
वृत्तिः। यद्यापि परासंबद्याः परात्रा वृत्तिः इत्यत्रार्पणः
सामानयः लक्षणांगुणवृत्त्योह् तथापयास्योरविन्तरालक्षणाः
भेदेना भेदाः। एवमेतातिस्राणं सब्दस्या वृत्तयो व्याख्या-
ताः।

तत्तदान्त्रम् मुख्यागुणवृत्त्योक्ताविधात्वमेवः।
लक्षणाः पुनास्त्रिविधाः--जाहालक्षणाः जाहालक्षणाः जाहा-
जाहालक्षणाः केति। तत्रा जाहालक्षणाः नामा सब्दस्या
मुख्यार्थापरियमागुणः अर्थंतंत्रे वृत्तिः; यथा गांगाः
सब्दस्या स्वर्थां स्वर्थमात्राः परियमागुणः त्रामात्रे वृत्तिः।
जाहालक्षणाः तु पुनः मुख्यार्थापरियमागुणः क्रियान्यामेवा
स्वर्थांमुपाद्या अर्थंतंत्रे वृत्तिः; यथा "शोनस्तिष्ठति।"
ित्यस्वालक्षणायां शोनसंबद्याः शोनिमानम् ग्रहितवावशवाव-
व्याक्ताः वृत्तिः। जाहाजाहालक्षणाः तु मुख्यार्थापरिग्रहे
सति मुख्यार्थाकादेशपरियमागुणः सब्दस्याकादेश-
शंतंत्रे वृत्तिः; यथा "सो 'यम् देवदत्ताः।" इति व्यक्ते सो
'यमपादयोह् देशकालासाबालविशिष्टों देशकालाबह्यगपरियमागुणः
देवदत्तंयायक्ताः वृत्तिः। एवमेताः सर्वत्र केति लक्षणाः लोके
प्रसिद्धा। नानु मुख्यागुणालक्षणावृत्तिः मध्ये कतमाः
pratyagatmani sabdasya vruttiriti, tatra brumah—mukhyam
vrttim varjayitvā gunalaksanavrtyoh pratyagatmanyapratisedhah. Sasthīgunakriyājātirūdhīnām laukikānāmabhāvat
pratyagatmani mukhyā vrttih pratisedhyata eva. Na khalu
"Neti neti." pratisedhasamastaviṣeṣane pratyagatmani
vānmanasagocaratīte sasthyādisambhavo 'sti, yena mukhyā
vrttirghateta. Tasmād gauṇi laksanā vā sabdasya pratyag-
ātmani vrttih.

"Pratyaktvādatisūksmatvādātmadrstyanusīlanāt/"

iti gunayogadahānādiśabdasya gauṇi pratyagatmani vrttir-
aṅgikṛtaiva. Laksanāpi jahallaksanā ajahallaksaraś ca
neyate; jahadajahallaksanā tvāṅgikriyate parokṣyasadvi-
tīyaśabale vyutpannayoh tattvampadayoh ekāmsaparītīgaṇam-
śāntare vrttisambhāvat 'So 'yam.' ityādiṅkaḥasthopadayaor-
iva. Tasmāj jahadajahallaksanayā pratyagatmā bodhyate;
na gayatrīvaiśvānarādiśabdavat svārthaparītīgaṇajahal-
laksanayā; nāpi "Yajamānāh prastarah." "Yajamāna ekaka-
palah." ityādivat svārthaparītīgaṇa jahallaksanayeti
siddham.

Sābhāsājānānavācī yadi bhavati punarbrahmaśabdastathāham—
śabdo 'hamkāravācā bhavati tu jahati laksāṇā tatra pakṣe
Nauresa rauti loham dhati viśadharao rajjuragre tavāṣā-
vityatrevatmaṣṭunāpi na khulu tada kaścidapyasti doṣaḥ

Idameva vṛttitrayamaṅgākṛtya "Samarthāḥ padavidhīḥ." ity-
atra sūtre jahatvārthāḥ jahatvārthāḥ jahadajahatsvārthetī
bhāṣāpadaprapkṣepeṇa traśiḍyaśuddah laksāṇāvibhāgām ca-
krūḥ. Na caiva mantavyaṃ laksāṇayāpyātmano bodhyatve kar-
matvaprasaṅga iti, a[āvidyā]dhyānopitātaddharmāvixinivarta-
katvāt śāstrasya. Śāstram hi pratyaśātmā śāstraḥdhyānpitamaddharman nivartayatyeva kevalam, na tu tam karmā-
karoti; atah "Yato vāco nivartante." ityādi virdhodho 'pi
nāstyeva. Aupanisadatvaviśeṣaṇamāpi pratyaśātmānaḥ śās-
trasya tadvisayāvidyāśāṁvartaṅkavtena karmatvābhāve 'pyupa-
padyata eva. Tasmān mākhyaavṛttiśārihāreṇa laksāṇāyā vā
guṇavrtyā vā yathābhāgām pratyaśātmāṇi pratipādyamāne na
kaścidvirdhodha iti laksāṇāguṇavrttiśārṣaṇa mumuksaṇā krta-
vayavayatirekena bhāvyam--iti.

Bāhyābhyanantaravastūni yarmanimāṇā cakāsati
tasyai kūṭasthanityāyai mahatyai samvīde namah
śrīmaddeśvarāṅghrisphutakamalamājakāhpātāsamaparkapūtan sarvajñātma samastaśrutipathakuṣalaḥ śabdavṛttiprabhedam vyācakhyāvetamevaṃ yatijanamanasi jñānavaimalyasiddhyai śabdajñānam nidānam bhavati hi jagataḥ śreyasah preyāśca

iti śabdavṛttivivekaḥ
Dvitiyam Prakaranam

[II. Mahāvākyārthavivarāṇam]

Bhāti visvam yadajñānād yadajñānāccca nivartate
Tasmai bodhasvarūpāya namaḥ śuddhāya ēkārṇīgīne.

Athāto vedāntamahāvākyārthe vyākhyaśyāmaḥ. "Aham
brahma." iti mahāvākyārthajñānādeva mumukṣuṇām mokṣo bhava-
vati. Mahāvākyārthajñānam ca bhavati 'Aham, brahma' iti
padadvayārthaparijñānāt. Padadvayārthau ca dvividhau,
vācyau lakṣyau ca. Tatra vācyau śabalam; lakṣyau śuddhaṃ.
Prāṇapindārakāryaśabalam pratyakcaitanyamapi daiva-
paryantam [...amadhidaivaparyantam] aham śabdavācyam. Prā-
ṇapindārkaṃvidyāśabalam advayānandacaitanyam brahma-
śabdavācyam. Itaduktaṃ bhavati—sadvitīyam pratyagrupam-
ahamsaḥabdavācyam pāroksyasahitam advayaśnandacaitanyam brah-
maśabdavācyamiti tayorahamtrahmaśabdavācyayoh kāryakāraṇa-
śabalam padarthaḥ śāmśādhikaśaranyaviśesānviśesāvyabhā-
vena virodhasphurane sati ubhayatra upādhiparītyaḥ kri-
yate; suddhau padārthau ca lakṣyate. Tatra ahampadena pṛṇapindātmakāryasyaadvitīyabhāgagaparītya gena pratyakcaitanyabhāgo lakṣyate. Brahmapi dena ca pṛṇapindātmaka-kāraṇāvidyāpāroksyabhāgagaparītya gena adva yaṇandacaいたanya-bhāgo lakṣyate. Evam pratyakcaitanyamahampadena, adva yaṇandacaいたanya brahmapi dena, lakṣayitvāvatisthāmānasaya yajṣādikṣaṇapita kalmasavya sarvakarmakāndaphalabhūtasya sarvakarmasamnyāsināhā sakṣātkṛtarahmānaṃ jIvanmuktaṃ sanyegjñānāgnidaghasamastaduḥkhanidānaṃ sarvalaksanasam-pannaṃ svājñānakalpitasvapnadrśyakalpitagurumīva kalpita-sabrahmacārisahasraparivestitam gurumupasannasya tatpra-sādalabdhāśravaṇamanananidhidhyāsanābhyasanirastāsambhāva-nāvīparītābhāvanātātparyajñānasamāsyayaviparyayasya param-eśvarānugṛhītasya adhikārīṇāḥ "Brahmaivāhamasmi."; "Aham-eva brahma." iti padadvayalaksitayorahambrahma padārthayoh "Aham brahmaśmi." it Mahāvākyādanubhavaphalaparantam ekatvajñānamutpadyate, adhikārīṇāḥ pramitijanako vedah iti nyāyat. Tasmājñānodayādajñānatackāryanivrttau bādhi-tāntuvṛttyā jIvanmuktaṃ pānena parabrahmaṃ jIvanmuktyoh yu-gapadanubhavāvirodhena kaṇcitkālamavasthitasya saṁīrārām-bhakayoh puñyapāpayorupabhogādēva ksapanaḥ, saṁcitkarmarām samyajñānāgnidaghatvāt, ēgaṁinośca puñyapāpayoh akāraṇāt, kathāmcitkaraṇe tayorapi jñānādāśśesādvartamāna-
dehapate sati—hetvabhāvate—śārīrāntarānut-
patteh sarvagatatasarjaṁśatvasarveśvaratvasarvātmatva-
satyasaṁkalpatvādīnāṁ ajñānakalpitānāṁ gurvaṁśādipra-
paccavat ajñānabhāve yadyapabhāvah, tathāpi nirgunabrāh-
maparisamastavedasākhopanisadgatapunaruktasamastapadopa-
sambhūtraḥa vidhīmukhena pravruttamahāvākyasūvāntarāvākyaparimsānaparījaṁśānyupagamāt, sāmāṅādhikaranyavisāsan-
visēṣyabhāvena virodhasphurane lakṣyalakṣanabhāvena he-
yāṃśaḥnopādeśāṇopādānanyāyopapateh, padārthajñānasam-
uttavāyārthaṁjñānasamūldadādādghajagatpariśistāntitya-
śuddhabuddhamuktasatyaparamāntākāsvaṁdevatvaṁ pratyagbrahma-
svarūpāvasthānalaksanamātyantikam kevalyaṁ viduo bhava-
tyeva. "Ācāryavān puruṣo veda tasya tāvadeva ciraṁ yā-
vanna vimoksye atha sārpaṁyate." iti "Tasya ha na devāś-
canābhūtyā Īśate." ityādiruteḥ. Utkrāntatipatāgaṁkāra-
ṇābhhavat tatpratisedhaśruteśa sadyomuktiyeva jīvanmukti-
śrutismitānāṁ kalpitajīvanmuktaguruvisayatvie śisyasya 
viduo jīvanmuktyabhyupagame ca jñānadagdhaṁśamātrarū-
pan śisyam pratypadeśtrāsambhavōd viduo jīvanmukteḥ 
prayojanābhhavat ciraśrutiścājñānānirābhhāhanāpanayana-
maṁtāvālambikāvalyābhiprayatvyādhyuktatareti kecit.

 Bhūmanyakasyati namasyati vāsudevam
sāṅgam nirasyati tapasyati tattvamartham
Samnyasya karma pari[vārī]vasyati veditāram
dhanyo jayatyayamaho munirekadandī.

Śrīdevesvarapādapaṇkajajaranassamparkapūtātmanā
sarvajñātmagirāṅkitena muninā vyākhyānametat kṛtam,
Brahmātmaikyaparasya vedaśirasah samnyāsināṁ śreyāse
tairevam nījadharmapālanaparairnityam nīsevyam tu tat.

iti mahāvākyārthah samāptah
Trtiyam Prakaranam

[III. Tattvamadarthaavyakhyanam]

Mahadaddijagadyasmajjatan rajubhujanga vat
Tam namami sadanadanadamanthardhinrtaaksinam

Tadhchabda [sa]cchabda vacyamavidyaśabalam brahma.
कायम चा सप्तादासकाम लिङ्गम हिरंयागर्भायां तास्तुक्ष्मसारत्रामात्मनात्र त्रिवर्तकरान्णरुतिसिद्धान्त पान्क्रतमहाभूतानि। तेभा उत्पन्नमाधिदायवम ब्रह्मांडम; अध्यात्मम अधिवृत्तम चा कराष्ट्रास्कराणाधिष्ठितमाल्लोकप्रसिद्धम न तह्य चा सप्तादासकाम प्राणिनाम स्थुलासरिराजातम चा सर्वाम विराधदित्युत्यते। रत्नस्तथा स्थुलासरिराम विराधाक्ष्यम; रत्नस्तथा सुख्स्मसारिराम हिरंयागर्भाक्ष्यम; जक एव प्रार्थवायुभिमानं जीवा त्वाप्रसिद्धरथावह; सच्छाब्दध्वायुनिन्या ब्रह्माविन प्रार्थवायुनिन्या प्राणाधिरामानक्रियायोगां जीवा इत्युत्यते। सा च जीवां जाग्रत्व प्रवासुस्पुटिकाक्षी जाग्रत्वप्रवासुस्पुटियत्वतिरिक्तो निर्गुणो निरवायवो निषाधगो नियाषुधादुब्धधमुक्तसत्यापरमाणं नान्दवास्वाधवाह परमाणवायु त्रिस्वपि कालेहु तन्यकाण्ठकराणासान्निधानां जाग्रत्वप्रवासुस्पुटियतरांतहकराणावस्थाः क्रियाकारकारली नानिकोष्ठ पास्यति। इद्रियार्थोपालविद्रीजागरितां स्थुलाकर्मानिर्मितम; कराणेपुषपसाधर्मायु जागरितासामकाराजासुध्रकर्मानिमित्तो वासनारुपाधस्यदेवसायावसपनाहं; स्थुलासुध्रकर्मादेवायुरार्थस्तत्राजाग्रत्वप्रवासुदयोपारसे तत्त्रु माद वाताक्षे कायायो पवतावर्कसायंतहकराणाया सच्चाब्दध्वायुनिन्या मायाविनी ब्रह्माणी साबले कराणाधिरामावस्थानाम सुस्तिह। एवमेतानि जाग्रत्दिस्तहानानि जीवां क्रमानो 'क्राणि
matarca paśyati. Emanavadhārya pūrvam samādhyañrambhakāle
mumukṣuḥ paścāniścāle 'ntahkarane jātte kṣetrajātam sar-
vam krameṇa prāvilapayet, kṣetrajñām ca pariśesayet. Pañ-
cīkṛtamaṇḍhamābhūtebhyo yadutpannamandādi tatsarvam pañ-
cīkṛtamaṇḍhamābhūtavyatirekena nāsti; yathā mrudutpanno
ghaṭo mrūvyatirekena nāsti, tatkāryatvāt. Eman pañcīkṛt-
maṇḍhamābhūtāni apañci kṛtamaṇḍhamābhūtavyatirekena na
santi. Idānīm hiranyagarbhamātrasūkṣmaśarīramātran pari-
sīstam. Tatrāpi saptaDaśakaṃ līṅgamapañci kṛtamaṇḍhamā-
bhūtavyatirekena nāsti, yathā mrudutpanno ghaṭo mrūvyatire-
keka nāsti, tatkāryatvāt. Idānīmapañci kṛtamaṇḍhamābhū-
tāni pariśīśtāni. Tatrāpyannasaśbdavācyā prthivī udaka-
vavyatirekena nāsti, udakaṃ tejovatirekena, tejo vāyuva-
tirekena, vayurākāśavyatirekena, ākāśaḥ taccabdavācyamāyā-
vibrāhmvatyatirekena; māyāvapi śuddhabrahmavyatirekena
nāsti. Idānīmantahkaranaabhāvāt jāgratvapnasuṣuptīṁ-
abhāve jīvatvavārjita pratyagātmacaitanyasvābhāvo nitya-
śuddhabuddhamuktasatyaparamānandādvayasyavabhāvam brahma
tattvampadārthau pariśīṣtāu. Tatra "Brahmaiva māṁsmi,"
"Aham evabrahma." iti taptaparaśugrahaparyantadārṣthopeto
yastattvamasivākyārthah karatalanyastāmalakvadānubhava-
paryantena jñānena jānāti sa mucyata eva, "Ācāryavān purus-
so veda tasya tvādeva ciraṃ." iti śruteḥ.

iti tattvampadārthavyākhyānam'samāptam
Caturtham Prakaranam

[iv. Avāntaravākyārthavyākhyānam]

Satyānandādirūpāya sarvalokaikasāksine
Namo vedāntavedyāya guruve bhedābhedine.

Athato 'vāntaravākyārtham vyākhyaśyāmah, vidhivad-upasannāya nityānityavastuvivekaśīdhanacatustayasyaṃ-pannāya brāhmaṇāya śravanamanananidhyāsanādividhiprere-rítaya yataye mukhyādhihkārine; anyesāṃ śravanādividhi-preranamantarena pratisedhābhāvamātreṇa adhikāritvādeva-mukhyatvāt.


Tathā[atha] tvampadārthahirūpaparāvāntaravākyar-thamapi darśayisyāmah. Annamayaprāṇāmanamayamayāsvijñāna-
mayānandamayāśākhyaasopādhikāṭtmalaksanakośaḥ pāncakodanyāso
nirupādhyātmasvarūpanirūpārtham, muṣāniṣktadrutatārrādi-
pratimāvat pūrveṇātmanā samānaṣyottaranātraṇo 'tra kathyā-
māṇatvāt: anyathā tadanupayoṣā, itthām ca upayoṣā; na hi amukhyamamrthamanpanyasya mukhyasyārthasya saukaryena pratipādanam sambhavati, arundhatikathanavat; na hi sthūlām tārakāmamukhyāmarundhati manuktvā tatsampavartini śūksmā mukhyārundhati saukaryena nirdeśum śakyate; tad-vat kośapāṇcakamanuktvā na mukhya ātmā vaktum śakyata iti nirupādyā 
[padhika] tmasvarūpakathānārthameva sopādhikānāṁ kośatmanāṁ kathanam, ruñjesīkānyāyena kośapāṇcakādātmānī-karsopapatteḥ. Tathā ca śrutya-prataram—

Āṅgusthamātrah puruṣo 'ntarātmā sadā janañāṁ hrdaye samnivistah,
Tam svācchārītātpravṛṣehmunījādīvasīkāṁ dvairīṣaḥ;
iti. Tasmā kośapāṇcakādvilāksanaḥ pratyagātmā sarvaśa-
rītresveko mahāvākyārthānrayī tvarpadārtha iti śrutau ko-
śapāṇcakopanyāsasya tātparīyam. Tathā jāgratsvapnasusu-
tivilāksana jāgratsvapnasaṃsambandharahito 'dhyātmā-
dhibhutādhidāivasarīfrastha ekastvampadārthāh, avastḥātrā-
vasya vyabhicaritvāt; atmanasavasthatrayanuyayino 'vyab-
bhicāritvāt; vyabhicāriṇāṁ ca sarpaṇḍadāhābhūchidra-
balīvardamūtritatvādivanmīthātivāt; avyabhicāriṇāścātmā-
Pañcamam Prakaranam

[v. Bandhamoksavicārah]

Svājñānakalpitajagatparamēsvaratvajīvatvabhedakalusīkṛtabhūmabhāvā, Svābhāvikasvamahimasthitirastamohā pratyakcitirvijayate bhuvanaikayoniḥ.

Avidyāvasthāyām tu sābhāsājñānadvārena suddhasaiva brahmaṇah prakṛtinimittakāraṇatvam īśvaratvam sākṣitvam ca kāryaprapāṇcamīśityājīvabhedam ṅṛgyam cāpeksya bhavati; yathā suddhasaiva pratyagātmanassābhāsakāryakaraṇasambandhadvārena niyojyātvarātvarābhoktrtrvapramātṛtrvāsambandhah, na kāryakaranasamghātādiviśīstasya, tadvat. Taduktam——

Aīśvaryam kāraṇatvam ca sākṣitvamapi cātmanah, Sadeśītavyakārthasāksyārthenāsyasaṃgateḥ.
iti. Tasmād brahmaiva samsarati sābhāsasvāvidyayā sva-
vidyayā ca brahmaiva mucyate. Samsāraścīsyā brahmaṇo jī-
vatvēśvaratvajagadbhedārayatvam; tannāše svarūpasthitih
mokṣāḥ; "Yo vai bhūma tadamṛtam, atha yadalpam tanmā-
yam." iti śrutēḥ. Brahmaṇeṣca pratyagṛupenaiva jñānājñā-
nārayatvamucyate. Ahametāvantam kālam nājñāśisamātmānam;
iddānīm sācīryaprasādāt [iddānim jānāmiti] jñānājñānayoh pra-
tyagātmābhūrayatvānubhavāt nādvayāñandasvarūpeṇa brahmaṇo
jñānājñānārayatvam, advayāñandasvarūpāṃ brahma mūdhām-
ityādyanubhābhāvāt. Nāpiśvarasya pratibimbasya jñānājñā-
nārayatvam, īśvārao mūdhā ityādyanubhābhāvāt. Īś-
varasya sarvajñātvaśrutismṛtilokaprasiddhavirodhācca.
Nāpi jagato jñānājñānārayatvam, jadatvaprasiddheḥ. Nāpi
jīvākyaprabhimbasya jñānājñānārayatvam, susuptikāle
saryopādhipralaye jīvatvam śaktimadavidyāyāmavasthitamiti
punarūtthānaliñgenānumeyāmeva bhavati, na tvāpārokhātayā
parokṣatayā vā susuptikāle jīvatvasya sphuranāmasti. Na
cā parokṣe jīvākve jīvāsya parokṣatvam sambhavati. Tatra
jīvāśrayatvam cet, ajñānamapi parokṣameva syāt; na Caitād-
drṣṭam; tasmāt pratyagbrahmaṇa evājñānitvamabhuyupaganta-
vam, susuptikāle pratyakcaitanyāśrayatvenaiva jñānasya
sphuranāt. Na cājñānasya visayaśrayavibhāgenāvāsyam bhā-
vitavyamiti codyamasti, susuptau tadabhāvādeva; taduktaṃ
vārtikakaśraih—

Pramātradyyutthiteḥ pūrvaḥ cidanyānacottamah [hanvayāttamo-]
Viśesānā cidevaika svānubhūtyaiva ganyate.

iti. Tatrājñānasyānāṃṣditvāt antahkaranaṅkāṅkacukadvāraṃ vīnaiva caityanyāṃśrayo bhavati; jñānasya tu pariṇāṃśditvāt antahkaranaṅkāṅkacamaparidhāyaiva caityanyāṃśrayo bhavati. Kutasthasya pariṇāṃśditvāram vīnaiva pariṇāṃmasambhandhavirodhāt. Ato bodhyāśabalarṣīmaḥ na paro nāpyacetana iti śabalarṣimno bodhyatvavacanām ājñānānapakṣasaṃ ādīnaṃ na bhavati. Brahmaḥ jñānānapakṣe 'pi jñānāṃśrayatvasya brahmaḥ mano 'ntahkaranaṅkāṅkacukadvāratvāt virodhājñānānasambandho 'pi brahmaḥ mano 'jñānānasambhandhadvāraṇaḥ eva, na brahmadvāraḥ. Nāpyajñānāntarasambhandhadvāraḥ, bhedasya bhedāntaraṇapksatvavadajñānānasambhandhashāpyajñānāntarasambhandhaṇapksatvāt. Tasmādavidusā eva vīdiyoḥ, avidyayai eva vīdiyoḥvātāvam. Tasmād brahmaiva saṃsāraḥ brahmaiva muṣyate "Brahma vrī idamagra, āśītadiṣṭām anuvīdavāvedahāṃ brahmaṁ niṣṭih tas-māttatsarvamabhavat." ityādiśrutaḥ. Yadi punarātmavāsisṭasya jīvapratinibimbasyai jñānakarmadhikāritaṁ syāt, na punarjīvatvakaṅkacukadvāreṇa pratyagbrahmanyah, tadā vi-
śīṣṭarūpenāiva tasya sargagoṅśāṅvayo vaktavyah, sādhaka-
syaiva phalitvāt. Anyāthānyasya sādhakatve 'nyasya ca
phalitve akṛtabhyāgamakrtavipraṇāśaprasaṅgāt; viśeṣanāsyā
cā mahāpralayādau nastasya punaruttānābhāvāt; nastotpata-
tesca lokavedaviruddhatvāt. Samāṇanāmarūpapratyabhijñāyā
tadeva viśeṣanāmidhānāmīti vaktumāṣākyaṃ. Viśeṣanānaśād
viśisṭasya viśeṣapratyabhijñānta[pratīty]rabhāvāt svārū-
pasyaiva pratyabhijñātṛtve svārūpasyaiṅjñātṛtvamāṇāpadyaṃ.
Dvaitadāraṇānavibhrāmasyājñānārayatvādudāvādhiśiṣṭatādvā-
reṇa svārūpasyaiva sādhakatve svārūpasyaiva phalitvasam-
bhavānānoktadosah. Tathā brahmaṇādiśāraviśiṣṭatādvāre-
ṇātmah karmādhiḥkāritvā brahmaṇādiśāraviśiṣṭarūpenai-
vātmano bhoktrtvam syāditi codiyam nāvatarati, viśisṭasyā-
sādhakatvāt, svārūpasyaiva ca sādhakatvāt. Tasmād brahma-
maiva samsaratī svājñānāt, svājñānācāca mucyate. Na ca
brahmaṇassādhakatve 'Advayānandabrahma mūḍham.' ityādyā-
nubhavābhāvo dūṇāṃ, pratyagrupena brahmaṇo mūḍhatvasa-
dhakavābhupagamādityuktam. Taduktam bhāṣyakāraḥ "Na
cā brahmaṇa istic cikīrṣunāśāstrārthaviparatakalpanayā
dvārthaparityāgaḥ kāryāḥ." iti. Vārtikārairāpyuktam--

Aksaṃā bhavaḥ keyam sādhakatvaparakalpane
Kīṃ na paśyati samsāram mayyevaśānākanalpitam.
iti. Tasmād brahmaiva samsarati brahmaiva mucyate; na tu jīvānām jñānājñānasambandhaḥ, bandhamokṣānvayo vā. [tena] ajñānakalpitājñānakalpitabhedānām vā pratibimbakal-pānām vā bimbasthanīye brahmaṇi ajñānamitī paksasya nir-astavāt. Yattu

Parākpravanaya drṣṭyā dhīsthah jīto 'jñānamātmanī
tyomakārṣṇyādivattatāttajjāmī] sambhāvayati na svataḥ.

iti dhīsthasyājñānamuktam, tadantah karanopādhikasya jī-varūpasasya svakāraṇājñānapratyabhijñāvāyamajjakatvābhiprāyena, nājñānasasya jīvāśrayatvābhiprāyena. Pratyakcaitanyāśryam-evā hyajñānam jīvaḥ svagatatvenābhivyanaṅkti, vyāhajakānām
bahunāmevamsvabhāvatvāt; tathā hi śābaleṣādayah pindāṁ
sarvagatatvenaiva vyānajayantī śābaleyo gauḥ, bāhuleyo
gauḥ, mundo gauḥ.' iti. Tathā hrasvaṁgraṇiḥapalo dhva-
nibhedāṃ karanabhivyaktidvāreṇa śabdamaṇi vyānajayantā
vagatatvenaivabhivyāṅjayantī hrasvo 'kāro dirgho 'kāro
ityādi. Tathā manikrpānadarpādādayo mukhasyaḥbhivyāṅjakaṁ
svagatatvenaiva mukhasvabhivyāṅjayantī. Tasmādabhivyāṅjā-
kānām bahunāmayameva svabhāvo loke samadhigataḥ yadutā-
ḥivyāṅgyam svagatatvenābhivyāṅjayantī iti. Tasmādantah-
karaṇasya tadupādhikājīvasya vājiñāṇāśrayatvābhāve 'pi
pratyāgaṭātmaśrayājīnāṇibhiyavajakavādyuktameva tadgata-
tvena jñāṇasya sphuranam 'Aham na jānāmīdam.' iti. Asti
caṁtaḥkaraṇasya tadupādhijīvasya vājiñāṇābhivyajakatvam;
tadabhāve susuptyādau pratyāgaṭātmaśrayasyājīnāṇasya prati-
yamānatve 'pi sphutatarapratītyabhāvāt; tadabhāve ca jā-
garite sphutatarapratīteḥ; uktam ca vārtikakārairantarā-
karaṇāderajīnāṇasyābhivyajakatvam,

Bāhyam vṛttimānupādyā vyaktih syānāhama yathā
Narte 'ntahkaraṇam tadvaddhvāntasya vyaktirāṃjasī.

iti. Yadapi gītēsu kṣetrajñāṇādhyāye sthitvā bhāsyakāreṇa
karaṇasyājīnāṇitvamuktam, tadapi pratyāgaṭamano 'jīnāṇitva-
sya paramārthatvāpavādārtham, na tvantahkaraṇasājīnān-
tvasamarthānārtham, pratyāgaṭamano 'jīnāṇitvasya paramār-
thatve prāpte 'jīnāṇābhivyajakasya karaṇasya tadajīnān-
iti tasya mastake taddhī ksiṇati, pratyāgaṭmanastu tat-
sambandho mā bhūditi; na tvantahkaraṇasyājīnāsambandho
vivikṣitah, sāṅkhyaśiddhāntasvākāraprasaṅgāt, bhāsyāntara-
virodhācca. Tasmādbhāgavatpādiye dārśane pratyāgaṭmana
eva jīnāṇitvamajīnāṇitvam ca. Taduktamīstasiddhiśārañ.-
Svaruk ca bhāti yattatra jñānājñānavibhāgdhiḥ
Ato 'vidyā bhavedyasya bhavettadvayaiva sā.

iti. Tasmāt sābhāsaprathyagajñānāmeva paramātmanah kṣetra
trakṣetrajñātmaṇaṃ kājanātve dvāram. Tatrājñānavatikāscī
dābhāsaprādhaṇānadvārāvastambhena kṣetra jñā-
kāraṇatvam, ajñānapradhaṇānadvārāmdāya kṣetrakāraṇatvam.
taduktām--

Tamaḥ pradhānāṃ kṣetraṇāṃ citpradhānāścidātmanāṃ
Parah kāraṇatāmeti bhāvanājñānakarmabhīḥ.

iti. Atrakṣetrajāśabdena puryastakopādhipatiṣitacidābhās-
grahanām. Karmendriyapaṇḍakaṃ, buddhāndriyapaṇḍakaṃ, an-
tahkaranacatuṣṭayam, prānādipaṇḍakaṃ, bhūtapaṇḍakaṃ, avi-
dyā, kāmaḥ, karma--iti puryastakam.

Karmendriyaṇī khalu pāṇca tathāparāṇī
buddhāndriyaṇī maṇaśḍicatuṣṭayam ca,
Prānādipaṇḍakamatho viyadādikam ca
kamasca karma ca tamaḥ punarastami pūḥ.
Avidyeti mithyājñānam, avidyākāryaprakaraṇāt. Atra tamo-
graññamaavidyāvärttametatparamātmanah. [Vidyāvärtta tu] 
pūrvvoktamiti.

iti śrīmatparmahamsaparivrajakācāryasya sar-
vajñātmanah kṛtau pāñcapraṇāyatāhyam pra-
kaṇanam samāptam.
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