LEFT WEBERIAN CRITICAL SOCIOLOGY
AS IDEOLOGY
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AS IDEOLOGY

by

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ABSTRACT

Much of contemporary Anglo-American radical social criticism, although paying intellectual homage to the work of Karl Marx, is firmly rooted in the modern liberal ideological tradition - corporate liberalism - that began to evolve with the development of monopoly capitalism. Left-Weberian critical sociology, represented in this thesis by the work of C. Wright Mills, Alvin W. Gouldner and Thomas B. Bottomore, is one form of Anglo-American social criticism, and is the focus of study for this work. It is contended that left-Weberian social criticism is a corporate liberal moral reaction to the absurdities and excesses of monopoly capitalism. Theorists of this school of radical thought acknowledge that liberal democracy is more or less a sham, that individuals lack the power of decision-making because their lives are dominated by huge rationalized social structures. They, as intellectuals who believe that ideas matter and should be instrumental in creating a rational, democratic society, are outraged to find themselves "on the outside looking in"; they are ineffectual and politically impotent. However, moral outrage is not sufficient to transcend the limitations of their epistemological and social bases. They firmly reject the apparent reality of corporate capitalism, yet, cannot go beyond it in thought because their radicalism depends not only on an actual adherence to corporate liberalism, but also on the social position of the intellectual within corporate capitalist society. That is to say, their radicalism depends on an ultimate acceptance of bourgeois society. It is in this sense that left-Weberian critical sociology is a form of bourgeois ideology, even though not sanctioning the power of the ruling class per se.
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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction
During the latter years of the 1960's and closely associated with the New Left student movement, there appeared a form of sociology calling itself "new" or "radical" sociology. Antagonistic towards mainstream Academic sociology for its support of the status quo (implicitly or explicitly), for its adherence to a positivistic social science, and for its separation of theory and action, among other criticisms, "radical sociology" advocated a sociology that was anti-Establishment and committed to wide-spread social change. This sociology extolled the need for political engagement on the part of the sociologist and emphasized a humanistic, subjective method that neither claimed nor wished to be value-free or objective.

To some extent the trilogy of theorists whose work forms the subject matter of this thesis -- C. Wright Mills, Alvin W. Gouldner and T.B. Bottomore -- have points of convergence with the "radical sociology" of the New Left years. Yet, despite some similarities, for reasons to be delineated below, we choose to adopt the terminology of David Lazar in describing this particular tendency within Anglo-American sociology as left-Weberian critical sociology.¹

One of the fundamental differences between left-Weberian sociology and "radical sociology" is the belief on the part of left-Weberians that their sociology is scientific in approach; whereas, as Anthony Giddens (1973) maintains, "radical sociology" faces severe epistemological problems because it claims to offer an accurate account of society as well as providing a moral guide to action. There is an
emphasis on action rather than on theoretical and empirical rigor. Another basic reason why we choose not to use the label "radical sociology" is derived from an observation made by Tamar Pitch. She states that with the decline of the New Left by the early 1970's, the most recent developments within "radical sociology" have been towards a "critical theory" of the Frankfurt School variety. (Pitch; 1974, 46) Consequently, the designation "radical sociology" has continued to fall into disuse in the last few years. "Radical sociology" as a classification, itself a vague concept during its heyday, has even less of a meaning today.

Let us then recount Lazar's characterization of the left-Weberian tendency within Anglo-American sociology:

The left-Weberians believe that sociologists should play a major part in the clarification of the great social and political issues of our time...[They] claim to reconcile an objective sociology with a commitment to criticism of social arrangements. They have a dual allegiance: they are professional sociologists and they wish to produce a "critical" sociology. They believe that the sociology they advocate is superior both to the various traditions in conventional sociology and to various forms of social criticism. Conventional traditions are criticized for the fact that they avoid commitment and allegedly produce a sociology concerned with trivial problems. Various forms of social criticism, which exist outside or on the margins of sociology, are criticized for being unscientific in approach. (Lazar; unpublished manuscript)

In a published account of left-Weberian sociology, Lazar adds that the left-Weberians begin with a "moral-political dissatisfaction: They see that the products of Western sociology are ideological ... [and]... they know that the vast majority of sociologists have bureaucratic-capitalist orientations". (Lazar; 1976,320) A number of the theorists that Lazar counts amongst the left-Weberians are the following:
Alvin W. Gouldner, Tom B. Bottomore, C. Wright Mills, Norman Birnbaum, John Rex, and Peter Worsely.

Utilizing the nomenclature of left-Weberian, then, this thesis will be concerned with delineating the particular nature of this critical orientation within sociology as a form of knowledge. This involves understanding the social basis of left-Weberian sociology -- the interests that it expresses -- as well as the epistemological limitations inherent in such a material grounding. It will be contended that left-Weberian social criticism is a moral reaction to the absurdities and excesses of monopoly capitalism. Theorists of this school acknowledge that liberal democracy is more or less a sham; that individuals lack the power of decision-making because their lives are dominated by huge rationalized social structures; and that, as intellectuals who believe that ideas matter and should be instrumental in creating a rational society, they are "on the outside looking in" -- they are ineffectual and politically impotent. However, moral outrage is not enough to transcend the limitations of their epistemological and social bases. The left-Weberians firmly reject the apparent reality of corporate capitalism; yet, they cannot go beyond it in thought because their radicalism depends not only on an actual adherence to corporate liberal methodology but also on the social position of the intellectual within corporate capitalist society. That is, their radicalism depends on an ultimate acceptance of bourgeois society.

What is being maintained as the central postulate of this thesis is that left-Weberian critical sociology, as a radical tendency within a liberal tradition that goes back to what Morton White labels the "revolt against formalism", is a form of bourgeois ideology, not because it underwrites the power of the ruling class per se, but
because as theorists within this school:

they are limited, in theory, by the limits of bourgeois society in reality; because their development, including their criticism of bourgeois society, is governed by the development of bourgeois society and unable to go beyond it. (Shaw in Blackburn; 1972,34)

Insofar as this thesis is concerned with understanding left-Weberian critical sociology as a form of knowledge, it is an exercise in the sociology of knowledge. However, it takes a decidedly different tact than the major sociology of knowledge tradition as established by Karl Mannheim and instead proceeds from the Marxist sociology of knowledge promulgated by such authors as Karl Korsh (Marxism & Philosophy) and Georg Lukács (History and Class Consciousness). Because the central concern of this work is not the point-by-point rebuttal of the claims of left-Weberian sociology and the detailed provision of an alternative or "more correct" framework, it is not considered imperative that a thorough elucidation of such an alternative theory and practice is necessary. What is considered important, though, even if in thematic form, is a delineation of the particular epistemological standpoint utilized in this thesis to come to terms with left-Weberian social thought. This we will immediately attend to.

Marxist epistemology is at the same time ontology. Marx's famous utterance "social existence determines consciousness" makes this an obvious statement. In a social world that fragments human lives, cripples human existence, consciousness of that social world appears as fragmented and crippled. "Man is the human world, the state, society. This state, this society, produce religion which is an inverted world consciousness, because they are an inverted world". (Marx; 1964,43)
This early formulation of the relationship between consciousness and existence is returned to numerous times by Marx, but nowhere more clearly and succinctly than in his discussion of the "fetishism of commodities" in the first chapter of *Capital*:

> A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character of men's labour appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labour; because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labour is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of their labour. (Marx; 1967,72)

In this formulation, commodity production lies at the very centre of man's fragmented consciousness in modern capitalist society. That is, commodity production presumes the existence of alienated labour -- the separation of the creating subject from his object -- to the extent that the products of labour take on the appearances of independent and autonomous entities -- as relations between things not creating individuals.

Simultaneously, man himself is turned into a commodity in terms of the labour-power that he possesses; he sees himself as an object. In this sense, then, the fetish of commodities cannot be seen as merely an illusion confronting human beings. John Allett criticizes the phenomenological approach of Berger and Luckmann when they state that "reification implies that man is capable of forgetting his own authorship of the world." Allett states that "[i]t is not the subject who deceives himself but reality which deceives him." (Allett; 1975-77,287) The problem is not simply that individuals perceive themselves and others as things but that in fact they are things -- they are commodities.

> Therefore, the relations connecting the labour of one individual with that of the rest appear, not as direct
social relations between individuals at work, but as what they really are, material relations between persons and social relations between things. It is only by being exchanged that the products of labour acquire, as values, one uniform social status, distinct from their varied forms of existence as objects of utility. (Marx; 1967,73)

(my emphasis)

The fetishistic nature of commodities acts as testimony to man's real alienation within capitalist society, to the real separation of subject and object. Insofar as what "appear to be" is taken as "what is", we can speak of the fetishism of commodities as being an "inverted" appearance of an "inverted" reality. It is an alienated understanding of an alienated social world.

This is the meaning of the word ideology. As a distorted form of consciousness, ideology is rooted in a particular distorted social praxis. In this conception, ideological thought is consciousness that is bounded by the real development of society and is consequently unable to go beyond the dictates of that society. Therefore, to be labelled ideological, thought does not necessarily have to provide justification for the existence of a social class, it does not have to become a weapon in the struggle between classes (it obviously can be and is that at times). Ideology is not reducible to the motivations of individuals or to the conscious practice of classes or groups; it is not the direct expression of the experience of members of a class. Rather, ideology is thought which is restricted to understanding social reality from the standpoint of "appearances" (because, for example, it is rooted in the social relations of commodity production) and unable to penetrate those social relations which give rise to an "immediate" reality. Ideology conceals those social relations but reproduces them in distorted form...
as an "immediate" understanding of social reality:

[O]ne might say that bourgeois ideology is composed of half truths which result from an exclusive emphasis on appearances. They become distortions of the whole truth and particularly of the dynamic factors in the situation whenever their limitations go unrecognized. (Ollman; 1971, 229)

Georg Lukács, more than any other single Marxist writer, is the theorist who has advanced this particular conception of the nature of ideology. His analysis of reification and social thought amounts to the extension of the basic phenomenon of commodity fetishism to all forms of social life:

The transformation of all objects into commodities, their quantification into fetishistic exchange-values is more than an intensive process affecting the form of every aspect of life in this way (as we were able to establish in the case of labour-time). But also and inseparably bound up with this we find the extensive expansion of these forms to embrace the whole of society. (Lukács; 1971, 171)

It stamps its imprint upon the whole consciousness of man; his qualities and abilities are no longer an organic part of his personality, they are things which he can "own" or "dispose of" like the various objects of the external world. And there is no natural form in which human relations can be cast, no way in which man can bring his physical and psychic "qualities" into play without being subjected increasingly to this reifying process. (Lukács; 1971, 100)

Driven ceaselessly by the requirements of capital accumulation, there occurs a concomitant increase in the division of labour and the spread of formal rationalization, not only in the capitalist economy, but to all spheres of social life as well. Lukács claims that this process disrupts every organically unified process of work and breaks it down into its component parts. To the extent that this happens, society increasingly becomes a system of artificially isolated partial systems
which are internally highly rationalized and law-governed. "[T]hey tend to develop through their own special laws independently of the other partial functions of society ...." (Lukács; 1971, 103) Yet, this rationalization of partial systems, which gives rise to the parcelling of social reality in search of rational laws governing the parts, ultimately results in the abandonment of the concrete subject-matter that underlies the purported expertise of any particular part. That is, because the search for "essences" is restricted to partial systems, the true nature of economics, for example, cannot be adequately understood because of the increasing inability to relate it to other aspects of social life. The study of economics becomes solely concerned with elucidating a partial system of economic laws, political science with political processes, etc.

The more highly developed it [science] becomes and the more scientific, the more it will become a formally closed system of partial laws. It will then find that the world lying beyond its confines, and in particular the material base which it is its task to understand, its own concrete underlying reality lies, methodologically and in principle, beyond its grasp. (Lukács; 1971, 104)

The increasing drive towards formal rationalization with the consolidation of capitalism is therefore also a drive towards fragmentation. Not only does this have dire consequences for the immediate existence of individuals within capitalist society, it also produces a fragmentation of mind, warps the cognitive senses of individuals and creates an inability to transcend the level of "appearance". For Lukács, this becomes the problem of "immediacy" inherent with bourgeois society in general and bourgeois thought in particular, Bourgeois
thought becomes increasingly unable to understand society as a whole because it does not possess the methodological tools for comprehending the special way in which the various parts of the whole are internally connected social relations.

In this instance, when we speak of the "whole" or "totality" we most emphatically do not mean that it exists in any way as a homogenous entity from which deductions about the various ties existing between the parts may be made:

For Marx, the identity of opposites is conditional; but their non-identity, their struggle, antagonism and break-up are inevitabilities. Just the opposite in Hegel. It is the difference between a conciliatory, harmonizing "dialectic" (ultimately no dialectic at all), and a revolutionary, subversive method. (Nicolaus; 1973, 41)

"[The totality] remains the sum of all relations and that which is expressed in each, but does not help, as a distinct concept, in elucidating any one of them." (Ollman; 1971,34) According to Korsh, the concept of the whole is a working principle to guide research and in each instance must be understood in a historically specific manner. (Korsh;1963,214) The totality is a complex of internal-relations that express the thoroughly contradictory nature of class society and, therefore, in order to comprehend the form that the whole will take depends on the analysis of the particular manner in which the various contradictions are worked out in history. This cannot be understood from the nature of "totality" itself but must be empirically investigated; the whole must be "cut into" to determine the multifarious ways in which the various parts are interrelated. Ollman describes this process of apprehending the whole as "individuation", which he says Marx
accomplishes through the "force of abstraction". "An 'abstraction' is a part of the whole whose ties with the rest are not apparent; it is a part which appears to be a whole in itself." (Ollman;1971,61)

The fundamental problem of bourgeois thought, as discussed above, is that liberal theorists confuse the abstract with the concrete; they take what "appears to be" as that "which is essential". We stated earlier that this confusion is rooted in the fetishism of commodities and is symptomatic of an alienated existence. In contrast to this orientation, Korsh maintains that Marx's use of "abstraction" is the "truly general" because it arises out of an analysis of the historically specific conditions of production. (Korsh;1963,79) For example, with respect to the abstraction of the category of labour, Marx states that despite the fact that as a relation it holds true from the most ancient economy to the modern bourgeois economy, it is only in the latter that it achieves practical truth in reality and as a category as well:

Indifference towards specific labours corresponds to a form of society in which individuals can with ease transfer from one labour to another, and where the specific kind is a matter of chance for them, hence indifference. Not only the category, labour, but labour in reality has here become the means of creating wealth in general, and has ceased to be organically linked with particular individuals in any specific form. (Marx;1973,104)

The general value-form, which represents all products of labour as mere congelations of undifferentiated human labour, shows by its very structure that it is the social resume of the world of commodities. (Marx;1967,67)

Here Marx illustrates the dialectical unity between "abstract" and "concrete". "True generalizations" can only be derived from their
concrete historical relations. He criticizes bourgeois economists for their historical conceptualization of abstract labour because, although they understand that labour creates value, they take capitalist society as given and immutable -- as "society" in general -- and, therefore, "smudge over all historical differences and see bourgeois relations in all forms of society". They remain at the level of abstraction taking "appearances" as "essences":

This example of labour shows strikingly how even the most abstract categories, despite their validity -- precisely because of their abstractness -- for all epochs, are nevertheless, in the specific character of this abstraction, themselves likewise a product of historic relations, and possess their full validity only for and within these relations. (Marx;1973,105)

To properly comprehend the social whole, then, it must be studied in a historically specific light. However, in order to accomplish this, the "force of abstraction" is required to penetrate the "living whole" in the search for its "essence". In the Introduction to the Grundrisse, Marx charts two intellectual journeys in the attempt to understand social reality. The first one, and the incorrect one, is to begin with the "whole" -- population for example -- and move towards more general categories through abstraction until a small number of determinate relations are discovered. The second journey begins with the most simple abstract generalizations and their interaction and moves outwards in the attempt to capture the nature of the totality. For Marx, the latter is the correct method. Nonetheless, this does not mean that Marx must begin with the earliest form of society and work his way methodically through history until finally arriving at the bourgeois
economy. As Martin Nicolaus states, "... the proper beginning is not with the dawn of history, but rather, with that category which occupies a predominant position within the particular social formation being studied." (Nicolaus;1973,37) Marx tells us that "[i]n all forms of society there is one specific kind of production which predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others." (Marx;1973,107) In capitalist society, this particular type of production is commodity production, the production of exchange value. Therefore, "[a]our investigation must ... begin with the analysis of a commodity". (Marx; 1967, 35) That this is pivotal to comprehending the specific nature of capitalism -- and both the objective and subjective forms corresponding to it -- can be seen in Lukács' understanding of bourgeois society:

[T]he problem of commodities must not be considered in isolation or even regarded as the central problem in economics, but as the central, structural problem of capitalist society in all its aspects. (Lukács;1971,83)

The category of the commodity, which is the unity of two opposites -- use-value and value -- embodies the key antithesis which becomes expressed at all levels of social existence with its penetration ever further into bourgeois life. It involves the central contradiction of capitalist society -- the private appropriation of the social product -- and is manifested at the political level as the contradiction between civil society and the state, and the social level as the contradiction between the individual and society. They form a totality of internal relations that are dialectically related in that they are "bathed" in and express this fundamental contradiction of class society. Marx and Engels in *The Holy Family* note that:
The contradiction between the democratic representative state and civil society is the completion of the classic contradiction between public common-weal and slavery ... [and] to the same extent that the two are opposed to each other they also determine each other. (Marx and Engels;1975b,137)

That is to say, for example, there is involved a fundamental unity between civil society and the state; one does not appear in causal sequence before the other. One cannot appear causally before the other (except in pure thought), because they emerge, in dialectical fashion, with the growth of the division of labour and bourgeois property relations. They are bourgeois property relations. To conceptualize politics as an autonomous sphere separate from the totality of which it is a part is to deal with it as an abstraction, is to remain merely descriptive. This is what Marx and Engels mean when they state that the struggle within the state between monarchy, democracy, etc., are merely the illusory forms in which struggles between various classes are fought out among one another. (Marx and Engels;1975a,52) It is not that political struggle is illusory, but only that it is one form of class struggle taking place at the level of politics.

These dichotomous categories, which for Marx express the central contradiction inherent in the commodity form, and which are dialectically related, are understood by liberal theorists in the abstract -- ideologically. They do not conceptualize the relationship between capital and wage-labour, private and public, the individual and society, as dialectically related parts of a totality of social relations, but rather, they conceive the relationship between these dichotomous categories as accidental or external.
It is primarily in this sense that left-Weberian critical sociology can be seen as a form of ideology. Despite their criticism of monopoly capitalist society, they are not able to penetrate the "veil of reification"; they are not able to perceive the true nature of the social whole -- capitalist society. We will return to this in the final chapter.

The remainder of this chapter will seek to provide a background for conceptualizing left-Weberian critical sociology as representative of a radical form of bourgeois thought, more specifically, as a utopian/idealistic variant of corporate liberalism. First, we will discuss the emergence of corporate liberal thought and its general bifurcation into radical and conservative tendencies. Second, we will outline in brief and schematic fashion the nature of corporate liberalism in order to provide a basis from which to contrast it with left-Weberian critical theory. Essentially, this will be a study of conservative corporate liberalism's view of reality (its understanding of "power" and "interest", the relationship of the individual to society, the function of the intellectual, and the function of the "public" of voluntary associations).

To understand the rootedness of left-Weberian critical sociology within a general corporate liberal tradition, Chapter Two will study the left-Weberian view of reality (its understanding of "power" and "interest" as well as the manner in which it perceives the relationship of the individual to society) and attempt to demonstrate the parallels that exist between corporate liberalism as portrayed in this introductory chapter and left-Weberian sociology. Chapter Three will delineate the normative orientation (the vision of the "good society") and historical
agency of left-Weberian critical sociology and illustrate the similarities existing between these and corporate liberalism's view of the "good society" and the role of the person of knowledge. Chapter Four will draw together the previous three chapters with the purpose of explaining the epistemological underpinnings of this version of critical corporate liberalism as well as its groundedness -- its social basis -- in monopoly capitalism. Here we will attempt to explain both the immediate and mediated interests expressed by left-Weberian critical sociology. That is, we will claim that the immediate interests expressed are those of the disenfranchised and alienated intellectual and that the true class interests which underlie this position -- the mediated class interests -- are those of corporate capital.

The following section will primarily serve as a backdrop for situating left-Weberian sociology as a critical form of thought grounded in the larger tradition of corporate liberalism. To accomplish this, an outline of the development of corporate liberalism will be undertaken. Although this will necessarily be of a cursory nature, it should be of ample substance to provide a framework for apprehending the character of left-Weberian radicalism, for understanding it as a form of social criticism rooted in corporate liberalism.

Corporate liberalism began to emerge in the United States by the late nineteenth century with what Morton White, in his book Social Thought in America, calls the "revolt against formalism". Central to this new, developing set of theories and methods was the role of the intellectual -- either as a social critic or a social reformer -- in the pragmatic application of knowledge to solving social problems. For the
most part, the "revolt" was the initial reaction of early corporate liberal theorists, of various disciplines, to the theory, methods and practice of an unworkable laissez-faire capitalist society. They saw unregulated capitalism as the major cause of poverty amid wealth, industrial strife, and growing support for radical and militant labour organizations. Charles A. Beard, who Morton White lists as a prominent figure in the "revolt", writes of the reforming tendencies in theory and practice that appeared by the late nineteenth century:

[S]o the widespread and radical discontent of the working classes with the capitalist system hitherto obtaining produced a counter-reformation on the part of those who (wished) to preserve its essentials while curtailing some of its excesses. This counter-reformation made a deep impress upon American political thinking and legislation at the turning of the new century. More than once during his presidency Mr. [Theodore] Roosevelt warned the capitalists that a reform of abuses was the price which they would have to pay in order to save themselves from a socialist revolution. Eminent economists turned aside from free trade and laissez faire to consider some of the grievances of the working class and many abandoned the time-honoured discussion of "economic theories", in favor of legislative program embracing the principles of state socialism, to which countries like Germany and Great Britain were already committed. (Beard quote in White;1970,45)

White asserts that:

[In Beard's] concept of the American Counter-Reformation he formulated a category which embraced the generation of economists, philosophers, lawyers, historians, and political scientists who were represented by Veblen, Dewey, Holmes, Robinson, and Beard himself. They criticized some of the more glaring evils of capitalism, but their political affiliations were never revolutionary. (White;1970,46)

That is, this group of theorists was primarily critical of unregulated laissez-faire capitalism and envisioned in its stead a scientifically managed society in which peace and harmony would replace violent conflict. For these early reformers, the central problem of modern society
was conflict itself rather than injustice or inequality; therefore, it was conflict that was to be eradicated. Consequently, because conflict was perceived to be due basically to psychological causes (i.e., egoism), scientific management -- social control -- was considered to be the answer to the problem of order. (Lasch;1965,162) Concomitantly, because the "new radicals" (as Christopher Lasch labels these reformers) conceptualized exploitation as a matter of waste and not injustice, as a matter of "inefficiency", their solutions consisted of proposing that expert management of productive resources be undertaken. This is seen clearly throughout the various works of Thorstein Veblen (probably the most "radical" of the "new radicals") and most sharply in his volume, The Engineers and the Price System. This book takes as its central theme the wastefulness of the"price system" (Veblen's euphemism for capitalism) because production was geared solely to maximization of profit and directed by business men:

So the business men who have controlled industry, being laymen in all that concerns its management, have increasingly been content to let well enough alone and to get along with an ever increasing overhead charge of inefficiency, so long as they have lost nothing by it. The result has been an ever increasing volume of waste and misdirection in the use of equipment, resources, and manpower throughout the industrial system. (Veblen;1963,66)

Of course, Veblen's solution lies in the direction of industrial production by technical experts for the general welfare of the community.

Yet, as the Schwendingers state, the concept of "efficiency" among early corporate liberal theorists did not solely pertain to the "efficient" management of industrial production but also to the "efficient" moral management of great masses of human beings in the attempt to integrate them within the social order. (Schwendinger and Schwendinger;
Here the emphasis placed on education as an effective means for "socializing" the individual becomes instrumental in the endeavor to eliminate selfish ambitions that generate social conflict. (Lasch; 1965,159) In this scheme, integral to the regulation of modern society (monopoly capitalism) is the intellectual/technician. If nothing else, the "revolt against formalism" was an expression of the need for knowledge to be applied pragmatically to the resolution of human problems (within the parameters of monopoly capitalism):

The intellectual is the social critic -- one who has the analytical potential and conceptual tools for solving social problems -- and related to this view of the intellectual is the great American emphasis on education as the solution to social problems. (Pitch; 1974,48)

But, as the Schwendingers make clear, this "technocratic" view of the intellectual accrues from their function as "organic" intellectuals (to use Gramsci's concept) within a monopoly capitalist society. That is, the need for ideological legitimation of the "welfare-state", as well as practical measures to reduce class conflict, saw a development of new institutions to house intellectuals to train and be trained in the theory and practice of social control. These "organic" intellectuals of emerging corporate capitalism had an institutional groundedness:

in the operations of such agencies as the modern university, public commissions, philanthropic foundations, research and planning institutes, and governmental bureaus. These institutions began to employ professional analysts and researchers who were neither "men of leisure", "free-lance professionals", nor political functionaries. Nor did they necessarily write for popular consumption. They were, instead, part of a growing, disciplined, bureaucratic army of professionals who were employed to directly manage or aid in the management of social institutions. (Schwendinger and Schwendinger; 1974,156)
In this understanding, the Schwendingers do not necessarily include all technocratic theorists within the boundaries of corporate liberalism, as apologists of the status quo; e.g., although Thorstein Veblen produced technocratic writings, he is considered to be a "non-Marxist socialist" and not a corporate liberal theorist. Because Veblen does not underwrite the position of the bourgeoisie, the dissociation between the corporate liberalism of Lester Ward and E.A. Ross, for example, and Veblen's "non-Marxist socialism" may be tenable. However, we are not operating under the assumption that ideology must necessarily sanction the rule of a particular class, or become a direct instrument in a social struggle. Rather, we are arguing that as a form of thought it is limited by the real barriers of the existing social relations and, therefore, fails to transcend the very social structure in which it is embedded. Given this understanding of the nature of ideology, we feel that Veblen, although critical of the existing status quo, is not able to truly transcend in thought the very society of which he is so critical. Because Veblen's criticism of the status quo was itself rooted in the status quo and was itself aimed at only the excesses of capitalism (its inefficiency and waste), his ideal society really only appears as a stylized form of welfare-state, as corporate liberalism's vision of the "good society" in an idealized and abstract form. In this sense, Veblen can be seen as occupying a utopian/idealistic stance within the corporate liberal tradition. Tamar Pitch writes that:

Depending on the specific socio-political climate, the American intellectual has either been a social critic in the Veblen tradition, a social reformer in the Chicago School tradition, or has been thoroughly coopted by the system in one of its agencies devoted to ameliorating social problems. (Pitch;1974,48)
We may discern, then, at least two variants within corporate liberalism, depending on the role assigned to the intellectual: A critical tendency expressing dissatisfaction with the present status quo to the point of advocating large-scale change, and a more or less conservative tendency concerned with social reform within the existing social structure. This distinction between criticism and social reform can be understood in the following manner, as Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. states:

From the beginning of the republic, there have been two strains, related but distinct, in American progressivism. One strain may be called pragmatic: that is, it accepts, without approving, the given structure of society and strives to change it by action from within. The other may be called utopian: that is, it rejects the given structure of society, root and branch, and strives to change it by exhortation and example from without. (Schlesinger, quoted in Lasch;1965,309fn.)

It is our contention that left-Weberian critical sociology occupies, just as Veblen occupied during his time, the utopian/idealistic position within the tradition of corporate liberalism. The groundwork for understanding this position will be laid in Chapters Two and Three, whereas the final chapter will more exclusively and critically deal with it and its consequences for knowledge.

For now, we turn our attention to the outline of conservative corporate liberal thought. The explicit purpose for delineating such a framework for corporate liberalism is not to provide an indepth analysis of this thought (its rich subtleties and complexities are not of immediate interest), but to establish what might be labeled an "ideal type" outline to be used as a point of reference throughout the remainder of this work with respect to left-Weberian critical sociology. Given this, a qualification must be made: Not all those who could be called
corporate liberal theorists will necessarily conform, in all details, to the contours of the framework to be constructed. In other circumstances this may be considered illegitimate, but for the purpose of locating left-Weberian sociology as a critical variant within the broad parameters of corporate liberalism, this is deemed a valid approach.

The first task of this next section will be to examine the manner in which corporate liberals conceptualize the relationship of the individual to society. To put this in proper context, the classical liberal position that sees a contradiction between the individual and society will be briefly discussed. Following this, the corporate liberal understanding of the individual/society relation, as contained in the work of Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, will be studied. The second task confronting us is to provide an outline of the corporate liberal concepts of "power" and "interest" and how these are related to their "pluralistic" worldview and the role of the intellectual/technician. As mentioned earlier, this will furnish a baseline for situating left-Weberian critical sociology within the corporate liberal tradition.

Classical liberalism sees a contradiction between the individual and society. It posits man as an "isolated individual" independent of other individuals and connected with society only through a "social contract":

The crucial point about this conception is that the relevant features of individuals determining the ends which social arrangements are held (actually or ideally) to fulfil, whether these features are called instincts, faculties, needs, desires, rights, etc., are assumed as given, independently of a social context. This givenness of fixed and invariant human
psychological features leads to an \textit{abstract} conception of the individual who is seen as merely the bearer of those features, which determine his behavior, and specify his interests, needs and rights. (Lukes; 1973, 73)

In the classical liberal conception, society is entered into by free individuals with the explicit intent to end the "war of all-against-all" and to safeguard the "Natural Rights of Man". Bourgeois society, in contrast to Medieval society, is "natural" society because it corresponds to the inherent rights and needs of individuals. The individual, therefore, is logically prior to and superior to society. The latter is an artificial contrivance whose sole purpose is to help facilitate individual private interests. Locke makes this clear in his \textit{Second Treatise on Government} when he states:

\begin{quote}
Whenever the legislators endeavor to take away and destroy the property of the people, or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war with the people who are thereupon absolved from any further obedience, and are left to the common refuge which God has provided for all men against force and violence. [They have a right to] by the establishment of a new legislature, such as they shall think fit, provide for their own safety and security, which is the end for which they are in society (Locke; 1952, 124)
\end{quote}

It can be said that the classical liberal view of man and society amounts to the tearing apart of historically evolved relations between men; man, who is both created by his social relations as he creates them, is replaced by the abstractions of the independent, egoistic man, who, in his search for security of his Natural Rights, enters into society:

\begin{quote}
Man is far from being considered, in the rights of man, as a species-being; on the contrary, species-life itself -- society -- appears as a system which is external to the individual and as a limitation of his original independence. The only bond between men is natural
\end{quote}
necessity, need and private interest, the preservation of their property and their egoistic persons. (Marx; 1964, 26)

Of course, in this ideological appraisal of the relationship of man to society we do see elements of truth, although they appear as distorted. (This is one understanding of the nature of ideology.) Indeed, the classical liberals do recognize that society in its abstract formulation as an aggregate of competing individuals is the creation of humanity, but the relationship is not a dialectical one, only a one-way causal and accidentally related one. In the same fashion, they generally acknowledge that the function of the state is to preserve private property. The state is to safeguard the Rights of Man within civil society, but once again the relationship, rather than being internal, is conceptualized as external and not intrinsically related. They are conceived to be relations between man and nature and not man and man (which, of course, involves the mediation of nature).

What this really means is that classical liberalism actually acknowledged the inherent contradictions of bourgeois society -- the tension between the particular and the general interest -- but understood it in an abstract, ideological way as the natural contradiction between the individual and society, civil society and the state. Karl Korsh maintains that early classical political economy saw the class antagonisms as they arose from the private ownership of property but considered capitalist society as natural and immutable. Consequently, classical political economists came to the brink of understanding the true nature of bourgeois society, but were forced to turn back due to their own class position; they could not transcend their own bourgeois
standpoint. (Korsh;1963,47) Korsh states that the classical political economy of Smith and Ricardo and the German philosophical idealism of Kant and Hegel, as superior forms of bourgeois thought that actually attempted to transcend bourgeois society and that were engaged in the critique of the "natural" principles of bourgeois society earlier promulgated by Locke, Hobbes, et al., were due primarily to the real development of capitalist society. That is, in the inchoate phases of capitalist evolution, the Rights of Man, etc., were used to criticize feudal privilege and justify emerging bourgeois property relations, whereas the criticism of those principles correspond to the consolidation of capitalist society where its further development necessitated their critique. (Korsh;1963,61) This genuinely critical phase of bourgeois thought only bridged a narrow space of time -- from the last phase of the revolutionary epoch of the bourgeoisie to the classical epoch of social science -- because of the emerging imperatives to obfuscate the growing dilemmas of capitalist society and the need for counter-revolution. Central to this development was the destruction of the bourgeois family as an independent producer of commodities (with the development of large-scale industry) and its relegation to the sphere of caring for the personal, subjective lives of its members:

Earlier the bourgeoisie had portrayed the family as the progressive center of individualism, but as industrial production destroyed the basis of the early bourgeois family, the family came to be either scorned as a backward institution or nostalgically romanticized. In either case it was contrasted to "society", the system of social production and administration. (Zaretsky;1976,31)

This development saw the emphasis in bourgeois thought shift from the rights of the property owning individual (the petite bourgeois family)
to the rights of "society"; to the need for personal integration within a moral order. In an emerging age in which property was increasingly distributed unevenly and concentrated in the hands of a few, and in which few could realistically hope to acquire property, the status quo could not be defended on the grounds previously employed. Such "natural" rights of man as equality, liberty and security were potentially revolutionary in an age when these ideals had become anachronistic, when they could only be actualized by wide-scale social change. They would act back upon bourgeois society and dissolve it.

The consolidation of bourgeois society and its increasing drive towards formal rationalization saw a gradual decay in the field of political economy with a movement towards "pure economics". The development of economics into a rationalized partial system simultaneously meant a denial that there existed a connection between economics and anything political or social. (Korsh;1963,95)

Political economy which attempted to discover a source of value in objective production relations has been transformed into economics which seeks such a source in consumer preferences, etc. The abstractions with which it builds are not, therefore, those which correspond to the historical categories of the capitalist mode of production. Instead, they refer to the hypothetical and hypostatised subjective values of economic individuals. (Shaw;1975,77)

This same process gave birth to the other specialized disciplines of social science, each claiming expertise in various aspect of human life. For example, "[s]ociology shares the retreat of economics from the objective social relations of production, but elaborates the pseudo-basis of subjective values into a formal system." (Shaw;1975,80) In this intellectual division of labour, sociology was to concentrate on social life,
on man's interactions within society. The field of study was defined as "social actions", "sociation", or "social facts". However, in this instance "social life" is understood from a decidedly abstract and subjective standpoint in that human beings are conceptualized as actors guided by internalized social norms, motivated to action by social values. Sociology divorces the relationship of social existence from its basis in capitalist property relations, and, thus, can only study the "social relations between classes in political, cultural and ideological forms". (Shaw;1975,82) It can only be concerned with describing social life, with comprehending it from the standpoint of "appearance".

Underlying the notion that individuals are subjective actors oriented towards cultural values is the assumption that human beings require order and stability to function as individuals. This is seen most clearly in the writings of conservatism and early sociology which expressed, at different levels of abstraction, the need for hierarchy, tradition, morality and social harmony. Man was cast as an irrational, egoistic being that to be fully human needed regulation within a stable social order. In direct contrast to classical liberalism, such authors as Auguste Comte and Edmund Burke denounced as absurd the notion of the rationally calculating "isolated individual" pitted against society or standing outside of society. In its stead was propounded the doctrine that human beings are social beings wholly dependent upon society. Sociology recants on the classical liberal acknowledgement that there exists a contradiction between the particular and general good, stating that the individual can only develop in and through society. For human beings to develop as individuals, man's egoism must be tamed and regulated
by society; man must internalize the imperatives of social control in
the form of a moral conscience that will provide him with the tools by
which proper, socially sanctioned choices of action may be made. In
the absence of a fully matured sense of self, man's egoistic propen-
sities surface and the attendant problems of "mal-adjustment" appear.
In this conception, the interests of society are also those of the
individual.

Yet, the attempt on the part of early sociology to dissolve the
classical liberal contradiction between the individual and society only
involves a shift in its conceptualization rather than its resolution.
The subjective component of the human being, rooted in his egoistic
biology, is seen to be juxtaposed against the objective demands of "the"
social group. This is not the surmounting of the individual/society
problematic, but simply its reinterpretation.

In the work of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim, two of the most
prominent sociologists of the modern era (the era of corporate capitalism),
there is overriding emphasis on values and norms as a source for social
action, as moral guidelines. A common concern of both these theorists
is that in modern industrial capitalism social values are losing, or
have lost, their ability to orient the subjective human actor in courses
of action conducive to the development of a secure, individuated person-
ality. Underlying this particular perception of modern capitalism is a
view of man and society not dissimilar to the early sociology of Auguste
Comte. The subjective component of man, in its various formulations, is
seen in opposition to the force of the social group, of objective society.
As Eli Zaretsky maintains:
The major tradition of modern bourgeois social thought, as exemplified in the work of Freud and Weber (and we might add, Durkheim), portrays the conflict between the "individual" and "society" as the "human condition" and thereby encourages "mature" acquiescence to the demands of capital. (Zaretsky; 1976, 40)

Durkheim asserts emphatically, in argument against the classical liberal conception of the "isolated individual", that:

Individual and society are certainly beings with different nature. But far from there being some inexpressible kind of antagonism between the two, far from its being the case that the individual can identify himself with society only at the risk of renouncing his own nature either wholly or in part, the fact is that he is not truly himself, he does not fully realize his own nature, except on the condition that he is involved in society. (Durkheim, quoted in Israel; 1971, 148)

In this view, society becomes the source of order and stability that human beings require to develop as individuals and hence, to become fully human. There can be no contradiction between the individual and society, according to Durkheim, because the individual owes everything -- owes his humanness -- to society. Yet, as Zaretsky maintains, the individual/society problem still remains but is conceptualized as the "human condition". In Durkheim's formulation of the "dualism of human nature" we find that:

The conflicts of which we have given examples are between the sensations and the sensory appetites, on the one hand, and the intellectual and moral life, on the other; and it is evident that passions and egoistic tendencies derive from our individual constitutions, while our rational activity -- whether theoretical or practical -- is dependent on social causes. ... Therefore, since the role of the social being in our single selves will grow every more important as history moves ahead, it is wholly improbable that there will ever be an era in which man is required to resist himself to a lesser degree, an era in which he can live a life that is easier and less full of tension. To the contrary, all evidence compels us to expect our effort in the struggle between the two beings within us to increase
with the growth of civilization. (Durkheim, in Wolf; 1960, 338-339)

There is an acknowledgement on the part of Durkheim that the egoistic propensities rooted in man's subjective, biological nature must be regulated by the authority of society, both for the stable functioning of the social order and for the development of the human personality. In this case, the emergence of the human personality, which is a social and historical phenomenon, is a social control mechanism that channels and directs human egoism. As Gouldner states with respect to functionalism in general, there is present a "domain or metaphysical assumption" that stresses the insatiability of man:

Pinning their hopes for stability on a moral restriction of men's wants rather than on efforts to increase their satisfaction, neither Platonism nor Functionalism takes serious account of the vast productive powers of science and technology. Underlying this is the assumption that men are inherently insatiable. (Gouldner; 1970, 430)

So, despite the fact that Durkheim argues forcefully against the classical liberal notion of the "isolated individual" embodied with "natural rights" -- the individual that must renounce his full autonomy in the formation of the "social contract" -- and, thus, dispels the classical liberal contradiction between the individual and society as myth, he does not manage to transcend this central problem. In reality, he effects a change in the meaning of the individual/society problem with respect to the imperatives of social control in emerging corporate capitalist society. Durkheim posits the question: How may social stability remain intact without destroying individuality, and conversely, how may individuality flourish without destroying social stability. For Durkehim, this is a social and historical problem that contains within it
a fundamental ahistorical component. There remains a conflict between the subjective wants and appetites of the individual and his existence as a social being.

This corporate liberal construction of the contradiction between the subjective individual and the objective demands of the social group is apparent also in the thought of Max Weber, albeit in somewhat different form. Gerth and Mills summarize Weber's view of man and society:

He conceived of individual man as a composite of general characteristics derived from social institutions; the individual as an actor of social roles. However, this holds only for men in so far as they do not transcend the routines of everyday institutions. The concept of charisma serves to underlie Weber's view that all men everywhere are not to be comprehended merely as social products.

Just as for George H. Mead the "I" is ordinarily in tension with the social roles derived from the expectations of others, so for Weber the potentially charismatic quality of man stands in tension with the external demands of institutional life. ... For Weber, the response of the charismatic leader to distress unifies external demands and internal urges. In a broad sense, one may say that externality is identified with constraint and charisma with freedom. Weber's conception of human freedom thus partakes of the humanist tradition of liberalism which is concerned with the freedom of the individual to create free institutions. (Gerth and Mills; 1946, 73 my emphasis)

Given the above understanding, the subjective, spontaneous component of man in Weber's thought, which Gerth and Mills liken to Mead's concept of the "I", can be roughly equated to Durkheim's notion of the egoistic elements of the human being. This aspect of the human constitution is encased within cultural values or expectations which when internalized form the human personality. According to Gerth and Mills, therefore, in Weber there exists a timeless tension between the subjective spontaneity of the individual and the need for conformity to cultural values.
Under certain historical circumstances the "active" component of human beings may "break out" of the cultural constraints in the form of charismatic movements in which new institutions are fashioned, new cultural values institutionalized. This is the motive force of history.

However, modern bureaucratic society, with its increasing division of labour in the form of instrumental rationalization, continually destroys the basis upon which any kind of free spontaneity -- behaviour deemed irrational by instrumental rationality -- can be expressed. Moreover, the unique national and cultural values which provided for the emergence of the cultivated, well-rounded individual (the values which allowed an outlet for human creativity) were simultaneously being levelled with the emergence of the technical expert and the spread of formal rationalization to all spheres of human existence:

Hovering over the Western world, Weber saw the specter of rationalization, of bureaucratization -- not only in political government but in the economy, the educational system, religion, recreation, and all other areas of social life. Tradition and charisma alike would be reduced in authority, incapable of ever again being the basis of human behavior. (Nisbet;1973,442)

Therefore, Weber speaks of the "parceling-out of the soul" underway in modern bureaucratic society, and with it the destruction of human individuality. In the absence of a higher value system, human behavior was increasingly circumscribed by narrow, formal rational considerations.

The central problem of modern society is its destruction of the values necessary for the development of the autonomous personality. The corporate liberal contradiction between the individual and society appears in Weber's thought as the historical contradiction between subjective, value-oriented man and objective, bureaucratic society. But, underneath
this understanding is the ahistorical tension between the spontaneous individual and the constraining system of cultural values spoken of earlier by Gerth and Mills.

Weber's general conception of the individual/society relation is not unlike that of Durkheim's. Both consider the human being to consist of two fundamental aspects: (1) An objective or social element which amounts to the internalization of cultural values and norms in the form of a personality, and (2) A subjective element which is inherently egoistic (for Durkheim) or spontaneous (for Weber) and which is pitted against the external constraints of society. Given this understanding, both Weber and Durkheim can be partially critical of modern industrial society for not permitting the proper development of the human individual, for not providing an adequate structure of values and norms to orient human beings. However, lying below this historical perception are ahistorical conceptions that picture an irresolvable tension between the subjective and objective components of human nature. The problem is understood as inherent in human life. This is what we mean when we say that the contradiction between the individual and society in modern corporate liberal thought, although it may not always be recognized as such, is between the subjective individual and objective society. In denying that human beings are "isolated individuals", in affirming that men are social beings, they push the classical liberal contradiction between the individual and society deeper into meta-theory, give it a new twist, and obscure it from view. That is to say, corporate liberal thought, in one of its forms as modern sociology, can attempt to understand the relationship of the individual to society in a historical manner.
by employing the concept of the "self-image", etc., (some cultures allow the emergence of individuals with a personal identity, others do not). Essentially, however, because the "self-image" is in reality a social control mechanism, what underlies this conception is an ahistorical construction that sees the subjective impulses of the individual in tension with the requirements of social regulation in society. Despite the greater sophistication of modern sociological categories, the problem as first formulated by Auguste Comte has not been eclipsed.

Marx tells us that the classical liberal conceptualization of man is one-sided, fragmented, and an abstraction. In "On the Jewish Question", he states that:

Man as a member of civil society is identified with authentic man, as distinct from citizen, because he is man in his sensuous, individual and immediate existence, whereas political man is only abstract, artificial man, man as an allegorical, moral person. (Marx;1964,30)

In this sense, man's real alienation, his real fragmentation, is understood as "authentic" man in civil society separated from "moral" man in the political community (which is considered a natural separation). The classical liberal primacy given man in civil society (economic man) corresponds to the early development of capitalist society where the prerogatives of bourgeois property must be justified vis-à-vis feudal privilege. But sociology, both early and modern, because it corresponds to a later development of bourgeois society (the age of counter-revolution and centralized property) stresses the opposite abstract conception of man -- moral man, social man, personal man. Man is a social being, not an "isolated individual" pitted against society. But, as we have seen, the attempt to surmount the problem of the tension between
the individual and society only really entailed a shift in meaning, not its resolution:

On one side appeared "society" -- the capitalist economy, the state, the fixed social core that has no space in it for the individual; on the other, the personal identity, no longer defined by its place in the social division of labour .... In opposition to this harsh world that no individual could hope to affect, the modern world of subjectivity was created. (Zaretsky; 1976, 40)

Individuality, now no longer connected with objective criteria of property ownership, becomes associated with one's personality or self-identity. Individuals are now conceived as subjective beings energized and constrained by cultural values, in search of a moral identity.

The latter idea still involves the notion of abstract man because sociology does not understand, just as classical liberalism did not understand, that human beings both create and are created by their social relations. They do not understand that to conceptualize the problem of capitalist society in terms of a conflict between the subjective proclivities of man and the constraints of objective society is to deal with both man and society in the abstract; is to ignore that such a conflict is rooted in the historically specific class relations of capitalism; is to fail to recognize that their very formulation of what the Schwendingers call the "neo-Hobbesian problem or order" ("neo-Hobbesian" because it corresponds to the need for integration in industrial capitalism) is but an intellectual expression of the real problem of order in capitalist society.

As will be demonstrated presently in Chapter Two, left-Weberian critical sociology understands the plight of modern man to be the increasing inability of individuals to fashion a coherent self-identity -- a
morally autonomous personality -- in the face of centralized bureaucratic structures. It will be seen that underlying the left-Weberian understanding of modern capitalist society is essentially the same view of man and society contained in the work of Durkheim and Weber.

At this juncture, we begin our "second" task of this section -- the further schematic outline of corporate liberalism. In order to accomplish this it might perhaps be instructive to briefly consider the classical liberal view of reality as well as their concept of "interest" and compare it with that of its latter-day corporate liberal cousin.

In their struggle against feudal privilege, the bourgeoisie, in the form of classical liberal thought, denounced all intermediary structures that existed between the individual and the state. All institutions that seemed to inhibit the "Natural Rights of Man" were considered artificial and at odds with Natural Law; if humanity was to evolve to higher stages of civilization these barriers to human progress must be removed. As Robert Nisbet maintains:

The abstract individual was conceived as the sole bearer of rights and responsibilities. The State, conceived in the image of people who lay incorruptible beneath the superstructure of society, would be the area of fraternity and secular rehabilitation. All that lay between these two elements -- gilds, churches, professions, classes, unions of all kinds -- were suspect for their fettering influence upon the individual and their divisive consequences to the people's State. (Nisbet, in Olsen;1970,198)

In this understanding, society was considered to be simply an aggregate of singular individuals or families that through unfettered competition in the pursuit of private interests could further the interests of the entire community.
That which was considered to be an "interest" was not conceptualized as emanating from the objective situation of classes, etc. (because these were considered to be arbitrary and anachronistic residues) but, rather, from the isolated individual. Isaac Balbus maintains that "interest" was defined in a subjective manner as a psychological state of mind which corresponded to whatever the individual perceived to be in his interest, to whatever the individual "desired". (Balbus; 1971,155)

Underlying this conception is the image of man as a rationally calculating individual, as an "independent centre of consciousness", who, because he knows his own mind, should not be hindered by feudal tradition or an interventionist state. Also underlying this notion is an "epistemological individualism" that takes the individual as the starting point of analysis without recognizing the objective social relations of production that, although they are created by men, exist independently of their will. That is to say, these social relations of production allot to each person his objective situation, and therefore, "interest", in the established order.

As noted earlier, the emphasis that classical liberalism placed on the individual vis-à-vis society gradually gave way to a more collectivist mode of thinking in the corpus of conservative writings (among them sociological thought) that began to emerge with the Romantic Reaction. The individual, now conceptualized as basically irrational in nature, needed the social bond that only social institutions could provide. We find a growing emphasis on the functions of tradition and hierarchy, once so anathema to classical liberals, in the provision of
security for the individual. Robert Nisbet writes that such theories as conservatism, anarchism, syndicalism, and the liberalism of Tocqueville and Lamennais appeared at this time and, although variform in nature, shared a number of important continuities with respect to a worldview, in contrast to the classical liberal view of reality. These continuities comprise the elements of the "Plural Community" and are as follows: (1) Plurality: the notion that society is a plurality of diverse social and cultural associations forming a community (2) Autonomy: each association has a function within the larger social order and requires autonomy from encroaching political authority and other institutions to be functional (3) Decentralization: authority must be delegated as much as possible to the various associations in order to keep the social order from atrophy, to ensure the proper functioning of its structures (4) Hierarchy: there should be a stratification of values and goals which forms the backbone of the plural community; it ensures diversity and guards against atomization and a mass society (5) Tradition: all stable social orders require a consensus among the constituent parts for the proper functioning of the whole (6) Localism: there is an emphasis on the function of the family, neighbourhood, and small community in combating human isolation and alienation. (Nisbet;1973,389-390)

Whereas the theories from which the above elements of pluralism were extracted often express the interests of a class position antithetical to industrial capitalism (e.g., petite bourgeois anarchism), they constitute a partial resource pool of ideas that once abstracted and reinterpreted from the standpoint of corporate capitalism's problem of hegemony become important in the construction of a corporate liberal view
of reality. The Schwendingers, in their book *The Sociologists of the Chair*, write that by the last quarter of the nineteenth century, in response to emerging monopoly capitalism and growing inequities between capital and labour, there arose radical labour movements throughout the industrialized capitalist world. Generally these were centered around trade unions and often took the form of anarcho-syndicalist organizations. The word "anarcho-syndicalism" was coined during the late nineteenth century in France and involved an eclectic combination of early socialist, Marxist, anarchist and trade union ideas. (Schwendinger and Schwendinger; 1974,121) Anarcho-syndicalists perceived capitalist society to consist of large economic blocks of irreconcilable interest groups split between wage-labour, on the one side, and the state and capital on the other:

Unlike the Marxists, however, they felt that parliamentary struggles compromised the class struggle. They rejected both political and parliamentary strategies for social change and restricted their policies for the attainment of socialism to such trade union actions as industrial slowdowns and strikes. (Schwendinger and Schwendinger;1974,122)

The utopian society would consist of decentralized trade unions in the absence of privately owned banking and industrial syndicates. The Schwendingers state that similar developments occurred in the United States at approximately the same time, for example, in the organization of the militant International Workers of the World (IWW).

Contiguous with the emergence of these radical movements, partly in response to their very ideas, and partly due to the increasing need to stabilize the new corporate economy in the face of labour unrest, appeared the earliest attempts to consolidate a body of theories -- corporate liberal theories -- to explain and to reconcile the class conflicts which promised to tear capitalist society apart. Because these new ideas origi-
nated in various industrialized countries in response to basically the same imperatives, and because they contained essentially similar analyses of the problem of industrial disorder, the Schwendingers state that this transitional form of thought (early corporate liberalism) can be labelled "liberal-syndicalism".\(^6\) Such diverse theorists as Emile Durkheim in France, Edward A. Ross and Lester Ward in the United States, and Adolph Wagner and Gustave Schmoller in Germany, came to conceptualize industrial society as a number of competing, functionally related economic groups whose conflict could be reconciled through melioristic "welfare-state" proposals by making the competition more fair within the framework of capitalism. (Schwendinger and Schwendinger;1974,125) These theorists were generally critical of unregulated laissez-faire capitalism because it left labour groups at a serious disadvantage and thus contributed to increasing industrial tensions. They realized that if reforms were not instituted, the growing unrest could push labour groups toward more radical solutions to their problems (e.g., toward socialism). In a classic case of "cutting one's losses", the early corporate liberal proposals included the establishment of a neutral state that would act as an arbiter between conflicting groups to ensure industrial harmony. The state should strive to create a balance of power between the competing units so that no one group could unduly wield power for its own sake.

This does not mean that they were anti-capitalist, because, on the contrary, they saw the capitalist class as a functional group necessary for the stability of industrial society. (Schwendinger and Schwendinger;1974,123) It was the laissez-faire capitalist who was only concerned with his own selfish ends instead of co-operating in the creation
of a harmonious industrial democracy who was negatively sanctioned by liberal-syndicalists. In this formulation, the anarcho-syndicalist critique of capitalist society was "turned on its head" by liberal-syndicalism and defused.

As mentioned earlier, these theorists were primarily concerned with providing answers to the "neo-Hobbesian" problem of order, of social control. Proper socialization in the form of a moral conscience was considered instrumental in this process. This could only be effective if intermediary institutions were present to ensure that individuals could develop social bonds with other individuals, could feel secure and "rooted" in their relationships. This is the main implication of Durkheim's emphasis on the need for society to develop "corporations" or "occupational groups". He was concerned with the means by which individuals could be integrated within the social order. In direct contrast to classical liberalism, Durkheim notes the importance of intermediary groups for social life:

A nation can be maintained only if, between the State and the individual, there is intercalated a whole series of secondary groups near enough to the individuals to attract them strongly in their sphere of action and drag them, in this way, into the general torrent of social life. (Durkheim;1933,28)

Another social force located by these early corporate liberal theorists in the maintenance of societal equilibrium was the predominance of a consensus of beliefs that would allow interest groups to compete, but not to the extent that "the rules of the game" would be circumvented in the attempt to attain the absolute ends of the respective groups. The blocs of competing interest groups must realize the need
for class accommodation and conciliation as well as competition. The state and opposing interest groups must force those driven inexhaustibly by selfish interests to comply with the "rules of the game". Failing this, according to E.A. Ross, the system itself could collapse. (Schwendinger and Schwendinger;1974,221)

It should be apparent that the early theories of corporate liberalism, in the general guise of liberal-syndicalism, conform quite closely to Nisbet's outline for the "Plural Community". Nisbet himself writes of Durkheim:

What Durkheim did was to take the same overall perspective of community we have seen in the writings of conservative, liberal, and radical pluralists, and, without relinquishing any of the premises of these ideologies, convert the perspective into the theoretical structure of a system of sociology. (Nisbet;1973,437)

Nisbet finds in the work of Emile Durkheim a concern with the decentralization of political authority so that functional groups may enjoy a greater measure of autonomy and thus better serve to integrate individuals within the moral order, a concern with the establishment of a new value consensus to encourage social bonding, and a concern with the proliferation of numerous interrelated social groups that will provide individuals with a "home" -- with security. These are basically the elements of Nisbet's "Plural Community" and they can be found as well in the works of other early corporate liberals such as E.A. Ross and Lester Ward. Their worldview, then, can be summarized as "pluralistic".

As is the classical liberal idea of "interest", the liberal-syndicalist concept of "interest" is essentially "subjective" in content. In the liberal-syndicalist conception of monopoly capitalist society
there are two major interest groups -- syndicated labour and syndicated capital -- each with their own special "interests". However, in this instance "interest" is defined in a subjective manner; it involves the selfish, egoistic desires of a specific group of people vis-à-vis other groups. "[Albion] Small actually viewed social class as merely one among many "interest groups" which were attempting to control the state in order to advance their own "selfish interests". 7(Schwendinger and Schwendinger; 1974, 281) Group interest emanates from the selfish, natural desires of the individuals composing the interest group. Workers may demand higher wages, capitalists may seek higher profits, but both pursue their own ends as subjectively defined by them. Class reconciliation becomes possible, given this understanding of the concept of interest, because it merely involves the social control, within certain limitations, of selfish group desires, the taming of egoism. Christopher Lasch illustrates this in his book The New Radicalism in America:

[T]hey [the "new radicals"] proposed to attack such public problems as the conflict between capital and labour by eliminating the psychological sources of conflict, by "educating" capitalists and laborers to a more altruistic and social point of view -- in other words, by improving the quality of men's private lives. (Lasch; 1965, 163)

This perception of "interest" also undergirds the liberal-syndicalist notion of power. Power is subjectively defined as the ability to realize one's own desires despite opposition. Or, as Weber has said:

"Power" is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests. (Weber; 1947, 152)

In this perception of "interest" there is no notion that the "interests" of classes are objectively determined by their respective
relationships to the mode of production. That which determines whether one is a capitalist or not does not revolve around the question of "motivations of conduct", around egoistic desires for higher profits, but rather, on one's position in the place of production. Likewise, "power" cannot be properly understood if it is seen to be rooted in the selfish drive to "get what one wants" as subjectively defined by social actors. Power in this sense is conceptualized as the cause of human domination, of inequality, because one group of individuals is able to dictate to other groups the terms of their relationship. This amounts to an elaborate tautology which states that a group has power because it has power. It does not adequately explain the "essence" of power, what it actually corresponds to in terms of a social basis. A more complete view would be to see the exercise of power as a consequence of class rule based on the ownership of private property. That is, it does not depend on any "accidental" relationship between groups, on a "probability" that one group will be able to dominate another, but on the objective relationships between social classes. "[P]olitical power is precisely the official expression of antagonism in civil society." (Marx and Engels; 1975c,161) Power has concrete roots in the relationship between classes and is not to be considered a "free-floating" phenomenon subjectively imposed on others on a whim or desire.

Consequently, given the liberal-syndicalist definition of power, decentralization is the answer to the problem of its monopolization by a particular group. The power of one group must be off-set by the power of competing groups (with the aid of the neutral state if necessary) in order that a balance of power be struck among the functionally
interdependent economic blocs. A balance of power will ensure that, at least in the long run, the interests of the entire community will be served.

For the most part, this scheme borrows heavily from the classical liberal model which emphasized the importance of competition between property owning individuals and families to preserve freedoms and ensure social progress. With respect to the central dynamics necessary for the preservation of a political democracy, the liberal-syndicalists, and, as shall be seen presently, the liberalpluralists, shift the focus from the competition between individuals to competition between interest groups. That is, although the emphasis changes from individual to group competition, pivotal to both in the institutionalization of the "good society" is the separation of polity and economy, public and private -- bourgeois private property. With this separation political freedoms are maintained because no one individual or group has control of the instruments of the state.

During the revolutionary phase of the bourgeoisie, classical liberalism used this argument against the feudal aristocracy to justify bourgeois property. However, in the age of emerging corporate capitalism this same argument was utilized in the partial critique of laissez-faire capitalism:

In their criticisms of laissez-faire capitalism, they [corporate liberals like Ward, Ross and Small] described a liberal state corrupted by men of wealth and power. In their programmatic statements about social reforms, they described a beneficient state that dispensed justice in the interests of the population as a whole. (Schwendinger and Schwendinger; 1974,126)
This (ideological) perception of the state, which the Schwendingers label "schizophrenic", emphasizes the need for the real separation of polity and economy within a regulated corporate capitalist society. This could be achieved through the proper control of interest group competition in order to prevent the access of one economic group to dominant political power. Decentralization of power entails the preservation of a separation between public and private in the form of corporate private property with its interventionist Welfare State.

The abstract formulation of the separation of the polity and economy, then, finds its concrete roots in the existence and perpetuation of bourgeois private property; in the maintenance of the production of exchange-value as opposed to use value; in the longevity of the commodity form.

As stated earlier, liberal-syndicalism was a theoretical attempt on the part of early corporate liberals to come to grips with the problems of monopoly capitalist stabilization around the turn of the nineteenth century. Their transitional sets of theories and concepts, especially concerning the nature of class conflict and class collaboration, formed much of what came to be known by the 1950's as liberal-pluralism. The Schwendingers articulate that the concept of pluralism represents a higher level of formal abstraction than syndicalism. Primarily, this is due to the fact that pluralists do not just see economic blocs or syndicates in competition, but also, numerous other interest groups (e.g., citizens groups). In fact, there appears a marked shift away from an emphasis on structural relations between capital and labour (which formed the centre of liberal-syndicalist concerns) to the multifarious
relationships existing between functionally independent interest groups:

Pluralism eventually envisioned highly fluid and adjustable functional relationships between an infinite variety of interest groups and, as a result, was highly effective in obfuscating the social-class dynamics that actually determined long-term changes in capitalist societies. (Schwendinger and Schwendinger; 1974, 277)

Competition amongst the various social groups becomes the very life-blood of a pluralistic democracy. According to Seymour Martin Lipset:

[D]emocracy is not only or even primarily a means through which different groups can attain their ends or seek the good society; it is the good society itself in operation. Only the give-and-take of a free society's internal struggles offers some guarantee that the products of the society will not accumulate in the hands of a few power-holders, and that men may develop and bring up their children without fear of persecution. (Lipset; 1960, 439)

Expressed in this statement are a number of major pluralistic tenets:
The fundamentally important role of voluntary associations (the "public") in creating a dynamic society; the need for interest group competition in striking a balance of power (Galbraith's "countervailing powers"); and the need for decentralization of power -- the separation of polity and economy. That is, if we employ Nisbet's six elements of a "Plural Community" we see an emphasis here on "decentralization", "plurality", "localism", and "functional autonomy".

Yet, such competition as does exist among the plurality of interest groups must be institutionalized; it must transpire within socially acceptable limits or it may result in a "tearing apart" of society. (Coser, in Coser et al.; 1976, 181) A consensus must prevail concerning the "democratic" methods that may be employed to further a group's ends. This corresponds to "tradition" in Nisbet's formulation.
Nevertheless, "hierarchy" also has a place within the liberal-pluralist schema. Generally, theorists of this tradition acknowledge that modern capitalist society is stratified along a series of status positions. However, since the status system is regarded as basically open, opportunities for social mobility exist. As such, it is considered functional in that it helps to create a dynamic society in which individual attempts to "get ahead" result in benefits to the social whole.

Despite this, one important aspect of modern pluralism is not taken into consideration in Nisbet's abstract nomenclature of pluralism (i.e., the role of mass education and the function of the person of knowledge -- the intellectual). Liberal-syndicalism, given what Morton White labeled the "revolt against formalism", placed a great emphasis on the pragmatic effects of knowledge in the amelioration of social problems. At times in the works of the early corporate liberal sociologists, this conception of the intellectual approached that of Comte's "sociologist-priest" -- the intellectual/technician as technocratic manager of industrial society. However, less extreme views are more often adhered to with a belief in the social scientist as a skilled technician and social engineer with responsibilities for "fine-tuning" society in league with public interest groups. Knowledge and the role of the intellectual is ostensibly to be used in practical fashion for social reform as dictated by earlier corporate liberals; although for many modern social scientists the reforming zeal once embraced by their intellectual forefathers has been lost -- many have been completely co-opted within private or public bureaucracies and are content to "follow
orders", to not be concerned with much other than their employer's prerogatives.

Connected with the practical role of the intellectual is an emphasis on mass education and the mass media to create "extensive flows of information and influence among its [pluralistic society's] constituent parts". (Olsen;1971,184) This is a crucial tenet of liberal-pluralism because adequate education and knowledge are necessary for intermediate organizations to effectively communicate their ideas, to debate others' ideas, and to mobilize for action. Without proper information, the "free give-and-take" of a pluralistic society cannot function and there appears a threat to democracy. Moreover, if associations are not aware of the intentions of other groups or not aware of who is responsible for social and political decisions, there emerges the danger that the system of power will be skewed in one group's favour. Politicians may not feel they must remain accountable to the people; larger interest groups may unduly influence the state at the expense of smaller groups. Therefore, for a pluralistic democracy to be worthy of its name, there must be adequate channels for public information and debate in order that interest groups may express their views and exert influence to ensure that no one person or group dominates the decision-making process.

Liberal-pluralism, descending in linear fashion from liberal-syndicalism, shares a similar though more abstract view of social reality. It sees operative within modern capitalist society a decentralized power system: Struggle between various functionally interrelated interest groups competing within an overall consensus; an informed "public" with access to information pertinent to their interests; and social scientists
ready and willing to apply scientific knowledge to the resolution of human problems.

Modern pluralism also shares a similar conception of "interest" and "power" with liberal-syndicalism. Essentially, pluralism views "interest" from a subjective standpoint as the specific set of "attitudes" or "preferences" of a particular group or association that becomes manifested as political issues. As an example of the pluralistic concept of interest, Isaac Balbus quotes David Truman's *The Governmental Process*:

> [As] used here "interest group" refers to any group that, on the bases of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups of the society for the establishment, maintenance or enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes ... the shared attitudes, moreover, constitute the interest.

(Truman quoted in Balbus; 1971,159)

In the same way, "power" is conceptualized in a subjective manner. Power is wielded by those individuals at the reins of institutions capable of affecting decisions in their own favor against all opposition. Interest groups are power groups whose motivation to seek power or influence those in power stems from the subjectively defined interests of the group. In sum, "[t]hey are structures of power because they concentrate human wit, energy, and muscle for the achievement of received purposes". (Latham, in Keynes, *et.al*; 1970,67)

Balbus writes that:

> If preferences or wants are taken as the starting point of theoretical analysis, then the origin of preferences or wants necessarily become random or free-floating; i.e., consciousness is given no structural basis and is therefore not subject to systematic analysis. (Balbus; 1971,165)

What this suggests is that underlying the pluralist notion of "interest" and therefore "power", are similar methodological problems that informed
their conception of the relationship of the individual and society. Although society is recognized as an "objective" structure, it is in reality understood from a decidedly "subjectivist" standpoint; it is conceptualized as really nothing more than a conglomeration of institutions which are only a conglomeration of separate individuals moved to action or constrained by subjective values:

For social groupings are people in connected relationships; the connected relationships do not exist apart from the people. To recognize the group basis of society and, by inclusion, the group basis of the political and other communities, is not to lose sight of the individual. Far from it -- the individual is the centre without which the circumference of the group could not form. ... [G]roups exist for the individuals to whom they belong; by his membership in them the individual fulfills personal values and felt needs. (Latham, in Keynes et.al.;1970,67)

Interest groups are formed because a certain number of individuals share similar values; power is sought in order to safeguard or implement the goals of the group. But, as Balbus states, because this understanding of interest cannot locate the origins of interest except as emanating from individual subjective desires, this is tantamount to saying, in an abstract and round-about manner, that individuals are inherently selfish and egoistic. This is what many early corporate liberals stated "up front", and this was why they believed that a competitive, pluralistic capitalist system, regulated so that competition was "fair", comprised the ideal society. In more sophisticated and abstract terminology, modern corporate liberals have come to the same conclusion, based on essentially the same reasoning, and employing the same deficient epistemology.

Just as modern corporate liberal economics restricts its study
to "consumer preferences", sociology analyzes the subjective orientation of social actors in terms of the particular values that they embrace. Insofar as politics overlaps with sociology, the subdiscipline of "political sociology" emerges to study the power relations that surround cherished values. But such a study from the very start rules out the fact that "power" (in this instance) is a manifestation of the social relations of capitalist society, of the antagonism between classes. It studies "power" and "interest" in a formal sense, torn out of the context of class relations that give them any meaning at all. As a consequence, as with the corporate liberal conception of the relation between the individual and society, sociology can only deal with surface appearances, with debilitating abstractions:

The very most that can be achieved in this way is to set up a formal typology of the manifestations of history and society using historical facts as illustrations. This means that only a chance connection links the theoretical system to the objective historical reality that the theory is intended to comprehend. (Lukács;1971,154)

Before we close this chapter, a few words will be said about the liberal-pluralist normative orientation. For the most part, because the status quo is generally acceptable to liberal-pluralists, there remains little to be done to achieve the "good society". What is required amounts to ensuring that the very mechanisms in place that provide for a stable democracy are maintained and strengthened -- mass education, open channels of communication, the opportunity to form groups to further one's interests, the extension of social reform measures in order that all levels of society are integrated and can participate in the economic and political structures of society, etc.. However, as Lipset says,
we cannot have our cake and eat it too:

We cannot have the advantages of an aristocratic and a democratic society; we cannot have segregated elite schools in a society which stresses equality; we cannot have a cultural elite which produces without regard to mass taste in a society which emphasizes the value of popular judgement. By the same token we cannot have a low divorce rate and end differentiation in sex roles, and we cannot expect to have secure adolescents in a culture which offers no definite path from adolescence to adulthood. (Lipset;1960,451)

This appears as a general acknowledgement that even though modern capitalist society is the "good society", it is not truly a "utopia". It has its problems, but none of a magnitude that cannot be resolved gradually over a period of time.

As shall be seen in Chapter Three, the left-Weberian theorists basically employ the same conceptualization of "interest" and "power" as the conservative theorists of corporate liberalism. Moreover, it will become obvious that although the left-Weberians are critical of the existing status quo and the manner in which it is perceived by liberalpluralists, they actually reproduce the pluralist view of reality at a higher level of abstraction as their own vision of the "good society".

This introductory chapter has sought to accomplish a number of preliminary tasks in order to lay the foundation for comprehending left-Weberian critical sociology as a form of liberal ideology. In the first few pages of this chapter we delineated our understanding of the nature of ideology in general and provided a brief outline of the epistemological standpoint to be taken in this thesis. This latter endeavor was hardly to be taken as an exhaustive study on the problem of knowledge (this would obviously take a work of its own), but was meant to suggest
the direction in which some of the answers lie. Following the discussion on ideology, the remainder of the chapter characterized corporate liberalism. This began with an explication of the "revolt against formalism" and the emergence of corporate liberalism. It was maintained that this tradition contained both "radical" and "conservative" adherents, depending on the role assumed by the intellectual. Veblen was characterized as representing the radical (utopian/idealist) tendency and the Chicago School the conservative position. Proceeding this we dealt with the outline of conservative corporate liberalism. The relationship of the individual to society, the concept of "power" and "interest", the role of the intellectual, etc., were studied as these were manifested in the theories of conservative corporate liberalism. This was done in order to provide a base-line for understanding the coming chapters on left-Weberian critical sociology as an example of the radical tendency within corporate liberalism.
Footnotes

1. Lazar states that the usage of the term "left-Weberian" is, for him, a shorthand label to describe this particular group of theorists. It does not imply that there exists a Weberian orthodoxy to which these theorists subscribe. Essentially this is how we look at the issue and, therefore, we will not be concerned with establishing Weber as the ultimate source of their ideas.

2. Of course, pivotal to Marx's concept of commodity production is the theory of surplus-value - the exploitation of wage-labour by capital. Although this is not directly discussed in this paper, it is too central to Marx's thought to go unacknowledged.

3. It is plain that Lukács borrows from Max Weber with respect to the discussion of rationalization. However, Weber's thesis is essentially descriptive in nature because it is conceptualized as a wholly cultural process, whereas Lukács is able to ground his theory in the historically specific phenomenon of capitalist commodity-production.

4. It should be noted that the entire tradition of liberalism, whether one talks about classical liberalism, laissez-faire liberalism or corporate liberalism, is tremendously complex, both in terms of its historical development and its diverse collection of theorists. As such, our treatment of liberalism will necessarily be selective and will often deal with generalities rather than specifics.

5. Of course, this does not mean that no other radical organizations were active, but that, simply, for our purposes, "anarcho-syndicalism" is solely mentioned.

6. The Schwendingers state that although there were many secular, religious, and national variations in the development of liberal-syndicalist ideas, on an abstract level they can be seen as similar theoretical constructions. (Schwendinger and Schwendinger;1974,128)

7. The Schwendingers note that Small used the concept "class", but that in his usage of this category it was clear that he meant "interest group". The confusion arises because of the absence of a standardized system of early corporate liberal categories. "These categories did not become stabilized in American sociological usage until the twenties." ((Schwendinger and Schwendinger;1974,281)
CHAPTER TWO: The Left-Weberian View of Reality
One of the principle tasks deemed essential for a thorough understanding of the left-Weberian sociology of Mills, Gouldner and Bottomore is a delineation of their view of social reality. Such an exercise will hopefully provide a general, composite worldview that could be said to characterize this school of thought. As well, it will provide the background information from which the more abstract assumptions which form the groundwork of the left-Weberian view of reality -- specifically, the relationship between the individual and society -- can be extracted. The primary concern of this chapter will be to outline the left-Weberian view of reality as expressed in the works of the three theorists chosen for study. It will be more a source of material on which the concluding chapter will feed than a critical dissection of the ideas themselves. Yet, Chapter Two will be "meaty" enough that immediate connections will be apparent between the discussion in Chapter One concerning the assumptions of man and society contained in conservative corporate liberalism and the assumptions of the left-Weberians. In summarizing the chapter this will be indicated.

The outline of Mills', Gouldner's and Bottomore's view of social reality will have as its focus the respective theorist's perceptions of the nature of modern capitalist society and its effects on the quality of human life. Often these authors contrast modern capitalist society with earlier forms of capitalism, as well as Soviet state socialist society. Insofar as these contrasts impinge upon a full reading of the left-Weberian view of reality, they will be considered. First, then,
Mills' definition of social reality will be adumbrated, to be followed by Gouldner's and Bottomore's.
C. Wright Mills

There has been some debate whether or not C. Wright Mills ever fully abandoned the assumptions of social behaviorism that occupied his attention as a graduate student and young faculty member. Don Martindale, in Prominent Sociologists Since World War II, makes the claim that Mills' flight from social behaviorism was contained in germ form even during his early years, and that by the time of the writing of The Sociological Imagination, the "break" was irreversible. Another position, however, and we feel a more accurate one, is espoused by Joseph A. Scimecca in his volume The Sociological Theory of C. Wright Mills. Scimecca asserts that Mills' early interest in the social behaviorism of the pragmatists was cemented with Weberian sociology in Character and Social Structure (a work co-authored with his former mentor) to create a "working model" of a social system that was put to practical use in all his later works (indeed, it was found in White Collar published two years prior to Character and Social Structure).

It is our belief, following Scimecca, that Character and Social Structure can be interpreted as an effort to construct a framework, or paradigm, for the analysis of human life within various social structures. It is our contention that the explicit theories developed in this work -- concerning human motivation, the genesis of the self-image, role-conflict and human estrangement, integration or autonomy of social orders, etc. -- form a fundamental groundwork for Mills' substantive theoretical
comprehension of the "main drift" of contemporary social structures and its consequences for the "inner life" and "external career" of individuals. Although we will not illuminate the complete paradigm set forth in Character and Social Structure, those areas germaine to a full understanding of C. Wright Mills' view of reality (the imperatives involved in the genesis of the "absolute individual" and its obverse the "cheerful robot") will be introduced.

One of the central themes developed in Character and Social Structure is that within certain historic social structures there appears in the evolution of humanity an individuation of the self, the emergence of individuality. This concern seems to derive in the main from George Herbert Mead. In making the distinction between "primitive" and "civilized" human society, Mead professed that, in the case of the former, the "oppressive" and "stereotyped" social institutions in their rigidity and inflexibility "crush or blot out individuality"; whereas, in the latter form of society, the "flexible" and "progressive" social institutions foster rather than discourage individuality. (Mead;1934,262) The same general conception is expressed by numerous sociologists such as Weber, Durkheim, Simmel and Cooley. Yet, it is less important to delineate the exact source of Mills' formulations than to note the similarity in stance exhibited by Mills, on the one side, and the classic sociologists on the other. In general, for all, individuality emerges with the surmounting of traditional, undifferentiated social structures caricatured by a strong "collective conscience" and "stereotyped social roles". Individuation of self, which is characteristic of modern society, is facilitated by differentiation of structures and heterogeneity of social roles insofar
as, in Mills' words, "a detachment from roles, a distance from the expectation others exact when we play these roles [occurs]." (Gerth and Mills; 1953, 100) Man's image of self no longer completely coincides with the expectations of others because, due to the segmentation of social structures, roles are no longer continually homogenous in public and private spheres. Their monolithic nature is overcome. A "free space" is created resulting in the potential for voluntary choice and action, and based on this, there is the necessity to reconcile and synthesize competing expectations of significant others. We are told by Mills that this feature is grounded in the human need to maintain a balance of self-image (to reduce anxiety):

In a society in which the roles certain persons may play are consistent, and in which few choices exist, the problem of the consistency of the self is socially solved. For then no one person may take it upon himself to achieve an individual integration of self. But in a society where there are inconsistent expectations exacted of the person, and hence alternatives offered, each person will have to achieve such consistency and unity of self as he can. In this process, man is individuated, and this individuation involves the building of a generalized other from the conflicting expectations of significant others. (Gerth and Mills; 1953, 100)

The process of individuation, Mills maintains, finds its highest expression in classical liberal society, superbly illustrated by the example of early nineteenth century United States. It is here that the structures of society have been most supportive of human individuality. Central to this is the differentiation into "relatively autonomous orders" on the part of the major institutions. The economic order, embracing the full intent of the doctrine of laissez-faire, demanded a very real freedom from political interference. Concurrent with this the religious
order, kinship order and military order emerged as separate arenas in which no other institution was sovereign. (Gerth and Mills; 1953, 356) The authority of the political order, once the traditional mode of social integration, becomes in liberal society a largely unseen and unfelt loose framework with a mandate to protect the social order (certainly not to dominate it). (Mills; 1951, 10) The decentralized nature of the polity is matched by small-scale ownership of property in the economic order and by the unbureaucratic and technologically unsophisticated military. (Mills; 1956, 7) The means of production, of administration, and of violence are characteristically decentralized to the extent that decisions and actions undertaken in one institution do not necessarily impinge upon the transactions of other orders. The faltering of a local economy, for example, does not automatically entail the marshalling of political and military forces to its aid. In a society of "relatively autonomous" institutions, "ramifications" between orders is of minimal consequence.

The initial growth in the autonomy of the institutional orders mentioned above begins, according to Mills, with the Western Renaissance and Reformation. (Gerth and Mills; 1953, 352) From this time on, politics emerges from the all-pervasive religious order; economics is removed from political and religious domination. Historically, liberal society is the quintessence of these trends; the formal -- and operative -- separation of state and economy completes the drive towards functional autonomy of institutional orders.

It is in the interstices of the polity and economy that the bourgeois public, with the voluntary association as its classic instrument,
fully emerges as the backbone of democracy. (Mills;1956,299) With the triumph of the middle classes and middle class property, the feudal integration of economy and polity crumbles; a "free space" in which unrestricted competition of opinion peers centred in "little circles of face-to-face citizens discussing their public business" is instituted. The bourgeois public, then, with its free ebb and flow of discussion, links the interests of groups of private citizens with the state giving them an effective voice in decisions that affect their lives. At the same time, it provides a very real check on the power of the state primarily because "its members may go beyond criticism of specific policies; they may question the very legitimations of legal authority". (Mills;1956,299) For confirmation of this, witness John Locke's thesis concerning the right of the people to dissolution of the legislature in situations of tyranny.

According to Mills, the victory of bourgeois private property not only secured a basis for political freedoms and competition of ideas, but also provided in the economic realm a foundation for the guiding ethos of individual competition (the prime determinant in the development of morally autonomous man). The differentiation of social structures and the contiguous development of individuation is crowned by the emergence of a bourgeois private economy of independent commodity producers. It is here that all the forces of individuation coincide and find their highest expression. It is here that "absolute individuality" sets root and flourishes.

Mills asserts in White Collar that the single most important fact about a liberal society of small-scale ownership is that most men
owned the property with which they worked. (Mills; 1951,7) This provided security (in a bad year one could consume one's own produce) and also equality, personal independence, and freedom from oppression. In a self-balancing and expanding society of freely competing entrepreneurs, no one man, or group of men -- no central authority -- could hope to dominate the mechanisms of the free market. (Mills; 1951,9) A social configuration such as this, based on the principle of laissez-faire, assured individuals of success and prosperity if hard work and diligence were adhered to:

Competition was a means of producing free individuals, a testing field for heroes; in its terms men lived the legend of the self-reliant individual. In every area of life, liberals have imagined independent individuals freely competing so that merit might win and character develop; in the free contractual marriage, the Protestant church, the voluntary association, the democratic state with its competitive party system, as well as on the economic market. Competition was the way liberalism would integrate its historic era; it was also a central feature of the classic liberal's style of life. (Mills; 1951,12)

Although liberal society contained differentiated social structures -- the relative autonomy of its major institutions -- and thus carried within its parameter the foundation for the development of the individuated self, the society was integrated in such a way, along a consensually held set of principles, that the forces of differentiation were not carried to the extreme. Differentiation of social structures is circumscribed by, indeed tempered with, an integrative principle of individuality and competition inherent within the segmentation of social orders in the West:

In all orders competition means that individuals act in a field of action which impersonally disciplines them
for uniform strivings and motives, and in its terms free men find their places. (Gerth and Mills; 1953, 356)

And, concomitantly, what appears at the highest level of abstraction -- the symbol sphere -- is a way of thinking that expresses the very value, worth and dignity of the human individual -- a "cult of the individual" in its Durkheimian formulation -- which serves to unify and guide the rational and moral self-determination of the individual. (Gerth and Mills; 1953, 356)

Essentially, what this means at the level of the role is that with differentiation people are freed from the overwhelming constraints of the "collective conscience" and forced to synthesize a self-image -- an individuality -- from the conflicting expectations of others. The search for self is on. Yet, and this is fundamental for grasping the nature of nineteenth century America from Mills' standpoint, such a phenomenon does not result in personal anarchy due to the all important fact that there prevails a consensus. This consensus is a uniformly held value-system centred around the principles of competition and individuality that serves to integrate human action within the larger social whole. In conflict there is consensus. From this was constructed an "inner-directed" self, or, in Mills' words, an "absolute individuality".

Mills offers two ideal types of society: (1) The liberal society of democratic publics, best illustrated by the model of 19th century America; and (2) Mass society, which the modern United States is increasingly coming to approximate. (Mills; 1956, 302) If, in Mills' view, liberal society can be characterized as an era of individuality in which the power of the public reigned supreme, then monopoly capitalism at mid-twentieth
century must be conceptualized as a regressive form of social structure
due to its hindering of individual initiative and autonomy. A general
outline of mass society and its emergence is provided by Salvador Giner:

'[M]odern society is the result of a general breakdown of
the elements of differentiation that internally div-er-
sified former societies, as well as the parallel result
of a loss of the sense of the sacred: technology, econ-
omic abundance and political equality have created a homog-
enous society, in which men are the prey of the impersonal
forces of bureaucracy and regimentation, while ideological
fanaticism is their only fatal refuge from the moral desert
created by generalized apathy and secular disbelief. (Giner;
1976,xii)

For Mills, the impending development of a mass society in modern America
matches the general pattern elucidated by Giner. The de-differentiation
and growing homogeneity of modern social structures, founded on the pro-
cess of bureaucratization, centralization and formal rationalization
and capped with the development of a fabulous technology subservient to
irrational ends, delineates the general movement behind the "main drift"
of monopoly capitalist society. Out of this shift in social structural
alignment is created the Kafkan protagonist of modern society, the tragic
figure of the anti-hero.

A detailed examination of Mills' thesis concerning the ascendancy
of the "power elite" and the creation of the "white-collar world" will
not be detailed here. Rather, their broad parameters as they lend sub-
stance to Mills' more abstract formulations in Character and Social
Structure will be of sole import in the depiction of his view of monopoly
capitalism. That is to say, what historical occurrences have created a
bureaucratized and massified world? What historical occurrences undermine
people's ability to achieve "unity of self"?
Mills writes in *White Collar* that the nineteenth century United States was characterized by "democratic property" but that now "class property" is predominant. (Mills;1951,14) The fundamental difference is that "democratic property" entails a unity of work and property on the part of the owner, guaranteeing his personal freedom; whereas, on the other hand, "class property" implies that the owner employs wage-labour, thereby assuring the worker's enslavement. Such a unity that existed between work and property is reduced to flotsam by the tidal wave of property centralization whose swell had begun by the time of the Civil War. (Mills;1956,120) Business enterprise, when coupled with a rapidly growing technology, began to outstrip the available market (which developed at a slower pace) resulting in crises of overproduction. The restriction of competition and the administration of prices became immediate imperatives. "In the attempt to stabilize matters, the captains of industry began to draw together, and out of their epic competition there emerged impersonal monopoly." (Mills;1951,21) With merger appears a new social form which quickly comes to dominate the economic landscape -- the corporate bureaucracy. And so begins the juggernaut of the "Enormous File" with its increasing rationalization and specialization of work function:

[O]ffices continually become larger and, as they do, changes occur: personal telephone calls, smoking during office hours, visits from personal friends, and handling of personal mail are restricted, while mechanization and social rationalization -- including rest periods, rest rooms, and hospital plans -- increase.(Mills;1951,198)

Yet, the centralization of property to form a national, indeed international, economy requires the concomitant centralization of other
major institutions in order to achieve an administered equilibrium that becomes essential with the eclipse of the spontaneous self-balancing society of small property. Now the "ramifications" of, for instance, an economic downturn reverberate their calamitous effects throughout all institutions shaking their very foundations:

The government is therefore increasingly obliged to intervene and to support by special political measures whole industries and sectors of social life. This interventionism, in turn, tends further to centralize controls and to increase the interdependence of the large structures. (Gerth and Mills; 1953, 461)

And so we see that centred around the domestic problem of "slump" during the 1930's, an irrevocable step is taken towards the fusion of political and economic orders. In this early frenetic attempt to stabilize a ravaged capitalist economy, the political man assumed the lead. (Mills; 1956, 273) By the end of the decade, the unity of polity and economy is forged into a triumvirate with the ascendancy of the military. This fateful development finds its origins in the expansion of technology (more specifically, in the enormous range and destructive capabilities of modern weaponry) and the shift in elite focus to international problems surrounding warfare. (Mills; 1956, 275)

We now live not in an economic order and in a political order, but in a political economy and moreover a political economy that is closely linked with military institutions and decisions. (Gerth and Mills; 1953, 456)

Therefore, pivotal to the maintenance of the status quo is the coordination and centralization of decision-making functions within the major institutions of monopoly capitalist society -- the polity, military and economy. Increasing bureaucratization as the means to social integration
is the result, as is the wielding of decision-making power (often with
global consequences) by those at the summits of the respective institu-
tions -- the power elite.

The steady integration of the three major institutions of American
society has, as noted, widespread "ramifications" for the entire social
structure. Institutions not of the "Big Three" are relegated and shaped
to serve the imperatives of the ascendant orders, as are the four "spheres"
(which Mills distinguishes from institutions in Character and Social
Structure) -- technology, status, education and symbols. The kinship
order loses its productive function and now becomes important as a refuge
from work, as a unit for mass consumption. Religion is desecrated to the
extent that its tone becomes one of complacency and indifference; it
bears the soft message of "good cheer" and "glad tidings" which soothes
the conscience of an amoral society; it becomes a well-adapted rearguard.
(Mills;1958,152) The sphere of education, once serving to create citizens
who were critical and creative thinkers, is now restricted to the teaching
of vocational skills for the labour market and "life-skills" for "social
adjustment", as well as the indoctrination of nationalist loyalties.
(Mills;1972,368) The perversion continues into the technological sphere
where rational means are subverted to irrational ends by the power elite,
thus creating the central dynamic of capitalism -- the tendency towards
overproduction, (Mills;1951,25) It also continues into the symbol sphere
where the "master symbols" of legitimation, once established by face-to-
face discussion in the construction of legitimate claims and limits to
authority, now become those of the master institutions manufactured and
disseminated by a manipulative mass media (with the result that power is no longer legitimized, only obfuscated and, therefore, removed from critical reflection). And finally, it continues into the status sphere where the pursuit and possession of the omnipotent "greenback" becomes a fetish functioning to align individual aspirations with those of the "Organization".

The above forms an institutional outline for an understanding of the emergence of mass society in twentieth century United States. Large-scale bureaucratization has its immediate effects in the interdependence of all social institutions. This marks the breakdown of social differentiation and the beginnings of a homogenous society -- a mass society.

Mill characterizes a mass society as follows:

(1) Far fewer people express opinions than receive them; for the community of publics becomes an abstract collection of individuals who receive impressions from the mass media. (2) The communications that prevail are so organized that it is difficult or impossible for the individual to answer back immediately or with any effect. (3) The realization of opinion in action is controlled by authorities who organize and control the channels of such action. (4) The mass has no autonomy from institutions; on the contrary, agents of authorized institutions penetrate this mass, reducing any autonomy it may have in the formation of opinion by discussion. (Mills; 1956,304)

He notes that four trends mark the transition from a society of publics to a mass society: (1) With the rise of large bureaucratic structures in the economic, political and military orders, and their increasing interpenetration, there is a conçomitant decline in the role of the democratic public as that arena which separated the state and economy, on the one side, and the state and family, on the other. (Mills;1972,360)
Closely associated with the destruction of the bourgeois public as central to politics is the institutionalization of a mass media of distraction. This marks the second major trend in the genesis of a mass society. Mills states that "between consciousness and existence stand communications, which influence such consciousness as men have of their existence." (Mills;1951,333) During the era of liberal society, the link between consciousness and existence was primarily provided by face-to-face discussion and served to integrate individual experience with group experience in the context of the larger society. However, in the age of the large organization and sophisticated technology, the means of communication become enlarged and centralized. The tendency here is away from active face-to-face participation in public discourse to passive acceptance of electronically delivered symbols and images under the ownership and control of a coterie of elites. The mass communication system creates what Mills labels "a sort of technological illiteracy" that: (a) encroaches upon and disrupts small-scale discussion; (b) does not connect the information on issues with personal troubles of individuals; (c) does not enable individuals to transcend the narrow milieux of their lives, to focus on the larger realities of whole social structures. (Mills;1972,363) Instead, the mass media supplants the talked about experience-as-issues of men in publics with technologically induced experience-as-comic opera. "The contents of the mass media are now a sort of common denominator of American experience, feeling, belief, and aspiration." (Mills;1951,334) Images of success and its "individuated psychology" inundate the consciousness and become embedded as aspects of modern man's character structure. A world of
baubles, bangles and beads placates the browbeaten "little man" of Babbitt's world, diverting his attention from socio-political issues into an onanistic realm of privatized gratification. His selectively laundered experience is not really conceptualized as issues for public debate, nor does it demand such formulation. Man is rendered passive, isolated, de-politicized; his "browbeatedness" reinforced and assured.

(3) The third master trend indicated by Mills in the ascendancy of a mass society is the shift in the class, status and occupational structure following the demise of the old middle class of independent small-scale entrepreneurs. (Mills;1972,363) Destroyed is the unity of work and leisure; gone is the linkage between work, status, income and property. Replacing this unity, which at one time facilitated the growth of a secure individuated self, is the fragmentation inherent within bureaucratized wage-labour. Mills writes that:

[A]s work declines in meaning and gives no inner direction or center, leisure becomes the end of life itself, and the leisure ethic swallows up all values, including those of work. (Mills;1972,349)

The meaninglessness of work and the need to escape from it spawns two distinct images of self: The everyday image based upon work, and the holiday image based upon leisure. The vocabularies of motive comprising man's roles in work and leisure pull in polar directions. The unity of self is bifurcated. Man is alienated. Furthermore, with the separation of work and homelife the sphere of leisure "becomes the center of character-forming influences, of identification models: it is what one man has is common with another; it is a continuous interest." (Mills; 1951,234) Likewise, the status system is affected by the transition to a
white-collar world and invariably falls prey to that fetish of leisure, mass consumption. Past years witnessed a stable status system in which a consensus prevailed over the connotations of prestige (the ability to work productively one's own property). Now, however, decline of small-scale property sees the status system rest precariously on the highly ambiguous power to consume, which introduces contradictory vocabularies of motive surrounding the pursuit of status. Claims to prestige may be made by invoking a number of vocabularies of motive which may or may not be honoured. A "status panic" ensues. The full implication of the status panic as well as the disjunction between work and leisure and work and home is found in the continual process of segmentation of human roles and contradictory vocabularies of motive. In brief, this means the disintegration of the unity of self.

(4) The fourth master trend making for a mass society is the transition from a small community of publics to that of the metropolitan society. (Mills;1972,365) The former society is one in which most individuals know each other more or less intimately because their daily routines are not formally segregated. In contrast, a metropolitan society consists of people with narrow routines who never come to know each other except in terms of specific functions. Whole people are not, cannot be, known. Roles are further segmented because one's daily pattern consists of utilizing a vast array of vocabularies of motive appropriate to specific narrow milieux which are devoid of continuity. Pre-judgment and stereo-type flourish under these conditions; they are the counterpart to a hollow self-image, a disunity of self.

In the emergence of a mass society, what do these four trends
(the destruction of the bourgeois public, the growth of a mass media of distraction, the centralization and bureaucratization of private property, and the appearance of the metropolis) mean for the individual living in modern twentieth century America?

To begin with, it means that man confronts large, impersonal bureaucratic structures in the face of which he is powerless. Modern capitalist society sees man separated, as Weber noted, from not only the means of production, but also the means of administration and the means of violence. The modern world reduces man to a small insignificant cog in a vast, rationalized social mechanism. Those functions once performed by man for himself (and which secured his individuality) -- production, decision-making, defence -- have been expropriated and now stand over and above him as Leviathan. As such, the institutional groundwork of the morally autonomous individual reduces to a heap of brick and mortar.

Secondly, it means that the values that once provided the "consensus within conflict" for the integration of individuals within a differentiated society of competitive small-scale entrepreneurs are ameliorated to the point where they amount to empty rhetoric. Mills writes with especial Durkheimian flavour that:

The moral uneasiness of our time results from the fact that older values and codes of uprightness no longer grip the men and women of the corporate era, nor have they been replaced by new values and codes which would lend moral meaning and sanction to the corporate routines they must follow. (Mills;1956,334)

The liberal values of substantive rationality -- reason, freedom, individuality, competition -- are left anchorless in monopoly capitalism. Once guides to action, they now constitute apologies for inaction. Once
a mode for man's self-integration, they now in their resounding hollowness assure his very dis-integration.

The massification of society driven by the process of formal rationalization (which increasingly segments human activity and destroys the values of substantive rationality) can be most forcefully understood when the cumulative impact on the abilities of people to construct a unified, individuated self-image is considered.

As noted earlier with respect to nineteenth century liberal society, individuation of self occurs when social differentiation provides people with a certain "distance" from their roles and where there are conflicting expectations of significant others surrounding role performance. Out of the competing vocabularies of motive, an individuated self-image can be synthesized. Yet, there must remain a broad consensus, a commonly held set of values that circumscribes role play and brings order and stability (a generalized other, a conscience). The conflicting vocabularies of motive cannot be anarchical. This is the problem that modern man faces in the emerging mass society because people play numerous roles that may contain a plethora of word motives; the separation of man from the means of decision-making, production, etc., the parceling-out of man into narrow routines, means that he plays many public and private roles that are disjointed and have no internal continuity. Nothing ties his world together. There is no underlying value-system that provides meaning for his segmented existence. What results, as Ernest Becker states, is that "social performance becomes mechanical, and the individual gets lost in the artificiality of his roles." (Becker,
Furthermore, there emerges a confusion over what exactly is involved in playing a specific role because now there are many vantage points from which role performance may be judged:

No one vocabulary of motives is accepted by everyone, so the alert individual must use one or the other tentatively, until he finds the way to integrate his conduct with others, to win them as allies of the act. (Gerth and Mills; 1953, 122)

Mills refers to this phenomenon as "segmentalization of conduct". What it means for the individual is that no consistent self-image can be maintained because his need to balance his image of self with the conflicting expectations of others amounts to an elaborate sashay out of which no autonomous sense of self can emerge:

Hypocrisy and posing -- the stylization of self-presentsations -- are the results of the status-ridden man's frantic attempt to get others to confirm his self-image in a society in which there is no common career pattern, no harmony in the shifting expectations and appraisals by others. (Gerth and Mills; 1953, 95)

The ultimate consequence of a higher value system in abeyance, coupled with the gutting of individuality by role ambiguity, is modern man as privatized man, as mass man. Human beings tend to become amoral, apolitical, conformist, self-indulgent, manipulable. They become "cheerful robots". In a world of "greedy mechanism and mechanized greed", to borrow D.H. Lawrence's colourful prose, individuality moves on a forced march back into history.

What, then, can be said in summary with respect to Mills' view of reality? He views man as a subjective actor pulled and pushed by word motives composing social roles. The subjective acts of the role player are oriented to the expectations of significant others in an attempt to
strike a balance between those expectations and the self-image. In this sense, man is a moral centre whose psychological motivation emanates from the individual in an attempt to order his life, to provide meaning and stability for his life, to integrate himself within the social whole. Emerging mass society impedes the ability of subjective man to create a unity of self, to develop an autonomous self-identity. He becomes dominated by a set of rationalized and centralized social structures that destroy his individuality. Weber's lament becomes Mills'.

What does this say with respect to Mills' conceptualization of the individual and society? Principally it means that individuals are in need of order and stability in terms of coherent norms and values which act as guidelines. The individual, through the process of socialization, internalizes cultural values in the form of a moral identity which then "steers" his conduct. As discussed in Chapter One, the emphasis on the importation of norms and values in the fashioning of a personal identity is prominent in the work of both Emile Durkheim and Max Weber. Yet, these writers do not conceive the individual as solely a passive recipient in the socialization process. Man also has a "spontaneous" or "egoistic" component rooted in his biology that strains against the demands of the social order, that constantly wants to move "outward" beyond the "social bond". This we described as the corporate liberal contradiction between the individual and society. It is a contradiction grounded in the very nature of man and is essentially irresolvable. It is also a contradiction that can be witnessed in Mills' writing and it lies at the very heart of Mills' understanding of man in mass society. That is, for Mills, the human organism is by definition
active. (Gerth and Mills; 1953, 7) Anchored in the human organism is the "psychic structure", which refers to the integration of "feeling", "sensation" and "impulse". For these elements of the psychic structure to be transformed into "emotions", "perceptions" and "purposes", the learning of certain objectives and values is necessary -- man must be socialized. This particular spontaneous component of the human being must be socially channelled and regulated in order to elicit properly sanctioned behaviour. There exists a certain tension between this spontaneity and the demands of the social group:

The steering process provided by role incorporations and social conditioning may not take care of all there is in man; that is, the person's roles may not include all that is involved in his psychic structure. Through its specific systems of premiums and taboos, approbations and disapprovals, the social context may rule out the display of some features of the psychic structures of some persons. ..These elements ... form the psychic stuff covered by the term "repression". (Gerth & Mills; 1953, 78)

Mills writes that the repression of certain psychic elements may necessitate their diversion to other outlets. On the one hand, this may lead to new beginnings for man and his society, to positive social change, but, on the other, it may point towards such phenomena as mob activities and even fascism. The latter "is more easily accomplished if the usual roles and expectations of the more routine areas of life become ambivalent or surcharged with psychic and emotional elements". (Gerth and Mills; 1953, 433) That is, in a social situation in which there is institutional breakdown and role ambiguity -- in situations of anomie -- the system of social regulation may not provide adequate and consistent support for human behaviour. Therefore, there may be recourse to certain unsocialized elements of the psychic structure; individuals may be more
prone to "reactive" behaviour. They will be more open to suggestion, to conformist activities, to narrowly circumscribed routines. Such is the picture that Mills paints for American mass society. Individuals no longer have a stable and integrated value system and consequently are forced to fend for themselves. They become privatised mass men.

We can see, then, a parallel between the manner in which Durkheim and Weber conceptualize the individual/society relation and Mills' position on the matter. Human beings need moral regulation in order to function as reflective, autonomous individuals. Failing this they are faced with the psychological effects of anomie; they must fall back upon certain unsocialized aspects of their constitution. It is in this formulation of the problem of modern society that we can locate the corporate liberal contradiction between the individual and society.
The method by which Alvin W. Gouldner's view of reality will be unveiled will be accomplished by characterizing his perception of "traditional" society (pre-bourgeois society) in contrast with "capitalist" and "neo-capitalist" society. Through the demonstration of Gouldner's view of the respective eras of social development it is hoped that this will serve as a vehicle for unearthing some of his assumptions concerning the nature of society and man in society.

The very fact that Gouldner speaks of "traditional" society and its obverse, "modern" or "bourgeois" society, indicates a departure from a strictly Marxian analysis concerned with the development of the productive forces and social relations of production. It also reflects a reliance upon a theoretical orientation that follows the sociological tradition of Weber and Durkheim, among others. For Gouldner, the primary difference between traditional and modern societies is not necessarily grounded in the development of the productive forces (although this is not ignored completely) but, rather, in the particular mode of communication -- language -- that characterizes the respective societies. Communication, with its varying symbol systems, is fundamental for cultures because it is the medium through which the world is rendered meaningful and acted upon. It is through language that social reality is constructed and the world made "whole"; it is the basis of culturally shared meaning and the establishment of social order. As Jürgen Habermas states "[t]he moral realization of a normative order is a
function of communicative action oriented to shared cultural meaning and presupposing the internalization of values". (Habermas;1970,107)

Given this phenomenological approach, from which Gouldner borrows liberally, it follows that external social constraints on language, be they a particular form of authoritarian domination or the undeveloped nature of the productive forces of society, for example, have a profound effect on the nature of quality of human interaction within society. It is in this way that Gouldner can distinguish between all pre-bourgeois traditional societies and bourgeois society without studying historically specific social relations of production.

The distinction between traditional and modern society for Gouldner, as it is for Habermas, is characteristically Weberian in content with the major determining criteria being Weber's differentiation between traditional and charismatic social action, on the one hand, and formal and substantive rational action, on the other. As well, Durkheim's categories of mechanical and organic society, especially as they relate to the role of the "collective conscience" in circumscribing human action and making the world "whole", also have an important position in Gouldner's formulation. This should become apparent in the following discussion.

Traditional society, in Gouldner's conceptualization, is marked by an authority structure that finds its legitimacy in "the Old", in the "What Has Been". (Gouldner;1976,24) This parallels Weber, as can be seen:

A system of imperative co-ordination will be called "traditional" if legitimacy is claimed for it and believed in on the basis of the sanctity of the order
and the attendant powers of control as they have been handed down from the past, "have always existed". (Weber;1947,341)

What this ultimately entails is that no rational justification must be elaborated in order to legitimize power and privilege in pre-modern society. Claims to legitimacy are grounded in "the personal authority of the individual which he enjoys by virtue of his traditional status." (Weber;1947,341) According to Gouldner, this obviates challenges to claims of authority because the legitimacy of the order, being rooted in the sacredness of tradition, lies beyond the realm of criticism. Traditional society in this way erects barriers to rational discussion and reflection primarily because traditional grammars of discourse invoke clerical or aristocratic authority as justification for the status quo. (Gouldner;1976,24)

This appears as one aspect of the "givenness" of traditional society. The social world presents itself as natural and eternal, removed from human ability to know and manipulate. Another element in the traditional man's view of the world as "given", which is initially set in classical antiquity and medieval society, is expressed in what Gouldner calls the "Tragic View of Man". The "Tragic View" emphasizes the restricted abilities and opportunities of man to act creatively in the world. Fate does not yield easily to the mortal. Such a worldview implies the sacredness of the status quo, of the finiteness of man and the infiniteness of God. It entails the separation of theory and practice, of the limitedness of human power and of politics. (Gouldner; 1976,71) Consequently, the rules by which men live and the values that they hold appear as "invisible", "natural" and "God-given"; it removes
the "phenomenal" world from the arena of human reflection placing it squarely in the realm of "noumena". Social reality is unproblematic due to the fact that although an all-encompassing "collective conscience" highly mystifies social life, it presents the world as whole and integrated. Traditional society is marked by group consensus, which is founded on relatively monolithic culturally shared meanings.

Pre-modern society, then, subverts the primary means for rational action because it embodies inherent barriers to rational communication. The inhibition of the free play of rational discourse, which mediates social action, makes impossible orientation to rational values and, therefore, rational action.

At this juncture, Gouldner's conception of "modern" or "bourgeois" society will be considered. This will demonstrate the pivotal position that rational discourse plays in the establishment of a rational society as well as prepare the groundwork for the comprehension of Gouldner's view of reality with respect to neo-capitalist society.

Gouldner asserts, following Habermas, that there are no "pre-bourgeois" ideologies. (Gouldner;1976,31) This is so because by definition ideologies are rational modes of discourse that beseech human actors to partake of the world in terms of social reconstruction. Ideology presupposes unrestricted communication and the unity of theory and practice, both of which are absent within traditional society. The religious or metaphysical Weltanschauung of traditional societies differs from ideologies as worldviews by reason of the fact that ideologies summon logical and empirical evidence as truth claims (rather than invoking authority or tradition) and begin with a "report" of "what is"
in society as a basis for a "command" to action. (Gouldner;1976,71)
They implore men as powerful world creators to channel their energies in a specified direction in order to alter the world, not, as do religions, to acquiesce in the face of an overwhelming "given" social reality. Ideology surmounts the "Tragic View of Man" replacing it with an "idealistic" view, a view that underwrites human creative powers and the tenets of progress and perfection. (Gouldner;1976,71)

Although ideology is conceived as being rational discourse, Gouldner also maintains that it embodies inherent limits with respect to the full attainment of rationality; that is to say, even though ideologies rely on rational persuasion and logic in their appeal to the masses, special interests that shape their content are contained within. Ideologies are selective worldviews focussing attention on particular aspects of the social world and diverting attention from other areas. Interests or "values" are the subjective elements in determining the specific way in which social reality is perceived, whether attention is focused or diverted in regards to certain elements of social life. In this way, they confer meaning on the cultural world by reorganizing its "immensity" into "forms" apprehendable to individuals.

Yet, this neo-Kantian perspective on knowledge is not the inherent limit on rationality to which Gouldner refers. Rather, the rationality of ideology is restricted due to the fact that ideologies do not make their assumptions -- interests or values--manifest, but submerge them in claims to scientific truth. As such, they embody a "false consciousness", a limitation on rational discourse. (Gouldner;1976,46)
Ideologies are "false conscious" modes of discourse because they refuse to take their own assumptions as problematic. For validation, ideologies rely not on who is speaking but on what is being claimed and how it is being factually supported. The social status of the speaker no longer carries the weight it once did in traditional society with respect to the validity of a statement. Truth claims are now evaluated on the basis of superior logic and reasoning. In this way, ideologies claim to be "self-grounded"; they stand or fall on their own merits not on the authority or interest behind the argument. On the one side, this is the strength of ideology as a form of rational communication because its arguments must withstand the criticisms of others. On the other side, however, ideology embodies a contradiction that actually leads to a "false consciousness" because the assertion that it is "self-grounded" obfuscates the fact that there are interests behind its postulations, that values are involved in the presentation of an "objective" worldview. Consequently, one's basic assumptions are removed from criticism. This lack of self-awareness (unreflexiveness) results in a cognitive flaw characteristic of all discourses grounded in the culture of modern rationality, a cognitive flaw which Gouldner labels "objectivism". "Objectivism is the pathology of cognition that entails silence about the speaker, about his interests and his desires, and how these are socially situated and structurally maintained." (Gouldner; 1976, 50) Ideology involves a "false consciousness" in that it mystifies and makes unproblematic its own groundedness in special interests. 

As should be abundantly clear, Gouldner conceives ideology simultaneously as a rational mode of discourse and as a form of thought
possessing inherent barriers to rationality, as possessing a "false consciousness". He conceptualizes ideology as a mode of communication peculiar to the bourgeois era because it is only at this time that the barriers to rationality are hurdled with the eclipse of traditional society. But on what conditions is the early bourgeois world and its attendant mode of communication founded, and what effects does this have on human action in bourgeois society? The following discussion will take up the above inquiries as a basis for comprehending the manner in which Gouldner understands the place of the individual in neo-capitalist society as it has evolved from its early bourgeois phases.

As rational discourse, ideology is an historically unique phenomenon that was brought into being by, and also brought into being, bourgeois society. As such, the transcending of traditional society was a necessary historical phenomenon in this process. Gouldner contends that the surmounting of the "Tragic Vision", that brake on human progress contained within traditional society, was basically the force unleashed by Protestantism in the West. "Protestantism commonly encourages a pattern of coping with anxiety by work, rather than by ritual or magic." (Gouldner;1976,27) It emphasizes the activistic, this-worldly, ascetic individual who possesses the power to transform his own surroundings in accordance with his "calling"; as such, man's salvation is sought through this-worldly activity in the pursuit of his highest ideals regardless of intervening obstacles. Protestantism encourages the unity of theory and practice. This fundamental reorientation of thought and action is completely at odds with traditional belief systems and serves to undermine their efficacy in the maintenance of the ancien
The emphasis that Protestantism placed on men as "makers and shakers" of their own destiny had far reaching repercussions for the modern world because it forged the infrastructure on which ideological discourse, as well as science and technology, were grounded. The emergence of ideology presupposes man as active and powerful rather than passive; it assumes that his activity should be oriented to ideals (the "calling"), that these ideals in themselves matter, are powerful, and that through their communication can mobilize men. These presuppositions premised the prior "cultural conditioning" of the Protestant Reformation. Furthermore, with respect to science and technology, Gouldner states that:

In much the same way, Protestantism had undermined Renaissance magic and alchemy by linking control of the environment to the conduct of disciplined, routine work, thereby laying the cultural infrastructure for modern technology and science. Science and technology arise when the will to know is grounded in an impulse to control, and when this control is felt to be possible through routine work. Both modern ideology, on one side, and technology, on the other, have a certain affinity because both in part rest on Protestantism's assumption that work is anxiety relieving. (Gouldner; 1976, 28)

It is witnessed, then, that Gouldner considers Protestantism to have prepared the groundwork for the emergence of a culture of modern rational discourse (ideology) and the basis for modern science and technology. Of course, it would not be fair to say that it was the singular, or even determining factor in the genesis of modern culture, as it would be unfair to assert that Weber claimed capitalism was caused by Protestantism; but in both cases, Gouldner and Weber, Protestantism and the role
of ideas appears as an independent factor in the pluralistic causation of modern society characterized by rational action.

With the gradual erosion of traditional society and its attendant religious and authoritarian "symbolic universe", social reality became transparent. No longer could the social world be maintained as whole by invoking traditional justifications of the status quo. On this ground, ideology grew and in reciprocal fashion prepared that ground. Ideology seeks to provide new meaning for the social world and to implore human actors to take up the project of social reconstruction in the "public" sphere.

The social rooting of ideology is based on the premises that men are free to discuss and act upon their political views and intentions, and that men are free to come to their own decisions based on information made public. The culture that spawns ideology as rational discourse is grounded in "a technology of a specific kind of mass (public) media, printing, and its specific mode of production: privately owned, small-scale, widely diffused, competitive, and decentralized units". (Gouldner; 1976, 39)

The genesis of the bourgeois "public", which is grounded in the mode of production of capitalism (bourgeois private property and the patriarchal family) and also dialectically linked with the advent of printing and subsequent "communications revolution" (creation of the mass media), constitutes one of the great historical advances in rationality. The bourgeois public is based upon the "free space" created with the exclusion of a single grouping of notables who had historically treated the community and state as their own private
business. (Gouldner;1976,103) The emerging bourgeoisie, who based the separation of state and civil society, of "public" and "private", on the inalienable rights of man, created a "public" free from authoritarian domination that provided the proper context for rational discussion of pressing social issues. Within the public sphere, discussants could no longer proceed by invoking tradition or authority to justify their claims because they were now held personally accountable for their views; instead, they had to use logical and empirical proof in order to sway those being addressed. Such a forum allowed a diversity of perspectives and encouraged tolerance towards competing statements. The bourgeois public, as shall be illuminated more extensively later on, became a social space for critical reasoning and rational political action.

There can be no comprehension of the bourgeois public without understanding its obverse, the "private". That is to say, they stand in a reciprocal relationship such that their own specific boundaries define the boundaries of the other. Emerging at the same time, one can not exist without the other. (Gouldner;1976,101) If the public sphere is seen as an arena in which one is forced to justify one's assertions (being open to criticism by others), the "private" is the realm in which no one has the right to prod and demand rationalizations for particular actions. Why is this so? According to Gouldner it is:

Primarily because the interests of private persons, and their families, may conflict with the interests of other private persons, and their families; because (or when) they are, to some extent, all playing a zero-sum game against one another; and also, because they are behaving at variance with the interests of the group as a whole or of the state. Underneath the growth of privacy, then, was a possessive, self-protective
individualism rooted in a system of competitive private property. (Gouldner; 1976, 103)

Because the "private" does not have to account for itself, it places limits on public discussion and public demand for justification of actions; simultaneously, the "private" guarantees a social space that is open to critical discussion. "The private sphere, then, is at one and the same time the grounding and limit of the public." (Gouldner; 1976, 104)

In early bourgeois society, with the boundaries of the private and public spheres carefully delineated (as set down by the bourgeois theorists who constructed the "Declaration of the Rights of Man"), the "public" acts as both link and buffer between the family and the state. (Gouldner; 1976, 104) It serves to connect the state apparatus with the everyday life of people, thereby assuring a voice for their interests, and at the same time, it preserves the family as a sacred realm not open to public scrutiny or state manipulation. The delicate balance struck between the separation of "public" and "private", polity and economy, established the limits and power of the state, thus safeguarding a certain degree of personal freedom and autonomy for individuals. It is in such a context that rational discourse can emerge because people are freed from old forms of domination and censorship.

If the position of the private sphere in the emergence of the bourgeois public (as a forum for critical discussion) was fundamental in advancing ideology as rational communication, the advent of the mass media (the communications revolution) was no less instrumental in this process. With the Industrial Revolution and perfected techniques of
printing, book-binding and papermaking, there occurred for the first time in human history the means for a widespread literacy. Attendant upon this development was the sheer increase in the volume of information that had to be processed by people in order to understand their world. A new public problematic arose centred around the need for publicly shareable meaning. (Gouldner;1976,93) According to Gouldner, the emergence of ideologies was partly a response to this phenomenon.

Ideologies as integrating worldviews had the function of interpreting and amalgamating the diffused volume of information within a Weltanschauung; they had the task of world reconstruction. This was particularly exigent when it came to understanding that modern creation -- the news -- because of its inherently fragmented nature. News decontextualizes events; ideology, through rational discussion of the news, recontextualizes it and gives it meaning. (Gouldner;1976,94) In this way, news encouraged the formation of a "public" by stimulating face-to-face conversation over the meaning of news. Gouldner gives us this definition of a "public":

Historically speaking, then, a "public" consists of persons who habitually acquire their news and orientations from impersonal mass media where they have available to them diverse information and orientations diffused by competing individual entrepreneurs or corporate organizations, and where this diversity increases talk among those sharing news but seeking consensus concerning its meaning. That is a bourgeois public. (Gouldner;1976,96)

The creation of the bourgeois public is, then, for Gouldner, a historically unique phenomenon that has its grounding in the Protestant Reformation, the decentralized bourgeois property system, the communications revolution and print technology. Its grammar of discourse, as
elucidated earlier, is characterized by modern ideology. This, he main-
tains, has been the greatest step forward in rationality in Western civil-
ization; it is the distinguishing feature of early bourgeois society, of
the Enlightenment era. Rational discourse presumes the end of trad-
tional society with its built-in constraints on undistorted communication
and rational social action, and the genesis of a new society in which
the masses are politicized and moved to action by virtue of reason and
logic. This fosters the potential for critical thinking and critical
action due to the fact that there now exists a forum in which ideas and
their political consequences can be stated and negated without fear of
sanction or reprisal. The "public" houses the conditions for reflective,
critical discourse in modern society. (Gouldner; 1976, 119)

Gouldner notes, however, that whereas bourgeois society and the
bourgeois public are the embodiment of rationality, these also contain
inherent limits to the complete consummation of rationality. He suggests
that the class system coupled with the patriarchal family place severe
restrictions on rational discourse primarily because so many people are
excluded from public sphere discussion due to an absence of leisure time.
Women in the home, and the working class in general, were primarily
accountable to others for their time and, thus, were often precluded
from partaking in public debate. "The bourgeois public... was open pri-
marily to those who were economically and sexually privileged." (Gouldner;
1976, 99)

Gouldner sums up rather clearly how he feels about the bourgeois
public:

A bourgeois public clearly has its limits in property interests,
class-shaped cultural assumptions and educational backgrounds; but it also supports diversity, eccentricity and dissent among persons by allowing deviants the supportive consensual validation of a public organ, however small and poorly organized. (Gouldner;1976,96)

In this way, the bourgeois public cannot be conceived as a democracy-in-being; rather, it is a small fragile social space from which freedoms and human rights can be fought for and hopefully increased. The bourgeois parliamentary system, recognizes Gouldner, is more or less a "sham"; however, it at least provides the opportunity for criticism and is the last bulwark against censorship and tyranny. (Gouldner;1976,164)

In capsulized form, what Gouldner is saying is that with the distinct separation of "public" and "private" in early bourgeois society, with the separation of the polity and economy (although at best he sees it as an incomplete separation), there emerged an opportunity and potentiality for critical dialogue as well as rational and politized action that up to this historical juncture had never existed before. Within the Enlightenment era lay the seeds for a democratic, egalitarian and free-society.

Gouldner states that attendant upon the structural differentiation of the modern bourgeois economy have been fundamental changes that now render the above view of reality as antiquated nonsense in neo-capitalist society. The major trend that Gouldner points to in his assessment of neo-capitalism is the gradual destruction of the bourgeois public as the depository of critical reason and the concomitant development of a mass society. Two general developments, ultimately connected, are instrumental in this: (1) The emergence of mass electronic communications; (2) The growth of large-scale, rationalized organizations, especially the state.

In early bourgeois society, with its culture of rational discourse,
the role of intellectuals was pivotal for the creation and dissemination of ideologies and other cultural works. Such intellectual production was originated within the "Cultural Apparatus". Gouldner, quoting C. Wright Mills, describes the "Cultural Apparatus" as:

> A ll the organizations and milieux in which artistic, intellectual, and scientific work goes on, and to the means by which such work is made available to circles, publics, and masses. (Mills, in Gouldner; 1976, 171)

Apparently the masses were not really engaged in intellectual production as such but, actually, received ideas through popularized interpretations in newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, face-to-face discussions and so forth. (Gouldner; 1976, 168) Intellectuals, who were the actual creators of complex ideology, also acted as mediators of ideas in that they conveyed them via the media to the public. It is here that ideas were discussed, ruminated over, and acted upon by an aware and critical public. Consequently, intellectuals played a seminal role in establishing a rational society because they provided important clarifications with respect to social issues; they, given an attentive and politicized audience (the "public"), were able to help provide orientation for the masses in projects of public reconstruction. When in touch with the masses, intellectuals are an important source of interpretive data that can form the basis of rational action in society.

The ability of intellectuals to reach the public via the Cultural Apparatus is dependent upon, among other factors already described, a symbol system that is not inimicable to critical thought and rational action. This implies a symbol system based upon the unimodality and lineality of printed materials, a symbol system that is fundamentally
conceptual and linguistic. (Gouldner;1976,176) What Gouldner seems to mean by this is that with its revolution in communications based on the spread of printing and print technology, early bourgeois society fostered a symbol system that saw individuals actively interpret and talk about the printed material that confronted them in preparation for action. With the emergence and proliferation of news and the mass media (printing), knowledge of the world becomes less dependent on personal experience (as in traditional society) and more reliant on decontextualized reports of events carried in newspapers, etc. Social reality becomes mediated by the mass media as juxtaposed with the immediate, face-to-face contextualized experience of traditional society.

The latter instance can be characterized as a multimodal pattern of social interaction because:

Face-to-face talk allows direct feedback with which considerable pressure may be generated to modify feelings in some manner defined as proper to the reports. In face-to-face talk, command and report are mutually contextualizing and are more readily brought into an integration, in which each supports the other. (Gouldner;1976,105)

The former case can be seen as unimodal because with the absence of direct interaction and feedback from the news-reading public there occurs a dissociation between report and command. This is due to the fact that there is no control over the response of the reader by the mass media. There results a growing decontextualization of both report and command with their separation.

The unimodal and linear nature of the print based mass media, with its disjunction between report and command, implores men to actively interpret and talk about the news in order to recontextualize it into a
meaningful system. Men in this instance must be involved in a critical way after a reading of the news because its very structure creates the need for interpretation; people upon reading the news are left with a "residual tension" that requires that they do something on completion. The act of interpretation "brings men back into the picture" but in a mediated way that creates the opportunity for critical reflection.

What Gouldner means is that the very symbols men use in conjunction with a mode of communication that is unimodal and linear is that they are conducive to critical and reflective thought and action -- to rationality. Such a symbol system facilitates the linkage between ideologues propounding various interpretive ideologies (the Cultural Apparatus) and the public. People possess the potential for critical reasoning.

Yet, with neo-capitalist society there emerges a new form of mass communication that may, Gouldner cautiously states, be reworking the very symbol systems of man to the extent that the ability to use critical reason becomes emaciated. Gouldner feels that with the advent of the growth and proliferation of the electronic media -- television, radio, films, and so forth, (the new communications revolution) -- there is a corresponding decline in the ability of the Cultural Apparatus, staffed by intellectuals and academicians, to reach the public with debates concerning social issues. This becomes one element in the increasingly widespread phenomenon of the depoliticization of the public; the mollification of the masses.

Such an occurrence may be largely due to the eclipse of a symbol system founded on print technology that was supportive of rational discourse, supplanted within the very consciousness of men by a new symbol
system unamenable to critical reflection carried by a new communications technology. Specifically, the modern communications media accentuates the iconic and nonlinguistic components of communication (it reintroduces multimodal communication) which has a tendency to obliterate the sense of "critical distance" so crucial for rational social criticism. Primarily, this is due to the fact that "television is a 'you-are-there' participatory and consummatory activity." (Gouldner;1976,169) The multimodal character of television dominates one's sensibilities to the extent that simply what one is required to do is to monitor the proceedings because there is little or no residual tension that implores criticism, interpretation, or the need for activity; viewing is an end in itself. (Gouldner;1976,169) Gouldner maintains that because of television's diffused nature it becomes a new source of mass experience that actually, due to its iconic and nonlinguistic characteristics of communication, restricts the ability of people to reflect upon and discuss rationally their shared aspects of consciousness. Television introduces a new modality and tempo of experience that becomes a primary source of socialization directly affecting, resonating, and reworking the primary socialization of early childhood experience. (Gouldner;1976,169) The paleosymbolic structures of human life, which are laid down in the primary process of interaction with significant others (changing but slowly over one's life), and which correspond to areas of personal experience of limited shared meaning and thus, restricted communicability, are, with television, superseded by a technologically implanted paleosymbolism based on personal experience of an iconic and nonlinguistic type. The further extension of those areas of human experience not readily communicable is the immediate consequence
Television as a new source of socialization leaves a "residual iconic imagery" structuring the paleosymbolic in such subtle ways that personal experience is removed from the ability of humans to conceptualize symbolically and to be articulated:

In brief, things people could not normally speak about are now being affected by other things they cannot speak about, in ways and with results they cannot speak about. (Gouldner; 1976, 169)

At the level of human psychology, Gouldner claims that the above phenomenon deleteriously affects the ability of individuals to use or be reached by rational discourse -- ideology -- because the characterological grounding of ideology has a tendency to be undermined. Ideally, within early bourgeois society ideology:

[1]inks individual to society, person to group, by allowing certain selected components of individual consciousness to be shared with other persons with whom they may now be debated, disconfirmed, or confirmed, in public discourse. Ideology thereby grounds itself in the infrastructure of individual persons, in their individual consciousness and unconsciousness, on the one side, and, on the other, as a dimension of a social collectivity, a dimension of communality, a language. (Gouldner; 1976, 83)

However, with its technologically implanted paleosymbolism, television inhibits the ability of people to conceptualize and speak about those things which mold and shape their personal experience in neo-capitalist society. This may have the ultimate effect of crippling the appeal of ideology because it now presents itself to people as irrelevant or superfluous. As such, without ideology to overarch problems of milieux with the sweep of social structural change (the problem as formulated by C. Wright Mills), the world is experienced as meaningless; culture as absurd; there sets in apathy, passivity and malaise. For Gouldner, as for Mills, with the disjunction between the personal and the socio-historical in the
absence of ideology (the "sociological imagination") "the work of reason and the play of sensibility" -- "activistic rationality" -- becomes anachronistic, limited to but a few still steeped in the tradition of Enlightenment Reason.

Thus, Gouldner sees at work within neo-capitalist society the gradual eclipse of ideology as rational discourse primarily due to the fact that the very basis of rationality -- the unimodal and linear mode of communication engendered by print technology -- is surmounted by new advances in electronic communications. People in neo-capitalist society increasingly have their consciousness shaped by radio, cinema and television -- the "consciousness industry" -- rather than by the ideological products of the Cultural Apparatus. He maintains that with the decline of reason there emerges the phenomenon of mass society in which the bulk of the populace are incapable of using or being reached by ideological discourse. This, however, does not mean that there is an end-of-ideology because a small number of elites still retain the grammar of ideological discourse as a dominant mode of consciousness. (Gouldner;1976,170) Thus, the consciousness of society is bifurcated. To the extent that this is happening, the Cultural Apparatus retreats to the confines of the university and its environs, isolating itself even further from the mainstream of society.9

Neo-capitalist society is marked by the pacification of the masses (the genesis of mass society and destruction of the "public") which is, on the one side, contiguous with the attentuation of the grammar of rational discourse related to the rise of the "consciousness industry", and on the other, as shall be seen, connected with the structural differentiation of
the capitalist political economy.

Gouldner, following Habermas (who has attempted to synthesize French structuralism with hermeneutics), relies heavily on the model of Althusser for understanding the complexities of the neo-capitalist political economy. Gouldner asserts that with the increasing complexity of the capitalist economy there occurs a concomitant differentiation of structures and functions to the extent that no longer does the bourgeois class have complete control over the political and administrative "orders" due to their growing "relative autonomy". (Gouldner;1976,230)

Each of these realms - the polity, bureaucracy and economy - because of their increasing technical nature, requires an expertise making special knowledge and abilities imperative for their smooth operation. The demands of a complex political economy force the bourgeoisie, then, to "sub-let" the organization of the administrative and political spheres to an administrative "class" and political "class" respectively. This has the tendency to create an institutional "slippage" because now each of the orders requires a level of specialization not attainable by those in other spheres, thus, the "relative autonomy" of the various institutions. Therefore, Gouldner claims that the rule by the bourgeoisie in neo-capitalist society is a rule mediated by bureaucratic and political "classes". It is an "indirect rule". (Gouldner;1976,230) Because they have bequeathed the means of administration and means of violence to others, the bourgeoisie no longer has full control over the operation of the political economy. The day to day decisions made in governing the economy and controlling the masses become the primary responsibility of politicians and bureaucrats. Consequently, the pivotal problem for the bourgeoisie becomes that of
securing the loyalty of the other dominant classes in order that bourgeois class interests are safe-guarded and not impinged upon. (Gouldner; 1976,239) Ideology assumes a new importance at this time because it serves to sensitize the political and administrative classes to the special needs of the dominant economic class. The presence of an integrative ideology bridging the dominant classes functions in the long run to preserve the class interests of the bourgeoisie; that is, their social reproduction as an upper class is guaranteed. Yet, because of their "relative autonomy", the respective classes must negotiate with each other to establish the terms of their mutual exchange in the short and medium run. (Gouldner; 1976,237) Through this process of "negotiation", a tacit alliance is struck between the agencies of the state and the dominant economic class to the extent that they become highly integrated. (Gouldner;1976,237)

This is witnessed in the increasing "socialization" of the costs of production by the state. However, as stated earlier, other consequences accrue from the "negotiation" between the bourgeoisie and the respective bureaucratic and political elites; the power of the bourgeoisie is circumscribed. They are not fully in control of their own fate.

Gouldner claims that the bourgeois class is increasingly a "hegemonic class". This is a historically new phenomenon for a dominant class because, whereas in contradistinction to the members of the ruling classes of ancient Greece and feudal Europe -- who, for instance, relied less on manipulating the manner in which people thought in order to present themselves as rightful masters than in direct coercion and domination (might makes right) -- the bourgeoisie in neo-capitalism find it imperative that people believe in the justness of the system. They must legitimize
their action. (Gouldner;1976,231)

Ironically, this becomes one of the most fundamental contradictions inherent within, and threatening the longevity of, the modern bourgeois order. Owing to the fact that the bourgeoisie divests itself of producing culture, and in particular ideas (because of the total absorption of their energies in the process of economic gain), they become skeptical of ideology and those who use and produce it. Ideology is perceived as possessing the capacity for generating a separate basis of power antithetical to bourgeois interests. The bourgeoisie, therefore, prefers to garner the loyalty of the masses through an improved standard of living linked to an expanding Gross National Product -- "consumerism". (Gouldner;1976,232) They elect to "buy off" those who would dissent rather than "reason" with them. The contradiction that emerges is that the bourgeoisie, while they eschew a reliance on ideology for legitimation, need it to firmly integrate and orchestrate the highly differentiated structures of society as well as to ensure the loyalty of the masses if, for some reason, the expansion of the G.N.P. ceases. (Gouldner;1976,244) This makes for an intrinsically unstable arrangement.

The tendency for the bourgeoisie to put all their "marbles" of legitimation in one basket -- the basket of material gratifications -- serves as another drag on the "career" of ideology in modern capitalism; people are less convinced of the legitimacy of the bourgeoisie through the exercise of rational ideological appeals than they are by what the bourgeois order can provide them with in terms of "lifestyle". As Gouldner states:
This pattern of social control has largely generated a tendency toward the devaluation of ideological integration -- toward the "secularization" of politics, we might say -- that discourages ideological skills, sensitivities, and openness. Ideologies then lose their tautness and effectiveness. (Gouldner; 1976, 245)

Under these conditions, science and technology, because they are linked in the public mind with an improved standard of living:

represses the ideological problem and inhibits ideological creativity and adoption. The new technology has not become a new mass ideology, but, rather, for most of the population obedience is conditioned by the gratifications it associates with technology. (Gouldner; 1976, 246)

Ideology as rational discourse goes into further decline amongst the masses and, concomitantly, so does the viability of a politicized public.

Another major factor that Gouldner points to as contributing to the decline and destruction of the bourgeois public (that sits alongside the eclipse of a lineal and unimodal system of communication and the "secularization" of politics) is the increased scientization of bureaucracy (i.e., the emergence of a technocracy). Basically, this development moves as a two-pronged attack on the life of rational discourse by, on the one hand, crippling ideology, and on the other, undermining the public's ability to scrutinize decisions made by technical experts. Both have the same ultimate effect -- the de-politicization of the masses.

Gouldner argues that bureaucracy, or its modern equivalent, technocracy, although operating with respect to formal-rational requirements, is "sabotaged" precisely because there are political and economic interests behind the organization responsible for deflecting the scientific and technical expertise -- the rational means -- toward irrational and nonscientific ends. (Gouldner; 1976, 241) Therefore, because bureaucracies
have **private** goals, they must either defocalize and obscure them or be legitimimized by value-laden ideology.

However, there is a "Catch-22" involved here in that the spread of the bureaucratic organization in modern society actually undermines and replaces ideology due to the fact that the very structure of bureaucracy, in order to "get the job done", demands a special discipline that overarches ideological conviction. Gouldner states that "it is exactly this discipline that enables ideological dissonance to be overcome, declares it to be irrelevant, and makes bureaucracy the perfect tool of a small external oligarchy". (Gouldner, 1976, 242) Ultimately, what this means for the bureaucracy is that it must rely increasingly on the defocalization of its special interest goals for legitimation rather than on ideology. The continual emphasis on formal means (purposive-rational action) over substantive ends prepares within the human mind the willingness to be obedient and complacent; people learn not to challenge "commands".

Given this, Gouldner states that the proliferation of the bureaucratic form in modern society, coupled with growing "consumerism" among the masses, provides a "functional alternative to and substitute for ideological motivations, and thus competes with and deteriorates ideology". (Gouldner;1976,242) The culmination of this process can be witnessed in the erosion of the critical faculties within the general populace.

One last element that Gouldner views as being instrumental in the destruction of the bourgeois public and rational discourse is the emergence of a technocracy contiguous with the structural differentiation of the capitalist political economy. Because in modern society the management of the economy requires complex technical knowledge, there
emerges the necessity for technical experts to take a leading role in overseeing its complicated operation. The complex nature of the decision-making process within such a system has the tendency to preclude members of the public simply due to their incapacity for comprehending the issues at hand. (Gouldner; 1976, 264) Rational discourse, with respect to issues that touch the very centre of people's lives, is therefore repressed. This amounts to one further development within neo-capitalist society that serves to debilitate the survival of the bourgeois public and its grammar of rational discourse.

How, then, does Gouldner conceptualize modern social reality? He states unequivocally that neo-capitalist society becomes more like the image of a "social system" containing its own "system imperatives" than a hierarchically structured society ruled by a particular class. (Gouldner; 1976, 236) This is basically the result of the highly differentiated nature of modern society, the consequence of "indirect rule". However, this development, the development of a "mass society", was also engineered by the new communications revolution (the switch to a multimodal, non-linguistic symbol system), by increasing bureaucratization and the spread of purposive-rational action, and by the exclusion of the public from politics because of the "technical" nature of the decision-making process. All have had the cumulative effect of destroying the bourgeois public which harbingered the grammar of rationality. The Age of Reason is eclipsed by the Age of Complacency.

Gouldner describes how Jürgen Habermas summarizes the emergence of this new era:

In time, the bourgeoisie generates a style of life that blurs the private sphere's distinction from the public, and that places both increasingly under the domination
of growing corporate organizations. Bourgeois culture becomes a culture of consumers, rather than of critically questioning and politically concerned persons, of spectators who are now to be entertained. Critical individualism is attenuated as people are assimilated into the growing private and government bureaucracies. Once a sphere for critical discourse among persons, now the "public" is succeeded, managed and manipulated by large organizations which arrange things among themselves on the basis of technical information and their relative power positions. The "public", then, no longer connects the state apparatus with the everyday life of society. Politics becomes managed by the corporate associations and by the state. People increasingly reject politics and seek psychological individuation through the exploration of privatized (or depublilized) life styles. (Habermas, quoted by Gouldner; 1976, 139)

For all intents and purposes, this is exactly how Gouldner understands the movement from early bourgeois to neo-capitalist society.

With the decline of the grammar of rational discourse as the intervening variable in social action, orientation to internalized values of rationality become more difficult. Action is controlled more by external stimuli patterned after the structure of purposive-rational action than by that guided by social norms. Habermas states that this situation results increasingly in adaptive behavior on the part of individuals rather than autonomous, reflective behavior. (Habermas; 1970, 107) Gouldner would second this. Indeed, so would Mills and Weber. The individual as a subjective actor, as a being pushed and pulled by cherished values, loses the ability of autonomous action with the emergence of rationalized social structures. That is, man finds himself in the quan-dary of an anomic society.

Essentially, Gouldner's view of man in society parallels that view taken by C. Wright Mills and the conservative corporate liberals. Men need moral regulation in order to function adequately as individuals,
in order to guide their behavior towards worthwhile endeavors. In the absence of a coherent value-system, human beings are released from the control of society and may "go their own way". As with Mills, this may be a source of constructive social change in which more suitable social structures and moral codes are sought, or, human beings may simply flounder in apathetic, hedonistic malaise. For the most part, according to Gouldner, individuals in neo-capitalism have followed the latter route.

What this suggests is that the human being is not totally social-izable, not fully compliant. For Gouldner, there is an inevitable "slippage" between man and society:

No animal with man's enormous powers of reason can be wholly vicious or mindless of the need's of others; and no animal with man's highly charged, ever-ready potential for sexual arousal can be wholly reasonable or compliant. Those who want man totally amiable and controllable had best geld him. (Gouldner;1971,508)

Here Gouldner acknowledges a tension between individual and society similar to that of Mills, Durkheim and Weber. The individual is in need of an internalized set of values and moral rules in the form of a self-identity that encases the "activistic" component of man rooted in his biology. As such, Gouldner states that:

The concerns and interests of men do, in large part, derive from and coincide with these larger entities; but they do so, however, only in part and never in toto. However deep men's identification with and dependence upon a larger cause or group, and however successful the cause or however benign the group, there are always points in the lives of men when they must go their own ways, when it becomes painfully evident that their cause and their group do not constitute the totality of their personal existence. (Gouldner;1971,509)

Once again we see the corporate liberal contradiction between the individual and society, this time in the work of Alvin Gouldner.
In considering the left-Weberian view of reality, what is most apparent is their overriding concern with the limits that modern society (whether it be of the Soviet socialist or Western capitalist type) places on the majority of individuals in the respective societies. T. B. Bottomore is no exception on this score. Virtually all his writing, even the seemingly most theoretically detached, has at base the problem of human domination in modern society and the desire to develop schemes for the engendering of a new, more humane social order. The former concern will be delineated here, the latter in the proceeding chapter.

For a proper comprehension of Bottomore's view of reality, a brief excursus is necessary in order to establish a number of the categories he deploys in apprehending social reality. This can be adequately accomplished through a brief examination of interrelationships between his concepts elite, class and power. Following this, it should be a relatively simple task to apply these constructions to the two major types of societies mentioned earlier.

In *Elites and Society*, Bottomore provides two basic ideal types for judging power relations in societies. The concept "ruling class" is borrowed from Marx but undergoes severe modifications in Bottomore's conception in terms of its relegation to the status of an ideal type. Bottomore makes the case that the importance of Marx's category lies in the fact that it delineates the basis of the political power of the
ruling class (its economic dominance) and points to social antagonisms that arise between classes of superordination and subordination.

(Bottomore;1964,37) For Bottomore, "ruling class" in its pure, ideal typical form implies that the upper class of property owners enjoy undisputed and unrestricted political power. Given this approach, he states that with minor qualifications the feudal nobility and the bourgeoisie of early Western European capitalism come closest to this ideal type. (Bottomore;1964,29) There is a fusion in the same persons of military, political and economic power based on property ownership. Such an orientation parallels exactly C. Wright Mills' facile handling of the issue in The Power Elite. Indeed, Bottomore quotes approvingly the footnote that Mills offers to dismiss the problem:

"Ruling class" is a badly loaded phrase. "Class" is an economic term; "rule" a political one. The phrase "ruling class" thus contains the theory that an economic class rules politically. (Mills, quoted by Bottomore;1964,33)

Bottomore states that if it can be shown that a ruling group can form and derive power from other than economic sources (e.g., from military domination or from a political party) then it cannot be properly maintained that we are dealing with a ruling class per se. He offers two situations in which there is a plain divergence from the "ruling class" ideal type: (1) Where there is a wealthy, distinctively cultured upper class of large property holders who do not have undisputed or unrestricted political power, and thus do not have an easy time in the perpetuation of property rights. (Bottomore;1964,39) "Class" does not entail "rule" in the preceding sense. Under this situation there may be a potential opposition between the privileges of the upper class and political power as it is
exercised through the franchise by the masses. (2) Where the ruling group is not a class in Marx's sense (e.g., in the present-day Communist societies). Here possession of the means of administration by the top-ranking officials of the Communist Party may be seen as the power-base. The state and the economy are under their control because they have political power. They are a "political elite". In this sense, says Bottomore, we must speak of the relative autonomy of politics. (Bottomore; 1971, 160)

With these distinctions Bottomore proposes to use both concepts "ruling class" and "political elite" to "refer to different types of political system or to different aspects of the same political system." (Bottomore; 1964, 44) They may be seen as complimentary rather than mutually exclusive categories.

This formulation of the problem of power in society "cuts to the quick o' the uncer" with respect to Bottomore's view of social class. Power connotes inequality; the existence of separate bases of power suggests that one determinant of inequality -- social class -- is not the sole basis of power, but that other forms of privilege and domination are manifest within societies. Here intellectual homage must be paid to Weber and his distinctions between class, status and party. Bottomore, following Weber, recognizes the importance of the ownership of private property in the economic determination of power. The relationship of individuals in the "market situation", to use Weber's phrase, ultimately corresponds to one's "class situation". In Weber's sense, class refers exclusively to economic groups which are to be differentiated from status groups and political parties. Bottomore concurs with Weber on the usage
of the above concepts. As we have briefly mentioned, the basis of power in the U.S.S.R. is seen as rooted in the political party, as rooted in a political infrastructure as opposed to an economic infrastructure. The members of the party, due to the exercise of power, have created new social classes and new privileges. (Bottomore;1965,53) By the same token, Bottomore says we cannot refer to feudal estates and Hindu castes as pure forms of "social class" because they are not strictly economic groups, but also involve extra-legal and religious privileges with respect to civil and political rights. (Bottomore;1965,17) The best example of "class" is contained in bourgeois society with the differentiation between capital and labour. Here inequality is based on economic position and not on de jure special rights. Yet, he qualifies this statement by maintaining that bridging the two great classes is situated the middle class, which forms a hierarchy based on occupation, consumption and style of life -- social prestige. (Bottomore;1965,25) Now, it is true that there is a close association between class, status and party in a complex social system (the reciprocal influences of one on the other often strengthening the basis of social inequality), and that class position is often the prime determinant in the accumulation and preservation of status and power. However, for Weber and Bottomore, the latter two can form an independent groundwork for social inequality. The task of the social scientist is to adumbrate the sources and nature of inequality within historically specific social structures. How, then, does Bottomore utilize his concepts to understand the bases of power and the relationship between rulers and ruled in modern industrial societies?

In considering the case of capitalist societies, Bottomore makes
a primary distinction between the early years of capitalism in Western Europe and the early years in the United States. American society never had to extricate itself from feudal fetters but was established from the outset as a bourgeois nation of small property owners -- farmers, traders, businessmen -- with a seemingly limitless frontier that offered boundless opportunity for the ambitious. He maintains that in contrast to European countries the United States was a society of decentralized property ownership in which "some 80 per cent of the working population (excluding Negro slaves) owned the means of production with which they worked."

(Bottomore;1965,41) Although not devoting much discussion to this epoch, and certainly not conceptualizing it through the same myopic lens as C. Wright Mills, Bottomore does suggest that this era in American history is the "closest approach there has been to a "property-owning democracy".

(Bottomore;1965,41) He tells us that:

Social equality largely prevailed and the range of economic inequality was limited. There were relatively few established positions of privilege and subordination. Government was in the main by discussion and by popular vote.

(Bottomore;1968,29)

No one individual or group of individuals was powerful enough to exercise unlimited political power due to the absence of a power-base.

As mentioned, this contrasts with the European experience in which the new manufacturing class, sometimes in alliance with the old aristocracy, was able to capture elite positions in the political, military and administrative spheres in the formation and consolidation of a ruling class.

(Bottomore;1964,29) However, by the end of the nineteenth century in America, the "property-owning democracy", grounded in decentralized property, saw its eclipse with the concentration of wealth and income in the hands
of financial and industrial capitalists. With this the American class system began to approach that of European nations. It became a house divided. The establishment of the **Social Register**, exclusive boarding schools, country clubs, etc., signalled that upper class wealth and social position was being transmitted through family connections. (Bottomore; 1965,42) Simultaneously, the emerging upper class began to occupy the important elite positions in the polity and administration as done by their European counterparts in previous years. Elites recruited predominantly from the upper class assure policies favourable to that class in the maintenance of property rights and income. The upper class becomes by definition a ruling class. There are upper class personnel in the positions of power.

Contiguous with the decline in small property ownership and the genesis of the monopoly trust was a growing inequality of wealth and power. By the end of the nineteenth century this gave impetus to the emerging trade union movement and laid the basis for populist and progressive social criticism concerned with social reform. (Bottomore;1968,21) Demands for state regulation of industry, for worker job security and safety, and for an end to poverty and the abuses of power were gradually institutionalized to a greater or lesser degree with the consolidation of the Welfare State. Bottomore feels that:

[I]n all the industrial countries there is some degree of central economic planning, some attempt to regulate the distribution of wealth and income, and a more or less elaborate public provision of a wide range of social services. (Bottomore;1965,12)

This is coupled with the belief that the state has acquired a degree of independence from classes, that the class consciousness of workers has
been undermined with the steady increases in their standard of living, and that the growth of the middle classes of white collar employees has modified the class system. All these factors lead Bottomore to ask whether or not we can properly speak of an upper class that is also a ruling class. He replies in the affirmative. Yes, Western capitalist nations still have upper classes that simultaneously rule politically. With the exception of the Scandanavian countries (he does not expand on this), Bottomore explains that the upper classes have been able to maintain property rights essential for their perpetuation as a class, and that this has provided them with the power to preserve themselves as a ruling class. (Bottomore;1964,40) Despite progressive taxation, state owned property, the extension of the franchise, and some restrictions put on private property by the Welfare State, all have made only a modicum of difference in the abilities of the upper class to rule effectively in their own favour. They have successfully withstood the attack on their property and property rights. Further support for the existence and maintenance of a ruling class in Western democracies is highlighted by the persistent recruitment of upper class members for elite positions in the administration and polity. (Bottomore;1964,125) Such positions are formally open to all on the basis of competitive examinations or proper educational qualifications, but the proper credentials are only attainable through the institutions of higher learning which have historically been reserved for those of the upper strata. "Indeed, they [the institutions of higher learning] have had a pre-eminent role in perpetuating class differences which could no longer be maintained by inequalities in
civil and political rights." (Bottomore;1975,142) Moreover, not only does privileged education provide proper qualifications, but it also acts along with other upper class institutions such as private clubs, soirees, cultural events, and so forth as an important means of socialization through which a relatively homogenous worldview -- a class consciousness -- is cultivated. In the long run this is crucial because divisiveness among elite groups wielding power in different spheres may emerge over particular issues in the short run. (Bottomore;1965,58) Integration of elites and their general co-operation is an important function of a common Weltanschauung.

The centralization of property, which is coterminous with the growing rationalization of business enterprise and which establishes a small group of elite owners and managers above a mass of workers, is matched in other spheres of social life and further serves to separate individuals from the ability to make decisions affecting their lives. The modern world increasingly becomes divided between elites and masses with the emergence of large bureaucratic organizations, including modern political parties. The growth of the central government, both in scope and power, coupled with the increasingly technical nature with respect to economic, political and military decisions, all tend to concentrate the crucial decision-making powers in a few hands. Mass political parties relegate the role of the individual to that of voter and spectator, eliminating him as an active participant in policy creation. Politics is packaged and sold; issues that affect his very life and the lives of millions are tarnished with Madison Avenue glitter and gold. On the
decline, as well, is the political viability of independent voluntary associations and locally elected bodies. (Bottomore;1965,56) With the centralization in the economic and political spheres, with decisions made by small circles of upper class elites, the impact of small-scale grassroots organizations for the deciding of fundamental issues approaches a David-and-Goliath-like scenario. But in this instance the "good guys" rarely win.

Essentially, then, what Bottomore conceptualizes as the seminal evil in modern society is centralization, whether it be of private property or of administrative and political functions. With centralization, the world is divided between elites and masses, between the powerful and the powerless. Not only is modern capitalism characterized in the above fashion, but so also is the Soviet Union. As mentioned earlier, the centralization of the state administration in the hands of the officials of the Communist Party is the primary source of social inequality, and with this of power. Bottomore states that the political elite of the Soviet Union approaches most closely the ideal type of "power elite":

That is, a group which, having come to power with the support or acquiescence of particular classes in the population, maintains itself in power by virtue of being an organized minority confronting the unorganized majority.... (Bottomore;1964,42)

Here there is little or no possibility for establishing counter organizations with counter elites; opposition to the political elite is suppressed, often coercively. Bottomore seems to suggest that the state socialist societies of the Soviet type, with the exception of Yugoslavia, approach what would be called a mass society in the manner conceptualized by C. Wright Mills. 13,14
However, the same conclusion with respect to the capitalist democracies cannot be as forcefully made. The principal difference between the two types of society is in the potential to establish organizations counter to the elite in power, which still characterizes Western capitalism as opposed to Soviet society. (Bottomore;1965,58)

In the former societies there are no formal-legal barriers to suppress public dissent or the formation of organizations opposed to those holding power. Working class political parties and trade unions, among other groups (e.g., student, intellectuals and ethnic minorities), although often marginal to the exercise of power, do provide opposition and a basis for social criticism within capitalist society. They embody a potentiality for social criticism and, insofar as it is exercised, must be taken into account by the ruling class (who themselves do not comprise a fully integrated and co-ordinated series of elites):

Contrary to the orthodox Marxist view, popular control may well be greater in some of the capitalist countries, where independent trade unions can bring pressure to bear upon managements, and where the competition among political groups prevents the emergence of a single, omnipotent elite. (Bottomore;1971,143)

Power is not wielded in a carefree, monolithic manner as once done during the "Gilded Age", but is now tempered and somewhat more tenuous than in previous years. (Bottomore;1965,65) This is why the capitalist societies are not yet mass societies.

Nonetheless, in both types of industrial society it is the consolidation of power in the hands of a few, made possible by the centralization of the major institutions, that is inimical to individual freedom and the exercise of rationality. In the United States the movement from a
decentralized economy of small-scale property holders to centralized property and bureaucratic administration describes in a nutshell the debilitating effects that modern capitalism has on individual self-development and freedom. As mentioned, though, this is but one side of the story of centralization for Bottomore because consolidation of political functions in the Soviet Union has even harsher consequences for individuals.

Marx, Bottomore states, views human alienation as due to the existence of private property, but another position, expounded by many of the early sociologists (e.g., Simmel and Tönnies), sees alienation as accruing from industrial society in general -- as resulting from large-scale organizations, an extreme division of labour, a bureaucratic system of rationalized administration (whether industry is publicly or privately owned), and from a highly developed money economy. (Bottomore; 1960,43) Although Bottomore does not state explicitly that he holds the view of Simmel and Tönnies (only that they present an alternative to Marx), he does suggest in another context (Classes in Modern Society p.54) that, whereas there is considerable variation between Soviet and capitalist forms of society, the schema proffered by the two sociologists is valid. This has been confirmed in the preceding discussion with respect to the basis of power in Soviet and capitalist societies. The problem is not so much the existence of the commodity relations of capital and the extraction of surplus value from one class by another as it is the centralization of institutions -- whether they be economic, political or administrative -- with those at the pinacles of the respective hierarchies occupying the "elite positions" of power. People wield power because
they, in Mills' words, have access to the "command posts" of power.

Given the above state of affairs, Bottomore is prompted to ask whether the rational organization of work (and leisure) in modern society is in fact favourable to individual self-development and freedom. (Bottomore;1960,48) With these cherished values in hand, he points to theorists like Mills, Riesman and Marcuse (who he says are all concerned with the growth of large organizations as opposed to the individual's ability to be self-determining) suggesting that these theorists appeal to something in the individual -- his critical reason or moral consciousness -- which is capable of resisting the domination by institutions. (Bottomore;1973,441) Indeed, here we have Bottomore recognizing a tension between the moral, "subjective" individual and the "objective" social structure in the work of the above theorists. However, Bottomore himself subscribes to this thesis. He points to such antagonisms as the student and labour revolts of the 1960's, as well as growing pockets of intellectual dissent in the Soviet Union, for confirmation of the resistance mounted by individuals under repressive conditions. They also serve as confirmation, by example, of the above three authors' theories. (Bottomore;1973,441) In a candid moment he even goes as far as to say that "there is always some tension and possibility of opposition between the individual and society..." (Bottomore;1968,84), and that in order to comprehend the nature of human nature we need to understand the "interaction between biological inheritance and reflective action, between the autonomous, self-creating individual and the context established by social institutions and cultural norms." (my emphasis) (Bottomore;1973,439) Quite apparent is the kinship between Bottomore
and the other two left-Weberians discussed thus far -- Mills and Gouldner -- with respect to the relationship of the "subjective" individual vis-à-vis society. Modern society (whether it be capitalist or socialist) of rationalized, bureaucratic structures places debilitating limitations on the ability of the morally autonomous individual in his quest for self-determination. This places Bottomore with the two previously discussed authors in that all three deal with the corporate liberal tension between "subjective man" and the "objective, rationalized society".
Summary

Despite some variation in the way in which Mills, Gouldner and Bottomore view the nature of social reality, it should be apparent that in general they are remarkably similar in their orientation on this issue. All three, to a greater or lesser extent, conceptualize the years of early capitalism (especially in the United States), with its decentralized mode of production and administration, etc., as an era in which the values of individuality were held sacred. The emergence of a differentiated society of small-scale social institutions enabled individuals to extricate themselves from traditional modes of thought and action -- from the "collective conscience" -- and orient themselves to the Enlightenment values of reason, freedom and equality. Upon internalizing the values of substantive rationality man develops himself as an individual human being. Under the social conditions amenable to Enlightenment Reason, the character structure of human beings is symbolized by the "morally autonomous individual".

Yet, this celebration of individuality is not appropriate for the modern era of monopoly capitalism (or neo-capitalism for Gouldner) because the respective sociologists, to a man, agree that the structure of bourgeois society has been altered to the extent that the values of individuality are no longer supported institutionally. Modern society in both the capitalist democracies and the Soviet socialist bloc has evolved in the manner forecast by Weber. Social institutions have increasingly become centralized and rationalized. Bureaucracy is omnipresent. Society
is analogous to a vast, co-ordinated machine directed by those elites at the summits of the various institutions, more often than not in concert. With the centralization of decision-making functions the bourgeois public, which once provided a forum for rational debate of fundamental issues and which provided both a link and buffer between the individual and the state, is rendered impotent, relegated to the "middle levels of power". The individual discovers that he no longer has a voice in his own affairs; he is powerless in the face of powerful institutions.

Moreover, the formal rationalization of most spheres of modern social life, because of the bureaucratic emphasis on formal means rather than substantive ends, acts upon and destroys the Enlightenment values of rationality, as, in its own way, does the destruction of the political relevance of the "public". With the ends of the bureaucracy de-emphasized, that is to say, de-focalized and obfuscated, and with the growing meaninglessness and irrelevance of politics, modern man comes to feel that he no longer is in control of his own life; that his decisions (when he makes them) do not have any effect on the course of events. He becomes apathetic; concerned solely with his own personal welfare he retreats into a privatized world of leisure activities. His deafness to the values of Enlightenment Reason is matched by Substantive Rationality's own noisy muteness. In modern society man is no longer moved by classical liberal values. The structures which once supported the "morally autonomous individual" give way to those which house a society of Akaiy Akakievitches -- that supreme bureaucratic personage of Gogol's The Overcoat.

The relationship that the left-Weberians have to the general Weberian theoretical outline are here unmistakeable. For Weber, the
continual spread of bureaucracy and purposive-rational action was that process which was destructive of human "wholeness" and autonomy. He spoke of the inevitable "parcelling-out of the soul" that modern man was forced to contend with as well as the dissolution of the unique cultural values which oriented human behavior, both inescapable realities of the bureaucratized society. Essentially, this is the manner in which the left-Weberians view the sweep of modern socio-historical change, albeit somewhat less pessimistically.

At base, for all three theorists -- Mills, Gouldner and Bottomore--is the omnipresent liberal problematic of the contradiction between the individual and society. Yet, it is the old liberal problem cast in modern guise; that is to say, it is now a corporate liberal dilemma. Classical liberal thought conceptualized the tension between the individual and society in order to establish the "natural" rights of individuals vis-à-vis the state. This formulation premised man as prior to and superior to society. The latter-day construction acknowledges the impossibility of the "isolated individual" and emphasizes the social nature of man. The stress on the individual shifted from that of "economic man" to "social man", "subjective man". Pursuit of self-interest in the age of counter-revolution and property consolidation was now conceived as anti-social. Underscored was the need for "social control", for a common morality as a source of social order. In the work of such men as Weber and Durkheim, we see that social life is ordered through the subjective orientation to cultural values, through the internalization of moral norms. Human individuality is conceptualized as a product of social life conceived in subjective terms (e.g., moral autonomy, self-autonomy, personal identity).
It is in this context that the contradiction between the individual and society appears in new light. But is a Janus-faced contradiction. On the one hand, objective society is understood as destroying subjective man, his personal autonomy, his self-identity; objective society impinges on the ability of moral man to orient his actions toward cherished values in the establishment of a stable normative order. With the consolidation of industrial and bureaucratic society, there appears less room for autonomous action oriented to cultural values. With the erosion of cherished values, the souls of men become "parceled-out"; they become anomic.

This appears as the historical side of the contradiction. Modern industrial society can be partially criticized because it does not provide individuals with a secure self-identity. This is the common criticism of Mills, Gouldner and Bottomore, as it is of Durkheim and Weber. But forming the groundwork for this conception is the underlying notion that human beings need social control; they need to be morally regulated. This becomes the ahistorical side of the contradiction. Rooted in man's biological make-up is a certain "activeness" (egoism, spontaneity, etc.,) that must be "steered" and channeled by social forces in order to integrate the individual within society. There is a tension between the "outward" movement of the individual and the constraints of the social bond.

In Chapter One this tension between the individual and society was located within the corporate liberal theories of both Durkheim and Weber. Chapter Two has sought to demonstrate that this central problem is also contained in the work of left-Weberian critical sociology. Insofar as
this conceptualization of the individual/society relation was a basis from which Weber and Durkheim partially criticized modern society, it also propels the left-Weberians in the same direction. However, as will be seen in Chapter Three, although these theorists are critical of capitalist society, in terms of envisioning a "good society" they actually reproduce an idealized version of capitalism itself. It will be maintained in Chapter Four that the left-Weberian inability to transcend capitalist society, even with respect to postulating how the "utopian" society would be structured, is due to the fact that the are emersed in a particular (bourgeois) class-based epistemology and hence, for example, can only deal with the relationship of the individual to society in an "abstract" manner; they are only able to conceptualize social reality from the standpoint of "appearance".
Footnotes:

1. Roles are defined by Mills as "a conduct pattern of a person which is typically expected by other persons". (Gerth and Mills; 1953,83) They are composed of various vocabularies of motive by which Mills means that: "A satisfactory or adequate motive is one that satisfies those who question some act or program, whether the actor questions his own or another's conduct. The words which may fulfill this function are limited to the vocabulary of motive acceptable for given situations by given social circles." (Gerth and Mills;1953,116)

2. Mills states that "given orders may be functionally independent or dependent of one another" depending on the manner in which they are integrated. (Gerth and Mills;1953,350)

3. By "ramifications" Mills means "those activities which are ends in one order but which are used as the means of another institutional order." (Gerth and Mills;1953,32)

4. Modern society is, then, characterized by Mills as becoming increasingly a "co-ordinated" society by which he means: "...the integration of a society by means of one or more institutional orders which become ascendant over other orders and direct them; thus other orders are regulated and managed by the ascendant order or orders." (Gerth and Mills;1953,355) The best example of a "co-ordinated" society is that of totalitarian Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia in which the rule of a one-party state over all other institutions and associations guarantees integration. Mills feels that the structure of modern American capitalist society, in its "main drift", is approaching that of the above two societies, with the power elite occupying the "command posts" of the ascendant institutions.

5. "In the West, the concrete historical grounding of the tragic includes, on one side, the radical disorder of fragmented cities and societies, the Greek and Medieval fragmentations. In these, men could be exposed to even the grossest changes in fate, to the most radical disruption of everyday life -- to brute violence, death, and to total slavery. A second concrete historical rooting of the tragic in the West was, of course, Christianity itself. Periodically vulnerable to pessimism about this world, Christianity affirmed a sense of man's ineradicable finiteness along with a simultaneous commitment to absolute values. (Gouldner;1976,74)

6. "Ideology thus entailed the emergence of a new mode of political discourse; discourse that sought action but did not merely seek it by invoking authority or tradition, or by emotive rhetoric alone. It was discourse predicted on the idea of grounding political action in secular and rational theory. A fundamental rule of the grammar of modern ideology, tacit or explicitly affirmed, was the principle of the unity of theory and practice mediated by rational discourse. Ideology separated itself from the mythical and religious consciousness;
it justified the course of action it proposed, by the logic and evidence it summoned on behalf of its views of the social world, rather than by invoking faith, tradition, revelation or the authority of the speaker. Ideology, then, premised policies shaped by rational discourse in the public sphere, and premised that support can be mobilized for them by the rhetoric of rationality (Gouldner; 1976, 30).

7. For Gouldner, then, rationality entails an ability to speak about the tacit assumptions held by the enquirer, to make them manifest for scrutiny and reflection. This presupposes the capacity to think about one's thinking, to use metacommunication. (Gouldner; 1976, 49) However, this in turn requires assumptions that must be open to reflection; therefore, the ideal of rationality presupposes meta-metacommunication, meta-meta-metacommunication, ad infinitum. Gouldner claims that for any one person possibly the limit to such self-awareness concerning one’s assumptions is a third or fourth-order reflexivity. (Gouldner; 1976, 49) More will be said about Gouldner's "reflexive sociology" in Chapter Three.

8. Gouldner states that with the growing inability of the masses to be moved by ideology the proletariat, as the oft-touted historical agent of change in capitalist society, may never realize its potential due to the domination of its consciousness by the "consciousness industry". (Gouldner; 1976, 176) This does not mean that he conceptualizes the present "stability" of modern society as inevitable for the future (that we are living in a "one-dimensional society") because he points to inherent contradictions within the cultural configuration of neo-capitalist society that may lead to a reunification of politicized masses and ideological elites. Chapter Three will deal at length with this issue.

9. "Power, in this sense, is the Weberian formulation meaning "the ability of an individual or group to attain its end in a course of action even against the opposition of others who are involved in that course of action."

10. This is basically S. Ossowski's argument that Bottomore, although somewhat equivocal on the matter, seems to uphold.

11. Bottomore concedes that since the death of Stalin in the U.S.S.R. there has been somewhat more toleration of dissent as well as the lifting of some restrictions with respect to Soviet Socialist Realism in cultural production. "But there is still neither freedom of movement for the individual, nor any possibility of organized public." (Bottomore; 1965, 59)

12. Bottomore says that Yugoslavia has remained outside the sphere of Soviet influence for the most part. As well, Yugoslavia has experimented with decentralization of the economy to some extent, with
worker's control of industry and an economy combining public ownership with a form of market economy as distinguishing characteristics.

13. See Mills' definition of a "mass society" (p.69)

14. Bottomore states that for social criticism to prove really effective in radical politics, in the search for a radical transformation of existing social structure, it must be carried by a social movement of large numbers of men. Social criticism must be rooted in their experiences and interests and in their desire to change society accordingly. He maintains that in most of the West European nations the labour movement still occupies this place, and that students, intellectuals, ethnic minorities, etc., in order to be effective, must forge alliances with the labour movement.
CHAPTER THREE: The Left-Weberian Normative View of Society and Historical Agency for Change
Given that left-Weberian critical sociology understands man's central problem within modern capitalist society to be the concentrated levels of power enjoyed by those at the summits of large bureaucratized institutions vis-à-vis the generally powerless masses, what do they propose as an alternative form of social organization, and how could it be achieved? This chapter will take as its task the delineation of Mills', Gouldner's and Bottomore's positions regarding their normative view of society and their historical agency for change. As in Chapter Two, the focus here will not be on a critical discussion of the ideas presented for study (this will be reserved for the concluding section of this work). Rather, it will attempt to illustrate the continuities between the ideas of the respective left-Weberian theorists with respect to their "good society" and how it might be attained, as well as the continuities between the left-Weberians and the corporate liberal tradition in general. It will be maintained in this chapter that although the left-Weberians are critical of the corporate capitalist status quo, and although they do not underwrite the power of the bourgeoisie, their thought is bounded by their own rootedness in the corporate liberal tradition. They occupy the idealistic/critical position within this form of thought as opposed to the realistic/social reformist stance. The concluding chapter will deal critically with the ramifications of the above. For now, attention will be turned to an elucidation of the normative view and historical agency of Mills, Gouldner and Bottomore (in that order).
C. Wright Mills

Mills' Normative Orientation

There is an inherent problem in considering C. Wright Mills' normative orientation in that for all his moral outbursts directed against monopoly capitalist society, and for all his pleas for a more humane, "decent" society, Mills never delineated in an adequate manner how an alternative society would be constituted, what it would look like in its broad parameters. Some might argue that Marx had an identical problem, that his refusal to indulge in "kitchen recipes" was equal to the same thing, but at least we know that Marx was a communist. With Mills, even that seemingly black and white question cannot be easily divined for an answer of substance. It is apparent that the deep ambivalence Mills reserved for socialism Soviet style was reflected in the manner in which the "good society" could become operational. (This, of course, is true for most members of the left, Bottomore and Gouldner included).

Nonetheless, strewn throughout his writings Mills does provide a number of clues that contribute to an understanding of some of the structural prerequisites for the establishment and maintenance of the "good society". These, along with the historical agency for the fulfillment and continued operation of that society, will be studied in the forthcoming section.

It will be remembered from the discussion in the preceding chapter that the seminal problem faced by modern man was the eclipse of the Enlightenment values of freedom, rationality, progress and individuality in an age of increasing formal rationalization and bureaucratization. At
the heart of this process was the decline of a society of politicized publics in which decision-making was decentralized, and the emergence of a mass society with politically irresponsible elites in the ascendant positions of power.

To highlight this shift in social structure and its attendant impact on individuals, Mills juxtaposed nineteenth century liberal society with modern bureaucratic capitalism. Some observers may have discerned in Mills' portrayal of liberal society his own alternative to monopoly capitalism; that is to say, Mills' somewhat romantic canvas of nineteenth century America was taken as his normative view of society, as his "good society". If such claims were accurate (and they certainly do have some merit), Mills could quite justifiably be labelled a simple romantic, as one bent on rolling back history to a former golden age of capitalism. Whereas strands of populism do populate the pages of Mills' work, we do not feel that this is the major thrust of his orientation. For Mills, the great promise, and simultaneously, the great tragedy of modern industrial society is that at this historical juncture, for the first time in history, man is capable of rationally and willfully directing the course of historical events for the betterment of mankind -- if only those in the position of decision-making were morally responsible individuals. The existence of the power elite makes this the cruel irony of the modern era. Nineteenth century liberal society could never boast of this potential because, like the historical process described in Tolstoy's War and Peace, history was one of blind drift, of fate. The self-balancing society moved to the interplay of numerous indistinguishable forces one on the other. (Mills; 1958, 37) However much Mills may
have romanticized liberal society, he was too much a modern sociologist, too much an heir to Dewey, et.al. to want to return to a society in which history was indefatigably controlled by the tyrant Fate. As shall be seen presently, the "good society" involves the willful making of history by individuals armed with knowledge and the political desire to create a "decent" society. It involves the union of "power" and "intellect".

Although such a position may appear at first to parallel the Marxian notion of the unity of theory and practice, Mills is less ensconced in this tradition than he is in the corporate liberal framework that charges the person of knowledge, and primarily the social scientist, with the responsibility of intellectual custodian in the establishment of a "just society". This does not mean to imply that C. Wright Mills is an apologist of the status quo or that he holds the same position within this tradition as the "Abstracted Empiricists" or "Grand Theorists" he so soundly criticizes; only that, as a critical theorist within this framework, he, much like Veblen, occupies its most idealistic ground, and in so doing, while rooted in its assumptions, becomes a foremost critic of the status quo. Further discussion of this issue would usurp the function of this work's final chapter and will be reserved until that time.

Mills' normative orientation, as will be seen to be the case with Gouldner and Bottomore respectively, has at its centre the passionate desire to see returned to individuals the act of self-government, to see them become full citizens of a polity in the broadest meaning of the phrase. In short, what he demands is the full institutionalization of a democratic society. However, it is this yearn that is communicated most poignantly and not the specific socio-economic groundwork on which it is
to be erected. That is, although Mills soundly condemns the corporate structure of the private capitalist economy, he does not fully offer an alternative, but only says that as a precondition for a democratic society the private economy must be made publicly responsible. (Mills;1958,120) This is a rather vague statement at best and is certainly not tantamount to an admission of socialist proclivities. It does acknowledge that the domination of national and international decisions by corporate bureaucracies must be broken in order that the polity, as a true forum for public decision-making, be relieved of the heavy yoke of corporate handmaiden and given its rightful mandate. The separation of economy and polity, then, is conceived as a primary step in the establishment of democracy.

Yet, whereas Mills provides us with an outline of what conditions are necessary for a political democracy (which shall be elucidated in a moment), he does not satisfactorily come to grips with the manner in which the economy should be organized. How is it to be made "publicly responsible"? Given that Mills believes that industrialization does not necessarily entail the development of private centralization of enterprizes (Mills;1951,21), and given that he believes one must maintain control over one's means of subsistence in order to assure a sense of freedom, it seems likely that some form of worker ownership and self-management of industrial enterprizes would be the option most appealing to Mills. Such an industrial organization would facilitate individual control over the production of industry while providing for central planning through public discussion of long-term goals. Indeed, in one of his earliest books, The New Men of Power, Mills does supply some substance to make such a position tenable. He states that the strategy of unions vis-à-vis capital should be to
educate their workers to the realities of the American political-economy and to press for worker control of management functions. (Mills; 1948, 255) Proceeding, he states that decentralized shop control and centralized planning are compatible. (Mills; 1948, 259) Mills, shortly after writing the book, abandoned the labour movement as an agency for radical reform. This most likely accounts for his silence and subsequent lack of development of this particular theme in his later years. In The New Men of Power, the movement toward worker's control was devised as a strategy for unionists to follow in order to avoid co-optation into corporate capitalism and as a means by which democracy could be brought to fruition. With Mills' worst fears vindicated in the ensuing years (at least in his own estimation), the concept of worker management must have seemed utopian, even by his own standards. Nonetheless, although it may have lost its appeal as a means to an end, worker control of industry, or more abstractly, the individual's control over his means of subsistence, remained, even if in the background, a component of Mills' normative orientation.

If the economy within the political democracy envisioned by Mills would have to be rendered publicly responsible in order to produce for human needs as well as to check the power of the corporate elite, then, similarly, unless the military ascendency in terms of its personnel and its ethos (the military definition of reality, "crackpot realism") was overcome, and unless the political vacuum was filled with a politicized public, the barriers to the "decent" society must be considered insurmountable.

Above are the three major preconditions on which Mills' normative orientation is grounded. According to him, as delineated in
The Causes of World War Three, the political structure of the modern democratic state requires six further conditions: (1) The public must become the very forum for political discussion over important issues; (2) Nationally responsible parties must debate openly the important issues; (3) The senior civil service must be linked to the world of knowledge and sensibility and composed of skilled men who are independent of vested interests; (4) The intelligentsia, both inside and outside the university, must be able to carry on the important discourse of the Western world and must be considered relevant and influential to publics, parties and movements; (5) The media of genuine communication must enable individuals to see personal troubles as social issues and this, coupled with #3 and #4 above, are essential for making politicians responsible to publics; and (6) Free associations linking families, smaller communities and publics, on the one hand with the state, and on the other with the military and economy, are needed for reasoned opinion and rational execution of the public will. (Mills;1958,118)

The distillation of the above reads as follows: The public, with the voluntary association as its classic instrument, must be revitalized -- repoliticized -- in order that the clash of various interests be resolved through rational, public debate. The polity, free of elite manipulation, could now be receptive to the desires of the various and dispersed voluntary associations that seek to have input into the construction and execution of social policy. So established, the public would act as a forum for decision-making and a guarantee that the authority vested in political leaders not be abused. A decentralization of political power becomes a de facto reality. The person of knowledge, both through the
mass media and face-to-face communication, would play an integral role in creating a viable public by clarifying issues, defining new problems, criticizing, and tabling scientific and/or technical data for debate. His is the task of insuring that the community of publics is both know­ledgable and articulate because only through a union of knowledge and power can human beings hope to willfully create history. A democratic public that is actually connected with the powers of decision-making is the very seat of sovereignty. (Mills;1956,323)

On first glance it seems ironic that while Mills discounts the view of reality of the modern-day liberal-pluralist theorists, his own normative orientation, his own "good society", is the caricature of a pluralistic society. Two of the principal tenets of pluralism are: (1) A pluralistic society would contain a vast proliferation of autonomous groups, associations and other organizations and (2) A pluralistic society is characterized by continual and extensive flows of information and influence among its constituent parts. (Olsen;1970,184) These match Mills' statements concerning the role of the public and the role of the intellectual in the maintenance and operation of the "good society". With a society structured in this way, power will be decentralized and in the hands of those affected by policy decisions.

Yet, on the double take, Mills' pluralistic "good society" is less ironic than it is consistent with his analysis of "power" and "interest" in monopoly capitalist society. In Chapter One it was maintained that conservative corporate liberalism, in one of its forms as liberal-pluralism, defined the categories "power" and "interest" in a subjective manner; that is, they were essentially reducible to qualities of individuals. Not
dissimilar is Mills' analysis. Power is defined by Mills as "simply the probability that men will act as another man wishes. This action may rest upon fear, rational calculation of advantage, or a dozen other individual motives." (Gerth and Mills; 1953, 195) This Weberian formulation is expanded upon in another context where Mills adds that power:

[has to do with whatever decisions men make about the arrangements under which they live, and about the events which make up the history of their period...[I]n so far as such decisions are made (and in so far as they could be but are not) the problem of who is involved in making them (or not making them) is the basic problem of power. (Mills; 1959, 40)

Essentially, this conception of power parallels that of the conservative corporate liberals discussed in Chapter One. Both are subjective definitions of power in that they focus on the ability of individuals to "get what they want". Attention is riveted on "decision-making" in one's own favour, on conscious attempts at wielding power. This is why Mills emphasizes the importance of exclusive socialization of the power elite in forming a relatively uniform worldview:

The power elite, as we conceive it, also rests upon the similarity of its personnel, and their personal and official relation with one another, upon their social and psychological affinities. (Mills; 1956, 278)

With the creation of a power elite "class consciousness" the long-run decisions made by this group ultimately coincide and operate in their own interest. This is also why Mills can morally blame the power elite for organized (and unorganized) acts of irresponsible decision-making, for their "higher immorality". They have the power to make decisions, but because the power elite is responsible to no one save themselves, their personal selfish desires dictate social and political policy.

In this instance, Poulantzas' criticism of Ralph Miliband is apropos to
the case of Mills:

This is the problematic of social actors, of individuals as the origin of social action: sociological research thus leads finally, not to the study of the objective co-ordinates that determine the distribution of agents into social classes and the contradictions between classes, but to the search for finalist explanations founded on the motivations of conduct of the individual actors.

(Poulantzas, in Blackburn;1972,242)

In corresponding fashion, Mills' concept of "interest" is related to that of conservative corporate liberalism in that "interest" is also subjectively defined. That is to say, although Mills is not as naive as the liberal-pluralists who believe that individuals immediately know their own interests and act upon them accordingly (Mills calls this a "fetish of democracy" because he believes that often individuals are "falsely conscious" of their interests), he still conceptualizes "interest" in a subjective manner as "values":

For interests involve not only values felt, but also something of the means by which these values might be attained. Merely by looking into himself, an individual can neither clarify his values nor set up ways for their attainment. (Mills;1951,xix)

The particular set of "interests" or "values" of a given individual in a given social strata depends upon the interplay of the four dimensions of stratification: class, occupation, status and power:

The probability that people will have a similar mentality and ideology [and thus interest], and that they will join together for action, is increased the more homogenous they are with respect to class, occupation, and prestige. (Mills;1951,295)

Given this Weberian understanding of the problem of interest, social class is only one "interest group" among many involved in the struggle for power and influence in society. Mills' concern in modern American
society, as has been seen, is that the ascendancy of the power elite has subverted the abilities of other interest groups (relegated to the middle levels of power) from having an effect voice in social and political policy.

Because Mills' perception of "power" and "interest" is fundamentally grounded in liberal-pluralist assumptions, it follows logically that Mills should agree with the pluralist prerequisite for a political democracy -- the separation of polity and economy, the decentralization of power. It can be said that Mills' pluralistic tendencies are not surprising because the very rootedness in the assumptions of corporate liberalism, which of course are founded upon corporate property, will prevent Mills from fully transcending this epistemological base. The very fact that Mills' reproduces liberal-pluralist categories in his vision of the "good society" attests to his inability to separate himself from those he so soundly criticizes. It appears that if the liberal-pluralist categories used to describe social reality are expressions, at one level, of corporate capitalist property relations, then at a higher level of abstraction, so too are the constructions of Mills' normative orientation.

At this juncture any further amplification on this theme will be terminated for consideration in the final chapter of this thesis. For now, attention will be turned to Mills' historical agency.
Mills' Historical Agency

As recounted earlier in this section, Mills originally believed that the trade union movement, with the proper instigation by labour leaders, could be used as a lever to effect radical reforms in the establishment of a more humane society. However, according to Mills, the labour movement as a historical agency became sidetracked - co-opted into the structures of corporate capitalism - and failed to fulfill its inherent potential. (Mills;1951,322) He came to refer to the contention that the working class could be the source of a radical politics as the "labour metaphysic". Although Mills saw the labour unions as becoming just another "vested interest" in monopoly capitalism, and although he believed it "quite unrealistic" to count on the working class as an agency for change, he still maintained that the working class could not be "written off" completely. Moreover, it was not necessarily inevitable for the run of history that labour would be politically ineffectual, but it clearly is at this moment and for the foreseeable future. (Mills;1963,256)

Increasingly, as Mills neared the end of his life, he turned to the young, radical intellectuals as a group that might constitute an important source of social change. This is made clearest in his short essay entitled "The New Left". (Mills;1963,247) But even as early as "The Social Role of the Intellectual" dated 1944, we witness in germ form the importance for Mills of the left intellectual. In this article he delineated the moral responsibility of the intellectual, which for the
most part was only fleshed out and expanded upon through the remainder of his academic career. Again in *The New Men of Power*, another of Mills' earliest works, he calls for the union of the left intelligentsia and the labour unions for the purposes of charting a course in their struggles with corporate capital. *The New Men of Power* is itself dedicated to the labour intellectual who, it is hoped, will help facilitate the unity of "power" and "intellect". Essentially, the function of the intellectual was to engage in a "politics of truth" in which his knowledge of social reality was to be communicated to individuals in such a way that they could link their personal troubles with widespread social issues in order that appropriate social action be taken. The intellectual must not only criticize existing social structures in terms of their threat to human freedom, but must also provide the vision of an alternative society as well as insights into how it can be achieved. (Mills;1959,131) His concerns must be to generate a self-cultivating public of politically aware individuals through the provocation of public discussion and public action. (Mills;1959,185)

This seminal concern of Mills, derived from the philosophy of the pragmatists and grounded in the "revolt against formalism", is manifested in all of his works. Its logical conclusion, as illustrated in Mills' mature writings, is the intellectual as historical agent. From Mills' earliest writing to his last there is an overriding consistency in the faith that the pragmatic effect of knowledge and the role of the person of knowledge lie at the core of resolving human problems. The emphasis may have changed, but the thrust remained continuous.

However, for the dialogue between the person of knowledge and
the public to actually transpire, for the adequate transmission of the
values of reason and freedom to become a reality, Mills states that there
must exist parties, movements and publics having two characteristics: (1)
Within them ideas and alternatives of social life must be truly debated,
and (2) They have a chance to really influence decisions of structural
consequence. (Mills; 1959,190) This seems to reduce to a "chicken and
egg" argument. That is to say, what must come first, an intelligentsia
that is ready and willing to address the public in a morally responsible
way, or a public that is already politicized and only lacks direction?

Ideally, of course, what is required is a committed intelli-
gentsia and a politicized public; in real terms, what Mills saw was an
intelligentsia in default with no sign of a politically effective public,
party or movement on the social horizon. That milieu in which cultural
production was generated -- the "cultural apparatus" -- was steadily
becoming bureaucratized and expropriated from those who created culture.
This accentuated the gulf between a critically atuned intellectual
community and the public because ideas of substance were being laundered
by the mass media.

By the late 1950's, Mills' hopes for a radicalized intelligentsia
were buoyed with the budding of the New Left. He sensed that it was the
young intellectuals throughout the world who were awakening from the old
complacency. (Mills; 1963,258) Feeling that it was the intelligentsia
that could embody the impetus towards radical reform, that could infuse
the menopausal world of American politics with a sense of life-after-
forty, Mills called on the left intellectuals not to rely on others to
initiate change nor to attach themselves to traditional political parties
or movements (not to become working class agitators, for example), but to remain independent and to assert this independence through actions directed at reclaiming their "cultural apparatus". (Mills;1963,232)

This struggle, which would be a joint political-cultural struggle, would take an intellectual and moral tact rather than a directly political one. To repossess the "cultural apparatus" would provide greater control over what would be produced and how it would be distributed. From this basis a critique of the status quo could be initiated in the attempt to reach a wider public. The mass media, used on the intellectual's own terms, would be part of this strategy and could be employed to publicly disseminate alternative definitions of reality and plans for social action. (Mills;1963,233) Furthermore, educators must demand that they have greater control over curriculum, scientists must refuse to work for the American War Machine, and there must be a separate peace made between the intellectuals of the world; they must refuse to fight the Cold War:

In summary, what we must do is to define the reality of the human condition and to make our definitions public; to confront the new facts of history-making in our time, and their meanings for the problem of political responsibility; to release the human imagination by transcending the mere exhortation of grand principle and opportunistic reaction in order to explore all the alternatives now open to the human community. (Mills;1963,235)

Through the actions of the left intelligentsia in the above ways, Mills feels that they can begin to build a potent New Left. In the last years of his life, and in the first years of the emerging student movement, Mills sensed that "we are beginning to move again". He discerned a will on the part of the young intellectuals to break out of their apathetic malaise and to act.
In summary, it can be said with respect to Mills historical agency that, with the union of knowledge, moral vision and power, the "good society" can be willfully made by individuals. With the union of the intellectual and the politicized public of voluntary associations, a society pregnant with the anticipation of Enlightenment Reason can be propagated.

Yet, as discussed in Chapter One, is not such a position a re-working of the liberal-pluralist perspective on historical change and its agency? Of course, the pluralists see the structures of the "good society" already in place and operational only to be fine-tuned to ameliorate social problems; whereas Mills conceptualized the role of the intellectual and the politicized public to be oriented toward fundamental social change rooted in a thorough critique and repudiation of the status quo. Nonetheless, as maintained in Chapter One, both positions are rooted in the "revolt against formalism" and differ only in degree, not in kind. In both cases, whether the person of knowledge be a scientist or technician, he is conceived as having knowledge instrumental in creating a rational, planned and harmonious society attendant upon its communication to the masses. Through rational discussion antagonistic positions may be reconciled and acted upon in the public's interest. Knowledge is to be utilized in pragmatic fashion for the genesis of the "good society" and for the solving of social problems.

In this instance, whether one is a theorist bent on reform within the system -- a Lester Ward or a Seymour Martin Lipset -- or whether one is a social critic bent on structural change -- a Veblen or a Mills (or as shall be seen presently, a Gouldner or a Bottomore) --
-- the fact that both the reformers and the critics take sustenance from the broth of corporate liberalism has consequences with respect to where one ultimately ends up. With Lipset, this is obvious. But with Mills, it is more problematical. Although he is extremely critical of monopoly capitalism, he is rooted in its major intellectual tradition and finally ends by reproducing, in abstract and utopian form, the very society he so much deplores. This is witnessed in both his normative orientation and historical agency. Like a man caught in the subconscious drift of a dream, he can exercise no conscious control of its outcome. It carries him through to its logical conclusion.
Alvin W. Gouldner

Gouldner's Normative Orientation

In the following discussion it should become clear just how closely Gouldner's normative orientation and historical agency converges with that of Mills. This should not be surprising given the similarity in their respective views of social reality. A fuller analysis and explanation of these similarities will be provided in the concluding chapter. At present, our attention will be turned to an elucidation of Alvin Gouldner's normative view and historical agency.

Generally, what Gouldner perceives with the transition from early capitalism to neo-capitalism is the eclipse of reason, of the language of critical discourse -- rationalistic ideology. This, as illustrated in Chapter Two, has two basic causes: (1) The emergence of large bureaucratic institutions structured along instrumental rational lines blurs the separation of public and private, thereby destroying the public as a form for critical dialogue, and (2) The emergence of the electronic mass media as a new source and tempo of experience, which is not readily conceptualizable as experience, renders it unamenable to critical, reflexive discussion in public. The direct result of these developments is the decline of rational ideology and with it the decisive link between the individual and history -- his capacity to conceptualize "personal troubles as social issues". People, then, are left without the means to situate themselves in the increasingly nebulous world of formal rationality; lacking the competency to understand the importance
of substantive rational values, or the manner in which they may be
enacted, they salve their wounds with privatized life-styles. These
psychological effects of anomie become the fundamental characteristic
of modern man.

Given the above scenario, what is Gouldner's alternative to
modern society? As with Mills, much can be gleaned from his appraisal
of early bourgeois society. However, it should be stressed that
Gouldner's normative view is not simply a reproduction of early capital-
ism. For Gouldner, such a study provides an insight with respect to the
way in which modern technological society could be structured in order
to create a humane and egalitarian society. In this vein, the major
institutional feature of early capitalism in the enhancement of substan-
tive rationality was the genesis of the "public" situated between the
decentralized and separate spheres of the economy and polity. This
development, along with others, marked the greatest advance in human
rationality known to history. It was here that a culture of critical
discourse (CCD) was able to emerge with the amelioration of state sanc-
tions on speech. Individuals, including leaders, were held personally
accountable for their opinions and actions in the public sphere because
they were treated as private persons stripped of special privileges.
The bourgeois public, although never a "democracy-in-being", was a cru-
cial structural development in the movement towards a liberal democracy
due to the fact that private lives were connected with the state. This
made it imperative that political leaders justify decisions; they were
held responsible; power was legitimate. Of course, Gouldner acknowledges
that the limits to rationality in early bourgeois society were real
(patriarchy and private property), but the above institutional outline is the "clay" from which Gouldner molds the framework for his "good society".

A primary ingredient of the "clay" is the revitalization of the public as the fundamental basis of a democracy. Individuals must have an open forum in which decisions are made by them, through rational discussion, in order that they remain in control of their own lives. The public is the very mechanism that will once again link individuals with the state, and simultaneously, protect them from it. It forces those of the polity to be candid about their actions and responsible to the interests of the people.

Nonetheless, the public cannot be effectual if individuals are ineffectual. What must be cultivated is a culture of critical discourse that would allow, indeed demand, a reflexive self-awareness about one's values and assumptions and about those of others. To this end, public rationality depends on the end of domination whether it be economic, political, patriarchal, etc. (Gouldner;1976,98) Individuals must be free of the fear of sanctions by authorities and must be free of censorship. They must be free to criticize and to be criticized.

Structurally speaking, the fostering of public rationality -- the creation of a situation in which there is an "end of domination" -- entails the severing of the political and economic orders. In neo-capitalism the incomplete separation of these institutions means that the role of the public is severely restricted because the capitalist class, in "tacit" alliance with the political and administrative classes, makes decisions behind the backs of the general populace. An initial step in
resolving this problem -- the move towards an "emancipatory socialism" -- is the "spread and diffusion of the people's ownership and effective control over the means of production ...." (Gouldner;1976,165)

Property must be decentralized to prevent the monopolization of political power. Gouldner argues that a further concentration within the economic realm, a nationalization of property by the state in the name of socialism, for example, is an unequivocable step backward:

Any society that entails the strengthening of the state apparatus by giving it unchecked control over the economy, and re-unites the polity and the economy, is an historical regression. (Gouldner;1976,165)

In the state socialist societies, the "free space" in which a critical public could be formed has no structural support because of the complete amalgamation of the two major institutions; insofar as it does exist, it consists of small groups of "deviants" or "dissenters", often of a private character, pitted against the officially sanctioned views of the state. What creates the "socialist" public is the absence of the opportunity for public debate and criticism, rather than its presence. (Gouldner;1976,96)

One of the key elements, then, in instituting an "end to domination", and consequently, a culture of critical discourse, would be the decentralization of power in whatever form it takes. To prevent a single group of people from monopolizing the means of power, it must be dispersed, and those who make final decisions must be held accountable.

Another important instrument in the creation of a critical and informed public is the proper utilization of the mass media. An uncensored mass media becomes an important tool in the transmission of
information pertinent to a critical, democratic public. It can be instrumental in offering alternative and competing views of reality, in instigating exchange and dialogue. An uncensored mass media would also provide the communication linkage between the general public and those individuals with specialized scientific and technical knowledge, which is essential (by making technicians directly accountable to an informed public) to public control of science and technology.

The discourse between the public and the technical intelligentsia, which would also be enhanced by the various critiques of humanistic intellectuals, would have as its ultimate aim the enslavement of the formal rational means of technology to the substantive rational ends as dictated by a reflexive and self-aware public. Gouldner describes Jürgen Habermas as a humanistic intellectual who believes critical theory, as substantive rationality, must be utilized in the manner of a "watchdog" over the technical intelligentsia, who actually operate and devise modern technology. (Gouldner;1979,39) For Gouldner, the role of the humanistic intellectual is fundamentally the same. (Gouldner;1979,11) By engaging in a thorough critique of the means of science and technology (and as well, by criticizing the critique) and by making his observations public, the critical theorist will enhance the public's ability to decide on how and for whose benefit science and technology will be employed. This will contribute to a guarantee against the emergence of a new technical elite.

It should be apparent that the normative orientation of Gouldner is in its essentials the same as C. Wright Mills'. In summary these parallels can be listed. Both theorists: (1) Stress the imperative for
a decentralization of the major institutions in order to return the power of decision-making to the public; (2) Believe that through decentralization there can develop a separation of polity and economy where no single group will dominate the "command posts" of power; (3) State the importance for a democracy of a politicized public of critical and creative (self-reflective) thinkers. The public, with its numerous voluntary associations, will limit the power of any one group while providing a direct link (and buffer) between the individual and the state; (4) Link a politically viable public with the role of an unencumbered mass media and the enlightening function of the intellectual. The proper deployment of mass media tools will enable the critical intellectual and the scientist and technician an opportunity to disseminate interpretive and/or technical knowledge to a large number of people. From this basis rational judgements can be made.

For these two theorists, the general nature of the "good society" is that of an open, dynamic, pluralistic society in which political and social decisions, as well as actions, are publicly debated by those affected by them. Gouldner, as with Mills, reserves the liberal-pluralist definition of reality for his normative view. We saw how Mills was logically lead to these conclusions because of the manner in which he defined the nature of "interest" and "power". The same argument holds for Gouldner.

For Gouldner, the concept of "interest" closely resembles that of conservative corporate liberalism in that both must be considered "subjective".
Whatever produces gratification for persons is in their interest; property and wealth are certainly among the most common interests men have but so, too, may men have interests in a nation-state, in an ethnic or racial group, in their education and knowledge and linguistic skills, and they may also have an interest in the success of their ideologies. (Gouldner;1976,211)

An "interest" is subjectively defined as "gratification for persons" and is essentially reducible to a psychological state of mind of individual persons. It is "free-floating". "An out-there condition is in our interest insofar as, and only insofar as, it produces an in-here gratification for us." (Gouldner;1976,210) Although Gouldner asserts that his concept of interest is both "objective" and "subjective" -- it involves "out-there" conditions and "in-here" gratifications -- it still remains a "subjective" definition. That is, in this conception the perpetuation of private property constitutes an "interest" because it produces personal gratifications -- it makes a person happy, etc. This seems to suggest that capitalists are motivated to maintain and expand their property, for example, because it increases their profits and thus their gratifications; that capitalists are motivated by greed. As suggested earlier, though, the interest of capital cannot be reduced to profit-making motivations or to greed but is related to its objective class situation which exists independently of any need to experience an "in-here" gratification.

Gouldner writes in another context that:

The concerns and interests of men do, in large part, derive from and coincide with these larger entities [culture, society]; but they do so, however, only in part and never in toto. However deep men's identification with and dependence upon a larger cause or group, and however successful the cause or however benign the group, there are always points in the lives of men when they must go their own way,
when it becomes painfully evident that their cause and their group do not constitute the totality of their personal existence. (Gouldner;1970,509)

This not only expresses the idea that in an ultimate sense there is a contradiction between the individual and society (something we have already discussed), but also that in the final analysis interests are the interests of individuals; that interests emanate from the individual as a separate entity. This fails to go further than the corporate and classical liberal conceptions of interest, despite the fact that Gouldner introduces the possibility of a "false consciousness" (the incorrect awareness of the source of one's gratifications).

Similarly, power is defined by Gouldner, like Mills, in Weberian terms:

[Power is inherently the opportunity to achieve one's aims despite the resistance, which may be expressed as moral disapproval, of others. In short, power enables men to get what they want even when what they want and the way they seek to get it is at variance with conventional morality. (Gouldner;1970,328)]

Once again we see that this conception of power is a "subjective" definition that parallels that of conservative corporate liberalism. The exercise of power depends upon individuals or groups defining what they want in terms of gratifications and consciously setting about procuring them. Given this understanding, ideological socialization is considered by Gouldner to be crucial in the smooth functioning of a political economy of "indirect rule". The functions that the individuals of the political and economic "classes" perform hinge upon "right behavior" that "depends greatly on appropriate socialization and education" of these classes to the vital interests of the bourgeois upper class. (Gouldner;1976,233)
This is accomplished in a multitude of ways such as through intermarriage and admission to privileged social clubs:

Now, each of the dominant classes learns to take the role of the other. It thus makes the "other" an internalized audience, so that the political and administrative classes' policies may be influenced by the hegenomic class even without communicating with it. (Gouldner;1976,235)

This understanding of power and the relationship between the three dominant "classes" seeks to explain class relations as inter-personal relations. Gouldner conceptualizes the exercise of power in terms of motivations of conduct on the part of groups of individuals oriented towards maximizing personal gratification. Insofar as the source of gratification of the bourgeoisie is in the private ownership of property, it is motivated towards the preservation and strengthening of the profitability of capital:

The upper class will oppose anything that threatens its ability to reproduce itself by threatening the profitability of its holdings, and thereby its capacity to reinvest and make more profit. (Gouldner;1976,237)

This formulation of power, as was Gouldner's perception of "interest", ultimately reduces to the value-oriented social actor -- the individual. Interests are considered to be rooted in "sources of gratification", power is defined as the "ability to get what one wants". Both categories are essentially similar to those of the corporate liberal tradition described in Chapter One. They are "subjectively" conceived.

Consequently, as with Mills, the solution to the problem of centralized power is the separation of the polity and economy and the institutionalization of a de facto pluralistic society. It means offsetting the power and wealth of one group with that of numerous other groups.
Gouldner's Historical Agency

Gouldner's latest book, _The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class_, actually serves an attempt to locate a potential source of social change within the new working class stratum composed of humanistic intellectuals and technical intelligentsia -- a new historical agency. This "New Class", as Gouldner refers to it, "holds a mortgage on at least one historical future".\(^1\)\(^2\) In general, the book amounts to an elaborate shopping trip for a new emancipatory proletariat, although Gouldner explains that such liberation is not a historical inevitability due to the fact that the New Class is a "flawed universal class" -- one with special vested interests that in itself must be tempered and overcome if anything more than a circulation of elites is to emerge from its rise to power. Indeed, the attainment of power by the New Class is itself not unproblematical (although it may be a "good bet").

Gouldner's thesis with respect to the emancipatory potential of the New Class is essentially that, although the two major factions within this class -- the technicians and intellectuals -- emerge within early bourgeois society and have direct links with the bourgeoisie (often the brothers, sisters or children of the old moneyed class), they come to find the basis of their privilege in jeopardy with the subsequent development of capitalist society. They become alienated from the very system that provides their special privileges, creating a source of irritation that must be overcome if their longevity as a class is to be assured. Depending on the manner in which the New Class sets about the task of clearing the hurdles before them (e.g., the class alliances made) will be the quality, in human terms, of the possible new society.
What, then, is the basis of the New Class's power? How are their interests subverted in capitalist society? How can these fetters be overcome? And how can this amount to a movement towards human liberation?

Gouldner maintains that competition between the various bourgeois enterprises made rationalization of production a necessity for survival. This fundamental fact of bourgeois life was the structural impetus that gave birth to the New Class -- those individuals who through their scientific and technical expertise would heighten efficiency and production. (Gouldner; 1979, 18) As mentioned earlier, the initial source of individuals who performed these functions was actually the relatively well educated segment of the bourgeoisie itself. Consequently, in the early phase of the development of the New Class there was little differentiation between membership in the bourgeoisie and the New Class. This begins to change with the full institutionalization of a public education system because contiguous with this development is a separation between the recruitment, and hence, reproduction, of New Class members and the capitalist class. (Gouldner; 1979, 18) No longer does the old moneyed class have control over the reproduction of the New Class; membership does not depend on the privileges of property but on possession of specialized knowledge. Emerging from this is the creation of a New Class ideology that stresses the autonomy of the New Class from economic and political interests, and which asserts its own grounding in "the specialized knowledge or cultural capital transmitted by the educational system, along with an emphasis on the obligation of educated persons to attend to the welfare of the collectivity." (Gouldner; 1979, 19)

This new ideology is the ideology of "professionalism". It
amounts to a tacit subversion of the bourgeoisie because, even though it is a bid for prestige within the system, it cryptically provides an alternative in that it sets itself above pecuniary interests by espousing its own technical and moral superiority. (Gouldner; 1979, 19) It invokes the hallowed name of "pure science" as a legitimizing ideology.

This is necessary because the New Class has vested interests that must be obfuscated:

The special privileges and powers of the New Class are grounded in their individual control of special cultures, languages, techniques, and of the skills resulting from these. The New Class is a cultural bourgeoisie who appropriates privately the advantages of an historically and collectively produced cultural capital ... The special culture of the New Class is a stock of capital that generates a stream of income (some of) which it appropriates privately. (Gouldner; 1979, 19)

The New Class, as a cultural bourgeoisie, markets cultural products as a means of subsistence. It has a vested interest in maintaining or creating a social system that will facilitate their appropriation of a larger share of income from the production of culture, and thus, a social system that offers them greater control over their work and work settings. (Gouldner; 1979, 20) Insofar as this is the central concern of the New Class, it will oppose other social systems which allocate privilege on some other basis, for example, bourgeois property. On the one hand, then, the New Class can be seen as a progressive force against the privileges of private property, but, on the other, it demonstrates a profound antiegalitarian character because of its concern with preserving privilege and status on its own terms. (Gouldner; 1979, 20) The New Class is a "flawed class". Its vested interests, which need servicing and which will propel humanity into
a new form of elite rule if not checked by a critically aware public, remain of central import to the New Class.

If the New Class has a common interest in the social conditions and skills amenable to the production and reproduction of cultural capital, it also has a common stake in the conditions supportive of a culture of critical discourse (CCO) -- that pattern of speech that demands rational justification for one's assertions without invoking the social status of the speaker and without using the threat of coercion to convince the listener. Gouldner claims that the grammar of critical discourse is the "deep structure of the common ideology shared by the New Class":

The shared ideology of the intellectuals and intelligentsia is thus an ideology about discourse. Apart from and underlying the various technical languages (or sociolects) spoken by specialized professions, intellectuals are commonly committed to a culture of critical discourse (CCD). CCD is the latent but mobilizable infrastructure of modern "technical languages". (Gouldner;1979,28)

Even though the New Class may often be divided between its two basic component parts -- technical intelligentsia and humanistic intellectuals -- (that is to say, the New Class is not a class without internal divisions and antagonisms), a common bond that does ultimately unite them is an adherence to CCD and the social conditions that nurture it. In this way, the New Class is a "Speech Community".

The New Class as a "Speech Community" has a vested interest in opposing all forms of censorship and installing CCD as a standard of good speech. This has both its emancipatory and elitist repercussions because, on the one side, the New Class will wage warfare against all those whose interests are served through censorship, thus contributing to public enlightenment and reflexivity. However, on the other side, an inherent danger
is present because a new hierarchy may arise based on knowledge and "good speech" — the elitism of the philosopher-king. (Gouldner; 1975-76; #26,15)

This is one further reason why the New Class is a "flawed class".

The power of the New Class is rooted in their privileged education and in their intellectual and technical expertise within a modern technologically advanced industrial society. During the early years of capitalism, this power was largely circumscribed because of the undeveloped scientific and technological apparatus and because of the undeveloped public school system. This in great part gave control directly to the bourgeoisie. Yet, with the subsequent development of the capitalist political economy, there appears a system of "Indirect Rule".\(^3\) Control over the industrial infrastructure of neo-capitalism devolves increasingly upon managers and technical experts who possess the essential skills for the reproduction of capital. In contrast to the legal ownership of property by the old moneyed class, the New Class increasingly acquires considerable de facto control over the mode of production. This arms the New Class with ammunition to exact greater concessions from the bourgeoisie in order to continually undermine the power of the bourgeoisie in the furtherance of its own class position. "There is extensive and replicated evidence that managers, men having great power without commensurate property, are slowly placing the old moneyed class on the historical shelf." (Gouldner; 1979,12)

Further evidence of this trend is witnessed in the growing role of the Welfare State in such areas as public administration and education, under the control of New Class members. Gouldner claims that although the bourgeoisie benefit monetarily from advances in technology and from the "socialization" of the costs of production, they lose control over their
own destiny; their functional autonomy is attenuated. (Gouldner;1979,14) The key mechanism here is the encroachment of the Welfare State on those functions once directed by the capitalist class. Indeed, Gouldner maintains that the additional institutionalization and expansion of the Welfare State is a political strategy of the New Class to consolidate its class position. Similarly, a "socialist" state is also a New Class political strategy, but one that seeks a greater hegemony for itself. The former state form still implies the existence of the bourgeoisie which, being not impotent, restricts the power of the New Class (and vice-versa).

For the most part, although the New Class remains a subordinate class within neo-capitalism and does strive to better its position within the system through various strategies, it accepts its somewhat inferior role within this social structural constellation insofar as the system allows the New Class to exist as a privileged strata and to pursue its own ideal and material interests. (Gouldner;1979,12) However, the above conditions for New Class loyalty to the established order cannot always be satisfied within advanced capitalist society; they are subject to flux and change due to the contradictory nature of neo-capitalism. Generally, when the New Class perceives its interests to be blocked by the structures of neo-capitalism, much like the fetters placed on the bourgeoisie by feudal society, they experience a sense of alienation and disenchantment with the status quo.

The technical intelligentsia, with the increased scientization of the bureaucracy, acquire a greater autonomy from the control of the bourgeoisie, thus reducing the functional autonomy of the latter class. Notwithstanding the above, the bureaucratic organization itself, although
operated along the lines of instrumental rationality by the technical intelligentsia, is not a structure free from political patronage. New Class means are subverted to political ends established by top managing directors appointed from outside the bureaucracy and transmitted to New Class experts by way of bureaucratic "line" officials. The modern bureaucracy becomes an uneasy coalition of top directors, bureaucrats and technical experts which results in mounting tensions between the former two groups and the New Class. This is apparent because the New Class is alienated from the ends to which its skill is directed. Also, the political appointees -- coupled with their henchmen, the bureaucrats -- not being familiar with the technical expertise required to make decisions, are alienated from the means. (Gouldner;1976,255) Accruing from this situation is a resentment on the part of the technical intelligentsia because their work is evaluated by those they judge to be incompetent to judge. Nor surprisingly, "it is within the bureaucratic structure that much of the technical intelligentsia of the New Class begins its struggle to rise". (Gouldner;1979,52) The technical intelligentsia, in a growing fit of rationality (substantive this time), realize that their skills are used to further irrational ends. This serves as a radicalizing experience. Gouldner writes that such a development in the consciousness of this particular group is demonstrated by the emergence of programs like the Ecology Movement. Here there is a growing awareness that the goals of technology must be set by those other than bureaucratic managers. (Gouldner;1976,272)

A further source of alienation and resentment experienced by New Class members (in particular, the humanistic intellectuals) is their perception of a status disparity between their "high culture", with its
potential impact on the creation of a humane world, and their relatively low incomes and isolation from power. (Gouldner;1979,65) Given this, the marginal man as intellectual becomes much more likely to engage in political activity opposed to the status quo.

It should quickly be noted that Gouldner also sees a number of other factors that serve to alienate the New Class and dispose them unfavourably towards the existing regime. He states that any form of censorship, whether it be state censorship, censorship by the bourgeois market place, or censorship of the mass media through its domination by the "Consciousness Industry" (as opposed to the "Cultural Apparatus"), inhibits the autonomy of the New Class because its power depends on the pen, not the sword. More specifically, not only does censorship cripple the New Class' means of subsistence (the freedom to market its cultural wares), it also blocks the channels of communication necessary to mobilize public support for their special projects. (Gouldner;1979,64)

One last source of New Class alienation which contributes to its radicalization is its commitment to the social "totality". Because of its member's privileged education and the social roles that they play, the New Class is often defined as having an obligation to the society as a whole. (Gouldner;1979,65) Its heart "bleeds" when social injustices are perpetrated against the general population (whether this injustice stems from a "bureaucratic cage" or from the barrel of a gun), and it feels a duty to take up the cudgel for the oppressed.

What, therefore, is the promise that emerges from a growing disenchchantment of the New Class with the status quo? And what is needed in order for the New Class to actually embark upon the road to human
emancipation, as opposed to simply a new form of domination? Gouldner asserts that the only real choice for technologically advancing societies is between two modes of organizing bureaucracy. The choice must be made between:

(1) a mode of punishment-centered bureaucracy, in which the older bureaucratic structures predominate, and whose system of social controls necessarily focus on the infliction of punishments because its rewards are limited, and,
(2) an organizational structure, a representative bureaucracy, in which the technocracy plays a much larger if not the leading role, generating a willing consent and integrating the system through the allocation -- unequal, to be sure -- of the increased productivity they generate.

Far from being the single-minded advocates of a stripped down ideology of "instrumental rationality" the technocrats are able, precisely because of the increased productivity they can generate, and because of their greater commitment to work rather than to status-deference, and because of their elaborated linguistic codes and higher education, to organize a more rational and more collaborative organizational system. (Gouldner;1976,267)

Gouldner clearly opts for the latter choice, making the case that the technocrats are much less disposed to dominate the working class and are willing, to a certain extent, to enter into closer collaboration with it in terms of management decisions. (Gouldner;1976,268) They can afford to be lenient because to solicit support for their projects they have the capabilities to provide greater material benefits -- rewards not punishments. As well, because they are not as status conscious as bureaucrats (they are more secure), they can be much more tolerant of dissent. In this way, the relationship of the New Class to the masses would be one similar to that of teachers to students. The relationship would contain contradictions but not antagonistic ones. (Gouldner,1975-76;#26,35)

What is needed in order to ensure that this form of tutelage does not
continue indefinitely are new social methods and theoretical understandings. What he means by this is that those in control of cultural and technical production must not be allowed to inhibit the autonomy of others as a price of tutelage, and that the pivotal mechanism in this is a critically aware public.

How is this to transpire, given the fact that at present the only true critical public is housed in the universities? Gouldner seems to suggest that the emergence of a critical and reflexive public has to occur simultaneously with, indeed is a prerequisite for, the attainment of power by the New Class. That is to say, the usurpation of power from the bourgeoisie depends on class alliances, and in particular, the alliances between the New Class and the working class. To cement such an alliance the New Class must fashion new ideologies; it must legitimize itself in the eyes of the public. Yet:

[Technical expertise is not sufficient to generate legitimacy, when this expertise is not exercised on behalf of the values, goals, or interests of those others who are expected to bestow or withhold that legitimacy. (Gouldner;1976,270)]

An alliance means just that. It means that the New Class must take into consideration working class interests to garner its support. But even greater costs may be exacted from the New Class if it is to be successful in mobilizing the public behind them. To create a following, the New Class must reintroduce ideological appeals; it must speak to the public in a manner conducive to the reestablishment of a general culture of critical discourse. If successful, this reformation of language from a restricted to an elaborate linguistic code could not only form the basis of a "consciousness raising" focussed against bourgeois private property, but,
eventually, could form the groundwork of a critical public that would also restrict the powers of the New Class. The function of the critical theorist in this development is crucial because it becomes his duty to encourage a reflexivity of mind (both on the part of the New Class and the working class) in order that interests can be made public for critical inspection. His is the role of watchdog and of fostering watchdogism.

Gouldner's politics, then, has at its centre the reintroduction of critical discourse on a wide scale -- a reformation in language -- in order that human beings can begin to see what options and routes are open to them as far as social action is concerned. Such a "reformation", which would perform much the same function that Weber attributed to the Protestant Reformation in laying the cultural infrastructure for the development of capitalism, is essential to pave the way for the gradual creation of a new, humane society. The failure to initiate and consolidate gains towards a language of critical discourse would most likely result in only a circulation of elites. A critically aware public may be the only agency with the potential to prevent this.

The course of action to be struck in the creation of a critical public (the first phase of the reformation) is a "media-critical politics". Because language behavior has long been affected by initiatives of the state apparatus -- primarily through control over public education and the mass media -- that is to say, a form of state censorship, a politics must be organized against state control of language by challenging the relationship between those institutions linking the state and language. (Gouldner;1976,149) It means exploiting the contradictions inherent in a mass media whose prime imperatives are profitability (they will sell out
long-term interests for short-term profits, e.g., expose of the Watergate affair) by providing definitions of social reality different from those of social managers. (Gouldner;1976,158) It is only through a thorough critique of the existing mass media, made public by utilizing what autonomy it does possess, that mass public enlightenment has any potential. (Gouldner;1976,160) It is through this mechanism that intellectual elites speaking an elaborated linguistic code can once again be united with the public in dialogue and social action (Mills' unity of the "power" and the "intellect"). This, it should be noted, is not Gouldner's complete political program because he states that barriers to freedom such as the sexist family structure and abuses of private property can be challenged directly. But:

The struggle for the mass media may ... be one opening wedge in the fuller development of the politics of a critical theory, for it is a strategic hub that moves in all directions. (Gouldner;1976,160)

In summary, for Gouldner, it can be said that the key historical agency for social change, at least the one that holds the greatest promise, is the emergence of the New Class of intellectuals and technical experts whose interests are ultimately blocked by neo-capitalism and, hence, who struggle, or who will begin to struggle, against the status quo. In order to accomplish their aims, class alliances will have to be made with the working class, which may have the consequence of increasing public rationality. It is the task of the critical theorist to ensure that the public in this process is critically aware of the interests of the capitalist class as well as those of the New Class, and to insist on the employment of substantive rationality in public decision-making. On
the shoulders of the critical public and the critical theorist rest the possibility of a future of liberation for humanity.

It was noted that Mills' normative orientation was closely approximated by Gouldner's own vision of the "good society". Apparent as well is the similarity in the means by which this society could be engendered and maintained. Both theorists conceptualize the radical intellectual, acting in concert with, and even orchestrating, a radical public of voluntary associations, movements, etc., as instrumental in the "long march through the institutions" toward the ideal society. This view is actually taken from the pages of liberal-pluralism in that the seat of social change is held by the public of voluntary associations which has access to information necessary for rational decision-making. Once again, we have Gouldner and Mills wanting to believe in the "system" but being unable to do so. Consequently, they take the corporate liberal conception of the public and the role of the person of knowledge, abstract and idealize it, and then place it on the self labelled "for the future".
Thomas B. Bottomore

Bottomore shares with both Mills and Gouldner a similar normative view of society and a similar historical agency for attaining the "good society". The latter two left-Weberians' normative schema consists primarily in resurrecting the political viability of the "public" of voluntary associations within an overall institutional framework of decentralized social orders. This would theoretically return man's alienated powers to the individual; it would provide the normative infrastructure for the development of the autonomous man. In such a society, intellectuals and technical experts would be linked to the democratic, politicized public in a continual dialogue with respect to the needs of individuals in a rationally planned society. For Gouldner and Mills, this is not simply the end product of the "good society", but the "good society" itself in operation. Bottomore's position is similar.

In Chapter Two it was demonstrated that Bottomore (as well as Mills and Gouldner) saw the centralization and bureaucratization of the major institutions as the foremost problem that man had to contend with in modern industrial society. The emergence of rationalized bureaucracies in the attempt to centrally direct and manage industrial society, whether controlled by a "ruling class" or "political elite", continually operates to infringe upon the decision-making capabilities of individuals. The apex of this development is found in the genesis of a society of rationalized, bureaucratic structures, at the expense of a decentralized institutional framework which supported the democratic public and individual
involvement in decision-making. During the era of nineteenth century American capitalism, men were not separated from the means of production and administration and violence, were not extranged from the power to direct their own lives through the exercise of reason. This becomes a problem only with the centralization of power.

However, to move backwards in time, to recapture the Golden Age of the nineteenth century is not the intent or implication of the contrast Bottomore makes between the capitalism of yesteryear and modern day capitalism. (It is doubtful that Bottomore considered the past century a "Golden Age" in the first place.) That is, Bottomore does not yearn for a time long past; his normative view of reality is not a romantic resurrection of the nineteenth century liberal society. To return to a rural, agrarian society in which the principles of a laissez-faire economy determine the direction of social development holds no appeal. Being too much a twentieth century sociologist with faith in the application of scientific knowledge to the rational planning of a complex industrial economy, Bottomore finds anathema the blind drift of laissez-faire. This is not to say that he does not borrow from the model of competitive capitalism, as do modern liberal-pluralists, only that he does not in a naive manner venerate the past. The model of competitive capitalism serves as an ideal type from which considerations concerning the operation of the "good society" may be abstracted and reinterpreted in light of the direction modern industrial society must travel to achieve human emancipation. The liberation of humanity does not depend on the agrarian commune but on the development of industry and technology within a political context amenable to public discussion and control. For example, in order
to attain the end of a true industrial democracy such fundamental preconditions (illustrated by the model of competitive capitalism) are deemed necessary: The separation of polity and economy, a politically functionable public, an elimination of a vast division of labour, and so on. But these imperatives do not immediately mean that Bottomore is engaged in a romantic and reactionary fling with the past, with the abstract contours of classical liberal society simply being dusted off and put on parade. Rather, it means that the past is being reconnoitered and interpreted from the point of view of the present for clues considered essential in the construction, operation, and maintenance of the "good society". In this instance, as was discussed with respect to Mills and Gouldner, "the point of view of the present" is fundamentally rooted in corporate liberal assumptions, as will be made more clear in the proceeding discussion.
Bottomore's Normative Orientation

What then can be said about the normative orientation of Tom Bottomore? In *Sociology as Social Criticism*, Bottomore seems to infer that "socialist humanism", which attacks capitalism, technocracy and totalitarian socialism, merits his personal support as a social ideal. (Bottomore;1975,208) Socialist humanism is critical of the above three social types because all have in common concentrated power elites, centralized orders, inequality and a de facto undemocratic social constitution. The inequality demonstrated by those social forms in terms of the inherent elitism of economic, political and military institutions underlies the powerlessness of people to effectively manage their own lives. Therefore, socialist humanism not only opposes the undemocratic societies of capitalism, Soviet socialism, etc., but also the principle of plural elitism. (Bottomore;1964,119) Bottomore states that plural elitists such as Aron and Schumpeter are generally correct at one level of analysis with respect to competition between elites within capitalism (at a more profound level they fail to see the coincidence of interest among elites); yet, as far as he is concerned, a society based on elite competition is at best rule for the people and not by the people. (Bottomore;1964,119) The latter is the essential ingredient in democracy and is the quality that is lost in a plural elite schema. Consequently, socialist humanism, as described by Bottomore, must have as its underlying concern the establishment of a solid basis for democracy within an overall context of human equality. The drive for socialism must be circumscribed by the drive for a greater human freedom and equality.

In order to actualize a truly humanistic socialism, socialism
itself must be rethought, especially in light of the Soviet experience. One must be wary of the inherent dangers of bureaucratization and centralization of institutions if socialism is to live up to its promise of human liberation. (Bottomore;1964,139) The lessons of socialism in the Soviet Union and its satellites underscore the imperative that steps be taken to prevent the monopolization of power by a new ruling minority of political bosses and/or industrial managers. The case of totalitarian socialism indicates that socialization of the means of production -- the end of private property -- does not automatically imply that a humanitarian socialism has been or will be constructed. Given this problem, attention must be turned to the question of worker participation in the management of large-scale industry. Reforms in the administration of social services must be undertaken in order to ensure that those affected by the wide range of services have input into their operation, new forms of education must be sought to provide for better early experience in self-government and responsible decision-making (the authoritarian nature of education must be ameliorated). Ultimately, this "rethinking" involves the search for ways and means by which people can begin to make decisions for themselves instead of blindly following the dictates of a ruling elite. (Bottomore;1975,211)

For Bottomore, the reconsideration of socialism means posing this question: What widespread changes in social institutions must be undertaken in order that human beings can regain control of their lives? The social scientist can be indispensable in this task because, through comparative and historical study of social structures with respect to problems of class, status and power, a set of guidelines for the institutional frame-
work of the "good society" can be conceived and offered for public debate. It is this consideration that informs Bottomore's appraisal of the model of nineteenth century American capitalism. What basic social structural elements in the nineteenth century contributed to a democratic, egalitarian society, and can they be institutionalized in a modern industrial setting?

The "good society" envisioned by Bottomore is contained in the dual principles of competition and consensus. More specifically, this schema attempts to come to grips with the need for central planning within a complex industrialized society, on the one hand, and the inherent dangers of centralization, on the other. In order for a collectivized economy to remain free from monopolization by a few, it would have to include institutionalized safeguards to ensure people's control. To this end, coupled with centralized economic planning will be a certain degree of competition developed within a consensual framework.

Instrumental in this will be the revitalization of the "public". The development of autonomous voluntary associations, professional groups and local governments so that citizens are able to express their interests and desires and have them acted upon, is the backbone of Bottomore's normative view. Voluntary associations are the "means through which government by the people is made more real and practical in a large, complex society". (Bottomore; 1964,126) As in nineteenth century America, the public will act as a forum for public debate and decision-making; it will serve as a link between the individual and the state while ensuring against tyranny of a centralized political authority. A politically workable public will be able to appropriate many of the functions of a centralized government and turn them over, where feasible, to local groups.
(Bottomore;1964,139) This would help alleviate the danger of rule by a political elite. The structure of authority, because of its decentralized nature, could not easily be commandeered by elitist minorities.

New economic institutions appropriate to a collectivized economy would have to be developed to deter bureaucratic domination of the economy. Bottomore suggests that economic authority could be effectively decentralized through worker self-management (now being experimented with in Yugoslavia). (Bottomore;1964,139) Moreover, the scope of economic centralization would not have to be total. Such enterprises as small-scale retail trading, farming and semi-artisan production would not necessarily have to become collectivized in order for them to be effective or to operate in the interests of the whole. (Bottomore;1964,140) Within an overall national plan for economic production, small-scale production and worker owned and operated industries could compete with respect to price and quality, thereby helping to ensure that economic management remain out of the hands of the few. (Bottomore;1964,140) Bottomore explains that a combination of a collectivized and market economy, although containing a number of practical difficulties, can be seen as one viable way to operate a modern economy that has the potential to be truly democratic and egalitarian.

Competition of this sort should be encouraged in other spheres of society to parallel that in the economy and polity. Intellectual production in terms of radio and television broadcasting, book writing and publication, and scientific research, to name a few, should be linked with independent associations owned and controlled by their members (while being supported by public monies and subject to national regulation).
The value of competition in intellectual production is not to be underestimated. Intellectual and cultural uniformity would be avoided, or at the least minimized; it would establish an autonomous base for social criticism and be a wellhead for constructive, innovative ideas. It would be a source for change and renewal.

Crucial to Bottomore's decentralized political and economic framework grounded upon competition and public discourse, is the requisite of an overarching consensus which circumscribes the limits of conflict and cements society. There must be competition within consensus. Surrounding the structures of social organization must be a sense of legitimacy -- a commonly held belief system that acknowledges the overall worth of the society. (Bottomore;1964,141)

It should be clear here what Bottomore is saying with respect to his view of the "good society". To date, both types of industrial society are characterized by a dominant elite at the head of centralized bureaucratic structures. Bottomore's normative view consists of decentralizing economic and political functions by introducing decentralized economic and political structures directly participated in by the majority of the population. In this way, power cannot devolve upon a few individuals at the pinnacle of a corporate or political bureaucracy because power itself is dispersed. Power is held by those who actually run and participate in political and economic decisions. Competition between groups of individuals insures that no one group can monolithically gain access to the means of power. What collective authority there is finds its substance in the consensus enacted through public debate and exchange. It is a rationally derived authority that expresses the will of the various groups
of free citizens while guaranteeing that competition between groups is within the bounds of the "national interest".

This all sounds strangely familiar. Bottomore's view of the "good society" is really a liberal-pluralist society in operation. Competing interest groups refereed by a neutral state, the role of the voluntary association, the function of conflict within an overall consensus, are all liberal-pluralist conceptions concerning the operation of modern capitalist society. Bottomore seems to reserve these for a future ideal society. Apparently, this is due to the fact that Bottomore actually accepts the liberal-pluralist problematic concerning the nature of power and the means by which it may be diffused. That is, as noted in our second chapter, Bottomore defines "power" in the Weberian sense and utilizes an "interest group" theory of classes (Weber's as well) in order to understand the nature of power in capitalist society. Given this orientation, which is actually the manner in which Mills and Gouldner also approach the problem, Bottomore can only describe formally the manifestations of the class relations within capitalism as "power-relations". Power is exercised by those in control of the major institutions, whether this be the economy, polity, or military.

According to pluralist doctrine, this insures a democratic society because the various elites are conceived to be in competition, thereby prohibiting central control by any one group. As mentioned in Chapter Two, Bottomore sees this only operative at one level, because, on another, the elites often act in concert due to their similar worldview and backgrounds. Yet, this criticism is one of quantity and not quality; that is to say, in order for power to be properly decentralized one must go beyond plural
elitism (which can never be government "by-the-people") to a fully pluralistic society in which the various political and economic institutions are decentralized as completely as possible and directed by those comprising them. For power to be effectively controlled, all must share in its exercise. Freely organized interest groups must exist to prevent the reoccurrence of elite rule. Here Bottomore "out-pluralists the pluralists". Give him credit for recognizing the inadequacy of the pluralist view of reality, for demonstrating the commanding position within modern capitalist society of the men of corporate property, but he truly fails to go beyond liberal-pluralism because he shares the same problematic, the same conceptualization of power. This is one major reason why Bottomore can disagree with the pluralist view of reality but reserve it for his normative view. The basic provisos that pluralism sets for the operation of the "good society" are fundamentally interchangeable with Bottomore's. Their disagreement is on the timetable.
Bottomore's Historical Agency

How, then, is Bottomore's normative vision to be made a reality? Bottomore says that at work in the rise and fall of social groups are two processes: (1) A gradual acquisition of positions of power by individuals belonging to a new social stratum, sometimes through alliances with members of established political elites, and (2) A revolution, where a rising social group overthrows the old elite. (Bottomore;1964,65) From the outset he discounts as utopian the possibility of a sudden revolutionary transformation of class society. (Bottomore;1975,69) Only an accumulation of reforms directed at fundamental social change is realistic under the present social conditions. This is mainly due to the fact that with the implementation of the Welfare State, with increasing affluence and the growth of the middle classes, and with the relative decline in the numbers of the working class, the revolutionary potential of labour has been ameliorated and most likely will not figure as prominently as it did in Marx's day. (Bottomore;1975,120) This does not mean that the labour movement is itself completely impotent or will become so, because, especially in Western Europe, there is the potential for radical intellectuals and labour to form a unified movement aimed at large-scale social reforms. (Bottomore;1975,209) It is here that social criticism can ground itself in the practical experiences of large numbers of men and be truly effective.

However, a radical politics cannot be the sole instrument for forcing the hand of the capitalist ruling class. Other social and political forces within the development of capitalism have been and will be needed before capitalism exits from the world stage. Of the past stipulations deemed imperative for a peaceful (or relatively peaceful) tran-
sition from capitalism to socialism, the attainment of universal sufferage in the nineteenth century must be seen as one of the most important. With the emergence of political democracies came the potential for the separation of economic and political power. (Bottomore;1964,31) Indeed, if to date in modern capitalist nations such potential has not been fulfilled (with, according to Bottomore, the possible exception of the Scandinavian countries) it is because the upper class has been able to place in political power their own representatives. Given this, the first task is to elect a working class party with the support of a unified labour movement. The possibility is there, as can be attested to by the example of Sweden.

Further developments within capitalism itself appear to Bottomore to form a basis upon which socialism can gradually evolve. The emergence of monopoly capitalism with the Welfare State as its integrating mechanism is problematical: On the one hand, it could consolidate the rule of the bourgeoisie, but on the other hand, it could form the springboard necessary for a democratic socialism. The spread of public ownership of industry, of public provision for a wide range of social and cultural services, and of public management of the economy inculcate to some extent an ideological infrastructure amenable to the socialist doctrines of the working class: (Bottomore;1965,71)

The increasing provision of social services by the state, which in recent times has been largely brought about by the pressure of the labour movement, has also fortified the socialist conception of a more equal, more collectivist society. (Bottomore;1965,72)

Whereas Bottomore acknowledges that social legislation within the Welfare State may not be egalitarian in intention or effect, some of its real consequences have been to make the "pill" of socialism easier to swallow for
a greater number of people.

Bottomore seemingly sums up his position on socialism and its gradual evolution from capitalism in his book *Austro-Marxism*:

Such progress as there has been toward socialism in advanced capitalist societies has resulted from the attainment of political power by working class parties through parliamentary majorities in a democratic system (aided of course by "extra-parliamentary" forces, just as the maintenance and perpetuation of capitalism itself depends upon such "extraparliamentary" forces), and from a gradual transformation and extension of the activities of the state in economic regulation and planning and in the provision of welfare services, rather than from any attempts to "destroy" the bourgeois state. (Bottomore; 1978a,42)

In fact, it seems as if Bottomore's reformist tendencies parallel those of the Austro-Marxists (Bauer, Hilferding, Bernstein, et.al.) in many ways. The Austro-Marxist "slow revolution", in Bottomore's words, amounts to a:

[G]radual construction of a socialist society after the conquest of political power by a working class party, through radical reforms in all spheres of social life, involving in many ways the consolidation and gradual extension of reforms already undertaken by the bourgeois state....(Bottomore;1978a,26)

This is in actual fact Bottomore's own scheme for the inauguration of socialism. Because the Scandinavian countries have ostensibly socialist governments in power, or at least governments sympathetic to labour, it is possible that Bottomore sees these nations in the vanguard with respect to the movement toward a classless, egalitarian, socialist society.

The role that the intellectual is to play in Bottomore's "good society" and in the movement toward it must not be discounted. He calls for the unification of radical intellectuals and the radical labour movement in the forging of a close link between ideas and interests (the union of "power" and "intellect"). The work of critical intellectuals is crucial
for a radical movement because they can depict the injustices, conflicts and limitations of the status quo, thereby helping to pave the way for a new society. However, their criticisms must go beyond description to prescription of what the "good society" should entail and how it can be attained. They must be able to interpret emerging social movements and prefigure how these can lead to a new order. (Bottomore:1975,210) To date, Bottomore claims that the radical intellectual has not been fully effective because of the pessimism about the possibilities of socialism now embedded within radical thought. This must change.

The role of the intellectual goes beyond that of simply helping to achieve a better society. This is so because, according to Bottomore, the intellectual will become increasingly important in a new, democratic society of politicized men and women by providing a framework of concepts and a basis of exact knowledge for intelligent discussion of political issues and social policy. (Bottomore:1961,323) Through the use of the mass media and public discussions and lectures, there can be instituted a creative dynamic between the political desires of the public and the uses of scientific knowledge supplied by the intellectual. In this way, rational knowledge can be applied to social issues in order to effect planned, deliberate social change. The sociologist would be fundamental in this process by illustrating the interconnections between social phenomena in order that unintended consequences do not accrue from social planning measures. Sociological knowledge specifically and all knowledge generally has the potential for human liberation. It also has the potential to create a society of self-directing people. Important in this development is the intellectual as social critic and purveyor of knowledge. Yet, this does not mean that
the intellectual will approach the function of Plato's philosopher-king in the scenario Bottomore paints. The intellectual will initiate discussions, provide knowledge, etc., but the final decisions with respect to social policy will be made by the public. The role of the intellectual will be primarily that of public enlightenment, not elitist leadership.

To conclude this section, it must be said that although Bottomore disagrees with the pluralist definition of current reality, he seems to reserve the pluralist outline for his "good society". The same observation applies to the role the intellectual is to play in Bottomore's "good society". Since the "revolt against formalism", it has been corporate liberal theory that exalts the function of the person of knowledge -- whether it be social scientists or technical experts (often they are one) -- in the planned evolution of society. With proper management of society and its resources, with an informed public that is capable of rational decision-making and has the opportunity to express itself through various voluntary associations, the good ship Utopia-on-Earth is launched. The intellectual/technician is conceptualized as the embodiment of scientific reason; his is the voice of rationality. Made public, this knowledge is powerful in the construction and maintenance of the "good society". Of course, this is all ideology (in the pejorative sense of the word) because the true function of the intellectual/technician within corporate capitalism is basically to ensure the smooth operation and longevity of that social form. But, Bottomore believes in and supports this ideology. He becomes incensed that it is not reality and thus assumes the critical stance within this tradition. The function of the intellectual, then, becomes one of social critic; he beats the bushes for those of like mind with the intention of establishing as reality the abstract
ideals of corporate liberalism. Insofar as the status quo diverges from these ideals, the intellectual's duty is one of social critic; insofar as the status quo converges with these ideals, the intellectuals's duty is one of social reform. Each occupies one side of the same coin. Each expresses a common heritage.
Summary

It has been demonstrated that a common thread runs throughout the three representative left-Weberian critical theorists—Mills, Gouldner and Bottomore—with respect to their normative orientation and historical agency for social change. To recapitulate briefly, the major thrust of the left-Weberian normative view is to see the opportunity for self-government in the willful making of history returned to individuals. This has been lost in modern capitalist society primarily because the structures that once supported the individual's ability to orient himself to the Enlightenment values of substantive-rationality (in the creation of an autonomous personality) have been undermined with the process of institutional centralization. The "public", which formed the most elemental structure in the fostering of public rationality, suffers a demise in modern society.

The left-Weberian normative view is principally concerned with resurrecting the public as the true forum for political decision-making, as the seat of sovereignty within a political democracy. To this end, the left-Weberians agree that the power wielded by those in control of the major bureaucratic institutions must be broken and diffused. The primary social structural imperative in the humbling of those in the elite positions of power is the decentralization of the major institutions themselves. The economy and polity must be formally, and in reality, dissociated. Ownership and control of the mode of production must be decentralized to
facilitate the individual's control over his own means of subsistence. This does not entail a de-industrialization of society, only that industry will be made "responsible" through public control. To accomplish this is to move positively toward a separation of polity and economy because now no longer will the political realm be easily manipulated by those with commanding economic influence. The polity can be instituted as a sphere sympathetic with the general will of the people. It can take on the function of mediating the various interests of the population (made public through exchange and debate within a rejuvenated system of intermediary voluntary associations) in the planned and deliberate making of history. The role of the intellectual is paramount in this scenario because it is his duty to ensure that the public is knowledgable and articulate with respect to social and political issues. It is the moral obligation of the intellectual to engage in criticism and public debate as well as to table scientific data for public scrutiny. He is to be responsible for establishing a "reflexive" public that is capable of linking "personal troubles and social issues" in order that the values of Enlightenment Reason can once again be embraced and form the centre of human action. The consequence of a union between the politicized public and the critical intellectual will be to link the individual with the state, rendering it accountable to the general populace. It will guarantee that people have control over policy-decisions affecting their lives and the lives of others. It will guarantee that society is a true political democracy.

The left-Weberian historical agency can most readily be summarized by the phrase that is central to the work of Mills -- "the unity of power
and intellect". As described above, the "good society" in its operation will involve the discourse between intellectuals and the public for its continual perfection. This is not only the end to which the ideal society strives, but it is also the very means by which it can be engendered. If history is not to be made by elites, that is, if there is to be a "good society", the public itself must become aware of social injustices to be righted and appropriate strategies to be employed to counteract the elites presently enshrined within the positions of power. The function of the critical intellectual is to provide both description and prescription so that parties, publics and movements will be able to chart a course of action oriented to significant social change. A critical public so committed is the only vehicle that can prevent social change from simply amounting to a circulation of elites. Given the present situation of Soviet socialism and those modelled after it, the left-Weberians are skeptical of the elitist repercussions of modern revolutionary praxis and opt for more gradual reformist measures. This is acknowledged by both Gouldner and Bottomore when they state that the potential movement underfoot towards an "emancipatory socialism" may follow the pattern of emerging bourgeois society (from feudalism) where the process was gradual and consolidated over a long span of time. (Gouldner;1979,31), (Bottomore;1975,60)

To be fair, this is not to say that the political programs of the three theorists considered here are identical. Gouldner and Mills seem to suggest that what is first required is a "consciousness-raising" -- a reformation of language and consciousness -- that would at least be partially rooted in a "media-critical politics" which is aimed at reclaiming the "cultural apparatus" and mass media. Bottomore, though, appears
inclined towards a social-democratic strategy of winning state power through the election of a working class party. The essential difference between the two strategies is rooted in the respective appraisals of the present state of the labour movement. Gouldner and Mills, as mass society theorists, are more pessimistic than Bottomore on this issue. The former two conceive of the masses as wallowing in apathy, as lost sheep in need of a Bo Peep schooled in the art of "consciousness-raising". Bottomore, although not conceptualizing labour as a revolutionary movement, sees the potential for working class parties to gain control of the Welfare State and use it for their own ends, especially in Western Europe.

Notwithstanding the differences of the respective theorists on this point, the overall nature of their historical agency is not dissimilar. They see the public of voluntary associations, in league with the critical intelligentsia, as possessing the potential to undermine the "command posts" of power in the gradual reformation of society. The union of "power and intellect" can carry the day.

In this chapter we have attempted to illustrate that not only do the left-Weberians define the categories of "power" and "interest" in liberal-pluralist fashion, but that in so doing it also leads them logically to a vision of the "good society" that is essentially the liberal-pluralist view of reality. If Robert Nisbets's outline of a "Plural Community" is utilized to describe the left-Weberian ideal society, the only element not applicable is "hierarchy". However, "decentralization", "plurality", "autonomy", "tradition" and "localism" are all fundamental to the left-Weberians. It was also noted in this chapter that for the left-Weberians the central role of the intellectual in the inauguration and operation of
the ideal society owes a great deal to the corporate liberal conception of the function of the intellectual in corporate capitalist society.

Chapter Four will attempt to elucidate the nature of left-Weberian sociology as a critical variant of corporate liberal thought. It will be stated that although the left-Weberians are critical of monopoly capitalism, they are not able to transcend it. Even in their conceptualization of a "utopian" society, they are fundamentally grounded in the theories and assumptions of its major intellectual tradition.
Footnotes

1. We are being selective in our discussion of Gouldner's view of the New Class. For example, it is not considered essential to this thesis to study the role Gouldner ascribes to the New Class in Third World revolutionary movements or in the Soviet Socialist societies.

2. Gouldner provides us with a terminological note with respect to his labelling the New Class a "class": "First, I remind them (potential critics of his terminology) that, since Marx did little to define "class" formally and connotatively, I feel similarly free not to make a scholastic issue of this matter. Secondly: insofar as Marx has a clear concept of class it would appear to suggest that a class are those who have the same relationship to the means of production. In like manner, I, too shall suggest that there are certain communalities in the New Class' relationship to the means of production and, in particular, to what I shall later call cultural capital or human capital. Third and finally, I remind those objecting to my use of "class" that the Communist Manifesto exhibits a not dissimilar usage. It holds that the term may be properly applied to such historically diverse groupings as slaves, serfs, journeymen or bourgeoisie, and clearly does not limit the term "class" to capitalist societies. If journeymen and plebians can be "classes," then surely intellectuals and intelligentsia can constitute a new "class". (Gouldner; 1979,8)

3. See Chapter Two for a more elaborate discussion of "Indirect Rule" (p.99).
CHAPTER FOUR: Left-Weberian Critical Sociology as Ideology
This following chapter will address three tasks. The first will be a brief summary of the preceding chapters with the central purpose of stating that left-Weberian critical sociology occupies the utopian/ideal-istic variant of corporate liberalism. The second will be concerned with explicating, in terms of the ability of left-Weberian sociology to understand the nature of capitalist society, the consequences of the left-Weberian rootedness in corporate liberalism. And third, we will elucidate the particular "interests" expressed by left-Weberian critical sociology. At present our attention is turned to the first of our three tasks.

In Chapter One it was stated that the transition from laissez-faire to corporate capitalism was not only marked by social structural alterations, but also by "the revolt against formalism" -- the transformation of the idea systems legitimizing and seeking stability for the capitalist order in crisis. Central to this development was the emergence of an "interventionist" Welfare State that required ideological justification as well as technical and intellectual "staff members" to devise and execute social and political policies to engender social stability. It was during this period that the purpose of the intellectual became closely intertwined with the function of creating ideologies and strategies of reform in the attempt to ameliorate social problems that promised to tear extant society apart. Intellectuals were to descend from the ivory tower and apply their knowledge pragmatically to issues of "real life". Depending on the specific socio-historic climate, the intellectual became either a social reformer concerned with change from within, or a social critic who emphasized the need for more wholesale social structural changes. Tamar
Pitch states that these two tendencies are characterized by the types of Veblen (the social critic) and Chicago School sociology (social reformers). We maintained that this general bifurcation in early corporate liberal thought has been perpetuated to the present, and that the particular orientation of left-Weberian critical sociology could be understood by situating it alongside Veblen and other theorists of similar mind. That is, left-Weberian sociology can be characterized as a utopian/idealistic variant of the larger corporate liberal tradition.

In Chapter One, we also adumbrated a number of basic elements of corporate liberalism to illustrate the debt left-Weberian sociology owed that form of thought. The relationship of the individual to society was analysed as it appeared in the work of two early corporate liberals, Durkheim and Weber; the concepts of "power" and "interest" were discussed as defined by one school within conservative corporate liberalism -- liberal-pluralism. As well, we studied, for those same liberal-pluralists, the importance of a pluralistic society in the operation and maintenance of the "good society" (the separation of polity and economy, interest group competition and the role of the intellectual). These aspects of conservative corporate liberalism were situated in the thought of left-Weberian sociology.

Chapter Two dealt exclusively with describing the view of reality of Mills, Gouldner and Bottomore. It was claimed that the left-Weberians conceptualized modern capitalist society to consist of large, rationalized bureaucratic structures centrally directed by an elite minority. Under such circumstances the ability of individuals to construct an integrated, individuated self-identity is severely restricted because the values and
norms which once provided the support for the morally autonomous indi­
dual are eclipsed. The values of substantive rationality, at one time
institutionally supported in early bourgeois society, are undermined with
the process of formal rationalization in industrial society. Consequently,
the means for creating a secure and autonomous personality are debased;
people suffer the psychological consequences of an anomic social structure.
The result of this is that individuals seek refuge inside themselves in
the pursuit of privatised leisure activities.

We stated that the above scenario as painted by the left-Weberians
 pivoted on similar conceptions of man and society discussed to be present
in the work of Durkheim and Weber. Generally, for both the conservative
and critical variants of corporate liberalism, the individual was des-
cribed as a subjective being directed or "steered" by cultural norms once
they were internalized in the form of a moral conscience. Seminal to this
view of man in society is the notion that individuals require moral reg-
ulation to properly develop as human beings. Underlying this idea is the
conception that human beings are of a "dualistic" nature -- they are both
active and passive. Corporate liberals of both tendencies see a tension
between these two components of the human being; the active element need-
ing to be channeled towards socially sanctioned modes of behavior through
the internalization of values. Thus, the corporate liberal contradiction
between the individual and society was located within human nature. It
was demonstrated that both the left-Weberians and conservative corporate
liberalism shared this particular conception of the relationship of the
individual to society. They both occupy different sides of the same coin.
Chapter Three outlined the left-Weberian normative view and historical agency. Insofar as their concepts of "power" and "interest" affected an adequate understanding of how the "good society" could be maintained, these too were dealt with. It was discovered that Mills, Gouldner and Bottomore essentially utilized identical definitions of "power" and "interest" as employed by liberal-pluralism. That is, "power" was defined in Weberian fashion as the probability one person or group would be able to achieve a desired course of action even if opposed. This paralleled the liberal-pluralist approach. Similarly, the left-Weberian concept of "interest" was seen to overlap with that of liberal-pluralism. It was stated that both perspectives were "interest group" theories that ultimately were "subjective" in outline. That is, "interest" is considered to be rooted in those structures which provide "gratifications" for individuals, or which are based upon cherished values of social actors. In the final analysis, both the left-Weberian and liberal-pluralist concept of "interest" owes intellectual homage to classical liberalism, which maintained that "interests" were those of separate individuals. As with the conceptualization of the individual/society relationship, the left-Weberian concepts of "power" and "interest" can be seen to be part of the corporate liberal heritage.

Furthermore, we asserted in Chapter Three that because the left-Weberians defined "power" and "interest" in this particular manner, it is one reason why their vision of the "good society", in its abstract framework, so closely resembled that of their self-proclaimed adversary, liberal-pluralism. That is, the left-Weberians criticize liberal-pluralism
for not accurately portraying modern capitalist reality when it is described as "pluralistic". Yet, they can find no fault with the ideal of pluralism (because it is actually the left-Weberian vision of the "good society"). Their only real complaint is that the reality does not coincide with the ideal. The left-Weberians desire a society in which once again there can be a politically viable public of autonomous voluntary associations that link the individual to the state, on the one hand, and protect him from it, on the other. This will require a separation of polity and economy to provide the "free space" in which the "public" can function as the seat of sovereignty. For the left-Weberians, as it is for liberal-pluralists, the major requirement in the operation of the "good society" is the decentralization of power and the subsequent "give and take" of interest group competition that emerges with the separation of polity and economy. However, the likeness between left-Weberian sociology and liberal-pluralism does not end here. Both frameworks emphasize the role of the intellectual, and especially the social scientist. The intellectual is to be a purveyor of socially useful knowledge applicable to solving human problems. This was the function assigned to the intellectual in corporate capitalist society as early as the "revolt against formalism". We stated that the left-Weberians occupied the stance of "social critic" within this tradition, whereas the conservative corporate liberals were either "social reformers" or simply "hired heads".

This summary of the previous chapters has attempted to demonstrate the affinity between left-Weberian critical sociology and the major intellectual tradition of the monopoly capitalist era, corporate liberalism.
We feel and have attempted to demonstrate that left-Weberian sociology is largely embedded within this particular tradition. Insofar as it is a "critical" sociology, it differs with "conservative" sociology more in emphasis than substance.

In the next section of this chapter, we will be concerned with illustrating that because the left-Weberians are embedded within a general corporate liberal tradition, they cannot adequately come to grips with the reality of capitalist society; they cannot transcend bourgeois society. It will be maintained that the left-Weberian criticism of capitalism remains a partial critique, one limited to understanding it from the standpoint of "appearance". As such, left-Weberian sociology must be seen as a form of ideology.

It was maintained in Chapter Two that the left-Weberian conception of the individual/society relation was essentially corporate liberal in content. As such, many of the same criticisms directed against thinkers like Durkheim and Weber are apropos to the left-Weberians. That is, the left-Weberian understanding of the relationship of the individual to society is built on categories of the abstract "individual" and abstract "society". Consequently, as shall be seen, they can only be partially critical of capitalist society.

For the left-Weberians, "society" is essentially a "moral order", a system of culturally prescribed patterns of interaction which form guidelines for individual behavior. The values and norms of society are internalized in the interaction with other individuals. Central to this process is the orientation of one's conduct to the expectations of others in
the learning of roles. This socialization of human beings not only creates the human individual, it simultaneously provides the "social bond" necessary to establish social order. The internalization of cultural values, then, is a form of subtle social control; it forms the basis of consensus.

Yet, this particular conception of society as a moral or normative order is to deal with "society" in the abstract. We stated in Chapter One that the field of sociology was defined as "social action", "sociation", etc., and that this approach was inherently "subjective" in nature. The same criticism must hold for left-Weberian critical sociology. This latter tendency also takes as fundamental the normative structure of society in the regulation of human behavior, the ability of social actors to orient themselves to cherished cultural values in establishing a secure self-identity. It is a "subjective" understanding of society because it considers the basis of society to be the intersubjective social actor, the social actor whose relations with other social actors is mediated by shared expectations of behavior. Essentially, society reduces to a conglomeration of interacting individuals which "hangs together" because of the shared consciousness of its members. Lucien Sève, in criticizing Ralph Linton's cultural anthropology, states that:

Linton successively submits as basic definitions that "the social system as a whole is a ... configuration of culture patterns" and that in its turn culture is "the configuration of learned behavior and results of behavior"; ... Society is therefore regarded there as a sum of behavior, as a reality homologous to the psychism of individuals. These being so, the psychic individual, far from appearing as a social result, a juxta-structure of objective social relations, is represented on the contrary as the element
constituting society, its real basis. (Sève; 1978, 244)

This same fundamental criticism can be applied to the left-Weberian conception of society. The psychologise "society" by reducing it to a sum of individual interactions. Mills offers the clearest example of this. In Character and Social Structure, he maintains that through the concept of the role persons are linked with the social structure. That is, the "person" is composed of the various "roles" in which he enacts; in turn, the organization of various roles forms an "institution" and the various institutions taken together compose the "social structure". Society is at bottom, in this instance, the role-playing individual in his various interrelationships, the individual energized or constrained by subjectively held values. This forms the basis of society and the subject matter for social analysis.

Yet, this approach is at best descriptive because it does not transcend the level of "appearance". It divorces the basis of human action within given concrete societies from the objective social relations of production and instead deals with the manifestations of those social relations in terms of cultural values, social roles, etc:

To be a capitalist or proletarian in a capitalist society is therefore quite different from conforming to cultural patterns or to occupying a social role through "need for favourable response" or by virtue of any other psychological motivation emanating from the individual; on the contrary, this is a matter of necessary matrices of activity which stamp objectively determined social characteristics on individuals. (Sève; 1978, 258)

To ignore the material grounding of human behavior by ignoring the objective social relations of production means that the left-Weberians are forced to deal with society in the abstract, with society in general.
Although they purport to study society from a historical standpoint, which is of course an advance over the ahistorical constructs of a Talcott Parsons, the left-Weberians still are barred epistemologically from adequately comprehending the nature of society in its true historical movement because they are restricted, for example, to understanding social institutions from the perspective of "patterned interaction", as stemming from the behavior of individual social actors.

In similar fashion, the left-Weberians deal with the individual as an abstraction. This is not to deny the validity of the attempt to utilize an abstract concept of man (e.g., to define the capacities, etc. of man as homo sapiens) only that this cannot be sanctioned as legitimate if in the endeavor to study man in a social and historical context the epistemological error is made in treating the individual as an abstraction. The latter is the problem left-Weberian sociology faces. More specifically, as discussed in Chapter Two, these theorists attempt to capture the character of human life in monopoly capitalist society in terms of the ability of the individual to create an autonomous personality. Their understanding of man's problem in modern society is grounded upon the attentuation of the values of critical reason, now replaced solely with formal rational requirements of human action. But this is built upon a conception of the abstract individual:

Now even if he is conceived in a historicized and socialized way, man in a particular country and period is still precisely abstract man in so far as he is considered apart from the concrete social relations within which each singular individual is produced. (Sève; 1978, 242)

The left-Weberians do not understand the basis of the human personality
to be founded upon man's historically evolved social relations, but upon
the particular constellation of values, etc., internalized by the social
actor. In this way they can only describe the nature of human alienation
in modern capitalist society in terms of an absence of a stable and co-
herent normative structure. The left-Weberians see the lack of "inner-
direction" in modern society, the presence of privatised men, as resulting
from a higher value system in limbo. In the absence of such a value
system, men become solely concerned with maximizing their own gratifica-
tions and in the process learn how to treat other individuals as purely
means to an end, as objects. This is powerfully captured by Mills in
White Collar:

> Without common values and mutual trust, the cash nexus that
links one man to another in transient contact has been made
subtle in a dozen ways and made to bite deeper into all areas
of life and relations ....Men are estranged from one another
as each secretly tries to make an instrument of the other,
and in time full circle is made: one makes an instrument of
himself, and is estranged from It also. (Mills;1951,188)

Now, we are not denying that something like what Mills' describes does
transpire in reality, only that it does not adequately explain the nature
of alienation in modern capitalist society. As mentioned in Chapter One
with respect to the discussion on commodity fetishism, individuals may
not only see themselves as commodities, but indeed they actually are
commodities. Individuals do not necessarily have to experience themselves
as a commodity to become an object or to react to others as if they were
objects. It does not depend pre-eminently on the absence of "common values
and mutual trust" before human beings are transformed into objects, but
on the historically specific relations of commodity production. The left-
Weberian conception of the individual requires tearing man out of this
historical context of social relations and deals with him solely in a
cultural manner in which the surface manifestations of the mode of production are studied as they impinge upon the autonomy of the individual. Once again, then, with respect to conceptualizing the nature of the social and historical individual, they must remain descriptive; they must deal with abstract man. As Marx states:

The conceptions and ideas of people, separated from actual things, are bound, of course, to have as their basis not actual individuals, but the individual of the philosophical conception, the individual separated from his actuality and existing only in thought, "Man" as such, the notion of man. (Marx, quoted in Sève; 1978, 248)

Insofar as the left-Weberians deal with "society" and the "individual" in the abstract, they also establish between the two what Sève refers to as a "pseudo-dialectic" of reciprocal influences. That is, left-Weberian sociology acknowledges that human beings have created their society at the same time that society creates the individual. However, this dialectic takes place at a "subjective" level because it is concerned with illustrating how social actors, through their interrelations, transform the normative structure of society; how in the self-creation of the individual the individual in turn influences those around him. Gouldner provides us with this in microcosm:

...Ego's conforming acts always have some consequences for Alter's expectations; expectations are always modified by prior relevant action...[T]he longer the unbroken sequence of Ego's conforming actions goes on, the more likely is it that Alter will take Ego's later actions for granted and the less likely is it that they will be given notice. This, in turn, will elicit tendencies for Ego either to reduce or to increase the extent of his conformity with Alter's expectations. If he reduces them, this may, in turn, lead Alter to reduce his conformity with Ego's expectations still further, and thus generate a vicious
cycle of decreasing mutual gratification and conformity, and thereby of growing tension. (Gouldner;1970,233)

As mentioned, such an orientation takes the starting point of analysis as the subjective social actor in interaction with others as the basic unit constituting society.

In this understanding of the dialectic between self and society, there is no conception that the relationships between individuals are objectively determined by the social relations that man enters into independently of his will and which are not "subjectively" maintained through such things as "consensual validation". This does not mean, though, that individuals are "left out of the picture" because, indeed, it is individuals who have created their social relations as they are created by them. Therefore, it is more correct to speak of social relations as both objective and subjective:

If, however, people are themselves the products of these relations, it is because far from being foreign to them the relations constitute their real life process. They can only constitute their real life process to the extent that they are relations between them, between people. (Sève;1975,40)

What we are stating is that social relations of production cannot be reduced to "intersubjective" relations between individuals, to relations which individuals may or may not chose to adopt, to relations that can be changed without overturning the whole of society, from the bottom up. There is a dialectic, then, but not one existing between the two abstractions "individual" and "society". It emerges from the historically specific manner in which individuals are related as they produce their means of subsistence. As such, it can only take a historically specific form, for example, the dialectic inherent in the contradiction between capital and wage-labour.

As we stated in Chapter One, to understand this historical con-
tradiction or any of the corresponding forms that it may take (e.g., the contradiction between individual and society) in a manner that would tear them out of their historical context is to fall prey to the problem of "immediacy" of bourgeois thought, is to be condemned to study social reality as it "appears" to the observer.

This is the essential problem of left-Weberian critical sociology. Being rooted in the corporate liberal sociological tradition, they are faced with the same epistemological problems as their more conservative counterparts. In considering the left-Weberian categories of "individual" and society, we were able to demonstrate that both concepts were abstractions; they were divorced from their real basis in the social relations of capitalist society. Consequently, this forms an insurmountable barrier to not only understanding capitalist society, but also to criticizing it. Given this fact, the left-Weberian criticism of capitalist society can only be a partial criticism, a criticism motivated by moral outrage based on the perceived excesses of that society.

Indeed, this is one of the central postulates of this paper. The left-Weberian critique of monopoly capitalist society pivots upon their abstract conception of the individual/society relation, and, therefore, is limited in its criticisms.

It has been maintained that the corporate liberal contradiction between the individual and society is present, not only in the work of Durkheim and Weber, but also the left-Weberians. This contradiction is rooted in the human condition and consists of the tension between the activity of the organism, on the one side (whether defined as "egoism", "spontaneity", etc.), and the need for social control in the creation of
the human personality and group solidarity, on the other. As such, it forms a timeless, ahistorical contradiction. However, the above sociologists realize that under different historic conditions this contradiction is manifested in various ways. Therefore, it becomes the very pivot on which turns their normative evaluation of specific social structures.

We mentioned in Chapter One that Weber and Durkheim were both partially critical of industrial society: For Weber, human spontaneity was being destroyed by bureaucratization, and for Durkheim, industrial society did not provide adequate social bonds to inhibit the egoism of individuals. This also holds for the left-Weberian perspective with respect to corporate capitalist society. The ahistorical contradiction is reproduced in modern society as the problem that "subjective" man has in fashioning a morally autonomous identity vis-à-vis "objective" society; the individual is crushed with the onslaught of centralized institutions. Under other historic conditions (e.g., early bourgeois society) the individual was able to internalize the values of critical reason and develop an integrated self-identity, but now the old structures which supported those values have declined and man has been set adrift in the wash of formal rationality. Therefore, the left-Weberians can criticize monopoly capitalism for destroying the basis of individuality.

But, because this understanding of contemporary capitalist society is based upon the abstractions of "individual" and "society", and because this in itself is grounded upon the corporate liberal contradiction between the individual and society, the left-Weberians can only describe the cultural manifestations -- the subjective impact on human beings -- of the
continual spread of the consequences of commodity production to all spheres of social life. The difference here is between Weber's conception of the process of formal rationalization, which as noted in Chapter One is seen as an autonomous cultural process, and Lukács' conception, which he roots in the historically specific requirements of capital accumulation. Consequently, for Weber as well as the left-Weberians, the process of formal rationalization and centralization of institutions is the fundamental evil that human beings must contend with in modern society; rather than the existence of the historically specific relations of commodity production and the extraction of surplus value. They are limited to understanding the effects of bureaucratization on the normative structure of society and the repercussions this has for the value-oriented individual.

In coming to grips with corporate capitalism, then, the left-Weberians must remain on the level of immediacy; their analysis endures as largely descriptive. Their criticisms can only be partial criticisms based on their desire to see human beings securely individuated and in control of their own lives. It is evident that the left-Weberian criticism of capitalist society is founded upon a moral dissatisfaction with the status quo rather than upon its tendency towards greater and more complex crises.

If the contradiction between the individual and society is the fulcrum on which the left-Weberian evaluation of modern society is balanced, it is also inextricably bound up with the role of the intellectual in this same society. We have illustrated that since the time of the "revolt against formalism" there has been an emphasis on the importance
of the intellectual in the application of knowledge for the resolution of social problems, for the creation of a humane and rational society. This, of course, was the "ideal" of intellectual activity within emerging corporate capitalism; its real underbelly was of lesser moral stuff in that it was principally concerned with short circuiting the crisis of legitimation in late nineteenth century capitalist society -- it was concerned with the problem of capitalist hegemony. As such, the function of the person of knowledge, especially the academic in such new and expanding disciplines as sociology, was that of an "organic intellectual". The high ideals surrounding the role of the intellectual, then, not only legitimized attempts at social engineering and state intervention in the economy, but also the very social position of the intellectual.

The left-Weberians, as professional sociologists, believe in the importance of the intellectual as the harbinger of a rational society; they believe the very corporate liberal ideology that establishes the credentials for the professional intellectual in modern capitalist society. Evidence for this is contained in the fact that the intellectual is perceived to be important as a social agency, and in the central position the intellectual is to occupy in the maintenance of the "good society".

However, with respect to the efficacy of the intellectual in monopoly capitalism, "ideal" is "real". That is, as Lazar states, the left-Weberians recognize that most intellectuals have "bureaucratic-capitalist" tendencies and are not engaged in the attempt to provide the masses with information about their masters or the means by which individuals could regain control over their lives. Simultaneously, as social
critics the left-Weberians are "squeezed from both ends". They have no effective input into decisions made by those at the summits of the large bureaucracies -- those in power -- because the only real mechanism intellectuals have in terms of wielding influence is through the masses. Gouldner acknowledges this when he asserts that the power of the "New Class" depends on its ability to communicate its special projects to the public, to motivate the public through ideological appeals to act on behalf of the "New Class". But, the left-Weberians generally confront a passified and privatised mass instead of a viable public. There is no true political forum by which ideas may be communicated, debated and acted upon. Gone is the era of the nineteenth century when a genuine public held those in leadership positions responsible for decisions, when intellectuals were effective in helping to establish a critical and rational public. With the destruction of the bourgeois public in the face of institutional centralization, there disappears the opportunity for individuals to debate issues; there disappears the ability to make those in power accountable (the middle does not connect top and bottom); there disappears the political effectiveness of the intellectual.

It is at this point that the left-Weberian view of the individual/society relationship and the conception of the role of the intellectual coincide. The eclipse of rationality embodied within the morally autonomous individual at the same time implies the political irrelevance of the intellectual as social critic. In the absence of a politically attentive public, the intellectual is severed from the means by which his ideas make a difference and he is forced to retreat to the solitude of his dusty library. He becomes of no social or political consequence.
Insofar as the privatised masses and the politically impotent intellectual form an interface, this sheds light on both the left-Weberian normative orientation and political strategy for its consummation. The political strategy, as seen in Chapter Three, is basically directed towards rejuvenating the public in order to effect a union of "power" and "intellect" for the creation of the "good society". Mills and Gouldner demonstrate this orientation most fully in their appeal to intellectuals to reclaim the "cultural apparatus" in order to begin the task of public "consciousness raising".

This can form the first link in the construction of a movement that will link intellectuals with an aware public. Moreover, their vision of the "good society" involves a general schema by which the public of voluntary associations will once again be supreme. Central to this view is the separation of polity and economy to facilitate the creation of a "free space" in which the public can once again flourish. The upshot of the whole strategy is to see revitalized the politically viable public in which individuals will be able to control their own destinies. Essential in this scenario, though, is the intellectual. Now given the opportunity, his knowledge can make a difference; he can be instrumental in providing ideas, etc. to an attentive public and have them acted upon. No longer will his efforts be marginal in the operation of a rational and humane society. The ideal of the intellectual as outlined by corporate liberalism will have been made a reality in this "new society".

But what do the left-Weberians really want in terms of a "good society"? Korsh has stated that Karl Marx's criticism of the Utopian
Socialists did not stem totally from the fact that they dared to dream, that they wanted to create a "utopia", but that such a "utopia" actually reduced to bourgeois society itself. They idealized existing society leaving out only the "shadows". (Korsh;1963,53) In similar fashion, much the same can be said for the left-Weberian conception of the "good society". We are not so critical of their attempts to visualize how an ideal society would or should appear, but rather, what this "good society" actually represents in reality. In Chapter Three, it was maintained that for the most part the left-Weberian normative orientation was an abstract and idealized reproduction of the liberal-pluralist view of modern capitalist society. Indeed, it seems to be the case that with respect to corporate capitalism they have "taken a picture of it without shadows". That is to say, their "good society", with its separation of polity and economy, public and voluntary associations, and professionals and intellectuals, is an idealized recreation of modern capitalism minus the "rough edges".

In this "new society", the intellectual will continue to be instrumental in terms of his ability to provide the public with important knowledge on which informed action can be based. The function of the intellectual will approach the ideal established by "the revolt against formalism" in that knowledge will be addressed to solving human problems and establishing an articulate public. He will be a social critic dedicated to the preservation and maintenance of a rational society.

Here there is very little discussion with respect to overcoming that most basic division of labour that separates mental from physical production -- the very groundwork on which the function of the intellectual is
based. Bottomore, it seems, is the only theorist of the three to address the issue. In *Elites and Society*, he makes the claim that the increasing technical superiority of modern industry is approaching the time in which, if coupled with worker self-management, a "leisure class" may comprise the whole population. (Bottomore;1964,142) Under such conditions, individuals will have more time in which to develop both physical and intellectual capacities. Yet, such a development does not necessarily seem to usurp the role of the intellectual as social critic and disseminater of ideas. Scientific specialists, including sociologists, it appears, would have a part to play in this society, although they would not be engaged in acts of "social engineering" but in public enlightenment, in the diffussion of knowledge to the public.

For the left-Weberians, then, it seems that the function of the intellectual, in not only helping to create the "good society", but also in preserving and maintaining it, is essentially that which is lionized by corporate liberalism. That is, in idealized form the intellectual as social critic is to occupy the same relative position of the social reformer within existing corporate capitalism. They are two sides of the same coin and differ in degree not kind.

If the left-Weberians idealize the role of the intellectual in corporate capitalism and read his importance back into their "good society", the particular outline of their normative society itself approximates an abstract description of corporate capitalism.

Although the left-Weberians are critical of private property, it is actually the centralization of the major institutions, whether polit-
ical, economic, military, etc., that is of major concern. This has been seen with respect to their relatively favourable appraisal of early bourgeois society vis-à-vis modern bureaucratic capitalism. Contiguous with the bureaucratization of social institutions is the emergence of positions of power removed from public scrutiny and accountability. Voluntary associations can no longer link the individual with the state, and conversely now no longer have the power to protect him from it. In Chapter Three, we stated that this particular understanding of power was inadequate because it failed to locate the basis of power in the relationship between classes and instead studied "power-relations" between social actors. This conception of power, which is a liberal-pluralist conception, carries the left-Weberians toward the same normative statements of the pluralist. If the problem of power is its concentrated nature, it must be decentralized. This can only be achieved by separating the polity and economy in order to create an arena in which voluntary associations can be politically potent and in which the power of one group can be offset by a plurality of others. Both liberal-pluralism and the left-Weberians come to this conclusion.

But the liberal-pluralist schema has its fundamental basis in private property -- this is the very meaning of the separation of polity and economy. For the liberals the existence of private property is an essential guarantee against political dictatorship; it is the fount of freedom. What does this mean for the ostensibly socialist left-Weberians? We have few doubts that the socialistic sentiments of left-Weberian scholars is genuine, that they are morally committed to such an ideal. However, the question remains: Is not the left-Weberian normative orientation based
upon the abstract parameters of modern capitalist society, private property and all? The separation of polity and economy, of public and private, entails the existence of a society based on private property. The fact that the left-Weberians construct a "socialist superstructure" over this fundamental groundwork alters nothing. In this sense, then, the left-Weberians' "good society" appears as capitalist society with the excesses deleted. It forms an abstract and idealized picture of a corporate welfare state society; the way capitalist society should work; the way its apologists say it does work.

Alvin Gouldner states that the "New Class" has two political strategies which it employs in strengthening its class position. The first is geared toward an extension of the existing welfare state in order to ensure job security and to effect greater control over their work and work situation. However, the existence of the bourgeoisie limits the power of the New Class, just as the New Class puts barriers on bourgeois control. The second political strategy is for the full implementation of a socialist state in which the New Class will enjoy a fuller hegemony. (Gouldner; 1979,17) Gouldner's position, in a descriptive manner, seems to parallel the above statements with respect to the left-Weberian normative orientation. That is, the statement that the left-Weberians' "good society" is actually an idealized and abstract version of the corporate welfare state -- capitalist society with a socialist veneer -- is at least partially vindicated by Gouldner's position. Yet, Gouldner would further state that left-Weberian critical sociology is a direct expression of a fraction of the New Class -- the alienated humanistic intellectuals. He cites the
example of Jürgen Habermas' critical theory as an ideology of a morally concerned sector of the New Class -- the older humanistic elite -- which asserts priority of its own cultural concerns over purely technical and bureaucratic considerations. Hence, the aim of critical theory is to control the technical elite and facilitate popular participation in effective decision-making by establishing the requisites of a social system grounded in substantive rationality. This would subordinate the technician to the requirements of Reason. (Gouldner; 1979, 39)

This appears as a fine description, not only of Habermas' normative orientation, but also of the left-Weberian project as well. Yet, the crucial difference between Gouldner's thesis and our own is that we believe that this ideology is not the direct expression of the interests of an autonomous social class -- the humanistic intellectuals of the New Class -- but rather, that left-Weberian thought is a form of bourgeois ideology because it is rooted in the major intellectual tradition of corporate capitalism. As such, it falls prey to the methodological barriers erected by the relations of commodity production. In a secondary sense, as a radicalism of intellectuals, it can be seen as an expression of the perceived discrepancy between the liberal ideals of modern capitalist society (and the role the intellectual was to play in achieving them) and the reality of the growing irrationality of post-World War Two capitalist society. Rooted in the assumptions and ideals of this society, the left-Weberians turn them on corporate capitalist society itself. They take up the humanitarian stance of the utopian/idealist liberal and plea for a new moral order in which the ideals of the past system can be attained. In
their attempt to transcend a society they so much deplore, the left-Weberians come full circle and reproduce it as an abstract ideal.
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