SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

AND THE

THEORY OF WORKING CLASS REVOLUTION
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THEORY OF WORKING CLASS REVOLUTION
IN
KARL MARX

By
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ABSTRACT

For all intents and purposes the thesis presented here will be an examination of the implicit and explicit social psychology of Karl Marx. That Marx has a psychological content is obvious to even the most cursory reader (indeed, it has been argued by Louis Althusser, in a fit of structuralist pique, that it is exactly the cursory reading of Marx that "discovers" a psychological content). Precisely what this psychological content consists of is a contentious matter. Nevertheless, it is of the utmost importance that the issue of psychological content be confronted in order that social psychology finds its appropriate position in the sociological method suggested by Marx's historical materialism.¹

The desire to carry out this examination of Marx's psychological assumptions, and to demonstrate the social psychology most appropriate to the historical materialist approach to social history, is largely derived from an utter frustration and dissatisfaction with so called "traditional" Marxist social psychology. From existentialism to Freudianism, from social behaviorism to structuralism, the attempt has been made to supplant or negate Marx's psychological content. Many of these attempts have demonstrated little concern for the philosophical implications of their brutalizations of Marx.

The accusation that various attempts at "translating" Marx's psychological content are not "faithful" to Marx is frequently heard. This is partially attributable to Marx's own ambiguity. As such, it
is a problem that confronts anyone who wishes to study Marx and to make public the results of his study. I see no reason why this attempt should escape this fate. However, with effort, perhaps this attempt will prove more faithful and less brutal. This is my sincere hope and stated aim.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In preparing this acknowledgement I was required to somehow restrict my expressions of gratitude to a few individuals who have, in one way or another, contributed to my present situation. The task has been very difficult.

Perhaps the greatest debt of gratitude is owed to all of those individuals who convinced me that knowledge is important to personal growth. I would therefore thank all those who have been my teachers, official and unofficial, and have contributed to my present reverence for knowledge.

Next I feel it necessary to express my gratitude to the members of my committee. To Peter Archibald, without whose guidance and expertise this thesis would have remained but a seminal idea, I must extend a special thanks and an expression of my heart felt gratitude. To Cyril Levitt, who attempted to train my intellect by teaching me Hegel and Marx, and who sought to "correct" my sometimes faulty interpretation of Marx, I owe a great deal. I also thank Dr. Louis Greenspan for his participation and for his contribution to my knowledge of Freud and of Freudo-Marxism which I extracted from his course on Identity and Religion.

There are also many others who directly and indirectly contributed to this work. Some of these individuals are probably unaware of their influence and for this reason I officially record the gratitude that I owe them. To name but a few who occupy this category:
Dr. Richard Brymer, Richard Hadden, Roy Johnson, Dr. Hans Mol and Reg Ripton.

I would dedicate this thesis to my wife Sharon who somehow saved me and in the process made it possible for me to continue.
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INTRODUCTION

In October of 1969 the English version of Henri Lefebvre's, *Sociologie de Marx*, published some three years earlier in the French, was introduced to the North American market. The book has more than likely influenced many young scholars, particularly within the discipline of sociology, who sought a sociological introduction to Marx. Unbeknownst to many readers the work contained what may prove to be a theoretically trivial but academically abhorrent error in citation. On page 160 Lefebvre reproduces the following passage.

The superstition that used to ascribe revolutions to the ugly intentions of agitators is a thing of the past. Today everyone knows that whenever a revolutionary upheaval takes place, its source lies in some social need that outdated institutions are not meeting. The need may not be felt strongly enough or widely enough to obtain immediate success, but any attempt at brutal repression will only make it more powerful....Our task consists in studying the causes of the recent uprising and finding out why it was defeated....The movements of February/March 1848 were not the work of individuals acting on their own, but irresistible spontaneous manifestations of needs... (Lefebvre 1969: 160)

The passage is an obvious argument for a theory of social revolution dependent upon the manifestation of frustration and aggression in individuals. Where social needs are blocked, revolutions have an opportunity to occur. Where the blockage is reinforced through repression, revolutionary upheavals will be more powerful. Indeed, success is dependent upon both the intensity of frustration on the individual level and on the number of individuals who experience this frustration.
It appeared as though Lefebvre had discovered, in a passage that he suggests is "little known" (Lefebvre 1969: 160), the explanation of Marx's implicit psychology of revolutionary upheavals. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Lefebvre gives the source of the passage as, *Enthüllungen über den Kommunistenprozess zu Köln*, Basel and Boston 1853, written in 1852 and subsequently published anonymously. The Boston edition, which was apparently Lefebvre's source, was produced on the whole for an audience of German refugees who had chosen asylum in America. The work was unavailable in English throughout the period between 1853 and the production of Lefebvre's book, but became available in English in 1971. Reading the English version, currently available in at least two sources, demonstrates that there is no such passage contained therein, although a remarkably similar passage does occur, in an article written and published some years prior to the publication of the first version of the aforementioned work, in the New York Daily Tribune.

The times of that superstition which attributed revolutions to the ill-will of a few agitators, have long passed away. Everyone knows nowadays, that whenever there is a revolutionary convulsion, there must be some social want in the background, which is prevented by outworn institutions from satisfying itself. The want may not yet be felt as strongly, as generally, as might insure immediate success, but every attempt at forcible repression will only bring it forth stronger and stronger, [until it bursts its fetters. If, then, we have been beaten, we have nothing else to do but to begin again from the beginning. And, fortunately, the probably very short interval of rest which is allowed us between the close of the first and the beginning of the second act of the movement], gives us time for a very necessary piece of work: the study of the causes that necessitated both the late outbreak, and its defeat; [causes that are not to be sought for in the accidental efforts, talents, faults, errors or treacheries of some of the leaders, but in the general social state and condi-
tions of existence of each of the convulsed nations. That the sudden movements of February and March, 1848, were not the work of single individuals, but spontaneous, irresistible manifestations of national wants and necessities, more or less clearly understood, but very distinctly felt by numerous classes in every country, is a fact recognised everywhere;

(Engels 1979: 5 — brackets added)

The central thrust of the original is amply demonstrated in Lefebvre's text, particularly when the deleted sections (bracketed in the second rendition) are taken into account. The actual source, an article written at Marx's request by Engels entitled, "Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany", was published over the course of several months spanning the years 1851-1852. The passage appeared in the very first installment under the heading, "Germany at the Outbreak of the Revolution", published in the New York Daily Tribune of October 25, 1851, under the signature of Marx who reportedly read and approved each installment prior to it being dispatched. This may suggest that Marx approved of the implicit theory of frustration-aggression as it appeared in the lead-off article, but conjecture on this point may prove mute if Marx's avowed works express different approaches to the psychological element of revolutionary upheaval. As to why Henri Lefebvre would mistakenly cite a passage, originally published in English, from a work which was at the time only available in German, remains a mystery. Nonetheless, Lefebvre's apparent error may point us in a direction not otherwise envisaged.

The central concern of this thesis shall be to seek the foundation of the theory of frustration-aggression in Marx's writings from the period of 1844 to 1867. We will centre our analysis on the
period beginning with the writing of the Paris manuscripts and culminating in the three volumes of *Capital*. This does not, however, imply that we will approach the texts in search of blatant statements of cause/frustration and effect/revolution. Marx was certainly never this crude in his analysis of historical and social trends. As such, not only must the theory of frustration-aggression be textually demonstrated, it must also be fully explicated with reference to Marx's entire schemata of evolutionary/revolutionary change. It is this concern that has dictated the placement of the content of the various chapters of which this work is composed.

The first chapter will deal exclusively with the concept of social psychology as it appears to Marx and Marxism, answering important questions about the viability of a Marxist social psychology, the traditional approach to a social psychology of Marxism, and Marx's critique of psychology. The attempt will be made to demonstrate paths which should be avoided in search of a Marxist social psychology.

The theory of frustration-aggression assumes that needs, wants, or interests lay at the centre of any process of social change. Chapter two will seek to investigate the system of needs that we find in Marx's writings and, at this stage, we will attempt to explicate the relationship between needs and their historical or social reproduction as wants. We will also typify or categorize the diversity of concepts that one comes across in Marx's discussion of need in order to simplify future references to needs and wants.

The implicit and explicit psychological premises of Marx's own theoretical position will be reviewed in the third chapter. Par-
ticular emphasis will be assigned to the historical genesis of individuality and the role of needs and wants in this genesis, although more traditional psychological assumptions will also be investigated.

In chapter four we will develop the theory of frustration-aggression, primarily with reference to Marx's texts. We will also suggest various concepts implicit in Marx's theory that would appear to be marked improvements over the more traditional approaches to frustration-aggression theorizing.

Having established a theoretical position we will investigate, in our fifth chapter, how this position might help to organize Marx's historical analysis of class relations and the concept of evolution culminating in necessary aggression. At this point we will also necessarily consider both the structural and ideological pre-conditions for successful working class revolutionary aggression.
CHAPTER ONE

A Critique of Social Psychology

Marx has often been accused of ignoring the relationship between the individual and society — of not correctly forming a social psychology — and of underestimating the role of men in the dialectical process of social formation. These accusations arise, for the most part, from Marx's apparent emphasis on economic categories and processes, particularly in the later writings. In Capital I, Marx begins his investigations with "...the analysis of the commodity". (Marx 1977: 43) In his introduction to the Grundrisse, Marx starts the analysis, not with individuals as psychological units or even with abstract individuals, but with socially determined individual production relations.

Individuals producing in society — hence socially determined individual production — is, of course, the point of departure. (Marx 1973: 83)

The assumption develops among certain schools of Marxism that Marx did not understand the individual to be a fit subject for investigation. Often this position developed to the extent that individuals were totally excluded from the historic process, except, of course, as passive receptors. E. P. Thompson, however, argues that "...Marx was writing, with his tongue firmly in his cheek, and striking a pre-emptive blow against his critics by borrowing the rhetoric closest to the hearts of every exploiter who could exonerate
himself as being the träger of economic "laws". (Thompson 1978: 148)

The argument that Marx precludes the investigation of the individual or, indeed, of men in general, seems highly irregular in face of Marx's obvious concern for the process of individuation, evidence of which we will encounter in subsequent chapters. Moreover, in several texts Marx obviously argues in favour of some analysis of the "real individual" involved in production relations. In the German Ideology, Marx outlines a set of basic assumptions.

The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the material conditions of their life, both those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity. These premises can thus be verified in a purely empirical way. (Marx and Engels 1976: 31)

Marx's analysis of the "categories" of political economy is premised on real individuals and on the empirically observable relations between these individuals and their previously given and newly created material conditions of life. In short, Marx premises his economic analysis on a method of investigation — the premising of real individuals and their empirically valid social relations — that might require the development of a social psychology.

Since men and their relations are injected into Marx's analysis of economic relations it might be argued that, in order to fully comprehend Marx's economic analysis, it would be necessary to come to grips with his social psychological premises. Indeed, we will argue in the second chapter that the theory of need, as a social psychological concept, plays a necessary and important role in Marx's
economic analyses.

Marx, however, implies more than this. Marx suggests that, should one wish to indulge in economic or historical analysis, one would find it necessary to indulge in some preliminary form of social psychological analysis. This Marx makes abundantly clear in the *Poverty of Philosophy*.

In logical sequence, it was the century that belonged to the principle, and not the principle that belonged to the century. In other words it was the principle that made the history and not the history that made the principle. When, consequently, in order to save principles as much as to save history, we ask ourselves why a particular principle manifested in the eleventh century rather than any other, we are necessarily forced to examine minutely what men were like in the eleventh century, what they were like in the eighteenth, what were their respective needs, their productive forces, their mode of production, the raw materials of their production — in short, what were the relations between man and man which resulted from these conditions of production.

(Marx 1976: 170)

Marx has argued that historical analysis is dependent upon a thorough-going understanding of the relations between man and man and on an understanding of what men were like; hence, on the development of what we might call an empirical social psychology. This would therefore imply that an understanding of Feudal relations would require an understanding of what men in the feudal era were like. Irregardless of this evidence to the contrary, some would continue to argue against the existence or necessity of a Marxist social psychology.

Perhaps most emblematic of the position taken against social psychology is Louis Althusser. Althusser has long maintained that Marx's mature works were largely devoid of any consequential social
psychology, that this is the direction that a truely scientific Marx­
ism must take, and, initially, that the break with the obvious spec­
ulative humanism of the young Marx is easily established in the period
1844-1845. The resulting counter-attack to Althusser's position has
taken many forms, both philosophical and methodological. E. P. Thomp­
son has accused Althusser of developing a Marxist idealism in spite
of his attempts to avoid the Hegelian influence in Marx. (Thompson
1978: 98) Lucien Sève has argued that Althusser and the structur­
alists have purposefully distorted the meaning of the 6th thesis on
Feuerbach in favour of a more structuralist interpretation. (Sève
1978: 66) At the same time, and in the face of the obvious social
psychological content of Marx's mature works, there has been a deter­
ioration of Althusser's original hypothesis vis-a-vis the break with
speculative humanism in 1845. Thus, in the preface to volume one of
Capital, Althusser rescinds his earlier thesis of break or rupture.

As the reader may know, I have previously attempted to
defend the idea that Marx's thought is basically different
from that of Hegel, and that there is therefore a true
break or rupture, if you prefer, between Marx and Hegel.
The further I go, the more I think this thesis is correct. However, I must admit that I have given a much too abrupt
idea of this thesis in advancing the idea that it was pos­
sible to locate this rupture in 1845 (The Theses on Feuer­
bach, The German Ideology).
(Althusser 1971: 93)

Rather than admit the validity of the earlier works, Althusser
merely protracts the break. Speaking of Capital I, Althusser insists
that this is the judgmental work in the sense that it embodies the
"true" Marx.

This work is the one by which Marx has to be judged. By
it alone, and not by his still idealist "Early Works"
(1841-1844); not by still ambiguous works like the German Ideology, or even the Grundrisse,...: Not even by the famous Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, where Marx defines the "dialectic" of the "correspondence and non-correspondence" between the Productive Forces and the Relations of Production in very ambiguous (because Hegelian) terms. (Althusser 1971: 71)

At first it would appear that Althusser has re-situated the break in the years surrounding the production of the first volume of Capital. No longer are we allowed to seriously investigate Marx's works prior to 1867 since they are still linked to the "earlier" Hegelian influence. Nevertheless, somewhat later Althusser calls Capital I into question by suggesting that Part I of volume one is seriously tainted with Hegelianism, as is chapter 32 of volume one, part VIII. Thus, Althusser extends the break into the very work that he claims must be the foundation of a judgement of Marx and attempts to deny social psychology any foundation in the "mature works" by methodologically expunging any implicit social psychology.

A last trace of Hegelian influence, this time a flagrant and extremely harmful one (since all theoreticians of "reification" and "alienation" have found in it the "foundation" for their idealist interpretations of Marx's thought): the secret of fetishism (The Fetishism of Commodities and the Secret Thereof, Part I, Chapter I, Section 4). (Althusser 1971: 95)

This would ultimately suggest that, in judging Marx from Capital I, as Althusser suggests, the reader is presented with a serious conflict. There is obvious psychology in Capital I; a social psychology that Althusser would censure. Thus, one is forced to either submit to Althusser's thesis and judge Marx only after Althusser's "pruning" of Capital, — a pruning that has the potential for infinite
regression — or, barring this, the reader must reject Althusser's thesis and look upon the works of Marx as a basic continuity expressing only slight changes in interest. The necessity of Althusser's pruning may itself provide evidence that any judgement of Marx based on *Capital* must find in favour of the basic continuity of Marx's thought.

Despite Althusser's accusations vis-a-vis Marx's inability to divest himself entirely of speculative humanism (read Hegelian influence) it is obvious, even as early as 1844, that Marx, in spite of his high regard for Hegel, was eminently aware of the many problems associated with the speculative approach, and that he had recognized the speculative nature of Hegel's work.

...Hegel very often gives a real presentation, embracing the thing itself, within the speculative presentation. This real development misleads the reader into considering the speculative development as real and the real development as speculative. (Marx and Engels 1975: 61)

This awareness of the relationship between the real and the speculative in Hegel, an awareness that was not easily attained — as evidenced by the relative importance of Hegel and Hegelianism in nineteenth century Germany — suggests that Marx was certainly cognizant of the important distinctions to be made between a speculative and a scientific approach. Speaking of both Bruno Bauer and Hegel, Marx argues that speculative philosophy is entirely too teleological, in the sense that historical agency is a matter for "Spirit" or the "Ideas", thereby denying the importance of the role of men in history. This would indicate that Marx was entirely aware of the philosophical
and logical consequences of the speculative approach. With speculative philosophy "truth" becomes the master of history.

For Herr Bauer, as for Hegel, truth is an automaton that proves itself, Man must follow it.
(Marx and Engels 1975: 79)

This teleological stance, along with the subsequent denial of human input into the historical process, leads, Marx suggests, to the personification of history at the expense of the real men who create and recreate social reality. This denial of human agency is a concept that Marx has repeatedly denounced, most emphatically in the theses on Feuerbach, and perhaps most famously in the opening passage of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon. Yet it is a concept virtually unavoidable in the speculative approach to philosophy.

That is why history, like truth, becomes a person apart, a metaphysical subject of which the real human individuals are merely the bearers.
(Marx and Engels 1975: 79)

Not only was Marx aware of the existence of a distinction between philosophy and the scientific approach to human relations, of the teleological implications of speculative philosophy, but he was also aware of the material foundations of this approach. His explanation suggests that the ultimate root of speculative philosophy rests on the general acceptance or diffusion of a particular, hence class oriented, ideology.

Once the ruling ideas have been separated from the ruling individuals and, above all, from the relations which result from a given stage of the mode of production, and in this way the conclusion has been reached that history is always under the sway of ideas, it is very easy to abstract from these various ideas "the idea", the thought, etc., as the
dominant force in history. It follows naturally, too, that all relations of men can be derived from the concept of man, man as conceived, the essence of man, Man. This has been done by speculative philosophy.
(Marx and Engels 1976: 61)

All of this, the realization of the distinction between the real and the speculative in Hegel, the awareness of the teleological problem, and the formulation of an explanation for speculative philosophy, would tend to deny any credence to Althusser's argument that any social psychology found in Marx must necessarily be attributed to vestiges of speculative humanism. Rather, one might be led to argue that Marx's concern for the awareness of the problematic of speculative philosophy would ensure that any psychological premises found in Marx's analyses would be adequately worked-out, hence, would be for the most part scientific and empirically verifiable. Indeed, it was this awareness, this ability to distinguish between the real and the merely speculative, that formed the backbone of Marx's rather extensive critique of the psychology implicit in the work of those philosophers and political economists that he chose to acquaint himself with. The form of this critique we shall investigate later in this chapter.

Judging by the evidence of social psychology in Marx's mature works and by the obvious awareness of the trap of speculative philosophy characteristic of the "early works", it would seem appropriate that we reject Althusser's restrictive thesis and let Marx's social psychology speak for itself.
Traditional Marxist Social Psychology

Interest in a Marxist social psychology is certainly not a uniquely modern phenomenon. Lucio Colletti reminds us that Karl Kautsky's, *Die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung*, published in 1927, contained an entire book on human nature. (Collette 1974: 24) Somewhat earlier, Engels', *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State*, which Lawrence Krader claims is at least partially the result of notes compiled by Marx during the latter stages of his life on Lewis Henry Morgan's *Ancient Society* (Krader 1972: 1), certainly deals extensively with the relationship between "human nature" and the material conditions of existence. In it Engels not only suggests that "...jealousy is an emotion of comparatively late development..." (Engels 1972: 50), but also takes the position that:

...in the first form of sex love that historically emerges as a passion, and as a passion in which any person (at least of the ruling classes) has a right to indulge, as the highest form of sexual impulse — which is precisely its specific feature — this, its first form, the chavalrous love of the Middle Ages, was by no means conjugal love. (Engels 1972: 78)

As such, we find in Engels' work an instance of human beings responding to a "universal" sexual impulse in an historically specific manner.

Nonetheless, for all the early interest in a Marxist social psychology evidenced by Engels and Kautsky, the discipline as a whole is startlingly immature. The current importance of structuralist Marxists such as Louis Althusser may have been enhanced by this relative immaturity. Many social psychologists, interested in approaching the works of Marx, find it necessary to preface this task with a cri-
tique, if only a private self-assuring critique, of Althusser's work. Witness Lucien Sève, who devotes a six page note to Althusser in which he argues that "...the problem of the relations between Marxism and humanism put forward by Louis Althusser does not seem acceptable". (Sève 1978: 161)

All social psychology deals with the active subjects or subject that make up the social order and with the relationships that develop and exist within this order. Thus, on the one hand, there develops an understanding of the social order and, on the other hand, there develops a series of psychological premises. Basically let me argue that there are two primary categories of Marxist social psychology: That which seeks psychology in Marx's own work, accepting both Marx's analysis of the social structure and his psychological premises; and that which argues for a reconstruction of Marx's psychology while basically agreeing with the structuralist premises. Typically, the advocate of a reconstruction of Marx's psychology finds that the development of partial theories of social causation lies at the root of the failure of social theory to predict historical trends. Thus, while Marx may have developed a superior theory of social causation with respect to the social order and its structural elements, his psychological premises were faulty. It is this faulty psychology that, in some eyes, makes Marx's theory of social causation a partial theory.
Fruedo-Marxism

Central to the Freudo-Marxist position, as representative of a much wider tradition, is the belief that the social psychology of Marx demands the importation of psychological premises from outside of Marx's enlightenment assumptions of rational behavior. As W. Peter Archibald points out:

The rationale for doing so was cogently argued by Reich (1972:294): the rational thing for workers to do is collectively combat capitalism. That they have not done so concertedly must therefore mean that they are governed by an irrationalist rather than a rationalist psychology, as Marx as well as the political economists would have it. (Archibald 1978: 44)

Bertell Ollman goes so far as to suggest that one of Marx's major deficiencies, a deficiency that most assuredly upset his predictive capabilities, rests in this assumption of rational behavior.

Marx is clearly right in believing that the individual is to a remarkably high degree the product of his society, and that by changing his living conditions we change him, but there are at least two questions which remain to be answered: are the changes which occur in character always rational, that is, in keeping with the new interests which are created? (Ollman 1978: 244)

While the combination of Freudian psychology with Marx's structuralist analysis has been taken up by many theoreticians, it nonetheless has its detractors. Richard Ropers argues that the attempts have been unsuccessful for the most part.

Fromm, Reich, Osborn, and Marcuse have made attempts to combine Freudianism with Historical Materialism. Their attempts have been largely unsuccessful, in my opinion, because of the diametrically opposed conceptions of man, his origins, and his motivations, as well as divergent conceptions of the development and nature of society in the Marxist paradigms. Whereas Marx saw man as basically
a rational purposive producer, Freud saw man dominated by unconscious and irrational instincts, with the non-productive death instinct being predominant. (Ropers 1973: 43)

To seek, on these grounds, to refute the importation of Freudian elements appears ineffective. Freudo-Marxists have merely to assert, as Ollman has asserted, that the introduction of Freud is a mixed blessing at worst in that it fleshes out or entirely replaces Marx's own inferior, because rationalist, understanding of the psychological structure of the human being.

There is, however, one divergence on the nature of man which appears antithetical to any synthesis of Marx and Freud. The consideration of sexual appetite is seldom broached by Marx, and yet in his earliest analyses of political economy Marx offers insights that both anticipate and criticize Freud and the Freudo-Marxists. In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Marx makes the point that certain animal functions tend to displace the more human functions where labour is forced.

...man (the worker) only feels himself freely active in his animal functions — eating, drinking, procreating... and in his human functions he no longer feels himself to be anything but an animal. What is animal becomes human what is human becomes animal.
(Marx 1977c: 71)

Similarly, in an unpublished draft of the final section of Wage Labour and Capital, Marx suggests that the one-sided development of the sexual instinct, as an animal function, is the result of the material and social conditions of existence experienced by the working class.

Leaving aside the nonsense that the entire working class cannot possibly take the decision not to make any children, their condition, on the contrary, makes the sex-in-
As such, one might argue that Marx attributed the relative importance of these sexual instincts as a source of working class pleasure to the denial of "freely active" human activity. In effect, the enhanced importance of sexual activity is a by-product of alienated labour.

Marx's desire to "legitimate" the "excessive" sexual interests of the working classes in this manner suggests that there is a basic conflict between the approaches of Marx and Freud. Where Marx seeks to excuse the working class interest in sexuality, Freud might find this interest to be both healthy and necessary. One might argue, therefore, that Freud, observing the "excessive" or "enhanced" importance of the sexual instincts under conditions of commodity production, developed a theory which accepted this enhanced interest and importance as "normal". What Marx suggested was a symptom of the alienating conditions of bourgeois society Freud saw as a sign of real liberation.

This criticism does not, of course, deny Marxists access to Freud's interest in sexuality. Nor does it invalidate all of Freud's observations and conclusions. On the contrary, sexuality and sexual activity, the enhanced and exclusive importance of these biological and social functions, may be legitimate elements in the character structure of the individuals who daily produce and reproduce the social reality that is capitalism. What determines the bourgeois nature of Freud's theorizing, and this charge can be leveled with more justice at his more recent followers, is the acceptance of sexuality as the major, trans-historical, if not only, approach to the understanding
of human activity, and indeed as the derivative source of this activity.

For all intents and purposes the concentration on the sexual impulses as the "essence" of "Man" forces the Freudian concept of man to become an historically general concept. Furthermore, it could be argued that, as a consequence of its ignorance of the historically specific nature of the enhanced importance of sexuality, Freudian theorizing is merely the legitimation of excessive levels of sexual interest, hence of the alienation and the alienated character of present social and production relations, and that it justifies the one-sided development of the individual under capitalism's distorting influence. As early as 1884 Engels had understood various forms and degrees of sexual expression to be historically specific manifestations of the basic sexual impulse as one impulse among many. Similarly, while Marx would grant sensual pleasures "...are also genuinely human functions" (Marx 1977c: 71), he would disagree with any subsequent fragmentation and exaggeration of some single element of the individual's life activity.

But taken abstractly, separated from the sphere of all other human activity and turned into sole and ultimate ends, they are animal functions.
(Marx 1977c: 71)

This abstraction is precisely that which the Freudo-Marxist typically attempts in collapsing all activity into the realms of eros and thanatos, both theoretically and, for psychoanalysts such as Reich, practically.³

While the importation of Freudian psychology may encounter
difficulties of a serious nature with respect to some of the basic psychological premises, there is also some doubt as to its apparent virtue as an irrational psychological theory. Let us take Herbert Marcuse's, *Eros and Civilization*, as a case in point. Marcuse correctly asserts of Freud that "(t)he animal becomes a human being only through a fundamental transformation of his nature,...". (Marcuse 1974: 12) In Marcuse's interpretation of Freud this change in nature is characterized by the denial of the "pleasure principle" (immediate satisfaction of drives) and the adoption of the "reality principle" (delayed satisfaction of drives).

...the unrestricted pleasure principle comes into conflict with the natural and human environment. The individual comes to the traumatic realization that full and painless gratification of his needs is impossible. And after this experience of disappointment, a new principle of mental functioning gains ascendency. (Marcuse 1974: 13)

This adoption of the reality principle is therefore that transformation which makes man out of animal. Yet there seems to be a problem with the mode of adoption. Marcuse asserts that conflict with the environment forces the animal to a "traumatic realization". As such, it appears that Marcuse grants the animal-biological-man much more than a sensual, but largely unconscious, existence. How does this unconscious organism make the decision to forgo the pleasure principle in favour of the reality principle?

Arguing that the distinction between the pleasure principle and the reality principle largely corresponds to the distinction between the unconscious and the conscious processes (Marcuse 1974: 12), Marcuse suggests that the ascendency of the reality principle is large-
ly the result of a learning process (Marcuse 1974: 13). To the extent that the reality principle corresponds to the conscious processes it can be said that the environment forces the development of consciousness per se. In effect, consciousness itself is a product of the "traumatic realization". This is the centre of the problem; how does "traumatic realization" manifest itself if the consciousness and conscious processes are themselves products of the trauma?

Marcuse speaks of frustration/disappointment as if this were all that was needed for decision making. But frustration without a rationally functioning ego centre, hence consciousness capable of realizing, would not necessarily or logically lead to a traumatic realization. Given that the only functioning processes are unconscious, traumatic realization may be traumatic but it surely cannot be conscious realization. In short, Marcuse's reference to traumatic realization, indeed to any conscious realization, can only apply if there exists a rational ego centre capable of consciously realizing the ascendency of the reality principle. Marcuse rejects this possibility.

...the human being which, under the pleasure principle, has been hardly more than a bundle of animal drives, has become an organized ego... Under the reality principle, the human being develops the function of reason:...
(Marcuse 1974: 14)

In effect, only with the ascendency of the reality principle do we find the development of an organized ego capable of developing the function of reason. Consequently, Marcuse falls into the trap of assuming that which he creates.

The frustration of pleasure under conditions of the pleasure
principle — not all pleasure can be satisfied safely — leads the animal-man to adopt the reality principle. But the adoption of the reality principle is itself an act of reason. Thus, Marcuse assumes exactly what he denies. He assumes a creature that is pleasure maximizing and can make rational choices between immediate but sporadic satisfaction and delayed but guaranteed satisfaction while arguing that the ability to make these types of decisions is a product of life "under the reality principle". Man can hardly, therefore, be "...geared to a rationality which is imposed from outside" (Marcuse 1974: 14). The choice of the reality principle over the pleasure principle assumes rationality, it does not create it. Men must be rational prior to the adoption of the reality principle.

Marcuse, as is true of most idealists, persists in reifying and mystifying social relations; in this case pre-historic rationality and the accompanying relations between men and their material conditions of existence. He forces these material conditions of existence to impose rationality on the subject prior to the subject's development of his own rationality. Where, must we ask, does the material world, not yet a human material world in the sense that it has a social component added to the natural component, obtain the rationality that it imposes upon men? The only answer that Marcuse offers us is intimately connected to the concept of a reality principle. In effect, rationality is a product of life under the reality principle. But this is merely a displacement of the problem. Once more we must ask, where does the reality principle obtain the rationality that it imposes upon men?
This problem that we have encountered in Marcuse's treatment of the transformation from animal to man is entirely a product of Marcuse's latent idealism. He forgets that men make history and therefore that men make principles in the process of making their history. If principles have any rationality that they can impose upon men then this rationality is human rationality. It is men who make rational principles, not rational principles that make men. The transformation from animal to man is not a consequence of the "traumatic realization" of the reality principle, as Marcuse would have it, because men created the reality principle in a slow process of historical development.

While this can hardly be considered a complete critique of the Freudo-Marxist tradition, it certainly indicates some serious deficiencies associated with the synthesis of Freudian psychology with Marx's structuralism. Indeed, the justification for the inclusion of Freud's psychology, is called into question. As such, it would seem highly appropriate to investigate the rationalist approach to a Marxist social psychology.

**Symbolic Interactionism**

The rationalist approach to a social psychology of Marx is divided into several camps. Among the groups occupying this camp the most dominant social psychology would appear to be represented by the symbolic interactionists, and, to a lesser extent, by what could be called the relationalists.
Perhaps the most easily recognized, because North American, attempt is the approach which suggests some form of synthesis of G. H. Mead's social behaviorism with the historical and social analysis of Marx. Richard Ropers has argued that the synthesis of Marx and Mead would prove viable "...if the social psychology of G. H. Mead is found to be compatible with the dominant assumptions of Marxism,..." (Ropers 1973: 45). Moreover, Ropers envisages the synthesis as some sort of symbiotic relationship in which each theory has deficiencies corrected by its counterpart. As such, Ropers' entire case rests on the perceived weaknesses of each theory.

Marx, as is well known, laid bare the structural sources and effects of physical violence as social control. However, Mead's more ephemeral social psychological concepts concerning social control can serve as a needed supplement to the Marxist ideas about man as an object. (Ropers 1973: 47)

Mead's weakness can be summed up quite simply; "...he was, in a sense, a poor sociologist". (Ropers 1973: 50) Marx, on the other hand, suffers from a much different weakness; Marx's theory needs buttressing precisely where his sociological analysis comes into contact with the lowest common denominator in any society, the individuals who comprise it.

The elaboration of the mediating links between the psychological processes of individuals and social structures is the key contribution to be derived from a Meadian social psychology in developing a Marxist social psychology. (Ropers 1973: 57)

Once more we are confronted with an attempt to supplement Marx, albeit an attempt which, unlike the Freudian attempt, seeks to pass itself off as a social psychology closely approximating the im-
mature social psychology Marx would have written if Marx had been a social psychologist. This is the essence of Ropers' concern for compatibility and his subsequent discovery of this compatibility.

Mead's social psychology is compatible in numerous areas with many of the basic assumptions Marx and Engels made about consciousness, language, man and, in some cases, society. (Ropers 1973: 57)

Unfortunately, Ropers never seriously calls into question the assumptions implicit in symbolic interactionism. Richard Lichtman, in an otherwise favourable analysis of symbolic interactionism, attempts just this. He discovers that the compatibility suggested by Ropers is not entirely adequate to a synthesis of symbolic interactionism and Marxism.

But the view is inadequate as it stands: it is overly subjective and voluntaristic, lacks and awareness of historical concreteness, is naive in its account of mutual typification and ultimately abandons the sense of human beings in struggle with an alien reality which they both master and to which they are subordinate. It is a view which tends to dissolve the concept of "ideology" or "false consciousness" and leaves us, often against the will of its advocates, without a critical posture towards the present inhuman reality. (Lichtman 1970: 77)

Nonetheless, Lichtman concludes that there is a potential in symbolic interactionism which may lead one "...to reconcile the humanizing insights of symbolic interactionism with the comprehensive explanatory power of Marx's theory of knowledge and society". (Lichtman 1970: 93)

The possibility of this reconciliation of symbolic interactionism with Marxism rests, for Lichtman, on the reconstruction of symbolic interactionism on the basis of his criticism of several
themes. In the majority of cases where the synthesis is attempted, however, the reconstruction does not usually take this path. Archibald suggests that some symbolic interactionists, in search of a synthesis of this nature, have incorporated hypotheses "...about historical trends which directly contradict Marx's" (Archibald 1979: 17) and that the typical interactionist explanation of alienation, for instance, "...looks suspiciously like the opposing Durkheimian hypothesis that anomie – the absence of much-needed structure in individuals' lives – rather than powerlessness produces the phenomena we usually associate with psychological alienation". (Archibald 1979: 17) As such, not only is symbolic interactionism not involved in what at first appears to be a simple test of compatibility, but, where the symbolic interactionist has initiated the synthesis, the results have suggested that the symbiotic relationship heavily favours the survival of a largely unchanged approach to symbolic interactionism with a corresponding adulteration of Marx and Marxism. In effect, symbolic interactionism is not at all concerned about its ability to effect a synthesis in which Marx retains his original flavour, but merely seeks to confiscate certain elements of Marx's explanation of social reality, just as it sought to maintain certain Durkheimian hypotheses.

The Relationalists

The relational school of social psychology is not entirely a rationalist approach to social psychology. Indeed, Bertell Ollman,
who calls Marx to task for his naive assumptions in favour of rationality, still claims to find the relational approach to be appropriate to his own less rationalistic attempts at social psychology.

For me, then, Marx's relational view of reality (which means too, his dialectic), his conceptual framework for dealing with human nature and his theory of alienation, one part of which is the labour theory of value, are extremely useful aids for understanding nature, man and society.

(Ollman 1978: 240)

Nonetheless, other relational views of social psychology are more or less "faithful" to Marx's social psychology.

Lucien Sève takes up the issue of a relational social psychology in his book, Man in Marxist Theory and the Psychology of Personality. Recognizing that Marx and Engels had rejected the notion of a "human essence" independent of history very early in their careers, Sève is led, in his role as devil's advocate, to assert the apparent impossibility of psychological analysis.

But all psychological analysis carried out at the level of human individuals is thereby invalidated from the scientific point of view, since the nature of the individual for mature Marxism is not originally to bear the human essence in himself but to find it outside himself in social relations.

(Sève 1978: 68)

The human essence, the product of social relations, is caught up in the dialectical process by virtue of its relationship with social relations. This is the foundation of relational social psychology. The human essence is, in all cases, historically determined and is infinitely mutable within certain practical limits. Unfortunately, having relegated the human essence to the realm of social relations — social relations which under conditions of commodity production are,
according to Sève, relations between things not relations between individuals — effectively robbed psychology of its subject. In short, the individual is not in possession of the object (i.e., the human essence), nor is the scientific study of social relations properly called psychology.

It is maintained, therefore, that individuals can only intervene in Marxist theory in so far as they personify social relations, hence, in so far as they are not psychological subjects. (Sève 1978: 69)

Where then does Sève discover the scientific psychology in Marx?

Many theoreticians have been confronted by this question and many have come to the conclusion that there is no scientific psychology present in Marx's mature works. Sève rejects this position and argues that throughout his work Marx maintained an interest in the individual and his development. The multitude of references in Marx to the one-sided development of the individual under capitalism and the multi-faceted development of individuals which would correspond with conditions under socialism lay the foundation for Sève's call for a "...systematic and rigorous re-examination of what becomes of the problematic of man as a whole within mature Marxism, from the German Ideology to Capital". (Sève 1978: 73)

In partial fulfillment of the re-examination Seve goes on to argue that the speculative or philosophical humanism attributed to Marx by some scholars — largely on the basis of the Paris manuscripts — was rejected by Marx and Engels in favour, not of sociological structuralism, but of a truely scientific humanism. Indeed, the movement from a speculative social psychology to a more concrete
social psychology is seen to be the foundation of the German Ideology and, in particular, of The Theses on Feuerbach.

Not only is the concept of abstract Man invalidated as speculative, but its historical genesis is also explained on the basis of conditions in which real men develop, and consequently a new concept of man as a historically determined social individual replaces it, opening the way to a non-speculative anthropology of which the 6th thesis on Feuerbach constitutes the corner stone.

(Sève 1978: 77)

According to Sève's hypothesis, Marx and Engels' break with their philosophical past is essentially a break with the problematic of speculative humanism. In the place of speculative humanism Marx and Engels premise a theory of the historical production of social individuals. In this manner, history and the individuals who inhabit it are, for Sève, inextricably linked in any scientific analysis.

It is therefore impossible to found a science of individuals on a different basis from the science of history. But it is equally impossible to found the science of history without at the same time founding the theory of the historical production of individuals.

(Sève 1978: 90)

For the most part this amounts to a re-statement of the passage on page 170 of the Poverty of Philosophy, already quoted on page 8 of this work, where Marx demonstrates that historical study demands knowledge of the social and individual relations that correspond to any given historical epoch.

Sève also takes up the issue of individual intervention with respect to social or economic analysis.

Generally there is no economic process or relation which does not call men into action, no economic concept, therefore, which does not have an anthropological side.

(Sève 1978: 91)
Thus, the economist too must realize that even economic relations are mediated by individuals, or as Marx so aptly puts it: "(i)t is clear that commodities cannot go to market and make exchanges of their own account". (Marx 1977: 88) At first sight, however, this merely grants men a simple mediating role. Sève, on the other hand, wishes to develop his analysis further and is led to assert that "...it is relations between men which constitute the real essence of relations between things". (Sève 1978: 91) Hence, where commodity production dominates "...relations between individuals disappears behind the appearance of pure relations between things". (Sève 1978: 91)

We now find, in Sève's formulation, that the essence of man (i.e., "human relations" as against "social relations"), constituting the real essence of the social relations between things, given conditions of commodity production, calls men into action. The assumption remains that these actions may or may not be conducive to the recreation of the initial social relations but that, nonetheless, the action is determined by the existence of these social relations.

Thus the men whom Marx and Engels say make history are themselves through and through products of history and if they display initiative by revolutionising social relations this is not by virtue of one does know what creative essence or transcendental freedom inherent in man, but because they are compelled to do it precisely by the contradictions in these social relations. (Sève 1978: 108)

Once more we have the problem of men personifying social relations, but with a crucial difference. Where previously individuals mediated social relations between things, we now find social relations between things are the mediating forces that place themselves between
the underlying "human relations" and the reactions called forth in individuals by these "human relations". Typically these reactions are personifications of the social relations; the capitalist acts as a capitalist, the worker as a worker, and the system perpetuates itself. Nonetheless, Sève still discovers an exit from the problems of the psychology of personified social relations in a passage cited from the German Ideology. Sève discovers in this passage a division between personal and personified existence.

In this analysis, which catches a glimpse of a whole new scientific world to be explored, one can clearly see how the concept of personal life, the personal individual, is strictly articulated with the historico-economic analysis in which it finds its starting-point, and how nevertheless it belongs not to the science of economic relations alone but to a possible science of the individual considered in himself.
(Sève 1978: 113)

In effect, Sève discovers an unattached "human essence" that can become the object of a psychological science; unattached in that Marx neither rejects nor investigates it in the course of his further studies and unattached in that this personal content of the individual allows for the study of individuals "...as concrete persons..." (Sève 1978: 113) — as persons, not as personifications.

As with most social psychologists who wish to develop a Marxist social psychology Sève must ultimately argue that Marx, while correct in his historical analysis, was unable (or unwilling?) to develop a comprehensive psychology of personality. In effect, Sève too must seek to supplement Marx.

And it is true that although he indicated its starting-point and the shape of its outline, in discovering these ways Marx was not able to pursue to its conclusion what
amounts to the science of the individual. The task gives us an idea of the theoretical task which remains to be carried out on the terrain of the theory of personality, not only for psychology to attain full development but for the completion of Marxism itself in this area...
(Sève 1978: 136)

What we must question is the source of Marx's inability to pursue this course suggested by Sève. Was it a sign of Marx's lack of time or lack of concern? This could most likely become a seriously debated question, although a question of dubious worth. By way of suggestion, however, let us quote Marx.

Except as personified capital, the capitalist has no historical value, and no right to that historical existence, which, to use an expression of the witty Lichnowsky, "hasn't got no date".
(Marx 1977: 555)

It is perfectly "possible" that what individual persons do is not "always" determined by the class to which they belong, although this is no more crucial to the class struggle than an aristocrat going over to the tiers-etat was crucial to the French Revolution.
(Marx 1976b: 330)

Ultimately dealing with the historical importance of relations, activities, and ideas, would Marx cede any purpose to the study of non-personified character structures? If so, then why did he not follow this avenue of research? If not, then how could this avenue of research in any way, shape, or form imply "full development" or "completion" within Marxism?

We have looked at three of the major methods of approaching the social psychology of Marxism. All three methods are characterized by attempts to improve upon the social psychological content of Marx's own work. We are faced with the task of deciding whether or not these attempts are founded on an actual lack of social psychology in the
works of Marx. Having looked at what others have said on the subject of Marx's social psychology, let us look to what Marx has said on the subject of others' social psychology.

Marx's Critique

In 1847 Marx wrote of Proudhon:

M. Proudhon does not know that all history is nothing but a continuous transformation of human nature.

(Marx 1976: 192)

In these few short lines Marx outlines the foundation of his critique of psychology as it presents itself in the works of philosophers and political economists alike.

Marx's critique of the German idealists consistently draws the reader's attention to the abstractness of the analysis and the consequences of this abstractness. The critique of Max Stirner is perhaps the most illustrative for our purposes.

Earlier when observing the behavior of people from his "own world", from his "heaven", he set aside two factors of actual liberation in making his abstraction of freedom. The first factor was that individuals in their self-liberation satisfy a definite need experienced by them. As a result of setting aside this factor, "Man" has been substituted for actual individuals, and striving for a fantastic ideal — for freedom as such, for the "freedom of Man" — has been substituted for the satisfaction of actual needs.

(Marx and Engels 1976: 305)

Stirner perceived the abstract and formal freedom of bourgeois social relations and posited this abstract freedom as an ideal need. Thus, we find that Saint Max has created a speculative Man — a man whose "true" need goes far beyond the common, practical needs of ac-
tual men (e.g., the basic needs for food, shelter and clothing) — in the process of realizing an abstract and speculative freedom.

Stirner's man needs freedom in the same way that actual men need daily sustenance. But, as Marx demonstrates, Stirner's freedom is not actual freedom; it is an abstract freedom, the manifestation of bourgeois formal freedom. Stirner's freedom is the "principle of freedom". It is the freedom of the market, the freedom of capital, in the guise of the freedom of Man, that Stirner develops as the self-liberation of the individual.

The attempt to adopt an abstract speculative need, and as a consequence, an abstract speculative image of man, drives real men from the analysis. This, in turn, causes Marx to argue that Stirner necessarily excludes actually existing social relations from his analysis.

Since Saint Max pays no attention to the physical and social "life" of the individual, and says nothing at all about "life", he quite consistently abstracts from historical epochs, nationalities, classes, etc.,...
(Marx and Engels 1976: 129)

In effect, all of Stirner's concern for freedom — "freedom as such", freedom as the eternal category and principle of history — proves for nought. The abstraction implicit in Stirner's concept of freedom leads to a speculative humanism and a speculative philosophy that can only liberate idealistically. Stirner succeeds in liberating "Man" (i.e., Stirner's concept of Man) from something, only on the level of consciousness, while actual men remain enslaved.

Nonetheless, Marx's critique of Stirner remains forever a critique of the abstract, speculative approach and Marx persistently
contrasts the speculative with the actual. Throughout this section of the *German Ideology* we find Marx opposing actual needs to Stirner's ideal needs. The psychology of needs is left, for the most part, unchallenged.

While Marx's critique of Stirner centres on the speculative human nature that permeates Stirner's concepts, Marx's critique of Feuerbach is somewhat different. Feuerbach, unlike Stirner, was ostensibly a materialist, but an imperfect materialist.

As far as Feuerbach is a materialist he does not deal with history, and as far as he considers history he is not a materialist.

(Marx and Engels 1976: 41)

As an imperfect materialist Feuerbach consistently develops an imperfect concept of the nature of man and Marx draws our attention to this problem throughout the section on Feuerbach in the *German Ideology*, but most notably in the 6th thesis.

Feuerbach resolves the essence of religion into the essence of man. But the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.

Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism of this real essence, is hence obliged:

1) To abstract from the historical process and to define the religious sentiment (Gemut) by itself, and to presuppose an abstract — isolated — human individual.

2) Essence, therefore, can be regarded only as "species", as an inner, mute, general character which unites the many individuals in a natural way.

(Marx 1976c: 4)

It is evident that Marx's central critique in the 6th thesis rests on Feuerbach's incorrect apprehension of the human essence. The criticism involves two closely interrelated points. First, Marx
notes, as Sève argued, that Feuerbach mistakenly assumes that the human essence is empirically observable as an unchanging core in the isolated individual when, in fact, the human essence is verifiable and observable only in human activity and in historically active humans. Secondly, Feuerbach, in failing to understand this distinction between the actual historical manifestation of the human essence in the sensual world of historically active human beings and the merely abstracted non-historical manifestation observable in the individual per se, is forced, on the one hand, to deal abstractly with the sensuous world and, on the other hand, to seek the universality, necessarily associated with the existence of a universal human essence, in some merely "natural" attribute or characteristic common to all individuals. Marx realized, where Feuerbach did not, that all individuals are limited, definite, historically specific and, most notably, distorted receptacles for the human essence. The historical specificity of directly observable human nature — directly observable in the sense that it is observable in the abstract individual — has an obvious and logical effect on Feuerbach's non-historically specific psychology.

Feuerbach's "conception" of the sensuous world is confined on the one hand to mere contemplation of it, and on the other to mere feeling; he posits "man" instead of "real historical man". "Man" is really "the German".

(Marx and Engels 1976: 39)

Where Stirner developed a concept of man which ignored the historical specificity of human nature through the assumption of a speculative need (i.e., freedom as such — abstract freedom, the reality of bourgeois social relations), Feuerbach develops a concept
of man which ignores the historical specificity of human nature through
the acceptance of the bourgeois German as a model from which the human
essence can be extracted. This obvious error, along with the fail-
ure on Feuerbach's part to criticize the true foundation of the hu-
man essence — Feuerbach's failure to criticize social relations —
has some dire effects on Feuerbach's philosophical position.

He gives no criticism of the present conditions of life. Thus he never manages to conceive the sensuous world as
the total living sensuous activity of the individuals com-
posing it; therefore when, for example, he sees instead
of healthy men a crowd of scrofulous, overworked and con-
sumptive starvelings, he is compelled to take refuge in
the "higher perception" and in the ideal "compensation of
the species", and thus to relapse into idealism at the very
point where the communist materialist sees the necessity,
and at the same time the condition, of a transformation
both of industry and of the social structure.

(Marx and Engels 1976: 41)

The philosophy of materialism gives way to philosophical idealism pre-
cisely at that point where Feuerbach considers and develops his psy-
chology.

Marx's critique of the implicit psychology of the French and
English is remarkably similar to the critique he develops of Feuer-
bach. Indeed, the greatest difference appears to lie in the more
highly developed ideological nature of French and English psychology
and the correspondingly less developed critical nature of the theor-
ing. Thus, Holbach, who "...depicts the entire activity of indivi-
duals in their mutual intercourse, e.g., speech, love, etc., as a
relation of utility and utilisation", (Marx and Engels 1976: 409)
merely expresses a form of bourgeois ideology in psychological guise.

Hence Holbach's theory is the historically justified philo-
sophical illusion about the bourgeois just then developing
in France, whose thirst for exploitation could still be regarded as a thirst for the full development of individual conditions of intercourse freed from the old feudal fetters. (Marx and Engels 1976: 410)

The psychology of the early political economists, the "spokesmen" of bourgeois reality, was greatly influenced by the philosophical illusions of those "bourgeois philosophers" who directly preceded them. In the *Grundrisse*, Marx remarks of Smith and Ricardo:

Smith and Ricardo still stand with both feet on the shoulders of the eighteenth-century prophets, in whose imaginations this eighteenth-century individual — the product on one side of the dissolution of the feudal forms of society, on the other side of the new forces of production developed since the sixteenth century — appears as an ideal, whose existence they project into the past. Not as a historical result but as history's point of departure. (Marx 1973: 83)

Hence, in addition to the economic critique of Smith and Ricardo, Marx saw fit to enter upon a criticism of the ahistorical psychological assumptions implicit in their theorizing.

It is in political economy that we find the first large scale development of the "Robinsonade" as a tool for historical justification. The "individual" is treated as an eternal category rather than as an historical development. In political economy we find the development of privately interested — in effect, class interested — interpretations of history which seek to justify bourgeois social relations. The newly developed "bourgeois individual" becomes the inhabitant of this history. The pre-historic savage makes his appearance on the historical stage as the British shopkeeper in furs. The interests of the pre-historic savage correspond with the interests of the bourgeois individual. Where Feuerbach saw the German and used
this German as his model, the political economist found the English middle class retailer.

For all this criticism, and given the ideological foundation of political economy, Marx still does not accuse political economy of consistently and consciously perpetrating a hoax. On the contrary, the power of the political economist rests, in part, upon the "apparent" truth contained in political economic theory, and the failure of political economy to reach satisfactory conclusions rests on an inappropriate scientific method.

Man's reflections on the forms of social life, and consequently, also, his scientific analysis of those forms, takes a course directly opposite to that of their actual historical development. He begins, post festum, with the results of the process of development ready to hand before him.
(Marx 1977: 80)

All that remains for the political economist is to explain how these results occur. This he does by positing the results of history as "history's point of departure".

The political economist re-writes history on his own terms. Bourgeois individuality, bourgeois relations, bourgeois concerns, (i.e., the products of history) are transposed onto earlier historical forms. The principle of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are accepted as eternal principles, exerting their influence on social relations down through the ages and ultimately resulting in "modern European society".

For the most part Marx was critical of the approach of the political economists. Perhaps his most scathing criticism of a political economist proper, if we ignore Proudhon's efforts at "metaphy-
sical" political economy, were directed against Jeremy Bentham. Bentham, who usurped and brought to its conclusion the utilitarianism of Holbach and Helvetius, is perhaps the least economical and the most psychological of the nineteenth century political economists. It is Bentham who elevates the essence of the British shopkeeper to its ultimate level by assuming this shopkeeper as his model. Nonetheless, Marx still expresses some positive aspects of Bentham's utility theory, noting that "...Owen proceeded from Bentham's system to found English communism". (Marx and Engels 1975: 131) While this beginning may not appear to be all that prosperous in terms of the success of Owen's work, both theoretically and practically, — although Marx does stress some positive elements of Owen's attempts — it nevertheless implies a great advantage over the critical criticism of the Germans.

The criticism of the French and the English is not an abstract, preternatural personality outside mankind; it is the real human activity of individuals who are active members of society and who suffer, feel, think and act as human beings. That is why their criticism is at the same time practical, their communism a socialism in which they give practical, concrete measures, and in which they not only think but even more act, it is the living, real criticism of existing society, the recognition of the causes of "the decay". (Marx and Engels 1975: 153)

It is true that Bentham did not attempt this criticism, but, nonetheless, his theory of utility, as the foundation upon which English communism was erected, may have laid the necessary ground work for a criticism of this nature.

What may be Bentham's greatest contribution, in Marx's estimation, rests on his success in explicating the relationship between
economic and social relations and his investigations of the effects of these relationships on the individuals and presumably on the satisfaction of individual desires. Unfortunately, the theory of utility was also sadly lacking and could not, therefore, make the leap to a theory of socialism.

Remaining within the confines of bourgeois conditions, it could criticise only those relations which had been handed down from a past epoch and were an obstacle to the development of the bourgeoisie. Hence, although the utility theory does expound the connection of all existing relations with economic relations, it does so in a restricted sense.

(Marx and Engels 1976: 413)

Utility theory is restricted in the sense that the critique takes place strictly from the viewpoint of the bourgeois class. The theory of utility could not criticize those relations that were obstacles to the development of the proletariat in the form it had taken with Bentham. Does this imply that utility theory could have taken a more appropriate, less restricted form if it had developed a critique of those relations that were obstacles to the development of mankind in general or of the proletariat in particular?

The central issue in Marx's critique of the psychology of the Young Hegelians and of the political economists rests almost entirely on the lack of awareness of, or concern for, the historical transformation of human nature, combined with the ideological origin and function of the theories. The abstract and formal freedom of bourgeois social relations was posited by Stirner as an ideal need. Stirner thereby assumed that men wanted exactly what bourgeois social relations granted, formal freedom. Feuerbach limited his investiga-
tions of the human essence to its limited and individual manifesta-
tion and, in the process, was forced to posit an abstract human es­
sence. When confronted with the obvious contradiction implicit in
the "scrofulous mass", he found nothing to criticize since social
relations had been left out of his formulation. Bentham, on the
other hand, was the first to actually empirically investigate the re­
relationship between active individuals and the reality of their social
conditions. It is this bourgeois perspective which limits Bentham's
utility theory.

The economic content gradually turned the utility theory
into a mere apologia for the existing state of affairs,
an attempt to prove that under existing conditions the
mental relations of people today are the most advantageous
and generally useful.
(Marx and Engels 1976: 413)

Utility theory, initially capable of reaching into the empir­
ical heart of the matter and of criticizing social relations, lost
its critical content precisely because it was too intimately linked
to bourgeois economics and, as a result, to bourgeois ideology.

Conclusions

The chapter has dealt with some fairly broad issues and has
thereby indicated some very serious matters for discussion. We have
determined that Louis Althusser's thesis is not only improperly de­
veloped but that it is academically destructive in its insistence
on a careful editing of Marx's works in order to expunge the Hegel­
ian influences. Moreover, we have also indicated that, not only did
Marx include a social psychological content in his theories, but that
Marx actually called for what might be called social psychological investigations in historical analyses.

Unfortunately, we also discovered that many traditional attempts at a Marxist social psychology were ultimately damaging to Marx and to Marxism in that they consistently replaced or refurbished the social psychological content of Marx's theoretical position with what I would argue is an inferior or non-corresponding social psychology. Indeed, a close analysis might suggest that Marx's own critiques of the psychology of German idealism, Feuerbach, and the political economists, might best be re-directed against traditional Marxist social psychology. Interestingly enough, Thompson argues that it is entirely possible to hurl Marx's critique of Proudhon at Althusser. (Thompson 1978: 122)

On Marx's critique we have but this to say: Marx has indicated errors in the study of the "human essence" that we must assume he did not make in his own social psychology. As such, it would seem safe to suggest that Marx's social psychology is not entirely antithetical to the development of a psychology of needs; that Marx's social psychology must develop a critical content, especially with respect to social relations; and that when developing this critical content careful consideration must ensure that the critique does not fall into the trap of expressing a limited, ideological foundation. The violation of any of these tenets, would most likely lead to a decidedly non-Marxist social psychology.

It now remains for us to take up the first of these tenets, the development of a theory of need, prior to our attempt to textually
indicate his implicit and explicit social psychology.
CHAPTER TWO

A Theory of Need

Agnes Heller has correctly emphasized in her book, The Theory of Need in Marx, the centrality of a system of needs in Marx's work. (Heller 1976: 25) Indeed, she identifies the "economic" importance of a theory of need by pointing out that use value "...is defined entirely in terms of needs". (Heller 1976: 23) Unfortunately, she also attempts a categorization of needs which would seem to indicate an implicit frustration-aggression theory of social dynamics, while never actually making explicit references to either frustration or aggression. A brief elucidation of her concept of radical needs should indicate this problem.

Heller develops the concept of radical needs in relation to the "ought" which is communism. Radical needs are by definition the "...needs which embody this Ought and which, by their very nature tend to transcend capitalism — and precisely in the direction of communism". (Heller 1976: 74) Thus, for Heller, radical needs are the obvious source of revolutionary ferment.

Moreover there is no question here (nor in any other passages where this conception of the antinomy is under discussion) of any "natural law" that leads society into the future. The necessity of the "transition" is not in fact "guaranteed" by any natural law but by the radical needs. (Heller 1976: 84)

Radical needs both guarantee revolutionary activity and determine the content of the consequential transition to communism.
This is not, however, because the radical needs are intrinsically revolu-

tutionary (i.e., they consist of a need to overcome or to revolt

against given social relations); rather, needs are radical because

only revolutionary activity can develop that social formation which

is capable of satisfying these needs. In this sense radical needs

have an instrumental quality; they demand or motivate action designed
to satisfy them. On the other hand, these radical needs are the pro-

ducts of the very society that would deny their satisfaction.

According to Marx, radical needs are inherent aspects of

the capitalist structure of need: without them, as we have

said, capitalism cannot function, so it creates them afresh
every day. "Radical needs" cannot be "eliminated" from
capitalism because they are necessary to its functioning.
They are not the "embryos" of the future formation, but
"members" of the capitalist formation: it is not the
Being of radical needs that transforms capitalism but their
satisfaction.
(Heller 1976: 76)

The desire to satisfy radical needs, needs called forth by
the social formation capitalism and experienced primarily by the work-
ing class as non-satisfiable needs, results in the reformation of soc-
ial conditions at the hands of this working class. The formula for
frustration-aggression is, we would argue, central to the concept of
radical need. Needs develop and the individuals experiencing these
needs seek to satisfy them. These needs, however, are non-satisfiable
in the sense that the social relations of capitalism actively mini-
tate against their satisfaction. The certain result is frustration;
in this case a frustration experienced by the working class as a whole.

Since "...the need itself mobilizes the working class into
transcending capitalism" (Heller 1976: 91) and, since the frustra-
tion of needs is part of the definition of radical needs, it seems safe to suggest that the impetus to aggressively oppose capitalism is mediated by the frustration of needs. In short, the existence of radical needs implies that the formula: aggressive revolutionary activity is a function of needs, should be re-written to include mediating frustration, so that, aggressive revolutionary activity is a function of the frustration of needs.

Certain aspects of Heller's concept of radical needs should prove useful to a more explicit rendition of the theory of frustration-aggression and it is for this reason that I reserve judgement on the concept at this time. However, Heller may still have fallen into the trap of letting her categorization of needs reflect her implicit concept of frustration leading to revolutionary aggression rather than allowing the categorization dictated by Marx to come through. Marx introduces the concept of radical needs in his introduction to the critique of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*. However, at no point does Marx designate specific needs as radical needs. As such, it is evident that Heller "explores" a concept in search of some concrete content. Indeed, one might suspect, with cause, that Heller's identification of radical needs respresents the collapsing of several concrete needs, occupying several distinct categories in Marx's theory of need, into a single convenient package. The need for free time and the need for universality are not relegated to a single distinct category labelled radical needs by Marx.

Heller identifies the need for free time as a radical need. In *Capital III*, Marx suggests that the true realm of freedom, freedom
beyond the realm of necessity that is implicit in associated production, has the shortening of the working day as a basic prerequisite. (Marx 1977b: 820) On the other hand, Marx also implies that the need for free time is directly related to both physical and moral concerns.

During part of the day this force must rest, sleep; during another part the man has to satisfy other physical needs, to feed, wash, and clothe himself. Beside these purely physical limitations, the extension of the working-day encounters moral ones. The labourer needs time for satisfying his intellectual and social wants, the extent and number of which are conditioned by the general state of social advancement. (Marx 1977: 223)

Since the radical nature of the need for free time has, in Marx's estimation, both a physical and a moral content, we are now faced with the task of determining which of these contents cannot be satisfied given the conditioning limits of capitalism.

The physical content can easily be expressed as the minimum level necessary for the subsistence of the worker and for the survival of the working class. The worker requires "X" number of hours free from labour in order that he might reproduce himself as labour power and, at the same time, reproduce the class of labourers. As such, the physical content of the radical need for free time would appear to find a corresponding and supporting need within the capitalist system itself. To the extent that the physical content of the need for free time replaces labour-power and reproduces the working class it acts in accordance with the demands of capitalism. It would seem safe to suggest, therefore, that the physical content of the need for free time is, over the long run, satisfiable, and, as a con-
sequence, non-radical.

This leaves us arguing that it is the moral content of the need for free time that acts as the repository for the radical nature of the need for free time. Thus, in that the radical nature of the need for free time becomes a moral concept it also necessarily takes on a social aspect. To the extent that the worker's intellectual and social wants are socially determined, the need for free time is also socially determined. In effect, free time is necessary only in order to satisfy other needs and the need for free time is experienced as a product of the development of these other needs. As such, the need for free time is not experienced as an end in itself but as a means to the satisfaction of other needs.

This would seem to suggest that the radical nature of the need for free time is therefore a product of other no less radical needs, since, of course, the need for free time — as a moral concept — is itself the product of these needs. However, this need not necessarily be the case, for while free time is necessary in order to satisfy intellectual and social wants, it is also necessary, according to Capital III, to facilitate the transition from socialized labour to truly free labour (i.e., labour that is not constrained by necessity). Thus, the radical nature of the need for free time may come from its connection with truly free labour.

The worker's intellectual and social needs can only be satisfied given the satisfaction of the need for free time, just as the worker's subsistence needs can only be satisfied given a living wage. Wages, however, also have a social component in that at least part
of the worker's need for increased wages is the result of an increase in social and intellectual wants. (Marx 1973: 286) In this respect the need for wages and the need for free time are remarkably similar in content. As such, and given the tendency of capitalism to directly limit the expansion of wages, it would appear possible to argue that the struggle for wages is also a struggle for a radical need. However, this is clearly not the case. The struggle for wages does not facilitate the transition from socialized labour to truly free labour. In effect, the struggle for wages cannot directly result in the transformation from capitalism to communism, nor can it be considered a truly liberative struggle in the sense that it will result in the development of truly free activity. Thus, it is the connection between the need for free time and the creation of truly free activity that makes the need for free time a radical need and, to the extent that truly free activity implies more than mere free time, the need for free time is necessarily only a part of a wider system of radical wants.

The need for universality — variously defined as the "all-round development of individuals", "the integral development of individuals", or "the fully developed individual" — is perhaps much more of a radical need than is the need for free time. As such, this need for universality, an unintended consequence of the nature of labour in the industrial workshop, may indeed suggest a revolutionary content.

Marx has suggested that the relations of factory production might succeed in developing workers who are difficult to handle due to their relative independence. (Marx 1977: 520) Thus, Heller may
have isolated what we could call a radical need in this instance. However, this need for universality may also find its roots in what we might best call human nature in general. We shall look into this more closely in the third chapter. Suffice it to say at this point that the need for diverse activity, a need common to animals and men, may rest at the foundation of the need for universality. If this is true, then the need for universality is not created afresh every day in the sense that Heller intends, but is an historically specific manifestation of a much more basic need for diversity.

It would appear from the above that Heller's assumptions have led to a categorization of needs which is distinct from Marx's own categorization and, consequently, to a categorization of needs which subsequently affirms her assumptions. Not only is the need for free time a need that is determined by the development of other non-radical needs (i.e., intellectual and social wants) as well as by physical limitations (e.g., time to eat, sleep, etc.), but the need for universality is not necessarily independent of non-capitalist need structures. In effect, the need for free time and the need for universality are not entirely creations of capitalism and can be experienced by men who do not inhabit capitalist social relations - although granted in a different, historically specific, way.

Nonetheless, a theory of need is a necessary adjunct to any theory of frustration-aggression. Frustration logically implies that some desire or need be denied. There should, therefore, be some form of conceptual breakdown of needs that would permit the reader to judge the theory with respect to its explanatory powers. In effect, it would
appear necessary to indicate, as Heller did, those needs which might be considered important (because they are necessarily frustrated by given social conditions) and those needs which might be considered unimportant (because they are largely satisfiable given the existing social conditions). That the theory of needs exists, however, does not by any means "prove" or even require a frustration-aggression explanation. If this were true our task would be greatly simplified. In order, therefore, to avoid the pitfalls of drawing too much from our subject prematurely, we shall proceed with an investigation of Marx's theory of need abstracted from any explicit contact with our greater purpose. In short, we shall resist the temptation, at this point, to hypothesize about the importance of specific needs to a theory of frustration-aggression and attempt a categorization of needs without reference to frustrated needs.

Marx's Categorization of Needs

It is always difficult to decide where one must begin when attempting to investigate a difficult and involved concept. The theory of need is precisely this, difficult and involving. This is in part due to the fact that on top of the basic needs of the organism Marx posits a system of historically specific and socially created needs that may include both imaginary and necessary components. As such, the problem of categorization would appear to be central to any understanding of Marx's own theory of need. Unfortunately, throughout his most productive years Marx persistently ignored the develop-
ment of a single categorization of needs in his work and, indeed, it is not until the *Grundrisse* that we find Marx asserting the necessity of developing a proper system of needs. (Marx 1973: 528)

Because Marx never managed to systematize his theory of need we must be careful in our own attempts to bring order to his categorization. We will therefore attempt to develop or categorize Marx's system of needs under three sub-headings. The first section will deal with consumer necessity, a very broad system of needs encompassing physiologically and habitually necessary needs. The second section will briefly deal with the concept of human needs, without postulating about the origin of these needs. The final section will attempt to deal with those needs that Marx either leaves unattached or else attaches to some concept of pre-social "animal" essence. As to where to begin, we had thought that it would be possible to begin with Marx's categorizations but soon discovered that there was a basic problem with the entire terminology of the theory of need.

Anyone who has read a moderate amount of Marx will note that there is a great deal of disparity between the texts pertaining to the use of the terms need and want. Indeed, Bedürfnis, which is typically the German term which is translated variously as need or want, can legitimately be translated as either term. In English, however, the two terms are not entirely synonymous. The term want usually implies a much more subjective content than does the term need. In effect, while men may want what is not necessary they usually, by definition, need that which is necessary. Because of this implicit difference between the two English terms for Bedürfnis reading Marx
on the theory of need is often confusing. In order to at least par-
tially correct this problem we will attempt to differentiate between
the terms need and want and to carry over the differentiation through-
out the remainder of this work.

In A Treatise of Social Labour, Lawrence Krader argues that:

Needs are the direct, material source of the wants in the
relation of nature; they are wants which are of necessity
natural and are socialized by the human kind.
(Krader 1979: 68)

As such, Krader suggests that needs are the foundation of wants and
that "(b)y their socialization, the wants cease to be one with needs".
(Krader 1979: 68) With the development of human society needs become
transformed into wants. The need to eat, an abstraction in the sense
that the activity "eating" does not define a content (i.e., that which
is to be eaten and the manner whereby it is consumed), becomes the want
to eat rice with a fork. Needs are given a social content and there­
by become wants. Thus, given this definition, needs become, in a
sense, the "pre-social" or "animal" — certainly "natural" — founda-
tion which can subsequently act as a limitation on the social expres­
sion of desires. Wants, on the other hand, are defined as the his­
torically specific manifestation of needs, "the socialized matter of
nature" (Krader 1979: 68), which in the process of this transform­
ation becomes "...the stuff of human society". (Krader 1979: 68)

For all intents and purposes this is the definition that we
will attempt to apply to Marx's theory of need. Needs will become
the foundation upon which a superstructure of wants is deposited.
Wants will be the historically specific and concrete apparitions of
need. While our text will demonstrate this differentiation the quotations from Marx will not. We can but hope that the reader will be able to ascertain the correct term through reference to the subsequent discussion of the citations from Marx.

Consumer Necessity

But life involves before everything else eating and drinking, housing, clothing and various other things.
(Marx and Engels 1976: 41)

The foundation of Marx's theory of need is the concept of survival itself. The first needs, needs not yet endowed with a social content and therefore needs shared by man and beast, are those needs basic to the survival and the maintenance of the biological subject. These needs are natural in that they are imposed by the organic requirements of the human body. The need to consume, to replenish that part of the bodily components depleted in activity, is nature imposed in the sense that the body is a product of nature. The need for protection from the environment, the need for shelter and clothing (clothing would apparently be unique to the human subject), is natural in the sense that it too is imposed by the requirements of the natural body in conjunction with the rigour of the natural environment. The "naturalness" of needs is therefore premised on the naturalness of the environment as well as the naturalness of the organic body. However, while these basic needs may share in common their naturalness, in their concrete manifestations they demonstrate a diversity produced by the very naturalness that is their common link. The satisfaction of the carnivore differs from the satisfaction of the her-
bivore. The shelter of the inhabitant of the south seas differs from the shelter of an inhabitant of the arctic regions.

While the satisfaction of these needs unites all the species in a common bond of productive activity, Marx realizes, of course, that the nature of productive activity differs markedly from animal to man, arguing that animals produce "...only under the domination of immediate physical need, whilst man produces even when he is free from physical need and only truely produces in freedom therefrom". (Marx 1977c: 74) Nonetheless, even though the productive activity of man differs from the productive activity of the animals, the satisfaction of these basic needs and the resulting "necessary" productive activity is historically general within the human species.

Just as the savage must wrestle with Nature to satisfy his wants, to maintain and reproduce life, so must civilized man, and he must do so in all social formations and under all possible modes of production. (Marx 1977b: 820)

At all points on the historical continuum man must expend a certain amount of productive energy in order to satisfy his needs.

While needs may vary according to climate, or other physical conditions, they exist as the universal basis for human productive activity (i.e., the temperate climates may allow for the satisfaction of need premised on simple agricultural techniques while the more hostile climates would indicate some form of nomadic existence), the nature of productive activity, as we shall observe more closely in our third chapter, implies that the variance of needs premised on natural conditions develops into a variance of wants premised on the historical and social transformation of needs. In effect, the satis-
faction of needs develops into an historical and evolutionary process; which is in itself a distinction to be made between the satisfaction of human needs and wants and the satisfaction of the needs of animals. (Marx and Engels 1976: 82) The results of historical processes are the various and, in some cases, geographically distinct, stages of social development and varying national and cultural systems of wants.

On the other hand, the number and extent of his so-called necessary wants, as also the modes of satisfying them, are themselves the product of historical development, and depend therefore to a great extent on the degree of civilisation of a country, more particularly on the conditions under which, and consequently on the habits and degree of comfort in which, the class of free labourers has been formed. (Marx 1977: 168)

As such, it might appear that Marx would argue, and indeed he does argue (Marx 1973: 294), that these basic wants are capable of certain degrees of expansion and contraction primarily because habit is only a subjective limitation on desire. Luxury may, over relatively short periods of time, become necessity, given habitual comfort as a distinguishing factor. Over longer time periods, however, wants are capable of extensive changes in both form and substance, premised on both subjective and objective limits. It is possible to find new means of satisfaction as well as new wants — both imaginary and real — developing in some form of rough correspondence with social and production relations. That classic passage from the Grundrisse about the means to satisfy hunger (Marx 1973: 92) is often cited as evidence of Marx's knowledge of the historical transformation of the means of satisfaction.

The development of new wants, however, is at least partially
traceable to the general nature of man. Marx argues that "(t)he need which consumption feels for the object is created by the perception of it". (Marx 1973: 92) As such, the greater the diversity of objects, the greater the diversity of wants. The individual desires those things which the production process is capable of presenting to his senses. The real limitation on the creation of desires is therefore an objective limitation associated with the inability of the production process to present new objects to the senses. Of course, we would admit that there is also the objective limitation associated with the foundational needs that we discussed earlier. One would also seriously doubt that should the production process present to the individual's senses a glove with an over abundance of fingers that this individual would experience a desire for this object. The objects produced by the production process must still contain use-value if they are to create a desire in the consumer.

The production process, up to and at least partially including the feudal period, would satisfy and produce few wants. This is primarily the result of the relationship between production and demand. Typically, in pre-capitalist social formations, effective demand preceded production. The craftsman produced those objects that he had been commissioned to produce. The process whereby new wants were created was necessarily slow at this stage. New wants developed only through the gradual expansion of association.

In the place of old wants, satisfied by the production of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. (Marx and Engels 1976a: 488)
With a gradual increase in trade and with a gradual increase in wants as a result of this trade, a strain was placed on the system of barter that predominated pre-capitalist social and economic formations. Marx makes it clear that the strains on barter as a means of exchange directly results in the adoption of money as a form of value.

As long as mutual needs are supplied by barter, there is not the least occasion for money. This is the simplest combination. When needs have multiplied, bartering becomes more difficult: upon this, money is introduced. (Marx 1973: 859)

This introduction of money and all that money implies is perhaps the greatest impetus to the massive creation of wants. With money the usefulness which earlier permeated relations is replaced with a concern, not for the useful character — although usefulness still plays a major role in production — but for exchangeability. The object produced becomes a commodity, while the act of production itself takes on the aspects typical of commodity production. The individual exchanges use-value, be it in the form of his product or of his labour power, for the universal equivalent in the form of money. The result is a massive increase in the objects of desire premised largely on the availability of these objects.

Since he exchanges his use value for the general form of wealth, he becomes co-participant in general wealth up to the limits of his equivalent — a quantitative limit which, of course, turns into a qualitative one, as in every exchange. But he is neither bound to particular objects, nor to a particular manner of satisfaction. The sphere of his consumption is not qualitatively restricted, only quantitative. (Marx 1973: 283)

The individual possesses a certain quantity of the general
wealth by virtue of the possession of its equivalent in money. As such, he finds himself capable of experiencing, and ideally capable of satisfying, the entire expanse of desires embodied in the objects of general wealth. His only limitations rest in the quantity, not the quality, of his share of this general wealth. Where previously there were juridical limitations on the quality of his consumption (i.e., the peasant could generally only satisfy wants associated with his "peasantness"), there now remained only "personal" limitations. To the extent that the individual is deemed to be personally responsible for his financial situation he is also held personally responsible for limitation placed on the satisfaction of his desires.

In all cases the individual is presented with an obvious dilemma where the money form of value expresses itself. While he has in his possession the non-restricting universal equivalent, he also has it only in limited amounts. In the presence of a veritable wealth of desires the individual must make the decision to limit his satisfaction to only a few of these desires — in Marx's day the worker could only choose to satisfy his physiological desires in most cases — and while he may experience a relatively diverse satisfaction, he also experiences a relatively greater degree of dissatisfaction. His satisfaction is limited by his purse; his desires, on the other hand, are unlimited in any real sense of the word. If the individual perceives an object, particularly where the object is already satisfying the wants of someone else, the individual will experience desire for that object. In effect, Marx suggested that social comparison may have contributed to the expansion of wants and conversely, that
social comparison may have exerted an effective subjective limitation on desires (i.e., the individual only desired what others were already satisfied with). (Marx 1977d: 216)

Up until now we have been focusing our attention on the expansion of the experience of wants. In effect, we have merely witnessed wants which were previously felt by specific class individuals or by specific nationalities become universal wants. This expansion of the subjective basis of wants is further magnified, Marx suggests, by the existence of production relations premised on the private ownership of the means of production. The existence of money and the corresponding desire to expand personal wealth in the form of accumulated capital, results in an increase in the production of uniquely different consumable objects.

Subjectively, this appears partly in the fact that the extension of products and needs becomes a contriving and evercalculating subservience to inhuman, sophisticated, un-natural and imaginary appetites. Private property does not know how to change crude need into human need. (Marx 1977a: 109)

Production, no longer premised on the satisfaction of already existing wants but on the creation of exchange value, implies that there develops an ever increasing diversity of objects of consumption. The basic subsistence wants are further supplemented by social wants "...the extent and number of which are conditioned by the general state of social advancement". (Marx 1977: 223) The process of production attempts to define use-value on its own behalf in the creation of imaginary appetites. The necessity of reducing the costs of production — the necessity of producing on a mass scale — causes supply
to anticipate demand. The necessities of life become necessities in a dual sense: they are necessary in a subjective sense since they are demanded by the consumer; they are necessary in an objective sense since production requires the consumption of these products in order to maintain itself and is premised on the continuing demand for these necessities.

What began as basic needs evolves into a system of wants and ultimately into, what Marx calls in *Capital II*, consumer necessity.

Articles of consumption, which enter into the consumption of the working-class, and, to the extent that they are necessities of life — even if frequently different in quality and value from those of the labourers — also form a portion of the consumption of the capitalist class. For our purposes we may call this entire sub-division consumer necessities, regardless of whether such a product as tobacco is really a consumer necessity from the physiological point of view. It suffices that it is habitually such. (Marx 1977a: 407)

Needs are experienced as historically specific wants. Marx has also stipulated that these wants are class specific (the above passage certainly indicates this, while a similar passage on page 414 of the *Grundrisse* is perhaps slightly more explicit). Consumer necessities of the capitalist class would constitute luxury for the working class. However, Marx also implies that worker demand does not limit itself to the consumer necessities typical of the working class but extends itself beyond class boundaries. This is perhaps the substance of that passage in *Wage Labour and Capital* where Marx discusses the size of the dwelling.

A house may be large or small; as long as the surrounding houses are equally small it satisfies all social demands for a dwelling. But let a palace arise beside the little house, and it shrinks from a little house to a hut. The
lilte house shows now that its owner has only very slight or no demands to make; and however high it may shoot up in the course of civilisation, if the neighbouring palace grows to an equal or even greater extent, the occupant of the relatively small house will feel more and more uncomfortable, disatisfied and cramped within its four walls. (Marx 1977d: 216)

The implications are obvious. The worker, effectively cut off from the less coarse and more numerous consumer necessities of the capitalist class, nonetheless experiences the desire for those objects which comprise the system of wants for the capitalist class. Unable to satisfy these desires the worker will experience dissatisfaction and discomfort; he will feel relatively deprived as against absolutely deprived. The apparent leisure of the capitalist class develops into a desire for leisure in the working class; the "richness" of the articles of consumption enjoyed by the capitalist class develops into a desire for more consumables in the working class. The attempt to relieve these sources of dissatisfaction may result in intensified labour, partially as a result of the increase in wages and due to the "appearance" afforded by the nature of wages. This appears to be what is implied by Marx throughout the Grundrisse, where he remarks on the "mania for wealth" that results in an intensification of labour. (Marx 1973: 224, 289)

The illusion that all desire may be satisfied, derived from the possession of money which does not restrict satisfaction qualitatively, causes the worker to believe that intensified labour will allow for an increased share of the general wealth. This increased share, he believes, may be utilized in order to satisfy wants for luxury items or it may allow him to periodically reduce his labour
time. As Marx points out, however, this belief is entirely false since all commodities, labour power included, are exchanged over the long run for their cost of production. (Marx 1977: 167) The illusion persists primarily because it is possible in the individual case to increase one's share of the social wealth even though over the class as a whole the attempt is futile. Thus, the worker, as an average member of his class, must experience wants that are seldom if ever satisfiable and which instil in him the desire to increase his industriousness.

When Marx speaks of consumer necessities it is obvious that he refers to a body of wants which forms a necessary requisite for the production process typical of capitalist relations of production. While specific wants are compelled by production, consumer necessities, as a system of wants, lay the foundation for any productive activity. The capitalist must anticipate consumption if he is to continue to produce and if his process of production is to continue undisturbed this consumption must be realized. Marx also argued that the satisfaction of these wants was historically specific since, of course, the creation of wants is an historically specific phenomenon. At the same time, the satisfaction of wants implicit in the concept of consumer necessity was class specific since the workers were capable, owing to the nature of wage labour, of actually satisfying only a certain minimum quantity and quality of wants. This class specificity need not, however, extend itself into the realm of desire. As such, the satisfaction of desires did not correspond with the experience of desires, and the social satisfaction experienced by mem-
bers of the working class fell immeasurably below the social satisfaction experienced by the capitalist class. (Marx 1977d: 216)

More importantly, however, the expansion of these wants has both a subjective and objective root. Subjectively wants expand because individuals have the capacity to experience desire for those objects which present themselves as consumables, while objectively wants expand because capitalist forces of production compel demand: by increasing production of various diverse consumables, by liberating desire from any qualitative limitation, and by modifying the means by which basic physiological needs (e.g., the need to eat) are satisfied. One can easily see that the desire to eat cooked meat rather than raw flesh would lead to the necessary creation of previously superfluous instruments for cooking and eating.

The entire system of expanding wants, from its earliest inception in basic needs, to later manifestations as consumer necessities, would suggest a gradual and general improvement — although punctuated by various contractions — in the social conditions of existence.

Human Wants

A great deal of Marx's pronouncements on human wants comes from early passages in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and are, for this reason, considered suspect by many Marxists of a non-humanistic bent. Note that even Agnes Heller prefers to collapse human wants into her category of radical needs. Irregard-
less, it would seem safe to suggest, as a preliminary hypothesis in-formed by the pronouncements on human wants in the *Grundrisse*, that human "needs" were Marx's foundation for any development of a social system founded on the realization of communist social and production relations.

Marx makes the point in the Paris manuscripts that the observation of the relationship between man and woman reveals the extent to which human wants have supplanted other basic desires, especially with respect to social interaction. As Marx argues:

This relationship also reveals the extent to which man's need has become a human need; the extent to which, therefore, the other person as a person has become for him a need — the extent to which he in his individual existence is at the same time a social being. (Marx 1977c: 96)

Marx implies that man's character as a social being, in this case as an individualized social being, is coincidental with the development of human wants. The extent to which other human beings become necessary to the individual is reflective of the extent to which this individual existence has become social existence. Marx does not, at this point, indicate the material pre-conditions for these developments. This he accomplishes in the *Grundrisse*, in a passage that dramatically reflects an Hegelian influence and appears to derive its content largely from the section on Civil Society in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*. (Hegel 1976: pp. 123-127; see especially: paragraphs 183, 185-187, 192)

The fact that this need on the part of one can be satisfied by the product of the other, and vice versa, and that the one is capable of producing the object of the need of the other, and that each confronts the other as owner
of the object of the other's need, this proves that each of them reaches beyond his own particular need etc., as a human being, and that they relate to one another as human beings;...
(Marx 1973: 243)

In the passage Marx is speaking of the conditions of commodity production and exchange where individuals confront one another as the owners of their respective products. As such, it would appear that the material pre-conditions for the development of human wants are the conditions of commodity production and exchange typical of capitalism. Production takes on the appearance of being production for another and the satisfaction of individual wants is premised on the ability of each individual to satisfy the wants of other men. Unfortunately, as both Hegel and Marx realized, the reality of the production and exchange relations — its social character as production for another — is not altruistic. The satisfaction of the wants of the other person is treated as a means, not as an end. The human want for the other person is not a desire for the other person as a person. Rather, the desire for the other person is a desire for a consumer who will exchange for the commodity that you offer. Thus, these material pre-conditions for the development of human wants and desires are only pre-conditions and they cannot develop beyond association premised on a means-end relationship.

In this vein, both Hegel and Marx would appear to suggest that capitalism, as capitalist civil society, offers only the "promise" of humane development and is entirely incapable of realizing this promise. For Hegel the state must rise out of civil society, for Marx the necessary response is worker revolutionary activity lead-
ing to communism.

That civil society is merely a pre-condition would suggest that the worker, in Marx's estimation, must at the very least come to realize more clearly the possibility of further social development. Indeed, this is the case, as we shall see somewhat later in this work when we deal with ideology, class consciousness, and communist consciousness. Returning, however, to the concept of human wants and to the Paris manuscripts, we find Marx suggesting that:

Poverty is the passive bond which causes the human being to experience the need for the greatest wealth — the other human being.
(Marx 1977c: 106)

We can only postulate as to how poverty, as a passive bond, causes the worker to experience a desire for the other person as a person. The answer may have something to do with the inability of the worker to seek commodity exchange relations with his fellow workers. In effect, since the worker has nothing to exchange but his labour power, and since he can exchange his labour power for the means of subsistence only with the capitalist, the relations between the workers are non-exchanging relationships. In effect, the worker cannot experience the want of the other person as a consumer because he has nothing to exchange with this other person. Thus, the desire for the other person as a consumer cannot get in the way of the development of a desire for the other person as a person.

Could it be that Marx is suggesting that exchange relations act as barriers to the development of human wants? This may indeed be the case, for Marx also suggests that communist artisans can experi-
ence the desire for the other person as a human want.

When the communist artisans associate with one another, theory, propaganda, etc., is their first end. But at the same time, as a result of this association, they acquire a new need — the need for society and what appears as a means becomes an end.

(Marx 1977c: 117)

What distinguishes communist artisans from their non-communist counterparts? We would argue that the major difference lies in the form of their respective associations. The communist artisans associate in order to discuss political and theoretical concerns; the non-communist artisans associate in order to exchange the fruits of their labour. In effect, the non-communist artisans treat each other as consumers while the communist artisans interact as human beings.

The existence of human wants or desires (i.e., the desire for the other person as a person and the desire for society) would appear to be both a prerequisite and a product of communism. Workers experience the desire for the other person because they experience poverty. In their poverty their mutual relations are denied any content premised on commodity exchange. At the same time their association would more than likely take on a political content. In effect, workers would discuss their poverty and develop theoretical solutions to their problems. Communist artisans, on the other hand, choose to engage in what is primarily a non-exchanging relationship with their fellow communist artisans of their own accord. As a result they experience the desire for society. But is this the fullest possible explanation for the development of the human desire for other people? Is this want purely a product of historical development?
We think not, for Marx suggests, also in the Paris manuscripts, that the want or desire for other people may have a "natural" foundation. We will suggest that there is a need at the root of the development of the desire for the other person as a human want.

Pre-existent Needs

Although the promise was made to remain within the categorization suggested by Marx it is necessary at this point to investigate certain needs which Marx apparently left uncategorized and which would apparently satisfy our differentiation between needs and wants. In most cases these needs are spoken of in terms that would intimately link them to man's "animal nature", although to call them animal needs would undoubtably be a confusing misnomer.

While these needs have the appearance of being animal needs Marx certainly does not mean that all of these needs are shared in common with the other species; some of these needs are "animal" only in the sense that they are present prior to the development of human society. In effect, they are foundational needs, needs upon which the historical process may deposit material sediment which allows Marx to successfully subsume these needs into the earlier mentioned categorizations of wants. Typical of the needs shared with the other species are the physiological needs that develop into a large portion of consumer necessity. However, Marx also suggests that several other needs, needs not necessarily associated with physical survival, may occupy this category of pre-existent needs.
In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Marx suggests that there is some form of naturalistic foundation to the need for other people.

The savage and the animal have at least the need to hunt, to roam, etc. — the need of companionship.

(Marx 1977c: 111)

The need to hunt, the need to roam, could conceivably be needs specific to survival. The need for companionship, on the other hand, certainly might not imply any connection with survivability; although if Marx had used the term cooperation this could certainly be the case. As such, one might argue that the pre-existent need for companionship, shared by man and beast alike, may form the foundation upon which the "human want" for society develops. If this is the case — and it must be admitted that Marx does not explicitly make this connection — then it might follow that relations of commodity exchange prevent this need from developing in a human direction.

In the Grundrisse, Marx draws the reader's attention to Adam Smith's views on the relationship between the worker and his labour. Smith suggests that all labour is perceived by the worker as a sacrifice and, as a consequence, all wages were to be regarded as a reward for sacrifice. Marx rebukes Smith for this simplistic notion, for, although the historic forms of "...slave-labour, serf-labour, and wage-labour, always appear as repulsive" (Marx 1973: 611), the general form of labour is in itself potentially satisfying.

It seems quite far from Smith's mind that the individual, "in his normal state of health, strength, activity, skill, facility", also needs a normal portion of work, and of the suspension of tranquility.

(Marx 1973: 611)
Thus, Marx argues that labour has the potential of being satisfying in itself; satisfying in the sense of suspending tranquility and, moreover, that the individual has the need for this type of activity. Marx does not, however, clarify the nature of this "need".

We cannot be sure, from the Grundrisse, whether the "need" for diverse activity is a naturally or historically present need or want. Nonetheless, Marx apparently hints at a natural origin in his reference to slave and serf labour (i.e., since Smith makes the attempt to pass off historically specific remarks as historically general conditions, Marx's critical notations must be references to the historically general, therefore, specific to the general nature of man).

Coupled with our earlier observation that productive activity occurs across the species — although only men produce without external compulsion (see also: Marx 1977: 174) — this would suggest that the need for productive activity is the foundation for the development of a want for productive activity. As such, the need for activity would appear to lay the foundation in conjunction with an equally fundamental and pre-existent need — the need for self-realization and the need for real freedom — for labour that distinguishes men from animals.

Certainly, labour obtains its measure from outside, through the aim to be attained and the obstacle to be overcome in attaining it. But Smith has no inkling whatever that this overcoming of obstacles is in itself liberating activity — and that further, the external aims become stripped of the semblance of merely external natural agencies, and become posited as aims which the individual himself posits — hence as self-realization, objectification of the subject, hence real freedom, whose action is, precisely labour. (Marx 1973: 611)
Labour as self-realization, fundamental to human nature in general, is that which distinguishes men from animals. In addition to the external compulsion to labour there is an internal compulsion manifested as the need for self-realization, hence as the need for real freedom. Thus, the need for self-realization and the need for real freedom act as foundational needs upon which an entire superstructure of historically specific desires and wants can be deposited.

Conclusions

We have seen that Marx held an extremely complex theory of need. We were also capable of dividing needs and wants into three basic categories; consumer necessity, human wants, and pre-existent needs. However, pre-existent needs, only a part of which comprises the basic elements of consumer necessity, operate in several instances as the foundation upon which historical modification can construct a unique edifice. The need for companionship, a need experienced by both man and beast, becomes the human desire for the other person as a person. The need for self-realization, the need for real freedom—in effect, the need for free labour—becomes the foundation for what Heller calls the radical need for universality. That the pre-existent needs should occupy such a central role in Marx's theory of need will seem heretical to many. To allay their fears, as well as to indicate that Marx's own thoughts had developed in this direction, let us conclude this chapter with a brief quotation from Marx.

...some of these desires—namely desires which exist under all relations, and only change their form under dif-
ferent social relations — are merely altered by the communist system, for they are given the opportunity to develop normally; but others — namely those originating solely in society, under particular conditions of production and intercourse — are totally deprived of their conditions of existence.

(Marx and Engels 1976: 256)
CHAPTER THREE

The Social Psychology in Marx

Marx has called man a social animal.7 What we must realize is that this simple assertion does not make for social psychology. This can only be accomplished through reference to a more concrete definition of the content of social psychology. To simply argue that man is reflective of social relations may prove invaluable to the concept of social psychology, but it reveals little about actual social psychologies. As a consequence, only the investigation of Marx's social psychology, not an extrapolation from the definition of man as a social animal, can prove of any use to us.

Many have argued that the investigation of Marx's social psychology is hampered by the nature of Marx's writings. Social psychology is treated ancillary to the historical and economic analyses. Marx consistently failed to execute a work exclusively concerned with the explication of his social psychology. This leaves us with certain concepts, particularly those subject to textual contradiction, that are open to question. Some, perhaps reluctant to secure a footing for fear that the support is precarious or questionable, yearn for a definitive work of social psychology in the pen of the master. However, the "failure" of Marx to develop a social psychology abstracted from historical and economic analysis has some favourable points. While Marx undoubtably "assumed" certain of his psychological concepts
he nonetheless derived his concrete content from the study of indi-
viduals and the relations that these individuals engaged in. Marx
did not develop hypotheses which he tested in the laboratory, "on
the street", or through survey methods. Instead, he examined social
psychology as an expression of the relations of production, thereby
developing a vision of the human essence that is largely invisible
to the observer of the abstracted individual human being. 8

Occasionally Marx is explicit about the social psychological
assumptions that he investigates, at other times he maintains an un-
revealed content, a set of assumptions, or fails to acknowledge some
taken for granted psychological premises. This requires that we treat
Marx's social psychology in such a way that we differentiate between
that which is explicit and that which is merely implicit. This we
shall attempt, and to this end we would argue that Marx's theory of
individuation is central to the explicit content of Marx's social
psychology.

Marx's explicit social psychological content has for its found-
ation several supporting psychological premises, one of which is em-
bodied in the theory of need, which are not fully explored by Marx.
This especially applies to the theory of pre-existent needs. For
this reason, we must first develop the implicit content of Marx's
social psychology prior to the development of the theory of indivi-
duation.
The Foundation: Human Nature in General

Many social psychologists choose to begin their social psychologies at what would appear to be a reasonable starting point. They begin where the definition of man first distinguishes itself from the definition of animal. In short, they develop a social psychology premised on the "pure essence" of man by isolating that key distinguishing ingredient in "human nature". They effectively distinguish human nature from animal nature. Marx also isolated a distinguishing feature which plays an important role in the theory of individuation.

But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best bee is this, that the architect raises his structures in imagination before he erects it in reality. (Marx 1977: 174)

Thus, that which distinguishes the human species from the animal species is the distinct advantage of being able to conceptualize, and by implication, to modify and improve his productive goals. Whereas the bee begins his construction unconsciously and operates on the basis of some instinctual pattern, the human architect begins purposefully, in his mind, and completes his structure in response to some consciously designed pattern. No doubt the human architect, as a fully conscious individual capable of developing "his own purposes", is a product of history. Nonetheless, the human being, unlike the bee, has the capacity of developing and positing his own productive purpose. The productive purpose of the bee, on the other hand, is forever instinctual.

Ideally, this human activity, in that it objectifies human
purpose, represents the objectification of the human individual and, hence, some form of self-realization. Marx, however, does not begin his social psychology here. He does not forget that the "human essence" has a biological, hence natural, foundation.

Man is directly a natural being. As a natural being and as a living natural being he is on the one hand endowed with natural powers, vital powers — he is an active natural being. These forces exist in him as tendencies and abilities — as instincts. (Marx 1977c: 145)

Marx realizes that a strict social psychology of the "human essence" is nothing more than an abstraction from the totality of the human being. While many accept and investigate the "distillation" of the human essence, forgetting that any liquid must always conform to the shape of its receptacle, Marx correctly investigates both the jar and its contents. Thus, the relationship between the natural being and its surroundings is investigated as the ultimate source of the production of the human essence. The first historical act is posited as the satisfaction of the rudimentary needs of "...eating and drinking, housing, clothing and various other things". (Marx and Engels 1976: 41) Here, in the satisfaction of basic needs, begins the process of human development proper.

Marx seems to imply that the direction that human development must travel is pre-existent in the very nature of these powers and tendencies. Indeed, this is the claim that Heller has set forth with respect to radical needs, needs which have as their nature the transcendence of capitalism in the direction of communism.

For Marx, these natural powers and tendencies are more fully
developed where communist social relations predominate. Marx does not, we must note, argue that these powers and tendencies are possessed of a force which subsequently guarantees their satisfaction at some future point in history. Nevertheless, unlike some who would argue that the "animal man" must be considered to have been subsumed by social man over the course of historical development, Marx suggests that the instinctual powers of men are actively present in this historical process. When considering the reproduction of the working class, necessary for the survival of capitalism, Marx asserts that "...the capitalist may safely leave its fulfillment to the labourers' instinct of self-preservation and of propagation". (Marx 1977: 537)

Workers, as a class, will survive because workers will instinctively oppose their personal eradication and instinctively replace themselves through the production of children. As such, the worker remains a repository of instinctual drives — of needs as against wants — which demand satisfaction. The satisfaction may take the historically specific form manifest in the corresponding want, but it is experienced at its very root as a need.

While the existence of an active natural drive or drives may prove to be the foundation upon which Marx develops his social psychology, it is not our intention to fully develop the concept of human nature in general as it is revealed in Marx's work. Rather, in an effort to focus our efforts we will centre our attention on those areas which appear to be of prime importance to Marx's theory of individuation, which we feel is central to Marx's explicit social psychology.
As we have already noted, in the _Grundrisse_, Marx draws the reader's attention to Adam Smith's views on the relationship between the worker and his labour. We argued, in our second chapter, that the need for activity is a pre-existent need. However, this need for activity becomes further modified with historical development and becomes the want for activity. Marx argues, of the repetetive production process, that "...constant labour of one uniform kind disturbs man's animal spirits, which find recreation and delight in mere change of activity". (Marx 1977: 322) In effect, the need for activity is a need for diverse activity. The implication is, of course, that the need for activity constantly asserts itself where the desire for diversity is frustrated.

The content of the satisfaction of the need for activity changes with historical development; hunting and gathering activity (although surely other activities are also involved, e.g., sexual, etc,) becomes primitive agriculture, which gradually succumbs to craft. More importantly, the activity itself cannot or, ideally, should not become exclusive activity. The craftsman would be able to indulge in activity outside of his craft activity. The human desire or want for diversity in activity, or enjoyments, would therefore seem to have a natural need foundation.

Marx further argues that where labour (i.e., human activity) is no longer satisfying in itself, where labour satisfies only wants external to the activity of labouring, where it is not diversified activity and where "...no physical or other compulsion exists, labour is shunned like the plague". (Marx 1977c: 71) The individual, as
a natural being, persistently avoids non-satisfying activities. Unfortunately, in most instances, at least with respect to labour, which is ideally necessary in and for itself and is objectively necessary to survival, non-satisfying activity is also non-avoidable activity.

Where avoidance is rendered impossible the response would appear to differ somewhat. Typically the individual becomes aggressive, although the aggressive behavior is often misdirected. Marx suggests many instances where worker frustration, unable to express itself as withdrawal, is directed, not against the effective cause of this frustration (i.e., the relations of production), but against the instruments of production. The worker is destructive of the instruments of production and even directs his anger against other human beings who are not direct sources of frustration. (Marx 1977: 191; 1975: 605)

The desire to avoid non-pleasurable or non-satisfying activity would seem to leave a void in the human experience of life. Particularly where, as is the case with the historic forms of labour, nonsatisfying productive activity takes up so much of the individual's time and energy. The exclusion of enjoyable human experience would suggest that individuals, unable to diversify their activity, would find no opportunities to experience satisfaction. This is not entirely the case, however, for Marx preserves a private domain where any hope of enjoyment is concentrated. Marx suggests that the primitive instinctual needs, by all means modified into historically specific wants, reassert themselves.
Leaving aside the nonsense that the entire working class cannot possibly take the decision not to make any children, their condition, on the contrary, makes the sex-instinct their chief pleasure and develops it one-sidedly. (Marx 1976a: 433)

Unable to find pleasure in activity of the public kind (e.g., labour, culture, literature, etc.), partially because labour is not satisfying in itself and partially because the time and wealth necessary to the enjoyment of cultural pursuits are denied them, the workers seek private pleasure in their sexual activities. In effect, the individual must seek enjoyment in a reversion to the natural pleasures where enjoyment of historically specific human pleasures has been denied. The possibility of multifaceted enjoyments, the endowment of historical development, expresses itself as the actuality of one-sided enjoyment and the one-sided development of the individual.

The "animal-in-man" in Marx's social psychology, the theory of need as pre-existent needs, provides Marx with a definite foundation upon which to construct a social psychology. It provides the psychological structures (i.e., instincts) upon which history and the social process can build as they transform human nature. The need for diverse activity, the need for the full development of the individual's capacities for enjoyment, is instinctively derived. In that the need for activity is actually a need for diverse activity, and since human activity is self-realization, it logically follows that there develops a human want for diverse self-realization—in effect, for full development of all, both socially and naturally derived wants and desires. The implication is that multifaceted enjoy-
ments, the historical manifestation of the desire for diverse activity, is perhaps a universal "desire of the species". If this is true, history is the record of the relations between humans and their activity with respect to methods and levels of enjoyment.

The historical process reflects the attempted avoidance of non-pleasurable activity and the desire to increase enjoyable activity. The history of enforced labour is, therefore, the history of enforced denial of satisfying activity. Class relations are the relations whereby one class enjoys at the direct expense of all other classes. What we must investigate is the theory of individuation as it seeks to explicate this history of the non-satisfaction of human desires.

Historically Specific Human Nature: Individuation

Marx has indicated that all of history is nothing but the continuous transformation of human nature. At the same time, he demanded a thoroughgoing understanding of this human nature — in effect, Marx has demanded the development of what appears to be a concrete social psychology — as a prerequisite for any adequate historic or economic analysis. Consequently, one would imagine that Marx must develop a social psychology premised on not only the evidence of an historical transformation of human nature but also on the centrality of this transformation with respect to the historical evolution of social relations.

In the German Ideology, Marx outlines the three "moments" of the first historical act — in fact, the first act with any histor-
ical significance. This act, as we have mentioned previously, is pos-
ited on the satisfaction of the rudimentary natural needs. But this
first act is also more than this. On the one hand, the satisfaction
of rudimentary needs is dependent on some form of productive activ-
ity which, as a direct consequence of the logic of production, not
only satisfies these needs but creates new wants.

The second point is that the satisfaction of the first
need, the action of satisfying and the instrument of
satisfaction which has been acquired, leads to new needs;
and this creation of new needs is the first historical
act.
(Marx and Engels 1976: 41)

On the other hand, this first historical act, the act of satisfying
needs and creating wants, is also the source of elementary social re-
lations. The impetus, therefore, behind the increasing complexity
of the social relations characteristic of human development is always
the productive activity called forth initially by needs and subsequen-
tly by wants. Thus, in Marx's formulation, the first historical act,
whatever the concrete content of that act, is defined as such precisely
because it initiates the process we call the "historical process".

As a consequence of his definition of the first historical
act Marx develops his historical analysis, his historical material-
ism, through reference to relations of production. He therefore links
changes in human nature directly with changes in production relations.
In the Grundrisse, Marx sets out a concept of historical development
which posits three historical stages defined by the social relations
predominating during each epoch.

Relations of personal dependence (entirely spontaneous
at the onset) are the first social forms in which human productive capacity develops only to a slight extent and at isolated points. Personal independence founded on objective (sachlicher) dependence is the second great form, in which a system of general social metabolism, of universal capacities is formed for the first-time. Free individuality, based on the universal development of individuals and on their subordination of their communal, social productivity as their social wealth, is the third stage. The second stage creates the conditions for the third. Patriarchal as well as ancient conditions (feudal, also) thus disintegrate with the development of commerce, of luxury, of money, of exchange value, while modern society arises and grows in the same measure. (Marx 1973: 158)

The first stage apparently encompasses the epoch bounded on the extremes by primitive familial, tribal relations and by feudal relations of lordship and vassalage. Here conditions of dependence are strictly personal — the "oneness" of the tribe, the power of the chief or of the feudal lord, the personal relationship through which the exercise of power is mediated — and are premised, for the most part, on common ownership of the means of production in the earliest forms of personal dependence.

The second stage would correspond to the era of civil society in its bourgeois manifestation. It is characterized by objective dependence due to the private ownership of the means of production and the consequential relations of commodity production. This stage begins in the latter periods of the feudal form, and culminates in the flowering of free individuality corresponding to conditions in the yet to be attained socialist society.

The third stage, the stage of free individuality and the "universal development of the individual", is understood to be the logical and historical justification for capitalism. The function of
capitalist society, therefore, is the production, not of material wealth for its own sake, but of social wealth for the sake of individuals. Indeed, Marx argues that:

Human beings, by no means wanting to form a society, have, nevertheless, only achieved the development of society, because they have always wanted to develop only as isolated individuals and therefore achieved their own development in and through society.

(Marx and Engels 1976: 214)

Society is a product, therefore, of individuals striving to develop as isolated individuals and, as we shall come to see, the development of the fully individuated individual is contingent on the development of social relations which are supportive of the process of individuation.

Almost immediately it is evident that there exists a confusion of terms. The concept of individuality and individuation are not easily collapsed into one another. Marx uses the terms in a way which suggests their non-correspondence and yet could also imply the possibility of correspondence. There are indications that human beings are at least partially "individualized" prior to the formation of a society premised on the fully individuated individual. As such, the history of social formations, the history of developing social relations, is necessarily the history of the process of individuation. At the same time, however, the historical process culminates in the development of "free individuality", of the complete development of individuals as individuals, and we find Marx collapsing the two terms — individuation and individuality — in the historical process. Only in the third stage of human development do the concepts of individ-
uation and individuality correspond, and then only because individuality is free individuality.

The theory of individuation is central to Marx's entire concept of history and to his understanding of the true relations of socialist society; this we shall discover as we delve further into the theory itself. What we must therefore attempt is the development of a comprehensive understanding of the theory of individuation and its relationship with the concept of a need for diverse activity which we suggested is, at least in part, an integral element in Marx's implicit theory of human nature in general. In order to accomplish this task we will investigate the historical genesis of individuated human beings within the rudimentary confines of Marx's tripartite division of history.

The earliest primitive conditions of the first stage are discussed by Marx in his most comprehensive works throughout the period from 1845 to 1867 and beyond. In the Grundrisse, Marx argues that these earliest conditions are characterized by communal relations of production.

A natural condition of production for the living individual is his belonging to a naturally arisen, spontaneous society, clan etc. This is e.g. already a condition for his language etc. His own productive existence is possible only on this condition. His subjective existence is thereby conditioned by his relation to the earth as his workshop.

(Marx 1973: 492)

The subjective existence of the individual, his personal existence as well as his public impersonal existence, is conditioned by these naturally arisen productive relations and, as a result, is
reflective not of fully developed personal individuality, but of the surrounding communal relations.

To this end Lawrence Krader argues that it is meaningless to differentiate between the personal and the impersonal in extremely primitive social groups. (Krader 1972: 10) In the face of this supremacy of the tribal consciousness, premised on the non-antagonistic nature of the interests of the community and of the tribal individual, production relations are characterized by primitive cooperation. This primitive cooperation has, therefore, not only an objective foundation in the common ownership of the means of production but a subjective foundation as well.

Cooperation, such as we find it at the dawn of human development, among races who live by the chase, or, say in the agriculture of Indian communities, is based, on the one hand, on ownership in common of the means of production, and on the other hand, on the fact, that in those cases, each individual has no more torn himself off from the navel string of his tribe or his community, than each bee has freed itself from connexion with the hive. (Marx 1977: 316)

The nature of primitive cooperation is conditioned by the objective and subjective support implied by the system of communal property, as well as the poorly developed sense of individualized conflicting interests characteristic of primitive social relations. In this primitive society the production of new wants is severely limited, while those wants that are experienced (i.e., subsistence wants) are relatively equally shared. Primitive cooperation is as much a product of shared communal property as it is a product of the relative simplicity of wants and desires. Unlike the cooperation of later societies, the cooperation of primitive society is not con-
fronted with routinized competitive social relations. The poorly developed sense of self-interest, as well as the lack of individualized property relations, precludes the conflict associated with the oppositional nature of self-interest and "general interest". Thus, Marx can claim that productive labour is premised on individual enrichment only in much later societal formations.

> It is not cooperation in wealth-producing labour by means of which the commune member reproduces himself, but rather cooperation in labour for communal interests (imaginary and real), for the upholding of the association inwardly and outwardly. (Marx 1973: 476)

The individual, certainly capable of developing an awareness of the distinction between himself and the other individuals with whom he necessarily interacts, nonetheless devotes his productive activity to the communal interests of his group.

Considering Marx's implicit theory of human nature in general and the theory of need which is a part of it, we have found Marx positing a communal individual who finds pleasure in the satisfaction of his needs as wants. The individual in the primitive commune would, irregardless of his "tribal" consciousness, experience the desire to satisfy various instinctual drives. That no contradiction exists between the interests of the member of the tribe and the tribe itself at this stage also implies that the tribe or communal mode of production does not attempt to limit the satisfaction of human wants and desires.

The commune member producing within the confines of the communal world would, no doubt, be able to satisfy his desires. While
his labour is still alienated — alienated in the sense that it is an objectification of self — the product of his labour is his product in the sense that all communal property is his property. His purpose, as the purpose of the commune, manifests itself in the process of production and is represented in the final product. Since the productive purpose is the purpose of the community as a whole, and since the product is the product of this community, the member of the commune affirms himself as "member" in the act of production.

It is because his labour is not alienated, because his labour serves a purpose with the community, that "his" product does not stand opposed to him, and to the extent that his society is the product of his productive activities, it too does not stand opposed to him. It would appear, therefore, that the labouring activity of the primitive community, aside from satisfying the wants of the community as a whole, would also satisfy the wants and desires of those individuals who make up this community.

Labour at the primitive level is still not yet "true labour" since it would still be constrained by the necessity to satisfy wants and desires external to it. Yet, because the interests of the individual are equivalent to the communal interests, and indeed, because his interests are satisfied, the internal structure of the community would be basically harmonious and the individual would be inexorably linked to the "...rather satisfying and agreeable bonds of the group, of the primitive community". (Marx 1972: 359; translated by L. Krader and cited from page 39 of his introduction)

Since the natural and communal desires of the communal indivi-
dual are adequately satisfied one might wonder what would cause the demise of the primitive communal form. Marx's answer suggests that, while the process of individuation is, on the one hand, infinitely slow, it is at the same time the inevitable result of the first historical act. We should emphasize, however, that the inevitability is directly related, not to history in a "spiritual" sense, but to Marx's theory of need. The first historical act results in the satisfaction of the basic rudimentary needs and only as a consequence of the relationship between the primitive human being and his relations of production does it create new wants.

As we suggested in our second chapter, this creation of new wants gradually extends itself until the process of creation becomes a manipulative and exploitive attempt to create new value in the form of surplus value. Thus, the first historical act, an act of production, begins the process of expanding wants. The process of expansion is premised, of course, on the existence of needs that can be satisfied in diverse ways. At the same time, this process of expansion takes two basic directions; on the one hand, there is an expansion of wants directly associated with consumption (i.e., the expansion of consumer necessity), on the other hand, there is an expansion of productive requirements — wants associated with improvements in the production process. On top of this, and perhaps ancillary to the improvement of the production process, there is the creation of new social wants in the form of new social relations. In effect, the production of new class relations is a direct result of the improvements in the production process.
This historical process whereby productive activity, at first sporadic and limited, increases in intensity and is matched by sporadic but corresponding increases in wants, as well as social relations, contributes to the breakdown of the communal consciousness.

This beginning is as animal as social life itself at this stage. It is a mere herd-consciousness, and at this point man is distinguished from sheep only by the fact that with him consciousness takes the place of instinct or that this instinct is a conscious one. This sheep-like or tribal consciousness receives its further development and extension through increased productivity, the increase of needs, and, what is fundamental to both of these, the increase of population. With these there develops the division of labour,...

(Marx and Engels 1976: 44)

The increase in population, itself partly the result of the improved ability of production relations to support this population adequately, further intensifies the process of historical individuation. With improved production comes changed social relations, further intensified and modified wants, and ultimately, new productive requirements in the form of division of labour.

The relationship that the division of labour has with the process of individuation is not immediately clear in Marx's work. In the *German Ideology*, Marx makes it evident that "...the division of labour also implies the contradiction between the interests of the separate individual or the individual family and the common interest of all separate individuals who have intercourse with one another". (Marx and Engels 1976: 46) With this alienated character of labour we find the development of contradictory interests.

However, Marx would seem to modify this position, a position that would apparently situate relatively complete individuation very
early in the history of social relations, when reconsidering the theory some ten years later. Presumably, empirical evidence of individuation based on the simple division of labour was lacking and in the *Grundrisse*, Marx makes it abundantly clear that the division of labour, in particular, the natural division of labour, is not entirely responsible for the development of the opposition between self-interest and the community interests of the larger order.

But the human beings become individuals only through the process of history. He appears originally as a species being (*Gattungswesen*), i.e., as being, herd animal — although in no way whatever as a *zoon politikon* in the political sense. Exchange itself is the chief means of this individuation. (*Vereinzelung*) It makes the herd-like existence superfluous and dissolves it. (Marx 1973: 496; [transcribed from the Greek])

Marx clearly argues that the more, but not most, complete form of individuation, the development of self-interest, is the result of exchange relations. However, he also argued that this self-interest was not entirely as it seemed to be.

However, the true nature of the latter is shown only if we analyze the content — the interest of the "latter". We then find, that these interests themselves are again common to certain social groups and characterise them, that they are class interests etc. Hence, this individuation is itself a class etc. individuality and these in the last instance all have economic conditions at base. (Marx 1972: 329-330; translated by C. Levitt and cited from — Levitt 1978: 14)

Thus, the development of the class individual is dependent upon the division of labour to the extent that the division of labour lays the foundation for the objective impersonal dependence characteristic of relations of commodity exchange (Marx 1973: 146) and for class society.

For long periods of time there must have existed both a deve-
veloped division of labour and a tribal, non-individuated — or at least only partially individuated — consciousness. This can be attributed in part to the fact that in its earliest forms exchange was not an individual enterprise but a communal concern. (Marx 1973: 873; 1977: 49, 83, 332) As such, the juridical concept of individuality associated with self-conscious, self-interested, exchanging individuals devolved onto the community, to the extent that well into the period of feudalism the feudal estate and not the individual per se was treated as the juridical individual by the state. (Marx 1977c: 41) Exchange was initially carried out in the interest of the community and only gradually was the community's role supplanted by that of the family, and later, the individual as a class individual.

Although Marx suggests that exchange may be the chief means of individuation, the division of labour must not be overlooked. The division of labour, in developing the material foundation for exchange and for classes, also develops the material foundation for the awareness of self-interested character structures. In developing the regulated role, the division of labour allows the communal-feudal individual to adopt a role identity. In effect, the individual defines himself in and through his productive role. He also develops specific "role-interests", interests primarily associated with production and, in the latter stages of feudalism, represented by the guild, the estate, or the coalition of nobility.

These role interests, the foundation for class interests, often find themselves coming into conflict with the larger interests of the community or with the lesser interests of other class indivi-
duals. With exchange, however, there develops an even greater conflict between the interests of individual members of the class itself. In effect, increased exchange and the further development of commodity production tend to generalize relations of competition both within and outside of the class.

With the gradual dissolution of feudalism, with the wearing away of its economic base, we find the new production conditions and the new men of capitalism developing within and in contradiction to feudal social relations. In its first stages the process of dissolution is gradual and evolutionary. The initial impetus to change is still embodied in Marx's logic of history, therefore, in the mutating character of the theory of need, productive activity and social relations.

Not only do the objective conditions change in the act of reproduction, e.g. the village becomes a town, the wilderness a cleared field etc., but the producers change, too, in that they bring out new qualities in themselves, develop new powers and ideas, new modes of intercourse, new needs and new languages.

(Marx 1973: 494)

The primitive individual, barely aware of any personal opposition to the general interests of the community, becomes, over time, the self-conscious individual fully cognizant of his individual class interests, and, in some instances, willing to express his opposition to the more general interests of society at large. The relationship between the individual and the community swiftly changes in the latter stages of feudalism where "...it is only his purse and not his character, his individuality, which connects a man with an estate".

(Marx 1977c: 61) The previously comforting link between the indivi-
dual and the community is stretched to its limits and acts as a fetter on the further development of both the social relations and the relations of production. The conditions of feudalism, conditions of personal dependence, must be replaced by relations of juridical individuality. Hence, individual interest — rather, class individual interests — appear to dictate the failure of the feudal form of society.

Marx has characterized the second historical stage as the era of personal independence and objective dependence. Thus, we have personal freedom contradicting objective dependence. There exists an appearance of individual liberty in the face of totally enchained existence. The appearance of liberty is a product of the existence of "private" interests which are both expressed and satisfied. Unfortunately, as Marx realizes, given the nature of class society, even private interests are socially dictated.

The point is rather that private interest is itself already socially determined interest, which can be achieved only within the conditions laid down by society and with the means provided by society; hence it is bound to the reproduction of these conditions. (Marx 1973: 156)

The dictating conditions for personal freedom such as we find it in this second stage of historical development — at the stage where conditions of personal dependence are dissolving only to be replaced by conditions of objective dependence — are relations of production and exchange best facilitated by free competition and free trade. The personal independence of the producing, consuming, and exchanging class individual is nothing more nor less than the full liberation of capital itself. The conditions for class individuated individuals
dictate a form of freedom that falls far short of the idealistic notions which consistently colour the theories of the political economists. Free individuality and personal development are severely curtailed by objective and impersonal dependence.

This kind of individual freedom is therefore at the same time the most complete suspension of all individual freedom, and the most complete subjugation of individuality under social conditions which assume the form of objective powers, even of overpowering objects — of things independent of the relations among individuals themselves. (Marx 1973: 652)

The alienating power of wage labour and commodity production implies that the individuals existing under these relations have their life activity directly dictated by the social and productive relations of capitalist society. As such, one could hardly be led to argue that the appearance of the class individual represents the highest form of individuation. Marx often clearly draws the distinction between individual well-being and the well-being of individuals as personifications.

The "well-being" which the rentier enjoys as rentier is not the "well-being" of the individual as such, but of the rentier, not of an individual well-being but a well-being that is general with the framework of the class. (Marx and Engels 1976: 219)

The class role of the individual, for all intents and purposes the productive role of the individual that we earlier mentioned, dictates the individual's material condition. He is objectively limited by limitations on his wealth, despite the fact that the dependence upon money as a form of value makes the individual "...lord of all things". (Marx 1973: 839) At the same time, the individual is subjectively limited by the conditions of his class and the corresponding
influence of this class on individual consciousness. The capitalist therefore expresses himself in a life-activity which seeks only the greatest possible expansion of value (Marx 1977: 81, 147), while the worker's life-activity "...is for him only a means to enable him to exist". (Marx 1977d: 202)

This class role inevitably leads to the narrow and restricted development of the individual; the capitalist sacrifices all to the expansion of value while the worker has nothing to sacrifice but life itself. Consequently, the history of individuation, up to and including the second stage of Marx's historical analysis, results in the creation of individuals who achieve "...only a one-sided, crippled development". (Marx and Engels 1976: 262) However, the conditions of capitalist classes would imply the possibility of further individual development.

While the capitalist, as the personification of capital, may satisfy class interests (i.e., role-interests) and thereby experience pleasure, he nevertheless discovers further potential. He discovers interests, and the time to develop these interests, that are not directly associated with the expansion of value.

As capitalist production, accumulation, and wealth, becomes developed, the capitalist ceases to be the mere incarnation of capital. (Marx 1977: 556)

On top of class interests there is deposited a system of self-interests, interests aligned with the personal not with the personification, and as a consequence the capitalist experiences "...a Faustian conflict between the passion for accumulation, and the desire
for enjoyment". (Marx 1977: 557) The capitalist must somehow manage to find a middle ground between these two forces if he is to enjoy and at the same time remain a capitalist.

The worker, on the other hand, finds his situation somewhat different. Workers, as a class, "...have nothing of their own to secure and fortify:..." (Marx and Engels 1976a: 495), they are a class without innate class interests in that their interests represent the potential interests of society as a whole. As such, individual workers may initially only seek pleasure in the satisfaction of those wants and desires that are still relatively closely linked with need and, due to the nature of their productive activity, they find it difficult to develop their class interests into a basis for common action.

Indifferent to his labour, the worker is, for the most part, indifferent to his association with other workers. He associates with his class not out of the perception of common interests but because his association is a requisite of production. (Marx and Engels 1976a: 496) Nonetheless, although workers do not treat their association and their common interests as a foundation for common opposition to their predicament in the initial stages of class development, these two factors still lay the foundation for later working class resistance.

Initially the worker's reaction to his conditions of existence are isolated. He may develop the mania to get rich (Marx 1977c: 25), he may desire to become a capitalist and to obtain pleasure from the satisfaction of the interests — both class and personal (e.g., cultural, intellectual, etc.,) — associated with the capitalist. The worker's sense of relative deprivation, where the worker has not yet formula-
lated a decision to collectively resist, may cause the worker to be­come more industrious and to seek improvements in his living conditions through "legitimate" means. It does not take the worker long to real­ize that this method of gaining increased satisfaction will ultimately fail.

Although the worker soon discovers that he cannot achieve any degree of satisfaction with respect to the improvements of his living conditions, according to Marx, he does not necessarily ascertain the actual source of his demise. Thus, even where the working class be­gins to act in a collective manner their resistance typically remains at the level of wage demands. In effect, the working class does not resist capitalism, but seeks to wrest a greater share of the social wealth from the agents of capitalism, the capitalist bosses. We shall investigate this issue more closely in subsequent chapters.

It would appear that Marx's theory of individuation implies, first and foremost, the development of individuated human beings defined in terms of self-interests that largely correspond to class interests. As such, the development of individuated class individuals results in a corresponding development of social conflict and tension. Ultimately, as is the case with the transformation from feudalism to capitalism, this social tension must erupt into a full scale revolutionary activ­ity which succeeds in overthrowing the previous ruling interests.

The previous "communal" interests are subordinated to individ­ual role-interests, in the first instance, since individuation appears coincidental with the formation of identities premised on social and production relations and production roles. The individual, defining
himself in and through his social role, develops individual interests that correspond to this role. In this manner, the "war of all against all", implied in the victory of self-interest over communal interests, is brought under some semblance of control. The general state of war, although still manifest within classes in the modified form of general consumption, is historically realized as class conflict.

However, while the capitalist may define himself and his purpose with reference to his productive role as the will and consciousness of capital, the general laws of capitalism effectively deny the proletarian a "human productive role" and consistently attempt to reduce the interests of the worker to the level of survival. As such, the development of self-interests is no guarantee that these self-interests can be satisfied — the illusion of bourgeois political economy — and Marx wishes to take the process of individuation one step further.

Marx has already suggested that the third stage of historical development is "...based on the universal development of individuals". (Marx 1973: 158) It is obvious from what we have already seen that the universal development of the individual is effectively denied by capitalist social and production relations; although at the same time the foundation for this full development is implicit in the production relations of capitalism and in the creation of a class of individuals who perceive their interests or wants to be non-satisfiable given the social relations of modern capitalism. The one-sided development of the capitalist takes the form of a subordination of his individual interests and personal desires to the interests of the personification.
For the worker this one-sided development manifests itself as the subordination of life to the production of objects which act as powers over and against him. This one-sided development stands in opposition to any form of full individuation in the sense that full individuation is coincidental with free individuality.

The third stage, the stage of free individuality and the stage of socialism, represents the fulfillment of the process of individuation in that it represents the dissolution of all class relations and, thereby, the dissolution of all personifications and one-sided developments.

Only at this stage does self-activity coincide with material life, which corresponds to the development of individuals into complete individuals... (Marx and Engels 1976: 88)

The process of individuation is completed in the full development of the individual. The correspondence of self-interest — self-interest devoid of any connection with class — with self-activity, premised on the prior existence of a class "...completely shut off from all self-activity" (Marx and Engels 1976: 87), is the culmination of the historical process of individuation. At this point Marx collapses the concept of individuation into the concept of complete and free individuality.

The completion of the process of individuation corresponds to the development of complete and universal individuals. More importantly, this correspondence is not reflective of some "spiritual" drive towards complete individuation, but is the result of the logic of productive activity and of the existence of certain needs. The need for
diverse activity, hence the want for diverse self-realization, culminates in the development of individual diversity.

We have seen that the theory of individuation is, for the most part, a theory of the development of personal individual interests and desires. The personal communal interests and desires of the primitive commune member become the impersonal individual interests and desires of the personification. Only as a result of the process of individuation do these desires of the personification give way to truly individual personal desires. Only as a result of the workers' revolutionary activity can these desires be satisfied.
CHAPTER FOUR

A Theory of Frustration-Aggression

When we first consider the possibility of a theory of frustration-aggression as an explanation for social change we are immediately reminded of the attempts of the Freudo-Marxists (most notably of Wilhelm Reich, Erich Fromm, and Herbert Marcuse) to incorporate theories of social change that appear to owe much to a concept of frustration leading to aggression into Marx's theory. We have previously argued that the Freudian approach attempts to reconstruct Marxism and to reinterpret Marx with reference to Freud's bourgeois theories of social causation. To thereby argue, however, that this rejection of Freudo-Marxism inevitably leads to a rejection of the theory of frustration-aggression is incorrect.

Until now we have not approached the matter of frustration-aggression textually. We have, however, demonstrated that Agnes Heller's concept of radical need implicitly assumes frustration of needs and revolutionary aggressiveness as a response to this frustration. At the same time we can suggest that Marx also argues that revolution has a need/want component.

If, moreover, he had concerned himself with the actual individuals "existing" in every revolution, and with their relations, instead of being satisfied with the pure ego and "what exists", i.e., substance (a phrase the overthrow of which requires no revolution, but merely a knight-errant like Saint Bruno), then perhaps he would have come to understand that every revolution, and its results, was determined by these relations, by needs, and that the "political or
social act" was in no way in contradiction to the "egotistical act".
(Marx and Engels 1976: 378)

In this passage Marx calls Stirner to task for his antithet-
cial distinction between "political or social" revolution and "egotis-
tical" rebellion. The latter category, an attempt on Stirner's part
to personify revolution and to thereby give it a motive force of its
own, ignores the actuality of revolution. Stirner forgets that men
make revolutions and do so in response to social relations and wants.
Marx, however, seeks to make these social relations and the histori-
cal creation of wants central to the concept of historical progress.

For Marx, the antagonism between classes, orders, estates,
etc., a consequence of class control of the means of production and
of the inequitable distribution of social wealth that results, is the
motor force of historical development.

The very moment civilisation begins, production begins to
be founded on the antagonism of orders, estates, classes,
and finally on the antagonisms of accumulated labour and
immediate labour. No antagonism, no progress. This is
the law that civilisation has followed up to our day.
(Marx 1976: 132)

This might suggest that, given motivating wants and the objectively,
class based, limitations of satisfaction, Marx too, implicitly assumed
that revolution was at least partially a response to frustrated wants.
Thus, if we are to establish an implicit theory of frustration-aggres-
sion we should attempt to demonstrate that objective limitations on
satisfaction coincide with revolutionary responses.
Objective Limitations and Subjective Responses

One thing that should be evident to any reader of Marx is the place accorded the working class in the revolutionary overthrow of existing social relations. At the same time one cannot help but notice that Marx consistently points to the obvious poverty and misery that is the lot of this class.

Along with the constantly diminishing number of magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolise all advantage of this process of transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation: but with this too grows the revolt of the working-class,...
(Marx 1977: 175)

We find a relationship between revolt and aggression and human suffering which, while it may not be explicitly causal, is certainly persistently coincidental. The centralization of capital, the intensification of poverty, along with its quantitative expansion (i.e., greater numbers of people "fall into" the category of working class as capital centralizes), coincides, according to Marx, with working class desire to revolt against such conditions. And yet to demonstrate that the objective limitation of satisfaction coincides with revolutionary upheavals only explains one element in the theory of frustration-aggression.

In point of fact, the coincidence of frustration and revolution may be accidental or causal. It is necessary, therefore, that we establish some form of causality. In order to accomplish this it would appear inevitable that we investigate the "subjective" content of the theory. As such, we must confront the texts of Marx in a manner designed to reveal this subjective content and to thereby demonstrate the
potential importance of a theory of frustration-aggression.

We have already noted that the system of needs is central to the works of Marx. Moreover, we have indicated that the expansion of needs (i.e., the creation of social wants and social means of satisfaction) is an historical process with an evolutionary content. We have also discovered that this continual expansion of wants demonstrates the possibility of increased dissatisfaction (even where the level of absolute satisfaction has increased this seems to be the case). The evolutionary quality of the process of want satisfaction demonstrates the historical importance of seeking satisfaction. The subjective experience of new wants and desires results in activity designed to satisfy new desires and, as a consequence, in changes in the mode of production and in social relations. We did not, however, attempt to understand the subjective response to increased dissatisfaction or to wants that were persistently frustrated. We assumed that wants merely encouraged productive activity, although we did realize that there was a possibility that certain wants — i.e., radical wants — would remain non-satisfiable given the social relations of capitalism. In order to determine the likely response to the frustration of these non-satisfiable radical wants it would appear necessary to regress once more to the natural level of needs for our beginning.

In the Paris manuscripts Marx develops a concept of man as a natural being.

Man is directly a natural being. As a natural being and as a living natural being he is on the one hand endowed with natural powers, vital powers — he is an active natural being. These forces exist in him as tendencies and abilities — as instincts. On the other hand, as a natural,
corporeal, sensuous, objective being he is a suffering, conditioned and limited creature, like animals and plants. That is to say, the objects of his instincts exist outside him, as objects that he needs — essential objects, indispensable to the manifestation and confirmation of his powers. (Marx 1977c: 145)

Marx argues, as we have argued in chapter three, that man is first and foremost a natural being possessed of natural needs and capacities (i.e., pre-existent needs).

That man exists as an objective being forces men to enter into a relationship with the objective natural world in order to satisfy and affirm needs and capacities. The accidental and natural qualities of this objective world would imply that needs and capacities, particularly on the individual level, would at certain times be non-satisfiable. As a consequence of this inability of the objective natural world to satisfy all individual needs and capacities at all times, we find a specialized response develops.

Man as an objective, sensuous being is therefore a suffering being — and because he feels that he suffers, a passionate being. Passion is the essential power of man energetically bent on its object. (Marx 1977c: 146)

Marx allows an affective content to enter into the satisfaction of these needs and capacities. That which the individual desires not only effects him physically (i.e., the stomach signals hunger) but where it is denied (i.e., where suffering, therefore frustration, occurs) it affects him emotionally, as passion. The denial of satisfaction intensifies the experience of the want.

The initial response to a frustrated want is a heightened emotional state. We will argue, as this chapter proceeds, that passion —
the intensification of desire — is a mediating and necessary link between the experience of objective deprivation and dissatisfaction and the subjective response engendered in aggressive behavior. Note, however, that Marx maintains the cognitive element at the same time as he introduces the affective. The individual is passionate only because he feels that he suffers. In effect, the individual does not experience suffering simply as a general "ache" or "pain", but he interprets his suffering with reference to himself. He does not feel suffering, he feels that he suffers.

At this level, however, one could hardly argue that passion necessarily engenders revolutionary aggression as a response. Indeed, in the earliest stages passion could only result in an intensification of productive activity if suffering was to be alleviated. This appears to be the implicit content of the concept of man "energetically bent on its object". Only once the process of historical development has led to the creation of class relations and the inequitable distribution of existing social wealth is the possibility for revolutionary aggression realized. Only at this point can activity seek to redistribute social wealth and to change existing social relations; hence, only at this point can activity be revolutionary. Therefore, only at the historic level is it possible to witness revolutionary aggression as a response to the denial of satisfaction. As such, we must begin by stating that the link between frustration and aggression on the group level and as a revolutionary response is historically specific. We shall seek to explain this historical specificity in greater detail somewhat later in this chapter.
The existence of passion as a possible component in the theory of frustration-aggression suggests that heightened responses to frustrated wants should be observable at the historic level. Moreover, for our purposes it would appear that these heightened responses should be aggressive in a revolutionary sense. In effect, we would like to associate passion with revolution. Marx suggests, in a comparison of middle class responses to labour as against the responses of the proletariat, that this association of passion with revolution is valid.

"Worry" is nothing but the mood of oppression and anxiety which in the middle class is the necessary companion of labour;... whereas the poverty of the proletarian assumes the acute, sharp form, driving him into a life-and-death struggle, makes him a revolutionary, and therefore engenders not "worry", but passion.

(Marx and Engels 1976: 219)

Evidently, passion and revolution are, in Marx's estimation, closely associated. The denial of an adequate share of the social wealth makes the worker a revolutionary and engenders passion. However, the relationship between passion and revolution here is not explicitly one of cause and effect. Marx has not suggested that poverty, makes for passion, which in turn makes for revolution. He has merely suggested that poverty makes for both revolutionary and passionate men. Moreover, Marx does not pretend to argue that passion is strictly a proletarian response, for, while the middle class experiences worry, the bourgeois is capable of experiencing passion.

The "avaricious man"- shown here as an impure, unholy egoist, hence as an egoist in the ordinary sense, is nothing but a figure on whom moral readers for children and novels dilate, but that actually occur only as an exception, and is by no means the representative of the avaricious bourgeois. The latter, on the contrary, have no need to deny the "promptings of conscience", "the sense of honour", etc.,
or to restrict themselves to the one passion of avarice alone. On the contrary, their avarice engenders a series of other passions — political, etc. — the satisfaction of which the bourgeois on no account sacrifice. (Marx and Engels 1976: 248)

Since both the proletarian and the bourgeois individual can experience passion, and since their subjective response to passion necessarily differs, (i.e., the bourgeois certainly would not indulge in revolutionary activity once capitalism as a social order has been established), it stands to reason that passion is not of itself revolutionary. Along with the historically specific character of the link between frustration and aggression, there is a class specific character. In effect, only the class that finds itself oppressed can develop an aggressive response to frustration in the sense that this aggressive response has a revolutionary content. We shall also seek to explain this class specificity in more detail later in this chapter.

While we have suggested that the aggressive content of passion is historically specific and class specific, we still have not established an explicit connection between the frustration of wants, the experience of passion, and the resulting aggressive behavior. In order, therefore, that we might discover exactly what the relationship is between the want and passion let us take a somewhat circuitous route through Marx's critique of Stirner.

In a passage quoted by Marx, Stirner uses the term passion in a way that suggests its synonymity with fixated ideas.

I destroy in it any inclination towards independence and absorb it before it becomes fixed and can become a fixed idea or passion. (Marx and Engels 1976: 260)
Stirner's definition of passion is idealistic and it is fortunate for us that Marx chooses to give a more accurate explanation of the actuality of fixed ideas.

Stirner cannot eat without at the same time eating for the sake of his stomach. If the worldly conditions prevent him from satisfying his stomach, then his stomach becomes a master over him, the desire to eat becomes a fixed desire, and the thought of eating becomes a fixed idea — ... (Marx and Engels 1976: 255)

Fixed ideas (i.e., fixed desires or passions) correspond with desires that, for whatever reason, cannot be adequately satisfied. However, Marx further develops this concept of fixed desires in a manner that suggests some form of class distinction is possible.

Whether a desire becomes fixed or not, i.e., whether it obtains exclusive (power over us) — which, however, does (not) exclude (further progress) — depends on whether material circumstances, "bad" mundane conditions permit the normal satisfaction of this desire and, on the other hand, the development of a totality of desires. This latter depends, in turn, on whether we live in circumstances that allow all-round activity and thereby the full development of all our potentialities. (Marx and Engels 1976: 255)

It is obvious that the individuals who comprise the working class develop fixated wants, hence passion, because material circumstances do not permit the normal satisfaction of even the most basic of wants (i.e., the wants associated with consumer necessity). To the extent that some of these wants are radical wants, the passion hence the aggressive behavior, would develop in a revolutionary direction. This is not, however, the case with the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie develop fixated needs because their one-sided development as the personification of capitalism does not permit full development. While it is true, as we suggested in the third chapter, that the cap-
italist is capable of developing personal interests that do not necessarily correspond to their class interests—particularly in more advanced capitalism—it still remains for the capitalist to mediate between these personal interests and the interests of the personification in such a manner that his existence as the will and consciousness of capital is not drastically undercut. In effect, the capitalist must subordinate his personal desires to the fixed desires of the personification if he is to maintain his position of relative privilege.

It is obvious that passion is, for all intents and purposes, a heightened desire for the satisfaction of certain wants. The intensification of this desire is either premised on the frustration of the wants or on the one-sided development of the class individual. Since the source of passion—of fixated desires—differs from class to class one might fully expect that the subjective response to the heightened emotional state would also differ with respect to class. The bourgeois response would logically be conservative since the bourgeois individual would ultimately desire to maintain the relatively higher level of satisfaction associated with his class. The proletarian response, on the other hand, would logically be revolutionary since the working class must seek to expand satisfaction in opposition to material conditions (i.e., social and production relations) which consistently seek to minimize this satisfaction.

We could perhaps discover passages where Marx implicitly argues that the bourgeois response to fixated wants is necessarily reactionary aggression. Indeed, the state would apparently act as the agency of this reactionary aggression. At the same time, we would like to argue
that passion engenders non-aggressive but still revolutionary responses on the part of the bourgeois. We most certainly could find passages which suggest that the working class response to non-satisfiable wants is revolutionary and aggressive. We can also demonstrate instances where proletarian responses to dissatisfaction is or can be reactionary. For the time being we must leave these matters for later consideration. What is important at this juncture is that we establish a link between the frustration of wants and the possibility of large-scale aggressive responses. In effect, we need to establish that the frustration-aggression theory of social dynamics need not limit its explanations to individually experienced frustration and individualized atomistic aggression.

Marx apparently suggests that there is a link between the frustration of wants and mass action in a passage from the German Ideology, where he even goes so far as to isolate specific wants containing, in specific situations, an element of world-historical importance.

Or again, take the case of sugar and coffee, which have proved their world-historical importance in the nineteenth century by the fact that the lack of these products, occasioned by the Napoleonic Continental System, caused the Germans to rise against Napoleon, and thus became the real basis of the glorious Wars of Liberation of 1813. (Marx and Engels 1976: 51)

The want or desire for such simple consumer necessities as sugar and coffee, frustrated by the Napoleonic Continental System, caused the German people, in Marx's account, to indulge in revolutionary and aggressive behavior. The want of a simple and habitual commodity, coffee, caused an entire nation to aggress against the source of their frustration. As such, it is evident that the frustration
of wants is capable, in Marx's estimation, of explaining mass action. But is Marx's theory of frustration-aggression so simply a theory of stimulus and response? We think not, and must seek further explanation.

When one first considers frustration-aggression as a possible explanation for certain phenomenon it seems a rather simple thing. Visions of neanderthal ancestors dragging unconscious and presumably unwilling mates by their hair epitomized frustration-aggression responses. In essence, those things which men desired but could not obtain without the use of force were, we thought, obtained illegitimately through the use of coercion. Even though we traditionally imposed our own notion of legitimacy onto our neanderthal ancestor one can see why the simple stimulus response model was initially granted so much credibility.

With Marx, however, we have discovered that aggression, as a response to frustration, also has a class component in the sense that it must explain how passion engenders both aggressive and non-aggressive responses in the proletariat and the bourgeoisie respectively. Our characterization ignores this; the suffering "mates", although they most certainly experience frustration, are given no recognition. At the same time, our explanation assumes some normative concept where aggression is implicitly illegitimate when, in fact, institutionalized aggression is the very content of the state, hence a legitimate organ of class oppression. To put it simply, our neanderthal ancestor assumed that his aggressiveness was entirely legitimate. The theory of frustration-aggression is infinitely more complex than our simple characterization would suggest.
Enlightened Frustration-Aggression Theorizing

Fortunately, the crude characterization of frustration-aggression also conflicts with the more "enlightened" approach to frustration-aggression theorizing that we find today. Indeed, recently suggestions have surfaced from within the field that would imply that aggression is much less dramatically connected with frustration than was originally thought. In order to do justice to Marx, and at the same time to do justice to the more "scientific" concept of frustration-aggression currently arising in the literature, we will investigate the current approaches to frustration-aggression theorizing. In order to make our task manageable, we will accept the theory of frustration-aggression outlined in Michael Billig's book, *Social Psychology and Intergroup Relations*, as a definitive approach to frustration-aggression. We will, therefore, seek to measure the fit between Marx and Billig with respect to certain of the mechanics of frustration-aggression and at the same time suggest situations where Marx goes beyond or falls short of current theorizing.

Billig begins his analysis of the concept of frustration-aggression with a review of the more relevant political and social psychological literature. Although Billig is critical of many of the "pioneers" this would nonetheless seem the logical place to begin.

Relatively early in the history of frustration-aggression theorizing there was an attempt to mediate between the stimulus and the response. We find that:

A frustrating stimulus, defined in terms of the blocking or prevention of goal responses, does not produce aggres-
sive responses directly: it produces in the subject an instigation to aggress, which in the normal course of events gives rise to actual aggression.
(Billig 1976: 124)

Although the mediated link between frustration and aggression finds its initial expression in the works of Sigmund Freud, Billig argues that the concept has been further developed in a more behaviorist and rational direction within traditional social psychology. However, while the concept takes on a more rational content, there is a blatant assumption that the frustration of goal responses results in the creation of a new goal—aggression—which begins to assert itself as a distinct power in the life of the frustrated individual.

Frustration provokes an instigation to aggress—if, however, the frustrator cannot be attacked, the instigation to aggress does not evaporate but ensures that some other form of aggression will take place. Notably aggression will be displaced onto some other target.
(Billig 1976: 125)

The individual, frustrated in his attempt to satisfy a want, finds himself possessed of an over-whelming desire to aggress which demands satisfaction. In these early models the desire to aggress lacks, for the most part, any instrumental connection with the originally frustrated goal response. For example, the frustration of basic consumer necessity would result in the creation of a desire to attack the frustrator; but the attack is not premised on the eventual satisfaction of the originally frustrated desire for consumer necessities. The satisfaction of these desires is entirely accidental to the satisfaction of the desire to aggress. That the aggressiveness can be redirected or displaced satisfactorily would tend to suggest that any instrumental link between the originally frustrated wants and the sub-
sequent aggressive behavior is minimal at best.

In an attempt to correct this obvious deficiency in the early theories of frustration-aggression Billig makes the point that "(a) model which only posits a stimulus, a response and an intervening aroused state, is too simplistic". (Billig 1976: 145) We feel that Marx would concur, for while there are isolated situations that might suggest crude displacement (see especially - Marx 1975: 605; where Marx suggests that abuse of parental authority may be a crude compensation on the part of the "most cowardly, unresisting people" for the submissiveness and dependence to which they "debase" themselves in bourgeois society) there are many situations that suggest an instrumental quality to aggressive behavior, even where this aggressiveness is apparently mis-targeted.

The early aggressiveness of the working class, described by Marx in Capital I, suggests that there was a direct instrumental connection between aggression and frustration.

No sooner had Everet in 1758 erected the first wool-shearing machine that was driven by water-power, than it was set on fire by the 100,000 people who had been thrown out of work. (Marx 1977: 404)

The responses of the Luddite movement in general were remarkably similar. The newly unemployed masses, their basic wants and desires threatened, attempted to aggress against the perceived source of their demise. The destruction of the machines would, or so they thought, return to them their jobs. That this aggression could more appropriately be directed at the mode of production rather than at the instruments of production does not obviate the instrumentality of these
aggressive acts.

The displacement of aggression from the proper to the improper target is highly problematic for the early theorists and, to a lesser extent, for Billig. Experimental results often fail to uphold earlier results or, barring this, entirely contradict other results. (Billig 1976: 140) This is perhaps because their experiments typically equate frustration with some form of prior aggression.

One of the simplest forms of frustration is a direct attack by someone else; one can say that an attack constitutes an interference with whatever "ongoing goal-seeking activity" the subject happens to be engaged in. There have been, therefore, a number of experiments conducted by frustration-aggression researchers investigating responses to direct attack.

(Billig 1976: 132)

More often than not these experimental attacks took the form of shock treatments, in the style of Stanley Millgram, or of personal insult. What usually seems to be lacking is precisely an ongoing goal-seeking activity. The experimental volunteer has necessarily, or so it would seem, subordinated his personal goal-seeking activity to the goals of the experiment. In effect, he wishes to see the experiment succeed. Unless the experiment is discontinued short of completion, frustration would not appear to be necessarily present or coincidental with direct attack; particularly where this direct attack is considered to be legitimate within the constraints of the experimental procedure as is the case with the administration of shock treatments. As such, any responses to direct aggression need not necessarily be attributable to frustration. Consequently, any explanation of displacement would have no validity with respect to displacement where this
was the case. Perhaps the experiments merely measure the tendency of individuals to seek some form of retribution or even to successfully complete the experiment in the manner suggested by the original aggressive act.

Nonetheless, the early explanations for displacement usually suggested that the proper target went unscathed because "...the frustrating agent may be too powerful, or there may be strong internal sanctions which forbid the subject from expressing his anger directly". (Billig 1976: 125) Many might apply this simplistic notion to Marx. After all, it is extremely dangerous to attack the living embodiment of capital — the capitalist — and relatively safe to indulge in industrial sabotage. We would reject this early explanation and its application to Marx as being incorrect, or, at the very least, too simplistic. While it may apply to the early instances of atomistic working class responses it certainly was not the case where, as Marx described it, a large and powerful mass of workers took it upon themselves to destroy Everett's shearing machine.

Billig, however, suggests that explanations of displacement should also take into account "...the social relations between the three main actors in the situation, the frustrated subject, the proper and improper targets". (Billig 1976: 141) In effect, it is necessary that we determine existing relations of power and authority if we are to understand displaced aggression. This explanation, however, is little more than a modified version of the earlier thesis, with the added advantage that Billig's version can more adequately explain the choice of improper targets. The earlier thesis suggested that where
the frustrator was too powerful the aggression was displaced onto some target that was similar to the original target but not perceived to be as powerful. Billig, on the other hand, argues that where the frustrator is perceived to be too powerful displacement typically takes the form of generalized aggression against socially inferior targets. For all intents and purposes Billig presents us with a simplistic explanation for various out-group tensions and prejudices. However, at this level Billig's concept of displacement still lacks a distinct connection with instrumentality.

These difficulties associated with explanations of displacement, at least partially the result of the experimental methodology, may also be the result of a too simplistic and individualistic analysis of the concept of frustration-aggression. It is assumed that the proper target is another individual or group of individuals of higher or lower status than that of the frustrated subject, and that the improper target will also be an individual or group of individuals. But what if frustration is not derived from isolated or even coordinated individual actions? What if frustration is a generalized condition, in the sense that it is experienced by a large number of people, and largely attributable to shared conditions of existence? What if social relations in general are frustrating?

Given that the frustration associated with revolutionary aggression is a general phenomenon, in that it is shared by the working class as a whole, and finds its source in the material conditions of existence, Marx's explanation for displacement would appear to be far superior to that of either the earlier theorists of frustration-aggres-
sion or to that of Billig. Returning once more to Captial I, we find Marx suggesting that displaced aggression is ostensibly an error in judgement.

It took time and experience before the work people learnt to distinguish between machinery and its employment by capital, and to direct their attacks, not against the material instruments of production, but against the mode in which they are used.
(Marx 1977: 404)

The working class, fully aware that their wants were not being met because their jobs had been usurped by machines, sought initially to attack and destroy these machines. The instrumental quality of their actions speaks for itself; without the machines the capitalist would be forced to re-hire the workers. Only through experience did the worker learn that capital necessarily replaced the machines and that the more appropriate target for their aggression was capitalism itself.

The concept of instrumentality is a concept accepted by Billig, even though his analysis of displacement might suggest otherwise, and is considered central to any notion of large-scale frustration leading to aggression. Ancillary to this concept of instrumentality and equally central to the theory of large-scale aggression is the necessity of some form of commonality on the level of group meaning. As Billig so aptly puts it:

Frustration per se can explain all too little by not taking into account the cognitive meaning of that frustration for those who suffer it. Not to take account of the cognitive and social variables in a theory of group aggression would be to state that wars and revolutions are due to coincidence of individual states of emotional arousal.
(Billig 1976: 149)
It is obvious from Marx's work that the working class suffers what has been referred to as "systematic frustrations" experienced by members of a social aggregate. (Billig 1976: 158) As such, there is certainly a commonality of frustration upon which to premise a commonality of response. However, as Billig argues, and as I am sure Marx too would argue, systematic frustration itself would merely produce individualized responses. (Billig 1976: 156) All revolutionary movements require, therefore, some form of meaning system common to the group as a whole. Using Billig's own text:

...revolutionary movements do not occur in a social vacuum where the crucial determinant would be a certain level of physiological arousal. They occur because the participants believe that certain social, economic or political ends are being denied them, and furthermore that they should rightly possess such ends. The participants' belief systems and theories of social causation are of prime importance. (Billig 1976: 153)

Moreover, Marx himself would argue that this belief system not only had to be common but it had to be revolutionary. In the *German Ideology*, Marx persistently commented on the inability of the peasants to conduct a revolutionary communistic movement.

The great risings of the Middle Ages all radiated from the country, but equally remained totally ineffective because of the isolation and consequent crudity of the peasants. (Marx and Engels 1976: 66)

By 1850 Marx's opinion of the peasant class had changed somewhat. Where initially he saw no possibility of a common system of meaning developing as the basis for the opposition of given social conditions, he began to entertain the idea of a peasant class consciousness.

The peasants have a kind of historical tradition of their
own, which is handed down from father to son, and in this historical school it is muttered that whenever any government wants to dupe the peasants, it promises the abolition of the wine tax, and as soon as it has duped the peasants, retains or reintroduces the wine tax. In the wine tax the peasants test the bouquet of the government, its tendency. (Marx 1978: 120)

The peasants, as a class, had a traditional system of beliefs which defined class interests and developed a concept of social causation. By 1851, however, Marx had advanced his opinion of the class of peasants one step further. Not only were they capable of gaining a form of class consciousness but they were capable of granting this class consciousness a revolutionary content.

The three years of rigorous rule of the parliamentary republic had freed a part of the French peasants from the Napoleonic illusion and had revolutionised them, even if only superficially; but the bourgeoisie set themselves in motion. Under the parliamentary republic the modern and the traditional consciousness of the French peasant contended for mastery. (Marx 1979: 188)

The transformation of the consciousness of the peasant class was partial. Marx still maintains that "...the great mass of the French nation is formed by simple addition of homologous magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes". (Marx 1979: 187) The great mass of the French peasantry still held its Napoleonic illusions and its conservative attitudes. Nonetheless, Marx implies that at least certain elements of the peasant class were capable of revolutionary aggression for the first time because it had developed a class consciousness capable of expressing revolutionary demands.

While it is evident that Marx would agree with Billig on the necessity of a group belief system for effective revolutionary aggres-
sion, it is also evident that Marx went much further in this respect. Billig uses the concept of belief system, in the first instance, to address himself to the concept of "relative deprivation". In effect, Billig suggests that perceived frustration is more important to his model of frustration-aggression than is actually or objectively experienced frustration. The implication being, that there is a distinction to be made between objectively experienced frustration or social dissatisfaction and the frustration that finds itself at the core of a group's belief system. Presumably, the frustration or social dissatisfaction that manifests itself in the participants' belief system could be unconnected with any "real" experience of deprivation. It is the ideological frustration that actually results in mass group aggression according to Billig.

This emphasis on the non-objectivity of social dissatisfaction reveals something of Billig's concept of the revolutionary group's belief system. He claims that all belief systems are in fact ideologies, and that in revolutionary groups "...aggression is determined by the ideology". (Billig 1976: 154) While ideology may indeed play a role in Marx's theory of frustration-aggression, especially with respect to displacement, we find that Billig's definition of ideology, while it owes something to Marx, is far too dependent on Karl Mannheim for its content. Billig fails to make the distinction between class consciousness and ideology, believing, as did Mannheim, that all class consciousness is ideology. Indeed, Billig does not even retain Mannheim's distinction between ideology and utopia.

Returning to the concept of relative deprivation we remember
that in chapter two of this work we discovered Marx espousing just such a concept in relation to consumer necessity. However, Marx did not give this concept an ideological content. He did not argue, for instance, that the worker desired the palace because his class ideology told him to desire it, but merely because it arose next to his "hut". The worker experiences the desire for the less coarse consumer necessities of the capitalist class out of the simple perception of these articles of consumption. It is true that certain notions of "distributive justice" prevail, but these notions are not necessarily a part of a revolutionary working class ideology in that they are the content of bourgeois law and bourgeois ideology. The worker is frustrated not because his class ideology tells him that he wants more and better consumer necessities but because he finds more and better consumer necessities appearing on the market counter.

The rapid growth of productive capital brings about an equally rapid growth of wealth, luxury, social wants, social enjoyments. Thus, although the enjoyments of the worker have risen, the social satisfaction that they give has fallen in comparison with the state of development of society in general. (Marx 1977d: 216)

The content of relative deprivation is not ideological, but objectively real and experienced dissatisfaction. A sense of relative deprivation is not necessarily dependent on the formation of class consciousness but on the existence of social wealth and luxury. It is experienced by individuals, although it may find expression as a result of the relatively deprived class' consciousness.

We must admit, of course, that the content of relative deprivation may be the product of the experience of this deprivation. This
does not deny, however, that ideology plays a role in the response
to relative deprivation. Ideology may succeed in diffusing any vio­
lent revolutionary outbursts for a period of time. At the same time,
ideology may re-direct any aggressive actions in an attempt to safe­
guard the actual source of all deprivation. Moreover, the development
of working class consciousness — ideology for Billig — greatly enhances
the possibility of the working class developing a common aggressive
resistence as we shall find in our final chapter. But nowhere does
Marx argue that ideology or class consciousness creates relative de­
privation or causes relative deprivation to be transformed into frus­
tration.

The exclusively ideological nature of much of Billig's theory
of frustration-aggression may do damage to the theory as a whole pri­
marily because it makes the revolution a manipulable response. Given
the ideological nature of aggression it remains for "party ideologues"
to convince the worker that he suffers and that his suffering could
be alleviated through revolutionary activity. At the same time it leaves
the manipulation of working class responses open to bourgeois ideolo­
gues. The true battle between the classes then becomes a battle of
ideas; the winner of this battle gets to general the working class.

Conclusions

We have discovered that the theory of frustration-aggression
found in Marx is extremely complex. It must account for various class
manifestations of aggression and at the same time make the distinction
between revolutionary aggression and reactionary aggression. We have promised to deal more fully with several related issues in our next chapter.

Our brief sojourn with an external model has proved as effective as we could expect although not as effective as we might have hoped. Nonetheless, it has suggested to us a direction to be followed. While Billig certainly does not offer a Marxist theory of frustration-aggression, although this may have been his ultimate intent, he does help us to define several areas of theoretical import.

We have discovered that frustration resulting in aggression can be mediated by an instigation to aggress. Let us refer to this as passion. In doing so, however, we must make it clear that what is for Billig a desire to aggress is for us a desire to act. The act is aggressive given certain conditions and is revolutionary only in certain situations. As such, frustration-aggression, at least as an explanation for revolutionary activity, is an historically specific theory of human behavior. We will, as we have already suggested, attempt to explain this further in the next chapter.

Although Billig's theory and its reliance on ideology is problematic, it serves to indicate the importance of ideology with respect to any theory of class action. As a consequence we will necessarily revise Billig's concept and, following Marx, we will in future refer to ideology, class consciousness and communist consciousness as separate and distinct manifestations of class beliefs. This too we shall attempt in our next chapter.

With these promises in mind, let us proceed.
CHAPTER FIVE

The Objective and Subjective Content of Revolution

The concept of revolutionary behavior is central to our attempt to understand Marx's social psychology with reference to a rather complex theory of frustration-aggression. It is for this reason that we must finally turn our attentions in this direction. We must come to understand Marx's ideas about the fundamental causes of revolutionary movements as well as those factors to which they owe their success. To facilitate this understanding we will concentrate on the revolutionary movement most often mentioned in Marx's work and, therefore, on the revolution implied in the transformation from capitalism to communism.

We have previously criticized Michael Billig for giving the concept of revolutionary aggression a much too ideological content, especially with reference to relative deprivation. We find Marx consistently arguing in favour of the experience of absolute and relative deprivation as the source of the necessity for a working class revolutionary response.

The proletarian, for example, who like every human being has the vocation of satisfying his needs and who is not in a position to satisfy even the needs that he has in common with all human beings, the proletarian whom necessity to work a 14-hour day debases to the level of beast of burden, whom competition degrades to a mere thing, an article of trade, who from his position as a mere productive force, this sole position left to him, is squeezed out by other, more powerful productive forces — this proletarian is, if only for these reasons, confronted with the task of revolutionising his conditions.

(Marx and Engels 1976: 289)
The rather simple argument that revolutionary aggression must be a response to the experience of objectively based dissatisfaction— to absolute and relative deprivation where the feeling of deprivation is not defined by ideology—is inadequate to any explanation of Marx's concept of revolution. Marx too often cites examples of failed revolutionary movements which begin in the realm of absolute deprivation.

Considering the class struggle in France, Marx argued that:

The workers had no choice; they had to starve or take action. They answered on June 22 with the tremendous insurrection in which the first great battle was fought between the two classes that split modern society. It was a fight for the preservation or annihilation of the bourgeois order. (Marx 1978: 67)

Facing the prospects of starvation the Paris proletariat initiated the revolution. But their revolution remained essentially non-revolutionary simply because the "avowed needs" of the proletariat did not demand the overthrow of bourgeois society for their satisfaction.

The Paris proletariat was forced into the June insurrection by the bourgeoisie. This sufficed to mark its doom. Its immediate, avowed needs did not drive it to engage in a fight for the forcible overthrow of the bourgeoisie, nor was it equal to the task.

(Marx 1978: 69)

The Paris proletariat experienced frustration in the form of the denial of basic necessities and yet its actions were neither revolutionary nor successful.

For Marx, then, revolution—in particular, successful revolution—occurs given several empirically observable conditions beyond the mere existence of relative or absolute deprivation.

These conditions of life, which different generations find
in existence, determine also whether or not the revolutionary convulsions periodically recurring in history will be strong enough to overthrow the basis of everything that exists. And if these material elements of a complete revolution are not present — namely, on the one hand the existing productive forces, on the other the formation of a revolutionary mass, which revolts not only against separate conditions of existing society but against the existing "production of life" itself, the "total activity" on which it is based — then it is absolutely immaterial for practical development whether the idea of this revolution has been expressed a hundred times already, as the history of communism proves.

(Marx and Engels 1976: 54)

While the concept of absolute deprivation is important we find Marx suggesting that there must be a correct development of the forces of production if there is to be a successful revolutionary venture. Moreover, the ultimate level of attainment that any revolutionary activity is capable of achieving is, in the final analysis, limited by these productive forces. (Marx and Engels 1976: 431) In effect, the quality of social life after a successful revolutionary movement has been pre-determined by the productive forces which comprise its foundation.

On the other hand, Marx makes it abundantly clear that the success of a revolution is also dependent on the active participation of a large mass of revolutionaries. In other words, where a revolutionary movement seeks to overturn an already entrenched social order it must be able to depend on the support of a relatively large percentage of the population if it is to expect any measure of success. Indeed, Marx often noted that the success of the bourgeois revolutions was largely due to the ability of the bourgeoisie to draw the workers into the battle through the expression of bourgeois class interests as
universal interests. Which brings us to another important point; it is not enough that a revolutionary movement enjoy the support of a mass of people, rather, it is necessary that this mass of people have some sense of common purpose or interest binding them together.

Marx's third point, a point easily overlooked, deals with the nature of the target of the revolutionary aggression. Successful revolutions do not occur where the target is a particular "separate condition"; instead, the target of a successful revolution must be the entire corpus — the "total activity", the "production of life" itself — of social relations.

We are now confronted with several questions. Given that the revolutionary upheaval we wish to investigate is the workers' revolution, how are these material pre-conditions to manifest themselves? What is the productive and social basis for revolution? How is the revolutionary mass formed? What causes this mass to take on a revolutionary character? These questions will necessarily be answered differently for each different historical revolution. We must seek to answer these questions and, in order to make our answers as concrete and as specific as possible, we will concentrate on the historical revolution that Marx anticipated as a workers' revolution.

**Historically Specific Material Pre-conditions**

For Marx the material pre-conditions for a successful revolutionary movement are fourfold. First there is the necessary production of a mass capable of expressing itself in a revolutionary manner.
Secondly, there is the necessary ability of the pre-existing society to produce social wealth adequate to the overall wants of society in general. Thirdly, there is the reduction of necessary labour time to a minimum. It is this reduction that permits Agnes Heller to premise a radical need for free time. Fourthly, there is the universal development of individuals premised on the universal development of social and economic relations.

The formation of a mass capable of developing a revolutionary content in the case of a working class revolution is, according to Marx, directly attributed to the concentrating impetus of the production relations of capitalism.

It posits the concentration of workers in production, a unification which will occur initially only in a common location, under overseers, regimentation, greater discipline, regularity and the POSITED dependence in production itself on capital. (Marx 1973: 587)

To put it simply, the working class as a mass of people is a production of the concentration of labour-power into given locations thereby facilitating the increased capacity of the capitalist production process and further reducing the possibility of waste due to lack of supervision.

Initially association was minimal in that competition for scarce jobs directly limited any form of cooperative action. (Marx and Engels 1976: 77) Indeed, given the non-voluntary nature of working class association and the social nature of alienated labour, the worker often treated working class combination as an alien power. (Marx 1973: 470; 1977b: 85) Gradually, however, the working class began to develop
some level of cooperative class association based on the commonality of interest implied in the maintenance of wages.

Large-scale industry concentrates in one place a crowd of people unknown to one another. Competition divides their interests. But the maintenance of wages, their common interest which they have against their boss, unites them in a common thought of resistance—combination. (Marx 1976: 210)

Thus, we find capitalism, more precisely, the production process of large-scale industry, gives birth to a social class capable of expressing opposition to its conditions of existence and reproduction. At the same time, Marx realizes that, not only must the class exist, but that this class must be powerful enough to carry out its revolutionary purposes. Indeed, Marx occasionally attributes the failure of revolutionary movements to the relative powerlessness of the working class. (Marx and Engels 1976: 66) The simplification of class antagonisms implied in bourgeois social relations (Marx and Engels 1976a: 485) suggests that the division of society into two contending classes, one of which, the proletariat, comprises the vast majority (Marx and Engels 1976: 59), would develop a class powerful enough, if only in sheer numbers, to overthrow the existing society. At the same time, not only is the number of members of a revolutionary mass important, but the concentration of these members also serves to increase their resistance. (Marx 1977: 474)

The development of a class capable of expressing opposition to the conditions of its existence as a class, would imply that the conditions of its existence were disatisfying conditions. This is obviously the case as we have seen with Marx's emphasis on absolute
deprivation, although relative deprivation applies equally well. However, while Marx emphasizes the power of absolute deprivation in the creation of a revolutionary mass, he further accentuates this deprivation with reference to an apparent contradiction implicit in bourgeois society.

In order to become an "unendurable" power, i.e., a power against which men make a revolution, it must necessarily have rendered a great mass of humanity "propertyless", and moreover in contradiction to an already existing world of wealth and culture; both these premises presuppose a great increase in productive power, a high degree of its development.
(Marx and Engels 1976: 48)

Only where absolute deprivation has taken on a relative content — in effect, only where absolute deprivation becomes relative deprivation in the sense that it is opposed to an "existing world of wealth" — does deprivation become an "unendurable" condition. On the subjective level the necessity of the contradiction between absolute poverty and absolute wealth is obvious given the theory of need that we previously discussed in chapter two. The social character of wants and the existence of desire as a function of perception suggest that where few wants can be satisfied, few demands are made. In short, if the working class were deprived primarily because the social order was generally unable to satisfy any surplus wants, it would not experience the dissatisfaction necessary to its combination as a revolutionary class.

However, the existence of this social wealth, as we shall soon see, has an objective necessity with respect to the success of a revolutionary movement. In "Moralizing Criticism and Critical Morality",
a polemic directed against Karl Heinzen and published in several issues of the Deutsche-Brusseler-Zeitung, Marx points out that in the course of its development a class bent on the revolutionary overthrow of existing society must first "...produce the material conditions of a new society itself, and no exertion of mind or will can free it from this fate". (Marx 1976b: 320)

The existence of social wealth is at least partially necessary for the success of the communist revolution. Yet this development of the material conditions of production capable of sustaining communist society — of social wealth, among other things — takes on a unique twist with the working class. The alienated conditions of production premised on wage labour implies that the working class is incapable of determining, in the first place, the type of material conditions it produces and, in the second place, is denied an effective share in those material pre-conditions that it does produce. In short, the working class is "locked into" the production and reproduction of the conditions of alienated labour, hence, into the reproduction of the material conditions of capitalism.

With respect to this first condition Marx at least partially relieves the working class of the responsibility for the creation of these material pre-conditions for communism in that the creation of the material pre-conditions is attributed to the bourgeoisie. As we earlier mentioned in chapter four, the individual capitalist, acting as a member of his class, is forced by the "passion" to maximize the production of value to act in a revolutionary manner. Indeed, Marx argues that:
The bourgeois cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. (Marx and Engels 1976a: 487)

In the process of fulfilling the demands he experiences as the personification of capital, the capitalist undermines the very society he is dedicated to preserve. The production of the material pre-conditions for communist society is an unintended consequence of capitalists actively seeking to fulfill their function as the will and consciousness of capitalism. The input of the working class in this production of the material pre-conditions for their success as a revolutionary force is limited simply to this: the working class supplies the labour-power necessary to the production of all social wealth and of all material pre-conditions.

The development of productive forces capable of satisfying all social wants (i.e., consumer necessities) adequately, is central to the possibility of any movement beyond the social and production relations of capitalism. As Marx argues, the development of certain forces of production is:

...an absolutely necessary and practical premise, because without it privation, want is merely made general, and with want the struggle for necessities would begin again, and all the old filthy business would necessarily be restored;...

(Marx and Engels 1976: 49)

Thus, in addition to its subjective necessity as the source of dissatisfaction, this ability to produce absolute wealth is necessary if the inequitable distribution of social satisfactions, and with it the division of labour and private property, is not to reassert itself as the principle social relation. Only where all wants are realistically and
to labour. The capitalist consistently usurps the labourer's free time — as time for individual development — in order to increase the production of social wealth. (Marx 1973: 634) Thus, during times of great productive activity the working class is variously employed in the production of commodities. At such times, as we have seen, workers experience a relatively small expansion in social enjoyments due to an enhanced ability to purchase consumer necessities.

A certain degree of individual development is possible because of this enhanced ability to purchase consumer necessities. The worker may have the money necessary in order to purchase books, to see plays, to share in culture. However, even though he may have the power to increase his social enjoyments he often lacks the free time necessary for more complete development. On the other hand, during times of reduced productive activity — during times of economic contraction — the worker is thrown out of work. And while he now has more of the free time necessary to his individual development he no longer possesses an adequate share of the social wealth with which to satisfy his most basic wants.

The contradictions in the workers existence are evident. No less evident are the contradictions implicit in capitalism itself. They are experienced in the everyday life of the worker as the existence of social wealth without a share in its consumption. But this experience of the contradictions within capitalism is further intensified by the periodic collisions within capitalism itself.

As a consequence of the contradictory nature of capitalism the bourgeois form of property repeatedly comes into collision with
the newly developing forces of production — forces of production which Marx apparently argues are more appropriate to the development of a communist society.

The productive forces at the disposal of society no longer tend to further the development of the conditions of bourgeois property; on the contrary, they have become too powerful for these conditions, by which they are fettered, and as soon as they overcome these fetters, they bring disorder into the whole basis of bourgeois society, endangering the basis of bourgeois society.

(Marx and Engels 1976a: 490)

This collision between the forces of production and bourgeois property, occurring as a "natural" product of the necessary development of revolutionary instruments of production and of revolutionized relations of production, brings about a forcible reinforcement of the laws of bourgeois property. The forces of production are capable of overproducing and of undermining the privateness of property in their overproduction. In order to achieve the reinforcement of bourgeois property there necessarily occurs a destruction of the offending forces of production — factories are closed and machinery is left to decay — a general depreciation of existing capital, a contraction of production, and the collision between bourgeois property and production relations manifests itself as a crisis of overproduction.

The crises are always but momentary and forcible solutions to the existing contradictions. They are violent eruptions which for a time restore the disturbed equilibrium.

(Marx 1977b: 249)

The restoration of the equilibrium, the reaffirmation of bourgeois property relations, is always temporary. The stage is set for greater and more destructive crises. The working class experience of the contradiction between wealth and poverty is intensified with
each new crisis. In the face of his poverty capital hurls the destruction of untold wealth. With this destruction of capital and with the crisis of over-production the worker's existence is constantly placed in jeopardy as he loses his means of livelihood in the contraction of production. As the powers of the production process escalate with the further development of capitalism, the consequent crises deepen.

Hence the highest development of productive power with the greatest expansion of existing wealth will coincide with depreciation of capital, degradation of the labourer, and a most sophisticated exhaustion of his vital powers.

(Marx 1973: 750)

The worker sinks ever deeper into the depths of absolute deprivation, which he nonetheless experiences as relative deprivation due to the existence of absolute wealth. The worker's life is a living manifestation of the contradiction that is capitalism. How can he fail but react to his conditions in an aggressive manner?

We have seen how the productive capabilities of capitalism lay the foundation for the possibility of communist society. We have also seen how the contradictory character of capitalism might "cause" the working class to desire a new social order. What remains to be seen is the process whereby this mass of workers, frustrated by the contradictions which are at the very core of their lives — the contradiction between a world of material wealth and a life of absolute poverty — is transformed into a revolutionary mass capable of overthrowing society.
In chapter four we developed a concept of frustration-aggression which suggested that cognitive variables were important mediating factors. As such, we argued that aggression should not simply be understood as an organism's instinctual "lashing-out" at anything which hinders the satisfaction of its wants or needs. Instead, we suggested that the organism approached aggression instrumentally, as one possible course of action among many. This does not imply that Marx rejects any form of instinctual lashing-out. Men may daily and repeatedly lash-out without concern for the instrumentality of their actions. But up until this point — the point where society is class society and where revolution should be working class revolution — Marx has concerned himself, for the most part, with class individuals rather than with individuals per se. In the case of class individuals Marx seems to maintain that their response to frustration is typically instrumental and, in this sense, requires an adequate foundation upon which to premise decision making procedures. Thus, Marx argues:

As soon as the working-class, stunned at first by the noise and the turmoil of the new system of production, recovered, in some measure, its senses, its resistance began,...

(Marx 1977: 264)

The reader cannot miss the almost organic way in which Marx speaks of the stunned working class. It might appear that Marx has personified the class itself. We know, of course, that this was not Marx's intention. He spoke too often of the working class as a class in which "...it is as individuals that the individuals participate
in it". (Marx and Engels 1976: 80) Indeed, he lay all hopes for an end to class conflict, hence for a successful communist revolution, on the existence of individuals who had not been subsumed by their classes. (Marx and Engels 1976: 77) As such, we can only assume that the working class did not resist its exploitation at the hands of capitalism because its individual members found themselves incapable of making the decision to resist collectively. In effect, their individual resistance is not interpreted as revolutionary working class resistance.

We would suggest that this early working class was little more than a group of mutually competing individuals who, although they shared in a common living condition, did not as yet share in a sense of "classness". Thus, the lack of working class resistance can be traced to the existence of a class of individuals — individuals who are nonetheless class individuals — who, due to the fact that the working class has no exclusive class interests to call its own, are not determined by particular class interests. To put it more simply, the bourgeoisie cooperate in order to protect their class interests. The worker, on the other hand, not possessed of the class interests necessary for class cooperation, finds no "natural" basis for cooperation, hence, for resistance. The workers resist capitalism, initially, on the basis of individual interests which may not necessarily be shared with the rest of the class. In essence, the lack of working class resistance is a problem of individuation.

While the problem of individuation is in many senses central to the inability of the working class to resist capitalism, Marx also
suggests that there is a problem of consciousness. This problem of consciousness is at least partially an integral element of the problem of individuation since workers must come to realize that they possess common interests that require common resistance. However, the problems of consciousness are also more than this.

In the early stages of capitalism, or so we would like to argue, the consciousness of the individual worker was somewhat incongruous with his life situation. In effect, the worker is still infected with habitual and feudal ways of interpreting the world which lead to the development of "false consciousness". He considers himself to be a serf, a peasant, a medieval burgher or craftsman in the guise of wage labour. His world is coloured by feudal conceptions which directly limit his resistance. We also, therefore, are confronted with a problem of false consciousness which must be overcome in our search for a revolutionary mass.

We must necessarily deal with the "problem of individuation" before we attempt to understand the "problem of consciousness". Capitalism, having set up the conditions under which individual workers are forced to compete in order to survive, has thereby isolated these workers from each other with the result that:

...the isolated labourer, the labourer as "free" vendor of his labour-power, when capitalist production has once attained a certain stage, succumbs without any power of resistance.

(Marx 1977: 283)

The isolation of the individual worker, the fact that the individual worker treats working class association as an alien power, effectively strengthens the power of capitalism. We might argue that the worker,
as an isolated individual, is complacent primarily because he views his individual resistance as pointless. This is the root of the connection between the problem of consciousness and the problem of individuation. We are not sure that Marx would make this connection between isolation and the pointlessness of resistance. Indeed, Marx might argue that individual resistance is still possible and occurs with some regularity. But individual resistance is effectively pointless from a revolutionary standpoint in that individual resistance can hardly cause the overthrow of existing society.

In the process of bringing workers together, however, capitalism develops the conditions whereby some form of common class consciousness can take shape. The problem of individuation is overcome in the process of developing a common understanding of the life situation which the workers share in common. The worker remains individuated in the sense that the class interests are distillations of the individual interests of the members of the working class. With the development of this basis for common activity the complacency of some workers is replaced by a sense of the power of associated labour. The decision to resist is, for some, at least partially dependent on the perception of a possibility of successful resistance. More importantly, with the development of a basis for common activity, the strength of the working class as a revolutionary force is greatly enhanced.

The confusion implicit in the formation of a class during periods of social dissolution (i.e., during the transition from feudalism to capitalism) is largely due to the non-correspondence of the individual worker's conceptions with the conditions of existence. In other
words, the "problem of false consciousness" is a result of individuals who habitually interpret their non-feudal world with reference to feudal conceptions. Indeed, this continued existence of a feudal mentality seriously limits the early resistance of the working class.

The proletariat goes through various stages of development. With its birth begins its struggle with the bourgeoisie. At first the contest is carried on by individual labourers, then by the operatives of one trade, in one locality, against the individual bourgeois who directly exploit them. They direct their attacks not against the bourgeois conditions of production, but against the instruments of production themselves; they destroy imported wares that compete with their labour, they smash to pieces machinery, they set factories ablaze, they seek to restore by force the vanished status of the workman of the Middle Ages. (Marx and Engels 1976a: 492)

As individual members of a class, the worker's first attempts at resistance are individual and isolated. With their development as a class their resistance becomes a more cooperative effort. Those who share common conditions of production, and because they share common conditions of production they share common living conditions (Marx 1977b: 86), begin to develop a common consciousness—in as much as their consciousness is consciousness of these living conditions. Nonetheless, their initial common resistance is still directly attuned to the "feudal mentality" of the individual worker. They do not seek to "overcome" capitalism, but, instead, they seek to reverse the process of historical development in a restoration of the social and production relations of the Middle Ages. This is in part due to the content of working class wants; a content which is largely made up of habitually satisfied but presently denied wants. In effect, the working class makes demands for satisfaction of the wants that were pre-
viously satisfied under conditions of feudal production. Because they remember that these wants were satisfied by feudal production and social relations they express a desire to return to these formerly satisfying relations.

We might, therefore, be led to argue that only the experience of the new wants — the radical wants — of capitalism will result in a working class which directs its resistance towards revolutionary goals. These radical wants, wants not experienced prior to capitalism — at least not in the manner that they are experienced under capitalism — leave the working class in a position where it is unable to call for a return to the more comfortable feudal relations. These radical wants cannot be satisfied by the social and production relations of feudalism, nor are they satisfied by capitalist society. However, certain aspects of capitalism are necessary to the satisfaction of these radical wants and, thus, the working class must seek to overthrow capitalism, at least that part of capitalist social relations which acts as a fetter on the satisfaction of these radical wants, if it is to realize the satisfaction of radical wants.

The desire for the universal development of the individual, the desire for substantial freedom, might compel the working class to commit itself to a revolutionary course of action. No doubt there is something to this theory. Indeed, this is the basis of Heller's concept of radical needs. But to the extent that the reactionary content of the early resistance of the working class is connected to the existence of a "feudal mentality", and to the extent that even wants take their place in the production of consciousness (Marx and Engels
1976: 440), it would appear of the utmost importance that the working class develop a consciousness capable of giving a revolutionary content to their resistance.

Having suggested that revolution is at least partially dependent on the development of a common consciousness capable of sustaining revolutionary resistance, it would seem an appropriate point for us to begin our analysis of the role of ideology in Marx's theory of frustration-aggression. We previously argued that Billig over emphasized the role of ideology in his model and that he developed a concept to ideology not entirely in keeping with Marx. This does not imply that there is no role to be played by consciousness in Marx's theory. Rather, we would argue that, to the extent that working class consciousness and communist consciousness are not ideological, Marx's theory discounts ideology as a source of revolutionary working class aggression.

Marx suggested in the *German Ideology* that the foundation of ideological thought was implicit in the fully developed division of labour.

Division of labour only becomes truly such from the moment when a division of material and mental labour appears. From this moment onwards consciousness can really flatter itself that it is something other than consciousness of existing practice, that it really represents something real; from now on consciousness is in a position to emancipate itself from the world and to proceed to the formation of "pure" theory, theology, philosophy, morality, etc. (Marx and Engels 1976: 44)

The division of labour into material and mental labour, in part the foundation for the conflict between self-interest and general interest, also implies the development of consciousness independent of the
conditions of material production. Being independent of the conditions of production, as experienced by the working class, allows those who do not labour to ignore those contradictions in bourgeois society that daily present themselves to the proletariat.

We find that with the division of labour there develops a division of society into classes possessed of opposed interests, and a corresponding development of a class whose major responsibility is abstract thought (i.e., priests, philosophers, etc.). Typically, the non-productive section of the contemplative class (some members of the contemplative class are productive — e.g., engineers, architects, scientists, etc.,) must align itself and its conceptions with the interests of the ruling class since the ruling class is capable of syphoning off surplus value in order to support non-productive members of society. As a result of this alignment with the ruling powers the abstract conceptions of the non-producing contemplative class take on an ideological quality; ideas develop which tend to justify or rationalize the exercise of political power, and the manner of its execution, by a single ruling class.

The existence of a non-producing contemplative class — a class of priests and philosophers etc., — was, or so Marx believed, largely a product of social relations premised on personal dependence. With the development of the capitalist mode of production and with the experience of social relations premised on personal independence and objective dependence a far more subtle form of ideology develops which appeals to the mystical nature of capitalist production.

The social powers, i.e., the multiplied productive forces,
which arise through the co-operation of different individuals as it is caused by the division of labour, appears to these individuals, since their co-operation is not voluntary but has come about naturally, not as their own united power, but as an alien force existing outside them, of the origin and goal of which they are ignorant, which they thus are no longer able to control, which on the contrary passes through a peculiar series of phases and stages independent of the will and the action of man, nay even being the prime governor of these.

(Marx and Engels 1976: 48)

For Marx, the mystification of production and social relations, in part the product of social relations of personal independence (Marx 1977: 81) and of social production (Marx 1977: 82), makes the power of social production appear as an alien force. Thus, in the production of commodities, in the production of alienated objects and in the alienation of human powers, Marx discovers the foundation of bourgeois ideology. At the same time, Marx argues, in the Grundrisse, that the process of exchange—a necessary moment in commodity production—further mystifies social relations.

This system of exchange rests on capital as foundation, and, when it is regarded in isolation from capital, as it appears on the surface, as an independent system, then it is a mere illusion, but a necessary illusion. Thus there is no longer ground for astonishment that the system of exchange values—exchange of equivalents measured through labour—turns into, or rather reveals as its hidden background, the appropriation of alien labour without exchange, complete separation of labour and property.

(Marx 1973: 509)

The disguised exploitation that is the key to relations of production and the social relations of capitalism, the confusion inherent in mistaking profit for surplus value (Marx 1977b: 167), the mystification of relations arising out of money transactions (Marx 1977a: 318), all serve to subvert the worker from his best interests.
On the one hand the appearance of the alienated social powers of production implies complacent workers. The apparent powerlessness of all men, in the face of an alien force which they cannot control, causes the workers to accept their conditions as merely natural conditions. (Marx 1977: 689) Where working class resistance does take place it is typically not directed at the entire "production of life" or the "total activity" which is the basis of their suffering. Instead, it addresses itself to only partial issues in its opposition to the instruments of production. Until the worker can "get behind" the appearance of things, until the workers can remove the blinders of ideology founded on the appearance of alienation, and thereby demystify social and production relations, working class revolutionary aggression is an impossibility.

While the reproduction of capitalism and the continual alienation implicit in wage labour might appear to suggest that the ideological blinders of the working class are continually reproduced, this is not the case. Marx makes it plainly obvious that the working class reaches a stage in its development where it is no longer fooled by ideology.

For the mass of men, i.e., the proletariat, these theoretical notions do not exist and hence do not require to be dissolved, and if this mass ever had any theoretical notions, e.g., religion, these have now long been dissolved by circumstances.
(Marx and Engels 1976: 56)

The conditions under which the class of workers reproduces itself, and as a consequence reproduces its oppressor and its conditions of oppression, predicates a dissolution of ideology as a power
capable of controlling working class activities. The first form of ideology to fall under the axe of working class circumstances is the less subtle ideology of personal dependence. The ideological conceptions and ideas of the "feudal mentality" of the early working class is replaced with a working class consciousness devoid of ideological conceptions.

Marx repeatedly suggests that class consciousness is largely a product of the conditions of existence under which a class reproduces itself (Marx 1979: 128) and that the ruling ideas are the ideas of the ruling class. (Marx and Engels 1976: 59) With capitalism, however, the contradictory nature of social and production relations results in the development of a working class consciousness — consciousness aware of the contradictions implicit in the living conditions of the working class — that stands opposed to the ideological class consciousness of the bourgeoisie. The ideas of the ruling class, as ruling ideas, are gradually revealed as ideology to the working class in the process of developing a working class consciousness.

The development of an independent working class consciousness is, according to Marx, largely a product of the realization of a common predicament. In the first place, class consciousness is largely consciousness of poverty (Marx and Engels 1975: 36). But it is also more than this. Marx suggests that the contradictions inherent in capitalist society — in effect, the contradictions that manifest themselves in crises and in the existence of social wealth in opposition to the poverty of the working class — demonstrate the fallability of bourgeois society and, as a consequence, the fallability and falsity
of bourgeois ideology. (Marx and Engels 1976: 293) Marx further sug-
gests that the continued development of working class cooperation and
of the capitalist system in general tend to de-mystify the conditions
of exploitation that pervades capitalism.

With the development of co-operation on the part of the
labourers, and of stock enterprises on the part of the bour-
geoisie, even the last pretext for the confusion of profit
of enterprise and wages of management was removed, and pro-
fit appeared in theory, as mere surplus-value, a value for
which no equivalent was paid, as realised unpaid labour.
(Marx 1977b: 389)

Marx suggests that working class consciousness is largely cons-
ciousness of poverty and of the improper character of this poverty.
As such, the experience of deprivation, absolute or relative depriva-
tion, is further intensified and modified by the belief that this de-
privation is improper. However, while this is an enormous "advance
in awareness" it still does not suffice to dictate a revolutionary
content with respect to working class aggression. Rather, it takes
a more difficult and radical advance in consciousness for the trans-
formation of working class resistance into working class revolution.

Before any revolutionary advance is possible, Marx appears
to suggest, the working class must develop some form of communist con-
sciousness. Marx further suggests that this communist consciousness
develops as a product of the living conditions of the working class.

...a class is called forth which has to bear all the bur-
dens of society without enjoying its advantages, which is
ousted from society and forced into the sharpest contra-
diction to all other classes; a class which forms the maj-
ority of all members of society, and from which emanates
the consciousness of the necessity of a fundamental revo-
lution, the communist consciousness, which may, of course,
arise among the other classes too through the contempla-
tion of the situation of this class.
(Marx and Engels 1976: 52)
Or, as Marx chooses to express it in an earlier work; the development of a revolutionary class is dependent upon the development of a class with radical chains, of a "...sphere which has a universal character by its universal suffering and claims no particular right because no particular wrong but wrong generally is perpetrated against it;...". (Marx 1975a: 186)

The development of a communist consciousness does not simply imply the realization that a fundamental revolution is necessary in order to overcome the living conditions of absolute poverty in which the working class continually exists. Rather, it also derives both "...the content and the material for its revolutionary activity directly in its own situation". (Marx 1978: 56) In effect, the developed communist consciousness is aware, in a general sense, of a strategy and of a direction or purpose. On the other hand, Marx also suggests that the contemplation of these conditions of existence can also successfully develop a communist consciousness. However, nowhere does Marx argue that all members of the working class will develop a communist consciousness and thereby a revolutionary zeal. There seems to be an implicit connection between resistance, rather, between collective resistance, and the development of a communist consciousness.

Both for the production on a mass scale of this communist consciousness, and for the success of the cause itself, the alteration of men on a mass scale is necessary, an alteration which can only take place in a practical movement, a revolution; the revolution is necessary, therefore, not only because the ruling class cannot be overthrown in any other way, but also because the class overthrowing it can only in a revolution succeed in ridding itself of all the muck of the ages and become fitted to found society anew. (Marx and Engels 1976: 52)
The development of a communist consciousness on a mass scale requires the development of a successful revolutionary movement. But if the development of a communist consciousness is a prerequisite for a successful revolutionary movement, how is this movement to become a reality?

Marx offers us two logical alternatives. On the one hand, since those who contemplate the situation of the working class can develop a communist consciousness without experiencing the situation of the working class, we might find workers being "taught" the communist consciousness. Indeed, this might appear to be a task that Marx had set for himself. On the other hand, since "...even a minority of workers who combine and go on strike very soon find themselves compelled to act in a revolutionary way" (Marx and Engels 1976: 204), we might find the development of a core of revolutionary workers who could take the task of leading the working class revolution upon themselves.

Marx suggests that both alternatives are viable and in the Manifesto of the Communist Party, he does not maintain a distinction between those communists that develop through the contemplation of the situation of the working class and those communists that develop out of that class. (Marx and Engels 1976a: 497) Indeed, the communists were merely "...the most advanced and resolute section of the working-class parties in every country, that section which pushes forward all others". (Marx and Engels 1976a: 497)

In the German Ideology, Marx argues that the leaders of the working class movement will be created by the conditions of produc-
tion in large-scale industry (Marx and Engels 1976: 74), and we can only assume that these leaders will develop the communist consciousness out of their continual active involvement in working class resistance. However, if we assume that those involved in large-scale industry will experience the most powerful manifestation of the want or desire for universality — since, of course, their labour will be the most routinized and fragmented — we might see how the experience of the want for universality, as the desire for universal development, might guide the revolution, through the effects of this want on the leaders of the working class movement, in the direction of communism.

The existence of a leading minority who have "...the advantage of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement" (Marx and Engels 1976a: 497), as a result of their development of a communist consciousness, implies that the movement is largely a movement of a dissatisfied and frustrated minority. To this end, in Capital III, Marx argues that "(t)he more a ruling class is able to assimilate the foremost minds of the ruled class, the more stable and dangerous becomes its rule". (Marx 1977b: 601) In effect, it is in the interests of the capitalist class to subvert those capable of lending a revolutionary content to the working class movement. Worker resistance without a revolutionary content is presumed to be relatively ineffective.

While Marx insists that there is a revolutionary minority in positions of leadership within the working class, the need for frustration as an instigation to action is still a necessary requisite to revolutionary aggression. In that "...theory becomes a material force
as soon as it has gripped the masses" (Marx 1975a: 182), and since communist theory, as theory about revolution, can only grip the masses if it represents the "...realisation of the needs of that people" (Marx 1975a: 183) as immediate practical needs (Marx 1975a: 183), it stands to reason that the leaders of the working class movement, as communists, must make appeals to the wants of the working class.

The working class movement, as a movement whose aim is the resistance of capitalist oppression, is a movement of the vast majority. (Marx and Engels 1976a: 495) More importantly, it is the movement of a vast majority that is frustrated. The working class is capable of resistance — based on its consciousness of its deprivation and of the improper character of this deprivation — even where a revolutionary leadership is missing. The revolutionary leadership, therefore, does not "cause" working class resistance or aggression, it merely seeks to channel this resistance in a revolutionary direction. It helps to guide the working class towards the achievement of revolutionary goals and assists in the diffusion of a communist consciousness. Ultimately, however, the development of both the communist consciousness and the working class movement in general, is dependent on the experience of deprivation. The sense of frustration that arises out of the contradiction between working class poverty as against the wealth of the capitalist class, combined with the realization that the relations of production are capable of extending social wealth beyond the confines of the capitalist class, manifests itself as working class resistance in general and as communist theory in particular.
Conclusions

We have seen that the objective foundations for a revolutionary movement are very important for Marx. Revolutions which the forces of production are incapable of sustaining necessarily fail. However, the power of these objective foundations also manifests itself in the mobilization of a resisting class of men. In effect, the subjective content of a revolutionary movement is a derivative of the objective foundations.

The working class, the centre of resistance, premises this resistance on the experience of dissatisfaction. As this working class develops and becomes politically cooperative the individual workers can make the decision to commonly resist their oppression. This is in part the result of the perception of increased strength and of the consequent increase in the potential for successful resistance. And yet, at the same time, the cooperation of the working class contributes to the de-mystification of the social and production relations of capitalism. As a result, working class resistance becomes more "scientific" and effective in its ability to achieve its goals. Where the resistance initially sought to destroy the instruments of production, it soon sought to manipulate the process of production by withdrawing its services. In effect, labourers, realizing the importance of their labour power, attempted, according to Marx, to change the system (e.g., they sought to increase their share of the social wealth, or they sought to reduce their labour time) by striking against the conditions of their employment by capital.
Marx suggests that each withdrawal of labour power by the workers further concentrated and strengthened the working class. At the same time, it aided in the development of a revolutionary communist consciousness and of a working class leadership. The process of resistance demonstrated to some the futility of attempts to manipulate the various components of capitalism in an effort to gain a more equitable share of the social wealth. Those who realized this necessarily developed a theory of resistance that was premised on the revolutionary overthrow of capitalist society.

We must assume, therefore, that in addition to the experience of frustration, working class revolutionary aggression is dependent on the development of a consciousness which is capable of giving the basic aggression associated with dissatisfaction a revolutionary content. At least part of this content is a realization that the capitalist system is unable to grant an equitable share of the social wealth to the working class. However, we might also suggest that a part of this content is the experience of a want for universal development. Irregardless, the foundation for the development of working class resistance in general and of revolutionary aggression in particular is always the denial of satisfaction — in effect, the frustration experienced as a result of a life of absolute and relative deprivation — associated with poverty in the face of untold social wealth.
Although the term "historical materialism" was never used by Marx, it, nonetheless, has become a term generally used to describe Marx's method of historical analysis. We choose to continue with this usage of the term primarily because it is generally understood and accepted and because it defines the materialist discipline of historical analysis in fairly precise terms.

Our usage of the term "social psychology" differs somewhat from the more traditional concept of social psychology. It would appear necessary, therefore, that we define our terms in order to avoid confusion.

Whereas traditional social psychology has concerned itself with individual behavior and the behavior of small groups, with the process of individual socialization and the development of individual personality, we feel that these issues are less important for a social psychology which is to be developed within the confines of historical materialism. This is partly the result of Marx's method of analysis (i.e., concentration on individuals as members of certain historically specific politico-economic groups variously described as classes, estates, tribes, clans, etc.,) and, as such, a dictate of historical materialism as a method. As such, we find that the more traditional and abstract concepts of "in group", "out group", references to various abstract categorizations, are not entirely appropriate to social psychological analysis within the paradigm of historical materialism. At the same time, we concern ourselves with the concepts of socialization and personality development in only their broadest contexts.

The simplest definition that we would apply, therefore, to our notion of social psychology would tend to treat certain social and economic relations as historically specific phenomenon which "cause", in conjunction with certain elemental "human needs and capacities", the development of certain modes of socialization (it follows that different societies would socialize their members in different ways and to different extents), and of historically specific "personifications" or "character structures" (e.g.- tribe member, peasant, worker, capitalist, communist, etc.,), which, in turn, effect the social and economic relations. Thus, social psychology, in this sense, would be defined as an analysis of social and economic factors (including socialization and personification as social factors) and the dialectical relationship between all these factors and the historically and socially modified expression of needs and capacities.

Wilhelm Reich describes the temporarily successful establishment of "sex economic" clinics and groups in Berlin in, The Mass Psychology of Fascism (Reich: 1970), and in, Listen Little Man (Reich:

4 The assumption behind the theory of the historical production of social individuals is that the members of the primitive commune were non-individuated in the sense that they were possessed of a largely "tribal" consciousness. Gradually, the tribal consciousness is "permitted" to break down and individuals develop who are capable of expressing themselves as individuals and of satisfying their individual wants.

5 Marx implicitly understood the process of individuation to be a one-sided development in that it represented the dissolution of the community. (Krader 1972: 41) Thus, even though individuation is not complete in bourgeois society it is overdeveloped when compared to the relative underdevelopment of the social. Only with communism, only with the development of the want for the other person "as a person", is the development of the individual balanced or coordinated with the development of the social. Hence, at this stage social or communal existence is re-constituted at a higher level as fully individuated social existence.

6 Although Marx does not identify the want for universality as a radical want he does identify it as a want which arises largely due to the nature of detail labour. As such, the want of universality would appear to be a combination of the historically modified need for activity and the need for self-realization or true freedom.

7 In *Capital I*, Marx makes the point that man is a social animal quite clearly.

...man is, if not as Aristotle contends, a political, at all events a social animal.

(Marx 1977: 309)

We would note, however, that there seems to be some ambivalence on this point. In the introduction to the *Grundrisse*, Marx proclaims that man is a political animal in the literal sense.

The human being is in the most literal sense a ζώον ζωλογικόν, not merely a gregarious animal, but an animal which can individuate itself only in the midst of society.

(Marx 1973: 84)

At a later point in the *Grundrisse*, Marx appears to return to the social over against the political.

He appears originally as a species-being (Gattungswesen), clan being, herd animal – although in no way as a ζῷον ζωλογικόν in the political sense.

(Marx 1973: 496)

We can only assume, quite correctly, that Marx intended, in every case, toward the definition of man as a social animal. In *Capital I*, Marx makes the argument that:
Strictly, Aristotle's definition is that man is by nature a town-citizen. This is quite as characteristic of ancient classical society as Franklin's definition of man, as a tool-making animal, is characteristic of Yankeedom. (Marx 1977: 309)

Evidently, man as a political animal is a concretion of the more abstract form of man as a social animal.

8 It would seem highly unlikely that the traditional social psychologists would develop fully the concept of psychological alienation through observation of the abstract individual, psychological testing, or the administration of attitudinal questionnaires; although one might argue that these methods may be adequate means of testing a pre-conceived hypothesis of alienation.

9 That there is a direction that human development must travel implies a teleology. Krader argues that:

The process of natural selection is without a universal design, hence it is not teleological, for a design implies a telos or goal; the process of human selection is in part conscious, by design, hence it is in part teleological, in part it is without design, and the only order to be observed is the natural order.

(Krader 1979: 63)

In a sense, then, Marx develops a concept of historical development that is in part teleological. The development of communist society is by design. This teleology is not problematic in the sense that it merely represents the conscious element in the process of human selection. However, Marx makes his teleology problematic when he makes statements that would seem to grant communism much more than a merely conscious design developed out of the potential of capitalism. Communist is the riddle of history. Communist is the goal of history.

(Marx 1977c: 97)

Communist makes sense of history. Communist is the goal of history.

At the same time, we would argue that the concrete content of communism — communism as true freedom and as full individuation and self-realization — being pre-existent in human "needs" which are variously expressed as wants, also tends to lend an historical inevitability to the process whereby communism is realized.

10 In several instances, most notably in his private correspondences, Marx noted that it was necessary for communists to educate the working class. In 1866 Marx wrote to Engels of the necessity for the English working class to receive a revolutionary education. (Marx and Engels 1975a: 171) Since a revolutionary education can be gained only through some form of "bloody encounter with those in power..." (Marx and Engels 1975a: 171) it stands to reason that Marx's attempts to educate must take the form of incitements to revolt.
Marx argues that communists are the most advanced members of the working class and by this he means that they know the path and the direction of working class resistance. These communists have, therefore, to push workers along this path. Marx repeatedly refers, in his correspondence, to the role of the communists as observers who would be able to compromise treachery within the working class. (Marx and Engels 1975a: 150) At the same time, Marx noted that the International had worked "behind the scenes" in order to bring off workers' demonstrations in London. (Marx and Engels 1975a: 168)

Aside from the fact that Marx's role as an educator of the working class demanded that the working class be guided into "bloody encounters" with the ruling class, evidence of which we noted in the case of the workers demonstrations at London in June and July 1866, Marx also envisaged himself and Engels as the operators of a vast revolutionary machine. In a sense, Marx and Engels were to be the "generals" of the English working class revolution. (Marx and Engels 1975a: 182)
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