RATIONAL AND EXPERIENTIAL GROUNDS FOR BELIEF IN GOD:
THE TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT IN THE WORK OF CHARLES HARTSHORNE

By

PHILIP BOO RILEY, B.A.

A Thesis
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree
Master of Arts

McMaster University
July 1975
THE TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT IN THE WORK OF CHARLES HARTSHORNE
SCOPE AND PURPOSE: The question behind this thesis is "What does Charles Hartshorne conceive to be the rational and experiential grounds for belief in God?". This question is approached through a study of Hartshorne's distinctive formulation of the teleological argument and the central features of that argument. Attention is given to the components of Hartshorne's natural theology in order to establish the context within which to approach Hartshorne's formulation of the argument, to the principles of his metaphysics which I see to underpin his formulation, to the proper manner in which to conceive of the argument, the cosmic organism analogy, and to his proposed solution to the problem of evil.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

At this time I would like to thank Dr. Gerard Vallée and Dr. George Grant for their careful evaluation of this thesis and its subject matter; Dr. John Robertson for his guidance in the formulation of the topic of this thesis; and Dr. Cathleen Going for her painstaking and careful supervision of the writing of this thesis. Finally, I thank my wife Mary Beth for her steadfast and patient assistance in the preparation of the pages to follow.
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I The Components of Hartshorne's Natural Theology as Prolegomenon to His Formulation of the Teleological Argument</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Nature and Purpose of a Proof as Such</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 The Definition of Deity</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Why There Cannot Be Empirical Proofs</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Place of Experience in Theological Argument</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Experience as Ontologically Basic: The &quot;Key to Reality&quot;</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Experience as the Basis of Metaphysical Inquiry: The &quot;Key to Metaphysics&quot;</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Positive Theology and Analogy</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The Logic of Dipolar Theism</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II The Teleological Argument</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Structure of the Argument</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Four Notions Seen to be Operative in the Cosmic Organism Analogy</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 The Scale of Beings and the Cosmic Variables</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Aesthetics and Hartshorne's Metaphysics</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Panpsychism</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 The Theory of the Social Structure of Reality</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III The Cosmic Organism Analogy</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV Conclusion: The Problem of Evil</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABBREVIATIONS

NT  A Natural Theology for Our Time

BH  Beyond Humanism: Essays in the New Philosophy of Nature

CSP  Creative Synthesis and Philosphic Method

MVG  Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism

PSG  Philosopher's Speak of God

RSP  Reality as Social Process: Studies in Metaphysics and Religion

DR  The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God

LP  The Logic of Perfection and Other Essays in Neoclassical Metaphysics

The full bibliographic data for these works is to be found at the conclusion to the thesis.
INTRODUCTION

The concern of this thesis is Charles Hartshorne's understanding of the rational and experiential grounds for belief in God. By "rational and experiential grounds for belief in God" is meant the endeavour to show that the claims for belief in God can be justified by a rational examination of the fundamental features of our common human experience. That Charles Hartshorne can be said to participate in this endeavour is evidenced by his understanding of the nature and method of metaphysics.

Metaphysics may be defined as the "rational and secular study of the universal traits of experience and existence." For example, if suffering and change are held to be universal, this is a metaphysical tenet, which is illustrated by the doctrine of a suffering and changing God but contradicted by that of an impassive and immutable one. By definition, there can be no exception to a metaphysical principle. A "secular" study is one which assumes no evidence other than such as is accessible to any intelligent man who sufficiently reflects upon our common human experience. Special religious gifts or experiences are not to be taken in evidence. They may be used to suggest hypotheses, but any decision as to true or false is to rest upon more generally accessible phenomena. Religious data are not excluded, provided they are common property, that is, capable of detection, in some degree, in the experience even of (sufficiently observant) atheists. 1

Accordingly, my concern is the way in which Charles Hartshorne's formulation of his neoclassical metaphysics contributes to the

1 RSP, p. 30
endeavour to show the rational and experiential grounds for belief in God. 2

With this concern in mind, I approach Hartshorne's neoclassical formulation of the teleological argument in this thesis. In the first chapter I discuss the main components of what may be thought of as Hartshorne's natural theology, my intention being to establish the proper context within which to discuss Hartshorne's formulation of the teleological argument. In the second chapter I discuss Hartshorne's formulation in terms of i) what he considers to be the correct structure of the teleological argument, and ii) four notions central to his metaphysics—the cosmic variables and the scale of beings, aesthetics, panpsychism, the social structure of reality—which I see to underpin his formulation. In the third chapter I discuss what Hartshorne considers to be the most appropriate way to conceive of the basic issue of the teleological argument, that of the divine mind ordering the world, and note the way in which the four notions underpinning his formulation of the teleological argument are operative in his cosmic organism analogy. In the conclusion I discuss Hartshorne's solution to the problem of evil, my intention

2 Hartshorne assigns the term "neoclassical" to his metaphysics (See NT, p. 27), and contrasts it to what he terms "classical". The difference between these two terms is stated by Hartshorne as follows: "Classical metaphysics is a metaphysics of being, substance, absoluteness, and necessity as primary conceptions; neoclassical metaphysics treats these as abstractions, the primary ones being those of creative becoming, event, relativity, and possibility." (LP, xiii) Essentially the same applies to the difference between what he terms neoclassical and classical "theism", "idea of God", etc. (See P32, pp. 1, 2 and LP, pp. 33-44).
being to illustrate the basic features of his neoclassical formulation of the argument by examining their application to a specific theological question.

This thesis is primarily an exposition of Charles Hartshorne's formulation of the teleological argument, and as such is not a critical evaluation of that formulation, but a critical examination. This is to say that in "exposing" his formulation of the teleological argument I do not propose to assess that formulation, nor the wider issues of his neoclassical metaphysics; rather, I propose to examine that formulation in terms of what I believe its essential features to be. It is my hope that such critical attention to a portion of his work will prove helpful in the understanding of his work as a whole, and consequently, in the understanding of his reflection on the question of the existence of God.
CHAPTER I
THE COMPONENTS OF HARTSHORNE'S NATURAL THEOLOGY AS PROLEGOMENON TO HIS FORMULATION OF THE TELÉOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

As may be gathered from its title, the purpose of this chapter is not to present in its entirety Hartshorne's understanding of the possibility of natural theology, but only to present the key features of this understanding in so far as they bear upon his conception of the teleological argument. Our intention in focusing upon what Hartshorne considers to be the purposes, the nature, and the conditions of the proofs for the existence of God is to establish the broader context within which a discussion of Hartshorne's formulation of the teleological argument must take place. The chapter is divided into four sections, each containing a discussion of a "component" of Hartshorne's understanding of natural theology. We shall first turn to Hartshorne's consideration of theistic proofs in general and discuss two relevant points: 1) the proper definition of deity, and 2) the necessarily double and complementary character of proofs as a priori and a posteriori. Secondly, we shall discuss Hartshorne's use of experience in theological argument from two perspectives: 1) experience as ontologically basic, the "key to reality", and 2) experience as the basis of metaphysical inquiry, the "key to metaphysics". Next we shall examine Hartshorne's justification of theological analogy and his critique of negative theology. And finally, we shall conclude with a brief sketch of the logic of dipolar theism.

1. Nature and Purpose of a Proof as Such

Hartshorne states that while it is not erroneous to hold that the
classical proofs for the existence of God failed, one need not assume that all such proofs are doomed to failure. In order to understand this proposal we must obtain an answer to several questions, the first of which is, "What does Hartshorne consider to be the purpose of the proofs for the existence of God?".

Hartshorne is critical of what he takes to be a presupposition of classical theists, that proofs in principle were to function as "...a set of undeniable or axiomatic premises from which the desired conclusion could be deduced." 1 He readily admits the improbability of finding both the universal premises acceptable to all and the logically correct construction of the inference necessary for the theistic conclusion. Thus a proof in his mind is not to be understood as a coercion, by means of deduction from indubitable premises, to belief in the existence of God. But if a proof does not coerce one into belief, then what is its purpose? Hartshorne rejects Kant's contention that all proofs, because they are irrelevant to belief in the existence of God, should be abandoned, and maintains the position that the proofs do serve to open and clarify the question of theistic belief.

But though it is unrealistic to hope that all doubts concerning theism can be removed by deductive argument, it may be quite as unrealistic to suppose that no doubts can be removed. 2 Arguments for God's existence are not coercive and therefore convincing to all, nor are they impossible and therefore convincing to none. But, they are useful in so far as "they convince some who otherwise would not be convinced." 3a In this manner Hartshorne

---

1 NT, p. 29
2 Ibid., p. 30
3a CSP, p. 275
adopts an intermediary position, that theistic proofs by reason of removing some doubts as to the existence of God, serve to render the question of theistic belief more intelligible and hence more valid.

But if the proofs for the existence of God are to be regarded as valid, then to what does Hartshorne attribute the cause of the failure of natural theology in the eighteenth century? If the question of natural theology is to be regarded as an essentially open one, as it is by Hartshorne, then the cause of the failure can not lie in the innate absurdity or impossibility of the task of natural theology. Rather, it lies in the way in which the eighteenth century theologians went about fulfilling this task. Along this line of reasoning Hartshorne cites two factors to which can be attributed the cause of the failure of eighteenth century natural theology: i) an inappropriate definition of deity, and ii) the neglect of the necessarily double and complimentary character of the proofs as a priori and a posteriori. To a discussion of these two factors we now turn.

1.1 The Definition of Deity

In *A Natural Theology for Our Time*, Hartshorne states that the possibility of theistit proof is dependent upon the formulation of universal rules, based not upon empirical issues, but upon basic concepts. He then proposes four conditions of such rules, from which he derives the definition of deity as "worshipful", "unsurpassable", and "modally all-inclusive". We shall first summarize these conditions, and then discuss his definition of deity. The four rules are as follows:

1. There must be rules definitive of individuality as such,
not excluding deity. Such rules are to be based upon the concept of interaction, that all individuals are both active and passive, cause and effect.

ii. There must be rules definitive of all non-divine individuality, i.e., all individuals except deity. Such rules are to be based upon the concept of fragmentariness, that non-divine individuals possess a scope of interaction that is less than cosmic and a power of self-maintenance that is limited, and are therefore conceivably capable of being surpassed by another being of greater scope and power.

iii. There must be criteria for distinguishing between these two sets of rules. Such criteria are the distinction between individuality as such and individuality as definitely limited and surpassable.

iv. There must be a justification for this distinction. Such justification is to be based upon the reasoning that the ideas of limited scope and surpassability are intelligible only in contrast to the ideas of unlimited scope and unsurpassability. \[3b\]

These four conditions of the universal rules required for theistic proofs combine to provide the basis for the definition of deity as unsurpassable in scope of interaction and power of self-maintenance, i.e., the concept of interaction as such, scope and quality unspecified. It is important to note here Hartshorne's use of interaction as a transcendental category. This use, he contends, is not only more in accordance with the religious idea of God—God as the worshipful one, as supreme love—but is as well more coherent than the use by classical theists of one-way action only as the transcendental

\[3b\] NT, pp. 35
category. It is more in accordance with the religious idea of God, for it contains not only the idea of supreme or unsurpassable action that is attributed to deity by classical theists, but as well the idea of supreme or unsurpassable passivity that Hartshorne understands to be essential to the notion of divine love. It is logically coherent for the following reason. The logic behind the contrast "unlimited, unsurpassable action" and "limited, surpassable action" is the same as that behind the contrast "unlimited, unsurpassable response" and "limited, surpassable response". To deny the validity of the second contrast results in an inconsistency within the logic of the first contrast, and therefore the absence of any clear rationale for that contrast. We shall explicate Hartshorne's use of contrasting categories in defining deity in the final section of this chapter.

With these four conditions in mind, we now turn to a more detailed discussion of the reasoning involved in Hartshorne's definition of deity as "worshipful", "unsurpassable by another except self", and "modally all-inclusive". As mentioned above, Hartshorne sees one of the causes of the collapse of eighteenth century natural theology to lie in its inappropriate definition of deity as "the greatest possible actuality". In contrast he proposes a definition of deity in terms of "worshipfulness" and "unsurpassability". A deity both worshipful and unsurpassable must be conceived as both individual, an individually unique concrete actuality, and universal, coincident with being or reality as such. On this account deity is the exception to the rule that a single being can not be both universal and individual to an equal degree. Hartshorne employs this "both...and" formula
not only in reference to the question we are at present discussing, but, as we shall see throughout the course of this thesis, as well to other apparently strict dichotomies.

God is not simply infinite, or "wholly other" than finite things; nor is he simply one more, though the greatest, finite thing; rather he and he alone is both finite and infinite: both relative and absolute, conditioned and unconditioned, mutable and immutable, contingent and necessary. He is individual, but the individual with strictly universal functions, the all encompassing and yet not merely universal principle of existence. 4

Hartshorne states that while the theistic arguments of philosophy can be said to require a definition of deity as the self-surring surpasser of all, religion, "as a concrete practical matter, as a way of life", can be said to require the definition of deity as a being worthy of worship. 5 In The Divine Relativity Hartshorne states that his purpose is to formulate an idea of deity that preserves and increases religious value. "By religious value I mean the power to express and enhance reverence or worship on a high ethical and cultural level." 6 Hartshorne therefore turns to religion, the purpose of which is, to some extent, to cultivate and express man's experience of deity, to gain an understanding of "God" as a religious term. And, as in theistic religions it is deity who is the one worshipped, Hartshorne proposes to analyze the idea of worship as such (not merely actual worship, but the a priori possibility of worship).

4 NT, p. 36
5 EBP, p. 40. As we shall see in the section on the social theory of reality, this definition has bearing upon the social conception of the universe.
6 DR, p. 1
Worship is the integrating of all one's thoughts and purposes, all valuations and meanings, all perceptions and conceptions. [it] is a consciously unitary response to life. 7

In theistic religions the correlative of this "unitary response" is "...an all-inclusive wholeness in the world of which the individual is aware, and this wholeness is deity." 8 This all-inclusive whole is an individual in some sense analogous to the way in which I am an individual, minus the fragmentary character of my existence.

The notion of wholeness is important, for Hartshorne sees in it a correction of a "mistake" that he attributes to classical theism. The essential question of theism has not to do with infinity, "...the idolatrous worship of 'the infinite'...", but with cosmic wholeness and the conception of God as inclusive reality. 9 The concept of inclusive wholeness occupies a central place in Hartshorne's neoclassical theism, as we shall see in our discussion in Chapter Three of the cosmic organism analogy, in which it is basic. At this point in the discussion it is necessary only to note the basic implication of this concept, that if God as the whole is to include the individuals of the world as his member parts, then He must in some manner be influenced by these individual member parts, and hence be dependent upon the world.

In A Natural Theology for Our Time Hartshorne examines this concept by looking at the meaning of divine creation and divine love as applied to the all-inclusive whole. First of all, if the word

7 NT, p.p. 4,5
8 Ibid., p. 5
9 Ibid., p. 7
"creation" is to have any meaning in this context, there can not be assumed to exist an absolute disparity between divine and human creating; and yet the divine mode of creation must somehow differ in principle from that of man. This difference is to be found in the definition of deity that is derived from the four universal rules: God is the all-inclusive being, unlimited in scope. Man is a fragmentary being, limited in scope, and his creation is therefore fragmentary creation, limited in scope. On this view God's superiority lies not only in the fact that he is the Creator, but that he includes the whole of His creation; for "...nothing can be outside God in his total reality." 10 Similar remarks apply to divine love.

Hartshorne states that "...neoclassical theism can say and mean 'God is love'. " 11 Correlative to the notion of worship as love of God is the notion, "God is love". The argument here is that only the being who is supreme love can be supremely loveable, for He is the all-inclusive referent of our integrated concern who loves all creatures. Hartshorne further argues that the type of knowledge ascribed to God necessary for him to love all creatures is "...knowledge inclusive of the actual concrete feeling of creatures..." 12 Such knowledge is to be conceived of as "sympathetic participation". Hartshorne contrasts his position to that of Aristotle. He states that Aristotle saw in divine love the implication of change and

10 Ibid., p. 12
11 Ibid., p. 75
12 Ibid., p. 13
incompleteness, and consequently posited Absolute Beauty as the object
of love. Hartshorne sees this as incorrect, for on his analysis
beauty can not be a mere abstract principle, for it is capable of
actualization only in concrete experience. Hence, if we are to speak
of "a beauty of the cosmos", we must as well speak of "a concrete
experience of the cosmos."

There can be an all-inclusive beauty only if there be an all-inclusive appreciation of beauty, and what could that be if
not a cosmic sympathy? Cosmic beauty as a value must be actu-
alyzed in cosmic experience. 13

And such cosmic experience can only be the experience of God, which
Hartshorne thematizes as divine love.

In Anselm's formula, "the one not conceivably surpassable being",
Hartshorne finds an adequate expression of the definition of deity
required by religious worship. But, Hartshorne argues, to unquali-
fiedly identify this formula with "immutable perfection" or "abso-
lute maximum" is not only to rob it of its religious value but to ren-
der it logically incoherent. He therefore attaches to the formula the
corollary "except by self". On this view one may say that God is
absolutely perfect, granted that it is understood that such perfec-
tion does not imply "completeness" in the sense of the absence of a
capacity for growth and enrichment in the divine life. On the con-
trary, Hartshorne holds that the perfection of God can be spoken of as

13 Ibid., p. 15
His ideal or unsurpassable mode of perfectibility. Because self superiority is not impossible for the perfect being, the perfect being can be defined as "the self-surpasser of all (i.e., unsurpassable by another), including self". And this connection between "self-surpassing" and "surpasser of all" is just the idea expressed in the foregoing conception of "wholeness". For a being to be all inclusive, in principle he must necessarily include all reality (i.e., any conceivable reality). Such a being must include all the value there is, lacking none. But as value is increasingly becoming actualized as time wears on, the being who embraces this value must himself also be increasing in value, in so far as he is related to and includes the changing world and its novel value. At the basis of this conception is what Hartshorne refers to as "modal coincidence": "...a being necessarily all-inclusive must be one whose potentiality for change is coextensive with the logically possible." All actual things are constitutive of God's actuality, and all possible things must be potentially his constituents.

He is the whole in every categorical sense, all actuality in one individual actuality and all possibility in one individual potentiality... God is infinite in what he could be, not in what he is; he is infinitely capable of actuality, rather than infinitely actual. 17

14 Hartshorne cites Fechner as the one who first had this insight. See for example, CSP, p. 277 and NT, p. 72. An examination of the meaning of the term perfection has occupied a central place in all of Hartshorne's works. We shall return to a discussion of this topic in the section on aesthetics in Chapter II and in Chapter III—but only in reference to the teleological argument.
15 See DR, pp. 19-22, "Definition of Perfection"
16 NT, p. 20
17 Ibid., pp. 20, 21
We see then that Hartshorne's proposal for a "natural theology for our time" consists in part of a revision of what he takes to be the position of classical theists, i.e., an unqualified identification of deity with the infinite, the absolute, and the immutable. The appropriate terms to be used are "unsurpassable except by self", "inclusive whole", and "modally all-inclusive". And furthermore, the logic of such a definition of deity is not contrary to the religious idea of God, but rather is in complete accordance, for worship...

...does not require sheer infinity—a formless emptiness at best—taken as actual. It requires that God's potentiality, what he could be, must be as wide as the absolute infinity of logically possible values. That is, no value can be possible in itself, yet impossible for God. 18

Now our question is, "how can theistic proofs be revised so as to conform with this definition of deity?". To address this question we now turn to the reasoning involved in Hartshorne's assertion that because all theistic proofs must be a priori and a posteriori, empirical proofs for the existence of God are in principle invalid.

1.2 Why There Cannot Be Empirical Proofs

In A Natural Theology for Our Time Hartshorne calls attention to what he sees as the acceptance of a hard and fast distinction between the a priori ontological argument and the a posteriori cosmological and design arguments which predominated in eighteenth century natural theology. 19 Hartshorne contends that such a distinction is invalid. "The proofs are all a priori: proofs from principles or categories, not from facts; proofs from necessities, not from contin-

18 Ibid., p. 74
19 Ibid., p. 67
Furthermore, the proponents of the ontological argument held that although the argument be a priori, it is also experiential, for "...among the implications of the reasoning was the view that in thinking God we in a fashion also experience him..." 21. But a distinction must be made between "strictly empirical" and "experiential". Hartshorne appeals to Popper for the definition of empirical as "that which some conceivable experience would falsify". To be empirical, a proposition can not only be illustrated by experience; it must be such that some experience could conceivably disconfirm it. Therefore, the arguments for divine existence can not be strictly empirical, for what experience could conceivably show that God did not exist? God, being ubiquitous, can be experienced, but God...

...being the sole necessarily existing individual, could not possibly be disconfirmed by a contingent fact; and so in the useful or distinctive sense his existence is not 'empirical'. 22

The study of mere empirical facts yields only facts of a more or less basic type. But, "...God as a mere fact, however important, comprehensive, or basic, is God as not God." 23

If this be so, then what is the proper form of the premises of the theological arguments? Hartshorne holds that on the level of metaphysical generality no view can be neutral as to theism, for 

...the idea of deity is the chief, if not (as I believe) the sum,

---

20 FSG, p. 14
21 NT, p. 67
22 Ibid., p.p. 67,68
23 FSG, p.14
of the metaphysical ideas." 24 The premises are to be so structured that any metaphysical proposition, at least implicitly, either denies or accepts theism. In this connection the function of the proofs is to make explicit the previously implicit denials or acceptances of theism. According to Hartshorne natural theology consists in the "critical consideration of the most general ideas and ideals necessary to interpret life and reality." 25 Its purpose is to clarify and explicate these general ideas, and to do so by demonstrating that these ideas and ideals lack coherence outside of the context of theism. And this task is not empirical, but is rather essentially metaphysical. Hence, the premises of the theological arguments are to be formed by appealing not to empirical facts, but to the meaning of metaphysical categories. God's existence is either necessary or impossible. If necessary, then no conceivable empirical fact can conflict with it; if an empirical fact can conflict with it, divine existence is impossible.

The classical formulation of the design argument is criticized by Hartshorne for these very reasons. Its proponents failed to advert to the a priori element in the argument, and mistakenly argued from the empirically observed order and goodness of the world, this being contrasted to a possible world conceivably in worse shape. To structure any proof in this fashion is in principle incorrect, for not only must any proof not focus upon empirical facts, but it as

---

24 DR, p.2
25 NT, p.x
well must show that no conceivable world is inappropriate to a
Creator.

There is no way to escape the necessity of arguing philoso-
phically or from general categories, rather than inductively,
pseudo-scientifically, from particulars, if one wishes to
make out anything concerning the existence of God. 26

Thus Hartshorne, in a sense, finds himself in agreement with the
 criticisms propounded by Hume and Kant as to the inevitable inadequacy
of empirical premises to establish a necessary existence. But, in-
stead of denying the possibility of the proofs in principle, Hartshorne
contends that the empirical is only part of the argument; and that
it is only without reference to premises based upon metaphysical
concepts, concepts whose non-application in experience is incon-
ceivable, that the arguments are doomed to failure. A properly
formulated proof must have a priori grounds as well as empirical
ones; or, otherwise put, it must have rational grounds as well as
experiential ones. Hence, the teleological argument is to prove
that the concept of world order as such necessarily entails the con-
cept of the divine orderer.

The a priori/ a posteriori distinction meets the conditions of
the "four rules for reasoning about theism" in that God is the one
individual definable a priori. The universal rule is that all in-
dividuals must interact with some other individuals, i.e. individ-
uality as such entails interaction. To ask which, or how many in-
dividuals is an empirical question referring to the perceived world
of particular individuals. But in the case of God the question is

26 MVG, p. 254
by necessity a priori, and the answer is "all individuals there are, or would be, without possible exception." This is all that is required to define the one divine individual, for...

...he alone could on any world have unrestricted scope of interaction. No further principle of individuation is needed or possible. Whereas the role of local interaction simply as such is highly indefinite and specifies no one individual, the role of universal interaction is unique. 27

In regard to ordinary existence there can only be empirical or factual evidence, because ordinary individuals can not be defined by concepts. The individuality of God, on the other hand, can not be specified empirically, for the existence of God is no empirical fact. Rather, God has a metaphysically unique status, for He is the one whose essential distinctiveness is purely conceptual, or categorical, and therefore definable a priori.

It is important to note here Hartshorne's assertion that the existence of an individual does not constitute the entirety of that individual. He argues that to suppose that the existence of the divine constitutes the divine actuality is to make the idea of God's existence an empty one. Were "existent deity", taken alone, is an empty concept. Furthermore, on Hartshorne's analysis, the divine existence is "a concept formally incapable of lacking actualization." 28

Accordingly, Hartshorne states that...

...the empty conceptual knowledge that God exists does tell us that his individuality is actualized somehow. How it is actualized is for science, revelation, personal experience, some form of empirical knowledge, to tell us, so far as we

27 NT, p. 68
28 Ibid., p. 77
can know it at all. 29

Our knowledge of the divine actuality is indeed negligible, for par-
ticular actuality, even divine actuality, is empirical, and the only avenue to particular actuality is perception. Ordinary individuals, as empirically indviduated, are known as empirically existing in-
dividuals through perception. But, this does not hold true for the divine individuality.

But in one unique case, it [perception] is not the avenue to existence or individual identity. Rather, conceptual, or if you prefer, spiritual, insight is this avenue, for the reason that this individuality is specifiable only a priori or non-
sensously. 30

In this fashion the aseity of God is to be affirmed, and the em-
pirical arguments, while incorporated to a degree, are shown not to tell the whole story concerning the entirety of divine actuality, and nothing in principle concerning the question of divine existence.

This section of the chapter can best be summed up by drawing attention to what Hartshorne labels "the religious global proof". Such a proof, regarded as the argument which sums up all the theo-
logical arguments, is based upon the necessity of religious expe-
rience and its one adequate referent, God. First of all, the argu-
ment does not apply to particular, contingent and dispensable values, but to the religious value which is essential and not one among others; for "...if and only if life has meaning do particular forms of life have meaning." 31 Hartshorne states that this aspect of the argument is somewhat similar to Kant's concern for the primacy of

\[29\text{Ibid., p. 77} \]
\[30\text{Ibid.,} \]
\[31\text{Ibid., p. 47} \]
the practical will, in so far as it recognizes the idea of God to be intrinsic to rational volition. But, it further must be recognized that this is not (contra Kant) the only means of proof for the existence of God. And this brings us to the second point, that arguments for divine existence, while they need to incorporate the practical, can not consist entirely of the practical. More important, there is a theoretical aspect in the argument which must deal with a priori questions. And this is the purpose of the more explicit proofs, of which the teleological argument is one. It is an a priori argument, for "the order of the world" is not an empirical fact, but a necessary concept which no conceivable experience could falsify. Localized interaction requires order and can not of itself render the possibility of order intelligible; therefore, the necessary existence of a strictly universal, yet individual, form of interaction is required. The alternative to the divine orderer's existence is not an existing chaos, a world conceivably worse than this one, but rather, nothing conceivable at all, for reality as such requires order. In sum, the theistic proofs are revised by Hartshorne on two basic points: the proper definition of deity and the a priori/a posteriori structure of all proofs. For it is only with such revision that the question of theistic belief can be made intelligible and hence more valid.

2. The Place of Experience in Theological Argument

Our discussion in the first section of this chapter dealt with issues that could be said to fall under the heading "rational grounds for belief in God". In the present section we shall be dealing with issues that could be said to fall under the heading "experiential
grounds for belief in God". I trust that this division for the purposes of presentation is not misleading, for in Hartshorne's program the two are not conceived as separate endeavours, but rather as interrelated parts of the same endeavour. Thus we shall see that because Hartshorne endorses in rational metaphysics he can be classified as a "rationalist", but that this classification must be qualified for he does not argue from concepts alone, but proposes to base his metaphysical inquiry in experience.

A reference to Whitehead is in order at this point, as Hartshorne's use of the experiential matrix is in part derived from Whitehead's "reformed subjectivist principle". In Process and Reality Whitehead writes that the philosophy of organism accepts Hume's dictum that nothing is to be admitted into one's philosophic system that is not found to be an element of subjective experience. Appealing to the principle of relativity, Whitehead states that all things are to be conceived as "qualifications of actual occasions"; and this qualification is to be conceived as the "...experience of the actual world enjoyed by the actual entity, as subject". 32 Accordingly,

The subjectivist principle is that the whole universe consists of elements disclosed in the analysis of the experiences of subjects...apart from the experiences of subjects there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare nothingness. 33

Having accepted the "subjectivist principle", Whitehead must initiate a correction of the categories utilized by modern philosophy in metaphysics (that is, the notions of "vacuous actuality, void of subjective experience" and "qualities inherent in substance"). The correction

33 Ibid., p. 194
of these categories is effected by the adoption of "feeling", the subjective concrescence of all things, as the fundamental mode of description in his metaphysical system.

Hartshorne adopts both the subjectivist principle and Whitehead's notion of feeling, and these doctrines are at the base of his metaphysics. In order to explicate his use of them we shall examine Hartshorne's use of the experiential matrix from two perspectives: experience as ontologically basic, the key to reality; and experience as the basis of metaphysical inquiry: the key to metaphysics.

2.1 Experience as Ontologically Basic: The "Key to Reality"

Our discussion of experience as ontologically basic will serve to introduce panpsychism, the theory that not just some part, but all of nature is to some degree "sentient", "experiencing", "feeling".

We shall first examine Hartshorne's development of experience as creation in Creative Synthesis and Philosophical Method, and then turn to a preliminary discussion of the logic of the panpsychic theory.

Hartshorne adopts what he calls a "pancreationist" view of reality: existence is creation, hence "to be" is "to create". Creativity is the first principle and it is our own subjective experience that provides the clearest instance of this principle. If experience is fundamentally the fusion of many data into one experience, then the explanation of this is possible only if it first be admitted that each experience is basically a free act. In this respect creation is the meaning of freedom; it is the self-determination inherent in an experience by which an emergent "one" arises out of a previous "many".
The effect, the experience, is the "one", and the cause, the data, is the "many". Hartshorne does not restrict this analysis solely to the experiencing human subject, but takes it to be descriptive of all reality, for "...apart from experience, the idea of reality is empty." 34 Furthermore, this doctrine of the universality of creative experience provides the basis for Hartshorne's doctrine of the social structure of existence, that experience is experience of something, and this "something" is the free experience of others. It is this free experience of other free experiences, or "sharing of creativity", that is the social character of existence. We shall discuss this theory in detail in the next chapter.

A corollary to the pancreationist view is that the basic mode of reality is "becoming", and that "being" is merely an aspect of this reality. Becoming is conceived of as inclusive of being (and yet still in contrast with being) because no matter how much is uncreated, if the least thing is created, therein results an emergent totality of both. Creation is in this sense creation of the total reality. Becoming is creative synthesis by reason of the fact that a new unity emerges in the fusing together of its antecedent factors. "To put together is not to create what is put together, but it is to create the new inclusive togetherness or synthesis itself as a single entity." 35 This notion is fundamental to Hartshorne's metaphysics and accordingly to his doctrine of God, as we shall see in our discussion of the logic of dipolar

34 CSP, p.6
35 Ibid., p.14
theism in the final section of this chapter, and our discussion of Hartshorne’s analysis of the way in which God’s ordering of the world is to be conceived (in Chapter II).

The theory of panpsychism, that all reality is ultimately composed of experience, entails the rejection of the dualistic view that at least a part of reality is composed of dead, insentient matter. Hence, experience is to be taken as a first principle, applicable to all reality. The logic behind this position is as follows. Hartshorne states that he is following Leibniz, the first philosopher to state clearly the case for panpsychism, in taking the position that sense perception alone is inadequate to determine whether or not the basic individual constituents of the material world are alive, i.e., psychic in nature. 36 Leibniz argued that because the individual components of reality are unknown to us due to the inadequacy of our sense perception, the only model of singular individuality known to us is the unity and individuality of our human experience. External sense perception is capable of revealing to us only where things are, not what they are. Only “internal perception”, our non-sensory mode of experience, the most significant of which is memory, can reveal to us the "whatness" of things. In the experience of memory I know myself as a unitary individual, as a unity of feeling or experience. Leibniz accordingly conceived of his monads not as microscopic inert material substances, but rather, upon analogy to this experience, as percipient subjects. In the same way, according to Hartshorne, the

panpsychic view entails the conception of the basic units of reality as individual unities of experience. And thus the dualistic view of reality as composed of, at least in part, dead insentient matter, is rejected.

If the panpsychic view is to be adopted, then what of the familiar distinction between mind and matter? Hartshorne's answer is that "mind" is to be conceived as the basic means of describing reality:

...mind and matter are not two ultimately different sorts of entity, but rather, two ways of describing a reality that has many levels of organization. The "mind" way I take to be more final and inclusive, so that my position is the opposite of materialism. 37

Hartshorne sees no need to draw an arbitrary line, somewhere beyond the field of our human subjective experience, after which all of nature is to be regarded as mere insentient, lifeless stuff. He argues that to say that a part of nature is insentient or inanimate, is to ascribe a certain privation to the part of nature in question, i.e., it is to say what it lacks. Here the assertion is that it lacks experience. The problem is that while we can know experience directly (i.e., we have experience), we can not really say that we know its absence. To what positive fact can we have recourse in order to assert the absence of life in a part of nature? In Philosophical Interrogations Hartshorne argues this point through and states that the ascription of feeling to all concrete singulars is justified in that "...no positive trait can logically exclude feeling as such: Extendedness will not do it, for the social structure of feeling is its spatio-temporal character." 38 It was Descartes' position that

37 LP, p. 217

physical bodies only are extended in space and that mind is not. Assuming this position, could not one argue that extension excludes the psychical and therefore provides us with a positive fact whose presence proves that feeling is absent? Hartshorne answers this question negatively, stating that this argument fails because it cannot show that mind is in every aspect unextended. 39 And experience, according to the social theory of reality, has a social structure, and it is this structure which gives experience its extendedness.

Extension is primitively given, not in mere matter, but in enjoyed, suffered matter, matter connected with mind, and all spatial location works from the "here" which is determined by my personality, or interests, or focus of attention, to a "there" separated from the direct action of this personality by a greater or less interval..."locus", for matter, has only so much meaning as interactions with minds can give it. 40 Accordingly, experience and extendedness are not logically exclusive, for the former "embraces" the latter in that it is the basis of the latter: extension is within the sentient wholeness.

Hartshorne contends that the opposite of panpsychism is "mere nonsense".

If the "insentience of singulants" must be a "fact" wholly negative for all possible observation, and this the same as no fact, then their having feeling, however slight, is the only alternative to nonsense. What metaphysics seeks to exclude is precisely and solely nonsense (or contradiction). 41 Hartshorne sees bifurcation of nature into nature alive and nature lifeless as problematic, and therefore proposes to understand nature in terms of an "analogy of indefinite extent", in this case, panpsychism. "Mere

---

39 See LP, pp. 124, 125; and in reference to Hartshorne's criterion of posivity, see LP, ch. XII, and CSP, ch. VIII, esp. pp. 160, 161 in reference to Descartes and extension.

40 RSP, p. 37

41 C. Hartshorne, "Interrogation of Charles Hartshorne", p. 351
Yes—and—No thinking, as Pierce held, is the last word on no fundamental subject; rather it is always a more or less crude oversimplification." Dualism, conceived as the problem of the interaction of mind and body, two domains supposed to be radically unlike each other, is avoided by Hartshorne's doctrine of feeling as basic to all reality. It is panpsychism, and this theory alone, that provides the means of conceiving the affinity between the higher and the lower levels of mature, between human organisms and electrons, between mind and matter.

Panpsychism is basic to Hartshorne's metaphysics. In the next chapter we shall examine this doctrine, as well as the doctrine of the social structure of existence, in terms of its use in the cosmic organism analogy. We shall now complete our discussion of the place of experience in theological argument by examining its function as the starting point in metaphysical inquiry.

2.2 Experience as the Basis of Metaphysical Inquiry: "The Key to Metaphysics"

We noted in the previous section that Hartshorne adopts Whitehead's reformed subjectivist principle, and the subsequent revision of the substance-quality categories of traditional metaphysics used by modern philosophy. Whitehead's point was that the use of the subjectivist principle entails such revision of the categories, and that failure to effect such a revision results in innumerable difficulties, as the history of modern philosophy illustrates. In the previous section we examined the logic of Hartshorne's central revision, the theory of panpsychism. In the present section we shall further examine Hartshorne's

---

42 Ibid., p. 352
43 See Process and Reality, Part II, ch. VII
adoption of the reformed subjectivist principle, now discussing it as it bears upon his method of metaphysical inquiry.

In adopting the reformed subjectivist principle, Hartshorne adopts the position that the primary data available to metaphysics for analysis are to be found in the experience of the subject; and further, that the analysis of such experience discloses the basic characteristics of all reality. Hence, one task of metaphysics is the explanation and clarification of the basic features of subjective experience, and in turn the generalization of such features so as to make them applicable to all reality. In this connection Hartshorne finds it necessary to reject any dualistic interpretation of reality, and utilize the panpsychic one on the grounds that it is more coherent and possesses greater applicability to experience than the former. His argument is that the turn to subjective experience in forming our metaphysical concepts would indeed be a useless endeavour if the rest of reality were not in some sense analogous to our experience. He states that "...to experience what an individual unit of reality would be like if it were not an individual experience or part of one is obviously impossible," 44 The question of the "whatness" of things is, for Hartshorne, really the problem of analogy: "what are the properties of direct experience that can systematically be applied to all reality?". In reference to the social structure of all experience, and our knowledge of it, Hartshorne writes.

44 BH, p. 188
Given a fragment of reality so elaborate as the human body is represented (in vision) and also intuited (in all sensations) to be, and given the causal uniformity of reality, knowledge of the rest of reality is a mere matter of inductive inference.

The proper method of metaphysical inquiry is to examine that part of reality with which one is most familiar, one's subjective experience, and proceed, by analogy, to that part of reality with which one is least familiar. Such a method is illustrated in Leibniz's conception of monads. Because he found that only in "internal perception" can we experience what it is to be an individual, Leibniz conceived his monads upon analogy to the human self. In the same way Hartshorne grounds his metaphysics in experience: the concepts which are applicable to all reality are to be formed by analogy to the basic features and characteristics of our subjective experience.

The higher levels of existence exhibit the universal characteristics in greater degree, hence in more readily discernible form (very small values of a variable may make the variable itself imperceptible to us); the highest planetary creatures, ourselves, are also the only ones we can study in all the ways in which we can study anything. Here is the sole possible window (admittedly at best translucent, not transparent) opening upon the intimate nature of things. Are we likely always to keep shutters on that window?

Hartshorne's use of this method will be examined in relation to his formulation of the teleological argument in our discussion of his conception of the cosmic variables and the scale of beings in Chapter II. Let us now continue our discussion of this method in terms of his adoption of the reformed subjectivist principle.

---

45 Ibid., p.204
In *Philosophical Interrogations* Hartshorne states that assuming analogy to hold, the function of metaphysics is to elucidate the universal analogies common to all reality. "To do so we start with a specimen of reality, and our own experiences as actual are the clearest and most indubitable instances (Descartes)." 47 The denial of experience to some part of reality (i.e., the positing of a dualistic interpretation, e.g., mind/body) results in the impossibility of knowing that actuality in a positive way, for...

...the moment something is given, it not only enters into an experience but, by virtue of the unity of feeling which constitutes experience, it presents itself as composed of feelings or as a function of feeling. 48

Actuality can be positively conceived only by analogy to the elements of our own experience, and the conception of all actuality in terms of experience, of feeling is possible, as we saw above, only within the context of panpsychism.

Let us now consider the way in which this method of metaphysical inquiry bears upon Hartshorne's formulation of the theological arguments. As we saw above, the question of the necessary existence of God is for Hartshorne *a priori* (as opposed to *a posteriori*) in nature. In *Man's Vision of God* he argues that if *a priori* insight into the necessary features of existence is possible, then these features must be present in all experience and therefore knowable. But, if such features are not present, then "...there is no appropriate object for an *a priori* method to know." 49 Hence, one basic question of any

---

47 C. Hartshorne, "Interrogation of Charles Hartshorne", p. 349
48 Ibid., p. 349
49 *MVG*, pp. 61, 62
theological argument is, "are such necessary or categorical features present in experience?". As we shall see in the next chapter, Hartshorne proposes an affirmative answer to this question, and argues that 'order' is one such feature. Accordingly, if the purpose of the theological arguments is to render intelligible the necessary or categorical features of experience by interpreting them theistically, then the teleological argument seeks to render intelligible not our experience of some instance of special order, but rather the necessary order without which there could be no experience at all. The teleological argument serves to demonstrate that order, a fundamental aspect of our experience, can be interpreted in a non-contradictory way only within the context of theism.

We shall discuss in detail the structure of Hartshorne's formulation of the teleological argument in Chapter II. For our present purposes, it is now necessary to continue our presentation of the components of Hartshorne's natural theology by turning to an examination of Hartshorne's argument for positive theology, in which the reformed subjectivist principle plays an important role.

3. Positive Theology and Analogy

The completion of our consideration of the role Hartshorne assigns to experience in theological argument brings us to his adoption of positive theology, and the necessity of an analogy doctrine in developing a positive conception of deity. In opting for a positive theology, he argues that the concepts which are applicable to all of nature, and supremely so to deity, are to be derived from our experience. In Divine Relativity he writes:
Human nature is the supreme instance of nature in general, as known to us, and moreover, it is the instance which in some respects at least is much more certainly and intimately known to us than any other. 50

Such a turn to the subject makes it necessary for Hartshorne to reject what he takes to be the traditional philosophic procedure of defining deity, i.e., analyzing the ordinary, the finite as limited and dependent, and then attributing the negative to deity (e.g., Spinoza's absolutely infinite). Accordingly, in defining deity in terms of dual transcendence, he writes:

To turn from ordinary things to the transcendent cannot be to turn from dependence to independence, but from selective non-universal forms of dependence or independence to the universal forms of both. In ordinary cases dependence and independence occur together, but neither one in universal form. Whore one is there is also the other. 51

In this passage "ordinary" refers to our own human experience; we are in some sense independent of influences exterior to us (this being necessary to maintain one's integrity), and in some sense dependent upon those exterior to us (e.g., the relativity illustrated in one's love for another). In accordance with the four conditions of the rules for theistic proofs, Hartshorne does not reject either of these terms, but applies them both to deity as the instance of their maximal exemplification, i.e., unsurpassable and universal in scope.

In reference to the cosmic organism analogy Hartshorne writes...

...that only theism of the second type [panenthism] can really do anything with the traditional "way of analogy" with which the emptiness of purely negative theology has been allegedly atoned for... 52

50 DR, p. 27
51 CSF, p. 230
52 MCG, p. 591
In the next section we discuss the basic principle of panen-
theism (second type of theism); for now let us turn to Hartshorne's
justification of the analogy doctrine in light of his critique of
negative theology.

Earlier we noted Hartshorne's four conditions of the rules for
theistic proofs, the third of which is that there must be some cri-
teria for distinguishing between divine and non-divine exemplifica-
tion of the categories. A problem herein arises in so far as our
theological concepts are derived from our own non-divine experience.
The problem is even more acute for a theology which is grounded in
experience. The question is, "How are we to avoid creating God in
our own image?". As we saw above, Hartshorne addresses this problem by
asserting that God is the one individual whose individuality is defina-
ble a priori. In doing so he hopes to retain the meaning of our concepts,
and yet not sacrifice God's metaphysical uniqueness for the sake
of conceivability.

In what does God's metaphysically unique status and character
consist? Hartshorne labours to keep a description of God which is
purely metaphysical, the terms of which are the purely universal
categories (e.g., relation, causality, etc.). Whereas the unique-
ness of man can not be described in terms of categories alone, God's
uniqueness can be. And not only can it be, but a purely categori-
cal description is applicable to God alone. In this sense the terms
we apply to creature and Creator are not univocal but analogical.
In Process and Reality Whitehead writes that "...God is not to be
treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked
to save their collapse. He is their chief exemplification." 53
Hartshorne develops this way of conceiving God's metaphysically u-
nique status in terms of God's individuality: "...In the case of
deity, the most general conceptions without anything more specific,
suffice to 'individuate'..." 54 Hartshorne recognizes the intent of
asserting the a priori otherness of God in the dualities of tradi-
tional theism (e.g., God as necessary/world as contingent), but
criticizes such an effort on the grounds that it results in a contra-
diction in the conception of God; and further, that such a procedure
denies the possibility of relation in deity. Hartshorne argues that
there is no logical reason, once God is to be defined in a purely
categorical manner, to ascribe "non-relatedness" to deity and not
all-relatedness". (Hartshorne contends that this logic applies to all
such dualities: God is necessary and contingent, etc.) The radical
"otherness" of God is retained precisely because he illustrates the
categories in a maximal way, while the creatures only indicate
the categories in a non-distinctive fashion; they are "...always
and in all aspects something middling under both categories. In this
middling character lies their imperfection." 55 Following this line
of reasoning Hartshorne states that relation is...

...the ability of a thing to express in its own nature those
other things which, among alternatively possible or contingent
things, happen to exist. 56

53 Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 405
54 DR, p. 31
55 Ibid., p. 32
56 Ibid., p. 33
Hartshorne contends that to reject analogical reasoning completely—i.e., negative theology's mistaken notion that only in their negative application were the categories unique to God—not only detracts from the "Christian concreteness and appreciation of individual uniqueness"\(^{57}\), but leads to the mistaken "...metaphysical false modesty of seeking to honor deity by refusing to apply any of our positive conceptions to him."\(^{58}\) The negative theologian, if he is really thinking of deity, is applying concepts to him, albeit negative ones. Further, the application of the negation of the categories to deity implies that one "...understands something positive in deity which is incompatible with such categories."\(^{59}\) Negative theology must result either in self-contradiction in its reasoning, or the implicit refusal to think about deity, neither of which Hartshorne believes to be viable options in a sound theology. The basis of Hartshorne's criticism here is twofold. On the one hand there are "religious" grounds: religious worship requires a positive conception—"Christian concreteness"—of the being worthy of worship. But, there also exist the metaphysical grounds: God, the one individual definable \textit{a priori}, is the maximal instance of the categories; hence the positive description is more in keeping with God's metaphysical status than a purely negative description.

The conception of God as the maximal instance of the categories leads Hartshorne to write "...theology (so far as it is the theory of the essence of deity) is the most literal of all sciences of existence."\(^{60}\) It is man, not God, that is the negation of the ca-

\(^{57}\) \textit{NT}, p. 34
\(^{58}\) \textit{DR}, p. 35
\(^{59}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 35
\(^{60}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 36
categories, for man illustrates them only with qualifications, whereas God is "...the literal instance of the categories; they are himself in his individual essence..." 61 Once an unqualified negative theology is dispensed with as a consequence of its problematic nature and its shortcomings, the theologian may assume his more proper role, this being to render theological terms more precise, i.e., to eliminate the metaphorical meanings, so as to secure a clearer understanding of the literal meanings of the categorical features utilized in describing the essence of deity. Theology, accordingly, addresses the problem...

...that theological terms, though literal, derive this literal meaning from intuitions which are not conspicuous in normal human experience, and must be carefully distinguished from other, more conspicuous intuition, with which they may be confused. 62

For Hartshorne, the question "Is there a God?" coincides with the question "Can God be literally and directly known (in his individual essence)?". And it is the categories which serve to designate the divine individual. But, a distinction must be here introduced; to know God as an individual, distinguished from others, is quite a different task from knowing God as actual, distinguished from other possible states of actuality appropriate to his individuality. "Here is the place for negative theology. Here we must confess our incurable ignorance." 63 To know God as He is, supremely relative to the world, as actual, would be to know the world as God knows it. Rather... "That he has relations we can know, but just what relations to just what, we can never precisely know in even a single concrete case." 64

---

61 Ibid., p. 36  
62 Ibid., p. 38  
63 PSC, p. 19  
64 DR, p. 91
To know conceptually God as individual, as the chief exemplification
of the categories, is possible; but our knowledge of concrete reality—
of the actuality of God as supremely relative— is indeed infinitesimal.
It is concrete, contingent reality, not the divine essence definable
a priori, which "...transcends reason, and can ultimately only be
felt as sheer fact." 65

In this section we have been discussing Hartshorne's justifica-
tion of analogy in forming a positive conception of deity and his
critique of negative theology. Much of his argument is based upon
the "law of polarity", which he states as follows:

...ultimate contraries are correlatives, mutually interde-
pendent, so that nothing real can be described by the wholly one-
sided assertion of simplicity, being, actuality, and the like,
each in a "pure" form, devoid and independent of complexity,
becoming, potentiality, and valued contraries. 66

Hartshorne is critical of theologies which posit God as the absolute-
exception to the law of polarity, and then conclude with a monopolar
conception of deity (cf. his understanding of Thomism's "Pure Actuality")
in which only one pole of the categorical contrasts are ascribed to
deity as the supreme being, the other being arbitrarily relegated to
an inferior status. The simple contrast between excellent-inferior
proves to be inadequate when compared to the more comprehensive
method of formulating the definition of deity based upon the use of
conceptually ultimate contrasting poles:

...the contrast excellent-inferior, the truly invidious contrast,
has no tendency to coincide with that between such polar contrasts
as one-many, cause-effect, active-passive; but rather, this
invidious contrast breaks out indifferently on both sides of
the categorical polarities. 67

65 Ibid., p. 38  
66 PEG, p. 2  
67 Ibid., p. 4. We shall consider this method in more detail in
the section on the cosmic variables in Chapter II.
Thus Hartshorne develops a method defining deity by applying the supreme instance of not one, but both poles of the ultimate contrasts. For example, God is conceived of as supremely absolute and relative, or the supreme cause and effect. But, to avoid contradiction, two aspects in the one supreme being must be posited, each aspect corresponding to each pole. In the pages to follow we shall develop this means of characterizing deity, which Hartshorne labels "the theory of dipolarity."

4. The Logic of Dipolar Theism

Hartshorne defines deity in terms of a dipolarity of supremacy: to one aspect of deity is attached the supreme case of a category, and to the other aspect is attached the supreme case of its contrasting category. That such a distinction does not result in contradiction Hartshorne affirms, stating that "...there is no law of logic against attributing contrasting predicates to the same individual, provided they apply to diverse aspects of this individual." 68 All that is in deity need not be his essence. "To have accidents, some accidents or other, will be a requirement of the essence...but the particular accidents which God has will be strictly outside his essence." 69 One aspect of deity refers to deity as accident, the other to the individual essence of deity, essence meaning the individual in abstraction from all that which is in him as accidental.

Above we discussed Hartshorne's definition of deity as the supreme and all worshipful being. To reiterate the argument, the difference between God, the being who is perfect, and the imperfect is a

---

68 Ibid., pp. 14, 15
69 Ibid., p. 4
difference not of degree but of kind. The superiority of deity can not be expressed other than by "...superiority in principle, a definite conceptual divergence from every other being, actual or so much as possible. We may call this divergence categorical supremacy." 70

The categorical supremacy of deity, as we saw above, requires that he is the one individual conceivable a priori, his character expressed in terms of the categories without qualification, without limitation, and without reference to any matter of fact. (Factuality always consists in some limitation upon the categories.) Hartshorne acknowledges that, by virtue of this definition, it must be asserted that deity exists necessarily (if theism is to make any sense at all), but—and this is the basic principle involved in panentheism—it is incorrect to assume that in this necessary existence we have the whole story concerning deity, and that there can not be two logically diverse aspects in God. Hartshorne writes that...

...the necessity of deity which follows from categorical supremacy refers to his existence as an individual and ceases to be a truism if it is construed to mean that every thing in God's total reality is necessary. 71

The categorical supremacy refers to God's individuality in comparison to that of other individuals, not to God's actuality in comparison to what he might have been. "That God could not fail to exist as himself is not equivalent to saying that he could in no fashion be other than he is." 72

70 E.E., p. 7
71 Ibid., p. 8
72 Ibid.
Following this logic through, a conception must be arrived at which allows for both necessity and contingency within God, but one which does not result in contradiction. The conception formulated by Hartshorne posits two distinct logical levels in God, one being His abstract self-identity, the other the concrete and contingent states of the divine life. The former refers to the existence of God, the latter to the actuality of God; but, to repeat, only the existence of God can be termed necessary. One can say, on this account, that the necessity of God consists in part in the a priori requirement that it can not fail but to be actualized. 73

As we noted above, at the heart of panentheism, and of Hartshorne's metaphysics, is the distinction between becoming and being, and the acceptance of the former as the more inclusive category. Becoming, or process, and being form a single reality, but the latter is an abstraction from the former: "Process is not the mere identities of 'being'; it is the identities with the differences, or rather it is the diverse states with abstract aspects of identity." 74 We also saw above that Hartshorne chooses to treat the concept of deity not as an exception, but as the basis, and therefore a part of, his metaphysical system. As becoming in Hartshorne's metaphysics is ultimate, it is required that change be admitted to be real in God, in that he is part of that metaphysical scheme. But, that there is change in God need not be in conflict with the perfection of God,

---

73 This distinction between the two logical levels in God, and the definition of perfection that follows from it, is central to the Ontological Argument. See LP, ch. II, sect. VII, esp. pp. 63, 64.
74 PSC, p. 9
which requires the necessity of his existence, for this perfection can admit of another form, and this form is to be attributed to the "accidental" aspect of deity. Accordingly, the perfection of God consists not only in the surpassing of all others, but also in the surpassing of himself (even though not in his individual essence). Noting that only some values, but not all values, admit of a categorically maximal form, Hartshorne proposes to define perfection as

...the categorically ultimate form of all values that admit such form (it can be shown that they are abstract aspects of value) and the categorically superior form of all attributes that do not admit an ultimate form (they are all ways of expressing the concrete value, happiness). 75

God changes in so far as he excels his previous state of being, i.e., acquires more concrete value; but, this is not change into another being, rather, it is change into a more superior state of the same identical being. God retains his individuality through diverse experiences; and these experiences must conform to the individuality of God, i.e., they must be experiences infallible and wholly adequate. Hartshorne further argues that the contrast between the perfect, as pure actuality, incapable of change and the imperfect, that which is increasing in value, the self-changing being, is placed within deity, perfection and imperfection each referring to one aspect of deity.

Since perfection can not change and imperfection can not be changeless, it follows that a God both perfect and imperfect will be unchanging in the ways in which he is perfect and changing in the ways in which he is not perfect. 76

The assertion "becoming is ultimate" carries with it, according to

75 Ibid., p. 10
76 RSP, p. 160
Hartshorne, the corollary that time is real. Hartshorne writes that time is "...objective modality (Pierce); it unites determinate, actual, past reality with indeterminate, potential, future reality." 77 It is this conception of time, and the reality of time even in application to deity, that leads Hartshorne to the distinction between God in his abstract individual aspect and God in his concrete experiencing aspect. The assertion "God exists necessarily" means...

...unlimited capacity to adjust successfully—that is, with preservation of individual integrity—or it means ability to adjust to all others, whoever and whatever they may be. Given such capacity, the individual can not fail to exist. 78

In this respect the admission that change is real in God does not entail the denial of his status as the single necessarily existing being; rather this adittal requires the positive and full assertion of this status as the reason for the preservation of identity amidst all change. "Necessity is simply freedom over the whole range of possibilities for existence." 79

Hartshorne refers to his dipolar conception of deity, panentheism, as a "higher synthesis" of both traditional theism and traditional pantheism. 80 As such, God must be spoken of in terms of absolute cause as well as relative and all inclusive whole, the application of both descriptions to deity (although to diverse aspects) being necessary to characterize his full being. To explicate this notion of

---

77 *ESG*, p. 11
80 See *ESG*, pp. 500, 512
panentheism as "higher synthesis." Hartshorne addresses the question "Is God independent of the universe, existing without it; or is he incapable of such an existence?" The panentheistic doctrine answers the latter half of the question positively, but with some qualification.

According to Hartshorne the deity of classical theism, a deity wholly independent of the world, was based upon a radically asymmetrical conception of the causal relation; thus the conception of God as pure cause and in no way effect. The panentheistic doctrine requires a different conception of cause—a moderately asymmetrical conception of the causal relation. Moderate asymmetry means that the class or kind of effect is implied in the cause, i.e., the non-nularity of the class of effects (n.b. the class, not the particular members of the class) is necessary by virtue of the nature of the cause. The cause is always independent of the particular effect, while the effect is necessarily dependent upon the cause. Expressed in temporal terms, the present entails the past, as in memory (the past is involved in the present absolutely), while the future is required only as some member of a given class, as in anticipation.

Hartshorne states that anything required by—that is, in the moderately asymmetrical sense—something is the cause of that something. God, as the supreme cause, is universally required by all other things, and only requires the non-nularity of this class of all other things.
Hartshorne, as we noted above, contends that God must be effect as well as cause; and that God is effect in his concrete total reality. God, the supreme power or agency, is the supreme stream of effects. God as acting, as well as acted upon. Divine causation, in this fashion, is to be spoken of in terms of response to the concrete world. Such response entails a true perception of the concrete world, and these perceptions of the concrete can not be completely independent of the alternatives inherent in concrete existence (as are abstractions), but are rather concrete effects. Divine causation in terms of response requires the perfect awareness of all things on the part of God. To effect such perfect awareness God must participate in the concrete existence of all things, i.e., they must be the content of his experience. It follows that God as the totality of effects—true perception, perfect awareness of the totality of things—is in one aspect of his being maximally dependent upon all things.

Panentheism, according to Hartshorne, is the only doctrine which allows for a deity both independent (God as cause in the moderately asymmetrical sense) and dependent (God as effect), each being ascribed to diverse aspects of deity.\textsuperscript{81} Both classical theism and pantheism are correct, but only partially. Panentheism is the synthesis of what is correct in both, and the denial of what is incorrect in both—that there can be no possible distinction in God, between God as independent cause and God as inclusive reality. Accordingly, in one aspect God is independent cause, and in another

\textsuperscript{81} ECS, p. 505
aspect God is the inclusive reality, including the independent cause of all things. God may not only in his total reality be identical with this inclusive reality, but as well, in one aspect of himself, identical with the independent cause.

We prefaced the foregoing discussion of panentheism by noting that two aspects of the same deity must be posited in order to render the law of polarity applicable to Hartshorne's doctrine of God. To conclude this discussion we must examine why this procedure—i.e., positing two aspects in the same God—does not itself end in contradiction. The key to the logic of the argument is the concept of "inclusion".

Above we saw that Hartshorne speaks of the two aspects of deity in terms of individuality and actuality. The divine individuality, definable by concepts alone, is abstract; but the divine actuality is concrete, the instantiation of the abstract individuality. God is "perfect" in his necessary character; but it is the concrete states of the divine which have or instance "perfection". Perfection is not perfect; but God in his concrete states is necessarily perfect. The abstraction, perfection, obtains necessarily as its non-exemplification is an impossibility by virtue of Hartshorne's definition of deity. But this necessity does not obtain in the case of the concrete exemplification of it. Accordingly, Hartshorne's doctrine portrays two logically distinct levels within God himself: existential necessity, abstract (eternal) and actual, concrete contingency (temporal); or otherwise put, the absolute aspect and the relative aspect. Let
us now proceed to analyze further the relation between these two aspects.

In the definition "self-surpassing surpasser of all others", the words "self-surpassing" refer to the relative aspect, and the latter part, "surpasser of all others", refers to the absolute aspect. Hartshorne states that according to Aristotelian principle, the relative includes the abstract, and the latter has no being apart from its inclusion in the former. 82 Relativity is the inclusive conception, non-relativity (absolute) is the reduction of this concrete to a partly negative and therefore abstract case. God as the supreme being is supremely relative (that which is self-surpassing) and contains the supreme absolute (that which is all other surpassing).

The relative aspect of God, that which improves upon itself, logically entails the absolute aspect because the improvement upon oneself requires the maintenance of some self-identity, i.e., it must be the same thing. The relative aspect of God...

...is really a variable, the abstract variable of which A [the absolute aspect] is the abstract constant, the latter being like "sameness" abstracted from concrete sameness- and differences, the former like "difference", abstracted from the same concrete. 83

The relative must include the absolute, not vice versa, for it is a contradiction to hold that something contingent (i.e., the relative) can be genuinely involved in something wholly necessary (i.e., the absolute). "The absolute can not know or have any relation to the relative, but only the relative to the absolute." 84 The panentheistic

82 See RSP, p. 115; and CSP, p. 233
83 PSC, p. 508.
84 Ibid., p. 511
conception thus preserves the non-relatedness of the absolute to relative things, while allowing for the relation of God, as transcendentally relative, to both the absolute and the totality of relative things. Whatever includes relations, according to Hartshorne, is concrete and comprehensive, and that which excludes relations is abstract and non-comprehensive. God as relative and containing the relations of absolute as well as relative possesses all the reality that is in either, and also is a relative which is more than the absolute. God as absolute...

...is not related to anything contingent but to the necessary category of accidentality—there shall be accidents. God as a concrete whole, AR [absolute-relative] in character, is the one who is related to accidental things themselves. 85

In Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, in which he addresses the problem of conceiving transcendence, Hartshorne expresses the same logic in slightly different terms. God as absolute is independent—he is able to maintain his essential individuality amid all change. But, this independence in his essential aspect does not by logical necessity limit the scope of his influence in inessentials.

There seems no contradiction in holding that in the transcendent being the essential core of identity is infallibly secure, while the peripheral content is responsive to every item of reality. 86

Universal independence applies to an abstract aspect of the transcendent, while universal dependence refers not to another abstract aspect, but to the concrete reality of the transcendent being. But,
the abstract is the real only in the particular, concrete aspect—not separately. Universal relativity includes all that is positive in universal independence, as well as including relation to the whole of concrete actuality. This relation can similarly be expressed in terms of modal logic...

...where the conjunction of a necessary with a contingent proposition yields a compound proposition which is contingent. Necessarily 'p' and contingently 'q' must itself be contingent. Since it is the necessary which is independent or absolute, not the contingent, the overall character of the absolute and the relative is given by relativity or contingency, not by absoluteness or necessity. 87

So concludes our discussion of the logic of dipolar theism. We have seen that the panentheistic conception of deity is at the base of Hartshorne's argument for an analogy doctrine and of his criticism of negative theology. By positing two aspects in the same deity, the conditions of the law of polarity are met, and in Hartshorne's mind, much of the contradiction in the classical conception of deity is overcome. The dipolar conception can avoid such contradiction only if the relation between the two aspects is one of inclusion—the relative includes the abstract; God in his total reality is concrete. In the third chapter we hope to illustrate the use of this concept of inclusion in our explication of the cosmic organism analogy, in which it proves to be a basic idea.

87 Ibid., pp. 233, 234
CHAPTER II
THE TEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

In the present chapter we shall examine what Hartshorne conceives to be the proper structure of the argument from design and four notions, central to his neoclassical metaphysics, that are integral to this proper structuring of the argument. In this fashion the groundwork for Chapter III, an explication of the cosmic-organism analogy, will be laid by making explicit and clarifying those notions which are operative in Hartshorne's exposition of the analogy.

1. The Structure of the Argument

Because Hartshorne sees that Hume's refutation of the teleological argument is based upon his understanding of the way the argument is to be structured, we are initiating our discussion of Hartshorne's formulation of the teleological argument by briefly turning to Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and his statement of the argument contained therein. Our purpose in doing so is to obtain a clear and concise statement of the teleological argument understood as an empirical argument, its premises being drawn from some specific instance of cosmic order.¹

According to Hume the argument from design is to be formulated as follows:

The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance; of human design, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since therefore the effects resemble each other,

¹. See above, p. 14
we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and that the Author of nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man; though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work, which he has executed. By this argument a posteriori, and by this argument alone, we do prove at once the existence of a Deity, and his similarity to human mind and intelligence. 2

It is this formulation of the design argument that is "refuted" by Hume. Hartshorne holds that Hume's refutation of the argument is invalid and can be met if the argument is formulated in the neoclassical way. 3 The first step to understanding how Hartshorne proposes to meet Hume's refutation is to establish what Hartshorne conceives the correct formulation of this argument to be. Hume's version of the argument is an empirical argument; and for Hartshorne, as shown above, there can be no merely empirical proofs for the existence of God. Theological arguments must contain, besides an a posteriori component, an a priori component.

Any cosmic order is intelligible theistically, otherwise a mere mystery. To argue from empirical facts is to imply that had the world been less well ordered, God could not have been its orderer. A world not basically ordered (how if not by an orderer?) is without clear meaning. 4

Accordingly, the premises of the teleological argument are not to be derived from some specific instance of the cosmic order, i.e., contingent, actual facts, as Hume supposes; but from the inconceivability of world as such without order, and the inconceivability of order as such without an orderer. The argument must therefore conclude that any world order requires the divine orderer.

---

3 See CSP p. 296
4 CSP, p. 285
As noted above Hartshorne does not propose irrefutable premises from which the theistic conclusion is to be drawn, but opts for the structuring of proofs so as to render explicit just what the denial of theism entails. Accordingly, in Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, Hartshorne develops the argument according to the possible rejections that must be made in order to avoid the theistic conclusion.

A₁ There is no cosmic order.
A₂ There is cosmic order but no cosmic ordering power.
A₃ There is cosmic and ordering power, but the power is not divine.
A₄ There is cosmic and divine power. ⁵

Hartshorne argues that A₁–A₃ are unacceptable, and that the theistic conclusion therefore follows. The explication of the non-acceptability of these premises, and the logical necessity of the conclusion, can be obtained by investigating Hartshorne's metaphysical scheme with this question before us: 'How is order to be conceived within this scheme, and why is a divine orderer required for the world order?'. It is the suggestion of this thesis that the answer to this question is to be obtained by considering four notions which I see to underpin Hartshorne's formulation of the teleological argument. These are the scale of beings and the cosmic variables, aesthetics, panpsychism, and the social structure of reality. In order to bring these notions into their proper perspective, i.e., Hartshorne's

---

⁵ CSP p. 281. See NT, p. 30 for Hartshorne's argument for the validity of this use of deductive proof.
understanding of the correct formulation of the teleological argument, we note the way in which these notions bear upon the relevant points of Hartshorne's criticism of Hume. Presented in Philosophers Speak or God.

The first point on which Hartshorne criticizes Hume is what he takes to be Hume's failure to recognize the possibility of the "dipolar synthesis". Hartshorne states that by virtue of considering only two forms or monopolar theism as incontrovertibly opposite, Hume ends up in this dilemma; either the entirely positive conception of the "Anthropomorphic", a deity finite and changeable, and possessed of a will and consciousness imperfect and corruptible, somewhat analogous to that of man; or the entirely negative conception of the "Mystic", a deity infinite and immutable, without will or consciousness, and in no sense analogous to man. Such a dilemma, according to Hartshorne, is resolved in the dipolar conception of deity whereby a synthesis can be attained by assigning, as it were, each horn of the dilemma to one of the two distinct aspects of the divine. Accordingly, deity may in some sense be said to be analogous to man, the finite, contingent aspect, and in some sense entirely "other" than man (the infinite, absolute aspect). The reasoning behind this procedure we examined above: man is a fragmentary being, who has both permanent and changing characteristics, but neither in an unqualified sense. But, God, the "self-surpassing surpasser of all", does possess these features in an unqualified sense; he is unequivocally eternal and temporal, immutable and mutable, absolute and relative, etc. What underlies Hume's dilemma, hence his critique, is the assumption of the impossibility of conceiving of categorically supreme finite cases.

6 See above pp. 6 & 9
What Hume here overlooks, like many before and after him, is that categorical perfection can be defined in dipolar fashion, so that there may be a perfect or ideally supreme form of finitude, complexity, change, and contingency, as well as of infinity, simplicity, eternity, and necessity. 7

On Hartshorne's logic, God is to be conceived as the infinite degree (or whatever maximal form is appropriate) of whatever variable is applicable to the finite degree to man. The generic identity of the variable, its univocity, is retained, and "God" is thereby rendered positively conceivable upon analogy to human experience. A discussion of this topic will occupy us in the section below on the scale of beings and the cosmic variables.

The second point on which Hartshorne criticizes Hume refers to the fact that Hume argues that mind and matter are "given to us as alike mysterious and incomprehensible systems of particulars", 8 and is thereby led to a twofold objection to the theory of the divine mind ordering the world. The first is as follows. As the mental world is essentially similar to the material world (and experience can not supply us with any differences), it must require a cause in a way similar to that of the material world. Accordingly, in positing the existence of a divine mind conceived on analogy to our own finite minds, we must grant that the ideas in the divine mind require a cause to fall into order, as do material objects require a cause to fall into order. As this supposition leads on to an infinite regress of causes, there can be no good reason

7 FSC, p. 434
8 Ibid., p. 435
for not positing material objects as sufficient, in themselves, to account for the world order. According to Hartshorne, this objection is to be met by again applying the logic of dipolar theism to the question. The existence of God is not a particular actuality, for which a cause is to be sought, but is "merely the being of some divine actuality or other, the necessary non-nullity of a class of actualities. Thus the existence of God requires no cause, even though every actuality, even divine, requires one." 9 In this fashion Hartshorne avoids the infinite regress in positing the existence of a divine mind. Hume's second objection, which is more central to our thesis, is as follows. According to Hume we can have no insight into how a mind controls its own ideas, or the notions of bodies. Hence, it is in vain to imagine a supreme mind ordering the world, if we cannot even conceive of how our own mind orders our own thoughts. We have, therefore, no rational basis for the theory of a divine mind ordering the world. This objection raises the following question: "To what experience do we appeal in order to formulate the notion of an ordering mind?". It may be said that Hume, like Hartshorne, "turns to experience"; but what must be noted is that Hartshorne, in adopting Whitehead's reformed subjectivist principle and in understanding experience in terms of memory, comes to an understanding of what constitutes experience that is not only different from that of Hume, but one that as well, in Hartshorne's phrase, truly "answers" Hume's understanding, i.e., his skepticism concerning causality. 10 Accordingly, Hartshorne finds

---

9 Ibid.

10 See ESE, p. 74 and C. Hartshorne, Whitehead's Philosophy (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1972), p. 14
Hume's analysis of experience on this point to be lacking. We do in fact have such experience of a mind ordering its own ideas, as given in memory and anticipation, and of a mind ordering a "material" body, as given in the relation of mind to body. Both instances are essentially sympathetic in nature. In order to interpret meaningfully this experience, and, on generalization, the world order, we must have recourse to psychical concepts. The explication of this notion will occupy us below in the section devoted to Hartshorne's theory of panpsychism.

The third point on which Hartshorne criticizes Hume is what he takes to be Hume's dogmatic assumption of strict determinism in the contention that the order of nature must be an absolute order. Hume writes,

Instead of admiring the order of natural beings, we should clearly see that it was absolutely impossible for them in the smallest article, ever to admit of any other disposition. 11

But for Hartshorne all entities are self constitutive to the degree that they are individual; thus, the order of nature must be a relative order, i.e., it must consist "not in a determination of all events just as they occur, but in the setting of limits to the self-determination inherent in each event. Order is thus the limit imposed upon chaos." 12 This follows from the social conception of reality: being is power, and if there are beings other than God, then they must exercise power in some measure. Absolute determinism must accordingly be ruled out. The social conception of reality, which plays a central role in both the cosmic organism analogy and Hartshorne's 'solution' to the problem of evil, will be discussed in

11 Hume as cited in FSG, p. 424 12 FSG, p. 436
more detail in a later section.

The fourth point on which Hartshorne takes issue with Hume is derived from the first and third points given above, and has to do with the problem of conceiving the perfect being's ordering of the world. Hartshorne sees that on account of his failure to conceive of a world order apart from absolute determinism, and further, from his denial of the possibility of a finite perfection, Hume is unable to conceive of a divine mind ordering the world in a coherent and non-contradictory manner. As we have seen, Hartshorne intends to meet these two difficulties of Hume, yet there still remains the question, "What is the most appropriate manner in which to conceive of God's ordering of the world?". The key to this answer for Hartshorne lies in aesthetics: God's ordering of the world is an aesthetic order, the aim at harmony in contrast, at the maximality of the balance of order and freedom, of limitation and creative individuality. In the section below we shall discuss Hartshorne's notion of aesthetic order, drawing out its implications for Hartshorne's formulation of the teleological argument.

Thus far we have noted the way in which the four notions I see to underpin Hartshorne's formulation of the teleological argument--the scale of beings and the cosmic variables, aesthetics, panpsychism, and the social structure of reality--bear upon his critique of Hume, and have thereby established them in their proper perspective, i.e., Hartshorne's understanding of the correct formulation of the argument. An examination of each of these four notions is set out in the remaining portion of this chapter, in so far as each is integral to what Hartshorne conceives to be the proper formulation of the argument from design.
2. Four Notions Seen to be Operative in the Cosmic Organism Analogy

The cosmic organism analogy, as will be shown in Chapter III, is for Hartshorne the most appropriate way to conceive of the basic issue of the teleological argument, that of a divine mind ordering the world. Because of this, it seems to this writer that the four notions which I take to underpin Hartshorne's formulation of the teleological argument must be operative as well in his exposition of the cosmic organism analogy. Accordingly, the examination and clarification of each of these four notions serves to establish the proper context within which to consider Hartshorne's cosmic organism analogy.

2.1 The Scale of Beings and the Cosmic Variables

Hartshorne writes in *Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method* that metaphysics "studies non-restrictive existential affirmations." 13 Central to this task is the use of what Hartshorne terms "cosmic variables." He argues that non-restrictive statements are able to affirm existence only because "...they employ concepts with the extreme range of possible meanings." 14 These concepts must be unlimited, i.e., they must possess "...an infinite (perhaps absolutely infinite) range of possible values..." for they are non-restrictive concepts, and as such must be "maximally flexible." 15 In this present section we shall discuss Hartshorne's conception of the cosmic variables and the scale of beings, our purpose being to further elucidate Hartshorne's justification of theological analogy.

---

13 *CSP*, p. 162
as well as to explicate his procedure of defining categorical perfection in the dipolar fashion.

The scale of beings, Hartshorne suggests, is to be employed in conceiving of entities regarded as both "inferior" and "superior" to human kind.

Thus it is a reasonable view that all things, so far as they are individuals rather than aggregates, fall upon a single scale,..., running from the least particle of inorganic matter to the great universe itself. 16

As man is within the scale of beings, it is a viable procedure to turn to human experience and "scale" it, i.e., establish comparative degrees of this experience, applicable in some measure to the members of the entire scale. The question for philosophy then becomes "What are the appropriate variables, applicable to all members of this scale?"; or, in Hartshorne's terms, "What are the properties which entities higher in the scale possess in greater degree than those lower in it?". 17

Such variables must meet several requirements, one of which we have already mentioned - they must be maximally flexible. One may, in this sense, speak of the variables as infinite.

Thus the breadth of the variables is that of the whole universe, of what is and what might be. Surely this universe is not finite, since by finitude we can only mean a restriction upon its universal scope. 18

Further, Hartshorne argues, the use of local variables is insufficient, for their use logically implies the cosmic variables. In

16 BH, p. 112
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., p. 114
so far as things must be compared (and they must, for fact is by definition public, hence comparative) they require something capable of measuring the determinate differences and the extent of likeness that exist between them, i.e., something possessing a maximal range of values. The cosmic variables, as inclusive of all possible local variables, provide us with such a measure. As such, they are "the definition of 'being'." 19 Within the context of the discussion, i.e., the cosmic variables suitable for application to the scale of beings, "being" refers to that which appears in all things; it is "the total system of all cosmic dimensions of continuous variation." 20 The cosmic variables, as the definition of "being", must refer to that which inalienably appears to some degree in all things. It follows that the cosmic variables are not conceived as abstractions from the common elements among concrete things; rather, they are universals, that which is one in many things. Citing Whitehead's notion of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, Hartshorne states that what is required to explain the concrete is not the indeterminate and empty concepts or abstraction, but greater concreteness and definiteness or conception. 21 The general concepts, because they are applicable to all reality, need not be "empty" in the sense of "not directly bearing upon the concrete"; for, they may be so conceived that they apply positively to every concrete actuality, i.e., that they can not fail of positive

19 Ibid., p. 113
20 Ibid., p. 115
21 Ibid., p. 299
illustration. 22

This brings us to a further requirement of the cosmic variables, that they are to possess experiential meaning. This is the problem to be met: "Where are we to seek some 'especially privileged instances of being?'". 23 For Hartshorne, in accordance with the reformed subjectivist principle, we are to turn to subjective experience. "It seems to me", he writes in Creative Synthesis andPhilosophic Method, "that one must use man as the model..., and work from there towards larger wholes and lesser parts." 24 According to the theory of panpsychism, experience pervades the scale of being, human experience being only one specialized form. The appropriate method is, accordingly, to generalize human experience in order to arrive at variables applicable to the scale of beings.

In Chapter VIII of Beyond Humanism Hartshorne illustrates this method in suggesting that the three categories of cognition, feeling (and sensation), and volition supply us with cosmic variables. The category of cognition, for example, possesses a number of dimensions which admit of a range infinitely greater than that known among animals. In the case of memory Hartshorne writes,

Again, to see how all memories are alike, we should not try to cease imagining particular memories; rather we should imagine how our human memories could continuously expand or contract in various directions, or could have been greater or less in various continuous respects. 25

22 See Lp., ch. XII, "Some Empty Though Important Truths", and CSP., pp. 90-92 on the 'principle of generality'.
23 BH, p. 300
24 CSP., p. 129
25 BH, p. 115
We are to retain the identity of the category, yet allow differences of degree of complexity. The same procedure is exercised in reference to the categories of feeling and volition, as we shall see below when we discuss the theory of panpsychism.

The cosmic variables are psychic in nature; they are established not by generalizing beyond psychology, but by generalizing psychology itself. Such a procedure, argues Hartshorne, is far from being anthropocentric, rather, it is the possibility of conceiving that which is "other" than man, be it the subhuman or the supra-human.

We cannot conceive any mode of difference from our experiences which is not in some degree also a mode of difference between these experiences. We can generalize beyond human experience only by generalizing "experience" itself beyond human variety. 26

The distinction is not between what does experience and what does not experience, but between different modes of experiencing of different individuals, or species of individuals. And it is this procedure, states Hartshorne, that provides one with the basis of an analogy of indefinite extent. 27

In Reality as Social Process Hartshorne employs the notion of the scale of beings in order to define perfection. He argues that every being can be described in terms of the contrast absolute and relative (non-reflexive and reflexive) and that this distinction can be applied as a category to the scale of beings. Perfection, instead of being defined as the negation of the relative, the changing, is defined in terms of superiority and its denial in reference to both sides of the contrast. Hence, we may speak of God

26 Ibid., p.121
27 See above, p. 23 and CSP p. 40
as perfect in both an absolute (non-reflexive) sense as superiority of adequacy in all types of relation, and in a relative (reflexive) sense as superiority of inclusion, or enjoyment of all actual, concrete values. The category of relative perfection is not defined in terms of negative meanings, or abstractions, as is the category of absolute perfection; but rather in terms of the features of concrete experience. Thus we see that the positive meaning of experience can be sufficiently extended to apply to the being superior to all others in the scale of beings.

What is to be noted here is that the relative perfection of the supreme being does not allow degeneration (one of Hume's chief objections 28). Superiority in the relative sense entails inclusion, of all others, and of self. Hartshorne writes that what must be recognized is...

...that superiority in the scale of beings implies inclusiveness, not exclusiveness, of individuals of lower levels, the latter not sacrificing all of their independence in being so included (e.g., electrons in a cell, cells in a vertebrate). 29

We have been discussing Hartshorne's use of the scale of beings and the cosmic variables, one of the four notions I take to be operative in Hartshorne's exposition of the cosmic organism analogy, in order to bring to light a portion of the proper context within which one is to understand the cosmic organism analogy. Let us now move on to a discussion of the remaining three notions.

28 See PCS, p. 434 and RSP, p. 112
29 ES, p. 123
2.2 Aesthetics and Hartshorne's Metaphysics

In the present section we shall discuss what Hartshorne conceives to be the place of aesthetics in his neoclassical metaphysics, with the intention of exploring, to some extent, the way in which Hartshorne sees aesthetics as "informing" metaphysics. More specifically, our concern is with Hartshorne's proposal to conceive order aesthetically and the way in which this conception contributes to the cosmic organism analogy. This section could be seen as an explication of what Hartshorne terms the "aesthetic imperative"—that there be unity in contrast.

In the first chapter of this thesis we indicated the central place of experience in Hartshorne's metaphysics, and the importance of examining experience in carrying out the metaphysical task. Our question now is, "In what way does Hartshorne propose to examine experience?" In Reality as Social Process Hartshorne states that experience can be interpreted within the framework of aesthetic principles. His argument is that all experience is concerned with value, and the most basic value is aesthetic value. "Aesthetic value is the immediate value, and this all experience must present, and to this all mediate value must lead." Aesthetics is then to be regarded as basic: "In principle, all nature can be interpreted aesthetically..." Its study is basic to cosmology and metaphysics because it focuses upon our direct awareness of the concrete, and it is just this immediate awareness that is presupposed.

30 RSP, p. 144
31 LP, p. 309
by all abstract knowledge. It is in the aesthetic attitude, and not the ethical (practical) and cognitive (intellectual), that we are most attentive to concrete experience; the world is first felt, and then known:

...cognition is only a way of using the felt qualities of things, taking them merely as signs of identities and differences which are structural rather than qualitative. 32

The aesthetic categories are most relevant to the concrete, given to us in experience as clothed in qualitative feeling. Feeling is, therefore, the "presupposed substratum" of cognitive activity. 33

In this respect Hartshorne is similar to Whitehead, who also regards the category of feeling as primary, and consequently also adopts the aesthetic mode of interpretation as the most basic. Hartshorne carries this conception further (and likewise, his similarity to Whitehead 35) in his contention that both goodness (acting rightly) and truth (thinking correctly) presuppose beauty. The basic value is the intrinsic value of experience, "as a unity of feeling inclusive of whatever volition and thought the experience contains, and exhibiting harmony or beauty." 36 The value of truth and goodness lies in what they contribute to experience; they have "instrumental value" in that they contribute to aesthetic value, the broader category. Hence, logic and ethics presuppose aesthetics, "the study of what makes experiences good in themselves." 37

32 CSP, p. 76  
33 Ibid.  
35 Cf. the final part of Whitehead's Adventures of Ideas (Cambridge: The University Press, 1933).  
36 CSP, p. 303  
37 Ibid.
Granted that Hartshorne recognizes the primacy of aesthetics, in what way does he propose to apply it to his metaphysical scheme? A partial answer to this question is to be obtained by examining Hartshorne's conception of order as basic.

Hartshorne defines beauty as integrated diversity and intensity of experience and argues that it is a metaphysical idea "valid for any possible state of reality... Value could not not be this sort of thing and actuality could not not have value." 38 Beauty is therefore applicable to divine experience; God too can be said to strive for aesthetic value, i.e., for harmony and intensity of experience. Furthermore, it can be said that He aims at maximum value of creaturely experience, as the data of his own experience. This aim at aesthetic value by God can be thought of as "God's righteousness", and it is ideally complete. But God's actual enjoyment of the creatures is not likewise complete, for this enjoyment does not admit a final maximum. This enjoyment...

...is endlessly capable of increase, since the divine capacities for aesthetic enjoyment are strictly infinite, and any totality of actual creatures must in some respects at least be finite. 39

God can forever increase in aesthetic enjoyment, for aesthetic value is in principle inexhaustible. But His righteousness, his aim at maximum aesthetic value, is forever perfect.

Recalling our discussion of the logic of dipolar theism

38 Ibid., p. 307
39 Ibid., p. 310.
in Chapter I, we see that Hartshorne applies essentially the same
logic in defining deity in terms of dual transcendence, i.e., uni-
versal independence and dependence, or relativity. God as abstract
possesses those dimensions of value which do admit a maximal form;
e.g., infallible knowledge of all that is actual as actual and all
that is possible as possible (modal coincidence). God as concrete,
however, possesses those dimensions of value which admit no maxi-
mal form. In Hartshorne's mind, the inability of theologians to
recognize the truth that value does not admit an absolute maximum
in all its dimensions proved to be a source of much confusion, as
is evidenced by the conception of deity as the absolute maximum of
value.

But all that is necessary to exalt God above all beings,
actual or possible, is to require that he be unsurpassable by
another...God is the all surpassing, self-surpassing being.40

It follows that the identification of transcendence strictly with
the unsurpassable good, or the sum of all possible perfections is
to be rejected. God, as we saw above, is to be conceived as all
surpassing; in one aspect He is unsurpassable absolutely (i.e., in
that which does logically admit a maximum, e.g., infallible know-
ledge); and as self surpassing; in one aspect He is surpassable by
Himself alone (that which does not logically admit a maximum, e.g.,
the enjoyed value of knowledge of the concrete).

The Leibnizian notion of the best possible world is, according
to Hartshorne, a logical impossibility. If beauty is the concrete

40 Ibid., p. 225
aspect of value which does not admit a maximum, then given any harmonious variety of objects, there could always be a more intensely beautiful variety. Besides the principle that aesthetic value is inexhaustible, this argument turns upon what Hartshorne terms "the principle of positive incompatibility": there are, in principle, incompatible goods, or "incompossibles". And, it is this very incompatibility of possibilities that is the meaning of possibility itself.

All possible variety actualized together would be sheer confusion, since, as Leibniz conceded, there are incompossibles, things distributively but not collectively possible. What, short of the absurdity, 'all possible harmonized variety', would be the greatest possible one? There is no reason to suppose the question has an intelligible affirmative answer. 41

On this account Hartshorne criticizes the Thomistic conception of "Pure Actuality". He argues that the notion of pure actuality must mean all possible actuality if it is to have relation to possibility at all; and this, by virtue of the principle of positive incompatibility, would mean "all possible confusion" 42. All possible value can not be exhaustively actualized; and therefore the divine actuality can not be identical with the totality of the logically possible.

Definiteness, being this and therefore not that, or that but therefore not this, seems essential to all beauty, all value, and all actuality of which we have any conception. Perhaps a merely positive entity is as little distinguishable from non-entity as a merely negative one. 43

42 Ibid., p. 153
43 Ibid., p. 229
The logical distinction between actual and possible requires the notion that choice, actualization, involves exclusion. Definiteness is the actual, i.e., literally de-finite, "this" but not "that"; and this definiteness is the value of actuality. Actuality can only be understood as a restriction of the possible; the price of actualization is the loss of possibility. "An actuality which excluded nothing would be coextensive with possibility." 44 This notion occupies a central position in Hartshorne's conception of aesthetic order, and we shall now consider further the reasoning behind it.

In an article entitled "Order and Chaos", 45 Hartshorne questions what he takes to be the traditional understanding of the relation between chance and purpose, an understanding which saw them as mutually exclusive. This view, coupled with the deterministic view of causality, led to the denial of chance, or randomness in the nature of things. "In reality", contends Hartshorne, "neither causality nor purpose is intelligible without chance." 46

Causality, on Hartshorne's analysis, is that real possibility (that which can occur given certain circumstances) which is distinct from pure, or merely logical possibility (that which can occur under some conceivable circumstances). Determinism consists in the identification of the actual outcome of a situation with its real possibility. It thereby obliterates the distinction between

44 RSE, p. 99
actuality and possibility, "and causality as real possibility is
done away with." The whole point of possibility, argues Hartshorne,
"is that it does not coincide with actuality, the latter being
always an arbitrary selection among possibilities." 47 The really
possible, more definite than the logically possible, is by no
means as definite as actuality itself. The logically possible,
pure potentiality, is indefinite, unlimited and devoid of incom-
patibility; real potentiality is always limited and therefore to
some extent exclusive; and actuality is the final portion of lim-
itness, exclusiveness. We must say of each event that it is both
caused, i.e., that it issues out of real potentiality, and further,
that it occurs by chance, which is to say that "it is more deter-
minate than its proximate real potentiality, and just to that ex-
tent is unpredictable, undeducible from its causes and causal laws." 48

Causal conditions limit but do not determine the actual outcome of
a situation—and this is the meaning of chance—for the determina-
tion of the outcome is essentially self-determination. "In short,
causality implies indeterminism". 49

It can be argued that aesthetics as well requires this dis-
tinction between the actual and possibility. Beauty is the maxi-
mising of aesthetic value, and the attainment of value requires
diversity and contrast; and such positive contrast is provided for
in the distinction between the actual and possibility.

Possibility is not mere absence of actuality, it is the
non-actual which can become actual, and this can-become
actual is a positive something irreducible to something else...

47 Ibid. 48 RSP, p. 89
49 'OC', p. 261
The contrast between the *is* and the *might have been* belongs to the *is* and is essential to beauty. 50

To deny this contrast is to deny being of any beauty whatsoever, i.e., to rob all being of the possibility of its variety in unity, and to force upon it the monotony of an "everlasting fixed pattern without hint of an open alternative." 51 It is just this contrast which is essential to greater intensity of experience, which in turn means greater aesthetic value realized in that experience. This is to say that aesthetic experience requires possibility, unforseen novelty: "It is an aesthetic law of experiencing that without the unforseen there can be no experience." 52 Determinism, according to Hartshorne, is an aesthetically absurd doctrine; it is "a theory of cosmic monotony, not of cosmic beauty." 53

Hartshorne argues further, on the grounds of the social conception of the universe (that there is not just one solitary purpose agent, but many) that chance is in an additional sense inherent in purpose, not its opposite. For, if each creative purpose agent X and Y is to attain its particular end, it can not be said that either intends the actual sum of their realizations, [X Y]. "Purpose requires chance because it is essentially social, and a multiplicity of purposes must leave their conjoint outcomes unintended." 54 Hartshorne states that by adding providence to

---

50 *MVG*, pp. 225, 226
52 *CSP*, p. 306
54 "OC", p. 263
this situation, one does not thereby guarantee the determination of the outcome, but only the presence of the supreme or pre-eminent form of influence on the decisions of each purposive agent. The perfect being does not suppress the free self-determination of His creatures, but rather sets the optimal limits to the risks inherent in such self-determination. For Hartshorne, then, purposiveness is a more complicated conception than the mere denial of the reality of chance. It follows then, that divine purposiveness cannot be conceived as the elimination of chance, because this is the same as the elimination of the self-determination of the creatures. In the final section of this chapter we shall further examine the social conception of the universe; at present we shall discuss the conception of order which follows from the above.

Prediction, according to Hartshorne, is not to be conceived in the absolute sense of the mechanistic model, for this view amounts to the reduction of real potentiality to practically zero. "Everywhere there is some escape from absolute order." 55 Prediction must be relative in principle; it must be so because every individual is to some degree self-creative. "Man is not a mere spectator watching future events as one by one they become present; he is, in the last analysis, a creator, making events to be." 56 Rather than non-statistical absolute predictions, only the statistical predictions of modern science can be adopted on Hartshorne's view. On these grounds Hartshorne argues for the reality of law, but also for the impossibility of its absolute

55 LP, p.314
56 OC, p.263
applicability. Law functions, in this manner, as a limitation upon the randomness and irregularities of nature, setting boundaries as to what may happen. It is only in pure mathematics, not in concrete nature, that we find inflexible and absolutely unchanging laws. We saw earlier that Hartshorne universalizes creative freedom by adopting a "pan-creationist" view of reality. This view means that chance, as well, is universalized:

For a range of truly open possibilities means that whichever one is actualized, the causal conditions failed to specify it as against its competitors, and the word "chance" just stands for something not antecedently specified, either as predestined or as intended. 57

It follows that for Hartshorne absolute order can be nothing but nonsense: the absolute ordering of chance would amount to no chance to be ordered, and hence no ordering at all. How, then, are we to speak of teleology on this view? According to Hartshorne's conception of causality, all creatures must to some extent be self-determining, and to this extent they are individual purposive agents. One may therefore speak of "universal teleology". And, along with universal teleology, there must be partial chaos due to the fact that chance is inherent in the nature of things. The limits to such chaos can not be set by the individual purposive agents themselves. The only possible explanation of such limits is the theistic one, which includes the notion of supreme purpose. The old notion of teleology, which posited the divine purpose as the only really efficacious purpose, was discredited by Darwinism. 58

According to Hartshorne a "new teleology" must be conceived, one which sees...

57 Ibtia., p. 266
...providence in the beneficent framework of statistical law, thanks to which limits are set to the mutual frustrations of the various creatures, and a vast variety of forms of existence are enabled to coexist in essential harmony. 59

Teleology conceived in this fashion means that providence is not the negation of chance, but the ordering of chance; and the setting of limits consists in the channelling of the chaos inherent in the nature of things.

We have shown so far that what Hartshorne intends by the phrase "setting of limits" can by no means be "absolute order". How does Hartshorne conceive of "setting of limits"? We find our answer in Chapter VI of Man's Vision of God, "God and the Beautiful", where Hartshorne argues that our best clue as to the meaning of order lies in aesthetic experience. As aesthetic experience is the fundamental mode of experience, so must aesthetic order be the fundamental order. Order is, therefore, best conceived on analogy to aesthetic experience. Let us now examine this notion further.

The conception of beauty outlined by Hartshorne in Man's Vision of God is the principle of "organic unity", or the principle of "unity in variety". The absence of either unity or variety is the absence of being or value; the conjunction of both is beauty, the degree of which increases concomitantly with the complexity of the unity in variety. Variety and unity are therefore a priori; and the necessity of each term is the same. All aesthetic value is a balance of the two, increasing as each term increases. This is termed by Hartshorne "the aesthetic imperative." 60

59 'OG', p. 266 60 MVG, p. 229
Hartshorne contends that the metaphysical problem of the relation of God to the world is essentially the same as the aesthetic one, with the exception of the latter's "emphasis upon the conditions of value in the host concrete form, rather than in the merely abstract form of logical coherence." 61 It is important to take notice of this contention because it reflects a precept basic to Hartshorne's metaphysics, that the locus of the really real is the concrete. In A Natural Theology for Our Time he outlines several requirements that must be met by a philosophy if it is to contain the religious idea of God, one of which is that the distinction between the abstract truth that an individual exists, and the concrete state in which the individual exists must be recognized. This is to say, it must be recognized that "the most concrete mode of reality is not existing substance, thing, or person, but actually occurring event, state, or experience." 62a It follows that beauty is not to be conceived as an abstraction (of what could an abstraction be inclusive?), but as a concrete value actualized in some cosmic experience, and this, as we saw above, is God as all-inclusive. 62b Further, this is the only conception of deity which can meet the demand of both unity and contrast, for it allows what are positive qualities on one side of the contrast "God-world" to be present on the other; i.e., it is a doctrine in which God is defined as the all-inclusive being. God, as inclusive, is capable of

61 Ibid., p. 220
62a NT, p. 25
62b See above, p. 9 and pp. 42-45
repeating...

...in himself all positive qualities and qualitative contrasts that are present in man, including the quite positive contrast between actualization of potency and potancy itself, as this contrast is unified in change. 63

God must parallel all the variety of the world, as well as integrate it into one unity. Hartshorne describes this function as "sympathetic parallelism".

This notion of the primacy of the concrete has its roots in Hartshorne's conception that awareness of the concrete is aesthetic in nature, i.e., it is a feeling of quality. It is on these grounds that Hartshorne argues that the only positive way to conceive of being (identity amid change) is qualitatively, and not merely structurally; and the key here is aesthetic experience. Experience consists of qualities presented in feelings. "'Beauty' is something unitary which exists not in spite of, but even thanks to, qualitative contrast. Feeling is a positive unity of which various qualities may be integral aspects." 64 The qualitative aspect of beauty, discerned only through "the aesthetic psychological interpretation of change" 65, is not to be neglected.

On this point Hartshorne is critical of "traditional" theology. With its emphasis upon the intellectual appreciation of beauty, i.e., beauty "defined through structure as correlated with the intellect" 66, the "tradition" focused upon the relational aspect of things to the neglect of qualitative feeling. But, the two are not to be separated.

63 MVG, p. 221  64 Ibid., p. 260
65 Ibid., p. 261  66 Ibid., p. 223
for the only way to know qualities is to feel them. And according to Hartshorne, this maxim is applicable to deity:

God must equally know qualities and relations, and how he could know a quality except by having it as a feeling-tone, a quality of his experience itself, we have not the faintest clue in experience. 67

Experience itself is the unity of relations and qualities, and quality, carried by feeling, is that without which there could be no possibility of relation. This is one contribution of aesthetics to theology according to Hartshorne: that quality and feeling are not regarded as defects, and that God is therefore to be conceived not as without feeling, but as supremely rich in feeling.

The "aesthetic imperative", as well as the recognition of the primacy of the concrete, is contained in the dipolar conception of deity, which posits a contrast within God, i.e., a variety and multiplicity in God, as well as an unity. Positive contrast is essential to beauty, and in the case of deity there is to be found the most unique contrast in the divine mind and its infinitely superior capacity to unite all diversity, as opposed to the capacity of lesser minds. Only God, the highest conceivable being, is capable of including the variety of the universe as a whole. "The only adequate theme of all variations is the maximally flexible or divine sympathy." 68

To insist upon the unqualified simplicity of God, as a unity without parts, is, according to Hartshorne, to insist upon "the un-speakable monotony" of God, or "the absolute inner poverty" of God as

67 Ibid.
68 Ibid., p. 217
conceived by Thomist theology. In a manner similar to Whitehead's formation of the table of antitheses (in the final chapter of Process and Reality), Hartshorne applies the "aesthetic imperative" to the relation of God and the world. He states that one of the chief failures of "traditional" theology was its failure to meet this imperative:

Thus while God was ugly by defect of variety, reality, as composed of God and the world, was ugly by defect of unity, and the two defects were clearly two sides of the same defect. Hartshorne holds that 'traditional' theists ended up with the conception of God as an empty unity, and a conception of the world as an ununified plurality. What is required—and this, as we saw in Chapter I, can only be met by the dipolar definition of deity—is the notion of God as inclusive of the variety of the world. Only then can there be unity in variety.

For the only way to unify God with his creatures is to regard the unity of God's being (the supremacy of which lies in its inclusiveness) as the unity of reality as such. And the only way to give maximal diversity as well as unity to God is to allow that his unity genuinely embraces all that is, with all the variety which it really has.

This is the dipolar conception of God as abstract-concrete, the concrete including both the abstract aspect and the concrete value of the world.

In this section we examined the way in which Hartshorne sees aesthetics as "informing" his metaphysics, with the intention of explicating his contention that absolute order is an impossibility, contra Hume. We have further shown that within Hartshorne's metaphysics aesthetics provides us with a key to the proper conception of order, aesthetic order, as unity in variety.

---

69 Ibid., pp. 217, 219. Not even the doctrine of the trinity supplies the required contrast for Hartshorne: "What is required is maximal contrast, not levels within the unity of God—for instance, between the contingent or changing and the necessary or immutable." (NVC, P. 218)

70 Ibid., p. 219

71 Ibid.
2.3 Panpsychism

We noted above that the basis of one of Hume's criticisms of the theory of a divine mind ordering the world was his contention that mind is no more intelligible to us than matter. In Hartshorne's theory of panpsychism we find the opposite assertion, that it is "mind" that provides us with the only intelligible way to conceive of reality. It is our intention, in this section, accordingly, to bring to light just how Hartshorne's analysis of "mind" provides the basis upon which to conceive the cosmic organism analogy, that is, the theory of a divine mind ordering the world. To do so we shall discuss Hartshorne's analysis of the nature of causality from the panpsychic view, focusing particularly upon his conceptions of "memory" and "sympathetic participation". By way of introduction we shall continue our discussion of extendedness, and then move on to Hartshorne's understanding of panpsychism as "a synthesis of idealism and realism", and conclude by drawing out the implications of this view.

Above we saw that extension is not, for Hartshorne, "mere matter", but is the interrelatedness of mind—it is the "social structure of reality". The question before us now is "How are we to conceive of the relations between minds that constitute the extended world?". The clue to our answer is that the maxim "all is psychic" carries the corollary "all is feeling, feeling of feeling". According to Hartshorne, the relations among feelings can be rendered intelligible only by

\[72\] See above pp. 22, 23
conceiving of them in terms of "organic sympathy", or "sympathetic participation".

Feelings echo to some extent the feelings around them, and this is the basis of the possibility of relationships among realities by which they constitute a world of things relevant to one another.73

Similar logic applies to time. Just as what we experience as extended throughout space is in reality a collective unity of sentient singulars so too what we experience as "enduring" through time is not a singular substantive individual, but in reality a "sequence" or "series" of many diverse singulars. These diverse singulars, the basic temporal units, are termed "specious presents" by Hartshorne, following Whitehead's epochal view of time.74 The basis of the identity of this sequence is the intrinsic relation of each experient occasion to its predecessor, i.e., each occasion's sympathetic participation with its predecessor. Turning to the human self—the only specious present we directly experience—we find a privileged instance of this intrinsic relation and sympathetic participation in our memory of the past. We shall say more to this point momentarily.

For our purposes the best way to approach Hartshorne's theory of panpsychism is to examine his understanding of it as a synthesis of idealism and realism. His argument is as follows. Hartshorne contends that the failure to recognize the logical relations between two very different questions in discussing "idealism" and "realism" is the source of much confusion. One is the ontological question, "How fundamental in reality is 'mind'?", and the other is the epis-

74 Ibid.
temological question, "What is the relation between the subject and object in "knowing"?". The logical relation between these two is that the "realist" position in regard to the epistemological question requires the "idealist" position in regard to the ontological question. It is the synthesis of these two positions that provides us with panpsychism, or what Hartshorne also terms the theory of "psychic realism". Let us examine this argument in détail.

The combination of four principles—two of which can be associated with "realism", the other two with "idealism"—constitutes Hartshorne's theory of "psychic realism". They are as follows:

**Realism:**
1. Principle of Objective Independence: "An 'object', or that of which a particular subject is aware, in no degree depends upon that subject."
2. Principle of Subjective Dependence: "A 'subject', or whatever is aware of anything, always depends upon the entities of which it is aware, its object."

**Idealism:**
3. Principle of Universal Objectivity: "Any entity must be (or at least be destined to become) object for some subject or other."
4. Principle of Universal Subjectivity: "Any concrete entity is a subject, or set of subjects; hence, any other concrete entity of which a subject, S1 is aware, is another subject or subjects (S2, or S2, S3, etc.)."
The first principle states that the relation to the particular knowing entity is extrinsic to the known entity. The second states that the knowing entity must conform to the known entity. Such is the thesis of realism. The third states that, though by virtue of the principle of the objective independence, relation to a particular subject is extrinsic to the known, relation to subjectivity as such is not thus extrinsic. To be is to be known— not necessarily by this or that particular entity, but by some entity or other. The fourth principle, the principle of panpsychism, that to be is to be a subject, meets the requirements of the two realist principles— subject \( S_1 \) can know, and thusly be dependent upon subject \( S_2 \)— and affords the only intelligible explanation of the third principle, i.e., to be known is to be known by a subject. In this fashion the four principles can be seen as compatible.

But, besides demonstrating the compatibility of the four principles, Hartshorne argues further that it is only the realist doctrine that can supply the basis of the idealist doctrine. The main thrust of the argument centers around an analysis of the relation of "being past", given in experience as memory, and applying it to causality. By applying the two realist theses, we see that in the relation of \( B \) to \( A \), the relation may be intrinsic to \( B \) as the effect, i.e., \( B \) conforms to \( A \) (as in our present experience of memory); and at the same time the relation may be extrinsic to \( A \) as the cause (the experience remembered). The objective order of this relation is "A alone, not
entailing the occurrence of B", and then "B with A, i.e., B remembering A". This view of causality provides the basis for the idealist argument in that only panpsychism—the theory that all reality is experience, hence composed of some sort of memory—can render it intelligible. It is along these lines that Hume’s problem of conceiving of causal influence is to be met. It is an insoluble problem in so far as Hume neglected panpsychism, and framed the question in terms of "dead, insentient matter". Hartshorne argues that in memory our present experience includes that which is past, and is thereby influenced by that past; and that this is the paradigm upon which to conceive best the principle of causality, i.e., "that causality is memory, at least so far as effects are experiences." 76 Memory in this way serves to explain what was so problematic for Hume—"Influence is either taken as an arbitrary 'constant conjunction', or else as memory; there is no additional possibility that has been made at all clear." 77 And, as memory is essentially sympathetic participation in a past experience, this concept plays a central role in explaining the causal order.

In Hartshorne’s mind his development of the panpsychic doctrine entails the reversal of Berkeley’s idealist argument. He argues that rather than adopting the notion of the "absolute independence" of the knowing subject, the relativity of the knowing subject is to be asserted. Such a reversal is required because the central problem in conceiving the structural order of the world is not,

---

77 Ibid.
according to Hartshorne, non-relation, but relation. And only the concept of the subject can provide us with an entity that can be "genuinely relative," i.e., that can intrinsically have relation. "The subject is rich in relations, the mere object has no relation, at least not to the particular subject which has it as object." 78 Subjectivity provides the more inclusive concept, and Hartshorne contends that this concept is explicable only within the framework of panpsychism.

According to Hartshorne, the case for panpsychism can be summarized in the form of six arguments, each illustrating the inadequacy of the idea of "non-subject" to explain reality:

1. Causality: the relations between past events and present events—relations exemplified by causality—require the inherence of the past in the present. The only intelligible way to conceive of causal relations is within panpsychism, for only upon analogy to memory can we conceive of the internal reference to the past in a present experience.

2. Unity in Diversity: Only panpsychism can furnish insight into the aesthetic structure of reality, for apart from subjectivity there is no principle for the one and the many.

In the subject we have a principle of unity or wholeness, of actual singularity, which is yet not the unity of an ineffable bare identity, but admits of variety of qualities and relations and components. An experience has aesthetic coherence which makes it one, not barely one, but a unity-in-variety, a synthetic unity able to relate itself to a rich diversity 79

---

78 RSP, p. 75
79 Ibid., p. 79
This is the integration of unity into organic wholeness that is the meaning of aesthetic order.

3. Contrast between particular and universal, actual and potential: This contrast is intelligible only within the context of subjects whose purposes and consummations contrast, as do universals and their instances contrast, and as possibility contrasts with actuality.

4. Quality: All known qualities are qualities of feeling. Since they qualify both the object perceived and the percipient occasion, the subject must have quality of feeling or sensation, as Berkeley held. But, it is the subject aware not merely of its own quality, but a quality not of itself.

5. Realization of Possibilities: Realization means decision among values, for the concrete is logically arbitrary. This decision is creative choice, and can only be understood intelligibly in terms of the subject's self-determination.

6. Intrinsic Value: The only motive for being interested in an "object" is to assume it has inherent intrinsic value, and on the panpsychic view such an "object" must be alive and feeling.

The only intelligible conception of direct derivation of value from an object is that the object has value to give, and this means, has its own values, its own life and feeling, and thus is some sort of subject. So

The object must contribute value to the subject if it is to influence the subject at all, and this value is its intrinsic value, i.e., the value of a subject.

80 Ibid., p. 82
What are the implications of Hartshorne's view of causality in terms of panpsychism for the cosmic organism analogy? Given Hartshorne's contention that the most intelligible way to speak of causality is upon analogy to memory, an examination of Hartshorne's conception of memory should give us an answer to this question. With this intention in mind, we shall close this section by discussing Hartshorne's conception of memory as presented in an article entitled "Mind as Memory and Creative Love".

Hartshorne defines mind as "more or less sympathetic valuation"; and memory— if the concept is sufficiently generalized— constitutes the receptivity in virtue of which the mind has something to evaluate. Hartshorne argues that "memory" must be generalized sufficiently to include not only remembering of past states of one's own personal sequence, but also of past states not of that sequence, that is, perception. Memory and perception differ if the latter is conceived as relation to others of our contemporary world, and the former as an identity relation of one's present self to one's past self. To assimilate perception into memory as Hartshorne proposes is to collapse this supposed difference. Thus in perception it is not our contemporaneous world that we are aware of, but a somewhat past world; and further, whatever identity is said to exist between a past and present "self" in memory, such an identity must be said to exist to some extent in the relation of the perceived to the perceiver as well. The consequences of Hartshorne's proposal are twofold:
1. that, as we saw above, the "reformed subjectivist principle" is to be adopted: Absolute identity is given not in substances enduring through time, but only in events, occasions. The identity of the former is a relative one, constituted by the sympathetic participation of the present in the past and future members of its own sequence. In memory we have such experience of the relative identity of the self.

2. that the "otherness" of the object in the subject-object relation is not thought of as absolute. In perception (non-personal memory) there is some degree of identity between subject and object, and this identity consists in sympathetic participation.

Only the past is experienced in its concrete actuality, not the present; and further, there exists a relative—and not absolute—identity between the "self" and the "other than self".

Two important principles follow from this view, each based upon the primacy of "sympathy". First, sympathy is a variable covering all instances of intrinsic relation between selves, whether of one's own past, or of another's past. In each, sympathy is basic, that is, sympathy felt "by one concrete and momentary self for other concrete and momentary selves, or some aspect or sequence of these." Yet it is our experience that sympathetic participation with the good of another is never complete, but always partial due to the fact that another's experience is always beyond our full comprehension.

---

81 Hartshorne, "Mind as Memory and Creative Love", p. 447
Could one say that the same holds true for divine experience?

Hartshorne answers no, contending that our lack of complete sympathetic participation is due to the fragmentary character of our existence. 82

But God, as the all-inclusive whole, does have an all-embracing sympathetic participation; and, by virtue of this, He not only wills the good of others, but is able fully to share that good.

For adequate knowledge of a good is possession of it. In this sense the conscious and everlasting cannot be capable of "unselfishness" if that is to mean "willingness to cause a good result whose value can never be its own." 83

Deity is not to be defined as the minimal instance of sympathetic participation—as in a deity completely independent of the world, deriving no value from it—but as the maximal instance. Deity as the maximal instance of sympathetic participation is deity as "benevolent," and Hartshorne states that this is just what the coherence of the idea of God requires. God not only wills the good of his creatures; he shares in the actual achievement of the good by the individual creatures.

The second principle that follows from Hartshorne's conception of memory as essentially sympathetic participation is that the principal motivation behind an action is not "self-realization," but "contribution" to another's fulfillment.

The adequate good beyond the present can only be some future good potentially recipient of our present selves as contributions to its own actuality. I call this view, *contributivism.* 84

---

82 See above, p. 4
83 Hartshorne, "Mind as Memory and Creative Love," p. 450
84 Ibid., p. 456
This notion of contributing to the good of another, when put in the form of the question "What is the ultimate future to which we offer ourselves?", is related to Hartshorne's understanding of the nature of worship discussed in the first chapter of this thesis. The answer to this question is that deity, defined as the "all-inclusive whole in the world of which we are aware", is the only adequate receiver of our contributions. God is "the everlasting and infallible form of sympathetic valuation." 85 And, as the only way that a mind can evaluate something is through receiving it in memory, it follows that in deity there must be something analogous to memory. The divine "memory" can be said to be God's inheritance of the contributions of His creatures, that is to say, his sympathetic appropriation of the value of their individual existences.

In this section we analyzed Hartshorne's argument that panpsychism is a synthesis of idealism and realism, focusing upon his contention that only the panpsychic theory allows for an intelligible conception of causality, that is, upon analogy to memory. We saw further that the concept "sympathetic participation" is central to Hartshorne's analysis of memory. In applying this to divine experience we re-emphasized the importance of the definition of deity as the "all-inclusive whole" for Hartshorne. It is hoped that this section has served to clarify Hartshorne's theory of panpsychism, and consequently to establish another portion of what I take to be the proper context within which to discuss Hartshorne's

85 Ibid.
cosmic organism analogy. We now move to a discussion of Hartshorne's theory of the social structure of reality and complete our discussion of this proper context.

2.4 The Social Structure of Reality

In the first section of this chapter we noted Hartshorne's criticism of Hume's contention that the order of nature must be an absolute order. In the section on aesthetics and Hartshorne's metaphysics we detailed the reasoning behind this criticism, but only in terms of aesthetics (the principles of "unity in variety", "the inexhaustibility of aesthetic value", "positive incompatibility").

We now turn to Hartshorne's theory of the social structure of reality, and examine the conception of order that follows from this theory, in so far as it has direct relevance to the cosmic organism analogy. In this section we first introduce the social theory, and then discuss it in terms of two different, but—in the context of the cosmic organism analogy—related perspectives: first, the problem of the mind-body relation; and second, the way in which God's ordering of the world is to be conceived on this theory.

In Reality as Social Process Hartshorne defines the social as...

...the appeal of life for life, of experience for experience. It is 'shared experience', the echo of one's experience in another. Hence nothing can be social that is without experience. The minimum of experience...is feeling. Creatures are social, and feel in relation to each other's feelings. 86

That his theories of the social structure of reality and panpsychism mutually require each other is clearly evidenced in the above
definition. Our purpose in discussing them in two different sections is a matter of emphasis. In discussing panpsychism we focused primarily upon the conception of subjectivity required by that theory. In the present section we shall focus primarily upon the conception of relatedness required by the social theory.

Hartshorne's theory of the social structure of reality is another instance of his "both...and" reasoning. According to him it is a higher synthesis of various possible theories, primarily those emphasizing order (which Hartshorne believes the "determinists" tend to absolutize to the neglect of freedom) and freedom (which he believes the "libertarians" tend to absolutize to the neglect of order). The societal conception allows for both: there is order, but it is never absolute; there is creative freedom, but it is kept within limits. Hartshorne states that this theory, if sufficiently generalized, "can explain any conceivable degree of relative orderliness or of freedom." 87 He argues that the opposite of this theory, that all is "non-social", is unverifiable, for no observation could conceivably show this to be the case; and further, that there are instances in which the social character of things is verifiable (e.g., human groups). Thus, Hartshorne's social conception provides us with a cosmic variable—it is actually known to be true in some cases, but not known to be false in any conceivable case. This is to say, it must be true of all things whatsoever. The im-

---

87 Ibid., p. 31
lications of this theory can be seen upon examination of the notion of society as it applies to the problem of the mind-body relation, and the problem of conceiving God's relation to the world. To this examination we now turn.

Following Whitehead, Hartshorne defines "society" as an unitary group of individuals. And, as it has to do with the grouping of individuals, it has to do with order. Societies may be classified either as "democracies" or as "monarchies"; the former is a society without a dominant member imposing rule upon the subordinate members; and the latter is a society with such a dominant member. A tree is a clear example of a democracy, for each of the component cells of the tree possesses more functional unity than the tree as a whole.

But what is the clearest example of a monarchical society? Hartshorne's answer is that we find it in our experience of the personality exercising immediate control over the body: I "rule" my body. Let us now proceed to examine how the societal conception serves to render this experience more intelligible.

In an article entitled "The Social Structure of Experience" Hartshorne addresses the issue of "social knowledge" by analyzing the structure of experience as social. The problem here is "can E directly feel A's feelings as A feels them?". The answer is "no", if we mean by "directly feel" an exact duplication of another's feeling. But, there may be a positive answer, for duplication of another's

feeling is not the only way to feel that feeling.

The logical structure of the significant question is not: Can one feel another's feeling as the other does, but can one feel another's feeling in some equally direct, yet otherwise different manner? 89

The positive answer to the question requires the societal conception—an immediate feeling has a social structure, i.e., it is feeling of another's feeling. The clue here is memory. We saw above that if memory is sufficiently generalized, self-knowledge and knowledge of another can be seen to be analogous. It is therefore possible that I can feel another's feeling as directly as I feel my own.

If the above holds true, then the primary question becomes, "How do I feel my own feelings?". In answering this question, we first must consider how thought (mind) can be conceived to influence "mere matter" (body). We have taken the first step in this direction in our discussion of panpsychism—there are not two different types of entities, "mind" and "matter", but rather mind is the basic mode of description covering all entities. The question must then be put, "How does mind influence mind?". On Hartshorne's analysis feeling is in principle social, or participatory. Hence, in my awareness of bodily states, it is not my awareness itself that I am aware of (contra Berkeleyian "solipsism"), but something essentially "other". For example, in the experience of a toothache, I feel pain because the injured cells of the tooth themselves have feelings of their own. My feeling of pain is the result of "sharing" in the

89 Ibid., p. 164
feelings of these injured cells—and what I feel is distinctly "other", and not just my own private feeling. In this instance we have what may be called a "double location": the feeling is localized "there" in the cells of my tooth, yet at the same moment it is me "here" that is suffering the feeling of pain.

Not merely, then, that I have pain, and also they have; but rather, their painful feelings are felt by me as other than just my own feeling, this otherness being in fact essential to the "thereeness"... Thereeness of feeling in this sense—so runs our theory—is social otherness: to say that the first is given is to say that the second is given, and just as directly. 90

I am one individual, the cells of my body are other individuals, and it is only in participatory sharing that the feelings of others can be mine.

We have just shown how, according to Hartshorne, it is that I can feel the feelings of my bodily cells and thereby be influenced by them; but, how is it that the bodily cells can be influenced by my personal experience? Hartshorne states that this question is essentially the question "How is it that a high level experience can make a difference to a low level experience?". 91 In our analysis of experience as such we find the key to understanding the mutual influence that exists between body and experience. As we saw above, our paradigm is memory: the present experience's datum is some past experience which influences the present experience. "To be aware of something is ipso facto to be influenced by it." 92

90 Ibid., p. 108
91 See LP, p. 226
92 Ibid., p. 227
Accordingly, we are influenced by our bodily cells simply by experiencing them, i.e., feeling their feeling. To explain how human experience can influence bodily cells, we need only reverse this principle: "We have feelings that the cells can feel." 93 Due to the superior complexity and intensity of our experience, the cell's experience of our experience—their "participatory sharing"—is inadequate to a great extent; but, nonetheless, there is influence.

These considerations shed light upon the relation of a "whole" to its "parts": if we can conceive of the mind as the "whole" of which the body is the "parts", and, this is just what Hartshorne proposes to do. In retrospection the mind is given as including sensory content, aspects of the bodily processes directly enjoyed, and "this means that a state of mind is a whole of which certain bodily functions are merely constituents." 94 In this way we have, according to Hartshorne, an intelligible solution to the problem of conceiving how a whole can influence its parts. This is simply...

...the influence of the dominant experiences, in which what goes on in the parts is perpetually, though incompletely, summed up...this summing up being then reacted to by the parts which are also social in character. 95

Within the framework of the social theory of reality we are able to meet this problem, for it allows us to conceive of the interrelations between varying levels of experience.

We noted earlier that a monopolistic society is a society in which one dominant member imposes rule upon the subordinate members. But to rule is not to render the ruled powerless, since according

93 Ibid., p. 229
94 Hartshorne, "Mind as Memory and Creative Love", p. 454
95 Ibid., p. 462
to Hartshorne "to be" is "to have power". "A 'ruler' is the eminent influence in his society, but not in any sense the sole influence." Ruling is therefore the "subordination" of the lesser powers to the power whose effective field of operations is the society as a whole. Hartshorne contends that "superiority in principle tends to have influence, to exert guidance." It is by virtue of the superior power that the entire group acts with a functional unity greater than that evidenced in its members. From this view it follows that the members of a monarchical society--as their own functional unity is not superior to that of the whole society--may themselves be democracies. This leads one to conceive of the possibility that...

...all societies, however democratic, may be portions of an all-inclusive monarchical society, the entire universe, with order imposed throughout by a single dominant all-ruling member.

Hartshorne argues that this is in fact the case— that a democratic society can exist only in virtue of inclusion within a larger monarchical society. A democracy, with no imposed ruler, lacks the required guarantee of the conservation of the society, i.e., that the members of the society assist rather than thwart the purposes of the other members.

If there were in the universe no radically dominant member, able to set limits to the chaotic possibilities of individual freedom, it seems there would be no reason why the scheme of things should not dissolve in a chaos of unmitigated conflict, that is to say, in the cessation of all feeling and activity through the irresistible force of unbearable fortune.

---

96 NT, p. 97  
97 LP, p. 226  
98 RSP, p. 38  
99 Ibid., p. 39
The universe, if it is a society (that it is not is unverifiable),
must be a monarchical society. "Democratic cooperation is possible
only within an all-inclusive monarchy." 100 What is required is a
cosmic coordination imposing limits upon the free decisions of the
less than cosmic individuals.

Three things follow from the societal conception of the uni-
verse, that are particularly relevant for Hartshorne’s cosmic organism
analogy. First of all, the scheme of nature is to be conceived as
a series of the compounding of individuals into higher inclusive
individuals, that is to say, of individuals consisting of individuals.
This brings us back to the notion or "contributionism", that...

...to be is to be an individual contributing to the existence
of higher individuals, or containing contributory lower indi-
viduals, and usually both of these at once. To be is to be
contributory and to enjoy the contributions of others. 101

Nature consists of experient individuals compounded into more in-
cclusive experient individuals, the lesser individuals contributing
their feelings to the more inclusive individuals compounding them.
All things, accordingly, contribute to an all inclusive whole, some-
what as a man's bodily cells contribute to his whole person. And
social influence is mutual. Contributionism is creative, for each
individual in his contribution to the concrete actuality of another
individual, to a greater or lesser degree, "makes" that individual.

The more important the individual member of the society, the more
he contributes to the being of the other individual members. Accord-

100 Ibid.
101 C. Hartshorne, "Man in Nature", in Irwin C. Lieb, ed., Ex-
perience, Existence, and The Good (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univer-
sity Press, 1961), p. 93
ingly, God, the supreme member of the society, contributes "most vitally and largely to the actuality of all." 102

Secondly, on these grounds God is to be defined as a social being, for He is the dominant ruling member of the world society, and as such exerts His supreme influence upon the subordinate members of the society so as to secure its conservation. This is not deity defined as independent of the world society,

...but as the being uniquely able to maintain the society of which it is a member, the only social being unconditionally able to guarantee the survival, the minimal integrity, of its society, and of itself as a member of that society. 103

And this conception of the supreme being, as we saw in the first chapter, can be made intelligible only within the logic of dipolar theism.

Finally, it follows that omnipotence is to be defined in terms of social power: "power adequate to preserve the society no matter what the other members may do." 104 Social power is the power to impose limits upon the freedom of the other members of the society without destroying their freedom. God, as the supreme form of such power, is able to set the optimal limits to freedom, i.e., limits such that the risks allowed do not outweigh the opportunities involved. "But some risk there must be if there is to be any opportunity, any existence in the social sense." 105

102 DR, p. 29
103 HSP, p. 41
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
In this section we have discussed Hartshorne's theory of the social structure of reality, with the intention of examining the type of order that follows from this theory. To this end we have discussed both the mind-body relation and the relation of God to the world from within the framework of Hartshorne's notion of society.

In the above chapter we have endeavoured to show what Hartshorne conceives the proper formulation of the teleological argument to be, and as well the way in which four notions central to his neoclassical metaphysics— the scale of beings and the cosmic variables, aesthetics, panpsychism, and the social structure of reality— can be said to underpin that formulation. In doing so we have established, in so far as each of these four notions is operative in Hartshorne's cosmic organism analogy, what I believe to be the proper context within which to discuss that analogy.
CHAPTER III
THE COSMIC ORGANISM ANALOGY

We are members one of another because we are members of the ultimate body-mind, one inclusive, unborn, and imperishable organism. 1

The question before us in this thesis is "How does Charles Hartshorne conceive of the teleological argument for the existence of God?". In this third chapter we shall focus upon the way in which he believes that the central notion of the argument, that of order, can best be understood. When speaking of the various possibilities of arguments for the existence of God in Philosophers Speak of God, he writes, "there can be as many arguments for God as one can distinguish fundamental aspects of experience and thought." 2

The teleological argument rests upon the assertion that order is just such a fundamental aspect of experience and thought. We saw above that for Hartshorne the examination of one's experience provides one with the basis for one's metaphysical ideas. 3 Within the context of the teleological argument the question that must be answered is, "What is the basis in human experience of our conception of order?". In the last chapter we examined Hartshorne's contention that this basis is to be found in the mind-body relation, i.e., the ordering of the body by the mind. Hence, the most appropriate manner in which to understand the relation of God to the world, or more specifically, God's ordering of the world, is upon analogy to our own experience of the relation of mind to body.

---

1 LP, p. 214  
2 PSC, p. 24  
3 See above, pp. 24-28
It follows that the cosmic organism analogy—that analogous to the relation of one's mind to one's body, God is the mind of the world body—provides one with the most appropriate manner in which to discuss the teleological argument. Our purpose in this present chapter, therefore, is to explicate Hartshorne's presentation of this analogy in chapter V of *Man's Vision of God*, "Theological Analogies and Cosmic Organism", and show how this analogy is the best way to conceive of God's ordering of the world.

In the last chapter we noted that Hartshorne's theories of panpsychism and the social structure of reality mutually required each other. In the final two sections of that chapter we saw that the mutual interplay of both theories was necessary for a proper understanding of Hartshorne's view of the mind-body relation. In the presentation of the cosmic organism analogy in *Man's Vision of God* the necessary integration of these two theories is illustrated in that the analogy is, in Hartshorne's mind, essentially a synthesis of the mind-body analogy, interpreted according to panpsychism, and the analogy of social relations, interpreted according to the societal conception. This is to say, that the cosmic organism analogy rests upon an understanding of the mind-body relation as "immediately social". Hartshorne examines the relative merits of each of these analogies in so far as each contributes to an understanding of the nature of knowledge and power, and derivatively, to his conceptions of divine omniscience and divine omnipotence.

---

4 See above, p.86
the superior in principle, or perfect instances of these types of relation. Following this scheme, we first discuss each component analogy and its merits separately, and then the way in which Hartshorne combines the two. We then conclude the chapter by drawing out the implications of this analogy for the conception of order employed by Hartshorne in his formulation of the teleological argument.

The mind-body analogy as used in the cosmic organism analogy by Hartshorne is stated as follows:

Thus a body, to the best of our knowledge, is really a "world" of individuals, and a mind, if the body is one having a mind (or capable of thinking and feeling), is to that body something like an indwelling God. 5

The understanding of the mind-body relation at the base of this analogy depends upon what we saw above to be Hartshorne's "mistrust of sense-perception": the body as given in sense perception "appears" to be an organism containing no parts, rather than as one containing real and sentient individuals. 6 Hartshorne defines the body in his essay on Whitehead, "The Compound Individual", as "a vast nexus or interlocked colony of relatively low-grade individuals, which in varying degrees are subject to the control of the human mind." 7 It is his contention that given this definition or the body, to refer to nature as God's body is not to speak metaphorically, but literally. 8 Let us explore what Hartshorne means here by examining the merits of the mind-body analogy in terms of the cosmic organism analogy.

5 MVG, p. 177
6 See above, p. 21
8 Ibid., p. 213; See above, p. 32
Hartshorne states that the mind-body analogy proves to be illuminating as to the nature of power, in that it offers us an instance of direct control, or "the ability to carry out a purpose."

He argues that the immediate effect of a human purpose is a change in the human body, and that this immediacy provides us with the most suitable instance of a power relation on which to conceive of divine omnipotence, defined as "direct control of every part of the universe." Hartshorne attributes the neglect of this use of the mind-body relation in theological analogies to the inability on the part of theologians to conceive of an "eminent, uniquely perfect body." It is one thing to say that human bodies undergo decay and destruction, and hence their minds; but this gives one no reason to suppose that an uniquely perfect world body would likewise undergo such decay and destruction, for the power that human minds have to maintain their bodies may be possessed by the divine mind in an eminent fashion, i.e., as "unconditioned power to preserve the body always." The defining characteristic of the human body is that it is an integrated complexity. The dissolution of this integration is due to the intrusion of events not under the mind's immediate control, i.e., external events. But, we have no reason to infer that the universe, as an organic whole, must undergo such dissolution, for not only does the divine mind have immediate control over all the member parts of its body, but it alone has no external environment to interfere with the

---

9 MGW, p. 178  
10 Ibid.  
11 Ibid., p. 180  
12 Ibid.
integrated complexity of its body. As we saw above in our discussion of the definition of deity as the all-inclusive whole, Hartshorne conceives of God as..."...the Compound Individual who at all times has embraced or will embrace the fullness of all other individuals as existing at those times." 14

The relation of mind to body is also illuminating, according to Hartshorne, as to the nature of knowledge. The mind's awareness of the body affords us an instance of immediate knowledge, in that there is no need of "external perception" as in our inferential awareness of extra-bodily objects. Hartshorne argues that the content, for example, of our visual field given in perception is much more informative of the states of the internal parts of our body than of the external world. The point of our most immediate contact with reality is not the "object" given in sensation, but our own bodily parts. It is only these bodily states that are "genuinely given in sensation." 15 We examined above Hartshorne's argument that nothing can influence an experience except the data immediately experienced. Hartshorne's argument here is that the only data given directly in experience, i.e., that we feel the feelings of, is the body; and that our knowledge of the world outside the body is based on inference from these bodily states. The upshot of this argument is as follows.

Visual perception is shot through with inference aiming at the external world; subtract this inference, as we must do to conceive of the immediacy of omniscience, and it is the relation

13 See Dr., p. 81
14 Hartshorne, "The Compound Individual", p. 218
15 Ibid., p. 200
to the optical nervous system that remains as worthy of use in the theological analogy. 16

In our own immediate awareness of our bodily states (or our characteristically indistinct awareness of bodily cells) we have the best instance upon which to conceive of divine omniscience, which Hartshorne defines as immediate intuition of every part of the universe, i.e., knowledge adequate to the whole world. 17

To summarize our discussion so far: Hartshorne chooses to speak of the relation of God to the world upon analogy to the relation of one's mind to one's body, minus the characteristic vagueness and indistinctness evidenced in human-type control and awareness of bodily parts. The precise form of this analogy is given by Hartshorne as follows: In omniscient awareness of the world, the parts of the world are given to the divine mind as muscle-nerves, much in the same way as in my awareness of my body, my brain cells are given to me as muscle-nerves. In omnipotent control of the world, the parts of the world are given to the divine mind as nerve-muscles, much in the same way as in my control of my bodily parts, my brain cells are given to me as nerve-muscles. 18

Now let us turn to a brief discussion of what Hartshorne sees as the only other analogy of use in theological discourse, the social analogy, or the analogy of human social relations. Basically, this analogy turns on our experience of our awareness and control of other human beings. Such awareness and control, to be effective, must be sympathetic in nature. Hartshorne sees the chief merit of

---

16 NVG, p. 184
17 See DR, p. 121
18 See NVG, p. 185
this analogy over the mind-body analogy to lie in its intelligibility. He states that while it can be said that the mind does have immediate relations to the body, the nature of these relations is by no means clear and distinct. On the other hand, in sympathy—as evidenced in our participatory sharing (although somewhat imaginative) in the feelings of other human beings—there is to be found no such "opaque mystery". 19 Furthermore, this analogy provides us with a relation of which both terms can equally be understood by us as human beings. We all know what it is like, for example, to know another as well as to be known by another, for we have had such experiences. But how can it be known, with any degree of distinctness, what it is like for a cell to know and to be known, relations of which we have had no experience? The social analogy, however, has a disadvantage. According to Hartshorne this lies in its inability to supply us with an adequate explanation of how "one mind is able to communicate its feeling to another immediately." 20 Within the context of social relations communication of feelings involves the use of an intermediary, the human body. Hence, the more complete intelligibility of the social analogy requires an understanding of the mind-body relation.

Upon consideration of both analogies Hartshorne finds himself faced with the following problem. The mind-body relation is "factually immediate but mysterious or unintelligible as it stands." 21

---

19 Ibid., p. 186
20 Ibid., pp. 186, 187
21 Ibid., p. 187
Furthermore, it has a materialistic semblance to it (in so far as it consists of the relation between mind and what appears to be "matter") which renders it somewhat inappropriate for use in interpreting the relationship in question, that of God to world, which is essentially one of mind to mind(s). On the other hand, the social analogy, while providing us with an intelligible instance of the relation of mind to mind, fails to convey the immediacy required for understanding the relation of an omniscient and omnipotent deity to the world. The question is then, can the two analogies be combined "so as to produce a unitary variable without either the seeming unintelligibility and materialistic character of the one or the non-immediacy of the other?" 22 The basis of an affirmative answer to this question has been given in the preceding chapter: in Hartshorne's societal conception the body is understood as a society composed of sentient, individual organic cells, each possessing feelings and desires in some sense analogous to the human self. On this analysis the mind, in a manner analogous to our sharing in the feelings of other human beings, is able to immediately (although indistinctly) share in the feelings of the bodily cells. The mind-body relation can, therefore, be understood as the immediately social relation between a dominant and superior mind and many inferior minds.

For Hartshorne the possibility that an immediate relation can be social rests upon the recognition that, while social relations between complex equals must be indirect and inferential, it

---

22 WVG, p. 187
does not follow that the relations between complex and simple
unequals must be likewise indirect and inferential. For, if the
relation between equal complex minds were to be as direct as the
relation between our complex mind and the many cells of our body,
themselves inferior minds, then the dependence of the complex
minds upon one another would be equally as radical as that of mind
upon body, the result being loss of freedom and individuality with
respect to one another. "It is only the combination of equality
with complexity that makes indirectness necessary in the relations
among men." 23 Directness of feeling in the case of radical un-
equals on the cosmic scale is, on the other hand, possible. This
is evidenced in the relation of mind to body, in which the mind's
intuition of the bodily cells results neither in the loss of the
privacy necessary for the degree of independence of functioning
required, nor in the loss of the complete individuality of the
mind through "enslavement" to the feelings of the bodily cells.
Because no one bodily cell has as much influence upon the whole
bodily system as the personality, the personality is able to in-
fluence the bodily cells in its movement of the body literally
"at will"; whereas the bodily cells are able to influence the
personality only in a vastly inferior way (but nonetheless, the
influence is real). For Hartshorne, then, the human mind as given
in the mind-body relation is not so much "a definite term of social
relation", but rather, "a sort of environment." 24

23 BH, p. 197  24 NVC, p. 190
The importance of the above considerations is attested to
if we look with Hartshorne to one of Hume's criticisms of the
design argument. 25 Hume argues that due to the reciprocal
equality of action and reaction in any instance in which mind is
said to influence "matter", mind must be regarded as dependent
upon "matter" as "matter" is said to be upon mind. Hence, his
argument goes, God, as the mind of the world-body, must be equally
dependent upon the world as the world is upon Him. But, according
to Hartshorne's analysis of the mind-body relation presented a-
bove, such equality of dependence does not exist between the mind
and the bodily cells (and, on our analogy, between the divine
mind and the world-body), because the power of the human mind is
radically superior to that of the bodily cells. Hartshorne states
that Hume was correct in so far as he insisted that the world-mind
must be reactive (passive) as well as active, but "action and
reaction need not be equal in relations between wholes and parts..." 26
There must be action and reaction due to the social character of
existence, but it need not be equal; rather, the degree of equal-
ity varies with the degree of disparity that holds between the
individuals on the cosmic scale.

Returning to our discussion of Hartshorne's synthesis of
the mind-body analogy and the social analogy, we see that for him
the relation between the radically superior divine mind and all

25 See PSC, p. 424
26 MVC, pp. 208,209
lesser minds is to be conceived, by analogy to the relations of the human mind to the bodily parts, in the following manner. The relation is direct, but man does not intuit the divine as a definite and distinct social other (to intuit the divine distinctly would require omniscience, i.e., to be divine oneself), but as "a vague environment." Further, due to the universality of his aim at creative value on the part of all creatures—"His Righteousness"—God's direct intuition of the human mind and its entire context does not result in a loss of independent functioning on the part of that human mind. In sum,

...the lack of appreciable directness in human social relations is entirely compatible with its being nevertheless the case that not only some but even all direct interaction is social, whether the direct interaction of cell with cell, of cell with light rays striking the body, of human mind with human brain cell, of world mind with all parts of the world body.  

The cosmic organism analogy is now to be stated as follows: the world is God's body, and it is composed of individual members to which he has immediate social relations.

One of Hartshorne's central assertions in formulating the cosmic organism analogy is that the universe, "the whole formed by God and the world", 29 is an organic unit, i.e., an organism. An organism, according to Hartshorne, is an individual "whole whose parts serve as "organs" or instruments to a purpose or end-value inherent in the whole." 30 Individuality on this definition does not refer to "pattern", for a pattern is merely

---

27 Ibid., p. 190  
28 Ibid., p. 192  
29 Hartshorne, "The Compound Individual", p. 159  
the way in which the parts interact among themselves. What is required for an organism is the dynamic action of an individual whole upon its parts, such as is given in experience in the mind's ordering of the bodily parts so as to realize a purpose. I am aware of myself not as a composite of interacting bodily cells, but as a single unit of action, controlling my bodily parts in the achievement of a purpose; and the unity of my action is a definite unity, not reducible to the interrelations of my unified parts. But, can we say that the universe is itself organic? Hartshorne states that the organic order evidenced in human beings is not the most distinctive instance of such order in the cosmos—rather, it is the cosmos itself. "Now the cosmic order is the most individual, the most distinctive of all." 31 That the world is not less but more organic than man is attested to by the fact that it is the most stable order, i.e., it endures itself as a whole no matter how much the parts of the world may undergo destruction. The cosmos is ever being enriched by new patterns, and to such an extent that its organicity "exceeds any requirements of individuality that we can clearly understand or measure." 32

An organism, by definition, requires a complexity of parts contributing to it as a whole; but such contribution to an organic whole need not mean that the part be internal to the whole in the sense of spatial inclusion. All the internality that is required for an organism is some plurality contributing to the

---

31 MVG, p. 200
32 Ibid., p. 201
whole, i.e., "an immediately contributory complexity." 33 So, in the case of the atomic particle ("a disembodied soul" because it has no body directly serving its purpose), which is at the inferior pole of the cosmic scale, this complexity consists solely in the direct sharing in the feelings of the members of its "external" (which in this case is indistinguishable from "internal") environment, its neighboring atomic particles. "The particle, one might say, is embodied only in its environment not in itself." 35 But in the case of deity, at the "superior" pole of the cosmic scale, the "immediately contributory complexity" required for organic wholeness consists not in an "external" environment, but entirely in an "internal" environment. "The cosmos, which deals with everything through its internal relations, can perfectly well dispense with external ones..." 36 All that is required for the maintenance of the cosmic whole is that every organ contributing to it should do so directly, and as well, that each organ should be directly responsive to the initiatives of the cosmic whole. The organic unity of the cosmos lies in its inclusiveness of all that is, i.e., in its internal relations to all that is. "Everything contributes equally directly to the cosmic

33 LF, p. 196  
34 Ibid., p.195  
35 Ibid., p. 196  
36 Ibid., p.197; cf NT, p. 98. But, relation to the future, even in case of deity, can never in its concreteness be internal to the present on Hartshorne's asymmetrical view of time. For a discussion of the logic of internal and external relations within the context of dipolar theism see DR, pp. 95-115
and the cosmic value can be nothing other than the value of the one all-inclusive organism, the universe, of which all lesser organisms are parts.

In the previous chapter we discussed Hartshorne’s notion of "contributionism", that all reality is composed of living entities contributing the value of their lives to an all-inclusive whole. To be inclusive of value the whole cannot be a mere collective group, the sum of the interrelations of many entities, for it makes no sense to contribute value to a collection which itself cannot take satisfaction in the contributions of others. What is necessary to render the notion of contributionism intelligible is the conception of a unitary entity which takes into its own unity the sum of the value of many interrelated entities as a value itself, i.e., as the all-inclusive value. To include a value is to take concrete satisfaction in it; so, in order to speak intelligibly of the one concrete satisfaction or enjoyment of the sum of the value of the many, there must be "an individual who takes satisfaction in the being satisfied of all," as we saw above, the individual who is capable of including all values (all actual values as actual and all possible values as possible), of sympathetic participation in the lives of all creatures, is God.

God must himself value all things; for nothing possesses actual value but an actually-enjoying subject, while the potential possession of value can only be the potential enjoyment of a subject.  

---

37 Ibid.  
39 IP, p. 43
Hartshorne argues that the only way to avoid the evil of an "abstract collectivism" is to posit a cosmic mind to whose concrete individuality all that exists contributes. Such is the mind which finds satisfaction in the "being satisfied of all," "for all would be integral parts of its own body, whose health would be inseparable from the prevailing health of its parts." 40

The conception of teleology required for the cosmic organism analogy is that of organic teleology, and it can be said to be based on the principle of the many in the one. Hartshorne states in the Logic of Perfection that "an organism is not a 'whole which determines its parts', but something more complex..." 41 The meaning of this statement is twofold. First of all, the whole is a dynamic unity that does determine the parts, but, the parts as well influence the whole (and by virtue of this, every other part). Secondly, as the whole is a creative synthesis of the parts, possessing its own unity as distinct from the interrelations of these parts, the parts themselves must be "given" to the whole, which is to say that they must be actual prior to the creative synthesis. And, it is by virtue of their being "given" that the parts are able to determine the whole. "Strictly speaking, in so far as an organism is a whole, in the logical sense it does not even influence its parts." 42 This is to say that the actual momentary synthesis by the whole does not determine the parts.

40 Hartshorne, "Elements of Truth in the Group-Mind Concept", P. 260
41 EP, p. 199
42 Ibid.
entering into that synthesis. Just as my present experience does not determine its data (the past experience given in memory), but does, by virtue of this synthesis, influence subsequent experiences, so the whole does not determine the parts in each momentary synthesis, but does, by virtue of this synthesis, influence the subsequent states of the parts. One implication of this view is that the purpose we attribute to the universe as an all-inclusive whole is a purpose directed not at determining the action of its member parts, but rather at maintaining a comprehensive order within which the creative action of the parts is made possible and kept within limits. The end of the cosmic organism lies in "the prosperity of the parts and of the whole as the integration of the parts," and this is achieved through its sympathetic participation in the actuality of those parts. Analogous to my enjoyment of health through participation in the health of the bodily cells, "the happiness of the cosmos is the integration of the lesser happiness of the parts." Thus we see the primacy of the principle of the many in one; the very nature of being is "its organic character as many individuals in one, the many being as real as the one." The pattern of organic unity is to be described as the compounding of lower individuals into higher individuals, not by violating the dynamic integrity of the lower individuals but rather by preserving and enhancing it.

43 Hartshorne, "Organic and Inorganic Wholes", p. 133
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., p. 134
Hartshorne's argument that the all-inclusive whole is to be conceived as the cosmic organism is similar to his method of defining deity in accordance with "the religious idea of God".\(^{46}\) Hartshorne argues that only the conception of the ultimate value as the all-inclusive enjoyment of the contributory value of others by the cosmic organism can meet the "concrete religious need", which he states is "a rational conception of a concrete whole to which we can devote ourselves."\(^{47}\) It is the definition of deity as totally independent of the values of the lives of his creatures, rather than in terms of concrete relativity, that can offer nothing towards meeting this need.

I firmly believe that if religion is to perform its function of furnishing the supreme perspective for all values, it must outgrow the crudity of this purely one-way relation between creator and creature. Man has an ultimate rational need to regard himself as contributing to something quite as concrete and individual as himself, but, unlike himself, not limited and localized in space and time.\(^{48}\)

This is the cosmic mind of the world body, and, as we noted above in our discussion of the definition of deity required by religious worship, this conception can only be made coherent within the logic of dipolar theism. Only when perfection is defined as "the self-surpassing surpasser of all", as it is in dipolar theism, can the notion of contributing to the perfect being—the one being capable of an "endlessly enriched life"\(^{49}\) make sense. "Thus there is no longer any incompatibility between perfection and the status of the cosmic group mind, or concrete unity of things and

---

\(^{46}\) See above, pp. 6-11

\(^{47}\) Hartshorne, "Elements of Truth in the Group-Mind Concept", p. 263

\(^{48}\) Ibid., p. 261

\(^{49}\) NT., p. 101
value." 50 Only with the conception of the cosmic organism can the intelligibility of the phrase "all-inclusive whole" be secured.

We conclude this chapter by delineating its relation to the rest of the thesis. It was suggested in the second chapter that the four notions which underpin Hartshorne's formulation of the teleological argument—the scale of beings and the cosmic variables, aesthetics, panpsychism, and the social structure of reality—are operative as well in his exposition of the cosmic organism analogy. And so it is that the cosmic organism analogy rests upon the use of the scale of beings and the cosmic variables. As man is a member of the scale of beings, it is possible to define the other members of the scale—in the case of the cosmic organism, the infinitely superior member, deity—by turning to experience and "scaling" the basic features of our experience. As the proper experience upon which to conceive the teleological argument is the relation of the mind to body, Hartshorne employs these two as cosmic variables in formulating the cosmic organism analogy. In the section on aesthetics we examined the primacy of the concrete in Hartshorne's metaphysics, as well as the "aesthetic imperative" (that there be unity in variety) in order to come to an understanding of Hartshorne's conception of order as aesthetic. So, it is that in the cosmic organism analogy we see that the world—"the sensorium of God (Newton)" 51—is ordered by the all sympathetic divine mind, and that such ordering, rather than violating the integrity of the

50 Hartshorne, "Elements of Truth in the Group-Mind Concept", p. 263
51 MVG, p. 279
individuals constituting the world, is the very possibility of there being any individuals at all. In the section on Hartshorne's theory of panpsychism we explored his argument for the intelligibility of mind, and hence of a divine mind ordering the world body, by examining his assertion that "sympathetic participation" is the key to causality. So it is that in the cosmic organism analogy the theory of panpsychism is basic and that the divine mind's ordering of the world parts is to be conceived of as the "sympathetic participation" of the all-inclusive whole in the life of its contributing parts. And finally, we saw in our section on Hartshorne's theory of the social structure of reality, that the social conception, which covers any instance of "relative orderliness", carries the implication that the universe is to be conceived of as a monarchical society, of which deity is the dominant ruling member. So it is that in the cosmic organism analogy the mind-body relation is understood as immediately social, and, by analogy, the divine mind is understood to be the whole directly influencing the world parts by virtue of its all-embracing and direct appreciation of the contributions of those parts.

Finally, it must be reiterated that Hartshorne conceives of the argument from design as an a priori argument, the structure of which is: any order conceivable requires an orderer, and that any world order conceivable requires a divine orderer. Our purpose in discussing the cosmic organism analogy has been to examine the way in which Hartshorne sees this analogy as the best way to conceive of God's ordering of the world, and consequently, as providing one
with the most appropriate manner in which to discuss the teleological argument. Hartshorne, in keeping with his understanding of the proper method of metaphysical inquiry, bases his conception of order upon an examination of the order experienced in the relation of mind to body; and, by analogy, conceives of the type of order necessary in the relation of the divine mind to the world-body. This does not, in any way, amount to the claim that God's ordering of the world is an empirical fact, but only to the assertion that the cosmic organism analogy provides us with a coherent and intelligible way to conceive of this relation. In this fashion, Hartshorne's cosmic organism analogy helps to fulfill what he sees to be one of the purposes of proofs for the existence of God—

...though it is unrealistic to hope that all doubts concerning theism can be removed by deductive argument, it may be quite as unrealistic to suppose that no doubts can be removed. 52 — by focusing upon the idea of order, an idea which is necessary for "any interpretation of life and reality", and explicating and clarifying it within the theistic context.

52 NT, p. 30
CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION: THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

Thus far the objective of this thesis has been to present Hartshorne's understanding of the teleological argument, and to examine the way in which he sees the cosmic organism analogy as the best way to conceive of the central issue of that argument, that is, the divine mind's ordering of the world. We conclude with a presentation of Hartshorne's solution to the problem of evil for two reasons. First of all, in his development of the cosmic organism analogy in Man's Vision of God Hartshorne states that the most serious problem facing this analogy is that of evil. Accordingly, an examination of his solution to the problem of evil will serve to illuminate his cosmic organism analogy and his understanding of the teleological argument.

Secondly, Hartshorne's solution to the problem of evil is based upon both his contention that the teleological argument is a priori, and the application of the four notions that underpin his formulation of the teleological argument. Accordingly, an examination of his solution to the problem of evil will serve to clarify these two features of Hartshorne's formulation of the teleological argument.

It is hoped that the present discussion does not provide us with yet another chapter, but rather with a conclusion in so far as we are not introducing a new topic of discussion so much as illustrating Hartshorne's application of the principles already

---

1 See MVG, p. 195
expounded in this thesis to a specific theological question. We present Hartshorne's solution to the problem of evil in a three-fold way: i) in terms of the necessarily a priori character of theological proofs; ii) in terms of the four notions underpinning Hartshorne's formulation of the teleological argument; and iii) in terms of the implications of the conception of a divine mind including the world.

We noted above that Hartshorne is critical of what he takes to be the classical formulation of the teleological argument. On this formulation one argues that the world exhibits order in a number of observable ways, and that because this empirical world order can be contrasted to an imaginary one in worse shape, the conclusion that a divine orderer exists is appropriate. The problem with this formulation, according to Hartshorne, is that in arguing from an empirical premise one reduces the conclusion to an empirical status as well (i.e., one that experience could conceivably falsify). The problem of evil must then be a real problem for those who expound this formulation, for the "atheologian" need simply argue that the evidence empirically observable in the world entails the opposite conclusion— even if there is an order, there need not be an ordering power, and further, even if there is an ordering power, it need not be divine. 2 The basis of Hartshorne's criticism of this formulation lies in his contention that God is the ground of all possibility as well as all actuality, and that by virtue of this, no conceivable world could not be God's world. The atheologian

---

argues that the fact of evil is logically incompatible with the existence of God, and since evil does exist, and nothing that can contradict a necessity can exist, the existence of God must be contingent. But for Hartshorne the existence of God cannot be contingent, so the correct formula is "either God's existence is necessary, or it is impossible". If it is impossible, it is incompatible with anything; if it is necessary, it is compatible with everything, even evil. Accordingly, the atheologist can not merely argue that this empirical world order is logically incompatible with the necessary existence of God; he must further argue that no world conceivable could be God's world.

This discussion brings to the foreground that for Hartshorne the critical issue at stake in the teleological argument is that no world conceivable can contradict the necessary existence of the divine orderer.

Without God, to speak per impossible, individuals could not form even a disorderly world, but only a meaningless, unthinkable chaos in which there would be neither any definite good nor any definite evil. This is the same as no world. 3 God's ordering of the world is the possibility of there being any world at all; and the order of the world is such that both good and evil can occur; this following from the very nature of the way things are. This is, I believe, what Hartshorne means in saying that the argument from design turns on the acceptance of order as a fundamental aspect of experience and thought.

---

In the depths of our consciousness we feel and accept the divine ordering without which there could be nothing significant or definite. The worst sinner still does this in his imperfect way.  

In this way Hartshorne is led to the conclusion that the problem of evil is actually a logical muddle, and is to be regarded as "a mistake, a pseudoproblem."  

Given that Hartshorne is correct, and that the existence of evil in the world in fact poses no problem for the teleological argument, why has the contrary been held through the centuries? Hartshorne's answer is twofold:

...people had a confused idea, really a self-contradictory one—though vague enough for the contradiction to escape clear detection—of the meaning of the term "God", and therefore they also had confused ideas about what is to be meant by "creature", or a being other than God.

We have already seen that for Hartshorne a coherent and non-contradictory meaning can be assigned to the term "God" only within the logic of dipolar theism. For the purposes of the present discussion we shall focus directly upon the latter half of Hartshorne's answer, and upon the former indirectly, in order to examine the way in which his understanding of what constitutes a "creature" contributes to his solution to the problem of evil.

The basic proposition of Hartshorne's creationist metaphysics can be summed up in the dictum, "being is power, and all individuals must have some degree of power." This leads Hartshorne to criticize the definition of the omnipotent being as "a being perfect in power... able to prevent anything undesirable from occurring" on the grounds

---

4 Ibid., p. 211
5 Ibid., p. 202
6 Ibid.
that such a definition assigns to deity a "monopoly" on all decision-making power, the effect being that the creatures have none. 7

Hartshorne contends that genuine individuality consists in making free decisions. Hence, to suppose that any individual—even God—can make all creaturely decisions result in such an absolute harmony that nothing undesirable could occur is to consider a non-sensical notion. The argument here is that the value of existence rests upon the possibility of each individual existent deciding for himself. A decision is essentially a choice among possibilities, i.e., rendering abstract indeterminateness concrete and determinate. Accordingly, it is meaningless to assert that any decision can be foreseen in its concreteness, much less eternally foreseen by God (as Hartshorne believes certain Thomists hold 8), for until a decision takes place it does not exist as a wholly definite entity or fact. To argue that absolute harmony is conceivable because it is possible that the supreme being can decide our decisions is to fall prey to a species of "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness". One can influence a decision by determining the abstract features of that decision; but it is logically impossible that the decision in its full concreteness can be pre-determined, or pre-decided. And such logic applies even to the pre-eminent influence of God, for "influence in principle cannot degenerate into sheer determinism." 9

7 Ibid.
8 See, for example, DR, p. 135
It is not that God is weak, but that my act is mine, and it is senseless to say that God simply makes this act, for if this were so it would be His act and not mine at all. 10

Decision, if it is to genuinely individual, demands genuine indeterminateness, that is, real and open alternatives from which to choose freely.

According to Hartshorne's theory of panpsychism, experience, as free creative synthesis, pervades the entire scale of beings. This means that the above view of individual decision making power does not hold simply for the rational animal, man, but, to some degree, for all members of the scale of beings.

Rational freedom is to be viewed as a special, high-level form of freedom in general, and this as inherent in the category of individuality. as such, whether atomic, human, or divine. 11

All individuals are to some degree free; God is the supreme instance of freedom, and the mere negation of this freedom does not provide one with the meaning of the term "creature", but only with that of the term "nonentity". To understand the matter correctly, one must conceive of deity as that member of the scale of beings who possesses freedom to a higher degree (infinitely higher) than the lesser members of the scale. Within this context the divine power or freedom is to be defined as "the unsurpassable freedom or power to influence others" by setting optimal limits to their freedom. 12

By virtue of the social structure of existence, freedom can be limited only by another's freedom, and by virtue of the temporal structure

10 LP, p. 313
11 PE, p. 205
12 Ibid., p. 204
of existence, this influence is that freedom which has been exercised in the past. As we saw above, Hartshorne terms this "sharing of creativity," and sees memory as its most obvious instance. "In memory one takes account of one's own previous decisions as relevant to the present decision." 13 One's present free act is not cast in a vacuum, but is limited by other past free acts known in memory. "Always there is a degree of freedom; and the inclusive limit upon the present act of freedom is the sum of past acts to which it is a reaction." 14 Accordingly, the control of God over the freedom of others is the influence of His own past free decisions, felt by the free agent in his present concrete experience.

Within this framework the evil in the world can only be understood as the result of "unfortunate (not necessarily in general wicked) cases of creaturely decision." 15 Freedom being universal, the risks of evil and the opportunities for good are both inherent in the nature of things. "No providence and no planning could make it otherwise for the necessity is logical." 16 Hartshorne states that tragedy is the price of individuality; the greater the individuality, the greater the possibility of tragedy. But, this is not to say that tragedy is a part of the divine plan; rather, it is merely the result of the fact that creatures must decide for themselves.

The world is not and could not be a set of mere things, passively put and kept in their places, vessels of clay molded by the divine potter, and arranged each on its appropriate shelf. 17

---

15 *PE*, p. 205 16 Hartshorne, "Mind as Memory and Creative Love", p. 461
17 *LP*, p. 312
Danger is the price of individuality, and to ask of providence that this danger be erased, is to ask that existence itself be erased. Those who ask for a world without freedom and the risk of evil, ask for one without opportunity for good—“Indeed they know not what they ask.” 18

If all concrete creaturely decisions are to be assigned to the creatures, then what does God decide? Hartshorne’s answer is twofold. First of all, our model for the cosmic organism analogy is the social one: God is the dominant ruling member of the world society. As such He is responsible for setting the abstract “outlines” or “limits” within which the activity of the members of that society may take place. Hartshorne states that “in the cosmic case these abstract limits of freedom are the ‘laws of nature’”. 19 These abstract laws cannot determine concrete events for they are statistical only. 20 And, since there is a plurality of individuals, and “because plural freedom cannot be ordered (no matter by whom) save approximately and statistically”, a certain degree of discord and disorder is inevitable. 21 On these grounds the question “Why did this particular concrete evil occur?” can not be addressed to deity.

Perhaps there is no why God sends us evils, since he does not send them at all. Rather he establishes an order in which creatures can send each other particular goods and evils. 22 Thus, the explanation of suffering in the world can be found upon examining the very nature of that world itself.

18 PE, p. 208 19 Ibid., p. 206
20 See above, p. 68 21 LB, p. 189
22 NT, p. 120
The principle of incompatible goods, together with that of creativity, or the self-determination of each moment of existence in and by the reality of that moment, furnishes the ultimate reason for suffering in the world. 23

An absolutely harmonized order is a logical absurdity; freedom entails the possibility of conflict, and so all order can only be relative order. That this is so, rather than leading one to the denial of the existence of God, leads one to just this affirmation: for the order that is logically possible, the order of the cosmos that is the very possibility of the existence of the creatures, can only be attributed to the decisions of an all-embracing cosmic mind.

The second "decision" that Hartshorne ascribes to God is that of deciding...

...what use to make in his own life of what happens through creaturely freedom, just how the course of the cosmic history is to be interpreted and enjoyed in the divine perspective. 24

As we saw above, only the notion of the cosmic organism, as an individual unit of action and not as a mere collection of interacting agents, can make this "decision" intelligible. It is precisely this conception of deity, as freely evaluating the creatures, each in its own context and the context of the cosmic whole, that can meet "the concrete religious need" of man. Hartshorne argues persistently (witness the title of his work, Beyond Humanism) that no creature, nor any group of creatures, nor any abstract conception of collectivism, can discharge this function of evaluating all individual members of the cosmos. The sum of the value of all creaturely lives is "as a whole, effectively enjoyed by a

23 CSP, p. 311  
24 "FE", p. 206
simple subject in a single satisfying experience. Such a subject could not be less than divine." 25 Only the sole non-fragmentary being, God, can adequately be aware of all creatures at all times, and because of this awareness, His life alone can be "the ultimate receptacle of all achievement." 26

But does not the above carry the implication that God includes not only the joys of his creatures, but their sufferings as well? Hartshorne's answer here is affirmative. If God is inclusive of the entire cosmos, as he is conceived to be in the cosmic organism analogy, then he must include the suffering that inevitably characterizes the cosmos. Thus, when Hartshorne states that the creatures contribute to the one inclusive whole, he intends that this contribution be understood as both positive and negative, as containing both suffering and joy.

All things make immediate contributions to the one, but they contribute what they are and have, their sorrow as well as their joy, their discord with their neighbors as well as their harmonies. 27

The all-inclusiveness of the world mind lies not in its being "exalted above all suffering", but in its capacity to be supremely relative to all creatures, hence to all creaturely suffering. This is the perfection of God as the perfection of love, for to love another is to depend upon that other for one's own joy and sorrow. Divine love "is more than godliness, wisdom, and power, it is also happiness as partly arising from sympathy with the joys of others." 28

And does not this view further imply that the unity of the

---

25 DR, p. 133  
26 Ibid., p. 128  
27 LP, p. 203  
28 RSP, p. 158
world-body of the divine mind is not a perfect, absolutely harmonized one? Hartshorne's answer is again affirmative, granted two qualifications. One may indeed speak of the unity of the world-body as absolute "in so far as unity is the basis of co-presence to one awareness, the divine omniscience." 29 But, this is possible only within the logic of dipolar theism, whereby omniscience is defined as an "abstract relational type", referring in this case to the supreme instance of "cognitive adequacy", i.e., knowledge adequate to its object. 30 This unity may further be spoken of as absolute in so far as the divine mind has the eminent power to maintain the unity of the bodily parts no matter how much they themselves may undergo destruction. But, this does not give one reason to suppose that the cosmic organism would not contain the discord and conflict of evil; rather it explains just how this is so.

Behind this argument lies Hartshorne's assertion that it is given in experience that our awareness of the past is dominated by two motives: a drive towards harmony and a drive towards social-inclusiveness. We tend to exclude evil by virtue of the first drive, but not to the extent that it cancels out the latter drive.

In the supreme or divine case, this would imply a maximal elimination of evil so far as this elimination is compatible with maximal social inclusiveness. . . The elimination of evil could become absolute only if the social inclusiveness becomes zero 31.

And as we saw above, on Hartshorne's conception of the cosmic organism analogy, the latter can not be zero, and so the former can not be absolute.

---

29 MVG, p. 195
30 See DR, p. 121
31 MVG, p. 196
The second qualification has to do with the question of the immutability of God. Hartshorne sees in the traditional association of divine perfection with divine immutability the implication that not only moral, but aesthetic evil as well is to be excluded from the divine life. Hartshorne argues against their association by asserting that while such abstract or general traits as "goodness" may be immutable, God is, in some sense, nonetheless capable of increase aesthetically. Moral evil does not qualify the divine existence, but by virtue of the divine mind's sympathetic participation in the actuality of creaturely existence, aesthetic evil does. This is to say that God does not experience the negative or privative aspects of evil which are essential to moral evil, i.e., ignorance of the interests of others, but only the positive ones. "God is himself qualified by what is positive in evil, namely discord, which is not mere absence of harmony, but positive clash." 32 God's experiencing the positive aspects of evil is not the result of any "wickedness" on His part, i.e., that He alone is responsible for all suffering, but simply the result of his participatory sharing in the choices of his creatures, who can themselves be wicked. The very meaning of the term "coniscience", i.e., concrete and intimate knowledge of all that exists, dictates this notion of a deity supremely participating in the suffering of all that exists. "God does not simply know that we suffer, he knows our actual

32 Ibid., p. 196
suffering in its concreteness." 33 Immutability, as what is meant in the biblical phrase "without shadow of turning" 34, on this account refers to the abstract character of God's goodness, "the eternal divine abstract purpose." 35 On the other hand, "if goodness means love, then God is dependent for happiness upon others to an unique degree", and hence can be thought of as supremely mutable in the sense of relativity. 36 And this is the fundamental principle upon which the cosmic organism analogy rests, that the happiness of the whole—the cosmic mind—consists in its inclusiveness of the lesser happiness of its parts—the world body.

In this conclusion we have presented Hartshorne's solution to the problem of evil, our intention being to illustrate the way in which Hartshorne's understanding of the teleological argument for the existence of God applies to a specific theological question, that of the problem of evil. We first of all saw that the problem of evil is a "pseudo-problem" in Hartshorne's mind because of his understanding of proofs for the existence of God as a priori. Then, in discussing Hartshorne's analysis of what it is that constitutes "a being other than God," we noted that the four notions that underpin his formulation of the teleological argument and that are operative in his cosmic organism analogy—the scale of beings and the cosmic variables, aesthetics, panpsychism, and the social structure of reality—are contained in his solution to the problem of evil. And finally, by focusing upon the fundamental notion

33 *PE*, p. 207
34 *MVG*, p. 15
35 *DR*, p. 129
36 *MVG* p. 198
of the cosmic organism analogy, that of the divine and all-inclusive mind sympathetically participating in the lives of the individual members of the world body, we saw that the cosmic organism analogy provides us not only with a philosophically coherent conception of deity, but a religiously satisfying one as well. In this way we were able to see that the cosmic organism analogy not only fulfills the requirements of "a natural theology for our time" (chapter I), but as well renders intelligible the central issues of the teleological argument, and effectively meets its criticisms (Chapters II, III). Finally, it is hoped that we have not only achieved an adequate presentation of Hartshorne's conception of the teleological argument, but further, that we have shed some degree of light upon what Hartshorne considers to be the rational and experiential grounds for belief in God.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

A bibliography of the published writings of Charles Hartshorne from 1929 to 1967 can be found in The Concrete God by Ralph E. James (New York: The Bobbs-Merril Company, 1967), pp. 195-216. Listed below are the works of Hartshorne that have been cited in the thesis.

BOOKS

Hartshorne, Charles, A Natural Theology for Our Time. LaSalle: Open Court, 1967.


--------. The Logic of Perfection and Other Essays in Neoclassical Metaphysics. LaSalle: Open Court, 1962.


ARTICLES


--------. "The Social Structure of Experience", Philosophy, XXXVI, no. 137 (1961), pp. 97-111

SECONDARY SOURCES


