INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM AND THE BIRTH OF SOCIOLOGY IN FRANCE:
SAINT SIMON, COMTE AND DURKHEIM
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SAINT SIMON, COMTE, DURKHEIM

By

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A Thesis
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree
Master of Arts
McMaster University
June, 1975
MASTER OF ARTS (1975) McMaster University
(Sociology) Hamilton, Ontario.

TITLE: INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM AND THE BIRTH OF SOCIOLOGY IN FRANCE: SAINT SIMON, COMTE AND DURKHEIM

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NUMBER OF PAGES: iv, 187
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Scope and Contents

This thesis investigates the socio-historical roots of modern sociology in France. It traces the development of sociology as reflected in the works of Saint Simon, Comte and Durkheim and relates the content of these works to the shifting class structure in France from approximately 1789 to 1900.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Dr. Roy Hornosty and Dr. Carl Cuneo for their incisive and in-depth comments and criticisms in the preparation of this thesis. I am also thankful to my many friends who have taken the time out of busy schedules to read sections of the manuscript and afford me the benefit of their comments and criticisms. I am especially indebted intellectually, and in some parts of the thesis editorially, to Dusky Lee Smith who's influence is deeply felt throughout all aspects of the content of the thesis. His analysis, "Sociology and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism," more than any other work, provided the basic questions with which the thesis attempts to deal. His comments and criticisms have been maddening, abrasive, and at points, unnerving, but too, they have always been direct and honest. Therefore, for whatever contribution contained in the thesis, a great part of the credit belongs to Dusky Smith. Finally, I would like to thank Carol Virgint who, unfortunately, like the wives of most academics, thought about me before she thought about herself.
INTRODUCTION

THE SOCIOLOGY OF TRADITION

The massive social, economic, and political upheavals associated with capitalism's development in France provided the social and historical context in which sociology first appeared. August Comte coined the term "sociology" in 1838, almost fifty years after the French Revolution and only ten years before Louis Napoleon embarked on his ambitious industrialization programs. Emile Durkheim taught the first university level "social science" course in 1887, just sixteen years after the Paris Commune was brutally crushed. Prior to these events, Saint Simon called for a "new christianity" to morally consolidate industrial capitalism and condemned the aristocratic class as being superfluous to post-Revolutionary (1789) France's well being. The works of these three writers, Saint Simon, Comte and Durkheim, reflect the structural transformation from a feudal to a capitalist society and the development of capitalism's own ideological justification (i.e., in part, sociology).

This thesis begins to deal with the sociological tradition started by Saint Simon, Comte, and Durkheim and the socio-historical conditions which gave it birth. The thesis
focuses upon biography, history, and social structure and how the intersection of these factors relates to a particular ideological development. In focusing in this way, the thesis is an attempt to concretely fit sociology's conceptual development into a specific historical framework.

With only rare exceptions*, the available histories of sociological development are merely histories of ideas. Of course, there is nothing wrong with attempting to understand the development of ideas. If those ideas, however, are presented as abstractions, divorced from the socio-economic order and as being unrelated to the historical trends in which they arose, then factors for understanding the broader implications of those ideas have been overlooked.

An examination of two contemporary explanations of sociology's development reveals two points. First, there is an exclusive concern with the intellectual themes and subthemes characterizing sociology as a discipline. These themes and subthemes are usually presented without analytic regard to the socio-historical development in which they appeared. Secondly, sociology's history is presented as a celebration of the existent state of modern sociology. Don Martindale and Robert Nisbet represent two well-known examples of this a-historical and celebrationist approach.

*See, for example, Dusky Lee Smith, "Sociology and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism."
Martindale writes that at the time Comte coined the term "sociology" two great events stand out as "fundamental": "the rise of the national state and of the capitalistic economic order." Capitalism and nationalism thus provided, he argues, the "milieux" in which social science was given birth. This observation raises the important issue of the relationship between sociology's development and capitalism. These two great facts--capitalism and nationalism--however, are dropped as the basis for Martindale's analysis. He does use them at the end of his analysis where he surprisingly concludes that "sociology was born as a conservative answer to socialism." This conclusion, however, is not based on any systematic analysis of capitalism or an analysis of the relationship between "social science" and the differing interests to be found in capitalism. Martindale fails to point out why socialism had to be answered. He also ignores who the anti-socialist "answer" was meant for.

Martindale ignores many issues because his analysis is based upon the development of the conflict between ideas such as socialism versus sociology. He ignores the historical division of interests between, for example, workers and owners. In Martindale's analysis, ideas compete, not human beings. Socialism is seen as a set of logical constructs which conflict with another set of logical constructs called sociology. The conditions under which this conflict takes place are categorically a-social and a-historical. Sociology is de-
clared the winner at the outset because it is fulfilling a teleological destiny. The early sociologists were, he explains, anti-socialist ideologues. Thus their "science" could not be very scientific, but they did salvage their discipline from the 'wild-eyed radicals.' The early sociologists who favored capitalism were thus able to establish the foundations of modern sociology.

Robert Nisbet, like Martindale, is interested exclusively in the developmental relationship between ideas. He writes that in the period of the industrial and French Revolutions a "momentous reorientation" of European thought occurred. Nisbet analyses this reorientation by looking at what he calls the unit-ideas of sociology. He stresses the importance, "especially in political and social thought," of "constantly" seeing, "the ideas of each age as responses to crises of events and to the challenges formed by major changes in the social order." (Emphasis supplied.)

Nisbet takes one chapter in which to outline the importance of the two revolutions (Industrial and French) on the development of sociological thought. While the Industrial and French revolutions qualify as "crises of events" and "changes in the social order," Nisbet writes that he is actually concerned "less with the events and changes of the two revolutions than with the images and reflections that are to be found in the social thought of the nineteenth century." (Emphasis added.) The constant need to see ideas as responses
to events and changes in the social order is apparently not as constant as it might first have appeared. Nisbet, however, explains this apparent incongruity, "Our interest is in ideas, and the relations between events and ideas is never direct; it is always mediated by conceptions of events." Thus, rather than going to the events themselves, Nisbet chooses to look at the ideological mediations of those events.

Nisbet's argument that all socio-historical events are to some extent moulded by whoever happens to be looking at that history leaves little room for contention. This does not differ, however, from the old sophist argument that 'man is the measure of all things.' All human understanding is mediated by individual human brains, each having had individual experiences. This applies to Nisbet's own conceptions of what he calls the three great ideological currents—conservativism, radicalism, and liberalism. Nisbet does not seem to recognize this fact and thus rests his analysis on conceptions (ideologies) of conceptions (events). His analysis becomes removed (purposively?) from understanding the relationship between thought and social events.

The issue may be pushed further by pointing out that historians of all varieties disagree on many things, but on one thing there remains an unusual equanimity; the French Revolution was a class revolution in which the center of power shifted from the aristocracy to the bourgeoisie. Even if historians did not see this massive "social event" occur-
ring, however, would the explicit characterization of their society as a developing "capitalist" society by the early social thinkers themselves count for nothing?

Saint Simon, Comte, and Durkheim did not hesitate to recognize the conflicts of their times—the struggle between the Aristocracy and the nouveaux riches capitalists and later, between workers and capitalists. In fact, all these thinkers referred to one or another of these conflicts as being fundamental questions in their thought systems. 9

Nisbet and Martindale analytically ignore these conflicts as the basis for sociology's development. The reason for ignoring these conflicts is not rooted in the fact that they are simply looking at a different question, or at other variables. Their own celebration of, not only sociology, but also modern society restrains them from making an analytic statement which could tarnish the dominant conceptions in sociology and question the status-quo in modern capitalist society.

The Celebration

The purpose of this thesis is not simply to deal with variables which historians of sociology such as Martindale and Nisbet analytically ignore. This work, hopefully, is different from their work not only in substance, but also in direction. It is an attempt to stand not in their tradition of sociology, but in opposition to it.
The celebration of sociology's tradition is intimately tied to a celebration of the status-quo of capitalism, past and present. Comte made it clear when he coined the term "sociology" that this new discipline should be established to insure the moral equilibrium of capitalist society. Sociology since Comte has been primarily an expansion and embellishment of that theme. There have been significant sophistications and variations on the theme, but the tradition, of which Comte, Martindale and Nisbet are a part, has always been and is even today tied to maintaining and celebrating the status-quo of capitalist society.

The traditional approach to sociology, as both subject and object, is characterized by a sense of arrival and celebration. The feeling is imparted that new plateaus are continually being reached bringing sociology ever closer to a summit of knowledge and truth. The path which brought early sociology to the point where it could begin the ascent to these plateaus Martindale calls the "Road to Sociology." Nisbet calls early sociology a "golden age" in human thought. These characterizations reflect the great intellectual investment which enamours Martindale's and Nisbet's analyses and contains them in a rigidly a-social and a-historical framework.

Martindale and Nisbet both acknowledge the conservative moral utility that sociology has been to the existing social order. "Major ideas in the social sciences," Nisbet
writes, "invariably have roots in moral aspiration. . . . Each of these ideas makes its first appearance in the undisguised, unambiguous terms of moral affirmation." In the same vein, but more specifically, Martindale writes:

The ideological properties of early sociology thus are undeniable. Only a conservative ideology was able to establish the discipline.

Even though both Martindale and Nisbet thus recognize the conservative political nature of sociology's development neither carries this ideological characterization beyond its mere statement. This is not the result of a mere oversight. Rather, because their sociology is a direct lineal descendant of the sociology they are studying and because they believe in the basic modern form of that sociology such an analysis might expose the continuing ideological nature of their own work.

In science, "objectivity" and "political activism" are held to be mutually exclusive categories. Sociology, however, has come to blend them together by defining "political activism" and like terms only in the context of that which disrupts the given social order. A brief analysis of the nature of science in general and sociology in particular demonstrates the logic behind this blending.

Human beings are, as Mills argues, social and historical actors. We live out our lives in historically specific times. The specificity of the time in which we live is closely related to the specific structure of the relationships we
have with the people around us. Nothing that is humanly conceived or constructed can exist separate from the specific time or the specific structure in which it is used. This is as true of those producing "objective science" as anything.

A sense might exist in which a scientist can observe some physical process and remain "disinterested" in whether one result occurs or another. It might even be possible to observe this process, then, after much explication and analysis, to produce an "objective" definition which is useful and applicable in a universal sense. There is thus, to use a common example, a sense in which an atomic bomb can in itself be viewed as a very indiscriminating collection of objective observations—it will decimate kings as well as commoners. To view an atomic bomb in this way only, however, is to stretch the human ability of abstraction beyond the limit of absurdity.

Atomic bombs are not spontaneously generated. Nor are they produced by other bombs. They are conceived in the human mind and constructed under human direction. They are, furthermore, conceived and constructed for specific use by specific people. It is the human use of the bomb, which exemplifies the consequential dimension of all science, that makes science a vast exercise in value commitments. The people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the close of World War II undoubtedly experienced an "objective" event. The bomb, however, did not drop itself. The event cannot be divorced,
even by the stretch of a genius's imagination, from the social structure that allowed one group to conceive, construct and use a weapon of such incredible power against another group of human beings.

Sociology was founded on the contention that the same techniques used in the natural sciences to master physical processes should be extended to mastering the "natural principles" of human order. The "science" of society thus began with the assumption that there is a natural order, which, properly understood, would make it possible to recognize as "unnatural" any deviation from it. All that is individual and particular, that is, that assumes independent choice, is subverted by all that is general and social. Society, in a true Durkheimian sense, becomes all important. This basic assumption makes it impossible to recognize different interests within a society. It assumes that the only legitimate interest is society's interest.

As with physical science, social science is freed from the bounds of historical analysis. The specific historical structure is transformed into the natural order of things. Sociology as "science" becomes merely a project in self correction and greater explanations of the given, but not yet fully understood, physical universe. Sociology's "truth" becomes "objective," "detached," and, therefore, a-social and a-historical.

Martindale sees sociology's development as having
been "inevitable." This teleological destiny, taken with his present faith in sociology—hoping merely for a more integrated discipline—excludes a social and historical analysis of sociology's development. He presents an organic view of social knowledge which cannot perceive that any thought can stand outside or fundamentally against it. This organic view stands true also for the society which it purports to study—no fundamental conflicts can be found within it. Thus, conflict theory, even if in its original state it did not accept society as an organic whole, is enveloped and digested by Martindale's sociology and transformed into an opportunity to add a measure of "realism and sophistication" to the discipline; conflict "culminates" in the idea of "process" whereby different interests are worked out within society.

Martindale's orientation presents society as society. All fundamental conflict is defined from the realm of possibility. Because all basic conflict is gone there can be no justification whatever for attempting to modify the given capitalist social structure.

The society in which Martindale's sociology has 'culminated' continues to be a capitalist society. People continue to live in very different positions in the relationship to the means by which they make their livelihood. This observation falls beyond the capability of Martindale's purview. Understanding the different interests and the differential ability to satisfy those interests, as well as the
possibility of changing this concrete socio-historical situation, is made impossible in Martindale's approach. It rules out pro facto social and historical analysis and can operate only at the level of ideas. No human conflicts can be found in Martindale's analysis even though the history of capitalism is soaked with human blood. He presents only conflicting ideas and even they are self (!!) correcting. 17

Nisbet is not as adamant about sociology's "scientific" development as Martindale. This does not mean, however, that his sociology and through sociology his view of modern society is any less celebrationist. He simply arrives by a slightly different route.

Nisbet is interested in sociology's creative impetus whereas Martindale deals more with the discipline's overall development as a science. He writes that the "contextual frame" in which sociology arose was the conflict between the feudal-traditional and the democratic-capitalist social orders. 18 He, therefore, recognizes that sociology has been intimately tied to democratic-capitalist development. He does not, however, attempt to analyze the role played by sociology in the rise of capitalism and democracy. He keeps his analysis strictly at the ideal level and even celebrates traditional sociology's creative genius in forming and continuing domination by these ideas.
How many of us even perceive the society around us—quite apart from interpreting it—except through the perceptual filters of these ideas and perspectives?²⁹

Nisbet's celebration of traditional social theory produces an intellectual inertia which extends into the social-structural realm. This intellectual inertia is translated into a firm commitment to the status-quo of modern capitalist society. "We have reached the point today," he writes, "when the word revolution begins to have a hollow sound. . . . And despite our occasional quixotic tilting at windmills, the results of the revolutions are fixed. They are irreversible."²⁰

Nisbet's statement is aimed explicitly at past revolution, but it carries with it a very conservative view of the present and future. He does write at the level of ideas that "sooner or later the process of revolt, of abandonment of 'chrysalids' of concept and method takes place."²¹ The analysis, however, stops at this abstract level. It is, therefore, impossible to understand what changes in the social structure, so irreversibly fixed, could possibly provide the "creative juices" for this revolt of ideas.²² The most severe shortfailing of Nisbet's analysis is that he cannot even entertain such fundamental structural questions. He must be satisfied to merely assure his reader that if a new system of thought does appear it will be the result of the faculties that the scientist shares with the artist.²³
Nisbet and Martindale are happily trapped in a tradition of ideas. Both are precluded from viewing these ideas in light of the human condition by the glory they see in the concepts which have helped to establish and maintain capitalist society. Neither is capable in his analytic scheme of viewing "authority," to name one example, beyond its abstract conception and theoretical development. There is only a history of words in their words. Not one indication of awareness is apparent that human beings, and some more than others, have had to live their lives and try to make their livelihoods with the "authoritative" presence of well-armed police, better-armed armies, and daily intellectual doses from "welfare authorities," "economic authorities," "psychiatric authorities," etc., ad nauseum.

The simple promise for sociology that Mills has outlined, to make sense of the structure of the world and how our individual lives fit into that structure, is more than ignored by Nisbet and Martindale; it is made impossible. Sociology as 'creative truth' is in itself their only purpose. They are truly professional sociologists. Their tradition of sociology, by their wholesale commitment to it, is indistinguishable from the sociology of tradition--status-quo sociology.

This thesis, as opposed to Martindale's and Nisbet's analyses, attempts to be critical. It is not, however, critical in an abstract way. It attempts to put sociology's de-
velopment into a concrete historical perspective. It is consciously not a critique aimed at the level of ideas. Whatever a Durkheim, or for that matter a Nisbet or Martin-dale, writes may or may not be important; even truthful. Nevertheless, whatever importance that it does have cannot be divorced from the effect that it has in celebrating or debunking the legitimacy of the given social order.

Obviously, this writer cannot give a full analysis of French history, the lives of each writer considered, nor a complete analysis of all the ideas presented by Saint Simon, Comte and Durkheim. What will be attempted, therefore, will be an overview of (1) the structural aspects of the history in which each lived and worked. This overview will include: a) the social and political temper of the epoch and b) the biographical intersection of the men with that epoch. Also, (2) as a focus of analysis each writer's own views on history will be related to the social conditions.

Albert Salomon has outlined the preoccupation with "progress," during and after the French Revolution. This notion--progress--provides an analytic focal point for this thesis is presented by using the following metaphor which comes directly from early sociology's organic orientation. The thesis will look at what Saint Simon, Comte and Durkheim each say regarding the "motors," the "gears" and the "drivers" of historical development. By "motor" is meant each writer's philosophical orientation to what moves history. "Gears" is
used to outline each writer's views on the level which "progress" has reached in their own society; making fundamental structural changes "necessary" (forward gear); consolidating the given structure (neutral gear); or reverting to a past structure (reverse gear). "Drivers" represents the human element, that is, who should be the caretaker of "progress."

Finally, because it is a critical thesis every attempt has been made to be as fair and accurate as possible. This has resulted in the use of many quotes, sometimes lengthy. While this may add an extra burden on the reader, it is felt that the best evidence is the original evidence. All important statements, therefore, are quoted in the context and where the context cannot be deduced by presenting what comes before and after, or where it is felt that any doubt might arise, an additional clarification is made in the footnote.
INTRODUCTION NOTES

1 Mills, C. Wright, The Sociological Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959) pp. 143ff. Mills advocates focusing upon the intersection of "biography, history and social structure" as the basis for the "proper study of man." This thesis does not do justice to Mill's expectations even though its essential focus is derived from him. To do justice to Mills' analysis would require a much more intimate appraisal of the interrelationship between these three analytic factors. Contained by space and by time as well as access to primary biographical datum Mills' intention is used in spirit if not in letter. To meet Mills' expectations would require, in the opinion of this writer, a separate thesis for each writer. While this would certainly be a worthwhile undertaking it simply goes beyond the scope of this study, even though this study attempts, at its own level, to very seriously deal with at least some of the most important biographical, historical and structural intersections.


3 Ibid., p. 529.

4 Ibid., p. 530. This victory is inevitable because of sociology's scientific nature. In the interest of fulfilling this teleological destiny, Martindale justifies the ideological excesses of early sociology. "The statement that early sociology was in part a conservative ideology is neither an attack on nor a defense of sociology. To the degree that the field remains an ideology (conservative or liberal), it is prevented from becoming a science. It is in the nature of a science that the ultimate acceptability of any generalization rests on the objective criteria established by the discipline. The emergence of sociology as a conservative ideology certainly helped in the establishment of the discipline as a legitimate area of study for stable young men (rather than as a breeding ground for wild eyed radicals), but sociology could remain and grow only to the degree that it developed professional and scientific standards. If positivistic organicism accomplished no more than the establishment of the new field, it would be worthy of review."
That this entire period can be characterized in terms of class struggle was a fact that was presented by every historian considered by this writer. This does not mean that all of the historians considered class conflict to be the only characterization of this period or even the most important characterization. What is important is that without exception class struggle is seen to be a very important fact of the time. Of course, whether or not this is the most important fact may be subject to debate. The perspective of this writer is that consideration of class struggle is the key to understanding this entire period of French history and that without it the history is reduced to the documentation of personality conflicts which can in no manner explain the multivarious trends and overall conflicts which in their own right are the history of the time. Historians considered included the following: A. Aulard, *The French Revolution, 1789-1804*, Vol. 3.; T. Fisher Unwin, London, 1913.; Guy Chapman, *The Third Republic of France, The First Phase 1871-1894* (London: MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1962); Robert Baldick, *The Siege of Paris* (London: B. T. Batsford, Ltd., 1964); Georges Duveau, *1848: The Making of a Revolution* (New York: Panteon Books, 1965); Paul A. Gagnon, *France Since 1789*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1964); M. Guizot, *Memoires-Pour Servir a l'Histoire de mon Temps*, Tome II, (Paris, Libraire Nouvellev, 1872); Albert Guerard, *France: A Short History*, (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1947); Douglas Johnson, Guizot: *Aspects of French History 1787-1874* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963); Georges Lefebvre, *The Coming of the French Revolution* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970); Katherine Munro, *France Yesterday and Today* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1945); Bayle St. John transl., *The Memoirs of St. Simon of the Reign of Louis XIV and the Regency*, two volumes (New York: Willey Book Co., 1936); J. M. Thompson, *Robespierre and the French Revolution* (London: The English Universities Press, Ltd., 1959); Herbert Tint, *The Decline of French Patriotism 1870-1940* (London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1964); Rene Remond, *The Right Wing in France From 1815 to de Gaulle* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966); John B. Wolf, *France 1814-1919* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963).
This is the title of Martindale's, op.cit., first chapter.

Nisbet, op.cit., p. 316.

Ibid., p. 18.

Martindale, op.cit., p. 530.

Ibid., p. 526. The exact quote reads, "With the growth of the physical, and later chemical and biological, sciences and their splendid gains in one area or another, and with their gradual institutionalization in industry and in the universities it was inevitable that the possibilities of a social science would be conceived."

Ibid., p. 534.

Ibid.

Martindale, Ibid., p. 528, writes: "Science establishes its own criteria of acceptability, and all outside limitations are alien to it. It is self correcting. There are no limits natural to it in quite the same sense as is true of so many historical styles, or processes, or ways of life. Perhaps the day will come when even the limitations imposed by the planet itself will be transcended. It is not surprising that after its initial successes in mastering external nature, science should turn to man himself."

Nisbet, op.cit., p. 316.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 317.

Ibid., p. 318.

Ibid.

Ibid., pp. 318-319.

CHAPTER I

SAINT SIMON

Already at the turn of the century (1710) one of St. Simon's more illustrious relatives, the Duc de St. Simon, was writing his famous Memoirs in the court of Louis XIV at Versailles and, among other things, lamenting the fact that the King was becoming surrounded by the "vile Bourgeoisie."

The historian, Guerard, writes:

Louis XIV would have raised his eyebrows, not even amused, if he had been openly called, like Louis Philippe, the King of the bourgeois. Yet the great administrator and financier who made the splendor of the reign possible, Colbert, was a bourgeois, a tradesman's son. Louvois, who drilled and equipped the armies (and was only too eager to have them put to use), was the son of Le Tellier, a bourgeois. Vauban who girdled the realm with fortresses which are classical masterpieces, was a country squire, the descendant of a provincial lawyer. Boussuet, favorite preacher, tutor of the King's son, theorist of monarchy by divine right, mouthpiece of the Gallican clergy, was a bourgeois. Boileau, the lawgiver of Parnessus, to whom the King himself gracefully bowed in matters of literary taste, was the quintessence of the bourgeois spirit. Louis treated the bourgeois Raéine as a friend. He upheld the bourgeois Molière even in his pitiless satires against vapid courtiers, and in his attacks on religious hypocrites. The aristocratic writers of the time, La Rochefoucauld, Madame de Lafayette, Madame de Sevigne did not stand high in his favor; the young Saint Simon, last champion of the feudal tradition, was left to seethe with rage.1

France was undergoing a very fundamental change in the structure of its economy and as a result the power base of the
feudal nobility was constantly being called into jeopardy. As a result, a general mistrust arose between the King and the old Aristocracy resulting in Louis' summons of most of the nobility to Versailles where "he felt safer when he had them under his masterful glance." ²

Undoubtedly this "gilded cage" theory has much credence but something else was also going on that touched much deeper than the conflict and mistrust between the aristocracy and the King. The bourgeois (nouveaux riches) were becoming real powers totally separate from any royal designations of titles of nobility. There were fortunes to be made, new lands to be conquered, a whole new system of economic, political and social arrangements to be formulated which would shake France and indeed all of Europe right to its very core. In a word, capitalism, was the order of the day. It was becoming less and less important to which rank of nobility one belonged and more and more important who could acquire the most of what there was to acquire. In the words of George Lefebvre it was a "race for money" and one did not have to have M. le Duc in front of his name to enter. ³ To be sure, the Aristocrats were not excluded from the race and many of the younger nobles joined with fervor and like Chateaubriand declared, "Arise, ye desired storms." ⁴ But for the most part the Aristocracy became increasingly sensitive to further encroachments of "rights" by the bourgeoisie so that by the time it was making its last list of demands in
1789 it was arguing for a tightly closed class system. The precipitating factor which probably brought on this demand for exclusivity more than anything else and was also, according to Lefebvre, the precipitating factor of the revolution as a whole, was the American revolution (1776). The tremendous outlay of cash by Louis XVI in support of the American war effort left the treasury virtually bankrupt and by 1786 severe economic reforms were a certainty.

The King's chief economic minister, Calonne, formulated the plan which was to draw the lines of battle between the Old Order of Nobles and the new order of capitalists. The major points of the plan were directed mainly at trying to make everyone pay a fair share of the tax burden, a proposition to which no one really protested vehemently. The crux of the matter came when it was proposed that the manorial lands of the church should in effect by expropriated and sold and the proceeds put against the debts of the government, and that the rights of individual nobles to tax the peasants of their domains be done away with in favor of a national taxation system. Obviously, only the bourgeoisie had something to gain from such a plan, a plan which dug at the very roots of the economy of the Old Order and opened immense new economic possibilities in things, such as land speculation as well as virtually doing away with the old land-equals-status-equals-title system of social hierarchy.

The picture was as bright for the bourgeoisie as it
was bleak for the Aristocrats. The Old Order had outlived its utility, its raison d'etre; the new order was to be one in which its raison d'etre was not first to have high social status for the sake of a simple title and the right to live in a "gilded cage," but to make the cages and sell them for a profit to whoever would buy them and if one sold enough and made enough he could buy the title--irrespective of birth. The rule of the day was "equal rights," and the promise of the game was liberty and brotherhood, the outcome was that there was only one winner. The man who could make the cages faster, better and more efficiently than anybody else and keep on making them was the new man of power, and needless to say, he began to like the new role.

This brief introduction is not meant to be an attempt to put the French Revolution into a nutshell; that is impossible. What is not impossible and what is the attempt here is to give the reader a flavor of the time in which the revolution arose and gained momentum for it certainly continued after 1789. The bourgeoisie was fighting both tooth and nail at least until 1830, to consolidate power. They first fought the Aristocracy and won, but the fight was not over. Robespierre and the Jacobins took over in 1792 and were to hold power until 1794. But the Jacobins took democracy too seriously causing such "moderate royalists" and bourgeois gentilshommes as Lafayette to flee for their lives. The bourgeoisie needed a new leader; they got him in the form of
Napoleon Bonaparte. Guerard sums up this period with stunning clarity:

On June 26, 1794, the battle of Fleurus clinched the second conquest of Belgium and the victory of republican France. A month later, on July 27 (ninth of Thermidor in the new Revolutionary calendar), Robespierre fell. The rebellion against him was not that of humanity and liberalism; the men who overthrew him had been terrorists themselves. They were not afraid of Robespierre's tyranny but of his justice. The Incorruptible was taking "republican virtue" too literally. Moreover, the republic was growing dangerously democratic. A radical constitution had been voted; to be sure, it was to remain in abeyance until the war was over, but it was an ugly threat. The Maximum law, a rigid control of prices, was a curb on profiteering; and if gambling in the wildly inflated currency was an exciting game, the guillotine might stop it at any moment. It was high time to restore normalcy. So Robespierre was killed by a sorry pack. He haunts history as an enigmatic ghost; pure but not lovable; formidable yet precise, pedantic, almost old-maidish; the man of one book, Rousseau's Social Contract, made flesh.

With Napoleon at their head the bourgeois revolution seemed assured success. Bonaparte had been a "godsend." He secured the new order and brought a degree of stability to France and to Europe. He made peace with the Austrians in 1801, peace with the Pope in 1801-1802, and peace with England in 1802 and for about a decade "internal peace, prosperity and victory went together." But, by 1810, Napoleon's external exploits began to make the bourgeoisie very uneasy, because of twelve attempts six had failed, including Waterloo (1815). So Napoleon too was deposed. Indeed, it was a time of transitory men, Louis XVI, Robespierre, and Napoleon Bonaparte, but in this parade there are some characters who appear to be
permanent fixtures, like Lafayette, the old Aristocrat
turned bourgeois coming to the fore and receding in the
political realm when necessary. It was really the time of
men like Lafayette, Chateaubriand, and the time, also, of
men like Henri Saint-Simon; for Saint-Simon was definitely
a part of it. He was imprisoned by Robespierre during The
Terror, he was one of the biggest land speculators in all
of France (in league with the Prussian ambassador to England),
and was supported at one time by the biggest bourgeois of the
day. Among his "banker and industrial friends" were inclu-
ded Basterreche, Ardoin, Ternaux, Lafitte, Vital Roux, Peri-
or, de Broglie, and La Rouchefoucould. He seemed to have
done and tried just about everything possible from fighting
in the American revolution to attempting suicide.

The purpose of this chapter is not to rob St. Simon
of his variety, nor to reduce him to a "stooge of the bour-
geoisie." The purpose is to demonstrate that his thoughts
were very much tempered by the class conflict occurring in
France at the time and that to read St. Simon separated from
Lafayette and Robespierre is to rob him of the usefulness of
reading him at all. The man in his history is something
worth learning.

In order not to attempt too much and thereby offer
too little, consideration will be made of one particular
theme that runs through all of St. Simon's work, the role
of reason as the motor of social change or history. In the
analysis itself the relation can be shown of his conceptions or theory to the reality of his life.

A great deal of the content will come from Felix Markham's translations, but use will also be made of the original works (i.e. untranslated) where they were not available in English, or are better left in French.

St. Simon viewed history as a necessary and progressive unfolding process of increasingly higher stages of development driven by reason manifesting itself in particular groups of men. In L'Organisateur (1819) one finds a good beginning point to understanding this germinal idea. He writes, "L'histoire est encore loin d'être une simple série d'observations sur la marche et le développement de la civilisation." History, he argues, is not a simple matter of observation and documentation of particulars. If we stop at such a level of analysis, "l'histoire n'a presque jamais été qu'une biographie du pouvoir, dans laquelle les nations ne figurent que comme instruments et comme victimes," in which history becomes not much more than a simple critique which views historical change simply in terms of who is in power at any one point in time. This situation is likened to an old house with an old gothic exterior, the interior of which has been modernized. From the outside it would appear that nothing has changed, but this opinion is naive in view of the fact that the interior has not been seen. In historical terms this means that by viewing only the particu-
lars of any historical epoch (e.g., the peculiar power relations) and stopping with such a brief coup d'oeil much is lost that is valuable in understanding history in any meaningful sense. In essence he views historians as generally failing to make the necessary attempts to cut past mere exteriors so that they might explain from whence we come and whither we go. He writes, "Aucun auteur que je connaisse n'a marche daus la ligne traces par Condorcet, et n'a tente d'établir directement la grande serie des progres successifs de l'esprit humain." Encased within this simple quotation is the task in retrospect which St. Simon sets for history and for himself, to understand the progress of history and man's role in that progress.

This task which St. Simon sets out for himself is dealt with philosophically in his, "Introduction to Scientific Studies of Nineteenth Century." The discussion involves the concept of "the progress of the universal idea" which put succinctly means improving the work done on reducing the universe to some single universal cause (i.e. some ultimate reason). The Egyptians viewed stars, rivers, plants, etc. as being causes in themselves. Homer improved on this multiple causation by making moral qualities of these "first causes" and putting them altogether in Olympus allowing Socrates to attribute "the powers of Olympus to a single being." After this Descartes stated that indeed God had created the Universe but that he had placed it under an im-
mutable physical law. "Descartes eliminated every idea of revelation or blind belief. He inspired men to learn, and left only the idle to mere belief." Thus, observation and reasoning were introduced forming "the idea of several causes considered as aspects of a single being, Reason; and so reached the idea of a universal and single intelligence--God." But tying God to his creation seemed pointless "because God, having foreseen everything that was to happen, cannot change anything in the system he has created." So man's task became one of discovering facts and taking the fact of most universal application and taking it as the single cause of events. Obviously what Simon is getting at is the transformation of reason from its early Deist (religious) base into modern Physicism (positivism). He writes, "What is the idea of God without the idea of revelation? A sterile idea. Every scientific discovery has shewn up one of the fallacies of the system which claims to be revealed: the idea of God is nothing but the idea of human intelligence universalized." It would seem that what St. Simon is both retrospectively and futuristically proposing is the removal of God and metaphysics from thought and exchanging them for an immutable law which takes the form of Newton's law of gravity. He writes, "My conclusions... will be that it is possible to organize a general theory of the sciences, physical as well as moral, based on the idea of gravitation regarded as
the law on which God has founded the Universe, and by which he
governs it."38 "God" in this sense becomes a mere figure-
head for the new philosophy, an outmoded but not necessarily
useless concept.

I say, and I claim to have shown, that the idea of God should not be used in the physical sciences, but I do not say that it should not be used in political matters, at any rate for a long time, since it is the best means that has been discovered of managing the fundamental political relations. It is necessary to examine and act, always from the point of view of physicism. The scientific opinions formulated by these philosophers should thus be clothed in forms which make them sacred, in order that they can be taught to the children of all classes and the illiterate, whatever their age.39

Metaphysics, religion, and all that is related to "imagination" is done away with. History no longer proceeds because God so ordained it--it proceeds because it follows a natural, observable, scientific law of motion. He states most explicitly,

Il n'y a pas deux ordres de choses; il n'y en a qu'un: c'est l'ordre physique.
Les phenomenes se partagent en deux classes: les phenomenes des solides et les phenomenes des fluides. 40

L'homme est un petit monde; il existe en lui, sur une petite echelle, tous les phenomenes qui s'execuent en grand dans l'univers.
La planete est dependante de l'univers; elle est comme une pendule enfermee dans une horloge dont elle recoit le mouvement.
L'homme est dependant de la planete qu'il habite; il est comme une montre enfermee dans une pendule qui est enfermee dans une horloge.
L'esprit humain vieillit a mesure que la planete approche du terme de sa duree.
A mesure que l'esprit humain vieillit, sa faculte de raisonner augmente, et sa faculte d'imaginer diminue.
A mesure que la planète vieillit, l'action des solides qu'elle contient devient preponderante. Nous imaginons quand l'action des fluides est predominante dans les actes de notre intelligence; nous raisonnons quand l'action des solides est preponderante. 41

The old system of religious thought had outlived its utility and St. Simon was calling for a new philosophy, a new Reason to fit the new epoch of history. "Nos écrivains," he writes, "ne seront-ils rien autre chose que les échos des derniers philosophes? . . . Serons nous constraints de choisir entre la barbarie et la sottise? Écrivains de XIX° siècle, a vous seuls appartient de nous oter cette triste alternative." 42

But to whom exactly is this challenge to take over the role of caretaker of Reason directed?

A partial answer to this question can be seen in Simon's analysis of the role that the clergy had played from "the establishment of Deism to the fifteenth century." He writes:

The clergy shewed themselves superior in talent and virtue to the laity. It was the clergy who cultivated the waste lands and drained marshes; it was they who deciphered the ancient manuscripts. They taught the laity to read and write; they perfected metaphysics, striving to begin their reasoning from a single point and arrive at a single conclusion. Before the fourteenth century, no European was so distinguished in physical and mathematical science as Roger Bacon and he was a monk. It was the clergy who founded the hospitals and the first schools of modern education; it was they who gathered together the peoples of Europe to resist the Saracans; who resolved to carry the war into Asia and Africa, the only means of deterring them from fresh attempts to trouble the powers of Europe. 43
Obviously, the new "superior" group would be those persons who could carry on the good work of the clergy whose "talents obtained for them the reward which they deserved." It would have to be a group which could properly advance Reason, in the form of esprit humain, and a group to whom society could entrust all power, spiritual and temporal. In "De La Societe Europeene" Simon writes, "La philosophie du siecle dernier a ete revolutionnaire; cele du XIXe siecle doit etre organisatrice." The question of who should do the organizing of the spiritual and temporal power in his nineteenth century world was St. Simon's raison d'être. Most of his voluminous works deal with this particular subject and his answers are in no uncertain terms. It was the reason that Charlemagne came to him in a vision and told him how great and influential in philosophy and science he would be, and why St. Simon had his servant wake him up every day with the words, "M. St. Simon wake up, you have great things to do," and which brought St. Simon and his followers to lead the fight for a new philosophy, a new Christianity which would be in line with the new economic and political realities of his time, a fight which he perceived to be the role of the intellectual. "L'ordre social a ete boulverse, parce qu'il ne convenait plus aux lumieres: c'est a vous d'en creer un meilleur: le corps politique a ete dissous, c'est a vous de le reconstituer." In more explicit terms the role that the intellectuals should play as the guiders of power in
spiritual matters is layed out in "De l'Organisation Sociale."

He first divides intellectuals into two essential groups. First, intellectuals involved in physical science and mathematics, (L'Academie des Sciences) and secondly, theologians, writers, poets, painters, sculptors, and musicians, (L'Academie de Beaux-Arts). To these two groups he entrusts the functions of coding the interests and passions of men so as to allow the restoration of the "regularity of function to the organization of society." He writes:

Scientists and artists, examine with the eye of genius the present condition of the human mind. You will perceive that the sceptre of public opinion is in your hands; seize it therefore, boldly. You have the power to bring happiness to yourselves and to your contemporaries; to preserve posterity from the evils we have suffered and are suffering still. Therefore subscribe, all of you.

Thus the role of the intellectual (les savants) is seen as bringing Reason to the new society in the form of understanding the "present condition of the human mind" so that effective measures can be taken to insure the "regularity of function of society." But why does public opinion have to be engineered, and under whose principles is it to be decided what is to be engineered. Again the answer to this question is integral to St. Simon's basic view of the stage that Reason has reached in history (i.e., nineteenth century France) and may be analyzed from his statements on temporal power. "La direction," he writes,"du pouvoir temporel doit etre confiee aux cultivateurs, aux fabricants,
aux négociants et aux banquiers les plus importants." But why this particular group of gentlemen? The answer to this question perhaps best comes from Simon's configuration of society as a pyramid.

The community has often been compared to a pyramid. I admit that the nation should be composed as a pyramid; I am profoundly convinced that the national pyramid should be crowned by the monarchy, but I assert that from the base of the pyramid to its summit the layers should be composed of more and more precious materials. If we consider the present pyramid, it appears that the base is made of granite, that up to a certain height the layers are composed of valuable materials, but that upper part, supporting a magnificent diamond, is composed of nothing but plaster and gilt.

In more specific terms the pyramid can be broken into three essential classes, intellectuals and industrialists in the first, non-producing property owners (i.e. the old aristocrats) comprise the second, and the third is composed of "the rest of humanity," (i.e. workers--non-property owning, and peasants). In the first class the role of intellectuals has already been discussed and is obviously considered to be very important among those who march "beneath the banner of human progress." However, the role of the intellectuals is seen as being valuable only in terms of advancing the new stage of reason which is viewed as the "idea of industry." Under this the bourgeoisie (the essential producers) becomes "in the most real sense the flower of French society," and in St. Simon's own words the only place where we will find "our safety and the end of the revolution."
After so diligently aligning himself with the bourgeoisie one could expect to find attempts to discredit either of the other two classes who might attempt to take power from the not yet firmly entrenched bourgeois elite. Indeed this is the case, but the formation of the threat seems to become regarded as coming almost exclusively from the non-property owning workers and peasants and the old aristocracy becomes transformed into a basically innocuous group who could, if they wished, "rise into the first class" but nevertheless, are perceived as a rather minor pestilence in comparison to the threat presented to the stability or "organic unity" of France by the "rest of humanity."

The basic problem with the working class was that they could not yet grasp the level of development of "l'esprit humain" and thus could easily be "swayed by brutal passions which urged them to revolt and every kind of anarchy." In a letter to an American he wrote, "If I consider what was the motive which brought about the French Revolution, and which class of society felt it most strongly, I find that it was equality, and that it was men of the lowest class who were impelled most strongly through their ignorance, and their interests to prove it with violence." The unbridled interests of this third class are seen, then, as a very real threat to be harnessed and controlled by the enlightened first class. Again he says it so clearly himself in an open
In England there are plenty of scientists. The educated classes in England have more respect for the scientists than for kings; everybody in England knows how to read, write, and add. Well my friends, in that country the workers in the towns and even in the country eat meat every day.

In Russia, if a scientist displeases the emperor they cut off his nose and ears and send him to Siberia. In Russia the peasants are as ignorant as their horses. Well my friends, the Russian peasants are badly fed, badly clothed, and are soundly beaten with sticks.

He predictably concludes, "remember that the property-owners, though inferior in numbers, are more enlightened than yourselves, and that, in the general interest, domination should be proportionate to enlightenment."

Some fifty years after St. Simon wrote those lines seventeen thousand communards were to be brutally murdered by the enlightened ones in the crushing of the Paris commune on the occasion of the twentieth birthday of the Third Republic. It would be a time in which St. Simon's illustrious forebearer's lamentations about the "vile Bourgeoisie" would be transformed into Adolph Thiers invective against the "vile multitude."
CHAPTER I NOTES

1 Guerard, op. cit., p. 143-144.
2 Ibid., p. 143.
4 Ibid., p. 15.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., p. 21.
7 Ibid., p. 25.
9 Guerard, op. cit., p. 177.
10 Ibid., p. 167.
11 Ibid., p. 171.
12 Ibid., p. 174.
13 Ibid.


16 Manuel, op. cit., p. 331.

17 Emile Durkheim, Socialism and Saint-Simon (Yellow Springs, Ohio: The Antioch Press, 1958) p. 84.

18 Manuel, op. cit., pp. 9ff.

19 Ibid., pp. 325ff.
To this add, "If Descartes had known the law of gravity, how beautiful, clear and satisfying would his system have been. How energetically did this thinker describe the independence of his ideas: 'Give me', he said, 'matter and motion, and I will create a world.'" p. 12.
CHAPTER II

AUGUST COMTE

The period dating from the first restoration of the Bourbon Crown (to Louis XVIII in 1814) to 1830 was a time composed of rising intraclass antagonisms (within the bourgeoisie) as well as a time in which the aristocratic land owning class was making a last ditch effort to hold onto state power. After a brief 100 day interlude in which Napoleon returned to Paris and forced Louis XVIII to flee to London, Louis, with the help of the Prussians, returned to Paris to reestablish the monarchy amid "an atmosphere of violent abuse and recrimination."\(^1\) This set the mood for the succession in 1824 of the Ultra Royalist brother of Louis, Charles X.\(^2\) The Charter under which Louis had been granted the crown had established a parliamentary check on the power of the King—a check which Charles X chose to ignore. In the increasingly hostile situation of 1828 Charles, writes Gagnon, was faced with two alternatives; "to submit to a parliamentary regime, with Center and Left majorities choosing his policies and his ministers, or to change the rules of the game and govern by decree. His choice," concludes Gagnon, "of the second provoked the Revolution of 1830."\(^3\)
The broad historical class perspective and the outcome of 1830 is further summarized by Gagnon:

Delacroix pictured the revolution as classless and disinterested—workers, students, and bourgeois offering their lives together in the cause of freedom—but a single class emerged the winner, or a portion of a class, the upper bourgeoisie. Between the illusions of Charles X and the romance of the Paris crowds lay the reality; there had been no revolution, only the defeat of a Bourbon coup d'état. To the frustrated democrats, the July Monarchy was nothing more than the restoration by other means and a few, very few, other men... Without being a revolution, then, the events of 1830 revived and hardened the French revolutionary tradition, sharpened class suspicions, and prepared the propertyless for more radical solutions to their problems. 4

The July Monarchy (1830-1848), which was established with the ousting of Charles X, has been characterized as "the very perfection of bourgeois rule," under the new king, Louis Philippe. But, if this was the case the question must be asked, why didn't the bourgeoisie protect their 'figure-head monarch' (if he was such) in 1848 when Paris again began bristling with barricades and secret democratic societies, and when Louis was forced to flee to England using an assumed name? The answer to this question would obviously be many fold in an in-depth analysis. However, this writer will deal only with those two primary reasons for the downfall of the July Monarchy which will, hopefully, give the reader the best feeling for the time we are discussing.

Firstly, the promise of democracy that the revolution (1789) had offered the lower classes (workers and pea-
sants) had been blatantly betrayed by Louis Philippe's right hand man, Guizot (Prime Minister 1840-1848) as evidenced when he said, "If you want to vote get rich." Not only did the July Monarchy let the carrot that they dangled before the people's noses rot, they buried it without letting the people have so much as a taste. Secondly, and a consideration which greatly interpenetrates with the first, was the conflict that was brewing between industrial and financial concerns and between the big bourgeoisie and the petit bourgeoisie.

It must be stated at the outset of this brief discussion that neither the 1789 Revolution nor the subsequent upheavals of 1830 and 1848 were worker or peasant revolutions in the sense of a class interest (on either of their parts) in taking over state power. In all these cases it was worker/peasant manpower fighting under bourgeois leadership against remnants of the Aristocracy, in the first place, and, secondly, in 1848 against a regime which, while basically bourgeois in general character, had grown increasingly lethargic and which had increasingly concentrated its power into the hands of a small group of big bourgeoisie at the expense of the small and middle levels. It must also be remembered that the workers who depended on the growth and size of industrial development were still a small and relatively under-developed group as evidenced by the industrial under-development of the French economy. Also, most workers were employed
by the petit bourgeois in firms employing less than twenty people\textsuperscript{10} and thus not being, at least for some time, susceptible to the mass organizing which was being carried out in the giant sweatshops of England in this same period. Further, 1789 made a great section of the non-property holding peasantry into property holders and while conditions changed very little in their relationship to the large property holders\textsuperscript{11} the French peasant remained basically conservative,\textsuperscript{12} trying to protect what little he had. Furthermore, the Chapellier law of 1791 had outlawed all associations of over twenty people without government license. It was not until 1864 under Napoleon III that trade unions were allowed to form legally. Even then it would seem that their existence might have been a part of a necessarily strategic retreat on the part of Napoleon in the face of a growing working class movement, especially in Paris. Other worker reforms would follow:

In 1868 Article 1781 of the Code, which laid down that the evidence of the master was to be preferred to that of the employee, was expunged. . . Beyond this, efforts were made to encourage the mutualiste (friendly society) movement. (However) none of these reforms had any effect in reconciling employed and employer.\textsuperscript{13}

Even though this conclusion is premature it, nevertheless, would seem fair to suggest from what has been said, that the political developments in France from 1789 to 1848 were not basically proletarian nor peasant in character, if we mean by this that neither the proletariat nor the peasantry were sufficiently advanced to carry on a struggle with a view of
seizing state power themselves. In both cases the workers and peasants played merely supportive roles to different factions of the bourgeoisie. But, what were these factions, and did we not just finish characterizing the 1789 Revolution with respect to Saint Simon on simple class struggle lines, promoting the idea that the bourgeoisie was a single monolithic class? Indeed, and rightly so in that in 1789 the lines of struggle were very finely delineated, dividing France into 'producers and non-producers'--a situation in which it was easy to distinguish friend from foe. It was characterized as a class struggle, furthermore on the strength of the fact that one definite economic group, the bourgeoisie, had wrested power away from another economic group, the Aristocracy, and had begun to change France right to its core. After 1789, however, these fine class distinctions had become predictably blurred as interclass antagonisms gave way to differences within the bourgeoisie itself. Factions of every shade and color covered the entire political spectrum as basic problems arose not only with regard to the form of government, but in relation to every issue imaginable. The culmination of this indistinctness of class divisions (and, therefore, political indistinctness) in the politics of the Third Republic is aptly painted by Katherine Munro:

The English observer was apt to view the politics of the Third Republic as an uninitiated visitor looks at an exhibition of surrealist paintings. One canvas, certainly, he could recognize by its sweeping outlines and hammer and sickle; elsewhere,
he could catch glimpses of familiar colours and forms; but on the whole it seemed to him a puzzling display of politics for politics' sake. The catalogue, moreover, no help at all. For one thing, the titles often varied in Chamber, Senate and constituency; for another, they seemed to bear little relation to what he saw, or to be self-contradictory. What could he make of "Socialist-Communists," of "Socialist-Radicals," or of the group that was registered and worked in the Chamber under the title "Not-Registered"? How could he guess that "Independent" meant "reactionary", or that the Radical Left was to the right of the Radicals? He had to master the fact that these were known in the Senate as the "Democratic Left," while the "Democratic Left" of the Chamber was known there as the "Republican Union". At election time, he heard much of the candidates of "Democratic Alliance," but in Parliament it apparently disappeared. Nor could he find any trace in Parliament or constituencies of the seemingly influential Action Francaise. Moreover, these groups and parties, based on all the permutations and combinations of political solutions devised by a lively and argumentative people, were not static: they appeared and disintegrated, shifted and changed, with kaleidoscopic rapidity.14

Of course, the reason for the kaleidoscopic nature of the politics of the Third Republic is directly traceable to the economic conditions and the contradictions raised by those conditions in the period prior to the establishment of the Republic. The condition of which we speak is, as has already been alluded to, the rising intra-class antagonism within the bourgeoisie. This problem will be dealt with here in only two critical aspects. First, the problems arising from the demands made by industrialization for greater amounts of capital to build new and expand old factories and transportation systems, and, secondly, the basic contradiction
between the big and small factions of the bourgeoisie.

Guy Chapman writes that, "from a banker's point of view, industry was scarcely respectable before the twentieth century: everyone knew that it was risky compared with commerce. 'The industrialist ties up capital: the merchant turns it over.' The customers of industry were nation wide, and could not be identified, whereas in commerce and agriculture, the goods were there. There was nothing like cereals, 'a noble trade, universal and almost without risk since most of it is by cash transaction.'" Without capital there can be no industry, with no industry there can be no industrial working class, and up to 1848 'no industry' would seem to be not an unfair description of France. While it would appear that Guerard's description of the July Monarchy as the 'very perfection of bourgeois rule' was correct (the rich did get richer) it would appear, also, that a qualification should be made here. The fact is that neither industry nor the state could make any real economic advancements without the backing from the big financiers such as Hottiguer, Mallet, Rothschild or Theluson and all of these families (many of them foreign) did not like the idea of tying their money up in building factories and adequate transportation systems which were required if France was to turn into an industrial state. In brief, the finance capitalists held a stranglehold on the industrial capitalists and the state and it became apparent that the interests of the monarchy of finance
capital (the July Monarchy\textsuperscript{19}) were not necessarily coincident with the interests of other segments of the bourgeoisie. Furthermore, the lives of the big bourgeoisie and the petit bourgeoisie had become so distinctly different that their basic class interests of 1789 began to recede, if not disappear. Remond writes of the big bourgeoisie:

The political date 1830 thus marks a decisive step in the history of mores: another regime, another society. The change can be seen in the displacement of the locale of society life: the center of gravity moved from the Left Bank to the Right Bank, from the Faubourg Saint-Germain to the Chaussee-d'Antin. Thiers built on the place Saint Georges, the Leuwens on Place de la Madelaine and the Dambreuse's town house was on Rue d'Anjou. After the sittings of the Chamber the ministers now went to their bankers; at the doors of their townhouses there were lines of brilliant carriages; their homes displayed a luxury that the noble Faubourg confidentially mocked for its ostentation and bad taste. This new society did not forget the scorn with which it had been humiliated for so long.\textsuperscript{20}

Compare this with Wolf's description of the petit bourgeoisie:

Just below the upper crust of society were the petty bourgeoisie whose yearly incomes ranged from 1,500 to 6,000 francs. Many of them had a hard time maintaining their status above the workers, but they considered themselves to the better element of society. Unlike the upper bourgeoisie, they did not leave memoirs, nor did they create a stir in the social life. They often belonged to the National Guard, and managed their small workshops or businesses. The head of the family worked hard at his business or profession, while his wife managed her own household, often doing most of the work herself. These people were often unhappy as the result of their contacts with the wealthy in the National Guard or in business, for they had to practice the strictest economy to make both ends meet, and, thus were unable to attain the standards of living of their wealthy neighbours. The literary men
of the age pilloried this class for its short sighted, matter of fact, cautious outlook and its parsimony. Its members were avid place hunters, sharp dealers, and schemers, but they were to become the backbone of the nation. They supported the July Monarchy until February, 1848, when their defection made victorious the cause of the revolutionaries; in a later age they became the chief prop of the Republic. 21

So Louis Philippe and the July Monarchy also fell, but they did not fall to a revolutionary force. In the words of Guerard all the disaffected bourgeoisie "wanted was a new team, not a new deal." 22 Of course, when the July Monarchy collapsed so did a number of the bankers who had been so important to its development. "When after a fortnight's closure, the Bourse reopened government stocks had fallen by a third, a number of financial houses had closed their doors and a great deal of money had taken refuge in London." 23

But, the picture was not as bleak as it might first appear. Enter the coup d'etat of Louis Napoleon, "Saint Simon on horseback," 24 which would offer a future to capital into which it would rush "like air into a vacuum." 25 The stage was set for Louis Napoleon, soon to rename himself Napoleon III, to begin to play the role of midwife to the birth of French industrial expansion and the Third Republic. The date of the coup was December 2, 1851 and Emile Durkheim would be born some seven years later on the 15th of April, 1858, the son of the new bourgeois revolution, as well as the intellectual inheritor of the philosophy of the 'Father of Sociology', Auguste Comte, who was formulating and writing
his major ideas during the formative period immediately prior to the establishment of the Second Empire (Napoleon III).

Isidore Auguste Marie Francois Xavier Comte was born to petit bourgeois parents at Montpellier on January 19, 1798. His parents were devout Catholics and "Royalists in sympathy" yet young Auguste showed a certain independent spirit and, according to Gould, had adopted republicanism by the time he was eleven years old and had by the age of fourteen "ceased to believe in God." Comte was apparently a very good student and was accepted at the elite Polytechnic School in Paris before he was old enough to meet the age requirements. At the age of sixteen (1814) he moved to Paris to attend the Polytechnic and lived in Paris all of the remainder of his life. Gould relates the incident which brought Comte's Polytechnic days to an end and demonstrates the independence of the student whom his classmates called 'the thinker'.

A tutor, who otherwise seems to have been an estimable person, offended the pupils by squatting in an armchair and putting his feet up on a table while addressing his questions. Comte's turn came. He replied alertly to the questions, but assumed a singularly careless posture. "My son," said the annoyed professor, "your attitude is unbecoming." "Sir," answered Auguste, "I thought I did right to follow your example." Hasty close of the examination! Auguste drew up a note, signed it, and obtained a long row of signatures: "Sir, painful as it is to us to adopt such a measure towards an old Polytechnic boy, we must nevertheless ask you not to enter this school again." The governing board consulted. Authority must be vindicated. The school was dismissed. There was no hope
that Comte, the ringleader, could be rein-stated. The brilliant Thinker, in marked disgrace, went down to Montpellier. For some months he consoled himself among his friends, and attended lectures at the School of Medicine. 29

Comte returned to Paris in 1816 and in 1817 was introduced to Saint Simon, who by this time was well beyond middle age. Comte impressed Saint Simon with his precise and logical thought and became Saint Simon's secretary and "adopted son" until 1824 when Simon's tutelage apparently became unbearable for young Comte. Frank Manuel writes of the early relationship:

Saint-Simon presented him to the circle of liberal economists, paid him whenever the rich industrialists and bankers sent money, and in long conversations expounded his scientific and social system. The letters which Comte addressed to his friend Valat during this period bear witness to the young man's enthusiasm for his master. Saint-Simon was a remarkable conversation-alist, and like many other men with the gift of volubility he was incapable of formulating his ideas in long, structured treatises. In contrast, Comte was an autodidact with a volatile temperament like pere Simon; a rigorous scientific training at the Ecole Polytechnique had even further strengthened his extraordinary native powers of systematization. At the beginning it seemed that their geniuses completed each other and that the relationship would yield a rich intellectual harvest. 30

For Comte, out of this relationship would come not so much a 'rich intellectual harvest' as a harvest of charges of plagiarism of his major ideas from Saint Simon of which Manuel, again, writes:
In answer to the charges of his adversaries, Comte fought furiously for his claim to originality in all the ideas which he had developed, and in his letters of this period the repudiation of Saint-Simon's effect upon his doctrine became an idee fixe. He freely admitted their association during a brief period, but he steadfastly maintained that he had learned nothing from the befuddled old philosopher . . . When in order to torment him Comte's detractors revived the idea that his profound law of the three states had been borrowed, he could find no epithet violent enough to hurl back at them. In the introduction to the *Systeme de politique positive* he mentioned the foolish old philosopher of the Restoration with disdain, and in one of his last letters he called him a "depraved juggler." 31

Interestingly, after his relationship with Saint Simon was severed Comte's financial ties nearly totally dried up and he was forced to rely on an income gained primarily from the position of Entrance Examiner for the Polytechnic. Occasionally, the odd capitalist would send him some money 32 but for the most part Comte was fairly well deserted. He would openly write in a bitter tone in 1846, "Perhaps the rich will some day regret having acted less well than they might towards the Philosophers, who will endeavor to shield their (the rich men's) sic. social existence against a vigorous popular reaction!" 33 Perhaps one reason, more than any other, for the desertion was Comte's placing himself as the High Priest of Humanity—the head of a religion which at best could appear strange, and at worst, bizarre. Independent of the logical continuity between his theoretical system and his religious activity his treatment of his great love for
Clothilde de Vaux as the Virgin Mother of the Religion of Humanity and his worshipping all things that she touched as sacred relics could easily produce the image of an unbalanced, if harmless, madman. 34 We will have occasion to see, however, that even though Comte was ridiculed and not read seriously during his lifetime the title of 'Father of Sociology' is nevertheless an accurate title and that sociology's relationship to the birth and later the maintenance of industrial capitalism (and the class relationships contained therein) is intimately tied to Comte's contribution.

August Comte's biographical proximity and his theoretical establishment of a general view to explain historical movement reflects broad ties to Saint Simon. One is, therefore, tempted, at first glance, to merely include him in the analysis already carried out. 35 Yet Comte's view of history merits separate attention on the basis of two important considerations. First, while the basic components of Comte's analysis are clearly the same as Saint Simon's (as will become evident) the emphasis of the analysis reflects a quantitative as well as a qualitative progression in the demand for establishing 'normality' in social relations. The distinction will be seen to center the difference between Saint Simon's calls for organization 36 and Comte's calls for Order—a distinction which will reflect the difference between an historical period in which the French bourgeoisie was still in an essentially revolutionary situ-
ation and an historical period in which the revolution was basically over and in which the process of consolidation of power by certain elements of the bourgeoisie against all claims to its legitimacy had begun in earnest. Secondly, Comte's analysis of history is, in the opinion of this writer, much more explicitly outlined, than is Saint Simon's, into an integrated and encompassing statement of social philosophy the direct effects of which can be clearly shown to have affected nearly all sociological thought that followed.

The comprehensive and integrated nature of Comte's positivist historical views and the center around which those views always gravitate is demonstrated in the division of "the highest of sciences" (Sociology) into two essential parts. "The one, the statical, will treat of the structural nature of this, the chief of organisms (Humanity EV); the other, the dynamical, will treat the laws of its actual development." The historical implication is immediately introduced in that the proper realm of inquiry of sociology is from the beginning tied to conceptions of Order (the statical) and Progress (the dynamical). The study of sociology is, for Comte, the study of history or, more precisely, the study of sociology is the study of the development of Humanity on its way to a higher more perfect form. What will interest us here (as with Saint Simon) are 1) the mechanisms which cause this progress (motors of social change); 2) the
practical implication of those mechanisms on change within the specific society in which Comte was writing (forward, neutral or reverse gear) and 3) as a point of necessary information to fill out number two the practical prescription of decision-making in the society (who should be driving the machine).

In the concluding pages of *Positive Polity* Volume II, Comte outlines the need for establishing "the true Philosophy of History." (emphasis added EV) Such a philosophy must, by Comte's positivist definition, define the "Normal State" of current affairs in its relationship to the known direction of past history so that appropriate action can be taken to avoid the twin evils of "Reaction" and "Anarchy." Obviously, exactly what constitutes 'the true Philosophy of History' as part of the positive paradigm and what in fact constitutes positivism as a mode of thought are essential questions which must be dealt with first, for it is on the basis of assumptions which openly claim for themselves 'the truth' that the specific historical questions that we are asking will be answered. Comte writes:

Positivism consists essentially of a Philosophy and a Polity. These can never be dis severed; the former being the basis, and the latter the end of one comprehensive system, in which our intellectual faculties and our social sympathies are brought into close correlation with each other. For, in the first place, the science of Society, besides being more important than any other, supplies the only logical and scientific link by which all our varied observations of phenomena can be brought into one consistent whole.
The implication of this statement is that in human thought (Philosophy) as well as in human action (Polity) a comprehensive set of ordered relationships always exists. In the same way that physical phenomena are subject to the natural laws which govern their activity and in so far as natural law is immutable under the precept of reason and is, therefore, totally knowable (no part can exist outside of natural law) the true Philosophy, fully grasped, enables the Positivist onlooker to, "comprehend human life under every aspect, social as well as individual." (Emphasis added EV.) This is not to say that all things are immediately understandable to all men but simply that full understanding of all things is possible. Understanding the comprehensive system that surrounds us, argues Comte, has in the history of Humanity come in increasingly higher levels. All thought (understanding), he writes, must pass, "without exception," through three successive states: the Theological, the Metaphysical, and the Positive, or the fictitious, the abstract, and the positive. These separate levels, manifested in the development of individuals (biography) as well as in the development of the Great Being, Humanity (history), represent movement or Progress "tending towards a state of increased perfection." The movement of the three successive stages carries with it correspondingly successive increases in social unity based on the increasing awareness of truth, or understanding the natural order. Some clarification is
necessary on this very important point.

The primitive mind, argues Comte, is limited to "spontaneous illusions" about the natural processes occurring around him and his understanding is extremely limited by the total or near total lack of systematization of the observations that he does make. The Theological state (or the most primitive state) is thus infused with individualistic and anthropomorphic interpretations whose social significance or efficacy is very slight. However, even though the primitive intelligence is trapped by the immediacy of its relations to the environment it contains two "distinct tendencies: the one, to produce a community of opinions, the other to found spiritual authorities." These tendencies are rooted in the nature of man and provide for a necessary development to a higher intellectual state, i.e., the Metaphysical state.

The essential uniformity of human nature disposes us all to think in the same manner, when our situations are sufficiently similar. The disposition is too strong to be neutralised by the vagueness inherent in supernatural beliefs in consequence of their purely subjective source. The fact that they are spontaneous, and not framed after reflection, tends to prevent discordance; and a still greater influence in this direction must we attribute to the instinctive sociability which insensibly urges every man to an intellectual communion no less precious to the heart than to the intellect. Even in the most trifling opinions that we form from our personal observation of facts, we may everyday see how needful to us is the assent of others.
Thus, while the Theological state (stage) was "no less indispensible than inevitable, as the only starting point for civilization," so too was the indispensible and inevitable advancement of reason by the developing ability (based on the necessity of social assent) of man to formulate concepts abstracted from the immediate and the concrete and to systematize these abstractions into commonly held social views. In short, "the progress of reason consists chiefly in more and more restraining the suggestions from within, in order to make them more conformable to the impressions from without." In a very important sense the essential condition necessary for demonstrable objectivity (Positivism) is born in the creation of systematic (socially consistent) thought. But, "Positivity having not yet taken shape as a philosophy, its work is provisionally delegated to the metaphysical spirit, which thus seems to become the essential agent of the transition, whereas it can never be anything but an instrument of it." (Emphasis supplied.) Of course, the instrumental-ity of the metaphysical stage is its establishment of abstract thought which makes possible systematic observation and thereby the formulation of natural law (i.e., the possibility of a 'true Philosophy'--Positivism).

In summary of this preliminary discussion of positivism and its importance to the following discussion several key points must be made. Positivism is held to be the culmination of reason that roots its objectivity in socially
recognized and socially demonstrable laws. That is, the positivist intelligence (understanding) is the highest order of truth available to Humanity. Secondly, 'Natural Order' is the 'Normal State' of all things which is not to say that human beings always understand what is normal but that natural order stands outside and is not dependent upon any understanding whatsoever. The Natural Order exists the same (operates under the same natural laws) in relation to the primitive savage and the modern scientist alike—it is only their understanding, or lack of understanding, that distinguishes between them. Thirdly, all analysis must necessarily relate to the Natural (True) Order of the world and all things, mental and physical, must be viewed as being subservient to (can not go against) that Order. While this will minimize greatly the necessity of discussing the mechanics of social change (the motors) it will emphasize the definitive nature ('the Truth') of the practical perspectives of Comte's analysis; i.e., the movement of society (forward, neutral or reverse gears) and the practical prescription of who should be doing what in society (who should be driving). It will also raise important theoretical questions such as, how is disorder (e.g., the French Revolution) possible? And, what is the human role in making history?

Comte spends very little time discussing the mechanics of social change. The Positivist method presents a juggernaut called 'the Truth' which encompasses an understanding of
the direction of the social machine past, present and
future, and which holds as its sine qua non that the history
of Humanity must move towards 'a state of increased perfec-
tion'. The words which Comte most frequently uses to de-
scribe this movement are 'indispensable' and 'inevitable'.
In a very important sense, the discussion of motors becomes
immediately unnecessary for the movement of the machine is
itself the motor. The machine progresses because it must
progress. As there is a natural law which dictates that
over time acorns can only develop into oaks so too is there
a natural law which dictates that Society (The Great Being,
Humanity) can only develop in a particular (positively dis-
cernable) way. In such a system it is impossible as well as
unnecessary to assign cause (the acorn does not "cause" the
oak) but, the task instead is to describe and understand at
all stages of development the Law of development so that that
knowledge can be used by all men at all times.57 The Law of
development for Society has already been dealt with briefly
in the opening remarks on the nature of positivist thought
but a few more specific points are in order before moving on
to the more practical aspects of Comte's thought.

Based on the given premise that nothing exists out-
side of the Natural Order, Comte outlines how Humanity re-
lates to that Order. The following diagram represents three
different ways of stating the positivist motto; "The prin-
ципle, Love; The basis, Order; The end, Progress."
Truth + Man's participation in Truth = Practical Responses  
Thought + Feeling = Action  
Order + Love = Progress

Significantly, what this motto represents is the purest kind of human logic—the tautology. Each part of the motto is exactly equivalent to both of the other parts. Because nothing can exist outside of the Natural Order the Human Participation in that Order can be nothing but Natural and the Action that arises from that Participation can also be nothing but Natural. The question that immediately arises is, why have three parts to the motto at all? Why not just say that all is Natural? The answer to this is, of course, that to just say 'all is natural' is to ignore the dynamic characteristics of Human history while concentrating on the statical. While, for Comte, it is indeed correct to say that all is natural, that should not be read to say that all things that are natural are equal. While it is natural for the primitive to understand the Order of his world in terms of Directing Wills (see footnote 50) and it is natural for the Positivist to understand his world in terms of observable Natural Laws, the Positivist's understanding is closer to the 'Truth' than is the primitive's—the superiority of the positivist's view being based on the increasingly encompassing acceptance (social unity based on universal observability) of his views. In this sense, then, the study of History
(or Sociology) becomes the documentation of the various levels that Reason (Order) has reached in the human consciousness in the course of the perfection (Progress) of the social world. Comte writes:

The same theory then which explains the mental evolution of humanity, lays down the true method by which our abstract conceptions should be classified; thus reconciling the conditions of Order and Movement, hitherto more or less at variance. Its historical clearness and its philosophical force strengthen each other, for we cannot understand the connexion of our conceptions except by studying the succession of the phases through which they pass. And on the other hand, but for the existence of such a connexion, it would be impossible to explain the historical phases. So we see that for all sound thinkers, History and Philosophy are inseparable. 58

Having thus established the intimate connection of the development of Humanity (History) to the development of the Human Mind (three stages) the proper presuppositions are established for Comte's practical proposals for mid-nineteenth century France. The stages of intellectual development represent the historical cumulative process of acquired Truth which ties the present to the past and the future to the present—unilinearly. Further, having outlined this broad sweep of human history and having concluded that human history is equivalent to the advances of the human mind in its ability to understand 'the Truth' Comte is ready to conclude that "the normal type of Human Existence is one of complete unity. All progress therefore, whether of the individual or of the race, consists in developing and consolidating that
unity."\(^{60}\) (Emphasis supplied.) Here we have the positive tautology carried to its logical extension. Progress is "nothing but the gradual development of Order,"\(^{61}\) and in the study of that development (Sociology), "the statical study, and the dynamical study tend gradually to unite in one, as the essential spirit of each more and more distinctly comes out, to illustrate the intimate connection between them; and we explain alternately the laws of Order by those of Progress, and the laws of Progress by those of Order."\(^{62}\) The practical implications (even though partially self evident) of this theoretical and philosophical statement can now be shown by examining out two analytic variables of the gears and drivers of society.

Comte's theoretical framework obviously demands 'developmental necessity' (a forward gear) in that it contains within itself, analysis, not only of the present and the past but also of the future. This developmental necessity (which Comte calls Progress) is, however, a very qualified statement with a very specific practical meaning. Progress, for Comte, means the moral consolidation of the existing industrial class divisions of mid-nineteenth century France. The remainder of this chapter will concentrate specifically on these class divisions and how Comte's positive Philosophy fits directly into those class divisions as a means of consolidating the power of the French bourgeoisie.

Progress, writes Comte, comes in the form of three
sorts, Physical, Intellectual, and Moral. Of these three the intellectual and moral forms of progress are particular to Humanity and of these two, moral progress has even more to do with our well being than intellectual progress. The moral faculties are more modifiable, although the effort required to modify them is greater. If the benevolence or courage of the human race were increased, it would bring more real happiness than any addition to our intellectual powers. Therefore, to the question, What is the true object of human life, whether looked at collectively or individually? the simplest and most precise answer would be, the perfection of our moral nature; since it has a more immediate and certain influence on our well being than perfection of any other kind.

It is only a small step further to the categorical statement, "All systematic study of human Progress must then consist in the development of its one law--Man is ever becoming more religious." But, the question must be asked, religious in terms of what? Directing Wills? Gods? The God? Obviously, over the course of the development of the three intellectual states the word "religious" would have very different specific connotations. Comte writes:

Religion, originally Spontaneous, then Inspired, and afterwards Revealed, has at length found its ground in Demonstration. In its full maturity it must satisfy at once the feelings, the imagination, and the reason as each of these was in turn the source of one of its earlier forms. But over and above this it must govern directly the active powers of Man, powers which neither Fetichism, nor even Polytheism, nor least of all Monotheism, could adequately control.

The most important element of this view of religion is, then, not the specific forms (even though they are very important
in the developmental sense) but rather the general function that religion plays in the movement of the human condition to a 'state of increased perfection'. In this movement (the given end being a state of perfect unity) the function of religion by definition:

... excludes use of the plural; it makes it as impossible to speak of several religions as of several healths. In each case, moral or physical, there are only different degrees in the attainment of the true harmony. The natural development of the human race, like that of the entire animal series, exhibits as a whole a Harmony which grows more and more complete in proportion as rises into the higher types. But the character of this unity always remains the same, in spite of all the irregularities through which it may actually be worked out.

The sole distinction which must be constantly maintained is that which relates to the two different phases of our life, individual and collective. Although more and more closely connected these two forms will never be united in one, and each implies a special quality in religion. To establish a state of complete unity, its task must consist both in regulating each personal life, no less than in combining different individual lives. Still, however important this distinction is, it must not affect the intimate relation which these two Functions of Religion bear to each other. The conception of their thorough agreement is the first general notion required by the Positive theory of Religion, which can never be reduced to a system at all, if these two great ends of human existence did not coincide in fact.67

What does this mean in practical terms? If one can know the "Real Order"68 of human existence one is in the position of making judgements of good and evil, health and sickness etc. that bind absolutely all those who exist under that Order.
And in practical terms for Comte what was the "Real Order" for mid-nineteenth century France? The answer is simply stated: industrial capitalism.

Comte approaches the questions of industry and capitalism in two stages discussing, first, the natural and necessary development of industrial society and in this he finds that, secondly, capitalism is the natural and necessary form of industrial activity. He writes:

These three consecutive modes of Activity—Conquest, Defence, and Labour, correspond exactly to the three successive states of Intelligence—Fiction, Abstraction, and Demonstration. This fundamental correlation gives us also the general explanation of the three natural ages of Humanity. Its long infancy, covering all antiquity, had to be essentially Theological and Military: its adolescence in the middle age was Metaphysical and Feudal: and lastly, its maturity, which only within the last few centuries has become at all distinguishable, is necessarily Positive and Industrial. 69

As the culmination of all human intellectual progress is Positivism, the culmination of all human activity which corresponds to that intellectual progress is Industry. Industry is the given end or the "Normal State" of human activity—that form against which all other forms of activity are measured. Again, Comte presents a fait accompli, a theory of all history which holds each part (including the future) as the sine qua non of all the other parts and within that given framework explains unilaterally the material development of mankind. Of course, Comte does not argue in a vacuum that Industry is the 'Normal State' of human activity and it is appropriate to
present his argument more specifically.

Of the earliest stage of human activity he writes:

Man is spontaneously impelled towards military life by two very powerful instincts: the repugnance he long feels for any daily labor; and a downright taste for destruction. The latter instinct which is always more energetic than that of construction, is besides continually developed by his exertions in procuring animal food. Both brain and stomach therefore concur in making military Activity preponderate over pacific at the outset of human association.70

This form of activity being as "indispensable as it was inevitable"71 spontaneously begins the process of collectivising human beings by subordinating individual aspirations to centralised command as well as extending through conquest the actual size of social groups. Gradually, as the size of the social group becomes more extended, military conquest becomes less and less practical and the society begins to take a defensive posture depending more and more on the regular produce of the feudal estates. But the feudal period is merely a transitory period in which the socially integrating features of military activity are amplified and developed and in which the way is thus paved for industrial activity. What is important here is that the historical development of the material base through the three periods is seen as equivalent to the development of social unity, the basis of this being the increasing interdependency and social complexity of the social organism. Industry thus represents the highest form of human Activity because it is the form which is built upon the greatest social unity--each part being dependent upon some
other part for its social existence.\textsuperscript{72} Put simply, the instinct to social unity "had to be purely civic in Antiquity, collective in the Middle Age, and universal in the Final State."\textsuperscript{73} (Secondary emphasis supplied.) But, the question remains, what is the specific practical historical coordinate to the increasing social unity? What about practical life brings about this unity? Comte answers these questions categorically.

This all important change, the starting point of our true Progress, can only be accounted for by two correlative laws respecting our material existence, to which attention has not yet been drawn. Properly amalgamated, they form the Positive theory of accumulation; without which all such progress from selfish to unselfish toil would be impossible. Accordingly, the admirable native instinct, which everywhere guides the institution of language, gives the name of capital to every permanent aggregate of material products; and thus indicates its fundamental importance to the sum of human existence.\textsuperscript{74}

Man's labor, argues Comte, has always produced more than man has consumed. Over the entire period of human history the products of man's labors have accumulated to a point at which there is a large store of goods ("capital") which are used to free men to do more diversified tasks, thus allowing for the increased division of labor. The Production, Accumulation and finally the Transmission of wealth\textsuperscript{75} thus comes to play a central role in the development of the 'Great Being', Humanity.
Thus understood the institution of Capital forms the necessary basis of the Division of Labor, which in the dawn of true science, was considered by the incomparable Aristotle to be the great practical characteristic of social union. In order to allow each worker to devote himself to the exclusive production of one of the various indispensable materials of human life, the other necessary productions must first be independently accumulated; so as to allow the simultaneous satisfaction of all the personal wants, by means of gift or of exchange. A closer examination, therefore, shows that it is the formation of Capital which is the true source of the great moral and mental results, which the greatest of the philosophers attributed to the Distribution of industrial tasks. 76

With capital established as a central or core aspect of the development of social unity Comte is ready to deal with the specifics of control of capital.

Throughout Comte's writing control (or authority) is divided into two separate aspects, Spiritual and Temporal. While not dealing with the historical development of the Spiritual/Temporal distinction 77 Comte's practical applications of that distinction to mid-nineteenth century France can be very insightful. As might be expected, Positivism as a philosophical system is to supply the Spiritual authority whereas, perhaps not quite so expectedly, the holders of capital (the capitalists) are to supply the temporal authority. The specific historical context and the relationship of Spiritual to Temporal power is outlined by Comte in the following way:

    The Religious power, as the great organ of
Continuity, alone represents the two boundless periods which precede and succeed the world of today, the proper sphere of Political action. The true Priesthood, whose privilege it is to speak in the name of the Past, the subject of their constant study, and of the Future, the object of their continual aspirations, is empowered to bestow a peculiar and potent consecration on every practical authority, civic or domestic.78 (Emphasis added.)

Given that the "true Priesthood" (the Positivists) is the sole holder of the "true Philosophy of History" its function is one of intellectual/moral/religious "consecration" which holds industrial society together. Because the Positive Priesthood understands what the 'Normal State' looks like, or should look like, it alone can pass judgement on the health or disease of any given society and its word, like the word of the most highly qualified physician, simply must be accepted. But, how is this truth to be disseminated, and to whom, and what beyond the truth that modern society must be industrial does this truth encompass? The answers to these questions lead naturally into Comte's analysis of Temporal power i.e., who should be driving the machine of society.

Comte writes:

No one knows so well as the Positivist that the principal source of real morality lies in direct exercise of our social sympathies, whether systematic or spontaneous. He will spare no efforts to develop, these sympathies from the earliest years by every method which sound philosophy can indicate. It is in this that moral education, whether private or public, principally consists; and to it mental education is always held to be subordinate. . . But however efficient the training received in youth, it
will not be enough to regulate our conduct in after years, amidst all the distracting influences of practical life, unless the same spiritual power which provides the education prolong its influence over our maturity. Part of its task will be to recall individuals, classes, and even nations, when the case requires it, to principals they have forgotten or misinterpreted, and to instruct them in the means of applying them wisely. And here, even in the work of education strictly so called, the appeal will be to Feeling rather than to pure Reason. Its force will be derived from Public Opinion strongly organised. 79 (Emphasis added EV.)

And further,

All views of the future condition of society, the views of practical men as well as of philosophic thinkers, agree in the belief that the principal feature of the state to which we are tending will be the increased influence which Public Opinion is destined to exercise.

It is in this beneficial influence that we shall find the surest guarantee for morality; for domestic and even for personal morality, as well as for social. 80

What Comte is arguing, then, is that it is the moral nature of man, specifically his social sympathies and feelings, which must be affected if social unity (the 'Final State') is to become a reality (which for Comte it must). Catholicism had begun this moral integration of humanity, he argues, but, because it was tied to metaphysical (unpractical) conceptions which failed to account for the existence of natural laws which govern all activity, human and otherwise, it was a premature attempt leaving Positivism the task of filling the void. Positivism, he writes:

... is based on a complete synthesis; one
which embraces, not the outer world only, but the inner world of human nature. This, while in no way detracting from the practical value of social principles, gives them the imposing weight of theoretical truth; and assures their stability and coherence, by connecting them with the whole series of laws on which the life of man and of society depend. (Emphasis supplied.)

The practical dissemination of the positive 'truth' in the form of Public Opinion provides the basis for advancing the argument one more step with regard to Comte's views on the control of temporal power. He writes:

We are now sufficiently advanced for the perfect realisation of the Catholic ideal (moral unity EV) in Positivism. And the principal means of realising it will be the formation of an alliance between philosophers and the working classes, for which both alike are prepared by the negative and positive progress of the last five centuries.

The direct object of their combined action will be to set in motion the force of Public Opinion.

It is essential at this point to restate Comte's separation of Spiritual and Temporal power for the formation of Public Opinion, in which the proletariat plays a very special role, carries with it very important consequences in the political sphere. The working class, he argues, is most suitable for the moral and spiritual chores which he assigns them because they, like the Positive Philosophers:

... have the same sense of the real, the same preference for the useful, and the same tendency to subordinate special points to general principles. Morally they resemble each other in generosity of feeling, in wise unconcern for material prospects, and in indifference to worldly grandeur. This at least will be the case as soon as philosophers in the true sense of that word have sufficiently mixed with the nobler members.
of the working classes to raise their own character to its proper level. 85

A cursory examination of this position could lead one to believe that Comte sees the working class as the source of the new Philosophy—as somehow being in the leadership of the Positive Revolution. After all, Comte is arguing that the Philosophers should mix with the 'nobler members' of the working class to 'raise their own character', not the other way around. A closer view, however, reveals a much different picture. The proletarians are not the source of the new Philosophy, but merely:

... auxiliaries of the new spiritual power: auxiliaries indispensable to its action. This vast proletary class, which ever since it rise in the Middle Ages has been shut out from the political system, will now assume the position for which by nature it is best adapted, and which is most conducive to the general well-being of society. Its members, independently of their special vocation, will at least take a regular and most important part in public life, a part which will compensate from the hardships inseparable from their special position. Their (philosophers/proletarians) combined action, far from disturbing the established order of things, will be its most solid guarantee, from the fact of being moral not political. And here we see definitely the alteration which Positivism introduces in the revolutionary conception of the action of the working classes upon society. For stormy discussions about rights, it substitutes peacable definition of duties. It supersedes useless disputes for the possession of power by enquiring into the rules that regulate its wise employment. 86 (All emphases supplied.)

The proper role of the working class in the new industrial society is now made clear by Comte. Obviously, the working
class is as much the object of control (a point which Comte will be shown to make even more definitively shortly) as it is the mechanism by which the new Positive Philosophers are to steer the 'moral (not political') workings of industrial society. But whose work is it to regulate the political life of society? Comte answers this question by dealing with the very important political question of ownership of property or capital.

The central role that capital plays in establishing the Final State of human unity has already been discussed. The direction and use of capital is what will interest us here. Comte writes:

An army can no more exist without officers than without soldiers; and this elementary truth holds good of Industry as well as of War. The organisation of modern industry has not been found practicable as yet; but the germ of such organisation lies unquestionably in the division which has arisen spontaneously between capitalist and workman. No great works could be undertaken if each worker were also to be a director, of if the management, instead of being fixed, were entrusted to a passive and irresponsible body.87

The capitalist class is thus established, by Comte, "as necessarily the possessor of material power"88 and the working class, under the guidance of the Positive Philosophers, is established as the executor of the will of the capitalists in the industrial process while at the same time acting as a moral counterweight to the capitalist's selfish motives.
Comte writes in the most explicit terms possible:

Looking upon the whole sociocratic organisation as the seat, objectively, of the true providence, it is vested, for the material order, specially in the patriciate (the capitalists EV), as for the intellectual it is vested in the priesthood, and for the moral primarily in woman. Love and knowledge, these are attributes respectively of the two higher elements, whilst provision, or the satisfaction of our material wants, is a function which for its right discharge must be analysed in its two real elements of will and power. In the patriciate is the chief seat of the will, will condensing in itself as it were our whole objective life, as societies and as individuals. On this ground it is that capital should be concentrated in the patriciate, as the directing class on which devolves the provisioning of the other classes, each in its appropriate way. As for the abuses inherent in such vast power, the Positive Religion is adapted to check them by its possession of a common ideal, furnished by the Great Being. Composite and subjective-Humanity is alien to will, and recognises only the sway of demonstrable laws.

Direction being the special function of the patriciate we are warranted in assigning the complementary function to the proletariat, as the immediate agent of the power of humanity. Its service, involving merely the responsibility of carrying out instructions, leaves the proletariat free both in mind and heart to apply the common doctrine and make it felt as a check on the abuses attendant on the undue absorption in science or industry.89 (Emphasis supplied.)

This moral/political synthesis of man in modern industrial society and the implications of such a synthesis are made even more evident in Comte's treatment of the inheritance of wealth (capital) from one generation to the next. The direct inheritance within the capitalist class, argues Comte, makes the capitalists' subjection to moral principles much more likely, thus perfecting the political/moral synthesis.
Again, he writes very clearly:

The superficial view of property, springing too often from envious motives, which condemns Inheritance because it admits of possession without labor, is not subversive, merely narrow. From the moral point of view we see at once the radical weakness of these empirical approaches. They show blindness to the fact that this mode of transmitting wealth is really that which is most likely to call out the temper requisite for its right employment. It saves the mind and the heart from the mean and sordid habits which are so often engendered by slow accumulation of capital. The man who is born to wealth is more likely to feel the wish to be respected. And thus those whom we are inclined to condemn as idlers may very easily become the most useful of the rich classes, under a wise reorganisation of opinions and habits. Of course too, with the advance of Civilisation the difficulty of living without industry increases, the class we are speaking of becomes more and more exceptional. In every way, then, it is a most serious mistake to wish to upset society on account of abuses which are already in course of removal, and which admit to a most beneficial conversion.90 (Emphasis supplied.)

Comte's bitterness at not receiving just compensation for his efforts on behalf of the capitalists becomes immediately understandable, but the coup de grace is yet to come.

We still have not dealt with the way in which the Positive Philosophy or Morality is to be disseminated to the working class. For this purpose Comte proposes to utilize a system of general education, aimed specifically at the working class sponsored by the state ("It should be looked on as a sacred debt which the republic owes to the working classes."91), the purpose being to morally solidify beyond reproach the function and position of the workers in relation
to the capitalist mode of production. He writes:

Positive Education, adapting itself to the requirements of the Organism with which it has to deal, subordinates intellectual conditions to social; regarding the latter as the end, the former simply as the means. Its principal aim is to induce the working classes to accept their high social function of supporting the spiritual power, while at the same time it will render them more efficient in their own special duties. (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, the child's "moral development, which is always to be the first consideration" is merely to provide the appropriate temperament for industrial apprenticeship later in life. Indeed, Comte concludes:

Morally what is required is, that they (workers EV) should have a sufficient degree of the dignity of labour, and that they should be prepared for the mission that now lies before them.

The workman must learn to look upon himself, morally as a public servant, with functions of a special and also of a general kind. Not that he is to receive his wages for the future from the State, instead of from a private hand. The present plan is perfectly well adapted to all services which are so direct and definite, that a common standard of value can be at once applied to them. (Emphasis supplied.)

The integrated nature of Comte's theoretical and practical prescriptions can now readily be seen. To be in the service of capitalism is to be in the service of the 'Great Being--Humanity' and the moral consecration of that 'Great Being' is the task of both his philosophical and practical views. Translated into practical terms the positivist motto; 'The principle, Love; the basis, Order; the
end, Progress,' can be seen to be an all-encompassing statement of social philosophy bringing into intellectual unity the apparent moral contradictions associated with the birth of industrial capitalism. Like Saint Simon, Comte saw France undergoing a period of fundamental change—a change which required a new philosophical/moral rationale to control the relations of disparate people in an increasingly complex system of production. The sophistication of thought that Comte makes over Saint Simon will be dealt with in the conclusion of this thesis where the historical development of the logic of scientific domination\(^96\) can be broadly traced from Saint Simon up through Comte and Durkheim into modern theory. What will interest us for the remainder of this chapter are those apparent theoretical contradictions that could have a bearing on the broader analysis.

Undoubtedly, the cornerstone of Comte's entire analysis is the notion that history moves unilinearly in an onward and upward fashion, following natural and immutable laws of development which, once discovered, provide the key to the good society. But, several apparently severe contradictions come immediately to the fore from such a view. If history is controlled or ordered by a natural law of development, then, how is disorder (e.g., the French Revolution) possible? And, what is 'human' about the history of humanity, or, is there a 'human' role in making history? Also, if there is a human role
in making history and if history is rationally calculable (i.e., based on Reason) then how can Love or affectation, manifested particularly in women and workers, be the principle on which the new rational industrial society is being built? The answer to the first question is answered by Comte in his analysis of the 1789 Revolution.

In the first place, he argues, the 1789 Revolution was not a case of disorder in the march of history, but rather the establishment of a new Order on a higher plane. He writes:

It is often supposed that the destructions of the old regime was brought about by the Revolution. But history when carefully examined points to a very different conclusion. It shows that the Revolution was not the cause but the consequence of the utter decomposition of the mediaeval system; a process which had been going on for five centuries throughout Western Europe, and especially in France; spontaneously at first, and afterwards in a more systematic way. The Revolution, far from protracting the negative movement of previous centuries, was a bar to its further extension. It was a final outbreak in which men showed their irrevocable purpose of abandoning the old system altogether, and of proceeding at once to the task of entire reconstruction. The most conclusive proof of this intention was given by the abolition of royalty; which had been the rallying point of all the decaying remnants of the old French constitution.97

How, then, is disorder possible? It is not, at least not really. What might appear at any particular time to be disorder will in the broader historical sense be shown to be actually the advancement of Order even though the advance-
ment may come under the direction of reactionary views. In the case of the French Revolution, "the first stage of the revolutionary movement was accomplished under the influence of principles that had become obsolete, and that were quite inadequate to the new task required by them." Of course, it is Positivism, 'the true Philosophy of History', which is to provide the new principles for the new Order. One of these principles, perhaps the most important one, is the human subjugation to the invariable natural laws of development which govern the history of Humanity. Writing of the immutable Order of the world, Comte states:

Men have, it is true, been ignorant of this Order. Nevertheless we have always been subject to it; and its influence has always tended, though without our knowledge, to control our whole being; our actions first, and subsequently our thoughts, and even our affections.

As we have advanced in our knowledge of it, our thoughts have become less vague, our desires less capricious, our conduct less arbitrary. And now that we are able to grasp the full meaning of the conception, its influence extends to every part of our conduct. For it teaches us that the object to be aimed at in the economy devised by man, is wise development of the irresistible economy of nature, which cannot be amended till it is first studied and obeyed. In some departments it has the character of fate; that is it admits of no modification. But even here, in spite of the superficial objections to it which have arisen, it is necessary for the proper regulation of human life. (Emphasis supplied.)

And so, in response to the question of the human role in making history, Comte flatly declares:

We are powerless to create: all that we can do in bettering our condition is to modify an
order in which we can produce no radical change. Supposing us in possession of that absolute independence to which mystical pride aspires, it is certain that so far from improving our condition, it would be a bar to all development, whether social or individual. The true path of human progress lies in the opposite direction: in diminishing the vacillation, inconsistency, and discordance of our designs by furnishing external motives for those operations of our intellectual, moral, and practical powers, of which the original source was purely internal.

What we have to do is to dispose our life as to submit to these resistless fatalities in the best way we can. 100 (All emphasis supplied.)

Social Unity (the 'Final State' is thus based on the internal subjugation of beliefs, aspiration etc., of the individual to external social positively defined 'truths'. And in what form must this subjugation be brought about? Intellectually? Politically? Certainly, but these are only secondary aspects of the one great task that remains.

The object of our philosophy is to direct the spiritual reorganisation of the civilised world. It is with a view to this object that all attempts at fresh discovery or at improved arrangement should be conducted. Moral and political requirements will lead us to investigate new relations; but the search should not be carried farther than this is necessary for their application. Sufficient for our purpose, if this incipient classification of our mental products be so far worked out that the synthesis of Affection and of Action may be at once attempted; that is, that we may begin at once to construct that system of morality under which the final regeneration of Humanity will proceed. 101

Finally, the task of the sociologist, as well as all
other men, is made explicitly clear. Because he can do nothing about the natural order of the world in which he lives and because this order is natural (could not be fundamentally any other way) he must try to affect social acceptance of this order. Social affection, Love, is Order made manifest and Progress is Order made complete. Some fifty years after Comte wrote this spiritual challenge it would begin to be met in earnest by a giant of the sociological tradition, Emile Durkheim, whose theories would dominate the field and influence nearly every sociologist who would follow. Also, some 100 years after Comte's works had been published, the military dictatorship of Brazil would use as its national motto, inscribed on the Brazilian flag, Ordem e Progresso.
CHAPTER II NOTES

1Gagnon, op. cit., p. 98. This abuse was, of course, directed by the Royalists against the Bonapartists that had aided Napoleon's return and is usually referred to as the 'White Terror'.

2The reader should note that this is a very complicated period of French history and that no attempt is being made to outline even a small portion of the major aspects of the period. The only point that is being made is that the Old Order was not yet dead.


4Gagnon, op. cit., p. 121. J. P. T. Bury, France 1814-1940, (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1969), similarly writes, "Above all, however, the July Revolution was a triumph for the bourgeoisie and for the doctrine of popular sovereignty. With the overthrow of Charles X the bourgeoisie finally achieved the political and social supremacy whose sweets they had already tasted during the Great Revolution and the Empire. The days when men feared that the emigres would overthrow the revolutionary land settlement had gone forever. The bourgeoisie had now made a King, and their sovereignty as representatives and leaders of the nation was demonstrated in terms of his creation." p. 46.

5Guerard, op. cit., p. 177.

6Ibid., p. 178.

7While Karl Marx's work, "The Class Struggles in France," is the best source for an analysis of this conflict other historians will be used to show the conflict. The reader should bear in mind at all times, however, that this historical characterization comes to this writer directly through Marx and that this writer considers Marx's work to be the most accurate and insightful work done on this period.
Guerard, op. cit., p. 179, writes, "The regime (The July Monarchy EV) was not incompetent but it was dull. Lamartine, a great lyric poet who was also the spiritual leader of the opposition, had pronounced the death warrant: 'France is bored'."

For example, Guy Chapman, op. cit., p. 133, gives the following figures to demonstrate the level of development and the changes in those levels over a fifty-two year period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Steel Production (Metric tons '000's)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>41</td>
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<td>1869</td>
<td>110</td>
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<td>1875</td>
<td>256</td>
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<td>1880</td>
<td>389</td>
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<td>1882</td>
<td>458</td>
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<td>1887</td>
<td>493</td>
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<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>825</td>
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<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>1,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>1,568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>2,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>4,428</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be readily seen in this most basic industry, French industry remained at almost stagnant levels until the late nineteenth century.

See Katherine Munro, op. cit., p. 14 and following, who states this opinion more strongly than this writer would accept when she writes, "The development of French industry, like that of French agriculture, has favored the small man." (p. 16). I will be attempting to show, in the course of this argument that it was the petit bourgeoisie who lived a most tenuous existence and whose life work could be put into bankruptcy overnight by decisions over which he had no control.

Speaking of the peasant in relation to a different problem Chapman characterizes the peasants' basic conservatism: "... the peasant, ignorant, illiterate, and suspicious, was not to be persuaded to change his ways." Chapman, op. cit., pp. 112-113.

A point of example was the dire need in France for an adequate system of railways for the transport of agricultural as well as other goods throughout the national economy, as many of the roads were built by the Romans and were wholly
inadequate. However, even after the engineers of the Pontset Chaussees came up with the design the government found itself in a real dilemma. Chapman, *op. cit.*, pp. 115-116, writes of one example, "... while many members of the Haute Bank, of whom the most prominent in the railway world was Baron James de Rothschild, head of the Paris branch of the family, saw promise in railways, they could not from their own resources raise the capital for all the proposed lines. To extract all the money locked up in land, or hidden in stockings, the guarantee of the state was needed. The bankers considered that if they found the money and bore a large part of the risk, they were entitled to direct both the construction and the administration. The government, on the other hand feared the appearance of what must inevitably grow into powerful corporations capable of challenging the State's liberty of action. But without the cooperation of the bankers the capital could not be found. Therefore, while ready to guarantee interest on invested money, the government would only authorise short lines, under onerous conditions, and give concessions for short periods."

18 Katherine Munro, *op. cit.*, p. 19, writes, "Another difficulty of French governments in the past was their weakness vis-a-vis the Bank of France. This private corporation had a monopoly of note issue. It was owned by 40,000 shareholders and responsible to a council of fifteen Regents responsible to the two hundred largest shareholders. Only three of these were Treasury officials and the governor, though appointed by the government, had to be a shareholder."

19 Immediately prior to the downfall of Charles X a new journal appeared in Paris called the National. It was "founded by a group of liberal journalists with the support of Talleyrand and the liberal banker, Jacques Lafitte and edited by three bright young men, Adolph Thiers, Francois Mignet, and Armand Carrel." Pinkney, *op. cit.*, p. 13. It was the banker Jacques Lafitte who formed the government in the crises of 1831 and upon his failure to secure order King "Louis Philippe turned to the Party of Resistance and with a ministry headed by another banker, Casimir Perier, secured a much stronger government." Bury, *op. cit.*, p. 50. Thus, the very birth of the July Monarchy is inextricably tied to the large bankers by the personal direction of the government by two of the most influential bankers of the day.


21 Wolf, *op. cit.*, p. 107. Gagnon, *op. cit.*, p. 142, further clarifies this. "The coalition that toppled Louis Philippe in February of 1848 was much the same as that which
had opened his way in 1830: disaffected bourgeois and petty bourgeois, artisans and proletarians, unemployed (many from the countryside, seeking relief from the prolonged depression), and the urban poor, stiffened by National Guardsmen, and activists of the republican societies."

22 Guérard, op. cit., p. 189.


24 Guérard, op. cit., p. 159. Quoted from St. Beuve.

25 Chapman, op. cit., p. 117. Quoted from Lois Girard.

26 Comte was one of four children, all of whom were christened with the name of the Virgin Mary.


28 Ibid., p. 3.

29 Ibid., pp. 6-7.


31 Ibid., p. 257.

32 Gould relates, for example, that in 1846 Comte was in serious financial trouble and M. Captier, a cloth manufacturer, loaned him 1,000 francs. Gould, op. cit., p. 72.

33 Quoted in Gould, op. cit., p. 51.

34 Comte, in fact, had periodic bouts with madness which he referred to as 'cerebral disturbances'. Manuel, op. cit., p. 261, writing of Comte's marriage (to a prostitute) produces the following bizarre picture. "The vengeance with which Comte pursued his wife in later years was monstrous. To the disciples he left a secret testament setting forth in detail the facts of her life as a prostitute along with a dismal rehearsal of his marital complaints. In the first attack of madness in 1826 it was this woman who kept him at home behind barred windows after the famous psychiatrist Dr. Esquirol had surrendered him with the notation, 'No cure', suffered his flinging of knives, his ravings, his acted-out fantasies of Homeric grandeur, and nursed him back to a state of relative equilibrium. It was she who went through the macabre religious ceremony on which Comte's mother had
insisted—a guard from Esquirol's clinic in attendance, a priest prolonging the sacrament while Comte ranted against the church, his mother on bended knees calling for the transfer of God's punishment from her son to herself. (The groom had ended the performance by signing the contract Brutus Napoleon Comte.)"
"Each man frames or accepts the supposition for himself, as if he lived in isolation." P.P., Vol. 3, p. 27.

By anthropomorphic (a term which Comte does not use) is meant primitive man's tendency to see all things in terms of willful, acting (like human) parts of the world. See, P.P., Vol. 3, p. 24.

The idea of 'Law' applicable to all people (or natural law to all things) perhaps best exemplifies this systematization.

This utilitarian aspect should be made clearer even though the only reason for raising the question here is to point out Comte's non-reliance on ultimate or underlying causes (motors). It is not, he argues, distinguishably different for one man to believe that God 'causes' water to flow downhill and that another believes that gravity 'causes' water to flow downhill--neither adds anything to the store of human knowledge. What is useful is as full a knowledge as possible about all the conditions etc., which affect the flow of water. That is to say, Theological and Metaphysical explanations add no useful or utilisable knowledge which Humanity can benefit from due to the highly subjective nature of these doctrines, whereas Positivism, by replacing these subjective suppositions with objective, observable, natural, Laws, provides information that can be used to build machineries etc. See, P.P., Vol. 1, p. 39. To this should be added Comte's qualification. "Every attempt to speculate as to events the laws of which are not yet know, naturally aspires to determine their causes, and this always leads to the hypothesis of Directing Wills. We cannot escape this twofold tendency except by abstaining from speculation, and that is not always possible or even proper. Whatever maturity human reason may attain, every one will supply the shortcomings of law by cause." P.P., Vol. 3, p. 24. (Emphasis supplied.)
Truth, in this sense, is like money in the bank. The more money that one acquires in his bank account the more interest he accrues which added to the principal in turn accrues more interest etc., that is, Truth, like money in the bank, compounds itself.

62 Ibid.
64 Ibid., p. 119.
67 Ibid., p. 9.
68 This is Comte's term. See P.P., Vol. 3, p. 53.
69 Ibid., p. 52.
70 Ibid., p. 47.
71 Ibid.
75 See Ibid., p. 134.
76 Ibid., p. 135.
77 See P.P., Vol. 2, chapters 1 and 5.
78 Ibid., p. 258.
80 Ibid., p. 110.
81 Ibid., pp. 112-113.
Comte uses the terms working class and proletariat interchangeably.

This in contradistinction to the capitalists. "The occupations of working men are evidently far more conducive to philosophical views than those of the middle classes; since they are not so absorbing as to prevent continuous thought, even during the hours of labour. And besides having more time for thinking, they have a moral advantage in the absence of any responsibility when their work is over. The workman is preserved by his position from the schemes of aggrandisement which are constantly harassing the capitalist." P.P., Vol. 1, p. 103.

Indeed, the functions of the patriciate and the proletariat are mutually exclusive. "In spite of the economists, savings-banks are regarded by the working classes with unmistakable repugnance. And the repugnance is justifiable; they do harm morally, by checking the exercise of generous feelings. Again, it is the fashion to declaim against wine-shops; and yet, after all, they are at present the only places where the people can enjoy society. Social instincts are cultivated there which deserve our approval far more than the self-helping spirit which draws men to the savings-bank. No doubt this wise unconcern for money, wise as it is, involves real personal risk; but it is a danger which civilisation is constantly tending to diminish, without effacing qualities which do workmen honour, and which are the source of its most cherished pleasures. The pleasure ceases when the mental and moral faculties are called into stronger exercise. The interest which Positivism will arouse among the people in public questions, will lead to the substitution of the club for the wineshop. In these questions, the generous inspirations of popular instinct hold out a model which philosophers will do well to follow themselves. Fondness for money is as much a disqualification for the spiritual government of Humanity, as political ambition. It is clear proof of moral incompetence, which is generally connected in one way or other with intellectual feebleness." P.P., Vol. 1, p. 156.
It is, perhaps, unfair to introduce this term at this point for it points to conclusions not yet drawn and arguments not yet explicitly analysed. But the reader should be kept aware that while we have concentrated very heavily on a demonstrative analysis thus far, that Comte's arguments regarding capitalism and the class relations of capitalism point to further analytic insights of a more inducive nature which encompass a broader historical range and it is these insights when made and shown to rest on the evidence presented here that provide totally for the purpose of this thesis.
Remond characterizes post-1848 France in the following manner:

At the same time a group of transformations slowly altered the face of France: the growth of the cities, the rural exodus, industrialization, the formation of a single national market, all gradually shifted the center of gravity from the thousand small regional areas of France toward a France of workers and petit bourgeois in which the urban middle classes saw their importance expand. Concomitantly, the authority of traditional social forces weakened. Anxieties changed, it became less a matter of fighting radicalism than of resisting Socialism.¹

Indeed "the timid, stingy, lethargic"² regime of the July Monarchy had given way to a new and exciting period of industrialization which brought with it a new series of conflicts in the form of worker/employer struggles. But also with the Third Republic came a broad new hope. Curiously the St. Simonians reappeared calling for "the extinction of poverty"³ and establishing the Credit Mobilier under the St. Simonian Periere brothers, the purpose of which was to "supplement the insufficiency of capital available to industry by nursing selected businesses up to the day when they would be able to stand unsupported, and then to offer the shares to the public."⁴ A movement for, "socialism under capitalist leadership"⁵ was begun as Napoleon III declared himself to be a socialist⁶ and proceeded to "answer the
railwaymen's prayers" among others, and to offer state "loans to industries to allow them to renew machinery and put in new." The discovery of the Siemens-Martin and Bessemer processes of steel production, while not catching up to the British immediately in terms of production, did show great promise as steel production steadily rose. In the twenty years preceding 1871 French exports tripled and basic primary industries such as coal extraction showed signs of real progress. With this development of French industry there came, of course, the rise of the industrial proletariat and with the industrial proletariat came the social problems that both Saint Simon and Comte had foreseen and with which the bourgeoisie would have to deal.

"Up to 1870," writes Guy Chapman, "and indeed in many cases later, to speak of a 'working-class' is a misnomer." The reason that Chapman picks 1870 as the cut-off date, this writer would contend, is because of the general confusion of most historians surrounding the question of how to deal with the 'working-class' in light of the 1871 Paris Commune. The question of whether or not to historically call the Commune a worker's rebellion against capitalism can not be dealt with here. What interests us here is that the working class had indeed grown in size to a point at which the workers could in fact seize Paris, raise the red flag as their symbol, and legislate measures of aid to themselves. Eventually 17,000 of them also died, losing their lives not
to the Prussians with whom France was at war at the time and a reason often given for the takeover, but to fellow Frenchmen, Frenchmen dispatched from Versailles to "re-establish order", a theme that had become a preoccupation in France. Earlier in the year Napoleon III had said, "Between revolution and the empire the country has been challenged to choose, and has chosen... My government shall not deviate from the liberal line it has traced for itself... More than ever we may envisage the future without fear." When he made that statement he was, of course, referring to the decision to fight Prussia rather than let France fight with itself. He was either a fool, a liar, or a battle weary old man for it was French not Prussian guns that brutally murdered the 17,000 communards barely days after he made that statement. Adolph Thiers, whom Guerard characterizes as the "defender of the middle class" rose to power with Napoleon's defeat at Sedan and it was he who unleashed the fury of the Versailles troops, under MacMahon and Gallifet, on the people of Paris. At once Henri de St. Simon's relative's lamentation about the "vile bourgeoisie" some 160 years earlier had transformed itself into Adolph Their's invective against the "vile multitude" and the struggle was on in France, a struggle that the Third Republic would never escape. A good summation of the fall of the commune and its importance
for post-1871 France was written by Henry Markheim who in that year (1871) wrote the following:

Capitulation will soon restore order, with all its shams and hollowness—that is, a despotism which will pander to the vices of the moneyed classes, deliver them from Belleville by grape shot, and from the Prussians by self humiliation, and restore for another period of twenty years the life of selfishness and Sybaritism, the prelude in France of a social earthquake, in which the whole nation may some day be swallowed up, and disappear, like Sodom and Gomorrha, from the face of Europe. I must say that the working classes, against whom I was prejudiced at the commencement of the siege, have gradually risen in my opinion during these last two months of suffering to which they have so cheerfully submitted. Perhaps their vices were more skin deep than those of the bourgeoisie, and they have been to some extent disciplined by misfortune and the consciousness of a genuine determination to defend their city; but they are essentially unsteady, disorganized, impetuous, and they had been quaked ever since the Great Revolution of '93, till their case has become well-nigh hopeless. In them, however, I fancy I can recognize some germs of life which Fortune may develop for the salvation of France, while the rest of French society is a corpse, for which the only remedy is lime, to arrest putrefaction. 17

Indeed, the new battle lines were clearly drawn now and would temper all of the relationships in France up to the present. The division of which we speak is, of course, the conflict between the working class and the bourgeoisie. 18

On the basis of what has been said above a brief attempt must be made to characterize in some general terms the temperament of the time in which Emile Durkheim worked and lived. If a general characterization can be made of the time between 1870 and 1917 (Durkheim lived between 1858 and
1917), and in this one must proceed with great caution, that characterization would have to include the demand by all factions of the bourgeoisie for normality, for the status-quo, in short, for the consolidation of the Third Republic. Laced into this demand one would necessarily find the multicoloured threads demonstrating the variety that was France at the turn of the century: the problems with Prussia, Revanche, the Entente Cordiale with England, imperial expansion into Africa and Asia, the Dreyfus Affair, the Panama scandal, the Casablanca Affair, etc., etc. But, throughout all of this there appears one theme that haunts every page of the history--order. Interestingly, Guizot, who had been one of the last vestiges of Louis Philipp's July Monarchy, was to set the tone in 1872 when he wrote:

Au fond, le saint-simonism et le fourierisme n'ont ete que des phases naturelles de la grande crise morale, sociale et politique, qui depuis le siecle dernier travaille la France et le monde, de courts meteores dans cette longue tempete. Frappes de quelques-unes des erreurs de notre temps, surtout en matiere d'institutions politiques, et comprenant mieux que l'ecole radicale l'importance des principes d'autorite, de discipline et de hierarchie, Saint-Simon et Fourier se crurent appeles a la fois a redresser la Revolution francaise et la porter jusqu'a ses dernieres et definives limites. Mais, avec des pretentions a l'esprit d'organisation, ils etaient possedes de l'esprit de revolution; et sous le manteau de quelques idees plus saines dans l'ordre politique, ils jetaient dans l'ordre moral et social les plus fausses comme les plus funestes doctrines. En meme temps qu'ils defendaient le pouvoir, ils dechainaient l'homme et ruinaient dans ses fonde-ments la societe humaine. Et, comme il arrive en pareil cas, c'etait par leur cote revolutionnaire qu'ils acqueraient quelque puissance; leurs plus
habiles adeptes faisaient profession de mépris pour les maximes anarchiques dans le gouvernement; mais leurs doctrines et leurs tendances générales ne faisaient qu'aggraver, dans les masses populaires, la perturbation anarchique, en y formant les instincts qui livrent l'homme à la soif jalouse du bien-être matériel et à l'egoïsme de ses passions. 19

The words could just have easily been Thier's or MacMahon's or any number of leaders who rallied around the precepts put forward by the newly founded party of Order, "national unity, peace, order, property." 20 Thiers could say with a degree of confidence after the fall of the Commune, "we are rid of socialism," 21 and at least for a few years he was right. In 1873 power shifted to Marshal MacMahon who called for the establishment of "moral order" and was to hold effective power until 1877. When MacMahon was ousted by the Republicans the following 22 years were what Guérard has characterized as an "era of opportunism." 22 But, for whom was this an 'era of opportunism'? For the workers? For the big bourgeoisie? For the petit bourgeoisie? Also, would the petit bourgeoisie side with workers as they had in 1830, 1848 and in many cases again in 1871, if a revolutionary situation presented itself? At least a partial answer to some of these questions and an easily understandable explanation of the transformation that the classes had undergone is presented by John Wolf:

Below this group of landlords, businessmen, and professional men, whose wealth allowed considerable freedom, was the petty bourgeoisie. The highly skilled artisans, the wealthier peasants, shopkeepers, schoolteachers, petty functionaries, and white-col-
lared workers of one kind or another fell into this class. All of these people had some little invested wealth, but not enough to live on too comfortably, even with the additional income not resulting from their labors. They were always forced to practice strict economy to maintain their position in society. Under previous regimes, these little people were rigorously excluded from the councils of the nation, and their aims, interests, and ambitions received only cursory attention from the powers that controlled the country. Democracy, however, armed them with the ballot, and their numbers gave them strength; under the Republic, it was impossible to prevent them from exercising considerable influence over affairs. They elected men of their own ranks to the councils, the chamber, and the senate, or they chose lawyers, doctors, professors, or others who sympathized with their outlook, to represent them in Paris. In the years just before the war, well over a third of the deputies held their seats in the chamber because they satisfied these men. . . These little people all seem to have been infected with the sin of envy. They recognized the inevitability of economic inequality, but they wished always to protect the small against the great, the poor against the rich, the weak against the strong. . . To these people the little man, with a little house, a little garden, and little income, is the ideal citizen. . . This passion for equality, which they interpret largely to mean that everyone should be cut down to their level, led these little people to the support of the radical's program for graduated income and inheritance taxes, and equal military service, as well as anticlericalism.

As the twentieth century approached, however, the petty bourgeois and the wealthier peasants discovered that there was a radicalism more radical than their own. The socialist doctrine, which would not stop short of real economic equality, came to appear as dangerous to them as it earlier appeared to the upper bourgeoisie. With the rise of a Marxian party and the development of syndicalism, these little people realized that they really were moderates. In the years immediately preceding the war, and especially in the postwar era, these little people with a little money invested in land, a shop, stocks, or bonds came to drop much of their earlier economic radicalism. They had no desire to see their own little holdings endangered by an attack from the left. In parliamentary parlance, they still were voting for the left, but in actual fact,
many of their representatives, even in the radical socialist party itself, were men of the center, interested primarily in maintaining the status quo. In this sense, the terms radical and socialist become mere nameplates not necessarily reflecting anything substantial of their definitions in the political sphere. Further, this 'bourgeois' reaction (not just big or little) or fear of the workers seems to be well founded. The workers' syndicates had reached a membership of around 350,000 and strikes in the 1880's and 1890's became increasingly more frequent and often "turned to violence by the inevitable appearance of strikebreakers, agents provocateurs and private or public security forces." This is not to say that the workers were putting forward a united front, but the 'germs of life' that Markheim referred to in 1871 were definitely there and beginning to multiply and organize. The bourgeoisie had no other choice but to deal with socialism and the threat that socialism represented. The life of the Third Republic depended upon its ability to deal with the working class and the philosophy of socialism while trying not to deny its own democratic heritage. This task would be carried out by perhaps honest and dedicated men but men unquestionably dedicated to the preservation of the Third Republic, men like Emile Durkheim.

While no complete biography of Durkheim is known to this writer sufficient resources are available for tying
Durkheim's biography into the historical epoch. "There was," writes Harry Alpert, "no restraining Durkheim in the performance of his duties to his country." Among the committees and councils that he served on were the Ministry of the Interior, society of Franco-American Fraternity, University Rapprochement, For the Jews in Neutral Countries, and the Republican League of Alsace-Lorraine. In 1915 when France was suffering defeats at the hands of the Germans he penned a series of "letters to all Frenchmen" out of which came the motto "Patience, Effort, Confidence." Having graduated from the exclusive Ecole Normale Superieur in 1882 he had decided, according to Harry Alpert, to become a sociologist for two primary reasons: "(a) his dissatisfaction with the state of the philosophical disciplines, (b) his desire to continue to contribute to the moral consolidation of the Third Republic." In this effort the work of Emile Durkheim appears as a chameleon, changing in the reflections cast by the Third Republic, immersed and blending into social upheavals of almost revolutionary proportions in which a rising working class movement had begun to take the once revolutionary principles of the now conservative bourgeois rulers to heart.

While care has been taken not to overgeneralize this portion of French history, certain themes do appear which, as was the case with St. Simon, offer a feeling for the time.
On a comparative basis, the class conflicts of 1789, while by no means simple, were more manifestly representable on a basis of simple dichotomy than were the upheavals that followed. In the words of St. Simon, 1789 was a conflict between 'producers' and 'non-producers' which translated itself into clear distinctions between the working Third Estate and the non-working Aristocracy, in short between economic friends and economic foes. By the turn of the century (1900), however, a great many changes had taken place and the situation with regards not only to inter-class but also intra-class conflicts had abundantly complicated the matter. It has further been noted that with the advent of the industrial revolution and the twentieth century another key change takes place in the form of another polarization in French society in terms of industrial workers and employers and that from this a dominant and necessary bourgeois theme appears, i.e., the establishment and maintenance of order.

In an industrialized society science, and the person who practices it, comes to play a very important and central role. When a new petroleum refining process is needed it is the scientists who are put to the task. When a new alloy is needed to build new structures again it is the scientists who are expected to do the job. When it is a cure for a disease that is needed it is the scientist to
whom the society learns to look for answers. Scientists become heralds of truth rooted in objectivity, reason based on evidence. In such a society justifications for the maintenance of the particular social relations can not be based on faith. When order is proposed as something that is good, just and proper it must be scientifically so ascertained.

Any serious consideration of Durkheim's work necessarily involves a consideration of Emile Durkheim the scientist. This particular effort, to understand Durkheim's perspective of history in relation to the epoch in which he lived, will be no exception. The intersection of history and natural law will serve as the focal point of the examination and will appear as a constantly recurring theme in our considerations of the motors of social history, the gears to which those motors are attached, and finally with regards to who should be directing the machine of society as a whole.

To understand Durkheim's conception of the motors of history one must first understand the construction of the motor and the dynamics of combustion. That is, the condition and the major principle under which the motor operates. The principle involved here is the principle of a self-started (sui-generis) history and the condition in which that history takes place is the transindividual entity that Durkheim calls society. With regard to the former he writes:
What causes have brought about the progress of the division of labor?

To be sure, this cannot be a question of finding a unique formula which takes into account all the possible modalities of the division of labor. Such a formula does not exist. Each particular circumstance depends upon particular causes that can only be determined by special examination. The problem we are raising is less vast. If one takes away the various forms the division of labor assumes according to conditions of time and place, there remains the fact that it advances regularly in history. This fact certainly depends upon equally constant causes which we are going to seek. 31

From this one may assume that for Durkheim there are no universal or overriding causes which would easily explain historical development nor reduce development or progress to a single cause such as St. Simon did, or tried to do, with respect to Newton's law of gravity. Indeed the problem of the genesis of historical development becomes clear in The Rules of Sociological Method when Durkheim criticizes Comte and Spencer for confusing function and origin in addressing social facts.

Thus Comte traces the entire progressive force of the human species to this fundamental tendency "which directly impels man constantly to ameliorate his condition, whatever it may be, under all circumstances"; and Spencer relates to this force to the need for greater happiness. 32

The problem with such an analysis, argues Durkheim, is that the level of analysis is brought down to an individual/psychological/motivational level, a level at which we can see social facts "as a product purely of mental effort, it seems
to us that they may be produced at will whenever we find it necessary." "But," he continues in two sentences of crucial importance, "since each one of them is a force, superior to that of the individual, and since it has a separate existence, it is not true that merely by willing to do so one may call them into being. No force can be engendered except by an antecedent force." 33 "Moreover," he states conclusively, "science is not concerned with first-causes, in the absolute sense, of the word. For science, a fact is primary simply when it is general enough to explain a great number of other facts." 34 Thus in his criticisms of simple monocausality (particularly is Spencer) we find the transition to an important point. He writes:

Spencer does not see a reality sui generis in society, which exists by itself and by virtue of specific and necessary causes, and which, consequently confound themselves with man's own nature, and to which he is held to adapt himself in order to live, just as to his physical environment—but he sees it as an arrangement instituted by individuals to extend individual life in length and breadth. 35

If not at the individual level where then, and for what exactly, does one look when one is looking for the motors of social change? The answer is apparent.

Man thus finds himself placed under the sway of causes sui generis whose relative part in the constitution of human nature becomes ever more considerable . . . social causes substitute themselves for organic causes. The organism is spiritualized. 36
But, what specifically are these social causes, what is their relationship to historical development, and in what sense may they rightly be called causes? If the reader will recall, Durkheim was quoted above as saying, 'For science, a fact is primary simply when it is general enough to explain a great number of other facts.' Now let us finish that quotation, "Now the social milieu is certainly a factor of this kind, since the changes which are produced in it, whatever may be their causes, have their repercussions in all directions in the social organism and cannot fail to affect to some extent each of its functions." 37 He continues:

This conception of the social milieu, as the determining factor of collective evolution, is of the highest importance. For if we reject it, sociology cannot establish any relations of causality. In fact, if we eliminate this type of cause, there are no concomitant conditions on which social phenomena can depend; for if the external social milieu, i.e., that which is formed by the surrounding societies, can take some action it is only that of attack and defense; and, further, it can make its influence felt only by the intermediary of the internal social milieu. The principle causes of historical development would not be found, then, among the concomitant circumstances; they would all be in the past. They would themselves form a part of this development, of which they would constitute simply older phases. The present events of social life would originate not in the present state of society but in prior events, from historical precedents; and sociological explanations would consist exclusively in connecting the present with the past... But it is impossible to conceive how the stage which civilization has reached at a given moment could be the determining cause of the
subsequent stage. The stages that humanity successively traverses do not engender one another. 38

What we are looking for, it would then seem, are motors of social change which may be termed efficient (or sufficient) causes which are scientifically observable and thereby quantifiable and which do not rest on monocausal suppositions. On this basis of not looking for ultimate answers to the causes of social change one can now begin to see more clearly how Durkheim's scientific bias will affect what he considers to be the motors of social change. In the first place, the analysis has at its base an intimately observable (at least to Durkheim) and general phenomenon which is the progress of the division of labor in society as it occurs in the context of specific social milieus. Put simply, the state of the social milieu is equivalent to the motors of social change which is (are) the volume and density of the particular milieu. In other words, "progress is a consequence of changes in the social milieu" 39 and the social milieu is defined in terms of the two variables of the volume and density of society. Durkheim writes:

There remains no other variable factor than the number of individuals in relation and their material and moral proximity, that is to say, the volume and density of society. The more numerous they are and the more they act upon one another, the more they act with force and rapidity; consequently, the more intense social life becomes. But it is this intensification which constitutes civilization. 40
Durkheim clarifies his argument and presents the opportunity to make some conclusions regarding the motors of social change and thus end this part of the presentation.

We do not here have to look to see if the fact which determines the progress of the division of labor and civilization, growth in social mass and density, explains itself automatically; if it is a necessary product of efficient causes, or else an imagined means in view of a desired end or of a very great foreseen good. We content ourselves with stating this law of gravitation in the social world without going any farther. It does not seem, however, that there is a greater demand here than elsewhere for a teleological explanation. The walls which separate different parts of society are torn down by the forces of things, through a sort of natural usury, whose effect can be further enforced by the action of violent causes. The movements of population thus become more numerous and rapid and the passage-lines through which these movements are effected—the means of communication—deepen. They are more particularly active at points where several lines cross; these are cities. Thus social density grows. As for the growth in volume, it is due to causes of the same kind. The barriers which separate peoples are analogous to those which separate the different cells of the same society and they disappear in the same way.41

Durkheim reserves strict teleological arguments for the philosophers. He satisfies himself with the observation of efficient causes and rests his argument on simply what observably happens, that is, what seems to follow a natural pattern or scientific law. The next question will be what constitutes a scientific law and from this a perspective should be gained concerning the type of gear (forward, neutral or reverse) to which Durkheim’s motor of social change is at-
tacked.

St. Simon's view of historical development, presented elsewhere in this paper, was described as "an unfolding process of increasingly higher stages of development driven by reason etc." From this it can be maintained that in its essential elements and based upon a "natural, observable, scientific law of motion" that it is a statement of process which carries itself beyond its present limits in accordance with the natural laws that have been outlines. That is to say, that St. Simon's motor of history (Reason manifested in l'esprit humain) is attached to a forward gear. It will be argued here that while Durkheim also rests his argument on natural observable scientific laws that the outcome is quite different in that the motor of social change (changes in the social milieu) is attached to a neutral gear.

Emile Durkheim was not in search of a new social system. Nor was he interested in changing any of the essential relations in French society. There are two levels at which he deals with the problem of the future of his society, a scientific/theoretical level and a practical level. In The Rules... he outlines the scientific/theoretical level:

Are we to admit an inherent tendency which impels humanity ceaselessly to exceed its achievements either in order to realize itself completely or to increase its happiness; and is
the object of sociology to rediscover the manner in which this tendency developed? Without returning to the difficulties such a hypothesis implies, in any case laws which would express this development cannot be at all causal, for relation of causality can be established only between two given facts. Now, this tendency, which is supposed to be the cause of this development, is not given; it is only postulated and constructed by the mind from the effects attributed to it. It is a sort of motivating faculty that we imagine as underlying movement, in order to account for it; but the efficient cause of a movement can only be another movement, not a potentiality of this kind.

All that we can observe experimentally in the species is a series of changes among which a causal bond does not exist. The antecedent state does not produce the subsequent one, but the relation between them is exclusively chronological. Under these circumstances all scientific prevision is impossible. We can, indeed, say that certain conditions have succeeded one another up to the present, but not in what order they will henceforth succeed one another, since the cause on which they are supposed to depend is not scientifically determined or determinable. Ordinarily, it is true, we admit that evolution will take the same direction as in the past; but this is a mere postulate. Nothing assures us that the overt phenomena express so completely the nature of this tendency that we may be able to foretell the objective to which this tendency aspires as distinct from those through which it has successively passed. Why, indeed should the direction it follows be rectilinear? (Emphasis supplied.)

The point is made, then, that future is not, by any stretch of the imagination, scientifically determined by some inherent quality or historical driving force. It will not necessarily move to higher and higher stages of development,
it will not necessarily move or progress at all. Beyond that point which we term the present we have only conjecture. But, is this to say that the history of a society is not subject to natural laws? Indeed not, for the message is meant only for the future. If one is a scientist one must direct his efforts at scientifically verifiable questions. One cannot verify an "effect of a cause" or, "the necessary resultant of a given state" in a future tense. The scientist can speak only with assurance of that which he is observing or has observed, and it is from these observations that natural laws, such as "the growth and condensation of societies... necessitate a greater division of labor," originate. This is not to say that the scientist could not have ideas about the future, or that practical problems could not be predicted on available evidence. This was obviously not Durkheim's idea, as we shall soon discover. The point is that science and with it Durkheim is freed from the future. Because he rejects historical laws of development he does not have to predict or calculate a new stage of development, and he may if he wishes merely by content with the stage at which he finds himself.

The practical side of the future centers around moral consolidation and should provide the indication of forward, neutral or reverse gear that is required. But, first let us try briefly to understand how Durkheim saw his
role as a scientist and scholar, and indeed the role of science itself in relationship to practical questions.

In the first place, science by itself can not alone have practical interests. In The Rules he writes, "Sociology thus understood will be neither individualistic, communistic, nor socialistic in the sense commonly given these words. On principle it will ignore these theories, in which it could not recognize any scientific value, since they tend not to describe or interpret, but to reform social organization."48

But, he says in Division of Labor:

Along side of this actual, realized science, there is another, concrete and living, which is in part ignorant of itself, and yet seeks itself; besides acquired results, there are hopes, habits, instincts, needs, presentiments so obscure that they cannot be expressed in words, yet so powerful that they sometimes dominate the life of the scholar. All this is still science, it is even its best and largest part, for the discovered truths are a little thing in comparison with those which remain to be discovered. Moreover, in order to possess a good idea of the first and understand what is found condensed therein, one must have been close to a scientific life while it was still in a free state; that is to say, before it became fixed in the form of definite propositions. Otherwise one will have the letter, but not the spirit. Each science has, so to speak, a soul which lives in the conscience of scholars. Only a part of this soul assumes sensible bodily form. The formulas which express it, being general, are easily transmitted. But such is not the case with this other part of science which no symbol translates without. Here all is personal and must be acquired through personal experience.49
Obviously, to Durkheim science is much more than the compilation of facts, or the construction of theorems or postulates. There is an essentially living aspect that could have a real consequential dimension in everyday life.

This is further clarified in The Rules:

At least, if it (sociology EV) takes an interest in them (practical social doctrines EV) it is in proportion as it sees in them social facts which can aid it both in understanding the social reality and in disclosing the needs that are the motivating power in society. We do not mean, however, that it ought to take no interest in practical questions. It has been evident, on the contrary, that our constant preoccupation has been to orient it so that it might have practical results. It necessarily meets these problems at the end of its researches. But, by the very fact that they present themselves to sociology only at this moment, and that, consequently, they are derived from facts and not from emotions, one can foresee that they must be formulated for the sociologist in quite other terms than for the masses, and that the tentative solutions it can give them could not coincide exactly with any of those which now satisfy various interest groups. But the role of sociology from this point of view must properly consist in emancipating us from all parties, not to the extent of negating all doctrine, but by persuading us to assume toward these questions a special attitude that science alone can give in its direct contact with things. Science alone can teach us to treat historic institutions, whatever they may be, with respect but without mystic awe, by making us appreciate both their permanent and their ephemeral aspects, their stability and their infinite variability.

The critical point to be made here is that the role of sociology as a science can have practical consequences in
everyday life but that its existence itself is not geared to such practical considerations. In other words, if sociology is a science and if science affords us truth, or facts, then there is no reason why these facts should not be used in a practical manner which is not to say that science in general or sociology in particular exists for any particular interests or interest groups in society. In fact sociology must "spurn popular success ... For, so long as it remains involved in partisan struggles, is content to expound common ideas with more logic than the layman, and, consequently, presumes no special competence, it has no right to speak loudly enough to silence the passions and prejudices."51 The question asked now must be, what, if any, truth did Durkheim discover and how does this 'truth' relate to the conditions in France at the turn of the century? The first question will be fairly easily answered, the second will comprise the final part of this presentation.

In The Rules Durkheim answers the first question quite forthrightly when he writes, "The principle we have just expounded would, . . . , create a sociology which sees in the spirit of discipline the essential condition of all common life, while at the same time founding it on reason and truth."52 (Emphasis supplied.) While there is probably no part of Durkheim's work which does not (or could not) serve as attesting to this effort, none could serve the
purpose better than The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. While not involving oneself in the construction of the argument (Durkheim's methodology can not be tackled within the confines of this paper) one can get a grasp of the essentials of the argument for the need of discipline from some of Durkheim's conclusions. Religious forces are; he writes,

human forces, moral forces;.

It is only by regarding religion from this angle that it is possible to see its real significance. If we stick closely to appearances, rites often give the effect of purely manual operations: they are anointings, washings, meals. To consecrate something, it is put in contact with a source of religious energy, just as to-day a body is put in contact with a source of heat or electricity to warm or electrize it; the two processes employed are not essentially different. Thus understood, religious technique seems to be a sort of mystic mechanics. But these material manoeuvres are only the external envelope under which the mental operations are hidden. Finally, there is no question of exercising a physical constraint upon blind and, incidentally, imaginary forces, but rather of reaching individual consciousness of giving them a direction and disciplining them. It is sometimes said that inferior religions are materialistic. Such an expression is inexact. All religions, even the crudest, are in a sense spiritualistic: for the powers they put in play are before all spiritual; and also their principle object is to act upon the moral life. And further to advance the argument:

Thus there is something eternal in religion which is destined to survive all the parti-

cular symbols in which religious thought has succedually enveloped itself. There can be no society which does not feel the need of
upholding and reaffirming at regular intervals the collective sentiments and the collective ideas which make its unity and its personality. Now this moral remaking cannot be achieved except by the means of reunions, assemblies and meetings where the individuals, being closely unite to one another, reaffirm in common their common sentiments; hence come ceremonies which do not differ from regular religious ceremonies, either in their object, the results which they produce, or the processes employed to attain these results. What essential difference is there between an assembly of christians celebrating the principle dates of Christ, or the Jews remembering the exodus from Egypt or the promulgation of the decalogue, and a reunion of citizens commemorating the promulgation of a new moral or legal system or some great event in the national life.55

One can begin to see now with almost startling clarity what the practical future holds for the scientist. Because we have reached our conclusions by 'truth and reason' we can now act upon them, and scientific thought becomes "only a more perfect form of religious thought. Thus it seems natural that the second should progressively retire before the first, as this becomes better fitted to perform the task."56 And what is the task? It is obvious that our motor of social change is not a perpetual motion machine tied to progress through an unshiftable forward gear. But neither is it tied to a retrogressive reverse gear. It would seem that derived from its scientific neutrality our machine is in neutral. It is evident that through this neutrality that Durkheim introduces an inertia, an inertia with its basis in the task, based on 'truth and reason' of
'upholding and reaffirming at regular intervals the collective sentiments' and that this translates itself into a call for the moral consolidation of the existing social arrangements. Of course, this latter point must now be explained and more clearly shown.

It was suggested in the introduction to this section that Durkheim's work was like a chameleon and that it was oscillated from left to right etc. The evidence that prompted that characterization will now be given with regard to the question posed earlier, who should be directing the machine of society as a whole?

The answer at first can be deceivingly simple and to some might sound fetchingly socialistic. Who should be directing society? Society itself. That is to say that society as an entity unto itself has certain needs which naturally have to be fulfilled if it, and therefore, all of its subparts are to continue to exist. Therefore, all of the subparts or organs have a duty to see that the general societies needs are fulfilled because their interest is defined as synonymous with the interest of the whole of society. Even down to the smallest classification, the individual, the duties are seen to be synonymous.

As for what is called individual morality, if we understand by that a totality of duties of which the individual would, at the same time, be subject and object, and which would link him only to himself, and which
would, consequently, exist even if he were solitary,—that is an abstract conception which has no relation to reality. Morality, in all its forms, is never met with except in society. It never varies except in relation to social conditions. To ask what it would be if societies did not exist is thus to depart from facts and enter the domain of gratuitous hypotheses and unverifiable flights of the imagination. The duties of the individual towards himself are, in reality, duties toward society. 58

Of course, what makes this proposition 'socialistic' is that responsibility or duty is reciprocal, which is to say that society is also responsible for the welfare of the individual. In Division of Labor Book III, chapter two, Durkheim outlines this 'socialistic' philosophy further. "Normally," he writes, "man finds happiness in realizing his nature; his needs are in relation to his means. Thus in the organism, each organ demands only as much food as it requires." 59 He continues:

Inversely, we may say that the division of labor produces solidarity only if it is spontaneous and in proportion as it is spontaneous. But by spontaneity we must understand not simply the absence of all express violence, but also of everything that can indirectly shackle the free unfolding of the social force that each carries in himself. It supposes, not only that individuals are relegated to determinate functions by force, but also that no obstacle, of whatever nature, prevents them from occupying the place in the social framework which is compatible with their faculties. In short, labor is divided spontaneously only if society is constituted in such a way that social inequalities exactly express natural inequalities. 60
Furthermore, a general leveling process takes place in society as individuals gravitate to their natural positions.

The progressive decline of castes, beginning from the moment the division of labor is established, is an historical law, for, as they are linked to the politico-familial organization, they necessarily regress along with this organization. Public office is more and more freely open to everybody with no questions as to wealth. Finally, even this last inequality, which comes about through birth, though not completely disappearing, is at least somewhat attenuated. Society is forced to reduce this disparity as far as possible by assisting in various ways those who find themselves in a disadvantageous position and by aiding them to overcome it.

"The task of the most advanced societies," becomes then, a work of justice. That they, in fact, feel the necessity of orienting themselves in this direction is what we have already shown and what everyday experience proves to us. Just as the ideal of lower societies was to create or maintain as intense a common life as possible, in which the individual was absorbed, so our ideal is to make social relations always more equitable, so as to assure the free development of all our socially useful forces.

No other system could appear more ideal or natural.

In effect, individuals are here grouped (under organic solidarity), no longer according to their relations of lineage, but according to the particular nature of the social activity to which they consecrate themselves. Their natural milieu is no longer the natal milieu, but the occupational milieu. In a general way, classes and castes probably have no other origin nor any other nature: they arise from the multitude of occupational organizations being born amidst the pre-existing familial organization.
And further:

The institution of classes and of castes constitutes an organization of the division of labor, and it is a strictly regulated organization, although it is often a source of dissension. The lower classes not being, or no longer being, satisfied with the role that has devolved upon them from custom or by law aspire to functions which are closed to them and seek to dispossess those who are exercising these functions. Thus civil wars arise which are due to the manner in which labor is distributed. There is nothing similar to this in the organism. No doubt, during periods of crises, the different tissues was against one another and nourish themselves at the expense of the others. But never does one cell or organ seek to usurp a role different from the one which it is filling.64

Here we finally have it, the crux of the matter splendidly outlined by Durkheim himself. The question immediately raised must be, to what extent did Durkheim view France to be "an organism" and depending upon the answer to this question, how did Durkheim deal with the class struggle that was occurring in France at the time and, again depending upon the answer to the first question, what practical solutions could Durkheim suggest to alleviate these problems?

The answer to the primary question centers around two aspects of organic solidarity. One aspect involves the structural perspective of the division of labor and the second involves the justification process65 (or the institution of moral order) as it corresponds to the structural differentiation. While the analysis of these two aspects is
of the most obvious nature what is specifically stated in them will weigh heavily in the conclusions which will be made and therefore the arguments will be presented. In Division of Labor Durkheim outlines the problem with which he is about to deal and in this presents a good starting point for this aspect of the inquiry. He writes:

Nowadays, the phenomenon has developed so generally it is obvious to all. We need no further illusions about the tendencies of modern industry; it advances steadily towards powerful machines, towards great concentrations of forces and capital, and consequently to the extreme division of labor. Occupations are infinitely separated and specialized, not only inside the factories, but each product is itself a speciality dependent upon others. Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill still hoped that agriculture, at least, would be an exception to the rule, and they saw it as the last resort of small-scale industry. Although one must be careful not to generalize unduly in such matters, nevertheless it is hard to deny today that the principal branches of the agricultural industry are steadily being drawn into the general movement. Finally, business itself is ingeniously following and reflecting in all its shadings the infinite diversity of industrial enterprises; and, while this evolution is realizing itself with unpremeditated spontaneity, the economists, examining its causes and appreciating its results, far from condemning or opposing it, uphold it as necessary. They see in it the supreme law of human societies and the condition of their progress. 66

Further, concerning France he writes, "Since its origin, France has passed through very different forms of civilization; it began by being agricultural, passed to craft industry and to small commerce, then to manufacturing, and finally
to large scale industry.\textsuperscript{67} The point needs to be belaboured only a little more. Durkheim obviously considered the structural division of labor to be extensively developed in France. The question is, however, is the structural division of labor sufficiently advanced to consider the relationships, and the people contained within those relationships, as being natural, i.e., as they should be, or as they would be if society were an organism?\textsuperscript{68} From Durkheim's perspective the question is answered simply and directly, "For us, . . . , all is natural, even the most peculiar social order; for all is grounded on the nature of society."\textsuperscript{69} How could it be otherwise? Indeed there may be 'abnormal forms' which could make the progress of the division of labor "deviate from its natural course\textsuperscript{70} but what is important is that these are abnormal forms and as abnormalities are something to be corrected.\textsuperscript{71} But what of the people who occupy the various positions in society, are they also to be considered as already occupying their natural positions? To this Durkheim answers a qualified yes. If the reader will recall that Durkheim argues for a spontaneous or natural democratic levelling process taking place in the organic society and to this adds the qualifications\textsuperscript{72} which Durkheim places in the degree that that levelling process had reached perhaps the argument can be advanced another step. He writes:
It (society) thus shows that it feels obliged to leave free space for all its merits and that it regards as unjust any inferiority which is not personally merited. But what manifests this tendency even more is the belief, so widespread today, that equality among citizens becomes ever greater and that it is just that this be so. A sentiment so general cannot be a pure illusion, but must express, in confused fashion, some aspect of reality.73 (Emphasis supplied.)

But to push the argument to more definitive limits, for up to this point it has not clearly been shown that Durkheim did not see room for great changes in the positions people found themselves in, (which would mean that the relationships were not natural), let us turn to the question of moral order. In concluding the Division of Labor Durkheim writes with great clarity:

It has been said with justice that morality—and by that must be understood, not only moral doctrines, by customs—is going through a real crisis. What precedes can help us to understand the nature and causes of this sick condition. Profound changes have been produced in the structure of our societies in a very short time; they have been freed from the segmental type with a rapidity and in proportions such as have never before been seen in history. Accordingly the morality which corresponds to this social type has regressed, but without another developing quickly enough to fill the ground that the first left vacant in our consciences. Our faith has been troubled; tradition has lost sway; individual judgement has been freed from collective judgement. But, on the other hand, the functions which have been disrupted in the course of the upheaval have not had the time to adjust themselves to one another; the new life which has emerged so suddenly has not been able to be completely
organized, and above all, it has not been organized in a way to satisfy the need for justice which has grown more ardent in our hearts. If this be so, the remedy for the evil is not to seek to resuscitate traditions and practices which, no longer responding to present conditions of society, can only live an artificial, false existence. What we must do to relieve this anomy is to discover the means for making the organs which are still wasting themselves in discordant movements harmoniously concur by introducing into their relations more justice by more and more extenuating the external inequalities which are the source of the evil. Our illness is not, then, as has often been believed, of an intellectual sort; it has more profound causes. We shall not suffer because we no longer know on what theoretical notion to base the morality we have been practicing, but because, in certain of its parts, this morality is irremediably shattered, and that which is necessary to us is only in process of formation. Our anxiety does not arise because the criticism of scholars has broken down the traditional explanation we use to give to our duties; consequently, it is not a new philosophical system which will relieve the situation. Because certain of our duties are no longer founded in the reality of things, a breakdown has resulted which will be repaired only insofar as a new discipline is established and consolidated. In short, our first duty is to make a moral code for ourselves. Such a work can not be improvised in the silence of the study; it can arise only through itself, little by little, under the pressure of internal causes which make it necessary. But the service that thought can and must render is in fixing the goal that we must attain. This is what we have tried to do.74

While the 'need for justice' remains an obvious part of the program it is obvious that there is something else that is of primary concern. The new life is merely not "completely organized" and one's first duty is the establishment of a
moral code. In essence, questions of changing fundamental relationships in societies (i.e., workers/employers) are completely subverted. At least:

It is not a matter of putting a completely new society in the place of the existing one, but of adapting the latter to the new social conditions. At least, it no longer stirs questions of classes; it no longer opposes rich to poor, employers to workers—as if the only possible solution consisted of diminishing the portion of one in order to augment that of the other. But it declares in the interest of both, the necessity of a curb from above which checks appetites, and so sets a limit on the state of disarrangement, excitement, frenzied agitation, which do not spring from social activity and which even make it suffer. But differently, the social question, posed this way, is not a question of money or force; it is a question of moral agents. What dominates is not the state of our economy but, much more, the state of our morality.75

To repeat a phrase, 'the organism is spiritualized'.

But if the purpose here has been to demonstrate that Durkheim was tempered by the time in which he lived then the task that remains is to demonstrate how the characterization made earlier in terms of the need for the bourgeoisie to contain a rising working class movement directly relates to Durkheim's work. Only the foundation has been laid in the preceding pages. Up to this point only inuendo, with regard to class analysis, has been involved regarding the establishment of a basic conservatism in Durkheim and in demonstrating the manner in which fundamental differences arising
within a society can be defined, through the organic thesis, out of existence or, at least, relegated to a position of abnormality and thus subverted, albeit scientifically, to secondary importance.\textsuperscript{76} In brief, what remains to be done is to show that Durkheim viewed France in terms of class divisions and that these class divisions were deemed to be natural in their interrelationship therefore making any change in their relative position an unnatural occurrence and therefore, an occurrence to be avoided.

Again the word 'natural' is the central focal point. In the \textit{Elementary Forms} one finds an indication that classes are, for Durkheim, a natural phenomenon. He writes:

That which is at the foundation of the category of time is the rhythm of social life; but if there is a rhythm in collective life, one may rest assured that there is another in the life of the individual, and more generally, in that of the universe. The fact is merely more marked and apparent than the others. In the same way we shall see that the notion of class is founded on that of the human group. But if men form natural groups, it can be assumed that among things there exists groups which are at once analogous and different. Classes and species are natural groups of things.\textsuperscript{77}

Of course, the meaning of class if presented in a morphological or classificatory sense but the social sense is also evident insofar as social class corresponds to social time (and social space) in a non-conflicting, structurally interdependent (i.e., functional) relationship. That is to say, the differentiated organs of an organism can not operate at
random or incongruously but must work on a common 'agreement' of interrelationship in both the spatial and temporal senses. Durkheim writes:

This (knowing what is to be done EV) is possible only when the individuals and things which compose it are divided into certain groups, that is to say, classified, and when these groups are classified in relation to each other. Society presupposes a self conscious organization which is nothing other than a classification. This organization naturally extends itself to the place which this occupies. To avoid all collisions, it is necessary that each particular group have a predetermined portion of space assigned to it: in other terms, it is necessary that space in general be divided, differentiated, arranged, and that these divisions and arrangements be known to everybody. On the other hand, every summons to a celebration, a hunt or a military expedition implies fixed and established dates, and consequently that a common time is agreed upon, which everybody conceives in the same fashion. Finally the cooperation of many persons with the same end in view is possible only when they are in agreement as to the relation which exists between this end and the means of attaining it, that is to say, when the same causal relation is admitted by all the cooperators in the enterprise. It is not surprising, therefore, that social time, social space, social classes and causality should be the basis of the corresponding categories, since it is under their social forms that these different relations were first grasped with a certain clarity by the human intellect.78

In the Division of Labor one finds what this means when translated into the class structure that industrial France faced and which Durkheim, in part, summarily describes:

Finally, in the seventeenth century, the third phase of this history of the working classes begins: the birth of large scale industry. The
worker is more completely separated from the employer. 'He becomes somewhat regimented. Each has his function, and the system of the division of labor makes some progress'. . . At the same time that specialization becomes greater, revolts become more frequent. 'The smallest cause for discontent was enough to upset an establishment, and cause a worker unhappiness who did not respect the decision of the community.' We well know that, since then, the warfare has become even more violent.79

More explicitly he states that, "the conflict between labor and capital" had become more severe, "insofar as industrial functions become more specialized, the conflict becomes more lively, instead of solidarity increasing."80 Indeed, at the time of the writing of the Division of Labor, Durkheim was willing to go so far as to say the "incessantly recurrent conflicts, and the multifarious disorders of which the economic world exhibits so sad a spectacle . . . are not of the first importance . . . (in that) we are far from the time when they (economic functions EV) were disdainfully abandoned to the inferior classes. In the face of the economic, the administrative, military, and religious functions become steadily less important. Only the scientific functions seem to dispute their place, and even science has scarcely any prestige save to the extent that it can serve practical occupations, which are largely economic. That is why it can be said, with some justice that society is, or tends to be, essentially industrial."81 But in an essentially
industrial society where, at least, one of the essential relationships is between the class of industrial workers and the class of employers and in a society which has been characterized as an organism, what is the basis for the conflict between workers and employers? Durkheim very carefully outlines his answer on two levels. Firstly, in *Division of Labor* he explains this "abnormality" in a manner congruent to his arguments for social justice stated earlier. 
"In effect, if the institution of classes or castes sometimes gives rise to anxiety and pain instead of producing solidarity, this is because the distribution of social functions on which it rests does not respond, or rather no longer responds, to the distribution of natural talents." It is important that this meritocratic principle be presented here so that Durkheim is presented fairly and not simply overgeneralized as a social fascist. He obviously sees room for improvement of individual position within his theoretical framework. This polemic for justice, however, recedes in importance when faced with practical questions i.e., the question of moral order. This is not meant to suggest that Durkheim was not serious about his desire for justice in assigning roles (functions) in the organic society—who indeed is not for justice? However, if the analysis is pressed to the second level of Durkheim's explanation for the manager/worker conflict a truer picture may be possible. Durk-
Heim's second level of explanation is what appears to be the core of all his efforts, that is, the use of 'lack of moral order' as the mode of explanation for the conflicts. In the face of moral order (i.e., the preservation of the organism, industrial France) the ideal of justice fades like the sun behind a cloud. Without hesitation he clearly writes:

Our method has, moreover, the advantage of regulating action at the same time as thought. If the social values are not subjects of observation but can and must be determined by a sort of mental calculus, no limit, so to speak, can be set for the free inventions of the imagination in search of the best. For how may we assign to perfection a limit? It escapes all limitation, by definition. The goal of humanity recedes into infinity, discouraging some by its very remoteness and arousing others who, in order to draw a little nearer to it, quicken the pace and plunge into revolutions. This practical dilemma may be escaped if the desirable is defined in the same as is health and normality and if health is something that is defined as inherent in things. For then the object of our efforts is both given and defined at the same time. It is no longer a matter of pursuing desperately an objective that retreats as one advances, but of working with steady perseverance to maintain the normal state, of re-establishing it if it is threatened, and of rediscov­ering its conditions if they have changed. The duty of the statesman is no longer to push society toward an ideal that seems attractive to him, but his role is that of the physician. He prevents the outbreak of illnesses by good hygiene, and he seeks to cure them when they have appeared. 84

With ideals neatly circumscribed and effectively reduced because of the practical problems they might raise (revolution) Durkheim is ready to advance to practical solutions.
to the problems of disorder that industrial France was facing. Again clearly he writes in summary fashion, "What is needed if social order is to reign is that the mass of men be content with their lot. But what is needed for them to be content, is not that they have more or less but that they be convinced that they have no right to more." On the surface and in the theoretical system this, of course, applies to all strata of society, for anomie is something to be avoided by all men. But again the practical questions must be asked. Firstly, how is this convincing to be carried out? Secondly, how is it to be decided who merits what? And finally who stands to benefit? On the first question Durkheim writes:

Man is destined to fill a special function in the social organism, and, consequently, he must learn, in advance, how to play this role. For that an education is necessary, quite as much as that he should learn his role as a man. We do not, however, wish to imply, that it is necessary to rear a child prematurely for some certain profession, but that it is necessary to get him to like the idea of circumscribed tasks and limited horizons.

This may be interpreted as saying, that the organism has many diverse functions contained within it all of which must be carried out if the organism is to continue to exist. Within the organism the individual cells must learn through the educational system to be content with their positions so that 'the tissues may not war against each other'. To move on the second question, who merits what position in society,
and how is this to be decided? The answer to this question remains fairly vague, one may, however, derive from Durkheim's general theoretical framework and by analogy his perspective on this crucial practical question with regard to early twentieth century France.

The general theoretical framework can again be seen to revolve around the word natural. In this case, insofar as the social structure is seen in terms of an organism (as France is to Durkheim) the basic relationships must be viewed as natural and abruptions of these relationships must be viewed as pathological or unnatural. Now, for the final time, does it follow that the people contained within these relationships are in their proper i.e., natural positions? For if they are, the stage is set for the argument for the solidification around the existing social structure of those particular individuals who happened to be filling them at the time of Durkheim's writing. This would be in direct contradiction to Durkheim's calls for social justice and would raise a severe paradox. This indeed would appear to be the case, if added to the diffusion of justice when faced with practical problems shown earlier is the following analogy. In writing of castes Durkheim states, "If in the average case, individuals were not really born for the function assigned to them by custom or law, this traditional classification of citizens would have been quickly overthrown."
The reason for this being, of course, that individuals would not be fulfilling their natural functions thus bringing into questions the solidity or natural cohesion of the social structure. "The proof," he continues, "is that this overthrow is effected as soon as discordance breaks out. The rigidity of social forms, then, only explains the immutable manner in which these talents are distributed, and this immutability itself can be due only to the laws of heredity. To be sure, education, since it was carried on entirely in the midst of the family and was prolonged late for reasons we have cited, strengthened the influence, but it could not alone have produced such results. For it acts usefully and efficaciously only if it is employed in the same way as heredity."88 The analogy carries this caste analysis into the class analysis of Durkheim's France on the strength of two points. First, Durkheim Consistently argues for the maintenance of the basic French social structure in that the social structure is seen as simply the manifestation of structural divisions (classifications) found in the progress of the division of labor which are viewed as functionally interdependent i.e., as an organism. In essence, the relationship of individuals to social structure is seen as basically the same, be the structure caste, class or otherwise in the respect that no structure can continue to exist under unnatural conditions, and that to call for continuance of
the structure is to a priori accept the naturalness of the structure and the position, at least in a great majority of cases, of the individuals contained therein. Secondly, while Durkheim does say, "The more specialized the forms of activity, the more they escape the action of heredity," (which is to say that with the progress of the division of labor brings with it a decrease in the importance of heredity) he also says:

"That is not to say that heredity is without influence, but that it transmits very general faculties and not a particular aptitude for this or that science. What a child receives from his parents is some power of attention, capacity for perseverance, a wholesome judgement, imagination, etc. But each of these faculties can be suitable to a multitude of different specialties, and assure success in each."

However, "what is certain is that faith in heredity, formerly so intense, has today been replaced by an almost opposed faith. We tend to believe the individual is in large part the son of his work." What Durkheim is getting at least in part, is that social facts have overtaken many, but not all of, the classifactory functions that heredity once held. Heredity becomes, in this sense, like the moulder's clay which plied by the proper craftsman can produce a success in any particular occupational field. Thus:

"Here is a child gifted with a lively imagination: at a young age, he is put among artists; he will become a painter or a poet. If he lives in an industrial environment, he may become an engineer with inventive
genius. If chance places him in the business world, he will perhaps be a fearless financier. 92

Now the quality of the final product rests on two crucial factors, the quality of the primary material (hereditary factors) and the quality of the social process that develops that material (social factors). In this the paradox is raised. That is, how is Durkheim to deal with the injustices that he admits were a part of France (i.e., natural functions not corresponding to natural ability) and yet argue with overpowering conviction for the moral solidification of the people around the structural divisions that were a part of industrial France? In Education and Sociology he writes:

Even today, do we not see education vary with social class or even with locality? That of the city is not that of the country, that of the middle class is not that of the worker. Would one say that this organization is morally unjustifiable, that one can see in it only a survival destined to disappear? This proposition is easy to defend. It is evident that the education of our children should not depend upon the chance of their having been born here rather than there, of certain parents and not of others. But even the moral conscience of our time would have received on this point the satisfaction that it expects, education would not, for all that, become more uniform. Even though the career of each child would no longer be predetermined, at least in large part, by blind heredity, occupational specialization would not fail to result in a great pedagogical diversity. 93

More theory. What of the practices?
The point to be made here is that with or without heredity as a factor society must necessarily produce people to fit the specialized jobs, or fulfill the necessary functions, if that society is to continue to exist. But on what basis did Durkheim see this decision being made (i.e., who should be educated and trained for what job?). Obviously, in no place does Durkheim make such categorical statements as, working class children should be forced to become workers or that middle class children should be given special privilege. As we have seen he almost goes out of his way to say just the opposite. On the level of practice, however, this writer would contend, that a much different picture can be obtained. Durkheim writes, "It is idle to believe that we raise our children as we wish. We are forced to follow the rules which prevail in the social milieu in which we live."

(Emphasis supplied.) And further:

Each occupation, indeed, constitutes a milieu sui generis which requires particular aptitudes and specialized knowledge, in which certain ideas, certain practices, certain modes of viewing things, prevail; and as the child must be prepared for the function that he will be called upon to fulfill, education, beyond a certain age, can no longer remain the same for all those to whom it applies. That is why we see it in all civilized countries tending more and more to become diversified and specialized; and this specialization becomes more advance daily. The heterogeneity which is thus created does not rest, as that which we were just discussing, on unjust inequalities; but it is not less . . . In most cases, we are not predestined by our
intellectual or moral temperament for a given function. The average man is eminently plastic; he can be equally well used in widely varied occupations. If, then, he specializes, and if he specializes in a given form rather than in some other, it is not for reasons which are within him; he is not forced to it by necessities of his nature. But it is society which, to be able to maintain itself, requires that labor be divided among its members and be divided among them in a given fashion rather than another. This is why it creates for itself, by means of education, the specialized workers whom it needs. It is, then, for an through society that education is thus diversified.95

Now, it is not the case that factory workers and factory managers would constitute such separate occupational mileus which would produce *sui generis* more factory workers and more factory managers from their respective ranks, at least in the average case? And does this not present an extremely practical way of deciding who merits what— that is letting society create for itself through the particular mileus the specialized workers that it needs? One the Society has decided there can be no question and the role of the state can come into play, "It is, then, up to the State to remind the teacher constantly of the ideas, the sentiments that must be impressed upon the child to adjust him to the milieu in which he must live."96

On the basis of the analogy and the other evidence presented the critical conclusion that has been sought here
can be reached. That is that Durkheim, 'in the average case' considered that the individuals in industrial France were in their natural positions for if they were not the overthrow of this 'classification of citizens' would have to be imminent thus seriously bringing into question the equilibrium of the society that Durkheim so diligently sought to preserve. For Durkheim no society continues to exist under unnatural conditions. Further the law of heredity, to the extent that it remains and with the modification of the social milieu (i.e., occupational milieu) as an important determinant in itself, would seem to this writer to state clearly that the natural inclination of the average child of a worker, based on these two factors, would be to become a worker or at least remain at basically the same level as its parents. In this one finds a very practical way of deciding who 'merits' what position in society and from this what kind of education each should receive. It must always be kept in mind, however, that Durkheim does, at least theoretically, make room for the non-average case: for it must also be remembered that it is not Emile Durkheim or any other individual or group of individuals that decides who merits what, it is the organism, sui generis, that simply produces what it needs. All that Emile Durkheim could do was to interpret with 'truth and reason' the functioning of the organism. The 'truth and reason' for working class
people is perhaps summed up best by Durkheim himself in the following analysis and comparison of workingmen, savages, and ancestors, on the basis of a qualitative inferiority which is attributed to all three.

The workingman, if he is in harmony with his conditions of existence, is and must be closed to the pleasures normal to the man of letters, and it is the same with the savage in relation to civilized man . . . We reason as if all our pleasures could have been theirs (ancestors--EV). Then, thinking of all the refinements of civilization enjoyed by us and which they knew nothing about, we are inclined to pity their lot. We forget they were not qualified to enjoy them. If they were so greatly tormented by the desire to increase the productive power of work, it was not to achieve goods without value to them. To appreciate these goods, they would have had to contract tastes and habits they did not have which is to say, to change their nature.97 (Emphasis added--EV).

It is, thus, no longer a problem that raises questions of class indeed. It is no longer a problem of individuals. It is no longer a problem that raises even the question of justice, beyond the formulation of the question. The Society produces what it needs--fulfilling those needs is justice. When the life of the organism is brought into question, of what significance is an individual or class of individuals? Life is the function of the organism, the life of the organism is the duty of individuals and the natural groupings of men that constitute its individual cells and organs.
CHAPTER III NOTES


3 Ibid., p. 117. Taken from a pamphlet written by Napoleon III.

4 Ibid., p. 118.

5 Ibid., p. 118.


7 Ibid., p. 117. Chapman continues, "Within five years the skeleton of a national system was in operation. The short lines had been amalgamated into six groups. . . . By the end of the fifties, the frontiers had been reached." p. 118.

8 Chapman, Op. Cit., p. 123. To this should be added, "Although some 38 million francs were allotted, of which nearly 40% were given to textiles, the greater part to cotton. Nearly 25% more went to metallurgy, 9% went to mines and 8% to sugar. The loans were not all wise; an attempt was made to keep charcoal mining alive: in spite of its loan, the Decazeville works in Aveyron went bankrupt." p. 123.

9 See Chapman, Op. Cit., pp. 124-133, for a discussion of this. See also footnote 68.

10 Ibid., p. 137.

11 Ibid., p. 134. Chapman gives the following figures on total coal production.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric Tons</th>
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<tr>
<td>1860</td>
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<td>1870</td>
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<td>1880</td>
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<td>8,304,000</td>
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<td>13,330,000</td>
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<td>19,362,000</td>
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It must be noted here that this writer is not for one moment suggesting that French industrial capitalism all of a sudden was without problems. What is being suggested is
that there is concrete evidence to support the contention that 1848 brought with it a fundamental change in the economic base of France, from commerce capitalism to industrial capitalism, which would not greatly affect the fundamental social structure i.e., the creation of the industrial proletariat. For a discussion of the problems faced by French industrial capitalism see, Chapman, Op. Cit., p. 138ff.

12 Chapman, Ibid., p. 326.
18 Baldick, Op. Cit., p. 235, writes, "Divisions had been created between working class and bourgeoisie, between capital and provinces, which have not been closed to this day. After the great siege of 1870-1871, neither Paris nor France could ever be the same again." Guerard, Op. Cit., pp. 202-203, also writes, "Between the bourgeoisie and the working class, there were memories which the years could not deprive of their tragic intensity." Gagnon, Op. Cit., p. 155, continues, "The Social Republic was dead; henceforth the Second Republic and, after 1871, the Third, were to be socially conservative, almost constantly fearful of the workers. The bright romantic and utopian hopes of February lay in ashes; whether the 'Age of Realism' and 'scientific socialism' can neatly be dated from June of 1848 is debatable, but a chasm opened up between French classes which to this day has been rarely bridged, never closed." Wolf, Op. Cit., p. 360, continues the theme, more covertly perhaps, but there nevertheless, "The responsibility for the commune cannot be argued away by an easy rationalization; this horrible fratricidal blood-bath was probably an inevitable result of the industrial and political patterns of nineteenth century France; it was as much an outcome of the forces within French civilization as was any other event of the century." Note: The reader should be made aware that none of the historians listed above see French history strictly in terms of class struggle and that the selections are just that, selections. What is significant is that to a person the bourgeoing class struggle in France is seen to have great, if not paramount, importance. The bias of this
writer is that France in this period, without class analysis is merely the story of personalities and personality conflicts which does not explain in any way why 17,000 communards had to die. Did they die because Thiers and MacMahon were simply bad fellows or rotten diplomats?


21 Ibid., p. 212.


23 Wolf, Op. Cit., pp. 429-431. Note: The section omitted (...) dealt with anti-clericalism and was felt to be only tangential to the argument presented.


27 Ibid., pp. 75-76.

28 Ibid., p. 75.

29 Ibid., p. 28. Guy Aimard, Op. Cit., p. 16, makes a very similar conclusion, "Sa demarche etait en cela analogue a celle de Comte. Ce dernier pensit, lui aussi, que la sociologie devait aboutir a l'eboration des principes d'une philosophie positive et permettre ainsi a las France de sortir de l'etat de desequilibre engendre par la revolution."


*From this point on, after the initial footnote, all of Durkheim's works will simply be footnoted by name.
32. The Rules..., p. 89. Note: Durkheim's more extensive criticism of the theory of happiness is found in Division of Labor, pp. 233ff.

33. The Rules..., p. 90. Note: Durkheim's qualification of this statement should be added here, "Nevertheless we do not mean to say that the impulses, needs and desires of men never intervene actively in social evolution. On the contrary, it is certain that they can hasten or retard its development, according to the circumstances which determine the social phenomena. Apart from the fact that they cannot, in any case, make something out of nothing, their actual intervention, whatever may be its effects, can take place only by means of the efficient causes." pp. 91-92.

34. Rules, p. 116.
36. Ibid., pp. 345-346.
38. Ibid., pp. 116-117.
40. Ibid., p. 339.

41. Ibid., p. 339. Note: The reader might wonder why a more complete explication of the meanings of volume and density is not forthcoming in this discussion. In the judgment of this writer further explanations would only be tangentially related to the major scope of the presentation and further definitions could not further, nor detract from, the argument and have therefore been excluded.

42. Rules, pp. 117-118. The reader should be made aware of the context in which Durkheim makes this statement. He is not at this point arguing for an inherently conservative position. He is arguing against monicausality and in the statement of that argument this writer finds the basis, not the argument itself, for a conservative (natural gear) perspective. See also Rules, p. 120., and D. Of L., p. 337, where Durkheim writes, in part, "From this point of view, civilization appears, not as an end which moves people by its attraction for them, not as a good foreseen and desired in advance, of which they seek to assure themselves the lar-
gest possible part, but as the effect of a cause, as the necessary resultant of a given state. It is not the pole towards which historic development is moving and to which men seek to get nearer in order to be happier or better, for neither happiness nor morality necessarily increases with the intensity of life. They move because they must move, and what determines the speed of this march is the more or less strong pressure which they exercise upon one another, according to their number."

43 If the social milieu (volume and density) is not correct no amount of pleasure seeking, for example, can cause the division of labor to progress. See D. Of L., p. 252.

44 D. Of L., p. 337.

45 Ibid., p. 267. More fully the statement reads, "The law we have just established is quite otherwise. We say, not that the growth and condensation of societies permit, but that they necessitate a greater division of labor." (Emphasis supplied--EV.)

46 This should not be read as attributing to Durkheim some dishonesty in constructing his argument to escape the future. It was in the opinion of this writer, simply a logical necessity of his scientific system and in conjunction with this necessity that he saw for re-establishing moral order.

47 An interesting, if brief, analysis of Durkheim the practicalist is carried out by Harry Alpert, Op. Cit., p. 57. "Durkheim always endeavored to use the beacon of sociological knowledge to cast light upon practical questions. He was not adverse to bringing to the mediate social and political problems of his day the full force of his scientific and philosophical learning. Nor did he in whom the sense of moral duty was so strong ever shirk from his responsibilities and obligations as a citizen.

48 Rules, p. 142.

49 D. Of L., pp. 362-363. The context in which this appears is, as is evident from the selection, the spirit of scientific discovery. Nevertheless, the tone is struck for a very practical doctrine, and the selection is useful to the extent that it demonstrates this basis.

50 Ibid., pp. 142-143.
51 Ibid., p. 146.

52 Ibid., p. 124.

53 Whether or not Durkheim was scientific, while indeed a very important question, can not be answered here because of the great depth of the question raised. This will be a basic but not fatal weakness of the argument. Durkheim will be considered as a dedicated and honest scholar who reached some conclusions about society. To accuse Durkheim of dishonestly striving to reach the conclusions that he did would be an unverifiable accusation which nobody could answer. All that this writer can be concerned with here are the conclusions themselves and not the arguments used to get to those conclusions. It must be further noted that while this writer does not wish to accuse Durkheim of dishonesty, he does, of course, continue to maintain that all of Durkheim's work was tempered by the relationships of the society in which he lived, as is the work done by this writer in this epoch of history. Whether or not Durkheim, or this writer for that matter, are honest or not does not change the basic perspective of the temperament process. If the reader finds this truth is relative position untenable then allow this writer to join him for he certainly does not believe that what he thinks is not true it is simply a matter of not being a god with The Truth, to which all men must bow down.


55 Ibid., pp. 474-475.

56 Ibid., p. 477.

57 Care must be taken not to overstate the case. Durkheim is not being presented as saying there will be no more social change. Obviously that would be ridiculous. The key word is consolidation which in itself obviously means some kind of change. A word with a similarity to consolidation is equilibrium, similar in the sense of a direction, construed to be conservative by this writer, of social change. Durkheim writes, D. of L., p. 341, "Since progress is a consequence of changes in the social milieu, there is no reason for supposing that it must ever end. For it to have a limit, it would be necessary for the milieu to become stationary at some given moment, but such an hypothesis is contrary to most legitimate deductions . . . That is a mechanical law of social equilibrium not less than that which governs the equilibrium of liquids. For it to be otherwise, it would be necessary for all human societies to have the same vital energy and the same density."
The term 'justification process' leans, perhaps prematurely, to conclusions not yet stated. It is used strictly as a tool to suggest the direction of the remainder of the paper, and has no basis in what Durkheim himself might have had to say about the institution of moral order. Durkheim would probably have considered such a term a severe vulgarization of a high level priority.

'Natural' is used here in the specific context of the question which may be rephrased; is the advancement of the division of labor with respect to structural differentiation, sufficiently advanced to a point at which certain particular relationships, e.g., worker/employer relationships, may be termed natural, i.e., functionally consistent with the workings of society as a whole (or as an organism)? Also, simply as a point of information, D. of L., p. 349, "... the social realm is not less natural than the organic realm."

"Moreover, the study of these devious forms will permit us to determine the conditions of existence of the normal state better." This point will become much more clear in the remaining text.
This argument might be broadly expanded by an investigation of Durkheim's relegation of economic factors to secondary status. See D. of L., p. 282. See also, Socialism, p. 193ff.

Elementary Forms, p. 32.

Ibid., p. 492. Note: While Durkheim is writing here about more primitive groups it is the principle of interdependence (social time, social space, etc.) that is important to also understanding organic relationships.


Ibid., p. 354.

Ibid., pp. 2-3.

'Class' is meant here only in the sense in which Durkheim used it i.e., that an organism has structural divisions, that these divisions constitute classifications and in the case of society, that these classifications are composed of natural groups of men which are termed a class. As Durkheim consistently uses the terms working class and middle class it can be safely assumed that these constitute at least two of the classifications in industrial France. It should be noted that Durkheim is not talking about a group that might have a consciousness of itself. He writes, Moral Education (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961) p. 65, "We have seen--and it is altogether evident--that beyond the individual there is only a single psychi entity, one empirically observable moral being to which our will can be linked: this is society." This fits nicely with Durkheim's conception of justice being a natural function of the organism insofar as class divisions in the organic society are only abnormally divisions of conflict (the respective classes simply have not learned their proper places.) Durkheim's denial of class consciousness is important to the extent that class is reduced to something which can not have a class interest--for interest is seen always in terms of the organic whole. It should further be noted that class is not used in a completely economic sense. Durkheim, for example, writes, Journal Sociologique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1969) p. 462, "Dans tout Etat, il existe des groupements, juridiquement constitues en dehors de l'organisation proprement politique: telles sont les castes, les classes, en tant de moins qu'elles ont une base legale et non pas simplement economique, les communes." A more thorough analysis should discuss this legal/economic
differentiation but for the limited purposes here the
economic importance of the class question for industrial
France is clear and evident and is not diminished by not
analysing the legal aspects. At least, economic sociology
remains an important part of the science of the industrial
society. Ibid., p. 462. "On pourrait donc s'attendre a y
trouver les ouvrages relatifs a la famille, et aux corpora-
tions economiques, ces deux sortes de groupes repondant aux
conditions precitees. Mais il nous a paru convenable de
conacrer un chapitre special al la famille a cause de son
importance exceptionelle et d'autre part, de rattacher les
corporations a la sociologie economique, en raison des
rapports etroits qu'elles soutiennent avec la vie industri-
elle et commerciale."

83 D. of L., p. 375.
84 Rules, p. 75.
85 Socialism, p. 200.
86 D. of L., p. 402.
87 Ibid., p. 306.
88 Ibid., p. 306. To this should be added, (Ibid.,
p. 307,) "It is certain that reasons, social, politic, or
even prejudices, have had to contribute to its development
and its strength, but it would be absurd to believe that it
was invented."

89 D. of L., p. 312.
90 Ibid., p. 315.
91 Ibid., p. 308.
92 Ibid., p. 315.
93 Education and Sociology, pp. 116-117,
94 Ibid., p. 94.
95 Ibid., pp. 117-118.
96 Ibid., p. 79.
97 D. of L., p. 240. The section omitted (. . .) reads,
"It is thus with the cultivation of the mind, with still
stronger reason is it so of material luxury. There is, then,
a normal intensity of all our needs, intellectual, moral, as
well as physical, which cannot be exaggerated. At each moment of history, our thirst for science, art, and well-being is defined as our appetites, and all that goes beyond this standard leaves us indifferent or causes us suffering. That is too often forgotten in comparing the happiness of our ancestors with our own."
The Decline of Religious Domination and Feudal Society

Sociology was created in France to morally and intellectually solidify the antagonistic class base engendered in the rise of industrial capitalism. Feudal society had been based upon agricultural production and aristocratic social relations. Capitalism's establishment was based on rising industry and bourgeois social relations. The transition between these two historical situations uprooted established tradition and mores. Old centers of power were unseated while new centers had not yet established their own 'legitimate authority'. The Church's medieval authority went to maintain a rural and agricultural existence and was manifested symbolically (i.e., in the Crown) as well as symbolically (i.e., militarily) in the Bourbon King and his 'landed nobility'. When the symbolic authority of the Crown began to wane, a new, central, cohesive force developed that legitimat ed the urbanizing, industrializing, and class divided society that France was becoming. Sociology was a significant part of that force.

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The King's moral and intellectual strength came through the Church by "Divine Right." This political role made the Church (which was a huge land owner in its own right) the King's natural ally and the source of the dogma which tied all people to "his" authority. The Church also provided the manpower (the priesthood) which disseminated and enforced that dogma. The priesthood's function was to serve God by being the interpretive intermediary between Divine Truth and heathen ignorance and to serve mankind by providing this Truth and interceding on man's behalf with God. The priest was a technician trained in Truth and Wisdom, a scribe merely relating Divine Will as the Universe unfolded according to God's plan. The priest, however, was also a servant of mankind providing a channel through which this Divine Plan could be procured. God (and his plan) was omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient; he was the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost; he was all things to all men; 'the way, the truth, and the life'; the source of sainthood for those who followed and the rack for those who did not. Even though, of course, it was the Pope who, in acting for God, bestowed sainthood and it was the priesthood which, also acting for God, administered the rack. At once distantly abstract and painfully pragmatic, the religious order accounted for the entire spectrum of human thought and action. The medieval world was made logically consistent by the individual's subordination to it.

The logic of domination imposed through the religious
order depended primarily on faith and fear. The truths that the priest passed on to his parishioners were categorical and were to be accepted without question under duress of physical dismemberment, death, social ostracization, and eternal damnation. This domination had the pragmatic consequence of greatly inhibiting systematic observations upon which technical or industrial developments depend.

The weight of the religious metaphysic, that all activity in the universe came from a Divine source, maintained the belief in laymen and medieval scientists (such as there were) alike that effective changes could not be brought about in the natural environment. The relationship, however, between knowledge and the use of knowledge (and, therefore, the transformation to a new understanding of the world dependent upon science and technology) was by the eighteenth century becoming more evident. The increasing population established demand for more foodstuffs as well as the ability to process and distribute food and other essential items. The introduction of new crops, implements, and techniques in agriculture created a demand for ironware horseshoes, plows, and other implements; nails, farm buildings, etc. The resulting "higher level of agricultural incomes led" to a high "increase in the demand for textile products." The new demands helped create new smelting and spinning techniques. The inventions associated with smelting and spinning in turn "led directly to the inventions that made further
large scale expansion possible.\textsuperscript{3}

While it is not necessary to completely subscribe to this simple historical cause/effect model, there is some basis in the argument for, firstly, the intertwined relationship of socio-economic demands to scientific/technological development and secondly, the mutually causative effects of different technological advancements upon each other.

Flinn, for example, describes the interrelated technological growth of apparently unrelated sectors in the late eighteenth century British economy. The steam powered spinning mill had been in use since the early 1770's and the Newcomen steam pump had been used for mine drainage for nearly three-quarters of a century. Flinn points out, however, the adaption in 1781 to Watts rotary motion revolutionized not only the textile and mining industries but the steel industry as well. The rotary engine led to dramatic advancements in blast furnace technology which were combined with Cort's new puddling and rolling processes.

During this same period (1750-1760) canals were planned for transporting raw materials and finished products. Construction began and was accelerated through the 1770's, and reached new peaks in the 1790's.\textsuperscript{4}

The issue can be raised as to what brought about, or brought together, these technological processes. The most simple answer is, as presented above, that demographic factors, such as increased population, made these advancements
necessary. The argument, however, can be shown to be circular because the stated cause (population increases) can readily be seen to be an effect of increased productivity. Obviously, then, understanding technological development cannot rest on simple and general 'iron spur of history' explanations, but must look more specifically at who was using the spurs in driving society into the industrial revolution. The issue that is being raised becomes, who made applied knowledge (technology) a regular pursuit to be systematically developed and why? The answer to these questions should provide some insights into the relationship of "need," or demand, to technological advancements as well as locating and putting parameters on whose needs those advancements were going to satisfy.

Technology, Science, and the Birth of Industrial Capitalism

Invention can be the product of relatively isolated individuals working largely apart from any ongoing concerns with other individuals, groups of individuals, or societies at large. On the other hand, technology, or the use of invention in some productive process is an enterprise of social significance and cannot be accurately viewed in a cultural nor in an economic vacuum. The development and incorporation of new machineries, processes, and techniques of production requires a way in which social decisions of what will and what will not be developed are made. The results
of this decision making process have far reaching social and economic consequences in a broad socio-historical sense as well as in an individual sense. For proof of these consequences one need only point to the often quoted statistics concerning textile production and the effects of the introduction of steam powered looms along with the resultant displacement of the rural people needed to work the looms in late eighteenth century England's sweatshops.

Once the decision has been made concerning what to produce the ability to put that decision into effect must also be considered. This ability rests on not only a will to institute new techniques or install new machineries, but also the capability of mobilizing capital resources—human, material, and financial—towards the realization of that will.

Robin Briggs writes that:

In the nineteenth century science would cooperate with capitalism and the new forms of industrial organization to change the face of the world. There was no absolute reason why this should not have happened earlier: the knowledge existed, but it was not easy to persuade the possessors of capital that they could increase their profits by employing it.6

The capitalists, or entrepreneurs, of the late eighteenth century were either not willing or not able to invest the large fixed sums of capital necessary to develop advanced systems of technological production. They chose, instead, to stay with labor intensive activities simply using more workers to meet increased demand. This mode of expanding
production, however, had serious long term limitations. On a ship building project, for instance, the utility of each additional worker beyond a certain number can be shown to decrease making that worker's efforts less productive than that of his fellows. Carried to its logical extension adding more workers might even prove to be counter-productive once the useful number has reached a saturation point. Furthermore, the large eighteenth century production efforts, such as shipbuilding, depended on easily attainable lumber and shallowly mined ores. As long as another person with another axe or shovel could supply the crucial materials at very low cost there was no need to look for new ways to produce the raw materials or finished goods. The economic and social reality that faced the eighteenth century shipbuilder, in other words, prescribed that he follow the path of least cost as well as following traditional shipbuilding methods. For many years this meant using the capital most readily available to him—human labor and easily attainable raw materials. Demand, however, continued to increase and this, combined with the declining marginal utility of simply adding human laborers, led the organizers of production, the capitalists, to search out other alternatives.  

If the answer to increasing demand could no longer be found solely in additional human labor then it must be found in the productive process itself. As has been suggested, up to the industrial revolution, increased production was
accomplished by increasing the human variable in the productive process while the process itself changed little or not at all. When changing the human variable could no longer bring about adequate changes in production levels the capitalists turned to improving techniques and devising new production methods. Ashton has found that marked increases occurred in the number of patents issued annually in Britain between 1760 and 1802. While the number of patents issued in any one year before 1760 rarely exceeded a dozen this number had risen to 107 in 1802 and was up to 180 by 1824. Flinn points out, however, that these inventions did not come about in a socio-economic vacuum; mere invention without application is meaningless. "There must ... be a readiness to put the techniques promptly and effectively to work. There must, in other words, be entrepreneurs as well as inventors." He also points out that the central role of the organizers of production, the capitalists, has not been given its sufficient historical due:

Because they were imitators rather than inventors, posterity has seldom honoured this class of men; yet for every Arkwright (inventor of the water frame for textile spinning) in the Industrial Revolution there was a hundred such anonymous, busy, tireless, profit-seeking employers.10

The intimate connection, then, between technological development and industrial capitalism's development in the nineteenth century is, as has been argued, an intimate and obvious one. The relationship, however, between "pure"
science and technology and thereby the relationship of science to capitalism still needs to be discussed. This is a very important problem because science, unlike technology, has the high status in past and current thought of being value-free, objective, neutral, detached, etc. It is believed to be, in effect, an understanding of the world unblemished by any practical considerations or day-to-day interferences. This separation of science and technology, while having its roots in pre-Aristotelian thought, was still emphasized in the beginnings of the industrial revolution. The university trained "scientists" strove to maintain a separate "Natural Philosophy" position and their practical contributions to the early industrial revolution were nearly non-existent. Thus, Britain's early strength, concludes Eric Ashby, lay in its amateurs, the self-made men--the craftsman-inventor, the mill owner, the iron-master. "It was no accident," he claims, "that the Crystal Palace, that sparkling symbol of the supremacy of British technology, was designed by an amateur." 11

The English universities played no part while the Scottish universities played only a very small part in the development of British industry. Under the pressure of industrial needs, however, an organized effort did appear in Britain to marry science in the schools to technology in the factories. Utilitarianism became the discipline's watchword
Throughout the polemics and pamphleteering of the 1850's and 1860's one finds scientific education urged upon the schools and universities not because science was now in the mainstream of European thought but because it would improve the efficiency of manufactures.  

The Industrial Exhibitions of 1851 and 1867, furthermore, pointed to the great gains in technology on the continent. These exhibitions demonstrated to the British, who had always depended heavily on local raw materials, and all others alike that "Industry must in future be supported, not by a competition of local advantages, but by a competition of intellects." As that understanding became clearer, science and technology, brought together by the needs of capitalism, became harder and harder to separate. This development has continued to the point today where the only separate status that technology has from science is an occasionally utilised, abstract one. Science is technology except where "values" are unavoidably involved. Magically, the practical construction of the atom bomb is justified as an inevitable "scientific breakthrough." As a part of "Science" the bomb is thus intellectually divorced from its technical construction. This myth notwithstanding, science and technology since the industrial revolution have come to be indistinguishable either among themselves or from the goals of the rulers in the social system in which they have arisen.
Tracing sociology's development in France from Saint Simon's social philosophy through August Comte's encyclopedic machinations on the social order and up to Emile Durkheim's sociological methods is one particular aspect in capitalism's development. This aspect, the birth, growth and development of a control technology, a logic of domination which rationalizes capitalism's existence, replaces the moral/intellectual justification functions once held by the religious order. The religious justifications proved inadequate to contain a rapidly developing technological social order which classified people by their working relationship to the producer as well as the product of that technology, capital.

Capitalist society's new intellectual justification is attributable in great part to capitalism's early banner carriers, the early French sociologists, August Comte and Emile Durkheim. Comte has been appropriately labelled the "Father of Sociology." If this is an accurate title, and there seems little reason to question it, then the immediate intellectual successor to Comte, in effect, his intellectual "son," would have to be Durkheim. But the chronology would not be complete if Comte's early philosophical-social mentor, Saint Simon, were not also included. For, while Saint Simon's writings are, perhaps, more properly labelled social philosophy, the challenge for the development of a system of intel-
lectual domination under the rubric of science definitely came from him. If an analogy may be permitted, Saint Simon can be seen to be the 'holy ghost' of the social order's new logic, a force seldom seen and almost never heard, but a force which came into its own in a powerful way in his intellectual successors. Comte derives his spiritual energy from Saint Simon and systematizes it into a clearly delineated dogma. As an encyclopedic thinker, Comte appears as the 'father' of the new logic, an authoritative and strictly moralistic writer laying the basic theoretical groundwork for the 'son', Durkheim--the practitioner, the methodologist, the builder of the logic, and the practical founder of the church of social science. These three, as well as the tradition that they established, are the major source of intellectual domination far more powerful than the cross, of an intellectual domination far more terrifying in its ability to control than the rack.

Saint Simon

Saint Simon's formulation and expression of his social philosophy stretches from the period prior to the 1789 Revolution, through the Revolution and into the turbulent days that followed. Although his family was rooted in the landed Aristocracy, and his post-revolutionary activities made him one of the largest land speculators in all France, Simon's philosophy is urban, industrial, and capitalist in
both desire and effect. His writings are an impassioned challenge for a new thought system capable of placing a new understanding of the world into the French national psyche. "Nos écrivains," he writes:

ne seront-ils rien autre chose que les échos des derniers philosophes? Serons nous contraints de choisir entre la barbarie et la sottise? Ecrivains du XIXe siècle, a vous seuls appartient de nous oter cette triste alternative.14

Saint Simon's Alternative

As a response to his own challenge to establish a new philosophy, Saint Simon outlines an historical view which takes the form of unabridgable truth. History, he argues, is documenting and understanding the progressive stages that Reason has reached in the human consciousness. This progress is a unilinear development: Reason coming to more and more dominate human imagination, religious thought being imagination and Reason being scientific thought. The basis of the challenge to the writers of his day, then, is found in the vacuum that he saw occurring as religious thought increasingly found itself incapable of maintaining a coherent view of the world in light of scientific discoveries.

God, or the concept of God, Saint Simon grants, was in its time a powerful integrating factor in human intelligence. As an integrating factor it played an important role in developing the conditions necessary for a unified, scienti-
fic understanding of the world. But, he concludes rhetorically:

What is the idea of God without the idea of revelation? A sterile idea. Every scientific discovery has shown up one of the fallacies of the system which claims to be revealed: the idea of God is nothing but the idea of human intelligence universalized.15

"Human intelligence universalized," clearly means molding all human thought into a common, ordered understanding of the world. In medieval France, the concept of God provided a highly structured view of the world, indeed the universe, in every detail, minute and grand. With industry's advent, however, and the technological advancements prompted by industry, religious views began to lose their social efficacy. The organizers of production did not turn to the priests for new systems of agricultural or textile production. The priest's understanding of the world, Saint Simon perceived, was clearly different from the inventor's or the scientist's which produced knowledge utilisable in a very practical industrial sense. The priests produced a utilisable knowledge as the Protestant Ethic reveals, but it did have its limits which held the industrialists back and retarded industrial growth.

As the system of science expanded and replaced dogmatic faith with observable practicality in everyday life, the unifying and integrating functions that religion once played in medieval society became displaced without, however,
being replaced by a new moral force capable of holding the new society together. Not that religion lost its efficacy altogether, but legitimations for kings are not easily transformable into legitimations for capitalists. Rule by "Divine Right" works as long as the central symbol of authority, the Queen or King, holds an accepted, controlling political position in society. This was obviously, however, not the case in France in 1789. While Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette were being deprived of their heads in a very unsymbolic fashion, the unity of France was being deprived of its symbol for central power. It was some years before the bourgeois beheaders' authority was firmly established.

Saint Simon understood explicitly that the bourgeois revolution could not rely on outmoded conceptions and symbols of authority that had their roots in the religious order. The domination of human thought and human action, he believed, not only had to come from within the capitalist system itself, but also had to firmly establish capitalism's moral basis.

The philosophy of history that he presents places the culmination of Reason in the "idea of industry." Also, he designates as the practical caretaker of Reason the bourgeois captains of industry whom he describes as "in the most real sense the flower of French society." "La direction du pouvoir temporel," he categorically recommends, "doit être confiée aux cultivateurs, aux fabricants, aux négociants et
aux banquiers les plus importants.  

Even the 'most important' capitalists, however, cannot bring about the new social order by themselves. For the most important elements of the bourgeoisie to control temporal affairs they require a spiritual authority providing intellectual substance and continuity to their claims for legitimacy. To insure this legitimacy, Saint Simon foresees the need to establish an intellectual/spiritual organ based on the disciplines of art and science. Together these two disciplines can satisfy the requirements of Reason (science) while at the same time making that truth palatable to those who have to live with or under it. Thus, "Scientific opinions," he writes, should "be clothed in forms which make them sacred, in order that they can be taught to the children of all classes and the illiterate, whatever their age." 

Saint Simon saw the intellectual vacuum extending far beyond children and illiterates. The problem of individual subordination to a given social understanding, in this case the capitalist understanding, was a problem which touched the very glue holding France together in the transition from a feudal, religion dominated, to a capitalist, science dominated, society. Promoting and facilitating this transition is to be the task of all intellectual effort.

Scientists and artists examine with the eye of genius the present condition of the human mind. You will perceive that the sceptre of public opinion is in your hands; seize it, therefore, boldly. You hold the power to bring happiness
Again the challenge. This time, however, the challenge is not to formulate, but to disseminate the new philosophy— the philosophy of science manifested in the capitalist social system. In England, Saint Simon effuses, scientists are more highly regarded than kings, the result being that the peasants and workers eat meat every day. But in Russia where science is seen to be of little value "the peasants are as ignorant as their horses . . . and are badly fed, badly clothed, and are soundly beaten with sticks." In other words, scientific enlightenment and industry are together the key to happiness for workers and peasants. Because the captains of industry are (with the help of their intellectual emissaries) the caretakers of the Age of Reason the fulfillment of their will should be the aspiration of all others. "Remember," Saint Simon admonishes the workers and peasants, "that the property owners, though inferior in numbers, are more enlightened than yourselves, and that, in the general interest, domination should be proportionate to enlightenment." 

August Comte

August Comte was for some time Saint Simon's secretary and 'adopted son'. Comte's social-science-philosophy does not differ in any significant aspect with Saint Simon's.
Nearly every central idea presented by Comte can be found, at least in embryo form, in Saint Simon's writings. Yet, it is Comte who claims the title of 'father of sociology'. One reason why this is so is related to presentation rather than content. Comte presents an encyclopedic, integrated philosophy of social science incorporating Saint Simon's somewhat disjointed thoughts into one comprehensive whole. In Comte there is a discernable system of thought and presentation, a conscious effort to integrate and synthesize, that is absent in Saint Simon. Comte's presentation sophisticated the particular parts of the general philosophy into a tight knit analysis. Each part supports the entire argument by being intimately tied to each of the other parts and, therefore, to the whole.

The Positive Philosophy: Order

Comte, like Saint Simon, ties his social philosophy closely to "historical" analysis. For both, history is the study of human society's increasing domination by Reason at the expense of the traditional domination by religion. Out of this view, both saw in the newly established capitalist society, in which they were willing participants, a need for a spiritual force to fill the vacuum created by the diminishing force of religion. To fill this vacuum, Comte declares the objective of his positive philosophy: "The object of our positive philosophy is to direct the spiritual reorgan-
Human society's level of civilization is reflected in two mutually developing factors, industry and the unity of human thought based upon science: Industry is rooted in the practical, day to day existence of society while unity is a spiritual, a continuity producing and integrating factor. This practical/spiritual division of social power is referred to by Comte as a spiritual/temporal dichotomy of authority. This dichotomy of authority is the absolute center of Comte's work. The rest of his work revolves around it. His work loses most of its importance if the intellectual's spiritual function as the new source of religious strength for capitalism is removed.

"All systematic study of human Progress," he unequivocally states, "must then consist in the development of its one law--Man is ever becoming more religious." By 'religious', of course, he does not mean in the God fearing sense, but in the functional sense of controlling human thought and, thereby, controlling human action. Above all else, the religion of science--Positivism--"must govern directly the active powers of Man, powers which neither Fetishism, nor even Polytheism, nor least of all Monotheism, could adequately control." Control through science is basic to understanding Comte. The assumption of his science--that all things in the world, including humans, exist and act in accordance with natural laws of Order--precludes the contention that
human beings are unique from any other thing in the world.

That Comte insists on capitalizing Order is not insignificant. In his system, it is human beings that are insignificant. There is an Order in the world and human happiness, as well as "the true path of human progress," lies in totally subverting internal intellectual, moral and practical powers for external motives for these operations.26 "What we have to do is to dispose our life as to submit to these resistless fatalities in the best way we can."27

The only difference between metaphysical religion and the religion of science, according to Comte's own analysis, can now be seen to be the assertion that one is 'true' and the other is not. Functionally, they are exactly the same. Both conceptions demand total human subservience to a given understanding of the world's Order. For Comte, this given understanding is intimately and unabashedly tied to capitalism and capitalism's growing need to control the working classes.

The scientists (positivists) constitute "the true priesthood"28 and, therefore, represent the spiritual authority. The industrial capitalist, argues Comte, is "necessarily the possessor of material power."29 (Emphasis added.) At this point in history (c. 1848) French industry was still in its infant stage and to speak of the capitalist's counterpart, the industrial working class, is, as Guy Chapman writes, "a misnomer."30 Comte demonstrates a degree of historical
insight, however, when he somewhat prophetically writes, "The organisation of modern industry has not been found practicable as yet; but the germ of such organisation lies unquestionably in the division between capitalist and workman." 31

As in an army, he argues, industry must have its captains and its foot soldiers, or as in a body, it must have its head and its feet. Though these parts are not interchangeable they are functionally interdependent. The worker needs the capitalist to centralize capital and organize production and the capitalist needs the worker to implement production. Clearly, the capitalist captain is to be in a control position and it is the worker foot soldiers who are to be controlled.

Workers are to become a part of the spiritual organ of society, forming an alliance with the positive philosophers. The spiritual organ is to serve as a counterweight to the capitalist's motives. This counterweight, which is strictly moral in character, he calls public opinion. The central role that the workers are to play in checking the vast power of the capitalists is impressive. They are most suitable for this spiritual role because they, unlike the capitalists, are unfettered by concerns for "material prospects." 32 Indeed, should they develop an unwise concern for either political or material gains their qualification for being a part of the spiritual organ would be discredited. 33
Comte, however, is very careful to stress that their function is "moral not political" and as an exclusively moral force will be the "most solid guarantee" of "the established order of things." This argument is, obviously, of critical importance, taking on even greater emphasis when how the spiritual organ operates is considered. The spiritual organ provides that the workers are to be merely "auxiliaries of the new spiritual power" taking their clues from the truths provided by the positivists. The worker's role merely involves "the responsibility of carrying out instructions." 

Carried into practice, the positive philosophy is, indeed, a 'most solid guarantee' for the continued existence of capitalism. The system of positive education which is essential for putting the philosophy into practice further reflects the practical commitment of Comte's positive social science to capitalism's maintenance as the proper system of social order. Education, he predictably concludes, must fulfill two goals: It must, in its early stages, establish the child's "moral development, which is always the first consideration;" after the first is accomplished it provides the proper temperament for the second stage of education, industrial apprenticeship.
The positivist motto: "The principle Love, the Basis Order, the End Progress" is reducible to one term—Order. This motto, in intent and effect, calls for the spiritual solidification of capitalism. It is logical and understandable that Comte, in his statement of social responsibilities, has difficulty distinguishing between women and workers. They both lack the ability to approach thought in a logical manner, and, consequently, they share the propensity to an affective nature. Both these characteristics make their subordination to their logical overlords natural and, more importantly, understandable. Their subordination to the 'established order of things' gives them the role of emissaries of Love and social affection which assures social Order. And Progress? Progress is Love and Order put together, Progress is "nothing more than the gradual development of Order."\(^{39}\)

The philosophy and science of social order which Comte firmly commits to capitalism establishes with him its first and most important principle—all things, including 'Progress', must go the effect of maintaining the 'established order of things', i.e., capitalism.
Comte provides the raison d'etre for capitalist science/technology, but Durkheim provides the technology for control. For Comte, science is truth and his work strives to philosophically affirm science's truth over the previous form of truth, religion. He establishes, in effect, the scientific cosmology which imposes not only the manner of thought, but the presuppositions limiting the nature of thought. His work, however, is philosophical in a very traditional sense due to its general, all-encompassing nature. Its ability to dominate human thought rests primarily in its broad statement and lacks any methodological approach for dealing with changing social situations.

Durkheim recognized this shortcoming and was determined to establish techniques whereby social science could begin to take on the practical aspects of understanding and control that could be evidenced in the developing natural sciences. His contribution to social science is his replacement of brightly garbed Saint Simonian and Comtean proselytizers with white coated, 'value free', practical, scientists. The 'truth' that he represents is the same in all its essentials as his forebearers. His presentation of this 'truth', however, is far more sophisticated in its embellishment of capitalism's status-quo as the goal of a scientific understanding of the world.
Saint Simon and Comte are interested in the broad sweep of human history as well as history's culmination in the establishment of industrial capitalism. In their explanation of this, each looks to either a natural law (Newton's law of gravity in Saint Simon) or to the composition of human nature (as in Comte). Durkheim criticizes these explanations by arguing that they fail to recognize the very important development of society as an historical force sui-generis. The observable history of society, he writes, points to particular, verifiable 'causes' of social development. These causes are subsumed under the category, the Division of Labor. Society's historical development, the argument goes, is the observable development of the increasingly complex division of labor.

The division of labor brings with it increased interdependency among human beings which in turn demands control of the several divisions so that the dependency requirements are regularly fulfilled. As the division of labor increases, interdependency increases and, therefore, control must also increase. Thus, the embodiment of the division of labor, society, begins to demonstrate certain characteristics which transcend the particular parts which compose it. In a very literal sense, society takes on a life of its own, it becomes an organism with social tissues, cells, and organs.
which go to the maintenance of the organism as a whole. The functional subservience of the part for the good of the whole means, again literally, that the "organism is spiritualized."  

Several important issues are raised in this literal treatment of society as an organism. First, the appearance of the analysis as philosophy is removed. No longer is it tied to 'ultimate' or even 'first causes', it is content to merely describe with "truth and reason" what observably happens. Durkheim and all social science is forthwith freed from the necessity of philosophical theories of history which point to inevitable historical development. His science transcends both philosophy and history; it is truth separated from former human conceptions of truth; it is unbridled and open at any point to revision; its only purpose is to "describe or interpret" and not to reform. This is a very powerful and convincing commitment as it apparently has no presuppositions which rest on any factors, but the truth. Once sociology is properly established, Durkheim vows, it "will be neither individualistic, communistic, nor socialistic." It is important to note, however, that he does not say that it will not be capitalistic; his 'true' theoretical disposition required that it would be.

The Spiritualization of Society: Capitalist Society

Durkheim might have freed himself from history, but history was not at the same moment freed from him. While he
is concerned with only the immediate, efficient causes and not the ultimate historical causes of social arrangements, his raising society to the status of a spiritual organism is a channel of constraint no less confining than any absolute philosophy. The constraint is explicit and, contrary to his theoretical pronouncements, is unrevisable. Durkheim's sociology and all traditional sociology that followed him is unequivocally tied to the practical problem of maintaining 'society's' moral equilibrium and, thereby, capitalism's day-to-day status-quo.

Durkheim's purpose is to "create a sociology which sees in the spirit of discipline the essential condition of all common life." Discipline, however, is essential only because it assures society's regular functioning and the social organism's continued existence in its given state is a precluded value assumption. Society does not have to be determined by a philosophically set pattern of historical development to take on the attribute of being human society's 'natural condition'. French capitalist society is, there can be little doubt, for Durkheim, such a 'natural condition' of human existence and as such a condition to be regularly 'reaffirmed and upheld'. Capitalism's status-quo is presented by Durkheim as the natural human condition; people living their lives subverted to the needs of the social organism.
The sophistication of Durkheim's thought over Comte's is highly significant. Durkheim is no longer arguing for a philosophy, for an ism. He is not arguing for capitalism, just as he would not argue for socialism, or even positivism. These are practical social doctrines beyond the purview of the objective, detached scientist. He is merely relating that French society is an organism and as such has a continuing life which transcends the lives of the cells (human beings) which constitute its existence. The fact that it is a capitalist society in which some cells make profit from other cells' labors counts for nothing. The statement is made as a fait accompli that the duties which an individual sees for himself, "are in reality, duties toward society."45

Implications of Society as an Organism

The ism which Durkheim thus establishes is the organism he calls society. He need never mention the term capitalism just as he need never mention the term exploitation. To say that French society should be capitalistic is unnecessary. By virtue of its being an organism with its own life, philosophical contingencies such as should or should not are practically meaningless. Capitalism and society are the same thing and to use the term capitalistic society is to be merely redundant. The relationships of the people within the complex capitalist division of labor, and indeed the people themselves, are important only to the extent
that they work for society's structural maintenance as a whole.

Terms which carry implications of social injustice such as exploitation have no meaning when the *sine qua non* for justice is held to be that very society's continued existence. In Durkheim's organic light, justice, with human accountability, is overshadowed by function and social responsibility and points to clear implications for the "conflict between labor and capital."46

**Control: Science as Religion**

Durkheim carefully points out that "the incessantly recurrent conflicts, and the multifarious disorders of which the economic world exhibits so sad a spectacle . . . are now of the first importance.‖47 (Emphasis supplied.) To resolve the conflicts and firmly establish social order, the source of these conflicts must, Durkheim argues, first be understood. He outlines his position precisely.

It is not fundamentally economic conditions or worker/capitalist conflicts which cause social disorder. These economic distinctions represent organic divisions reflected in functions and are, therefore, natural divisions of the organism. What is critically important is the acceptance of these divisions. "What dominates is not the state of our economy but, much more, the state of our morality."48 In practical terms this translates into the methodological *raison d'etre*
of social science. "What is needed if social order is to reign," he argues, "is that the mass of men be content with their lot. But what is needed for them to be content, is not that they have more or less, but that they be convinced that they have no right to more."49 (Emphasis supplied.)

The task of morally convincing the masses is, naturally, left to the scientists whose thoughts can now be seen to be only "a more perfect form of religious thought. Thus it seems natural that . . . (religion) should progressively retire before . . . (science) as this becomes better fitted to perform the task."50 The logic of scientific control and domination is now completed and the implications for working class people are made clear:

The workingman, if he is in harmony with his conditions of existence, is and must be closed to the pleasures normal to the man of letters, and it is the same with the savage in relation to civilized man.51 (Emphasis supplied.)

The object of Durkheim's sociology is obviously to channel and constrain not to expand horizons. The organic metaphysic that this constraint embodies requires that all "problems" (including the 'problem of prime importance', the conflict between workers and capitalists) be defined in functional terms. All advantage, however one cares to define it, is attributed to society's organic structure. Society is, therefore, the sine qua non for all that is good and its existence cannot be called into question by the 'pathological' adjustment problems of any one particular part.
Durkheim’s social science thus plays exactly the same functional role between ruler and ruled in capitalist society that the priesthood played in medieval society. The task of interpreting God's divine plan and passing this interpretation on to the ignorant masses has been transformed only slightly into the "scientific" interpretation and distribution of "Society" as a living, spiritualized organism. In their roles as interpretive intermediaries both the priests and scientists provide the "legitimate" social definitions of reality for their respective class divided societies. In the former case, the king and landed nobility ruled because God so ordained it. In the latter case, the bourgeoisie ruled because the scientists said that science so ordained it.

In transforming the productive base from an agricultural and rural existence, with the mass of human beings working for the nobility, to an industrial and urban existence, with the mass of people working for the capitalists, there was an accompanying movement of society's power center. This transference of power called into question all the established symbols of legitimate authority. Capitalism had to go to its strength in men like Durkheim who could "scientifically" verify the existent structure's naturalness. The differences in the specifics between the priests and the scientists (God or Society) are overshadowed by their common function as systematizers and rationalizers of the given social order--it is merely the status-quo of a different social order that has to
be preserved.

Capitalism and the Status-quo-icians

Harmony, status-quo, equilibrium, solidarity, integration; these are synonomous terms justifying the domination of human beings by the social system in which they live. With their acceptance as presupposed categories of social analysis, distinctions between even clearly different groups of people become confused and blurred. The religion of social science subverts human need by defining all things in terms of social needs. Durkheim's social scientific thought cannot broach the idea that there is a definite, observable social relationship between some people amassing great wealth and luxury while others live in abject poverty. Nor can he deal with the issue that this exploitative relationship is related to the fact that those with the great wealth own the productive facilities to whom all others must come to make a livelihood.

Durkheim's science makes all that is "human," whatever in its variety that term might mean, subject to the interpretation of the status-quo-icians of capitalist society. The tradition of sociology is established as merely a 'more perfect form of religious thought'. Its task is to morally solidify capitalism. Justice, truth, reason, etc., become inextricably entangled in the web of capitalist social relations while appearing to maintain a humanly transcendent position. They become a form of "newspeak," "objectively"
derived, but inseparable from their social utility. They
cannot stand apart from capitalism nor in opposition to it
for they are defined in terms of its continued existence, yet
their proponents claim neutrality. The social organism is
scientifically spiritualized and with its spiritualization
the practical subservience of working people is established
beyond scientific question.

Of course, the "newspeak" is not without its reality.
Death in the mines and boredom on the production lines is
life and vitality for capitalism. To strive for peace does
in fact mean to strive for greater power to annihilate. Af­
fection or love is Order ("everything is beautiful in its own
way"), Order is Progress (the Brazilian dictatorship's nation­
al mott is "Ordem e Progresso"), and science, the understand­
ing of this Order, is unaccountable to the mass of men as well
as the mass of women. It is meant to dominate, not to serve
them. Following in this scientific tradition means becoming
a part of it all, learning the language, so to speak, so that
the entrance ways and exits of the halls of learning and truth
are made totally clear and understandable.

The 'truth' in Saint Simon's, Comte's, and Durkheim's
social science is inseparable from moral/intellectual domin­
ation and control. The only difference between the three is
the difference in the level of sophistication in control tech­
niques found in their otherwise similar arguments. Saint
Simon's crude letter to the working classes urging for their
own good to be dominated by the property owners is developed by Comte into a highly structured direct moral domination by his positive priesthood. The tradition culminates with Durkheim et. al. in the entire "scientific" transformation of human need and aspiration into social function and organic solidarity. The tradition thus provides a practical understanding to explain all basic societal or individual conflicts out of existence and, thereby, to regularly 'reaffirm and uphold' the status-quo. The philosophers and statisticians who created sociology were, and those who follow them are, by their own scientific definitions, the status-quo-icians of capitalism.
CONCLUSION NOTES


2 The reader should not take this as advocating an 'iron spur of history' argument. It is in reference to a particular period of human history and is not universalized beyond that particular period.

3 This is Bairoch's argument as presented by M. W. Flinn, Origins of the Industrial Revolution, (London: Longman Ltd., 1966) p. 78.

4 Flinn, op. cit., p. 15.

5 For example, uses human effort beyond the inventor's effort, or uses materials thus denying either the human effort or the materials the use of other human beings.

6 Briggs, op. cit., p. 88.

7 This is not a treatise explaining in great detail this period of human history. It is a general line of investigation and is meant only to present the most important stresses on the structure of society.

8 Reference in Flinn, op. cit., pp. 70-71.

9 Ibid., p. 70.

10 Ibid., p. 80.


12 Ibid., p. 31.

13 Ibid., p. 54. Lord Lyon Playfair, one of the organizers of the 1851 Exhibition, quoted.

14 Markham, op. cit., pp. 26-27.

15 Ibid., p. 19.

16 Ibid., p. 69.
17 Ibid., p. 72.
18 Ibid., p. 2.
19 Ibid., p. 20.
20 Ibid., p. 2.
21 Ibid., p. 6.
22 Ibid., p. 8.
27 Ibid.
30 Chapman, op. cit., p. 326.
32 Ibid., p. 102.
33 See Ibid., p. 103.
34 Ibid., p. 120.
35 Ibid.
38 Ibid., p. 138.
41 Ibid., p. 124.
42 Rules, op. cit., p. 142.
The remainder of this sentence reads, "while at the same time founding it on truth and reason." The exclusion of this last part should not be taken with dubious motive. Obviously, from what has already been said all that Durkheim said he believed to be based on truth and reason. The point is that it is his truth and his reason.

43 Ibid.
44 The remainder of this sentence reads, "while at the same time founding it on truth and reason." The exclusion of this last part should not be taken with dubious motive. Obviously, from what has already been said all that Durkheim said he believed to be based on truth and reason. The point is that it is his truth and his reason.

45 *El. Forms*, op. cit., p. 399.
46 *D. of L.*, p. 354.
47 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
48 *Soc. and S. Simon*, op. cit., p. 204.
49 Ibid., p. 200.
50 *El. Forms*, p. 477.
51 *D. of L.*, p. 240.
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