CANADIAN "CHIVALRY" IN VIETNAM:

THE PRESS COVERAGE

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CANADIAN "CHIVALRY" IN VIETNAM:
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ABSTRACT

This research examined newspaper coverage of Canada's political, economic, and social involvement in the war in Vietnam from 1954 to 1973. The research questioned whether the reporting followed the claims of the propaganda or the ideological process model. Were the news reports a form of propaganda with the media acting as instruments of the dominant elite by reproducing the views and opinions of prominent political officials? Or did the news coverage include debate, variety, and revision--characterizing the contestation of an ideological process as predicted by hegemony theory?

Both content and semiotic structural analysis were used to examine the press reports. Content analysis was used to provide a detailed summary of the overt characteristics of the data. Semiotic structural analysis examined changes in thematic content as well as the construction and maintenance of a preferred perspective.

The findings indicate that news coverage of Canadian participation in Vietnam closely mirrored dominant political views, as predicted by the propaganda model. The media reproduced a narrow, limited version of events when politicians maintained a conservative, Cold War consensus. But during such periods when political debate was characterized by an ideological openness, news coverage directly mirrored a wider
variety of themes and sources in a more open format.

Furthermore, newspaper coverage of Canada's involvement in the war in Vietnam favored a 'chivalry metaphor'. News reports tended to reflect the idealistic romanticism of this metaphor. In contradiction to other, more realistic perspectives on events, notions of charity and honour were firmly established in early news articles. This viewpoint persisted throughout the war and was only reviewed when the Pentagon Papers provided an alternative and authoritative source of information. Then Canada was portrayed as a submissive errand boy rather than a gallant knight.

In summary, the propaganda model partially accounted for the characteristics of the data. The news articles examined were usually reproductions of state policy. Government perceptions of events did overwhelmingly determine the perspective favored in the news reports. Yet, there was a marginal voice of criticism and debate that gained some prominence as the Vietnam War ended. Nevertheless, Canadian newspapers were generally faithful servants of the state.
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INTRODUCTION

The Vietnam War is commonly remembered only as an American military failure. Yet, as argued in Taylor’s *Snow Job* and Levant’s *Quiet Complicity*, Canada played an important role in the war and has been accused of failing in its diplomatic involvement (Taylor, 1974; Levant, 1986). Canadian diplomats and soldiers were part of an international commission that was to regulate the armistice of 1954 and bring democracy to South Vietnam.

When Canada accepted its first peacekeeping role on the International Control Commission (ICC), along with India and Poland, newspaper headlines presented our country as a chivalrous adjudicator\(^1\). But as the war continued that coverage changed dramatically. A cursory review of later headlines, and the use of such provocative words as ‘patsy’ and ‘duped’, suggested a contentious approach on the part of the media. Similar to accusations levelled at the *New York Times*, Canadian newspapers appeared to have assumed an ‘obstreperous’ stance toward ICC activity in Vietnam.

In debating the relationship between accounts of

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\(^1\) Historical summary of the ICC presented in Chapter I, Section II and Appendix II.
political events and the news production process, critical social-scientific theories have shifted considerably throughout the history of the study of the newspaper as an ideological institution. Traditionally, critical media analysts conceptualized both news and official versions of political events as closed forms of propaganda (Marx, 1976; Miliband, 1969; Mills, 1967a). Within this approach, 'closure' is a term indicating the precision with which the media mirror and reproduce dominant political worldviews. Closure is thus a measure of faithfulness to the perspective of the dominant social class. And although closure is generally defined as the pressure to "make sense" of phenomena "in a particular way", this concept is expanded to imply class alignment when describing ideology (O'Sullivan et al., 1983:35).

Even contemporary scholars reiterate this perception of the propaganda model, especially when applied to news about political participation in military events (Herman and Chomsky, 1988). It should be emphasized that closure is not complete within this model: some semblance of debate is necessary, if only to project a democratic image of the press.

In contrast to the propaganda model of the media, hegemony theories conceptualize ideology as a contested terrain characterized by a struggle for specific perspectives to maintain dominance and a constant effort to sustain consensus. Proponents of hegemony theory and the ideological
process model—Neo-Marxists, structuralists, and semiotic analysts—advocate moderation in conceptions of ideological closure (Hall, 1977; Knight and Taylor, 1986; Elliott et al., 1986). These researchers focus on the semiotic analysis of discourse within printed texts. They define discourse as the selection of signs, symbols, and words in order to manipulate and control specific ideas and perspectives or versions of events.

One sharp distinction between this approach and the classical propaganda theory centers on the claim that ideology is not simply the manifest reproduction of dominant worldviews (Fowler, 1991; Therborn, 1980). According to this approach, ideology operates at a much deeper level (Fiske, 1987). Following these claims, this research explored both the overt practices involved in reproducing dominant belief systems and the subtle—even subconscious—promotion of ruling class ideas as evidenced in Canadian newspaper coverage of Canada's involvement in the war in Vietnam.

Semiotic structuralists, as described above, stress process as a feature of ideology. They claim that through the deconstruction of discourse it is possible to identify the hegemonic nature of the ideological process and the constant negotiation of collective meanings (Coward and Ellis, 1977). This process of meaning negotiation consists of the absorption or marginalization of less prominent critical and alternative perspectives by the dominant viewpoints. Neo-Marxist revisions
of ideology have therefore combined with semiotic structuralism to postulate a theory of news as a more fluid and ever-shifting ideological process (Sumner, 1979; Hall, 1977).

In essence, the crucial debate within critical theories of the media centers on the question of whether news content tends toward more 'closure' and the exclusion of conflicting views or more 'openness' with the inclusion of diverse perspectives. In this research, that debate was re-examined using the example of media coverage of Canada in Vietnam. Did the news coverage on Canadian participation in the War overwhelmingly represent a closed reproduction of state versions of events, following the claims of the propaganda model? Did a particular perspective permeate the reporting process? Or was there evidence of openness in the articles, reflecting the range of viewpoints predicted by the ideological process model?

I. THE RESEARCH TOPIC

News reporting about Canada in Vietnam provided an excellent research topic for several reasons. First, there are commonly held perceptions that during the sixties the North American press was 'unfettered'—that the press was not subjected to the usual military censorship. While these accusations of an "uncensored" media were levelled at American and not Canadian newspapers and broadcasters, they
nevertheless recommended a review of the nature of Canadian reports on the war.

During the Vietnam War the American media were perceived as exercising extensive freedom; the American press was described as "ubiquitous, cantankerous, and obstreperous", especially after publication of the Pentagon Papers (Salisbury, 1980; Braestrup, 1977; Harris, 1983). This was a time when the media, and certainly the press, were hypothesized to be acting as autonomous, uncensored agents of protest.

Attesting to presumptions of a free press, Vietnam was called the "uncensored war" (Hallin, 1986). During this war it was assumed that "the relations between the media and the government...was one of conflict" (Ibid.:3). Since the war was conceptualized as uncensored, the media were assumed to have "had extraordinary freedom to report the war in Vietnam without direct government control" (Ibid.:6).

These assumptions of an uncensored media were so pervasive that American journalists were accused of contributing to their country's defeat in Vietnam. For example, Stanley Karnow's account of the war reported Henry Kissinger as denouncing "American television networks and newspapers for alleged distortions that supposedly turned the people against the war" (1983:16). And in Photographs That Changed the World, Marshall McLuhan made these claims most directly when he wrote, "The war in Vietnam was lost in the
living rooms of the nation" (Monk, 1989:44).

Notions of media autonomy have been modified in recent research (Groen, 1988; Kellner, 1990; and Hallin, 1986). Contrary to popular beliefs, studies of the role of the American media and their coverage of Vietnam have subsequently found that journalists censored their own work through self-imposed ideological and institutional restraints. While these studies centered on the American media, probable parallels in journalistic practices suggest that the Canadian press exercised a similar stance.

A second reason for selecting the topic for this research was that public protest against the War was high in both the United States (USA) and Canada. This level of public reaction suggested the possibility of a wide range of viewpoints in the news coverage. The range of debates could reasonably be anticipated to include both official, critical, and alternative versions of events.

Canadian participation in the War became a controversial topic politically and publicly. The Vietnam War era was a time when the Canadian state was dramatically unsettled by events of the October Crisis in 1970 and the subsequent invocation of the War Measures Act. The war years were also a time when the public strongly voiced its criticism of Canadian foreign affairs policy. Public protest in Canada, similar to the USA, reached its zenith during the late sixties (Moffat, Undated; Zaroulis and Sullivan, 1984). Hence, the
reproduction of public opinion could reliably be anticipated in news reports.

Thirdly, the study of news coverage on this topic had merit because in-depth secondary analysis of Canadian External Affairs policy provided a strong point of reference. Secondary sources now provide detailed analysis of the government’s position and records of behind-the-scenes events (Eayres, 1983; Ross, 1984; Thakur, 1984). Furthermore, two intriguing books have questioned the role of the Canadian press during the War (Levant, 1986; Taylor, 1974). By using these secondary sources, comparisons could be made between news reports and the range of positions held by Canada’s politicians. In essence, a literature review of secondary sources on the politics of this issue was used as the "referent" to assess ‘what was really happening’ (Baudrillard, 1975).

Finally, the analysis of newspaper reporting on Canadian participation in Vietnam provides an opportunity to examine the existence of Cold War ideology. Political scientists, media analysts, and sociologists have theorized that Cold War ideology has dominated international politics and the news reproduction process for the last fifty years (Chomsky, 1986; Galbraith, 1969; Halliday, 1986; McNair, 1988; Thompson, 1982). East-West tensions, the arms race, and the legitimacy of military solutions to international problems have been proposed as the prime ingredients of this dominant
political perspective.

II. CANADA IN VIETNAM

Canada became part of the political and military turmoil of Indo-China in July, 1954 through the Geneva Agreements. That summer, Canada, along with India and Poland, had been selected for membership on the International Control Commission (ICC) proposed by the countries meeting in Geneva, Switzerland. The Geneva Agreement declared that "the sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity" of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were to be supervised by three international commissions--an ICC unit for each country (Bridle, 1973:7).

Each ICC unit was to consist of an inspection team with bureaucratic facilities to oversee the tasks assigned. These tasks included supervision of elections in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. But before monitoring the elections, the ICC was to supervise the migration options, since it was anticipated that sections of the population in either North and South Vietnam might elect to migrate for religious, economic or political reasons.

The release of prisoners of war and civilian internees (from the preceding war between the French and the Vietnamese nationalists) was yet another task for the ICC. The commission was to supervise the withdrawal of French troops, settle disputes, and process petitions which arose during the
withdrawal. As well, supervision of military withdrawal involved the allocation of military and civilian supplies and equipment.

Canada’s participation in the war in Vietnam was not, however, restricted to the ICC involvement. Throughout the War, Canadian arms producers sold huge stocks of military equipment either as units or as parts of American equipment. In *Making A Killing*, Regehr claimed that "sales reached an all-time high of 441.2 million dollars in 1967 when United States purchases of war materials . . . . were at their frenzied peak . . . ." (1975:3). The Canadian public questioned the morality of profiting from the war in Vietnam (Ibid.).

While participation on the ICC and the arms trade constituted indirect involvement, some Canadians also participated directly in the conflict. Canadians fought in Vietnam by enlisting with the American armed forces. It is now estimated that 40,000 Canadians fought in the war alongside their American counterparts (*Star*, 7/25/89:B1)².

Therefore, although the Vietnam War is predominantly associated with the United States, Canada also participated in important ways. That involvement included Canada’s roles as a member of the ICC; as a supplier of goods and services; and,

²A more recent publication, *Unknown Warriors* by Gaffen, challenges this figure and claims that only between 6,000 to 12,000 Canadians participated in the war as members of American military forces (1990:36).
through the Canadian peace movement, as protestors and resolute critics of External Affairs' policy concerning Vietnam.

III. MEDIA COVERAGE

How did the Canadian media cover Canada's participation in the war? Secondary sources on this topic claim that coverage was inadequate. These sources avow that Canada was secretly co-opted by the USA and that the Canadian public was duped into supporting American military intervention in Vietnam's War (Taylor, 1974; Levant, 1986). Implicit in the titles alone--Snow Job and Quiet Complicity--are accusations of deception, disinformation and political propaganda. Taylor claimed that Canadian society as a whole had been quietly 'snowed under' by disinformation from American diplomats and military leaders. In a similar vein, Levant felt that Canadian participants on the ICC and Canada's public had been 'quietly coopted into complicity' with the USA and that the media had played an important role by underreporting the issues to the public.

In Snow Job, Taylor implied the operation of the propaganda model when he suggested, "If the Americans did a snow job on the Canadian leaders, the Canadian leaders did an even bigger snow job on the Canadian people" (1974:vii). Although Taylor did not explicitly identify how that 'snow job' was carried out, the media could be identified
collectively as one likely agency. Taylor claimed that "the average newspaper reader" was merely able to "surmise" the decisions of Canadian diplomats "without knowing very much" (Ibid.:146). He accused the newspapers of inadequate coverage and attributed that inadequacy to the Official Secrets Act, which he claimed was able to "muzzle the (sort of) informed criticism of newspapers, opposition MPs, academics and other concerned private individuals" (Ibid.:191).

In contradiction to his assertions that newspapers were 'muzzled', Taylor identified occasions when news workers did evade censorship. He conceded that the media did engage in some investigative journalism when they exposed members of the ICC:

> According to charges by Canadian journalists, some Canadian officers functioned as spies, passing on first-hand observations of North Vietnam, including assessments of the US bombing (Ibid.:18).

In other words, there were occasions when journalists did play an important part in opening the discourse on events in Vietnam by providing their own information about events or information, going significantly beyond the gamut of official versions of events.

Secrecy was nonetheless a key concept in Victor Levant’s description of news coverage of Canadian involvement in the war. In Quiet Complicity, Levant used the adjective 'hidden' to describe political agreements between the United States of America and Canada. When Levant described his difficulties in gaining access to Canadian diplomatic
documents, he characterized information about Canadian diplomatic involvement as highly secretive, confidential, and sensitive. Levant conceptualized two versions of events: one that operated publicly to provide information about Canada "as an impartial and objective peace-keeper"; and a distinctly different version—which, according to Levant—was "the real one" (1986:2). In this 'real', updated version, Canada was portrayed as a "willing ally" of the USA (Ibid.).

These two books highlight contradictory descriptions of the role of the media in keeping Canadians informed about their country's involvement in the war. Did the media aid and abet the deluding of the Canadian public? Or did the newspapers provide reliable information on the issues surrounding this event? Taylor's and Levant's assertions suggest a review of the newspapers of these times, a tally of the manner in which these events were reported, consideration of the prominence which news reports about Canadian participation were granted, and an examination of how the reports framed events.

IV. LIMITS OF THE RESEARCH

In examining media coverage of Canadians in Vietnam, this research concentrated on the content of the coverage. Since the focus was restricted to content and discourse analysis, several limitations of the study were established. Each of these limitations constituted an area in which
extensive research has already been carried out.

In the first place, this study examined news reports without an in-depth discussion of the bureaucratic processes of news production, even though these processes have been acknowledged as playing an important role in news reproduction. As well, institutional restrictions (e.g. External Affairs telling reporters not to print a story); bureaucratic decision-making; the negotiation of news work; and newspaper policies have all been omitted from the analysis. No interviews were conducted to ask reporters whether governmental restrictions were imposed on their work.

It has already been documented that journalistic routines do play a part in shaping perspectives on news events (Gans, 1979; Tuchman, 1978). As well, upper management is known to exercise a strong hand in the selection of news articles, the definition of presentations, and the control of the scope of the content of news stories (Gitlin, 1980; Joseph, 1987, Lerman, 1983).

The exclusion of interviews with journalists or a review of management and editorial policy was made on the basis that the content of news reports was the primary focus for this research. Questions concerning relative closure or openness were evaluated by examining the placement of articles, topics, sources, and variation in points of view. This research focussed on the analysis of the content recognizing a possible basis for subsequent interviews with
news workers.

Second, the research did not examine media ownership. Although recognition of the "need to pay careful and detailed attention to the ways in which the economic organization and dynamic of mass media production determine the range and nature of the resulting output" is conceded, extensive research has already been conducted in that area (Golding and Murdock, 1979).

The concentration of media ownership in Canada is another area that has been well documented (Porter, 1965 and Clement, 1975). That concentration has also been well debated (Baldwin, 1977; Clement, 1977). Debates between Baldwin and Clement focussed on the extent and nature of the overlap between media and economic elites. However, the quantum leap from media ownership to control "over the dissemination of information" needs to be examined in greater detail: the Clement-Baldwin debate did not provide a comprehensive analysis of the link between ownership and content (Ibid.: 332). Although newspaper owners are already acknowledged to be a small, powerful group, an examination of the actual content of their products is needed to complete the picture; a necessity also identified by Baldwin.

In summary, the study of structural influences was excluded from this research in order to place the emphasis fully on the discursive content of news items. After a detailed reading of the news reports, it was possible to
identify areas for further query. A review of possible areas for investigation of the relationship between journalistic routines, media ownership, and content is presented in the Conclusion.

V. THE FINDINGS

After selecting the newspaper to be examined and then gathering, coding, and analyzing the data, I found several important trends. The most telling feature was the massive coverage of events once Canadian participation on the ICC was resolved, in 1973. Another readily discernible characteristic of the articles was the very conservative nature of the overall coverage. Very early in the study, it was found that there was a high reliance on official versions of events and only a very limited voice allowed secondary definers such as the peace movement. For the purpose of this analysis, it was deemed important that criticism of Canadian participation in the war never gained prominence through the banner headlines until 1973.

And finally, although the initial impression of the news articles was that they were providing the "cold, hard facts", a closer, semiotic reading of the text indicated the existence of a preferred perspective—the chivalry metaphor. Notions of Canadian involvement in events in Vietnam as a noble, generous gesture followed the perspectives of those in power and were reinforced through the use of such literal
approaches as passive sentence structures and the pervasive use of indeterminate nouns.

These findings (as well as claims about the marginalization of specific controversial topics) were gathered using Sumner's guidelines for social-scientific analysis. In *Reading Ideologies*, Sumner provided a "scientific, historical materialist method for reading ideology" (1979:238). He listed the four stages that are geared to produce "increasingly precise approximations to the nature of ideology being investigated" (*Ibid.*). These stages are: solid impressions, theory, history, and analysis. Although Sumner applied these recommendations to the study of law, they prove equally useful for the study of other ideological forms. Sumner listed the stages in the given order, but he did not indicate that they should be carried out in that sequence. Hence, the stages are shuffled in this dissertation. This research began with a review of theory and history and then continued with a summary of solid impressions and the analysis.

This approach was supplemented by Fowler's recommended techniques:

Critical linguistics seeks, by studying the minute details of linguistic structure in the light of the social and historical situation of the text, to display to consciousness the patterns of belief and value which are encoded in the language—and which are below the threshold of notice for anyone who accepts discourse as 'natural' (1991: 67).

Sumner's "solid impressions" are augmented with an examination
of "the minute detail", as Fowler explained. This method is necessary to substantiate the claim that ideology has deliberate as well as unconscious components.

This dissertation reports the findings following an eclectic combination of various theoretical and methodological considerations. Accordingly, the dissertation is divided into five chapters. It begins, in Chapter One, with a review of the literature and the identification of central debates that guided the research. This chapter reviews theories of media, propaganda and ideology, and formulates questions about prominence and emphasis, themes and sources, ideological process, and lexical as well as narrative choices. This first chapter reviews the work of Herman and Chomsky, Hall, Knight and others and identifies central debates between the propaganda versus ideological process; summarizes the attributes of a 'closed' versus an 'open' approach to the reading of events; and lists the manner in which ideological processes function.

Chapter One also provides a summary of the primary historical events of this period and outlines the shifts in Canada's External Affair positions. Five distinct periods are identified. Descriptions of these periods provide a point of comparison between events and reports. And finally, this chapter reviews the questions that guided the research.

Once these questions were established, consideration was given to methodology. Chapter Two compares and contrasts
content and semiotic structural analysis of communication, summarizing the relationship between the questions and the methodology. This chapter includes a description of how the data were gathered, coded, and analyzed. It provides a summation of the scope of the data and outlines some of the issues encountered in categorizing and codifying the news reports.

Chapter Three begins with an overview of the news reports on Canadian participation in Vietnam. Within this chapter an analysis is provided of the more overt aspects of the news articles—-the prominence, content and sources. Trends in the data were examined in light of shifts in political consensus. Then a critique of the propaganda model is used to begin the analysis of the ideological process.

A more detailed overview of the data’s content is conducted in Chapter Four. At this stage the news articles were examined for dominant themes and definitions of situations. This chapter explores shifts in the nature of media coverage, identifies characteristics of an ideological process, and outlines the manner in which certain issues and sources were marginalized.

Once the more general descriptions of the data were made in the last two chapters, several of the more representative articles are examined using semiotic structural analysis. Chapter Five reports on that analysis by examining the birth, reproduction, and continuation of the "Chivalry
Metaphor". The research, at this level, conducted a detailed reading of the text in an attempt to glean the more subtle or "unconscious cultural content" of the news articles (Hawthorn, 1992:174).

The final chapter, titled "Conclusions", pulls together the research findings. The main topics for consideration here are a re-assessment of the propaganda model, an elaboration of the ideological process as identified within the context of this series of news reports, and a review of conjectures about the hegemonic process as concluded within this research. This research report concludes with an evaluation of the methodology, an outline of the significance of the study, and several future research suggestions.

SUMMARY

In analyzing newspaper coverage on Canada's involvement in Vietnam, this research sought to explore debates on the nature of media coverage on political events by reviewing theoretical claims using an empirical base. Through the examination of the theoretical and methodological approaches that most reliably identify the features of news, the research sought to assess whether the propaganda model or the ideological process model most accurately reflects the relationship between news and political power.

First, the research examined whether a detailed examination of the content of one news story enables the
identification, quantification and analysis of the closure or openness of the reportage. In other words, the research examined whether claims of the relative closure or openness can be verified using a precise tally of the content of articles in correlation with the more qualitative assessment of structural semiotic analysis.

Second, the research focussed on how the ideological process works. With the benefit of a longitudinal study, the research first traced variations in Canadian foreign affairs policy (the referent) and then compared these variations to changes in the news.

Finally, in struggling with the possibilities of quantifying closure or openness through the more objective approach of content analysis and augmenting the analysis through the more subjective, qualitative analysis, the research also reassessed the methods usually selected to analyze mass communication data. This work examined whether or not quantification of data complemented or enhanced the semiotic structuralist approach, whether ideological process can be qualitatively detected, and whether shifts and gaps can be identified.
CHAPTER ONE

PROPAGANDA OR IDEOLOGICAL PROCESS?

This research was inspired by a central debate within critical theories of the media: Do news reports tend toward closure, as predicted by the propaganda model, or toward openness, as predicted by the ideological process model? Although these questions oversimplify the debate, they do provide a useful focus for exploring the nature of ideology.

According to instrumentalist theories of society, news is fundamentally a form of propaganda. News reports constitute a tight reproduction of the dominant political ideology and the ‘necessary illusion’ for maintaining a social, political, and economic status quo. Herman and Chomsky, leading proponents of this model, claim that the dominant elite constitute a stable state power by maintaining ideological closure, marginalizing dissent and legitimizing themselves through ownership and control of the media (1988:xii, 2).

Within the propaganda model ideological closure is the repetition of dominant definitions of events and situations in order to construct and maintain social consensus
(a definition supported by Hall et al., 1978: 55, 65). This
static type of closure is brought about when "certain
definitions of reality come to prevail to the exclusion of
others" and when these definitions present dominant meaning
systems as inherently natural (Knight and Dean, 1982:145.)

Within the propaganda model however, closure is not
absolute. Some degrees of openness are made possible by
virtue of the sheer variety of possible themes and sources and
a concern with reflecting a democratic society. Herman and
Chomsky's model, for example, allows for a range of differing
views and opinions. In order to sustain this democratic
facade, media propaganda necessarily accommodates some degree
of variation and disagreement in the range of ideological
debate.

In contrast to this proclivity toward near-closure
inherent in the propaganda model, hegemony theory proposes a
more open model of the media. The ideological process model,
as postulated by hegemony theory, conceptualizes news as a
process of "revising, renewing, renegotiating, (and)
redefining" meaning and/or belief systems (Knight and Taylor,
1986:230). Like the propaganda model, the ideological process
model acknowledges that dominant ideas and belief systems are
repeated and reproduced in the media. However, this model
stresses the dynamic nature of the ideological process and
identifies the media's revisionistic tendencies.

With its affinity for closure, the propaganda model
assumes that the ruling class can maintain its position of power in the absence of some measure of threat. By contrast, the ideological process model hinges the maintenance of hegemony upon the inclusion and containment of criticism and alternatives. Contradictions, according to this model, are domesticated and absorbed.

Since this research focussed on the tendency with which news coverage of Canadian participation in Vietnam reflected either instrumentalist or hegemony social theories, this chapter begins by comparing and contrasting the two. Then, in Section II of this chapter, a summary is provided of the historical and political context in which the news reports were written in order to contextualize the research. This summary identifies the key historical events that are used to define the distinct time periods. The chapter concludes with a description of the questions that guided the research.

I. TENDING TOWARD CLOSURE OR OPENNESS?

Both the propaganda and the ideological process models are fundamentally in general agreement that mainstream media fulfil an ideological role on behalf of the interests of dominant societal groups—be they defined in class or power- elite terms. Both models sit squarely in the critical camp, seeing the media as instruments of dominance.

Both models, moreover, recognize that the media are not monolithic: they do allow for, even require, some range of
difference in terms of the viewpoints, opinions, etc. they represent. Where the models part company, however, is in the range of divergence and conflict in the media.

According to the propaganda model the media are structured overwhelmingly, if not exclusively, in terms of differences in the interest, values and practices of societal elites. Herman and Chomsky have little to say about any incorporation of 'popular' voices and viewpoints in media representations, other than to say that they are marginalized if they diverge substantially from the viewpoints of the elite.

In contrast, the ideological process model conceptualizes consensus formation as a dynamic battle where various perspectives vie to gain dominance. Within that contestation of an ideological process oppositional views, from the public perhaps, have to be integrated into mainstream meaning systems.

In debating the degree of closure or openness, there are three distinct areas in which the propaganda and the ideological process model engage in direct debate with each other. These areas of debate are emphasis and frequency, media content, and source reliance. First, the propaganda model stresses emphasis and frequency as the main way in which official versions of events achieve and maintain dominance. But the strongest disagreement between these two paradigms centers on content and sources. Instrumentalist theory
acknowledges only a very limited variety of viewpoints in the political debates represented in the news reports.

The ideological process model, in contrast, outlines various features of the news production process which open the news coverage to include a variety of perspectives. Hegemony theory and the ideological process model, in fact, centre their criticism of the propaganda model on its rigid conceptions of ideological closure. Hegemony theory hypothesizes that the ideological process engenders a negotiated, ever-changing concept of the struggle for dominance in defining reality, and it also acknowledges the occurrence of ideological shifts and gaps. The main areas of debate between the two theories can be summarized first as prominence, diversity of themes, and range of sources.

A. Prominence, Themes, and Sources

As adherents of the propaganda model, Herman and Chomsky place heavy reliance on the importance of emphasis. In describing how the media serve the "societal purpose" of privileged groups, they claim that this purpose is first served through "emphasis and tone" (1988:298). Newspapers provide prominence to certain types of news articles in a very physical manner: through frequency of coverage, location within the paper and through the space accorded to articles. Official versions of events are featured on the front pages while any dissent that might "undermine the government line"
is normally relegated to "the back pages of the newspapers" (Ibid.:xiv). The propaganda model therefore predicts that criticism and alternative viewpoints will only be found 'hidden' within the obscure sections of a newspaper'.

The second criterion for ascertaining whether news reports on Canada's activities in Vietnam constituted propaganda or ideological process centers upon the content or themes of the news reports. Tendencies toward closure or openness can be demonstrated by the diversity of themes, the dominant themes or myths or metaphors, and the structure of news items.

At face value, news about war is a special kind of news, one in which a closed, restricted perspective on events is justified for reasons of national security and military efficiency. Secrecy about strategies or resources is a primary concern in the relationship between the press, the military, politicians and the public (Harris, 1983; Knightley, 1975).

Yet this closure is not only restricted by concerns with national security. Herman and Chomsky claim that the media habitually engage in the "selection of topics" and that debates on all topics are kept "within the bounds of acceptable premises" (1988:298). These avid proponents of the propaganda model acknowledge that even when elites engage in

1 Confirmation of the power of location was provided by Canadian Mark Harrison, executive editor of the Star (03/24/73:18). In a news commentary article he conceded that the "position of news stories can color their importance" (Ibid.).
fierce debates, those debates were restricted to discussion of
tactics rather than challenging the fundamental premises from
which the elites operate.

Herman and Chomsky wrote that "even when elites
disagree, the media do not reflect that disagreement" (Ibid.: xiii). And they added that on rare occasions when the media
do report dissent within elites, "they fail to place issues
within a meaningful context" (Ibid.). Power elites accomplish
this by suppressing and biasing the supply of information.

In contrast to this description of the media's
inclination toward a constricted reproduction of reports on
events, hegemony theory postulates a wider scope of themes by
identifying distinct types of news content. Elliott et al.,
used three distinct categories to define perspectives or
discourse types: official, critical (or oppositional), and
alternative (1986). Official discourse was defined as official
versions of state policy and the points of view of ruling
politicians (Ibid.:265). Official discourse, or expressions
of belief systems held by political rulers, describe events as
though that is "the way things are", thereby inducing
consensus (Kellner, 1990: 17).

Critical (or oppositional) discourse, in turn, was
defined as that perspective which challenges official
discourse without offering or demanding fundamental social,
political, and economic changes (Elliott et al., 1986:266).
Alternative discourse was defined as those ideas and beliefs
which negate official versions of events and overlook direct criticism of the official discourse. As well, alternative discourse was characterized as discussing and demanding the social, political, and economic changes ignored within critical discourse (Ibid.:267).

Within hegemony theory these various discursive forms are hypothesized as struggling for dominance. Criticism tends to persist, and must be either absorbed or rejected.

Another area of disagreement between the propaganda model and the ideological process model is the extent of source reliance. In accordance with the propaganda model, Herman and Chomsky assert that the "groups that dominate" are the primary definers of reality with the power to restrict the sources and themes of discursive content (1988:298). Herman and Chomsky identify three distinct reasons for the tendency to restrict sources: economics (costs and profit margins), journalistic practices, and class cohesion.

Herman and Chomsky constantly stress that the main reason that the media restrict their use of sources stems from the need to maintain class cohesion. The co-authors believed that the media "serve to mobilize support for the special interests that dominate the state and private activity" (Ibid.:xi).

The war in Vietnam proved to be enormously profitable for the Canadian military-industrial complex. This complex is defined as an amalgam of military, business, and
government; including industries engaged in military production (contractors as well as sub-contractors); members of the military who are in 'top-of-the' hierarchy positions; and politicians directly involved with military spending and policy-making, e.g. Department of National Defence, External Affairs, committees and sub-committees (Adams, 1982; Galbraith, 1969; Lens, 1987; Melman, 1974; and Mills, 1958).

Within this research, Canadian military production is deemed to be a branch of the North American military-industrial complex. In 1959, with the Defence Production Sharing Agreement between Washington and Ottawa, Canada and the United States agreed that American purchases of military equipment would be kept roughly equivalent to Canadian military purchases in the United States (Regehr, 1975:19). In addition, many of Canada's more prominent defence industries were already branch plants owned by American companies. Besides, many Canadian military decisions were pre-determined by NATO, an organization which reinforced the American impact (Ibid.).

Hegemony theory also allows for closure through restricting the availability of sources. This approach recognizes that habits and the pressures of time foster a journalistic reliance on "primary definers". These political, legal, and corporate definers express their views through the vehicles of press releases, publicity agents, and news conferences (Hall et al., 1978:58). Hall specifically
identified these sources as "accredited representatives of major social institutions--M.P.s for political topics, employers and trade-union leaders for industrial matters" (Ibid.).

Reliance on these 'accredited' sources was also acknowledged as being influential in the selective shaping of viewpoints within the propaganda model, as described above. But Hall went beyond the too simplistic identification of official sources or primary definers which characterizes the propaganda model. He identified the limited yet significant importance of secondary definers. The public, for example, was identified as important definers (Ibid.:61).

Hence, the hegemony model allows more latitude for the incorporation of non-elite, popular voices into news accounts. And even though these voices do not reproduce elite viewpoints, they are not necessarily marginalized when they diverge from those viewpoints. This is not to say that this model subscribes to an egalitarian, pluralistic model of the media. Rather, it recognises fully that the media obviously treat elite voices and popular voices in uneven ways, in terms of both access and credibility of authoritativenss. Secondary definers are acknowledged to add a decisive, divergent viewpoint.

Using Hall's distinctions, then, the range of sources includes the more powerful and influential primary definers as well as the less authoritative, but still
important, secondary definers. Furthermore, the authority of sources is, in part, established through geographical references in newspaper datelines as well (Schudson, 1986:79; Hallin, 1986:112).

In sharp contrast with the propaganda model, hegemony theory of the media conceptualizes the presence as well as absence of certain voices. Absent or omitted sources are those excluded from the mainstream newspapers. These voices were perhaps published in the alternative press or identified in historical reports. While they may be recognized later, they were not deemed immediately newsworthy within their contemporary context (Knight and Taylor, 1986:233). They are sources who may indeed have participated in events and held valid opinions; however, they may also have represented an ultra-conservative or ultra-radical perspective.

Omission is a most effective mechanism for closing or restricting perspectives, yet the identification of omitted sources is a complicated process. However, with the benefit of hindsight and the availability of secondary sources describing both the war and Canada's involvement in it, it was possible to identify these omissions.

In debating tendencies toward openness or closure, therefore, it was necessary that the range of sources used in Canadian newspaper reports should be examined. The maintenance of closure is theorized as having been perpetuated by a reliance on official sources: heads of state, supporting
intellectuals, and bureaucratic leaders.

An open discourse, by contrast, would have tapped a wider, more comprehensive, range of sources. In addition to political officials and bureaucratic leaders, unofficial or secondary sources such as members of the public would have been included.

B. Change and Process

In sharp contrast to an instrumentalist theory of the media, hegemony theory conceptualized ideology as a dynamic process. Within this theoretical framework hegemony is defined as the maintenance of social cohesion; where social consensus "has to be actively won and secured" (Hall, 1977:332). Reviewing Gramsci's theory of hegemony, Hall believed that the consent of the subordinate classes (to comply with the belief systems of those in power) has to be won because "consent is normally in the lead, operating behind 'the armour of coercion'" in the liberal-capitalist state (Ibid.). Furthermore, Hall identified news reporting as an important factor in ideological hegemony since the newspapers formulate versions of newsworthy events, conceptions of reality, and reproductions of the dominant worldviews.

To begin, the degree of closure or openness can be assessed in the actual structure of news articles. According to Elliott et al., the form of "presentation" as well as the way in which the information is organized within an article
are key determinants of relative closure or openness in discourse (1986).

In Elliott et al.'s typology, newspaper presentations are categorized either as 'open' or 'closed'. Openness of format was said to exist when "core assumptions" within the structure of articles were "interrogated and contested" as well as when "alternative and even oppositional themes" were included in the news articles (Ibid.: 268). Questioning and opposition, even elements of debate, are assumed to exist within an open text.

Closure, on the other hand, will be found within the articles if the points-of-view "operate mainly or wholly within the terms of reference set" by officials or other sources (Ibid.). Discourse would be constrained or 'closed' by terms of reference set exclusively by state and bureaucratic officials. Alternatively, a text would be said to expand or 'open' through the inclusion of discussion, questions, and range of ideas (Ibid.:265). The term 'open' therefore describes articles in which issues are debated and contested while 'closed' best describes the structure of news articles which contain and repeat a unilinear reproduction of events, decisions, or opinions.

The manner in which information is reproduced within an article is further identified as 'tight' or 'loose'. This criterion assesses the nature of the vocabulary and sentence structure. Again, according to Elliott et al., a 'tight'
format is used when "the evidence and argument is organized to converge upon a single preferred interpretation and to close off other possible readings" (Ibid.: 270). A 'loose' format, in contrast, is one in which "ambiguities, contradictions and loose ends are not fully resolved within the programme (article), leaving the audience with a choice of available interpretations" (Ibid.).

While structure plays a part in shaping the reading, expressed viewpoints play a stronger role in opening or closing the perspectives of the text. According to the ideological process model, newspapers support and perpetuate ideological hegemony whether through the negation and diffusion of voices of dissent or opposition or alternatively, through the inclusion and/or fragmentation of any form of alternate discourse. Knight and Dean described that process well:

. . . . ideology 'works' hegemonically to legitimize and universalize as common sense the interests, perspectives, and practices of the dominant, such that alternatives challenging these dominant views tend to be expelled from normal reality as dangerous, bizarre, comical (1982:146).

Thus the ideological process can include either the integration or the marginalization of critical and alternative discourse. Through this process of absorption or expulsion dominant worldviews are revised.

Ideology, therefore, is not a 'seamless web'. An examination of the news coverage on a specific topic could be predicted to exhibit ideological shifts and gaps (Bruck,
1989:116). Ideological shifts consist of points at which the news coverage demonstrates dramatic changes. These alterations may include, for example, the introduction of shifts from an official, national view to another perspective, or there may even be points at which critical or alternate discourses dominate.

Ideological shifts involving changes in preferred perspectives were identified by Knight and Taylor in two cases. Knight and Taylor analyzed "rightward shifts" in Canadian news reports on British political events (1986:231). And, in his analysis of the tabloid press, Knight identified the importance of shifts in emphasis from impersonal to personal reporting (1989:94). Changes in emphasis therefore can be important constituents of ideological shifts.

In contrast to complete ideological shifts, ideological gaps have been defined as spaces within newspaper coverage "for rather more conflict and contestation than the prevailing wisdom of critical media research might predict" (Elliott et al., 1986: 284). This claim directed the need to explore the possibility of identifying gaps in the flow of news information.

And finally, the analysis of the ideological process addresses the issue of omitted themes. The first possibility for omission from the discourse occurs at the point of classification on the basis of newsworthiness. As has been
outlined earlier, "'news' is the end-product of a complex process which begins with a systematic sorting and selecting of events and topics according to a socially constructed set of categories" (Hall et al., 1978:53).

So there will always be themes that are omitted in newspaper reporting. On the one hand the media inform, and on the other they obscure and conceal (Knight, 1982:16). Newspapers, for example, can choose to be either "selective" or "occlusive", mainly (and at times exclusively) through their use of sources (Ibid.:36). The media can either absorb or marginalize less dominant perspectives and ideas or they can omit sources from the discourse, thereby excluding certain "types and forms of social knowledge" (Ibid.).

C. Discourse Analysis

Herman and Chomsky are epistemological realists. As advocates of the propaganda model they believe that a definite reality exists, that it has an essential truth or meaning to it. They claim that this truth is misrepresented by the commercial media. And they explain that this misrepresentation occurs as a result of the ways in which news is filtered to serve the interests of elites over and above the interest of truth.

The hegemony model, on the other hand, avows to a constructionist view of reality. Reality is hypothesized to be socially constructed through language. Hence this approach
advocates the analysis of discourse so that the construction of reality through specific viewpoints or perspectives becomes apparent.

This approach is supported when the definition of hegemony from the work of Laclau and Mouffe is reviewed (1987). Laclau and Mouffe begin with Gramsci’s notion of hegemony and define it as the creation, by the "leading and dominant class", of a "system of alliances" including "the gaining" of the consent of the masses (Ibid.: 66). Furthermore, according to Laclau and Mouffe, that consent is gained "through the articulation of elements which, considered in themselves, do not have any necessary class belonging." (Ibid.:68).

The "articulation of elements" noted in the Laclau and Mouffe quotation above, consists of the paradigmatic and syntagmatic choices practiced by reporters. Reporters make paradigmatic choices with the selection of symbols or words and syntagmatic decisions when they are arrange sentences (Fiske and Hartley, 1978). According to Hartley, ideological closure occurs when words are selected and assembled in such a way as to produce a preferred reading of news events (1988:63).

Semantic choices certainly contribute to the hegemonic nature of the media (Kellner, 1990). Kellner, too, identified the power of ideology when he noted that "Ideology becomes hegemonic when it is widely accepted as describing
"the way things are," inducing people to consent to the institutions and practices dominant in their society and its way of life" (Ibid.: 17).

Then, in a broader sense, news reports also constitute ideological representations through the use of narrative. Narration has been described as "a form that our perception imposes on the raw flux of reality" (Sarup, 1989: 141). This is the process of forming a story line. When news reports are constructed through the description of a series of events, cause and effect are implied (Barthes, 1972). Furthermore, closure, coherence and completeness are subsumed within the narration (Angus and Langsdorf, 1993).

And finally, hegemony theory adds that dominance is reinforced through the use of certain myths and metaphors. Myths are defined as composite messages or multiple units of truncated information. Myths are conceptualized as a "'second-order' system of signification whose method for establishing meaning is suggestive and evocative rather than declarative, and whose function is the 'deformation' of first-order meaning" (Knight and Dean, 1982:146). In other words, myths provide overall meaning systems that form perspectives without being apparent themselves. Myths are proposed as means to overcome the difficulties of assimilating the complexities of experiences. They provide an informational shorthand that facilitates communication (Ibid.:147).

Support for the role of myths in ideological
dominance is provided by MacQueen in his review of an anthology of myths, *Sacred Narrative* (1988). MacQueen examined myths in terms of dominance and gender relations. He claimed that myths are used in societies to "help dominants achieve and maintain dominance" (*Ibid.*:145). MacQueen reported that myths maintain consensus and legitimate social order because they generalize 'naturalness' (*Ibid.*:146-153). At the time of the Vietnam conflict, for example, American public opinion was shaped and influenced by the myth that the United States was the great defender of freedom and democracy (Hellman, 1986; Jewett and Lawrence, 1988; Slotkin, 1973).

In *Snow Job*, Taylor proposed a variety of myths for Canada's participation on the ICC. He believed strongly in the existence and influence of composite meaning systems and wrote:

Nations, like individuals, live by myths. These myths may be unconscious or only dimly perceived but they provide the foundation for our actions and opinions; however subtly or imprecisely they condition and shape our view of our place in the world (1974:i).

Taylor stressed the "unconscious" feature of myths by listing several possible myths for Canada's foreign policy during the Vietnam War era: Quiet Diplomat and Canada-as Helpful-Fixer. According to Taylor, the gyst of these myth was notions of Canada as "good friend", "loyal member", "selfless" and trustworthy (*Ibid.*:iii).

But, as defined in MacQueen's article, myths are more complex. They tell a story. Myths are abstract meaning
systems with more varied components than the examples listed in Taylor's work. Taylor's examples could better be named "metaphors". Like myths, metaphors are conceptual systems that express the unknown in terms of the known (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980:3). As well, they are also unconsciously used to describe and define reality (Ibid.:5). However metaphors differ from myths in conceptual size; metaphors are constructed through more simplistic analogies. Lakoff and Johnson identified "Argument is war" and "Love is madness" as two specific examples of the use of metaphor. According to Lakoff and Johnson metaphors are expressed through paradigmatic choices.

In summary, the examination of the data in this study was conducted at three distinct levels. First, at a 'physical' level, differences in the news reports were assessed in terms of location and scope of coverage. Then, at the content level, an analysis was made of ideas or themes and of sources. Finally, and in correspondence with the analysis at the first two levels, the news articles were examined for wider meaning systems—at the literal level of change, process, meaning construction, and larger conceptual systems.

II. SHIFTS IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS POLICY

A review of secondary sources indicated several dramatic changes in domestic political consensus during Canada's involvement in Vietnam. Ideological shifts and
changes were signalled by modifications in foreign policy, rising public protest, and key historical events. Since the analysis of the data in this research was related to the dominant political positions, it was necessary to review the nature and timing of these ideological shifts.

A detailed analysis of Canada’s role in the ICC as written by Douglas A. Ross was used as a set of benchmarks to map out shifts in political consensus. In his book titled *In the Interest of Peace* Ross identified three distinct political positions taken by Canada concerning Vietnam (1984). He designated the terms "conservative", "liberal-moderate", and "left-liberal", using these names to demarcate shifts in the Department of External Affairs’ policies.

Conservative politicians from the 1950s were described as vehement anti-Communists who were concerned with the welfare of Catholic refugees. They believed that the number of Vietnamese Catholics seeking to move South demonstrated the merits of the Diem regime (*Ibid.*). This conservative faction of the Department of External Affairs was loyal to American efforts and advocated "Free World" ideals, e.g., "the defence of freedom and political liberty was worth even the grave risks entailed in intervention and escalation" (*Ibid.*).

There was also a strong "liberal-moderate strain" within the Canadian state which included the Minister of External Affairs Pearson, John Holmes (central figure in the
debate from 1954-1960, Assistant Under Secretary of State for External Affairs), and Sherwood Lett (first commissioner to the ICC and former BC Supreme Court Justice) (Ibid.:12). This faction was suspicious of the Diem government but maintained that support for his government was worth the risk. While agreeing to American military advisors in Vietnam, they believed that the task of the ICC was to prevent the risk of a great-power military confrontation and they felt that the Viet Minh forces were attempting to subvert the regime in the South.

At the more liberal end of the political spectrum was the left-liberal approach (Ibid.:17,18). This group included Escott Reid (whom Ross described as the most influential of the three within the External Affairs department (Ibid.:19); Chester Ronning, the Canadian high commissioner to India from 1952 to 1957; and Herbert Norman. These men were primarily loyal to the Geneva Agreement, even though they conceded that the "holding of elections would mean, in all probability, the accession to power of Ho Chi Minh's communist government throughout all of Vietnam" (Ibid.:19). Those adhering to the left-liberal position even maintained that North Vietnam's use of violence was justified in light of American military actions.

Ross has, in effect, outlined the parameters of the possible news coverage concerning Canada's role on the ICC. His delineation of positions could also be elaborated to
include viewpoints not voiced by Canadian officials in their communications statements but present in the public debate. At the 'conservative' end of the continuum there were "right-wing" politicians and diplomats. Similarly the 'left-liberal' end of the spectrum could be extended to include what has been traditionally called the political 'left' (referred to in the literature as those holding a 'left-wing' perspective).

Within this research a 'right-wing' perspective and "conservative consensus" best define the beliefs of those who strongly adhered to the Cold War ideology and were ready to use the atom bomb in the battle against communism. This faction of society may have been small, but it did exist.

Extreme 'right-wing' adherents were not directly included in Ross's analysis, but he acknowledged their existence. These 'right-wing' viewpoints were identified by Ross as increasing in numbers in the late 1960s when Communist China tested an atomic bomb (Ibid.:263). While Ross conceded the existence of a 'right-wing' or conservative faction in Canada, he claimed their voice was muted because any public advocacy to use nuclear arms during the fifties and the sixties, when the horrors of those weapons were still very strong in the public memory, was unthinkable.

In addition to describing the "right-wing" position, Ross makes several references to what has been termed either a "left-wing" point-of-view or a liberal-moderate political consensus (Ibid.:258). According to Ross, Pearson (for
example) often responded to a "growing left-liberal sentiment among the Canadian public" (Ibid.:261). Ross describes this public opinion of the 1960s as left-liberal, indicating it was further to the left of the political spectrum than the "liberal-moderate" political consensus. Like the 'left-liberals', "left-wing" proponents condemned American intervention in Vietnam believing it to be the result of forces of nationalism rather than suspecting communistic expansion. But "left-wing" rhetoric was more radical than the "left-liberal" perspective and expressed a much stronger criticism of American activities in Vietnam, questioning Canadian profiteering from the war and drawing attention to economic aspects.

Political consensus on External Affairs' position varied as the war continued. At times the Canadian politicians settled at a liberal-moderate position and at other times it had swayed so much as to be ultra-conservative. The next five sections summarize events based upon secondary sources.

A. A Liberal-Moderate Consensus (1954-55)

Ross identified the first period of Canadian participation on the ICC, from 1954 to 1955, as one marked by a liberal-moderate consensus. Nuclear restraint was Canada's highest priority when it accepted a position on the ICC (Ross, 1984:9).

Consistent with Ross's claims concerning the
existence of a liberal-moderate consensus in Canada, Halliday identified 1954 and 1955 as the early years of Phase II of the Cold War. According to Halliday, Phase II was characterized as a period of "oscillatory antagonism" (Ibid.). This Phase was theorized to have continued until 1969 and these oscillations were directly reflected in Canada’s foreign policy.

Generally a high degree of consensus existed within Canada’s three political parties during these first two years of participation on the ICC. Although the Liberals were in power, the Conservatives agreed with policy statements in principle, and even the CCF (the party traditionally most critical of Liberal policy) was in agreement (Ibid.:70,90).

The key historical events for this period were therefore: the Geneva Agreement; the selection of Canadian military personnel for the ICC force; and American military intervention in Vietnam. Within South Vietnam, American military involvement during this period consisted mainly of 320 Military Assistance Advisory Group troops who functioned in an advisory capacity to the South Vietnamese military (Ibid.:224)².

In summary, these two years (1954 and 1955) are referred to herein as Period I. Canadian political consensus can be described as predominantly liberal-moderate during this period, implying an open atmosphere for debate and criticism.

². Thakur had a precise list of the number of American troops (1984:192).
Canadian political factions freely expressed criticism of the threat of military escalation in Vietnam and Canadian ICC members were prepared to report both the United States and North Vietnam as violating the Geneva Agreements.

B. **A Conservative Consensus 1956-64**

In July, 1955, Dulles made known his "Domino Theory" regarding the likelihood of Communist expansion. The Domino Theory became an important influence on Canada's External Affairs' position on involvement in Vietnam. This theory projected a slow but steady expansion of Communism, in a manner analogous to the manner in which a row of dominoes may be toppled in turn simply by knocking over the first stone. In this manner, according to Dulles, Communist expansion would be achieved once the first Indochinese country (in this case Vietnam) was won by the Communists. Having gained control over Vietnam, the Communists were anticipated to expand into Thailand, Cambodia, and other Far Eastern countries. This theory played an important role in revising Canada's foreign policy for the next few years (Ross, 1984:65).

Between 1956 and 1964 External Affairs gradually moved toward a more conservative position. Under the leadership of St. Laurent and later Diefenbaker, Canadian politicians recognized problems with Diem and with elections in South Vietnam. Canadian leaders were concerned about
evidence of North Vietnamese aggression and alarmed over the ICC's failure to reach consensus on attributions of responsibility. These concerns led them to adopt an increasingly conservative stance.

The liberal-moderate consensus of Period I was transformed into a conservative consensus during Period II, from 1956 to 1964. During this period the growth of the National Liberation Front (NLF) in South Vietnam and the perceived expansion of communism, along with events in the Gulf of Tonkin, contributed to the development of a conservative consensus. This was also the period described by Halliday as the period of 'Oscillating Antagonism' (Halliday, 1986:3).

The history of this period ends with the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964. Alleged military action between North Vietnamese troops and American naval boats prompted an American escalation of military involvement in the area (Thakur, 1984:191).

Period II is characterized as demonstrating a conservative political consensus. And within that conservative atmosphere of concern, criticism and debate were withdrawn. Canadian foreign policy, during this period, shifted toward support for American military actions.

C. Return To A Liberal-Moderate Consensus (1965-67)

Canadian foreign affairs policy toward events in
Vietnam was again characterized as "liberal-moderate" from 1965 to 1968 (Ross, 1984:282). After Chester Ronning, chief official of the Canadian ICC contingent in Vietnam, returned to Canada to make his reports in 1965, Canadian politicians and diplomats became "disillusioned about American sincerity" and its ability to find a peaceful solution (Ibid.:284). According to Ross, Canadian policy could even be described as a "left-liberal tinged liberal-moderate approach" (Ibid.:373).

During this period when, according to Ross, left-liberal sentiment peaked, official protest against the war was registered on several occasions. For example, at the United Nations General Assembly, Paul Martin (then Canadian Minister of External Affairs) spoke out against the bombing of North Vietnam (Thakur, 1984:230).

Yet during this same period of official protest, there were two features of Canadian-American relations that may have had a muffling influence. One possible factor was the signing of the Auto Pact in January, 1965 and the other was the position paper issued by Canada and the United States called Principles for Partnership (Levant, 1986:18). While these two events would not directly restrict and muffle the voice of news reporters, they could nevertheless restrict the content of official discourse and thereby limit the content of press conferences held on the topic of ICC reports.

In Period III, therefore, the liberal-moderate consensus reasserted itself. Updates on events in South and
North Vietnam by Canadian delegates to the ICC, concern about increased military involvement by the USA, and the rise of public protest have been identified as factors that contributed to the nature of the liberal political consensus during this time. Again, within the liberal-moderate consensus, Canadian politicians were free to engage in heated debates and to express cutting criticisms of American actions in Vietnam.

D. Conservative IdeologicalContainment (1968-72)

Then between January 30 and 31, 1968, the South Vietnamese-American military attack nicknamed the "Tet Offensive" took place. The strength and the imminence of the Viet Cong forces provided dramatic media footage and prompted a public review of developments in Vietnam (Thakur, 1984:45). This event coincided with Pierre Trudeau’s election.

In 1968, Trudeau became Prime Minister of Canada. With this political change came a drastic revision in Canada’s foreign policy (Ross, 1984:324). Trudeau refused to publicly oppose American war aims in Vietnam. According to Ross:

A cautious policy of restrained and 'balanced criticism' of the two sides to the conflict remained the effective policy consensus of the government no matter how intense was public pressure from left-liberal systemists for condemnation of American 'atrocities' (Ibid., 326-327).

Within his cabinet and his party he maintained a conservative consensus and an ideological distance between his government’s
policies and the conflict in Vietnam (Ibid.:325).

Period IV can perhaps best be described as an era when there was a crisis of legitimacy both for the USA and for Canada (Elliott et.al., 1986:264). This was the period during which the activities of the Quebec Liberation Front (FLQ) and the installation of the War Measures Act during the October Crisis made necessary the use of the Canadian army to maintain national security. During this period the Canadian public most vehemently protested a wide range of decisions being made by federal and provincial governments (Corrado and Oliverio, 1988).

Trudeau’s "containment approach" to public debate, these historical events within Canadian society, and the vehemence of public protest, are identified as characteristics of this period. Also, while Canadian society experienced dramatic upheavals during this period, the Cold War, according to Halliday, was in a period of ‘Detente’ (1986). In fact that easing in East-West relations is described by Halliday as continuing until 1979.

During Period IV, therefore, Canadian political consensus reverted to a conservative position. The nature of constraint exercised upon public criticism of the Vietnam War is most sharply typified by the phrase "ideological containment". Conservative efforts to maintain social and political stability had forestalled the controversies of the previous period. And while this was a period of intense
military activity and sharp public protests, the political containment policy could be predicted to restrict the freedom of expression by political officials.

E. Liberal-Moderate Conservatism (1973)

In 1973 political consensus about the war had come full circle. Nearly everyone in Canada was in agreement that the USA should withdraw from Vietnam. Though there was extensive disagreement about why the war was being lost, a liberal consensus was tenable because there were only a smaller number of debatable issues--an end to the American presence in Vietnam meant that few decisions were necessary. The North American public and its political and diplomatic representatives no longer needed to fervently influence one another.

In January the Paris Peace Accords were drawn up concerning Vietnam. Canada agreed to serve on the ICC for a 60-day trial period. A renewal of 60 days was agreed to in March, but in May of 1973, Canada withdrew its ICC participation.

Canadian politicians and diplomats had accepted the supervisory role of facilitating American disengagement from Vietnam late in 1972 (Ross, 1984:380). Liberal-moderates had reluctantly agreed, accepting this responsibility as one that promised an end to American involvement in the conflict (Ibid.:369).
The conservatism of the previous period, Period IV, was modified in 1973 as the United States withdrew from Vietnam. Trudeau's government had by now shifted to a liberal-moderate conservative consensus and for at least four months nearly one thousand Canadian soldiers and diplomats participated in a supervisory capacity in South Vietnam.

III. QUESTIONS

In assessing whether news reports on Canada's participation in Vietnam exemplified tendencies toward the closure of propaganda or the openness of an ideological process, the research compared and contrasted four characteristics of the data across the five historical periods.

A. The Propaganda Model

Within Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model, variations in the prominence afforded to news items concerning the Vietnam War was identified as one of the main features of closure or openness. The extent of news as a form of propaganda could therefore be evaluated through differences in frequency and types of coverage, prominence through location within the paper, and the reinforcing influence of format as well as impinging news items. Furthermore, the research drew comparisons of the relative prominence accorded to official, critical and alternative discourse.
If the data tended to indicate the closure characteristic of the propaganda model, there would be a tendency for official discourse to constitute almost all of the data, to be allocated more front-page coverage, and to be supplemented by news photos and supportive articles.

In a general sense 'frequency' or extent of the coverage as a reliable indicator has been validated by Bruck who claims:

the more contentious an issue in terms of the dominant discourses and the interests of the established social and political powers, the lower the percentage of news reports in the overall coverage (1989:114).

An inverse application of this projection would suggest that official coverage comprised of consensual politics would be reported with high frequency while critical and alternate discourse will constitute a lower "percentage of news reports". Therefore, according to this claim, conjectures about the dominance of the discourse and the contention or controversy surrounding an issue can be deduced from the full scope of coverage in terms of length of the articles, extent of the variety of related issues, and prominence of the coverage through location within the paper.

According to Herman and Chomsky, "slippage" is defined as contested issues which would be expected to receive minimal coverage during periods of little or no controversy (1988:xiv). These contested issues would typically be placed on the back pages of newspapers, in isolation from other news
items.

In order to examine whether the content of the data followed predictions of the propaganda model versus the ideological process model, several further features of the news articles were evaluated for closure of openness. In a general way, the data were coded for types of discourse, themes and content, and the structure of the articles.

First, the themes of the data were examined by tabulating the types of discourse and the proportions of official, critical and alternative articles. As well, the topics, opinions and attitudes were identified more precisely.

The conjecture was that if the range of themes within the representative set of articles varied with the political consensus of the periods, the data could be judged to reflect the propaganda model. If, for example, there was a wider range of themes and topics only during periods I, III, and V when the political consensus was liberal but a narrower range during the periods of conservative political consensus, the data could be judged to reflect the propaganda model.

However, if the range of themes and topics was not dependent only on the political consensus but responded as well to increases in public protest, for example, the data would then be assessed as following the predictions of the ideological process model. Furthermore, if the official, critical and alternate discourse included a discussion of topics such as profit-making from war efforts, this discussion
was read as an indication of an open reporting on the North American military-industrial complex and its war-related business enterprises.

Again, a narrowness in the range of topics debated would indicate that news reporting is a form of propaganda since it follows the predictions of the propaganda model. Alternatively, a diversity of topics and an openness to represent viewpoints that deviate from narrow interpretations of events are indicators that the data represent an ideological process.

Not only would the types of news items and the themes of their content vary if the data followed the ideological process model, but the actual structure of the articles would be expected to vary as well. The question of whether news information was presented in a tightly closed style or an open, loose manner was also used to classify tendencies toward relative closure or openness. Again, the propaganda model indicates that the structure of news articles will tend toward a closed and tight structure which nonetheless varies with the political ambience of the period. In contrast, according to the ideological process model, the data will display variation and the presence of open and loose reporting structures independent of the nature of the current political consensus.

In summary, if news reporting followed the propaganda model, a limited variety of themes and topics would
be anticipated throughout the data since no anticipations of political shifts are predicted in this model. Allowing for some seepage, only limited and insignificant changes in textual content would occur. These changes would be anticipated to directly mirror new developments in political consensus. Therefore, following this occlusive model, it would be anticipated that only during periods when Canadian politicians maintained a liberal-moderate stance would any broadening of variety and a looseness of structure be identified in the debates. In contrast, during times of conservative consensus, the news coverage, if it followed the propaganda model, would consistently be restrictive and closed.

In the event that news reporting followed the predictions of the ideological process model, the variety in types of discourse and content would constantly undergo changes. Furthermore, the variety of themes would not only reflect the political consensus, but would also be enhanced by the greater energy with which critics were challenging official decisions and versions of events.

The third area of analysis examined the diversity of sources cited for information transmitted in news articles. The propaganda model predicts a comparatively limited number of sources. According to this model, Canadian politicians holding positions of power would consistently and almost exclusively be the sources cited throughout the data set.
In comparison, the ideological process model predicts a wider range of news sources as well as inclusion of official, unofficial, public and private voices. An open discourse would include critical discourse as represented both by politicians and by members of the public. In conjunction with the variety of sources, the newspaper articles would also indicate periods of time during which the prominence of the critical and alternative challenges to dominant world views would be most visible (Gans, 1979; Knight and Dean, 1982; Useem, 1984). Following the ideological process model, therefore, there would be a discernible inclusion as well as exclusion of sources.

This research explicitly examined the avenues by which criticism was expressed by the Canadian peace movement. The literature reviewed in this connection suggested that an extensive or informed coverage of the peace movement could not be anticipated. Crispin, for example, claimed that the peace movement in Britain was misrepresented and neglected (1982:17). Furthermore, in an article in Crispin’s book titled Peace in Our Times?, Connell stated that the media were biased against the peace movement. Connell wrote that the media habitually underestimated the size of crowds engaged in protests and that they manipulated other types of news information through their selection and use of spokespersons (Ibid., 27, 29).

The history of this era indicated that extensive
Canadian public protest did take place. As early as 1967, nearly four hundred University of Toronto professors, including the Faculty Committee on Vietnam from Victoria College, petitioned Ottawa "to reveal all military production contracts related in any way to Vietnam and to consider refusing to sell arms to the United States until its intervention in the war ended" (Taylor, 1974:123).

By examining the data in light of history it was possible to ascertain how newspapers favour certain sources. Were there "persons of renown" other than those quoted in newspaper articles speaking out against the war? Was the Canadian peace movement given a measure of media coverage which was proportionate to the scale of its activities?

According to the propaganda model, primary definers are most likely to be cited in newspaper articles. The model also predicts that primary definers will not express criticism of their peers, and so this research undertook to detail the frequency with which such instances occurred. The propaganda model assumes the existence of a unified elite, and further proposes that journalists align themselves with the dominant class. Thus it would be anticipated that journalists' reports would not contradict the statements of the primary definers who are their sources.

Yet history has shown that no such consistent alignment between journalists and primary definers has occurred. A review of the literature, as summarized below,
indicates that journalists have been found to hold private beliefs about the war. Many prominent journalists privately held ideas which contradicted the dominant political viewpoints. And, in a limited way, journalists attempted to interject those contradictory views into their work.

Wilfred Burchett, the French war correspondent, very vividly portrayed the limited autonomy of journalists. He wrote that the power of journalists was indirect in that only by "asking the sort of questions" that force exposure of information can they bring their perceptions to bear on the news reporting process (1981:179).

Within the collection of articles which this research examines, certain reporters did play a limited role in including topics not seen in articles from regular staff members or from wire services. On several occasions these atypical, unusual reports followed a long series of articles by that reporter. Through this process these reporters were allowed a prominent position within the news process.

The ideological process model does not make the assumptions of class cohesion or journalistic consensus which the propaganda model does. The process model predicts the utilization of a range of sources throughout the sample set, conceding a dramatic escalation of a conscious journalistic presence during periods of heightened political debate and public protest. If the articles follow the process model, therefore, it would display a range of sources and debate,
both consenting and dissenting, yet nevertheless show a tendency to expel some sources.

B. The Ideological Process

The next objective directing the research was the identification of an ideological process. The proposition was that if variation in the dominance of themes was apparent, if shifts and gaps did occur within the data, and if certain themes were absorbed while others were expelled, these characteristics indicated the operation of an ideological process. Therefore, irregularities in the prominence, dominance, and reproduction of themes as well as instances of their absorption into or exclusion from official discourse were appraised.

Absorption was presumed to have occurred if topics previously contained in the critical discourse begin to appear in the official discourse. In contrast, expulsion from the discourse can be assessed to occur if themes which were reported suddenly are no longer reported, assuming that these themes were actually still pertinent to news events. By way of example, the opinions of Ho Chi Minh were reported in newspapers for several years and then no news items contained any of this type of information although the man was still a prominent politician. Cessation of news reports on Ho Chi Minh would be considered an expulsion of a theme and source.

One theme predicted to be missing from the news
content is the accusation that the United States and Canada, along with other Western allies, were actually concerned about events in Vietnam less for political reasons—to 'protect democracy'—than for economic reasons. In The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy, Robert W. Tucker wrote that the American anti-war movement linked what he viewed as American expansionism to the American form of capitalism—a form that was more aggressive than the capitalism of other countries (1971:74).

In addition to envisioning the omission of certain themes, the ideological process model acknowledges that certain sources also would be omitted, muffled, or gradually absorbed. One of the obvious sources or voices that could be expected to be excluded would be any news report which cited 'the other side'—the Viet Cong, Ho Chi Minh or even the peace movement in Vietnam.

Since the propaganda model denies an active ideological process and discounts the importance of possible change, conjectures based upon the ideological process model most strongly guided inquiry in this area. If the ideological process model of the media is valid then shifts, gaps, omissions, and occlusions can be anticipated in the article set. The methods used in this research to identify these aspects of the data are explained in Chapter Two.
C. **Semiotic Structural Analysis**

Assessment of the semiotic structural analysis of the sample articles was directed toward closure versus openness as well. This analysis raised questions such as whether word choices contributed to a cohesive, closed perspective or openly promoted mental involvement in the textual reading? Did the story line offer a closed, complete narrative or are some questions left unanswered, allowing for an open-ended interpretation? Do articles end, for example, with a concluding statement, with a question or mystery, or as an unfinished story—as fictional narratives sometimes do?

Hall most convincingly argued the need for micro-level textual analysis (Hall *et al.*, 1980:134) In describing news reporting as an "encoding process", (specifically the transformation of "reality" into words and sentences), he explained that these codes map out areas of social life into discursive domains. These discursive domains are "hierarchically organized into dominant or preferred meanings" of individual words within printed texts (*Ibid.*).

First, the selection of words or the paradigmatic choices were examined. The paradigmatic selection is made from a variety of possible signs and signifiers (nouns, verbs or other words that have parallel meanings but reflect distinct social differences). For example, Hartley identified "soldiers, freedom-fighters, guerrillas, terrorists, volunteers and gunmen" as a paradigmatic set of terms in which
the precise meaning of the word is attributed through social use (Hartley, 1988:21). If the words used in the text replicated dominant political views, their closure was identified. A diversity of noun or verb selections, indicating a variety of perspectives, was seen as an indicator of openess.

As for sentence construction or syntagmatic selections, Hartley recommended several guidelines for a semiotic deconstruction of news. One was an examination of the orientation: the elements of socio-verbal interaction. Hartley claimed that the text of news items is constructed in such a way as to form "the relationship between the addressee and addressee—the speaker and the hearer, writer and reader" (Ibid.:25). Relying on the work of Volosinov, Hartley declared that all language is fundamentally interactive but added that the dialogic nature of language is heightened through the mode of address, clues of the presence of the mediator, the use of "vox pop", as well as the 'probing/tough interview, conversation, common sense understanding, and visibility of the information gathering process (Ibid.: 99-105). Again, these distinctions were weighed in terms of their tendency to replicate closure in the form of authoritarian monologues or an open address to the reader.

Directness through mode of address is elaborated in the work of Bakhtin, the Russian Formalist whose work is described by Kristiva as the source of contemporary structural
analysis. Bakhtin claimed that the text of novels could be typified using a dialogue/monologue (or direct/indirect) distinction (Kristiva, 1980:64). With the monologal (or direct) approach, the author simply 'speaks' in her writing without drawing in the reader. A text typified as 'dialogue', on the other hand, draws the reader to "enter" the reading and, in essence, also engage in a parallel writing. Some of the textual features that allow or encourage dialogue are: addressing the reader, writing about the mind of the character and drawing the reader closer, or writing about characters with elements of intimacy that far exceed public conversational practices except within intimate relationships.

Even at the word level, directness and indirectness are possible according to Bakhtin's categorizations. Direct words provide "direct, objective comprehension" while indirect words, through their ambivalence, require a more complex reading. Kristiva cited the following examples from Bakhtin's work: "autobiography, polemical confessions, questions-and-answers, and hidden dialogue" (Ibid.:73).

Citing the work of Althusser, Fiske also drew attention to this monologue/dialogue distinction-- "Althusser (1971) places great importance on that aspect of discourse which he calls "interpellation" and which corresponds roughly with what linguists call "mode of address" (Fiske, 1987:53).

The use of narrative or the linking of events was also a way to close or open the discourse by bringing
linearity to a series of events (Fowler et al., 1979:141). That linearity was identified through the diversity of events drawn together in one article.

Furthermore, larger meanings were examined through the identification of metaphors. The chivalry metaphor was identified in the first, most prominent news report on Canada's ICC role.

Within this research Cold War ideology was predicted to be one of the dominant myths. 'Cold War' was a term popularised by Walter Lippman in 1947 (Halliday, 1986:3). The existence and power of this myth has been examined by such diverse scholars as the economist Galbraith (1969), historian Thompson (1982), sociologist Saunders (1983), and linguist Chomsky (1982,1986). Proponents of this Cold War ideology assumed an East-West antagonism, the legitimacy of military solutions for international conflicts, and the use of military strength to deter political instability (Halliday, 1986). Replication of this myth through the use of the supportive or parallel chivalry metaphor was evaluated as a closed text while variation from and revision of the metaphor was assessed as providing openness.

**SUMMARY**

In questioning the nature of media coverage of Canada's involvement in the war in Vietnam, this research focussed on the central debate of whether the news reports
exemplified a closed form of propaganda (as predicted by the instrumentalist theory of the media), or a more-open ideological process (as predicted by hegemony theory). Tendencies toward closure or openness were examined through the physical features of news articles and their location within newspapers, the content of the articles, and the manner in which meaning was structured through the writing process.
CHAPTER TWO

GATHERING AND CODING THE DATA

For assessing tendencies toward closure or openness in news about Canada's role in the Vietnam War, the first task was to gather a valid representation and description of the news coverage of these events. This chapter outlines how the data were gathered then catalogued and coded to allow both a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the news items.

First the chapter debates the attributes and shortcomings of content analysis in relation to the ameliorating features of semiotic structural analysis in Section I. Then the chapter continues, in Section II, by explaining how the dBase III+ data management system was used to facilitate the analysis. At this point the coding is described with some identification of the problems encountered in following some of the guidelines recommended in the literature.

The third section explains how the coding procedure corresponded with the questions directing this research. This section describes how closure and openness were assessed through the physical features of the reporting, the method used to
trace out the ideological process, and the considerations that
guided the semiotic structural analysis.

I. A REVIEW OF THE METHODOLOGY

Two distinct methodologies have evolved in the socio-
scientific analysis of the content of mass media. Content
analysis, which uses the word as the basic unit of analysis, is the
oldest method for examining ideas within units of print. This
approach emphasizes frequency counts and the more physical
attributes of content such as scope and prominence.

A more contemporary approach to the analysis of media
content is the semiotic structural method. This approach is used by
those media analysts who favour the hegemonic model. As these two
approaches are combined within this study, it was useful to examine
the advantages and disadvantages of each approach.

A. Content Analysis

Content analysis has often been deemed the best method
for acquiring an initial assessment of the nature of media coverage
This approach is still used by media analysts such as Hackett (at
Simon Fraser’s Communications Department), Bruck (at the Carlton
Centre for Culture, Communication and Society) and Manoff (at the
Centre for War, Peace, and the News Media in New York).

Content analysis provides an objective, systematic and
reliable starting point (Holsti, 1968:598). It methodically quantifies various aspects of the content of communication. This approach provides a precise basis for the development of inferences (Krippendorff, 1980:14). And finally, content analysts make some helpful suggestions for carrying out the coding process. Guido H. Stempel's (1989) essay on content analysis outlined just how the topics of news articles can be listed and organized for the coding process. These suggestions were incorporated into the coding categories described below.

However, there are problems inherent within this approach. The more important areas of debate within the methodology of content analysis, and those most relevant to this research, concern the use of manifest versus latent content; the context of the data; quantitative versus qualitative analysis; significance, omissions, objectivity; and the use of the word, theme or larger meaning systems as the unit of analysis (Berelson, 1952; Carroll, 1953; Holsti, 1969).

As described above, content analysis is merely a starting point for developing a sense of the scope of the data. With its reliance on manifest meaning it enables further analysis of the latent or implied meaning within the text. It provides a facile overview of the data without acknowledging the dynamics of ideological processes; it does not recognize inequalities of power, power relations between ideas and sources, the marginalization and certainly not the exclusion of ideas, and the means by which
certain words and themes gain prominence or dominance over others.

B. Semiotic Structural Analysis

Within this research, content analysis was combined with a semiotic structural analysis of communication. Bruck and his assistants drew a similar conclusion for the need to combine these approaches in their introduction to the report by the Centre for Communication, Culture and Society on arms control and the media. The writers of this report suggested that empirical (or quantitative) analysis be combined with a "political/ethical" (or qualitative) analysis. In the Foreword to their report, Bruck and his assistants noted their shift away from a pure content analysis approach. They wrote:

The scholarly examination of the media's news work has made considerable advances in the last years. In terms of the analysis of news texts, we can speak of a virtual paradigm shift away from studies which try to get hold on the meaning of texts by means of mere content analysis and concern with the bias in the selection of stories.

Although Bruck et al. identified the need for a paradigm shift away from a strict content analysis they did not clarify how they have made that shift within their study. Although Bruck et al. do not name the methodology, they would probably agree that structural analysis (also called cultural or semiotic analysis), provides the best guidelines for proceeding with a more in-depth analysis of

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1. This quote is taken from page 4 of the document. There is no date on the report.
newspaper stories.

Like content analysis, structural analysis also focusses on symbols and themes of text. Yet this approach expands that focus to include an examination of the sign within a wider socio-political context. Structural analysis is used by the Glasgow University Media Group (in Glasgow, Scotland) and by Stuart Hall (Director of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham, Britain), and by Graham Knight (at McMaster University, Hamilton).

Structural analysis of communication distinguishes between the manifest and latent content of news reports. It is concerned with the construction of preferred or dominant meanings of a text (Knight, 1982:146). The structuralist theory of discourse is founded on the basis of Marxist notions of social existence.

Stuart Hall extensively examined the ideological role of the media as well as the conception of communication as a process. He was unwilling to isolate the textual analysis from the larger social and cultural whole within which it exists. Hall advocated that mass media be studied as commodities, in terms of their history, their function, and their interplay with other social mechanisms such as politics and economics (1977: 333). The interplay between mass media and political and economic institutions is especially true for news about international relations and conflicts since a wide variety of factors shape the news coverage.
C. Combining the Two

Semiotic structural analysis, in contrast to a more rigid content analysis, uses both the internal context of words and themes and the external context of the communication process. Furthermore, structural analysis uses quantitative measures to map out content, but emphasizes qualitative analysis as well. Since statistical analysis is not used in the structural approach, significance is qualitatively expressed.

Knight and Taylor claimed that content analysis, which examines manifest content and "the quantifiable presence of discursive elements (keywords, themes, images)", cannot provide a solid impression (Knight and Taylor, 1986:233). They recommended the structural method of semiology which focuses on the relations between these elements or signifiers and the production of meaning or "signifieds" (Ibid.).

Furthermore, Knight and Taylor stressed the importance of the relationships of the presence and absence of diverse types of discourse. The structural analysis of content, therefore, places emphasis on the omission as well as the inclusion of different types of information. This approach is especially important in the study of news, which was defined by Knight as a finished product of "a social process of production...that simultaneously informs and obscures" (Knight, 1982:16)

The state has enormous power and influence to control the news about public events by withholding information, refusing to
conduct interviews, or by feeding false information. This process is described by Gitlin in *The Whole World is Watching* (1980). According to Gitlin, ideology is distributed through the media when it "defines and defines away its opposition" (*Ibid.*:2). Gitlin supported the examination of the omitted issues or perspectives. He claimed that there are times when news may be blocked out because it is too close "to the core interests of national political elites" (*Ibid.*:5). Those blackouts could occur simply through omissions.

In addition to allowing for the analysis or the examination of themes omitted from the reportage, structural analysis of communication combines the objective and subjective without apology, for there is no pretense that total objectivity is possible.

While content analysis has been criticised for not having a theory of the meaning of words, such a theory is central to the semiotic structuralist approach. Knight made this point in "Stratified News: Media, Sources and the Politics of Representation":

...the meaning of words that represent facts, is relational and discursive. Meaning is only established contextually and differentially, as part of a continuous process of representation (1987:3).

Hence the content analysis approach, while providing a general overview of the content, does not enable an in-depth analysis of the meanings actually conveyed in the words or, more especially,
sets of ideas.

Barthes' theory of myth most lucidly demonstrated that communication is a process that is comprised not only of words, but also of sets of ideas. Similar to McLuhan's claim that language is not composed of words or single units of meaning, but rather embraces a "configuration of meanings", Barthes theorized that contemporary speech has a system which he calls 'myth'. Barthes defined mythical communications in terms of mythical speech. He described this type of speech as a process:

Mythical speech is made of a material which has already been worked on so as to make it suitable for communication; it is because all the materials of myth (whether pictorial or written) presuppose a signifying consciousness, that one can reason about them while discounting their substance (1972:110)

Within this conception of communication, words are only elements of the larger structure and should not be examined in isolation from the structural whole.

A final element of this 'structural whole' is the use of metaphors as condensed meaning systems. Metaphors are simpler than myths and operate mainly at the paradigmatic or word level (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). Metaphors occur with the selection of known terms to express the unknown. Hence a simple examination of explicit word selections would be used to identify the use of metaphors.

In their primer, Key Concepts in Communication, O'Sullivan, Hartley, Saunders and Fiske advocate the use of
"active, imaginative decoding" when metaphors are being identified. Hence characteristics of metaphorical paradigms are intensely subjective. As well, and as described in the previous chapter, metaphors operate at a subconscious level. Therefore, in order to ameliorate the arbitrary nature of this type of analysis, the existence of metaphors was examined within the context of the quantitative features of the data: percentage of official discourse, reliance on primary definers, and the inclusion or omission of thematic content.

All in all, semiotic structural analysis, with its identification of both explicit and implied meanings, provides a more comprehensive methodology while still acknowledging the need for the precise mapping of content favored with content analysis. The integration of the content approach into the structural approach as selected for this research follows the recommendations of Bruck et al. as well as Knight and Deans. This integrated approach is also advocated by Lindkvist. He recommended an "integration between the approaches" and the development not of "a General Method or Model" but of "a battery of instruments" (1981:40). Content analysis can be used to provide a precise catalogue or map of the content, and structural analysis can then

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2This approach is also favored by the other Scandinavian social scientists who participated in the Conference on Content Analysis held in Sweden in 1979. The papers from this conference were published, along with Lindkvist's article in Advances in Content Analysis, edited by Karl Erik Rosengren, (London: Sage, 1981).
be used to identify implied meanings within this content.

II. GATHERING THE DATA

This section summarized the decisions that were made concerning which papers to read, since papers were not indexed during this time period. As well, a report is provided on the number of papers read, the format of the papers of this time, and the criteria used to select the articles for this study.

A. Choosing the Newspapers

The use of the print media as the basis for analysis has merit for several reasons. Newspaper reports are used because of the facility with which they can be accessed. This medium allows for great diversity—news reports as well as editorial opinion. Also there is some reflection, and exposure of the ideas which give rise to that reflection. And finally, the print media form an information base for other media forms. In War and Peace News the authors found that journalists rely "on the press to define the parameters of an 'acceptable' story" and use the press to "supply a large amount of basic news materials" through clipping files (1985:2).

Two Canadian English-speaking newspapers have been selected. First, the paper with the largest circulation was identified using the lists of leading newspaper (by circulation) from Gale's Directory of Publications (1988:2095-2097). The leading
Canadian newspaper, by circulation, is the *Toronto Star*. It had an average daily circulation of 523,458 in 1988. The *Star* is generally viewed, and views itself, as presenting a liberal perspective on news events.

The *Globe and Mail (G&M)* was selected as a contrast to the *Star*. According to their reports the *G&M* had a circulation of 317,000 in 1988. (It is interesting to note that by comparison the *New York Times* had a daily circulation of 1,056,924 in the same year). Furthermore, the *G&M* is recognized as the "agenda setter" for other media. In contrast to the *Star*, which assumes a populist audience, the *Globe* is traditionally a more conservative paper, oriented toward the upper-middle classes. Knight and Dean provide a concise description of the basic distinctions of the *G&M*, outlining their assumptions about the basic nature of that paper. According to Knight and Dean this paper can best be described as one that views itself as "Canada's national newspaper" (1982:148).

They added that the *Globe & Mail*:

... is a "serious," moderately "highbrow" newspaper catering particularly to the professional, managerial, and commercial middle classes as well as the established political and economic elites. Its tone is generally "conservative," with a strong commitment to traditional liberal principles.... (Ibid.).

Voumvakis and Ericson, in *News Accounts of Attacks on Women*, explained how differences between the *Globe and Mail* and the *Star* were described by the Royal Commission on Newspapers (1984). Voumvakis and Ericson described the differences between the two
papers in this way: "The Globe and Mail is considered to be at the 'quality' end of a continuum which includes 'popular' at the opposite end" (Ibid.:16). They added that "The Globe and Mail caters to an 'elite' audience of readers, those who are interested in business and economic issues, national politics, and international affairs" (Op.cit.).

In contrast to the G&M, Voumvakis and Ericson describe the Toronto Star as having a "more regional and metropolitan" focus, as being in the middle of the 'quality' to 'popular' continuum and therefore more 'traditional' and as a "mass circulation newspaper which seeks to appeal to readers across the board" (Ibid.).

When considering how best to locate material on Canada's involvement in the war in Vietnam, three separate approaches were used to determine which papers would be read. First, secondary sources were used to develop a chronology of ICC activities and peripheral historical events (see Appendix I). The dates in this chronology were used as a primary indicator of months in which newspapers were anticipated to contain news reports.

Another approach for selecting months targeted for examination was the use of secondary sources (mainly the work of Levant (1986), Taylor (1974) and Ross (1984)). These sources were used to compile a brief list of references for citations that had been used in their work. This was, however, a scant list.

The third approach to scanning the newspapers was to
select months at random. Newspapers such as the Globe and Mail are photographed in monthly installments. The Toronto Star, being a longer paper, was however collected in the half-monthly installments as they were stored on micro film. The section below provides a report on the extent to which all the newspapers were examined for the duration of Canada's involvement in the War.

No analysis was made using comparisons between the two papers. In subsequent chapters brief mention is occasionally made to exactly which paper provided the data, but this was only for citation purposes.

B. Format of the Papers

Differences in the format of the papers should be noted since front-page coverage played an important role in the analysis of prominence. However, since each paper consistently used the banner-headline format for the most pressing news of the day, that criteria was maintained as a reliable indicator of prominence.

In the early 50s, the Toronto Daily Star (as it was called at that time) was divided into two sections. News placed on the front page consisted of global, national, regional or local events. These articles often began on the front page and were completed on the second page. Lesser news items were placed at the top of subsequent pages leaving ample room—probably about 80% of the page—for advertising. A certain set of issues was repeated on a daily basis. As the news happened, as different aspects of a news
item came to light, or as unusual events took place, the paper gave a running account of the issues. It was possible to pick any week and predict what type of items would be on the front page for each day.

Several issues were placed on the first page, usually an average of ten separate stories. These items were such a smattering of bits and pieces that any detailed elaboration of events can only be drawn together with careful study.

By approximately pages 24 to 28, depending on the size of the paper, there was an editorial page with an editorial cartoon in the top centre. These editorials were usually of a critical nature and often did not appear to relate to any of the issues reported in the paper or the popular issues of the day.

The second section of the paper also commenced with a news page. Often the top items on the first page of this section reported on current international news items. The number of issues reported were usually less than those on the first page of the first section. More pictures were commonly used on this page as well. And again, as with the front page of the paper, the reporting of issues was completed on subsequent pages. This section did not contain as much news, and seemed to focus more on items that allowed for pictorial presentation.

The Globe and Mail consistently limited the number of sections in its smaller paper. "News", "Business", "Sports", and "General" were the usual section titles. Pressing new developments
received front page coverage in this paper as well; when the novelty waned, the news items were moved to the third page.

Sometimes news was quite obviously used as "filler". Very often newspapers have small areas in the last pages of the paper where the placement of the advertisements left spaces that would accommodate short news items.

Just as both papers used news as filler, there was one practice that never varied. In all the papers read, there was a very controlled placement of the editorial page, e.g., the Globe and Mail always placed its editorial page and editorial cartoon on page six. This varied somewhat within the layout of the Star.

One significant change that did occur with time was the number of columns used by each paper. In 1954, the year for which the data were first gathered, each paper had pages divided into nine columns. By the late 60s, both papers were moving toward somewhat expanded columns, using eight- column pages. While this number may not seem significant, it did make the print noticeably bigger.

Although this research focussed only on two newspapers, an examination of the Canadian News Facts weekly (which was first published in 1967) verified that these papers were representative of the news items reported on the same topics in other Canadian newspapers.

Canadian newspapers were not indexed until 1977, (the G&M began indexing just a year earlier). This limitation is significant
in that research on the ICC by researchers such as Levant, Ross, and Taylor may have been handicapped by a lack of awareness of the extent to which Canadians were informed of the controversies surrounding the Commission, and the diplomatic efforts of Ronning.

C. Selecting the Articles

The following guidelines were used to select the news articles: Canada and Vietnam, Canadian reporters and Vietnam, military sales by Canada to the United States for use in Vietnam, Canadian protest against the war, Canadian military involvement in the war, Canadian comments on the war, news about the ICC, Canada and the ICC, and business news that pertained to the war. Headlines, new items, editorials, commentaries, summaries, and editorial cartoons were all collected for the data set.

The 'ICC' articles were reports about Canadian participation in Vietnam through the ICC. War reports were those items that provided information about the war pertinent to Canadian involvement or written by Canadian reporters. Items coded as 'arms sales' reported or reflected on the sale of Canadian arms. 'Peace movement' items were about the Canadian peace movement and 'press' items reported on Canadian reflections on the journalistic process.

Articles on the International Control Commission represented the largest part of the collection, a total of 384 articles. Therefore 66% of the articles within the data set dealt primarily with the ICC and in nearly every one of those articles,
reference was made to Canada's participation. Only this set of articles was coded for the specific thematic content. In Chapter III, where the argument is made for the identification of a narrow debate and superficial critical discourse, the findings are in reference to this subset of articles.

Reports on events of the war that provided pertinent information were included as well; these were reports on major military events that were assumed to have a sharp impact on Canadian society, such as the Gulf of Tonkin, birth of the Viet Cong, and the Tet Offensive; they numbered 76. Again, this certainly does not represent the scope of coverage given to the war in general.

The collection included 30 articles about military production in Canada and the arms trade with the United States, 32 on the Canadian government's policy decisions about Vietnam, 55 on Canadian protest against the war and 1 on the press. These articles were examined in light of Canada's ICC participation.

A number of noteworthy articles were selected that did not directly report on Canadian participation in the war. These articles were selected because of their indirect relevance to this study. A report on Eisenhower's speech warning about the power of the American military-industrial complex and Bertrand Russell's letter to the editor were included because they represented important events that were indirectly pertinent to this study (G&M, 01/18/61:21; Star, 03/06/64:6).
Canadian volunteers who participated in the War as American soldiers received little media coverage during the war. Only 5 news items on this topic were published during the 1954 to 1975 time-span. This topic became more popular after the war when the veterans began to solicit for medical assistance and recognition.

In the 50s, when reports from Vietnam first became front-page news, fewer news photos were used. Later, during the 60s, when newspapers were experiencing sharper competition from the use of television as a news source, pictures became a more important feature of news papers for many of the stories. At this time, as well, pictures from the war in Vietnam were also included on a more frequent basis. The use of news photos, the role of the photographer in war correspondence, changes in the exclusion and inclusion of photographic material, and the subject matter of photographs all played an important role in war reporting on Canada's involvement in the Vietnam War.

III. CATALOGUING, CODING, AND ANALYZING

The dBase III+ program was used to catalogue and code the data. This computer program offered special features necessary to this research. It was selected precisely because it best afforded the quantitative-qualitative link central to the analysis of this research project.
In a reliable, quantitative manner, the dBase III+ program allowed counts to be taken, lengths of articles to be totalled, and selected sorting to be carried out. Using this system, it was possible not only to tabulate the findings but also to do cross-sorting between categories. This program allowed, though the listing of records for each news item, the creation of fields for which the relevant features of the data could be recorded and consolidated. While the exact names of government officials could first be listed in the fields, for example, these names could later be generalized for status and nationality through the flexibility of this data management system. At the very start, the articles were coded according to such overt features as 'PAPER' and 'DATE' for identification purposes. 'PAPER' was used to record the name of the newspaper in which the data were found. In this study the papers were either Star or Globe & Mail. The second field recorded the date of the article under the heading 'DATE'. Again, the date was needed for identification, but more importantly, dates were used to allow for comparisons in the data throughout the five time periods.

Each of the twenty-one subsequent fields were used to code and categorize the data for further analysis under the headings of prominence, themes, sources, and the identification of ideological process. For the semiotic structural analysis the entire texts of the articles were entered into the 'Notes' section of the program.
A. Prominence, Themes and Sources

Prominence was evaluated according to such physical characteristics as frequency of coverage, location within the paper, length of coverage and emphasis through repetition and reinforcement. Changes in these aspects of the data were compared to the political climate of the time, as defined by the five time periods outlined earlier.

At this first stage the main criterion for differentiating the nature of the news coverage was the 'type of discourse'. And at each of the following levels of analysis of the data, differences in location, length, content, and sources, for example, consideration was given to whether the article was in official, critical, or alternative discourse. As has been mentioned earlier, so few articles of alternative discourse were found that often this category was dropped from the analysis.

Elliott et al.'s distinctions in types of discourse were used to identify large-scale differences in the articles. Official discourse was identified as that which consisted of government reports on events (1986). All articles that consisted of reproductions of state policy in the form of assertions containing statements of who, where, and what were coded as official discourse.

Critical discourse was identified as those articles which criticized reports and versions of events. Those articles that challenged the official discourse with either negativity,
questions, or denouncements were coded as critical discourse. The criticism could be from within the nation or directed toward other political units.

The editorial cartoons were all coded as 'critical' since the nature of editorial cartoons is primarily satirical. Throughout their history, cartoons have been accepted as one genre that accepts the exaggeration of the physical features of politicians, the hyperbole of parody, and the use of picturesque metaphors to ridicule political decisions and decision-makers.

While the guidelines suggested by Elliott et al. were initially compelling, they proved difficult to use in practical application for two reasons. In the first place, this approach included both topics and sources within the same definition. The problem with this overlap became most apparent when official sources were voicing criticism, for example. This mixture made the analysis more complex than the 'type' category could accurately identify. However, this problem was overcome by using "TYPE" as a general indicator of the nature of the news coverage and then adding the more specific analysis of content through themes as well as the precise identification of sources.

In the second place, the alternative category proved problematic. Actually the problem with this category stemmed from the fact that there was so little alternative discourse. Furthermore, at the coding stage I identified this type of discourse with those articles that were neither official or
critical. So this category often became merely a default code: any data that did not read as official or critical discourse were coded as alternative. As a default category it ended up containing diverse articles, only a few of which could truly be considered 'alternative' discourse.

In practice, the type of discourse was coded by the first impression formed by reading the headline and the first two or three paragraphs. Since the articles were fairly consistently either declarative statements of political declarations, pronouncements and decisions or observations made by prominent officials throughout, those very few times when critical asides were included within official discourse did not present a problem. And since the alternative voices were rarely added, even at the end of lengthy report articles, a mixture of voices did not detract from the coding procedure either.

Once a general distinction had been made in the nature of the types of discourse, difference in the prominence, length, and format were examined for each. Did official discourse receive more front-page coverage? When did criticism gain prominence? And how did those changes correspond to shifts in the political climate as outlined by the five time periods? These were the questions that guided the analysis of whether the claims of the propaganda or the hegemony model best predicted the nature of the news coverage.

Field four of the dBase III system was used to record the number of the page in the paper on which the article was found.
This field had been titled 'PAGE'. Location became an important indicator of differences in prominence accorded the news articles.

The length of the article was calculated in centimeters, under the heading 'LENGTHCM'. A full page was usually about fifty-five centimeters long. Papers in the 50s had eight columns. Papers in the 70s had six columns. Approximations of length were made by estimating the length in multiples of 10 centimeters.

Another manner in which emphasis is provided involves the repetition of topics in various forms. Field five was called "FORM". Articles were catalogued according to whether they were main news items or banner-headline articles, regular news items, editorials, letters to the editor, cartoons or news commentaries. Reports, opinions and criticism on Canada's involvement in Vietnam were contained in a variety of articles. Most of the data was in the form of news reports of various lengths. On several occasions large headline in bold letters, placed at the top of the front page, indicated banner articles that amplified the header and content of the 'lead' story for that day.

Bruck attributed the column format as having a tendency to either reinforce or disperse the content of news items (1989:116). He claimed that "the most leeway in discursive openness or closure can be found in the column format" (ibid.). According to Bruck's research, the most openness is to be found in the editorials and opinion pieces. He added:
They are the most explicit news format for stating the parameters of the dominant consensus and arguing its merits. Yet, this dominant consensus does not automatically coincide with the interests of the social and political authorities of the day (1989:115).

Conceding these differences in the nature of news formats, the analysis of impinging news items must take into account the content and themes of the articles.

While prominence through frequency, location, length and form were assessed as physical indicators, differences in the nature of the content of the data were analyzed through the identification of discourse "TYPES". As outlined in the previous chapter, official discourse was defined as news that reproduced official versions of state policy, critical discourse as articles that challenged the official versions, and alternative discourse as content that had a distinctly different viewpoint from the usual perspectives (Elliot et al., 1986).

In addition to the coding of the content of articles in a very general way through the identification of types of discourse, the data were catalogued more specifically according to the subject matter of the articles. Since questioning whether openness or closure could be assessed, in part, through the nature and variety of themes of the data, the content of the news items were coded according to topics; themes, opinions, and attitudes; and structure of the articles.

As mentioned above, the thematic content of all articles specifically reporting on Canada's ICC involvement were coded
according to "TOPIC" in field six. Topic headings were ICC (for news reports about the Commission), GOV (for articles about government foreign policy, Canadian or other), PM (for Peace Movement articles), MIL (for articles on military production and spending), PRESS (for general reporting on the war), and WAR (this one refers to articles on war in general).

Records were made of the first three themes or main units of information for each article. These were called ‘THEMEONE’, ‘THEMETWO’ and ‘THEMETHRE’ in order to tally the themes and the primacy of their position for the collection. The theme fields were reviewed several times until code words could be selected to replace the more general descriptions of the themes.

The general identifiers that were used to code the themes in the subset of the ICC articles are detailed in Chapter III, section II (Confined Debate). Further content was identified as to whether the articles were about ACC (acceptance of the ICC role), ALL (the alliance of ICC members either as East versus West or the United States versus Communist countries), NEG (the negotiation of Canadian participation on the ICC), PRO-US (statements in defence of American activities), ANTIUS (statements against the United States in Vietnam) US (more general information about the United States), SVN (information about South Vietnam, VMINH anj later VCONG (information about North Vietnam, the Viet Minh, or, as they were later known, the Viet Cong), and the open heading of OTHER which recognized that more themes were covered which did not fit
under the other headings.

Identification of these themes was carried out by finding the code words directly within the text or by implying the content of the theme. Since these themes were very concrete—(a report on alliance, for example, could be directly inferred from a report on the relationships between the countries)—this coding process was fairly straightforward.

The decision was also made, after reviewing the themes of the articles on the ICC, to generate a separate set of coding categories that could be used to report attitudes and opinions toward the ICC and topics such as predictions about the success of the Geneva Agreement (GA) or Canada’s role, as a member of the ICC. Coding at this abstract level proved to be more difficult. However, if the news report summarized in a general way feelings that the ICC could be effective, e.g., the attitude could fairly easily be extrapolated from the content.

A gradient from positive to negative was set up within these categories (this analysis is reported in Chapter III, Section II as well). The coding system started by identifying all those articles that were OPT (optimistic either about the Geneva Agreement or the ICC), CON (concerned and beginning to question the feasibility of the GA and the ICC), SKEPT (skeptical), PESS (pessimistic), or DEN (denigration of the ICC).

In addition to the analysis of the themes, attention was given to closure or openness at the structural level. Knight and
Dean identify the skewing or shaping of presentations of reality to conform with official definitions or dominant ideas as a means to bring about closure (1982:145). Although they examined the theme of order and normality through reports on terrorism in Britain, claiming that closure is brought about "through the presentation of social disorder as the restoration of order...", their findings are adapted in this research (Ibid.). The content of the news articles, the homogeneity and conformity of the themes, as well as simplicity and repetition are used together as indicators of closure.

Not only was the debate within the news content reviewed in light of the themes of each article, but it was also explored between several articles on the same topic. Debate is also provided through 'companion pieces'. The category "IMPINGING DISCOURSE" was used to identify articles with 'companion pieces'. The decision to code articles according to this criterion is based on Knight and Taylor's dictum that discourse should be studied in terms of intra- and also inter-textuality, as described previously (1986:233).

Further support for the use of this criterion is provided by insights about journalistic practice. Dempson (1968) provided some tips on the use of companion stories to make a point. He recounted how the Toronto Star reported the Montreal story in which Diefenbaker bragged that he infuriated Khrushchev and made him bang his shoe on the table at the UN in 1960. In the companion story Brehl noted "that the shoe-hammering had taken place sixteen days after Dief had spoken" (Ibid.:122).
Following both Knight and Dean’s suggestion and Dempson’s observation, articles on either side of the item that are relevant to the theme of the data are identified as ‘Impinging Discourse’. Brief descriptions of the topics of these articles are included in the cataloguing process.

Up to this point the coding of the articles was directed toward the content. Three different approaches were used to code differences in the nature of the data: the type of discourse, and the themes and topics. Then an equally important feature of the articles was coded as well—the sources.

Citation practices and source reliance was the third area in which the data were analyzed for closure or openness. The coding of sources and several features of the journalistic process was directed toward generalizing the types of sources used and understanding aspects of the information-gathering process that could be ascertained from information within the articles. Sources were therefore coded in two separate ways, the status of sources and the information-gathering process.

The first five sources for each article were identified whenever possible. These were catalogued under the headings "PRI: SOURCE, SECSOURCE, THIRDSOURCE, FOURSOURCE, AND FIFTSOURCE". The names of the sources and their political, institutional or national affiliation was recorded for each article. Direct quotes were attributed without difficulty. Carefully calculated assessments were made on only very few occasions.
Each of the first five sources were further coded as primary, secondary or anonymous sources. As outlined in Chapter Two, and following the guidelines set by Hall et al., political, legal, and corporate leaders (who voiced their distinct views through press releases, agents, and conferences) were coded as primary definers (1978). Thus accredited representatives such as heads of state, top military personnel, members of foreign or external affairs, diplomats, and official spokesmen of the ICC (again, "spokesmen" is quite appropriate because none were women). Army chiefs from the French, American, Canadian, North Vietnamese, or South Vietnamese forces were classified as primary definers although their political distinctions were not lost in the coding process.

Even those officials who politically opposed the West, and Canada, were coded as primary definers. Officials from China, USSR, North Vietnam, or those labelled in the reports as 'Communists' along with the parallel category of military officials, were all coded as primary definers. Their distinct affiliation was reexamined later.

Men such as the historian Toynbee, the intellectuals Gellner and Holmes, and the protrctor Mel Watkins, were categorized separately as 'experts' and primary definers. They did not represent a significant proportion of the data.

Hall made a sharp distinction between primary and secondary definers. Among the various secondary definers Hall
identified less powerful politicians, less prominent institutionally affiliated members and members of the public.

In this research members of Canadian opposition parties, such as the New Democratic Party and subsequently Progressive Conservatives, were coded as secondary definers. Further secondary definers included members of the Canadian Peace Movement, family members of official sources, less prominent members of the ICC, and people selected at random in 'on the street' reports. This group included the public from Canadian and Vietnamese populations.

And finally, the category "anonymous", was needed as well. The code was used for sources that were described as 'well-informed', 'qualified', 'unnamed', 'contacts', 'reliable', 'diplomatic', and 'official'. These were usually confidential sources who were being protected from disclosure.

After coding the sources, several aspects of the information-gathering process were coded as well. Bylines or the names of the reporters, datelines or the geographical location for the origin of the report, and records of the press or wire service, whether Canadian Press, Associated Press, International Press, or Reuters were catalogued for each article. The names for these fields were of course, 'BYLINE', 'PRESS', 'DATELINE' and 'METHOD'.

The identification of reporters, when names were listed through the byline, was coded under the heading 'BYLINE'. Since the nature of the content of the articles was to be examined in
relation to the reporters, this heading allowed a tabulation of which reporters were most directly identified.

The identification of the reporter and his (all named reporters in this data set were men) direct contribution to the nature of the news coverage were mapped out through the byline and then further note was taken of the role of geography and the news-gathering process.

For example, the service of a wire service had been used in the information-gathering process, and as such, these services were coded under the heading ‘PRESS’.

Then the actual geographical location of where reporters were located when gathering the information was identified under the heading of ‘DATELINE’. Geographical place, location, or city add to the credibility, reliability and authenticity (all attributes of ‘authority’). Therefore the datelines were coded and examined for their role in the news gathering process. Whether articles had Ottawa datelines, for example, were used as indicators of which sources controlled the information-disclosure process. It was assumed that information about Canadian affairs from Washington, by American officials, would shape the reading in other ways, depending on the nature of the content. The identification of method, listed under the heading "METHOD" coded whether the reporter used observation, citation, or research to gather his
data³.

With most articles the imputation of source was clearly identified and therefore easy to classify. Names of sources and mention of citation were used as indicators of 'citation.' Articles that provided the directive that observation was used, directly identified the role of the reporter by including phrases such as 'was seen', or 'on the road to'. In these cases when reporters provided literal information of having witnessed an event, the method was coded as 'observation'.

There were times when recognition of whether the information was cited, observed or researched were not as easy to extrapolate. In that case some assumptions were made based on the nature of the information provided, indirect clues such as pictures of the reporter on location, or the identification of the reporter and the dateline. Again, with this category, 'research' became a catch-all for those articles in which neither citation or observation could be surmised. During Period I, for example, an example of alternative discourse was the interview with Ho Chi Minh about military training of the Viet Minh, *(Star, 06/04/55:1; 06/06/55:1)*. Since this was a theme that at this point had little relevance to the other discourse, it had been coded as alternative.

³No gender distinction was made in the cataloguing of articles since all the reporters were male. Any input by females was impossible to detect since it was never credited, except on a few occasions when female members of the Canadian peace movement were recognized as sources.
And several of these types of articles were slowly absorbed through assimilation into the other discursive types.

Nearly all editorials, commentaries, and news reviews appear to be written with the benefit of research, unless otherwise stated. This class of data, along with the editorial cartoons, were therefore usually categorized as having used research to gather information. Research therefore might consist of simply having read other news articles on a topic.

B. Identifying Process

Several aspects of each article were used to identify change and process. The structure of the articles, the content of headlines, the choice of vocabulary, changes in perspective, and shifts in the nature of the content were each used to trace variations in dominance, marginalization, and absorption.

First change and process was examined through the structural openness or closure as suggested by Elliott et al. (1986) for coding the presentation of information. 'PRESENTATION' was coded as either open or closed. The content of news articles can be constrained by the terms of reference set by the official discourse and be organized in a closed presentation, or be allowed to expand through the provision of space used to discuss, question, and examine a range of ideas or themes, forming an open presentation.

Presentations such as news bulletins were categorized as
closed because of the restrictions placed on the free flow of ideas. A closed presentation provided a terse summary or narrative of decisions or events. Articles that were coded as "closed" had a single sequence of ideas within the report and reflected only one version of events.

For example, the content of an article might present a linear version of a single aspect of ICC activity, such as the list of officers being sent to Vietnam, and then add more information about their years of experience (G&M, 7/21/54:3). The presentation of this article would be coded as closed.

Or another article might repeat further information about the personnel being assigned to the ICC and add information about the men’s concerns for their safety in Vietnam (Star, 01/26/73:1). Since these types of articles included a variety of perspectives on the issue, the diversity contributed to an open, less monotonous, presentation.

In a general way, "open" was used to describe articles in which official discourse was contested, or a variety of points-of-view were presented. Instead of a single point of view, articles that were coded as "open" displayed a presentation style that encouraged an examination of several, sometimes moderately conflicting ideas.

Further assessment of openness or closure in the structure of news articles was made through coding the nature of the information within the data. The category of ‘INFORMATION’
consisted of an analysis of whether ideas were presented in a tight or loose format. Again, according to Elliott et al. (1986), a 'tight' format is one in which the evidence and argument is organized to converge upon a single preferred interpretation and to close off other possible readings through the prevalence of formality. A 'tight' format, for example, was one in which the vocabulary consisted exclusively of nouns and verbs, as if the information had been directly reproduced from a government press release.

A 'loose' format, in contrast, was identified for articles in which "ambiguities, contradictions and loose ends are not fully resolved, leaving the audience with a choice of available interpretations" (Ibid.:270). A 'loose' format often included either slang, inferential adjectives or innuendos.

An early check was carried out of this 'INFORMATION' category. It was thought that perhaps short articles, through their very size, would restrict the free flow of ideas while longer articles would provide more opportunities for open presentations through the inclusion of a range of ideas. Longer articles were more liable to be open by virtue of their greater opportunity to provide space for plural sources and points of view. However, the structure of the content was not found to be restricted or determined by length.

The third field of the data-mapping system, named 'HEADLINE', recorded the headline or the caption, usually in the
form of large print at the top of the article. This field proved to be most important for the analysis of the content. Then too, the history of key words such as "red" or "farce" proved extremely useful for identifying the birth of a point of view or the repetition of ideas.

Key words were used to indicate which articles would be subjected to further analysis. For example, an analysis was made of the labels or names given to Ho Chi Minh and his allies.

An examination was also made of the manner in which the critical was integrated into the dominant world views. According to Hall, official sources sometimes begin to integrate ideas which were previously critical themes (1982:67). When this occurs, these ideas are sanctioned and occupy a position of preferred or dominant meaning. This revision in the dominant perspective through the absorption of the critical discourse, or a changing in themes, is how official sources "legitimize as common sense" ideas that previously threatened the hegemony of the dominant ideology (Knight and Dean, 1982:146).

Absorption and revision are not, however, the only features of the ideological process. At times critical discourse is hypothesized as marginalized by derogatory remarks, denial, or downgrading (Hall, 1982:67). Marginalization may be brought about by presenting a critical discourse "as dangerous, bizarre, comical" (Knight and Dean, 1982:146).

In other words, hegemony is brought about by the
inclusion and containment or expulsion of critical discourse. Critical discourse is anticipated to be 'domesticated' or presented as exaggerated threats to the social order. These changes in types of discourse are analyzed to provide a map of the ideological process or struggle for dominance during the period of Canada's involvement in the war in Vietnam.

Another manner in which critical discourse is stratified in relation to dominant discourse is by representing the criticism as a reaction; commonly initiated by asking "How do you feel about..." rather than "What do you think about...". In other words, the stratification represents an ideological shift. According to Knight, television coverage of the Vietnam war changed its "representation of the war from an objectified, top-down perspective to a closer, more subjective look at those actually conducting the fighting" (1988:96).

This change in perspective, or ideological shift, indicates a move away from the dominant perspective or narrow ideological position⁴. Changes in the data-gathering process, either from citation to observation and research or from official to critical sources, suggest "difficulties (in) naming" events or framing the meanings of events within a specific perspective (Hall, 1982:67).

⁴. The time when new developments in political policy, international relations, or other events occur is often named a 'signal' by journalists.
Changes can be used to identify the occurrence of an ideological gap or times when the media lack a system for understanding events. Hall, as described in the previous chapter, has identified these gaps as occurring when the media are struggling with explanations or conceptualizations of events (1973b:92).

Throughout Hall's research there are several recommendations for recognizing ideological gaps. In the first place Hall underscores the need to look at the meanings behind words (1982:71). The need to carefully examine words stems from the prevalence of contradictions reproduced within the content as consensus is being reshaped (Hall, 1977:346).

In a similar manner, Elliott et al. identified contradictions as central to ideological gaps (1986). During times when ideological gaps were surmised, programming and output were predicted to consist of "rather more conflict and contestation than the prevailing wisdom of critical media research might predict" (Ibid.:284).

Contradictions, conflicts and ideological gaps are examined both intratextually (within a specific article) and intertextually (through an analysis of the impinging discourse). Descriptions of journalistic work indicate that editors make distinct decisions about the location of news articles, therefore the identification of intertextual contradictions can be assumed to be a conscious decision.
A final characteristic of the ideological process is obscuring rather than informing; selecting or excluding; hiding by absorbing; and omitting or muting (Knight, 1982:16,36). Any identification of the obscured or omitted viewpoints can only be carried out in a qualitative manner since it is, by definition, either absent or nearly invisible.

The list of omitted or muted sources can be surmised by summarizing all the participants in the events. And the list of omitted themes can be gleaned from secondary sources on the history of events, from the records of political decisions, and from articles in the alternative press.

C. Semiotic Structural Analysis

In essence, the semiotic structural analysis of the data was conducted in a similar manner to how one would make a reading of a novel or film. In fact, comparisons with writing styles used in novels proved most helpful for exploring the voice or voicelessness of the writer, sentence structures, and plots.

Years of conditioning are difficult to break. One becomes so embedded in the stereotypical writing of news discourse that it is difficult to break free and say, how is it constructed? Only by comparing the nature of the text to a novel, was it possible to deconstruct the grammar and writing styles and note the changes with time.

Political news is usually reproduced in unbiased nouns
and politically sterile verbs. Generally the form of this kind of writing, similar to news on other topics, consists of simple sentence structures identifying the who, where, when, and what. Names of the actors, their political affiliation and nationality, and the actions and decisions taken are summarized in a format that seeks to exemplify objectivity and a lack of bias.

With far less frequency, adjectives are sometimes employed, as were nouns loaded with innuendo as well as conjecture. Connoted meanings in adjectives and nouns presented a separate problem both for detection and analysis. Subjective, inferential analysis was necessary. Generally it was simply a matter of identifying connotative terms and exploring their usages.

Jalbert has outlined three further suggestions for coding connotative words and signs (1984). He suggested coders recognize and note passivity with agent deletion, lack of clarity within nouns, adjectives and adverbs, and the choice of general referents. For example, when collective nouns were used, an examination was made of how the signs are the attributes of Cold War ideology in the form of alliances, conceptions of a "Free World", condemnation of the East, Communists, or any countries or their representatives which were not West and Capitalist. And in recognition of the 'sides' assumed within Cold War ideology, words were examined for differences when reporting events and actions by the East or the West.

Word selection was also examined for metaphorical
analysis. Since the literature on metaphor construction had identified the use of known words to express the unknown, words repeated, emphasized, or even unusual were explored for their role in the construction of meanings (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). For example, the word "honorable" was favored in early announcements of Canadian acceptance of an ICC role. Yet that approach was not identified in historical reports on events, alerting the reader to a favored, defined perspective on events.

A total of seven articles were selected for in-depth semiotic analysis with the benefit of earlier analysis. The articles selected for a detailed semiotic and lexical analysis were chosen on the basis of representation over time, samples of the different types of discourse, and the prominent critical articles toward the end of Canadian involvement in Vietnam.

At this micro-level, paradigmatic or specific word choices were first examined. Fowler et al. described how words can be used to 'neutralize' potentially antagonistic class relations by reporting on individual personalities and 'natural' differences (1979:21). Furthermore, words can be selected either for their denotative or connotative meanings, as described in Hall’s work (1982). An analysis of denotative terms proved useful for identifying definitions of situations, for example, but the selection of connotative words (and the plethora of implied meanings) were most pertinent to the semiotic analysis of the texts. As stated earlier, this was also the level at which
paradigmatic choices were examined for the construction of the chivalry metaphor.

Syntagmatic discursive patterns (or sentence structures) were examined next. At this level of analysis there was an identification of passive versus active, the deletion or identification of agency, and time framing. Passive syntagmatic choices have been described as having a "powerful neutralizing effect" (Ibid.:31). In the case of this research these choices of passive syntagyms were found to contribute to the closure of the text.

The exchange of verbs for nouns was also identified. In Language and Control, Fowler claimed that "nominalization was, inherently, potentially mystificatory that it permitted habits of concealment, particularly in the areas of power-relations and writers' attitudes" (1979:80). According to Fowler, mystification and reification are brought about through the naming process. The interchange of nouns and verbs enables the deletion of all agency—hence mystifying and closing political or diplomatic decision processes, for example. It became difficult to criticize because agency can only partially be glimpsed and guessed at (Ibid.:15).

Barthes called this deletion of agency through exnomination (without naming) a "self-disguising process" (1973:138). Exnomination has been identified as a discursive power, one that is hidden and one that is held by a certain class which is thereby in position to make commonsense of a class-based
clasense of the real. According to Fiske, "Exnominantion masks the political origin of discourse, and thus masks class, gender, racial and other differences in society. It establishes its sense of the real as the common sense....", thereby garnering consent (Fiske, 1987:43). Within the context of this research, therefore, exnominantion is equated to closure, since 'not naming' assumes a cohesive, understood consensus.

Not only is agency deleted by ideological closure, it is constructed through the naming process. Hall called this the construction of "preferred readings" (1977:341). And Hartley claimed that noun or verb selection was putting reports together "with signs that indicate how it should be understood...what it 'means'" (1988:63).

After examining tendencies toward closure or openness through word selection and sentence construction, the larger meanings of news articles were examined through the use of narrative. Classic realist narrative is the construction of a self-contained, internally consistent world. Narrative can be constructed through the linearity of cause and effect within a news report where details are listed to make sense in a specific sequence (Fiske, 1987:130). Through narrative a cohesive world is created to provide a realistic backdrop for the sources cited (Ibid.:152).

Finally, an overall meaning system was identified in the form of the chivalry metaphor. This metaphor was examined in
relation to manifest features of the data and Cold War ideology. Chivalry, gallantry, and honour were the ideas that first framed Canada's participation on the ICC. These ideas were perpetuated when themes of economic costs and benefits were never seriously addressed. Any portrayals of Canadians as honorable diplomats were not reviewed until the final stages of ICC activity.

SUMMARY

In summary, this chapter has outlined the methodological considerations pertinent to this research. First the chapter explained and justified combining content with semiotic structural analysis of the data. Then, a description was provided of how the data were gathered from the newspapers. A description of the cataloguing process outlined the characteristics of the data that are being analyzed. A review of the guidelines used to examine the data explained how theories of media recommended the methodological approach used to formulate conclusions on the open or closed nature of the data, the ideological process, the possibility of ideological gaps and the way in which sources and information are excluded from the coverage.

And finally, this chapter has provided a description of the coding procedures used to record the physical attributes of the data, to identify the content and sources of news articles, and to describe the dominance, absorption, and rejection of themes of the
news reports on Canada’s involvement in the war in Vietnam.

In the next three chapters the data are analyzed to assess whether the news reports followed the propaganda or the ideological process model. Characteristics of prominence, content, sources, and change are examined within the context of the five periods of the war.

Predictions of the propaganda model, with its assumption of a powerful elite, stress the prominence of official versions of events, a confined debate, and an overwhelming reliance on primary definers without recognition of shifts in political stances. The ideological process model, with its theory of hegemony as a process of contestation, change, and renewed dominance, predicts renegotiation and renewal as political climates vary. Having coded with an emphasis on empirical detail in an effort to allow the precise content of news articles to lead the analysis, it was then possible to start assessing which of the models more accurately describe the news production process during this era of Canada’s history.
CHAPTER THREE

PROMINENCE, THEMES, AND SOURCES

Analysis of the data began by exploring features of the news coverage according to claims made by the propaganda model. As outlined in greater detail in Chapter One, this model places high reliance on the prominence accorded official or power elite perspectives on events, the limited range of viewpoints expressed, and an overwhelming reliance on official sources.

This chapter reports on the physical prominence accorded official versus critical discourse, differences in the nature of the content between these two types of coverage, and the media's propensity to favour the views of political leaders. At this early stage of the analysis it also became clear that the propaganda model had not fully predicted the rise to prominence of the critical discourse and had underestimated the independent role of journalists.

I. PROMINENCE

The prominence of news coverage on Canada's involvement in Vietnam was examined using several different indicators. Prominence was assessed through the frequency of the different
types of discourse, location and length differences, and the format. Findings indicate that official versions of events were most frequently reported, constituted a larger proportion of the coverage, were the longest, and were most often featured in the banner-headline format.

A. **Frequency of Coverage**

First, a rough indicator of prominence was assessed by examining how frequently news stories about Canada in Vietnam were reported. The rate of coverage was calculated by adding up how many month’s worth of newspapers were scanned, then calculating the average number of articles found per month. As Table 3.1 indicates, rates of coverage varied considerably during each of the time periods.

The rate of coverage began with 3.4 articles per month scanned during the beginning of American and Canadian involvement in Period I. During this initial period of liberal-moderate consensus, when news on Canadian participation was novel and highly newsworthy, the rate of coverage was only half of the average rate of coverage throughout the length of the story. Then coverage of Canada in Vietnam dropped sharply to 1.0 articles (per months scanned) during the conservatism of Period II, when ICC involvement became a contentious military and diplomatic issue. Just at a time when military activity by the USA was secretly being increased in Vietnam, Canada’s peripheral role as member of the ICC received scant coverage. Mirroring the increasingly conservative political
climate, news coverage was dramatically low.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Papers (months)</th>
<th>Articles</th>
<th>Rate (per month)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I (1954-55)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II (1956-64)</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III (1965-67)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV (1968-72)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V (1973)</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Then coverage increased considerably to 9.2 articles per months scanned from 1965 to 1967 (Period II) when the war escalated. Pearson’s liberal-moderate consensus and the burgeoning protest against the war were two possible influences on this rate of coverage.

As in a former conservative period the rate of coverage decreased during the ‘ideological containment’ of the Trudeau era in Period IV. At the height of the war and the height of public protest against the war, the data included only 4.8 articles per months scanned. In large part the decrease in coverage could be anticipated because Canada’s role and the work of the ICC had become almost nonexistent.

While a number of historical and journalistic factors may have influenced the rate of coverage during these four periods, one can reliably conclude that each time there was a conservative
consensus, the rate of coverage was the lowest. During Periods II and IV, when Ross's historical analysis of political debates about Canadian participation in Vietnam were most contentious (within the halls of political and diplomatic decision-making), the vigour of the debate was not reflected in the extent to which the public was kept abreast of that debate.

The most noteworthy feature of the frequency of coverage was the explosion in number of articles in 1973. The rate of coverage reached its peak just when Canadian involvement in Vietnam ended. During Period V the rate of the coverage was 18.2 articles per months scanned. After a Canadian liberal-moderate consensus had been reestablished, when the debates were finished and Canada's role clearly defined, (when the news about the war was a summation of events), the papers provided the most extensive coverage.

Intense reporting at the end of these events suggest that newspapers play only a minimal role in social consensus formation. Only when politicians had established their consensus, was the public more fully informed.

B. Proportion of Official Discourse

The primary coding distinction for the data involved the identification of the types of discourse. Below, Table 3.2 lists the number of articles for each discursive type. Of the 622 news items gathered in this collection, 423 or 68% consisted of official discourse. In 184, or 29.5%, of the articles, criticism was expressed either against the Geneva Agreement or the countries
participating in the events in Vietnam. Only 15 articles, or 2.5%, expressed alternative information or opinions and that changed very little over the time span of this news story.

The highest percentages of official discourse occurred early in the war, when a strong consensus about involvement on the ICC occurred (79%). The percentage of official discourse decreased gradually until Period IV (and the ideological containment policy of that period) when public protest against the war was the strongest. The percentages of critical discourse gradually increased throughout the war, but it decreased markedly in the last period.

These figures show that although Trudeau’s government is interpreted by Ross as entering a period of ‘ideological containment’ in 1968, that containment only decreased the official discourse, it did not deter the increased critical discourse (1984:326). By Period IV, in reflection of the growing voice of protest, only 57% of the coverage was official discourse. Criticism of, and protest against, the war had gained a stronger representation within the news reports, indicating that when the government restricted its interactions with the media an ‘information’ gap was created in the paper’s “newshole”, thereby expanding opportunities for official discourse to be replaced by critical viewpoints.

1 As argued earlier, other than a brief reference to alternative discourse when appropriate and the in-depth analysis of an example of this type of discourse in Chapter V, further analysis of this type of discourse was discontinued.
The amount of official discourse in Period V, as in Period III, suggested that the critical was absorbed into dominance and granted equality with the official, reflecting the more open, liberal-moderate position held by government officials. Official discourse was 71% of the data at this time. This was a considerable increase in coverage at a time when the ICC was only supervising American withdrawal and consensus had shifted to what was described as a liberal-moderate conservative position.

Critical discourse constituted a moderate proportion of all the data—nearly 30% of the articles. The amount of critical discourse had increased with time, especially during Period IV when public outcry against the war was the strongest. At that time critical discourse was 40% of the data. In part, the strength of the critical discourse was inflated through the inclusion of editorial cartoons. These cartoons, because they numbered 44, had a strong impact on the numbers.
On average, critical discourse within the news articles constituted one-fifth to one-quarter of the news coverage. These amounts suggest that when journalists attempt to incorporate balanced coverage into the news reporting process, that balance is not in terms of fifty/fifty coverage but rather the three-quarters to one/quarter that this data set indicates.

The critical discourse reached its peak in Period IV (40% of the data) when public protest also peaked. Although this was the period of "Contained Conservatism" by Canadian politicians, their absence from the critical discourse is overwhelmingly substituted by the force with which the Canadian and American public organized to participate in the news process.

The subsequent decrease in the critical discourse to 28% in Period V does not reflect a decrease in opposition to Canadian participation in the war but an absorption by the official sources of the critical issues. At this time Canadian politicians were openly participating in a critique of the war and Canada's participation in it.

The most important findings about the nature of critical discourse from these calculations are, therefore, an increase in criticism as first politicians (in Period III) and then the public (in Period IV) voice their opposition to the war. Critical discourse was most prominent during Period V, when the debates were resolved. That rise in visibility occurred at a time when

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2Research on political reporting at the Fraser Institute indicated a similar percentage of critical news reporting (Fitzsimmons, 1989).
publication of the Pentagon Papers had absorbed criticism into a place of prominence within the discourse.

C. Location and Length

Not all news items are equal; location within the paper is a crucial indicator—a notion that is central to Herman and Chomsky's work (1988). Articles placed near the 'truss ads' are deemed of lesser value. Therefore notice must be taken of the position the articles are given.

When the ICC was first created, 43% of the articles were located on page one of the paper. (See Table 3.3.) That percentage decreased to 31% in Period II, dropped sharply to 15% in Period III and 13% in Period IV, and then rose considerably to 23% in Period V during the period of critical absorption.

These percentages are not an accurate reflection of the differences between the prominence granted official versus critical discourse because of the preponderance of official discourse in the sample and the practice of not consistently reporting prominent international events on the front pages. However, one important observation should be noted about the location of the types of discourse. Articles containing critical discourse were much less likely to be placed on page one.

The critical articles did not gain prominence until the end of the war when most of the articles that gained front page prominence also formed the banner headline. Two of these very prominent critical articles were written by Charles Taylor and are
examined in greater detail in Chapter V.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Official</th>
<th>Critical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I ('54-55)</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II ('56-64)</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III ('65-67)</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV ('68-72)</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( 1973 )</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>140(24%)</td>
<td>115(27%)</td>
<td>22(16%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The location of articles was not the only way to gain a sense of the prominence of coverage on a news event. The length of an article is also relevant. As was explained in Chapter Two, measured estimates are a tradition in content analysis. Therefore a similar estimate of lengths was made of the news items collected for this data set.

There was a general tendency for the length of the articles to grow with time. In Period I the average length of the articles started at 58 cm. Other than the decrease in length during the confusion and decreased military involvement of Period II (to an average of 48 cm.) there was a general tendency to gradually increase the coverage of Canada's participation in the war in Vietnam. By Period V, when there was such a dramatic increase in the number of articles, the average article was 99 centimeters long, nearly twice the length of the articles in Period
I.

A comparison was made of the lengths of the articles in light of the discourse type. (See Table 3.4.) In Period I, the average length of both the articles containing official discourse and all the other articles was 58 centimeters. The average length of all articles decreased in Period II when coverage of these events were most sporadic. But then for the next three periods of time, the size of the articles grew gradually, implying that the length of coverage reflects the life-span of a news topic.

A comparison of the average length of critical articles shows that they were often a little shorter (49 cm.) than all the other articles (53 and 52 cm.) in the first phases of the war.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Official</th>
<th>Critical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I ('54-55)</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II ('56-64)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III ('65-67)</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV ('68-72)</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V (1973 )</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Average</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only during Period V, when the decisions were being made about the termination of the war, did the average length of the critical discourse increase considerably. During the last period the average length of the critical articles increased by about 30
centimeters, as did the articles with official discourse. The increased average length of the articles and the increased prominence both support the notion that an increase in critical content may be included in the coverage during periods of political change when there was more to report.

An increase in prominence and length of critical discourse may be the first indicator that criticism is gaining dominance. A further examination of the themes and the sources, later in the chapter, will further demonstrate how the critical discourse was being absorbed by the dominant discourse.

E. Format

In addition to frequency, location and length, format is a central issue of debate in the propaganda versus hegemony models. The propaganda model stressed the tendency for the media to record critical discourse in marginal locations. An examination was made as to the different formats used for the official and critical discourse.

With the passing of time the proportion of official discourse changed somewhat but its location within the paper did not. When the format of news articles was examined in Table 3.5, it was found that the greatest diversity was found in Period III and the least diversity was in Period IV during the period of political ideological containment. When only the official discourse was examined, that trend was reinforced. As Table 3.5 summarizes, official discourse was found mainly in news articles—at the least
73% and at the most 94%. These figures indicate that, similar to the trend for the overall data set, the most

diversity in official discourse occurred in Period III and the least diversity in this reporting form was found in Period IV.

A wider range of article types were used to convey critical discourse. As with the official discourse, the greatest diversity of critical articles occurred in Period III when 2% of the critical discourse was found in banner stories, 36% in less prominent news stories, and 62% occurred in the other formats. This table also emphasizes the prominence that critical discourse finally received in Period V when as much as 4% of the critical discourse appeared in the banner headlines—more than at any other time.

In total, much of the criticism was concentrated in the news articles—45%. As well, 53% occurred in "other" formats which
included such diverse forms as news commentaries, editorials, letters to the editor, a summary article, a Hansard report and a caption to a picture. In other words, the criticism was generally evenly distributed throughout the types of discourse except for the editorials and the news commentaries which have a tradition of taking a critical stance.

Up to this point the analysis favors the closure predicted by the propaganda model—the tendency for newspapers to favour official versions of events is certainly being supported. However, that model has overlooked the prominence that can be gained by critical voices and the vagaries of the nature of press coverage as it responds to officialdom, and even to the public (although in a limited way). Furthermore, this model with its static conceptions of power, does not include a consideration of the political changes that are possible.

II. CONFINED DEBATE

Once the more blatant physical features of the data had been summarized, the next step was to define the range of the content of the articles. At this stage, through the use of a detailed coding of the articles, a more precise outline was developed of the topics and attitudes of the news coverage. Furthermore, the discovery was made that there was a telling difference between the official and the critical discourse in the nature of the content for these types of discourse.
A. Themes of Official Discourse

In order to assess the parameters of debate a detailed examination was conducted of the 387 articles that reported explicitly on the ICC. For each of the periods of the war, a tally was made of the frequency with which the different themes were included in the data. Then the numbers of the diverse themes were totalled at the bottom of the table. And finally, in order to more precisely assess the

Table 3.6
Themes of Official ICC Discourse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERS</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEG</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REP</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WITH</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORG</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROL</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERSPR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COOP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COST</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Themes | 52 | 52 | 73 | 74 | 210 | 461 |
Articles     | 47 | 52 | 59 | 41 | 104 | 303 |

diversity of themes, the bottom row of numbers repeated the total number of articles containing official discourse.

A comparison between the total number of themes and the number of articles allowed for an assessment of the
diversity of themes for each period. Period II, according to these figures, had the lowest diversity of themes. Although there were 52 identifiable themes there were also 52 articles—meaning that each of the articles contained only one theme. Calculations for Period V highlight a greater frequency with which themes were repeated. For that period many of the 104 articles contained two or more themes.

The most striking feature of this tally of themes was the innocuous nature of the most prominent topics. The most prominent theme was information about ICC personnel (PERS) (78) which simply listed the names of Canadians selected to work in Vietnam and, on rare occasions, listed the attributes such as "cool-headedness" and familiarity with a number of languages that were used for personnel selection (G&M, 07/24/54:2; 08/12/54:12; 08/25/54:3; 02/21/56:7).

Another common theme of the articles concerned the issues and controversies surrounding the release of ICC reports (REP) with little or no information about their content (48). Readings of the reports were criticized as happened in 1955 when the headline read, "Reds Twist Canada Envoy Report Into Propaganda"; or in 1962, when the headline read, "Canadian-Indian Report Distorts Truth: Peking" (Star, 04/22/55:3; G&M, 06/08/62:21). Whenever a new set of reports were published, political pressures for full disclosure of the reports were reported (G&M, 03/06/65:10).

Two further features of the nature of the themes
were telling. First, the more controversial topics, Canadian co-optation by American diplomats and accusations of partisan Canadian alliances were most often repeated in Period III when Canadian foreign policy was most liberal. Reports on these topics decreased when Canadian foreign policy was more conservative, during Periods II, IV and V. These topics were also absent in Period I, a liberal moderate period. But at that time these types of issues could only have been anticipated.

Only during Period V, when Canadian involvement in Vietnam comes to a close, was there a great variety of themes. As the last two figures in the table indicate, there were 104 articles on the ICC during that period, and there were twice as many themes.

B. **Themes of Critical Discourse**

Official discourse was found to be narrowly focussed in content. This was ever more true for the critical discourse. In comparison to the themes of the official discourse, there was also low level of 'substance' to the critical discourse, except in period V. In fact, this type of discourse often did not directly address concrete issues.

While political alliance had not been an important issue in the official discourse (except in Period III), it was the most frequent topic of the critical discourse. But many of the more controversial issues, such as co-optation and cost,
were consistently overlooked in the critical discourse.

Several other controversial areas received only moderate attention. Reports released by the ICC, ICC withdrawal, and accountability were addressed in some of the critical articles.

Table 3.7
Themes for Critical Discourse On ICC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>'54-55</th>
<th>'56-64</th>
<th>'65-67</th>
<th>'68-72</th>
<th>'73</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEG</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WITH</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COOP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORG</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COST</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERSPR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total Themes | 4  | 2  | 7  | 13 | 31 | 57 |
| Articles     | 5  | 8  | 20 | 24 | 27 | 84 |

Critical discourse during Period V contained the greatest diversity of themes and topics. Period V was also the time when the longest critical articles were printed—those over 250 centimeters in length. In fact, the lengthy articles did not appear until criticism of the war had been legitimized through the release of the Pentagon Papers and accepted because American participation in the war was coming
to an end.

A review of the number of themes in contrast to the number of articles provided further support for the claim that the critical discourse lacked substance. The bottom row of figures for Table 3.7 totals the number of critical articles for each period. A comparison between the numbers of themes and numbers of articles shows that the number of critical themes fall short of the number of articles. For the first four periods, the number of themes is far less than the number of articles containing critical discourse which indicates a very narrow debate. Only in Period V, at the resolution of Canadian ICC activities, does the number of themes (31) surpass the number of critical articles (27). In other words, only at this stage do the critical articles more frequently address substantive issues.

Using these changes in the variety of themes it was concluded that there was a general tendency to include a wider variety of topics during the more politically liberal periods, reinforcing the openness of the discourse during such times.

C. Attitudinal Content

This distinction between the official and critical discourse was reinforced when the attitudinal content of the articles was examined.

To tally the attitudes expressed toward the ICC, the articles were coded according to whether they praised or
criticized the ICC, with a range of several other attitudes in between. Articles that expressed positive sentiments on the ICC, or the work it was doing, were readily distinguished from those that were negative. Although the gradients of optimism or pessimism could have been methodically calculated by the frequency of use of positive or negative words, a scale from 'positive' to 'concerned' to 'negative' was constructed by reference to both the sentiment of specific words and general themes.

Table 3.8, below, summarizes the attitudes expressed toward the ICC within the official discourse. The official discourse contained positive and negative attitudinal content as well. The attitudinal content favored anti-American statements (in 20 articles), concern (on 19 occasions), positive statements (18), and optimism (14). Negative attitudes were less likely to be included. In part, this occurred because of the very definition of this type of discourse. Yet, negative attitudes were sometimes woven into the content of official discourse. Negativity included denunciation (5 times), pessimism (10), and skepticism (9).

When the political climate was most liberal and most anti-American, as it was in Period III, that criticism is reflected in the news items. But when the political stance was pro-American, as it was in Period II, again that position was reflected in the news reports.

It is also worth noting that the statements in
support of the USA, during Period II, occurred when the

Table 3.8
Attitudinal Content Of ICC Official Discourse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>'54-55</th>
<th>'56-64</th>
<th>'65-67</th>
<th>'68-72</th>
<th>'73</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Praise</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optimism</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-US/SVN</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Com</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concern</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Com</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-US</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pessimism</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skepticism</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denunciation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Themes: 46 57 54 30 59 246
Articles: 47 52 59 41 104 303

American military was actually most subversive in its activity in Vietnam. Although that subversive behaviour could not, by the nature of the activities, be expected to be included in the news coverage at this time, the discrepancy between the pro-American sentiment and the political and military reality of American involvement in Vietnam is surprising and ironic.

All in all, official discourse was less likely to contain attitudinal content. As the last two numbers in Table 3.8 demonstrate, three hundred and three articles contained only 246 items of attitudinal content, a marked difference from the final figures for the substantive content in Table
3.6.

When the attitudinal content of the critical discourse on the ICC are examined, the criticism focussed exclusively on the more negative end of the spectrum. Again, that characteristic is best explained through the coding process. However, it should be emphasized that, unlike the official discourse, the critical discourse did not contain even a small measure of positive content.

As the table indicates, the most frequent attitude for the critical discourse was denunciation (DEN) (on 25 occasions). Denunciation was directed, for example, at the Geneva Agreement, the work of the ICC, and at Canadian criticism of American military actions (G&M, 07/26/54:15; Star, 04/05/55:1; 12/08/65:7). Anti-American statements were expressed in 21 articles. This was followed closely by an equally negative attitude of pessimism (PESS) which appeared 14 times.

As Table 3.9 demonstrates, negative attitudes varied throughout time periods. Periods I, III and V, within a liberal-moderate political consensus, were the only times when anti-Communist statements were included in the critical discourse. While these numbers are few (3 articles) it is nonetheless worth noting that during these periods, there was less bias in the criticism with respect to this topic.

Pessimism was most pronounced in Period V. That amount of pessimism reflects more explicitly the number of
Table 3.9
Attitudinal Content of Critical Discourse on ICC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>'54-55</th>
<th>'56-64</th>
<th>'65-67</th>
<th>'68-72</th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denunciation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-US</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pessimism</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-US/SVN</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Com</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concern</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skepticism</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Com</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Praise</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optimism</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Themes</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Articles</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

times reports on the possibilities for the ICC to fill its mandate occurred.

Only 25 of the 387 articles on the topic of the ICC contained the 'denunciation' theme. But a telling characteristic of the occasion of the denunciation was that it was most frequent during Periods III and V. At that time when Canadian foreign policy took its most liberal political position, denunciation was the most concentrated. And later, at the resolution of Canada’s ICC participation, denunciation was again loud and strong. This concentration of denunciation overlaps with the control primary definers have over the critical discourse--strong criticism was only reported when expressed by primary definers.
III. Sources

This research found a total of 821 distinct sources within the data set³. Source identification occurred most consistently in news articles, and less frequently in news summaries or commentaries. Of all the identified sources, 666 (81%) were coded as primary definers, 131 (16%) were coded as secondary definers and 24 (3%) were anonymous sources. In essence, the research verified the high reliance on primary definers predicted in the literature (Hall et al.:1978).

A. Reliance on Primary Definers

Official discourse, in part by nature of the definition of this type of data, used primary definers 86% of the time. Yet this number rejects complete reliance on primary definers as claimed in the propaganda model, since a sizable proportion of credited sources were secondary definers and anonymous sources (14%). The percentage of anonymous sources remained steady at about 3% throughout the data.

On average seventy-five percent of the sources for critical discourse were primary definers. And for this type of discourse as much as 25% of all citations were expressed by secondary definers.

For the official and critical discourse, distinct

³For 139 of the 622 articles no sources were cited. Some of the articles without sources were editorials, news photographs, cartoons, and letters to the editor. Sources were also nonexistent for articles which had been written using only research or observation.
changes were examined in the context of changes in the political climate in which events and quotes were cited. Table 3.10 outlines how source reliance changed according to the periods of Canadian involvement in the war and within the discourse types. The use of primary sources decreased gradually throughout the data for both the official and critical discourse. That gradual decrease was offset by a parallel increase in the number of secondary definers.

Surprisingly, there was little reliance on anonymous sources for the critical discourse; on only 3 occasions were anonymous sources used. Although one might anticipate that sources would more likely be protected and unidentified when expressing criticism, this assumption could not be identified within the data set.

These figures indicate a limited diversity of sources as the news coverage continued rather than any changes in selection of sources as the political climate changed. For example, there was a gradual, overall tendency to increase the reliance on secondary definers from 92% for the official discourse and 81% for the critical discourse to 81% and 68% respectively.

The proportion of official sources grows even larger when military sources, who were also official sources, are included. A total of 45 articles had military officials as the prime source for citations. When the figures for the primary use of official sources combine both the officials and the
military, the percentages show that 75% or three-quarters of the articles used prominent official sources.

As outlined above, the official sources were usually heads of state or their representatives. Official sources voiced their information through press releases and press conferences. Sometimes the sources were from several different nationalities.

Several specific examples demonstrate how the use of sources changed during the different periods. During Period I and Canada's liberal-moderate consensus, a wider range of sources was used. In this first period, cited sources included

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Official</th>
<th>Critical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I (1954-55)</td>
<td>PRI- 69 (92%)</td>
<td>PRI- 9 (81%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SEC- 4</td>
<td>SEC- 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II (1956-64)</td>
<td>PRI- 102 (95%)</td>
<td>PRI- 10 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SEC- 0</td>
<td>SEC- 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III (1965-67)</td>
<td>PRI- 139 (82%)</td>
<td>PRI- 30 (61%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SEC- 22</td>
<td>SEC- 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV (1968-72)</td>
<td>PRI- 85 (81%)</td>
<td>PRI- 33 (61%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SEC- 14</td>
<td>SEC- 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V (1973)</td>
<td>PRI- 146 (81%)</td>
<td>PRI- 36 (68%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SEC- 27</td>
<td>SEC- 17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Averages 86% 75%
Peking Radio, Press sources identified as "Communist", Prime Minister St. Laurent, French political and military leaders, North Vietnamese officials, Ho Chi Minh, and Canadian ICC diplomats.

During Period II and Canada's more conservative political consensus, the number of sources was less diversified. At this time, official sources were confined to Canadian External Affairs Minister Green, American military personnel, and Ho Chi Minh through Radio Hanoi.

In contrast, Period III articles cited a much wider range of sources reflective of more inclusive opportunities within the liberal-moderate consensus of that period. Sources for this period included Pearson, External Affairs Minister Martin, North Vietnamese leaders on Radio Hanoi, American Secretary of State Dean Rusk, New Democratic leader Douglas, and ICC diplomats.

The most noteworthy feature of the citations for Period IV was the infrequency with which Trudeau was quoted. External Affairs Minister Sharp was the chief spokesperson during most of that period and Trudeau was only cited once. Consistent with the conservative political consensus of containment, he restricted his interaction with the media. The first time he was cited within this collection of data was on December 23, 1972, when he criticized American bombing of North Vietnam (G&M,12/23/72:01). Trudeau was also cited in a perfunctory report on the send-off of ICC troops in Period V
(Star, 01/27/73:01).

And although Trudeau was not cited on other occasions within this period, the widest range of sources did occur during this time. ICC Chairman Gauvin and External Affairs Minister Sharp were cited most often, although American, Soviet, Chinese, Canadian, North and South Vietnamese were cited as well.

Critical discourse was also voiced by primary definers. There were 15 articles in which prominent officials not affiliated with the West participated in critical debate on the Geneva Agreement, ICC reports or ICC actions in Vietnam. The criticism was expressed by China, Russia and other countries (often through radio reports) traditionally labelled 'Communist'. It was voiced by the Vietnamese as well, including the Viet Minh, the Viet Cong and South Vietnamese Nationalists.

Some of the voices were muffled by not identifying sources. There was a total of 24 occasions on which anonymous sources were used in the official and critical discourse.

In several of the articles anonymous sources provided "behind the scenes" information. Many times anonymous sources were used for 'sensitive' material. The information cited with anonymous sources could be strategically sensitive in a military sense or diplomatically sensitive. For example, in the G&M, an article about how the "Americans were annoyed with Canadians" serving on the ICC,
the source was described as "well informed" (11/23/72:01).

A further examination was made of the nature of news items in which multiple sources were cited. As could be expected, this collection of data contained 129 instances when Canadian officials were cited as the first or initiating source and 42 articles in which they were cited as the second or responding source. United States officials were cited 57 times as the initial definer and 32 times as responding sources. Considering the number of times that ICC officials were used as information sources--71 as first and 21 as responding sources--it would appear that Canadian officials generally established and defined the slant or perspective of the information Canadian newspapers released about Canadian foreign affairs.

B. Secondary Definers

As described above, secondary definers constituted only 16% of the sources cited throughout the data set.

For 412 articles, primary definers were first cited and in only a total of 71 articles were secondary definers such as the public, the opposition or members of the peace movement listed as the source who were first cited. Of these, 19 were responded to by primary definers who adjusted, modified, or revised the initial arguments. The end result was that for a large proportion of the total citations primary definers initiated the definitions of the situation.
Only in Period III was Ho Chi Minh allowed a prominent voice. At that time Ho Chi Minh’s letter to India gained front-page coverage in a banner headline (Star, 02/08/66:01). But in spite of the liberal-moderate political climate of this era, the papers nonetheless still distanced themselves from the North Vietnamese. For although Ho wrote a letter to Canada at the same time, as recognized in the G&M’s banner, the Star distances Canadian involvement from Ho by only announcing Ho’s petition to India (G&M, 02/09/66:01).

Members of the Canadian Peace Movement were not usually cited in the capacity of definers. Instead, articles coded as 'Peace Movement' focussed on information about Canadian Peace Movement activities. For example, one article reported on the need for the police to be "out in force" since nearly 3,000 marchers were anticipated in Ottawa (G&M, 03/28/66:01). Only passing reference to the nature of the protest was reported with the repetition of the word "complicity" (Star, 03/28/66:01).

The count for the number of times the peace movement was cited in this collection of articles is 12 times. First, in 1955 when Quakers provided information about events in Saigon (G&M, 04/06/55: ). While members of the New Democratic

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"According to Gitlin, there is a tendency by the media to trivialize the peace movement (1980:3,9). He identified a focus on the numbers and the physical activities of members of the Peace Movement, on where they marched, for example, as examples of trivialization. An example of this kind of article was printed in the Star, March 26, 1966, page 14."
party and Canadian Academics as well as members of the American Peace Movement had been cited earlier. Canadian members were first cited through a letter the Toronto Peace Movement was handing out in a boycott against Dow Food Wrapping in protest to Dow's napalm production (G&M, 03/13/65:04; G&M, 03/15/54:05; Star, 10/12/65:46; Star, 01/12/67:26).

As predicted by Gitlin, the peace movement was not given a very strong voice (1980:3). Members of the peace movement rarely made statements. They were almost always restricted to a responsive role. The peace movement was rarely allowed to voice an opinion without rejoinders being included in the same article.

Kate MacPherson's article on the growth of the Voice of Women was a rare example of a member of the peace movement expressing her views (Star, 01/27/73:20). Two other members of the Canadian peace movement received considerable prominence during this time, Vennema and Culhane. Dr. Vennema was a medical doctor and Claire Culhane was a nurse. Both were engaged in considerable humanitarian efforts in South Vietnam. Vennema received the greater coverage. On about 5 of the occasions when peace movement members were cited, it was Vennema who was the individual source. On two of these occasions, the citation was from a letter he had written to his brother in Dundas, Ontario.

Culhane, another member of the peace movement, was
cited twice in this collection, once in a news event and once she had an indirect citation through a letter to the editor. Her views on Vietnam were recorded in the monograph entitled Why is Canada in Vietnam? The truth about our Foreign Aid. Culhane had served as a nurse in Quang Ngan, Vietnam, from 1967 to 1968 as a member of the UN's World Health Organization (WHO) and Canadian University Services Overseas (CUSO). Her work and observations led her to believe that foreign aid to Vietnam helped prolong the war (1972:11). Possibly because of the radical nature of her thoughts, Culhane was never allowed a voice in the peace movement news.

When the Canadian Peace Movement was most active, reports were printed in the papers examined. According to Moffat, Canadians most actively participated in protests against the war in Vietnam in March of 1966, and they were very active in May of 1970 as well (Undated manuscript:95).

There were several occasions when members of the peace movement used the letters to the editor format to make their opinions heard. On March 3, 1964, the Stax printed a letter by Bertrand Russell. He was protesting American involvement in Vietnam. He listed three reasons why the United States should withdraw from Vietnam. He asserted that the "Viet Cong of South Viet Nam have a non-Communist majority", that their policy stipulates "that Viet Nam should be neutral and independent of East and West in the Cold War", and that the United States was misrepresenting Ho Chi Minh's statements
(Star, 03/067/64:6). It is of interest to note that, while Russell had sent a copy of this letter to a Canadian newspaper, he never once made reference to Canada’s role in the war.

Thus far, several indicators of the weakness of critical discourse have been identified in terms of prominence and content. Earlier, it was shown that the critical discourse lacked impact because it had a less prominent position. In the previous section, it was concluded that the critical discourse lacked substance because it did not address precise aspects of the issues reported. And at this stage of the research critical discourse was found to be further weakened because it was less likely to be repeated by primary definers, and frequently not substantiated by the citation of datelines or reporters.

C. Geography

Levant and Taylor accused "Washington" of influencing the Canadian information process (1986) (1974). Geography as authority has also been identified by Schudson in "Deadlines, Datelines, and History" (1986). Hence datelines were examined to see what trends could be identified. Did the early articles indicate that federal government press releases had formed the most common voice of authority? Did that change toward the end of the war?

A tabulation of the datelines indicated that Ottawa
was the most common geographical location for news about Canadian involvement in the war (for 23% of the articles that had datelines included). An equally substantial percent of the articles with datelines identified Canada as the geographical location (21%). Another common location was Saigon (18%).

Very little of the news about Canada in Vietnam originated from Washington. Only a total of 48 news articles (out of the 556 articles that had datelines) listed Washington as the geographical source. These figures indicate that politicians in Ottawa exercised considerable control over the news source.

A similar trend was identified in the datelines of the critical discourse. The largest proportion of critical discourse originated from Ottawa (21%) and other cities in Canada (21%). During Period V Ottawa and other Canadian datelines demonstrated an even stronger centralization of geographical source. Toward the completion of Canadian involvement in the war, 13 Ottawa and 8 Canada datelines indicated that 64% of the criticism originated from within the country.

On only one occasion did the critical articles contain datelines during Period IV. This lack of datelines further weakened the authority granted the critical discourse since no geographical anchorage was provided.
D. **Ears not Eyes**

The field 'PRESS' was used to assess the manner in which the reporter played a role in the information-gathering process. This field was used to count who wrote the articles. Table 3.11 shows who wrote each of the official discourse articles. The "No Mention" articles were probably written by staff members using the wire service reports. The "Specials" were freelance journalists whose story was credited with the word 'special' and sometimes 'special to the **Star**'. "Staff" could be a reporter or staff member. "CP" was the Canadian Press wire service. "NY Time" identified articles attributed to the **New York Times**. The wire services were clumped together as Associated Press, United Press International and Reuters or "AP-UPI-REUTERS". The 'Other' category included articles which were the actual text of the Geneva Agreement, editors, and letters to the editor.

As Table 3.11 tabulates, the largest segment of the data was actually written by reporters or staff members. One hundred and forty-seven articles containing official discourse (or 35%) were written by reporters or staff members. This figure can be added to the number of articles written as "specials" (an absolute 56 or 14%) to show that about half of the official discourse was written with direct journalistic intermediacy.

This means that the other half of the articles was written through the bureaucratic procedures of newspaper work.
The implication of this tendency is that the discourse was produced in the highly formal, impersonal, and impartial manner of a bureaucratic reproduction of events, reinforcing the chances for a sterile report of the four "W's"—who, when, where and what.

In actual fact, by adding up the figures for the use of the wire services, Canadian Press (CP), Associated Press (AP), United Press (UP), and Reuters indicate that official discourse was reproduced from only one-third of these articles.

Table 3.11
Bylines and Wire Services
For Official and Critical Discourse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Official Discourse</th>
<th>Critical Discourse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>146 (35%)</td>
<td>49 (36%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>74 (18)</td>
<td>15 (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP-UP-R</td>
<td>67 (16)</td>
<td>13 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special</td>
<td>56 (14)</td>
<td>27 (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NY TIME</td>
<td>42 (10)</td>
<td>12 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Ment</td>
<td>18 (4.5)</td>
<td>10 (7.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>11 (3)</td>
<td>9 (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>414</strong></td>
<td><strong>135</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the War progressed, some changes in the patterns for bylines and wire services were distinctly different. In Period I, when Canada was first asked to join the ICC, as many as 45% of the articles were written by staff members. This
high reliance on staff members was duplicated in Period III as well. During these times of greatest change, staff members were first used to report on definitions of events.

Another strong trend in this feature of the data was the increased reliance on copies of articles from the New York Times during Periods II and IV, when Canadian political consensus was more conservative.

These contradictory trends of reliance on staff members during the more liberal definitions of events and the increased readiness to reproduce American perceptions during an increasingly conservative era offer some indication that Manoff’s claims are apparent. A moderate tendency to restrict the viewpoints can be related to changes in this aspect of the news work process. But that moderate tendency would be amplified within the critical discourse if it were true.

When comparisons are drawn for the bylines and the use of wire services for the critical discourse, a few, small variations can be identified. As indicated in Table 3.12, staff members were only 1% more directly involved in the writing of critical articles. There was a somewhat decreased reliance on wire services since only one-fifth of the critical articles were credited to that approach.

There were two characteristics of this feature of the data that were distinct for this type of discourse— an increased use of "Special" reporters and (although the table does not directly identify this trend) an increased use of
"Letters-to-the Editor". As much as 20% of the critical data was written by free-lance journalists and all of the "other" categories were letters reported on the editorial page.

This propensity to involve "special" reports and the editorial page does identify a further 'seamlessness' in the web of the reporting process. Criticism and protest was included through this approach. Yet this approach would only moderately open the news coverage since the variety of voices representing the free-lance reports and the peripheral positioning of letters-to-the-editor would weaken the impact of these voices.

For the analysis of the bylines and the use of wire services, therefore, it should be said that there was very little difference for the types of discourse. The only noteworthy feature of this aspect of the data was the increased use of special reporters and letters-to-the-editor for the critical discourse.

In addition to the bylines and the use of wire services, a further examination of the methods used to gather information was made. The procedures used to gather information, whether citation, observation, or research was identified for only the news articles. The information-gathering process was not identified for news photos, cartoons, editorials, letters-to-the-editor, commentary or summary, the assumption being that each of these did not directly identify the process.
With 81% of the articles using citation as the means for gathering information there was a tendency for the official discourse to be reproduced in such a manner that the officials who were sources had an enormous opportunity to define reality. Observation was identified as only one of the means of gathering information for only 8% of the articles containing official discourse. And 'research' was only used for 16 of the articles.

<p>| Table 3.12 |
| Information-Gathering Procedures For Official Discourse |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1954-55</th>
<th>'56-64</th>
<th>'65-67</th>
<th>'68-72</th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cit.</td>
<td>45(50%)</td>
<td>60(85%)</td>
<td>83(77%)</td>
<td>55(73%)</td>
<td>118(86%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obs.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Res.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comb.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In contradiction to the myth that journalists act as the "eyes and ears" of the readers, this summary indicates that the "eyes" can usually be deleted from this job description. Simply describing journalists as "ears" is much more accurate.

In reviewing the methods used by journalists to gather the information for the critical discourse, the data indicated that 'citation' was the usual method as well. As Table 3.13 demonstrates, 68% of the critical articles used
citation, only 9% of the critical articles used observation, and 24% of the critical articles used research (or a combination of approaches) as the information-gathering process. These figures indicate the lack of personal intrusion into the discourse by the journalists.

The reliance on authoritative sources allowed the primary definers—through the bureaucratic procedures of press conferences and releases—to maintain control over the news agenda.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1954-55</th>
<th>'56-64</th>
<th>'65-67</th>
<th>'68-72</th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cit.</td>
<td>5 (50%)</td>
<td>4 (50%)</td>
<td>22 (75%)</td>
<td>24 (71%)</td>
<td>22 (67%)</td>
<td>77 (68%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obs.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10 (9 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Res.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13 (12 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comb.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13 (12 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

E. **Journalists as Critics**

The propaganda model underestimates the role of the reporter as critic. According to this theoretical approach, the role of the reporter is complementary to the power elite. Yet the analysis of the headlines and content of the more compelling articles indicated that there were several occasions when reporters played an independent role in the
news process. Several prominent reporters voiced sharp, incisive criticism.

As early as 1962, as part of a series for the G&M, for example, Frederick Nossal wrote the first scathing criticism of the ICC. Nossal's article was titled "Canada's Role in Vietnam" and was printed on the editorial page of the Globe & Mail on March 7, 1962. The writer's name was listed directly under the title and he was described as "Globe and Mail Correspondent". The dateline indicated that Nossal was in Hong Kong at the time when he wrote the article.

The article began with these caustic remarks:

Canada's role in the Vietnamese war is daily becoming more bizarre and ridiculous. As a member of the International Control Commission in Vietnam, one of Canada's prime functions is to prevent the introduction of illegal arms into the country, to the North as well as the South - yet never before has there been such a gigantic build-up of military forces and equipment by both sides (G&M, 3/7/62:6).

Nossal used two emotionally laden adjectives--"bizarre" and "ridiculous"--in his evaluation of the work of Canada's position on the ICC. He also alerted his readers to the massive buildup of arms--a warning that should alert the world to the fragile military tension in Indo-China; one that erupted with the Gulf of Tonkin incident only two years later in the summer of 1964. Nossal's quote confirms the strategy of establishing and displaying objectivity by slanting both sides of a conflict.

Nossal openly declared what the ICC was not able to report--that the United States was indeed providing massive
military support to the Diem government. Nossal claimed that Communist North Vietnam was also building up its military strength although "with more secrecy" (Ibid.). Nossal hereby set himself up as an authority. This quote cited no sources indicating that the reporter had access to this information and enough authority to make the statement without reference.

Nossal’s only positive comment on the Commission concerned the notion that according to past members of the ICC their presence had prevented the outbreak of open conflict; Nossal affirmed the Canadian government’s fears of military escalation.

Strong criticism of the ICC was also expressed by Star reporter Ralph Allen. In September of 1965 Allen (a managing editor at the Star) had arrived in Saigon assigned to do a series of articles about the war and about Canadian participation on the ICC. After two articles with a general view of the war, his third article in the series bore the caption, "Absurd’s the word for our Viet job". This article is again examined in Chapter V.

The critical discourse that gained most prominence at the end of the war, in Period V, was also linked with a prominent reporter, Charles Taylor, for the Globe & Mail (4/17/73:1; 7/7/73:1). His articles are examined in detail in Chapter V as well.

These examples indicate that reporters do attempt on select occasions to incorporate their views and opinions into
the news process. However, the marginal position of Nossal's isolated example does not suggest a strong oppositional voice by reporters. And the Allen article, as is argued in a later chapter provided only an entertaining antidote to the terse, factual reporting style usually used to describe decisions and reports on Canada in Vietnam.

SUMMARY

This first analysis of the data provides an initial impression that Herman and Chomsky were right—official versions of events received more prominent coverage, consisted of a limited debate, and usually cited official sources. However, there were several features of the data that vary from Herman and Chomsky's predictions and there are even several readily discernible characteristics of the data that suggest that they are wrong.

The data indicated that the news reporting process was not as homogeneous as the propaganda model predicted. While Herman and Chomsky made no concessions for variations in coverage as dissent increased, the data, through variation alone, suggest that news coverage increased when the political consensus was more open. During periods of a liberal-moderate consensus, the coverage was consistently higher. During periods when consensus was conservative, indicating less political acceptance of a range of points of view, the rate of coverage decreased.
Most striking was the fact that the amount of coverage was highest during that period when the issue was resolved. During Period V when Canadian participation in Vietnam was resolved, there was a drastic increase in the rate of coverage. Reports on events were no longer actually 'news', there was now an openness about previously muffled events.

As had been predicted by the propaganda model, there was indeed a large proportion of official discourse. But there was also a sizable proportion of critical discourse.

Furthermore, the propaganda model does not concede that on some occasions critical discourse may even be reported with prominence. Criticism was marginalized until the release of the Pentagon Papers, and then reports on Canadian participation in the war received substantial front-page coverage.

This first examination of the data also suggested that Herman and Chomsky had underestimated the role of reporters. Reporters took a more controversial position than the propaganda model had predicted—as indicated by the extent and nature of critical discourse. Certainly, the initial impression was that featured reporters played an influential role in, first, emphasizing a modicum of diversity in perceptions and, second, engaging in limited criticism.
CHAPTER FOUR

CHANGE AND PROCESS

In the previous chapter, findings indicated the pervasive dominance of official versions of events and an overwhelming compliance on primary definers. It was also found that critical discourse lacked prominence and substance until it gained visibility in Period V. Furthermore, journalists were described as playing a more decisive role in the nature of criticism than the propaganda model had predicted.

At this second stage of the analysis, an examination was made of the more abstract, general features of the data. The identification of change and process explored whether or not tendencies toward closure or openness occurred within the structure and thematic content of the data. Change and process was also examined within the critical discourse and shifts in definitions of the situation. Likewise, following the suggestions of hegemony theory of the media, the omission of specific information was examined in contrast to issues raised in historical accounts of the Vietnam War.

This chapter begins by reporting on changes in the structure of the articles in relation to shifts in the
dominant Canadian political climate. Next, through the analysis of headlines and texts, an examination is made of changes in the dominant themes, the nature of critical discourse, ideological shifts and gaps, and the manner in which a peripheral discourse was incorporated within the news articles.

I. CHANGE

When exploring changes in the thematic content of the data, the first criterion was the structure or the writing style of the news articles. Then the persistence of Cold War ideology was examined through the peculiarities of vocabulary choices and overall definitions of the conflict in Vietnam in Section B. Since Period III was, according to historical accounts, the years of Canada's most liberal-moderate political consensus, there was an examination of the prominent issues of this era in the following section.

As outlined below, the influence of dominant political views was found to shape the very nature of the articles, to add to the persistence of Cold War ideology, and to reflect the vocabulary used to define alliances. And the content of articles from Period III certainly mirrored the liberal-moderate atmosphere of that time.

A. In Structure

The structure of news articles was examined by
categorizing the writing style in which the information was presented. As outlined in the methodology chapter, Chapter II, a singular, linear presentation and the convergent nature of the information within articles had been coded as "closed" and "tight", respectively. Terse versions of events or decisions expressed in an assertive style usually represented this type of structure.

Articles that used several approaches in presenting information, in contrast, had been coded as "open" while articles that provided divergent pieces of information had been coded as "loose". Open articles were those which included some element of conjecture, evaluation or debate.

Whenever the news items diverged from a formal, unilinear presentation or provided information in the form of conjectures, predictions, or assessments, the articles were coded open or loose. An example of a 'open', 'loose' article is provided from Period I. In reporting the selection of personnel for the ICC, the article varied from the usual formal reports of names and military or diplomatic status to add that "cool-headed" soldiers were being selected (G&M, 08/25/54:03).

Once the presentation and information was coded for each of the articles, percentages of cross-tabulations were calculated for those articles that were "closed" and "tight" or "open" and "loose". Since the propaganda model predicted a tendency toward singularity and confinement, propensities
toward a closed, tight structure were assessed as closure. At the same time, tendencies toward structural variation and diversity were assessed as openness.

As Table 4.1 indicates, the structure of the official discourse tended to fairly directly reflect the liberal or conservative political climate of the times. During Period I when the political climate was liberal-moderate, 77% of the articles were closed and tight. At this time only 8% of the official discourse was reproduced with an open presentation and loose information format.

Table 4.1
Cross Tabulations of Official Discourse, Presentation and Information, per Period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Periods</th>
<th>Closed-Tight</th>
<th>Open-Loose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I (1954-55)</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II (1956-64)</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III (1965-67)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV (1968-72)</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V (1973)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Averages</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The closure of the structure of the official discourse peaked in Period II when 85% of those articles were found to be closed and tight. The number of open and loose articles decreased somewhat during the same period and was calculated at 7.5%. This was also the period in which Canadian foreign policy had become increasingly conservative.
In Period III the closure and tightness of the official discourse decreased dramatically to 57% which was the lowest throughout the data set. As well, the openness and looseness was more frequent since 15% of the articles displayed that trait. These changes occurred during a period when Canada's foreign policy was described as taking on a more liberal-moderate approach to events in Vietnam and Canada's participation in the war.

For Period IV, in contrast to the description of Canadian foreign policy as assuming a stance of conservative containment, the measure of openness and looseness increased by only one percentage. The small increase can best be explained by an increased reliance on secondary definers. This period, when public protest against the war was the highest, coincided with the 1% increase in the open-loose structure of news articles.

An increased tendency toward an open-loose structure was continued in Period V when 63% of the official discourse was closed-tight, the next lowest percentage to Period III. But the number of articles with an open-loose structure had decreased to 8%. This tendency toward a more open structure in the writing style was as low as it had been for Periods I and II. This was therefore a time when more of the articles were a mixture of closed-loose and open-tight.

With the low percentage of closed-tight articles during this last time period, and a liberal-moderate
conservative consensus at the end of Canadian and American involvement in Vietnam, the official discourse demonstrated a less restricted structure when politicians, diplomats, and ICC officials expressed themselves in a somewhat more relaxed manner.

All in all, these figures indicate that changes in the nature of the presentation of information for official discourse during each of these periods directly reflected changes in political consensus. However, foreign policy stance alone did not determine the format. Public opinion and secondary definers had some impact on the format of the official discourse.

Table 4.2
Cross-Tabulation of Critical Discourse, Presentation, And Information per Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Closed·Tight</th>
<th>Open·Loose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I (1954-55)</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II (1956-64)</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III (1965-67)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV (1968-72)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V (1973 )</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A separate analysis was made of the structure of the 140 articles that constituted the critical discourse. As the table above indicates, the critical articles showed a lesser overall tendency to consist of a closed presentation and tight
information than the official discourse. In Period I only 54% of the critical articles had a closed-tight structure while at the same time 77% of the official articles demonstrated that same tendency. Concomitantly, as many as 36% of the critical articles were open-loose.

The conservative climate of Period II was directly reflected in the critical discourse as well. With 58% of the articles closed and tight and only 16% of the articles open and loose, the news reporting was less likely to contribute to an atmosphere of openness since even this type of article was structured in such a manner as to reduce controversy and debate with this tendency to present information in a linear and limiting manner.

As the war progressed the critical discourse opened considerably. From 1964 to 1968 (or Period III), only 43% of the articles presented information in a closed-tight manner when 22% of the articles were open and loose. And in Period IV, the number of closed-tight critical articles reached the lowest point within the data—33%—and the number of open-loose articles continued to increase—28%.

Within the liberal-moderate political consensus of Pearson's government, the openness and looseness of the critical discourse could have been predicted after the examination of the official discourse. But the low percentage of closed-tight articles of Period IV contradicts the expectations for the structure of the articles at a time when
the contained conservatism of Trudeau's early years would suggest a return to a restricted structure even in the critical discourse. This feature of the data was read as an indicator of an ideological gap or crack, a time when the openness of critical discourse would overshadow the closure of an official version of events.

In Period V, the percentage of articles with a closed-tight structure returned to a moderate low of 42% and those with an open-loose structure grew to 30%. Within the liberal-moderate conservative consensus at the end of Canadian involvement in the war, the structure of the articles had settled at a moderately open scale in relation to the structure of previous periods.

In summary, the structure of the critical discourse was moderately open and loose when the war began. This decreased sharply during the conservative consensus of Period II and then opened and loosened gradually as the war progressed.

B. Cold War Ideology

On Monday, July 19, 1954, the G&M announced the possibility of Canadian participation in the ICC with a banner headline. The Globe's banner read, "FRENCH, REDS AGREE, CANADA MAY ACT ON BOARD SUPERVISE INDO ARMISTICE".

Stories of the conflict in Vietnam between the French and the Vietnamese nationalists had been receiving
sporadic, low-key coverage up to this point. But in July 1954 when the Geneva Agreement designated Canada as a member of the ICC, the story made the headlines and it certainly was news since Canada had never before assumed such a role.

The following table, listing the banner headlines for Period I, provides a general impression of the most prominent topics of the news coverage.

A most distinct trait of the news articles during this period was the Cold War ideology. In the aftermath of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Headline</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Paper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CANADA TO ACCEPT PEACE ROLE</td>
<td>07/19/54</td>
<td>STAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR, REDS AGREED, CDA MAY ACT</td>
<td>07/19/54</td>
<td>G&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ON BOARD SUPER INDO ARMISTICE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRUCE SIGNED AT GENEVA:</td>
<td>07/21/54</td>
<td>G&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDO-CHINESE WAR ENDED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASS MOVEMENT OF VIETNAMESE:</td>
<td>07/26/54</td>
<td>G&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREPARE TO MOVE 500,000 SOUTH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT TASK:</td>
<td>07/29/54</td>
<td>G&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANADA'S ROLE ...ONEROUS, HONORABLE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIETNAMESE GOING SOUTH:</td>
<td>07/30/54</td>
<td>G&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>700,000 TO LEAVE RED AREA, FRANCE U.S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRUCE OBJECTIVE BALKED: PEARSON ACCUSES</td>
<td>05/04/55</td>
<td>G&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REDS IN VIETNAM OF FOULING TRANSFER...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the Korean War and the war in Vietnam, "anti-Red ideology" centered around the fear of Communist expansion from China (Ross, 1984:43). And the pervasive use of the word "red" was certainly a reliable indicator of that mind set.
The final banner headline in this set, for example announced Pearson’s accusations toward the "REDS" (G&M, 07/30/54:01). Cold War ideology was reproduced in the use of the adjective "red" and the collective noun "Reds". The same East-West antagonism was apparent in accusations toward Eastern socialist countries, and this antagonism was often prefaced with the accolade 'Communists' (G&M, 05/27/55:10) (Star, 06/25/55:21). In contrast to the accusations, on the other hand, praise for and defence of actions of countries that were considered 'Allies' along with a tendency to modify criticism of the United States was also characteristic of the news items. In contrast, the repeated threats of another war were usually attributed to the possible aggression from the "East" (sometimes called the "Red Threat") (G&M, 05/04/55:1).

By comparing the headings with articles, one can only conclude that news workers contributed to the creation of Cold War terminology. An analysis of the citations reproduced in quotation marks indicates that the actual official discourse used exact names of persons and countries, simple reports on events, and few generalizations. An examination of the quotes indicated that Cold War terms such as "reds" could not be identified in the cited text. For example, on November 11, 1954, the Globe & Mail had an article reporting on a speech given by External Affairs Minister Pearson to the Economic Club of Detroit. The article reported that Pearson warned against either an "attitude of defeatism" or a posture
of provocation' and discouraged the acceptance of the view "that co-existence can be nothing but a snare" (G&M, 11/9/54:1). As well, information in the article indicated that Pearson was speaking about East-West relations. Yet the headline for this story read, "Pearson Asks Open Mind Toward Reds" (Ibid.).

The inclusion of such direct quotes was rarely found. Generally, the citation was prefaced with the phrase "issued a report", "when he stated", and "opinion is" followed by a paraphrased summary of the content of the quote (Star, 07/17/54:1; G&M, 07/17/54:1; Star, 07/19/54:1). Therefore the opportunities to reproduce Cold War ideology occur within the headlines, collective nouns of the reporting process, and interpretations provided by the reporters and the editorial personnel.

William Stevenson's reports for the Star also demonstrated that practice. When he first announced the Geneva Agreement he identified the People's Republic of China as "Red China" and "Communist China" (Star, 07/16/54:1). Ho Chi Minh and his forces, collectively known as "Viet Minh", were also described as "Communist Viet Minh" although at this point of time that group could more accurately be described as 'Nationalists'.

Canadian political consensus on events in Vietnam
was to become its most conservative during Period II. Dulles's "Domino Theory" reflected the fear of Communist expansion in the second half of the '50's. Politically and militarily it was obvious, with the benefit of hindsight and the advantage of the expansion of available information from the release of the Pentagon Papers, that this was a period when extensive, secret, military escalation occurred within Vietnam.

Cold War ideology persisted during Period II. As one of many possible examples, an article with the headline "Truce Team Members Snubbed by Laos Reds" reproduced the Cold War concept "Reds" (G&M, 05/16/61:1). Within the article, again, no such oversimplification was used. Instead, the "Reds" were described as "pro-communist rebel authorities".

That geo-political duality of "the West" versus "the Reds" was also replicated in the ever-shifting attributions of blame: from the Communists, to the United States, to Diem's government, to the American military, and to Canada as silent bystander.

During Period I any threat to the orderly discharge to the directives of the Geneva Agreement was attributed to 'the other side' very early, with the first report in the collection. The prediction was made that "Communists" may

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1This was also the era when Eisenhower made his famous speech warning against the possible abuse of power by the American military-industrial complex (G&M, 01/18/61:2).
attack and "fall upon Hanoi" (Star, 07/16/54:1). This prediction would suggest that North Vietnam was not yet being labelled as a "Communist" country although earlier in that same announcement the Viet Minh (troops supporting Ho Chi Minh) were labelled as a "Communist" force.

Along with the condemnation of the supposed threats of the "East", praise was usually reserved for the "West's" forces. For example, Stevenson reported, "French Morale High...", quoting a British army observer on the eve of French defeat (Star, 07/17/54:2).

C. Definitions of the Conflict

Throughout this dissertation the terms 'events' and 'conflict' have been selected as more neutral signifiers. But the exact nature of the conflict was not precisely indicated with these terms. The alternative view of events claimed that military and political events within Vietnam, especially early in the war, could best be described as "a civil war". With this alternative view of events, through the term 'civil war', the conflict was no longer defined with implications of geopolitical expansion but with an emphasis on the nationalistic nature of the conflict.

Events in Vietnam were rarely reported in news articles using this alternative view, as a civil war. In fact, any local protest within Saigon or recognition of the issues of that protest were rarely reported. Neither was the
undemocratic nature of Diem’s rule ever featured in articles on local unrest (G&M, 05/06/55:04; 05/30/55:21).

Civil discord had been prompted by the land reform process. By April of 1959, it was clear that an escalation of problems was about to happen and news at this time reported on the discontent with land reform in Vietnam (G&M, 04/03/59:03). However, this problem was not elaborated as an important root of political unrest.

In large part the recognition of the conflict as a civil war would have hinged on whether one faction was or was not "Communist". A clearer, less evaluative approach would have been to use the descriptive "communists" only if a political faction had given itself that title. During Period I the terms ‘rebel’, ‘reds’, ‘leftists’, and ‘extremists’ were favored as general categories to identify alliances with an overly simplified ‘us’ and ‘them’. ‘We’ were ‘democratic’ and ‘free’, they were ‘communists’ and ‘revolutionaries’. And although this simplistic division has been identified by others, the analysis from this data demonstrates the extent to which those divisions were created not by the political speakers but through journalistic practices. For example, at this early stage of events, the Star had an article headed, "FAIL AT GENEVA IF U.S. HAS WAY REDS TELL WEST" (07/17/54:01).

Historically, Period II was the time when the National Liberation Front (NLF) had been organized. This group came to be labelled the ‘Viet Cong’ by Diem, as a term of
discredit. In September 1959, at the battle at Plain of Reeds, the term 'Viet Cong' for South Vietnamese Communists, was first used in military and media reports. The National Liberation Front, organized in opposition to Diem, was often grouped together with other resistance groups under the collective title of the South Vietnamese Communists.

During Period III, the article with the headline "HO CHI MINH WANTS PEACE WITH VIETNAMESE SETTLING OWN AFFAIRS", while containing the word 'imperialism', never defined the conflict as a civil war (Star, 12/20/65:01). Secondary sources affirm that, certainly during these early years, East-West conflict provided the central conceptual notion. Yet no recognition of nationalistic aspects of war was ever given during the early periods of the war.

An unwillingness to recognize the nationalist interests of the National Liberation Front was most dramatically displayed in the news photo of Hoang and Nguyen published in 1969. A picture of these two men was shown with the heading "VIET CONG REPRESENTATIVES ON CANADIAN TOUR" (G&M, 1/30/1969:3). Within the caption to the photo the men were identified as members of South Vietnam's National Liberation Front. The error of the heading and the caption was the ease with which Diem's term of contempt was so readily replicated without any expression of what the differences and similarities might be. Confusing these men with the term 'Viet Cong' and implying that they were 'enemies from the North'
(which they were usually assumed to be), did not distinguish them from the South Vietnamese Nationalists which they could have been.

D. Liberal-moderate Discourse

Events and developments in Period III brought about a marked contrast in the coverage of Canadian participation. In 1965 the ICC began to provide detailed accounts of conflicts within the Commission. For the first time articles admitted that members of the ICC ‘truce team’ were "split on Vietnam blame" (G&M, 03/02/65). And in 1966, with the announcement by Hugh Campbell (described in greater detail in the next section under the heading of "The Birth of Critical Discourse"), many of the articles on the ICC in Vietnam began to condemn the ICC’s work.

The banner headlines for this period highlight the dominant topics of the official discourse, as listed in Table 4.4. Levant and Taylor described this period as a time of secret decision-making and negotiations between the United States and North Vietnam. In contrast, the dominant trait of the content of this period indicates that within the ambience of a liberal-moderate consensus and a low level of ICC participation, the coverage was extensive (8 articles per month scanned), the content was the most varied, and the criticism of the war—although moderate—was certainly erupting.
The chief trait of the data from this period was the prominence of the viewpoints of top Canadian officials. In contrast to other periods, this was the period when Prime Minister Pearson was the most prominent official source. He was, for example, the Canadian head-of-state addressing the topic of troops to Vietnam during this crucial period of the American troop build-up (G&M, 02/04/65:2).

Another telling characteristic of the official discourse of this period was the frenzy of negotiations surrounding Pearson’s peace proposals (G&M, 03//9/65:2; 03/10/65:3). This was also a time, following Pearson’s pronouncements, that the issue of American military might was most openly discussed (Star, 02/09/65:7). Even Canadian protest against American bombing of North Vietnam was a prominent issue (G&M, 03/06/65:1).

In late 1964 Seaborn, a member of the ICC and a Canadian diplomat had been sent on a secret mission to Hanoi. The messages he carried to the North Vietnamese were assumed to be a warning from the United States about an escalation in military aggression from the South. Further information on the content of the communication that Seaborn was to convey was omitted from the news under the need for military security.

Secrecy about Seaborn’s and Ronning’s efforts was only at the level of the exact content of the messages and communications (G&M, 06/08/65:03; 06/12/65:01). While these
Table 4.4
Banner Headlines of Period III (1965 - 1967)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Headline</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Paper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIMS TO SPARE U.S.: PM URGES</td>
<td>03/06/65</td>
<td>G&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEACE FORCE AS SOLUTION IN VIET NAM²</td>
<td>06/12/65</td>
<td>G&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPROMISE PROPOSED: CANADA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUSHES TALKS BETWEEN HANOI AND US</td>
<td>02/08/66</td>
<td>STAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK OPPOSES BOMBING HANOI: HO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHI MINH WRITES INDIA TO ASK HELP IN</td>
<td>02/09/66</td>
<td>G&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEACE HINT FROM HANOI SENT TO CANADA, INDIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANY FRUSTRATIONS, BUT... CANADA</td>
<td>01/13/67</td>
<td>STAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRIES QUIETLY FOR VIET NAM PE WHEN FRIENDS FALL OUT... AS</td>
<td>01/27/67</td>
<td>STAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEY OFTEN DO</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

trips were, in subsequent years, described as 'secretive trips by message carriers', they were reported in the papers. Yet the nature of these missions was never defined. Certainly any notion that they were trips to gain military intelligence and convey threats from the American military were never suggested.

There was an openness about air strikes during this time period (G&M, 03/29/65:17). Even the psychological warfare strategies were reported (Star, 09/14/65:2).

In contrast to other periods and synonymous with Ross's portrayal of the liberal-moderate stance held by the Canadian government, greater recognition and acceptance of

²In 1964, Walter Lippmann wrote an article in the Star using the term "Viet Nam" (02/07/64:07). For the next three years the Star continued the practice of using the two-word name.
Communism was recorded. One article read, "If the elections should turn the whole country Communist, that would have to be accepted by the rest of the world", without mentioning that the USA would probably find this most difficult to accept (G&M, 03/09/65:6).

II. CRITICAL DISCOURSE

In Chapter III, critical discourse was described as very secondary to official reports on events. That secondary status is reexamined at this stage of the analysis where the inferior status of the critical discourse is reviewed through the content of editorial cartoons. The farcical treatment of several criticisms of Canadian involvement in the war is most blatantly reproduced within this format and topics rarely incorporated in other forms were presented within this marginal context.

Critical discourse became the dominant discourse in Period V. A review of the banner headlines for this period supports earlier findings about this shift in the ideological process.

At this point an examination was made of the editorial cartoons. These playful distractions were found to focus on issues that could have constituted the critical discourse in a more serious capacity. Reviewing the content of the cartoons highlighted the possible diversity of the critical discourse.
The intertextual analysis was conducted to identify debate between articles. Juxtaposed news articles were reviewed to see if critique could be identified between news reports on the same page, perhaps through taking a different perspective on events.

Lastly, the rise to prominence of critical issues is outlined. With the resolution of Canadian participation in Vietnam, there was a burgeoning of critical discourse and, for the first time, criticism was accorded a high level of visibility within the news coverage.

A. **EDITORIAL CARTOONS**

The editorial cartoons were the most sharply critical format and most precisely portrayed a widely divergent set of topics and arguments. Editorial cartoons are, by their very nature, critical and sarcastic. They have a tradition of deriding politicians and political decisions. These cartoons are almost always placed on the editorial page and can usually be expected to expand, support or contradict editorial opinion.

Many of the 44 cartoons were about international relations and had political dominance as the central theme. In total, 20 cartoons were directly concerned with the portrayal of unequal political relations between various countries.

American dominance over Canada was the topic of three of the cartoons. One cartoon pictured Pearson in prison,
behind bars with the pattern of the 'Stars and Stripes' (Star, 01/18/67:6). Economic dependence on the United States was portrayed in a cartoon with Pearson at an empty cash register pondering the notion of asking the US for a loan (G&M, 03/02/66:6). And military dominance was portrayed by President Johnson as a tall cowboy showing Pearson, looking dumpy in an Royal Canadian Mounted Police uniform and running shoes, how to use a gun (Star, 01/03/64:6). The caption read, "Yup, them's real bullets".

Several cartoons portrayed American dominance over the Vietnamese. In one cartoon the American State Department was portrayed as a toy vendor with General Ky of South Vietnam as the windup toy (G&M, 05/17/66:6). The toy vendor does not however have a facial expression of dominance, rather he appears surprised at the cocky manner in which the toy struts.

Dominance was reinforced by the use of such symbols as conical straw hats. These hats were often referred to as "coolie" hats, reinforcing a stereotypical secondary status. For example, in 1965 the Star printed a cartoon in which President Johnson is bullying a North Vietnamese man, his conical hat is on the ground (See Appendix Three, Cartoon 2). Johnson is saying "that's for nothing, now do something". Not only is President Johnson taller, dressed in a policeman's uniform, armed (if only with a billy club), and intimidating the North Vietnamese person, but the man on the ground is dressed as a peasant. This portrayal of the Vietnamese as a
peasant vastly misrepresents the North Vietnamese leaders who were educated, sophisticated people. It is not until the end of the war that we see a North Vietnamese in a business suit.

Editorial cartoons did indeed most consistently express the sharpest criticism. And the cartoon that most succinctly portrayed Canadian complicity with the United States in Vietnam was drawn by MacPherson (Star, 12/16/65:6). This is cartoon number four in Appendix Three.

MacPherson portrayed Johnson on the ground. He is dressed in a military uniform and being attacked by two Asian characters, presumably North Vietnamese. Johnson has a determined look on his face although he is unarmed. The North Vietnamese are attacking him with daggers. They are dressed in peasant costumes comprised of conical hats and slippers. They are not portrayed as wearing military garb. Johnson has one of the North Vietnamese in a "headlock" and the other is approaching him with a sharply pointed dagger.

Beside this activity, Canadian External Affairs Minister Paul Martin, dressed in the diplomatic garb of a black jacket and striped pants, is standing at a telephone booth. He has a phone in one hand and a brief case with a dove on it in the other hand. Martin is asking Johnson, "Wots the message?". The implication of this question is that Martin is asking President Johnson what he should tell the world about events in Vietnam. The spelling of "wots" adds to the denigration of Martin, as if he's too stupid to even speak
properly. Not only can Martin not trust what he sees and report that, but he has to wait for Johnson's version of reality.

In addition to this cartoon about the ICC, there is only one other cartoon that directly portrays the ICC. This cartoon was also by Macpherson. It appeared in the Star in January of 1973 and simply makes the statement that military conflict is continuing as the members of the ICC disembark in Vietnam (See Appendix Three, Cartoon 7). This cartoon shows a bullet-riddled airplane marked "Canadian Peace Force" with the ICC members coming down the stairway. The cartoon is more humorous in that the ICC members have stunned, comic looks on their faces as they disembark with their maple leaves on their sleeves and their tennis rackets in hand. Bombs are being dropped around them leaving craters, and flares are splashing across what looks like a night sky.

The difference between the sarcasm of the previous "Wot's the message?" cartoon and this one indicates that while the topic of the ICC in the mid-'60s was more controversial, it had become a source of comic relief by 1973. The comedy of the latter cartoon almost closes the story on the ICC, certainly it does so emotionally, since now it had merely become a humorous topic.

In summary, editorial cartoons addressed issues never directly included in the news articles. American dominance, Canada's secondary political status, allegations of
abusive use of power, or even the evaluation of power relations were the subject matter of this media form. Each of these issues were playfully examined within the cartoon format but had rarely been the subject matter of the critical news articles up to the last stage of Canada’s work in Vietnam in 1973.

B. Intertextual Analysis

Of the 622 articles which dealt with Canada’s involvement in the war in Vietnam either through the ICC, protest against the war, arms sales etc., 365 (or nearly two/thirds) of the articles did have other articles about the Vietnam war in general either above, below or beside the article used in this data set.

Findings indicate that four different conclusions could be drawn about the impact of impinging content. In the first place some of these articles, and the way they were positioned, gave the impression that it was possible to identify a dialogue between the articles with different sides of the story being represented by each of the articles. Sometimes the stories and their impinging articles gave the impression of one story reinforcing the other. There were times too when a set of articles on the Vietnam war was positioned near each other and that proximity seemed to diffuse the issues. And finally, the proximity of the articles appeared to allow a more controversial issue to be ‘hidden’.
within a set of articles.

A few samples from the data can be used to demonstrate each of these results. This initial example of impinging discourse demonstrates how articles may reinforce each other. On February 4, 1966 the *Saskatoon Star-Phoenix* ran a photo of American soldiers with the body of someone who was identified as a Viet Cong sniper draped over the hood of their jeep. The picture suggested aggressive militancy on the part of the United States. Impinging on this photo were two articles about how the USA was pushing for talks to negotiate peace with the Viet Cong and how the USA welcomed peace talks with the Soviet Union (02/04/66:04). Not only did the impinging discourse soften the militancy of the picture but the occasion of two articles about American concerns for peace reinforced the content of each of the articles, reinforcing and closing the coverage.

It could not be said that this reinforcing effect served only to close the discourse. Impinging articles were also able to reinforce the opening of the discourse as demonstrated by two articles on the front page of the *Globe and Mail* (01/04/73:1). One headline read, "Canada deplores bombing by U.S. in North Vietnam, Ottawa tells Washington" and the caption below read, "Doves in Senate set Jan.20 as deadline for ending the war." These two articles were able to support each other in opening the discourse by providing two distinctly different views of American militancy.
As well as reinforcing each other, impinging discourse also presents two sides of a story, and as such, balances the news. In 1965 when India openly condemned the American bombing of North Vietnam, articles on the problems in Saigon and the risks of the soldiers portrayed the other side of the story (G&M, 06/12/65:1). This juxtaposing of different views has the impact of diffusing the issue.

Juxtaposing different views may also appeal to ‘hide’ the issues. An article on how the Canadians were forced to cover for the United States as members of the ICC and one on the export of Canadian jets to Vietnam are dwarfed and overshadowed by news photos about American participation in the war and large headlines of the threat of military escalation by the North Vietnamese (G&M, 02/19/66:4) (Star, 09/17/65:23). Accusations of Canadian complicity and military production profits were being printed as early as the mid-sixties, but they are well hidden within the content.

At times the themes of articles and their impinging articles were in contradiction. For example, in December, 1965, the Star published an editorial about the promise of peace for the New Year (12/31/65:6). The article assessed the year’s events and predicted that peace was possible. But the editorial cartoon contradicted the article and depicted China sharpening a huge sword with the words "World War III".

This analysis suggests that intertextual relationships are highly diversified. There are times when
impinging discourse contributed to increased closure by having units of data reinforcing each other. There are also times when they contribute to an openness in viewpoints by juxtaposing a variety of themes within each other's proximity. And finally, sometimes impinging discourse may have the impact of diffusing and/or hiding controversial issues. Other than noting these different effects, more analysis of impinging articles would be redundant.

C. The Rise of Critical Discourse

The banner headlines of Period V indicate that at this point in time criticism of American military actions in Vietnam and the history of Canadian diplomatic participation had finally gained prominence in the news coverage. As the list of banner headlines in Table 4.6 indicates, outcry about events in Vietnam was, for the first time, blatantly being reported in bold headlines.

When these headlines are compared to those in Tables 4.3 or 4.4, the prominence of criticism becomes very obvious. These headlines express an immediate, personal outcry against "Bombing By US". The tension and discord between Canada and the "U.S." is directly conveyed with these summaries of the news articles.

These were prominent, long articles. The length of the articles, along with the prominence of the sources cited for the content and the fact that some of these topics were of
a very controversial nature indicated that critical discourse
had been absorbed into mainstream thinking. Once the Americans

Table 4.5
Banner Headlines of Critical Discourse--Period V (1973)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Headline</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Paper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CANADA DEPLORES BOMBING BY US IN NORTH VN, OTTAWA TELLS WASHINGTON</td>
<td>01/04/73</td>
<td>G&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BICKERING STALLS EFFORTS OF CANADIAN TRUCE TEAM IN VIET NAM</td>
<td>01/31/73</td>
<td>STAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANADA BREAKS DEADLOCK: CEASEFIRE TEAMS BEGIN TASK MONDAY</td>
<td>02/03/73</td>
<td>STAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH HAD INSTRUCTIONS FOR CANADA'S ENVOY PENTAGON PAPERS SHOW</td>
<td>07/06/73</td>
<td>G&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANADIANS CARRIED VIET PEACE</td>
<td>07/07/73</td>
<td>STAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIDS FOR 2 YEARS: PAPERS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANADA AND THE PENTAGON PAPERS</td>
<td>07/09/73</td>
<td>G&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. UNDERMINED CANADIAN ENVOY'S PEACE</td>
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had decided to leave Vietnam and once there was a strong
Canadian consensus on the need to make one last effort to
supervise American withdrawal, the most detailed criticism
came to light.

Several of the articles were written by James
Cahill, a reporter for the Star, and Charles Taylor, for the
Globe & Mail. The Cahill article criticized Canada-American
relations in Vietnam by stating "Legacy of Viet War is Growing
Distrust of U.S. by Canadians" (Star, 01/27/73:13). And
Taylor asked, "Is Canada the U.S. Patsy in Viet Nam?" and
avowed, "Wash had Instructions for Canada's Envoy" (G&M,
04/17/73:1; 07/06/73:1). These two articles are examined in
greater detail in Chapter V. Taylor completed this series by proclaiming, "A Glimpse of U.S. Scorn for Canada's Viet Doves" (G&M, 07/10/73:1).

III. SHIFTS AND GAPS

The ideological process model, with its greater emphasis on differentiation and meaning negotiation, predicts subtle changes in perspectives and definitions. According to this theoretical approach, openness is produced by shifts in meanings and even gaps where meanings lack succinct definitions or new perspectives are entering the discourse. This section reports on the examination of shifts, the occasion of an ideological gap early in Period III, and the omitted themes.

A. Shifts in Perspective

Period I was typified as having a liberal-moderate political consensus. But that consensus was dramatically replaced with a highly conservative political consensus within only two years. That political shift was reflected in the changing nature of official discourse for Period I. The news articles of this period exemplified a sharp shift from formal and positive to personal and critical information.

That shift intensified during Period II. First, there was a shift from impersonal reports of personnel selection to the personalized stories on the smuggling and
death. An early article providing a more personal portrayal of life for a Canadian ICC member occurred in 1957 when the *G&M* reported on the death of Cannon, who had been found knifed to death in his bed (04/13/57:1). This report included the highly personal events of Cannon's body being shipped back to Canada but no rationale was given of why he was killed; whether it was simply a case of 'break and enter' or whether he had been killed because of his role on the ICC. The media failed to explain this crime since they rarely identify the absence of news.

Even more curious, only twelve days later the *G&M* filed a story predicting, "May never solve Indo-China killing of Quebec Man" (04/25/57:40). This report provided no explanation of what circumstances surrounded Cannon's death. His death was not placed within the context of Vietnamese frustration with the manner in which the ICC was executing its job.

After this event, news reports about the ICC continued to be very official and closed. Then in 1962 news first surfaced that Canadians were being charged and reprimanded for smuggling (*G&M*, 03/09/62:01). Even this discourse was very closed, providing a limited number of facts about the incident, and serving only to discredit ICC members and their integrity.
B. Ideological Gaps

Just as there was a marked shift from Period I to II, other changes were identified for Period III when the political consensus once again returned to a liberal-moderate stance. And examination of the news articles for this third period reflected traits that paralleled a more open political consensus. News articles of this period displayed more sharp contradictions, used more news photos and again shifted to a more personalized perspective on events.

In fact, official discourse contained the most contradiction during Period III. One headline read, "Martin Defends U.S. Bombing in Vietnam" (G&M, 03/13/65). This statement contradicted another article published several days later. In the second article contradictions were even apparent within. The article began with the headline, "Canada Backs U.S. on peace talks", continued with Pearson's "urging a pause in the bombing" and ended with the statement saying, "Acknowledgement that U.S. and South Vietnam are in error is wrangled from Martin" (G&M, 03/24/65:4).

A similar contradiction was apparent in the impinging articles: the American response to Pearson’s plan for resolution in Vietnam and the issue of having negotiations included all sides, and North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese and their responses to the Minority Report by Canada in support of the U.S. (G&M, 03/10/65:3).

Clearly those contradictions reflected the conflict
that existed within society as verified in reports on the 54th Inter-Parliamentary Conference in Ottawa recorded pro and con positions on events in Vietnam (Star, 09/09/65:21). Canadian prominent officials were openly expressing concern, during this liberal-moderate era when Operation Rolling Thunder was being conducted. And at the same time, some Canadian ICC members, through their reports, were supporting the actions of the American military. Even External Affairs Minister Martin was quoted as defending American bombing in Vietnam (G&M, 3/13/65:4).

Another striking irregularity of the data was the unequal distribution of photos during the years. While there were only a few pictures during the years from 1954 to 1964, an average of about two pictures per year, there was a startling increase in the number of pictures in 1965 - twenty three pictures. And later, for 1966, there were 39 pictures. At this time a high percentage of the photos were credited to Associated Press (AP) and other radio wire services, a technology that became very popular during this period.

From 1967 to 1972 those numbers decreased again, with an average of 8 pictures per year. For 1973, there was the largest number of pictures—43 news photos. In 1973 the number of photos can be accounted for, in part, by the fact that when the Star sent out the much promoted reporters, Cahill and Gayn, an equally famous photographer, Spremo, accompanied them. Having paid the extra expense of this
renowned photographer, the newspaper increased its commitment to using more news space to publish his pictures.

Records of the Canadian liberal-moderate political consensus, the escalation and confusion of the conflict in Vietnam, and the dilemmas faced by reporters each support the idea that these were times when an ideological gap did exist. The possibility of an ideological gap was represented by the confusion found within the data.

Diplomatic secrecy during this period may have played a determining role in the confusion of the official discourse. That confusion was exemplified in an article printed in 1962 (G&M, 06/05/62:3). In June of that year the ICC released one of its few reports. The article had the headline, "U.S., Vietnam Are Criticized by Commission". Since the article was short, was not accompanied by any other information on the war or the ICC, and was located on page three, it did not make a strong expression. The article does not clearly identify just who was criticized by whom and only a careful, repeated reading of the article allows the reader to understand what was being reported.

A similar confusion occurred when attempts were made to understand who was attacking Diem, the extent to which the smuggling was a common practice among the ICC members, the efficacy of the ICC, and the leniency shown toward the ICC soldiers found guilty of smuggling opium out of Vietnam (G&M, 05/03/62:23; 03/13/62:1; 03/29/61:1; 02/28/62:7).
As well as increasing the number of news photos and printing contradictory news items, the content of the data also indicated that reports tended to shift perspectives during periods of ideological gaps.

In 1962, in the G&M, Nossal provided a detailed account of the problems faced by ICC members. At this time as well the story 'breaks' about Canadian soldiers serving on the ICC being charged with smuggling drugs (explicitly opium) and gold into and out of Vietnam.

In spite of this mark on the integrity of the ICC, in June of 1962, the ICC announces criticism of both the United States and Vietnam of violations of the Geneva Agreement in one of its series of reports.

The personal opinions of active ICC participants were not part of the news reports again until 1973, when unnamed sources would complain about working and living conditions, as in the stench of the surroundings, or complaints about individuals, as when Canadians were described as being arrogant (Star, 02/05/73:02; G&M, 04/07/73:04).

These characteristics of Period III, reinforce earlier claims of a highly diverse content. In a previous section, titled "A Liberal-Moderate Discourse", the claim was made that the news articles of this period contained the greatest variety of themes and topics. And in the last chapter, in the examination of secondary sources, it was found that the greatest variety of definers such as Ho Chi Minh were
cited. Each of these factors, along with present claims of contradiction, visual or photographic variety, and the inclusion of personal viewpoints, indicate that the openness of the political climate of this era was directly reflected in the openness of the news reporting process.

C. **Omitted Themes**

In contrast to content analysis, semiotic structural analysis and the hegemony model claim that consideration must be given to the themes, topics, or issues omitted from the actual news reports. Secondary literature provided summaries of these times and indicated several aspects of Canadian ICC involvement in Vietnam that, with the benefit of hindsight, had a strong impact on possible outcomes.

One of the most important shortcomings of the original Geneva agreement was American noncompliance. Yet this topic was persistently overlooked in the reporting. Only one article, with North Vietnam and China as the sources, criticized the fact that these parties had not formally agreed to the Geneva Agreement at the outset (*G&M*, 07/22/54:15). It rarely included criticism of the fact that the United States and South Vietnam had, from the start, not been signatories of the treaty. The US had not signed because, of all the countries, it held a strong belief in the Domino Theory, and professed linkage concern that China might attempt to absorb Indo-China within its boundaries. While the United States did
make a formal statement agreeing to refrain from using force to upset the agreement, the press never held the US accountable on this issue.

Only the editorial cartoons, during Periods III and V, commented on the American military’s decisive role in the war. One very telling and provocative cartoon showed President Johnson with his peace proposals for VN (Star, 09/03/65:6). An American General was at the bottom of an escalator on which President Johnson descended with a peace dove in a cage (See Appendix Three, Cartoon 3). The cage was named ‘Negotiation’. The General was pushing the ‘up’ button with a sly look on his face, so that the President was experiencing difficulties descending the stairs.

Another editorial cartoon depicted the power of the American military over world events. In the cartoon six old generals were drinking a toast to the next war (Star, 01/25/73:6). The cartoons also portrayed the power of the military over the press when the great American eagle in military costume and decorations strangles the New York Times with its talons (G&M, 06/17/71:6).

Blame centering on the profitability of the war first entered the data in 1965 with early reports of Canada’s sale of a small jet for use in Vietnam (Star, 09/17/65:23; 10/12/65:21; 11/03/65:05). (Several years later these jets were sold to Europe and ironically called ‘Peacekeepers’.) At this point, nonetheless, no questioning of morality of the
sales was included. Any linkage between the ICC, Canada, the United States, arms trade or the Auto Pact, was not included—although this was the year that the Auto Pact had been finalized. And a claim of the linkages between the ICC and the other components was acknowledged in 1973. At that time Senator Hartke declared on CBC that the Auto Pact had been signed with the hope of encouraging Canada to participate more directly in the war in Vietnam (Star, 03/09/73:11).

Two years later, in 1969, an article titled "Canadian Arms for Vietnam War Create Jobs and a Moral Dilemma" did question the issue (Star, 11/15/69:64). This article is closely examined in Chapter V. And in 1973, in a letter to the editor the question was raised again (Star, 01/13/73:23).

War in itself was never criticized although the methods sometimes were, such as in 1965 when External Affairs Minister Martin condemned the use of gas (G&M, 03/27/65:10). Nor, for that matter, was the reluctance to use nuclear weapons in a limited way ever expressed in the critical discourse although such a strategy was being considered within the Pentagon. And Canadian politicians were secretly concerned that the United States might use nuclear power to bring an expedient end to the war (Ross, 1984).

Another controversial topic that received limited coverage was an article about the 'Green Beret' firm, Dorthea Knitting Mills, and its adoption of a 'Viet boy' with the
words "no conflict" in single quotations in the caption exemplifying the manner in which the Canadian media were prepared to confront the arms industry (Star, 01/25/67:25).

Another omission was a strong voice of criticism from ICC members. The first news of criticism of the ICC by one of its members appeared toward the end of 1965. On November 1, 1965, a very small article (no more than fifteen centimeters long) announced "VIET ROLE 'SHAMES' CANADA" (Star, 11/1/65:1). This article provided the first indication of problems with the role of the ICC in Vietnam. Certainly this was the first time a member of the ICC expressed his opinion about his work.

The strength of a word as negative and emotionally charged as 'shame' might have drawn a reader's attention but the single quotation marks around the word immediately suggest to the reader that the press does not support the accusation. The story was also repeated in the Globe & Mail. The G&M concluded the article with Campbell's resentment about having to pretend that he did not see American helicopters and warships. The Globe article, thanks to its extra length, was able to provide a little more information about the alliances of the ICC although they added very little to the substance of the coverage.

Again, it was an editorial cartoon that also denounced Canada's role as silent bystander. A cartoon expressing sharpest criticism of Canada was printed in April,
1970, by the Globe & Mail (See Appendix Three, Cartoon 6). This cartoon could only have been directed at Canada's role on the ICC although there were no direct clues in the cartoon to make that assumption. The cartoon comprised a replica of Canada's official emblem. A lion and a unicorn were portrayed under a crown and standing on a banner of the Canadian motto, "A mari usque ad mare". In the middle of the insignia were three monkeys, 'Hear-no-evil, See-no-evil, and Speak-no-evil". Only a consideration of Canada's role in Vietnam could be assumed to be the inspiration for this cartoon in which Canada was portrayed as blind, deaf and dumb.

And finally, there was the under-representation of women. That omission is most succinctly emphasized through an examination of the editorial cartoons. In the collection of 44 cartoons there are 210 male figures and only eight representations of females. For the eight female figures, two were being rescued, one was a bride, two were just pictures on the wall (a wife and a mother), and another one was a listener. While the male symbols were making decisions, taking action, engaged in conflict, making comments, the female symbols only spoke when they were nagging, otherwise they were only passively participating.

Only one female symbol expressed any action, that was when South Vietnam was portrayed as a female peasant who was being rescued by President Johnson the fireman (See Appendix Three, Cartoon 1). In this cartoon the American
President was a fireman rescuing a South Vietnamese female from a fire. She was portrayed as stupid enough to be resisting the rescue effort in the face of disaster. These portrayals of women indicate that gender was trivialized.

The lack of female faces was very obvious in the news photographs collection. When all the pictures were gathered together the dearth of female faces becomes a glaring feature of the collection. The pictures were coded for the number of men, women and children included in the collection. Summing up these totals indicates that there were 478 pictures of men, 73 pictures of women, and 32 pictures of children. Of the 73, many of the women were either wives who were photographed beside their husbands, victims of the war photographed with their children, and members of the Canadian Peace Movement.

Several times women were shown alone. One picture showed a prostitute, in an article by Ralph Allen as part of his series "Ralph Allen in Viet Nam" (Star, 9/23/65:61). Only one picture showed a woman in a position of power. She was Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh who was the Foreign Minister of the Provisional Revolutionary government of South Vietnam (also identified as a member of the Viet Cong) (Star, 1/27/73:4). Mrs. Nguyen was shown signing the cease fire agreement between the United States, North Vietnam, and the Republic of Vietnam.

This portrayal of women accurately reflected their exclusion from important military and political positions. In
reality, there were few women combatants or politicians, they were mostly victims.

All in all, a number of themes have been identified as omitted from or under-represented in the news coverage. To further understand how a diversity of themes was present but only in a very marginal capacity, an analysis was made of those topics that provided a peripheral discourse to the main concerns expressed in the news articles.

IV. THE PERIPHERAL DISCOURSE

Critical discourse is described in the literature as maintaining "a precarious relationship" with the official discourse. As the official discourse strives to maintain dominance, it has been hypothesized as internalising, marginalizing, and integrating critical and alternative points of view. This section reports on how dominant viewpoints were presented in a peripheral capacity. Certain themes were identified as marginalized, muted, and sensationalized. Not until the end of the war, during Period V, did such themes as Canadians in the American military, Canadian profits from the war, racism, and sexuality gain any prominent coverage.

A. Marginalization

On several occasions news reports were placed within the paper in isolation from any other news articles. News workers call these articles "fillers". They appear to be used
to fill a space above, below, or within advertisement or other 'non-news' articles. Locating them in isolation from the context of a whole suggests a devaluation of their news worthiness.

One set of ideas that was isolated was the topic of Canadian military participation in the war. Articles within the data set indicate that Canada’s military participation occurred in two ways: in Canadian enlistment in American armed forces serving in Vietnam, and in the selling of arms to the United States.

Only one picture in the collection showed a military bunker in Vietnam with a fairly large Canadian flag flying overhead (G&M, 01/30/68:4). The caption to the picture read, "The flag of a Canadian serving with the U.S. Marines flies over a gun emplacement south of the demilitarized zone in Vietnam." In the picture collection this was the only reference to that omitted or certainly under-represented theme of Canadians serving in American armed forces. The interesting feature of this picture was the lack of controversy this picture created. Since pictures place a high priority on stories of national interest, it was surprising that this photo has been so scaled down in terms of the coverage that surrounded this issue. The picture was from Associated Press and impinged on several other articles about the war. There were two other pictures of the life of American soldiers, an article describing the state of events in Saigon, a picture of
Dr. Benjamin Spock in a peace march in Boston, and an article about the fear of the bubonic plague in Vietnam. What could have been a controversial newsworthy item was lost, or hidden, amidst the various themes of the data.

Estimates about the number of Canadians who participated in the war as members of American militia range from 6,000 to 30,000 (Gaffen, 1990:36). In Unknown Soldiers, Gaffen predicted that Canadian involvement at this level would only have become a controversial issue if a Canadian soldier had been taken prisoner (Ibid.: 279). And the fact that these men were engaged in this way did not become a prominently newsworthy item until the '80's.

Social-scientific theories about the power of the North American military-industrial complex predict a constraint of news items on the arms trade. In limited contrast to this prediction, there were several articles in the collection that did report on the export of Canadian arms to the United States for use in Vietnam. In 1967, for example, the Star announced that Canadian arms sales to the United States were doing well and setting records (01/24/67:21). A few months later the Star reported that Pearson insisted on selling arms to the United States even if they were to be used in Vietnam (03/10/67:1). Although this trade was reported, the news items were certainly isolated from other items reporting on the War.

The moral dilemma of serving on the ICC was examined
briefly in 1966 when the G&M printed an article about the Canadian government's position, even going so far as to state that "its truce commission membership" influenced this decision (G&M, 01/01/66:2). Several years later the selling of arms to the US was questioned (Star, 11/15/69:64) (G&M, 04/28/71:7). The ethics of profiting from the war while serving on the commission was present but generally isolated from the reports that held more prominent positions within the data.

Yet there was a series of prominently placed articles about the Canadian sale of CF-5 jets and their success in Vietnam (Star, 10/12/65:21; 11/03/65:5) (G&M, 03/18/66:3; 02/07/68:B3). For example, while Ralph Allen was in Vietnam reporting his series of articles about the war (and probably attempting to incorporate issues most relevant to Canadian readers), he too wrote a very brief article on the CF-5 jets. The article was placed at the top of the Star's World News page. It was headed, "Hellyer's Freedom Fighter just the ticket, say Yankee airmen" (Star, 10/12/65:21). The article was identified with a picture of Allen and the subtitle "Ralph Allen in Viet Nam", to indicate that it was part of his series. The byline identified Allen as a member of the Star staff and was datelined, Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Vietnam.

What was most striking about this article was both that it was very open about the production and trade of CF-5s
to the USA for the conflict in Vietnam, and the fact that the article nonetheless isolated from other issues. Allen had spent some time in Vietnam at the time of this report. He had already completed an article about the ICC, and yet he made no reference to the discrepancy between supplying arms while participating as a member of the ICC and monitoring military build-up in the country (Ibid.).

B. Muted Issues

Within the alternative press, accusations of colonialism and racism were sometimes levelled at the United States (This Magazine, 1965:12). But within the data set colonialism was only identified in one of the news reports in November of 1954. In an article titled, "Notes Vietnam Fate: Manila Ignores Charge That It's a U.S. Vassal", Rawle Knox from the London Observer wrote the first of what was described as a series of three articles (G&M, 11/11/54:10). This article described how resources and manpower in Manila were being exploited by the USA and added that similar plans were in store for Vietnam. The terms "colonialism" or "imperialism" were absent from the coverage but several examples of economic relations between the United States and Manila as well as the Philippines and the use of 'vassal' suggested imperialist relations. Although this article was to be the first of three articles, the next two articles were never found in subsequent copies of the G&M.
And the issues of racism first entered news reporting in 1955, when America congressman Powell claimed that the American government tried to discourage him from attending a conference at which the Indo-Chinese were planning to meet (Star, 04/18/55:29). Powell, a black congressman, claimed that racist attitudes were one of the reasons for the attempted restrictions.

Although the issue of racism was marginalized in the news articles, denigration of the North Vietnamese was apparent in the editorial cartoons. During Period III, the cartoons almost consistently portrayed the North Vietnamese and Vietnamese nationalists as peasants with crude arms, black pajamas, and conical hats (Star, 2/10/65:6; 1/5/65:6; 12/16/65:6). While delayed economic and military development was generally true of Vietnam, this derogatory innuendo devalued the authority and sophistication of the North Vietnamese leadership. But the cartoons did not portray the Vietnamese as monkeys which were the symbols sometimes used by the Americans on the battle field.

The issues of racism and colonialism come into sharper focus when earlier cartoons are compared with depictions of the North Vietnamese toward the end of the war. In a cartoon by Bikworth, printed in the Star in 1973, for the first time, a North Vietnamese leader, Pham Van Dong, was portrayed as a business man in suit and tie and fancy cufflinks (Star, 01/27/73:18). This portrayal was in sharp
contradiction to the usual peasant suits given North Vietnamese.

Another editorial cartoon, in the Globe and Mail, presented a similar portrayal of the North Vietnamese leader in business attire (06/15/73:6). In this cartoon Van Dong was shaking hands in agreement with Kissinger. Dong was the same height as Kissinger, for the first time not emphasizing the height of the North Vietnamese but allowing some equality. The similarity in their attire reinforced that equality.

After Powell’s accusations in the mid-‘50’s, racism did not directly surface in the texts again until 1970 when the Star printed a news commentary by Rabbi Feinberg of Toronto who had been to North Vietnam on Ho Chi Minh’s invitation. He claimed that racism was used by the American military to indoctrinate the GIs (Star, 04/13/70:6). This inclusion of racism in the coverage demonstrates that it was not entirely excluded but very marginally included.

Economic dependency was another muted issue. During the early years of the ICC, India was one country on the commission that often openly condemned American activities in VN. When the commission first came into being, it was India that appeared to put the most energy into initiating efforts. As early as July of 1954, India promoted the work of the ICC, as the caption reads, "INDIA URGES EARLY START ON PROGRAM" (G&M, 07/26/54:01).

In 1962, India led the condemnation of the USA and
South Vietnam as reported in the article headed "U.S., VIETNAM CONDEMNED BY COMMISSION" (G&M, 06/05/62:03). By the mid-'60's, India no longer actively participated on the ICC and, in part, the explanation could be that in 1966 Mrs. Gandhi went to the United States to negotiate economic aid in the amount of $150,000,000, just as Canadian trade relations of the Auto Pact were understood to be 'tied' to ICC participation (G&M, 03/30/66:8).

The report on Mrs. Gandhi's trip in 1966 added that an extra $500,000,000 in economic aid had been "blocked", but now that Mrs. Gandhi and President Johnson had met, the USA was "expected to start releasing the money". The caption for this article read, "Mrs. Gandhi expresses sympathy for position of U.S. on Vietnam". This article provided a muted version of India's dependency on the USA and her subsequent silence in condemning the United States. This issue was isolated by making no cross references to related matters (in this case India's participation on the ICC).

Earlier, in 1962, economics, dependence, and political cooperation were integrated in a report by John Holmes, who was president of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. He acknowledged and warned of the relationship between economies and politics when he said, "Don't tempt our government to seek popularity by standing up to the Yankees" (G&M, 11/10/62:3). Although the article was nearly hidden on the third page, it drew attention to the
issues with the boldly printed caption "Don't Antagonize U.S., Canadians Urged". Clearly this example demonstrated the ideas held by intellectual elites, and its inclusion provided openness to the reporting.

C. Sensationalizing

As claimed earlier, personal information or direct quotations from ICC personnel were rarely included. For example, the recreational activities of American soldiers were not addressed by Canadian reporters. But, because an examination was made of the type of content prominent Canadian reporters did select, a small set of articles provided sensational coverage on the topic of Vietnamese orphans. The personal opinions of the ICC participants were not part of the news articles until 1973, when unnamed sources would complain about working and living conditions, as in the stench of the surroundings, or complaints about individuals, as when Canadians were described as being arrogant (Star, 02/05/73:02) (G&M, 04/07/73:04).

The Time/Life series, The Vietnam Experience, has "Combat Photographer" as one of the volumes (Mills, 1983). On the cover and within the book, there are a large number of pictures of black American soldiers. When the representation of negroid features within this book are compared to the number of black faces in the data collected for this series, there was a surprising discrepancy between the two. This
discrepancy could be explained in two ways: (a) the identification of those who had negroid features in the photocopies of the film copies of old newspapers was difficult, and (b) the number of pictures of black soldiers might have increased had the collection process not focussed exclusively on Canada-Vietnam stories.

The issue of black soldiers in Vietnam first surfaced, within this research, when the articles by Jack Cahill, which were accompanied by news photos by Boris Spremo, were found. In the article Cahill added, "A big proportion of the 1,245 children in this orphanage are black" (Star, 02/14/73:53). The Spremo photos showed that many of the Vietnamese orphans and foundlings who were described as having been fathered by American servicemen, had Asian-Negroid features. The racially distinct characteristics were identified in one of the pictures. A review of the news photos in the collection (ones that impinge on the articles on Canada's involvement in Vietnam) indicated that some blacks could be identified in the photos (G&M, 06/20/66:8 and 03/10/66:8). In contrast to the general under-representation of Blacks in the news photos, a caption to one of these pictures read, "Negroes account for 14.8 per cent of the US forces and 18.3 percent of the deaths" (Ibid.).

**SUMMARY**

This analysis of the ideological process indicates
a continued support for earlier claims of the dominance of official versions, the narrow parameters of the debates, the rise to prominence of the critical discourse, and the moderately influential role of journalists.

First, the very structure of the news articles (the form in which information was presented) augmented and supported the current political consensus. Even within the style in which articles were written there was a consistent tendency for structure to reflect changes in the political climate. There was more closure during those times when the Canadian government was described as holding a conservative consensus and more openness when there was a liberal-moderate consensus.

Regardless of political climate, Cold War ideology tended to pervade the articles. Elements of Cold War thinking were only moderately relaxed toward the final years. Moreover, from this interpretation of the texts, it appeared that journalists played a key role in the creation and continuation of various aspects of Cold War thinking by using terse terms such as "Reds" in the headlines.

This review of the ideological process supported claims about the weakness of critical discourse. The secondary status of critical discourse, both in location and substance, was intensified through its presentation through editorial cartoons. And the initial conjecture that perhaps criticism would be visible between articles, was updated. The
interetextual analysis demonstrated that the positioning of articles did not consistently contribute to debate or dialogue.

Yet the critical discourse did gain prominence at the end of the war as witnessed by the substantial number of critical articles featured in the banner headlines. This prominence through format was reinforced by length. This rise in visibility was identified as a way in which the critical is "absorbed" into the official discourse—components of criticism simply gain equal status with the dominant views of those in power.

Ideological shifts and gaps were identified in the data. These shifts consisted almost exclusively of a move from formal to informal, personal reporting. And the central ideological gap, as identified within this data set, occurred during the mid-'60's and Pearson's liberal-moderate era. At this time, the content of the reports was most diverse, contradictory, and confusing.

During this ideological gap there was also a dramatic increase in the number of news photos. The burgeoning number of visually reproduced messages appear to suggest a journalistic imperative, "trying to get the story out" as Hallin claimed in "The Uncensored War", (1986).

The last prediction of hegemony theory was the omission of certain information. An examination of omitted themes concluded that only two possible themes were indeed
missing from the content—a nihilistic advocacy of nuclear weaponry or an idealistic condemnation of war as a means to resolve international conflicts. Instead, a wide diversity of topics was included, if only in a very marginal way. This research outlined a "peripheral discourse" that constituted a wide variety of topics sporadically included in the reporting.

These claims that official discourse consistently maintained dominance throughout the data are again examined in the next chapter by looking at some specific articles. The preferential treatment of official versions of events will be examined from yet another methodological approach. And a continued analysis is made of the status of critical discourse, even when, as has been found in this chapter, the critical rises to considerable prominence.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE CHIVALRY METAPHOR

At this final stage of the research, tendencies toward closure versus openness were examined through a semiotic structural analysis of several sample articles. Building on the analysis of manifest content in Chapter III and thematic content listed in Chapter IV, this chapter reports on meaning construction through word selection, sentence construction, and complex meaning systems.

This chapter proposes that the chivalry metaphor was used as the central meaning system within the news articles. In *Snow Job*, Taylor had explored the metaphors of "Quiet Diplomacy", "Virtuous Bystander", "Helpful Fixer" and "Impartial Friend" (1974:iv and back cover). Levant capitalized on the notion 'quiet' and, as demonstrated by the title of his book, *Quiet Complicity*, conceptualized Canada's role as "Silent Dupe" (1986). Then, in a more scathing tone, Levant even suggested that Canada had been "the chore-boy of Molock" (the Semitic God to whom children were sacrificed) (*Ibid.*, 174).

Another metaphor for Canada's role was represented
by Ross when he claimed that Canada had averted an escalation of the conflict in Vietnam to nuclear war. He thereby conceptualized Canada as a "Nuclear Monitor".

Within this research, however, I argue that the "Chivalry Metaphor" best describes the perspective used to conceptualize and communicate Canadian involvement in the war. The Age of Chivalry, as marked by the Crusades and romanticized in tales of King Arthur, championed the value of the strong protecting the weak from the immoral. An overly simplistic good-versus-bad dichotomy, an idealized morality, and the inclusion of a rescued damsel are all components of this archaic myth. Furthermore, the oft-identified use of the United States as the "white knight of democracy", as described by Hellman, complements this view of Canada as a gallant member of the ICC (1986: 67). Use of the chivalry metaphor parallels Cold War ideology.

In Chapters III and IV, the findings have indicated that news coverage of Canadian participation in Vietnam closely reproduced the views of Canadian politicians who were in power, a situation predicted by the propaganda model. Tendencies toward closure were indicated by the high reliance on official discourse and primary definers along with the reporting of their preferred definitions of events. With the benefit of these findings, the chivalry metaphor was identified as the overall meaning system that framed the preferred perspective.
In addition to a tendency to reproduce official versions of events, critical discourse was found to be limited, weak and lacking substance. Although, on average, nearly one-third of the articles constituted critical discourse, the content of these articles did not represent a meaningful counterpoint to official viewpoints. Instead, critical topics were marginalized and trivialized until the last months of Canadian participation in Vietnam. A semiotic structural analysis was made of the continued tendency to favour official versions of events. Criticism and debate only gained prominence when political decisions were resolved.

One unanticipated finding concerned the increased coverage at the end of the War. The analysis thus far indicated that news coverage changed dramatically in Period V, both in scope and content. Additional evidence of those changes is provided through the examination of two articles that best represent those changes. For the first time, critical discourse had gained prominence in location and length.

And finally, journalists were found to play a more important role than the propaganda model had predicted. Two articles from Period V, both by Charles Taylor of the Globe & Mail, were selected for semiotic analysis. These articles were excellent examples of investigative reporting. In brief, this chapter examines the birth, continuation, promotion and finally the confrontation of the "chivalry metaphor" as it
operated in the news texts.

I. BIRTH OF THE METAPHOR (Period I)

Birth of the chivalry metaphor began with an article that first announced Canada's proposed role on the ICC. The headline for this article read: "No Illusions About Task: Canada's Role in Indo-China Called Onerous, Honorable: Two Government Officials Are Flying to New Delhi For Truce Group Parleys" (G&M, 7/29/54:1)¹. The reporter was Harvey Hickey and through his replication of specific terms from the press announcement, he reinforced and promoted the notions of diplomatic courtesy and chivalry that were inherent in the original government announcement.

Earlier analysis of the types of content and the status of sources cited in the articles had shown that top Canadian politicians were able to strongly influence the nature and perspective of the news articles. The large percentage of official discourse and its concomitant tendency to favour primary definers meant that the news coverage very directly mirrored the views of those in power.

The control exhibited by Canadian political officials was also replicated in the framing of events. In essence, the early news coverage presented Canada as a noble knight enlisted to protect the virtues of the Geneva Agreement for the benefit of the maiden Vietnam. Framing participation

¹Article #1. Entire report reproduced in Appendix VI.
as an act of international courtesy was made possible through the replication of terms favored in the original press release. Not only was the chivalry metaphor consistent throughout the article, there were a variety of ways in which an idealized romantic summary of events was provided. Throughout the article the repeated presentation of political consensus, the removal of human agency, the overly simplified non-Communist versus Communist duality, and the emphasis on gallantry rather than economic considerations also contributed to the strength of the metaphor.

A. Terms of Engagement

Right from the start, the words used to describe the task, "onerous, honorable", implied chivalry and gallantry. In large part the birth of the metaphor was made possible through exclusive reliance on the press statement as source, indicating Hickey's replication of the perspective initially proposed by the government.

In adopting the term "onerous", the chivalry metaphor was in essence created by the Canadian government and then amplified by the press. 'Gambling' would have been a more accurate trope to frame events. 'Gambling', which implied the risks for ICC success, would have provided a more realistic assessment of the factors that would influence possible outcomes, such as American and South Vietnamese reluctance to sign the final agreement. "Dutiful servant" of
the United States would also have been more accurate. But throughout this article, and this is an important point that bears repeating, the reporter complied with the manner in which the government had originally framed events.

This first article announcing the ICC began with a terse statement. The sterility of the content belied the political pressure under which Canada had conceded to this task:

Canada today agreed to serve on the international commissions which will supervise the Indo-China armistice and sent two senior officials to New Delhi to help work out the preliminary arrangements.

With India and Poland, Canada will form three supervisory commissions: one each for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, which, by means of military inspection teams, will observe the execution of the armistice agreement signed at Geneva last week (Ibid.).

In part the sterility was brought about by simply naming the countries without identifying the politicians or diplomats. As well, simply naming the countries added to the implication of political collectivity and, more important, consensus. Naming the whole through the collective noun gathered public and private voices into a cohesive whole without recognition of individual or group differences.

Another feature of the coverage that supports the notion of the operation of the chivalry metaphor concerns the use of specific symbolism. Within medieval jousting, and prior to any type of combat, some formalized, symbolic gesture is used to initiate interaction. Within these diplomatic
relations concerning the ICC, the symbolic gesture was the release of an impersonalized "official statement":

In an official statement issued after a cabinet meeting this afternoon, the Government said it had no illusions about the magnitude and complexity of this "onerous" assignment. However, it added that available information led to the conclusion that there was a reasonable chance of the commissions operating effectively and thus making a constructive contribution to peace in Southeast Asia (Ibid.).

Through this use of the metonymic term "statement", the diverse political positions that are known to have existed at this time were collectivized into this consensus. And the removal of human agency—the anonymous, faceless "every man" as Nietzsche would say—overgeneralized the consensus.

The removal of human agency (and the production of implied consensus), is even exemplified with descriptions of decisions on this issue that omit any possible contention or debate:

At the same time, the statement hinted that the Government has no intention of being made the butt of Communist obstruction. If its expectation of effective operation proved ill-founded and the commissions were frustrated by obstruction, the Government said, "then, of course, no useful purpose would be served by continuing their existence." That was taken as an implied threat of withdrawal in the face of obstruction (G&M, 7/29/54:1).

The "statement hinted", not the agents creating the statement. The press release takes on an independent, human existence; it is able to "hint" at government intention. And the removal of agency hides the notion of any 'production' of information. The statement takes on a form of authority that
obscures the power relations involved in the original decision making. In actual fact (as outlined in the history of this era) Canada had been pressured to accept a role on the ICC, and not all of those in power were in agreement with the nature of the task.

As well, it should be emphasized, there was this tendency to favour the word "serve". That word was repeated throughout this text and evident in several other articles as well (G&M, 7/31/54:4; Star, 7/29/54:1; G&M, 5/14/55:1). 'Service' is certainly a prime ingredient of chivalry while words such as "act", "participate", or even "work" could have been used to describe ICC activities. But just as agency was not directly identified, the nature of the activities was often not specified.

Agency was not, however, totally eliminated as the next paragraph demonstrated:

R.M. Macdonnell, assistant undersecretary of State for External Affairs and Air Commodore H. H. C. Rutledge, co-ordinator of the joint staff in the Defense Department left here tonight by air for New Delhi.

There they will work with Escott Reid, Canadian high commissioner to India, who has been in consultation with the Indian Government ever since the formation of the commissions was proposed. All will attend a conference called by India to work out preliminary arrangements for the operation of the commissions (G&M, 7/29/54:1).

But since those named as direct participants are not cited, the political and diplomatic agency is still dislocated from the information in 'the statement'. The reader is led to assume from the reading that each participant was in agreement
with the content of the statement.

Not only was this consensus inaccurately implied, but an oversimplification of duality was visibly included. The article continued by reporting that "Other participants in this conference will be representatives of Poland, France, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and the Communist Vietminh forces" (G&M, 7/29/54:1). An inaccurate generalization was in fact made when calling the Vietminh "Communist". "Nationalists" would have been a more accurate name. Again, the collectivization demonstrates the hazards of a facile generalization but certainly builds on the overly-simplistic duality of Cold War ideology with its 'West versus East' assumptions.

Even at this early stage one issue that was, and would continue to be an important issue is marginalized. There was, within this article, only a passing reference to the economic cost of Canada’s acceptance of the ICC role:

It is expected that Canada will have to send a diplomatic and military staff of nearly 200 people to Indo-China to work on or under the commissions. The work will continue for at least two years since the commissions are intended to supervise elections in July, 1956. Today’s statement said nothing about whether Canada was expected to meets its own costs in the operation. The chief of the three missions will be named shortly (G&M, 7/29/54:1).

Earlier, in Chapter IV, economics was identified as part of the peripheral discourse. In reviewing the issue of economics within the context of the chivalry metaphor, it becomes clear that including the cost could be perceived as an unchivalrous
act. Certainly Canadian politicians were well aware of projected costs in an era when the Canadian economy was already considerably stressed. News articles in these 1950 papers often reported on unemployment, bankruptcy and government concern with spending. And ICC participation went on to cost, on average, one million dollars per year (Taylor, 1974:22). Moreover, ongoing government debate about this concern was certainly identified in other sources on the history of this era.

Clearly, a heavy reliance on the manner in which the government conceptually framed this decision directly influenced the approach featured in the news story. Most of the citations were direct quotations from the official statement. The statement became the real, reinforcing the appearance of objectivity. Contrary to the article examined at the end of this chapter, where the reporter included assertions of "what was really" happening, this first report directly replicated an official perspective on events. This approach contributed to the initial and seminal use of the chivalry metaphor. Primary definers, the government, had effectively controlled the viewpoint that continued to shape reporting on these events.

B. Good versus Evil

A central component of chivalry and courtesy is the issue of morality and the simple good knight/bad knight
dichotomy. That duality, also an integral ingredient of Cold War ideology, was equally important to the manner in which opponents in the Vietnam conflict were described.

As mentioned earlier, often the "Communists" had been incorrectly collectivized. In defining the protagonists of the early war between the French and the Vietminh, all non-Aligned (the West) forces were collectivized as Communists:

Such violations are defined as a refusal by either the French or the Communists to move troops as required by the regroupment plan or a violation by either party of the regroupment zones, territories, or air space of the other. If unanimity cannot be reached on such questions it is provided that majority and minority reports can be made to the Geneva powers (Ibid.).

While it was true that "the French" were in Vietnam, naming the other side "the Communists" is problematic and probably incorrect as outlined earlier in Chapter IV.

Inequalities of national respect were reinforced by precisely identifying "the good" who bear naming and "the bad" who should remain nameless. This paradigmatic decision was often used to describe the opponents: The French are specifically identified in terms of their nationality but national affiliation was omitted for "the Communists".

Not only were the "Communist" others collectivized, they were often vilified. In a previous paragraph (number three), the article first framed that non-Aligned otherness with an element of vilification. At the outset, the Canadian government was reported as having "no intention of being made the butt of Communist obstruction".
In this case "obstruction" is only a connotative term, it does not denote any specific behaviour. The use of connotation so strongly implies generalized assumptions of the evils and non-cooperativeness on the part of this group that it does not need to be spelled out.

Yet even at this early stage of the conflict, South Vietnam and the USA were in fact most strongly obstructing the negotiation process. But no accusations are levelled at "the good guys" who form part of the collective "West".

Canada, implicated as the White Knight, was described in such a way within the news articles that absolute integrity can only be assumed. This first announcement of Canadian participation lauded the Canadian decision to work on the ICC without precise mention of the reasons for Canada being selected for this job.

The article, again returning to the faceless, impersonal statement which serves as a shiny armour, reiterated the challenges ahead and waffled on the reasons for Canada's selection in terms of geography:

"Canada is geographically remote from Indo-China," the statement said, "and her collective security responsibilities in South-East Asia are limited to those that arise from membership in the United Nations. We know from experience, however, that just as local conflicts can become general war, so conditions of security and stability in any part of the world serve the cause of peace everywhere.

"If, therefore, by participation in the work of these Indo-Chinese commissions, Canada can assist in establishing such security and stability in Southeast Asia, we will be serving our own country as well as the cause of peace" (Ibid.).
And while the responsibility will be faced by the virtuous country, the article certainly did not spell out the assumed East-West geo-political alliances that had prompted the decision process. In contrast, Taylor's article in 1973 did spell out that Canada was expected to "fall into line" with the USA (G&M, 7/6/73:1).

Implications that Canada would accept the ICC task on moral principles (with all the idealism of service to "our own country"), as this article suggested, are but one example of the vague nature of this first announcement. Had the report been more accurate it would have reported directly on American pressures for Canadian compliance and the North American need to protect markets in the Far East, as Ross's historical accounts claim (1986).

C. Peace--The Holy Grail

Another way in which this first announcement of Canadian participation on the ICC implied the use of the chivalry metaphor was through the use of such indeterminate, connotative meanings as 'peace' and 'security'. The idealism of chivalry is perhaps best personified in the quest for the Holy Grail--peace. During the crusades when the chivalry ethos was most pervasive, knights went in quest of the cup or platter used by Christ at the last supper, according to medieval legends. And in many ways, the "quest for peace" as identified in news reports, has a similar, symbolic
connotation. Peace was never explained in political or historical terms. This is another exnominated concept with safely undefined terms.

The "cause of peace" as noted at the end of the section from the article (above) was given as the goal for these efforts. Yet in Ross's book on the ICC, economic concerns and nuclear peace were given as reasons for Canadian foreign policy in the far east (1984:6).

This initial announcement of Canadian diplomatic participation was filled with inaccuracies and implications. The political reason for Canada's selection to this job centred on a strategic geographical location. Canada was picked not because of its distance from South-East Asia but its proximity to the United States.

It was emphasized that a place on the commissions did not mean that Canada was guaranteeing or undertaking to enforce the ceasefire. No new military or collective security commitment was involved. The commissions, said the statement, would be solely supervisory, judicial and mediatory. Where disputes could be settled, they would be reported to the member nations of the Geneva conference.

It was considered that the commissions should be able to function more effectively than the Korean supervisory commission because there was equal Communist and non-Communist representation on the Korea body, which circumstance frequently blocked action. Also, the Korea commission could report only to the two military commands (Ibid.).

Clearly Communist and non-Communist alliances had been carefully considered during the planning of participants for the ICC. Yet, the fact that Canada was the non-Communist alliance was not spelled out.
"A study of the information available," said the statement, "has led us to the conclusion that the commissions have a reasonable chance of operating effectively and of making a constructive contribution to the successful implementation of the ceasefire agreements and hence to peace in Southeast Asia.

"If our expectations unfortunately prove ill-founded and the commissions are frustrated by obstruction, then, of course, no useful purpose would be served by continuing their existence (Ibid.).

Again mention was made of "obstruction". But in this case the action is disembodied from whoever might be doing the obstructing. Since the term "the butt of Communist obstruction", mentioned earlier in this article, did attribute the action to an actor, this attribution could persist. Certainly no indication was given to the contrary; only "the Communists" were identified as possibly resisting order.

Within this tight reproduction of diplomatic consensus little is said of the fear of the use, on the part of the United States, of nuclear arms. In his book, Ross refers time and again to this fear on the part of Canadian politicians (1985). The United States was seen by Canadian diplomats as too militant and too ready to use nuclear weapons. But with the way this text was structured, that concern was omitted from the discourse. Instead, the reader would be led to infer that it was really "the Communist obstruction" and violation by Communist forces that presented a threat.

Finally the narrative was brought to conclusion, and perfect closure was achieved within the last paragraph. Again
the morality and idealism of chivalrous responsibility was reiterated with reference to a "worthy" effort to "strengthen peace". Speaking in these chivalrous platitudes, the actual political tensions of events were overlooked. 'Strengthening peace' meant reining in the American military and containing Communist expansion, negating the notion that the USA was equally engaged in "frighteningly arrogant . . . nation-building" that could be argued to be a form of capitalist expansion (Ross, Ibid.:3).

II. SELFLESS DEVOTION (Period II)

Up to this point, critical discourse was found to be marginalized and weak. Until Period V, articles constituting critical discourse were not usually located on the front pages of the newspapers, were usually shorter in length, and tended to focus more on the affective rather than on substance. Preference for the chivalry metaphor offers an explanation of why certain issues were presented as they were.

In the first place, Canadian ICC participants were presented as larger-than-life, noble actors. In the early years, for example, men being sent to Vietnam were never interviewed. Whether or not fervent dedication to diplomatic ideals existed at the personal level was not reported. Idealized notions of ICC morality are implied by the outrage expressed when it was learned that some members had engaged in criminal behaviour, as the article from 1962 portrayed. In
turn, idealized morality was only paradoxically debated in a 1969 article on the Canadian arms industry. Even articles reporting on the Canadian peace movement did not directly contest the metaphor. Nor were notions of Canada as a courteous, gallant country, seriously questioned in a scathing 1965 criticism of ICC work by Richard Allan. Instead, the chivalry metaphor was perpetuated throughout the first four Periods of the War, as is examined in the next three sections.

A. White Knights

The ICC's work must have been extremely difficult. First there was simply, as stressed in historical accounts but not reported until Period V, the challenge of the climate. Moreover, Period II, when this next article was published, was a period of extreme military and diplomatic confusion. As history records, the United States was secretly and dramatically escalating its military involvement in Vietnam.

However, much political and military confusion is side-stepped in this report on the misdemeanors of ICC members. No mention is made of the political arena in which these activities took place. The story is presented as a subplot of what was actually a wider narrative. This report on smuggling lacks any contextualization and reads like an isolated act from a three-act play.

Canadian members of the ICC were first discredited in the article headlined "Courts-Martial, Firings Expected:"
Indo-Chinese Gold and Opium Smuggled by Nine Canadians: Civilians Implicated, Names Not Disclosed" and written by Walter Gray (G&M, 3/13/62:1). The use of this banner headline allowed the outrage to overshadow the scope of the transgression.

The article opened with this announcement:

Ottawa, March 12--Prime Minister John Diefenbaker today revealed that nine Canadians serving on the International Truce Commission in Indo-China were engaged in smuggling gold and opium within that country. And at the same time he indicated that other Canadians serving on the commission in 1956 were involved in similar activities. However, the previous Liberal Administration never made the facts public (G&M, 3/13/62:1).

Smuggling became a persistent problem throughout the war but it first reached public scrutiny at this time. In an isolated and simplistic narrative style these accusations were reported without reference to the context within which events were occurring. By framing the events strictly within the House of Commons debates, issues of the wider context of the ICC were excluded. The article continued with a lengthy report:

Although the Prime Minister did not reveal the names of the nine Canadians who included one commissioned officer, one non-commissioned officer, five other ranks, and two clerks with the External Affairs Department, it was learned that once the current investigations are completed, their names would be made public. Court-martial proceedings are expected to be instituted against the service personnel (Ibid.).

No follow-up was provided to the story, the narrative is only

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2Article #2. Entire report reproduced in Appendix VI.
maintained intratextually. Opportunity existed for intertextual narrative since this was a time when ICC reports were most contentious.

The article continued with a history of smuggling charges against ICC members and the civilians engaged by the ICC. One hardly knows what to make of this article. Out of context of the history of the times, the incomplete narrative restricts understanding.

While there may be problems with the use of narrative, the problem presented here is one of incomplete narrative: There is no exploration of the dramatic background against which these actions were taking place or the massive deceptions occurring throughout Vietnam on a massive scale. Several months later, a small article reported that 30 days detention, and a reduction to the rank of private had been given to a Canadian Army corporal who had confessed to smuggling gold and opium within Indochina (G&M, 5/3/62:23). Several other Canadian members of the ICC were also charged and fined $100 each, others were suspended from duty pending dismissal.

This attack on the integrity of the Canadian ICC members proves even more interesting if it is reread for narratve style. Then the incompleteness of the narrative becomes clear since the true backdrop for the story was actually created by the many secretive American violations of the Geneva Agreement. But the honour of the Canadians, men
who held unimportant positions on the ICC, was sacrificed rather than allowing a full, accurate retelling of events.

B. Knights or Mercenaries? (Period IV)

There was yet another way in which the reproduction of Canadian involvement in Vietnam as a member of the ICC was perpetuated as a gracious act of chivalry. Economic issues, while certainly of concern to government officials, were excluded both in terms of the costs of ICC participation and the protection of market opportunities in South-East Asia.

As has been mentioned with other excluded or marginalized issues, the question of economics was not totally absent from the discourse. Within the context of loud public protest during Period IV it did surface on rare occasions. One article headlined "Canadian Arms for VN create jobs and a moral dilemma" best represented the limited and unusual way in which this issue was included (Star, 11/15/69:64)³.

This article, written by John Saunders, had been codified as alternative discourse with an open, loose presentation of the information. A detailed, direct discussion of Canadian profiteering from the war was so unusual, even at this point in time, that it was coded 'alternative'.

And the content and form of the article was unusual as well. In many ways it reads like a fable or allegory— it

³Article #3. Entire report reproduced in Appendix VI.
‘shadow-boxes’ with paradoxical issues but never directly summarizes a definite opinion or resolution. Although direct mention is made of the production of "machines that kill people", other features of the article included the personal tone of focussing on a "nice, middle-aged, motherly woman" implying a farcical framing of the claims that underlie the article. The text begins:

Ann Kotva is a nice, middle-aged, motherly woman in Rexdale who helps make machines that kill people in Viet Nam.

She’s one of more than 100,000 Canadians who owe their incomes wholly or partly to the U.S.–Canada Defence Production Sharing Agreement, a frequently attacked but economically bountiful arrangement in which Canada gets a big chunk of U.S. military spending (ibid.).

Kotva is used as a humanizing peg. Although this report hints at criticism, no direct statements are made. Instead, Kotva becomes the personalized, human voice. When these ideas are reported in this way, the implication is that this topic of profits from military sales can not be presented in a straightforward manner.

The indirect, open style of the article becomes even more problematic when the next few paragraphs are examined. Although very factual information is being presented, those facts are interspersed with terms that hint at opinion but never directly state evaluations:

By the end of last year, when the agreement was nearly a decade old, Washington had brought $2.1 billion worth of military goods from Canadian firms under its terms.

That figures is $377 million more than Ottawa purchased south of the border. Some Canadians are
becoming nervous about the future of the agreement. Other Canadian, opposed to the U.S. military ventures, want the deal killed (Ibid.).

Who are these Canadians who are so vehement they want the deal "killed"? By linking a word as emotive as "killed" Saunders brings about a kind of circularity. Here "killing people" (in the first paragraph of the article) is equated with "killing deals" and tends to neutralize the effect of the notion of 'killing'.

The paradox of this woman with her very human concerns of making a living is used to grab the reader's attention, reinforce objectivity and sets a personalized, ordinary life against a much larger issue--war and killing and the lives of many. That paradox continued throughout the text:

In essence, the agreement provides continental free trade in weapons and military gear--at least for the official armed forces.

Mrs. Kotva works at the Litton Systems Ltd. plant near Toronto International Airport. Her job is hooking up wires in the complex circuitry of Litton's Special-Purpose Airborne Computer.

Actually, not even executives of the company call the machine that: It's a "bombing computer" which goes into U.S. Air Force F-4 fighter-bombers stationed at points all over the world, including Viet Nam (Ibid.).

Precisely what the writer meant when he wrote "at least for the official armed forces" (in the first paragraph of this section) is very unclear. Some implied meanings can be read into that phrase--was it "some 'unofficial' armed force"? Just who would that be? Conjectures could be made, but
guessing would clearly be problematic. While Saunders 'opens' the discourse in this way, the openness leads to the need to read the text at two levels: the visible and the implied. The paradox leads nowhere, it opens the discourse but the political and moral implications of Kotva's work are left unclear.

A revised view of Canadian involvement in Vietnam suggests that there was an inter-relationship between such factors as Canadian willingness to fund the cost and the military risk of ICC involvement, the Defence Cost Sharing Agreement, and the Auto Pact. While the reporter implied a linkage between morality and profitability, that link is merely presented as a type of allegory. In fact, ICC participation is totally excluded from the equation in this report. Certainly any notion of Canada as a chivalrous, global citizen is merely indirectly debated, again exemplifying the weakness of criticism at this point in time.

C. Never Confronting the Metaphor

The social unit that did question the chivalry metaphor outside of the news coverage was the peace movement. However, this group was never allowed to explicitly confront the metaphor within the news reports. The voicelessness of the peace movement was exemplified in an article representative of the usual approach given public protest.
In 1969, the Globe & Mail printed a series of articles about protest against Vietnam in the United States, Canada and Beijing. These articles are representative of the type of news coverage consistently accorded the peace movement.

After noting that there were 1,000 marchers in Vancouver it had pictures of the "tens of thousands in New York." (G&M, 11/17/69:19)\(^4\). The caption to one picture read: "Around the world, this was the day of the Vietnam Moratorium: people parading, scuffling, sometimes being violent" (Ibid.). This caption represents in a precise manner the nature of most of the content of the texts: specific names for the event, location, and descriptions of protestors. And the focus of the content of the articles was on the actions rather than the issues.

In many ways the pictures and their captions discredited the movement. For another photo the caption read: "In Paris: a bloodied demonstrator talks to riot police as the parade goes by" (Ibid.). In other words, "Here they are marching for peace and they aren't even peaceful themselves."

In a similar manner, a picture of a march in Toronto is captioned, "Generally peaceful, police called it -- although in Nathan Phillips Square they broke up a fight between left- and right-wing groups" (Ibid.).

\(^4\)From Articles #6 and #7. Entire report reproduced in Appendix VI.
An article on the same page had the headline, "3,000 march in Toronto, protesting war in Vietnam" (Ibid.).

About 3,000 people protesting against the war in Vietnam marched from Queen’s Park to the City Hall on Saturday. Members of the Vietnam Mobilization Committee said the turnout was disappointing.

There was confrontation between leftist groups and members of the right-wing Edmund Burke Society and one arrest (Ibid.).

This article continued with the name of the accused, implying a personal familiarity with the person, while in actual fact the information was probably taken from a police report:

James Dennis Corcoran, 20, of Carlton Street, was charged with creating a disturbance after the marchers arrived at Nathan Philips Square. Police also removed seven persons from the square and took them inside City Hall. They were released after being cautioned. (Ibid.).

On the whole, news coverage of the peace movement, as these articles demonstrate, never contested the chivalry metaphor. Rather than reporting the peace movement’s concern with profiteering from the war or with American militarism in Vietnam, the news papers focus on other features of the social protest. The content of the protest was supplanted with reports on the manner in which the protest was conducted.

D. "Laughing It Off" (Period III)

One article that did attempt to directly confront the chivalry metaphor and question Canadian participation on the ICC was printed in an earlier period, in 1965. While this article began with the powerful headline "Absurd's the word
for our Viet job" to Ralph Allen's article, it continued in a discourse that typified carnivalesque writing and thereby never seriously critiqued the ICC role (Star, 9/25/65:7). Even within the liberal-moderate political climate of this period, when prominent politicians were questioning Canada-U.S. relations, direct criticism was still not seriously expressed.

As described earlier, carnivalesque discourse is a humorous charade. And Allen's article provides a wonderful example of this type of writing. The ideas, scenarios, and quotations read like floats in a carnival parade. Allen gave the parade a theme, "The War of Great Pretenses", and then proceeded to amplify the theme through this description:

In this, the War of Great Pretenses, Canada is not playing the most important role but it's certainly playing one of the most uncomfortable and absurd.

The fiction that the International Commission for Supervision and Control is doing an effective and impartial job of enforcing the 1954 Geneva truce agreement was difficult to sustain even during the relatively peaceful years through the turn into the 60s (Ibid.).

With this opening sentence Allen both denounced the war and Canada's participation in it. Throughout the rest of the rather lengthy article of about 300 centimeters, Allen made accusations in support of this denunciation. He began with the claim that although the ICC had been ineffective during the fifties, this had not become obvious until the sixties. Allen

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^Article #4. Entire report reproduced in Appendix VI.
traced out the alliances among the members of the ICC, illustrated the powerlessness of the ICC when Hanoi closed down its inspection stations, and claimed that Saigon offered no better support to the work of the ICC than Hanoi.

In appointing the Commission the signatories to the agreement did not say so in so many words but everyone understood perfectly well that one of the three members, Canada, was the West’s referee; another Poland, was the East’s referee; and the third, India, was the referee between the referees. The Lewis Carroll plot-structure took a surprisingly long time to reach the inevitable denouement (Ibid.).

The article continued with a summary of ICC activities since the early 1960’s including this description of Hanoi’s activities:

A few days after this second report on the U.S. bombings, the Hanoi government made an official rule of a practice that both Hanoi and Saigon had been following almost from the start. The five inspection sites the Commission had been allowed in the North were closed down and all five inspection teams were forbidden to move outside the city limits of Hanoi.

The reason given was that in view of the U.S. raids, the North Viet Nam government could no longer guarantee the safety of the visiting Pinkertons, much as it would like to (Ibid.).

With this brief history we are provided with another 'float', the "visiting Pinkertons", as Allen satirized, best portrayed as the "Keystone Kops".

And the next float is vividly presented as well with "blindfolds" and "Oriental glee":

The effect of this was merely to put the last knot in a blindfold that the Commission had been wearing all along. It’s (sic) never had any powers of enforcement or any rights of search and both the warring states have taken a certain Oriental glee
in misleading, obstructing and lying to its agents from the outset of their mission (Ibid.).

Puzzles and riddles and planned confusion are the primary ingredients of the Lewis Carroll novel. In a similar vein, Allen continued the article with a story about the ICC which he named "an unacknowledged conundrum". In essence, Allen falls victim to his own metaphor. By conceding that this unsolvable puzzle exists, the reporter is excused from interjecting his conclusions.

Allen ended the article with his personal ridicule:

To keep this feeble hope alive—and to maintain the illusion that the Commission is achieving something here and now—is costing Canada more than $600,000 a year. It's still less than the cost of one B-52 bomber plane.

And though you won't get any official hint of this either in Ottawa or here, our presence on the Commission as a non-neutral neutral refereeing the war on behalf of the U.S. does give Canada a far from unwelcome excuse for staying out of the fighting (Ibid.).

Finally, in this last sentence, Allen provided his assessment of Canadian actions in Vietnam. But considering the lack of seriousness earlier in the article and remembering that most newspaper readers would have stopped much earlier, this evaluation does little to review or revise the use of the chivalry metaphor.

III. A DISEMBODIED BLACK KNIGHT (Period III)

It was found that secondary voices were rarely
featured in the prominent articles. Along with muted themes, important, alternate voices were muted as well. An examination of the one time that Ho Chi Minh's voice entered the news coverage with some amount of clarity occurred during Period III. Yet even then, he was kept relatively silent.

Within my memory of medieval chronicles, the Black Knight was never allowed a face or a voice. Hidden behind his black suit of mail and a menacing expression on the face visor, he was never given occasion to justify or even explain his position. A similar comparison of silencing can be drawn by deconstructing the voice of authority accorded Ho Chi Minh in the article Headlined "Peace Hint from Hanoi sent to Canada, India Paper" which was reproduced from the press services of the *New York Times*, *(G&M/ 2/9/66:1)*.

At this time, Ho Chi Minh was making his appeal to the ICC against the military backdrop of Operation Rolling Thunder. Massive bombing was being conducted by the American military on North Vietnam. The bombing raids lasted from March 2, 1965 to October, 1968. Therefore, when Ho wrote this letter North Vietnam had been experiencing the bombing for nearly a year.

A. *Voiceless*

While the headline to this article implied the inclusion of a 'voice from Hanoi', that voice was not conveyed

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*Article #5. Entire report reproduced in Appendix VI.*
in the news report. Instead, Ho Chi Minh was kept behind his 'black visor'. The article began with this introduction:

UNITED NATIONS-- Hitherto unpublished parts of a letter North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh sent to Canada and India contain what some diplomats here interpret as the first sign of interest by Hanoi in a possible peace conference on Vietnam.

In letters to Canada and India, parts of which were disclosed yesterday for the first time, Ho mentioned their special responsibility for peace in what formerly was French Indo-China (Ibid.).

Allowing a voice would have meant including more of the content of the letter Ho Chi Minh had written, as the following section indicated:

"In the face of the extremely serious situation brought about by the United States in Vietnam, " Ho wrote to Prime Minister Lester Pearson, "I hope that your Government will fulfill its obligations under the Geneva Agreement (Ibid.)."

In this paragraph, only a few sentences are reproduced from Ho Chi Minh's letter. These sentences serve merely as representations of the verity of the existence of the letter. This very brief excerpt is lost in the rest of the article. Ho was not allowed a direct, unmediated voice. Instead, his plea to members of the ICC emerges from the discourse with great difficulty.

B. On Deaf Ears

Not only was Ho Chi Minh not allowed to express himself within the content of the news report, the article was also constructed so as to eliminate any sense of how his concern was received. Ho's voicelessness was matched by its
reception. The news report severely limited the extent to which any type of diplomatic response was recognized:

(In Ottawa, officials said they had not seen a copy of the letter Ho sent to India. But first reports indicated that it was very similar to the earlier Ho letter sent to Communist bloc countries in January. Canada received a copy of that letter as a member of the International Control Commission. (Far from raising peace hopes, the letter, as released from Ottawa, was intransigent (Ibid.).

A curious feature of the quote above was the unusual inclusion of brackets at the beginning of each (and the next several) paragraph(s). These punctuation marks have the impact of implying that these comments are "asides". No direct response was given to Ho Chi Minh’s appeal. Instead, asides or less serious responses were included.

An important commentary on the letter is reflected with the word "intransigent". No source is attributed to this valuative commentary on Ho’s letter. So Ho Chi Minh is not only effectively silenced through the exclusion of his voice from the article, his position itself is discredited and dismissed with this evaluation.

C. No Accountability

Notions that Ho’s requests or concerns were dismissed continued in this news report:

(Prime Minister Pearson, when asked in the Commons yesterday about the letter to India, said he knew nothing beyond what he had heard on the radio. But he added that Canada had been discussing with the other members of the commission, India and Poland, the idea of peace
negotiations. This appears to have been an error. There was no confirmation in Ottawa last night that Canada has in fact had recent discussion on the subject with India and Poland.)
The messages to India, Poland and Canada were appended to a letter Ho sent to the head of government last Jan. 24 (Ibid.).

After an official denial of the very existence of the letter, the news report included this unaccredited quotation.

Canada and India on one occasion joined in a majority report holding that violations had taken place by both North and South Vietnam. Last year Canada filed a minority report dissenting from a joint report by Poland and India holding South Vietnam and the United States responsible for hostilities there and for failure to carry out the agreement to unify the country after elections (Ibid.).

The most direct response to Ho's letter, was hereby provided through the response the American State Department which had not received a copy.

But that was the voice that was granted the 'last word':

However Chairman J. William Fulbright (D. Ark.) of the Senate Foreign Relations (sic) said Ho's move "could be of great significance."

Meanwhile, the Security Council remained bogged down by disagreement among its 15 members on what to do about the U.S. initiative for a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. There was no indication of an early meeting to discuss the U.S. resolution which the council voted by a narrow margin to place on its agenda (Ibid.).

Social-scientific research on the news process had suggested that voices from 'the other side' will be excluded from the discourse. Yet a review of the frequency of sources indicates that few voices are missing from the discourse altogether. However, this examination of the representation
of Ho Chi Minh's voice indicated that it is more accurate to say that oppositional voices were muffled. And this article portrayed how that muffling was done.

IV. QUIXOTIC CRITICISM (Period V)

Up to this point the textual analysis has argued that the chivalry metaphor maintained a consistent presence in the discourse. Not until Period V, with its intensified reporting on events in Vietnam and its increased criticism, were notions of courtesy and chivalry questioned. Two articles were deconstructed as most representative of changes in the semiotic nature of the more prominent critical discourse in 1973. These articles are described in this research as 'quixotic criticism' because, as is argued below, they continued to be marked by a spirit of impractical idealism, lofty romanticism, and extravagant chivalry (all definitions of the quixotic when chivalry goes to the extreme, as exemplified by Don Quixote who jousts with windmills in the classic tale Don Quixote de la Mancha by Cervantes).

By June, 1973, Charles Taylor had finally gained access to that section of the Pentagon Papers reporting on Canadian involvement in the war in Vietnam. I write 'finally' because this was nearly three years after the initial release of the information. And the release of information in these papers created, in essence, a genealogical gap. In addition to the extravagantly idealized notions of Canada's virtuous
behaviour as a member of the ICC, the reading of Taylor's articles can best be described as a historical disjunctur reflecting a conception of history defined by Foucault as 'genealogy'.

Following Nietzsche's claims in On the Genealogy of Morals, Foucault too rejected notions of historical linearity by breaking off one epoch from another. As Sarap described so well:

Foucault rejects the Hegelian teleological model, in which one mode of production flows dialectically out of another, in favour of a Nietzschean tactic of critique through the presentation of difference (1989:63).

Sarap continued by explaining this approach to summaries of the past by adding that traditionally historians "insert events into grand explanatory systems and linear processes" and, in that process, neglect sets of knowledge that "have been disqualified as inadequate" (1989:64).

With the rupture in geneology brought about by the Pentagon Papers, several features of news reporting changed. The indirect, suggestive discourse of earlier periods, with repetitive exomination, was now replaced by a dramatically different discourse. Taylor's articles demonstrated, for the first time, a much more direct discourse. Actors were precisely identified, a wider variety of perspectives was cited, and there appeared to be more balance in the attributions of blame. For the first time, there is an open recognition of difference and disagreement and some attempts
are made to balance the accounts by providing both sides of the story.

A. Direct Communication

Charles Taylor's article Headlined, "Is Canada the U.S. patsy in Vietnam?" presented a stark contrast to a similar question asked by Allen in 1965 (G&M/ 4/17/73:7). For the first time in several years Canadian involvement in Vietnam was again being debated. After evaluation of the ICC as "absurd" (in Period III), no such condemnation was reported although the word "deplore" appeared in four of the headlines during this period. These headlines reported that "Canada Deplored American Bombing of North Vietnam", Canadian protestors condemned the bombing, Canadian House of Commons issued a similar statement, and then the denunciations were reviewed in a news summary (G&M, 01/04/73:1; Star, 01/04/73:1; 01/06/73:1; G&M, 01/07/73:B1).

The direct style of the question in the headline was reiterated in the text:

With South Vietnamese troops crossing into Cambodia--and continued heavy fighting in Vietnam itself--Canada's role as a peacekeeper has become increasingly futile and increasingly perilous.

By fighting in Cambodia, South Vietnam has violated the Paris agreements which called for an end to "all military activities" in Cambodia and Laos. U.S. officials have tried to justify the move on the grounds that North Vietnamese forces have made advances in Cambodia since the agreements were signed.

7Article #8. Entire report reproduced in Appendix VI.
At the same time, U.S. bombers are blasting the countryside around the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh in a desperate attempt to save the besieged city and the tottering regime of Marshal Lon Nol.

With their Cambodian moves, the United States, South Vietnam and North Vietnam are all acting in open contempt of the Paris agreements. This not only imperils the prospects for peace in Indochina; it also makes Canada's role on the International Commission of Control and Supervision look even more futile (G&M/4/17/73:7).

With these introductory paragraphs Taylor provided a precise summary of current events in Vietnam and began with an unabashed evaluation. He stated explicitly that the military actions of South Vietnam, the United States, and North Vietnam were in violation of agreements.

With this text, no implications were made that any one of the combatants was taking a more aggressive role. Taylor underscored, in the text, the notion that "all" were acting "in open contempt of the Paris agreements". This claim was reiterated later in the text when Taylor claimed that "both sides are guilty of flagrant violations". This article was the first time throughout the data, that the admission was made that all sides were ever at fault—falsely implying that the strength and power of each side was equal.

Not only was Taylor listing his information directly, even his writing style was direct. The text was not mediated by sources or citations. Taylor wrote as if he were there, directly observing and assessing events. The dateline was not appended to this text, but the picture that formed part of the article implied that he was right there. And
contrary to a similar article by Allen in 1965, the journalist provided an unmediated voice. His evaluation is reported. No quotes were given. This is one of the first times the narrator (or reporter) has a more direct presence.

B. Neutrality and Implied Equality

Not only was the communication direct in Taylor's writing, but the partiality of earlier reports was gone. His report attempted to incorporate a variety of differing perspectives. Taylor moved from diplomatic sources in Ottawa to Canadian ICC members and even to representatives of the North Vietnamese:

It now seems only a matter of time before External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp and his Cabinet colleagues will be forced to honour their threat to withdraw from the ICCS or else to eat their own words.

In Vietnam itself, military activity is on a much greater scale and intensity than most Canadians have been led to believe. Diplomatic sources speak of division-size engagements in the northern province of South Vietnam and in Tay Ninh near the Cambodian border. In some areas of the Mekong Delta, fighting is even heavier than it was before the Paris agreements.

While Canadian observers watch hopelessly, both sides are guilty of flagrant violations of the ceasefire. On many occasions, Canadians have seen South Vietnamese planes take off with bombs under their wings and later return empty.

Officials for the Provisional Revolutionary Government (the Viet Cong) have protested to the ICCS that South Vietnamese planes have bombed designated "pickup spots" in their territory, just before ICCS helicopters arrived to airlift PRG delegates to meetings of the Joint Military Commission. If these reports are true, it would mean that South Vietnamese intelligence have advance notice of the pickups and schedule their raids in hopes of killing some of the Communist
officials (Ibid.).
Not only did the directness of the discourse become reinforced by the variety of viewpoints, suspicion of the South Vietnamese, which was not usually included before, was clearly outlined here. While earlier reports had always implied that only the North violated the agreement, the South was accused here as well. Taylor had written, "... both sides are guilty of flagrant violations..." (Ibid.).

But even with this superficial implication of impartiality (by allowing the Viet Cong perspective to be included and by including condemnation of the South Vietnamese) the anti-Communist bias persisted. As the article continued reporting on events, more negative implications were directed toward the North Vietnamese:

But the Communists have made relatively few such protests to the ICCS and have shown little inclination to demand investigation of South Vietnamese truce violations. There is no certain explanation for the Communists' failure to exploit such obvious opportunities for propaganda, especially since they could still frustrate ICCS investigation of their own truce violations, with the help of the Hungarians and the Poles. But it seems part of a general Communist policy to downgrade the ICCS and severely limit its effectiveness (Ibid.).

The text rambled on, sometimes impartial, sometimes biased, sometimes balanced, sometimes partial.

Partiality tended to continue in the vilification of "the other side":

At the same time, the Communists seem determined to intimidate the Canadians and frustrate their investigative role in sensitive
areas. Aside from the shooting down of an ICCS helicopter—with one Canadian among the dead—artillery and rocket fire have been directed at two ICCS team sites in the Mekong Delta (Ibid.).

Again, only the Communists are accused of 'intimidating the Canadians' although a secondary history of this time indicates that both North and South were attempting to interfere with the ICC's work. For example, subsequent news reports conceded that the helicopters had indeed defied agreed-upon boundaries.

As the article continued, it was clear that not only had Taylor moderately increased the neutrality in reporting, he was also ready to relinquish Canada-US solidarity:

There is a growing feeling in Ottawa that, once again, Washington has made patsies of us (Ibid.).

Taylor's outrage, as expressed by his use of the word "patsies", reflected the strength of the chivalry metaphor. Taylor, 'takes his gloves off' and, for the first time, provided information of a less 'gentlemanly' nature:

It was always evident that the United States had named Canada to the ICCS without Ottawa's formal consent. It is now know that the United States assured Ottawa it had already gained formal consent from Indonesia, Poland and Hungary. Checking with the other three capitals, Canadian officials discovered this wasn't the case.

... . . . . In other words, Washington was always confident that Canada would fall into line, despite all the reservations expressed in advance by Mr. Sharp and Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau (Ibid.).

The duped "patsy" that was tricked into a task and expected to "fall into line" was the metaphor with which Taylor assessed Canadian participation on the ICC. Again, the vehemence of
Taylor's tone can best be explained in terms of earlier adherence to the chivalry metaphor. Had notions of courtesy and chivalry not been as strong and pervasive, there would not have been such a powerful outrage at this point in time.

Vehemence and disgust with Canada's role are continued with further comments in the article:

In the face of such heavy-handed treatment, can Canada simply announce its intention to withdraw from the ICCS, giving a month's notice, as Mr. Sharp has suggested? In that case, Washington might well announce at the last moment that no replacement could be found, once more telling Ottawa "to do its duty" (Ibid.).

These are powerfully direct accusations that Ottawa 'was told' (not asked) to "do its duty".

The article resumed with even more conjectures about what other countries could have taken Canada's place on this newly formed version of the ICC without ever mentioning how Canada would benefit from acceptance of this role that Canadian diplomats were so reluctantly accepting:

According to political sources, the Cabinet is divided, with Energy Minister Donald S. Macdonald and Industrial Minister Allastair Gillespie opposing any withdrawal that would embitter U.S.-Canada relations at a time when delicate economic negotiations are pending (Ibid.).

Finally Taylor even included open recognition of the mercenary aspects of Canadian participation on the ICC. And that recognition was underscored through a caption to the pictures of head shots of Macdonald and Gillespie who were described as being "against withdrawal" (the former) and not wanting "bitter relations" (the latter) (Ibid.)..
C. An Update Without Revision

An examination of Taylor's article, "Washington had Instructions for Canada' envoy: Pentagon Papers show Pearson went along with U.S. bombing" (G&M/ 7/6/73:1) demonstrates his continued use of direct communication. Again, this article, and its voice of outrage, can best be understood against the backdrop of the chivalry ethos. In essence, the authority of the Pentagon Paper was used to review the selection of that metaphor.

The text began:

Lester Pearson told Lyndon Johnson in May 1964, that he would "personally understand" if the United States began non-nuclear bombing of North Vietnam, according to previously unpublished portions of the Pentagon Papers.

... . . . .These portions of the Pentagon Papers describe in detail Canadian-U.S. co-operation in preparing Mr. Seaborn's trips to Hanoi and the extent to which Ottawa became an instrument of President Johnson's "carrot-and-stick" policy of diplomatic overtures and military escalation (Ibid.).

This historical re-examination was substantiated, therefore, by accessing the Pentagon Papers as a dramatically new and alternative source, one that was used as an absolute voice of "truth". Taylor opened by explaining the reliability of this version of events:

Originally published in part by The New York Times and other newspapers in 1971, the Pentagon Papers were a top-secret study of the whole U.S. involvement in Vietnam from 1945 to 1967 prepared on the orders of former Defence Secretary Robert McNamara. Portions were made available to the

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*Article #9. Entire report reproduced in Appendix VI.
newspapers by Daniel Ellsberg, a former Rand Corp. employee. Rand was a Government consultant under contract.

But the so-called diplomatic sections—describing the involvement of other countries—remained unpublished under a U.S. court injunction. Portions relating to Canada’s role were made available to The Globe and Mail this week (Ibid.).

Then Taylor directly accessed the telegraph cables what were reproduced within the Pentagon Papers. In this manner, Taylor again reinforced the credibility of his claims. The immediacy of the cable, a text addressed to someone else and relaying ‘the facts’, provided compelling, ‘behind-the-scene’ information. This cable was presented as so credible that some of the text was printed

The cable reads in part: "President told Pearson that he wishes Hanoi to know, that while he is a man of peace, he does not intend to permit the North Vietnamese to take over Southeast Asia. He needs a confidential and responsible interlocutor to carry the message of U.S. attitudes to Hanoi. In outline the U.S. position there was some discussions of ‘carrot-and-stick’ (Ibid.)."

With this news report, in sharp contrast to the early reports, names are named and direct quotations are included to provide the immediacy omitted previously. Thanks to a alternate document, which was attempting to amass "the real facts", a more personal narrative style was possible.

In the article Taylor is presenting the information that Seaborn had been a spy and a messenger for the United States. Assumptions of impartiality are central to what Taylor wrote. He structured the article using the basic assumption that "Of course the reader knows that Seaborn was
supposed to be acting in the spirit of impartiality":

It said: "In Ottawa, Sullivan found much the same disposition among Canadian officials. While Foreign Minister Martin seemed a little nervous about the prospect of 'expanding the war,' External Affairs officials readily assented to the use of Seaborn as an interlocutor.

"Seaborn, who struck Sullivan as an alert intelligent and steady officer, readily agreed to these conditions and has made immediate plans for an accelerated departure" (Ibid.)''.

Clearly the Pentagon Papers provided a source of information that was completely different from the types of information usually released—behind-the-scenes; it was subjective and evaluative.

However, to describe Taylor's reports as a "review" of the chivalry metaphor does not mean he revises or replaces that meaning system. In part, Taylor perpetuates the metaphor by simply adding some details and minimally undermining old notions of honour and gallantry. He does not provide a distinctly-other metaphor. He never, for example, addresses any outrage against the vast American military presence in Vietnam and Canadian support of those activities. Instead, he fine-hones the metaphor, consistent with his claims of "Virtuous Bystander" as proposed in his book (1974). He does not overturn the chivalry metaphor by totally replacing it with the "Chore-Boy" symbolism suggested by Levant (1986).

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9 Continuation of this article in Appendix VI, Article #9.
SUMMARY

The initial perspective on Canadian diplomatic participation on the ICC was framed as an act of chivalry. The chivalry metaphor was adopted during Period I when early announcements by the Canadian government were faithfully repeated in the news reports.

The metaphorical discourse was vague, indefinite, and, at times, allegorical. The chivalry metaphor consisted of an over-simplified duality between good and bad, non-Communists and Communists, East and West. This conceptual approach to ICC activities included idealized notions of human and political behaviour. Peace and security were featured as undefined aspirations that were perpetuated by neglecting to define agency, by implying moral superiority, and by downplaying practical considerations (both costs and gains).

Indications of the acceptance of that metaphor were confirmed by the early furor over the moral behaviour of certain ICC members. Moreover, recognition of the chivalry metaphor contributed to an understanding of why such issues as economic costs and international trade relations received only marginal coverage. Any substantial inclusion of these topics would have detracted from notions of gallantry by implying self-interested motives.

The chivalry metaphor was not contested until Canadian participation in Vietnam ended in Period V. Even then, acceptance of ICC involvement as an act of chivalry
contributed to an explanation for the outrage after the Pentagon Papers provided revised accounts of the diplomatic actions that had taken place behind the idealized facade of diplomatic chivalry.

Just as closure was overwhelming identified when examining the prominence of official discourse, the narrow debate, and the reliance on primary definers, deconstruction of these important articles demonstrated a similar tendency toward closure. First of all, framing events around Canadian involvement in the war in Vietnam as an act of chivalry closed the debate. Few other options were presented. Had events seriously been re-examined by the critical discourse as early as 1965, the legitimacy of questioning the "noble gestures" would have opened the discourse.

And finally, during Period V, and with the benefit of a totally new, accredited, behind-the-scenes or 'back-stage' source, the discourse changed considerably as criticism gained a fresh legitimacy and prominence. Yet even here, closure is maintained. Taylor's outrage about Canadian duplicity as an ICC participant is best understood when it is examined within the context of the chivalry metaphor. That metaphor is never replaced.
CONCLUSIONS

Reports on Canada’s involvement in the war in Vietnam spanned nearly twenty eventful years. A cursory review of news items on this topic, and the use of such provocative terms as ‘absurd’, ‘farce’, or ‘shame’ to describe Canadian participation on the International Control Commission, intimated an obstreperous press. These derogatory words implied a strongly critical voice, one that vehemently condemned External Affairs and provided a sharp contrast to official versions of events.

The Vietnam War had prompted an intense public outcry throughout North America, as well as in other countries. To expect press reports on Canada in Vietnam to represent a variety of viewpoints would therefore not have been unreasonable. And even protest from within the Canadian government, where politicians held highly divergent views, could reasonably be anticipated to contribute a sharp debate in the media and further open the media coverage to a wide variety of viewpoints.

Instead of diversity, however, this research found a high degree of closure. Newspapers tended to replicate relations of dominance: The voice of the politically powerful
strongly overshadowed any protesting or alternative views.

Findings from this research indicate that news is merely a general indicator that "something interesting is happening over there" in a closed, superficial manner. Official versions of events were spiced with just enough openness to maintain interest. Deceptively tantalizing words, approaches, stories, pictures, and editorial cartoons were used, but, to use another trope, they were more of a condiment than a main dish.

In news reports about Canadian participation in Vietnam, closure was brought about by restricting perspectives and persistently reproducing the world views of those in power. Closure was also reinforced in more subtle ways: through a metaphor that implied social cohesion and through merely symbolic confrontations with this dominant idea.

News reporting on Canada in Vietnam during the war simply reinforced existing power hierarchies. When I finished this research I was struck by the notion, "Why would anyone expect an institution (the media) so dependent on the powerful for information ever be assumed to suddenly invert that power relationship?"

The media, when considered in relation to government, is much like the flea and the elephant. Newspapers and television, or the flea, have a presence. They can make the elephant uncomfortable—can even make the elephant move. But the power/size difference, along with relations of
dependency, provide an enormous restriction.

To some degree the fleas ete out discomfort through persistence. It is always there, patiently tapping into any change that may occur. That opportunism was starkly exemplified by the Pentagon Papers. When they were released to provide a behind-the-scenes source of credible information, the media world maximized that rare opportunity.

Yet the degree to which the media can confront the government is limited by a dependence on politicians as news sources. When reporting on Canadian participation in Vietnam, newspapers' accounts shared an intimate relationship with dominant politicians. Through the media's reliance on primary political definers and their formal assertions, the viewpoints of dominant politicians overwhelmingly shaped perspectives on political events.

News reports responded in only a limited way to social and political changes. Within this analysis of news articles on Canada's involvement in Vietnam, it was found that only during those times when divergent political positions were integrated within the government's consensus, did the news media portray elements of diversity and a limited openness.

At this final stage of the research conclusions are drawn about: (i) the findings; (ii) the methodology; (iii) and the significance of the study (along with a description of further research possibilities).
I. **THE FINDINGS**

In examining this collection of newspaper articles, the analysis focused on changes in tendencies toward closure or openness in response to or in concert with political changes. These tendencies were then used to re-assess the predictions made by the propaganda and the ideological process models of the media.

A. **A Tight Reproduction: Re-assessing the Propaganda Model**

The central hypothesis for this research was that if the data favored the closure of the propaganda model, there would be a tendency for official discourse to constitute almost all of the data, to be accorded more front-page coverage, and to be consistently reinforced by news photos and supportive articles.

Initially, the data gave the impression that the propaganda model was right. Official discourse prominently outlined the history of the times, primary definers overwhelmingly shaped perceptions of events, and formally structured reports typified the narrow parameters of the debates.

Certainly the official discourse maintained a dominant physical position. Official discourse was prominent in location and persistence. Official versions of events were made conspicuous because they frequently occupied a front-page position. And official discourse was more pervasive because it
generally constituted nearly three-quarters of the data.

Prominence did vary somewhat as changes occurred in the political consensus. Initially, the novelty of events afforded nearly half of the articles front page coverage. Then, within the more conservative political consensus of Period II the story was given less prominence. But later, in Period III, when Canadian participation on the ICC became a more controversial issue under Pearson's liberal-moderate consensus, the extent of the coverage increased considerably. During Period IV, and Trudeau's 'ideological containment' policy, there was a further decrease in the coverage and prominence. Yet, at this time when public outcry against the war was at its height, the critical discourse peaked. Then, during the final months of 1973, the coverage was again very intense.

As well, the dominance of official discourse was reinforced by a heavy reliance on primary definers throughout the data. Official discourse was indeed often simply a repetition of the press statements, decisions and claims of the most powerful members of society, the heads of state.

However, the discourse was not absolutely restricted to the official versions of primary definers. Debates did occur within narrow parameters. But, just as Knight had claimed in his theoretical discussion, "News and Ideology", reports on the controversy surrounding Canada's role in Vietnam was "selective and occlusive" and the data did indeed
portray events as "partial representations of reality" (*Ibid.*:36).

The debates were not quite as narrow as the propaganda model had predicted. While military information was kept secret under the rubric of 'national security', brief mention was made hinting at Canadian diplomatic involvement in American-North Vietnamese negotiations. Taylor and Levant accused Canadian diplomats of spying for the Americans when they made their trips to North Vietnam--claims supported by information in the Pentagon Papers. Seaborn's and Ronning's activities had been reported but without specific reference to the exact diplomatic messages being carried. Following diplomatic protocol, precise statements of their departures and arrivals were reported without explanation of the nature of their missions. Restricting information on these important events contributed to the closure of the discourse.

Even the structure of news articles responded to or directly reflected the closure or openness of the political climate. During the more conservative political climates the articles displayed more closure and tightness. Then these restrictions were relaxed during the more liberal climate of the 1960's.

The amount and nature of critical discourse and the type of prominence accorded this discursive type was an indicator of the shortcomings of the propaganda model. Thirty
percent, or nearly one-third of all the news items constituted critical discourse. As well, critical discourse gained some prominence in Period V when several of the long articles were accorded banner-headline coverage.

But one of the most compelling differences between official and critical discourse was the inclusion and omission of substantive information. While official discourse provided specific information in the form of politically sterile reports, it also incorporated a modicum of opinion. But the reverse was not true, the critical discourse was often superficial and focussed almost exclusively on opinion and predictions. Critical discourse usually lacked meaningful substance. The amount and nature of the critical discourse can best be described as an inoculation of opposition or democracy. Inoculation is defined by Barthes as a small dose of "acknowledged evil" (Barthes, 1973: 150).

Furthermore, the very framing of events--through the pervasive use of the chivalry metaphor--attested to the high degree with which official versions of events are replicated in the media. Taylor and Levant were certainly correct in their condemnation of the media's role in "the snow job" and the "quiet complicity" to which the Canadian public were subjected on this topic.

Even toward the end of Canadian and American involvement in the war, when critical discourse was absorbed by the official discourse and criticism was being expressed by
top political officials, no dramatically different version of events was presented to directly confront previous reports. At this time critical discourse was only accorded prominence when it was expressed by powerful primary definers.

Therefore, in assessing the propaganda model, the analysis indicates that while the model was generally accurate in its predictions of the nature of the news coverage, it is, nonetheless, too restrictive and static. This approach underestimates and underemphasizes the development and impact of shifts in political consensus on news reports. Change does occur, especially over a couple of decades of time.

In addition to this too-closed approach, the propaganda model does not acknowledge that some slippage does happen. It allows no recognition of the fact that during such times when there was the loudest public protest against the war, most markedly during Period IV, there was a mild influence on the news process.

The propaganda model does not concede that secondary definers do exist and do play a moderate role in representing critical viewpoints. As well, the propaganda model does not adequately acknowledge the impact of feature and investigative reporters. These journalists played moderately incisive roles in shaping the critical discourse.

Then too, there are times when the cohesion of those in power did loosen up, in sharp contrast to the claims of the propaganda model. Charles Taylor, and his moderately incisive
role in reviewing the chivalry metaphor, is in fact a stark example of a member of the power elite criticizing his peers. Taylor is listed in *Who's Who In Canada* as Charles Plunket Bourchier Taylor, writer and horse breeder (1992:1040). His profession, graduation from Upper Canada College, director- and trustee-ship with a number of minor financial institutions, along with his top corporate executive office in Windfields Farm Limited all suggest that he could be considered a minor member of Canada's power elite. Yet he was the journalist who facilitated the most prominent voice of criticism at the end of the ICC's work.

B. **Openness: A Confined Ideological Process**

The hypothesis was that if dominant themes were independent of political consensus, if shifts and gaps occurred within the data, and if themes were absorbed or expelled, these modifications indicated an ideological process.

Conjectures suggested that if the themes of the articles varied with the political consensus of each period, the data followed the propaganda model. If there was a wider range of themes and topics during periods I, III, and V, when the political consensus was liberal and a narrower range during the periods of conservative political consensus, the data followed the propaganda model. But if the range of themes and topics was not just dependent on the political consensus
but responded to increased public protest, for example, the data was assessed as following the predictions of the ideological process model.

Furthermore, if the data included a discussion of topics such as profits from the war efforts that discussion was read as an indication of an open report on the North American military-industrial complex and their war-related profiteering.

The most notable feature of topics covered was the great diversity of Period III. Only during this time did such diverse topics as news about the ICC, the war, public protest against the war, and Canadian sales of arms production destined for Vietnam occur. Within that most liberal-moderate political climate 48% of the articles were directly about the ICC and the highest number of articles were found to approach this topic from the different angles. As for the exclusion of topics, the analysis indicated that instead of describing the themes and sources as omitted from the discourse, it was more accurate to say they were under-represented, marginalized or muffled. The themes of profits from arms sales, complicity, economic alliances, racism, and colonialism were all included, if only in a very minimal way.

Two topics were indeed omitted from the discourse. One excluded topic was the possibility of dropping the A-bomb. The use of nuclear arms (an option that was considered by the American military) was not included. And criticism of war as
a means of solving international conflict was never voiced in
the discourse either. As also identified by Hallin, the
immorality and inhumanity of war was not found to be a theme
(1986).

True to the predictions of the ideological process
model, there was a limited use of oppositional voices. By
tracing out when Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Cong were cited, it
was possible to identify that powerful oppositional definers
were less likely to be accorded a voice during the less
liberal political consensus of the late sixties.

The voices of members of the Canadian peace movement
and the public were reported in the late sixties when public
outcry against the war peaked. But when these sources were
cited, the substance of their input was limited.

Surprisingly, there was almost no alternative
discourse and no overwhelming reliance on anonymous sources
for critical discourse. In general, secondary and anonymous
sources and voices provided only a limited openness to the
discourse. The ideological process model had been correct in
predicting that these voices did exist but, using this example
of coverage of Canada in Vietnam, overemphasized the
importance of secondary definers.

Another prediction of the ideological process model
involved shifts or gaps in the discourse. Although Bruck
had also recognized the existence of ideological gaps, he had
not defined how or when they could occur (1989). This research
has suggested that confusion, contradiction, and the increased use of visual images were most likely to occur during times of gaps within the ideological process.

Critical discourse demonstrated a similar tendency to vary somewhat, but responded most directly to social protest. Critical discourse was least closed and tight during Period IV when the Canadian public was most vehemently protesting against the war.

The data therefore demonstrated a confined ideological process. Although changes in the content and sources tended to mirror shifts in political consensus, the diversity of themes, the presence of secondary definers and the final absorption of critical discourse did indicate the existence of a process of inclusion and absorption. However, the extent of this process did not replicate the expanse predicted by the ideological process model.

Semiotic structural analysis of the data further supported the claims of the propaganda model about the narrowness of debate by identifying the chivalry metaphor and the shallowness of criticism. Even those articles that displayed the most scathing criticism were found to be carnivalesque, offered no substantive oppositional version of events.

This research also suggests that the extent of "renewal and revision" of past versions of events could not be identified in this study. Only when another, highly credible,
alternative version of events was presented, with the release of Pentagon Paper information in 1973, was the chivalry metaphor openly questioned. And even then the response was only as an outrage at the old metaphor. The metaphor of chivalry, courtesy, and loyalty was reviewed but not supplanted.

This lack of revising past history is understandable, in part, because this story spanned many years and encompassed dramatic replacements of political actors. At the time of Taylor’s access to the Pentagon Papers, Pearson was dead.

The weakness of the ideological process model therefore centres on two shortcomings. First of all, this approach, in the case of reporting on Canadian participation in Vietnam, overestimated the openness or the strength of criticism to be anticipated and mistakenly assumes the presence of an alternative version of events. In the second place, this approach, in focussing so sharply on ideology, neglects individual or collective agency. It was the role of individuals and one newspaper that was important for the release of the Pentagon Papers. And the politicians and their consensus shifted, independent of the ideological components represented in the news reports.

C. Hegemony and the Media

The media have been described as being hegemonic, as
a tool of the powerful. According to hegemony theory, society's power brokers rule through dominant ideological institutions, practices, and discourse. Those who hold power are said to exert their influence through the social construction of reality.

First of all, the form of the official discourse certainly contributed to the hegemonic nature of the media by the manner in which it mirrored the claims made by Kellner about the assertive style of this type of data (1990). Kellner said, "Ideology becomes hegemonic when it is widely accepted as describing "the way things are," inducing people to consent to the institutions and practices dominant in their society and its way of life" (Ibid.: 17). When official discourse was reproduced in terse assertions and precise nouns and verbs this discourse type linguistically reflected the notion that "this is the way it is".

Lehrman wrote about the power of the institutional voice (1983:80). She described the voice as selfless, superficial, using a language of morality, transforming topics, and deleting significant elements. This research certainly supported her claims. As described most precisely in Chapter V, connotation and exnomination were used to distance the news process from the state, morality was indirectly pervasive through the use of the chivalry metaphor, and certainly significant elements were muffled if not missing. Through style alone, therefore, it can be seen that
the news process abets state hegemony.

Lehrman, and adherents of the ideological process model, persistently stress the deletion, exclusion or omission of 'significant elements'. In essence, this research found that the news process is much more subtle on this point. In general, newspapers are merely incomplete sources of information since they under-represent certain themes and sources, and exclude others. The hegemonic power of the media therefore centers on their ability to include just enough of a wide range of controversial topics and themes as to appear representative, but never really fully incorporate them into the mainstream of their conceptual system.

Zaroulis and Sullivan noted a similar paucity of information in newspapers and identified the importance of alternative sources of information for the peace movement (1984:2). Zaroulis and Sullivan cited the example of Morrison, the Quaker who immolated himself on November 2, 1965. This man was motivated by stories he had heard about the happenings in Vietnam from an alternate source than the newspaper, from fellow Quakers who had just returned from that country.

The Quakers represented efforts to ameliorate the shortcomings of traditional sources of information. They spearheaded efforts to get information out about Vietnam. They set up a Vietnam Information Centre in Washington early in the war (Ibid.:40).
The media's heavy reliance on primary definers calls for a redefinition of the nature of the news process. The aim of news is not one of "keeping the people informed" as much as "providing access to privileged information".

For the press and other media outlets, information is sought primarily through access to prestigious sources. While a wide range of sources existed during Canada's participation on the ICC, only top Canadian primary definers (of the USA and its allies) usually initiated and shaped the debates.

The most noticeable characteristic of the data was the simplification and fragmentation. In The Newsmongers, Comber & Mayne identified the simplification of issues as one barrier to effective newscasting about political issues (1986). In contrast to a simplistic approach to society, sociologists, holders of the propaganda model and the ideological process model impute and attempt to trace relationships between politics, economics, and the media. Herman and Chomsky, for example, theorized a closed relationship between these three social realms. According to their theories those who are dominant politicians and powerful economic leaders are a single body which owns and tightly controls the media.

Yet within news articles, linkages between politics and economics are rarely made. For example, when the "U.S. CONGRESS OK(ed) AUTO PARTS PACT", political influences or
trade-offs were not reported (Star, 9/1/85:1).

That simplicity and isolation of interrelated topics was most conspicuous in the singularity of the one metaphor that was used as a media shorthand. In American Myth and the Legacy of Vietnam, Hellman defined myths as "the stories containing a people's image of themselves in history" (1986). He added that they are extreme simplifications and that simplification is their strength. The media's tendency to replicate and never contest that myth, but perpetuate it through the use of a parallel metaphor, would certainly contribute to its hegemonic power.

And finally, this examination of the newspaper coverage of Canada's participation in the Vietnam War suggests that the media is very much a secondary, dependent institution. In its subservient capacity it reproduces and replicates the social and political power relations of society at large. Clearly ruling politicians controlled the release of information and the point of view. Those in power even restricted the news process through diplomatic protocol and legislature confining information that related to national security.

In that dependent capacity, the media generally acted as a tool of state hegemony. The extent and prominence of official versions of events, overwhelming reliance on official definers, and the reproduction of official perspectives made the media a very effective tool.
Political power is not static, however. As this story well demonstrates, change does occur. And at such times the media is able to act like a flea on an elephant. In moments of transition newspapers opportunistically impose some discomfort and even impact political behaviour in a very limited way.

II. EVALUATING THE METHODOLOGY

Various problems encountered with the methodology have been identified throughout. In this section a brief review of these problems is used to indicate and inform the limits of the analysis and further research.

A. Including Quantity with Quality

In The Manufacture of News, the editors concluded, "At various points in this book we have drawn attention to the weakness of empirical material in the field of mass media and deviance" (1983: 71). Although Cohen and Young made this claim over twenty years ago and with specific reference to the representation of deviance in the media, the criticism holds true for media studies in general.

An empirical study of the media using the analysis of omitted themes and sources, the distinctions of types of discourse, and the classification suggested by Elliott et al. has never been conducted (1986). The inclusion of this type of
coding into content analysis has never been carried out either.

As this study has demonstrated, detailed tabulations of specific characteristics of the discourse strengthen descriptions of media discourse as a closed phenomenon. And the empirical data provided specific examples of how the discourse was closed through percentages of discourse types and primary definers. As well, these quantitative data provided a reliable basis for selecting accurately representative articles for the semiotic structural analysis.

Basically, this study has provided an initial outline from which a more sophisticated quantitative analysis would be possible. Further research could be conducted on the articles that contained only ICC information, for example. This subgroup of articles provided a substantial sample. A statistical examination of the strength of correlations between prominence, themes, and definers could be calculated for each of the five periods.

This study also set up some warning flags for further quantitative analysis. As was mentioned earlier, such trends as closed-tight or open-loose "structures" of the data on a select topic should be reviewed in comparison with structural aspects of reporting in general. A study of reporting on a specific issue (especially over a long time span) should always take into consideration general changes in reporting practices.
This research has also provided an example of how the quantitative approach of content analysis can enrich the highly subjective, at times even intuitive, exploration of wider meaning systems. As repeated on several occasions, semiotic structural analysis seeks to explore the ingredients of "sub-" or "unconscious" content. Therefore the identification of trends in manifest content provides a meaningful starting point for exploring the latent content.

And finally, when claims in the literature speak of an "absorbed discourse", a "revisionism" in dominant ideology or "balanced reporting", as three specific examples, this research has demonstrated the possibility of identifying more precisely how those features of the news process can be quantitatively and qualitatively defined. In the case of this research, to continue these examples, "absorbed" was an integration into the dominant discourse as opposed to "official discourse", "revision" was reviewing and correcting but not replacing, and "balance" was a 75/25 split.

3. Types of Discourse

A crucial weakness of this research was the coding and use of "types of discourse". Elliott et al.'s suggestions for identifying official, critical and alternative discourse presented several problems (1986). Generally, distinctions between official and critical could be identified but often the articles were not homogeneous. Sometimes official
discourse had elements of criticism and vice versa. In future, articles should be coded at the paragraph level.

As well, more stringent guidelines needed to be established for identifying alternative discourse rather than leaving it, even at the definition level, as a default category.

And the major problem for coding at this level was the indiscriminate mixture of content and source. These two features were in essence differentiated by the lists of themes and sources, but some clarification of how the content alone represented official discourse (by linking the thematic content more specifically with government policy, for example) would be needed before these categories were used in further research.

In addition to this weakness in the types of discourse, it should be noted that future work, following this coding procedure, would do well to check the feasibility of the types of discourse with news stories on other topics. A similar approach could be used to examine news reports on other news events which rely extensively on government officials as sources of information; debates on Canada’s national debt, for example.

C. The Coding Process

One basic shortcoming of the coding process was that one person did all the coding and the same person did the
coding as well as the analysis. A more critical examination of the coding process, a pre-test of coding guidelines, and the use of others to code the data would be recommended for further research. In order to review the reliability of the findings within this research, it would be recommended that the data be recoded by another person following redesignated categories formulated from this research.

In short, the coding would ideally have been more stringent. It would have been possible, for example, to record the identification of sources for each measured section of news and thereby check with greater accuracy whether official discourse had more sources cited (centimetre for centimetre) than the critical or alternative discourse. Then, once the data had been recoded, it would also be beneficial to subject the information to the more stringent statistical analysis of multiple regressions and correlation.

III. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY AND FURTHER RESEARCH

The basic aim of this study had been to quantitatively and qualitatively explore critical theories of the media. As well, this work addressed the practicality of combining two parallel methodologies; the content analysis implied by the propaganda model and semiotic structural analysis favored by the ideological process model. This section summarizes the significance or implications of this study in light of these theoretical and methodological
orientations and makes some suggestions for possible areas of further research.

A. Significance of the Study

In addition to outlining the merits of combining quantitative and qualitative methodologies, this research makes a meaningful contribution in two other areas. In the first place the research furthers the question of how to explore the conceptual link between power and content. And in the second place, this research reports on the role of criticism in the Canadian press during those turbulent '60's.

The sixties, and to some degree the seventies, were years in which public criticism grew on several fronts. The growth of movements protesting civil liberties in the United States and the massive protests against the War marked a time when public criticism gained its greatest support. There have been assumptions that this massively mobilized social activism impacted the nature of news coverage.

This research was able, in a detailed manner, to assess the nature of critical discourse and contribute to an understanding of why, on one hand, the Vietnam War was named an "Uncensored War" and why, on the other hand, media analysts claimed, "Myths about "the living-room war" notwithstanding, the press did not emphasize the critical perspective on the Vietnam War" (Entman, 1989:5).

While elements of criticism were indeed included in
the newspaper coverage, the initial lack of prominence for that criticism, the lack of substance within critical articles, the lack of suggestions for alternative means for resolving the conflict, and the secondary status of the definers account, in part, for the overall lack of any substantive criticism of the war. Criticism provided only a marginal voice of opposition to the very closed coverage usually provided to reports on Canadian ICC participation.

This research strongly supports the work by Hallin on American coverage of the Vietnam War. The closure of the coverage provided an indirect censorship, called "self-censored" by Hallin. Reliance on official versions of events, favoring primary definers, and never directly confronting the government's framing of events, amounted to a form of voluntary censorship.

B. Comparing Other Media Forms

Only two papers were used in this research. Limiting the data collection was necessitated by time constraints and justified by Halloran, Elliott, and Murdock's findings that the news from the different sources showed an "important and fundamental similarity" (1970:300).

However further research using American and European sources as well as the Russian News Digest could augment and amplify the findings. With a resource such as a team of research assistants, such a project would be recommended.
Further research could also include a comparison of various media sources. Since it was TV that was originally named as the reason for American defeat in Vietnam, using the methodology of this research on television newscasts would be another possibility. The questioning of Rick Groen's statement that "no consistent ideology" can be identified in television coverage of the war could be carried out with the benefit of the methodology of this research (G&M, 03/26/88:C1).

In light of these conclusions about the extremely closed nature of Canadian newspaper coverage of the ICC, any claims that the media would have enough power to contribute to American defeat in Vietnam are highly questionable. Rick Groen drew similar conclusions after his review of the exhibit "Vietnam on Television/ Television on Vietnam". He identified no consistent, oppositional ideological thread in his study. In unison with Hallin's claims in The "Uncensored War", Groen concluded that a strong tendency toward ideological closure would make it unlikely that the media could have precipitated enough anti-war sentiments to directly bring about American defeat in Vietnam (G&M, 03/26/88:C1) (Hallin, 1986).

In the Groen article, the reporter was suggesting that it was actually the televised pictures of the war that incidentally or inadvertently turned people against the war. Groen separated the controlled message of the text and what was being said from the more complex and less easily controlled message of the video clip. Therefore any further
exploration of media coverage of Vietnam would need to contrast the visual images used by reporters with the verbal and textual messages.

C. Further Areas of Study

On June 17, 1990, the *Toronto Star*, published an article by Richard Gwyn appealing to the West, and to Canadians specifically, to "seek to ease Soviet fears". Gwyn declared that the Cold War was over.

Since December 4, 1989 and the Bush-Gorbachov summit at Malta, the American media (followed by the Canadian media) have pronounced the end of the Cold War (Ivie, 1990:1).

Already changes are apparent in how news on the Soviet Union is being reported. More extensive coverage seems to be one feature of these changes (Kohan, 1989 and 1990; Nelan, 1990). The existence of Cold War ideology within media reports warrants further examination. The possible 'thawing' or 'ending' of the Cold War provides an excellent opportunity to further examine the nature of Cold War ideology from 1948 to the late '80's specifically in terms of whether these changes are reflected in the news production process.

Since this research has examined the prominence, closure and process of a particular ideology (specifically Cold War ideology), this theory and methodology could also be applied to examine the possible birth and growth of "Green Ideology", the discourse of environmentalists and ecologists.
This study could examine such changes as the G&M's new environmental reporter, Martin Mittelstaedt, and the Star's weekly report "Earthweek: A Diary of the Planet" by Steve Newman. In these cases interviews with the reporters and a study of the history of bureaucratic decision-making for these columns would be included with the quantitative and qualitative analysis of the content of articles on the topic of the environment.

CLOSING COMMENTS

In redefining the ideological role of the media (in light of this research), newspapers can best be compared to weather vanes. Weather vanes tell only which way the winds are blowing, not their temperatures or their speeds. Like weather vanes, newspaper reports on Canada's involvement in Vietnam accurately pointed out when events were developing but provided only limited substance to their reports. Newspapers merely direct the reader's attention to events and locations. Further understanding of the politics and specifics of current events can best be acquired through other information sources such as interest groups, scientific research, specialized periodicals, and secondary analysis.
Appendices
Appendix I:  Chronology of Events

Period I: Liberal-Moderate Consensus (1954 - 1955)

March and May.  The ICC starts to criticize American actions in Vietnam.
July, 1955.  Diem rules out elections in SVN, ICC hotel is picketed, Dulles's Domino Theory is publicized.

Leaders:

Canada:  1948-57 St. Laurent, Liberal
         Pearson, Foreign Affairs

USA:  1952 Eisenhower, Democrat.
       1956 Eisenhower, re-elected

SVN:  1954 Diem

NVN:  1949 Ho Chi Minh

Period II: Conservative Consensus (1956 - 1964)

1956.  USA adds 350 TERM troops to 320 MAAG troops (Ross, 1984:224).
September, 1956.  ICC Sixth Interim Report.
1957.  NORAD is established.
May, 1957.  Diem visits in the USA.
June, 1957.  Diefenbaker comes to power.
February, 1958.  Ho Chi Minh in India.
1959. Defence Production Sharing Agreement between Washington and Ottawa. It established that American purchases of military equipment in Canada would be kept roughly equivalent to Canadian military purchases in the USA.


April, 1960. ICC Tenth Interim Report.
1960. Escalation of war: USA increases MAAG strength from 327 to 685.
December, 1960. NLF formed. By now there are 900 USA military personnel in Vietnam and the Soviets are airlifting military supplies into DRVN.


February, 1961. NLF 10-point program—overthrow American colonialism and Diem; establish coalition government; implement agrarian reforms; neutralist foreign policy; relations with DRVN and eventual reunification (Thakur, 1984:315).

Late 1961. Diem works with the USA rather than the ICC.


Beginning 1962. 4,000 American troops in Vietnam.
June 30, 1962. The rise of the Civil Rights Movement when James Meredith registers at Ole Mississipi.

July, 1962. ICC Special Report accusing South Vietnam of forming a military alliance with the States and NVN of aggression.

End of 1962. 12,000 American troops in Vietnam.
1963 "Trying to get the story out" (Hallin,1986).
October 14, 1963. The Dragon Lady, Diem’s sister-in-law on lecture tour in the USA.
1963. Kennedy asks Times to remove Halberstam.
End of 1963. 17,000 American troops in Vietnam.
1964. Clandestine raids against North Viet Nam.
June, 1964. Seaborn’s first runs between Hanoi and Saigon.

Leaders

Canada: 1957-63 Diefenbacter, Progressive Con.
         59-63 Howard Green, Foreign Minister
         1963 Pearson, Liberal
         63-68 Paul Martin, Foreign Minister, Canada
         Diem supporter (Ross,1984:234).

USA: 1960 Kennedy, Democrat
      1963 Nov. 22. Kennedy assassinated.
      L B Johnson president.

NVN 1945-69 Ho Chi Minh, Founder and President of Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

SVN: 1954 - 1963 Diem
      1963 General Nguyen Khanh.


1965. NVN moving troops into SVN.
Feb. 1965. The Americans were following a strategy of deeds of military escalation with declarations of political moderation.
           ICC’s Two Special Reports.
March 1965. Military buildup. 75,000 American troops by mid-year.

MARCH 1965. FIRST LARGE PROTEST MARCH IN THE U.S.

April 1965. Pearson recommends a "limited pause" in the bombing at Temple University, in the USA.


Nov. 2, 1965. Self-Immolations begin in the U.S.


End of 1965 184,300 American troops.

1966. Troops increased to 385,000.


1966. Fulbright Hearings begin.

Spring, 1967 Troops 485,000

Early 1967. Nearly 400 University of Toronto professors protest the war.

March 1967. Pearson's formal reply to the U of T group.


In 1967. Journalists go "to see for themselves" (Nash, 1984: 263).

April, 1968. Trudeau and Sharp come to power.


Leadership:

Canada: Pearson until 1968.


1968 Nixon, Republican.

1961-69 Dean Rusk, Sec. of State

NVN: 1949 - 1969 Ho Chi Minh

SVN: 1965 Tran Van Do, leader SVN.

1967 Nguyen Van Thieu, SVN.


More than 180 reporters, (Hallin, 1986).

March 1968. Massive Rally in Chicago. 10,000.
Early 1969. Trudeau and Sharp were in Paris, part of a process to develop a new truce commission.

March 1969. In the States, break-ins at Dow Chemicals, the napalm producers.

1969-70. Wave of bombings and arson on American University Campuses.

Jan. 1970. Cabinet decides it will only participate on this commission if "it can play a genuinely useful role".

October Crisis, 1970. And War Measures Act in Canada.
Jan. 5, 1971. House of Commons gave unanimous approval to a government motion which deplored the bombing.
June 12, or 13, 1971. The N.Y. Times announces release of the Pentagon Papers.

Leadership:

Canada: 1968 - 1972 Trudeau, re-elected

USA: 1972 Nixon, Republican, elected.

SVN:

NVN: 1969 Pham Van Dong, leader on death of Ho.


Canada to try for 60 days to serve on ICCS.

March, 1973. Under Sharp, Canada agrees to another 60 days.

April, 1975. India recognizes PRG and then Canada does.
Leadership:

Canada: Trudeau

USA: LBJ.
  1974  Nixon out, Ford In.
  1976  Carter, Democrat.

NVN: Van Dong
Appendix II: Summary of ICC History.

Canada became part of the political and military turmoil of Indo-China in July, 1954 through the Geneva Agreements. Vietnam had been a French colony since 1884, and following World War II, there was considerable political unrest in this area of the globe (Thakur, 1984:310). One section of the Vietnamese population, under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh, had been attempting to oust the French from Vietnam since 1946. And in May of 1954 the French army was defeated by the Northern Vietnamese at Dien Bien Phu. The French defeat lead to the Geneva Conference on Indo-china.

The Geneva Agreement was formulated by China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, the USSR, Laos, Cambodia, and the two governments of Vietnam (ibid.:45). The agreement declared that "the sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity" of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were to be supervised by three international commissions -- an ICC unit for each country (Bridle, 1973:7). At this time the Commission was officially called the International Commission for Supervision and Control for Vietnam (ICSC). For expediency, this was generally shortened to "ICC" (as the quote from Bridle's book exemplified). Hence the use of "ICC" is repeated throughout this research, although the name was changed in 1973. The 1973 commission was actually called the International Commission of Control and Supervision for Vietnam, or the ICCS. The 1973 version of the ICC constituted four countries: Canada, Hungary, Poland and Indonesia. At this time, Canadian military personnel headed the Commission.

In 1954, the first Commission consisted of Canada, Poland and India, with an Indian chairman. Each ICC unit was an inspection team with bureaucratic facilities to oversee the tasks assigned. These tasks included supervision of elections in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. But before monitoring the elections, the ICC was to supervise the migration options, since it was anticipated that sections of the population in either North and South Vietnam might elect to migrate for religious, economic or political reasons.

The release of prisoners of war and civilian internees (from the preceding war between the French and the Vietnamese nationalists) was yet another task for the ICC. The commission was to supervise the withdrawal of French troops, settle disputes, and process petitions which arose during the withdrawal. As well, supervision of military withdrawal involved the allocation of military and civilian supplies and equipment.

Facets of ICC history most pertinent to this study are encapsulated in a summary of changes in the scope of the operation in terms of personnel and reports.

From 1954 to 1955, called Period I in this study, ICC activity was high. The Commission consisted of 1500 people and compiled five reports (Thakur, 1984:310). Then in Period
II, from 1956 to 1964, ICC involvement decreased considerably with only 580 people working on commission activities per year and releasing seven reports.

It is of interest to note that during this period the USA is consistently expanding its involvement in South Vietnam (Ross, 1984:224). In 1960, for example, these is a considerable escalation of war with the USA doubling and then tripling its military personnel by December. In the meantime, the Soviet Union is also airlifting military supplies into North Vietnam. In 1961 there were 2,600 American troops in Vietnam and by the end of 1962 that number has increased dramatically to 12,000 American troops in Vietnam. At the end of 1963, there are as many as 17,000 American troops in Vietnam.

Canadian ICC participation in Period III, from 1965 to 1968, centered mainly on the activities of Canadian diplomats, Seaborn, Ronning, and Ritchie. During the massive bombing that began in February of that year, the ICC released two Special Reports.

Period III was characterized as constituting secretive participation in events in Vietnam. Only 300 people were engaged in ICC work and no reports were released after 1965.

But ICC activities reached their lowest point in Period IV with less than 300 people and still no reports.

In total, fourteen reports had been released from 1954 to 1965. By December, 1954 the ICC had completed its First Interim Report indicating in a general way its own analysis of the task ahead. January, 1955 marked the date for the first recognition of the deterioration of the effectiveness of ICC and as early as March, 1955, in a Second Interim Report the ICC started to criticize American actions in Vietnam. In July, 1955, when Diem (the South Vietnamese leader supported by the United States) ruled out elections in South Vietnam, the ICC could easily have folded.

Subsequent reports shifted in identification of which factions, North or South Vietnam as well as the United States or the Soviet Union, were violating the Agreement. Sometime, the ICC was instructed to overlook specific activities. For example, in 1961 and again in 1963, Canada's External Affairs advocates that the ICC ignore American helicopters and accept Washington's view of the condemnation of North Vietnam.

At other times, the reports did explicitly condemn activities. In July, 1962, an ICC Special Report accused South Vietnam of forming a military alliance with the United States and condemned North Vietnam of military aggression.

After the Paris Peace Accords in January 1973, Canada agreed to serve on the ICC for 60 days. Then in March, 1973, under the leadership of External Affairs Minister Sharp, Canada agreed to another 60 days. During this period, Canadian and ICC activity was prominent. Nearly 1000 people were assigned to the task and although no formal reports were
released, several press briefings were conducted. The work of the ICC ended in May, 1973.
APPENDIX THREE
Photo 1:

It's about time CANADA played an independent role on ICE.

DEMANDS DEBATE ON ISSUE OF VIETNAM

George Johnston, 52, a Carleton University professor, protests Canada's role in crisis in Vietnam during vigil on Parliament Hill in Ottawa yesterday. He and other demonstrators want question debated in Parliament.

Credit: CP, G&M, 03/02/66:3.
Photo 2:

VIET CONG REPRESENTATIVES ON CANADIAN TOUR

Hoang Bich Son (left) and Nguyen Van Ba, members of South Vietnam's National Liberation Front, begin Canadian tour in Montreal yesterday. They are scheduled to speak in Montreal, Toronto, Winnipeg, Edmonton, and Vancouver.

Credit: CP Wirephoto,
G&M, 01/30/69:3.
Cartoon 1:

YUP, THEM'S REAL BULLETS, LESTER.

Credit: Macpherson, Star. 01/02/65:6.
Cartoon 2:

Credit: Macpherson, 
*Star*, 09/03/65:6.
Cartoon 3:

"That's for nothing, now do something."

Credit: Macpherson, Star, 02/10/65:6.
Cartoon 5:

Cartoon 6:

Credit: No name, G&M, 04/13/70:6.
Cartoon 7:

Appendix IV: Headlines or Captions of Official Discourse

**DATE** | **HEADLINE**
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**Period I (1954-55)**

04/21/54 | THE INDO-CHINA TRUCE
07/16/54 | HONORABLE PACT NEAR, RED CHINA RADIO DECLARES
07/17/54 | FRENCH MORALE HIGH: HOPE FOR REAL CHANCE TO SMASH RED ARMY
07/17/54 | FAIL AT GENEVA IF U.S. HAS WAY REDS TELL WEST
07/19/54 | FRENCH, REDS AGREE: CANADA MAY ACT ON BOARD SUPERVISE INDO ARMISTICE
07/19/54 | PROTEST PARTITION
07/19/54 | CANADA TO ACCEPT PEACE ROLE
07/20/54 | CANADA SEEN SET TO ACCEPT ROLE IN TRUCE
07/21/54 | CANADA READY TO SERVE ON ARMISTICE BOARD
07/21/54 | CANADA IS SEEN ON 'HOT SEAT' AS TRUCE GUARDIAN
07/21/54 | SIGN INDO-CHINA ARMISTICE FIRST TIME IN 20 YEARS WORLD WITH PEACE
07/21/54 | 253,000 CASUALTIES: COST OF I-C WAR TO FRANCE
07/21/54 | THE INDO-CHINA WAR
07/21/54 | TRUCE SIGNED AT GENEVA: INDO-CHINESE WAR ENDED
07/22/54 | CANADA SERVES: ONLY IF PEACE WORKS--PEARSON
07/22/54 | VOTE SET: FINAL TEXT ON INDO-CHINA PLEDGES FREE ELECTIONS FOR...
07/22/54 | U.S.: VIETNAM ABSTAIN FROM APPROVING TREATY ENDING I-C WAR
07/23/54 | WARN AGAINST TRESPASSING: U.K., U.S. CALL ON 10 NATIONS
07/23/54 | GENEVA PACT MOVE TO PEACE: EDEN
07/24/54 | CHINESE-TRAINED VIET MINH PILOTS ATTACKED AILINER: STAR REPORTER....
07/24/54 | FRENCH BACK INDO TRUCE BY BIG MARGIN
07/24/54 | INDO JOB PERSONNEL IS PROBLEM FOR OTTAWA
07/26/54 | MASS MOVEMENT OF VIETNAMESE: PREPARE TO MOVE 500,000 SOUTH
07/26/54 | INDIA URGES EARLY START ON PROGRAM
07/27/54 | REPORT CANADA READY TO ACCEPT TRUCE BOARD JOB
07/27/54 | DIRECT ARMS AID TO INDO-CHINA PROPOSED TO U.S.
07/28/54 | TRUCE STARTS BUT REBELS STILL ATTACK
07/28/54 | PEARSON WILL EXPLAIN ROLE OF CANADA ON INDO-CHINA COMMISSION
07/29/54 | NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT TASK CANADA'S ROLE...
07/30/54 | VENZNESE GOING SOUTH: 700,000 TO LEAVE RED AREA, FRANCE, U.S. ...
08/03/54 | TRUCE BODY PEOPLE NOW IN NEW DELHI
08/09/54 | FREE WORLD CANNOT RELAX
08/12/54 | SEND 71 ARMY OFFICERS TO TRUCE COMMISSIONS
08/18/54 | WEARING LEIS
08/25/54  TEMPERAMENT A GUIDE: COOL-HEADED SOLDIERS PICKED FOR TRUCE
08/28/54  CANADA ASSIGNS SIX TO INDO-CHINA TEAM
11/09/54  PEARSON ASKS OPEN MIND TOWARD REDS
04/04/55  TALK INDO TRUCE BLOCKS AS BRIG. LETT IN OTTAWA
04/06/55  CANADA TO STAY ON TRUCE GROUP
04/07/55  REDS DEFY PACT, FOIL CANADA EFFORT TO AID REFUGEES-STEVENSON
04/08/55  INDO-CYTOONE TEAM WORTH ITS SALT, LETT DECLARES
04/18/55  ALL HUMAN EVILS, VENOM SEEMS READY TO SPIT FORTH AT BANDUNG
04/22/55  'THANK GOD I'M FREE MAN' SENDS CHOU INTO RAGE
04/30/55  STATEMENT PLANNED
05/04/55  TRUCE OBJECTIVE BALKED: PEARSON ACCUSES REDS IN VN OF FOULING
05/06/55  VIETNAM CONGRESSES VOTE TO END BAO DAI'S REGIME
05/11/55  INDIA PLEADS TO KEEP CANADA TRUCE TEAM WORKING IN INDO-CYTOONE
05/14/55  CANADA WOULD EXTEND DATE OF VN MOVE
05/27/55  REPORT TO BARE CANADA'S CENSURE OF COMMUNISTS' VN TACTICS
05/30/55  DIEM IS READY FOR SHOWDOWN WITH HOA HOA
06/08/55  HO'S A-BOMB ANSWER IS HUMAN MACHINE: COST LOW-- STEVENSON
06/13/55  DIEN BIEN PHU USED BY RED CHINESE BASE FOR NEW DRIVE--STEVE
06/14/55  INDIA TRUCE CHAIRMAN PUNCHED BY CANADIAN SEEN AS WARNING SIGN
06/15/55  SEND MISSIONARIES TO CANADA, BUDDHIST OFFERS STEVENSON
06/16/55  EAT RATS IN HAIPHONG: SAY FAMINE IS CURSE BY RED-EXILED PRIESTS
06/22/55  REPORT JOHNSON WILL BE NAMED TO INDO-CYTOONE
06/23/55  ENJOY HUMAN LIVERS: AMAZONS HELP FIGHT AGAINST DIEM RULE
06/25/55  CANADA CAUGHT IN MIDDLE HO WANTS VOTE OR READY TO TAKE SOUTH
06/25/55  REDS OBSTRUCT FLOW OF REFUGEES TO SOUTH IN INDO-CYTOONE--CANADA
08/13/55  ARMY OF LAOS GUERRILLAS IS LED BY RED PRINCE

Period II (1956-64)

02/21/56  CANADIANS UNLIKELY TO WITHDRAW FROM FAR EAST TASK ON SCHEDULE
02/21/56  TRUCE TEAMS ARE PATIENT: FIVE LANGUAGES ARE NECESSARY IN INDO-CYTOONE
03/05/56  MILITANT MATERIALISM: POPE WARNS RED PEACE ONLY A TRUCE
03/05/56  SOUTH VIETNAM ELECTS CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY
04/12/56 12-NATION PARLEY PROPOSED: U.K. OPPOSES SOVIET PLAN FOR VN
05/24/56 LINKED TO SOVIET BLOC: REDS CONSOLIDATE HOLD THROUGH NORTH VN
06/22/56 'DANGEROUS TO PEACE AND SECURITY' REDS BUILDING FORCES...
08/18/56 ON WAY TO INDO-CHINA
02/23/57 PRESIDENT OF S. VIETNAM ESCAPES GUNMAN'S SHOT
04/13/57 FIND CANADIAN IN INDO-CHINA KNIFED IN BED
04/25/57 MAY NEVER SOLVE INDO-CHINA KILLING OF QUEBEC MAN
09/11/57 REPORT CANADA WANTED TO DROP CAMBODIAN GROUP
01/01/58 FREE ELECTIONS ASKED TO REUNIFY VIETNAM
11/14/58 U.S. BUDGET PEACETIME HIGHEST
04/03/59 SOUTH VN REDISTRIBUTION: LAND REFORM PROCEEDS QUIETLY
09/08/59 SECURITY COUNCIL VOTES 10-1 ON LAOS CRISIS
09/12/59 LAOS THREAT EXAGGERATED, ENVOY TOLD
09/15/59 REACTION COOL
09/24/59 15 LAOTIAN SOLDIERS WOUNDED IN CLASHES
09/28/59 SEATO BADLY SPLIT OVER U.S. PLAN TO CREATE EMERGENCY LAOS FORCE
12/15/60 FIERCE FIGHTING STILL RAGES IN VIENTIANE
12/16/60 WEST FACES NEW KOREA AS LAOS BATTLE RAGES
12/29/60 WILL TAKE STEPS IN LAOS CRISIS, CHINA THREATENS
01/04/61 MAY REVIVE TRUCE TEAM FOR LAOS
01/04/61 WHERE ARE THE FRESH TROOPS COMING FROM? THE MYSTERY OF LAOS WAR
01/04/61 WAITING FOR AN INVITATION
01/18/61 EISENHOWER CAUTIONS AGAINST MILITARISM IN TIMES OF PEACE
01/18/61 CANADA CONFERS
01/19/61 U.S. POLITELY REJECTS EAST-WEST LAOS TALKS
01/20/61 U.S. AND BRITAIN FAVOR 3-POWER LAOS STUDY
01/20/61 GREEN AIDS FOR TRUCE
01/21/61 SEE-SAW BATTLE
02/22/61 RUSSIA ASKS TALKS ON LAOS INCLUDE CHINA
02/23/61 CANADA ROLE IN DOUBT
03/02/61 CANADA CAN KEEP PEACE—FOULKES
03/16/61 VIETNAM HOT WAR
03/18/61 LAOS: HOPE FOLLOWED BY FRUSTRATION
03/24/61 CANADA SET TO ACT IN LAOS, PM STATES
03/27/61 PERSONNEL STAND BY IN CANADA
03/27/61 A WEEK OF CRISES: KENNEDY ALL-OUT FOR LAOS SOLUTION
03/29/61 FAVORS TRUCE TEAM
04/07/61 VIETNAM PERIL STUDIED BY KENNEDY, MACMILLAN
04/08/61 FOCUS: SABOTAGE AND POLLING IN A VITAL COUNTRY
04/10/61 DIEM WINS RE-ELECTION IN VIETNAM
04/15/61 LAOS-CEASEFIRE CALL STILL AWAITED
04/24/61 LEFTIST TROOPS TAKE KEY CENTRE IN LAOS
04/29/61 LAOS PARLEY SEEKS FAST SOLUTION
05/10/61 TRUCE TEAM MEMBERS SNUBBED BY LAOS REDS
05/16/61 BRITAIN, SOVIET ORDER START OF LAOS TALKS
02/05/62 U.S., SOVIET DIPLOMATS DISCUSS LAOS TENSION
02/05/62 SCATHING ATTACK: CASTRO ACCUSES KENNEDY OF
FELONY AND HYPOCRISY
02/28/62 VIETNAM AIR ATTACK CLOSE TO KILLING DIEM
03/09/62 GREEN WON'T REVEAL DETAILS: CAN OFFICER RECALLED
OVER VN DRUG
03/13/62 COURT-MARTIAL, FIRINGS EXPECTED: IN-CHINA GOLD
AND OPIUM SMUGGLE
05/03/62 30 DAYS DETENTION ORDERED CORPORAL DEMOTED FOR
SMUGGLING
05/16/62 TRUCE COMMISSIONER CITED IN GOLD SMUGGLING
HEARING
06/05/62 U.S., VIETNAM CRITICIZED BY COMMISSION
06/26/62 GREEN BACKS REPORT
06/30/62 SOUTH VIETNAM: REPORT EXPOSES TREATY BREACHES
11/10/62 SEMINAR IN WINDSOR: DON'T ANTAGONIZE U.S.,
CANADIANS URGED
11/12/62 ONLY 40 REDS LEAVE
06/10/63 HONORED AT NOTRE DAME: CANADA CAN HELP U.S.
EXTEND INFLUENCE
06/12/63 BUDDHIST SETS HIMSELF ABLAZE TO PROTEST
SAIGON'S IRON RULE
02/15/64 OUR UN SOLDIERS ARE READY
02/21/64 VIETNAM GUERILLAS HIT COMMISSION TRUCK
11/27/64 N. VIETNAM CHARGES U.S. SHELLED ISLAND

Period III (1965-67)

01/18/65 LEAVING AN IMPRINT AT THE LBJ RANCH
02/04/65 PEARSON AGAIN DENIES VIETNAM FORCE CHARGE
02/09/65 WHY THE WAR ON LAND HAS BEEN SO DISASTROUS TO
THE HAPLESS ARMY
03/02/65 TRUCE OBSERVERS SPLIT ON VIETNAM BLAME
03/02/65 A VIOLENT ROUTE TO PEACE IN VIETNAM
03/06/65 AIMS TO SPARE U.S.: PM URGES PEACE FORCE AS
SOLUTION IN VIET
03/06/65 BRITISH WILL PUBLISH CANADIAN'S TRUCE VIEW
03/09/65 CANADIAN VIEW ON VIETNAM SUPPORTS U.S.
03/09/65 PEACE-FORCE SUGGESTION AN IDEA, NOT FIRM
PROPOSAL, PEARSON
03/09/65 MOVE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION
03/10/65 U.S. CAUTIOUS OVER PEARSON PLAN FOR
INTERNATIONAL VIETNAM FORCE
03/15/65 VIETNAM
03/15/65 WILL SOUTH VIETNAM'S BUDDHISTS BOW TO HO CHI
MINH
03/17/65 QUESTION PERIOD
03/17/65 DEBATE REFUSED
03/23/65 PEARSON PLAN FOR VIETNAM APEARS(SIC) LOST
03/24/65 CHARGES MARTIN STRESSES ONE SIDE OF VIETNAM
03/29/65 AIR STRIKES LIFT SOUTH VIETNAM'S MORALE, TAYLOR SAYS
06/08/65 FORGETS TWO OF HANOI'S CONDITIONS FOR PEACE TALKS, MARTIN TELLS ....
06/12/65 COMPROMISE PROPOSED: CANADA PUSHES TALKS BETWEEN HANOI AND US
06/12/65 U.S. MUST STOP BOMBING: PEARSON, SHASTRI
09/01/65 U.S. CONGRESSMEN OK AUTO PARTS PACT
09/04/65 MADISON AVENUE BLITZES THE JUNGLE
09/09/65 TROOPS IN VIET NAM SPLIT AUSTRALIANS
09/15/65 CHINA'S NEW PLAN FOR FUTURE-REVOLUTION BY PROXY
09/17/65 U.S. TO TEST OUR NEW JET IN VIET NAM
09/23/65 SEX AND THE SAIGON GIRL
10/12/65 HELLYER'S FREEDOM FIGHTER JUST THE TICKET SAY YANKEE AIRMEN
10/19/65 CONTROL COMMISSION GROUP: THREE CANADIANS AMONG 12 MISSING ON
11/03/65 CANADA'S NEW JET SCORING IN VIETNAM
11/23/65 CANADA BACKS U.S. ON PEACE TALKS
12/03/65 VIET WAR FULLY BACKED BY U.S. PUBLISHERS
12/08/65 THE VIET CONG LIAISON MAN SAYS 'WE CAN WIN'
12/29/65 OTTAWA BOY HOME, VIET NAM VETERAN
12/29/65 A PAUSE AS THE WORLD HOLDS ITS BREATH
12/31/65 THE PURPOSE BEHIND THE PEACE BLITZ: 'U.S. OFFERS A NEUTRAL SAIGON
12/31/65 THE BELLS OF NEW YEAR'S MAY PROMISE PEACE
01/08/66 PEARSON SAYS CANADA CANNOT STOP ARMS BEING USED IN WAR
01/08/66 COMMISSION CONSIDERS MOVING INTO CAMBODIA
02/01/66 POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER PAUSE, PEARSON SAYS
02/01/66 US TO RESUME BOMBING: ASSERT CAN. INDEPENDENCE IN FOREIGN POLICY
02/01/66 U.S. TAKING 'BIG RISK' AT UN MEETING ON VIET
02/04/66 PRIVATE TALKS ON VIETNAM ISSUE ARE STARTED AT UN
02/04/66 YANKS BAG THEIR FIRST VIET CONG
02/07/66 U.S. AND ALLIES TIGHTENING HUGE NET ON VIET CONG
02/07/66 FOES AND FRIENDS FACE LBJ IN HAWAII
02/08/66 UK OPPOSES BOMBING HANOI: HO CM WRITES INDIA TO ASK HELP IN
02/08/66 WHY DOESN'T CANADA SUPPORT U.S. IN VN, LIKE AUSTRALIA
02/09/66 PEACE HINT FROM HANOI SENT TO CANADA, INDIA
02/10/66 '400,000 YANKS FOR VIET NAM'
02/10/66 HO CALLS ON CANADA TO FULFIL OBLIGATIONS
02/10/66 GENEVA ACCORD: HO TELLS CANADA TO FULFIL OBLIGATIONS TO TRUCE
02/11/66 U.S. DID ALL IT COULD FOR PEACE, MARTIN SAYS
02/11/66 REPLY TO HO IS CONSIDERED, PEARSON SAYS
02/11/66  A VIET NAM PEACE ‘GOOD FOR BUSINESS’
02/12/66  U.S. PRESIDENT STILL BLOCKS LETTER
           DISCLOSURE: MARTIN
02/14/66  ANGRY OVER HARVEST, VIET CONG KILLS 54
02/17/66  MARTIN VISIT TO U.S. AIDS AT PEACE MOVE
02/19/66  CONTROL BODY CAN HELP
02/21/66  VIETNAM PEACE INITIATIVE MET FAVORABLY: MARTIN
02/22/66  QUESTION PERIOD
02/22/66  MARTIN SEES HOPE FOR VIETNAM TALKS
03/01/66  CANADA CARRIES THE LATEST FRAIL VIETNAM HOPE
03/03/66  THE SIT-IN’S OTHER SIDE
03/04/66  CANADA VISIT IS PREDICTED FOR INDIAN PM
03/07/66  CANADA’S VIETNAM POLICY JUSTIFIED, RUSK SAYS
03/09/66  CANADIAN CHINA EXPERT ON MISSION IN VIETNAM
03/10/66  MRS. RONNING KEEPS SILENT ON HUSBAND
03/16/66  FRANK EXCHANGE WITH HANOI, RONNING SAYS
03/17/66  A CONFUSED U.S. STORY ABOUT VIETNAM
03/17/66  RONNING REPORT WON’T BE MADE TO COMMITTEE
03/18/66  GENERAL DISMISSES CRITICISM OF CF-5
03/26/66  ‘PEACE TRAIN’ TO OTTAWA, IT’S PROTEST DAY ON
           THE HILL
03/28/66  POLICE OUT IN FORCE AS 2,700 DEMONSTRATORS
           MARCH ON HILL TO
03/28/66  2,000 PEACE-MARCHERS PROTEST IN OTTAWA
           ‘COMPlicity’ IN VIET
03/30/66  MRS. GANDHI EXPRESS SYMPATHY FOR POSITION OF
           U.S. ON VN
04/05/66  ICC TO HOLD HANOI MEETINGS
05/21/66  THE HIGH COST OF CIVILIZED KILLING
05/23/66  SOUTH VIETNAM STRIFE DEPLORED BY JOHNSON IN APPEAL
           FOR UNITY
05/23/66  ASIA PEACE COMMISSION IN FINANCIAL TROUBLE
06/20/66  RADIO HANOI BROADCAST: RONNING FINDS NORTH VIETNAM
           HOLDS TO
06/20/66  INSULATION FOR CAMBODIA
06/20/66  VIETNAM WAR STEPUPE INDICATED BY JOHNSON IN APPEAL
           TO HANOI
06/21/66  MARTIN SILENT ON RONNING TRIP
06/22/66  CANADA STILL TALKING IN QUEST FOR PEACE
06/23/66  CALLS RONNING TRIP PART OF A CONTINUING EFFORT
11/25/66  ONE CANADIAN KILLED, ANOTHER HURT IN AMBUSH
01/03/67  HANOI’S HO WRITES POEM TO VICTORY
01/05/67  GET OUT, HE ADVISES U.S.: WAR WITH PEKING LOOMS
           OVER VIET BOMBING
01/07/67  12 YEARS OF ISOLATION: MAPLE LEAF OVER HANOI
01/13/67  MANY FRUSTRATIONS, BUT... CANADA TRIES QUIETLY FOR
           VIET NAM PEACE
01/20/67  NO HARM TO US IN DRUG BAN: WINTERS
01/20/67  TRADE: JUST HOW TOUGH CAN THE US BE?
01/23/67  FEINBERG PARTY REPORTS RED CHINA GAVE THEM VERY
           COOL RECEPTION
01/24/67 OUR ARMS SALES TO U.S. SET RECORD
01/25/67 GREEN BERET FIRM ADOPTS VIET BOY: 'NO CONFLICT'
01/27/67 WHEN FRIENDS FALL OUT...AS THEY OFTEN DO
02/06/67 SHELLING, RAIN, MUD AND NO MOVIES--THAT'S A VIET
   PEACEKEEPER'S LIFE
02/10/67 HO WRITES NEW YEAR POEM: 'VICTORY WILL BLOSSOM LIKE
   SPRING'
02/11/67 HANOI DID ASK LBJ
02/13/67 MARTIN PLANS STATEMENT ON VIET WAR
02/14/67 'TIME IS RIPE' TO HELP END VIET WAR--MARTIN
03/10/67 PEARSON WON'T BACK DOWN ON VIET ARMS
03/31/67 RONNING BEST HANOI LINK DESPITE CRITICISM: MARTIN

Period IV (1968-72)

01/01/68 REPORT U.S. OFFICIALS UNDER FIRE TO SHOW PROGRESS
   IN VIETNAM
01/05/68 U.S. REACTION DISAPPOINTING TO CANADA
01/09/68 CANADA TO CHECK CHARGE U.S. USING LETHAL GAS
01/19/68 CANADA SENDS MAN TO SOUND OUT HANOI
01/19/68 U.S. PULLOUT FAVORED BY KIERANS
01/20/68 WITH PM ON UNITY: MARTIN, 64, STRESSES EXPERIENCE
01/22/68 SAYS U.S. SHOULD HALT BOMBING: MARTIN CRITICIZES
   'INFLEXIBLE
01/24/68 CAMBODIAN BORDERS ARE PROBLEM TO CANADIAN
   COMMISSION MEMBER
01/30/68 THE FLAG OF A CANADIAN SERVING WITH THE US MARINES
02/01/68 NO CANADIANS HURT IN SAIGON RAID
02/02/68 RED ATTACKS PROVE NO PART OF SOUTH VIETNAM IS
   SECURE
02/05/68 CANADIAN MISSIONARIES RESCUED FROM VIET CONG ATTACK
02/07/68 FIRST OF CF-5 PEACEKEEPERS DELIVERED TO ARMED
   FORCES
02/09/68 DIER STILL IN HANOI AWAITS PLANE TO SOUTH
02/09/68 CHINESE RIFLE BOON FOR RED SNIPERS
02/09/68 A LAWN MOWER THROUGH THE CHARLIES
02/10/68 CANADIANS TOLD TO KEEP WAR IN PERSPECTIVE
02/10/68 A CANADIAN MISSIONARY DEFENDS WAR IN VIETNAM
10/02/68 14 EVICTED BY U.S. HOUSE: PANEL PROBING FOR RED
   TINGE TO PROTEST
01/10/69 VIET CONG TO SPEAK AT MASSEY HALL
01/13/69 DYNAMITE HURLED: V C STEAL UP ON US BASE, BLOW UP
   18 HELICOPTERS
01/14/69 VIET NAM HERO MUST PAY $75 TAX ON $500 AWARD
01/14/69 KOREANS QUIZ VIETS
01/15/69 SWEDEN REPORTED READY TO HELP HANOI AFTER WAR
01/20/69 6 HELD IN VIET MARCH PAY DOUBLE USUAL FINE
01/20/69 CANADA MUST HEED U.S. ON DEFENCE, EDITOR SAYS
01/22/69 WE CANNOT BE A NATO FREELoader’ DEFENSE TIES WILL STAY
01/23/69 IN THE COURTS: PROFESSOR ARGUES CASE 6 HOURS ‘WILL YOU SHUT....
01/30/69 VIET CONG REPRESENTATIVES ON CANADIAN TOUR
11/15/69 STUDENTS STOP TRAIN IN ANTI-VIET PROTEST
11/15/69 CANADIANS JOIN IN PROTESTS
11/21/69 STRABIN HAD ‘NOTHING NEW’ TO REPORT FROM HANOI
03/21/70 OUSTED PRINCE CALLS FOR A NATIONWIDE REFERENDUM UNDER SUP OF ICC
03/27/70 SOUVANNA PROPOSES ICC RESUME CONTROL
04/03/70 FRENCH OVERTURE ON SE ASIA: CANADA’S AID SOUGHT IN REVIVING
04/17/70 RUSSIA SUGGESTS SOLUTION TO END INDO-CHINA CRISIS
05/02/70 SHARP VOICES REGRET OVER NIXON’S CAMBODIA POLICY
05/02/70 ASSAULT OF SANCTUARIES CALLED IMPORTANT STRATEGY: MILITARY
05/07/70 HE’S A YOUNG U.S. SOLDIER...
05/07/70 SHARP SAYS CANADA AND SOVIET EXPLORE NEWS INDO-CHINA TALKS
05/17/70 ASIANS URGE ICC REACTIVATION IN CAMBODIA
04/01/71 THE CUP OF GUILT FROM CALLEY’S TRIAL
04/23/71 VIETNAMESE, 72, FOUGHT TO ENLIST
04/28/71 108 ANTI-WAR VETERANS ARRESTED ON SUPREME COURT STEPS
05/11/71 TRUCE TEAM VISITS LAOS REBEL CENTRE
06/17/71 DISCLOSURE IN TIMES PROTESTED BY CANADA
06/17/71 10,000 S VN PATROL NEAR SAIGON TO AVOID DISRUPTION OF PARADE
06/18/71 HANOI WARNED COURIER WAR WOULD SPREAD: SHARP
07/03/71 OTTAWA WITHHOLDS DETAILS OF RONNING’S VISIT TO HANOI
07/05/71 GENEVA ACCORDS VIEWED AS ‘A DISASTER’
01/12/72 CANADA VIET TRUCE FORCE SLASHED
10/27/72 WOULD CANADA HELP POLICE A CEASEFIRE?
11/01/72 CANADA REPORTED TO BE MEMBER OF PLANNED VIETNAM TRUCE BODY
11/01/72 MOVE TO CONTROL MORE TERRITORY BEFORE CEASEFIRE MADE BY HANOI
11/02/72 CANADA WAITS DETAILS ON PEACE FORCE PLANS
11/03/72 CANADA OFFERS ITS HELP IN SUPERVISING VIETNAM TRUCE
11/03/72 WHITE HOUSE CONTINUES TO DEMAND FURTHER TALKS NIXON SAYS..
11/15/72 CANADIAN OFFICIAL OPENS TALKS TO REVIEW RELATIONS WITH U.S.
11/16/72 ROLE NOT DECIDED: CANADA
11/21/72 NEW YORK MEETING: SHARP, ROGERS DISCUSS CANADIAN TRUCE ROLE
11/22/72 SHARP SEEKS MORE TALKS TO CLARIFY ROLE IF CANADIANS GO
11/23/72 COMPOSITION, DUTIES OF CEASEFIRE FORCE MAY BE MAIN ISSUE
12/04/72 SHARP VETOES ARMS IN PEACEKEEPING ROLE
12/05/72 TRUCE ROLE COULD COST 'SCORES OF MILLIONS': OTTAWA SOURCES
12/06/72 MICHELIN MOVE INTO U.S. MAY CHANGE TIRE MARKETING
12/07/72 SHARP WILL SEEK CLARIFICATION OF CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH A . . .
12/09/72 OBSERVER ROLE CANADA'S VIET TERMS 'REASONABLE' TO U.S.
12/23/72 CAN'T BOMB TO PEACE, PM SAYS

Period V (1973)

01/01/73 U.S., NORTH VIETNAM READY TO RESUME TALKS AFTER BOMBING HALT
01/01/73 HANOI FORCES SAID LACKING GUIDANCE
01/02/73 U.S. AND HANOI TO RESUME PEACE TALKS IN PARIS
01/04/73 CANADA DEPLORES BOMBING BY U.S. IN N VIETNAM, OTT TELLS WASH
01/04/73 TALKS IN PARIS 'DOING BUSINESS' U.S....
01/05/73 U.S. RECONCILIATION CALL REBUFFED BY HANOI
01/05/73 JURORS QUESTIONED ABOUT WAR VIEWS
01/15/73 VIET NAM PEACEKEEPING OTTAWA FEARS IN卷VOLMENT MEANS JUST
01/24/73 SHARP SAYS TERMS WILL DECIDE CANADA'S PEACEKEEPING ROLE
01/24/73 OF SMUT BUSTING...AND TRUCE SUPERVISING
01/24/73 400 CANADIAN TROOPS ARE ALERTED COULD BE IN VIET NAM IN 10 DAYS
01/24/73 WAR COMES TO END SATURDAY
01/24/73 SUPERPOWERS USED WAR TO TEST NEW WEAPONS
01/24/73 FORMER DIPLOMAT SAYS CANADA HAS A DUTY TO SUPERVISE TRUCE
01/26/73 NO DANGER PAY FOR VIET CIVILIAN SERVICE
01/26/73 CANADA'S PEACE FORCE HOPES TO WIN TRUST OF WAR-WEARY VIETS
01/27/73 THE MICHELIN MYSTERY: WHERE WILL IT SELL THOSE TIRES
01/27/73 FIGHTING TO END TONIGHT VIET NAM PEACE PACT SIGNED
01/27/73 TOUGH TIMES AHEAD, TRUDEAU TELLS TROOPS
01/27/73 CANADA WASN'T CONSULTED ON PEACE FORCE:SHARP
01/29/73 GUNS BOOMING AS CANADIAN ARRIVE: RED TAPE SNARLS VIET TRUCE
01/29/73 U.S. IS READY TO USE AIR AND SEA POWER IF TRUCE ISN'T HONORED
01/29/73 TRUCE OBSERVERS HOPE OTTAWA WON'T PULL THEM OUT TOO QUICKLY
01/29/73 OTTAWA WON'T AID MILITARY SUPPLIERS HURT BY CEASEFIRE
01/31/73 BICKERING STALLS EFFORTS OF CANADIAN TRUCE TEAM IN VIET NAM
02/02/73 4-NATION VIET OBSERVER FORCE MOVES OUT TO 3 NORTHERN CITIES
02/02/73 NO GUARANTEE WE'LL STAY IN VIET NAM, SHARP SAYS
02/02/73 CANADIAN MISSIONARY LISTED AS VIET PRISONER
02/02/73 THE VIET NAM AGREEMENT IS MADE OF PIBS
02/02/73 NIXON SAYS VIET NAM TRUCE STRENGTHENS U.S. CREDIBILITY
02/03/73 CANADA BREAKS DEADLOCK: CEASEFIRE TEAMS BEGIN TASK MONDAY
02/03/73 'SAFEST PLACE ON EARTH,' TRUCE TEAM SAYS.
02/05/73 TRUCE OBSERVERS GO TO WORK IN A SWEATING, SMELLY CITY
02/05/73 IF 'WAR' KILLS OUR MEN WE LEAVE, SHARP SAYS
02/05/73 CANADIANS FIRST SMELL OF VIET ACTION WILL BE A FISHY STENCH
02/05/73 VIET OBSERVERS START FIRST DAY IN ACTION
02/05/73 WE'LL REPORT DISSENTION GAUVIN TELLS TRUCE TEAM
02/06/73 CANADIANS SENT TO VIET NAM'S WORST CRIME AREA
02/07/73 CANADIAN RED CROSS TEAM LEAVES TO INSPECT VIET NAM PRISON CAMP
02/07/73 U.S. TRIPLES ARMS SALES AROUND WORLD SINCE '61
02/08/73 RECOGNITION OF HANOI 'WILL HELP OUR WORK' VIET TRUCE CHIEF
02/08/73 'I'LL BUST MY BEHIND' TO PROBE ANY FIGHTING CANADIAN PROMISE
02/08/73 27 U.S. PRISONERS TO BE FREED SUNDAY NIGHT, VIET CONG HINTS
02/10/73 123 MORE CANADIANS SETTING OUT FOR VIET TO JOIN PEACE FORCE
02/12/73 'CANADA IS TRYING TO BRING PEACE, SO IT MUST BE A GOOD PLACE
02/12/73 WHEN WAR'S SO WILLING PEACE IS SO RELUCTANT
02/14/73 CANADIANS ORDERED INTO FIELD ALL ALONE IF OTHERS WON'T GO
02/14/73 AUTO PACT LOOKS SAFE FOR NOW
02/14/73 200,000 ORPHANS ARE REAL LOSERS IN WAR
02/16/73 THE VIET CONG FAIL AS PARTY GIVERS
02/17/73 CAYER OFFERS WEAK SMILE, FEEBLE WAVE
02/19/73 TRUCE TEAMS MOVING TO COUNTRYSIDE
02/20/73 VIET FOES NOT TRYING TO END WAR, SAYS TRUCE CHIEF
02/20/73 SAFETY NOT ASSURED CONG BLOCKS CRASH PROBE BY CANADIANS
02/21/73 CANADA'S SHREWD PEACE MOVE SETS VIET CRASH PROBE IN MOTION
02/23/73 SHARP WOULD SET UP 'CONTINUING AUTHORITY' TO WATCH VIET PEACE
02/23/73 OUR MAN IN VIET RIGHT TO SPEAK OUT
02/23/73 CANADIANS DELIVER NOTE DEMANDING SAFETY PLEDGE
02/24/73 POLES SET UP SAIGON-TO-WARSAW RADIO FROM THOSE FAMOUS UMBRELLAS
02/28/73 SHARP SAYS PEACE TALKS NEARING FINAL AGREEMENT
03/16/73 GAUVIN WANTS PROBE AT SCENE OF CRASH
03/24/73 'THE POSITION OF NEWS STORIES CAN COLOR THEIR IMPORTANCE'
04/03/73 ICCS OBSERVERS SPLIT ON BLAME FOR BLOODY BOMBING OF PAGODA
04/03/73 TRUCE MISSION WAITS AS TEAMS WRANGLE
04/04/73 MILITARY COMMISSION FAILS IN BID TO END SAIGON OUTPOST SEIGE
04/05/73 ICE-CUBE TRAYS AND GASOLINE TANKS FROM ICCS TANKS THIEVES
04/06/73 WITHDRAWAL FROM CEASEFIRE TEAM IN VIETNAM WOULD BE DISASTROUS
04/06/73 ICCS MOVES OUT
04/09/73 ACCIDENT, VIET CONG SAYS CANADIAN IS KILLING IN DOWNEO HELI
04/09/73 INCIDENT NOT ENOUGH REASON TO QUIT ICCS: TRUDEAU, SHARP
04/10/73 VIET CONG FORCED CRASH SURVIVORS TO SIGN FALSE STATEMENTS
04/10/73 PARLIAMENTARY EXCERPTS FROM HC PROCEEDINGS
04/10/73 CAN MIL CHIEF TELLS OF INCIDENT COST NINE LIVES ICCS HELI
04/10/73 HELICOPTER FLIGHTS SUSPENDED BY ICCS
04/10/73 CEREMONY HELD AT SAIGON AIRPORT TO MARK RETURN OF SIX BODIES
04/11/73 CANADA MUST STILL HANG ON
04/12/73 'IT WAS SO QUICK' CANADIAN SAYS
04/12/73 FLYING UNDER VIET CONG DIRECTION DOWNEO HELICOPTER SAID
04/18/73 PARLIAMENT- QUESTIONS
04/28/73 ICCS SENDING TEAM TO PROVE WHERE TRUCE COPTER WAS DOWNEO
04/30/73 HELICOPTER NOT MOVED, ICCS TEAM DECIDES
05/01/73 ICCS TO QUIT MALARIA RIDDEN CAMP
06/01/73 CENTRAL ICCS HALTS MEETINGS IN LONG WRANGLE OVER PROCEDURE
06/02/73 FORMAL DIPLOMATIC TIES WITH HANOI, SAIGON ARE STUDIED
06/02/73 CANADA DENOUNCED
06/04/73 CANADA PULLOUT 'REGRETTABLE' HUNGARIANS SAY
06/05/73 ICCS WITHDRAWAL PRESENTS DIPLOMATIC AND AID PROBLEMS FOR EX
06/06/73 FIGHTING INTENSIFIES IN DELTA, CAMBODIA
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Article #1
Headline: No Illusions About Task: Canada's Role in Indo-China Called Onerous, Honorable: Two Government Officials Are Flying to New Delhi For Truce Group Parleys
Paper: G&M, 7/29/54:1
Byline: Harvey Hickey

Ottawa, July 28 (Staff)--Canada today agreed to serve on the international commissions which will supervise the Indo-China armistice and sent two senior officials to New Delhi to help work out the preliminary arrangements.

With India and Poland, Canada will form three supervisory commissions: one each for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, which, by means of military inspection teams, will observe the execution of the armistice agreement signed at Geneva last week.

In an official statement issued after a cabinet meeting this afternoon, the Government said it had no illusions about the magnitude and complexity of this "onerous" assignment. However, it added that available information led to the conclusion that there was a reasonable chance of the commissions operating effectively and thus making a constructive contribution to peace in Southeast Asia.

At the same time, the statement hinted that the Government has no intention of being made the butt of Communist obstruction. If its expectation of effective operation proved ill-founded and the commissions were frustrated by obstruction, the Government said, "then, of course, no useful purpose would be served by continuing their existence." That was taken as an implied threat of withdrawal in the face of obstruction.

R.M. Macdonnell, assistant undersecretary of State for External Affairs and Air Commodore H. H. C. Rutledge, co-ordinator of the joint staff in the Defense Department left here tonight by air for New Delhi.

There they will work with Escott Reid, Canadian high commissioner to India, who has been in consultation with the Indian Government ever since the formation of the commissions was proposed. All will attend a conference called by India to work out preliminary arrangements for the operation of the commissions.

Other participants in this conference will be representatives of Poland, France, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and the Communist Vietminh forces.

It is expected that Canada will have to send a diplomatic and military staff of nearly 200 people to Indo-China to work on or under the commissions. The work will continue for at least two years since the commissions are intended to supervise elections in July, 1956. Today's statement said nothing about whether Canada was expected to meet its own costs in the operation. The chief of the three missions will
be named shortly.

Under the Geneva agreement, Canada, India and Poland will each appoint an equal number of officers to form inspection teams. Teams will be permanently located at 14 points in Indo-China and there will also be mobile teams to patrol the frontiers, the demilitarized zones and the demarcation lines between the zones established for the re-grouping of the French and Communist armies.

The commissions will control the movement of troops in connection with the regrouping, supervise the demarcation lines and demilitarized zones and control the release of prisoners of war and civilian internees. They will also maintain teams at seaports, airfields and along the frontiers to check as to whether either side is moving soldiers or war material into the country.

With some important exceptions, the commissions will make their decisions by majority vote, the chairman, India, having the deciding vote where the other two commissioners disagree. However, there must be unanimity, that is, any commissioner has veto powers, where the question is one of a violation or a threat of violation of the armistice which might lead to a resumption of hostilities.

Such violations are defined as a refusal by either the French or the Communists to move troops as required by the regroupment plan or a violation by either party of the regroupment zones, territories, or air space of the other. If unanimity cannot be reached on such questions it is provided that majority and minority reports can be made to the Geneva powers.

In its statement which was issued through the External Affairs Department, the Government said the invitation to serve on the commissions was being accepted with full knowledge of the responsibilities and difficulties involved. The invitation was extended by British Foreign Secretary Eden and Russian Foreign Minister Molotov as co-chairmen of the Indo-China conference at Geneva.

"Canada is geographically remote from Indo-China," the statement said, "and her collective security responsibilities in South-East Asia are limited to those that arise from membership in the United Nations. We know from experience, however, that just as local conflicts can become general war, so conditions of security and stability in any part of the world serve the cause of peace everywhere.

"If, therefore, by participation in the work of these Indo-Chinese commissions, Canada can assist in establishing such security and stability in Southeast Asia, we will be serving our own country as well as the cause of peace."

It was emphasized that a place on the commissions did not mean that Canada was guaranteeing or undertaking to enforce the ceasefire. No new military or collective security commitment was involved. The commissions, said the statement, would be solely supervisory, judicial and mediatory. Where
disputes could be settled, they would be reported to the member nations for the Geneva conference.

It was considered that the commissions should be able to function more effectively than the Korean supervisory commission because there was equal Communist and non-Communist representation on the Korea body, which circumstance frequently blocked action. Also, the Korea commission could report only to the two military commands.

"A study of the information available," said the statement, "has led us to the conclusion that the commissions have a reasonable chance of operating effectively and of making a constructive contribution to the successful implementation of the ceasefire agreements and hence to peace in Southeast Asia.

"If our expectations unfortunately prove ill-founded and the commissions are frustrated by obstruction, then, of course, no useful purpose would be served by continuing their existence.

"The exchanges of views which we have had with those powers with whom we are especially closely associated in efforts to maintain peace and strengthen security has confirmed our conviction that we ought to accept this onerous but honorable assignment."

The powers referred to were presumably Britain and the United States.

"Finally," said the statement in conclusion, "we have been conscious of the serious consequences which might follow if we were to decline the invitation since this could delay and complicate the implementation of the ceasefire agreements with unhappy and possibly even serious results.

We have no illusions that the task we are undertaking will be either easy or of short duration but we take satisfaction from the fact that in performing it Canada will be playing a worthy and responsible part in an effort to strengthen peace".

Article #2
Paper: G&M, 3/13/62:1

Byline: Walter Gray

Ottawa, March 12--Prime Minister John Diefenbaker today revealed that nine Canadians serving on the International Truce Commission in Indo-China were engaged in smuggling gold and opium within that country. And at the same time he indicated that other Canadians serving on the commission in 1956 were involved in similar activities. However, the previous Liberal Administration never made the facts public.

Although the Prime Minister did not reveal the names of the nine Canadians who included one commissioned officer, one
non-commissioned officer, five other ranks, and two clerks with the External Affairs Department, it was learned that once the current investigations are completed, their names would be made public. Court-martial proceedings are expected to be instituted against the service personnel.

The two External Affairs clerks have been suspended and will subsequently be dismissed. However, because the offenses took place outside Canada, they are not subject to prosecution under Canadian law.

Mr. Diefenbaker made his statement at the House opening. Erhart Regier (CCF, Burnaby-Coquitlam), who brought the incident to light in the Commons last week, was not in his seat at the time, but entered the Chamber soon after the Prime Minister completed his remarks. Mr. Diefenbaker charged that Mr. Regier made inaccurate statements outside the House, and for this reason it became necessary, in the national interest, to set the record straight.

Mr. Regier claimed that one officer received $50,000 for smuggling narcotics into Canada. Mr. Diefenbaker said some of the nine did receive sums of money in the local currency.

It was learned outside the House they received 50,000 piasters, not dollars, or about $1,700.

Mr. Diefenbaker said there was no evidence that narcotics were smuggled into Canada by the Canadians serving on the three truce commissions in Indo-China.

Mr. Regier linked the smuggling incident with what he called mass arrests in British Columbia by Royal Canadian Mounted Police a few months ago. Mr. Diefenbaker said this statement was wrong.

"The drug involved in the matter which is before the House is opium, which the enforcement officers advise is rarely, if ever, handled by illegal narcotics dealers in Canada," said the Prime Minister.

At the outset, Mr. Diefenbaker said the Government had hoped, in view of the delicate political situation existing in Indo-China, that the allegations would not be made the subject of public debate, but as Mr. Regier has chosen not to accept the statements of External Affairs Minister Howard Green and had made inaccurate statements outside the House, the Government decided to make some of the facts known.

Late in 1961 it was discovered that some military members of the Canadian delegation to the international supervisory commissions in Indo-China were engaged in smuggling activities within that country, he said.

"Immediate investigations by the military authorities in Indo-China indicated that one commissioned officer and one non-commissioned officer had engaged in gold smuggling, and five other ranks appeared to have engaged in the smuggling of gold and opium," the Prime Minister stated. "All of those involved who were still in Indo-China were recalled to Canada. Disciplinary action was taken in Indo-China against a number of these military personnel before their return to Canada,
investigation of the others are still continuing."

Mr. Diefenbaker said that at first it was believed that only military personnel were involved but subsequently it was learned that two members of the clerical staff of the External Affairs Department also were engaged in smuggling.:

"Administrative action to prevent a recurrence was taken immediately by the Department of External Affairs and by the Department of National Defense. The RCMP was apprised of this situation and were requested to take charge of the investigation in so far as it affected the civilian members of the Department of External Affairs. The two members of the Department of External Affairs engaged in these activities were returned to Canada and have been interviewed by the RCMP. They have signed statements admitting that they acted together in smuggling a quantity of gold and a parcel of opium on behalf of a Chinese person, from one city to another in Indo-China" (G&M, 3/13/62:1).

Article #3
Headline: Canadian Arms for VN create jobs and a moral dilemma
Paper: Star, 11/15/69:64
Byline: John Saunders

Ann Kotva is a nice, middle-aged, motherly woman in Rexdale who helps make machines that kill people in Viet Nam.

She's one of more than 100,000 Canadians who owe their incomes wholly or partly to the U.S.-Canada Defence Production Sharing Agreement, a frequently attacked but economically bountiful arrangement in which Canada gets a big chunk of U.S. military spending.

By the end of last year, when the agreement was nearly a decade old, Washington had brought $2.1 billion worth of military goods from Canadian firms under its terms.

That figure is $377 million more than Ottawa purchased south of the border. Some Canadians are becoming nervous about the future of the agreement, figuring the U.S. won't tolerate this kind of drain on its dwindling trade surpluses indefinitely. Other Canadian, opposed to the U.S. military ventures, want the deal killed.

In essence, the agreement provides continental free trade in weapons and military gear--at least for the official armed forces.

Mrs. Kotva works at the Litton Systems Ltd. plant near Toronto International Airport. Her job is hooking up wires in the complex circuitry of Litton's Special-Purpose Airborne Computer.

Actually, not even executives of the company call the machine that: It's a "bombing computer" which goes into U.S. Air Force F-4 fighter-bombers stationed at points all over the world, including Viet Nam.

It releases bombs, rockets
When an F-4 swoops toward its target, the Rexdale-built computer inside it releases its load of bombs or rockets at the pre-programmed instant.

"I put in my eight hours," Mrs. Kotva says calmly at her bench, "and I go home. I've got four kids. They're what I worry about, not what the company does."

Litton Systems was set up nine years ago by giant Litton Industries of Los Angeles to get the contract to built navigation systems for Canadian Starfighter jets.

Company officials are proud of the way they've moved on from that job to an increasing amount of civilian business. But they don't want to appear ungrateful for their military orders, especially those received under the production sharing pact.

At its peak three to four years ago, production of the bombing computer employed more than 500 at Litton. More than 100 still work on it.

This and other contracts received under the agreement account for about 15 percent of the sales of the 1,500-employee firm.

In 1966, when the level of U.S. military purchases in Canada was about the same as it is now, Ottawa estimated the agreement provided full-time employment for 13,000 to 15,000 Canadians and affected another 110,000 in varying degree.

Canada makes a wide variety of electronic components, from the Special Forces green berets, sewn in a Toronto loft, to the electronics and aerospace industries would inevitably be lost without the contracts to nourish it.

In Litton's executive offices, Vice-president Bob Marcille seems to echo Mrs. Kotva. "We sell to the U.S. department of defence," he says, "not to what they used to call the War Department."

"We know where some of them (the Litton bombing computers) are used, but there's not much you can do about it. If you don't like the business you get out and make chocolate bars."

Marcille, father of eight, is an un-hawkish Californian. He's now a landed immigrant in Canada and the only Litton Systems executive who's not a Canadian citizen.

He doesn't relish the way his products are used in Viet Nam, but he like to think the fact that the U.S. has had then
has helped to prevent a bigger war.

'We've only been picketed once

Another Litton man expresses relief that the firm's military activities have attracted little attention. "We've had very little trouble with the Anti-Viet Nam people," he says.

"We've only been picketed once. I guess we've been lucky."

Lucky or not, people who look kindly on the golden eggs laid in Canada by the production-sharing goose are beginning to worry.

Production sharing is an old habit with Canada and the U.S. It started in 1941 with an arrangement which Mackenzie King, then prime minister, described as "a sort of barter."

The idea was to make it easier for Canada, short of dollars for equipment purchases, to obtain what it needed to fight the war.

Later, in peacetime, production sharing was used to enable Canadians to get long, efficient production runs—and a fair share of the work—by making all of some of the types of equipment needed by both countries.

Many production sharing contracts, however, have been for items used by only one of the partners. Litton's computer is an example.

Under the current agreement, both sides waive customs duties and the U.S. gives Canada an exemption from its Buy American Act, a peace of legislation which normally compels Defence Department purchasing agents to do just that.

The agreement aimed at balance

When the agreement was reached in 1959, it was understood that the two nations would buy similar amounts of goods from each other, at least over the long run. It doesn't seem to be working that way.

At first, the American got the breaks. Canada spent $84 million more in the U.S. in 1960 than the other way around.

But in 1961, the tide turned. U.S. purchases in Canada outweighed Canadian purchases in the U.S. by $48 million.

Canada's surplus under the agreement has grown since. The cumulative total passed $190 million in 1967.

Propelled by Viet Nam war spending, U.S. purchases in Canada last year rose to $320 million. Canadian orders dropped to $134 million, half the 1967 level.

The result was doubling to $377 million of Canada's surplus over the decade. Officials report American orders are slightly lower this year, but the frozen Canadian defence budget may lead to a similar increase in the surplus in 1969.

At the Treasury Department in Washington, one of the officials told The Star he and some of his colleagues are
"concerned" about this unbalance—especially with money recently flowing out of the U.S. at a rate of $10 billion a year faster than it's coming in.

The production sharing pact, he said, is "one of a number of things which were initiated for one reason or another and are now all coming in adversely (for the U.S.) at once."

These international programs (including the much larger auto trade pact with Canada) have become "too one-sided," the official said.

If at all possible, he felt, the Defence Production Sharing Agreement should be modified so it is "mutually beneficial".

The American loss under the agreement isn't large, he said, "But it's something that comes to mind."

Regretfully, the treasury man added: "That's not saying it isn't something we have to take."

The people closest to the operation of the agreement seem to be the least worried about it.

Counsellor (defence production) Frank Jackman co-ordinates Canada's end in the Canadian embassy in Washington. He sees "no imminent danger" to the pact.

"The main problem of course, is than new equipment purchases by the Canadian armed forces have been pretty few and far between in the past few years," Jackman says.

No U.S. pressure for change

But despite the surpluses, no one has tried to make Canada act to reverse the trend. "We've had not pressure at all," he reports.

Nevertheless, he admits, "on the political level, the future is a bit unclear."

Although many senators and representatives complain loudly about the auto pact, Jackman has heard of no congressional opposition to the defence production agreement. But he can visualize it arising.

"If you've got a factory producing widgets in your back yard," he suggests, "and some procurement officer proposes to buy widgets in Canada, you get excited."

One of those procurement officers is Richard Webb, who works across the Potomac River in the defence department's fabled Pentagon building.

"I personally can't get too concerned about a temporary—and I must emphasize temporary—surplus in favor of Canada," he says.

Webb is the department's director of procurement analysis and planning. He likes the extra sources and increased competition for defence contracts which the agreement provides.

Opposition not noticed
Webb professes considerable surprise to hear that anyone is worried about the agreement's safety. Even a $400 million imbalance over ten years is "the gnat on the elephant" beside the annual $42 billion the U.S. Defence Department spends on goods, equipment and services, he observes.

Webb is unaware of any opposition to the agreement. "If there was one letter coming into this building from any of our members of Congress, I'm sure I would have heard of it."

"This agreement," he adds, "is to provide logistical support, not political footballs."

Oddly the Defence Production Sharing Agreement is one of the few Canadian international undertakings that were never actually signed. It was "formalized" a few months after it was negotiated, simply by an exchange of letters.

It's almost unique in that it has no official expiry date. So if nobody does anything specific about it, it goes on forever.

Article #4
Headline: Absurd's the word for our Viet job

SAIGON In this, the War of Great Pretences, Canada is not playing the most important role but it's certainly playing one of the most uncomfortable and absurd.

The fiction that the International Commission for Supervision and Control is doing an effective and impartial job of enforcing the 1954 Geneva truce agreement was difficult to sustain even during the relatively peaceful years through the turn into the 60s.

In appointing the Commission the signatories to the agreement did not say so in so many words but everyone understood perfectly well that one of the three members, Canada, was the West's referee; another Poland, was the East's referee; and the third, India, was the referee between the referees. The Lewis Carroll (Alice Through The Looking Glass) plot-structure took a surprisingly long time to reach the inevitable denouement.

It wasn't until June 1962 that Canada and India, with Poland dissenting, denounced North Viet Nam for "inciting, encouraging and supporting hostile activities" against South Viet Nam. It wasn't until February, 1965, that Poland and India, with Canada dissenting, denounced the United States for military intervention and specifically for the bombing of North Viet Nam.

Lacks real power

A few days after this second report on the U.S. bombings, the Hanoi government made an official rule of a practice that both Hanoi and Saigon had been following almost from the
start. The five inspection sites the Commission had been allowed in the North were closed down and all five inspection teams were forbidden to move outside the city limits of Hanoi.

The reason given was that in view of the U.S. raids, the North Viet Nam government could no longer guarantee the safety of the visiting Pinkertons, much as it would like to.

The effect of this was merely to put the last knot in a blindfold that the Commission had been wearing all along. It’s never had any powers of enforcement or any rights of search and both the warring states have taken a certain Oriental glee in misleading, obstructing and lying to its agents from the outset of their mission.

In the south, it’s true, the inspection teams still have more freedom of movement and maintain bases in five cities. But since their only purpose there is to get the goods on their hosts they receive no more real co-operation from Saigon than from Hanoi.

The inspectors, who patrol the major docks and airfields in teams of one military officer from each of the three nations, may see a ship coming into a harbor and obviously loaded with suspicious tanks and planes—in the North probably from China, in the South almost certainly from the U.S. If they’re going to make the evidence stand up they’ve got to document it.

More often than not, the Vietnamese liaison officer who is attached to the team and gives them their only official status with aircraft pilots, customs inspectors and ships’ captains, will either deny there’s anything to investigate or stall them with red tape—in one case at least the pretext was that the liaison officer had to hurry home and see his sick mother-in-law—until there’s nothing left to investigate.

Cold-war split

Another chronic cause of futility is the cleavage of loyalties within the Commission itself. Neither Blair Seaborn, the earnest young career officer of External Affairs who heads the Canadian mission, nor any of the 60-odd member of his delegation will say anything whatever for publication—a silence imposed specifically and categorically on orders from Ottawa.

The other two senior members of the Commission, Henry Wendrowski of Poland, and Mohammed A. Rahman, a classical scholar from Cambridge who heads the Indians and acts as chairman of the Commission as a whole are equally careful of their official utterances.

But no one with the vaguest knowledge of the Commission’s present climate has any doubt that whatever pretence it once had of being an unbiased judicial body, has, in practice, been abandoned and all three delegations are political instruments pure and simple, following the orders of the political superiors back home.
Except in the very early days, when the Commission apparently did do a practical and necessary job of supervising the demilitarization to the 17th parallel and the movement of refugees and at least reducing the crimes of vengeance on both sides, the Commission's alignment by nations has been almost automatic.

It's not that any delegation seeks, by definition or policy, to defeat the truth; it's more that different truths interest them in different degrees.

A former Canadian naval officer who served on one of the inspecting teams for several years before retiring to go into business in Saigon, reduced it to simple—and he warned somewhat exaggerated—terms the other afternoon.

"Let's say a team goes down to the dock and sees an incoming ship loaded half with Viet Cong guerrillas and half with U.S. atom bombs."

"Somebody suggests they go and take a closer look."

"The Canadian says: 'What bombs?'"

"The Pole says: 'What Viet Cong?'"

"The Indian says: 'What ship?'

In any case the government official accompanying them wold be as likely as not to refuse to let them approach or even to the ship's manifest. Or he'd say the ship was in quarantine or in a prohibited military zone. Or almost anything else that came into his mind if the cargo was really hot enough to warrant a special effort to conceal it.

The only differences between Hanoi and Saigon, inspecting officers who've tried to buck the system say, is that in Saigon the government officials who draw the red herrings are more likely to do it with an air of apology.

Too much information

But the Commission already has far more evidence than it knows what to do with—or probably will ever remove from the stacked filing cabinets in its headquarters compound. With or without the co-operation of the offenders—with or without the constant hazard of wrangling in its own ranks—it has accumulated hundreds of authenticated reports of violations of the treaty on both sides.

What to do with them is an unacknowledged conundrum, but nevertheless a real one.

The explosive reports of 1962 and 1965 were made to the co-chairman of the original Geneva Convention, the Soviet Union and Great Britain. All that happened was that they were circulated to the world and the world was allowed to argue them to its own various conclusions.

Thus far the majority view in the Commission has been that to tot up its latest stack of "incident" reports and try to put them together—with the almost inevitable two-to-one split in any summary that might be reached—would only be to put more fruitless argument into a deadlock that's hopeless
enough as it is. And the whole half-lunatic dilemma is complicated by the need to "prove" what everybody knows already.

The few members of the three delegations who see any future in their and the commission's work--and most of them are sincere and honest men according to their lights and insofar as their instructions will permit--console themselves that while they're here they're at least a physical reminder that there is a theoretical ceasefire line called the 17th parallel and a theoretical truce to use as a possible base from which to achieve a real truce sometime later.

To keep this feeble hope alive--and to maintain the illusion that the Commission is achieving something here and now--is costing Canada more than $600,000 a year. It's still less than the cost of one B-52 bomber plane.

And though you won't get any official hint of this either in Ottawa or here, our presence on the Commission as a non-neutral neutral refereeing the war on behalf of the U.S. does give Canada a far from unwelcome excuse for staying out of the fighting.

Article #5
Headline: Peace hint from Hanoi sent to Canada, India

UNITED NATIONS--Hitherto unpublished parts of a letter North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh sent to Canada and India contain what some diplomats here interpret as the first sign of interest by Hanoi in a possible peace conference on Vietnam.

In letters to Canada and India, parts of which were disclosed yesterday for the first time, Ho mentioned their special responsibility for peace in what formerly was French Indo-China.

Canada, India and Poland constitute the International Control Commission established by the 1954 Geneva conference to implement the agreements ending the war between France and the Indo China states and temporarily partitioning Vietnam at the 17th Parallel.

"In the face of the extremely serious situation brought about by the United States in Vietnam," Ho wrote to Prime Minister Lester Pearson, "I hope that your Government will fulfill its obligations under the Geneva Agreement."

The letter to India, it is reported from New Delhi, referred to India's special responsibility in Vietnam as chairman of the commission. Member of the Indian delegation to the UN said they knew nothing of the contents of the letter.

However a third letter, to Edward Ochab, chairman of the Polish Council of State, merely thanked the Polish Government and people for their support and urged them "to condemn the
peaceful initiative and manoeuvres of the United States in the United Nations."

UN diplomatic sources said Ho's special remarks to India differed from those in his letters to Canada and Poland.

(In Ottawa, officials said they had not seen a copy of the letter Ho sent to India. But first reports indicated that it was very similar to the earlier Ho letter sent to Communist bloc countries in January. Canada received a copy of that letter as a member of the International Control Commission.

(Far from raising peace hopes, the letter, as released from Ottawa, was intransigent.

(Ho listed among the conditions for a peace settlement: U.S. recognition of and readiness to recognize and to negotiate with the National Liberation Front (the political arm of the Viet Cong) as the sole representative of the South Vietnamese people; a halt to air attacks against North Vietnam; and acceptance of the demands of the North Vietnamese Government, including withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam.

(When Canada received its letter there was no suggestion from Ottawa that it contained a proposal that the International

--HO LETTER-- Page 2

Control Commission should initiate negotiations to end the war.

(Prime Minister Pearson, when asked in the Commons yesterday about the letter to India, said he know nothing beyond what he had heard on the radio. But he added that Canada had been discussing with the other members of the commission, India and Poland, the idea of peace negotiations. This appears to have been an error. There was no confirmation in Ottawa last night that Canada has in fact had recent discussion on the subject with India and Poland.)

The messages to India, Poland and Canada were appended to a letter Ho sent to the head of government last Jan. 24.

"Diplomats were at a loss to interpret what the North Vietnamese statesman expected Canada and India to do in fulfilling their obligation under the Geneva Agreement. That agreement gave the control commission the power to observe and report on observance of the settlement in Vietnam. It did not give them any power to reconvene the conference to take any action against violators.

Canada and India on one occasion joined in a majority report holding that violations had taken place by both North and South Vietnam. Last year Canada filed a minority report dissenting from a joint report by Poland and India holding South Vietnam and the United States responsible for
hostilities there and for failure to carry out the agreement to unify the country after elections.

Gopalaswami Pathasarakthi, permanent representative of India at the U.N. saw Secretary-General U Thant last night, but made no mention of Ho's special message to India.

In Washington, U.S. officials were skeptical about Ho's reported request to India as a genuine peace seeker by the North Vietnamese.

A flurry of excitement was set off when reports were received from New Delhi that he North Vietnamese leader had asked the Indian Government in a 2-week-old letter to use its good offices to restore peace in Vietnam.

But the excitement, which even touched off encouraging statements by congressional leaders, quickly died as the New Delhi reports were analyzed by State Department officials.

Representative Cornelius Gallagher, a New Jersey Democrat and member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said after checking with the State Department: "Unfortunately it appears to be another false alarm."

The State Department refused any comment on the grounds that the Indian Government had not informed it of the letter.

However Chairman J. William Fulbright (D. Ark.) of the Senate Foreign Relations (sic) said Ho's move "could be of great significance."

Meanwhile, the Security Council remained bogged down by disagreement among its 15 members on what to do about the U.S. initiative for a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. There was no indication of an early meeting to discuss the U.S. resolution which the council voted by a narrow margin to place on its agenda.

Article #6
Headline: 3,000 march in Toronto, protesting war in Vietnam
Paper: G&M, 11/17/69:4

About 3,000 people protesting against the war in Vietnam marched from Queen's Park to the City Hall on Saturday. Members of the Vietnam Mobilization Committee said the turnout was disappointing.

There was confrontation between leftist groups and members of the right-wing Edmund Burke Society and one arrest.

James Dennis Corcoran, 20, of Carlton Street, was charged with creating a disturbance after the marchers arrived at Nathan Philips Square. Police also removed seven persons from the square and took them inside City Hall. They were released after being cautioned.

One policeman leaned from his saddle like a cowboy and grabbed the man by the collar.

"The Santa Claus parade was better," said a woman watching in the square.
Article #7
Headline: Canadian complicity in U.S. war alleged

Ottawa (CP) An estimated 500 protesters against U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war on Saturday heard MP Edward Broadbent (NDP Oshawa-Whitby) charge the Canadian Government with complicity in the U.S. war effort.

The demonstrators gathered on Parliament Hill and wound their way through the capital's downtown business section carrying stencilled placards and chanting slogans.

The march ended at the University of Ottawa where Mr. Broadbent was the main speaker. Referring to Canada, he said, "we have been . . . the willing collaborators of the Americans."

Last year, he said, Canada supplied the U.S. Government with $320-million worth of military supplies, compared with $142-million in 1963.

"There has been a very close correlation between the increase of our sale of weapons to the United States and the increase of their war effort in Vietnam."

Article #8
Headline: Is Canada the U.S. patsy in Vietnam?
Byline: Charles Taylor

With South Vietnamese troops crossing into Cambodia--and continued heavy fighting in Vietnam itself--Canada's role as a peacekeeper has become increasingly futile and increasingly perilous.

By fighting in Cambodia, South Vietnam has violated the Paris agreements which called for an end to "all military activities" in Cambodia and Laos. U.S. officials have tried to justify the move on the grounds that North Vietnamese forces have made advances in Cambodia since the agreements were signed.

At the same time, U.S. bombers are blasting the countryside around the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh in a desperate attempt to save the besieged city and the tottering regime of Marshal Lon Nol.

With their Cambodian moves, the United States, South Vietnam and North Vietnam are all acting in open contempt of the Paris agreements. This not only imperils the prospects for peace in Indochina; it also makes Canada's role on the International Commission of Control and Supervision look even more futile.

A matter of time

It now seems only a matter of time before External
Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp and his Cabinet colleagues will be forced to honor their threat to withdraw from the ICCS or else to eat their own words.

In Vietnam itself, military activity is on a much greater scale and intensity than most Canadians have been led to believe. Diplomatic sources speak of division-size engagements in the northern province of South Vietnam and in Tay Ninh near the Cambodian border. In some areas of the Mekong Delta, fighting is even heavier than it was before the Paris agreements.

While Canadian observers watch hopelessly, both sides are guilty of flagrant violations of the ceasefire. On many occasions, Canadian have seen South Vietnamese planes take off with bombs under their wings and later return empty.

Officials of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (the Viet Cong) have protested to the ICCS that South Vietnamese planes have bombed designated "pickup spots" in their territory, just before ICCS helicopters arrived to airlift PRG delegates to meetings of the Joint Military Commission. If these reports are true, it would mean that South Vietnamese intelligence have advance notice of the pickups and schedule their raids in hopes of killing some of the Communist officials.

Few protests

But the Communists have made relatively few such protests to the ICCS and have shown little inclination to demand investigation of South Vietnamese truce violations. There is no certain explanation for the Communists' failure to exploit such obvious opportunities for propaganda, especially since they could still frustrate ICCS investigation of their own truce violations, with the help of the Hungarians and the Poles. But it seems part of a general Communist policy to downgrade the ICCS and severely limit its effectiveness.

Even now, the ICCS is already hovering on the brink of futility. Reliable sources estimate that since the ceasefire there have been well over 10,000 "incidents" worthy of investigation. Yet so far the ICCS members have been able to agree to only 144 investigations, of which 86 are still in progress. In only 17 cases so far has the ICCS been able to send a unanimous report or even divergent views to the four parties to the ceasefire.

In most cases, too, the investigations have involved minor incidents such as random shelling or mine explosions. ICCS teams have got nowhere near the major engagements.

At the same time, the Communists seem determined to intimidate the Canadians and frustrate their investigative role in sensitive areas. Aside from the shooting down of an ICCS helicopter--with one Canadian among the dead--artillery and rocket fire have been directed at two ICCS team sites in
the Mekong Delta.

There is still controversy as to whether the downing of the helicopter was "accidental" and whether the Communists moved its wreckage to support their contention that it had strayed far from its agreed path.

But the Communists were clearly determined to drive the ICCS team from Hong Ngú, a strategic entry point near the Cambodian border. Attempting to guard against illegal shipments of arms and men across the border, the ICCS team was driven from the site after a flurry of rocket attacks from two North Vietnamese regiments.

The ICCS is still manning another team site at Tri Ton, also near the Cambodian border, although it has also been subject to artillery and rocket attacks. Again, the Communists seem anxious to force an ICCS withdrawal.

There is speculation in Ottawa that North Vietnam and the PRG may be trying to force the ICCS out of all its team sites. Poland and Hungary would support this move while the Indonesians are already said to be wavering and doubtful about the viability of the team sites.

If the ICCS is force back to its seven regional sites in South Vietnam, its usefulness as a peacekeeping force would be virtually nil. At that point, it would be as useless as the old International Control Commission.

All this is a sad outcome to the original brave words from Ottawa about Canada's determination to make the ICCS really effective. Clearly, the ICCS was doomed to failure from the moment when it became evident that Canada was the only nation that took its mandate seriously.

Angered everyone

"The Poles and Hungarians have accused us of being arrogant," one official source remarked. "That's fair enough. We were determined from the start to show them we weren't going to be patsies. But it hasn't got us very far--except to make everyone mad at us."

There is a growing feeling in Ottawa that, once again, Washington has made patsies of us. It was always evident that the United States had named Canada to the ICCS without Ottawa's formal consent. It is now know that the United States assured Ottawa it had already gained formal consent from Indonesia, Poland and Hungary. Checking with the other three capitals, Canadian officials discovered this wasn't the case.

U.S. officials also assured Ottawa that they had made strenuous efforts to find another country willing to serve instead of Canada. After repeated prompting from Ottawa, Washington finally admitted that only one other country, Japan, had ever been considered.

In other words, Washington was always confident that Canada would fall into line, despite all the reservations
expressed in advance by Mr. Sharp and Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau.

In the face of such heavy-handed treatment, can Canada simply announce its intention to withdraw from the ICCS, giving a month's notice, as Mr. Sharp has suggested? In that case, Washington might well announce at the last moment that no replacement could be found, once more telling Ottawa "to do its duty."

Anticipating such an impasse, Ottawa is already giving thought to possible replacements for its ICCS contingent. It is hoped that Italy, Holland, Belgium or Brazil might agree to serve on a downgraded and virtually castrated ICCS for the sake of their bilateral relations with Washington.

Asians might agree

One or more Asian nations might be willing to take Canada's place for the sake of their own regional interests—and might just be acceptable to Hanoi. Among the possibilities are Malaysia, Singapore and even Pakistan.

But there is no great confidence that anyone will want to take over the Canadians' thankless task. Nor is there any great confidence that the Cabinet will announce our withdrawal as the futility of our ICCS role becomes increasingly evident to more and more Canadians.

According to political sources, the Cabinet is divided, with Energy Minister Donald S. Macdonald and Industrial Minister Allastair Gillespie opposing any withdrawal that would embitter U.S.-Canada relations at a time when delicate economic negotiations are pending.

Article #9
"Washington had Instructions for Canada' envoy: Pentagon Papers show Pearson went along with U.S. bombing
Paper: G&M/ 7/6/73:1 Byline: Charles Taylor

Lester Pearson told Lyndon Johnson in May 1964, that he would "personally understand" if the United States began nonnuclear bombing of North Vietnam, according to previously unpublished portions of the Pentagon Papers.

Mr. Pearson, Prime Minister of Canada at the time, gave the President this assurance during a 30-minute meeting in New York. It came nine months before the United States started bombing North Vietnam and three weeks before Blair Seaborn, Canada's delegate on the International Control Commission, made his first visit to Hanoi, bearing messages from Washington.

These portions of the Pentagon Papers describe in detail Canadian-U.S. co-operation in preparing Mr. Seaborn's trips to Hanoi and the extent to which Ottawa became an instrument of President Johnson's "carrot-and-stick" policy of diplomatic
overtures and military escalation.

Originally published in part by The New York Times and other newspapers in 1971, the Pentagon Papers were a top-secret study of the whole U.S. involvement in Vietnam from 1945 to 1967 prepared on the orders of former Defence Secretary Robert McNamara. Portions were made available to the newspapers by Daniel Ellsberg, a former Rand Corp. employee. Rand was a Government consultant under contract.

But the so-called diplomatic sections--describing the involvement of other countries--remained unpublished under a U.S. court injunction. Portions relating to Canada's role were made available to The Globe and Mail this week.

They include a State Department cable of May 30, 1964, describing the Pearson-Johnson meeting of two days earlier. The cable was signed by acting Secretary of State George Ball and sent to Henry Cabot Lodge, then U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam. The cable described Mr. Johnson's request to Mr. Pearson that Mr. Seaborn, soon to take up his duties in Saigon, should carry U.S. messages to Hanoi.

The cable reads in part: "President told Pearson that he wishes Hanoi to know, that while he is a man of peace, he does not intend to permit the North Vietnamese to take over Southeast Asia. He needs a confidential and responsible interlocutor to carry the message of U.S. attitudes to Hanoi. In outline the U.S. position there was some discussions of carrot-and-stick'.

"Pearson, after expressing willingness to lend Canadian good offices to this endeavor, indicated some concern about this (sic) nature of the 'sticks'. He stipulated that he would have great reservation about the use of nuclear weapons, but indicated that the punitive striking of discriminate targets by careful iron-bomb attacks would be 'a different thing.'

"He said he would personally understand our resort to such measures if the messages transmitted through the Canadian channel failed to produce any alleviations of North Vietnamese aggression, and that Canada would transmit messages around this framework."

The cable then told Ambassador Lodge about a meeting in Ottawa--also on May 28, 1964--between William Sullivan, a senior State Department official, and External Affairs Minister Paul Martin, Deputy Undersecretary of State for External Affairs Arnold Smith and Mr. Seaborn.

Readable assented to use

It said: "In Ottawa, Sullivan found much the same disposition among Canadian officials. While Foreign Minister Martin seemed a little nervous about the prospect of 'expanding the war,' External Affairs officials readily assented to the use of Seaborn as an interlocutor.

"Seaborn, who struck Sullivan as an alert intelligent and
steady officer, readily agreed to these conditions and has made immediate plans for an accelerated departure."

Brief mentions of the six Seaborn missions to Hanoi in 1964 and 1965 were made in the portion of the Pentagon Papers published in 1971. Responding to Opposition prodding, External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp told the House on June 17, 1971, that Mr. Seaborn acted as a channel of communication not as a direct representative of the U.S. Government.

Mr. Sharp denied that Canada knew of a U.S. intention to bomb North Vietnam, although Canada knew the contents of the messages carried by Mr. Seaborn.

The Pentagon Papers make it clear that Mr. Seaborn's first trip to Hanoi—in June, 1964—was especially important since he had an interview with North Vietnam Premier Pham Van Dong, and since President Johnson was making basic decisions in developing his "carrot-and-stick" approach to the war.

According to the Pentagon Papers, an elaborate program of covert military operations against the state of North Vietnam" began on Feb. 1, 1964, under the code name Operation Plan 43A. This was ordered by Mr. Johnson on the recommendation of Secretary McNamara.

These covert operations included flights by U-2 planes, kidnapping of North Vietnamese citizens for intelligence information, parachuting sabotage and psychological warfare teams into North Vietnam, commando raids from the sea to blow up rail and highway bridges and the bombardment of North Vietnamese coastal installation by PT boats.

Planning an overt war

At the same time, according to the Pentagon papers, President Johnson had begun planning to wage an overt war against North Vietnam.

The extent to which Ottawa was aware of either the covert operations or Mr. Johnson's plans for overt attack is not made clear in the papers. But communications between U.S. officials show an awareness that Canada might have some reservations about the stick part of President Johnson's policy.

On May 22, 1964---six days before Mr. Johnson and Mr. Pearson had their New York meeting—the State Department sent a cable to Ambassador Lodge in Saigon. It was marked "literally eyes only for ambassador from secretary" and it was signed by Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy.

The cable read, in part: "In light of present Canadian attitudes we tend to see real difficulty in approaching the Canadians at this time with any message as specific as you suggest, i.e., that Hanoi be told by the Canadians 'that they will be punished.' But we are keeping this in mind and will see whether we can go further, when we consult them next week, than the more general type of message stated in my 1821. As you can see, the more specific message might lead us into a
very difficult dialogue with the Canadians as to just what our plans really were."

It is clear from these new portions of the Pentagon Papers that Mr. Seaborn received a lengthy list of points to make in Hanoi, as well as a list of diplomatic and political evaluation that he was expected to subsequently transmit to Washington.

Another internal U.S. paper--headed Instructions for Canadian Interlocutor with Hanoi and dated June 1--gives an Outline of Subjects for Mr. Seaborn prepared by William Sullivan. The paper states that the outline was given to the Canadian Embassy in Washington on May 30.

Evaluation of mental outlook

The outline states that "the President wishes Hanoi to understand that he is fundamentally a man of peace. However, he does not intend to let the North Vietnamese take over all of Southeast Asia."

The outline says that aside from "establishing his credentials as a political personality who can and will deal with senior representative of the Hanoi regime," Mr. Seaborn "should also, by listening to the argument and observing the attitudes of the North Vietnamese, form an evaluation of their mental outlook. He should be particularly alert to (a) difference with respect to the Sino-Soviet split, (b) frustration of (sic) war weariness, (c) inclinations of North Vietnamese desire for contacts with the West, (d) evidences of cliques or factions in the Party of Government, and (e) evidence of differences between the political and the military.

"Mr. Seaborn should explore the nature and the prevalence of Chinese Communist influence in North Vietnam and perhaps through direct discussions with Soviet representatives, evaluate the nature and influence of the Soviets."

After listing other U.S. positions for Mr. Seaborn to convey, the outline concludes:

"In sum, the purpose of Mr. Seaborn's mission in North Vietnam would be an interlocutor with both active and passive functions.

"On the passive side he should report either observa-

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Pentagon Papers show war role
. From Page One

tions or direct communications concerning North Vietnamese attitudes towards extrication from or escalation of military activities.

"On the active side, he should establish his credentials
with the North Vietnamese as an authoritative channel of communications with the U.S. In each of these functions it would be hoped that Mr. Seaborn would assume the posture that the decision as to the further course of events in Southeast Asia rests squarely with Hanoi."

The same U.S. internal paper includes a Further Outline for Mr. Seaborn. It explains that "this further outline is based on the assumptions that (a) a U.S. decision has been taken to act against North Vietnam and (b) we plan to use 'carrots' as well as a 'stick' on Hanoi."

In the category of carrots, the further outline states that if Hanoi agreed to stop the war, the United States would send food assistance to North Vietnam, reduce controls on U.S. trade with North Vietnam and extend diplomatic recognition to Hanoi, among other measures.

But the further outline is quite clear about the stick. It states that "unless Hanoi stops the war within a specified time period (i.e. ceases all attacks, acts of terror, sabotage or armed propaganda or other armed resistance to government authority by the V.C.) the United States will initiate action by air and naval means against North Vietnam until Hanoi does agree to stop the war."

The Pentagon Papers do not make clear whether this further outline with its specific threat of bombing was ever given to Mr. Seaborn for transmission to Hanoi. But the U.S. internal paper states: "I believe that we would probably not wish to hand this further outline to the Canadian Government pending the initial soundings of the Canadian interlocutor in Hanoi pursuant to Mr. Sullivan's original set of instructions."

Reporting on his June, 1964, meeting in Hanoi with Premier Dong, Mr. Seaborn quoted Mr. Dong as saying he was glad to hear from Mr. Seaborn that the United States did not have aggressive intentions against North Vietnam and did not intend to attack it.

The Seaborn cable continues: "I corrected him at this point and said U.S.A. did not RPT not wish to carry war to north but might be obliged to do so if pushed too far by continuation of Viet Minh (sic)-assisted pressures in SVN. I repeated that U.S.A. patience was not RPT not limitless."

Mr. Seaborn's messages to Ottawa following his June visit to Hanoi are quoted in the Pentagon Papers. At one point Mr. Seaborn writes: "I expect to be seeing Mr. Lodge shortly after my return to Saigon (this tel is being drafted in plane en route from Hanoi) and will show him copy."

The messages make it clear that Mr. Seaborn conveyed all the points contained in the original outline of U.S. positions. He reported that from the tone of his conversations with the North Vietnamese Premier, "I believe Pham Van Dong has understood and accepted and perhaps welcomes my role as intermediary."

Mr. Seaborn also attempted to satisfy Washington's
request for specific information and impressions of North Vietnam's relations with China and the Soviet Union as well as the state of its economy and internal politics.

In general he was unable to give any hard information on any of these topics, but reported that he had found no evidence of feuding between political factions, war weariness or discontent among the people.

As well as reporting Pham Van Dong's statement on the war ("our people will go on struggling and resisting"), Mr. Seaborn gave his own assessment of North Vietnamese morale.

He said it would be unwise to count on Hanoi's jumping at a chance of reaching accommodation with the United States through war weariness or factionalism.

He concluded: "Prospect of war being carried to North may give greater pause for thought. But I would hesitant to say the DRVN (North Vietnam) are yet convince, despite U.S.A. public statements and moves and private msg I have conveyed, that USA really would be prepared to take this step, ultimate consequences of which would be start of World War III.

"I am also inclined to thing that DRVN leaders are completely convince that miliary action at any level is not RPT not good to bring success for U.S.A. and Govt. forces in SVN.

"They are almost as completely convince that Khanh Govt. (in Saigon) is losing ground on political front and are confident that in fullness of time success is assured for Liberation Front supported by DRVN."
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