

INFORMATION TO USERS

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN  
MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED

This copy was produced from a microfiche copy of the original document. The quality of the copy is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received.

Canadian Theses Division  
Cataloguing Branch  
National Library of Canada  
Ottawa, Canada K1A 0N4

AVIS AUX USAGERS

LA THESE A ETE MICROFILMEE  
TELLE QUE NOUS L'AVONS RECUE

Cette copie a été faite à partir d'une microfiche du document original. La qualité de la copie dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise pour le microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

NOTA BENE: La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer. Microfilmée telle que nous l'avons reçue.

Division des thèses canadiennes  
Direction du catalogage  
Bibliothèque nationale du Canada  
Ottawa, Canada K1A 0N4

POLITICS OF SURVIVAL AND CHANGE

POLITICS OF SURVIVAL AND CHANGE IN DOMINICA, 1763-1973:  
AN INTERPRETATION OF THE POLITICAL LIFE EXPERIENCE OF  
DOMINICANS IN THE COLONIAL AND POST-COLONIAL  
SITUATION

by

FRANCIS CARLTON GRELL, M.A.

A Thesis

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies

in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements

for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

McMaster University

March 1976

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (1976)  
(Political Science)

McMASTER UNIVERSITY  
Hamilton, Ontario

TITLE: Politics of Survival and Change in Dominica, 1763-  
1973: An Interpretation of the Political Life Experience  
of Dominicans in the Colonial and Post-Colonial Situation

AUTHOR: Francis Carlton Grell, B.A. (Iona College)

M.A. (McMaster University)

SUPERVISOR: Professor H. Aster

NUMBER OF PAGES: v, 372



## Abstract

This thesis on Dominica is the only study in the social sciences which deals extensively and exclusively with the life experience of Dominicans. The study has three interrelated purposes. It analyses and interprets the life experience of Dominicans as subjects of their own experiences rather than as objects or victims of colonial forces. It seeks to reveal to Dominicans that, despite their colonization, they have a positive identity of which they can be proud and which can be useful to them in the realization of their future aspirations. Finally, it argues consistently against more common metropolitan perspectives used in the analysis of Caribbean experience. The thesis attempts to accomplish these interrelated purposes by an examination of those significant activities in the Dominican life experience which have been directed towards human survival and change in the colonial situation.

Specifically, the study shows how Dominicans themselves, beginning with the slave period, through the emancipation era, the creation of political organizations, right up to the Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement, have acted constantly on their own behalf in order to achieve the dual objectives of survival and change.

Finally, given the emphasis of the thesis and because Dominica is probably the least studied Island in the British Caribbean, the study is considered a contribution not only to the understanding of Dominican political and social life, but also to Caribbean and general social science literature.

### Acknowledgement

It is impossible to thank by name the numerous Dominicans who made this study possible. Special thanks, however, must be given to the following Dominicans who during the State of Emergency in 1973 made time in their busy schedules for rather lengthy formal interviews: E.C. Loblack, Shand Allfrey, Franklin Baron, Artherton Martin, Julian Johnson, Charles Savarin, Anthony Joseph, Randolph Lockhart, Veronica Nicholas, Daniel Cauderion, Jeff Charles, Edward Royer, C.A. Augustus, and Rupert Sorhaïndo.

Special thanks also must be extended to Mrs. A. Riviere, the Chief Librarian of the Roseau Library, for her invaluable assistance in locating material and documents in the Government Archive; to Rev. Bro. Estrada, the Principal of the Saint Mary's Academy, for his collection on the "SMA Crisis"; to Rev. Father Prosemans, for without his expertise guidance and criticisms and his collection it would have been almost impossible to write Chapters III and IV; to Mr. Martin Sorhaïndo, General Secretary of the Freedom Party, for his access to memoranda and policy statements of the Freedom Party; to Desmond and Gregory Shillingford, leaders of the Black Power Movement for a New Dominica, for old newspaper issues and the Manifesto of the Movement; to the Hon. Minister Patrick John, Deputy Premier, for information on the Labour Party Government; to the Hon. L.I. Austin, Attorney General, for access to the Laws of Dominica, and to Mr. C. Seignoret, Permanent Secretary to the Premier for making available government releases and other information.

One of the author's foremost concerns is that this study must communicate its ideas and analyses primarily to a Dominican and Caribbean readership. This thesis could not have been written without the help and cooperation of all Dominicans. The Dominicans directly involved demonstrated one very important aspect of the Dominican character, namely that of hospitality and generosity, which was shown throughout this endeavour, notwithstanding an intolerable state of emergency in effect at the time.

Finally, special thanks to members of my dissertation Committee Professors, Howard Aster, Chairman, Peter Potichnyj and Marshall Goldstein for their encouragement and criticisms. None of these persons, however, are to be held responsible for errors or misinterpretation of fact that might be in the study.

## Table of Contents

	<u>Page</u>
Chapter I	INTRODUCTION..... 1
Chapter II	CONSTITUTIONAL-POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN DOMINICA..... 72
Chapter III	THE SLAVES AND THE MAROONS IN THE PLANTATION SITUATION..... 91
Chapter IV	THE BLACK AND MULATO DOMINICANS IN THE POST-EMANCIPATION SITUATION..... 140
Chapter V	THE UNIONS..... 187
Chapter VI	THE POLITICAL PARTIES..... 227
Chapter VII	THE MOVEMENTS..... 276
Chapter VIII	CONCLUSION..... 318
APPENDIX I	..... 336
APPENDIX II	..... 342
BIBLIOGRAPHY	..... 345

" A nation devoid of a sense of its history is not worthy of the name. A People blind to its past can have no claim to national pride. We need the torchlight of the past to illuminate the present and to guide us to the future. These thoughts are worthy of of serious considerations".

Alfred C. Leevy, "The Need to know  
our History". 1972

## Chapter I

### INTRODUCTION

This thesis, about Dominica and its people, has three interrelated purposes.<sup>1</sup> First, it analyzes and interprets the life experience of Dominicans as subjects of their own experiences rather than as objects or as victims of colonial forces. Secondly, it seeks to reveal to Dominicans that, despite their colonization, they have, in sharing the history of these experiences, the basis for a positive identity of which they can be proud and which can help "lay the foundation for the realization of future aspirations."<sup>2</sup> Thirdly, the study argues consistently against more common metropolitan perspectives used in the analysis of the Caribbean experience, for often these perspectives have treated West Indians as inferior people or as "insignificant colonials [who] did not make history but only endured it."<sup>3</sup> The thesis attempts to accomplish these interrelated purposes by an examination of those activities in the Dominican life experience which have been directed towards human survival and change in the colonial situation.

The thesis has one major limitation which must be explained; it does not directly treat Dominica as a colonial economic system. It is, however, possible to do so. It would entail centering on Dominica as a plantation unit, Dominicans as chattel or the means of plantation production, and Dominicans as part of a 'vertical' trading pattern within the West Indian colonial economic structure. It would mean unduly emphasizing the persistent poverty of Dominicans, the state of underdevelopment in Dominica and the resulting economic expansion in the British metropolitan centre. Finally, it would require emphasizing the factors for the foundation, development and preservation of the slave system itself.<sup>4</sup>

The author has, however, decided against this approach for two related reasons. First, he would have to understand and to analyze Dominicans primarily as economic instruments or colonial objects, and Dominica as basically a metropolitan outpost. Secondly, in so doing he would have to contribute to the one-sided negative images of Dominican (West Indian) cumulative experiences in the colonial situation or, more precisely, to their "colonial heritage."<sup>5</sup> Therefore, given the stated purposes of the thesis, the author has chosen instead to emphasize and to show how Dominicans, acting as subjects of their own experiences, have attempted to survive as human beings despite the colonial economic structure in Dominica. However, when the colonial economic structure becomes crucial to the analysis of Dominican survival, the pertinent aspects of the colonial economy will be emphasized as is evident, for instance, in Chapter III of the study.

In addition, from within the wide range of life experience of Dominicans, the author has selected certain activities which he views as most significant.<sup>6</sup> In this study, the author defines significant activities as those cooperative actions utilized by Dominicans themselves to prevent their dehumanization and which have been directed toward achieving survival and change in the colonial situation. By defining significant activities in this way, the author admits his understanding that the future independent survival of the Dominican people is dependent upon the collective and cooperative activities of all its people, both black and mulato Dominicans.

The above concern has provided the author with the basic guide for the selection of research materials, and for the logic and organization of the chapters in this work. The thesis, hence, explores various manifestations of the

Dominican people's collective violent, non-violent and protest activities during the 18th and 19th centuries. As well, the thesis examines other forms of purposive and collective activities undertaken by the Dominican people such as various political organizations, trade unions, political parties and movements. Throughout this work, the author is concerned to examine, explore, interpret and analyze those selected forms of the Dominican people's life experiences which reflect this notion of significant activity and which are or have been directed towards human survival and change. It should be noted at this point that the author utilizes a number of terms such as "revolt", "rebellion", and others which have had various conceptual and operational meanings.<sup>7</sup> In this work, these terms ought to be interpreted in terms of the author's concern with significant activities, that is to say, their meaning is derived from the perspective of the nature of the activities undertaken by the Dominican people themselves, rather than from some external source and, moreover, these terms are interpreted as purposive and collective actions directed at survival and change.

The remainder of this chapter is divided into three sections. Section I presents the perspective of the study. It specifically discusses the concepts of survival and change and makes clear their relation to the question of a positive identity. The section ends with a discussion of the problem of a positive identity.

Section II presents a brief analysis and a criticism of the comparative methodologies which dominate Caribbean social science research. This is done primarily because the perspective utilized in



the thesis departs from this Caribbean social science tradition. Furthermore, as the author's concern with the inappropriateness of these specific methodologies is also shared by other writers, additional criticisms of these methodologies, given by both prominent West Indian (Caribbean) social scientists and non-West Indian scholars doing Caribbean studies, are presented to help clarify the problems attending these comparative methodologies. In this section, the author also offers a critical view of Imperial history, provides a discussion of the question of objectivity in Caribbean social science, and explains how his own objective position is to be understood in the study.

Section III discusses the research methods of the study. The Introduction ends with a note on the ordering of subsequent chapters and with a brief outline of their basic contents.

## I.

### Survival and Change

The over-riding concern in this thesis is to examine, explore, interpret and analyze how the Dominican people themselves have acted in order to survive and to bring about change. At this point, it is necessary to clarify how the terms survival and change are utilized in this work. While, for analytical purposes the author will attempt to explicate them separately, he will nonetheless show that, in fact, they cannot be separated, for the Dominican people's activities directed for survival were most often the same activities as those directed towards change.

Survival, in this study, is understood as the Dominican

people's concern with and purposive, collective actions directed at the achievement of both biological and ontological existence in the colonial situation. Biological existence entails the Dominican people's attempts at "hanging on" or "staying alive."<sup>8</sup> Specifically, it is understood as comprising Dominican activities to provide the basic needs of life, such as food, clothing and shelter, especially in the harsh colonial conditions. Ontological existence entails the Dominican people's emphasis upon the religious, cultural and socio-political dimensions of living as a co-operative effort, of going beyond just "staying alive." It involves the co-operative attempt of people acting towards making better lives for themselves. Specifically, ontological survival is understood as the activities of the Dominican people aimed at preventing their de-humanization by harsh colonial forces. De-humanization here means the dual processes whereby people are made to believe that they cannot act other than as agents or adjuncts of someone else, that is to say, they cannot conceive or act as themselves; and secondly, it is the process whereby people's lives are reduced to a single struggle of simply "hanging on."<sup>9</sup> Thus in a positive sense, ontological survival is understood as the struggle by the Dominicans for the achievement of human freedom and dignity, or stated in other words, for the achievement through their collective actions of self definition as a people. In the modern period especially, ontological survival is understood as the activities of the Dominican people to make better lives for themselves and their society by creating organizations such as unions, political parties and political movements. The specific character of survival and change will become clearer in the substantive chapters which follow,

beginning with the slave period and moving in a progressive order to the recent Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement.

In these chapters it will be shown that the field slaves met the needs of their biological existence by taking great care in the cultivation of food in their allotted garden plots, while other slaves appropriated basic food stuffs from their masters.<sup>10</sup> The slaves concern with ontological survival was demonstrated in the emphasis they placed on religious and cultural aspects of their existence. Among these were general superstition and obeah, which involved the use of poisonous herbs and the belief in the supernatural power of the dead. From these forms the slaves derived a strength and gratification which allowed them to continue their human existence in the wretched plantation situation, for they believed that the use of these religious forms could have tangible effects on those whom they considered to be wicked slave masters.

In the specific case of the Maroon slaves, the question of survival and that of change was more closely linked and further broadened.<sup>11</sup> In addition to the religious-cultural and biological dimensions, the Maroons' emphasized further the social, political and linguistic dimensions of ontological survival. The social dimension included the introduction of camps with chiefs in control of the organization of Maroon family, economic and cultural life in the forests of Dominica. Its political aspect included the autonomous rule of chiefs over camp life and the acceptance of the Maroons to follow the strategies devised jointly by various chiefs in the struggle for fundamental change in the plantation system. Its linguistic form in the British plantation

system entailed the use of French and its subsequent patois derivation which provided a communication system frequently unknown to British masters but of immense value to the slave population. This communication network assisted the Maroons, particularly in the circulation of plans to subvert the plantation system, to bring about positive change in Dominica.

In addition to their struggle to subvert the plantation system and to terminate slavery, the Maroons attempted to reclaim Dominica as independent territory so that all black Dominicans and sympathetic mulattoes could use the lands and forests independently as free and dignified human beings. The human freedom the Maroons sought was contemporaneously articulated in the French Revolution and entailed the concepts of equality, dignity and brotherhood. These concepts were directly opposed to the *raison d'être* of the plantation system and the state of slavery which supported it. Black freedom in an independent Dominica was crucial to the Maroons' understanding of ontological survival.

In the post-emancipation period black Dominican survival was a concern with making human existence possible unfettered by colonial constraints.<sup>12</sup> It was partly for this reason that black Dominicans occupied Crown Lands as independent territory as a means to develop their human potential as free people. On these lands they built their houses and attempted to grow food stuffs either collectively or individually outside the plantation system and in a social environment which allowed them to be free human beings. The 1844 Rebellion demonstrated that black people were very concerned with their ontological survival. Thus, the rebellion

was fought because blacks believed that the colonial government wanted to return them to the state of slavery. The revolt of 1847 was fought, in part, to preserve the right to worship in the Catholic religion unhampered by discriminatory decisions of the white Anglican plantocracy.

The mulattoes' conception of survival and necessary change was closely related to their ontological existence. They were concerned with political autonomy and independence from the dominant white colonial plantocracies and freedom in order to develop Dominica as a non-colonial territory within the context of a broad West-Indian nation. In this respect the mulattoes of the post-emancipation period gave expression to a notion of Dominican nationalism that was anti-colonial in thrust and pro-West Indian nationhood in content. It was for this reason that the mulattoes once suggested to England that Dominica be sold to another power on the assumption that it might at least be possible for them to live as free human beings.<sup>13</sup>

The trade union organization itself has represented a form of black human survival.<sup>14</sup> While trade unionism arose in an attempt to rectify specific hostile economic conditions which have been directly connected to basic social deprivations, it has been more than that. In fact the union organization has been an expression and reflection of the collective human activity of black people to impress upon Dominican society that they are full-fledged members whose concerns with human existence extend beyond the narrow emphasis of having enough to eat. Thus the union represented a reservoir of collective strength and courage of black people to assert themselves, to express

their human rights as working people and to demand the respect of the rest of Dominican society. The organization has given demonstrable proof that "backward" black people can not only take care of their basic biological needs, but also can come together to rectify and to change conditions to allow them to live better lives.

The first popular political party developed as an extension of the union and represented a further commitment to carry forward the question of black human survival.<sup>15</sup> The political parties in general have provided more demonstrable proof that Dominicans want to see their own lives, affairs and ultimately their own destiny controlled by themselves. The black people in particular now could, through democratic means, place in office political leaders who promised not only to take care of their basic needs, but also to advance their ontological existence as well. The unions and parties have, however, only partially fulfilled these expectations. It is within this context and against this background of this partial fulfillment that the following three movements must be understood.<sup>16</sup>

The Student Movement has been concerned with change towards making their educational experience more meaningful and relevant to their own personal growth and identity and to Dominican development as well. The latter emphasis was demonstrated partially in the movement's fight to replace religious studies with that of agricultural science, considered infinitely more significant to the growth and betterment of Dominica.<sup>17</sup>

The Black Power Movement has highlighted the shortcomings of both the unions and especially the political parties. It has argued that the independent survival of Dominica depends not only on an

independent territory, but more precisely on one in which a suitable political culture can maximize human freedom and raise the standard of social, political and economic life of the dominant black majority especially. The movement has failed, however, because it has not developed a concrete ideology for change.

The Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement has been successful where the Black Power Movement has failed. The apparent success of the Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement resides in part in its recognition of both the limitations and the complexities of the black experience in Dominica. It understands, for instance, that black people, in the slave and post-emancipation period, developed cooperative activities in which human survival was a shared biological and ontological concern. This cooperation was expressed in the attempts by these Dominicans to deal with the question of human needs within a context which could best maximize independent human activity, as well as reflect their human dignity and freedom. The Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement has demonstrated this understanding in both its thought and action. The movement is also aware that while the unions and the parties have carried forward the struggle for both biological and ontological survival, they have seemingly arrived at an impasse. The movement, therefore, expresses a concern with the development of the potential for the complete human process of survival beyond the level developed by both these organizations.

In a sense, the concerns of the slaves, the Maroons, the black people in the emancipation period, the mulattoes, the unions, the parties, the Student Movement and Black Power Movement, have found recent

expression in the Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement. The intention of the Maroons to live together harmoniously governed by the principles of freedom, equality and brotherhood within and in control of an independent territory are factors which have also emerged in the Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement. The Maroons were partially successful in their quest. Since then, through the activities of Dominicans and their organizations, attempts have been made, albeit in various manifestations, to carry forward the Maroons' concern with independent survival in a free and decolonized Dominica. At this juncture in the Dominican life experience, the Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement is the latest in a progression of activities guided towards the goal of independent survival in Dominica.

Given the link between the concepts of survival and change it is necessary at this point to elaborate the way in which 'change' is utilized in the thesis. Lewis Coser has discussed the relationship between violent conflict and change.<sup>18</sup> He presents a framework in which it is possible to discuss the general character of change in Dominica, especially at the political and structural levels. If this framework is utilized, change in Dominica, from slavery to its present condition as a semi-independent state, could be described as minor or insignificant, for there has been little or no drastic or fundamental reconstruction or transformation of some of the colonial structures and institutions in the Island. There has been some innovations and adaptation, but at the institutional and constitutional level there has been much continuity between past and present. This is manifested by easily discernable aspects of a persistent colonial heritage and a



dependency complex, particularly at the governmental level. In this sense, the abolition of slavery did not result in the end of the old power structures and institutions, nor in the birth of new and indigenous political forms.

The utilization of Coser's framework, however, is only one way to understand and view change in Dominica. A far more productive, interesting and meaningful way is to comprehend and appreciate the contributions that Dominicans themselves have made to change within the Island, especially as it is linked to the question of human survival. In short, we must be prepared to look at the activities of the people involved and not only at mere changes in colonial political structures and institutions.

Change is therefore viewed in this study as the Dominican activities which seek to alter, transform, modify, eradicate, destroy and subvert colonial institutions, structures and conditions which threaten Dominican human survival. Change is also understood, in a more positive meaning, as the activities which seek to introduce, create, and develop new institutions, organizations, movements and conditions which promote and contribute to Dominican human survival. Hence, survival and change are necessarily linked together.

### The Problem of Identity

The question of identity is of immense concern to Third World Countries and in this regard the Commonwealth Caribbean is no exception. Hugh Springer, a well respected West Indian scholar, states the West Indian problem of identity in these terms: "Indeed, we still... are unsure

of ourselves... still trying to discover what we are like... what is the essence of our West Indianness."<sup>20</sup> To the Black Power Movement in Dominica the problem remains a constant, burning issue.<sup>21</sup> When the Dominica Chronicle of July 1, 1972, headlined "Caribbean Identity Search Vital," it was simply giving expression to a generally unspoken but real concern in the Caribbean. Yet so far there has been no serious analysis, proper conceptualization, or productive perspective coming from among those who are concerned, including the Black Power intellectuals.

Rex Nettleford, a well known West Indian intellectual, has correctly noted that there is a link between a sense of identity and a consideration of the question of independence and Caribbean nation building.<sup>22</sup> This sense of identity of which Nettleford speaks cannot rest, however, upon a set of negative images which contribute to a negative identity.<sup>23</sup> In West Indian writing there is a plethora of negative images. Gordon Lewis, a prominent scholar of Caribbean affairs, provides an example when he states "...that slavery still permeates much of the Caribbean communal psychology; that Caribbean person is in his cultural self schizoid; that colonization has stripped the colonized West Indian bare of self respect from which he has developed a chronic inferiority complex."<sup>24</sup>

While negative images will not suffice, at the same time nor will a "prefabricated" identity serve the purpose of independence or nation building. The identity about which the author speaks must be located in the sum of West Indian and Dominican experiences. It entails, in outline form, four dimensions. (1) "Who are we? This will require an examination of the present state and conditions of both the Dominican society and

its people. (2) "Where did we come from?" This will entail the development of a productive, useful perspective on Dominican historical experience. (3) "How did we participate in the transition and change processes of the society from the past to the present?" This requires a realistic, appreciative, and critical analysis of indigenous strategies and activities in which Dominicans have engaged. (4) "Where are we going?" This entails a committed concern with the future of Dominican independent survival.

In their own individual ways, Springer, The Chronicle, and the Black Power Movement are interested in a positive identity. "Identity... contains a complementarity of past and future both in the individual and in the society; it links the actuality of a living past with that of a promising future."<sup>25</sup> While the dimensions of the question of identity which the author has explicated can be reconciled with Erikson's understanding of positive identity, there are at least three current perspectives which cannot be readily reconciled and can even prove misleading. These are Elkin's socialization perspective, the cultural nationalists' 'myth creation' perspective, and what can be termed Fanon's collective violent strategy. They are discussed in turn.

Stanley Elkins, in his work Slavery: A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual Life, has derived some astonishing conclusions about black American life and identity.<sup>26</sup> His study was developed within a socialization perspective adapted from the work of Bruno Bettelheim on personality disintegration and alteration in German concentration camps.<sup>27</sup> Socialization theory in general stresses the importance of environmental forces on personality and identity formation, and emphasizes the dominance of environmental factors over

genetic characteristics. The theory, as Elkins understood it, is that once an identity is created in a 'closed system' such as slavery, it is transmitted indefinitely--- unless consciously halted --- from generation to generation.

From Elkins' perspective one is told how the black "sambo" type was created by the American plantation socialization processes which were most harsh and uncompromising.<sup>28</sup> Then Elkins purports to explain how the black "sambo" personality has tended to persist in the American system. In his perspective, black slave rebellions are characterized as abnormal activity, and the Nat Turner Revolt is seen as "aimless butchery."<sup>29</sup> Elkins does not conceive of slave rebellions as liberation activity but rather as rash acts of desperation, divorced from strategy and political meaning.

American black intellectuals have regarded Elkins' work as a chauvinistic enterprise of poor taste and worse logic.<sup>30</sup> The socialization perspective, as adopted by Elkins is simply not congruent with American black experience. For example, it fails to explain why most black Americans do not fit into this commonly accepted definition of "sambo." As well, it fails to treat seriously the slaves' plans and coherent activities expressed in their rebellions against the slave system. The brutal fact remains that Elkins' socialization perspective, by its very assumptions and internal logic, leads to predetermined and set conclusions. In effect, it was not possible for Elkins to arrive at any other conclusion about black identity, its creation and transmission, given the assumptions and internal logic of his socialization theory. There is little doubt that a combination of this kind of

socialization theory with traditional plantation data will lead to the pessimistic, negative images of black identity of the "sambo" type. Such a perspective could produce a similarly distorted image of Dominican identity.

Positive identity cannot, on the other hand, result from an embellishment of historical material, or from what the author can label as 'myth creation.' The Cultural Nationalist Movement, a component of the broad black power movement in the 1960's, has approached the black identity question in American history by creating myths of their black leaders. In the movement's accounts, for instance, of Nat Turner, Denmark Vesey, and Gabriel Proser, leaders of slave rebellions, these men's activities are invariably embellished at the expense of productive and critical analysis. Because of this embellishment, it becomes almost impossible for these black leaders and their activities to make a useful contribution to the understanding of the question of black identity, or to contribute meaningfully to the black liberation struggle with which this movement says it is concerned.<sup>31</sup>

The question of black identity cannot therefore be dealt with in a perspective which creates distorted images and myths. In fact, it demands that one comes to grips with a people's life experience in a sensible, revealing and purposeful way. In the Dominican and Caribbean context it requires that while West Indians can be most critical of the material produced in imperial history, they do not have the right to correct it by creating as an alternative a bastardized version of that history. To create myths in the tradition of the Cultural Nationalist Movement, for example, concerning the Dominican Maroons, or

the Dominican masses in the post-emancipation period, is a time-consuming luxury which can serve no productive end.

Frantz Fanon in Black Skin White Mask utilizes a Hegelian paradigm to develop a thesis in order to explain how the colonized slave identity is a result of a master-slave relationship in the colonial environment.<sup>32</sup> In Wretched of the Earth he provides a most radical strategy to destroy the identity created for the slave - the colonized by the master - the colonizer.<sup>33</sup> This strategy purports to end colonial oppression, dehumanization, and exploitation, and simultaneously enables the colonized to reclaim both his manhood and his territory. The strategy enables colonized people collectively to come to a new awareness of self and a new collective identity as free people in an independent territory. This strategy advocates the systematic utilization of collective violence by the dispossessed against the colonizer. In this revolutionary process two ends are served; the colonized, in killing the colonizer, destroys his physical oppressor, and, more importantly, destroys the negative self-definition created and instilled in him by the colonizer for his exploitation. The positive end of this revolutionary undertaking is the emergence of a new self identity for those who were formerly colonized.

To people who are undergoing a colonial experience, the 'magic-like' quality with which Fanon has endowed the concept of violence is most satisfying and appealing. In a more serious vein, however, he presents us with some real, concrete problems in dealing with the quest for identity. Even if we dispense with the feeling that Fanon expects us to accept his revolutionary strategy on faith, we are

still left with some serious concerns which Fanon himself addresses indirectly. Towards the end of The Wretched of the Earth one finds that the use of violence by the dispossessed in the colonial environment can bring to the fore some previously unconscious psychological and emotional problems.<sup>34</sup> In other words, such violence may create and trigger off more problems than it can necessarily solve. As to the cleansing and cathartic power of Fanon's revolutionary violence, which allows for the emergence of the new collective self-identity, it can be argued that there is no empirical validation of this strategy's effectiveness to date.<sup>35</sup>

In the present search for a Dominican identity the mere adoption of Fanon's violent strategy would serve no useful purpose. The Black Power advocates of collective violence in Dominica seem unaware, for instance, of the problems that can result from the use of this revolutionary violent strategy in the post-colonial situation. At this juncture, the advocacy of violence in the creation of a black identity, in the liberation of black Dominicans and in the struggle for independent survival in Dominica, would simply be a gimmick - a diversionary tactic - to hide an inability to properly utilize the philosophy and ideas of Fanon, and to deal pragmatically and realistically with the problems which confront Dominican identity and future independent survival.

Finally, the thesis is offered as an alternative perspective to those already discussed, and which by its emphasis on survival and change deals positively with the question of a Dominican identity.

## II

Comparative Methodologies: Caribbean Social Science

The systems approach in the Easton tradition and the developmental methodology in the Almond-Coleman tradition, have become the dominant methodologies in West Indian Political Studies. Edward Greene a political scientist at the University of the West Indies, not only supports this statement but is also correct when he asserts that these studies show an absolute neglect of "theories and models which describe, explain and permit prediction with special reference to the problems of change and decolonization."<sup>36</sup> While Green, himself, engages in studies of electoral behaviour in the traditional mode of North American Political Science, his views about the discipline in the Caribbean, nonetheless, support the author's concern with, and criticisms of, systems analysis, developmental models, and pluralism as developed by M. G. Smith, a leading West Indian Sociologist.<sup>37</sup> The author briefly examines each of these methodologies in turn.

Firstly, the basic emphasis of systems analysis is how a political system maintains and supports itself. It is in a specific sense, a concern with the way in which political inputs, actions, demands and supports are converted by the processes in a political system into decisions and policies, called outputs. These outputs or feedback in turn affect the inputs and help maintain the stability and equilibrium of the political system. Its chief exponent, David Easton, adds: "What I am suggesting here is that support resting on a sense of the legitimacy of a government and regime provides a necessary reserve if the system is to weather those frequent storms.... Answers to questions concerning



the formation, maintenance, transmission, and change of standards of legitimacy will contribute generously to an understanding of the way in which support is sufficiently institutionalized so that a system may regularly and without excessive expenditure of effort transform inputs of demand into outputs of decisions."<sup>38</sup> Given the particular interest demonstrated by Easton it is obvious that any study utilizing this model in the context of the colonial experience could, indeed, show how the colonial system did tend to persist, and logically demonstrate a concern with the stability and equilibrium of the slave system itself. Given this, the model is therefore considered inappropriate for an understanding of the internal processes of change in the struggles for decolonization by West Indian people themselves.

Secondly, the developmental model is generally interested in modernization and progress, using a comparative measure as a yardstick for analysis. "Progress is toward greater similarity of values, norms and structures, to those of the Western World."<sup>39</sup> The basis for comparison is usually by the standard of a developed country, in some cases, by the standard of the country which has been involved in the colonization of the developing country under study. Thus, "modern means being Western without the onus of dependence on the West."<sup>40</sup> Little or no emphasis is placed on the internal dynamics or forces for change within the society under study. So, it is not possible within this particular framework to begin to comprehend the parameters, dimensions, and indigenous factors that make possible internal development. This is a problem which is becoming more and more understood in

the developing countries themselves. For example, even in the area of communication, CADEC, a prominent regional agency, has cautioned Caribbean countries "against accepting a new communication development strategy just because it was recommended by developed countries." Similarly, the Dominican Developmental Plan 1971-1975 says: "...that the solution to the nation's developmental problems...cannot be sought in terms of an imitative application of a foreign model."<sup>41</sup>

In a crude sense, then, developmental theories may lead to development by imitation, or "that ultimately development is in the direction of greater comparability with political systems of the Western World."<sup>42</sup> In response, Frantz Fanon has forcefully argued, "We know we do not want to catch up with anyone. What we want to do is go forward all the time, night and day in the company of all men. So, comrades, let us not pay a tribute to Europe by creating states, institutions, and societies which draw their inspiration from her. Humanity is waiting for something from us other than an imitation which will almost be an obscene caricature. If we want to turn Africa into a new Europe, and America into a new Europe, then let us leave the destiny of our country to Europeans. They will know how to do it better than the most gifted among us. If we wish to live up to our people's expectations we must seek to respond elsewhere than in Europe."<sup>43</sup> In short, "Let us decide not to imitate Europe.... No, we do not want to catch up with anyone."<sup>44</sup> The imperatives of developmental models cannot be easily reconciled with Fanon's acute observations nor, obviously, with the author's analysis.

Thirdly, the shortcomings of the concept of pluralism can be adequately illustrated by an understanding of the problem of the internal-colonial situation of blacks in the United States. Pluralism cannot deal with the question of decolonization. The author takes as a reference point the thought of the leading American exponent of the pluralist model, Robert Dahl, to demonstrate the deficiencies of the model, as it substantively relates to the black condition and the struggle for change.<sup>45</sup>

For the purposes of this study, the first relevant point of the pluralist model emphasizes that various important questions lie beyond the reach of both government and electorate and rest in the hands of semi-public decision making bodies. This is considered unfortunate precisely because some of the questions which are regarded as routine issues, non-political and unimportant, and consequently relegated to the semi-public decision making bodies for adjudication, are very important political questions for blacks, demand government action and should be dealt with in the political arena.

The pluralist model also stresses that all antagonistic groups have the opportunity to present their case at some point in the decision making process. According to the model, no legitimate group is permanently excluded from deliberation. It is clear that blacks have tried throughout their history to seek opportunities to present their case in the decision making process. It is equally clear that issues of vital importance to the black citizen are not considered compelling, or legitimate enough by the white majority as to be allowed to reach the public agenda. Lowi says that the American system has so evolved

that established interest groups enjoy built-in stable relations with government institutions that do not favour unestablished groups.<sup>46</sup>

Gamson reinforces this position by arguing that the system normally operates either to prevent out-groups from organizing politically, or tries to block their entry into the competitive decision making process if they become organized.<sup>47</sup> In the American political experience, blacks have apparently been sealed into a permanent minority category by this arrangement. This has led Greensberg to conclude that blacks have been heard, but the reality is that their voices have made little or no visible difference.<sup>48</sup> On these grounds the model fails, for blacks have been denied entry to the political decision making process and have not been accepted as a legitimate body in the American political system.

Further, according to the pluralist model, the policy process is incremental; that is, change is gradual and consistent with earlier policy. This procedure does not fundamentally alter the basic social, economic and political arrangements in the society. This, it must be argued, is a major weakness of the model, for the nature of the black colonial problem demands fundamental and radical institutional and structural changes in the economic, political and social sectors. Pluralism in this form may make collective violence in one form or another the only viable recourse left open to blacks to effect real decolonization. Thus incrementalism is misguided, for it attempts to ask blacks to continue to suffer colonial oppression and to accept insignificant and gradual change.

In the Caribbean context, pluralism is a feature of the comparative approach and even its chief exponent, M.G. Smith, is cognizant of some of its shortcomings. He says: "Systematic study of the British West Indies is a recent development, hence the slenderness of the sociological literature and dependent character. This dependent character reflects the fact that hitherto most of the researches in this area have been conducted by visiting social scientists from the United States or Britain, and have been guided by theories and themes of interest developed in studies of societies and cultures outside the British Caribbean. It has not been entirely fortuitous that studies of the British Caribbean reflect theories and themes of interest developed in the study of societies outside this area." <sup>49</sup>

In spite of his awareness of these problems, Smith has, nonetheless, persisted in using it. Among his many critics, Lewis and Greene are far less charitable towards this model. Lewis points out that; "The difficulty with this theory is that as an explanation of the complex interaction between class, race and culture in the West Indian society it fails at too many points to fit the observable facts." <sup>50</sup> Similarly, Greene adds, "For political scientists, the dissatisfaction with the model is mainly because of its failure to fully explore the political implications of cultural norms and social relationships. The basic controversy revolves around the true relationship between cultural difference and social stratification." <sup>51</sup>

For Smith, however, these two factors of cultural difference and social stratification vary independently: "Cultural pluralism is a special form of differentiation based on institutional divergencies." <sup>52</sup>

Two other scholars, Lloyd Braithwaite and Raymond Smith disagree. They argue that pluralism and class stratification are positively correlated because they see a wide area of shared values among different social strata in West Indian societies.<sup>53</sup> This formulation is, however, diametrically opposed to Smith's major hypothesis that: "Given the fundamental differences of belief, value and organization that connote pluralism, the monopoly of power by one cultural section is the essential precondition for the maintenance of the total society in its current form."<sup>54</sup>

It must be pointed out that the differences in fundamental belief, values and organization among the various strata in colonial societies highlight the impossibility of collective activity on the part of these groupings to implement change of benefit to the entire society. Secondly, the concern with the maintenance of the total society in its current form is reminiscent of the focus of systems theory and its failure to accommodate the concept of indigenous change processes within the context of the colonial situation.

Many West Indian intellectuals, and others, have recognized the pitfalls, limitations and problems of comparative social science methodologies in the study of West Indian and colonial societies. Some of these scholars have addressed also the problems of objectivity and commitment in their criticism of comparative approaches. These criticisms have been developed by scholars from a variety of disciplines, among them, George Beckford, an economist, Archie Singham, a political scientist, Orlando Patterson, a sociologist, and two other non-West Indian social scientists, David Lowenthal and Gordon Lewis.

George Beckford, a West Indian scholar, in his Persistent Poverty, has dealt with all three questions --- comparative approaches, objectivity, and commitment. He says, "Too often we view our problems through the eyes of metropolitan man; and our analysis of these problems depend too inordinately on the analytical constructs developed for, and appropriate to, North Atlantic society but which may be inappropriate for the Third World. Even our pattern of research and style of presentation suffer on this account. No apology is necessary for directing the book to a Third World readership. It is true that others may find it helpful, but it is obvious that Third World problems can be solved only by Third World peoples. We alone have the basic understanding of our problems and the necessary commitment to overcome them." <sup>55</sup>

In addressing the question of objectivity, Beckford recognizes that his work challenges, in its philosophical orientation, the time honoured myths of the plantation, and that his style of presentation is "a kind of break with traditional academic work." He argues that, "What we need most are studies pregnant with ideas, not studies full of sterile detail. Ideas are what help people to understand problems and to pursue further inquiry." He continues: "Yet another consideration is that traditional social science scholarship operates under the veil of 'objectivity'. How human beings can engage in anything which is objective is really beyond my comprehension. Worst of all is human activity. As Myrdal has suggested, real objectivity in social science research is achieved by explicitly stating the value premises on which a study is based." <sup>56</sup>

Beckford makes his value premises explicit in articulating his

sense of commitment. "The valuations through the present book are clearly those of a Third World writer. In this connection, I wish to make it clear from now... I refer to the improvement of the welfare of Third World peoples... in my view genuine independence --- that is the full freedom of a people to control the environment in which they live... I feel certain that all people wish to be independent. To have to be dependent on others is dehumanizing... people would rather be poor but free than to be slaves in material comfort."<sup>57</sup> Beckford's treatment of comparative approaches, and especially the questions of objectivity and commitment, as the author will show later, substantively reflects his own concern with these issues.

Archie Singham in The Hero and the Crowd in a Colonial Polity, has written a minor classic on the politics of a small island, specifically the politics of Eric Gairy and the Grenadian masses.<sup>58</sup> He complements Beckford's position in his own approach to the study of West Indian societies. Singham states that scholars who have studied West Indian colonial polities "adopt, either consciously or unconsciously, the methodological assumptions of metropolitan writers." In addition, "the systematic study of colonial societies has been undertaken almost entirely by metropolitan scholars. While there are different traditions, each reflecting the emphasis of the particular power involved, almost all metropolitan scholars have examined the colony from the point of view of the metropolis, no matter whether the basic point of departure has been Marxist, or to justify imperialism."<sup>59</sup>

Singham is also critical of many of the economic and political studies written about these colonial territories which utilize comparative



methodologies. On the economic question he says: "The economic consequences of colonial domination have been most thoroughly analyzed, and have been heavily influenced by the Marxian tradition. In spite of this orientation, the tendency has often been to view these consequences from the standpoint of the imperial society...."<sup>60</sup> With respect to political historians in the British tradition, he says that, "They have tended to stress the importance of political institutions and the role played by them in the evolution of colonial societies. These studies have reflected the biases of the 'constitutional' school which has made political development synonymous with constitutional development, and the tendency of British colonial rule to specify the stages of constitutional development in relation to how much power the colony was 'prepared for.'"<sup>61</sup> One conclusion Singham correctly draws is that "...colonial politicians measured their own esteem by the standards set by the Colonial Office."<sup>62</sup> Subsequently, "This has led to a considerable amount of competition among the various colonies themselves, with local politicians stressing the advanced character of their societies in relation to more backward colonies. Within the British West Indies the uneven course of constitutional development resulted in considerable bitterness and jealousy among the various territories."<sup>63</sup> For example, the most obvious manifestation of this rivalry among the various former colonies may be seen in the case of the ill-fated West Indian Federation, 1959-1961.

Orlando Patterson, in Sociology of Slavery partly reflects Singham's concern with the focus of the colonial-political historian, when he states: "There are the scholarly though often tedious works of

those historians who have concentrated almost exclusively on the constitutional development of the islands." He adds that it is not "difficult to understand why the tradition would have been so faithfully preserved by the recently emerged bourgeois intelligentsia of the formerly enslaved negro population. This is merely an indication of the effectiveness of the process of mystification which has had three hundred years of British colonial rule within which to consolidate and impose its crippling influence."<sup>64</sup>

Finally, the limitations and pitfalls of these various comparative methodologies have been recognized by some non-West Indian scholars, especially those who have a concern for the welfare of West Indian people, for example, David Lowenthal and Gordon Lewis. Lowenthal notes: "In the West Indies, as in any other former colonies, nationalism and the search for identity today seem to require local, not foreign interpreters. The work of metropolitan social scientists may be dismissed as irrelevant even when it is not condemned as imperialist. In the West Indies, as elsewhere, there are indeed things only an insider can know, approaches only an insider can take...."<sup>65</sup> Lewis adds, "...it has been so much a part of the colonial burden for him (the West Indian) to read about himself in books written by the expatriate and the outsider, in a relationship in which, to use Manier's term, he is supposed to be civilized by those types playing the role of his instituteur social, that it seems inexcusable to add yet another title to the list."<sup>66</sup> These views, of Lowenthal, Lewis and the others, as mentioned earlier, have been presented partly because these writers share the author's concerns with comparative methodologies, and as a means

to provide additional clarification of the problems attending the use of comparative methodologies in Caribbean social science.

Imperial history can also be considered in part as an aspect of comparative studies, in so far as the imperial historian studies the colonial territory and its people with tools devised in, biases emanating from, and from a view-point peculiar to the metropolitan country. In fact, it can be argued he invariably writes the history of the metropolitan country engaged in imperial practices and in exploitation of the colonial territory and its people. Orlando Patterson and Frantz Fanon have dealt precisely with this issue. Patterson says that the West Indian historical tradition is made up primarily of imperial history, with few noteworthy exceptions. He adds: "There are the large number of works by scholars of imperial history to whom the islands are of significance only in so far as they represented the platform upon which European powers thrashed out their imperial differences." <sup>67</sup> Fanon is even harsher in his characterization of the imperial historian. He says: "The history he writes is not the history of the country which he plunders but the history of his own nation in regards to all that he skims off, all that she violates and starves." <sup>68</sup>

Even a cursory examination of the chapter headings in the History of the British West Indies written by the noted British historian, Sir Allan Burns, indicates the traditional content and focus of "West Indian" history. Chapter headings read, "The End of the Stuart Period", "The Restoration" and so forth. <sup>69</sup> As a high school teacher, the author participated in the presentation of West Indian history in

imperial categories, and in this context he found himself treating the English buccaneers John Hawkins and Francis Drake as West Indian heroes. Yet, these were the men who had subjected black West Indians to untold suffering in the dreadful Middle Passage. Given that the West Indian historical tradition has been dominated by imperial history, it is not surprising that native West Indians not only subscribe to it, but even write about their islands in imperial terms. For example, the West Indian historians Cecil Goodridge and Joseph Boromé treat and conceive of "Dominican" history in an imperial perspective. One simply has to read Boromé's "Spain and Dominica" and "The French and Dominica"; and Goodridge's "The French Connexion" to realize how entrenched the imperial historical perspective remains in West Indian scholarship.<sup>70</sup>

Even when imperial historians focus on the native peoples in the colonial situation, the results have often been equally dismaying. They invariably present images, descriptions and characterizations of these native peoples which highlight their miserable plight. They often show that these colonial deprivations are a result of the native peoples' innate and often deficient character. For example, Thomas Atwood, the British historian has written the only "history" of Dominica to date, a work that is presently serialized in the Dominica Social Welfare Bulletin as "genuine" Dominican history. In the work Atwood characterizes black Dominicans in slavery as "beasts" and says: "Show me a negro and I will show you a thief."<sup>71</sup> Joseph Ragatz, whose book is sometimes considered by many West Indian scholars as a classic study of the slave plantation system, has described black West Indians as follows: "The West Indian negro had all the characteristics of his race, he stole, he lied, he was

simple, suspicious, inefficient, irresponsible, lazy, superstitious and loose in his sex relations." <sup>72</sup> Another American scholar recently concluded that Dominicans were naturally lazy. <sup>73</sup>

Monteil, in "The Decolonization of the Writing of History", responds to the comparative emphasis and the nature of imperial history with both a critical viewpoint and a solution. He says: "Since Europe and American have become aware of the Third World, and since Africa and Asia have become aware of their situation (in the Sartrean sense of the word) and of their relationship to the rest of the world, it has become common place to ask whether all of African or Asian history ought not to be redone. Because of the internal contradictions of colonialism, has not the history of 'colonial' peoples been falsified, and does it not remain falsified, mutilated, and consequently almost unusable? The superiority complex of the white man, the exclusive custodian of civilization --- theirs, the only one there is, sometimes called 'Christian', sometimes called 'Western' --- has not this attitude of superiority led the white population to reject a priori anything whose sources, facts, or opinions bear the hallmark of an indigenous origin? In short, has history been decolonized? And if not, what has been done thus far, and what more can be done about it?" Monteil continues, "The first solution, of course, is to produce a national history, established and published by Africans or Asians, a history often treated by its editors as a kind of committed history --- sometimes even as a 'thesis' to be defended." <sup>74</sup> Then, addressing himself to the role of the Third World intellectual, Monteil points out, "Intellectuals should study the past, not for the pleasure of doing so, but for the

purpose of learning valuable lessons." Monteil is pleased that some Third World intellectuals are concerned with decolonization history. For instance he says, "We are happy to see an African come to grips with his own problems and are thus prepared to give him an attentive and sympathetic hearing. Accordingly, we discover with interest echoes of the author's own personal experience." He laments, and correctly so, that "Unfortunately, such passages are all too rare." <sup>75</sup> As a citizen of Dominica, the author is sympathetic towards Monteil's position.

Finally, it must be understood that it is possible for an historian to indeed make a valuable contribution to colonial studies. Ballandier, in his article "The Colonial Situation: A Theoretical Approach", sums up the possibility well. "The historian examines the various periods of colonization with respect to the colonial power. He enables us to grasp the changes that occur in the existing relationships between that power and its territorial dependencies. He shows us how the isolation of colonial peoples was shattered by a caprice of history over which these peoples had no control. He evokes the ideologies which, at different times, have been used to justify colonialism and have created the 'role' adopted by the colonial power, and he reveals the discrepancies separating facts from theories. He analyzes the administrative and economic systems which have guaranteed 'colonial peace' and permitted economic profit (for the metropole) from the colonial enterprise. In short, the historian makes us understand how, in the course of time, the colonial power implanted itself in the heart of its colonial societies. Acting in this manner he furnishes the sociologist

with his first indispensable frame of reference. He reminds the sociologist that the history of a colonial people has developed as a result of a foreign presence while at the same time he elucidates the different aspects of the latter's role and influence."<sup>76</sup>

### The Question of Objectivity

In the preceding section concerning Caribbean Social Science, the question of objectivity was dealt with critically in the context of comparative methodologies. Frequently objectivity has been understood as synonymous, or closely integrated with the metropolitan viewpoint. Beckford has presented a critical view of precisely this point. While Atwood, Ragatz and Clarke, for instance, openly make derogatory statements about the native people in the colonial situation, their point of view and their analyses have been considered objective studies. Part of the explanation lies in the fact that these studies were conducted by metropolitan scholars utilizing comparative approaches, and their works were read and appraised by metropolitan critics who apparently shared the same biases and prejudices.

It is obvious that the views held by metropolitan intellectuals on what is objective scholarship are not views shared by Third World writers of colonial countries concerned with the same matters. One simply has to read the works of Orlando Patterson, Elsa Gorveia, or C.L.R. James and compare them to those of T. Atwood, Sir Allan Burns or Madeline Kerr to realize the significant difference in viewpoints.<sup>77</sup> These two sets of writers --- one group approaching the colonial situation from an

Indigenous perspective, the other from a metropolitan, comparative perspective --- present radically different views about the colonial situation. Yet too often the metropolitan view point alone is called objective.

The author agrees with Beckford in part that the problem of objectivity can be 'solved' given this situation by stating explicitly the limitations, the value assumptions and perspective of a study. Concretely, for a Third World intellectual interested in and writing about the colonial experience, objectivity requires a real acceptance of the havoc that the colonial forces have wreaked on native people, or the way "it overturned in a brutal manner the history of the people it subjugated."<sup>78</sup> First, objectivity demands an acknowledgement of the colonial situation and, secondly, it requires that the Third World intellectual makes explicit his perspective and his approach. He may state that he views the situation not from the comparative standpoint of the metropolitan country, but from one originating within the experience of the native people in the colonial situation; his is to be considered, therefore, an indigenous standpoint, or, a view from the "bottom up." The Third World intellectual explains that he is attempting to understand the people not as objects of colonial forces but as subjects of their own experiences. Thus an analysis of the West Indian and Dominican societies from such an indigenous point of view will lead inevitably to a presentation of images different from Atwood's, as well as offer an alternative conception of the native peoples' experiences.



So much has been written in this regard in the name of "objective" history and "analysis" that Lowenthal and Comitas, for instance, in Slaves, Free Men, Citizens, see a burden for West Indian people in those terms: "To come to terms with the constraints of their history is a formidable task for a people long taught that, as insignificant colonials, they did not make history but only endured it."<sup>79</sup> In this respect West Indians have been made to suffer from "objective" works which were in fact no more than inexplicit, comparative metropolitan perspectives and analyses. Objectivity therefore demands making explicit the vantage point and perspective utilized. In this sense, an indigenous, but nonetheless, objective perspective would demonstrate that while West Indians and Dominicans in particular did not make history in the European or North American sense, they did make history which can be demonstrated objectively, in a non-comparative perspective.<sup>80</sup> It is obvious, nevertheless, that as long as "objectivity" remains an exclusive property of metropolitan research, that West Indians will have to continue to read of themselves as "insignificant colonials."

Black intellectuals during the black American revolt in the 1960's partially exploded this myth that objectivity was the exclusive property of metropolitan research. For instance, these black intellectuals refused to accept any further the usual white metropolitan historian's characterizations of the Nat Turner rebellion in 1831, and the Denmark Vesey and Gabriel Prosser revolts of 1822 and 1800. They rejected the customary analysis that Turner, Vesey and Prosser were at best traitors, who engaged in basically abnormal, irrational activities, and at worst, were senseless murderers. In some cases these metropolitan writers

considered these activities as totally insignificant and simply refused to treat these "incidents" seriously. Yet their works were stamped for decades as objective evaluations and analyses. Black intellectuals not only rejected these characterizations but also viewed these men as "heroes" involved in liberation struggles in the oppressive slave system in the United States. While they admit that the activities might not have been revolutionary, they were nonetheless legitimate revolts against servitude and colonization. In short, this black perspective on Turner, Vesey and Prosser was considered an objective analysis of these American historical experiences. In this case objectivity was not only a matter of a different vantage point but as equally important a matter of an explicit perspective.<sup>81</sup>

From the brief analysis presented on comparative methodology in Caribbean social science, imperial history, and the problem of objectivity, it is clear why the author thinks that these social science comparative methodologies are inappropriate to his undertaking; why an imperial perspective has no place or serves no useful purpose in his analysis; and why, as a citizen of the Caribbean, he has put forth such a position on "objectivity" and the way in which it is to be understood by readers of this study. In the next section, the substantive dimensions of the author's position on "objectivity" will become clearer in the discussion of the study's research methods.

## III

Research Methods

The study is developed against the background and with an awareness of West Indian colonization, its forces, imprints and legacies. Much has been written about this colonization. For example, C.L.R. James, in Black Jacobins; describes in graphic detail the horrors of this colonial transplant of Africans to the Caribbean. He states in one instance:

"One captain, to strike terror into the rest, killed a slave and dividing the heart, liver and entrails into 300 pieces, made each of the slaves eat one, threatening those who refused with torture. Such incidents were not rare.... When the ship reached the harbour, the cargo came up on deck to be bought. The purchasers examined them for defects, looked at the teeth, cinched the skin, sometimes tasted the perspiration to see if the slave's blood was pure and his health as good as his appearance. Some of the women affected a curiosity, the indulgence of which, with a horse would have caused them to be kicked 20 yards across the deck. But the slave had to stand it.... Having become the property of his owner, he was branded on both sides of the breast with a hot iron...." 82

In describing the brutality and political consequences of British colonization, Eric Williams says: "It is a sad commentary on the nature of early democracy that the Negro slaves were treated most harshly in the British self-governing colonies. Popular franchises in the hands of slave owners were the worst instruments of tyranny ever forged for the oppression of mankind." 83 On the economic structure of the slave system in the colonial Caribbean, Gordon Lewis points out: "It was an economy of extensive sugar plantations worked by enforced coloured labour under European supervision for the ultimate benefit of absentee owners." 84 Concerning its social dimension Lowenthal says: "West

Indian slavery was more than a way of life, it was the way of life... and slave holders elsewhere almost universally judged West Indian slavery as the most severe."<sup>85</sup> Fanon reminds us about the "totalitarian character of colonial exploitation"<sup>86</sup>; he maintains that it is "violence in its natural state."<sup>87</sup> A consequence of colonization is that black men are turned into an inferior group of human beings --- slaves --- things. It is no wonder that Fanon considers the colonists as "Nothing more than war criminals."<sup>88</sup> In this study, however, colonization and its characteristics are accepted as givens in the colonial situation. It is against this background that the study examines especially early Dominican activities for survival and change.

David Lowenthal has said: "In the West Indies, as elsewhere, there are indeed things only an insider can know, approaches only an insider can take...."<sup>89</sup> This statement is especially important in the delineation of the research methods adopted in this thesis.

This study on Dominica began about fourteen years ago. At this juncture, there were no courses taught on the West Indies, much less on Dominica, in the school system. As a student the author was subjected to a school curriculum geared totally toward passing the coveted Cambridge University School certificate, the content of which had little or nothing relating to the Dominican experience and society, or, for that matter, to the Commonwealth Caribbean. Later, as a high school teacher, the author participated in this anomalous educational colonial curriculum, helping, in one instance, students to outline a School Certificate essay entitled "My First Experience of a Snow Storm." Finally, when the school system introduced West Indian history, it

taught about the exploitation of black West Indians by Hawkins and Drake in the Middle Passage, again, in order to have students pass the Cambridge School certificate. The school curriculum advanced from virtually a complete absence of West Indian content to one in which West Indians and Dominicans were treated by extension as colonial appendages without a history, culture or politics of their own.

Accordingly, the author decided that he would one day attempt to rectify this anomaly and would write about Dominicans, their history, their culture, their politics, their customs and their social habits. At this early stage he received much encouragement from a friend and colleague, Reverend Brother Estrada who later became the Principal of Saint Mary's Academy, the school in which the author was both a student and teacher. In 1972 the Academy was the scene of a student revolt against the colonial curriculum and against those teachers the students believed had helped to maintain and perpetuate it.

In a formal way the author came to Caribbean-Dominican studies after his second year of graduate studies. In this period much of his attention was devoted to the black experience in the United States and with both the comparative and black theories which dealt with that experience. These two sets of theories, explanations and generalizations about the same black experience, not surprisingly, provided radically different perspectives and conceptualizations of the black situation. His dissatisfaction with comparative theories dealing with the black experience led him to look at the West Indian experience more closely with this concern in mind.

The present study of Dominica began in earnest three years ago. It was at this point that the author encountered the phenomenal paucity of written material about Dominica. Within the West Indian scene, Dominica appears to be one of the least studied of the Commonwealth countries in the Caribbean. West Indian scholars seem to have neglected it. One simply has to look for an article on Dominica in the four volumes on the Caribbean put out by D. Lowenthal and L. Comitas, or in Readings in the Government and Politics of the Caribbean by T. Munro and R. Lewis, to be reminded of this neglect.<sup>90</sup> In fact, there is only one history of Dominica to date, The History of the Island of Dominica, an imperial history written by Thomas Atwood in 1797.

In the modern period, there is hardly any material available except for newspapers and government reports, and they have been badly preserved. The Library at the University of the West Indies, and the West India Reference Library, both located in Jamaica, as well as the Roseau Library in Dominica, contain little of substantive use to his study on Dominica.

Dominicans who have contributed to both internal change and development in the island have not, understandably enough, taken the time to write about their activities. If, by chance, aspects of their activities were recorded, the material has been lost. In an overwhelming number of cases they wrote nothing, nor was anything written about them. For example, Christopher Emmanuel Loblack, founder of the Union and co-founder of the first popular political party in Dominica, has not written anything about himself and his activities for, given his total lack of formal education, he quite understandably finds it difficult to write.

His first language, French patois, has a verbal but not a written form. Thus when a social scientist attempts to study Dominica, he simply has to rely on a variety of techniques, which include participant observation, formal and informal interviews, oral history, the limited material that can be located in the archives, and on other primary sources like newspapers and official government documents.

The social scientist who is a citizen of a small country like Dominica and who chooses to write about his country and its people finds himself in a rather interesting situation which is virtually unfamiliar to metropolitan scholars studying in their own environment. In Dominica, given that the author was university educated, he was considered an "expert" on the subject about which he sought to gather information and material. Thus, to many leaders and founders of the political parties, union organizations and movements whom he interviewed, he was considered a source of expertise that could be utilized. For instance, in 1971 the author was requested to give a paper to the Dominican Amalgamated Workers Union (DAWU) executive concerning possible improvements to their operations, organizational structure and programs. Later, in 1973, the Black power movement --- the Movement for a New Dominica --- invited him to present a paper on Dominican identity, a concept with which they were grappling. Similarly, when the author interviewed Loblack on the unions and the Labour Party, he solicited his opinions on the future of these organizations in Dominica. These activities did not violate the "objectivity" of the study, but simply must be seen as an indispensable aspect of participant observation in a small country like Dominica.

Dominica is not only a small country but is in fact also a small community with a population of 70,000, in a geographic area of 298 square miles. Its black majority lives primarily on the coastal belt and engage in agricultural pursuits for their livelihood. They speak mainly a French creole patois and are generally Roman Catholic by religion. For the last fourteen years they have voted a Labour Party Government into national office. The dominant majority share certain observable features within this well defined geographic area. These include a common religion, political and electoral patterns and behaviour, patois dialect, participation in an identifiable set of economic pursuits as well as common social and cultural behaviour. These attributes and features usually provide the bases for an acceptable community study. In the Island there are the political, economic and social parameters, dimensions and characteristics which allow for an extensive study of human activity within a well defined geographical boundary.

Given the role and interest of the indigenous social scientist in such a small community, it is clear that the concept of the "laboratory" so popular to the metropolitan social scientist, would prove unproductive to this study. An advantage, of course, for the indigenous social scientist is that, unlike the metropolitan scholar who attempts a similar study, entry to the community poses no special problems. In the case of Dominica, the situation was one of cooperation and generosity on the part of all Dominicans, even by those whom the author did not personally contact. In this sense, Dominicans themselves have contributed extensively to this study, which the author hopes will be both useful and intellectually satisfying to them.



The author began informal interviews both in Canada and New York City in the fall of 1972. In Canada he held lengthy interview sessions with Reverend Brother Estrada, the former Principal of St. Mary's Academy. A student revolt at this secondary school necessitated the closing of the school in 1972 and the termination of the teaching careers of the Reverend Brothers. Interestingly enough, the revolt took place during the Headmastership of Brother Estrada, who, on his arrival in Dominica in 1960, had seen the immediate need for a student revolt against the colonial curriculum, as well as for an island-wide upheaval to terminate the stifling dominance of British colonialism. During the interviews, Estrada made it clear that while the incident had taken place at the school, he recognized that its causes and roots were located in the socio-economic, political, religious and still existing colonial fabric of the Island. Moreover, given the small size of the Island, and the fact that all events can become political, he was not surprised that the school revolt had such an island-wide impact. Estrada was generous enough to loan the author his complete file on the incident.

In Canada, the author held further interviews with Roosevelt Douglas on the role of black power in Dominica and in the rest of the Caribbean. Roosevelt Douglas is a Dominican known for his participation in the Sir George Williams University computer incident in Montreal, and is a black power leader and theoretician.

The author held lengthy discussions and formal interviews with Hilroy Thomas in New York on the subjects of the student revolt and the black power movement in Dominica. Thomas, a black power leader and a former student of the author, was the individual who inadvertently sparked

the student revolt.

By the end of 1972 and early 1973 the author began to put together in a coherent, systematic and disciplined way his thoughts, recollections, and experiences which he believed would be pertinent to the present study about Dominica. Thus, notes were made on the socio-economic, religious, political, cultural and educational life of Dominica. In this process he documented his experiences as a school teacher in 1969. In that year he taught a class in ethics which, incidentally, Desmond Trotter attended. Trotter is the black power leader presently sentenced to hang for the slaying of a Canadian in 1974. In this class on ethics, the author's discussion centred upon the relevance of an American brand of black power in the Caribbean, and particularly in Dominica. Then, in 1973, the author held long, formal interviews with Trotter on the subject of black power in Dominica and received Trotter's complete file on the movement.

In 1965 Premier Edward Leblanc, then Chief Minister for the Island, talked informally about his own educational background to the author. Leblanc was proud of the fact that he had educated himself, through sheer individual initiative without the aid of secondary educational institutions. His dislike for intellectuals and engineers trained and educated in universities was made manifest in a tirade over a broken water pump, which he claimed resulted from the sloppy handiwork of a university trained engineer; in fact, Leblanc claimed that he could have done the job better himself. This distrust, and dislike of intellectuals and their criticisms became a distinctive feature of the Leblanc regime and his governments in Dominica during the last thirteen years.

In this process, the author put together clues concerning the union activities of Loblack, obtained as a result of the lengthy conversations between Loblack and the author's father. Throughout the conversations, the author's father maintained an educated middle-class position concerning politics, culture, and economics in Dominica. Loblack, in his own characteristic style, tried to convince him of the place of the lower class in the Island's social and political structure, of their economic plight, and of their need to be respected as full-fledged members of the Dominican society. The author later found that Loblack's views have remained consistent with his activities in Dominica.

In personal discussions with his father, the 1920's, 1930's and even the 19th century came alive for the author. His father was a newspaper editor of the Dominica Tribune in the 1930's, as well as an aspiring politician. His knowledge and awareness of the social and economic conditions, especially of the 1930's was documented by the famous Moyne Commission in 1938. From him the author gathered details only an "insider" could know about the famous Charles Falconer --- the dominant Mulato leader of the mid-nineteenth century. Charles Falconer, in fact, was related to the Grell family by marriage. Further, the author's father has been a reliable source of information on the political, social and economic situation in Dominica, right up to the present. Because of him, the author had easy access to Loblack, to Franklin Baron, the first Chief Minister in Dominica, and to Randolph Lockhart, the son of the founding father and first president of the Representative Government Association of the 1920's.

This process helped to put the present Premier's actions in perspective. Patrick John's present political style, attitude toward authority, and conception of power could have been discerned from his past activities. John was both a friend and teacher of the author. As a teacher, he demonstrated a flair for showmanship, as well as a capacity for storytelling in which truth "was helped along" whenever and wherever it proved dull and unappealing. John's attitude toward authority, for example, and to those who wielded it was most cavalier in both style and content. As a result of his attitude toward both school and religious authority at St. Mary's Academy John was dismissed in 1959. He then joined the unions, and from there, went into politics. Thus John's position as Labour Minister was clear concerning his "support" for the student revolt against school authority at St. Mary's in 1972.

In 1973, the author engaged in systematic participant observation of Island activities. In addition, he did archival research at the Library of the University of the West Indies, the West India Reference Library, in Jamaica, and at the Roseau Library and at the local archives in Dominica.

Material of specific relevance to the study of Dominica was sparse at the University Library in Jamaica. There were a few government documents, reports of Commissions of Inquiry, particularly on the violent and protest incidents at the St. Mary's Academy, at and around the High Court in Roseau, and at Vielle Casse. There were diaries of various Governors and Administrators of the Island, as well as sketches, recollections, and descriptions made by former

colonial residents during the British presence on the Island. The West India Reference Library in Jamaica, while it provided a notable collection of essays on the rule of Governor Ainslie, did not provide material in any substantive way different from that of the University Library. The author made complete bibliographies of their relevant holdings, and researched all of the material of significance to the Dominican study.

At the University the author held informal interviews with Elsa Gorveia, the noted Historian, with the Political Scientists Carl Stone and Edward Greene, and with the Economist George Beckford. The thesis proposal was discussed with them, and their advice sought. They were all very encouraging and were most honest about having little or nothing substantive to offer. They encouraged the study for two reasons. First, because Dominica was simply an unknown Caribbean Island, any social science study, by definition, would be original. Secondly, the author's perspective was of interest to them as they believed more studies utilizing indigenous perspectives were needed in the Commonwealth Caribbean. Indeed, both Beckford's and Gorveia's works testify to that concern of treating Caribbean experiences in perspectives that are local and indigenous in origin, while still remaining cognizant of the imperial, colonial, and plantation forces which helped to shape West Indian realities. At the time they warned the author about the scarcity of material pertinent to his study of Dominica and requested a copy of the work when it was completed.

After conducting his research at Jamaica, the author left the Island with yet another introduction to Father Prosemans, from

Elsa Gorveia. Father Prosemans, a Belgian Priest, is considered to be the leading historian on early Dominican history. The author's first introduction to Father Prosemans was kindly provided by Reverend Brother Estrada during one of our informal interviews. The two introductions did not prove necessary. In Dominica the Reverend Father Superior of the Redemptrist Order in the Roseau Cathedral, and Father Jolly, a local priest --- both friends of the author --- provided him with more than adequate personal introductions. Jolly, at this time was engaged in preparing a play on black power in Dominica, and solicited the author's opinions. The author consequently held interviews with Father Jolly on the subject of black power in the Island. A collection of essays on Governor Ainslie which the author had located at the West India Reference Library in Jamaica proved of great importance to Father Prosemans in his forthcoming history of Dominica. Prosemans was delighted by the find, and generously provided the author with his historical expertise, access to his archives and indispensable guidance concerning the use of the Roseau Library and Government Archives on the Island.

Prosemans' early Dominican history, soon to be published, is a well researched manuscript. It contains detailed information on the lives and activities of Governors, slave masters, and slaves but is without any clear perspective or focus. The author is not being unnecessarily critical of Prosemans' work, for Prosemans is well aware of this problem. Indeed, one of Prosemans' laments has been that the Government of Dominica has refused to provide him with a Dominican research assistant capable of helping him in both basic research and

in the formulation of meaningful questions and perspectives about the material of use to Dominicans. At this point in the development of Dominica, Prosemans is well aware that it is really up to Dominicans to give such historical material the perspective that is meaningful to them. The fact that he is not a Dominican has been painfully brought home to him by those of the black power persuasion in their excessively harsh criticisms of excerpts of his work that he has made public. In a sense, he was glad that the author had chosen to give an indigenous perspective to aspects of the Dominican life experience. Prosemans was most helpful and alerted the author further to the scarcity of archival material for the kind of research intended. Prosemans was also quite accurate about the deteriorating, dilapidated and confusing state of the Government Archive. He suggested that the Official Gazettes would be of immense importance in providing primary information for the present study. He pointed out where the author could locate pertinent material in the Government Archive and in the Roseau Library.

At the Roseau Library, Mrs. Riviere, the chief librarian proved most cooperative and helpful. She personally located historical material that the author considered relevant to his study. She put together a complete bibliographical listing on all the material in the Library that related to the Caribbean, and to Dominica in particular. She provided the author with a library assistant who could get material out of the Archive for him at short notice. She allowed him to take home official Archival material because of the conditions and state of the Archive. This Government Archive is simply a basement room which is

stuffy, hot and without ventilation, and in which government documents and official material have been stored without concern for proper order. A rough attempt was made in the middle 1960's to arrange and order the material, but it must have proved a most difficult undertaking and not much came out of this brave effort.

In general, documents in the Library and in the Archive were a duplication of those the author had already obtained in the Jamaican Libraries. Notable among primary materials found in Dominica were the Fillan's Almanacs which covered the entire 19th century, and the Official Gazettes which provided material covering the period of slavery to the present. Those volumes of the Official Gazettes missing in the Archive were found either at the High Court Building in Roseau or in the Attorney General's Office, situated in the New Ministerial Building on Bath Road. The Attorney General generously afforded the author office space and easy access to whatever material he needed. His secretary was most cooperative in this matter. Furthermore, the Archives contained newspapers dating back to the slave period, "blue books", memos by Governors and Administrators and an assorted collection of colonial documents.

Of all the Archival material, the newspapers were in the worst condition. They were brittle, in some cases dates and page numbers were missing and some of the pages were almost impossible to read. It is not possible to underestimate the importance of directions as to where to locate relevant material, provided by an old wise headmaster and friend, S. J. Lewis, and that provided by Father Prosemans. Given the conditions of the newspapers the author could not take them home as was possible in the case of the Official Gazettes. Thus the author



employed a research assistant to work in the Archives, to copy out portions from the newspapers of relevance to the study. These long hours spent doing research in the Archives were most frustrating and tedious.

Mrs. Riviere generously provided the author with extra copies of relevant Social Welfare Bulletins put out by the Social Service Division of the Government. Copies which were unobtainable from the Library were obtained directly from this Department.

Photostating archival material was a tempting idea. In 1973 there was only one machine on the Island, the quality of replication was, for the most part, poor, and since each page cost fifty cents, the idea was quickly abandoned.

Mr. Stanley Boyd, the editor of the Dominica Chronicle allowed the author free access to the Chronicle's archives. The author also interviewed him for he is considered a knowledgeable man and a reliable source of information on the 1920's and the 1930's. He personally assisted the author in locating pertinent material in past issues of the Chronicle and the Dominica Tribune, especially on the 1920's and 1930's. Fortunately the Chronicle's archives carried numerous back issues of the Dominica Tribune and the Dominica Herald. Much of the Tribune's material had been destroyed in an earlier fire. The Herald, which began operations in 1956, was closed down in 1973 as a result of the state of emergency imposed on Dominica in June-August of that year.

Dominicans were most cooperative. Franklin Baron, the first Chief Minister, besides making himself available in his hectic business schedule for interviews, also made available whatever material he could

personally locate on his Government and party that he had headed. Similarly, Mrs. Shand Alfrey, the co-founder of the Labour Party, a Federal Minister in 1958, presently a member of the Freedom Party, and the editor of the Dominican Star, put her entire archives at the authors disposal. Given her enthusiasm for this work, which included cooperation during a number of interviews, she requested that the study be serialized in its entirety in her newspaper. The author promised that he would serialize the dissertation when it was completed.

There were times when the author did not have to seek out resource people. For example, when it became known that he was concerned with the unions, this was sufficient to bring the Secretary-General of WAWU to his home to be interviewed.

While there is very little written material available, many Dominicans have committed to memory a great deal of information about the social, religious, cultural and local political activities within the Island. With a little bit of encouragement and the appropriate questions, this information becomes readily available. Thus it is not only necessary to rely on participant observation techniques, but one must also be aware of the oral historical tradition of Dominicans. Events, even from the 19th century, are recounted by many Dominicans as though they were personally present at the time. Interestingly enough, the same event can be repeated by a number of people who are unrelated and who hardly know each other, to afford common knowledge, in substantively the same way. With regards to the 1920's and 1930's this was especially apparent. Their oral information was easily verified by Dominicans who actually lived in that period. In the more recent period materials on

the unions and parties have also been committed to memory in this oral historical tradition. Thus, for a social scientist, interviews which seek to bring out information from this oral tradition are an indispensable tool in the research of the Dominican experience.

Interviewing within this oral tradition never posed a problem. The black power leaders like Desmond Trotter were most cooperative and informative. Hilarian Deschamp, Gregory Shillingford, and Julian Johnson, the latter whom the author formally interviewed, all provided substantive oral information on black power in Dominica. Gregory Shillingford provided the author with a copy of the black power manifesto and the notorious "Green Paper". The "Green Paper", a sheet of mimeographed material, presented views so critical of Government policy that the Government saw fit to extend the state of emergency declared in the summer of 1973. Dr. William Riviere, a Dominican, helped introduce black power thinking to Dominica. As a history professor specializing on early West Indian history, he listened to, and discussed the author's notes on the slaves and blacks in post-emancipation Dominica. He provided both valuable criticism and encouragement.

Randolph Lockhart, a semi-retired lawyer, a friend of the author's father who knew the author from childhood, was simply overjoyed that the author was interested in interviewing him concerning his father who was the first President of the Representative Government Association in the 1920's. In the interview, Lockhart enthusiastically discussed his own role as Secretary of the Tax Payers Association in the late 1920's as well as his involvement in the West India Conference in 1932. He

also willingly provided some rather interesting details on Cecil Rawle, the man who spearheaded the West India Conference in Dominica.

Similarly, Loblack was equally pleased; he knew the author's father well, and remembered the author as a child. He provided the author with much oral information on the union he founded, on the Labour Party he co-founded and on the Freedom Party of which he was presently a member. He most generously gave his views on the West India Conference of 1932, on his role in the Moyne Commission, as well as on local conditions existing in the 1920's and 1930's. He also provided valuable comments concerning local conditions up to the present. In the process of interviewing Loblack, it was necessary at times for the author to resort to the use of French Creole Patois. This technique proved most rewarding, as Loblack seemed far more at ease in communicating in patois than in English.

Veronica Nicholas, presently the General-Secretary of the Dominica Trade Union and mother of a close friend of the author was flattered at being formally interviewed. She capably discussed early aspects of the formation and development of the union and presented some rather insightful details on its present situation in Dominica. Together with Loblack, she was one of the founding members of the DTU organization and the Labour Party. It was from her that the author received some written material on the DTU. Like Loblack, she held some rather strong, critical views of the present political and economic climate, including the Black Power Movement, and the Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement.

In 1973 the author had free access to the DAWU files, and it was particularly easy for him to interview the General Secretary, Anthony Joseph, because of the seminar paper the author presented to the union executive in 1971. Most of the written material which DAWU possesses has been written by Latin American affiliates. DAWU subscribes heavily to this material and is, in turn, influenced by Latin American union thinking. However, the unions generally, in both their material and activities remain vague and hazy as will be evident in Chapter V.

The pattern of cooperation which the author received was repeated in the interviews held with Artherton Martin. Martin was the innovator of the Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement. Martin and the author were class-mates at secondary school in Dominica, and did their first degree at the same time in New York.

In all other interviews, including those with Martin Sorhaindo, the Secretary of the Freedom Party, Rupert Sorhaindo, Vice-President of the Freedom Party and Vice-Principal of St. Mary's Academy, Father Calvin Felix, the Principal of St. Mary's Academy, Father Charles, Superior of the Redemptrist Fathers at the Roseau Cathedral, Charles Savarin, General Secretary of the Civil Service Association, and with students at the St. Mary's Academy, the individuals involved went out of their way to provide the author with written material, where available, and with the material that they had committed to memory. The generosity shown by Dominicans throughout differed only in style from that provided by Lockhart, Loblack, Nicholas, and Martin. For example, on the school revolt, many Dominicans would simply approach the author and volunteer

their views, particularly because they knew that the author was both formerly a student and teacher at the SMA. Even the present Premier, Patrick John, was not an exception to the rule. When Deputy-Premier, at the time, he passed by the author's home to inform him that he had located the Government Development Plan, which the author had requested.

The favourable climate in which the author did his research was heightened, by contrast, by the fate of a PhD. candidate in anthropology from the University of Carolina, who, in 1973 was still doing doctoral research on the Island. When the author met him that year he had been on the Island for two years and was just beginning to find out who the appropriate resource people were for the purpose of conducting interviews. He found the people cooperative, but as an outsider, the going was very slow. For example, it was simply not possible for him to have received such helpful service as that which was rendered to the author by the Permanent Secretary to the Premier's Office, Clarence Seignoret. Seignoret had made it clear to his secretarial staff that the author was to receive any material that he requested. This courtesy extended to having special copies of material typed for the author and delivered to the author's home by a government secretary.

Despite all this cooperation and generosity displayed by Dominicans, the author was never once compromised by anyone seeking to have him take a position for, or against, a particular political issue. His "objective" posture was, at all times, respected. This respect afforded the author by Dominicans was particularly important relative to the author's use of participant observation technique as a major research technique of the study.

Participant observation was an indispensable technique. It allowed the author an opportunity to become involved in local or community life so as to facilitate his acquiring of a great wealth of interesting material. While this is not a technique commonly applied in research in political science, it has been utilized quite extensively in other branches of social science, especially in anthropology and sociology.<sup>91</sup>

The objective of the participant-observer is to gather detailed, indepth, sensitive, and subtle kinds of information that could be missed through use of another technique. While one retains scientific criteria, for instance, relevance and internal consistency, an attempt is made to remove the distance between the social scientist and that which he studies. In a sense, Selltiz et al have summed it up when they view participant observation as a form of sympathetic identification with that which one studies.<sup>92</sup>

The anthropologist as a participant observer might, for instance, attempt to analyse the community by living in it for a long period, by involving himself in local events, and by learning the various dialects and local languages. In addition, he could do interviews, rely on traditions such as oral history and continuously make connections among variables in his on-going note taking. Without being close to the community and its people, the anthropologist is almost assured of an unsuccessful study. On the other hand, the chance of success is much greater if a social scientist can involve himself in the events and life of the community.

A social scientist engaged in participant observation must therefore be able to recreate in his own mind and imagination the experience, the thoughts, and feelings of those he studies.<sup>93</sup> At the same time, however, the social scientist using this technique must be capable of being both detached and directly involved without sacrificing the advantages of either, nor must he disturb the usual operations or patterns of life found in the community. It means that the scientific posture is interrelated with the social one. Finally, the social scientist must be able to withdraw himself from the community in order to do his analysis in an independent manner.

There are, however, methodological problems with participant observation. The most serious of these, as Blalock points out, is the problem of replication.<sup>94</sup> It is primarily because of this difficulty, to prevent preconception from creeping in, from distorting interpretation, that the author relied on the oral historical tradition of the Island and, in addition, on informal and formal interview research methods. These research instruments will not solve the problem of replication, but do contribute to making replication partially possible.

As a citizen of Dominica, the problems of entry into the community, which an "outsider" would have encountered were simply nonexistent in the author's case. Throughout the study precepts of participant observation were maintained and adhered to closely, except where special adaptation was necessary to meet the local situation. Finally, the author's detachment and withdrawal from the Dominican community were accomplished on his return to Canada, to analyse the data and to write the study.



The chapters in this study are arranged in a sequential mode, which covers the significant activities to be analyzed from 1763 to 1973, or from slavery to the Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement. This sequential ordering allows the reader to easily discern the relation of events in each chapter, and enables him to discern the contributions that Dominicans themselves have made to societal and political change processes.

Chapter II provides constitutional-political material of importance which leads to an easy comprehension of the discussions which follow in subsequent chapters. Chapter III analyses the slaves' activities for human survival and for change. Hence emphasis is placed on slave political organization, including leadership, strategies and ideologies for change and survival, and on the influence of the French Revolution on the slave revolts. It also examines the slaves' non-violent strategies for human survival, and finally, looks at the legacy left by the Maroon slaves to the black people, that is the will to survive even in the hostile plantation conditions.

In chapter IV the author first examines the violent revolts of the black Dominicans, the descendants of slaves, in the hostile colonial situation of the post-emancipation period. Secondly, he analyses the protest activities of the mulattoes against the dominant white plantocracy. In this context he first examines how the British Colonial Government attempted to resolve the conflict between the mulattoes and the white plantocracy, and secondly, how the mulatto political organization and protest activities which emerged after

the First World War attempted to end the "British Resolution" which was Crown Colony Rule. Finally, the chapter examines the political activities of the mulatto organization, the TRPA involvement at the West India Conference of 1932 which was concerned not only with an end to Crown Colony Rule, but also with the question of West Indian nationhood.

Chapter V discusses union organizations. It shows how the very fact of the union organization itself was an introduction of a non-violent organizational dimension in the continuous struggle for survival and for change by black Dominicans. It also shows that the continued existence of the unions represents a commitment by black people to carry on sustained collective struggles on behalf of their own welfare. Then it examines the activities of the union in relation to these ends. It looks at the unions' ideology, or in some cases, their lack of ideology, as political organizations. In this political context it introduces the reader to the notion and role of personalized politics, charismatic leadership, and in Archie Singham's sense, the role of the "charismatic hero". This notion of personalized politics and one of its variations, "mapuis" politics, is discussed later in the thesis as an obstacle to necessary change.

In chapter VI the political parties are discussed in much the same way that the author discusses the union organizations. The chapter examines the first party organization as an extension of union political activity, and as a further commitment of black people to extend and sustain struggles in the interest of their welfare. In the context of party organizations the chapter extends the discussion

of the notion of personalized politics, "mapuis" politics, and charismatic leadership, and examines party ideologies. It looks particularly at the success and failures of the parties as the Governments of the Island with regards to actual change and development.

Chapter VII discusses the political movements. The author takes a realistic look at the Black Power Movement. He examines the movement's criticisms of the Dominican social and political systems, as well as its ideas for change of both systems in the Island. The author then examines the student movement and its revolt at St. Mary's Academy. More specifically, he examines the students' struggle against colonial authority in the school system and shows how and why the revolt affected the whole body politic of the Island. Finally, the Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement, is examined. The chapter emphasizes the way in which the Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement has concretely implemented change concepts. It shows why the movement has encountered opposition in this process from government and other powerful interests on the Island. It shows how Castle Bruce Cooperative has, nonetheless, demonstrated a practical way of combining theory and practice, in a dynamic and working ideology for community change and development, and in a relationship which brings man and soil together in agricultural Dominica in the interest of independent human survival.

Chapter VIII concludes the dissertation with a re-examination of the survival and change question in the life experience of Dominicans. In addition, it suggests a possible way to deal with the problem of a continuing independent survival in Dominica.

## Chapter 1

## Footnotes

1. There is also much need for a systematic study on Dominica and its people as it is probably the least studied Island in the British Caribbean. This will become clear as the chapter progresses.
2. Rex Nettleford, "National Identity and Attitudes to Race in Jamaica", in Consequences of Class and Colour, David Lowenthal and Lombras Comitas, eds. (New York: Anchor Books, 1973), pp. 35-55.
3. David Lowenthal and Lombras Comitas, eds., Slaves, Freeman, Citizens (New York: Anchor Books, 1973), p. xiii.
4. For a critical discussion of these factors, see for example, Eric Williams' classic study, Capitalism and Slavery (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944), and George Beckford, Persistent Poverty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972). The author concurs with Singham when he says, "The economic consequences of colonial domination have been most thoroughly analyzed...." See Archie Singham, The Hero and the Crowd in a Colonial Polity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 4.
5. This "colonial heritage" is recognized by West Indian scholars as debilitating. It has eroded West Indians' confidence in themselves and has undermined their ability to change their lives and their society for the better. For an elaboration see, for instance, Walter Rodney, The Groundings with My Brothers (London: Bogle L'Ouverture Publications, 1970)
6. Indeed, within the social science tradition, it is widely recognized that "the process of writing is inevitably one of selection. When writing, an author, consciously or not, has some audience in mind." See, Seymour Lipset, Political Man (New York: Anchor Books, 1963), p. xix.
7. The various and often confusing conceptual and operational meanings of these terms find expression in the use of the terms "riots" and "revolt" in the American Black violent experiences of the 1960's. For instance the McCone Commission (Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots, Violence in the City --- An End or a Beginning (Los Angeles: University of California Library, 1965)) established in 1965 to investigate the Watts incident, characterized black collective violence as a riot. It claimed that the violence was the action of a few alienated, undereducated, unattached, unemployed and delinquent members of the black population. It calculated that only two per cent of that population was involved in the incident. The Commission's

characterization formed the basis of the "riff raff" theory in which subsequent black collective violence was viewed simply as spontaneous outbursts of pent-up feelings by a few lawless, irresponsible and irrational black people engaged in activity which was both deviant and dysfunctional to the society and the political system.

By contrast to the "conservative" McCone Commission, the "liberal" Kerner Commission in 1968 presented a more sophisticated understanding of black collective violence. However, it still viewed black collective violence as riots. The Commission gave the concept of "riot" political meaning by characterizing it as articulated protest focussed against the genuine grievances in the black ghetto. In both cases, the concept of riot used subsequently affected the policy process itself. (See Otto Kerner, Chairman, Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968))

Richard E. Rubenstein, Rebels in Eden (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1970), p.p. 8-10, criticizes the use of the term "riot" by both the McCone and Kerner Commission Reports. He points out that as long as the power structure can characterize black violence as "riot" it means that they can legally use force to suppress it. Similarly, Robert M. Fogelson, Violence As Protest (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1971), p.p. 178-202, says that McCone's "riff raff" theory was most reassuring to the dominant white society for two reasons. First, if only a tiny fraction, the "riff-raff" element, of the black society was involved in the riots it would mean that there was no community support for the rioters, and hence the black violence would seem less frightening than it first appeared to be. Secondly, it would mean that the white society could deal with the problem by the elimination of the "riff-raff" without having to become involved in a transformation of the black ghetto.

Intellectuals have been aware of this problem, and also have contributed to the controversy. To the Black intellectual, Charles Hamilton, the concept "riot" is a misnomer. It is an attempt to make a true revolt into unlawful, chaotic, destructive, irresponsible and senseless behaviour without real, or symbolic meaning. Similarly, Skolnick says that the concept of riot gives little or no intrinsic political or social value to black violence. As he says positively, what is considered to be a "riot" may be in fact a prelude to a revolution. See Charles Hamilton, "Riots, Revolts and Relevant Responses", in Floyd B. Barbour, ed., The Black Power Revolt: A Collection of Essays (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1968) and Jerome H. Skolnick, "Social Response to Collective Behaviour", in Edward Greenberg, Neal Milner, and David J. Olson, eds., Black Politics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971).

Among other intellectuals the same kind of confusion persists. For instance, Lewis Coser, "Internal Violence as a Mechanism for Conflict Resolution", Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1970), p.p. 93-111, views black violence as having too much unrealistic conflict to be considered a genuine revolt. Yet, it is precisely that which Coser considers as 'unrealistic

conflict' that has led Robert Blauner, in "White Wash over Watts", in Trans-Action (March-April 1966), to conclude that black violence constituted a revolt. Gary T. Marx, "Issueless Riots", in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (September, 1970), simply confuses the matter when he views black violence in categories of 'issueless' and 'instrumental riots'. M. Janowitz, "Patterns of Collective Racial Violence", in The History of Violence in America, Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., (New York: Bantam Books, 1970), adds to the confusions with his conception of black violence in terms of 'commodity riots' and 'communal riots'. To Peter Rossi, ed., "Introduction", Ghetto Revolts (New York: Aldine Publishing Co., 1970), black violence constituted a revolt but was not a revolution; it was a revolt because it lacked the necessary articulation to make a revolution. Bayard Rustin, in Violence and Social Change, Henry Bienen, ed., (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 19, is referred to as saying that black violence was less than revolt because the violent activities were not coherent, nor politically articulated. They were more than riots because black violence attacked the traditional symbols which are usually assaulted during a revolt. However, L. Rainwater, "Open Letter on White Justice and the Riots", in Ghetto Revolt, *op. cit.*, sees this lack of coherence in Rustin's sense, as black strategy and style. He explains, that this has been the way in which blacks do things: a direct reflection of black activity, be it Church participation or singing the blues. To M.J. Gans, "The Ghetto Rebellions and Urban Class Conflict", in the Proceedings of the Academy of Political and Social Science (September, 1970), black violence constituted spontaneous rebellions, and should not be confused with riots or civil disorders. Conversely, N. Kaplan, "The New Ghetto Man: A Review of Recent Empirical Studies", in Journal of Social Issues (Winter Vol. no.26, 1970); argues that black violence constituted riots for they were elementary forms of political activity.

To cultural nationalists of the Black Power persuasion, black collective violence constituted a genuine revolt. Black violence was planned, and focussed against the colonial domination in the ghetto. It was an attempt to reclaim the ghetto as independent territory. At the same time, however, the cultural nationalist intellectuals recognized that while black violence was a revolt, it was not a revolution, for there were no attempts, except in the ideology and writings of the Black Panthers, to replace the existing political, social and economic systems by an alternative. (See works of C. Hamilton, *op. cit.*; R. Blauner, *op. cit.*; and R. Rubenstein, *op. cit.*, in particular, Chapter VI "The Ghetto Revolt")

The author is led to conclude, therefore, that the concepts 'riot' and 'revolt' varied and were given value depending upon where the user stood in the political and social structure. The social scientist, Commission member, the liberal, the conservative, the Black militant or intellectual, all used the concepts in a way which had implications for the development of their analysis and understandings of black collective violence.

8. Margaret Atwood, Survival, (Toronto: Anansi Press, 1972), p. 17.

9. In Marx's analysis of the alienation of labour, in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, the author finds certain statements which to some extent complement his own understanding of dehumanization and are therefore worth noting. Marx views work under conditions of alienated labour as being external to man and not part of his nature. The worker, therefore, does not "fulfill himself in his work but denies himself, has a feeling of misery rather than well being, does not develop freely his mental and physical energies but is physically exhausted and mentally debased." In Marx's understanding such labour is imposed or forced labour. It is not labour which satisfies a need but it is the means for satisfying the needs of others. Marx therefore sees forced labour as "labour of self-sacrifice, of mortification." Finally, Marx says: "We arrive at the result that man (the worker) feels himself to be freely active only in his animal functions --- eating, drinking and procreating, or at most also in his dwelling and personal adornment --- while in his human functions he is reduced to an animal. The animal becomes human and the human becomes animal." (Indeed, one could understand slavery in Dominica as an attempt to reduce man to an animal, to chattel.) However, beyond acknowledging this similarity of views on the question of dehumanization, the author has made no attempt to develop a Marxist perspective for the thesis. In fact, the author is not a Marxist, and, in Popper's sense, he is an "unbeliever" in Marxist theory. Popper points out that Marxist theory appears able to explain practically everything within the field to which it refers. It is tantamount to "an intellectual conversion or revelation, opening your eyes to a new truth hidden from those not yet initiated. Once your eyes were opened you saw confirming instances everywhere: the world was full of verifications of the theory. Whatever happened always confirmed it. Thus its truth appeared manifest; and unbelievers were clearly people who did not want to see the manifest truth; who refused to see it...because it was against their class interest...." (Later in the chapter, the author's own perspective for the thesis is discussed.)

See Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, translated by T. B. Bottomore, in Erich Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1972), pp. 93-109. (emphasis appears in the text) Also see Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1968), pp. 34-35. (emphasis appears in the text.)

10. The slaves will be discussed at length in Chapter III.
11. The Maroons, or "Negre Maron", were slaves who ran away from the plantation system in Dominica to the forests in the Island. Because of this the Maroons are also referred to as Runaways. The Maroons will be discussed in Chapter III.
12. Black Dominicans in the post-emancipation period will be discussed in Chapter IV.
13. This episode, along with other relevant mulato activities will be discussed in Chapter IV.
14. The union will be discussed in detail in Chapter V.
15. The parties will be discussed in detail in Chapter VI.
16. The three movements will be discussed in detail in Chapter VII.
17. This question of land and agricultural development in relation to the betterment and independent survival of Dominica will be discussed in Chapter VIII.
18. Lewis Coser, "Social Conflict and Theory of Social Change", in Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1970).
19. Rex Nettleford, op. cit., p. 35.
20. M. W. Springer, "On Being a West Indian", Caribbean Quarterly (Vol. 3, no. 3, December, 1953), p.p. 181-183.
21. In this regard, the author was requested to write, and did write a paper on "Dominican Identity" for the Movement, in 1973.
22. Rex Nettleford, op. cit..
23. See, Erik M. Erikson, "Race and the Wider Identity", Identity, Youth and Crisis (New York: W.W. Norton & Co. Inc., 1968), p.p. 295-320.
24. Gordon Lewis, "Politics of the Caribbean" in The United States and the Caribbean, American Assembly, ed., (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 19-1), p. 5-36.
25. Erik Erikson, op. cit., p. 310.
26. Stanley M. Elkins, Slavery: A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual Life (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969).
27. B. Bettelheim, "Individual and Mass Behaviour in Extreme Situations", Journal of Abnormal Psychology, XXXVIII (Oct. 1943).



28. The author takes the definition of "sambo" from Elkins himself. "Sambo, the typical plantation slave, was docile but irresponsible, loyal but lazy, humble but chronically given to lying and stealing; his behavior was full of infantile silliness and his talk inflated with childish exaggeration. His relationship with his master was one of utter dependence and childlike attachment..." See Stanley Elkins, op. cit., p. 82.
29. Nat Turner, a slave, led what is considered to be the most successful slave rebellion in 1831 in the American southern plantation system. See for further details, John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, (New York: Vintage Books, 1967).
30. See Melvin Drummer, ed., "Stanley M. Elkins", in Black History a Reappraisal (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1969), p. 180.
31. For further criticism of the black cultural nationalist intellectuals and the question of embellishment, see Harold Cruse, The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual (New York: William Morrow & Co. Inc., 1967), p.p. 544-565.
32. Frantz Fanon, "The Negro and Recognition", Black Skin, White Masks (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1967).
33. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1968).
34. Ibid., p. 249-310.
35. See, Lewis A. Coser, Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict, op. cit., p.p. 211 - 222.
36. Edward Greene "A Review of Political Science Research in the English Speaking Caribbean; Toward a Methodology", ( Unpublished monograph, originally prepared for a Conference 'Man and his Environment', 1973). The author was given a copy of the paper by Greene in 1973.
37. See, M. G. Smith, The Plural Society in the British West Indies ( Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965).
38. David Easton; "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems", World Politics (Vol. IX April, 1957), p. 399-400. For a fuller development of "Systems Analysis", see David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1965).
39. Ali A. Mazrui, "From Social Darwinism to Current Theories of Modernization", World Politics (Vol. 21, October, 1968) p. 77.
40. Ibid., p. 72.
41. See, Dominica Chronicle (December 21, 1974) p. 2; and the Dominica Development Plan 1971 - 1975 (Roseau: Government Printery) p. 171.
42. Ali A. Mazrui, op. cit., p. 73.

43. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, op. cit., p. 315.
44. Ibid., p.p. 313 - 315.
45. Robert Dahl, Pluralist Democracy in the United States (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967).
46. Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism (New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 1969). Chapter entitled "The Public Philosophy: Interest Group Liberalism".
47. William Gamson, "Stable Unrepresentation in American Society", in Black Politics, Edward S. Greenberg, Neal Milner & David Olson eds., (New York: Holt Rinehart & Winston Inc., 1971).
48. Edward S. Greenberg, "Models of the Political Process: Implications for the Black Community", in Black Politics, op. cit..
49. M. G. Smith, The Plural Society in the British West Indies (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965), p. 18.
50. Gordon Lewis, The Growth of the Modern West Indies (London: MacGibbon and Kee Ltd., 1968), p. 13.
51. Edward Green, op. cit., p. 9.
52. M. G. Smith, op. cit., p. 83.
53. Lloyd Braithwaite, "Social Stratification in Trinidad", Social and Economic Studies (Vol. II October, 1953); R. T. Smith, British Guiana (London: Oxford University Press, 1962).
54. M. G. Smith, op. cit., p. 86.
55. George Beckford, Persistent Poverty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. vi,
56. Ibid., p. vii.
57. Ibid., p. vii.
58. Archie Singham, The Hero and the Crowd in a Colonial Polity, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968)
59. Ibid., p. 3.
60. Ibid., p. 4.
61. Ibid., p. 5.
62. Ibid., p. 5.

63. Ibid., p. 5.
64. Orlando Patterson, The Sociology of Slavery (New Jersey: Associated University Presses, 1969), p. 11.
65. David Lowenthal, West Indian Societies (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p.p. xiv-xv.
66. Gordon Lewis, Growth of the Modern West Indies, op. cit., p.p. 9-10.
67. Orlando Patterson, op. cit., p. 10.
68. Frantz Fanon, Wretched of the Earth, op. cit., p. 51.
69. Sir Allan Burns, History of the British West Indies (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1954).
70. Both articles are in Dominica, Aspects of Dominican History (Roseau: Government Printery, 1972).
71. Thomas Atwood, The History of the Island of Dominica (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1971), p. 272.
72. Joseph Ragatz, The Fall of the Planter Class in the British Caribbean 1763-1833 (New York: Octagon Book, 1928), p. 27.
73. W. C. Clarke, Notes on the Geography and History of Dominica (privately published, 1962).
74. V. Monteil "The Decolonization of the Writing of History" in Social Change: The Colonial Situation Immanuel Wallerstein, ed., (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), p. 592.
75. Ibid., p. 594.
76. G. Balandier, "The Colonial Situation: A Theoretical Approach" in Social Change: The Colonial Situation, op. cit., p. 36.
77. O. Patterson, op. cit.; Elsa Gorveia, Slave Society in the British Leeward Islands at the End of the Eighteenth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965); C.L.R. James, Black Jacobins: Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1963); Madeline Kerr, Personality and Conflict in Jamaica (London: Collins, 1963); T. Atwood, op. cit.; A. Burns, op. cit..
78. G. Balandier, op. cit., p.34.
79. David Lowenthal, and Lombras Comitas eds., Slaves, Free Men, Citizens (New York: Anchor Books, 1973), p. xiii.

80. Within this non-comparative perspective, the Third World scholar is still bound by certain "scientific" criteria. His analysis must be critical, 'rigorous', logically consistent, and his selection of facts must have a basis in material or experience that can be verified empirically.
81. A very illuminating instance has been the way in which ten black intellectuals dealt with William Styron, a white Southerner who wrote about the "Confessions of Nat Turner". Collectively they branded Styron as a racist whose sole intention was to distort black history in the usual white manner. See, John Hendrick Clarke, ed., William Styron's Nat Turner: Ten Black Writers Respond (New York: Beacon Press, 1968).
82. C.L.R. James, Black Jacobins, op. cit. p.p. 8-9.
83. Eric Williams, The Negro in the Caribbean (Washington, D.C.: Associates in Negro Folk Education, 1942), p.p. 13-14.
84. Gordon Lewis, Growth of the Modern West Indies, op. cit., p. 49.
85. David Lowenthal, West Indian Societies, op. cit., p.p. 42-43.
86. Frantz Fanon, Wretched of the Earth, op. cit., p. 41.
87. Ibid., p. 43.
88. Ibid., p. 101.
89. David Lowenthal, West Indian Societies, op. cit., p. xv.
90. David Lowenthal & Lombras Comitas, ed ., Slaves, Free Men, Citizens ; Work and Family Life ; Consequences of Class and Color ; Aftermath of Sovereignty (New York: Anchor Books, 1973). Trevor Munroe, and Rupert Lewis, eds., Readings in Government and Politics of the West Indies (Jamaica: University of the West Indies, 1971).
91. A classic example of the use of participant observation as a sociological-anthropological research technique is found in William Foot Whyte, Street Corner Society: The Social Structure of an Italian Slum (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966).
92. Claire Sellitz, Marie Jahoda, Morton Deutsch, and Stuart W. Cook, "Data Collection: Observational Methods", Chapter VI, Research Methods in Social Relations (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1959).
93. Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., An Introduction to Social Research (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1970).
94. Blalock says, "One of the fundamental difficulties with participant observation... is the lack of standardization usually involved. Each social scientist is like a journalist writing his own story; there is little guarantee that several journalists will report the same story.... Replication is the obvious answer to this difficulty; but replication is not always easy to accomplish." H. M. Blalock, Jr., An Introduction to Social Research, op. cit., p. 44.

## Chapter II

### CONSTITUTIONAL-POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN DOMINICA

This brief presentation of the political and constitutional history of Dominica will provide the necessary background information and reference material to accompany subsequent discussions in the rest of the study. It will be seen that the types of political-constitutional developments which have taken place in Dominica have invariably affected the life experiences of Dominicans, and hence it is important to note this history first.

In 1627<sup>1</sup>, Dominica and a number of other islands in the Caribbean were granted by a patent to the Earl of Carlisle by King Charles I.<sup>2</sup> At this time, however, the British were not in actual possession of the Island. By the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, the British had to relinquish their alleged claims to the Island and the islands of the 1627 patent, Dominica, St. Vincent, St. Lucia and Tobago were adjudged neutral territories. This neutrality, however, was constantly violated, as the British and the French continued to wage their customary war for possession of Dominica.<sup>3</sup> In 1763, the issue was re-considered by the Treaty of Paris, and Dominica was formally ceded to Britain.<sup>4</sup> Except for a brief interlude of French repossession from 1778 to 1783, Dominica remained a colony until 1967, when a new constitution was established and Dominica became an Associate State.

with Britain. In this association, Dominica has complete internal self government. In 1973 Dominica was still an Associate State with Britain, and still is, today.

In 1763, when the British gained actual possession of the Island, they set up structures and institutions to regulate the governing of the colony, similar to those existing in Britain. On October 7, 1763, by a Royal Proclamation, Dominica was joined with Grenada and the Grenadines, St. Vincent and Tobago to form a single government with a Governor at its head.<sup>5</sup> His government consisted of a Board of Councils made up of nominees from each of the colonies. The Governor was responsible for the security, the liberties and the properties of the British inhabitants and he had the authority to convene General Assemblies when 'state and circumstances' permitted.<sup>6</sup> The Governor and the King's Councils, in conjunction with the representatives of the people, who were elected from among the freeholders and inhabitants of the colony, were to make laws in a General Assembly to bind all the people as near as possible to the laws of England. Therefore, the Governor was considered to be a direct representative and colonial figure of the King, and the colonial Council and Assembly were to be duplicates of the British House of Lords and Commons.

In 1768, Dominica had its first short-lived Assembly. One of the first legislative acts of the Assembly was an amendment to a

number of ordinances which had been devised by Governor Melville and his Council and which had been in effect prior to the inauguration of the Assembly. This act led to a conflict between the Governor and the Assembly and the issue was finally resolved in 1803 when the local court demanded that the legislative act be abrogated. This particular conflict is worth noting, for it began a series of conflicts between the Governor and the Assembly which became a regular feature and notable trademark of the colonial constitutional-political administration throughout the 19th century, and which persisted up to the beginning of the 20th century when Crown Colony rule was imposed on Dominica.<sup>7</sup>

In 1775, a major constitutional development took place in the political system in Dominica when the King of England conceded to the demand of the colonial legislature to set up a government in Dominica independent of the single governmental arrangement that was formed in 1763. By a Royal Proclamation, an Assembly for Dominica was to be elected from the various towns and parishes in the Island. The Governor appointed the twelve man Council, and he himself was the head of government. The Proclamation specified the necessary qualifications for electors and designated that nine members would be the required quorum to conduct legislative business.

From among the twelve Council members, the Governor was permitted to choose seven members for his Privy Council. As a general rule, the whole Council and a Lieutenant Governor were to assist the Governor in the administration of his office, in making and carrying out executive policies and decisions. In its legislative capacity, the Council shared equally its authority with the Assembly to make laws.

statutes and ordinances for the governance of the Island.

As the two bodies shared equally in the legislative authority, an Act of either House became law of the colony only with the joint consent of the Council and the Assembly. In the Assembly, the important officers were the Spoker, the Sergeant of Arms, who was also the Messenger of the Assembly, and the Clerk. In the Council, the important officers were the Chief Justice, the Judge of the Court of Admiralty, who was also the assistant justice, the Attorney General, the Registrar, and the Prevost Marshal. All these officers, as well as the other members of the two bodies, were exempted from military duties in the colony. This political arrangement did not undergo any significant development until 1833.

In this new governmental arrangement the Governor, although he continued to be a direct representative and local figure of the King, now had additional independent responsibilities outside the jurisdiction of both the Council and Assembly. He was made the General of the Colonial forces and militia in the Island with the authority to grant commissions and deploy troops when he considered it to be in the interest of protecting the colony, the white inhabitants and their property. He had the authority to allot and renew land grants and leases. He could grant licenses to school teachers, to taverns, to innkeepers, for marriages and for gambling purposes. As a check on his independent jurisdiction, however, his control over the Island's purse was restricted. Money for any project, including protection costs, was controlled and dispensed by the planter class which dominated the elected Assembly. This independent jurisdiction of the planter class over monetary and financial matters in the colony on one hand, and the independent duties and



responsibilities of the Governor which relied on the allocation of funds from the planter class on the other hand, created a constant source of friction in the colonial plantation system.<sup>8</sup>

In 1778, the French, under the command of the Marquis de Bouille, recaptured Dominica.<sup>9</sup> This re-possession was shortlived, and by the Treaty of Versailles in 1783 Dominica was returned to the British. During the French occupation the Legislative General Assembly continued to function and even passed some bills.<sup>10</sup>

In 1784, Sir John Orde became the Governor of the Island and convened a new Assembly, which immediately had to deal with an internal revolt by the Dominican Maroon-slaves. This revolt threatened the plantation's political and economic systems so severely that by 1797 the colonial planter class, through the General Assembly, passed laws which made death or banishment the punishment for Maroons.<sup>11</sup> In addition, laws were passed allowing slave testimony in court when the slaves gave information concerning the whereabouts and the activities of the Maroons.

In 1791, when the planter class considered the Maroon revolt successfully suppressed, it openly gave its thanks to Governor Orde for his determined efforts in the suppression. However, as other relations between the Assembly and the Governor remained strained, Orde's successful suppression of the slaves notwithstanding, the planters forced the British Government to recall Orde to answer the various charges of misconduct which the planter class had levelled against him.<sup>13</sup>

In 1802, George Prevost was appointed Governor of Dominica. In that year, the Black Rangers of the 1st West India Regiment, who

were recruited to erect fortifications, revolted at the Cabritts in the north of Dominica. Many of the Black Rangers escaped with weapons and joined the Maroons in the woods and forests of Dominica. In 1805, the French attempted to recapture the Island but succeeded only in setting fire to Roseau, the capital.

The plantation slave system in Dominica was finally abolished in 1832. In that year, the mulattoes --- free-people-of-colour --- were granted political rights and privileges by the Brown Privilege Bill and by 1838, the number of mulattoes in the House of Assembly had increased to give them a majority.<sup>14</sup>

In 1833, another major constitutional development took place in the colonial system when the colonial government in Dominica was placed under a single governmental arrangement with those of Antigua and the other Leeward Islands.<sup>15</sup> At the head of this new plan was a Governor-in-Chief who resided in Antigua, and in each of the islands a Lieutenant Governor presided as the head of the local government. Under this arrangement, the Dominican legislature comprised, in addition to the Lieutenant Governor, seven elected and seven nominated members. Except for a common Governor-in-Chief, however, the islands remained autonomous units.

A further development occurred in 1863 when a Single Chamber Act was passed granting the Governor the authority to appoint members to the House of Assembly. These appointed members were to share legislative authority on an equal basis with the elected representatives. This new development initiated an outburst of political protest, especially from among the elected mulatto class. As a result, an elected

mulatto member of the Assembly, G. W. Falconer, was sent by the coloured middle class to England to petition the Queen to intercede on its behalf and to nullify the Single Chamber Act.<sup>16</sup> The petition was unsuccessful and in October of 1864, Dominica received a Single Chamber Constitution.

The Single Chamber plan, however, proved rather cumbersome and ineffective in operation. Less than a year after its establishment a bill was introduced to terminate the arrangement and instate a crown colony rule system. This generated intense political agitation among the coloured (mulatto) elected members of the legislature.<sup>17</sup> Their protest was so incessant that a compromise had to be effected and the crown colony rule bill was withdrawn. This compromise allowed for a legislature limited to fourteen members, seven elected and seven nominated members with the Governor allowed a vote only in the case of a tie. Five members constituted a quorum. This particular legislative format remained operative until crown colony rule was eventually imposed on the colonial system in Dominica in 1898.

In 1871, Dominica became a unit, or a presidency, in the Leeward Island Federation whose government was situated in Antigua. The local office of Lieutenant Governor was abolished and replaced by that of a President who represented the Governor residing in Antigua and acted by his authority. The Federal Executive Council and the Federal Legislative Council, created by the Leeward Islands Act of 1871, comprised twenty members.<sup>18</sup> Ten of these members were nominated by the Governor, and the other ten were elected by the local members from among the six islands' legislatures. Dominica was permitted two elected members, Antigua three.

and the other five members came from the other four presidencies.

The Federal constitution granted the Federal government concurrent powers with those of each of the island's legislatures, unless it was otherwise specified by the Leeward Island Act of 1871.<sup>19</sup> The finances for the Federal government were obtained from a proportionate system devised for each Presidency. The Federal legal system comprised a Supreme Court of the Leeward Islands and three judges with jurisdiction in each of the islands. Dominica remained a unit in this Federation until 1940, in spite of incessant local protest.

The constitutional development which engendered the most mulatto middle class protest was undoubtedly the imposition of a crown colony rule system on Dominica in 1898. It was imposed despite the recommendations made by a Royal Commission of Inquiry sent out by the British government to investigate the conditions existing in Dominica.<sup>20</sup> With the imposition of crown colony rule, both the franchise, limited as it was, and the Constitution of 1863 were abolished. The Legislative Council was replaced by the Crown which ruled directly from England. In actuality, the Governor of the Leeward Island Federation ruled Dominica by the authority of the British Crown. The Legislative Council under this system comprised twelve members, six official and six unofficial, all appointed by the Governor. The formal office of President was abolished and in Dominica the Governor was represented by an Administrator.

In 1922, the Wood Royal Commission visited Dominica.<sup>21</sup> The Commission was sent by the British government in response to the persistent protests of the people of Dominica, and more specifically, the protests of the Representative Government Association, founded in 1919 to oppose the

system of crown colony rule. On the basis of the Commission's recommendations a modified constitution within the crown colony matrix was introduced in Dominica. The Dominica coloured middle class considered the modified constitution to be most inadequate, for it represented, at best, only a slight crack in the formal system of crown colony rule. This constitution allowed for the election of only four members to the unofficial side of the legislature. The other two unofficial members and the whole official side were still appointed by the Governor. In 1925, under the modified constitution, an election was held and in July of that year the new Council met.

In 1932, Dominicans, specifically the Tax Payers Reform Association under the astute leadership of Cecil E. Rawle, took the initiative to convene a West Indian Conference. The Conference was held in Roseau and was well attended by West Indians from all of the islands with the exception of Jamaica. At the Conference, the West Indians were uncompromising in their condemnation of crown colony rule. In addition to the abolition of crown colony rule, the West Indians asserted in clear terms their keen desire for greater political freedom and increased local autonomy within the islands.<sup>22</sup> These steps were seen as the necessary foundation for the eventual creation of a West Indian Federation.<sup>23</sup>

In light of the impact of the West Indian Conference, the Secretary of State for Colonies dispatched a Royal Commission, the Closer Union Commission, to Dominica in 1933. The objective of the Commission as the name suggests, was to investigate the feasibility of a closer union on more autonomous lines of the Leeward Islands, the

Windward Islands and Trinidad. After its investigation, the Commission recommended greater local autonomy for each island, and an increase in the numbers of the unofficial side of the legislature over that which had been established by the recommendations of the Wood Royal Commission.<sup>24</sup>

Due to the impressive outcome of the West Indian Conference and the recommendations of the Closer Union Commission, a further modification was made to the crown colony rule system in Dominica. A provision was instituted whereby the Legislative Council would consist of three official members; three nominated non-official members, five elected members, and an Administrator. Under this modified constitution, the Administrator could cast a vote only to break a tie. As a safeguard measure, in this allegedly advanced-constitutional re-arrangement, the Governor was vested with a number of reserve powers. In this supposedly liberal crown colony rule constitution, the voting age qualification was established uniformly at twenty-one years; this of course was in addition to the property and income qualifications that were in existence since the 1924 constitution. New electoral districts in the parishes and the towns of the Northern, Southern, Eastern and Western districts were created to accommodate this constitutional advance. Roseau stood as an independent electoral district.<sup>25</sup>

Partly because of the increased voting privileges granted by this advanced crown colony constitution, additional impetus was generated at the local level for immediate severance of Dominica's connection with the Leeward Island Federation and for joining the Windward Island group. Dominica, it was argued, had far more in common, economically, and otherwise, with the Windward Islands. The need for such

a change was once more communicated to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. This time the British government granted the demand of the people of Dominica. By an Imperial Act in 1938 --- the Dominica Act of 1938 --- it was agreed that Dominica would end her federal association with the Leeward Islands, and in January 1940 it became a colony within the Windward Island group.<sup>26</sup>

In 1938, the Moyne Royal Commission visited Dominica to examine the general situation in the Island which had resulted, to a large extent, from the Depression of that decade.<sup>27</sup> The Commission concluded that social and economic conditions were so wretched that thoughts envisaging further significant political and constitutional developments should not be entertained until the working conditions, specifically for the labouring black people, were vastly improved.<sup>28</sup> Moreover, in order to improve the working conditions in the Island, the Commission recommended the passage of labour legislation. These legislative provisions suggested by the Commission facilitated the successful introduction of the first Trade Union organization in Dominica by Mr. E. Christopher Loblack. Because of World War II, however, the Dominica Trade Union did not emerge officially until 1945.

In 1951, Dominica achieved Universal Adult Suffrage. With it came the abolition of income and property qualifications as the prerequisites to stand for election to the Legislative Council. A deposit of \$120 was the only requirement for candidacy. Universal Adult Suffrage meant, among other things, that the Legislative Council was permitted a clear majority of eight representatives from a constituted eight electoral districts. Members of the Legislative Council were

authorized to select three of their own members to sit in the established Executive Council, and they also had the authority to recall these three elected members to the Executive Council by a two-thirds majority vote. The Governor of the Windward Islands, nonetheless, continued as the head of the government of Dominica. In his absence the local Administrator presided.

A subsequent crack occurred in the crown colony rule system when the constitution was further modified to accommodate a ministerial arrangement.<sup>29</sup> "On 12th March 1956, Dominica emerged from a largely Crown system towards that of responsible Government."<sup>30</sup> This event, however, did not prevent the Administrator from wielding his usual authority, especially in the financial sphere. It was at this juncture in the constitutional history of the island that the Dominica United People's Party was organized by Franklin A. Baron, who was one of the three initial members to be elected to the Executive Council. The Dominica United People's Party was not, however, the first popular political party in the Island, for the Dominica Labour Party had preceded it by almost a year.

In 1959, two interrelated and additional provisions were incorporated into the framework of the ministerial plan. First, the Executive Council was made collectively responsible to the Legislative Council. Secondly, the Legislative Council assumed the authority to remove the government by a vote of no confidence. These two developments were considered important because they made the government more responsible to the people's representation in the Legislative Council.



Under section III of the Constitutional Order in Council of 1959, the Administrator was granted the authority to appoint a Chief Minister providing that the Chief Minister to be appointed had the support and confidence of the elected members of the government. The Chief Minister was to be the first among equals in the Executive Branch of the government. All other ministers were to be appointed by the Administrator guided by the advice of the Chief Minister.<sup>31</sup> In 1960, Franklin A. Baron became Dominica's first Chief Minister and the Minister of Finance. The number of government ministers was established at four. Aside from Finance, the others included Trade and Production, Labour and Social Services, and Communications and Works. In spite of these developments, the Administrator remained the colonial head of the Executive Council.

The duties and responsibilities of the Council encompassed the organization of the Civil Service and the administration of financial matters.<sup>32</sup> The Legislative Council was charged with making general laws for the proper functioning of the government of Dominica. The Chief Minister was charged with the power to call the Legislative Council into session, and the Administrator retained the prerogative to prorogue the Legislative Council after five years of its first meeting. With the ministerial arrangement operating as smoothly as was anticipated, the stage was set for the introduction of cabinet government in Dominica.

In 1967, crown colony rule officially came to an end in Dominica. On March 1, Dominica became a State in association with Britain. Although

the executive authority is exercised on behalf of the Queen by a Governor, this authority is nominal rather than actual, for unless the constitution specifies otherwise, the Island is ruled by a Premier and four ministers in a cabinet.

Today Dominica is autonomous in all matters with the exception of defence and external affairs. The British government is responsible for external defence of the Island and for conducting foreign affairs. Even under this plan, however, the Dominica government can conduct negotiations and sign treaties that are local in orientation and impact. Dominica can sign agreements in areas of trade, financial and technical assistance, cultural and scientific relations with any member of the Commonwealth and the U.S.A., or with any organization of which the United Kingdom is a member.<sup>33</sup> Britain still maintains control, nevertheless, over matters of nationality and citizenship status, and Dominican citizenship is governed by the British Nationality Acts.

The government of Dominica has the authority to change the provisions of the constitution subject to certain procedures. In the case of terminating her association with Britain a two-thirds majority vote of the House of Assembly and a two-thirds majority vote cast at a referendum are mandatory. No referendum is necessary, however, to end the association for purposes of joining or forming a liason with any other Commonwealth country in the Caribbean. The United Kingdom reserves the right to terminate unilaterally her connection with Dominica but has given the assurance that it would provide the Island with a six months notice of its decision to end the relationship, and would hold

a conference with the Island to discuss the political and economic consequences of such a step.

In 1993, Dominica was still a State in association with Britain. In that year the Dominican government was giving serious consideration to following Grenada's example, to seek political independence from Britain in 1974. This independence was defined naively and negatively by the Dominican government. The Dominican government simply wanted to terminate the Island's association with Britain so that the Island could have its own independent constitution.<sup>35</sup> It is doubtful that the people of Dominica will allow their government to take such a drastic step at this time.

## Chapter II

## Footnotes

1. Dominica, pronounced Dom-IN-ee-ka was 'discovered' on November 3, 1493, by Christopher Columbus. For additional material on the Island's physical features, climate and demographic characteristics see "Appendix I".
2. For an elaboration of details of the patent, see, Sir Allan Burns, History of the British West Indies (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.) p. 194.
3. The British and the French were at constant war for possession of the Island. See for example works of Joseph Boromé, "The French and Dominica, 1699 - 1763", and Cecil A. Goodridge, "Dominica - The French Connexion", in Dominica, Aspects of the Dominican History (Roseau: Government Printery, 1972).
4. Sir Allan Burns, op. cit., p. 505.
5. The first Governor of this arrangement was Robert Melville.
6. Charles Clarke, A Summary of Colonial Law; The Practice of the Court of Appeals from the Plantation, (London: Sweet, 1834), p. 135.
7. For example, in 1783 Sir John Orde, the Governor, was recalled to England to answer to charges levelled against him by the planters in the local assembly. See, Fillian's Almanac and Dominica Year Book, ed. A. R. Lockhart (Roseau: Official Gazette Office, 1876 edition), p. 78. In 1815 Governor Ainslie suffered a fate similar to Orde's; see Dominica, Collection of Plain Authentic Documents in Justification of the Conduct of Governor Ainslie in the Reduction of a most Formidable Rebellion among the negro slaves in the island of Dominica; at a crisis of the most imminent changes to the lives and property of the inhabitants (London: C. Lowndes, 1815).
8. For a more general and elaborate account of the authority and jurisdiction of the Governor in theory and practice see, Chapter II in D.J. Murray, The West Indies and the Development of Colonial Government 1801 - 1834, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), and especially Chapter II. In Morley Aycarst, The British West Indies: The Search for Self Government, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1962). Also see Hume Wrong, Government of the West Indies, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923).

9. Sir Allan Burns, op. cit., p. 520.
10. Thomas Atwood, The History of the Island of Dominica, (London: 1791; also London: Frank Cass & Co., 1971), p.p. 138-170.
11. See laws concerning Runaways in "Clause III of the Legislature" in Dominica, Laws of Dominica, (Roseau: Attorney General's Office, 1828 edition), p.p. 142-158.
12. Dominica: Trials of Runaway Slaves, 1786-1787 and Official Communication in Connection with Runaway Slaves 1787-1803, ed., Rev. Fr. Prosemans (Pointe Michel: The Proseman's Archives, n.d.).
13. Fillan's Almanac, op. cit., p. 78; also see Sir Allan Burns, op. cit., p. 544. He adds that Orde was eventually honourably cleared of all charges.
14. Even to permit the free-people-of-colour to sit in the Legislative Assembly the qualifications for voters and representatives had to be changed. See Fillan's Almanac, op. cit., p. 84. On the issue of the Brown Privilege Bill see, J. Boromé "How Crown Colony Government Came to Dominica", in Aspects of Dominican History, op. cit.
15. The Leeward Islands are a part of a chain of islands running northward of Dominica in what is called the "Caribbean Archipelago".
16. The continuous political protest of the mulattoes in the post emancipation has lead David Lowenthal to say: "In the-British Caribbean white rule was successfully challenged only in Dominica where ... the 'Mulato Ascendancy' kept control of the legislature for two generations after emancipation, inducing at least one white overseer to leave for another island with the comment that he hoped 'niggers will not be quite so saucy as they are here ... The day is not far distant when this miserable place will be a miniature San Domingo". David Lowenthal, West Indian Societies (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 63. Section quoted by Lowenthal is from 'Amicus', Dominica Colonist (11 July 1863).
17. The protest activities of the coloured middle class (mulattoes) will be discussed in Chapter IV.
18. See, for an elaboration of "The Leeward Islands Act 1871", Fillan's Almanac, op. cit., p.p. 39-46.
19. Such was the Federal Jurisdiction that it could make null and void any local act which conflicted with a federal act.

20. See, Sir Robert Hamilton, Chairman, Report of the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into Conditions and Affairs of the Island of Dominica, (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1894).
21. West Indies, Report of Hon. E.F.L. Wood, M.P. (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for the Colonies), (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1922).
22. The writer was fortunate enough to have been able to interview Randolph Lockhart who was then the Secretary of the TPRA. The interview was held in July, 1973, in Roseau, Dominica.
23. A West Indian Federation, which included Jamaica, came into being in 1959 and collapsed, for many reasons, by 1962. In 1962, Jamaica and Trinidad became politically independent.
24. See, West Indies, Report of the Closer Union Commission, (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1933)
25. Constitutional and political events of this period became much clearer from informal and formal interviews held in July and August 1973 with Franklin Baron, Stanley Boyd, Randolph Lockhard and Carlton Grell.
26. Sir Allan Burns, op. cit., p. 699.
27. West Indies, West India Royal Commission Report, (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1945).
28. Both E. C. Loblack and Carlton Grell were very helpful in providing background information to the Moyne Commission in Dominica. In fact, they were both consultants to the Moyne Commission.
29. The introduction of the Ministerial arrangement was discussed with F. A. Baron, the First Chief Minister in that arrangement. The interview with Mr. Baron was held in August 1973, Roseau, Dominica.
30. Dominica, Development Plan 1971 - 1975 (Roseau: Government Printery n.d.), p. 1.
31. Ibid., p.2.
32. Interview with F. A. Baron held in August, 1973, Roseau, Dominica.
33. R. L. Williams, Industrial Development of Dominica, (Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1971), p. 3.
34. Dominica, Development Plan 1971 - 1975, op. cit., p. 5.

35. This question concerning independence will be raised again and discussed in Chapter VIII

## Chapter III

### THE SLAVES AND THE MAROONS IN THE PLANTATION SITUATION

#### I

The Constitutional history of Dominica outlined in the previous chapter provides little information concerning actual governing practices in the plantation system, especially as these practices relate to the enslaved people of Dominica. In order to understand this relationship it is necessary to identify the actual political and economic measures devised and utilized by the colonial ruling class in the slave system in Dominica. In turn, this understanding will enable the reader to discern some of the contributing factors behind the various activities of the enslaved Dominicans in their struggle for human survival and their efforts to change the oppressive slave system.

#### Colonial Plantation Politics

It is generally agreed that British political and economic control of slave plantations was similar throughout the British Caribbean colonies.<sup>1</sup> The Caribbean islands shared a common experience of foreign British domination and exploitation of their land and human resources. Indeed, the actual political practices were based on this exploitation and domination of resources.<sup>2</sup>

In the British West Indies, the plantation, political and economic systems were directly related, with each system forming a supporting unit for the other. Thus it was not possible in the plantation situation to



affect either the economic or political system without simultaneously affecting them both. The ruling elite --- the white planter class<sup>3</sup>--- controlled these two interlocking systems which were founded on black slavery and exploitation of economic and land resources and which formed the basis for maintaining white plantation society in the Caribbean from the 17th to the 19th century.<sup>4</sup>

Beginning in 1763, when the British took possession of Dominica, the plantation society was ruled and dominated by an exclusively British planter class which viewed itself as a political and economic oligarchy.<sup>5</sup> At that period, the French were excluded from direct participation in the Assembly or Council and from other official capacities.<sup>6</sup> The British Crown appointed a Governor to head the colonial government in Dominica<sup>7</sup>, but in actuality his authority was more nominal than real, especially when it infringed upon the interests of the local planter class.<sup>8</sup> As the planters controlled the Island's purse strings, the Governor was virtually at their mercy and it was only on those occasions when the planter class considered its life, property and other interests to be in serious jeopardy, that they willingly gave the Governor their cooperation. For example, funds were allocated to the Governor for raising a militia for the protection of the plantation society from French and Maroon slave invasions.<sup>10</sup>

In addition to the regular planters, the white ruling oligarchy comprised merchants, businessmen, and professional men including lawyers, and medical doctors, many of whom served as attorneys for absentee plantation owners. These people resided, for the most part, in Portsmouth, Grandbay and especially in Roseau --- the seat of the local government ---

and in other areas easily accessible to Roseau.

A substantial number of the plantation owners in Dominica were absentee owners.<sup>11</sup> Many of the original owners had accumulated sufficient wealth from the exploitation of slave labour and natural resources of Dominica, and had returned to Britain, leaving the direct supervision of the plantation to a hired attorney.<sup>12</sup> This phenomenon increased hardships for the slaves as the attorney's main concern was to maximize plantation profits in order to satisfy both the absentee owner and himself so that he, too, could return to Britain and live a life of comfort. The procedures utilized by the attorneys to achieve that goal served to increase the abuses and atrocities perpetrated against the slaves --- whom he did not consider his own property --- and against the land resources in Dominica.<sup>13</sup>

Only the wealthy white British inhabitants in Dominica belonged directly to the colonial ruling elite.<sup>14</sup> However, a white person who did not belong directly to the ruling oligarchy was nonetheless a member of the general ruling class,<sup>15</sup> as opposed to the mulattoes and the black slaves who comprised the overwhelming majority of the population of the plantation system.<sup>16</sup> Given the direct and dynamic relationship between the plantation economic and political systems, and the fact that no white person was excluded from the general ruling class, it followed that not even the poorest white person was permitted to engage in any form of manual labour.<sup>17</sup> If a white inhabitant were allowed to do manual labour, an occupation reserved exclusively for slaves, it would relegate that individual to the status of a plantation slave. This would have reflected badly on the white ruling oligarchy and would have tarnished the cherished

and dominant myth of white racial superiority.

Thus it can be seen that all whites benefited from the plantation system in Dominica in the 18th century, and therefore all shared a common concern in preserving its stability and continuity.<sup>18</sup> Even the French inhabitants, who in 1763 were formally excluded from active participation in the plantation political life for international political and religious reasons, were allowed by the beginning of the 19th century to involve themselves actively with the ruling class and elite to preserve the plantation system in Dominica.<sup>19</sup>

11

Bryan Edwards, a British planter and an influential historian of the plantation, characterized West Indian slaves thusly: "Miserable people ... condemned to perpetual exile and servitude."<sup>20</sup> The Dominican slaves fitted that characterization perfectly. In Dominica, as elsewhere in the Caribbean colonies, masters were granted absolute authority over the enslaved people.

Masters have absolute property in their slaves... the very existence of the plantation depends on the masters' having every authority over the slaves that is necessary to enforce their implicit obedience and keep them under due subjection on all occasions. <sup>21</sup>

Indeed, even laws passed by the planter class as a group to preserve the plantation system did not affect the absolute rule of an individual master over his own slaves.<sup>22</sup>

The enslaved people of Dominica were considered property or, at best, inferior beings by the planter class.<sup>23</sup> Consequently, they were excluded entirely from all deliberations and policy making pertinent to

both their lives and activities. The black people were allowed a legal personality only when it was in the interest of the planter class to grant one. Thus, for example, when the protection of the plantation society from internal Maroon-slave rebellions was at stake, slave evidence was made admissible in the colonial courts with regard to Maroons, their activities and whereabouts.<sup>24</sup> In policies pertaining to slaves' working conditions, food, housing, hours of labour, birth rate and number of children, the white ruling class imposed their will on the black masses regardless of the desires and concerns of the blacks.

Plantation field supervisors and slave drivers shared in the absolute role of masters over slaves. Total control in the field extended from 'normal' slave supervision to brutal and physical punishment as a means of making the slaves more efficient and submissive to authority.<sup>25</sup>

The severity of slave discipline was justified on the grounds that a system of forced labour must rely on some effective compulsion. 26

Concerning punishment of slaves in the Caribbean, an observer had this to say:

Every ten negroes have a driver, who walks behind them, holding a short whip and a long one.... They [slaves] are naked, male and female, down to the girdle, and you constantly observe where the application has been made. 27

This inhumane treatment of the slaves, was often justified on the grounds that black people, like lower animals, suffered little or no pain.

When one comes to be better acquainted with the nature of negroes, the horror of it must wear off i.e., 'brutal punishment'. It is the suffering of the mind that constitutes the greatest misery of punishment, but with them it is merely corporeal. As to brutes it inflicts no wound on the mind, whose natures seem made to bear it and whose sufferings are not attended with shame or pain beyond the present moment. 28

This and other racist arguments and views helped to justify the total power of masters over slaves. These justifications also served to remove the possible guilt that some masters might have felt had they been conscious that their extreme brutality towards slaves was perpetrated against actual human beings, not animals or chattel.<sup>29</sup> Given the general acceptance and belief in these rationalizations, legal sanctions and moral suasion proved ineffective in checking the atrocities inflicted by masters on slaves. In fact, economic interests in the plantation system provided the only significant and real curb on a master's treatment of a slave; for as the slave was considered indispensable chattel to a profitable plantation economy, it was important to the master that the slave not be so thoroughly brutalized as to become useless and unprofitable to the plantation economy.<sup>30</sup>

111

The mulattoes --- the free-people-of-colour --- were a marginal group in the colonial-plantation system,<sup>31</sup> occupying a position in plantation society between the white ruling class at the top and the slaves at the bottom.<sup>32</sup> They were not white. Therefore they were not recognized as free in a society that made 'white' synonymous with 'human freedom'. Hence, mulattoes were subordinate to the white ruling class and were excluded from political deliberations and decision making

processes in the colonial system.<sup>33</sup> When it was in the interest of the white ruling class, the mulato group was employed to protect the plantation society from Maroons. However, this 'duty' did not entitle the mulato class to share any political rights and privileges with the white ruling inhabitants. While the lot of the mulatoes was significantly better than that of the slaves, their position remained, nonetheless, both unenviable and ambivalent.<sup>34</sup> Thus, for instance, while many mulatoes joined the colonial militia and search parties to scout the woods for Maroons, some of them used the occasion to join the Maroons to participate actively with them in the slave cause.<sup>35</sup> A substantial number of mulatoes who did not join the colonial forces or participate actively with the Maroons did, however, assist the Maroon struggle in other ways.<sup>36</sup> It is in conjunction with the Maroon struggle that the mulatoes of Dominica will be discussed in this chapter.

#### Colonial Plantation Economics and Slave Labour

The plantation economic system in Dominica was specifically set up to meet the requirements of coffee and sugar production.<sup>37</sup> In 1788, there were over two-hundred and fifty coffee estates and fifty sugar plantations in Dominica.<sup>38</sup> These coffee plantations produced half the coffee in the British Caribbean. The system of black slavery was introduced in Dominica to meet the growing demand for coffee and sugar in the metropolitan centres and simultaneously to produce large profits for those colonialists engaged in the production of such crops.<sup>39</sup> Prior to the introduction of black slavery in Dominica, the European colonists, particularly the Spanish and the French, used the labour of the indigenous

Caribs in the cultivation of coffee and sugar.<sup>40</sup> When the demand for these crops increased, black slavery became necessary because the indigenous Caribs proved to be a most difficult people for the Europeans to enslave and the Europeans finally exterminated them.<sup>41</sup> Thus, by the time the British had taken full possession of the Island from the French, the slave institution was operating almost at its peak capacity. At the beginning of the 19th century black slaves of both African and Creole descent numbered over fifteen thousand persons, and were the only source of plantation labour in Dominica.

Most of the available flat land was cultivated on the island including the relatively flat lands of Layou and Canefield which were cultivated with sugar-cane. Coffee was grown in the hillier districts, including Grand-bay and Bellevue.<sup>42</sup> After allowances for basic capital outlay on the plantation, including slaves, building mills and store houses, obtaining rudimentary plantation tools, and spending as little as possible on food for the slaves, the planters made a clear profit from the lands cultivated by the enslaved people of Dominica.

The planters of the 18th and 19th centuries made substantial profits from the lands cultivated by the enslaved people whom they worked hard and fed as little as possible.<sup>43</sup> At the same time, the planters enjoyed a life of leisure marked by lavish food consumption and tastes. An observer noted that, "...at even a country dwelling of a planter one found the choicest of wines and food for a dinner of sixteen to twenty people."<sup>44</sup> Even the overseers lived "like princes,"<sup>45</sup> and to satisfy their own lavish tastes and yet not interfere with the

planter's profits, they would overwork the slaves and, when possible, even decrease their meagre food supply.

The Dominican field slaves were allowed to grow their own food on small patches of abandoned plantation tracts, or on lands considered unsuitable for profitable cultivation of export and marketable crops. On these plots the field slaves grew ground provisions and vegetables which included yams, tania, dasheen, bananas and plantains.<sup>46</sup> On Sunday, both church and market day for the slaves, they would sell quantities of these provisions and vegetables for other basic necessities including coarse clothes and eating utensils.<sup>47</sup>

Enslaved Dominicans shared a common method of plantation labour organization with other enslaved West Indians. The slaves were forced to work in gangs which were summoned to the fields each working day at sunrise by the sound of a conch shell or a bell. The slaves were accompanied by a supervisor and a driver and were made to work all day except for a lunch break around mid-day. Those who did not arrive on time at the field were usually punished by the driver who carried a whip at all times. During the harvest season especially, the slaves who worked at the mills or boiling houses laboured either very late or all day and night.<sup>48</sup>

The tools and implements that the field slaves were compelled to use contributed to the horrors of enforced slave labour. Students of the plantation system are in agreement that making holes in the ground with a hoe was one of the most laborious tasks that West Indian slaves had to perform;<sup>49</sup> yet planters insisted that the slaves use



the hoe rather than the plough, although it made the task extremely difficult. The planters assumed that if the slaves did not work continuously, they would involve themselves in activities destructive to the plantation system and thus they devised a planting system that occupied slaves all year round. As a result, a vicious cycle was established. As the slaves were compelled to labour all year, they proved, from a plantation standpoint, most inefficient and required more supervision; in turn, to make the slaves more productive the supervisors and drivers resorted to harsher and more frequent punishment. This phenomenon served to create a greater incentive among the Dominican slaves to run away and to resist.<sup>50</sup>

It is against the background of the plantation political and economic systems that one must understand the enslaved people's activities, their attempts to survive as human beings and to change the conditions that attempted to make their human survival impossible. Given these considerations, the next section of this chapter focusses on the survival activities of enslaved Dominicans, especially those of the Maroons --- the Runaway slaves.<sup>51</sup>

## II

Orlando Patterson states correctly that: "Despite the rigours and the severity of slavery and despite the all-embracing nature of the exploitation by the master of his slave and the totality of domination over him, the latter nonetheless was never completely subdued."<sup>52</sup> The absolute authority of the master over the slave and the resulting brutality were attempts by the master to dehumanize

the slave and to ensure complete submission to his control and schemes. This inhumane exercise of unbridled power, however, drove the slave to struggle incessantly against the master and the plantation system.<sup>53</sup> This was a major reason why the Dominican slave was never "completely subdued"; he constantly struggled against the forces that sought to make him a chattel.

In 1662, there were approximately 338 black people in Dominica.<sup>54</sup> There is no indication that a formal slave institution existed then, but by about 1720, the French introduced the black slave institution into Dominica.<sup>55</sup> Up to this time, the Spanish and the French had made various attempts to enslave the indigenous "savage" Caribs,<sup>56</sup> and as the venture had proven too difficult, the Europeans systematically annihilated the original inhabitants of Dominica. So effective was this policy of genocide that by the middle of the 18th century the English historian, T. Atwood, could record that "there are not more than 20 or 30 families" of Caribs in Dominica.<sup>57</sup>

Since Carib enslavement proved unsuccessful, the Europeans found it necessary to obtain another cheap source of labour in order to make the cultivation of coffee a profitable colonial venture. The answer was black slavery.<sup>58</sup>

The French introduced a slave system in Dominica which was Catholic in orientation. This French Catholic slave system had a number of significant features. The French Jesuit priests, for instance, who were slave owners in Dominica, baptized and presented their slaves with a knowledge of the Catholic religion. The slaves were taught about life after death and the meaning of Heaven and Hell. They learned

that Heaven could be attained by their obedience to God's will and that of their earthly masters.<sup>59</sup> It was hoped, of course, that such instruction would make the plantation slave even more willing to accept his subordinate status and the absolute authority of his earthly master.

Ironically, instruction in the Catholic faith, and in the French language proved immensely valuable in the slaves' struggle for human survival. The very fact that the religious teachings constituted a pedagogy served implicitly to raise the consciousness of the slaves and to sensitize them further to their human plight. The French language provided them with a common language in which to communicate and share that plight, and it meant that the slaves could easily grasp the significant principles and ideals of the French Revolution despite the efforts of the British planters to prevent it. When the vast majority of the French plantations were distributed to British planters in 1763, the French language became extremely beneficial to the slaves since it permitted them to converse with each other to the discernable frustration of the non-French speaking British masters.<sup>60</sup> In time the French language and the English language, which the slaves were compelled to learn in order to understand the commands of the British masters, were integrated by the slaves in a number of curious and novel ways to form Dominican Creole Patois.<sup>61</sup>

There is no evidence that collective slave violence and the phenomenon of Runaway slaves were features of the French plantation system in Dominica.<sup>62</sup> At least three interrelated factors may have accounted for this absence: first, the general influence of the Catholic Church and the physical presence of the French Jesuit priests who were

considered to be the most humane of slave masters; secondly, the French Slave Code which was influenced by the Catholic religion and regulated masters' relations to the slaves; thirdly, the regular visits of metropolitan officials who checked to ascertain that slave ordinances and codes were obeyed by masters.<sup>63</sup> By 1763, however, with the distribution of most of the French plantations, including those belonging to the Jesuits, to British planters, the phenomenon of Runaway slaves began and continued to be a regular aspect of the British plantation system in the Island. Even the biased English historian, T. Atwood, accurately claimed that the extraordinarily severe treatment of the slaves by the new British masters caused this method of slave resistance. The British masters were responsible for numerous deaths and "caused others to runaway into the woods."<sup>64</sup>

In order to survive in the extraordinarily harsh British plantation system, the enslaved Dominicans were involved in both non-violent and violent activities. While both types of activity contributed significantly to the struggle for human survival, the Maroons' violent activities, however, had the greatest impact on the plantation system, for the Maroons sought to alter the system radically.

#### The Non-Violent Struggle of the Slaves

The enslaved Dominicans engaged in a number of major non-violent activities in plantation society including Obeah and Superstition, Feigning sickness, Idleness and Inefficiency, and Looting.

Dominican Obeah<sup>65</sup> which originated in plantation slavery is still practiced today in Dominica, especially in the rural districts, for many of the same reasons that the people of Dominica utilized it

during their bondage.<sup>66</sup> On the slave plantation, the black people were convinced that through the use of spells, charms and incantations they could invoke various Spirits to castigate extremely cruel masters. Obeah was employed by the slaves to "punish those who do them any injury" on the plantation,<sup>67</sup> and provided the slaves with psychological and emotional satisfaction as they firmly believed that they were getting even with a most vicious master.

However, Obeah in this form did little to threaten the lives of masters or to force them to alter their sadistic ways towards their slaves. The practice of Obeah became menacing when the leaders among the Obeah slaves utilized their expertise in the use of poisonous herbs to exterminate some of the more cruel members of the planter class. Even the possibility of being poisoned by an Obeah expert proved threatening to many cruel masters. Because of their skill and influence the Obeah leaders were considered extremely dangerous, especially by the British masters.<sup>68</sup> Atwood adds: "By this means many white people have been killed by poison under the persuasion of these Obeah men."<sup>69</sup>

Generally, however, Obeah was practiced in less tangible and easily discernable forms of superstition. In Dominica the overwhelming majority of black people were Catholic and were of African ancestry. The union of certain facets of Catholicism with African tribal religions formed the basis for much of Obeah and general superstition in Dominica.<sup>70</sup> Even after this amalgam, Catholicism as a religion maintained an existence independent from superstition on the plantation: today this separation is still evident on the Island.<sup>71</sup> Thus many slaves believed in the notions of Heaven and Hell, the power of the dead and in evil spirits,

and they paid enormous respect to the dead who were viewed as having a source of power beyond the grave which they could invoke, and over which no master had control or authority.<sup>72</sup>

The slaves were convinced that they could call upon the dead and evil spirits to punish wicked masters, and this conviction provided them with varying degrees of gratification. Additional satisfaction was derived from their Christian interpretation that cruel masters would be castigated even further in the fires of Hell. At the same time the slaves believed that for their suffering on the plantation they would be justly rewarded in Heaven. Thus, Obeah and general superstition did contribute to the enslaved Dominicans' will to survive.

Feigning illness was one of the more popular acts of resistance employed by slaves to avoid labouring on the plantation. This simulated illness was often displayed in concrete, and visible forms to the overseers. One form was the opening of old sores in crucial areas that made it impractical to have the slave work out in the field. At other times the slaves would "have unfeelingly endured the pains of jiggers by suffering them to breed in their flesh."<sup>73</sup> The feet of the slaves would swell so badly that it would be impossible for these people to labour on the plantation. Excruciating as this experience was, Dominicans would endure such pain rather than toil on the plantation under the indiscriminating whip of a driver. A number of slaves took this form of non-violent resistance so seriously that they allowed their feet to swell to such an enormous proportion from the eggs of the jiggers that it would become necessary to amputate the infected feet.<sup>74</sup> The result was that these slaves would no longer have to labour as chattel in the fields.

Adam Smith once wrote that: "A person who can acquire no property can have no other interest than to eat as much, and to labour as little as possible."<sup>75</sup> The black people of Dominica fitted this characterization accurately. Not only were they forbidden to own property, but they were themselves considered property ---chattel for plantation labour. As such, they were forced to work for the benefit of other men and were given very little to eat. The enslaved Dominicans saw no reason to maintain the plantation system by means of their efficient and continuous labour, and consequently, they toiled as little and as inefficiently as they could get away with undetected. They were never in a hurry unless the driver was within sight, moving from their huts to the fields in the slowest way possible.

The black people complemented this strategy by acting 'stupidly' with plantation tools.<sup>76</sup> Even after they were taught again and again the proper way to use tools, they often used them in as unproductive a manner as possible. Atwood, the British historian and observer of the plantation system in Dominica, described the slaves in coffee and sugar production as follows: "Idleness is very predominant in negroes... and their dislike for labour so great, that it is very difficult to make them work."<sup>77</sup> In his eagerness to proclaim idleness as a congenital characteristic of black people, Atwood failed to grasp the obvious significance of slaves' idleness as committed resistance to plantation servitude.<sup>78</sup>

Ostensible proof of this could have been found readily on the plantation. Even a cursory examination of the tiny plots of land where field slaves grew their own food would have revealed ample evidence to

illustrate that idleness was a deliberate strategy of slave resistance. Not only did a substantial number of the field slaves grow enough for their own basic food requirements on the usually small and often unproductive plantation tracts, but in many instances they produced a surplus to sell at the Sunday market. More proof could be found from observations of Maroon cultivations in the woods and forests of the Island. Even the search parties of the planter class could not help commenting, albeit grudgingly, on the large productive gardens of the Maroons which were prepared for supplying food for their various camps.<sup>79</sup>

Food provided by the masters especially for the domestic slaves was either at a bare minimum or below a level capable of sustaining biological survival.<sup>80</sup> However, this did not prevent masters from demanding that slaves carry out their assigned duties in a quick and efficient manner.<sup>81</sup> As domestic slaves could not rely on small gardens as some field slaves could, to complement their scanty food supply, these domestic slaves simply took provisions, beverages and other foods from the masters' storehouses and kitchens, especially when they could get away with it undetected. Atwood, of course, interpreted this differently, for as he says: "Show me a negro, and I will show you a thief."<sup>82</sup> Like other plantation historians, Atwood sought to make 'stealing' an inherent characteristic of black people, rather than identifying it as part of a general strategy to stay alive.



### Collective Violent Activities of the Slaves

Important as these non-violent activities were to the slaves' existence, they had a limited impact on changing the plantation system, nor did they constitute a major threat to the plantation economy and the existence of the planter class. The collective violent activities of the Maroons however, did constitute a real threat. The Maroons undermined the plantation organization at its two most vulnerable points, wreaking havoc on both the lives and the property of the planter class. They unleashed the greatest internal and menacing blow on these vulnerable points and contributed in a decisive way to the ultimate downfall of the entire slave system. In their forty year struggle to live as free human beings, they denied the plantation system much of the stability, tranquility and continuity that a plantation slave economy required to maximize profit.

The topographic outlay of the Island contributed to the basic needs of the Maroons and made possible their strategic operations and assaults on the plantation. Maroons and potential Runaways found it extremely advantageous to familiarize themselves with the physical features of Dominica, and when slaves ran away from the plantation, they would seek protection and shelter in the most inaccessible parts of the Island. There they would cultivate food, raise poultry and small livestock, build houses, and fish from the numerous rivers.<sup>83</sup> When their food supply was low, they would supplement it with needed foods from an adjoining plantation.<sup>84</sup> Most of the Maroons' hideouts testified to their clever use of the physical outlay of the Island. Their hideouts included

the areas of Morne, Negre Maron, Coulihaut Heights, Morne Rosalie, Grand Bay, Geneva, and other inaccessible parts of the mountainous and forested interior of Dominica.<sup>85</sup>

This strategic utilization of the seemingly inaccessible regions of the Island created great alarm among the planter class.<sup>86</sup> While the Maroons were able to venture out of these regions with enormous ease and invade the plantation, the planters and their search parties did not enjoy the same facility of movement. The Maroons seemingly understood this well. Thus they would storm out of the woods and hideouts unexpectedly, attack the plantation swiftly and flee back into the inaccessible areas with little fear of effective chase by the planters and their parties. This dreaded element of surprise attack was the dominant strategic pattern of Maroon assault on the plantation system.

In the forest and mountainous regions, the Maroons organised various kinds of political and social structures. They established camps each of which was autonomous, with its own chief who both commanded and was responsible for its social arrangements. As a rule, Christian marriage was a regular feature of camp life, and a number of the chiefs were married and had children.<sup>87</sup> While each camp maintained an autonomous and independent existence, especially at the level of day to day decision making and the exercise of authority by the individual camp chief, the various chiefs would get together when it was necessary to devise collective strategies for assaulting the plantations.<sup>88</sup>

In their operations and efforts to change the plantation system, the Maroons enjoyed the cooperation and assistance of other

slaves and some mulattoes. When the Maroons were particularly pre-occupied with their rebellions, or when a planter search party managed by chance to invade the camps and destroy their food supplies, plantation slaves surreptitiously provided food, including plantains, bananas, various other ground provisions, vegetables and fowls. A few mulattoes harboured the Maroons secretly on their estates, while others joined the Maroons directly in the struggle to end the plantation system. When caught these slaves and mulattoes paid dearly, often with their lives, because assisting the Maroons was considered a criminal activity by the planter class.<sup>89</sup> Not even extremely harsh punishment, however, could deter these slaves and mulattoes from their efforts to help the Maroons destroy a system that they considered unjust.

The very act of running away provided the involved slave with a degree of satisfaction, for he considered running away a crucial step towards his freedom.<sup>90</sup> The Runaway slaves themselves provide some immediate reasons for the decision to flee the plantation. The Maroon Juba outlines why he and thirteen other slaves had run away to the woods: "They all went away because they were very hard worked and had nothing allowed them to eat."<sup>91</sup> Juba also relates how the Runaway initially survived in the forests before he could reap food from his cultivated garden. The slave would eat wild yams he found growing in the interior as his ground vegetable-provision; for meat the slave would hunt Agouties; for salt he would boil water.<sup>92</sup> Other slaves furnished additional reasons for fleeing the plantation. The slave Jacques had run away along with some other slaves because of inhumane treatment and fear of harsh punishment from the masters. The Runaway slave, Flora,

fled because her master had violated her as a woman. In her decision to escape from the plantation she had been encouraged by her husband, Joseph, who was ultimately made to suffer dearly.<sup>93</sup>

Taking into account the reasons furnished by the slaves, it is possible to conclude that running away was not a phenomenon of the French plantations because the French planters, including the Jesuit Priests, apparently did not completely threaten the human existence of the slaves either by depriving them of food or by extremely brutal treatment and punishment. It is significant that the first noted case of running away occurred at Geneva, in the Grand-Bay area, which was owned by the Jesuits before the British took possession.<sup>94</sup> Even the British considered the Jesuits to be the most humane of slave masters.<sup>95</sup>

The Maroons were engaged initially in activities that were, for the most part, directly focused on procuring fundamental survival needs. At this point an observer comments, "...they were not however, often guilty of any material mischief and had never committed murder."<sup>96</sup> The planters decided, however, that they should terminate the practice of running away and end the independent Maroon existence in the woods. It was hoped that annihilation of the Maroons would demonstrate to potential Runaways the futility and severe consequences of such an undertaking. In order to demonstrate their determination to end the runaway practice, the planters severely punished any Runaway in full view of the rest of the slave population.<sup>97</sup>

The objectives of the planter class served to stimulate the Maroons into devising counter survival strategies which also involved eradicating the planters. Thus, within the period spanning 1780-1814,

the Maroons set about to destroy the entire plantation system, and by so doing, they set in motion a process of radical change which never diminished even after the Maroons were gone.

The violent struggle of the Maroons against the plantation system was expressed by three interrelated dimensions: looting, the ravaging of property, and terrifying and exterminating planters. The impact of the Maroon struggle on the plantation economy and on the lives of the planters was particularly marked, for the planters were compelled to spend inordinate sums of money for protection. In 1791 alone, the planters spent an estimated sum of fifty thousand pounds. It is no wonder, therefore, that an English observer laments that the Maroon rebellion "...had been a very heavy burden to the colony."<sup>98</sup>

The Maroon struggle was characterized by three peaks of collective violence or rebellion. Each rebellion exceeded the previous one in range and intensity, and the apprehension and alarm of the planters increased accordingly. The first rebellion spanned approximately 1780-1786, the second, from 1792-1802, and the third, between 1812-1814.<sup>99</sup>

The Maroons began their violent activities by looting the British plantations of ground provisions and small livestock. Later, their activities were extended to carrying off cattle, destroying whatever cattle they could not take away and setting fire to major buildings and property on the British plantations. The first British plantation to fall to the Maroons' onslaught was managed by the Englishman Hugh Gould, whose opposition to the Maroons only served to infuriate them and to make them more determined. On the day of the major attack on

the plantation, Gould fortunately was away on business, and escaped with his life. The Maroons stripped everything of value from his home, then burned it.<sup>100</sup>

From this time forward, white plantation society became increasingly alarmed about the activities of the Maroons. They became tense, and usually fell to rejoicing every time it appeared that the Maroons were suppressed. The society was frequently disappointed as a result, for its white inhabitants showed a marked propensity to underestimate the Maroon cause. Martial law became a regular feature of the society, as it was imposed every time it was perceived that there was an impending Maroon attack. With each imposition of Martial law, plantation society posted proclamations giving ultimata to the Maroons. The Runaways responded in a decidedly distinctive fashion--- they became more resolute in their efforts to terminate the plantation system. One cynical observer noted:

To these proclamations the runaways paid no manner of attention; on the contrary they bid defiance to every measure... [and] had the audacity to threaten they would repel any attempt to be made to reduce them. 101

### The Maroon Rebellions

The Maroon rebellions will be discussed under the following topics: leadership, strategies, their impact on the plantation, and the influence of the French Revolution. Because the third and last rebellion contains the significant elements of the other two as well, it will be treated in some detail.

The Maroon rebellions were led by able chiefs. Each rebellion was headed by a commander-in-chief who was chosen from among the various camp chiefs. The acknowledged commanders of the three rebellions were Balla, Farcelle, and Jacco. The other camp chiefs served in the capacity of lieutenant commanders.<sup>102</sup> These men were grudgingly respected and highly feared by the planter class. For example, when the white inhabitants had become alarmed by the second rebellion, they believed that they could end both their apprehension and the Maroon struggle by signing a treaty with chief Farcelle. Farcelle agreed to a treaty, and together with other consenting Maroons was manumitted and considered a "free man" by the planters. In return, Farcelle was to spy on the Maroons' activities and plans. However, the planter class miscalculated and underestimated Farcelle who, in 1800, deliberately led a search party into a Maroon ambush. Unfortunately for the Maroon effort, the effective and capable Farcelle was caught, branded a "traitor" and was banished from Dominica by the planters.<sup>103</sup>

Under the leadership of these able chiefs, the Maroons put into operation well-planned and effective strategies. During the brief French re-occupation from 1778-1783 (for reasons of their own) the French gave indirect if not tacit approval to the Maroons in their first rebellion.<sup>104</sup> For instance, they did not interfere when the Maroons "in large bodies all armed with muskets, bayonettes and cutlasses" systematically attacked the British plantations in broad daylight.<sup>105</sup> Their assaults were so effective that one English observer lamented, "driven to the greatest distress and in dread of being destroyed by these cruel wretches, the English planters were constrained

to abandon their estates and to retire with their families to Roseau."<sup>106</sup> However, when the British re-captured the Island in 1783, and the British planters were given the protection which they claimed had been denied them by the French, the Maroons radically altered their strategy of attack --- and became even more menacing to the British slave masters. Instead of confronting the British planters in broad daylight, their surprise assaults were "generally in the most secret manner, in the night time, when they were under no dread of being apprehended."<sup>107</sup>

The Maroons' threat to plantation existence forced the planter class to devote time and energy in the legislature to enact laws that it was hoped would suppress the Maroons. Harsh laws were passed to curb the increasing number of slaves who were fleeing the plantations to join the Maroons. In 1798 a bill was passed to make slave evidence admissible in the court when it concerned the Maroons and their whereabouts.<sup>108</sup> This pre-occupation with the Maroons, and concomitantly with legislation for their extermination, distracted the planter class from their plantation business.

The attempts by the Governor to suppress the Maroons received the most willing support and cooperation from the planter class. It was the Governor's responsibility to raise a militia and search parties to protect plantation society and the interests of slave masters from the Runaways. In 1787, when the apprehension of the white inhabitants had assumed an alarming level because of the activities of the Maroons, the planters requested that the Governor procure additional troops from Grenada.<sup>109</sup>

The Governor and the planter class were in agreement that suppression



of the Maroons, and preventing slaves from running away would constitute a very costly project. Money was allocated by the legislature for this undertaking and many rewards were offered. Some slaves were offered both money and their liberty if they would spy on the Maroons for the planters. A substantial number of these slaves seized the opportunity of supposedly spying on the Maroons, in order to join them in the woods. There were, however, a few slaves who accepted the reward which a historian and Catholic priest appropriately labelled, "the thirty pieces of silver."<sup>110</sup>

Another plan devised by the planter class for the annihilation of the Maroons was the organization of the Black Ranger Corps. This was made possible by a bill passed by the planters in 1794. It enabled the Governor, in his capacity as commander-in-chief for the colony, to authorize the commanding officer of the Corps of Rangers, to obtain slaves to act as rangers and guides in pursuit of their goal to exterminate the Maroons. The plan backfired and the black rangers proved a positive threat to the plantation system, for in 1802 they revolted at the Cabritts in the north of Dominica, and, as the Governor noted, the rebellion threatened the destruction of the entire colony.<sup>111</sup> The rebellion was finally put down with the assistance of the British marines, but not before many black rangers had escaped with various kinds of ammunition to join the Maroons in the forests. As knowledge of this event filtered through plantation society, the white inhabitants felt even more tense and insecure.

The French Revolution played a significant part in the Maroon

struggle by providing the Runaways with some coherent and well-articulated notions on the ideals of human equality, dignity, freedom and the brother-hood of all men. These in part, albeit not as well articulated, were the very principles for which the Maroons were struggling. They served, therefore, to provide the Maroons with additional inspiration and ideological ammunition in the war against servitude. The French Revolution also illustrated concretely what oppressed people would and could sacrifice in order to win a war against subjugation and dehumanization.

The knowledge that the Maroons and other plantation slaves had grasped the ideals of the French Revolution served to create further apprehension and anxiety among the planter class. Thus, when the second Maroon rebellion broke out with increased violence and determination, the planters ascribed this intensification of the struggle to the influence and principles of the French Revolution. A major source of this influence was ascribed to the French gazette, L'Ami de La Liberté, printed in Roseau. The Legislative House of Assembly concluded that the gazette was extremely pernicious for in it, "such encouragement is given to slaves and opinions promulgated in their favour so dangerous to the lives and properties of their masters."<sup>112</sup> It was on the basis of this conclusion and similar understandings that General Cadwell could take the position that one of his major duties was the prevention of further spread in the British colonies of the "wild and pernicious doctrines of liberty and equality."<sup>113</sup> And on the effect of the French Revolution on the Maroons an English historian-observer wrote: "They have been encouraged by the disturbances which at present prevail

in the island of Martinique, occasioned by the late revolution in France."<sup>114</sup>

Compounding the planters' fear that the French Revolution had indeed influenced and inspired the Maroons, was the concomitant fact that slaves were fleeing from French plantations in Dominica and even from the French islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique to join the Maroons. These plantations were highly affected by the French Revolution. The House of Assembly was deeply distressed by the situation and complained that the phenomenon was "producing the effect we have this day so much reason to lament."<sup>115</sup> Atwood wrote:

Since this work has been sent to the press, advice has been received from Dominica, that the runaways under command of this chief Farcelle having been joined by a number of other slaves, from the different plantations of the French inhabitants, have again commenced depredations of a most serious nature in the island. 116

From the second rebellion onwards, the number of slaves fleeing the plantations increased constantly.<sup>117</sup> If all plantation lists of absentees resembled the one calculated for the Layou and neighbouring districts, then the planters had sufficient reason to feel further threatened by another impending "alarming danger."<sup>118</sup> This foreboding was aggravated by the black ranger rebellion on the Cabritts in 1802. The "alarming danger" materialized in the third and last Maroon rebellion.

There were other factors which intensified the apprehension of members of plantation society. By the beginning of the 19th century the planters were well aware of the fact that the Maroons and other plantation slaves had knowledge of both the abolition of the slave trade

and the impact that the anti-slavery movement was having in Britain. It was understood, and perhaps correctly so, that these two factors would provide additional incentive to the Maroon cause to destroy the plantation system. The stage was set for the most determined efforts of the Maroons to end the plantation system and of the white inhabitants to preserve it in Dominica. The last of the Maroon rebellions climaxed in 1812-1814, and was undoubtedly the most resolute and violent of them all.

#### The Last Rebellion

In the last rebellion, the Maroons proved so determined that the planters considered it in their best interests to negotiate a settlement immediately. Governor Ainslie, the head of the colonial government, sent a delegation to the Maroons carrying the planters' proposals. However, like his predecessors, Ainslie seemingly failed to understand that the Maroon cause was not a subject for bargaining. The colonial delegation, like previous ones, only infuriated the Maroons and two members were immediately executed by the Runaways at Rosalie. A proclamation was then issued by Ainslie in which rewards were posted for Maroons and captured chiefs brought to Roseau.<sup>119</sup> Pardon was also offered to those Maroons who would voluntarily surrender themselves during a twenty day period.<sup>120</sup> This pardon had very little meaning for it simply effected the return of Runaways to masters who could furnish proof of ownership.<sup>121</sup> It often meant pardon from instant brutal treatment of the Runaways by masters, but it was not a pardon which entitled the slave to freedom within plantation society.

The proclamation, however, did not achieve the end for which it was intended. On the contrary, it stimulated the Maroons to perform one of their most daring acts of the three rebellions, for they marched on Roseau, the capital and seat of the planter class' government.<sup>122</sup> As was the case in the first and second rebellions, when similar proclamations gave impetus to Maroon activities which cost individual plantations many thousands of pounds, the Maroons plundered and burned various plantations.

At this phase of the rebellion the Governor posted yet more rewards for the capture of Maroons. The Maroons promptly reciprocated by posting a reward of two thousand pounds for the head of the Governor in the town of Roseau.<sup>123</sup> Then the planters decided that a full-scale venture to exterminate the Maroons was mandatory. This extermination was scheduled to commence after the twenty-days of pardon had expired. Hardly a Maroon accepted the conditions of pardon laid down by the colonial government,<sup>124</sup> and so Martial law was proclaimed for forty days and the Island assumed a war-like posture.<sup>125</sup>

The colonial militia was stationed in different parts of Dominica to protect the white inhabitants. Roseau was heavily guarded and parties of the ninth regiment were dispatched with guides to locate and destroy the Maroons and their camps. At the same time the Maroon rebellion continued incessantly and the whole plantation complex was assaulted. Armed with cutlasses and guns, the Maroons systematically perpetrated violence on the lives of planters and on their estates by plundering all kinds of provisions and livestock.<sup>126</sup> The alarm of the white inhabitants assumed extraordinary proportions as the Maroons were

"daily increasing in numbers and force and audacity, to the great terror...of the community." Plantation society had good reason to consider the situation as "very serious and critical."<sup>127</sup>

Apprehension within plantation society must have increased with knowledge that the Maroons had successfully trapped a party of the 9th regiment in the woods. The Maroons' strategy was simple and effective. They dug pits in the ground, implanted sharp sticks with their points facing upwards, and covered the pits with thin layers of grass. The Maroons enticed a party of the 9th regiment directly into the pits. However, some members of the party avoided the trap and the Maroons were about to execute them when another party of the 5th regiment appeared.<sup>128</sup> This group not only outnumbered the Maroons, but had vastly superior weapons. In the skirmish that followed, large numbers of Maroons lost their lives, but many others escaped.

In general, the militia of the planter class far outnumbered the Maroons, and this made it possible for the militia to search every enclave in the Island that might have served as a Maroon hideout. When Maroons were caught, they were either immediately killed, or brought to Roseau where many were slaughtered publicly in the market place.<sup>129</sup> A few Maroons were banished from the Island.

Roseau was heavily guarded both day and night by a special detachment of troops from Morne Bruce. This fact, however, did not deter the Maroons from attempting to burn down the entire capital and seat of the planter government as a final major effort against the plantation system. The attempt was unsuccessful, and with this final

act, the Maroons violent struggle against the plantation system drew to an end two months later in 1814.

The planters now looked forward to resuming the normal business of plantation exploitation, and the white inhabitants spoke with relief of "our hair breadth escape from these dangers and these horrors...." It meant that they could return "to secure establishment and tranquility and repose...."<sup>130</sup> A white resident noted that the termination of the Maroon war was appreciated deeply throughout the Island, for during its continuance, trade, cultivation and profits had been severely retarded.<sup>131</sup>

The punishment dealt out to the Maroons caught during the rebellion and during the period of Martial law was considered most brutal, even by the planters.<sup>132</sup> This created friction between the Governor and the planters, for many of them realized the extreme profitability in the preservation of those slaves who had been caught, especially as the slave trade had been abolished. The planters considered the execution and banishment of so many slaves as unnecessary and wasteful. Mulattoes who were also caught or suspected of assisting the Maroons were punished either by public execution or banishment. In spite of the controversy over slave punishment, when the Maroon rebellion was considered at an end and Martial law terminated, the white plantation society rejoiced.<sup>133</sup>

The fact that the Maroons were physically suppressed in 1814 should in no way detract from their accomplishments. In addition to their own overt activities, the Maroons had generated and fostered among the slave population a continuous will and desire to survive as free

human beings. The Maroons had created among the slaves a determination to change radically, by any means available, a system which exploited and dehumanized them. These achievements persisted long after the Maroons had disappeared. Thus, from 1814 onwards, the slaves of Dominica became increasingly restless and unwilling to toil on the plantations. By 1823, plans for slave rebellions were discovered in at least two parishes. Fearing a general slave uprising, Governor Huntington hastened to pacify the slaves by assuring them in a proclamation that emancipation was near and nothing would prevent it.<sup>134</sup>

From 1823 it became obvious to the planters that the enslaved people of Dominica were determined to obtain their freedom at any cost, regardless of the obstacles. By 1830 this resolute determination took the form of a mass protest,<sup>135</sup> and finally, in 1834, the slave system was abolished in Dominica.

### Conclusion

The plantation slave system in Dominica and other West Indian islands was devised to meet the growing demand for certain tropical commodities in the European centres. By the 18th and early 19th centuries enslaved Dominicans were the only source of plantation labour. In the plantation system, slavery and manual labour were made inseparable, while being white and the attribute of freedom were made identical. Thus slaves were utilized in all areas that demanded physical labour. Indeed, the colonial plantation economic system itself depended upon this enforced manual labour. In turn, the economic system supported the colonial political system as well as various social organizations within



the plantation society. As black slavery and plantation economics were considered inseparable and as the political system both derived from, and in turn, maintained the plantation economic system, the white ruling class, which dominated both systems, did everything in its power to preserve the black slave institution in Dominica.

In order to maintain a profitable plantation system, the planters or slave masters resorted to various types of brutal and inhumane treatment of the slaves. They underfed the slaves; they overworked them all year round; they invented racial myths to justify their inhumanity and to perpetuate the absolute power they exercised over the slaves whom they viewed as animals and chattel. This absolute power meant literally that a slave master was unrestrained by either convention or law in the use of any device or scheme he deemed necessary to extract maximum labour and services from a slave for plantation profit.<sup>136</sup> It was only when it served the interests of the planters that slaves were viewed as inferior beings with a limited legal personality. The totality of this rule of master over slave persisted in the laws of Dominica long after the slave institution was abolished. Even the influential British medical doctor, Alford Nichols, a man unsympathetic towards the black people, thought it necessary at the end of the 19th century that such laws in Dominica should be completely expurgated to remove every relic of cruelty and oppression in them.<sup>137</sup>

It was to survive as human beings and to change these wretched conditions of oppression, degradation and starvation that the enslaved Dominicans seized opportunities to engage in the non-violent and violent kinds of activities that have been discussed. However, it was the collective

violent efforts of the Maroons and Runaway slaves that had the most impact on changing the plantation system. If as Fanon has stated, that colonization is a work of violence, then colonization in Dominica was no exception. The Maroons responded to this violence, in the name of human freedom, with counter violence of their own. The Maroons threatened the destruction of the entire plantation system and undermined the ability of the plantation system to maintain the stability, tranquility, and continuous slave labour that were considered basic requirements for a profitable plantation economy. Even the threat of a Maroon attack was sufficient to keep plantation society in a state of apprehension and alarm. Therefore plantation society exhibited a constant state of tension for a period of about forty years. In fear of their lives, planters would not stay on their estates but would often reside in Roseau where protection from the Maroons could be obtained. This, of course, was disadvantageous to the plantation economy. These and other factors already discussed explain how the Maroons contributed to the eventual collapse of the plantation slave system in 1834.

The Maroons began their rebellions when the British took over the Island. Given the seemingly "tolerant" nature of the French - Catholic type of slavery existing prior to the British take-over, the Maroons' primary and exclusive targets at the beginning of their violent activities were the plantations owned by cruel British masters.

A major goal that the Maroons hoped to achieve through their struggle was well articulated by a mulato called Paulinaire who, when caught, was tried by a planter court for his active involvement in the

Maroon war. He affirmed that the Maroons simply wanted to live as free men. In order to accomplish this end they had planned to capture the entire Windward side of Dominica as their territory. In this territory the Maroons had agreed to allow a few planters who had been kind to them to live amongst them. All other planters were to be killed or banished to the Leeward side of the Island. Every mulatto who refused to assist in the Maroon objective was to be put to death.<sup>138</sup> Paulinaire's statement was corroborated by a British planter and member of the Council, Alex Stewart, who said that the Maroons had planned "to destroy every English estate in the island."<sup>139</sup>

The Maroons' plan to seize the Windward side of the island and to execute practically every white planter in Dominica never materialized. But their activities over a period of forty years did present the plantation system with its greatest single internal threat and sought to end the plantation profit, the enslavement of black people and the white domination that made such enslavement possible. In attacking its very *raison d'être* the Maroons struck telling blows that contributed to the collapse of the slave system.

Moreover, the Maroons, by their activities during this period, demonstrated a persistent will to be free which had a substantial impact on the other slaves. They learned well from the Maroons and this knowledge was concretely expressed after the Maroons had disappeared, inasmuch as the slaves became increasingly restless, reluctant and unwilling to labour on the plantation. This attitude was displayed in planned, but unrealized revolts in 1823, and in a mass slave protest in 1830. Even after the slave institution was abolished the black people

never desisted from active struggle when their human survival and rights as free people were in jeopardy in the post-emancipation period. In the next chapter, aspects of this active struggle are presented.

Concerning the activities of the Maroons, the late Lottus Roberts, a native Dominican, a well respected intellectual, a civil servant and a politician, said:

The Runaways are our forefathers. We who live today are heirs to their heritage of liberty for which they fought so stubbornly and which they purchased so dearly. They were simple people, untutored in the letters, untrained in the art of modern warfare. But they loved liberty, and it can be argued that the geography and the botany of Dominica helped save freedom for us. 140

## Chapter III

## Footnotes

1. See Orlando Patterson, The Sociology of Slavery (New Jersey: Associated University Presses, 1969); Elsa Gorveia, Slave Society in the British Leeward Islands at the End of the Eighteenth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965); Bryan Edwards, History, Civil and Commercial of the British Colonies in the West Indies, Vol. I & II (London: Stockdale, 1807); Thomas Southley, The Chronological History of the West Indies, I, II & III (Great Britain: Frank Cass & Co., 1827); Eric Williams, Capitalism & Slavery (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944); Joseph Paqatz, The Fall of the Planter Class in the British Caribbean 1763 - 1833 (New York: Octagon Books, 1928). These authors are among the many who have written about the Caribbean slave plantation stressing in most cases the similarities among the plantations in the various Caribbean colonies. Also see, D.J. Murray, The West Indies and the Development of Colonial Government 1801 - 1834 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965); H. Ahearst, The British West Indies: The Search for Self Government (London: Puskon House, 1962); Hume Wrong, Government of the West Indies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923); Gordon Lewis, The Growth of the Modern West Indies, *op. cit.*; David Lowenthal, West Indian Societies *op. cit.*, are among the many authors who stress the similarities of colonial administrative and political patterns in the British West Indies.
2. This point is well discussed by G. Balandier, "The Colonial Situation: A Theoretical Approach", in Social Change: The Colonial Situation, ed., Immanuel Wallerstein (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966)
3. The ruling elite in Dominica comprised the planters, merchants, professional people all associated with the exploitation of slaves and land in Dominica. Unless otherwise specified, "ruling elite", the "planters" and "planter class" are made synonymous and are equivalent to the "white establishment" in the slave plantation system.
4. This point has been discussed also by Eric Williams, *op. cit.*, Elsa Gorveia, *op. cit.*, Gordon Lewis, *op. cit.*, David Lowenthal, *op. cit.*, Orlando Patterson, *op. cit.*, Joseph Paqatz, *op. cit.*, George Beckford, Persistent Poverty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972).

5. This point is adequately dealt with by Elsa Gorveia, Slave Society, op. cit., and by Morley Avearst, The British West Indies, op. cit.. In this section while the emphasis is on Dominica the discussion of political-economic arrangements in the slave plantation system, with certain alterations of some details, could do as well for other British Caribbean islands. For comparative, and more elaborate descriptions of these arrangements see Eric Williams, The Negro in the Caribbean (Washington D.C.: Associates in Negro Folk Education, 1942); also Eric Williams, From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean 1492 - 1969 (London: Andre Deutsch, 1970); also see Ragatz, op. cit..
6. This point will be expanded later in the chapter.
7. Robert Melville was the first Governor. For more details on Robert Melville see Sir Allan Burns, op. cit., p.505.
8. See D. J. Murray, op. cit.; Hume Wrong, op. cit., who describe at some length the issue of nominal - actual authority of the Governors in the slave plantation systems.
9. Because of this situation much conflict was generated between Governor and planters. See, Dominica, Collection of Plain Authentic Documents in Justification of the Conduct of Governor Ainslie ..., op. cit.; also, Sir Allan Burns, op. cit., p. 544.
10. See for instance "Chapter XII", in Thomas Atwood, The History of the Island of Dominica, op. cit..
11. The phenomenon of Absenteeism was a conspicuous feature in the British Caribbean plantation system. See M. G. Smith, The Plural Society in the British West Indies (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965). Also see; Douglas Hall, "Absentee - Proprietorship in the British West Indies to about 1850", in Slaves, Free Men, Citizens, eds., Lombas Comitas and David Lowenthal (New York: Anchor Books, 1973).
12. In the Southern States, for instance, planters and slaves resided on a continuous basis on the same land; the plantation was the fixed dwelling place of both planters and slaves. Absenteeism was not a general practice in the Southern United States and planters were the general overseers.
13. T. Southley, Chronological History of the West Indies, op. cit., and T. Atwood, The History of the Island of Dominica, op. cit., have discussed the abuses emanating from absenteeism.
14. Bernard Marshall, Society and Economy in the British Windward Islands 1763-1823, unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation (Jamaica: University of the West Indies, 1971), claims that this was true for all the Windward Islands, including Dominica.

15. See Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, op. cit.. The correlation between economics, colour and class has been a dominant theme in West Indian social history. See, for instance, David Lowenthal, West Indian Societies, op. cit., also David Lowenthal & Lombras Comitas, eds., "Introduction: Cultural Expressions of Class and Colour", in Consequences of Class and Colour, West Indian Perspectives (New York: Anchor Books, 1973)
16. A look at the population breakdown in the Dominican plantation system in the late 18th century would reveal this ratio of whites to blacks. In 1773 --- pop. - 3,350 whites; 750 mulattoes; 18,753 slaves. In 1780 --- pop. - 1,066 whites; 543 mulattoes; 12,713 slaves. In 1788 --- pop. - 1,236 whites; 445 mulattoes; 14,967 slaves. These statistics are quoted from Fillan's Almanac, op. cit., and from T. Southley, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 71.
17. Bernard Marshall, op. cit., also makes this claim for the other Windward Islands.
18. Orlando Patterson, op. cit., Elsa Gorveia, op. cit..
19. White exclusiveness in ruling and interest in preserving the plantation slave system were features and characteristics of the whole Caribbean plantation system at this time. Elsa Gorveia, Slave Society, op. cit., p. 93, accurately notes that for the Leeward Islands at this period "to be white was sufficient qualification for admission to civil rights."
20. B. Edwards, History, Civil and Commercial of the British Colonies in the West Indies, Vol. II, (London: Stockdale, 1807), p. 68.
21. From House of Commons Account Papers, Vol. XXVI, 1789, pt. III, no. 646a; also see Laws of Dominica, op. cit..
22. Slave laws for these specific reasons were passed in 1778 - 1789 and had little effect. See, Fillan's Almanac, op. cit., also see "Minutes of the Legislative Council" in Dominica, Official Gazettes (Roseau: Official Gazette Office, June 11, 1799, and July 19, 1799).
23. This was not peculiar to the Dominican situation. Eric Williams accurately notes, "Slavery was fundamentally the same everywhere ..." , Eric Williams, The Negro in the Caribbean, op. cit., p. 14.
24. See, "At a Court of Special sessions Holden at the Court House in the Town of Roseau," in Trial of Runaway Slaves, op. cit., also Laws of Dominica, op. cit., p.p. 142 - 158.

25. For a graphic description of slave brutality see C.L.R. James, The Black Jacobins (New York: Random House, 1963), p.p. 6-22.
26. E. Gorveia, Slave Society, op. cit., p. 131.
27. Janet Shaw, "Lady of Quality" quoted in E. Gorveia, Slave Society, op. cit., p. 127.
28. Ibid.; also see T. Atwood, The History of the Island of Dominica, op. cit., p. 266, who refers to slaves in Dominica as "brute beasts."
29. This view is substantiated by the graphic description of slave brutality given by C.L.R. James, Black Jacobins, op. cit..
30. The thesis that slavery was governed by economic considerations and not moral ones with regard to the abolition of the institution is excellently developed by Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, op. cit..
31. The mulato was generally a result of a black slave woman giving birth to a child of a white father. The freedom of this child came from manumission by the white father who sometimes left the mulato with property in his will. For an elaboration see David Lowenthal, West Indian Societies, op. cit., p.p. 76 - 143. Also C.L.R. James, "The Free Colored in a Slave Society", in Slaves, Free Men, Citizens, op. cit..
32. For a classic study of this form of stratification see M.G. Smith, Stratification in Grenada, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965).
33. For a description of mulato conditions in the Caribbean slave system see, B. Edwards, op. cit., Vol. II, p.p. 23 - 26. For mulato conditions in Dominica, see T. Atwood, op. cit., p.p. 208 - 223.
34. As a result, with regard to mulatoes in the entire British Caribbean, C.L.R. James, Party Politics in the West Indies (Trinidad: Vedic Enterprises, 1962), p.p. 138 - 135, concludes, "Without a firm social base, they are not a stable grouping."
35. See, for instance, the activities of the mulato Paulinaire related in Trials of Runaway Slaves, op. cit.. Paulinaire fought with the Maroons against the plantation system.
36. See, Trials of Runaway Slaves, op. cit., passim.
37. See T. Southley, Vol. III, op. cit., p. 71; also, T. Atwood, op. cit., Chapter V. For a general understanding of why slavery and sugar were synonymous in the Caribbean, read, Eric Williams, The Negro In the Caribbean, op. cit., and From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean 1492 - 1969, op. cit..



38. See Thomas Atwood, op. cit., p.p. 72 - 81.
39. Sugar was king throughout the Caribbean, as Eric Williams has often pointed out. See Eric Williams, The Negro in the Caribbean, op. cit., p. 12. For a brief history of coffee in Dominica, see R.L. Williams, Industrial Development in Dominica, (Jamaica: Institute for Social & Economic Research, 1971), p. 38 - 41.
40. This is based on informal interviews with Rev. Fr. Prosemans, the leading historian on early Dominican history. It will be developed in his forthcoming History of Dominica to be published in two volumes.
41. For an elaboration see articles by Douglas Taylor on the Caribs, including "Columbus saw them first," "Tales and Legends of the Dominican Carib"; also Joseph Boromé, "Spain and Dominica", "The French and Dominica", in Aspects of Dominican History, op. cit., Fr. Prosemans discusses this issue in his forthcoming History of Dominica
42. Remnants of these plantations can still be discerned in Dominica today.
43. This had been noted by C.L.R. James, Black Jacobin, op. cit., and Gordon Lewis, The Growth and Development of the Modern West Indies, op. cit..
44. B. Edwards, Vol. III, op. cit., p. 8.
45. E. Gorveia, op. cit., p. 109.
46. These are still the dominant ground provisions grown by the black farmers in Dominica.
47. I am particularly indebted to Fr. Prosemans for this point, derived from informal interviews with him in July and August, 1973, in Roseau and Pointe Michel.
48. This is further described by Byran Edwards, Vol. III, op. cit., p.p. 129 - 131.
49. From informal interviews with Prof. Williams Riviere, a specialist in early West Indian history, in August, 1973, Roseau. The point is also developed in Elsa Gorveia, Slave Society, op. cit..
50. From informal interviews with Professor William Riviere.
51. I am greatly indebted to Rev. Fr. Prosemans, for without his help, criticisms and guidance, the rest of this chapter in particular could not have been written.

52. Orlando Patterson, Sociology of Slavery, op. cit., p. 260. Patterson has developed this point in his "Slavery and Slave Revolts: A Sociohistorical Analysis of the First Maroon War 1665 - 1740", in Maroon Societies, ed., Richard Price (New York: Anchor Books, 1973)
53. The most extensive of these struggles took place in Haiti, in the 18th Century, and is excellently discussed in C.L.R. James, The Black Jacobins, op. cit..
54. Fillan's Almanac, op. cit., p.75.
55. See Fr. Prosemans, "Notes on the Slaves of the French", in Aspects of Dominican History, op. cit., p. 164.
56. See Joseph Boromé, "Spain and Dominica 1493 - 1647", "The French and Dominica", in Aspects of Dominican History, op. cit..
57. T. Atwood, op. cit., p. 221.
58. For the rest of the Caribbean, Eric Williams adds "It was to satisfy the labour requirements of the West Indian Islands that the greatest migration in recorded history took place. This was Negro slave trade." Eric Williams, The Negro in the Caribbean, op. cit., p.12.
59. For a discussion of the Jesuit Priests relations to slaves and the Christian-Catholic instruction they gave to the slaves, see Fr. Prosemans, "Notes on the Slaves of the French", in Aspects of Dominican History, op. cit..
60. This point was developed particularly as a result of informal interviews held with Fr. Prosemans in July - August, 1973 in Roseau and Pointe Michel.
61. With the "search for a Dominican identity" a present concern, Patois is increasingly becoming a popular mode of expression even among the middle class. It is now being accepted as a genuine aspect of Dominican culture.
62. This phenomenon has led Fr. Prosemans to label, unfortunately, this period as the "Idyllic Slave Period" in his forthcoming History of Dominica, and in his "Chart on the Maroon Rebellions" on display in the Roseau Library, and in informal interviews held with him in July - August, 1973.
63. Also see Elsa Gorveia, "The West Indian Slave Laws of the Eighteenth Century", Revista de Ciencias Sociales, Vol. IV (1960) p.p. 75 - 105.
64. T. Atwood, op. cit., p.p. 224 - 225.

65. Obeah is a combination of various tenets of African tribal religion --- chant, incantations, potions --- with those of Catholicism, namely the belief in the power of the spirits of the dead in the hereafter, i.e., Heaven and Hell. Through the use of these chants, incantations, and potions, Dominicans believed they could invoke the spirits of the dead to punish those who had done them harm. This Obeah practice has two tangible dimensions. First, charms or relics were worn on the body to ward off evil spirits and harm. Secondly, poisonous herbs and potions were used to kill extremely wicked masters, especially in the slave system.
66. It is used to deal with hostile conditions which affect black human survival.
67. T. Atwood, op. cit., p. 269.
68. Ibid., p. 271.
69. Ibid., p. 271.
70. The question of Obeah and the Catholic Religion was discussed with Fr. Prosemans at length in informal interviews held with him in July - August 1973, in Roseau and Pointe Michel.
71. Some of the most staunch Catholics I know are also great believers in Obeah. This in itself is a contradiction especially as the Catholic Church is violently opposed to the use of Obeah.
72. The dead are viewed in precisely the same way in Dominica by a very large segment of the black population.
73. T. Atwood, op. cit., p. 274.
74. Ibid., Chapter XII.
75. Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations (London: P. Nelson and Sons, 1884), p.p. 365 - 366.
76. Non-violent slave resistance was discussed with Prof. William Reviere, specialist on early West Indian History, who is presently engaged in research for a book on slave forms of resistance in early West Indian history. Informal interview held with him in July - August, 1973, Roseau.
77. T. Atwood, op. cit., p. 273. Also see J. Ragatz, The Fall of the Planter Class, op. cit., p. 27.
78. Many other colonial writers have done the same thing as Atwood and Ragatz. See for example a more current study by a British social psychologist, Madeline Kerr, Personality and Conflict in Jamaica, op. cit..

79. See, for example, Message of the Governor, in "Minutes of the Legislative Council", Official Gazette, September 10, 1799.
80. See evidence of this phenomenon presented by the slaves, in Juba's evidence in Trials of Runaway Slaves, op. cit..
81. This feature has been noted by most writers on slavery, see works of Elsa Gorveia, Slave Society, op. cit., Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, op. cit., and C.L.R. James, The Black Jacobins, op. cit..
82. T. Atwood, op. cit., p. 272.
83. This ideas was derived from discussions with Fr. Prosemans. Informal interviews held in July - August, 1973. Also see Message of the Governor in "Minutes of the Legislative Council", Official Gazette, September 10, 1799.
84. From evidence given by Runaway slaves at their trials in Trials of Runaway Slaves, op. cit..
85. It is only recently, in the last decade, that most of these areas became accessible to motor transportation. Morne Negre Maron and portions of Coulihaut Heights are still inaccessible.
86. See, Collection of Plain and Authentic Documents in Justification of the Conduct of Governor Ainslie, op. cit., Also see "A Letter to His Excellency George Robert Ainslie ...from the planters, merchants, and the inhabitants of the Island" Chairman, H.C. Newman, Rector of the Parish of St. George, June 18, 1814. The text of the letter can be found in T. Southley, op. cit., Vol. III, p.p. 556 - 559.
87. From the Trials of Runaway Slaves, op. cit., we obtain a number of examples. For instance, Chief Corree was married to Claire and they had a son named Joseph. Interestingly enough, there were a number of Maroons born in the woods of Dominica outside the slave system. This phenomenon is noted, for instance, in "Minutes of the Legislative Council", Official Gazette, March 27, 1800.
88. At his trial before the planters' court, Chief Cicero gave evidence from which we can learn about the political-social arrangements of Maroon camp life. See, Trials of Runaway Slaves, op. cit..
89. From the Trials of Runaway Slaves, op. cit., we learn of these instances: a free coloured planter Louis Montrelle was accused of "having encouraged and harboured on his Estate run away negroes..."; part of his punishment was a fee of 200 pounds. (Slaves caught were severely punished.) Joseph, a slave who had provided the Maroons with bananas, plantains, fowls and other provisions, was sentenced to be burnt alive at Coulihaut on March 11, 1786, for harbouring and encouraging the Maroons. Other examples are provided in Fr. Prosemans, ed., Official Communications in Connection with Runaway Slaves, 1787 - 1803 (Pointe Michel: private collection n.d.).

90. While many slaves would voluntarily run away from the plantations to join the Maroons, others had to be persuaded to make that final decision. The Maroons would therefore, embark on recruitment drives in which they would coax slaves from plantations to join them. As Governor Watson said, the Maroons "hold out enticing invitations to others to join them and render the parties formidable." See, "Message of the Governor to the Legislature", September 10, 1799, in Official Communications, op. cit..
91. From the slave Juba at his trial on March, 1786, in Trials of Runaway Slaves, op. cit..
92. From informal interviews with both Fr. Prosemans and Prof. Riviere in July-August, 1973.
93. For his encouragement, Flora's husband Joseph received 24 lashes in the Market Place, plus a fine. Also see Jacques' evidence at his trial in Trials of Runaway Slaves, op. cit..
94. Fr. Prosemans, "Lecture on the Maroons", (Pointe Michel, Private collection, n.d.). Prosemans has traced this event on a chart which was publicly displayed in the Roseau Library in 1973.
95. From Prosemans, "Notes on the Slaves of the French", in Aspects of Dominican History, op. cit.; also discussed during our informal interview sessions in July-August, 1973. Also see, T. Atwood, op. cit., p. 225; evidence from the slaves in Trials of Runaway Slaves, op. cit..
96. T. Atwood, op. cit., p. 227.
97. See, Official Communications in Connection with Runaway Slaves, op. cit.. Chief Elephant's head was stuck up on a pole in Roseau as an example to other slaves, noted in Dominican Journal, February 2, 1814.
98. T. Atwood, op. cit., p. 253.
99. For details about the Maroons in the "second rebellion" and the planters' reaction to them see "Minutes of the Legislative Council" in Official Gazettes, op. cit., of September 10, 1799; March 27, 1800; July 8, 1800; July 9, 1800; October 14, 1800; November 4, 1800; August 4, 1801; February 8, 1802; May 4, 1802; April 19, 1803; also Fillan's Almanac, op. cit., passim, p.p. 74-87.
100. T. Atwood, op. cit., p.p. 228 - 229.
101. Ibid., p. 237; also Official Communications in Connection with Runaway Slaves, op. cit..
102. See Cicero's trial in Trials of Runaway Slaves, op. cit..

103. See the House of Assembly authorizing the Lieutenant Governor to sign a treaty with Farcelle, and see Message from Governor Johnstone concerning Farcelle's treacherous behaviour, October 14, 1800, in Official Communications in Connection with Runaway Slaves, op. cit.
104. The British historian, Allan Burns, History of the British West Indies, op. cit., p. 544, forcefully argues that the French gave direct assistance to the Maroons.
105. T. Atwood, op. cit., p. 230.
106. T. Atwood, op. cit., p. 230.
107. Ibid.
108. On April 27, 1798, the House of Assembly passed a bill entitled "An Act to make the Testimony of slaves admissible in certain cases ...", in Official Communications, op. cit., and also see Dominica, Laws of the Island of Dominica, op. cit., p.p. 148 - 158, in particular, where laws are passed with regards to slaves.
109. "Minutes of the House of Assembly", Official Gazette, op. cit., September 14, 1787.
110. Fr. Prosemans "Lecture on the Maroons", op. cit.
111. Also noted in T. Southley, op. cit., Vol. III, p.p. 228-229.
112. See "Report of the House" on the 'Causes of the present rebellion and disturbances among the slaves' in Official Communications, op. cit.
113. Ibid.
114. T. Atwood, op. cit., p. 250.
115. "Report of the House" on the 'Causes of the present rebellion...' op. cit.
116. T. Atwood, op. cit., p. 250.
117. Fr. Prosemans has compiled an impressive set of absentee lists which were inspected during the course of one of our many interviews.
118. See Message of Governor Watson, to the House of Assembly in "Minutes of the Legislative Council", Official Gazette, September 10, 1799.
119. Governor Ainslie's proclamation was published in the Dominican Journal, February 25, 1814. Also see T. Southley, op. cit., Vol. III, p.p. 556 - 559.

120. See, Collection of Plain and Authentic Documents in Justification of the Conduct of Governor Ainslie ..., op. cit..
121. This point will be developed by Fr. Prosemans in his forthcoming History of Dominica.
122. See, Sketches and Recollections of the West Indies, by a Resident (London: privately published, 1828), p.p. 85 - 90.
123. See "A Letter to His Excellency George Ainslie... from the planters, merchants and inhabitants of the Island", by the Chairman H.C. Newman, Rector of the Parish of St. George, June 18, 1814. The text of the letter is in T. Southley, op. cit., Vol. III, p.p. 556-559.
125. See, Sketches and Recollections of the West Indies, op. cit.
126. Ibid.
127. From "A Letter to His Excellency George Robert Ainslie ...", by Chairman H. C. Newman, op. cit.
128. See also, Sketches and Recollections, op. cit.
129. See "Last of the Maroons" in the Dominican Chronicle, August 17, 1814. There is also a vivid description given of the death of Jacco, the Maroon Commander-in-Chief.
130. See, Collection of Plain and Authentic Documents in Justification of the Conduct of Governor Ainslie, op. cit., p. 14. Also see "A Letter to His Excellency George Robert Ainslie", op. cit.
131. See, Sketches and Recollections, op. cit.
132. See, "Last of the Maroons", op. cit.
133. Sir Allan Burns, op. cit., p. 604.
134. This is also discussed in fuller detail in J. Ragatz, The Fall of the Planter Class, op. cit., p. 417.
135. Ibid., p. 456.
136. See, Laws of the Island of Dominica, op. cit..
137. H. Alford Nichols, Dominica, W.I. (St. John's Antigua: Jose Anjo, n.d.), p. 32.
138. See Paulinaire's trial before the Council February 7, 1791, in Official Communications, op. cit., and also see Bernard Marshall, Society and Economy in the British Windward Islands, op. cit..

139. Alex Stewart's comment is quoted in B. Marshall, Society and Economy in the British Windward Islands, op. cit., p. 508.
140. Loftus Roberts "The Maroons" (unpublished article, n.d., in the Prosemans' collection).



## Chapter IV

### THE BLACK AND MULATO DOMINICANS IN THE POST-EMANCIPATION SITUATION

With the collaboration of the British Crown, the planter class in the post-emancipation period continued to exercise a controlling force on the Island, dominating both its political and economic life.<sup>1</sup> Thus, for black people, conditions in this era were not significantly different from those existing during their enslavement. This control extended over the mulato people as well, despite the Brown Privilege Bill in 1832<sup>2</sup> which granted them political rights and privileges previously denied, and which allowed them a controlling majority in the House of Assembly in 1838. In this section the author will look at the black people's violent struggle to survive as free human beings under wretched conditions, and at the mulatoes fight through protest for their political rights, autonomy and freedom. In Part I the active and violent aspects of the black people's activities from emancipation in 1834 to the imposition of Crown colony rule on the Island in 1898 are discussed. In Part II an analysis is presented of aspects of the continuous political protests of the mulatoes from 1863 to the West India Conference in Dominica in 1932.

It is said that these black people in the post-emancipation period were a passive mass,<sup>3</sup> and many scholars have either dismissed them entirely or discussed them in distorted and negative terms.<sup>4</sup> Throughout this chapter the author will attempt to correct this image by emphasizing the violent

activities of the black people. Finally, this section is written with the thought in mind that Dominican society is still composed of both blacks and mulattoes and that ultimately the future independent survival of Dominica depends on their combined efforts and cooperation.

## I

As a part of the emancipation process, beginning in 1832<sup>5</sup>, the British Crown attempted to prepare the black Dominicans for the responsibilities of freedom and simultaneously to ease the traumas that were to be anticipated in the transition from slavery to freedom by instituting an Apprenticeship system.<sup>6</sup> However, the British did not provide the black people with any economic compensation, necessary materials, or resources to make a successful transition from slavery to their survival even as free labourers. But the British Crown did financially compensate the planters for the abolition of slavery in Dominica.<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, every piece of plantation property, including the tools utilized by the slaves and the garden plots cultivated for their basic food needs remained the property of the planters. It is not unreasonable to surmise that a colonial rationale for these policies was that the freed slaves without necessary materials and resources for biological existence outside the plantation complex would be forced to return and seek low wage employment on the plantations. This did, in fact occur, and black Dominicans were paid a mere twenty-five cents a day. In effect then these emancipated people moved from a state of "chattel slavery to peonage."<sup>9</sup>

For the majority of black people, emancipation meant the possibility of making at least two decisions. After they were free to leave the plantation, a substantial number of black people decided to remain and accept the low wages offered by the planters. As soon as these plantation workers had made and saved sufficient money many, either individually or cooperatively, bought land which the planters had abandoned or considered unprofitable to cultivate.<sup>10</sup> Many black Dominicans made their livelihood on these lands. There were, however, black people who chose not to remain on the plantations as they perceived it to be a continuation of their recent slave experiences.<sup>11</sup> After emancipation they left the plantations, carrying away their huts, and settled on previously uncultivated crown lands.<sup>12</sup>

During the emancipation era, agriculture remained the major occupation of the black people as it was the skill they knew best and because through food and crop production it was possible to survive.<sup>13</sup> They grew ground provisions and vegetables, selling any surpluses at the markets. The meagre profits were invested in the small scale cultivation of limes, cocoa, vanilla, bayleaf, coconuts and coffee, producing enough at times for export abroad.<sup>14</sup>

The large migration of emancipated Dominicans away from the plantations proved detrimental to the colonial economic system in the Island. Partly because of this, the coffee estates in Dominica, which in the 18th century provided about half of the coffee produced in the British Caribbean, were in ruins by 1840.<sup>15</sup> Thus, from a colonial plantation viewpoint it is clear why the planters considered the movement of black people from the plantations an undesirable activity.

The planters adopted numerous devices to get the black Dominicans back to the plantations. One of these was an eviction scheme through which the black people could be ejected 'legally' from the crown lands on which they had settled.<sup>16</sup> However, as these crown lands were vital to their existence, black people resisted stoutly any of these attempts to appropriate 'their' land. When black Dominicans did involve themselves in violent activities it was invariably to protect the land, property and freedom crucial to their existence.

#### The Black Rebellion in 1844

From emancipation to 1843 there is no evidence that black Dominicans were engaged in violent activities against the plantation colonial system. By 1844, however, this situation changed as the black people interpreted a supposed island wide census, initiated by the local government, as a first step towards reinstating them to their former slave status.<sup>17</sup> Thus, June 3, 1844, the day the census began also marked the commencement of the black rebellion against the colonial system.

Black Dominicans viewed the government agents who were asking for their names as part of a plot to have them re-enslaved. Upon receiving information of the activities of the enumerators in the various districts of the island, the black people left their homes and congregated on the streets. Armed with cutlasses and bludgeons these Dominicans threatened death to any enumerator who dared take their names, and as the determination of black Dominicans increased, many enumerators had to flee for

their lives. At Canefield, Coulihaut and in the environs of Roseau, many enumerators did not get the chance to flee before being attacked and beaten.<sup>18</sup> At Point Michel, a white magistrate just managed to get away with his life.<sup>19</sup> At Grand-Bay, black Dominicans destroyed anything which either reminded them of or seemed to suggest a return to slavery.<sup>20</sup> The black rebellion became island-wide and followed closely the route of the census-takers.<sup>21</sup>

On receiving news of the determined and wide-spread nature of the rebellion, the local colonial government declared martial law,<sup>22</sup> dispatching soldiers and police to the affected parts of the Island. In addition, the president of the government, Lieutenant Governor D. Stewart Laidlaw issued a proclamation stating that the census was devised simply and solely for the purpose of obtaining correct statistics and data, including the age and sex of all inhabitants of the Island. The black people were told that the census was not a step towards their re-enslavement, and that information to that effect was simply the mischief of some evil-minded persons. Furthermore, a plea was made to the black Dominicans to end their rebellion and they were assured that as loyal subjects of the British Crown, neither they nor their children would ever again be enslaved.

This proclamation of June 4, 1844, however, failed to provide the black Dominicans with an adequate guarantee that their freedom would not be taken away, and made no mention of alleviating the wretched conditions afflicting the black people. Even while President Laidlaw was asking the black people to end their rebellion, the colonial military in the affected districts was committing atrocities against them. At

Grand-Bay for instance, a black man captured by the militia was beheaded, and his head impaled on a pole.<sup>23</sup> The Colonist, a newspaper of that period, which served the interests of the white planters, was overtly sympathetic to the actions taken by the militia at Grand-Bay. About this grotesque act, the Colonist had this to say:

The awful beacon now exhibited on the high road to Grandbay will we trust act as a solemn docile monitor to these misguided people that the laws of the land are not to be set at defiance nor her Majesty's peaceful and loyal subjects threatened with death and destruction of property. The head of the rebel now blanches upon a pole erected at the junction of three roads.... 24

This atrocity at Grand-Bay did not serve the end for which the Colonist said it was intended. The black rebellion continued with the black people demonstrating determination and resistance. At Grand-Bay, for example, a black man surrounded by the colonial militia decided to commit suicide rather than allow himself to be seized and returned to what he perceived to be his re-enslavement.<sup>25</sup>

The activities of the black people at the Coulibrie estate were representative of the island-wide rebellion. When plantation owner George Gilbert presented his case before the House of Assembly for financial reimbursement for property damage, he indirectly gave evidence concerning the activities of black Dominicans. He said that "about 400 rebels armed with cutlasses, sticks and other weapons" had surrounded his house, broken into it and destroyed and plundered every article and property which belonged to him.<sup>26</sup> Henry Sorhaindo, another planter, gave supporting evidence when he reported to the House that articles of considerable value "were stolen, taken away or destroyed by the rebels."<sup>27</sup> Numerous other reports to the House showed that the black people had

generally either destroyed buildings and crops, or seized plantation property such as furniture, food and simple cooking utensils. In general, however, the planters did not suffer as a result of such black activities, for the colonial government reimbursed them.<sup>28</sup>

The black rebellion was still in force when, on Monday June 10 1844, Sir Charles Fitzroy, the colonial Governor-in-Chief of the Leeward Islands, came to Dominica. Given the wide-spread nature of the rebellion, the determination shown by black Dominicans, and the crisis that the plantation system was experiencing, Sir Charles Fitzroy issued yet another proclamation. He offered pardon to all black people involved in the rebellion, with the exception of their leaders, if they would surrender themselves to the magistrates of the Island before June 14, 1844.

While this pardon was being extended, a detachment of the 1st Royal Regiment troops from Barbados arrived in Dominica and joined the local militia. In the face of such military force, the black Dominicans did not stand a chance, and hundreds of them were captured and were brought to Roseau. According to the House of Assembly, the jails rapidly became overcrowded, "principally with dangerous and desperate characters who were concerned with the late disturbances."<sup>30</sup>

On June 13, 1844, the President assured the planters and other proprietors that the black rebellion had been suppressed. He stated that there was no longer any reason for apprehension or fear of destruction to life or property, and so martial law was terminated. However, Laidlaw stationed troops in areas hit hardest by the rebellion

to deter black Dominicans from further disobedience to colonial laws and to ensure their 'respect' for the planters' property. The Colonist expressed the planters' gratitude and relief to President Laidlaw, for his supposedly prompt and decisive actions which suppressed what the newspaper considered would have been the worst revolt in Dominican history. The Colonist added:

We are happy to learn that in the disturbed districts the labourers [black people] are now tranquil.... 31

In order to leave a lasting impression about the consequences of rebellions, the planters hanged a number of black men who were claimed to have been among the leaders of the rebellion. As during the period of slavery the planters once again showed little regard and respect for the lives of black Dominicans. On July 1, 1844, for instance, at a special court devised by the planters, Philip Motard, an alleged leader of the rebellion, was tried, found guilty and was hanged at Point Michel on the following day.<sup>32</sup> Throughout these proceedings the Colonist praised the local government, the planter courts and the militia for their handling of the rebellion.<sup>33</sup> The planters, however, showed a propensity for underestimating the will of black Dominicans to struggle to live as free human beings. In 1854 another revolt occurred at Batalie.

#### The Black Revolt at Batalie in 1854

Emancipation for the enslaved people of Dominica meant freedom from the oppressive and enforced system of plantation labour and, if they chose, the liberty to leave the plantation. As discussed earlier, some former slaves did take possession of unoccupied and unused crown



lands where they settled with their huts and cultivated necessary ground provisions and vegetables.<sup>34</sup> This entire procedure displeased the planters immensely, for they regarded it as a loss of cheap and valuable labour and thus they set about to make life difficult for black Dominicans on these lands. The Batalie revolt was another response by Dominicans to the planters' unceasing attempts to confiscate the crown lands upon which they had established their homes.

The Dominica Almanac provides pertinent information concerning the origin of these crown lands.<sup>35</sup> They came into existence when the British occupied the Island, and subsequently sent a number of commissioners to Dominica to survey portions of the land for prospective settlers. A belt of three chains in width on the periphery of the Island was set aside as crown land, to be used by the military in protecting the Island. The British Crown also agreed that this portion of land could be utilized by planters of contiguous areas although it was specified that within the three chains there were areas mapped out exclusively for military purposes and for the erection of fortifications. These crown lands remained generally unused by both the military and the planters, especially during the latter phases of slavery. Following emancipation, these lands suddenly became 'invaluable' to the planters as black people had moved from the plantation to settle there. Thus, schemes to evict them became a major pre-occupation of the white planters.

The planters encountered substantial difficulty even in ascertaining the legal titles of these crown lands. Communication on the subject of crown lands and their titles transpired between the British Crown and the local planter government, and the planters were

eventually allowed to make 'legal' claim to the crown lands inhabited by black Dominicans.<sup>36</sup> Eviction orders were posted. However, while the matter was settled to the legal satisfaction of the planters, and was expressed by Lieutenant Governor Blackhall in eviction statements, the arrangement was clearly not satisfactory to the Dominicans at Batalie, who understood the eviction policy as a direct threat to their continuing existence. The black rebellion which took place at Batalie was an unambiguous expression of black people's rejection of the eviction orders and a commitment to fight for the land which sustained their independent livelihood.

The planters' decision to evict the people at Batalie was not supported by the Dominican mulattoes in the Assembly. In the legislature the coloured people made their protest to the eviction policy known in no uncertain terms. For this, the Colonist not only criticized the mulattoes but also blamed them for the black revolt which transpired at Batalie.

Who has caused the ill-feeling and excitement about the Queen's three chains? The Governor? No, but certain members of the Ascendancy mulattoes who advised the deluded people not to give way, and now they have succeeded in exciting a resistance amounting to disloyalty .... It is well known that if it were not for these seditious firebrands whose missionaries are actively employed in different parts of the country sowing seeds of dissension among a peacefully inclined population no dissatisfaction would be expressed. 37

The blame levelled against the mulattoes for the Batalie revolt showed that the Colonist, to say the least, had a short memory span. It had clearly forgotten the black rebellion which, less than a decade before, it had assessed as having the potential of becoming

the worst revolt in the history of Dominica, the very rebellion mounted exclusively by black people. The Colonist further displayed a facility for forgetting that the Maroon war and the 1844 rebellion had exploded the myth that black Dominicans were a "peacefully inclined population" when they considered their very existence to be at stake.

When both legal and persuasive tactics failed to evict the people at Batalie, the planters resorted to physical violence and direct force.<sup>38</sup> On January 21, 1854, they sent a crown surveyor and three policemen to eject the Dominicans at Batalie. The black people confronted the colonial officers carrying the eviction orders with a determined resistance, forcing them to flee for their lives. When news of this black resistance reached Roseau, Lieutenant Governor Blackhall decided to carry out the eviction order personally. With a magistrate, eight armed policemen, and four European sailors, who had been sworn in as special constables, he went to Batalie. As a show of force, Blackhall ordered one police officer to destroy a home. With this demonstrable support of the law, Blackhall seemingly expected that Dominicans would meekly accept eviction from the crown lands, but the black inhabitants responded with direct counter-violence. Seeing his group attacked, Blackhall attempted to address the black people. They gave him no audience, and fearing for their lives, the Governor and his agents were compelled to flee to Roseau. On this occasion, the black Dominicans had the satisfaction of successfully defending their means of livelihood from the planters and their agents.

This successful black resistance however, did not dissuade the planters from their schemes to confiscate the lands at Batalie. For

the black inhabitants at Batalie, peace was short in duration. At this point Lieutenant Governor Blackhall communicated to Antigua that there was a crisis confronting the planters in Dominica and specifically requested that the Governor-in-Chief of the Leeward Islands, McIntoch, send troops to the Island to help resolve it. McIntoch complied and a detachment of the 2nd West India and 57th Regiment stationed in Antigua arrived in Dominica on February 5, 1854 and was kept in reserve and readiness by the local government. Then the planters tried yet another scheme to force the black inhabitants to abandon the land at Batalie.

On February 8, 1854, the planters obtained from the court of the Queen's Bench, warrants for the arrest of a number of alleged black leaders from among the inhabitants at Batalie as a device to deter any further black resistance to their expropriation scheme. Delivering the arrest warrants apparently proved more difficult than the planters anticipated. In Roseau, the black Dominicans openly protested in support of the black cause at Batalie. The black boatmen in Roseau, for example, refused to carry the planters' marshal and his crew to Batalie. Had it not been for European ships in the Roseau harbour which provided the marshal and his agents with means of transport, the arrest issue might have ended in Roseau.<sup>39</sup>

On February 13, the marshal and his crew reached Batalie, but black resistance made it impossible for the marshal to arrest any of the stipulated Dominicans. Probably out of frustration, the marshal and his agents arrested three black women for whom no arrest warrants were issued and carried them back to Roseau.<sup>40</sup>

The determined resistance of the Dominicans forced the planters to send the reserve troops to Batalie on February 15. The black inhabitants were overpowered by the numerical strength and superior weaponry of the colonial military, and many black inhabitants appropriately sought refuge in the neighbouring woods and forest. Homes belonging to the people were destroyed; some Dominicans were captured and brought to Roseau. When the planters seemed satisfied that the ejection of the people was complete and the land at Batalie was confiscated, they allowed the military detachment to return to Antigua on March 14, 1854.

#### The Revolt at La Plaine in 1893

The last violent confrontation in which black Dominicans were engaged in the 19th century transpired at La Plaine on the South-eastern coast of the Island. As in the Batalie situation, the revolt was precipitated by an eviction order issued by the local government. In this case the poor peasants of that area had refused to pay land taxes to the local government. Although the revolt took place at La Plaine it could well have taken place in any other rural district where the conditions were equally as wretched.<sup>41</sup> La Plaine in 1893 was assessed as "the poorest quarter of the island. There is no work.... The district has been neglected by the government."<sup>42</sup> During this period the local government's neglect of the black population was felt in almost every rural area of the Island.

The black people of La Plaine, as in other areas of Dominica, had acquired land during the post-emancipation period. In some cases

the lands had been bought cheaply from planters who found these lands progressively less profitable to work since the abolition of slavery.<sup>43</sup> On the acquired lands in La Plaine, these Dominicans could cultivate only basic foods and produce a meagre surplus which was sold to obtain other essential commodities. Without capital or assistance of any kind from the local government it was not possible for these people to grow or raise export and marketable commodities on a large scale.<sup>44</sup> In 1888, a new tax scheme was imposed on the peasants by the local government.<sup>45</sup> Given the wretched conditions in which most of these people were forced to live it was simply impossible for them to pay these taxes. The government sent a police force to evict the peasants who had refused to comply with this new tax order.

The resistance of the people of La Plaine, however, made the police attempts at a eviction futile, and the local government requested troops from Antigua, as it did in 1854.<sup>46</sup> The troops did not find their task easy, for the black people again put forward a stout resistance. At the end of the rebellion four men were killed and two wounded.<sup>47</sup> In this revolt the black people scored a partial victory because it forced the planters to take notice of the general black unrest that was surfacing throughout the Island. Due to the La Plaine revolt and the fear of other possible revolts, the planters sent a petition to the British Crown, which dispatched a Royal Commission to Dominica in 1894.

The Commission was sent specifically to investigate the economic and social conditions in La Plaine, the general conditions existing throughout the Island, and to determine the causes for the

discontent which existed among the inhabitants. At the conclusion of its investigation, the British Crown rejected the Commissions apparently liberal recommendations, among which included granting Dominicans a more representative and autonomous voice in the local decision making process. Instead, the British Crown chose to rectify the economic and social problems of Dominica by imposing a system of crown colony rule on the Island. This simply meant that the Island would be governed directly by the British Crown.<sup>48</sup>

In its analysis of the economic and social conditions of Dominica, the Royal Commission was in a sense correct when its chairman, Robert Hamilton, concluded that: "The inhabitants of Dominica have acquired a character for turbulence...."<sup>49</sup> Hamilton would have been far more accurate in his analysis had he understood that the "acquired character for turbulence" was as a result of the unending struggle against dehumanization, especially on the part of black Dominicans, whose wretched and oppressive conditions continued in the post-emancipation period.<sup>50</sup>

In addition to these exclusive black rebellions, there were occasions between 1838 and 1898 when black Dominicans formed loose coalitions with certain mulattoes in the Assembly to struggle for change and to resist unfair legislative practices. Two of these joint efforts occurred in 1847 and 1886.

#### The Religious Struggle in 1847

The imperial history of the Island was in part a constant conflict between the British and the French for possession of the

Island and for control of the plantations. This was not only an international political conflict, but also a religious conflict between French Catholicism and British Protestantism. In Dominica, Catholicism had taken root when the French Jesuit priests had converted enslaved Africans. Thus when the British took possession of the Island practically every slave was Catholic. Although the British distributed most of the French plantations among British planters, they permitted many French people, including some planters, to remain on the Island. Due to the presence of both the French and British in the plantation system, mulattoes born to either of the two groups were baptised in either the Catholic or Protestant religions. The enslaved people and therefore the overwhelming majority of the Dominican population in the post-emancipation period were Catholic. It is against this historical backdrop that the religious revolt of 1847 must be understood.

The Anglican Church, the church of the white English planters and many of the mulatto people received an annual dowry from the public funds of the Island, as it was so closely associated with the dominant ruling class. The Catholic Church, on the other hand, representing the overwhelming majority of the population, did not receive such aid from the public treasury. The violent rebellion of 1847 was caused by unsuccessful attempts in the Legislature to provide an equitable distribution of public funds to both churches.

On various occasions before the House of Assembly, the Secretary of the Catholics and a member of the Assembly, T. F. Lockhart, demanded that a bill be passed to provide both religions with equal annual dowries.<sup>52</sup>



Lockhart's arguments however had no effect on the non-Catholic ruling class. Eventually Lockhart told the House that its unwillingness to pass such a bill amounted to a grave injustice and that the Catholic majority would not submit meekly. Lockhart's appraisal proved correct. The Catholics of Dominica regarded the unwillingness of the non-Catholic members to pass such a bill as a grave injustice and an attempt to frustrate and deprive them of their religious rights.

In October 1847, more than three thousand Dominicans, the majority of whom were Catholics, were involved in violent activities that threatened to destroy the colony.<sup>53</sup> When President Bremer, the head of the local government, posted a proclamation it only served to aggravate the revolt further.<sup>54</sup> These violent activities were of such magnitude and intensity that it reminded the Rector of Roseau, the Reverend George Clarke, of the 1844 revolt.<sup>55</sup> The Dominican, sponsored and supported by most Protestants in the House, described the impending crisis in the following manner:

Rumour and pretty accurate rumour too has it that the Privy Council was called in consequence of our state of community since Monday last threatening an outbreak. The prophecy uttered by T. F. Lockhart, secretary to the Catholics of Dominica in the House of Assembly on June 15...seems about to be accomplished. The threat involved in the language is about to be carried into effect. The eve of that day has arrived and the island is on the brink of revolution. 56

However, the anticipated 'revolution' did not materialize as promises were made to rectify the dowry issue, martial law was proclaimed, and troops were held in readiness. Even after the revolt had subsided, the town of Roseau remained for a time in an alarming state of unrest.<sup>57</sup> In order to help prevent another religious revolt,

in 1848 the Legislature passed laws focusing attention on punishment for rebels and rioters who tampered with Church property. They even specified punishment for those who molested persons descending from the steps of the United Church of England and Ireland.<sup>58</sup>

### The Tax Struggle in 1886

The black-mulato coalition of 1886 was formed between a number of black people and elected mulato members of the Assembly, including the prominent mulato leaders S.R. Pemberton and William Davies.<sup>59</sup>

A substantial number of the elected members of the Assembly were infuriated by Governor Gormanston's introduction of a bill to levy a land tax, and specifically the way in which he attempted to have it passed. These members considered Gormanston's methods undemocratic, a violation of their legislative rights, and a denial of the consideration that such a bill required. As a result, they stormed out from the Assembly in protest and took their case to the people of Dominica.<sup>60</sup>

These elected members then held a number of public meetings in the market place in Roseau, coinciding with the days on which most Dominicans came to the market either to sell or buy food and other products. When they were assured of substantial black support, the House members decided to present their grievances in a mass, direct protest demonstration to the Governor. The people of Dominica then "broke into Government House and demanded an audience with the Governor."<sup>61</sup> Seeing the large crowd which had gathered in the Government Yard,

Gormanston agreed to grant the crowd an audience. With this massive show of support, the House members expressed their dissatisfaction to the Governor concerning his undemocratic actions in the Assembly. The problem was resolved only after the Governor explained to the crowd that the Legislature had misread his intentions. He pointed out that the welfare of the Island was his main concern and that his actions always had the complete sanction of the British government.<sup>62</sup> The House members were satisfied with the Governor's explanations and persuaded the crowd to disperse, but Roseau remained in a state of tension.

In the same year the land tax was passed. In addressing itself to the land tax issue, the Dial forcefully asserted that the people of Dominica were paying the land tax because they wanted to do so, implicitly denying that they were compelled to do so by undemocratic measures.<sup>63</sup> The Dominican's determination during the issue was best appraised by another edition of the Dial:

It remains to be seen whether a Governor Gormanston, even a titled one, is allowed with the help of officials to tax the people of this island without the consent of their representatives; for if this is allowed Her Majesty's Government will have to collect their taxes at the point of a bayonet. <sup>64</sup>

## II

For about thirty years after the passage of the Brown Privilege Bill in 1832, the mulatto people seemed unwilling to engage in open protest against the white planters' domination in the post-emancipation period. This is somewhat surprising considering that by 1838 the mulattoes

held a controlling majority in the Assembly. About 1863, however, the situation changed and the mulattoes became increasingly more overt in their struggles for political autonomy in the colonial system.<sup>65</sup> They realized that to survive politically as free men they would have to protest openly against the white planters to prevent the complete erosion of their rights as elected representatives in the Legislature; struggle to prevent the imposition of crown colony rule, and even after its imposition, continue their struggle to bring it to an end; and, attempt to terminate Dominica's association in the Leeward Islands Federation, which was imposed in spite of their protest. The mulattoes recognized that the Leeward Islands Federation and the imposition of crown colony rule in particular would not only restrict their local autonomy in the decision making process, but would also end their franchise.<sup>66</sup>

#### The Constitutional Protests of 1863 and 1865

The mulatto willingness to protest openly, and even by unconventional methods in the Legislature, was often demonstrated by an elected representative, the prominent mulatto leader Charles Falconer.

In 1863, the Governor and the white planters set about to amalgamate the House of Assembly and the Legislative Council into a single chamber.<sup>67</sup> To many of the elected mulattoes, a Single Chamber House meant an erosion of their power as elected representatives. The matter was put before the House for deliberation, but it was obvious from the proceedings that the supporters of the single chamber proposal would win. The Speaker of the Assembly was about to rule on

the issue when Falconer stood up, interrupted the session and in heated protest, defied the passage of the bill. Falconer would not relent in his purpose and the Speaker ordered the Sergeant-at-arms to evict him from the House. Falconer, armed with a hunting whip, dared anyone to lay a hand on him, and a scuffle transpired ending only when Falconer agreed to go to jail for his unconventional behaviour in the Legislature. A large angry crowd sympathetic to Falconer's cause waited outside the Court House and Falconer had to plead with them to allow him to go to jail quietly and to desist from rescuing him by violent means. After arriving at the jail, Falconer had to beg many people not to crash through the prison guards to release him from confinement. Even then the town of Roseau almost broke out in a revolt.<sup>68</sup>

In a few days Falconer was released and he subsequently sued the Speaker and others for damages and false imprisonment. "To their sorrow they had to pay damages and costs."<sup>69</sup> The Single Chamber Bill, however, was passed in December 1863.

Approximately two years later Falconer and other mulattoes were involved in another struggle for their political survival in the Single Chamber Legislature. This time the white planters, with the assistance of the Governor, embarked on a plan to end the mulatto franchise by having crown colony rule imposed directly on the island. This led to a rumour that "slavery was to be restored."<sup>70</sup> In the Legislature, the protagonists for crown colony rule were led by the British planter William McIntyre who had the full support of the head of the local government, William Cleaver Robinson.<sup>71</sup>

An intense and lengthy debate transpired in the Legislature between the protagonists of crown colony rule and the opposing Dominican mulattoes. When the bystanders in the Court House perceived that the protagonists were acquiring the upper hand, they protested with loud shouts, hisses and enthusiastic arguments. The Speaker of the House, an Englishman named Thomas Doyle, demanded that the House be cleared of bystanders ("strangers"). The Sergeant-at-arms failed as the people simply stood their ground. When a stone came crashing through the window and landed on the Speaker's table, he requested police assistance from the Governor to clear the Court House. Falconer and his supporters objected to the use of police, but McIntyre and those who supported the Speaker won.<sup>72</sup> When the police, under the direct supervision of the Sergeant-at-arms, attempted to eject the bystanders from the Court, they resisted violently. Eventually, marines from a ship called the Aurora were called in and the House was finally cleared of the people who had openly protested against the imposition of crown colony rule.

Both William McIntyre and William Cleaver Robinson suffered personally for their overt support of crown colony rule. McIntyre had his Goodwill estate set on fire, and Robinson was marked for assassination.<sup>73</sup>

Falconer met with John Imray, the British medical doctor and nominated member of the Legislature, who reported that Falconer and his mulatto following would have agreed to a compromise at this point, if crown colony rule was not imposed and the franchise not lost.<sup>74</sup> Indeed, the Falconer-led-mulattoes would have accepted a compromise

in the interest of preserving the franchise, but it is apparent that John Imray misunderstood the nature of the compromise. The Falconer-led-mulatoes did not think that an equal number of nominated and elected members in the Legislature was in their best interest, and thus when Imray, with the assistance of the Governor, moved to pass this so-called compromise bill, the mulatoes protested against it. The mulatoes wanted to preserve the franchise, but they also desired an elected majority of nine representatives to four nominated members. This proposal proved totally unacceptable to Imray and his supporters in the House, and in April of 1865, his compromise bill was passed in the Legislature and signed into law by William Robinson.

Angry at the outcome, the Falconer-led-mulatoes decided to carry their protest to England. In England, the mulato delegation comprising Falconer, George Garraway and Lewis F. Bellot, told the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Edward Cardwell, that the people of Dominica could take care of their political matters only if they had a majority of elected members in the Legislature. Cardwell, however, was not convinced and the Act remained a law of the land.<sup>75</sup>

Although the Falconer-led-mulatoes had not been successful in effecting a favourable compromise in the Legislature, their protests had nonetheless averted the imposition of a formal crown colony rule system in 1865. Aside from this, however, these mulatoes had to settle for a modified constitution which provided for an equal number of elected and nominated members in the Legislature. As far as the enfranchised Dominicans were concerned, the Falconer-led-mulatoes

were heroes, and at the elections held in September-November 1865, they re-elected all the mulattoes who had struggled against the imposition of crown colony rule and the modified constitution.

The struggle to prevent crown colony rule had only just begun in 1865. It was further complicated by an external decision to include Dominica in a Leeward Island Federation. From then on, mulatto Dominicans had to fight an unceasing battle to hold on to their political rights. Specifically, they had to fight against a constitutional proposal which sought to destroy their elected representation, the exercise of their franchise, and their ability to make decisions of particular importance to their interests.

#### The Mulatto Protest against the Federation

The British decision to include Dominica in a Leeward Island Federation in 1871 was greeted with a storm of protest by the mulatto people, which did not subside until Dominica severed her connection with the Federation and became part of the Windward Island group in 1940.<sup>76</sup> While it was apparent that the Leeward Island Federation would provoke controversy as it would erode further local decision making powers, the initial outburst was caused by the British government imposing an additional political arrangement on the island without the consent of Dominicans.<sup>77</sup>

Between 1871 and the visit of the Hamilton Royal Commission in 1894, the mulattoes wrote a substantial number of protest petitions to the Secretary of State for Colonies, as they were determined to end Dominica's association with the Federation. They repeatedly mentioned



two points in their petitions: that the Federation hindered their ability to make local decisions of great importance to their lives; and that it drained substantially the financial and economic resources of the Island.

The Hamilton Commission gave additional encouragement to the mulattoes for it appeared to be both liberal and sympathetic toward their cause. During the Commission's visit, the mulattoes once again tried to terminate the Federal connection by presenting a petition of protest to the local Administrator to be passed on to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. In it they specifically argued that the Federation had created a superfluous and costly officialdom and that Dominicans were being forced to spend money without the consent or authority of their local representatives. Once again the mulattoes asserted that the Federal arrangement had violated their political autonomy as it was imposed solely at the discretion of an external power. Finally, given these factors, they argued that the Federation was simply detrimental to the welfare of the Island.<sup>78</sup>

Mulato Dominicans, including the prominent House leader, William Davies, who testified before the Commission, were optimistic that favourable changes would follow after their testimony. They expected not only that the Federation would be terminated, but also that they would be given greater autonomy than that which had been provided by the modified constitution of 1865.<sup>79</sup> These hopes were dashed by Governor Haynes Smith's message concerning the recommendations of the Royal Commission and the decisions taken by the Secretary

of State regarding their protest demands. The substance of the message was:

The Royal Commission [Hamilton] recommended certain changes in the position of the unofficial members of the Legislative Assembly and the Secretary of State had intimated...to advise Her Majesty to assent.... But the Secretary of State intimates that it is advisable and in the interest of Dominica to retain the connection with the Leeward Islands group.... 80

Mulato optimism was replaced by a new wave of protest. In reply to the Governor's message, the mulatoes made it clear that the decisions of the Secretary of State were simply not in the interest of Dominicans. They stated: "We are constrained to say we can only accept this concession as an instalment of the full and legitimate demands of the country." They also added:

We are sorry to be unable to recognize in the Bill for altering the political constitution an efficient instrument for receiving either fair representation of the different interests in the island and of the different classes of the population, or that effective control of taxation and expenditure by the representatives of the taxpayers which is as yet the only human check in any community on the wasteful and improper use of its resources. 81

Finally, the Dominican mulatoes emphatically expressed their disapproval of the decisions made by the Secretary of State by declaring to Haynes Smith that they would not accept "such a reactionary measure."<sup>82</sup> Despite their protests; however, the Federation continued. The struggle to terminate Dominica's connection with the Leeward Island Federation would once again dominate mulato activities in the 1920 - 1930 period, but at this juncture in Dominican political history, the mulatoes had to focus their attention more closely on the impending imposition of crown colony rule.

### The Mulato Struggle against Crown Colony Rule

"Dominicans prided themselves in having fought Crown Colony government to the last moment."<sup>83</sup> A more accurate and complete understanding of the struggle would indicate that Dominicans persisted with the protest against crown colony rule even after its imposition in 1898.

In a message to the Legislative Assembly of Dominica, the Governor-in-Chief of the Leeward Island Federation outlined what he considered were the grave ills plaguing the island. He told the Assembly that the economic and financial state of the island was pitiful; that trade was declining steadily; that poverty was growing at an alarming rate; that immigration was high; and that at the end of the year 1897, "there was a deficit in the general revenue of the island."<sup>84</sup> As a solution, Governor Fleming proposed that it was in the best interest of the Island at this critical time to accept a crown colony rule system in which:

The imperial Government holds to this island Dominica the helping hand of assistance, but on the condition that the constitution of the Presidency be modified so as to give the Crown control of the finances by possessing a majority in the Legislature. 85

The Dominican mulattoes were, to say the least, incensed by Fleming's proposed solution. In a protest petition they responded that the proposal of the British Crown to take over the financial affairs of the Island and to further modify the constitution to give the British government absolute control over local matters, was an act of bribery, fraud and treachery. They declared that "neither the form nor the substance of the Government's proposals can ever be made

acceptable to the inhabitants of Dominica."<sup>86</sup> They argued further that the proposal was used by the Mother Country --- given that she had created the island's crises by her fiscal policies --- "for buying for a 'song' the rights of Colonial Citizens."<sup>87</sup> The mulattoes then submitted a protest resolution to the Governbr and the Secretary of State for the Colonies. It read in part:

That the Governor be informed that it is not the desire of the people of Dominica that any change whereby an increase of the official vote is to be affected should be made in the constitution of the island, the officials as a rule having only a passing interest in the island and being paid for specific duties and not to legislate.

That the Secretary of State for the Colonies be informed that the people of Dominica are unwilling to barter even their limited status as citizens of the British Empire for any sum of money to be named, and if compelled to submit to political annihilation by action of official guides or by the use of superior force their loyalty to the Crown will be forever weakened and their confidence in the British fair dealing forever weakened. 88

When in July 1898 it seemed that crown colony rule would be imposed despite their protests, the mulattoes forwarded a more strongly worded resolution. William Davies and other elected members made it known that insufficient reasons had been given for the "abolition of the existing Constitution of the Island and substitution of a despotic form of government by the Crown."<sup>89</sup> Furthermore, the imposition of this despotic form of government was "profoundly distasteful to the bulk of the inhabitants of this island."<sup>90</sup> A form of government in which a governor could simply force any legislation on the people of Dominica was tantamount to robbing Dominicans of all their political liberties. Given this alarming state of affairs, the mulattoes concluded: "that the sole hope of political enfranchisement for the people of

Dominica lies in the acquisition of the island by some foreign power."<sup>91</sup> To this end they asked:

That Her Majesty the Queen be humbly solicited to barter this island with either the French Republic or the Republic of the United States of America whichever may be by plebiscite the declared wish of the people of Dominica as soon as opportunity may offer. 92

Dominica was not bartered, nor was the imposition of crown colony rule averted. On August 2, 1898, an Act to simplify the Legislature --- "The Constitutional Act of 1898" --- was passed. With it crown colony government was established in Dominica.<sup>93</sup> The Island's internal affairs were now directly handled by Britain and the Governor who represented this direct rule was responsible only to Britain. The mulatto franchise was abolished. In part, crown colony rule meant:

The Legislative Council hereby created shall have and exercise all power, authorities and rights of the Legislative Assembly abrogated, and after the date of the proclamation of this Act all Legislative authority in this Presidency shall be vested in the Governor and the Legislative Council hereby established.... 94

With the establishment of crown colony rule, the mulatto antagonists predicted that various kinds of political unrest would break out throughout Dominica.<sup>95</sup> However, such types of unrest did not materialize. Heskeith Bell became the administrator in the years immediately following the imposition of crown colony rule. Although he was claimed the beginning of the most brilliant administration in Dominica,<sup>96</sup> Bell could not weaken the continuing protest against crown colony rule, and for the re-establishment of the franchise in Dominica.

Among the mulattoes who carried on the struggle against crown colony rule, A.R.C. Lockhart deserves particular mention. He vowed that he would never take part in government until the franchise was restored, and by the end of World War I he became an instrumental force in the formation of the protest movement called the Representative Government Association.<sup>97</sup>

#### The Representative Government Association Protest

The Representative Government Association, referred to as the RGA, was comprised almost exclusively of educated mulatto people. In Dominican society, the class structure was dominated by the white inhabitants with the mulattoes forming the middle stratum, and the black majority was at the bottom. The mulattoes usually owned property and as a result could afford to have their children tutored either privately in Dominica or abroad, or educated at the Dominica Grammar School, a secondary school founded in 1893. Post-secondary and professional education was obtained for the most part in England, and medicine and particularly law were the dominant professions.<sup>98</sup> Thus members of the RGA were not only educated, but most were also lawyers skilled in polemics, a potent weapon in the protest arsenal of the RGA.

In 1919, the RGA was formed with A.R.C. Lockhart as its first president. Its foremost concern was general constitutional change. Its specific goals were to bring an end to both crown colony rule and the Leeward Island involvement, and to restore the franchise on even a broader basis, thereby increasing elected representation in the Legislative Council.<sup>99</sup> Its major strategy was protest activity, including

argument, debate and inflammatory speeches, through which the RGA hoped to muster broad Dominican support to achieve its political ends.<sup>100</sup>

The organization received initial impetus from two external sources: from the Grenadian-born leader, T. Albert Marrayshow, who was instrumental in organizing a similar movement in that island, and secondly, from the concepts of democratic freedom and self-determination given a new popularity by the American President, Woodrow Wilson. These concepts were particularly relevant to Dominicans and other West Indians and they inspired the RGA to become both a creator of, and an outlet for a type of Dominican nationalism.<sup>101</sup>

In this struggle for constitutional change, the RGA severely criticized crown colony rule, maintaining an uncompromising position that it had failed absolutely in Dominica. The movement postulated that crown colony government had retarded economic progress in Dominica; that the system had prevented the development of Dominican natural resources and that under its rule underdevelopment in Dominica would persist; that it was a system completely out of touch with the aspirations and needs of the people of Dominica. Crown colony rule, it was argued, was damned by its own *raison d'etre*; for while it had claimed that the system had been established because the majority of Dominicans were too uneducated to handle their own affairs properly, the government had failed in every way to educate the people. The Association predicted that one day historians would regard crown colony rule as a form of fascism.

The RGA also criticized the Leeward Island Federation, and

argued forcefully that it was imperative for Dominica to withdraw from the Federation. The Association pointed out that measures had been adopted in Antigua without reference to the requirements or needs of Dominicans and without any knowledge of conditions in the Island. It claimed that if the Federation was terminated, Dominica would save approximately 5,000 pounds which went annually to the upkeep of Federal officials in Antigua --- who duplicated official services in Dominica. Furthermore, the Association argued that Dominica had not and would not in the future derive any benefit from the connection, and in fact, Dominica's development had been handicapped by Antigua. Indeed, the time had arrived for Dominicans to work out their own destiny.<sup>102</sup>

These RGA arguments and views were presented to the Dominican public at mass meetings held throughout the island and particularly at Saint Gerard's Hall in Roseau.<sup>103</sup> The RGA could boast that it had a following which represented a wide cross section of the Dominican population, as indicated by the fact that each meeting was well attended by over 2,000 enthusiastic and receptive Dominicans of different social and economic standing in the society.<sup>104</sup> The crowds were never disappointed. Capable members of the calibre of A.R.C. Lockhart and Cecil Rawle captivated their audiences with fiery, flamboyant and often well articulated arguments on the subject of crown colony rule and the Leeward Island Federation. In turn, the RGA would capitalize on the show of support and enthusiasm that it generated among the people. As each RGA meeting drew to a close, accompanied by chants of slogans which provoked nationalistic feelings and sentiments



--- "Abandon the Spirit of Autocracy: Adopt the Principle of Liberalism" and "Crown Colony, No taxation without Representation"<sup>105</sup> - the RGA would get the people present to sign its protest petitions. The crowd's response was overwhelming and the meetings would eventually conclude with thunderous applause amidst much stirred emotions. Probably the greatest testimony to the impact of the RGA was the about-turn of members of the Legislative Council who had previously supported crown colony rule. Many now participated actively with the RGA in the struggle for constitutional reform.<sup>106</sup>

In its demands for constitutional change, the Association offered a number of recommendations and guidelines to the British government. For instance, it was recommended that the constitution should be altered to include a Legislative Council, a President, five official members, five nominated un-official members, and five members elected by the tax payers of Dominica. In addition, the RGA proposed that these changes be implemented within a broad framework that permitted increased local autonomy in government affairs.<sup>107</sup>

Due to the Association's incessant demands for more progressive forms of government, demands also shared by other West Indian movements, the British government dispatched the Wood Royal Commission to the West Indies. In January 1922, the Commission arrived in Dominica, and was greeted not only by the protests of the RGA, but also by those of other local groups which by this time had also felt the necessity to demand constitutional change.<sup>108</sup> At the end of its investigation of the conditions in the Island, the

Wood Commission concluded that legitimate demands existed for constitutional change which included a termination of Dominica's association with the Leeward Island Federation.<sup>109</sup> This was partly based on the Commission's recognition that the RGA's demands were not motivated simply by group interest. Indeed, the RGA demands were also supported by the Dominica Chamber of Commerce, the Agricultural Society, 2,300 Dominicans who signed a petition, and Mr. McIntyre, a Scottish planter and a member of the Legislative Council who was a former protagonist of crown colony government. This support along with the receptive and enthusiastic audiences at the RGA meetings gave the Association justification for its claim before the Commission that it spoke for Dominicans of every class, colour and creed in the Island.

The Royal Commission was not, however, convinced that the demands for sweeping constitutional change were in the best interests of the Island at that time. It argued that the topographical outlay of the island made necessary forms of political and other communication nearly impossible, and that the greater part of the population --- about 70 per cent --- was illiterate.<sup>110</sup> These factors would collectively impede the successful and effective implementation of the far-reaching changes sought. The Commission, however, could not discount the genuine protest of Dominicans against crown colony rule, and as a result, in September 1924, a modified crown colony constitution was established in Dominica.

This constitution provided for a Legislative Council consisting of a Governor, an Administrator, and four elected members.<sup>111</sup> In the 1925

election, four members of the RGA were elected. They were Cecil Rawle for Roseau, A.A. Baron for the Northern District, S.L.V. Green for the Western District, and H. D. Shillingford for the Eastern District.<sup>112</sup>

Unfortunately, all the changes sought by the RGA were not granted. The Association had, nonetheless, made progress and rightfully deserves credit and praise. The Association had constructed a firm basis from which succeeding Dominicans would be able to struggle effectively for greater constitutional change. Even after the organization had formally disbanded in the late twenties, the struggle against crown colony rule and the Leeward Island Federation did not diminish but grew more intense, and culminated in the historic West Indian Conference in 1932. The Conference, hosted in Roseau, was spearheaded by Cecil Rawle, a former RGA member. As Rawle figures so prominently in both the arrangement and content of the Conference he will be discussed in the next section.

### The West Indian Conference

In 1924, the President of the RGA, A.R.C. Lockhart died. Although Lockhart's ability as an orator, organizer and skilled agitator was admirable and uncommon, Cecil E.A. Rawle dominated the RGA even during Lockhart's presidency.

Rawle was the vice-president of the RGA and later the president of the Tax-Payers Reform Association (TPRA), an association which had evolved from the RGA. He was not a revolutionary, at least in the common definition of that word, and he was the first man to admit it. R. Lockhart, the son of A.R.C. Lockhart, in describing Rawle recently

as "a most able lawyer, a very forceful and effective speaker" referred to him not as a radical or revolutionary, but as a "Victorian Liberal."<sup>113</sup> He did, however, put his fine intellect and skill as an orator and polemicist into the struggle against crown colony rule and the Leeward Island Federation. Indeed, it was largely through his efforts as the president of the TPRA that the West Indian Conference was initiated and hosted by Dominica in 1932. Details of the general struggle against crown colony rule and the Federation have already been discussed in the analysis of the protest activities of the RGA, and therefore focus will be placed on Rawle's activities as the president of the TPRA, and the chairman of the West Indian Conference.

In 1932, the Dominica Chronicle was unabashedly enthusiastic in its commendation of Dominica for the initiative shown in calling a West Indian Conference, concerned, as the newspaper put it, with a closer Caribbean Union.<sup>114</sup> The newspaper gave special thanks to the TPRA for its extremely valuable contribution to, and role in the genesis of this newly emerging West Indian unity, saying: "Dominica has made history for itself."<sup>115</sup>

The Conference was generally lauded as a new chapter in West Indian History, and so it was! Every West Indian island, with the sole exception of Jamaica, was represented. Rawle envisaged the Conference as that "which we all fervently hope will record the emancipation of the West Indian peoples from their political serfdom."<sup>116</sup> This sentiment was shared by every single West Indian representative. The Conference was not only concerned with West Indian unity, but was in itself an expression of that unity, and as Rawle proclaimed,

a sign of West Indian solidarity. It had two major ends: the termination of crown colony rule, and building the foundation of West Indian Nationhood.<sup>117</sup>

At the conference, Rawle expressed the general views of Dominicans, and more specifically, those of the members of the RGA. He first told the representatives why Dominica had initiated the Conference. He claimed that Dominica was the West Indian island which had suffered most at the hands of crown colony government with its administrative excesses and extravagances. This formed a prelude to Rawle's forceful and commanding attack on crown colony rule in which he stated that the system of government in Dominica had ignored with impunity, "public opinion and public protest." It was characterized by fraud, arrogance, unbridled absolutism, injustice, recklessness, especially in expenditure, and indifference to the general welfare of the people of Dominica. Among the many failures that Rawle laid at the doorstep of crown colony rule was its total inability to develop the Dominican community, thereby forcing many Dominicans to live in squalor and abject poverty. It failed to educate Dominicans in general, and whenever it gave aid for educational purposes, including university scholarships, it was to the rich at the expense of the poor.<sup>118</sup>

In spite of Rawle's hatred for crown colony rule, the violence and radical measures that usually form a part of revolutionary thinking and procedure were never in his rhetoric or intimated by him as a means of ending the crown colony system in Dominica and the rest of the Caribbean. On the contrary, Rawle was an advocate of and a firm believer

in non-violent strategies to accomplish desirable change. He and other associates in the TPRA were convinced that British justice and a "West Indian-British" way of operating were 'goods' in themselves. It was precisely these beliefs that caused Rawle and his associates to maintain that desirable change would come when the British authorities were made conscious of the injustices that were inherent in, and emanated from, crown colony rule.<sup>119</sup> Thus Rawle preached that struggle for desired change should be through constitutional measures and not through assassinations, arson or any other form of violence. He said:

Relying on the righteousness of our cause... if we stand together and march demanding our rights as British Citizens, refusing to be regarded any longer as political outcasts, our cause, self-government, must conquer in the end and full British Citizenship cannot be denied. 120

In his philosophy of change through non-violence, Rawle can be likened to Martin Luther King of the United States, or Gandhi in India. His contribution to constitutional change in Dominica, unlike his contemporaries, has not gone unnoticed, and today Rawle is considered a "Man of Action and Vision."<sup>121</sup> A statue stands at Goodwill in Roseau as a tribute to his struggles for Dominican self-determination.

The immediate impact of the Conference was manifested in a tangible form in 1936. R. Lockhart, a participant at the Conference, affirms that the Conference successfully impressed upon the British authorities the determination of Dominicans and other West Indians to obtain greater local autonomy and to increase the exercise of local initiative in government matters. As a result of the Conference, Dominica

in 1936 obtained an advanced constitution which widened the cracks in the crown colony system and increased local strength in the Legislative Council.

While the West Indian representatives at the Conference in Dominica were engaged in non-violent protest, almost every other West Indian island, was experiencing unrest and excitement of a different nature. Violence broke out mainly among the working and labouring people of these islands, from Trinidad in the south to St. Kitts in the north. The major reason for this was the grave Depression of the 1930's which hit the labouring and working class people in the Caribbean the hardest. The West Indian situation was further aggravated by the racial tension and intolerance which had grown at an alarming rate in the United States as a result of the Depression. Thus, many West Indians who had emigrated to the USA after the First World War were not only faced with mounting economic hardships, but also with racial discrimination.<sup>122</sup> A substantial number of these West Indians returned to the Caribbean where conditions daily became more depressed and wretched. Dominica remained a notable exception, however, and violence did not break out there.<sup>123</sup>

In an attempt to ensure the survival of the labouring and working people of Dominica, the first Trade Union in Dominica was formed by E. Christopher Loblack, a black man himself, and a member of the working and labouring class. The next chapter is an account of the Trade Unions and their struggle to improve the conditions of the labouring people of Dominica.

## Chapter IV

## Footnotes

1. Thus David Lowenthal concludes: "Emancipation removed civil barriers of race, but in every West Indian territory political equality was a legal fiction." David Lowenthal, West Indian Societies, *op. cit.*, p. 63.
2. For a discussion of the 'Brown Privilege Bill' see J. Boromé "How Crown Colony Government came to Dominica", in Aspects of Dominican History, *op. cit.*.
3. This is a position taken by C. Thomas, From Crown Colony to Associate State: Political Change in Dominica, Commonwealth Caribbean 1973 unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (University of Massachusetts, 1973), Chapter III.
4. As to the question of dismissal of black people in the post-emancipation period, Boromé is correct when he points out that there has not been any research done on black Dominicans in the post-emancipation period, J. Boromé, "George Falconer", Caribbean Quarterly, Vol. 6, 1959-1960, p.p. 11-17.
5. This section on the black Dominicans could not have been written without the assistance, guidance and criticism of Fr. Prosemans. It was he who also suggested that the Official Gazettes of that period would be an indispensable source of primary material. Together with the newspapers, it was the major source of primary material for this chapter.
6. The apprenticeship system was common to all British West Indian islands and has been written about extensively. See Eric Williams, From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean, 1492 - 1969 (London: Andre Deutsch, 1970); Sir Allan Burns, *op. cit.*.
7. This was common to the British West Indies, see, for instance Eric Williams, The Negro in the Caribbean, *op. cit.*.
8. This point was derived from an informal interview held with Fr. Prosemans in Pointe Michel, July-August 1973.
9. Eric Williams, The Negro in the Caribbean, *op. cit.*, p. 15.. Similarly, M. Ayearst, The British West Indies, *op. cit.*, p. 25, says "The chief distinction from slavery was that the slaves now received wages."
10. The cooperative was not peculiar to black Dominicans in the post-emancipation period. See, Woodville Marshall "Notes on Peasant Development in the West Indies since 1838", in Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 17, No. 3, September 1968.



11. Ibid., p. 252. Woodville Marshall puts it in these terms concerning the black peasants in the post-emancipation: "They represented a reaction to the plantation economy, negative reflex to enslavement, mass production, monocrop dependence, and metropolitan control."
12. See, Fillan's Almanac, op. cit., p. 71.
13. J.B. Yankey, A Study of the Situation in Agriculture and the Problems of Small Scale Farming in Dominica, West Indies, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis (Madison, Wisconsin, 1965).
14. Ibid.
15. See, Great Britain, House of Parliament 1894, Report of the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into the Conditions and Affairs of the Island of Dominica, Chairman, Robert Hamilton (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1894) p. xiii in particular. This Report will be referred to subsequently as the Hamilton Report. Also see R.L. Williams, Industrial Development of Dominica, op. cit., p.p. 38-41.
16. See, Fillan's Almanac, op. cit., p. 71. This point will be developed later in the chapter.
17. See "Minutes of the House of Assembly", July 29, 1844; August 20, 1844; September 13, 1844 in Official Gazette, 1844. This bound volume is located in the Government Archive in Roseau. In these Minutes statements are made referring to the black disturbance in the Island. (A factor which gave credence to the black peoples' belief that slavery was to be reinstated was that slavery continued to exist in the French island of Martinique, just south of Dominica).
18. Ibid.
19. See "Minutes of Privy Council" June 4, 1844 and July 29, 1844, Official Gazette, 1844.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. The Dominica Colonist, June 8, 1844.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. See, "Minutes of the House of Assembly and Council", Official Gazette, November 19, 1844.

27. See, "Minutes of the House of Assembly and Council", Official Gazette, September 24, 1844.
28. See, "Minutes of the House of Assembly and Council", August 28, 1844; October 15, 1844; November 15, 1844, Official Gazette, 1844.
29. See, "Minutes of House of Assembly and Council", July 28, 1844; September 13, 1844; in Official Gazette, 1844.
30. See, "Minutes of House of Assembly", Official Gazette, July 29, 1844.
31. The Dominica Colonist, June 22, 1844.
32. See, "Minutes of the House of Assembly", July 1844, especially July 28, 1844, and July 29, 1844, in Official Gazette, 1844.
33. The Dominica Colonist, August 21, 1844.
34. About West Indians in general both S. Mintz and W. Marshall have this to say: "Our peasantry then starts at emancipation in 1838. It comprises the ex-slaves who after 1838 started small farms 'on the peripheries of plantation areas' wherever they could find land --- in abandoned plantations and in the mountainous interiors of the various territories." S. Mintz, "The Question of Caribbean Peasantries: A Comment", Caribbean Studies, Vol. 1, no. 3., quoted in W. Marshall, "Notes on Peasant Development in the West Indies", op. cit..
35. See the Fillan's Almanac, op. cit., (1826 edition) p.p. 64-73.
36. Ibid., and also see The Hamilton Report, op. cit., p.xiii.
37. The Dominica Colonist, January 28, 1854. The Colonist was a newspaper owned by the white planters and edited by Thomas Doyle. One of its major targets for criticism was the mulattoes, the coloured people, especially the mulatto leader Charles Falconer.
38. The rest of this section on the Batalie Revolt is developed from information scattered primarily throughout the Official Gazettes of 1854; The Hamilton Report, op. cit.; and in the Fillan's Almanac series, op. cit.. Both Fr. Proseman and Prof. Riviere were very helpful with criticisms and guidance. These two men have been discussed earlier, see Chapter I.
39. See, "Minutes of House of Assembly", February 15 and passim February 1854 in Official Gazette, 1854.
40. Ibid.
41. See especially the "Introduction" of the Hamilton Report op. cit., for a description of the social and economic conditions in Dominica.

42. Testimony of Rev. J. Conturier, Parish Priest of La Plaine before the Hamilton Report, op. cit., p. 40.
43. See, Hamilton Report, op. cit., p. xiii for details on how black peasant proprietors emerged in Dominica. Also see, W. Marshall "Notes on Peasant Development in the West Indies", op. cit..
44. See J. B. Yankey, A Study of the Situation in Agriculture and the Problems of Small Scale Farming in Dominica, West Indies, op. cit..
45. The issue of the tax scheme will be discussed later in this chapter.
46. Sir Allan Burns, History of the British West Indies, op. cit., p. 662, refers to this revolt as "La Guerre Negre". A literal translation would be "The Nigger War".
47. See, Hamilton Report, op. cit., p. xxii.
48. Crown Colony Rule came to Dominica in 1898. See J. Boromé, "How Crown Colony Government came to Dominica", in Aspects of Dominican History, op. cit..
49. The Hamilton Report, op. cit., p. xxii.
50. In other words, the Hamilton Report, even though it was headed by a Chairman considered liberal, failed to recognize the "character of turbulence" as deliberate activities of struggle in which especially black Dominicans were engaged to make possible their human survival.
51. Even today Dominica is still predominantly Catholic. It is estimated that over 90 per cent of the population are baptized Catholics. Even today almost all of the Catholic priests are non-British and are predominantly of French-Belgian extraction.
52. See, "Minutes of the House of Assembly" May 4, 1847; June 5, 1847; August 18, 1847, in Official Gazette, 1847.
53. See, "Letter of the Rector of Roseau" sent by Rev. George Clarke to the council, Official Gazette, October 23, 1847.
54. "Minutes of the House of Assembly", Official Gazette, October 19, 1847.
55. See, "Letter of the Rector of Roseau"; op. cit..
56. The Dominican, October 27, 1847.
57. Remarks passim in Official Gazettes, 1847.
58. See "Act 91 and 93" of the Legislative Assembly, Official Gazette, 1848.

59. Hamilton Report, op. cit., p. xii.
60. The people of Dominica at this time were: Blacks -- 19,700; Coloured -- 7,000; Whites -- 330, in Hamilton Report, op. cit., "Introduction". For population figures of 1871 see, Fillan's Almanac op. cit., (1876 edition).
61. Hamilton Report, op. cit., p. xii.
62. The Dominican, September 16, 1886.
63. The Dial, May 8, 1887.
64. The Dial, September 11, 1886.
65. This has led David Löwenthal, West Indian Societies, op. cit., p. 63, to conclude: "In the British West Caribbean white rule was successfully challenged only in Dominica. Elsewhere, whites controlled local legislatures..., only a few subordinate government posts went to non-whites."
66. Hamilton Report, op. cit., p. xvii.
67. Concerning this issue, see statement in "Minutes of the House of Assembly", Official Gazette, May 28, 1863; the "Introduction" of the Hamilton Report; and other statements passim in Official Gazettes of June to December, 1863.
68. Ibid.
69. See J. Boromé "George Charles Falconer", in Caribbean Quarterly, Vol. 6, no. 1 (1959-60), p. 15.
70. J. Boromé "How Crown Colony Government came to Dominica", op. cit., p. 122.
71. See, "Minutes of House of Assembly" Official Gazette, March 23, 1865; also see "Proclamation by William Robinson", in Official Gazette, May 10, 1865.
72. See, "Minutes of House of Assembly", Official Gazette, April 11, 1865.
73. See J. Boromé "How Crown Colony Government came to Dominica", op. cit., p. 123.
74. See, "Minutes of House of Assembly", Official Gazette, April 12, 1865.
75. See, "Supplementary Constitution Act of 1865", Official Gazette, April 20, 1865.

76. See, Morley Ayearst, The British West Indies, op. cit., p. 31.
77. See, the Hamilton Report, op. cit., p. xvji.
78. See, "Minutes of the Legislature", Official Gazette, November 6, 1897.
79. See, "Supplementary Constitution Act of 1865", op. cit.
80. See, "Haynes Smith Address", Official Gazette, November 5, 1894.
81. See, the "House Reply to Smith", Official Gazette, November 7, 1894.
82. Ibid.
83. J. Boromé, "How Crown Colony Government came to Dominica", op. cit., p. 138.
84. "Address delivered to the Legislative Assembly by Governor-in-Chief, Francis Fleming", Official Gazette, July 11, 1898.
85. Ibid.
86. See, Official Gazette, July 23, July 30, 1898.
87. Ibid.
88. "Resolution" in the "Appendix" of Official Gazette, July 23, 1898.
89. See, "Minutes of the Legislative Assembly", Official Gazette, July 30, 1898.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. Also see J. Boromé "How Crown Colony Government came to Dominica" op. cit.
94. "Act to Simplify the Legislature: Constitution Act of 1898", Official Gazette, August 2, 1898.
95. "Protest of Elected Members", Official Gazette, August 6, 1898.
96. J. Boromé, "How Crown Colony Government came to Dominica", op. cit., p. 138. Boromé continues in his naive flattery of Bell as he says: "Dominica may not have achieved its greatest prosperity during his stay, but enjoyed its happiest moments."

97. An interview with A.R.C. Lockhart's son Randolph Lockhart in July 1973, Roseau.
98. Ibid., also from informal interviews held with Stanley Boyd, and Carlton Grell, in July-August in Roseau.
99. See S.L.V. Green, Secretary of the R.G.A., "To the People of Dominica", Dominica Chronicle, September 17, 1921.
100. Interview with Randolph Lockhart held in July 1973 in Roseau. R. Lockhart was a participant and an observer; later he became secretary of the TPRA.
101. Ibid.
102. These ideas were advanced and published in a number of Dominica Chronicle issues. For instance see "To the People of Dominica", Dominica Chronicle, September 17, 1921; "A Draft of the Petition", Dominica Chronicle, September 28, 1921.
103. See, for instance, "The RGA Meeting", Dominica Chronicle, October 5, 1921.
104. Interview with R. Lockhart, July 1973, in Roseau.
105. The Dominica Chronicle, October 6, 1921, p. 6; also Interview with R. Lockhart.
106. "RGA Resolutions win Sympathy of Legislative Council", Dominica Chronicle, November 30, 1921.
107. The Dominica Chronicle, September 28, 1921.
108. Interview with R. Lockhart in July, 1973, Roseau.
109. West Indies, Report of the Hon. E.F.L. Wood, M.P., Parliamentary Under-secretary of State for the Colonies (London: H.M. Stationery Office, June, 1922), p. 19.
110. Ibid.
111. The Dominica Tribune, September 6, 1924.
112. Interview with F.A. Baron, First Chief Minister in Dominica and son of A.A. Baron, held August, 1973, Roseau.
113. Interview with R. Lockhart in July 1973, Roseau.
114. The Dominica Chronicle, October 5, 1932, p. 8.

115.           The Dominica Chronicle, November 26, 1932, p.7.
116.           "The Speech of C.F.A. Rawle" in Proceedings of the West India Conference held at Roseau, Dominica B.W.I. (Roseau n.p. 1932)
117.           Ibid.
118.           Ibid., p.p. 1-2. Rawle continues his attack on Crown Colony rule.
119.           Ibid., p. 8.
120.           Ibid., p. 22.
121.           "C.E.A. Rawle - Man of Action and Vision", in Dies Dominica, eds., Public Relations Division ( Dominica: Premier's Office, November 1967).
122.           See also, J.H. Proctor, Jr., "British West Indian Society and Government in Transition 1920-1960", Social and Economic Studies, Vol. II, 1962.
123.           Separate interviews with R. Lockhart, E.C. Loblack and Stanley Boyd held in July-August, 1973, Roseau.

## Chapter V

### THE UNIONS

The unrest and violence which dominated the Caribbean scene in the Depression period induced the British government to dispatch a Royal Commission to British Guiana and the Islands to investigate the conditions which had led to such disturbances.<sup>1</sup> When the Moyne Commission came to Dominica in 1938, it was particularly stunned by the wretched conditions which afflicted ninety per cent of the Dominican population. This led the Commission to conclude in part that, "...of all the British West Indian Islands, Dominica presented the most striking contrast between the poverty of a large proportion of the population, particularly in Roseau, the capital, and the beauty and fertility of the island."<sup>2</sup> As a result, the Commission postulated that unless the general social and economic conditions within the island were improved, the Dominican middle class should not envisage further constitutional advance and development.

Compounding the economic and social deprivations experienced by the labouring and working people were legal obstacles preventing any demonstrable protest against their plight. The only exception was in Jamaica where open protest by working class people was permitted without severe legal repercussions. These obstacles were not sufficient, however, to prevent a workers' conference, the British Guiana and West Indies Labour Congress, from taking place in Port



of Spain, Trinidad. This conference was concerned with reform, to help ameliorate the adverse conditions afflicting the workers in the various islands in the 1930's.<sup>3</sup>

Thus, the important role of the Moyne Commission is best understood when viewed against the background of economic and social depression, legal obstacles against protest, and the determination to establish workers' unions in the various islands. The Commission recommended legislative enactments which removed legal obstacles hindering the development of the union in Dominica.<sup>4</sup>

A very concerned black labourer, E. C. Loblack, took advantage of the improved legal situation and launched the first mass organization with an identifiable black leadership in the 20th century that was oriented toward struggle for black human survival. Loblack, an unlettered man, formed the Dominica Trade Union, the first workers' union in Dominica.<sup>5</sup> This first union, as well as the others which followed, has remained vague in most of its operations; its goals are frequently unclear; the size of its membership is uncertain; and it possesses little or no written material about its activities. This chapter should be understood primarily as an attempt to give some systematic order to the vague quality of the unions and their activities. It is the first study in Dominica to date to undertake such a task and therefore should be seen as a preliminary, if not simple, analysis of the unions.

Accordingly, the chapter is divided into two parts. Part I presents a brief history of the development and struggles of the first union, the Dominica Trade Union (DTU). Special reference is made to

the way in which the Dominica Amalgamated Workers Union (DAWU) and the Waterfront and Allied Workers' Union (WAWU) evolved from the DTU. Finally, a history of the development of the fourth union in Dominica, the Civil Service Association, is noted.

Part II analyzes the unions' relationships with the body politic, which includes the government, the Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement, and the amorphous Black Power Movement. These relationships are analyzed in order to give some understanding and specific content to the union activities for change. In addition, the unions' own understanding of the concept of change is examined. Specifically, the author will look at their concept of change as it relates to the kind of society the unions would like to achieve.

### The History of the Unions

In Dominica it is impossible at most times to separate the activities of the charismatic leader from the organization he founds or heads. Issues of a political nature or otherwise are decided by the overwhelming majority of Dominicans on the basis of identification with the charismatic leader.<sup>6</sup> The success of most organizations depends on this identification. Loblack, who founded the first union in Dominica and co-founded the first mass political party in Dominica, the Labour Party, was no exception to that rule. He was a 'charismatic hero'.<sup>7</sup> Loblack headed the DTU for eighteen years and provided the black Dominicans with a mass organization and an identifiable leadership through which they could struggle on a continuous basis for

their livelihood. The DTU once assessed itself as "an expression of the hopes and aspirations of the working people of Dominica."<sup>8</sup>

E. C. Loblack was born in Grand-Bay, a rural district in the south of Dominica. As a child of working-labouring class parents he did not have an opportunity to attend a secondary school in Dominica, and he subsequently became a government 'blue collar' worker.<sup>9</sup> Given this background, Loblack experienced and understood the plight which afflicted the labouring people, particularly in the Depression period of the 1930's, and he believed that he had to do something to ameliorate the existing conditions. A union organization became Loblack's major solution.<sup>10</sup>

In 1938, Loblack laid bare before the Moyne Commission his experience and understanding of the wretched conditions in which the black majority in Dominica had to live.<sup>11</sup> The conditions in the Island were such that black labouring men worked for one shilling and three pence a day. Black women were even worse off --- they worked for ten pence a day.<sup>12</sup> There were no laws governing employers' practices and behaviour in relation to tenants' rights.<sup>13</sup> Consequently, workers were subjected to the arbitrary practices of employers who would often evict them from company owned houses without notice or compensation. Housing conditions were in a pitiful state and testified to the general and extreme poverty afflicting black Dominicans.<sup>14</sup>

Loblack was not the only person who gave evidence of these conditions to the Commission. Even middle class Dominicans could not avoid testifying to the abject poverty which dominated the Dominican society in the 1930's.<sup>15</sup> But Loblack made an impressive impact on the

Commission and he was responsible to a large extent for the Commission's decision to remove legal and legislative barriers to worker organization and demonstrable protest. It was the removal of these barriers that made possible Loblack's formation of the union in 1938.

The idea of a union in Dominica was generated at the West Indian Conference in 1932. At this Conference, Loblack was particularly impressed with the ideas and dynamism of the charismatic Trinidad-born leader, Andrew Cipriani,<sup>16</sup> who inadvertently placed the idea for a union in Loblack's mind.<sup>17</sup> However, the actual push to form the union was given by the liberal member of the Moyne Commission, Sir Walter Citrine, who eventually led the Commission to conclude that "collective bargaining was both necessary and desirable in the Dominican situation."<sup>19</sup>

Although union organization took root in Dominica in 1938, the DTU was not formally registered until after the Second World War. Concern over the War both in Dominica and England precluded the official registration of the union.<sup>20</sup> However, in 1945, with the assistance of two middle class Dominicans, Ralph Nichols and Austin Winston, Loblack got the union operating fully.<sup>21</sup> From its beginning, the union included such notable leaders as Veronica Nicholas and Anthony Joseph, who presently are the General Secretaries of the DTU and DAWU respectively.

Despite the fact that Loblack had to continue working for the government and could only devote his free Sundays to union organization, by 1947 through his efforts, the DTU had established twenty-three branches throughout the Island.<sup>22</sup> In that year also the union located its head office in Lagon, Roseau, where it still stands. Besides Loblack

as president, official positions of vice-president, general secretary and treasurer were created within the organization.

This island-wide expansion of the union marked the initial development of some concrete features in organization previously absent among the working people. First, the union linked the urban and rural workers into an identifiable collective force, and helped to foster a sense of solidarity and shared identity amongst the workers. Also, as an island-wide organization with a communication system which attempted to link all the branches to the head-office, Dominican workers could now make their collective grievances felt and heard in a forceful and effective manner.

In addition, the union sought links with the International Congress of Trade Unions. By 1958, it had extended its connections to include the International Confederation of Trade Unions, the Inter-American Organization of Workers, the Caribbean Area Division of International Organization of Workers, and others.<sup>23</sup> By such affiliations the union expressed an intention to place the Dominican workers' concerns in the broader international context, and by so doing, derive greater impetus and inspiration to carry on union activities in Dominica.

The union's primary focus was the amelioration of the depressed economic and social conditions of the workers of Dominica. At this point, there was not any ostensible political dimension to its activities, and the organization consciously attempted to remain outside the domain of conventional politics.<sup>24</sup> Loblack's knowledge of union organization, operation and struggle was derived from English sources.<sup>25</sup> Based on an interpretation of how unions originally functioned

in England, Loblack concluded that the DTU should attempt to resolve the problems of the workers solely with negotiation and collective bargaining. However, in the area of collective bargaining and negotiation, especially with the store owners (the merchant class) Loblack encountered difficulty with these methods, including personal discrimination.<sup>26</sup>

Loblack experienced discrimination and opposition from the merchant class, which was primarily mulato, because he was an uneducated black man from a working class background, concerned with people of a similar background.<sup>27</sup> The merchants concluded that not only were they more able than Loblack to handle union practices and operations, but they were also in a better position to understand the problems and to take care of the welfare of the working people.<sup>28</sup> Of course, it was in their vested interest to brand Loblack as a troublemaker as he was demanding fairer business practices, improved treatment of workers, better working conditions, and reform in the workers' social and economic situation.

Due to the recalcitrance of the merchant class, Loblack and the DTU departed from their customary strategy of collective bargaining and negotiation and ventured into conventional politics.<sup>29</sup> The difficulties encountered by the union made it clear that not even the basic needs of the working people could be met without overt and effective political strategies. Thus the union adopted the immediate political objective of placing members in the Legislative Council where it hoped they might have a chance of effecting legislation of benefit to the workers.<sup>30</sup> As no mass political party existed in Dominica at this time, this move was seen not only imperative to the human survival of the workers, but

also had an historic significance as the union, albeit unconsciously, had now set the stage for the emergence of the first popular political party in Dominica. Thus, when "three bare-footed men" - as Loblack proudly says - were successfully placed in the Legislative Council, the union had achieved a radical change of immense importance on behalf of the black Dominicans.<sup>31</sup> The very fact that three working men were in the Legislative Council was a unique experience in the political life history of Dominica.

The DTU's decision to enter the political arena signalled its commitment to achieve further changes in the crown colony constitution. When Universal Adult Suffrage, and with it an advanced crown colony constitution, came to Dominica in 1951, the DTU felt it had reason to be proud of its contribution to a significant constitutional-political change. The union concluded that this advance had potential for far-reaching benefit to the black majority in Dominica.<sup>32</sup>

Loblack may have exaggerated the accomplishments of the union when he claimed that the organization changed the image of the island.<sup>33</sup> In perspective, however, this claim should not be simply discounted, especially if one appreciates this period in the life history of Dominicans. The DTU, for instance, was partly responsible for humanizing working hours. Specifically, it helped bring to an end the extremely long hours put in by black women domestics at the homes of relatively wealthy and affluent mulattoes, particularly in Roseau. The union also saw to it that merchants who blatantly violated worker-tenants' rights were brought before the courts in Roseau. As a result, laws were passed that helped provide adequate compensation for tenants and employees,

including tradesmen, carpenters and masons. With the help of competent lawyers and clergy, the DTU launched an adult education program aimed at raising the literacy level of workers, and making them far more conscious of their collective political potential.<sup>34</sup> What remains, however, the single greatest accomplishment of the DTU was its struggle to obtain human respect from the merchants and mulato class for the bayfront black workers and, concomitantly, to get the black workers to think of themselves with dignity. This significant achievement in union history requires further discussion.

In Dominica the black workers, especially those engaged in the most menial tasks, were labelled derogatorily, especially by the mulato class, as "Vie Negre". Those on the bayfront were referred to as "Vie Negre Bord La Mar".<sup>35</sup> They were generally treated with disdain in the Roseau community and were considered, at best, second class citizens by the mulato middle class. These workers were expected to behave in a distinctively vulgar and unruly manner, and in a society which afforded them such little respect, they behaved accordingly. A vicious cycle was established which the DTU sought to break.

As they were considered inferior and second class citizens in the social fabric of the society, the "Vie Negre Bord La Mar" could not work on the bayfront without a required badge which ostensibly symbolized their lowly status. The workers were compelled to purchase their badges annually for four shillings from the Roseau Town Council.<sup>36</sup> Failure to wear the badges at work resulted in fines and, in some cases, in jail sentences for the workers.<sup>37</sup>

The DTU assessed these deplorable working conditions and decided



to protest the specific issue of the badge. The union argued before the Administrator of Dominica that the badge violated the human dignity of the bay-front workers, both in terms of how the Roseau society regarded them and in terms of their own self-esteem.<sup>38</sup> The DTU's arguments must have been convincing for the Administrator of the Island agreed that the use of the badges should be discontinued. The protest, supported by the administrator, was then directed against the Town Council. The Roseau Town Council eventually agreed to terminate the mandatory requirement of badges for bay-front employment.<sup>39</sup> This also meant an end to fines and punishment, and an end to a symbol of inferiority and second-class citizenship.

Success with the Administrator and the Roseau Town Council on the badge issue marked only the beginning of a continuous struggle for human rights for the "Vie Negre Bord La Mar". In order to intensify efforts to achieve maximum human rights on all fronts in the society, the union created a special unit of bay-front workers within the organization.<sup>40</sup> The unit expanded to the point where, in 1964, it was capable of forming an independent organization called the Water Front and Allied Workers Union. Potentially, this union can be considered the most influential of the four presently existing in Dominica.

The genesis of WAWU (Water Front and Allied Workers Union) itself signalled a heightening of the ongoing battle for human respect and dignity. The workers now had an autonomous union which could devote its energies to the cause initiated by the DTU. The formation of the WAWU organization was an expression of a new pride and self-confidence that these workers had been developing. Confidence and faith

in their own ability was shown when they accepted Louis Benoit (Zaboca), 'one of their own', a man from the ranks of the "Vie Negre Bord La Mar" as their identifiable leader and president of WAWU. Today, these former "Vie Negre Bord La Mar" are among the better paid workers in the Island. They are quite respected--- at times grudgingly-- by the middle class, and especially by the merchants who recognize WAWU's potential collective strength on the bay-front and in the wider community. When the phrase "Vie Negre Bord La Mar" is currently used, it's in a mocking tone and generally as self-parody by these workers themselves - but not derogatorily.<sup>41</sup> As a matter of fact, the term "Vie Negre" is in vogue as a form of greeting, especially among the black power oriented youth of the island. Even the middle class will occasionally use the term to express slight, but amusing disapproval of activity or behaviour of its members. Both the unions can be proud of this change which benefited the workers' lives.

The bay-front workers were only one of the special units created by the DTU. There were also special branches for carpenters and masons. Re-organization along these lines was becoming increasingly necessary as the union's membership grew and as the services demanded by an expanding organization were extended.<sup>42</sup> With its successes at the polls and its contribution to the effort to achieve Adult suffrage, the union felt confident enough to venture further into the political arena on behalf of the workers.

Loblack, however, was extremely conscious that a union organization, by its definition, was incapable of effectively handling expanded and intensified political activity. It was partly with this in

mind that in 1955, Loblack and Mrs. Shand Alfrey co-founded the first mass and representative political party --- the Dominica Labour Party. At this juncture, the party was a direct extension of the union, a representation of its heightening political consciousness and a manifestation of its commitment to intensify political activity.

Loblack remained primarily as a union leader for he envisaged difficulty in providing adequate leadership for two organizations. Under him the DTU proceeded with its characteristic brand of activity, demanding greater concessions and grant-in-aid schemes from the Colonial Office in England. In 1956, for example, it was partly through union effort that the Colonial Development Corporation (CDC), a British sponsored corporation, established an island-wide electrification service in Dominica. Loblack believed that this project was one of the most remarkable achievements of the union on behalf of the working people.<sup>44</sup> Up to that time only the middle and upper class people, particularly in Roseau, could afford electric lights and services in their homes.<sup>45</sup>

After eighteen years Loblack presently is neither a member of the DTU nor of the political party he co-founded. Towards the end of the 1950's many of the younger and allegedly more progressive members of the DTU contended that Loblack had become anachronistic in his methods and conservative in his demands. Many members left the organization over this controversy, and over the conflict which arose concerning the replacement of Loblack as leader. A former official of the DTU, Anthony Joseph, left to form the Dominica Amalgamated Workers' Union (DAWU).

By the end of the 1950's, Loblack, "the man of common sense"

---labelled such by the current DTU General Secretary, Veronica Nicholas ---was viewed as irrelevant to a progressive union. It was felt that the union could no longer rely on "common sense" especially when confronted by sophisticated legal and technical expertise in bargaining and negotiation.<sup>46</sup> Apparently Loblack did not see it that way, for it was claimed that he wanted to persist with his outmoded union techniques and strategies. While Loblack was a potent force for change at the initial development phases of the union, his resistance to alterations in union operations and strategies made him an obstacle to necessary future changes in Dominica. The internal union conflict between Loblack and these supposedly more progressive members was eventually settled before the Court in Dominica.<sup>47</sup>

The current President and the General Secretary of the DTU are Deverill Lawrence and Veronica Nicholas respectively. Despite the absence of Loblack as mentor and leader, the organization has shown no appreciable change in either strategies or outlook. Indeed, the union organization does not seem to have developed far beyond the stage at which Loblack left it.

In the middle of the 1960's, three other unions were founded in Dominica. Two of these, DAWU and WAWU, emanated directly from the DTU, while the other, the Civil Service Association, developed from an ad hoc organization to a formal union.

#### The Dominica Amalgamated Workers' Union (DAWU)

The Dominica Amalgamated Workers' Union was officially registered in December 1960, but it was not until 1963 that it held

its first Annual Delegate Conference . DAWU considers this conference significant in that it helped to determine the organization's character.<sup>48</sup>

DAWU arose at a time when Dominican workers, especially non-union workers, were becoming increasingly aware of the need for strong and effective union organization. At this point the DTU was incapable of providing either because it was plagued by both a leadership crisis and problems of transition. The Banana Association, a non-unionized body, comprised workers who wanted a union but were unwilling to join the DTU, provided the initial thrust for the formation of DAWU.<sup>49</sup>

Originally, DAWU represented only people of the Banana Association, and its aim was to complement rather than compete with the DTU. This remained true until the DAWU extended its operation to incorporate workers who might have been members of the DTU or WAWU. Thus it is not surprising that presently the three unions compete directly for members.<sup>50</sup> Even in 1967, the better organized and more efficient DAWU claimed a membership of 1378. Recently the DTU, which has been slowly losing its members both to DAWU and WAWU, could claim no more than 600 members. In 1967, the DAWU proudly stated that, "excluding those that were considered routine, 35 disputes were dealt with as follows: 22 were settled satisfactorily, 8 are pending...."<sup>51</sup>

#### The Water Front and Allied Workers' Union (WAWU)

On December 20, 1964 the Water Front and Allied Workers' Union officially began its operations.<sup>52</sup> Like DAWU, WAWU sprang directly from

the DTU. The precipitating factor in its formation was a dispute over membership funds. DTU members, especially the bay-front workers, became incensed over the way in which union funds were handled and the failure to provide an adequate statement of union's monies.<sup>53</sup> As a result of this dissatisfaction, WAWU was formed.

At its inception, membership in the WAWU organization was restricted to bay-front and port workers, but like DAWU it has since expanded to include workers of varied occupations in Dominica.

WAWU is content with both its departure from the DTU and its subsequent achievements. It has continued and heightened the struggle for human dignity and respect for the former "Vie Negre Bord La Mar" initiated by the DTU. Between 1964 and 1973, for instance, it claimed with satisfaction, twenty-six different agreements favourable to all its members.<sup>54</sup> In the area of inter-island transportation, WAWU is a leader, establishing the only public bus system in the Island. Presently, plans are being formulated to build a new WAWU headquarters and to institute a medical security scheme for all its members.

#### The Civil Service Association (CSA)

The Civil Service Association developed from an informal organization into a full-fledged union in the middle 1960's. Currently, its membership is approximately 1700 civil and public servants of different ranks and occupations.<sup>55</sup>

Prior to attaining its formal union status, the CSA was an ad hoc, clique oriented body catering to the limited interests of the middle class civil and public employees in the higher echelons

of government service.<sup>56</sup> The transition of the CSA to a broad representative organization of all government workers was in itself a remarkable one. The inclusion of high level government employees with lower ones in the union has contributed to a breaking down of class lines within the civil and public service. Because of its specialized clientele, the CSA is the only one of the four existing unions not in direct competition with the others for members. At this point to provide background information for the analysis of actual union operations and thinking, it is necessary to note the formal arrangements of the unions.

#### Formal Arrangements

Sharing a common origin and early history, and representing similar kinds of workers, the DTU, DAWU and WAWU are quite alike in their formal aims and objectives.

In actual practice, the major responsibility for both union leadership and daily operations lies almost completely with the general secretaries. WAWU proves the notable exception in that the charismatic President Louis Benoit performs the identifiable leadership function, and not the general secretary, C. A. Augustus.

These organizations are concerned with the unionization of all workers. Collective bargaining and negotiation are dominant strategies for winning better wages and economic security. Through effective representation, these organizations aim to protect their members' rights and best interests within the framework of democratic institutions and traditions. Social welfare is important to the unions. They make

allowances for sick benefits and legal aid for their members, and recognize the need for continuing and adult education programs. Basically, when these unions differ in formal goals, it is in detail rather than major content.<sup>57</sup>

On the other hand, the CSA has both a different history and type of membership than the DAWU, WAWU and DTU. The CSA caters to a predominantly white collar majority while the others cater to blue collar workers. The CSA claims that "it is an organization of workers created to protect and promote the social, economic and political interests of its members."<sup>58</sup> These members include workers at the clerical, technical, administrative, executive and professional levels, as well as doctors, nurses, teachers, minor and subordinate government employees, prison wardens and firemen.

Its formal aims and objectives range from bargaining for better wages to undertaking "specialised research as the basis for competent representation."<sup>59</sup> The CSA also publishes a monthly newsletter to provide some continuous education. The union strives to protect the public image of the civil service by promoting good relations between public service employees and the general public.

The CSA claims that its benefits include an insurance plan, numerous salary revisions, the right to interview the Public Service Commission on matters affecting members, and the right to be consulted on major issues concerning civil servants. In addition, it points out that it has been quite successful in obtaining redress on matters injurious to workers' welfare.<sup>60</sup>

The formal "on paper" arrangements, however, provide little



insight concerning actual union operations and can prove misleading in an analysis of the unions' activities. A more realistic understanding comes with a critical look at these organizations in their relations to the body politic, their ideology or lack of ideology for change, and from their conception of the type of society they would struggle to achieve. In the next section, these aspects are analyzed.

## II

### The Growth of the Union: the Question of Legitimacy

Gaining acceptance as a legitimate organized body in the Dominican society was a constant uphill struggle for the unions. While the violent types of difficulties commonly experienced by the American Federation of Labour at its early stages, for example, were unknown to the Dominican unions, problems of other sorts abounded in their developmental stages.

Until the middle 1960's in Dominica, the middle class in particular openly discriminated against the union and did its utmost to hinder the organization's development. Union activities were condemned as appropriate solely for lower and working class people, and the DTU was generally referred to derogatorily as the organization of "Vie Negre."<sup>61</sup>

Eventually, however, the middle class Dominicans found that their failure to recognize the union as a legitimate entity and their open hostility towards the organization were contrary to their own best interests. There were many factors which made the unions a force not easily ignored. First, the union organizations included not only the DTU, but also two additional organizations which represented

increasing numbers of workers. Secondly, the "Vie Negre" and the "Vie Negre Bord La Mar" had not only formed the backbone of the first popular political party, but had also been most instrumental in electing that party to government in 1960.<sup>62</sup> Thirdly, the middle class recognized that the assumed 'blessing', which was the CDC has resulted in part from the efforts of the union. Fourthly, the unions incessantly claimed that they were speaking for the majority of workers in the Island.<sup>63</sup>

Partly as a result of the change in middle class attitudes towards unions and unionization, the CSA evolved from a loose and clique - oriented association to a broad representative union.<sup>64</sup> Presently the CSA speaks not only for top echelon civil employees but also for government mechanics and messengers. Today, particularly, middle class Dominicans find it important as black people to struggle collectively and continuously for their human rights and liberties. Thus in a limited sense the unions have contributed to an integration of classes in Dominica. Its new - found legitimacy, especially among the middle class, has helped to forge a bond of unity ---tenuous as it may seem--- among the "white and blue" collar workers. This unity emerged tangibly in the 1973 crisis in Dominica popularly labelled as the "Cauderoir Issue."<sup>65</sup>

In this case, the Labour Government insisted on transferring civil servant Daniel Cauderoir because of his critical views of government, in an allegedly arbitrary manner which violated his rights as a worker. As a result the CSA protested strongly on his behalf against this government action. When the other unions joined the CSA in support

of its demands and went on strike, the government of Dominica declared a state of emergency to prevent, what it claimed, the unions from destroying the economy of the Island by their actions. Indeed, the unions in Dominica have progressed rather quickly. They have developed from a despised organization of alleged "Vie Negre" to legitimate organizations that presently include a cross-section of the Dominican society, which can collectively threaten the economy of the entire Island.

#### The Question of Union Ideology

The DTU's conception of change is evolutionary in character. From its inception, struggle for change has been undertaken within a colonial framework. Thus, the DTU sought to maximize benefits for workers without in any way radically altering that framework. At best it fought for a liberal, or more humane colonial arrangement, and consequently never developed a view of an independent Dominica or of what independence would mean to the continuing welfare of workers. It has always felt ill at ease with a Dominican government completely responsible for internal affairs in the Island. Indeed, it appears contented with the Colonial Office and its representatives in the Island. Surprisingly enough, while Loblack was rejected as anachronistic his political guidelines and style have remained the dominant political orientation of this union.

Loblack believed in British democracy, in its achievements abroad, and in the "British way of doing things." Union activities and strategies should not violate this understanding of British democratic

and conventional methods. To him, democratic change was reasonably orderly and evolutionary. A liberal crown colony constitution providing for wider participation of the workers in local decision making, but having final British approval, was a proper government arrangement worth struggling to achieve. At the present time, Loblack maintains that Dominica would have stood a chance for a better future under a liberal form of colonial rule than under the existing indigenous Labour Government.<sup>67</sup>

Although Loblack was not a revolutionary, he did prove himself a sort of radical in his own time by breaking with the Dominican tradition and organizing the workers. Even his goal to achieve a more liberal colonial constitution must be placed in proper context and appreciated accordingly. The failure of Loblack, however, as well as that of the DTU has been the inability to think and operate outside a British colonial matrix. The present failure of the DTU in part is that, despite various changes in the political system in Dominica,<sup>68</sup> its ideology has not advanced beyond that of Loblack.

Specifically, the DTU has been generally content to fight the Colonial Office in Britain for increased concessions and more grant-in-aid on the behalf of the labouring people. Thus, when the Colonial Corporation Development came to Dominica to provide an island-wide electrification service, the DTU was justifiably proud.

The absence of an ideology oriented towards change, except within a broad colonial framework, has conditioned the DTU's present strategies, its basic comprehension of radical change and its future possibilities in Dominica. Its representation of the Castle Bruce

workers in their struggle against CDC is a concrete case in point.

It has already been established that the DTU was instrumental in bringing the CDC to the Island. Besides providing electrical services, the CDC also owned property on which exportable commodities, primarily bananas, were cultivated. The Castle Bruce estate was owned by the Corporation and was worked by the Dominicans of that village, who were represented by the DTU. Thus, when the workers found themselves in open conflict with the CDC and insisted on radical change in the corporation's political authority structure and an end to economic domination and the exploitation of land resources, the DTU experienced a conflict of interests.

The union seemingly failed to comprehend the nature of change demanded by the workers at Castle Bruce by treating what was considered a political and economic struggle against a colonial regime, manifested in the CDC, as a simple industrial dispute between workers and management.<sup>68</sup> Thus, inadvertently, the DTU became an obstacle to necessary anti-colonial change directed towards an independent existence. Interestingly enough, the views and position of the allegedly anachronistic Loblack on the Castle Bruce issue were in no appreciable way different from those of the DTU.

The WAWU, on the other hand, has not developed an ideology for change which is independent and different from that of the current Labour Government. Its orientation towards change is ad hoc and contingent for the most part on the Labour Government's positions and views on the issue. The organization does not have an overall perspective on change

or on what direction change should take with regard to Dominica's future. This has prevented the WAWU from realizing its potential as a most powerful union in the Island.

Part of this difficulty lies in the fact that present ministers in the Labour Party Government, Patrick John and Arnold Active, were also prominent leaders within the WAWU organization. Membership identification, especially with the charismatic Patrick John, has forged a lasting bond between the WAWU organization and the Labour Party. Furthermore, the relationship between the two organizations has been reinforced by the close friendship between the charismatic president of WAWU, Louis Benoit (Zaboca) and Patrick John. Influence and control flows from Patrick John in the direction of Louis Benoit and WAWU rather than the other way around. Thus, WAWU will not consciously engage in a strike situation that would patently embarrass or offend the Labour Government. For instance, its negative position on the Castle Bruce struggle or on black power thinking is identical to that of government.

Not having worked out an ideology of its own, far less a consistent one, WAWU has engaged in seemingly inconsistent and erratic actions. For instance, in 1971 Louis Benoit was an identifiable part of the vanguard in the fight against the Labour Government's repressive policies on civil rights, liberties and freedoms which culminated in what is popularly known as the "December 16th Crisis".<sup>70</sup> It appeared that WAWU had formed a part of the official opposition to government, but it was temporary and might have been motivated by personal friction between leaders of the party and the union. Presently WAWU is viewed

as an extension of the Labour Party Government.

Cognizant of this identification and liason between the two organizations, WAWU has attempted to silence its critics by arguing that the basis of the apparent closeness is primarily that of personal friendship, and is not primarily political. Given that both Patrick John and Arnold Active came from WAWU, they are presently resource people for the organization. Except for being resource persons, the argument remains particularly unconvincing given that politics in Dominica is not issue oriented and political decisions depend primarily on the degree of identification with the charismatic leader. The nature of political dealings is so personalized that politics and friendship, especially at that level, are indistinguishable.

The DAWU, however, is different from both the DTU and the WAWU. It is different from the DTU primarily because it has a radical ideology, and from the WAWU because it has a consistent ideology.

DAWU's conception of change is socialist in orientation, while not consciously Marxist in direction. Socialism of the DAWU variety culminates in a society where worker-management characterizes every facet of labour and working relations.<sup>73</sup> Its conception of democracy in this socialist framework is not unlike that of its major Latin American affiliate CLASC:

It is total participation in building of a collective future, and it represents the real possibility of man, as a personal and free being, to participate in a responsible way in all the activities where he may realize his own destiny....

Full development of democracy depends on the active and simultaneous presence of four indispensable requisites: Political Liberty, personal freedom, economic democracy and social democracy...trade unions must participate in a responsible and effective way in the construction of a new society. 74

It was on the basis of DAWU's adherence to socialist change that in 1967 it supported a Labour Government which purported to be socialist and concerned with the complete political independence of Dominicans. DAWU has since rejected the Labour Government which it feels is more bent on destroying social justice than on creating a socialist state in which human freedom could be maximized.<sup>75</sup>

DAWU has openly protested the political and social injustice perpetrated by the Government as in the case of Daniel Cauderion's arbitrary transfer. It has also given overt support to the Castle Bruce struggle in which radical, in fact revolutionary, changes, anti-colonial in thrust, are being sought. The organization has denounced the DTU in its attempt to handle the Castle Bruce struggle in the conventional, traditional and limited scope of industrial negotiation. It has also attacked the government for its vacillating position on the Castle Bruce struggle, especially as the Castle Bruce radical conflict proposes agricultural and land reform of far-reaching significance to the rest of the agricultural sector in the Island. Given that DAWU understands that government is opposed to broad, relevant and radical change, and since the union's motto is "We are revolutionary: We demand rapid social change in the country,"<sup>76</sup> the union strongly urged its members to bring down the government by voting against the Labour Government in the 1970 elections.<sup>77</sup>



In other areas as well, DAWU has tried hard to act consistently with its ideological and philosophical beliefs. A concrete example has been its rejection of affiliation with any Caribbean union that is connected to any American (USA) unions. DAWU's reasons for this are that the American unions adhere to a capitalist ideology that is incompatible with its own. Further, these capitalist oriented American unions not only exercise a pervasive influence on the Caribbean affiliates, but actually maintain a colonial, imperial relationship in which the Caribbean unions are dominated as subordinates and inferiors. Thus DAWU is convinced that such an affiliation prevents relevant involvement in struggles, especially if these are anti-colonial and anti-capitalist in thrust.<sup>78</sup> In the Dominican context an affiliation of this kind would hinder racial and socialist change which the country so urgently requires.

Committed to social justice and the realization of maximum human freedom in the Dominican context, DAWU is conscious that such principles are realizable only in a society where everyone is a worker in the interest of the state and where the land resources are available and utilized for the collective benefit of all Dominicans. It is aware, at the same time, that in order to accomplish this end, unions must embark on a more rigorous program to involve workers in the change process. It maintains that education along these lines is a potent weapon. DAWU seeks to make such an education available to its members and other interested Dominicans through its newsletters and other Latin American union literature. The union hopes not only to organize

all its workers but also the larger society.<sup>79</sup> "Only the organized people can save the people."<sup>80</sup>

The ideology of the CSA is commonly understood as democratic liberalism. Socialism of any kind is totally absent in the thinking of the organization and its goal is a democratic society in Dominica in which all Dominicans can maximize their individual rights and liberties as full and equal citizens of the state. "A society where the individual recognizes himself as a citizen of equal rights with every other citizen in the society."<sup>81</sup>

It is in this context that the protest of the CSA against government's violation of the individual rights of Cauderoin and other low paid government workers must be understood. Given that its liberal, democratic ideology is anti-colonialist in orientation and in favour of radical change, the CSA has given support to the Castle Bruce struggle and, like DAWU, was highly critical both of the government's vacillation and of the DTU's inability to place these workers' struggle outside the milieu of narrow industrial relations.

The CSA believes firmly that for further meaningful changes to be accomplished that workers, especially, must be made more fully aware of the need for their increased and active involvement in programs for change. Thus through its bulletins, the CSA urges not only workers but also all Dominicans to envisage themselves as the primary vehicle for change pertinent to a progressive and developing country.<sup>82</sup>

As a body representing all civil servants, ranging from medical doctors to minor salaried workers on an equal basis, the CSA has

accomplished three significant changes for lower echelon workers. First, it has contributed to the minor salaried workers' development of a pride in themselves as legitimate, important and equal members of the civil service community. Secondly, these workers are becoming increasingly confident that the CSA will engage in protest or other activities for them with the same intensity and commitment as it would for a medical doctor or top echelon civil employee. Thirdly, this equality of representation has helped to break down in the general public's mind the distinction of first and second class citizens in the civil service.

The CSA's conception of liberalism has, however, certain inbuilt limitations which could prevent the organization from actualizing its proposed goal for all Dominicans. Indeed, the union would give equal representation to all civil employees. The problem, however, is that the organization engages in struggle for the rights and liberties of each of its members while simultaneously accepting as legitimate the ranks, categories and divisions which define Dominicans in general and civil servants in particular. Specifically, the union will fight for the rights of the "messenger" or the "permanent secretary". There is no apparent understanding by the CSA that these ranks and categories might constitute the source of the messenger's problems, and therefore no thought is given to any radical re-evaluation of these ranks and divisions. Ironically, acceptance of certain categories as legitimately defining Dominicans would make for a society where it is not even possible for an individual in the CSA's liberal democratic sense to develop and recognize "himself as a citizen of equal rights with every other citizen in the society."<sup>83</sup>

### Relations in the Body Politic

Considering their colonial perspective, both the DTU and Loblack see little value in the radical change proposals talked and written about by youths of the black power persuasion. They argue that these youths fail to appreciate the importance of tradition or the benefits derived from the experiences of past struggle. These youths are viewed as disruptive and ignorant of what is best for Dominica, and while they criticize the union for its shortcomings, they have yet to present a viable concrete alternative plan for Dominica's betterment.<sup>84</sup>

The DTU's relationship to the Labour Government, especially since 1967, the year that Dominica became semi-autonomous, has been one of apprehension. Ironically, while the DTU spearheaded the fight to increase and enlarge the political rights of the working and labouring people, it never envisaged an independent Dominica run by a working class oriented government.

The WAWU's position on the amorphous black power movement is not only similar to the DTU's but also coincides with that of the Labour Government. The movement is considered no more than a "Third Force", a communist and undemocratic group bent on the destruction of the Dominican society through violence.<sup>85</sup> The WAWU sees the movement as generally a group of unemployed and lazy youths who have nothing better to do than talk about radical change, the end to private ownership, race hatred, and to criticize the Labour Government unnecessarily for their own shortcomings.<sup>86</sup> Like the DTU, the WAWU understands the struggle for radical change at Castle Bruce as a conflict to be solved within the bounds of industrial negotiations.<sup>87</sup>

Given its socialist orientation and its concern with radical and revolutionary change, the DAWU on the other hand, is partly sympathetic to black power thinking.<sup>88</sup> There is, however, no ostensible link between the union and this amorphous movement for at least two reasons. First, those who claim to be involved in the movement have divorced theory from practice - that is, they will make pronouncements on radical change, yet not commit themselves to the actualization of any ideas. Secondly, those alledged members of the movement have concentrated too much on sloganizing and anti-white propaga~~n~~da. Thus, at this point in time, the union believes that any identifiable link would prove detrimental to achieving future radical goals.<sup>89</sup>

DAWU has manifested overt support for the radical struggle which is taking place at Castle Bruce. It is convinced that the genuine efforts of these workers are of significance not only to themselves but also to the rest of Dominica. On these grounds it has openly criticized the negative and narrow position of the DTU and WAWU and the harmful indecisiveness of the Labour Government concerning the struggle.

Recently the organization has become more vocal in its insistence that despite the fact that it is part of the labour movement, it is not in any way to be identified with the Labour Party Government. DAWU is particularly incensed over this government's restrictive policies on civil liberties and its ineffective handling of the economy and social development. DAWU refuses to be associated with any political party. "Our position is clear: DAWU's mission is to unite the workers through education and not divide them through party politics."<sup>90</sup>

Finally, while the liberal democratic ideology of the CSA does not preclude a desire for radical change, this change, however, is not socialist in orientation. The CSA, like DAWU and the youth who espouse black power, are concerned about anti-colonial change and the maximization of human liberties and freedoms in Dominica. As a result, the CSA does not condemn the loosely organized black power movement, but at the same time remains cautious and imprecise about positive and active support for it.

Therefore, it is not surprising that the CSA, while it identifies with the anti-colonial struggle at Castle Bruce, is not as demonstrable or overt as DAWU in its support. This does not obviate, however, a friendly association between leaderships of the CSA and the Castle Bruce struggle.<sup>91</sup>

The CSA's relationship to government is a direct one for its members are in the public and civil service. It is seemingly impossible therefore, for the government to understand representation by the CSA on behalf of a member in non-political terms. Thus, for instance, had Daniel Cauderion not been in the employment of government the CSA protests against his arbitrary transfer would have been considered an industrial dispute and not have been a precipitating factor for a state of emergency declaration. This direct relationship is made even more political, given that the government was instrumental in devising the scope and parameters of CSA negotiations.

### Conclusion

The unions have definitely contributed to the survival of the working class Dominicans by helping to change and ameliorate extremely stifling and adverse conditions. More specifically, it was partly through the efforts of the DTU that Universal Adult Suffrage and with it, an advanced crown colony constitution, came to the island in 1951. Thus the previously disenfranchised black majority could not only vote, but through the DTU's organization and direction they could also elect their own representatives to the Legislative Council.

The DTU was directly responsible for the creation of the first popular political party---the Dominica Labour Party. Formed as a political extension of the union, the party originally represented a commitment by the DTU to intensify political struggle on behalf of the working people. Indirectly, albeit inadvertently, the DTU helped achieve complete internal control of Dominican affairs, for the Labour Party became the Government of the semi-autonomous state in the Island in 1967.

The unions obtained legislative enactments to help improve working conditions and to deter employers from their blatant, customary and arbitrary practices which jeopardized even the basic existence of the working and labouring class Dominicans. In the area of collective bargaining and negotiation, the unions have had some remarkable achievements.

Finally, there is the Unions' historic uphill battle to attain from the Dominican society due respect for the labouring black

people and the jobs they performed. In addition, the unions simultaneously developed among the workers a sense of pride and self-worth as first class Dominican citizens while destroying the conception and image of themselves as "Vie Negre". Today, these union organizations are respected by all sectors of the Dominican society.

In the next chapter the political parties will be discussed, and it will be shown that particularly the Labour Party and the Labour Party Government are in a sense an intensification and broadening of the collective concerns for human survival and for related change which were initiated by the trade union organization, in particular, the DTU.



## Chapter V

## Footnotes

1. Great Britain, West India Royal Commission Report, Chairman, Lord Moyne (London: H. M. Stationery Office 1945) This report will be referred to subsequently as the Moyne Commission Report.
2. Ibid., p. 407.
3. See J. H. Proctor, Jr., "The West Indies in Transition 1920 - 1960", op. cit.
4. From an interview with E. C. Loblack, founder of the first union in Dominica. The interview was held in July, 1973, Roseau. Also see Gordon Lewis, The Growth of the Modern West Indies, op. cit., p. 88-89.
5. The emergence of the unions throughout the Caribbean in the 1930's was seen as a "revolution". W. A. Lewis further said, "The major issues discussed today no longer revolve around the aspirations of the middle classes but are set by work-class demands.... Initiative has passed into the hands of trade union leaders...." W. A. Lewis, Labour in the West Indies: The Birth of a Workers Movement (London: Fabier Society Research Service, no. 44, 1939), p. 33. M. W. Springer saw the people of the 1930's in the context of the union as follows: "For the first time the people as a whole were politically awakened." H. W. Springer, "The West Indies Emergent: Problems and Prospects", in The West Indies Federation Perspective of a New Nation, ed. by David Lowenthal (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 3. Both these passages are quoted in J. H. Proctor, Jr., "British West Indian Society and Government in Transition 1920-1960", op. cit.
6. Max Weber defines charisma as, "the absolutely personal devotion and personal confidence in revelation, heroism or other qualities of individual leadership." From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, eds. M. H. Gerth and C.W. Mills (New York: 1946), p. 79. In this thesis we understand "charisma" as personal magic of leadership arousing special popular loyalty and enthusiasm.
7. The phrase 'charismatic hero' was given 'vogue value' by Archie Singham, Hero and the Crowd in a Colonial Polity, op. cit.
8. The DTU: Amended Constitution by the 13th Annual Conference 1958, p. 1.

9. This section on Loblack's life was developed from information derived from formal interviews with E. C. Loblack, Veronica Nicholas, presently General Secretary of the DTU; Anthony Joseph, presently General Secretary of the DAWU; and from informal interviews with Carlton Grell. Interviews were held in July-August, 1973, Roseau.
10. Ibid., also from interviews with Shand Allfrey, the co-founder of the Labour Party held August, 1973, Roseau.
11. E. C. Loblack was a consultant to the Moyne Commission.
12. Derived from an informal interview with Mrs. Body (called "Ma Body" by everyone). She worked for ten pence a day.
13. See Gordon Lewis, The Growth of the Modern West Indies, op. cit., p. 88-89.
14. From the interview with Loblack; also Shand Allfrey, Carlton Grell, Stanley Boyd share equally Loblack's characterization of the 1930's.
15. Carlton Grell is an example of a middle class Dominica, who testified to the Commission on the abject poverty afflicting the Island.
16. Derived from the interview with Loblack in July, 1973, Roseau.
17. Andrew Cipriani is generally considered one of the most important 'fathers' of Trinidad, if not the Caribbean, nationalism. See C.L.R. James Party Politics in the West Indies, op. cit.; Gordon Lewis, Growth of the Modern West Indies, op. cit.; David Lowenthal West Indian Societies, op. cit.
18. Sir Walter Citrine was one of 10 members of the Moyne Commission.
19. Moyne Commission Report, op. cit., p. 197.
20. Interviews held with Anthony Joseph, Veronica Nicholas, in July-August, 1973, in Roseau. Both were with the union when it officially began its operations.
21. Carlton Grell knew Austin Winston well. In an informal interview with Carlton Grell, the author was informed that Austin Winston was very important to the Union then particularly because of his writing ability. Loblack is at ease in Patois; English is not his first language.
22. Interviews with Veronica Nicholas and Loblack.
23. See The DTU: Amended Constitution, op. cit.
24. From interview with Loblack, Veronica Nicholas, Anthony Joseph.

25. During the interview with Loblack in July, 1973, Loblack dug out a book with no covers or front pages which he referred to as his "Bible" on union affairs.
26. Interview with Loblack, V. Nicholas, A. Joseph and Shand Allfrey.
27. Interview with Shand Allfrey, co-founder of the Labour Party with Loblack in 1955. The interview was held in August, 1973.
28. Interview with Veronica Nicholas, August, 1973, Roseau.
29. Interview with S. Allfrey, Loblack and A. Joseph.
30. Interview with Loblack, Nicholas, Joseph, and Allfrey.
31. Interview with Loblack.
32. Interview with Loblack, Nicholas and Joseph.
33. Interview with Loblack.
34. Interview with Randolph Lockhart, semi-retired lawyer, in July, 1973. Informal interviews with Carlton Grell. Interview with A. Joseph who as a Union Official was also a primary school teacher.
35. "Vie Negre" and "Vie Negre Bord La Mar" are (Creole) Patois expressions. The expressions lose their actual meanings in translation. At best, an English approximation of these expressions would be the derogatory word "nigger" and "nigger by the sea".
36. Interview with Loblack.
37. Interview with A. Joseph.
38. Interview with Loblack.
39. While in Dominica the author had the opportunity to talk with bay-front workers concerning the use of the badge. It was not difficult to talk to a number of older workers. They could remember that in 1960 he was a "Tally-Clerk" on the bayfront for the Government.
40. Interviews with Loblack, Joseph, Nicholas.
41. This was quite evident in 1971 and 1973, by comparison to early years that the author can remember.
42. Interview with Loblack.
43. Both Loblack and Allfrey are in agreement on this point.
44. Interview with Loblack.

45. The author can remember this very well as a young person growing up in Dominica. It was also verified by Stanley Boyd and Carlton Grell during informal interviews, July, 1973.
46. Interview with Veronica Nicholas, held in August, 1973.
47. Interview with Loblack, Nicholas and Joseph.
48. It is at this point, for instance, that DAWU decided it would seek affiliation with Latin American rather than with European or North American unions.
49. Interview with A. Joseph, General Secretary of DAWU, July, 1973, in Roseau.
50. This competition has led to duplication of members in the unions and to conflict. For instance, in 1967, the DTU attempted to undermine negotiations which involved the DAWU and WAWU in a workers' dispute with J.A. Astaphans, owner of the largest and richest super-market enterprise in the Island. Specifically, the DTU pushed to get members of both DAWU and WAWU to join its organization. In the eyes of DAWU and WAWU such selfish competitive activity was interpreted as steps by the DTU to protect Astaphans' interest and not the workers' rights. The magnitude of the conflict eventually warranted the intervention of the Labour Commission. On a recent occasion DAWU was highly incensed by the actions of the Deputy Premier, formerly the General Secretary of the WAWU, who assured workers of A.C. Shillingford and Company represented by DAWU, "That there was nothing in the law to prevent them from going on strike in order that DAWU could be forced to step down in favour of WAWU." DAWU, Expression, Vol. 3, (June-July), p. 2.
51. DAWU, 6th Annual Convention, 27th April, 1969, p. 3.
52. WAWU, Constitution (St. Lucia: Voice Press, n.d.).
53. Interview with C.A. Augustus, General Secretary of WAWU, in August, 1973, Roseau.
54. Based on a list compiled for me by C.A. Augustus, General Secretary of WAWU, in August, 1973.
55. Interview with Charles Savarin, General Secretary of the CSA, August, 1973, Roseau. Also see CSA, What It Does, What It Is (Dominica:n.d.).
56. Interviews with R. Lockhart, C. Grell, Charles Savarin.
57. See the DTU, Constitution, op. cit.; the WAWU, Constitution, op. cit.; the CSA, What It Does, What It Is, op. cit.; the DAWU, "Complete Alteration of Constitution and Rules", 1964.
58. C.S.A., Newsletter, January, 1973, p. 11.

59. C.S.A., What It Does ..., op. cit.

60. Ibid.

61. It would be impossible to document the number of times that the author has heard the Union being called by that name.

62. For a discussion of the development of the first popular political party, the Labour Party, see Chapter VI.

63. Interviews with the General Secretaries of all four unions. Such a claim was supported in interviews with Jeff Charles, Manager of the Radio Dominica, and recognized reliable source of current information on Dominican affairs, and with Daniel Cauderoin, 'critic of society', radio broadcaster, and poet also recognized as a reliable source of information on current Dominican affairs. Both interviews were held in July, 1973, Roseau and Trafalgar respectively. The following are some official statistics about the working force in Dominica on which this union claim could be interpreted.

In 1960 it was estimated by the government that 37% of the total population "bore the burden of providing a livelihood for the whole". In the 1960 census according to the government the labour force was as follows: population -- 59,900; labour force -- 23,400; working population -- 22,500; employed at the time of the census -- 21,528.

This census "coincides with the time when agricultural operations are in full swing, it is reasonable to expect a much larger unemployment in other parts of the year."

This, of course, did not and does not account for 'disguised unemployment' which would make the percentage of unemployed Dominicans far higher. In the 1970 census, the labour force was as follows: population -- 70,302; labour force -- 29,526.

"A reasonable estimate of the unemployment on a yearly basis would be 15% of the Labour Force. The agricultural sector employed over 60% of the total working force".

The information was derived from the Dominica Development Plan 1971 - 1975, p.p. 24-29.

64. This recognition came out quite clearly in the interview with the General Secretary of the C.S.A, Charles Savarin. The interview was held in August, 1973, in Roseau.

65. The most recent example of this phenomenon was demonstrated in the "Cauderoin issue". Both middle class and black Dominicans were equally incensed over the Government's violation of Daniel Cauderoin's human rights. Daniel Cauderoin is of middle class background. Their collective anger over the violation of Cauderoin's human rights formed in part the basis for the Government's declaration of a state of emergency in June 1973.

66. The author understands ideology as an actual set or system of coherent and shared beliefs which link theory to practice in a dynamic way, and which also specifies the necessary strategies to achieve desirable ends and objectives.
67. Interview with Loblack, July, 1973, in Poseau.
68. This was quite evident in Veronica Nicholas' views on the Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement's position against CDC. Interview with V. Nicholas, August, 1973, in Roseau.
69. From a comparison of Loblack's and Nicholas' views. From interviews held with Loblack and Nicholas.
70. On that day in 1971 a mass violent confrontation almost broke out in front of Supreme (High) Court Building in Roseau because of the Labour Government's policies; in this case, the Government's attempt to destroy the Roseau Town Council. The incident will be noted and referred to in Chapter VI. Also see for additional information, Dominica, Report of Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances at the Supreme Court Building and its Environs in Roseau on 16th December, 1971, (Premier's Office, 1972).
71. The other unions as well, are aware of WAWU's relations with the Labour Government. DAWU has raised much protest concerning the issue. Also expressed in interviews with A. Joseph and C. Savarin of DAWU and CSA respectively.
72. Interview with C.A. August, General Secretary of WAWU, August, 1973, Roseau.
73. Interview with Anthony Joseph, General Secretary of DAWU, July, 1973, in Roseau.
74. Declaration of the Principles of CLASC (Latin American Christian Trade Union Confederation), (DAWU's Office Collection, May, 1968), p. 11.
75. See, DAWU, 6th Annual Delegate Convention, (Roseau: DAWU's Office, 1969).
76. DAWU, Expression, Vol. 2, May, 1973, p. 1.
77. See DAWU, 6th Annual Delegate Convention, op. cit., p. 5.
78. Interview with Anthony Joseph.
79. Interview with Anthony Joseph.
80. DAWU, Expression, Vol 2, May, 1973, p. 1.

81. Interview with Charles Savarin, General Secretary of CSA, August, 1973, in Roseau.
82. CSA, Newsletter, January, 1973.
83. Interview with Charles Savarin.
84. Interview with Loblack and Nicholas.
85. The expression "Third Force" was given 'vogue value' by Premier E.O. Leblanc in his various radio broadcasts concerning the state of emergency and its relation to black power activity.
86. This came out in a speech by Patrick John, then Minister for Communication and Works, at the House of Assembly situated in the Ministerial building on Bath Road. The author was present at this session in August. Also from the interview with C.A. Augustus who gave similar statements.
87. Interview with C.A. Augustus.
88. Interview with Anthony Joseph.
89. Interview with Anthony Joseph.
90. DAWU, Expression, Vol. 3, June-July, p. 3.
91. On three occasions in July-August, 1973, Charles Savarin, General Secretary of CSA, Artherton Martin, the innovator of the Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement and the author held discussions on the Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement and its relation to the unions, black power movement and political parties in Dominica.

Chapter VI  
THE POLITICAL PARTIES

The first representative political party, the Labour Party, emerged as a result of the DTU's commitment to intensify and broaden workers' political struggles. It marked a concrete manifestation of the union's heightening political consciousness and, specifically, its recognition that not even basic human needs could be achieved independent of systematic and committed political struggle.

Dominica has had three representative political parties---the Labour Party, the Dominica United People's Party and the Freedom Party ---which were organized after 1951, the year the Dominicans were granted Universal Adult Suffrage. Prior to this date 'political party' was simply a term used to designate two opposing factions in the Dominica Legislature, as in the case of the mulato Ascendancy Party and the white Conservative Party in the 19th century.<sup>1</sup>

The Dominican representative parties are in a sense like most modern political parties in developed Western democracies in that they focus attention on winning the highest political offices and governing the country.<sup>2</sup> Thus, especially at election times Dominican parties concentrate much energy on appealing to and organizing broad electoral support while at the same time relying on the allegiance of their devoted members. This, however, is where relevant and meaningful comparative statements end. An appreciation of the Dominican political parties and



their activities is not to be found through conventional electoral behaviour analysis, or for that matter, through traditional discussions about the parties' 'on paper' objectives, their functions, and loose organizational structures. Rather this appreciation is attained through a critical understanding of the unique reasons and circumstances for the parties' existence, their ideology or lack of ideology, their actual relations to the body politic, and their general activities in a society where the electorate is small, politics is highly personalized and not issue oriented, and where identification with a charismatic party leader is of enormous political significance.

## I

### The 'First' Labour Party

In a precise sense it is more accurate to speak of two Labour Party organizations. The 'First' Labour Party---as it will be referred to---was organized by Loblack and Shand Allfrey to extend and intensify in a more integrated way the struggles initiated and directed by the DTU. Politically, the party reflected the colonial orientation of Loblack and Allfrey. The 'Second' Labour Party began with Edward Leblanc's rise to leadership in 1961 and the subsequent expulsion of Shand Allfrey and E. C. Loblack. It is circumscribed by Leblanc and his associates' bid to sever the narrow identification of the party with the DTU, end its colonial oriented politics, and broaden it into a national working class party which could, at the same time, accommodate intellectuals and middle class Dominicans.

On Commonwealth Day 1955, the 'First' Labour Party organization was officially in operation. It was founded by two Dominicans, Phyllis Shand Allfrey and Loblack, who had diverse social, educational and economic backgrounds and who, by virtue of the fact that Allfrey is white and Loblack is black, were born to an upper and lower class respectively. Yet this white Dominican woman, a prominent writer of planter class ancestry joined with Loblack to form a mass political party comprised of working class people! It was a phenomenon anomalous enough to raise questions.

It is unsatisfying and clearly unproductive to postulate, as some Dominicans have done, that Allfrey was driven to such lengths in order to relieve her guilt feelings over her novel The Orchid House and to atone for her ancestral injustices.<sup>3</sup> Interesting as this crude psychologism might prove, it is extremely debatable whether or not it would lead to an appreciation of the initial developmental phases of the party. A rewarding appreciation is derived rather from an understanding of Allfrey's political thinking and its expression in concrete activity.

The Labour Party organization took form when Allfrey returned to Dominica after a twenty year absence. It was not her intention to get involved in active politics, far less to organize a political party.<sup>4</sup> Her literary career stood paramount in her thoughts and she was enthusiastic about continuing with it. While in the Island she was particularly affected by Loblack's incessant appeal for an additional organization to strengthen the union's struggle, and it was primarily through him that she was drawn into the political sphere.<sup>5</sup>

The need for organized political activity to accomplish desired change was not new to Allfrey. While in England she had encountered a number of groups---primarily students, from places within the British Empire---concerned with organized political activity to achieve anti-colonial changes. Allfrey was not only affected by them, but had accepted some of their thoughts and concerns as legitimate.

There were discernible factors in Dominica which substantiated Loblack's appeal for the formation of a political party. The union's struggle and success notwithstanding, Allfrey had seen for herself the extremely hostile social and economic conditions which continued to plague a substantial number of the working people. Agricultural labourers in many areas were barely making enough to keep from starving; domestic servants were still being abused. Workers from the rural areas, in an attempt to better their lot in life, found only frustration and disappointment in coming to Roseau. Thus, Allfrey agreed with Loblack that a political party was necessary to complement the union in its struggle to overcome these abject conditions.<sup>6</sup>

The Dominica Labour Party, modeled on the British Labour Party reflected the political philosophy of Loblack and Allfrey. Loblack remained at the head of the union, Allfrey as the leader of the party, and it was easily established that while the organizations would remain officially independent of each other, they would, nonetheless, be sufficiently coordinated as to represent and express the best interest of the workers. Furthermore, through this bond Loblack and Allfrey hoped that the two organizations would help foster a more integrated sense of collective identity and pride among the working class.<sup>7</sup>

The party claimed from the start that it was mildly socialist in orientation, and very humanistic. This socialism was neither marxist nor directed towards radical and revolutionary re-organization of the economic structure of the Island. It claimed to be a socialist organization simply because it stood for social justice for all Dominicans; it was a humanistic organization because it was concerned with social justice and "full of anxiety and pity for the underprivileged."<sup>8</sup> Its humanistic orientation was affirmed concretely in its constitution which incorporated as a top priority the principles of the Declaration of Human Rights as defined by the United Nation's charter. The party's political conception of change was not revolutionary, but evolutionary change which culminated in a highly developed colonial constitution. Consequently, Allfrey and Loblack spent considerable energy trying to convince Dominicans who were hostile to the party that the organization had no revolutionary intentions, for the party did not even envisage a Dominica independent of British authority.

The very existence of the Labour Party, however, filled the Dominican middle class with apprehension, for a political organization comprising black working class people could end the middle class monopoly of the local government and affect adversely its political interests. Allfrey, a member of the upper-class, would be directly responsible for this catastrophe if the working class assumed control of government. As a result, Allfrey was branded as a traitor who sold her class interest to the labourers and servants of Dominica, and the party did not receive any financial support from the middle class.<sup>9</sup> These obstacles did not

deter Allfrey, Loblack and others from persisting with the struggle to establish the party and to win control of the colonial government of the Island.

The party, however, was confronted with economic difficulties. The original grant of 5,000 pounds from the British Labour Party to the Caribbean Labour Parties had contributed little to sustaining the local party in Dominica. Without middle class financial backing, the party had to sustain itself principally through the personal funds of its leaders. Party members who also belonged to the DTU contributed a fee of 4 cents monthly: while non-union members paid 10-12 cents a month. Even a room for office purposes was not only a large financial expenditure in these circumstances, but was also difficult to obtain. Without funds the party could not attract solid personnel capable of effective organization. The party organization survived, nonetheless, due to the indefatigable efforts of its founding members who, besides Allfrey, the President, and Loblack, included Allfrey's husband Robert, party treasurer, Arnold Active, secretary (presently Minister of Home Affairs), Anthony Joseph of the DTU (presently the General Secretary of DAWU) and Veronica Nicholas of the DTU (presently the General Secretary of the DTU).<sup>10</sup>

The 'First' Labour Party represents the second continuous working class organization in the 20th century in Dominica. Besides the union, it was another organization in which the working people, and especially those who had come to Roseau in search of a better life, could express their collective frustrations and grievances and have them translated into effective struggle.

The party served an immediate concrete function at this juncture. In the middle 1950's, people, especially of working class background, emigrated to Britain in search of employment. Their identification with the local Labour Party helped smooth the transition from Dominica to Britain. In the United Kingdom, many emigrants believed that the local Labour Party's connection with the British Labour Party provided a sufficient basis for their identifying with the British Party, and through the British Party they could continue to belong to the local Labour Party as well as keep in touch with Dominican affairs.<sup>11</sup>

Moreover, the party was concerned with forming the government of the Island. In 1957, the Labour Party contested its first general elections. At the polls, however, it was soundly defeated by the newly created Dominica United People's Party (DUPP).<sup>12</sup> Allfrey suffered personal defeat in the Western District where she obtained only 19.4 per cent ( 562 ) of the votes, while her DUPP opponent Elkin Henry received 31 per cent (912).<sup>13</sup> There are a number of reasonable explanations for this Labour Party defeat. First, the members of the DUPP were not newcomers to Government. Many of them had been elected as independents to Government in 1954 and their leader, F.A. Baron, was first elected in 1951. In addition, they were far more experienced with platform and campaign techniques. Secondly, while Allfrey was a competent party organizer, she did not possess and could not match the campaign flair and dynamism of Baron. Of course, to make matters worse, she had chosen to run against the extremely popular 'local son' Elkin Henry. Thirdly, the DUPP was fully supported by the Dominican middle class in this contest with the working class Labour Party. Finally, the working class people,

many of whom were employed by the middle class supporters of the DUPP, were threatened with economic reprisals by these employers if they voted labour.<sup>14</sup> These workers found it in their best interest to vote DUPP.

In the 1958 Federal elections for local representatives to the Federal Government in Trinidad, the Labour Party made an extremely impressive showing. Of the 23,718 votes cast, three Labour candidates, Allfrey, E. O. Leblanc, the present Premier of Dominica, and Angelo Bellot - received 9345, 8968, and 1836 votes respectively, while the two DUPP candidates managed between them but 2467 votes.<sup>15</sup>

There are a number of factors to explain this Labour landslide victory. First, the notables and elected members of the 1957 local elections did not run for federal office, partly because they were convinced that the Federation of the West Indies would not last.<sup>16</sup> Secondly, the middle class was also convinced that the Federation would collapse and saw no necessity to cajole or threaten workers who decided to vote Labour. Thirdly, a vote for Allfrey was in fact a blessing in disguise; for if she left the Island it would not only attenuate their running conflict, but would in effect signal the demise of the Labour Party organization. The middle class general thinking was accurate on two counts; Allfrey, on winning the election left Dominica for Trinidad, and the Federation did collapse officially in 1961. The middle class miscalculated however, not only in underestimating the survival capacity of the Labour Party, but more importantly, it underestimated E.O. Leblanc who, after the breakdown of the Federation, returned to Dominica to assume the leadership of the party and to create

the first working class government in the history of Dominica.

The Labour Party took its federal victory in 1958 as an opportunity to submit a thirty point Development Program to the Federal Government on behalf of all Dominicans, and especially the working class.<sup>17</sup> Since the collapse of the Federation a few items on the program have been implemented by the local Labour Government. Most of the other items, however, have yet to make the transition from paper to actual development projects.

Its drawbacks and losses notwithstanding, the party considered itself successful on many grounds. As a party, which generally extended the struggles of the DTU, it believed that it contributed to the development of a greater sense of collective pride and confidence in the working people. The party gave to the concept "labour" a positive value that has not been lost in Dominica. Even the present Labour Party Government uses the word as a potent symbol to bind and identify it to the working population while at the same time to remind these people of their allegiance to a 'labour' Government. Perhaps one of the greatest testimonies to the success of the 'First' Labour Party is that it gave birth to a Labour Government in 1961 which is still in office. Ironically, however, 1961 marked the death of the 'First' Labour Party and the termination of the leadership of both Allfrey and Loblack. It also signalled the emergence of the 'Second' Labour Party under the charismatic leadership of Edward Oliver Leblanc. In that year the Labour Party and the government became synonymous. It is quite accurate to say that in a sense, the achievements and failures of the party/government are also the political triumphs and blunders of the charismatic Leblanc.



## II

The Dominica United People's Party (DUPP)

Given the existence of an organized workers' party, the Labour Party, and its predictable participation in the forthcoming elections of 1957, the second representative political party, the DUPP, emerged in 1956 to present a collective, unified and solid middle class front. In 1957, the DUPP was elected to form the first representative party government in the history of Dominica.

A shared, cohesive ideological position, however, played little or no part in the genesis of the DUPP, partly because the DUPP was organized by a group of political independents already in Government. In fact, whereas the Labour Party formed the basis for a Government in 1961, the Government of 1954 formed the basis of the DUPP. Given the immediate *raison d'etre* for its existence, it is not surprising that the guidance, political thinking and direction of the party was left up to Franklin A. Baron. As the leader of the DUPP, Baron won 60 per cent of the votes in his Roseau district and became in 1959 the first chief minister in the history of Dominica.<sup>18</sup>

The success at the polls in 1957 of this electoral coalition of middle class independents is attributable largely to the efforts of the dynamic and flamboyant leader of the party, Baron. He was not only the major architect of the party's constitution, but it was primarily his strategies and platform that formed the basis for the party's campaign in the various parts of the Island. Given the energetic

way in which he went about organizing the party for elections, it is not surprising that "it didn't take a long time to have the party going."<sup>19</sup> As a consequence, Baron and the DUPP became synonymous. It meant that a vote for Baron was a vote for the DUPP organization and vice versa.<sup>20</sup> While this identification provided a winning combination in 1957, it proved fatal to the DUPP at the polls in 1961 and 1966. The DUPP began its political existence with Baron and ended with Baron's retreat from active politics. How it survived in the interim from 1956 to 1966 was in many ways due to the political struggle of Baron. In its ten year life span the party had failed to develop a concrete collective ideology of its own.

In 1959, the DUPP under Baron was responsible for a major change in the Island's constitution. Dominica was granted an advanced crown colony constitution which increased and broadened the scope for local decision making and helped pave the way towards complete internal self-government in 1967. This constitutional advance included an increase in the number of constituencies, the replacement of the Administrator as the head of the Legislative Council by a chief minister, and the creation of three new ministeries.<sup>21</sup> Dominica had arrived at a ministerial system of government with F.A. Baron as its first minister.

The immediate and successful implementation of this system was basically due to F.A. Baron. He devoted an inordinate amount of time explaining the bureaucratic procedures of this arrangement, even to top ranking civil servants.<sup>22</sup> Baron is convinced in retrospect that had he spent that time with the electorate instead, explaining the DUPP Government's programs, his and the DUPP's chances at the polls in 1961

would have been infinitely better.<sup>23</sup>

#### The DUPP's Policies and Achievements

The DUPP stated its---actually Baron's---general policy simply as "A United Effort of All Classes of Our People for Progress and Prosperity of All."<sup>24</sup> Its aims were to promote political, economic and cultural progress in Dominica; raise the standard of living for workers in particular and to promote the well-being of Dominicans in general. Specifically, the DUPP conceived of progress in terms of road development, increased educational facilities at all levels, advanced international and local communications networks, and in the maximization of land and agricultural resources in the Island.

By 1960, the DUPP Government could claim a number of concrete improvements and changes. It was extremely proud, particularly, of its road development projects, for it had extended the road system from barely 100 miles to 200 miles, thus putting Dominica on par with Grenada in this respect. Specifically, the party/government could point to the completion of the Transinsular, Layou and Rosalie roads; it had partially completed the Castle Bruce Road and had begun work on the Soufriere and La Plaine Roads. In addition, it had opened up and surfaced a total of 37 feeder roads that touched twenty distinct villages. This road development scheme was seen generally as opening up of fertile lands, which had been virgin forests because of transportation difficulties, to agricultural development and timber exploitation.<sup>25</sup> The benefits deriving from this scheme would bring not only prosperity to those immediately involved in agriculture and timber exploitation,

but also to Dominica in general.<sup>26</sup>

A number of schools were constructed and some were in the process of being built. These included the party/government's assistance in 1959 to the new Saint Mary's Academy, a Catholic secondary school,<sup>27</sup> and plans for a large (by Dominican standards) new Dominica Grammar School. It increased scholarships to all the secondary schools. It constructed the only airport---the Melville Hall Airfield---in existence in Dominica today. The DUPP government built a new tuberculosis ward at the Roseau Hospital and set about to improve services for the nursing staff in general. It reorganized the Social Welfare Department and increased the staff in the villages. It gave financial support and encouragement to Village Councils and local self-help community efforts. The DUPP provided an island-wide distribution of food. Under this Government, low-cost housing projects were constructed in the Goodwill-Fond Colé areas. The basic labourer's pay was raised to \$2.00 per day, a rate which has remained unchanged since then. Through an island-wide assessment conducted by the DUPP, a Federal grant of \$4 million came to Dominica which made Baron extremely proud.<sup>28</sup> In 1960 in a Five-Year Development Plan, the DUPP promised even greater achievements of benefit to all Dominicans.<sup>29</sup> Yet in that year the DUPP was rejected and Dominica elected its first Labour Government in 1961.

There are a number of reasons for this rejection of the DUPP in spite of its seemingly impressive record of change. First, the political defeat of the Labour Party in 1957 only served to intensify its efforts to bring about closer identification between the working class and the party organization. The Party worked diligently to get the

working people to accept in a committed way the party as their own organization serving their best political interests. Secondly, this activity included a constant reminder that the DUPP was middle-class in orientation, and it was the middle class which was responsible for the hostile conditions that most black people confronted daily. Thirdly, in the three years of DUPP rule, these working people had acquired an increased confidence in their collective political strength which was not easily shaken by middle class employers' threats. The black people recognized that as a majority in Dominica they could elect their own government to achieve meaningful alternatives. Fourthly, and enormously significant, the black people found their charismatic "hero" in Edward Oliver Leblanc.

There were other factors as well for the rejection of the DUPP. The DUPP solicited the support of the working class people only at election time, and did not consider them an intrinsic part of the party.<sup>29</sup> They were never consulted or involved directly in the DUPP's programs for change and development. Indeed, they appeared as recipients or, for that matter, objects on which the middle class party bestowed whatever changes it deemed in their best interest. One major objective of the DUPP, for instance, was to raise the standard of living of the working people to the level of the middle class. Yet the DUPP expressed no intention of altering the conditions which originally engendered this very difference. Concretely, besides its road development, which in fact equally bettered the propertied class, this Government had no substantial plans to accomplish a more equitable re-allocation, distribution and use of the natural resources in the Island. Stated differently,

no change of benefit to the working people would come if it adversely affected the life patterns of the middle class and property owners in Dominica. Given the small size of Dominica, the limited nature of its natural resources and the available amount of arable land, it is not clear how the welfare of the majority of Dominicans was in fact a serious priority of the DUPP.

In perspective it should be acknowledged that the DUPP Government did bring about some beneficial changes to the working people.<sup>31</sup> Even its Agricultural Bank envisaged and proposed in its 1960 Five Year Development Plan might have proved beneficial to the small farmers and peasants. However, operating as a party independent of working class involvement, the DUPP proved that it had not advanced in its political thinking and behaviour much beyond that of the mulatto groups and organizations of the 19th and early 20th centuries, with regard to black people and their interests. This was particularly disastrous for the DUPP at this time for the black people were not only enfranchised, but had a political organization in which they could manifest their collective power. The party was in this sense, rightfully deserving of the name "Party Gros Bourgs".<sup>33</sup>

In his 1973 assessment of the failure of the DUPP, Baron pointed to two major factors: invisibility of the leadership, and that the party was ahead of its time.<sup>34</sup> First, Baron claimed that the inordinate amount of time he devoted to explanation of the bureaucratic structures of the newly formed ministerial system to the civil servants was done at the expense of personal contact and communication with the electorate. As a

result, the people did not know what his Government was accomplishing on their behalf. Seeing their chief minister only at election time, it was therefore not possible for the people to identify themselves with him or to have faith in his programs and promises. Secondly, he claimed that the party/government and the majority of the Dominican electorate were simply at different levels of political understanding concerning the nature and direction of beneficial changes in the overall perspective of Dominican progress and development.

Baron's first point has merit and E.O. Leblanc, for instance, has learned well the consequences of political invisibility at the leadership level in a body politic that thrives on personal identification. Leblanc, therefore, has made it a point to open his office to everyone and gave a hearing to whoever approached him.<sup>35</sup> The second point, however, is dependent partly on the successful manifestation of the first; if the leader is invisible and communication is absent, it is therefore not possible to explain the benefits of changes achieved in the interest of general Dominican progress and development. The party was not ahead of its time, but more exactly, it was at fault given its lack of comprehension of the dynamics and nature of mass politics in Dominica. Thus, the twenty-two specific achievements the party/government claimed it brought about in 1958-1959 on behalf of the poor man meant little without personal leadership contact, communication and explanation.<sup>36</sup>

While the DUPP proclaimed in its policy statements the unification of all classes in order to achieve progress and prosperity, it did little

and made no concrete plans to even help break down class distinctions in Dominica. As a matter of fact, it reinforced them.<sup>37</sup>

Finally, in 1966, the DUPP suffered its second consecutive defeat at the polls at the hands of the Labour Party.<sup>38</sup> In that year Baron resigned as leader of the party at an annual convention held in Grand-Bay. He realized that the Dominica voting public had made him and the DUPP synonymous. During the last two election campaigns the Labour Party had been effective in inculcating, in creating, and reinforcing in the electorates' mind this synonymous image. Furthermore the Labour Party had successfully spread the propaganda that it was Baron and his kind---"the Gros Bourgs"---who were largely, if not totally responsible for the working people's oppression. It was to save the DUPP organization from collapse and to give it a chance to form a government in the future that Baron maintains he resigned.<sup>39</sup> His resignation, however, displayed much political naivete, for he failed to grasp that it was the entire party and not simply he which was perceived as "Gros Bourgs" in both interest and orientation. Baron underestimated his immense value as the prime cohesive factor, and as the man who was responsible for the organization of the party. Consequently, he failed to foresee the collapse of the DUPP without his leadership. Indeed, a few months after Baron's resignation the party disbanded.

Shortly thereafter, some members of the defunct DUPP formed an organization labelled the National Democratic Movement that was actually of minor political consequence and shortlived. In 1968, members of this organization and other members of the defunct DUPP



coalesced to form the Freedom Fighters. This movement's objective was to provide collective opposition to the Labour Government's oppressive policies which seemed designed to subvert the cherished democratic institutions of Dominicans as well as to terminate Dominican's civil liberties and freedoms. From a protest movement, the coalition moved rapidly to become a party organization in late 1968, aimed at replacing the Labour Party as government. This third representative party in Dominican history was called the Freedom Party.

However, before the Freedom Party is discussed, it is necessary to analyze the 'Second' Labour Party, the Labour Government of Dominica. In fact, it is in relation to this Labour Government that the activities of the Freedom Party are best understood.

### III

#### The 'Second' Labour Party

The 'Second' Labour Party arose under the leadership of E. O. Leblanc and his principal associates, N.A. Ducreay, W. Stevens and Mable James in 1961. Its objectives were to end the party's colonial thinking and orientation, to disassociate the party from its stifling and narrow identification with the DTU, and to broaden the party into a national working class organization capable of accommodating intellectual and middle class Dominicans. In the leadership and personal conflict between Leblanc, his associates, and Allfrey and her supporters, Leblanc won, Allfrey lost, and she and Loblack were subsequently expelled from the party in 1964.

The 'Second' Labour Party continued under the banner of a socialist

organization claiming that, "We stand for social justice".<sup>40</sup> Its real complaint was not with the 'First' party's socialist perspective, but rather with its refusal to make radical breaks with the past. For the 'First' party necessary political changes were to be gradual and were in no way to explode the colonial matrix or sever ties with the imperial authority of Britain.<sup>41</sup> The 'First' party envisaged ultimate political evolution as culminating in a broad liberal colonial framework. While this arrangement would allow for a greater political expression on the part of the working people, the 'First' party had no conception of working class persons at the head of an independent Dominica.<sup>42</sup> The 'Second' party, on the other hand, envisioned this independence as a necessary goal.<sup>43</sup>

In 1961, the working class people of Dominica expressed their collective political identity and increased confidence by electing to office a Labour Party Government headed by the charismatic leader E.O. Leblanc. Such is the identification with this government and leader that not even glaring atrocities committed by the ruling party against democratic rights and freedoms of the population as in 1968, 1971, and 1973 could lead to a renunciation of the Labour Party Government in favour of the Freedom Party, the official opposition.<sup>44</sup>

Part of this continuing identification stems not only from the black peoples' special relationship to Leblanc, but from the conviction that they have a definite stake in the survival and future of the Island. In this respect, the Labour Party has been successful in accomplishing certain attitudinal changes in the working class' relations to politics and the political arena. The working people of Dominica no longer see

government as the property of the middle class elite, as was the case in the 19th century and even up to the 1950's. Thus, given their new found sense of political importance, they are willing to live with even obvious atrocities by their government, rather than support an alternative ruling middle class party. One manifestation of this political awakening could be found in the summer of 1973 when working class people in Dominica spoke of politics with strong convictions. They were definitely concerned with the government's imposition of a state of emergency and with its possible effects.<sup>45</sup>

Historically, the 'Second' party emerged at the time of the imminent and predictable collapse of the West Indian Federation, and when E.O. Leblanc returned from the Federal Capital to campaign actively for the 1960 elections. His victory at the polls and his election as chief minister made him the de facto leader of the party.<sup>46</sup> From then on the party departed increasingly from the political thinking of Allfrey and Loblack, under Leblanc's new leadership style and purpose. Politicization of the working people in order to keep the Labour Party in government now became a major feature of the Leblanc regime. In 1964 with the support of important party members Leblanc became the de jure leader and Allfrey and Loblack were expelled. Under the current Premier the party has become more representative, increasingly nationalistic and decreasingly socialist and humanist in the sense conceived by the original party.

Under Leblanc, the party defeated the DUPP in 1965 and the Freedom Party in 1970. Having entrenched itself as a majority party with firm working class support, the middle class, which prior to 1965

had been hostile to Alfrey and the 'First' party, has found it in its interest to give even overt support and assistance to the Labour Government. In fact, even those middle class Dominicans who once referred derogatorily to Leblanc "as the little boy from the country" have made an about-face. Today, Dominican intellectuals as well have joined the party giving active backing to its policies and programs.<sup>47</sup>

Leblanc, like many other charismatic Caribbean leaders, for example, Eric Gairy of Grenada, came to party politics via the union.<sup>48</sup> As a DTU member of rural and working class background, Leblanc has often boasted in reference to his background that he has not received one day of formal secondary school education. It was by the dint of sheer individual initiative and effort that he was able to obtain the coveted London Matriculated Certificate in 1948.<sup>49</sup> In 1957, he entered politics and became a Labour Party member. In 1959 he was a Dominican representative at the Federal level; and at the collapse of Federation, he returned to Dominica to contest successfully against F.A. Baron for the Roseau South Constituency and the chief minister's position.

When the working people of Dominica voted Leblanc into the chief minister's office, they had accomplished a change which broke a political tradition and class barrier in Dominica. He was the first man of such a background to attain the highest position in the political structure of the Island. The middle class elite was extremely irritated and shocked. It was inconceivable that the "little boy from the country" a political unknown, could have been permitted by an illiterate mass of working class people to violate acceptable political culture and defy a proper functioning social structure. Moreover, the middle class was

cognizant that its political monopoly had come to an abrupt end with Leblanc, and as the head of a democratic government, he now spoke for all Dominicans. This, plus the suspicion that Leblanc might remain in office for some time, forced the middle class to understand that it would be in its best interest not to display open hostility towards him. They, nonetheless, found it extraordinarily difficult to accept Leblanc as an alternative chief minister regardless of Barón's shortcomings and their personal criticisms and feelings towards him.

Leblanc, as the head of government, symbolized to the working class that as a Dominican majority it could get beneficial changes accomplished. Moreover, he was a concrete manifestation that their collective efforts could become an authoritative voice in the government decision making apparatus. And, if success can be indicated by consecutive re-election to office, then Leblanc has not failed his people.

#### Changes and Achievements

The working class people have been satisfied with some of the concrete changes achieved by the Labour Party Government. The government's road program, especially its feeder road system to small farmers, a factor of allegedly enormous significance to agricultural development, has been rather impressive. It built a huge Dominica Grammar School which is open to children of all backgrounds in Dominica. It has instituted a National Providence Fund concerned with old age. It has made possible a low-income housing project in the Canefield area. The government has provided various kinds of technical training at the Technical wing of the new Dominica Grammar School and at the newly built

Clifton Dupigny College.<sup>50</sup> In some areas, especially in the rural districts, the government has re-vitalized Village Councils in an attempt to make the people feel far more responsible for their own lives through participation in decision making and in the implementation of local policies.<sup>51</sup> In 1967, Leblanc accomplished a first in the name of working class people and Dominicans in general when he became Premier of a government in complete control of internal Dominican affairs. Moreover, in the cultural-social area, Leblanc has made a marked contribution.

Leblanc, by his attitude and behaviour, helped break down a middle class prejudice and class barrier of significance to the cultural re-awakening of Dominica. Middle class Dominicans differentiated themselves from the lower class in many ways including language and dress-wear. For formal occasions, for instance, the accepted form of dress was the jacket and tie, and the tie was worn by practically all 'white collar' workers at their jobs and social events. As a rule, the middle class did not speak patois and many pretended not to understand it. Schools forbade its use, for it was a definite sign of the uneducated and of lower class crude behaviour.<sup>52</sup> If it was used by the middle class Dominicans, it was to address or give commands to those of the lower class working at their homes as domestic servants or as farm hands on their estates.

As the Premier of Dominica, Leblanc rejected the tie and jacket as inappropriate to the climate and did not wear either to state functions or formal events. At first he was criticized openly by the middle class for this disrespect and improper behaviour. It was said 'he did not know better'; such was not unexpected from an uneducated man of lower class rural background. However, Leblanc's persistence, despite such criticism,

bore results, and the tie and jacket as formal apparel have been rejected by all Dominicans. Today the top part of the formal wear of Dominica is a rather loose white shirt, open at the neck and it is often referred to as an "Afro-Jacket."

Through the initial efforts of Leblanc, patois has become increasingly a language spoken by all classes in Dominica and presently forms an integral part of the cultural heritage of the Island. It is the motto of the Dominican national emblem, "Après Bondie c'est La Ter,"<sup>54</sup> and now it is even spoken on Radio Dominica.

Leblanc has given much encouragement in other cultural areas as well. "Bèlè", a unique native dance with African roots, has been partially revived. The singing ensemble, "Siffleur Montagne" aimed at popularizing aspects of the Dominican experience and heritage in song was given financial backing by his government.<sup>55</sup>

Leblanc has therefore done much to further the working people's pride in themselves as full Dominicans. Indeed, he gave concrete expression to aspects of their common and past experiences which now form a major part of the cultural heritage of Dominica. E.O. Leblanc is correct in a sense when he labels himself as the 'original' black power advocate in the Island.<sup>56</sup> His contributions and those of his government are acknowledged even by Dominicans who are among his most ardent and bitter critics.<sup>57</sup>

What Leblanc has accomplished is partially reflected in the continuing confidence that the working class have in him personally. For instance, even after the arbitrary and tyrannical manner in which the Labour Government handled the Cauderoïn issue, and despite police brutality

perpetuated against the working people in the name of that government during the 1973 state of emergency, these people expressed categorically that given an immediate election they would not elect a Freedom Party Government.<sup>58</sup> Instead, they persisted in denouncing the Freedom Party as a "Party Gros Bourg" which did not have the interests of the working class at heart. Then, to justify their continuing faith and confidence in Leblanc, they shifted to responsibility for the state of emergency and its manifested enormities from Leblanc to Ronald Armour, the Deputy Premier. Interestingly enough, Armour is formally well educated and belongs to the propertied gentry of the Island. They did not find Armour acceptable, but tolerated him as long as their charismatic hero Leblanc felt the need for him. Thus when Armour resigned in the heat of the 1973 state of emergency, the working class people were openly relieved.

Leblanc has then apparently forged, through his efforts and contributions, a lasting identity and bond between himself, his government, and the working class people. Given the present composition of the Freedom Party, the working people still believe that he is the best representative and expression of their continuing struggle for survival.

#### The Labour Party/Government: the Question of Ideology and Development

For the last thirteen years, the Labour Party has formed the government of the Island. There is no real distinction between the party and the government, for Leblanc as head of state and leader of the party organization has made government and party synonymous. Any discernable, and rather inconsequential, differentiation is to be found at the time



of national elections when the Labour party seeks re-election to government: the distinction is in fact a party/government platform strategy. The Annual Convention is the place where the party/government seeks to re-kindle the faith of supporters in its programs and to foster among them a deepening sense of identification with the party/government and its leader. The structure of the party beyond this remains loose and it is not possible to ascertain the Labour membership from an estimated electorate of over 26,000.<sup>59</sup>

In the 1970-1975 Dominica Development Plan, the Labour Party Government has outlined its plans for improvement, progress and change in the Island. The government, however, does not have an articulated, concrete or consistent ideology through which such plans could be implemented successfully.<sup>60</sup> It labels itself as socialist, but this is not an ideology, rather socialism is an expedient slogan without any content. It was thus possible, given the use of the concept, for the government to brand the Castle Bruce struggle for change with the perjorative labels of "Communism and Collectivism" of the Russian variety, and to accuse Castle Bruce Cooperative activities of being inspired by an international communist conspiracy. At best, the transition from paper plans to implementation is done by this government on a contingent basis and sometimes in the self-interest of government ministers.<sup>61</sup>

As a result, the economy of Dominica is confronted with a rather severe crisis that may eventually threaten the basic existence of all Dominicans.

Concretely, the banana industry, which accounts for 82 per cent of all agricultural exports, 70 per cent of all total earnings and employs 52 per cent of the working force,<sup>62</sup> is in chaos and faces increasing

financial difficulty. The banana situation is further aggravated by the economic crisis confronting Britain, the industry's only export market. Yet government makes plans to increase banana production at the expense of diversification that could decrease the Island's dependency on this monoculture and could provide a variety of other crops for local food consumption. Thus, as the prices for bananas on the export market slumps, so does the economy; while the prices for basic necessities in the Island skyrocket. Meanwhile, the basic wage for the labouring man in 1973 remained at \$2.00 a day and poor people's relief at \$1.00 per week.

The timber industry has collapsed, but even while in operation Dominica continued to import most of its lumber. The fishing and livestock industries have been given no direction and contribute little to both the economy and employment. In fact, the bulk of fish and livestock is imported. Generally, imports twice exceed exports in monetary terms.<sup>63</sup>

There are no light industries catering to food production and processing on the Island. For example, while the Island grows grapefruit and oranges, Dominica imports canned fruit consisting of oranges, grapefruit and even bananas.<sup>64</sup>

Not having worked out an economic perspective, the government does not fully grasp the ramifications of CDC's continued exploitation of the resources of the Island, and how it could make CDC contribute instead to the development and prosperity of the country. As a result for instance, the government allows CDC to raise its rates for electric service in any manner it deems necessary for its own profit.

Hotels for an invisible and 'expanding' tourist industry were

built throughout the Island and, not surprisingly, were closing down almost immediately after they had been constructed from a lack of clientele. The government has no worked-out strategies for developing a tourist industry of any size, far less has it given serious consideration to the advantages of that industry to the economy. At the same time while these useless tourist hotels were being constructed, housing for Dominicans, especially in Roseau, was left in a dilapidated condition and continues to deteriorate steadily.<sup>65</sup> In fact, Roseau at this moment is characterized by severe overcrowding.

Given its lack of ideology, no plans have been devised to accommodate the increasingly large numbers of high school graduates who have exploded on the scene and find themselves unemployed with no emigration outlet. Because of growing restrictive policies in Canada and elsewhere, emigration, particularly of youths between 18 and 30, has dropped steadily from a 1960 total of 2194 to 313 by 1968 and to even lower levels by 1971.<sup>66</sup> As a result, these youths must remain on the Island, and they find themselves without jobs and in some cases, without food. Their frustration mounts daily and they have found temporary solace in smoking 'grass' and in occupying themselves by playing dominoes.

In general, unemployment is extremely high. A conservative estimate by the government places it at 15 per cent of the working force. The government even admits that a "substantial number of the persons in the working force are not employed for a full twelve months of the year."<sup>67</sup> When disguised unemployment is taken into account this 15 per cent estimate becomes an extraordinarily larger figure, about 40 to 50 per cent.<sup>68</sup>

Road development which is directly linked with agricultural advancement is increasingly being implemented on a contingent and self interest basis. For instance, in the early 1960's an important road was constructed with asphalt between Point Michel and Soufriere in the South of Dominica, and of immense value to the villager's welfare has since been permitted to deteriorate into a dirt and unmotorable track as a punishment to the people of Soufriere for voting against the Labour Party by electing Henry Moise of the Freedom Party.

Ironically, the largest developmental project in Dominica outside of hotels has been, and continues to be, the construction of police stations all over the Island. The unit in Roseau is estimated to have cost over one million dollars in Eastern Caribbean currency. Many Dominicans feel cheated for they believe that such money should have been invested more wisely in more useful projects. They philosophically view such construction as the government's attempt to make the police and defence force "comfortable". In fact, they may be quite correct, for given the chaotic economic situation, government's lack of concrete ideology for future change, and the self interest displayed by various ministers, it is probably in the government's best interest to secure the loyalty of the police and defence forces.

This situation has led to increasing disenchantment with the Labour Party Government. For instance, DANU, a socialist oriented organization, feels betrayed by and has disassociated itself from this government which calls itself socialist, but which simply uses socialism as a label to mark the capitalist and property interests of its ministers.

Like other Dominicans, it is highly incensed over a Labour Government which says: "We stand for social justice for every citizen regardless of race or status, whether poor or prosperous", but which has at least on three major occasions blatantly violated every conceivable aspect of social justice and human rights of Dominicans by its tyrannical policies and despotic behaviour.<sup>70</sup>

There is little doubt that the Labour Government, by its lack of an articulated purpose, clear cut or well-devised and consistent policies, has contributed immensely to this growing disenchantment. Concretely, the government has not worked out any long range and practical policies on the banana industry, the mainstay of the economy, or on the utilization of available land and agricultural resources for the benefit of all Dominicans. The government, for instance, proclaims the advantage of cooperatives and their development,<sup>71</sup> yet when a cooperative venture is attempted, as in the case of Castle Bruce, directed toward achieving changes of enormous importance to the welfare of the villagers, government not only discourages it, but also throws obstacles of all kinds in the way of the venture's success.<sup>72</sup> It would seem that the Labour Party has come full circle. It has evolved from being primarily a party filled with empathy for the lot of the working people to a government that is becoming a distinct part of the propertied class, typified by George Karam and J.A. Astaphan. This is manifested in part by the aspirations of some ministers, or as in a few cases, by actual appropriations of quality crown lands as the private property of government ministers. The government, nonetheless, continues to maintain

the facade that it is concerned fundamentally with representing the best interests of the working class people. Finally, in 1973, despite its obvious failures, this government was entertaining thoughts of complete political independence from Britain.<sup>73</sup>

#### IV

#### The Third Party---The Freedom Party

The Freedom Party emerged to present a collective opposition to the policies of the Labour Party Government that were considered to be directed at terminating the civil rights and democratic freedoms of Dominicans. From a protest movement in 1968, it developed rapidly into a political party extending its organizational structure and activity towards the replacement of the Labour Party as an alternative government. Structurally, however, the party is as loose as the Labour Party and has, out of a possible 26,000 voting electorate, approximately 2,000 paying members.<sup>74</sup> At the same time the party does not have a charismatic leader of the stature of E.O. Leblanc. The Freedom Party to date is the only representative party in the history of Dominica which has not formed the government of the Island. It now has a public image of a permanent opposition.<sup>75</sup>

When the DUPP collapsed in 1966, there existed no official opposition to the government. At an informal and unofficial level, individuals, groups, organizations including the Catholic Church, the press, the Chamber of Commerce and others in the Roseau community in particular, would act sporadically as interest groups to resist policies

which affected them directly. The National Democratic Movement, notwithstanding, these transient interest groups were rather ineffective in their individual opposition to government. In 1968, a policy of government, which threatened to end freedom of speech and to set an anti-democratic and despotic precedent, which would affect all Dominicans ultimately, forced these disparate elements together. Their collective purpose was to resist such policy at that time and for the future. The coalition called itself the Freedom Fighters. If "Labour" was the watch word of the government, then "freedom" was the opposition's guiding principle.

#### The Development and Formation of the Party

In 1968, the Labour Government passed a bill into law entitled "the Seditious and Undesirable Act" as a means of bridling the freedom of speech of the newspaper, The Dominica Herald, a very bitter critic of the government and its policies. Many Dominicans, however, did not interpret the government's action in isolation but as an undesirable and undemocratic precedent with far-reaching consequences for the entire Island. In particular, the Dominica Chronicle and the Star, the other two newspapers in the Island, albeit not as vociferous or ardent in their criticisms of government as the Herald, nonetheless understood this Act as making more than serious allusions to their continuing existence. Thus, they collectively signed a joint statement of protest in which they postulated that if the freedom of speech of the Herald were curtailed it would be considered an attack on all three newspapers.<sup>76</sup> The three newspapers became founding members of the Freedom Fighters.

The Fighter's protest over this policy took substantive form at public meetings where the movement explained the implications and consequences of the Act for Dominican freedom and civil rights.<sup>77</sup> At one such occasion at Peebles Park, Allfrey so highly aroused her Dominican listeners that these people marched to the House of Assembly at the Court House in Roseau to protest the government's actions. In addition, the Freedom Fighters dispatched a protest petition to the Governor urging him to withhold consent of the bill thus preventing it from becoming law. Then the newspapers threatened collectively to close down and terminate their services for the people of Dominica.<sup>78</sup>

The Freedom Party was founded on the assumption that a continuous surveillance and more representative organization was required if the struggle to preserve the human rights and freedoms of all Dominicans was going to be effective.<sup>79</sup> In fact, the Vice-President of the party states: "The Freedom Party was founded on the assumption that this sort of activity [the 1968 policy] would re-occur unless there was a strong opposition to prevent such practices of government."<sup>80</sup> It is from this premise that the Freedom Party's motto emanates: "No one is free who does not work for the freedom of others." Specifically, freedom for the party entails: Freedom from fear; Freedom from want; Freedom to worship in the manner of one's choice; and Freedom of Speech and Expression.<sup>81</sup> The party evolved from a movement dedicated to:

condemn the introduction of the Seditious Act which is contrary to human rights, dignity, freedom and demand its total withdrawal. We solemnly swear that we shall not rest until we secure that end. 82

Yet in spite of its pledge and struggles for human rights, the



Freedom Party remains an opposition body which is not viewed as an alternative to the Labour Government. Why is this the case?

An immediate reason is that the Freedom Party has failed to develop a 'party image' capable of projecting it as an estimable preference to the present ruling regime. More precisely, the Freedom Party has not evolved beyond its initial stage of being a pressure group. Indeed, it represents in the public's mind a pressure group operating on an ad hoc basis, reacting to government and its policies, rather than suggesting alternative policies that could represent it as a viable replacement for the Labour Government. Accordingly, the party comes across as not having an ideology, with no clear conception of optional approaches; and without programs for change and development in any way different from those of the Labour Government. Thus the party's specific plans for development and change include; improvement of the conditions of the people of Dominica; introduction of a social security scheme; acceleration of economic growth with particular reference to agriculture and tourism; assisting youth to find a rightful and useful place in the community; better training and education for youth; improved housing for poorer classes; mass slum clearance; and a high powered mission to seek investment for the state and expansion of the tourist industry,<sup>83</sup> which are similar to the unaccomplished objectives of the Labour Government. More importantly, the Freedom Party has no strategy or concrete ideology for actualizing a successful implementation of its plans.

### The Question of Ideology and Protest

That the Freedom Party has not developed an ideology is reflected in its activities and modus operandi since 1968. Despite the name 'party', the organization has remained fundamentally a group comprised of disparate elements and interests, primarily from the Roseau community. The party has failed to operate as a cohesive organization capable of continuous and effective opposition or of forming an alternative to the Labour Party Government. Thus it has created an image in the public's mind that it is an organization whose *raison d'etre* is simply that of opposition to government's policies, given that it is the *de jure* official opposition party.<sup>84</sup>

In 1971, for example, the Freedom Party presented overt collective resistance to yet another autocratic policy initiated by the government. However, since 1968 when it had opposed the government, the party has displayed no coherent or articulated collective strategies that could have helped to avert the 1971 crisis. Thus the party goes from crisis to crisis reacting and operating on a contingent basis. The 1971 issue was important nevertheless, for it demonstrated that Dominicans will eventually struggle in any way necessary for the human rights and freedoms that are fundamental to their existence. Furthermore, this 1971 issue illustrated that the Freedom Party was at least true to part of its original dedication.

In 1971 the government moved to terminate the activities of the Roseau Town Council (RTC), the local government of Roseau.<sup>85</sup> The local government comprised elected members from the Freedom Party. Given that the Labour Party was presently reactivating, giving encouragement to

and urging the development of Village Councils, its policy to destroy the RTC was interpreted as being motivated solely by narrow political considerations, primarily the government's failure to win a commanding majority in the Council. The Freedom Party denounced the policy as a violation of the democratic and electoral process through which the Roseau community had asserted its voting preferences.<sup>86</sup> The party brought its grievances to the Roseau community, explaining that the national government was once again displaying its total unconcern for Dominican basic democratic freedoms and rights. The people reacted and a mass protest followed.

Over two thousand Dominicans demonstrated their dissatisfaction with the policy before the House of Assembly at the Court House in Roseau. Sporadic acts of violence broke out.<sup>87</sup> The situation could have developed into a full-scale revolt except for the fact that the police behaved cautiously and with great restraint.<sup>88</sup>

In reflecting on that fateful day, Alfrey and L.A. Robert of the Freedom Party hailed that December 16 as the greatest single day in the history of Dominica.<sup>89</sup> It was the momentous occasion on which Dominicans struggled for their freedom and resisted their re-enslavement.<sup>90</sup> However, the role of the party in this historic incident notwithstanding, Dominicans, especially of working class and intellectual background, continued to view the party as a pressure group reacting to sporadic crises but incapable of sustaining struggle to prevent such tyranny from reoccurring.

The absence of a unified party ideology is again manifested by its high ranking members in their views and position concerning the

amorphous black power movement, presently called the Movement for a New Dominica (MND).<sup>91</sup> Rupert Sorhaingo, the Vice-President of the Freedom Party, recognizes that in the black power rhetoric and pronouncements there are certain valuable statements on radical change which corroborate his own views on the subject of change and development.<sup>92</sup> Mrs. Allfrey's primary understanding of the MND is based on the anti-white behaviour and attitudes of its so-called members and on its anti-British pronouncements found in the movement's literature and programs.<sup>93</sup> Loblack is far more categorical in his position; he simply condemns the movement as a waste of time, useless and with nothing concrete to contribute to the Island's development and advancement. In August, 1973, M.E. Charles, the President of the party, and Henry Moise, the Leader of the Opposition in the House of Assembly, joined Deputy Premier Patrick John and the government in condemning the movement as a group whose programs were part of a large international conspiracy to overthrow the government by violence, subvert the system and society, and end private property in the Island. Thus, without a cohesive party ideology, it is easily comprehensible how all these diverse views on the MND could come from members of the same political organization. This lack of a unified ideology and collective purpose is also reflected in the image the party projects, especially to the working people.

#### The Freedom Party and the Working Class People

Due to the absence of an ideology and a collective direction, working class Dominicans in general view the Freedom Party as a destructive organization, 'a Gros Bourg conspiracy' whose sole purpose is to harass and harangue a working class oriented Labour Government. The

Dominica Herald , popularly and accurately identified as a Freedom Party newspaper, simply aggravates the situation by criticizing government without any direction, focus or constructive purpose. To state it plainly, the newspaper lambastes government for the sake of doing it. Thus the people, aware of this practice, have lost confidence in the newspaper's criticisms. The government of Dominica recognizes this and has made much political mileage by openly accusing the Herald of being the mouthpiece of the Freedom Party. In defence, certain Freedom members have taken pains to explain that the opinions and position of the Herald reflect basically the viewpoint of the editor, who also happens to be a member of the party.<sup>96</sup> However, the public remains unconvinced for the simple reason that these people cannot find a collective party position to replace what they interpret as the party's views stated in the Herald.

The image of the Freedom Party as a "Party Gros Bourg" held by the working people is largely the fault of the party organization. Despite the fact that most party members recognize that the organization is the heir of the DUPP, they have done practically nothing to obliterate this "Gros Bourg" image of the organization in the minds of the electorate. Instead of a continuous political program of education, for instance, to destroy this image, the party relies on 'crises' created by the government or on campaign slogans and "mapuis"<sup>97</sup> as a means of erasing that image and to meet the people.

Given that it is comprised principally of elements from the Roseau community, the party has conceded the rural districts and the working people there to the Labour Party. This political slackness

notwithstanding, the party still has not attempted in a systematic way to involve the urban working people in the organization.

The 1973 state of emergency situation clearly indicated, however, that despite the working class peoples' identification with the charismatic Leblanc, they would accept an alternative to the present government. This desire was given concrete expression, for example, at a by-election at Marigot-Westley in September 1973. At the polls in that village the people rejected both Labour and Freedom candidates and elected instead an independent, Pat Stevens. But, true to form, the Herald in particular, interpreted the results as a defeat of the Labour Party, rather than a rejection of the brand of politics practiced by both parties.<sup>99</sup>

A Critical Conclusion: The Question of Party Image and the Continued Relevance of the Freedom and Labour Parties

The Labour Party has convinced its working class following that their enemies are the estate and property owners like Eugenia Charles and Stanley Fadelle of the Freedom Party. Given that many members of the Freedom Party come from the defunct DUPP, the Labour Party continues to brand the Freedom Party as "Gros Bourg" and "bourgeois". While this characterization of the Freedom organization appears accurate, the Labour Party Government, however, is different only in facade, rather than in substance. For instance, the biggest supporter of the Labour Party Government today is J.A. Astaphan, the supermarket owner, who is notorious for the extremely low wages that he pays Dominican workers.<sup>100</sup> The personal body guard of E.O. Leblanc during the 1973 state of emergency

was the Syrian George Karam, an owner of a large mechanic shop and a motor car dealership, whose attitude toward working class people is recognized as leaving a lot to be desired, and the wages he pays to them are no different from those paid by J.A. Astaphan. The former Deputy Premier Ronald Armour belongs to the landed gentry of the Island and on his family estate the workers are paid low wages. Furthermore, there are a few government ministers who are either appropriating choice crown lands or are building mansions in the Canefield area in the name of the working people.<sup>101</sup>

Indeed, if the Freedom Party like the defunct DUPP is "bourgeois", the Labour Party is equally so. The major distinction between the two presently, since they are both without a coherent and concrete ideology, is that given the working people's identification with Leblanc, the Labour Party has continued to convince the working people that, as an organization and government with the prefix 'labour', it best represents their collective interest and welfare.

Finally, lacking a consistent forward looking ideology, neither party has a conception of a Dominican society towards which it could work. The Labour Party Government has focussed its attention on remaining in power regardless of the consequences for Dominica. Thus it prolonged a state of emergency on a flimsy excuse that a "Green Paper" supposedly put out by the Movement for a New Dominica alluded to the violent subversion of government.<sup>102</sup> The government now seems incapable of developing positive and constructive ideas with regard to future change. At the same time, the government will not tolerate any criticism

directed toward it, even when that includes positive and constructive criticism suggesting possible alternatives for future survival in Dominica. In 1973, for example, the government kept throwing obstacles and legal technicalities in the way of what appears to be a successful cooperative venture at Castle Bruce.<sup>103</sup>

The Labour Party did bring significant changes and contributed to the welfare of the working people. These have been discussed in the body of the chapter. The government, however, has arrived at an impasse concerning how to operate realistically in the best interest of Dominicans. But concerned with remaining in power, the government was even entertaining thoughts in 1973 on complete political independence from Britain. Of course, no consideration has been given to the meaning of this notion of independence with respect to future Dominican survival.<sup>104</sup> For its part, the Freedom Party is prepared to accept the parameters defined by government for political discourse and deliberation and so it does not present a feasible alternative to the Labour Government. The present condition of both parties now begs the question of their continuing relevance in Dominica.

It is against the above background that the three Dominican movements discussed in the next chapter should be understood. Each movement in its own way is pre-occupied with the question of necessary radical change towards an independent Dominican survival beyond the point reached by the unions and especially the political parties.



## Chapter VI

## Footnotes

1. For an elaboration of the various types of political parties including political parties that are simply labels for factions as opposed to political parties which are representative organizations, see, Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (London: Methuen, 1954).
2. See Frank J. Sorauf, Political Parties in the American System (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964), p.p. 8-15.
3. Orchid House, a novel written by Shand Allfrey in the 1930's has been branded by many Dominicans as being anti-black for its nostalgia over the decline of the white plantocracy in Dominica. This subject of Orchid House was discussed with Shand Allfrey and she denied that it was in any way anti-black. This interview with Allfrey was held in August, 1973, in Roseau.
4. From the interview with S. Allfrey in August, 1973, Roseau.
5. Interview with Allfrey. Loblack, the co-founder of the Labour Party supports Allfrey's claim. The interview with Loblack was held in July, 1973, Roseau.
6. From separate interviews with both Allfrey and Loblack in July-August, 1973, Roseau.
7. Interviews with Loblack and Allfrey. Also, interviews with Anthony Joseph and Veronica Nicholas, General Secretaries of DANU and DTU respectively, who were also initial members of the Labour Party in 1955.
8. Interview with S. Allfrey in August, 1973.
9. The author can remember when these remarks and criticisms were made about Allfrey. Also, interviews with Allfrey, Loblack and Carlton Grell in 1973.
10. The list of these officials was supplied by Robert Allfrey, who, in an informal interview in August, 1973, also supplied details about the Labour Party and his wife's involvement in it.
11. Derived from conversations with a number of Dominicans who had lived and worked in Britain for a while; also from the interview with Shand Allfrey.
12. The DUPP which was formed around the same time will be discussed later, in section II of this chapter.

13. A number of independent candidates also ran in this district. Dominica, Report on the Legislative Council General Elections of 1951, 1954, 1957. (Castries: Voice Press).
14. The author remembers this phenomenon well. It was further substantiated in interviews with Loblack, Nicholas, Joseph, Allfrey, Carlton Grell, in July-August, 1973.
15. Dominica, Report of the Legislative Council General Election of 1961, 1966, 1970. (Roseau: Government Printery).
16. Interview with F.A. Baron, first Chief Minister in Dominica, leader of the DUPP, in August, 1973, Roseau.
17. Dominica Labour Party, The Programme of the Labour Party of Dominica, 1958 (Roseau: Labour Party Office)
18. Dominica, Report of the Legislative Council General Election, of 1961, 1966, 1970, op. cit.
19. Interview with F. A. Baron.
20. This the author can remember well. It was almost the slogan of the DUPP.
21. See the Dominica Development Plan 1971-1975, op. cit., p.p. 2-3.
22. This claim made by Baron was substantiated in a conversation with Clarence Seignoret, Permanent Secretary to the Premier's Office and Ministry of Finance, in August, 1973. Also see, Dominica, Constitutional Reform: First Talk, MPC581, (mimeography copy in F. Baron's collection).
23. Interview with F. A. Baron in August, 1973.
24. DUPP, A Political Statement of the DUPP (1959-1960), (Roseau: published by DUPP).
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid. Also, interview with F.A. Baron in August, 1973.
27. The author was attending the Saint Mary's Academy at that time. The assistance of the Baron Government to the school raised much political controversy concerning government aid to a 'private' Catholic school.
28. This Baron believed was one of the accomplishments of his government. Interview with F.A. Baron in August, 1973.
29. See Dominica, Dominica Development Proposal, 1960-1964 (Roseau: Ministry of Social Services).

30. This was a perennial criticism of the DUPP. Given the party's middle-class composition, its members talked to and were visible to the working class people only at election time. In fact, this was openly expressed in the neighbourhood in which the author lived.
31. See for instance, DUPP, What has DUPP Done for the Poor Man (Roseau: DUPP Office, 1960).
32. See, Dominica Development Proposal, 1960-1964, op. cit.
33. Rough translation is "Big Shots". Currently the phrase is made synonymous with "bourgeois". It refers to middle and upper-class Dominicans, their life styles and behaviour as well as to those representing the interest of these middle and upper class people.
34. Interview with F.A. Baron, August, 1973.
35. Even Julian Johnson, a black power leader, and a leading critic of the Leblanc government, has agreed that this was one of Leblanc's wise decisions. Interview with J. Johnson in July, 1973, Roseau.
36. DUPP, What has DUPP Done for the Poor Man, op. cit.
37. A specific example makes the point very directly. The DUPP protested against the exclusive nature of the popularly called "white people's club" at the corner of High Street and Bath Road in Roseau. The protest was successful for DUPP members were allowed entrance into this club, but they overtly refused to attend. Paradoxically, the DUPP members and associates maintained at the same time a Union Club which was exclusively for the middle class and which denied membership to the lower class. (The author lived close to both clubs and personally knows of their practices.) Thus the three levels of class stratification that West Indian scholars find common to Caribbean societies were left untouched and re-inforced by the DUPP. On the question of stratification in British Caribbean societies, see D. Lowenthal, West Indian Societies, op. cit., and M.G. Smith, Stratification in Grenada, op. cit.
38. Dominica: Report on the Legislative Council Election of 1961, 1966, 1970, op. cit.
39. Interview with F.A. Baron in August, 1973.
40. See, Dominica Labour Party, The Programme of the Labour Party of Dominica, op. cit.
41. Derived from the interviews with Shand Allfrey and Loblack in July-August, 1973.
42. This was quite clearly brought out in both the interviews with Loblack and Allfrey in July-August, 1973.

43. Independence in both cases refers to political independence normally defined as simply the severance of Dominica's ties with Britain. Premier Leblanc has often talked about this form of independence.
44. The 1973 state of emergency incident concerning Daniel Cauderoin was noted in Chapter V, see especially footnote 65. The 1968 and 1971 incidents will be discussed later in this chapter under section IV concerning the Freedom Party.
45. The state of emergency was mentioned in Chapter V, see especially footnote 65.
46. In this election Leblanc competed against F.A. Baron for the Roseau South Constituency, or for the Newtown Area as it is known.
47. Prime examples of intellectuals and middle class people are Ronald Armour, Jenner Armour, Dr. O. Liverpool, E. Francis. The Armours in particular own at least one of the largest estates in Dominica.
48. See Archie Singham, The Hero and the Crowd in a Colonial Polity, op. cit. Also see Jessie H. Proctor, Jr., "The West Indies in Transition 1920-1960", op. cit., C.L.R. James, Party Politics in the West Indies, op. cit.
49. This Leblanc himself had once told the author in 1965. Also see, "Our Premier", in Dies Dominica, ed., Public Relations Division, (Roseau: Premier's Office, 1972).
50. All these were easily discernable in 1971 and 1973.
51. In a conversation with Patrick John, Deputy Premier, in August, 1973, Roseau.
52. While the author was a student, and later a teacher, at Saint Mary's Academy, students would even get the whip if they were caught using patots.
53. Adeline Johnson, Ivan Shillingford, Carlton Grell and other middle class people all made this criticism.
54. A rough translation is "After God is the Earth", referring to the fertile soil in Dominica.
55. On one occasion in 1969 the author wrote the request, on behalf of the group, to Premier Leblanc. As a result, the group got money to make a record in Barbados.
56. Leblanc often referred to himself that way during radio broadcasts made in 1971

57. Even Daniel Cauderoin, the precipitating factor of the State of Emergency in 1973, makes this acknowledgement. Interview held with him in August, 1973, Trafalgar in Dominica.
58. This was particularly true in Roseau South Constituency, in the Newtown area. The Cauderoin issue was noted in Chapter V.
59. This figure was provided by Rupert Sorhaindo, Vice President of the Freedom Party during an interview held with him in July 1973, Roseau.
60. In this respect, the present Labour Government resembles the late DUPP.
61. Urias Forbes, "The West Indies Associated States: Some Aspects of the Constitutional Arrangements" Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1, March 1970, p. 88, is correct when he says about political actuality in the Associate States including Dominica, "...in actual fact the over-riding consideration of the charismatic political leaders in the area is the securing of political advantages which are highly personal in character."
62. Dominica Development Plan 1971-1975, op. cit., p. 31.
63. Even though government gave monetary statistics only for "principal imports and principal domestic exports" the figures are still rather startling. In 1968 total principal imports were \$20,212,755, while principal domestic exports were \$12,236,619. In 1969 principal imports were \$24,826,617 while principal domestic exports were \$13,989,242 in Dominica Development Plan, op. cit., p.p. 190-191.
64. Such is the situation that Dominica imports large quantities of instant coffee, generally referred to as simply "Nescafe", while "Dominica's soil, climate, rainfall and drainage are all favourable factors for the cultivation of coffee and expansion of the crop were offer an alternative to bananas as a cash crop...", R.L. Williams, Industrial Development of Dominica, op. cit., p. 39.
65. The housing situation was even worse in 1971 and 1973 than it was in 1964 when it was reported in a study that housing was one of the most pressing social needs of the Island. See, Major General L.D. Grand, Report on the Housing Problem in Dominica (London: Engineer Planning and Resources Ltd., 1964).
66. See, Dominica Development Plan 1971-1975, op. cit., p.p. 26-27.
67. Ibid., p.p. 24-29.
68. A Dominica Chronicle survey estimated it at 50 per cent. See, Dominica Chronicle, September 28, 1974.
69. Dominica Labour Party, The Programme of the Labour Party of Dominica, 1960, op. cit.

70. In 1968 the Labour Government attempted to close down the Dominican Herald, the opposition newspaper, for its critical views of the Government; in 1971 the Government wanted to end the existence of the Roseau Town Council because the opposition, elected by the people, had the majority. In 1973 the Government imposed a state of emergency on the Island as a means of terminating protest over its arbitrary violation of Daniel Cauderoin's civil rights.
71. Government has a Cooperative Branch in its Ministry of Agriculture. Its duty is to help set up cooperatives in the Island. Also, see, Dominica Development Plan 1971-1975, op. cit., p.ii-iii.
72. For instance, in order for the Castle Bruce Cooperative to get the land "legally" at Castle Bruce the Government suggested that it register as a cooperative with the Cooperative Branch. The Cooperative Branch, however, would not register the Castle Bruce Cooperative because it claimed the Castle Bruce could not show legal title to the land. Interview with Artherton Martin, innovator of the Castle Bruce Cooperative, in July, 1973, Roseau.
73. In 1973, Premier O.E. Leblanc talked about it on Radio and in the House of Assembly.
74. Interview with Rupert Sorhaingo, Vice-President of the Freedom Party, in July, 1973, Roseau.
75. Even officials of the Freedom Party are aware of this. Informal interviews with Martin Sorhaingo, Secretary of the Freedom Party, in July, 1973, Roseau.
76. See editions of Dominica Chronicle, July 3, 6, 10, 1968.
77. Interviews with Anthony Joseph, E.C. Loblack, W.A.W. Boyd, Shand Allfrey, Carlton Groll, Jeff Charles in July-August, 1973.
78. See editions of Dominica Chronicle, July 3, 6, 10, 1968; also Dominica Herald, October 10, 1970.
79. Interview with Rupert Sorhaingo in July, 1973; also interview with Shand Allfrey, August, 1973.
80. Interview with Rupert Sorhaingo in July, 1973.
81. Freedom Party, Policy Statements, Vol. 1 & 2 (Roseau: Freedom Party Office, n.d.)
82. The Dominica Star, July 20, 1968.
83. Freedom Party, Development Program: Let Us Arise and Build (Roseau: Herald Printery, 1970).

84. An example of this can be seen in the Freedom Party's "Labour's Sins" (Roseau: Freedom Party Office, 1970).
85. See Government Release No. 400/71 "Proposed Local Government Legislation" (Roseau: Government Information Service, 1971).
86. Interview with Annette St. Hillare, Mayor of Roseau, in August, 1973, Roseau.
87. See, Dominica, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances at the Supreme Court Building and Environs in Roseau on December 16, 1971 (Roseau: Premier's Office, 1972).
88. Interviews with Jeff. Charles, Daniel Cauderoin, radio commentators and recognized critics of the Dominican society. Also, interviews with Carlton Grall, E.C. Loblack and Annette St. Hillare in July-August, 1973 Roseau.
89. The Dominica Star, June 6, 1970.
90. Interview with Shand Allfroy, August, 1973, Roseau.
91. The MND will be discussed more fully in Chapter VII.
92. Interview with Rupert Sorhaingo.
93. Interview with Shand Allfroy.
94. Interview with E. C. Loblack.
95. The author was present at the House of Assembly on that day in July, 1973.
96. Star Lestrado is the editor. Rupert Sorhaingo, Martin Sorhaingo, Loblack and Allfroy claim that the views of the Herald are primarily those of Lestrade and not those of the Party. Interview held with Freedom Party officials and members in July-August, 1973.
97. "Mapuis" can be translated roughly as a personal, vindictive attack and insult which have nothing to do with political issues. (Its a direct extension of charismatic politics).
98. Even Rupert Sorhaingo, the Vice-President of the Party, laments this fact. Interview with R. Sorhaingo in July, 1973, Roseau.
99. See, Dominica Herald, September 8, 1973.
100. The author once worked there. Some workers in 1973 were paid \$9.80 per week.

101. A drive through the Canefield area on the way to Cockrane would help to verify this. In 1973 for instance, many Dominicans were wondering how long the Minister of Agriculture would be able to keep for himself prime estate land bought from Dr. Blatcher, a veterinarian, with taxpayers' money.
102. This "Green Paper" as it is called, is entitled "Let Us Not be Further Fooled". It was claimed that it was put out by the Movement for a New Dominica in June-July, 1973. All members of the Movement do not take credit for it.
103. The Castle Bruce Cooperative will be discussed more fully in Chapter VII.
104. This notion of independence with regard to Dominican survival will be discussed in the concluding chapter, Chapter VIII.



## Chapter VII

### THE MOVEMENTS

In addition to the attempt of the unions and political parties to secure Dominican survival, three movements have recently emerged in Dominica, the Black Power Movement, the Student Movement, and the Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement, each of which is concerned with change beyond that achieved by the unions and political parties. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the movements' activities directed towards change as well as to illustrate the extent of their accomplishments. Each movement is introduced in turn.

In 1969, black power thinking emerged in Dominica. Youthful intellectuals, many of whom were personally experiencing various forms of hardship, including unemployment, or who were highly conscious of the necessity for change devised two related strategies. First, they believed that through radical criticisms of the Dominican society and its political, economic, social, religious, educational and cultural systems, they could awaken Dominicans, especially the black majority to the necessity for radical change. Secondly, these youths proposed the use of radical alternatives to deal with the question of an independent Dominican survival. It is here, however, that the movement has failed, as the people involved have not been engaged in any concrete activities to implement their proposals. As will be discussed, the Black Power Movement has remained a critic of

the Dominican society, seemingly unwilling or unable to bridge the gap between its theoretical proposals and the actual implementation of those proposals for change.

The Student Movement, on the other hand, represents, albeit in a limited way, a direct and concrete expression of black power thinking in action. Its concrete activities for change have been focused on a specific Catholic educational institution, the Saint Mary's Academy,<sup>1</sup> its colonial education system and its white authority structure, all of which have been denounced in black power thinking as oppressive agents and obstacles to meaningful radical changes in Dominica. Because the Saint Mary's Academy is a major secondary education institution in a small society, the protest activities which transpired there had significant political and social repercussions, in the wider community. In the process, the Student Movement tried to awaken Dominicans to the value of relevant education, in the interest of meaningful change and development.

The Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement has been the most significant and consistent of the three movements. This Cooperative Movement has attempted to develop further the trade unions' interest in providing the most productive working environment conducive to the well-being of workers. Moreover, the Castle Bruce Cooperative has taken seriously the Labour Government's concern with social and community development. Specifically, the Castle Bruce Cooperative has adopted the government mandate of "Development of man and development for man", which the Labour Government says, "is the ultimate objective and central concern of all planning efforts in Dominica."<sup>2</sup> The Castle Bruce Cooperative

has also shown that it is aware of the guidelines for development which the Dominican government says it "will continue to keep in sharp focus." These guidelines include: "that efficient exploitation and effective development of natural resources, whilst they may result in an increase in total output, need not necessarily lead to the upliftment of the people...; that the solution to the nation's development problems, particularly the social aspects of them, cannot be sought in terms of an imitative application of a foreign model. It must be in keeping with the realities and peculiarities of the local situation...; that discerning, active and authentic popular participation is an essential resource for development; and that a community develops its participation capability...."<sup>3</sup>

It is with these development considerations in mind that the Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement has attempted to deal with the question of human and agricultural growth and development within a political, social, educational and cultural context or, more precisely, in the context of a human community, the Castle Bruce Village. In its attempt to integrate human and agricultural growth with communitarian objectives the Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement has developed a radical ideology for change which links theory with practice in a dynamic way. In attempting to accomplish these ends, the Castle Bruce Movement has actualized a major theoretical objective of the Black Power Movement which is a concern with an independent human survival.

There is a tangible link existing among the three movements which is borne out by the fact that the leaders of the Student Movement and the identifiable leader of the Castle Bruce Movement, Atherton Martin,

consider themselves members of the amorphous Movement for a New Dominica (MND). In this chapter, the three movements will be analyzed separately.

### The Black Power Movement---MND

The Black Power Movement, or as it is currently called, the Movement for a New Dominica (MND), is not an easily identifiable nor highly structured organization. It is an amorphous movement with an open membership and a transient leadership. It operates out of homes rather than from a public headquarters. In a general sense the movement encompasses every Dominican youth concerned with radical change in whatever expression he chooses, be it the shouting of black slogans or self-conscious black rhetoric, Afro-hair styles, cultural patois sayings, walking bare footed, dressing in a dashiki, a manifest dislike of white values, or being a critic at large of the Dominican society.<sup>4</sup> In a more precise sense, however, it can be considered an "intellectual movement"---a movement of "theory".

For this reason at least, it is best to think of and to understand this movement in terms of the writings of its various members. They have written on the subject of black awareness, on cultural pride and racial identity, on radical change and on the liberation of the black masses.<sup>5</sup> In their writings, criticisms have been leveled at the Labour Party Government, the Freedom Party, the Catholic Church, the propertied class, the press, and on the educational system in

Dominica. These writings, which come from intellectuals located in the University of the West Indies, North American and British universities and from secondary schools in Dominica, have found collective expression in the Movement's Manifesto. In this section, therefore, an account is given concerning the ideas, criticisms and programs found in the Manifesto.<sup>6</sup> The discussion concludes by pointing to the failure of the MND and its Manifesto.

### The Origins of Black Power

In 1969, black power thinking was formally introduced to Dominica by three Dominican intellectuals of the University of the West Indies, Julian Johnson, Swinburne Lestrade and Bill Riviere.<sup>7</sup>

In an article in the Dominica Chronicle, Johnson summarized the aims of black power.<sup>8</sup> These aims were not original for they had been articulated earlier by Walter Rodney, then a lecturer at the University of the West Indies, in his book The Groundings with My Brothers.<sup>9</sup> The aims were first, to create an awareness of what it means to be black; second, to mobilize and unify the black people to act in their own interest; third, to reject white cultural imperialism; and fourth, to seek to ensure the rule of black people in a black society. Violence was not ruled out as a strategy.<sup>10</sup>

"Black power" was then defined as a call to the masses to take their destinies into their own hands and terminate white domination in the cultural, social, economic and political life of Dominica. Black awareness, in black power terms, was an appeal for the black man to

know his history, to come to grips with his heritage in a meaningful and rewarding perspective, and to reject categorically the white historians' negative and insulting views which, at best, were a glorification of John Hawkins, Francis Drake and Queen Victoria.<sup>11</sup>

Since these initial newspaper statements, various members of the Black Power Movement have written numerous articles. In *Iwaway*, the periodic publication of the MND, the articles include a wide range of topics on black culture and awareness, varying from "Redefining Ourselves" "We are African People", to "Beauty and the Black Woman", to "Black Power in the Dominican Scene".<sup>12</sup> In the MND Manifesto of 1973, these criticisms, concerns and programs have been brought together.

#### MND---the Critic of Society

The MND postulates that the root of black power was the slave system in Dominica and the Caribbean. The movement considers the brutality of the slave system as not only the beginning of black oppression, but concomitantly that of black power as well. The Manifesto claims that in the slave system the "white racists" did their utmost to make Dominicans hate themselves and in the process, Dominicans were brutalized in an unimaginable way. This brutality of the slave system, however, precipitated slave rebellions throughout the Caribbean and the Americas which had at least one thing in common. They were collective opposition to slave and colonial domination. The MND leaders postulate that this was the genesis of black power, and claim further that the present Black Power Movement has emerged as a result of the "white racists"

continuing exploitation of Dominica.<sup>13</sup> Currently, the movement says that this domination is maintained and perpetuated by a non-white national neo-colonist bourgeoisie in conjunction with their white imperialist allies abroad. Therefore the Manifesto concludes that not only do the national bourgeoisie and the upper class lackeys<sup>14</sup> of the imperialists exploit Dominica, but also as a result it is impossible for them to initiate necessary social change. Thus, "Only the masses can liberate themselves."<sup>15</sup>

Consequently, the goal of the Manifesto is proclaimed as self determination for Dominica, and the role of the movement is to assist Dominica in achieving that goal. The MND asserts that the basis for the solution of the social problems in Dominica resides firstly in the development of a clear understanding about the nature of Dominican society, secondly in motivating forces to social and economic development, and thirdly in the organization of Dominicans to achieve self determination and true liberation.<sup>16</sup> In this context, the MND defines black power as "the Collective Ownership, Control and Development of Dominican and Financial Resources for the Collective Development of All the Black People of Dominica." The movement's end is "the Full and Independent Development of All Dominicans, Hopefully within the Context of a Genuine Caribbean Nation."<sup>17</sup>

The MND postulates that Dominicans are kept poor primarily by a handful of local families who, in an alliance with the white power structure abroad, enjoy a standard of living at the expense of the vast majority of Dominicans who live in abject poverty.<sup>18</sup> The basis of this economic inequality, the movement says, finds its historical root in

British capitalist colonialism. Consequently, the MND concludes that British colonial domination is the foundation of social discontent in the Caribbean. It claims, therefore, that the people of Dominica demand a new social order.<sup>19</sup>

The movement states categorically, however, that the present political parties are incapable of accomplishing this new social order. The two parties, according to the MND, are simply bourgeois and collectively own all the large estates. The maintenance of the status quo is their primary, if not only, goal and as a result they are incapable of leading Dominica to national independence that culminates in a genuine socialist state.<sup>20</sup> For that matter, the parties cannot even save the economy from the strong hold of imperialism. Thus the movement postulates that for Dominicans to achieve national liberation, they must move towards political independence with a new form of government underpinned by an economic structure that is a balanced agricultural-industrial producer.<sup>21</sup> Given that the MND understands that both the political parties simply reflect and represent the interests of the exploiting upper class, that they are collectively "an appendage of racist-imperialist Britain," the MND clearly states that it is not a political 'liberal' party.

The Labour Party Government is a specific target of the MND.<sup>23</sup> For example, the movement argues that the Labour Party Government which, in 1960 claimed that its top priority was helping the poor man, the lower class, has, by its continuous arbitrary actions and incompetent performance, failed completely to do so. In fact, since that time, the



the MND believes that the rich have grown richer and the poor, poorer. It claims that these poor people have remained underfed, under-educated, in poor health and burdened with an unreasonable cost of living. The movement concludes, therefore, that no party, including the Labour Party which is only committed to winning elections and maintaining itself in power, can ever resolve such crucial problems of the masses.<sup>24</sup>

The education system is severely attacked for its colonial orientation. It prepares its graduates, the movement says, to play an unproductive role as colonial subjects in the Civil Service. In general, this education promotes, maintains and perpetuates oppression of Dominican people. The movement claims that it is a bank account rather than ability which has been the criterion for entrance into a secondary school, thus it is only the middle class children and not those of the working class who get educated. The University of the West Indies is also understood as being no different from the secondary school system, given its colonial orientation. The movement concludes that the university, like the secondary schools, cannot prepare its graduates for the vital task of nation building.<sup>25</sup> Finally, not even Shakespeare, and the Catholic religious nuns and brothers escape the movement's onslaught on the educational system; they are branded as racists. The movement points out that, nonetheless, Shakespeare continues to be a pertinent part of the high school curriculum, and the racist religious teachers, who only serve to brainwash Dominican youth in the interest of the "white boy" and to preserve upper class dominance in Dominica,<sup>26</sup> are allowed to dominate the school system.

In addition to the political parties, the upper class and land owners, and the educational system, nearly every other major institution in Dominica is lambasted by the MND. The financial institutions, especially foreign banks, are seen as major exploiters of the people of Dominica. Development in Dominica is criticized for the poor use of scientific knowledge. The village councils are condemned as simple rubber stamps of the Leblanc Labour Government--- they do not have any decision-making power of their own. The housing situation, the medical services, community development, and the recreational facilities in Dominica are assessed as terribly inadequate. Even some members of the movement are attacked violently for not grasping the full significance of what black power entails. Then of course, there is the Church itself which is supported by "Bideau L'Englise".<sup>27</sup> The movement claims that these two institutions do not want change in the Dominican society, because they have vested interests in preserving the present system of property. The movement accuses them of being determined to keep poor Dominicans in a state of degradation.

Finally, the movement sums up the Dominica situation as follows: "This is Dominica, a British colony in 1972, and under a Government that for years has been preaching they represent the interest of the lower class...! Brothers and Sisters, it is clear that we must understand that the basis of our poverty is race and class.... There can be no new society without class conflict."<sup>28</sup>

In response to this situation the MND has put forward a proposal for a better Dominica. Its alternative is political and economic independence for Dominican people based on collective black ownership

and decentralized control in the use of land. This political independence entails an end to Associate Statehood with Britain, for without such political independence economic and human development are impossible. The MND lists policies for every sector in the Dominican society, from fishing to education. These policies are couched in such statements as: an organized approach to the development of the fishing industry; nationalization of all foreign owned banks; mass education; an efficient transportation system; modern hospitals in at least six different areas in the Island; and modern recreational facilities in every community in Dominica.

The movement asserts that revolutionary change is necessary to accomplish this "Better Dominica". This revolutionary change must be based upon principles drawn from Dominican-Caribbean historical experience, and must provide guidelines for action and change in the direction desired by the masses. Ideology, the movement states, must define clearly both short and long term political and economic objectives. Secondly, this ideology must be scientific: it must be based on a correct interpretation of Dominican history, and it must be consistent. Thirdly, this ideology the MND argues, has to deal with the three problems of land, capitalism and racism.<sup>29</sup>

In the final analysis, the MND's criticisms of the Dominican society and its proposals for a better Dominican notwithstanding, the Manifesto of the MND has failed. This failure does not even lie in its excessive, negative criticisms of the Dominican society, or in its inordinate use of emotive language at the expense of balanced analysis. The failure of the Manifesto lies in the inability of the members who

produced it to move from the domain of theory to action or, for that matter, to unite in a dynamic way theory and action (praxis). The movement lacks a concrete and cohesive ideology and, concomitantly, a radical set of forward looking strategies to achieve the goals set in its Manifesto. Not even one of its proposals, and some of them are worthwhile, has made the important transition from Manifesto paper to concrete implementation. It is, therefore, not surprising that despite the movement's congenial policies and socialist alternatives for Dominica, that the innovative Castle Bruce Cooperative did not permit the MND to join it in its radical struggle for change which in part deals with the problem of "landless people". The MND was viewed critically and accurately by the Castle Bruce Cooperative as a movement of "theory" which had no actual experience in the struggle for radical change.<sup>30</sup>

## II

### The Student Movement: the Protest at the S.M.A.

The student revolt at the Saint Mary's Academy (SMA) was the first such radical demand for change in the history of a secondary school in Dominica. It was a protest against the white authoritative controls, religious teachers and the Catholic Church, and a colonial oriented curriculum. It was a revolt against these factors, for the students understood them as collectively serving to deny their participation in the decision making process at the school and stifling a genuine and appropriate expression of their cultural heritage and black identity. In a positive sense, the student revolt symbolized these youths' desire

to participate more fully in decisions which affected their lives, and to create an environment in which they could manifest their cultural pride and black identity.

The history of the authority structure significant to an understanding of the student revolt dates back to 1956, when the Christian Brothers of Ireland---a North American religious organization ---came to Dominica to replace the Redemptrist Fathers at the SMA.<sup>31</sup> With few exceptions, the religious Brothers were strict authority figures and stern disciplinarians who believed in and never hesitated to use physical punishment as a teaching aid. This was particularly true of the first group of Brothers who came in 1956.

In the late 1960's two diverse but , nonetheless, significant changes occurred. First, the principal of the SMA, Brother Basset, who did not believe in the use of corporal punishment, adopted a more liberal attitude towards discipline and toned down the autocratic posture of the head-master's office.<sup>32</sup> Secondly, black power thinking came to Dominica. At the SMA a young Dominican lay-teacher, Hilroy Thomas, brought these two strands together in a dynamic way, and he inadvertently set the stage for the student protest.<sup>33</sup>

Thomas, an outspoken advocate of black power, took the liberal change in the school's authority structure as an opportunity to introduce some specific radical changes. For instance, he refused to wear the required neck-tie, demanded of both lay faculty and students, on the grounds that it first symbolized and perpetuated a British colonial mentality, and secondly, it was irrelevant to a Dominican way of life

and environment.<sup>34</sup> Basset did not interpret it that way, Thomas was asked to resume the wearing of the tie, and when he refused, his resignation was demanded.

The forced resignation of Thomas made political waves in Dominica, given the small size of the Roseau community and the importance of the SMA as a secondary school. Both the unions and the parties became involved in the issue and subsequently Thomas was hired by the government as a civil servant.<sup>35</sup> Himself a youth, Thomas symbolized the growing consciousness emerging among the youths, especially at the SMA. Thus, the students interpreted Thomas' resignation as a resumption of autocratic authority that was clearly a step in the wrong direction. The impending crisis was heightened when in the middle of 1971, Brother Estrada replaced Basset as the headmaster.

The Thomas incident was still fresh in their minds when the students perceived Estrada's decisions as directed towards halting the process of the attenuation of school authority patterns and disciplinary measures.<sup>36</sup> Unfortunately, from Estrada's standpoint, this occurred at a period of growing black consciousness among the students. Thus an explosive situation was created and a revolt transpired.

The revolt raised the questions of race relations in the Island, the place of youth in decision making and authority structures, the role and contributions of the Catholic Church in a developing country like Dominica, and the relevance of a colonial curriculum to a growing cultural pride, racial identity and the independent growth of Dominica. The revolt also gave glimpses of the adult society's consideration of relevant education. This was manifested in the position taken by the

Church, the Commission of Inquiry, the parents and the lay-teachers. As well, the student protest served to illustrate the nature of party politics in Dominica. The remainder of this section discusses in turn the student protest, the question of race relations raised in that protest, and the response of the adults and political parties to the incident.

In March 1972, the principal, Brother Estrada sent a student Derrick Bellot, home because he had refused to trim his "Afro". The principal viewed the size of Bellot's hair as breaking a school rule that stated that Afros had to be of a reasonable length. These school rules which came into effect in September 1971, also forbade bell-bottom trousers, beards and permitted only the wearing of leather shoes during class hours.<sup>32</sup> In general the students considered them anachronistic to their self-expression in the rapidly changing world of the 1960's. The Bellot case was therefore interpreted as an example of school policy in which the rules would be used to frustrate and assault the student's growing awareness of their cultural pride and racial identity. On this note protest actions began.

School activities, classes and authority relations were brought to a stand-still.<sup>38</sup> The Brothers were branded as racists and some students even threatened their lives.<sup>39</sup> The Church was attacked as a bulwark of colonialism which simply stifled and oppressed Dominicans.<sup>40</sup> In May of that year the Bishop, Arnold Boghaert, was forced to close down the school. The students took their protest and grievances to the government of Dominica which eventually set-up a Commission of

Inquiry to investigate the crisis.<sup>41</sup>

While stating their case before the Inquiry, the students also made some demands as well. The movement wanted first, an end to religion as a compulsory subject, arguing that it was irrelevant to their growing consciousness and it was a device of the Catholic Church to continue to exert a stifling colonial strong hold on the Island; secondly, an end to maladministration at the school, specifically referring to the autocratic decision making by the Brothers which excluded students from effective participation in a process that pertained to their lives; thirdly, an end to the improper manner of administering physical punishment which was a highly contentious form of punishment for anybody, but far more so when used by a white principal in relation to black students and infinitely exaggerated when white teachers manhandled black students in classes. The students argued also that the school uniform, with its compulsory use of a neck-tie was antithetical to a genuine Dominican black identity, and compulsory use of leather shoes was a policy which discriminated against lower class students. Moreover, they claimed that a school regulation which placed restrictions on the length and size of "Afros" was a direct assault on emerging black consciousness. The Bellot incident and that of a white Brother who allegedly kicked a black student were asserted as clear manifestations of white racism, autocratic decision making, maladministration and the arbitrary despotic use of physical punishment.

The student revolt brought to an end the teaching careers and



presence of the Religious Brothers in Dominica, and by the summer of 1973 they had departed from the Island. In September of that year the school was re-opened and a number of changes were discernable. A local Black priest, Calvin Felix, and a Dominican teacher, Rupert Sorhaíndo, had replaced the Brothers as principal and vice-principal respectively. Rupert Sorhaíndo, in particular, was sympathetic to black power thinking and to the students' expression of cultural pride and racial identity.<sup>43</sup> The school attire no longer demands the use of a neck-tie and the students are allowed to wear their Afros without restrictions. Religion has been replaced by agricultural science, a subject considered enormously more significant to a developing country. Most important of all, the students were granted greater participation in the decision making process at the school.

The enormous emphasis some students gave to the racial factor during the protest leads one to think that the Brothers were used as scapegoats as a means to mask a number of real problems of the school. For instance, the North American Brothers, whatever their faults, cannot be held responsible for the 19th century British colonial education system in Dominica. That they taught in a system in which the school curriculum was highly irrelevant to the Dominican experience and the emerging youth black consciousness is not the fault of the Brothers, but rather the failure of the Dominican society to make its education a relevant experience. It was the Dominican society and not the Brothers which placed the extraordinarily high emphasis on passing the General Certificate of Education of the London and Cambridge Universities in

England. The failure of the Brothers in this respect is that they accommodated themselves to such educational demands of the society. Furthermore, the Brothers were not responsible for the predominantly middle class student composition at the SMA, as the phenomenon is not peculiar to the SMA, but is built into the very fabric and structure of the whole secondary school system in the Island. The fact therefore of being "white" in a "black" country cannot be used to blame the Brothers for the above problems.

If the Brothers must be blamed, it is because they accepted without question the traditional nature of school authority in Dominica, and by participating in the school's educational arrangements, they helped maintain its colonial posture. The problems of the Academy are rooted not in white racial discrimination but fundamentally in the still existing colonial political, social, economic, religious, and class structures in Dominica.

The Brothers, however, were not Dominicans and by their unquestioning position and acceptance of the irrelevant school system, it can be argued, they helped frustrate necessary and meaningful changes. Consequently in the interest of change they had to go as a step toward having the school contribute in a significant way to necessary changes in Dominica. At that point in Dominican development, the fact that the Brothers were white and non-Dominicans simply complicated the issue of change.

Some Brothers were perceptive enough to penetrate through the racial facade of the protest and to isolate the educational structure and the socio-political system in Dominica as the real problems. Brother

Estrada expressed a part of this understanding when he said to the Commission of Inquiry: "From the time I came here in 1961 I said that this place [Dominica] was in need of a social revolution. I still believe that it is in need of a social revolution."<sup>45</sup>

The Catholic Church understood the protest for the most part as students' "refusal to accept authority and the break down of discipline."<sup>46</sup> It further interpreted and misrepresented the crisis when it labeled it as a racial issue characterized by "the growing intolerance in a small sector of the community towards people of a different race and nationality."<sup>47</sup> In its unwillingness to deal with the real problems raised by the student movement and to look at the actual symptoms of student discontent, the Catholic Church, it can be argued, maintained its inflexible attitude toward relevant change in Dominica.

Like the Church, many parents also rejected the protest on the grounds that it denounced necessary school authority. In addition they rejected the protest because it condemned the Church which was still an important institution in their lives. They were upset because the student demands were couched in black power terminology, and because the student activities brought to a halt the education process which led to the indispensable School Certificate of Education, the 'meal ticket' in the Dominican society.

However, in the interest of continuing education at the SMA, Dominican parents decided to come together to listen to the students' grievances and demands for change.<sup>48</sup> They met on at least two occasions

and in May 1972 agreed that a Parent-Teachers' Association was required for a more effective liason between the school and themselves. Interestingly enough, some skeptical parents have not only since become sympathetic to, but have also exhibited a genuine understanding of the students' demands.<sup>49</sup> This resulted partly from the fact that the anticipated and predicted collapse of the SMA did not transpire after the Brothers left the Island. Presently, even a few parents who overtly supported the school authorities during the process currently express a qualified praise for the changes which have since taken place, while others, especially of middle class background, continue to lament the Brothers' departure.<sup>50</sup>

The Commission of Inquiry while cognizant, in the light of the students' demands, of the importance of "changing the socio-economic system",<sup>51</sup> was similar to the Church and many parents in its understanding of the student revolt. It considered one of its major tasks as "bringing the school back to normal."<sup>52</sup> Like the Church, it devoted an inordinate amount of time and energy to the racial aspect, while only passing comments were made on the pertinent issue of the colonial oriented school curriculum. Having failed to develop a clear perspective to view the student movement's protest, the Commission was unable to comprehend fully, far less make provisions for incorporating in the secondary school system in the Island, some of the meaningful demands made by the students.

The lay-teachers of the Academy presented a petition to the Commission with a view to resolving the crisis through a compromise

measure. Similarly, in their interest to "restore equilibrium" by partially granting the students' demands, they failed to understand that given the present school situation, "equilibrium" was antithetical to the changes sought by the students. Had these lay-teachers grasped the real problems being articulated in the student movement protest, they would not have made the following statement:

A school must have discipline. Students at secondary level may not necessarily know what is best for them. And the authority which a teacher has, should be able to force a boy to do things which may be disagreeable to him, but may be for his own benefit. 53

Finally, the two political parties used the protest to continue the irrelevant game of "mapuis" politics.<sup>54</sup> The Labour Party Government presented a facade of support in favour of the students and, as mentioned, even agreed to meet with a student delegation. This government position was related to the alleged show of support given by the Freedom Party to the religious Brothers. From a Labour Party standpoint, the Freedom Party's position was obvious given that Eugenia Charles, the president of the party, was the Brothers' lawyer. The real issues of the protest, however, were not a matter for meaningful consideration by the two parties. It was rather simply a crisis that permitted the parties to carry on their customary political squabbling.

While in many respects the support of the members of the Freedom Party<sup>55</sup> was a facsimile of the adult Dominican response, the Labour Party's stance in favour of the students was basically hypocritical. For instance, the Minister of Education, H. L. Christian, has made it known since that he secretly supported the Brothers during the protest.<sup>56</sup> Thus it would seem that the Commission of Inquiry, for example, was appointed by government

solely as a gesture to pacify the students, with little concern for ascertaining the relevance of the protest. It can be argued that the government knew on whose side it would stand eventually.

Of the movements discussed, the Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement is the most significant. Like the MND and the students, the cooperative is concerned with meaningful change in the Island.

### III

#### The Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement

The Castle Bruce Cooperative, the most significant and consistent of the three movements as well as being the most important Dominican cooperative in the 20th century, operates and is located in the small village of Castle Bruce. This village is situated on the eastern seaboard of Dominica and has a population of about 1,000 inhabitants. The farm area in question is approximately 1500 acres, of which 300 acres are cultivated. Its physical makeup is of an undulating nature moving from sea-level to 1500 feet. The farm comprises the flat and cultivated land of Castle Bruce valley, and can be reached in all weather by jeep, tractor and truck. Rainfall in the Castle Bruce area is generally about 150 inches per annum.<sup>57</sup> The people of the village depend both directly and indirectly upon the land for their survival.

The history of the CDC at Castle Bruce represents a classic case of modern plantation economics and illustrates the nature of persistent poverty and underdevelopment.<sup>58</sup> From 1948 to 1973, the Commonwealth Development Corporation made unilateral decisions concerning production and conditions of work, maintained a totally authoritative

relationship with the villagers, exploited the land in the interest of its metropolitan head office, showed no consideration for the welfare of the village, and all profits derived from Dominican labour and the exploitation of Dominican natural resources at Castle Bruce went to Britain. In 1958 this colonial corporation employed 200 to 250 people at Castle Bruce. By 1972 the corporation claimed that the estate no longer operated at a profit and unilaterally decided to dismiss 59 workers. This event, which precipitated the radical struggle at Castle Bruce, might have gone unnoticed were it not for the presence of Artherton Martin, a young Dominican, who had just returned from a course of study at Cornell University. Martin's guiding political philosophy was simple: "Human beings get deep satisfaction from making decisions and doing things for themselves."<sup>59</sup> The CDC permitted the people to do neither.

On August 5, 1972, Martin, who had recently been appointed manager of the estate, was dismissed for his refusal to carry out the decision to terminate the employment of 59 Dominicans.<sup>60</sup> As a result, on August 12, 1972, work at the Eastle Bruce estate ceased. A strike transpired and the workers rejected CDC's domination over them and the exploitation of Dominican land at Castle Bruce. They stated clearly that the CDC wasted valuable flatland, that the corporation did not allow them to make decisions in the interest of Castle Bruce and Dominican people, and that the CDC was concerned simply with profit.<sup>61</sup> They also postulated that there was a need for the estate to play a role in solving the problems of the community, and so they appealed to the government to assist them in obtaining

funds to buy the estate. They proposed the following alternatives: that ownership of the estate be transferred to the workers; that the workers continue to work the estate for the collective benefit of the people of Castle Bruce; that the land be maintained as one estate and not be divided into portions; that the funds acquired to purchase the estate be re-paid from the profits the people of Castle Bruce themselves made from estate production.<sup>62</sup> Martin became the leading spokesman and articulator of these demands in the struggle for an alternative Castle Bruce arrangement.

We have had to ask ourselves whether the interest of CDC is the same as those of ourselves. We have had to ask ourselves whether the high potential agricultural land in the valley cannot be better used for the benefit of all Dominicans.

This open demonstration of CDC's lack of concern has led us to understand that as long as CDC is in charge our future is unsure.

The issue...is whether the workers as a group will own and operate Castle Bruce Estate or whether CDC will be allowed to ruin the workers and the village. 63

The people of Castle Bruce decided in response to work and operate the Castle Bruce Estate but not in a liberal capitalist framework, for it was wasteful and could not contribute to general welfare and community spirit.<sup>64</sup> They chose instead a cooperative framework which could concretely provide for more employment, which could prevent unilateral decisions by placing workers in both managerial and ownership positions, and which could help explode the negative and destructive myth that people who have undergone various colonizing experiences cannot work together for their collective survival.



### The Cooperative: Education, Ideology, and Justification

Cooperative undertakings are not alien to the people of Castle Bruce. The history of Castle Bruce even under the CDC demonstrated that the people of Castle Bruce can work as a collective. In 1964 the people had already experimented with a cooperative organization, although it was of short duration.<sup>65</sup> What was absent was not cooperative feeling among the workers, but rather an articulation of it in a concrete and systematic form which could effectively end the CDC's domination of Castle Bruce.<sup>66</sup> Stated differently, there was a need for continuous relevant education, politicization and socialization in concrete cooperative arrangements capable of sustaining a struggle to achieve both the rejection of the CDC and the development of an alternative Castle Bruce community.

Thus, education was held on a weekly basis and was conducted by cooperative officers on the conception of cooperation, its importance in developing countries, its benefits and pitfalls, and on the steps necessary to form and to register a cooperative. These discussions were followed by sessions held among workers themselves to elaborate the implementation of farm plans and the overall organization of the cooperative. In this context, the cooperative's notion of praxis, based on an analysis of Dominican agriculture and its needs,<sup>67</sup> was stated thus:

In this project, we propose an approach to development which links theory to study, to practice and work in a dynamic state where study generates solution to development problems while itself being revitalized and refined by the experience of implementing these solutions. 68

The cooperative movement recognizes that there would be problems with full scale cooperative farming and activity, especially at the initial stage of the venture. The movement was aware that one of the

major obstacles was "the form of private ownership where every man had his own one half of two acres plot and the non-cooperative individualistic attitude it has bred..." but was nonetheless optimistic for it believed that: "the collective experience of the workers has left them convinced of the interdependence of their lives and fortunes."<sup>69</sup>

The experience of being collectively laid off and discriminated against, has gone a long way towards teaching the group the need to act as a group to secure a firm future of Castle Bruce. 70

The cooperative was also aware of the destructive nature of 'possessive individualism' to a full cooperative venture. It did not maintain naively that individualism could be transformed in an extremely short space of time into cooperative behaviour and activity. Thus the cooperative states:

The educational work must go on and the initial organization of the farm must accommodate this question. One way in which this will be accomplished is by making a section of the farm available to workers and non-working members alike, for private farming activities, profits from which would go directly to the operator. 71

The cooperative does not say how long this practice would be encouraged, nor does it show any awareness of the fact that such encouragement may jeopardize the venture by the dissipation of necessary energy into private enterprise. The cooperative does try, however, to link such private undertakings with the cooperative enterprise.

Such small plots...will be operated in line with the overall farm land use plan so that the various crops are located in the areas best suited to their cultivation. Transport, storage and marketing facilities of the cooperative would be available to these private plots in return for which a stipulated contribution to the cooperative fund would be expected. 72

The present determination of the people of Castle Bruce to struggle indefinitely if necessary, is partly due to the type of intensive educational programs devised by the cooperative movement. These programs emphasize that first, sacrifice and responsibility are intrinsic to radical change; that secondly, committed leadership and expertise are necessary; and thirdly, that the Castle Bruce village and the plantation are interdependent.<sup>73</sup> The programs stressed the immense value of participation and decision making within the cooperative as these related to actual practices in collective farming. The movement considered this aspect of participation and decision making as vitally important for a successful transition of workers from objects of authority to planners and authors of responsible decision making.<sup>74</sup> The cooperative has made the one-man one-vote principle the basis for decision making in all affairs of the enterprise. The movement views this as a truly democratic procedure.

In its first couple of months, the cooperative movement spent little time and energy defending its *raison d'etre* and objectives from critics like the government and the press.<sup>75</sup> Instead, it directed its attention and energy to firming up the enterprise to a point where all members and workers could personally articulate the goals and activities of the cooperative and defend them when necessary. Thus the movement utilized in a positive way the embargo which the government had placed on radio broadcasts of its activities. In late October-November of 1972 the cooperative felt confident enough that the venture was adequately strong and sufficiently well-organized not only to withstand adverse

criticism, but capable of informing the Dominican public about its novel experiment.

The cooperative utilized the press which had displayed open hostility towards it to help disseminate pertinent information about the enterprise. This included both the Herald, which had joined the government in branding the venture as collectivization in the Russian communist tradition, and the Star, whose editor still maintains that the enterprise is implausible given the 'possessive individualism' of the Dominican farmer.<sup>76</sup>

The workers themselves became teachers who went to other villages and explained to the farmers there the need for cooperative farming. They also contacted youths in these villages and familiarized them with the need for such cooperative activity. In addition, the movement disseminated information all over the Caribbean. A monograph, Chance for a Change, in which plans and ideas of the cooperative venture are articulated, was sent to every Caribbean Island, with the exception of Jamaica where no appropriate organization could be found. The Castle Bruce experiment then caught the attention of regional development agencies. For instance, CADEC, located in Barbados, views Castle Bruce as not only a relevant model for development in that district, but also as having equal significance for the rest of Dominica.<sup>77</sup>

The cooperative justifies its enterprise on both short and long term grounds. Immediate cooperative benefits include the initial employment of 150 people "until such time as the livestock and vegetable programmes are under way". The movement envisages "an increase in the cash flow of the village economy due to wages being paid on the

farm, with the consequent rise in business activity for shopkeepers ...and others." It maintains that children will be in a better condition to attend school given "improved food availability from vegetable production and steady incomes that will permit purchase of suitable food from outside the area."<sup>78</sup> On a long term basis the cooperative intends to achieve advancement and improvement in the recreational and educational life of the community. Specifically, it hopes to revive agricultural interest among the youth. It is concerned with implementing agro-industries and livestock which will provide more employment in the future and in the case of livestock, contribute to the nutrition of both Castle Bruce and the rest of Dominica. Most important, the Castle Bruce Cooperative sees its experiment as having enormous significance to the rest of Dominica.

...Organizing more people to cooperate and farm the same portion of land, provides a lesson that may be essential for future generations of Dominicans.... There is just not enough good land to go around, so ways must be found to organize people into a new relationship with the land....

It is our conviction that unless people take active part in this development process, growth, not development results. This is so because the human element remains excluded from the 'experience of doing' which is the most effective way of harmonizing human and physical resources for an overall improvement in our living conditions. The Castle Bruce Cooperative blends economic and social change in a working atmosphere so that lasting improvement can occur in the self-confidence ability and general living standard of the community. 79

The Cooperative's Relations with the  
Government, MND, and the Roseau Community

In response to the Castle Bruce people's proposal, the government grudgingly agreed to buy the land from the CDC, but decided not to sell it to the cooperative. Instead, the government decided to sub-divide the land into lots for individual purchase.<sup>80</sup> The people of Castle Bruce rejected the government's decision.

The arable land of the estate comprised about 1500 acres. The cooperative realized that to accept the government's land division policy was impractical on at least three grounds. First, it would be impossible to get vital credit from the Caribbean Loan Bank which did not consider loans for farmers with less than twenty acres. Secondly, an implementation of that policy would mean that far more people of the village would be unemployed. Thirdly, as individuals, farmers of Castle Bruce would prove incapable of managing a farm in a productive way even if adequate funding was provided.<sup>81</sup> At least one consequence would be that the villagers would steal from those who possessed property and thus the policy would prove economically disastrous and fatal to the survival of Castle Bruce. The cooperative made it abundantly clear that it would fight government as long as it was necessary for the people of the village to accomplish their communitarian ends.<sup>82</sup>

In an attempt to destroy the cooperative enterprise, the government prevented ideas generated by the Castle Bruce struggle from capturing national attention. Thus, broadcasts of news concerning the activities of the cooperative were banned on the national radio which is completely controlled by government. This action by government

must be understood in the perspective that radio provides the major source of news and information, especially for people in the agricultural areas. This anticipated failure of the cooperative was also of personal importance to many government officials. For Ronald Armour of the Labour Party Government, Eugenia Charles and Stanley Fabelle of the Freedom Party, for instance, a successful cooperative venture at Castle Bruce receiving national recognition and acceptance was clearly not in the best interests of their own private estates.

Given that the Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement was involved concretely in the radical changes that members of the MND wrote and talked about, the MND approached the cooperative with a view to joining its operation. Martin, the identifiable leader of the cooperative struggle and also a member of the MND, disapproved of the liason for a number of reasons. First, he was in a position to recognize the major failure of the MND which was a lack of concrete experience in actual struggle for change. Hence the MND would not necessarily be an asset and could prove a liability. Secondly, he was aware of the bad public image of the MND and believed that an identification of the cooperative enterprise as simply a black power struggle would seriously jeopardize its chances for success. Thirdly, he could not utilize his joint position as the basis for a unilateral decision to include the MND in the operations of the Castle Bruce Cooperative. Finally, Martin believed that it was not the MND which could help Castle Bruce, but the other way around.<sup>83</sup> However, as the two movements were at least theoretically concerned with the same ends, Martin agreed to a meeting of the two organizations.

At the end of 1972, the Coordinating Committee of the cooperative and members of the MND met. At this meeting the cooperative showed appreciation for the support that the MND was willing to give, but maintained that the credibility of its undertaking rested at this point on the fact that Castle Bruce workers themselves articulated the demands and objectives sought at the village. It was suggested, however, that MND join the cooperative in disseminating ideas about the venture in other parts of Dominica where indeed such ideas were really needed.<sup>84</sup> Unfortunately, some MND members interpreted the cooperative's position as a rejection of the MND's assistance, and the MND has not taken the suggestion of the cooperative seriously.

Originally the people of Roseau, including the working population, failed to see any tangible connection between the Castle Bruce struggle and their own lives. In addition, the government, the DTU and the newspapers had contributed to the development of a negative image of the cooperative venture. In fact, when the Roseau people thought about the enterprise, it was to envisage its imminent collapse.<sup>85</sup>

This negative view began to crumble when the CDC, which is also in charge of electric service, raised its light and electric rates exorbitantly to the alarm especially of the Roseau working people. In reaction, some people went so far as to propose that government nationalize the electric plants and services.<sup>86</sup> The Roseau community now became increasingly conscious of the CDC's major concern as simply profit at the expense of Dominicans. Inadvertently the CDC, by this price increase, had contributed to forming an identification between the Roseau people



and the Castle Bruce Cooperative.

This identification was strengthened when it became known that the Castle Bruce project had caught the attention of CADEC, and this, in the Roseau people's opinion, legitimized the cooperative venture. Thus they began to view the enterprise in a rather serious and positive way. For instance, the Jaycees, an urban-based organization, began discussion about the venture in terms of its political relevance for Dominica. In early 1973, even Ronald Armour, the Deputy Premier, when confronted directly by public opinion favourable to the venture, could only say that government was never in fact against the Castle Bruce project.<sup>87</sup> Many influential Dominicans, including Jeff Charles, D. Cauderoin, J. Johnson, C. Savarin and A. Joseph have publicly wished the enterprise success; while others have adopted a 'wait and see' attitude. Even the newspapers have become less hostile. In late 1973 the government of Dominica had made a firm promise to buy the land. The cooperative and the people of Castle Bruce are optimistic.

### Conclusion

While the MND has written about the need for change and has presented alternatives, it has not been involved in any concrete activity to implement these plans. At best, the movement has remained a 'critic of society' that government in return has made an easy scapegoat for its failures. Finally, this unwillingness or inability of the MND to make the transition from their proposals to actual change implementation, it must be argued, is a problem of the organization itself. With a loose structure, a highly transient leadership, and an

uncertain membership it is impossible for the movement to make this transition.

The Student Movement, on the other hand, accomplished a number of changes at the SMA. The students made it clear that if the popular Dominican refrain---"the youth of today are the leaders of tomorrow"--- had any substantial significant meaning, then they would have to obtain the required expertise and practice in decision making in the present. The school, therefore, was the relevant place with which to begin. Furthermore, education had to be pertinent to the important development of black consciousness and identity, and in both areas changes were accomplished. At the SMA the autocratic authority structure has been terminated. At Faculty meetings, for instance, a student presently not only sits in but also participates actively in the decision making process. The school attire no longer frustrates the expression of black cultural pride and identity. Religion as a subject has been replaced by agricultural science, a subject considered more relevant to Dominican development. Above all, a Dominican school is now run by Dominicans, not by people by virtue of their cultural background, who find it very difficult to relate to and to identify with the problems and needs of the Island.

A post-protest slump, however, is evident at the SMA. The students who could push for a complete revision of the curriculum have since departed. Thus, with few exceptions, the school curriculum remains heavily colonial in content. The General Certificate of Education is still the dominant objective of the school, and even the

agricultural science program has not received the response which was initially anticipated. In addition, the Student Council, reorganized on a basis relevant to the decision making process at the school, is not working effectively.

One explanation for this state of affairs is that the present students of the SMA are like other secondary students and Dominican youth who are increasingly falling victim to despair and apathy, given that there is no employment for them upon graduation, and there is little possibility for emigration. Thus, these students do not see the pressing need to carry on the struggle for further changes at the SMA. In the opinion of some, it really does not matter what is done at the school for the situation remains hopeless even in the broader society.

Finally, it should be noted that there are a number of problems in the organization of the Castle Bruce Cooperative which it should attempt to resolve immediately. For example, under the heading "Structure of Ownership" the cooperative lists the people who will own at the time of transfer and in the future; what collective ownership entails; what are individual rights and obligations, as well as the place of individual expression in the collective decision making apparatus. The cooperative specifies four dimensions to decision making: (i) overwhelming support (ii) tacit approval (iii) apprehension (iv) strong opposition.<sup>88</sup> The inevitable problem which will arise is how to differentiate in actual decision making among these four dimensions as the movement has failed to specify what kinds of actual practices would fall within these four categories. Stated differently, the cooperative has not differentiated what expression or set of activities

would be considered "apprehension" as opposed to "strong apprehension". Furthermore, it has given no clear understanding as to how these would be related in practice to the movement's use of the one-man, one-vote principle. Left undefined, it can be argued, this arrangement could serve in actual practice to undermine the very basis of collective decision making.

There is, however, little doubt that these problems and others can be resolved with time, especially if the venture is given serious national encouragement instead of government opposition. One thing remains certain, given the size of Dominica and the omnipresence of the national government in practically all affairs of the Island, that without government's cooperation, the Castle Bruce Cooperative does not stand a chance of long term success.

## Chapter VII

## Footnotes

1. The Saint Mary's Academy, founded in 1932, is one of the few secondary schools in Dominica. It is a Catholic institution which was founded by Catholic Redemptorist Priests. In 1956, these priests were replaced by teaching religious Brothers who came from the United States. The student revolt which this chapter examines, as will be shown, begins with the establishment of the Brothers as the authority figures at the S.M.A..
2. The Dominica Development Plan 1971-1975, op. cit., p. 171.
3. Ibid., p. 172.
4. This dislike of white values has been manifested by many of the youth in anti-white slogans and in some cases, open hostility toward white people. The black power movement quickly drew fire from most of the adult world in Dominica and attacks from the government in particular. It was in an attempt to kill its image as an anti-white movement and to make itself more relevant that it changed its name to the Movement for a New Dominica (MND).
5. Many of these articles have been published in the movement's paper entitled Twavay.
6. The MND's Manifest is entitled: Caribbean Rebellion and Social Change: Towards Understanding of the Black Power Movement in the Caribbean --- Focus on Dominica (Roseau, privately published, 1973).
7. Since that time Bill Riviere, Swinburne Lestrade and J. Johnson have gone their separate ways. Johnson is the only original member now residing in Dominica and is presently a civil servant with the rank of Assistant Permanent Secretary.
8. J. Johnson, "Black Power in Dominica" in Dominica Chronicle, March 22, 1969, p. 2.
9. Walter Rodney has been hailed as the first black power leader in the Caribbean. His thoughts and concerns with black power are discussed in Walter Rodney, The Groundings with My Brothers (London: Bogle L'Ouverture Publications, 1970).
10. Interview with Julian Johnson in July, 1973, Roseau.
11. J. Johnson, "Aims of Black Power in Dominica" Dominica Chronicle, April 12, 1969, p. 6.

12. These articles are in volumes of Twavay, Vol. 1 no. 1, April 1973; Vol. 1 no. 3, July 1973; Special edition, August, 1973.
13. Informal interview with Roosevelt Douglas, black power leader and theoretician, in 1972, Canada.
14. The problem of the MND has not been the inaccuracy of these statements. Rather it has been the frequent use of such terms as "white racists" and "upper class lackeys" which, among other emotive language, has led to much of the disenchantment with the movement in the Island.
15. MND's manifesto, Caribbean Rebellion and Social Change..., op. cit., p. 7.
16. Ibid., p. 3.
17. Ibid., p. 29.
18. These local families which are specifically attacked are Stanley Fabelle, the Armour family, the Douglas family and Eugenia Charles' family. The vast majority of Dominicans are black people who either work as labourers in Roseau or on their estates.
19. Informal interview with Desmond Trotter, black power leader in Dominica, July and August, 1973, Roseau.
20. Informal interview with Roosevelt Douglas in 1972, Canada.
21. Interview with Julian Johnson in July, 1973, Roseau.
22. MND's manifesto, Caribbean Rebellion and Social Change..., op. cit., p. 2.
23. Because of the movement's constant and at times erratic criticisms of the political parties, especially the government, the government and even the opposition have found it convenient to react to the movement by blaming it for most of the ills of the society. For example, the government in 1973 continued its state of emergency on the basis of the publication of a "Green Paper", a mimeographed sheet of paper, supposedly put out by the MND in which veiled threats were made concerning subverting the system by violence.
24. Interviews with Julian Johnson, Hilarian Deschamp. Gregory Shillingford in July-August, 1973, Roseau.
25. Interviews with Julian Johnson and Bill Riviere in July-August, 1973, Roseau. (Interestingly enough, most of the MND leaders who proclaim the inadequacy of the educational system in the task of nation building are University of the West Indies people.)

26. "White boy" has been frequently used by Roosevelt Douglas in his discussion on black-power. This phrase and other emotive language is often used throughout the manifesto.
27. Translation of this derogatory phrase is roughly "staunch conservative Church people."
28. MND's manifesto, Caribbean Rebellion and Social Change..., op. cit., p.p. 24-28.
29. Ibid.
30. Interviews with Atherton Martin; innovator of Castle Bruce Cooperative, July & August, 1973, Roseau.
31. This was the same year that the author began his secondary school education at the S.M.A..
32. This was evident when the author taught at the S.M.A. in 1969. The comparison to the years when the author was a student and later a teacher (1962-1965) was astonishing.
33. Hilroy Thomas was a student of the author's. He was affected by the University of the West Indies intellectuals who had formally introduced black power thinking to Dominica
34. Interview with Hilroy Thomas in 1972, New York City.
35. WAWU, for instance, made Thomas' case a union issue.
36. These rules in question were devised by Estrada and were implemented against the author's advice in the summer of, 1971.
37. Ibid.
38. Stones were thrown at the black board. In fifth form, for instance, on two occasions at least, the waste paper baskets were set on fire. Teachers who attempted to teach were constantly interrupted. Many of the teachers were struck with tamarind seeds. Desks were smashed. A piano in one class was overturned. From an interview with Brother Estrada in 1972 in Canada; also an interview with Edward Royer, a lay-teacher during the event, in August, 1973, Roseau.
39. From informal interviews with Brother Estrada in Canada, 1972; see also, Dominica, Report of Committee of Inquiry into Disturbances at the Saint Mary's Academy, June, 1972, (Roseau: Government Printery, 1972).
40. See "Black Student Arise - Estrada Strikes Again", March 16, 1972; also, "Students Speak", 1972, in which the Brothers are branded as "conniving racist foreigners", published by the SMAO, Student Movement Against Oppression. I am grateful to Brother Estrada for his complete file on the matter.

41. On March 17th, the Student Movement in a protest march, went to the Ministerial Building. There the leaders of the movement were met by the Premier E.O. Leblanc. Their grievances were made known to him. (Conversations with youths who were involved; also, interview with Edward Royer, a teacher at the Saint Mary's Academy, in August 1973.)
42. Dominica, Report of Committee of Inquiry..., op. cit., p.2.
43. Interview with Rupert Sorhaindo, Vice Principal of the SMA, July, 1973; also conversations with students about Fr. Calvin Felix and Rupert Sorhaindo.
44. A number of Dominican adults in conversation with the author stated that the issue was simply a racial one. Also, see, Dominica, Report of Committee of Inquiry..., op. cit., where the racial aspect is made into a significant issue.
45. Dominica, Report of Committee of Inquiry, op. cit., p. 2; ~~Interviews~~ with Estrada in Canada in 1972.
46. The Barbados Advocate, June 3, 1972, p. 3.
47. Ibid.
48. Conversations with a number of parents who remembered the author as a teacher at the SMA, and who were willing to discuss their feelings about the situation with the author.
49. Informal interview with Fr. Calvin Felix, Principal of SMA in August, 1973, Roseau.
50. Because the author was a school teacher for four years at the SMA, a substantial number of parents either approached the author to talk about the school situation or, conversely, he found it easy to approach and talk about the situation with them. It is from such conversations that these conclusions have been drawn.
51. Dominica, Report of the Committee of Inquiry..., op. cit., p.3.
52. Ibid., p. 1.
53. Ibid., p.p. 26-27.
54. "Mapuis" politics was discussed in the previous chapter. "Mapuis" in this context can be translated roughly as personal and vindictive attacks which have nothing to do with political issues.
55. One government minister said outright that the school was run by the opposition in "Events leading up to the present situation at S.M.A." (Roseau: privately printed, n.d.); the article can be found in Estrada's file. The Dominica Educator, a pro Labour Party Government newspaper gave  
cont'd.



55. contd.

front page coverage to the "Kicking Incident". The Dominica Herald, May 27, 1972 gave a front page headline to the event, "Government Encouragement of Indiscipline Results in School Closure." The Herald is an open supporter of the Freedom Party.

56. Interview with Jeff Charles, Radio Broadcaster, a critic of Dominican society, in July, 1973; also interview with Rupert Sorhaindo, July, 1973.
57. Castle Bruce Cooperative, A Chance for a Change (Dominica: The Cooperative, 1972).
58. For a discussion on modern plantation economics and its relation to persistent underdevelopment, see, George Beckford, Persistent Poverty op. cit.
59. Interviews with Atherton Martin in July and August, 1973.
60. Dominica Herald, August 5, 1972, p. 1.
61. Informal interview with members of the Castle Bruce Cooperative Steering Committee in August, 1973, Roseau.
62. "Castle Brucers Argue for Take-Over", in Dominica Chronicle, August 26, 1972, p. 5.
63. The Castle Bruce Cooperative, A Chance for Change, op. cit., p.p. 15-17.
64. Interviews with A. Martin in July & August, 1973.
65. Interviews with A. Martin in July & August, 1973.
66. Interviews with A. Martin in July & August, 1973.
67. See, Castle Bruce Cooperative, A Chance for Change, op. cit.
68. Ibid., p. 4.
69. Ibid., p. 41.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. Informal interview with members of the Castle Bruce Cooperative Steering Committee in August, 1972, Roseau.
74. Interviews with A. Martin in July & August, 1973.

75. See, "DAWU in the Castle Bruce Affair", Dominica Chronicle, September 2, 1972. DAWU said it is "saddened by both the Cabinet and the Government and the opposition newspapers to the profound sociological and...economic phenomena involved at Castle Bruce". See, Dominica Chronicle "Editorial", September 2, 1972, p.2, and on page one "'System' Road Block for Castle Bruce"; see Dominica Star, September 2, 1972, p. 1, where agreement is given for the government's stand against collectivization and referred to as a "stern and sensible release". See Dominica Herald, September 2, 1972, p. 7, "We are happy that Castroism is not to be our guide for the future".
76. Interview with Shand Allfrey, August, 1972, in Roseau.
77. In 1973 CADEC (Catholic Agency for Development in the Eastern Caribbean) had provided grants and loans to the Cooperative. Informal interview with the Steering Committee in August, 1973.
78. Castle Bruce Cooperative, A Chance for a Change, op. cit., p.45.
79. Ibid., p. 46.
80. A conversation with Mr. A.J. Barzey, economist in the Development and Planning section of the Premier's Office in August, 1973.
81. Interviews with A. Martin in July and August, 1973.
82. See, for instance "Castle Bruce Delegation meets Ministers to discuss Estate matters" August, 1972, Release of Government No. 529. See also, "Delegate from Castle Bruce calls on Premier" September, 13, 1972, Release No. 573; "Government replies to proposals from Steering Committee for the proposed Castle Bruce Cooperative" August 30, 1972, Release No. 535. The releases are put out by the Government Information Service. Also see, Dominica Chronicle, September 2, 1972.
83. Interviews with A. Martin in July and August, 1973.
84. Informal interview with the Castle Bruce Cooperative Steering Committee in August, 1973.
85. Interviews with Jeff Charles and Daniel Cauderoin, Radio Broadcasters and critics of the Dominican society. July and August, 1973. Informal interviews with Carlton Grell, July and August, 1973.
86. Interviews with Jeff Charles, Daniel Cauderoin and Artherton Martin.
87. Interviews with Jeff Charles, Daniel Cauderoin, Julian Johnson, and Artherton Martin.
88. Castle Bruce Cooperative, A Chance for a Change, op. cit., p.p. 21-32.

## Chapter VIII

### CONCLUSION

The foregoing examination of those significant activities in the Dominican life experience directed towards survival and change has accomplished the original purposes of the thesis.<sup>1</sup> Through the analysis of the Dominican collective violent activities, protests and political organizations Dominicans have been presented as subjects of their own experiences rather than as objects or victims of colonial forces. In this process the study revealed that Dominicans, despite their colonization, have a positive identity of which they can be proud and which might be useful to them in laying the foundation for the realization of their future aspirations. The thesis also argued against the traditional comparative and metropolitan perspectives, for the major reason that they have left West Indians, including Dominicans, with a debilitating colonial heritage.

Specifically, the study has shown how Dominicans themselves, beginning with the slave period, through the emancipation era, the creation of political organizations, up to the Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement, have acted constantly on their own behalf in order to achieve simultaneously the objectives of survival and change. Throughout the thesis it was shown that Dominicans have been and are still concerned with both their biological and ontological existence. To ensure their biological survival, they have struggled collectively, especially in harsh colonial conditions, to hang on and stay alive by placing emphasis on procuring the basic

needs of life, such as food, clothing and shelter. At the same time, however, they have also struggled to go beyond just staying alive by acting cooperatively to make better lives for themselves. Especially in the slave and post-emancipation period, this ontological survival was manifested in attempts by Dominican people to prevent their dehumanization, it meant struggles against being reduced, by harsh colonial forces, to chattel which could simply perform the basic functions to sustain mere biological life. Moreover, this ontological survival entailed a Dominican fight for human freedom and dignity. For the Maroons and the mulattoes as well, for instance, such ontological survival required collective action against the colonial forces for the purpose of achieving self-definition as a people.

In the modern period, this Dominican struggle for ontological survival has been manifested also in activities directed toward making better lives for themselves. In this attempt Dominicans have created a number of political organizations such as unions, parties and movements; and these have been substantively analyzed in the body of the thesis.

Concretely it was shown that the field slaves met the needs of their biological existence by taking great care in the cultivation of food in their allotted garden plots, while other slaves appropriated basic food stuffs from their masters. The slaves' concern with ontological survival was demonstrated in the emphasis they placed on religious and cultural aspects of their existence. Among these were general superstition and obeah, which involved the use of poisonous herbs and the belief in the supernatural power of the dead. From these forms the slaves derived

a strength and gratification which allowed them to continue their human existence in the wretched plantation situation, for they believed that the use of these religious forms could have tangible effects on those whom they considered to be wicked slave masters.

In the specific case of the Maroon slaves, it was shown that the question of survival and that of change was more closely linked and further broadened. In addition to the religious-cultural and biological dimensions, the Maroons' emphasized further the social, political and linguistic dimensions of ontological survival. The social dimension included the introduction of camps with chiefs in control of the organization of Maroon family, economic and cultural life in the forests of Dominica. Its political aspect included the autonomous rule of chiefs over camp life and the Maroons' acceptance to follow the strategies devised jointly by various chiefs in the struggle for fundamental change in the plantation system. Its linguistic form in the British plantation system entailed the use of French and its subsequent patois derivation which provided a communication system frequently unknown to British masters but of immense value to the slave population. This communication network assisted the Maroons, particularly in the circulation of plans to subvert the plantation system, to bring about positive change in Dominica.

In addition to their struggle to subvert the plantation system and to terminate slavery, the Maroons attempted to reclaim Dominica as independent territory so that all black Dominicans and sympathetic mulattoes could use the lands and forests independently as free and dignified human beings. The human freedom the Maroons sought was

contemporaneously articulated in the French Revolution and entailed the concepts of equality, dignity and brotherhood. These concepts were directly opposed to the *raison d'être* of the plantation system and the state of slavery which supported it. Black freedom in an independent Dominica was crucial to the Maroons' understanding of ontological survival.

In the post-emancipation period it was shown that black Dominican survival was a concern with making human existence possible unfettered by colonial constraints. It was partly for this reason that black Dominicans occupied Crown Lands as independent territory as a means to develop their human potential as free people. On these lands they built their houses and attempted to grow food stuffs either collectively or individually outside the plantation system and in a social environment which allowed them to be free human beings. The 1844 Rebellion demonstrated that black people were very concerned with their ontological survival. Thus, the rebellion was fought because blacks believed that the colonial government wanted to return them to the state of slavery. The revolt of 1847 was fought, in part, to preserve the right to worship in the Catholic religion unhampered by discriminatory decisions of the white Anglican plantocracy.

The mulattoes' conception of survival and necessary change, it was shown, was closely related to their ontological existence. They were concerned with political autonomy and independence from the dominant white colonial plantocracies and freedom in order to develop Dominica as a non-colonial territory within the context of a broad West Indian nation. In this respect the mulattoes of the post-emancipation period

gave expression to a notion of Dominican nationalism that was anti-colonial in thrust and pro-West Indian nationhood in content. It was for this reason that the mulattoes once suggested to England that Dominica be sold to another power on the assumption that it might at least be possible for them to live as free human beings.

The trade union organization itself, it was shown, has represented a form of black human survival. While trade unionism arose in an attempt to rectify specific hostile economic conditions which have been directly connected to basic social deprivations, it has been more than that. In fact the union organization has been an expression and reflection of the collective human activity of black people to impress upon Dominican society that they are full-fledged members whose concerns with human existence extend beyond the narrow emphasis on having enough to eat. Thus the union represented a reservoir of collective strength and courage of black people to assert themselves, to express their human rights as working people and to demand the respect of the rest of Dominican society. The organization has given demonstrable proof that "backward" black people can not only take care of their basic biological needs, but also can come together to rectify and to change conditions to allow them to live better lives.

It was shown that the first popular political party developed as an extension of the union and represented a further commitment to carry forward the question of black human survival. The political parties in general have provided more demonstrable proof that Dominicans want to see their own lives, affairs and ultimately their own destiny controlled by themselves. The black people in particular could, through democratic

means, place in office political leaders who promise not only to take care of their basic needs, but also to advance their ontological existence as well. The unions and parties have, however, only partially fulfilled these expectations. It is within this context and against this background of this partial fulfillment that the modern Dominican movements have been examined.

The Student Movement, it was shown, has been concerned with change towards making the educational experience more meaningful and relevant to their own personal growth and identity, and to Dominican development as well. The latter emphasis was demonstrated partially in the movement's fight to replace religious studies with that of agricultural science, considered infinitely more significant to the growth and betterment of Dominica.

The Black Power Movement has highlighted the shortcomings of both the unions and especially the political parties. It has argued that the independent survival of Dominica depends not only on an independent territory, but more precisely on one in which a suitable political culture can maximize human freedom and raise the standard of social, political and economic life of the dominant black majority especially. The movement has failed, however, because it has not developed a concrete ideology for change.

The Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement, it was shown, has been successful where the Black Power Movement has failed. The apparent success of the Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement resides in part in its recognition of both the limitations and the complexities of the black experience in Dominica. It has understood, for instance, that black people, in the slave



and post-emancipation periods, developed cooperative activities in which human survival was a shared biological and ontological concern. This cooperation was expressed in the attempts by these Dominicans to deal with the question of human needs within a context which could best maximize independent human activity, as well as reflect their human dignity and freedom. The Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement has demonstrated this understanding in both its thought and action. The movement is also aware that while the unions and the parties have carried forward the struggle for both biological and ontological survival, they have seemingly arrived at an impasse. The movement, therefore, expresses a concern with the development of the potential for the complete human process of survival beyond the level developed by both these organizations.

On the basis of this substantive analysis, which began with the slave period and moved in a progressive order to the recent Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement, it can be argued that the concerns of the slaves, the Maroons, the black people in the emancipation period, the mulattoes, the unions, the parties, the Student and Black Power Movements, have, in a sense, found recent expression in the Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement. The intention of the Maroons to live together harmoniously governed by the principles of freedom, equality and brotherhood within and in control of an independent territory are factors which have also emerged in the Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement. The Maroons were partially successful in their quest. Since then, through the activities of Dominicans and their organizations' attempts have been made, albeit in various manifestations, to carry forward the Maroons' concern with independent survival

in a free and decolonized Dominica. At this juncture in the Dominican life experience, the Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement is the latest in a progression of activities guided towards the goal of independent survival in Dominica.

The Castle Bruce example is, however, an isolated phenomenon. While it provides an illustration of how it is possible to utilize productively Dominican natural resources --- people and fertile land --- as the basis for an independent human survival, the cooperative venture has been restricted to the village of Castle Bruce. The current question which remains is, what about independent survival in the rest of Dominica? More precisely, how is it possible for Dominicans to utilize their natural resources in a proper manner to achieve the goal of an independent biological survival? Secondly, and as equally important, how are Dominicans going to direct their activities towards necessary change in order to make survival a genuine, qualitative question; or more concretely, how are Dominicans going to develop a survival situation in which the standard of social, educational, cultural, and political life and human freedom in an independent territory is maximized?

The author does not think that it is really possible to 'conclude' a dissertation in which the topic is about an ongoing human experience. It is possible, however, to make a statement concerning the direction he would like this continuous human experience to follow. He explained in the "Introduction" that a social scientist who is a citizen of a small country like Dominica is often requested to present expert opinion even about that subject he is researching.<sup>2</sup> In Dominica, while he was conducting formal interviews or was engaged in participant observation, the author

was asked by a number of Dominicans, including E. C. Loblack, V. Nicholas, S. Allfrey and black power youths, for his thoughts about where Dominica should be going and what should be done. The author informally discussed his views then, and now as both a social scientist and a citizen of Dominica he would like to make a formal suggestion about a future course of action.

In 1973, Premier Edward Leblanc expressed, on a number of occasions, his government's desire to seek independence for Dominica. Leblanc's conception of Dominican independence was a rather narrow and negative definition of political independence. It entailed the severance of Dominica's formal Associate Statehood relation with Great Britain. His notion of independence did not even include Beckford's sense of "genuine independence --- that is the full freedom of a people to control the environment in which they live and to manipulate that environment in any way they desire"<sup>3</sup>, or in Singham's sense, the question of "genuine decolonization".<sup>4</sup> More directly, Leblanc's concern with independence was not a consideration of Dominican independent survival. Grenada's political independence, scheduled for 1974, was Leblanc's model. This independence for Dominica would include a Prime Minister instead of a Premier, additional ministries, an increase in an already top-heavy bureaucracy, a Dominican flag, a place at the United Nations General Assembly, to name a few. It was not an independence which placed emphasis on, for instance, the development of internal parameters of social services, educational facilities and economic resources for the benefit of all Dominicans. Indeed, it is a kind of independence that Dominica needs least at the present.

According to the present constitution, Dominica as an Associate State is completely in control of its internal and local affairs. Britain is in charge of the Island's limited foreign affairs and is directly responsible for external defence. The present question of Dominican independence can and should be dealt with within this framework. Independence would entail a tough-minded recognition by Dominicans that they are in fact in control of their internal affairs, and as such can and must control the natural resources within Dominica. Concretely, this amounts to the right, the responsibility, and duty to govern their internal affairs and to develop their natural resources in a manner which best serves the interest of all Dominicans. The 1967 Constitution made this possible; it is up to Dominicans to make it a substantive reality.

It is this recognition which should form the philosophical basis of independence in Dominica. The concern with political independence must be related to the question of a complete independent survival within Dominica. It should entail a serious commitment to develop a concrete strategy which seeks to relate closely land development to Dominican human growth and freedom. In this context political independence becomes a pre-occupation with the most efficient way to accomplish this end of independent existence.

The two acknowledged forms of natural resources in Dominica are people and fertile soil. The population of Dominica is small; it is approximately 70,000. The land is fertile and most of it is covered with virgin forests. Planned and exploited properly, there is sufficient fertile land in Dominica to support the independent biological survival

of all Dominicans. There is absolutely no reason why almost one-half of the food needs required in Dominica must be obtained from external sources.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, the proper development of the land resources is adequate to form the basis from which ontological survival can be sustained and eventually maximized.

This control and utilization of the land resources in the interest of an independent Dominican existence could make the Island an independent territory, despite its legal association with Britain. Disassociation from Britain by itself will not provide Dominica with genuine independence as long as Dominicans fail to control and utilize their national resources in the interest of all citizens. This form of political independence from Britain should be a consideration only after independent existence within Dominica is firmly rooted in the Island's fabric and has its own momentum; or if in the process of achieving this independence, Britain decides to stifle its realization.

There is very little chance that the question of independent survival will become a serious issue as long as the present political climate persists. It is imperative, therefore, that a new level of politics --- political thinking and activity --- be introduced nationally in Dominica. The chapter on "Political Parties", for instance, discussed how governmental politics generally resides at the level of non-issues, charisma, identification with the masses and with "mapuis." This new level of politics requires a renunciation of the existing forms in favour of a politics which includes a commitment to deal seriously with issues relevant to independent life in Dominica. In general terms it calls for the replacement of "mapuis" with constructive discussion of important issues

and matters, for a combination of charisma with competence and for mass education instead of mass identification.

It is interesting to note that the present Labour Government has included in its Development Plan 1971-1975 a number of significant ideas and policies which can deal substantively with the question of independence as discussed so far.<sup>6</sup> These Development Plans show that government is 'aware' that development in Dominica ultimately depends on an integrated and productive relationship between human and land resources in the Island. The government says: "Development of man and development for man is the ultimate objective and central concern of all planning efforts in Dominica."<sup>7</sup> The government is also 'conscious' that there are problems attending such a developmental objective and has therefore provided adequate guidelines to deal with them. In this context the Development Plan states "that efficient exploitation and effective development of natural and material resources, whilst they may result in an increase in total output, need not necessarily lead to the upliftment of the people".<sup>8</sup> The government proposes, therefore, that general development must be an integrated process of "'economic' and 'social sectors'" and "that discernable, active and authentic popular participation is an essential resource for development...."<sup>9</sup> More specifically, the government has plans and policies to cover the development and improvement of the agricultural sector, the forest industry, mining and tourist industries, and the communication and transportation situation. These plans and policies also cover the development and improvement of educational, cultural, medical and health services as well as housing, social and community matters, to name but a few.

The problem, therefore, is not a lack of ideas or policies, but rather the lack of serious intention on the government's part to actualize these plans and policies.

In Dominica the government's written plans and policies tend to serve at least two purposes. First, these plans are designed to silence government's critics who claim that it is intellectually bankrupt, devoid of ideas for change, and is simply interested in maintaining itself in power at any cost. Secondly, these plans constitute an impressive document and strategy when seeking foreign assistance, or more exactly, grants-in-aid from Britain. The government has, however, neither the intention of taking its plans seriously nor the commitment to implement them. This lack of commitment stems from the Dominican political climate which thrives on non-issues, charismatic appeal and mass identification. It is for this reason, therefore, that a new level of politics must be introduced in Dominica so that these written plans of government might be actualized.

The Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement intimates the beginning of a new level of politics. In fact, the emergence of this politics has been one reason why the government has opposed the Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement. Interestingly enough, the Cooperative does not violate the developmental policies written by the government. The idea of the Cooperative and its concern of bringing man and land together in a productive, developmental relationship is a 'paper' goal of the Labour Government. Premier Leblanc personally stated that the two most important natural resources in Dominica "are the people and the land".<sup>10</sup> Moreover, he continued: "the way in which the land becomes available to the people,

and what the people do with the land must be a matter of the first importance.... The preparation of the people to use the land beneficially is thus one important aspect of the plan's strategy. The fact that the land must be available on demand to be utilized is another. Neither the one or the other can be divorced in the strategy of optimal utilization of the country's resources."<sup>11</sup> In this context, Leblanc also addressed the question of the cooperatives:

No one will doubt that agriculture must continue as the leading sector for a long time yet. What one may debate is the character which the leading sector should assume... if true and lasting growth is to be achieved... the way in which the land becomes available to the people and what the people do with the land must be of the first importance.... He (the small scale farmer) must apply the best principles of management and cultural practices available to him; and to exploit the markets most advantageous to his understanding ...either individually or on a cooperative basis. 12

The Castle Bruce Cooperative Movement has also illustrated some of the substantive elements that a new level of politics should possess. It has a concrete dynamic ideology; it has demonstrated a productive unity of charisma and competence at the leadership level, and it is concerned with the serious issues of change for a complete independent survival. By so doing, the Cooperative has underlined the inadequacy of a political system which too often thrives and operates on the rather simple, unproductive level of charisma, "mapuis" and mass identification. Furthermore, it has ostensibly bridged the gap between 'paper' policies and the concrete activities necessary for change.

Government's present opposition to a new level of politics only serves, however, to intensify its need. The government must abandon its current political activities in the interest of achieving genuine



independence in Dominica. It must not only write about policies and plans for change and development but must also seek to have them implemented in a systematic, serious and committed way. The people of Dominica, if they choose, can completely control their own affairs, life and natural resources; thus all three can be unified in a productive way to serve the best interests of all Dominicans. There no longer exists in Dominica the hostile white plantocracy against which the slaves, the black Dominicans and mulattoes in the post-emancipation period, the unions and the political parties in the 1950's and early 1960's have had to struggle to make possible Dominican survival. It is now possible for all Dominicans, government and people, to collectively direct their activities to the goal of an independent survival.

The Dominican experience has illustrated that Dominicans historically have struggled and can cooperate. The time has again arrived to resuscitate this cooperative activity for the achievement of genuine Dominican independence. For instance, there is no justification for the opposition of government to the Castle Bruce Cooperative. Government should understand the Cooperative as a concrete example of the commitment, dynamism and seriousness necessary for actual change, development and growth.

Finally, the author believes that this needed new level of politics and its relation to independent survival can be successfully introduced through a mass education program. The purpose of such a program would be to allow all Dominicans to participate in significant discussions relevant to their independent existence and to agree upon what is required to realize that end.<sup>13</sup> More specifically, this mass education would serve

two functions. First, it would help bring about the necessary change in thinking and attitudes pertinent to the introduction of a new level of politics, and secondly, it would deal with the question of what independent survival in Dominica realistically entails. Admittedly, it can be argued that the suggestion about mass education is too utopian. However, it is worth remembering that there currently exists a limited example of this new politics in Dominica itself, specifically in the Castle Bruce Cooperative, where mass education has proved most productive to the implementation of the cooperative's communitarian ends.

For the future, then, Dominicans must control their internal affairs and natural resources in the interest of their independent biological and ontological survival. To accomplish this end, it is mandatory that they operate and participate in a new level of politics. This requires the replacement of "mapuis" by significant Dominican issues; the unity of charisma and expertise; the death of propaganda and unrealistic political promises; and a firm commitment towards appropriate change. It is only then that the development of Dominican human and natural resources will achieve the objective of an independent Dominica and maximum freedom for all its citizens.

## Chapter VIII

## Footnotes

1. These were stated in Chapter I.
2. This point was dealt with in Chapter I.
3. George Beckford, Persistent Poverty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. vii.
4. Archie Singham, The Hero and the Crown in a Colonial Polity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 330.
5. See for instance, Dominica. Development Plan 1971-1975, op. cit., p.p. 190-191.
6. Dominica. Development Plan 1971-1975, op. cit.
7. Ibid., p. 171.
8. Ibid., p. 171.
9. Ibid., p. 172.
10. Ibid., p. ii.
11. Ibid., p. ii.
12. Ibid., p. iii. (emphasis added).

13. The following are a few suggestions concerning the parameters of this mass education.

...Mass education should entail realistic appraisals of the natural resources and their indispensable place in the development and context of Dominican independent existence. It should include the necessity for Dominicans to take firm control of their internal affairs, lives and natural resources. It must include serious discussion on the question itself of Dominican independence. It should stress that Dominican independence cannot be a simple severance of its Associate-State status with Britain, for this form of independence is negative and unproductive, if not suicidal. Rather, it should be argued that a viable and important form of independence is the Dominican control of their local affairs, their lives and their natural resources in a unity which best benefits their existence. It also includes a discussion as to why it is mandatory that Dominicans stay clear of customary politics and why they should accept and participate in a new level of politics. It incorporates a dialogue about government's developmental plans and policies. This in particular could be handled, for instance, in adult and youth education sessions. At these sessions, it could be discussed why it is necessary for these plans

cont'd...

## 13. cont'd.

and policies to be implemented jointly by the government and people. Throughout the program the underlying theme should be the relationship between appropriate development of natural resources, human growth and freedom in an independent Dominican territory.

Mass education should also include the concern that achieving independent human survival is itself a human process which creates its own change and accomplishment; for as a process the concern with independent survival does not separate means utilized from the ends to be accomplished. Thus, means and ends are to be united in a dynamic way as well as the theory and practice of policies and plans. The process must be seen as a pertinent learning experience; for in that experience Dominicans themselves should be able to discern and realize their own growth and freedom as well as the independent development of the Island. Mass education, therefore, must seek to develop a Dominican ideology for independent survival.

Ultimately, mass education must include a consideration of the kind of society that Dominicans would like to bequeath to future generations. This objective can serve immediate concrete ends, for it sets before Dominicans a goal to be accomplished, provides a target towards which activities for an independent survival are directed, and generates present inspiration and incentive.

## APPENDIX I

### Dominica: Location, Physical Features, Climate, Vegetation and Population

Dominica is the third largest island in the area commonly referred to as the British Caribbean. It is situated between the two French Islands of Guadeloupe to the north and Martinique to the south at the line of latitude  $15^{\circ} 11'$  North and longitude  $61^{\circ} 15'$  West.

The area of Dominica is approximately 305 square miles. Its physical features make the Island the most rugged of the British Caribbean Islands. There is very little flat land in Dominica, and whatever there is can be found on the coastal belt. For the most part the terrain moves in levels of steepness from the coast to the interior. The interior is dominated by a range of mountains running roughly from north to south. This mountainous range reaches its highest peak in Morne Diablotin, 4,747 feet, in the north of Dominica. From the central range, a number of valleys radiate in various directions (see Map 1). Many of these valleys form the beds of the 365 rivers in the Island as well as many of the town sites including Roseau, the Capital. In addition to rivers, there are numerous fresh water lakes and sulphur springs.

The climate is tropical to sub-tropical with temperatures ranging from  $75^{\circ}$ - $85^{\circ}$  on the coast to  $60^{\circ}$  in the interior. Humidity is low because of the prevailing Trade Winds and dominant influence of the sea breezes. Rainfall is heavy ranging from less than 100 inches on the

western coast in particular, to over 300 inches per annum in the interior (see Map II).

The Island is of rich volcanic soil. Consequently, it is possible to grow almost every kind of tropical agricultural commodity. Most of the land, however, remains unused and especially, in the interior much of the land is covered with virgin forest (see Map III). Because much of the land is unused and uninhabited, Dominica presently gives the appearance of an over-populated island.


In 1960, the population of Dominica was approximately 59,916; in 1970 it was estimated at 70,302. The population density in 1960 was 206 per square mile with the overwhelming majority of Dominicans living in towns and villages on the coastal belt. Even then the population density varied from parish to parish. In the parish of St. George, in which Roseau is situated (see Map IV), the population density was estimated at 744 per square mile; in the parish of St. Peter, the density was 100 per square mile. Presently, Roseau's population is over 14,000 and accounts for about one-fifth of the Island's population and has a population density of over 35,000 per square mile. Other towns with a population between 2,000-4,000 include Portsmouth, Marigot and St. Joseph. Dominica has a youthful population. In the 1960 census, 44 per cent of Dominicans were 14 years and under; currently about 60 per cent are under 25 years. Ninety per cent of the population is black. The official language is English; however, most Dominicans, especially those in the rural districts, speak a Creole Patois.

Map I









338

PORTSMOUTH




Physical features


-  Land over 4000 feet
-  Land between 3000 - 4000 feet
-  Land between 2000 - 3000 feet
-  Land between 1000 - 2000 feet
-  Land between 500 - 1000 feet
- 

ROSEAU











PORTSMOUTH




**Climate**


-  Over 300 inches of rain
-  Over 200 inches of rain
-  Over 100 inches of rain
-  Over 100 inches of rain
-  Over 100 inches of rain
-  Less than 100 inches of rain






Map III





Settlement pattern with parish boundaries



## APPENDIX II

### (i) Significant Dominicans who were formally interviewed in 1973

- Shand Allfrey, Co-founder of the Labour Party; Minister of Labour of West Indian Federation; Editor of Dominica Star and member of Freedom Party.
- C.A. Augustus, General Secretary of WAWU.
- Franklin Baron, Founder of DUPP; First Chief Minister in Dominica.
- Jeff Charles, Manager of Radio Dominica; broadcaster; recognized knowledgeable critic of Dominican society.
- Daniel Caudeiron, Broadcaster; poet; "black-power intellectual" and recognized knowledgeable critic of Dominican society.
- Julian Johnson, Black Power leader and theoretician, Assistant Permanent Secretary; critic of society.
- Anthony Joseph, Initial member of first union (DTU); Initial member of first political party (Labour Party); General Secretary of DAWU.
- E.C. Loblack, Founder of first union (DTU); co-founder of Labour Party; member of Freedom Party; knowledgeable man about Dominican society.
- Randolph Lockhart, R.G.A. member; Secretary of TRPA; lawyer.
- Artherton Martin, Innovator of Castle Bruce Cooperative; Black Power theoretician.
- Veronica Nicholas, Initial member of DTU; initial member of Labour Party; General Secretary of DTU.
- Edward Royer, Student in crisis years at the Saint Mary's Academy; teacher during the Student Revolt.
- Charles Savarin, General Secretary of CSA; knowledgeable person on Dominican affairs.
- Rupert Sorhaindo, Vice-president of Freedom Party; Vice-principal of Saint Mary's Academy; knowledgeable critic of Dominican society.

(ii) People knowledgeable in Dominican affairs who were informally interviewed in 1972 - 1973.

Rev. Brother Estrada, Principal of the S.M.A., 1971-1972.

Rev. Fr. Jolly, Local Priest.

Mr. J.H.C. Grell, Editor of Dominican Tribune, Agriculturalist.

Mr. S.J. Lewis, Teacher, former Headmaster of S.M.A.

Mr. S. Boyd, Editor of Dominican Chronicle.

Hon. Minister P. John, Deputy Premier of the Government of Dominica.

Mr. C. Seignoret, Permanent Secretary to the Premier.

Mrs. Body, Labourer in the 1930's.

Mr. A.J. Barzey, Economist of the Government of Dominica.

Mr. M. Sorhaindo, Secretary of Freedom Party.

Mr. H. Thomas, Black power leader and theoretician.

Mr. R. Douglas, Black power leader and theoretician.

Rev. Fr. Felix, Principal, Saint Mary's Academy.

Mr. G. Shillingford, Black power leader.

Mr. H. Deschamp, Black power leader.

Mr. D. Trotter, Black power leader.

Prof. E. Greene, Political Scientist, University of the West Indies, Jamaica.

Prof. C. Stone, Political Scientist, University of the West Indies, Jamaica.

Prof. W. Riviere, Historian, University of the West Indies, Trinidad.

Rev. Fr. Prosemans, Priest and local historian.

Prof. E. Gorveia, Historian; University of the West  
Indies, Jamaica.

Prof. G. Beckford, Economist; University of the West  
Indies, Jamaica.

The Castle Bruce Steering Committee.

Bay-front Workers.

S.M.A. Students.

Parents of S.M.A. Students.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### I

#### Primary Sources

- Atwood, Thomas. The History of the Island of Dominica. London: (1797) Frank Cass & Co., 1971.
- Bartell, E. National Income Statistics: Dominica. Barbados: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1965.
- Bell, Sir Henry. Glimpses of a Governor's Life, Diaries, Letters and Memoranda. London: S. Low Marston & Co., 1946.
- Bell, Sir Henry H. Notes on Dominica and Hints to Intending Settlers. revised and enlarged by W. Douglas Young and by M.A. Alford Nichols. Barbados: Bridgetown Advocate Co., 1919.
- Birge, W.S. In Old Roseau, Reminiscences. New York: I.H. Blanchard & Co., 1900.
- Broome, M.A. Colonial Memories. London: Smith & Alder, 1904.
- Carmichael, Mrs. Domestic manners and social conditions of the white, coloured and negro population of the West Indies. 2 vols. London: Whittaker, 1833.
- Castle Bruce Cooperative. A Chance for a Change. Dominica: the Castle Bruce Cooperative, 1972.
- Castle Bruce Cooperative. "Education Programme of Proposed Castle Bruce Cooperative". Dominica: the Castle Bruce Cooperative. 1972 .
- Charles, Rev. Peter. Anecdotes Descriptive of the Temper of the Habits which generally characterized the White Inhabitants of Dominica in respect of the Negro Race in the year 1799 - 1800. Shrewburg: Salopian Journal, 1824.

- Civil Service Association. CSA Newsletters. Dominica: CSA office, volumes of 1972, 1973.
- Civil Service Association. What It Does, What it Is. Dominica: CSA office, n.d.
- Clarke, Charles. Summary of Colonial Law; the practice of the Court of Appeals from the plantation, and of the laws and their administration in all the Colonies with charters of justice, orders in Council. London: Sweet, 1834.
- Coleridge, H.N. Six Months in the West Indies in 1825. 3rd ed., London: John Murray, 1832.
- Coke, Thomas. History of the West Indies: Containing the Natural Civil and Ecclesiastical History of each Island, with an Account of the Missions instituted in those Islands from the Commencement of their Civilization. London: A. Paris, printer, 1810.
- Colonial office. Labour Conditions in the West Indies. reporter, Major G. Orde Browne. London: Her Majesty Stationery office, Cmd. 6070, 1939.
- Dominica. Minutes of the Proceedings of the Sixth Meeting of the Second Session of the First Parliament under the 1967 Constitution held at the Court House, Roseau, on Wednesday, 25th Sept., 1968, at 10:00 a.m. mimeo. Roseau: Office of the House of Assembly, 2nd October, 1968. (This series of minutes extend from 1968 to 1973).
- Dominica. Speech from the Throne. mimeo. 27th January, 1969; 9th December, 1971.
- Dominica. Supreme Court Records. in MSS form, Vol. I. Roseau: the public Library. n.d.
- Dominica. Laws of Dominica. Roseau: Attorney General's office. 1828 edition.
- Dominica. House of Representative (Assembly) Minute Books. MS 1787 - 1849. Government Archives.

- Dominica. Government Information Service.  
Draft release. Nos. 529/73; 670/73;  
575/73; 545/73; 267/71; 400/71; 313/71.
- Dominica. Government of Dominica. Aspects of Dominican  
History. Roseau: Government Printing Division,  
1972.
- Dominica. Public Relations Division. Dies, Dominica.  
Roseau: Premier's office, 1972.
- Dominica. Public Relations Division. Dies, Dominica.  
Roseau: Premier's office, 1967.
- Dominica. Fillan's Almanac and Dominica Year Book.  
A 19th Century series. Roseau: Official  
Gazette.
- Dominica. Trials of Runaway Slaves, 1786 - 1787 and  
Official Communications in Connection with  
Runaway Slaves, 1787 - 1803. ed. Rev. Fr.  
Prosemans. Pointe Michel: The Proseman's  
Collection.
- Dominica. Report of Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances  
at the Supreme Court Building and Environs in  
Roseau on December 16, 1971. Roseau: Premier's  
office, 1972.
- Dominica. Report of Committee of Inquiry into the Disturbances  
at the Saint Mary's Academy, June 1972. Roseau:  
Government Printery, 1972.
- Dominica. Report of Federal Election, 1978. Castries:  
Voice Press.
- Dominica. Report on the Legislative Council General Election  
1961, 1966, 1970. Roseau: Government Printery.
- Dominica. Report on the Legislative Council General Election  
1951, 1954, 1957. Castries: Voice Press.
- Dominica. Proceedings of West India Conference. Held  
at Roseau, Dominica B.W.I. Castries: Voice Press.
- Dominica. Privy Council Minutes Books. M.S. 1775 - 1864.
- Dominica. Official Gazettes (Volumes from 1843 - 1898)  
Roseau: Official Gazette Office.



- Dominica. Dominica Development Proposals 1960 - 1964.  
Government, Ministry of Social Services.
- Dominica. Legislative Council Minutes of the Proceedings.  
M.S. 1916 - 1967. Government Archive.
- Dominica. Laws of the Island of Dominica (from 1763 -  
1859). Government Archive.
- Dominica. Welfare News and Review. Vols. 1947 - 1969.  
Roseau: Government Social Development Department.
- Dominica. Development Plan, 1971 - 1975. Dominica:  
Government Printery.
- Dominica. Blue Books. M.S. 1848 - 1869. Government  
Archive.
- Dominica. Collection of Plain Authentic Documents in  
Justification of the Conduct of Governor Ainslie  
in the Reduction of a most Formidable Rebellion  
among the negro slaves in the Island of Dominica;  
at a crisis of the most imminent danger to the  
lives and property of the inhabitants. London:  
Lowndes, 1815.
- Dominica. Constitutional Reform: First Talk MPC S 81.  
Franklin Baron's Collection.
- Dominica. Report on Social Development for the Years 1962 -  
1965. Roseau: Government Printery, 1962.
- Dominica. Dominica Welfare News. Vols. monthly, 1950 -  
1963. Roseau: Government Printery.
- Dominica. The Dominica Welfare Review. Vols. quarterly,  
1963 to 1973. Roseau: Government Printery.
- Dominica. Dominica Constitutional Order 1967. No 226,  
London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1967.
- Dominica. Development Plan for Dominica 1965 - 75. (mimeo):  
Roseau: Government of Dominica, 1966.
- Dominica. Seditious and Undesirable Publications. Dominica  
Act No. 16, 1968.

- Dominica Amalgamated Workers' Union. Expression. Vols. of 1973. Roseau: DAWU office, 1973.
- Dominica Amalgamated Workers' Union. "Complete Alteration of Constitution and Rules". Roseau: DAWU office, 1964.
- Dominica Amalgamated Workers' Union. Sixth Annual Convention Roseau: DAWU office, 1973.
- Dominica Amalgamated Workers' Union. Annual Delegate Convention. Roseau: DAWU office, 1964.
- Dominica Amalgamated Workers' Union, ed. Report to Executive Council. Roseau: DAWU office, 1972.
- Dominica Amalgamated Workers' Union, ed. CLASC Vol. V: Manifesto and Program. Roseau: DAWU office, 1971.
- Dominica Amalgamated Workers' Union, ed. Rules of the Trade Union Council of Caribbean Workers. Roseau: DAWU office, 1970.
- Dominica Amalgamated Workers' Union, ed. Trade Union Action and Organization II Regional Seminar for Caribbean English Trade Union Leaders. Roseau: DAWU office, n.d.
- Dominica Amalgamated Workers' Union, ed. Political Report from CLASC Executive Committee to the XI Latin American Council of Workers. Roseau: DAWU office, 1969.
- Dominica Amalgamated Workers' Union, ed. Declaration of Principles of CLASC (Latin American Christian Trade Union Confederation). Roseau: DAWU office, 1968.
- Dominica Amalgamated Workers' Union, ed. Manifesto: The First Caribbean Conference of Trade Union Organization to all Workers and Public Opinion in Latin America: The Curacas Charter. Roseau: DAWU office, n.d.
- Dominica Labour Party. A Memorandum for West Indian Federal Labour Party Convention. Roseau: Labour Party office, 1959.
- Dominica Labour Party. The Programme of the Labour Party of Dominica. Roseau: Labour Party office, 1958.
- Dominica Freedom Party. Policy Statements Vols. 1 - 14. Roseau: Freedom Party office, n.d.

- Dominica Freedom Party. The Development Programme: Let Us Arise and Build. Roseau: Herald Printery, 1970.
- Dominica Freedom Party. "Resolution - Special Meeting RTC 29 March". Roseau: Freedom Party office, 1971.
- Dominica Freedom Party. "Labour's Sins". Roseau: Freedom Party office, 1970.
- Dominica Freedom Party. General Secretary Reports of 1969 - 1970, 1970 - 1971. Roseau: Freedom Party office.
- Dominica United People's Party. "What Has DUPP Done for the Poor Man". Roseau: F. Baron's Collection, 1970.
- Dominica United People's Party. A Political Statement of the DUPP 1959 - 1960. Roseau: Franklin Baron's Collection.
- Dominica Trade Union. Amended Constitution. Castries: Voice Press, 1958.
- Dominica Waterfront and Allied Workers' Union. Constitution. Voice Press, n.d.
- Edwards, Bryan. History, Civil and Commercial of the British Colonies in the West Indies. 3 Vols. London: Stockdale, 1807.
- Esquiano, O. Esquiano's Travels 1785 . ed. Paul Edwards. London: Heinemann, 1967.
- Estrada, Bro. Rene. "Letter to D.M. Philbert". 3 Vols. Estrada's Collection.
- Gloster, A. Laws of the Colony of Dominica commencing from its earliest establishment to the close of the year 1818. Roseau: The Archives.
- Great Britain, Colonial Office. Report by Sir Sydney Armitage - Smith on a financial mission to the Leeward Islands and St. Lucia, 31st October, 1931. London: HMSO, 1932.
- Great Britain, Colonial Office. Papers Relative to Governor Ainstie ordered by House of Commons, May 14, 1814. Jamaica: University of West Indies Library.

- Great Britain, House of Parliament 1894. Report of the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into the Conditions and Affairs of the Island of Dominica, Chairman Robert Hamilton. London: H.M. Stationary office, 1894.
- Grieve, Syminton. Notes on the Island of Dominica. London: Adam and Charles Blade, 1906.
- Halliday, Sir Andrew. West Indies: the natural and physical history of the Windward and Leeward Colonies, with some account of the moral, social and political condition of their inhabitants immediately before and after the abolition of negro slavery. London: Parker, 1837.
- House of Commons. Account and Papers. Vol. XXVI. 1783 pt. III, No. 646a.
- Johnstone, Andrew Cochrane, et al. Letters concerning the charges and court martial of Mayor John Gordon and Colonel A.C. Johnstone of the 8th West India Regiment stationed in Dominica. no title page  
Roseau: Library Archives, 1904.
- Kemer, Otto, Chairman. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing office, 1968.
- Kingsley, Charles. At Last: a Christmas in the West Indies. London: Macmillan, 1892.
- Loblanc, Edward Oliver. The Grenada Declaration. Dominica: Public Relations office, 1971.
- Lovell, L. A Letter to a Friend, relative to the Present State of the Island of Dominica. Winchester: Printed by James Robbins, 1818.
- Madden, R.R. Twelve Months Residence in the West Indies during the Transition from Slavery to Apprenticeship with incidental notices of the State of society, prospects and natural resources of Jamaica and other islands. Vol. I - II. London: Cochrane, 1835.
- Martin, R.M. History of the British Colonies. Vols. I - V. London: Cochrane, 1834.

- McCone Commission.  
Governor's Commission on  
the Los Angeles Riots. Violence in the City --- An End or a  
Beginning. Los Angeles: University of  
California Library, 1965.
- Movement for a New  
Dominica. Twavay. Vols. of 1973. Roseau:  
MND, 1973.
- Movement for a New  
Dominica. "Let us Not be Further Fooled". Roseau:  
MND, 1973.
- Movement for a New  
Dominica. Caribbean Rebellion and Social Change:  
Towards an Understanding of the Black  
Power Movement in the Caribbean - Focus on  
Dominica. Roseau: MND 1972 .
- Nichols, Henry A.  
Peter, C. Dominica. St. Johns: Jose Ango, n.d.
- Anecdotes, Descriptive of the Temper and  
the Habits which generally characterized the  
White Inhabitants of Dominica in Respect of  
the Negro Race in the year 1799 - 1800.  
Shrewburg: W. Eddowes Salopian Journal  
office, 1824.
- Porter, Lt. Whitmouth. View of the Island of Dominica. Jamaica:  
West India Reference Library, 1840.
- Professional Planter. Practical Rules for the Management and  
Medical Treatment of Negro Slaves in the  
Sugar Colonies. London: Barfield, 1803.
- Public Relations Division, ed. "Our Premier", Dies Dominica. Premier's  
office, 1972.
- Resident. Sketches and Recollection of the West Indies.  
London: privately published, 1828.
- Richards, A.H. A Gem of Dominica, Memoir of the Hon.  
J.R.H. Bridgewater. Bridgetown: Cole's  
Printery, n.d.
- Roseau. Citizens. Dominica's Case. Dominica: Library Archive,  
1932.
- Smith, Adam. Wealth of Nations. London: P. Noison  
and Sons, 1884.
- Social Development  
Division. Structure and Functions of the Social  
Development Division of the Ministry of  
Home Affairs Dominica, mimeo. Roseau:  
Social Development Division, n.d.

- Southley, Thomas. The Chronological History of the West Indies. Vol. I, II, III. Great Britain: Frank Cass and Co., 1827.
- Student Movement. "Letters by Bro. (Castor) Thomas", March 1, 1972, and March 23, 1972. Roseau: in Bro. Estrada's Collection, 1972.
- Student Movement. "Letter to Hon. E.O. Leblanc, May 9, 1972", from Black Students at U.W.I. Cave Hill. Roseau: SMAO, in Bro. Estrada's Collection, 1972.
- Student Movement. "U.W.I. students speak, March 31, 1972", from Chancellor Hall Jamaica. Roseau: SMAO, in Bro. Estrada's Collection, 1972.
- Student Movement. "Letter to Hon. Minister of Education and Health", April 28, 1972 and May 1, 1972. Roseau: SMAO, in Bro. Estrada's Collection.
- Student Movement. Students Speak. Vols. of 1972. Roseau: SMAO, 1972.
- Student Movement. Student Movement Against Oppression. Roseau: SMAO, 1972.
- Sturge, J. and Harvey, T. The West Indies in 1837, being the Journal of a visit to Antigua, Montserrat, Dominica, St. Lucia, Barbados, and Jamaica, undertaken for the purpose of ascertaining the actual conditions of the Negro population of those Islands. London: (no stated publisher) 1838.
- Thomas, Clarkson. History of the Rise, Progress and Accomplishments of the Abolition of the African Slave-Trade. Vol. I, II. London: British Parliament, Longmans, 1808.
- Waller, J.A. Voyage in the West Indies; containing various observations made a residence in Barbados, and several of the Leeward Islands. London: Phillips, 1820.
- West Indies. Report of the Closer Union Commission. London: H.M. Stationery office, 1933.

- West Indies. Report of the Hon. E.F.L. Wood, M.P. (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for the Colonies). London: H.M. Stationery office, 1922.
- West Indies. West India Royal Commission Report, Lord Moyne, Chairman. London: H.M. Stationery office, 1945.
- Watkins, Frederick Henry. Handbook of the Leeward Islands; published by authority of the Government of the Leeward Islands by the Crown Agent for the Colonies. London: West India Committee, 1924.
- Windward Islands. Proposals for Constitutional Reform in Leeward and Windward Islands, 1959 reprinted in The Voice of St. Lucia, 11 April, 1959.
- Windward Islands. Report of the Windward Islands Constitutional Conference. Cmnd. 3021. London: Her Majesty Stationery office, 1966.
- Young, Sir William. West India Common Place Book compiled from Parliamentary and Official Documents. London: R. Phillips, 1807.

#### NEWSPAPERS

<u>Title</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Dates Used</u>
<u>Barbados Advocate</u>	daily	1972
<u>Dominica Chronicle</u>	weekly	1814
<u>Dominica Chronicle</u>	weekly	1909 - 1973
<u>Dominica Colonist</u>	weekly	1840 - 1863
<u>Dominican</u>	weekly	1842 - 1869
<u>Dominica Dial</u>	weekly	1884 - 1893
<u>Dominica Educator</u>	weekly	1973

<u>Title</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Dates Used</u>
<u>Dominica Herald</u>	wookly	1957 - 1973
<u>Dominica Journal</u>	weekly	1814
<u>Dominica Tribune</u>	weekly	1924 - 1951
<u>Dominica Star</u>	weekly	1968 - 1973

## II

Secondary Sources

- American Assembly. The United States and the Caribbean.  
New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1971.
- Anglo - American Caribbean Commission. Caribbean Islands and the War. A record of Progress in Facing Stern Realities.  
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing office, 1943.
- Andic, F.M. and Mathows, T.G. eds. The Caribbean in Transition: Papers on Social, Political and Economic Development.  
Rio Piedras: Proceedings of the Second Caribbean Scholars' Conference, 1964.
- Aspinall, A.E. Handbook of the British West Indies, British Guiana and British Honduras.  
London: West India Committoo, 1926.
- Aspinall, A.E. Pocket Guide to the West Indies and British Guiana, British Honduras, Bermuda, the Spanish Main, Surinam, the Panama Canal. Revised by J. Sydney Nash, 10th ed.  
London: Mathuan, 1954.
- Aspinall, A.E. The British West Indies, Their History, Resources and Progress. London: Sir. Isaac Pitman, 1912.
- Atwood, Margaret. Survival. Toronto: Anansi Press, 1972.
- Auglor, F.R. and Gordon S.C. Sources of West Indian History. London: Longmans, Green, 1962.
- Auglor, F.R. et al. The Making of the West Indies. London: Longmans, 1961.



- Ayearst, Morley. The British West Indies: The Search for Self Government. London: Puskin House, 1962.
- Bacchus, M.K. Education, Socio-cultural Integration in a 'Plural Society'. Montreal: McGill University, Centre for Developing-Area Studies, Occasional Paper Series, No. 6, 1970.
- Balandier, G. "The Colonial Situation: A Theoretical Approach", in Social Change: The Colonial Situation. ed. Immanuel Wallenstein. New York: John Wiley & Sons, inc., 1966.
- Banks, E.P. "A Carib Village in Dominica", in Social and Economic Studies. Vol. 5, 1956.
- Beachey, R.W. The British West Indies Sugar Industry in the Late Nineteenth Century. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957.
- Bockford, George. Persistent Poverty. New York: Oxford University Press, 1972.
- Bell, Wendell, ed. The Democratic Revolution in the West Indies: Studies in Nationalism, Leadership, and the Belief in Progress. Massachusetts: Schonkman, 1967.
- Ball, K.N. and Morell, W.P. eds. Select Documents on British Colonial Policy, 1830 - 1860. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928.
- Benedict, Burton, ed. Problems of Smaller Territories. London: Athlone Press, 1967.
- Best, Lloyd. "Black Power and National Reconstruction: Proposals following the February Revolution", Tapia Pamphlet, 1917 .
- Best, Lloyd "Independent Thought and Caribbean Freedom", New World Quarterly. Vol 3, No. 4, 1967.
- Battleheim, Bruno. "Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations", Journal of Abnormal Psychology. XXXVIII, October 1943.

- Bienen, H. ed. Violence and Social Change. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968.
- Blalock, H.M. Jr. An Introduction to Social Research. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1970.
- Blanshard, Paul. Democracy and Empire in the Caribbean: A Contemporary Review. New York: Macmillan, 1947.
- Blanshard, P. Democracy and Empire in the Caribbean. New York: Macmillan, 1947.
- Blauner, Robert. "White Wash over Watts", in Trans-Action. March - April, 1966.
- Boromé, Joseph. "George Charles Falconer", Caribbean Quarterly, Vol. 6, 1959 - 1960.
- Boromé, J. "How Crown Colony Government Came to Dominica", in Aspects of Dominican History. ed. Dominica. Roseau: Government Printery, 1972.
- Boromé, J. "Spain and Dominica, 1493 - 1647", in Aspects of Dominican History. ed. Dominica. Roseau: Government Printery, 1972.
- Boromé, J. "The French and Dominica 1699 - 1763", in Aspects of Dominican History. ed. Dominica. Roseau: Government Printery, 1972.
- Braithwaite, L. "Social Stratification in Trinidad", Social and Economic Studies. Vol. II, October 1963.
- Braithwaite, L. "Social and Political Aspects of Rural Development in the West Indies", Social and Economic Studies. Vol. 17, 1968.
- Braithwaite, L. "The Development of Higher Education in the British West Indies", Social and Economic Studies. Vol. 17, 1968.
- Burn, W.L. Emancipation and Apprenticeship in the British West Indies. London: Jonathan Cape, 1937.

- Burns, Sir Allan. History of the British West Indies.  
London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.,  
1954.
- Campbell, C. "Towards an Imperial Policy for the Education  
of Negroes in the West Indies after Emancipa-  
tion", in Jamaican Historical Review. Vol.  
VII, Nos. 1 and 2, 1967.
- Campbell, L.G. Development of Natural Resources in  
Dominica. Agricultural Series No. 3.  
Barbados: Institute of Social and Economic  
Research, 1966.
- Carter, E.H. et al. History of the West Indian People. Bk. I.  
London: Nelson, 1961.
- Cauderoin, D. et al. eds. Free Your Mind. No. 5. July - August.  
1973
- Christopher, B.M. "Middle-class and their European Values",  
Dawnlit. Vol. V, 1965.
- Clarke, W.C. Notes on the Geography and History of  
Dominica, privately published, 1962.
- Clarke, J.H. ed. William Styron's Nat Turner: Ten Black  
Writers Respond. New York: Beacon Press,  
1968.
- Coupland, Reginald. The British Anti-Slavery Movement. London:  
Frank Cass, 1964.
- Coupland, Reginald. The Empire These Days: An Interpretation.  
London: Macmillan, 1935.
- Coser, Lewis. Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict.  
New York: The Free Press, 1970.
- Cruse, Harold. The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual.  
New York: William Morrow & Co., Inc.,  
1967.
- Cumpr, G.E. The Social Structure of the British  
Caribbean (excluding Jamaica: Part I),  
Jamaica: UCWI, Extra-Mural Department  
1947.
- Cumpr, G.E. Report of the Conference on Social Develop-  
ment held at the University College of the  
West Indies, 1961. Kingston: Standing  
Committee on Social Services. 1961

- Dahl, Robert. Pluralist Democracy in the United States. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967.
- Dallas, R.C. The History of the Maroons. Vols. I - II 1803. London: Frank Cass, 1968.
- David, E.W. West Indian Historiefes. Bks. I - IV. London: Nelson, 1936.
- Day, C.W. Five Years Residence in the West Indies. London: Colburn, 1852.
- Davison, R.B. Black British: Immigrants to England. London: Oxford University Press for the Institute of Race Relations, 1966.
- Davy, John. West Indies before and since Slave Emancipation. Comprising the Windward and Leeward Islands' Military Command, founded on Notes and Observations collected during a three year residence. London: Cash, 1954.
- Day, C.W. Five Years Residence in the West Indies. Vols. I - II, London: Colburn, 1852.
- Damas, W.G. The Economics of Development in Small Countries with Special Reference to the Caribbean. Montreal: University Press, 1965.
- Dosmith, S.A. "Westminister's Export Models", Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies. Vol. I, No. 1, November, 1961.
- Duvorger, Maurice. Political Parties. London: Methuen, 1954.
- Drummer, Molvin. ed. "Stanley M. Elkins", in Black History, A Reappraisal. Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1969.
- Easton, David. "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems", World Politics. Vol. IX, April 1957.
- Easton, David. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965.
- Elkins, Stanley. Slavery: A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual Life. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969.

- Erikson, Erik. Identity, Youth and Crisis. New York: W.W. Norton and Co. Inc., 1968.
- Fanon, Frantz. Black Skin, White Masks. New York: Grove Press Inc., 1967.
- Fanon, Frantz. The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press Inc., 1968.
- Farley, R. Trade Unions and Politics in the British Caribbean. Georgetown: Daily Chronicle, 1957.
- Fogelson, F.M. Violence as Protest. New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1971.
- Foner, L. and Genovese, E. eds. Slavery in the New World: A Reader in Comparative History. Englewood Cliffs, Prentice - Hall, 1969.
- Forbes, Urias. "The West Indies Associated States: Some Aspects of the Constitutional Arrangements", Social and Economic Studies. Vol. 19, No. 1, March 1970.
- Frampton, A. "Land Tenure in Relation to the British West Indies", in Caribbean Economic Review. No. IV, Nos. 1 and 2, 1952.
- Froude, J.A. English in the West Indies, or, the bow of Ulysses. London: Longmans, Green, 1888.
- Gans, H.J. "The Ghetto Rebellions and Urban Class Conflict", in Proceedings of the Academy of Political and Social Sciences, September 1970.
- Ganson, William. "Stable Unrepresentation in American Society", in Black Politics, ed. Edward S. Greenberg; Noel Milner, David Olson. New York: Holt Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1971.
- Gorham, H.H. and Mills, C.W. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New York: 1946.
- Girvan, N. "After Rodney - The Politics of Student Protest in Jamaica", New World Quarterly. Vol. 4, No. 3, 1968.

- Goodridge, C.A. "Dominica - The French Connexion", in Aspects of Dominica History, ed. Dominica. Roseau: Government Printery, 1972.
- Gordon, S.C. A Century of West Indian Education: A Source Book. London: Longmans, 1963.
- Gorveia, Elsa. A Study on the Historiography of the British West Indies to the End of the Nineteenth Century. Mexico: D.F. Panamerican Institute of Geography and History, 1956.
- Gorveia, Elsa. Slave Society in the British Leeward Islands at the End of the Eighteenth Century. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965.
- Gorveia, Elsa. "The West Indian Slave Laws of the Eighteenth Century", in Revista de Ciencias Sociales. Vol. IV. 1960.
- Grand, L.D. Report on the Housing Problem in Dominica. London: Engineer Planning and Resources Ltd., 1964.
- Greene, Edward. "A review of Political Science Research in the English Speaking Caribbean; Toward a Methodology". Unpublished monograph originally prepared for a Conference MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT, 1973.
- Greenberg, Edward. ed. "Models of the Political Process: Implications for the Black Community", Black Politics. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1971.
- Grieve, S. Notes on the Island of Dominica. London: Adam and Charles Black, 1906.
- Guérin, D. The West Indies and their Future. London: Dennis Dobson, 1961.
- Hall, D.G. "Slaves and Slavery in the British West Indies", in Social and Economic Studies. Vol. II, 1962.

- Hall, Douglas. "Absentee - Proprietorship in the British West Indies to about 1850", in Slaves, Free Men, Citizens, eds. Lombras Comitas and David Lowenthal. New York: Anchor Book, 1973.
- Hamilton, Charles. "Riots, Revolts and Relevant", in Black Power Revolt: A Collection of Essays, ed. Floyd, B. Barbour. Boston: Porter Sargent, 1968.
- Harris, Coleridge. "The Constitutional History of the Windwards", Caribbean Quarterly. Vol. 6. No. 3, May 1960.
- Harris; Wilson. "History, Fable and Myth in the Caribbean and Guianas", Caribbean Quarterly. Vol. 16. No. 2, 1970.
- Herskovitz, M.J. The Myth of the Negro Past. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958.
- Hinds, D. Journey to an Illusion: The West Indian in Britain. London: Heinemann, 1966.
- Hoyos, F.A. The Road to Responsible Government. Barbados: Letchworth Press, n.d.
- James, C.L.R. "The Free Colored in a Slave Society", in Slaves, Free Men, Citizens, eds. David Lowenthal and Lombras Comitas, New York: Anchor Book, 1973.
- James, C.L.R. The Case for West Indian Self Government. London: Hogarth, 1933.
- James. C.L.R. Black Jacobins: Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution. New York: Vintage Book, 1963.
- James. C.L.R. Party Politics in the West Indies. Trinidad: Vedic Enterprises, 1962.
- Janowitz, M. "Patterns of Collective Racial Violence", in The History of Violence in America, eds. Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr. New York: Bantam Books, 1970.

- John, K.R.V. "Footnotes on Slavery", Flambeau, No. 3, January 1966.
- Kaplan, N. "The New Ghetto Man: A Review of Recent Empirical Studies", in Journal of Social Issues, Winter, Vol. 26, 1970.
- Katznelson, I. "White Social Science and the Black Man's World", Race Today, Vol. 2, 1970.
- Kerr, Madeline. Personality and Conflict in Jamaica. London: Collins, 1963.
- Khan, I. The Obeah Man. London: Hutchinson, 1964.
- Knowles, W.H. Trade Union Development and Industrial Relations in the British West Indies. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959.
- Kornhauser, W. The Politics of Mass Society. Glencoe: Free Press, 1959.
- Lancelot, E. "Constitutional Developments Five Years before and after Statehood", in Dies Dominica. ed. Public Relations Division. Roseau: Premier's office, 1972.
- Laying, Anthony. "Dominica an island in need of an historian", in Caribbean Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 4, December 1973.
- Lee, J.M. Colonial Development and Good Government: A Study of the Ideas Expressed by the British Official Classes in Planning Decolonization, 1939 - 1964. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967.
- Levy, A.C. "The Needs to Know Our History", in Dies Dominica. ed. Public Relations Division. Roseau: Premier's office, 1972.
- Levy, A.C. "The Labour Situation Less Than One Decade after Emancipation", in Dies Dominica. ed. Public Relations Division. Premier's office, 1972.
- Lewis, Gordon. "British Colonialism in the West Indies: the Political Legacy", Caribbean Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1, April 1967.



- Lewis, S. and Mathews, T.G. eds. Caribbean Integration: Papers on Social, Political and Economic Integration. Rio Piedras: Institute of Caribbean Studies, 1967.
- Lewis, W.A. The Agony of the Eight. Barbados: Advocate Printery, 1965.
- Lewis, W.A. Development Planning. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966.
- Lewis, W.A. Labour in the West Indies: The Birth of a Workers Movement. London: Fabian Society Research series, No. 44, 1939.
- Lewis, Gordon. The Growth of the Modern West Indies. London: MacGibbon and Kee Ltd., 1968.
- Lewis, Gordon. "Politics of the Caribbean", in The United States and the Caribbean. ed. American Assembly. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1971.
- Lipset, Seymour. Political Man. New York: Anchor Books, 1963.
- Lowenthal, David. West Indian Societies. London: Oxford University Press, 1972.
- Lowenthal, David. ed. The West Indies Federation: Perspectives on a New Nation. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961.
- Lowenthal, D. and Comitas, L. eds. Slaves, Free Men, Citizens; Work and Family Life; Consequences of Class and Color; Aftermath of Sovereignty. 4 Vols. New York: Anchor Books, 1973.
- Lowenthal, D. and Comitas, L. eds. "Introduction: Cultural Expressions of Class and Color", in Consequences of Class and Color, West Indian Perspectives. New York: Anchor Book, 1973.
- Lowenthal, D. "Levels of West Indian Government", Social and Economic Studies. Vol. II, 1962.

- Lowenthal, D. "The Range and Variation of Caribbean Studies", Annals New York Academy of Science, Vol. 83, 1960.
- Lowi, Theodore. The End of Liberalism. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. Inc., 1969.
- McDonald, F. "The Commonwealth Caribbean", in The United States and the Caribbean". ed. American Assembly.-- New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1971.
- Maingot, A.P. "From Ethnocentric to National History Writing in the Plural Society", Caribbean Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1969.
- Marshall, W.K. "Social and Economic Problems in the Windward Islands 1838 - 65", in The Caribbean in Transition: Papers on Social Political and Economic Development, eds. F.M. Andic, and T.G. Mathews. Rio Piedras: Institute of Caribbean Studies, 1965.
- Mathews, T.G. "Historical Writing in the Caribbean", Caribbean Review, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1970.
- Mathews, T.G., et al. Politics and Economics in the Caribbean. Rio Piedras: Institute of Caribbean Studies, 1966.
- Mathieson, W.L. British Slave Emancipation, 1838 - 1849. New York: Octogan Books, 1967.
- Mathieson, W.L. British Slavery and its Abolition, 1823 - 1838. London: Longmans, Green, 1926.
- Marshall, Woodville. "Notes on Present Development in the West Indies since 1838", in Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 17, No. 3, September 1968.
- Marshall, Bernard. Society and Economy in the British Windward Islands, 1763 - 1823, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Jamaica: University of the West Indies.
- Marx, Gary T. "Issueless Riots", in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, September 1970.

- Maynard, C.A. "A Caricature of a Small Society", Dawnlit. Vol. 1, No. 2, 1962.
- Mazrui, A.A. "From Social Darwinism to Current Theories of Modernization", World Politics, Vol. 21, October 1968.
- Mintz, S.W. and Davenport, W. eds. "Caribbean Social Organization", Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 10, No. 4, (special issue) 1961.
- Mitchell, H.P. Caribbean Patterns: A Political and Economic Study of the Contemporary Caribbean. Edinburgh: Chambers, 1967.
- Montell, V. "The Decolonization of the Writing of History", Social Change: The Colonial Situation. Immanuel Wallerstein, ed. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966.
- Morrell, W.P. British Colonial Policy in the Mid-Victorian Age: South Africa, New Zealand, the West Indies. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969.
- Moskos, C.C. Jr. The Sociology of Political Independence: A Study of Nationalist Attitudes Among West Indian Leaders. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Schonknan, 1967.
- Munroe, T. & Lewis, R. eds. Readings in Government and Politics of the West Indies. Jamaica: University of West Indies, 1971.
- Murray, C.G. United West Indies. London: West Strand Publishing Co., 1912.
- Murray, D.J. The West Indies and the Development of Colonial Government, 1801 - 1834. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966.
- Naipaul, V.S. The Mimic Man. London: Andre Deutsch, 1967.

- Nettleford, Rex. "National Identity and Attitudes to Race in Jamaica", in Consequences of Class and Color, eds. David Lowenthal and Lombas Comitas. New York: Anchor Books, 1973.
- Norris, K. Jamaica. The Search for an Identity. London: Institute of Race Relations, Oxford University Press, 1962.
- Ober, F.A. Guide to the West Indies and Bermudas. New York: Dodd and Moad, 1908.
- O'Loughlin, C. Economic and Political Change in the Windward & Leeward Islands. New Haven Yale University Press, 1968.
- Oxaal, Ivar. Black Intellectuals Come to Power. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Schenkman, 1968.
- Parry, J.H. and Sherlock, P.M. A Short History of the West Indies. London: Macmillan, 1956.
- Patterson, Orlando. The Sociology of Slavery. New Jersey: Associated University Presses, 1969.
- Patterson, Orlando "West Indian Migrants Returning Home: Some Observations", Race, Vol. X, 1968-1969.
- Patterson, Orlando. "Slavery and Slave Revolts: A Sociohistorical Analysis of the First Maroon War, 1665 - 1740", in Maroon Societies, ed. Richard Price. New York: Anchor Book, 1973.
- Penson, L.M. The Colonial Agents of the British West Indies. London: University of London Press, 1924.
- Pinckard, George. Notes on the West Indies. London: Longmans, Green, 1806.
- Pitman, F.W. "Slavery on the British West India Plantations in the Eighteenth Century", Journal of the Negro History, Vol. XI, 1926.

- Pitman, F.W. The Development of the British West Indies, 1700 - 1763. Hamden Connecticut: Anchor Books, 1967.
- Pitman, F.W. Development of the British West Indies, 1700 - 1763. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1917.
- Post, K.W.J. "The Politics of Protest in Jamaica, 1938: Some Problems of Analysis and Conceptualization", Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 18, No. 14, December 1969.
- Profswork, R. ed. Regionalism and the Commonwealth Caribbean. Trinidad: U.W.I., Institute of International Relations, 1969.
- Price, A.G. White Settlers in the Tropics. New York: American Geographical Society, No. 23, 1969.
- Proctor, J.M. Jr. "British West Indian Society and Government in Transition 1920 - 1960", in Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 11 1962.
- Proudfoot, M. Britain and the United States in the Caribbean: A Comparative Study in Methods of Development. London: Faber and Faber, 1964.
- Prosemans, Roy. Fr. "Notes on the Slaves of the French", in Aspects of Dominican History, ed. Dominica. Roseau: Government Printery, 1972.
- Prosemans, Roy. Fr. History of Dominica. in manuscript form, Pointe Michel: Unpublished.
- Prosemans, Roy. Fr. "Maroons" a mimeograph lecture. Pointe Michel: Prosemans' Collection, n.d.
- Public Relations Division. ed. "C.E.A. Rawle - Man of Action and Vision", Dias Dominica. Dominica: Premier's office, 1967.

- Ragatz, Joseph. The Fall of the Planter Class in the British Caribbean 1763 - 1833. New York: Octogan Books, 1928.
- Ragatz, L.J. "Absentee Landlordism in the British Caribbean, 1750 - 1833", Agricultural History. Vol. V, 1931.
- Rainwater, L. "Open Letter on White Justice and the Riots", in Ghetto Revolt, ed. Peter Rossi. New York: Aldine Publishing Co., 1970.
- Raphael, L. "West Indians and Afro-Americans", Freedomways. Vol. 4, 1964.
- Raynal, G.L.F. Philosophical and Political History of the Settlements and Trade of the Europeans in the East and West Indies. Vols. I - V. trans. by J. Justamond. London: T. Cadell, 1777.
- Roberts, G.W. and Abdulah, N. "Some Observations on the Education Position of the British Caribbean", Social and Economic Studies. Vol. 14, 1965.
- Roberts, Loftus. "The Maroons", unpublished article. Pointe Michel: Proseman's Collection, n.d.
- Rodney, Walter. The Groundings with My Brothers. London: L'Ouverture Publications, 1970.
- Rossi, P. ed. "Introduction", Ghetto Revolts. New York: Aldine Publishing Co., 1970.
- Rottenberg, S. "Labour Relations in an Undeveloped Economy", Caribbean Quarterly. Vol. 4, No. 1, 1955.
- Rubon, Vera, ed. Caribbean Studies: A Symposium. Jamaica: Institute for Social and Economic Research, 1957.
- Rubenstein, R.E. Robots in Eden. Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1970.
- Sogal, A. Politics and Population in the Caribbean. Rio Piedras: Institute of Caribbean Studies, 1969.

- Sollitz, C., Jahoda, M.  
Deutsch, M., Cook, S.W.  
eds. Research Methods in Social Relations.  
New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,  
1959.
- Sowell, W.G. The Ordeal of Free Labour in the  
British West Indies. New York: Harper  
and Bros., 1861.
- Sherlock, P. West Indies. London: Thames and  
Hudson, 1966.
- Simey, T.S. Welfare and Planning in the West Indies.  
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946.
- Singham, Archie. The Hero and the Crowd in a Colonial  
Polity. New Haven: Yale University  
Press, 1968.
- Skolnick, Jerome, H. "Social Response to Collective Behavior"  
in Black Politics, eds. Edward Greenberg,  
Neal Milner, David J. Olson. New York:  
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971.
- Slator, M. The Caribbean Islands. London: B.T.  
Batsford, 1968.
- Smith, M.G. Stratification in Grenada. Berkeley:  
University of California Press, 1965.
- Smith, M.G. The Plural Society in the British West  
Indies. Los Angeles: University of  
California Press, 1965.
- Smith, R.T. British Guiana. London: Oxford  
University Press, 1962.
- Sorauf, F.J. Political Parties in the American System.  
Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1964.
- Springer, H.W. "On Being a West Indian", Caribbean  
Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 3, December 1953.
- Springer, H.W. "The West Indies Emergent: Problems and  
Prospects", in The West Indies Federation:  
Perspective on a New Nation, ed. David  
Lowenthal. New York: Columbia University  
Press, 1961.

- Taylor, Douglas. "Columbus Saw Them First", In Aspects of Dominican History, ed. Dominica, Roseau: Government Printery, 1972.
- Taylor, Douglas. "Tales and Legends of the Dominica Carib", In Aspects of Dominican History, ed. Dominica, Roseau: Government Printery, 1972.
- The Well, A. Report on Squatter Problem and Land Use, Island of Dominica, Kingston: Jamaica Lands Department, 1950.
- Thomas, Cuthbert. From Crown Colony to Associate State: Political Change in Dominica Commonwealth Caribbean 1973, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts, 1973.
- Thornton, A.P. "Aspects of West Indian Society", International Journal, Vol. XV, 1960.
- University of Pennsylvania. The Idea of Colonialism, eds. by Strausz-Foreign Policy Research Hupe and Hazard, London: Atlantic Book, Institution, 1958.
- Walker, James. Letters on the West Indies, London: Rost Fenner, 1818.
- Wesley, C.H. "The Free Colored Population in the British Empire", Journal of Negro History, Vol. XIX, 1934.
- Whyte, W.F. Street Corner Society: The Social Structure of an Italian Slum, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966.
- Williams, Eric. British Historians and the West Indies, London: Andre Deutsch, 1964.
- Williams, Eric. Massa Day Done: A Masterpiece of Political and Sociological Analysis, Port of Spain: P.N.M. Publishing Co., 1961.
- Williams, Eric. The Negro in the Caribbean, Washington, D.C.: Associates in Negro Folk Education, 1942.



- Williams, Eric. Capitalism and Slavery. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944.
- Williams, Eric. From Columbus to Castro: the History of the Caribbean 1492 - 1969. London: Andre Deutsch, 1970.
- Williams, R.L. Industrial Development of Dominica, Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1971.
- Wiseman, H.V. The Cabinet in the Commonwealth. London: Stevens, 1958.
- Wooding, H. "The 1954 British Commonwealth Relations Conference and Its Significance for the British West Indies", Caribbean Historical Review, Nos. 3 and 4, December 1954.
- Wrong, Hugo. Government of the West Indies. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923.
- Yankoy, J.B. A Study of the Situation in Agriculture and the Problems of Small Scale Farming in Dominica, West Indies. unpublished Ph.D thesis. Madison: Wisconsin 1969.